S52 Le a ea tedUniversity o of Virginia Library KF4600 .C6 1 V1 f 927t H 1A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS VOLUME ONEA TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION BY THOMAS M*’ COOLEY, LL.D. FORMERLY ONE OF THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF MICHIGAN, JAY PROFESSOR OF LAW IN THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, AND CHAIRMAN OF THE INTERSTATE COMMEROE COMMISSION EIGHTH EDITION WITH LARGE ADDITIONS, CONSIDERATION OF AMENDMENTS, AND GIVING THE RESULTS OF THE RECENT CASES By WALTER CARRINGTON OF THE MARYLAND BAR IN TWO VOLUMES VOLUME ONE BOSTON LITTLE, BROWN, AND COMPANY 19272 TI sag ay 68275 ee 6a Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1868, by LITTLE, BROWN, AND COMPANY, In the Clerk’s Office of the District Court of the District of Massachusetts. Entered according to Act of Congress, in the years 1871, 1874, 1878, 1883, 1890, by LITTLE, BROWN, AND COMPANY, In the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington. Copyright, 1896, By THomas M. CooueEy. Copyright, 1903, By THomAs B. Coo.ry, Trustee. Copyright, 1906, 1910, By Tuomas B. CooLey. Copyright, 1917, 1919, 1927 927, By CHARLES H. Coouey. All rights reserved. PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BY THE BERWICK & SMITH Co,PREFACE TO THE EIGHTH EDITION Tuer twenty-four years that have elapsed since the previous edi- tion of this work have been peculiarly fruitful in questions requiring constitutional interpretation. It has been a period characterized by great social and industrial developments and readjustments, and by many discoveries and inventions. Much of the legislation made necessary by the new conditions thus arising has been subjected to the scrutiny of the courts to determine its conformity to constitu- tional requirements. Many State Constitutions have been altered or amended and four amendments have been added to the Consti- tution of the United States. It follows that many of the constitu- tional questions decided are entirely novel. Under these circum- stances it was not possible to treat all of them in annotations to Judge Cooley’s text, and, therefore, new text has been added. But this has been done with a sparing hand and only where deemed essentially necessary, and in order to differentiate the new text from the old the former has been enclosed in brackets. No change has been made in Judge Cooley’s text except the occa- sional substitution or’ elimination of a word where the addition of new text made this essential to continuity. In the remarkably few instances in which the greater weight of subsequent judicial opinion does not sustain the text attention is called to that fact in the added text or in an appended note. No attempt has been made to cite every case having any bearing upon a constitutional question. This would not have been consist- ent with either the purpose or scope of the work. A careful selec- tion has been made of all important cases that are within the pur- view of the treatise as defined by Judge Cooley in his preface to the second edition. These include all such cases reported prior to June 1, 1926. Immediately following the list of cases will be found a com- parative table of pages of the text of the Seventh and present edi- tions, which will be found useful in locating citations to the text of the former edition. The Constitution of the United States has also been added as an appendix and will be found in Vol. 2, p. 1421. WALTER CARRINGTON. OctoBErR, 1926.PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION In the Preface to the first edition of this work, the author stated its purpose to be, to furnish to the practitioner and the student of the law such a presentation of elementary constitutional principles as should serve, with the aid of its references to judicial decisions, legal treatises, and historical events, as a convenient guide in the examination of questions respecting the constitutional limitations which rest upon the power of the several State legislatures. In the accomplishment of that purpose, the author further stated that he had faithfully endeavored to give the law as it had been settled by the authorities, rather than to present his own views. At the same time, he did not attempt to deny — what he supposed would be sufficiently apparent — that he had written in full sympathy with all those restraints which the caution of the fathers had imposed upon the exercise of the powers of government, and with faith in the checks and balances of our republican system, and in correct conclusions by the general public sentiment, rather than in reliance upon a judicious, prudent, and just exercise of authority, when con- fided without restriction to any one man or body of men, whether sitting in legislative capacity or judicial. In this sympathy and faith, he had written of jury trials and the other safeguards to per- sonal liberty, of liberty of the press, and of vested rights; and he had also endeavored to point out that there are on all sides definite limitations which circumscribe the legislative authority, independent of the specific restrictions which the people impose by their State constitutions. But while not predisposed to discover in any part of our system the rightful existence of any unlimited power, created by the Constitution, neither on the other hand had he designed to advance new doctrines, or to do more than state clearly and with reasonable conciseness the principles to be deduced from the judicial decisions. The unexpected favor with which the work has been received having made a new edition necessary, the author has reviewed every part of it with care, but without finding occasion to change in any important particular the conclusions before given. Further reflec- tion has only tended to confirm him in his previous views of the needVill PREFACE of constitutional restraints at every point where agents are to exer- cise the delegated authority of the people; and he is gratified to observe that in the judicial tribunals the tendency is not in the direc- tion of a disregard of these restraints. The reader will find numerous additional references to new cases and other authorities; and some modifications have been made in the phraseology of the text, with a view to clearer and more accurate expression of his views. Trust- ing that these modifications and additions will be found not without value, he again submits his work ‘“‘to the judgment of an enlight- ened and generous profession.” THOMAS M. COOLEY. University or MIcHIGAN, Ann ARBOR, July, 1871.CONTENTS VOLUME ONE PAGE XXili-CXCV List or Cases CITED CoMPARATIVE TABLE OF PAGES OF THE SEVENTH AND THE EIGHTH EDITIONS . : ‘ ‘ : : : 6 A : exevii-ccill CHAPTER I DEFINITIONS Definition of a state, nation, people, sovereignty, and sovereign state 3 What sovereignty consists in 3, 4 Apportionment of sovereignty in eneries 4 Definition of constitution and constitutional gov ecument 4,5 Of unconstitutional law . 5,6 The will of the people the final a 6 CHAPTER II THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES What the United States government the successor of ; Colonial con- federacies ‘ : 7 The States never in a strict sense sovereign 8 The Continental Congress . : : : ; : 8,9 Limitations upon its power; the Articles of Confederation, and the supersession thereof by the C onstitution : 9 Adoption of the Constitution by North Carolina, Rhode raland and the New States ; : 9-11 United States government one of erimersied powers 11, 12 General purpose of this government 12 Powers conferred upon Congress 12-15 Powers under the new amendments 16-19 Executive and judicial power of the nation 20-24 Constitution, laws, and treaties of United States to be supreme ; ‘final decision of questions under, to rest with national judiciary 25-31 Removal of causes from State courts; decisions of State courts to be : 31-45 followed on points of State lawCONTENTS When legislative construction of State Constitution followed by Fed- eral courts : Restrictions upon State action Protection to privileges and immunities of citizens Extradition of fugitives from justice . Faith and credit secured to records, ete. Guaranty of republican government Implied prohibitions on the States Reservation of powers to States and people Construction of national bills of rights Statutes necessary to jurisdiction of national courts Amendment of Constitution CHAPTER III THE FORMATION AND AMENDMENT OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS State governments in existence when Constitution of United States adopted . i ; : 3 Common law in force; what it consists in. English and Colonial legislation . Colonial charters and revolutionary constitutions Constitutions of new States Sovereignty of the people Who are the people, in a political sense Proceedings in the formation and amendment of constitutions Restraints imposed thereon by Constitution of the U nited States What generally to be looked for in State constitutions Rights are protected by, but do not come from them CHAPTER IV CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS Interpretation and construction . Who first to construe constitutions Final decision generally with the courts The doctrine of res adjudicata and sta e decisis Construction to be uniform The intent to govern . The whole instrument to be ex somites! Effect to be given to the whole . Construction of amendments é ; Words to be understood in their ordinary n meaning When words to be given their technical sense Common law to be kept in view : Words sometimes employed in different senses Construction of words re-enacted in revised or amended Constitution . 16, 17, 46 PAGE 45 45 46-52 02-57 07-64 64-66 66, 67 67, 68 68-70 Ord 97, 98 98-106 104-107 108-123 123, 124 124-127 127-129 128, 129 129, 130 130-132 132, 133 133, 134 135 135, 136CONTENTS Xl PAGE Operation of laws to be prospective . : ‘ : ‘ : 136137 Implications ‘ 138-140 Consideration of the ern to ike seinetiied : é ‘ ; . 141,142 Proceedings of Constitutional Convention may be examined . . 142-144 Force of contemporaneous and practical construction : : . 144-151 Unjust provisions not invalid : : 152, 153 Duty in case of doubt on constitutional questions - . : ; : 153 Directory and mandatory provisions . : ; : : : . 154-164 Self-executing provisions : : 165-171 Danger of arbitrary rules of Peretmiction : ; : : ‘ LIL Vi CHAPTER V THE POWERS WHICH THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT MAY EXERCISE Power of American yet compared to that of British Parlia- ment 173-183 Grant of Peclative power is eran of ihe mice power . 175-179 But not of executive or judicial power 176-184 Definition of legislative and judicial authority 183-188 188-194 Declaratory statutes . 5 ; ; : Statute setting aside judgments, granting new trials, ete. . ; . 190-193 Recitals in statutes do not bind individuals 194 Statutes conferring power on guardians, etc., to sell lands . 194-201 Statutes which assume to dispose of disputed rights . 201-206 Statutes validating ee a ae 205, 207 Legislative divorces 208-213 Legislative encroachments upon executive power 213-221 Judicial encroachments upon executive power 221-224 Legislative power not to be delegated 224-239 Delegation of power in relation to exec ution of law 228-232 Delegation of power to boards and commissions 231, 232 Suspension of statutes 232-235 Conditional legislation 240-243 Initiative and referendum . 238 Local option laws : 244, 245 Irrepealable laws not to be paced 246-248 Territorial limitations upon State eealatve authority 248-258 250-258 Interstate comity : ae : Jurisdiction over land Beaute By Federal pavement : ; 258 Other limitations by express provisions : 258-264 Limitations springing from nature of free government 258-265 CHAPTER VI THE ENACTMENT OF LAWS s . marcy Importance of forms in parliamentary law : : : : . 266, 267 267-286 The two houses of the legislature : ; : : :CONTENTS Differences in powers of Meetings and adjournments ; Contested elections, rules of proceeding, punishing disorderly be- havior Contempts. : Privileges of members Legislative committees Journal of proceedings 3 Corrupt contracts to influence legislation Counsel before legislature; lobby agents The introduction and passage of bills Limitation of time for introduction Three readings of bills Enactment of code; sufficiency of reading Yeas and nays : Vote required for the passage of a bill Title of statutes Amendatory statutes . : Signing of bills by presiding officers Approval of bills by the governor Other legislative powers of the governor When acts to take effect CHAPTER VII THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL Authority to declare statutes unconstitutional a delicate one Early cases of such declaration . : Will not be done by bare quorum of court Nor unless a decision upon the point is necessary Nor on objection by a party not interested Nor solely because of unjust or oppressive Nor because conflicting with fund Nor because opposed to the spirit Extent of legislative power : : : : Difference between State and national governments . A statute in excess of legislative power void Statutes invalid as encroaching provisions amental principles . of the constitution on executive or judicial authority Or conflicting with the bill of rights Legislative forms are limitations of power . Statutes unconstitutional in part Constitutional objection may be waived Judicial doubts on constitutional questions Inquiry into legislative motives not permitted Consequences if a statute is void PAGE 267, 268 268, 269 270, 271 272-274 274-275 275-277 277-279 280 280-286 286-291 286, 287 287-289 289, 290 290, 291 291 291-313 313-319 319, 320 320-325 325, 326 326-331 A LEGISLATIVE ACT MAY BE 332-335 3395, n. 1 339-337 338, 339 339-341 341-348 349, 350 351-354 304, 355 354, 355 355-359 356-358 358, 359 359 359-368 368-37 1 371-379 379-382 382-384CONTENTS CHAPTER VIII THE SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT PAGE The American system one of decentralization . : : ; . 385-389 State constitutions framed in reference to it d : : 389 Local government may be delegated to citizens of the mmieinalitr 389, 390 Legislative control of municipalities . : E : : : . 391-400 Powers of public corporations . : ; ; ‘ : : . 400-409 Strict construction of charters . ; : : ; : ‘ . 401-405 Contracts ultra vires void . ; : : : 5 ; : . 405-408 Must act through corporate authorities. : : 3 : . 408,409 Corporations by pee and implication . : 2 . 409-411 Municipal by-laws. . 411-434 Delegation of powers by municiy aki not aeiaeible} ‘ ; . 434-436 Irrepealable municipal legislation cannot be adopted : . 436-444 Municipalities entitled to protections and immunities which fread State action . : 4 : : ; : : : : . 444-455 Presumption of correct action . : ‘ . 451-455 Power to indemnify officers . 455-457 Powers to be construed with retarenee to purposes of ee creation . 458-462 Authority confined to corporate limits : : . 462,463 Municipal subscriptions to works of internal pro vetientl : . 463-479 Negotiable paper of corporations : . 470-477 Municipal military bounties , ; : 479-488 Limitations of legislative control over municipal corporations . . 488-491 Legislative control of municipal taxation 491-499 Legislative control of corporate property : : 499-507 Towns, counties, school districts and road districts, status of. . 507-510 Property of private owners liable for judgments against . . 9510-515 Not liable for neglect of official duty . 515, 516 Different rules govern corporations which accept Haniceial pharters . 517-530 517-530 In what respect the charter a contract Validity of corporate organizations not to be quesconed poilateralive 531 The State sometimes estopped from questioning 531, 532 CHAPTER IX PROTECTION TO PERSON AND PROPERTY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES Bill of Rights, importance of 533-536 Bills of attainder 536-540 Ex post facto laws : 541-554 Laws impairing the ehipation of contracts 554-599 What charters are contracts ‘ 565-570 Contracting away powers of sovereignty 570-579CONTENTS Grant of exclusive privileges Changes in the general laws Obligation of a contract, what it is Modification of remedies always admissible Appraisal laws Stay laws, when void. : Laws taking away substantial rights . Validating imperfect contracts State insolvent laws : The thirteenth and fourteenth areriients CHAPTER X THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY Villeinage in England Servitude in Scotland In America Impressment of seamen Unreasonable searches and seizures : Every man’s house his castle, made a part of our niconsu ition) figs 4 Protection afforded by constitutions oe es only to governmental action Construction of coreen corel provisions Search warrants. ; Search for and seizure of papers and barsnonilencs : Search for and seizure of intoxicating liquors Seizure of property under civil attachment Estoppel to question validity of search e Admissibility of evidence obtained by illegal search anal seizure Quartering soldiers in private houses . Criminal accusations, how made : : When presentment or indictment by grand jury cen cal Presumption of innocence . Bail to persons accused of crime Prisoner standing mute Trial to be speedy To be public : Not to be inquisitorial : Prisoner’s statement and confessions . Prisoner’s right to give evidence in his own behalf Confronting prisoner with witnesses . Prisoner to be present at trial Trial to be by jury Number of jurors Right of challenge PAGE 580 580-582 582-586 585-599 594 597-599 598 599 599-601 601, 602 603-607 607 607-609 609, 610 610-636 610-615 615-617 617, 618 618-630 625-628 628, 629 629, 630 631 632-636 636, 637 637-639 638, 639 630-642 643-645 645 645-647 647 647-650 651-658 658-662 662-666 667 668-684 674-676 676CONTENTS Jury to be of the vicinage . Verdict to be unanimous and free Instructions of the judge, how limited Power of jury to judge of law Accused not to be twice put in jeopardy Excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishments Right to counsel : Protection of professional confidence Right to representation by counsel during entire nal Duty of counsel . Whether counsel to adress the j jury on ate law Punishment of misconduct in attorneys Compulsory process to secure witnesses : Continuance until witnesses can be brought in . Writ of Aabeas corpus . Legal restraints upon personal liberty Necessity of Habeas Corpus Act . What courts issue the writ ‘ ‘ General purpose of writ, and practice upon Right of discussion and petition Right to bear arms Jealousy of standing armies VOLUME TWO CHAPTER XI XV PAGE 676, 677 677, 678 678-680 679-684 685-692 692-696 696-708 700, 702 703 703-708 705 705, 706 723-728 728-729 729-730 729 OF THE PROTECTION OF PROPERTY BY THE “LAW OF THE LAND’ Magna Charta, chap. 29 ‘ Constitutional provisions insuring protection “by land” Meaning of aire process of Tae ” and “law of the land” Vested rights not to be disturbed What are vested rights Interests in expectancy are not Legislative modification of estates Control of rights springing from marriage . Legislative control of remedies . Vested rights of action are protected . Confiscation of rights and property Statutes of limitation Alteration in the rules of ev dens Retrospective laws Curing irregularities in legal Seoneedines Validating imperfect contractsCONTENTS Pendency of suit does not prevent healing act What the healing statute must be confined to Statutory privilege not a vested right Consequential injuries from changes in the laws Sumptuary and other like laws . Betterment laws Freedom in making contracts of aamake ment Unequal and partial legislation ; Local laws may vary in different localities Suspension of general laws. Equality the aim of the law Minor inequalities will not invalidate a lay Strict construction of special grants Privileges and immunities of citizens . Due process of law and equal protection of the ines : - S2h; Judicial proceedings void if jurisdiction wanting What constitutes jurisdiction Consent cannot confer it Jurisdiction sometimes dependent upon cons mileenGons of ee Jurisdiction in divorce cases Necessity for process . Process by publication Courts of general and special ariel tion Effect of irregularities in judicial proceedings Judicial power not to be delegated Right to trial by jury Judge not to sit in his own cause CHAPTER XII LIBERTY OF SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS Protection of, by the Constitution of the United States State constitutional provisions Not well protected nor defined at common re Censorship of the press; publication of proceedings in Pari ament not formerly suffered Censorship of the press in America : ; Secret sessions of public bodies in the United States . What liberty of the press consists in . Common-law rules of liability for injurious Pibhentone Cases of privileged communications Liberty of silence Provisions of Federal C eneaniton not ap] Bie sable to States Libels on the government, whether punishable Sedition law Laws enacted during war justified by emergency PAGE 787-789 790-792 792-795 795, 796 796, 797 798-801 801, 802 802-845 802-808 809-813 813-816 816, 817 817-821 821-824 824-845 845 845-846 846, 847 847, 848 848-850 851-858 898-903 900 904, 905CONTENTS Laws making it a crime to advocate the overthrow of government Civil actions based upon criticism of government Actions by cities for libel : ‘ : ; ‘ c Further cases of privilege ; criticism of officers or candidates for office Statements in course of judicial proceedings by witnesses by jurors ; in affidavits and otis! papers in pleadings : : k with view to asutitine a eaminal prosecution by counsel . Privileges of legislators Publication of privileged communications trout the press Accounts of judicial proceedings, how far protected Privilege of publishers of news Publication of legislative proceedings The jury as judges of the law in libel cases Mr. Fox’s Libel Act : : : : : : “Good motives and justifiable ands? burden of showing is on de- fendant . CHAPTER XIII RELIGIOUS LIBERTY Care taken by State constitutions to protect Nature of religious societies and jurisdiction of courts in melauon thereto Religious liberty pistemuiahed from Tsou foleration What it precludes Does not preclude resoenition of superintending Prov idence by Sable authorities Nor appointment of Charlaine: fats day s, ete. Nor recognition of fact that the prevailing religion is ohmennct The maxim that Christianity is part of the law of the land Punishment of blasphemy . And of other profanity Sunday laws, how justified Respect for religious scruples ; Religious belief as affecting the competency, or pity of witnesses CHAPTER XIV THE POWER OF TAXATION Unlimited nature of the power Exemption of national agencies from State taxation PAGE 905-907 907 908 908-922 922-928 922, 923 923 923, 924 924 924-926 926-928 929-931 931-936 931-936 936-948 948-950 950-956 950-956 957-959 960 960, 7.1 960-964 965-974 974,975 975 975 976 976-980 981 981, 982 983, 984 984, 985 986-999 989-999CONTENTS PAGE Exemption of property of United States from State taxation . 993 Exemption of franchises conferred by Congress from State taxa- tion’ — . ; : : 994, 995 Exemption of § State agencies ee Hitional taxation é : : 995-999 Limitations on State taxation by national Constitution . : . 999, 1000 Power of States to tax subjects of commerce . . 1000-1016 Discriminations in taxation between citizens of diffe erent States ; 1016 State cannot by taxation impair obligation of contracts . . 1016-1018 Taxation by State of property located in another State . . 1019-1021 Federal income tax ; : . 102251023 Inequality in taxation Penaliing rom ae allintion ae property . 1024 State taxation of public property . : 3 : . 1024, 1025 Concurrent taxing powers of Federal and State governments . . 1025, 1026 Elements essential to valid taxation : é ‘ : é . 1026-1107 Purposes must be public : : : : ‘ é : . 1026-1040 Legislature to judge of purposes. : : ‘ é é . 1030-1033 Unlawful exactions . : : : : é 3 : ; . 1033-1040 Necessity of apportionment . : : . . 1040-1051 Taxation not always according to value of aecnerts : ‘ . 1050, 1051 Taxation with reference to benefits in local improvements. . 1051-1084 Local assessments distinguished from general taxation . j . 1055-1057 Apportionment of the burden in local assessments . ; : . 1058-1084 Taxation must be uniform throughout the taxing districts. . 1064-1084 Road taxes in labor : é , : : : : . 1083, 1084 Inequalities in taxation iney itable : ; ; : ‘ ‘ . 1084-1086 Double taxation . : j : 3 . 1084, 1085 Legislature must select subjects of t taxation . : ‘ : . 1086-1087 Exemptions admissible. : ; ‘ : . 1087-1098 Constitutional provisions porbidding ereriptions : : ; . 1097, 1098 Legislative authority requisite for every tax . : : : . 1099-1103 Excessive taxation . : : : . 1102,11038 The maxim de minimis lex non curat in tax proc Sith. : . 1103 What errors and defects render tax sales void 5 g ; . 1104-1106 Relief in equity against collection of taxes. : ‘ : ~ 110651107 Remedies for collection of taxes. : : : : : . 1103-1107 CHAPTER XV THE EMINENT DOMAIN Ordinary domain of State distinguished from eminent domain . 1108-1110 Definition of eminent domain ‘ - LOTTO Not to be bargained away; general rents vented in the States! 2 lien How far possessed by the general government : ‘ : = U2 eS What property subject to the right : : : : ; - 1118-1118 Legislative authority requisite to its exercise . . : : : 1119CONTENTS Strict compliance with conditions precedent necessary Statutes for exercise of, not to be extended by intendment Purpose must be public . What is a public purpose Whether milldams are Question of, is one of law How property to be taken Determining the necessity for How much may be taken What constitutes a taking Consequential injuries do not Appropriation of highway to plank ‘ond: or arieoatl Erection in highway of telegraph or telephone line Erection over railroad right of way of telegraph or telephone ine : Erection in highway of electric light or power plant Laying gas pipes in highway Construction of sewer in highway Conversion of country road into city street : Lands taken for one use appropriated to a different use. Diversion of navigable stream from its natural course Whether the fee in the land can be taken The damaging of property Compensation to be made Time of making Tribunal for assessing : Right of appearance and notice : Principles on which damages are to be as ascaae What damages the assessment covers Action where work improperly constructed CHAPTER XVI THE POLICE POWER OF THE STATES Definition of police power What is included in Legislative discretion as to exercise of Constitutional limitations upon Power where vested Conflict with Federal authority Exercise of with respect to contracts Restraints upon freedom of contract Effect of constitutional Daca of laws impairing Bbligation of contracts . Exercise of, in respect to chawier contracts License or prohibition of sales of intoxicating drinks National prohibition x1x PAGB 1119-1124 1122-1124 1124-1129 1129-1141 1134-1138 1141 1141-1143 1143-1147 1147-1149 1149-1193 1148-1158 1161-1180 1181-1183 1184 1184-1186 1186, 1187 1187 1187 1187-1190 1192, 1193 1193-1195 1195-1200 1201 1202-1209 1207 1207, 1208 1210-1222 1220 1209, 1220 1223-1224 1223-1227 1228 1229-1231 1232 1234-1236 1236-1249 1236, 1237 1237-1249 1240-1249 1250-1257 1257-1266Payment of license fee to United States gives no right in opposition to State law CONTENTS Quarantine regulations and health awe S'°, Inspection laws; harbor regulations Distinction between proper police resulation and an iriterferenee with commerce State taxes and burdens upon commerce Sunday police regulations Regulation of highways by the States Regulation by States of operation of motor eehicles on hehe ays . Control of navigable waters What are navigable Congressional regulations of Monopolies of, not to be granted by States Power in the States to improve and bridge And to establish ferries and permit dams Regulation of speed of vessels Levees and drains . Regulation of civil rights anal priv lesen : Regulation of business charges Securing continuity of business War power Destruction of aildinger to prevent eoread of ire . Establishment of fire limits Zoning statutes and ordinances Other State regulations of police Power of States to make breach thereof a crime People possessed of the sovereignty, but can only exercise it under legal forms . Elections, the mode CHAPTER XVII THE EXPRESSION OF THE POPULAR WILL Act ofévoting cannot be complet, Qualifications for office Officers de facto and de jure Who to participate in elections; conditions of residence, etc. Residence, domicile, and habitation defined Registration of voters Other regulations Preliminary action by author ition notice, Soroclamvation® etc. Mode of voting; the ballot Importance of secrecy ; secrecy a eon nriilere Ballot must be complete in itself PAGB 1266-1267 1270-1272 1272, 1273 1274-1278 1278-1281 1281 1281-1284 1284-1287 1287-1297 1287-1290 1291-1293 1293 1293-1295 1296, 1297 1297 1297, 1298 1298, 1299 1300-1310 1311 1312-1313 1313-1314 1314 1315-1318 1318-1346 1347, 1348 1349 1349-1354 1354 , 1354, 1355 1355-1358 1358-1364 1365-1368 1368-1370 1368-1370 1371-1373 1373 1374-1379 1380CONTENTS XX] PAGE Parol explanations by voter inadmissible : : 7 ; . 1380, 1381 Ballot must not contain too many names . : : : . 1381, 1382 Names on ballot should be full ‘ : : : : : : 1382 Abbreviations, initials, etc. . ; ‘ : q : : . 1382-1385 Erroneous additions do not affect . ; é . 1384, 1385 Evidence of surrounding circumstances to erolain ballot 5 . 1386, 1387 Boxes for different votes; errors in depositing : : : ; 1388 Privilege of elector in voting for candidates . . : ; 1388, 1389 Plurality of votes generally determines election. : : 1389, 1400, 1401 Majority required in some States in certain elections. . 1349, n. 1, 13889 Freedom of elections; bribery 2 : : : , ‘ . 1889, 1390 Treating electors; service of process; intimidation of voters, ete.. 1390, 1391 Betting on elections, contracts to influence them . : : 1391 Militia not to be called out on election days . : : : . 1391-13894 Electors not to be deprived of votes : : : : : . 1394-1396 Liability of officers for refusing votes. : : : . . 1395, 1396 Elector’s oath when conclusive : : i : : 5 1396 Conduct of election : : ‘ : ; : . 1396-1399 Effect of irregularities . : : ‘ : ; : . 1396-1399 Effect if candidate is eligible : : : : : ; . 1401, 1402 Admission of illegal votes : : : : : : ‘ . 1403, 1404 Exclusion of legal votes . : ; : : : : , . 1403, 1404 Fraud, intimidation, etc. : : : : : ‘ : . 1408, 1404 Canvass and return of votes; canvassers act ministerially . . 1405-1408 Contesting elections; final decision upon, rests with the courts. 1408-1418 Canvasser’s certificate conclusive in collateral tia : . 1411-1413 What proofs admissible . 1412-1418 Whether qualification of voter may i quired into by courts . 1415-1418 AppENDIx: Constitution of the United States : : : : 1419 INDEX 1439-1565A Page Abbate v. United States 318 Abbett v. Com’rs Johnson Co. 453, 516 Abbey Land, &c. Co. v. San Mateo Co. 1321 Abbott ». Commonwealth 756 v. Kansas City, &c. Co. 1115 v. Lindenbower 768, 769, 791 v. Milwaukee, &c. Co. 1180 v. National Bank of Commerce 827 Abell v. Douglass 76 Abels v. Supervisors of Ingham 1354 Abendroth v. Greenwich 391 v. Manhattan R. Co. L173; L177 Abercrombie v. Baxter 594 Aberdeen v. Saunderson 501 v. Sykes 407, 474 Ableman »v. Booth A ie Abraham »v. Baldwin 956 | v. Casey 40 | Abrams, Ex parte 301, 306 v. United States 904, 907 A. C. Batchelor v. State 700 A. C. Ochs Brick, &c. Co. v. Chicago, | &c. Co. 1128 | Achenbach v. Kincaid 373 | Ackeret v. Minneapolis 520 Ackerman v. Jones 935 v. Nutley 439 Acklen v. Thompson 311 Ackley School Dist. v. Hall 298 Acme Cement Plaster Co. v. Amer. Cement Plaster Co. 1125 Acme Dairy Co. v. Astoria 167 Adair v. State 641 v. United States 801, 830 Adams, Ex parte 668 v. Adams 59, 715, 727 vy. Amer. A. C. Co. 50 v. Beale 768 v. Beloit 261 v. Beman 1093 v. Brenan 407 v. Chicago &ce. Co. 443, 1164, 1178 v. Church 110 ». Clark 277, 278, 279 v. Coulliard 1255 ». Cowles 859 v. East Boston Co. 281, 283, 284 v. Field 119 v. Flanagan 1364 v. Hachett 578 LIST OF CASES CITED XXill Page Adams v. Howe 178, 264, 348, 374 v. Iten Biscuit Co. 1338 v. Palmer 211, 581, 582 v. People 249 v. Rankin 891 v. Rivers 1193 v. Roberts 562 v. Russell 35 v. Shelbyville 1075 v. Somerville 1068 v. State 386, 688, 863 v. Tanner 824 v. Thomas 51 v. Tonella 1059 v. Vose 726 v. Wiscassett Bank 509, 512, 515 Adams Co. v. Burlington & M. R. R. 0. Sle Lit si22 v. Quincy 1025, 1057, 1077, 1095 Adams Express Co. v. Ky. 1012, 1015 vy. Ohio State Auditor 1012, 1015, 1062 | Adamson v. Davis 765 v. New York 445 Addis v. Applegate 723 Addington v. Littleton 446, 520 Addle v. Davenport 1360 Addoms v. Marx 771 Addy »v. Janesville 451 Addyston Pipe & S. Co. v. United States 1002 Adel v. Woodall 470 Adirondack R. Co. v. New York 559 Adkins’ Case 1345 Adkins v. Children’s Hospital 333, 339, 373, 824, 830, 1269, 1344 v. Richmond 1007, 1018 Adler v. Jenkins 531 v. Whitbeck 1046, 1104 Admiral Realty Co. ». New York 470 Adsit v. Sec. of State 1372 Aetna Fire Ins. Co. v. Jones 1231 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken 62 Aetna Ins. Co. v. Brigham 1332 ». Chicago &c. R. Co. 1239 Agawam v. Hampden 504 Agee v. Smith 1307 Agnello v. United States 616, 632 Agnew, In re 1000 Agricultural & Mechanical College v. Hager Ah Chong, In re 26 Ah Fong, In re 26XX1V Page Ah Fook, Matter of 742 | Ah Foy, Ez parte 427 Ah Jow, In re 721 Ah Kow »v. Nonan 808 Ah You, Re 430 A’Hern v. Iowa St. Agr’l Soc. 453 Ahl v. Gleim 485, 777 Ahrens v. Ahrens 26, 27 | Aikman v. Edwards 92, 319 Air-Way Electric Appliance Corp. v. Day, 1005, 1011, 1013, 1014, 1020 | Aitken v. Wells River 444, 1111, 1313 | Akron v. Chamberlain Co. 439 | Akron, &c. R. Co. v. United States 767 | Alabama, &c. Co. v. Kenney 576 Alabama, &c. Ins. Co. v. Boykin 784 Alabama Great Southern R. Co. »v. Hill 61, 609 Alabama Industrial School v. Addler 23 Alabama Interstate Power Co. v. | Mt. Vernon, &c. Co. 1113, 1115, | 1117, 1145, 1202) Alabama Power Co. v. Keystone Lime Co. 1215 Alabama R. R. Co. v. Kidd 467 | Alaska Fish Salting & By-Products Co. »v. Smith 1045 | Alaska Salmon Co. »v. Standard Box Co. 204 Albany v. Sikes 451 Albany County v. Hooker 23 Albany Co. Super’s v. Stanley 339 | Albany St., Matter of 341, 370, 744, | 1124, 1146, 1148, 1205, 1216 Albershart v. Donaldson 531 Albertson v. Landon 204, 770 Alberty v. State 550, 551 Albie v. Jones 112 Albrecht v. State 294, 296, 1045, 1050 Albright v. Sussex Co. Lake, &c. Com. 1140 Albrittin ». Huntsville 518 Alcock v. Cooke 745 | Alcorn v. Hamer 245, 1081 | Albuquerque Nat. Bk. v. Perea 1049,1107 | Alderding v. Allison 111 Alderman »v. School Directors 386 Alderson v. Com’rs 1408 | Aldis ». Union El. R. Co. 1174 Aldrich v. Aldrich 275 v. Cheshire R. R. Co. 1152, 1209, 1220 v. Kinney 58, 60, 856 | v. Printing Co. 914 v. Sharp 864 v. Youngstown 452, 453, 518 Aldridge v. Railroad Co. 772, 1144 v. Williams 143 Alexander v. Alexander 752, 887 v. Bennett 180 v. Baltimore 1071 v. Chicago, &e. R. Co. 806 v. Lane 44 LIST OF CASES CITED Page Alexander v. McKenzie 561 v. Milwaukee 440, 1149, 1155 v. Mt. Sterling 523 v. People 372 v. State 1001, 1259, 1261 v. Taylor 112 v. United States 701 v. Worthington 125, 141 Alexandria &c. Co. v. Alexandria, &c. Co. 1192 Alford v. State 298 Alfred Phosphate Co. v. Duck River Phosphate Co. 1127, 1140, 1143 Allbyer v. State 1372 | Alleghany City ». McClurkan 476 Allegheny Co. v. Gibson 506 v. Warfield 323 Allegheny County Home’s Case 305, 309 Allen v. Aldrich 711 v. Archer 775 v. Arguimbau 37 v. Armstrong 768, 769, 791 v. Board of State Auditors 181, 291 v. B. & O. R. R. Go. 24 v. Cape Fear, &c. Ry. Co. 889 v. Chippewa Falls 448 v. Commonwealth 1259, 1263 v. Crofoot 922 v. District of Columbia 1053 v. Drew 1074, 1079 v. Georgia 844 v. Glynn 1360 v. Hanks 752 v. Jay 461, 467, 1029, 1033, 1039, 1136 v. Jones 1119 v. Lafayette 404 v. Louisiana 363 v. McCalman 529 v. McKeen 524 v. Pioneer Press Co. 811, 948 v. Raleigh 379 v. Riley 13, 14 v. Southern Pac. R. Co. 37 v. Staples 620 v. State 674, 686, 688, 690 v. Taunton 462 v. Tison 304 v. United States 685 v. West Bay City 522 v. Wyckoff 843 Allen, &c. Co. ». Shreveport Water- works Co. 446 Allen Co. Com’rs »v. Silvers 363, 372 2. Simons 13, 989 Allen’s Application 725 Allentown v. Henry 1071 v. Western U. T. Co. 1343 Allerton, In re, 1094 Alley v. Edgecomb 481 Allgeyer v. Louisiana 12, 254, 1233 Allied Architects Ass’n 2. Payne 264, 265, 817, 1028Page 185, 187, 1336 | 306, 754, 755, 1324 | Allion v. Toledo Allison, Ex parte LIST OF CASES CITED XXV Page American Sugar R. Co. v. Louisiana $14, 828 Re 690 | American Sunday-School Union 2. v. Blake 139 Taylor 1090 ». Richmond 1325 | American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pearce 1184 Allor v. Auditors 338, 864 v. Smith 1159 Alloway v. Nashville 1214 | Americus v. Perry 92, 490 Alma Coal Co. v. Cozad 1125 | Amery v. Keokuk 1065 Almy v. California 1000 | Ames v. Boland 846 Alston v. Newcomer 1367 | v. Lake Superior R. R. Co. 569 Altenburg v. Commonwealth 1250 | 1207, 1239 Alter’s Appeal 786, 809 | v. Port Huron Log-Driving &c. Altgelt ». San Antonio 440 | Co: 759, 873 Altnow v. Sibley 516| Amey v. Mayor, &c. 238 Alton v. Hope 530 | Amis v. Smith 39 Alton Woods 745 | Ammonds 2. State 653 Altvater v. Baltimore 446 | Amos v. Gunn 319, 320 Alvin v. Collin 1392 | v. Moseley 144, 145, 148, Alvord v. Collin 1104 |} 149, 277, 278, 279 Amann v. Damm 897 | ». United States 631 Amberg v. Rogers 768 Amoskeag Mfg. Co. ». Concord 1062 Amboy »v. Sleeper 415 | v. Goodale 1137 Ambrose v. State 415 | »v. Head 1137 Ambrosini v. United States 996 | ». Worcester 1137 Amenia v. Stamford 1083 | Ampt »v. Cincinnati 469 American & British Mfg. Co. 2. Amsbaugh v. Exchange Bank 855 Inter. P. Co. 50 | Amsterdam Water Com’rs, Matter American Bank Note Co. v. N. Y. lof 1194 El. Ry. Co. 1164 | Amy v. Selma 394, 398 American Baseball Club v. Chase 1001 v. Smith 48 American Casualty Ins. &c. Co. 2. Anadarko v. Swain 531 Fyler 222 Anderdon v. Burrows 1224 American Coal Co. v. Allegany Co. 1338) Anderson, In re 26, 417, 426 American De Forest Wireless Tel. | »v. Albemarle 1074 fi; Co. v. Superior Ct. 25D v. Anderson 105 American Dist. Tel. Co. ». Oldham 522 ». Dunn DA, 2D aowee American Exchange National Bank v. East 447 v. Lacy 340, 361 ». Great Northern R. Co. 296 American Express Co. v. Michigan 21 v. Hill 311, 480, 1038 v. People 4] v. Jackson 116 v. State 275 v. Jamestown 530 American Federation of Labor 2. v. Kerns Co. 1080 Buck’s Stove Range Co. 68 vy. Kerns Draining Co. , 1132 American Fertilizing Co. v. Bd. of ». Louisville & N. Ry. Co. 829, 1299 Agriculture 999 | ». Lower Merion Tp. 774, 792 American Fur Co. v. United States 1256 | v. Malm 956 American Glue Co. »v. Common- v. Manchester Fire As. Co. 226 wealth 1062 v. Millikin 816 American Indemnity Co. v. Austin 296 v. Ocala 373, 1284 American Lithograph Co. v. Werck- y. O’Conner 404 meister 627 v. Pifer 1365, 1366, 1413, 1417 American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis 41, 1008 v. Smith-Powers Logging Co. 1140 American Print Works v. Lawrence v. State 713, 739, 741 1114, 1313} v. Tedford 392 American Pub. Co. v. Fisher 674, 677| ». Uncle Sam Oil Co. 834 v. Gamble 934, 943 v. Wellington 429 American R. Tel. Co. v. Hess 442 ». Whatcom Co. 167 American R. Exp. Co. v. Bratton 833 ». Wilkins 775, 776 American Refr. Transit Co. v. Hall 1009] Anderton 2. Milwaukee 844 American River Water Co. 2. Andes v. Ely 478 Amsden 1291} Andreas v. Gas & E. Co. 1186 American Steel, &c. Co. v. Speed Andover v. Grafton 472 999, 1009| Andres v. Ottawa Circuit Judge 13XXVi LIST OF CASES CITED Page Page Andres v. Wells 940 | Arizona Insane Asylum v. Wolfly 223 Andrews, Ex parte 1281} Arizona Power Co. v. State 834, 1330 ». Andrews 850 | Arizona Pub. Co. v. Harris 943 vo. Beane 192, 789, 792 | Arkadelphia v. Clark 433 ». Beck 863 ». Windham 519 v. Bible Society 976, 978 | Arkansas v. Tennessee 112 v. Carney 185 | Arkansas Cent. R. Co. v. Smith 1220 v. Gardiner 928 | Arkansas Southern R. Co. v. Louis- v. Grand Lodge of Masons 586| iana, &c. R. Co. 598 v. Insurance Co. 413} Arkansas Stove Co. v. State 566, 569, ». King County 1040 735, 834 ». Page 209, 778| Arkansas Valley, &c. R. Co. ». ». People 277, 278, 279, 317 Johnson 1157 v. Russell 781 ». Mann 866 v. St. Louis Tunnel Co. 328 | v. Witt 1155 v. Simms 701 | Armington »v. Barnet 571, 988, 1115, v. State 178, 348, 667, 688, 730 1143 v. Swartz 844 | Armour v. Augusta 1272 v. Wheaton 846 | v. North Dakota 1236 Andrews School Town v. Heiney | Armour & Co. v. North Dakota 1335 1158, 1160 Andrus v. Bd. of Police 803 Angelus v. Sullivan 608 Angle v. Chicago &c. Co. 756 Anglo-American Provision Co. »v. Davis Prov. Co. 58, 62, 253 Ankeny v. Spokane 1052 | Annable v. Patch 751 | Annapolis ». Harwood 278 v. State 301 Annis v. People 661 Anniston, &c. Co. »v. Jacksonville &c. Co. 1192 Anonymous 754 Ansley v. Timmons 15 Anthony »v. State 665 | 0. Tarpley 58, 60 Antisdel v. Chicago 1244 | Antoni v. Greenhow vo. Wright Antonio v. Gould 24, 587 | 340, 582 305, 308 Antonio Guerra, In Re 11 } App. of Scranton Sch. Dist. 262 | Appleton Water Works Co. ». R. R. som. 575 Appleyard v. Massachusetts 53 Application of North Milwaukee, Re 226 | Appling »v. State 630 | Appointment of Revisor, In re 183 | Arayo v. Currell 251 | Arbegust v. Louisville 1063 | Archibald v. Clark 289 Arcia v. State 690 Arctander, Matter of 707 Arey v. Lindsey 137 Argentine v. Atchison &c. Co. 449 Argetakis v, State 616 Arimond »v. Green Bay Co. 1115, 1152, 1158 | Arizona Commercial Mining Co. ». Iron C. C. Co. 50 Arizona Copper Co. v. Hammer 754 v. Virginia 51 Armour Packing Co. v. Vinegar Bend Lumber Co. 255 Arms v. Ayer 227, 228, 229 Armstrong v. Emerson 1012 v. Harshaw 59, 856 v. Jackson 360, 800 v. Mayer 318 v. Morrow 709 v. Philadelphia 518 v. State 621, 631, 677, 682 v. Tulsa 530 v. United States 12 Arndstein ». McCarthy 651 Arnett v. Cardwell 422 v. State 229, 230, 490 Arnold, Ex parte 1375 v. Arnold 984 v. Davis 1365 v. Decatur 1120, 1144 v. Ingram 921, 957 v. Kelley 191, 811 v. Knoxville 120, 1052, 1074 v. McKellur 322 ». Mundy 1290 2. Schmidt 724 2. United States 327 Arnsperger v. Crawford 1126 Aron v. Wausau 447, 455 Arrigo, In re 1230 Arrington v. Arrington 64 Arrow v. Hamering 327 Arrowsmith v. Burlingim 737 v. Harmoning 35 v. State 646 Arthur v. Choctaw County 1145 Arundel ». McCulloch 1290 Asbell v. Kansas 1229, 1324 Asberry v. Roanoke 1077 Asbury v. Albemarle 496 Aschoff v. Evansville 453 Ash ». Commonwealth 624 v. Cummings 1137, 1202, 1203, 1206LIST OF CASES CITED Ash v. People 420, 1278, 1335 XXVll Page Atkinson v. Woodmansee 25, 72, 142, 146 Page Ashbrook v. Commonwealth 1270} Atlanta v. Central R. R. Co., 1219 v. Schaub 261 | v. First P. Church 1057, 1095 Ashby v. Manley 58, 61, 64} v. Green 1199 Ashcroft v. Bourne 861 | v. Hampton 446 Asher v. Louisville, &c. Co. 1215 |} v. Holeomb 451 v. Texas 1018 v. Stein 407, 430 Ashland v. Baggs 522 v. Warnock 449 ». Williams 529 | ». Word 1200 Ashland, &c. R. Co. v. Faulkner 1179 | ». Williams 447 Ashley v. Peterson 621 | Atlanta News Pub. Co. v. Medlock ». Port Huron 450, 529, 1154, 1158 | 928, 932 v. Superior Court 671| Atlanta Terra Cotta Co. v. Ga. Ry. Ashton-Jenkins Co. v. Bramel 854 &ec. Co. 1214, 1218 Ashuelot R. R. Co. v. Elliott 198, 569, | Atlantic, &c. Co. ». McKnight 1157 596 | v. Philadelphia 444 Aspinwall v. Com’rs, &c. 393 | Atlantic & Ohio R. R. Co. »v. Sulli- v. Daviess Co. 473 vant 22 Association v. Mettler 811| Atlantic & Pac. R. Co. v. Mingus 204 Associated Schools, &c. v. Renville | Atlantic, &c. R. Co. v. City of New Co. Sch. Dist. No. 83 385} Bern 1058 Associated Pipe Line Co. v. State R. Atlantic, &c. Tel. Co. v. Chicago, Comm. 1158 | &e. Co. 467, 1158 Astley v. Younge 923 | v. Philadelphia 418, 1012 Astor v. New York 775 | Atlantic Coast Electric R. Co. 2. Astrom v. Hammond 382| Public Utility Com’rs. 178 Astruc v. Star Co. Atchafalaya Land Co. »v. F. B. Wil- 887 | Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Coachman 346, 372, 833 liams Cypress Co. 765 v. Daughton 1059 Atchison v. Bartholow 393 ». Gainesville 1053, 1054, 1229 v. King 529 | v. Georgia 1004 Atchison, &c. Co. v. Campbell 832 | v. Goldsboro 1239 ». Clark 809 v. Napieo 1004 ». Howe 1043 ». North Carolina Corp. Comm. ». Railroad Comm. 797, 1249 1249 v. State 278 v. Perry 806 Atchison, &c. R. Co. v. Baty 96, v. State 334 771, 1245) v. Wharton 1267 ». Boerner 1216 | Atlantic De Laine Co. v. Mason 408 v. Brown 898| Atlantic Ex. Co. v. Wilmington & ». Campbell 1310) We R. Co: 1311 v. Matthews 836| Atlantic Food Products Corp. 2. ». Sowers 78, 249 McClure 619 v. State 669 | Atlantic S. R. & G. R. Co. v. State 1276 v. Vosburg 805, 836} Attaway 2. Cartersville 452 Athearn v. Independent District 387 | Attorney-General v. Barstow 1406, Atherton v. Atherton 59, 857 1409, 1411 v. Fowler 38 ». Boston &c. Co. 844, 1310 Atkin v. Kansas 833 ». Brown 215, 316, 318, 382 Atkins v. Commonwealth 709 v. Brunst 119 ». Phillips 428 | v. Cambridge 399 997 ». Chicago, &c. R. R. Co. 350, 571, ». Plympton v. Randolph 496, 525 1240, 1243, 1303 169, 1371 ». State Highway Dept. 1050, 1051 v. Detroit Atkinson v. Bemis 411 ». Detroit & Erin P. R. Co. 125 v. Detroit Free Press 944 ». Detroit &c. Co. 128 v. Doherty & Co. 747 ». Detroit Com. Council 1352 ». Dunlap 192, 762, 772 v. Hau Claire 79, 377, 1033 ». Goodrich Transp. Co. 421 ». Ely 1381, 1382, ». Marietta & Cincinnati R. R. 1383, 1386, 1397, Co. 1122 1406, 1409, 14138, 1415 v. Piper 802, 1319 ». Exeter 511 ». United States Operating Co. 256 v. Geerlings 964XXVIll Page | Attorney-General v. Genesee Co. 1408 ». Jochim 217, 843 | ». Joy 290, 305 v. Lowery 391, 393, 395, 502 v. Marr 238 »v. Marston 1352 v. Mayor, &c. of New York 438 v. Metropolitan R. Co. 1179 v. Morris & Essex R. R. Co. 1162 v. Old Colony R. Co. 832 ». Railroad Companies 316, 569, 1304 v. Rice 278, 280, 296 v. Rogers 186 ». Scott 1337 v. Supervisors of St. Clair 1394 ». Supervisors of Lake Co. 382 ». Tufts 561 v. Weimer 236 v. Williams 497, 1319} v. Winnebago Lake &c. Co. 1068 Atwater 0. Woodbridge 571 v. Woodrich 514 Atwill ». Mackintosh 895 Atwood v. Lincoln 409 v. Welton 984 Atz v. Andrews 632 Aubrey, In re 1231 Auburn v. Union Water Power Co. 1151 Auchenbach »v. Kincaid 987 Auditor v. Holland 225 Auditor-General v. University 1088 Auditor of State v. Atchison, &c. IR-eRe Co: 181 Auld v. Butcher 586, 765 v. Walton 1369 Augusta ». Burum 437 v. Mackey 454 2. Murphey 1100 v. Reynolds 442 v. Sweeney 561 Augusta, &. R. R. Co. v. Renz 1281 Augusta Bank v. Augusta 588, 1084 Augusta Evening News». Radford 921 Augustin v. Eggleston 1401 Aurora v. Elgin, &c. Co. 1180 v. Gates 474, 475 v. Gillett 451 v. Hayden 471 v. Reed 451, 1152 Aurora Bd. of Education v. Moses 316 Aurora City v. West 109 Austen v. Miller 44 Austin, et al., In re 706 0. Augusta T. Ry. Co. 1197 v. Coggeshall 459 v. Detroit, &e. Ry. 439, 1179 v. Murray 417, 425, 432, 433 v. Tennessee 1000, 1253 v. Terminal Ry. Co. 1198 v. Tonka Bay 1157 Austine v. State 655 Avent-Beattyville Coal Co. v. Com. 1307 LIST OF CASES CITED Page Averbuch v. Averbuch 110 Avery v. Avery 861 v. Tyringham 964 Avis v. Vineland 431 Axtell v. Gerlach 1103 Axton-Fisher Tobacco Co. v. Even- ing Post Co. 887, 889 Aycock v. Martin 597 Ayer v. Com’rs on Height of Bldgs. 845 Ayer & L. Tie Co. v. Keown 1010 Ayers, In re 23, 592, 725 v. Chicago Title & T. Co. 1045 v. Grider 887 v. Lund 77 Aylesworth v. St. John 926 Aynette v. State 730 Ayres v. Methodist Church 976, 979 v. Moan 1393 v. State 1234, 1322 B Babcock v. Buffalo 529, 1326 v. Camp 109 v. State 261 Baccigalupo v. Commonwealth 640 Bachelder v. Moore 670 Backus v. Detroit 821 v. Fort St. Union Depot Co. 41, 826 v. Lebanon 566, 571, 865 Bacon v. Arthur 1296 v. Callender 755, 789, 800 v. Fisher 701 v. Illinois 1009, 1010 v. Mich. Centr. R. R. Co. 887, 897 v. Texas 38, 46 v. Walker 1226 v. Wayne Co. 700 v. York Co. 1406 Bacot, Ex parte 1128 Badders v. United States 696 Badenoch v. Chicago 316 Bagg’s Appeal 193 Bagg v. Wilmington, C. & A. R. Co. 1249 Baggett v. Grady 923 Bagnall v. London, &ce. 1209 Bahen, Ex parte 417 Bahnand ». Bize 26 Bailey’s Case 127 Bailey v. Alabama 166, 607, 608 v. Boston, &c. R. Corp. 1221 v. Commonwealth 153 v. Drexel Furniture Co. 125, 130 v. Fisher 1357 v. Fiske 816 v. Gentry 107 v. Mayor, &e. 507 v. Mayor, &e. of New York 523 v. Milner 45 v. Miltenberger 1113 v. New York 519, 526 v. People 630, 831, 1347LIST OF CASES CITED Page Bailey »v. Phila., &c. R. R. Co. 108, 128 333, 1240, 1243, 1297 v. Sweeney 1193 v. Van Pelt 229, 230, 231 v. Wilson 232 v. Wright 611 Bain, Ex parte 553 Baird v. Mayor 869 v. State 289 Baity »v. Cranfil 778 Baker v. Baker yi, il v. Baker, Eccles & Co. 59 v. Boston 1326 v. Boston El. Ry. Co. 1197 | v. Braman 340, 367, 369 | ». Cincinnati 1056 v. Clark 956 | ». Commonwealth 621 | v. Ducker 9683 | v. Gordon 728 | v. Johnson 1195, 1202 v. Kelly 764 v. Kerr 862 v. Lewis 1291 v. Mattocks 76 v. Panola Co. 1046 v. People 851 v. Portland 1341 ». Rand 110 v. Shy 27 | v. State 219, 688, 692, 815 | v. Stonebraker’s Adm’r 763 | v. Windham 456 | Balch v. Com’rs 1134 | Baldridge v. Morgan 78 Baldwin v. Alger County 1408 | v. Bank of Newbury 601 v. Chicago 423 ». Douglas Co. 1084 v. Flagg 595 ». Franks 18 | ». Green 413 | v. Hale 600, 601 v. Mayor, &c. of New York 499 v. Newark 587, 588, 772 v. No. Branford 391, 481 ». Opportunity First M. E. Church 964 v. State 326 Bales v. Wichita, &c. R. Co. 1221 Balfour v. Louisville, &c. Co. 1215 Ball v. Chadwick 141 ». Commonwealth 640 v. Gilbert 1391 v. Winchester 516 ». Woodbine 447 Ballard »v. State 641 Ballentine v. Mayor, &c. 345 Balogh v. Jackson 671 Ballot Act, Re 1360 Ballou v. State 450 Balm »v. Nunn 864 Baltes v. Farmers’ Irr. District XX1X Page Baltic Mining Co. v. Mass. 1012 Baltimore v. Baltimore Tr. &G. Co. 443 v. Baltimore, &c. R. R. Co. 818 v. Beck 446 v. Cemetery Co. 1094 v. Clunet 227, 578 v. Eschbach 477 ». Garrett 1152 v. Hampton Court Co. 392, 417, 426, 825 v. Johns Hopkins Hosp. 1065 v. Johnson 1152 v. Keeley Inst. 1027 v. Pendleton 528 v. Redecke 428 v. Scharf 741, 1065 v. State 128, 142, 147, 216, 351, 372, 375, 379, 380, 807, 1225 v. Stewart 1076 ». Wollman 417 Baltimore & E.S. R. Co. v. Spring 1028 Baltimore, & F. T. R. »v. Baltimore, &c. Co. 1116 Baltimore, & Havre de Grace Turn- pike Co. v. Union R. R. Co. 576 Baltimore & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Baugh 43 v. Chambers 258 v. Fifth Bapt. Church 1154 »v. Genn 251 v. Interstate Commerce Com. 627, 1274 v. Kahl 1152 v. Kane 1152 v. Maryland 1302 v. Pub. Serv. Com. 585 Baltimore & O. & C. R. R. Co. ». North 1192 Baltimore & O. & P. W. & Ky. R. R. Co. v. Pittsburgh, &c. Co. 1147, 1148, 1208 Baltimore & P. R. Co. v. Fifth Bapt. Church 441 ». First Baptist Church 1198 ». Magruder 1115 Baltimore & O. S. W. R. Co. ». Burdalow 834 v. Reed 771 v. State 1208 Baltimore, & S. R. Co. v. Nesbit 1121 Baltimore Belt R. Co. v. Sattler 1195 Baltimore Co. Water, &c. Co. v. Du- breuil 1186, 1187, 1190 Baltimore Sav. Bank v. Weeks 586, 837 Baltimore Tr. Co. v. Baltimore B. R. Co. 40 Balton v. Walker 956 Baltzer v. North Carolina 592 Bamberger & Co. v. Schoolfield 40, 256 Banaz v. Smith 384, 1076 Banco de Senora v. Morales 60 Bancroft v. Dumas 245, 1250 vy. Lynnfield 457, 461 v. Thayer 386Bandel v. Isaac LIST OF CASES CITED Page | 142 | Barbier v. Connolly Page 11, 20, 417, Bandi v. McKay 730 577, 825, 1234, 1236 Banger’s Appeal 1046 | Barboro v. Boyle 1132 Bangor v. Pierce 341 | Barbour v. Barbour 752 v. Smith 1268, 1280 v. Camden 485, 788 Banholzer v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. 63 v. Erwin 763 Bangs v. Snow 1104, 1099 v. Georgia 1257 Bank »v. Hines 1038 v. Paige Hotel Co. 255 v. Supervisors 992 v. Tompkins 110 Bank of Augusta v. Earle 250, 253, 255 | Barclay v. Barclay 714 Bank of Chenango v. Brown 236, v. Howell’s Lessee 1195 240, 244 Barden v. Northern Pac. R. R. 117 Bank of Chillicothe v. Chillicothe 404 | Bardwell v. Anderson 839 Bank of Columbia v. Okely 739, 816 v. Collins 738 Bank of Commerce v. New York Barfield v. Gleason 1076 City 992 v. State 51 v. Tennessee 072, 574, 1085 | Barker, Ex parte 55 v. Wiltsie 260, 263 v. Cleveland 109 Bank of the Dominion v. McVeigh 6566 v. Pittsburgh 562 Bank of Hamilton v. Dudley 755 v. People 693 v. Dudley’s Lessee 39, 360 v. State 1259 Bank of Illinois v. Sloo 120 v. People 66, 139, 140, 1350 Bank of Kentucky v. Adams Express Barling v. West 422, 423 Go: 69 | Barlow v. Lambert 75 Bank of Michigan v. Williams 358, 737| Barnaby v. State 1280 Bank of Minden »v. Clement 590 | Barnard »v. Bartlett 630 Bank of Republic v. Hamilton 247 v. Chicago 1195 Bank of Rome 2. Village of Rome 237 v. State 660 Bank of the State v. Bank of Cape v. Taggart 14] Fear 566 | Barnard & Miller v. Chicago 383, v. Cooper 812 392, 401, 403 v. Dalton 61 | Barnardiston, R. V., Case of 953 Bank of Utica v. Mersereau 701 | Barnes ». Campbell 940 Bank of United States v. Daniel 39 | Barnes v. Commonwealth 700 ». Norton 31 v. Dist. of Columbia 307, 399 Bank Tax Case 992 v. Dyer 1073 Bankers’ Case, The 737 | v. First Parish in Falmouth 149 Bankers Trust Co. v. Blodgett 543, | v. Lacon 497 545, 1043 | v. Pike Co. 1397 Bankhead v. Brown 1126, 1141, 1146} v. McCrate 922, 923 Banks, Ex parte 644 v. Suddard 257 v. Commonwealth 632 v. Supervisors 1370 2. The Mayor 992 | Barnet v. Barnet 783, 786 v. State 298, 301, | Barnett, Ex parte 726 617, 632, 824 | Barnett v. Denison 471 Banner Pub. Co. v. State 910, 956 v. People 692 Banning v». Commonwealth 1326 v. Phelps 887, 889, 890, 891 2. Taylor 735 v. Railroad Co. 1245 Banning Co. v. California 559, 572 | v. Ward 890, 891 Bannister v. Lucas 865 | Barnitz ». Beverly 596 Bannon 2. State 806 | Barnum 2. Gilman 1352, 1402 Banta v. Chicago 391 v. Okolona 43, 238, 471, 475 Baptist Church v. Wetherell Barber v. Hartford L. Ins. ( 2. Pittsburgh Ft. W. &c ». Root v. St. Louis, &e. Co. v. Trustees of School Barber Asphalt Paving Co. ». Bots- ford v. Griffin R. Co. 2. Hunt Barber’s Petition ‘ O. 963, 961 | Baron v. United States 41, 1333 | Barp v. Baraboo Co: 41 | Barr v. Moore 849, 851) Barree v. Cape Girardeau 629 451 921 518, 520 935 | Barre R. R. Co. ». Montpelier &c. 386 Co: Barre Water Co., Re 286 | Barrett v. Crane 64 v. Failing 280 v. Holmes 620, 621 v. Kemp 1190, 1192 1028, 1122 859 858 764 1145Barrett v. State v. Taylor Barrington v. Barrington v. Missouri Barron v. Baltimore . Burnside . Dent . Detroit . Memphis v v v v Barronet, Matter of Barronet’s Case, Barrow v. Bradley ». Commonwealth v. Page Barrows 2. Bell ». Farnum’s Stage Lines Barry, Ex parte v. Lauck v. Mercien ». Truax Barry’s Case Barsaloux v. Chicago Bartemeyer v. Iowa Barthelemy v. People Barthelmess v. Cukor Bartholomew v. Harwinton 484, 485, Bartlett v. Ball v. Christhilf ». Clarksburg v. Columbus v. Crozier v. Kinsley v. Knight v. Lang v. McIntire v. Morris v. Wilson Barto v. Himrod 225, 239, 240, 243, 245/| Bayville v. Boothbay Harbor ; Barton v. Brown 370 1048 v. Kimmersley 837 | Bazzuro, In re 750 v. State 668 | Beach v. Bradstreet 178, 364, 379 v. Swepston 407 v». Ranney 891 v. Syracuse 518, 528 | v. Viles 39 ». Thompson 111 ». Walker 772, 777 v. United States 685 | Beal v. Nason 761 v. Wichita River Oil Co. 583 | v. State 250 Bartruff v. Remey 772 Beale v. Pankey 314 Bashor v. Bowman 1126 | Beall v. Beall 750, 803 Baskin v. State 1261 v. Seattle 522 Bass v. Fontleroy 247 | Beals v. Amador Co. 491 v. Nashville 166, 579 Bean v. State 630 ». Roanoke &c. Co. 750 | Beane v. St. Joseph 530 Bass, Ratcliff & Gratton v. State Bear Gulch Placer Min. Co. 2. Tax Comm. 1047} Walsh 1222 Bassett v. Porter 410 | Bear Lake County v. Bridge 854 Bassing v. Cady 53, 54, 56, 687 | Beard v. Beard 854, 858 Basten v. Carew 861 v. Chicago, &c. R. Co. 76 Batchelder v. Batchelder 849 ». Hopkinsville 469, 473 Bates, Ex parte 219 ». Wilson 289 v. Bodie 61, 109, 114| Bearden v. Madison 427 ». Cullum 763 | Beardsley v. Bridgeman 891, 94 v. Delavan 856 y. Erie Ry. Co. 1311 ». Houston 964. SONG Waa ee Gwe Rye Cou etal LIST OF CASES CITED Page 219 | Bates v. Kimball 107, 183, 1371 | v. McDowell 208 v. Relyea 33, 35, 36 | v. Spooner 66, 686 v. Taylor 221, 21 | Bates Co. v. Winters 859 | Bathrick v. Detroit Post, &c. Co. 454, 519| Batman v. Megowan 1160 | Batre v. State 644 | Battis, Hx parte 645 | Battle ». Howard 225, 1028, 1030 | Battles v. Tyson 1395 | Baugher v. Nelson 1119} Baughn »v. State 932, 944/| Baum v. Clause 1001 v. Raphael 722 | Bauman v. Detroit 1372, 1373, 1395 | v. Ross 39, 722, 727 | Baumhoff v. St. Louis, &c. R. Co. 114 134, 676| Bauserman v. Blunt 30, 41 727 | Baxter, Matter of 540 1179 v. Brooks 1409 18, 48, 1254 | v. Dickinson 475 959 ». Winooski Turnpike 515 214, 216 | Baxter Co. Bank v. Copeland 600 788 | Bay v. Gage 772 753 | Bay City v. State Treasurer 147, 479, 495 924 | Bay City, &c. Co. v. Austin 588 447 | Bay City First Nat. Bank v. Fellows 229, 444 232 449, 515 | Bayard v. Klinge 1350 408 v. Singleton 80 58, 60, 856 | Bayerque v. Cohen 40 755 | Baylis v. Lawrence 956 1380 | Bayly v. Fourchy 927 127 | Bays v. Hunt 920 775 v. State 386 1056, 1207, 1219 XXXl Page 335 752 5, 116 109 » 220 471 933 1409 682, 684 429 305 890 543, 750 843 888 315 445 192 178, 35XXxll Page | Beardsley v. Smith 509, 514, 515 v. Tappan 896 Beardstown v. Virginia 125, 143, 1381, 1395, 1416 Beasley v. Beckley 868 Beatrice v. Leary 451 Beaty v. Knowler 400 Beauchamp 2. Bertig 61, 250 v. State 178, 348 Beaudeau v. Cape Girardeau 320 Beaudin v. Oconto 530 Beaufort Co. Com’rs v. Old Domin- ion S. S. Co. 1012 Beauregard v. New Orleans 38 Beauvoir Club v. State 305, 1281 Beaver v. City of Harrisburg 1123 Beavers, Ex parte 724 Beazell v. Ohio 553 Bebb v. Jordan 391, 1318 Beck »v. Stitzel 887 Becker v. LaCrosse 463 v. Phila., &c. R. Co. 122 Beckerle v. Brandon Beckler Produce Co. v. Amer. R. Exp. Co. 833 Beckley v. Alling 1390 Beckwith v. Racine 598 v. Rucker 1360 v. Winters 1360 Bedard ». Hall v. Mahoney 555 Bedee v. People 691 Bedell, Ez parte 695 v. Bailey 870 Bedford v. E. B’ldg & Loan Ass’n 255 v. United States 1155 Bedford Quarries Co. v. Chicago, &e. Co. 1127 Bedle v. Beard 410 Bee Pub. Co. »v. Shields 943 Beebe v. State 184, 192, 345, 348, 358, 1255 Beecher v. Baldy 166, 370 Beeching’s Case 717 Beekman 2. Railroad Co. 1133, 1141 | v. Saratoga & Schenectady R. R. Co. 1110, 1124, 1129, 1143 Beeks v. Dickinson County 516 | Beeler v. Jackson 897 | Beene v. State 706 Beer Company v. Massachusetts | 578, 579, 1232, 1250, 1252, 12 5, 1270, 1327 | 867, 868 og Beers v. Beers v. Botsford 513 »v. Haughton 587, 589 Beets v. State 664 Begale v. Bigelow 1104 Begerow, In re 646 Behrens v. Allen 934, 936 Behrensmeyer v. Kreitz 1384 Beidler ». Sanitary Dist. 1294 Beiling v. Evansville 417 LIST OF CASES CITED Page Beilman v. Poe 58 Beirne v. Brown 539, 541 Belch v. Manning 728 Belcher Sugar Refining Co. »v. St. Louis Elev. Co. 1129, 1134, 1188 Belden v. State 114 v. Hugo 220 Belknap »v. Ball 920 v. Louisville 1350 Bell v. Bell 58, 850 v. Clapp 615, 622 v. Clawson 1413 v. First Judicial Dist. Ct. 311 v. Kirkland 407 v. Mattoon Waterworks Co. 114 v. Morrison 39, 42, 761 v. Norfolk, &c. R. R. Co. LS v. Plattville 405 v. Prouty 1126 v. Rice 620 v. State 640, 646, 647, 662 ». West Point 530 Bell’s Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania 1042 Belleville Railroad Co. v. Gregory 128 Bellinger v. N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co. 1115, 1152, 1193, 1220 Bellingham Bay, &c. R. Co. v. New Whatcom 33 Bellmeyer v. School Dist. 385 Bellows v. Parsons 121 Bellows Falls Power Co. v. Com. 1085 Belo v. Com’rs 1085 v. Looney 943 Belser v. So. Carolina T. Comm. 773 Beltz v. Pittsburg 1327 Belvin v. Richmond 519 | Bemis v. Becker 119 v. Guirl Drain Co. 67, 1146 Benden v. Nashua 1152 Bender v. Crawford 597, 763 v. State 321 Bendey v. Townsend 40 Benedict v. Goit 1163 v. Smith 113 v. State 702 v. Vanderbilt 1274 | Benford v. Gibson 561 Benjamin v. Manistee, &c. Co. 1294 v. Webster 436 Bennet v. Am. Exp. Co. 1341 v. Brooks 1282 Bennett v. Bennett 62 v. Boggs 346 v. Borough of Birmingham 404, 420 2. Commonwealth 688 2. Crumpton 959 ». Deacon 897 v. Fisher vides v. Harms 49, 752 v. La Grange 967, 968 v. New Orleans 450 v. Pulaski 423 v. State 641, 674, 984LIST OF CASES CITED XXXlil Page Page Bennett v. Winston-Salem &e. Co. 439,| Beseman v. Pa. R. R. Co. 1154 1143, 1152} Bessethe v. W. B. Conkey Co. 669 Benoist v. St. Louis 1069 | Bethany v. Sperry 408 Bensley v. Mountain Lake, &c. Co. 1123) Bethea v. Dillon 1370 Benson v. Mayor, &c. of Albany Bethlehem Motors Corporation v. 351, 353| Flynt 50 v. Mayor, &c. of New York Bethune v. Hayes 423 344, 502, 503, 507, 564, 1240, | Bettge v. Territory 674 1247 | Bettman v. Cowley 584 Bentinck v. Franklin 762 | Bettner v. Holt 889 Benton v. Commonwealth 691 | Bevard v. Hoffman 1396 v. Trustees, &e. 452 | Beveridge v. Lewis 1217, 1219 ». Yarborough 1125 | Beville, Ex parte 119 Bents v. Graves 846 | Beviness v. Missouri Valley 522 Benvenuto, In re 750 | Bibb v. Bibb 111 Benz v. Weber 298 v. Janney 370 Berdos v. Tremont & Suffolk Mills 1237} Bibb Co. Loan Ass’n v. Richards 289 Berea College v. Commonwealth Bickerdike v. Allen 839 807, 808 | Bickett v. Knight 335 v. Kentucky 339, 362, 569, 1299 ». State Tax Commission 1046 Berg v. Veit 1413 | Bicknell ». Comstock 762 Bergeman v. Backer 40, 844 | Biddle v. Commonwealth 868 Berger, Ex parte 178 ». Hooven 761 vba ye Co: 256 v. Smith 817 v. Salt Lake City 520 | Biddles v. Enright 1330 v. United States Steel Corp. Bidwell v. Whittaker 125 571, 748 | Biedler v. Sanitary Dist. 1157 Bergeron, In re 708 | Bielenberg v. Montana N. Ry. Co. 771 Bergman v. Cleveland 423, 1342} Bielich v. State 700 Berkin v. Healy 762 | Bier v. McGehee 89 Berkeley v. Bd. of Education 776 | Big Grove v. Wells 472, 477 Berlew v. El. Iluminating Co. 1186 | Bigelow v. Bigelow 66 Berlin ». Gorham 236 ». Randolph 516, 518 Berman v. Coakley 708 v. Old Dom. Copper Min. &c. Bernard v. Chicago 1157 Co. 57, 61 Bernardi v. Northern Pac. R. Co. v. West Wisconsin R. R. Co. 1244, 1245} 128, 377, 1216 Bernhardt v. Brown 839 | Biggs, Hx parte 706 Bernheimer v. Converse 586, 587, v. McBride 149, 215, 217 588, 589 | Bigham »v. Pittsburgh 530 Bernier v. Russell 810 | v. State 687 Bernstein v. Milwaukee 530 | Bigler’s Executive v. Penna. Canal Berot v. Porte 894, 910,911] Co. 1123 Beroujohn v. Mobile 425 Berthold v. Fox 595 | Bertholf v. O’Reilly 1257 Bertonneau v. School Directors 807 Bertram v. Jones 50 Berrien Springs Water Power Co. v. Berrien Circuit Judge 1137, 1140 Berry, Ex parte 372 v. Baltimore, &c. R. R. Co. 278, 360 v. Carter 890 v. Clary 784 v. De Maris 758 v. Doane Point R. R. Co. 278 »v. Durham 529 v. Kansas City, &c. R. Co. 316 »v. Ransdell 764, 765 v. State 653, 655, 315 v. United States 628 v. Wilcox 1366 Bigley v. National Fidelity & Casu- alty Co. 888, 959 Bill ». Norwich 530 Billiard v. Bd. of Education 972 Billings v. Detten 791 v. Fairbanks 895, 897 v. People 1045 v. Wing 887 Billings Sugar Co. v. Fish 1100, 1298 Billmeyer v. Evans 598 Bills v. Goshen 421 Bimeler v. Dawson 59, 855, 859 Bines v. State 654 Bingham v. Gaynor 909, 910, 912 Binghampton Bridge Case 566, 575, 796 Binns v. United States 78, 79 Bird, Ex parte 1281 v. Benlisa 1106 v. Daggett 476 v. Perkins 531XXX1V Page Bird v. St. Mark’s Church 964 ». Smith 1290 v. State 660 ». Wasco County 315 Birdsall v. Carrick 324 Birdsong, In re 695 Birmingham v. McCary 528 v. Wills 1100 Birmingham &c. Co. v. Birmingham &c. Co. 2 Birmingham M. R. Co. v. Parsons 228 Birmingham Ry., &c. Co. v. Jung 984 ». Smyer 1179 Birmingham Traction Co. 2. Bir- mingham, Ry. &c. Co. 1179 Bisbing v. Asbury Park 530 Bischoff v. N. Y. El. Ry. Co. 1216 Bishop v. Marks 1081 ». No. Adams Fire Dist. 1190 259, 260, 263, 349, 361, 392 58, 856 1345 v. Tulsa Bissell v. Briggs v. Davison ». Jeffersonville 473, 476 ». Dolan 314 ». Kankakee 472 | Blakeslee v. Carroll 923 ». Penrose 147 | Blanchard v. Bryan 670 v. Spring Valley 471 | ». Eastern Pa. Power Co. 1185 Bissett v. Littleton 413 v. Raines 867 Bittenhaus v. Johnston 836 | v. Stearns 1395 Bitzer v. Thompson 420 | Blandford v. State ou Bivens v. Henderson 768) Blandford School District v. Gibbs 1403 Bjork v. Tacoma 525 | Blanding v. Burr 237, 491 Black v. Black 852 | Blankenship v. King County 522 ». Columbia 446 | ®. Sherman 453 ». Karly 531} Blankford, In re 1366 v. Gloucester City 261 | Blatchley 0. Moser 415 v. Pate 1379, 1417, 1418 | Bleakney v. Bk. of Greencastle 777, 781 v. President, &c. 433 | Bledsoe v. Stallard 1208 ». Sherwood 1025 | Bleon v. Emery 1050 v. State 688 | Blessing v. Galveston 277, 288, 393 Blackburn v. Crawford 701 | Blewette v. Wyandotte, &c. R. R. Blacker v. State 654 | Co: 1244 Blackford v. Peltier 764 | Blin v. Campbell 846 Blackinton v. Blackinton 109} Blinn v. Nelson 837 Blackman v. Halves 1126 | Bliss v. Caille Bros. Co. 872 ». Mauldin 1288, 1289 ». Commonwealth 348, 730 Blackman Health Resort v. Atlanta 578 ». Hosmer 1114 Blackrock Copper Min. & Mill Co. v. Kraus 390 v. Tingey 128 v. South Hadley 1193 Blackstone v. Miller 555, 1020 | Bliss’s Petition 48 v. Nelson 724)! Blizzard v. Danville 449 Blackstone Mfg. Co. v. Blackstone 255, | Block v. Salt Lake R. T. Co. 441 1062 ». Jacksonville 1267 Blackwell v. Newkirk 1398 v. Schwartz 1231 v. State 133, 648, 662, 665| Blocker v. Burness 984 Blackwell Lumber Co. v. Empire v. State 641 Mill Co. 1140, 1141 | Blodgett, In re 308 Blackwood v. Van Vleit 136 v. Union &c. Co. 773 v. Vanvleet 595 | Bloedel v. Cromwell 1380, 1381, 1390 Bladen v. Philadelphia 155 | Blood v. Mercelliott 301 Blades v. Board of Water Com’rs 1032 | Bloodgood ». Mohawk & Hudson Blahnt v. State 983 13% 13% (Ova) 333; 1127. 11255 Blain v. Bailey 316 1129, 1143, 1202, 1203 LIST OF CASES CITED Page Blain v. Dean 859 ». Montezuma 446 Blair v. Charleston 1197 vy. Chicago 44, 298, 818, 820 ». Forehand 1322 v. Granger 530 v. Kilpatrick 828, 1342 ». Milwaukee, &c. R. R. Co. 1239 v. Ostrander 31, 600 v. Ridgely 82, 539 v. West Point 412 Blake v. Brothers 1396 ». Dubuque 1209 v. McClung 50, 830 v. Mason 1396 v. O'Neal 113 v. Rich 1194 . St. Louis 518, 528 », Winona, &c. R. R. Co. 1243, 1304 451 392, 445, 506 583, 593 ee Blakely v. Devine Blakeman v. Wichita Blakemore v. CooperLIST O Bloom v. Newark F CASES CITED XXXV Page Page 531| Board of Improvement »v. School v. Orange 451 Dist. 1057, 1094 v. Richards 75, 964, 976, 982, 1281 | Board of Park Com’rs v. Prinz 530 Bloomer v. Stolley 247 | Board of Police Com’rs v. Wagner 624 v. Todd 1361 | Board of Public Works v. Columbia Bloomfield v. Charter Oak Bank 409 College 59 v. State 805 | Board of Revenue v. Hewitt 776 v. Trimble 415| Board of St. Openings, &c., In re 1118 Bloomfield, &c. Nat. Gas L. Co. 2. | Board of Supervisors ». Cowan 493 Calkins 1187 | ». Heenan 294 Bloomington v. Bay 518 | Board of Trade v. Olsen 339 v. Brokaw 440, 450, 451, 529 Board of Trustees v. Outagamie v. Latham 1076, 1219 County 145, 149 v. Wahl 423 | Board of Water Com’rs v. Dwight 307 Blossburg, &e. Co. v. Tioga R. R.Co. 42} Boardman v. Beckwith 774 Blount v. Janesville 438, 784, 1052 | Bode »v. State 1250, 1252 Blue v. Beach 1230, 1345 Bodenhofer v. Hogan 1392 Blue Goose Min. Co. v. Northern Bodine v. Times-Journal Pub. Co. 932 Light Min. Co. 60 | Bodwell v. Osgood 910 Bluefield Waterworks, &c. Co. 2. Boehm v. Hertz 1027 Public Serv. Comm. 1309 | Boerner v. Thompson 579 Bluett v. State 705 | Bogardus v. Trinity Church 75 Blumb v. Kansas City 448, 528 | Bogert v. Indianapolis 425 Blydenburg v. Miles 694, 1329 | Boggess v. Buxton 586, 587 Blythe v. Hinckley 26 | v. Scott 1105 Board of Administration v. Miles 225 | Boggs v. Merced, &c. Co. 1109 Board of Canvassers of Election v. | Bogle, Ex parte 424 Noll 1408 | Bogni ». Perotti 810 Board of Com’rs v. Bearss 485 | Bohan »v. Port Jervis Gaslight Co. 1161 ». Bradford 460 | Bohanan v. Nebraska 33 v. Bright 787 Bohannan v. Commonwealth 630 v. E. H. Rollins & Sons 473 | Bohen, Matter of 1322 v. Lucas 456 ». Waseca 530 ». Merchant 843 | Bohl v. State 982 v. Pidge 1288 | Bohlinger v. Germania L. Ins. Co. v. Tollman 291 895, 896, 956 v. Watson 508 | Bohlman v. Green Bay, &c. Co. v. Wheeler 508 1120, 1121 Board of Com’rs of Champaign Co. Bohmy 2. State 413 »v. Church 493 | Bohon’s Assignee v. Brown 14 Board of Com’rs Jasper Co.v. Allman 453 Boice v. Boice 595 Board of Com’rs of Logan Co. ». | Boins Bros. Inv. Co. v. Purdie 1086 Adler 1195, 1196, 1198] Boisdere v. Citizens’ Bank 378 Board of Directors of Alfalfa Irr. Boise, &c. Co. v. Boise City 565 Dist. v. Collins 1130 | Bolens, In re 52 Board of Education v. Berry 531 | Bolling v. Lersner 34 v. Blodgett 762| Bollman & Swartwout, Ex parte 724 v. De Kay 471} Bolin v. Nebraska 35, 638, 739 »v. Littrell 583 | Bolster v. Lawrence 530 ». McLandsborough 988 | Bolton v. Johns 755, 785 v. Mayor of Brunswick 338 v. Prentice 711 e. Minor 94, 387, 970, 976| Bombaugh v. Bombaugh 751 v. Phillips 578| Bon Homme Co. v. Berndt 263 v. State 182] Bonaparte v. Camden & Amboy R. Board of Education, &c., v. State IRS Co: 467 Bd. of Education 398 ». Tax Court 1018 v. Thompson 386, 387} Bond v. Appleton 119 v. Tinnon 808 »v. Commonwealth 668 Board of Harbor Commissioners ?. v. Hume 249, 250, 252 Excelsior Redwood Co. 231 ». Kenosha 1057, 1107 Board of Health v. Van Hoesen 1134 v. State 640 Board of Highway Com’rs v. Bloom- Bonham »v. Fuchs 140 ington 383 v. Needles 474XXXVI Page Bondheim 2. Gilbert 251 Bondi v. McKay 27 Bonds of Madera Irrig. Dist., Re 1076, 844, 1055 = Zi Bonnett v». Bonnett v. Vallier 335, 361, 373, 383 Bonney v. Bowman 862 ». Reed 792 Bonsall v. Mayor of Lebanon 1284 Boogher v. Knapp 887, 888 Booker v. Young 1350 Boon v. Bowers 105, 116, 201 Booneville ». Ormrod 1207 v. Trigg 315 Boorman v. Santa Barbara 758, 1065 v. Connelly 259, 815 Booten v. Pinson 140, 178, 192, 334, 344, 347, 354, 470, 490, 561, 1352 Booth v. Booth a v. McGuinness 357 v. People 1345 ». State 22, aud v. Weigand 255, 256 v. Woodbury 485, 1032, 1201 Booth & Flinn v. Cook 1338 Bopp v. Clark 346 Borak v. Birmingham 415 Borden v. Fitch 60, 849 v. Trespalacios Rice, &c. Co. 302, 1141 Borg v. Chicago, &c. Co. 869 Borghart v. Cedar Rapids 1218 Borgnis v. Falk Co. 232, 349, 368, 492, 747, 1249 Bornee, Ex parte 120, 687 Boro v. Phillips Co. 1081 v. State 632 Borough of Dunmore’s Appeal 398, 491, 499, 564 Borough of York v. Forscht 460 Borup, In re 439, 493 Bosley v. Mattingley 125 Bossier v. Steele 305 | Bostick v. State 1330 | Boston v. Chelsea ». Cummins 100, 225 348, 545 v. Jackson 1037 v. Schaffer 420, 1046 | v. Shaw 428, 1284 | v. Talbot 1145 Boston & A. R. Co. v. Cambridge 1116 Boston & Lowell R. R. v. Salem & Lowell R. R. 575 Boston & Roxbury Mill Dam Cor- poration v. Newman 1136, 1143 Boston, &c. Co., In re 1190 Boston, &c. R. Co. v. Lowell, &c. R. Co. 1162 Boston Beer Co. v. Massachusetts 577 Boston, Concord, and Montreal R. R. v. State 1248 Boston, C. & M. R. R. Co. ». State 1249 Boston Ice Co v. Boston, &c. R. 253, 317 LIST OF CASES CITED Page Boston Mercantile Co. v. Ould- Carter Co. 600 Boston Mining, &c. Co., Matter of 312 Boston Molasses Co. v. Common- wealth 1095 Boston Water Power Co. v. Boston & Worcester R. R. Co. 1115, 575 Bostwick v. Brinkerhoff 38 v. Perkins 846, 847 Boswell ». Commonwealth 640 v. Security Mut. L. Ins. Co. 586 ». State 640, 687 Bosworth v. State University 294, 302, 309 Bothwell v. Bingham Co. 993 Bott ». Boston El. R. Co. 865, 868 v. Wurts 86 Bottoms v. Brewer 1137 Botts, Hx parte 426 v. Williams 54 Boucher v. New Haven 529 Boughton v. Carter 1115 Boulder v. Niles 518 Boulware v. Davis 253 Bounds v. Kirven 1163 Bourgeois, Hx parte 416 Bourland v. Edison 891 ». Hildreth 263, 1364, 1397 Bourn v. Hart 468 Bourne v. The King 696 Boushaber v. Union Pac. R. Co. 144 Boutlier v. Malden 522 Boutwell v. Champlain Realty Co. 1288, 1291 Bovey v. Dublin 522 Bow v. Allenstown 388, 410, 411 Bowden »v. Jacksonville 447 v. Kansas City 453 Bowditch v. Jackson County 1125 398, 594 34, 35, 36, 37 Bowdoinham »v. Richmond Bowe v. Scott Bowen v. Byrne 997 v. King 409 v. Hixon 1408 ». Preston 753 v. State 23 Bowen’s Adm’x v. Louisville, &c. Co: 529 Bowers v. Smith 1360 Bowes v. Aberdeen 297 Bowie v. Lott 165 Bowler v. Eisenhood 1409 v. Nagel 392, 1031 Bowles v. Landaff 487 Bowling Green v. Carson 423 v. Rogers 452 Bowman v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. 1252 v. Continental Oil Co. 360, 367, 1013 v. Middleton 343, 357, 745 v. Secular Society 980 v. Smiley 370, 599LIST OF CA Page Bowman 2. State Entomologist 293, 302, 340, 374, 865 »v. Wayne Cir. Judge 714 | Boxwell v. Affleck 962 | Boyce, Ez parte 178. 347, 578, 1230, 1346 v. Sinclair 776, 781, 787 Boyd, In re 218 ». Alabama 1232 v. Bd. of Councilmen 434 ». Bryant 245, 1337 } ». C. L. Ritter Lumber Co. 1126, 1140, 1143 v. Ellis 66 v. Mills 1360, 1376 | ». Nebraska 13 | ». Olcott 87, 278 ». Roane 859 v. Selma 1061 v. State 309, 578, 655 v. United States 632, 636 Boye v. Girardey 1046 Boyer v. Northern Pac. R. Co. 255 | Boyett, In re 185 | Boyland v. Mayor, &c. of N. Y. 522 Boyle, Matter of 261, 329 v. Arledge 40 ». Musser-Sauntry Land &c. Co. 58 v. Zacharie 601 Boyson v. State 686 Braceville Coal Co. v. People 843, 1307 Bracey v. Durst 50 Bracken v. Dinning 51 Brackett v. Commonwealth 1221 v. Norcross 755, 800 Bradbury »v. Davis 120 | v. Idaho Falls 472 v. Vandalia Levee, &c. Dist. 1133, 1298 Braddee v. Brownfield 348 Braddy v. Milledgeville 425 Braden v. Stumph 1350 Bradentown v. State 458, 462 Bradfield v. Avery 1351 v. Bradfield 849 v. Roberts 968 Bradford v. Brooks 193, 762 v. Cary 563 | v. Cameron 478 | ». Durham 769 | ». Shine 597 | v. Shine’s Ex’rs 762 | v. Stevens 1251 | Bradford Construction Co. v. Heflin 144 Bradley, Ex parte 670, 706 | v. Avery 1402 | ». Bander 1062, 1085 v. Baxter 225 ». Buffalo, &e. R. R. Co. 1244, 1249 | v. Clarke 650 v. Cox 1374 v. Fisher 706 SES CITED XXXVII Page Bradley ». Hammonton 461 v. Heath 895, 911, 928, 959 v. M’Atee 390, 573, 578, 1052, 1071, 1075 ve Nie Yq &c. Co: 818, 819, 1127, 1143 v. Oskaloosa 453 v. People 992 ». Pharr 1128 v. Richmond 1045 v. State 181 v. Union Bridge, &c. Co. 330 Bradshaw v. Heath 58, 60, 849, 856 v. Lankford 227 v. Omaha 382, 393, 1063 v. Rogers 1201 Bradstreet Co. v. Gill 896 Bradt v. Towsley 890, 891 Bradwell v. State 48, 82, 841 Brady v. Bronson 1121 v. King 792 v. Mattern 366, 373 v. Mayor, &c. of N. Y. 476, 477 v. Northwestern Ins. Co. 425, 1314 v. Randleman 446 v. Richardson 846 v. West 320 Bragg v. Meyer 44 v. People 793 Bragg’s Appeal 762 Case 852 ». Tuffts 45 Brainard v. Colchester 571, 572 Bramlett v. Greenville 1153 Branahan v. Hotel Co. 432 Branch v. George Knapp & Co. 943 v. Tomlinson 371 Branch Bank of Mobile v. Murphy 326 Brand v. Brand 61 v. Multnomah Co. 238 ». Union El. R. Co. 1217 702 Brandon v. Gowing v. People v. State 660, 662 303, 319 Brandt v. Spokane, &c. R. Co. 1179 Braner v. Baltimore Ref. &c. Co. 443 Branham v. Lange 221, 275, 276, 315 Brannan v. Henry 790 Branson v. Bush 1072 ». Gee 826, 1203, 1205 v. Philadelphia 444, 1243 Brantley v. State 691 Brashear v. Madison 469 Brass v. North Dakota 1301 Brassard v. Langevin 1389 Brasso v. Buffalo 528 Braun v. Chicago 1046 Braunstein v. Louisville 452 Bray v. Baxter 1370 Braynard v. Marshall 31 Brazee v. Michigan 360, 1330 Brazier v. Philadelphia 415, 424 Brearly School ». Ward 543, 590XXXVIll Page Breeding v. Davis 752 Bregguglia v. Lord 430 Breidenthal ». Edwards 1360 Breitenbach v. Bush 597 Breitung v. Lindauer 588, 590 Brenham v. Brenham Water Co. 403 ». German American Bank 470, 471 Brenhan v. Story 201 Brennan »v. Titusville 1001, 1007, 1018 v. Weatherford Brent v. Chapman 761 Bresslin v. Sun Printing &c. Ass’n 935 Brett v. Building Com’r 845, 1239, 1318 Brevoort v. Detroit 775 ». Grace 199, 200, 201 Brewer v. Bowman 1127 v. Chase 897 @. Davis 562 ». McClelland 1371 | v. Mayor, &c. 278 v. New Gloucester 512 . Weakley Brewer Brick Co. v. Brewer s 921, 1378 225, 1091, 1093 Brewer-Elliott Oil &c. Co. v. United States Brewster v. Davenport v. Hough ». Sherman v. Syracuse Brice v. Curtis v. McDow Brick Presbyterian Church v. Mayor &c. of New York 437, 578, 1321 1288 447 1407 788, 1035 956 171 301, 787, Bricker v. Potts 887 Brickles v. Milwaukee, &c. Co. 1180 Brickley, In re 730 Bridal Veil Lumbering Co. v. John- son 1126, 1130, 1141 Bridge v. Ford 859 v. Russellville 1064 Bridge Co. ». Hoboken Co. 566 Bridgeport v. Housatonic R. R. Co. 237, 750, 787 Bridges, Ex parte 723 v. Shalleross 210 Bridgewater v. Plymouth 795 Briedwell v. Henderson 1046, 1050 Brien v. Williamson 135, 166 Brieswick v. Mayor, &c. of Bruns- wick 304 Brig Aurora »v. United States 227 Briggs v. Boston 1205 v. Garrett 921 v. Georgia 159 v. Hubbard 750, 762, 772 v. Johnson Co. 385 v. Lewiston, &c. Co. 1168, 1180 v. Russellville 1063 v. Walker 33 v. Whipple 457 Brigham ». Miller 151, 211 Bright v. Boyd 799 LIST OF CASES 154 | 571, 1094 |} CITED Page | Bright ». Commonwealth 985 v. McCulloch 297, 1050 Brightman »v. Bristol 1326 Brighton v. Peirsol 1199 v. Wilkinson 393, 395 Briglia v. St. Paul 520, 521 Brim v. Jones 841 Brimmer v. Boston 578 v. Rebman 1272 Brink v. Grand Rapids 453 Brinkmeier v. Mo. Pac. R. Co. 35 Brinkmeyer v. Evansville 518 Brinn, In re 600 Brinneman v. Scholem 1025 Brinsfield v. Howeth 956 Brinton v. Seevers 785 Brisbin v. Cleary 1374, 1377 Briscoe v. Anketell 592, 754 v. Bk. of Kentucky 11, 45, 337 Bristol v. Johnson 456, 457 v. New Chester 398, 502 v. Supervisors, &c. 756 v. Washington Co. 827, 1019 Britain v. Kinnaird 860 | British Plate Manuf. Co. v. Mere- | dith 1152 | Britt v. Buncombe Co. Bd. of Can- vassers 1380 Brittle v. People 84 Britton v. Bd. of Election Com’rs 1358, 1361 v. Des Moines, &c. Co. 1219 vo. Ferry 147 | Broadbent v. State 816 | Broadbent's Case 666 | Broadfoot v. Fayetteville 702, 843 | Broadfoot’s Case 609 Broadnax v. Baker 821 v. Groom 278, 279 Broadway Coal Min. Co. v. Smith 1218 Broadway Baptist Church ». Mc- Atee 1094 Broadwell v. Carter Co. 37 v. Kansas City 450, 1159 Brock v. Barnet 1126 v. Boyd 114 vo. Hishen 1203 v. Milligan 984 Brocklis, Ex parte 674 Brockway v. Kinney 110 v. State 637 | Brodhead v. Milwaukee 485, 1033 | Broll v. State 683 Bromage v. Prosser 944 Bromley v. Hallock 1380 v. People 249 v. Reynolds 1048 Bronson v. Albion Tel. Co 1182 ». Bruce 920, 940, 942 v. Kinzie 586, 591, 594 v. Newberry 587, 589 v. Oberlin 432, 1337 o. Syverson 125, 130, 131Bronson v. Wallace v. Wallingford Bronson’s Estate Brook v. Montague Brooke v. Philadelphia Brooker v. Coffin Brookhaven v. Smith Brooklyn, Re v. v. Long Island Water Supply Co. Brooklyn & Newtown R. R. Co. ». Breslin Coney Island R. R. Co. Brooklyn Central R. R. Co. v. Brook- lyn Brooklyn Park Com’rs v. Armstrong | 1133, 1194, 1195 | City R. R. Co. ». Maryland LIST OF CASES CITED XXXIX Page Page 40 | Brown ». Foster 860 451 v. Galveston 357, 489, 490 1021 v. Gerald 1125, 1140 927 | v. Globe Printing Co. 956 473 | v. Grover 140, 1363 887, 890 v. Guyandotte 453 75, 1158 v. Hanson 887 556, 568, 1314 | v. Haywood 807, 808, 810 424 v. Hitchcock 588 v. Houston 999, 1005, 1009 1114] »v. Hummel 566 v. J. H. Bell Co. 1299 1170 |} v. Kennebec Water Dist. 1203 v. Leitch 370 412, 1168. al v. Lunt 1357 ». McCollum 1382 999, 1006, 1251, 1252 Brooklyn Trust Co. v. Herbron 408 | 1278 Brooks v. Cedar Brook &c. Co. 1150 v. Massachusetts 35 ». Garner 1105 v. New Jersey 41, 66, 67, 739 v. Harrison 887 v. Nichols 424, 1283 v. Hatch 316 v. O’Connell 383 v. Hyde 263 | v. Ohio Valley R. Co. 339 v. Missouri 36 v. Orangeburg Co. 506 v. Mobile School Com’rs. 128 | v. Parker 763 v. United States 1275, 1276 | v. People 553 Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. Railroad | v. Peterson 26 Comm. 1312 | v. Pratt 75 Brophy v. Hyatt 1283 | v. Providence, &c. R. Co. 1155, 1220 snah¢ , 72 > Rs Tro 7 . 2 A BPinoriae 9. Poopls Gale seas Beceem Brow v. Hathaway 911) v. Salt Lake City 453, 518, 525 Brower v. O’Brien 1406 | v. School Dist. 1107 v. Watson 257 | v. Schools’ Trustees 765 Brown, Ex parte 626, 644, 721 v. Seattle 1153 In re 27 v. Seay 169 v. Atlanta 1362 v. Smart 600, 601 v. Asheville El. L. Co. 1144, 1182 ». Smith 888, 1060 v. Beatty 1110, 1209 v. State 151, 303, 578, 629, v. Bonougli 1106 | 640, 666 v. Brown 280 | 674, 688, 691, 847 v. Browning 252 | v. Storm 799 v. Calumet R. Ry. Co. 1213 v. Turner 1353 v. Cape Girardeau 382 | v. United States 147, 250, 691 v. Carolina Midland Ry. 1246 | v. U.S. Fidelity, &c. Co. 1257 v. Cayuga & Susquehanna R. v. Walker 650 R. Co. 1115, 1154, 1209 | v. W. T. Weaver Power Co. 1214 v. Chadbourne 1288, 1289 | ». Wilcox 136 v. Chicago, &c. Co. 1206 | »v. Wilmington 454 v. Chillicothe 446 | v. Worcester 1205 v. Circuit Judge 180 | Brown’s Appeal 1045 v. Colorado 559 | Brown’s Executrix v. Greene 1106 2. Commonwealth 664, 1296 | Brown & Bennett v. Powers 51 v. Com’rs Rush Co. 1407 | Brown-Forman Co. v. Ky. 339 v. Daly 26 | Brown-Ketcham Iron Works v. Swift v. Denver 1065 Co. 822 v. Dist. of Columbia 453 | Brown Shoe Co. v. Hunt 827 ». Duffus 185, 725| Brown University v. Granger 1094 v. Duplessis 1172} Brownback v. North Wales 1017, 1335 v. Durepo 711 Browne ». Scofield 1288 v. Epps 868 | Brownfield v. Kearney 471 v. Fifield 134 | Browning v. Hooper 845 v. Fleischner 240 v. Springfield 618, 520xl OF CASES CITED Page Page Brownlow v. O’ Donoghue Bros. 1159 | Buckner v. Gordon 1363 Brownville v. Cook 415 v. Lynip 1376 Bruce v. Ackroyd 61 | Buckrice v. People 677 ». Bradshaw 201 | Buckstaff v. Hicks 922 ». Tobin 38 | Buckwalter v. Neosho Co. Sch. Dist. Bruffet 7. G. W. R. R. Co. 566 No. 42 1207 Bruhnke »v. La Crosse 519, 521/ Budd v. N. Y. 577, 1301 Bruley v. Garvin 701 v. State 810 Brumagim 2. Tillinghast 1000 |} Buddington, Matter of 725 Bruning v. N. O. Canal & Banking Co Budge v. Grand Forks 1106 1123 | Buell v. Ball 455, 1063 Brunings v. Townsend 671 | Buffalo, In re 1207 Brunswick v. Finney 236, 237 v. Keller 1319 Brunswick & W. Ry. Co. v. Way v. Till 392 creda 1122 ». Webster 423, 431, Brunswick, &c. Water Dist. v. Me. 1335 Water Co. 1220 | Buffalo & N. Y. R. R. Co. v. Brain- Brush v. Carbondale 440 ard 1127 v. Keeler 1391 v. Ferris 865, 1203 Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. Co. v. Harvey 1207 229, 346, 1022| Buffalo, N. Y. & P. R. R. Co. ». Bryan 2. Birmingham 425, 1321 Overton 1118 ». Cattell 562 | Buffalo & Niagara Falls R. R. Co. v. v. Page 407 Buffalo 1243 ». Reynolds 280 | Buffalo Grade Crossing Com’rs, In ». Stephenson 1350 re 1205 v. Walker 758 | Buffington v. Grosvenor 49 Bryant v. Robbins 181, 1298 | Buhl v». Fort St. Union Depot Co. 1150 v. Shute 60 | Builders’ Supply Depot v. O’Connor Brymer v. Butler Water Co. 1308 806, 837 Bryson v. Bryson 211, 212| Buildings v. Stoklosa 1317 v. Campbell 211} Buist v. Charleston 102, 1089 Buchan v. German American Land | Bulger, In re 561 Co. 113 v. Eden 449,519 Buchanan, Re 36 | Bulkley v. Callanan 1107 v. Hubbard 76 a ING NG Ars Ifo Lal 1a, Lt (Chey ». Jones 862 1244, 1247 ». Litchfield 471 | Bull v. Conroe 793, 809 ». Warley 339, 1229 v. Read 227, 236, 241, 346 Buchner v. Chicago, &c. Co. 1165 | Bullard v. Chandler 63 Bucher v. Cheshire R. R. Co. 40 | Bullen v. Wisconsin 1020 Buch’s Ex’r v. Fluvanna Co. 471 | Bullitt v. Sturgeon 136 Buck v. Beach 1060 | Bullock v. Bullock 62 2. Bell 845 v. Curry 463, 470 v. Kuykendall 1279, 1285 v. Railroad Comm. 1312 v. Miller 1061 | Bumgardner v. Circuit Court 587 Buckalew v. Chosen Freeholders 516 | Bumpass v. Taggart 997 Buckhannon, &c. R. Co. v. Gt. Scott Bumpus v. French 839 Coal, &e. Co. 1220, 1221 | Bumsted v. Govern 262, 296 Buckhout v. New York C. 1086 | Bunkley ». Commonwealth 836, 1325 Bucki v. Cone 1289} Bunn »v. Gorgas 597 Buckingham v. Angell 1418 v, People 147 ». Davis 874 v. Riker 1391 2. Ludlum 112| Bunting v. Oak Creek Drain Dist. 1148 v. Smith 1118, 1124 | v. Oregon 1346 Buckley v. Beaulieu 615 | Bunton v. Worley 923 v. Buckley 851 | Buonaparte v. Camden & Amboy R. v. Hall 724 RiiGo: 66, 1143 Or NY enOcNcnEl. Karke CO. 1249 | Burch v. Newberry 193 Buckles ». Ellers 76 ». Savannah 1046 Buckman »v. State 673 | Burcher v. People 1346 Bucknall v. Story 1103 | Burchett v. Blackburne 113 Buckner 2. Finley 60 | Burciago v. State 1263LIST OF CASES CITED Page Burckell v. State 1325 Burckholter v. M’Connellsville 390 Burdeau v. McDowell 617 Burden »v. Stein 1132 Burdeno v. Amperse 135 Burdett v. Abbott Zhe v. Allen 844 v. Commonwealth 943 Burdick v. Babcock 387 | ». Missouri Pacific R. Co. 866 | v. People 747, 1331, 1332 Burdine, x parte 726 Bureau Co. v. Railroad Co. 1040 Burford v. Grand Rapids 446 v. Wible 890 Burger, In re 723 ». State Female Normal Sch. 1114 Burgess v. Clark 1136 v. Pette 1105 v. Plainville 529 ». Pue 147, 236, 244, 390 v. Salmon 327 ». Seligman 43, 44 ». State 640 Burgett v. Burgett 291 Burghardt v. Turner 751 Burguieres v. Sanders 742 Burkburnett Bridge Co. v. Cobb 1307 Burke v. Elliott 1357 v. Mechanics’ Savings Bank 199 v. Monroe Co. 301 ». St. Paul, M. &c. Ry. Co. 180 ». Supervisors of Monroe 1403, 1407 v. Terry 1371 Burkett 0. MecCurty 185 Burks v. Bennett 870 ». Hinton 122 Burley v. State 667 v. United States 1130 Burlingame v. Burlingame 923, 926 v. Thompson 382 Burlington v. Bumgardner 420, 1046 v. Gilbert 439 413, 1099 198, 228 v. Kellar ». Leebrick v. Putnam Ins. Co. 420 Burlington & M.R.R.Co.v. Webb 1245 Burlington &c. Co. v. Reinhackle 1170 Burlington, C. R. & N. R. Co. v. Dey 1311 Burmeister v. Howard 405 Burner v. Atchison 1056 Burnet v. Dean 261, 264 Burnett, Hz parte 417, 419, 432 v. Kinney 63 v. Maloney 262 v. Sacramento 1056, 1071, 1074 v. State 690 Burnette, In re 702 Burnham »v. Chelsea 485 ». Commonwealth 854 ». Morrissey 272, 276 ». Stevens 726 Burnside v. Lincoln Co. Ct. 341, 1255 xli Page Burns, Ex parte 198 v. Clarion County 399, 491 v. Crawford 597 v. Rock County School District No. 18 1118 v. United States 632 Burr v. Boston 1088 v. Carbondale 494, 1038 ». Ross 278 Burrel v. Associated Reform Church 961 Burridge v. Detroit 441 Burrill v. Augusta 453 v. Boston 481 v. West 112 Burritt v. Com’rs 319 v. New Haven 404 Burroughs v. Commonwealth 23, 25 v. Eastman 610 Burrow v. Moran 1259, 1262 Burrows, Jn re 865 v. Delta Trans. Co. 1270 Burrus v. Witcover 251, 252 Burson v. Huntington 997 Burt v. Advertiser N. Co. 940, 943 v. Brigham 1121 ». Merchants’ Ins. Co. 1112 v. Williams 193, 597 ». Winona, &c. R. Co. 383 Burt, &c. Lumber Co. v. Bailey 60 Burtch v. Zeuch 619 Burton, Hz parte 727 »v. Burton 887 v. Chattanooga 450 v. New York, &c. R. Co. 52, 56 Burtt v. Pyle 670 Burwell v. Lillington 471 Buschbaum v. Heriot 923 | Buser v. Shepard 588, 753 | Bush v. Bd. of Supervisors of Orange Co. 487, 1028 v. Indianapolis 314 v. Kentucky 19, 20 v. Seabury 423, 1335 v. Shipman 563, 564 Bushel’s Case 679, 953 Bushnell v. Beloit 237 v. Beloit 479 ». Chicago, &c. Co. 433 Bushnell’s Case 725 Buskett, Re 650 Buskirk v. Strickland 1153 724 Busse v. Barr Busser v. Snyder 130, 265, 349 Butchers Slaughtering & Melting Ass’n v. Commonwealth Butchers’ Union Slaughterhouse Co. ». Crescent Live-Stock Landing Co. Butcher’s Union Co. v. Crescent City Co. 578, 581 68 Butler ». Attorney-General 1290 v. Bd. of Regents 1353 ». Chambers 1323 A479 o. Dunhamxii LIST OF CASES CITED Page Page Butler v. Farnsworth 84 | Cadwallader v. Harris 135 v. Gage 36 | Cady v. Walker 702 v. Gorely 600 | Caffee v. State 642 ». Kokomo 1180 | Cage v. Trager 1205 v. Palmer 586, 596, 789 | Cagwin v. Hancock 477 ». Pennsylvania 561, 562 | Cahoon ». Commonwealth 165 ». Perry 608, 803, 1083 | Cain ». Com’rs 245, 1057 ». Phillips 1356 | v. Miller 121, 714 v. Porter 1105 | v. Syracuse 447 v. Poultney 485 v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. 862 v. Printing Com’rs. 23 | Cairnes v. Pelton 891 v. Rockwell 560 | Cairo v. Bross 420 v. Shiver 370 v. Zane 471, 474 v. State 67, 217, 628, 664 | Cairo, &c. R. R. Co. v. People 1245 v. Supervisors of Saginaw 191, 1048 v. Sparta 471, 497 v. Toledo 774 | v. Trout 166 v. Wentworth 639 | Calaveras County »v. Brockway 1409, 1413 Butler’s Appeal 348, 1091 | Calcote v. Stanton 34 Butlock v. Fla. ex rel R. R. Commis- | Calder». Bull 11, 105, 133, 182, 348, 541 sion 36 | v. Kurby 578 Butschkowski v. Brecks 27 | v. Michigan 348, 380 Butte v. Paltrovich 1329 | Caldwell, Ex parte 275, 276 Butte & B. Consol. Min. Co. v. Mont. v. Alton 423 Ore. P. Co. 748 v. Barrett 245 Butte, &c. Co. v. Montana U. R. v. Boone 452 Co. 1116, 1126, 1127, 1130, 1145 | v. Conn. R. &e. Co. 1180 Butte City Water Co. v. Baker 148 v. Donaghey 23, 559 Butte Land, &c. Co. v. Merriman 113 | v. Gale 118 Butte Miners’ Union». Butte 445,492, 506 v. Justices of Burke 237 Butterworth v. Henrietta 446 v. Lincoln 1045 Butterworth-Judson Co. v. Cent. R. | v. N. Y. &c. R. Co. 1156 Co. 1117 v. North Carolina 1007 Buttfield ». Stranahan 230 | v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co. Button, In re 670 1003,°1339 Buttrick v. Lowell 452 v. Texas 35, 67 Butts v. Swartwood 984 | Caldwell Co. v. Harvert 493, 763 Butts County v. Jackson Banking Co. | Caledonian Coal Co. v. Baker 855 142, 143, 146, 404 v. Strahan 326, 327 Buty v. Goldfinch 764 Buys »v. Gillespie 890 Byam »v. Collins 896 Byars v. State 833 Byers ». Commonwealth 865 v. McAuley 30, 41 v. Meridian Printing Co. 741, 935 Byler v. Asher 1369, 1396 Byram v. Co. Com’rs 1094 Byrd, Ex parte 423, 1335 Byrne v. Funk 920 2. Maryland Realty Co. 1318 v. Missouri 45 C C.C.C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Illinois 1267 C. B. Carswell & Co. v. Habberzetle 1086 C. G. Blake Co. v. United States 1210 Cabanne »v. Graf 855 Cabell v. Cabell 211 Cabot ». Kingman 1187 Caddo Parish v. Red River Parish 190 Caledonian Trustees Ry. Co: Walker’s 1198, 1200 v. Calhoun v. Fletcher 738 v. Little 429 v. McLendon 105, 191 Calhoun County v. Galbraith 137 | Calhoun Gold Min. Co. ». Ajax Gold Min. Co. 121, 122 California v. Central Pacific R. Co. 994, 995, 1048, 1275 alifornia Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works 392, 1229, 1231 California Telegraph Co. v. Alta Tel. C 10. 575 Calking v. Baldwin 1202, 1206 Calkins ». Cheney 961, 963 v. State 660 v. Sumner Call ». Chadbourne v. Hagger 922, 923 236, 237 592, 761, 764, 765 v. Rocky Mountain Bell Tel. Co. 853 v. Town of Wilkesboro 1141 Callaghan v. Tobin 357 Callahan ». St. Louis, &c. Co. 836 Callam ». Saginaw 495LIST OF CASES CITED xlili Page Page Callan v. Wilson 868 | Canon City v. Cox 530 Callen v. Columbus Edison El. Light v. Manning 1256 Co. 1117, 1118, 1158, 1182 | Cannaday »v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Callendar v. Marsh 438, 1152 Co: 251, 252 Callendar’s Case 900 | Cannan v. Mathes 309 Callison v. Hedrick 1202, 1205 | Cannon v. Brame 109 v. Peeples 1409, 1413 v. Hemphill 305 Calmes, Ex parte 644, 645 v. Mathes 160, 161, 305 Calvin v. Reed 850 v. New Orleans 1016 Calwell v. Boone 446 | Canter v. Commonwealth 640 Camas Stage Co. v. Kozer 573, 1003 | Canton v. Canton Cotton Warehouse Cambridge v. Lexington 399 | Co. 506 Camden v. Arkansas Light & P. Co. 395 vo. Nist 413 ». Camden Village Corp. 1025 | Canton-Hughes Pump Co. ». Llera 61 Camden & Amboy R. R. Co. 2. Briggs Cantril v. Sainer 311 1245, 1304 | Cantwell ». Owens 125 Camden & S. R. Co. v. Stetson 609 | Cape Girardeau »v. Riley 163 Cameron». Chicago &c. Co. 806, 836, 1215 v. St. Louis, &c. R. Co. 1240 ». Kenyon-Connell Comm’! Co. 413 | Cape Girardeau &c. Road v. Dennis 1147 v. Parker 562 | Cape Girardeau Co. Ct. v. Hill 317 v. Pittsburgh, &c. R. Co. 1216 | Cape May v. Cape M. &c. Co. 44] ». Supervisors 1121 | Capen v. Foster 140, 1369, 1370, 13895 Caminetti v. United States 1275 ». Portland 462 Camoras v. Sioux City 305 | Caperton v. Martin 763 Camp »v. State 1007 | Capital City Dairy Co. v. Ohio 66 Camp Phosphate Co. v. Anderson 865, 869 | Capital Lumber Co. v. Saunders 600 Campau v. Detroit 365, 379 | Capital Nat’! Bk. v. First Nat’! Bk. 33 ». Langley 760 | Capital Traction Co. v. Hof 68, Campbell, Ex parte 1255 | 672, 674, 868 v, Bannister 897 | Capito 2. Topping 289, 325 v. Board, &c. 313 | Caplis, Ex parte 646 ». Campbell 887 | Capp »v. St. Louis 531 ». Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 1304 | Carabajal v. Lucero 1380 »v. Dwiggins 1065 | Cardigan v. Page 1392 v. Evans 760, 854 | Cardwell v. American Bridge Co. 80, v. Fields 90 1292, 1295 ». Gello 109 | Carey v. Chicago, &c. Ry. Co. 1245 v. Holt 762, 842 ». Giles 204, 348, 372 o. Hunt 1413 | Carfer v. Caldwell 721 v. Indianapolis 264 Cargill v. Power 366, 596 v. Metrop. St. Ry. Co., 1168, | Cargill Co. ». Minnesota 1332 1197, 1199 | Carl ». McDougal 888 ». Morris 48, 822, 823, 1016 | ». New Haven 520 ». Motion Picture &c. Union 884, 855 | Carlesi ». New York 40, 553, 554 ». Quinlin 119 | Carleton v. Bickford 60 ». Spottiswoode 956 ». Goodwin's Ex’r 193 v. State 66, 653, 692 ». Rugg 866 ». Union Bank 204, 348, 360 v. Whitcher 284 v. W. M. Ritter Lumber Co. 62 | Carling v. Seymour Lumber Co. 600 Campbell Co. v. City of Newport 1068 | Carlisle v. United States 218 Campbell Lumber Co. v. Levee Dist. 447 | Carlough 2. Ackerman 1380 Campbell’s Case 81, 174, 317 | Carlslake ». Mapledoram 888 Canaan v. Enfield Village Fire Dist. 1025 | Carlson v. St. Louis River D. & I. Canadian & A. M. & Tr. Co. v. Blake 590 Co. 1151 Canadian Country Club v. Johnson 204 | Carlton v. People 1356 Canadian Northern Ry. Co.v.Eggen 49 ». State 1254 Canadian Pac. R. Co. v. Moosehead Carman v. Hickman County 1029, Tel. Co 1159, 1190, 1191 Canady ». Coeur D’Alene Lumber Co. 1218 Canal Co. v. Railroad Co. 204 Canal Trustees v. Chicago 1056 Cancemi v. People 674, 847 1030, 1039 ». Steubenville & Ind. R. R. Co. 1155 Carmen »v. State 690 Carmody »v. State 645 Carn v. Moore 1374 Carnahan v. Sieber Cattle Co. 768xliv LIST OF CASES CITED Page | Page Carne »v. Litchfield 659 | Carter County v. Sinton 296, 298, 472 Carney v. Boston Elev. R. Co. 667 | Carter’s Adm’r v. Carter 371 Carothers v. Hurly 767 | Cartersville ». Lanham 426 Carpenter v. Ashley 928, 956 v. McGinnis 305, 315 v. Bailey 940 | Carthage v. Frederick 441 v. Capital El. Co, 1185, 1186 | v. Munsell} 433 v. Dane County 700 v. National Bank 421 v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co. 76 | Carton »v. Illinois Cent. R. R. Co. v. Jennings 1219 1244, 1304 v. Lancaster 1187 | Carty v. Carty 850, 851 v. Landaff 1215, 1216, 1219 | Carty’s Adm’r v. Winooski 452 v. Lord 56 | Caruso v. Montclair 1152, 1205 v. Meredith 957 | Caruthers v. Russell 1392 v. Montgomery 328, 380 | Carver v. Greason 943 v. Oswego & Syracuse R. R. Co. 1164 v. Jackson 26 ». Pennsylvania 146, 543, 783 | Carwile v. Jones 1366, 1380, 1390 v. People 102, 130, 260, 682 | Cary, In re 706, 707 v. Snelling 996 v. Morrison 1155 v. Strange 62, 63 v. Western U. Tel. Co. 283 v. Tarrant 888 | Cary Library »v. Bliss 1192 Carples v. Cumberland Coal, &c. Co. 617) Casborus ». People 691 Carr, R. V., Case of Carr, In re v. Brown v. Coke . Georgia &c. Co. . Nichols ». Northern Liberties eee . St. Louis v. State 23 Sutton Carrington v. St. Louis Carrithers v. Shelbyville s s Carroll v. Hartford F. Ins. v. Lessee of Olmstead v. Mo. P. Ry. Co. v. St. Louis v. State v. United States 953 | Case v. Dean 620, 629, 632 | 764, 769, 1103 249 v. Dunmore 370, 599 837 | v. New Orleans &c. R. R. 109 280 v. Reeve 112 1206 v. Rorabacher 274 740 v. State 1356 446, 448, 450, | v. Sullivan 471 528 v. Thompson 1202 413 v. Wildridge 125 , 178, 982, 1227 | Casel ». New York 447 714 | Casey v. Commonwealth 632 452 | Cash v. Whitworth 1132 236, 393, 802| Caskey ». Edwards 1314 Co. 1332 | Cass v. Dillon 237, 318, 487 200 | Cass County »v. Chicago, &c. Co. 1043 261 v. Johnson 1350 447, 461 v. Nixon 335 690, 730 v. Wilbarger Co. 475 616, 618, | Cass Farm Co. Ltd. v. Detroit 1053, 1074, 1076 v. Wis. Cent R. R. Co. 1154 | Cassard v. Tracy 756 Carroll Co. v. Smith 43 | Casselman v. Winship 887 Carrollton v. Bazzette 430, 1015, 1335 | Cassidy ». Drake 579 Carson »v. Blazer 1108 v. Macon 579 v. Carson 545, 582 v. Old Colony R. R. Co. 1220 ». Coleman 1201 v. St. Joseph 444 v. Brockton Sewer Com’rs 1051, | Castellaw v. Guilmartin 109 1057, 1065, 1082 | Castillo v. McConnico 1106 v. Genesee 518, 520 | Castle v. Lewis 720 v. McPheteridge 1353, 1402 | ». Mason 1272 Carter v. Balfour 75 | Castleberry v. Kelly 887, 890 v. Commonwealth 671 | Castner v. Minneapolis 1035 ». Dow 421, 1322 | Caswell, Re 1253 v. Dubuque 461) Cater v. Northwestern Tel. Exch. v. Green 272) Cos 1181 v. Henry 320 | Cateril ». Union Pac. Ry. Co. 771 v. McClaughry 685 | Cates v. Kellogg 940 v. Papineau 961, 964 | v. Wadlington 1288 ». Rice 102 Cathcart v. Robinson 76 v. State 631, 647 | Catlin ». Hull 1018 v. Texas 1 v. Smith 83 v. Walker 861 | Cattell ». Lowry 1387LIST OF CA Page Caughlin ». Omaha 530 Caughran 2. Gilman 59 Caulfield v. Bullock 1395 | Cavanaugh v. Commonwealth 705 | Cavender v. Hewitt 347, 349, 785, 793 | Cawley v. Northern Waste Co. 667 | ». People 1353 | Cayuga Bridge Co. v, Magee 820 | Cearfoss v. State 127 | Cedar Rapids Water Co. v. Cedar Rapids 1308 Cella Commission Co. v. Bohlinger 360, | 361, 366 Center Tp. ». Com’rs Marion Co. 109 Centoamore v. State 702 | Central Banking, &c. Co. v. United States Fidelity &c. Co. 114 Central Branch U. P. R. R. Co. 2. | Atchison, &c. Co. 1111 | Central Bridge v. Lowell 566, 1115, 1116 Central City Horse Ry. Co. v. Ft. Clark Horse Ry. Co. 1116 Central Consumers Co. v. James 628 | Central of Georgia v. Wright 1049 290 v. State Central Ia. Ry Co. v. Board 1043 Central Land Co. v. Laidley 46 Central Loan & T. Co. v. Campbell Comm’n Co. 830 | Central Lumber Co. v. South Da- kota 813, 1231, 1236 Central Nat’l Bk. v. Stevens 28 Central Ohio R. R. Co. v. Holler 1219 Central Pac. R. Co. v. California 989 Central Park Extension, Matterof 1133 Central Plank Road Co. v. Hannaman 304 Central R. & Bkg. Co. v. Wright 1097 Central R. R. Co. v. Bd. of Assessors 1006 v. Hetfield 1164, 1189 v. Rockafellow 984 v. State va Central, &c. R. R. Co. v. Andrews 1170 vy. Atchison, &c. Co. 1206 v. Met. Gas Co. 1146 v. People 309 Central Transp. Co. ». Pullman’s 12), (04 (Coy. 818 Centralia v. Scott 530 Centre St., In re 1072 Cereghino v. Oregon &c. Co. 443 Chadbourne v. New Castle 506 Chadwick v. Kelley 1074 ». Moore 597 Chafee v. Quidnick Co. 669 Chaffe v. Aaron 755 Chaffee Co. Com’rs v. Potter 473, 474 Chafor v. Long Beach 518 Chagrin Falls & Cleveland Plank Road Co. v. Cane 1163 Chalker v. Birmingham, &e. Co. 49, 1016, 1017 v. Ives 756 752 Chamberlain v. Anderson SES CITED xly Page Chamberlain 2. Dover 408 v. Elizabethport, &c. Co. 1162 ». Lyell 370 v. Sibley 224 Chamberlain of London v. Compton 417, 431 Chambers v. Baltimore, &e. Co. 49, 51 »v. Church 1297 v. Fisk 147 v». Gibb 773 ». Satterlee 1075 v. State 314, 1353 Champaign »v. Pattison 529 Champaign Co. v. Church 399, 506, 515 Champer v. Greencastle 423 Champion v. Ames 334, 341, 1001, 1275 v. McCarthy 702 Champlain Realty Co. 2. Brattleboro 1009, 1010 Chance v. Marion County 128, 132 v. State 667 Chandler v. Calumet & H. M. Co. 827 v. Nash 180, 863 v. Neff 1361 Chaney v. Bryan 850 v. Riverton 520, 529 Chapin v. The Paper Works 820 Chapman, In re 276, 686 v. Albany & Schenectady R. R. Co: 1170 ». Calder 910 v. Gates 1202, 1204 v. Hood River 400 ». Lincoln 443 v. Macon 529 v. Moore 113 v. Morgan 846 v. Smith 109 v. Staunton 1196 853 Chappee v. Thomas | Chappell 2. United States 1113, 1130 | Chappell Chem. & F. Co. 2. Sulphur | aM. Go: 37, 672 | Charest v. Bishop Chariton v. Barber 433 Charles Eneu Johnson Co. v. Phila. 529 Charles River Bridge ». Warren Bridge 543, 796, 818, 1207 | Chas. Wolff Packing Co. 2. Court of | Industrial Relations 187, 830, 1236, 1237, 1303, 1305, 1306, 1308, 1311, 1312 Charleston v. Benjamin 982 Charleston, &c. R. Co. v. Reynolds 1205 Charlestown Branch R. R. Co. 2- Middlesex 1202, 1204 Charlotte, C. & A. R. Co. ». Gibbes 1249 Charlotte Harbor, &c. Co. 2. Welles 775, 776, 787 Charlton v. Alleghany City 1152 v. Kelly 724 ». Watton 934, 936 370 Charpentier ». Bresnahanxlvi Page Charpless v. Mayor of Phila. 1026 Chase v. Blodgett 62 | v. Chase 849 ». Cheney 963 v. Fish 275 | v. Merrimack Bank 512 | v. Miller 1364 | ». Oshkosh 442 | v. People 641 v. Revere House 865, 1324 | v. Stephenson 808 | Chattanooga v. Keith 794 | v. Southern R. Co. 402, 1247 Chattanooga &c. Power Co. v. Law- son 1155 Chattaroi Ry. Co. v. Kinner 586 | Chauvin v. Valiton 853, 1049 Chavannes »v. Priestly 838 Cheadle v. State 942 Cheaney v. Hooser 236, 485, Cheek v. Prudential Ins. Co. 1032, 1036 253, 898 Cheever v. Shedd 439 v. Wilson 61 Chelsea v. Treas. and Receiver Gen. 1037 Chenango Bridge Co. v. Binghamton Bridge Co. 818, 821 Cheney v. Atlantic City Water Works Co. 1123 v. Barker 1186 | v. Jones 372 Cheney Bros. Co. v. Massachusetts 1007 Chenowith v. Commonwealth 697 Cherokee v. Fox 423 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia 3, 135 v. So. Kansas R. Co. Cherokee Tobacco Cherry »v. Sprague Cherryvale v. Hawman Chesapeake, &c. Co. v. Hoard Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Co. ». Baltimore &c. Co. v. Stock v. United States Chesapeake, &c. Ry. Co. v. Miller Chesapeake, &c. Tel. Co. v. Golds- borough v. Mackenzie Chesapeake Stone Co. v. Moreland 1125; 1127, Cheseborough v. San Francisco Chestatee Pyrites Co. v. Cavenders &e. Co. 1110, 1119, 1120, Chester v. Black v. Pennell Chestnut v. Shane v. Shane’s Lessee Chestnut St., In re Chestnutwood v. Hood Chetwynd v. Chetwynd Chevrier v. Robert Chicago v. Banker 1113, 1203, 1206 | 27 76 | 445 318 1115 | 182 127 765, 766 | Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Kentucky 1299 | LIST OF CASES. CITED Page Chicago v. Baptist Union 1094 v. Bartree 426 v. Blair 400, 401, 1052 v. Bowman Dairy Co. 1336 v. Brophy 528 v. Chicago University 1088, 1095 v. Chicago League B. B. Club 445 v. Collins 429, 441 v. Drogasawacz 1343 v. Hebard Express, &c. Co. 417, 422 v. Hesing 529 v. Kautz 403, 422, 431 v. Langlass 529 v. Larned 1056, 1065 v. Lehmann 1146, 1148 v. Le Moyne 1156 v. Lord 1218 v. M. & M. Hotel Co. 401 v. McCarthy 522 v. McCoy 404 v. McGinn 426 v. McGiven 530 v. Manhattan Cement Co. 445, 506 v. Morell 1046 v. Netcher 429, 809, 1229 v. O’Brennan 528 v. O’Brien 426 v. Penn. Co. 425 v. People 1398 v. Robbins 39, 518 v. Ross 401 v. Rumpff 813 v. Stratton 435 v. Sturges 445, 492, 506 v. Taylor 1197, 1200 v. Union Ice Cream Mfg. Co. 415 2. Washingtonian Home 2927, 229, 400, 418, 1227, 1239 v. Weber 400, 401, 403, 425 v. Wheeler 1209 v. Wisconsin Lime & Cement Co. 403 Chicago &c. Co. v. Abbott 1208 v. Ayres 1199 v. Bowman 1215, 1217 v. Chappell 1040 v. Cicero 1122 v. Englewood Co. 1156 v. Guffey 572, 573 v. Hazels 1200 v. Illinois 16, 744, 1201 v. Illinois &c. Co. 1192 v. Joliet 419, 1161, 1172, 1325 v. Lake 1117 v. Milwaukee, &c. Co. 1180 v. People 443 v. Pontius 836 v». Smith 1120 v. Starkweather 1117 v. Stein 1157 v. Sturm 1019 v. Traubarger 545 v. Wilson 1149 v. Wiltse 1128Page Chicago, &c. R. R. Co. v. Ackley 1304 v. Arkansas 1002 | y. Austin 789 | v. Barrie 1245 | v. Boone Co. 1048 v. Carlinville 418, 424 v. Cass County 114 ». Cavanaugh 232 v. Chicago Mechanics’ Inst. 1112 v. Cole 67 v. Doyle 317 v. Fair Oakes 1150 v. Gildersleeve 333 v. Hackett 35, 368, 382 v. Haggerty 1243 v. Hough 1150 v. Illinois 437, 1226 v. lowa 19, 1243, 1303 v. Jonesville 1075 v. Kansas City, &c. R. Co. 1058 v. Keith 1111 v. Kemper 1218 v. Lake 576, 1141, 1146 v. McGuire 824, 1236 v. Mallory 1370, 1398 v. Mancher 1003 v. Mitchell 1210 v. Oconto 509 v. Parsons 1214 v. People 792, 1244, 1304 | ». Perry 33 v. Pub. Serv. Comm. 1276 ». R. R. Comm. of Wisc. 1004 v. Salem 424 v. Smith 122, 346, 348 v. State 50, 1043, 1058 v. State Public Ut. Comm. 1003 v. Thompson 251 v. Tranbarger 577, 1235 v. Triplett 1247 v. Vaughn 1222 v. Wellman 379 v. West Chicago, &c. R. Co. 1179 v. Westby 360 »v. Whiting, &c. Co. 1179 v. Wisconsin 569, 1242 v. Wisc. R. Comm. 1268 v. Zernecke 1248 Chicago & Alton R. R. Co. v. Adler 757 Chicago B. & N. Ry. Co. v. Porter 1130 Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Jones 1311 v. Nebraska 1247 v. Wolfe 326 Chicago, &c. Coal Co. v. People 1337 Chicago, &G. T. Ry. Co.v. Hough 1242 v. Wellman 1311 Chicago & G. W. Ry. Co. v. First Meth. Church 440, 1123 Chicago Life Ins. Co. v. Auditor 586 v. Needles 35, 567 Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. 2. Becker 1304 v. Milwaukee 1054 LIST OF CASES CITED Page Chicago, M. & S. P. Ry. Co. ». Minnesota 1310, 1311 v. Solan 1268 ». Tompkins 1308, 1309 Chicago, Mun., &c. Co. v. Lake 565 Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co. ». Chicago 1189 v. Chicago, &c. Co. 1192 v. Galt 1123 v. Langlade Co. 238 Chicago, P. & St. L. Ry. Co. ». Eaton 1215 Chicago Packing, &c. Co. v. Chicago 415, 433, 579 Chicago Park Com’rs v. Boal 1221 Chicago R. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Commission 395 Chicago, R. I. &c. Co. ». McGlinn 258 v. Ottumwa 1054 v. Sturm 62, 826 Chicago, S. F. &. C. Ry. Co. 2. Ward 1214 Chicago Sanitary Dist. v. Ray 450 Chicago Terminal Transfer R. Co. 2. Greer 245 Chicago Theological Seminary 2. IIli- nois 572 Chicago Title, &c. Co. v. Smith 58 Chicago Union Traction Co. v. Chi- cago 390, 405, 559 Chicot Co. v. Davies 288 v. Sherwood 10) Chidsey v. Canton 449, 515 Chiesa v. Des Moines 1152 Chilcott ». Hart 119 Child v. Bemus 430 v. Boston 449 Child Labor Tax Case 1026 Children v. Shinn 956 Children’s Home v. Fetter 726 Childress v. Mayor 425 | Childs’ Case 723 ». New Haven, &c. Co. 1216 v. Shower 379, 800 Chiles v. Chesapeake, &c. R. Co. 1299 v. Drake 305 ». Munroe 305 Chilton v. St. Louis & I. M. R. Co. 1299 Chilvers v. People 420, 1047, 1296 Chimgay v. People 339 Chinak v. Burnside 474 Chincleclamouche &c. Co. v. Com. 567 Chinese Exclusion Case 27 Chiniquy v. People 477 Chippewa Valley &S. R. Co. v. Chi- cago &c. R. Co. 285 Chisholm v. Georgia 3, 8, 75, 89 v. Montgomery 405 Chittenden v. Columbus 1283 v. Wurster 214, 216 Choate v. State 654 v. Trapp 571 Choctaw Coal, &c. Co. v. Lillich 889xlviil Page Chouteau ». Gibson 114 Chow Goo Pooi, In re 721 | Choyssikos v. Demarco 26 | Chrisman »v. Bruce 1395, 1396 Christ Church v. Philadelphia 572, 573, 581, 793 Christal v. Craig 888 Christensen, Matter of 856 | Christian, In re 1272 v. Commonwealth 696 Christian Church v. Sommer 964 Christian Union v. Yount 255 Christie ». Bayonne 313 | Christmas v. Russell 60, 61} Christopher v. Akin 895 | Christy v. Com’rs 562 | v. Elliott 295, 301, 305, | 841, 1226, 1283 | Chumasero v. Potts 222 | Chunn »v. Gray 60 | Church v. Bullock 972, 973 >. Chapin 110 | v. Kelsey 67 | v. Rowell 1365 v. So. Kingstown 837, 864 Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. United States 78 Chute v. Winegar 474 Chybowski v. Bucyrus Co. 182 Cica, Ex parte 724 Cicero Lumber Co. ». Cicero 424, | 441, 1152] Cimarron v. Midland Water, Light & | Ice Co. 395 | Cincinnati v. Batsche 1075 | v. Bryson 420 | v. Buckingham 423 v. Cincinnati Traction Co. 402 v. Louisville, &c. R. Co. 1110, 1112, 1144, 1145 | 565, 583 | Public Ut. Com. S ». Rice 982 Cincinnati, &c. Co. v. Carthage 565 ». Cincinnati 1076 2. Commonwealth 1043 Cincinnati, &c. R. Co. ». Common- wealth 424 v. Com’rs of Clinton Co. 184, 229 | ». Connersville 1150 |} v. Cook 1244 | 2. Cumminsville 1199 v. Slade 35 v. Stode 37 v. Village of Belle Center 1191 Cincinnati College v. State 1094 Cincinnati Gas Co. v. State 1046, 1057 Cincinnati Gaslight Co. v. Avon- dale v. State Cincinnati Gazette Co. v. Timberlake 932, 934, 936 Cincinnati, H. & I. R. R. Co. v. Clif- ford 443 421 567 LIST OF CASES CITED Page Cincinnati, H. & D. R. Co. »v. Bowl- ing Green 427 Cincinnati Health Ass’n v. Rosenthal 48 Cincinnati, W. & M. R. Co. v. Ander- son 1116, 1191 Circleville v. Neuding 529 Cisco v. Roberts 1274, 1281 v. School Board 1299 Citizens’ El. Light & P.Co.».Sands 744 Citizens’ Gas &c. Co. v. Elwood 443 Citizens’ Ins. Co. v. Parsons 12 | Citizens’ National Bank v. Burton 991 v. Consol. Glass Co. 59 v. Kentucky 339 Citizens of Cincinnati, In re 181 Citizens’ Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Perry Co. A477 Citizens’ Sav. Bk. ». Owensboro 573, 793 Citizens’ Telephone Co. v. Cincinnati, &c. R. Co. 1179, 1181 Citizens’ Water Co. v. Bridgeport, &c. Co. 581 Citizens & Taxpayers of De Soto Par- ish v. Williams 1350 City of Aurora v. West 237 City of Bloomington v. Lathan 1201 City of Brooklyn, Re 1116 City of Buffalo v. Holloway 528 City of Cape Girardeau v. Honck 1145 City of Charleston v. Public Service Com. 297 City of Chicago v. Tribune Co. 900, 907, 908 City of Cimarron v. Midland Water, Light & Ice Co. 396 City of Covington ». Southgate 1036, 1038, 1063 City of Detroit v. Beecher 1213 City of Fairfield v. Ratcliff 1057 City of Ft. Smith v. Scruggs 986 City of Janesville ». Carpenter 1158 City of Laurel v. Weems 65, 1088, 1089 City of Lexington v. McQuillan’s Heirs 1056, 1078 City of Louisville v. University 503 City of Lowell v. Hadley 158 City of Madison v. Daley 1122 City of Milwaukee v. Railroad Com. 232 City of New Orleans v. Faber 1334 City of N. Y. Re 1116 ». Miln 1280 City of Orlando v. Equitable Build- ing & Loan Ass’n 1106 City of Pasadena v. Stimson 1144 City of Paterson v. Society, &c. 236 City of Peoria v. Kidder 1071 City of Philadelphia v. Ward 1145 City of Rochester v. Gutberlett 866 City of St. Louis v. Alexander 237 v. Allen 400 v. Bentz 414 v. Cafferata 393, 414 v. Hill 1159LIST OF CASES CITED City of Santa Ana v. Harlan City of Santa Cruz v. Enright 1144 City of Sapulpa v. Okla. Nat. Gas Co. City of Tacoma v. State City of Troy v. Western Union Tel. Co. City of Valparaiso v. Chicago &e. O. City of Washington ». Pub. Serv. Com. City of Winfield v. Ct. of Industrial Relations City Council ». Benjamin ». Pepper City Council of Montgomery 2. Town- send 1198, 1200 City National Bank v. Kiowa 400 | ». Mahan 45 | City Oil Works v. Helena Imp. Dist. | No. 1 1215 | City R. Co. v. Citizens’ &c. Co. 566 City St. Imp. Co. v. Regents of Uni- versity 1058, 1095 City Water Co. v. Sedalia 395 Civil Rights Cases 18, 1299 Claasen, In re 638 Claflin ». Hopkinton 460, 481 Claiborne Co. v. Brooks 472 Clair v. State 638, 671 Clampitt ». United States 696 Clapp v. Cedar Co. 476, 479 | v. Ely 193 | v. Otoe Co 532 | Clare v. People 298 | Clarey v. Union Cent. L. Ins. Co. 251 Clarion Turnpike, &c. Co. v. Clarion | Co. 1221 | Clark, Ex parte 720 Matter of 52, 54 In re 543, 727 Re 93, 610, 826 vy. Allaman 75 v. Baltimore 772 vy. Barnard 23 »v. Bever 43 »v. Binney 933 ». Bd. of Directors 808 v. Buchanan 1408 ». Cambridge, &c. 399 ». Clark 209, 211, 582, 757, 773, 849 »v. Coburn 1119, 1134 9. Commonwealth 1357 v. Corp. of Washington 424 v. County Court 862 ». Co. Examiners 1384, 1387, 1406 ». Crane 155 v. Davenport 318, 1099 ». Des Moines 400, 407, 461, 472, 476, 477 ». Drain Com’r 1208 v. Ellis 360 Page 1214 396 1122 | 1046 1189 | 397 | 396 | 1281 | 424 Clark v. Eltinge v. ) ee eeeeeeee eee eeseedses se 8 33 v. Clark Distilling Co. ». Western Md. a Page 61 Hardison 1380 . Holmes 859, 860 . Janesville 237, 328, 329, 479 ». Jeffersonville, &c. R. R. Co. 119 . Kansas City 339, 841 Keith 582 Lamb 871 . Le Cren 417, 431 ». Los Angeles 796 . McCreary 754 McKenzie 1407 . Manhattan Beach 1398 Martin 586, 597 . Miller 382, 1208 ». Mitchell Co. 1126 ». Mobile 228 ». Molyneaux 944 . Morehouse 58 . Nash 1130, 1364 ». People 372, 375, 668 . Robinson 1362, 1365, 1369, 1384, 1403 Rochester 37 Rogers 236 Russell 1248 . Sammons 109 ». School Directors 386 . School Dist. 404 . So. Bend 427 ». State 545, 548, 640, 705, 1307 ». Tower 579 ». Wabash R. Co. 1209 . Washington 436, 518 . Wells 846, 855 White 1126 R. Co. Clark-Ray-Johnson Co. v. Williford 1106 | Clark’s Adm’r v. Hannibal & St. Jo. R. Clark Slark > eese v. R. Co. "3s Case e, Ex parte . Clarke . Co. Examiners Irwin Jack McCown Smith Van Surlay | Clarksburg &c. v. Clarksburg | Clarson v. Milwaukee | Claudius v. Davie | Clausing ». Kershaw Claussen v. Luverne Clay, Ex parte ». Grand Rapids ». Smith Clay Co. v. Chickasaw Co. Claybrook v. Owensboro Clayton Re v. Harris v. Henderson xlix 1275 1247 607 627, 1361 40, 62, 63 1385 153 237 1366 39 199 443 418 608 530 444, 579 723 1060 601 317, 398 808 844 139 448LIST OF CASES CITED Page | Page Clear Creek Water Co. v. Gladeville | Cloughessey v. Waterbury 529 Imp: Go. 1115, 1117| Cloyd ». Trotter 855 Cleburne v. Gulf, &c. Ry. Co. 403 | Clute ». Turner 742 Clee v. Sanders 1033 | Clyatt v. United States 608 Clegg v. Laffer 889 | Coal Float v. Jeffersonville 417 ». School District 508 | Coal Run Co. v. Finlen 1043 Cleghorn v. Greeson 371 | Coast ». Mayor, &c. of Ni WY: 437 ». Postlewaite 1048 | Coast Line R. Co. ». Savannah 559, 565 Cleland v. Anderson 289, 842 | Coates ». Campbell 1026, 1033 v. Porter 1400 | Coates v. Mayor, &e. of N. Y. 425, Clem »v. State 681 438, 1321 Clemens v. Conrad 996 v. Muse 40 Clement v. Graham 222 | Coatesville Gas Co. v. Chester Co. 165 ». Mattison 711| Coats v. Hill 757 Clendaniel v. Conrad 232, 259, 262, | Cobb v. Bord 264 263, 277, 279, 295, 298, 301, 346, | v. Lincoln Park Com’rs 1158 360, 1119, 1122, 1140, 1141) 1143, v. Okla. Pub. Co. 957 1144, 1145 | Cobbett v. Hudson 723 Cleveland, In re 180, 181, 1409 | Cobbett’s Case 723 v. Augusta 443 | Coburn, In re 189, 192 v. Clements Bros. Const. Co. 178, v. Ellenwood 411 383, 1346 v. Harvey 75 v. Cleveland El. R. Co. 565} Coca-Cola Co. v. Atlanta 1085, v. Creviston 114 1092, 1098 v. Heisley 1048 | Cochnower »v. United States 180 v. Rogers 859 | Cochran v. Darcy 596 v. Tripp 1065 | v. Jones 1353 ». Watertown 236 | v. Miller 590 Cleveland, &c. Co. v. People 758 v. Preston 372, 845, 1318 v. Schuler 834 v. State 620, 680 Cleveland, &c. R. Co. 0. Granbo 419 | v. Van Surlay 178, 199 v. Hadley 1220 | 203, 348, 353 v. Porter 1074 | Cochran’s Case 711 v. Smith 1209, 1220 | Cochrane ». Frostburg 447 Cleveland, C. C. & I. R. Co. v. Closser Cock v. Weatherby 887 1311 | Cockagne v. Hodgkisson 897 Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. 2. | Cocke v. Halsey 1357 Backus 1012, 1015} Cockrum >. State 730 v. Illinois 1267 | Coddington v. Bispham 595 Cleveland Leader Printing Co. ». | Codman ». Crocker 234, 505 Nethersole 889 | Coe, In re 258 Cleveland R. Co. ». Marshall 748 v. Armour Fertilizer Works 38 Cleveland School Furniture Co. dD. v. Errol 1009, 1010 Greenville 392 v. Los Angeles 531 Clifford, In re 1114 v. Shultz 1270, 1321 2. Martinsburg 1153 | ». Wormell 113 Clifton v. Cook 1397 | Coffee ». Castleberry 792 v. Meuser 110 | v. State 658 Cline v. State 665 | Coffey ». Edmonds 1375 Clinton ». Cedar Rapids, &c. Co. 1171 v. Harlan Co. 743 ». Draper 303 | v. United States 109 v. Englebrecht 78| Coffin v. Brown 920 ». Phillips 428 | v. Coffin 275, 931 v. State 984 v. Rich 589 Clippinger v. Hepbaugh 282 ». State 561 Clodfelter v. State 25 v. Thompson 1361 Clopton v. State 1324 ». Tracy 846 Close ». Greenwood Cemetery 1242 | Coffman v. Bk. of Ky. 597 Cloth ». Chicago, &c. R. Co. 1140 | v. Keightley 485 Clothing Co., In re 600 | 2. Osterhous 370 Cloud ». Pierce City 859 | Cofrode v. Gartner 49 Clough »v. Unity v. Verrette 1209 | Coggeshall ». Des Moines 40] 139, 140, 1363, 1371LIST OF CASES CITED } Page Coglan v. Beard 1414 Cogswell v. N. Y. &c. Co. 1154, 1161 Cohen, Ex parte 650 v. Barrett 291 v. Cleveland 439 v. Hoff 194 v. New York 522 ». New York Times Co. 890 | v. Portland 60 | ». Rosendale Realty Co. 1319 v. Wright 540 Cohens 2. Virginia 31, 32, 146 Cohn, Ez parte 1044 v. Beal 1356 | v. Bromberg 64 | v. Hoffman 590 | v. Kingsley 280 v. State 617, 627 | Cohn, Baer & Berman v. Bromberg 57, | 61, 64| Coit v. Sutton 1015 Colbert’s Estate, In re 47 Colburn v. Colburn 850 v. New Tel. Co. 1181 v. Woodworth 110 | Colby »v. Jackson 1224 | Coldwater v. Tucker 463 Cole v. Bedford 487 ». Black River Falls 1356 ». Brown-Hurley Hardware Co. 281, 283 2. Cunningham 57, 58 v. Dorr 236, 237, 245 »v. Eastham 1108 v. La Grange 468, 475, 1033 v. Medina 446, 521 v. Millspaugh 890 v. Muscatine 438 v. Norborne Land Drainage Dist. 1080 v. Tucker 1360 v. Wilson 959 Cole Mfg. Co. v. Falls 309 Coleman, Ex parte 53 Matter of 702 v. Ballandi 590 v. Carr 201 v. MacLennan 922, 942, 947 v. Roberts 671 v. Yesler 377 Coles v. Madison Co. 393, 564, 757 Collamer v. Page 846 Collector v. Day 996, 997 Colley v. Commonwealth 619 v. Merrill 75 Collie ». Franklin Co. 494 Collier v. Ft. Smith 521 v. Frierson 85 Collins v. Collins 594, 847 v. Henderson 147, 386 v. Hills 1251 v. Howard 1290 v. Johnston 40, 721, 724, 743 li Page Collins v. Lean 619, 630 v. Loisel 687 v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. 251 v. New Hampshire 1323 v. Philadelphia 448, 453 Colman v. Holmes 763 Coloma v. Eaves 407, 474 Colony v. Dublin 772 Colorado, &c. R. Co. v. Fort Collins 565, 578 Colorado BE. Ry. Co. v. Union Pac. Ry. Co. 1130, 1145, 1191 Colpetzer v. Trinity Church 744 Colt v. Eves 66, 158 Coltin v. Ellis 222 Colton v. Rossi 1204 Columbia v. Guest 1099 v. Melton 1153 Columbia Co. v. Davidson 477 v. King A477 Columbia Heights Realty Co. v. Rudolph 1215 Columbia National Bank v. Powell 65, 831 Columbia School Dist. v. Jones 1132 Columbia Trust Co. v. Lincoln Inst. 246 | Columbia Valley Tr. Co. v. Smith 766 Columbus v. Columbus 398 v. Penrod 522 : i Columbus Gas Light &c. Co. v. Colum- | bus 44] | Columbus Insurance Co. v. Curte- nius 1295 v. Peoria Bridge Co. 1295 | Columbus Packing Co. v. State 838 Columbus S. R. Co. v. Wright 1012 | Columbus Water Works Co. v. Long 1137 Colvill v. Fox 1125 Columbus & W. Ry. Co. v. Witherow 1156, 1178, 1199 Colwell v. Chamberlin 314 | Comas Stage Co. 2. Kozer 1285 | Combs v. Brewer 1418 Comer v. Fulsom 485 | Comfort v. Kosciusko 426 Comingor v. Louisville Tr. Co. 865 Commercial Bank ». Iola 468, 1033 Commercial Bank of Natchez v. State 566 Commercial Club v. Chicago, &c. R. Co. 1276 Commercial E. L. & P. Co. v. Jud- son 1047 Commercial Loan, &c. Co.v. Mallers 109 Commerical Nat’l Bank». Chambers 844 Commissioners v. Beckwith 1120 v. Duckett 450, 518, 526 v. Gas Co. A417 v. Little 872 ». Morrison 865 ». Owen 1041 vy. Seabrook 865 v. Trust Co. 290, 291lii LIST OF CASES CITED Page | Page Commissioners, &c. v. Bowie 1204 | Commonwealth v. Boston Transcript v. Cox 476 Co. 1237 v. Holyoke Water Power Co. »v. Bowden 688 $21, 1239 v. Boyd 700 Commissioners Allegany Co. v. Union v. Breed 1294 Min. Co. 1107 v. Brennan 578 Commissioners Brown Co. v. Stan- v. Brickett 714 dard Oil Co. 1010 v. Broad St. R. Co. 576 Com’rs Calhoun Co. v. Woodstock | v. Brooks 423 Iron Co. 572 v. Brown 1058 Com’rs of Dickinson Co. v. Hogan 1218 v. Byrne 737 Siena of Hamilton Co. ». : v. Certain Liquors 621 Aighels 506 v. Chambers 940 Com’rs Harford Co. ». Hamilton 712 v. Chapin 1108, 1288 Commissioners of Highways v. Mar- v. Charlestown 1290 tin 516 v. Chase-Davidson Co. 1341 Commissioners of Homochitto River v. Clap 892, 917, 920 v. Withers 1288 v. Clapp 360, 1252, 1255 Commissioners of Kensington v. v. Clark 264, 361, 652, 815 Philadelphia 506 v. Clary 258 aaa eeoners of Knox Co. v. Aspin- v. Clearview Coal Co. 1158 wa 237 v. Cluley 1402 v. Wallace 238 v. Coffee 623 Com’rs of Ottawa Co. v. Nelson 1048 v. Collins 674 ee eenioners of Revenue v. The 7 v. Colton 1281 ate 95 v. Com’rs &e. 754 Commissioners of St. Joseph Co. 2. v. Cat 686 Pidge cc 12965 | v. Costello 276 Com’rs Sinking Fund ». Green, &c. v. Co. Com’rs 1399 Nav. Co. 1294 | v. Coyningham 390 Com’rs of State Park v. Henry 1203 | o. Crass 1391 Com’rs of Stanly Co. v. Snuggs 280 v. Crotty 621 nraamioners oaunion Drainage a v. Crowinshield 424, 1283 .No.12.S a 7: v. Cullen o Commonwealth v. Alden Coal Co. 1010 ‘ Cullins Se 2. oan 227, 687 v. Cunnings 679 ». Alger 1225, 1286, 1319 GO i ic 2 v. Amer. Bell Tel. Co. 1018 - Gee ae ‘ oe 654 Fin ». Andrews 249, 673 657, 661, 1283 ». Anthes 682 ». Dailey ae (676 2. Archer | 644 2. Dana 641 v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Davis 427, 884 fee 187, 735, 1310 v. Dean " 245 z Ra 705 v. Del. Div. Canal Co. 1043 s nee Al eee 2. Dollar Sav. Bank 340 v. Bailey rset. Doo 868 2. Bakeman 688 0. Dorse 552 v. Bean 426 v. Do ma 9 v. Bearse 1330 aca ee e ‘ v. Drewry 301 2. Beaulieu 1327 ». Duane 756, 790 v. Bosver Dam Coal Co. 225, 227, 298 2. Duffy ‘ 544 2 Bennett 245 y 2. Billings re 5 aed aaa 2. Binns 1352 7 Be = ise ». Bird Pratee v. Eastern R. R. Co. 1247 2. Blanding 884. aS Body ee ERR Sod 4, oe 2. Edison Electric Light Co. 989 ehbcine: na v. Emery 872 5 RS t v. Emmers 802 nner 660, 958 E i 8B ic ’ v. Emminger 1407, 1412 Boece Ys am 667 v. Endrukat 691 - Doston, we. KR. R. 1248 v. Erie & N. E Sesion Ad a : e = i EUs be Coss @40254 13, vertising Co. 1319 1161, 1162, 1164sesssceseede2es eseseeecd Sees eeeee ese¢esesee8 eecsccees : eee?esse8 gseseess LIST OF CASES CITED Page Commonwealth v. Erie & W. Tr. Co. 566 . Erie R. R. 1008 . Essex Co. 569 | . Featherstone 911 . Fells 688, 689, 690 | . Fenton 427 | Ferguson 1044 | Fisher 297, 982, 1195 | . Fitzpatrick 690 . Fowler 1250 . Fredericks 245 . Freelove 638 . Gage 424 . Gallagher 660 | . Gamble 562 | . Germania L. I. Co. 1044 . Gilbert 1341 . Goddard 688 . Godshalk 933 Green 62, 301, 1402 . Gregory 1332 Griest 87 . Griffith 251 . Groves 554 Hall 54, 552 . Hamilton Mfg. Co. 803, 1342 Hana 371 | Harman 658 Harmel 1015 | Hart 688, 727 | Hartman 355, 385 Hartnett 119 | Has 982, 1281 | Haskell 709 | Hawes 57 | Hawkins 685 | . Henry 1235 Herr 178, 299, 348, 354, 380} . Hillside Coal Co. 833, 834 | . Hilton 48 . Hinds 622 . Hipple 180 . Hitchings 66, 360, 361, 362 Holbrook 1267 Holder 249 Holt 653 Housatonic R. R. 1304 owe 1255 Hoxey 1389 . Hubley 427, 1315 Hunt io Hyneman 1281 Illinois Cent. R. Co. 267 . International Harvester Co. 142, 146 . Intoxicating Liquors 621, 1250, 1256 Jeandelle 1281 John T. Connor Co. 1347 sseses Jones Josselyn Judges of Quarter Sessions 185, 198, 582, 693, 1409 778 236, 237 liti Page Commonwealth v. Keary 1331, 1332 v. Kelly 1372, 1387, 1409, 1413 ». Kendall 1255 v. Kenneson 313 v. Killion 653, 654 ». Kimball 361, 641, 756, 790 v. King 666, 1292 v. Knapp 655, 682, 697 v. Kneeland 977 v. Knowlton 75 ». Leach 75 ». Lebanon Water Works 1087 v. Leech 270, 1410 v. Lehigh Val. R. R. Co. 1008, 1304 ». Linn 976 v. Locke 225 v. Lodge 76 ». Lottery Tickets 619 ». Look 1108 ». Louisville First Christian Church 1090 ». Louisville, &c. R. R. Co. 1282 v. Lynchburg Y. M. C. A. 1094 v. McCall 276 ». McCarthy 1327 v. McClanahan 653 v. McClelland 1369 v. McCloskey 345 v. McCombs 1356, 1397 v. McHale 1389, 1395 v. McLane 871 ». McWilliams 225, 237, 244 v. Mann 561 v. Marshall 756, 775, 790 v. Marzynski 1282 v. Matthews 424 v. Maxwell 348, 360 ». Meeser 1412 ». Mervis 392 v. Miller 1324 v. Mitchell 655 ». Moir 263, 265, 341, 352, 357, 381, 390 ». Molton 640 v. Moore 346, 373, 1045 v. Morey 657 ». Morgan 660, 661 v. Morris 920 v. Morrison 443, 1176 v. Mulhall 1283 vy. Mullen 661 ». Murphy 730 ». Myers 641, 1015 v. Nesbit 982 ». New York, &c. Co. 1018 ». New Bedford Bridge 594 ». Newburyport 399, 495 ». Nichols 660, 940 s ece . Nickerson 25, 31, 130, 1259, 1260, 1262, 1263, 1264 . Nolan 424 . Odell 920 Old Colony, &c. R. Co. 1162liv LIST OF CASES CITED Page | Page Commonwealth ». Olds 690 | Commonwealth v. Turner 666 paintor 236, 237 | v. Uprichard 250 v. Patch 414, 418, 426, 1270] v. Van Tuyl 682 vp. Patton 263 v. vane ieee : ; 1116, 1241, v. Vighotti o v. Pa. Canal Co rou oral Mier acres 1333 aPants 1287 | v. Wagner 666 ». Perry 831, 1306 v. Waite 1322 ». Petty 14 v. Waldman 1282 v. Phelps 543, 552, 610 v. Walter 1353 ». Philadelphia Co. 989 v. Wardwell 921 2. Pittsburg 498 v. Wellford 773 v. Pittsburg, &c. R. R. Co. 818, 1115 v. Wells 1391 ». Plaisted 427, 489, 490, 969,1352 | v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co. 989 v. Pomeroy 360 v. Westinghouse El. & Mfg. Co. v. Porter 682, 705 989 v. Potts 362, 365 v. White 249, 983, 1282 v. Powell 306 v. Whitney 868 v. Preece 656 | v. Wilkins 423 v. Price 423 | v. Wilkinson 1163 v. Puder 265 | v. Williams 140, 766 v. Putnam 851 v. Woelper 1377 v2. Ramunno 685 | v. Wolf 982 v. Randall 713 v. Wood 684 v. Reed 872 v. Worcester 417, 1283 v. Reeder 136, 1401 v. Wright 341 v. Reinecke Coal Min. Co. 834, 1331 v. Zelt 1251 v. Rice 687 | Commonwealth’s Appeal 1094 v. Richards 663, 664 | Compagnie Francaise v. La. St. Bd. v. Richter 1151 of Health 1271 v. Riley 1237, 1347 | Company of Free Fishers, &c. The v. ». Roberts 346| Gann 1108 2. Roby 691 | Comstock v. Gay 751 v. Roxbury 388 | Conabeer v. N. Y. C. &c. Co. 1174 v. Rock 682 | Conant, In re 870 v. Roy 421 | Concha v. Concha 114 v. Ryan 872 | Concord v. Boscawen 463 9. Savings Bk, 1103 | v. Portsmouth Savings Bk. 472 v. Scott 660 | v. Robinson 472 ». Semmes 644 | Concord R. R. v. Greeley 1125 v. Shaleen 51 | Concordia Cemetery Ass’n v. Minnesota, v. Sheeran 1392] &c. R. Co. 1118 v. Sholes 690 | Condemnation of Lands, In re 1114 v. Short 1344 | Condemnation Suits, In re 1208 v. Sisson 232, 1329 | Condict 2. Jersey City 453 v. Slavski 349, 373, 663, 665, 666 Conditional Discharge of Convicts, ». Slocum 424! Inre, 217, 219 ». Smith 666, 1257 | Condon »v. Galbraith 1106 2. Snelling 959 | Cone v. Cotton 856 v. Snyder 1335 v. Hartford 1071, 1082, 1284 v, Spencer 659 | Cone E. & C. Co. v. Poole 255 ». Stall 773 | Coney v. Owen 800 ». Starr 982 | Confiscation Cases 757 v. Stodder 420, 424, 1283, 1336 | Congdon ». Norwich 529 v Stowell 690 Conger »v. Pierce Co. 1149, 1227 v. Sturtivant 655 | Conkey v. Hart 586, 591, 592, 599 v. Taylor 655, 657 | Conklin v. N. Y. &c. Co. 1153, 1157 v. Tewksbury 1225, 1319 v. State 690 v. Theberge 391, 424 | Conlin v. San Francisco 468, 493 v. Towles 48 | Connally v, General Const. Co. 829 v, Trent 1225, 1319 | Connecticut College for Women ». ». Tuck 686, 688} Calvert 1124, 1136, v, Tuckerman 657 1140, 1141, 1148LIST OF Page Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. ». Cross v. Cushman v. Spratley 79 595 254, 256, 845, 854 Connecticut R. R. R. Co. v. Commis- sioners Connell v. Connell Connella v. Haskell Connellee v. Blanton Connelly v. State v. United States Conner, Ex parte . Elliott v. Gray s .~] . Nevada . New York ses Conners v. Burlington, &c. R. Co. v. People Connolly v. Boston v. Union Sewer-pipe Co. Connor v. Green Pond, &c. Connors v. Carp River Iron Co. v. People ». Pratt Connort, Ez parte Conrad v. Ithaca Conservators of River Tone v. Ash . Mayor, &c. of New York 1204 782 721 924 675 628 304 47 562 295 520 561 867 661 1282 814, 815, 1230 t; Rie Co: 303 316 660 726 721 518 All Consolidated Apt. House v. Baltimore 445 Consolidated Channel Co. v. R. R. Co. Consolidated Coal Co. v. Illinois v. People Consolidated Gas Co., In re 1134 815 1337 105 Consolidated Rendering Co., In re v. Vermont Constant v. Shockey Constitutional Convention, In re Constitutional Provision, Re 254, 627 627 1380, 1414 86 100 Consumers’ Gas & E. L. Co. v. Con- gress Springs Co. 1184 Consumers’ League v. Colo., &e. ReCos Contest of Special Election, In re 372, 803 1398 Contested Election, In re 142, 1360, 1364 Continental Fire Ins. Co. v. Whitaker Continental Imp. Co. v. Phelps Contra Costa R. R. v. Moss Contzen v. United States Converse, Ex parte Re Conway »v. Cable v. Taylor’s Ex’r v. Waverly Conwell v. Emrie v. O’Brien Cook v. Burlington v. Conners 1333 151 1146 13 843 67 769, 772, 791, 792 1296 1107 1114 413 1085 110 CASES CITED lv Page Cook »v. Cook 857 v. Gray 595, 596 v. Gregg 588, 760 v. Hart 54 v. Hill 910, 912 v. Howland 253, 254, 255 v. Macon 452 v. Marshall Co. 295, 296, 815 v. Massey 773 v. Moffat 25, 601 v. Pennsylvania 1006, 1017, 1251 v. Portland 394 v. Salt Lake City 1196 v. San Francisco Civ. Serv. Comm, 1405 ». Slocum 1073 v. South Park Com’rs 1206, 1207 v. State 219, 422, 1360 v. United States 544 v. Vimont 113 Cook County v. Chicago 390, 392, 458, 508, 516, 1225, 1226, 1235, 1313, 1314 Cook Farm Co. v. Detroit 498 Cooke v. Cooke 208 v. Iverson 223, 224 v. O’ Malley 943 v. United States 838 Cookerly ». Duncan 775 Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens 1002, 1274, 1280 v. Fitzgerald 270 v. Freeholders 516 v.Galyon 894, 923, 686, 1259, 1261 Coolidge v. Guthrie 1124 v. Williams 820 Coombs v. Rose 911 Cooney v. Foote 313 v. Hartland 453 Coonradt v. Myers 757 Cooper, Ex parte 1322 Re 670, 1134 v, Barber 941 v. Bell 709 v. Board of Works 852 v. Brazelton 60 ». Caruthersville 530 ». Commonwealth 685 v. Cooper 850, 851 v. Greeley 891, 941 v. McJunkin 713 v. Montgomery Co. 1085 v. Newell 859 v. People 670, 921, 942 v. Phipps 923 ». Rollins 339 v. Seaverns 75, 890 v. Springer 493 ». Stone 941 ». Sunderland 859, 860 ». Telfair 182, 348, 372 v ». Utah Light, &c. Co. 143, 146 v. Williams 1118, 1124lvi LIST OF CASES CITED Page | Page Cooper’s Case 900 | Cotton ». Com’rs of Leon Co. 237, Cooper Lumber Co. v. Dammers 1316 a 348, 372 Cooper Mf’g Co. v. Ferguson 148, 256 | v. Phillips 1352 Coosa River St. B. Co. v. Barclay Cotton Exchange v. Railway Co. 1304 587, 1248] Cottrell v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co. 51 Copas v. Anglo-Am. Prov. Co. 854 v. State 319 Cope, Re 1087 | Cotts v. Wheeling 1209 v. Payne 113 | Cotulla v. Kerr 912, 957 Copes v. Charleston 237 | Couch v. McKee 762 Copland ». Pirie 314, 316] Coulehan v. White 1380, 1390 Copp v. Henniker 867 | Coulter v. Louisville, &c. R. Co. 1093 ». State 993 | Coulterville v. Gillen 414 Coppage v. Kansas 801, 830 | Coughlin ». McElroy 1415 Copper v. Mayor, &c. 474 | v. People 676 Corbett v. Bradley 156} Cougot v. New Orleans 1335 ». McDaniel 1409 | Council Bluffs v. Kansas City, &c. R. Corbin v. Benton 523'l) | RCo: 1304 ». Hill 769 | Counselman v. Hitchcock 649, 650, 662 v. Houlehan 251, 348, 555 | County Board of Education v. Dur- Corbin Young Men’s Christian Ass’n | ham 434 »v. Com. 1095 | County Com’rs v. Jones 561 Corcoran v. Cambridge 1054, 1076 | County Commissioners of Somerset Cordova v. Folgueras 750 | County v. Pocomoke Bridge Co. 149 Corfield v. Coryell 47, 822, 1016| County Court v. Griswold 1133 Coriell ». Ham 586 | County of Black Hawk »v. Springer 866 Corley v. State 655 | County of Los Angeles v. Hollywood Corlis ». E. W. Walker Co. 747| Cemetery Ass’n 1321 Corliss, Ez parte 5| County of McLean v. Humphrey 609 Matter of 1402 County of Mobile v. Kimball 492 Re 1353 | County of Peoria v. Harvey 1209 ». Corliss 158, |} Courier-Journal Co. v. Phillips 891 Cornelisen v. Atlanta 530 |} Courtner v. Etheredge 599 Cornell v. State 436, 695 | Courts of Appeals, In re 180 Cornet v. Winton 27, 1202 | Cousins »v. State 1045 Corning v. McCullough 588 | Coutant v. People 142, 147, 372 v. Greene 236 | Couts v. United States 669 v. Holmes 1220 | Cover v. Baytown 491 v. Saginaw 453 | Covington v. Bryant 518 Cornwall v. Commonwealth 582 | ». Buffett 182 Corrigan v. Buckley 829 v. East St. Louis 316, 318, 414 v. Gage 428 v. Kentucky 395, 565, 573 Corrigan et al. v. City of Chicago 1118 v. Lee 520, 522 Corrugated Culvert Co. ». Simpson v. State 1391 110, 113 v. Southgate 792 Pp. Corry v. Baltimore v. Carter Corsicana v. White Corson v. Maryland Cortland v. Larson 1021, 1062 124, 141, 807 1018 405, 422, 433 Corwin v. Comptroller 322 v. N. Y. & Erie R. R. Co. 1244, 1245 Cosgrove v. Augusta 429 Cosmos Exploration Co. v. Great Eagle Oil Co. 229 Costar v. Brush 575 Coster v. N. J. R. R. Co. 1195 Costigan v. Pa. R. Co. 1161 Cotten v. Ellis 140 Cotter v. Stoeckel 1231 Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co. 841, 1808 Cottman v. Grace 63 Covington & C. Bridge Co. ». Ken- tucky 1277, 1296, 1304, 1307 453 | Covington & L. Turnpike Road Co. 2. 573, 1308 1121 Sandford Covington Ry. Co. v. Piel Covington St. R. Co. v. Covington &e. Co. 1177 Cowan v. McCutchen 767 v. Milbourn 977 Coward v. Wellington 912 Cowardin v. Universal L. Ins. Co. 255 Cowdery, In re 707 Cowen v. West Troy 413 Cowgill v. Long 789 Cowles v. Harts 112 Cowley »v. Pulsifer 935 Cox, Ex parte 186 v. Allen 847 ». Bunker 891LIST OF CASES CITED lvii Page Page Cox »v. Coleridge 651)! Crawford »v. Gilchrist 85, 86, 128 ». Com’rs of Pitt County 1031 v. Marion 1160 ». Cox 856 v. School Dist. No. 7 807 v. Lee 956 | v. State 639 ». Louisville &c. Co. 467, 1164 | v. Topeka 430 ». Mason City, &c. R. Co. 1215 v. Wilson 83 ». Phila., &c. R. Co. 1213, | Crawford Co. ». Hathaway 1115, 1130 1214, 1215, 1221) Crawfordsville v. Bond 453 ». Pitt County 279 | ». Braden 1020 v. Revelle 1125, 1140, 1144] v. Hays 386 ». Robison 137 | Crawfordsville, &c. Co. v. Fletcher 128 v. State 215, 263 | Crawshaw v. Roxbury 460 Coxe v. Martin 597 | Creal v. Keokuk 438, 1152 Coxhead v. Richards 897 | Cream of Wheat Co. v. Co. of Grand Coy, In re 726, 1361 Forks 1061 Coyle v. McIntire 1032) Crease v. Babcock 228 v. Smith 79, 102 Creation of New Counties, Re 287 Coyner v. Lynde 847 | Creevy v. Carr 959 Cozard v. Kanawha Hardwood Co. 1140| Creighton v. Piper 1353 Crabb v. Celeste School Dist. 509 | ». San Francisco 493 Crabtree v. Crabtree 122| Crenshaw v. Arkansas 1007 Craemer v. Washington 843 ». Slate River Co. 348, 1137 Craft v. State Bank 75 | Creote v. Chicago 1065 Crafts v. Ray 1091 | Cresap v. Gray 1406 Craig v. Andes 477 | Crescent Brewing Co. v. Oregon Short »v. Brown 888 Line R. Co. 1304 ». Burnett 417, 419 Crescent City, &c. Co. v. Butcher’s ». Dimock 997 Union &c. Co. 33 v. First Presb. Church 1321 | Crescent Cotton Oil Co. v. Miss. v. Kline 1293 | 253, 1000 v. Missouri 45} Cressey v. Meyer 766 v. Philadelphia 1075| Creston v. Nye 646, 672 ». Rochester &c. R. R. Co. Creston Water Wks. Co. v. McGrath 1145 1164, 1167, 1176, 1179 | Cribb v. State 705 ». State 673| Crichfield v. Bermudez A. P. Co. ». Werthmueller 1256 | 284, 285 Craighead v. Martin 864 | Criesa v. Des Moines 439 Craighill ». Lambert 1133 | Crim v. Crim 64 Crain v. United States 844 | Crigler v. Shapler 46 Cram v. Chicago, &c. R. Co. 316, 340] Cripple Creek v. Adams 475 Crandall, Petition of 723 | Cristilly v. Warner 250, 257 v. James 109| Crittenden v. White 14 »v. Nevada 822, 1008} Crockett ». McLanahan 924 v. State 48, 822| Cromarty v. Boston 529 Crane v. Bennett 122, 940 | Cromer v. Logansport 451 ». Campbell 1257 | Cronan v. Cotting 120 v. Harrison 439, 1220 | Crone v. Angell 887 v. Johnson 1342, 1343| Cronin v. People 425, 431 »v. Meginnis 211, 212, 858 | Cronise v. Cronise 211, 582 v. School District 386 | Crooke v. Van Pelt 724 v. State 892 Crocker v. State 866 ». Waters 943 | Crookshank, Hz parte 1259, 1262, ». West Chicago Park Com’rs 1052 1263, 1264 Craney v. Donovan 891| Crosby v. Hanover 1115 Cranor v. Volusia Co. Com’rs 787 v. Libby 1380 Cransan v. Smith 14 v. Lyon 1093, 1098 Cravens ». Louisville, &c. R. Co. 762 ». Mayfield 808 v. State 279, 632 », Spear 28 Craw v. Tolono 1056 v. State 1259, 1261 Crawford, In re 58 »v. Warren 426, 1326 ». Bridgeport 1120 | Cross, Ex parte 249 v. Delaware 439, 1153, 1156, 1178 ». Allen 40 1353, 1402 v. Armstrong 59 ov. DunbarCross v. Cross lviii LIST OF Page | 856 | Cummerford v. McAvoy ~ v. Hopkins 390 | v. State 656 | Crossley v. California 29, 686 Crossman v. Galveston 434, 1315, | 1325, 1327 | ». United States 12 | Crouch, Ex parte 724 | v. Hall 75 | Crouse v. State 298 Crow v. Bowlby 109 v. St. Louis 1035 Crowder v. Sullivan 473 Crowe v. Charlestown 439 Crowell v. Akin 744, 865 | v. Hopkinton 481, 485, 487, 1034, 1039 v. Randall 34 Crowley, Ex parte 728 | v. Burlington, &c. Ry. Co. 1243 v. Copley 1081, 1297 | 2. State 372 v. West 419 Crown Cork & Seal Co. »v. State 991 Croxton »v. Truesdel 1372 Croy v. Epperson 1007 Crozier v. Cudney 630 v. Fried Krupp Aktien- gesellschaft 1203, 1204 Cruikshanks v. Charleston 742 Crum »v. Broy 1283 Crumlish’s Adm’r ». Central Imp. 0. 59 Crump v. Guyer 772 v. Morgan 80 Cruse v. Fischl 1089 | Crutcher ». Commonwealth 1018 v. Kentucky 367, 1013, 1018 Crystal Springs Land & W. Co. ». | Los Angeles 33 Cubbison v. McCreary 984 Cubreth, Ex parte 53 Cudahy Packing Co. v. Minn. 1014 2. Parramore 41, 1337 | Cuddy, Ez parte 727 | Culbertson ». Commonwealth 544 | v. Iola Portland Cement Co. 863 Cullen v. Carthage 404, 461 | v. N.Y. N. H. & H. R. R. Co. 1149 | Cullinan v. Walker 1023 | Culp, In re 60 | Culver v. Marx 891 |} v. Streator 454 Culver’s Estate, In re 1021 Cumberland ». Willison 453 | Cumberland, &c. R. R. Co. 2. Co. Ct: ~ 339, 772 Cumberland Gaslight Co. v. W. Va. &c. Co. Cumberland & P. R. Co. ». State 1015, Cumberland Tel. &c. Co. ». Avritt v. United El. Ry. Co. 5( © 1043 | 1181 | 1179 | CASES CITED Page 940 Cumming v. Bd. of Education 824, 837 v. Police Jury 1057 Cummings v. Ash 1112 v. Howard 781 v. Merchant’s Nat’! Bk. 1040 v. Missouri 89, 538, 540, 543, 545 v. National Bank 1040, 1048 v. Peters 1132 v. Wingo 50 Cummins v. Seymour 1187 Cumnock »v. Little Rock 401 Cunard §S. S. Co. v. Mellon 1264, 1265 | Cunningham v. Cambridge 236 v. Brown 923 v. Macon 24 v. Neagle 30 v. Northwestern Imp. Co. 747, 825, 1338 v. Ponca City 1134 v. Seattle 453, 529 v. State 641 v. Wilde 752 Cunnion, In re 702 Cunnius v. Reading School Dist. 837 Cunnyngham v. Shelby 253 Cupp v. Com’rs of Seneca Co. 854, 1205 Cureton v. State 1277 Curley v. Tait 773 Curran v. Arkansas 45 v. Shattuck 1201, 1206 Surrie v. Waverly, &c. R. Co. 1216 Currier v. Marietta & Cincinnati 152, 18%, (Ole). 1122, 1123 Curry v. Buckhannon &c. Co. 1199 v». Walter 934 Curryer v. Merrill 386 Curtis, Ex parte 15 v. Curtis 887 v. Gibbs 856 v. Gill 868 v. Hiden 750, 810 v. Hubbard 611 v. Leavitt 599, 757, 781 v. Mussey 914 v. State 646 v. Whipple v. Whitney Curtiss v. Gibbs Cushing v. Hederman Cushman »v. Smith Cusic v. Douglas Cusick’s Appeal Cutlip v. Sheriff Cutts v. Hardee Juykendall v. Doe Cuyler v. Rochester 356, 1036, 1039 588, 591 59 890 1202 589, 754 1369 305, 310 597 57, 64 846 Cypress Pond Draining Co. ». Hooper Dabbs ». State Dada v, Piper 873, 1032, 1036 1330 924LIST OF CASES CITED lix Page Page Dagge v. State 319] Darling v. Boesch 322 Daggett v. Colgan 1027 v. Gunn 1048 »v. Hudson 1369 ». Miles 137 Dagwell, In re 42 | »v. Newport News 1155 Dahnke v. People 181, 671} ». Rogers 260, 261 Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bond- | Darlington v. New York 506 urant 35, 253, 340 | v. United States 1113 Dailey, Ex parte 1353 | ». Ward 426 v. Reynolds 890 | Darnell v. Indiana 1061 v. State 1353 | Darrington v. State Bk. of Ala. 45 ». Superior Court of San Fran- Darrow v. People 263, 1351 cisco 671 | Darst v. People 419 Daily ». Swope 1081, 1099 | Dart v. Houston 562, 568 Daily Post Co. v. McArthur 948 | Dartmouth College v. Woodward 248, Dakin v. Hudson 859 395, 467, 501, 524, 561, Dakota Central Telephone Co. 2. 566, 567, 582, 736, 819, 1239 Ss. D. 380 | Dash v. Van Kleek 136, 137, 188, Dakota Synod »v. State 967, 968 | 191, 543, 757, 772 Dalby v. Wolf 390 | Datz v. Cleveland 216 Dallas Ry. Co. v. Galler 570 | Daubman v. Smith 298 Dale ». Commonwealth 220 | Daugherty, Ex parte 276 v. Governor 572, 581, 793 v. Amer. McK. P. Co. 49, 51 v. Irwin 1365, 1366, 1370 v. Thomas 341 v. Marvin 113} Dauphiny v. Buhne 956 0. Medcalf 784| D’Auvilliers v. De Livaudais 850 v. State 682 | Davenport v. Barnett 109 Daley v. Watertown 451 | v. Mayor 1353 Dalles Lumbering Co. v. Urquhart 1132 ». Richmond 438, 1322, 1327 Dalrymple v. Mead 1288 | v. Stevenson 446 Dalton, Ex parte 276 v. Young 203 Re 1346 | Davenport, &c. Co. v. Davenport 412 v. Calhoun Co. Dist. Court 627 | David v. Portland Water Co. 490 v. Geo. C. Brown & Co. 1045 | Davidow v. Wadsworth Mfg. Co. 834 v. State 68, 270| Davidson v. Boston & Me. R. R. Co. »v. Water Com’rs 1120 1149, 1150 v. Wilson 529 ». Briggs 122 Daly v. State 804 | ». Hanson 224 Damour v. Lyons City 450 v. Hine 128, 453, 489, 490 Dana, Matter of 677, 868 ». Jennings 94 Dancaster v. Hewson 926 v. Lawrence 765 Dane Co. v. Dunning 865 v. New Orleans 492, 739, 742, 842, Danforth v. Groton 784 1065, 1080, 1298 »v. Groton Water Co. 763, 771 ». Richardson 590 v. State 640 | Davie v. Douglas Co. 509, 516 Daniel Ball, The 1288, 1293 | Davies, In re 707 Daniells 2, Watertown 775| —-+v. McKeeby 139, 746, 759 Daniels v. Board of Education 516 v. Morgan 417 v. Clegg 119| Daviess Co. 2. Dickinson 476 v. Hathaway 455] Davis, Ex parte 715 v. Homer 623, 1313 In re 276, 277, 587, 724, 859, 861 Danks v. Quackenbush 587 ». Auld 1324, 1326 Dantzer v. Indianapolis Union Ry. v. Bank of Fulton 294 Co. 1150 v. Berry 695 Danville v. Fox 521 ». Boget 966 ». Pace 120, 346, 354, ». Brown 887 355, 755, 772, 781 ». Burke 167, 168, 169, 843 v. Shelton 1045 v. Corona Coal Co. 765 Danzer & Co. v. Gulf, &e. Co. Ce v. Davis 60, 61, 114 D’Arcy v. Ketchum 57, 60 v. Dubuque 1064 Darcy 2. Allain 580, 813 vy. Duncan 919 Dare Co. v. Currituck Co. 398 ». Dunn 1195 Dargan v. Mobile 519 v. E. Tenn., &c. R. Co. 1162 Darius v. Apostolos 1299 ». Elmira Sav. Bk. 29lx Davis v. Florida Power Co. LIST OF CASES CITED Page | 335, 346 | ». Gaines 102, 163, 260, 279, 1034, 1064 | v. Gray 558, 563 v. Guilford 522 0. Hambrick 1360 ». Hearst 940 ». Hildebrant 71 v. Holbrook 1391 v. Jackson 448 vo. Janeway 283 2. Laughlin 1048 v. Litchfield 1077 2. Lynchburg 1065, 1074 2. Massachusetts 435 v. Mayor, &c. of N. Y. 438, 442 v. Menasha 810 v. Mills 96 2. Minneapolis, &c. R. Co. 49 v. Minor 762 v. Montgomery 445 v. Nation 765 v. New England R. Co. 1210 v. New Orleans &c. Co. 518 v. O’Ferrall 753 v. Petrinovich 44] v. Reed 435 v. Richardson 997 v. Rockport 527 v. Rupe 596 0. St. Louis Co. Com’rs 840 v. Shepstone 918 v. Silverton 1153 v. Spragg 443 v. State 215, 295, 309, 316, 354, 360, 616, 664, 804, 805 ». State Bank 777, 783 v. Texas 66, 67, 844 v. Warde 1409 ». Wood 112 ». Woolnough 306 Davis’s Lessee v. Powell 800 Davison v. Duncan 949 v. Johonnot 201, 809 Davock v. Moore 287, 490 Davoust v. Alameda 518, 525 Dawdell v. United States 666 Dawkins >. Billingsley 887 v. Lord Paulet 925 v. Lord Rokeby 925 | Dawson, In re 865 2. Aurelius 452 v. Coffman 75 | »v. Duncan 94] v. Holt 94] v. Lee 808 | v. Shaver 348 v. State 548 Dawson Soap Co. ». Chicago 445, 492, 506 Day, Re 181, 1343 | v. Gallup 34 | v. Green 1283 Page Day v. Jones 1364 v. Kent 1397 v. Munson 121 v. Savadge 870 v. Stetson 279 Dayton v. Asheville 448, 1160 v. Quigley 428 v. Rewald 1153 v. So. Covington 413 Dayton Coal and Iron Co. ». Barton 1307 Dayton-Goose Creek R. Co. v. United States 832, 1002, 1004, 1301, 1302 Dayton Mining Co. v. Seawell 1134 Daytona v. Edson 522 Deal v. Miss. Co. 1028 Dean v. Ann Arbor St. Ry. Co. 1179 v. Borchsenius 770, 787 v. Gleason 791, 1093 v. Miller 1418 v. Spartanburg Co. 261 v. Sullivan R. R. Co. 1194, 1209 v. Willamette Bridge Co. 673 Deansville Cemetery Ass’n, Matter of 1134, 1141 Dearborn v. Boston, C. & M. R. R. Co. 467, 1219, 1220 Deaton v. Polk 1214 Deats, Ex parte 579 Deavitt v. Washington Co. 1117 De Ben »v. Gerard 416 De Berry v. Nicholson 1370 Debevoise v. New York 258 Deblois v. Barker 1284 Debnam v. Chitty 291 Debolt v. Ohio Life Ins. & Tr. Co. 571 Debs v. United States 904, 906 De Camp v. Eveland 380 ». Hibernia R. R. Co. 313, 1127 Decatur v. Barteau 455 v. Fisher 522 Decatur Co. v. Humphreys 1120 De Chastellux v. Fairchild 107, 184, 192, 207 Decker v. Baltimore, &c. R. R. Co. 26 v. Gaylord 909 Decorah v. Dunstan 423 De Cordova v. Galveston 773 Dedham 2. Natick 712 Deeds v. Sanborn 1064 Deems »v. Baltimore 1314, 1322 Deering & Co. v. Cunningham 284 ». Peterson 1030 Dees, In re 1045 v. Kingman 1025 De Geofrey v. Merchants’ Bridge &c. Co. 1174 De Giacomo, In re 554 De Grazier v. Stephens 47, 48, 51, 822 De Groff v. St. Paul, &c. Co. 559 Deibeikis ». Link-Belt Co., 747, 755, 835 Deitrick’s Admin. v. State Life Ins. Co. 49LIST OF CASES Page Dejarnette 0. Commonwealth 683 | v. Haynes 341 De Kalb Co. Tel. Co. v. Dutton 1182, 1183 De Krafft v. Barney 722 Delafoile v. State 611 | Delagel v. Highley 933 De Lamar’s Gold Min. Co. v. Nesbitt 33] Dela Montanyav.DelaMontanya 857 Delancey »v. Ins. Co. 818 | Delaney v. Brett 339 | v. Plunkett 346, 624 | Delano’s Case 707 | Delaplaine v. Cook 767, 768 De La Rama v. De La Rama 78 | Delaware &c. Co. v. Pennsylvania 1019 Delaware & H. Canal Co. v. Mahlen- brock 256 Delaware, &c. R. Co. v. Yurkonis 1000 Delegal v. Highley 934 De Lima v. Bidwell 12 Dell v. Marvin 94 Dellaripas’ Appeal 1073 Dells v. Kennedy 1369 Delmonica v. Mayor, &c. of N. Y. 528 Deloach v. Rogers 1403 Delphi v. Evans 439, 1121 Demaree v. Scates 1351 De Mill v. Lockwood 751 Democratic Pub. Co. v. Harvey 943 | De Moss v. Newton 765 | Dempsey »v. People 667 Den »v. Bolton 963 v. Downam 779 v». Dubois 128 v. Schenck 128 Denham v. Holeman 304 | Denison ». Hyde 856 Denn »v. Reid 127 Dennett, In re 223 Petitioner 222 Denney 2. State 176 Dennick v. Railroad Co. 258 Denning v. Corwin 859 Dennis v. Atlantic Coast Line R.Co. 258 ». Caughlin 1376 v. Moses 96, 830, 837, 1331 ». State 1368 Dennis, Long & Co. v. City of Louis- ville 1123 Dennison v. Christian 54, 55 Dennison School District v. Padden 386 Denny, In re 146, 1401 v. Ashley 855 v. Mattoon 206, 792 v. Reynolds 109 v. White 371, 370 Dent v. West Virginia 20, 545, 746, 1342, 1343 Denton v. Jackson 411, 463, 509 Dentzel ». Waldie 783 Denunzio »v. Schlatz 702 Denver 2. Bach 429 CITED lxi Page Denver v. Bayer 1199 v. Burrows 529 v. Capelli 448 ». Coulehan 1064 v. Davis 518 ». Frueaufft 1334 ». Hayes 238 v. Hobbs’ Estate 1085 v. Knowles 1077 ». Maurer 518, 520 v. Millin 433 ». Rhodes 450, 528, v. Rogers 426, 433 v. Spencer 518 v. United Cigar Stores Co. 1334 v. Vernia 438, 1200 Denver Circle R. Co. v. Nestor 315, 1199 Denver City Irrig. Co. v. Middaugh 1220 Denver City R. Co. v. Denver 1058 Denver Dry Goods Co. v. Jester 711 Denver Power, &c. Co. v. Denver, &c. R. Co. 1190 Denver Public Warehouse Co. v. Hol- loway 891, 894, 956 Denver &c. Co. v. Bourne 1199 v. Hannegan 1218 v. Lamborn 1204 Denver, &c. R. Co. v. Denver 1239 ». Stinemeyer 1179, 1199 Denver & R. G. Ry. Co. v. Denver, «&e. Co. 1192 Department of Public Works & Build- ings v. Caldwell 1196 Depew v. Bd. of Com’rs, &c. 1288 v. Robinson 889 ». Trustees 79 ». Trustees of W. and E. Canal 1294, 1296, 1297 De Pledge ». New York 530 Depue v. Banschbach 1148 | Derby v. Derby 654, 851 Derby Turnpike Co. v. Parks 348 Derden v. State 668 | Derinza’s Case 666 8 | De Rinzie v. People 641 Derlin v. Derlin 707 DeSaussure v. Gaillard 23 De Severinus v. Press Pub. Co. 940 | De Silvia v. State 306 Deskins v. Gose 387 | Des Moines »v. Gilchrist 404 ». Manhattan Oil Co. 244, 361, 434, 1227, 1230, 1232, 1236, 1315 | Des Moines C. Ry. Co. v. Des Moines 431 Des Moines, &c. Levee Dist. No. 1 |». Chicago, &c. R. Co. 1297 | Desmond v. Dunn 262 | Desnoyer v. Jordan 751 De Sollar ». Hanscombe 110 Detmold v. Drake 369, 370 Detroit ». Beckman 448, ae ». BlackebyIxii LIST OF CASES CITED Page | Page Detroit v. Bd. of Inspectors of Elec- | Dial v. Holter 910 tion, &c. 1373, 1374 | Diamond »v. Attleborough 451 ». Chapin 322, 1077 v. State 641, 642 ». Corey 518, 525 | Diamond Ice, &c. Co. v. Klock Pro- v. Daly 1218 duce Co. 110, 114 v. Detroit Cit. St. Ry. Co 556 | Diamond Match Co. ». New Haven 1115 v. Detroit & Howell &c. Co. 569 | v. Ontonagon 1009 v. Detroit, &c. Co. 569 | Diana Shooting Club v. Husting 1289 v. Lewis 1061 v. Lamoreux 297 ». Martin 382} Dibdin v. Swan 941 ». Osborne 47 | Dice v. Sherman 1137 v. Parker 1053, 1074| Dick v. Board of Education 516 v. Plank Road Co. 566, 1242 v. McLaurin 862 ». Rentz 280 v. State 682 v. Rush 1360 | Dickens’s Case 706 Detroit & S. P. Ry. Co. »v. City of Dickenson v. Fitchburg 1213, 1214, 1216 Detroit 1144) Dickerman »v. Consolidated R. Co. 1322 Detroit, &c. Co. v. State 686 v. Duluth 1153 Detroit, &c. R. Co. v. Fuller 1018} Dickerson v. Franklin 1069 Detroit, &c., Short Line R. Co. »v. v. Okolona 1153, 1199, 1209 Hall 1121} Dickey, Ez parte 1329 Detroit Citizens’ S. R. Co. v. Detroit 440 | v. Hurlburt 1399 Detroit Citizens’ &c. Co. v. Detroit v. Reed 198 Ry. 442 | v. Tennison 1126, 1208 Detroit City St. R. Co. ». Common Dickinson v. Boston 518 Council 1013 v. Edmondson 167 Detroit Com. Council v. Rentz 1060 v. Hayes 110 Detroit Free Press ». McArthur 948 v. Johnson 275 Detroit G. H. & M. R. Co. v. Grand v. Perry 898 Rapids 1054} Dicks v. Hatch 846 Detroit Ry. Co. v. Guthard 35, 574| Dickson v. Dickson 211, 257 Detroit United Ry. v. Detroit 33 v. People 1353 Dettenhofer v. State 701 v. Strickland 139, 1351, 1354, 1410 De Turk ». Commonwealth 166, | Dieffendorf v. Ref. Cal. Church 963 168, 1352) Diehl ». Crump 186 De Vall v. De Vall 58 v. Totten 671 De Varaigne v. Fox 1195 | Dietrichs v. Lincoln, &c. Co. 1111 Dever v. Cornwell 776, 1104, 1106} Dietz v. State 700 Devers v. York City 787 | Diggins ». Brown 1078 Devin v. Scott 1256 | Diggs v. Thurston 672 Devlin v. Brady 283 Dike v. State 811 v. Donnelly 1406 | Dikeman v. Dikeman 595, 596 v. McAdoo 630 | Dill, In re 725 2. Philadelphia 1153 | v. Ebey 35 Devon Witches, Case of 653 | Dillard v. Collins 894 De Voss v. Richmond 473) Dillingham ». Hook 582 Devoy v. New York 140, 379 ». Snow 410, 1104 Devries ». Conklin 135 v. Spartanburg 158 v. Phillips 660 v. State 675 Dew v. Cunningham 289 | Dimes v. Proprietors of Grand Junc- De Walt v. Bartley 1359, 1360 tion Canal 871, 874 Dewar v. People 80 | Dimmick ». Tompkins 724 Dewe 2. Waterbury 911) Dinan »v. Swig 100 Dewey vv. Des Moines 841} Dingey v. Paxton 764, 769 v. Detroit 522| Dingley v. Boston 1134, 1194 Dewhurst v. Allegheny 369, 803 | Dinuzzo v. State 316, 579 De Witt v. Elizabeth 779 | Directors, &c. ». Burton 386 De See ea 840 Directors of Poor v. School Directors 1025 Bee o aban 39 Dirken v. Gt. Northern Paper Co. 346, exter, Ex parte 644, 645 373, 578, 804, 808, 1235 v. Boston 1054, 1076| Dishon v. Smith 408, 1372, 2 Carpenter & Davis 1201, 1210 1397, 1406, 1409 Deyoe ». Superior Court 297, 298! District Attorney, &c. Re 1352LIST OF CASES CITED Page 339, 805 District of Columbia v. Brooke v. Gregory 1334 | v. Keen 421 v. Kraft 1334 v. Robinson 982 | ». Washington Gas Light Co. 289 | District Township v. Dubuque 125, 128] 41, 154| Ditson v. Ditson 850, 851, 856 Dively v. Cedar Falls 472, 871 | Divine v. Commissioners 262 | Division of Howard County 305, 393 Dix v. State 663 Dixon, Ex parte 1045 v. Baker 450, 451 | vo. Orr 1405, 1412 | v. Parmelee 702 | v. People 94, 671 v. Poe 1331 | Dixon Co. v. Field 473, 475 Doane v. Grew 894, 896 Dobbins v. Com’rs of Erie Co. 991, 992 v. Los Angeles 382, 444 | v. State 690 | Dobyns v. Weadon 1399, 1412 Dockett v. Old Forge 401 | Dockstader v. Roe 26 | Dodd v. Thomas 744 Dodge »v. Coffin 61| »v. Co. Com’rs 1155, 1220 | v. Gilman 928 | ». Granger 453 v. Gridley 316 v. Mission Township 265, 1026 v. Woolsey 25, 71, 89, 248, 571} Dodson v. MeCurnin 283 Doe v. Beebe 1112) ». Braden 27 | v. Douglass 79, 201, 348 v McQuilkim 1104 ». Winn 75 Dogge v. State 670 Doherty v. O’Callaghan 701 Dohrmann v. Hudson County Bd. &e. 451 Dole v. Lyon 940 v. Van Rensselaer 921 Doles v. State 689 Dominguez v. State 57 Dominick v. Bowdoin 218 Dominion Hotel Co. v. Arizona 1346, 1347 Donable’s Adm’r v. Harrisonburg 392, 463 Donahoe v. Owens 1408 v. Richards 387, 970 v. Webster Groves 530 Donahue v. Will Co. 217 Donald v. Massachusetts 554 Done »v. People 693 Donkle ». Kohn 985 Donley »v. Pittsburgh 779 Donnell v. State Donnelly v. Decker v. Longport v. State v. Tripp Donnersberger v. Prendergast 309 Donofrio v. Seattle Donoghue v. Philadelphia Donohugh v. Roberts Donovan v. Haverhill v. Penn. Co. Dooley v. Sullivan ». United States Dooling v. Budget Pub. Co. Doon Township v. Cummins Doonan v. Glynn Dorain v. Walters Doran v. De Long Dorchy v. Kansas Dore v. Milwaukee Dorgan v. Boston Dorlan v. East Brandywine, &c. Co. 1218, 1409, 43, 362, 368, Dorlin v. Shearer Dorman v. Jacksonville Dornberg v. Spokane Dorr, Ex parte v. United States xiii Page 1299 1298 1132 665 453 298, , 361 1196 506 313 1214 1159 519 12 889 476, 478 114 1413 270 1312 439 1057 1219 966 439 1315 719, 722 78, 932, 933 Dorrance St., Matter of 1284 Dorsey, Matter of 139 v. Brigham 13 ». Dorsey 192, 811, 850 v. Gilbert 201 Dorsey’s Appeal 305, 309 Dortic v. Lockwood 870 Doss v. Commonwealth 682 Dostal, Ex parte 723 Dothage v. Stuart 800 Dotton v. Albion 522 Doty v. American Tel., &c. Co. 1123, 1205 Doud v. Mason City, &c. Co. 1214 Dougherty, Hx parte 272 v. Austin 226 v. Amer. McKenna Process Co. 249, 258 ». Commonwealth 668 v. St. Louis 522 Doughten v. Camden 1075 Doughty v. Hope 158, 852 Douglas v. Brynes 1145 v. Freeholders, &c. 127 v. Gyulai 58 v. Kentucky 579, 1328 v. People ex rel. Ruddy 845 v. People 1327, 1329 ». U.S. Fidelity &c. Co. 867 Douglas Co. v. Bolles 474 Douglass v. Daisley 896 445 ». Greenville v. Loftus Donnaher’s Case 1161, 1164 v. Pike Co. 593, 594 44, 585lxiv LIST OF CASES CITED Page Page Douglass v. Placerville 391, 404 | Duanesburgh »v. Jenkins 497 ». Turnpike Co. 1163 | Dubois v. McLean 202 Douros, Hx parte 725 | Dubuque 2. Illinois Cent. R. R. Co. Dove v. School District 808 377, 479 Dover v. Portsmouth Bridge 1294 | Ducat v. Chicago 48 Dow v. Beidelman 9, 320, 1303} Duche 2. Voisin 854 ». Norris 348, 377, 372| Duchess of Kingston’s Case 108 zai Case 54| Dudley v. Flemingsburg 444, 446 owda v. State 836, 865, 1324 v. Mayhew 846 Dowdell v. State 317 v. Smithland 446 ». United States 663, 664 | Dudrow v. King 118 Dowling v. Lancashire Ins. Co. 226, | Duffield v. School Dist. 1345 228, 229, 231| Duffy v. Cook 326 v. State 552 v. Creditors 600 Dowling’s Case 674 v. Dubuque 447, 528 Downes v. Bidwell 27, v. Hobson 997 Downey v. Gooch 42 v. Treas. & Receiver General 1048 ae Porter 621} Dugan »v. Hollins 105, 116 v. Wilson 891 v. State 1281 Downs v. Blount 783, 784| Duke v. Ashbee 1392 2. Bowdoin Sq. Bapt. Soc. 964 | v. Rome 450 0. Peterson 783 | Dull v. Blackman 63 v. Swann 390} Dullam v. Willson 80, 217 Doyle ae laure Gane 957 | Duluth & I. R. R. Co. ». St. Louis v. Continental Ins. Co. 254, 381 Co: 1087 v. Hallam ‘ 109 | Dumbra v. United States 620, 624 v. Mitchell Bros. Co. 1022} Dunbar v. Boston, &c. R. Co. 771 v. O Doherty 923 v. San Francisco 1114 ee Agee mG eee Duncan v. Baltimore, &c. R. Co. 144, 7 v. Des Moines, &e. Co. 58 148, 373, 79 v. Dist. Ct. 669 v. Barnett e st v. Dist. Ct. of Polk Co. 838 v. Lynchburg 454 Draining Co. Case 1080, 1083 ». McCall 40 Drainage Dist. No. 1. In re 279 v. Missouri 552, 844 Drainage of Lands, Matter of 1133 v. Nassau El. R. C 1179 Drake v. Drewry 37 Ren Sania 30 a J 1371 v. Record Publishing Co. 897 peer 7 72 v. Terre Haute 753 : ie ger ets: 9 v. Thwaites 934, 936, 957 as ae " 545, 552, 756| Duncombe v. Daniell 915 : delphia 1246 | v. Pri 2 278 Draper v. Medlock 114} Dundee Nee 12s . hii PRU EIS ces * s oe aval Stores Co. v. Mc- é ; 1 States ; 2 owe 11 Drath 2. Burlington, &c. R. Co. 1204/ Dunden »v. Snodgrass 774 Drayton, Ex parte 608 | Dunham »v. Anders 757 Drebman ». Stifle 538, 540, 593, 757 ». Chica ; , 593, 757 | v. Chicago 1093, 1097 Drennan v. People 119 v. Cox 1041 Dressen v. Brameier 962 mi I ; 5 962 | v. Hyde Park 440 Drew v. Davis 1103, 1104 | ». Powe ‘ mee venus v. Powers 923 Shae 1297 v. Rochester 403, 417, Dreucker v. Solomon oa ; ele 14/ Dunlap v. Glidden 922, 923 Drexel, Ez parte 1334 ».§ Dreyer v. Illinois 690 s aia ue eupEenis 90 | v. Toledo, &c. Ry. Co. 757, 1220 é ce 564} Dunman »v. Bigg 896 Drinkall 2. Spiegel 53/D i 5: unn v. Adams 76 Driscoll ». Taunton 1215 | 3» /NGKE - os Bo 215 v. Addison Manual Training ritt v. Snodgrass 387 School Droll v. Furnas County 1088, 1089 i es , 1086 v. Burleigh 837 Dronberger v. Reed 1206 v. Chicago Ind “31a eihee. Sees are a eae ndustrial School 968 Drummond ». Leslie 890 3. Ce Yaeounce Lee Dryden v. Swinburne 1402 a Baer ee an Dryfus v. Dridges 159 igkeeeare: ye 2. Sargent 751, 753, 754LIST OF CASES CITED Dunn ?. State v. Winters Dunne v. People Dunnovan v. Green Du Page County v. Jenks v. People Dupy v. Wickwire Duquesne v. Fincke lxv Page Page 666 | East & West India Dock, &c. Co. v. 910 Gattke 1209 14| East Brandywine, &c. R. R. Co. v. 471, 1350 Ranck 1213 139 East Central E. M. Co. v. Central &c. 1397} Co. 42 191| East End St. Ry. Co. v. Doyle 1164 392| East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Duquesne Light Co. ». Duff 1185, 1187 Co. 437, 507, 563 Durach’s Appeal 390, 1046, 1091 | East Kingston v. Towle 770 Durand v. Dyson 232, 742 | East Lincoln v. Davenport 474 Durant, In re 706, 708 | East Norway Lake Ch. 2. Froislie 964 ». Consumers’ Light & P. Co. 396 | East Oakland v. Skinner 407, 472 v. Essex County 118| East Portland ». Multnomah Co. 1048 v. Kauffman 1039, 1064) East Saginaw Salt Manuf. Co. v. East v. People 661] Saginaw 571, 573, 581, 793, 794 Durein v. Pontious 307 | East St. Louis v. East St. Louis, &c. Durgin v. Minot 1231 | Gor 460 Durham 2. Eno Cotton Mills 1235 v. Maxwell 316 ». Lewiston 105, 192, 348, 810 v. O'Flynn 1200 v. Southern R. Co. 402, 1247 v. Wehrung 435 Durkee v. Janesville 307, 812} East St. Louis Connecting Ry. Co. v. ». Kenosha 454 E. St. Louis, &e. Co. 1191 Durkin v. Kingston Coal Co. 1347 | East Shore Land Co. v. Peckham 1203 Durrett v. Davidson 543, 1072| East Tenn. &c. Co. v. Frazier 567 Duson v. Thompson 1414} Easter v. El Dorado 445, 506 Dutton v. State 647, 663, 695 | Easterbrooks v. Atwood 1381, 1415 Dutton Phosphate Co. v. Priest 803 | Eastern Bldg. & L. Ass’n v. Welling 35 Duty v. Thompson 1408 | Eastern Illinois State Normal School Dwight v. Boston 1061| ». Charleston 407 Dwenger v. Chicago, &c. Co. 1170 | Eastern Lunatic Asylum v. Garrett 1201 Dwyer v. Goran 109 | Eastern Oregon Land Co. v. Willow ». Gulf, C.&S. R. R. Co. 1270} River Land & Irrig. Co. 1130 ». Libert 909 | Eastern R. R. Co. v. Boston, &e. ». Nolan S5Siee Rohe ©o: 576, 577 Dyckman v. Mayor, &c. of N. Y. 860 | Eastern State Hospital v. Graves 765 Dye v. Cook 590 | Easthampton v. Hampshire Co. Com’rs Dyer v. Baltimore 1207 | 1119, 1189 v. Bayne 128 | Eastman v. Dearborn 856 v. Melrose 992 | v. McAlpin 291 v. Morris 890 | v. Meredith 449, 451, 509, ». Osborne 1062 | 516, 517, 526, 588 v. State 326 v. State 346, 1343 26 . Tuscaloosa Bridge Co. Dykes, Ex parte < E Eagle Ins. Co. v. Ohio Eaglesfield, Ex parte Eakin v. Raub Eales v. Barbourville Eames v. Savage v. Whittaker Earle v. Bd. of Education v. Conway v. Grant v. Pennsylvania v. Picken Earley v. Morse Earley’s Appeal Early v. Fitzpatrick Eason v. State 238, 820 | Easton v. Iowa 644| Easton Bank v. Commonwealth Eaton, Matter of 723, 725 v. Boston, &e. Co. 1115, 11438, 1152, 1154, 1160, 1197, 1220 573 1241 v. Boston, & M.R. R. Co. 1220 1045 | v. Brown 1360 143 | v. Walker 307 808, 1017 | v. Weiser 518, 522, 525 614, 742| Eaton, C. & P. Co. v. Commonwealth 911 1051 262 | Eau Claire Bank v. Reed 859 28 | Ebeling v. Morgan 685 701| Eccles v. Ditto 1319, 1320, 1321, 1327 28 | Echols v. State 1409 654 | v. Staunton 1124 896 | Eckhart v. State 361, 363 404 Eckert v. Van Pelt 889 670 | Eckles v. Wood 543 372 | Eckrich 2. St. Louis Transit Co. 867lxvi Page Economy Light Co. v. United States 1288 Ecuyer v. N. Y. L. Ins. Co. 894, 957 Eddings v. Seabrook 1149, 1155 Eddleman v. Union Co. Tract., &ce. Co. 1113 Eddy v. Capron 284 ». Eddy 837 Eddy Valve Co. v. Crown Point 473 Edelstein v. Carlile 762, 763 Eden v. People 831 v. Pineo 1062 Edge v. Holcomb 746 Edgecombe »v. Burlington 1134 Edgerly v. Swain 887 Edgerton v. Goldsboro Water Co. 403 v. Hart 861 | Edgewood v. Public Service Com- mission 396 Edgewood R. R. Co.’s Appeal 1125, 1134 Edison Gen. El. Co. v. Canadian Pac. Nav. Co. 250 Edmonds v. Banbury 140, 1369 Edmunds v. Herbrandson 261 v. State 1257 Edmundson »v. Pittsburgh, &ec. R. R. Co. 1197, 1200 Edson v. Edson 58 Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trustees v. Martin 42 Edwards, In re 647 v. Bruorton 1161 v. Com. 218 v. Davenport 44 | v. Elliott 67 v. Jagers 566 v. James 158 v. Johnson 595 | v. Kearzey 590, 597 v. Lesueur 89 v. Nash County Bd. 289 v. Pope 202, 204 v. State 675, 1261 v. Thrash 439 v. Williamson 587 Edwards’ Lessee v. Darby 147 Edwardsville ». Madison Co. 1190 Eells v. People Effinger v. Kenney Efland v. Southern R. Co. Egan v. Dotson 362, 366 833 v. Signal Pub. Co. 943 Egerer v. N. Y. C. &e. Co. 1177 Eggleston v. Doolittle 962 Egyptian Levee Co. v. Hardin 1056, 1081, 1298 Ehlers v. Stoeckle 744 Ehrlich v. Jennings 24 v. Weber 27 Hichels v. Evansville St. Ry. Co. 403, 1168 Eidemiller v. Wyandotte 1121 887, 892, | 595 | 892, 921] LIST OF CASES CITED | Kidman v. Martinez Eikenberry v. Edwards Eimer v. Richards | Kingartner »v. Ill. Steel Co. | Eisenbach v. Hatfield Eisner v. Macomber Eitel v. State Ekern ». McGovern Page 772 865 109 49 1150 1022 261, 329 81, 217, 221, 224, 739, 740, 743, 746, | 852, 1355, 1357, 1319, | Elam, Ez parte v. Badger v. Maggard Elbin v. Wilson Elder v. Barnes v. Reel v. State v. Wood El Dorado v. Scruggs Eldred v. Johnson Eldridge, Matter of v. Kuehl v. Smith 1358 1320 895 1366 1396 1288 850 650 35 1221 112 707 764, 1107 1114, 1127 Election Law, Matter of 1391 Electric Constr. Co. v. Heffernan 1184 Electric Impr. Co. v. San Francisco 428 Elgin v. Eaton 439 v. Kimball 450 v. Winchester 808 | Eliasburg Bros. Mercantile Co. 2. Grimes 364, 828, 1051 Eliason v. Coleman 1353 Elie v, Adams Exp. Co. 422 Elijah v. State 690 Eliot ». McCormick 856 Elizabeth City Bd. of School Trustees v. Hinton 1132 Elizabethtown & P. R. R. Co. v. Thompson 1164 Elk v. Wilkins 1361 Elk Point ». Vaugn 414 Ellerbee v. State 648 | Ellett ». Commonwealth 582 | Ellingham v. Dye 86, 87, 136, 144, 183 | Elliott ». Ailsbury 890 | v. Detroit 226 v. Fair Haven &e. Co. 1168 | v. People 696 v. Philadelphia 452 | v. Wohl 851 | Elliott’s Knob Iron, &e. Co. v. State Corporation Comm. 204 Ellis, Ex parte 870 v. Frazier 263, 1042 v. Jones 588 v. May 1360, 1375 v. Pacific R. R. Co. 1121 v. State 641, 656, 807 Ellison v. Barnes 271 Ellyson, Ex parte 1409 Elmendorf v. Carmichael 194 v. Mayor, &c. of N. Y. 158 v. Tailor 39LIST OF CASES CITED Page Elmore v. Fields 24 Elmore, &c. Co. v. Henderson-Mizell Mere. Co. 112 Elms v. Crane 923 Elmwood v. Marcy 68, 472 EI Paso, &c. R. Co. v. Eichel 35 ». Gutierrez 78, 79 | Else v. Smith 619 | Elston v. Piggott 21, 255 | Elswick v. Matney 109 | Elvain v. Mudd 997 227, 230, 232, 306, 1374, 1375, 1390 1103, 1104 Elwell ». Comstock v. Shaw Ely Ave., In re 1174, 1175 Ely v. Holton 773 v. Niagara County 506 v. Supervisors of Niagara 1326 360, 378, 730 340, 369, 370, 1125, 1148 v. Thompson Embury v. Conner Emerick v. Harris 868 Emerson v. Atwater 105, 116, 122 Emert v. Missouri 1008, 1017 Emery v. Chicago &c. R. Co. 1117 v. Gas Co. 1057 | v. Lowell 449 v. Mariaville 472 v. Reed 118 Emery’s Case 276, 649 Emigrant Mission Committee 2. Brooklyn El. R. Co. 1160 Eminent Household, &c. 7. Bunch 114 Emmons 2. Virginia 525, 530 Empire City Bank, Matter of 852, 854 Emporia v. Soden 1193 Encking v. Simmons 152} Endicott v. Davidson 1105 | Enfield v. Jordan 43 | Enfield Toll Bridge Co. v. Hartford &c. Co. 575, 1162| Engel v. Milwaukee 454 | ». Minneapolis 522 | Engle v. Shurts 757, 790 Engebretsen v. Gay 1153 Engelking v. Spokane 518 English v. Chicot County 405 v. Dickery 1409 ». New Haven, &c. Co. 796 v. Oliver 278 Engstad v. Grand Forks Co. 1094 Ennis Waterworks v. Ennis 44 Enos v. Chicago, &c. Co. 1171 Ensign v. Barse 304, 769 Ensworth v. Albin 263, 1369, 1370 Enterprise v. Smith 307 Enterprise Ditch Co. v. Moffit 570 Enterprise Lumber Co. v. Porter 1153 Entinck v. Carrington 614, 627 Eoff v. Kennefick-Hammond Co. 1060 Epping v. Columbus 131 v. Robinson 861 Equator Co. v. Hall 40 Ixvii Page Equitable Life A. S. ». Clements 1234 Equit. G. & Trust Co. ». Donahoe 309, 378 Erb v. Morasch 832, 1281 Erber v. Dun 896 Erford v. Peoria 315 Erickson v. Carlson 27 Erie Co. v. Com’rs Water-Works 1025 ». Erie 165, 1025 Erie Ry. Co. ». Commonwealth 573 v. New Jersey 1008 v. Pennsylvania 248 v. Williams 1002, 1236, 1330 Erie & North East R. R. Co. ». Casey 204 Erlinger v. Boneau 236, 237, 245, 307 Erle v. Norfolk 530 Ernst v. Kunkle 1074 v. West Covington 516 Erskine v. Nelson Co. 779 Ervine’s Appeal 184, 204, 205, 357, 735, 737 Erwin v. Benton 1365, 1368 Esberg-Gunst Cigar Co. v. Portland 454 Escanaba Co. v. Chicago 79, 80, 1002, 1295 Eshelman v. Chicago, &c. Co. 675, 863 Esmon v. State 692 Essex Co. v. Pacific Mills 150 Essex Public Road Bd. v. Skinkle 395 Essex Witches, Case of 653 Essgee Co. v. United States 632 Estate of Coppack, In re 58 Mahoney 844 Roosevelt, Re 1045 Shepard 1022 Este v. Strong 112 Estep v. Hutchman 201, 203 Esterbrooks v. Atwood 1380 Esterline v. State 682 Esterling Timber Co. v. Pierce 767 Estes v. Owen 1052 Estopinal v. Michel 1365 Esty v. Westminster 487 Etchison Drilling Co. v. Flournoy 136, 137, 791 Etheredge v. Osborn 109 Etheridge v. Sperry W. & G. 42 Ettor v. Tacoma 439, 448, 586 Eubank ». Montgomery Co. 135 »v. Richmond 231, 1229 Euclid-Doan Bldg. Co. v. Cunning- ham 391 Eufaula v. Gibson 1390 v. McNab 403 Eureka Basin, &c. Co., Matter of 1129, 1134 Eureka Co. Bk. Habeas Corpus Cases 726 Eureka Springs Ry. Co. ». Timmons 76 Europe v. Addison Amusements 1338 Eustis v. Parker 467 Eutaw v. Botnick 1219 Evanhoff. v. State Industrial Acc. Comm. 144, 145, 148, 149Ixvill Page | Evans v. Boston 1134 | ». Brown 278, 279 | v. Denver 779 | ». Gore 1095, 1096, 1097 v. Kankakee 452 v. McFarland 475 v. Montgomery 543, 587 v. Myers 149 v. Osgood 408 v. Phillipi 137, 261 v. Populus 561 v. Sharpe 305 v. Selma Union High School Dist. 973 v. State 1259, 1261 Evanston v. Gunn 666 Evansville v. Dennett 478 v. Miller 434, 1325 v. Senhenn 445 v. State 215, 489, 1352 Evansville, &c. R. R. Co. v. Dick 1154 v. Swift 1215 Everage v. State 685 | Everett ». Council Bluffs 434, 1325 v. Marquette 1326 Evergreen Cemetery v. New Haven 1134 Everhart v. Holloway 856 Evernham »v. Hulit 292, 309, 315 | Evening News v. Tryon 948 | Evison v. Chicago St. P. &c. Co. 418 | Eviston v. Cramer 921} Ewell v. Daggs 599 Ewing v. Alabama, &c. Ry. Co. 1123 v. Filley 1397, 1410 v. Hoblitzelle 262, 298 v. Louisville 1196 v. Mallison 861 v. Orville 167 | v. School Directors 387 v. State 1259, 1261 |} Excelsior Mfg. Co. v. Keyser 789 | Exchange Bank v. Hines 360, 1041, 1048} Exchange National Bank v. Hender- son Express Printing Co. v. Copeland 1393 Exum »?. State 15 Eyre v. Jacob 372 | Ezekiel v. Dixon 125 | F Facey v. Fuller Fadness v. Braunborg 860, 861 | 961, 963 Fagg, Ex parte 416 F. A. Hall Co., Inre 600 Fahey v. State 293, 1043 Fahr v. Hayes 896 Fails v. State 688 Fain v. Commonwealth 691 Fair v. Philadelphia 448 Fair Haven, &c. R. Co. vo. New Haven 569, 1242 Fairbank v. United States 16 LIST OF CASES CITED Page Fairchild ». Adams 910, 919 v. Lynch 114 v. Oakland, &c. Co. 1157, 1180, 1196, 1218 Fairfield v. Gallatin : 40 ». Huntington 260, 543, 556 v. McNany 109 v. Rural Independent Sch. Dist. 478 Fairhope Single Tax Corp. v. Melville 4 Fairhurst v. Lewis 712 Fairley v. City of Duluth 362 Fairman v. Ives 912, 945 Falconer v. Campbell 42, 545 v. Robinson 315 Falconi v. United States 639 Fales v. Wadsworth 766, 767 Falgont v. United States 637 Falk, Ex parte 163, 262 Fall v. Hazelrigg 119, 150 Fall Creek Sheep Co. v. Walton 742 Fallbrook Ir. Dist. v. Bradley 1026, 1130, 1052 Falls v. United States S. L. & B. Co. 251 Fallsburg Power & Mfg. Co. v. Alex- ander 1125 Falvey, In re 276, 724 Fanning v. Gilliland 1126 ». Gregorie 1296 v. Krapfl 861 v. Schammel 779 Fargo v. Hart 1014 v. Michigan 1006 v. Powers 141 Faribault v. Misener 147 Farist Steel Co. v. City of Bridgeport 1131, 1150 Farley v. Dowe 589 Farm Investment Co. v. Carpenter 176, 186, 373, 855 Farmers’ Loan and T. Co. v. Funk 170 v. Lake St. El. R. Co. 28 Farmers’ National Bank v. McCall 870 Farmer’s Union Ditch Co. v. Rio Grande Canal Co. 859 Farmers’ & Mechanics’ Bk. ». Butchers’ &c. Bk. 473, 476 v. Fed. Res. Bk. 1231, 1344 v. Smith 147, 372, 600 Farmers’ & Mechanics’ National Bank v. Dearing 138 Farmers’ Reservoir, &c. Co. v. Cooper 1220 Farmville v. Walker 1255 Farnandis v. Gt. Northern R. Co. 1196 Farney v. Towle 34 Farneman v. Mt. Pleasant Cemetery Ass’n 1134 Farnham v. Colman 670 %. Pierce 609 Farnsworth, Ez parte 238, 357 v. Lime Rock Ry. Co. 1130 v. Storrs 910 ». Vance 597 v. Whiting 865LIST Page Farnsworth Co. v. Lisbon 225 | Farnsworth Lumber Co. v. Fairley 1102 | Farnum v. Concord 515 v. Johnson 245 Farr v. Rasco 940 ». Sherman 135 v. Valentine 909 Farrar v. Clark 764 ». St. Louis 1056, 1074 Farrel v. Hawley 54 Farrell, In re 725 v. West Chicago Park Com’rs 1053, 1076 | v. Hawley 53, 56 | v. Hicken 1371 ». Larsen 1413, 1414 | Farrelly v. Cole 102 Farrington v. Tennessee 571, 572, | 1084, 1085 v. Turner 1400 Farrow v. Railway Conductors’ C. P. Ass’n. 60 OF CASES CITED Farwell v. Des Moines Brick Mfg. Co. 1064 Faulk v. State 631 Faulkner v. Hart 249 Fausler v. Parsons 1370 | Favorite v. Superior Court 871, 872) Fawcett v. Charles 932 | v. Clark 888 v. Fowlis 860, 861 | ». Mt. Airy 403, 494 | v. York & No. Midland R. R. Co. 1244, 1245} Fay v. Bankers’ Sec. Co. 748 Fayetteville v. Carter 420 Fearing v. Irwin 795, 1149 Fechheimer v. Washington 76 Federal Baseball Club v. National League 1001 Federal Constr. Co. v. Curd 7Al Federal Mining, &c. v. Pub. Ut. Com. 627 Federal Trade Commission v. Amer. Tobacco Co. 376 Federal Union Surety Co. v. Flem- ister 1333 Feek v. Bloomingdale 245 Feemster v. Tupelo 262 Fehr v. Schuylkill Nav. Co. 1220 Feibleman v. State 140, 319 | Feige v. Mich. Cent. R. R. Co. 193 Feineman v. Sachs 252 Feldman ». City Council 468, 1033 Felix v. Scharnweber 36 v. Wallace Co. Com’rs 182 Felker v. Elk Co. 460 Fell v. State 245, 578 Fellows v. Charleston 1235 v. New Haven 48 vo. Walker 1033 Felts v. Murphy 664, 724 Fenelon v, Butts 1397 Ixix Page Fennell v. Bay City 415 Fensky v. Campbell 42 Fensterwald v. Burk 334 Fenton v. Garlick 58, 856 v. Scott 1380, 1414 ». Yule 319 Fenwick v. Gill 800 Ferbrache v. Drainage Dist. 139 Feree v. Commonwealth 640 Fergus v. Brady 149 v. Russel 275 | Ferguson v. Landram 487, 803, 1029, 1039 v. Selma 1326 ». Snohomish 1064 v. Tuttle 1333 ». Williams 783 Fernandez, Ex parte 724 Fernandis v. Gt. Northern R. Co. 1155 Fernstler v. Siebert 962 Ferraria v. Vasconcellos 961, 962 Ferrel, In re 573 Ferrell v. Commonwealth 250 Ferrelle, In re 57 Ferrenbach v. Turner 1: Ferris v. Bramble 1126 Ferry v. Spokane, &c. R. Co. 50 v. Campbell 742, 771, 789 v. King County 508 Fertich v. Michener 387 Fertilizing Co. ». Hyde Park 579, 1270, 1326, 1327 | Fetter, Matter of 52 Ficklen v. Shelby Taxing Dist. 1018, 1279 Fidelity and Casualty Co. v. Allibone 1333 Fidelity & Columbia Tr. Co. v. Louis- ville 1060, 1061, 1085 Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United States 673 Fidelity Mut. Life Ass’n 0. Harris 252 v. Mettler 814 Fidelity State Bank, In re 555, 558, 593 Field v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. 805 ». Barling 1154 v. Clark 229, 231, 279, 361 »v. Des Moines 404, 1114 v. Gibbs 59 v. People 139, 218 Fielden v. [Illinois 844 Fields ». Com’rs of Highland Co. 457, 1098 ». Osborne 1360 Fifield v. Close 995, 996 v. Phoenix 447 Fifield’s Adm’x v. Rochester 520 Fifth Ave. Coach Co. v. New York 418 Figg v. Thompson 429 Fikes v. State 1332 Filber v. Dauhterman 887 Filbin Corp. v. United States 1201 Finch v. Riverside, &c. R. Co. 1179Ixx LIST OF CASES CITED Page Page Finkelston v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Fiske v. Hazzard 481 Co. 182 ». Framingham Manuf. Co. 1136 Finlayson v. Peterson 776 v. People 407, 430, 1346 Finn v. Bd. of Canvassers 1366 | v. State 815 Finneran v. Burlington 746| Fitchburg R. R. ». Grand Junction R. Finney v. Boyd 109 | Co. 1239, 1246 Finney County v. Bullard 1040 | Fite v. State 217, 220, 361 Finsky v. State 629 ac v. Atlanta 305, 392, 427 Fire Dep’t ». Helfenstein 48, 1046 | McGhee 24 v. Noble 48 | Fitageral v. Cleveland 130 v. Wright 48 . Robinson 964 Firemen’s Ass’n 7. Lounsbury 303, 305| ». St. Paul, &c. Ry. Co. 1244 First Cong. Church v. Bd. of Review v. Sharon 451 1090 | Fitzgerald & M. Const. Co. v. Fitz- First National Bank v. Adams 991| gerald 854, 855 ». Anderson 991} Fitzhugh v. Jackson 1230 ». Ayers 40, 992| Fitzpatrick v. United States 638, 662 v. California 26, 65 vo. Warden 1126 v. Chehalis Co. 40, 992| Fitzsimmons v. Wilks 1380 v. Christensen 1065 | Flack, In re 55 v. Fellows 16} Flagg v. Baldwin 76, 251, 252 ». McGuire 872| Flagg v. Inhabitants of Concord 1115 »v. Missouri 26 | »v. Locke 586 ». Union Trust Co. 138 ». Worcester 446 v. Strauss 182 v. Sch. Dist. No. 70 A475 First National Bk. of Geneva v. Shaw 251) Flaherty, Re 429 First National Bank of Rock Springs . MeCormick 865 v. Foster 675 | Flanagan v. Philadelphia 1296 First Nat'l Bk. of Wellington v. Chap- . Plainfield 1046 man 991} Flannagan v. Jepson 669 First National Bank of Wheeling v. | Flannigan v. Chapman, &c. Land Co. 861 Merchants’ National Bank 626} Flatbush, In re 304, 1062 First Parish v. Stearns, 1350, 1403, 1404} Fleagle v. Goddard 911 First Parish in Woburn v. Middlesex Fleetwood v. Read 831, 1041 Co. 1213, 1219) Fleischman Const. Co. ». Burns 41, 42 First Pres. Soc., Matter of 963 | Fleischner v. Chadwick 314, 316 First Ref. Pres. Ch. v. Bowden 962) Fleishman v. Walker 847 First Wisconsin National Bank 2. Fleming, Hx parte 396 John 347 Re 220 Firth v. United States 640 v. Charnock 1059 Fischil ». Cowan 109 | y. Greener 309 Fish 2. Collens 1402 | v. Hance 384 __ ». Kenosha 477 | Fleminster v. Central Ga. Power Co. Fishburn ». Chicago 429 | 1155 Byae? Chicago M. &c. Co. 30| Fletcher v. Auburn &e. Co. 1202 Fisher v. Betts 583 v. Baxter 275 ». Boston 446 v. Ferrel 61 v. Deering 119 2. Fletcher 1224 ». Dudley 1360 ». Lord Somers 116 v. Haldeman 39 v. Oliver 139, 294, 1048 v. Hildreth 1391 v. Peck 179, 348, 374, v. Horricon Co. 1136 538, 543, 558, 1201 v. McGirr 360, 622, 623, 1256, 1322 ». Tuttle "et GS v. New Bern 525 ». State 660 v. New Orleans 35 >. Wall 1375 v. State i 702) Flexner v. Farson 61 ee ee Ct 837, 853 Flickenger v. Industrial Acc. Comm. 137 hea N ss . Fs - e ot Flint v. Pike 933, 934, 936 Fisk. E Negroes ». Dobbs 774 v. Stone Tracy Co. 269, 279, 346, isk, Ex parte 725 22 21 749 v. Jefferson Police Jur 89, 554, 562 3205 oer per: lemadaieg y » 004 1 062 é 988, 989, 996 acess ~ Flint & Fentonville P. R. Co. 2. . Woodhull 186, 204, 382LIST OF CASES CITED Page 386 Flint, &c. R. R. Co. v. Dewey Flint River, &c. Co. v. Foster 345, 372, 868 | 413 Flood v. State Florentine v. Barton Florer v. Sheridan Florida C. Ry. Co. v. Reynolds v. Sullivan Florida E. Coast Fruit Land Co. ». Mitchell Florida Fertilizer Co. v. Boswell 199, 201 1041, 1059 Florsheim, &c. Co. v. Lester 256 Flournoy v. Jeffersonville 864 Flower v. Flower 857 Flowerree Cattle Co. 0. Lewis & Clark Co. 1061 Flowers v. Logan County 348 Floyd v. Miller Lumber Co. 986 v. Mintsey 112 v. Wilson 762 Floyd Co. v. Salmon 326, 327 Fluckiger v. Seattle Flues v. New Nonpareil Co. 445 932, 934, Flukes, In re 810, 827 Flum v. State 632 Flynn v. Boglarsky 924 v. People 639 Fobes v. Rome, &c. Co. 1172, 1178 Fogg v. Holcomb 785 Foley v. People 644 v. State 304, 309, 311 Folkenson v. Easton 137 Follette v. Pacific Light, &c. Corp. 744, 845 Folsom v. Greenwood County 598 v. School Directors A471 v. Township Ninety-Six 43, 1027 v. New Orleans 506 Foltz v. Kerlin 1353 v. Public Service Commission 396 v. State 1281 Fond Du Lac Water Co. v. Fond Du Lac 1062 Fong Yue Ting v. United States 16, | 602, 673 | Foot v. Buchanan 649 Foote v. Fire Department 1322 v. State 695 Forbes v. Halsey 768 v. Johnson 910, 924 v. State Council 859 Forbes Pioneer Boat Line v. Bd. of Com’rs 776 Ford v. Chicago, &c. Co. 1145, 1146, 1165 ». Co. Com’rs 1192 v. Delta & Pine Land Co. 46, 1057, 1094 v. Dilley 727 Fordyce v. Godman Ze 268 Foreman v. Hardwick 1391 ». Marianna 872 Forepaugh v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. 69, 252 1042 | 258 | 935 | Ixxi Page Foresman v. Byrns 1061 Forest Coal Co. v. Doolittle 874 Forman v. Sewerage and Water Board 500 Forrest v. Fey 61 Forster v. Forster 191, 775 Forsyth v. Barnes 57, 60, 64 v. Hammond 1064 v. Oswego 377, 756 Fort Collins v. Roten 531 v. Wallace 1151 Fort Dodge v. District Township 1395 Fort Leavenworth R. R.Co.v. Lowe 258 Fort Madison v. Ft. Madison Water Co. 598 Fort Scott v. Pelton 1018 v. W. G. Eads Brokerage Co. 391 Fort Smith v. Hunt 418, 420, 442, 578 Fort Smith Paving Dist. No. 5 2. Sisters of Mercy 1058, 1095 Fort Wayne v. Coombs 450 | Fort Worth v. Crawford 447 Fort Worth, &c. R. Co. v. Garoin 1197 Forward v. Hampshire &c. Co. 1115 Fosdick v. Perrysburg 318 Foss, Re 57 v. Foss 849 v. Hildreth 957 Foster v. Byrne 590 v. Duluth 1025, 1088 »v. Essex Bank 372, 599, 754, 784 v. Kansas 1253, 1254 v. Kenosha 1100 v. Morse 869 v. Neilson 25 ». Roberts 121 v. Rowe 742 v. St. Louis 448 v. Searft 1372, 1394 v. Scripps 921 v. Shepherd 868 v. State 668 Foudi v. Boston Mutual LifeIns. Co. 667 Foudry v. St. Louis, &c. R. Co. 1199 Foule v. Mann 744, 750 Fountain Creek Drain Dist. v. Smith 1144 Fourniquet v. Perkins 110 Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States 12 Foust v. Pa. R. Co. 1218 Fout v. Frederick County 296, 298 ». Hood River 245 Fowler, Matter of 1146 v. Beebe 1357, 1397 ». Chichester 940 v. Cleveland 75, 453 ». Danvers A484 ». Halbert 800 v. Norfolk & W. R. Co. 1199 v. Pierce 321 v. State 1399, 1405 Fowles, In re 5 v. Bowne 895[xxii LIST O F CASES CITED Page | Page Fox, Ex parte 609 | Freeman v. Alderson 855 v. Cottage 862 | v. Gaither 326 ». McDonald 216 v. Howe 28 v. Manchester 522 v. Price 890 ». Mohawk & H. R. Humane v. United States 689 Society 263 | Freeport v. Isbell 446 v. Ohio 65, 66, 686 v. Marks 455 v. Postal Tel. Cable Co. 251, 252| Freeport Water Co. v. Freeport 44, v. State 16, 640 573, 1243 ». W. P. R. R. Co. 1202 | Frees v. Ford 339 ». Washington 884 | Freeze v. Tripp 120 ». Wood 275 | Freiday v. Sioux City Rap. Tran. Co. Foxcroft v. Mallett 39 1164 Foye v. Patch 114| Freleigh v. State 578 Frain v. State 655 | Frellsen v. Mahan 1084 Francis v. Francis 41 | Fremont v. Postal Tel. Cable Co. 1045 v. Hazlett 61! Fremont, &c. R. Co. v. Pennington ». Railroad Co. 1041, 1093 Co. 598 v. Wood 923 | French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. Francis Jones Co. v. Venable 1127 1053, 1074, 1076 Francois, Ex parte 807 v. Boston 448 Frank, Ex parte 428, 1046 ». Braintree Manuf. Co. 1135 v. Mangum 554, 721 v. California 277 Frankfort v. Aughe 416, 1267 | >. Camp 1290 v. Bowen’s Adm’x 529 ». Commonwealth 561 ». Edelin 1195 v. Deane 545 ». Winterport 283, 460 »v. Edwards 158 Frankfort, &c. R. Co. v. Phila. 424 v. Kirkland 1080 Frankland v. Cassaday 111 v. Millville 469 Franklin v. Brown 694, 696, 724 v. Nolan 1402 v. Browne 889 | v. Robb 1184, 1186 v. Seattle 452 v. Senate 270, 271, 272 v. State 705, 1262, 1263 v. State 148, 664, 1007, Franklin Co. v. Railroad 1043 1269, 1279 Franklin Co. Grammar School ». Fretwell v. Troy 423 Bailey 566 | Frick v. Pennsylvania 1020, 1021, Franklin F. Ins. Co. v. Hall 1333 1025, 1026 Franklin Bridge Co. v. Wood 372 | Friedman v. Mathes 166, 167 Frantz v. Antry 5| Friend v. Childs Dining Hall Co. 75 v. Lester 875 ». Hamill 1396 Franz v. Railroad Co. 1171 | Fries v. N. Y. &c. Co. 1174 Frary v. Frary 849 | Frieszleben v. Shallcross 1362 Frasch ». New Ulm 525 | Frink v. Darst 105, 116 Frasher v. State 807 | ». National Mut. F. Ins. Co. 253 Frazee, Matter of 429 | Frisbie v. Fowler 890 ». Beattie 866 | Frisby v. United States 543, 552 Frazer v. Lewiston 516 | Friscoville Realty Co. v. St. Bernard Frazier ». Commonwealth 639| Parish Police Jury 1179, 1180 ». BE. Tenn. Tel. Co. 1182 | Frith v. Dubuque 446 v. Putnam Co. Bd. of Canvas- | Fritts ». Palmer 257 sers 1380, 1382, 1384 | Fritz, Ex parte 232 Freadrich v. State 347 | v. Fritz 715 v. State : 1336 | Froelich v. Cleveland 424, 1283 Freborn 2. Pettibone 596 | Frohwerk v. United States 904 Free ». Buckingham 984 | Frolickstein v. Mobile 983, 1281 Freedman 2. Sigel 996, 997 | Frommer v. Richmond 423 Freeholders ». Barber 420 | Frorer v. People 833, 1307 Freeholders of Sussex County ». Strader | Frost v. Belmont 281, 391, 457 449 | ». Chicago 423, 429 Freel v. School City of Crawfordsville 452 ». Ketteler Manual Training Freeland v. Hastings 356, 461, 487, School oe 488, 1029, 1039 ». People 624 v. Williams 593, 843 v. Thomas 221LIST OF CASES CITED Page | Frum v. Leamer 1413 Fruth v. Bd. of Affairs 1158, 1318, 1319 Fry v. Bennett 941 v. Booth v. State Fry’s Election Case 158, 1397, 1400 747, 1243 1365, 1366, 1368 Fryer v. Kinnersley 895 F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Va. 803, 805 Fujii, Ex parte 1336 Fuller, Ex parte 728 | ». Chicago, &c. R. R. Co. 1304 ». Dame 282, 283 o. Edings 1149 ». Gould 1048 v. Groton 456, 457, 461 v. Hager 776 2. Hampton 514 v. Morrison Co. 493 v. People 298 v. State 610 Fullerton v. Bk. of United States 39 v. McCaffrey 1381, 1390 Fulmer v. Commonwealth 132 Fulton v. Davenport 1063 v. State 836, 865, 1324 Fulton Light, &c. Co. v. State 1157, 1288, 1294 Fults ». Munro 113 Fuqua v. Pabst Brewing Co. 1254, 1305 | v. State 662 Furgeson v. Jones 859 Furman v. New York 125 | ». Nichol 582 | Furman St., Matter of 1056, 1152, 1213 Furnell v. St. Paul 529 Furniss v. Hudson RiverR.R.Co. 1209] G | G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield 112 | Gabbert v. Railroad Co. 302 Gabel v. Houston 423 Gabisso, Succession of 168 Gableman v. Peoria, D. &c Co. 30 Gabriel ». McMullin 925 Gadsden v. Crafts 113 | ». Mitchell 403 | Gaetjens v. New York 453 Gaff v. Greer 963 Gage v. Bani 1106 ». Caraher 768, 1107 v. Censors 1343 v. Graham 497, 498 v. Shelton 887 Gagnet v. Reese 727 | Gaiennie v. Douilhet 1379, 1418 Gaines v. Buford 797 v. Coates 814, 818, 1335 »v. Gaines 211 Gaines & Co. v. Holmes 1230, 1254, 1277 Ixxili Page Gainesville, H. &W. Ry. Co. v. Hall 1199, 1220 Gale, Matter of 707 v. Kalamazoo 814, 1271, 1335 v. Mead 158 v. So. Berwick 460 Galen v. Clyde &e. Co. 516 Galena & Chicago U. R. R. Co. 2. Appleby 1239, 1247 v. Dill 1247 v. Loomis 1239, 1247 Galesburg v. Hawkinson 198, 394 Galey v. Montgomery County 871 Gall v. Cincinnati 1335 Gallagher v. Williamson 702 Gallatin v. Bradford 417, 432 Galliano v. Pierre 251 Gallup v. Smith 154 Galpin v. Chicago 295, 311, 315, 316 Galtis v. Kilgo 957 Galveston v. Posnainsky 518 Galveston, & S. A. R. Co. v. Texas 368, 555, 1006, 1014 Galveston & W. R. Co. v. Galveston 393, 443 Galveston, &c. R. Co. v. Wallace 249, 250, 257 Gambill v. Erdrich Bros. & Marx 391 Gamble v. Keyes 616 ». Montgomery 1334 Gammel v. Potter 1137 Gannett v. Leonard 201 Gannon, Re 838, 1224 v. People 691 Gano v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry.Co. 806 Gantly’s Lessee v. Ewing 594 Garvett, Ex parte 707 Garcia v. Territory 695 Gardemal v. McWilliams 924, 931 Garden Cemetery Corp. v. Baker 1052, 1058 Garden City v. Merchants, &c. National Bank 109 Gardina v. Jefferson Co. Bd. of Registrars 1370 Gardiner v. Bluffton 444, 1054 v. Johnston 438 Gardner v. Burke 1402 v. Collector 277 v. Collins 39 ». Hope Ins. Co. 569 ». Jeter 593 v. Michigan 392 ». Michigan C. Ry. Co. 43 v. Neil 630 1115, 1132, 1193, 1202, 1203 ». Newburg v. Ray 1374 v. Rumsey 257 ». Ward 1395 441 yargan v. Louisville, &c. Co. 1 Garland, Ex parte 538, 543, 545lxxiv Garland v. Brown’s Adm’r Garland Chain Co. ». Rankin LIST OF CASES CITED | | | | | Borough 1220 Garner v. Gordan 727 Garnett v. Jacksonville, &c. Co. 1162 Garr v. Selden 923, 928 Garrabad, Re 430 Garrett v. Beaumont 772 v. Cordell 593 v. Doe 772 v. James 434 | ». Lake Roland El. R. Co. 1154 v. St. Louis 1071 v. State 1271 Garrigan v. Kennedy 164, 304, 311 Garrigus v. Board of Com’rs 292, 305 v. State 669 Garrison v. Hollins 869 v. New York 522 v. Tillinghast 1000 | Garrity v. Eiger 1257 Gartin v. Penick 963 Garvey, In re 647 v. Long Island R. Co. 1161 v. People 544 Garvey’s Case 688 Garvin v. Garvin 888 v. State 302 Garvin Co. School Board Dist. No. 18 v. Thompson 387, 388 Gas Co. v. Parkersburg 443 v. San Francisco 525 v. Wheeling 128 Gas Products Co. v. Rankin didie 373, 1320, 1321 Gas & Water Co. v. Delaware, &c. Co. 1191 Gasaway v. Seattle 1025, 1110, 1119 Gascoign v. Ambler 890 Gaskill ». Dudley 514 Gasquet v. Fenner 58 Gasquet’s Interdiction 58 Gass v. Wilhite 962 Gasset v. Gilbert 895 Gast Realty, &c. Co. v. Schneider Granite Co. 1052, 1053, 1074 Gastineau v. Commonwealth 429 v. McCoy 888 Gaston v. Mace 1289 v. Merriam 317 Gatch v. Des Moines 1065 Gates v. Milan 516, 521 ». Neal 1395 Gatewood v. Garrett 909 v. North Carolina 40 Gathercole v. Miall 917, 941 Gathman v. Chicago 518 Gatlin v. State 629 v2. Tarboro 1041 Gatton v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 69 Gatzow ». Buening 477 Gaulden v. State 707 Gautier ». Ditmar 178 Page Gauvreau v. Van Patten 1390 Gavieres v. United States 685 Gaw v. Ashley 1352 Gay »v. District Ct. 340, 368, 671 v. Engelbretson 326 Gaylor v. Bridgeport 447 Gaylord v. Chicago Sanitary Dist. 1125, 1137, 1140 Geary v. Geary 61 v. Simmons 109 Gebhard v. R. R. Co. 757 Gebhardt v. Reeves 1170, 1195 Geduld v. Baltimore, &c. R. Co. 61 Gee v. Williamson 109 Gee’s Adm. v. Hopkinsville 446 Geebrick v. State 225, 242, 244 Geer v. Connecticut 1269 Gehling v. School District 386 Gelpcke v. Dubuque 44, 238, 473, 477 Gemmer ?. State 140, 177 General Oil Co. v. Crain 22, 23, 1010 Genet v. Brooklyn 1219 Gensch v. Milwaukee 530 Genther v. Fuller 1107 Gentile v. State 263, 1297 Gentry v. Griffith 274, 354 Geofroy v. Riggs 26 Geohegan v. Union El. R. Co. 116, 117, 122 George v. Consol. Lighting Co. 1124 v. George 1282 v. Gillespie 109 v. Oxford 328, 471 v. Portland 821, 1335 v. Travis 579 George A. Fuller Co. v. Otis Elevator Co. 113 George B. Newton Coal Co. ». Davis 1312, 1313 George Bollin Co. v. No. Platte Val. Irrigation Co. 280 George W. Bush & Sons Co. v. Maloy 1279, 1285 Georgetown v. Ammerman 1151 Georgetown, &c. R. R. Co. ». Eagles 1155 Georgia v. Stanton 3 Georgia Packing Co. ». Macon 1015 Georgia Pen. Co’s. v. Nelms 558 Georgia R. & Banking Co. 2. Wright 1092, 1098 v. Harris 846, 848 Georgia R. &c. Co. v. Decatur 38, 1053, 1073, 1074 v. R. R. Commission 413, 437 v. Smith 233, 1303 Gerhard v. Seekonk, &c. Com. 1160 Gerino, Ex parte 725 German, &c. Cong. v. Pressler 961 German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Hale, 1332 v. Lewis 1305, 1332 German-American Ins. Co. »v. Huntley 957LIST OF CASES CITED Page German Evangelic, &c. v. Deutsche Evangelisch, &c. 962, 964 German Ins. Co. v. Allen 1333 German Reformed Church ». Sei- bert German Sav. Bk. ». Franklin Co. Germania Ins. Co. v. Wisc. Germania Trust Co. v. San Fran- 963 40 35 cisco 1085 Germantown Trust Co. v. Powell 831 Gerrie v. Port Huron 530 Gerrish v. Brown 1288 Gerry v. Stoneham 772 Gertum v. Board 562 Gerzad v. People 688 Gettys v. Gettys Gewin v. Mt. Pilgrim Baptist Church Gfeller, Ex parte Gherna »v. State 850 962, 964 702 50, 128, 170, 360, 362, 543, 578 Gianfortone v. New Orleans 507 Giannini, In re 219 Gibb v. Washington 1357 Gibbons »v. Dist. Columbia 1087 v2. Hood River Irr. Dist. 598 v. Mobile & Gt. No. R. R. Co. 238 v. Mobile, &c. R. R. Co. 787 ». Ogden 11127, 130; 1002, 1004, 1025, 1293 v. Territory 682 v. United States 24 Gibbs v. Gale 767 Giboney v. Cape Girardeau 1064 Gibson, Ex parte 725, 726 v. Armstrong 962 v. Chouteau 34, 765 v. Emerson 180 ». Harrison 1322 v. Hibbard 784 v. Huntington 520 v. Lyon 43 v. Mason 741, 1349 v. Mississippi 19, 553 v. Pekarek 769 v. School District 3386 v. Scotland County 1370 v. United States 1131 v. Wood 1366 Gick v. Stumpf Giddings v. Blacker v. Secretary of State Giesy v. Cincinnati, &c. Co. 702 1401 102 1149, 1194, 1219 660 305 284 764 Gifford v. People v. Railroad Co. Gil v. Williams Gilbert v. Ackerman v. Minnesota 904 v. People 926, 928, 945 v. Selleck 762, 763 Gildersleeve v. Gildersleeve 57, 850 v. People 853 Ixxv Page Giles v. Little 37 v. United States 619, 622, 628 Gilfillan ». Union Canal Co. 588 Gilkeson v. The Frederick Justices 390 Gilkey v. Cook 136 Gill v. Davis 283 v. Parker 1255 Gillard v. Chester 447 Gillesby v. Canyon County 579 Gillespie v. Lincoln 453 v. Palmer 1350, 1395, 1396, 1401 v. People 811, 826, 1332 v. So. Omaha 1156 v. State 304, 311, 642, 650 Gillette v. Hartford 1069 Gilliland v. Administrator of Sellers 841 v. Phillips 786 Gillinwater v. Mississippi, &c. R. Co. 102, 103, 166, 1120,1122 Gillison v. Charleston 529 Gillitt ». McCarthy 307 Gillmor v. Salt Lake City 529 Gilluly ». Madison 451 Gilman v. Cutts 750 v. Lockwood 601 v. Lowell 887 v. Philadelphia 11, 1002, 1274, 1281, 1293 v. Sheboygan 573 v. Tucker 843 v. Williams 370 Gilmer v. Lime Point 1112) 1123: 1143, 1205, 1206 Gilmore, Ex parte 1261, 1263 v. Hentig 1065 Gilson v. Dayton 475 v. Rush County 1047 Gin Kato, Ex parte 27 Ginn v. Rogers 846 Ginsberg v. Wabash R. Co. 13, 33 Giozza v. Tiernan 844 Girard, Ez parte 816, 817 Re 1339 v. Philadelphia 394 Girdner v. Stephens 89, 762 Gish v. Castner, &c. Drain. Dist. 1219 Gist v.. Western Union Tel. Co. 252 Gitlow v. People of the State of N. Y. 907 Giuricevic v. Tacoma 525 Given »v. State 1319, 1320 Givens v. Hillsborough Co. 263, 474 v. Zerbst 726 Gladden »v. State 667 Gladney v. Sydnor 543, 749 Gladson v. Minnesota 1267 Glasgow v. City of St. Louis 1149 »v. Rowse 1051 Glavey v. United States 180 Gleason v. Dodd 58, 60, 856 850 v. Gleason v. Keteltas 869 ». Northwestern Mut. L. Ins. Co. 61Ixxvl LIST OF C: Page | 1215 |} 1218 Glendenning v. Sheetz v. Stahley Glenn, Ex parte 690 v. Garth 63 Glidden v. Harrington 742 Glide, The 29 Glidewell v. Martin 279 | Glinnan v. Judge of Recorder’s Ct. 676 Glisson v. Biggio 909 Globe Newspaper Co. 2. Commonwealth 942 Globe School Dist. v. Bd. of Health 1271 | Gloucester Ferry Co. 2. Pennsylvania 1013, 1274, 1275, 1296, 1307 Gloucester Ins. Co. v. Younger 4.4 Gloucester Pleas, In re 1395 Glover v. Charleston, &c. R. Co. 1209 v. Powell 1160, 1291 v. Taylor 1392 Godcharles v. Wigeman Godchaux Co. v. Estopinal 35 Goddard, Ex parte 51 v. Chicago &c. Co. 1185, 1186 v. Jacksonville 1250, 1326 Petitioner 414, 417, 426, 1284 Goddin v. Crump 237, 379 Godshalk v. Metzgar 93 Goecker v. McOsker 1413 Goenen »v. Schroeder 596 Goetcheus v. Mathewson 852, 1396 Goetze v. United States 12 Goff v. Frederick 393 Goggans v. Turnispeed 584 Gohen v. Texas Pacific R. R. Co. 316 Gold v. Fite 127 Gold Water & W. Co. v. Keyes 32 Golden v. Mitchell 847, 863 Goldey v. Morning News 256 Goldfield Consol. Milling, &c. Co. v. Old Sandstorm Annex Gold Min. Co. Goldman v. Crowther 1134, 1191 Goldsberry v. State 705 Goldsmith v. Geo. G. Pendergast Constr. Co. 1073 Goldstein ». Maloney 767, 790 Goldthwaite v. Montgomery 390 Gomez, In re 724 Gompers v. Buck’s Stove & Range Co. 670 v. United States 670 Gonell v. Bier 1353 Gonzales v. Pensacola 439 Gooch, Re 1324 Good »v. Zercher 782 Goode v. Nelson 608 Goodell, Matter of 803 v. Jackson 105, 116 v. Judith Basin County 1364 Goodenough, In re 727 Goodhue, Re 347 Goodin v. Thoman 140, 562 343, 810, 1307 | 1226, 1228, 1316 |} ASES CITED Page Goodland ». Popejoy 392 Goodlott v. Kelly 767 Goodman v. Munks 763 ». State 662 Goodrel v. Kreichbaum 21 Goodrich »v. Detroit 406 ». Mitchell 214 v. Otego 447, 1152 ». Winchester, &c. T. Co. 1057 Goodsell v. Boynton 326 Goodtitle v. Kibbe 1112 v. Otway 116 Goodwin v. Thompson 75 Goodwin, &c. Co.’s Appeal 702 | Goodwine v. Evans 1217 | Goodwyn v. Shreveport 447 Gordon, Ex parte 724 v. Appeal Tax Court 248, 57 v. Building Ass’n 811, 817 v. Cornes 494, 495, 1028 v. Corning 50, 51 v. Farrar 1395 v. Hillman 57 v. Ingraham 184 v. Journal Pub. Co. 888 v. Kerr 26 v. Munn 62 v. Moores 217 | v. People 314 ». Preston 409 v. Silver Creek 1160 v. State 685 v. Ware National Bank 109, 110, 862 Gore v. State 668 Goree v. Cahill 1399 | Gorgas v. Phila., &c. R. Co. 1213 | Gorham v. Campbell 1397 v. Cooperstown 530 v. Luckett 668 v. New Haven 439 v. Springfield 236 | Gorman v. Pacific R. R. Co. 569, 1246 Gormley v. Taylor 373 Gorrell v. Greensboro Water Supply | Co. 118 Gosa v. Milwaukee, &c. Co. 1180 Goshen v. Kern 423, 1046 ». Richmond 795 } v. Stonington 344, 778, 785 | Goshorn v. Purcell 774, 783 Goslin v. Cannon 897, 925 | Gosling v. Veley 417, 1402 | Gosnell v. State 1342 | Goss Printing Press Co. v. Todd 671 | Gosselink v. Campbell 426, 1283 Gosset v. Howard 272 Gossett v. Southern Ry. Co. 1155, 1158 | Gossigi v. New Orleans 423, 1335 | Goszler ». Georgetown 438, 1152 | Gott ». Pulsifer 946 Gottbehuet v. Hubacheck 889, 921 Gottschalk ». Brown 53 v. Chicago, &c. Co. 1199LIST OF CASES CITED Ixxvil Page Page Gottschall ». Campbell 867 | Grand Rapids &e. Co. v. Osborn 33 Gottstein v. Lister 87, 277 v. Wieden 1121 Gougar v. Timberlake 1361 | Grand Rapids Booming Co. v. Gough v. Dorsey 180, 864 Jarvis 1158 v. Pratt 191 | Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Ives 186, 811 Goughnour v. Brant 128 ». South Bend 1239 Gould, Ex parte 627, 650 | Grand Trunk Western R. Co. »v. v. Boston Duck Co. 1136 United States 765 v. Fuller 819 | Grand Union Tea Co. v. Lord 891 ». Gould 773 | Grande Ronde Electrical Co. . ». Hudson River R. R. Co. 1149, 1157} Drake 1115 v. Sterling 407, 472, 476, 787 | Granger v. Pulaski Co. 508, 516 ». Sullivan 1105 | Granite State Land Co. 2. v. Topeka 448 Hampton 1095 Goulding v. Clark 408 | Grannahan v. Hannibal, &c. R. Gouled v. United States 615, 617, 618, 624, 627, 632, 649 1405 921 | 481, 1039 | 105, 183, 191 | Govan v. Jackson Gove v. Blethen ». Epping Govern v. Porter Grabowski v. State 684 | Grace v. McElroy 120 v. Teague 1357 | Grade Crossing Com’rs, In re 439 | Grading Independence, etc., In re 1207 | Grady County v. Hammerly 159 | Graffty v. Rushville 1017 Grafton v. Holt 870, 873, 874 v. United States 679 Graham, Ez parte 772 | In re 621, 629 | v. Bailard 1120 | v. Charlotte 529 v. Chicago 1077 ». Com’rs Chautauqua Co. 1041 v. Cooley 1257 v. Detroit 1087 v. Dye 331 v. Folsom 24 ». Grand Rapids 1082 | v. Greenville 237 | ». Weeks 42 | ». West Virginia 553, 696, 697 Grainger v. Douglas Park Jockey Club 2 379, 381, 382, 803 | Gralton v. Daviess Co. Fiscal Ct. 1401 | Gram Constr. Co. v. Minneapolis, &c. R. Co. 1196 Grammar School v. Burt 566 Granby v. Thurston 393 Grand Gulf R. R. Co. v. Buek 571 Grand Island & N.W.R. Co. 2. Baker 473 Grand Lodge, &c. ». Bd. of Review 1090 Grand Lodge of La. v. New Orleans 572 Grand Rapids v. Brandy 427 | ». Hughes 402 | v. Newton 431 v. Perkins 1208 ». Powers 844 Grand Rapids &c. Co. v. Heisel 1156, 1172 R. Co. 1239, 1248 | Grant v. Brooklyn 528 v. Buckner 28 v. Courter 353 v. Erie 446 v. Harris 702 v. Leach 820 v. Spencer 158 v. State 678 v. Swank 113 v. United States 627 Grant’s Case 758 Grant Ass’n v. People 1049 Graphite Co. v. Burnet Nat. Bank 76 Gratiot County State Bank v. Johnson 112 xrattan v. Matteson 864 Gratz v. McKee 1289 Graves v. Blanchet 890 v. Graves 109 ». Howard 581, 583, 584, 586, 587 v. Jones 1092 ». Nor. Pac R. R. Co. 867 ». Otis 438, 1152 v. People 305 ». Saline Co. 478 Graves’ Case 728 Gray v. Commonwealth 1282 v. Connecticut 828, 1250 v. Danbury 529 ». First Divison, &e. 1164 v. Griffin 453 ». Hook 1392 vy. Knoxville 451 vy. Navigation Co. 570 ». Pentland 909, 910 ». Pittsburgh 779 ». Salt Lake City 1153, 1200 v. State 816 ». Western U. T. Co. 1269 Grayson v. Bagby 863 Great Falls Manuf. Co, v. Fernald 1137 v. Garland 1203 Great Northern Ry. v. Clara City 905 v. Minneapolis 1208 v. State 1158, 1217 Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. JonesIxxvili LIST OF CASES CITED Page | Page Great Southern Life Ins. Co. v. City | Greenwood »v. Louisville 446 of Austin 1059, 1060 v. Rickman 1089 Great Western Machinery Co. v. State 415 seSmith 257 | Union Freight R. Co. 1242 Great Western R. R. Co. v. Decatur 1243 | Larne ood Cemetery Land Co. 2. Great W. Tel Co. v. Purdy 63] Routt 223 Greeley v. Jacksonville 316 |} Greer v. Downey 1283 Green, Ez parte 721, 943 | Gregg v. People 766, 1324 Re 30 | Gregory, Ex parte 420, 1046 v. Aker 169 v. Bridgeport 456 v. Biddle 560 | v. Cleveland, &c. R. Co. 874 v. Carson 1335 | v. Denver Bank 588 v. Chapman 941 | v. Gregory 850 v. City &c. Co. 1179 v. State 186 v. Collins 846 | Greir v. Downey 760 v. Creighton 847 | Grenada Co. Supervisors v. v. Custard 856 | Brogden 378 v. Frazier 41, 346 Gretna v. Bailey 236, 245, 364, 397 v. Holway 996 i Grey v. Newark Plank-Road Co. 262 v. Hotaling 1025 | Gri bble v. Wilson 868 v. Mayor, &c. 304 | Gridley v. Bloomington 426, 1284 v. Neal’s Lessee 39, 42 | Grier v. Shackelford 1409 v. Portland 1172 | Griffin ». Cunningham 811 v. Reading 438, 1152} v. Gesner 190 v. Rienzi 474, 1350, 1357 v. Goldsboro Water Co. 1310 v. Sarmiento 59 v. Griffin 856, 857 v. Savannah 127 1 . McKenzie 763 v. Shumway 1363 v. Martin 1160 v. State 23, 639, 687, ». Mixon 758 689, 807, 1150, 1298 | vo. New York 445 v. Swift 1150, 1298 | v. Ranney 997 o. Telfair 956 v. Thomas 301 v. Van Buskirk 61 | v, Wilcox 592, 757, 758 v. Weller 129, 131, 132, 278 v. Williamstown 530 Greenberg v. Western Turf Ass’n 1299 | Griffin’s Case 18 Greenboro v. Robinson 446 | Griffin’s Executor v. Cunningham 192, Green Castle, &c. Co. v. State 121, 315 208, 792 Greencastle Township »v. Griffing v. Gibb 40 Black 127,129) 131; , 160 | Griffith v. Connecticut 584 Greene, Re 493 v. Mercer County Court 1372 ». Briggs 623, 735, 867 | Griffiths, In re 181 v. Louisville &c. Co. 24, 1093 | Griggby Construction Company v. San Antonio 1283 v. Freeman 1060 v. United States 57 | Griggs v. Foote 438 Greene County v. Lydy 41, 122, v. Hanson 862 340, 368, 373, 803 | Grigsby v. Reib 75 Greenfield v. Dorris 596 | Grills v. Jonesboro 423 v. Russel 175, 176, 178, 187 | Grim v. Weissenburg Sch. Greenlaw v. Greenlaw 849 Dist. 779, 1034 Greenlee County v. Laine 141 | Grimes v. Coyle 897, 911, 924 Greenough v. Greenough 105, 180 v. Doe 781 183, 184, 190, 205, 785 v. Eddy 1271, 1324 v. People’s Sav. Bank 831 | Grimmett v. State 647 Greensboro v. Ehrenreich 431 | Grimsted v. Johnson 711 Greenstreet v. Thornton 853 | Grissell ». Housatonic Ry. Co. 1246 Greenville v. Kemmis 415 | Griswold v. Bragg 800 Greenville & Columbia ». Guilford 439 R. R. Co. v. Partlow 1216, v. McGee 752 1218, 1219 v. School District 1049 Greenwood v. Cobbey 911 | Grob ». Cushman 280 0. Curtis 250, 251 | Groes v. White 923 v. Freight Co. 569 | Groesbeck v. Seeley 764, 769 v. Furr 853 | Groesch 2. State 245LIST OF CASES CITED Page 360 505, 558 688 1265, 1266 78 Groffs, In re Grogan v. San Francisco v. State ». Walker & Sons Gromer v. Standard Dredging Co. Groome v. Gwinn 222 Gross v. Rice 696 v. U. S. Mortgage Co. 36, 782 Grossman, Ex parte 134, 218 ». Houston, &c. R. Co. 1196 v. Oakland 430 Grosvenor v. Chesley 586 v. United Society 963 Grove v. Todd 783 ». Brandenburg 923 Grover v. Huckins 760 ». Trustees Ocean Grove 310 Grover & B.S. M. Co. v. Radcliffe 59 Grover Irrig. & Land Co. v. Lovella Ditch, Reservoir & Irrig. Co. 1130, 1140 Groves v. Barden 1353 v. Dunlap 1341 v. Eubank 1362 Grubb v. Bullock 218 v. Turner 1390 Grubbs »v. State 309 v. St. Paul 453 Grumbine v. Washington 452, 528 Grundy v. Commonwealth 754 Grundy County v. Tennessee Coal &c. Co. 874 Guaranty Tr. & S. Dep. Co. v. Green Cove Spgs. &c. Co. 58, 59 Guard v. Rowan 772 Gubasko v. New York 530 Guenther v. People 692 Guerin v. Moore 752 Guerra, Ex parte 1232, 1234 In re 25, 578, 1232, 1259 Guerrero, In re 421, 436, 872 Guetig v. State 641 Guffey v. Smith 42 Guild v. Kidd 800 v. Rogers 586, 591 Guile v. Brown 865 Guilford v. Cornell 302 v. Supervisors 1035 ». Sup’rs of Chenango 457, 484, 486, 491, 498, 564, 788, 1034 7 Guillotte v. New Orleans 426, 1335 Guilmartin v. Philadelphia 531 Guinn v. Iowa, &c. R. Co. 1210, 1220 Guiterrez, Ex parte 553 Gulf, &c. R. Co. v. Hefley & Lewis 1307 v. Texas 832, 1267 Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. ». Ellis 68, 844, 1333 v. Fuller 1199 ». Rambolt 129 v. State 1304 Gulf Coast Ice & Mfg. Co. v. Bowers 1184, 1185 Ixxix Page Gulfport v. Stratakos 1282 Gulick v. New 282, 1402 Gulledge Bros. Lumber Co. 2. Wenatchee Land Co. 257 Gulline v. Lowell 1193 Gumm v. Hubbard 1382 Gundling v. Chicago 748, 829 Gunn, Re 270 v. Barry 89, 90, 588, 590 v. Union R. Co. 869 »v. White S. M. Co. 255 Gunnarssohn ». Sterling 245 Gunnison Co. Com’rs v. Rollins & Sons 474 Gunter v. Atl. C. L. R. Co. DO Dato v. Dale Co. 301 Guppy v. Moltrup 306 Gurnee v. Chicago 1052 v. Speer 582, 588 Gurney v. Minneapolis U. E. Co. 1189 Gurnsey v. Northern California Power Co. 1184, 1185, 1186 Gurski v. State 629 Gustafson v. State 93 Gustavus v. Dahlmer 60 Gut v. Minnesota 544 v. State 552, 676 Guthrie v. Oklahoma 493 Guthrie, &c. R. Co. v. Faulkner 1218 Guthrie National Bank v. Guthrie 492, 493 Gutman »v. Va. Iron Co. 348 Guy v. Baltimore 1017 Guyandot Valley R. Co. v. Buskirk 1217 Gwin v. United States 193 H Haas v. Chicago, &c. R. R. Co. 1244,1246 Haavik v. Alaska Packers’ Ass’n 51 Habersham 2. State 682 Hack »v. State 687 Hackensack Water Co. v. Public Utility Com’rs 395 Hacket v. Wilson 821 Hackett, In re 741, 865, 1104 ». Brooksville Graded School Dist. ». State Liquor Licensing Board 967, 972 81, 89, 90 Hackettstown v. Swackhammer 404 Hackney v. Vawter 964 Hadacheck v. Sebastian 1315 Haddad »v. State 232 Hadden v. Chorn . 962 v. Collector 292 57, 58, 59, 845, 851, 857 410 Haddock v. Haddock Hadduck’s Case Hadley v. Mayor, &c. Hadsell v. Hancock Hafford ». New Bedford 1408, 1412 457 446Ixxx Page 959 Hagan v. Hendry v. Richmond 1274, 1293 Hagany v. Cohnen 867 Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. 1065 ». Supervisors of Yolo 1080 } Hageman »v. Vanderdoes 75 Hager v. Ky. Children’s Home Society 1031 Hagerstown v. Baltimore &c. | Co. 431, 434 | v. Dechert 360, 362, 366 v. Schuer 393 v. Witmer 427, 441 Haggard v. Hawkins 303 Hagge v. State 1406 Haggerty v. St. Louis Ice Mfg. & Storage Co. 1340 Hagler v. Larner 1271 Hagood v. Southern 23 Hahn v. United States 151 Haigh »v. Bell 1283 Haight v. Grist 997 v. Lucia 670 Haile v. Gardner 1259, 1262 Haine’s Appeal 869 v. Hall 1289 ». Levin 869 ». School Dist. 409 Hair v. State 664 Hairston v. Danville, &c. R. Co. 1128, 1141 Haislip v. Wilmington, &c. Co. 1216 Haithcock v. Columbia 531 Hakewell, Matter of 728 v. Ingram 956 Halbert v. San Saba Spgs. L.’& L. S. Ass’n 267 | v. Sparks 386 Hale v. Everett 94, 130, 141, 962, 864, 967 v. Henkel 627, 650 v. Kenosha 1057, 1094 v. Lawrence 1313 v. State 182 v. Wilkinson 997 v. Worstell 214 Haley v. Boston 519 v. Clarke 219 v. Philadelphia 105, 190, 772 v. Taylor 713 Haley & Lang Co. v. Huron 451 Hall, In re 318 v. Armstrong 673 v. Bunte 301 ». Concord 516 v. De Cuir 823, 1244 v. Dunn 137, 245, 317 v. Gavitt 1392 ». Geiger-Jones Co. 1003, 1339, 1340 v. Industrial Com. 250 v. Marks 863 v. Marshall 237, 1393 LIST OF CASES CITED Page | Hall ». Moran 1259, 1262 v. Rae 805 v. State 630, 816 v. Steele 279, 287 v. Tarver 562 v. Thayer 872, 873 v. United States 639 v. Washington County 700 v. Williams 58, 60, 856 v. Wisconsin 558, 563 Haller Sign Works v. Physical Culture Training Sch. 1229 | Hallida v. Hunt 14 Hallinger v. Davis 673, 739 Hallock v. Franklin County 1209 v. Miller 891 Halloran v. Jacob Schmidt Brew- ing Co. 250 Hallyburton »v. Sagle 752 Halsey v. Rapid Transit St. Ry. Co. 1179, 1184 Halstead v. Buster 4l v. Mayor, &c. of N. Y. 400, 457, 461, 476 v. Nelson 911 Ham v. McClaws 343 | v. Salem 1132 v. Smith 1392 v. State 55, 1412 v. Wisconsin, &c. Ry. Co. 1215 | Hamann v. Heekin 149 | Hambleton v. Glenn 61 | Hamblin v. Marchant 752 Hamden v. New Haven 1087, 1088 | Hamersley 2. New York 1203 Hamilton, Ez parte 727 v. Alabama Power Co. 1195 v. Brown 844 v. Eaton 26 v. Eno 921 v. Hirsch 753 v. Ky. Distilleries, &c. Co. 348, 380 v. Kneeland 75 v. Lovejoy Tp. Highway Com’rs 1208 v. People 682 v. Pittsburg, &c. R. Co. 1221 | v. President, &c. of Carthage 531 v. St. Louis Co. Ct. 96, 142 v. State 249, 320 v. Vicksburg, &c. R. R. Co. 80, 1154, 1292, 1295 v. Wilson 1040 Hamilton, &e. Co. v. Hamilton 556 Hamilton Co. v. Massachusetts 34 v. Montpelier Sav. Bk. 475 Hamilton Co. Com’rsv. Rasche 774, 804 Hamilton Gaslight &c. Co. v. Hamil- ton 443, 569 Hamlet ». Taylor 326 Hamlin v. Mack 742 v. Meadville 404, 471 Hammer v. Dagenhart 1000 v. State 48, 360, 823LIST OF CASES CITED lxxxi Page Page Hammett v. Philadelphia 578, 1038, | Hanson Lumber Co. ». United States 1113 1052, 1054, 1056, 1074, 1119 | Hapgood v. Doherty 868 Hammitt v. Gaynor 488 ». Whitman 772 Hammond »v. Anderson 116 | Happel v. Brethauer 280 v. Clark 86, 87, 128, 129, | Happy v. Morton 962 383, 384, 502, 584 v. Mosher 854 ». Haines 244 | Harbaugh »v. Cicott 1368, 1388, 1403 v. People 725 | Harbeck v. New York 379 ». Winder 1054 | Harbison v. Knoxville Iron Co. 735, 746 Hammond Beef & P. Co. v. Best 601 | Harbor Com’rs v. Pashley 1016 Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas 254, | Hard v. Burton 863 569, 627 v. Nearing 738, 741 ». Montana 1046, 1235 | Hardaway »v. State 1259, 1261 Hampden County v. Morris 13 | Hardeman v. Downer 589 Hampshire v. Franklin 398, 1035 | Harden v. Cumstock 928 Hampton v. Coffin 1209 | Hardenburgh v. Lockwood 1160 v. McConnel 61 | Harder’s Fireproof Storage, &c. Co. ». Watson 1155} v. Chicago 178, 1086 ». Wilson 940 | Hardin v. Baptist Church 961 Hampton Beach Imp. Co. ». Hamp- v. State 638 ton 1088 | Hardin-Wyandot L. Co. »v. Upper Hamrick v. Rouse 247| Sandusky 37 Hancock, Matter of 60, 870 Harding, Ex parte 725 ». City of Muskogee 1053 v. Alden 850, 851, 856, 858 v. Gaden 833 | v. Funk 1136, 1215 ». Louisville &c. Co. 40 | v. Goodlett 1136, 1141 v. Mitchell 909 v. Rockford, &c. Co. 471 v. State 647 v. Stamford Water Co. 1161 ». Yaden 834, 1307 Hardman v. Cabot 1187 Hancock’s Estate 57 | Hardwick v. Pawlet 712 Hancock National Bank v. Farnum 61 | v. Wolcott 827, 828 Hand »v. Ballou 768 | Hardy v. Atchison, &c. R. R. Co. 1304 Hand Gold Mining Co. v. Packer 1134 | v. Brooklyn 450 Handel v. Champlin 1269 | Hare ». Ft. Smith, &c. Co. 1120 Handy v. Chatfield 592, 599 | v. Hare 850 ». St. Paul, &c. Pub. Co. 1282 | ». Kennerly 1100 v. State 682 | v. Mellor 910 Haney v. Marshall 48 | Harkness’ Estate, In re 1022 Hanford v. Davies 46 | Harkey v. State 653, 654 Hang Kie, In re 425 | Harkrader v. Wadley 28 Hanger v. Des Moines 460 | Harlan v. People 65 Hankins v. Lawrence 1136 | Harley v. Montana O. P. Co. 854 v. People 415 | Harman v. Harwood Zi Hanley v. Donoghue 57, 60 v. Lynchburg 452 ». Kansas City, &c. R. Co. 1304 v. Omaha 439 Hanlin v. Chicago, &c. Co. 1165 | Harmison v. Ballot Com’rs of Jeffer- Hanlon v. Doherty 702 son Co. 176 Hanna v. Kelsey Realty Co. 257 | Harmon v. Auditor 114 ». Young 140 ». Bolley 1054 Hannel v. Smith 121 ». Chicago 433, 1003, 1009, Hannibal v. Richards 1326 1277, 1281, 1326 Hannibal, &c. R. Co. v. Husen 1324 v. Dreher 963 Hannis Distilling Co. ». Baltimore 1021 v. Omaha 1200 Hannon 2v. Grizzard 1351, 1365 ». State 230 ‘y. St. Louis Co. Ct. 515 ». Wallace 594 Hanoff v. State 662 | Harmony v. Mitchell 1313 Hanover v. Turner 849 | Harnage v. Martin 112 Hans ». Louisiana 23, 601 | Harp v. Osgood 714 Hanscom »v. Boston 529 | Harpending v. Haight 222, 223, 323 Hansen v. Vernon 1029 v. Reformed Church 39 Hanson v. Adrian 1418 | Harper ». Com’rs 742 v. Grattan 708 v. Richardson 1202, 1205 ». Krehbiel 948 v. Rowe 792Ixxxll v. State v. Terry v. Walker 1 v. United States Harris Co. v. Boyd Harrisburg v. Segelbaum Harrison v. Baltimore v. Bridgeton v. Bush v. Denver City Tramwa v. Elgin v. Harrison v. Leach v. Metz v. Morton v. New Orleans, &c. Co. v. Sager v. St. Louis, &c. Co. v. Stacy v. State v. Stroud v. Supervisors v. Willis Harrison Justices ». Holland Harrodsburg v. Abram v. Renfro Harrold v. Oklahoma Harrow v. Myers Hart, Hx parte In re v. Albany v. Bostwick v. Bridgeport v. Brooklyn v. Commonwealth v. Remington Paper Co. LIST OF CASES CITED Page Harper Co. Com'rs v. Rose 474 Harrigan v. Lumber Co. 1297 Harrigan & Reid Co. v. Burton 431 Harriman v. Baptist Church 964 v. Boston 529 Harrington v. Co. Com’rs 1209 ». lowa Cent. R. Co. 1156 | v. Miles 887 v. Providence 1326 v. State 684 Harris v. Allegany Co. 374 v. Austell 590 v. Brown 962 v. Colquit 109 v. Dennie 34 v. Dist. of Columbia 521 v. Harris 109 v. Huntington 910 | v. McClanahan 859 | v. Marblehead 801 v. Morris 711 | v. People 304, 674 | ». Roof 282 | v. Rutledge 784 v. Schuylkill River, &c. R. Co. 1217 309, 705 | 889 37, 167, 1350 552 1025 1052 425, 1270 394, 398, 503 895, 897, 945 ViCon L179: 1181, 1196 1283 850, 856 134 772 oe 1172 41, 109, 113, 593 119 24 763 348 1389 | 296, 305 756 393 520 430 655 121 56 219 433 764 453 522, 1284 695 Page | Hart v. Evans 1385 v. Folsom 370 v. Henderson 770 v. Holden 485 v. Jewett 110 v. Mayor, &c. of Albany 1225, 1319 v. Neillsville 448, 528 v. State 553, 1254 v. Von Gumpach 921 Harteau v. Harteau 851 Hartford v. Parsons 425 v. State 889 Hartford Bridge Co. v. Union Ferry Co. 348, 372 Hartford F. Ins. Co. v. Chicago M. &c. Co. 40, 1232 v. Redding 317, 1333 v. Reynolds 702 Hartland v. Church 1060 Hartman, Ez parte 724 v. Aveline 53 v. Greenhow 38, 118, 558, 582 Hartmar v. Tresise 1124 Hartranft’s Appeal 222 | Hartsell ». Asheville T= O68 Hartt v. Harvey 1406 Hartung v. People 548, 696, 756, 790 Hartzler v. Goodland 471 Harvard v. Day 1103 Harvey v. Com’rs Rush Co. 561 v. Elkins 1314 v. Farnie 851 v. Lackawanna, &c. Co. 1149, 1156, 1215 v. Tama Co. 1392 v. Thomas 348, 745, 1127 Harvey Coal, &c. Co. v. Dillon 742 Harward »v. St. Clair, &c. Co. 788 Harwood »v. Astley 916 v. Bloomington 1220 v. Wentworth 279 Hasbrouck v. La Febre 600 v. Milwaukee 464, 494, 496, 787 v. Shipman 597 Hasford v. Eno 707 Haskel ». Burlington 804 Haskell, Re 428 v. Howard 423 v. Kansas Natural Gas Co. 1269, 1280 v. New Bedford 340, 370, 1148 v. Perkins 956 Hassett v. Carroll 509, 889, 920 | Hastings v. Bushong 64 v. Lane 772 v. Lusk 928 Hastings &c. Co. v. Ingalls 1180 Haswell’s Case 900 Hatch v. Land 897 v. Lane 895 v. Stoneman 222 v. Vt. Central R. R. Co. 1152, 1193, 1220LIST OF CASES CITED Ixxxiil Page Page Hatcher v. State 804 | Hayes v. Holly Springs 475 ». Toledo, &c. Co. 772 v. Missouri 19, 676, 825, 843 Hatcheson v. Tilder 1402 | v. Pratt 29 Hatchett ». Mt. Pleasant Ch. 964 | v. Press Co. 934 Hatfield v. Commonwealth 249 v. Reese 109 Hathaway v. Bruggink 925 v. State 829 v. Everett 452) Hayford v. Bangor 1119, 1144, 1145 »v. McDonald 306 | Haymaker v. State 1353 v. New Baltimore 305 | Hayne v. Chicago & O. P. Elev. R. v. Sackett 388, 394 Co. 395 Hathon v. Lyon 752 | ». Metropolitan Tr. Co. 224 2. Natural Carbonic Gas Co. 361, | Haynes v. Burlington 1115 1319, 1321 | v. Seattle 756 Hathorne v. Panama Park Co. 673 v. State 667, 774, 792 Hattiesburg v. Geigor 453 v. Thomas 1156 Hattiesburg Grocery Co. v. Robert- Hays »v. Brierly 956 son 1051 v. Hogan 259 Hatzfield v. Gulden 283 v. Port of Seattle 559 Hauenstein v. Lynham 26, 27 v. Risher 1146 Haugen v. Albina Light & W. Co. 1306 | vy. Walnut Creek Oil Co. 1112, 1144 Haupt v. Simington 859 | Haywood v. Savannah 412 Hausenfluck ». Commonwealth 638 | Hazel v. Jacobs 853 Hauser v. No. Brit. & M. Ins. Co. 1333 ». Owensboro 453 Haver v. Yaker 26 | Hazelhurst v. Mayes 1169, 1184 Haverford Electric Light Co. ». Hazelton v. Atlanta 424 Hart 1186 | Hazen v. Essex Company 1136 Haverhill Bridge Props. v. Co. v. Lerche 386 Com’rs 1203 | Head ». Amoskeag Co. 862, 1137 Haverly I. M. Co. v. Howcutt 863 ». Providence, &c. Co. 476 Having v. Covington 452| Head Money Cases 27, 999, 1232, 1279 Havre De Grace v. Fletcher 445| Heald v. Dist. Columbia 339 Hawaii v. Mankichi 78| Health Dept. v. Rector of Trinity Hawbecker v. Hawbecker 125 | Church 839, 1346 Hawes v. Chicago 430 | Healy v. Delta 1120 v. Miller 1380, 1393 | ». Kansas City 531 v. State 641, 642| Healy Lumber Co. v. Morris 1140 Hawk v. Marion County 460 | Heard v. Brooklyn 1170 Hawke v. Smith 70, 71) v. Heard 326 Hawker v. New York 1343 | Hearn v. Brogan 317 Hawkins v. Barney’s Lessee 560 | Hearst ». New Yorker-Staats-Zeitung v. Bleakly 79 959 ». Carrol 127 v. Woelper 1408 vy. Commonwealth 393| Heath, Ex parte 158, 1395, 1398, v. Governor 183, 222, 223, 33% 1404, 1406, 1407 v. Jones 109 | ». Hazelip 763 ». Lumsden 940 | Heather v. Mitchell 530 v. Mangum 1040 | Heather Children, Matter of 727 v. Ragsdale 856 | Heaton’s Estate, In re 119 v. Springfield 453 | Heavner v. Elkins 1074 Hawley v. Hurd et al. 20, 735 | Hechinger v. Maysville 425 v. Malden 1021, 1060, 1061, 1062) Hector 2. State 654, 689 »v. Walker 1347 | Hedden, Ex parte 838 Hawthorn v. Calef 566, 588, 598 v. Hand 176, 300, 866 v. People 1330 | Hedderich v. State 1250 Hay v. Baraboo 317| Hedgecock v. Davis 147 ». Cohoes Company 1137, 1155] Hedges v. Dixon County 475 Hayden »v. Foster 1104 »v. Madison Co. 516 »v. Goodnow 390 | Hedley v. Com’rs of Franklin Co. 372 ». Hasbrouck 910| Hedlund v. Geyer 1257 ». Noyes 417, 431, 432| Hegarty’s Appeal 198, 204 Hayes, In re 943 | Hegeman v. Western R. Co. 1238, 1241 ». Appleton 423| Heier v. State 686 v. Douglas Co. 1077 | Heike v. United States 666lxxxiv Page Heilbron, Ez parte 431 Estate of, Re 590 | Heim v. McCall 51] Hein v. Davidson 744 | Heinlein v. Martin 111) Heino v. Grand Rapids 530 | Heins v. Lincoln 471 Heirs of Duverge »v. Salter 314 Heirs of Holman 2. Bk. of Norfolk 199, 856 Heirs of Ludlow v. Johnson 125 Heiskell ». Knox Co. 277, 289 Heisler ». Thomas Colliery Co. 122, 261, 372, 803, 1010, 1041 Heiss v. Milwaukee &c. Co. 1165 Hekking »v. Pfaff 58 Heldt v. State 657, 661 Helena v. Dunlap 1092 v. Dwyer 429 v. Gray 421 v. Helena Water Works Co. 796 v. Kent 426 v. Thompson 529 Helena Cons. Water Co. v. Steele 490 Helena Power Transmission Co. v. Spratt 255, 1130, 1140 Helena Waterworks Co. v. Helena 819 | Hellen »v. Medford 369, 552, 1119) Heller v. Atchison, &c. R. R. Co. 795 v. Franke 727 v. Sedalia 446, 453 Helme »v. Bd. of Election Com’rs 1374 Helming v. Forrester 776 Helverstine v. Yantes 868 Heman »v. Allen 1076 Heman Constr. Co. v. Wabash R. Co. 1074 Hench 2. Pritt 1126 Hendershot v. State 1208 Hendershott v. Ottumwa 438 Henderson v. Davis 411 v. Dreyfus 932, 933 v. Griffin 39 v. Heyward 429 v. Hughes County 1093 v. Lambert 1069 v. Lexington 1141, 1145 v. Lieber 383 v. London 1068 v. McClain 1153 »v. Minneapolis 1153, 1157 v. New York 1002 v. Oliver 1107 v. Young 405 Henderson Bridge Co. ». Henderson 1015 v. Ky. 1012 Henderson County »v. Henderson Bridge Co. 113 Henderson Co. »v. Travelers’ Ins. Co. 475 Henderson’s Distilled Spirits 615, 1104 Henderson’s Tobacco 317 Hendersonville v. Jordan 1398, 1403 LIST OF CASES CITED Page Hendrick v. Maryland 1003, 1284, 1285, 1287 Hendrick’s Case 65 Hendrickson v. Apperson 41, 593, 598 v. Clark 1406 v. Decow 963 v. Hendrickson 327, 328, 380 Hendrix v. Daughtry 923 v. Southern R. Co. 1205 Hendryx v. Peoples United Church 962 Heninger v. Peery 1126 Henisler v. Freedman 626 Henke, In re 53 v. McCord 383 Henkel v. Cincinnati 36 v. Detroit 450 Henley v. Lyme Regis 618, 526 Henneberger, Re 263 Hennepin Co. v. Bartelson 1284 Hennersdorf v. State 1282 Hennessy v. St. Paul 1325 Hennington v. Georgia 1268, 1281 Henrico Co. v. Richmond 245 Henry, In re 694, 696 v. Cherry 130 v. Chester 1093 v. Deitrich 963 . Dubuque & Pacific R. R. Co. 1194, 1206, 1213 s v. Henkel 725 »v. Henry 304, 590 v. Lincoln 525 v. Missouri, &c. R. Co. 113 v. Tilson 142 v. White 113 Henry Gaus & Sons Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, &c. R. Co. 1164 Henshaw v. Foster 172 Hensley v. Force 59 Hensley Township v. People 1038 Hensoldt v. Petersburg 278 919, 946, 947 662, 665, 705 Henwood »v. Harrison v. People Hepburn v. Curts 755 ». Griswold 16 Hepburn’s Case 1124 )| Herald v. Board of Education 509 Herber v. State 548 Herdic v. Roessler 14 Herndon v. Chicago, &c. R. Co. 1267 v. Imperial Fire Ins. Co. 182 v. Salt Lake City 446 Herold v. Parish Bd. of School Direc- tors 974 Herr v. Cent. Ky. Lunatic Asylum 24 Herrick v. Barzee v. Randolph 281, 283, 284, 286 571, 573, 988 Herrington v. Lansingburgh 528 Herrmann ». State 427 Hersey v. Neilson 261, 845 v. Nelson 509 v. Supervisors of Milwaukee 1093, 1105, 1107LIST OF CASES CITED Page Hershfield ». Rocky Mountain Bell el. Co. 1181 v. State 685 Hershizer v. Florence 752, 754 Hess v. Johnson 593 v. Pegg 120, 260, 391, 393 v. State 1259, 1260 v. Werts 781 v. White 677 Hessin v. Manhattan 404 Hessler v. Drainage Com’rs 788 Hester v. Durham Traction Co. 1179 1181 Heth v. Fond du Lac 451 Hewin v. Atlanta 1334 Hewison v. New Haven 450, 505, 525 Hewitt ». Normal School District 386 ». Prince 701 ». School District 387 v. Seattle 454, 520, 521 ». State Bd. of Med. Examiners 229 Hewitt’s Appeal 1064 Hey Sing Jeck v. Anderson 623 Heydenfeldt v. Towns 874 Heyfron, Ex parte 855 Heyman v. Hays 1007 Heyward, Matter of 54 v. Christensen 768 v. Judd 586, 596 v. Mayor, &c. of New York 341, 369, 1111, 1177, 1194, 1195 v. People 622, 623, 1256 ». State 488 v. Wichita 530 Hibbard, &c. Co. v. Chicago 443 Hibernia R. R. Co. v. Camp 1142 Hibernian Sav. &c. Soc. ». San Francisco 992 Hickerson v. Benson 1391 Hickey v. Hinsdale 158 Hickie v. Starke 34 Hickman v. Kansas City 1111, 1204, 1217 Hickman’s Case 1126 Hickok v. Plattsburg 520, 521 v. Tallman 766, 768 Hicks v. Steigleman 762 Hicksville v. Blakeslee 407 Higdon v. Heard 649 Higert v. Greencastle 529 Higginbotham v. Berg 224, 1359 v. Chicago 1209 v. Farmers’ Ins. Co. 79, 675 v. Lime 999 v. State 661 Higginson v. Treas. & Sch. House Com’rs 504, 505 High v. Coyne 1044 v. Shoemaker 742 Highbarger v. Milford 1157 Highland Boy Gold Min. Co. ». Strickley 1134 Ixxxv Page High School Dist. 137 ». Lancaster Co. 1040 Hightower v. Bailey & Koerner 755 Hightstown v. Glenn 262 Highway Com’rs v. Ely 447 | v. Martin 449 | Highway Trailer Co. v. Janesville El. Co. 453, 518 Hilands v. Commonwealth 691 Hilbish v. Catherman 488 Hildreth v. Lowell 1134, 1284 v. McIntyre 1357 Hill, Ex parte 722 ». Atlantic, &c. R. Co. 116 ». Boston 449, 451, 517 v. Boston, &c. R. Co. 257 v. Boyland 163 v. Charlotte 447 v. Com’rs 304 ». Commonwealth 660 v. Higdon 1056, 1071, 1074, 1079, 1091, 1100 ». Hill 1409 v. Howell 1418 v. Kessler 589 v. Kricke 763, 764 v. Miles 910 v. Morse 110 »v. Nelms 691 v. People 674, 675, 847 ». Pride 859 v. Rae 804, 1235 v. Ray 347 v. Roberts 1028, 1032 v. Skinner 1370 v. Slade 140 ». Spear 1255 v. State 327 ». Sunderland 193 ». Tohill 148 ». Wallace 361, 368 v. Wells 872 v. Woodward 25 Hillard v. Moore 595 Hillebert v. Porter 597 Hilliard v. Connelly 186 ». Miller 785 Hills v. Chicago 143, 166, 167, 345 Hillsboro First Nat'l Bk. ». Trail Co. Com’rs 1085 Hillstrom v. St. Paul 453, 520 Hilton, In re 706 vy. Roylance 961 ». Stewart 114 vy. Thatcher 752 Himes v. Stahe 624 Himman v. Warren 78 Himmelman ». Carpentier 767 Hinchman 2. Paterson Horse R. Co. 1177, 1188, 1189, 1297 ». Town 848 Hinckley ». Somerset 523 Hind ». Rice 305Ixxxvi LIST OF Page | Hinde v. Vattier 39 | Hindman v. Oregon Short Line R. Co. 806 | v. Piper 204 | Hine, The v. Trevor 65 | Hines v. Charlotte 446 v. Leavenworth 1056, 1074 | v. Lockport 450, 530 | v. Nevada 528 ». Rocky Mountain 1158 Hing v. Crowley 381 | Hingham, &c. Turnpike Co. v. Nor- folk Co. 341 | Hingle v. State 293, 296 Hinkle, In re 1356 Hinkley »v. Seattle 439, 1215 Hinman v. Chicago, &c. R. R. Co. 1245 Hinson v. Lott 1008 Hinton v. State 631 Hintrager v. Mahony 1105 Hintz v. Mich. Cent. Ry. Co. 673, 869| v. State 657 | Kor Hinze »v. Iola 52: Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States 1275 Hipp v. Charlevoix Co. Supervisors 1409S Hipple v. State 691 Hirn v. State 316, 578, 579 Hirsh v. Block 368, 382, 1141 o Hirth- Krause Co. v. Cohen 341 Hiss v. Baltimore &c. Co. 1179 | v. Bartlett 271 | Hitchcock 2. Platt 474 | Hitchings, In re 672 Hite v. Hite 841 | Hixon v. Sharon 1035 | Hixson v. Oakes 1266 | Hoadly v. Chase 725 | Hoag v. Hatch 887 | v. Switzer 1155 | Hoagland ». Creed 863 Hoar v. Wood 927, 928, 945 Hoare »v. Silverlock 932 Hobart v. Supervisors 236, 237, 348 | Hobbs v. Germany 387 v. Long Distance Tel. &c. Co. 1181 ». Washington 452 | Hobbs & Johnson, Ex rel 807 | Hoboken v. Phinney 1099 | Hockett v. State Liquor Licensing Board 178, 351 Hocking Valley Coal Co. v. Rosser 806, 836 | 1361 | 1377, 1397 | Hodge v. Bryan ». Linn v. Muscatine Co. 742 | Hodges v. Balt. Pass. Ry. Co. 1168 | v. Buffalo 400, 459 | ». Crowley 469 v. Snyder Hodgins v. Bay City Hodgkins v. Rockport Hodgson v. Knoblauch v. Millward 754 446, 453, 519, 525 387 1390 758, 759 | Holden v. Hardy CASES CITED Page Hodgson »v. New Orleans 1046 v. Scarlett 927 »v. Vermont 638, 739, 842 Hoefling ». San Antonio 1059 Hoff v. Pure Oil Co. 892 v. State 660 Hoffert, Ex parte 1092 In re 1086 Hoffman, In re 414 v. Hoffman 58, 60, 715, 850, 856 v. Judge of Circuit Court 709 v. Locke 370 v. Philadelphia 1219 v. State 688 Hoffrichter v. State 673 Hogan v. O’ Neill 53, 54, 55 Hoge v. Railroad Co. 572 Hogg, Ex parte 305 v. Mackay 1087 v. Zanesville Canal Mfg. Co. 79, 1296 Hoggard v. Monroe 454 Hoggatt v. Vicksburg, &c. Co. 1188 Hoglan v. Carpenter 1353 Hogston v. Bell 284, 285 Hohenadel v. Steele 838 Hohmann v. Chicago 1198 Hoisington v. Huff 370 Hoke v. Henderson 737 v. United States 1275 Hoko River Boom Co. »v. Fairservice 765 Holbrook v. Finney 751 v. Murray 58, 59 Holcomb, In re 621 Holcombe v. Creamer 1236, 1344 739, 833, 1346 v. James 348, 762, 809, 810 v. Maine Cent. R. Co. 1304 v. Minnesota 544 Holder v. Aultman, Miller & Co. 250 v. State 680 Holding v. Feldman 4 Holland v. Bd. of Com’rs 1061 v. Com’rs of Silver Bow Co. 1061 v. Davis 1388 v. Dickerson 586 v. Osgood 158 v. State 186 Holland Land, &c. Co. »v. Interstate Co: 37 Hollenbeck v. Winnebago Co. 452 Holley v. Burgess 888 v. Mt. Vernon 488 Holliday v. Ont. Farmers, &c. Co. 895 Hollingsworth v. Duane 670 v. Virginia 70 Hollis ». Meux 924 v. State 714 Hollister v. Hollister 850, 851 v. State 1113 v. Union Co. 796 Hollman, Ex parte 383, 608LIST OF CASES CITED Ixxxvil Page Page Holloway v. Sherman 587, 754| Hopper v. Britt 355 Hollywood Chamber of Commerce v. California 254 v. R. R. Comm. 746, 797 v. Chicago, &ce. Ry. Co. 339 Holman v. School Trustees 387 v. Oklahoma Co. 232 Holmberg, In re 26 | Hopple v. Brown 404, 509 Holmes, Ex parte 56 v. Brown Township 476 ». Holmes 582, 858] Hopps v. People 641 v. Jennison 34, 56| Hopson, In re 722 v. Royal Fraternal Union 910, 957 | Hopt ». Utah 658, 667, 676 v. United States 628 | Horace Waters & Co. v. Gerard (fay ». Wallow 80 | 118, 119, 133 Holsman v. Thomas 1336 | Horbach v. Miller 762 Holt v. Downs 961 | Hord v. Holston River R. Co. 1155, ». State 548, 685, 695 1160, 1220 v. United States 653 v. State 584 ». Yarborough 924, 925| Horine, Ez parte 219, 220 Holt’s Appeal 409 | Horkey v. Kendall 314 Holton v. Com’rs Mecklenburg Co. 1041/| Horn v. Atlantic & St. Lawrence R. v. Milwaukee 1071, 1213, 1215 RCo; 1244, 1245 Holyoke Co. v. Lyman 569, 818, 1242 v. Chicago, &c. R. R. Co. 1246 Holzbauer v. Ritter 1315 | ». Mitchell 720 Home v. Bentinck 923 | Horn Silver Mining Co. v. New York Home, &c. v. Wilkinsburg 1057, 1095 254, 256 Home Building & C. Co. v. City of Hornaday v. State 1339 Roanoke 1154} Horne v. State 592 Home for Incurables v. New York 35 | Horstman v. Kaufman 649 Home Ins. Co. v. Augusta 420, 584| Horton v. Baptist Church 962 ». Swigert 228, 1044 ». Colo. Spgs. Masonic Bldg. Soc. ». Taxing Dist. 315 1090 Home Ins. & T. Co. v. Tennessee 573 v. Goodenough 110 Home Laundry Co. v. Louisville 1283 v. Newport 490 Home of the Friendless v. Rouse 571 | ». Old Colony Bill Posting Co. 865 Home Savings Bank v. Des Moines 991 v. State 638 Homer v. Commonwealth 318 ». Sullivan 1379, 1418 Homestead Cases 590 v. Thompson 497 Hong Wah, In re 425 v. Watson 1353 Hood »v. Finch 1208 | Horton Investment Co. v. Seattle vy. Lynn 459 | 1072, 1073 v. State 59, 60, 850 | Hoskins v. Brantley 1353 v. Wheeling 299, 306 | Hosmer v. Loveland 912, 923, 931 Hooe v. United States 1119, 1122| Hospes v. O’Brien 1272 Hook v. Hackney 889, 921| Hot Springs Lumber, &c. Co. 2. Hooker v. Burr 339 Revercomb 1288, 1289 v. Hooker 192| Hot Springs R. R. Co. v. Williamson v. New Haven & Northampton 1199 Co. 1149, 1154, 1158, 1204} Hotchkiss »v. Dist. of Columbia 1347 Hooper, In re 52 | ». Oliphant 939, 940 ». Bradford 1045| Hottentot Venus Case, The 723 ». Bridgewater 1132| Houck v. Little River Drainage ». California 253, 1000, 1234 Dist. 1053, 1054, 1071, »v. Emery 404, 1029, 1039 1072, 1074, 1082 Hoover v. McChesney 746 v. State 629 v. Mitchell 109 | Houdayer, Re 827 ». Wood 338 | Houdayer’s Estate, Re 1061 Hope v. Johnson 754| Houghton v. Huron Copper M. Co. 463 ». Mayor, &c. 296, 303 v. Page 75 Hopkins v. Baker Bros. 1062 | Houghton Co. Supervisors v. Blacker v. Clemson Agric. Coll. 22, 23, 24 1401 v. Duluth 237 | Houlton v. Dunn 285 v. Hopkins 849 v. Nichol 280 ». Lewis 1254| House, Re 1027 v. McCann 117 v. Mayes 26, 1232 v. Richmond 405, 419 v. White 700lxxxvill Page House Bill, Re 100, 1040 House Bill No. 1230, Re 1330 House Bill No. 1291, Re 1374 House and Lot v. State 1256 House of Lords Cases 871 House of Refuge v. Ryan Householder v. Kansas City Houseman v. Kent Cire. Judge 181, 775 Houston, Re 1007 v. Bartels 1153 v. Moore 14, 6. »v. Ormes 2 v. Richardson 45 v. State 131 Houston, &c. Co. v. Texas 44, 45, 559 ». Odum 277, 1164 ». United States 1004, 1275 Houston Direct Nav. Co. v. Ins. Co of N. A. 1254, 1268 Houston & E. T. Ry. Co. v. Adams 1220 | Houston, E. & W. T. R. Co. ov. Campbell 1249 Houston & T. C. Ry. Co. v. Texas &c. Co. 556, 566} Hovelman v. Kansas City Ry. Co. 559, 565 Hover v. Barkhoof 382 Hovey v. Elliott 671, 838 ». Shaffner 690 v. State 149, 214, 223, 324 Howard, Ez parte 220 ». Burke 1357 ». Church 1071 v. Fleming 721 v. Harrington 1352 v. Hulbert 318 | v. Ill. Cent. R. Co. 368 v. McDiamid 393, 1412 v. Moot 590 | v. Philadelphia 445 v. San Francisco 446 v. Schneider 309 v. Shields 1397 ». Shoemaker 1353 ». Skinner 1364 v. State 140 v. Tacoma School Dist. 509, 516 v. Thompson 910 v. Worcester 448 v. Zeyer 800 Howard Ave., In re 1058 Howard Co. v. State 770 Howard Mills Co. v. Schwartz Lumber, &c. Co. Howarth v. Barlow Howat v. Kansas Howe, Re v. Plainfield Howell v. Bee Pub. Co. 1137, 1140 909 37 1044 : 959 v. Bristol 1068, 1072 v. Buffalo 495 865 | | Hoy v. State | Hoyer v. State LIST OF CASES CITED Page Howell v. Daughet 1283 v. Fry 865 v. Jackson Co. 1215 », N. Y. &c. R. Co. 439 v. State 304, 804 609 | Howes v. Grush 748, 795 167 | Howison v. Weeden 110, 113 Howland v. Geo. F. Blake Mfg.Co. 956 v. School Dist. 1121 Hoxie v. New York, &c. R. Co. 48 360, 364 ».Wright 59, 856 1412, 1413 66, 67, 615, 617, 619, 629, 632 Hoyle v. Hickory 1152 Hoyt v. East Saginaw 1071, 1075 ». Hudson 529 v. People 709 v. Shelden 34 v. Sprague 199 v. Wyman 773 Hub, The v. Hauberg 1058 Hubbard »v. Bell 1289 v. Brainerd 758, 772 v. Brush 1041 v. Limerick Water & El. Co. 1115, 1209 v. Paterson 433 v. Taunton 460 Hubbell ». Des Moines 1214 v. Higgins 229 v. Hubbell 856 v. Viroqua 447 Hubell v. Hubell 850 Huber v. Martin 366, 570, 1242 v. Merkel 1320, 1321 v. People 304 v. Riley 540, 543, 735, 1363 Huckle ». Money 627 Huddleston v. Eugene 1187 Hudelson v. State 682 Hudgens »v. State 1085 Hudgings, Ex parte 838 Hudson v. Geary 423, 982, 1281 v. Remington Paper Co. 114 v. State 676 v. Thorne 428 Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter 51, 844, 1239 Hudson Tel. Co. v. Jersey City 437 Hudspeth v. Davis 597 178, 179, 225, 227, 242, 245, 361, 362, 364 v. Swayze Huesing v. Rock Island 403 Huey »v. State 688 Huff v. Bennett 934, 940 ». Cook 1353 Huffmire v. Brooklyn 1155 Huggins v. Field 708 v. Home Mut. F. Ins. Co. 840 Hughes, Matter of 52 v. Auburn 448LIST OF CASES CITED Page | Hughes ». Baltimore 450 vy. Cannon 784 ». Commonwealth 685, 692 v. Co. of Monroe 452 v. Hughes 147 v. People 415 ». Recorder’s Court 423 v. State 617, 629 v. Traeger 488 »v. United States 1155 Hughey’s Lessee v. Horrel 792 Huling v. Kaw Valley Ry. Co. 1208 Hull, In re 1282 ». Hull 850, 856 ». Marshall Co. 477 v. Miller Hulseman v. Rems Humbird v. Avery 264, 290 1364, 1412 | 368, 369 | Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Strauss 1320 Humboldt v. Long 474 Humboldt Co. v. Churchill Co. Com’rs 297, 382 v. Dakota City 530 Hume v. Commercial Bank 872 ». Des Moines 448, 451 > v. New York 522 vy. Rogue River Packing Co. 1290 | Humes v. Mayor, &e. 438 v. Missouri, &c. R. Co. 96 | ». Tabor 621 Hump Hairpin Mfg. Co. v. Emmer- son 1007, 1012, 1013} Humphrey v. Eakeley 867 v. Pegues 571 v. Perry 1413 Humphries v. Brogden 1226 Hunckel v. Voneiff 923 Hundley v. Collins 961 Hung Hang, Ex parte 724 Hungerford’s Appeal 109 Hunsaker v. Wright 249, 1092, 1097 Hunscom v. Hunscom 984 Hunt v. Bennett 912, 915, 921, 956 v2. Blackburn 702 | v. Boonville 453 | ». Campbell 1398 | v2. Hoffman 1407, 1408 v. Iowa Cent. Ry. Co. 1220 | v. Lucas 758 | ». Murray 330 | v. State 279, 319, 324, 682 Hunt’s Lessee ». McMahan 800 | Hunter, Ex parte v. Board of Supervisors 1061 . Chesapeake, &c. R. Co. 1221 . Cobb 997 v v v. Colfax 1338, 1339 2. Colfax Consol. Coal Co. 50, 96, 229, 234, 340, 341, 578, 805, 806, 869 v. Moore 821 v. Mutual Reserve L. Ins. Co. 846, 855 Hunter v. Nolf v. Pittsburg v. Wood Hunting v. Johnson Huntington v. Attrill v. Cheesbro Huntsville v. Goodenrath v. Madison County Hunycut v. Thompson Huntzicker v. Crocker Huntzinger v. Brock Hurford v. Omaha Ixxxix Page 1392 236, 357, 393, 395, 502, 503 720 753 62 426 1219 1025, 1057 712 110 586 157, 158 Hurlbut v. Prairie du Chien Union Tel. Co. Hurley v. Com. of Fisheries 1183 368 v. Hurley 302, 306, 599 ». Motz 531 v. Powell 1107 v. Van Wagner 1392 Hurn, Ex parte 612 Huron, Re 671 v. Second Ward Sav. Bk. 475 Huron Waterworks Co. v. Huron 403, 500 Hurst v. Smith 726 v. State 685 v. Warner 229, 1270 Hurtado v. California 638, 740 Huse v. Glover 80, 1002, 1016, 1292, 1293, 1294 v. Merriam 1103 Huson v. Dale 891 Huss v. Toledo &c. Co. 1184 Hussey v. Davis 622 Hussman v. Durham 993 1370, 1415 424, 845, 1337 Huston v. Anderson ». Des Moines v. Scott 317 ». Wadsworth 67, 863 Hutcheson v. Peck 711 v. Storrie 1075 Hutchins v. Page 959 Hutchinson v. Brown 1359 ». Caldwell Lumber Co. 1127 »v. Concord 446 v. Lewis 922 v. Olympia 518 ». Ozark Land Co. 1068 v. Parkersburg 1199 v. Wheeler 891 Hutchinson & S. R. Co. v. Fox 475 540 | Hutson v. Mayor, &c. of N. Y. 518 Hutton ». Camden 1325 v. State 387 v. Webb 1028 Huus v. N. Y. P. R. S. 8S. Co. 12 Huyett v. Pa. R. Co. 300 Hyatt v. Bates 109 ». New York 53 ». People 52, 53 ». Rondout 520, 521 v. Taylor 124, 125LIST OF CASES CITED Page | Page Hyde v. Brush 1369 | Independent School Dist. v. Rew 478 v. Cogan 506| Independent Tug Line »v. Lake v. Fall River 439, 1195 Superior L. & B. Co. 50 v. Jamaica 449| Indian Territory Lluminating Oil v. Melvin 1393 Co., In re 1095 v. Minnesota, &c. R. Co. 1110, | Indiana &c. Co. v. Eberle 1156 1158, 1196, 1197, 1210, 1218| Indiana Central Railroad Co. »v. v. White 320 Potts 164, 296, 298, 301, 311 Hydes v. Joyes 435 | Indiana Power Co. v. St. Joseph, &c. Hygrade Provision Co. ». Sherman 829 Power Co. 1220 Hyland v. Oregon Hassam Paving Indianapolis ». Consumers’ Gas Co. 442 Co. 281, 283, 284, 286} v. Holt 1076 Hylton »v. United States 989 v. Miller 434 v. Navin 42 I v. Williams 447 Indianapolis, &c. Co. v. Eberle Iasigi v. Van de Carr 726 1164, 1170 Idaho v. Rasmussen 1271, 1324| Indianapolis, &c. Ry. Co. v. Houli- Idaho, &c. R. Co. v. Nagle 1218 han 1338, 1347 Idaho-Iowa Lateral, &c. Co. ». v. Kercheval 578, 1225, 1239, Fisher 1112, 1130 1244, 1246 Idaho Northern R. Co. v. Post Fall v. Townsend 1244, 1245 Lumber Co. 1288, 1289 | Indianapolis Northern Tract Co. v Idaho Power, &c. Co. v. Blomquist 178 Dunn 1219 179, 233, 354, 1239 | Indianapolis R. R. Co. v. Smith 1156 Teck v. Anderson 758 | Indianapolis Sun v. Horrell 888 Ignaciunas v. Risley 1315 | Infelisse, In re 27 Igoe v. State 304 | Ingalls v. Cole 125 Tjams v. Duvall 141 v. Morrissey 892, 921, 932 a v. Ross 4 392, 1228) Inge v. Bd. of Public Works 1071 es v. Swan 891 v. Police Jury 1132 me Co. v. Peoria Bridge 1294 | Ingersoll v. Coal Creek Coal Co. 709 v. Wade 475 v. Nassau El. R. Co. 566 Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Arnold 1245| Inglee ». Coolidge 34 : Bohne 1004, ee 9 | Inglis v. Sailor’s Snug Harbor 39 ). Bloomington 150 v. Shepherd 1388 v. Chicago, &c. R. R. Co. 1192| Ingraham v. Booton 630 v. City of Chicago 1123, 1191 v. Geyer 251 v. Decatur 1095 v. Regan 119 v. Doherty 25 | Ingram v. Colgan 794, 1027 v. K. Sioux Falls Quarry Co. 1145 | v. Maine Water Co. 1136, 1207 v. Freeman 220 | Inhabitants of Abington v. Inhabit- v. Ihlenberg 167| ants of N. Bridgewater 1367 v. Illinois 1267 | Inhabitants of Boothbay Harbor 1048 v. Irvin 573| Inhabitants of Hanover v. Turner 851 v. en Co. 1092 | Inhabitants of Springfield ». Conn. v. Feople 569, 1243 River R. R. Co. 1162, 1164 v. Pub. Ut. Comm. 1004, 1275 | Inhabitants of Whiting v. Inhabit- v. School Trustees 1198, 1218] ants of Lubec 1025 a Ny enor 1242 | Inland Steel Co. v. Yedinak 1347 - en 280 | I an v. ‘ 94 Illinois Cent. Tr. Co. v. Lueders 803 | uae ae ei mee Conference Female College an Steamship Co. v. Tinker 1016 ooper 412 | Innes v. Tobin 53) 55; 56 Illinois & Michigan Can a v. Chicago Innis v. Bolton 1363 oe so ae R. R. € 577 | Inspiration Consol. Copper Co. »v Y ae 1C eit 611} New Keystone Copper Co. 1127 v. Sentinel Co. 932, 933, 935 | Institution for Edu. Mute & Blind Imlay v. Union Branch R. R. Co. | ». Henderson 2 Teterial Tk °C ; 1165, 1169| Insurance Co. v. Morse 822 Tails On a Pub. Sieve 1114 v. Ritchie 790 I Le in rane = Co., In re 942 v. Treasurer 34 ». Lewis & Clark County 508 v. Yard 1093Page Insurance Co. of North America v. | Welch 225, 230, 233, 234, 1333 | Intendant &c. of Greensboro v. Mul- lins 415 | ». Anderson Co. 368 | v. R. R. Comm. 1276 | International Bridge Co. v. New | York 569, 1296 International Harvester Co. v. Ken- tucky 829 v. McAdam 249, 250, 251, 252 vy. Missouri 805 International Paper Co. v. Massa- chusetts 41, 1011, 1013, 1020 International Text-Book Co. 2. Auburn 1277 | ». Dist. of Columbia 1277 v. Gillespie 1001 v. Lynch 1001 | ». Peterson 1001 | v. Pigg 363, 1001 | v. Tone 1001 v. Weissinger 1331 International Trust Co. v. A. Les- chen, &c. Rope Co 253 Inter-Ocean Publishing Co. 2. Ass’d Press 1306 Inter-River Drain Dist. ». Ham 1155 | Interstate Amusement Co. v. Albert 253 Interstate Commerce Commission, Re 21 v. Baird 627 ». Baltimore, &c. R. Co. 70 | ». Cincinnati 187 | ». Goodrich Transit Co. 228, 2 231, 232, 234, ». United States Interstate Transit Co. v. Derr 1005, 1285 Interurban R., &c. Co. v. Pub. Ut. Com. 578, 1239 Intoxicating Liquors, Re 1254 Invader Oil & Refining Co. v. Ft. Worth 417, 773 Investigating Comm., In re 911 Inwood 2. State 672 Tola v. Birnbaum 445, 492, 506 Iowa C. R. Co. v. Iowa 839, 844, 862 Iowa City v. Glassman 418 Iowa Life Ins. Co. v. Lewis 814, 1333 v. Bd. of Supervisors 340 Iowa Loan, &c. Co. v. Polk Co. 1087 Iowa Pipe, &c. Co. v. Callanan 1054, 1082 Iowa R. R. Land Co. v. Soper 774, 803 Iowa Savings & L. Ass’n v. Heidt 781 Ireland v. Bowman 1289 ». Macintosh 762 v. Turnpike Co. 338, 598 Irion v. Knapp 909 Iron Cliffs Co. v. Negaunee Iron Co. 35 Iron Mountain Co. v. Haight 320 Iron Mt. R. R. Co. v. Bingham 1170 LIST OF CASES CITED XCl Page Iron R. R. Co. v. Ironton 1144 Irons v. Field 888 Irrigation Resolution, In re 100 Irvin v. Spratlin 111, 862 Irvine v. Greenwood 519, 525 Irwin v. Gt. Southern Tel. Co. 1181 v. Wright 993 | Isenhour v. State 373 | Isham v. Fullager 964 v. Trustees 964 Isom v. Mississippi, &c. R. R. Co. 360 Israel v. Arthur 206, 792 Ivanhoe v. Enterprise 1072 Iverson v. State 316 Ives v. So. Buffalo R. Co. 739, 1230, 1231 Ivey v. Lalland 251 Ivie v. Minton 910, 957 J J. B. Mullen & Co. v. Mosley 624 J. E. Rumbell, The 29 J. H. Clark Co. v. Rice 14 J. W. Perry Co. v. Norfolk 35, 1095 Jacques v. Litle 563 Jack v. Thompson 852 Jackson, Ex parte 13, 624, 626 Matter of Tdiewiee v. Bell 1314 v. Breeland 67 v. Butler 593 ». Chew 39 ». Commonwealth 662, 666, 667 vy. Grand Forks 522 v. Hathaway 1195 ». Jackson 849, 858 v. Lyon 754 v. Munson 539 v. Neff 988, 1046, 1050, 1085, 1086, 1091 420, 1046 v. Newman v. Nimmo 180 v. Reeves 305 v. Rutland & B. R. R. Co. 1195, 1245 v. Shaw 263 v. State 299, 300, 312, 692, 703 v. United States 1155, 1294 v. Vedder 112 v. Walker 1392 v. Williams 891 ». Winn’s Heirs 1202 ex dem. Folliard v. Wright 27 v. Young 158 Jackson, &c. Co. v. Interstate, &e. Co. 442 Jackson Co. v. Kaul 509 Jackson Iron Co. v. Auditor- General 1000 236, 334, 335, 373, 374, 390 528 1328, 1334, 1335 Jacksonville v. Bowden v. Drew v. LedwithXCll LIST OF CASES CITED Page | Page Jacksonville, &c. Co. v. Adams 677 | Jeffress v. Greenville 1110, 1203 Jacksonville El. L. Co. v. Jackson- Jeffrey v. Brokaw 1107 ville 1027 | Jeffrey Mfg. Co. v. Blagg 817 Jacob v. Louisville 1217 | Jeffries v. Ankeny 816, 1395 Jacob Ruppert v. Caffey 1258 v. Harrington 1353 Jacobs, In re 1331 v. Lawrence 403 v. Clearview Water Supply Co. 1140 v. Williams 1226 ». Cone 667 | Jeliff ». Newark 1052 v. Marks 62| Jenkins, Ex parte 720 v. Seattle 1196 v. Andover 464, 1031 v. Smallwood 597 v. Ballentyne 843 v. State 692 v. Bd. of Education 1271 Jacobsen v. Superior Court 743, 1119, v. Charleston 1018 1159, 1202 v. Ewin 130, 133 v. Massachusetts 351, 1229, 1232 v. Gronen 214 Jacoway v. Denton 89, 585 v. Jenkins 753 Jahn, Re 868 v. State 668 Jaines v. Tampa 522 v. State Bd. of Elections 178, 354, James v. Commonwealth 66 372, 373, 1364 v. Pine Bluff 417, 1284 v. Thomasville 416 v. Reynolds 738 v. Waldron 1395 v. Rowland 190} Jennie De Pauw Memorial M. E. v. Stull 595 Ch. v. New Albany Waterworks 453 v. Wood 1341} Jennings v. Brown 1378 James G. Fair, Estate of 1061 v. Coal Ridge Imp. & Coal Co. 844 James Clark Distilling Co. v. West- v. Commonwealth 1062 ern Md. R. Co. 1005 v. Idaho Ry., &e. Co. 2950, 206 James Everard’s Breweries ». v. Paine 923, 928 Day 16, 1260, 1266 | v. Stafford 859 Jameson v. People 410 | v. State 674 Jamieson v. Ind. N. Gas & Oil Co. 1269] Jensen v. South Dakota Cent. R. Co. v. Wiggin 1351 1244, 1245, 124 Jamison v. Burton 118, 120 v. Southern Pacifie Co. 835, v. Flanner 217, 220, 221, 222] 1003, 1338 Jamesville & W. R. Co. v. Fisher 1354 v. Union Pacific R. Co. 1244 Jane v. Commonwealth 66 | Jernagin v. State 644 Janesville v. Carpenter 1229 | Jernigan v. Madisonville 226 Janson v. Stuart 889 | Jerome v. Ross 1114 January, Ex parte 649 | Jersey City ». Elmendorf 311 v. January 596 v. Hall 318 Janvrin, Re 182 v. Kiernan 530 v. Exeter 460 | Jersey City Presb. v. Weehawken Jarnigan v. Fleming 891 First Presb. Church 749 Jarrolt v. Moberly 141) Jesler v. Bd. of Harbor Com’rs 35 Jarvis, In re 1017 | Jessup ». Carnegie 255 v. Hathaway 910, 923| Jeter v. Vinton-Roanoke Water Co. Jasnawski v. Bd. of Assessors 306 1115, 1117, 1130, 1140 Jaunszewski, Ex parte 721] Jett v. Commonwealth 65 Jay v. O’Donnell 1405, 1406, oe Jetton ». Univ. of the South 1095 Jay Burns Baking Co. ». Bryan Jewel Theater Co. v. State Fire 329, 1336] Marshall 302 v. McKelvie 372, 1228, 1336] Jewett ». Boston Elev. R. Co. 666 Jaynes v. Omaha St. Ry. Co. ». New Haven 446 1179, 1181 | v. West 1413 2. People 654) Jitney Bus Ass’n v. Wilkes-Barre 424 Jefferson Branch Bank ». Skelly Joannes v. Bennett 896 ic ' 89, 248 | Jobe v. Urquhart 277 Jefferson City v. Coutmire 416 | Jockheck v. Shawnee Co. Com’rs Jeffersonville &c. Co. v. Hendricks 48 | 1114, 1118 Jeffersonville, &. R. R. Co. 9. | Johannessen v. United States 543, 545 Dunlap 317/ John v. C. R. & F. W. R. R. Co. 238 v. Nichols 1245 | John & Cherry Streets, Matter of v. Parkhurst 1245 745, 1124LIST OF CASES CITED Page John Hancock Ice Co. v. Rose John Hancock M. L. Ins. Co. ». 1010 | Johnson v. Taylor Warren 1333 John Ross & Co. v. Daviess Co. 1010 John Spry Lumber Co. v. Sault Sav. ks 744 John Woods & Sons v. Curl 366 | 663, 666, 983 1282 Johns v. State Johnson, Ex parte In re 189 y. Atlantic, &c. Co. 1115 v. Bay City 525 v. Beazley 110 ». Bentley 780 v. Bd. of Education 807 ». Bond 592 v. Bradstreet Co. 896 | v. Brown 945 ». Browne 57 »v. Campbell 486, 788 v. Centerville Milling Co. 1136 v. Com’rs Wells Co. 260, 775 ». Common Council 477 v. Commonwealth 889 ». De Bary-Baya M. Line 1061 ». Drummond 1016} v. Fletcher 590 v. Goodyear Mining Co. 735, 811 ». Grand Forks County 139, 1363 | v. Great Falls 136, 148, 290 | ». Harrison 296 ». Higgins 301, 380, 583, 597 vo. Hoy 724 »v. Hudson R. R. Co. 125 ». Johnson 1289 ». Joliet & Chicago R. R. Co. 151, 380 v. Jones 757, 758 v. King 924 ». Lankford 24 v. Little 1390 ». Loper 1016 v. Marsh 911 v. Martin 244 ». Parkersburgh 166, 1153 v. People 298, 1367 v. Philadelphia 404, 420, 1046 v. Powers 63 ». Railroad 261 ». Rich 241 ». Richardson 783, 789 v. Risk 37 v. St. Louis 1153, 1199 ». San Diego 398 v. School Dist. 315, 386 v. Slapp 1380, 1413 v. Somerville 529 2. Spicer 302 v. Stack 237 ». Stark County 479 v. State 215, 617, 640, 653, 655, 690, 691, 692, 1259, 1262, 1263, 1264 XCill Page 783 v. Thomson-Houston El. Co. 1184, 1186 Union Pac. Coal Co. v. 75, 76, 118 v. Wallace 864 v. Wells Clunty 102 v. Whilden 856 Johnson, Executor v. Oregon City 1061 Johnson Co. v. January 474 Johnson’s Estate, In re 191 Johnston v. Chicago 454, 518 Johnston v. Commonwealth 345, 662, 982 v. Dist of Columbia 448 ». Kennecott Cooper Corp. 1338 ». Louisville 404 ». Old Colony R. Co. 1194 ». Riley 52, 54 v. Southern Pac. Co. 859 Johnstone v. Robertson 1399 v. Sutton 925 Joliet »v. Harwood 448, 528 ». Verley 450 Joliet & N. I. R. R. Co. v. Jones 1246 Jolly v. Hawesville 452 v. Terre Haute Drawbridge Co. 79, 1295 Jones, In re 726 v. Black 341 ». Boston 1071, 1081 v. Brantley 1282 ». Brim 844 ». Bush 887 v. Caldwell 113 »v. Carter 800 v. Cavins 329 v. Columbus 304 ». Darnall 727 vy. Davis 314, 1021 vy. Driskell 854 vy. Duncan 843 ». Erie, &c. Co. 1164 v. Estate of Keep 996 ». Fletcher 621 ». Galena, &c. R. R. Co. 1244 v. Harris 984 v. Hicks 1260, 1261 ». Hutchinson 266, 277, 278, 324 v. Jones 208, 211, 363, 382, 554, 762, 837 ». Leonard 53 ». Madison Co. 494 v. Meehan 750 v. Nebraska 386 ». New Haven 518, 527, 530 1125, 1143 1252, 1255 ». North Ga. El. Co. v. People v. Perry 188, 196, 200, 203, 737 ». Portland 1026 ». Pulitzer Pub. Co. 934 ». Racine 1203 390, 458, 1313 364, 639, 868 1210 ». Richmond ». Robbins ». Seaboard Air Line R. Co.XCIV Page | Jones v. Sioux City 452, 454, 518, 520 vo. Skinner 1364 | v. Smith 1364 | v. State 326, 550, 552, 554, | 632, 674, 701, 892, 1372 ». Surprise 202, 1252, 1255 v. Thompson 309, 310 v. Townsend 884, 920 v. Venable 1127 v. Weathersbee 109 v. Weston 1264 v. Williamsburg 447 Jones Hollow Ware Co. v. Crane 558, | 578, 1239 Jones Nat’l Bk. v. Yates 34 Jonesboro v. Cairo, &c. R. R. Co. 298 Jonesboro, &c. Co. v. Maddy 12, 33 Jonesboro, &c. Turnpike Co. v. Brown 223 Joos v. Illinois Nat’l Guard 24 Joplin Consol. Mining Co. »v. City of Joplin 1145 | Jordan ». Bailey 140 | v. Benwood 451, 1153 | v. Evansville 178, 1111 %. Jordan 113 v. Lexington 529 v2. Massachusetts 638 v. Moore 372 v. Woodward 1136 Jordan’s Case 653 | Joseph, In re 724 | v. Randolph 1017 Joslin Mfg. Co. ». Providence 360, 393. 492, 802, 1221 Joslyn v. Detroit 528 Journeay v. Gibson 783, 786 Joy v. St. Louis 573 v. Thompson 599 Joyce v. Woods 1326 | Joyner v. School District 1103 | Jozwich v. United States 628 | Judd v. Judd 790 | Judefind »v. State 1282 Judkins v. Hill 1403 Judson »v. Bridgeport 1120 v. Reardon 419, 710 v. Winsted 453, 518, 525 | Judson Freight Forwarding Co. ». Commonwealth 1002, 1011 | Judy ». Beckwith 1061 v. Lashley 416 Jugiro v. Brush 830 Julia Bldg. Ass’n v. Bell Tel. Co. 1181 Julian v. Golden Rule Oil Co. 402, 432| Julien v. Model B. & L. I. Co. 347, | 805, 1235 v. Woodsmall 1194 |} Jump v. Barnes 956 | Juniata Limestone Co. ». Fagley 834 | Justice ». Commonwealth 572 | Justices ». Fennimore 872 | ». Murray 67 | LIST OF CASES CITED Page Justus, Ex parte 727 Juul v. Sch. Dist. 516 K Kahlen v. State 1110 Kahn v. State 261 v. Sutro 140 Kaine, Matter of 725 v. Commonwealth 808 Kair, Ex parte 341, 345, 373, 1346 Kalamazoo v. Crawford 1052, 1071 Kaler v. Puget Sound Bridge, &c. Co. 111 Kalich v. Knapp 1283 Kalispell ». Flathead County School Dist. No. 5 1058, 1095 Kalloch v. Newbert 630 v. Superior Court 638, 741 Kaminitsky v. Railroad Co. 1247 Kamm v. Normand 1288 Kane v. Baltimore 1132 v. Commonwealth 682 v. Cook 60 v. Erie R. Co. 351, 373 v. New Jersey 1285, 1286 v. N. Y. E. Ry. Co. 1177 v. People 696 v. State 1046, 1050 Kansas v. Colorado 22, 1291 v. Ziebold 866 Kansas, &c. Co. v. Cuykendall 1170 v. Louisiana, &c. Co. 1128 v. Petty 1123 v. St. Joseph, &c. Co. 1199 v. Terminal, &c. Co. 1111 Kansas City v. Baird 1073 v. Clark 340 v. Corrigan 412 v. Holmes 426 v. Huling 758 v. Hyde 1217 v. Jordan 413, 414 v. King 449 v. Liebi 444 v. Union P. Ry. Co. 339 v. Whipple 1041, 1354 Kansas City, &c. R. Co. v. Botkin 1012 v. Schwake 1154 v. Wiygul 1293 Kansas City Ordinance No. 39,946, In re 380, 400, 417, 1120, 1140 Kansas City R. Co. v. Anderson 1221 Kansas City Southern R. Co. ». Anderson 806, 12138, 1245 2. Kaw Valley Drainage Dist. 1005 v. Road Imp. Dist. No. 6 1073 v. United States 229 Kansas Masonic Home ». Sedgwick Co. 1090 Kansas Pacific R. R. Co. ». Mower 1244 Karcher v. Wheeling El. Co. 1186 Karney v. Paisley 766 Katz v. Walkinshaw 75Page Katzenberger v. Aberdeen 472 v. Lawo 413 Kaucher v. Blinn 888 Kauffman v. Tacoma, &c. R. Co. 1164 v. Wooters 840 Kaufman v. Dostal 1256 Kaukauna W. P. Co. v. Green Bay &c. Co. 40, 1131, 1150 Kayer v. Bremen 531 Kaysville City v. Ellison 1064, 1118 Keagy v. Wellington Nat’l Bank 115} Kean v. McLaughlin 926 v. Stetson 1290 Kearney, Ex parte 724, 725 ». Vann 317 Kearns v. Howley 1359 Keasy v. Louisville 438 Keating v. Cincinnati 450 v. Spink 146 Keator L. Co. v. St. Croix B. Corp. 1294 Keddie v. Moore 867, 868 Kedrolivansky v. Niebaum 891 Kee v. Armstrong 889 Keefer v. State 829 Keeler, Ex parte Keeley v. Evans 51 ». Great Northern R. Co. 894 Keeling, Ex parte 411 Keen »v. State 545 Keenan v. Cook 1369 Keene v. Clarke 34 »v. Huntington 450 v. State 552 Keeney v. Tredwell 672 Keerl ». Montana 33, 690 Keese v. Denver 1082 Keeter v. State 865 Keever v. Mankato 618, 525 Kehon v. City of Atlanta 51 Kehrer v. Richmond 451, 1152 Keil ». Gray’s Harbor &c. Co. 1199 Keirns v. N. Y. &c. Co. 1174 Keith v. Clark 558, 582 v. Keith 765 v. Kellogg 864 v. Lockhart 494 v. State 660, 1254 v. Ware 757 Keith Co. v. Citizens’ Sav. & L. Ass’n 471 Kell v. Kell 857 Kellar v. Los Angeles 530 Keller v. Corpus Christi 1114 v. Potomac Electric Power Co. 101, 360, 368 v. State 305, 1331 v. Western Paving Co. 237 Kelley v. Boston 529 ». Boston, &c. Co. 772 ». Corson 1103, 1105 ». Minneapolis 469 ». Partington 891 v. Pike 110 OF CASES CITED Kelley v. Rhoads v. Sherlock Kellogg, Ex parte ». Hickman v. Janesville v. Oshkosh v. State Treasurer v. Union Co. Kelly v. Bemis v. Brown v. Cummens v. Flaherty v. McCarthy v. Marshall v. Meeks v. Milan v. Minneapolis v. People v. Pittsburgh v. Schuyler v. Sherlock 672, 693, 697 | v. Tinling ». United States Kelsey v. King Kelso v. Cook | Kemmler, Re Kemp, In re Kempen »v. Bruns Kemper 2. Fort v. McClelland Kendall, Ex parte In re v. Canton v. Dodge v. Kingston v. State v. United States Kendillon v. Maltby Kendricks v. State timer Kennard »v. Louisiana Kennedy, Ex parte In re . Insurance Co. . McCarthy . Meara . Palmer ». Phelps Sacramento Kennedy’s Case Kenneke, Hx parte Kenner v. Kenner S37e790 S Kennett’s Petition Kenney v. Craven v. Gurley Kelleyville Coal Co. v. Harrier Kellinger v. Railroad Co. Kennebec Purchase v. Laboree Kennebec Water Dist. ». Waterville 1110, 1113, 1116, 1207, 1215, 1220 XCV Page 1010 918 833 1168 726, 861 1365, 1375, 1405 518 247 374 1294 382 1413 702 891 754 461, 487, 1039 262, 372, 391 472 440 697 66, 742, 1064 611 945 919, 946 258, 1001 1177 141, 144, 148 695 671 1403 924 1103 644 1357 561 KA fod 101, 372, 766, 767 691 69 911 664 Kenesaw Free Baptist Ch. v. Lat- 963 842 745 245, 1282 589 753 114 296, 608 327 1271, 1326 155 220 1341 208 Kennerson v. Thames Towboat Co. 158, 1003 1149, 1155 35 894, 896, 956OF CASES CITED Kevi LIST Page Kenney Pres. Home v. Kenney 790 Kennison v. Beverly 451 Kent v. Bongartz 909 vo. Kentland 1048 v. State 690 v. Worthing Local Board 518 Kentish Artillery ». Gardiner 871 Kentucky v. Dennison 52, 54, 55 v. Powers 38 Kentucky Finance Corp. v. Para- mount &c. Corp. 725 Kentucky Lands Inv. Co. v. Lowery 1104 Kentucky Live Stock, &c. Ass’n 2. ager 302 Kentucky R. R. Tax Cases 19 Kentucky State Journal Co. v. Workman’s Compensation Bd. 346, 371, 1338 Kentucky Union Co. v. Common- wealth of Kentucky 142, 146 Kentworthy v. Ironton 529 Kenyon v. Stewart 586 Kenyon Hotel Co. v. Oregon Short Line R. Co. 418, 424 Keokee Coke Co. v. Taylor 1236 Keokuk v. Packet Co. 79 Keokuk, &c. Bridge Co. v. Illinois 1015 Keokuk & W. R. Co. v. Missouri 574 Keokuk N. L. Packet Co. v. Keokuk 361 Ker ». Illinois 33, 54, 56 Kerlin v. Devil’s Lake 1398, 1400 Kermott v. Ayer 76 Kerr, Matter of 575 ». Brookline 447 v. Dougherty 200 v. Flewelling 1380 v. Hicks 962 v. Jones 1353 vo. Kerr 850 v. Kitchen 201, 204 v. Perry School Tp. 1048 v. Union Bank 109 Kerrigan, Ex parte 670 Kershaw v. Bailey 910 Kersten v. Milwaukee 1075 | Kerwhacker v. Cleveland, &c. Co. 1160 Kessler, Ex parte 373, 987, 1058 In re 1046, 1050 | Kesterson v. Hill 762 Ketcham v. McNamara 600 Ketchie ». Hedrick 194 Ketchum Coal Co. v. Pleasant Val- ley Coal Co. 1134 | Ketelsen v. Stilz 119 | Kettering v. Jacksonville 531, 1250 | Kettle River Ry. Co. v. Eastern Ry. Co. 1123, 1130 Key »v. Harris 318 Keymer, Re 214, 216 Keyser v. Stansifer 961, 962 Kibbe v. Kibbe 58 v. Chetwood’s Adm’rs 201 Page Kibele v. Philadelphia 528 Kidd v. Pearson 1000, 1254 Kidder v. Parkhurst 924 Kieffer, Ex parte 1272 Kiehle ». South Bend 473 Kiernan v. Portland 90 Kies v. Lowery 92 Kilbourn v. Thompson 272, 273, 276 Kilburn v. Woodworth 58, 856 Kile v. Montgomery $23 Kiley v. Chicago, &c. R. Co. 804 v. Kansas City 447 Kilgore v». Commonwealth 316 . Magee 262 Kilham v. Ward 1395 Killgrove v. Morriss 128 Killingstad v. Meigs 863 Kilpatrick v. Smith 221 Kimball v. Aleorn 532, 1357, 1397 v. Grantsville City 103, 1064 v. Kimball 849 v. Post Publishing Co. 932, 933 v. Rosendale 791, 1107 v. Salt Lake City 439, 440, 1217 Kimber v. Press Ass’n 932, 935 Kimble v. White Water Valley Canal 1209 Kimbro v. Bank of Fulton 593, 765 Kime v. Cass Co. 1205 Kimmish »v. Ball 48, 1324 Kincaid v. Hardin 452 v. Indianapolis Nat. Gas Co. 1187 Kincaid’s Appeal 247, 438, 1321 Kindel v. Beck & P. Lith. Co. 255 Kine v. Sewell 923 ». Defenbaugh 166 King v. Almon 668 v. Beaumont 530 v. Bedford Level 1355 v. Belcher 764 v. Burdett 862 v. Clement 943 v. Commonwealth 259, 659, 817, 1339 260, 261, 865, 1324 v. Com. ex rel. Smith v. Cross 62, 826, 1019 v. Davenport 425, 1314, 1826 v. Dedham 105 v. Dedham Bank 184, 566 v. De Manneville 727 v. Hardwick 1511 v. Hawkins 1402 v. Hayes 742 v. Hipswell 154 v. Hopkins 864 v. Hunder 562 v. Hunter 140 ». King 851 v. Mayor, &c. of Stratford upon Avon 409, 410 v. Moore 326 828, 1104 v. MullinsLIST OF CASES CITED xXevli Page | Page King v. Parry 1402 | Kirkland v. State 624 v. Patterson 896 | Kirkman »v. Bird 587, 754, 589 v. Phoenix Ins. Co. 46, 997 | Kirkpatrick v. Eagle Lodge 911 v. Pillsbury 888 v. Piedmont Tract 1199 v. Portland 1077 | Kirtland v. Hotchkiss 19, 823, 842, v. Raleigh, &c. R. Co. 1392 988, 1060, 1061 v. Reed 240 | Kisler v. Cameron 1407 v. Root 915, 921, 939, 941, 957 | Kistler v. State 684 v. Rosewell 1326 | Kistner v. Indianapolis 446 v. St. Gregory 154 | Kitchin v. Wood 167, 170 v. State 219 | Kitsap Co. Transp. Co. v. Seattle v. Taylor 977 1291, 1293 v. Tizzard 1352 | Kittanning Coal Co. ». Common- v. Vicksburg R. &c. Co. 1196| wealth 1044 v. Wilson 40 | Kittle, Re 650 ». Woburn 511) Klafter v. State Bd. of Examiners v. Woolston 977 of Architects 229 v. Younger 116 | Klamath Lumber Co. v. Bamber 204 King Const. Co. v. Mary Helen Klatz v. Angle 51 Coal Corp. 707 | Klein v. Barry 183, 231 King Lumber Co. v. Crow 277, 1356 | v. Hutton 586 Kingfisher County Election Bd. ». v. Keller 251 State 1408 | v. New Orleans 400 Kingley v. Cousins 599 | v. State 632 Kingman, Re 182, 394, 1028, 1051, 1095 v. Valerius 180 v. Brockton 1028 | Kleinschmidt v. Dumphy 674 Kingman Co. Com’rs v. Leonard 827 | Kleizer ». Symmes 910 King’s Appeal 837 | Klewin v. Bauman 890 Kingsbury’s Case 55 | Klinck v. Colby 895, 911 Kingsland v. Mayor, &c. 821, 1157, 1214/ Kline v. Burke Const. Co. 22, 28 Kingsley v. Merrill 149, 1085 | v. Kline 857 Kinkead v. McKee 963 | Kling v. Fries 1255 Kinmundy v. Mahan 435 | Klinger v. Mo. 37 Kinne v. Hinman 864 | Klingler v. Bickel 1314 Kinneen v. Wells 1371 | Klumph v. Dunn 887 Kinney, Ez parte 807, 1262, 1263 | Klumpp 2. Stanley 783 v. Beverly 737 | Knapp v. Deer Creek 451 ». Citizens’ Water, &c. Co. 1144 | v. Grant 496, 788 v. Clark 39 v. Tolan 727 Kinney’s Case 807 v. Thomas 220 Kinsel, In re 672, 868 | Knapp, &c. Mfg. Co. v. N. Y., &e. Co. Kinseley ». Ham 630 1154, 1164 Kinsey v. Union Tract Co. 1179 | Knapp, Stout &c. Co. v. McCaffrey 21 Kinsley v. Dyerly 1007 | Kneass’s Appeal 204 Kinsworthy v. Mitchell 1103 | Knee v. Baltimore City Pass. Ry. Kintz v. Harriger 25 Co. 94 Kinyon, In re 1007 | Kneedler v. Lane 14 Kip v. Paterson 420, 423 v. Norristown 425, 432 Kipp v. Davis-Daly Copper Co. Kneeland v. Milwaukee 105, 116, 1127, 1179 121, 152, 1092 v. Elwell 827 v. Pittsburgh 1046 Kirby v. Boylston Market Ass’n v. State 649 426, 1284] Kneetle ». Newcomb 371 v. Citizens Telephone Co. 1181 | Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart v. Paragould 1343 26, 226 Depeae eve Eva os 1245 | Knickerbocker Trust Co. »v. Myers 598 v. Shaw 355, 494, 495, 988 | Knight, Ez parte 309, 310, 311 Kirchner v. Smith 702 v. Begole 772 Kirk v. Bd. of Health 1234 v. Beyers 869 v. Nowill 433 v. Foster 891, 940 v. Rhoads 1375 ». Gibbs 891 ». State 677 | Knight, &c. Co. v. Miller 167,§295, Kirk-Christy Co. v. Amer. Ass’n 1127 298, 339xeVlil LIST OF CASES CITED Page | Page Kniper v. Louisville 404 | Kremer »v. Chicago, &c. R. Co. 1215 Knisely v. Cottrel 1335, 1044 | Kreps v. Brady 130, 133 Knobloch v. Chicago, &e. Ry. Co. 424 | Kreulhaus v. Birmingham 421 Knoop v. Piqua Bank 571 | Kreyling v. O'Reilly 762 Knopf v. People 264 | Krickbaum’s Contested Election, Knote v. United States 218 In re 1398 Knoulton v. Redenbaugh 772 | Kring v. Missouri 544, 552 Knowles v. People 660, 816 | Krone v. Krone 765 ». Yeates 399 | Kroop v. Forman 1120 Knowlton v. Baumhover 970 | Krouch, Ez parte 838 v. Moore’ 128, 989, 996, 1026, 1044 | Krueck v. Phoenix Chair Co. 317 v. Supervisors of Rock Co. Krueger v. Colville 579 1066, 1097 | v. Wisc. Tel. Co. 1183 v. Williams 490, 1027 | Kuback, Re 414 Knox v. Bd. of Education 404 | Kucker v. Sunlight Oil & G. Co. 149 ». Chaloner 1288 | Kuckler v. People 550 v. Cleveland 762 v. Weaver 317, 318 v. Rossi 997 | Kuehner v. Freeport 1054 ». State 55 | Kuhn v. Bd. of Education 393 Knox County v. Aspinwall 476 | v. Common Council 808 v. Ninth Nat’l Bk. 43, 478 v. East Syracuse 530 Knoxville v. King 742 v. Fairmont Coal Co. 44 Knoxville, &c. R. R. Co. v. Hicks 178 | Kuhns v. Kramis 309 Knoxville & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Harris Kulp v. Fleming 41 735 | Kundinger v. Saginaw 794 Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison 1307 | Kunkle v. Coleman 1406 Knoxville Water Co. v. Knoxville 68 v. Franklin 787 818, 820, 1243 | Kunst v. Grafton 439, 451, 1155 Kobbe v. Harriman Land Co. 783 | Kuntz v. Sumption 1048 Kobs v. Minneapolis 529 | Kunz v. Troy 528 Kochersperger v. Drake 1044 | Kurtz v. Hurlbut 305 Koehler v. Hill 86, 277, 278, 1349 v. People 298, 301, 305, 1281 v. Miller 754 | Kutcher v. Post Printing Co. 943 Koen, Ex parte 531 | Kuykendall v. Harker 1370, 1400 Koenig v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Kyle v. Jenkins 541 Co. 257, 1119 | v. Malin 404 Koerper v. St. Paul, &c. R. Co. 1215 v. Texas &c. N. O. Ry. Co. Koestenbader v. Peirce 1219 1123, 1128 Kohl v. Lehlback 844 | Kyzar v. State 1259, 1261 v. United States 1113 Kohlheimer v. State 688 it Kokomo v. Loy 531 Konkel v. State 52 | Labadie v. Ford 1152 Koontz v. Franklin Co. 561 | La Bowe v. Balthazor 668 v. Nabb 118 | Labrie v. Manchester 404 Kopel, In re 727 | Lace v. Smith 601 Koplovitz v. Jensen 1287 | Lacey, Ex parte 427 Koral v. Conlan 651 ». Davis 768, 1104 Kornegay »v. Goldsboro 341, 349 v. Lemmons 742 Kosciusko v. Slomberg 430 | v. Oskaloosa 442 Koser, Ex parte 982 | Lacher v. Venus 712, 851 Koshkonong v. Burton 764 | Lackawanna Iron Co. v. Little Wolf 158 Kountze v. Morris Aqueduct 1130, 1144| Lackland 0. Northern Mo. R. R. Co. 2. Omaha 382 391, 404, 1159, 1162 Kozel v. Kozel 956 | La Croix v. Co. Com’rs 578, 673, 794 Kraft ». Wickey 857 | Lacy, Ex parte 302, 1269 Kramer v. Cleveland &e., Co. 1120, 1125 | v. Martin 221 v. Kister 702 | Ladd ». Holmes 259, 263 Kranz v. Mayor, &c. of Baltimore 450 v. Rice 702 Krebs ». Oliver 888 | Laefon v. Dufoe 305 Kreiger v. Shelby R. R. Co. 36 Lafarier ». Grand Trunk R. Co. 1305 Kreitz v. Behrensmeyer 1381, 1382, 1384, 1365, 1366, 1386 Lafayette v. Bush v. Cox 438, 1152 400, 403, 470LIST OF CASES CITED Page Lafayette v. Fowler 438, 1071, 1075 v. Jenners 372 v. Nagle 440 ». Orphan Asylum 1094 v. Timberlake 446 Lafayette, &c. R. R. Co. v. Geiger 147, 236 v. Winslow 1192 La Fayette Plank Road Co. v. New Albany & Salem R. R. Co. 1156 Lafayette Police Jury v. Martin 1207 Lafferty v». Huffman 280 v. Schuylkill River E. S. Ry. Co. 1161 La Floridienne, &c. Societe Anonyme v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co. 762 La Follett ». Mitchell 114 Lahr v. Metr. Elev. R. R. Co. 1173 Laing v. Milten 923, 924 v. Rigney 64 Laird v. Carton 793 | ». Pittsburgh 1133 | v. Sims 148 | Lake, Matter of 769 Lake Charles v. Rose 1262 Lake Co. v. Graham 473 Lake Erie, &c. R. R. Co. v. Heath 66, 865 v. Public Ut. Comm. 1277 ». Watkins 193 Lake Erie & Western Ry. Co. v. City of Kokomo 1189 | v. Scott 1156 | v. Com’rs of Seneca Co. 1116 Lake Koen Nav. Reservoir & Lrrig. Co. v. Klein 1130 Lake Pleasanton W. Co. »v. Contra Costa W. Co. 1132 Lake Roland El. R. Co. v. Balti- more 440 Lake Shore, &c. R. R. Co. v. Chicago, &c. R. R. Co. 1110, 1116, 1156 v. Clough 803 Lake Shore & M.S. R. Co. v. Grand Rapids 1094 ». Ohio 1267 v. Smith 1308, 1310 Lake St. El. R. Co. v. Chicago 1054 Lake View v. Rose Hill Cemetery 395, 1321 v. Tate 428, 430 Lake View School Trustees ». People 388 Lakes v. Goodloe 674 Lamar, Ex parte 721, 724 v. Lamar 714 v. United States 216 Lamar W. & E. L. Co. ». Lamar 469 Lamb »v. Lane 166, 1208 ». Lynd 270 . Powder River Live Stock Co. 765 1204 v ». Schotter v. Wahlenmaier 110, 862 Xclx Page Lambert, Re 853 v. Barrett 317 v. Norfolk 1196, 1200 v. Smith 278 Lambertson v. Hogan 191 Lammert v. Lidwell 236, 246 Lamont v. Stavanaugh 452 Lampkin v. Pike 313 Lancaster v. Augusta Water Dist. 1208 v. Barr 810 Lance v. Dugan 59 Lancey v. Clifford 1288 v. King Co. 469, 1112 Lander v. Deemy 137 v. Jones 923 v. Seaver 713 Landers v. Frank St. M. E. Ch. 964 ». Landers 859 v?. Van Aukin 1107 Landis v. Campbell 910 Landon »v. Litchfield 571 Landsdowne v. Public Service Com- mission 396 Lane v. Bailey 1370, 1379 v. Commonwealth 217 v. Dorman 202, 372, 737 ». Lane 714 v. Mitchell 1396 v. Nelson 206, 772, 775 v. Spokane Falls &c. Co. 609 v. Vick 39 Lanfear v. Mayor 874 Lanford v. Alfriend 726 Lang v. Bayonne 383, 1356 v. Commonwealth 268 v. Lynch 1252, 1254, Langan v. Atchison 529 Langdon v. Applegate 119, 315 v. Mayor 1157 Lange, Ex parte 696 Langenberg v. Decker 610 Langer v. Courier-News 943 Langford v. Com’rs of Ramsay Co. 1203 v. Fly 757 v. United States 25 Langhammer v. Munter 1365 Langhorne v. Robinson 1062 462, 463, 528 393, 1063 192, 1388, 1399 Langley v. Augusta Langworthy v. Dubuque Lanier v. Gallatas v. Greenville 1215 Lankford v. Platte Iron Works Co. 44 2. Schroeder 23 280, 322 532, 1394 v. Somerset Co. Lanning v. Carpenter v. Christy 924 Lannon v. Ring 1380 Lansdon v. State Bd. of Canvassers 1406 Lansing v. Carpenter 921 v. Lansing 1391 v. Michigan Power Co. 137 ». Smith 1156LIST OF CASES CITED Page | Page Lansing v. Stone 75 | Lawrence E. Tierney Coal Co. »v. v. Toolan 448 Smith 177, 178, 354, 374 v. Van Gorder 406 | Lawrence University ». Outagamie Lantz »v. Caraway 1298 Co. 373, 1087 v. Hightstown 579 | Lawrenceburg v. Wuest 415 Lanzer v. Butt 783 | Lawson v. Hicks 928 Lanzetti, Succession of 303 v. Jeffries 89, 192, 811 Lapeyre v. United States 218, 327 | Lawton v. Cardell 630 La Plaisance Bay Harbor Co. v. v. Harkins 452 Monroe 79 v. Steele 836, 1225, La Plant v. Hyman 956 1236, 1327, 1341 = Eine ee pont 868 v. Stewart Dry Goods Co. 348, a Porta v. Leonar 928 1329, 1334 Laramie Co. v. Albany Co. 393 v. Waite 765 pore: Noonan oe ee v. Cipperly 961 v. Saginaw 48 | Lay v. Sheppard 777, 800 Larned vo. W heeler 1395 Layman »v. State 686, 1259 Larrison v. Peoria, &c. Co. 278 | Layton v. New Orleans 398, 491, 499 i. v. Railroad Co. 320 Lazarus v. Morris 1110 arsen, Ex parte 721 | Lazoie v. Milliken 1312 z peebers a Lea v. Lea 110 ; 34 v. Louisville, &c. : Larson »v. Furlong 1290 v. White. eer cones v. Grand Forks 530 | Leach, Re 181 Larson Bros. &c. Co. v. Kansas City 529 v. Leach 752 Lascelles v. Georgia 55 v. Money 627 Lasher v. People 263, 806, 815 v. People 1356 a? eee 119, 120 Leadville Coal Co. ». McCreery 30 me, OY eee Journeay 1321 as . Ste 552 v. Tex 755 Latah County v. Peterson 1126 | Leaken, ae 720 peers. Erown 593 Leathe v. Thomas 37 e ee 360 Leavell v. Western U. T. Co. 1015 eas m Rint es negvenvcne v. Duffy 440 Latless v. Holmes 326 | A Renee Daa ; 77 La Tourette ». McMaster ae Bh Leavenworth Co. v. Lang 1049 332, 1333 | v. Miller 238, 479 Laucks’ J 599 | Leavitt ». Canadi es ee seal eee Leavitt v. Canadian P. R. Co. 842 1 v. Steer : : 87 | v. Watson 1107 ae eee &e. R. R. Co. 136 | Lebanon v. Oleott 1143 alin : asta ae | pebange Sch. Dist. v. FemaleSem. 744 . ae _, oo/ | Le Barron ». Le Barron 80 “sei nocwend 99, 178, 334, 354, a | Lebowe v. Balthazor 867 4 » he 217 | Le Bur, Ex parte 722 Laurel Hill C “6 ; anes a ae ul Cemetery v. ope ne in Le Clair v. Davenport 423, 1335 Laurens v. Elmore bras 1018 Le ee Winie : oe Lavagnino »v. Uhlig 317 i aba ey ate Tegal eONTy ore 5 7. us v. Hastings 1087 Lavalle v. Strobel 76 onda 302,216 Ravn oes Reade e v. Flemingsburg 460 BRO TRE » 540 v. Hoffman 803 spPeocle tee v. McClelland 609, 712 Tevioriotna ts ae v. Minneapolis 439 Lawrence, In re 750 oo Nurhy, a Se ocia ar v. Osceola, &c. Improvement v. Louisville 769 p Bae, roke I C see a Gt. N I : ~ . 2 orokKe iron oO. o. R. Co. 1209 v. Sandy Hill 518, 529 v. Nelson 80 ». Rutland R. Co. 570, 735, 834 Lawrence Business College v. Bus- sing 1089 ee e : Springfield Water Power Co. 1214 . State . Sturges - Tillotson 96, 687, 709 1085 370Page Leefe, Matter of 873 Lee Loak, In re dae Leep v. St. Louis, &c. R. Co. 366, 835 Leeper v. State 386 v. Texas 67, 844 Le Feber v. West Allis 437 Le Fever v. Detroit 1094 Lefferts v. Supervisors 1048 42, 761, 762, 764 16, 142, 146 Leffingwell ». Warren Legal Tender Case Leger v. Warren 611 Legg v. Annapolis 266, 319 Leggett ». Hunter 178, 201 Legislative Adjournment, Re 270 Lehew v. Brummell 844 Lehigh, &c. Coal Co. v. Borough of Junction 1009, 1060 Lehigh Bridge Co. v. Lehigh Coal & Nav. Co. 1197 Lehigh Co. v. Hoffort 447 Lehigh Iron Co. v. Lower Macungie 165 Lehigh Portland Cement Co. »v. McLean 253 Lehigh Val. R. R. Co. ». Common- wealth 584 v. Dover, &c. R. R. Co. 1156 v. Pennsylvania 367, 1008, 1304 Lehigh Valley Water Co.’s App. 796 Lehigh Water Co. v. Easton 35, 555 Lehman v. McBride 315, 1365 v. Pettingell 1408 v. State 26 Lehn v. San Francisco 451 Leicht v. Burlington 1069 Leigh v. Green 854 v. State 1407 Leiper v. Baltimore & P. R. Co. 397 Leisy v. Hardin 1251, 1252 Leith v. Leith 849 Leland v. Wilkinson 188 Leleu v. Delcambre 1380 Leloup v. Mobile 367, 1006 Lem Woon »v. Oregon 638 Lemieux v. Young 1236 Lemke v. Farmers’ Grain Co. 365, 1280 Lemly v. State 1253 Lemmon ?v. Chicago, &c. R. R. Co. 1244 v. People 48 Lemons v. People 163 v. Wells 887 Lemont v. Jenks 421, 828 Lenihan v. Commonwealth 706 Lennon v. New York 755, 774, 756 Lent v. Tillson 844, 862 Lentell v. Boston, &c. Co. 1175, 1176 Lenz v. Charlton 741, 769 Leominster v. Conant 1082 Leonard v. Commonwealth 1353 v. Middleborough 1035 v. Reed OL v. Schall 110, 114 v. State 662, 1227, 1336 v. Wiseman 127 LIST OF CASES CITED Cl | Page Leovy v. United States 1292 Leprohon v. Ottawa 6, 992 Leroy & W. R. R. Co. v. Ross 1219 Les Bois v. Bramell 785 Leser v. Garnett 1362 Leslie v. Bonte 112 v. State 692 Less v. Butte 1153, 1196, 1200 Lessee of Dulany v. Tilghman 782, 783 Lessee of Gray v. Askew 120 Lessee of Hughey »v. Horrell 1060 Lessee of Walton v. Bailey 783 Lessley v. Phipps 590 Lester v. State 632, 690 v. Thurmond 928 Letcher v. State 305 Levan v. Millholland 862 Levee Com’rs v. Johnson 803 Levee District No. 9 v. Farmer 1149 Levering v. Park Com’rs 982 ». Williams 413, 1282 Levert v. Daily States Pub. Co. 889, 920 | Levi v. Louisville 1058, 1093 Levin v. Gladstein 60 Levine v. Levine 58, 61 Levins v. Sleator 208, 211 Levy v. Hitsche 585 v. State 414, 415 v. Superior Court of San Fran- cisco 661 | Lewelling v. Manufacturing Wood Worker’s Underwriters 1332 | Lewinsky, Hz parte 296, 304 | Lewis, Ex parte 177, 180, 489 v. Brown 773 v. Chapman 894, 897 v. Clement 933 v. Com’rs 1408 v. Dunne 308, 312, 315 v. Few 914, 921, 941 v. Foster 781 v. Garrett’s Adm’r 853 v. Hawley 888 v. Levy 932, 934, 935, 944 v. Lewelling 141 v. Lewis 599 v. McElvain 755, 780 v. Monson 1105 v. Smith 1041 v. State 20, 690, 1340 v. Thornton 105, 116 v. United States 317 v. Walter 933 ». Webb 105, 192, 207, 348, 762, 810 Lewis’s Appeal 178, 348 Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs 1291, 1294 Lewis and Clark County v. Indus- trial Acc. Board 297, 1030 Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan 844, 885 Lewisburg, &c. R. Co. v. Hinds 1215, 1218Page Lewiston v. Grant 1314 Lexington v. Butler 473 v. Long 1213 92, 96, 352, 357, 489, 490 R. R. Co. v. Apple- v. Thompson Lexington, &c gate 1164 Leyman v. Latimer 888 L’ Hote v. New Orleans 813, 842, 1328 Libby v. Burnham 1104 v. English 1380 2. Portland 518, 526, 527 Liberty Highway Co. v. Mich. Pub. U. Comm. 232 License Cases, 1008, 1225, 1232 1250, 1256, 1322 License Tax Cases 350, 1234, 1251, 1267 Lichtentag v. Tax Collector 1090 Liebengood v. Mo., &c., R. Co. 1304 Lieberman »v. State 672, 808 Liepold Bros. v. Ullman 1051 Life Association v. Board of Assessors 155 Ligat ». Commonwealth 1207 Light v. United States 339 Lightburne v. Taxing District 1050 Liles v. Gaster 923 Lilienthal Mercantile Co. v. Breslin 1051 Lillard v. State 696 Lima v. Cemetery Ass’n 1094 Limestone Co. v. Rather 158 Lin Sing v. Washburn 808, 1008, | 1068, 1279 | 724 | 196, 200 Lincoln, In re v. Alexander v. Boston 447, 522 v. Commonwealth 1187, 1215 v. Davis 1109 | v. Hapgood 1366, 1395 | v. Iron Co. 474 | v. Janesch 1284 v. Smith 66, 674, 867, | 868, 1251, 1255, 1256 v. Tower 59 | Lincoln Bldg., &c. Ass’n v. Graham 191 | Lincoln First Pres. Ch. v. Lincoln First Cumberland Pres. Ch. 962, 963 Lincoln Park, In re 1204, 1207 | Lincoln Tr. Co. v. Williams Bldg. | Corp. 1315, 1319 Lindenmuller v. People 1281 Linder v. United States 11, 378, 1232 Lindholm »v. St. Paul 53( Lindley ». McGlauflin 863 Lindsay v. Anniston 429 v. Com’rs 334 v. United States Sav., &e., Ass’n 296 Lindsay & Phelps Co. ». Mullen 827, 1290 Lindsey v. Hill ORT aol v. Smith 888 Lindsley v. Coats 75 v. National Carbonic Gas Co. 803, 813, 1231, 1319, 1320 LIST OF CASES CITED Page Lindstrom v. Bd. of Canvassers 1359 v. Mutual Steamship Co. 1003 Lindzey v. State 544 Line v. Phila., &c. R. Co. 1220 Linehan, In re 1345 Liness v. Hesing 1393 Linford v. Fitzroy 645 Lingenfetter, Ez parte 1282 Lining v. Bentham 670 Links v. Anderson 1413 Linn v. Chambersburg 1027 v. Minor 122 Linney v. Maton 890 Linsley v. Hubbard 201 Linton Pharmacy v. McDonald 447 Linwood, &c. Levee Dist. v. State 1114 Lipes v. Hand 866 Lippman v. People 612 Liquors of McSorley 869 Liquors seized at Auto Inn, In re 619, 629 Lisbon v. Bath 1099 Litchfield v. McComber 586 v. Pond 1202, 1203 v. Vernon 1030 Litchville v. Hanson 421 Litowich v. Litowich 850 Little, Re 55 v. Fitts 846 v. Madison 452 v. Merrill 408 v. Smith 119, 120 Little Chute v. Van Camp 423 Littlefield v. Brooks 1365 v. Gay 600 v. State 420 Littlejohn v. Greeley 921 v. People 1371 Little Miami R. R. Co. »v. Collett 1216 Little Miami, &c. R. R. Co. v. Dayton 1116 Little River Township v. Reno County 397 Little Rock v. Katzenstein 1073 v. Willis 450 Little Rock, &c. R. Co. v. Greer 1196 v. Hanniford 806 v. Newman 1218 v. Payne 769, 1245 Little Rock & F. S. Ry. Co. ». McGehee 1214 Little Rock June. Ry .Co. v. Wood- ruff 1214 Little Rock, M. &c. Ry. Co. »v. Brooks 1288 Littleton v. Fritz 866 v. Richardson 852 v. Smith 859 Littlewort v. Davis 386 Live Stock, &c. Ass’n v. Crescent City, &c. Co. 1270, 1271 Livermore v. Waite 86, 136LIST OF CASES CITED clil Page Liverpool & L. L. & Ins. Co. ». Massachusetts 1000 | Liverpool & L. G. Ins. Co. v. Bd. of Assessors 1061 Livesley v. Litchfield 139, 1363 Livingston v. Los Angeles Sup. Ct. 714 v. Mayor, &c. of N. Y. 67, 1056, | 1071, 1080 v. Paducah 1045 v. Rector, &e. 963 v. Van Ingen UP Livingston’s Lessee v. Moore 66 Livingston County v. Darlington 494, 1038 | ». Weider 494, 1038 | Lloyd v. Chambers 843 | v. Matthews 63 | ». Mayor, &c. of New York 520, | 526, 528, 998 | ON @- Co: 327 L. N. Dantzler Lumber Co. v. Texas, &c. R. Co. 25 Loan Association v. Topeka 174, 467, | 986, 1033, 1039, 1040 | Lobrano v. Nelligan 201 | Lochner v. New York 824, 1229, 1346 Lock Haven Bridge Co. ». Clinton Co. 1112 | Locke v. Bradstreet Co. 896 | v. Dane 543, 775 | v. Speed 181 | Locke’s Appeal 231, 244 Lockett ». State 649 Lockhart v. Horn 762 v. Locke 59 v. Troy 305 Lockport v. Gaylord 309 | Lockwood, Ex parte 40, 823, 1343 | v. Dover 516, 517 v. St. Louis 1094 v. Wabash R. Co. 441 Lodi Twp. v. State 263 Loeb v. Attica 416 v. Columbia Tp. Trustees 40 v. Jennings 672, 696 v. Mathis 122 Loeber v. Butte Gen. El. Co. 1184 Loeffner v. State 640 Loesch v. Koehler 827 Loftus v. Pa. R. Co. 49 Logan, Ez parte 112, 113 v. Hodges 912 v. Matthews 1282 v. Parish of Ouachita 168 v. Pyne 404, 424 v. Stogdale 1126 v. United States 21, 823 v. Walton 753 Logan County v. Adler 516 Logansport v. Dick 528 Logue v. Commonwealth 630 Lohrstorfer v. Lohrstorfer 763 Lombard v. Antioch College Page Lommen »v. Minneapolis Gaslight Co. 675 Lonas v. State 307 London Street Tramways Co., Ltd. v. London County Council 118 Londonderry v. Andover 409 Londoner v. City and County of Denver 35, 393, 1049, 1112 v. Lichtenheim 985 Long v. Birmingham 453 v. Emery 1050 v. Fuller 1132, 1203 v. Long 1395 v. Neenah 445, 452 v. Peters 895 v. State 178, 325, 326, 351, 354, 640, 653, 1228, 1328 v. Taxing Dist. 431 v. Watts 988 Long’s Case 654 Long Island R. R. Co., Matter of 1404 Long Island Water-Supply Co. »v. City of Brooklyn PILL 15; 1130, 1131 Longview v. Crawfordsville 508 Longworth v. Worthington 800 Lonoke v. Chicago, &c. Co. 433 Lonthan ». Commonwealth 885 Look v. Dean 1224 Looker v. Maynard 570 Looney v. Crane Co. 1020 v. Sioux City 452 Loomis v. Coleman 387 v0. Hartz 1112 v. Jackson 88, 1398 ». Wadhams 862 Loposser v. State 1409 Lord v. Chadbourne 754 ». Equitable Life Assur. Soc. 570, 1116, 1242 v. Litchfield 573, 793 ». Steamship Co. 13 v. Thomas 584 v. Wilcox 112 Lorenzen, Ex parte 417, 747 Lorillard v. Clyde 114 v. Monroe 516 Loring v. Hildreth 841 v. Marsh 40 Lorman v. Benson 75, 1288 v. Clarke 69 Los Angeles ». Los Angeles City Water Co. 555, 565, 585 Los Angeles Co. v. Reyes 1126 Losasso, Re 644 Lothrop v. Commercial Bk. 255 v. Steadman 194, 204, 228, 380, 1332 Lott v. Morgan 1016 v. Ross 1099 v. State 632 Loughbridge »v. Harris 1137, 1141 Lougher v. Soto 263LIST OF CASES CITED Page Page Loughin v. McCaulley 26 | Louisville Gas Co. v. Citizens’ Gas Louisiana v. Bd. of Assessors 574 Co. 44, 581 ». Jumel 23 | Louisville, N. A.& C. R. Co. v. Wallace 844 v. New Orleans 560, 593, 843 | Louisville, N. O. & T. R. Go. 2. v. Pilsbury 585 Blythe 201 v. Police Jury 560 ». Caster 1246 v. Texas 21, 1003 ». State 1244 Louisiana, &c. R. Co. v. La. R. &e. Louisville Ry. Co. v. Foster 1198 Co. 1208 | Louisville Safety Vault & T. Co. ». v. State 673, 869 Louisville & N. R. Co. 844 Louisiana Constr. & Imp. Co. ». Louisville School Board »v. King 758 Illinois C. R. Co. 391 | Louisville T. W. Co. v. Common- Louisiana ex rel. Hubert v. New | wealth 1047 Orleans 598 | Louisville Water Co. v. Clark Die Louisiana Land Co. v. Blakewood 1205 v. Kentucky 572 Louisiana Lottery Co. v. Richoux 278 | Loumand v. New Orleans 598 Louisiana Nav. Co.v. Oyster Comm. 38] Lovato v. New Mexico 688 Louisiana State Bd. of Agriculture Love v. Filtsch 23, 24 v. Tanzmann 300 v. Judge of Recorders Ct. 392, 427 Louisville v. Bk. of Louisville 573 | v. McCoy 803 v. Bitzer 1073, 1074 | v. Moynahan 711 v. Commonwealth 526 | »?. Pamplin 26 v. Coulter 1327 v. Raleigh 447 v. Hehemann 529, 1196 v. Shartzer 800 v. Hyatt 450, 1056 | Lovejoy v. Portland 300, 306 v. Rolling Mill Co. 438 | Loveland »v. Detroit 460 v. Savings Bank 327 | Lovell v. Seeback 610 v. Vitzer 1073 | Lovett v. W. Va. Cent. Gas Co. 1196 Louisville, &c. Co. v. Ballard 305 | Lovingston v. Trustees 1046 v. Greene 22 »v. Wider 497, 788, 1036 v. Louisville 1144 | Low, Ex parte 1040 v. Mulverhill 520 v. Blanchard 120 v. Thompson 1218 v. Dunham 158 Louisville, &c. Ferry Co. v. Ken- v. Galena &c. Co. 1149 tucky 1020, 1062 v. Rees Printing Co. 833 Louisville, &c. R. Co. v. Allen 1304 v. Towns 222 v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. 1072 v. United States 639 v. Burke 1249 | Lowe, In re 580, 814 ». Burkhart 249 | v. Commonwealth 140, 562 v. Cent. Stock Yards Co. 72 v. Conroy 529 2. Finn 339 | ». Harris 776 v. Hopkins Co. 1247 v. Kansas 844 v. Ingram 1218 ». News Pub. Co. 943 v. Louisville 1119, 1191, 1192] Lowell ». Boston 356, 468, 1033, 1136 v. Lyons 232 | v. Hadley 1284 2. State 1041, 1097 | v. Oliver 484, 485 v. Western U. T. Co. 1117 | Lowenburg v. People 696 Louisville, &c. Terminal Co. ». Lower Vein Coal Co. v. Industrial Lellyett 1210| Bd. 1337, 1339 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Baldwin 19, | Loweree v. Newark 1203, 1206 1249, 1278 | Lowndes v. Town of Huntington 41 v. Commonwealth 222, 226 | Lowndes Co. v. Hunter 360 v. Davidson 237, 1395 | Lowrey v. Rainwater 623 v. Eubank 1277, 1304 | Lowry v. Francis 558 v. Interstate R. Co. 12 76ll acai nanan 910, 963 v. Kentucky 1241, 1268, 1277, 1311 v. Sawyer 752 v. Melton — 36, 805, 813, 825, 1235 v. Tucker 777 v. Palmes 44, 573 | Luchini v. Police Jury 460 ». Schmidt 839 | Luckett ». Madison County 561 vo. Whitely County Court 1116, Ludeling v. Chaffe 30, 37 1123, 1162, 1189} Ludlow ». Johnson 755 Louisville City R. R. Co. v. Louisville 438, 444 Ludlow-Saylor Wire Co. v. Wool- brinck 1051Page | Ludwig v. Cramer 889, 933 | v. Stewart 764 | Ludy v. Larsen 113 Luehrman v. Taxing District 382, 394 Lufkin v. City of Galveston 1103 vo. Harvey 712 2. Lufkin 778 Luman v. Hitchins Bros. Co. 841 Lumbard »v. Aldrich 255 Lumpkin v. Lumpkin 113 | Lumsden v. Cross 768, 1033, 1057, 1074 | Lund v. New Bedford 1120 v. Salt Lake County 403 Lunt’s Case 348 Luques v. Dresden 463 Luria v. United States 767 | Lusher v. Scites 380 | Lusk v. Dora 418 Luther v. Borden 64, 83, 84, 1349 v. Wheeler 404 | Lutz v. Charleston 451 | Lux v. Haggin 119 | Luxton v. No. River Bridge Co. 1113, 1275 | Lycoming v. Union 784 Lyddy v. Long Island City 317 Lydecker v. Palisade Land Co. 1104 Lydiard v. Wingate 943 | Lyford v. Laconia 1133 Lyle v. Richards 75 | Lyman v. Boston & Worcester R. R. Co. 1246 | ». Martin 1363 | v. Mower 757 Lynch, Ez parte 1040 v. Brudie 800 ». Forbes 1145, 1147 ». Hoffman 541 | ». Hutchinson 163, 280, 319 | v. Malley 1373, 1374 v. New York 439, 448 v. No. Yakima 453 | v. State 682, 705 | Lynchburg 2. Slaughter 474 | Lynde v. County 470 ». Lynde 64, 672, 709 Lyon »v. Circuit Judge 118 v. Hyattsville 1074, 1082 ». Jerome 435, 1114, 1146, 1202 v. Lyon 851 ». McDonald 1187 v. Manhattan R. Co. 609 2. Morris 382, 757 Lyon’s Case 900 Lyons v. Chamberlain 477 v. Longmont 167 v. Woods 279 Lytle v. Lansing 471, 472 M Mabardy ». McHugh 116, 117 Mabry v. Baxter 588 v. Commonwealth 628 LIST OF CASES CITED Page McAdoo »v. Benbow 127 McAdow v. Kansas City Western R: Co: 114 McAfee v. Commonwealth 1282 v. Covington 590 McAfee’s Heirs v. Kennedy 1136 McAlester-Edwards Coal Co. 2. Trapp 1095 McAlister v. Clark 425 ». State ex rel. Short 87 McAllen v. Hamblin 392 McAllister v. Detroit Free Press Co. 940 v. Hoffman 1391 Macan »v. Scandinavia Belting Co. 114 McAndrew v. Dunmore Borough 471 McAndrews v. Hamilton County 444 McAneny, In re 232 McArthur v. Goddin 754 McArthur Bros. Co. v. Common- wealth 23 McAuley v. Boston 529 McAunich v. Miss., &c., R. R. Co. 263, 305 McBean 2v. Chandler 1048 v. Fresno 469 McBee »v. Fulton 932, 944, 946 Macbeth Evans Glass Co. v. Amama 834 v. Jones 834 v. Van Blarican 834 McBrayer v. Hill 890 McBride v. Chicago 1056 v. Ledoux 896 McBurnie v. Sullivan 670 McCabe, Ex parte 610 ». Atchison, &c. R. Co. 1299 v. New York 1152 McCafferty v. Guyer 139, 540 McCain v. Des Moines 33 McCall v. California 254, 1009, 1279 v. Peachey 846 McCammon &c. Lumber Co. 2. Trinity, &c. V. R. Co. 1164 McCampbell v. State 676 McCann v. Commonwealth 1323 v. Eddy 1305 ». Johnson Co. Tel. Co. 1181 v. Sierra Co. 1204 McCardle, Ex parte 193, 381, 790, 794 McCarrol v. Weeks TAL McCarter v. Firemen’s Ins. Co. 255 ». Hudson Co. W. Co. 47, 570, 747 v. McKelvey 1352 McCarthy, Ex parte 56 Matter of 707 vy. Arndstein 650 v. Boston 453 ». Commonwealth 262 v. Froelke 1350 ». Hoffman 785 v. Tucson VSG Macartney 2. Shipherd 190, 192 McCarver, Ex parte 429 McCaslin v. State 305Page 108, 594 59, 109 McCauley »v. Brooks v. Hargroves McClain, Ex parte 1346 v. People 1207 v. State 640 McClarren v. Jefferson School Twp. 1222 McClary v. Lowell 1282 McClatchy v. Superior Court of Sacramento Co. 838 McClaughry v. Deming 859 v. Wetmore 926 McCleary v. Babcock 189 McClellan ». Chipman 29 v. Denver 1281 McClinch v. Sturgis McClintock ». McClure 163, 279 892, 894, 896 v. Phoenix 326 McCloskey »v. Kreling 1314 McCloud 2. Selby 514 McClung ». Pulitzer Pub. Co. 957 McClure v. Oxford 328, 471, 472 v. Redwing 448 McClurg »v. Brenton 617, 630, 631 McClusky, Ex parte 638 McCluskey v. Cromwell 125 McCollum, Ex parte 372 v. So. Omaha 756 McComas v. Krug 140 McComb 2». Akron 439, 1153 v. Bell 1068 v. Gilkey 201 McConkle ». Binnis 956 McConnell v. Goodwin v. McKillup McCool v. Smith 863, 873 623, 1341 316 McCormack »v. Robin 520 McCormick v. Fitch 1040 v. Rusch 597, 754 v. State 295, 306 McCormick’s Estate p. Harrisburg 1074 McCoull v. Manchester 528 McCoy »v. Davis 338 2. Grandy 800 v. Handlin 373, 872 ». Huffman 712 v. Michew 774 McCracken »v. Hayward 583, 586, 591, 594 McCracken Co. ». Merc. ‘irs Go: 763 McCray v. Chicago 122 v. State 630 v. United States 341, 345, 346 347, 348, 380, 381, 3 McCready »v. Sexton v. Virginia McCrear 2. State 709 | McCrowell v. Bristol 434 | McCroy »v. Miller 555 | McCue ». State 679 | M’Cuen v. Ludlum 887 | McCullers v. Wake County 1353 McCulley v. State 92, 146 LIST OF CASES CITED Page McCulloch v. Maryland 16, 25, 65, 138, 273, 987, 988, 990, 991, 994 v. State LOL 277 279" 288, 290, 360, 382 McCullough v. Brown 1253 v. Campbellsport 1153 vo. Graham v. Virginia 137 43, 46, 477, 582 McCully v. Tracy 398 McCune »v. Goodwillie 1105 McCutchen v. Windsor 387 McDade v. Chester 446 McDaniel, Ex parte 53, 56 v. Correll 191, 206, 792 McDerment v. Taft 1322 McDermott v. Evening Journal Co. 926 v. Union Credit Co. 890 McDermott’s Appeal 850 McDevitt v. People’s Nat. Gas Co. 1187 v. St. Paul 447 McDonald, In re 671 v. Dexter 62 v. Doust 348, 352, 380 v. Hinton 1360 v. Lee 889, 891 v. Mabee 853 v. McDonald 865 v. Massachusetts 553 2. Mayor 460 v. New Haven 561 v. Redwing 1114, 1313 v. Schell 868 v. Spring Valley 376, 756 v. State 696, 1249 v. Woodruff 940 McDonough, Ex parte 702 MacDougall v. Knight 933 v. Sheridan 669 McDowell v. Preston 529 v. Fuller 193 McDuffee v. Sinnott 762 Macedonia State Bank v. Graham 113 McEldowney v. Wyatt 259, 762 M’Elmoyle v. Cohen 60 McElrath v. United States 67 M’Elroy v. Albany 452 4 | McElvaine v. Brush 695 McEwan ». Pa., &e. Co. 1117 McFadden v. Commonwealth 687 v. Jewell 521 McFarland v. Butler 593, 757 | ». State 687 | McGahey »v. Virginia 43 McGarr ». National, &c. Worsted Mills 712 | McGatrick ». Wason 982 McGear v. Woodruff 672 McGee, Ex parte 234 In re 232 v. Collins 897 v. Mathis 571 v. San Jose 559 McGeehan ». State Treasurer 772LIST OF CASES CITED Page | McGehee v. McKenzie 785 | McKeen ». Delancy v. Mathis 1057, 1081, 1298 | Mackel v. Rochester v. State 313 | McKenna v. Edmundstone McGhee Irr. Ditch Co. v. Hudson 1114 vy. St. Louis McGiffert ». McGiffert 849, 856 | McKenny »v. Farnsworth McGillivrae v. Bremerton 401 | McKenzie v. Moore McGillway v. Employers’ Liability v. State Assur. Corp. 113 | McKeown v. Brown McGilvra v. Seattle Sch. Dist. 509 | McKeon v. N. Y., &c. Co. McGinity v. Mayor, &c. of N. Y. 522 | Mackey v. Reeves MacGinnis v. Marlborough-Hudson McKibbin v. Fort Smith Gas Co. 1186 | McKim v. Odom McGinnis v. Missouri Car, &c. Co. 258 | Mackin v. Detroit Timkin Axle v. State 1335 Loo Co. 300, v. Watson 962, 963, 977 ». United States McGinty v. Carter 869 | McKinney v. Barker 130, McGlinchy ». Barrows 621 ». O’Connor McGlone v. Womack 298, 1322 v. Salem McGovern v. New York 401 v. Springer McGowan v. Gardner 1396 | McKinnon v. Cotner v. State 682 v. People McGran v. Gaul 216 | McKinny »v. Carroll McGrane v. Nez Perce County 1377 | McKinsey v. Squires McGraw v. Dist. of Columbia 447 | McKinster v. Sager v. Marion 1017, 1335 | McKinzie v. Hatfield McGregor v. Cone 1254 | McKnight v. United States v. State Co. 891 | McKune »v. Weller McGrew v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. 67 | McLane v. Bonn McGruder »v. State 318 | McLaughlin, Ex parte McGuffie v. State 679, 681 | ». Corry McGuire, Ex parte 726 | v. Cowley v. Chicago, &c. R. Co. 254, 298, | v. So. Bend 301, 335, 373, 805 v. State ». Dist. of Columbia 426 | McLaurine v. Monroe v. Parker 1017 | McLean ». Hugarin ». State 551, 662 | ». Merriman McHaney »v. Trustees of Schools 772 | v. State McHenry v. Alford 1043 | McLeod’s Case ». Downer 991 | McLimans v. Lancaster ». Parkersburg 451 | McLure v. Melton Machette v. Wanless 701 | McMahan v. Crean Machine Co. v. Gage 1017 | McMahon v. Mead Machir v. Moore 1391 ». St. Louis &c. Co McInnis v. National Herald Print- ». Savannah ing Co. 889 McManus v. Carmichael MclInturf v. State 544 »v. McDonough McIntyre v. McBean 894 | ». O'Sullivan Mack 2. Charlotte City Waterworks 453 | v. Petoskey v. Kime 961, 962, 963 | McMaster v. Gould Mackaboy v. Commonwealth 861 | McMasters ». Commonwealth McKane v. Durston 47, 844 v. State McKay »v. Gordon 60 | McMath »v. State v. State 687 | McMerty v. Morrison Mackay v. Ford 927 | McMillan »v. Birch Mackay Tel. Co. v. Bd. of State v2. Boyles Affairs 1086 ». Lee County Mackay Tel. &c. Co. v. Little Rock 41 v. McNeill McKean, Ez parte 55, 720 v. Noyes McKee v. Cheney 283 | Macmillan Co. v. Clarke »v. Hughes 894, 911 | McMillen ». Anderson v. McKee 390, 1283 McMinn v. Whelan v. People 691 | McMinnville v. Howenstein v. Wilcox 135 | McMullen v. Hodge 1338, 1339 638, 639 1401, 1402 1388, 1397 578 762 280 1381 34 865 68 1413, 1414 650 158, 1372 545, 789 690 529 924, 927 1007 553 59 110 957 1357 720 789 585 1106 727 1199 1369 1288 675 34 488 845 1071 969, 1345 682 763 910, 927 787 400 65, 601 1137 360, 509 739, 842 1105 1119 89, 153evill LIST OF CASES CITED Page | Page McNaughton »v. Johnson 1342, 1343 | Madisonville v. Bishop 455 MacNaughton Co. v. McGirl 1001 v. Pemberton’s Admr. 447 McNeeley v. So. Pa. Oil Co. 299, 306 | Madisonville, &c. Ry. Co. v. Ross 1214 McNeely, Ex parte 677 | Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. MeNeer »v. McNeer 750, 752 Bernard Min. Co. 1207 MeNeil v. Commonwealth 322 | Maercker v. Milwaukee 808 MeNeill, In re 270 | Magaha v. Hagerstown 522 ». Somers 1352 | Magee »v. Brister 562 MeNichol v. U.S., &c. Agency 191 v. Commonwealth 1074 MeNiel, Ex parte 1002 v. Overshiner 1181 MeNulty ». California 739, 842 v. Supervisors 1407 Macon v. Daley 1195 v. Young 752 v. Hill 438 | Maggett, In re 838 v. Jones 1100 | Magnolia Bank v. Pike County 1059 v. Patty 1057, 1284 | Magoun ». Illinois Tr. &c. Bank Macon, &c. R. Co. v. Little 593 805, 1044 v. Riggs 1114 Illinois Tr. &c. Co. 814, 996 Macon & Western R. R. Co. v. Magruder, Ex parte 540 Davis 348, 372 ). Governor 222 Macon Sash, &c., Co., In re 600 | Maguire, Matter of 1342 McPherson »v. Blacker i 14.2) v. Maguire 582, 850, 851, 856, 858 146. 1401 | Magurn v. Magurn 856 ». Chebanse 414, 1326 Mahala »v. State 689, 690 v. Foster 404, 472, 477 | Mahan v. Cavender 865 v. Leonard 163 | Maher v. People 630, 661, 684 v. Secretary of State 125 | Mahler v. Eby 235 ». State 227, 235, 245, | Mahomet v. Quackenbush 303 (2, 373, 374 | Mahon »v. Board of Education 488 McQueeney ». Sutphen 767 v. Justice 54 McQuigan v. Delaware, &c. Co. 609 dv. IN. Ys, Cent. .R. Rs Go: 1164 McQuillen v. Hatton 1129, 1141 | Mahoney v. Bank of the State 411 McRae v. Grand Rapids, &c. Co. 673 v. Comry 1036 McRea v. Americus £15 | v. State Ins. Co. 61 Macready v. Wolcott 712| Mahoney’s Estate, Re 50, 1045 McReynolds v. Smallhouse 301, | Maiden »v. Ingersoll 27 1293, 1294 Maier, Ex parte 1341 McSpedon v. New York 460 | Maine v. Grand Trunk R. Co. of McSurely v. McGrew 393, 508, 774, Canada 1015 775, 787, 789, 1035 | Maine Water Co. v. Waterville 1091 McTwiggan v. Hunter 1049, 1065, 1103 | Mains »v. Fort Fairfield 452 MeVeigh v. United States 852, 854 Mairs v. Manhattan, &c., Ass’n 1155 McWethy »v. Aurora El. L. & P. | Maize v. State 225, 244, 348, 363 Yo. 1186 | Major v. Owen 114 MeWhirter’s Estate, In re 51} Malcolmson ». Scott 53 MeWhorter v. Dorr 1409 | Maldonado »v. United States 631 McWilliams 2. Drainage Dist. No. 19 1080, 1081 v. Neal 1352 Macy, In re 708 v. Indianapolis 1152 Maddox, Re 810 v. Graham 109 | Maddrey »v. Cox 394 Mader v. Topeka 417 Madera »v. Black 986 | Madera Waterworks v. Madera 568 Madill v. Currie 911 | Madison »v. Southern Wisconsin R, Co. 317 Madison County ». People 1097 Madison & Indianapolis R. R. Co. » The Norwich Savings Soc. 473, 476 v. Whiteneck Maloy v. Marietta Malette ». Spokane 428, 1054, 1100, 1344 Malin v. La Moure Co. 364 Malison, In re 644 Mallett ». North Carolina 544, 553 Mallory »v. Hiles 326 v. Pioneer Press Co. 940 Malloy v. South Carolina 543, 546, 551 | Malone v. Clark 862 v. Quincey 400, 401, 402, 403 v. Stewart 890 v. Williams 393, 561 Malot »v. State 660 103, 1056, 1071, 1100, 1101 662 1036 865 v. State Maltus »v. Shields 346, 1244 | Mana, In rePage | Manchester, Matter of 54 v. Clarkson 1187 v. Massachusetts 249, 1269, 1341 Maney, In re 55 Manford v. Singh 834 Mangles v. Hudson Co. 1114 Mangum v. Todd 447, 1153, 1200 Manhattan L. Ins. Co. v. Cohen 37 Manigault v. Springs 1111, 1155, 1229, 1239, 1295 Mankato v. Arnold 672 v. Fowler 420, 1046 Manley v. Manley 850, 856 Manly v. Raleigh 390 v. State 128, 131, 143, 676 Mann v. Commonwealth 685 Manning v. Shreveport 1199, D163) 1195S 1217, v. Van Buren 386 v. Weeks 830 Mannix v. Purcell 962 Mansfield v. Bristor 444 ». MeIntyre 850, 856 v. Moore 518 Mansfield, &c. R. R. v. Clarke 1144 Manston v. McIntosh 1360 Mantel v. State 413 Manteleone v. Seaboard, &c. Ins. Co. 592 Mantell, Hx parte 300 Mantorville R. &c. Co. v. Slinger- land Ata, ipAly/ Manufacturer’s G. & O. Co. v. Ind. &c., Co. 1159, 1269, 1280 Manufacturers’ Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Clarke 1043 Mapel v. John 1320 Mapes v. Weeks 940 Marbury v. Madison 101, 107 March v. Commonwealth 413 v. Portsmouth, &c. Co. 1115 Marchant v. Langworthy 158 | . Penn. Ry. Co. 844 | Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. v. Com- monwealth 1006 | Marcum »v. Ballot Com’rs 1358 | Marcy v. Oswego 474 Marengo v. Rowland 413 Marian »v. Epler 1056 Marietta v. Fearing 432, 563 Marin v. Augedahl Sil Mariner v. Dyer 668 Marion v. Epler 1071 v. State 249, 544, 552 v. Tuell 1290 Marion, &c. Ry. Co. v. Champlin 1041 Mark v. State 328, 380 Market ». St. Louis 530 Markey v. Queens County 451 Markham »v. Carver 1049 Marks, Ex parte 220 ». Baker 920 v. Morris 75 LIST OF CASES CITED cix Page Marks v. Purdue University 102, 260, 494, 1038 v. State 1254 Marlatt v. Silk 39 Marler v. State 664 Marlow v. Adams 800 Marmet v. State 804 Marney »v. Joseph 894 Maron, In re 869 Marquette Co. v. Ishpeming 517 Marr v. United States 1023 Marray v. State 169 Marron, In re 707 Marsh »v. Ellsworth 922, 928 v. Fulton Co. 472, 477 ». N. Y. & Erie R. R. Co. 1245 v. Nichols 14 v. Nichols, S. & Co. 29 v. Putnam 601 v. Supervisors 1040 v. Supervisors of Fulton Co. 477 Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. (Ofoy 283 v. Bush 1303 ». Donovon 340, 608 ». Dye 37 ». Gordon 273, 274, 838 ». Grimes 378, 1296 ». Gunter 923, 928 v. Harwood 275, 276 ». Kerns 1395, 1406, 1409, 1413 v. Owen 58, 60 v. Silliman 497, 788 v. Vicksburg 1016 Marshall Co. Court v. Calloway Co. Ct. 398 Marshalltown »v. Blum 1017 Marten v. Van Schaick 940 Martens v. People 428 Marth v. Kingfisher 445, 520 Martilla ». Quincy Min. Co. 711 Martin, Ex parte 1000 In re 263, 298, 833, 1346 v. Atchison, &c. R. Co. 1245 v. Barbour 1106 v. Bigelow 75 v. Broach 304 v. Brooklyn 519 ». Commonwealth 1254 ». Condon 1287 ». Crook 1398 v. Dix 346, 393, 1064 v. Elliott 611, 840 v. Francis 1392 »v. Hughes 590 ». Hunter’s Lessee el 34, 65, 182 v. Ingham 222 v. Lankford 24 v. McGarr 1403, 1404 v. Mott 14, 103 v. People 219 v. State 688, 689, 1267v. Matthews LIST OF CASES CITED Page | Page Martin v. Stovell 63 | Matthews v. Murphy 422 v. Texas SOS | v. St. Louis & &. F. Rn: Co. 205, 2. Tyler 469 | 1239, 1246 v. Waddell 39 v. Zane 326 v. Wade 1392 | Matthias v». Minneapolis &e. Co. 1196 v. White 888, 891 | Mattingly ». Commonwealth 631 Martin’s Appeal 204 | Mattox v. United States 664 Martinson v. Freeberg 891 | Matzger, In re 26 Marvel v. State ex rel. Morrow 1324 | Mauch Chunk v. McGee 301 Marx, Ex parte 672 | Mauk v. Brundage 957 v. Hanthorn 155, 768, 769, 1106 | Maul v. State 546 ». Hefner 251 | Mauldin »v. Greenville 1027, 1057 Mary Smith’s Case 653 | Maull v. Vaughn 590 Mashburn 2. St. Joe Imp. Co. 1288, | Maulsby »v. Reifsnider 928 1289, 1290 | Mauran v. Smith 222, 223 Mason, Matter of 726 | Maurer v. People 667 ». A. E. Nelson Cotton Co. 116 | Maurice v. Worden 925 v. Bridge Co. 817 | Maxey v. Williamson Co. 474 v. Cumberland 441 | Maxey v. Loyal 589 »?. Durham County 1209 v. Wise 782 2. Haile 589, 592 | Maxmilian ». New York 519 v. Harper’s Ferry B. Co. 1200, 1214! Maxwell v. Bugbee 48, 51, v. Kennebec, &c. R. R. Co. 822, 823, 1020 1209, 1220 v. Central Dist., &e., Tel. Co. 1182 v. Lancaster 1048 v. Com’rs Fulton Co. 868 v. McLeod 14 v. Dow 48, 67, 146, 674, v. Mason 849, 940 676, 739, 740, 823 v. Messenger 854 v. Goetschius 204, 208, 791 v. Missouri 40, 841 v. Jonesboro 423 v. Nelson 122 v. Miami 412, 453, 521, 1228 v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co. 1310 ». Newbold 34 v. Spencer 1082 v. Page 1065 v. State 671 v. Reed 371 v. Wait 178, 203 | May v. Fletcher 752, 753 Mason City, &c. R. Co. v. Wolf v. Holdridge 786 1195, 1196 v. Logan Co. 766 Masonic Temple Soc., In re 317 v. Rice 268 v. State 1090 v. State 660 Massachusetts v. Melon 339 v. Tenney 41 v. W. U. Tel. Co. 1012 | May & Co. v. New Orleans 1000 Massee v. Williams 956 | Mayberry »v. Kelly 338 Massie v. Cessua 748 | Mayer, Ex parte 793 Massuere v. Dickens 889 '». Nichols 54 Masten 2. Olcott 112 | v. Schleichter 891 Masterton v. Mt. Vernon 528 | Mayhew v. Eugene 413, 1256 Mather v. Chapman 777, 789 | Maynard v. Bd. of Canvassers 1389, 1401 ». Hodd 861 ». Hill 78, 208, 211, 582 v. Ottawa 468, 1033 | Maynes v. Moore 586 Mathews, Ex parte 120 | Mayo v. Com’rs 403 v. Beach 934 ». Dover & Foxcroft Village v. Bd. of Education 345 | Fire Co. 403 ». Murphy 359 | ». Freeland 1406 v. People 259 v. Sample 911 2. Savings Union Bank & T. v. Springfield 450 _ Co. $31 v. Washington 469 Mathison v. Minneapolis St. Ry. ». Wilson 75 Co. 373, 747, 825, 835, 1249, 1338, | Mayor ». Cooper 32 1339 ». Horn 191, 192 Mato, Ex parte 198 | v. Morgan 270 Matter of Application of Mayor 463 v. Winfield 428 Matthews v. Densmore 862 | Mayor, &c., Matter of 1094 v. Jeacle 137 v. Maerry 1284 854, 858 ». Thorne 149Page | Mayor, &c. of Annapolis v. State 297 | Mayor of Americus v. Mitchell v. Perry 214, 357 Mayor of Athens v. Ga. R. R. Co. 432 Mayor of Baltimore v. Hussey 1018 v. State 343 Mayor &c. of Carrollton v. Bd. of Met. Police 398 Mayor of Cartersville v. Lanham 1283 Mayor of Florence, Ex parte 125 Mayor of Hull v. Horner 410, 411 Mayor, &c. of Huntsville v. Phelps 22 Mayor, &c. of Lexington v. Long 1216, 1218 Mayor of London’s Case 718 Mayor of Lyme v. Turner 517, 526 Mayor, &c. of Macon v. Macon & Western R. R. Co. 404 Mayor, &c. of Memphis v. Winfield 417 Mayor, &c. of Mobile v. Allaire 414 v. Dargan 72, 1038, 1057 v. Rouse A415 v. Yuille 420, 422, 426, 431, 1337 Mayor, &c. of New York, Matter of 1056 Mayor of City of New York, Inre 1191 ». Furze 518 v. Hyatt 415 v. Lord 1313 v. Manhattan Ry. Co. 369 v. Nichols 413, 414, 4382 v. Ryan 390 v. Second Ave. R. R. Co. 420 Mayor, &c. of Paterson v. W. Orange Water Co. 1115 Mayor, &c. v. The Queen 179, 245, 1234 Mayor of Savannah v. Hartridge 402 v. Spears 450 v. State 295, 360 Mayor of Wetumpka »v. Winter 237 Mayor, &c. of Wilmington v. Turk 1318 Mayrant v. Columbia 439 ». Richardson 920 391, 413, 420, 1099 674, 700 Mays »v. Cincinnati v. Commonwealth Maysville v. Wood 967 Maysville &c. Co. v. Ingraham 1205 | Mazzetti v. Armour 121 Meacham ». Fitchburg R. R. Co. 1217 v. Jamestown, &c. R. Co. 251 Meachan v. Dow 1392 | Mead »v. Acton 487 | v. Derby 529 v. Larkin 853 v. McGraw 122 v. Michigan Cent. R. Co. 1152 v. Portland 40, 439, 1152 v. Walker 865 Meade v. Beale 40 v. County Treasurer 1356 v. Deputy Marshal 852 Meadowcroft v. People 769 Meagher v. Storey Co. 382 Mears v. Com’rs of Wilmington 518 LIST OF CASES CITED Page Mechanics’, &c. Bank Appeal 586 1326 | Mechanics’ and Farmers’ Bk. ». Smith 432 Mechanics’ & Traders’ Bank »v. Debolt 248 v. Thomas 571 Mechanics’ Bldg. & L. Ass’n ». Coffman 290, 1339 Meddis ». Kenney 859 Meddock v. Williams 782 Medford v. Learned Cidade Medlin ». Downing Lumber Co. 859 | Meech v. Buffalo 401 Meechan ». Shields 357 Meeker »v. Post Printing, &c. Co. 891 v. Van Rennselaer 1267, 1313 Meffert v. State Bd. &c. 543, 1235, 1239 Megson v. St. Louis 529 Meguire v. Corwin 283, 1392 Meighen v. Strong 785 Meisenheimer v. Meisenheimer 111 Meister v. People 708 Melcher v. Beeler 956 Melick v. Washington 422 Melizet’s Appeal 211, 752 Mellen v. Western R. R. Corp. 1154 Mellen Lumber Co. v. Indust. Com. 368 Mellon Co. v. McCafferty 37 Melrose Ave., In re 1088 Melvin v. Veiant 888 Memphis v. Bolton 1219 v. Fisher 812 v. Hastings 1119 v. Water Co. 814 Memphis & L. R. R. Co. v. R. R. Com’rs 574 Memphis &c. Co. v. Birmingham &c. Co. 1192 v. Payne 1206 Memphis City Bank v. Tennessee 574 Memphis Freight Co. v». Memphis’ 1125 Memphis Gaslight Co. v. Shelby Co. 573 Memphis State Line R. Co. v. Forest Hill Cemetery Co. 1118 Menard County v. Kincaid 756 Menasha v. Hazar 474 Mendel v. Wheeling 446 Mendenhall v. United States 665 775, 777, 781 416, 1256 Menges v. Wertman Menken »v. Atlanta Menserdorff v. Dwyer 983 Mercantile Bank v. Tennessee 574 Mercer v. McWilliams 1202 Merchant v. Pa. R. Co. 844 Merchants’ & M. Nat. Bk. ». Pennsylvania 41, 991, 1042, 1049 Merchants’ Bank v. Bergen Co. 472, 476, v. Cook OE 512 Merchants’ Bank of Danville »v. Ballou 599, 755 Merchants Exchange v. Knott 225, 231cxll Page Merchants Stock &c. Co. ». Chicago | | | | | | Bd. of Trade 669 Merchants’ Transfer Co. v. Bd. of Review 1009, 1060 Meredith v. Christy 1353 v. Lad 284 Mergenthaler Linotype Co. v. Davis 38 Meridian v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co: 568 Meridian Light & R. Co. v. Meridian 395 | Merivale v. Carson 941 Meriwether v. Garrett 394, 395, | 398, 503 v. Geo. Knapp & Co. 935 v. State 1259 Merkle v. Paschkes 229 Merrey v. Guardian Printing, &c. Co. 943 Merrick v. Amherst 464, 494, 1038 | v. Giddings, MacAr. & Mack 274 v. N. W. Halsey & Co. 1339 v. Van Santvoord 250, 255 Merrifield ». Worcester 449, 450, 528 Merrill v. Eastern R. R. 1248 ». Humphrey 1048 v. Monticello 471, 475 | ». Plainfield 457, 461 v. Sherburne 188, 192, 749 Merritt v. Cameron 149 v. Farris 1093 Mershon ». State 660 Mertens, In re 600 Merwin v. Ballard 772 Merz v. Missouri P. Ry. Co. 1243 Mesher v. Osborne 317 Meshmeimer »v. State 225, 363, 378 1255, 1256 | Messenger v. Mason v. State Messinger v. Anderson 34 1299 Mestas v. Diamond Coal, &c. Co. 137 Mestayer v. Corrige 420 Metcalf v. Gilmore 114 v. Mitchell 996 Methodist Ep. Church v. Wood 962 v. Wyandotte 451, 1152 Methodist Ep. Church Baraca Club v. Madison Metograph Mfg. Co. v. Scrugham Metropolitan Board of Excise v. Barrie 578, 1250, 1252 Metropolitan Board of Health », Heister 425, 1270, 1271, 1326 Metropolitan Gas Lt. Co., Matter of 304, 309 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. of New York »v. Assessors of Parish of 57% 714 Orleans 253 Metr. Police Board v. Wayne Co. Auditors 489 Metropolitan West Side El. R. Co. v. Gall 1197, v. Johnson 1215 42 | LIST OF CASES CITED Page Metz v. Asheville 449 Metzger, Matter of 724, 725 Mewherter v. Price 304, 310 Mexican Petroleum Corp. »v. So. Portland 1000, 1009 Meyer v. Berlandi 186, 363, 744 v. Mobile 1343 v. Muscatine 470 v. Nebraska 824, 830, 1236, 1329, 1345 ». Richmond 843 v. San Diego 871 Meyer & Co. v. Pleasant 1061 Meyers v. Baker 1330 v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Co. 424 v. Clark 425 v. Hansbrough 752 v. Hudson Co. El. Co. 1184 Mial v. Ellington 561, 746 Miami Coal Co. v. Wigton 1122 Michael v. Matson 702 Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chicago, &c. R. Co. 640 v. United States 669 v. Wall Tp. 804 Michales v. Hine 863 Michener v. Watts 14 Michigan Cent. R. Co. v. Michigan R. Comm. 1003, 1276 ». Powers 1059 Michigan Public Ut. Comm. v. Duke 1005, 1015, 1201, 1270, 1285 Michigan State Bank v. Hastings 566 Michigan Sugar Co. ». Auditor- General 1028 Michigan Tel. Co. v. St. Joseph 182, 184, 566 Mickle v. Henricks 695 Middlebrook v. State 669 Middlebrooks v. Insurance Co. 58 Middleport v. Insurance Co. 309 Middleton v. Lowe 222 v. St. Augustine 471, 1027 803, 824, 1337, 1339 Middletown, Matter of 292 Re 367 v. Texas Power, &c. Co. Mifflin v. Railroad Co. 1165 Migatt ». Ponca City Land &c. Co. 257 Mikesell v. Durkee 1172 Milam Co. v. Bateman 501 Milan M. & M. Co. v. Gorton 256 Milan & R. Plank Road Co. ». Husted 571 Milburn, Ex parte 724 Milecke, In re 342, 353 Miles v. Albany 456 v. Bradford 223 v. Brooklyn 451 v. Caldwell 39 v. Graham 1095 v. State 550 v. Worcester 450LIST OF CASES CITED Page Page Milhau »v. Sharp 404, 432, | Mills, Matter of 706 442, 443, 455, 1162 | ». Brooklyn 448, 518, 527 Milheim v. Moffat Tunnel &c. Dist. 36, v. Charleton 305, 307, 390, 1037, 1051, 1073 | 496, 788, 1033 Millard v. Bd. of Education 966 ». Commonwealth 628 v. Rogers 268 v. Duryea 61 ». Webster City 440 | ». Gleason 400, 404, 1105 Millburn v. Cedar Rapids, &c. Co. 1171 | v. Jefferson 329 Milledgeville v. Cooley 529 | v. Mo. K. T. R. Co. 431 ». Sternbridge 451 | v. St. Clair Co. 821 Miller, In re 57, 554, 729 | v. United States 1150 ». Ammon 1255 | ». Williams 393, 563, 566, 567 ». Birch 1326 | Millsaps v. Johnson 204 ». Birmingham 418, 420, 672 | Milne v. Davidson 1326 ». Board of Public Works 1225, | Milner v. Pensacola 394 1227, 1228, 1315, 1317, 1318 | Milton ». Bangor &c. Co. 521 v. Clark 1360 | Milward v. Thatcher 1352 ». Commonwealth 672, 714, 1259 | Milwaukee 2. Gross 425, 1271 v. Craig 1321 ». Milwaukee El. R. &c. »v. Detroit 521 | Co. 1179 v. Dorsey 887 | Milwaukee County ?. Isenring 279 ». Dunn 123, 383 | Milwaukee Electric Ry. &c. Co. ?. v. Kagle 867 | Wisconsin 44 v. English 963 | Milwaukee Gaslight Co. v. Schooner v. Fitchburg 419 Gamecock 79 ». Gable 961 | Milwaukee Industrial School ». ». Graham 789, 792| Supervisors 609, 864 ». Grandy 487, 1034| Milwaukee Light, Jn re 1207 2». Hixson 772,| Milwaukee Mechanics’ Ins. Co. 2: v. Hurford 323) Russell 583 v. Johnson 88, 1331 | Milwaukee Town 2. Milwaukee City 398 v. Jones 311 | Minden-Edison Light & Power Co. »v. Macon 453| v. Minden 470 v. Max 166 | Mineota v. Martin 421, 1046 v. Miller 64, 751| Miner v. Detroit Post, &e. Co. 920, 947 »v. Mullan 520, 522 | ». Markham 274 ». N. Y. & Erie R. R. Co. 1240, 1242 | ». Morgan 752 v. Nicholls 34] Miners’ Bank v. lowa 78 v. Nuckolls 891, 925 ». United States 566 v. Parish 890 | Miners’ Bank of Dubuque 2. United v. People 653, 676, 1327 | States 204 v. Pillsbury Ming, Ex parte 125, 130, 144, 148 o. Pulaski 1130, 1141, Wa SE v. Janney 1028 v. Rucker 1395 Wilkin 794, 782 v. St. Paul 446 Ainseapcls &c. Co. v. Beckwith 19, ». Southern Bell Teleph. & 808, 1234 Teleg. Co. 395 ». Herrick 19 v. State 161, 277, 279, 288, 312, ». Traill Co. 744 338, 569, 620, 628, 653, v. Nester 370 673, 690, 694, 864, 1288, 1291 | Minneapolis, &c. El. Traction Co. v. Syracuse 426, 434 ». Minneapolis 406, 407, 460 v. Texas 66, 1346 v. Searle 1199 ». Troost 1136 | Minneapolis, &c. R. Co. 2. Poppler 35 ». Wilson 1347 ». R. R. Commission 227, 233 Miller’s Ex’r v. Miller 856 ». Washburn L. C. Co. 37 Miller’s Ex’rs v. Swann 41 ». Wisc. R. Commission 229 Miller Grocery Co. ». Des Moines 525| Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co: ®: Millett v. People 810 Emmons 1244 Millholland v. Bryant 1375 ». Minn. &c. Co. 1191, 1192 Milligan, Hz parte 637, 671| Minneapolis Gaslight Co. v. Minne- Milligan’s Appeal 1389 apolis 436 Milliken »v. City Council 425| Minneapolis Western Ry. Co. 2. v. Pratt 1233 Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co. 1189 exiilCX1V LIST OF CASES CITED Page Page Minnesota v. Barber 381, 1272} Missouri Pac. R. Co. ». Richmond 912 Minnesota &c. Co. v. Minn. W. R. v. Sherwood 1268, 1270 Co. 1116} v. Tucker 832 Minnesota Canal & Power Co. v. Missouri R. Co. v. State 260 Pratt 27, 1123, 1134, 1291, 12992 | Missouri ex rel. S. W. Bell Tel. Co. ». Minnesota Debenture Co. v. John- | Pub. Serv. Comm. 1309 son 113} Mitchell v. Burlington 470 Minnesota Rate Cases 1004, 1005, v. Carter 521 1275, 1303, 1309 | v. Clark 21, 556 Minnesota Sugar Co. v. Iverson 6, 1033 | v. Cothrans 593 Minnetonka Lake Imp., In re 1151 | v. Deeds 775, 779 Minnick ». Durham 525 | v. Harmony 1124, 1201 Minor v. Board of Education 969 | v. Illinois, &e. Coal Co. 166, 1120 v. Happersett 81, 82, | v. Negaunee 1027 147, 841, 1361 | v. Railroad Com’rs 396 Minot v. West Roxbury 284 | v. Rome 440 v. Winthrop 1044, 1045 v. St. John 864 Miocene Ditch Co. v. Jacobsen 1130 v. State 306, 692, 705 v. Lyng 1130 v. Tibbetts 258 Miodownick v. Fischman 957 v. Williams 1322 Mires v. Hogan 762 | Mitchell Realty Co. v. West Allis 529 Mirich v. Forschner Contracting Co. Mitchell’s Case 702 868, 869 | Mithoff v. Carrollton 1132 Misch v. Russell 1394 | Mix v. Nez Perce Co. 259, 263, 413, 414 Miskimins, Ex parte 650 | Moberly ». Preston 890 v. Shaver 725 v. Roth 193 Mississippi, &c. Boom Co. v. Prince 309] Mobile v. Kimball 1002, 1277, 1281 Mississippi Mills ». Cook 165, 1041 v. Watson 398, 598 Mississippi R. R. Co. ». McDonald 567 | Mobile, &c. R. Co. v. Mississippi 1268 Mississippi R. Comm. ». Illinois v. Turnipseed 768, 825 Cent. R. Co. 1267 | Mobile & O. R. Co. v. Dismukes 1305 v. Mobile, &e. R. Co. 735 | v. State 318, 339, 340, 360, 369, 370 v. Yazoo, &c. R. Co. 1276 v. Tennessee 43, 571 Mississippi Society v». Musgrove 566 | Mobile Dry-Docks Co. v. Mobile 305,311 Mississippi University v. Waugh 312} Mobile Transportation Co. v. Mobile 757 Missouri v. Andriano 37 | Mode, Ex parte 225, 227, 235, 245 ». Lewis 19, 67, 804, 843) Modern Woodman »v. Mixer 62 ». Murphy 440 | Moe »v. Shaffer 58, 61 Missouri, &c. Co. v. McCann 41 | Moebus, Ex parte 721 v. Simonson 840 | Moers ». Reading 147, 237 Missouri, &c. R. Co. v. Bailey 585 | Moffatt ». Hardin 702 ». Cade 806, 836 | Mogul v. Gaither 298, 306 ». Harris 806, 836, 1003 | Mohall Farmers’ Elevator Co. v. Hall v. May 374 | 341, 566 v. Olathe 35, 38 | Mohan ». Jackson 1352 v. Roe 1213, 1214 | Mohawk Bridge Co. v. Utica &e. Co. 821 v. Shannon 1058 | Mohawk & Hudson R. R. Co., Matter v. Texas 1268 of 158 Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. 2. Haber 1271 Mohler ». Commonwealth 640 v. Krumseig 1233, 1239 v. State University 1196 v. McCann & Smizer 1268} Mohr, In re 55 Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Clarendon Mok ». Detroit, &e. Ass’n 314 &e. Co. 49 | Moler v. Whisman 298 v. Finley 1324 | Moletor ». Sinnen 611 v. Fitzgerald 29 | Molinari v. State 1260 ». Houseman 1208 | Moline v. Greene 1190 v. Humes 19, 771, 1245 | Mon Luck », Sears 1250 v. Kansas 70, 142, 146, 569 Monaghan ». Lewis 298, 301, 305, 572 v. McGrew Coal Co. 1304 ». State v. Mackey Y 19, 20, 806 | Monday », Rahway 181 v. Nebraska 832, 844, 1305 Mondon v. New York, &c. Co. 25, 747, v. Nebraska, Bd. of Transp. 174 825, 1274 2. Porter 1215 | Money ». Leach 614LIST OF CASES CITED CxVv Page Page Monford v. Barney 868 | Montpelier Academy v. George 394, 397 Monk v. Brundage 911 | Montpelier Bank & Tr. Co. v. Sch. ». Corbin 764 Dist. No. 5 75 Monmouth v. Leeds 155 | Montross »v. State 180, 246, 688 Monongahela Bridge Co. v. United Monumental Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Wil- States 230, 1003 kinson 754 Monongahela Nav. Co. v. Coons Mooar v. Harvey 1368 1149, 1157 | Moodalay »v. East India Co. 524 v. United States 1113, 1115, | Moody, Ez parte 726 1145, 1207, 1210 v. State 266, 277, 278, 319 Monroe »v. Collins 139, 364, 816, v. Trimble 1359 1369, 1370, 1371, 1395 | Moog ». Randolph 278 v. Endelman 1343 | Moon ». Atlanta 1199 ». Green 319 | v. Durden 136 v. Hoffman 425, 1314 | v. Harris 1414 v. Withycombe 228 | v. Stevens 870 Monroe Mill Co. v. Menzel 1288 | Moore, Ex parte 309 Montana Catholic Mission v. Lewis Matter of 706 & Clarke County 1094 | v. Atlanta 439 Montana Centr. Ry. Co. v. Helena, v. Cass 793 &c. Co. 1192 v. Church 251 Montana Co. v. St. Louis Mining &c. ». Detroit Locomotive Works 847 Co. 611, 840 v. Fannin 863 Montana ez rel. Haire v. Rice 33, 36 v. Greenhow 587 Montana Postal Tel. Cable Co. »v. ». Hanscom 859 Oregon Short Line R. Co. 1158 ». Holland 588 Montana Ry. Co. v. Warren 1214 v. Houston 348 Montclair v. N. Y. &c. Ry. Co. 1242 v. Illinois 686 v. Ramsdell 298 v. Indian Spring Channel Gold Montee v. Commonwealth 682 Min. Co. 834, 1331 Monteleone v. Royal Ins. Co. 1314 v. Indianapolis 578 Montello, The 1288 v. Irby 749 Monterey Co. v. Cushing 1126 v. Kent 753 Montgomery v. Conner 522 v. Kessler 1406 v. Deeley 887 ». Lawrence County 1155 ». Dormer 1418 v. Luce 762 ». Henry 1398 ». Maxwell 201 v. Hobson 783 ». Meagher 891 ». Kasson 558, 581 v. Minneapolis 529 v. Kelly 1334 ». Missouri 694 ». Meredith 774 ». Monroe 970 v. Montgomery Water Works 460 ». Moore 997 v. Pickering 701 v. Napier 368 ». Santa Ana, &c. R. Co. v. Nation 1352 1164, 1180 ». Natl. Com. of K. & L. of S. 742 v. State 682, 955 v. New Orleans 366 v. Townsend 439 ». Paving Imp. Dist. 1072 v. Wasem 1107 v. People 65, 416 Montgomery B. B. Works v. Gaston ». Pittsburgh 802 279, 280 ». Quirk 996, 997 Montgomery Co. v. Elston 993 ». Railway Co. 1120 Montgomery Co. Fiscal Ct. v. Trimble v. Sanborne 1288, 1289 1401 v. Sanford 1141, 1144 Montgomery First Nat. Bk. v. Tyson 442 v. Smaw 1109 Monticello v. Banks 1075 ». State 543, 587, 644, 685, 686 Monticello Bank v. Coffin’s Grove 386 ». Stephenson 957 Monticello D. Co. v. Mayor of Bal- v. Strickling 563 timore 339 ». Williams 60 Montjoy v. Pillow 796, 821 v. Yonkers 1053 Montoya v. Ortiz 1404, 1418 | Moore-Mansfield Constr. Co. v. Elec- Montpelier ». East Montpelier 394, 395, trical Inst. Co. 44 503, 565 ». Indianapolis, &c. R. Co. 116, v. National Surety Co. 845 295, 296, 298CXVi LIST OF CASES CITED 1133, 1298 Me Page Page ae Mfg. Co. v. Springfield S. R. 5 Morris v. Montgomery Tract Co. 1168, O. 1199 1179, 1180 ree apne Bank ot v. pee Short Line R. Co. 1157 I 0 ad v. Murphy 1 | v. People 34 Ts Moorman 2. Jefferson County 1094 v. Powell ‘cana Moose e Alexander County aa v. Royal Arch Masons 1094 v. Carson 41 v. State ‘ Mopsikov v. Cook 959 | ao verted Moragne v. State 1254 ». Stout : 263 Morah ». Steele 909 v. Vanlaningham 1398 cee Com Te ps Miami Co. 473, 474 Morris & E. R. Co. v. Newark 486, 1162 : Pete Se sane mea Morris Canal & Banking Co. v. Fisher : f alace Car Co. 5 7 br 476 : a es ee Morris Street Baptist Church v. Dart . Sturges : 28, 29 961, 964 Peete: Pine &c. Co. vee Morrison v. Fairmont, &c. Tract. Co. s >tC y 409 y Morehead »v. State 655, 676 v. Kent is Morehouse Parish v. Brigham 1047 v. McDonald 668 Moren v. Nichols 1407 v. Rice 752 Morey v. Brown 1322 ucnenee v. Morning Journal Ass’n 889 sy Staise : a Sa v. Newfane 516, 520 | Morriso y 3 Morford v. Unger PRL, OA 303, 395, : Tie “ Hestautant Com: 36 792, 1029, 1089, 1063} Morrissey v. Peo le a Morgan, Ez parte 317 | Morrow v Ww : 8.7 oe ae Trem ce orrow v. Wood 388, 713 Bi 833, 1235, 1346 Morrow Co. v. Hendryx 398 zi Reta me Morse d. Boston 529 Bae a v. Goold 118, 587, 589 % Bena ba ve 249 Morton, Matter of 623 : Eien 8, &. Co. 1171 v. Controller 301, 305 paisa a v. Macon 419, 429 H é 7950 | rN 7 AW) rc v. Elizabeth 1048 | : ates ok ‘ a v. Gloucester 1372 a Gee - 162 Ne v. Kendrick 114 | 0 Sisnaee aS v. King 75, 1193, 1288, 1289, 1291 | 0. Valentine 590 ». Livings 7 | Xe s eon nee v. Xeter Realty Ltd. 1104 SH Orcs rt Mose 2. State 666 eRe 421 | Moseley v. State 690 r Poite 110 Moser »v. White 192 Rages Hah nea ne Moses ». Pittsburgh, &c. Co. 1171 v. Schusselle 1032 2 Saniord pe v. Smith 247 N oe ae meets oes | pee Taylor, The v. Hammons 65 Morgan’s S. S. Co. v. Louisia | v rena an an Morley 2. LS. & M.S. Ry. Co. 40, 560 | sant; kom &e- By. Co. atte Morrell v. Dickey " 857 2 pi ib ». Fickle So? | Motes v. United States 662 Serres ee Mothaf 2. State 701 Worl eis Haines iene Motor Car Dealers’ Ass’n v. Fred S. Morrill v. State i025 | Mean ees eee Morris v. Barkley 890 ae Sock ose v. Bd. of Canvassers 1360 |} . pereen saab ai Sane Soe lve v2. Pa. R. R. Co. 247, 571 ° ) i v. Colo. Midland R. Co, 1396 | Mone iaites COG 4, (QSREATE aeel ee 2». Detroit 369, 803 ». Council Bluffs Asi the ee a Pee ao Toulton v. Newburyport Water Co. 1213 maGiowae rae NS v. eepenend 1033 2. Indianapolis 118, 430 Ate v. Sear orough 454 eieva , 439, 1111, ae | Mound City Land, &c. Co. ». MillerLIST OF CASES CITED CXVIi Page Mount v. Commonwealth 688 v. Richey 265 v. Tuttle 76 | Mount Carmel v. Shaw 442 | v. Wabash Co. 395 | Mount Carmel Public Utility &c. Co. v. Pub. Ut. Com. 566 Mount Hope Cemetery v. Boston 504 Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith 398, 503 v. Breeze 404 | Mount St. Mary’s Cemetery Ass’n v. Mullins 1053 | Mount Vernon »v. People 1088 v. State 369, 803 Mount Vernon F. Nat. Bk. v. Sarlls 430 Mount Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Frankfort Marine, &c. Ins. Co. 334 v. Alabama Interstate Power Co. Mount Washington Co.’s Petition 1207, 1216, 1219| Mount Washington Road Co., Peti- tion of 1143 | Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington 8355 1230s loot Mounts v. State 686, 688 Mower »v. Leicester 512, 515 ». Watson 926, 928 Moxley v. Ragan 371 Moyer, In re 102, 103 v. Nichols 56 v. Slate Co. 135 ». Van De Vanter 1360, 1369 Moynahan, In re 26 | Moynier, Ex parte 425 | Mueller v. Courtland 1126 | Mugler v. Kansas 12, 19, 577, 865, | 905, 1254, 1256, 1327 | Muhlenbrinck v. Com’rs 420, 423 Muhlker wv. N. Y. &c. Co. 1174 Mulcairns v. Janesville 454 Mulderig v. Wilkes-Barre Times 920 Mulford v. Farmers’ Reservoir, &c. Co. 1220 Mulhearn »v. Press Pub. Co. 709 Mulholland v. Des Moines, &c. Co. 584} Mulkern v. State 829 Muller v. Oregon 830, 1347 v. So. Pac. B. Ry. Co. 1214 Mulligan v. City of Perth Amboy 1203 Mullin v. People 671 Mullinex ». People 682 Mulnix v. Mut. Ben. L. Ins. Co. 164, 333 Mulvey v. Boston 765 Mumford v. Sewall 1018 Muncie Nat. Bk. v. Miller 775 Muncy Elec. &c. Co. v. People’s Elec. &c. Co. 575 Munday v. Wisconsin Tr. Co. 253 Mundt v. Sheboygan, &c. R. R. Co. 125, 291 Mundy »v. Monroe 366, 595 Page Munger v. Tonawanda R. R. Co. 1195 Municipal Fuel Plants 1028 Municipal Suffrage to Women, Re 240 Municipality v. Blane 1283 v. Dunn 1052 Municipality No. 1 v. Wheeler 543 | Municipality No. 2. White 1057, 1079 Munick v. Durham 518 Munn, Ez parte 721 v. Illinois 19, 67, 346, 747, 1225, 1301, 1303, 1311 v. People 1300, 1302 v. Pittsburg 530 Munro v. State 260 Munson v. Coll. Springs 418 v. Hungerford 1288 Munster v. Lamb 929 Murdock v. Ward 996 | Murphey v. Menard 303 7 | Murphy, Ex parte 727, 1403 In re 125, 545 v. Beard 1118 v. Chicago 438, 1152 v. Chicago, &c. R. Co. 1175 v. Commonwealth 124, 544, 674, 675 v. Curry 1359, 1394 v. Directors 387 v. Ft. Edward 377, 756 ». Jacksonville 405, 460 ». John Hoffman Co. 114 ». Kings Co. Canvassers 1390 v. Lowell 448, 528 v. Massachusetts 691 v. People 793, 1056 v. Ramsey 78, 1363, 1370, 1396 v. St. Mary Parish Police Jury 315 v. San Luis Obispo 478, 1376 v. Spokane 1398 v. State 309, 675, 692, 705 Murphy’s Estate, In re 671 Murray »v. Charleston 598 v. Chicago, &c. R. Co. 70 v. Com’rs of Ramsey County 263, 805 ». Co. Com’rs of Berkshire 1163, 1169 v. Hoboken Land Co. 853 v. Lehman 1041 v. McCarty 48 v. Menefee 1149, 1158 v. Sharp 1159 v. Waite 1390 ». Wilson Distilling Co. 22, 23 Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land Co. 725 Murtaugh »v. St. Louis 519 Musco v. United Surety Co. 369 Musgrove v. Vicksburg, &c. R. R. Co. 756 Music v. Big Sandy, &c. Co. 1215 Muskogee v. Hancock 1196 Muskogee El. Traction Co. v. Doer- ing 1245CXViil Page Muskogee Vitrified Brick Co. v. Napier 137 Muskrat v. United States 101 Musselman v. Logansport 775 Mutual Assurance Co. v. Watts 39 Mutual Ben. L. Ins. Co. v. Elizabeth 775 Mutual Film Corporation v. Hodges 230 v. Industrial Comm. 230 v. Ohio Ind. Comm. 1000 Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell 346, 748 Mutual R. F. Life Ass’n v. Boyer 256 Myers v. Anderson 1396 v. Baltimore Co. Com’rs 1061 v. Chalmers 1408 v. English 166, 348 v. Hodges 956 v. Knickerbocker Tr. Co. 583, 586 588, 593 v. Manhattan Bank 81 v. Park 742 v. People 250, 360 v. State 134 Mygatt ». Washburn 1060 Myles Salt Co. ». Board of Com’rs 1082 v. Iberia, &c. Drainage Dist. 32, 1054 Myrick v. Hasey 119 v. La Crosse 1107 LIST OF CASES | | | National Bond, &c. Co. ». Gibson CITED Page 1257 | National Car Advertising Co. v. Louis- ville, &c. R. Co. 251 | National Cir. &c. of Isabella v. Na- tional Order &c. of Isabella 58 National City Bank v. United States 1210 National Cotton Oil Co. v. Texas 40 National Docks &c. Co. v. State 1191 N Nagel, Ex parte 644 Nagle v. Augusta 424, 1283 Nalle v. Oyster 911 Nalley v. Home Ins. Co. 225, 299, | 300, 302, 361 Nampa v. Nampa, &c. Irr. Dist. 1152 Nance v. Piano Co. 738 Napa v. Maxwell 1120 Napa Sav. Bank v. Napa County 1089 Narregang v. Brown County 278 Narron v. Wilmington &c. Co. 840 | Nash v. Clark 1125, 1140 | v. Lowry 442 Nashville v. Althorp 428 | v. Burns 530 | v. Nichol 439 | v. Ray 404 | Nashville, &c. Co. v. Alabama 19 v. Davidson Co. 566 | Nashville, &c. R. R. Co.v. Hodges 1094 Nashville, &c. Ry. v. Hubble 120 Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Ala- bama 1002, 1249, 1278 Nashville Labor Temple v. Nashville 1089 Natal v. Louisiana 672, 1334 Natchez, &c. Co. v. Currie 1218 Nathan v. Spokane Co. 362 National Bank v. Commonwealth 995 v. Price 257 v. United States 991 v. Yankton 78 National Bank of Commerce »v. Jones 588 National Equitable Soc. v. Alexander 810 National Land and Loan Co. ». Mead 322 National Life Ins. Co. v. Mead 476, 478 National Mut. Bldg., &c. Ass’n ». Brahan 35 National Prohibition Cases 70, 71, 1258 National Safe Deposit Co. ». Stead 617 National Surety Co. v. Architectural Decorating Co. 592 v. Starkey 1089 National Trust Co. ». Murphy 255 National Union F. Ins. Co. ». Wan- berg 1236, 1332 Nations v. Johnson 852, 854 Navajo County Bank ». Dolson 317 Navasota v. Pearce 519 Naylor v. Field 316 v. McColloch 488 Naysmith v. Auburn 451 Neaderhouser »v. State 1296 Neagle, In re 719, 728 v. Tacoma 53 Neal v. Delaware 18, 19, 72, 1360 v. Green 40 v. Shinn 1393 Neass v. Mercer 590 Nebraska v. Campbell 518 v. lowa 46 Nebraska Dist. of Evang. Lutheran Synod v. McKelvie 304 Nebraska Tel. Co. v. State 1249, 1302 Neeb v. Hope 921, 942 Needham v. Thayer 856 Neel v. State 669 Neeley v. Rice 1414 v. Farr 1351, 1389, 1402 v. Henkel 56 Neely v. Henry 370 v. State 868 Neff v. Beauchamp 850 Nefzger v. Davenport, &c. R. R. Co. 13g Nega v. Chicago Rys. 845 Negley v. Farrow 921, 940, 942 Nehasane Park Ass’n v. Lloyd 1104 Neifing v. Pontiac 307 Neil v. State 863 Neill ». Keese 846 Neilson v. Chicago, &c. Ry. Co. 1220 Nellis, In re 672 Nels »v. State 682 Nelson, In re 677 Ex parte 838 v. Allen 105, 116, 800 ». Borchenius 888LIST OF CASES CITED CX1x Page Nelson v. Canisteo 520 v. Cheboygan Nav. Co. 1294 v. Chicago, &c. R. Co. 854 v. Commonwealth 706 v. Davis 923 v. Gass 1366, 1368 v. Goree 118 v. McBride 1380 v. Milford 456, 457 v. Minneapolis 617 vy. Ottawa County, Sch. Dist. No. 3 1132 v. Rountree 792 v. St. Martin’s Parish 598 v. Sneed 1413 | ». Spokane 530 v. State 682, 1282 Nelson Land & Cattle Co. v. Smith 43 | Nesbitt v. Clark Bin 2ol v. Trumbo 1126 Nesmith v. Sheldon 42 | Ness v. Hamilton 889 Nessen v. New Orleans 520 Nestor v. Commonwealth 632 Nettleton’s Appeal 742 | Neumeyer v. Krakel 141, 214, 216} Nevada National Bank v. Poso Irr. | Dist. 994 Neville v. State 1259, 1261 | Nevins v. Peoria 438, 451 | New v. State 705 | v. Walker 14 | New Albany & Salem R. R. Co. ». Maiden 1244 | v. MeNamara 1244 | v. O’Daily 1156, 1170 | v. Tilton 1225, 1244, 1249 New Boston, Petition of 871 v. Dunbarton 411 New Brunswick v. Fitzgerald 262 v. Williamson 318 New Castle v. Kurtz 522 New Castle Common v. Megginson 1087 New England Screw Co. v. Bliven 40 New England Tr. & S. Club v. Mather 826 New Era Life Ass’n v. Musser 591, 1241 New Hampshire v. Louisiana 23 New Haven v. New Haven &c. Co. 442 New Haven County v. Parish of Trinity Church 1214 New Haven Water Co. v. Russell 1144 v. Wallingford 1190 New Jersey v. Wilson 248, 571 v. Yard 571 New Jersey ex rel. Kennelly v. Jersey City 1179 New Jersey Zinc Co. v. Morris Canal, &e. Co. 1142 New London »v. Brainard 400, 459 New Mexico v. Baker 845 ». Denver, &c. R. Co. 1272, 1273 New Orleans v. Abagnatto 507 Page New Orleans v. Badie 424 v. Calamari 413, 374, 1235 v. Cannon 741 v. Cazelear 1064 v. Charouleau 1270 v. Clark 457, 486, 491 v. De Armas 34 v. Dubarry 1041 v. Faber 1335 v. Fourchy 1087, 1093 v. Gt. South Tel. Co. 559 v. Home Ins. Co. 1041 v. Hop Lee 425 v. Houston 571, 579 v. Kaufman 1046 v. LeBlanc 424 v. Lenfant 434 v. Miller 416, 425 v. People’s Bank 1087 v. Poutz 543 v. St. Romes 158 v. Sanford 434 v. Savings Bank 1047, 1092 v. Smythe 435 v. Southern Bank 316 v. Stafford 1335 v. Stempel 1019 v. Toca 374 v. Turpin 390 v. Warner 555, 1025 New Orleans &c. Co. v. New Orleans 1161 New Orleans, &c. R. R. Co. v. Gay 1142, 1194 v. New Orleans 505, 573 v. Southern, &c. Co. 1117 v. Southern Tel. Co. 1133 New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Drain- ageComm. 437,443,577,1111,1239 v. Louisiana Light Co. 89, 554, 577, 581, 1115 New Orleans Water Works v. Louisi- ana Co. 35, 36, 46 v. Rivers 581 New Providence v. Halsey 407, 474 New Standard Club ». McGowen 573 New Street, In re 1175 New York, Ez parte 22523 In re 1158 Matter of 1175 v. Barker 824 v. Heslerberg 1269 v. Mealy 575 v. Miln 1008 v. Railway Co. 1046 v. Richmond Light & R. Co. 396 v. Reardon 341 v. Roberts 1047 v. Second Ave. R. R. Co. 438 v. Sohmer 573 v. Squire 1282 v. State Board of Tax Com’rs 572 ». United States 556, 1275 v. Williams 426LIST OF CASES CITED Page | Page New York, &c. Co., Matter of 1191 | Newby, Ez parte 644, 645 v. Bristol 577, 1246 v. Platte Co. 1215, 1216 v. New York 455 v. Times-Mirror Co. 889, 891 New York, &c. Ry. Co., In re 1190 | Newby’s Adm’rs v. Blakey 761 ». Cohasset Water Co. 1218 | Newcastle, &c. Co. v. Peru & Ind. R. v. Erie R. Co. 1276 R. Co. 1115 v. Livingston 1222 | Newcomb ». Indianapolis 214, 216 v. Pennsylvania 555 v. Peck 59 v. Van Horn 372, 497, 784 | Newcome »v. Light 879 v. Williams 569, 570, 834, | v. Smith 1136 1003, 1242, 1331 | Newcum ». Kirtley 1403, 1409 New York & A. R. R. Co. v. New York | Newell v. How 888 &c. R. R. Co. 1192 v. Minneapolis &c. Co. 1184 New York & Harlem R. R. Cov. Kip v. Newton 856 1125, 1128 } v. People 124, 125, 127 v. Mayor, &c. v. N. Y. 1162 v. Smith 1137 New York & L. B. R. R. Co. v. Drum- v. Wheeler 1106 mond 1192 | Newhall v. Enterprise Min. Co. 1101 New York Central R. R. Co., Matter Newhouse v. Alexander 158, oO 1146 1413, 1414 ». Hudson Co. 1307 | Newland v. Marsh 184, 348, 372, 377 ?. Pub. Serv. Comm. 1276 Newman, Ez parte 348, 380 v. White 1337, 1339 v. Ashe 463 New York Cent. R. Co. v. Winfield 1005 | v. Commonwealth 662 New York ez rel. Doyle v. Atwell 37 | v. Gates 38 New York Electric Lines Co. v. Empire v. Lake 57 &c. Co. 33, 44, 565 v. State 1259, 1261 New York L. &c. R. R. Co., Matter Newport v. Commonwealth 1088 of 1118 v. Horton 357, 490 New York, L. E. & W. R. R. Co. ». v. Louisville, &e. Co. 402, 1247 Commonwealth 584 v. Newport & C. Bridge Co. 430 v. Estill 41, 256 | Newport Ave., In re 1190 v. Pennsylvania 1011 | Newport News v. Woodward 142, 167 New York L. Ins. Co. v. Cravens 40, | Newsom v. Cocke 373 254, 1000 v. Greenwood 756 v. Dodge 824, 830 | Newson v. Earnheart 1370 v. Dunlevy 112 v. Galveston 1335 v. English 811 v. Rainier 102 v. Hardison 340 | Newton v. Belger 419 v. Mobley ao v. Commissioners 561, 747, 795 v. Pike 255 | ». Hamden 1035 New York Municipal R. Corp. ». v. Newell 1380, 1382 Weber 1152 | Ng Fung Ho v. White 721 New York N. H. & H. R. Co. v. New Niagara Falls & W. Ry. Co., Matter York 1272| of 1134, 1141 New York & N. J. Tel. Co. ». Mayor | Niagara Ins. Co. v. Cornell 842 of Bound Brook 181 | Niccolls v. Rugg 963 New York ez rel. New York, &c. R. Nichol 2. Mayor of Nashville 237 Co. v. Miller 1012] Nicholls v. Barrick 1360 New York State R. Co. v. Shuler 835 | | Nichols, Matter of 589, 812 New York Tel. Co. v. State 1221 v. Ann Arbor, &c. R. Co. 1164 New York Tenement House v. Moe- v. Bertram 566 schen 802 v. Bd. of Election Com’rs 1374 Newark v. Watson 1322 v. Bridgeport 1056, 1071, Newark & S. O. Co. ». Hunt 742 1120, 1215, 1219 Newark Savings Bank ». Forman 587 v. Daily Reporter Co. 889 Newbern v. McCann 429 v. Duluth 440 v. National Bank 475 ». Fountain 452 Newberry v. Carpenter 611 2. Griffin 212 ». Trowbridge 109, 110 v. Guy 8838 v. United States 1361 v. Mudgett 1392 Newburyport Inst. for Savings ». v. School Directors 966 Brookline 1202 v - Somerset, &c. Co.LIST OF CASES CITED CXXl Page Page Nicholson v. N. Y. &c. R. R. Co. Norris v. Clymer 147, 198, 201 1167, 1215 | ». Crocker 790 Nickel v. Cole 37 | ». Doniphan 757, 759 Nickerson v. Boston 1298 | ». Hall 1106 ». Howard 713 v. Harris 75 Nicolai ». Md. Agric., &c. Ass’n. 204 ». Lincoln 805 Nicolay v. St. Clair 474 | v. Newton 722 Nicoll ». N. Y., &c. Tel. Co 1182 | ». Norris 849 Nicolls v. Ingersoll 714| ~—v. Vt. Cent. R. R. Go. ‘1115, 1154 Niehaus v. Cooke 1195 | ». Waco 1064 Nielsen, Petitioner 725 | v. Wrenshall 588 Nightingale, Petitioner 423 Norristown v. Fitzpatrick 452 ». Bridges 745 | Norristown, &c. Co. v. Burket 867 Nightingale’s Case 1335 | North ». McMahon 1380 Nikta v. Western Union Tel. Co. 178| North and S. Ala. R. R. Co. ». Niles Water Works v. Mayor 460 Morris 817 Nims v. Troy 529 | North & W. B. Ry. Co. ». Swank 1220 Nishimura Ekiu »v. United States | North Ala. Tract Co. v. Hays 153 180, 182 | North American Cold Storage Co. ». Nix v. Caldwell 911 Chicago 412 Nixon »v. Reid 93, 1296 | North American Lumber Co. v. Blaine Noble ». Davison 584 | 1095 ». English 1332 | North Bloomfield G. M. Co. v. Keyser v. Mitchell 254 871 v. Richmond 518 North Carolina v. Darnell 807 ». Union Riv. Logging R. Co. 827 | v. Temple 23 Noble & W. v. Mitchell 1333 | North Carolina, &c. Co. v. Carolina Noble State Bank v. Haskell 1226] Central, &c. Co. 1117 Nobles v. Georgia 41 | North Carolina Coal Co. v. G. C. Coal Noel v. Ewing 211, 752) & Iron Co. 137 v. People 363, 813, 1331 | North Carolina Pub. Serv. Co. ». v. State 125,746| Southern Power Co. 21, 1124 Noell v. Commonwealth 667, 668 | North Chicago C. R. Co. ». Lake Nofire v. United States 1357 View 1326 Nolan v. Jones 1336 | North Coast Power Co. v. Public Service v. State 654, 688| Commission 3 Nolen v. Riechman 845, 1337 | North Hempstead v. Hempstead Nolin v. Franklin 1329 | 411, 463 Nomaque v. People 667 | North Missouri R. R. Co. v. Lackland Nomination of Public Officers, Re 1353 1146 Noonan, In re 838 v. Gott 1146 v. Albany 529 ». Maguire 66, 573 v. Orton 895 | North Pa. R. Co. v Inland Tract Co. 1180 v. State 75 | North Yarmouth ». Skillings 503 Norberg v. Hagna 520, 531 Northe ut v. Church 118 Norfolk v. Ellis 1057 | Northeastern Neb. Ry. Co. 2. Frazier v. Perry Co. 1088 1215 ». Youn 1049 | Northern Bank ». Porter Township 475 Norfolk & W. R. Co. ». Commonwealth Northern Central R. Co. v. Baltimore 1281 1190 ». Pennsylvania 254, 367, 1009 ». Jackson 1019 v. Simmons 182 vy. Maryland 44 v. Sims 1000 ». Oldenburg 1160 Norfolk, &c. Turnpike Co. v. Virginia 38} Northern Counties Invt. Trust 2. Norman 2. Curry 305] Sears 94, 268 v. Heist 738, 750, 785 | Northern Indiana R. R. Co. v. Connelly v. Ky. Bd. of Managers 1027 1055, 1056, 1072, 1074, 1101 v. Sioux City 529 | Northern Liberties v. Gas Co. 426, 428 Norris, Ex parte 1357 ». St. John’s Church 1057 ». Abingdon Academy 348, 566 | Northern Ohio Traction &c. Co. 2. ». Atkinson 601 Ohio 565 v. Beyea 754, 772 | Northern Pac. & M. Ry. Co. v. Forbis ; 1214 v. BostonCXXl Page Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Clark 1107 ». Colburn 33 v. McAdow 1144 v. Minnesota 44, 437, 577 ». Morton Co. 1085 v. Myers 993 v. North American Tel. Co. 1158, 1211 v. North Dakota 34 v. Pierce County 316, 1082 v. Pub. Serv. Comm. 1276 v. Seattle 1053, 1072, 1073, 1074, 1100 v. Slaght 109 v. Traill Co. 993 Northern R. R. v. Concord R. R. 118 Northern Securities Co. v. United States 25 Northrop v. Waterbury 1140 Northwest Auto Co. v. Hurlburt 573, 1050, 1104 Northwest Steel Co. v. Sch. Dist 518 Northwestern &c. Bank v. State 25 Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park 138, 577, 1239 Northwestern Laundry Co. v. Des Moines 1231 Northwestern Lumber Co. v. Chehalis Co. Northwestern Mfg. Co. v. Wayne Cir. Judge 311, 1323 Northwestern Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Lewis. &c. County 253, 373, 1062 v. Wisconsin 1006 Northwestern National Ins. Co. »v. 1016 Fishback 740, 845, 1329, 1333 Northwestern Nat’l L. Ins. Co. ». Riggs 40 Northwestern Tel. Exch. Co. ». Anderson 565 Northwestern Tel. & E. Co. v. Min- neapolis 1229 Norton, Jn re 1356 v. Doherty 109 v. Ladd 984 v. Pettibone 777 v. Randolph 121 v. Shelby Co. 40, 238, 383, 1356 Norwalk v. New Canaan 1043 Norwalk St. Ry. Co’s Appeal 146, 181 Norwich v. Co. Com’rs 348, 372 v. Johnson 318 Norwich Gas Light Co. v. Norwich City Gas Co. 813 Norwich Water Com’rs v. Palmer 1145 | Norwood v. Cobb 59, 60 | v. Baker 1053, 1075 | Notestine v. Rogers 727 | Nougues v. Douglass 165 | Nowata Co. Gas Co. v. Henry Oil Co. 397 Noyes »v. Butler 58 N. Ward Go. v. Boston 1208 LIST OF CASES CITED Page | Nugent v. State 689 Nunn 2. State 730 Nunnemacher 2. State 143, 146 Nutt v. Knut 285 Nutting v. Massachusetts 1234 O Oakes v. State 889, 920 Oakes Mfg. Co. v. New York 525 Oakland v. Carpentier 435 v. Pacific Coast Lumber, &c. Co. 1221 | Oakland Co. Road Com’rs v. Pittmans 1120 Oakland Pav. Co. ». Tompkins 136 Oakley v. Aspinwall 152, 874 Oatman »v. Bond 593 Oates v. National Bank 43 O’Bannon »v. Louisville, &c. Co. 765, 1245 O’Berry »v. State 676 Oborn »v. State 676, 689 O’Brian ». Commonwealth 688 O’Brien v. Ash 750 v. Baltimore Belt Ry. Co. 1177 v. Chicago City R. Co. 773 v. Commonwealth 664 v. Derry 516 v. Flint 755 v. Krenz 594, 596 v. People 669 2. Philadelphia 1153 v. Rockingham Co. 509, 516 v. Shea 1282 v. St. Paul 1153 v. State 650 v. Young 560 Ocampo v. Lim 863 v. United States 638, 803 | Ocean Beach Ass'n 2. Brinley 122 | Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. »v. | Stranahan 229 | O’Connell v. People 641 | O’Conner v. Warner 191 O’Connor v. Fond Du Lac 215, 357, 490 2. Memphis 598 v. Pittsburg 438, 1152, 1220 v. Potter 628 v. Public Service Commission 396 . St. Louis Transit Co. 259, 295, 298, 300, 302, 306 v. Sill 911 | O'Dea v. O’Dea 60, 856 Odiorne v. Rand 158 Odlin ». Woodruff 1105 O’Donaghue v. McGovern 910 O'Donnell v. Bailey 571 v. White 1153 O'Ferrell ». Colby 1406 v. Simplot 753 Officer »v. Young 774, 811 O’Flynn v. State 669LIST OF CASES CITED Page Ogden 2. Blackledge 105, 188, 191 ». City of Madison 415, 672 v. New York 1156 v. Riley 887 135, 543, 583, 591, 600, 601, 147, 374, 585, 587, 766, 767 | v. Saunders v. Strong 125, 128 Ogden City v. Armstrong 1100, | 1102, 1106 Ogletree v. Woodward 1058 O’Grady v. Barnhisel 1103 O’Hara v. Carpenter 485 O’Hara v. Stack 961 | O’Hare v. Chicago, &e. Co. 1145 | O’ Haver v. Montgomery 417 Ohio v. Thomas 1324 | Ohio &c. R. R. Co. v. Ridge 467 Ohio & Lexington R. R. Co. v. Apple- gate 77 | Ohio & M.R.R.Co. v. Lackey 205, | 771, 1245 ». McClelland 578, 1225, 1244, 1247, 1249 | v. Taber 1254 Ohio Drilling Co. v. State Ind. Comm. 1388 Ohio Life Ins. & Tr. Co. v. Debolt Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana 827, 1319, 1320 Ohio Tax Cases 21, 1085 Ohio Valley Co. v. Ben Avon Borough 1301 1334 1103 Oilure Mfg. Co. v. Pidduck-Ross Co. O’Kane v. Treat 263, 1068, 1097, O’ Keefe v. Somerville 1334 O’ Kelly v. Athens Manuf. Co. 757 v. Williams 753 Oklahoma v. Texas 114, 1288 Oklahoma City v. Reed 520 Oklahoma Light & Power Co. v. Cor- poration Comm. 297, 299 Oklahoma R. Co. v. Severns Paving Co. 1073 Olander v. Hallowell 48 Olcott v. Supervisors 44 Old Colony Ry. Co. v. Framingham Water Co. Old Colony Trust Co. ». Omaha Old Dominion Copper Min., &c. Co. v. Bigelow 58, 113 1203 40 Old Wayne Mut. Life Ass’nv. Flynn 60 v. McDonough 60, 128 Oldham, In re 670 Oldknow v. Wainwright 1350, 1401 O’Leary, Ex parte 1325 v. Cook Co. 307 ». Mankato 530 Oleson v. Green Bay, &c.R.R.Co. 247, 318, 373 Olive v. Ingram 1353 v. State 1291 Oliver v. McClure 192, 586 248, 571 | Cxxiii Page Oliver v. Steiglitz 251 v. Union, &e. Co. 1207 vy. Washington Mills 822, 1016, 1018, 1041 v. Worcester 525, 526, 527, 997 Oliver Co. v. Louisville Realty Co. 116, 121, 122 Oliver Lee & Co.’s Bank, Matter of 89, 96, 137 Oliver’s Estate 773 Oliveros v. Henderson 943, 957 Olmstead v. Camp 1136, 1139, 1141, 1143 Olmsted v. Miller 891 ». Prop’rs Morris Aqueduct 1132, 1146 v. Olmsted 58, 61 Olney v. Harvey 394 v. Wharf 1199 Olsen v. Smith 841 Olson v. Cash 776 ». Phillips 1106 338, 340 425, 430 v. Ross Olympia v. Mann v. Olmstead 529 v. Schaller 1216 Omaha &c. Co. v. Rogers 1170 v. Standen 1199, 1200 Omaha Bell Ry. Co. v. McDermott 1214 Omaha Horse Ry. Co. v. Cable Tram- way Co. 1200 Omaha St. R. Co. v. Boesen 148 Omaha Water Co. v. Omaha 44, 565, 569, 1242, 1243 O’Maley v. Freeport 426 O’ Neil v. American Fire Ins. Co. 226 v. Craig 370 v. Demers 1259 ». Providence Amusement Co. 361, 1230, 1344 v. Vermont 67, 68, 693 O’Neill v. San Pedro, &c. R. Co. 1220 ». Leamer 1298 Onslow v. Horne 916 Ontario Knitting Co. v. New York 1146 Opel v. Shoup 26, 27 Opelousas, &c. R. Co. 2. St. Landry Cotton Oil Co. 1221 Opinion of Justices (209 Ala.) 100 (30 Conn.) 1364 (28 Fla.) 100 (79 Ky.) 100 (16 Me.) 211 (18 Me.) 160, 164 (38 Me.) 1384, 1402 (62 Me.) 484 (68 Me.) 356, 1033, 1034 (62 Me.) 1361 (64 Me.) 1406 (103 Me.) 175, 1235, 1319, 1320, 1321CXX1V Opinion of Justices Orange v. Resnick Opocensky v. So. Omaha LIST OF CASES CITED Page | Page (107 Me.) 1387 | Orange, &c. R. R. Co. v. Alexandria 1094 (118 Me.) 87 | Orband v. Kalamazoo Tel. Co. 889 (124 Me.) Ordelheide v. Modern Brotherhood of 1318, 1319 America 338 (7 Mass.) 1371 | Order of St. Benedict v. Steinhauser 962 (15 Mass.) 1371 | Ordineal v. Barry 283 (18 Pick.) 83 | Oregon v. Jennings 407, 474 (1 Met.) Oregon & C. R. Co. v. Jackson County 258, 1367 1013 (6 Cush.) 85 v. Portland 826 (14 Gray) 15 | Oregon Ry. Co. v. Portland 1192 (99 Mass.) 321 | Oregon Ry. & Nav. Co. v. Oregon, &e. (115 Mass.) 1353 Co. 12) (117 Mass.) 140, | Oregon Short Line R. Co. v. Davidson 561, 1408 1249 (138 Mass.) 214 | O’Reiley v. Kankakee Co. 1080 (148 Mass.) 100 | O’Reilley v. Kingston 1074 (155 Mass.) 1028 | Oren v. Abbott 1351 (160 Mass.) v. Pingree 480 227, 246 | Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs 20, 50, (163 Mass.) 834 | 735, 805, 840 (166 Mass.) 216 | Oriental Bank »v. Freeze 757, 794 (175 Mass.) 1027 | Orkney, In re 1052 (190 Mass.) Orkney Street, Re 1057 1026, 1028} Orlando »v. Giles 774, 787, 792 (201 Mass.) 54, 56 v. Pragg 434 (204 Mass.) 1148 | Orleans Parish v. Brown 836, 1324 (208 Mass.) 1334 | Orman »v. State 701 (209 Mass.) 835, v. Van Ardsell 762 1338, 1339 | Orme v. Salt River Valley Water Users (211 Mass.) 810 Ass’n 776 (226 Mass.) 1334 | Ormichund v. Barker 984 (231 Mass.) 1036 | Ormond v. Martin 800 234 Mass.) 1315 | Ormsby v. Douglass 896 (237 Mass.) 1362 | O’Rourk »v. Sioux Falls 447 239 Mass.) Orphan Asylum’s Appeal 1052, 1074 225, 227 | Orphan House v. Lawrence 112 (240 Mass.) 1354 | Orr v. Bennett 114 (247 Mass.) 1237 v. Gilman 146, 996, 1044 (251 Mass.) 1285 ?. Quimby 1202 (49 Mo.) 100,104 | v. Skofield 888 (4 N. H.) 199 | Orrick v. Akers 1327 (41 N. H.) Ortman »v. Greenman 338 674, 865 | Orton v. Noonan 784 (44 N. #H.) 1374 | Ortwein v. Commonwealth 640 (46 N. H.) 320, | Osage, &c. Co. v. Morgan Co. 477 321, 1364 | Osborn v. Bk. of United States 32, 138 (62 N. H.) 278 v. Hart 745, 1126 (63 N. H.) 1406 v. Jaines 764 (66 N. H.) 270 v. Nicholson 585, 592 (68N.H.) 1407] v. Shreveport 1315 (63 N. H.) 264 | v. State 676 (77 N. BH.) 1051 ». United States 218 (80 N. H.) v. United States Bank 991 1364, 1374 | Osborne v. Adams Co. 1033 (81 N. H.) v. Auburn Tel. Co. 1182 1003, 1285 ». Florida 1006 (3 R. I.) 192 | v. Humphrey 571 (19 R. I.) 1374 v. Lindstrom 764, 765 (34 R. I.) 497 v. Mobile 1008 (37 Vt.) 1364 v. Val O'Farrell Detective Agency 60 454 | Osburn 2. Staley 277, 278, 1157 280, 291, 348, 375LIST OF Page Oscanyan ». Winchester R. Arms Co. 251, 283 | Osgood v. Jones 1407 Oshkosh Waterworks Co. v. Oshkosh 555, 592 Oskaloosa Water Co. v. Bd. of Equal- ization 1062 Otis v. Oregon S. S. Co. 36 v. Parker 1236 Otis & Gassman »v. Parker 830 Otken v. Lamkin 386 Otoe Co. v. Baldwin 305 Ott ». Murphy 943 Ottawa v. Carey 475 ». National Bank 474 v. People 305 v. Spencer 1284 Ottawa, &c. Co. v. Larson 1170 Ottumwa v. Schwab 1250 | v. Zekind 431 | Ouachita Packet Co. ». Aiken 1016 Ouachita Power Co. v. Donaghey 158 Ould v. Richmond 391, 1045, 1050 Our House »v. State 1255, 1256 Over v. Hildebrand 910 v. Schiffling 897 Overby v. Gordon 63 Overshiner v. State 16 Overstreet ». Brown 846 Oviatt v. Pond 1255, 1256 Owen, Ex parte 52, 54 v. Jordan 859 v. Milhoan 1390 v. State 730 Owens, Ex parte 136, 351, 1373, 1377 ». Henry 844 ». Lancaster 449 v. State 665, 1413 v. Way 627 | Owensboro v. Commonwealth 1088 v. Hickman 1369 v. Sweeney 1052, 1071, 1074 Owensboro & N. R. Co. v. Todd 227 Owensboro Nat'l] Bk. v. Owensboro 991, 1085 Owings v. Norwood’s Lessee 25, 34 Ownbey v. Morgan 51, 823 | Owners of Ground v. Mayor, &c. of 1133 | Albany Owners of the James Gray v. Owners of the John Frazer 1274 | Owsley v. New York Cent. Tr. Co. 61 Oxford Bank v. Love 578 Oxnard Beet Sugar Co. v. State Ozan Lumber Co. v. Union Co. Nat'l Bk. Ozark Coal Co. v. Pa. Anthracite R. 1124, 1127, 1140 14 Co. Ozark Pipe Line Corp. v. Monier 1013 P Pace v. Alabama 20 ov. Burgess 989 CASES CITED Page Pace v. Wight 596 Pacheco v. Beck 1408 Pacific Bridge Co. v. Kirkham 1073 Pacific Coast Coal Co. v. Dist. No. 10, United Mine Workers of America 810 Pacific Coast Ry. Co. v. Porter 1219 Pacific Coast Savings Society v. City and County of San Francisco 1061 Pacific Exp. Co. v. Seibert 1007 Pacific Gas, &c. Co. v. Police Ct. 38 Pacific Ins. Co. v. Soule 989 Pacific Junction v. Dyer 1017 Pacific Live Stock Co. v. Lewis 4l Pacific Milling, &c. Co. v. Portland 302 Pacific Postal Tel. Cable Co. ». Irvine 1182 Pacific R. R. Co. v. Chrystal 1215, 1216 ». Governor 223, 27 v. Maguire 89, 571 Pacific Tel., &c. Co. ». Eshleman 1116 Pack »v. Barton 287 Packard v. Banton 1286 v. Ryder 1109 Packard Motor Car Co. v. Mil- waukee El. R. & L. Co. 1180 Packet Co. v. Catlettsburg 1016 v. Keokuk 1016 v. St. Louis 1016 v. Sickles 110 Packwood v. Kittitas Co. 1372 Pacquette v. Pickness 800 Paddell v. New York 1085 Padmore v. Lawrence 923, 928 Paducah v. Ragsdale 742 Page, Ex parte 696 Re 356, 986, 1039,1044 v. Allen 1369 »v. Commonwealth 653 ». Fazackerly 426, 1335 v. Fowler 110 v. Hardin 830 v. Kuykendall 1388 v. Mathew’s Adm’r 193 v. Merwin 890 ». N. Y. Realty Co. 1338 Paine v. Calor, &c. Co. 1187 v. Wright 40 Palairet’s Appeal 584 Palatine Ins. Co. v. Northern Pac. R. Co. 277, 280, 313 Palestine v. Siler 446 Palfrey v. Boston 991 1033 | Palmer, Jn re 728 ». Com’rs of Cuyahoga Co. 79, 80, 1294 ». Concord 892, 939, 945 v. Fitts 505, 508 ». Laberee 584 ». Larchmont El. Co. 448, 1175, 1184, 1185 ». Lawrence 105; 116 ». McCormick 854 CXXVCXXV1 Page | 1107 | Palmer v. Napoleon i 220 v. io v. Palmer 251, 252, 838 v. Smith 959 v. State 676, 1261 v. Stumph 1057, 1074, 1094 v. Way 1284 Palmer Co. v. Ferrill 1217 Palmore v. State 867 Pana v. Bowler 407, 474, 855 Panama R. Co. v. Johnson 754 Pangborn v. Westlake 119 v. Young 278 Pankey v. Ortiz 866 Paragould v. Lawson 763 Pardee v. Aldridge 112 Paris v. Mason 1121 v. Norway Water Co. 1062 Paris Mountain Water Co. v. Green- ville 1112 Parish v. Eager 761 Parish of Bellport v. Tooker 961 Park v. Detroit Free Press Co. 811, 948 Park Commissioners v. Common Council of Detroit 92, 498 Parke v. Bradley 228, 232 v. City of Seattle 1153 Parker, Ex parte 275, 276 v». Bidwell 714 v. Commonwealth 225, 242, 244 v. Cutler Mill Dam Co. 1108, 1287 v. Hett 1355 v. Hubbard 316 v. Kane 39 v. Mcqueen 940 v. Met. R. R. Co. 1243, 1296, 1304 v. Milldam Co. 1108, 1297 v. Ormsby 30 v. Orr 1376 v. Parker 60 v. Phetteplace 40 v. Redfield 571 | v. Savage 128, 590, 757 | v. School District 386 | v. Sexton 1103 | v. Shannohouse 755 v. Small 752 v. State 653, 982, 1356, 1401 v. Sunbury & Erie R. R. Co. 818 Parkersburg v. Brown 468, 475, 1033 Parkinson v. Brandenberg 326 v. State 128, 305, 326, 330 Parkland v. Gains 1069 Parks, Ex parte 723 v. Boston 1213, 1214 v. Goodwin 158 v. State 295, 296, 298, 811 v. West 159 Parks Bros. & Co. v. Nez Perce Co. 1007 | Parkside Cemetery Ass’n v. Cleve- land, &c. Traction Co. 818 Parmelee ». Lawrence 36, 757, Gunes v, Thompson 194 LIST OF CASES CITED Page Parmiter v. Coupland 956 Parr, Ex parte 424 Parrish ». Commonwealth 631 Parrott, In re 26 Parsons v. Age-Herald Pub. Co. 943 v. Bangor 1365 v. Casey 588 v. Clark 1108 v. Dist. of Columbia 1047, 1075 v. Goshen 461, 463 v. Howe 1122 v. Russell 735 v. Waterville 1179 Parsons’ Business College v. City of Kalamazoo 1090 Parsons Min. Co. v. McClure 28 Parsons Oil Co. v. Boyett 252 Partlow v. State 119 Parvin v. Wimberg 1360 Pasadena v. Railroad Commission 125, 130, 452, 518 Pasadena School Dist. v. Hollywood City Sch. Dist. 509 v. Pasadena 509 Paschal v. Perez 586 Paschall v. Whitsett 754 Pasco v. Pacific Coast Casualty Co. 114 Passaic v. Patterson Bill Posting, &c. Co. 1318, 1319 Passavant v. United States 844 Passenger Cases 1232, 1279 Pastone v. Pennsylvania 836 Patapsco Guano Co. v. Bd. of Agr. o N. C Patterson, Ex parte 403, 431, f 1272 Patch v. Covington 446 Patcock v. State 23 Patrick v. Commonwealth 629 v. State 1324 Patsone v. Pennsylvania 730, 813, 1313 Pattangall ». Mooers 920 Patten v. Florence 1406 v. People 631 | Patten Paper Co., Ltd. ». Kaukauna Water Power Co. 1151 670 Matter of 790 v. Bark Endora 1236 v. Barlow 103, 1369 v. Collier 87% v. Commonwealth 1232 v. Kentucky 14 v. Mississippi, &c. Boom Co. 113% v. Nutter 713 v. Philbrook 756, 775, 789 v. Society, &c. 393, 1094 v. State 663, 692 v. Wilkinson 891 v. Woolmon 93 Pattison v. Jones 895 v. Yuba 125, 237 Patton v. Coates 1389 v. Stephens 460 Patty v. Golgan 468LIST OF CASES CITED CXXVIi Page Page Paul, In re 311 | Peck v. Schenectady Ry. Co. 1176, 1179 v. Davis 121 v. Weddell 227, 1387 v. Detroit 867, 1148} Peck & Co. v. Lowe 1022 v. Hazelton 48 | Peckham v. Henkel 724 v. Virginia 50, 253, 1000 | Pecot v. Police Jury 137 ». Washington 423 | Pecue v. West 925 Paulas v. United States 616 | Peddicord v. Baltimore, &c. Co. 1164 Paulsen v. Portland 122, 844, | Pedigo v. Grimes 1366 1049, 1065, 1073 | Pedrick v. Bailey 417, 426 Pause v. Atlanta 1221 | v. Raleigh, &c. R. Co. 818 Pavesich v. N. E. L. Ins. Co. 922 | Peebles v. County Com’rs 1406 Pavish v. Meyers 610 | Peel v. Atlanta 1197, 1200 Pawhuska v. Pawhuska Oil & Gas Peel Splint Coal Co. v. State 833 Co. 391, 395, 506 | Peerce v. Carskadon 539, 541 Pawling v. Bird’s Executors 58, 850 v. Kitzmiller 593 v. Wilson 856 | Peers v. Bd. of Education 386 Pawloski ». Hess 372, 1226, 1285, 1286 | Peet ». Grand Forks 776 Paxson v. Sweet 1284 v. Mills 299, 300 Paxton v. State 659, 660 | Peete v. Morgan 1016 Paxton & H. Irr. C. & L. Co. ». | Peik v. Chicago, &c. R. R. Co. 1304 Farmer’s & M. Irr. & L. Co. | Peirce v. Bangor 1207 1130, 1144} v. Palmer 707 Payne v. Graham 331 | Pekin v. Brereton 529, 1156 v. Hodgson 1409 | v. McMahon 447 ». Kansas, &c. Ry. Co. 1123 v. Reynolds 470 v. Providence Gas Co. 355, 1109 v. Winkel 529, 1156 v. Treadwell 505, 782 | Pembina Mining Co. »v. Pennsylvania 50 v. United States 222 | Pemble »v. Clifford 76 Payson v. Payson 849 | Pendleton v. Russell 30 Payton v. Payton 857 | Pendleton Co. v. Amy 472, 474 Peabody v. Boston 1176 | Penhallow v. Doane’s Adm’r 9 v. Burch 1398 | Penick v. Floyd Willis Cotton Co. 1025 v. Russel 149 | v. Foster 404, 1089 ». School Committee 270 | Peninsular Casualty Co. v. State 1332 v. United States 1158 | Peninsular Ind. Ins. Co. v. State 803 Peak v. Swindle 91 | Peninsular Lead &c. Works v. Union Pearce v. Atwood 75, 871} Oil & P. Co. 146, 590 v. Olney 59 | Peninsular R. Co. v. Howard 874 ». Patton 763 | Penn v. Tollison 89 Pearsall ». Eaton County Super- | Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Austin 556 visors 1149 | Penn’s Case 678 v. Kenan 763 | Pennebaker v. Williams 284, 286 v. Great No. R. Co. 749, | Pennell v. Wilmington 530 1241, 1268| Pennie v. Reis 581 Pearse v. Morrice 155 | Penniman’s Case 361, 589 Pearson, Ex parte 859 Pennington v. Hare 1403 v. Distill. Co. 318, 1256 | Pennoyer v. McConnaughy 24 v. Portland 806 | v. Neff 739, 741, 842, 855 ». School Dist. No. 8 158 | Pennsylvania v. West Virginia 21, 187, ». Wimbish 672, 696 1001, 1005, 1006, 1269 v. Yewdall 739, 842 | Pennsylvania v. Wheeling Co. 189 Peart v. Meeker 1111 | Pennsylvania Coal Co. ». Mahan Pease v. Chicago 487 1161, 1320 v. Peck 39 | Pennsylvania Company ». Common- Peavey v. Robbins 1395 wealth 1085 Peay v0. Duncan 109 ». James 424 v. Little Rock 1075 v. McCann 766 Peck v. Batavia 521 ». Pittsburgh 502 v. Freeholders of Essex 871 | Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Pub. Ser. ». Holcombe 1357 Comm. 1003 ». Jenness 28 | Pennsylvania Hall, In re 499 v. Lockwood 432| Pennsylvania Hospital ». Phila- v. Louisville, &c. Co. 1111 delphia 578, 1112CXXVill Pennsylvania Philadelphia Pennsylvania Tel. Co., In re Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Angé », Baltimore, &c. Co. », Canal Com’rs », Commonwealth ». Duncan Mut. L. Ins. 1125, 1140, 1144 LIST OF CASES CITED Page | Gonz: 1007 | 1161 566 SIS 1008 567 v v v v 2. Ewing 302, 341, 346 ». Heister 1216, 1219 v. Hughes 35 v. Jersey City 417, 424 v. Lewis 1244 v. Lippincott 1197, 1200 v. Marchant 1197, 1200 v. Miller 567, 1303 v. Montgomery Co., &c. 1179 o. N. Y. &c. Co. 1157 v. Philadelphia Co. 1249 v. Riblet 346, 1244, 1249 v. Sagamore Coal Co. 1130 v. Towers 1310 Pennsylvania S. V. Ry. Co. v. Cleary 1214 ?. Walsh 1197, 1200 Pennywit v. Foote 60 Penrice v. Wallis 1216 Penrose v. Erie Canal Co. 587, 592 Pensacola Electric Co. v. Soderlind 339 Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Wester Co. Peonage Charge, In re People v. Acerno s v. Alameda 491 v. Albany, &. R. R. Co. 1410 v. Albertson 92, 140, 346, 355, 532, 562 v. Allen 150, 158, 304, 386, 687, 857 v. Altenberg 1409 v. Ambach 639 v. Amer. Bell. Tel. Co. 1018 ». Amos 113 v. Anderson 1380 v. Arensberg 1328 | v. Armour & Co. 1336 | v. Armstrong 426 v. Assessors 1025 v. Atwell 724 v. Auditor-General 581, 794 v. Auerbach 667 v. Austin 1025 ». Badjack 543 v. Baker 60, 706, 856 v. Baltimore, &c. R. R. Co. 1293 v. Bangs 1357 v. Banvard 563 | Barker Barnes . Barrett - Batchellor 37ers ny Ue: 1133 608 640 . Adams 617, 641, 642, 767, 864 656, 688, 702 | 1401 688 356, 496, 497, 505, 525, 1036 People v. Bates ». Batkin 51 . Beakes Dairy Co. 6 ge @ ao @ 2a @ a eeecece ee eeeeecec eeeeec Page 1380, 1388, 1397 229, 232, 334, 340, 341, 570, 1330, 1332 . Beam 1408 », Beck 641, 766, 767 ». Bellet 1282 », Bennett 864 ». Bennett Medical College 573 . Berkeley 1350 ». Bermingham 639 . Berrien Cire. Judge 831 ». Bertlini 640 ». Best 223 ». Biesecker 1323 . Bills 659 . Bingham 40 », Bircham 219 . Bissell 222, 223 ». Blake 140 ). Blakely 701 ». Blanding 326 ». Blevins 700 . Blodgett 124, 142, 376, 1364 ». Board of Assessors 991, 1088 . Board of Co. Canvassers 1360, 1408 ». Board of Com’rs 673 . Board of Education 386, 808 ». Board of Mgrs., &c. 694 . Board, &c. of Nankin 1408 ». Board of Registration 1408 )». Board of Supervisors 394, 501, 1085 ». Bond 723 ». Bootman 1341 ». Boston, &c. R. R. Co. 1304 ». Botkin 684 ». Bowen 322 ». Bowman 531 ». Bradley 166 . Brady 16, 55, 225, 637, 816 ». Bragle 667 ). Braun 298 ). Bray $23 ». Brazee 230 . Breen 650 ). Brenham 408, 1372 v, Bridges 1341 . Briggs 298, 309, 361 . Brighton 1120 ». Brislin 305 ». Brock 676 ». Brooklyn 495 ). Brooklyn Bd. of Assessors 989 ). Brooklyn Common Council 1353 ». Broom 1401 . Brown 220, 1350 ». Budd 1301, 1350 ). Buffalo Cold Storage Co. 1336 ). Buffalo Fish Co. 1341 ». Bull 140, 363, 561, 562 ». Bunker 369People v. Burns 0. ss eesseeaeeees sessseasdTeaas eesesese eeeeescecesnc ess S3ceS eeeo 3 v seseee LIST OF CASES CITED Page 128, 1395 Burt 278, 629 . Butler 553, 1406 . Butler St. Foundry, &c. Co. 651, 814 Butte 236 Cairo, &c. R. Co. 1107 Calder 569, 570 Campbell 161, 288, 682 Canaday 1363 Canal Appraisers 1193 Cannon 663 Canty A497 Capp 214 . Carlin 641 . Carpenter 773 . Carrigue 1352 Casa Co. 1324 Case 129, 615, 629, 632 | . Casey 641 | . Cassels 725 . Castree 615, 618, 620, 621, 632 | Charles Schweinler Press 347, 1347 | Chaigles 610, 615, 628, 632 | Chase 186 | Chicago 295, 1025 | . Chicago, &e. Co. 743 | . Chicago &c. R. Co. 1230, 1298 | Chicago Election Com’rs 1371 Chicago Gas Tr. Co. 814, 1306 Chicago Sanitary Dist. 1114 Chicago W. D. Ry. Co. 412 Chung Ah Chue 665 Chye 629 Cicott 117, 869, 1374, 1377, 1378, 1379, 1382, 1384, 1387, 1398, 1399, 1403, 1410, 1413, 1414, 1417 . Cipperly 1322 . Clair 1341 . Clapp 1049 . Clark 327, 552, 688, 1323 . Clean St. Co. 442 . Clute 1402 . Cochrane 838 . Coleman 48, 119, 554 Coler 407, 506, 581, 830 Colman 1091 Collins 225, 243 Com’rs 579, 992 Com’rs of Highways 266, 278, 279, 290 Com’r of Taxes 573, 993 Common Council of Chicago 497 Common Council of Detroit 489, 497, 501, 526, 532, 1032, 1036 . Compagnie &c. 999, 1232, 1279 . Comstock 680 . Cona 616 . Conley 964 . Conners 705 . Conrow 684 People ». Conway CXX1X Page 616 v. Cook 155, 686, 688, 1259, 1260, 1263, 1264, 1380, 1381, 1383, 1384, 1385, 1388, 1397, 1406, 1409, 1413 v. Coolidge 815, 1229, 1332 v. Corning 679 v. Cosmo 674 v. Co. Bd. of Cass 471 v. Courtney 658 v. Cover 1412 v. Cowles 171, 408, 1372 v. Croswell 683 v. Cullom 222 v. Cummings 220, 694, 864 v. Curry 309, 326 v. Curtis 56, 690 v. Cutler 660 v. Czarnecki 1380 v. Daniell 181 v. Davenport 573, 1094 v. Dawell 59, 60, 61, 850 v. Dayton 147 v. Dean 816 v. De Cesare 629 v. Denahy 305, 311 v. Dennett 1022 v. Detroit, &c. Co. 1150 v. Detroit, &c. Ferry Co. 114 v. Detroit United Ry. 418 v. Dettenthaler 293 v. Devine 664 v. Devlin 321 v. Dill 679 v. Dillon 687 v. Doe 158, 1025 v. Donohue 52 v. Draper 107, 177, 350, 351, 381, 390, 393, 1225 v. Dubois 562 v. Dudley 304 v. Dunn 235, 279, 673 v. Dunne 223 v. Durston 695 ». Eastman 892, 1061 v. Eaton 1181 v. Eddy 1098 v. Effelberg 619, 628 v. Eggleston 641 v. Election Com’rs 314 v. Elerding 1347 v. Elk River, &c. Co. 1114 v. Elliott 651, 696 v. Emmerson 125, 130, 148, 146 v. Ewer 1342 v. Fairman 726 v. Fancher 171 ». Father Mathew Society 302 v. Felker 696 ». Ferguson 1382, 1383 o. Finkelstein 1336 v. Finley 641 v, Finnigan 682<° s People v. Fire Ass’n eeseseosoeseed 8 sesssses LIST OF Page 1044 v. Fisher 351 v. Fishman 689 v. Flagg 382, 491, 1036, 1039 v. Flanagan 562, 631 v. Fleming 237 v. Flemming 621 v. Ford 706 v. Ft. Wayne &c. Co. 442 v. Freeman 214 v. Freer 942 v. Frisbie 192, 810 v. Gadway 311 v. Gallagher 353, 355, 807, 1255 v. Garbutt 641, 684 ». Gardner 250, 662, 690 v. Gass 570 v. Gastro 679 ». Gates 997 v. Gay 49 v. Gerald 702, 707 v. German &c. Church 963 v. Gibbs 418 v. Gies 142, 872 v. Gilbert 766 v. Gilhooley 665 v. Gillson 1328 v. Goddard 1353 v. Goodrich 219 2. Goodwin 688, 690, 1409 ». Gordon 803, 1396 v. Governor 222 223 too5 ®. Graham 158, 1398 v. Gray 472 ». Green (od; 002,001; 1202, 1204, 1352 ». Griffin 1323 ». Griswold 51, 347, 379, 823, 1342 v. Grover 392, 393 v. Gualey 665 v. Guiton 1323 v. Hall 270, 360, 582 ». Ham Long 690 v. Hamill 765 2. Hanifan 1352 v. Hanker 411 | . Hanrahan 293, 414, 416, 1328 Harding 144, 690 Hardisson 691 Harris 442 Hartman 647, 648 Hartwell 158, 408, 1372, 1401 | Haskell 562 Hatch 269, 323, 705 | Hauck 311 . Haug 298, 695, 808, 1250, 1267 Hawes 498, 499 Hawker 545 Hawkins 1273 Hawley 1255 Hayden 1202, 1203, 1204 Hayes 539, 546, 690, 725 Henderson 1043 CASES CITED Page People v. Hendrick 728 v. Hennessy 654, 1152 v. Henshaw 263 ». Hesterberg 1341 ». Higgins 1384, 1397, 1399, 1405, 1409, 1413, 1414 v. Hill 15, 360, 842 v. Hilliard 1406 v. Hobson 790 ». Hoffman 181, 1352, 1369 v. Hoge 166, 167 v. Holden 1368, 1381, 1414 v. Holley 158 »v. Holly 459, 460 v. Horan 6 v. Horwitz 426 ». Howard 255, 319, 664 v. Howe 295, 299, 300 v. Howland 140, 562 v. Hubbard 611 v. Hulbert 1328 v. Hupp 346 v. Hurlbut 96, 279, 301, 305, 356, 388, 390, 489, 505, 525 ». Hutchins 689 v. Hutchinson 159 v. Hylan 1356 v. Illinois Cent. R. Co. 1043 v. Imlay 48 v. Ingersoll 564, 583 v. Inman 1104 v. Institution, &e. 296 ». Jackson & Mich. Plank Rd. Co. 566, 598, 1240, 1241 v. Jenkins 1283, 1297 v. Jenness 984 ». Jonas 646 ». Jones 663, 1406, 1409 v. Joyce 290, 308 v. Kalnin 616 v. Kane 1357 v. Keeler 276 v. Keenan 705 v. Kelly 652, 726 v. Kelsey 390 v. Kennedy 227, 239, 245, 1385 v. Kenney 338, 362 v. Kent Co. Canvassers 1389 v. Kerm 690 v. Kerr 1149, 1168, 1170, 1177 v. Kerrigan 647 v. Kier 423 v. Kilduff 1375, 1406 v. Kings County Dev. Co. 765 v. Kipley 214, 216 v. Klinck Packing Co. 229, 931, 232, 25D ». Kniskern 1207 v. Knopka 619, 628 v. Koeler 859 v. Kopplekom 1369, 1370 v. Kowalski 669 v. LaFetra 340, 1239LIST OF CASES CITED CXXXi Page People v. Lake Co. 165 v. Lake Shore, &c. R. Co. 1150, 1242 v. Lamb 684 v. Lambert 654, 663 v. Lambier 20 ». Laundy 616 ». Lawrence 160, 164, 293, 360, 379, 457, 461 v. Leonard 1253 v. Le Roy 657 v. Le Tempt 1054, 1080 v. Letoile 647 v. Levee Dist. No. 6 260 v. Lippincott 561 ». Liscomb 723 v. Livingston 1414 v. Lloyd 906, 907 v. Lochner 30/6, 379, 1111, 1235 v. Loeffler 214 ». Londoner 1375, 1409 v. Long 691 v. Loomis 85, 86, 287, 1381 v. Lothrop 532 v. Lott 853 ». Love 335, 663, 666, 767 v. Lowney 667 v. Lynch 775, 791 v. Lyng 1017, 1252 v. McAdams 966 | v. Macauley 706 ». McBride 245, 260, 295, 297, 298, 301, 305, 308, 309, 315, 339, 393 ». MeCaddon 865 v. McCallum 301, 305, 315 v. McCann 304, 308, 641 v. McCormick 140, 1350 eeeceece eeeesedcse esoees ee v. . McCreery . McCullough 178, 214, 216, 324 491, 1098 . McDonald 544 . MeDonnell 640 . McElroy 128, 278, 287, 288 . McFadden 244 . McGlade 684 . McGowan 686, 692 . McKay 667 . McKinney 141, 562 - McMahon 651, 655, 657 - McManus 1381, 1387, 1397, 1398 . McNealy 688 . McNulty 551 . McRoberts 166, 1121 - Mahaney 270, 277, 278, 294, 297, 314, 315, 350, 505, 1101 . Majors 685 - Manhattan Co. 566 . Manko 616 Marquis 1256 Martin bps222 olds 707, 708, 1372 . Martinez 640 Marx 1323 Marxhausen 317, 615 Page People v. Mason 1260, 1264 v. Matteson 1380, 1387, 1409, 1412 v. Max 333 v. Mayen 66, 617, 622, 632 v. Maynard 152, 410, 532, 1394 v. Mayor, &c. of Brooklyn 498, eeeedec0unuee e@eeeed 988, 1055, 1056, 1070, 1079, 1080, 1201 . Mayor, &c. of Chicago 356, 479, 496, 505, 788 ». Mayor, &c. of N. Y. OT el LL 1113, 1241, 1296 . Mayworm 1382 ». Medical Society of Erie 433 ». Mellen 302 ». Mendelson 685, 692 ». Mercein UPA . Merrill 249 ». Metz 128, 802, 833 . Miller 640 ». Mills 87 . Miner 687 ». Mitchell 769, 788 ». Molliter 1402 . Mondon 657 . Monroe 220 . Monroe Ct. 687 », Monterey Fish Products Co. 230, 362, 376, 807, 1341 . Mooney 691 ». Moore 638 . Morrell 124, 178 . Morris 357, 395, 502, 524, 563 ». Mortimer 553 ». Morton 222, 223 ». Mosher 128, 214, 216 ». Most 884 . Moudon 652 . Mulholland 426 . Murphy 664, 707 . Murray 370, 648 . Musezynski 622 ». Musk 621 . Myers 802 ». Nally 237 . Naring 1133 ». Neff 689 . Newton 443 N. Y. Carbonic Acid Gas Co. 1320 . N. Y. Catholic Protectory 609 ». N. Y. Central R. R. Co. 4, 125, 131, 142, 354, 355, 379 v. Nichols 1103 v. Noelke 556, 662 v. Nostrand 1352 v. O’Brien 309, 662, 744 v. Olmstead 553 v. Olson 214 v. O'Neil 1269, 1340 v. Ormsby 668 ». Osborne 178, 214, 630 v. Otis : 582CXXXli Page | People v. Owen 662 | v. Parker 102, 690 v. Pease 1376, 1377, 1378, 1384, 1387, 1396, 1406, 1415, 1416, 1417 | v. Peck 158 | v. Peete 674 | v. People’s Gas Light, &c. Co. 298, 301, 303, 305, 373 | v. Phelps 552 v. Phillips 655, 1404 | v. Phippin 48, 811, 1343 | v. Phyfe 1346 | v. Pierce 392 v. Pine 682 | v. Pinkerton 54 | ». Pinkney 394 v. Pitt 1072 | v. Plank Road Co. 775 | v. Platt 319, 558 | v. Porter 654, 981, 1372 | v. Potrero, &c. R. R. Co. 80 v. Potter 141 | v. Powell 676 v. Power 393, 491, 499, 564 | v. Pray 337 v. Prestidge 653 v. Price 299 v. Priest 1110 v. Prison Warden 802 | v. Pritchard 315 | v. Purdy 125, 129, 142, 160, 321 | v. Quan Gin Gow 653 | v. Quigg 304, 318 | v. Railroad Co. 869 v. Ranney 654 | v. Raymond 140, 562 | v. Reardon 988, 1060, 1408 | v. Reed 1297 | v. Refining Co. 814 | v. Rensselaer, &c. R. R. Co. 339 v. Rice 1401, 1408 v. Ringe 376, 1331 v. Riordan 246 v. Riverside 390 v. Roberts 168, 214, 216, 256, 384, 828, 989, 1008 v. Robertson 1408, 1410, 1412, 1414 v. Rochester 304, 366 ov. Roe 12838, 1297 v. Rogers 654, 1327 v. Roper 573, 793 v. Rose 373, 767 v. Roth 232 v. Rotter 1323 ». Routh 705 v. Royal 679 v. Rucker 178, 334, 351 v. Ruggles 977, 979 v. Rumsey 166 v. Runkel 158 v. Russell 14, 420, 1046, 1337 v. Ruthenberg 907 v. Sackett 1414 People v. Salomon eee s v v LIST OF CASES CITED Page 237, 244, 532, 1025, 1395 v. Sanderson 1353 v. Saxton 1381, 1382 v. Schermerhorn 155 v. Schiellein 1408 v. Schintzius 1323 v. Schryver 641 v. Scott 653 v. Seaman 1381, 1382, 1383, 1409 v. Searle 667 v. Setunsky 48 v. Seymour 779 v. Shaw 1360 v. Shields 691 v. Sholem 1314 v. Siman 727 v. Simon 186 v. Simpson 666 v. Simpson, &c. Co. 1323 v. Sligh 665 v. Smith 644, 659, 689, 706, 707, 847, 1145, 1146, 1271, 1347 v. Soloman 300 v. Sours 86 v. Spain 649 v. Spicer 773 v. Springwells 532, 1038 v. Squire 579, 1241 v. Stakes 748 v. Stapleton 942 v. Starne 161, 164, 278, 288 v. State Bd. of Canvassers 271 v. State Bd. of Tax Com’rs 561, 742, 1064, 1100 v. State Prison 222 v. Steelik 907 v. Stephens 685 v. Stevens 415 v. Steward 216 v. Stewart 220, 658, 682 v. Stickle 219 v. Stout 225, 240 v. Strassheim 298, 299, 1361 v. Strollo 632 v. Stryker 578 v. Stuart 185 v. Suffolk Co. 1390, 1413 v. Sullivan 486, 631, 707 v. Supervisors 398, 472, 1408 v. Supervisors, &c. 191, 479, 789 v. Supervisors of Chenango 160, 277, 792, 1060 . Supervisors of Columbia 481, 771 ». Supervisors of LaSalle 105, 148 ». Supervisors of New York 184, 189, 498 ». Supervisor of Onondaga 320, 456 )». Supervisors of Orange 178, 348, 355, 378 Supervisors of Saginaw 1029 . Supervisors of San Francisco 491 . Swafford 647LIST OF CASES CITED CXXXiii Page People v. Wisconsin, &c. R.Co. 774, 792 »v. Witte 230, 1270, 1330, 1343 v. Woman’s Home M. Soc. 50 v. Woodbury 1064 v. Woodward 616 v. Worden 29 v. Worthington 1086 v. Wright 129, 148, 178, 314 v. Yates 222 v. Yonkers 843 v. Yosemite Lumber Co. 835, 986 v. Young 180, 516 v. Zerillo 730 ». Zimmerman 841 People ex rel. Killeen v. Angle 129 Doyle v. Atwell 392, 427, 725, 726 Page People v. Tallman 1207 v. Tappan 505 v. Tazewell 470 v. Terry 1357 v. Thatcher 1379 v. Thomas 651, 661 v. Thomasovich 1263 v. Thompson 619, 632 v. Thurber 48, 1046 ». Thyers 682 v. Tisdale 1382, 1384 v. Tompkins 158 v. Tool 669 v. Townsend 1062 v. Township Board of Salem 464, 813, 1027, 1029, 1038, 1138 v. Toynbee 355 v. Truckee Lumber Co. 1321, 1341 v. Trudell 1259 ». Trustees of Schools 1088 v. Turner 609, 764, 770 2. Turpin 1366, 1379, 1417 v. Tyler 658, 659, 688 v. Tweed 393 v. United States 993 ». Van Alstine 701 v. Van Cleve 1406, 1409, 1413 ». Van Eps 853 ». Van Horne 644 v. Van Kampen 1323 v. Van Pelt 1340 v. Van Slyck 1406 v. Van Valkenburg 471 v. Van Wormer 650 v. Videto 682 v. Wagner 428 v. Waite 1400 »v. Waldo 859 v. Wallace 161, 263 v. Walsh 502 v. Wands 298 v. Wansker 660 v. Warden 1330 v. Warden, &c. 725, 1342 v. Warden City Prison 690 v. Way 1408, 1413 v. Webb 680, 686, 691 vo. Weiner 422, 1228, 1235, 1328 v. Weissenbach 727 v. Weller 187 v. Wemple 1009, 1012 v. Western Union Tel. Co. 25. 333, 335 v. Whartenby 1061 v. White 690 v. Whitlock 304 v. Whitman 1353 v. Whyler 1084 ». Wicka 1261, 1259 v. Wm. Henning Co. 305, 335 v. Williams 67, 249 v. Willsea 304 v. Wilson 668, 942, 1283, 1398 Bradford v. Barbiere 1324 Sheldon v. Bd. of Appeals 1315 Eckerson v. Bd. of Education 762 Wing v. Bd. of Education 973 Simon v. Bradley 393 First Nat. Bank v. Brady 232 Gottschalk v. Brown 53 Dilzco v. Calder 1319 Friend v. Chicago 401, 402, 1318, 1325 O’Connell v. Chicago, &e. R. Co. 598 Foote v. Clark 552, 789 Healy v. Clean Sts. Co. 434 Rodgers v. Coler 493, 1306, 1307 Thomsen v. Com’r of Correction 1259, 1260, 1263, 1264 Potts v. Continental Beneficial Ass’n 255 Schurz v. Cook 573, 574 Thompson v. First Cong. Church 1090 Sullivan v. Flynn 219 Att’y General v. Gerke 26 Agnew v. Graham 1397, 1399 Woods v. Green 1405 Corscadden v. Howe 300 Baldwin v. Jessamine Withers Home 1090, 1094 Comstock v. Judge of Supr. Ct. 319 Hubert v. Kaiser 726 Robert Simpson Co. ». Kempner 627 McCallister ». Keokuk, &c. Bridge Co. 1064 Tweed v. Lisecomb 693, 697 Plotke v. Lower 773 Hayne v. McCormick 214 Farrington v. Mensching Carson v. Muldoon 6 1090, 1091 Lewisohn v. O’Brien 649 Booth v. Opel 598 Deneen v. People’s Gaslight, &c. Co. 262 N. Y. C. R. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm. 1276 Wogan v. Rafferty 337 Barmore v. Robertson 234, 1228, 1234, 1270, 1271, 1272 First National Bank v. Russel 111 Gamber v. Sholem 225, 229CXXXiV LIST People ex rel. Deneen v. Simon Attorney-General v. Sperry & H. Co. Clement v. Spruance New York Central R. C Tax Comm. Clay v. Stuart McManus v. Thompson Shand v. Tighe Stafford v. Travis Tyroler v. Warden, &c. Duryea v. Wilber Appel v. Zimmerman People’s Loan, &c., Bank v. Garling- ton People’s Loan & H. Ass’n ov. Keith Peoria v. Calhoun 41 v. Kidder Peoria, &c. R. R. Co. v. Peoria, &e. Oo v. Duggan Peppers, Ex parte Percy, In re Perdue v. Burnett Pere Marquette R. Co. Gypsum Co. Pereles v. Gross Pereless ». Watertown Perkins, Ex parte v. Burlington v. Carraway ». Coffin v. Cook County oO. 771, 806 U. 11 S. 2 v. 1375 295 309, 346 v. Corbin v. Grey v. Heert v. Lawrence ». Lewis v. Milford v. Mitchell v. Perkins v. St. Louis, &c. Co. v. State Perley v. Mason Perovich v. United States Perret v. New Orleans Times Perrin v. New London Perrine v. Chesapeake & Del. Canal Co. v. Farr v. Serrell Perry v. Britt-Carson Shoe Co. v. Keene v. Lewis v. McLendon v. Man v. Pernet v. Reynolds v. State v. Washburn v. Wheeler v. Whitaker ~I OF CASES CITED v. State ‘ 1056, 5, ), ’ i) Page 744 570 300, 1030 561 702 93 454 479 487 923 851 836 705 601 653 | 948 | 470 | 818 859 109 | 371 | 350 | 109 727 887 | 714 1366, 1396 723 | 986 964 1407 Page Perry’s Case 543, 984 Perry County v. Conway County 398 v. Selma 268 Person v. Watts 1021 Persons v. Jones 112 Peru v. French 518 Pervear v. Commonwealth 68, 1267 Pesterfield v. Vickers 413 Peterman v. Huling 330 Peters v. Duluth 744 v. Fergus Falls 451 v. Iron Mountain R. R. Co. 1239, 1248 v. State 1340 Petersburg v. Metzker 413 Petersilea v. Stone 1357 Peterson v. Berry 599 v. Cleaver 894, 911, 959 v. Culpepper 1352 v. Kittredge 1104 v. Lothrop 112 418, 424, 688 911, 931 v. State ». Steenerson v. Widula ote v. Wilmington 453 Petit v. Minnesota 842, 1282 Petri v. F. E. Creelman Lumber Co. 317, 318 Pettibone v. La Crosse &c. Co. 1209 v. Nichols 54, 56, 721 Pettigrew v. Evansville 1115 v. Washington Co. 874 Pettine, Ex parte 27 Pettingell »v. Chelsea 452 Pettit, In re 773 Pettsburg’s Petition 393 Petty v. Tooker 962 Pettyjohn v. Scott 1390 Pevear v. Lynn 529 Pfahler, Ex parte 238 Pfeifer v. Passaic Valley Sewerage Com’rs 1187 -feiffer v. Bd. of Education 971 Pfeifly ». Henry 889 Pflouz v. Foster 1409 Pharis v. Dice 595 Pharr v. Cabarrus Co. 1205 Phelps’ Appeal 755 v. Goldthwaite 1387 v. Meade 1107 v. Phelps 371 v. Piper 1360 v. Racey 1340 v. Schroder 1406, 1407 Phenix Ins. Co. v. Burdett 50 v. Hart 837 v. Pollard 789 Philadelphia ». Commonwealth 853 v. Diekson 1209 v. Dyer 1209 ». Fox 357, 393, 394, 525 v. Miller 1048 v. Rule 1075Page | Philadelphia v. Scott 1226, 1297, 1313 | v. Smith 519 v. Tyron 1082, 1284 | Philadelphia &c. Co. v. Yeiser 1220 | Philadelphia &c. Co.’s Appeal 1117 | Philadelphia, &c. R. R. Co. ». Bowers 1304 | v. Quigley 912 | v. Schubert 1236 Philadelphia Ass’n, &c. v. Wood 1068 Philadelphia Ball Club »v. Philadel- phia 1221 Philadelphia Clay Co. v. York Clay ) 1110 Co. Philadelphia Fire Ass’n v. New LIST OF CASES CITED York 20, 36, 1000 v. Wells 113 Philadelphia & Gray’s Ferry Co.’s Appeal 575 Philadelphia, M. &. S. S. R. Co. Petition of 1125 Philadelphia S. S. Co. v. Pennsyl- vania 1005, 1006, 1009 Philadelphia & Trenton R. R. Co. 1164 Philippine Sugar Estates Develop- ment Co. v. U.S. 1201 Philips v. Bury 524 Philleo v. Hiles 1040 | Phillips, In re 714 v. Allen 433 v. Arkansas Valley Interurban R. Co. 1179 v. Bell 608 vo. Berick 110 v. Bridge Co. 305, 310 v. Browne 274 v. Connellsville, &c. Co. 1117 v. Council Bluffs 440 ». Covington, &c. Co. 305 v. Dunkirk, &c. Co. 1119 v. Gallagher 1358 v. People 416 v. Postal Tel. Cable Co. 67 v. Raleigh Co. Bd. of Can- vassers 1380 v. South Park Com’rs 1206 v. State 670 v. Stevens Point 1049 ». Watson 1127 v. Wickham 1080 v. Wiley 890 | Phillips Academy v. Andover 1081 Philpotts v. Blasdel 109 Phinizy v. Augusta 529 Phinney v. Phinney 596 Phipps v. State 1297 v. West Md. R. R. Co. 1164 Phoedovins, Ex parte 1341 Phoenix F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Ten- nessee 573, 574 Phoenix Fire Assurance Co. 2. Montgomery Fire Dept. 314, 1027 Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Allen 705 CXXXV Page Phoenix Ins. Co. ». Commonwealth 48 v. Welch 228, 1044 Phoenix Printing Co. v. Robertson 890 Piatt v. People 1397 Pickard v. Pullman, &ce. Co. 1006 Pickett v. Boyd v. Russell 755, 774 1371, 1400, 1403 v. School District 386 Piek v. Chicago, &c. R. R. Co. 1243 Pierce v. Bartrum 1270 v. Beck 387 v. Boston, &c. Corp. 1188 v. Commonwealth 668 v. Dillingham 1324 v. Drew 1133, 1181, 1182 »v. Getchell 1396 v. Hubbard 864 v. Kimball 757, 1343 v. Maryland 1323 v. New Bedford 446 v. New Orleans Bldg. Co. 408 v. Pierce 384 v. Society of Sisters 826, 827 v. Somerset Ry. 46, 369 v. State 682 v. Union Dist. 808 v. United States 652, 904 Pierce Oil Corp. v. Phoenix Refining Co: 368 Pierpont v. Crouch 312 Pierson v. Minnehaha Co. 295 v. State 75, 692 Pike ». Magoun 147, 1396 v. Middleton 457, 461 v. State 1041 v. State Bd. of Land Com’rs 346 Pike County v. Barnes 237 ». Rowland 408 Pikeville v. Riddle 529 Pilkey v. Gleason 330 Pim v. Nicholson 163, 288, 312, 338 Pindel v. Holgate 109 Pine v. Commonwealth 642 Pine Grove v. Talcott 1048 Pingree v. Dix 1044 Pingrey ». Washburn 282, 1240, 1241 Pinney v. Providence L. & Inv. Co. 839 Pioneer Irrigation Dist. ». Bradley 295, 298, 299, 301, 308 Piper v. Chappell 422 v. Ekern 1121, 1125, 1161, 1225, 1319 ». Madison 518, 525 v. Moulton 388 Piqua v. Morris 525 v. Zimmerlin 1250 Piqua Bank v. Knopp Piquet, Appellant Pirkey Brothers v. Commonwealth 982, 1282 248, 566, 571 81 Piscataqua Bridge v. N. H. Bridge 571, 575, 796, 1115CXXXV1 Page 51 121, 122 First National Pistole v. State Pitcock v. State Pitkin County ». Ban 868 Pitman v. Bump 762 p. Drabelle 179 v. Flint 125 v. State 709 Pitney v. Washington 1333 Pittman v. Byars 728 Pittock v. O'Neill 679, 933, 935, 955 Pittsburg v. Coursin 155 v. Grier 518 v. Scott 1124, 1126 v. Sterrett Subdistrict Sch. 509, 1058, 1095 Pittsburgh, &c. Co. v. Benwood Iron Jorks 1128 v. Point Bridge Co. 1117 Pittsburgh, &c. R. R. Co. ». Brown 1325 »v. Chappell 360, 1246 ». Chicago 445 | v. Hartford City 424 v. Hixon 111 v. Home Ins. Co. 1246 »v. Muncie, &c. Co. 706 v. Railroad Comm. 1276 v. Reich 1217 v. Sanitary Dist. 1298 Vis. Wika. KR. h. Co: 1246 v. State 346, 1003 ov. Taber 1073 Pittsburgh & S. Coal Co. v. Bates 1009 v. Louisiana 1274 Pittsburg, C., C. & St. L. R. Co. ». Backus 1012, 1014 v. Bd. of Public Works 742 v. Crown Point 441 v. Long Island L. & T. Co. 33 v. Montgomery 339 v. State 1059 Pittsburg Hydro-El. Co. v. Liston 1144 Pixley v. Clark 1226 Pizano v. State 688 Plaistridge, Ex parte 670 Planer v. Standard Oil Co. 225 Plante, Ex parte 724 Planters’ Bank v. Black 191 v. Sharp 248, 566 Planters’ Ins. Co. v. Tennessee 574 Platner v. Best 110 Platt v. Hitchcock Co. 475 Platt Bros. & Co. ». Waterbury 1151 Platteville v. Bell 423 Plattsmouth Lodge v. Cass County 1090 Pleasant v. State 682 Pleasant Tp. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. 43 Pleasants v. Rohrer 762 Pledger v. Hathcock 890 Plessy v. Ferguson Pleuler v. State Plimpton v. Somerset Plitt v. Cox 20, 829, 1299 579, 1046 498, 673 1177, 1195 LIST OF CASES CITED Page Plumb »v. Christie 1250 v. Sawyer 754, 772 Plumber »v. Coler 993, 1020 Plumley v. Massachusetts 1278, 1323 Plummer v. Chesapeake, &c. R. Co. 257 v. Plummer 147 v. Wells 859 v. Yost 140 Plunkard »v. State 20 Plurality Elections, In re 1401 Plymouth v. Painter 1357 Pocantico Water Works Co. »v. Bird 1130 Pocopson Road 1127 Poertner v. Russell 119 Pogue v. Rowe 600 Poindexter v. Greenhow 24, 558, 582 v. May 1244 Polglaise ». Commonwealth 1283 Police Com’rs v. Louisville 1225 v. Wagner 623 Police Jury v. Britton 472 v. Shreveport 394, 395 Polinsky v. People 426 Polizzotto, Ex parte 1259 Polk v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. 894, 895 v. State 641 Polk’s Lessee v. Wendal 39 Polk Co. Savings Bank »v. State 1025 Pollak v. Milam 1106 Pollard ». Commonwealth 1261 v. Hagan 75 v. Lyon 887, 889 v. State 641 Pollard’s Lessee ». Hagan 1110, 1112 Polling Lists, In re 1369 Pollock v. Farmers’ L. & T. Co. 997 v. Hastings 888 v. McClurken 804 Pollock’s Adm’r v. Louisville 452 Pomeroy v. Chicago &c. Co. 1165 Pomfrey v. Saratoga 529 Pond v. Irwin 122 v. Negus 158 v. People 630, 631 Ponder v. Graham 211 Pontiac v. Carter 438, 1152 Pontiac Imp. Co. ». Cleveland Met. Park Dist. 1110, 1119, 1122, 1123, 1125, 1149 Pool ». Boston 460 Poon v. Miller 27 Pooth »v. State 1235 Pope v. Macon 700, 800 v. Phifer 80, 305 v. State 664 v. Williams 140 Popham ». Pickburn 949 Port Huron v. Jenkinson 417, 1284 Port Huron, &c. Co. v. Callanan 1208 v. Voorheis 1215 Port Richmond, &c. Ferry Co. v. Hudson Co. 1307LIST Page Port Wardens v. The Ward 1274 Porte v. Gamewell 469 Porter v. Botkins 891 v. Hill 109 ». International Bridge Co. 1190 v. Mariner 587 v. Porter 723 v. Ritch 826 v. Sabin 30 v. Sawyer 1391 v. State 863 v. Vinzant 392 Portland v. Bangor 18, 837 v. Cook 757 v. Portland Bit. Paving & I. Co. 1052 v. Portland Railway, &c. Co. 1045 ». Schmidt 379, 432 v. Water Co. 1092 v. Yick 277, 279 Portland &e. Co. v. Portland 1170 Portland & R. R. R. Co. v. Deering 1214, 1242 Portland Bank v. Apthorp 988 Portland Fish Co. v. Benson 232 Portland H. Benev. Soc. v. Kelly 1091 Portland-Oregon City R. Co. 2. Penney 1219 Portneuf Irr. Co. v. Budge 1207 Portwood v. Montgomery 398, 499 Posnett v. Marble 920 Post v. Boston 529 v. Suffolk Light &c. Co. 1184, 1186 ». Supervisors 40, 279, 290 Postal Tel. & Cable Co. ». Adams 1000, 1011 ». Baltimore 1007 ». Charleston 367, 1007 v. Eaton 1182 v. Newport 112 v. Peyton 1196 ». Richmond 1007 ». Umstadter 1269 Postmaster-General v. Early 191 Potlatch Lumber Co. v. Peterson 1140, 1291 Potomac Power Co. v. Burchell 1121 Potter, In re 773 v. Beale 611 v. Campbell 1406, 1414 v. Hiscox 857 Potts v. Atlanta 1134 v». Commonwealth 640 ». Penn. S. V. R. R. Co. 1215 Poughkeepsie Bridge Co., Matter of 1111 Poultry Producers’ Union »v. Wil- liams 863 Poundstone »v. Baldwin 1133 Powell, Ex parte 55, 218 v. Bd. of Education 385 v. Brandon 75 v, Hays 324 OF CASES CITED CXXXVil Page Powell ». Holman 1414 v. Houston, &c. R. Co. 1218 v. Jackson Com. Council 297 v. King 317 v. Pennsylvania 1323 v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co. 402 v. Sims 75 v. Spackman 1364 v. State 105, 191, 690, 1259, 1261 Power v. Athens 821 v. Bowdle 1106 v. Helena 1054, 1071 v. Kitching 765 ». Nordstrom 413 »v. Williams 675 Powers v. Baun 1380 v. Bears 1204, 1205 v. Bergen 203, 204 »v. Commonwealth 1355 v. Detroit 44 v. Dougherty Co. 237 v. Dubois 891, 921 ». Harten 1379, 1403, 1418 ». Skinner 283 v. Wright 789 Powers’s Appeal 1120, 1207, 1208 Poyer v. Des Planes 1325 Poynter v. Phelps 962 Prall v. Burckhartt 121, 122, 555 Prankard v. Cooley 531 Pratley v. State 1405, 1407 121, 794, 795, 1125, 1136, 1143 Pratt v. Brown v. Donovan 853 ». Hawley 51 ». Jones 766 v. Paris Gaslight & C. Co. 29 v. People 1393 v. Pioneer Press Co. 889, 940 v. Tefft 752 Pratt Institute v. New York 317, 572 Pray v. Northern Liberties 1094 Prenevost v. Delorme 1381 Prentice v. McKay 1115 v. Weston 1103 Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co. 187, 188 »v. Commonwealth 275 Prentiss v. Dittmer 340 v. Boston 529 v. Holbrook 109 Presbyterian Bd. of Relief v. Fisher 1094 Presbyterian Ministers’ Fund 2. Thomas 251, 252 Presbyterian Society of Waterloo ». Auburn & Rochester R. R. Co. 1164 Prescott v. City of Chicago 305 ». Duncan 137 v. State 66, 609 ». Tousey 924 ». Trustees, &c. 2a President &c. D. & H. C. Co. ». Whitehall 1192CXXXViil LIST OF Page President, &c. of Mendota v. Thomp- CASES CITED Page Providence Bank ». Billings 573, 818, 988 son 531 | Providence Coal Co. v. Prov. & W. Presidio Co. v. Noel-Young Bond, R. R. Co. 1304 &c. Co. 474 | Providence Savings Institute 2. Presser v. Illinois 18, 66, 361 Skating Rink 588 ssley v. United States 621, 628 | Providence-Washington Ins. Co. ». Homes O 110 Presson v. Presson 849 wens 1 ston, Re 833, 1332 | Provident Bank, &c. Co. v. Saxon 599 Pre ; A Ds ». Boston 846 | Provident Inst. v. Jersey City 843 ». Browder 39 | Provident Institute for Savings ». Prettyman v. Supervisors, &c. 237, 479 Malone 556, 831 Prewitt v. Security L. Ins. Co. 253 | Provident L. & T. Co. v. Hammond 295 Price v. Baker 1402 | Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek 28, 254 v. Goldsboro Tp. 521 801, 802, 822, 823, 835, 898, 1236 v. Hopkin 328, 764, 765 | Pryor, Re 393 v. Illinois 40 v. Downey 206, 792 v. Lush 1360 | Prytania St. Market Co. ». New v. Mott 136 Orleans 1086 v. New Jersey R. R. Co. 1246 | Public Service Com., In re 1145 v. State 686, 688, 692 Dy IN; Yn Cont he Go: 1275 Prichard’s Case 27 v. New York Rys. Co. 797 Priestly ». Watkins 582 v. Pavilion Natural Gas Co. 395 Priewe v. Wisconsin State L. & Imp. v. St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co. 826, 1151 Co. 232 Prime v. Yonkers 451 | Public Service Co. v. Corboy 22, 24 Primm ». Belleville 1041, 1093 v. Recktenwald 232, 297, 299, Prince v. Crocker 1027 301, 305, 308 v. Skillin 1406, 1407, 1409, 1412 | Pueblo v. Lukens 1007 ». State 641 v. Robinson 1057, 1073 Princeton v. Gieske 450 v. Strait 1153 Pritchard v. Citizens’ Bank 754 | Pueblo Co. Com’rs v. Smith 391 v. Magoun 1027 | Puget Sound Traction, &c. Co. ». Pritchett v. State 688| Grassmeyer 413 Pritz, Ex parte 260 | Pugh v. Des Moines 424 Privett v. Bickford 1351, 1402 | v. Pugh 340, 364 7 v. United States 112 | Puitt 2. Com’rs Gaston Co. 808, 1042 octor v. Andover 1126 | Pulaski Ave., In re 1205 Producers’ Transp. Co. v. Railroad | Pulford v. Fire Dept. 289 Comm. 397 | Pullen v. Raleigh 405 Prohibitory Amendment Cases 724, | Pullman Co. v. Kansas 1013 1254, 1350 | ». Richardson 1006, 1011, 1014 Proprietors, &e. v. Laboree 764 | Pullman Palace C. Co. ». Hayward 1013 v. Nashua & Lowell R. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania 40,1012, 1015, 1060 1115, 1187, 1216, 1218 v. State 1046 propeerers Mt. Auburn Cem. »v. Pumpelly v. The Green Bay &c. ambridge 571 Co. 1151, 1158 Prospect Park, &c. R. R. Co. v. Will- Purcell v. Lexington 1095 lamson 1192 v. Sowler 919 Prosser 2. Wapello Co. 1158 | Purdy v. Erie R. Co. 1310 v. Warner 856 | Purity Extract, &c. Co. v. Lynch Protestant Episcopal Church 0. 1254, 1266 Prioleau ; 1090 | Purkey v. Mabey 620 Prother v. Lexington 519 | Purvear ». Commonwealth 66 Protho v, Orr 164 | Puryear v. State 669 Protzman »v. Indianapolis, &c. Co. Pusey, In re 60 1156, 1170 | Pusey & Jones Co. v. Love 588 Prout v. Berry 193 | Putnal v. State 665 Providence v. Clapp 529 | Putnam v. Browne 922 Providence &c. Co., In re 1192 v. Conner 62 Providence, &e. R. R. Co. ». Nor- v. Johnson 1365, 1366 wich, &c. R. R. Co. ; 1192 | Putney Bros. Co. ». Milwaukee Providence & W. Ry. Co., Petitioner Light, &c. Co. 1210 1123 bo Pyle v. Woods 1207LIST OF CASES CITED CXXX1X Page Page Q Railroad Co. v. Blake 1147 v. Brown 842 Quackenbush v. Danks 589, 772 v. Com’rs of Clinton County v. Wisconsin, &c. R. R. Co. 1245 225, 237, 1018 Quaker Realty Co. v. Labasse 122 v. Dayton 1190 Quapaw v. Holden 530 v. Ferris 1201 Quarles, Re 823 | v. Foreman 1217 v. State 1282 | v. Fuller 1239, 1243, 1303 Quarrier, Ex parte 540 | v. Georgia 41, 68 Queen v. Justices of Hertfordshire 874 | v. Gregory 305 v. Justices of London 874 | v. Hambleton 1178 ». Justices of Suffolk 874 | v. Harris 1287 v. Lefroy 943 | vy. Jackson 1018 Queenan »v. Territory 674 v. Lake 1119 Quick v. Whitewater Township 129 | v. McClure 89 Quigley v. Pennsylvania &c. Co. 1200 | v. Maine 569 v. Phelps 1409, 1413 v. Mississippi 22, 32 Quill v. Indianapolis 473 v. Nat'l Bk. 43 Quillian ». Henderson-Mizell Merc. ». Peniston 996 Co. 109, 113 v. Richmond 747, 1149 Quimby »v. Vermont Cent. R. R. v. Rock 36 Co. 1194 | v. Shurmeir 1177 Quincy »v. Jackson 470, 1100 | v. Tennessee 22, 592 ». Jones 438, 440 | v. Trimble 59 Quinn »v. Hester 1032 | »v. Warren Co. 158 ». Markoe 1375, 1398 v». Whitneck 304 v. Review Pub. Co. 889, 920, 943 | Railroad Commission v. Chicago, v. State 139, 1363 &c. R. Co. 1275 Quitmann v. Jelks & McLeod 463 ». Louisville, &c. R. Co. 1310 Quong Ham Wah Co. »v. Ind. Acc. Railroad Commission Cases 19, Comm. 48, 51, 249, 383 | 1303, 1304 Quong Wing »v. Kirkendall 825 | Railroad Commissioners v. Portland, Quong Woo, In re 436, 1342, 1347| &c. R. Co. 232, 233, 569 Railway Co. v. Lawrence 1178 R v. Philadelphia 572 v. Prescott 993 Rabb »v. Supervisors 766 v. Renwick 1157 Rabel v. Seattle 1095 | Rainey v. United States 269 Racine v. Hunt 1413 | Raisor v. Chicago, &c. R. Co. 257 Racine Iron Co. v. McCommons 1007 | Raleigh v. Peace 1074, 1076 Radcliff v. Mayor, &c. of Brook- | _». Sorrell 1335 lyn 1149 | Raleigh, &c. R. R. Co. v. Davis 1143 Radcliff’s Ex’rs v. Brooklyn, 438, 1152 ». Mecklenburg Mfg. Co. 1218 Radcliffe v. Eden 506 v. Reid 571 Rader v. Beaver Dist. Bd. of Educa- Ralph »v. State 662, 663, 664 tion 1403 | Ralston v. Lothain 755 v. Road District 394 | Rambo v. Larrabee 191 v. Union 309 | Rameriz, Hx parte 66, 730, Radford v. Myers 113 845, 1225, 1327 Radice v. New York 1236 | Ramsey, Ex parte 721 Radnor Twp. v. Bell 1283 ». Harrison 957 Rae v. Flint 404 v. Hicks 962, 963, 964 Rafferty v. Central Traction Co. 1179 v. People 833, 1307 Ragatz v. Dubuque 1204 | Ramsey County v. Robert P. Lewis Ragio v. State 309, 311 Co. 1072, 1076, 1077 Rahrer, Re 384, 1252 Rand v. Commonwealth 552, 553, 554 Rahway v. Munday 598 | Randall v. Eastern R. Co. 446, 450 Rail v. Potts 1396 ». Gross 742 Rail, &c. Coal Co. ». Yaple 339 ». Hot Springs 530 Railroad v. Hicks 348 ». Jacksonville &c. Co. 1168 ». Pounds 774 ». Kehlor 867 Railroad Co. ». Alabama 22, 592 v. Kreiger 599 v. Bearss 1380 ». Patch 735, 760exl LIST O F CASES CITED Pave Page Randall v. Winona Coal Co. 569 | Reagan v. Farmers’ L. & T. Co. 24, Randolph, Ex parte 339 | 1308, 1310 v. Bd. of Freeholders 1217 v. Mercantile Tr. Co. 1307 ». Good 139, 539 v. United States 648 v. Springfield 261, 376, | Real Silk Hosiery Mills v. Portland 1008 520, 765, 802 | Reams v. Kearns 874, 875 Randolph’s Executor v. Quidnick Reardon v. St. Louis 516 Co. 40 v. San Francisco 439, 1199 Randolph Co. v. Ralls 862 | Rearick v. Pennsylvania 1007 Rangely v. Webster 59 v. Wilcox 915, 920 Ranger v. Great Western R. 871 | Reaume v. Chambers 75 Ranken v. McCallum 394 | Recalling Bills, Re 321 Rankin v. Harrisonburg 1155 | Recht v. Kelly 371 ». Jauman 218 | Reciprocity Bank, Matter of the 89 v. West 135 | Reckner v. Warner 868 Ransom v. Boston 214 | Reclamation Dist. 1,500, v. Sutter v. Rutherford County 302, Co. Super. Ct. 1132 385, 1031 | Record Pub. Co. v. Monson 372, v. Sault Ste. Marie 1154, 1157 803, 845, 1237 v. West 911/| Rector v. Smith 897, 926 Rape v. Heaton 59, 60, 855, 859 | Red v. Little Rock R., &c. Co. 1153 Rapid City First National Bank »v. Red River Bridge Co. v. Clarksville McGuire 874 MTD toe Rapid Transit R. Com’rs, Matter of Red River Valley Nat. Bk. v. Craig 589 1175, 1176 | Red Rock v. Henry 317 Rappert v. Caffery 1266 | Reddall v. Bryan 1112, 1132 Rasch v. Nassau El. R. Co. 1179 | Redden ». State 1259, 1261 Rash v. Farley 1008 | Redell v. Moores 363 Rasmussen v. Baker 133, 146} Redfield v. Florence 1391 v. Idaho 1270 | Redgate v. Roush 897 Rassmussen v. United States 78, 79 | Redmond »v. Tarboro 1087 Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis 1236, 1333 | Redwood Co. v. Winona, &c. Co. Ratcliff v. Wichita Union Stockyards 775, 1049 Co. 178, 1335 | Reed v. Beall 584 Ratcliffe v. Anderson 192 v. Belfast 449 Rathbone v. Bradford 326 | v. Cedar Rapids 472 v. Wirth 215, 357 | v. Commonwealth 705 Rathbun v. Wheeler 756 | v. Ohio, &c. Co. 1121 Ratherman v. Western Union Tel. | v. Reed 60, 850 Co. 366, 367, 1006 | v. Rice 66 Ratzky v. People 550 | v. Seattle 1126, 1140 Rauch v. Chapman 473 v. State 304, 660 Rauenstein v. N. Y. &c. Co. 1153 | v. Toledo 402 Rawl v. McCown 1370 v. Tyler 770 Rawley v. Hooker 594 v. Wright 737 Rawson v. Spencer 386, 398, 399, 503 | Re-election of Executive Officers, Re Ray, Ex parte 56 1410 v. Huntington 439 | Reelfoot Lake Levee Dist. ». Daw- v. Manchester 446| son 1057, 1074 v. St. Paul 529 | Rees’ Appeal 1133 ie Sweeney 76 | Rees-Scott Co. ». New Orleans 1010 Ray County v. Bentley 509 | Reetz v. Michigan 1343 Raymond v. Chicago Union Trac- | Reeves v. Treasurer of Wood Co. 1056, tion Co. 1024, 1040, 1048 1071, 1080, 1124, 1127, v. Fish : 1270, 1271 1132, 1133, 1298 Rea v. Harrington 888 | Reformed Church »v. Schoolcraft 762, 963 Read v. Case 714 | Reformed P. D. Church v. Mott 201, 204 v. Plattsmouth 262, 305, 493, 784 | Regan v. Harkey 630 Reading v. Keppleman 438 | Regents of University v. Turner 870 v. Savage 262 ». Williams 204, 247, 343, 367 Reading & P. R. R. Co. vp. Balthaser Reggel, Ex parte 52, 53, 54, 55 12 i ) 5 Reading of Bills, Re oa NgeiPe ca pedeer aLIST OF CASES CITED Page Regina v. Collins 898, 900 v. Hennessy 250 v. Lovett 899 v. Newman 959 v. Pikesley 651 | v. Sullivan 899 Register Newspaper Co. v. Stone 932 Regnier v. Cabot 891 Rehoboth v. Hunt 558 Reich v. State 416 | Reichert v. St. Louis &c. Co. 1164 Reid v. Colorado 1324 v. Delorne 909, 910 ». Ham 55 | v. Norfolk Ry. Co. 1180 | v. Smoulter 140 Reilly v. Stephenson 744 | Reily, In re 706 Reimdyke v. Kane 44 | Reining v. N. Y. L. &e. Co. 1173 Reinken v. Fuehring 1052 Reinman v. Little Rock 1315 Reiser v. Tell Ass’n 190, 191 Reitan v. Goebel 891 Reitenbaugh v. Chester Valley R. R. oO. 1121 Reithmiller v. People 346 Reitler v. Harris 590, 591, 767 Reliance Auto Repair Co. v. Nugent 865, 867, 868 | Remington, In re 670 v. Congdon 910 Remington Paper Co. v. Watson 33 Remsen v. People 684 Renlund v. Commodore Min. Co. 258 Renner v. Bennett 1403 Rennselaer v. Leopold 1118 Reno Smelting Works v. Stevenson 75 Rentz v. Detroit 1073 Replogle v. Little Rock 363, 1327 Republic Iron, &c. Co. v. State 295, 834 Requa v. Rochester 522 Reser v. Umatilla Co. 1283 R. E. Sheehan Co. v. Shuler 835 Respublica v. Dennie 884, 902 v. Duquet 425, 1314 v. Gibbs 1389, 1391 v. Oswald 668, 942 v. Passmore 942 Reusch v. Chicago, &c. Co. 1115 Revell v. People 1158 Revis v. Smith 923 Rew v. Independent School Dist. 114 Rex ». Baille 945 v. Carlile 934, 977 v. Chancellor of Cambridge 852 v. Clewes 655 v. Cooper 658 v. Cox 116 v. Creevey 934, 948 v. Dunn 655 v. Ellis 651 v. Enoch 655 Rex v. Fisher v. Fletcher exli Page 934, 936 696 v. Foxcroft 1350, 1401, 1402 v. Francklin 953, 954 v. Gardner 526 v. Hagan 665 v. Hector Campbell 893 v. Howes 658 v. Kingston 655 v. Lee 934 »v. Lewis 651 v. Locksdale 154 v. Lord Abington 948 v. Monday 1402 v. Newman 940 v. Partridge 655 v. Richards 658 v. River 651 v. St. Olave’s 1367 v. Simpson 655 v. Smith 651 v. Sutton 194 v. Thomas 655 v. Tubbs 609 ». Waddington 977 v. Walkley 655 v. Webb 651 v. Withers 1401 v. Woolston 979 Rexford v. Knight 1195, 1202, 1204 Reymann Brewing Co. »v. Brister 1018 Reynolds, Ez parte 147, 1206, 1208 v. Adden 63 v. Baker 81, 762 v. Baldwin 394, 395 v. Geary 1255 v. Lee 584 v. New Salem 409 v. Shreveport 438 v. State 1409 v. Stockton 57, 59, 64 ». United States 78, 965, 975 Rhea v. Bd. of Education 1271 Rhine v. McKinney 1207 vy. Philadelphia 531 Rhinehart v. Lance 670 v. State 300, 339 Rhines v. Clark 869 Rhoades v. El Paso, &c. Co. 676 Rhobidas v. Concord 516 Rhode Island v. Massachusetts 141, 144 v. Palmer 25 Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. 2. Doughton 1021 Rhodes v. Cannon 762, 763 v. Cincinnati 439 v. Cleveland 450 v. lowa 1253 v. Mo. S. & L. Co. 251 v. Otis 1288 v. Weldy 135 Rice v. Austin 224 60 v. Bennettexlii LIST OF CASES CITED Page | Page Rice v. Des Moines 529 | Richmond ». Southern Bell Tel., &c. v. Evansville 449 | Co. 1122 v. Foster 225, 242, 244 | v. State 959 v. Governor 223 | v. Supervisors 772 v. Parkman 203 v. Test 449 ». Ruddiman 328 | Richmond, &c. Co. v. Rogers 1149, v. State 263, 333 1156, 1213 ». Turnpike Co. 1217 v. Louisa R. R. Co. 818, 1115 v. Westerly 1390 2. Chamblin 1221 Rice’s Case 706} Richmond, &c. Turnpike Co. ». Rich v. Braxton 1088, 1105 Madison County Fiscal Ct. 1220 »v. Chamberlain 220 | Richmond & A. R. R. Co. v. Lynch- v. Chicago 1207 burg 1057 v. Flanders 372, 590 v. Patterson Tobacco Co. 1268 749, 767, 773, 790 | Richmond & D. R. R. Co. v. Reids- 2. Young 1413 ville 1045 Richard Oliver, In re 242 | Richmond & M. Ry. Co. v. Hum- Richard School Tp. v. Overmyer 1132 phreys 1215 Richards v. Citizens’ Water Supply Richmond County Acad. v. Augusta 827 Co. 1190 | Richmond Co. Com’rs v. Farmers’ »v. Raymond 385 Bank 288, 290 v. Rote 206, 792 | Richmond N. Gas Co. v. Clawson 1306 v. State 687 | Ricketts v. Spraker 369, 861, 1093 v. Washington Terminal Co. 1160 v. State 650, 1259, 1261 v. Wolf 1125} Rickey, Ex parie 725 Richardson, Ex parte 1343 | Riddell v. Fuhrman 27 v. Boston 874 | Riddle v. Proprietors, &c. 509, 512, 518 v. Commonwealth 219, 670 | Riddoch »v. State 23 v. De Giverville 251 | Rider, Ex parte 700 v. McChesney 341, 345 | Ridge v. State 836, 1324 v. Monson 201 | Ridge Street, In re 1152 v. Morgan 1056, 1081 | Ridgely v. Baltimore 1208 v. Richardson 752 | Ridley, Ex parte 219, 220 ». Roberts 890 | Rieter v. Grober 121, 122 v. Scotts Bluff Co. 286 | Rigg v. Wilton 119 v. State 921 | Riggins v. State 702 v. Union Cong. Soe. 963 | Riggins’ Ex’rs v. Brown 112 v. Vermont Cent. R. R. Co. Right of Electors, In re 1364 1149, 1156 | Rigney »v. Chicago 439, 1197, 1200 v. Webster City 440 | Riguey v. N. Y. Cent., &c. R. Co. v. Welcome 874 | 1152, 1157 Riche v. Bar Harbor Water Co. 1132 | Riley v. Charleston Union Sta. Co. Richey v. Smith 1327 | 306, 1112, 1148, 1146 Richland County v. Lawrence County 393, 398, 496, 503, 564 v. Richland Center 505 Richman v. Muscatine Co. 102, 260, 779, 787, 791 v. Supervisors 260 Richmond »v. Briethaupt 1413 v. Carneal 1141 v. Chesapeake & P. Teleph. Co. 396 v. Daniel 1099 v. Drewry-Hughes Co. 1043 v. Dudley 428, 430 v. Long 452, 518, 525 v. Long’s Adm’r 519 v. McGirr 472 v. Pace 1032 v. Richmond, &c. R. R. Co. 564, 588, 818 v. Richmond Nat. Gas Co. 405 v. Sitterding 115 v. Garfield Township 383 v. Independence 525 v. Louisville, &e. Co. 1128 v. Massachusetts 1347 ». Rochester 462 v. Wallace 670 Riley’s Case 554, 726 Rima v. Cowan 1107 Rinard v. Burlington, &c. Co. 1171 Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles County 340, 1141 Ring, Matter of 726 v. Wheeler 928 Rio Grande, The 109 Rio Grande Lumber Co. v. Darke 178, 333, 334, 342, 347, 354 Rippe v. Becker 481 Rippey v. Texas 1254 Rison v. Farr 139, 586, 593, 758, 759LIST OF CASES CITED exlill Page | Page Risser v. Hoyt 180, 866 | Robinson »v. Kalbfleish 1392 Ritchie v. People 833, 1229 | v. Kerrigan 299, 305 v. Richards 1374 | v. New York &c. Co. 1154 v.yWayman 263, 1347 | v. Oceanic S. N. Co. 48 Ritzman v. Campbell 278 v. Pa. Ry Co. 1145 River Rendering Co. v. Behr 426, 432 | v. Richardson 626 Rivers v. Augusta 447 | v. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Riverside, &c. Cotton Mills ». Mene- Co. 762, 763 fee 846, 854 v. Robinson 1213 Rixner, Succession of 26, 27, 1044 v. Schenck 372, 390 Roach v. Board, &c. 386 v. Scott 63 Roanoke, &c. R. R. Co. v. Davis 467 ». Skipworth 303 Roanoke City v. Berkowitz 1194 v. Springfield, &c. Co. 1156 Roaring Springs Townsite Co. 2. v. State 305 Paducah Tel. Co. 1119, 1125 v. Swope 1126, 1127 Robards v. Brown 594 | ». Van Auken 924 v. Lamb 843 | ». Ward’s Executors 58, 856 Robb v. Connolly 723 | v. Wayne Cir. Judges 674 Robbins v. Fletcher 890 | v. West 862 ». Shelby Taxing Dist. 1005, | ». White 561 1009, 1018 | Robinson Cadillac &c. Co. v. Rate- v. State 665, 682| kin 1257 v. Treadway 889, 921 | Robison v. Hotel & R. Employees, Roberson, In re 53 Local No. 782 884, 885, 892 ». Rochester, &c. Co. 747 | Roby v. Colehour 35 Roberts, In re 280, 290 | vy. Croan 1413 v. Caldwell 59 | v. Smith 49 v. Calvert 1389, 1398, 1404, 1409 v. West 780 v. Chicago 439, 1152) Roche v. Waters 776, 792 ». Lewis 29 | Rochester v. Collins 402 ». Louisville 182 | v. Gutberlett 865 v. Murphy 1372 v. Holden 1207 v. Ogle 426, 1283, 1326 v. Rochester R. Co. 572 v. People 654 v. Rush 463, 1025 v. Pratt 61 v. Upman 1046 v. Reilly 53, 54 Rochester H. & L. R. R. Co., Matter ». Roberts 871 O 1192 v. State 647, 668 »y. New York, &c. Co. 1192 Robertson, In re 707 | Rochester R. Co. v. Rochester 574 ». Baldwin 22, 608 | Rochester Water Com’rs, Re 1116 v. Bass 728 | Rochester White Lead Co. 2. v. Bullions 961 Rochester 518, 528 ». Land Commissioner 559 | Rock v. Carney 230, 232 v. Omaha 1052 | Rockaway Rac. Corp. ?. Stotesbury 1113 ». Rockford 237, 393, 479 | Rockefeller v. United States 1023 v. State 647 | Rockford, &c. R. R. Co. 2. Coppin- Robeson v. Brown 595 ger 121¢ Robie v. Sedgwick 409 v. Hillmer 1246 Robins Dry Dock, &c. Co. v. Dahl 226 Rockland Water Co. v. Camden & Robinson, Estate of 404} R&R. W. Co. 796 Ex parte 14, 669, 719, 1041 | Rockport ». Walden 762, 763 Re 610, 706, 725 | Rockville National Bank ». Latham 600 ». Bank of Darien 309, 360 | Rockwell ». Hubbell’s Adm’rs 587, v. Bidwell 241, 362 | 589, 754 ». Cheboygan Supervisors 270 ». Nearing 760, 854 v. Chicago, &c. R. Co. 60, 61 | Rode v. Siebe 1058 ». Commonwealth Ins. Co. 44 | Rodemacher ?. Milwaukee, &c. Co. v. Evansville 446 569, 1246 v. Fishback 48, 823 Roderigas v. Savings Institution 110 v. Greenville 447 | Rodgers v. Coler 1344 v. Hamilton 1343 | Rodman »v. Harcourt 1353 v. Howe 596 | Rodman-Heath Cotton Mills 2. v. Indiana, &c. Co. 573, 1087 Waxhaw 288exliv Roe 2. Roebuck & Co. v. Fed. Tr. Com. 3 seeeecees eseeeeeeerse ess33 ss v. dD. LIST OF CASES CITED Deming QOL oor Roethke v. Philip Best Brewing Co. Rogers, In re . Alabama 44, 335, 808 ». Arkansas 7 . Atlanta . Boston Club . Buffalo ». Bradshaw ». Burlington ». Coleman ». Common Council of Buffalo . Goodwin . Greenbush ». Hennepin Co. . Jacob . Jones -. Keokuk - Manuf. Imp. Co. . Omaha . Peck . Rochester, &c. R. Co. . San Francisco Super. Ct. . State . Stephens v. . Western Union Tel. Co. Rogers Locomotive Machine Works v. American Emigrant Co. Rohan-Chabot’s Estate, Re Rohrbacher v. Mayor of Jackson Rohrbough v. Douglas Co. Rolfs, In re Roll ». Roller v. Holly Murray 58, Rollins, Ex parte Rolph »v. Fargo Rolston v. Mo. Fund Com’rs Romaine, Re Roman Realty Co. v. Haddonfield Rome v. Omberg Rood v. McCargar Rooney, In re North Dakota 548, 546, Fe | Root v. Kansas City Southern R. Vass Augusta Co. v. Wright Root’s Case Roper v. Laurinburg Rosanski v. State Rosdeitscher, In re Rose v. McKie v. Rose OF v. Sanderson v. State Truax Rosebank Ave., Roseberry v. Huff Rosenbaum v. Newbern Matter of v. State 214, 215, 2 238, 470 | | Rothermel v. Meyerle 620, $ 32 | Rowe v 618, Page Rosenberg v. Dahl 113 Rosenblatt, Ex parte 53, 382, 725, 1018 Rosenbloom »v. State 1335 Rosenburg v. Des Moines 522 Rosenheim v. Hartsock 862 Rosenthal v. New York 813, 823 v. State Bd. of Canvassers 1406 Rosier v. Hale 745 Ross v. Clinton 450 v. Com’rs of Palisades Inter- state Park 1214 v. Crockett 408 v. Crofutt 52 v. Davis 1129, 1219 v. Duval 39 v. Hardie 1283 v. Irving 799 v. Lettice 771, 774 v. Lipscomb 368 v. Lister 370 v. McIntyre 67, 672 v. McLung 39 v. Oregon 46, 188, 554 v. State 657 v. Ward 912, 920 vo. Whitman 182 Ross’s Case 553, 726 Rossberg v. State 415 Rosser, In re 649 Rossmiller v. State 842 Roswell v. Bateman 417, 1052, 1073, 1074 | Roth v. House of Refuge 609 1015, 1017 Rothschild v. Grix 122 Rott v. Steffins 596 | Rounds v. McDaniel 712 v. Mumford 438 v. Waymart 316, 318 Roundstone v. Baldwin 1133 Roundtree v. Galveston 1057 | Rourke v. Holmes St. R. Co. 1174 Rouse v. Donovan 120 v. Kinston 1190 Rouse, H. & Co. v. Conovan 843 Roush v. Walter 1297 | Roushlange v. Chicago &c. R. Co. 1220 | Rousseau v. New Orleans 587 76 | Roussel v. Dornier 1360 701 | Routsong v. Wolf 783 1213 | Rowan v. Runnells 39, 42, 166 4 | v. poate 676, 737 ». Addison 1115 v. Granite Bridge Corp. 1154 v. Kidd 42 v. Portsmouth 450, 529 v. Richards 309, 311, 520 vo. Tuck 1352 283 | Rowell ». Smith 113 1114 | Rowland »v. Bd. of Elections 1406 v. Kalamazoo Supts. 454 v. State 579 1282 | Roxford Knitting Co. v. Moore 1124LIST OF CASES CITED Page | Royal v. Thomas 869 | Royal Brit. Bk. v. Turquand 476 Royall, Ex parte 721, 725 | Royster Guano Co. ». Virginia 1073 | Rozier v. Fagan 203 | v. State 1261 | Rubright v. Pitts 779 Ruch v. City of New Orleans 1111 Ruckman v. Union R. Co. 114 Rude v. St. Louis 1197, 1200 Rue High’s Case 1365 Ruggles v. Collier 435 v. Nantucket 1114 ». People 1304 Rugh v. Ottenheimer 754 Ruhl, Re 220 Rulinson v. Post 387, 388 Ruloff v. People 658 v. State 654 Rumney v. Keyes 711 Rumping v. Rumping 850 Rumsey v. New York, &c. R. Co. 120, 1150, 1158 v. People 152, 532 ». Sullivan 752 Rundle »v. Foster 702 Runge v. Franklin 924, 931 v. Glerum 1314 Runnels v. State 653 Runyon v. Coster’s Lessee 250 ». Morrow 687 Ruohs v. Backer 924, 928 Rupert v. Martz 587, 794 v. State 687 Rusch v. Davenport 518, 520 Ruse v. Williams 962 Rush v. Cavanaugh 708 Rushe v. Hyattsville 404 Rushing v. Sebree 310 Rushton v. State ex rel. Collins 481 Rushtrat v. People 823 Rushville v. Rushville Natural Gas Co. 114, 565, 1305 Rushville Gas Co. v. Rushville 291, 404 Rushworth v. Judges &c. of Hudson Co. 1 Russ v. Commonwealth 176, 178, 334, 351, 352 Oo Russell, In re 141, 818 v. Alt 864 v. Anthony 921 v. Ayer 166, 170 | v. Belcher 872 v. Burlington 438 v. Burton 280 v. Chittenden 1106 v. C. N. Robinson & Co. 1062 v. Cooley 181 v. Croy 828, 1040 v. Fargo 1314 v. Mayor, &c. of N. Y. 1114, 1313 ». Men of Devon 411, 511, 516 v. Perry 60 exlv Page Russell v. Place 110 v. Pyland 1391 v. Rumsey 752, 783 v. Sebastian 555 v. State 386 v. Whiting 725 Russellville ». White 421 Rust v. Gott 1391 v. Lowe 1195 Rutgers v. Mayor of Brunswick 815 Rutgers College v. Morgan 1031 Ruth, In re 1267 Rutherford ». Hamilton 1082 Rutland ». Mendon 119 Clarendon 1125, 1140, 1190 1360, 1390, 1415 Rutland R., &c. Co. 2. Power Co. Rutledge v. Crawford v. Krauss 55 Rutter v. Sullivan 238 Ryalls v. Leader 932, 935 Ryan, In re 114, 316 ». Allen 755 ». City of New York 829 1027, 1131 161, 288, 290 z 1 vy. L. & N. Terminal Co. v. Lynch t 1 ». Tuscaloosa 1398 », United States 692 tychlicki v. St. Louis 451 Ryckman v. Delevan 893 Ryder v. State 709 Ryegate v. Wardsboro 128 Ryerson v. Brown 1135, 1137, 1141 v. Utley 302, 305, 311, 1038, 1041 Ryerson & Son v. Peden 42 Ryhiner v. Frank 765 Ss S. & V. R. R. Co. v. Stockton 238 Sabin ». Chrisman 600 y. Vermont, &c. R. R. Co. 1155 225, 232, 361, 380, 578, 1230 Sabre v. Rutland R. Co. Sackett v. Sackett Sackheim v. Pigueron 767 Saco Water Power Co. v. Buxton 1062 Sacramento v. Crocker 1068 50 Saddler v. State Sadler v. Langham 149, 150, 367, 1124, 1126, 1137 | Sadlier ». New York 1160, 1161 | Safford v. People 682 Sage, In re 600 ». New York City 1151, 1157 112 ». United States Saginaw, &c. Ry. Co. 2. Bordner 1144 Saginaw Co. Bd. of Sup’rs 2. Hubin- ger 561, 563 Sagu v. State 640 Sahlinger v. People 668 Sailly v. Smith 615 | St. Albans ». Bush 856 St. Anthony Falls &c. Co. 2. Bd. of Water Com’rs 560, 1292exlvi LIST OF CASES CITED Page | Page St. Charles v. Nolle 1062 St. Louis, &c. Co. v. Hoshall 1209 St. Charles Sav. Bank v. Thompson v. Paul 835 & Gray Quarry Co. 859 | v. Petty 1128, 1130, 1144, 1145 St. Clair v. Cox 59 | v. State 832 St. Clair County v. Livingston 38 | v. Teters 1121 St. Germain Irrig. Ditch Co. ». v. Williams 743, 832 Hawthorne Ditch Co. 1320, 1321 | v. Worthen 1043 St. Hedwig’s School v. Cook Co. 968 | St. Louis, &c. Land Co. v. Kansas St. Hilaire, Bx parte 158} City 1053 St. James African Meth. Ep. Ch. ». St. Louis, &c. R. Co. v. Arkansas 1012, Baltimore, &c. R. Co. 1118 1013, 1014 St. Joe Improvement Co. »v. Lau- v. Aubuchon 1215 mierster 987 v. Clark 125 St. John v. New York 825 v. Cross 137 St. Johnsbury ». Thompson 414, 421 v. Griffin 627 St. Joseph v. Anthony 1056 v. Langer 1267 v. Ernst 1045 v. Ledbetter 1196 v. O'Donoghue 1056, 1074 v. Loftin 571 v. Rogers 472, 474 | v. Paul 1236 St. Joseph, &c. R. R. Co. v. Buchanan v. Pub. Serv. Comm. 1268 CovGt: 139, 238 v. Reynolds 1267 v. Callender 1121 | v. Richardson 1216 St. Lawrence Boom, &c. Co. v. Holt 859 | v. Royall 1150 St. Lawrence Tp. ». Furman 472, 473 v. Shore 1246 St. Louis v. Allen 393, 424 | v. Southwestern, Tel., &c., Co. 1146 v. Bell Telephone Co. 403 v. Spriggs 1304 v. Bentz 415, 427 v. Theodore Maxfield Co. 1213, v. Bowler 1046 1215, 1219 v. Cafferata 415, 1281 | v. Wynee * 1245 ». Clemens 779 | St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Gill 1310, 1311 v. Cons. Coal Co. 1003 | v. Mathews 844, 1246 v. Dorr 394 /St. Louis, A. & T. R. Co. v. Fire v. Foster 163 Ass’n of Phila. 256 v. Galt 739 v. Henderson 1215 v. Goebel 416|St. Louis Belt, &c. Co. v. Cartan v. Green 424 Real Estate Co. 1214 ». Gurno 438 | St. Louis Iron M. & S. Ry. Co. ». v. Heitzeberg &c. Co. 429, 1325 | Berry 574 v. Hill 826 v». McCormick 258 v. Liessing 298 v. Vickers 26 v. Nash 425, 1314] St. Louis Poster Advertising Co. ». v. Oeters 1082} City of St. Louis 1046 v. Regina Flour Mill Co. 431|St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co. »v. v. Roe 1207 Pub. Sery. Comm. 1268 v. Russell 390, 393, 395, 435, 507/ St. Louis S. R. Co. »v. Arkansas 40 v. St. Louis R. R. Co. 427 v. Griffin 335, 380, 1342 v. Schnuckelberg 1325 v. State 338 v. Schoenbusch 415|St. Mary’s Industrial School »v. v. Shields 102, 260} Brown 1031 v. Spiegel 131) St. Paul v. Chicago, &c. Co. 441, 1247 v. Tiefel 294, 302, 319 | v. Coulter 433 v. Trustees 1046 | v. Gilfillan 1325 v. United Railways Co. 572 | v. Robinson 672 v. Weber 414, 417, 418, 423 ». Schleh 421, 422 v. Wehrung 1046 v. Seitz 528 v. Western U. Tel. Co. 440, 1007 2. Smith 424 v. Witts — 497 ». Traeger 417, 423, 432 St. Louis, &c. Co. ». Cape Girardeau v. Umstetter 180 Bell Tel. Co. 1159 | St. Paul &e. Co., In re 1114, 1140 v. Evans, &c. Co. 1206 | ». Todd Co. 572 v. Faltz 1144 | St. Paul, &c. R. R. Co. v. Gardner 864 v. Hannibal 1116 | v. Parcher 571 v. Harbine 588 | St. Paul & N. P. Ry. Co., In re 1141LIST OF CASES CITED exlvil Page Page St. Paul Bd. of Water Com’rs 2. San Francisco v. Canavan 393, 505 Roselawn Cemetery 1118, 1207 v. Liverpool, &c. Co. 1044 St. Paul Gaslight Co. 2. St. Paul 585 v. Lux 1061 St. Paul, M. Ry. Co. v. Minneapolis 1192 v. McGovern 796 v. Phelps 149 v. Western U. T. Co. 1015 St. Paul Union Depot Co. 2. St. San Francisco Bd. of Educ. 2. Paul 1192 Hyatt 775, 787 St. Paul’s Church v. Concord 573 San Joaquin, &c., Canal & Irrigation St. Tammany Water Works v. New | Co., v. Fresno Flume & Irri- Orleans Water Works 555, 581 | gation Co. 75 Sala v. New Orleans 598 | v. Stevinson 1130, 1148 Sala’s Succession 26 | San Mateo County »v. Sou. Pac. R. Salata v. United States 628} R. Co. 18, 739, 1049, 1066 Sale v. First Baptist Ch. 961|San Mateo Water Works v. Sharp- Salem v. Eastern R. R. Co. 1326 stein 1160 v. Maynes 425 | San Pedro, &c. Co. v. Los Angeles 1095 ». Young 531 oe v. Deerfield 476 Salem Turnpike v. Essex Co. 398 . Rice 498, 1038, 1041 Saleno v. Neosho 473 | sunches v. Fordyce 315 Salina v. Blaksley 730, 1327 | v. State 632 Salisbury v. Equitable Purchasing v. United States 746 Co. 1045 | Sand Point v. Doyle 520 Salisbury Land & Imp. Co. v. Com- Sandel v. State 23, 302, 1174 monwealth 335, 373, 1125, 1133 Sanders, Re 1270 Sallden v. Little Falls 439, 1153, 1199 | v. Aare 424 Sallee v. Werner 714 v. Cabaniss 192 Salliotte v. King Bridge Co. 1149, 1294} v. : ‘ommonwealth 372, 805, 1232 Sallsbury v. Equitable Pur. Co. 1343 v. Getchell 1366, 1396 Salmon, Jn re 600 | v. Hillsborough Ins. Co. 586 Salt Company v. Brown 1134 v. Metcalf 668 Salt Creek V. T. Co. v. Parks 837 v. Rice 1402 Salt Lake City v. E. Jordan Irrig. v. Rollinson 923 Co. 1130 y. St. Louis & N. O. Anchor Line 136 v. Robinson 868 v. Saxton 23 v. Wight 629 | Sandford v. Nichols 620, 621 Salt Lake Lodge v. Groesbeck 1090 | Sands v. Kimbark 865 Salter v. State 378 vy. Manistee River Imp. Co. 79, 80, Salters v. Tobias 191 1292, 1294 Saltmarch v. Bow 529 v. Richmond 1284 Saltonstall ». N. Y. Cent. R. Co. Sandy v. St. Joseph 451 1195, 1196 petors v. Bennett 940, 941 Saltpetre Case 1313 . Poe 42 Sam Kee, Jn re 1325 | Sangamon Co. »v. Springfield 564 Samish River Boom Co. v. Union Sanger v. Kansas City 445 Boom Co. 1110, 1145 | Sanipoli v. Pleasant Valley Coal Co. Sammons v. Holloway 997 | 143, 146 Sams v. King 128 Sanitary Dist. of Chicago 2. United Samuels v. McCurdy 543, 1257 States 25, 1003, 1005, 1239 Samuelson v. State 299, 302 | Sanning v. Cincinnati 178, 390 San Antonio v. Jones 237 | Sans v. Joerris 940 v. Lane 473 | Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. ». San Antonio Pub. Serv. Co. 137 Ry. Co. 20, 735, 1043 San Antonio &c. Co. v. Wileony 834 | Santee Mills v. Query 51 San Antonio & A. P. Ry. Co. v. 8. W. Santo v. State 225, 240, 348, Tel. & Tel. Co. 1123 360, 362, 1252, 1255 San Bernardino v. Southern Pac. Co. Sapulpa v. Land 159, iO) aah 259, 1015 262, 392, 395, 987, 1104 San Diego v. Linda Vista Irrigation ». Okla. Nat. Gas Co. 396 Dist. 1088, 1095|Saranac Land & Timber Co. 2. San Diego Land & Town Co. v. Jas- Roberts 1104 per 187 | Saratoga Ave., In re 1190 v. National City 1309, 1310| Saratoga Springs v. Saratoga Gas, San Diego Water Co. v. San Diego 13808 E. L. & P. Co. 178, 230, 232, 233exlviil LIST OF C Page | Sarber v. Indianapolis 531 Sargeant v. Bd. of Education 1031 Sargeant & Lahr »v. Herrick & Stevens 993 Sargent v. Guilford 516 | Sargent & Co. v. Tuttle 393 Sarlo v. Pulaski County 578 Sater v. Burlington & Mt. Pleasant Plank Road Co. 1212, Satterlee »». Mathewson 1213 43 599, 782, 785 ) v. San Francisco 291 Sauer 7. New York 40, 439, 1152, 1157 Sauger v. Kansas City 506 Saul v. Creditors 250, 316 Sauls v. Freeman 872 Saulsbury v. Ithaca 529 Sault Ste. Marie Hospital v. Sharpe 366 Saunders v. Baxter 933 v. Collins 768 ». Haynes 1402 v. Mills 933, 959 v. Rodway 711 v. Springstein 1059 v. Wilson 800 Savage v. Commonwealth 245 v. Jones 2012 h2) 1273 v. Salem 442 v. Walshe 158 Savannah v. Cooper 1045 v. Hancock 1141 v. Kelly 472 v. Solomon’s Lodge 1090 v. Weed 1059 Savannah, &c. Co. v. Mayor, &e. of Savannah 1170 | Savannah, &c. R. Co. v. Parish 1209 Savannah, F. & W. Ry. Co. ». Geiger 311 Saviers v. Smith 1046, 1050 Saving Society v. Philadelphia 412 Savings & L. Society v. Multnomah Co. 827, 1019 Savings Bank »v. Allen 781 | v. Bates 781 Savings Bk. of Richmond v. Nat’] Bk. of Goldsboro 41 Sawter v. Shoenthal 300 | Sawyer v. Alton 1083 | v. Blakely 105 | v. Corse 518 | v. Gilmore 1048 2. Insurance Co. 141 v. Northfield 449 v. Vermont, &c. R. R. Co. 1244 | Saxony Mills ». Wagner 256 | Saxton v. St. Joseph 447 Sayles v. Davis 997 v. Foley 804, 1338, 1339 Sayre v. Phillips 430 v. Wisner 772 Sayward v. Denny 29 ASES CITED Page Seales v. Chattahoochee County 508 v. State 315, 982 | Seandinavian-American Bk. v. Sabin 42 Scandinavian Mut. Aid Ass’n v. Kearney Co. 1041 Seanlan v. Childs 147, 150 v. Wedger 455 Scarborough v. Mallory 888 Scates v. King 112 Schaaf v. Cleveland, &c. R. Co. 1164, 1180, 1186 Schaake v. Dolley 225, 230; 2315 341, 747 Schaefer v. United States 904, 907 v. Werling 1074 Schaezlein v. Cabaniss 226, 229 Schafer v. Ritchie 850 Scharpf v. Schmidt 26 Schattner v. Kansas City 438 Schatz, Ex parte 845 Schee v. La Grange 861 Schenck v. United States 904, 906, 907 | Schenley v. Alleghany 1056 ». Commonwealth 750; 2 | Schick v. United States 672, 1323 Schieffelin ». Hylan 472 Schigley ». Waseca 522 Schiller Piano Co. v. Illinois North Utilities Co. 1231 Schiltz v. Roenitz 843 Schipper v. Aurora 406 Schlesinger v. Wisconsin 828 Schlict v. Clark 1218 v. State 1281 Schlosser ». Hemphill 38 Schmalstieg v. Leavenworth Coal Co. 1337 | Schmalz v. Woolley 93, 297 | Schmidinger v. Chicago 187, 1236, 1335, 1336 | Schmidt, Ex parte 318, 672 v. Failey 1061 v. Indianapolis 50, 348, 379, 380, 421, 444 F. W. Cook Brewing 142, 146, 178, 179, 341, 346, 351, 354, 1111, 1239 Schmitz v. Zeh 317, 472, 475 Schmutz v, Little Rock Special Sch. Schmitt Co. v0. Dist. 471 Schneider v. Detroit 1156 v. Hurt 1105 v. Menasha 462, 463 | Schnell v. Rock Island 473 Schnier v. People 631 | Schoenheit v. Nelson 755 Schoepf, Ex parte 670 Scholl v. Bell 1418 v. German Coal Co. 1145 Scholle v. State 230 Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania 1324 School Board v. Patten 165, 166 School Directors v. Hart 387LIST OF CASES CITED Page School District v. Atherton 408 v. Bd. of Education 398 | v. Colvin 336 | v. Fogelman 386 | v. Fuess 528 | v. Gage 387 v. Insurance Co. 262, 508 | v. Merrills 1103 v. Stone 475 v. Wood 509, 510, 511 School Dist. No. 3 v. Atzenweiler 1031 | School Dist. No. 11 v. Chapman 475 School Dist. No. 20 v. Bryan 386 | School Dist. No. 24 v. Smith 1048 School Law Manual, In re 183 School Town v. Somerville 1058, 1095 School Town of Andrews v. Heiney 346, 353 Schoolfield’s Exec. v. Lynchburg 1041 Schooner Paulina’s Cargo v. United States 125 Schooner Rachel v. United States 755, 790 Schopp »v. St. Louis 441 Schroers v. Fisk 109 Schubkagel v. Dierstein 702 | 368, 1091 298, 1046, 1050, 1085 Schuler, Ex parte In re v. Mobridge 520 Schulherr v. Bordeaux 163, 165, 245 Schull v. Hopkins 921 Schulte v. Heman 1074 | v. Warren 1289, 1290 Schultz v. Guldenstein 956 v». Milwaukee 446 v. State 347 ». Strauss 923 Schurman v. Marley 76 Schurmeier v. St. Paul, &c. R. R. Co. 1164 Schussler v. Hennepin Co., Com’rs 454 Schuster v. State 682 | v. Weiss 560 Schutz v. State 684 Schuyler v. Curtis 747 Schwab v. Berggren 844 v. Richardson 1047 Schwartz, In re 298 v. Duss 962 Schwartz Bros. Co. v. Evening News Pub. Co. 943 Schweiss v. First Jud. Dist. Ct. 262 Schwertner v. Provident Mut. Bldg. Loan Ass’n 596 Scibilia ». Philadelphia 452 Scituate v. Weymouth 399 Scofield v. Milwaukee Free Press Co. 889 »v. Watkins 1093 Scotland Co. ». Thomas 474 Scotland Co. Ct. v. United States 470 Scott, Ex parte 219 In re 649 exlix Page Scott v. Aultman 702 v. Barnes County 592 v. Clark 329, 330 v. Coleman 61 v. Detroit Young Men’s Society’s Lessee 81, 90 v. District Court 596 v. Donald 24, 1252 v. Fishblate 455 v. Hooper 984 v. Jones 34 v. La Porte 405 v. McKinnish 891 v. McNeal 110, 845 v. Mather 800 v. Mayor, &c. of Manchester 518 v. Nashville Bridge Co. 1338, 1339 v. Neely 30 v. Sanford 124, 125 v. School District 387 v. Scott 109, 114 v. Smart’s Ex’rs 348 v. State 1327 ». Williamstown, School Dist. No. 9 386 v. Willson 1288 Scott Lumber Co. v. Wolford 1126 Seottish Rite Bldg. Co. v. Lancaster Co. 573 Scottish Union, &c. Ins. Co. v. Herriott 24 Scoville v. Canfield v. Cleveland Scown v. Czarnecki 1055, 1071, 1074 315, 335, 360, 362, 364 Scranton v. Penn Coal Co. 1075 ». Public Service Commission 396 v. Wheeler 1151, 1157, 1294 Scranton Gas, &c. Co. v. Delaware, &c. R. Co. 1116, 1146 v. Scranton 439 Scribner v. Rapp 962 125, 130, 131, 132, 143, 144, 676 v. State Scripps v. Reilly 933, 948 Scroggs v. State 1261 Scrum v. Slankard 1413 Scrutchfield v. Choctaw, &ce. Co. 1218 Scudder v. Coler 35 ». Trenton, &c. Co 1141 “McAllister 873, 1032, 1298 Scuffletown Fence Co. v Seaboard Air Line Ry. ». Blackwell 1247 ». Railroad Comm. 1276 40, 743 v. Seegers v. Simon 335, 805, 833 v. Southern Inv. Co. 1164 v. United States 1201, 1210 Seager v. Foster 414 Seals v. State 1402 Seamans v. Temple Co. 251 Seamen’s Friend Soc. v. Boston 1094 Seamster v. Blackstock 862 1402 Searcy v. Growcl LIST OF CASES CITED Page | Page Searl v. School District 1221 | Selma v. Jones 450 Searle v. Clark 1414 | Selma, &c. R. R. Co., Ex parte 238 v. Lead 1111, 1153 | Selman v. Wolfe 1290 Sears v. Akron 1145 | Selree v. Thompson 922 v. Board of Aldermen 1057 | Selsby v. Redlon Wd v. Chicago 442 | Selvage v. Talbot 1235 v. Com’rs 48 | Selzman v. United States 1266 v. Cottrell 178, 355, 372, 741 | Semayne’s Case 614 v. Crocker 1176 | Semler, Petition of 724 ». Fed. Tr. Comm. 230 | Semple v. Vicksburg 454 v. Terry 860 Sena v. United States 820 Seattle v. Goldsmith 1336 Senate Bill, Re 100 v. Kelleher 742, 1074 | Senate File, In re 87 ». McDonald 415 | Senate Resolution, Jn re 100, 320 v. Montana Ry. Co. v. State 1146 | Senate of Happy Home Club ». Alpena v. Oregon, &c. R. Co. 1291 Co. 22 »v. Smyth 1346 | Seneca v. Cochran 1314 Seattle &c. Co. v. State 1117 | Seneca Mining Co. v. Secretary of State Seattle, &c. R.Co.v. Roeder 1214, 1219} 384 v. State 1114, 1192 | Senior, Ex parte 671 v. Wash. ez rel. Linhoff 34 | Sentell ». N. O. & C. R. Co. 1322 Seattle and M. Ry. Co.v. Murphine 1214 | Sequestration Cases 597 Seattle Electric Co. v. Seattle, &c. R. Sergeant v. Kuhn 201 Co. 796 | Serrill v. Philadelphia 1069 Seattle School Dist. No. 1v. Seattle 1095 | Servatius v. Pichel 910 Seattle Transfer Co. v. Seattle 1156 | Servis v. Beatty 142 Sebree v. Thompson 956 | Servonitz v. State 383 Sechrist v. Bd. of Com’rs 787 | Sessions v. Crunkilton 1071, 1080, 1298 Secombe v. Kittelson 84, 91 | Sessums v. Botts 383 v. Milwaukee, &c. Co. 1124 | Seton Hall College v. So. Orange 44, 572 v. Railroad Co. 1120 | Settle, Ex parte 725 Second Employers’ Liability Cases 1002, | v. Van Evrea 130 1003, 1236, 1274 | Setzler v. Pa. &c. R. R. Co. 1218 Second Ward Savings Bank v. Schranck Seven Barrels of Wine, In re 1257 584 | Seven Bishops, Case of the 953 Secord v. Foutch 1373 | Seven Hickory »v. Ellery 322 Security Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Perwitt 254 | Severin, Ex parte 726 Security Sav. Bank »v. California 556, 831 | Severn ». Regina 6, 1234, 1279 v. Connell 115 | Sewall v. St. Paul 529 Sedgwick v. Stanton 282 v. Sewall 61, 850 Sedgwick Co. ». Bunker 398, 755 v. State 87 Seeley v. Bridgeport 866 | Seward, Ex parte 289, 1282 Seely v. Pittsburg 1075 v. Rising Sun 1061 Seelyville Coal & Min. Co. ». McGlosson Sewell v. Bd. of Education 387 834 | Sewickley v. Sholes 311 Seery »v. Viall 887 | Sexauer v. Star Milling Co. 136, 1136 Sego v. Stoddard 1360, 1376 Sexton v. Coahoma Co. 1095 Sehy v. Salt Lake City 529 | v. Newark Dist. Teleg. Co. 835 Seibert v. Lewis 587, 598 v. Todd 890 v. Linton 191 | Seymour v. Cummins 449 Seibold v. Wahl 1366 | v. Hartford 1094 Seifert v. Brooklyn 451 v. Turnpike Co. 467 Seisweiss v. James 977 | Seymour First Nat. Bk. v. Isaacs Seitz v. Mosier 776, 787 774, 792 Selby v. Bardons 116 | Shackford ». Newington 485, 1034 Selden v. Jacksonville 1150, 1153 | Shackleford v. Coffey 1136 Selden’s Exx’r v. Kennedy 837 | Shadden v. McElwee 923 Selin v. Snyder 860 | Shade v. Ash Grove Lime & Portland Selkirk v. Stephens 1269 Cement Co. 300, 835 ». Steven 1341 | Shafer v. Farmers’ Grain Co. 1280 Seller v. Jenkins 887 | ». Mumma 415, 425 Sellers, In re 724 | Shaffer v. Carter 48, 51 v. State 642, 643 | v. Union Mining Co. 1337LIST OF CASES CITED Page | Page Shall v. Minneapolis, &c. Co. 611, 630, 631 | Shelby Ice, &c. Co. v. Southern R. Shalor, Ez parte 220} Co. 1304 Shamlian v. Equitable Accident Co. 666 | Shelbyville Water Co. v. People 1062 Shannon v. Frost 961, 962 | Sheldon, Ex parte 55 v. Western Union Tel. Co. 1001 | v. Fox 428 Shapleigh v. San Angelo 394 v. Kalamazoo 529 Sharg v. Eszlinger 61 v. Wright 859, 860, 861 Sharon Ry., Appeal of 1192 | Sheley v. Detroit 1052, 1078 Sharp, In re 113 | Shelfer v. Gooding 920 v, Cincinnati 258 | Shelly’s Appeal 370 v. Contra Costa Co. 491 | Shelton v. Erie R. Co. 571 v. Mayor, &e. of N. Y. 307 | Shenandoah Val. R. R. Co. v. Griffith 114 v. Sharp 63 | v. Shepherd 1214, 1218 v. Spier 1056 | Sheolin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota 1229 ?. State 218 | Shepard v. Barron 368, 369, 803 v. Thompson 1357 | v. United States 640 Sharp’s Ex. v. Dunavan 1036 | Shepard’s Case 671 Sharpe v. United States 1215 | Shepards Point Land Co. v. Atlantic Sharpless v. Mayor of Phila. 237, 352, Hotel Co. 1158 485, 988, 1034 | Shepardson v. Milwaukee & Beloit Shartle v. Minneapolis 5a0lip Re Re Co: 379, 1204, 1205 Shattuck v. Allen 956 | Shephard v. Wheeling 183 v. Chandler 76 | Shepherd v. Chelsea 446 Shaver v. Pa. Ry. Co. 806 | ». Com’rs 1343 Shaw, Ex parte 723 | v. People 550 ». Bender 891 | Shepherd’s Fold v. Mayor, &c. of v. Charleston ASD N.Y: 1031 v. Charlestown 1209 Sheppard v. Dowling 235, 1253 v. Crawford 1288 | Sheppard’s Election Case 1397 v. Dennis 1036, 1086 | Sherbourne v. Yuba Co. 516, 519 v. Fisher 607 | Sheridan v. McCormick 110 v. Macon 247 v. Salem 315 v. Marshalltown 48, 372, 823 | Sherill ». O’Brien 142, 146 2. Moore 984 Sherin, In re 707 v. Nachwes 727 | Sherman v. Buick 1127 v. Norfolk R. R. Corp. 786 v. Carr 457, 461 v. Robinson 593 v. Langham 560 v. Sebastopol 451 v. Milwaukee, &c. Co. 1121 ». Thompson 711 v. People 838 Shawnee v. Hewett 561 v. Story 278 v. Sears 522 | Sherman Co. v. Simons 474, 509 Shawnee County v. Carter 155 | Sherrard v. Lafayette Co. 472 v. Jacobs 516, 517 | Sherwin v. Aurora 520 Shawneetown v. Mason 438 | Sherwood, In re 706 Sheahan v. Collins 940 v. Dist. Columbia 529 Shealy v. Chicago, &c. Co. 1156 ». Fleming 785 Shear v. Box 95 | Shideler v. State 685 Shearlock v. Beardsworth 893 | Shield v. Walker 1134 Sheazle, In re 26 | Shields v. Bennett 305, 311, 315 Sheckell v. Jackson 939 ». Clifton H. Land Co. 780 Sheehan v. Good Samaritan Hospital ». Coleman 29 1095 v. Durham 452 v. Sturges 714 v. Jacob 1360 Sheehy v. Kansas City, &c. Co. 1199 v. McGregor 1375, 1403 Sheely v. Biggs 887 v. Ohio 1242 Sheets v. McCook 522 | Shifflet ». Commonwealth 652 v. Paine 1104 | Shipley ». Todhunter 897 Shehan v. Keen 956 | Shipp ». McGraw 887 Shehan’s Heirs v. Barnett’s Heirs 201 v. Miller 39 Shelby v. Guy 39, 763 v. Patten 956 Shelby County »v. Tenn. &c. Co. 1027 v. State 668 v. Union & Planter’s Bk. 43, | Shipper v. Pa. R. R. Co. 50 574, 1085 | Shires v. Commonwealth 14eli LIST OF CA Page | Shisler v. Philadelphia 1120 Shissler v. People 847 Shively ». Bowlby 1109 Shobert v. May 673 | Shock ». McChesney 922 1113, 1133, | 1141, 1145 430 Shoemaker v. United States Shoen Brothers v. Atlanta Shohoney 2. Quincy, &c. R. Co. 141, 335 Sholl v. German Coal Co. 1127 Shonk v. Brown 206, 772, 785 | Shook v. Sexton 758 Shore »v. Splain 725 v. State 644 v. Wood Co. Bd. of Canvassers 1380 Short v. Bullion, B. & C. Mining Co. 1346 v. State 1083 Shortall v. Puget Sound Bridge, &c. Co. 297, 306, 1331 Shorter, et al., Matter of 540 v. People 630 v. Smith 575 Shortridge, Re 671, 934 | Shotwell v. Moore 993 | Shoultz v. McPheeters 180 Shover v. State 982, 1281 Shrader, Ez parte 185, 1270 v. Cleveland, &c. Co. 1153, 1199 Shreveport v. Cole 137 v. Leiderkrantz Soc. 1325 v. Levy 808, 966 | v. McClure 447 | v. Prescott 413 v. Schulsinger 1235 v. Southwestern Gas & E. Co. 3985 | Shreveport Traction Co. v. Shreveport 565, 566 | 1219 | 1149, v. Svara Shrunk v. Schuylkill Nav. Co. 1150, 1197 Shultz v. State 347 Shuman v. Fort Wayne 612 Shumate v. Heman 1053, 1076 Shumway v. Bennett 185, 198, 388 v. Stillman 60 Shurbun v. Hooper 1353 Shurtleff ». Parker 911 v. Stevens 910, 932, 945, 946 v. Wiscasset 474 Shwab v. Doyle 773 Siblerud, In re 192 Sibley v. Williams 75 Sibley, &c. R. Co. v. Elliott 573 Sic, In re 416 Sidgreaves v. Myatt 890 Sidwell v. Evans 120 Siebold, Ex parte 416, 720, 1361 Siegel, In re 25 Siegfried ». Raymond 1000 Sifers v. Johnson 1288, 1345 Sigourney »v. Sibley 870, 874 Sikes, Ex parte 420 Simmons, Ex parte SES CITED Page Silber v. Bloodgood 629 Silberman v. Hay 260, 868 Siler v. Louisville, &c. R. Co. 339 Silkman, Matter of 4 v. Bd. of Water Com’rs 427 Sill ». Corning 348, 355 Silliman v. Cummins 782 Sills v. Brown 665 Silsbee v. Stockel 792, 1107 Silvas, In re 724 | Silver v. Louisville &c. Co. 21 v. State 48 Silver Bow Co. v. Strombaugh 758 Silver Lake Bank v. North 255 Silverman v. New York 531 | Silverthorn Lumber Co. »v. United States 632 Silvey v. Lindsay 1367 | Silvus v. State 684 | Sim v. Edenborn 44 Simmer v. St. Paul 450 Simmonds v. Simmonds 193 723, 725 v. Camden 439 v. Commonwealth 250 v. Holster 887 v. Paterson 1151 v. Saul 59, 60 v. State Military Board 223 v. United States 689 v. West U. Tel. Co. 806 v. Wilson 1099 Simmons Hardware Co.v. McGuire 1018 Simms v. Railroad Co. 1202 Simon v. Bradley 987 v. Craft 839, 953 v. Durham 1407, 1408 v. London Guarantee, &c. Co. 924 v. Northrup 493 Simonds v. Simonds 209, 809 Simonds’s Ex’rs v. Gratz 983 Simons v. People 1400 Simpson v. Baily 305, 307 v. Nacogdoches 471 v». O’Hara 1344 ». Savings Bank 587, 77 v. Shepard 1275 v. State 75, 250 Simrall v. Covington 430 Sims, Re 610, 1019 v. Daniels 1360 v. Gay 861 v. Irvine 39 v. Jackson 1041 v. Sawyers £311 v. Sims 62 ». State 692 Sinelair v. Jackson 340, 341 v. Lincoln 494 Sing Lee, Ex parte 431 Singer v. Bender 889 v. National Bedstead Mfg. Co. 600 v. StateLIST OF CASES CITED Page Singer M’f’g Co. v. Fleming 255 v. McCollock 377 v. Wright 1009, 1015, 1305 Singer Sewing Machine Co. ». Brickell 366, 1007 Single v. Supervisors of Marathon 305, 788 218 1270 569, 1242 258, 1367 26 Singleton »v. State Sings »v. Joliet Sinking Fund Cases Sinks v. Reese Sinnot v. Davenport Sinsheimer v. Simonson 846 Sinton v. Ashbury 393 Sioux City v. School District 1091 Sioux City, &c. R. R. Co. v. Washing- ton Co. 1049 Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota Co. 844, 1024, 1059, 1064, 1093 Sioux City St. R. Co. v. Sioux City 1284 Sioux City Tr. & W. Co. v. Trust Co. of N. A. 40 Sioux Falls v. Kirby 430 v. Walser 1262 Sioux Falls Sav. Bk. ». Minnehaha 1040, 1048 Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope 253, 1005 Sipe, Re 430 Sisson v. Bd. of Sup’rs 187 v. Buena Vista Co. 295, 298, 1125, 1133, 1140, 1141, 1298 Sistersville Ferry Co. v. Russell 575 Sittler v. Custer Co. 1203, 1204 Sixth Ave. West, In re 1058 Skaggs v. State 662 Skain v. Milward 1418 Skaneateles Waterworks Co. v. Skan- eateles 556, 568, 818 Skelding v. Whitney 109, 110 Skellenger v. Smith 783 Skelton v. Ulen 1403 Skillman v. Chicago, &c. Co. 584, 1194 Skinner, Ex parte 727 v. Garnett Gold-Min. Co. 834 v. Hartford Bridge Co. 438, 1152 v. Henderson 1029 v. Santa Rosa 471 Slack v. Jacob 124, 125, 373, 374, 382 v. Maysville, &c. R. R. Co. 137, 1032 v. Railroad Co. 237, 479 Slade v. Lexington 555 v. Slade 109 Slater, Ex parte 638 Slaterville Finishing Co.v.Greene 1062 Slatten v. Des Moines, &c. Co. 1155, 1220 Slaughter ». Commonwealth 48 v. Louisville 1040 v. Meridian Light, &c. Co. 11533 1180, 1181, 1196, 1199 v. O’Berry 4 v. People 416 cli Page Slaughter House Cases 11, 19, 48, 67,580, 581, 602, 821, 822, 1232 Slauson v. Racine 363 Slaven v. Wheeler 874 Slavin v. McGuire 214 Slaymaker »v. Phillips 1377 Slayton v. Hullings 154 Sleght ». Kane 539 Slemmer v. Wright 707 Slinger v. Henneman 237, 245 Sloan v. Biemiller 1109 v. Cooper 109 v. Pacific R. R. Co. 566, 1240, 1242 v. State 393 Sloane v. Tiffany 750 Slover v. Union Bank 587 Smails v. White 305 Small v. American Sugar Ref. Co. 829 v. Danville 525 v. Frankfort 453 Smallwood v. York 928 Smally v. Anderson 890 Smart v. Aroostook Lumber Co. 1210, 1288, 1289, 1290 Smead v. Chandler 250 v. Indianapolis, &c. R. R. Co. 474 Smeaton v. Martin 1146, 1203 Smiley v. Kansas 40 v. McDonald 814 Smith, Hz parte 53, 54, 413, 724, 13827, 1405 Matter of 66 Petition of 725 v. Adrian 244 v. Alabama 1002, 1249, 1277 v. Appleton 598 v. Auditor-General 581 ». Ballantyne 112 v. Bd. of Review 109 v. Bohler 3034 v. Boston, &c. R. Co. 439 vo. Bryan 754 v. Burrus 943 v. Callanan 1106 v. Cameron 42, 67, 373, 1110, 1111, 1125, 11380, 1132, 1141 v. Cheshire 472 v. Chicago &c. Co. 1148 v. Clark 1017 v. Clark Co. 477 ». Claussen Park Drainage & Levee Dist. 1148 v. Cleveland 769, 791 v. Commonwealth 305, 307, 310, 652, 1086, 1214 v. Connelly 1136 v. Dirckx 773 v. Eastern R. R. Co. 1244 v. Farr 51 v. Frisbie 863 v. Gilbert 712 v. Godfrey 251 ». Goldsboro 1186cliv LIST OF CASES CITED Page Smith v. Good 90 v. Gould 607 v. Hard 774 v. Howard 922 v. Hoyt 320, 329 v. Hunter 34 v. Indiana 37 v. Inge 339 v. Jackson 1001 v. Janesville 240, 241 | v. Jeffecoat 1209 | v. Jennings 35 ». Judge 182, 355 v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co. 138, 348, 380, 381, 991, 1087 v. Kingston 1074, 1284 v. Knoxville 423 »v. Leavenworth 529 »v. Levinus 390 v. Long 702 v. Louisville 1046 v. Louisville Sewerage Com’rs 516 | v. Lyons 892 | ». McCarthy 236, 340 | v. McDowell 841 | v. McDuffee 621, 631 v. Macon 349 v. Maryland 66 v. Merchand’s Ex’rs 777 v. Milwaukee B.& T. Exchange 428 v. Mitchell 287, 288, 289, 321, 324 v. Moore 1353 v. Morrison 328, 765 v. Morse 404, 435 v. Myers 221 v. Nelson 962 v. Norment 221 v. Northern Neck Mut. F. Ass’n of Va. 587 v. Ohio Oil Co. 834 v. Packard 586, 587, 597 v. People 141, 667, 969 v. Reeves 23 ». Rice 859 ». Robersonville Graded School 509 | v. Rochester 453 v. St. Louis & S. W. Ry Co. 1271 ®. St. Paul, &c. R. Co. 141, 1196, | 1197, 1218 v. Santa Monica 1025 v. School Trustees 1370 v. Scott 935 v. Sedalia 1151 v. Selinsgrove 446 | v. Sherry 509, 764, 792, 1064 v. Short 996 | v. Shriver 42 | v. Silence 891 | v. Smith 60, 62, 326, 715, 850, 889 ». Speed 338 v. State 23, 54, 218, 662, 663, | 665, 695, 829, 1261, 1341 | Page Smith v. Stephens 742 v. Stewart 888 v. Strother 183 v. Sullivan 724, 725 v. Swormstedt 963 v. Thomas 896 v. Thursby 125 v. Townley Mfg. Co. $34, 1331 v. Township Board 386 v. Trimble 864 v. Van Gilder 587 v. Washington 438, 1152 v. White 113 v. Worcester 1053, 1073, 1082, 1298 Smith M. P. Co. v. McGroarty 50 Smithee ». Campbell 278 Smithman v. Gray 60 Smithson v. State 705 Smoot v. Wetumpka 518 Smuk v. People 631 Smyth v. Ames 20, 24, 1308, 1309, 1310 v. McMasters 1391 v. Titecomb 236 Smythe, Hx parte 235 v. State 638 Sneider v. Heidelberger 589 Snell, In re 727 Snetzer v. Gregg 368 Snider v. St. Paul 451 Snidow v. Giles County 821 Snively ». Record Publishing Co. 940 Snohomish Co. v. Haywood 1205 Snortum v. Snortum 776, 783, 785 Snow v. Fitchburg 1082 Snowhill v. Snowhill 201 Snyder v. Andrews 956 v. Bettman 996 v. Blake 1404 v. Bull 785 v. Fort Madison St. Ry. Co. 1179, 1180 v. Fulton 959 v. Marken 115 OB det, 18%) It, (Ohh. 1164 v. Rockport 438 v. Yates 249, 250, 251 Society, &c. v. Wheeler 40, 764, 772, 774, 800 Society for Savings v. Coite 993 Society of Scriveners v. Brooking 419 Soderberg, In re 51 | Sohcke, Hz parte 317 Sohier v. Mass., &c. Hospital 201 v. Trinity Church 961 | Sokel v. People 662, 663, 666 Solomon v. Cartersville 322 v. Commissioners 322 v. Oscoda 1107 | Somers v. Met. El. Ry. Co. 1177 | Somerset & Stoystown Road 316 Somerset County v. Pocomoke Bridge so. 295, 296, 300, 309LIST OF CASES CITED Page Somerville v. Hawkins 895 ». St. Louis Min., &c. Co. 566, 570 Somerville & Easton R. R. Co. v. Doughty 1212, 1215, 1218 Sommers v. Johnson 589 Soper v. Harvard College 1337 ». Lawrence Bros. Co. 362, 372 Sorchan v. Brooklyn 158 Sorocco v. Geary 1114, 1313 Sortwell v. Hughes 1255 Sourbier v. Brown 959 South & N. Ala. R. R. Co. v. Morris 360, 806 South Bend v. Martin 1015 v. Reynolds 469, 473 South Branch L. Co. v. Ott 42 South Carolina »v. Stall 582 124. 125; 126; 130, 133, 996, 997 South Carolina R. R. Co. v. Steiner 1164, 1167 ». United States South Carolina Western Ry. v. Ellen 803} South Chicago R. R. Co. v. Dix 1128 | South Covington & C. 8. Ry. Co. v. Bellevue 1047 | v. Berry 428 | v. Covington 1003 South Dakota v. No. Carolina 22 South East, &c. R. Co. v. Evansville, &c. E. R. Co. 298 South Georgia Mercantile Co. ». Lance 51 South Ottawa v. Perkins 277, 279, 472 South Park Com’rs v. Karpen 1117 v. Montgomery 1144, 1145 vo. Ward 109, 1110 Southard v. Central R. R. Co. 785 Southbound R. Co. v. Burton 1199 Southerland v. Norris 140 Southern B. & L. Ass’n v. Norman 255 Southern Electric Securities Co. 2. State 253 Southern Express Co. v. Common- wealth 694 ». Couch 833 2. Owens 76 v. R. M. Rose Co. 1099 v. Whittle 641 Southern Illinois, &c. Bridge Co. ». Stone 1143, 1145 Southern Indiana R. Co.v. Bedford 424 Southern Kansas R. Co. v. Oklahoma City 1117 Southern Operating Co. v. Chattanooga 9 Southern Pac. Co. v. Bogert 113 ». Campbell 1276 v. Denton 30, 254 v. Jensen 26 ». San Francisco Sav. Union 1213 Southern R. Co. v. Greene 825 ov. Gregg 1121 v, Grizzle 1247 cly Page Southern P. Co. v. Memphis 289, 316, 1133, 1141, 1190, 1214 v. St. Clair Co. 1031 v. United States 1274 v. Watts 1059 Southington v. Southington Water Co. 569 Southport 7. Ogden 413 Southwark Bank v. Commonwealth 125, 277, 278 Southwest Mo. L. Co. v. Taplin 556 Southwestern R. Co. v. Griffin 898 v. Paulk 1248 v. Telegraph Co. 1203, 1206 Southwestern Tel. &c. Co.v. Danaher 41 v. Smithdeal 1182 | Southwick v. Southwick 767 Southworth v. Edmands 1104 v. Palmyra & Jacksonburg R. R. Co. 291 Soutter v. Madison 598 Sovereign v. State 314, 316 Sowders v. Edmunds 858 Spaids v. Barrett 928 Spain, Re 1007 Spangler, In re 15 v. Jacoby 161, 277, 290 Spangler’s Case 31, 722 358, 1227, 1228, 1230, Spann v. Dallas 1315, 1318, 1325, 1327 Spare v. Springfield 1120 Sparf v. United States 652 Sparhawk 2. Sparhawk 192, 212 Sparrow v. Kingman 122 | Spaulding v. Nourse 787 v. Preston 623 Speakership, Re 270 Spealman v. Railroad Co. 1245 Spears v. People 685 v. State 654, 655 Specht v. Commonwealth 982, 1281 Spedden »v. Bd. of Education 385 Speed, In re 253 Speed’s Estate 735 Speer v. Athens 279, 1077 vy, Plank Road Co. 320 ». School Directors of Blairville 1032 Speidel v. Schlosser 169 Speight v. People 263 Spencer, Ex parte 724, 817 ». Board of Registration 1361 ». Conn. R. P. Co. 1209 v. Dearth 110, 115 v. MceMasters 890 ». Mayfield 446 v. Merchant 1030, 1032, 1047, 1053, 1065, 1072 v. Met. St. Ry. Co. 1217 v. State 125, 126, 315, 318, 665, 666, 696 Spengler v. Trowbridge 403 Sperry v. Flygare 1052 275 o. Willardclvi Page | Sperry & H. Co. v. Melton 1334 »v. Owensboro 1334 v. Tacoma 1334 Spickerman v. Goddard 1374 Spickler, Re 384 Spiegel’s House Furnishing Co. ». In- dustrial Commission 121 Spier v. Baker 1359 Spies v. Illinois 66, 676 Spiker v. Amer. Relief Soc. 60 Spill ». Maule 945 Spiller v. Woburn 387, 970 Spillman v. Williams 862 Splane v. Commonwealth 1282 Split Rock Cable Road Co., In re 1130 Spokane v. Camp 1315 v. Colby 1182 v. Dustine 1153 v. Ladies’ Benev. Soc. 439 Spokane, &c., R.Co.v. Spokane Co. 1058 Spokane, &c., Trust Co. v. Spokane Co. 1040, 1059, 1064 Spokane Hotel Co. v. Younger 1344 Spooner v. McConnell 79, 80, 81, 249 Sporrer v. Hifler 11, 997 Spoyd v. Ringing Rock Lodge 729 Spragg v. Shriver 206 Sprague v. Birdsall 820 v. Brown 141 ». Fletcher 49 | v. Norway 1397, 1398 v. Tripp 454 v. Worcester 1154 Spraigue v. Thompson 1003 Spratt ». Helena Power Trans. Co. 1130 Spreckels v. Spreckels 751 Spreckels Sugar Ref. Co. v. McClain 996 Sprecker v. Wakeley 587, 589, 762 | Sprigg v. Telegraph Co. 569 | Spriggins v. Houghton 1396 | Spring v. Russell 1033 Spring St. Co. v. Los Angeles 1076 Spring Valley Water Works». Barber 1062 v. San Francisco 818, 1308 v. San Mateo Water Works 1146 v. Schottler 569 | Springer v. Foster 40, 601 | v. United States 989, 1104 | Springfield ». Conn. River R. R. Co. 1115 v. Doyle 522, 529 | v. Green 1056 | v. LeClaire 518, 528 v. Springfield &c. Ry. 505, 567 Springfield, &c. Co. v. Cold Spring 47] v. Hall 1120 Springfield F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Keese- ville 454 Springfield Gas, &c. Co. v. Springfield 346, 360, 364, 368, 805 Springville ». Thomas 674, 677 | Squire v. Mudgett 590 | v. Portland 255 LIST OF CASES CITED Page Staats ». Washington 423 Stackhouse v. Lafayette 518 Stackpole v. Hallahan 1360 v. Hennen 928 Stacy v. Vt. Cent. R. R. Co. 1121 Stafford v. Sheppard 1413 Stahl v. Ringgold County 872, 874 Staley v. Illinois Cent. R. Co. 1003 Stamp v. Cass County 460 Stamps v. Burk 423 Stanchfield v. Newton 450 Standard Chemical & Oil Co. v. Troy 420 Standard Computing Scale Co. v. Farrell 25 Standard Distilling &c. Co. v. Spring- field Coal Min., &c. Co. Standard F. Ins. Co. v. Smithhart 701, 702 Standard Home Co. v. Davis 1339 Standard Oil Co. v. Kearney 418, 431, 432 Standidge v. Chicago, &c. R. Co. 865 Standiford v. Wingate 562 Standley v. U.S. R. R. Administration 763 Standpoint v. Doyle 1159 Stanfield v. Boyer 890 Stanfill v. Court of Co. Rev. 390 Stanford, Matter of 468 v. Coram 785 v. San Francisco 1061 v. Worn 1120 Stange v. Esval 261, 845 Staniford v. Barry 192 Stanislaus Co. v. San Joaquin &e. Co. 569 Stanley, Ex parte 646 v. Colt 201 ». Davenport 1171, 1190 v. Sangerville 516, 527 v. Schwalby 29, 33, 766 v. Stanley 1248 v. State 250 v. Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co. 1272 v. Webb 932, 933, 934, 936 Stanly County v. Coler 44, 474 Stannard v. Wilcox, &c. Sewing Mach. Co. 889 Stannard’s Corners Rural Cemetery Ass’n v. Brandes 1134 Stansell ». Amer. Radiator Co. 1105 v. Roach 281, 283, 285 Stanson v. Racine 365 Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co. 1022 v. Embry 285 v. Met. R. R. Co. 1282 Stanwood »v. City of Malden 1149 Staples v. Astoria 1372 Star Pub. Co. v. Donahoe 920 Star Transp. Co. v. Mason City 1343 Starbuck v. Murray 59, 856 Starin ». Genoa 237, 472 Starks v. Sawyer 1106LIST OF CASES CITED Page | Starkweather v. Bible Society 257 | State Starr v. Camden &c., Co. 1164, 1189 | v. Pease 210, 213 v. State 667 Starr Burying Ground Ass’n ». No. Lane Cemetery Ass’n 1118, 1134 State, Ex parte 165, 1357 ». Abraham 787 | ». Adams 186, 539, 568, | 653, 778, 1413 vy. Adams Exp. Co. 230, 839 | v. Agee 1018 v. Agey 1339 v. Ah Sam 296, 303 v. Aiken 1253 v v. Aime 632 v. ». Akers 279, 289, 298] __»v. v. Albee 676 | v. v. Alderson 4, 144, 154, 164, 373 |} D. v. Aldrich 1365 | z v. Algood 279, 319 1 v. Allen 301, 682, 741, 955 v v. Allison 657 | r v. Allmond 1250 v v. Alman 667, 688 v. v. Almy 673 dv. v. Alston 1045 v »v. Amana Soc. 962 v »v. Ambs 982, 1281 v v. American Sugar Refining Co. 88 v. ». American Surety Co. 304 v v. Amery 366 v v. Anderson 262, 615, 672, 1 1322, 1350, 1352, 1359 v v. Andrews 278 uv »v. Anselmo 682 z v. Applegarth 1008, 1050 z v. Archinard 1261 D v. Arlin 545, 546 f v. Armington 850 1 ». Arms 1358 v v. Armstead 183, 608 v. v. Armstrong 198, 826, 1330, 1331 v v. Ashbrook 1229 v. v. Ashley 348 v ». Ashman 51, 48 2 v. Askew 140 1 v. Ass’d Press 1306 a v. Assurance Co. of America 297 1 v. Atlantic &c. Co. 1285 178) 213; 1 230, 232, 364, 372 1 »v. Atwood 772 v. ». Auditor, &c. 150s Che v ». Austin 428, 640 v v. Avery 714, 1409 v v. Babcock 167, 319, 404 v. v. Babst 922 v. v2. Back 1043 v. v. Bacon 278 v. Bailey 329, 725 v v. Baker 139, 631, 660, 1259, v 1369, 1370, 1390 v ». Balch 920 v eeeeaeead4dceeeed ™ 8S clvii Page v. Baltimore, &c. R. R. Co. 757, 982 . Bancroft 128, 569, 570, 1141 Bank 592 ». Bank of S. C. 592 . Bankers’, &c. Ass’n 309 . Banks 665 ». Barba 833 ». Barbee WSU ide ». Barden 1390 ». Barge 418 ». Barker 558, 638, 1281 ». Barksdale 1263 ». Barnes 142, 665, 690, 975, 983, 1282 . Barnett 66 Barrels of Liquor 1256 Barrett 310, 682, 712 Bartles Oil Co. 1272 Bartlett 249, 659, 687 ». Bassett 372, 845, 1225, 1231 ». Bate 1414 . Bates 67, 225 ». Battle 690 . Bauman 726 Bayer 348, 380 Beal 660 . Beacon 149, 263 ». Beattie 427 . Beckner 639 Beddo 314 . Bednar 870 . Bee Pub. Co. 942 ». Behimer 692 . Belle Springs Creamery Co. 1336 ». Bellflower 531 ». Belvel 638 ». Beneke 225, 240, 868 . Benham 692 ». Benner 663 ». Bennett 249, 660, 1045 . Bentley 1062 Benton County Super. Ct. 1145 . Berg 1405, 1408 Berka 319 . Berkley 647 ». Berlin 804, 1255 ». Bernoudy 541 ». Berry 316 ». Beswick 663 ». Bibb St. Ch. 963 ». Bickford 361, 364, 371 Bienvenu . Biggs 815, 818 . Billings 839 . Billot 231 Binder 1350, 1401 Birkby 684 Birmingham Southern R. Co. 178, 354, 373 . Bishop 93 », Bixman 999, 1046 ». Black 663, 1359, 1391 . Blackwell 642@*ee¢eecec34aeee el viii State v. Blaisdell ». Board of Assessors ». Board of Com’rs ». Board of Deputy State Sup’rs 1375 ». Board of Education ». Board of Health LIST OF CASES CITED Page | 306, 691 . Blake 313, 340 . Blasdel 125 . Bley 865 ». Bloom 1357 », Blossom 1356 ». Blue Ridge 1398 1012, 1015 189, 190, 508 386, 387, 988, 1058, 1095 1270 ’ v. Board of Ins. Com’rs 19 ». Board of Liquidation 222, 386 | »v. Board of State Canvassers 1405, 1406 v. Board of Trustees 232 v. Boardman 424, 1283 v. Bode 1359 | v. Bollero 665 | v. Bond 328, 1369 v. Bonham 340, 347 | v. Bonnell 408 | v. Bonney 846 | v. Boone 1231 | v. Boone Co. 1114, 1190 v. Boone County Court 103 | v. Borowsky 675 | v. Borwick 631 v. Bostick 655 | v. Boswell 638 | v. Bott 982, 983 | v. Boucher 216 | v. Bowen 340, 805, 815, 1235 | v. Bowen & Co. 1332 | v. Bower 1408 | v. Bowers 300, 303, 662 v. Bowman 218 | v. Boyd 223, 224 | v. Bracco 1018 »v. Braden 224 v. Brady 892, 959 v. Brame 1259 ». Branin 393, 394 v. Brantley 90 v. Brassfield 1350 v. Brecht 691 v. Brennan’s Liquors 630, 868 v. Brewster 130, 140 v. Bridgeman, &c. Co. 306 v. Briggs 225, 231, 306 | v. Bristol 470 | v. Broatch 489, 490 v. Broadbelt 1322 v. Brodnax 295 v. Brokman 655 v. Brooken 361 v. Brookhart 136 ». Brooks 223, 224, 647, 657, 690, 1350 v. Browman 675 v. Brown 141, 180, 250, 279, 609, 640, 653, 680, 712 Page State ». Brown &c. Co. 833, 834 v. Brunst 562 v. Brunetto 665 v. Buchanan 75, 101, 1231, 1847 v. Buck 663 v. Buckner 725 v. Buente 373, 687 v. Bulkeley 1355 v. Bundy 640 v. Bunker 410 v. Bunting 833, 1346 v. Burbridge 1398 v. Burdge 231, 1345 v. Burdick 1360 v. Burgdoerfer 311, 844 v. Burgoyne 579 v. Burkett 1335 v. Burlington 449 v. Burlington, &c. Co. 278 v. Burlington Drug Co. 579 v. Burlington Lumber Co. 1010 v. Burnett 1410 v. Burnette 726 v. Burnham 897, 910, 912, 931, 945, 959 v. Burns 680 v. Burr 357, 707 v. Burrow 311 v. Butler 220, ola v. Butman 940 v. Butt 180 v. Butterfield 531, 532 v. Butterfield Live Stock Co. 51 v. Butts 1369 v. Buzine 53 v. Buzzard 730 v. Cadigan 50 v. Cain 314, 316 v. Caldwell 1007 v. Callahan 647, 725 v. Callaway 423 v. Callendine 686, 688 v. Callicut 1343, 1346 v. Calloway 423 v. Camden Common Pleas 263 v. Cameron 658 v. Camp Sing 146 v. Campbell 13; 75, 709} 1322 v. Candelaria 309 v. Candland 340, 373, 383 v. Canfield 742 v. Cape Girardeau, &c. R. R. Co. 72, 8%3 v. Cape May 441 v. Capital City Dairy Co. 1323, 1324 v. Cardozo 382 v. Carew 146, 597 v. Carlisle 682 v. Carman 75 v. Carr 531, 13855 v. Carrington 1361 v. Carro 66 v. Carroll 676, 1357, 1397State v. Carta LIST OF CASES Page | 653 v. Carter 260, 368, 1033 | v. Casey 679, 692 v. Cassidy 421, 1046, 1047 v. Cavers 1387, 1406 »v. Cawood 75 v. Central N. J. Tel Co. 1123 v. Ceriani 1259, 1263, 1264 v. Chambers 654 », Champeau 688 v. Chandler 62, 976, 977, 978 v. Chapel 1341 |} v. Chapman 1254 | v. Charleston (~) (yy } v. Chicago &c. Co. 443, 1228 v. Chicago, &c.R.Co. 129, 245, 246, 762, 1068, 1159, 1304 v. Chin Gin 632 v. Chuchola 632 v. Church 1392 v. Churchill 865 ». Cincinnati 508, 1064 ». Cincinnati Gas Co. 455, 813 1162, 1170, ». Cincinnati Tin, &c. Co. 790 9. Circuit Court 245, 311, 671, 943 v. Clark 263, 414, 423, 640, 691, 1395, 1401 v. Clarke 360, 421, 425, 1352, 1353, 1402 ». Clausen 144, 471, 825 o. Clausmeier 609, 610 v. Cleaves 659 v. Clement National Bk. 372 v. Clerk of Passaic 1406, 1409 ». Cleveland, &c. R. Co. 75 v. Click 158 o. Clifton 1322 ». Clinton 662 v. Clough 54 ». Coahoma Co. S22 OaG v. Coake 579 v. Cobaugh 1252 2. Cobb 673, 869 v. Cochran 987 v. Coffee 657 v. Coffman 685 v. Cole 1259 v. Coleman 640 v. Coleman & Maxcy 740 v. Colgate 685 v. Collector of Jersey City 1093 v. Collett 1282 v. Collier 1392 v. Colora 1259, 1260 D D . Chehalis County . Chehalis Co. Super. Ct. 1117, 1127 . Chelan Co. Super. Ct. . Chicago - Columbia Water Power Co. . Commissioner 1016, 1072, | 1099, 1298, 1405 | 1158 | 1114 804 1290, 1294 316 CITED clix Page State v. Commissioners 473 v. Com’rs of Baltimore 360 v. Com’rs of Clinton Co. 237 ». Com’rs of Hancock 237 v. Com’rs of Ormsby Co. 181 v. Com’rs of Perry Co. 363, 364 v. Com’rs of R. R. Taxation 569 v. Com’rs of School and Univ. Lands 597 ». Common Council of Madison 404 ». Common Pleas 983 v. Congdon 667 ». Conlon 93 v. Connor 688 ». Constantine 1401 v. Constitution, The 1280 v. Cook 14, 714 v. Cooke 245 v. Cooler 552 v. Cooley 1088 ». Cooper 691 ». Co-operative Store Co. 306, 1336 v. Copeland 225, 245, 360 v. Copp 668 ». Corbett 290, 1331, 1332 v. Cornell 309, 1027 v. Corner 1369 ». Corson 552, 553 ». Cosgrove 1409 v. County Canvassers 1406 v. Co. Com’rs 1408 v. Co. Com’rs of Baltimore 158, 804 ». County Court 262, 1091 v. Co. Ct. of Boone 260 v. Co. Judge 1407 v. County Judge of Davis Co. 295, 301 v. Co. of Hudson 516 v. Covington 215, 312 v. Cowan 393, 416 v. Cowlitz Co. Super. Ct. 1110, 1127 ». Cox 360, 674 v. Craig 140, 872 vy. Crane 873 v. Crawford 227, 375, 641 v. Cray 1322 v. Creamer 741 v. Creeden 1253 v. Crenshaw 422 v. Crescent City Creamery Co. 1323 v. Crooker 663 ». Crosly Bros. Mercantile Co. 1334 v. Cross 315, 691 ». Croteau 682 v. Crounse 324 v. Crowe 290, 1344 ». Crowell 962 ». Crummey 415 ». Cudahy Packing Co. 1049 v. Cullam 834 v. Cullom 1331 ». Cumberland, &c. R. R. Co. 1041clx Dv 0 v D ee 2 2 e eeeee e e s . ¢ eer cen oe v. Selma 420 | Verges v. Milwaukee Co. 8 Van Horn v. Des Moines 446 | Vermont Hydro-El. Corp. ». yee Ot v. People 986, 1322 90, 11 Van Horne v. Dorrance 348 | Verner v. Carson ee Van Inwagen v. Chicago 757 | v. cose ae v. Eg - 109 erner 22 a TEA Ecce nes Daily Newa Gor Ocala Martindale 295, 297, 309 an Loukhuyzen v. Daily News Co. | ernor I . eis ts ana Vann v. State 42 2 ecretary of Sta 306 Van Ness v. Pacard 70, | Vesta Mills v. Charleston 226 Van Norman ». Gordon 64 | ‘| Vestal v. Little Rock 1064 Van Orsdal v. Van Orsdal 850 | Veterans’ Welfare Board ». Ee a Van Pelt v. Davenport 450, 529 | : che 1 oe nea v. Hilliard 297 | Vette v. Childers Zoe Van Reipen v. Jersey City 1130 Vetter v. Broadhurst - Van Rensselaer v. Ball 586, 755 ed v. Hamilton Co: a v. Hays 586 | Vickers v. Stoneman v. eutney 39 | Vickroy v. Ferndale 1120 v. Read 755 pee ». Richardson 451 ». Snyder 586, 591, 592 _ Tobin 1016 Van Riper v. No. Plainfield 309 | Vic kabute v. Vicksburg Wee aonsael ae ». Parsons 262, 314, 815 Co. Vansant v. Harlem Stage Co. 420 packebure Waterworks Co. v. Vicks- ie V t, K. & Co. v. Common- urg ‘ 0 aan pa 1010 | Vicksburg, &c. Co. v. Dennis 572 Van Slyke »v. Ins. Co. 180, 193| Vicksburg & M. R. R. Co. v. Lowry 9 Vanvactor v. State 714 222, 223clxxxiv LIST Page Victoria v. Victoria Ice, Light & P. Co. 396, 578 Victory, The 34 2|W Vidal v. Girard’s Ex’rs 976 Viel v. Summers 1413 Vietti v. George K. Mackie Fuel Co. 26 Vigliotti v. Pennsylvania 41, 1259, 1260, 1261 Vigo Co. v. Stout 181 Vilas ». Milwaukee & Miss. R. R. Co. 1209 Village of Delhi, In re 1025 Vinas v. Merch. &c. Co. 924 Vincennes v. Citizens’ &ce. Co. 428, 440 v. Richards 447, 1152 Vincennes University v. Indiana 78 Vincent v. Nantucket 457, 461 Violett v. Alexandria 1049, 1077 v. Violett 797 Viosea v. Landfried 934 Virginia, Ex parte 18, 19, 720, 804 v. Rives 19, 804 »v. Tennessee 45 v. West Virginia 186 | Virginia, &c. Coal Co. v. Charles 766 Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. v. Kirven 109, 113 Vischer v. Vischer 849, 856 Viss v. Calligan 923 | Vogel v. Gruaz 702, 925 | v. Pekoe 806, 836 v. State 1353 Voglesong v. State 982, 1281 Vogt v. Louisville 573 Voight v. Milwaukee County 1156 v. Wright 1272 Volpi, Hx parte 1262, 1263 Von Hoffman v. Quincy 598 Voorhees, Matter of 52 Voorhies v. Faust 615, 622 Vose v. Morton 848 WwW Wabash, &c. Co. v. Beers 558 v. McDougall 1152 Wabash R. Co. v. Defiance 440 v. Tourville 59 Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co. ». Illinois 1304 Waco v. Powell 426 Wade v. La Moille 472 v. Richmond 394 v. State 667 v. Travis Co. Al »o. Walnut 40 Wadleigh v. Gilman 425, 1314 Wadley Southern R. Co. v. Georgia 40, 832 Wadsworth v. Union P. R. Co. 843 Wadsworth’s Adm’r v. Smith 1290 Wagaman »v. Byers 887 Waggoner v. Flack 44, 587, 592 OF CASES CITED Page Wager v. Troy Union R. R. Co. 1164, 1167 169 1a Wagner, Ex parte ». Bissell ». Bristol Belt Line R. Co. 1179, 1181 ee v. Gage County 1217 v. Leser 1074, 1077 v. Portland 453 v. Railway Co. 1207, 1208 v. St. Louis 418 v. Upshar 623 Wahlitz, In re 13, 14 Wahoo »v. Dickinson 198, 228 Waiohinu Agri. & Grazing Co., In re 1095 Wait v. Ray 387 Waite v. Brendlin 1403 v. Merrill 962 v. Santa Cruz 475, 478 Wakefield v. Newport 453 Walbridge v. Robinson 818 Walcher v. First Presb. Ch. 1315 Walcott v. People 1008 Waldo v. Portland 484 v. Waldo 850 Waldron v. Haverhill 454 v. Rensselaer & Saratoga R. R. Co. 1239 v. Rensselaer & Schenectady Re Re Co: 1245 Waldrop v. Kansas City, &c. Co. 531 Wales v. Lyon 109 v. Stetson 566, 818 v. Wales 586 alker v. Allen 1288 v. Caldwell 294, 314 v. Chapman 1049 120, 153, 178, 238, 264, 345, 346, 351 v. Cincinnati v. Deaver 753 v. Dunham 301 v. Faelber 1283 v. Garland 64 v. Harbor Com’rs 39 v. Jameson 814 v. New Mexico, &c. R. Co. 40, 78 v. Oswald 1350 v. Pelle 562 v. Richmond 407 v. Rome 398 v. Sanford 1398, 1399 v. Sauvinet 19, 67 ». Shasta Power Co. 1124 v. Spokane 352, 987 v. Springfield 1046 v. State v. Towle 305, 309, 706 229, 1322 v. Villavaso 34 v. Walker 58 v. Whitehead 593 Walkley v. State 705 Walkowsky v. Garfunkel 888LIST OF CASES CITED Wall, Ex parte 169, 225, 240, 244, ». Parrot Silver, &c. Co. vy. Trumbull 859, Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co. 437, 556, 796, 820 | Warburton v. White Wallace, In re 706 | Ward, Ex parte ». Adams 861 | v. Barnard v. Ferguson 1333 v. Boyce ». Georgia C. & N. Ry. Co. 886, 898 | v. Culver ». Hines 1015, 1020 | v. Farwell »v. Menasha 453 | v. Flood v. Myers 1044 v. Greencastle v. Norman 445 v. Greenville v. Reno 578 v. Love County ». Richmond 458, 1313 v. Maryland v. Sharon Trustees 394 997, v. Shelton 1056, 1081 v. Morris v. Wallace 850 ». New England, &c. Co. ». Winfield 1145 v. Peck Wallapai &c. Co. v. Territory 774, 792 ». State Wallenberg v. Minneapolis 439 v. Ward Waller v. Loch 895 v. Warner Walling v. Michigan 1005, 1017 Ward & Gow ». Krinsky Wallis v. Bazet Walls, Ex parte ». Midland Carbon Co. Wally’s Heirs v. Kennedy Walnut v. Wade Page 707 803 Wantlan v. White Wanzer v. Howland 861 | Waples v. Marrast | Warbiglee v. Los Angeles 949 707 | Ward Lumber Co. ». 1319, 1320 | 735, 810 | Ward Seminary v. Nashville 266, 320, 407 | Warden 2». Walpole v. Elliott 355, 793 ». Mass. Chem. Co. 1117 Walschlager v. Liberty 481 Walsh, In re 649 ». Barron 1054 ». Columbus, &c. R. Co. 33, 43 v. Pulitzer Pub. Co. 920 v. Rutland 453 v. State 267 Walston v. Commonwealth 552 »v. Nevin 843 Walter v. Bacon 775 v. People 552 Walters v. Baltimore, &c. R. Co. 1157, 1158 ». Commonwealth 622 v. Duke 1047 v. Indianapolis 428 v. Marshalltown 1152 v. Sentinel Co. 943 v. State 641 Waltham v. Kemper 516, 519 Walther v. Warner 1202, 1206 Waltingly v. Commonwealth 619 Walton v. Develing 1373 »v. Greenwood 227 v. Moore 1106 Walton Lunch Co. v. Kearney 669 Waltz v. Waltz 850 Wamesit Power Co. v. Allen 1120 Wammack »v. Holloway 1409 Wandt v. Hearst’s ‘‘ Chicago Ameri- can’’ 889 Wanek v. Winona 609 Wanser v. Atkinson 370, 749 White Mfg. Co. Madisonville, Co. Wardlaw v. Buzzard Ware v. Fitchburg v. Hylton v. Little v. Miller ». Owens ». Wichita Warfield v. Vandiver Warickshall’s Case Waring v. Jackson v. Savannah Warner v. Bowdoin Sq. Bapt. Soc. vy. Curran ». Ford Lumber, &c. Co. ». Grand Haven v. Paine v. People v. Scott ». Trow Warren »v. Bd. of Registration vy. Chicago ». Commonwealth v. Glynn v. Henley ». Lyons City ». McCarthy ». Mayor, &c. of Charlestown ». Paul ». St. Paul, &c. R. R. Co ». Shuman v. Sohn v. State 588, 864, 1332 47, 822, 996, 1337, Henderson- &e. 1078, clxxxv Page 769 387, 807 433 423 37 1016, 1017 1016 201 1159 657 957 34, 41, 1338, 1339 342, 352 1089 R. 1144 763 505 9, 26 1107 589 752 1315, 1319 87, 223 656 39 1041, 1051 961 806 575, 1196 1082 923, 928 561, 562 109 109 1365 1064 552 862 1079, 1084 502 59 360, 363 996 1112, 1146 129 843 682elxxxvi LIST OF CASES CITED Page | Warren Manuf. Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co. Warrenton v. Smith 530 Warshung v. Hunt 772 Warwick v. Underwood 109 Wasem v. Fargo 421, 422 | Washburn v. Cooke 896, 911 v. Franklin 757, 781 v. Milwaukee, &c. R. R. Co. 1217 v. Oshkosh 1064 Washington, Ex parte 725 v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. 565, 1239 »v. Dawson & Co. 226 | 2. Hammond 416 v. Mayor &c. of Nashville 1284 v. Meigs 1322 | v. Miller 317, 318 v. Nashville 1283 v. Page 147, 163, 312 | v. Public Service Comm. 395 1029, 1055, 1056, 1074, 1075, 1080 Washington Boom Co. v. Chehalis Boom Co. Washington Bridge Co. v. State 1240, 1243 Washington Avenue 1221 Washington County v. Berwick 484 v. Franklin R. R. Co. 298 Washington Gas Light Co. v. Dist. Columbia 519 Washington Ins. Co. v. Price 870, 871, 872, 874 Washington St., In re 259, 263 Washington University v. Rouse 571 Washingtonian Home v. Chicago 168 Wason v. Walter 881, 919, 935, 944 Wasson v. Wayne Co. Com’rs 1059 Waterbury v. Newton 1252, 1278, 1323 v. Platt 1123 v. Platt Bros. & Co. 1119, 1122 Water Com’rs of Norwich v. Johnson 735, 741 241 113 Waterhouse v. Public Schools Water, Light, &c. Co. v. Hutchinson Waterloo W. Mfg. Co. v. Shanahan 1028, 1141 Waters v. Leech 417 Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Bridwell 891 v. Hot Springs 413, 431 v. Texas 35, 37, 253, 552, 559, 743 Watertown v. Mayo 1270, 1824, 1329 Watertown Bank, &c. v. Mix 867 Waterville ». County Com’rs v. Kennebeck County Water Works Co. ». Burkhart 316, 1111, 1141, 1145, 1170, 1195 Watkins, Hx parte 724, 725 ». County Court 515 v. De Armond 711 ». Haight 772 v. Holman’s Lessee 201 v. Inge 1356 v. Walker Co. 1114 v. French Page 50 | Watkinson v. Hotel Pa. 232 Watson, Ex parte 644, 645 In re 178, 1050 v. Atlanta 452 v. Avery 962 v. Blackstone 180 v. Cowles 1089 v. Jones 961, 962, 963 v. Kent 318 v. McCarthy 888 | v. Mercer 543, 782, 783, 789 v. Needham 447 v. New York Cent. R. R. Co. 588, 590 v. Pittsburg, &c. R. Co. 1197 v. State 250, 620 v. Thurber 135 Watson Seminary v. Co. Ct. of Pike lao: 565 Watson’s Case 249 | Watt v. People 661 Watters v. Omaha 448 | Watterson v. Halliday 1090 Watts, In re 600 v. Greenlee 890 v. State 646 v. Waddle 62 | Waugh »v. Glos 245 v. Prince 519 Waxahachie v. Brown 404 | Way v. Barney 148, 168, 171 v. Lewis v. Way 127, 130 Wayland v. Co. Com’rs 1025 v. Herring 315 Wayman v. Southard 183 Wayne Co. v. Waller 700 Wayrick v. People 676 Weare v. Dearing lil | Weaver v. Cherry 463 v. Chicago First National Bank 116, 121 v. Davidson County 93, 263 v. Lapsley 165, 192, 305, 309, 311 v. Miss., &c. Co. 1158 Webb, Ex parte 317 ». Baird 700, 816 ». Beavan 887 v. Den 766, 767, 768 v. Dunn 1016 v. State 640 Webber v. Donnelly 1255 v. Salt Lake City 439 Weber v. Freed 1275 v. Harbor Com’rs 1112 v2. Minneapolis 451 v. Morris, &c. 109 v. Reinhard 346, 1041, 1071 v. State 687 Webers, In re Cau Webster v. Beaver Dam 756 v. Fargo 1072 158LIST OF CASES CITED clxxxvii Page Webster ». Harwinton 388, 391, 481 | Wells ». Burbank v. Reid 856, 859 v. Hyattsville Com’rs v. Rose 597 v. Johnson v. Susquehanna Pole Line Co. 570, v. McClenning 1140, 1143 v. Mo. Pac. R. Co. Wecherley v. Guyer 1395 v. People Weckler v. Chicago 1201 v. Robertson Weed v. Black 283 2. Salina v. Boston 1075, 1077, 1082 v. Savannah v. Donovan 77 v. Scott y. Foster 891 v. Somerset, &c. R. R. Co. Weeks v. Gilmanton 395 ». Supervisors ». Milwaukee 393, 791, 1038, 1057, v. Taylor 1393, 1064, 1068, 1078, 1092, 1101, 1326 ». Weston 792, v. United States 66, 611, v. Wisconsin River Power Co. 617, 632, 636 1160, Weems v. United States Weet v. Brockport Wehn v. Com’rs Weidenfield ». Sugar Run Weidenger v. Spruance Weightman v. Washington 695, 696 | Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Crawford Co. 517, 520, 521 447 v. Jersey City Ry: Co. 1130) v. Johnson 589, 749 Welman, In re 450, 516, 518 | Welsh v. Cross Weil ». Lynds 923 v. St. Louis v. Newbern 474, 475 v. Shumway 1366, v. Ricord 1326 v. State Weill v. Kenfield Weimer v. Bunbury 348, 741, 1104 ». Missouri 1000, 1005, 1009, Weir v. Cram 363 | Wendel v. Durbin vo. Day 386 | ». Hoboken Bd. of Education v. Rountree 258 | Wendling v. Commonwealth 647, v. St. Paul, &c. R. R. Co. 1111| Wendt v. Berry 383, 1355, 1356, Weis v. Ashley Weisberg v. Weisberg Weise v. Smith 1 Weismer v. Douglas 288, 312 | Welton v. Dickson 294, 320| Wenham ». State 190, 191 Wenner v. Thornton 288, 1289, 1291 | Wenzler v. People 468, 1029, 1033 | Werner, Re 1125, 1126, Weiss v. Guerineau 862 v. Galveston ». Stearn 1023 v. Pelletier v. Whittemore 888 | Wernimont v. State Weissengoff ». Davis 258 Weister v. Hade 11, 355, 372, 485, 486, 777, 788, 988 Weitzel v. Brown 666 Welborn v. Akin 593 Welch »v. Burrill 1022 ». Hotchkiss 420, 425, 1046 v. Md. Cas. Co. 230, 1333 v. Post 309 v. Stowell 425, 1326 v. Swase 229 v. Swasey 231, 1318 v. Swazey 845 v. Sykes 59 ». Wadsworth 599, 757, 777, 781 Welch Water, &c. Co. ». Welch 598 Weldon ». Winslow 789 Welker v. Potter 262 Weller v. Burlington 446 Wellington, Petitioner 341, 360, 372 v. Boston, &c. R. Co. 1215 Wellman, In re 278 v. Wickerman 1124 Wells, Ex parte 305 v. Bain 84, 88 | Wernwag 2. Pawling | Wessel v. Timberlake Wessling v. Nye West, Ex parte ». Bancroft . First Pres. Ch. . Kansas Natural Gas Co. 1001, ssec . Sansom . West v. Wichita 1315, 1317, West Branch, &c. Canal Co. ». Mulliner West Chicago Park Com’rs 2. McMullen West Chicago St. R. Co. 2. Illinois West Hartford ». Water Com’rs West Jersey R. R. Co. v. Cape May, &c. Co. ee West River Bridge Co. v. Dix 575, West Skokie Drainage Dist. ». Dawson West Virginia v. Laing West Virginia Transp. Co. v. Vol- canic Oil & Coal Co. 1121, 1123, Page 1103 1087 1059 109 326 386 1406 404 1094 862 1114 472 1398 1062 1196 1012 445 1064 326 596 525 1379 50 1141 1017 158 1132 648 1357 1346 320 304 309 238 61 706 61 347 1035 1334 1177 964 1005 592 715 1318 1152 263 1294 1025 1164 1115 1215 720 1134 ‘ Et i i Hy H ielxxxvlii LIST OF CASES CITED Page Page West Va., P. & T. Ry. Co. v. Gib- Western Union Tel. Co. v. Mayor 1278 son 1215, 1218 v. New Hope 418, 1007 West Wis. R. Co. v. Supervisor of v. Pendleton 1269, 1278 Trempeleau Co. 571] v. Philadelphia 1046 ». Supervisors 569 v. Speight 1001 Westbrook, Appeal of 1246 ». State 364, 440, 757 v. Baldwin Co. 1153 v. Taggart 1012 v. Deering 284 v. Tyler 1269 v. Miller 147 v. Western, &c. R. Co. 1114 Westenberg, Ex parte 639 ». Williams 1182 Westerfield, Ez parte 261 v. Wilson 35 Westerly Waterworks v. Westerly v. Wood 1001 556, 568 | Westervelt v. Gregg 739, 751, 754, 75a Westerman v. Supreme Lodge K. of v. Lewis 59 P. 773| Westfall ». Preston 1106 Western &c. Co. v. State 23 v. Wait 111 Western & A. Ry. Co. ov. City of | Westfield Cemetery Ass’n v. Daniel- Atlanta 1326} son 1134 ». Young 434, 1247 | Westinghausen v. People 105, 183 Western, &c. R. Co. v. Western | Westminster National Bank v. New Union Tel. Co. 1114, 1117,} England Electrical Works 113 1133, 1159, 1191 | Westminster Water Co. v. West- Western College v. Cleveland 445,/ minster 407, 437, 584 507, 525 | Weston v. Barnicoat 888 Western Fund Saving Society v. v. Charleston 38, 65, 992 Philadelphia 526 | v. Foster 1194 Western Indemnity Co. »v. Pillsbury | v. Loyhed 866 835, 1339 | ». Ryan 260, 316 v. Pittsburg 1338 | ». Syracuse 382, 455 Western Life Indemnity Co. ». | West Orange »v. Field 450 Rupp Western Newspaper Union v. Des 740 | Westport Stone Co. v. Thomas 4 Moines 1157 Western R. Co. v. Alabama, &e. R. Co. 1164 v. De Graff 224 Western States L. Ins. Co. v. Lock- wood 204 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Alabama 367 ». Beasley 1001 | v. Bolling 1001, 1269 v. Bushnell 1001 v. Call Pub. Co. 69 ». Carew 417 v. Commercial Mill Co. 1269 v. Crovo 1269 ». Crow 38 v. Decatur 1045 v2. Eubank 1305 v. Foster 1020 v. Fremont 1007 v. Hill 1133 | v. Howell 1269 v. Hughes 38 v. Indiana 1013 ». James 1268 v. Kansas 367, 368, 1006, 1013 v. Lakin 994 v. Lee 1003, 1005, 1269 v. Louisville, &c. Co. 790, 1110, 1120, 1191 v. Massachusetts 991, 1012 v. Mayer 988 1127, 1144 Wetherell v. Stillman 59 Wetmore v. Multnomah Co. 1041 Wettengel v. Denver 426 Weyerhauser v. Minnesota 742, 828, 1065, 1104 Weyl v. Sonoma R. R. Co. 1164 Weyler v. Gibson 24 Weyman v. Jefferson 438, 450 Weymouth & Braintree Fire Com’rs v. Co. Com’rs 394, 399, 503 Weyrich v. People 638 Whaley »v. Northern Road Improv. Dist. 1040, 1100 ». State 373 Whalin v. Macomb 158 Whallon, In re 715 v. Ingham Circ. Judge 351 Wharen v. Dershuck 957 Wharton v. Greensboro 393 Wheat v. Ragsdale 1414 v. Smith 1351, 1368, 1372, 1410, 1412 Wheatley v. State 649 Wheaton v. Beecher 920 v. Peters 69, 75 Wheeler v. Boguephalia Drain Dist. 1218 2. Boston 392, 426 v. Chicago 156 v. Chubbuck 327 v. Cincinnati 446 v. Contoocook Mills Corp. 1338LIST OF CASES CITED clxxxix Page Page Wheeler v. Ft. Dodge 520, 529| White v. Met. W.S. El. Ry. Co. 1215 v. Gilsum 516 v. Multnomah Co. 1369 v, Jackson 765 v. Nashville, &c. Co. 1202 v. Lawrence 1413 v. New Bern 522 BONE YN. H. & O. R: Co: v. Nichols 894, 896 33, 361 v. Northwestern N. C. R. Co. 1164 v. Patterson 1395 vy. Pennsylvania R. Co. 1149, 1155 2. Philadelphia 262 v. People 1055, 1056, 1074, 1080 vy. Plymouth 447 v. Phillipston 449 ». Rochester, &c. Co. 1195 ». Sanderson 1359 v. St. Johnsbury 1209 v. Schloerb 600 ». Shields 940 v. Scott 339 v. Spencer 1391 ». Seama 1366 v. State 304, 677 v. Smith 1089 ». United States 627 v. Stamford 351, 462 vo. Wall 349 v. State 690 v. Weightman 346 ». Tallman 433 Wheeling & B. Bridge Co. v. Wheel- ». Turner 424 ing Bridge Co. 573 v. United States 772 Wheeling Bridge Case 1292, 1295, 1296 v. Walker 50 Wheeling, &c. R. Co. v. Toledo, &e. v. White 209, 674, 778, Ri. Co. 1148, 1144 857, 865, 1126 Wheelock v. Lowell 487 v. Yazoo City 438, 447 ». Young 1114 v. Zane 134 Wheelock’s Election Case 1397 | White Auto Co. v. Collins 1257 Wheelon v. So. Dakota Land Set- White County v. Gwin 181 tlement Board 178, 299, 306, | White Lick Meeting v. White Lick 354, 361, 372| Meeting 963 Wheelwright v. Trefry 293 | White Mountains R. R. Co. v. White Whetstone v. Slonaker 384 Mts. R. R. Co. of N. H. 786 Whipley ». McCune 1397 | White Plains, In re 1222 Whipple v. Farrar 754 Matter of 1134 Whish v. Public Service Comm. 1004 | White Plains Water Com’rs, In re 1220 Whitaker v. Hitt 55, 1001| White River Turnpike Co. v. Vt. Whitaker & Fowle v. Lane 121 Cent. R. R. Co. 1115, 1143 Whitcomb ». Chase 1400 | White School House v. Post 755 Whitcomb’s Case 670 | White Sewing Mach. Co. v. Harris 773 White, Ex parte 55, 1317 | White Star Co. v. Gordon Co. 517 Re 1007 | Whitebread v. The Queen 696 ». Ainsworth 744 | Whitecar v. Michenor 964 ». Atlanta 399 Whited v. Lewis 305 ». Blanchard Bros. Granite Co. | Whitehead v. Latham 588 1187 |} Whitehouse v. Androscoggin R. R. v. Bracelin 1254| Co. 1220 v. Buchanan 846, 847 | Whitehurst v. Coleen 853 ». Carroll 922, 923 | ». Rogers 109 v. Chalfield 475 | Whitely ». Adams 895, 946 v. Charleston 1114 ». Miss., &c. Co. 1217 v. Clark 1126 | Whiteman »v. Railroad Co. 102 v. Co. Com’rs of Norfolk 1219 | Whiteman’s Ex’r v. Wilmington, &c. v. Crow 861 Co. 1143 v. Farmers’ Highline Canal & Whiterocks Irr. Co. v. Mooseman_ 1117 RCo. 1302 | Whitesell v. Strickler 109 v. Flynn 769 | Whitfield ». Longest 426, 1283, 1326 v. Glover 60 v. Paris 453 v. Hart 89, 585 | Whiting v. Barney 701 v. Hinton 280 ». Commonwealth 1221 v. Holman 580, 581 ». Earle 712 v. Kendrick 740 2». Mount Pleasant 297 v. Kent 423, 1335 v. West Point 404 v. Ladd 110 | Whiting’s Estate, Re 1061 v. Manhattan Ry. Co. 1205 | Whitley v. State 666, 667 v. NMlayor 417 | Whitlock ». Hawkins 774, 792Page Whitlow v. Nashville, &c. R. Co. 120 Whitman 2. Boston & Me. R. R. Co. 1219} ». National Bank of Oxford 169 | Whitmore v. Harden 78 | v. State 688, 689 Whitney »v. Allen 909, 910 v. Dick 721, 724 v. Ragsdale 1041 | ». Richardson 800 v. Robertson 27 v. State 20, 637 v. Stow 398 v. Toledo 1187 v. Township Board 1255, 1256 v. Wyman 163 | Whitsett ». Union D. & R. Co. 445 | Whitson »v. Franklin 424, 1243 Whittaker v. Deadwood 1058, 1074, 1153 v. Johnson Co. 109 LIST OF CASES Whittelsey v. Conniff 804 Whittemore v. Weiss 959 Whitten v. Haverhill 451 v. State 690 v. Tomlinson 52, 56 Whittier ». Farmington 762 v. Wendell 59 Whittingham v. Bowen 1126 Whittington v. Polk 108, 333, 348 Whittle ». Saluda Co. 709 Whitwell, Hx parte 1331 | Whorton v. Morange 847 | Whyte v. Nashville 435 | Wichita v. Missouri, &c. Telephone Co. 189 Wichita Falls, &c. R. Co. v. Holloman 1213, 1214 Wichita R. & Lt. Co. v. Public Ut. Comm. 234 Wick v. Gunn 1338 v. The Samuel Strong 40 Wicks v. De Witt 447 v. Mason 1314 Wider v. East St. Louis 497 | Widmayer v. Davis 1403 | Wierse v. Thomas 51 Wigal v. Parkersburg 525 Wiggin v. State 632 Wiggins v. Chicago 423 Wiggins & Johnson v. Williams 869 Wiggins Ferry Co. v. East St. Louis 1016, 1047, 1296 Wight v. Baltimore, &c. R. Co. 748, 845, 1330, 1332 ». Davidson 1053, 1075, 1077, 1208 v. Police Jury 791 Wilber v. Fort Dodge 451 Wilbraham v. Ludlow 1366 Wilbur ». Springfield 1074 Wilby »v. Elston 890 Wilcock v. Beaver Valley R. Co. 1199 Wilcox, In re 1380 v. Chicago 453 v. Deer Lodge Co. 497, 1036 CITED Page | Wilcox ». Edwards 137 v. Hemming 426, 1283 v. Jackson 39 v. Kassick 859 v. Luco 21 v. Meriden 1218 v. Nolze 53 v. Rochester 452 v. St. Paul, &c. Ry. Co. 1215 v. Smith 1357 v. Wilcox 849 Wild v. Deig 1126 v. Paterson 517 Wilder v. Boston &c. Co. 1123 v. Case 110 v. Chicago, &c. Co. 771, 806, 1245 v. Maine Central R. R. Co. 1244 Wildes v. Vanvoorhis 751 Wildey v. Collier 280 Wildharver v. Lunkenheimer 768 Wiles v. Williams 340 Wiley v. Bluffton 393 v. Flournoy 158 v. McDowell 1380 v. Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. 889, 891 v. Parmer 1016 v. Sinkler 823 Wilkens v. Hillman 1071 Wilkerson ». Cheatham 794 v. Rahrer 384 v. Rome 335, 346, 373, 972 Wilkes v. Wood 626 Wilkes-Barre v. Meyers 262 Wilkes-Barre Deposit & Sav. Bk. »v. Wilkes-Barre 1089 Wilkes County ». Call 141 v. Coler 475, 477 Wilkes’s Case 615 Wilkie v. Chicago 400, 401 Wilkins, Ex parte 674 v. Detroit 1057 v. Hillman 1054, 1080 v. McCorkle 859 v. Miller 304 v. Rutland 528 v. State 1342 Wilkinsburg v. Public Service Com. 396 Wilkinson v. Cheatham 795 v. Leland 188, 200, 203, 343, 357 v. Lord 299, 302, 316 Will ». Brown 316 Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. 80, 1002, 1292, 1295 Hatch Willamette Iron Works »v. Oregon Guo: 1154 Willard v. Harvey 773 v. Killingworth 391, 431 v. Longstreet 594 v. People 362, 366 v. Presbury 1052, 1075 Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co. 832, 1309 v. Kassick 59LIST OF CASES CITED excl Page Page Willett ». Weaver 105 | Williams v. Walsh 724, 1335 Willey v. Belfast 530 | v. Washington 446 William Deering & Co. v. Peterson 1033} v. Waynesboro 1045 William R. Compton Co. v. Allen | »v. Wingo 575 51, 822) Williams College v. Williamstown 1095 William Wilkins Co. v. Baltimore 1085 | Williams Printing Co. v. Saunders Williams, Hx parte 53, 724 920, 943 In re 428 | Williamsburg Sav. Bank »v. State 226 »v. Augusta 1322 | Williamson v. Carlton 341 v. Bank of Michigan 78 v. Lane 869, 1410 v. Bell 1413 ». Louisville Ind. School 453 v. Bidleman 261 v. Musick 1403 v. Black 943 v. New Jersey 564 v. Brooklyn El. R. Co. 1173 v. Suydam 199 v. Bryant 890 v. Williamson 201 v. Clayton 1356 | Williamsport 2. Beck 1052, 1074 ». Commonwealth 653, 686, 692 | Williar ». Baltimore, &c. Ass’n 757 v. Conger 40 | Willis v. Bayles 723 ». Courtney 753 | »v. Kalmbach 140, 178, 334, 373 v. Davidson 403, 404 | v. Mahon 167, 169 v. Detroit 165, 348, 1074 | v. Owen 122, 225 v. Duanesburg 497 | ». St. Paul Sanitation Co. 169 v. Eggleston 399, 492, 497, 1047 | v. State 677 v. Evans 178, 225, 229, 230, 231, | vy. Winona 1154 354, 804, 830, 817, 1344 | Willison v. Cooke 1317, 1319 ». Fears 828, 1001, 1017 | Williston v. Colkett 774 ». Gottschalk 867 | Willoughby v. George 7174 v. Haines 588 | Wills v. State 647 v. Heard 32) Wilmarth v. Burt 275 v. Hill 891 | Wilmington v. Ewing 519, 1284 v. Johnson 772 | v. Macks 1050 v. Kirby 1208 | v. Van De Grift 446 v. Kirkland 39 | Wilmington R. R. Co. v. Reid 571 v. Mayor, &c. of Detroit 1055, | Wilmington Transportation Co. 2. 1056, 1081| Calif. R. Comm. 1003 »v. Miles 119 Wilmington & W. R. Co. v. Als- 2. Mississippi 829| brook 573 v. Mutual Reserve Fund L. | Wilmot »v. Horton 506 Ass’n 253 | Wilson, Hx parte 54, 638, 639 v. Natural Bridge Plank Road Wilson, Re 1000, 1251 Co. 1163 v. Alabama &c. Co. 430, 1272 v. Neeley 28 ». Blackbird Creek Marsh Co. v. Newport 561, 562 1002, 1129, 1143, 1292, 1296 ». N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co. 1164, 1189 v. Blake 1408 v. Norris 34 v. Brown 590, 1372 v. Oliver 34 ». Carrollton Tobacco Ware- v. Payson 305, 309, 360 house Co. 865 v. People 304 v. Chilcott 1057 v. Port Chester 377, 756 ». Cleveland 271 v. Potter 1399 v. Collins 923 v. Riddle 887 ». Cottman 891 v. Roberts 409 ». Crockett 1124 v. School District 158, ». East Jersey Water Co. 1114 1033, 1093, 1132 v. Eureka City 435, 841 ». Smith 888 v. Fitch 919 ». Stanton Common School ». Franklin 1124 Dist. v. Herdesty 781 v. State 118, 305, 362, 632, 640, v. Jackson 59 674, 695, 696, 836, 1044, 1375 ». Johns Island Church 963 ». State Board 1043 v. King 1352, 1356 v. State ex rel. McNulty 1324, 1325 ». Lacroix 1409 v. Stein 1374, 1377 »v. McKenna 758, 770 v. Taladega 367 v. McNamee 1002, 1274, 1281excl LIST Page Wilson v. Mayor, &c. of N. Y. 1091, 1152 v. New 1311, 1344 v. Noonan 921, 959 | v. North Carolina 839 v. Ohio, &c. Co. 543, 545 | v. Ottumwa 444 v. People 696 v. Pittsburg, &c. R. Co. 1146 | v. Rockford, &c. Co. 1219 | v. Runyan 890 | v. Salamanca 474 v. School District 387 ». Shaw 1275 | v. Simon 755 | v. Simonton 868 v. Standefer 44, 587 | v. State 87, 306, 611, 657, 658, | 685, 707, 729 v. Sullivan 924 | v. Troy 523 | v. United States 627, 652 v. Wheeler 1093 | v. Wheeling 528 v. Wood 769 Wilson’s Case 718 | Wilson’s Exec. v. Deen 109 Wimmer v. Eaton 1384 Winbigler v. Los Angeles 530 Winchell v. State 667 Winchester v. Ayres 847, 863 v. Capron 1188 | v. Howard 167, 171 | v. Ring 1147, 1148, 1198, 1200 Winchester & L. T. Road Co. »v. Croxton 1310, 1311 Winchester, &c. R. Co. ». Common- wealth 187 Wind ». Iler & Co. 1015 v. State 866 Windham ». Portland 398 v. State 1050 Windsor »v. United States 631 Winfield v. Court of Industrial Rela- tions 395 Wingate v. Sluder 988 Wingert v. Zeigler 599 | Winklemans v. Des Moines, &e. Ry. Co. 1151 Winkley v. Newton 1061 Winn v. Blackman 1380 v. Riley 751 Winnisimmet Co. v. Grueby 1148 Winnovich v. Emery 723, 724 Winnsboro v. Smart 423 Winona v. Botzet 518, 525 Winona &c. Co. v. Plainview 474 Winona, &c. R. R. Co. v. Waldron 1215, 1244 Winona & St. Peter Land Co. ». Minnesota 574, 844 Winona & St. Peter’s R. R. Co. »v. Denman 1218, 1219 OF CASES CITED Page Winslow, Ez parte 723 v. Fleischner 229, 231, 235, 338 ». Grindall 109 ». State 654 v. Winslow 1298 Winsor v. The Queen 690 Winston v. Hudson 1334 ». Moore 347 Winter v. City Council 437 ». Jones 582 v. Thistlewood 1409 Winterton v. State 318 Winton v. Amos 284, 286 Winward >». Lincoln 251 Wires v. Farr 762 Wirth v. Wilmington 413 Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co. 58, 62, 257 Wisconsin, &c. R. Co. v. Jacobson 1276 v. Powers 559, 572 Wisconsin Cent. R. Co. ». Com- stock 993 v. Taylor Co. 142, 1041, 1087 Wisconsin Keeley Inst. Co. v. Mil- waukee Co. 1027 Wisconsin River Improvement Co. v. Lyons 79 ». Pier 1138, 1140, 1144 Wisconsin R. R. Comm. v. Chicago, &c:, R..Co: 1004 Wisconsin Tel. Co. v. Oshkosh 420 Wisconsin Water Co. v. Winans 1126, 1132, 1144 Wise v. Bigger 278 v. Henkel 724 v. Palmer 742 v. Yazoo City 1119 Wisners v. Monroe 305, 309 Witham »v. Osborn 1126 Withers v. Buckley 67 v. State 706 Withey v. Bloem 1347 Withington v. Corey 800 Withnall v. Ruecking Constr. Co. 1074 Witmer v. Schlatter 109 Witt v. St. Paul, &c. Co. 1204 v. State 667 Wittkowsky’s Land, In re 1207 Wittman v. Farmer 1054 W. J. Armstrong Co. v. N. Y. Cent., &c. R. Co. 854 Wixon v. Newport 451, 517 Woart v. Winnick Wolcott ». Holeomb 1364, 1369, v. Mayor, &c. of Wilmington 488, 1029, v. Rickey v. Wigton 129, Wolcott Woollen Manuf. Co. 2. Upham Wolf v. Humboldt Co. v. Lansing 420, Wolfe v. Covington, &c. R. R. Co. v. MeCaull 267, 321, 543, 545, 762, 773 1396 1030 712 160 1135 1392 1267 1164 323LIST OF CASES | | | Page Wolff ». Los Angeles 1195 ». New Orleans 598 | Woll v. Jensen 1402 Wolters, Px parte Qld. 2how eto; aul Wonderly v. La Fayette Co. 31 | 415, 672 602 638 Wong »v. Astoria Wong Kim Ark’s Case Wong Wing v. United States | Wood v. Boone County 516 v. Brady 41, 46 ». Brooklyn 413 v. Brush 830 ». Chesborough 37 v. Detroit 492 ». Duke Land & Imp. Co. 447 v. Fitzgerald 18 v. Fort 326 | v. Kennedy 781 v. McCann 282, 283 v. Randall 862 v. Stephen 112 v. Watkinson 58 ». Whitaker Woodall v. Darst 1262, 1263, 1264 260, 261, 1026, 1030, 1032 805 1056, 1078, 1201, 1284 Woodburn »v. Kilbourn Manuf. Co. 79, 1296 Woodbury v. Grimes 588 v. Thompson 890, 891 Woodcliff Land Imp. Co. N. J., &c. Woodard ». Brien Woodbridge v. Detroit Re Co; 1113 Woodcock v. Bennett 737 Woodfolk v. Nashville R. R. Co. 1219 Woodhull v. Wagner 601 Woodlawn Cemetery v. Everett 1321 Woodman v. Pitman 1290 Woodmere Cemetery v. Roulo 1112, 1118 Woodruff ». Bradstreet Co. 896 v. Fisher 1080 v. Mississippi 43 v. Neal 1160 v. Parham 1000, 1017 v. Scruggs 758, 781 45, 582 ». Trapnall v. West Orange 1259 Woods’ Estate, In re 851 Woods, Ex parte 124 v. Carl 14, 1232 v. Cottrell 623, 624 v. Miller 626 v. Seattle 1259, 1264 v. State 232, 1255 Woodside ». Wage 1356 Woodsmall v. State 863 Woodson v. Murdock 172, 300 Woodward v. Commonwealth 50 v. Lander 911, 912 "iGo: 0, 253 v. Mutual Reserve Life Ins | CITED CxClll Page Woodward v. Water District 527 v. Worcester 528 Woodward Iron Co. v. Cabaniss 167 Woodworth v. Bowles 169 v. Spring 857 v. Tremere 58 Woodyard Sayre 317 Wool, Matter of 707 Woolen S,anker 14 Woolsey, Matter of 502 v. Commercial Bank 382 Wooten, Ex part. 672 ». State 351 Worcester v. Georgia 26 v. Northborough 666 v. Norwich, &c. R. R. Co. 569 v. St. Ry. Co 396, 505, 506, 567 Worcester Co Worcester 1025 Worden v. New Bedford 454 Work v. Corrington 54, 55 ». Ohio 847 ». State 674 Workmen’s Compensation Fund, In re 100 Worley v. Columbia 452 ». Harris 531 Worman v. Hagan 184, 222 Wormley v. Dist. of Columbia 1053 Worsham »v. Stevens 588 Worswick Street Pav. Co. v. Indus- trial Acc. Comm. 137 Worten v. Paducah 1058 Worth v. Butler 890 v. Com’rs 1062 v. Norton 274 ». Wilmington, &c. R. R. Co. 1043 Worthen v. Badget 278 v. Prescott 714 Worthington v. Dist. Ct 208, 306, 311, 313, 347, 582, 850 Worthley v. Steen 262 Worthy v. Com’rs 34 Wortman, In re 1352 Wray, Hx parte 644 v. Knoxville, &c. R. Co. 1219 1056, 1074 663, 664, 665, 666 v. Pittsburgh v. State Wreford v. People 425, 433, 1325 Wren, Ex parte 278 v. Dixon 25, 168, 169, 170 Wright, Re 553 v. Augusta 446 ». Bd. of Education 386, 387 v. Boon 863 v. Boston 1082 v. Carter 1163, 1189 v. Chicago 1056 v. Cradlebaugh 769, 770 v. Defrees 381, 382 v. Dressel 621 v. Dunham 768 v. Ga. R. R., &e. Co. 573 v. Graham 790Cxciv LIST OF CASES CITED Page | Page Wright v. Hart ova 178 Yazoo &c. R. Co. v. Adams ee ov. Hawkins 757, Gi ee ’ ne Ss 0 v. r a zs rea 109 v. Clarksdale 35 = Lindsay 887 ». Longview Sugar Co. 1146 ». Lothrop 912, 922 ». Thomas 572, 1094 ». Louisville 1061| >. Washington 1246 o. Louisville, &c. R. Co. 1084 | Yazoo Delta Levee Bd. ». Dancy 1206 . May 148 | Yeadon v. White 1331 : Nagle 814 | Yeager v. Tippecanoe 516 a Oakley 762 | Yeaker v. Yeaker 26 ». People 640| Yeatman v. Crandall 1056, 1081, 1298 . Stat 686, 690 v. Day 792 : EN 590 | Yeaton v. Bank of Old Dom. 569 ». Tebbitts 285 ». United States 755, 790 4, Wimberly 810 | Yellow R. Imp. Co. v. Wood County 1062 ». Woodcock 1151| Yellowstone Park R. Co. »v. Bridges Woodg 895| Coal Co 1214 . Woodgate ¢ 50: i Worth 1262 | Yeoman ». State 642 ». Wright 208, 211) Yerger v. Rains 166 Wroe v. State 662 | Yick Wo, Matter of 425 Wroth »v. Johnson 1391 v. Hopkins 20, 44, 425, 808 Wrought Iron Range Co. ». Boltz = | von. Unies a ee Wulzen, In re 72 Zolo County v. Colgan v. Bd. of Supervisors 1141 sone Rive Bank v. Gemmill Re Wunderle ». Wunderle 26} Yonoski v. State Wurts v. Hoagland 1298 | York v. Hargadine 1161, 1314 Wyandotte v. Drennan 561 v. Pease 910 Wyant v. Central Tel. Co. 1181 | v. Texas 840 Bee KC Not 1535 | Yors eee 1356 v. McNamee ¢ y 2. v. Rome 452, 1346 | Yosemite Lumber Co. v. Industrial ». Smith 752| Accident Comm. 835 Wyeth v. Cambridge ee BST aa Yort v. Stout ss att 1 25, , 824, 1331 | Youman v. Commonwea ’ ’ Wyzant, Ex parte 1321 624, 628, 629, 632, 1259, 1263 »v. McLauchlan 418, 425 Young’s Estate, In re 701 Wylie v. Coxe 285 | Young, Ex parte 4 Wyman, In re 26 Re Wynehamer v. People 179, 348, 351, v. Beardsley 770 353, 738, 741, 760, v. Black 109 1225, 1255, 1256, 1270 v. Boles a Wynne, In re 327 v. Charleston ». Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Charnduet 10 834, 1331 v. Com’rs, &c. Wyoming v. Willingham 1269 ». Commonwealth 1334 Wyoming Nat. Bk. v. Brown 560 v. Buses na ». Hamilton ». Harrison 1201 bys v. Joslin 155 »v. Lemieux 346, 373, 1231 Yadkin River Power Co. v. Wissler v. McKenzie 124 1117, 1148 v. Miller Yale University ». New Haven 1089 ». Red Fork Levee Dist. 1208 Yamhill County v. Foster 508 ». Roberts 1403 Yancy v. Yancy 348, 762 ». State 631, 665 Yarbrough, Ex parte 16, 18, 725 ». State Bank 192 Yardley v. State 702 v. Thomas 1045 Yates v. Lansing 668 v. Vail aes ». Milwaukee 426, 433, 434, v. Wolcott ae 1157, 1159, 1325 ». York Haven El. Trans. Co. 1186 v. People 630 | Young Men’s Christian Ass’n v. Lan- v. Yates 850 caster Co. 1091, 1094LIST OF CASES CITED CXCV Page Page Youngblood v. Sexton 391, 421, 493, | Zeiler v. Central R. Co. 1350 1041, 1046, 1050, 1267, 1329 | ». Chapman 1370 Younger v. Judah 1299 | Zelmer v. Milner 1298 Youngs v. Youngs 62 | Zeo v. Springfield 1140 i Yuen Suey v. Fleshman 110 | Zhizhuzza, Re 392 | Yun Quong, Ez parte 298 | Ziang Sung Wan v. United States 653 Zimmerman v. Canfield 1120, 1204 7, v. Gritzmacher 425 v. Co. of Kearney 1203 Zabel v. Louisville B. O. Home 434, v. Kansas City, &c. R. Co. 1209 1057, 1094 v. Union Canal Co. 1149, Zabriskie v. Cleveland, &c. Co. 477 1294, 1297 v. Railroad Co. 238 | Zinn v. Dist. Ct. 676 7 Zahn v. Bd. of Pub. Works 1315, 1317 | Zircle v. Southern R. Co. 1128 ; Zane v. Hamilton Co. 584 | Zitske v. Goldberg 395 H Zanesville v. Auditor of Muskingum Zottman v. San Francisco 460 Co. 1098 | Zucarro v. State 413 v. Zanesville T. & Tel. Co. 181 | Zucht v. King 803 Zanone v. State 677 | Zumhoff v. State 1255 Zehren v. Milwaukee El. R. &c. Co. Zwietusch v. E. Milwaukee 1218 1180 | Zylstra’s Case 740SEVENTH EDITION Showing the page where text appearing in the Seventh Edition of Cooley’s EIGHTH EDITION 3 3 4—— 4,5 5 si, (a 6 6 7 7 8 —— 8,9 9 ——9 10 —— 10, 11 11 —— 11, 12 12 2S 13 —— 14, 15 14 —— 15, 16 15 16, 17 16 —— 17 17 ——17 18 —— 18 19 - 20 20 —— 20 21 —— 20 22 —— 20 23 —— 20-22 24 —— 25 25 —— 25, 27 26 —— 31 27 —— 31 28 — 3l 29 — 31-34 30 —— 34 31 38 32 —— 38 33 — 38 34 —— 45 35 —— 45 36 — 45, 46 37 46, 52 38 —— 52 3h!) === OY Or H OO bO INIA EIGHTH EDITION 57 57 — 57 64 _ 64 COMPARATIVE 64, 65 65-67 83, 84, 85 87, SS, 90, Oe 92, 9: 93, 94 - 95 — 95, 97 98, 99 Ol 101, 102 — 103, 104 6 —— 104, 105 , 80 , 81 84 do 88 39 9] 92 ~ 94 96 99 TABLE SEVENTH EDITION 4¢@ 78 79 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 LOO 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 11] 112 113 Constitutional Limitations will now be found in the Eighth Edition. EIGHTH EDITION 105, 106 106, 107 108 108 a8), 10 - 111-113 - 115, 116 — 116 118, 119 120 122 127 127, 128 128-130 131, 132 132, 133 34, 135 35, 186 36, 137 38, 139 39 41, 142 142, 143 143-145 145, 146 151 152, 153 153, 154 154, 155 STScxcviii SEVENTH EIGHTH EDITION EDITION 114 158, 159 115 159, 160 116 —— 160, 161 117 161, 162 118 162, 163 119 —— 164, 165 120 —— 165, 166 121 —— 166-169 122 —— 170; 171 123 lai 124 173 125 174 126 175 127 ——— 176, 1:77, 128 177, 179 129 179, 180 130 —— 180 131 —— 180-183 132 —— 183, 184 133 —— 184, 185 134 —— 187, 188 135 —— 188, 189 136 189, 190 137 —— 191, 192 138 —— 192 139 —— 198, 194 140 194, 195 141 —— 195, 196 142 196, 197 143 —— 197, 198 144 —— 198, 199 145 —— 200 146 —— 200, 201 147 —— 201, 202 148 203 149 —— 204 150 —— 204, 205 151 —— 206 152 —— 208 153 —— 208 154 —— 209, 210 155 210 156 —— 211, 212 157 —— 212, 213 158 213, 215 159 —— 218 160 218, 219 161 219-221 162 221 163 —— 224 COMPARATIVE TABLE SEVENTH EIGHTH EDITION EDITION 164 —— 227 165 227, 228 235, 236 166 —— 236 167 237 168 —— 238, 239 169 —— 239, 240 170 —— 240 171 —— 242, 2438 172 —— 2438 173 —— 244, 245 174 —— 245-247 175 247, 248 176 —— 248, 249 177 249 178 —— 250-252 179 —— 253 180 —— 255, 257 181 —— 257, 258 182 —— 264 183 —— 264 184 —— 264 185 264 186 —— 266 187 267 188 —— 268, 269 189 270 190 —— 270, 271 191 —— 272-274 192 —— 274, 275 193 —— 275-277 194 —— 277 195 277, 279 196 —— 280, 281 197 —— 286 198 —— 286 199 —— 286, 287 200 —— 287-289 201 —— 290, 291 202 291, 292 203 —— 294 204 —— 294, 295 205 295, 296 206 296-298 300 207 —— 302 208 —— 302, 303 209 —— 303, 304 210 —— 308 211 —— 308, 309 EIGHTH EDITION 212 —— 309, 310 213 —— 310, 311 214 —— 311-313 215 313, 314 216 —— 314-316 217 —— 316, 318 218 —— 319, 320 219 —— 320-322 220 322, 323 221 —— 324 222 —— 325, 326 223 —— 326, 327 224 —— 327-329 SEVENTH EDITION 225 329, 330 226 —— 330 227 332 228 333, 334 229 —— 334, 335 230 —— 335, 337 231 —— 338, 339 232 —— 339-341 233 —— 341, 342 234 —— 342, 343 235 343-345 236 —— 345, 346 237 —— 346, 348 349 238 —— 349, 350 249 —— 350, 351 240 391-353 241 —— 353, 354 242 354, 355 243 —— 356 244 356-358 245 —— 358, 359 246 —— 359, 360 247 361, 362 248 —— 362, 363 249 —— 364, 365 250 365-368 251 —— 368-370 252 370, 371 253 372, 374 204 374, 375 255 375-377 256 377, 378 257 378-380 258 380 259 382 260 —— 384SEVENTH EIGHTH EDITION EDITION 261 —— 385 262 —— 388 263 —— 388 264 —— 389 265 390, 391 266 —— 391, 393 267 —— 395 268 —— 395, 397 269 —— 399 270 —— 400, 401 271 —— 401 272 —— 405 273 —— 405 274 —— 408 275 —— 408, 409 276 —— 409, 410 277 —— 410, 411 278 —— 411-413 279 —— 413, 414 230 —— 417 281 —— 417, 418 282 —— 418, 419 283 —— 419, 420 284 —— 420-422 285 —— 431 286 —— 431 287 431 288 —— 431 289 —— 431 290 —— 431 291 —— 431, 432 292 —— 432 293 —— 434, 435 294 —— 435, 436 295 436-438 296 —— 438, 440 297 -—— 440 298 —— 442 299 —— 442-444 300 —— 444 301 —— 444, 447 302 —— 447, 448 303 —— 448-450 304 450, 451 305 —— 451 306 — 455 307 455, 456 308 456, 457 309 457-459 310 —— 459 COMPARATIVE TABLE SEVENTH EIGHTH EDITION EDITION 311 —— 460, 461 312 462, 463 313 —— 463, 464 314 468 315 468, 469 316 —— 469 317 469 318 —— 469, 470 319 —— 471 320 —— 471, 472 321 478 322 478 323 478 324 —— 478 325 478, 479 326 —— 479 327 481 328 —— 482 329 —— 483 330 —— 484, 485 331 —— 485, 486 330 —=ARG 352 aA RS. 334 —— 488, 489 335 490, 491 336 —— 493 337 —— 493-495 338 —— 495 339 —— 498 340 —— 498 341 —— 498, 499 342 499, 500 343 —— 500, 501 344 —— 501, 502 345 502, 503 346 507 347 507, 508 348 —— 508, 509 349 509, 510 350 —— 510, 511 351 511, 512 352 512, 513 353 —— 513, 514 354 514, 515 355 515, 517 356 517 357 520, 522 358 522, 523 359 528, 524 360 524-526 Cxclx SEVENTH EIGHTH EDITION EDITION 361 —— 526, 527 362 —— 527, 528 363 —— 631 364 —— 531, 532 365 —— 533 366 534 367 535, 536 368 —— 536, 537 369 —— 537, 538 370 —— 538, 539 37 —— 089 372 —— 540, 541 373 —— 541, 542 374 —— 542, 543 375 543-545 376 —— 545, 546 377 —— 546, 547 378 —— 547, 548 379 —— 548, 549 380 —— 549, 550 381 —— 550-552 382 —— 552, 553 383 —— 553, 554 384 —— 556, 557 385 —— 557, 558 386 —— 559 387 559, 560 388 —— 560, 561 389 —— 563 390 —— 563 391 —— 565 | 392 —— 566 393 —— 568 394 —— 568, 570 395 —— 570, 571 So Ole 1 1 ) an 397 —— 5795 398 —— 575, 576 399 —— 576-578 400 —— 578, 579 401 —— 579, 580 402 —— 580-582 403 —— 582, 583 404 —— 583, 584 405 —— 584, 585 406 —— 586-588 407 —— 588, 589 408 589, 590 409 —— 590, 591 410 —— 591, 592 a A } ot i i i H ice SEVENTH EIGHTH EDITION EDITION 411] —— 593, 594 412 594, 595 413 —— 596 414 —— 597, 598 415 —— 598, 599 416 —— 599, 600 417 —— 600, 601 418 —— 601, 602 419 —— 603, 604 420 —— 604, 605 421 —— 605, 606 422 —— 606, 607 423 —— 607, 609 424 —— 609, 610 425 —— 610, 611 426 —— 611, 612 427 —— 615 428 —— 615 429 —— 615, 618-620 430 620-622 431 —— 622-624 432 —— 624-626 433 626 434 630 435 636, 637 436 —— 637-639 437 —— 639, 643 438 —— 643, 644 439 644, 645 440 —— 645, 646 44] 647 442 —— 647, 648 443 —— 651, 652 444 —— 652-654 445 654, 655 446 —— 658 447 658 448 —— 660 449 660, 661 450 662 451 662, 664 452 —— 665-667 453 —— 668 454 673 455 —— 674 456 —— 674 457 —— 674 458 —— 674 459 —— 675, 676 460 676-678 COMPARATIVE TABLE | SEVENTH EIGHTH EDITION EDITION 161 —— 678, 679 462 —— 679, 680 463 —— 680, 681 464 —— 681, 682 465 —— 682, 683 466 —— 685 467 —— 686 468 - 687, 688 469 —— 689-691 470 —— 691, 692 471 —— 692, 693 472 —— 693, 694 473 —— 694, 696 474 —— 696, 697 475 —— 697, 698 476 —— 698 477 —— 700, 701 478 —— 701, 703 479 —— 703, 704 480 —— 704, 705 481 —— 705, 706 482 —— 707, 708 483 —— 709, 710 484 —— 710, 711 485 —— 711-713 486 — 713, 714 487 —— 714, 715 188 = ‘ l ), 716 489 —— 716, 717 490 — A 7A 491 —— 718, 719 492 —— 719, 720 493 —— 720-722 494 — 122, 723 495 — 723, 725 496 - 725-727 497 —— 727, 728 498 —— 728, 729 199 —— 729, 730 500 733 501 - 735 502 —— 735, 736 503 —— 736-738 004 —— 738, 739 005 —— 739-741 506 —— 74] 007 —— 743, 744 508 —— 744, 745 509 —— 745, 746 010 —— 747, 748 | SEVENTH EDITION 0) (i 558 —— 509 —— 960 EIGHTH EDITION 748, 749 750, 751 (51, 752 752, 754 760, 761 761, 762 762, 763 - 763, 764 765, 766 766-768 768, 769 769, 770 770, 771 CA lilies 773, 774 775, 776 776, 777 779, 780 780, 781 781, 782 782, 783 783, 784 784, 785 786 — 786, 787 787, 789 = CASIO) 7A) 791 792, 793 793, 794 794, 795 795, 796 797, 798 798, 799 799, 800 - 800, 801 802, 803 — 803-805 805-807 808 809 809, 810 810-812SEVENTH EIGHTH EDITION EDITION 561 —— 812 562 —— 812, 813 563 —— 816 564 —— 816, 817 565 - 817-820 566 —— 820 567 —— 821 568 —— 821 569 —— 821 570 —— 821 571 —— 821 572 —— 822 573 —— 822 574 —— 822-845 575 —— 845, 846 576 —— 846, 847 577 —— 847, 848 578 —— 848, 849 579 851 580 —— 851, 852 581 —— 852, 853 582 —— 853, 854 583 —— 854-856 584 —— 856-858 585 —— 858, 859 586 —— 859, 860 587 —— 861 588 —— 862, 863 589 —— 863, 864 590 864-867 591 —— 867-869 592 —— 869-871 593 —— 871, 872 594 —— 872, 873 595 —— 874 596 —— 876 597 —— 880 598 —— 880 599 —— 880 600 —— 881 601 —— 882 602 883 603 —— 884, 885 604 —— 885, 886 605 886, 887 606 —— 888, 889 607 890, 891 608 —— 891, 892 609 —— 893, 894 610 —— 894, 895 SEVENTH COMPARATIVE TABLE EIGHTH EDITION EDITION 611 —— 895-897 612 —— 897-899 613 899, 900 614 —— 900, 901 615 901, 902 616 908 617 —— 908 618 908-910 619 —— 910 620 —— 912, 913 621 —— 913 622 —— 914 623 —— 915 624 —— 916 625 —— 916, 917 626 —— 917, 918 627 —— 918, 919 628 —— 919, 920 629 —— 922, 923 630 —— 923, 924 631 —— 925, 926 632 —— 926, 927 633 —— 927, 925 634 — 929 635 930 636 —— 931 637 932, 933 638 —— 934, 935 639 —— 935, 936 640 —— 936, 937 641 —— 937, 938 642 — 938, 939 643 —— 939, 940 644 —— 940, 941 645 —— 941, 942 646 —— 942-944 647 —— 947 648 —— 948 649 —— 948 650 —— 948 651 —— 948, 949 652 —— 949, 950 658 - 951 654 —— 952-955 655 —— 955 656 —— 957 657 958 659 —— 960 660 —— 960-964 661 964 ecl SEVENTH EIGHTH EDITION EDITION 662 964, 965 663 —— 966 664 —— 967, 968 665 —— 968, 969 666 —— 974 667 —— 974 668 - 974 669 —— 974, 975 670 —— 976 671 —— 977 672 —— 978 673 —— 979 674 —— 981 675 —— 981, 982 676 —— 982-984 677 —— 984 678 —— 986, 987 679 —— 987, 988 680 - 988, 989 681 —— 990 682 —— 991, 992 983 —— 992-995 684 —— 995-997 685 —— 998 686 —— 999 687 —— 1000-1002 688 —— 1002-1016 689 —— 1016 690 —— 1016 691 —— 1016 692 —— 1016 693 —— 1016 694 —— 1018 695 —— 1026 696 —— 1026 697 —— 1026-1029 698 —— 1030, 1031 699 —— 1031, 1032 700 —— 1032-1034 701 —— 1034 702 —— 1037 703 —— 1037, 1038 704 —— 1038, 1039 705 —— 1039, 1040 706 —— 1041 707 —— 1041 708 —— 1042-1044 709 —— 1044, 1045 710 —— 1045-1047 711 —— 1047, 1048ccli SEVENTH EIGHTH EDITION EDITION 712 1049, 1050 713 —— 1050, 1051 714 —— 1052 715 1054, 1055 716 —— 1055, 1056 717 1056 718 —— 1058 719 1059, 1060 720 —— 1062, 1063 1063 722 1064, 1065 723 1065, 1066 724 —— 1066, 1067 725 1067, 1068 726 1068, 1069 727 1069, 1070 728 1070, 1071 729 1073, 1074 730 —— 1074 731 —— 1074 732 1077, 1078 733 —— 1080 734 —— 1080 735 —— 1080 736 —— 1082, 1083 737 —— 1083, 1084 738 —— 1084-1086 739 —— 1086, 1087 740 —— 1088-1090 741 —— 1090, 1091 742 — 1091, 1092 743 —— 1097 744 — 1097-1099 745 1099, 1100 746 —— 1100-1102 747 — 1102 (48 —— 1108, 1104 749 1104 750 —— 1106 752 —— 1108 753 1109, 1110 754 1110, 1111 755 —— 1111, 1112 756 —— 1118, 1114 757 1114-1117 758 1117 759 — 1117-1119 760 —— 1119, 1120 761 —— 1120, 1121 762 —— 1121, 1122 COMPARATIVE TABLE SEVENTH EIGHTH EDITION EDITION 763 —— 1123, 1124 764 —— 1124 765 —— 1126 766 1128, 1129 767 —— 1129 768 1131 769 —— 1131, 1132 770 —— 1182, 1133 771 — 1134, 1135 772 1135 773 — 1137, 1138 774 —— 1141 775 —— 1141, 1142 776 —— 1142, 11438 777 —— 1148-1145 778 —— 1145, 1146 77) ———= KY 780 —— 1148, 1149 781 1149, 1150 782 1150 783 1151, 1152 784 —— 1152-1154 785 —— 1154-1156 786 —— 1157 787 —— 1158 788 —— 1159-1161 789 1161, 1162 790 —— 1163 791 —— 1164, 1165 792 —— 1165 793 —— 1167 794 —— 1167, 1168 795 1168, 1169 796 —— 1169, 1170 797 —— 1170, 1171 F9S eat 799 —— 1172, 1173 800 —— 1174-1177 801 —— 1177 802 —— 1178-1180 803 - 1180 804 —— 1187-1190 805 1190 806 —— 1190 807 —— 1192, 1193 808 —— 1193, 1194 809 —— 1194, 1195 810 —— 1195-1197 811 —— 1197-1200 812 —— 1200, 1201 SEVENTH EDITION EIGHTH EDITION 813 —— 1201-1 204 814 1204 $15 1204, 1205 816 —— 1205, 1206 817 —— 1206, 1207 818 —— 1208, 1209 819 1209, 1210 820 —— 1210, 1211 821 1212 $22 1213, 1214 $23 —— 1216 $24 1216 825 1218-1220 $26 1220 $29 —— 1223 830 —— 1224, 1225 $31 —— 1225-1232 832 —— 1232-1235 833 —— 1235-1237 834 —— 1237 835 1240 $36 —— 1240 837 1240 838 1240, 1241 839 1241, 1242 840 —— 1248, 1244 $41 1244 842 1245-1247 843 —— 1247, 1248 844 1248, 1249 $45 1250, 1251 846 —— 1251, 1252 847 1252-1254 848 —— 1254 849 —— 1254, 1255 850 1255, 1256 851 1257-1270 852 1270 853 1270-1272 854 —— 1272 855 1272, 1273 856 1274 857 1277, 1278 858 1278-1281 859 —— 1281 860 1281-1284 861 —— 1284-1289 862 —— 1289, 1290 863 —— 1290-1292 864 —— 1293SEVENTH EDITION EIGHTH EDITION 865 —— 1293, 1294 866 —— 1295 867 —— 1296, 1297 868 —— 1297, 1298 869 —— 1298, 1299 870 —— 1300 71 1301, 1302 872 —— 1302 873 —— 1302, 1303 874 —— 1305 $75 —— 1305 76 —— 1305, 1306 877 —— 1306-1313 878 —— 1313-1319 879 —— 1319 880 —— 1321 881 —— 1321, 1322 882 —— 1322-1324 883 —— 1324-1327 884 —— 1328 885 —— 1328, 1329 886 —— 1329 887 —— 1332-1335 888 —— 1335-1337 889 —— 1339-1342 890 —— 1342-1348 COMPARATIVE TABLE SEVENTH EIGHTH EDITION EDITION 892 —— 1349 893 —— 1350 894 —— 1350 895 1354 896 —— 1354, 1355 897 —— 1355, 1356 898 —— 1356, 1357 899 —— 13858 900 —— 1360 901 —— 1360-1362 902 —— 1362, 1363 903 —— 1363-1365 904 —— 1365, 1366 905 1367, 1368 906 —— 1368, 1369 907 1369, 1370 908 —— 1370-1372 909 —— 1372, 1373 910 —— 1373, 1374 911 —— 1875, 1376 912 —— 1376 913 —— 1378 914 —— 1380, 1381 915 1381, 1382 916 —— 1382, 1383 917 —— 1383, 1384 SEVENTH EDITION cClil EIGHTH EDITION 918 —— 1384, 1385 919 —— 1385, 1386 920 —— 1386, 1387 921 —— 1388, 1389 922 1389, 1390 923 1390, 1391 924 1391 925 1393, 1394 926 —— 1394, 1395 927 1395, 1896 928 —— 1396, 1397 929 1397 930 —— 1399 931 —— 1400, 1401 932 —— 1402, 1403 933 —— 1403, 1404 934 —— 1404, 1405 935 1405-1407 936 —— 1407, 1408 937 1408, 1409 938 —— 1410, 1411 939 —— 1411, 1412 940 —— 1412, 1413 941 —— 1413-1415 942 —— 1415, 1416 943 —— 1416, 1417CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS VOLUME ONECONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS VOLUME ONE CHAPTER I DEFINITIONS A Sate is a body politic, or society of men, united together for the purpose of promoting their mutual safety and advantage by the joint efforts of their combined strength.' The terms nation and State are frequently employed, not only in the law of nations, but in common parlance, as importing the same thing; ” but the term nation is more strictly synonymous with people, and while a single State may embrace different nations or peoples, a single nation will sometimes be so divided politically as to constitute several States. In American constitutional law the word State is applied to the several members of the American Union, while the word nation is applied to the whole body of the people embraced within the juris- diction of the Federal government. Sovereignty, as applied to States, imports the supreme, absolute, uncontrollable power by which any State is governed.’ A State is called a sovereign State when this supreme power resides within itself, whether resting in a single individual, or in a number of indi- viduals, or in the whole body of the people.* In the view of inter- national law, all sovereign States are and must be equal in rights, because from the very definition of sovereign State, it is impossible that there should be, in respect to it, any political superior. 1 Vattel, b. 1, c. 1, § 1; Story on Wall. 700, 720, 19 L. ed. 227, 236; Const. § 207; Wheat. Int. Law. pt. 1, Vattel, supra. c. 2, § 2; Halleck, Int. Law, 63; Bouv. 3 Story on Const. § 207; 1 Black. Law Dict. “State.’’ See Hyde Inter- Com. 49; Wheat. Int. Law, pt. Cas national Law, Vol. I, 16. ‘A multi- §5; Halleck, Int. Law, 63, 64; Aus- tude of people united together by a tin, Province of Jurisprudence, Lec. communion of interest, and by com- VI.; Chipman on Government, 137. mon laws, to which they submit with “The right of commanding finally in one accord.” Burlamaqui, Politic civil society.’’ Burlamaqui, Politic Law, c. 5. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Law, c. 5. Dall. 457, 1 L. ed. 440; Georgia v. 4Vattel, b. 1, c. 1, § 2; Story on Stanton, 6 Wall. 65, 18 L. ed. 721. Yonst. § 207; Halleck, Int. Law, 65. 2 Thompson, J., in Cherokee Nation In other words, when it is an inde- v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1, 52, 8 L. ed. 43; pendent State. Chipman on Govern- Chase, Ch. J., in Texas v. White, 7 ment, 137. 34 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I The sovereignty of a State commonly extends to all the subjects of government within the territorial limits occupied by the associated people who compose it; and, except upon the high seas, which belong equally to all men, like the air, and no part of which can rightfully be appropriated by any nation,‘ the dividing line between sovereignties is usually a territorial line. In American constitu- tional law, however, there is a division of the powers of sovereignty between the national and State governments by subjects: the former being possessed of supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power over certain subjects throughout all the States and Territories, while the States have the like complete power, within their respective territorial limits, over other subjects.? In regard to certain other subjects, the States possess powers of regulation which are not sovereign powers, inasmuch as they are liable to be controlled, or for the time being to become altogether dormant, by the exercise of a superior power vested in the general government in respect to the same subjects. A constitution is sometimes defined as the fundamental law of a State, containing the principles upon which the government is founded, regulating the division of the sovereign powers, and direct- ing to what persons each of these powers is to be confided, and the manner in which it is to be exercised. Perhaps an equally complete and accurate definition would be, that body of rules and maxims in accordance with which the powers of sovereignty are habitually exer- cised. 1 Vattel, b. 1, c. 23, § 281; Wheat. Int. Law, pt. 2, c. 4, § 10. * McLean, J., in License Cases, 5 How. 504, 588, 12 L. ed. 256, 293. “The powers of the general govern- ment and of the State, although both exist and are exercised within the same territorial limits, are yet separate and distinct sovereignties, acting separately disturbed by the new amendments to the Federal Constitution, see United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 23 L. ed. 588. 31 Bouv. Inst. 9; Duer, Const. Juris. 26. See also State v. Thompson, 149 Wis. 488, 1387 N. W. 20, 43 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 339. ‘By the constitution of a State I mean the body of those writ- and independently of each other, ten or unwritten fundamental laws within their respective spheres. And which regulate the most important the sphere of action appropriated to the United States is as far beyond the reach of the judicial process issued by a State judge or a State court, as if the line of division was traced by land- marks and monuments visible to the eye.” Taney, Ch. J., in Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506, 516, 16 L. ed. 169, 173. See Tarble’s Case, 13 Wall. 397, 20 L. ed. 597. That the general division of powers between the Federal and State governments has not been rights of the higher magistrates and the most essential privileges of the subjects.””’ Mackintosh on the Study of the Law of Nature and Nations. For other definitions, see Holding »v. Feldman, 269 Fed. 306; Fairhope Single Tax Corp. v. Melville, 193 Ala. 289, 69 So. 466; State v. Alderson, 49 Mont. 387, 409, 142 Pac. 210, Ann. Cas. 1916 B, 39; People v. New York Cent. R. Co., 24 N. Y. 485; Matter of Silkman, 88 App. Div. (N. Y.) 102,CHAP. 1] DEFINITIONS 5 In a much qualified and very imperfect sense every State may be said to possess a constitution; that is to say, some leading prin- ciple has prevailed in the administration of its government, until it has become an understood part of its system, to which obedience is expected and habitually yielded; like the hereditary principle in most monarchies, and the custom of choosing the chieftain by the body of the people, which prevails among some barbarous tribes. But the term constitutional government is applied only to those whose fundamental rules or maxims not only locate the sovereign power in individuals or bodies designated or chosen in some prescribed manner, but also define the limits of its exercise so as to protect individual rights, and shield them against the assumption of arbi- trary power. The number of these is not great, and the protection they afford to individual rights is far from being uniform.” In American constitutional law, the word constitution is used in a restricted sense, as implying the written instrument agreed upon by the people of the Union, or of any one of the States, as the abso- lute rule of action and decision for all departments and officers of the government, in respect to all the points covered by it, which must control until it shall be changed by the authority which estab- lished it, and in opposition to which any act or regulation of any such department or officer, or even of the people themselves, will be alto- gether void. The term unconstitutional law must have different meanings in different States, according as the powers of sovereignty are or are not possessed by the individual or body which exercises the powers of ordinary legislation. Where the law-making department of a State is restricted in its powers by a written fundamental law, as in the American States, we understand by unconstitutional law one which, being opposed to the fundamental law, is therefore in excess of legislative authority, and void. Indeed, the term unconstitutional the government accordingly. The 84 N. Y. Supp. 1025; Hz parte Corliss, mere grant of a constitution does not 16 N. D. 470, 114 N. W. 962; Frantz v. Antry, 18 Okla. 561, 91 Pac. 193; State ». Harden, 62 W. Va. 313, 58 S. E. 715, 60 S. EB. 394. 1 Calhoun’s Disquisition on Govern- ment, Works, I. p. 11. 2 Absolute monarchs, under a pres- sure of necessity, or to win the favor of their people, sometimes grant them what is called a constitution; but this, so long as the power of the mon- arch is recognized as supreme, can be no more than his promise that he will observe its provisions, and conduct make the government a constitutional government, until the monarch is de- prived of power to set it aside at will. The grant of Magna Charta did not make the English a constitutional monarchy; it was only after repeated violations and confirmations of that instrument, and when a further disre- gard of its provisions had become dangerous to the Crown, that funda- mental rights could be said to have constitutional guaranties, and the government to be constitutional.6 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I law, as employed in American jurisprudence, is a misnomer, and implies a contradiction; that enactment which is opposed to the Constitution being in fact no law at all.1_ But where, by the theory of the government, the exercise of complete sovereignty is vested in the same individual or body which enacts the ordinary laws, any enactment, being an exercise of power by the sovereign authority, must be obligatory, and, if it varies from or conflicts with any exist- ing constitutional principle, it must have the effect to modify or abrogate such principle, instead of being nullified by it. This must be so in Great Britain with every law not in harmony with pre- existing constitutional principles; since, by the theory of its govern- ment, Parliament exercises sovereign authority, and may even change the constitution at any time, as in many instances it has done, by declaring its will to that effect.2 And when thus the power to control and modify the constitution resides in the ordinary law- making power of the State, the term unconstitutional law can mean no more than this; a law which, being opposed to the settled max- ims upon which the government has habitually been conducted, ought not to be, or to have been, adopted.* It follows, therefore, that in Great Britain constitutional questions are for the most part to be discussed before the people or the Parliament, since the declared will of the Parliament is the final law; but in America, after a con- stitutional question has been passed upon by the legislature, there is generally a right of appeal to the courts when it is attempted to put the will of the legislature in force. For the will of the people, as declared in the Constitution, is the final law; and the will of the leg- islature is law only when it is in harmony with, or at least is not opposed to, that controlling instrument which governs the legislative body equally with the private citizen.‘ 1“ An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection: it creates no office; it is in legal con- templation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.’ People v. Horan, 34 Col. 304, 86 Pac. 252; People ex rel. Farrington v. Mensch- ing, 187 N. Y. 8, 79 N. E. 884, 10 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 625, 10 Ann. Cas. 101. See also Minnesota Sugar Co. », Iverson, 91 Minn. 30, 97 N. W. 454. 71 Black. Com. 161; De Tocque- ville, Democracy in America, c. 6; Broom, Const. Law, 795; Fischel, English Constitution, b. 7, ¢. 5. In the Dominion of Canada, where the powers of sovereignty are confided for exercise, in part to the Dominion Parliament and in part to the Provin- cial Parliaments, with a superintending authority over all in the imperial gov- ernment, the term unconstitutional law has a meaning corresponding to its use in the United States. Severn v. Regina, 2 Sup. Ct. R. (Ont.) 70; Leprohn v. Ottawa, 2 App. R. 522. 3Mr. Austin, in his Province of Juris- prudence, Lec. VI., explains and en- larges upon this idea, and gives illus- trations to show that in England, and indeed under most governments, a rule prescribed by the law-making author- ity may be unconstitutional, and yet legal and obligatory. 4 See Chapter VII. post.CHAPTER II THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES THE government of the United States is the existing representa- tive of the national government which has always in some form existed over the American States. Before the Revolution, the powers of government, which were exercised over all the colonies in common, were so exercised as pertaining either to the Crown of Great Britain or to the Parliament; but the extent of those powers, and how far vested in the Crown and how far in the Parliament, were questions never definitely settled, and which constituted sub- jects of dispute between the mother country and the people of the colonies, finally resulting in hostilities.’ That the power over peace and war, the general direction of commercial intercourse with other nations, and the general control of such subjects as fall within the province of international law, were vested in the home government, and that the colonies were not, therefore, sovereign States in the full and proper sense of that term, were propositions never seriously dis- puted in America, and indeed were often formally conceded; and the disputes related to questions as to what were or were not matters of internal regulation, the control of which the colonists insisted should be left exclusively to themselves. Besides the tie uniting the several colonies through the Crown of Great Britain, there had always been a strong tendency to a more intimate and voluntary union, whenever circumstances of danger threatened them; and this tendency led to the New England Con- federacy of 1643, to the temporary Congress of 1690, to the plan of union agreed upon in Convention of 1754, but rejected by the Colo- nies as well as the Crown, to the Stamp Act Congress of 1765, and finally to the Continental Congress of 1774. When the difficulties with Great Britain culminated in actual war, the Congress of 1775 assumed to itself those powers of external control which before had been conceded to the Crown or to the Parliament, together with such 11 Pitkin’s Hist. U.S.c.6; Lifeand Ramsay’s Revolution in South Caro- Works of John Adams, Vol. I. pp. 122, _ lina, pp. 6-11; 5 Bancroft’s U. Svc. 18; 161; Vol. II. p. 311; Works of Jeffer- 1 Webster’s Works, 128; Von Holst, son, Vol. IX. p. 294; 2 Marshall’s Const. Hist. c. 1; Story on Const. Washington, c. 2; Declaration of § 183 et seq. Rights by Colonial Congress of 1765;8 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [voL. I other powers of sovereignty as it seemed essential a general govern- ment should exercise, and thus became the national government of the United Colonies. By this body, war was conducted, inde- pendence declared, treaties formed, and admiralty jurisdiction exer- cised. be “sovereign and independent ’ It is evident, therefore, that the States, though declared to ’, were never strictly so in their individual character, but were always, in respect to the higher powers of sovereignty, subject to the control of a central authority, and were never separately known as members of the family of nations." The Declaration of Independence made them sovereign and independent States, by altogether abolishing the foreign juris- diction, and substituting a national government of their owncreation. But while national powers were assumed by and conceded to the Congress of 1775-76, that body was nevertheless strictly revolu- 1 “All the country now possessed by the United States was [prior to the Revolution] a part of the dominions appertaining to the Crown of Great Britain. Every acre of land in this country was then held, mediately or immediately, by grants from that Crown. All the people of this coun- try were then subjects of the King of Great Britain, and owed allegiance to him; and all the civil authority then existing or exercised here flowed from the head of the British empire. They were in a strict sense fellow-subjects, and in a variety of respects one people. When the Revolution commenced, the patriots did not assert that only the same affinity and social connection subsisted between the people of the colonies, which subsisted between the people of Gaul, Britain, and Spain, while Roman provinces, namely, only that affinity and social connection which result from the mere circum- stance of being governed by one prince; different ideas prevailed, and gave occasion to the Congress of 1774 and 1775. “The Revolution, or rather the Dec- laration of Independence, found the people already united for general pur- poses, and at the same time providing for their more domestic concerns by State conventions and other temporary arrangements. From the Crown of Great Britain the sovereignty of their country passed to the people of it ; and it was not then an uncommon opinion that the unappropriated lands which belonged to the Crown passed, not to the people of the colony or State within whose limits they were situated, but to the whole people. On whatever prin- ciples this opinion rested, it did not give way to the other, and thirteen sovereignties were considered as emerged from the principles of the Revolution, combined with local con- venience and considerations; the people, nevertheless, continued to consider themselves, in a national point of view, as one people; and they continued without interruption to manage their national concerns accord- ingly. Afterwards, in the hurry of the war, and in the warmth of mutual con- fidence, they made a confederation of the States the basis of a general gov- ernment. Experience disappointed the expectations they had formed from it; and then the people, in their col- lective capacity established the present Constitution.”” Per Jay, Ch. J., in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, 470, 1 L. ed. 440, 462. See this point for- cibly put and elaborated by Mr. A. J. Dallas, in his Life and Writings by G. M. Dallas, 200-207. Also in Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 724, 19 L. ed. 227. Professor Von Holst, in his Constitu- tional History of the United States, c. 1, presents the same view clearly and fully. Compare Hurd, Theory of National Existence, 125.CHAP. 11] THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 9 tionary in its character, and, like all revolutionary bodies, its author- ity was undefined, and could be limited only, first, by instructions to individual delegates by the States choosing them; second, by the will of the Congress; and third, by the power to enforce that will." As in the latter particular it was essentially feeble, the necessity for a clear specification of powers which should be exercised by the national government became speedily apparent, and led to the adoption of the Articles of Confederation. But those articles did not concede the full measure of power essential to the efficiency of a national government at home, the enforcement of respect abroad, or the preservation of the public faith or public credit; and the difficulties experienced induced the election of delegates to the Constitutional Convention held in 1787, by which a constitution was formed which was put into operation in 1789. As much larger powers were vested by this instrument in the general government than had ever been exercised in this country by either the Crown, the Parliament, or the Revolutionary Congress, and larger than those conceded to the Congress under the Articles of Confederation, the assent of the people of the several States was essential to its accep- tance, and a provision was inserted in the Constitution that the ratification of the conventions of nine States should be sufficient for the establishment of the Constitution between the States so ratifying the same. In fact, the Constitution was ratified by con- ventions of delegates chosen by the people in eleven of the States, before the new government was organized under it ; and the remain- ing two, North Carolina and Rhode Island, by their refusal to ac- cept, and by the action of the others in proceeding separately, were excluded altogether from that national jurisdiction which before had embraced them. This exclusion was not warranted by any- thing contained in the Articles of Confederation, which purported to be articles of “perpetual union”; and the action of the eleven States in making radical revision of the Constitution, and excluding their associates for refusal to assent, was really revolutionary in character,? and only to be defended on the same ground of necessity on which all revolutionary action is justified, and which in this case was the absolute need, fully demonstrated by experience, of a more efficient general government.’ 1See remarks of Iredell, J., in Pen- 2Mr. Van Buren has said of it that hallow v. Doane’s Adm’r, 3 Dall. 54, it was “an heroic, though perhaps a 91, 1 L. ed. 507, 531, and of Blair, J., lawless, act.’’ Political Parties, p. 50. in the same case, p. 111. The true 3 “Two questions of a very delicate doctrine on this subject is very clearly nature present themselves on this occa- explained by Chase, J.,in Warev. Hyl- sion: 1. On what principle the con- ton, 3 Dall. 199, 231, 1 L. ed. 568, 582. federation, which stands in the form of10 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I Left at liberty now to assume complete powers of sovereignty as independent governments, these two States saw fit soon to resume their place in the American family, under a permission contained in the Constitution; and new States have since been added from time to time, all of them, with a single exception, organized by the consent ‘of the general government, and embracing territory previously under its control. The exception was Texas, which had previously been an indépendent sovereign State, but which, by the conjoint action of its government and that of the United States, was received into the Union on an equal footing with the other States. Without, therefore, discussing, or even designing to allude to any abstract theories as to the precise position and actual power of the several States at the time of forming the present Constitu- a solemn compact among the States, can be superseded without the unan- imous consent of the parties to it; 2. What relation is to subsist between the nine or more States, ratifying the Constitution, and the remaining few who do not become parties to it. The first question is answered at once by recurring to the absolute necessity of the case; to the great principle of self- preservation; to the transcendent law of nature and of nature’s God, which declares that the safety and happiness of society are the objects at which all political institutions aim, and to which all such institutions must be sacrificed. Perhaps, also, an answer may be found without searching beyond the prin- ciples of the compact itself. It has been heretofore noted, among the de- fects of the confederation, that in many of the States it had received no higher sanction than a mere legislative ratifi- cation. The principle of reciprocality seems to require that its obligation on the other States should be reduced to the same standard. A compact be- tween independent sovereigns, founded on acts of legislative authority, can pretend to no higher validity than a league or treaty between the parties. It is an established doctrine on the subject of treaties, that all of the articles are mutually conditions of each other; that a breach of any one article is a breach of the whole treaty ; and that a breach committed by either of the parties absolves the others, and authorizes them, if they please, to pro- nounce the compact violated and void. Should it unhappily be necessary to appeal to these delicate truths for a justification for dispensing with the consent of particular States to a disso- jution of the Federal pact, will not the complaining parties find it a difficult task to answer the multiplied and important infractions with which they may be confronted? The time has been when it was incumbent on us all to veil the ideas which this paragraph exhibits. The scene is now changed, and with it the part which the same motives dictate. The second ques- tion is not less delicate, and the flat- tering prospect of its being merely hypothetical forbids an over-curious discussion of it. It is one of those cases which must be left to provide for itself. In general it may be observed, that although no political ‘relation can subsist between the assenting and dis- senting States, yet the moral relations will remain uncancelled. The claims of justice, both on one side and on the other, will be in force, and must be ful- filled; the rights of humanity must in all cases be duly and mutually re- spected; whilst considerations of a common interest, and above all the remembrance of the endearing scenes which are past, and the anticipation of a speedy triumph over the obstacles to reunion, will, it is hoped, not urge in vain moderation on one side, and prudence on the other.’’ Federalist, No. 43 (by Madison).CHAP. 11] THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 11 tion,! it may be said of them generally that they have at all times been subject to some common national government, which has exer- cised control over the subjects of war and peace, and other matters pertaining to external sovereignty; and that when the only three States which ever exercised complete sovereignty accepted the Con- stitution and came into the Union, on an equal footing with all the other States, they thereby accepted the same relative position to the general government, and divested themselves permanently of those national powers which the others had never exercised. And the assent once given to the Union was irrevocable. “The Consti- tution in all its provisions looks to an indestructible Union composed 9 of indestructible States.’ ” The government of the United States is one of enumerated powers ; the national Constitution being the instrument which specifies them, and in which authority should be found for the exercise of any power which the national government assumes to possess.* In this respect 1See this subject discussed in Gib- bons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. ed. 23. 2 Chase, Ch. J., in Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 725, 19 L. ed. 227, 237. See United States v. Cathcart, 1 Bond, 556. 3“The government of the United States can claim no powers which are not granted to it by the Constitution ; and the powers actually granted must be such as are expressly given, or given by necessary implication.” Per Mar- shall, Ch. J., in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 326, 4 L. ed. 97, 103. “This instrument contains an enu- meration of the powers expressly granted by the people to their govern- ment.’ Marshall, Ch. J., in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 187, 6 L. ed. 23, 68. See Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 1 L. ed. 648; Briscoe v. Bank of Ken- tucky, 11 Pet. 257, 9 L. ed. 709; Gil- man v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713, 18 L. ed. 96; United States v. Cruik- shank, 92 U. S. 542, 550, 551, per Waite, Ch. J., 23 L. ed. 588, 590, 591; United States v. Harris, 106 U. S. 629, 27 L. ed. 290, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 601; Weister v. Hade, 52 Pa. St. 474; Sporrer v. Eifler, 1 Heisk. 633. “Congress cannot, under the pretext of executing delegated power, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not intrusted to the Federal govern- ment. And we accept as established doctrine that any provision of an act of Congress ostensibly enacted under power granted by the Constitution, not naturally and reasonably adapted to the effective exercise of such power, but solely to the achievement of some- thing plainly within power reserved to the States, is invalid and cannot be enforced.”’ Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 69 L. ed. 819, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 446, 39 A. L. R. 229. The tenth amendment to the Con- stitution provides that ‘the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”’ No power is conferred by the Constitution upon Congress to establish mere police regulations within the States. United States v. Dewitt, 9 Wall. 41, 19 L. ed. 593. See also Jn re Antonio Guerra, 94 Vt. 1, 110 Atl. 224, 10 AS oy ekee 1560. Nor is power conferred to pro- vide for copyrighting trademarks. Trademark Cases, 100 U. S. 82, 25 L. ed. 550. The fourteenth amendment does not take from the States police powers reserved to them at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. See Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 21 L. ed. 394; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 28 L. ed. 923, 5 Sup. Ct.12 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [voL. I it differs from the constitutions of the several States, which are not grants of powers to the States, but which apportion and impose restrictions upon the powers which the States inherently possess. The general purpose of the Constitution of the United States is declared by its founders to be, “to form a more perfect union, estab- lish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.” 1 To accomplish these pur- poses, the Congress is empowered by the eighth section of Article I:— 1. To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States. But all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.” 2. To borrow money on the credit of the United States. 3. To regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.’ Rep. 357; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 31 L. ed. 205, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 273. But it prevents their making, under the guise of police regulations, rules which abridge the liberty of the citizen to acquire contract rights out- side his own State and to enjoy the same. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 41 L. ed. 832, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 427, rev. 48 La. Ann. 104, 18 S. W. 904. As to the general division of powers between the Dominion of Canada and the provinces, see Citizens’ Ins. Co. v. Parsons, 4 Can. Sup. Ct. 215. 1In Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 66 L. ed. 254, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 124, the court said: “The Constitu- tion was intended — its very purpose was—to prevent experimentation with the fundamental rights of the individual.” ?Some interesting legal questions have grown out of the acquisition of the island of Porto Rico under the treaty with Spain, following the Span- ish War, and among them the status of the island under the revenue clauses of the Constitution. In Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. 8, 244, 45 L. ed. 1088, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 770, it is held that by the treaty of cession Porto Rico became territory appurte- nant to the United States but not a part of it within the meaning of those clauses of the Constitution. That Sec- tion 8 of Article 1, requiring duties, imposts, and excises to be uniform “throughout the United States” did not apply to the island of Porto Rico. The other ‘Insular Cases”, so called, involving the status of Porto Rico under the revenue clauses of the Constitution are De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 45 L. ed. 1041, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 743; Goetze v. United States and Crossman v. United States, 182 U.S. 221, 45 L. ed. 1065, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 742; Dooley v. United States, 182 U. S. 222, 45 L. ed. 1074, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 762; Armstrong v. United States, 182 U. S. 248, 45 L. ed. 1086, and Huus v. New York & Porto Rico Steamship Company, 182 U. S. 392, 45 L. ed. 1146, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 827. The same doctrine with reference to the Philippine Islands is announced in Dooley v. United States, 183 U. S. 151, 46 L. ed. 128, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 62, and Fourteen Diamond Rings ». United States, 183 U. S. 176, 46 L. ed. 138, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 59. ’ An interstate shipment is governed by the acts of Congress and the deci- sions of the United Supreme Court construing the same. Jonesboro, L. C. & E. R. Co. v. Maddy, 157 Ark. 484, 248 S. W. 911, 28 A. L. R. 498.CHAP. II] THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 13 4. To establish a uniform rule of naturalization,! and uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy, throughout the United States. 5. To coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin, and fix the standard of weights and measures. 6. To provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United States. 7. To establish post-offices and post-roads.? 8. To promote the progress of science and the useful arts, by securing for limited terms to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.* See also Ginsberg v. Wabash R. Co., 219 Mich. 665, 189 N. W. 1018, 28 Ae. R. 518. Commerce on the high seas, though between ports of the same State, is held to be under the controlling power of Congress. Lord v. Steamship Co., 102 U. S. 541, 26 L. ed. 224. See cases infra, 1002, 1252. Acts committed by Indians within the limits of their reservations are not subject to the criminal laws of the State wherein the reservation lies. State v. Campbell, 53 Minn. 354, 55 N. W. 553, 21 L. R. A. 169, and note on jurisdiction to punish crimes by or against Indians. As to what lands of tribal Indians cannot be taxed by State, see Allen Co. Commrs. v. Simons, 129 Ind. 193, 28 N. E. 420, 13 L. R. A. 512. 1 Naturalization may be by treaty, and also by organic act creating a State. Boyd v. Nebraska, 143 U. S. 135, 36 L. ed. 103, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 375, and cases there cited. But such naturalization applies only to those who were citizens of the admitted territory or country at the time of such admission. Contzen v. United States, 179 U. S. 191, 45 L. ed. 148, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 98. The requirement that the rule of naturalization shall be uniform means that the mode or manner of naturaliza- tion prescribed shall have uniform operation in all the States. The act of Congress conferring citizenship upon foreign-born women who are married to citizens of the United States does not violate the requirement. Dorsey v. Brigham, 177 Ill. 250, 52 N. E. 303, 42 L. R. A. 809. The purpose of granting to Congress the power to establish a uniform rule of naturalization was to deprive the several States of that power, and the reason was that if the power remained with the different States, the terms and conditions of citizenship would depend upon the will and pleasure of each of the States, and might be widely and materially different. Dorsey v. Brig- ham, 177 Ill. 250, 52 N. E. 303, 42 L. R. A. 809. It follows that the power gress is exclusive. There is current power in the States. Hamp- den County v. Morris, 207 Mass. 167, 93 N. E. 579, Ann. Cas. 1912 A, 815; Andres v. Ottawa Circuit Judge, 77 Mich. 85, 43 N. W. 857, 6 L. R. A. 238; Rushworth v. Judges of Inferior Court of Common Pleas of Hudson County, 58 N. J. L. 97, 32 Atl. 743, 30 L. R. A. 761; State v. Superior Ct., 75 Wash. 239, 134 Pac. 916, Ann. Cas. 1915 C, 425; In re Wahlitz, 16 Wis. 443, 84 Am. Dec. 700. 2 As to the power to exclude matter from the mail, see Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 727, 24 L. ed. 877. 3 Until Congress legislates upon the subject, a State may make reasonable regulations governing the sale or assignment of rights arising under a patent, designed for the protection of its citizens against imposition and fraud. Allen v. Riley, 203 U. S. 347, 51 L. ed. 216, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 95, 8 Ann. Cas. 137, affirming 71 Kan. 378, 80 Pac. 952, 6 Ann. Cas. 158. Prior to this decision of the Supreme Court there were decisions in lower Federal courts and in the courts of of Con- no con-14 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I 9. To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court; to define and punish piracies and felonies committed upon the high seas, and offences against the law of nations. 10. To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water. 11. To raise and support armies; but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years. 12. To provide and maintain a navy. 13. To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces. 14. To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions.+ 15. To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the States respec- tively the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.” some of the States which seem to have held that the States cannot pass any laws regulating the sale of patent rights. Hx parte Robinson, 2 Biss. 309; Woolen v. Banker, 2 Flipp. 33; Hal- lida v. Hunt, 70 Ill. 109; Cransan ». Smith, 37 Mich. 309, 26 Am. Rep. 514; Crittenden v. White, 23 Minn. 24, 23 Am. Rep. 676. State statutes requiring that notes given for a patent right shall express their purpose on the face of the paper have been held valid. Tod v. Wick, 36 Ohio St. 370; Herdic v. Roessler, 109 N. Y. 127, 16 N. E. 198: Shires v. Com., 120 Pa. St. 368, 14 Atl. 251; New v. Walker, 108 Ind. 365, 9 N. E. 386; Mason v. McLeod, 57 Kan. 105, 45 Pac. 76, 41 L. R. A. 548 57 Am. St. 327; Bohon’s Assignee v. Brown, 101 Ky. 354, 41S. W. 273, 38 L. R. A. 503; Marsh v. Nichols, 140 U. S. 344, 35 L. ed. 413, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 798: Woods ». Carl, 203 U.S. 358, 51 L. ed. 219, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 99; Ozan Lumber Co. v. Union County National Bank, 207 U. S. 251, 52 L. ed. 195, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 89; Allen v. Riley, 203 U. S. 347, 51 L. ed. 216, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 95, 8 Ann. Cas. 137; Ozan Lumber Co. v. Union County National Bank, 145 Fed. 344, 76 C. C. A. 218, 7 Ann. Cas. 390; Woods v. Carl, 75 Ark. 328, 87 S. W. 621, 5 Ann. Cas. 423; Michener v. Watts, 170 Ind. 376, 96 N. E. 127, 36 L. R. A. (N. s.) 142; Crittenden v. White, 23 Minn. 24, 23 Am. Rep. 676; State v. Cook, 107 Tenn. 499, 64 S. W. 720, 62 L. R. A. 174; J. H. Clark Co. v. Rice, 127 Wis. 451, 106 N. W. 231, 7 Ann. Cas. 505. The States may pass laws regu- lating the use of patented articles. Patterson v. Kentucky, 11 Bush, 311; 21 Am. Rep. 220; s. c. in error, 97 U. S. 501, 24 L. ed. 1115; State »v. Telephone Co., 36 Ohio St. 296, 38 Am. Rep. 583. State cannot require vendor of patent rights to take out license. Com. v. Petty, 96 Ky. 452, 29 S. W. 291, 29 L. R. A. 786. But one who peddles articles made under a patent may be required to comply with an ordinance requiring licenses for all peddlers. People v. Russell, 49 Mich. 617, 14 N. W. 578. 1Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19, 6 L. ed. 537; Sweetser v. Emerson, 236 Fed. 161, 149 C. C. A. 351, Ann. Cas. 1917 B, 244; In re Wahlitz, 16 Wis. 443, 84 Am. Dec. 700; Dreucker v. Solomon, 21 Wis. 621, 94 Am. Dec. 571. * Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1, 5 L. ed. 19; Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19,6 L. ed. 537; Kneedler v. Lane, 45 Pa. St. 238; Dunne v. People, 94 III.CHAP. I1| THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 15 16. To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such district not exceeding ten miles square as may, by cession of particular States, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of government of the United States ; and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings.’ 17. To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by the Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.’ 120, 34 Am. Rep. 213; Sweetser v. Emerson, 236 Fed. 161, 149 C. C. A. 351, Ann. Cas. 1917 B, 244; In re Spangler, 11 Mich. 305; Opinion of Justices, 14 Gray, 614; People »v. Hill, 59 Hun, 624, 13 N. Y. Supp. 637, affirmed 126 N. Y. 497, 27 N. E. 789; Ansley v. Timmons, 3 M’Cord, L. (S. C.) 329. 1 Perjury committed in a State court holden by permission of State law and of Federal officials in a Federal building, is not outside the jurisdiction of the State to punish. Exum ». State, 90 Tenn. 501, 17 S. W. 107, 15 L. R. A. 381. 2 Within the legitimate scope of this grant Congress can determine for itself what is necessary. Hx parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371, 27 L. ed. 232. The grant vests in Congress a wide range of discretion as to the means by which the powers granted are to be carried into execution. This matter was at an early day presented to the Supreme Court of the United States, and it was affirmed that there could be no narrow and technical limitation or construction. In the course of the opinion Marshall, Ch. J., said: “The subject is the execution of those great powers on which the welfare of a na- tion essentially depends. It must have been the intention of those who gave these powers to insure as far as human prudence could insure, their beneficial execution. This could not be done by confining the choice of means to such narrow limits as not to leave it in the power of Congress to adopt any which might be appropriate and which were conducive to the end. This provision is made in a Constitu- tion intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs. To have prescribed the means by which government should, in all future time, execute its powers, would have been to change entirely the character of the instrument, and give it the properties of alegal code. It would have been an unwise attempt to provide by immu- table rules, for exigencies which, if forseen at all, must have been seen dimly, and which can be best provided for as they occur. To have declared that the best means shall not be used, but those alone without which the power given would be nugatory, would have been to deprive the legislature of the capacity to avail itself of experi- ence, to exercise its reason, and to accommodate its legislation, to cir- cumstances. “We admit, as s all must admit, that the powers of the government are limited and that its limits are not to be transcended. But we think the sound construction of the Constitution must allow to the national legislature that discretion with respect to the means by which the powers it confers are to be carried into execution, which will enable that body to perform the high duties assigned to it, in the man- ner most beneficial to the people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but con- sistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional.”16 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I Congress is also empowered by the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments to the Constitution to enforce the same by appropriate legislation. The thirteenth amendment abolishes slavery and involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, throughout the United States and all places subject to their jurisdiction. The fourteenth amendment has several objects. 1. It declares all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, to be citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside; and it forbids any State to make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 415, 4 L. ed. 579, 603. See also Hep- burn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. 603, 19 L. ed. 513; Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 37 L. ed. 905, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1016; Fairbank v. United States, 181 U. S. 283, 45 L. ed. 862, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 648; Overshiner v. State, 156 Ind. 187, 59 N. E. 468, 51 L. R. A. 748; People v. Brady, 271 Ill. 100, 110 N. EB. 864, Ann. Cas. 1917 C, 1093; First National Bank v. Fellows, 244 U.S. 416, 61 L. ed. 1233, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 734, L. R. A. 1918 C, 283 Ann. Cas. 1918 D, 1169; James Everard’s Breweries v. Day, 265 U. S. 545, 68 L. ed. 1174, 44 Sup. Ct. Rep. 628. But “if the means employed have no real substantial relation to public objects which government may legally accomplish, if they are arbitrary and unreasonable, beyond the necessities of the case”, the authority of the courts to interfere and declare such action unconstitutional is beyond doubt. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Illi- nois, 200 U. S. 561, 50 L. ed. 596, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 341, 4 Ann. Cas. litrAse Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U. S. 364, 51 L. ed. 523, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 367. The Federal Supreme Court may not inquire into the degree of the neces- sity of the means adopted, nor as to the wisdom of the legislation, but may consider whether Congress has gone beyond the constitutional limits upon its legislative discretion. James Ever- ard’s Breweries v. Day, 265 U. S. 454, 68 L. ed. 1174, 44 Sup. Ct. Rep. 628. “Congress as the legislature of a sover- eign nation, being expressly em- powered by the Constitution ‘to lay and collect taxes, to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States’, and ‘to borrow money on the credit of the United States’, and ‘to coin money and regulate the value thereof and of foreign coin’; and being clearly authorized, as incidental to the exer- cise of those great powers, to emit bills of credit, to charter national banks, and to provide a national currency for the whole people, in the form of coin, treasury notes, and national bank bills; and the power to make the notes of the government a legal tender in pay- ment of private debts being one of the powers belonging to sovereignty in other civilized nations, and not ex- pressly withheld from Congress by the Constitution; we are irresistibly im- pelled to the conclusion that the impressing upon the treasury notes of the United States the quality of being a legal tender in payment of private debts is an appropriate means, con- ducive and plainly adapted to the undoubted powers of Congress, con- sistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, and, therefore, within the meaning of that instrument, ‘neces- sary and proper for carrying into exe- cution the powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States.’” Gray, J., in Legal Tender Case, 110 U. S. 421, 28 L. ed. 204. Congress has implied power to pro- tect voters at Federal elections from intimidation: Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651, 28 L. ed. 274; to pro- tect the right to make homestead entry upon public lands. United States ». Waddell, 112 U. S. 76, 28 L. ed. 673.CHAP. II] THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES i, or immunities of citizens of the United States, or to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, or to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.2 2. It provides that when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors * for President or Vice-President of the United States, representatives in Congress, the executive and judicial officers of a State, or the members of the legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty- one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or is in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion or other crime, the basis of congressional representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 3. It disqualifies from holding Federal or State offices cer- tain persons who shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. 4. It declares the inviolability of the public debt of the United States, and forbids the United States or any State assuming or paying any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave.4 The fifteenth amendment declares used necessarily extends its provisions to all persons, of every race and color. Previously to its adoption, the Civil Rights Act had been passed, which declared that citizens of the United 1 As to this clause, see p. 822, note 1, infra. 2See p. 822, n. 1. 3The appointment and mode of appointment of electors from a State are within the power of the State acting in such manner as its legislature may direct; and a law directing that one elector and one alternate shall be elected from each congressional dis- trict, and one elector and one alternate shall be elected at large in each of two districts into which the legislature di- vides the State for the purpose of electing the remaining two electors, is a valid exercise of the power of the legis- lature in this regard. McPherson ». Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 36 L. ed. 869, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 3, aff. 92 Mich. 377, 52 N. W. 469, 16 L. R. A. 475, 31 Am. St. 587. 4“That amendment was undoubt- edly proposed for the purpose of fully protecting the newly-made citizens of the African race in the enjoyment of their freedom, and to prevent dis- criminating State legislation against them. The generality of the language VOL. I1—2 States of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, ex- cept as a punishment for crime, should have the same rights in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, own, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and should be subject to like punishments, pains, and penalties, and to none other. The validity of this act was questioned in many quarters, and complaints were made that, notwithstanding the abolition of slavery and involuntary servitude, the freedmen were in some portions of the country subjected to disabilities from which others were exempt. There were also complaints18 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [voL. I that the right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State, on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.! of the existence in certain sections of the Southern States of a feeling of enmity, growing out of the collisions of the war, towards citizens of the North. Whether these complaints had any just foundation is immaterial ; they were believed by many to be well founded, and to prevent any possible legislation hostile to any class from the causes mentioned, and to obviate objections to legislation similar to that embodied in the Civil Rights Act, the fourteenth amendment was adopted. This is manifest from the discussions in Congress with reference to it. There was no diversity of opinion as to its object between those who favored and those who opposed its adoption.” Mr. Justice Field in San Mateo County v. Sou. Pac. R. R. Co., 13 Fed. Rep. 722. “A State acts by its legislative, its executive, or its judicial authorities. It can act in no other way. The consti- tutional provision, therefore, must mean that no agency of the State, or of the officers or agents by whom its powers are executed, shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Whoever by virtue of public position under a State government deprives another of prop- erty, life, or liberty without due process of law, or denies or takes away the equal protection of the laws, violates the constitutional inhibition; and as he acts in the name and for the State, and is clothed with the State’s author- ity, his act is that of the State. This must be so, or the constitutional pro- hibition has no meaning.”’ Strong, J., in Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 25 L. ed. 676. Approved, Neal ». Delaware, 103 U. S. 370, 397, 26 L. ed. 567. An act of Congress declaring that certain acts committed by individuals shall be deemed offenses and punished in the United States courts is invalid. The fourteenth amendment does not “invest Congress with power to legis- late upon subjects which are within the domain of State legislation; but to provide modes of relief against State legislation or State action of the kinds referred to. It does not authorize Congress to create a code of municipal law for the regulation of private rights; but to provide modes of redress against the operation of State laws and the action of State officers, executive and judicial, when these are subversive of the fundamental rights specified in the amendment.” Bradley, J., in Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, 27 L. ed. 835, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 18. See also United States v. Harris, 106 U. S. 629, 27 L. ed. 290, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 601; Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U. S. 678, 30 L. ed. 766, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 656. But Congress may punish the intimidation by individuals of voters at Federal elections. Ez parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651, 28 L. ed. 274, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 152. ' See, as to these amendments, Story on Const. (4th ed.) c. 46, 47, 48, and App. to Vol. II. An interesting article on the amend- ments will be found in Am. Bar Assoc. Journ. Vol. 10, 192. The adoption of an amendment to the Federal Constitution has the effect to nullify all provisions of State consti- tutions and State laws which conflict therewith. Ex parte Turner, Chase Dec. 157; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370, 26 L. ed. 567; Wood ». Fitzgerald, 3 Oreg. 568; Portland v. Bangor, 65 Me. 120, 20 Am. Rep. 681. See Griffin’s Case, Chase Dec. 368. These amendments do not prevent a State forbidding a body to parade without license from the Governor. The privilege of citizens of the United States is not thereby infringed. Pres- ser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252, 29 L. ed. 615, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 580. The fourteenth amendment does not entitle persons as of right to sell intoxi- cating drinks against the prohibitions of State laws; Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. 129, 21 L. ed. 929; nor is property taken without due process ofCHAP. I1] law by such a law, although without compensation an existing brewery is rendered valueless thereby: Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 31 L. ed. 205, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 273; it is not violated by the grant by a State, under its police power, of an exclusive right for a term of years to have and maintain slaughter-houses, landings for cattle, and yards for inclosing cattle intended for slaughter, within certain specified parishes: Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 21 L. ed. 394; nor by denying the right of jury trial in State courts. Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 23 L. ed. 678; it does not preclude a State from taxing its citizens for debts owing to them from foreign debtors: Kirt- land v. Hotchkiss, 100 U. S. 491, 25 L. ed. 558; nor from regulating ware- house charges: Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 24 L. ed. 77; nor charges for the transportation of freight and passengers by common carriers: Chi- cago, B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U.S. 155, 24 L. ed. 94; Railroad Com. Cases, 116 U.S. 807, 29 L. ed. 636, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 388; Dow v. Beidelman, 125 U.S. 680, 31 L. ed. 841, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1028; nor from making rail- roads, and not other masters, liable to servants for the negligence of fellow- servants: Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. »v. Mackey, 127 U. S. 205, 32 L. ed. 107, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1161; Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Herrick, id. 210; nor from giving double damages for killing stock through failure to fence: Mais- souri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 29 L. ed. 463, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 110; Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 26, 32 L. ed. 585, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 3; nor from requiring a railroad to pay for examination of its servants for color-blindness: Nash- ville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Alabama, 128 U.S. 96, 32 L. ed. 352, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 28; contra Louisville & N. R. R. Co. v. Baldwin, 85 Ala. 619, 5 So. 311. The fourteenth amendment does not profess to secure to all persons in the United States the benefit of the same laws and the same remedies. Great diversities may and do exist in these respects in different States. One may have the common law and trial by jury; another the civil law and trial THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 19 by the court. But like diversities may also exist in different parts of the same State. The States frame their laws and organize their courts with some regard to local peculiarities and special needs, and this violates no con- stitutional requirement. All that one can demand under the last clause of § 1 of the fourteenth amendment is, that he shall not be denied the same protection of the laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and under like circum- stances. Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U. S. 22, 25 L. ed. 989; Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U. S. 68, 30 L. ed. 578, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 350. So railroads, as a class, may be taxed differently from other property, and if the law provides for a hearing and judicial contest, it is due process of law. Kentucky R. R. Tax Cases, 115 U. S. 321, 29 L. ed. 414, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 57. The fourteenth amendment not only gave citizenship to colored persons, but by necessary implication it conferred upon them the right to exemption from unfriendly legislation against them distinctively as colored, — exemption from discriminations imposed by pub- lic authority which imply legal inferior- ity in civil society, lessen the security of their rights, and are steps towards reducing them to the condition of a subject race. The denial by State authority of the right and privilege in colored persons to participate as Jurors in the administration of justice is a violation of this amendment. Strau- der v. West Virginia, 100 U. 8S. 303, 25 L. ed. 664; Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313, 25 L. ed. 667; Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 25 L. ed. 676; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370, 26 L. ed. 567; Bush v. Kentucky, 107 UW. S) 110, 27 L. ed! 354, 1 Sup: Gt: Rep. 625; Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U. S. 565, 40 L. ed. 1075, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 904; Carter v. Texas, 177 U. S. 442 44 L. ed. 839, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 687. On negroes as grand jurors see note to 44 L. ed. U.S. 839. State may require negroes and whites to occupy separate compart- ments in passenger cars on roads20 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I The executive power is vested in a president, who is made com- mander-in-chief of the army and navy, and of the militia of the several States when called into the service of the United States; and who has power, by and with the consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senate concur, and, with the same advice and consent, to appoint ambassadors and other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not otherwise provided for.! The judicial power of the United States extends to all cases in law and equity arising under the national Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority ;* to all cases affecting ambassadors, other operating wholly within the State. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 41 L. ed. 256, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1138, aff. 45 La. Ann. 80, 11 So. 948, 18 L. R. A. 639. A trial jury may be made up en- tirely of whites, if negroes are not excluded from jury lists, but an indict- ment is bad, if found by a grand jury on which whites only are allowed by law. Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U. S. 110, 27 L. ed. 354, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 625. See, further, United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214, 23 L. ed. 563 ; Lewis v. State, 29 Tex. App. 201, 15 S. W. 642, 25 Am. St. 720. Negroes called for jury-service may be peremptorily challenged if peremp- tory challenges are not yet exhausted. Whitney v. State, 43 Tex. Cr. App. 197, 63 S. W. 879. A law prohibiting adultery between a white and a negro under heavier penalty than between two whites or two blacks, is valid. Pace v. Alabama, 106 U. S. 583, 27 L. ed. 207, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 637. See Plunkard ». State, 67 Md. 364, 10 Atl. 225, 309. Since these amendments, as before, sovereignty for the protection of life and personal liberty within the respec- tive States rests alone with the States; and the United States cannot take cognizance of invasions of the privilege of suffrage when race, color, or previ- ous condition is not the ground thereof. United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214, 23 L. ed. 563; United States v. Cruik- shank, id. 542. Police regulations which affect alike all persons similarly situated are valid: Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. 8. 27, 28 L. ed. 923, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 357; so of regulations of the practice of medicine: Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 32 L. ed. 623, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 231; State v. Knowles, 90 Md. 646, 45 Atl. 877, 49 L. R. A. 695; but the adminis- tration of such police ordinances so as to deny to Chinese rights accorded to whites in similar circumstances is pro- hibited. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 30 L. ed. 220, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1064. Corporations are “persons” within the meaning of the amendment. Santa Clara Co. v. Southern Pac. R. R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 30 L. ed. 220, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1132; Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Mackey, 127 U.S. 205, 32 L. ed. 107, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1161; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 42 L. ed. 819, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 418; Hawley v. Hurd et al., 72 Vt. 122, 47 Atl. 401. But are not “citizens” within the meaning of that term as used in the fourteenth amend- ment. Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U. S. 557, 43 L. ed. 552, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 281; Hawley v. Hurd et al., supra; but a foreign corporation is not deprived of equal protection of the laws because it is taxed by the State at as high a rate as are corporations of that State in its home State. Phila. Fire Ass. v. New York, 119 U. S. 110, 30 L. ed. 342, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 108. PUSS: Const. art. 2) 2A proceeding for mandamus is a “case” within the meaning of theCHAP. Il] THE CONSTITUTION public ministers and consuls ; * OF THE UNITED STATES aL to all cases of admiralty and mari- time jurisdiction ;? to controversies to which the United States shall be a party ; ° to controversies between two or more States ; * between a State and citizens of another State;° between citizens of differ- ent States; between citizens of the same State claiming lands under grants of different States; and between a State or citizens thereof and foreign States, citizens or subjects.® Constitution. Am. Express Co. ». Michigan, 177 U.S. 404, 44 L. ed. 823, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 695, reversing 118 Mich. 682, 77 N. W. 317. Application of Interstate Commerce Commission to a Federal court for the punishment of disobedience of the com- mand of the subpoena of the commis- sion is not a “‘case”’ within the mean- ing of the Constitution, and the court has not jurisdiction. Re Inter-State Commerce Commission, 53 Fed. 476. Congress may vest exclusive Juris- diction in Federal courts of suits aris- ing from acts done under color of authority of the United States, and may regulate all incidents of such suits. Mitchell v. Clark, 110 U. S. 633, 28 L. ed. 279, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 170. Federal courts have jurisdiction in a case of conspiracy, charging persons with conspiring to kill one in the cus- tody of the United States Marshal. Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263, 36 L. ed. 429, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 617. 1Tf a consul wishes to enjoy his exemption from the jurisdiction of a State court, he must specially plead it, and must plead it at the proper time. Wilcox v. Luco, 118 Cal. 639, 45 Pac. 676, 50 Pac. 758, 45 L. R. A. 579, 62 Am. St. 305, upon privileges and exemptions of consuls, see note to this case in L. R. A. And upon jurisdic- tion of consuls over actions between citizens of their own nations, tempo- rarily in a State, to the exclusion of the State courts, see Tellefsen v. Fee, 168 Mass. 188, 46 N. E. 562, 45 L. R. A. 481 and note, 60 Am. St. 379. 2A bill to enforce a lien for towage by foreclosure of the lien on a raft of lumber in complainant’s possession, the suit being brought against indi- vidual defendants and seeking a decree against them and in default of pay- ment a sale of the lumber to satisfy it But a State is not a proceeding in rem within exclu- sive admiralty jurisdiction, but is a suit in personam and may be brought in a State court. Knapp, Stout, &e. Co. v. McCaffrey, 177 U. S. 638, 44 L. ed. 921, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 824, aff. 178 Ill. 107, 52 N. BE. 898; 69 Am. St. 290. 3 This includes a suit by the United States against a State. United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 36 L. ed. 285, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 488. 4 As to what constitutes a justici- able controversy between States in the sense of the Constitution, see Common- wealth of Pennsylvania v. State of West Virginia, 262 U. S. 553, 67 L. ed. 1117, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 658, 32 A. L. R. 300. 5 North Carolina Pub. Serv. Co. »v. Southern Power Co., 282 Fed. 837, 33a A: I: R. 626: 6 U.S. Const. art. 3, § 2. A mere maladministration of the quarantine laws of one State to the injury of the citizens of another does not constitute a controversy among States. Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U. S. 1, 44 L. ed. 347, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 251. A State cannot make it a condition to the doing of business by a foreign corporation within its limits that the corporation shall agree not to remove cases against it to the Federal courts, Barron v. Burnside, 121 U. S. 186, 30 L. ed. 915, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 931; Good- rel v. Kreichbaum, 70 Iowa, 362, 30 N. W. 872. See Elston v. Piggott, 94 Ind. 14. Federal jurisdiction, having been invoked upon substantial grounds of Federal law, extends to the determina- tion of all questions involved in the ease, whether resting upon State or Federal laws. Silver v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., 213 U. S. 175, 53 L. ed. 758, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 451; Ohio Tax Cases, 232 U. S. 576, 58 L. ed. 738, 34 Sup. Ct.22 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I is not subject to be sued in the courts of the United States by citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign State.! Rep. 372; Louisville ete. R. Co. ». Greene, 244 U.S. 683, 61 L. ed. 1291; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 683, Ann. Cas. 1917 E, 97; Texas Co. v. Brown, 258 U.S. 466, 66 L. ed. 428, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 375. “The effect of this provision is not to vest jurisdiction in the inferior courts over the designated cases and controversies, but to delimit those in respect of which Congress may confer jurisdiction upon such courts as it creates.” Kline v. Burke Construc- tion Co., 260 U. S. 226, 67 L. ed. 226, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 79, 24 A. L. R. 1077. “And the jurisdiction having been conferred, may, at the will of Congress, be taken away in whole or in part; and, if withdrawn without a saving clause, all pending cases, though cog- nizable when commenced must fall.’’ Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U. S. 226, 67 L. ed. 226, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 79, 24 A. L. R. 1077. The provision is not a limitation upon, but leaves unrestricted the grant contained in § 1 of art. 3, which provides that ‘“‘the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such infe- rior courts as Congress may from time to time ordain and establish’’, and which has been held to grant the entire judicial power of the nation. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46, 51 L. ed. 956, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 655. Mr. Justice Brewer, who delivered the opinion of the court in this case, said: “Speaking generally, it may be ob- served that the judicial power of a nation extends to all controversies justiciable in their nature, and the parties to which or the property in- volved in which may be reached by judicial process, and, when the judicial power of the United States was vested in the Supreme and other courts, all judicial power which the nation was capable of exercising was vested in those tribunals; and unless there be some limitations expressed in the Con- stitution it must be held to embrace all controversies of a justiciable nature arising within the territorial limits of the nation, no matter who may be parties thereto.”’ 1U. S. Const. 11th Amendment. But a suit in a State court, to which a State is a party, may be removed to the Federal court for trial if a Federal question is involved. Railroad Co. ». Mississippi, 102 U.S. 135, 26 L. ed. 96. But “Judicial power of United States extends only to the trial and determi- nation of ‘cases’ in courts of record, and . . . Congress is still at liberty to authorize the judicial officers of the several States to exercise such power as is ordinarily given to officers of courts, not of record; such, for in- stance, as the power to take affidavits, to arrest and commit for trial offenders against the laws of the United States to naturalize aliens, and to perform such other duties as may be regarded as incidental to the judicial power rather than a part of the judicial power itself.” Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U. S. 275, 41 L. ed. 715, 17 Sup. Ga Rep. 326, holding that Congress may authorize justices of the peace to arrest deserting seamen and return them to their ships. That States are not suable except with their own consent, see Railroad Co. v. Tennessee, 101 U. S. 337, 25 L. ed. 960; Railroad Co. v. Alabama, 101 U. S. 832, 25 L. ed. 973; South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U. 8. 286, 48 L. ed. 448; 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 269; Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 200 U. S. 273, 50 L. ed. 477, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 252; General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U. S. 211, 52 L. ed. 754, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 475; Murray v. Wil- son Distilling Co., 213 U. S. 151, 53 L. ed. 742, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 458; Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural Col- lege, 221 U. S. 636, 55 L. ed. 890, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 654, 35 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 243; Palmer v. Ohio, 248 U. S. 32, 63 L. ed. 108, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 16; Public Service Co. v. Corboy, 250 U. S. 153, 63 L. ed. 905, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 440; Ex parte New York, 256 U. S. 490, 65CHAP. 1] L. ed. 1057, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 588; Ala- bama Industrial School v. Addler, 144 Ala. 555, 42 So. 116; Caldwell v. Don- aghey, 108 Ark. 60, 156 S. W. 839, 45 L. R. A. (n. 8.) 721, Ann. Cas. 1915 B, 133; Miller v. Pillsbury, 164 Cal. 199, 128 Pac. 327, Ann. Cas. 1914 B, 886; State v. New York Mut. L. Ins. Co., 175 Ind. 59, 93 N. E. 218, 42 L. R. A. (vn. s.) 256; State v. Martensen, 69 Neb. 376, 95 N. W. 831, 5 Ann. Cas. 291; State v. Kelly, 27 N. M. 412, 202 Pac. 524, 21 A. L. R. 156; Albany County v. Hooker, 204 N. Y. 1, 97 N. EB. 403, Ann. Cas. 1913 C, 663; State v. Southern R. Co., 145 N. C. 495, 59 S. E. 570, 13 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 966; Sandel v. State, 115S. C. 168, 104 S. E. 567, 13 A. L. R. 1268; General Oil Co. v. Crain, 117 Tenn. 82, 95 S. W. 824. A State by appearing in a suit against it may waive its immunity. Clark v. Barnard, 108 U. S. 436, 27 L. ed. 780, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 878; Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 200 U. S. 273, 50 L. ed. 477, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 252. If in an action against third persons the State auditor appears and is made a party, and pleads to the complaint, he cannot thereafter avoid a judgment on the ground that he represented the State. Stauer v. Rice, 121 Ind. 51, 22 N. E. 968, 6 L. R. A. 387. A State may attach any conditions it pleases to its consent. DeSaussure v. Gaillard, 127 U.S. 216, 32 L. ed. 125, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1053, State v. New York Mut. L. Ins. Co., 175 Ind. 59, 93 N. E. 213, 42 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 256. But apart from such conditions its liability must be determined like that of an individual. Green v. State, 73 Cal. 29, 11 Pac. 602, 14 Pac. 610; Bowen v. State, 108 N. Y. 166, 15 N. E. 56. Statutes permitting suits against the State are to be strictly construed. Miller v. Pillsbury, 164 Cal. 199, 128 Pac. 327, Ann. Cas. 1914 B, 886; Smith v. State, 227 N. Y. 405, 125 N. E. 841, 13 A. L. R. 1264. A State can be impleaded in its own courts only in the manner, to the extent and for the causes expressed in the statute granting consent thereto. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 23 Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U. S. 151, 53 L. ed. 742, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 458; McArthur Bros. Co. v. Commonwealth, 197 Mass. 137, 83 N. E. 334; Burroughs v. Common- wealth, 224 Mass. 28, 112 N. E. 491, Ann. Cas. 1917 A, 38; Riddoch ». State, 68 Wash. 329, 123 Pac. 450, 42. R.A: (nN: s:)) 2515 Ann*® Gas) 1913 E, 1033. Interest is not allowable on the claim unless the statute expressly so provides. Western & A. R. Co. v. State, (Ga.), 14 L. R. A. 438. And upon suits against a State, see in general, Carr v. State, 127 Ind. 204, 26 N. E. 778, 11 L. R. A. 370 and note; 22 Am. St. 624; Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 33 L. ed. 842, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 504; North Carolina v. Temple, 134 U.S. 22, 33 L. ed. 849, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 509. A suit by one State against another will not lie, if in legal effect prosecuted in the name of the State by citizens thereof as the real parties in interest. New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76, 27 L. ed. 656. A suit nominally against an officer, but really against a State, to enforce performance of its obligation in its political capacity, will not lie. Louisi- ana v. Jumel, 107 U. S. 711, 27 L. ed. 448, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 128; Hagood »v. Southern, 117 U. S. 52, 29 L. ed. 805, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 608; Jn re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443, 31 L. ed. 216, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 104; Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 44 L. ed. 1140, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 919; Hopkins ». Clemson Agricul- tural College, 221 U. S. 636, 55 L. ed. 890, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 654, 35 L. R. A. (n. s.) 243; Ex parte New York, 256 U. S. 490, 65 L. ed. 1057, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 588; Patcock v. State, 91 Ark. 527, 121 S. W. 742, 134 A. S. R. 88; Sanders v. Saxton, 182 N. Y. 477, 75 N. E. 529, 108 A. S. R. 826, 1 L. R. A. (x. s.) 727; Love v. Filtsch, 33 Okla. 131, 124 Pac. 30, 44 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 212; Lankford v. Schroeder, 47 Okla. 279, 147 Pac. 1049, L. R. A. 1915 F, 623; General Oil Co. v Crain, 117 Tenn. 82, 95 S. W. 824, 121 A. S. R. 967; Butler v. Printing Com’rs, 68 W. Va. 493, 70 S. E. 119, 38 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 653.24 And as to suits against States, see notes to 33 L. ed. U.S. 842; 11 L. R. A. 370; 8L. R. A. 399. See also Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U. S. 516, 43 L. ed. 535, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 269. But a suit will lie against a public officer or agent who, while claiming to act as such, invades private right un- der color of an unconstitutional law. United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196, 27 L. ed. 171, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 240; Cunningham »v. Macon, &c. R. R. Co., 109 U.S. 446, 27 L. ed. 992, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 292; Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270, 29 L. ed. 185, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 903, 962; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 42 L. ed. 819, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 418; Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 58, 107, 41 L. ed. 632, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 265, 262; Reagan v. Farmers’ L & T. Co., 154 U. S. 362, 38 L. ed. 1014, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1047; Ex parte Tyler, 149 U.S. 164, 37 L. ed. 689, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 785; Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U.S. 1, 35 L. ed. 363, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 699; Hopkins v. Clemson Agri- cultural College, 221 U. S. 636, 55 L. ed. 890, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 654, 35 Ib, 13% ANG (xp FS) 9B} The State’s immunity from suit cannot be availed of by public officers or agents when sued for their own torts though committed under color of their office. Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College, 221 U. S. 636, 55 L. ed. 890, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 654, 35 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 243; Johnson »v. Lankford, 245 U. S. 541, 62 L. ed. 460, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 203; Martin ». Lankford, 245 U. S. 547, 62 L. ed. 464, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 205; Elmore ». Fields, 153 Ala. 345, 45 So. 66, 127 A. S. R. 31; Joos v. Illinois National Guard, 257 Ill. 138, 100 N. E. 505, 43 L. R. A. (n. s.) 1214. And such an officer or agent may be enjoined from enforcing an unconstitutional statute to the injury of plaintiff’s rights. Graham v. Folsom, 200 U. S. 248, 50 L. ed. 464, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 245; Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Cos 200 U. S. 273, 50 L. ed. 477, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 252; Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 52 L. ed. 714, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 441,13 L. R. A. @& s.) 932, 14 Ann. Cas. 764; Hopkins v. Clemson Agri- cultural College, 221 U.S. 636, 55 L. ed. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I 890, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 654, 35 L. R. A. (n. s.) 243; Harrison v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 232 U. S. 318, 58 L. ed. 621. 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 333, L. R. A. 1915 F, 1187; Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 60 L. ed. 131, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 7, L. R. A. 1916 D, 545, Ann. Cas. 1917 B, 283; Greene v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., 244 U.S. 499, 61 L. ed. 1280, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 673, Ann. Cas. 1917 E, 88; Public Service Co. v. Corboy, 250 U. S. 153, 63 L. ed. 905, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 440; Scottish Union, ete., Ins. Co. v. Herriott, 109 Iowa, 606, 80 N. W. 665, 77 A. S. R. 548; Herr v. Central Kentucky Lunatic Asylum, 97 Ky. 458, 30 S. W. 971, 28 L. R. A. 394, 53 A. S. R. 414; Love v. Filtsch, 33 Okla. 131, 124 Pac. 30; 44 L. R. AG (N. S:)) 212: An owner of real property may prosecute an action of ejectment against a State official unjustly and wrongfully withholding the property, although the official is holding it for the State and for State uses. Weyler v. Gibson, 110 Md. 636, 73 Atl. 261, 17 Ann. Cas. 731. Where individuals claiming to be in possession as officers of a State, holding for the State, are sued in an action of ejectment and the State does not intervene and become a party to the record, the suit is not one against the State. Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U.S. 204, 42 L. ed. 137, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 770. See Antoni v. Greenhow, 107 U. S. 769, 27 L. ed. 468, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 91; Allen v. Baltimore & O. R. R. Co., 114 U. S. 311, 29 L. ed. 200, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 425, 962. An action lies to compel an officer to do what the statute requires. Rol- ston v. Missouri Fund Com’rs, 120 U. S. 390, 30 L. ed. 721, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 599; Houston v. Ormes, 252 U.S. 469, 64 L. ed. 667, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 369; State v. Toole, 26 Mont. 22, 66 Pac. 496, 55 L. R. A. 644, 91 A. S. R. 386; Ehrlich v. Jennings, 78 S. C. 269, 58 S. E. 922, 13 Ann. Cas. 1166, 125 A. S. R. 795. No claim arises against any govern- ment in favor of an individual, by reason of the misfeasance, laches, or unauthorized exercise of power by its officers or agents. Gibbons v. UnitedCHAP. II] THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 25 The Constitution and the laws of the United States, made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made under the authority of the United States, are declared to be the supreme law of the land;? and the judges of every State are to be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwith- standing.” States, 8 Wall. 269, 19 L. ed. 453; Clodfelter v. State, 86 N. C. 51, 53; Langford v. United States, 101 U. S. 341, 25 L. ed. 1010. Demands founded on the neglect or tort of ministerial officers engaged as servants in the performance of duties which the State as a sovereign has undertaken to perform, have never been recognized as the foundation of State obligations. Burroughs v. Com., 224 Mass. 28, 112 N. E. 491, Ann. Cas. 1917 A, 38. Upon what claims constitute valid demands against a State, see North- western & P. H. Bank v. State, 18 Wash. 73, 50 Pac. 586, 42 L. R. A. 33, and note. See, on suits against a State, 34 Am. L. Rev. 670. 1“The United States is a govern- ment with authority extending over the whole territory of the Union, acting upon the States and the people of the States. While it is limited in the num- ber of its powers, so far as its sover- eignty extends it is supreme. No State government can exclude it from the exercise of any authority conferred upon it by the Constitution, obstruct its authorized officers against its will, or withhold from it for a moment the cognizance of any subject which that instrument has committed to it.” Strong, J., in Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U. S. 257, 263, 25 L. ed. 648, 650. See also Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197, 48 L. ed. 679, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 486; Mondon v. New Work ete), bi. Co; 223) U.S: 1 56: ed. 327, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 169, 38 L. R. A. (n. s.) 44; Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 56 L. ed. 1182, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 715; Standard Computing Scale Co. v. Farrell, 249 U. S. 571, 63 L. ed. 780, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 380, Rhode Island v. Palmer, 253 U. S. 350, 64 L. ed. 946, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 486, 588; People v. Western Union Tel. Co., 70 Colo. 90, 198 Pac. 146, 15 A. L. R. 326 ; Atkinson v. Woodmansee, 68 Kan. dle “4 Pac: 640) 64 5 Re As o2on Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Doherty, 1538 Ky. 363, 155 S. W. 1119, 47 L. BR. A. (n. Ss.) 31; Hill v. Woodward, 100 Miss. 879, 57 So. 294, 39 L. R. A. (N. s.) 5388, Ann. Cas. 1914 A, 390; L. N. Dantz- ler Lumber Co. v. Texas, etc., R. Co., 119 Miss. 328, 80 So. 770, 4 A. L. R. 1669; Wren v. Dixon, 40 Nev. 170, 161 Pac. 722, 167 Pac. 324, Ann. Cas. 1918 D, 1064; State v. Williams, 146 Ne ©) 6185 6107S" Bi: Gly tia Re Ac (nN. s.) 299, 14 Ann. Cas. 562; State v. Miller, 87 Ohio St. 12, 99 N. E. 1078, Aa ae. AG (N) Ss) (2) Anny Cas: 1913 E, 761; In re Guerra, 94 Vt. 1, 110 Atl. 224, 10 A. L. R. 1560. A treaty, if in force, is the supreme law of the land and supersedes all local laws inconsistent with its terms. Techt v. Hughes, 229 N. Y. 222, 128 N. E. 185, 11 A. L. R. 166, petition for certiorari denied, 254 U. S. 648, 65 L. ed. 454, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 14; Trott v. State, 41 N. D. 614, 171 N. W. 827, 4A.L. R. 1372. 2U. S. Const. art. 6; Hyde Inter- national Law, Vol. II, 12 et seg.; Owings v. Norwood’s Lessee, 5 Cranch, 344, 3 L. ed. 120; McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. ed. 579; Foster ». Neilson, 2 Pet. 253, 314, 7 L. ed. 415, 435; Cook v. Moffat, 5 How. 295, 12 L. ed. 159; Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331, 15 L. ed. 401; Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v. United States, 266 U. S. 405, 69 L. ed. 352, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 176; Ex parte Tervi, 187 Cal. 20, 200 Pac. 954, 17 A. L. R. 630; People »v. Western Union Tel. Co., 70 Colo. 90, 198 Pac. 146, 15 A. L. R. 326; Kintz v. Harriger, 99 Ohio St. 240, 124 N. E. 168, 12 A. L. R. 1240; Com. v. Nicker- son, 236 Mass. 281, 128 N. E. 278, 10 A. L. R. 1568. A State constitution cannot pro-26 hibit Federal judges from charging juries as to matters of fact. St. Louis, I. M. &c. Ry. Co. v. Vickers, 122 U.S. 360, 30 L. ed. 1161, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1216. Congress may empower a corpora- tion to take soil under navigable water between two States for the building of a bridge for use in interstate commerce, although the legislature of one of the States protests against it. Decker v. Baltimore, &c. R. R. Co., 30 Fed. Rep. 723. A provision of a State constitution against limitation of liability for in- juries resulting in death is overrid- den by an act of Congress permitting such limitation in maritime affairs. Loughin v. McCaulley, 186 Pa. St. 517, 40 Atl. 1020, 48 L. R. A. 33, 65 Am. St. 872. Injuries falling within the Federal maritime jurisdiction cannot be in- cluded within the Workmen’s Compen- sation Act of a State. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 61 L. ed. 1086, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 524; Knicker- bocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149, 64 L. ed. 834, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 438. National banks, though instru- mentalities of the Federal government and subject to the paramount author- ity of the United States, are, neverthe- less, subject to the laws of a State, unless such laws interfere with the pur- poses of their creation, tend to impair or destroy their efficiency as Federal agencies, or conflict with the para- mount law of the United States. First National Bank v. Missouri, 263 U. S. 640, 68 L. ed. 486, 44 Sup. Ct. Rep. 213. See also Easton v. Iowa, 188 U.S. 220, 47 L. ed. 452, 23 Sup. St. Rep. 288; First National Bank ». California, 262 U. S. 366, 67 L. ed. 1030, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 602. A State constitutional provision or a State statute in conflict with a treat y must give way to its superior authority. Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 99, 1 L. ed. 568; Carver v. Jackson, 4 Pet. Was ed. 761; Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 8 L. ed. 483; Sinnot ». Davenport, 22 How. 227, 16 L. ed. 248; Haver »v. Yaker, 9 Wall. 32, 19 i ed. 571; United States v. 43 Gallons of W Rasen aan 93 U. S. 188, 23 L. ed. 846; CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I stein v. Lynham, 100 U. S. 483, 25 L. ed. 628; Geofroy v. Riggs, 183 U. S. 258, 33 L. ed. 642, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 295; House v. Mayes, 219 U. S. 270, 55 L. ed. 213, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 234; Hamilton v. Eaton, 1 Hughes, 249, Fed. Cas. No. 5,980; Gordon v. Kerr, 1 Wash. C. C. 322, Fed. Cas. No. 5,611; In re Sheazle, 1 Woodb. & M. 66, Fed. Cas. No. 12,734; In re Matz- ger, Fed. Cas. No. 9,511; In re Ah Fong, 3 Sawy. 144, Fed. Cas. No. 102; Baker v. Portland, 5 Sawy. 566, Fed. Cas. No. 777; In re Parrott, 6 Sawy. 349, 1 Fed. 481; In re Ah Chong, 6 Sawy. 451, 2 Fed. 733; Love v. Pamp- lin, 21 Fed. 755; Bahnand ». Bize, 105 Fed. 485; In re Holmberg, 193 Fed. 260; United States v. Rockefel- ler, 260 Fed. 346; Terrace v. Thomp- son, 274 Fed. 841; People ez rel. Att’y General v. Gerke, 5 Cal. 381; Blythe v. Hinckley, 127 Cal. 431, 59 Pac. 787, affirmed 180 U. S. 333, 45 L. ed. 557, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 390; Ez parte Tervi, 187 Cal. 20, 200 Pac. 954, 17 A. L. R. 680; Doe ex dem. Dock- stader v. Roe, 4 Penn. (Del.) 398, 55 Atl. 341; Wunderle v. Wunderle, 144 Ill. 40, 33 N. E. 195; Scharpf »v. Schmidt, 2 255: 50 N. E. 182; Le shman | v. State, 45 Ind. App. 330, 88 N. E. 365; Opel v. Shoup, 100 Iowa, 407, 69 N. W. 560, 37 L. R. A. 583; Ahrens v. Ahrens, 144 Iowa, 486, 123 N. W. 164, Ann. Cas. 1912 A, 1098; In re Anderson, 166 Iowa, 617, 147 N. W. 1098, 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 686, affirmed 245 U.S. 170, 62 L. ed. 225, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 109; McKeown v. Brown, 167 Iowa, 489, 491 N. W. 593; In re Moynahan, 172 Iowa, 571, 151 N. W. 504, 154 N. W. 904, L. R. A. 1916 D, 1127; Brown v. Daly, 172 Iowa, 379, 154 N. W. 602; Brown v. Peterson, 185 Iowa, 314, 170 N. W. 444; Vietti v. George K. Mackie Fuel Co., 109 Kan. 179, 197 Pac. 881; Yeaker v. Yeaker, 4 Metc. (Ky.) 33, 81 Am. Dec. 530, affirmed 9 Wall. 32, 19 L. ed. 571; Suc- cession of Rixner, 48 La. Ann. 552, 19 So. 597, 32 L. R. A. 177; Sala’s Suc- cession, 50 La. Ann. 1009, 24 So. 674; Choy, ssikos v. Demarco, 134 Md. 533, 107 Atl. 358; Inre Wyman, 191 Mass. 276, 77 N. E. 379, 114 Am. St. Rep.CHAP. I1| THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 27 It is essential to the protection of the national jurisdiction, and to prevent collision between State and national authority,’ that the 601; Riddell v. Fuhrman, 233 Mass. 669, 123 N. E. 237; Minnesota Canal & Power Co. v. Pratt, 101 Minn. 197, 112 N. W. 395, 11 L. R. A. (w.s.) 105; In re Infelise, 51 Mont. 18, 149 Pac. 635; Butschkowski v. Brecks, 94 Neb. 532, 143 N. W. 923, Ann. Cas. 1915 C, 965; Erickson v. Carlson, 95 Neb. 182, 145 N. W. 352; Jackson ex dem. Fol- liard v. Wright, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) 75; Techt v. Hughes, 229 N. Y. 222, 128 N. E. 185, 11 A. L. R. 166, petition for certiorari denied, 254 U. S. 648, 65 L. ed. 454, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep.14; Trott v. State, 41 N. D. 614, 171 N. W. 827, 4 A. L. R. 1372; Baker v. Shy, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 85; Ehrlich v. Weber, 114 Tenn. 711, 88 S. W. 188; Poon »v. Miller, (Tex. Civ. App.) 2348S. W. 573; Bondi v. MacKay, 87 Vt. 271, 89 Atl. 228, Ann. Cas. 1916 C, 130; In re Stixrud, 58 Wash. 339, 109 Pac. 343, 33 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 632, Ann. Cas. 1912 A, 850; State ex rel. Tanner v. Stae- heli, 112 Wash. 344, 192 Pac. 991. A treaty in conflict with a State statute does not nullify the statute, but sus- pends it in its application to citizens of the country with which the treaty is made. Ahrens v. Ahrens, 144 Iowa, 486, 123 N. W. 168, Ann. Cas. 1912 A, 1098; Jn re Stixrud, 58 Wash. 339, 109 Pac. 343, 33 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 682, Ann. Cas. 1912 A, 850. An act of Congress may supersede a prior treaty, and if it is repugnant to it, it, to that extent, abrogates it. Hyde International Law, Vol. II, p. 59; The Cherokee Tobacco, 11 Wall. 616, 20 L. ed. 227; Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 28 L. ed. 798, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 247; Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U. S. 190, 31 L. ed. 386, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 456; Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U. S. 561, 32 L. ed. 1068, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 623; Thomas v. Gay, 169 U. S. 264, 42 L. ed. 740, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 340; Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445, 43 L. ed. 1041, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 722; United States v. Thomp- son, 258 Fed. 257; Ex parte Pettine, 259 Fed. 733; Ex parte Gin Kato, 270 Fed. 343; Techt v. Hughes, 229 N. Y. 222) 128° Ne Bs 1853 11AL LR: 166: And a treaty may supersede a prior act of Congress. Hyde International Law, Vol. II, p. 59; Thomas v. Gay, 169 U. S. 264, 42 L. ed. 740, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 340. But a treaty cannot change the Constitution of the United States or be held valid if it be in viola- tion of that instrument. Thomas v. Gay, 169 U. S. 264, 42 L. ed. 740, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 340. When a treaty has been ratified by the proper formalities the courts have no power to inquire into the authority of the persons by whom it was entered into on behalf of the foreign nation. Doe v. Braden, 16 How. 635, 657, 14 L. ed. 1090; or the powers or rights recognized by it in the nation with which it was made. Maiden v. Inger- soll, 6 Mich. 373. The question whether power re- mains in a foreign State to carry out its treaty obligations to the United States is in its nature political and not judicial, and the courts ought not to interfere with the conclusions of the political department of the govern- ment in that regard. Terlinden ». Ames, 184 U. S. 270, 46 L. ed. 534, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 484, 12 Am. Crim. Rep. 424. The force of a treaty is such that it may even take away private property without compensation. Cornet ». Winton, 2 Yerg. 143. It may operate retroactively. Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U. S. 483, 25 L. ed. 628. Iowa statute excluding aliens from holding lands is overridden by treaty with Bavaria. Opel v. Shoup, 100 Iowa, 407, 69 N. W. 560, 37 L. Rs AS 583. And the Louisiana statute tax- ing inheritances and legacies received by foreigners is overridden by the treaty with Italy. Succession of Rix- ner, 48 La. Ann. 552, 19 So. 597, 32 L. R. A. 177; upon effect of treaties upon aliens’ right to inherit, see note hereto in L. R. A. 1“The possession of the res vests the court which has first acquired juris- diction with the power to hear and determine all controversies relating thereto, and for the time being disables28 other courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction from exercising a like power. ‘This rule is essential to the orderly adminis- tration of justice, and to prevent un- seemly conflicts between courts whose jurisdiction embraces the same sub- jects and persons. Nor is this rule restricted in its application to cases where property has been actually seized under judicial process before a second suit is instituted in another court, but it often applies as well where suits are brought to enforce liens against specific property, to marshal assets, administer trusts, or liquidate insolvent estates, and in suits of a similar nature where, in the progress of the litigation, the court may be compelled to assume the possession and control of the property to be affected. The rule has been declared to be of especial importance in its application to Federal and State courts. Peck »v. Jenness, 7 How. 612, 12 L. ed. 841; Freeman v. Howe, 24 How. 450, 16 L. ed. 749; Moran »v. Sturges, 154 U. S. 256, 38 L. ed. 981, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1019; Central Nat’l Bank v. Stevens, 169 U.S. 432, 42 L. ed. 807, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 403; Harkrader v. Wadley, 172 U.S. 148, 43 L. ed. 399, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 119.” Per Shiras, J., in Farmers’ Loan & T. Co. v. Lake St. Elevated R. Co., 177 U.S. 51, 44 L. ed. 667, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 564, rev. 173 Ill. 439, 51 N. EB. 55; Williams v. Neeley, 134 Fed. 1, 67 C. C. A. 171,69 L. R. A. 232; Young v. Hamilton, 1385 Ga. 339, 69 S. E. 593, 31 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 1057; Crosby v. Spear, 98 Me. 542, 57 Atl. 881, 99 A. S. R. 424; State v. Reynolds, 209 Mo. 161, 107 S. W. 487, 15 L. R. A. (w. s.) 963, 14 Ann. Cas. 198 123 A. S. R. 468; Parsons Min. Co. ». McClure, 17 N. M. 694, 133 Pac. 1063, 47 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 744; State v. Fredlock, 52 W. Va. 232, 43 S. E. 153, 94 A. S. R. 932. In an action in rem where the juris- diction of a Federal court has first attached, the State court is precluded from exercising its jurisdiction over the same res to defeat or impair the Federal court’s jurisdiction; and the converse of the rule is equally true. Kline ». Burke Construction Co., 260 U.S. 125, 67 L. ed. 226, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 79. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VvoL. I Under U. S. Rev. Stat. § 720, a Federal court is precluded from grant- ing an injunction against enforcing claims against Indians in a State court. United States v. Parkhurst-Davis Mercantile Co., 176 U. S. 317, 44 L. ed. 485, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 423. See, upon injunctions restraining proceed- ings in State courts, notes to 16 C. C. A. 90, and 27 C. C. A. 575. No State court has authority to order execution against a national bank in the hands of a receiver for the enforcement of a lien in attachment against the bank as garnishee, even though the lien were obtained before the receiver’s appointment. Earle ». Pennsylvania, 178 U.S. 449, 44 L. ed. 1146, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 915. But the State court may entertain an action in attachment against such bank and its receiver, and the receiver must report such fact and the judgment upon the action to the Comptroller of the Cur- rency whose duty it is to hold the pro- ceeds of the bank’s assets subject to all rights acquired by the plaintiff through the attachment proceedings. Earle v. Pennsylvania, above; Earle v. Conway, 178 U. S. 456, 44 L. ed. 1149, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 918, aff. 189 Pa. 610, 42 Atl. 303. A Federal court controlling receiver- ship of bank cannot restrain a prosecu- tion brought by State against an officer of the bank for crime committed in respect to the bank property before the civil suit was brought. Harkrader v. Wadley, 172 U. S. 148, 43 L. ed. 399, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 119. A receiver appointed by a Federal court voluntarily going into a State court cannot question the right of the State court to determine the contro- versy. Grant v. Buckner, 172 U. S. 232, 43 L. ed. 430, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 163, aff. 49 La. Ann. 668, 21 So. 580. A State court cannot compel the complainants in a suit pending in a Federal court to come into the State court and there relitigate the question in controversy in the Federal court, nor can it by injunction restrain them from proceeding under the final decree of sale of the Federal court, and from enforcing the other remedies adjudged to them by that decree. Central Nat.CHAP. | Bk. v. Stevens, 169 U.S. 432, 42 L. ed. 807, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 403. Proceedings in rem for the enforce- ment of a lien against a vessel given by a State statute for repairs made upon her in her home port under contract with her owners or their agent are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal courts, being in admiralty. The Glide, 167 U.S. 606, 42 L. ed. 301, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 980, rev. 157 Mass. 525, 33 N. E. 163, 159 Mass. 60, 34 N. E. 258. That such lien will be enforced in admiralty, see The J. E. Rumbell, 148 U. S. 1, 37 L. ed. 345, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 498. The same act may be a crime against both a State and the United States, and each then has jurisdiction to pun- ish it. Crossley v. California, 168 U. S. 640, 42 L. ed. 610, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 242, s. c. below; People v. Wor- den, 113 Cal. 569, 45 Pac. 844. Where the question of the validity of a patent arises collaterally, the State court has jurisdiction to pass upon it. Pratt v. Paris Gaslight & Coke Co., 168 U. S. 255, 42 L. ed. 458, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 62. See also Marsh v. Nichols, Shepard and Co., 140 U.S. 344, 35 L. ed. 413, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 798. State courts have jurisdiction of crimes committed on Indian reserva- tions where crime is neither by nor against Indians. Draper v. United States, 164 U. S. 240, 41 L. ed. 419, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 107. National banks are subject to State authority in all respects except where the attempted exercise of such author- ity ‘‘expressly conflicts with the laws of the United States, and either frus- trates the purpose of the national legis- lation, or impairs the efficiency of these agencies of the Federal government to discharge the duties for the perform- ance of which they were created.” Davis v. Elmira Sav. Bk., 161 U. S. 283, 40 L. ed. 700, 16 Sup. Ct: Rep. 502; and the power vested in a national bank by Federal law to take property ‘‘such as shall be conveyed to it in satisfaction of debts previously contracted in the course of its deal- ings”’ is not infringed by a State stat- ute making such conveyances voidable in case of insolvency within a limited THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 29 period thereafter by the transferor. McClellan v. Chipman, 164 U. S. 347, 41 L. ed. 461, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 85. Appointment of a receiver by a Federal court does not divest a State court of its previously acquired con- trol of the assets of a corporation. Mo. Pac. R. Co. v. Fitzgerald, 160 U. S. 556, 40 L. ed. 586, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 389; Shields v. Coleman, 157 U. S. 168, 39 L. ed. 660, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 670. Upon effect of judgment of State court upon United States title to lands, see Stanley v. Schwalby, 162 U. S. 255, 40 L. ed. 960, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 754. Federal court will not revise views of State court upon principles of general law. Sayward v. Denny, 158 U. S. 180, 39 L. ed. 941, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. Mee State decisions control interpretation of wills. Roberts v. Lewis, 153 U. S. 367, 38 L. ed. 747, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 945. When a Federal court of competent jurisdiction has acquired possession of property, and is proceeding to deter- mine a controversy concerning it, a State court cannot enjoin the plaintiffs in the Federal court from proceeding in the case. Moran v. Sturges, 154 U.S. 256, 38 L. ed. 981, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1019, rev. 136 N. Y. 169, 32 N. E. 623, 20 L. R. A. 391. A State court cannot adjudicate upon a maritime lien, nor can any action of such court divest property of such lien when it has once attached. Moran »v. Sturges, above. State stat- utes of limitation are not binding upon the United States, but the United States may take advantage of them. Stanley v. Schwalby, 147 U. S. 508, 37 L. ed. 259, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 418. Although the statutes of the State regulate the administration and de- scent of the assets of descendants, and exclusive jurisdiction of such matters may be conferred upon the State’s pro- bate courts, so far as its own citizens are concerned, the Federal courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon claims concerning such assets as between citizens of different States. Hayes ». Pratt, 147 U. S. 557, 37 L. ed. 279, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 503. But if the probate30 court has secured possession of the assets, the Federal court cannot de- prive it of such possession. Byers ». McAuley, 149 U. S. 608, 37 L. ed. 867, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 906; see the dissent- ing opinion of Mr. Justice Shiras in this case, concurred in by Chief Justice Fuller. The jurisdiction of the Federal courts over suits between citizens of different States cannot be impaired by any statutory regulations of a State concerning the manner in which the validity of demands against its coun- ties shall be _ established. Chicot County v. Sherwood, 148 U. S. 529, 37 L. ed. 546, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 695. In absence of congressional legis- lation Federal courts follow State statutes of limitation. Bauserman ». Blunt, 147 U. S. 647, 37 L. ed. 316, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 466. Federal courts will not entertain suit against a receiver appointed by State court without permission of such court. Porter v. Sabin, 149 U.S. 473, 37 L. ed. 815, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1008. Property in the hands of a receiver of a Federal court cannot be levied upon by a State officer to enforce the payment of taxes. Hz parte Tyler, 149 U. S. 164, 37 L. ed. 689, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 785. Assignee in bankruptcy is bound if he appears in a State court and answers. Ludeling v. Chaffe, 143 U. S. 301, 36 L. ed. 313, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 439; s. c. 40 La. Ann. 645, 4 So. 586. Federal courts are not bound by the rules of constructive notice and summons followed in the State courts. Tripp v. Santa Rosa St. R. Co., 144 U. S. 126, 36 L. ed. 372, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 655. A State can neither enlarge nor restrict the jurisdiction of the Federal courts. Southern Pac. Co. v. Denton, 146 U. S. 202, 36 L. ed. 943, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 44; Parker ». Ormsby, 141 U.S. 81, 35 L. ed. 654, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 912. Nor can it regulate the practice thereof. Scott »v. Neely, 140 U. S. 106, 35 L. ed. 358, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 712. Nor can a State court readjudicate matters determined by a Leadville Coal Co. ». Federal court. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I McCreery, 141 U. S. 475, 35 L. ed. 824, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 28. Where an administrator appointed under the laws of one State appears, without authority from the court appointing him, and defends upon the merits a suit brought against him in a Federal circuit court in another State, and the decree goes against him, and he later appears and files a bill of review in that court, the laws of the second State permitting administra- tors of other States to sue as such in its courts, the Federal court gets juris- diction of the administrator and the decree in the suit for review is binding upon him and must be given full faith and credit in other States. Lawrence v. Nelson, 143 U. S. 215, 36 L. ed. 130, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 440. Judgments and decrees of a circuit court of the United States are to be accorded in the State courts the same effect as would be accorded to the judgments and decrees of a State tri- bunal of equal authority. Pendleton v. Russell, 144 U. S. 640, 36 L. ed. 574, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 743. Federal Supreme Court will not issue mandamus to State Supreme Court to reinstate a disbarred attor- ney. fe Green, 141 U. S. 325, 35 L. ed. 765, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 11. Federal practice not subject to State control. Fishburn v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Go., 1387 U. S. 60, 34 I. edk 585, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 8. A State court will not be permitted to try a United States marshal, de- puted to protect one of the Federal judges in the performance of his duties, for an alleged murder where the killing was done by the marshal in affording such protection and was necessary thereto. Cunningham v. Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 34 L. ed. 55, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 658. Receivers appointed by Federal court are, by act of Congress, suable in State courts. Gableman v. Peoria, D. & E. R. Co., 179 U. S. 335, 45 L. ed. 220, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 171. Upon administration of Federal laws in State courts, see valuable note in 48 L. R. A. 33. Except by permission of Congress a State cannot determine the territorialTHE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 31 CHAP. II] final decision upon all questions arising in regard thereto should rest with the courts of the Union;! and as such questions must fre- quently arise first in the State courts, [the following] provision is made by the Judiciary Act: [A final judgment or decree in any suit in the highest court of a State in which a decision in the suit could be had, where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of, or an authority exercised under the United States, and the decision is against their validity; or where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised under any State, on the ground of their being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of their validity, may be reexamined and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court upon writ of error. . “Tt shall be competent for the Supreme Court, by certiorari or otherwise, to require that there be certified to it for review and determination with the same power and authority and with like effect as if brought up by writ of error, any cause wherein a final judgment or decree has been rendered or passed by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had, where is drawn in ques- tion the validity of a treaty or statute of, or an authority exercised under the United States, and the decision is in favor of their validity ; or where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised under any State, on the ground of their being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and the decision is against their validity; or where any title, right, privilege, or immunity is claimed under the Constitution, or any treaty or statute of, or commission held or authority exercised under the United States, and the decision is either in favor of or against the title, right, privilege, or immunity especially set up or claimed, by extent to which a judgment of a Fed- eral court shall be a lien. Blair »v. Ostrander, 109 Iowa, 204, 80 N. W. 330, 47 L. R. A. 469, 77 Am. St. 532; upon liens of judgments in Federal courts, see note to this case in L. R. A. That a State court will set aside a judgment obtained by fraud in a Federal court, see Wonderly v. La Fayette Co., 150 Mo. 635, 51 S. W. 745, 45 L. R. A. 386, 73 Am. St. 474. That Congress cannot compel State courts to entertain and act upon appli- cations for naturalization, see State v. Judges of Inf. Ct. of Com. Pleas, 58 N: J. L: 97, 32 Atl, 743; 30 L. R. A: 761, Liens arising from Federal decrees are not subject to State recording laws. Stewart v. W. & L. E. R. Co., 53 Ohio St. 151, 41 N. E. 247, 29 L. R. A. 438. 1Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 334, 4 L. ed. 97; Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 5 L. ed. 257; Bank of United States v. Norton, 3 Marsh. 423; Braynard v. Marshall, 8 Pick. 194, per Parker, Ch. J.; Spang- ler’s Case, 11 Mich. 298; Tarbles’ Case, 13 Wall. 397, 20 L. ed. 597; Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U. S. 257, 25 L. ed. 648; Com. v. Nickerson, 236 Mass. 281, 128 N. E. 273, 10 A. L. R. 1568.32 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I either party, under such Constitution, treaty, statute, commission, or authority. “Tn any suit involving the validity of a contract wherein it is claimed that a change in the rule of law or construction of statutes by the highest court of a State applicable to such contract would be repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, the Supreme Court shall, upon writ of error, reexamine, reverse, or affirm the final judgment of the highest court of a State in which a decision in the suit could be had, if said claim is made in said court at any time before said final judgment is entered and if the decision is against the claim so made.”’ *] 1 Judicial Code, § 237 (5 Fed. St. Ann., 2d ed., 723; supplement 1918, p. 411; supplement 1922, p. 223). “Tt is settled law, as established by well-considered decisions of this court, pronounced upon full argument, and after mature deliberation, notably in Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264; Os- born v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738; Mayor v. Cooper, 6 Wall. 247; Gold Water & Washing Co. ». Keyes, 96 U. S. 199; and Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U. S. 257: “That while the eleventh amend- ment of the national Constitution excludes the judicial power of the United States from suits, in law or equity, commenced or _ prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another State, such power is extended by the Constitution to suits commenced or prosecuted by a State against an individual, in which the latter demands nothing from the former, but only seeks the protection of the Constitution and laws of the United States against the claim or demand of the State; “That a case in law or equity con- sists of the right of one party, as well as of the other, and may properly be said to arise under the Constitution, or a law of the United States, whenever its correct decision depends upon a construction of either; “That cases arising under the laws of the United States are such as grow out of the legislation of Congress, whether they constitute the right, or privilege, or claim, or protection, or defence of the party, in whole or in part, by whom they are asserted I “That except in the cases of which this court is given by the Constitution original jurisdiction, the judicial power of the United States is to be exercised in its original or appellate form, or both, as the wisdom of Congress may direct; and lastly, — “That it is not sufficient to exclude the judicial power of the United States from a particular case that it involves questions which do not at all depend on the Constitution or laws of the United States; but when a question to which the judicial power of the Union is extended by the Constitution forms an ingredient of the original cause, it is within the power of Con- gress to give the circuit courts jurisdic- tion of that cause, although other questions of fact or law may be in- volved in it.”” Harlan, J., in Railroad Co. v. Mississippi, 102 U. S. 135, 140, 26 L. ed. 96, 98. Upon removal of causes to the Federal court, see note to 36 L. ed. U. S. 346, and another at page 528. The Federal Supreme Court may review the decision of a State Court as to what property of a bankrupt passes to his assignee in bankruptcy. Williams v. Heard, 140 U. S. 529, 35 L. ed. 550, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 885. The question whether a State stat- ute violates the due process of law provision of the Constitution of the United States is, of course, a Federal question, reviewable by the Supreme Court. Myles Salt Co. v. Iberia, etc., Drainage Dist., 239 U. S. 478, 60 L. ed. 392, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 204, L. R. A. 1918 BE, 190. As is also the question whether a State statute or a municipalCHAP. II| ordinance impairs a contract right. Walsh v. Columbus, etc., R. Co., 176 U. S. 469, 44 L. ed. 548, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 393; Grand Rapids, etc., R. Co. v. Osborn, 193 U.S. 17, 48 L. ed. 598, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 310; New York Electric Lines Co. v. Empire City Sub- way Co., 235 U. S. 179, 59 L. ed. 184, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 72, L. R. A. 1918 E, 874, Ann. Cas. 1915 A, 906; Detroit United Ry. v. Detroit, 242 U. S. 238. 61 L. ed. 268, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 87. See also Bellingham Bay, etc., R. Co. v. New Whatcom, 172 U.S. 314, 43 L. ed. 463, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 205. Whether an act, authorized by legis- lation decided by the courts of a State to be in conformity to its Constitution, amounts to a taking of property with- out due process is a Federal question authorizing a writ of error from the Federal Supreme Court. Wheeler v. env, IN H&B. R. Co: 178 UL s: 321, 44 L. ed. 1085, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 949. A claim that a State statute was enacted under the authority of a Fed- eral statute and is, therefore, valid, even though it violates the State Con- stitution, is a claim of a right under an “authority exercised under the United States.” Montana ez rel. Haire v. Rice, 204 U. S. 291, 51 L. ed. 490, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 281. Where the court of last resort of a State dealt with and passed upon the question raised by plaintiff in error as to the validity of a State statute under the Federal Constitution, and held it valid, the Federal Supreme Court has jurisdiction to pass upon the question, even though the constitutionality of the statute was not considered as an issue by the trial court. Chicago etc., R. Co. v. Perry, 259 U.S. 548, 66 L. ed. 1056, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 524. Where officers of the United States are in possession of lands and claim to hold for the United States, and are sued as trespassers, the case may be reviewed in the Federal court. Stan- ley v. Schwalby, 147 U.S. 508, 37 L. ed. 259, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 418. The construction of a contract of interstate shipment is a Federal ques- tion. Ginsberg v. Wabash R. Co., 219 Mich. 665, 189 N. W. 1018, 28 VOL. I—3 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 33 A. L. R. 518; Jonesboro, L. C. & E. R. Co. v. Maddy, 157 Ark. 484, 248 S. W. 911, 28 A. L. R. 498. Whether a right given by act of Congress to ‘legal representatives” is for benefit of next of kin to the exclu- sion of creditors is a Federal question. Briggs v. Walker, 171 U. S. 466, 43 L. ed. 243, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1. So is the effect of foreclosure proceedings in a Federal court. Pittsburg C. GC. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Long Island L. & T. Co., 172 U. S. 493, 43 L. ed. 528, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 238. Validity of title alleged to be de- rived through a congressional land grant when questioned raises a Federal question. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Colburn, 164 U. S. 383, 41 L. ed. 479, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 98. It is a Federal question whether a State court has given effect to the unreversed decision of a United States Circuit Court acting within its juris- diction. Crescent City, &c. Co. ». Butcher’s Union, &e. Co., 120 U. S. 141, 30 L. ed. 614, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 472. So, whether a prisoner has been twice in jeopardy; Bohanan v. Nebraska, 118 U. S. 231, 30 L. ed. 71, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1049; Keerl v. Montana, 213 U. S. 135, 53 L. ed. 734, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 469; and whether one in a coun- try with which we have an extradition treaty can be brought back for trial except under the treaty provisions. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U. S. 436, 30 L. ed. 421, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 225. That a State court has held valid a divorce in a foreign country raises no such question. Roth v. Ehman, 107 U. S. 319, 27 L. ed. 499, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 312. For other examples of cases held to involve no Federal question, see Crystal Springs Land & W. Co. v. Los Angeles, 177 U.S. 169, 44 L. ed. 720, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 573; De Lamar’s Gold Mining Co. v. Nesbitt, 177 U. S. 523, 44 L. ed. 872, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 715; McCain v. Des Moines, 174 U. S. 168, 43 L. ed. 936, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 644; Remington Paper Co. v. Watson, 173 U. S. 443, 43 L. ed. 762, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 456; Capital Nat’l Bk. v. First Nat’l Bk., 172 U. S. 425, 43 L. ed. 502, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 202; Barrington v. Missouri,34 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I But to authorize the removal under the Judiciary Act, it must appear by the record, either expressly or by clear and necessary intendment, that some one of the enumerated questions did arise in the State court, and was there passed upon. that it might have arisen or been applicable.’ 205 U. S. 483, 51 L. ed. 890, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 582; Stickney v. Kelsey, 209 U. S. 419, 52 L. ed. 863, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 508; Seattle, ete. R. Co. ». Washington ex rel. Linhoff, 231 U. S. 568, 58 L. ed. 372, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 185; Bowe v. Scott, 233 U. S. 658, 58 L. ed. 1141, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 769. The Federal Supreme Court, while bound by the construction of a State statute adopted by the State court of last resort, is not concluded by its reasoning, but must exercise an inde- pendent judgment, when called upon to determine the Federal question whether the act as construed and applied, is repugnant to the restric- tions of the Federal Constitution. Ward & Gow »v. Krinsky, 259 U. S. 503, 66 L. ed. 1033, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 529. The decision of a State court upon a question of fact ordinarily cannot be made the subject of an inquiry by the Federal Supreme Court. But to this rule there are two exceptions: (1) where a Federal right has been denied as the result of a finding shown by the record to be without evidence to support it, and (2) where a conclu- sion of law as to a Federal right and findings of fact are so intermingled as to make it necessary, in order to pass upon the Federal question, to analyze the facts. Northern Pacific R. Co. v. North Dakota, 236 U.S. 585, 59 L. ed. 735, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 429, L. R. A. 1917 F, 1148, Ann. Cas. 1916 A, 1; 7®tna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken, 266 U. S. 389, 69 L. ed. 342, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 129; Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 66 L. ed. 254, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 124; Jones National Bank »v. Yates, 240 U. S. 541, 60 L. ed. 788, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 429. In cases brought to the Federal Supreme Court from State courts for review, on the ground that a Federal right set up in the State court has been wrongfully denied, and in which the It is not sufficient [And where the deci- State court has put its decision on a finding that the asserted Federal right has no basis in point of fact, or has been waived or lost, the Federal Su- preme Court, as an incident of its power to determine whether a Federal right has been wrongly denied, may go behind the finding to see whether it is without substantial support. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 66 L. ed. 254, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 124. 1 Owings v. Norwood’s Lessee, 5 Cranch, 344, 3 L. ed. 120; Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 4 L. ed. 562; Inglee v. Coolidge, 2 Wheat. 363, 4 L. ed. 261; Miller v. Nicholls, 4 Wheat. 311, 4 L. ed. 578; Williams v. Norris, 12 Wheat. 117, 6 L. ed. 571; Hickie v. Starke, 1 Pet. 94, 7 L. ed. 67; Harris v. Dennie, 3 Pet. 292, 7 L. ed. 683; Fisher’s Lessee v. Cockerell, 5 Pet. 248, 8 L. ed 114; New Orleans v. De Armas, 9 Pet. 223, 234, 9 L. ed. 109, 113; Keene v. Clarke, 10 Pet. 291, 9 L. ed. 429; Crowellv. Randell, 10 Pet. 368, 9 L. ed. 458; McKinny »v. Carroll, 12 Pet. 66, 9 L. ed. 1002; Holmes ». Jennison, 14 Pet. 540, 10 L. ed. 579; Scott v. Jones, 5 How. 3438, 12 L. ed. 181; Smith v. Hunter, 7 How. 738, 12 L. ed. 894; Williams v. Oliver, 12 How. 111, 13 L. ed. 915; Calcote v. Stanton, 18 How. 243, 15 L. ed. 348; Maxwell v. Newbold, 18 How. 511, 15 L. ed. 506; Hoyt v. Shelden, 1 Black, 518, 17 L. ed. 65; Farney v. Towle, 1 Black, 350, 17 L. ed. 216; Day v. Gallup, 2 Wall. 97, 17 L. ed. 855; Walker v. Villa- vaso, 6 Wall. 124, 18 L. ed. 853; The Victory, 6 Wall. 382, 18 L. ed. 848; Hamilton Co. v. Mass., 6 Wall. 632, 18 L. ed. 904; Gibson v. Chouteau, 8 Wall. 314, 19 L. ed. 317; Worthy v. Commis- sioners, 9 Wall. 611, 19 L. ed. 565; Mes- senger v. Mason, 10 Wall. 507, 19 L. ed. 1028; Insurance Co. v. Treasurer, 11 Wall. 204, 20 L. ed. 112; McManus». O’Sullivan, 91 U. S. 578, 23 L. ed. 390; Bolling v. Lersner, 91 U. 8S. 594, 23 L. ed. 366; Adams Co. v. Burlington, &c.CHAP. I1] R. R. Co., 112 U.S. 128, 28 L. ed. 678, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 77; Chicago Life Ins. Co. v. Needles, 113 U.S. 574, 28 L. ed. 1084, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 681; Detroit Ry. Co. v. Guthard, 114 U. S. 138, 29 L. ed. 118, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 811; Arrowsmith v. Harmoning, 118 U. S. 194, 30 L. ed. 248, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1023; Germania Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin, 119 U. 8. 473, 30 L. ed. 461, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 360; Lehigh Water Co. v. Easton, 121 U.S. 388, 30 L. ed. 1059, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 916; New Orleans Water Works v. Louisiana Sugar Co., 125 U. S. 18, 31 L. ed. 607, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 741; Scudder v. Coler, 175 U. S. 32, 44 L. ed. 62, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 26; Roby ». Colehour, 146 U.S. 153, 36 L. ed. 922, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 47; Brown v. Massa- chusetts, 144 U. S. 573, 36 L. ed. 546, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 757; Jesler v. Bd. of Harbor Com’rs, 146 U. S. 646, 36 L. ed. 1119, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 190; United States v. Lynch, 137 U.S. 280, 34 L. ed. 700, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 114; Pennsyl- vania R. Co. v. Hughes, 191 U. S. 477, 48 L. ed. 268, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 132; American Steel, ete., Co. v. Speed, 192 U. S. 500, 48 L. ed. 538, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 365; Iron Cliffs Co. v. Negaunee Iron Co., 197 U. S. 463, 49 L. ed. 836, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 474; Barrington ». Missouri, 205 U. S. 483, 51 L. ed. 890, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 582; Smith v. Jen- nings, 206 U. S. 276, 51 L. ed. 106, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 610; Vandalia R. Co. v. Indiana, 207 U.S. 359, 52 L. ed. 246, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 180; Elder v. Wood, 208 U. S. 226, 52 L. ed. 464, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 263; Londoner v. Denver, 210 WU. S. 373, 52 L. ed. 1103, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 708; Western Union Tel. Co. »v. Wilson, 213 U. S. 52, 53 L. ed. 693, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 403; Kenney ». Craven, 215 U. S. 125, 54 L. ed. 122, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 64; Fisher v. New Orleans, 218 U. S. 438, 54 L. ed. 1099 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 57; J. W. Perry Co. v. Norfolk, 220 U. S. 472, 55 L. ed. 548, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 465; Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Olathe, 222 U. S. 187, 56 L. ed. 156, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 47; Brinkmeier v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 224 U.S. 268, 56 L. ed. 758, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 412; Dill v. Ebey, 229 U. S. 199, 57 L. ed. 1148, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 620; Adams v. Russell, 229 U. S. 353, 57 L. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 35 ed. 1224, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 846; Yazoo, etc., R. Co. v. Brewer, 231 U. S. 245, 58 L. ed. 204, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 90; Bowe v. Scott, 233 U. S. 658, 58 L. ed. 1141, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 769; Minne- apolis, etc., R. Co. v. Poppler, 237 U.S. 369, 59 L. ed. 1000, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 609; Union National Bank ». McBoyle, 243 U. S. 26, 61 L. ed. 570, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 370; Stodelman ». Miner, 246 U. S. 544, 62 L. ed. 875, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 359; Home for In- curables v. New York, 187 U. S. 155, 47 L. ed. 117, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 84, 63 L. R. A. 329; National Mut. Bldg. etc., Ass’n v. Brahan, 193 U. S. 635, 48 L. ed. 823, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 532; Thomas v. Iowa, 209 U. S. 258, 52 L. ed. 782, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 487; El Paso, etc., R. Co. v. Eichel, 226 U. S. 590, 57 L. ed. 369, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 179; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U. S. 559, 57 L. ed. 966, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 581; Waters-Pierce Oil Co. ». Texas, 212 U. S. 86, 53 L. ed. 417, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 220; Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Slade, 216 U. S. 78, 54 L. ed. 390, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 230; Godchaux Co. v. Estopinal, 251 U. S. 179, 64 L. ed. 213, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 116; Yazoo, etc., Valley R. Co. v. Clarksdale, 257 U. S. 10, 66 L. ed. 104, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 27; Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282, 66 L. ed. 239, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 106. ‘“We have repeatedly decided that an appeal to the jurisdiction of the court must not be a mere afterthought, and that if any right, privilege, or immunity is asserted under the Consti- tution or laws of the United States, it must be specially set up and claimed before the final adjudication of the case in the court from which the appeal is sought to be maintained.’ Per Mr. Justice Brown in Bolln v. Ne- braska, 176 U. S. 83, 44 L. ed. 382, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 287. See also Caldwell v. Texas, 137 U. S. 692, 34 L. ed. 816, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 224; Eastern Build- ing & L. Ass’n v. Welling, 181 U. S. 47, 45 L. ed. 739, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 531; Yazoo & M. V. Ry. Co. v. Adams, 180 U.S. 1, 45 L. ed. 395, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 240; Turner v. Richardson, 180 U. S. 87, 45 L. ed. 438, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 295; Texas & P. Ry. Co. ».So. Pac. Co., 137 U. S. 48, 34 L. ed. 614, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 10; Butler ». Gage, 138 U. S. 52, 34 L. ed. 869, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 235. It is not enough that the Federal question was first presented by a peti- tion for rehearing, unless that question was thereupon considered, and passed on by the court. Montana ez rel. Haire v. Rice, 204 U. S. 291, 51 L. ed. 490, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 281; Barrington v. Missouri, 205 U. S. 483, 51 L. ed. 890, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 582; Bowe ». Scott, 233 U.S. 658, 58 L. ed. 1141, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 769. But where it clearly and unmistakably appears from the opinion of the State court under review that a Federal question was assumed by the highest court of the State to be in issue, was actually decided against the Federal claim, and the decision of the question was essential to the judgment rendered, it is sufficient to give the Supreme Court of the United States authority to re- examine that question on writ of error. Montana ex rel. Haire v. Rice, 204 U.S. 291, 51 L. ed. 490, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 281. It is not sufficient that the presiding judge of the State court certifies that a right claimed under the national authority was brought in question. Railroad Co. v. Rock, 4 Wall. 177, 18 L. ed. 381; Parmelee v. Lawrence, 11 Wall. 36, 20 L. ed. 48; Felix v. Scharn- weber, 125 U.S. 54, 31 L. ed. 687, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 759; Henkel v. Cincinnati, 177 U.S. 170, 44 L. ed. 720, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 578. If the record does not show a Federal question raised or necessarily involved, the opinion of the court will not be examined to see if one was in fact decided. Otis v. Oregon S. S. Co., 116 U.S. 548, 29 L. ed. 719, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 523. But where an opinion is part of the record by law, it may be examined. New Orleans Water Works v. Louisiana Sugar Co., 125 U. S. 18, 31 L. ed. 607, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 741; Kreiger v. Shelby R. R. Co., 125 U.S. 39, 31 L. ed. 675, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 752; Gross v. U. S. Mortgage Co., 108 U. S. 477, 27 L. ed. 795, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 940; and see Phila. Fire Ass. ». New York, 119 U.S. 110, 30 L. ed. 342, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 108. 36 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I The record should show that the right was claimed in the trial court. Brooks v. Missouri, 124 U. S. 394, 31 L. ed. 454, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 443. Where plaintiff’s pleading alleged that a municipal ordinance was an attempt to take from him his property without due process of law, but made no reference to the Constitution of the United States, it was held that the averment was solely referable to the State Constitution, which contained a due process clause, and that no basis was afforded for invoking the appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Supreme Court. Bowe v. Scott, 233 U.S. 658, 58 L. ed. 1141, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 769. Where the jurisdiction of a State trial court was not questioned and no statute forbade the decree that was made, a decision by the highest court of appeal of the State granting a writ of prohibition, based on the rights of the parties, over the objection that in doing so it violated a right under the Federal Constitution, may be reviewed by the Federal Supreme Court though it is stated in terms of jurisdiction. Butlock v. Florida ez rel. Railroad Commission, 254 U. S. 513, 65 L. ed. 380, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 193. Where the Federal question is first raised in the petition to the Federal Supreme Court for a writ of error, and the accompanying assignment of errors, it is insufficient to give the court jurisdiction of the question, even though another Federal question is properly raised and brought up by the same writ of error. Montana ex rel. Haire v. Rice, 204 U. S. 291, 51 L. ed. 490, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 281. The dispute must be real and sub- stantial. Re Buchanan, 158 U. S8. 31, 39 L. ed. 884, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 723. Where the question presented is one which requires analysis and exposition for its decision, it is not frivolous. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Melton, 218 U. S. 36, 54 L. ed. 921, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep) 676) 47, ls (Re Ae (Na Ss) oa Milheim v. Moffat Tunnel Improve- ment Dist., 262 U. S. 710, 67 L. ed. 1194, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 694. The right claimed must be one of the plaintiff in error, and not of aCHAP. | THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 3d sion of the State court may be supported upon grounds which do not involve a Federal question, the United States Supreme Court will not review the case even though a Federal question was also raised in the State court.! But the rule is otherwise if the non-Federal grounds will not support the decision.” The Supreme Court has third person only. Giles v. Little, 134 U. S. 645, 33 L. ed. 1062, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 623; Ludeling v. Chaffe, 143 U. S. 301, 36 L. ed. 313, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 439. And his interest must be a personal, and not an official, interest. Smith v. Indiana, 191 U. S. 138, 48 L. ed. 125, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 51; Marshall v. Dye, 231 U. S. 250, 58 L. ed. 206, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 92. The right must be set up by him who would avail himself of it in the Federal Supreme Court. He cannot avail himself of the fact that somebody else raised the question in the State court, even though it were in the same suit. Sully v. American National Bank, 178 U. S. 289, 44 L. ed. 1072, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 935; Missouri v. Andriano, 138 U. S. 496, 34 L. ed. 1012, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 385. Where by Federal statute an as- signee in bankruptcy is immune from citation in certain proceedings such immunity can only be set up by the assignee himself, or by a person claim- ing under him. Ludeling v. Chaffe, 143 U. S. 301, 36 L. ed. 313, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 439. We take no notice here of the stat- utes for the removal of causes from the State to the Federal courts for the pur- poses of original trial, as they are not important to any discussion we shall have occasion to enter upon in this work. See Rev. Stat. of U. S. 1878, title 13, ch. 7; Cooley, Constitutional Principles, 122-128. Judge Dillon has published a convenient manual on the removal of causes. 1 Harrison v. Morton, 171 U. S. 38, 43 L. ed. 63, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 742; Chappell Chemical & F. Co. v. Sulphur Mines Co., 172 U. S. 465, 43 L. ed. 517, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 265; Allen v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 173 U. S. 479, 43 L. ed. 775, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 265; Allen v. Arguimbau, 198 U. S. 149, 49 L. ed. 990, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 622; Leathe v. Thomas, 207 U.S. 93, 52 L. ed. 118, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 30; Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U. S. 86, 112, 53 L. ed. 417, 431, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 220, 227; Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Stode, 216 U. S. 78, 54 L. ed. 390, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 230; Wood v. Chesborough, 228 U. S. 672, 57 L. ed. 1018, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 706; Holland Land, etc., Co. v. Interstate Trading Co., 233 U. S. 536, 58 L. ed. 1083, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 661; Man- hattan L. Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 234 U. S. 123, 58 L. ed. 1245, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 874; Mellon Co. v. McCafferty, 239 U. S. 134, 60 L. ed. 181, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 94; Enterprise Irrigation Dist. v. Farmers’ Mut. Canal Co., 243 U.S. 157, 61 L. ed. 644, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 318; Hardin-Wyandot Lighting Co. v. Upper Sandusky, 251 U. S. 1738, 64 L. ed. 210, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 104; Ward v. Love County, 253 U. S. 17, 64 L. ed. 751, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 419; Broadwell v. Carter County, 253 U. S. 25, 64 L. ed. 759, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 422; Minneapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Washburn Lignite Coal Co., 254 U. S. 370, 65 L. ed. 310, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 140; Nickel v. Cole, 256 U. S. 222, 65 L. ed. 900, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 467; Howat ». Kansas, 258 U. S. 181, 66 L. ed. 550, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 277; New York ex rel. Doyle v. Atwell, 261 U. S. 590, 67 L. ed. 814, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 410. For a judgment of a State court held not to rest upon an independent non-Federal ground, so as to defeat the appellate jurisdiction of the Fed- eral Supreme Court, see Bowe v. Scott, 233 U. S. 658, 58 L. ed. 1141, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 769. 2 Klinger v. Missouri, 13 Wall. 257, 20 L. ed. 635; Johnson v. Risk, 137 U. S. 300, 34 L. ed. 683, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 111; Ward v. Love County, 253 U. 8. 17, 64 L. ed. 751, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 419.38 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I jurisdiction under the statute only where the judgment or decree was rendered by the highest court of the State in which a decision in the suit could be had,’ and where such judgment or decree was final.?] The same reasons which require that the final decision upon all questions of national jurisdiction should be left to the national courts will also hold the national courts bound to respect the deci- sions of the State courts upon all questions arising under the State constitutions and laws, where nothing is involved of national au- thority, or of right under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States; and to accept the State decisions as correct, and to follow them whenever the same questions arise in the national courts.® 1 Atherton v. Fowler, 91 U. S. 143, 23 L. ed. 265; Newman »v. Gates, 204 U. S. 89, 51 L. ed. 385, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 220; Norfolk, ete., Turnpike Co. v. Virginia, 225 U. S. 264, 56 L. ed. 1082, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 828; Coe »v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U. S. 413, 59 L. ed. 1027, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 625; Mergenthaler Linotype Co. v. Davis, 251 U. S. 256, 64 L. ed. 255, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 133. The Supreme Court may review a final judgment of a court which, under the State law, is the highest court of the State in which a decision in the suit could be had, although it is not the highest appellate court in the State. Kentucky v. Powers, 201 U. S. 50 L. ed. 633, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 387, 5 Ann. Cas. 692; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Hughes, 203 U. 8. 505, 51 L. ed. 294, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 162; Sullivan », Texas, 207 U.S. 416, 52 L. ed. 274, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 215; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Crow, 220 U.S. 364, 55 L. ed. 498, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 399; Pacific Gas, etc., Co. v. Police Ct., 251 U. S. 22, 64 L. ed. 112, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 79; Mergenthaler Linotype Co. ». Davis, 251 U. S. 256, 64 L.-ed. 255, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 133; Prudential Ins. Co. ». Cheek, 259 U. S. 530, 66 L. ed. 1044, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 516. * Schlosser v. Hemphill, 198 U. S. 173, 49 L. ed. 1001, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 654; Missouri, ete., R. Co. v. Olathe, 222 U.S. 185, 56 L. ed. 155, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 46; Louisiana Nav. Co. v. Oyster Commission, 226 U. S. 99) 57 L. ed. With the power to revise the decisions of the State courts 38, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 78; Bruce v. Tobin, 245 U. S. 18, 62 L. ed. 123, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 7. In order to give the United States Supreme Court jurisdiction the judg- ment or decree must terminate the litigation between the parties on the merits of the case, so that if there should be an affirmance, the court be- low would have nothing to do but to execute the judgment or decree it had rendered. Bostwick v. Brinkerhoff, 106 U. S. 3, 27 L. ed. 73, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 15; Georgia Ry. & Power Co. »v. Decatur, 262 U. S. 432, 67 L. ed. 1065, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 613. As to what constitutes “a final judgment or decree,” see also Weston v. Charleston, 2 Pet. 449, 7 L. ed. 48; St. Clair County v. Livingston, 18 Wall. 628, 21 L. ed. 813; Hartman ». Greenhow, 102 U. S. 672, 26 L. ed. 271; Bacon v. Texas, 163 U. S. 207, 41 L. ed. 132; 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1023, Schlosser v. Hemphill, 198 U. S. 173, 49 L. ed. 1000, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 654; Louisiana Nay. Co. v. Oyster Commis- sion, 226 U. S. 99, 57 L. ed. 138, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 78; Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Olathe, 222 U. S. 185, 56 L. ed. 155, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 46. °In Beauregard v. New Orleans, 18 How. 497, 502, 15 L. ed. 469, 472, Mr. Justice Campbell says: “The constitu- tion of this court requires it to follow the laws of the several States as rules of decision wherever they apply. And the habit of the court has been to defer to the decisions of their judicial tribu-CHAP. I] nals upon questions arising out of the common law of the State, especially when applied to the title of lands.” In Bank of Hamilton v. Dudley’s Lessee, 2 Pet. 492, 524, 7 L. ed. 496, 507, it was urged that the exclusive power of State courts to construe legislative acts did not extend to the paramount law, so as to enable them to give efficacy to an act which was con- trary to the State constitution; but Marshall, Ch. J., said: “‘We cannot admit this distinction. The judicial department of every government is the rightful expositor of its laws, and emphatically of its supreme law.” Again, in Elmendorf v. Tailor, 10 Wheat. 152, 159, 6 L. ed. 289, 292, the same eminent judge says: ‘The judi- cial department of every government, where such department exists, is the appropriate organ for construing the legislative acts of that government. Thus no court in the universe which proposed to be governed by principle would, we presume, undertake to say that the courts of Great Britain or France, or of any other nation, had misunderstood their own statutes, and therefore erect itself into a tribunal which should correct such misunder- standing. We receive the construc- tion given by the courts of the nation as the true sense of the law, and feel ourselves no more at liberty to depart from that construction than to depart from the words of the statute. On this principle, the construction given by this court to the Constitution and laws of the United States is received by all as the true construction; and on the same principle the construction given by the courts of the several States to the legislative acts of those States is received as true, unless they come in conflict with the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” In Green v. Neal’s Lessee, 6 Pet. 291, 298, 8 L. ed. 402, 405, it is said by McLean, J.: “The decision of the highest judicial tribunal of a State should be considered as final by this court, not because the State tribunal in such a case has any power to bind this court, but because, in the lan- guage of the court in Shelby v. Guy, 11 Wheat. 361, a fixed and received con- THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 39 struction by a State in its own courts makes a part of the statute law.’”? And see Jackson v. Chew, 12 Wheat. 153, 162, 6 L. ed. 588, per Thompson, J.; also the following cases: Sims »v. Ir- vine, 3 Dall. 425, 1 L. ed. 665 ; McKeen v. Delancy, 5 Cranch, 22, 3 L. ed. 25; Polk’s Lessee v. Wendal, 9 Cranch, 87, 3 L. ed. 665; Preston v. Browder, 1 Wheat. 115, 4 L. ed. 50; Mutual As- surance Co. v. Watts, 1 Wheat. 279, 4 L. ed. 91; Shipp v. Miller, 2 Wheat. 316, 4 L. ed. 248; Thatcher v. Powell, 6 Wheat. 119, 5 L. ed. 221; Bell »v. Morrison, 1 Pet. 351, 7 L. ed. 174; Waring v. Jackson, 1 Pet. 570, 7 L. ed. 266; De Wolf v. Raband, 1 Pet. 476, 7 L. ed. 227; Fullerton v. Bank of United States, 1 Pet. 604, 7. L. ed. 280; Gardner v. Collins, 2 Pet. 58, 7 L. ed. 347; Beach »v. Viles, 2 Pet. 675, 7 L. ed. 559; Inglis v. Sailor’s Snug Harbor, 3 Pet. 99, 7 L. ed. 617; United States v. Morrison, 4 Pet. 124, 7 L. ed. 804; Henderson v. Griffin, 5 Pet. 151, 8 L. ed. 79; Hinde v. Vattier, 5 Pet. 398, 8 L. ed. 168; Ross v. McLung, 6 Pet. 283, 8 L. ed. 400; Marlatt v. Silk, 11 Pet. 1,9 L. ed. 609; Bank of United States v. Daniel, 12 Pet. 32, 9 L. ed. 989; Clarke v. Smith, 13 Pet. 195, 10 L. ed. 123; Ross v. Duval, 13 Pet. 45, 10 L. ed.51; Wilcox v. Jackson, 13 Pet. 498, 10 L. ed. 264; Harpending v. Reformed Church, 16 Pet. 455, 10 L. ed. 1029; Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet. 367, 10 L. ed. 997; Amis v. Smith, 16 Pet. 303, 10 L. ed. 973; Kinney v. Clark, 2 How. 76, 11 L. ed. 185; Lane v. Vick, 3 How. 464, 11 L. ed. 681; Foxcroft ». Mallett, 4 How. 353, 11 L. ed. 1008; Barry ». Mercein, 5 How. 103, 12 L. ed. 70; Rowan v. Runnells, 5 How. 134, 12 L. ed. 85; Van Rensselaer v. Kearney, 11 How. 297, 13 L. ed. 703; Pease v. Peck, 18 How. 595, 15 L. ed. 518; Fisher v. Haldeman, 20 How. 15 L. ed. 879, 186; Parker v. Kane, 22 How. 1, 16 L. ed. 286; Suydam »v. Williamson, 24 How. 427, 16 L. ed. 742; Sumner v. Hicks, 2 Black, 532, 17 L. ed. 355; Chicago v. Robbins, 2 Black, 418, 17 L. ed. 298; Miles v. Caldwell, 2 Wall. 35, 17 L. ed. 755; Williams »v. Kirk- land, 13 Wall. 306, 20 L. ed. 683; Walker v. Harbor Com’rs, 17 Wall. 648, 21 L. ed. 744; Supervisors v.40 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS United States, 18 Wall. 71, 21 L. ed. 771; Fairfield v. Gallatin, 100 U. S. 47, 25 L. ed. 544; Wade v. Walnut, 105°U; S: 1} 26 L: ed: 1027: Post v: Supervisors, id. 667, 26 L. ed. 1204; Taylor v. Ypsilanti, id. 60, 26 L. ed. 1008; Equator Co. v. Hall, 106 U. S. 86, 27 L. ed. 114, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 198; Bendey v. Townsend, 109 U. S. 665, 27 L. ed. 1065, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 482; Norton v. Shelby Co., 118 U. S. 425, 30 L. ed. 178, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1121; Stryker v. Goodnow, 123 U. S. 527, 31 L. ed. 194, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 203; Williams v. Conger, 125 U. S. 397, 31 L. ed: 778, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 933; Bucher v. Cheshire R. R. Co., id. 555, 31 L. ed. 795, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 974; German Say. Bank v. Franklin Co., 128 U.S. 526, 32 L. ed. 519, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 159; Springer v. Foster, 2 Story C. C. 383; Neal v. Green, 1 McLean, 18; Paine v. Wright, 6 McLean, 395; Boyle v. Arledge, Hemp. 620; Griffing v. Gibb, McAll. 212; Bayerque ». Cohen, McAll. 118; Wick v. The Samuel Strong, Newb. 187; N. F. Screw Co. v. Bliven, 3 Blatch. 240; Bronson »v. Wallace, 4 Blatch. 465; Van Bokelen v. Brooklyn City R. R. Co., 5 Blatch. 379; United States v. Mann, 1 Gall. 3; Society, &c. »v. Wheeler, 2 Gall. 105; Coates v. Muse, Brock. 529; Meade v. Beale, Taney, 339; Loring v. Marsh, 2 Cliff. 311; Parker v. Phetteplace, 2 Cliff. 70; King v. Wilson, 1 Dill. 555; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Cravens, 178 U. S. 389, 44 L. ed. 1116, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 962; Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U. S. 186, 44 L. ed. 1029, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 873; Warburton v. White, 176 U.S. 484, 44 L. ed. 555, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 404; Hartford F. Ins. Co. v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 175 U.S. 91, 44 L. ed. 84, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 33; Sioux City Tr. & W. Co. v. Trust Co. of N. A., 173 U.S. 99, 43 L. ed. 628, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 381; First Nat’l Bank v. Chehalis Co., 166 U. S. 440, 41 L. ed. 1069, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 629; Walker v. New Mexico & S. P. Ry. Co., 165 U. S. 593, 41 L. ed. 760, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 421; Bamberger & Co. v. Schoolfield, 160 U. S. 149, 40 L. ed. 374, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 225; First Nat’l Bk. v. Ayers, 160 U. S. 660, 40 L. [voL. I ed. 573, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 412; Berge- man v. Backer, 157 U.S. 655, 39 L. ed. 845, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 727; Baltimore Tr. Co. v. Baltimore B. R. Co., 151 U. S. 137, 38 L. ed. 102, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 294; Ex parte Lockwood, 154 U. S. 116, 38 L. ed. 929, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1082; Morley v. L. S. & M. S. Ry. Co., 146 U. S. 162, 36 L. ed. 925, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 54; Hancock ». Louisville & N. Ry. Co., 145 U. S. 409, 36 L. ed. 755, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 969; Kaukauna W. P. Co. v. Green Bay & M. Canal Co., 142 U.S. 254, 35 L. ed. 1004, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 173; Duncan v. McCall, 139 U.S. 449, 35 L. ed. 219, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 573; Pullman Pal. Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18, 35 L. ed. 613, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 876; Cross v. Allen, 141 U.S. 528, 35 L. ed. 843, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 67; Randolph’s Executor v. Quidnick Co., 135 U. S. 457, 34 L. ed. 200, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 655; Abraham v. Casey, 179 U. S. 210, 45 L. ed. 156, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 88; Mason v. Missouri, 179 U. S. 328, 45 L. ed. 214, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 125; Loeb v. Columbia Tp. Trustees, 179 U. S. 472, 45 L. ed. 280, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 174; Smiley v. Kansas, 196 U. S. 447, 49 L. ed. 546, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 289; National Cotton Oil Co. v. Texas, 197 U. S. 115, 49 L. ed. 689, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 379; Mead »v. Portland, 200 U. S. 148, 50 L. ed. 413, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 171; Northwestern National Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U. S. 243, 51 L. ed. 168, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 126, 7 Ann. Cas. 1104; Gatewood v. North Carolina, 203 U. S. 531, 51 L. ed. 305, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 167; Sauer v. New York, 206 U. S. 536, 51 L. ed. 1176, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 686; Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Seegers, 207 U. S. 73, 52 L. ed. 108, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 28; Old Colony Trust Co. v. Omaha, 230 U. S. 100, 57 L. ed. 1410, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 967; Carlesi v. New York, 233 U. S. 51, 58 L. ed. 848, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 576; St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. »v. Arkansas, 235 U. S. 350, 59 L. ed. 265, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 99; Wadley Southern R. Co. v. Georgia, 235 U. S. 651, 59 L. ed. 405, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 214; Collins v. Johnston, 237 U. S. 502, 59 L. ed. 1071, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 649; Price ». Illinois, 288 U. S. 446, 59 L. ed. 1400,CHAP. II] 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 892; Pacific Live Stock Co. v. Lewis, 241 U. S. 440, 60 L. ed. 1084, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 637; Hendrickson v. Apperson, 245 U. S. 105, 62 L. ed. 178, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 44; International Paper Co. v. Massa- chusetts, 246 U. S. 135, 62 L. ed. 624, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 292, Ann. Cas. 1918 C, 617; Mackay Tel. etc., Co. v. Little Rock, 250 U. S. 94, 63 L. ed. 863, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 428; American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U. S. 459, 63 L. ed. 1084, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 522; Vigliotti v. Pennsylvania, 258 U. S. 403, 66 L. ed. 686, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 330; Ward & Gow v. Krinsky, 259 U. S. 503, 66 i. ed.. 1033, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 529; Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418, 68 L. ed. 336, 44 Sup. Ct. Rep. 153; Harrison v. Remington Paper Co., 140 Fed. 385, 72 C. C. A. 405, 3 L. R. A. (N. s.) 954; 5 Ann. Cas. 314; Fleischman Const. Co. v. Burns, 284 Fed. 358; Greene County v. Lydy, 263 Mo. 77, 172 S. W. 376, Ann. Cas. 1917 C, 274; Barber v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 279 Mo. 316, 214 S. W. 207, 12 A. L. R. 758; Kulp v. Fleming, 65 Ohio St. 321, 62 N. E. 334, 87 A. S. R. 611; Savings Bank of Richmond v. Na- tional Bank of Goldsboro, 3 Fed. (2d) 970, 39 A. L. R. 1374. See also notes in 12 L. ed. 169, and 5 L. R. A. 508. The latest settled adjudications are usually followed. Wade v. Travis Co., 174 U.S. 499, 43 L. ed. 1060, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 715; Backus v. Fort St. Union Depot Co., 169 U. S. 557, 42 L. ed. 853, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 445; Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U. S. 398, 42 teed. 515; 18 Sup: Ct. Rep: 87 Barber v. Pittsburg Ft. W. & C. Ry. o166 U. S. 83. 41 Li. ed. 925, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 488; Bauserman v. Blunt, 147 U. S. 647, 37 L. ed. 316, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 466; Byers v. McAuley, 149 U. S. 608, 138 Sup. Ct. Rep. 406; Miller’s Exrs. v. Swann, 150 U. S. 132, 37 L. ed. 1028, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 52; New York L. E. & W. Ry. Co. v. Estill, 147 U.S. 591, 37 L. ed. 292, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 444; Wood »v. Brady, 150 U. S. 18, 37 L. ed. 981, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 6; May v. Tenney, 148 U. S. 60, 37 L. ed. 368, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 491; Stutsman Co. v. Wallace, 142 U. S. 293, 35 L. ed. 1018, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 41 227; Yazoo & M. V. Ry. Co. v. Adams, 181 U. S. 580, 45 L. ed. 1011, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 729. Upon when Federal courts do not follow State decisions, see note to 19 L. ed. U. S. 490. See also Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. McCann, 174 U.S. 580, 43 L. ed. 1098, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 755. But though the Federal Supreme Court is bound by the construction of a State statute adopted by the State court of last resort, it is not concluded by its reasoning, but must exercise an independent judgment, when called upon to determine the Federal question whether the act, as construed and ap- plied, is repugnant to the restrictions of the Federal Constitution. Ward & Gow »v. Krinsky, 259 U. S. 503, 66 L. ed. 1033, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 529, 28 A. L. R. 1207. It may determine whether the application made of the statute was so arbitrary as to contra- vene the fundamental principles of justice which the constitutional guar- anty of due process of law is intended to preserve. Southwestern Tel. etc., Co. v. Danaher, 238 U. S. 482, 59 L. ed. 1419, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 886, L. R. A. 1916 A, 1208. The decision of the State court, that a State statute has been enacted in accordance with the State constitu- tion, is binding on the Federal courts. Railroad Co. v. Georgia, 98 U. S. 359, 25 L. ed. 185; Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U. S. 172, 44 L. ed. 119, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 77; Tullis v. Lake Erie & W. Ry. Co., 175 U. S. 348, 44 L. ed. 192, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 186; Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. McCann, 174 U.S. 580, 586, 43 L. ed. 1093, 1096, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 755; M. & M. Nat’! Bk. »v. Pennsylvania, 167 U. S. 461, 42 L. ed. 236, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 829; Green v. Frazier, 253 U. S. 233, 64 L. ed. 878, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 499. Rules of real property settled by course of State decisions are followed by Federal courts. Lowndes v. Town of Huntington, 153 U. S. 1, 38 L. ed. 615, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 758; Halstead v. Buster, 140 U. S. 273, 35 L. ed. 484, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 782; Francis v. Francis, 203 U. S. 233, 51 L. ed. 165, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 129, affirming 13642 CONSTITUTIONAL Mich. 288, 99 N. W. 14; East Central Eureka Min. Co. v. Central Eureka Min. Co., 204 U. S. 266, 51 L. ed. 476, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 258; Messinger v. Ander- son, 225 U.S. 436, 56 L. ed. 1152, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 739; Guffey v. Smith, 237 U.S. 101, 120, 59 L. ed. 856, 866, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 526, 532; Downey ». Gooch, 240 Fed. 527; Rowe v. Kidd, 249 Fed. 882; Fensky v. Campbell, 290 Fed. 83; Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trustees v. Martin, 296 Fed. 442. And so as to chattel mortgages. Etheridge v. Sperry W. &. G., 1389 U.S. 266, 35 L. ed. 171, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 565; Scandinavian-American Bank v. Sabin, 142 C. C. A. 211, 227 Fed. 579; In re Dagwell, 263 Fed. 406. And assignments for benefit of credi- tors. South Branch L. Co. v. Ott, 142 U. S. 622, 35 L. ed. 1136, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 318. State decisions upon what is correct practice in criminal cases are followed unless due process is denied. Graham v. Weeks, 138 U.S. 461, 34 L. ed. 1051, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 363. The decisions of the State courts in construing their own statutes in relation to the rights of creditors of insolvent corporations are controlling on the Federal courts. Ryerson & Son ». Peden, 303 Ill. 171, 185 N. E. 423, 24 A. L. R. 1273. Whether the provision of a State Constitution relating to the condem- nation of private property for a public use permits or prevents the condemna- tion of a right of way through a private ditch for water to be used by individ- uals on their private lands, is a ques- tion for decision by the State courts. Smith v. Cameron, 106 Oreg. 1, 210 Pac. 716, 27 A. L. R. 510. In Green v. Neal’s Lessee, 6 Pet. 291, 8 L. ed. 402, an important question was pre- sented as to the proper course to be pursued by the Supreme Court of the United States, under somewhat embar- rassing circumstances. That court had been called upon to put a construc- tion upon a State statute of limitations, and had done so. Afterwards the same question had been before the Supreme Court of the State, and in repeated cases had been decided other- wise. The question now was whether LIMITATIONS [VOL. I the Supreme Court would follow its own decision, or reverse that, in order to put itself in harmony with the State decisions. The subject is considered at length by McLean, J., who justly concludes that “adherence by the Federal to the exposition of the local law, as given by the courts of the State, will greatly tend to preserve harmony in the exercise of the judicial power in the State and Federal tribu- nals. This rule is not only recom- mended by strong considerations of propriety, growing out of our system of jurisprudence, but it is sustained by principle and authority.” The court, accordingly, reversed its rulings to make them conform to those of the State court. See also Suydam uv. Williamson, 24 How. 427, 16 L. ed. 742; Leffingwell v. Warren, 2 Black, 599, 17 L. ed. 261; Blossburg, &c. R. R. Co. v. Tioga R. R. Co., 5 Blatch. 387; Smith v. Shriver, 3 Wall. Jr. 219; Sanford v. Poe, 69 Fed. 546, 16 C. C. A. 305, 37 U. S. App. 378, 60 L. R. A. 641; Fleischman Const. Co. v. Burns, 284 Fed. 358; Indianapolis v. Navin, 151 Ind. 139, 47 N. E. 525, 51 N. E. 80) 41° ReAS Sat It is, of course, immaterial that the court may still be of opinion that the State court has erred, or that the deci- sions elsewhere are different. Bell v. Morrison, 1 Pet. 351, 7 L. ed. 174. But where the Supreme Court had held that certain contracts for the price of slaves were not made void by the State constitution, and afterwards the State court held otherwise, the Supreme Court, regarding this decision wrong, declined to reverse their own ruling. Rowan v. Runnels, 5 How. 134, 12 L. ed. 85. Compare this with Nesmith v. Sheldon, 7 How. 812, 12 L. ed. 925, in which the court followed, without examination or question, the State decision that a State general banking law was in violation of the constitution of the State. The United States Cir- cuit Court had held otherwise previous to the State decision. Falconer »v. Campbell, 2 McLean, 195. Under like circumstances the State Supreme Court’s ruling on a statute of limita- tions was followed, overruling theCHAP. 11] Federal circuit decision which followed that of a lower State court. Moores v. Nat. Bank, 104 U. S. 625, 26 L. ed. 870. But the State court’s construc- tion of its constitution or laws after the controversy arose, and in a suit be- tween different parties as to the same subject-matter, is not binding on the Federal court. Carroll Co. v. Smith, 111 U.S. 556, 28 L. ed. 517, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 539; Enfield v. Jordan, 119 U.S. 680, 30 L. ed. 523, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 358. So, where after a ruling in the United States Circuit Court the State Supreme Court for the first time decides against such ruling, its decision will not be followed of necessity in the Federal Supreme Court. Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 20, 27 L. ed. 359, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 10. See Gibson ». Lyon, 115 U. S. 439, 29 L. ed. 440, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 129. And it has been held that where at the time of a decision of the United States Circuit Court of appeals, construing the constitution and stat- utes of a State, no decision upon the question had been made by the Su- preme Court of the State, and in this status of affairs property rights were acquired, the former court will adhere to its decision notwithstanding a con- trary decision by the latter court. United States ex rel. Pierce v. Cargill, 263 Fed. 856. See also State v. St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co., 162 Ark. 443, 258 S. W. 609. Where the constitutionality of a pro- vision in a State statute depends upon whether it is severable from other pro- visions which are unconstitutional, the decision of the State court as to such severability is conclusive on the Fed- eral Supreme Court. But in the absence of a decision by the State court the Supreme Court may itself decide the question, or it may leave it for decision by the State court. Dor- chy v. Kansas, 264 U. S. 286, 68 L. ed. 686, 44 Sup. Ct. Rep. 323. The doctrine stated in the text does not usually apply to questions not at all dependent upon local statutes or usages; as, for instance, to contracts and other instruments of a commercial and general nature, like bills of ex- change: Swift ». Tyson, 16 Pet. 1,10 L. ed. 865; Oates v. National Bank, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 43 100 U. S. 239, 25 L. ed. 580; Railroad Co. v. National Bank, 102 U.S. 14, 26 L. ed. 61; Glark v. Bever, 139 U. S. 96, 35 L. ed. 88, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 468; Pleasant Tp. v. Aitna Life Ins. Co., 138 U.S. 67, 34 L. ed. 864, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 215. In the interpretation of negotiable contracts the Supreme Court of the United States will follow the general principles of commercial law, and will not follow the particular construction of any State court. This is true, though such contracts be issued by municipalities of the State. Wood- ruff v. Mississippi, 162 U. S. 291, 40 L. ed. 973, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 820. So with regard to the master’s liability to servants for damage caused by negli- gence of a fellow-servant. Baltimore & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368, 37 L. ed. 772, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep: 914: Gardner v. Michigan C. Ry. Co., 150 U. S. 349, 37 L. ed. 1107, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 140; Nelson Land & Cattle Co. v. Smith, 235 U. S. 699, 59 L. ed. 431, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 200. The doctrine does not apply to cases involving the validity of alleged con- tracts. Turner v. Com’rs of Wilkes Co., 173 U. S. 461, 48 L. ed. 768, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 464. And see also the dissenting opinion of Peckham, J., in McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U.S. 102, 43 L. ed. 382, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 134. Also Bacon v. Texas, 163 U. S. 207, 41 L. ed. 132, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1023. It does not apply to cases involving the question of impairment of obliga- tion of contracts. McGahey v. Vir- ginia, 135 U. S. 662, 34 L. ed. 304, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 972; Knox Co. »v. Ninth National Bank, 147 U.S. 91, 37 L. ed. 93, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 267; Barnum »v. Okolona, 148 U. S. 393, 37 L. ed. 495, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 638; Mobile, etc. R. Yo. pv. Tennessee, 153 U. S. 486, 38 L. ed. 793, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 968 ; Folsom v. Township Ninety-Six, 159 U. S. 611, 40 L. ed. 278, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 174; Shelby Co. v. Union & Planter’s Bank, 161 U.S. 149, 40 L. ed. 650, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 558; McCullough ». Virginia, 172 U. S. 102, 43 L. ed. 382, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 134; Walsh v. Co- lumbus, etc., R. Co., 176 U. S. 469, 44 L. ed. 548, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 393;44 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Texas, 177 The Federal court must decide U.S. 66, 44 L. ed. 673, 20Sup. Ct. Rep. for itself whether there exists a 545; Stearns v. Minnesota, 179 U.S. contract within the constitutional 223, 45 L. ed. 162, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. protection. Louisville & N. R. R. 73; Yazoo, etc., R. Co. v. Adams, Co. v. Palmes, 109 U. S. 244, 27 L. 180 U.S. 1, 45 L. ed. 395, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 240; Freeport Water Co. v. Free- port, 180 U. S. 587, 45 L. ed. 679, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 493; Wilson v. Stande- fer, 184 U.S. 399, 46 L. ed. 612, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 384; Northern Cent. R. Co. v. Maryland, 187 U. S. 258, 47 L. ed. 167, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 62; Waggoner »v. Flack, 188 U. S. 595, 47 L. ed. 609, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 345; Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U.S. 226, 48 L. ed. 417, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 257; Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 193 U. S. 532, 48 L. ed. 778, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 576; Powers v. Detroit, ete., R. Co., 201 U. S. 548, 50 L. ed. 860, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 556; Blair v. Chicago, 201 U. S. 400, 50 L. ed. 801, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 427; Vicksburg v. Vicksburg Water- works Co., 202 U. S. 453, 50 L. ed. 1102, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 660, 6 Ann. Cas. 253; Sullivan v. Texas, 207 U. S. 416, 53 L. ed. 274, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 215; Northern Pacific R. Co. ». Minnesota, 208 U. S. 583, 52 L. ed. 630, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 341; New York Electric Lines Co. v. Empire City Sub- way Co., 235 U.S. 179, 59 L. ed. 184, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 72, L. R. A. 1918 E, 874, Ann. Cas. 1915 A, 906; Seton Hall College v. South Orange, 242 U.S. 100, 61 L. ed. 170, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 54; Milwaukee Electric Ry. etc., Co. v. Wisconsin, 252 U.S. 100, 64 L. ed. 476, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 306, 10 A. L. R. 892; Omaha Water Co. v. Omaha, 147 Fed. 1, 77 ©..C. A. 267, 12 L. R. A. (n. 8.) 736, 8 Ann. Cas. 614. It does not apply to insurance con- tracts. Robinson v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 3 Sum. 220. And see Reims- dyke v. Kane, 1 Gall. 376; Austen v. Miller, 5 McLean, 153; Gloucester Ins. Co. v. Younger, 2 Curt. C. C. 322; Bragg v. Meyer, McAll. 408; Alexander ». Lane, 85 C. C. A. 677, 157 Fed. 1002, certiorari denied, 208 U. S. 617, 52 L. ed. 647, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 569. Whether a lunatic’s con- tract is void or voidable is a question of general jurisprudence. Edwards ». Davenport, 20 Fed. Rep. 756. ed. 922, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 193; Louis- ville Gas Co. v. Citizens’ Gas Co., 115 U.S. 683, 29 L. ed. 510, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 265; Milwaukee Electric Ry. etc., Co. v. Wisconsin, 252 U. S. 100, 64 L. ed. 476, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 306, 10 A. L. R. 892. Soin determining the validity of municipal ordinances, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 30 L. ed. 220, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1064. And where a contract had been made under a settled construction of the State con- stitution by its highest court, the Supreme Court sustained it, not- withstanding the State court had since overruled its former decision. Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175, 17 L. ed. 520. See Olcott v. Supervisors, 16 Wall. 678, 21 L. ed. 382; Douglass v. Pike County, 101 U.S. 677, 25 L. ed. 968. See upon “rule of decision” in Federal courts, article in 60 Alb. L. Jour. 297. But even in relation to the doc- trines of commercial law and general jurisprudence, the Federal courts, for the sake of harmony and to avoid confusion, will lean towards an agree- ment of views with the State courts, if the question seems to them balanced with doubt. Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U.S. 20, 27 L. ed. 359, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 10; Wilson v. Standefer, 184 U. S. 399, 46 L. ed. 612, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 384; Stanly County v. Coler, 190 U. S. 437, 47 L. ed. 1126, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 811; Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 193 U. S. 532, 48 L. ed. 778, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 576; Tampa Waterworks Co. ». Tampa, 199 U. S. 241, 50 L. ed. 172, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 23; Kuhn v. Fair- mont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 54 L. ed, 228, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 140; Ennis Waterworks v. Ennis, 233 U. S. 652, 58 L. ed. 1189, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 767; Moore-Mansfield Constr. Co. v. Elec- trical Installation Co., 234 U. S. 619, 58 L. ed. 1508, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 941; Lankford v. Platte Iron Works Co., 235 U.S. 461, 59 L. ed. 316, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 173; Sim v. Edenborn, 242 U. S. 131, 61 L. ed. 199, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 36.CHAP. 1] THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 45 in the cases already pointed out, the due observance of this rule will prevent those collisions of judicial authority which would otherwise be inevitable, and which, besides being unseemly, would be danger- ous to the peace, harmony, and stability of the Union. [The legis- lative construction of a provision in a State constitution will be followed by the Federal courts in the absence of an authoritative decision of the highest court of appeal of the State to the contrary.’] Besides conferring specified powers upon the national govern- ment, the Constitution contains also certain restrictions upon the action of the States, a portion of them designed to prevent encroach- ments upon the national authority, and another portion to protect individual rights against possible abuse of State power. Of the first class are the following: No State shall enter into any treaty, alli- ance, or confederation, grant letters of marque or reprisal, coin money, emit bills of credit,? or make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts. No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any imposts or duties upon imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws; and the net produce of all duties and imposts laid by any State on imports or exports shall be for the use of the treasury of the United States, and all such laws shall be subject to the revision and control of Congress. No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty of tonnage, keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact * with another 1Van Dyke v. Geary, 244 U.S. 39, 61 L. ed. 973, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 483. 2 To constitute a bill of credit within the meaning of the Constitution, it must be issued by a State, involve the faith of the State, and be designed to circulate as money on the credit of the State, in the ordinary uses of busi- ness. Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 11 Pet. 257, 9 L. ed. 418; Woodruff v. Trapnall, 10 How. 190, 13 L. ed. 358. Treasury warrants designed so to cir- culate are bills of credit. Braggs v. Tuffts, 49 Ark. 554,68. W. 158. But if they are to be retired, as soon as pre- sented for payment at the State treas- ury, and paid, they are not bills of credit, even though the creditor to whom they are issued may demand at the time of receiving them that they be issued in denominations of one dollar each to the extent of the debt, the remainder being issued in denomi- nations of not less than five dollars, and even though they may pass from hand to hand and are receivable from any person in payment of taxes. Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Texas, 177 U.S. 66, 44 L. ed. 673, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 545, rev. 41S. W. 157. The facts that a State owns the entire capital stock of a bank, elects the directors, makes its bills receivable for the public dues, and pledges its faith for their redemption, do not make the bills of such bank ‘‘bills of credit” in the constitutional sense. Darring- ton v. State Bank of Alabama, 13 How. 12, 14 L. ed. 30. See, further, Craig v. Missouri, 4 Pet. 410, 7 L. ed. 903; Byrne v. Missouri, 8 Pet. 40, 8 L. ed. 859; Curran v. Arkansas, 15 How. 304, 14 L. ed. 705; Moreau v. Detcha- mendy, 41 Mo. 431; Bailey v. Milner, 35 Ga. 330; City National Bank v. Mahan, 21 La. Ann. 751. 3 Agreement between two States to appoint commissioners to trace and mark their common boundary line is not prohibited. Virginia v. Tennessee,46 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I State or with a foreign power, or engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay. Of the second class are the following: No State shall pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of con- tracts,! or make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi- leges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,? nor base discriminations in suffrage on race, color, or previous condition of servitude.’ Other provisions have for their object to prevent discriminations by the several States against the citizens and public authority and proceedings of other States. Of this class are the provisions that the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States; * that fugitives from 148 U. S. 503, 37 L. ed. 5387, 13 Sup. 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 80; Wood »v. Brady, Ct. Rep. 728. Upon judicial settle- 150 U.S. 18, 37 L. ed. 981, 14 Sup. Ct. ment of State boundaries, see Nebraska Rep.6. See also Ford v. Delta & Pine v. Iowa, 145 U. S. 519, 36 L. ed. 798, Land Co., 164 U.S. 662, 41 L. ed. 590, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 976, and note to 36 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 230. L. ed. U.S. 798. “The prohibition is aimed at the 1 Const. of U.S. art. 1, § 10; Story legislative power of the State, and not on Const. c. 33, 34. at the decisions of its courts, or the acts But this provision of the Constitu- of administrative or executive boards tion does not extend to the case where _ or officers, or the doings of corporations a State court overrules its prior deci- or individuals.’’ New Orleans Water- sions, even though they have become works Co. v. Louisiana Sugar Refining rules of property and contracts have Co., 125 U.S. 18, 31 L. ed. 607, 8 Sup. been entered into whose obligation is Ct. Rep. 741; Central Land Co. »v. seriously impaired by such overruling. Laidley, 159 U. S. 103, 40 L. ed. 91, Bacon v. Texas, 163 U.S. 207,41 L.ed. 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 80; Ross v. Oregon, 132, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1023; State v. 227 U. S. 150, 57 L. ed. 458, 33 Sup. O’Neil, 147 Iowa, 513, 126 N. W. 454, Ct. Rep. 220, Ann. Cas. 1914 C, 224; 33 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 788, Ann. Cas. Crigler v. Shapler, 79 Kan. 834, 101 1912 B, 691; and see also Turner v. Pac. 619, 23 L. R. A. (n. 8.) 500; Com’rs of Wilkes Co., 173 U.S. 461,43 King v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 195 Mo. L. ed. 768, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 464, and 290, 92 S. W. 892, 6 Ann. Cas. 618, dissenting opinion of Peckham, J., in 113 A. S. R. 678. McCullough »v. Virginia, 172 U. S. 102, Whether a State statute impairs 43 L. ed. 382, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 134. the obligation of a contract is a Federal That impairing remedy impairs the question. Pierce v. Somerset Ry., 171 obligation of a contract, see note to U.S. 641, 43 L. ed. 316, 19 Sup. Ct. 26 L. ed. U.S. 132. Rep. 64. See ante, p. 38, note 3. This provision does not cover the 2 Const. of U. S. 14th Amendment; case of an alleged impairment of a see Story on the Constitution (4th contract by State action other than ed.), ec. 47. legislative. Hanford v. Davies, 163 3 Const. of U. S. 15th Amendment; U. S. 273, 41 L. ed. 157, 16 Sup. Ct. Story on Const. (4th ed.) ec. 48. Rep. 1051; Turner v. Com’rs of Wilkes 4 Const. of U.S. art. 4. ‘‘What are Co., 173 U.S. 461, 43 L. ed. 768, 19 the privileges and immunities of citi- Sup. Ct. Rep. 464; Central Land Co. zens in the several States? We feel v. Laidley, 159 U.S. 103, 40 L. ed. 91, no hesitation in confining these ex-CHAP. II] THE CONSTITUTION pressions to those privileges and im- munities which are in their nature fundamental; which belong of right to the citizens of all free governments, and which have at all times been en- joyed by the citizens of the several States which compose this Union, from the time of their becoming free, in- dependent, and _ sovereign. What those fundamental principles are, it would perhaps be more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They may, however, be all comprehended under the following general heads: Protec- tion by the government, the enjoy- ment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety, subject neverthe- less to such restraints as the govern- ment may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole. The right of a citizen of one State to pass through or to reside in any other State, for purposes of trade, agriculture, pro- fessional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and maintain actions of every kind in the courts of the State; to take, hold, and dispose of property, either real or personal; and an exemption from higher taxes or im- positions than are paid by the citizens of the other State, — may be men- tioned as some of the particular privileges and immunities of citizens, which are clearly embraced by the general description of privileges deemed to be fundamental; to which may be added the elective franchise as regulated and established by the laws or constitution of the State in which it is to be exercised. These, and many others which might be mentioned, are, strictly speaking, privileges and im- munities; and the enjoyment of them by the citizens of each State in every other State was manifestly calculated (to use the expressions of the preamble of the corresponding provision in the old Articles of Confederation) ‘the better to secure and perpetuate mut ual friendship and intercourse among the people of the different States of the Union.’ ’”’ Washington, J., in Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 380. The constitutional guaranty is in- OF THE UNITED STATES 47 tended to protect the privileges and immunities against State action and not against the action of individuals. United States v. Wheeler, 254 U. S. 281, 65 L. ed. 270, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 133. It was not designed to interfere with the police power of a State. De Grazier v. Stephens, 101 Tex. 194, 105 S. W. 992, 16 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1033, 16 Ann. Cas. 1059. It does not profess to control the power of the State government over the rights of its own citizens. It merely guarantees privi- leges and immunities to citizens of other States. State v. Swanson, 182 Ind. 582, 107 N. E. 275. It does not give a citizen the right to enjoy within his own State the privileges which citizens of other States enjoy under the laws of those States. MeKane v. Durston, 153 U. S. 684, 38 L. ed. 867, 14 Sup: Ct. Rep: 913; McCarter v. Hudson County Water Co., 70 N. J. Eq. 695, 65 Atl. 489, 118 Am. St. Rep. 754, 14 L. R. A. (n. 5.) 197, 10 Ann. Cas. 116, affirmed 209 U. S. 349, 52 L. ed. 828, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 529. Nor to carry with him, when he goes into other States, the privileges which he enjoys in his home State. Detroit v. Osborne, 135 U. S. 492, 34 L. ed. 260, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1012. Foreigners who have never been residents of any one of the States are not within its protection. In re Colbert’s Estate, 44 Mont. 259, 119 Pac. 791. The Supreme Court will not describe and define the privileges and immunities in a general classification; preferring to decide each case as it may come up. Conner v. Elliott, 18 How. 591, 15 L. ed. 497; Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418, 20 L. ed. 449; McCready »v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 391, 24 L. ed. 248. The question in this last case was whether the State of Virginia could prohibit citizens of other States from planting oysters in Ware River, a stream in that State where the tide ebbs and flows,. and the right be granted by the State to its own citizens exclusively. Waite, Ch. J., in answer- ing the question in the affirmative, said: ‘The right thus granted is not a privilege or immunity of general, but of special citizenship. It does not belong48 of right to the citizens of all free gov- ernments, but only to the citizens of Virginia, on account of the peculiar cir- cumstances in which they are placed; they, and they alone, owned the property to be sold or used; and they alone had the power to dispose of it as they saw fit. They owned it, not by virtue of citizenship merely, but of citizenship and domicile united; that is to say, by virtue of a citizenship con- fined to that particular locality.” See also Paul v. Hazelton, 37 N. J. 106; Com. v. Hilton, 174 Mass. 29, 54 N. E. 362, 45 L. R. A. 475; Silver v. State, 147 Ga. 162, 93 S. E. 145; People »v. Setunsky, 161 Mich. 624, 126 N. W. 844; State v. Kofines, 33 R. I. 211, 80 Atl. 432, Ann. Cas. 1913 C, 1120; State v. Ashman, 123 Tenn. 654, 135 S: W. 325. For other discussions upon this subject, see Murray v. McCarty, 2 Munf. 393; Lemmon v. People, 26 Barb. 270, and 20 N. Y. 562; Camp- bell v. Morris, 3 Har. & M’H. 554; Amy v. Smith, 1 Lit. 326; Crandall v. State, 10 Conn. 340; Butler v. Farns- worth, 4 Wash. C. C. 101; Common- wealth v. Towles, 5 Leigh, 743; Haney v. Marshall, 9 Md. 194; Slaughter »v. Commonwealth, 13 Gratt. 767; State v. Medbury, 3 R. I. 138; People v. Imlay, 20 Barb. 68; People v. Cole- man, 4 Cal. 46; People v. Thurber, 13 Tl. 544; Phoenix Insurance Co. ». Commonwealth, 5 Bush, 68; Ducat ». Chicago, 48 Ill. 172; Fire Depart- ment v. Noble, 3 E. D. Smith, 441; Same v. Wright, 3 E. D. Smith, 453; Robinson v. Oceanic S. N. Co., 112 N. Y. 315, 19 N. E. 625; Bliss’s Petition, 63 N. H. 135; State v. Lancaster, id. 267; People v. Phippin, 70 Mich. 6, 37 N. W. Rep. 88; State v. Gilman, 33 W. Va. 146, 10S. E. Rep. 283; Fire Dep’t v. Helfenstein, 16 Wis. 136; Sears v. Commissioners of Warren Core36 Ind. 267; Jeffersonville, &c. R. R. Co. v. Hendricks, 41 Ind. 48; Cincinnati Health Association v. Rosenthal, 55 Ill. 85; State v. Fosdick, 21 La. Ann. 434; Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 21 L. ed. 394; Bradwell v. State, 16 Wall. 130, 21 L. ed. 442; Bartmeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. 129, 21 L. ed. 929; United States »v, Cruikshank, 92 U. S. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I 542, 23 L. ed. 588; Kimmish ». Ball, 129 U.S. 217, 32 L. ed. 695, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 277; Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581, 588-593, 44 L. ed. 597, 600, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 448, 494; Twining ». New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 53 L. ed. 97, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 14; Maxwell v. Bug- bee, 250 U. S. 525, 63 L. ed. 1124, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 2; Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial Ace. Commission, 184 Cal. 26, 192 Pac. 1021; Hammer ». State, 173 Ind. 199, 89 N. E. 850, 24 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 795, 21 Ann. Cas. 1034, 140 A. S. R. 248; Robinson v. Fish- back, 175 Ind. 132, 93 N. E. 666, Ann. Cas. 1913 B, 1271; Shaw v. Marshall- town, 131 Iowa, 128, 104 N. W. 1121, 10 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 825, 9 Ann. Cas. 1039; Olander v. Hallowell, 193 Iowa, 979, 188 N. W. 667; La Tourette »v. McMaster, 1048. C. 501, 89S. E. 398; De Grazier v. Stephens, 101 Tex. 194, 105 S. W. 992, 16 L. R. A. (nw. 8.) 1033, 16 Ann. Cas. 1059. Upon privileges of citizens of States, see note to 1 L. R. A. 56; political rights of, note to 8 L. R. A. 337. The right to engage in commerce between the States is impliedly guaran- teed by this provision of the Constitu- tion as a privilege inherent in American citizenship. Hoxie v. New York, etc., R. Co., 82 Conn. 352, 73 Atl. 754, 17 Ann. Cas. 432. The constitutional requirement pro- tects the citizen of another State against discriminatory taxation, but not to an entire immunity therefrom, nor to any preferential treatment as compared with resident citizens. Shaf- fer v. Carter, 252 U. S. 37, 64 L. ed. 445, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 221; People ez rel. Stafford v. Travis, 231 N. Y. 339, 132 N. E. 109. It gives the citizen of one State the right to remove to and carry on business in another without being subjected in property or person to taxes more onerous than the citizens of the latter State are subjected to. Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U. S. 525, 63 L. ed. 1124, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 2; Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 64 L. ed. 445, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 221; People ex rel. Stafford v. Travis, 231 N. Y. 339, 132 N. E. 109. Exemptions from taxation must be granted to non-residents upon sameCHAP. I1| terms as to residents. Sprague v. Fletcher, 69 Vt. 69, 37 Atl. 239, 37 L. R. A. 840; Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U. S. 60, 64 L. ed. 460, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 228. A statute imposing privilege taxes on construction companies which lays a higher tax on companies having their chief office outside the State than on those having it within the State, is repugnant to the constitutional re- quirement. Chalker v. Birmingham, etc., R. Co., 249 U. S. 522, 63 L. ed. 748, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 366. The right to sue and defend in the courts is one of the highest and most essential privileges of citizenship and must be allowed by each State to the citizens of all other States. Chambers v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., 207 U. S. 142, 52 L. ed. 143, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 34, affirming 73 Ohio St. 16, 76 N. E. 91; Canadian Northern Ry. Co. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553, 64 L. ed. 713, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 402; Missouri Pac. R. Co. ». Clarendon Boat Oar Co., 257 U.S. 533, 66 L. ed. 354, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 210; State ex rel. Prall v. District Court of Waseca County, 126 Minn. 501, 148 N. W. 463, Ann. Cas. 1915 D, 198; Davis v. Minneapolis, etc., R. Co., 134 Minn. 455, 159 N. W. 1084; Deitrick’s Admin. v. State Life Ins. Co., 107 Va. 602, 59 S. E. 489. But the constitu- tional requirement is satisfied if the non-resident is given access to the courts of the State upon terms which in themselves are reasonable and adequate for the enforcing of any rights he may have, even though they may not be technically and precisely the same in extent as those accorded to resident citizens. The power is in the courts, ultimately in the Federal Supreme Court, to determine the adequacy and reasonableness of such terms. Canadian Northern Ry. Co. »v. Eggen, 252 U. S. 553, 64 L. ed. 718, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 402. Subject to the restrictions of the Federal Constitution, the State may determine the limits of the jurisdiction of its courts, and the character of the controversies which shall be heard in them. The State policy decides whether and to what extent the State will entertain in its courts transitory VOL. I—4 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 49 actions, where the causes of action have arisen in other jurisdictions. Chambers v. Baltimore, ete., R. Co., 207 U. S. 142, 52 L. ed. 143, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 34, affirming 73 Ohio St. 16, 76 N. E. 91. See also Daugherty v. American McKenna Process Co., 255 Ill. 369, 99 N. E. 619, L. R. A. 1915 F, 955, Ann. Cas. 1913 D, 568; State v. District Court of Waseca County, 126 Minn. 501, 148 N. W. 463, Ann. Cas. 1915 D, 198. A State statute which provides that when a cause of action has arisen out- side the State, and by the laws of the place where it arose, an action thereon is there barred by lapse of time, no such action shall be maintained in the State unless the plaintiff be a citizen of the State who has owned the cause of action ever since it accrued, is not repugnant to the constitutional re- quirement. Canadian Northern Ry. Co. v. Eggen, 252 U. S. 553, 64 L. ed. 713, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 402. See also Loftus v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 107 Ohio St. 352, 140 N. EH. 94. Citizen of sister State may sue defendant resident of his home State in any State where he can get service upon him, even though cause of action arose in home State, provided it be transitory. Eingartner v. Illinois Steel Company, 94 Wis. 70, 68 N. W. 664, 34 L. R. A. 503; Cofrode v. Gartner, 79 Mich. 332, 44 N. W. 623, 7L. R. A. 511. Insurance laws cannot place greater restrictions upon citizens of other States than upon those of home State. State v. Board of Ins. Com’rs, 37 Fla. 564, 20 So. 772, 33 L. R. A. 288. Agents of non-resident insurers may be required to secure a certificate of authority from the imsurance com- missioner before insuring property within the State. People v. Gay, 107 Mich. 422, 65 N. W. 292, 30 L. R. A. 464. Citizens of other States cannot be denied right to become trustees by appointment through deeds, mort- gages, &c. Roby v. Smith, 131 Ind. 342, 30 N. E. 1093, 15 L. R. A. 792. Dower interests may be restricted to widows of residents. Buffington ». Grosvenor, 46 Kan. 730, 27 Pac. 137, 13 L. R. A. 282; Bennett v. Harms, 5150 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS Wis. 251, 8 N. W. 222; Ferry ». Spokane, etc., R. Co., 258 U. S. 314, 66 L. ed. 635, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 358. Privilege of selling liquors may be restricted to male inhabitants of State. Welsh v. State, 126 Ind. 71, 25 N. E. 883, 9 L. R. A. 664. A prohibition amendment to a State Constitution is not violative of the constitutional provision, al- though it may deprive persons of the right to pursue a business which was previously lawful and diminish the value of property devoted to such business. Gherna v. State, 16 Ariz. 344, 146 Pac. 494, Ann. Cas. 1916 D, 94. See also Saddler v. State, 148 Ga. 462, 97 S. E. 79; Gordon v. Corning, 174 Ind. 337, 92 N. E. 59. Discrimination in inheritance tax law between nephews and _ nieces resident within the State and those resident without is void. Re Ma- honey’s Estate, 133 Cal. 180, 65 Pac. 389. The constitutional provision does not apply to corporations. Warren Manuf. Co. v. Aitna Ins. Co., 2 Paine, 501; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 19 L. ed. 357; Pembina Mining Co. ». Pennsylvania, 125 U. S. 181, 31 L. ed. 650, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 737; Woodward y. Com., 7 S. W. Rep. 613 (Ky.);: Phenix Ins. Co. v. Burdett, 112 Ind. 204, 13 N. E. 705; Blake v. McClung, 176 U.S. 59, 44 L. ed. 371, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 307; s. c. 172 U.S. 239, 43 L. ed. 432, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 165; Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U. S. 557, 43 L. ed. 552, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 281; Cum- berland Gaslight Co. v. West Virginia & Maryland Gas Co., 110 C. C. A. 383, 188 Fed. 585; Bracey v. Durst, 218 Fed. 482; Chicago, etc., R. Co. »v. State, 86 Ark. 412, 111 S. W. 456, affirmed 219 U. S. 453, 55 L. ed. 290, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 275; Adams », American Agricultural Chemical Co., 78 Fla. 362, 82 So. 850; People ». Woman’s Home Missionary Soc., 304 Ill. 418, 135 N. E. 749; Schmidt ». City of Indianapolis, 168 Ind. 631, 80 N. BE. 632, 14 L. R. A. (wn. 8.) 787, 120 Am. St. Rep. 385; Hunter », Colfax Consol. Coal Co., 175 Iowa, 245, 154 N. W. 1037, L. R. A. 1917 D, 15: Arizona Commercial Mining Co. », [VoL. I Iron Cap Copper Co., 236 Mass. 185, 128 N. E. 4; State v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., 97 Miss. 35, 51 So. 918, Ann. Cas. 1912 C, 1150; Bethlehem Motors Corporation v. Flynt, 178 N. C. 399, 100 S. E. 693; Independent Tug Line v. Lake Superior Lumber & Box Co., 146 Wis. 121, 131 N. W. 408. A discrimination between local freight on railroads and that which is extra-territorial is not personal, and therefore not forbidden by this clause of the Constitution. Shipper v. Penn- sylvania R. R. Co., 47 Pa. St. 338. This clause does not forbid requir- ing security for costs from non-resident plaintiffs. Cummings v. Wingo, 30 S. C. 611, 10S. E. 107. See, for taxes which are forbidden by it, post, 1006, note 3. A statute allowing pauper citizens of the State and pauper aliens who have been domiciled in the State for three years to prosecute law suits without paying the court costs in advance or as they accrue and without giving bond for costs, does not violate the constitutional provision. White ». Walker, 136 La. 464, 67 So. 332. A State cannot give priority to creditors residing within its boundaries over those of the same class residing without. Blake v. McClung, 176 U. S. 59, 44 L. ed. 371, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 307; s. c. 172 U. S. 289, 43 L. ed. 482, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 165; Sully v. American Nat’l Bk., 178 U.S. 289, 44 L. ed. 1072, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 935; American & British Mfg. Co. »v. International Power Co., 173 App. Div. 319, 159 N. Y. Supp. 582; see also Bertram v. Jones, 205 Ky. 691, 266 S. W. 385. A conveyance, which the courts of the State wherein it was made held void as against the citizens of that State, the Federal courts will hold void as against the citizens of other States. Smith M. P. Co. v. Me- Groarty, 186 U. S. 237, 34 L. ed. 346, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1017. The mere fact that a partnership was organized under the laws of another State is not sufficient to justify the imposition of conditions upon its doing business within the State not required of local partnerships. StateCHAP. II] v. Cadigan, 73 Vt. 245, 50 Atl. 1079, 57 L. R. A. 666, 87 Am. St. 714. The constitutional provision is not violated by requiring plaintiff to have been a bona fide resident of the State for not less than six months preceding the filing of a petition for attach- ment. Tanner v. De Vinney, 101 Neb. 46, 161 N. W. 1052. A State statute under which a ripa- rian owner may be prevented from diverting the waters of a stream of the State into any other State, for use therein, does not violate the constitu- tional provision. Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U. S. 349, 52 L. ed. 828, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 529, affirming 70 N. J. Eq. 695, 65 Atl. 489, 118 Am. St. Rep. 754, 14 L. R. A. (n. s.) 197, 10 Ann. Cas. 116. Nor is it violated by a State statute which provides that in the employment of persons for the construction of public works citizens of the State must be given preference. Heim »v. McCall, 239 U. S. 175, 60 L. ed. 206, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 78, Ann. Cas. 1917 B, 287, affirming 214 N. Y. 629, 108 N. E. 1095. Further as to what particular rights are given by this constitutional pro- vision, see Chambers v. Baltimore, etc. R. Co., 207 U. S. 142, 52 L. ed. 143, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 34, affirming 73 Ohio St. 16, 76 N. E. 91; Armour & Co. v. Virginia, 246 U. S. 1, 62 L. ed. 547, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 267, affirming 118 Va. 242, 87 S. E. 610; La Tourette v. McMaster, 248 U. S. 465, 63 L. ed. 362, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 160; Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U. S. 525, 63 L. ed. 1124, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 2; Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U. S. 37, 64 L. ed. 445, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 221; Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U. S. 60, 64 L. ed. 460, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 228; United States v. Wheeler, 254 U. S. 281, 65 L. ed. 270, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 133; Ownbey 2. Morgan, 256 U. S. 94, 65 L. ed. 837, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 433; Haavik ». Alaska Packers’ Ass’n, 263 U. S. 510, 68 L. ed. 414, 44 Sup. Ct. Rep. 177; William R. Compton Co. »v. Allen, 216 Fed. 537; Cottrell v. Sperry & Hutch- inson Co., 227 Fed. 256; Adams ». Thomas, 246 Fed. 175; Keeley ». Evans, 271 Fed. 520; In re Soderberg, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES - 51 26 Ariz. 404, 226 Pac. 210; Quong Ham Wah Co. »v. Industrial Acc. Com- mission, 184 Cal. 26, 192 Pac. 1021; People v. Batkin, 9 Cal. App. 244, 98 Pac. 861; Smith v. Farr, 46 Colo. 364, 104 Pac. 401; Leonard v. Reed, 46 Colo. 307, 104 Pac. 410, 133 Am. St. Rep. 77; South Georgia Mercantile Co. v. Lance, 143 Ga. 530, 85S. E. 749; Lehon v. Gity of Atlanta, 16 Ga. App. 64, 84S. E. 608, affirmed 242 U.S. 53, 61 L. ed. 145, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 70; State v. Butterfield Live Stock Co., 17 Idaho, 441, 106 Pac. 455, 26 L. R. A. (x. s.) 1224, 1384 Am. St. Rep. 263; In re MeWhirter’s Estate, 235 Ill. 607, 85 N. EB. 918; Daugherty v. American McKenna Process Co., 255 Ill. 369, 99 N. E. 619, L. R. A. 1915 F, 955, Ann. Cas. 1913 D, 568; Pratt v. Hawley, 297 Ill. 244, 130 N. E. 793; Gordon v. Corning, 174 Ind. 337, 92 N. E. 59; Brown & Bennett v. Powers, 146 Iowa, 729, 125 N. W. 833; Bracken v. Dinning, 140 Ky. 348, 131 S. W. 19; State v. Nolan, 108 Minn. 170, 122 N. W. 255; State v. District Court of Waseca County, 126 Minn. 501, 148 N. W. 463, Ann. Cas. 1915 D, 198; State v. Senatobia Book & Stationery Co., 115 Miss. 254, 76 So. 258; Ex parte Goddard, 44 Nev. 128, 190 Pac. 916; State v. Stevens, 78 N. H. 268, 99 Atl. 723; People ». Griswold, 213 N. Y. 92, 106 N. E. 929, L. R. A. 1915 D, 538, affirming 151 App. Div. 933, 135 N. Y. Supp. 1132; Klatz v. Angle, 220 N. Y. 347, 116 N. E. 24, affirming 166 App. Div. 963, 151 N. Y. Supp. 1125; Wierse v. Thomas, 145 N. C. 261, 59 S. E. 58, 15 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 1008, 122 Am. St. Rep. 446; Com. v. Shaleen, 215 Pa. St. 595, 64 Atl. 797; State v. Rosenkrans, 30 R. I. 374, 75 Atl. 491, 19 Ann. Cas. 824, affirmed 225 U. S. 698, 56 L. ed. 1263, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 840; Santee Mills v. Query, 122 S. G. 158, 115 S. E. 202; State v. Ashman, 123 Tenn. 654, 135 S. W. 325; Wright »v. Jackson, 138 Tenn. 145, 196 S. W. 488; De Grazier ». Stephens, 101 Tex. 194, 105 S. W. 992, 16 L. R. A. (x. s.) 1033, 16 Ann. Cas. 1059; Bar- field v. State, 62 Tex. Cr. Rep. 400, 137 S. W. 920; Pistole v. State, 68 Tex. Cr. Rep. 127, 150 S. W. 618; State v. Frear, 148 Wis. 456, 134 N.52 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I justice shall be delivered up,! and that full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public acts, records, and judicial proceed- W. 673, L. R. A. 1915 B, 569, Ann. Cas. 1913 A, 1147; Jn re Bolens, 148 Wis. 456, 135 N. W. 164, L. R. A. 1915 B, 606, Ann. Cas. 1913 A, 1147; Konkel v. State, 168 Wis. 335, 170 N. W. 715. An unconstitutional discrimination by a State against the citizens of other States will not be cured if those States establish a like discrimination against the citizens of the State in question. Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U. S. 60, 64 L. ed. 460, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 228. For an instructive discussion of the doctrine of the ‘Privileges and Im- munities of Citizens in the Several States’’, see article by Wm. J. Meyers in 1 Mich. Law Rey. 286, 364. 1 Extradition as between the States. — The return by one State of fugitives from justice which have fled to it from another State is only made a matter of rightful demand by the provisions of the Federal Constitution. In the absence of such provisions, it might be provided for by State law; but the Constitution makes that obligatory which otherwise would rest in the imperfect and uncertain requirements of interstate comity. The subject has received much attention from the courts when having occasion to con- sider the nature and extent of the con- stitutional obligation. It has also been the subject of many executive papers; and several controversies between the executives of New York and those of more southern States, are referred to in the recent Life of William H. Seward, by his son. See also Hyatt v. People, 188 U.S. 691, 47 L. ed. 657, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 456, 63 L. R. A. 471, affirming 172 N. Y. 176, 64 N. EB. 825, 60 L. R. A. 774, 92 A. S. R. 706. Upon extradition between States, see note to 36 L. ed. U. S. 934; upon extradition interstate and interna-~ tional, see note to 41 L. ed. U.S. 1064. See also Whitten v. Tomlinson, 160 U.S 231, 40 L. ed. 406, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 297, and note to 40 L. ed. U. S. 406. The following are among the judicial decisions: The constitutional pro- vision and the Federal statutes en- acted in pursuance thereof deal merely with the conditions under which one State may demand rendition from another. They do not limit the power of a State to arrest, within its borders, a citizen of another State for a crime committed elsewhere; nor do they prescribe the manner in which such arrests may be made. These are matters left wholly to the individual States. Burton v. New York, etc., R. Co., 245 U. S. 315, 62 L. ed. 314, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 108. All the provisions of the Federal law relating to requisitions must be strictly observed and respected. Ex parte Owen, 10 Okla. Crim. Rep. 284, 136 Pac. 197, Ann. Cas. 1916 A, 522. The offense for which extradition may be ordered need not have been an offense either at the common law or at the time the Constitution was adopted; it is sufficient that it was so at the time the act was committed, and when demand is made. Matter of Clark, 9 Wend. 212; People v. Dono- hue, 84 N. Y. 438; Johnston v. Riley, 13 Ga. 97; Matter of Fetter, 23 N. J. L. 311; Matter of Voorhees, 32 N. J. L. 141; Morton v. Skinner, 48 Ind. 123; Matter of Hughes, Phill. (N. CC) oe Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66, 16 L. ed. 717; Ex parte Reggel, 114 U. S. 642, 29 L. ed. 250, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 748; In re Hooper, 52 Wis. 699, o8 N. W. 741. The words “treason, felony, or other crime’’, in the Constitution, in- clude every offense, from the highest to the lowest, known to the law of the State from which the accused had fled, including misdemeanors. Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66, 16 L. ed. CANS Ex parte Reggel, 114 U. S. 642, 29 L. ed. 250, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1148; Ross v. Crofutt, 84 Conn. 370, 80 Atl. 90, Ann. Cas. 1912 C, 1295; State v. Stewart, 60 Wis. 587, 19 N. W. 429, 50 Am. Rep. 388. U.S. Rev. Stat. § 5278, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 10, 126, expressly or by neces- sary implication prohibits the sur- render of a person in one State forCHAP. | THE CONSTITUTION removal as a fugitive to another where it clearly appears that the person was not and could not have been a fugitive from the justice of the demanding State. Hx parte Reggel, 114 U. S. 642, 29 L. ed. 250, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1148, 5 Am. Crim. Rep. 218; Hyatt v. New York, 188 U. S. 691, 47 L. ed. 657, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep, 456, 12 Am. Crim. Rep. 311; Bassing v. Cady, 208 U. S. 386, 52 L. ed. 584, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 392, 13 Ann. Cas. 905; Innes »v. Tobin, 240 U. S. 127, 60 L. ed. 562, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 290, affirming 77 Tex. Grim. 351, 173 S. W. 291, L. R. A. 1916 CG, 1251. The offense must have been actually committed within the State making the demand, and the accused must have fled therefrom. Ex parte Smith, 3 McLean, 121; Jones v. Leonard, 50 Iowa, 106, 32 Am. Rep. 116; Hartman v. Aveline, 63 Ind. 344; Wilcox v. Nolze, 34 Ohio St. 520; Hogan v. O'Neill, 255 U. S. 52, 56, 65 L. ed. 497, 500, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 222, 223; In re Roberson, 38 Nev. 326, 149 Pac. 182, L. R. A. 1915 E, 691; Gottschalk v. Brown, 237 N. Y. 483, 143 N. E. 653, 32 A. L. R. 1164; Ex parte Coleman, 53 Tex. Co. Rep. 99,113 S. W. 17; Ex parte McDaniel, 76 Tex. Cr. Rep. 184, 173 S. W. 1018, Ann. Cas. 1917 B, 335. ‘‘Presence of the accused in the State at the time that the crime was, if ever, committed, is sufficient proof to justify the arrest and delivery of the accused as a fugitive from justice.’’ People ex rel. Gottschalk v. Brown, 237 N. Y. 483, 143 N. E. 658, 32 A. L. R. 1164. To be a fugitive it is not necessary that one should have left the State after indictment found, or to avoid prosecution; but simply that, having committed a crime within it, he is when sought found in another State. Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U.S. 80, 29 L. ed. 544, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 291; State ». Richter, 37 Minn. 436, 35 N. W. 9; Hyatt». People, 188 U. S. 691, 47 L. ed. 657, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 456; Appleyard v. Massachusetts, 203 U. S. 222, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 122, 51 L. ed. 161, 7 Ann. Cas. 1073; Drew v. Thaw, 235 U. S. 432, 59 L. ed. 302, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 137; Hogan v. O'Neill, 255 U. S. 52, 65 L. ed. 497, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 222; OF THE UNITED STATES 53 Farrell v. Hawley, 78 Conn. 150, 61 Atl. 502, 112 Am. St. Rep. 98, 70 L. R. A. 686, 3 Ann. Cas. 874; Taft »v. Lord, 92 Conn. 539, 103 Atl. 644, L. R. A. 1918 E, 545; State v. Wellman, 102 Kan. 503, 170 Pac. 1052, L. R. A. 1918 D, 949, Ann. Cas. 1918 D, 1006; Ex parte Williams, 10 Okla. Crim. Rep. 344, 136 Pac. 597, 51 L. R. A. (n. s.) 668; Ex parte McDaniel, 76 Tex. Crim. Rep. 184, 173 S. W. 1018, Ann. Cas. 1917 B, 335; In re Henke, 172 Wis. 36, 177 N. W. 880, 13 A. L. R. 409. An escaped prisoner is a fugitive. Drinkall v. Spiegel, 68 Conn. 441, 36 Atl. 830, 36 L. R. A. 486. The criminal need not do within the State every act necessary to complete the crime. If he does there an overt act which is and is intended to be a material step toward accomplishing the crime, and then absents himself from the State and does the rest else- where, he becomes a fugitive from justice when the crime is complete, if not before. Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U. S. 280, 55 L. ed. 735, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 558; In re Sultan, 115 N. ©. 57.020 3S5 bs 375) 44 Ams 0G: Reps 4307 20) be Ree Ae 20s: But a person standing in one State and shooting across the boundary line and injuring one in another State is not a fugitive from justice in the first State. State v. Hall, 115 N. C. 811, 20S. E. 729, 44 Am. St. 501. A person is “charged”’ with a crime, within the meaning of the Constitu- tion, when a complaint for a felony has been filed against him before a com- mitting magistrate who can only dis- charge or hold for trial before another tribunal. Matter of Strauss, 197 U. S. 324, 49 L. ed. 774, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 53% 1 The accused may be arrested to await demand. State v. Buzine, 4 Harr. 572; Ex parte Cubreth, 49 Cal. 436; Ex parte Rosenblat, 51 Cal. 285. See Tullis v. Fleming, 69 Ind. 15. But one cannot lawfully be arrested on a telegram from officers in another State and without warrant. Malcolmson ». Scott, 56 Mich. 459, 23 N. W. 166. Nor can he be surrendered before formal demand is made, and parties who seize and deliver him up without demand54 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS will be liable for doing so. Botts v. Williams, 17 B. Monr. 677. Still if he is returned without proper papers to the State from whence he fled, or if his presence therein is secured by illegal methods, this will be no sufficient ground for his discharge from custody. Dow’s Case, 18 Pa. St. 37; Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U. S. 192, 51 L. ed. 148, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 111; Mayer ». Nichols, 203 U. S. 221, 51 L. ed. 160, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 121; see also ex parte Wilson, 63 Tex. Crim. Rep. 281, 140 Ss We 08506) les ARE AN (Ne 7s5)) 243: Even forceable and unlawful abduc- tion of a citizen gives a State no right to demand his release. Mahon ». Justice, 127 U. S. 700, 32 L. ed. 283, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1204; Cook v. Hart, 146 U.S. 183, 36 L. ed. 934, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 40. The question whether after such abduction in another country a State court will try a person, is not a Federal question. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 30 L. ed. 421, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 225. Where one who has violated the criminal laws of a State without having been present therein is surrendered to such State by another State, although such surrender is without authority, the fact that the accused was not in the demanding State at the time of the offense, or since then, does not deprive its courts of jurisdiction to try him therefor, nor does it show such an abuse of process as to warrant the dismissal of the case against him. State v. Wellman, 102 Kan. 503, 170 Pac. 1052, L. R. A. 1918 D, 949, Ann. Cas. 1918 D, 1006. The charge must be made before a magistrate of the State where the offense was committed. Smith ». State, 21 Neb. 552, 32 N. W. 594. The demand is to be made by the executive of the State, by which is meant the governor: Com. v. Hall, 9 Gray, 262, and it is the duty of the executive of the State to which the offender has fled to comply: Johnston v. Riley, 13 Ga. 97; Ex parte Swear- ingen, 13S. C. 74; People v. Pinkerton, 77 N. Y. 245; Work »v. Corrington, 34 Ohio St. 64, 32 Am. Rep. 345; In re Opinion of Justices, 201 Mass. 609, 89 N. E. 174, 24 L. R. A. (Nn. 8.) 799, but [VoL. I if he refuses to do so, the courts have no power to compel him: Kentucky »., Dennison, 24 How. 66, 16 L. ed. 717; Matter of Manchester, 5 Cal. 237; Ex parte Ray, 215 Mich. 156, 183 N. W. 774. He must determine for himself, in the first place, as to whether or not the demand made is in compliance with the law, and as to whether or not the person whose return is sought is in fact a fugitive from justice; but his deci- sion is subject to review by the courts in habeas corpus proceedings. Ez parte Reggel, 114 U. S. 642, 29 L. ed. 250, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1148; Roberts »v. Reilly, 116 U. S. 80, 29 L. ed. 544, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 291; Pettibone v. Nich- ols, 203 U. S. 192, 51 L. ed. 148, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 111, 7 Ann Cas. 1047; Bassing v. Cady, 208 U. S. 386, 52 L. ed. 540, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 392, 13 Ann. Cas. 905; Hogan v. O'Neill, 255 U. S. 52, 65 L. ed. 497, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 222; Farrell v. Hawley, 78 Conn. 150, 61 Atl. 502, 112 Am. St. Rep. 98, 70 L. R. A. 686, 3 Ann. Cas. 874; State »v. Clough, 72 N. H. 178, 55 Atl. 554, 67 L. R. A. 946, affirmed 196 U. S. 364, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 282, 49 L. ed. 515; Ex parte Owen, 10 Okla. Crim. Rep. 284, 136 Pac. 197, Ann. Cas. 1916 A, 522. See also Dennison ». Christian, 72 Neb. 703, 101 N. W. 1045, 117 Am. St. Rep. 817; In re Tod, 12S. D. 386, 81 N. W. 687, 47 L. R. A. 566. He is not obliged to demand proof, independent of the requisition papers, that the person whose surrender is demanded is a fugitive from justice. His failure to require such proof cannot be regarded as an infringement of any constitutional right of such person. Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U. S. 192, 51 L. ed. 148, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 111; Mayer v. Nichols, 208 U. S. 221, 51 L. ed. 160, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 121. After the requisition is issued and complied with, it is competent for the courts of either State on habeas corpus to look into the papers, and if they show no sufficient legal cause, to order the prisoner’s discharge. Ex parte Smith, 3 McLean, 121; Matter of Clark, 9 Wend. 212; Matter of Man- chester, 5 Cal. 237; Matter of Hey-CHAP. It] ward, 1 Sandf. 701; Hx parte White, 49 Cal. 434; State v. Hufford, 28 Iowa, 391; People v. Brady, 56 N. Y. 182; Kingsbury’s Case, 106 Mass. 223; Ex parte McKean, 3 Hughes, 23; Jones v. Leonard, 50 Iowa, 106, 32 Am. Rep. 116; Ex parte Powell, 20 Fla. 806; State v. Richardson, 34 Minn. 115, 24 N. W. 354; In re Mohr, 73 Ala. 503. As to the showing required, see State v. Swope, 72 Mo. 399; Ex parte Sheldon, 34 Ohio St. 319; Ham v. State, 4 Tex. App. 645. But it has been held that the courts of a State will not review the decision of the Governor in extradition pro- ceedings upon a question of fact made before him, which the law makes it his duty to decide, and upon which there was evidence pro and con. Dennison v. Christian, 72 Neb. 703, 101 N. W. 1045, 117 Am. St. Rep. 817. The prisoner should not be dis- charged merely because, in the judg- ment of the court, the evidence as to his being a fugitive from justice was not so full as might properly have been required, or because it was so meager as perhaps to admit of a con- clusion different from that reached by the Governor. Ex parte Reggel, 114 U. S. 642, 29 L. ed. 250, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1148. The Governor’s conclu- sion that the prisoner was a fugitive from justice must stand unless clearly overthrown. Hogan v. O'Neill, 255 U.S. 52, 65 L. ed. 497, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 222. A novel question was raised in In re Maney, 20 Wash. 509, 55 Pac. 930, 72 Am. St. 130. A sheriff while conducting a prisoner from one part of Idaho to another part of the same State, passed through a portion of the State of Washington. His prisoner in this latter State invoked the aid of the writ of habeas corpus on the theory that he was unlawfully detained. Writ denied. If one is brought under extradition proceedings into the State where the crime was committed, he will not be discharged by it for defects in pro- ceedings, except on application of officers of the State from which he has been taken. Ez parte Barker, 87 Ala. 4, 6 So. 7. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 50 In habeas corpus to prevent removal to another jurisdiction of one in custody in an extradition proceeding, the court will not inquire into the question of the invalidity of a statute, or the sufficiency of the indictment, since these are questions primarily for the trial court in the jurisdiction where the indictment was found. Whitaker v. Hitt, 52 App. D. C. 149, 285 Fed. 797, 27 A. L. R. 951. The Federal courts have no power to compel the State authorities to fulfill their duties under this clause of the Constitution. Kentucky v. Den- nison, 24 How. 66, 16 L. ed. 717. The executive may revoke his warrant, if satisfied it ought not to have issued. Work v. Corrington, 34 Ohio St. 64, 32 Am. Rep. 345. A governor may revoke his warrant at any time before the alleged fugitive has been removed from the State. State v. Toole, 69 Minn. 104, 72 N. W. 53. 38 L. R. A. 224; State ex rel. Falconer v. Eberstein, 105 Neb. 833, 182 N. W. 500. When once within the custody of the demandinz State, the prisoner may be tried for any crime there charged against him. Lascelles v. Georgia, 148 U. S. 537, 37 L. ed. 549, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 687; State v. McNaspy, 58 Kan. 691, 817, 38 L. R. A. 756, 50 Pac. 895; Re Little, 129 Mich. 454, 89 N. W. 38, 57 L. R. A. 295; Innes v. Tobin, 240 U. S. 127, 60 L. ed. 562, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 290, affirming 77 Tex. Crim. Rep. 351, 173 S. W. 291, L. R. A. 1916 C, 1251; People v. Martin, 188 Cal. 281, 205 Pac. 121, 21 A. L. R. 1899; Knox v, State, 164 Ind. 226, 73 N. E. 255, 3 Ann. Cas. 539, 108 A. S. R. 291; In re Flack, 88 Kan. 616, 129 Pace. 541, 47 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 807, Ann. Cas. 1914 B, 789, overruling State v. Hall, 40 Kan. 338, 19 Pac. 918, 10 A. S. R. 200; Taylor v. Commonwealth, 29 Ky. L. Rep. 714, 96 S. W. 440; Rutledge v. Krauss, 73 N. J. L. 397, 63 Atl. 988; In re Thaw, 167 App. Div. 104, 152 N. Y. Supp. 771; State ex rel. Brown 2. Stewart, 60 Wis. 587, 19 N. W. 429. And may be sued in civil suit. Reid v. Ham, 54 Minn. 305, 56 N. W.. 35, 21 L. R. A. 232, 40 Am. St. 333. Buta State into which is brought a citizenrc 56 and resident of another State upon criminal process to answer for an offense alleged to have been committed while in the State of his residence, will not upon his discharge, and before he has an opportunity to return, forcibly retain him to answer for an act of omission since he was brought into the State, unless such omission was conscious and willful on his part. In re Fowles, 89 Kan. 430, 131 Pac. 598, 47 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 227. A person who has been extradited, tried and acquitted, may be sur- rendered to another State upon an extradition warrant, without returning him to the State from which he was originally extradited. Innes v, Tobin, 240 U. S. 127, 60 L. ed. 562, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 290, affirming 77 Tex. Crim. Rep. 351, 173 S. W. 291, L. R. A. 1916 Cri2Z51e The constitutional requirement does not create a preference in the enforce- ment of the laws in favor of the demanding State. It has no applica- tion to a case where the offender is, at the time, held to answer for an offense against the laws of the State in which he has taken refuge. In re Opinion of Justices, 201 Mass. 609, 89 N. E. 174, 24 L. R. A. (n. 8.) 799. See also Carpenter v. Lord, 88 Oreg. 128, 171 Pac. 577, L. R. A. 1918 D, 674. Where a person is charged in two States with the commission of a sepa- rate offense in each, and has been arrested in one of them, such State has exclusive jurisdiction of the alleged offender until the demands of its laws are satisfied. Nevertheless the Govy- ernor of such State may honor the requisition of the Governor of a demanding State and such surrender of the prisoner will operate as a waiver of the jurisdiction of the asylum State. State ex rel. Falconer »v. Eberstein, 105 Neb. 833, 182 N. W. 500. See also Ex parte McDaniel, 76 Tex. Crim. Rep. 184, 173 S. W. 1018, Ann. Cas, 1917 B, 335. Where an offense was committed in a territory which subsequently became a State the State may exercise the right to extradite the offender. Ex parte McCarthy, 56 Tex. Crim. Rep. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. 1 209, 119 S. W. 682, 133 A. S. R. 964. For other questions relating to extradition .between the States, see Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U. 8. 192, 51 L. ed. 148, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 111, 7 Ann. Cas. 1047; Moyer v. Nichols, 203 U. S. 221, 51 L. ed. 160, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 121, affirming 12 Idaho, 250, 85 Pac. 897, 12 L. R. A. (. s.) 227 118 A. S. R. 214; Bassing v. Cady, 208 U. S. 386, 52 L. ed. 540, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 392; Burton v. New York, etc., R. Co., 245 U. S. 315, 62 L: ed 314, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 108; Ez parte Hart, 63 Fed. 249, 28 L..R. A. 801; Farrell v. Hawley, 78 Conn. 150, 61 Atl. 502, 70 L. R. A. 686, 3 Ann. Cas. 874, 112 A. S. R. 98; Ex parte Ray, 215 Mich. 156, 183, N. W. 774; In re Thaw, 167 App. Div. 104, 152 N. Y. Supp. 771; In re Sultan, 115 N. C. 57, 20 S. E. 375, 28 L. R. A. 294, 44 Am. St. Rep. 483; State v. Knowles, 94 Wash. 351, 162 Pac. 518. Extradition to foreign countries is purely a national power, to be exercised under treaties. Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 540, 10 L. ed. 579; Ez parte Holmes, 12 Vt. 631; People v. Curtis, 50UNE Wers2ie Upon interstate and international extradition, see note to 41 L. ed. U.S. 1046. See also Whitten v. Tomlinson, 160 U.S. 231, 40 L. ed. 406, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 297, and note to 40 L. ed. U. S. 406. In Neeley v. Henkel, 180 U. S. 109, 126, 45 L. ed. 448, 457, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 308, the question of the validity of an act providing for extradition to foreign countries or to countries occu- pied by the United States was before the court and the act sustained as applicable to Cuba before that island was turned over to the home govern- ment after the Spanish war. In the absence of a treaty there is no obligation to deliver a fugitive: U. S. v. Rauscher, 119 U. S. 407, 30 L. ed. 425, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 234; but by virtue of such a treaty an American criminal resident in a foreign country gets no right of asylum there so that he may not be removed therefrom by a State except under the provisions of the treaty. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U. 8.CHAP. II] ings of every other State.’ THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 57 Many cases have been decided under these several provisions, the most important of which are collected in the marginal notes. 436, 30 L. ed. 421, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 225. Foreign governments must make the application, not individuals. In re Ferrelle, 28 Fed. Rep. 878. That where a person is extradited from another country on one charge, he should be discharged if not held upon that, see Commonwealth ». Hawes, 13 Bush, 697; State v. Vander- pool, 39 Ohio St. 272; Blandford »v. State, 10 Tex. App. 627; U.S. ». Rauscher, 119 U. S. 407, 30 L. ed. 425, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 234; Johnson ». Browne, 205 U. S. 309, 51 L. ed. 816, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 539, 10 Ann. Cas. 636; Greene v. United States, 85 C. C. A. 251, 154 Fed. 401, certiorari denied 207 U. S. 596, 52 L. ed. 357, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 261; Dominguez v. State, 90 Tex. Crim. Rep. 92, 234 S. W. 79, 18 A. L. R. 503. But see In re Miller, 23 Fed. 32. But when he is surrendered as a matter of comity and not under treaty stipulations, and the indictment is set aside as being defective, he is liable to arrest upon a subsequent complaint for same offense. Fe Foss, 102 Cal. 347, 36 Pac. 669, 25 L. R. A. 593, and note. u@onsty 01 1. os) art, 45 vnbis covers territorial judgments. Suesen- bach v. Wagner, 41 Minn. 108, 42 N. W. Rep. 925. This clause of the Constitution has been the subject of a good deal of dis- cussion in the courts. See notes to 3 ied. U.S: 411, 12 1b. Re A. 5745.71: R. A. 578,4L. R. A. 131,11. R.A. 79. See also Reynolds v. Stockton, 140 U. S. 254, 35 L. ed. 464, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 773; Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107, 33 L. ed. 538, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 269, aff. 142 Mass. 47, 6 N. E. 782. See note on this case, 4 Har. L. Rev. 93. The clause “is not to be confused with the rule relating to construction of statutes by comity so as to conform to the ruling of the highest court of the State which enacted the statute. In the former, a State court is bound to recognize a judgment of another The last provisions that we shall here notice State; in the latter, where a judgment is not directly involved, the courts of a sister State will, by comity, under similar facts and where the course of decisions has been uniform, adopt the decision of the highest tribunal of the State enacting the statute, as to the construction to be given the act.” Nesbitt v. Clark, 272 Pa. St. 161, 116 AIS 4045 257A. 3 Re 1406) Saithe requirement of the Constitution is not that same, but that full faith and credit shall be given by States to the judicial decrees of other States. That is to say, where a decree rendered in one State is embraced by the full faith and credit clause that constitutional provision commands that the other States shall give to the decree the force and effect to which it was en- titled in the State where rendered.” Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562, 567, 50 L. ed. 867, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 525. The courts of one State are not required to regard as conclusive any judgment of the court of another State which had no jurisdiction of the sub- ject or of the parties. D’Arcy v. Ketchum, 11 How. 165, 13 L. ed. 648; Hanley v. Donoghue, 116 U. S. 1, 29 L. ed. 535, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 242; Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Min. etc., Co., 225 U.S. 111, 56 L. ed. 1009, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 641, Ann. Cas. 1913 BE, 875, affirming 203 Mass. 159, 89 N. E. 193, 40 L. R. A. (w. 8.) 314; Baker v. Baker, 242 U. S. 394, 61 L. ed. 386, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 152; Marin ». Augedahl, 247 U. S. 142, 62 L. ed. 1038, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 452; Han- cock’s Estate, 156 Cal. 804, 106 Pac. 58, 134 Am. St. Rep. 177; Gordon ». Hillman, 47 Cal. App. 571, 191 Pac. 62; Gildersleeve v. Gildersleeve, 88 Conn. 689, 92 Atl. 684, Ann. Cas. 1916 B, 920; Forsyth v. Barnes, 228 Ill. 326, 81 N. E. 1028, 10 Ann. Cas. 710; Tootle v. McClellan, 7 Indian Terr. 64, 103 S. W. 766, 12 L. R. A. (w. 8.) 941; Cohn, Baer & Berman v. Bromberg, 185 Iowa, 298, 170 N. W. 478; Cuy-58 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS kendall v. Doe, 129 Iowa, 453, 105 N. W. 698, 113 Am. St. Rep. 472, 3 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 449; Ashby v. Manley, 191 Iowa, 113, 181 N. W. 869; Walker v. Walker, 125 Md. 649, 94 Atl. 346, Ann. Cas. 1916 B, 934; Chicago Title, etc., Co. v. Smith, 185 Mass. 363, 70 N. E. 426, 102 Am. St. Rep. 350; Boyle v. Musser-Sauntry Land, etc., Co., 88 Minn. 456, 93 N. W. 520, 97 Am. St. Rep. 538; Moe »v. Shaffer, 150 Minn. 114, 184 N. W. 785, 18 A. L. R. 1194; Olmsted v. Olmsted, 190 N. Y. 458, 83 N. BE. 569, 123 Am. St. Rep. 585; In re Crawford, 68 Ohio St. 58, 67 N. E. 156, 96 Am. St. Rep. 648; Roller v. Murray, 71 W. Va. 161, “ONS y Heli2 lia Re Ae 1915 HY 984, Ann. Cas. 1914 B, 1189. See also In re Estate of Coppack, 72 Mont. 431, 234 Pac. 258, 39 A. L. R. 1152. The constitutional provision estab- lishes a rule of evidence. It does not affect questions of jurisdiction. Wis- consin v. Pelican Ins. Go., 127 U. S. 265, 32 L. ed. 239, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1370; Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107, 33 L. ed. 538, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 269, affirming 142 Mass. 47, 6 N. E. 782, 56 Am. Rep. 657; Douglas ». Gyulai, 144 La. 213, 80 So. 258; Gasquet’s Interdiction, 147 La. 722, 85 So. 884; Beilman v. Poe, 138 Md. 486, 114 Atl. 568; Old Dominion Copper Min., etc., Co. v. Bigelow, 203 Mass. 159, 89 N. E. 193, 40 L. R. A. (x. s.) 314; Marshall v. Owen, 171 Mich. 232, 187 N. W. 204; Clark v. Morehouse, 74 N. J. Eq. 658, 70 Atl. 307; Anglo-American Provision Co. ». Davis Provision Co., 169 N. Y. 506, 62 N. E. 587, 88 Am. St. Rep. 608, affirmed 191 U.S. 373, 48 L. ed. 225, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 92; De Vall v. De Vall, 57 Oreg. 128, 109 Pac. 755, 110 Pac. 705. Nor does it give to a judgment any extraterritorial effect. Gasquet v. Fenner, 247 U.S. 16, 62 L. ed. 956, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 416, affirming 235 Fed. 997; National Circle Daughters of Isabella v. National Order of the Daughters of Isabella, 232 Fed. 907; Anthony v. Tarpley, 45 Cal. App. 72, 187 Pac. 779; Beilman v. Poe, 139 Md. 486, 114 Atl. 568; Levine ». Levine, 95 Oreg. 94, 187 Pac. 609. The jurisdiction of the court is always [VoL. I open to inquiry. (Guaranty Tr. & S. Dep. Co. v. Green Cove Springs & M. R. Co., 1389 U.S. 137, 35 L. ed. 116, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 512; Streitwolf v. Streitwolf, 181 U.S. 179, 45 L. ed. 807, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 553, aff. 58 N. J. Eq. 563, 41 Atl. 876, 43 Atl. 683, 78 Am. St. 630; Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175, 45 L. ed. 804, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 551, aff. 157 N. Y. 719, 53 N. E. 1123. ‘‘ Where the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution is invoked to compel the enforcement in one State of a decree rendered in another, the question of the jurisdiction of the court by which the decree was rendered is open to inquiry. And if there was no juris- diction either of the subject matter or of the person of the defendant, the courts of another State are not required by virtue of the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution to enforce such decree.’”’ Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562, 573, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 525, 50 L. ed. 867. A Federal court may inquire into the jurisdiction of a State court of another State to render a decree sued upon in the Federal court. Hekking v. Pfaff, 91 Fed. 60, 43 L. R. A. 618. It is well settled that if the record of a judgment shows that it was rendered without service of process or appear- ance of the defendant, or if that fact can be shown without contradicting the recitals of the record, it will be treated as void in any other State, notwithstanding this constitutional provision. Kibbe v. Kibbe, Kirby, 119; Aldrich v. Kinney, 4 Conn. 380; Middlebrooks »v. Ins. Co., 14 Conn. 301; Wood v. Watkinson, 17 Conn. 500; Bartlett v. Knight, 1 Mass. 401; Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. 462; Hall v. Williams, 6 Pick. 232; Woodworth ». Tremere, 6 Pick. 354; Gleason v. Dodd, 4 Met. 333; Commonwealth v. Blood, 97 Mass. 538; Edson v. Edson, 108 Mass. 590, 11 Am. Rep. 393; Kilburn v. Woodworth, 5 Johns. 37; Robinson v. Ward’s Executors, 8 Johns. 86; Fenton v. Garlick, 8 Johns. 194; Pawl- ing v, Bird’s Executors, 13 Johns. 192; Holbrook v. Murray, 5 Wend. 161; Bradshaw v. Heath, 13 Wend. 407; Noyes v. Butler, 6 Barb. 613; Hoff- man v. Hoffman, 46 N. Y. 30, 7 Am.CHAP. 11] Rep. 299; Thurber v. Blackbourne, 1 N. H. 242; Whittier v. Wendell, 7 N. H. 257; Rangely v. Webster, 11 N. H. 299; Adams v. Adams, 51 N. H. 388, 12 Am. Rep. 134; Wilson ». Jackson, 10 Mo. 334. See McLaurine v. Monroe, 30 Mo. 462; Bimeler »v. Dawson, 5 Ill. 536; Warren v. Mc- Carthy, 25 Ill. 95; Curtiss v. Gibbs, 1 Pa. 406; Rogers v. Coleman, Hard. 416; Armstrong v. Harshaw, 1 Dev. 187; Norwood v. Cobb, 24 Texas, 551; Rape v. Heaton, 9 Wis. 328; McCauley v. Hargroves, 48 Ga. 50, 15 Am. Rep. 660; People v. Dawell, 25 Mich. 247, 12 Am. Rep. 260; Hood v. State, 56 Ind. 263; Lincoln v. Tower, 2 McLean, 473; Westervelt v. Lewis, 2 McLean, 511; Railroad Co. v. Trimble, 10 Wall. 367, 19 L. ed. 948; Board of Public Works v. Columbia College, 17 Wall. 521, 21 L. ed. 687; St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U. S. 350, 27 L. ed. 222, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 350; Van Fossen ». State, 37 Ohio St. 317; Cross v. Armstrong, 44 Ohio St. 613. See Drake v. Granger, 22 Fla. 348; Rey- nolds v. Stockton, 140 U. S. 254, 35 L. ed. 464, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 773; Guar- anty Tr. & S. Dep. Co. v. Green Cove Spr. & M. R. Co., 139 U.S. 137, 35 ied. 116, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 92; Grover & B. S. M. Co. v. Radcliffe, 137 U. S. 287, 34 L. ed. 670, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 92; Simmons v. Saul, 138 U. S. 439, 34 L. ed. 1054, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 369; Wabash R. Co. v. Tourville, 179 U. S. 322, 45 L. ed. 210, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 113, aff. 148 Mo. 614, 50S. W. 300; Ward v. Boyce, 152 N. Y. 191, 46 N. E. 180, 36 L. R. A. 549; Crum- lish’s Adm’r v. Central Imp. Co., 38 W. Va. 390, 18 S. E. 456, 23 L. R. A. 120; Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co., 242 U. S. 394, 61 L. ed. 386, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 152: ‘Where a personal judgment has been rendered in the courts of a State against a non-resident merely upon constructive service and, therefore, without acquiring juris- diction over the person of the defend- ant, such judgment may not be en- forced in another state in virtue of the full faith and credit clause.” But where a husband who has acquired a domicile in a State other than that of the marriage procures a divorce therein, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 59 such decree is not entitled under the full faith and credit clause to obligatory enforcement in the State of the mar- riage and the domicile of the wife, where she was not personally served with process in the State where the decree was rendered and did not voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the court, although there was con- structive service of process by publica- tion. Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562, 50 L. ed. 867, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 525. But where the plaintiff is duly domiciled in the State in which he sues for divorce, and such State is the duly established matrimonial domicile of the parties, if the defendant is without the State, reasonable constructive service of notice if authorized by the laws of the State will give the court such jurisdiction that its decree of divorce will be valid throughout the United States. Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155, 45 L. ed. 794, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 544, rev. 155 N. Y. 129, 49 N. E. 933, 40 L. R. A. 291, 63 Am. St. 650; Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 525, 50 L. ed. 867. Whether it would be competent to show, in opposition to the recitals of the record, that a judgment of another State was rendered without jurisdiction having been obtained of the person of the defendant, the authorities are not agreed. Some cases, more par- ticularly the earlier ones, hold not. Field v. Gibbs, 1 Pet. C. C. 155; Green v. Sarmiento, 1 Pet. C. C. 74; Lincoln v. Tower, 2 McLean, 473; Westervelt v. Lewis, 2 McLean, 511; Roberts v. Caldwell, 5 Dana, 512; Hensley ». Force, 7 Eng. 756; Pearce v. Olney, 20 Conn. 544; Hoxie v. Wright, 2 Vt. 263; Newcomb v. Peck, 17 Vt. 302; Willcox v. Kassick, 2 Mich. 165; Bimeler v. Dawson, 5 Ill. 536; Welch v. Sykes, 8 Ill. 197; Wetherell v. Stillman, 65 Pa. St. 105; Lance v. Dugan, 13 Atl. Rep. 942 (Pa.); Lock- hart v. Locke, 42 Ark. 17; Caughran v. Gilman, 72 Iowa, 570, 34 N. W. 423; Citizens National Bank v. Consolidated Glass Co., 83 W. Va. 1, 97 S. E. 689. But the greater weight of authority holds such evidence admissible. Star- buck v. Murray, 5 Wend. 148, 21 Am. Dec. 172; Holbrook v. Murray, 560 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS Wend. 161; Shumway ». Stillman, 6 Wend. 447; Borden »v. Fitch, 15 Johns. 121; Bartlet v. Knight, 1 Mass. 401, 2 Am. Dec. 36; Hall v. Williams, 6 Pick. 232; Aldrich v. Kinney, 4 Conn. 380; Bradshaw v. Heath, 13 Wend. 407; Hoffman v. Hoffman, 46 N. Y. 30; Gleason v. Dodd, 4 Met. 333; Kane v. Cook, 8 Cal. 449; Norwood v. Cobb, 24 Texas, 551; Russell v. Perry, 14 N. H. 152; Rape v. Heaton, 9 Wis. 328; Carleton v. Bickford, 13 Gray, 591; McKay v. Gordon, 34 N. J. L. 286; Thompson v, Whitman, 18 Wall. 457, 21 L. ed. 897; Stewart v. Stewart, 27 W. Va. 167; Chunn »v. Gray, 51 Texas, 112; Old Wayne Mutual Life Ass’n v. McDonough, 204 U. S. 8, 51 L. ed. 345, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 236; Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Min., etc., Co., 225 U.S. 111, 56 L. ed. 1009, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 641, Ann. Cas. 1913 E, 875; Cooper v. Brazelton, 68 C. C. A. 188, 135 Fed. 476; Cohen v. Portland Lodge No. 142 B. P. O. E., 140 Fed. 774; Davis v. Davis, 164 Fed. 281; Burt, etc., Lumber Co. v. Bailey, 175 Fed. 1381; Parker v. Parker, 137 C. C. A. 627, 222 Fed. 186, certiorari denied 239 U.S. 643, 60 L. ed. 483, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 164; Blue Goose Min. Co. »v. Northern Light Min. Co., 158 G. C. A. 129, 245 Fed. 727; Banco de Senora ». Morales, 23 Ariz. 248, 203 Pac. 328; Matter of Hancock, 156 Cal. 804, 106 Pac. 58, 134 Am. St. Rep. 177; In re Pusey, 180 Cal. 368, 181 Pac. 648 ; In re Culp, 2 Cal. App. 70, 83 Pac. 89; Anthony v. Tarpley, 45 Cal. App. 72, 187 Pac. 779; Underwood v. Under- wood, 142 Ga. 441, 83S. E. 208 L. R. A. 1915 B, 674; Forsyth »v. Barnes, 228 Ill. 326, 81 N. E. 1028, 10 Ann Cas. 710; Tootle v. McClellan, 7 Indian Terr, 645 103'S> W., 766; 12'T,. R.A (x. s.) 941; Old Wayne Mut. Life Assoc. v. Flynn, 31 Ind. App. 473, 68 N. E. 327; Robinson »v. Chicago, etc., R. .Co., 96 Kan. 137, 150 Pac. 636; Bryant v. Shute, 147 Ky. 268, 144S. W. 28; Spiker v. American Relief Soc., 140 Mich. 225, 103 N. W. 611, 104 N. W. 670; Marshall v. Owen, 171 Mich. 232, 137 N. W. 204; Farrow »v. Rail- way Conductors’ Co-op. Protective Assoc., 178 Mich. 639, 146 N. W. 147; Smithman v. Gray, 203 Mich. 317, [VoL. 1 168 N. W. 998; Moore v. Williams, 111 Neb. 342, 196 N. W. 695; Thomp- son v. Thompson, 89 N. J. Eq. 70, 103 Atl. 856; Woodward v. Mutual Re- serve Life Ins. Co., 178 N. Y. 485, 71 N. E. 10, 102 Am. St. Rep. 519; White v. Glover, 1388 App. Div. 797, 123 N. Y. Supp. 482; Gustavus v. Dahlmer, 98 Mise. 462, 163 N. Y. Supp. 132; Osborne v. Val O’Farrell Detective Agency, 175 N. Y. Supp. 860; Levin v. Gladstein, 142 N. C. 482, 55 S. E. 371, 115 Am. St. Rep. 747, 32 L. R. A. (nw. s.) 905; Mottu v. Davis, 151 N. C. 237, 65 S. E. 969; State v. Westmore- land, 76 S. C. 145, 56 S. E. 673, 8 L. R. A. (N. s.) 842; Rice v. Bennett, 29 S. TD: 341, 137 N..W. 357. In People v. Dawell, 25 Mich. 247, on an indictment for bigamy, in which the defendant relied on a foreign di- vorce from his first wife, it was held competent to show, in opposition to the recitals of the record, that the parties never resided in the foreign State, and that the proceedings were a fraud. To the same effect are Hood v. State, 56 Ind. 263, 26 Am. Rep. 23; Pennywit v. Foote, 27 Ohio St. 600; People v. Baker, 76 N. Y. 78, 32 Am. Rep. 274; O’Dea v. O’Dea, 101 N. Y. 23, 4 N. E. 110; Reed v. Reed, 52 Mich. 117, 17 N. W. 720; Smith v. Smith, 19 Neb. 706, 28 N. W. 296; and see further as to divorce cases, post, p. 848, et seg. Mr. Freeman discusses this general subject in his treatise on judgments, c. 26. ‘Judgments recovered in one State in the Union, when proved in the courts of another, ... (are not) re-examinable upon the merits, nor im- peachable for fraud in obtaining them, if rendered by a court having juris- diction of the cause and of the parties.” Per Mr. Justice Gray in Hanley »v. Donoghue, 116 U. S. 1, 29 L. ed. 535, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 242; Buckner v. Finley, 2 Pet. 592, 7 L. ed. 218; M’Elmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 312, 10 L. ed. 177; D’Arcy v. Ketchum, 11 How. 165, 18 L. ed. 648; Christmas v. Russell, 5 Wall. 290, 18 L. ed. 475; Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457, 21 L. ed. 897; Simmons »v. Saul, 138 U. S. 439, 34 L. ed. 1054, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 369% Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Min.,CHAP. I] etc., Co., 225 U.S. 111, 56 L. ed. 1009, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 641, Ann. Cas. 1913 E, 875, affirming 203 Mass. 159, 89 N. E. 193, 40 L. R. A. (w. 8.) 314; Alabama Great Southern R. Co. ». Hill, 139 Ga. 224, 76 S. E. 1001, 43 L. R. A. (n. s.) 236, Ann. Cas. 1914 D, 996; Hambleton v. Glenn, 72 Md. 331, 20 Atl. 115; Sewall v. Sewall, 122 Mass. 156, 23 Am. Rep. 299. But in some of the State courts it has been held that a judgment recovered in one State may be impeached in the courts of another State for fraud in obtaining it. Cohn, Baer & Berman v. Bromberg, 185 Iowa, 298, 170 N. W. 478; Ashley ». Manley, 191 Iowa, 113, 181 N. W. 869; Moe v. Shaffer, 150 Minn. 114, 184 N. W. 785, 18 A. L. R. 1194; Roberts ». Pratt, 152 N. C. 731, 68 S. E. 240. Upon the question of fraud as a de- fense to a judgment of another State, see note to 18 U.S. L. ed. 475. The judgment of a court of one State, when sued upon, or pleaded in estoppel, in the courts of another State, is put upon the plane of a domestic judgment in respect of conclusiveness as to the facts adjudged. Bigelow »v. Old Dominion Copper Min., etc., Co., 925 U. S. 111, 56 L. ed. 1009, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 641, Ann. Cas. 1913 HE, 875, affirming 203 Mass. 159, 89 N. E. 193, AOei;, RK. A: (Nn; 83) 314; Bates) v: Bodie, 245 U. S. 520, 62 L. ed. 444, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 182, L. R. A. 1918 C, 355; Marin v. Augedahl, 247 U.S. 142, 62 L. ed. 1038, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 452; Beauchamp »v. Bertig, 90 Ark. 351, 119 Sanwa (on 2o) la: IR. Ale (Nn. s)) G59) Forrest v. Fey, 218 Ill. 165, 75 N. EB. 789, 109 Am. St. Rep. 249, 1 L. R. A. (x. 8.) 740; Mahoney »v. State Ins. Co., 133 Iowa, 570, 110 N. W. 1041, 9 L. R. A. (n. s.) 490; Brand »v. Brand, 116 Ky. 785, 76S. W. 868, 63 L. R. A. 206 ; Francis v. Hazlett, 192 Mass. 137, 78 N. EB. 405, 116 Am. St. Rep. 230; Moe v. Shaffer, 150 Minn. 114, 184 N. W:. 785, 18 A. L. R. 1194; Clark v. Eltinge, 38 Wash. 376, 80 Pac. 556, 107 Am. St. Rep. 858. As has been said by the Federal Supreme Court: ‘‘The general effect of a judgment of a court of one State, when relied upon as an estoppel in the courts of another State, is that which THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 61 it has, by law or usage, in the courts of the State from which it comes.” Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Min., etc., Co., 225 U.S. 111, 56 L. ed. 1009, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 641, Ann. Cas. 1913 HK, 875, affirming 203 Mass. 159, 89 N. E. 193, 40 L. R. A. (w. s.) 314. The same defenses may be made to it, which could have been made to it in the State where rendered: Hamp- ton v. McConnel, 3 Wheat. 234, 4 L. ed. 378; Mills v. Duryea, 7 Cranch, 481, 3 L. ed. 411; Steele v. Smith, 7 W. & S. 447; Bank of the State »v. Dalton, 9 How. 522, 13 L. ed. 242; Scott v. Coleman, 5 Litt. 349, 15 Am. Dec. 71; but no others: Green »v. Van Buskirk, 7 Wall. 139, 19 L. ed. 109; Christmas v. Russell, 5 Wall. 290, 18 L. ed. 475; Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. 108, 19 L. ed. 604; Wernwag »v. Pawling, 5 Gill & J. 500, 25 Am. Dec. 317; Fletcher v. Ferrel, 9 Dana, 372, 35 Am. Dec. 143; People v. Dawell, 25 Mich. 247, 12 Am. Rep. 260; Dodge v. Coffin, 15 Kan. 277; Hancock Na- tional Bank v. Farnum, 176 U. S. 640, 44 L. ed. 619, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 506, rev. 20 R. I. 466, 40 Atl. 341; Thomp- son v. Taylor, 65 N. J. L. 107, 46 Atl. 567, 54 L. R. A. 585; Owsley v. New York Cent. Trust Go., 196 Fed. 412; Canton-Hughes Pump Co. v. Llera, 123 C. C. A. 397, 205 Fed. 209; Davis v. Davis, 70 Colo. 37, 197 Pac. 241; Bruce v. Ackroyd, 95 Conn. 167, 110 Atl. 835; Flexner v. Farson, 268 III. 435, 109 N. E. 327, Ann. Cas. 1916 D, 810; Cohn, Baer & Berman v. Bromberg, 185 Iowa, 298, 170 N. W. 478; Ashby v. Manley, 191 Iowa, 113, 181 N. W. 869; Robinson v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 96 Kan. 137, 150 Pac. 636; Geary ». Geary, 102 Neb. 511, 167 N. W. 778, 20 A. L. R. 809; Olmsted v. Olmsted, 190 N. Y. 458, 83 N. E. 569, 123 Am. St. Rep. 585; Gleason v. Northwestern Mut. L. Ins. Co., 203 N. Y.<507, 97 N. E. 35; Geduld v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., 55 Misc. 239, 105 N. Y. Supp. 110; Werner ». Pelletier, 148 App. Div. 137, 131 N. Y. Supp. 1010; Mottu ». Davis, 151 N. C. 237, 65 S. E. 969; Sharg v. Eszlinger, 45 N. D. 183, 176 N. W. 938; Levine v. Levine, 95 Oreg. 94, 187 Pac. 609. The constitutional provision does62 CONSTITUTIONAL not make it mandatory upon the courts of a State to entertain an action for the enforcement of a judgment of another State. Anglo-American Pro- vision Co. v. Davis Provision Co., 169 N. Y. 506, 62 N. E. 587, 88 Am. St. Rep. 608. A bill will not lie to enforce specific performance of a decree for alimony rendered in a court of a sister State. Bullock v. Bullock, 51 N. J. Eq. 444, 27 Atl. 485, 52 N. J. Eq. 561, 30 Atl. 676, 46 Am. St. 528. Execution cannot issue in one State upon a judgment rendered in an- other. The foreign judgment must first be reduced to a domestic judg- ment. Bennett v. Bennett, 63 N. J. Kq. 306, 49 Atl. 501. The judgment of the court of the State in which a corporation was created as to validity of its by-laws is entitled to full faith and credit in the courts of other States. Modern Wood- man v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 550, 69 L. ed. 785, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 389. The courts of a State cannot so apply its laws as to control contracts made under the laws of other States by citizens thereof. Aitna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken, 266 U.S. 389, 69 L. ed. 342, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 129. This provision of the Constitution does not require that disabilities im- posed upon a person convicted of crime in one State should follow him and be enforced in other States. Sims v. Sims, 75 N. Y. 466, approving Common- wealth v. Green, 17 Mass. 515, and dis- approving Chase v. Blodgett, 10 N. H. 22, and State v. Chandler, 3 Hawks, 393. The courts of the United States can- not enforce the penal laws of a State, and where an action was brought in such court by a State upon a judgment recovered in its own courts, the Fed- eral court looked back of the judgment to the original demand, and refused to enforce the judgment. Wisconsin ». Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U. S. 265, 32 L. ed. 239, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1370. But in order that the law may be penal it must inflict the penalty as punishment for some offense against the State. It is not within the rule if the penalty is mere liquidated damages for a private LIMITATIONS [voL. I wrong, still less if it is damages ascer- tained from the contract relations between the parties. Huntington ». Attrill, 146 U. S. 657, 36 L. ed. 1123, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 224, rev. 70 Md. 191, 16 Atl. 651, 2 L. R. A. 779, 14 Am. St. 344. See also upon “‘full faith and credit”’, note to this case in 36 L. ed. UsiSs U123: Where a discontinuance of the suit is entered by consent of the parties, the entry reciting that it is upon a settle- ment of the suit, it may be shown in an action in another State upon the original cause that the settlement was by an executory agreement which has not been fulfilled. Jacobs v. Marks, 182 U. S. 583, 45 L. ed. 1241, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 865, aff. 183 Ill. 533, 56 N. E. 154. The situs of a debt is with the debtor, so far at least as attachment and garnishment are concerned, and a judgment against a garnishee is not in- validated by the fact that his creditor, the principal defendant, resides out- side the State and has been served only constructively by publication. If otherwise sufficient, the judgment must be given “full faith and credit” in every State. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Sturm, 174 U. S. 710, 43 L. ed. 1144, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 797, followed in King v. Cross, 175 U. S. 396, 44 L. ed. 211, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 139, aff. 19 Ri T2205 33 Atle 147 A judgment in rem upon lands in another State is not binding in that State. Watts ». Waddle, 6 Pet. 389, 8 L. ed. 487; Carpenter v. Strange, 141 U.S. 87, 35 L. ed. 640, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 960; Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U. S. 186, 44 L. ed. 1028, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 873; Smith v. Smith, 174 Ill. 52, 50 N. BE. 1083, 43 L. R. A. 403; Mac- Donald v. Dexter, 234 Ill. 517, 85 N. E. 209; Morris v. Loyd, 183 Iowa, 1056, 168 N. W. 557; Youngs ». Youngs, 197 Iowa, 101, 196 N. W. 795; Gordon v. Munn, 87 Kan. 624, 125 Pac. 1, Ann. Cas. 1914 A, 783; Campbell v. W. M. Ritter Lumber Co., 140 Ky. 312, 131 S. W. 20, 140 Am. St. Rep. 385; Putnam v. Conner, 144 La. 231, 80 So. 265; Bullock'v. Bul- lock, 52 N. J. Eq. 561, 30 Atl. 676, 46 Am. St. Rep. 528; Thorburn v. Gates,CHAP. II] 177 App. Div. 474, 164 N. Y. Supp. 307; Sharp v. Sharp, 65 Okla. 76, 166 Pac. 175, L. R. A. 1917 F, 562; Robin- son v. Scott, 81 Oreg. 20, 158 Pac. 268. The judgment of the court of one State that a certain will works an equitable conversion into personalty of realty situated in another State is not binding upon the courts of that other State. Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U. S. 186, 44 L. ed. 1028, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 873, aff. 70 Conn. 195, 483, 39 Atl. 155, 40 Atl. 111. Upon effect of probate of will in another State, see Martin v. Stovell, 103 Tenn. 1, 52S. W. 296, 48 L. R. A. 130, and note; upon equitable con- version of real property into person- alty, see Cottman v. Grace, 112 N. Y. 299, 19 N. E. 839, 3 L. R. A. 145, and note; also Bullard v. Chandler, 149 Mass. 532, 21 N. E. 951, 5 L. R. A. 104, and note. An ex parte adjudication upon the domicile of decedent, made in grant of letters of administration, has no pro- bative force outside the State. Overby v. Gordon, 177 U.S. 214, 44 L. ed. 741, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 603; Tilt v. Kelsey, 207 U. S. 43, 28 L. ed. 95, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1. A guardian appointed in one State cannot exercise any authority in an- other except so far as permitted by the laws of that other. He cannot even sue in a Federal court held in that other. Morgan v. Potter, 157 U. S. 195, 39 L. ed. 670, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 590. A voluntary assignment of his prop- erty made by an insolvent debtor for the payment of his debts and valid by the law of his residence covers his property in another State in which none of his creditors reside, provided the assignee takes possession before the levy of judicial process, even though the assignment contains provisions for the preferment of creditors which are prohibited by the law of the State where such property is situated. Bur- nett v. Kinney, 147 U. S. 476, 37 L. ed. 247, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 403. But where the insolvency proceedings are involuntary and the assignee has not yet reduced the goods in the sister State to possession, the title does not THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 63 pass to him. Reynolds v. Adden, 136 U. S. 348, 34 L. ed. 360, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 843. A decree of a State court having jurisdiction of the parties that a con- veyance of land outside the State was in fraud of the rights of the plaintiff, but not directing defendant to recon- vey, is of no force outside the State in which the decree is rendered. But a decree that defendant is indebted to plaintiff and shall pay certain sums of money is binding upon the courts of other States. Carpenter v. Strange, 141 U. S. 87, 35 L. ed. 640, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 960. An appointment of an administrator has no extra-territorial force, and a judgment in one State against the administrator of the estate of X. is a personal judgment, and therefore can- not be pleaded by the same plaintiff against the administrator of the estate of X. in another State, because the defendants are neither the same person, nor are they in privity, and the matter is not therefore res judicata with respect to the defendant in the second action. Johnson v. Powers, 139 U. S. 156, 35 L. ed. 112, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 525. In a suit to quiet title to land out- side the State, service of process out- side the State upon a non-resident of the State gives no jurisdiction of him. Dull v. Blackman, 169 U. S. 243, 42 L. ed. 733, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 333. An order of a court of a sister State is subject to the statute of limitations of the State in which it is sought to be enforced. Great W. Tel. Co. ». Purdy, 162 U. S. 329, 40 L. ed. 986, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 810, aff. 83 Iowa, 430, 50 N. W. 45. A mistake in understanding the true meaning of the statute of a sister State as interpreted by the courts thereof, is not a refusal to give full faith and credit to such statute, and does not give jurisdiction to the Su- preme Court of the United States on writ of error. Banholzer v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 178 U. S. 402, 44 L. ed. 1124, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 972; Glenn ». Garth, 147 U. S. 360, 37 L. ed. 203, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 350. And such statute is a matter of fact and must be proved as such. Lloyd v. Matthews, 155 U. S.64 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I are that the United States shall guarantee to every State a republi- can form of government,! and that no State shall grant any title of nobility.” The purpose of these is to protect a Union founded on republican principles, and composed entirely of republican members, against aristocratic and monarchical innovations.’ So far as a particular consideration of the foregoing provisions falls within the plan of our present work, it will be more convenient to treat of them in another place, especially as all of them which have for their object the protection of person or property are usually repeated in the bills of rights contained in the State constitutions, and will require some notice at our hands as a part of State constitu- tional law. Where powers are conferred upon the general government, the exercise of the same powers by the States is impliedly prohibited, 222, 39 L. ed. 128, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 70. A judgment cannot receive credit if it is not responsive to the issue presented by the pleadings. Reynolds v. Stockton, 140 U. S. 254, 35 L. ed. 464, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 773, affirming 43 N. J. Eq. 211. A decree of divorce granting ali- mony, the decree having been rendered by a court having jurisdiction, must be given full faith and credit in a sister State so far as the divorce and the alimony due at the date of the decree are concerned, but is of no force out- side the State in which it is granted so far as it relates to alimony sub- sequently to become due. Lynde ». Lynde, 162 N. Y. 405, 56 N. E. 979, 48 L. R. A. 679, 76 Am. St. 332, affd. in 181 U. S. 183, 45 L. ed. $10, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 555. See also in this con- nection, Laing v. Rigney, 160 U. S. 531, 40 L. ed. 525, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 366; Arrington v. Arrington, 127 N. C. 190, 37 8S. E. 212, 52 L. R. A. 201, 80 Am. St. 791; Trowbridge ». Spinning, 23 Wash. 48, 62 Pac. 125, 54 L. R. A. 204, 83 Am. St. 806. The same faith and credit must be given to a judgment by confession or upon default as is given to a judgment rendered after a trial upon the merits. Forsyth v. Barnes, 228 Ill. 326, 81 N. E. 1028, 10 Ann. Cas. 710; Cuykendall v. Doe, 129 Iowa, 453, 105 N. W. 698, 113 Am. St. Rep. 472, L. R. A. (n. s.) 449; Cohn ». Bromberg, 185 Iowa, 298, 170 N. W. 478; Ashby v. Manley, 191 Iowa, 113, 181 N. W. 869; Ven- num v. Mertens, 119 Mo. App. 461, 95 S. W. 292; Barbour Asphalt Pay. Co. v. Griffin Roofing Co., 88 Mise. 79, 150 N. Y. Supp. 1075; Hastings v. Bushong, (Tex. Civ. App.) 252 S. W. 246; Walker v. Garland, (Tex. Comm’n App.) 235 S. W. 1078; Miller v. Miller, 90 Wash. 333, 156 Pac. 8; Cowen v. Culp, 97 Wash. 480, 166 Pac. 789. Judgment by confession entered by an attorney acting upon a warrant contained in a promissory note made in the State and conformably to its laws must be granted full faith and credit in sister State. Van Norman »v. Gordon, 172 Mass. 576, 53 N. E. 267, 44 L. R. A. 840, 70 Am. St. 304; Crim v. Crim, 162 Mo. 544, 63 S. W. 489, 54 L. R. A. 502, 85 Am. St. 521; Cohn, Baer & Berman v. Bromberg, 185 Iowa, 298, 170 N. W. 478; Ashby »v. Manley, 191 Iowa, 113, 181 N. W. 869. 1 Const. of U.S. art. 4, § 4. 2 Const. of U.S. art. 1, § 10. 3 Federalist, Nos. 43 and 44. It does not fall within our province to discuss these provisions. They have been much discussed in Congress within a few years, but in a party rather than a judicial, spirit. See Story on Const. (4th ed.) e. 41; Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1, 12 L. ed. 581; Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 19 L. ed. 227; Cooley, Constitutional Prin- ciples, ch, xi.THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES CHAP. I1| 65 wherever the intent of the grant to the national government would be defeated by such exercise. On this ground it is held that the States cannot tax the agencies or loans of the general government ; since the power to tax, if possessed by the States in regard to these objects, might be so exercised as altogether to destroy such agencies, and impair or even destroy the national credit."| And where by the national Constitution jurisdiction is given to the national courts with a view to the more efficient and harmonious working of the system organized under it, it is competent for Congress in its wisdom to make that jurisdiction exclusive of the State courts.?, On some other subjects State laws may be valid until the power of Congress is exercised, when they become superseded, either wholly, or so far as they are found inconsistent. The States may legislate on the sub- ject of bankruptcy if there be no national bankrupt law.’ [The con- tracts and dealings of national banks are subject to the operation of general and undiscriminating State laws which do not conflict with the letter or the general object and purposes of congressional legislation.‘] State laws for organizing and disciplining the militia are valid, except as they may conflict with national legislation ; ° and the States may constitutionally provide for punishing the counterfeiting of coin® and the passing of counterfeit money,’ since these acts are offenses against the State, notwithstanding they may be offenses against the nation also ; [and since the enactment of the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, a State may provide for the punishment of an offense against 1 McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 427, 4 L. ed. 415, 606; Weston v. Charleston, 2 Pet. 449, 7 L. ed. 481; City of Laurel v. Weems, 100 Miss. 335, 56 So. 451, Ann. Cas. 1914 A, 159. See cases collected, post, pp. 990 et seq 2Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 4 L. ed. 97; The Moses Taylor v. Hammons, 4 Wall. 411, 18 LL. ed. 397; The Hine v. Trevor, 4 Wall. 555, 18 L. ed. 451. 3 Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 4 L. ed. 529; McMillan v. Mc- Neill, 4 Wheat. 209, 4 L. ed. 552. And see post, pp. 599 et seq. 4 First National Bank v. California, 262 U.S. 366, 67 L. ed. 1030, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 602; see also Columbia Na- tional Bank v. Powell, 265 Pa. St. 85, 108 Atl. 445. But any attempt by a State to define the duties or control the con- VOL. I—§ duct of the affairs of national banks is void if it conflicts with the laws of the United States or frustrates the pur- poses of the national legislation, or impairs the efficiency of the bank to discharge the duties for which it was created. First National Bank v. Cali- fornia, 262 U.S. 366, 67 L. ed. 1030, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 602. 5 Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1, 51, 5 L. ed. 19,31. As to jurisdiction over military camps within a State, for military purposes, see United States v. Tierney, 1 Bond, 571. 6 Harlan v. People, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 207, 7 Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 410, 12 L. ed. 213; United States v. Marigold, 9 How. 560, 13 L. ed. 257. And see Hendrick’s Case, 5 Leigh, 707; Jett v. Commonwealth, 18 Gratt. 933; State v. Rankin, 4 Cold. 145; Moore v. People, 14 How. 13, 14 L. ed. 306.66 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I its prohibition law, although the act is an offense for which a punish- ment is prescribed by the Federal prohibition law.’ A State, in some instances, can possess and enforce prerogative rights which are not possessed by the national government in the absence of a Federal statute.?] The tenth amendment to the Constitution provides that the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people. And it is to be observed of this instrument, that being framed for the establishment of a national government, it is a settled rule of construction that the limitations it imposes upon the powers of government are in all cases to be understood as limitations upon the government of the Union only, except where the States are expressly mentioned.° 1 United States v. Lanza, 260 U. S. 377, 67 L. ed. 314, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 141. 2 United States Fidelity & Guar- anty Co. v. Bramwell, 108 Oreg. 261, 217 Pac. 332, 32 A. L. R. 829. 5 Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243, 8 L. ed. 672; Livingston’s Lessee v. Moore, 7 Pet. 469, 8 L. ed. 751; Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 410, 12 L. ed. 447; Smith v. Maryland, 18 How. 71, 15 L. ed. 269; Kelly v. Pittsburgh, 104 U. S. 78, 26 L. ed. 658; Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252, 29 L. ed. 615, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 580; Spies v. Illinois, 123 U. S. 131, 31 L. ed. 80, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 21; Buonaparte v. Camden & Amboy R. R. Co., Baldw. 220; James v. Common- wealth, 12 S. & R. 220; Barker v. People, 3 Cow. 686; Colt v. Eves, 12 Conn. 243; Jane v. Commonwealth, 3 Met. (Ky.) 18; Lincoln v. Smith, 27 Vt. 328; Matter of Smith, 10 Wend. 449; State v. Barnett, 3 Kan. 250; Reed v. Rice, 2 J. J. Marsh. 45, 19 Am. Dec. 122; North Mo. R. R. Co. v. Maguire, 49 Mo. 490; Lake Erie, &c. R. R. Co. v. Heath, 9 Ind. 558; Pres- cott v. State, 19 Ohio St. 184; State »v, Shumpert, 1 S. C. 85; Common- wealth v. Hitchings, 5 Gray, 482; Bige- low v. Bigelow, 120 Mass. 320; Boyd ». Ellis, 11 Iowa, 97; Campbell »v. State, 11 Ga. 353; State v. Carro, 26 La. Ann. 377; Purvear v. Commonwealth, 5 Wall. 475, 18 L. ed. 608; Twitchell v. Com., 7 Wall. 321, 19 L. ed. 223 ; United States v. Lanza, 260 U. S. 377, As illustrations, the sixth and seventh 67 L. ed. 314, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 141; Ex parte Rameriz, 193 Cal. 633, 226 Pac. 914, 34 A. L. R. 51. Under the tenth amendment to the Constitution every State of the Union possesses every power of civil govern- ment the exercise of which is not in conflict with the powers delegated to the United States or prohibited to the States. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Bramwell, 108 Oreg. 261, 217 Pac. 332, 32 A. L. R. 829) Second and fourth amendments do not operate on States. Miller v. Texas, 153 U. S. 535, 38 L. ed. 812, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 874; Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 58 L. ed. 652, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 341, L. R. A. 1915 B, 834, Ann. Cas. 1915 C, 1177; People »v. Mayen, 188 Cal. 237, 205 Pac. 435, 24 A. L. R. 1883; Tucker v. State, 128 Miss. 211, 90 So. 845, 24 A. L. R. 1377; State v. Peterson, 27 Wyo. 185, 194 Pac. 342, 13 A. L. R. 1284; Ez parte Rameriz, 193 Cal. 633, 226 Pac. 914, 34 A. L. R. 51; Hoyer »v. State, 180 Wis. 407, 193 N. W. 89, 27 A. L. R. 678. Nor does fifth. Thorington v. City Council of Montgomery, 147 U. S. 490, 37 L. ed. 252, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 394; Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172, 174, 44 L. ed. 119, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 77, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 120; Capital City Dairy Co. ». Ohio, 183 U. S. 238, 245, 46) I; ed: 171, 175, 22) Sup; Ct: Rep. 120; Davis v. Texas, 139 U. S. 651, 35 L. ed. 300, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep.CHAP. I] amendments to the Constitution may be mentioned. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 67 These consti- tute a guaranty of the right of trial by jury; but, as they do not mention the States, they are not to be understood as restricting their powers; and the States may, if they choose, provide for the trial of all offenses against the States, as well as for the trial of civil cases in the State courts, without the intervention of a jury, or by some different jury from that known to the common law." 675; United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 67 L. ed. 314, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 141; Tucker v. State, 128 Miss. 211, 90 So. 845, 24 A. L. R. 1377; Smith v. Cameron, 106 Oreg. 1, 210 Pac. 716, 27 A. L. R. 510; Hoyer v. State, 180 Wis. 407, 193 N. W. 89, 27 A. L. R. 673; Withers »v. Buckley, 20 How. 84, 15 L. ed. 816; Palmer v. Ohio, 248 U.S. 32, 63 L. ed. 108, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 16; Bemis v. Guirl Drain Co., 182 Ind. 36, 105 N. E. 496; McGrew »v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 230 Mo. 496, 132 S. W. 1076; Livingston v. New York, 8 Wend. 85, 22 Am. Dec. 622; Phillips v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 130 N. C. 513, 41 S. E. 1022, 89 Am. St. Rep. 868, 131 N. C. 225, 42 S. E. 587; Jackson v. Breeland, 103 S. C. 184, 88 S. E. 128. Nor the sixth. Davis v. Texas, 139 U.S. 651, 35 L. ed. 300, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 675. Nor the eighth. O’Neil v. Ver- mont, 144 U. S. 323, 36 L. ed. 450, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 693. The fifth amendment does not apply to trials in the consular courts of the U. S. held in non-Christian countries. Ross v. McIntyre, 140 U. S. 453, 35 L. ed. 581, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 897. The adoption of the fourteenth amendment has not extended to the several States of the Union the re- strictions imposed by the first ten amendments to the Constitution of the United States upon the Federal Gov- ernment. See Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 44 L. ed. 597, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 448; Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172, 44 L. ed. 119, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 77; Leeper v. Texas, 139 U. S. 462, 35 L. ed. 225, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 577; Caldwell v. Texas, 137 U. S. 692, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 224; Re Con- verse, 137 U. S. 624, 34 L. ed. 796, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 191; Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U. S. 22; United States v. Cruik- shank, 92 U. S. 542, 23 L. ed. 588; Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 21 L. ed. 394. “State legislation is, however, subject to the due process of law clause of the 14th Amendment.” Smith v. Cameron, 106 Oreg. 1, 210 Pac. 716, 27 A. L. R. 510. 1 Twitchell v. Commonwealth, 7 Wall. 321, 19 L. ed. 223; Justices »v. Murray, 9 Wall. 274, 19 L. ed. 658; Edwards v. Elliott, 21 Wall. 532, 22 L. ed. 487; Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 90, 23 L. ed. 678; Munn ». Illinois, 94 U. S. 118, 24 L. ed. 77; Huston v. Wadsworth, 5 Col. 213; Davis v. Texas, 139 U.S. 651, 35 L. ed. 300, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 675; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Cole, 251 U. S. 54, 64 L. ed. 133, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 68; State ex rel. Cartmel v. Htna Casualty & S. Co., 84 Fla. 123, 92 So. 871, 24 A. L. R. 1262. See Butler v. State, 97 Ind. 378; People v. Williams, 35 Hun, 516. A State may give a court of equity jurisdiction of a suit to establish an equitable interest in land. Church ». Kelsey, 121 U. S. 282, 30 L. ed. 960, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 897. The seventh amendment has no application to demands against the government, or to counter-claims. McElrath v. United States, 102 U. S. 426, 26 L. ed. 189. A jury of eight may be provided for criminal cases not capital. Max- well v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581, 44 L. ed. 597, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 448, 494. See also State v. Bates, 14 Utah, 293, 47 Pac. 78, 43 L. R. A. 33, and note. The federal jury is the common-law jury of twelve men. It does not include statutory juries before justices of the peace, and facts examined be- fore such statutory juries may be re- examined otherwise than according68 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [voL. I [Another illustration is the Eighth Amendment to the Constitu- tion which declares that cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted. It does not mention the States and, therefore, it is not a restraint upon, and does not apply to the Legislature of any State, but only to the national Legislature.' So far as the Federal Constitution is concerned, it is within the acknowledged power of the legislature of a State to prescribe the evidence which shall be received, and the effect of that evidence, in the courts of its own government. | With other rules for the construction of the national Constitution we shall have little occasion to deal. They have been the subject of elaborate treatises, judicial opinions, and legislative debates, which are familiar alike to the legal profession and to the public at large.’ So far as that instrument apportions powers to the national judiciary, it must be understood, for the most part, as simply au- thorizing Congress to pass the necessary legislation for the exercise of those powers by the Federal courts, and not as directly, of its own force, vesting them with that authority. The Constitution does not, of its own force, give to national courts jurisdiction of the several cases which it enumerates, but an act of Congress is essential, first, to create courts, and afterwards to apportion the jurisdiction among them. The exceptions are of those few cases of which the Constitu- tion confers jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court by name. And although the courts of the United States administer the common law in many cases,’ they can recognize as offenses against the nation only those acts which are made criminal, and their punish- ment provided for, by acts of Congress.’ It is otherwise in the to the course of the common law. the spirit, and it is always safe to read Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 43. L. ed. 873, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 580. 1Pervear v. Com., 5 Wall. 479, 18 L. ed. 608; O’Neil v. Vermont, 144 U. S. 323, 36 L. ed. 450, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 693; Dalton v. State, 123 Md. 373, 91 Atl. 417, Ann. Cas. 1916 C, 89. *State v. Lapointe, 81 N. H. 227, 123 Atl. 692, 2 A. L. R. 1212. * While the declaration of principles contained in the Declaration of Inde- pendence may not have the force of organic law, or be made the basis of judicial decision as to the limits of right and duty, and while in all cases reference must be had to the organic law of the nation for such limits, yet the latter is but the body and the letter of which the former is the thought and the letter of the Constitution in the spirit of the Declaration of Independ- ence. Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 41 L. ed. 666, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 255; McKinster v. Sager, 163 Ind. 671, 72 N. E. 854, 68 L. R. A. 278. See also Butchers’ Union Slaughter- House Co. v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing Co., 111 U. S. 746, 28 L. ed. 585, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 652; American Federation of Labor v. Buck’s Stove & Range Co., 33 App. Cas. (D. C.) 83, 32 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 748. 4'Townsend v. Todd, 91 U. S. 452, 23 L. ed. 413; Elmwood v. Marcy, 92 U.S. 289, 23 L. ed. 710; Railroad Co. v. Georgia, 98 U. S. 359, 25 L. ed. 185. 5’ Demurrer to an indictment for a libel upon the President and Congress.CHAP. It] By the court: ‘The only question which this case presents is whether the circuit courts can exercise a2 common- Jaw jurisdiction in criminal cases... . The general acquiescence of legal men shows the prevalence of opinion in favor of the negative of the proposition. The course of reasoning which leads to this conclusion is simple, obvious, and admits of but little illustration. The powers of the general government are made up of concessions from the several States: whatever is not ex- pressly given to former, the latter expressly reserve. The judicial power of the United States is a constitutional part of these concessions: that power is to be exercised by courts organized for the purpose, and brought into exist- ence by an effort of the legislative power ofthe Union. Of all the courts which the United States may, under their general powers, constitute, one only, the Supreme Court, possesses jurisdiction derived immediately from the Constitution, and of which the legislative power cannot deprive it. All other courts created by the general government possess no jurisdiction but what is given them by the power that created them, and can be vested with none but what the power ceded to the general government will author- ize it to confer. It is not necessary to inquire whether the general govern- ment, in any and what extent, pos- sesses the power of conferring on its courts a jurisdiction in cases similar to the present; it is enough that such jurisdiction has not been conferred by any legislative act, if it does not result to those courts as a consequence of their creation.” United States »v. Hudson, 7 Cranch, 32, 3 L. ed. 259. See United States v. Coolidge, 1 Wheat. 415, 4 L. ed. 124. “Tt is clear there can be no com- mon law of the United States. The Federal government is composed of twenty-four sovereign and independent States, each of which may have its local usages, customs, and common law. There is no principle which pervades the Union, and has the authority of law, that is not embodied in the Constitution or laws of the Union. The common law could be THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 69 made a part of our Federal system only by legislative adoption.” Per McLean J., Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591, 8 L. ed. 1055. See also Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524, 9 L. ed. 1181; Lorman v. Clarke, 2 McLean, 568; United States v. Lancaster, 2 McLean, 431; United States v. New Bedford Bridge, 1 Wood. & M. 403; United States v. Wilson, 3 Blatch. 435; United States v. Barney, 5 Blatch. 294; United States v. Eaton, 144 U. S. 677, 86 L. ed. 591, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 764; United States v. Cardish, 143 Fed. 640. Upon this ground it was held in Gatton v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 95 Iowa, 112, 63 N. W. 589, 28 L. R. A. 556, that in the absence of congres- sional action, common carriers en- gaged in interstate commerce were not limited to reasonable charges. See also Forepaugh v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 128 Pa. 217, 18 Atl. 503, 5 L. R. A. 508, and note, 15 Am. St. 672. These cases however are overruled in W. U. Tel. Co. v. Call Pub. Co., 181 U.S. 92, 45 L. ed. 765, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 561, aff. 58 Neb. 192, 78 N. W. 519, holding that in the absence of con- gressional action, interstate telegraph companies are subject to the common- law rule of reasonable charges, and no unreasonable discrimination between patrons. Mr. Justice Brewer, who de- livered the opinion of the court, said: “There is no body of Federal common law separate and distinct from the common law existing in the several States, in the sense that there is a body of statute law enacted by Con- gress separate and distinct from the body of statute law enacted by the several States. But it is an entirely different thing to hold that there is no common law in force generally throughout the United States, and that the countless multitude of inter- state commercial transactions are subject to no rules and burdened by no restrictions other than those ex- pressed in the statutes of Congress. The principles of the common law are operative upon all interstate com- mercial transactions, except so far as they are modified by congressional enactment.’”’ See also Bank of Ken- tucky v. Adams Express Co., 93 U.S.70 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I States; for the State courts take notice of, and punish as crimes, those acts which were crimes at the common law, except in a few States where it is otherwise expressly provided by statute or Con- stitution.’ How Constitution 1s Amended. [The framers of the Constitution realized that it might, in the progress of time and the development of new conditions, require changes, and they intended to provide an orderly manner in which these could be accomplished; to that end they adopted the Fifth Article 2? which provides: “The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to this Constitution, or, on the application of the legislatures of two- thirds of the several States, shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which, in either case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the legis- latures of three-fourths of the several States, or by conventions in three-fourths thereof, as one or the other made of ratification may be proposed by the Congress.” The adoption by both houses of Con- gress, each by a two-thirds vote, of a joint resolution proposing an amendment, sufficiently shows that the proposal was deemed “necessary”’ by all who voted for it. An express declaration that they regarded it as necessary is not essential. The two-thirds vote in each house which is required in proposing an amendment is a vote of two-thirds of the members present — assuming the presence of a quorum — and not a vote of two-thirds of the entire membership, present and absent. The submission of an amendment does not require the action of the President.® A proposed amendment can only become effective by the ratifi- cation of the legislatures of three-fourths of the States, or by con- ventions in a like number of States, the choice of method being left 174, 23 L. ed. 872; Interstate Com- merce Commission v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., 145 U.S. 263, 36 L. ed. 699, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 844, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 92; Murray v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 62 Fed. 24. 1As to the adoption of the com- mon law by the States, see Van Ness v. Pacard, 2 Pet. 137, 144, 7 L. ed. 374, 377, per Story, J.; and post, p. 74, and cases cited in notes. * Hawke v, Smith, No. 1, 253 U. S. 221, 64 L. ed. 871, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 495, reversing 100 Ohio St. 385, 126 N. E. 400. 3 National Prohibition Cases, 253 U. S. 350, 64 L. ed. 946, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 486. 4 Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Kansas, 248 U. S. 276, 63 L. ed. 239, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 93; National Prohibition Cases, 253 U. S. 350, 64 L. ed. 946, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 486. 5 Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 Dall. 378, 1 L. ed. 644; Hawke v. Smith, No. 1, 253 U. S. 221, 64 L. ed. 871, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 495, reversing 100 Ohio St. 385, 126 N. E. 400.CHAP. I] to Congress.! THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 71 Therefore the referendum provisions of State con- stitutions and statutes cannot be applied in ratification or rejection of amendments.?] 1 Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331, 15 L. ed. 401; Hawke v. Smith, No. 1, 253 U. S. 221, 64 L. ed. 871, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 495, reversing 100 Ohio St. 385, 126 N. E. 400. 2 Hawke v. Smith, No. 1, 253 U. S. 221, 64 L. ed. 871, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 495, reversing 100 Ohio St. 385, 126 N. E. 400, and distinguishing Davis ». Hildebrant, 241 U. S. 565, 60 L. ed. 1172, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 708; Hawke »v. Smith, 253 U. S. 231, 64 L. ed. 877, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 498, reversing 100 Ohio St. 540, 127 N. E. 924; National Prohibition Cases, 253 U. S. 350, 64 L. ed. 946, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 486. As to whether a State’s ratification of an amendment to the Federal Constitu- tion is irrevocable, see article by Mr. F. W. Grinnell, Am. Bar Assoc. Journ. vol. 11, p. 192. For other interesting articles relating to amendments to the Federal Constitution, see Am. Law Rev. vol. 57, pp. 481, 694.CHAPTER III THE FORMATION AND AMENDMENT OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS Tue Constitution of the United States assumes the existence of thirteen distinct State governments, over whose people its authority was to be extended if ratified by conventions chosen for the purpose. Each of these States was then exercising the powers of government under some form of written constitution, and that instrument would remain unaffected by the adoption of the national Constitution, except in those particulars in which the two would come in conflict; and as to those, the latter would modify and control the former.! But besides this fundamental law, every State had also a body of laws, prescribing the rights, duties, and obligations of persons within its jurisdiction, and establishing those minute rules for the various relations of life which cannot be properly incorporated in a constitution, but must be left to the regulation of the ordinary law-making power. By far the larger and more valuable portion of that body of laws consisted of the common law of England, which had been transplanted in the American wilderness, and which the colo- nists, now become an independent nation, had found a shelter of protection during all the long contest with the mother country, brought at last to so fortunate a conclusion. The common law of England consisted of those maxims of freedom, order, enterprise, and thrift which had prevailed in the conduct of public affairs, the management of private business, the regulation of the domestic institutions, and the acquisition, control, and transfer of property from time immemorial. It was the outgrowth of the habits of thought and action of the people, and was modified gradually and insensibly from time to time as those habits became modified, and as civilization advanced, and new inventions intro- duced new wants and conveniences, and new modes of business. ‘ Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. 567; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Central 507; State v. Cape Girardeau, &c. R. Stock Yards Cor 212) ULS9 132) bomla R. Co., 48 Mo. 468; Mayor, &c. of ed. 441, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 246; Atkin- Mobile v. Dargan, 45 Ala. 310; Neal son v. Woodmansee, 68 Kan. 71, 74 v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370, 26 L. ed. Pac. 640, 64 L. R. A. 325. 72CHAP. | FORMATION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 73 Springing from the very nature of the people themselves, and developed in their own experience, it was obviously the body of laws best adapted to their needs, and as they took with them their nature, so also they would take with them these laws whenever they should transfer their domicile from one country to another. To eulogize the common law is no part of our present purpose. Many of its features were exceedingly harsh and repulsive, and gave unmistakable proofs that they had their origin in times of profound ignorance, superstition, and barbarism. The feudal system, which was essentially a system of violence, disorder, and rapine,! gave birth to many of the maxims of the common law ; and some of these, long after that system has passed away, may still be traced in our law, especially in the rules which govern the acquisition, control, and enjoyment of real estate. The criminal code was also marked by cruel and absurd features, some of which have clung to it with wonderful tenacity, even after the most stupid could perceive their inconsistency with justice and civiliza- tion. But, on the whole, the system was the best foundation on which to erect an enduring structure of civil liberty which the world has ever known. It was the peculiar excellence of the com- mon law of England that it recognized the worth, and sought especially to protect the rights and privileges, of the individual man. Its maxims were those of a sturdy and independent race, accustomed in an unusual degree to freedom of thought and action, and to a share in the administration of public affairs; and arbitrary power and uncontrolled authority were not recognized in its prin- ciples. Awe surrounded and majesty clothed the king, but the humblest subject might shut the door of his cottage against him, and defend from intrusion that privacy which was as sacred as the kingly prerogatives.2 The system was the opposite of servile ; its features implied boldness and independent self-reliance on the part of the people; and if the criminal code was harsh, it at least escaped the inquisitorial features which were apparent in criminal procedure of other civilized countries, and which have ever been fruitful of injustice, oppression, and terror. For several hundred years, however, changes had from time to time been made in the common law by means of statutes. Origi- nally the purpose of general statutes was mainly to declare and 1“A feudal kingdom was a confed- and vigor, was either a cipher or a ty- eracy of a numerous body, who livedin rant, and a great portion of the people a state of war against each other, and were reduced to personal slavery.”’ of rapine towards all mankind; in Mackintosh, History of England, c. 3. which the king, according to his ability 2 See post, pp. 610 et seq.74 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I reafirm such common-law principles as, by reason of usurpations and abuses, had come to be of doubtful force, and which, therefore, needed to be authoritatively announced, that king and subject alike might understand and observe them. Such was the purpose of the first great statute, promulgated at a time when the legislative power was exercised by the king alone, and which is still known as the Magna Charta of King John.’ Such also was the purpose of the several confirmations of that charter, as well as of the Petition of Right,” and the Bill of Rights,’ each of which became necessary But further statutes also became needful because old customs and modes of business were unsuited to new conditions of things when property had become more valuable, wealth greater, commerce more extended, and when all these changes had brought with them new desires and necessities, and also new dangers against which society as well as the individual subject needed protection. For this reason the Statute of Wills 4 and the Statute of Frauds and Perjuries® became important; and the Habeas Corpus Act ® was also found necessary, not so much to change the law,’ as to secure existing principles of the common law against being habitually set aside and violated by thosein power. From the first the colonists in America claimed the benefit and protection of the common law. In some particulars, however, the common law as then existing in England was not suited to their condition and circumstances in the new country, and those partic- ulars they omitted as it was put in practice by them.’ They also by reason of usurpations. 1It is justly observed by Sidney that ‘Magna Charta was not made to restrain the absolute authority, for no such thing was in being or pretended (the folly of such visions seeming to have been reserved to complete the misfortunes and ignominy of our age), but it was to assert the native and original liberties of our nation by the confession of the king then being, that neither he nor his successors should any way encroach upon them.” Sidney on Government, c. 3, sec. 27. *1 Charles I. ec. 1. *1 William and Mary, sess. 2, c. 2. “32 Henry VIII. c. 7, and 34 & 35 Henry VIII. ec. 5. § 29 Charles II. c. 3. § 31 Charles II. e. 2. 7 “T dare not advise to cast the laws into a new mould. The work which I propound tendeth to the pruning and grafting of the law, and not the plowing up and planting it again, for such a remove I should hold for a perilous innovation.” Bacon’s Works, Vol. II. p. 231, Phil. ed. 1852. 8 “The common law of England is not to be taken, in all respects, to that of America. Our ancestors brought with them its general prin- ciples, and claimed it as their birth- right; but they brought with them and adopted only that portion which was applicable to their condition.” Story, J., in Van Ness v. Pacard, 2 Pet. 137, 7 L. ed. 374. “The settlers of colonies in America did not carry with them the laws of the land as being bound by them wher- ever they should settle. They left the realm to avoid the inconveniences and hardships they were under, where some of these laws were in force; particu- larly ecclesiastical laws, those for pay- ment of tithes, and others. Had itCHAP. IIT] been understood that they were to earry these laws with them, they had better have stayed at home among their friends, unexposed to the risks and toils of a new settlement. They carried with them a right to such parts of laws of the land as they should judge advantageous or useful to them ; a right to be free from those they thought hurtful, and a right to make such others as they should think neces- sary, not infringing the general rights of Englishmen; and such new laws they were to form as agreeable as might be to the laws of England.” Franklin Works, by Sparks Vol. IV. p. 271. See also Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, 1 L. ed. 440; Doe v. Winn, 5 Pet. 233, 8 L. ed. 108; Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591, 8 L. ed. 1055; Pol- lard v. Hagan, 3 How. 212, 11 L. ed. 565; Commonwealth v. Leach, 1 Mass. 59; Commonwealth v. Knowlton, 2 Mass. 530; Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4 Met. 111; Pearce v. Atwood, 13 Mass. 324; Sackett v. Sackett, 8 Pick. 309; Marks v. Morris, 4 Hen. & M. 463; Mayo v. Wilson, 1 N. H. 53; Houghton v. Page, 2 N. H. 42; State v. Rollins, 8 N. H. 550; State v. Buchanan, 5 H. & J. 356; Sibley v. Williams, 3 G. & J. 62; State v. Cummings, 33 Conn. 260; Martin v. Bigelow, 2 Aiken, 187; Lindsley v. Coats, 1 Ohio, 243; Bloom v. Richards, 2 Ohio St. 287; Lyle v. Richards, 9 S. & R. 322; State v. Jampbell, T. U. P. Charlt. 166; Craft v. State Bank, 7 Ind. 219; Daw- son v. Coffman, 28 Ind. 220; Bogardus v. Trinity Church, 4 Sandf. Ch. 633; Morgan v. King, 30 Barb. 9; Lansing v. Stone, 37 Barb. 15; Simpson ». State, 5 Yerg. 356; Crouch v. Hall, 15 Ill. 263; Brown v. Pratt, 3 Jones (N. C.) Eq. 202; Stout v. Keyes, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 184; Lorman v. Ben- son, 8 Mich. 18; Pierson v. State, 12 Gal. 149; Norris v. Harris, 15 Cal. 226; Powell v. Sims, 5 W. Va. 1; Colley ». Merrill, 6 Me. 55; State v. Cawood, 2 Stew. 360; Carter v. Balfour, 19 Ala. 814; Barlow v. Lambert, 28 Ala. 704; Goodwin v. Thompson, 2 Greene (Iowa), 329; Wagner v. Bissell, 3 lowa, 396; Noonan v. State, 9 Miss. 562; Powell v. Brandon, 24 Miss. 343; Coburn v. Harvey, 18 Wis. 147; FORMATION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 75 Reaume v. Chambers, 22 Mo. 36; Hamilton v. Kneeland, 1 Nev. 10; People v. Green, 1 Utah, 11; Thomas v. Railroad Co., 1 Utah, 232; Reno Smelting Works v. Stevenson, 20 Nev. 269, 21 Pac. 317; Hageman »v. Vanderdoes, 15 Ariz. 312, 1388 Pac. 1053, L. R. A. 1915 A, 491, Ann. Cas. 1915 D, 1197; Katz. v. Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116, 70 Pac. 663, 74 Pac. 766, 64 L. R. A. 236, 99 Am. St. Rep. 35; San Joaquin, etc., Canal & Irri- gation Co. v. Fresno Flume & Irriga- tion Co., 158 Cal. 626, 112 Pac. 182, 35 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 882; Clark v. Alla- man, 71 Kan. 206, 80 Pac. 571, 70 L. R. A. 971; Cooper v. Seaverns, 81 Kan. 267, 105 Pac. 509, 135 Am. St. Reps 309) 25) a Ra AS (Ne Ss!) solids Friend v. Childs Dining Hall Co., 231 Mass. 65, 120 N. E. 407, 5 A. L. R. 1100; Brookhaven v. Smith, 188 N. Y. 74, 80 N. EB. 665, 9 L. R. A. (w: 8.) 326, 11 Ann. Cas. 1; Horace Waters & Co. v. Gerard, 189 N. Y. 302, 82 N. E. 148, 121 Am. St. Rep. 886, 24 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 958, 12 Ann. Cas. 397; State v. Cleveland, etc., R. Co., 94 Ohio St. 61, 113 N. E. 677, L. R. A. 1917 A, 1007; Fowler v. Cleveland, 100 Ohio St. 158, 126 N. E. 72,9 A. L. R. 131; United States Fidelity & Guar- anty Co. v. Bramwell, 108 Oreg. 261, 217 Pac. 332; Moss. v. State, 131 Tenn. 94, 173 S. W. 859, L. R. A. 1915 D, 361, Ann. Cas. 1916 B, 1; Swayne v. Lone Acre Oil Co., 98 Tex. 597, 86 S. W. 740, 69 L. R. A. 986, 8 Ann. Cas. 1117; Grigsby v. Reib, 105 Tex. 597, 153 S. W. 1124, L. R. A. 1915 EB, 1, Ann. Cas. 1915 C, 1011; Johnson v. Union Pac. Coal Co., 28 Utah, 46, 76 Pac. 1089, 67 L. R. A. 506. The common law is in force in this country only so far as it is compatible with our views of liberty and sover- eignty. State ex rel. Rodd ». Verage, 177 Wis. 295, 187 N. W. 880, 23 A. L. R. 491. “The common law is rather an intangible something as viewed by our courts; that is, they hold it is the declaration of the courts of the differ- ent States of the United States, regard- less of whether it is in conflict with what has generally been adopted as76 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I claimed the benefit of such statutes as from time to time had been enacted in modification of this body of rules.’ And when the difficul- ties with the home government sprung up, it was a source of im- mense moral power to the colonists that they were able to show that the rights they claimed were conferred by the common law, and that the king and Parliament were seeking to deprive them of the common birthright of Englishmen. Did Parliament attempt to levy taxes in America, the people demanded the benefit of that maxim with which for many generations every intelligent subject had been familiar, that those must vote the tax who are to pay it.? the common law of England.” Graph- ite Co. v. Burnet Nat. Bank, (Tex. Civ. App.) 255 S. W. 676. When it becomes necessary to de- termine the common law of another State, the decisions of the courts of final resort of that State will be fol- lowed, regardless of precedents to the contrary in the State where the trial is held. Sykes v. Citizens’ National Bank, 78 Kan. 688, 98 Pac. 206, 19 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 665; Root v. Kansas City Southern R. Co., 195 Mo. 348, 92 S. W. 621, 6 L. R. A. (x. s.) 212: Johnson v. Union Pac. Coal Co., 28 Utah, 46, 76 Pac. 1089, 67 L. R. A. 506. But the courts of one State will presume the common law of a sister State to be the same as their own, in the absence of evidence to the con- trary. Dunn v. Adams, 1 Ala. 527, 8. c. 35 Am. Dec. 42; Abell v. Doug- lass, 4 Denio, 305; Kermott v. Ayer, 11 Mich. 181; Schurman v. Marley, 29 Ind. 458; Buckles v. Ellers, 72 Ind. 220; Tinkler v. Cox, 68 IIl. 119; Flagg v. Baldwin, 38 N. J. Eq. 219; Eureka Springs Ry. Co. ». Timmons, ol Arks 459) 1S) We Rep. 690; Southern Express Co. v. Owens, 146 Ala. 412, 41 So. 752, 119 Am. St. Rep. 41,8 L.R. A. (w. s.) 369, 9 Ann. Cas. 1143; Thompson v. Clarkson, 125 Ga. 72, 548. BE. 77,6 L. R. A. (n. s.) 658 ; Sykes v. Citizens’ National Bank, 78 Kan. 688, 98 Pac. 2005 190. Re Ac (N. s.) 665; Cherry v. Sprague, 187 Mass. 118, 72 N. E. 456, 105 Am. St. Rep. 381, 67 L. R. A. 33; Beard vp. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 134 Minn. 162, 158 N. W. 815, L. R. A. 1916 F, 866 ; Mount »v. Tuttle, 183 N. Y. 358. 76 N. E. 878, 2L. R. A. (nN. 8.) 428. Soof the law of a foreign country. Car- penter v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 72 Me. 388. So, that statutory modifi- cations of the common law are the same. Shattuck v. Chandler, 40 Kan. 516, 20 Pac. 225; Buchanan v. Hub- bard, 119 Ind. 187, 21 N. E. 538. 1The acts of Parliament passed after the settlement of a colony were not in force therein, unless made so by express words, or by adoption. Com- monwealth v. Lodge, 2 Gratt. 579; Pemble v. Clifford, 2. McCord, 31. See Swift v. Tousey, 5 Ind. 196; Baker v. Mattocks, Quincey, 72; Fechheimer v. Washington, 77 Ind. 366; Ray v. Sweeney, 14 Bush, 1; Lavalle »v. Strobel, 89 Ill. 370; Cathcart v. Rob- inson, 5 Pet. 264, 8 L. ed. 120. Those amendatory of the common law, if suited to the condition of things in America, were generally adopted by tacit consent. For the differing views taken by English and American statesmen upon the general questions here discussed, see the observations by Governor Pownall, and the comments of Franklin thereon, 4 Works of Frank- lin, by Sparks, 271. “The blessing of Judah and Issa- char will never meet; that the same people or nation should be both the lion’s whelp and the ass between bur- dens; neither will it be that a people overlaid with taxes should ever become valiant and martial. It is true that taxes levied by consent of the State do abate men’s courage less, as it hath been seen notably in the exercise of the Low Countries, and in some degree in the subsidies of England, for you must note that we speak now of the heart and not of the purse; so that althoughCHAP. III] FORMATION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 77 Did Parliament order offenders against the laws in America to be sent to England for trial, every American was roused to indignation, and protested against the trampling under foot of that time-honored principle, that trials for crime must be by a jury of the vicinage. Contending thus behind the bulwarks of the common law, English- men would appreciate and sympathize with their position, and Americans would feel doubly strong in a cause that not only was right, but the justice of which must be confirmed by an appeal to the consciousness of their enemies themselves. The evidence of the common law consisted in part of the declar- atory statutes we have mentioned,’ in part of the commentaries of such men learned in the law as had been accepted as authority, but mainly in the decisions of the courts applying the law to ac- tual controversies. While colonization continued, — that is to say, until the war of the Revolution actually commenced, — these decisions were authority in the colonies, and the changes made in the common law up to the same period were operative in America also if suited to the condition of things here. The opening of the war of the Revolution is the point of time at which the continuous stream of the common law became divided, and that portion which had been adopted in America flowed on by itself, no longer subject to changes from across the ocean, but liable still to be gradually modified through changes in the modes of thought and of business among the people, as well as through statutory enactments.” The colonists also had legislatures of their own, by which laws had been passed which were in force at the time of the separation, and which remained unaffected thereby. When, therefore, they emerged from the colonial condition into that of independence, the laws which governed them consisted, first, of the common law of England, so far as they had tacitly adopted it as suited to the same tribute or tax laid by consent or by imposing be all one to the purse, yet it works diversely upon the cour- age. So that you may conclude that no people overcharged with tribute is fit for empire.’ Lord Bacon on the True Greatness of Kingdoms. 1These statutes upon the points which are covered by them are the best evidence possible. They are the living charters of English liberty, to the present day; and as the forerunners of the American constitutions and the source from which have been derived many of the most important articles in their bills of rights, they are con- stantly appealed to when personal liberty or private rights are placed in apparent antagonism to the claims of government. 2 The common law of England, as it exists in the States of this country, means that body of jurisprudence as applied and modified by the courts of this country up to the time it became a tule of decision in each particular State adopting it. Gas Products Co. v. Rankin, 63 Mont. 372, 207 Pac. 993, 24 A. L. R. 294.78 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I their condition; second, of the statutes of England, or of Great Britain, amendatory of the common law, which they had in like manner adopted; and, third, of the colonial statutes. The first and second constituted the American common law, and by this in 1The like condition of things is found to exist in the new States formed and admitted to the Union since the Constitution was adopted. Congress creates territorial governments of dif- ferent grades, but generally with ple- nary legislative power either in the governor and judges, a territorial coun- cil, or a territorial legislature chosen by the people; and the authority of this body extends to all rightful sub- jects of legislation, subject, however, to the disapproval of Congress. Vin- cennes University v. Indiana, 14 How. 268, 14 L. ed. 416; Miners’ Bank v. Iowa, 12 How. 1, 13 L. ed. 867; Gro- mer v. Standard Dredging Co., 224 U. S. 362, 56 L. ed. 801, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 499; Tiaco v. Forbes, 228 U. S. 549, 57 L. ed. 960, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 585. Such legislation will remain in force until Congress exercises its power to annul it. Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Sowers, 213 U. S. 55, 53 L. ed. 695, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 397. The legislature of a territory “has all the legislative power except as limited by the Constitution of the United States and the organic act and the laws of Congress appertaining thereto.” Walker v. New Mexico, ete., R. Co., 165 U. S. 593, 41 L. ed. 837, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 421; Baldridge v. Morgan, 15 N. M. 249, 106 Pac. 342, Ann. Cas. 1912 GC, 337. Thus the Territory of Oregon had power to grant a legislative divorce. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190, 31 L. ed. 654, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 723. A territorial legis- lature may empower a probate court to grant a divorce. Whitmore ». Harden, 3 Utah, 121, 1 Pac. 465. In Treadway v. Schnauber, 1 Dak. 236, it was decided that without express authority a territorial legislature could not vote aid to a railroad company. The legislation, of course, must not be in conflict with the law of Congress conferring the power to legislate, but a variance from it may be supposed ap- proved by that body, if suffered to remain without disapproval for a series of years after being duly reported to it. Clinton v. Englebrecht, 13 Wall. 434, 446, 20 L. ed. 659. See Williams ». Bank of Michigan, 7 Wend. 539; Swan v. Williams, 2 Mich. 427; Stout v. Hyatt, 13 Kan. 232; Himman », Warren, 6 Oreg. 408. In general as to the control of Con- gress over the Territories, see Reynolds v. U.S. 98 U. S. 145, 25 L. ed. 244: National Bank v. Yankton, 101 U. S. 129, 25 L. ed. 1046; Hawaii v. Man- kichi, 190 U. S. 197, 47 L. ed. 1016, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 787; Binns v. United States, 194 U. S. 486, 48 L. ed. 1087, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 816; Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 1388, 49 L. ed. 128, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 808, 1 Ann. Cas. 697; tassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516, 49 L. ed. 862, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 514; De La Rama v. De La Rama, 201 U. S. 303, 50 L. ed. 765, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 485; El Paso, etc., R. Co. v. Gutierrez, 215 U. S. 87, 54 L. ed. 106, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 21. Interstate Commerce Commission »v. United States, 224 U. S. 474, 56 L. ed. 849, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 556. Congress may legislate directly in respect to the local affairs of a terri- tory, or transfer the power of such legislation to a legislature elected by the citizens of the territory. Binns v. United States, 194 U. S. 486, 48 L. ed. 1087, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 816; De La Rama v. De La Rama, 201 U. S. 303, 50 L. ed. 765, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 485. It may exclude polygamists from the right to vote. Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U. S. 15, 29 L. ed. 47, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 747. It may declare void the charter of a church granted by the legislature of the Territory. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 34 L. ed. 478, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 792. It may impose a tax exclusively in a territory without violating the clause of the Constitution requiring taxes to be uni- form throughout the United States.CHAP. II] FORMATION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 79 great part are rights adjudged and wrongs redressed in the American States to this day.’ Every colony had also its charter, emanating from the Crown, and constituting its colonial constitution. All but two of these were swept away by the whirlwind of revolution, and others sub- stituted which had been framed by the people themselves, through the agency of conventions which they had chosen. The excep- tions were those of Connecticut and Rhode Island, each of which Binns v. United States, 194 U. S. 486, 48 L. ed. 1087, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 816; Rassmussen, v. United States, 197 U.S. 516, 49 L. ed. 862, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 514. An act of Congress undertaking to regulate commerce in the District of Columbia and the territories of the United States would necessarily super- sede the territorial law regulating the same subject. El Paso, etc., R. Co. v. Gutierrez, 215 U.S. 87, 54 L. ed. 106, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 21. 1A few of the States, to get rid of confusion in the law, deemed it desir- able to repeal the acts of Parliament, and to re-enact such portions of them as were regarded important here. See the Michigan repealing statute, copied from that of Virginia, in Code of 1820, p. 459. Others named a date or event, and provided by law that English statutes passed subsequently should not be of force within their limits. In some of the new States there were also other laws in force than those to which we have above alluded, as for example, the ordinance of 1787, in the North- west Territory. There has been much discussion of the question whether that ordinance was superseded in each of the States formed out of that Terri- tory by the adoption of a State con- stitution, and admission to the Union. In Hogg v. The Zanesville Canal Manufacturing Co., 5 Ohio, 410, it was held that the provision of the ordi- nance that the navigable waters of the Territory and the carrying-places be- tween should be common highways, and forever free, was permanent in its obligation, and could not be altered without the consent both of the people of the State and of the United States, given through their representatives. “Tt is an article of compact; and until we assume the principle that the sov- ereign power of a State is not bound by compact, this clause must be consid- ered obligatory.” Justice McLean and Judge Leavitt, in Spooner v. McConnell, 1 McLean, 337, examine this subject at considerable length, and both arrive at the same conclusion with the Ohio court. The like opinion was sub- sequently expressed in Palmer ». Commissioners of Cuyahoga Co., 3 McLean, 226, and in Jolly v. Terre Haute Drawbridge Co., 6 McLean, 237. See also United States v. New Bedford Bridge, 1 Wood. & M. 401; Strader v. Graham, 10 How. 82, 13 L. ed. 337; Doe v. Douglass, 8 Blackf. 12; Con- necticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Cross, 18 Wis. 109; Milwaukee Gaslight Co. vy. Schooner Gamecock, 23 Wis. 144; Wisconsin River Improvement Co. »v. Lyons, 30 Wis. 61; Attorney-General v. Eau Claire, 37 Wis. 400; Keokuk v. Packet Co., 45 Iowa, 196. Compare Woodburn v. Kilbourn Manuf. Co., 1 Abbe Un S) 158) iss cy 1 Bisss 7540: But in Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U. S. 678, 27 L. ed. 442, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 185, it was decided that limitations on legislative power imposed by the ordinance ceased to have effect within a State upon its admission to the Union, except as the State had volun- tarily adopted them. See Sands »v. Manistee River Imp. Co., 123 U. S. 288, 31 L. ed. 149, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 113; Higgins ». Farmers’ Ins. Co., 60 Iowa, 50, 14 N. W. 118; La Plaisance Bay Harbor Co. v. Monroe, Walk. Ch. 155; Depew v. Trustees, 5 Ind. 8; Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 55 L. ed. 853, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 688; Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U. S. 210, 61 L. ed. 678, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 255, Ann. Cas. 1917 D, 637; State ex rel. Donahey ». Edmondson, 89 Ohio St. 93, 105 N. E.80 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I States had continued its government under the colonial charter, finding it sufficient and satisfactory for the time being, and accept- ing it as the constitution for the State.’ New States have since, from time to time, formed constitutions, either regularly in pursuance of enabling acts passed by Congress, or irregularly by the spontaneous action of the people, or under the direction of the legislative or executive authority of the Terri- tory to which the State succeeded. Where irregularities existed, 269, 52 L. R. A. (w. s.) 305, Ann. Cas. 1915 D, 934. And with reference to the enabling acts of Oregon, Louisiana, and California, Willamette Iron Bridge Con) Hatch) 1258U2 Ss) 1, ol I: ed: 629, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 811; Hamilton v. Vicksburg, &c. R. R. Co., 119 U.S. 280, 30 L. ed. 393, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 206; Cardwell v. American Bridge Co., 113 U. S. 205, 28 L. ed. 959, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 423; People v. Potrero, &c. R. R. Co., 67 Cal. 166, 7 Pac. 445. The provision that the rivers shall be forever free refers not to physical obstructions, but to the imposition of duties for the use of the navigation, and any discrimination against citizens of other States. Escanaba Co. ». Chicago, supra; Huse v. Glover, 119 UW: S: 543; 30 Ls ed: 487, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 313, and cases last cited. But a State may charge tolls for the use of improvements it has made in its navi- gable rivers. Huse v. Glover, supra; Sands v. Manistee River Imp. Co., supra; Palmer v. Com’rs, 3 McLean, 226 ; Spooner v. McConnell, 1 McLean, 337. See also, post, 1291 et seq. In some of the States formed out of the territory acquired by the United States from foreign powers, traces will be found of the laws existing before the change of government. Louisiana has a code peculiar to itself, based upon the civil law. Much of Mexican law, and especially as regards lands and land titles, is retained in the systems of Texas and California. In Michigan, when the acts of Parliament were repealed, it was also deemed important to repeal all laws derived from France, through the connection with the Cana- dian provinces, including the Coutuwme de Paris, or ancient French common law. In the mining States and Terri- tories a peculiar species of common law, relating to mining rights and titles, has sprung up, having its origin among the miners, but recognized and enforced by the courts. Regarding the canon and ecclesiasti- cal law, and their force in this coun- try, see Crump v. Morgan, 3 Ired. Eq, 91; Le Barron v. Le Barron, 35 Vt. 365. That constitutions are supposed to be framed in reference to existing insti- tutions, see Pope v. Phifer, 3 Heisk. 686. A change in a constitution cannot retroact upon legislation so as to en- large its scope. Dewar v. People, 40 Mich. 401. See Dullam v. Willson, 53 Mich. 392, 19 N. W. 112. 1It is worthy of note that the first well-authenticated case in which 4 legislative act was held void for incom- patibility with the constitution of the State, was decided under one of these charters. It was that of Trevett v. Weeden, decided in Rhode Island in 1786. See Arnold’s History of Rhode Island, Vol. II. ec. 24. Mr. Brinton Coxe, in his book on Judicial Power and Constitutional Legislation, makes much use of this case, and refers to others decided near the same time. Mr. Gouveneur Morris, in an address to the Pennsylvania Assembly in 1785, speaks of a law passed in New Jersey having been declared unconstitutional and void, and is supposed to have re- ferred to the unreported case of Holmes v. Wallow, which Mr. Coxe thought must have been decided in 1786 or 1787, but which President Scott of Rutgers College, who has examined the original files and records, informs us was decided in 1780. The next reported case in which a like result was reached was Bayard v. Singleton, to be found in Martin, N. C. Rep. p. 48.CHAP. 111] FORMATION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 81 they must be regarded as having been cured by the subsequent admission of the State into the Union by Congress; and there were not wanting in the case of some States plausible reasons for insisting that such admission had become a matter of right, and that the necessity for an enabling act by Congress was dispensed with by the previous stipulations of the national government in acquiring the territory from which such States were formed." Some of these constitutions pointed out the mode for their own modification; others were silent on that subject; but it has been assumed that in such cases the power to originate proceedings for that purpose rested with the legislature of the State, as the de- partment most nearly representing its general sovereignty; and this is doubtless the correct view to take of this subject.? The theory of our political system is that the ultimate sover- eignty is in the people, from whom springs all legitimate authority.° The people of the Union created a national constitution, and conferred upon it powers of sovereignty over certain subjects, and the people of each State created a State government, to exercise the remaining powers of sovereignty so far as they were disposed to allow them to be exercised at all. By the constitution which they establish, they not only tie up the hands of their official agen- cies, but their own hands as well; and neither the officers of the State, nor the whole people as an aggregate body, are at liberty to take action in opposition to this fundamental law. But in 1 This was the claim made on behalf of Michigan; it being insisted that the citizens, under the provisions of the ordinance of 1787, whenever the Territory acquired the requisite popu- lation, had an absolute right to form @ constitution and be admitted to the Union under it. See Scott v. Detroit Young Men’s Society’s Lessee, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 119, and the contrary opinion in Myers v. Manhattan Bank, 20 Ohio, 283. The debates in the Senate of the United States on the admission of Michigan to the Union go fully into this question. See Benton’s Abridgment of Congressional Debates, Vol. XIII. pp. 69-72. And as to the right of the people of a Territory to originate measures looking to an ap- plication for admission to the Union, see Opinions of Attorneys-General, Vol. II. p. 726. 2See Jameson on Constitutional Conventions, c. 8. VOL. 1—6 3 McLean, J., in Spooner v. McCon- nell, 1 McLean, 347; Waite, Ch. J., in Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, 172, 22 L. ed. 627, 629; Campbell’s Case, 2 Bland Ch. 209, 20 Am. Dec. 360; Reynolds v. Baker, 6 Cold. 221; Potter’s Dwarris on Stat. c. 1; State vy. Edmondson, 89 Ohio St. 93, 105 N. E. 269, 52 L. R. A. (nv. s.) 305, Ann. Cas. 1915 D, 934; Hackett v. State Liquor Licensing Board, 91 Ohio St. 176, 110 N. E. 485, L. R. A. 1917 B, 7; Ekern v. McGovern, 154 Wis. 157, 142 N. W. 595, 46 L. R. IN, (8 Gt), 796. The basic idea of the State constitu- tion is that this is a popular represent- ative government, the officers being mere agents not rulers of the people, —one where no man is so high as to be above the Constitution and no one so low as to be beneath its protection. Ekern »v. McGovern, 154 Wis. 157, 142 N. W. 595, 46 L. R. A. (N. 5.) 796.82 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I every State, although all persons are under the protection of the government, and obliged to conform their action to its laws, there are always some who are altogether excluded from participation in the government, and are compelled to submit to be ruled by an authority in the creation of which they have no choice. The political maxim, that government rests upon the consent of the governed, appears, therefore, to be practically subject to many exceptions; and when we say the sovereignty of the State is vested in the people, the question very naturally presents itself, What are we to understand by The People as used in this connection? What should be the correct rule upon this subject, it does not fall within our province to consider. Upon this men will theorize; but the practical question precedes the formation of the Constitu- tion and is addressed to the people themselves. As a practical fact the sovereignty is vested in those persons who are permitted by the constitution of the State to exercise the elective franchise. Such persons may have been designated by description in the en- abling act of Congress permitting the formation of the constitu- tion, if any such there were, or the convention which framed the constitution may have determined the qualifications of electors without external dictation. In either case, however, it was essen- tial to subsequent good order and contentment with the govern- ment, that those classes in general should be admitted to a voice in its administration, whose exclusion on the ground of want of capacity or of moral fitness could not reasonably and to the general satisfaction be defended. Certain classes have been almost universally excluded, — the slave, because he is assumed to be wanting alike in the intelli- gence and the freedom of will essential to the proper exercise of the right; the woman, from mixed motives, but mainly, perhaps, because, in the natural relation of marriage, she was supposed to be under the influence of her husband, and, where the common law prevailed, actually was in a condition of dependence upon and subjection to him;? the infant, for reasons similar to those which exclude the slave; the idiot, the lunatic, and the felon, on obvious grounds; and sometimes other classes for whose exclusion it is difficult to assign reasons so generally satisfactory. The theory in these cases we take to be that classes are excluded 1“The people, for political pur- sons for the exclusion in the opinions in poses, must be considered as synony- Bradwell »v. State, 16 Wall. 130, 21 mous with qualified voters.” Blair». LL. ed. 442, and Minor ». Happersett, Ridgely, 41 Mo. 63. 21 Wall. 162, 22 L. ed. 627. ? Some reference is made to the rea-CHAP. 111] FORMATION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 83 because they lack either the intelligence, the virtue, or the liberty of action essential to the proper exercise of the elective franchise. But the rule by which the presence or absence of these qualifications is to be determined, it is not easy to establish on grounds the reason and propriety of which shall be accepted by all. It must be one that is definite and easy of application, and it must be made perma- nent, or an accidental majority may at any time change it, so as to usurp all power to themselves. But to be definite and easy of application, it must also be arbitrary. The infant of tender years is wanting in competency, but he is daily acquiring it, and a period is fixed at which he shall conclusively be presumed to possess what is requisite. The alien may know nothing of our political system and laws, and he is excluded until he has been domiciled in the country for a period judged to be sufficiently long to make him familiar with its institutions; races are sometimes excluded arbi- trarily ; and at times in some of the States the possession of a certain amount of property, or the capacity to read, seems to have been regarded as essential to satisfactory proof of sufficient freedom of action and intelligence.’ Whatever rule is once established must remain fixed until those who by means of it have the power of the State put into their hands see fit to invite others to participate with them in its exercise. Any attempt of the excluded classes to assert their right to a share in the government, otherwise than by operating upon the public opinion of those who possess the right of suffrage, would be regarded as an attempt at revolution, to be put down by the strong arm of the government of the State, assisted, if need be, by the military power of the Union.? In regard to the formation and amendment of State constitu- tions, the following appear to be settled principles of American constitutional law : — I. The people of the several Territories may form for them- 1State v. Woodruff, 2 Day, 504; Catlin v. Smith, 2S. & R. 267; Opin- ions of Judges, 18 Pick. 575. See Mr. Bancroft’s synopsis of the first constitutions of the original States, in his History of the American Revolu- tion, ec. 5. For some local elections it is quite common still to require property quali- fication or the payment of taxes in the voter; but statutes of this description are generally construed liberally. See Crawford v. Wilson, 4 Barb. 504. Many special statutes, referring to the people of a municipality the ques- tion of voting aid to internal improve- ments, have confined the right of vot- ing on the question to taxpayers. 2 The case of Rhode Island and the “Dorr Rebellion”, so popularly known, will be fresh in the minds of all. For a discussion of some of the legal aspects of the case, see Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1, 12 L. ed. 581.84 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. 1 selves State constitutions whenever enabling acts for that purpose are passed by Congress, but only in the manner allowed by such enabling acts, and through the action of such persons as the en- abling acts shall clothe with the elective franchise to that end. If the people of a Territory shall, of their own motion, without such enabling act, meet in convention, frame and adopt a consti- tution, and demand admission to the Union under it, such action does not entitle them, as matter of right, to be recognized as a State; but the power that can admit can also refuse, and the territorial status must be continued until Congress shall be satis- fied to suffer the Territory to become a State. There are always in these cases questions of policy as well as of constitutional law to be determined by the Congress before admission becomes a matter of right, — whether the constitution formed is republican; whether suitable and proper State boundaries have been fixed upon; whether the population is sufficient; whether the proper qualifications for the exercise of the elective franchise have been agreed to; whether any inveterate evil exists in the Territory which is now subject to control, but which might be perpetuated under a State government, — these and the like questions, in which the whole country is interested, cannot be finally solved by the people of the Territory for themselves, but the final deci- sion must rest with Congress, and the judgment must be favorable before admission can be claimed or expected. II. In the original States, and all other subsequently admitted to the Union, the power to amend or revise their constitutions resides in the great body of the people as an organized body poli- tic, who, being vested with ultimate sovereignty, and the source of all State authority, have power to control and alter at will the law which they have made. But the people, in the legal sense, must be understood to be those who, by the existing constitution, are clothed with political rights, and who, while that instrument remains, will be the sole organs through which the will of the body politic can be expressed.? III. But the will of the people to this end can only be expressed 1When a constitution has been additions, and it is admitted, the adopted by the people of a Territory, changes become a part of the constitu- preparatory to admission as a State, tion, and binding as such, although not and Congress prescribes certain submitted to the people for approval. changes and additions to be adopted Brittle v. People, 2 Neb. 198; Secombe by the legislature as part of the consti- _v. Kittelson, 29 Minn. 555, 12 N. W. tution, and declares such changes and 519. additions to be fundamental condi- 2 Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1, 12 tions of admission of the State, andthe L. ed. 581; Wells v. Bain, 75 Penn. legislature accepts such changes and_ St. 39.CHAP. I1| FORMATION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 85 in the legitimate modes by which such a body politic can act, and which must either be prescribed by the constitution whose revision or amendment is sought, or by an act of the legislative department of the State, which alone would be authorized to speak for the people upon this subject, and to point out a mode for the expression of their will in the absence of any provision for amendment or revi- sion contained in the constitution itself. 1Qpinions of Judges, 6 Cush. 573; People v. Loomis, 135 Mich. 556, 98 N. W. 262, 3 Ann. Cas. 751; State v. Dahl, 6 N. D. 81, 68 N. W. 418, 34 L. R. A. 97. “There was a time in the early history of this country when in cer- tain quarters the view was entertained that the people could legally assemble in convention and revise their consti- tution, without the sanction of legis- lative action. See Jameson, Const. Cony. pp. 383-387, 663-666. But this opinion no longer prevails. Jameson, Const. Conv. §§ 219, 394-403, 570, 571, 574 h. Judge Jameson says: ‘The making of provision for assembling of conventions, and the hedging of them about with restrictions needed, as well for their efficiency as for the safety of the Commonwealth, is emphatically a matter of legislation. It is, more- over, a matter of legislation not funda- mental in character, but of that species which our constitutions apportion ex- clusively to the legislative departments created by them. The legislation necessary to initiate and to temper the operations of a convention no depart- ment of the government is competent to effect but the legislature. The sovereign itself could not do it, nor the electors — bodies whose organization is such as to make deliberation upon the details of laws impossible. Nor is it true . . . that the giving to the legis- lature, in a constitution, express power to recommend specific amendments to that instrument involves, by implica- tion, the denial to that body of power to call conventions for a general revi- sion of it.’” State v. Dahl, 6 N. D. 81, 68 N. W. 418, 34 L. R. A. 97. The first constitution of New York contained no provision for its own amendment, and Mr. Hammond, in his Political History of New York, Vol. I. c. 26, gives a very interesting account of the controversy before the legisla- ture and in the council of revision as to the power of the legislature to call a convention for revision, and as to the mode of submitting its work to the people. If essential mandatory provisions of the organic law are ignored in amend- ing the Constitution it violates the right of all the people of the State to government regulated by law. Craw- ford v. Gilchrist, 64 Fla. 41, 59 So. 963, Ann. Cas. 1914 B, 916. In Collier v. Frierson, 24 Ala. 100, it appeared that the legislature had proposed eight different amendments to be submitted to the people at the same time; the people had approved them, and all the requisite proceedings to make them a part of the constitution had been had, except that in the sub- sequent legislature the resolution for their ratification had, by mistake, omitted to recite one of them. On the question whether this one had been adopted, we quote from the opinion of the court: ‘‘The constitution can be amended in but two ways: either by the people who originally framed it, or in the mode prescribed by the instru- ment itself. ... We entertain no doubt that to change the constitution in any other mode than by a conven- tion, every requisition which is de- manded by the instrument itself must be observed, and the omission of any one is fatal to the amendment. We scarcely deem any argument necessary to enforce this proposition. The con- stitution is the supreme and para- mount law. The mode by which amendments are to be made under it is clearly defined. It has been said that certain acts are to be done, certain requisitions are to be observed, before a change can be effected. But to86 what purpose are those acts required or those requisitions enjoined, if the legislature or any department of the government can dispense with them? To do so would be to violate the instru- ment which they are sworn to support, and eyery principle of public law and sound constitutional policy requires the courts to pronounce against any amendment which is not shown to have been made in accordance with the rules prescribed by the fundamental law.’”’ See also State v. McBride, 4 Mo. 303; State v. Tufly, 19 Nev. 391, 12 Pac. 835; In re Const. Convention, 14 R. I. 649; Koehler ». Hill, 60 Iowa, 548, 14 N. W. 738, 15 N. W. 609; Livermore v. Waite, 102 Gall 113; 36) Pac. 424, 25 L. R.A. 312; Crawford v. Gilchrist, 64 Fla. 41, 59 So. 693, Ann. Cas. 1914 B, 916; Ellingham v. Dye, 178 Ind. 336, 99 N. E. 1, Ann. Cas. 1915 C, 200; State v. Powell, 77 Miss. 548, 27 So. 927, 48 L. R. A. 652; State v. Roach, 230 Mo. 408, 180 S. W. 689, 189 Am. St. Rep. 639; State v. Winnett, 78 Neb. 379, 110 N. W. 1113, 10 L. R. A. (w. s.) 149, 15 Ann. Cas. 781; Bott v. Wurts, 63 N. J. L. 289, 43 Atl. 744, 45 L. R. A. 251. But in Nebraska it has been held that the self-imposed limitations on the power of the people to amend their fundamental law should not be so construed as to defeat the will of the people, plainly expressed, on account of a slight and unimportant failure to comply literally with such limitations, if the requirements are substantially observed. State ex rel. Thompson ». Winnett, 78 Neb. 379, 110 N. W. 1118, 10 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 149, 15 Ann. Cas. 781. See also Hammond uv. Clark, 136 Ga. 313, 71 S. E. 479, 38 bp 1a ek, @e GB)) TE Where the Constitution required that, when proposed amendments thereto were submitted to the vote of the people, such amendments should be “published at least once each week in at least one newspaper in each county where a newspaper is published for three months immediately preced- ing the next election of senators and representatives, at which election the same shall be submitted to the electors for approval or rejection’’, it was held CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I that where there was a substantial compliance with such requirement, the fact that the publication was made for one week less than the required time in one county of the State did not invalidate the amendment. State ex rel. Thompson v. Winnett, 78 Neb. 379, 110 N. W. 1113, 10 L. R. A. (wv. s.) 149; 15 Ann. Cas. 781. Where an amendment to the Consti- tution has been proposed by the Legislature in the manner provided by that instrument, and it has been sub- mitted to the voters for ratification at the prescribed time and in sub- stantially the prescribed manner, and has been ratified by them, such amendment will not be declared void, even if it should appear that an execu- tive or ministerial officer did not com- ply strictly with the law as to the extent of publication in a particular newspaper. Hammond ». Clark, 136 Ga. 313, 71 S. E. 479, 38 L. R. A (N. 8.) 77. In some States proposed amend- ments are required to be entered in full upon the journals of each house of the legislature. This requirement is mandatory and a failure to observe it is fatal to the adoption of the amend- ment. People v. Loomis, 135 Mich. 556, 98 N. W. 262, 3 Ann. Cas. 751; Bott v. Wurts, 63 N. J. L. 289, 43 Atl. 744, 45 L. R. A. 251; State v. Tufly, 19 Nev. 391, 12 Pac. 835, 3 Am. St. Rep. 895. See also Hammond ». Clark, 136 Ga. 313, 71 S. E. 429, 38 L. R. A. (x. s.) 77. But see People v. Sours, 31 Colo. 369, 74 Pac. 167, 102 Am. St. Rep. 34. In Koehler v. Hill, 60 Iowa, 548, 14 N. W. 738, 15 N. W. 609, it is held that where a proposed amendment must be entered at length upon the journal, neither the enrolled resolution em- bodying it nor parol evidence can be received to contradict the journal; nor are the courts debarred from ascer- taining the truth by the fact that 4 second general assembly passed the amendment as enrolled. But if the proposition is recorded in the Senate journal and amended in the House and the amendment is then recorded in the Senate, it is not a valid objection that the whole proposition is. not recordedCHAP. III] FORMATION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 87 IV. In accordance with universal practice, and from the very necessity of the case, amendments to an existing constitution, or entire revisions of it, must be prepared and matured by some body of representatives chosen for the purpose. 1 It is obviously impossible for the whole people to meet, prepare, and discuss the proposed alterations, and there seems to be no feasible mode by which an expression of their will can be obtained, except by ask- ing it upon the single point of in one place in the Senate journal. In re Senate File, 25 Neb. 864, 41 N. W. Rep. 981. It is enough if the journal entry is by reference to the title. Thomason v. Ruggles, 69 Cal. 465, 11 Pac. 20. Where the constitution provided that amendments should be proposed by one general assembly, and approved and submitted to popular vote by a second, and seventeen amendments were thus approved together, and the second general assembly passed upon and submitted eight by one bill and nine by another, the submission was held sufficient and valid. Trustees of University v. McIver, 72 N. C. 76. Several propositions which in effect are but one amendment may be sub- mitted to the people as one amend- ment. State v. Timme, 54 Wis. 318, 11 N. W. 785. A high license amend- ment and a prohibitory amendment may be submitted at one time. In re Senate File, supra. An amendment becomes effective when the votes are canvassed. The Governor need not make a proclama- tion. Sewall v. State, 15 Tex. App. 56; Wilson v. State, id. 150. A proposed amendment which has duly passed the legislature does not require to be passed upon by the Governor before it can be submitted to the people. Com. v. Griest, 196 Pa. 396, 46 Atl. 505, 50 L. R. A. 568; State v. Dahl, 6 N. D. 81, 68 N. W. 418, 34 L. R. A. 97; In re Opinion of Justices, 118 Me. 544, 107 Atl. 673, 5 A. L. R. 1412; Warfield v. Vandiver, 101 Md. 78, 61 Atl. 568, 4 Ann. Cas. 492. In the absence of some other exclu- sive method of determination provided by the Constitution, whether an amendment has been legally proposed assent or disapproval. But no and adopted is a question for the courts. Hammond »v. Clark, 136 Ga. 313, 71 S. E. 479, 38 L. R. A. (w. 8.) 77; State v. Wurts, 63 N. J. L. 289, 43 Atl: 744, 45 1; REAL 251) Boyds: Oleott, 102 Oreg. 327, 202 Pac. 431; Gottslein v. Lister, 88 Wash. 462, 153 Pac. 595, Ann. Cas. 1917 D, 1008. Where the Governor has under statute appointed a commission to determine the result of the popular vote upon the proposed amendment, the proceedings of such commission may be reviewed by certiorari, not- withstanding the Governor’s procla- mation that the amendment has been duly adopted. Statev. Wurts, 63 N. J. L. 289, 43 Atl. 744, 45 L. R. A. 251. In voting on a constitutional amend- ment voters exercise a legislative func- tion and courts cannot enjoin the Secretary of State from publishing notice of the election even though the amendment, if adopted, may be in- valid. People v. Mills, 30 Col. 262, 70 Pac. 322. Under a State Constitution vesting the legislative power in the legislature and the people and giving the legisla- ture power to submit constitutional amendments, when the legislature authorizes the submission of a pro- posed amendment to the Constitution to the people, it merely places in mo- tion the process of the people exercis- ing their reserve legislative power, and a court of equity will not assume in advance jurisdiction to determine whether the proposed amendment, if adopted, is submitted and adopted in accordance with the law governing the same. McAlister v. State ex rel. Short, 95 Okla. 200, 219 Pac. 134, 33 A. L. R. 1370. 1 Bllingham v. Dye, 178 Ind. 336, 99 N. E. 1, Ann. Cas. 1915 C, 200.CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I 88 body of representatives, unless specially clothed with power for that purpose by the people when choosing them, can rightfully take definitive action upon amendments or revisions ; they must submit the result of their deliberations to the people — who alone are competent to exercise the powers of sovereignty in framing the fundamental law — for ratification or rejection. The consti- tutional convention is the representative of sovereignty only in a very qualified sense, and for the specific purpose, and with the restricted authority to put in proper form the questions of amend- ment upon which the people are to pass; but the changes in the fundamental law of the State must be enacted by the people them- selves.} V. The power of the people to amend or revise their constitu- tions is limited by the Constitution of the United States in the following particulars : — 1See, upon this subject, Jameson on the Constitutional Convention, §§ 415-418, and 479-520. This work is so complete and satisfactory in its treatment of the general subject as to leave little to be said by one who shall afterwards attempt to cover the same ground. Where a convention to frame amendments to the constitution is sitting under a legislative act from which all its authority is derived, the submission of its labors to a vote of the people in a manner different from that prescribed by the act is nugatory. Wells v. Bain, 75 Pa. St. 39. Such a convention has no inherent rights; it has delegated powers only, and must keep within them. Wood’s Appeal, 75 Pa. St. 59. Compare Loomis ». Jackson, 6 W. Va. 613, 708. “A constitutional convention is not a co-ordinate branch of the govern- ment. It exercises no governmental power, but is a body raised by law in aid of the popular desire to discuss and propose amendments, which have no governing force as long as they remain propositions.” State v. Doyle, 138 La. 350, 70 So. 322. The Supreme Court of Missouri has expressed the opinion that it was com- petent for a convention to put a new constitution in force without submit- ting it to the people. State v. Neal, 42Mo.119. But this was obiter. But if, after being accepted by the people, the convention modifies it and promul- gates it as modified, and the constitu- tion as promulgated is recognized as valid by the executive and legislative branches of the government, the modi- fications must be deemed valid. Miller v. Johnson, 92 Ky. 589, 18S. W. 522,15 L. R. A. 524. Where proposed amendments are required to be submitted to the people, and approved by a majority vote, it is a mooted question whether a majority of those voting thereon is sufficient, when it appears that they do not con- stitute a majority of all who voted at the same election. See State v. Swift, 69 Ind. 505; and cases cited, post, 1349 et seq. “The customary manner of calling constitutional conventions . . . is by resolution of the Legislature followed by a submission of the question to the electorate. In the absence of any provision in the Constitution on the subject, it seems that the Legislature alone can give validity to a conven- tion.” State v. American Sugar Refin- ing Co., 137 La. 407, 68 So. 742. That publication of proposed amendments with the statutes adopted at same session of legislature as that in which the amendments were pro- posed is a sufficient publication if made a sufficiently long time before election, see State v. Grey, 21 Nev. 378, 32 Pac. 190, 19 L. R. A. 134.CHAP. 111] FORMATION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 89 1. It must not abolish the republican form of government, since such act would be revolutionary in its character, and would eall for and demand direct intervention on the part of the gov- ernment of the United States." 2. It must not provide for titles of nobility, or assume to vio- late the obligation of any contract, or attaint persons of crime, or provide ex post facto for the punishment of acts by the courts which were innocent when committed, or contain any other pro- vision which would, in effect, amount to the exercise of any power expressly or impliedly prohibited to the States by the Constitution ofthe Union. For while such provisions would not call for the direct and forcible intervention of the government of the Union, it would be the duty of the courts, both State and national, to refuse to en- force them, and to declare them altogether void, as much when enacted by the people in their primary capacity as makers of the fundamental law, as when enacted in the form of statutes, through the delegated power of their legislatures.” VI. Subject to the foregoing principles and limitations, each State must judge for itself what provisions shall be inserted in its constitution; how the powers of government shall be apportioned in order to their proper exercise; what protection shall be thrown around the person or property of the citizen; and to what extent private rights shall be required to yield to the general good. And 1 Const. of U.S. art. 4, §4; Federal- ist, No. 43. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, 1 L. ed. 440. 2Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 18 L. ed. 356; Jefferson Branch Bank ». Skelly, 1 Black, 436, 17 L. ed. 173; State v. Keith, 63 N. C. 140; Jacoway v. Denton, 25 Ark. 525; Union Bank v. State, 9 Yerg. 490; Girdner v. Stephens, 1 Heisk. 280; Lawson v. Jeffries, 47 Miss. 686, 12 Am. Rep. 342; Penn v. Tollison, 26 Ark. 545; Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331, 15 L. ed. 401; Pacific R. R. Go. v. Maguire, 20 Wall. 36, 22 L. ed. 282; Railroad Co. v. McClure, 10 Wall. 511, 19 L. ed. 997; White v. Hart, 13 Wall. 646, 20 L. ed. 685; New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U. S. 650, 29 L. ed. 516, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 252; Fisk v. Jefferson Police Jury, 116 U.S. 131, 29 L. ed. 587, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 329; Bier v. McGehee, 148 U. S. 137, 37 L. ed. 397, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 580. The fact that the constitution con- taining the obnoxious provision was submitted to Congress, and the State admitted to full rights in the Union under it, cannot make such provision valid. Gunn v. Barry, 15 Wall. 610, 21 L. ed. 212. 3 Matter of the Reciprocity Bank, 22 N. Y.9; McMullen v. Hodge, 5 Texas, 34; Penn v. Tollison, 26 Ark. 545; Matter of Oliver Lee & Co.’s Bank, 21 N. Y.9; Edwards v. Lesueur, 132 Mo. 410, 33 S. W. 1180, 31 L. R. A. 815; State v. Edmondson, 89 Ohio St. 93, 105 N. E. 269, 52 L. R. A. (wn. s.) 305, Ann. Cas. 1915 D, 934; Hackett ». State Liquor License Board, 91 Ohio St. 176, 110 N. E. 485, L. R. A. 1917 Bae In matter of Oliver Lee & Co.’s Bank, 21 N. Y. 9, Denio, J., says: “The [constitutional] convention was not obliged, like the legislative bodies, to look carefully to the preservation of vested rights. It was competent to deal, subject to ratification by the people and to the Constitution of the Federal government, with all private90 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I the courts of the State, still more the courts of the Union, would be precluded from inquiring into the justice of their action, or question- ing its validity, because of any supposed conflict with fundamental rules of right or of government, unless they should be able to show collision at some point between the instrument thus formed and that paramount law which constitutes, in regard to the subjects it covers, the fundamental rule of action throughout the whole United States.! and social rights, and with all the existing laws and institutions of the State. If the convention had so willed, and the people had concurred, all former charters and grants might have been annihilated. When, there- fore, we are seeking for the true con- struction of a constitutional provision, we are constantly to bear in mind that its authors were not executing a dele- gated authority, limited by other con- stitutional restraints, but are to look upon them as the founders of a State, intent only upon establishing such principles as seemed best calculated to produce good government and pro- mote the public happiness, at the expense of any and all existing institu- tions which might stand in their way.” 1 All the State constitutions now contain within themselves provisions for their amendment. Some require the question of calling a convention to revise the constitution to be sub- mitted to the people at stated periods; others leave it to the legislature to call a convention, or to submit to the people the question of calling one; while the major part allow the legisla- ture to mature specific amendments to be submitted to the people sepa- rately, and these become a part of the constitution if adopted by the requisite vote. When the late rebellion had been put down by the military forces of the United States, and the State govern- ments which constituted a part of the disloyal system had been displaced, serious questions were raised as to the proper steps to be taken in order to restore the States to their harmonious relations to the Union. These ques- tions, and the controversy over them, constituted an important part of the history of our country during the administration of President Johnson; but as it is the hope and trust of our people that the occasion for discussing such questions will never arise again, we do not occupy space with them in this work. It suffices for the present to say, that Congress claimed, insisted upon, and enforced the right to pre- scribe the steps to be taken and the conditions to be observed in order to restore these States to their former positions in the Union, and the right also to determine when the prescribed conditions had been complied with, so as to entitle them to representation in Congress. There is some discussion of the general subject in Texas »v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 19 L. ed. 227. And see Gunn v. Barry, 15 Wall. 610, 21 L. ed. 212. Some States permit the amendment of the Constitution by the method of the initiative and referendum and such method has been held constitutional. State v. Roach, 230 Mo. 408, 1308S. W. 689, 1389 Am. St. Rep. 639; State v. Brantley, 113 Miss. 786, 74 So. 662, Ann. Cas. 1917 E, 723; Hackett »v. State Liquor Licensing Board, 91 Ohio St. 176, 110 N. E. 485, L. R. A. 1917 B, 7; Kiernan v. Portland, 57 Oreg. 454, 111 Pac. 379, 112 Pac. 402, 37 L. R. A. (N. 8s.) 332. When a constitution has been re- garded by the people of a State as valid, and it has never been adjudged illegal by the courts, a Federal circuit court will not question its legal adop- tion. Smith v. Good, 34 Fed. Rep. 204. It has been decided in some cases that a constitution is to have effect from the time of its adoption by the people, and not from the time of the admission of the State into the Union by Congress. Scott v. Young Men’s Society’s Lessee, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 119; Campbell v. Fields, 35 Texas, 751.CHAP. rt] FORMATION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 91 How far the constitution of a State shall descend into the par- ticulars of government, is a question of policy addressed to the convention which forms it. Certain things are to be looked for in all these instruments; though even as to these there is great variety, not only of substance, but also in the minuteness of their provisions to meet particular cases. I. We are to expect a general framework of government to be designed, under which the sovereignty of the people is to be exer- cised by representatives chosen for the purpose, in such manner as the instrument provides, and with such reservations as it makes. II. Generally the qualifications for the right of suffrage will be declared, as well as the conditions under which it shall be exer- cised. III. The usual checks and balances of republican government, in which consists its chief excellence, will be retained. The most important of these are the separate departments for the exercise of legislative, executive, and judicial power; and these are to be kept as distinct and separate as possible, except in so far as the action of one is made to constitute a restraint upon the action of the others, to keep them within proper bounds, and to prevent hasty and improvident action.! Upon legislative action there is, The Texas reconstruction constitu- tion became operative before the State was admitted to representation in Con- gress. Peak v. Swindle, 68 Texas, 242, 458. W. 478. An amendment to the Minnesota original constitution adopted before formal admission of the State is valid. Any irregularity is healed by the ad- mission, and the subsequent recogni- tion of the validity of the amendment by the State. Secombe v. Kittelson, 29 Minn. 555, 12 N. W. 519. 1 Authority in one department of government to interfere with another will always be strictly construed. Where the constitution provides for sessions of the legislature to be held at the State capitol, “except in case of war, insurrection or pestilence, when it may by proclamation of the governor assemble for the time being else- where ”’, it does not empower the gov- ernor to adjourn the Houses after they have convened, even though he de- clares a state of insurrection to exist; neither can he under his power to ad- journ the legislature, in case of dis- agreement between the two Houses in regard to their adjournment, adjourn them to meet at a stated time at an- other place when there has been no disagreement between the two Houses. Taylor v. Beckham, 108 Ky. 278, 49 L. R. A. 258, 56 S. W. 177. See this case in Supreme Court of the United States, where the writ of error after discussion was dismissed on the ground that no deprivation of rights secured by the fourteenth amendment, with- out due process, was shown, nor was there any case made of a violation of the guaranty of a republican form of government. ‘Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U. S. 548, 44 L. ed. 1187, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 890. Dissenting opinion of Har- lan, J., 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1009. Where the legislature is empowered to remove judges for cause, but is required to give notice and oppor- tunity to appear, this imports that the cause shall be one personal to the judge, and he cannot be removed merely to cut down expenses. But if his court is one which the legislature is authorized to ordain and establish,92 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [voL. I first, the check of the executive, who will generally be clothed with a qualified veto power, and who may refuse to execute laws deemed unconstitutional; and, second, the check of the judiciary, who may annul unconstitutional laws, and punish those concerned in enforcing them. Upon judicial action there is the legislative check, which consists in the power to prescribe rules for the courts, and perhaps to restrict their authority; and the executive check, of refusing aid in enforcing any judgments which are believed to be in excess of jurisdiction. Upon executive action the legislature has a power of restraint, corresponding to that which it exercises upon judicial action; and the judiciary may punish executive agents for any action in excess of executive authority. And the legislative depart- ment has an important restraint upon both the executive and the judiciary, in the power of impeachment for illegal or oppressive action, or for any failure to perform official duty. The executive, in refusing to execute a legislative enactment, will always do so with the peril of impeachment in view. IV. Local self-government having always been a part of the English and American systems, we shall look for its recognition in any such instrument. And even if not expressly recognized, it is still to be understood that all these instruments are framed with its present existence and anticipated continuance in view the legislature may abolish the court, and the judge’s office and salary will thereupon cease. McCulley v. State, 102 Tenn. 509, 53 S. W. 134, 46 L. R. A. 567. That all the territory of one judicial district may be distributed among other districts or annexed to one dis- trict, and the judge thus deprived of office, see Aikman v. Edwards, 55 Kan. 751, 42 Pac. 366, 30 L. R. A. 149; but this cannot be done where the judge’s term of office is fixed by the constitu- tion. State v. Friedley, 135 Ind. 119, 34 N. E. 872, 21 L. R. A. 634. Court will not enjoin any attempted exercise of legislative power by legis- lature. State v. Thorson, 9S. D. 149, G8 ONS We202533 1 Re A 582) 1 Park Commissioners »v. Common Council of Detroit, 28 Mich. 228; People v. Albertson, 55 N. Y. 50. Under the constitution of Georgia it is held that municipalities cannot maintain the proposition of absolute local self-government and the State legislature may by direct enactment control the local police. Americus ». Perry, 114 Ga. 871, 40 S. E. 1004, 57 i ReAs 230! It is held in State ex rel. White v. Barker, 116 Iowa, 96, 89 N. W. 204, 57 L. R. A. 244, that the legislature could not take from the municipality the management of a municipal water supply system. That action to that effect was invalid for violation of the principle of municipal self-government. This case is valuable for its histori- cal discussion of the principle. The legislature cannot fix the sala- ries of firemen employed by munici- palities, although there is no limitation on such action in the constitution, since this is a matter of purely local concern. Lexington v. Thompson, 113 Ky. 540, 68S. W. 477, 57 L. R. A. 775. A legislature may create a school district and appoint its officers. Kies v. Lowery, 131 Mich. 639, 92 N. W. 289. For a discussion of the ‘‘Right to Local Self-Government”’, see article by Mr. Amasa M. Eaton, 13 Harv. L. Rev. 441, 570, 638, 14 zd. 20, 116.CHAP. II1| FORMATION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 93 V. We shall also expect a declaration of rights for the protection of individuals and minorities. This declaration usually contains the following classes of provisions : — 1. Those declaratory of the general principles of republican gov- ernment; such as, that all freemen, when they form a social com- pact, are equal, and no man, or set of men, Is entitled to exclusive, separate public emoluments or privileges* from the community but in consideration of public services; that absolute, arbitrary power over the lives, liberty, and property of freemen exists nowhere in a republic, not even in the largest majority; that all power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded on their authority, and instituted for their peace, safety, happiness, security, and the protection of property; that for the advancement of these ends they have at all times an inalienable and indefeasible right to alter, reform, or abolish their government in such manner as they may think proper; that all elections shall be free and equal ; that no power of suspending the laws shall be exercised except by the legislature or its authority; that standing armies are not to be maintained in time of peace; that representation shall be in pro- portion to population; that the people shall have the right freely to assemble to consult of the common good, to instruct their repre- sentatives, and petition for redress of grievances; and the like. 1The provision that no corpora- tion shall be granted any special or exclusive privilege or immunity is not violated by an act which allows trus- tees of an estate to charge the estate any reasonable sum which they may have paid “to a company ”’, authorized by law so to do, for becoming surety upon their bonds. Re Clark, 195 Pa. St. 520, 48 L. R. A. 587. The privilege of taking oysters in public waters cannot be restricted to taxpayers. Gustafson v. State, 40 Tex. Cr. 67, 45 S. W. 717, 48S. W. 518, 43 L. R. A. 615. Labor unions may be granted right to register their trade-marks and labels and have them protected from in- fringement. Schmalz ». Woolley, 57 N. J. Eq. 303, 41 Atl. 939, 43 L. R. A. 86, 73 Am. St. 637; Perkins v. Heert, 158 N. Y. 306, 53 N. E. 18, 43 L. R. A. 858, 70 Am. St. 483. Sale of ferry franchise to highest bidder is not a grant of special or exclusive privilege, even though the franchise be exclusive, all persons being free to bid. Patterson v. Woll- man, 5 N. D. 608, 67 N. W. 1040, 33 L. R. A. 536; Nixon v. Reid, 8S. D. 507, 67 N. W. 57, 32 L. R. A. 315. Law making an exception from civil service regulations in case of veteran soldiers, and compelling their appoint- ment to vacancies upon their sworn statements of qualification, is void. Brown v. Russell, 166 Mass. 14,43 N. EB. 1005, 32 L. R. A. 253, 55 Am. St. 357. Statute authorizing the levy of an arbitrary tax upon ordinary and law- ful occupations is void. State v. Con- lon, 65 Conn. 478, 33 Atl. 519, 31 L. R. A. 55, 48 Am. St. 227. Statute granting to trade-unions copyright in their trade-marks is valid. State v. Bishop, 128 Mo. 373, 31S. W. 9, 29 L. R. A. 200, 49 Am. St. 569, and see note hereto in L. R. A. Statute specifying number of depu- ties to be allowed county officers in certain counties, but leaving it to dis- eretion of county court in other coun- ties is void. Weaver v. Davidson County, 104 Tenn. 315, 59S. W. 1105.94 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [voL. 1 2. Those declaratory of the fundamental rights of the citizen; as that all men are by nature free and independent, and have certain inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness; that the right to property is before and higher than any constitutional sanction; that the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed ;* that every man may freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right; that every man may bear arms for the defense of himself and of the State; that the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, nor shall soldiers be quartered upon citizens in time of peace; and the like. 3. Those declaratory of the principles which insure to the citizen an impartial trial, and protect him in his life, liberty, and property against the arbitrary action of those in authority: as that no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed; that the right to trial by jury shall be preserved; that excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive punishments inflicted ; that no person shall be subject to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense, nor be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; that private property shall not be taken for public use without compensation; and the like.? 1 Hale v. Everett, 53 N. H. 9; Board of Education v. Minor, 23 Ohio St. 211. 2The provision that courts of justice shall be open to every person and that right and justice shall be administered without denial, sale, or delay is violated by a statute which allows an attorney’s fee to successful lien claimants but not to successful defendants. Davidson v. Jennings, 27 Colo. 187, 60 Pac. 354, 48 L. R. A. 340, 83 Am. St. 49. Such fees are allowed in Florida. Dell v. Marvin, 41 Fla. 221, 26 So. 188, 45 L. R. A. 201, 79 Am. St. 171. Further proceedings in an action may be stayed until costs of an appeal are paid. Knee »v. Balti- more City Pass. Ry. Co., 87 Md. 623, 40 Atl. 890, 42 L. R. A. 363. A person is not deprived of property or particular services without compen- sation by a statute which compels him to appear before the court and testify in criminal cases, and deprives him of all right to fees therefor or makes such right contingent upon conviction of accused. State v. Henley, 98 Tenn. 665, 41S: W. 352) 39 Lb: R. Ay 126: And an expert witness cannot claim higher fees than other witnesses, nor can he refuse to testify until such fees are secured to him. Dixon »v. People, 168 Ill. 179, 48 N. E. 108, 39 L. R. A. 116; upon right of State to require services of witnesses without compen- sation, see note to Dixon v. People, above, in L. R. A. Moderate court fees may be ex- acted of parties to legal proceedings. Northern Counties Invt. Trust ». Sears, 30 Oreg. 388, 41 Pac. 931, 35 L. R. A. 188. Repeal of statute giving right ofCHAP. 11| FORMATION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 95 Other clauses are sometimes added declaratory of the princi- ples of morality and virtue; and it is also sometimes expressly declared — what indeed is implied without the declaration — that everything in the declaration of rights contained is excepted out of the general powers of government, and all laws contrary thereto shall be void. Many other things are commonly found in these charters of government ;! but since, while they continue in force, they are to remain absolute and unchangeable rules of action and deci- sion, it is obvious that they should not be made to embrace within their iron grasp those subjects in regard to which the policy or interest of the State or of its people may vary from time to time, and which are therefore more properly left to the control of the legislature, which can more easily and speedily make the required changes. In considering State constitutions we must not commit the mistake of supposing that, because individual rights are guarded and protected by them, they must also be considered as owing their origin to them. These instruments measure the powers of the rulers, but they do not measure the rights of the governed. “What is a constitution, and what are its objects? It is easier to tell what it is not than what it is. It is not the beginning of a community, nor the origin of private rights; it is not the foun- tain of law, nor the incipient state of government; it is not the cause, but consequence, of personal and political freedom ; it grants no rights to the people, but is the creature of their power, the instrument of their convenience. Designed for their protection in the enjoyment of the rights and powers which they possessed before the constitution was made, it is but the framework of the political government, and necessarily based upon the pre-existing condition of laws, rights, habits, and modes of thought. There is nothing primitive in it: it is all derived from a known source. It pre- action against county for injury result- ing from defective bridge does not violate a provision that every man shall have remedy by due course of law for all injuries done him. Temple- ton v. Linn. Co., 22 Oreg. 313, 29 Pac. 795, 15 L. R. A. 730. Proceedings in a second action in ejectment may be stayed until costs in the first are paid. Shear v. Box, 92 Ala. 596, 8 So. 792, 11 L. R. A. 620, and note. 1“This, then, is the office of a written [free] constitution: to delegate to various public functionaries such of the powers of government as the people do not intend to exercise for themselves; to classify these powers, according to their nature, and to com- mit them to separate agents; to pro- vide for the choice of these agents by the people; to ascertain, limit, and define the extent of the authority thus delegated ; and to reserve to the people their sovereignty over all things not expressly committed to their repre- sentatives.” E. P. Hurlbut in Human Rights and their Political Guaranties.96 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [von. I supposes an organized society, law, order, property, personal free- dom, a love of political liberty, and enough of cultivated intelligence to know how to guard it against the encroachments of tyranny. A written constitution is in every instance a limitation upon the powers of government in the hands of agents; for there never was a written republican constitution which delegated to functionaries all the latent powers which lie dormant in every nation, and are boundless in extent and incapable of definition. 1Hamilton v. St. Louis County Court, 15 Mo. 13, per Bates, arguendo. And see Matter of Oliver Lee & Co.’s Bank, 21 N. Y. 9; Lee v. State, 26 Ark. 265-6; State v. Noble, 118 Ind. 350, 21 N. E. 244, 10 Am. St. Rep. 143, 4 L. R. A. 101; State v. Denny, 118 Ind. 449, 21 N. E. 274,4 L. R. A. 65; Lexington v. Thompson, 113 Ky. 540, 68 S. W. 477, 101 Am. St. Rep. 361, 57 L. R. A. 775; Humes v. Mis- souri, etc., R. Co., 82 Mo. 221, 52 Am. Rep. 369; Atchison, etc., R. Co. ». Baty, 6 Neb. 37, 29 Am. Rep. 356; Stratton v. Morris, 89 Tenn. 497, 15iSs We Ot, 12 1a. Ri Al 70) Dennis v. Moses, 18 Wash. 537, 52 Pac. 3338, 40 L. R. A. 302. “Written constitutions sanctify and confirm great principles, but the latter are prior in existence to the former.”’ 2 Webster’s Works, 392. See also 1 Bl. Com. 124; 2 Story, Life and Letters, 278; Sidney on Government, c. 3, secs. 27 and 33. “Tt (the Constitution) is the pro- tector of the people, placed on guard by them to save the rights of the people against injury by the people.” Hunter v. Colfax Consol. Coal Co., 175 Iowa, 245, 154 N. W. 1037, 157 N. W. 145, L. R. A. 1917 D, 15, Ann. Cas. 1917 EH, 803. ‘Constitutions are intended to pre- serve practical and substantial rights, not to maintain theories.” Mr. Jus- tice Holmes in Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 48 L. ed. 1067, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 692. eB) il “Tf this charter of State govern- ment which we call a constitution were all there was of constitutional com- mand; if the usages, the customs, the maxims that have sprung from the habits of life, modes of thought, methods of trying facts by the neigh- borhood, and mutual responsibility in neighborhood interests; the precepts that have come to us from the reyolu- tions which overturned tyrannies; the sentiments of manly independence and self-control which impelled our ances- tors to summon the local community to redress local evils, instead of relying upon king or legislature at a distance to do so, —if a recognition of all these were to be stricken from the body of our constitutional law, a lifeless skele- ton might remain, but the living spirit; that which gives it force and attraction, which makes it valuable and draws to it the affections of the people; that which distinguishes it from the numberless constitutions, so called, which in Europe have been set up and thrown down within the last hundred years, many of which, in their expressions, seemed equally fair and to possess equal promise with ours, and have only been wanting in the support and vitality which these alone can give, — this living and breathing spirit which supplies the interpretation of the words of the written charter would be utterly lost and gone.’ People »v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44, 107.CHAPTER IV OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS THE deficiencies of human language are such that, if written instruments were always prepared carefully by persons skilled in the use of words, we should still expect to find their meaning often drawn in question, or at least to meet with difficulties in their practical application. But when draughtsmen are careless or incompetent, these difficulties are greatly increased; and they multiply rapidly when the instruments are to be applied, not only to the subjects directly within the contemplation of those who framed them, but also to a great variety of new circumstances which could not have been anticipated, but which must never- theless be governed by the general rules which the instruments establish. Moreover, the different points of view from which dif- ferent individuals regard these instruments incline them to differ- ent views of the instruments themselves. All these circumstances tend to give to the subjects of interpretation and construction great prominence in the practical administration of the law, and to suggest questions which often are of no little difficulty. Interpretation differs from construction in that the former is the art of finding out the true sense of any form of words; that is, the sense which their author intended to convey; and of en- abling others to derive from them the same idea which the author intended to convey. Construction, on the other hand, is the drawing of conclusions, respecting subjects that lie beyond the direct expressions of the text, from elements known from and given in the text; conclusions which are in the spirit, though not within the letter of the text. Interpretation only takes place if the text conveys some meaning or other. But construction is resorted to when, in comparing two different writings of the same individual, or two different enactments by the same legislative body, there is found contradiction where there was evidently no intention of such contradiction one of another, or where it happens that part of a writing or declaration contradicts the rest. When this is the case, and the nature of the document or declaration, or VOL. I—7 9798 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I whatever else it may be, is such as not to allow us to consider the whole as being invalidated by a partial or other contradiction, then resort must be had to construction; so, too, if required to act in cases which have not been foreseen by the framers of those rules, by which we are nevertheless obliged, for some binding reason, faithfully to regulate as well as we can our action respect- ing the unforeseen case.1 In common use, however, the word construction is generally employed in the law in a sense embracing all that is properly covered by both when each is used in a sense strictly and technically correct; and we shall so employ it in the present chapter. From the earliest periods in the history of written law, rules of construction, sometimes based upon sound reason, and seeking the real intent of the instrument, and at other times altogether arbitrary or fanciful, have been laid down by those who have assumed to instruct in the law, or who have been called upon to administer it, by the aid of which the meaning of the instrument was to be resolved. Some of these rules have been applied to particular classes of instruments only; others are more general in their application, and, so far as they are sound, may be made use of in any case where the meaning of a writing is in dispute. To such of these as seem important in constitutional law we shall refer, and illustrate them by references to reported cases, in which they have been applied. A few preliminary words may not be out of place, upon the questions, who are to apply these rules; what person, body, or department is to enforce the construction; and how far a deter- mination, when once made, is to be binding upon other persons, bodies, or departments. We have already seen that we are to expect in every constitu- tion an apportionment of the powers of government. We shall also find certain duties imposed upon the several departments, as well as upon specified officers in each, and we shall likewise dis- cover that the constitution has sought to hedge about their action in various ways, with a view to the protection of individual rights, and the proper separation of duties. And wherever any one is called upon to perform any constitutional duty, or to do any act 1 Lieber, Legal and Political Her- veyideas.’”’ ‘‘ Construction, in practice, meneutics. See Smith on Stat. and determining the meaning and applica- Const. Construction, 600. tion as to the case in question of the Bouvier defines the two terms suc- provisions of a constitution, statute, cinetly as follows: ‘Interpretation, the will, or other instrument, or of an oral discovery and representation of the agreement.’’ Law. Dict. true meaning of any signs used to con-CHAP. Iv] CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 99 in respect to which it can be supposed that the constitution has spoken, it is obvious that a question of construction may at once arise, upon which some one must decide before the duty is per- formed or the act done. From the very nature of the case, this decision must commonly be made by the person, body, or depart- ment upon whom the duty is imposed, or from whom the act is required. Let us suppose that the constitution requires of the legislature, that, in establishing municipal corporations, it shall restrict their powers of taxation; and a city charter is proposed which confined the right of taxation to the raising of money for certain specified purposes, but in regard to those purposes leaves it unlimited ; or which allows to the municipality unlimited choice of purposes, but restricts the rate; or which permits persons to be taxed in- definitely, but limits the taxation of property: in either of these cases the question at once arises, whether the limitation in the charter is such a restriction as the constitution intends. Let us suppose, again, that a board of supervisors is, by the constitution, authorized to borrow money upon the credit of the county for any county purpose, and that it is asked to issue bonds in order to purchase stock in some railway company which proposes to con- struct a road across the county ; and the proposition is met with the query, Is this a county purpose, and can the issue of bonds be regarded as a borrowing of money, within the meaning of the people as expressed in the constitution? And once again: let us suppose that the governor is empowered to convene the legislature on ex- traordinary occasions, and he is requested to do so in order to pro- vide for a class of private claims whose holders are urgent; can this with any propriety be deemed an extraordinary occasion? In these and the like cases our constitutions have provided no tribunal for the specific duty of solving in advance the questions which arise. In a few of the States, indeed, the legislative depart- ment has been empowered by the constitution to call upon the courts for their opinion upon the constitutional validity of a pro- posed law, in order that, if it be adjudged without warrant, the legislature may abstain from enacting it.! But those provisions 1By the constitutions of Maine, it has been held that the giving of New Hampshire, and Massachusetts, advisory opinions by Justices of the the judges of the Supreme Court are Supreme Court, while entitled to great required, when called upon by the consideration, is not the exercise of governor, council, or either house of the judicial function, and the opinions the legislature, to give their opinions thus given have not the quality of ‘upon important questions of law,and judicial authority. Laughlin v. Port- upon solemn occasions.” In Maine land, 111 Me. 486, 90 Atl. 318, 50 a100 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I R. A. (n. gs.) 1148, Ann. Cas. 1916 C, 734. In Massachusetts the way pre- scribed by the Constitution is the only way open to either branch of the legislature to obtain the assistance of the judicial department of govern- ment in the performance of the duties reposed in it by the Constitution, and it does not extend to the determina- tion of questions of fact, nor authorize the imposition upon the courts of functions vested by the Constitution exclusively in other departments of government. Case of Supervisors of Elections, 114 Mass. 247, 19 Am. Rep. 341; Boston v. Chelsea, 212 Mass. 127, 98 N. E. 620; Dinan »v. Swig, 223 Mass) 516, 112 Ne H. 91. In Massachusetts the justices will not give an opinion on the proper construc- tion of an existing act which the legis- lature may amend. Opinion of Jus- tices, 148 Mass. 623, 21 N. E. 489. In Rhode Island the governor or either house of the general assembly may call for the opinions of the judges of the Supreme Court upon any ques- tion of law. In Florida the governor may require an opinion on any question affecting his executive powers and duties. A duty with reference to a bill before it becomes a law, is not an executive duty, and as to it the judges cannot advise. Opinion of Justices, 23 Fla. 297, 6 So. 925. So in South Dakota. Re Con- stitutional Provision, 3 S. D. 548, 54 N. W. 650, 19 L. R. A. 575. In Missouri, previous to the con- stitution of 1875, the judges were re- quired to give their opinions ‘upon important questions of constitutional law, and upon solemn occasions’’; and the Supreme Court held that while the governor determined for himself, whether the occasion was such as to authorize him to call on the judges for their opinion, they must decide for themselves whether the occasion was such as to warrant the governor in making the call. Opinions of Judges, 49 Mo. 216. By a constitutional amendment of 1885, the Colorado Supreme Court is required to give its opinion upon important questions upon solemn occa- sions to the governor or either house of the legislature. The intention, it is held, is not ‘‘to authorize an ex parte adjudication of individual or corporate rights”, nor to exact ‘‘a wholesale exposition of all constitutional ques- tions relating to a given subject, in anticipation of the possible introduc- tion or passage of measures bearing upon particular branches of such sub- ject.” It appearing that the question was covered by pending litigation, the court refused to answer. In re Irriga- tion Resolution, 9 Col. 620, 21 Pac. 470. Nor should it give an opinion on provi- sions which do not affect a pending act. In re Irrigation Resolution, swpra. Questions must affect purely public rights. Jn re Senate Resolution, No. 65, 12 Col. 466, 21 Pac. 478; Re House Bill, No. 99, 26 Col. 140, 56 Pac. 181; Re Senate Bill, No. 27, 28 Col. 359, 65 Pac. 50. In Alabama a statute providing for obtaining the opinions of the Justices of the Supreme Court, or a majority thereof, by the Governor or either House of the Legislature, upon impor- tant constitutional questions, has been held to contemplate merely advisory opinions of the individual justices, not of the court, binding neither the jus- tices nor the department or officer requesting the opinion; and not to be invalid as being an encroachment by one department upon the powers of another. Jn re Opinions of the Jus- tices, 209 Ala. 593, 96 So. 487. In Vermont, by statute the gover- nor may require an opinion on ques- tions connected with the discharge of his duties; and in Kentucky an opin- ion has been given without require- ment of law on the power of the goy- ernor to fill a vacancy on the Supreme Bench. Opinion of Judges, 79 Ky. 621. In New York it has been held that the giving of advisory opinions is not the exercise of the judicial functions, and that no such duty attaches to the judicial office in the absence of an express provision of the Constitution. In re Workmen’s Compensation Fund, 224 N. Y. 13, 119 N. E. 1027. The jurisdiction of the United States courts is limited to cases and contro- versies in such form that the judicialCHAP. IV] CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 101 are not often to be met with, and judicial decisions, especially upon delicate and difficult questions of constitutional law, can seldom be entirely satisfactory when made, as they commonly will be under such calls, without the benefit of argument at the bar, and of that light upon the questions involved which might be afforded by counsel learned in the law, and interested in giving them a thorough investigation. It follows, therefore, that every department of the government and every official of every department may at any time, when a duty is to be performed, be required to pass upon a question of constitutional construction.1 Sometimes the case will be such that the decision when made must, from the nature of things, be conclusive and subject to no appeal or review, however erroneous it may be in the opinion of other departments or other officers; but in other cases the same question may be required to be passed upon again before the duty is completely performed. The first of these classes is where, by the constitution, a particular question is plainly addressed to the discretion or judgment of some one de- partment or officer, so that the interference of any other depart- ment or officer, with a view to the substitution of its own discretion or judgment in the place of that to which the constitution has con- fided the decision, would be impertinent and intrusive. Under every constitution, cases of this description are to be met with; and, though it will sometimes be found difficult to classify them, there can be no doubt, when the case is properly determined to be one of this character, that the rule must prevail which makes the decision final.” power is capable of acting on them and does not extend to an issue of consti- tutional law framed by Congress for the purpose of invoking the advice of the Supreme Court without real par- ties or a real case, or to administra- tive or legislative issues or contro- versies. Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 250, 55 L. ed. 246; Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 261 U. S. 428, 67 L. ed. 731, 48 Sup. Ct. Rep. 445. 1 “Tt is argued that the legislature cannot give a construction to the con- stitution relative to private rights secured by it. It is true that the legis- lature, in consequence of their con- struction of the constitution, cannot make laws repugnant toit. But every department of government, invested powers, with certain constitutional must, in the first instance, but not exclusively, be the judge of its powers, or it could not act.’”’ Parsons, Ch. J., in Kendall v. Inhabitants of Kingston, 5 Mass. 524, 533. The decision of a governor, having jurisdiction to decide in the first instance whether tax exemption is constitutional, must be obeyed by inferior executive officers. State v. Buchanan, 24 W. Va. 362. But a patent commissioner may not refuse to perform a ministerial act on the ground that the statute requiring it is unconstitutional. United States »v. Marble, 3 Mackey, 32. Notwith- standing a void proviso as to an officer’s salary, it is his duty to give the act effect. State v. Kelsey, 44N.J.L. 1. 2 Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137, 2 L. ed. 60; State v. Joseph, 175102 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I We will suppose, again, that the constitution empowers the executive to convene the legislature on extraordinary occasions, and does not in terms authorize the intervention of any one else in determining what is and what is not such an occasion in the constitutional sense; it is obvious that the question is addressed exclusively to the executive judgment, and neither the legislative nor the judicial department can intervene to compel action, if the executive decide against it, or to enjoin action if, in his opinion, the proper occasion has arisen.1 Ala. 579, 57 So. 942, Ann. Cas. 1914 D, 248; Davis v. Gaines, 48 Ark. 370, 3S. W. 184; Carpenter v. Peo., 8 Colo. 116, 5 Pac. 828; In re Moyer, 35 Colo. 159, 85 Pac. 190, 117 Am. St. Rep. 189, 12 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 979; Gillinwater v. Mississippi, etc., R. Co., 13 Ill. 1; Johnson v. Wells County, 107 Ind. 15,8 N. E. 1; State v. Tucker, 46 Ind. 355; Marks v. Purdue University, 37 Ind. 155; Richman v. Muscatine County, 77 Iowa, 513, 42 N. W. 422, 14 Am. St. Rep. 308, 4 L. R. A. 445; State v. Hitchcock, 1 Kan. 178, 81 Am. Dec. 503; St. Louis v. Shields, 62 Mo. 247; People v. Parker, 3 Neb. 409, 19 Am. Rep. 634; Newson »v. Rainier, 94 Oreg. 199, 185 Pac. 296; Buist v. Charleston, 77 S. C. 260, 57S. E. 862; State v. Owen, 97 Wash. 466, 166 Pac. 793. Where the constitution empowers the legislature to determine an elec- tion contest for offices of governor and lieutenant-governor, the decision of the legislature in any such contest is not subject to review in the courts. Taylor v. Beckham, 108 Ky. 278, 49 L. R. A. 258, 56 S. W. 177. See this case in Supreme Court of the United States, 178 U. S. 548, 44 L. ed. 1187, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 890; Dissenting opinion of Harlan, J., 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1009. Courts have jurisdiction to review apportionment statutes for abuses of discretion, amounting to violations of the constitution. Carter »v. Rice, 135 N. Y. 473, 31 N. E. 921; State v. Cunningham, 83 Wis. 90, 51 N. W. 724, 35 Am. St. 27; Giddings v. Secre- tary of State, 93 Mich. 1, 52 N. W. 944. In Giddings v. Secretary of State, 93 Mich. 1, 52 N. W. 944, the question And again, if, by the constitution, was expressly determined to be a judi- cial one. But see Fletcher v. Tuttle, 151 Ill. 41, 37 N. E. 683, 42 Am. St. 220, in which case it was held that a bill, which raised the question of the validity of an apportionment act, filed by an elector for the enforcement of his right to the elective franchise, would not lie since the right involved was a purely political one. 1 Whiteman v. Railroad Co., 2 Harr. (Del.) 514, 33 Am. Dec. 411; In re State Census, 9 Col. 642, 21 Pac. Rep. 477; Farrelly v. Cole, 60 Kan. 356, 56 Pac. 492, 44 L. R. A. 464. Under the Constitution of Oklahoma the action of the Governor in con- voking the legislature at, or adjourn- ing it to, another place than the seat of government ‘when in his opinion the public safety or welfare, or the safety or health of the members require it’’, such convoking or adjournment having been separately concurred in by a two-thirds vote of all the mem- bers elected to each branch of the Legislature, is conclusive upon, and not subject to be reviewed by, the Supreme Court. Coyle v. Smith, 28 Okla. 121, 113 Pac. 944. In People v. Parker, 3 Neb. 409, 19 Am. Rep. 634, it appeared that an offi- cer, assuming to act as governor in the absence of the governor from the State, had issued a proclamation con- vening the legislature in extraordinary session. The governor returned previ- ous to the time named for the meeting, and issued a second proclamation, revoking the first. Held, that the power of convening the legislature being a discretionary power, it might be recalled before the meeting took place.CHAP. Iv] CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 103 laws are to take effect at a specified time after their passage, unless the legislature for urgent reasons shall otherwise order, we must perceive at once that the legislature alone is competent to pass upon the urgency of the alleged reasons.* And to take a judicial instance : If a court is required to give an accused person a trial at the first term after indictment, unless good cause be shown for continuance, it is obvious that the question of good cause is one for the court alone to pass upon, and that its judgment when exercised is, and must be from the nature of the case, final. And when in these or any similar case the decision is once made, other departments or other officers, whatever may have been their own opinions, must assume the decision to be correct, and are not at liberty to raise any question concerning it, unless some duty is devolved upon them which presents the same question anew. But there are cases in which In exercising his power to call out the militia in certain exigencies, the President is the exclusive and final judge when the exigency has arisen. Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19, 6 L. ed. 537. Under the Constitution and stat- utes of Colorado, the Governor having determined that an insurrection exists, authorizing him to call out the militia, his determination is not subject to review by the courts. In re Moyer, 35 Colo. 159, 85 Pac. 190, 117 Am. St. Rep. 189, 12 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 979. 1See post, p. 326. It is clear that courts cannot inter- fere with matters of legislative discre- tion. Maloy v. Marietta, 11 Ohio St. 636; State ». Hitchcock, 1 Kan. 178; State v. Boone County Court, 50 Mo. 317; Patterson v. Barlow, 60 Pa. St. 54; Kimball v. Grantsville City, 19 Utah, 368, 57 Pac. 1, 45 L. R. A. 628, and see cases post, 258. As to self- executing provisions in general, see post, p. 165. In Gillinwater v. Mississippi & Atlan- tic Railroad Co., 13 Ill. 1, it was urged that a certain restriction imposed upon railroad corporations by the general railroad law was a violation of the pro- vision of the constitution which en- joins it upon the legislature ‘to en- courage internal improvements by passing liberal general laws of incor- poration for that purpose.” The the question of construction is court say of this provision: “This is a constitutional command to the legis- lature, as obligatory on it as any other of the provisions of that instrument ; but it is one which cannot be enforced by the courts of justice. It addresses itself to the legislature alone, and it is not for us to say whether it has obeyed the behest in its true spirit. Whether the provisions of this law are liberal, and tend to encourage internal im- provements, is matter of opinion, about which men may differ; and as we have no authority to revise legis- lative action on the subject, it would not become us to express our views in relation to it. The law makes no pro- vision for the construction of canals and turnpike roads, and yet they are as much internal improvements as railroads, and we might as well be asked to extend what we might con- sider the liberal provisions of this law to them, because they are embraced in the constitutional provision, as to ask us to disregard such provisions of it as we might regard as illiberal. The argument proceeds upon the idea that we should consider that as done which ought to be done; but that principle has no application here. Like laws upon other subjects within legislative jurisdiction, it is for the courts to say what the law is, not what it should be.”104 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I equally addressed to two or more departments of the government, and it then becomes important to know whether the decision by one is binding upon the others, or whether each is to act upon its own judgment. Let us suppose once more that the governor, being empowered by the constitution to convene the legislature upon extraordinary occasions, has regarded a particular event as being such an occasion, and has issued his proclamation calling them together with a view to the enactment of some particular legislation which the event seems to call for, and which he specifies in his proclamation. Now, the legislature are to enact laws upon their own view of necessity and expediency; and they will refuse to pass the desired statute if they regard it as unwise or unimportant. But in so doing they indirectly review the governor’s decision, especially if, in refusing to pass the law, they do so on the ground that the specific event was not one calling for action on their part. In such a case it is clear that, while the decision of the governor is final so far as to require the legislature to meet, it is not final in any sense that would bind the legislative department to accept and act upon it when they enter upon the performance of their duty in the making of laws. So also there are cases where, after the two houses of the legisla- ture have passed upon the question, their decision is in a certain sense subject to review by the governor. [If a bill is introduced the constitutionality of which is disputed, the passage of the bill by the two houses must be regarded as the expression of their judgment that, if approved, it will be a valid law. But if the constitution confers upon the governor a veto power, the same question of constitutional authority will be brought by the bill before him, since it is manifestly his duty to withhold approval from any bill which, in his opinion, the legislature ought not for any reason to pass. And what reason so forcible as that the con- stitution confers upon them no authority to enact it? In all these and the like cases, each department must act upon its own judgment, and cannot be required to do that which it regards as a violation of the constitution, on the ground solely that another department which, in the course of the discharge of its own duty, was called upon first to act, has reached the conclusion that it will not be violated by the proposed action. But setting aside now those cases to which we have referred, where from the nature of things, and perhaps from explicit terms of the constitution, the judgment of the department or officer acting must be final, we shall find the general rule to be, that when- 1 See Opinions of Judges, 49 Mo. 216.CHAP. Iv] CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 105 ever action is taken which may become the subject of a suit or pro- ceeding in court, any question of constitutional power or right that was involved in such action will be open for consideration in such suit or proceeding, and that as the courts must finally settle the particular controversy, so also will they finally determine the question of constitutional law.’ For the constitution of the State is higher in authority than any law, direction, or order made by any body or any officer assum- ing to act under it, since such body or officer must exercise a dele- gated authority, and one that must necessarily be subservient to the instrument by which the delegation is made. In any case of conflict the fundamental law must govern, and the act in conflict with it must be treated as of no legal validity. But no mode has yet been devised by which these questions of conflict are to be discussed and settled as abstract questions, and their determination is necessary or practicable only when public or private rights would be affected thereby. They then become the subject of legal controversy; and legal controversies must be settled by the courts.’ The courts have thus devolved upon them the duty to pass upon the con- stitutional validity, sometimes of legislative, and sometimes of Powell v. 1 Frink v. Darst, 14 Ill. 304, 58 Am. Porter, 5 Humph. 165; Dec. 575; Dugan v. Hollins, 13 Md. 149; Law v. O’Regan, 179 Mass. 107, 60 N. E. 397; Emerson v. Atwater, 7 Mich. 12; Boon v. Bowers, 30 Miss. 246, 64 Am. Dec. 159; Palmer v. Lawrence, 5 N. Y. 389; Bates v. Relyea, 23 Wend. 336; Goodell »v. Jackson, 20 Johns. 693; 11 Am. Dec. 351; Anderson v. Jackson, 16 Johns. 382, 8 Am. Dec. 330; Nelson v. Allen, 1 Yerg. 360; Lewis v. Thornton, 6 Munf. 87; Kneeland v. Milwaukee, 15 Wis. 454. 2Ogden v. Blackledge, 78 Cranch, 272, 2 L. ed. 276; Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 1 L. ed. 648; Calhoun v. McLendon, 42 Ga. 405; Sawyer v. Blakely, 2 Ga. App. 159, 58 S. E. 399; Durham v. Lewiston, 4 Me. 140; Lewis v. Webb, 3 Me. 326; King v. Dedham Bank, 15 Mass. 447, 8 Am. Dec. 112; Westinghausen v. People, 44 Mich. 265, 6 N. W. 641; In re Consolidated Gas Co., 190 N. Y. 350, 83 N. E. 299, 16 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 335; Greenough »v. Greenough, 11 Pa. St. 489, 51 Am. Dec. 567; Haley v. Philadelphia, 68 Pa. St. 45, 8 Am. Rep. 153; Governor v. State, 17 Tex. App. 345. 3 Governor v. Porter, 5 Humph. 165. The legislature cannot by statute de- fine the words of the constitution for the courts. Westinghausen v. People, 44 Mich. 265; Powell v. State, 17 Tex. App. 345. Compare People v. Super- visors of La Salle, 100 Ill. 495. And see post, p. 190, note. The legislative construction of a constitutional pro- vision must, however, be considered, the theory being that it entered into the legislative consideration of the act in question; but that construc- tion cannot be considered as final by the courts, and can have no effect against the plain mandate of the Con- stitution. Willett v. Weaver, 205 Ala. 268, 87 So. 601. The right to declare an act unconstitutional is purely a judicial power and cannot be exercised by the officers of the executive depart- ment under the guise of the observance of their oath of office to support the Constitution. State ex rel. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. State Board of Equalizers, 84 Fla. 592, 94 So. 681.106 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I executive acts. And as judicial tribunals have authority, not only to judge, but also to enforce their judgments, the result of a decision against the constitutionality of a legislative or executive act will be to render it invalid through the enforcement of the paramount law in the controversy which has raised the question.’ The same conclusion is reached by stating in consecutive order a few familiar maxims of the law. The administration of public justice is referred to the courts. To perform this duty, the first requisite is to ascertain the facts, and the next to determine the law applicable to such facts. The constitution is the fundamental law of the State, in opposition to which any other law, or any direction or order, must be inoperative and void. If, therefore, such other law, direction, or order seems to be applicable to the facts, but on comparison with the fundamental law the latter is found to be in conflict with it, the court, in declaring what the law of the case is, must necessarily determine its invalidity, and thereby in effect annul it.2. The right and the power of the courts to do this are so plain, 1“When laws conflict in actual cases, they [the courts] must decide which is the superior law, and which must yield; and as we have seen that, according to our principles, every offi- cer remains answerable for what he officially does, a citizen, believing that the law he enforces is incompatible with the superior law, the constitution, simply sues the officer before the proper court as having unlawfully aggrieved him in the particular case. The court, bound to do justice to every one, is bound also to decide this case as a simple case of conflicting laws. The court does not decide directly upon the doings of the legisla- ture. It simply decides for the case in hand, whether there actually are conflicting laws, and, if so, which is the higher law that demands obedi- ence, when both may not be obeyed at the same time. As, however, this decision becomes the leading decision for all future cases of the same import, until, indeed, proper and legitimate authority should reverse it, the ques- tion of constitutionality is virtually decided, and it is decided in a natural, easy, legitimate and safe manner, according to the principle of the supremacy of the law and the depend- ence of justice. It is one of the most interesting and important evolutions of the government of law, and one of the greatest protections of the citizen. It may well be called a very jewel of An- glican liberty and one of the best fruits of our political civilization.” Lieber, Civil Liberty and Self-Government. ““Whenever a law which the judge holds to be unconstitutional is argued in a tribunal of the United States, he may refuse to admit it as a rule; this power is the only one which is peculiar to the American magistrate, but it gives rise to immense political influ- ence. Few laws can escape the search- ing analysis; for there are few which are not prejudicial to some private interest or other, and none which may not be brought before a court of jus- tice by the choice of parties, or by the necessity of the case. But from the time that a judge has refused to apply any given law in a case, that law loses a portion of its moral sanction. The persons to whose interest it is prejudi- cial learn that means exist for evading its authority; and similar suits are multiplied until it becomes powerless. One of two alternatives must then be resorted to, —the people must alter the constitution, or the legislature must repeal the law.’”’ De Tocque- ville, Democracy in America, ec. 6. 2 “Tt is idle to say that the authority of each branch of the government isCHAP. Iv] and the duty is so generally CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 107 we may almost say universally — conceded, that we should not be justified in wearying the patience of the reader in quoting from the very numerous authorities upon the subject." defined and limited by the constitu- tion, if there be not an independent power able and willing to enforce the limitations. Experience proves that the constitution is thoughtlessly but habitually violated; and the sacrifice of individual rights is too remotely connected with the objects and con- tests of the masses to attract their attention. From its very position it is apparent that the conservative power is lodged in the judiciary, which, in the exercise of its undoubted rights, is bound to meet any emergency; else causes would be decided, not only by the legislature, but sometimes without hearing or evidence.”” Per Gibson, Ch. J., in De Chastellux v. Fairchild, 15 Pa, St. 18. “Nor will this conclusion, to use the language of one of our most eminent jurists and statesmen, by any means suppose a superiority of the judicial to the legislative power. It will only be supposing that the power of the people is superior to both; and that where the will of the legislature, declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that declared by the people in the constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the latter rather than the former. They ought to regulate their decisions by the fundamental laws rather than by those which are not fundamental. Neither would we, in doing this, be understood as impugning the honest intentions, or sacred regard to justice, which we most cheerfully accord to the legislature. But to be above error is to possess an entire attribute of the Deity; and to spurn its correction is to reduce to the same degraded level the most noble and the meanest of his works.’’ Bates »v. Kimball, 2 Chip. 77. See Bailey ». Gentry, 1 Mo. 164, 13 Am. Dec. 484. “Without the limitations and re- straints usually found in written con- stitutions, the government could have no elements of permanence and dura- bility; and the distribution of its powers, and the vesting their exercise in separate departments, would be an idle ceremony.’ Brown, J., in People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 532, 558. 11 Kent, 500-507; Marbury ». Madison, 1 Cranch, 137, 2 L. ed. 60; see post, p. 332; Webster on the Independence of the Judiciary, Works, Vol. III. p. 29. In this speech, Mr. Webster has forcibly set forth the necessity of leaving with the courts the power to enforce constitutional restric- tions. ‘‘It cannot be denied,” says he, “‘that one great object of written constitutions is, to keep the depart- ments of government as distinct as possible; and for this purpose to impose restraints designed to have that effect. And it is equally true that there is no department on which it is more necessary to impose restraints than upon the legislature. The tend- ency of things is almost always to aug- ment the power of that department in its relation to the judiciary. The judiciary is composed of few persons, and those not such as mix habitually in the pursuits and objects which most engage public men. They are not, or never should be, political men. They have often unpleasant duties to perform, and their conduct is often liable to be canvassed and censured where their reasons for it are not known or cannot be understood. The legislature holds the public purse. It fixes the compensation of all other departments; it applies as well as raises all revenue. It is a numerous body, and necessarily carries along with it a great force of public opinion. Its members are public men, in con- stant contact with one another and with their constituents. It would seem to be plain enough that, without constitutional provisions which should be fixed and certain, such a department, in case of excitement, would be able to encroach on the judiciary.” .. - “The constitution being the supreme law, it follows, of course, that everyCONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 108 [VoL. I Conclusiveness of Judicial Decisions. But a question which has arisen and been passed upon in one case may arise again in another, or it may present itself under different circumstances for the decision of some other department or officer of the government. It therefore becomes of the highest importance to know whether a principle once authoritatively de- clared is to be regarded as conclusively settled for the guidance, not only of the court declaring it, but of all courts and all depart- ments of the government; or whether, on the other hand, the decision settles the particular controversy only, so that a different decision may be possible, or, considering the diversity of human judgments, even probable, whenever in any new controversy other tribunals may be required to examine and decide upon the same question. In some cases and for some purposes the conclusiveness of a judicial determination is, beyond question, final and absolute. A decision once made in a particular controversy, by the highest court empowered to pass upon it, is conclusive upon the parties to the litigation and their privies, and they are not allowed after- wards to revive the controversy in a new proceeding for the purpose of raising the same or any other questions. ‘The matter in dispute has become res judicata, a thing definitely settled by judicial deci- sion; and the judgment of the court imports absolute verity. Whatever the question involved, — whether the interpretation of a private contract, the legality of an individual act, or the validity of a legislative enactment, — the rule of finality is the same. The controversy has been adjudged ; and, once finally passed upon, it is never to be renewed.! It must frequently happen, therefore, that acts.”” ‘‘Without this check, no cer- tain limitations could exist on the exercise of legislative power.’ See also, as to the dangers of legislative encroachments, De Tocqueville, De- mocracy in America, ec. 6; Story on Const. (4th ed.) § 532 and note. act of the legislature contrary to that law must be void. But who shall decide this question? Shall the legis- lature itself decide it? If so, then the constitution ceases to be a legal, and becomes only a moral restraint upon the legislature. If they, and they only, are to judge whether their acts be conformable to the constitution, then the constitution is admonitory or advisory only, not legally binding, because if the construction of it rests wholly with them, their discretion, in particular cases, may be in favor of very erroneous and dangerous con- structions. Hence the courts of law necessarily, when the case arises, must decide on the validity of particular The legislature, though possessing a larger share of power, no more repre- sents the sovereignty of the people than either of the other departments ; it derives its authority from the same high source. Bailey v. Philadelphia, &e.. Railroad Co., 4 Harr. 389; Whit- tington v. Polk, 1 H. & J. 236; McCau- ley v. Brooks, 16 Cal. 11. 1 Duchess of Kingston’s Case, 11 State Trials, 261, 2 Smith, Lead. Cas.CHAP. IV] 424; Young v. Black, 7 Cranch, 565, 3 L. ed. 440; Chapman v. Smith, 16 How. 114, 14 L. ed. 868; Aurora City v. West, 7 Wall. 82, 19 L. ed. 42; Tioga R. R. Co. v. Blossburg, &c. R. R. Co., 20 Wall. 137, 22 L. ed. 331; The Rio Grande, 23 Wall. 458, 23 L. ed. 159; Coffey v. United States, 116 U. S. 486; 29 L. ed. 684, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 437; United States v. Parker, 120 U. S. 89, 30 L. ed. 601, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 454; Wilson’s Exec. v. Deen, 121 U. S. 525, 30 L. ed. 980, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1004; Skelding v. Whitney, 3 Wend. 154; Etheredge v. Osborn, 12 Wend. 399; Hayes v. Reese, 34 Barb. 151; Hyatt v. Bates, 35 Barb. 308; Harris v. Harris, 36 Barb. 88; Maddox ». Graham, 2 Met. (Ky.) 56; Porter v. Hill, 9 Mass. 34; Norton v. Doherty, 3 Gray, 372; Thurston v. Thurston, 99 Mass. 39; Way »v. Lewis, 115 Mass. 26; Blackinton v. Blackinton, 113 Mass. 231; Witmer v. Schlatter, 15 S. & R. 150; Warner v. Scott, 39 Pa. St. 274; Verner v. Carson, 66 Pa. St. 440; Kerr v. Union Bank, 18 Md. 396; Whitehurst v. Rogers, 38 Md. 503; Wales v. Lyon, 2 Mich. 276; Prentiss v. Holbrook, 2 Mich. 372; Van Kleek v. Eggleston, 7 Mich. 511; Newberry v. Trowbridge, 13 Mich. 278; Barker v. Cleveland, 19 Mich. 230; Winslow v. Grindall, 2 Me. 64; Slade v. Slade, 58 Me. 157; Crandall v. James, 6 R. I. 144; Babcock ». Camp, 12 Ohio St. 11; Hawkins ». Jones, 19 Ohio St. 22; George ». Gillespie, 1 Greene (Iowa), 421; Taylor v. Chambers, 1 Iowa, 124; Wright v. Leclair, 3 Iowa, 221; Clark v. Sammons, 12 Iowa, 368; Whittaker v. Johnson Co., 12 Iowa, 595; Dwyer v. Goran, 29 Iowa, 126; Fairfield ». MecNany, 37 Iowa, 75; Eimer ». Richards, 25 Ill. 289; Wells v. McClen- ning, 23 ill. 409; Crow »v. Bowlby, 68 Ill. 23; Peay v. Duncan, 20 Ark. 85; Perrine v. Serrell, 30 N. J. 454; Weber v. Morris, &c., 36 N. J. 213; Fischil v. Cowan, 1 Blackf. 350; Denny ». Reynolds, 24 Ind. 248; Bates »v. Spooner, 45 Ind. 489; Davenport ». Barnett, 51 Ind. 329; Center Tp. ». Com’rs Marion Co., 110 Ind. 579, 10 N. E. 291; Warwick v. Underwood, 3 Head, 238; Jones v. Weathersbee, CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 109 4 Strob. 50; Hoover v. Mitchell, 25 Gratt. 387; Hungerford’s Appeal, 41 Conn. 322; Union R. R. Co. v. Traube, 59 Mo. 355; Perry v. Lewis, 49 Miss. 443; Harris v. Colquit, 44 Ga. 663; McCauley v. Hargroves, 48 Ga. 50, 15 Am. Rep. 660; Castellaw v. Guil- martin, 54 Ga. 299; Sloan v. Cooper, 54 Ga. 486; Doyle v. Hallam, 21 Minn. 515; Philpotts v. Blasdel, 10 Nev. 19; Case v. New Orleans, &c. R. R., 2 Woods, 236; Geary v. Simmons, 39 Cal. 224; Gee v. Williamson, 1 Port. (Ala.) 313, 27 Am. Dec. 628; Cannon v. Brame, 45 Ala. 262; Finney ». Boyd, 26 Wis. 366; Warner v. Trow, 36 Wis. 195; Schroers v. Fisk, 10 Col. 599, 16 Pac. 285; Ram on Legal Judgment, c. 14; Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Slaght, 205 U. S. 122, 51 L. ed. 738, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 442; Virginia- Carolina Chemical Co. v. Kirven, 215 U. S. 252, 54 L. ed. 179, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 78; Traxell v. Delaware, etc., R. Co., 227 U. S. 434, 57 L. ed. 586, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 274; Bates v. Bodie, 245 U.S. 520, 62 L. ed. 444, 38 Sup. Gt. Rep. 182, L. R: A. 1918 €, 355; Gordon v. Ware National Bank, 132 Fed. 444, 65 C. C. A. 580, 67 L. R. A. 550; Harrison v. Remington Paper Co., 140 Fed. 385, 72 C. C. A. 405, 5 Ann: Cas: 314, 3 Li. R. AV (qe Js:) 954; Pindel v. Holgate, 221 Fed. 342, 187 C. C. A. 158, Ann. Cas. 1916 C, 983; Quillian v. Henderson- Mizell Mercantile Co., 179 Ala. 548, 60 So. 820, 43 L. R. A. (N. s.) 950; Scott v. Scott, 83 Conn. 634, 78 Atl. 314, 21 Ann. Cas. 965; Thompson v. Hemenway, 218 Ill. 46, 75 N. E. 791, 109 Am. St. Rep. 239; Commercial Loan, etc., Co. v. Mallers, 242 Ill. 50, 89 N. E. 661, 134 Am. St. Rep. 306, 17 Ann. Cas. 224; South Park Com’rs v. Ward, 248 Ill. 299, 93 N. E. 910, 21 Ann. Cas. 127; Whitesell v. Strick- ler, 167 Ind. 602, 78 N. E. 845, 119 Am. St. Rep. 524; Graves v. Graves, 132 Iowa, 199, 109 N. W. 707, 10 L. BR. A. (n. s.) 216; Garden City »v. Merchants, etc., National Bank, 65 Kan. 345, 69 Pac. 325, 93 Am. St. Rep. 284; Elswick v. Matney, 182 Ky. 294, 116 S. W. 718, 136 Am. St. Rep. 180; Campbell v. Gello, 142 La. 1082, 78 So. 124, L. R. A. 1918 D,110 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. 1 a question of constitutional law will be decided in a private litigation, and the parties to the controversy, and all others subsequently acquiring rights under them, in the subject-matter of the suit, will thereby become absolutely and forever precluded from renewing the question in respect to the matter then involved. The rule of conclusiveness to this extent is one of the most inflexible principles of the law; insomuch that even if it were subsequently held by the courts that the decision in the particular case was erroneous, such holding would not authorize the reopening of the old controversy in order that the final conclusion might be applied thereto.! 251; Newhall v. Enterprise Min. Co., 205 Mass. 585, 91 N. E. 905, 137 Am. St. Rep. 461; Telford v. McGillis, 130 Minn. 397, 153 N. W. 758, Ann. Cas. 1916 E, 157; Leonard v. Schall, 132 Minn. 446, 157 N. W. 723, 4 A. L. R. 1166; Tax Lien Co. v. Schultze, 213 N. Y. 9, 106 N. E. 751, L. R. A. 1915 D, 1115, Ann. Cas. 1916 C, 636; Cook v. Conners, 215 N. Y. 175, 109 N. E. 78, L. R. A. 1916 A, 1074, Ann. Cas. 1917 A, 248; Sheridan v. McCor- mick, 39 N. D. 641, 168 N. W. 59, 8 A. L. R. 523; Corrugated Culvert Co. v. Simpson Tp., 51 Okla. 178, 151 Pace. 854, 4 A, L. R. 1170; White v. Ladd, 41 Oreg. 324, 68 Pac. 739, 93 Am. St. Rep. 732; Adams v. Church, 42 Oreg. 270, 70 Pac. 1037, 95 Am. St. Rep. 740, 59 L. R. A. 782; Yuen Suey »v. Fleshman, 65 Oreg. 606, 133 Pac. 803, Ann. Cas. 1915 A, 1072; Averbuch v. Averbuch, 80 Wash. 257, 141 Pac. 701; Ann. Cas. 1916 B, 873; Diamond Ice, etc., Co. v. Klock Produce Co., 103 Wash. 369, 174 Pac. 435,8 A. L. R. 685; Barbour v. Tompkins, 58 W. Va. WY G'S) 1D, 7OR/, B} We 12, AG (pb) 715; Huntzicker v. Crocker, 135 Wis. 38, 115 N. W. 340, 15 Ann. Cas. 444, A judgment, however, is conclusive as an estoppel, as to those facts only without the existence and proof of which it could not have been rendered ; and if it might have been given on any one of several grounds, it is conclusive between the parties as to neither of them. Lea v. Lea, 99 Mass. 493. And see Dickinson v. Hayes, 31 Conn. 417; Church v. Chapin, 35 Vt. 223; Packet Co. v. Sickles, 5 Wall. 580, 18 L. ed. 550; Spencer v. Dearth, 43 Vt. 98; Hill v. Morse, 61 Me. 541; Rus- sell v. Place, 94 U. S. 606, 24 L. ed. 214; De Sollar ». Hanscombe, 158 U. S. 216, 39 L. ed. 956, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 816; Horton v. Goodenough, 184 Cal. 451, 194 Pac. 34; Clifton »v. Meuser, 88 Kan. 408, 129 Pac. 159, 43 L. R. A. (v. s.) 124; Providence- Washington Ins. Co. v. Owens, (Tex.) 210 S. W. 558. A judicial sale by an administrator will pass title though the supposed intestate proves to be living. Rod- erigas v. Savings Institution, 63 N. Y. 460; s. c. 20 Am. Rep. 555; contra, Johnson v. Beazley, 65 Mo. 250; s. c. 27 Am. Rep. 285, and note. Death of the alleged intestate is a jurisdictional fact, and in the absence of such fact any administration upon his estate is null. Scott v. McNeal, 154 U. S. 34, 38 L. ed. 896, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1108; rev. 5 Wash. 309, 31 Pac. 873, 34 Am. St. 863. Many authorities are cited in 154 U. S. at page 43, 38 L. ed. 900. 1 McLean v. Hugarin, 13 Johns. 184; Morgan v. Plumb, 9 Wend. 287; Wilder v. Case, 16 Wend. 583; Baker v. Rand, 13 Barb. 152; Kelley v. Pike, 5 Cush. 484; Hart v. Jewett, 11 Iowa, 276; Colburn v. Woodworth, 31 Barb. 381; Newberry v. Trowbridge, 13 Mich. 278; Skeldin v. Whitney, 3 Wend. 154; Brockway v. Kinney, 2 Johns. 210; Platner v. Best, 11 Johns. 530; Phillips v. Berick, 16 Johns. 136; Page v. Fowler, 37 Cal. 100; Howison v. Weeden, 77 Va. 704; Fourniquet v. Perkins, 7 How. 160, 12 L. ed. 650; Gordon v. Ware National Bank, 65 C. C. A. 580, 182 Fed. 444, 67 L. R. A. 550; Lamb v. Wahlenmaier, 144 Cal. 91, 77 Pac. 765, 103 Am. St. Rep.111 CHAP. Iv] CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS But if important principles of constitutional law can be thus disposed of in suits involving only private rights, and when private individuals and their counsel alone are heard, it becomes of interest to know how far, if at all, other individuals and the public at large are affected by the decision. And here it will be discovered that quite a different rule prevails, and that a judicial decision has no such force of absolute conclusiveness as to other parties as it is allowed to possess between the parties to the litigation in which the decision has been made, and those who have succeeded to their rights. A party is concluded by a judgment against him from disput- ing its correctness, so far as the point directly involved in the case was concerned, whether the reasons upon which it was based were sound or not, and even if no reasons were given therefor. And if the parties themselves are concluded, so also should be all those who, since the decision, claim to have acquired interests in the subject-matter of the judgment from or under the parties, as personal representatives, heirs-at-law, donees, or purchasers, and who are therefore considered in the law as privies.’ But if strangers who have no interest in that subject-matter are to be in like manner concluded, because their controversies are supposed to involve the same question of law, we shall not only be forced into a series of endless inquiries, often resulting in little satisfaction, in order to ascertain whether the question is the same, but we shall also be met by the query, whether we are not concluding parties by decisions which others have obtained in fictitious controversies and by collusion, or have suffered to pass without sufficient con- sideration and discussion, and which might perhaps have been Alderding v. Allison, 170 Ind. 252, 83 N. W. 1006, 127 Am. St. Rep. 363; Kaler v. Puget Sound Bridge, etc., Co., 72 Wash. 497, 130 Pac. 894, 20 A. L. R. 674. But see Barton v. Thompson, 56 Iowa, 571, 9 N. W. 899. 1 The question whether a judgment, 66; Irvin v. Spratlin, 127 Ga. 240, 52 S. E. 1037, 9 Ann. Cas. 341; People ex rel. First National Bank v. Russel, 283 Ill. 520, 119 N. E. 617; Cain ». Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 123 Ky. 59, 95 S. W. 622, 124 Am. St. Rep. 313; Meisenheimer v. Meisenheimer, 55 Wash. 32, 104 Pac. 159, 133 Am. St. Rep. 1005. The rule laid down becomes the law of the case. Bibb v. Bibb, 79 Ala. 437; Weare v. Dearing, 60 N. H. 56; Pittsburgh, &c. Ry. Co. y. Hixon, 110 Ind. 225, 11 N. E. 285; Heinlein v. Martin, 59 Cal. 181; Frankland v. Cassaday, 62 Texas, 418; Adams Co. v. Burlington & M. R. R. Co., 55 Iowa, 94, 7 N. W. 471; Westfall ». Wait, 165 Ind. 353, 73 N. E. 1089, 6 Ann. Cas. 788; by force of its recitals, shall operate as a technical estoppel, or whether it shall operate as a bar only after the proper parol evidence shall have been given to identify the subject of litiga- tion, is one which our subject does not require us to discuss. The cases are examined fully and with discrimina- tion in Robinson’s Practice, Vol. VI., and are also discussed in Bigelow on Estoppel.112 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I given otherwise had other parties had an opportunity of being heard. We have already seen that the force of a judgment does not depend upon the reasons given therefor, or upon the circumstance that any were or were not given. If there were, they may have covered portions of the controversy only, or they may have had such reference to facts peculiar to that case, that in any other controversy, though somewhat similar in its facts, and apparently resembling it in its legal bearings, grave doubts might arise whether it ought to fall within the same general principle. If one judgment were absolutely to conclude the parties to any similar controversy, we ought at least to be able to look into the judicial mind, in order that we might ascertain of a surety that all those facts which should influence the questions of law were substantially the same in each, and we ought also to be able to see that the first litigation was conducted in entire good faith, and that every consideration was presented to the court which could properly have weight in the construction and application of the law. All these things, however, are manifestly impossible; and the law therefore wisely excludes judgments from being used to the prejudice of strangers to the controversy, and restricts their conclusiveness to the parties thereto and their privies."_ Even parties and privies are bound only so 1 Burrill v. West, 2 N. H. 190; Dunlevy, 241 U. S. 518, 60 L. ed. Davis v. Wood, 1 Wheat. 6, 4 L. ed. 22; Jackson v. Vedder, 3 Johns. 8; Case v. Reeve, 14 Johns. 79; Alexander v. Taylor, 4 Denio, 302; Van Bokkelin v. Ingersoll, 5 Wend. 315; Smith ». Ballantyne, 10 Paige, 101; Orphan House v. Lawrence, 11 Paige, 80; Thomas v. Hubbell, 15 N. Y. 405; Masten v. Olcott, 101 N. Y. 152, 4 N. BH. 274; Wood v. Stephen, 1 Serg. & R. 175; Peterson v. Lothrop, 34 Pa. St. 223; Twambly v. Henley, 4 Mass. 441; Este v. Strong, 2 Ohio, 402; Cowles v. Harts, 3 Conn. 516; Floyd v. Mintsey, 5 Rich. 361; Rig- gin’s Ex’rs v. Brown, 12 Ga. 271; Persons v. Jones, 12 Ga. 371; Buck- ingham v. Ludlum, 37 N. J. Eq. 137; Scates v. King, 110 Ill. 456; Leslie v. Bonte, 130 Ill. 498, 22 N. E. 594; Tiffany v. Stewart, 60 Iowa, 207, 14 N. W. 241; Lord v. Wilcox, 99 Ind. 491; Pardee v. Aldridge, 189 U. S. 429, 47 L. ed. 883, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 514; G.& C. Merriam Co. ». Saalfield, 241 U.S. 22, 60 L. ed. 868, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 477; New York L. Ins. Co. v. 1140, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 613; Harnage v. Martin, 242 U.S. 386, 61 L. ed. 382, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 148; Baker v. Baker, 242 U.S. 394, 61 L. ed. 386, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 152; United States v. Cali- fornia Bridge, etc., Co., 245 U. S, 337, 62 L. ed. 332, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 91; Arkansas v. Tennessee, 246 U. S. 158, 62 L. ed. 638, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 301, L. R. A. 1918 D, 258; Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Newport, 247 U. S. 464, 62 L. ed. 1215, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 566; Gratiot County State Bank ». John- son, 249 U. S. 246, 63 L. ed. 587, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 263; Sage v. United States, 250 U.S. 338, 63 L. ed. 828, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 415; Privett v. United States, 256 U. S. 201, 65 L. ed. 889, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 455; Elmore, etc., Co. v. Henderson-Mizell Mercantile Co., 179 Ala. 548, 60 So. 820, 43 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 950; Hx parte Logan, 185 Ala. 5255164 Sos; 570) 51 sR Ae (N. Ss.) 1068, Ann. Cas. 1916 C, 405; Eldred v. Johnson, 75 Ark. 1, 86S. W. 670, 112 Am. St. Rep. 17, 69 L. R. A. 823, 5 Ann. Cas. 521; Albie v. Jones,CHAP. IV] CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 113 far as regards the subject-matter then involved, and would be at liberty to raise the same questions anew in a distinct controversy affecting some distinct subject-matter.’ [Thus a judgment based 82 Ark. 414, 102 S. W. 222, 12 Ann. Cas. 433; Chapman v. Moore, 151 Cal. 509, 91 Pac. 324, 121 Am. St. Rep. 130; Dundee Naval Stores Co. ». McDowell, 65 Fla. 15, 61 So. 108, Ann. Cas. 1915. A, 387; In re Sharp, 15 Idaho, 120, 96 Pac. 563, 18 L. R. A. (x. s.) 886; Thompson ». Maloney, 199 Ill. 276, 65 N. E. 236, 93 Am. St. Rep. 133; People v. Amos, 246 Tu. 299, 92 N. E. 857, 138 Am. St. Rep. 239; Jordan v. Jordan, 274 Ill. 251, 113 N. E. 631, L. R. A. 1917 D, 563; Buchan v. German American Land Co., 180 Iowa, 911, 164 N. W. 119, L. R. A. 1918 A, 84; Macedonia State Bank v. Graham, 198 Iowa, 12, 199 N. W. 248, 34 A. L. R. 148; Henry ». Missouri, etc., R. Co., 98 Kan. 567, 158 Pac. 857, Ann. Cas. 1918 E, 1094; Henderson County »v. Henderson Bridge Co., 116 Ky. 164, 75S. W. 239, 105 Am. St. Rep. 197; Rosenberg ». Dahl, 162 Ky. 92, 172 S. W. 113, Ann. Cas. 1916 E, 1110; Jones »v. Caldwell, 176 Ky. 15, 195 S. W. 122, oR. A 1918))B) 50); Burchett jv: Blackburne, 198 Ky. 304, 248 S. W. 853, 34 A. L. R. 1425; Lumpkin v. Lumpkin, 108 Md. 470, 70 Atl. 238, 25L. R.A. (N.s.) 1063; Old Dominion Copper Min., etc., Co. v. Bigelow, 203 Mass. 159, 89 N. E. 193, 40 L. R. A. (x. s.) 314, affirmed 225 U.S. 111, 56 L. ed. 1009, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 641, Ann. Cas. 1913 E, 875; McGillway v. Employers’ Liability Assur. Corp., 214 Mass. 484, 102 N. E. 77, 46 L. R. A. (n. s.) 110; Minnesota Debenture Co. v. Johnson, 94 Minn. 150, 102 N. W. 381, 110 Am. St. Rep. 354; Henry v. White, 123 Minn. 182, 143 N. W. 324, L. R. A. 1916 D, 4; Tel- ford v. McGillis, 130 Minn. 397, 153 N. W. 758, Ann. Cas. 1916 E, 157; Butte Land, etc., Co. v. Merriman, 32 Mont. 402, 80 Pac. 675, 108 Am. St. Rep. 590; Westminster National Bank v. New England Electrical Works, 73 N. H. 465, 62 Atl. 971, 111 Am. St. Rep. 637, 3 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 551; Ludy v. Larsen, 78 N. J. Eq. VOL. I—8 237, 19 Atle 68a od) laa Rave (Ness) 957; Philadelphia F. Ass’n v. Wells, 84 .N. J. Eq. 484, 94 Atl. 619, L. R. A. 1916 A, 1280, Ann. Cas. 1917 A, 1296; Fults v. Munro, 202 N. Y. 34, 95 N. E. 23, 37 L. R. A. (N. s.) 600, Ann. Cas. 1912 D, 870; Gadsden v. Crafts, 175 INE ©2358: 95) Ss Hs GLON sii Renae 1918 E, 226; Corrugated Culvert Co. v. Simpson Tp., 51 Okla. 178, 151 Pace. 854, 4 A. L. R. 1170; Dale v. Marvin, 76 Oreg. 528, 148 Pac. 1116, Ann. Cas. 1917 © 557; Cope) ow Rayne; iit Tenn. 128, 76 S. W. 820, 102 Am. St. Rep. 746; Larsen v. Gasberg, 30 Utah, 470, 86 Pac. 412, 116 Am. St. Rep. 859; Coe v. Wormell, 88 Wash. 119, 152 Pac. 716, Ann. Cas. 1917 C, 679; Smith v. White, 63 W. Va. 472, 60 S. E. 404, 14 L. R. A. (. s.) 530; Blake v. O’Neal, 63 W. Va. 483, 61 S. Bb. 410, 16 L. R. A: (w. s.)) 1147; Grant v. Swank, 74 W. Va. 93, 8158. E. 967, L. R. A. 1915 B, 881, Ann. Cas. 1917 C, 286; Rowell v. Smith, 123 Wis. 510, 102 N. W. 1, 3 Ann. Cas. 773. Compare Benedict v. Smith, 48 Mich. 593, 12 N. W. 866; Howison v. Weeden, 77 Va. 704; Robinson’s Practice, Vol. VII. 134 to 156; Bige- low on Estoppel, 46 e¢ seq. 1Van Alstine v. Railroad Co., 34 Barb. 28; Taylor v. McCrackin, 2 Blackf. 260; Cook v. Vimont, 6 T. B. Monr. 284; Virginia-Carolina Chemi- cal Co. v. Kirven, 215 U. 8. 252, 54 L. ed. 179, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 78; Rad- ford v. Myers, 231 U.S. 725, 58 L. ed. 454, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 249; George A. Fuller Co. v. Otis Elevator Co., 245 U. S. 489, 62 L. ed. 422, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 180; Southern Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 63 L. ed. 1099, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 533; Harrison v. Reming- ton Paper Co., 140 Fed. 385, 72 Cxc: A. 405, 3 L. R. A. (WN. s.) 954, 5 Ann. Cas. 314; Water, Light, etc., Co. »v. Hutchinson, 160 Fed. 41, 90 C. C. A. 547, 19 L. R. A. (w. s.) 219; Quillian ». Henderson-Mizell Mercantile Co., 179 Ala. 548, 60 So. 820, 43 L. R. A. (n. s.) 950; Ha parte Logan, 185 Ala.114 525, 64 So. 570, 51 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 1068, Ann. Cas. 1916 C, 405; Scott v. Scott, 83 Conn. 634, 78 Atl. 314, 21 Ann. Cas. 965; Draper v. Medlock, 122 Ga. 234, 50S. E. 118, 69 L. R. A. 483, 2 Ann. Cas. 650; Rew v. Inde- pendent School Dist., 125 Iowa, 28, 98 N. W. 802, 106 Am. St. Rep. 282; McAdow v. Kansas City Western R. Co., 96 Kan. 423, 151 Pac. 1113, L. R. A. 1917 B, 1158; People v. Detroit, etc., Ferry Co., 187 Mich. 177, 153 N. W. 799, Ann. Cas. 1918 B, 170; Major v. Owen, 126 Minn. 1, 147 N. W. 662, Ann. Cas. 1915 D, 589; Leonard v. Schall, 182 Minn. 446, 157 N. W. 723, 4 A. L. R. 1166; Orr v. Bennett, 135 Minn. 443, 161 N. W. 165, 4 A. L. R. 1896; Eminent Household, etc. »v. Bunch, 115 Miss. 512, 76 So. 540, Ann. Cas. 1918 C, 110; Tax Lien Co. v. Schultze, 213 N. Y. 9, 106 N. E. 751, L. R. A. 1915 D, 1115, Ann. Cas. 1916 C, 636; Murphy ». John Hoffman Co., 215 N. Y. 185, 109 N. E. 101, L. R. A. 1916 A, 634; La Follett v. Mitchell, 42 Oreg. 465, 69 Pac. 916, 95 Am. St. Rep. 780; Ruckman v. Union R. Co., 45 Oreg. 578, 78 Pac. 748, 69 L. R. A. 480; Macan v. Scandinavia Belting Co., 264 Pa. St. 384, 107 Atl. 750, 5 A. L. R. 1502; In re Clifford, 37 Wash. 460, 79 Pac. 1001, 107 Am. St. Rep. 819; Pasco v. Pacific Coast Casualty Co., 101 Wash. 496, 172 Pac. 566, L. R. A. 1918 E, 811; Diamond Ice, etc., Co. v. Klock Produce Co., 103 Wash. 369, 174 Pac. 485, 8 A. L. R. 685; Central Banking, etc., Co. v. United States Fidelity, ete., Co., 73 W. Va. 197, 80 a Hie 121 ole das Re VAC (Ne s:)) (797 Pereles v. Gross, 126 Wis. 122, 105 N. W. 217, 110 Am. St. Rep. 901; Jn re Ryan, 157 Wis. 576, 147 N. W. 993, L. R. A. 1917 A, 448, 1916 D, 840. If certain facts were not necessarily included in the issue, a party is not concluded by the judgment as to them. Davis v. Davis, 65 Miss. 498, 4 So. 554; Doonan v. Glynn, 28 W. Va. 715; Lorillard v. Clyde, 99 N. Y. 196, 1 N. E. 614; Belden v. State, 103 N. Y. 1,8 N. E. 363; Umlauf v. Um- lauf, 117 Ill. 580, 6 N. E. 455; Con- cha v. Concha, L. R. 11 App. Cas. 541; Rushville ». Rushville Natural CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I Gas Co., 164 Ind. 162, 73 N. E. 87, 3 Ann. Cas. 86. Where the entry of judgment in an action involving several issues of fact recites a finding upon one of such issues that compels a judgment for the defendant, and is silent as to the rest, there is no presumption that they have been passed upon, and in the absence of some further showing they will be held open to inquiry in future litiga- tion between the same parties, based upon a different cause of action. Hud- son v. Remington Paper Co., 71 Kan. 300, 80 Pac. 568, 6 Ann. Cas. 103. If the second action is upon a differ- ent claim or demand from that in which the judgment pleaded was rendered, the judgment is an estoppel only as to those matters in issue or points controverted, upon the determi- nation of which the finding or verdict was rendered. Bates v. Bodie, 245 U. S. 520, 62 L. ed. 444, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 182, L. R. A. 1918 C, 355. If the second action involves the same property and more, the judgment is conclusive only as to those issues which were actually tried and deter- mined. Foye v. Patch, 132 Mass. 105. See Metcalf v. Gilmore, 63 N. H. 174. But if the facts were within the issue, the judgment is con- clusive as to them, although the ques- tion raised in the second action was not actually litigated. Harmon v. Audi- tor, 123 Ill. 123, 13 N. E. 161; Fair- child v. Lynch, 99 N. Y. 359, 2 N. E. 20; Trayhern v. Colburn, 66 Md. 277, 7 Atl. 459; Kennedy v. McCarthy, 73 Ga. 346; Shenandoah V. R. R. Co. v. Griffith, 76 Va. 913; Cleveland »v. Creviston, 93 Ind. 31; Chouteau ». Gibson, 76 Mo. 88. See also Okla- homa v. Texas, 256 U.S. 70, 65 L. ed. 831, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 420; Morgan ». Kendrick, 91 Ark. 394, 121 S. W. 278, 134 Am. St. Rep. 78; Hilton v. Stew- art, 15 Idaho, 150, 96 Pac. 579, 128 Am. St. Rep. 48; Brock v. Boyd, 211 Ill. 290, 71 N. E. 995, 103 Am. St. Rep. 200; Teel v. Dunnihoo, 230 Ill. 476, 82 N. E. 844, 120 Am. St. Rep. 319; Baumhoff v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 205 Mo. 248, 104 S. W. 5, 120 Am. St. Rep. 745; Chicago, etce., R. Co. v. Cass County, 72 Neb. 489, 101CHAP. IV] CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 115 on a statute subsequently held to be unconstitutional is not res judicata when the question is again presented after the statute has been declared void, and in respect to another subject-matter though involving the same right.! And, as a general rule, parties to a judgment are not bound by it in subsequent controversies between each other unless they were adversaries in the action wherein the judgment was rendered.’ All judgments, however, are supposed to apply the existing law to the facts of the case; and the reasons which are sufficient to influence the court to a particular conclusion in one case ought to be sufficient to bring it or any other court to the same conclusion in all other like cases where no modification of the law has inter- vened. There would thus be uniform rules for the administration of justice, and the same measure that is meted out to one would be received by all others. And even if the same or any other court, in a subsequent case, should be in doubt concerning the correctness of the decision which has been made, there are consequences of a very grave character to be contemplated and weighed before the experiment of disregarding it should be ventured upon. That state of things, when judicial decisions conflict, so that a citizen is always at a loss in regard to his rights and his duties, is a very serious evil; and the alternative of accepting adjudged cases as precedents in future controversies resting upon analogous facts, and brought within the same reasons, is obviously preferable. Precedents, therefore, become important, and counsel are allowed and expected to call the attention of the court to them, not as con- cluding controversies, but as guides to the judicial mind. Chan- cellor Kent says: “A solemn decision upon a point of law arising in any given case becomes an authority in a like case, because it is the highest evidence which we can have of the law applicable to the subject, and the judges are bound to follow that decision so long as it stands unreversed, unless it can be shown that the law was misunderstood or misapplied in that particular case. If N. W. 11, 117 Am. St. Rep. 806; 198 Iowa, 564, 200 N. W. 8, 36 A. L. R. Richmond »v. Sitterding, 101 Va. 354, 486, holding that a judgment based on 43 S. E. 562, 99 Am. St. Rep. 878, 65 a statute subsequently held to be L. R. A. 445; Roller v. Murray, 71 unconstitutional is not res judicata in a W. Va. 161, 76 S. E. 172, L. R. A. later case involving the same right to 1915 F, 984, Ann. Cas. 1914 B, 1139. a tax exemption, but relating to the See, for a further discussion of this tax of a subsequent year. doctrine, its meaning and extent, 2Keagy v. Wellington Nat. Bank, Spencer v. Dearth, 43 Vt. 98, and the 12 Okla. 33, 69 Pac. 811; Snyder »v. very full and exhaustive discussion in Marken, 116 Wash. 270, 199 Pac. 302, Robinson’s Practice, Vol. VII. 22 A. L. R. 1272. 1 Security Savings Bank ». Connell,116 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. 1 a decision has been made upon solemn argument and mature deliberation, the presumption is in favor of its correctness, and the community have a right to regard it as a just declaration or exposition of the law, and to regulate their actions and contracts by it. It would therefore be extremely inconvenient to the public if precedents were not duly regarded, and implicitly followed. It is by the notoriety and stability of such rules that professional men can give safe advice to those who consult them, and people in general can venture to buy and trust, and to deal with each other. If judicial decisions were to be lightly disregarded, we should disturb and unsettle the great landmarks of property. When a rule has once been deliberately adopted and declared, it ought not to be disturbed unless by a court of appeal or review, and never by the same court, except for very urgent reasons, and upon a clear manifestation of error; and if the practice were other- wise, it would be leaving us in a perplexing uncertainty as to the law.! 11 Kent, 475. And see Cro. Jac. 527; Rex v. Cox, 2 Burr. 787; King v. Younger, 5 T. R. 450; Goodtitle v. Otway, 7 T. R. 416; Selby v. Bardons, 3 B. & Ad. 17; Fletcher v. Lord Somers, 3 Bing. 588; Hammond ». Anderson, 4 Bos. & P. 69; Lewis v. Thornton, 6 Munf. 94; Dugan v. Hollins, 13 Md. 149; Anderson ». Jackson, 16 Johns. 382; Goodell ». Jackson, 20 Johns. 693; Bates v. Relyea, 23 Wend. 336; Emerson », Atwater, 7 Mich. 12; Nelson v. Allen, 1 Yerg. 360; Palmer ». Lawrence, 5 N. Y. 389; Kneeland »v. Milwaukee, 15 Wis. 454; Boon ». Bowers, 30 Miss. 246; Frink », Darst, 14 Il. 304; Broom’s Maxims, 109; Geohe- gan v. Union El. R. Co., 266 IIl. 482, 107 N. E. 786, Ann. Cas. 1916 B, 762; Moore-Mansfield Gonstr. Co. v. Indi- anapolis, etc., R. Co., 179 Ind. 356, 101 N. EH. 296, 44 L. R. A. (n. s.) 816, Ann. Cas. 1915 D, 917; Weaver ». Chicago First National Bank, 76 Kan. 540, 94 Pac. 273, 123 Am. St. Rep. 155, 16 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 110; Oliver Co. v. Louisville Realty Co., 156 Ky. 628, 161 S. W. 570, 51 L. R. A. (wn. S.) 293; Mabardy »v. McHugh, 202 Mass. 148, 88 N. E. 894, 132 Am. St. Rep. 484. 23 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 487, 16 Ann. Cas. 500; Hill v. Atlantic, etc., R. Co., 143 N. C. 539, 55 S. E. 854,9 L. R.A. (n. Ss.) 606 ; Mason »v. A. E. Nelson Cotton Co., 148 N. C. 492 62 S. E. 625, 128 Am. St. Rep. 635, 18 L. R. A. (n. s.) 1221. Dr. Lieber thinks the doctrine of the precedent especially valuable in a free country. “Liberty and steady progression require the principle of the precedent in all spheres. It is one of the roots with which the tree of liberty fastens in the soil of real life, and through which it receives the sap of fresh existence. It is the weapon by which interference is warded off. The principle of the precedent is emi- nently philosophical. The English Constitution would not have developed itself without it. What is called the English Constitution consists of the fundamentals of the British polity, laid down in custom, precedent, deci- sions, and statutes; and the common law in it is a far greater portion than the statute law. The English Consti- tution is chiefly a common-law con- stitution; and this reflex of a continu- Ous society in a continuous law is more truly philosophical than the theoretic and systematic, but lifeless, constitu- tions of recent France.’ Ciy. Lib. and Self-Goy. See also his chapter on precedents in the Hermeneutics. In Nelson v. Allen, 1 Yerg. 360, 376, where the constitutionality of the “Betterment Law” came under con- Se roeCHAP. Iv] sideration, the court (White, J.) say: “Whatever might be my own opinion upon this question, not to assent to its settlement now, after two solemn decisions of this court, the last made upwards of fourteen years ago, and not only no opposing decision, but no attempt even by any case, during all this time, to call the point again in controversy, forming a complete ac- quiescence, would be, at the least, in- consistent, perhaps mischievous, and uncalled for by a correct discharge of official duty. Much respect has al- ways been paid to the contemporane- ous construction of statutes, and a forbidding caution hath always accom- panied any approach towards unset- tling it, dictated, no doubt, by easily foreseen consequences attending a sudden change of a rule of property, necessarily introductory at least of confusion, increased litigation, and the disturbance of the peace of society. The most able judges and the greatest names on the bench have held this view of the subject, and occasionally expressed themselves to that effect, either tacitly or openly, intimating that if they had held a part in the first construction they would have been of a different opinion; but the construc- tion having been made, they give their assent thereto. Thus Lord Ellen- borough, in 2 East, 302, remarks: ‘I think it is better to abide by that determination, than to introduce un- certainty into this branch of the law, it being often more important to have the rule settled, than to determine what it shall be. I am not, however, convinced by the reasoning in this case, and if the point were new I should think otherwise.’ Lord Mansfield, in 1 Burr. 419, says: ‘Where solemn determinations acquiesced under had settled precise cases and a rule of property, they ought, for the sake of certainty, to be observed, as if they had originally formed a part of the text of the statute.’ And Sir James Mansfield, in 4 B. & P. 69, says: ‘T do not know how to distinguish this from the case before decided in the court. It is of greater consequence that the law should be as uniform as possible, than that the equitable claim CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 117 of an individual should be attended to.’”? And see People v. Cicotte, 16 Mich. 283. In Geohegan v. Union El. R. Co., 266 Ill. 482, 107 N. E. 786, Ann. Cas. 1916 B, 762, the court said: “The law can only be known if fixed and estab- lished rules are adhered to consistently. Manifestly, not only the interests of the State but of the individual, as well as the proper administration of justice, require that there shall be settled rules in the interpretation of the law, otherwise we would have ‘confusion worse confounded.’ ‘After repeated decisions on the same point by this court, the maxim stare decisis should prevail; it being for the best interests of society that there should be some permanency in judicial decisions, so that the law may be known, and, when known, pursued and obeyed. It should be a shield and a guide, and not a snare, for those who may come within its operation.’ Hopkins ». McCann, 19 Ill. 113.” In Mabardy v. McHugh, 202 Mass. 148, 88 N. E. 894, 132 Am. St. Rep. 484, 23 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 487, 16 Ann. Cas. 500, Justice Rugg, in delivering the opinion of the court, said: “It is highly desirable that laws for conduct in ordinary affairs, in themselves easy of comprehension and memory, when once established, should remain fast. The doctrine of stare decisis is as salu- tory as it is well recognized... . While perhaps it is more important as to far-reaching juridical principles that the court should be right, in the light of higher civilization, later and more careful examination of authori- ties, wider and more thorough dis- cussion and more mature reflection upon the policy of the law, than merely in harmony with previous decisions, Barden v. Northern Pacific R. R., 154 U. S. 288-322, 38 L. ed. 992, 14 Sup. Ct. 1030, it is nevertheless vital, that there be stability in the courts in adhering to decisions deliberately made after ample consideration. Par- ties should not be encouraged to seek re-examination of determined prin- ciples and speculate on a fluctuation of the law with every change in the expounders of it. As to many matters118 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I The doctrine of stare decisis, however, is only applicable, in its full force, within the territorial jurisdiction of the courts making the decisions, since there alone can such decisions be regarded as having established any rules. Rulings made under a similar legal system elsewhere may be cited and respected for their reasons, but are not necessarily to be accepted as guides, except in so far as those reasons commend themselves to the judicial mind.! Great Britain and the thirteen original States had each substantially the same system of common law originally, and a decision now by one of the higher courts of Great Britain as to what the common law is upon any point is certainly entitled to great respect in any of the States, though not necessarily to be accepted as binding authority any more than the decisions in any one of the other States upon the same point. It gives us the opinions of able judges as to what the law is, but its force as an authoritative declaration must be confined to the country for which the court sits and judges.2 But an English decision before the Revolution is in the direct line of authority; * of frequent occurrence, the establish- ment of some certain guide is of more significance than the precise form of the rule. It is likely that no positive rule of law can be laid down that will not at some time impinge with great apparent severity upon a morally innocent person. The law of gravita- tion acts indifferently upon the just and the unjust. A renewed declara- tion of law, that is already in force, supported by sound reason and not plainly wrong, in the long run prob- ably works out substantial justice, although it may seem harsh in its application to some particular case. These considerations are regarded as so weighty by the House of Lords that it cannot overrule any of its own deci- sions. London Street Tramways Co., Ltd. v. London County Council,[{1898] A. ©. 375.” Where an old constitution has been construed by the court, a new court after the adoption of a new constitu- tion will follow the old construction without regard to its own views. Emery v. Reed, 65 Cal. 351, 4 Pac. 200. How far a judgment rendered by a court concludes, notwithstanding it was one given under the law of neces- sity, in consequence of an equal divi- sion of the court, see Durant v. Essex Co., 7 Wall. 107, 19 L. ed. 154; s. c. 101 U.S. 555, 25 L. ed. 961; Hartman v. Greenhow, 102 U. S. 672, 26 L. ed. 271; Morse v. Goold, 11 N. Y. 281; Lyon v. Circuit Judge, 37 Mich. 377; and the cases collected in Northern R. R. v. Concord R. R., 50 N. H. 176. 1 Caldwell v. Gale, 11 Mich. 77; Koontz v. Nabb, 16 Md. 549; Nelson v. Goree, 34 Ala. 565; Jamison v. Bur- ton, 43 Iowa, 282; Morris v. Indi- anapolis, 177 Ind. 369, 94 N. E. 705, Ann. Cas. 1915 A, 65; Williams ». State, 81 N. H. 341, 125 Atl. 661, 39 A. L. R. 490; Gorrell v. Greensboro Water Supply Co., 124 N. C. 328, 32 S. E. 720, 70 Am. St. Rep. 598, 46 L. R. A. 513; Northeut v. Church, 135 Tenn. 541, 188 S. W. 220, Ann. Cas. 1918 B, 545. ? Dudrow v. King, 117 Md. 182, 83 Atl. 34, 39 L. R. A. (wn. s.) 955, Ann. Cas. 1913 E, 1258; Horace Waters & Co. v. Gerard, 189 N. Y. 302, 82 N. E. 143, 121 Am. St. Rep. 886, 24 L. R. A. (n. 5s.) 958, 12 Ann. Cas, 397; John- son v. Union Pacific Coal Co., 28 Utah, 46, 76 Pac. 1089, 67 L. R. A. 506. 8 “Hinglish decisions rendered prior to July 4, 1776, if they are clear and consistent, while they do not consti- tute a part of the common law, are usually considered conclusive evidence of what the common law is.” John-CHAP. IV] CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 119 and where a particular statute or clause of the constitution has been adopted in one State from the statutes or constitution of another, after a judicial construction has been given it in such last- mentioned State, it is but just to regard the construction as having been adopted, as well as the words; and all the mischiefs of disre- garding precedents would follow as legitimately here as in any other case. son v. Union Pacific Coal Co., 28 Utah, 46, 76 Pac. 1089, 67 L. R. A. 506. In Lasier v. Wright, 304 Ill. 130, 136 N. E. 545, 28 A. L. R. 674, the court said: ‘It has been the rule of this court to adopt the decisions of the English courts in laying down the rules of the common law, so far as they are applicable to conditions and usages in this country, and also in construing statutes taken from the mother country.” In Horace Waters & Co. v. Gerard, 189 N. Y. 302, 82 N. E. 143, 121 Am. St. Rep. 886, 24 L. R. A. (wn. s.) 958, 12 Ann. Cas. 397, the court said: ‘Where recognized printed reports of the English courts prior to 1775 show that the common law on any particular subject was by such case established and determined as therein stated, such reports are the best and highest evidence of such common law.” As the writ of error coram nobis originated and was long recognized in the common law and the sole recogni- tion given it in Indiana is by virtue of the adoption of the common law, it has been held in that State that its courts must be governed by the prece- dents established by the courts of Eng- land in relation to the writ, except where a change has been made by rul- ings of the Supreme Court of the State or by organic or statute law. Partlow v. State, 194 Ind. 172, 141 N. E. 513, 30 A. L. R. 1414. Compare Ketelsen v. Stilz, 184 Ind. 702, 111 N. E. 423, L. R. A. 1918 D, 303, Ann. Cas. 1918 A, 965. But in Williams v. Miles, 68 Neb. 463, 470, 94 N. W. 705, 96 N. W. 151, 110 Am. St. Rep. 431, 4 Ann. Cas. 306, 62 L. R. A. 383, the court said: “We do not believe that this court has ever understood that the legislature intended to petrify the common law, as embodied in judi- cial decisions at any one time, and set it up in such inflexible form as a rule of decision.’ See also Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255; Chilcott v. Hart, 23 Colo. 40, 45 Pac. 391. And in Vermont it has been held that precedents do not constitute the common law, but only serve to illustrate its principles; that statutes adopting it do not require adherence to the decisions of the Eng- lish courts even prior to the separation of the colonies, in case the court con- siders subsequent decisions, either in England or America, better expositions of the general principles of the common law. In re Heaton’s Estate, 89 Vt. 550, 96 Atl. 21, L. R. A. 1916 D, 201. In Florida it has been held that the English decisions rendered prior to the war of the Revolution are evidence of what the common law is; but in order to be binding in the State, these deci- sions must be clear and unequivocal. Ex parte Beville, 58 Fla. 170, 50 So. 685, 27 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 278, 19 Ann. Cas. 48. 1 Bond v. Appleton, 8 Mass. 472; Rutland v. Mendon, 1 Pick. 154; Commonwealth v. Hartnett, 3 Gray, 450; Turnpike Co. v. People, 9 Barb. 167; Campbell v. Quinlin, 4 Ill. 288; Little v. Smith, 5 Ill. 400; Rigg ». Wilton, 13 Il]. 15; Tyler v. Tyler, 19 Ill. 151; Fisher v. Deering, 60 Ill. 114; Langdon »v. Applegate, 5 Ind. 327; Clark v. Jeffersonville, &c. R. R. Co., 44 Ind. 248; Fall v. Hazelrigg, 45 Ind. 576; Ingraham v. Regan, 23 Miss. 213; Adams v. Field, 21 Vt. 256; Drennan v. People, 10 Mich. 169; Daniels v. Clegg, 28 Mich. 32; Harri- son v. Sager, 27 Mich. 476; Pangborn ». Westlake, 36 Iowa, 546; Attorney- General v. Brunst, 3 Wis. 787; Poert- ner v. Russell, 33 Wis. 193; Myrick »v. Hasey, 27 Me. 9; People v. Coleman, 4 Cal. 46; Bemis v. Becker, 1 Kan.120 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I [In the interpretation of a statute widely adopted by the states to the end of securing uniformity in a department of commercial law, great weight should be given to harmonious decisions of courts of other states."] It will of course sometimes happen that a court will find a former decision so unfounded in law, so unreasonable in its deductions, or so mischievous in its consequences, as to feel compelled to dis- regard it. Before doing so, however, it will be well to consider whether the point involved is such as to have become a rule of property, so that titles have been acquired in reliance upon it, and vested rights will be disturbed by any change; for in such a case it may be better that the correction of the error be left to the legislature, which can control its action so as to make it prospective only, and thus prevent unjust consequences.” 226; Walker v. Cincinnati, 21 Ohio St. 14; Hess v. Pegg, 7 Nev. 23; Freeze v. Tripp, 70 Ill. 496; In re Tuller, 79 Ill. 99; Ex parte Mathews, 52 Ala. 51; Danville v. Pace, 25 Gratt. 1; Bradbury v. Davis, 5 Col. 265; Lasier v. Wright, 304 Ill. 130, 136 N. E, 545, 28 A. L. R. 674; Rouse »v. Donovan, 104 Mich. 234, 62 N. W. 359, 53 Am. St. Rep. 457, 27 L. R. A. 577. But it does not necessarily follow that the prior decision construing the law must be inflexibly followed, since the circumstances in the State adopt- ing it may be so different as to require a different construction. Little ». Smith, 5 Ill. 400; Lessee of Gray v. Askew, 3 Ohio, 466; Jamison v, Bur- ton, 43 Iowa, 282. It has very properly been held that the legislature, by enacting, without material alteration, a statute which had been judicially expounded by the highest court of the State, must be presumed to have intended that the same words should be received in the new statute in the sense which had been attributed to them in the old. Grace v. McElroy, 1 Allen, 563; Cro- nan v. Cotting, 104 Mass. 245; Low v. Blanchard, 116 Mass. 272. It is proper to accept and follow the decisions of courts of another State upon the construction and valid- ity of their own statutes. Sidwell »v. Evans, 1 Pen. & W. 383; s. c. 21 Am. Dec. 387; Bank of Illinois v. Sloo, 16 La. 539, 35 Am. Dec. 223; Nashville, etc., Ry. v. Hubble, 140 Ga. 368, 78 S. E. 919, L. R. A. 1915 B, 1132. A constitutional provision derived from the common law and contained in other constitutions, which has re- ceived a settled construction by judi- cial decisions prior to its adoption, must be interpreted in the light of the common law and the general judicial acceptation of its meaning. Ez parte Bornee, 76 W. Va. 360, 85 S. E. 529, L. R. A. 1915 F, 1093. But in deter- mining whether a statute of a State is penal in the international sense, so as to deny jurisdiction to the courts of another State in which an action thereon is brought, such courts are not absolutely bound by the construc- tion placed upon such statute by the courts of the State which enacted it. Whitlow v. Nashville, ete., R. Co., 114 Tenn. 344, 84 S. W. 618, 68 L. R. A. 503. ‘Union Trust Co. v. McGinty, 212 Mass. 205, 98 N. E. 679, Ann. Cas. 1913 C, 525. 2 “The doctrine of stare decisis, like almost every other legal rule, is not without its exceptions. It does not apply to a case where it can be shown that the law has been misunderstood or misapplied, or where the former de- termination is evidently contrary to reason.” Rumsey v. New York, etc., R. Cos 1383eNe ¥. 79) 30 No WaGas 28 Am. St. Rep. 600, 15 L. R. A. 618. See also Arnold v. Knoxville, 115 Tenn.CHAP. IV] 195, 90 S. W. 469, 3 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 837, 5 Ann. Cas. 881; Rieter ». Grober, 173 Wis. 493, 181 N. W. 739, 18 A. L. R. 362. “While great consideration should be given to precedent, especially to one of long duration and general acceptance, it cannot be that a rule merely established by precedent is infallible. This would stay all prog- ress and forbid all development. If the rule established by precedent is highly technical and finds its origins in reasons which no longer exist, and the courts have from time to time found it necessary to make exceptions thereto to meet the needs and methods of doing business in modern times, it would seem that the courts should adapt their procedure to the age in which we live, and cease to follow a precedent for which they have always to apologize, and declare that it is highly technical and not justified either by reason or policy.” Whita- ker & Fowle v. Lane, 128 Va. 317, 104 Sib 2525 11 AL RR. 1157. Where the former decision has not become a rule of property, but per- tains merely to a question of practice, and the court did not have the aid of counsel to present both sides of the question before the basic decision was made, it may, if erroneous, be over- ruled and the proper practice adopted. Cain v. Miller, 109 Neb. 441, 191 N. W. 704, 30 A. L. R. 125. See also Spie- gel’s House Furnishing Co. v. Indus- trial Commission, 288 Ill. 422, 123 N. E. 606, 6 A. L. R. 540. ““Courts are not bound to perpetu- ate errors merely upon the ground that a previous erroneous decision has been rendered on a given question. If it is wrong, it should not be con- tinued, unless it has been so long the rule of action, and relied upon to such an extent, that greater injustice and injury will result by a reversal, though wrong, than to observe and follow it.” Calhoun Gold Min. Co. v. Ajax Gold Min. Co., 27 Colo. 1, 59 Pac. 607, 83 Ann. St. Rep. 17, 50 L. R. A. 209. See also Norton v. Randolph, 176 Ala. 381, 58 So. 283, 40 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 129, Ann. Cas. 1915 A, 714; Pitcock ». State, 91 Ark. 527, 121 S. W. 742, 134 CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 121 Am. St. Rep. 88; Prall v. Burckhartt, 299 Ill. 19, 182 N. E. 280, 18 A. L. R. 992; Weaver v. Chicago First National Bank, 76 Kan. 540, 94 Pac. 273, 123 Am. St. Rep. 155, 16 L. R. A. (w. s.) 110; Oliver Co. v. Louisville Realty Co., 156 Ky. 628, 161 S. W. 570,*51 L. R. A. (N. s.) 293; Foster v. Roberts, 142 Tenn. 350, 219 S. W. 729, 9 A. L. R. 481; State v. Mathews, 143 Tenn. 468, 226 S. W. 203, 13 A. L. R. 314; Mazzetti v. Armour, 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633, 48 L. R. A. (w. s.) 213, Ann. Cas. 1915 C, 140. “Tt is true that when a principle of law, doubtful in its character or uncer- tain in the subject-matter of its appli- cation, has been settled by a series of judicial decisions, and acquiesced in for a considerable time, and important rights and interests have become established under such decisions, courts will hesitate long before they will attempt to overturn the result so long established. But when it is apparently indifferent which of two or more rules is adopted, the one which shall have been adopted by judicial sanction will be adhered to, though it may not, at the moment, appear to be the preferable rule. But when a ques- tion involving important public or private rights, extending through all coming time, has been passed upon on a single occasion, and which decision can in no just sense be said to have been acquiesced in, it is not only the right, but the duty, of the court, when properly called upon, to re-examine the questions involved, and again sub- ject them to judicial scrutiny. We are by no means unmindful of the salutary tendency of the rule stare decisis, but at the same time we cannot be unmind- ful of the lessons furnished by our own consciousness, as well as by judicial history, of the liability to error and the advantages of review.” Per Smith J., Pratt v. Brown, 3 Wis. 603, 609. And see Kneeland v. Milwaukee, 15 Wis. 454; Taylor v. French, 19 Vt. 49; Bellows v. Parsons, 13 N. H. 256; Hannel v. Smith, 15 Ohio, 134; Day vy. Munson, 14 Ohio St. 488; Green Castle, &c. Co. v. State, 28 Ind. 382; Harrow v. Myers, 29 Ind. 469; Paul ». Davis, 100 Ind. 422; Burks ».122 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I [It is necessary to the application of the doctrine of stare decisis that there should be essential similarity in the facts of the two cases;' and in applying the doctrine, the decision asserted to be a precedent must be construed with reference to the facts under discussion.?] Whenever the case is such that judicial decisions which have been made are to be accepted as law, and followed by the courts in future cases, it is equally to be expected that they will be fol- lowed by other departments of the government also. Indeed, in the great majority of cases, the officers of other departments have no option; for the courts possess the power to enforce their construction of the law as well as to declare it; and a failure to accept and follow it in one case would only create a necessity for new litigation with similar result. Nevertheless, there are Hinton, 77 Va. 1; Mead v. McGraw, 19 Ohio St. 55; Linn v. Minor, 4 Nev. 462; Willis v. Owen, 43 Texas, 41, 48; Ram on Legal Judgment, c. 14, § 3; Quaker Realty Co. v. Labasse, 131 La. 996, 60 So. 661, Ann. Cas. 1914 A, 1073; Mason v. Nelson, 148 N. C. 492, 62 S. E. 625, 128 Am. St. Rep. 635, 18 L. R. A. (nN. 8.) 1221. “Common error” does not make law until sanctioned by a superior tribu- nal, and subsequently treated as law in business affairs. Ocean Beach Ass. v. Brinley, 34 N. J. Eq. 438. But it has been said: ‘‘After an erroneous decision touching rights of property has been followed thirty or forty years, and even a much less time, the courts cannot retrace their steps without committing a new error nearly as great as the one at the first.”” Bronson, J., in Sparrow v. Kingman, 1 N. Y. 246, 260. See also Emerson v. Atwater, 7 Mich. 12; Rothschild v. Grix, 31 Mich. 150; Loeb v. Mathis, 37 Ind. 306; Pond »v. Irwin, 113 Ind. 243, 15 N. E. Rep. 272; Paulson v. Portland, 16 Oreg. 450, 19 Pac. Rep. 450; Adams Co. v. Burlington & M. R. R. Co., 55 Iowa, 94, 2 N. W. 1054; Davidson »v. Briggs, 61 Iowa, 309, 7 N. W. 471; State v. Whitworth, 8 Lea, 594; Pitcock v. State, 91 Ark. 527, 121S. W. 742, 134 Am. St. Rep. 88; Calhoun Gold Min. Co. v. Ajax Gold Min. Co., 27 Colo. 1, 59 Pac. 607, 83 Am. St. Rep. 17, 50 L. R. A. 209; Geohegan v. Union El. R. Co., 262 Ill. 482, 107 N. E. 786, Ann. Cas. 1916 B, 762; Oliver Co. v. Louisville Realty Co., 156 Ky. 628, 161 S. W. 570, 51 L. R. A. (n. s.) 293; State v. Nashville Base- ball Club, 127 Tenn. 292, 154 S. W. 1151, Ann. Cas. 1914 B, 1248; Rieter v. Grober, 173 Wis. 498, 181 N. W. 739, 18 A. L. R. 362. In Missouri it is a usual rule of deci- sion (subject to exceptions) to consider constitutional questions once decided as no longer open. Greene County v. Lydy, 263 Mo. 77, 172 S. W. 376, Ann. Cas. 1917 C, 274. 1 Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 274 Pa. St. 448, 118 Atl. 394, 24 A. L. R. 1215, affirmed 260 U. S. 245, 67 L. ed. 237, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 83. See also Crane v. Bennett, 177 N. Y. 106, 69 N. E. 274, 101 Am. St. Rep. 722; Townsend v. Norfolk R. etc., Co., 105 Va. 22, 52 S. E. 970, 115 Am. St. Rep. 842, 4 L. R. A. (n. s.) 87, 8 Ann. Cas. 558. The rule of stare decisis will not pre- vent the courts from reviewing a con- stitutional question previously decided where the facts in the instant case are slightly different from those in former decisions. Chicago, etc., R. Co. ». Smith, 62 Ill. 268, 14 Am. Rep. 99; Prall v. Burckhartt, 299 Ill. 19, 132 N. E. 280, 18 A. L. R. 992. ? Crabtree v. Crabtree, 154 Ark. 401, 242 S. W. 804, 24 A. L. R. 912.CHAP. IV] CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 123 exceptions to this rule which embrace all those cases where new action is asked of another department, which that department is at liberty to grant or refuse for any reasons which it may regard as sufficient. We cannot conceive that, because the courts have declared an expiring corporation to have been constitutionally created, the legislature would be bound to renew its charter, or the executive to sign an act for that purpose, if doubtful of the con- stitutional authority, even though no other adverse reasons existed.’ In the enactment of laws the legislature must act upon its own reasons; mixed motives of power, justice, and policy influence its action; and it is always justifiable and laudable to lean against a violation of the constitution. Indeed, cases must sometimes occur when a court should refrain from declaring a statute unconstitu- tional, because not clearly satisfied that it is so, though, if the judges were to act as legislators upon the question of its enactment, they ought with the same views to withhold their assent, from grave doubts upon that subject. The duty is different in the two cases, and presumptions may control in one which do not exist in the other.2. But those cases where new legislation is sought stand by themselves, and are not precedents for those which involve only considerations concerning the constitutional validity of existing enactments. The general acceptance of judicial decisions as authoritative, by each and all, can alone prevent confusion, doubt, and uncertainty, and any other course is incompatible with a true government of law. Construction to be Uniform. A cardinal rule in dealing with written instruments is that they are to receive an unvarying interpretation, and that their practical construction is to be uniform. A constitution is not to be made to 1 In the celebrated case of the appli- cation of the Bank of the United States for a new charter, President Jackson felt himself at liberty to act upon his own view of constitutional power, in opposition to that previously declared by the Supreme Court, and President Lincoln expressed similar views re- garding the conclusiveness of the Dred Scott decision upon executive and legislative action. See Story on Const. (4th ed.) § 375, note. It is notorious that while the reconstruc- tion of States was going on, after the late Civil War, Congress took especial pains in some cases to so shape its legislation that the Federal Supreme Court should have no opportunity to question and deny its validity. 2A constitution forbade the pay- ment of any claim arising against the State under any agreement made without authority of law. It was held that this did not prevent the legis- lature from awarding pay for work done under an act which after its com- pletion had been declared unconstitu- tional; that the word “law” did not necessarily mean a constitutional law. Miller v. Dunn, 72 Cal. 462, 14 Pac. 27.124 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. 1 mean one thing at one time, and another at some subsequent time when the circumstances may have so changed as perhaps to make a different rule in the case seem desirable.!_ A principal share of the benefit expected from written constitutions would be lost if the rules they established were so flexible as to bend to circumstances or be modified by public opinion. It is with special reference to the vary- ing moods of public opinion, and with a view to putting the funda- mentals of government beyond their control, that these instruments are framed; and there can be no such steady and imperceptible change in their rules as inheres in the principles of the common law. Those beneficent maxims of the common law which guard person and property have grown and expanded until they mean vastly more to us than they did to our ancestors, and are more minute, par- ticular, and pervading in their protections; and we may confidently look forward in the future to still further modifications in the direction of improvement. Public sentiment and action effect such changes, and the courts recognize them; but a court or legis- lature which should allow a change in public sentiment to influence it in giving to a written constitution a construction not warranted by the intention of its founders, would be justly chargeable with reckless disregard of official oath and public duty; and if its course could become a precedent, these instruments would be of little avail. The violence of public passion is quite as likely to be in the direction of oppression as in any other; and the necessity for bills of rights in our fundamental laws lies mainly in the danger that the legislature will be influenced, by temporary excitements and passions among the people, to adopt oppressive enactments. What a court is to do, therefore, is to declare the law as written, leaving it to the people themselves to make such changes as new circumstances may require.?, The meaning of the constitution is fixed when it is adopted, and it is not different at any subsequent time when a court has occasion to pass upon it.’ The Intent to Govern. The object of construction, as applied to a written constitu- tion, is to give effect to the intent of the people in adopting it. In ‘Scott ». Sandford, 19 How. 393, parte Woods, 52 Tex. Crim. Rep. 575, 15 L. ed. 691; South Carolina v. 108 S. W. 1171, 124 Am. St. Rep. United States, 199 U. S. 437, 50 L. ed. 1107, 16 L. R. A. (n. s.) 450. 261, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 110, 4 Ann. 2 People v. Morrell, 21 Wend. 563; Cas. 737; Corry v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327, Newell v. People, 7 N. Y. 9; Hyatt v. 17 Am. Rep. 738; Murphy v. Com., Taylor, 42 N. Y. 258; Slack v. Jacobs, 172 Mass. 264, 52 N. E. 505, 70 Am. 8 W. Va. 612, 650. St. Rep. 266, 48 L. R. A. 154; Ex 3 Campbell, J., in People v. Blodgett,CHAP. Iv] CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 125 the case of all written laws, it is the intent of the lawgiver that is to be enforced. But this intent is to be found in the instru- ment itself. It is to be presumed that language has been em- ployed with sufficient precision to convey it, and unless examination demonstrates that the presumption does not hold good in the par- ticular case, nothing will remain except to enforce it. “Where a law is plain and unambiguous, whether it be expressed in general or limited terms, the legislature should be intended to mean what they have plainly expressed, and consequently no room is left for construction.” } 13 Mich. 127, 138; Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393, 15 L. ed. 691; McPher- son v. Secretary of State, 92 Mich. 377, 52 N. W. 469, 31 Am. St. Rep. 587, 16 L. R. A. 475. 1 United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 358, 2 L. ed. 304; Bosley v. Mat- tingley, 14 B. Monr. 89; Sturgis »v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 4 L. ed. 529; Schooner Paulina’s Cargo v. United States, 7 Cranch, 52, 3 L. ed. 266; Ogden »v. Strong, 2 Paine, C. C. 584; United States v. Ragsdale, 1 Hem. 497; Southwark Bank ». Commonwealth, 26 Penn. St. 446; Ingalls v. Cole, 47 Me. 530; McClus- key v. Cromwell, 11 N. Y. 593; Fur- man v. New York, 5 Sandf. 16; Newell v. People, 7 N. Y. 9; People v. N. Y. Central R. R. Co., 24 N. Y. 485; Bidwell v. Whittaker, 1 Mich. 469; Alexander v. Worthington, 5 Md. 471; Cantwell v. Owens, 14 Md. 215; Case v. Wildridge, 4 Ind. 51; Spencer »v. State, 5 Ind. 41; Pitman v. Flint, 10 Pick. 504; Heirs of Ludlow v. Johnson, 3 Ohio, 553; District Township ». Dubuque, 7 Iowa, 262; Pattison v. Yuba, 13 Cal. 175; Ezekiel v. Dixon, 3 Ga. 146; Inre Murphy, 23 N. J. 180; Attorney-General v. Detroit & Erin P. R. Co., 2 Mich. 138; Smith ». Thursby, 28 Md. 244; State v. Blasdel, 4 Nev. 241; State v. Doron, 5 Nev. 399; Hyatt v. Taylor, 42 N. Y. 258; Johnson v. Hudson R. R. Co., 49 N. Y. 455; Beardstown v. Virginia, 76 Ill. 34; St. Louis, &c. R. R. Co. v. Clark, 53 Mo. 214; Mundt v. Sheboygan, &c. Re Rs Com ol awis) 41; 9 Slack Jacob, 8 W. Va. 612; Hawbecker ». Hawbecker, 43 Md. 516; Ez parte Mayor of Florence, 78 Ala. 419; Possible or even probable meanings, when one South Carolina v. United States, 199 U. S. 487, 50 L. ed. 261, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 110, 4 Ann. Cas. 737; Bailey »v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U. S. 20, 66 L. ed. 818, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 449, 21 A. L. R. 1482; Pasadena v. Rail- road Commission, 183 Cal. 526, 192 Pac: 25, 10 A. L. R. 1425) Durlock Irrigation Dist. v. White, 186 Cal. 183, 198 Pac. 1060, 17 A. L. R. 72; People v. Emmerson, 302 Ill. 300, 134 N. E. 707, 21 A. L. R. 636; State v. Mobile, etc., R. Co., 86 Miss. 172, 38 So. 732, 122 Am. St. Rep. 277; Hx parte Ming, 42 Nev. 472, 181 Pac. 319, 6 A. L. R. 1216; Scribner v. State, 9 Okla. Crim. Rep. 465, 1382 Pac. 933, Ann. Cas. 1915 B, 381; State v. Harris, 74 Oreg. 573, 144 Pac. 109, Ann. Cas. 1916 A, 1156; Bronson v. Syverson, 88 Wash. 264, 152 Pac. 1039, L. R. A. 1916 B, 993, Ann. Cas. 1917 D, 883. The remarks of Mr. Justice Bronson in People v. Purdy, 2 Hill, 35, are very forcible in showing the impolicy and danger of looking beyond the instru- ment itself to ascertain its meaning, when the terms employed are positive and free from all ambiguity. “It is said that the Constitution does not extend to public corporations, and therefore a majority vote was suffi- cient. I do not so read the Constitu- tion. The language of the clause is: ‘The assent of two-thirds of the mem- bers elected to each branch of the legislature shall be requisite to every bill creating, continuing, altering, or renewing any body politic or corpo- rate. These words are as broad in their signification as any which could have been selected for the occasion from our vocabulary, and there is not126 a syllable in the whole instrument tending in the slightest degree to limit or qualify the universality of the language. If the clause can be so con- strued that it shall not extend alike to all corporations, whether public or private, it may then, I think, be set down as an established fact that the English language is too poor for the framing of fundamental laws which shall limit the powers of the legislative branch of the government. No one has, I believe, pretended that the Con- stitution, looking at that alone, can be restricted to any particular class or description of corporations. But it is said that we may look beyond the instrument for the purpose of ascer- taining the mischief against which the clause was directed, and thus restrict its operation. But who shall tell us what that mischief was? Although most men in public life are old enough to remember the time when the Con- stitution was framed and adopted, they are not agreed concerning the par- ticular evils against which this clause was directed. Some suppose the clause was intended to guard against legislative corruption, and others that it was aimed at monopolies. Some are of opinion that it only extends to private without touching public cor- porations, while others suppose that it only restricts the power of the legisla- ture when creating a single corporation, and not when they are made by the hundred. In this way a solemn instru- ment — for so J think the Constitution should be considered —is made to mean one thing by one man and some- thing else by another, until, in the end, it is in danger of being rendered a mere dead letter; and that, too, where the language is so plain and explicit that it is impossible to mean more than one thing, unless we first lose sight of the instrument itself, and allow our- selves to roam at large in the boundless fields of speculation. For one, I dare not venture upon such a course. Written constitutions of government will soon come to be regarded as of little value if their injunctions may be thus lightly overlooked; and _ the experiment of setting a boundary to power will prove a failure. We are CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. 1 not at liberty to presume that the framers of the Constitution, or the people who adopted it, did not under- stand the force of language.”’ See also same case, 4 Hill, 384, and State »v. King, 44 Mo. 285. Another court has said: ‘This power of construction in courts is a mighty one, and, unrestrained by settled rules, would tend to throw a painful uncertainty. over the effect that might be given to the most plainly worded statutes, and render courts, in reality, the legislative power of the State. Instances are not wanting to confirm this. Judge-made law has overrode the legislative department. It was the boast of Chief Justice Pemberton, one of the judges of the despot Charles II., and not the worst even of those times, that he had en- tirely outdone the Parliament in mak- ing law. We think that system of jurisprudence best and safest which controls most by fixed rules, and leaves least to the discretion of the judge; a doctrine constituting one of the points of superiority in the common law over that system which has been adminis- tered in France, where authorities had no force, and the law of each case was what the judge of the case saw fit to make it. We admit that the exercise of an unlimited discretion may, in a particular instance, be attended with a salutary result; still history informs us that it has often been the case that the arbitrary discretion of a judge was the law of a tyrant, and warns us that it may be so again.” Perkins, J., in Spencer v. State, 5 Ind. 41, 46. “‘Judge-made law’’, as the phrase is here employed, is that made by judicial decisions which construe away the meanings of statutes, or find meanings in them: the legislature never held: The phrase is sometimes used as meaning, simply, the law that becomes established by precedent. The uses and necessity of judicial legislation are considered and explained at length by Mr. Austin, in his Province of Juris- prudence. In South Carolina v. United States, 199 U. S. 487, 50 L. ed. 261, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 110, 4 Ann. Cas. 737, Mr. Justice Brewer, in delivering theCHAP. IV] CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 127 is plainly declared in the instrument itself, the courts are not at liberty to search for elsewhere. “Whether we are considering an agreement between parties, a statute, or a constitution, with a view to its interpretation, the thing which we are to seek is the thought which at expresses. To ascertain this, the first resort in all cases is to the natural significa- tion of the words employed, in the order of grammatical arrange- ment in which the framers of the instrument have placed them. If, thus regarded, the words embody a definite meaning, which involves no absurdity and no contradiction between different parts of the same writing, then that meaning, apparent on the face of the instrument, is the one which alone we are at liberty to say was intended to be conveyed. In such a case there is no room for construction. That which the words declare is the meaning of the instrument, and neither courts nor legislatures have a right to add to or take away from that meaning.” * The Whole Instrument to be Examined. Nor is it lightly to be inferred that any portion of a written law is so ambiguous as to require extrinsic aid in its construction. Every such instrument is adopted as a whole, and a clause which, standing by itself, might seem of doubtful import, may yet be made plain by comparison with other clauses or portions of the same law. It is therefore a very proper rule of construction, that the whole is to be examined with a view to arriving at the true intention of each part; and this Sir Edward Coke regards as the most natural and genuine method of expounding a statute? If any section of a law be stood to have employed words in their natural sense, and to have intended what they have said.’ ”’ 1 Newell v. People, 7 N. Y. 9, 97, per Johnson, J.; Chesapeake, &c. Ry. Co. vy. Miller, 19 W. Va. 409. And see Denn v. Reid, 10 Pet. 524, 9 L. ed. 519; Greencastle Township v. Black, 5 Ind. 566; Bartlett v. Morris, 9 Port. opinion of the court, said: “Tt must also be remembered that the framers of the Constitution were not mere visionaries, toying with speculations or theories, but practical men, dealing with the facts of political life as they understood them; putting into form the government they were creating, and prescribing, in language clear and intelligible, the powers that govern- ment was to take. Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, in Gibbons ». Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 188 L. ed. 23, 68, well declared: ‘As men whose intentions require no concealment generally em- ploy the words which most directly and aptly express the ideas they intend to convey, the enlightened patriots who framed our Constitution, and the people who adopted it, must be under- 266; Leonard v. Wiseman, 31 Md. 201, per Bartol, Ch. J.; Way v. Way, 64 Ill. 406; McAdoo v. Benbow, 63 N. C. 461; Hawkins v. Carrol, 50 Miss. 735; Cearfoss v. State, 42 Md. 403 ; Douglas vy. Freeholders, &c., 38 N. Js Zia Gold v. Fite, 2 Bax. 287; State v. Gammon, 73 Mo. 421; Broom’s Maxims (5th Am. ed.), 551, marg. 2Co, Lit. 381 a; Downes ». Bid- well, 182 U. S. 244, 45 L. ed. 1088, 21128 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. 1 intricate, obscure, or doubtful, the proper mode of discovering its true meaning is by comparing it with the other sections, and finding out the sense of one clause by the words or obvious intent of another2 And in making this comparison it is not to be supposed that any words have been employed without occasion, or without intent that they should have effect as part of the law. The rule applicable here is, that effect 2s to be given, of possible, to the whole instrument, and to every section and clause. If different portions seem to conflict, the courts must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make some words idle and nugatory.2 This rule is applicable with special force to written constitu- tions, in which the people will be presumed to have expressed themselves in careful and measured terms, corresponding with the Sup. Ct. Rep. 770; Old Wayne Mut. Life Ass’n v. McDonough, 204 U. S. 8, 51 L. ed. 345, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 236; Bailey v. Philadelphia, etc., R. Co., 4 Harr. (Del.) 389, 44 Am. Dec. 593; Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327, 17 Am. Rep. 738; State v. Mockus, 120 Me. 84) 113 Atl. 39, 14 A. L. R. 871; Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 376, 74 Am. Dec. 572; Davidson v. Hine, 151 Mich. 294, 115 N. W. 246, 123 Am. St. Rep. 267, 15 L. R. A. (n. s.) 575, 14 Ann. Cas. 352; State v. Jack- son, 119 Miss. 727, 81 So. 1; Kill- grove v. Morriss, 39 Nev. 224, 156 Pac. 686; People v. Mosher, 163 N. Y. 32, 57 N. E. 88, 79 Am. St. Rep. 552; People v. Metz, 193 N. Y. 148, 85 N. E. 1070, 24 L. R. A. (nw. s.) 201; Goughnour v. Brant, 47 N. D. 368, 182 N. W. 309; Blackrock Copper Min. & Mill Co. v. Tingey, 34 Utah, 369, 98 Pac. 180, 131 Am. St. Rep. 850, 28 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 255. 1 Stowell v. Lord Zouch, Plowd. 365; Chance v. Marion County, 64 Ill. 66; Dyer v. Bayne, 54 Md. 87; Broom’s Maxims, 521; State v. Jackson, 119 Miss. 727, 81 So. 1. * Attorney-General v. Detroit & Erin Plank Road Co., 2 Mich. 138; People v. Burns, 5 Mich. 114; District Town- ship v. Dubuque, 7 Iowa, 262; Manly v. State, 7 Md. 135; Parkinson ». State, 14 Md. 184; Belleville Railroad Co. v. Gregory, 15 Ill. 20; Ogden v. Strong, 2 Paine, C. C. 584; Ryegate v. Wards- boro, 30 Vt. 746; Brooks v. Mobile School Commissioners, 31 Ala. 227; Den v. Dubois, 16 N. J. L. 285; Den v. Schenck, 8 N. J. L. 29; Bigelow v. W. Wisconsin R. R., 27 Wis. 478; Gas Company v. Wheeling, 8 W. Va. 320; Parker v. Savage, 6 Lea, 406; Craw- fordsville, &c. Go. v. Fletcher, 104 Ind. 97, 2 N. E. 243; Gherna v. State, 16 Ariz. 344, 146 Pac. 494, Ann. Cas. 1916 D, 94; State v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 56 Fla. 617, 47 So. 969, 32 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 639; Crawford v. Gil- christ, 64 Fla. 41, 59 So. 963, Ann. Cas. 1914 B, 916; Hammond ». Clark, 136 Ga. 313; 71 S) E! 479; 38°) RaaAS (nN. s.) 77; State v. Jackson, 119 Miss. 727, 81 So. 1; Killgrove v. Morriss, 39 Nev. 224, 156 Pac. 686; Steele, etc., Co. v. Miller, 92 Ohio St. 115, 110 N. E. 648, L. R. A. 1916 C, 1023, Ann. Cas. 1917 C, 926; Blackrock Copper Min. & Mill. Co. ». Tingey, 34 Utah, 369, 98 Pac. 180, 131 Am. St. Rep. 850, 28 L. R. A. (N. s.) 255; State v. Ban- croft, 148 Wis. 124, 134 N. W. 330, 38 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 526. See Sams »v. King, 18 Fla. 557. That the title may be considered in order to throw light upon an otherwise obscure provision, see Knowlton »v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41, 44 L. ed. 969, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 747. See also People »v. McElroy, 72 Mich. 446, 40 N. W. 750, 2 L. R. A. 609, and note. To aid construction, the court may transpose sentences and _ sections. Gherna v. State, 16 Ariz. 344, 146 Pac. 494, Ann. Cas. 1916 D, 94.CHAP. Iv] CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 129 immense importance of the powers delegated, leaving as little as possible to implication.’ It is scarcely conceivable that a case can arise where a court would be justified in declaring any portion of a written constitution nugatory because of ambiguity. One part may qualify another so as to restrict its operation, or apply it other- wise than the natural construction would require if it stood by itself ; but one part is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reason- able construction the two can be made to stand together.? [Every provision should be construed, where possible, to give effect to every other provision. Upon the adoption of an amendment to a constitution, the amendment becomes a part thereof; as much so as if it had been originally incorporated in the constitution ; and it is to be construed accordingly.4 other provisions of the constitution.® If two amendments are adopted on the amendment will prevail.® If possible, it must be harmonized with all the If this cannot be done the same day they must be construed together and effect given to 1 Wolcott v. Wigton, 7 Ind. 44; People v. Purdy, 2 Hill, 31, per Bron- son, J.; Greencastle Township v. Black, 5 Ind. 557; Green v. Weller, 32 Miss. 650. 2 People v. Wright, 6 Col. 92. It is a general rule in the construc- tion of writings, that, a general intent appearing, it shall control the par- ticular intent; but this rule must sometimes give way, and effect must be given to a particular intent plainly expressed in one part of a constitution, though apparently opposed to a general intent deduced from other parts. Warren v. Shuman, 5 Tex. 441. In Quick v. Whitewater Township, 7 Ind. 570, it was said that if two pro- visions of a written constitution are irreconcilably repugnant, that which is last in order of time and in local posi- tion is to be preferred. In Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. ». Rambolt, 67 Tex. 654, 48. W. 356, this rule was recognized as a last resort, but if the last pro- vision is more comprehensive and specific, it was held that it should be given effect on that ground. 3 People v. Case, 220 Mich. 379, 19 N. W. 289, 27 A. L. R. 686. 4 State v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 195 Mo. 228, 93 S. W. 784, 113 Am. St. Rep. 661. ‘‘An amendment should be viewed VOL. I—9 in connection with the previously existing Constitution and the evils and conditions which led to the change. Moreover, effect should be given to every part of the instrument as amended, and in the absence of a clear reason to the contrary no portion of a written Constitution should be regarded as_ superfluous.” Steele, Hopkins & Meredith Co. v. Miller, 92 Ohio St. 115, 110 N. E. 648, L. R. A. 1916_C, 1023, Ann. Cas. 1917 C, 926. 6 Hammond v. Clark, 136 Ga. 313, 7Al Sh 1d, CY), 613 1b, 13 ALL (GCS Gb) C5 State v. Jackson, 119 Miss. 727, 81 So. 1 6 State v. Jackson, 119 Miss. 727, 81 So. 1. If an amendment duly adopted necessarily conflicts with some pre- vious provision of the Constitution, the amendment, being the last ex- pression of the sovereign will of the people, will prevail as an implied modification pro tanto of the former provision. Hammond »v. Clark, 136 Ga. 313, 71 S. E. 479, 38 Tes RE AS (NAISS) ile An amendment to a Constitution operates to repeal a provision thereof inconsistent with the amendment. People ez rel. Killeen v. Angle, 109 N. Y. 564, 17 N. E. 413.ees ae 130 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I both. Differences, if there are any, must, if possible, be reconciled.! If reconciliation is impossible, then, it would seem, both must fall.?| In interpreting clauses we must presume that words have been employed in their natural and ordinary meaning. As Marshall, Ch. J., says: The framers of the constitution, and the people who adopted it, “must be understood to have employed words in their natural sense, and to have intended what they have said.” 8 1 Fitzgerald v. Cleveland, 88 Ohio St. 338, 103 N. E. 512, Ann. Cas. 1915 B, 106. 2 Utter v. Moseley, 16 Idaho, 274, 100 Pac. 1058, 133 Am. St. Rep. 94, 18 Ann. Cas. 723. 3 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 188, 6 L. ed. 23. See Settle v. Van Evrea, 49 N. Y. 281; Jenkins v. Ewin, 8 Heisk. 456; Way v. Way, 64 Ill. 406; Stuart v. Hamilton, 66 IIl. 253; Hale v. Everett, 53 N. H. 9; State v. Brewster, 42 N. J. L. 125; Carpenter v. People, 8 Col. 116, 5 Pac. 828; South Carolina v. United States, 199 U. S. 437, 50 L. ed. 261, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 110, 4 Ann. Cas. 737; Bailey ». Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U. S. 20, 66 L. ed. 818, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 449, 21 A. L. R. 1482; Pasadena v. Rail- road Commission, 183 Cal. 526, 192 Pac: 25, 10) A. EL: R. 1425; Turlock Irrigation Dist. v. White, 186 Cal. 183, 198 Pac. 1060, 17 A. L. R. 72; People v. Emmerson, 302 Ill. 300, 134 N. E. 707, 21 A. L. R. 686; McKinney ». Barker, 180 Ky. 526, 203 S. W. 303, L. R. A. 1918 B, 581; State v. Mobile, etc., R. Co., 86 Miss. 172, 38 So. 732, 122 Am. St. Rep. 277; Hx parte Ming, 42 Nev. 472, 181 Pac. 319, 6 A. L. R. 1216; Kreps v. Brady, 37 Okla. 754, 133 Pac. 216, 47 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 106; Scribner v. State, 9 Okla. Crim. Rep. 465, 132 Pac. 933, Ann. Cas. 1915 B, 381; State v. Harris, 74 Oreg. 573, 144 Pac; 109 Ann? Cas) 1916) A, 1156); Henry v. Cherry, 30 R. I. 13, 73 Atl. 97, 186 Am. St. Rep. 928, 24 L. R. A. (w. s.) 991, 18 Ann. Cas. 1006; Bron- son v. Syverson, 88 Wash. 264, 152 Pac. 1039, L. R. A. 1916 B, 998, Ann. Cas. 1917 D, 833. “Words must be understood in their general and popular sense, as the people who voted on the Constitution understood them, and we should not go beyond this meaning unless the language is so ambiguous that we need to ascertain the mischief to be reme- died.” Kephart, J., in Busser ov. Snyder, 282 Pa. St. 440, 128 Atl. 80, 30/ AG a: Reel bios In framing a Constitution, words naturally are employed in a compre- hensive sense as expressive of general ideas rather than of finer shades of thought or of narrow distinctions. Com. v. Nickerson, 236 Mass. 281, 128 N. E. 273, 10 A. L. R. 1568. “Tt is a cardinal rule of construction that the language of a State Constitu- tion, more than that of any other of the written laws, is to be taken in its general and ordinary sense. The reason for the rule lies in the fact that its makers are the people who adopt it. Its language is their language, and words employed therein have meaning as the generality of the people under- stand them. When, therefore, words are used in a Constitution which have both a restricted and general meaning, the general must prevail over the restricted unless the nature of the subject-matter or the context indicates that the limited sense was intended. Says Mr. Justice Story: ‘Every word employed in the Constitution is to be expounded in its plain, obvious, and common sense, unless the context fur- nishes some ground to control, qualify, or enlarge it. Constitutions are not designed for metaphysical or logical subtilties, for niceties of expression, for critical propriety, for elaborate shades of meaning, or for the exercise of philosophical acuteness or judicial research. They are instruments of a practical nature, founded on the com- mon business of human life, adapted to common wants, designed for com- mon use, and fitted for common under- standings. The people make them,CHAP. Iv] CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 131 This is but saying that no forced or unnatural construction is to be put upon their language ; and it seems so obvious a truism that one expects to see it universally accepted without question; but the attempt is made so often by interested subtlety and ingenious refinement to induce the courts to force from these instruments a meaning which their framers never held, that it frequently becomes necessary to re-declare this fundamental maxim.' the people adopt them, the people must be supposed to read them, with the help of common sense, and cannot be presumed to admit in them any recondite meaning or any extraor- dinary gloss.’ 1 Story Const. § 451.” Bronson v. Syverson, 88 Wash. 264, 152 Pac. 1039, L. R. A. 1916 B, 993, Ann. Cas. 1917 D, 833. In Epping v. Columbus, 117 Ga. 263, 43 S. E. 808, the Court said: “Constitutions are the result of popular will, and their words are to be understood ordinarily as used in the sense that such words convey to the popular mind. 6 Am. & Eng. Enc. L. (2d ed.) pp. 924-5. There is nothing in the paragraph under consideration which indicates that the term ‘debt’ was used in any other way than in its ordinary and popular sense. If a person unversed in the technical niceties of the law is asked what is the amount of his debts, his answer to the question in every instance would be an amount which would represent the present liability that he was under at the moment the question was answered. A farmer who had been so unfortunate as to be compelled to place a long loan upon his farm, if asked what was the amount of the debt upon his farm would unhesitat- ingly answer by giving an amount which would represent the principal of the debt and any interest that was past due and payable at the time the inquiry was made. One who, in making a return of his property for taxation, is required to state to the tax receiver the amount of solvent debts due him, would not, in the case of a perfectly solvent debt, consider that he was under a moral obligation to return for taxation the value of the debt at any higher amount than one which would represent the principal Narrow and and any interest that was past due at the time the return was made. It is useless to multiply illustrations. The debt of an individual or a corpora- tion or the public, in its usual and popular sense, means the amount for which the individual or corporation or the public would be _ presently liable if called upon to discharge the obligation. The law deals at all points with the man of ordinary prudence and average capacity as the standard, for the simple reason that communities and commonwealths are made up of persons of this class. Con- stitutions are adopted by common- wealths so made up, and the meaning to be given to such instruments is that meaning which the man of ordinary prudence and average intelligence and information would give. Generally the meaning given to words by the learned and technical is not to be given to words appearing in a Constitution. In other words, the popular meaning is to be given to the words of a Con- stitution, unless the context or the instrument, taken as a whole, im- peratively requires some other mean- ing. Before the words can be given a purely technical meaning which would be different from the popular meaning, the intention that they should be so understood must be plainly apparent and palpably manifest.” 1 State v. Mace, 2 Md. 337; Manly v. State, 7 Md. 135; Green v. Weller, 32 Miss. 650; Greencastle Township ». Black, 5 Ind. 566; People v. N. Y. Central Railroad Co., 34 Barb. 123, and 24 N. Y. 485; Story on Const. § 453; Scribner v. State, 9 Okla. Crim. Rep. 465, 132 Pac. 933, Ann. Cas. 1915 B, 381. “The true sense in which words are used in a statute is to be ascertained generally by taking them in their132 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I technical reasoning is misplaced when it is brought to bear upon an instrument framed by the people themselves, for themselves, and designed as a chart upon which every man, learned and unlearned, may be able to trace the leading principles of government.! But it must not be forgotten, in construing our constitutions, that in many particulars they are but the legitimate successors of the great charters of English liberty, whose provisions declaratory of the rights of the subject have acquired a well-understood meaning, which the people must be supposed to have had in view in adopting them. We cannot understand these provisions unless we under- stand their history; and when we find them expressed in technical words, and words of art, we must suppose these words to be em- ployed in their technical sense. When the Constitution speaks of an ex post facto law, it means a law technically known by that designa- tion; the meaning of the phrase having become defined in the history of constitutional law, and being so familiar to the people that it is not necessary to employ language of a more popular char- acter to designate it. The technical sense in these cases is the sense popularly understood, because that is the sense fixed upon the words ordinary and popular signification, or, if they be terms of art, in their tech- nical signification. But it is also a cardinal rule of exposition, that the intention is to be deduced from the whole and every part of the statute, taken and compared together, from the words of the context, and such a con- struction adopted as will best effectu- ate the intention of the lawgiver. One part is referred to in order to help the construction of another, and the intent of the legislature is not to be collected from any particular expression, but from a general view of the whole act. Dwarris, 658, 698, 702, 703. And when it appears that the framers have used a word in a particular sense generally in the act, it will be presumed that it was intended to be used in the same sense throughout the act, unless an intention to give it a different signification plainly appears in the particular part of the act alleged to be an exception to the general meaning indicated. Dwarris, 704 et seg. When words are used to which the legislature has given a plain and definite import in the act, it would be dangerous to put upon them a construction which would amount to holding that the legislature did not mean what it has expressed. It follows from _ these principles that the statute itself furnishes the best means of its own exposition; and if the sense in which words were intended to be used can be clearly ascertained from all its parts and provisions, the intention thus in- dicated shall prevail, without resort- ing to other means of aiding in the construction. And these familiar rules of construction apply with at least as much force to the construction of written constitutions as to statutes; the former being presumed to be framed with much greater care and consideration than the latter.” Green v. Weller, 32 Miss. 650, 678. Words re-enacted after they have acquired a settled meaning will be understood in that meaning. Fulmer v. Commonwealth, 97 Pa. St. 503. The argument ab inconvenienti can- not be suffered to influence the courts by construction to prevent the evident intention. Chance v. Marion County, 64 Ill. 66. 1 Scribner v. State, 9 Okla. Crim. Rep. 465, 132 Pac. 933, Ann. Cas. 1915 B, 381.CHAP. IV] CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 133 in legal and constitutional history where they have been employed for the protection of popular rights." The Common Law to be kept wn View. It is also a very reasonable rule that a State constitution shall be understood and construed in the light and by the assistance of the common law, and with the fact in view that its rules are still left in force2 By this we do not mean that the common law is to control the constitution, or that the latter is to be warped and perverted in its meaning in order that no inroads, or as few as possible, may be made in the system of common-law rules, but only for its definitions we are to draw from that great fountain, and that in judging what it means, we are to keep in mind that it is not the beginning of law for the State, but that it assumes the existence of a well-understood system which is still to remain in force and be ad- ministered, but under such limitations and restrictions as that instru- 1 See Jenkins v. Ewin, 8 Heisk. 476; Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 1 L. ed. 648 ; Thompson v. State of Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 42 L. ed. 1061, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 620; Kreps v. Brady, 73 Okla. 754, 133 Pac. 216, 47 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 106; Rasmussen v. Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 50 Pac. 819, 38 L. R. A. 773. It is quite possible, however, in applying constitutional maxims, to overlook entirely the reason upon which they rest, and “considering merely the letter, go but skin deep into the meaning.” On the great debate on the motion for withdrawing the confidence of Parliament from the ministers, after the surrender of Corn- wallis, — a debate which called out the best abilities of Fox and Pitt as well as of the ministry, and necessarily led to the discussion of the primary principle in free government, that taxation and representation shall go together, — Sir James Mariott rose, and with great gravity proceeded to say, that if taxation and representation were to go hand in hand, then Britain had an undoubted right to tax America, be- cause she was represented in the British Parliament. She was represented by the members for the county of Kent, of which the thirteen provinces were a part and parcel; for in their charters they were to hold of the manor of Greenwich in Kent, of which manor they were by charter to be parcel! The opinion, it is said, ‘‘raised a very loud laugh”, but Sir James continued to support it, and concluded by declar- ing that he would give the motion a hearty negative. Thus would he have settled a great principle of constitu- tutional right, for which a seven years’ bloody war had been waged, by putting it in the form of a meaningless legal fiction. Hansard’s Debates, Vol. XXII. p. 1184. Lord Mahon, follow- ing Lord Campbell, refers the origin of this wonderful argument to Mr. Hardinge, a Welsh judge, and nephew of Lord Camden; 7 Mahon’s Hist. 139. He was said to have been a good lawyer, but must have read the history of his country to little purpose. 2 United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649, 42 L. ed. 890, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 456; South Carolina ». United States, 199 U. S. 437, 50 L. ed. 261, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 110, 4 Ann. Cas. 737; Blackwell v. State, 79 Fla. 709, 86 So. 224, 15 A. L. R. 465; Horace Waters & Co. v. Gerard, 189 N. Y. 302, 82 N. E. 143, 121 Am. St. Rep. 886, 24 L. BR. A. (Nn. s.) 958, 12 Ann. Cas. 397; McGinnis v. State, 9 Humph, 48, 49 Am. Dec. 697.134 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I ment imposes.! It is a maxim with the courts that statutes in derogation of the common law shall be construed strictly,? —a maxim which we fear is sometimes perverted to the overthrow of the legislative intent ; but there can seldom be either propriety or safety in applying this maxim to constitutions. When these instruments assume to make any change in the common law, the change designed is generally a radical one; but as they do not go minutely into particulars, as do statutes, it will sometimes be easy to defeat a provision, if courts are at liberty to say that they will presume against any intention to alter the common law further than is expressly declared. A reasonable construction is what such an instrument demands and should receive ; and the real question is, what the people meant, and not how meaningless their words can be made by the application of arbitrary rules.’ 1State v. Noble, 118 Ind. 350, 21 N. E. 244. “The language of the Constitution (of the United States) cannot be inter- preted safely except by reference to the common law and to British institu- tions as they were when the instru- ment was framed and adopted. The statesmen and lawyers of the Conven- tion, who submitted it to the ratifica- tion of the Convention of the thirteen States, were born and brought up in the atmosphere of the common law, and thought and spoke in its vocab- ulary. They were familiar with other forms of government, recent and ancient, and indicated in their dis- cussions earnest study and considera- tion of many of them, but when they came to put their conclusions into the form of fundamental law in a compact draft, they expressed them in terms of the common law, confident that they could be shortly and easily under- stood.” Hz parte Grossman, 267 U. S. 87, 69 L. ed. 377, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 332, 38 A. L. R. 181. 2 Broom’s Maxims, 33; Sedg. on Stat. & Const. Law, 3138. See Harri- son v. Leach, 4 W. Va. 383; Myers v. State, 192 Ind. 592, 137 N. E. 547, 24 A. L. R. 1196. 3 Barry v. Truax, 13 N. D. 131, 99 N. W. 769, 112 Am. St. Rep. 662, 65 L. R. A. 762, 3 Ann. Cas. 191. Under a clause of the constitution of Michigan which provided that “the real and personal estate of every female acquired before marriage, and all property to which she may afterwards become entitled, by gift, grant, in- heritance, or devise, shall be and re- main the estate and property of such female, and shall not be liable for the debts, obligations, or engagements of her husband, and may be devised or bequeathed by her as if she were un- married’’, it was held that a married woman could not sell her personal property without the consent of her husband, inasmuch as the power to do so was not expressly conferred, and the clause, being in derogation of the common law, was not to be extended by construction. Brown v. Fifield, 4 Mich. 322. The danger of applying arbitrary rules in the construction of constitutional principles might well, as it seems to us, be illustrated by this case. For while on the one hand it might be contended that, as a pro- vision in derogation of the common law, the one quoted should receive a strict construction, on the other hand it might be insisted with perhaps equal reason that, as a remedial provision, in furtherance of natural right and jus- tice, it should be liberally construed, to effect the beneficial purpose had in view. Thus arbitrary rules, of directly opposite tendency and force, would be contending for the mastery in the same case. The subsequent decisions under the same provision do not appear to have followed this lead. See White v. Zane, 10 Mich. 333; McKee v.CHAP. IV] CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 135 As a general thing, it is to be supposed that the same word is used in the same sense wherever it occurs in a constitution. Here again, however, great caution must be observed in applying an arbitrary rule; for, as Mr. Justice Story has well observed: “It does not follow, either logically or grammatically, that because a word is found in one connection in the Constitution with a definite sense, therefore the same sense is to be adopted in every other con- nection in which it occurs. This would be to suppose that the framers weighed only the force of single words, as philologists or critics, and not whole clauses and objects, as statesmen and practical reasoners. And yet nothing has been more common than to subject the Constitution to this narrow and mischievous criticism.2, Men of ingenious and subtle minds, who seek for symmetry and harmony in language, having found in the Constitution a word used in some sense which falls in with their favorite theory of interpreting it, have made that the standard by which to measure its use in every other part of the instrument. They have thus stretched it, as it were, on the bed of Procrustes, lopping off its meaning when it seemed too large for their purposes, and extending it when it seemed tooshort. They have thus distorted it to the most unnatural shapes, and crippled where they have sought only to adjust its proportions according to their own opinions.” * And he gives many instances where, in the national Constitution, it is very manifest the same word is employed in different meanings. So that, while the rule may be sound as one of presumption merely, its force is but slight, and it must readily give way to a different intent appearing in the instrument. Where a constitution is revised or amended,’ the new pro- Wilcox, 11 Mich. 358; Farr v. Sher- man, 11 Mich. 33; Watson v. Thurber, 11 Mich. 457; Burdeno v. Amperse, 14 Mich. 91; Tong v. Marvin, 15 Mich. 60; Tillman v. Shackleton, 15 Mich. 447; Devries v. Conklin, 22 Mich. 255; Rankin v. West, 25 Mich. 195. The common law is certainly to be kept in view in the interpretation of such a clause, since otherwise we do not ascertain the evil designed to be remedied, and perhaps are not able fully to understand and explain the terms employed; but it is to be looked at with a view to the real intent, rather than for the purpose of arbitrarily restraining it. See Bishop, Law of Married Women, §§ 18-20 and cases cited; McGinnis v. State, 9 Humph. 43; State v. Lash, 16 N. J. L. 380, 32 Am. Dec. 397; Cadwallader v. Harris, 76 Ill. 370; Moyer v. Slate Co., 71 Pa. St. 293. 1 Brien v. Williamson, 8 Miss. 14. If in one place in a statute the meaning of a word or phrase is clear, it will generally be taken in the same sense throughout the act. Rhodes ». Weldy, 46 Ohio St. 234, 20 N. E. Rep. 461. 2See remarks of Johnson, J., in Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213, 290, 6 L. ed. 606, 632. 3 Story on Const. § 454. And see Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1, 19, 8 L. ed. 25, 31. 4Whether the attempt to amend has sufficiently complied with the136 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I visions come into operation at the same moment that those they take the place of cease to be of force; and if the new instrument re-enacts in the same words provisions which it supersedes, it is a reasonable presumption that the purpose was not to change the law in those particulars, but to continue it in uninterrupted operation. This is the rule in the case of statutes,’ and it some- times becomes important, where rights had accrued before the revision or amendment took place. Its application to the case of an amended or revised constitution would seem to be unques- tionable.? Operation to be Prospective. We shall venture also to express the opinion that a constitution should operate prospectively only, unless the words employed show a clear intention that it should have a retrospective effect. This is the rule in regard to statutes, and it is “one of such obvious convenience and justice, that it must always be adhered to in the construction of statutes, unless in cases where there is some- thing on the face of the enactment putting it beyond doubt that the legislature meant it to operate retrospectively.” * Retro- spective legislation, except when constitutional requirements of formal- ity in amending the constitution is a question for the courts, and that the legislature has declared the amend- ment adopted is immaterial. State v. Powell, 77 Miss. 548, 27 So. 927, 48 BAS 652) That an amendment must be com- plete and not conditional and de- pendent, for its force, upon the sub- sequent acts and discretion of certain officers, see Livermore v. Waite, 102 Cal. 113, 36 Pac. 424, 25 L. R. A. 312, in which an attempted amendment relating to the relocation of the State capitol was declared invalid. All preliminary steps prescribed for amendment of constitution must be taken in full compliance with require- ments. State v. Tooker, 15 Mont. 8, 37 Pac. 840, 25 L. R. A. 560; State v. Brookhart, 113 Iowa, 250, 84 N. W. 1064. 1 Laude v. Chicago, &e. R. R. Co., 33 Wis. 640; Gilkey v. Cook, 60 Wis. 133, 18 N. W. 639; Blackwood v. Van Vleit, 30 Mich. 118. 2 Ex parte Owens, 148 Ala. 402, 42 designed to cure formal defects, So. 676, 121 Am. St. Rep. 67, 8 L. R. A. (nN. Ss.) 888; Oakland Pav. Co. ». Tompkins, 72 Cal. 5, 12 Pac. 801, 1 Am. St. Rep. 17; Sexauer v. Star Milling Co., 173 Ind. 342, 90 N. E. 474, 26 L. R. A. (n. s.) 609; Ellingham v. Dye, 178 Ind. 336, 99 N. E. 1, Ann. Cas. 1915 C, 200; Morgan v. Dudley, 18 B. Mon. (Ky.) 693, 68 Am. Dec. 735; Bullitt ». Sturgeon, 127 Ky. 332, 105 S. W. 468, 14 L. R. A. (w. s.) 268; State v. New Orleans R. etc., Co., 116 La. 144, 40 So. 597, 7 Ann. Cas. 724; Sanders v. St. Louis & N. O. Anchor Line, 97 Mo. 26, 10 S. W. 595, 3 L. R. A. 390; Johnson v. Great Falls, 38 Mont. 369, 99 Pac. 1059, 16 Ann. Cas. 974; State v. De Lorenzo, 81 N. J. L. 613, 79 Atl. 839, Ann. Cas. 1912 D, 329; Com. v. Reeder, 171 Pa. St. 505, 33 Atl. 67, 33 L. R. A. 141. 3 Moon v. Durden, 2 Exch. 22. See Dash v. Van Kleek, 7 Johns. 477; Brown v. Wilcox, 22 Miss. 127; Price v. Mott, 52 Pa. St. 315; Etchison Drilling Co. v. Flournoy, 131 La. 442, 59 So. 676; Broom’s Maxims, 28; post, p. 770 and notes.CHAP. Iv] CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 137 or otherwise operate remedially, is commonly objectionable in principle, and apt to result in injustice; and it is a sound rule of construction which refuses lightly to imply an intent to enact ‘t. And we are aware of no reasons applicable to ordinary legisla- tion which do not, upon this point, apply equally well to constitu- tions. [That the rule now applies to constitutions is settled by abundant authority.*] 1Calhoun County v. Galbraith, 99 U.S. 214, 25 L. ed. 410; Shreveport v. Cole, 129 U. S. 36, 32 L. ed. 589, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 210; San Antonio v. San Antonio Public Service Co., 255 U. 8. 547, 65 L. ed. 777, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 428 ; St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Cross, 171 Fed. 480; Harris v. Walker, 199 Ala. 51, 74 So. 40; McCarthy v. Tucson, 26 Ariz. 311, 225 Pac. 329; Wilcox v. Edwards, 162 Cal. 455, 123 Pac. 276, Ann. Cas. 1913 C, 1892; Flickenger v. Industrial Accident Commission, 181 Cal. 425, 184 Pac. 851; Worswick Street Paving Co. v. Industrial Acci- dent Commission, 181 Cal. 550, 185 Pac. 953; Matthews v. Jeacle, 61 Fla. 686, 55 So. 865; Etchison Drilling Co. v. Flournoy, 131 La. 442, 59 So. 867; Lansing v. Michigan Power Co., 183 Mich. 400, 150 N. W. 250; State v. Houdersheldt, 151 Minn. 167, 186 N. W. 234; State v. Westminster College, 175 Mo. 52, 74 S. W. 990; State v. Dircks, 211 Mo. 568, 111 S. W. 1; Lander v. Deemy, 46 N. D. 273, 176 N. W. 922; Muskogee Vitrified Brick Co. v. Napier, 34 Okla. 618, 126 Pac. 792; Hall v. Dunn, 52 Oreg. 475, 97 Rac) Sil. 125) LR. A. Gv. s:)) 193; Darling v. Miles, 57 Oreg. 593, 111 Pac. 702, 112 Pac. 1084; McCullough ». Graham, 70S. C. 63, 49 S. E. 1; Pres- cott v. Duncan, 126 Tenn. 106, 148 S. W. 229; Cox v. Robison, 105 Tex. 426, 150 S. W. 1149; Arey v. Lindsey, 103 Va. 250, 48 S. E. 889; Swift v. Newport News, 105 Va. 108, 52 S. EK. 821; Mestas v. Diamond Coal, etc., Co., 12 Wyo. 414, 76 Pac. 567. In Allbyer v. State, 10 Ohio St. 588, a question arose under the provision of the constitution that ‘“all laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation throughout the State.” Another clause provided that all laws then in force, not inconsistent with the constitution, should continue in force until amended or repealed. Allbyer was convicted and sentenced to im- prisonment under a crimes act pre- viously in force applicable to Hamilton County only, and the question was, whether that act was not inconsistent with the provision above quoted, and therefore repealed by it. The court held that the provision quoted evi- dently had regard to future and not to past legislation, and therefore was not repealed. A similar decision was made in State v. Barbee, 3 Ind. 258; Evans v. Phillipi, 117 Pa. St. 226, 11 Atl. 630; Pecot v. Police Jury, 41 La. Ann. 706, 6 So. 677. So as to the effect of a provision allowing compensation for property injured, but not taken, in course of public improvements. Folk- enson v. Easton, 116 Pa. St. 523, 8 Atl. 869. See also State v. Thompson, 2 Kan. 432; Slack v. Maysville, &c. R. R. Co., 13 B. Monr. 1; State v. Macon County Court, 41 Mo. 453; N.C. Coal Co. v. G. C. Goal & Iron Co., 37 Md. 557. An unconstitutional act, null and void at the time of its passage, cannot be given validity and effect by the adoption of a new constitution, or an amendment of the old constitution, where the act is not referred to. Etchison Drilling Co. v. Flournoy, 131 La. 442, 59 So. 867. In Matter of Oliver Lee & Co.’s Bank, 21 N. Y. 9, 12, Denio, J., says: “The rule laid down in Dash v. Van Kleek, 7 Johns. 477, and other cases of that class, by which the courts are admonished to avoid, if possible, such an interpretation as would give a statute a retrospective operation, has but a limited application, if any, to the construction of a constitution. When, therefore, we read in the pro- vision under consideration, that theCONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. 1 Implications. The implications from the provisions of a constitution are some- times exceedingly important, and have large influence upon its construction. In regard to the Constitution of the United States the rule has been laid down, that where a general power is con- ferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred.! The same rule has been applied to the State constitution, with an important modification, by the Supreme Court of Illinois. “That other powers than those expressly granted may be, and often are, conferred by implication, is too well settled to be doubted. Under every constitution the doctrine of implication must be resorted to, in order to carry out the general grants of power. A constitution cannot from its very nature enter into a minute specification of all the minor powers naturally and obviously included in it and flowing from the great and important ones which are expressly granted. It is therefore established as a general rule, that when a constitution gives a general power, or enjoins a duty, it also gives, by implication, every particular power necessary stockholders of every banking cor- poration shall be subject to a certain liability, we are to attribute to the lan- guage its natural meaning, without inquiring whether private interests may not be prejudiced by such a sweeping mandate.” The remark was obiter, as it was found that enough appeared in the constitution to show clearly that is was intended to apply to existing, as well as to subsequently created, banking institutions. In a California case the court says: “The existence of a statute at the time of the adoption of the Constitution is no justification for sustaining its validity, if opposed to the plain terms of the new Constitution.’”’ Veterans’ Wel- fare Board v. Riley, 189 Cal. 159, 208 Pac. 678, 22 A. L. R. 1531. 1Story on Const. § 430. See also United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 358, 2 L. ed. 304; McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. ed. 579; North- western Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 70 Ill. 634. In First National Bank v. Union Trust Co., 244 U.S. 416, 61 L. ed. 1233, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 734, the court after reviewing McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 for the exercise of the one or the Wheat. 316, 4 L. ed. 579, and Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 6 L. ed. 204, and considering the power given to Congress to pass laws to make the specific powers granted effectual, said: ‘‘In terms it was pointed out that this broad authority was not stereotyped as of any par- ticular time but endured, thus furnish- ing a perpetual and living sanction to the legislative authority within the limits of a just, discretion enabling it to take into consideration the chang- ing wants and demands of society and to adopt provisions appropriate to meet every situation which it was deemed required to be provided for.”’ See also Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 65 L. ed. 577, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 243. Congress may establish banks for national purposes. McCulloch »v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. ed. 579; Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 6 L. ed. 204; Farmers & Mechanics National Bank v. Dearing, 91 U. S. 29, 23 L. ed. 114; Smith ». Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U. S. 180, 65 L. ed. 577, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 248.CHAP. IV] CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 139 performance of the other. The implication under this rule, how- ever, must be a necessary, not a conjectural or argumentative one. And it is further modified by another rule, that where the means for the exercise of a granted power are given, no other or different means can be implied, as being more effectual or convenient.” * The rule applies to the exercise of power by all departments and all officers, and will be touched upon incidentally hereafter. Akin to this is the rule that “where the power is granted in general terms, the power is to be construed as coextensive with the terms, unless some clear restriction upon it is deducible [ex- pressly or by implication] from the context.” 2 This rule has been so frequently applied as a restraint upon legislative encroachment upon the grant of power to the judiciary, that we shall content ourselves in this place with a reference to the cases collected upon this subject and given in another chapter.’ Another rule of construction is, that when the constitution defines the circumstances under which a right may be exercised or a penalty imposed, the specification is an implied prohibition against legislative interference to add to the condition, or to extend the penalty to other cases. On this ground it has been held by the Supreme Court of Maryland, that where the constitution defines the qualifications of an officer, it is not in the power of the legislature to change or superadd to them, unless the power to do so is expressly or by necessary implication conferred by the constitution itself.‘ Other cases recognizing the same principle are referred to in the note.® 1 Field v. People, 3 Ill. 79, 83. See Fletcher v. Oliver, 25 Ark. 289. In Nevada it has been held that a constitutional provision that the coun- ties shall provide for their paupers will preclude a State asylum for the poor. State v. Hallock, 14 Nev. 202, 33 Am. Rep. 559. 2 Story on Const. §§ 424-426. See Du Page County v. Jenks, 65 Ill. 275. 3See post, pp. 173, 221. 4Thomas v. Owens, 4 Md. 189. And see Barker v. People, 3 Cow. 686; Matter of Dorsey, 7 Port. 293; Dick- son v. Strickland, 114 Tex. 176, 265 S. W. 1012. 5 The legislature cannot add to the constitutional qualifications of voters: Rison v. Farr, 24 Ark. 161; St. Joseph, &c. R. R. Co. v. Buchanan County Court, 39 Mo. 485; State »v. Williams, 5 Wis. 308; State v. Baker, 38 Wis. 71; Monroe v. Collins, 17 Ohio St. 665; State v. Symonds, 57 Me. 148; State v. Staten, 6 Cold. 233; Davies v. McKeeby, 5 Nev. 369; McCafferty v. Guyer, 59 Pa. St. 109; Quinn v. State, 35 Ind. 485; Clayton ». Harris, 7 Nev. 64; Randolph ». Good, 3 W. Va. 551; Morris 2. Powell, 125 Ind. 281, 25 N. EH. 221, 9 L. R. A. 326; Ferbrache v. Drainage Dist., 23 Idaho, 85, 128 Pac. 5538, 44 L. R. A. (n. s.) 538, Ann. Cas. 1915 C, 43; Coggeshall v. Des Moines, 138 Iowa, 730, 117 N. W. 309, 128 Am. St. Rep. 221; State ex rel. Gilson »v. Monahan, 72 Kan. 492, 84 Pac. 130, 115 Am. St. Rep. 224, 7 Ann. Cas. 661; Johnson v. Grand Forks County, 16 N. D. 363, 113 N. W. 1071, 125 Am. St. Rep. 662; Livesley ». Litchfield, 47 Oreg. 248, 83 Pac. 142, 114 Am. St. Rep. 920. Nor diminish them: Allison v. Blake, 57 N. J. L. 6, 29 Atl. ai2o) by Re A: 480, and note;Talbert v. Long, 134 Ga. 292, 67S. E. 826, 137 Am. St. Rep. 222; Cogge- shall v. Des Moines, 138 Iowa, 730, 117 N. W. 309, 128 Am. St. Rep. 221; State ex rel. Gilson v. Monahan, 72 Kan. 492, 84 Pac. 130, 115 Am. St. Rep. 224, 7 Ann. Cas. 661. But where the Constitution is silent upon the subject the legislature may pre- scribe the qualifications of voters. State v. Dillon, 32 Fla. 545, 14 So. 383, 22 L. R. A. 124; Plummer ». Yost, 144 Ill. 68, 33 N. E. 191, 19 L. R. A. 110; State ex rel. Gilson v. Monahan, 72 Kan. 492, 84 Pac. 130, 115 Am. St. Rep. 224, 7 Ann. Cas. 661; Hanna »v. Young, 84 Md. 179, 35 Atl. 674, 34 L. R. A. 55; Bonham v. Fuchs, (Tex. Civ. App.) 228 S. W. 1112; Willis ». Kalmbach, 109 Va. 475, 64S. E. 342, 21 L. R. A. (wv. s.) 1009. The legislature may regulate the exercise of the constitutional right to vote, leaving the right itself untouched. They may, for example, make reason- able provisions for determining the age, length of residence, etc., of persons who offer to vote. Such regulations are valid, provided they do not amount to a denial or invasion of the right conferred by the constitution. Ed- monds v. Banbury, 28 Iowa, 267, 4 Am. Rep. 177; Southerland »v. Norris, 74 Md. 326, 22 Atl. 137, 28 Am. St. Rep. 255; Pope v. Williams, 98 Md. 59, 56 Atl. 543, 103 Am. St. Rep. 379, 66 L. R. A. 398, affirmed 193 U. S. 621, 48 L. ed. 817, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 573; Capen v. Foster, 12 Pick. 485, 23 Am. Dec. 632; State ex rel. Klein v. Hillenbrand, 101 Ohio St. 370, 130 N. E. 29, 14 A. L. R. 255; State ez rel. Cothren v. Leon, 9 Wis. 279; State ex rel. Wood v. Baker, 38 Wis. 71. Thus a statute requiring an applicant for registration as a qualified elector of a municipality to state his or her age has been held valid. State ez rel. Klein v. Hillenbrand, 101 Ohio St. 370, 180 N. E. 29, 14 A. L. R. 255. The legislature cannot add to the constitutional qualifications of an officer: People v. McCormick, 261 Ill. 413, 103 N. E. 1053, Ann. Cas. 1915 A, 338; Feibleman v. State, 98 Ind. 516; State v. Craig, 132 Ind. 54, 31 N. E. 352, 32 Am. St. Rep. 237, 16 L. R. A. 140 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I 688 ; State v. Goldthwait, 172 Ind. 210, 87 N. E. 138, 19 Ann. Cas. 737; Barker v. People, 3 Cow. 686, 15 Am. Dec. 322. But see State v. McAllister, 38 W. Va. 485, 18S. E. 770, 24L. R. A. 343; nor shorten the constitutional term of an office: Howard ». State, 10 Ind. 99; Cotten v. Ellis, 7 Jones, N. C. 545; State v. Askew, 48 Ark. 82, 2 S. W. 349. But see State v. Plasters, 74 Neb. 652, 105 N. W. 1092, 3 L. R. A. (N. s.) 887, 13 Ann. Cas. 154; Booten v. Pinson, 77 W. Va. 412, 89 5S. E. 985, L. R. A. 1917 A, 1244; nor practically abolish the office by repealing provision for salary: Reid v. Smoulter, 128 Pa. 324, 5 L. R. A. 517, 18 Atl. Rep. 445; People v. Howland, 155 N. Y. 270, 49 N. BE. 775, 41 L. R. A. 838; nor extend the constitutional term: People v. Bull, 46 N. Y. 57; Goodin v. Thoman, 10 Kan. 191; State v. Brewster, 44 Ohio St. 589, 6 N. E. 653; Kahn v. Sutro, 114 Cal. 316, 46 Pac. 87, 33 L. R. A. 620; Gemmer v. State, 163 Ind. 150, 71 N. E. 478, 66 L. R. A. 82. But see State v. Plasters, 74 Neb. 652, 105 N. W. 1092, 3 L. R. A. (nN. 8.) 887, 13 Ann. Cas. 154. See also Hill ». Slade, 41 Md. 640, 48 Atl. 64; but see Jordan v. Bailey, 37 Minn. 174, 33 N. W. 778; nor add to the constitu- tional grounds for removing an officer: Lowe v. Commonwealth, 3 Met. (Ky.) 237; Brown v. Grover, 6 Bush, 1; People v. Howland, 155 N. Y. 270, 49 N. E. 775, 41 L. R. A. 838; as by enacting that intoxication while dis- charging his duties shall be deemed misfeasance in office, Com. v. Williams, 79 Ky. 42; but see McComas ». Krug, 81 Ind. 327; nor change the compensation prescribed by the con- stitution: King v. Hunter, 65 N. C. 603; see also, on these questions, post, p. 388, note; nor provide for the choice of officers a different mode from that prescribed by the constitution: People v. Raymond, 37 N. Y. 428; Devoy v. New York, 35 Barb. 264; 22 How. Pr. 226; People v. Blake, 49 Barb. 9; People v. Albertson, 55 N. Y. 50; Opinions of Justices, 117 Mass. 603 ; State v. Goldstucker, 40 Wis. 124; see post, p. 561, note. A legislative extension of an electiveCHAP. IV] The Light which the Purpose to CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 141 be accomplished may afford in Construction. The considerations thus far suggested are such as have no regard to extrinsic circumstances, but are those by the aid of which we seek to arrive at the meaning of the constitution from an examination of the words employed. It is possible, however, that after we shall have made use of all the lights which the instrument itself affords, there may still be doubts to clear up and ambiguities to explain. Then, and only then, are we warranted in seeking elsewhere for aid. We are not to import difficulties into a constitution, by a considera- tion of extrinsic facts, when none appear upon its face. If, however, a difficulty really exists, which an examination of every part of the instrument does not enable us to remove, there are certain extrinsic aids which may be resorted to, and which are more or less satisfactory in the light they afford. Among these aids is a contemplation of the object to be accomplished or the mischef designed to be remedied or guarded against by the clause in which the ambiguity is met with.’ office is void as applied to incumbents. People v. McKinney, 52 N. Y. 374. Where the constitution limits the term, appointee under statute providing for holding during good behavior cannot hold beyond constitutional term. Neumeyer v. Krakel, 110 Ky. 624, 62 S. W. 518. It is not unconstitutional to allow the governor to supply temporary vacancies in offices which under the constitution are elective. Sprague 2. Brown, 40 Wis. 612. But such vacancy does not arise by mere failure to hold the election. Ijams v. Duvall, 85 Md. 252, 36 Atl. 819, 36 L. R. A. 127. Enumeration in constitution of certain modes in which vacancies arise does not prevent legislative creation of other modes. State v. Lansing, 46 Neb. 514, 64 N. W. 1104, 35 L. R. A. 124. Illness of governor which dis- ables him to perform his duties is such vacancy as authorizes the officer designated by the constitution to assume the powers and discharge the duties of the governor until the dis- ability is removed. Barnard v. Tag- gart, 66 N. H. 362, 29 Atl. 1027, 25 L. R. A. 613. Where the term fixed by statute is unconstitutional, the tenure is at the will of the appointing “When we once know the reason power. Lewis v. Lewelling, 53 Kan. 201, 36 Pac. 351, 23 L. R. A. 510. 1 Alexander v. Worthington, 5 Md. 471; District Township v. Dubuque, 7 Iowa, 262; Rhode Island v. Massachu- setts, 12 Pet. 657, 9 L. ed. 1233; Jarrolt v. Moberly, 103 U. S. 580, 26 L. ed. 492; Fargo v. Powers, 220 Fed. 697; Greenlee County v. Laine, 20 Ariz. 296, 180 Pac. 151; In re Russell, 163 Cal. 668, 126 Pac. 875, Ann. Cas. 1914 A, 152; Story »v. Richardson, 186 Cal. 162, 198 Pac. 1057, 18 A. L. R. 750; State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389, 10 Am. Rep. 42; Cory ». Carter, 48 Ind. 327, 17 Am. Rep. 738 ; Kelso v. Cook, 184 Ind. 173, 110 N. E. 987, Ann. Cas. 1918 E, 68; State v. Brown, 97 Minn. 402, 106 N. W. 477, 5 L. R. A. (Nn. 8.) 827; Shohoney ». Quincy, etc., R. Co., 231 Mo. 131, 132 S. W. 1059, Ann. Cas. 1912 A, 1143; Hale v. Everett, 53 N. H. 9, 16 Am. Rep. 82; Wilkes County ». Call, 123 N. C. 308, 31S. E. 481, 44 L. R. A 252; Smith v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 39 Wash. 355, 81 Pac. 840, 109 Am. St. Rep. 889, 70 L. R. A. 1018. See Smith v. People, 47 N. Y. 330; People v. Potter, 47 N. Y. 375; Ball v. Chad- wick, 46 Ill. 28; Sawyer ». Insurance Co., 46 Vt. 697.142 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. 1 which alone determined the will of the lawmakers, we ought to interpret and apply the words used in a manner suitable and con- sonant to that reason, and as will be best calculated to effectuate the intent. Great caution should always be observed in the applica- tion of this rule to particular given cases; that is, we ought always to be certain that we do know, and have actually ascertained, the true and only reason which induced the act. It is never allowable to indulge in vague and uncertain conjecture, or in supposed reasons and views of the framers of an act, where there are none known with any degree of certainty.”! The prior state of the law will some- times furnish the clue to the real meaning of the ambiguous pro- vision,” and it is especially important to look into it if the constitution is the successor to another, and in the particular in question essential changes have apparently been made Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention. When the inquiry is directed to ascertaining the mischief designed to be remedied, or the purpose sought to be accomplished by a particular provision, it may be proper to examine the proceedings of the convention which framed the instrument. 1 Smith on Stat. and Const. Con- struction, 634. See also remarks of Bronson, J., in People v. Purdy, 2 Hill, 35-37. ? Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 376; Henry v. Tilson, 19 Vt. 447; Hamilton v. St. Louis County Court, 15 Mo. 3; People v. Gies, 25 Mich. 83; Servis v. Beatty, 32 Miss. 52; Bandel v. Isaac, 13 Md. 202; Story on Const. § 428; Newport News v. Woodward, 104 Va. 58, 51S. E. 193, 7 Ann. Cas. 625. Decisions made prior to the adop- tion of a constitution may be con- sidered in construing its provisions. In re Contested Election, 281 Pa. St. 131, 126 Atl. 199, 85 A. L. R. 815. ‘People v. Blodgett, 13 Mich. 127, 147; Newport News »v. Woodward, 104 Va. 58, 51 S. E. 193, 7 Ann. Cas. 625. * Per Walworth, Chancellor, Coutant v. People, 11 Wend. 511, 518, and Clark v. People, 26 Wend. 599, 602; per Bronson, J., People v. Purdy, 2 Hill, 31; People ». N. Y. Central Railroad Co., 24 N. Y. 485. See State v. Kennon, 7 Ohio St. 546; Wisconsin Cent. R. R. Co. v. Taylor Where the pro- Co., 52 Wis. 37, 8 N. W. 833; State v. Barnes, 24 Fla. 29, 3 So. 433; Legal Tender Case, 110 U. S. 421, 28 L. ed. 204, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 122; McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 36 L. ed. 869, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 3; Kentucky Union Co. ». Commonwealth of Kentucky, 219 U. S. 140, 55 L. ed. 187, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 171; Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Kansas, 248 U. S. 276, 63 L. ed. 239, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 93, 2 A. L. R. 1589; Story v. Richardson, 186 Cal. 162, 198 Pac. 1057, 18 A. L. R. 750; Butts County v. Jackson Banking Co., 129 Ga. 801, 60 S. E. 149, 121 Am. St. Rep. 244, 15 L. R. A. (Nn. 8.) 567; Schmitt v. F. W. Cook Brewing Co., 187 Ind. 623, 120 N. E. 19, 3 A. L. R. 270; Atkinson v. Woodmansee, 68 Kan. 71, 74 Pac. 640, 64 L. R. A. 325; State v. Sessions, 84 Kan. 856, 115 Pac. 641, Ann. Cas. 1912 A, 796; Com. v. International Harvester Co., 131 Ky. 551, 115 S. W. 703, 1383 Am. St. Rep. 256; Sherill ». O’Brien, 188 N. Y. 185, 81 N. E. 124, 117 Am. St. Rep. 841; Steele, etc., Co. v. Miller, 92 Ohio St. 115, 110 N. E. 648, Ann. Cas. 1917, C7926) tas Re A. 1916). C0236CHAP. IV] CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 143 ceedings clearly point out the purpose of the provision, the aid will be valuable and satisfactory; but where the question is one of abstract meaning, it will be difficult to derive from this source much reliable assistance in interpretation. Every member of such a con- vention acts upon such motives and reasons as influence him personally, and the motions and debates do not necessarily indicate the purpose of a majority of a convention in adopting a particular clause. It is quite possible for a clause to appear so clear and un- ambiguous to the members of a convention as to require neither discussion nor illustration; and the few remarks made concerning it in the convention might have a plain tendency to lead directly away from the meaning in the minds of the majority. It is equally possible for a part of the members to accept a clause in one sense and a part in another. And even if we were certain we had attained to the meaning of the convention, it is by no means to be allowed a controlling force, especially if that meaning appears not to be the one which the words would most naturally and obviously convey.’ For as the constitution does not derive its force from the convention which framed, but from the people who ratified it, the intent to be arrived at is that of the people, and it is not to be supposed that they have looked for any dark or abstruse meaning in the words employed, but rather that they have accepted them in the sense most obvious to the common understanding, and ratified the instrument in the belief that that was the sense designed to be conveyed.? These proceedings therefore are less conclusive of the proper construction of the instrument than are legislative proceedings of the proper con- struction of a statute; since in the latter case it is the intent of the legislature we seek, while in the former we are endeavoring to arrive at the intent of the people through the discussions and deliberations of their representatives. The history of the calling of the conven- Scribner v. State, 9 Okla. Crim. Rep. 465, 132 Pac. 933, Ann. Cas. 1915 B, 387; Sanipoli v. Pleasant Valley Coal Co., 31 Utah, 114, 86 Pac. 865, 10 Ann. Cas. 1142; Cooper v. Utah Light, etc., Co., 35 Utah, 570, 102 Pac. 202, 136 Am. St. Rep. 1075; Nunne- macher v. State, 129 Wis. 190, 108 N. W. 627, 9 L. R. A. (wv. 8.) 121, 9 Ann. Cas. 711. 1Taylor v. Taylor, 10 Minn. 107. And see Eakin v. Raub, 12 8. & R. 352; Aldridge v. Williams, 3 How. 1, 11 L. ed. 469; State v. Doron, 5 Nev. 399; Steele, etc., Co. v. Miller, 92 Ohio St. 115, 110 N. E. 648, L. R. A. 1916 C, 1023, Ann. Cas. 1917 C, 926; Scribner v. State, 9 Okla. Crim. Rep. 465, 132 Pac. 933, Ann. Cas. 1915 B, 387. 2 State v. Mace, 5 Md. 337; Manly v. State, 7 Md. 135; Hills v. Chicago, 60 Ill. 86; Beardstown v. Virginia, 76 Til. 34; Butts County ». Jackson Banking Co., 129 Ga. 801, 60 S. E. 149, 121 Am. St. Rep. 244, 15 Ti; Re A: (x. s.) 567; People v. Emmerson, 302 Ill. 300, 134 N. BE. 707, 21 A. L. R. 636; Scribner v. State, 9 Okla. Crim. Rep. 465, 1382 Pac. 933, Ann. Cas. 1915 B, 387.144 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I tion, the causes which led to it, and the discussions and issues before the people at the time of the election of the delegates, will some- times be quite as instructive and satisfactory as anything to be gathered from the proceedings of the convention.! Contemporaneous and Practical Construction. An important question which now suggests itself is this: How far the contemporaneous interpretation, or the subsequent prac- tical construction of any particular provision of the constitution, is to have weight with the courts when the time arrives at which a judicial decision becomes necessary. Contemporaneous inter- pretation may indicate merely the understanding with which the people received it at the time, or it may be accompanied by acts done in putting the instrument in operation, and which neces- sarily assume that it is to be construed in a particular way. In the first case it can have very little force, because the evidences of the public understanding, when nothing has been done under the provision in question, must always of necessity be vague and indecisive. But where there has been a practical construction, which has been acquiesced in for a considerable period, considera- tions in favor of adhering to this construction sometimes present themselves to the courts with a plausibility and force which it is not easy to resist. Indeed, where a particular construction has been generally accepted as correct, and especially when this has occurred contemporaneously with the adoption of the constitution, and by those who had opportunity to understand the intention of the instrument, it is not to be denied that a strong presumption exists that the construction rightly interprets the intention2 And 1See People v. Harding, 53 Mich. 481, 19 N. W. 155; Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657, 9 L. ed. 1915 B, 387; State v. Clausen, 85 Wash. 260, 148 Pac. 28, Ann. Cas. 1916 B, 810. 1233; Boushaber v. Union Pac. R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 60 L. ed. 493, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 236, L. R. A. 1907 D, 414, Ann. Cas. 1917 B, 713; Kelso v. Cook, 184 Ind. 173, 110 N. E. 987, Ann. Cas. 1918 E, 68; State v. Mockus, 120 Me. ce WIG} AL Ghd, IE ANS lly IRD GRATE Bradford Construction Co. v. Heflin, 88 Miss. 314, 42 So. 174, 12 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 1040, 8 Ann. Cas. 1077; State v. Alderson, 49 Mont. 387, 142 Pac. 210, Ann. Cas. 1916 B, 39; Hz parte Ming, 42 Nev. 472, 181 Pac. 319, 6 A. L. R. 1216; Scribner v. State, 9 Okla. Crim. Rep. 465, 1382 Pac. 933, Ann. Cas. 2 Amos v. Moseley, 74 Fla. 555, 77 So. 619, L. R. A. 1918 C, 482; Elling- ham v. Dyer, 178 Ind. 336, 99 N. E. 1, Ann. Cas. 1915 C, 200; State v. Mockus, 120 Me. 84, 113 Atl. 39, 14 A. L. R. 871; Evanhoff v. State Industrial Acc. Commission, 78 Oreg. 508, 154 Pac. 106; .State ex rel. Blakeslee v. Clausen, 85 Wash. 260, 148 Pac. 28, Ann. Cas. 1918 B, 810; Duncan »v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., 68 W. Va. 293, 69 S. E. 1004, Ann. Cas. 1912 B, 272. It requires a very clear case to justify changing the construction of aCHAP. IV] CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 145 where this has been given by officers in the discharge of their official duty, and rights have accrued in reliance upon it, which would be divested by a decision that the construction was erroneous, the argument ab inconvenienti is sometimes allowed to have very great weight.! The Supreme Court of the United States has had frequent occa- sion to consider this question. In Stuart v. Laird, decided in 1803, that court sustained the authority of its members to sit as circuit judges on the ground of a practical construction, commencing with the organization of the government. In Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee,* Justice Story, after holding that the appellate power of the United States extends to cases pending in the State courts, and that the 25th section of the Judiciary Act, which authorized its exercise, was supported by the letter and spirit of the Constitution, proceeds to say: “Strong as this con- clusion stands upon the general language of the Constitution, it may still derive support from other sources. It is an historical fact, that this exposition of the Constitution, extending its appellate power to State courts, was, previous to its adoption, uniformly and publicly avowed by its friends, and admitted by its enemies, as the basis of their respective reasonings both in and out of the State conventions. It is an historical fact, that at the time when the Judiciary Act was submitted to the deliberations of the First Con- gress, composed, as it was, not only of men of great learning and ability, but of men who had acted a principal part in framing, supporting, or opposing that Constitution, the same exposition was explicitly declared and admitted by the friends and by the opponents of that system. It is an historical fact, that the Supreme Court of the United States have from time to time sustained this appellate jurisdiction in a great variety of cases, brought from the tribunals of many of the most important States in the Union, and that no State tribunal has ever breathed a judicial doubt on the subject, trolling where there was no such acquiescence on the part of the judicial department. Board of Trustees ». Outagamie County, 150 Wis. 244, 136 N. W. 619, 2. A. L. R. 465. constitution, conceded to be somewhat involved, which has been uninter- ruptedly acquiesced in, for so long a period as fifty years. State v. Frear, 138 Wis. 536, 120 N. W. 216, 16 Ann. Cas. 1019. In Wisconsin it has been held that the rule that uninterrupted practice of the government prevailing through a long series of years and the acquies- cence of all its departments settle a constitutional interpretation in accord- ance with such practice, is not con- vou. 1—10 1 Amos v. Mosley, 74 Fla. 555, 77 So. 619, L. R. A. 1918 C, 482; Evanhoff v. State Industrial Acc. Commission, 78 Oreg. 503, 154 Pac. 106. 21 Cranch, 299, 2 L. ed. 115. 31 Wheat. 304, 351, 4 L. ed. 97, 109. See Story on Const. §§ 405-408.146 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I or declined to obey the mandate of the Supreme Court, until the present occasion. This weight of contemporaneous exposition by all parties, this acquiescence by enlightened State courts, and these judicial decisions of the Supreme Court through so long a period, do, as we think, place the doctrine upon a foundation of authority which cannot be shaken without delivering over the subject to perpetual and irremediable doubts.” The same doctrine was subsequently supported by Chief Justice Marshall in a case involving the same point, and in which he says that “great weight has always been attached, and very rightly attached, to contemporaneous exposi- tion.” ! In Bank of United States v. Halstead? the question was made, whether the laws of the United States authorizing the courts of the Union so to alter the form of process of execution used in the Supreme Courts of the States in September, 1789, as to subject to 1 Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 418, 5 L. ed. 257, 294. As to the weight to be given to proceedings and debates in a constitu- tional convention in interpreting pro- visions of the constitution, see Car- penter v. Pennsylvania, 17 How. 456, 15 L. ed. 127; Legal Tender Case, 110 U. S. 421, 28 L. ed. 204, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 122; McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1, 36 L. ed. 869, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 3; United States ». Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649, 42 L. ed. 890, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 456; Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 44 L. ed. 597, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 448; Orr v. Gilman, 183 U.S. 278, 46 L. ed. 196, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 213; Kentucky Union Co. ». Com- monwealth of Kentucky, 219 U. S. 140, 55 L. ed. 137, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 171; Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Kansas, 248 U. S. 276, 63 L. ed. 239, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 93, 2 A. L. R. 1589; Story ». Richardson, 186 Cal. 162, 198 Pac. 1057; 18 A. L. R. 750; Norwalk St. Ry. Co.’s Appeal, 69 Conn. 576, 37 Atl. 1080, 38 Atl. 708, 39 L. R. A. 794; Butts County v. Jackson Banking Co., 129 Ga. 801, 60 S. E. 149, 121 Am. St. Rep. 244, 15 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 567; People v. Emmerson, 302 Ill. 300, 134 N. E. 707, 21 A. L. R. 636; State v. Denny, 118 Ind. 382, 21 N. E. 252, 4L. R. A. 79; State v. Denny, 118 Ind. 449, 21 N. E. 274, 4 L. R. A. 65; In re Denny, 156 Ind. 104, 59 N. E 359, 51 L. R. A. 722; Schmitt »v. F. W. Cook Brewing Co., 187 Ind. 623, 120 N. E. 19,3 A. L. R. 270; Atkinson v. Woodmansee, 68 Kan. 71, 74 Pac. 640, 64 L. R. A. 325; State v. Sessions, 84 Kan. 856, 115 Pac. 641; Ann. Cas. 1912 A, 796; Com. »v. International Harvester Co., 131 Ky. 551, 115 S. W. 703, 133 Am. St. Rep. 256; State v. Camp Sing, 18 Mont. 128, 44 Pac. 516, 56 Am. St. Rep. 551, 32 L. R. A. 635; Sherill v. O’Brien, 188 N. Y. 185, 81 N. E, 124, 117 Am. St. Rep. 841; Keating v. Spink, 3 Ohio St. 105, 62 Am. Dec. 214; State v. Foraker, 46 Ohio St. 677, 23 N. E. 491, 6 L. R. A. 422; Steele, etc., Co. v. Miller, 92 Ohio St. 115, 110 N. E. 648, L. R. A. 1916 C, 1023, Ann. Cas. 1917 C, 926; State v. Carew, 13 Rich. L. (S. C.) 48, 199 Am. Dec. 245; McCully v. State, 102 Tenn. 509, 53 S. W. 134, 46 L. R. A. 567; Sanipoli v. Pleasant Valley Coal Co., 31 Utah, 114, 86 Pac. 865, 10 Ann. Cas. 1142; Cooper v. Utah Light, etc., Co., 35 Utah, 570, 102 Pac. 202, 136 Am. St. Rep. 1075; Peninsular Lead & C. Works v. Union Oil & P. Co., 100 Wis. 488, 76 N. W. 359, 69 Am. St. Rep. 934, 42 L. R. A. 331; Nunnemacher ». State, 129 Wis. 190, 108 N. W. 627, 9L. R. A. (w. s.) 121, 9 Ann. Cas. 711; Rasmussen v. Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 50 Pac. 819, 38 L. R. A. 773. 210 Wheat. 51, 63, 6 L. ed. 264, 267.CHAP. IV] CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 147 execution lands and other property not thus subject by the State laws in force at that time, were constitutional; and Mr. Justice Thompson, in language similar to that of Chief Justice Marshall in the preceding case, says: “If any doubt existed whether the act of 1792 vests such power in the courts, or with respect to its con- stitutionality, the practical construction given to it ought to have great weight in determining both questions.” And Mr. Justice Johnson assigns a reason for this in a subsequent case: “Every candid mind will admit that this is a very different thing from contending that the frequent repetition of wrong will create a right. It proceeds upon the presumption that the contemporaries of the Constitution have claims to our deference on the question of right, because they had the best opportunities of informing themselves of the understanding of the framers of the Constitution, and of the sense put upon it by the people when it was adopted by them.” ? Like views have been expressed by Chief Justice Wazte in a recent decision.” Great deference has been paid in all cases to the action of the executive department, where its officers have been called upon, under the responsibilities of their official oaths, to inaugurate a new system, and where it is to be presumed they have carefully and conscientiously weighed all considerations, and endeavored to keep within the letter and the spirit of the Constitution. If the question involved is really one of doubt, the force of their judgment, especially in view of the injurious consequences that may result from disregarding it, is fairly entitled to turn the scale in the judicial mind* [So a construction of the Constitution 1 Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 290, 6 L. ed. 632. See Pike v. Megoun, 44 Mo. 491; State v. Parkinson, 5 Nev. 15. 2 Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, 22 L. ed. 627. To like effect is Ez parte Reynolds, 52 Ark. 330, 12 S. W. 570. And see Collins v. Henderson, 11 Bush, 74, 92. 3 Union Insurance Co. v. Hoge, 21 How. 35, 66, 16 L. ed. 61, 68; Ed- ward’s Lessee v. Darby, 12 Wheat. 206, 6 L. ed. 603; Hughes v. Hughes, 4 T. B. Monr. 42; Chambers v. Fisk, 22 Tex. 504; Britton v. Ferry, 14 Mich. 53; Bay City v. State Treasurer, 23 Mich. 499; Westbrook v. Miller, 56 Mich. 148, 22 N. W. 256; Plummer v. Plummer, 37 Miss. 185; Burgess v. Pue, 2 Gill, 11; State v. Mayhew, 2 Gill, 487; Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 376; Coutant v. People, 11 Wend. 511; People v. Dayton, 55 N. Y. 367; Farmers’ and Mechanics’ Bank v. Smith, 3S. & R. 63; Norris v. Clymer, 2 Pa. St. 277; Moers v. City of Read- ing, 21 Pa. St. 188; Washington ». Page, 4 Cal. 838; Surgett v. Lapice, 8 How. 48, 12 L. ed. 982; Bissell ». Penrose, 8 How. 317, 12 L. ed. 1095; Troup v. Haight, Hopk. 239; United States v. Gilmore, 8 Wall. 330, 19 L. ed. 396; Brown v. United States, 113 U. S. 568, 28 L. ed. 1079, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 648; Hedgecock v. Davis, 64 N. C. 650; Lafayette, &c. R. R. Co. v. Geiger, 34 Ind. 185; Bunn ». People, 45 Ill. 397; Scanlan v. Childs, 33 Wis. 663; Faribault v. Misener, 20 Minn. 396; State v. Glenn, 18 Nev. 34, 1148 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I adopted by the legislative department, and long accepted by the various agencies of government and the people, is, where the mean- ing of the language construed is capable of two interpretations, entitled to great weight.]! Pac. 186; State v. Kelsey, 44 N. J. L. 1; United States v. Ala. G. Southern R. Co., 142 U.S. 615, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 306; French v. State, 141 Ind. 618, 41 N. EB. 2, 29 L. R. A. 113; State v. Frear, 138 Wis. 536, 120 N. W. 216, 16 Ann. Cas. 1019. Where the Constitution has been construed by the political departments of the government in its application to a political question, the courts will not only give great consideration to their action, but will generally follow the construction implicitly. People v. Supervisors of La Salle, 100 Ill. 495. Upon whether or not an executive officer may raise the question of con- stitutionality of an act which casts ministerial duties upon him, as a de- fence to a mandamus proceeding to compel performance of such duties, see State v. Heard, 47 La. Ann. 1679, 18 So. 746, 47 L. R. A. 513, and cases col- lected in note thereto in L. R. A. 1 Hvanhoff v. State Industrial Acc. Commission, 78 Oreg. 503, 154 Pac. 106. See also Butte City Water Co. v. Baker, 196 U.S. 119, 49 L. ed. 409, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 211, affirming 28 Mont. 222, 72 Pac. 617, 104 Am. St. Rep. 683; Laird v. Sims, 16 Ariz. 521, 147 Pac. 738, L. R. A. 1915 F, 519; Amos v. Mosley, 74 Fla. 555, 77 So. 619, L. R. A. 1918 C, 182; Kelso »v. Cook, 184 Ind. 173, 110 N. E. 987, Ann. Cas. 1918 E, 68; State v. Ses- sions, 84 Kan. 865, 115 Pac. 641, Ann. Cas. 1912 A, 796; Way v. Barney, 116 Minn. 285, 133 N. W. 801, Ann. Cas. 1913 A, 719, 38 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 648; Wright v. May, 127 Minn. 150, 149 N. W. 9, L. R. A. 1915 B, 151; John- son v. Great Falls, 38 Mont. 369, 99 Pac. 1059, 16 Ann. Cas. 974; Ex parte Ming, 42 Nev. 472, 181 Pac. 319; State v. Packard, 35 N. D. 298, 160 INS Wi: 150; Rees 1917 B 710: Duncan »v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., 68 W. Va. 298, 69 S. E. 1004, Ann. Cas. 1912 B, 272; State v. Johnson, 170 Wis. 218, 175 N. W. 589, 7 A. L. R. 1617. A construction of the Constitution adopted by the legislative department, and long accepted by the various agencies of government and the people, will be usually accepted as correct by the courts. State v. Nashville Base- ball Club, 127 Tenn. 292, 154 S. W. 1151, Ann. Cas. 1514 B, 1248. While not conclusive, the construc- tion given by the Legislature to con- stitutional provisions dealing with legislative procedure is entitled to great weight. Johnson v. Great Falls, 38 Mont. 369, 99 Pac. 1059, 16 Ann. Cas. 974. The passage of an act by the first State legislature is a contemporary interpretation of a constitutional clause in pari materia of much weight. Cooper Mf’g Co. v. Ferguson, 113 U.S. 727, 28 L. ed. 1137, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 739; People v. Wright, 6 Col. 92. Where nearly fifty years have elapsed since the enactment of a statute and property rights have been established in recognition of its valid- ity, it will not be held unconstitu- tional unless its invalidity is clear. Hill v. Tohill, 225 Ill. 384, 80 N. B. 253, 8 Ann. Cas. 423. Where, under identical provisions in two State Constitutions exempting “manufacturers” from license taxa- tion, the Legislature has for more than twenty years imposed license taxes on the business of gas, electric, water- works, telegraph, and telephone com- panies, such a construction is entitled to great weight. State v. New Or- leans Ry. & Light Co., 116 La. 144, 40 So. 597, 7 Ann. Cas. 724. Where under the practical interpre- tation of a State constitution by the executive and legislative branches of the government for nearly half a cen- tury a statute providing for the free education of the deaf, dumb, and blind has been upheld, it is some ground for holding constitutional a statute makingCHAP. IV] CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 149 Where, however, no ambiguity or doubt appears in the law, we think the same rule obtains here as in other cases, that the court should confine its attention to the law, and not allow extrinsic circumstances to introduce a difficulty where the language is plain. To allow force to a practical construction in such a case would be to suffer manifest perversions to defeat the evident purpose of the law- makers. “Contemporary construction ... can never abrogate the text; it can never fritter away its obvious sense; it can never narrow down its true limitations; it can never enlarge its natural boundaries.” ! While we conceive this to be the true and only safe rule, we shall be obliged to confess that some of the cases appear, on first reading, not to have observed these limitations. In the ease of Stuart v. Laird,” above referred to, the practical construction was regarded as conclusive. To the objection that the judges of the Supreme Court had no right to sit as circuit judges, the court say: “Tt is sufficient to observe that practice and acquiescence under it for a period of several years, commencing with the organization of the judicial system, affords an irresistible answer, and has indeed fixed the construction. most forcible nature. It is a contemporary interpretation of the This practical exposition is too strong and obstinate to be shaken or controlled. Of course the question is at similar provision for others. Veterans’ Welfare Board v. Riley, 189 Cal. 159, 208 Pac. 678, 22 A. L. R. 1531. Where under color of authority long practical construction has sanc- tioned certain appointments by the legislature, it will control. Hovey v. State, 118 Ind. 502, 21 N. E. 890; Biggs ». McBride, 17 Oreg. 640, 21 Pac. 878. 1Story on Const. § 407. And see Evans v. Myers, 25 Pa. St. 116; Sadler v. Langham, 34 Ala. 311; Barnes v. First Parish in Falmouth, 6 Mass. 401; Union Pacific R. R. Co. v. United States, 10 Ct. of Cl. Rep. 548; s. c. in error, 91 U.S. 72, 23 L. ed. 224; St. Paul, M. & M. R. Co. »v. Phelps, 137 U. S. 528, 34 L. ed. 767, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 168; Merritt ». Cameron, 137 U. S. 542, 34 L. ed. 772, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 174; smosv. Mosley, 74 Fla. 555, 70 So. 619, L. R. A. 1918 C, 482; Fergus v. Brady, 277 Ill. 272, 115 N. E. 393, Ann. Cas. 1918 B, 220; Peabody v. Russel, 302 Ill. 111, 134 N. E. 150, 20 A. L. R. 972; County Commissioners of Somerset County v. Pocomoke Bridge Co., 109 Md. 1, 71 Atl. 462, 16 Ann. Cas. 874; Stumpf v. Storz, 156 Mich. 228, 120 N. W. 618, 132 Am. St. Rep. 521, 23 L. R. A. (x. s.) 152; State v. Beacon, 66 Ohio St. 491, 64 N. E. 427, 90 Am. St. Rep. 599; Hamann v. Heekin, 88 Ohio St. 207, 102 N. E. 730, Ann. Cas. 1915 A, 1058; Evanhoff v. State Industrial Ace. Commission, 78 Oreg. 503, 154 Pac. 106; Kucker v. Sunlight Oil & G. Co., 230 Pa. St. 528, 79 Atl. 747, Ann. Cas. 1912 A, 503; Kingsley »v. Merrill, 122 Wis. 185, 99 N. W. 1044, 2 Ann. Cas. 748, 67 L. R. A. 200; State y. Frear, 138 Wis. 536, 120 N. W. 216, 16 Ann. Cas. 1019; Board of Trustees v. Outagamie County, 150 Wis. 244, 136 N. W. 619, 2 A. L. R. 465. The construction placed upon a provision of the Constitution by the legislative and executive branches of the government will not be permitted to overturn and render nugatory a clear provision of the Constitution. Amos v. Mosley, 74 Fla. 555, 77 So. 619, L. R. A. 1918 C, 482. 21 Cranch, 299, 2 L. ed. 115.150 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoOL. 1 rest, and ought not now to be disturbed.” ‘This is certainly very strong language; but language very similar in character was used by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in one case where large and valuable estates depended upon a particular construction of a statute, and very great mischief would follow from changing it. The court said that, “although if it were now res integra, it might be very difficult to maintain such a construction, yet at this day the argument ab inconvenienti applies with great weight. We cannot shake a principle which in practice has so long and so extensively prevailed. If the practice originated in error, yet the error is now so common that it must have the force of law. The legal ground on which this provision is now supported is, that long and continued usage furnishes a contemporaneous construction which must pre- vail over the mere technical import of the words.’ ! Language nearly as strong was also used by the Supreme Court of Maryland, where the point involved was the possession of a certain power by the legislature, which it had constantly exercised for nearly seventy years.” It is believed, however, that in each of these cases an exami- nation of the Constitution left in the minds of the judges suffi- cient doubt upon the question of its violation to warrant their looking elsewhere for aids in interpretation, and that the cases are not in conflict with the general rule as above laid down. Ac- quiescence for no length of time can legalize a clear usurpation of power, where the people have plainly expressed their will in the Constitution, and appointed judicial tribunals to enforce it. A power is frequently yielded to merely because it is claimed, and it may be exercised for a long period, in violation of the constitutional prohibition, without the mischief which the Constitution was designed to guard against appearing, or without any one being suffi- ciently interested in the subject to raise the question; but these circumstances cannot be allowed to sanction a clear infraction of the Constitution.2 We think we allow to contemporary and 1 Rogers v. Goodwin, 2 Mass. 475. See also Fall v. Hazelrigg, 45 Ind. 576; Scanlan v. Childs, 33 Wis. 663. 2 State v. Mayhew, 2 Gill, 487. In Essex Co. v. Pacific Mills, 14 Allen, 389, the Supreme Court of Massachu- setts expressed the opinion that the constitutionality of the acts of Con- gress making treasury notes a legal tender ought not to be treated by a State court as open to discussion after the notes had practically constituted the currency of the country for five years. At a still later day, however, the judges of the Supreme Court of the United States held these acts void, though they afterwards receded from this position. 3 State ex rel. Attorney-General ». Beacon, 66 Ohio St. 491, 64 N. E. 427, 90 Am. St. Rep. 599. See further, on this subject, the cases of Sadler v. Langham, 34 Ala. 311, 334; People v. Allen, 42 N. Y.CHAP. IV] CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 151 practical construction its full legitimate force when we suffer it, where it is clear and uniform, to solve in its own favor the doubts which arise on reading the instrument to be construed.! 378; Brown v. State, 5 Col. 525; Hahn v. United States, 14 Ct. of Cl. 305; Swift v. United States, 14 Ct. of Cl. 481. Practical acquiescence in a supposed unconstitutional law is entitled to much greater weight when the defect which is pointed out relates to mere forms of expression or enactment than when it concerns the substance of legislation; and if the objection is purely technical, long acquiescence will be conclusive against it. Continental Imp. Co. v. Phelps, 47 Mich. 299, 11 N. W. 167. 1There are cases which clearly go further than any we have quoted, and which sustain legislative action which they hold to be usurpation, on the sole ground of long acquiescence. Thus in Brigham v. Miller, 17 Ohio, 446, the question was, Has the legislature power to grant divorces? The court say: “Our legislature have assumed and exercised this power for a period of more than forty years, although a clear and palpable assumption of power, and an encroachment upon the judicial department, in violation of the Constitution. To deny this long- exercised power, and declare all the consequences resulting from it void, is pregnant with fearful consequences. If it affected only the rights of prop- erty, we should not hesitate; but second marriages have been contracted and children born, and it would bas- tardize all these, although born under the sanction of an apparent wedlock, authorized by an act of the legislature before they were born, and in conse- quence of which the relation was formed which gave them birth. On account of these children, and for them only, we hesitate. And in view of this, we are constrained to content our- selves with simply declaring that the exercise of the power of granting divorces, on the part of the legislature, is unwarranted and unconstitutional, an encroachment upon the duties of the judiciary, and a striking down of the dearest rights of individuals, with- out authority of law. We trust we have said enough to vindicate the Con- stitution, and feel confident that no department of State has any disposi- tion to violate it, and that the evil will cease.” So in Johnson v. Joliet & Chicago Railroad Co., 23 Ill. 202, 207, the ques- tion was whether railroad corporations could be created by special law, with- out a special declaration by way of preamble that the object to be accom- plished could not be attained by gen- eral law. The court say: “It is now too late to make this objection, since, by the action of the general assembly under this clause, special acts have been so long the order of the day and the ruling passion with every legisla- ture which has convened under the Constitution, until their acts of this description fill a huge and misshapen volume, and important and valuable rights are claimed under them. The clause has been wholly disregarded, and it would now produce far-spread ruin to declare such acts unconstitu- tional and void. It is now safer and more just to all parties to declare that it must be understood that, in the opinion of the general assembly at the time of passing the special act, its object could not be attained under the general law, and this without any recital by way of preamble, as in the act to incorporate the Central Rail- road Company. That preamble was placed there by the writer of this opinion, and a strict compliance with this clause of the Constitution would have rendered it necessary in every subsequent act. But the legislature, in their widsom, have thought differ- ently, and have acted differently, until now our special legislation and its mis- chiefs are beyond recovery or remedy.” These cases certainly presented very strong motives for declaring the law to be what it was not; but it would have been interesting and useful if either of these learned courts had152 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I Unjust Provisions. We have elsewhere expressed the opinion that a statute can- not be declared void on the ground solely that it is repugnant to a supposed general intent or spirit which it is thought pervades or lies concealed in the Constitution, but wholly unexpressed, or because, in the opinion of the court, it violates fundamental rights or principles, if it was passed in the exercise of a power which the Constitution confers.’ Still enumerated the evils that must be placed in the opposite scale when the question is whether a constitutional rule shall be disregarded; not the least of which is, the encouragement of a disposition on the part of legis- lative bodies to set aside constitutional restrictions, in the belief that, if the unconstitutional law can once be put in force, and large interests enlisted under it, the courts will not venture to declare it void, but will submit to the usurpation, no matter how gross and daring. We agree with the Supreme Court of Indiana, that, in construing constitutions, courts have nothing to do with the argument ab inconvenienti, and should not “‘bend the Constitution to suit the law of the hour’’: Green- castle Township v. Black, 5 Ind. 557, 565; and with Bronson, Ch. J., in what he says in Oakley v. Aspinwall, 3.N. Y. 547, 568: ‘‘It is highly prob- able that inconveniences will result from following the Constitution as it is written. But that consideration can have no force with me. It is not for us, but for those who made the instrument, to supply its defects. If the legislature or the courts may take that office upon themselves, or if, under color of construction, or upon any other specious ground, they may depart from that which is plainly declared, the people may well despair of ever being able to set any boundary to the powers of the government. Written constitutions will be more than useless. Believing as I do that the success of free institutions depends upon a rigid adherence to the funda- mental law, I have never yielded to considerations of expediency in ex- pounding it. There is always some plausible reason for latitudinarian con- less will the injustice of a con- structions which are resorted to for the purpose of acquiring power; some evil to be avoided or some good to be attained by pushing the powers of the government beyond their legitimate boundary. It is by yielding to such influences that constitutions are gradu- ally undermined and finally over- thrown. My rule has ever been to follow the fundamental law as it is written, regardless of consequences. If the law does not work well, the people can amend it; and inconveni- ences can be borne long enough to await that process. But if the legis- lature or the courts undertake to cure defects by forced and unnatural con- structions, they inflict a wound upon the Constitution which nothing can heal. One step taken by the legisla- ture or the judiciary, in enlarging the powers of the government, opens the door for another which will be sure to follow; and so the process goes on until all respect for the fundamental law is lost, and the powers of the government are just what those in authority please to call them.’’ See also Encking v. Simmons, 28 Wis. 212. Whether there may not be circum- stances under which the State can be held justly estopped from alleging the invalidity of its own action in appor- tioning the political divisions of the State, and imposing burdens on citi- zens, where such action has been ac- quiesced in for a considerable period, and rights have been acquired through bearing the burdens under it, see Rum- sey v. People, 19 N. Y. 41; People v. Maynard, 15 Mich. 470; Kneeland v. Milwaukee, 15 Wis. 454. 1 See post, p. 351, and cases referred to in notes.CHAP. IV] | CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 153 stitutional provision authorize the courts to disregard it, or indirectly to annul it by construing it away. It is quite possible that the people may, under the influence of temporary prejudice, or a mis- taken view of public policy, incorporate provisions in their charter of government, infringing upon the proper rights of individual citizens or upon principles which ought ever to be regarded as sacred and fundamental in republican government; and it is also possible that obnoxious classes may be unjustly disfranchised. The remedy for such injustice must be found in the action of the people themselves, through an amendment of their work when better counsels prevail. Such provisions, when free from doubt, must receive the same construction as any other. We do not say, how- ever, that if a clause should be found in a constitution which should appear at first blush to demand a construction leading to monstrous and absurd consequences, it might not be the duty of the court to question and cross-question such clause closely, with a view to discover in it, if possible, some other meaning more consistent with the general purposes and aims of these instruments. When such a case arises, it will be time to consider it. Duty in Case of Doubt. But when all the legitimate lights for ascertaining the mean- ing of the constitution have been made use of, it may still happen that the construction remains a matter of doubt. In such a case it 'seems clear that every one called upon to act where, in his opinion, the proposed action would be of doubtful constitutionality, is bound upon the doubt alone to abstain from acting. Whoever derives power from the constitution to perform any public function is disloyal to that instrument, and grossly derelict in duty, if he does that which he is not reasonably satisfied the constitution per- mits. Whether the power be legislative, executive, or judicial, there is manifest disregard of constitutional and moral obligation by one who, having taken an oath to observe that instrument, takes part in an action which he cannot say he believes to be no violation of its provisions. A doubt of the constitutionality of any proposed legislative enactment should in any case be reason sufficient for refusing to adopt it; and, if legislators do not act upon this principle, the reasons upon which are based the judicial decisions sustaining legislation in very many cases will cease to be of force. 1MecMullen v. Hodge, 5 Tex. 34. Bailey ». Commonwealth, 11 Bush, See Clarke v. Irwin, 5 Nev. 111; 688. Walker v. Cincinnati, 21 Ohio St. 14;154 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I Directory and Mandatory Provisions. The important question sometimes presents itself, whether we are authorized in any case, when the meaning of a clause of the Constitution is arrived at, to give it such practical construction as will leave it optional with the department or officer to which it is addressed to obey it or not as he shall see fit. In respect to statutes it has long been settled that particular provisions may be regarded as directory merely; by which is meant that they are to be considered as giving directions which ought to be followed, but not as so limiting the power in respect to which the directions are given that it cannot effectually be exercised without observing them.1 The force of many of the decisions on this subject will be readily assented to by all; while others are some- times thought to go to the extent of nullifying the intent of the legislature in essential particulars. It is not our purpose to examine the several cases critically, or to attempt— what we deem im- possible — to reconcile them all; but we shall content ourselves with quoting from a few, with a view, if practicable, to ascertaining some line of principle upon which they can be classified. There are cases where the meaning, whether a statute was to be regarded as merely directory or not, was made to depend upon the employing or failing to employ negative words plainly importing that the act should be done in a particular manner or time, and not otherwise.2 The use of such words is often conclusive of an intent to impose a limitation; but their absence is by no means equally conclusive that the statute was not designed to be mandatory.? Lord Mansfield would have the question whether mandatory or not de- pend upon whether that which was directed to be done was or was not of the essence of the thing required.t The Supreme Court of New York, in an opinion afterwards approved by the Court of Appeals, laid down the rule as one settled by authority, that “statutes directing the mode of 1JIn State v. Aldeson, 49 Mont. 387, 142 Pac. 210, Ann. Cas. 1916 B, 39, the court said: ‘‘Much confusion has arisen by assuming that every manda- tory provision requires literal compli- ance, while a directory provision only is satisfied with substantial com- pliance. ... The entire disregard of a provision would not necessarily invalidate action taken under it if directory, but would if it was manda- tory.” 2Slayton v. Hulings, 7 Ind. 144; proceeding by public officers are King v. Inhabitants of St. Gregory, 2 Ad. & El. 99; King v. Inhabitants of Hipswell, 8 B. & C. 466. 3 District Township v. Dubuque, 7 Towa, 262, 284. 4 Rex v. Locksdale, 1 Burr. 447. See also, Gallup v. Smith, 59 Conn. 354, 22 Atl. 334, 12 L. R. A. 353; Brennan v. Weatherford, 53 Tex. 330, 37 Am. Rep. 758; State v. Superior Ct., 81 Wash. 623, 143 Pac. 461, Ann. Cas. 1916 B, 838.CHAP. IV] CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 155 directory, and are not regarded as essential to the validity of the proceedings themselves, unless it be so declared in the statute.” ? This rule strikes us as very general, and as likely to include within its scope, in many cases, things which are of the very essence of the proceeding. The questions in that case were questions of irregu- larity under election laws, not in any way hindering the complete expression of the will of the electors; and the court was doubtless right in holding that the election was not to be avoided for a failure in the officers appointed for its conduct to comply in all respects with the directions of the statute there in question. The same court in another case say: “Statutory requisitions are deemed directory only when they relate to some immaterial matter, where a compliance is a matter of convenience rather than of substance.” ? The Supreme Court of Michigan, in a case involving the validity of proceedings on the sale of land for taxes, laid down the rule that “what the law re- quires to be done for the protection of the taxpayer is mandatory, and cannot be regarded as directory merely.” * A similar rule has been recognized in a case in Illinois. Commissioners had been ap- pointed to ascertain and assess the damage and recompense due to the owners of land which might be taken, on the real estate of the persons benefited by a certain local improvement, in proportion as nearly as might be to the benefits resulting to each. By the statute, 1 People v. Cook, 14 Barb. 290; 8. c. SINE OM. 2 People v. Schermerhorn, 19 Barb. 540, 558. If a statute imposes a duty and gives the means of performing that duty, it must be held to be mandatory. Veaziev. China, 50 Me. 518. ‘It would not perhaps be easy to lay down any general rule as to when the provisions of a statute are merely directory, and when mandatory or imperative. Where the words are affirmative, and relate to the manner in which power or jurisdiction vested in a public officer or body is to be exercised, and not to the limits of the power or jurisdiction itself, they may, and often have been, construed to be directory; but neg- ative words, which go to the power or jurisdiction itself, have never, that i am aware of, been brought within that category. ‘A clause is directory,’ says Taunton, J., ‘when the provisions con- tain mere matter of discretion and no more; but not so when they are fol- lowed by words of positive prohibi- tion.’ Pearse v. Morrice, 2 Ad. & El. 96.” Per Sharswood, J., in Bladen v. Philadelphia, 60 Pa. St. 464, 466. And see Pittsburg v. Coursin, 74 Pa. St. 400; Kennedy v. Sacramento, 19 Fed. Rep. 580. Under a statute providing that a court may appoint three commissioners to determine public rights, ‘‘may” is mandatory, and parties cannot agree that less than three shall act. Mon- mouth v. Leeds, 76 Me. 28. 3 Clark v. Crane, 5 Mich. 150, 154. See also Young v. Joslin, 13 R. I. 675; Shawnee County v. Carter, 2 Kan. 115; Marx v. Hanthorn, 148 U. S. 172, 37 L. ed. 410, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 508. In Life Association v. Board of Assessors, 49 Mo. 512, it is held that a constitutional provision that “all property subject to taxation ought to be taxed in proportion to its value’”’ is a prohibition against its being taxed in any other mode, and the word ought is mandatory.156 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I when the assessment was completed, the commissioners were to sign and return the same to the city council within forty days of their appointment. This provision was not complied with, but return was made afterwards, and the question was raised as to its validity when thus made. In the opinion of the court, this question was to be decided by ascertaining whether any advantage would be lost, orright destroyed, or benefit sacrificed, either to the public or to any individual, by holding the provision directory. After remarking that they had held an assessment under the general revenue law, returned after the time appointed by law, as void, because the person assessed would lose the benefit of an appeal from the assess- ment,! they say of the statute before the court: “There are no negative words used declaring that the functions of the commis- sioners shall cease after the expiration of the forty days, or that they shall not make their return after that time; nor have we been able to discover the least right, benefit, or advantage which the property owner could derive from having the return made within that time, and not after. No time is limited and made dependent on that time, within which the owner of the property may apply to have the assessment reviewed or corrected. The next section requires the clerk to give ten days’ notice that the assessment has been returned, specifying the day when objections may be made to the assessment before the common council by parties interested, which hearing may be adjourned from day to day; and the common council is empowered in its discretion to confirm or annul the assess- ment altogether, or to refer it back to the same commissioners, or to others to be by them appointed. As the property owner has the same time and opportunity to prepare himself to object to the assess- ment and have it corrected, whether the return be made before or after the expiration of the forty days, the case differs from that of Marsh v. Chesnut,” at the very point on which that case turned. Nor is there any other portion of the chapter which we have dis- covered, bringing it within the principle of that case, which is the well-recognized rule in all the books.” 3 The rule is nowhere more clearly stated than by Chief Justice Shaw, in Torrey v. Milbury,? which was also a tax case. “In con- 1 Wheeler v. Chicago, 24 Ill. 105,108. therefore not material to be followed, 214 Il. 223. it is upon the assumption that the ’ Wheeler v. Chicago, 24 Ill. 105, 108. legislature itself so considered it, and 421 Pick. 64, 67. We commend in did not make the right conferred de- the same connection the views of Lewis, pendent upon a compliance with Ch. J., in Corbett v. Bradley, 7 Nev. the form prescribed for securing it. 108: “When any requirement of a It is upon this principle that the statute is held to be directory, and courts often hold the time designatedCHAP. IV] | CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 157 sidering the various statutes regulating the assessment of taxes, and the measures preliminary thereto, it is not always easy to distinguish which are conditions precedent to the legality and validity of the tax, and which are directory merely, and do not constitute conditions. One rule is very plain and well settled, that all those measures that are intended for the security of the citizen, for ensuring equality of taxation, and to enable every one to know with reasonable certainty for what polls and for what real and personal estate he is taxed, and for what all those who are liable with him are taxed, are conditions precedent ; and if they are not observed, he is not legally taxed; and he may resist it in any of the modes authorized by law for contesting the validity of the tax. But many regulations are made by statutes designed for the information of assessors and officers, and intended to promote method, system, and uniformity in the modes of proceeding, a compliance or non-compliance with which does in no respect affect the rights of taxpaying citizens. These may be considered direc- tory; officers may be liable to legal animadversion, perhaps to punishment, for not observing them; but yet their observance is not a condition precedent to the validity of the tax We shall quote further only from a single other case upon this point. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in considering the validity of a statute not published within the time required by law, “understand the doctrine concerning directory statutes to be this: that where there is no substantial reason why the thing to be done might not as well be done after the time prescribed as before, no presumption that by allowing it to be so done it may work an injury or wrong, nothing in the act itself, or in other acts relating to the same subject-matter, indicating that the legislature did not intend that it should rather be done after the time prescribed than not to be done at all, there the courts assume that the intent was, that if not done within the time prescribed it might be done afterwards. But when any of these reasons intervene, then the limit is established.’ ? in a statute, where a thing is to be done, to be directory. No court cer- tainly has the right to hold any re- quirement of a law unnecessary to be complied with, unless it be mani- fest the legislature did not intend to impose the consequence which would naturally follow from a non-compli- ance, or which would result from holding the requirement mandatory or indispensable. If it be clear that no penalty was intended to be imposed for a non-compliance, then, as a matter of course, it is but carrying out the will of the legislature to declare the statute in that respect to be simply directory. But if there be anything to indicate the contrary, a full compliance with it must be enforced.” See also Hurford v. Omaha, 4 Neb. 336. 1State v. Lean, 9 Wis. 279, 292. See further, for the views of this court158 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I These cases perhaps sufficiently indicate the rules, so far as any of general application can be declared, which are to be made use of in determining whether the provisions of a statute are man- datory or directory. Those directions which are not of the essence of the thing to be done, but which are given with a view merely to the proper, orderly, and prompt conduct of the business, and by a failure to obey which the rights of those interested will not be prejudiced, are not commonly to be regarded as mandatory; and if the act is performed, but not in the time or in the precise mode indicated, it may still be sufficient, if that which is done accomplishes the substantial purpose of the statute.! But this rule presupposes that no negative words are employed in the statute which expressly or by necessary implication forbid the doing of the act at any other time or in any other manner than as directed. Even as thus laid on the subject here discussed, Wendel v. Durbin, 26 Wis. 390. The general doctrine of the cases above quoted is approved and followed in French »v. Edwards, 13 Wall. 506, 20 L. ed. 702. In Low v. Dunham, 61 Me. 566, a statute is said to be mandatory where public interests or rights are concerned, and the public or third persons have a claim de jure that the power shall be exercised. And see Wiley v. Flour- noy, 30 Ark. 609; State Auditor v. Jackson Co., 65 Ala. 142. 1 The following, in addition to those cited, are some of the cases in this country in which statutes have been declared directory only: Odiorne ». Rand, 59 N. H. 504; Pond v. Negus, 3 Mass. 230; Williams v. School Dis- trict, 21 Pick. 75; City of Lowell ». Hadley, 8 Met. 180; Holland v. Os- good, 8 Vt. 276; Corliss v. Corliss, 8 Vt. 373; People v. Allen, 6 Wend. 486; Marchant »v. Langworthy, 6 Hill, 646; Hx parte Heath, 3 Hill, 42; People v. Holley, 12 Wend. 481; Jack- son v. Young, 5 Cow. 269; Striker »v. Kelley, 7 Hill, 9; People v. Peck, 11 Wend. 604; Matter of Mohawk & Hudson Railroad Co., 19 Wend. 135; People v. Runkel, 9 Johns. 147; Gale v. Mead, 2 Denio, 160; Doughty ». Hope, 3 Denio, 249; Elmendorf »v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 25 Wend. 692; Thames Manufacturing Co. ». Lathrop, 7 Conn. 550; Colt v. Eves, 12 Conn. 243; People v. Doe, 1 Mich. 451; Parks v. Goodwin, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 56; Hickey v. Hinsdale, 8 Mich. 267; People v. Hartwell, 12 Mich. 508; State v. McGinley, 4 Ind. 7; Stayton v. Hulings, 7 Ind. 144; New Orleans v. St. Romes, 9 La. Ann. 573; Edwards v. James, 13 Tex. 52; State v. Click, 2 Ala. 26; Savage v. Walshe, 26 Ala. 620; Sorchan v. Brooklyn, 62 N. Y. 339; People v. Tompkins, 64 N. Y. 53; Limestone Co. v. Rather, 48 Ala. 483; Webster v. French, 12 Ill. 302; McKune ». Weller, 11 Cal. 49; State v. Co. Com- missioners of Baltimore, 29 Md. 516; Fry v. Booth, 19 Ohio St. 25; Whalin v. Macomb, 76 Ill. 49; Hurford »v. Omaha, 4 Neb. 336; Lackawanna Iron Co. v. Little Wolf, 38 Wis. 152; R. R. Co. v. Warren Co., 10 Bush, 711; Grant v. Spencer, 1 Mont. 1386; Oua- chita Power Co. v. Donaghey, 106 Ark. 48, 152 S. W. 1012, Ann. Cas. 1915 A, 447; Kennerson v. Thames Towboat Co., 89 Com. 367, 94 Atl. 372, L. R. A. 1916 A, 436; People v. Graham, 267 Ill. 426, 108 N. E. 699, Ann. Cas. 1916 C, 391; Ex parte St. Hilaire, 101 Me. 522, 64 Atl. 882, 8 Ann. Cas. 385; Newhouse v. Alexander, 27 Okla. 46, 110 Pac. 1121, 30 L. R. A. (w. s.) 602, Ann. Cas. 1912 B, 674; Dillingham v. Spartanburg, 75 S. C. 549, 56S. E. 381, 117 Am. St. Rep. 917, 8 L. R. A. (nN. 8.) 412, 9 Ann. Cas. 829; Pearson v. School Dist. No. 8, 144 Wis. 620, 129 N. W. 940, 140 Am. St. Rep. 1048.CHAP. IV] CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 159 down and restricted, the doctrine is one to be applied with much circumspection ; for it is not to be denied that the courts have some- times, in their anxiety to sustain the proceedings of careless or incompetent officers, gone very far in substituting a judicial view of what was essential for that declared by the legislature.’ But the courts tread upon very dangerous ground when they venture to apply the rules which distinguish directory and man- datory statutes to the provisions of a constitution. Constitutions do not usually undertake to prescribe mere rules of proceeding, except when such rules are looked upon as essential to the thing to be done; and they must then be regarded in the light of limita- tions upon the power to be exercised. It is the province of an instrument of this solemn and permanent character to establish those fundamental maxims, and fix those unvarying rules by which all departments of the government must at all times shape their conduct; and if it descends to prescribing mere rules of order in unessential matters, it is lowering the proper dignity of such an instrument, and usurping the proper province of ordinary legislation. We are not therefore to expect to find in a constitution provisions which the people, in adopting it, have not regarded as of high importance, and worthy to be embraced in an instrument which, for a time at least, is to control alike the government and the governed, and to form a standard by which is to be measured the power which can be exercised as well by the delegate as by the sovereign people themselves. If directions are given respecting the times or modes of proceeding in which a power should be exercised, there is at least a strong presumption that the people designed it should be exercised in that time and mode only ;? and we impute 1 See upon this subject the remarks of Mr. Sedgwick in his work on Statu- tory and Constitutional Law, p. 375, and those of Hubbard, J., in Briggs v. Georgia, 15 Vt. 61. Also see Dryfus v. Dridges, 45 Miss. 247. 2 See State v. Johnson, 26 Ark. 281; People ex rel. Clement v. Spruance, 8 Colo. 307, 6 Pac. 831; State v. Pat- terson, 181 Ind. 660, 105 N. E. 228; State ex rel. Frich v. Stark County, 14 N. D. 368, 103 N. W. 913; Grady County v. Hammerly, 85 Okla. 53, 204 Pac. 445; Sapulpa v. Land, 101 Okla. 22, 223 Pac. 640, 35 A. L. R. 872; Parks v. West, 102 Tex. 16, 111 S. W. 726; State v. Tooker, 15 Mont. 8, 37 Pac. 840, 25 L. R. A. 560; State v. Winnett, 78 Neb. 379, 110 N. W. 1113, 10 L. R. A. (n. 8.) 149, 15 Ann. Cas. 781. Where the Constitution provides that the legislature shall apportion the State into legislative districts every ten years, and that such apportion- ment shall be based upon the last pre- ceding federal census, one exercise of this power of apportionment exhausts it, and the State cannot be reappor- tioned until after the next federal census. People v. Hutchinson, 172 Til. 486, 50 N. E. 599, 40 Le Re Avgdc0: Where a Constitution provides that the legislature shall not impose taxes for the purpose of any county, city, town, or other municipal cor- porations, but may, by general laws, proper confer on the authorities160 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. 1 to the people a want of due appreciation of the purpose and proper province of such an instrument, when we infer that such directions are given to any other end. Especially when, as has been already said, it is but fair to presume that the people in their constitution have expressed themselves in careful and measured terms, corre- sponding with the immense importance of the powers delegated, and with a view to leave as little as possible to implication. There are some cases, however, where the doctrine of directory statutes has been applied to constitutional provisions; but they are so plainly at variance with the weight of authority upon the precise points considered that we feel warranted in saying that the judicial decisions as they now stand do not sanction the applica- tion. In delivering the opinion of the New York Court of Appeals in one case, Mr. Justice Willard had occasion to consider the con- stitutional provision, that on the final passage of a bill the question shall be taken by ayes and noes, which shall be duly entered upon the journals; and he expressed the opinion that it was only directory to the legislature.2 The remark was obiter dictum, as the court had already decided that the provision had been fully complied with ; and those familiar with the reasons which have induced the insertion of this clause in our constitutions will not readily concede that its sole design was to establish a mere rule of order for legislative pro- ceedings which might be followed or not at discretion. Mr. Chief Justice Thurman, of Ohio, in a case not calling for a discussion of the subject, has considered a statute whose validity was assailed on the ground that it was not passed in the mode prescribed by the con- stitution. “By the term mode,” he says, “I do not mean to include the authority in which the lawmaking power resides, or the number of votes a bill must receive to become a law. That the power to make law is vested in the assembly alone, and that no act has any thereof, respectively, the power to Ark. 281; State v. Glenn, 18 Nev. 34, assess and collect such taxes, having expressly prescribed the manner by which the legislature may authorize the assessment and collection of munici- pal taxes, it excludes the assessment and collection of such taxes in any other manner than pursuant to general laws. Sapulpa v. Land, 101 Okla. 22, 223 Pac. 640, 35 A. L. R. 872. 1 Wolcott v. Wigton, 7 Ind. 44; per Bronson, J., in People v. Purdy, 2 Hill, 31; Greencastle Township »v. Black, 5 Ind. 566; Opinions of Judges, 18 Me. 458. See People v. Lawrence, 36 Barb. 177; State v. Johnson, 26 1 Pac. 186. ‘““The essential nature and object of constitutional law being restrictive upon the powers of the several depart- ments of government, it is difficult to comprehend how its provisions can be regarded as merely directory.” Nicholson, Ch. J., in Cannon v. Mathes, 8 Heisk. 504, 517. Unless expressly permissive, constitutional provisions are mandatory. Varney v. Justice, 86 Ky. 596, 6 S. W. 457. 2 People v. Supervisors of Chenango, SNe WarsiCHAP. IV] CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 161 force that was not passed by the number of votes required by the constitution, are nearly, or quite, self-evident propositions. These essentials relate to the authority by which, rather than the mode in which, laws are to be made. Now to secure the careful exercise of this power, and for other good reasons, the constitution prescribes or recognizes certain things to be done in the enactment of laws, which things form a course or mode of legislative procedure. Thus we find, inter alia, the provision before quoted that every bill shall be fully and distinctly read on three different days, unless, in case of urgency, three-fourths of the house in which it shall be pending shall dispense with this rule. This is an important provision without doubt, but, nevertheless, there is much reason for saying that it is merely directory in its character, and that its observance by the assembly is secured by their sense of duty and official oaths, and not by any supervisory power of the courts. Any other construction, we incline to think, would lead to very absurd and alarming consequences. If it is in the power of every court (and if one has the power, every one has it) to inquire whether a bill that passed the assembly was ‘fully’ and ‘distinctly’ read three times in each house, and to hold it invalid if, upon any reading, a word was accidentally omitted, or the reading was indistinct, it would obviously be impossible to know what is the statute law of the State. Now the requisition that bills shall be fully and distinctly read is just as imperative as that requiring them to be read three times; and as both relate to the mode of procedure merely, it would be difficult to find any sufficient reason why a violation of one of them would be less fatal to an act than a violation of the other.” ? A requirement that a law shall be read distinctly, whether man- datory or directory, is, from the very nature of the case, addressed to the judgment of the legislative body, whose decision as to what reading is sufficiently distinct to be a compliance cannot be subject to review. But in the absence of authority to the contrary, we should not have supposed that the requirement of three successive readings on different days stood upon the same footing.” To this extent a definite and certain rule is capable of being, and has been, laid down, which can be literally obeyed; and the legislative body cannot suppose or adjudge it to have been done if the fact is other- wise. The requirement has an important purpose, in making legis- 1 Miller v. State, 3 Ohio St. 475, 483. 2 See People v. Campbell, 8 Ill. 466; The provision for three readings on McCulloch »v. State, 11 Ind. 424; separate days does not apply toamend- Cannon »v. Mathes, 8 Heisk. 504; ments made in the progress of the bill Spangler v. Jacoby, 14 Ill. 297; People through the houses. People v. Wal- v. Starne, 35 Ill. 121; Ryan v. Lynch, lace, 70 Ill. 680. 68 Ill. 160. vou. I—11162 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I lators proceed in their action with caution and deliberation ; and there cannot often be difficulty in ascertaining from the legislative records themselves if the constitution has been violated in this particular. There is, therefore, no inherent difficulty in the question being reached and passed upon by the courts in the ordinary mode, if it is decided that the constitution intends legislation shall be reached through the three readings, and not otherwise. The opinion above quoted was recognized as law by the Supreme Court of Ohio in a case soon after decided. In that case the court proceed to say: “The . . . provision. . . that no bill shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title, is also made a permanent rule in the introduction and passage of bills through the houses. The subject of the bill is required to be clearly expressed in the title for the purpose of advising members of its subject, when voting in cases in which the reading has been dispensed with by a two-thirds vote. The provision that a bill shall contain but one subject was to prevent combinations by which various and distinct matters of legislation should gain a support which they could not if presented separately. As a rule of pro- ceeding in the General Assembly, it is manifestly an important one. But if it was intended to effect any practical object for the benefit of the people in the examination, construction, or operation of acts passed and published, we are unable to perceive it. The title of an act may indicate to the reader its subject, and under the rule each act would contain one subject. To suppose that for such a purpose the Constitutional Convention adopted the rule under consideration would impute to them a most minute pro- vision for a very imperfect heading of the chapters of laws and their subdivision. This provision being intended to operate upon bills in their progress through the General Assembly, it must be held to be directory only. It relates to bills, and not to acts. It would be most mischievous in practice to make the validity of every law depend upon the judgment of every judicial tribunal of the State, as to whether an act or a bill contained more than one subject, or whether this one subject was clearly expressed in the title of the act or bill. Such a question would be decided according to the mental precision and mental discipline of each justice of the peace and judge. No practical benefit could arise from such inquiries. We are therefore of the opinion that in general the only safeguard against the violation of these rules of the houses is their regard for, and their oath to support, the constitution of the State. We say, in general, the only safeguard; for whether a manifestly gross and fraudulent violation of these rules might authorize theCHAP. IV] | CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 163 court to pronounce a law unconstitutional, it is unnecessary to determine. It is to be presumed no such case will ever occur. 9] If the prevailing doctrine of the courts were in accord with this decision, it might become important to consider whether the object of the clause in question, as here disclosed, was not of such a character as to make the provision mandatory even in a statute. But we shall not enter upon that subject here, as else- where we shall have occasion to refer to decisions made by the highest 1Pim v. Nicholson, 6 Ohio St. 176, 179. Those provisions which relate to the structure of a bill or the forms to be observed in its passage are generally directory, while those as to the number of members necessary to pass a bill and as to the effect and operation of a bill when passed, are usually manda- tory. Ex parte Falk, 42 Ohio St. 638. But the authentication of an act must be by signature, and one which though passed, is not signed nor enrolled is void. State v. Kiesewetter, 45 Ohio St. 254, 12 N. E. 807. See also in line with Pim v. Nicholson, supra, Washington v. Page, 4 Cal. 388. The provision in the Constitution of Illinois that ‘‘every bill, having passed both houses (of the legislature), shall be signed by the speakers thereof”, is mandatory. Lynch ». Hutchinson, 219 Ill. 193, 76 N. E. 370, 4 Ann. Cas. 904. In Hill v. Boyland, 40 Miss. 618, a provision requiring of all officers an oath to support the constitution was held not to invalidate the acts of officials who had neglected to take such an oath. And in McPherson »v. Leonard, 29 Md. 377, the provision that the style of all laws shall be, ‘“Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Maryland”, was held directory. Similar rulings were made in Cape Girardeau v. Riley, 52 Mo. 424; St. Louis v. Foster, 52 Mo. 513; Swann v. Buck, 40 Miss. 268. Directly the opposite has been held in Nevada. State v. Rogers, 10 Nev. 250. So a requirement that indict- ments shall conclude, ‘‘against the peace and dignity of the people of West Virginia ’’, was held in Lemons v. Peo- ple, 4 W. Va. 755, 1 Green Cr. R. 666, to be mandatory, and an indictment which complied with it, except in abbreviating the name of the State, was held bad. A provision that the legislature shall provide for determining contested elections is mandatory upon that department, but if in its enactments it fails to carry out the provision, the courts cannot annul the acts on that ground. Schulherr v. Bordeaux, 64 Miss. 59, 8 So. 201. So if the legisla- ture disregards a provision that before a special law is enacted there must be evidence of publication of notice of intention to introduce it. Davis »v. Gaines, 48 Ark. 370, 3 S. W. 184. Compare State ex rel. Attorney-Gen- eral v. Sayre, 142 Ala. 641, 39 So. 240, 4 Ann. Cas. 656. If a constitution provides “that when any bill is presented for an act of incorporation, it shall be continued until another election of members of Assembly shall have taken place and public notice of the pendency thereof given, it does not necessarily follow that the organization under the charter is not as to all practical purposes valid. The provision is directory to the Assembly, and in the absence of any clause forbidding the enactment, does not affect the corporators unless the State itself intervenes. Whitney v. Wyman, 101 U. S. 392, 397, 25 L. ed. 1050, 1052. “The State may waive conditions, and so long as the State raises no objec- tion it is immaterial to other parties whether it is a corporation de facto or de jure. Ibid.’’ McClinch v. Sturgis, 72 Me. 288, 295. The Constitution of Nebraska re- quires that, when a proposed amend- ment thereto is submitted to a vote of the people, such proposed amendment shall be ‘‘published at least once each164 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I judicial tribunals in nearly all the States, recognizing similar pro- visions as mandatory, and to be enforced by the courts. And we concur fully in what was said by Mr. Justice Emmot in speaking of this very provision, that “it will be found upon full consideration to be difficult to treat any constitutional provision as merely direc- tory and not imperative.” + And with what was said by Mr. Justice Lumpkin, as to the duty of the courts: “It has been sug- gested that the prohibition in the seventeenth section of the first article of the Constitution, ‘Nor shall any law or ordinance pass containing any matter different from what is expressed in the title thereof’, is directory only to the legislative and executive or law- making departments of the government. But we do not so under- stand it. On the contrary, we consider it as much a matter of judicial cognizance as any other provision in that instrument. If the courts would refuse to execute a law suspending the writ of habeas corpus when the public safety did not require it, a law violatory of the freedom of the press or trial by jury, neither would they enforce a statute which contained matter different from what was expressed in the title thereof.’ week in at least one newspaper in each county where a newspaper is published for three months immediately pre- ceding the next election of senators and representatives, at which election the same shall be submitted to the electors for approval or rejection.” It was held that where there is a sub- stantial compliance with this require- ment, the fact that the publication was made for one week less than the required time in one county of the State will not invalidate the amend- ment. State ex rel. Thompson »v. Winnett, 78 Neb. 379, 110 N. W. 1113, 10 L. R. A. (nN. 8.) 149, 15 Ann. Cas. 781. The court said: ‘If other pro- visions of the Constitution are manda- tory and are to be taken literally, these provisions by which the people have consented to place restrictions upon their own power in adopting amendments to the Constitution should not be so construed. We should inquire into the fair purpose and meaning of such restrictions, and should regard the substance rather than the letter of such requirements.”’ See also State v. Alderson, 49 Mont. 387, 142 Pac. 210, Ann. Cas. 1916 B, 39. 12 The word ‘‘may” as used in the Constitution of Mississippi, art. 10, § 225, providing that ‘‘the Legislature may place convicts on a State farm or farms and have them worked thereon under State supervision exclusively, in tilling the soil or manufacturing, or both, and may buy farms for that purpose”, is not mandatory, but merely directory, and it is not com- pulsory upon the Legislature to place convicts on a State farm, nor to buy a farm for that purpose. State ex rel. Greaves v. Henry, 87 Miss. 125, 40 So. 152, 5 L. R. A. (w. s.) 340. A statute which is passed in obedi- ence to a constitutional requirement must be held mandatory. State »v. Pierce, 35 Wis. 93, 99. 1 People v. Lawrence, 36 Barb. 177, 186. See also Mulnix v. Mutual Ben. L. Ins. Co., 23 Col. 85, 46 Pac. 1114, 33 L. R. A. 827; Garrigan v. Kennedy, 19S. D. 11, 101 N. W. 1081, 117 Am. St. Rep. 927, 8 Ann. Cas. 1125; Swift v. Newport News, 105 Va. 108, 52S. BE: 821, 3 L. R. A. (w. s:) 404. 2 Protho v. Orr, 12 Ga. 36. See also Opinions of Judges, 18 Me. 458; Indiana Central Railroad Co. v. Potts, 7 Ind. 681; People v. Starne, 35 Ill.CHAP. Iv] CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS Self-executing Provisions. But although none of the provisions of a constitution are to be looked upon as immaterial or merely advisory, there are some which, from the nature of the case, are as incapable of compulsory enforcement as are directory provisions in general.’ The reason is that, while the purpose may be to establish rights or to impose duties, they do not in and of themselves constitute a sufficient rule by means of which such right may be protected or such duty enforced. In such cases, before the constitutional provision can be made effectual, supplemental legislation must be had; and the provision may be in its nature mandatory to the legislature to enact the needful legislation, though back of it there lies no authority to enforce the command. Sometimes the constitution in terms re- quires the legislature to enact laws on a particular subject ; and here it is obvious that the requirement has only a moral force: the legislature ought to obey it; but the right intended to be given is only assured when the legislation is voluntarily enacted.” Illustra- tions may be found in constitutional provisions requiring the legislature to provide by law uniform and just rules for the assess- ment and collection of taxes; these must lie dormant until the legislation is had;* they do not displace the law previously in force, though the purpose may be manifest to do away with it by the legislation required.* So, however plainly the constitution may recognize the right to appropriate private property for the general benefit, the appropriation cannot be made until the law has pointed out the cases, and given the means by which compensation may be religious, cemetery or charitable pur- poses” is addressed to the Legislature and not to the courts. Its terms look forward to and require ulterior action 121; State v. Miller, 45 Mo. 495; Weaver v. Lapsley, 43 Ala. 224; Nougues v. Douglass, 7 Cal. 65; State v. McCann, 4 Lea, 1. 1 There are also many which merely contemplate the exercise of powers conferred, when the legislature in its discretion shall deem it wise; like the provision that ‘‘suits may be brought against the State in such courts as may be by law provided.” Ez parte State, 52 Ala. 231. 2School Board v. Patten, 62 Mo. 444. See Schulherr v. Bordeaux, 64 Miss. 59, 8 So. 201; State v. Spokane, 24 Wash. 53, 63 Pac. 1116. A constitutional provision that “the Legislative Assembly shall by a general law exempt from taxation property used exclusively for school, upon the part of the law-making branch of the government. State ez rel. Linde v. Packard, 35 N. D. 298, 160 N. W. 150, L. R. A. 1917 B, 710. 3 Williams v. Detroit, 2 Mich. 560; People v. Lake Co., 33 Cal. 487; Bowie v. Lott, 24 La. Ann. 214; Mississippi Mills v. Cook, 56 Miss. 40; Coatesville Gas Co. v. Chester Co., 97 Pa. St. 476. 4 Moore, J., in Supervisors of Dod- dridge v. Stout, 9 W. Va. 703, 705; Cahoon v. Commonwealth, 20 Gratt. 733; Lehigh Iron Co. v. Lower Macun- gie, 81 Pa. St. 482; Erie Co. v. Erie, 113 Pa. St. 360, 6 Atl. 136.166 assured.! CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I A different illustration is afforded by the new amend- ments to the federal Constitution. The fifteenth amendment pro- vides that “the right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States, or by any State, on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” To this extent it is self-executing, and of its own force it abolishes all distinctions in suffrage based on the particulars enumerated. But when it further provides that “Congress shall have power to en- force this article by appropriate legislation’’, it indicates the possi- bility that the rule may not be found sufficiently comprehensive or particular to protect fully this right to equal suffrage, and that legislation may be found necessary for that purpose.2 Other provisions are completely self-executing, and manifestly contem- plate no legislation whatever to give them full force and operation. 1Lamb v. Lane, 4 Ohio St. 167. See School Board v. Patten, 62 Mo. 444; Myers v. English, 9 Cal. 341; Gillinwater v. Mississippi, &c. R. R. Coe 13s t- Cairo: ie. R. R. Co: v. Trout, 32 Ark. 17. 2 United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214, 23 L. ed. 563. The Thirteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution provides: “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place sub- ject to their jurisdiction. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.” In Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U. S. 219, 55 L. ed. 191, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 145, the court, referring to this amendment, said: “While the Amendment was self- executing, so far as its terms were ap- plicable to any existing condition, Con- gress was authorized to secure its complete enforcement by appropriate legislation. As said in the Civil Rights Cases: ‘By its unaided force and effect it abolished slavery, and established universal freedom. Still, legislation may be necessary and proper to meet all the various cases and circumstances to be affected by it, and to prescribe proper modes of redress for its violation in letter or spirit. And such legislation may be primary and direct in its character; for the amendment is not a mere pro- hibition of State laws establishing or upholding slavery, but an absolute declaration that slavery or involun- tary servitude shall not exist in any part of the United States’, 109 U. S. 20, 20 L. ed. 842, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 18.” Any constitutional provision is self-executing to this extent, that everything done in violation of it is void. Brien v. Williamson, 8 Miss. 14; Russell v. Ayer, 120 N. C. 180, 27 S. E. 133, 37 L. R. A. 246. A provi- sion that ‘‘the legislature shall have no power to authorize lotteries for any purpose, and shall pass laws to pro- hibit the sale of lottery tickets in this State’, was held to be of itself a pro- hibition of lotteries. Bass v. Nash- ville, Meigs, 421; Yerger v. Rains, 4 Humph. 259. In State v. Woodward, 89 Ind. 110, it was held that a like provision took away any pre-existing authority to carry them on, but that it needed legislation to make them criminal. ’See People v. Bradley, 60 Ill. 390; People v. McRoberts, 62 Ill. 38; Mitch- ell v. Illinois, &e. Coal Co., 68 Til. 286; Beecher v. Baldy, 7 Mich. 488; People v. Rumsey, 64 Ill. 41; State v. Holladay, 64 Mo. 526; Miller v. Max, 55 Ala. 322; Hills v. Chicago, 60 III. 86; Kine v. Defenbaugh, 64 Ill. 291; People v. Hoge, 55 Cal. 612; Rowan v. Runnels, 5 How. 134, 12 L. ed. 85; Friedman v. Mathes, 8 Heisk. 488; Johnson v. Parkersburgh, 16 W. Va. 402, 37 Am. Rep. 779; De Turk »v.CHAP. Iv] CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 167 A constitutional provision may be said to be self-executing if it supplies a sufficient rule by means of which the right given may be enjoyed and protected, or the duty imposed may be en- forced; and it is not self-executing when it merely indicates prin- Com., 129 Pa. St. 151, 18 Atl. Rep. (5. “When a constitutional amendment is adopted in the manner specified by the Constitution, and there is nothing to indicate that the matter is referred to the Legislature for further action, it will be construed as self-executing, and effective from the date of its adop- tion.” Harris v. Walker, 199 Ala. 51, 74 So. 40. 1 Friedman v. Mathes, 8 Heisk. 488 ; State v. Weston, 4 Neb. 216; People v. Hoge, 55 Cal. 612; Ewing 2. Orville M. Co., 56 Cal. 649; Hills v. Chicago, 64 Ill. 86; Davis v. Burke, 179 U. S. 399, 45 L. ed. 249, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 210; Dickinson v. Edmondson, 120 Ark. 80, 178 S. W. 930, Ann. Cas. 1917 C, 913; Winchester v. Howard, 136 Cal. 432, 64 Pac. 692, 69 Pac. 77, 89 Am. St. Rep. 153; State ea rel. Burnett v. Deck, 106 Kan. 518, 188 Pac. 238; State v. Kyle, 166 Mo. 287, 65 S. W. 763, 56 L. R. A. 115; State ex rel. Delgado v. Romero, 17 N. M. 81, 124 Pac. 649, Ann. Cas. 1914 C, 1114; Kitchin v. Wood, 154 N. C. 565, 70 S. E. 995; State ex rel. Linde ». Hall, 35 N. D. 34, 159 N. W. 281; State ex rel. Twichell v. Hall, 44 N. D. 459, 171 N. W. 213; Acme Dairy Co. v. Astoria, 49 Oreg. 523, 90 Pac. 153; Newport News v. Woodward, 104 Va. 58, 51 S. E. 193, 7 Ann. Cas. 625; Thorne v. Clarksburg, 88 W. Va. 251, 106 S. E. 644. “Constitutional provisions are self- executing where it is the manifest intention that they should go into immediate effect and no auxiliary legislation is necessary to the enjoy- ment of a right given, or the enforce- ment of a duty or a liability imposed.” State ex rel. Clark v. Harris, 74 Oreg. 573, 144 Pac. 109, Ann. Cas. 1916 A, 1156. See also Lyons v. Longmont, 54 Colo. 112, 129 Pac. 200; State »v. Duncan, 265 Mo. 26, 175 S. W. 940, Ann. Cas. 1916 D, 1. “The question in every case is whether the language of a constitu- tional provision is addressed to the courts or to the Legislature — does it indicate that it was intended as a pres- ent enactment, complete in itself as definitive legislation, or does it con- template subsequent legislation to carry it into effect?” Willis »v. Mahon, 48 Minn. 150, 50 N. W. 1110, 31 Am. St. Rep. 626, 16 L. R. A. 281. ‘When a constitutional provision . is declarative of the common law, it is self-active.’ Knight, etc., Co. y. Miller, 172 Ind. 27, 87 N. E. 828, 18 Ann. Cas. 1146. All negative or prohibitive provisions in a constitution are self-executing. Law v. People, 87 Ill. 385. A provision imposing a duty upon an officer is_ self-executing. State v. Babcock, 19 Neb. 230, 27 N. W. 98. So, one providing for jury trial in all of a certain class of cases. Woodward Iron Co. »v. Cabaniss, 87 Ala. 328, 6 So. 300. So one providing that compensation shall be given for property ‘‘damaged”’ in the course of a public improvement. Householder v. Kansas City, 83 Mo. 488. See also Swift v. Newport News, 105 Va. 108, 52S. E. 821, 3 L. R. A. (nN. 8.) 404. So one providing that “knowledge, by any employee injured, of the defective or unsafe character or conditions of any machinery, ways or appliances, shall be no defence to an action for injury caused thereby.” Illinois C. R. Co. v. Ihlenberg, 75 Fed. Rep. 878, 34 L. R. A. 393. That justices of peace in cities above 5,000 shall be paid by salaries instead of fees. Anderson ». Whatcom County, 15 Wash. 47, 45 Pac. 665, 33 L. R. A. 187. That no county officer shall receive to his own use any fees or emoluments other than the annual salary provided by law, and all fees earned by any officer shall be by him collected and paid into the treasury of the county. State ex rel. Delgado v. Romero, 17 N. M. 81, 124 Pac. 649, Ann. Cas. 1914 ©; 1114. That civil service appointments “shall168 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I ciples, without laying down rules by means of which those principles may be given the force of law.} be made according to merit and fitness, to be ascertained, so far as practicable, by examinations which so far as prac- ticable shall be competitive.” People v. Roberts, 148 N. Y. 360, 42 N. E. 1082, 31 L. R. A. 399. That no person shall hold a State and a federal office at the same time. De Turk v. Com., 129) Paso 1S Ate Woo lis Rn. Ac 853, 15 Am. St. 705. Prohibition of donations by municipalities to private corporations is self-executing. Wash- ingtonian Home »v. Chicago, 157 III. 414, 41 N. E. 8938, 29 L. R. A. 798. So is a provision imposing a liability upon the stockholders of a corporation for its debts. Way v. Barney, 116 Minn. 285, 133 N. W. 801, 38 L. R. A. (w. s.) 648, Ann. Cas. 1913 A, 719. A provision that ‘‘other taxes may be levied by the police juries for road and bridge purposes, not to exceed five mills for five years on the property of the parish, or any ward thereof, where the rate of taxation and the pur- pose thereof shall have been submitted to the property taxpayers of said ward or parish entitled to vote under the election laws of the State, and a majority in numbers and value of those voting at such election shall have voted in favor thereof ”’ — is self-exe- cuting; and an enabling act by the legislature is not needed to enable the police juries to proceed to hold an election to take the sense of the tax- payers on the question of the levy of the tax in question. Logan v. Parish of Ouachita, 105 La. 499, 29 So. 975. The Constitution of Nevada, art. 10, sec. 1, declared that the Legisla- ture should provide a uniform and equal rate of assessment and taxa- tion to secure a just valuation of real and personal property, mining claims, etc., and that the acreage of patented claims should be assessed at the valua- tion of $10 per acre. Stats. 1905, ec. 58, provided for the assessment of patented mines at such valuation. Article 10, sec. 1, as amended in 1906, provided that patented mining claims should be assessed at not less than $500, except when $100 in labor has Thus, a constitution may very been actually performed on _ such mine during the year, in addition to the tax on the net proceeds, and no legislation was passed pursuant to such provision until 1913. It was held, that the constitutional amendment of 1906 was self-executing at least as to the provision for taxation of patented mines, and absolutely nullified the statute of 1905, so that an assessment thereunder in 1909 was invalid. Wren v. Dixon, 40 Nev. 170, 161 Pac. 722, 167 Pac. 324, Ann. Cas. 1918 D, 1064. A constitutional provision relating to tax sales which declares that “the sale shall be without appraisement, and the property sold shall be redeem- able at any time for the space of one year’’, is self executing. State ez rel. Curtis v. Ross, 144 La. 898, 81 So. 386. A constitutional provision relating to the taking or damaging of private property for public use, providing that when required by either of the parties the compensation therefor shall be ascertained by an impartial jury of twelve freeholders, properly construed, is so far self-executing as to entitle them in a suit at common law for com- pensation for property not taken but damaged, to have the damages assessed by such impartial jury of twelve free- holders. Thorne v. Clarksburg, 88 W. Va. 251, 106 S. E. 644. A constitutional provision prohibit- ing marriages between white persons and persons having one-eighth, or more, negro blood, is self-executing, in the absence of any other provision in the same instrument limiting its operation. Succession of Gabisso, 119 La. 704, 44 So. 488, 121 Am. St. Rep. 529, 11 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 1082, 21 Ann. Cas. 574. Where the constitution requires that all public institutions shall be located at the seat of government, the courts have power to determine whether a proposed insane asylum is a public institution, and, if it is found so to be, to enjoin its location elsewhere. State v. Metschan, 32 Oreg. 372, 46 Pac. 791, 41 L. R. A. 692, 53 Pac. 1071. 1 Davis v. Burke, 179 U.S. 399, 45 L. ed. 249, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 210;CHAP. Iv] CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 169 clearly require county and town government ; but if it fails to in- dicate its range, and to provide proper machinery, it is not in this particular self-executing, and legislation is essential.! Rights in such a case may lie dormant until statutes shall provide for them, though in so far as any distinct provision is made which by itself is capable of enforcement, it is law,” and all supplementary legisla- tion must be in harmony with it. State ex rel. Linde v. Hall, 35 N. D. 34, 159 N. W. 281; State ex rel. Clark v. Harris, 74 Oreg. 573, 144 Pac. 109, Ann. Cas. 1916 A, 1156. Though prohibitory provisions in a constitution are usually self-executing to the extent that anything done in violation of them is void, and no legis- lation is required to execute such pro- visions, they are not self-executing when they merely indicate principles without laying down rules by which they may be given the force of law. Wren v. Dixon, 40 Nev. 170, 161 Pac. 722, 167 Pac. 324, Ann. Cas. 1918 D, 1064. A provision that all printing shall be done by the lowest bidder under regulations supplied by law is not self- executing. Brown». Seay, 86 Ala. 122, 5 So. 216. The initiative and referendum pro- visions in the Constitution of Okla- homa are not self-executing. Ex parte Wagner, 210 Okla. 33, 95 Pac. 435, 18 Ann. Cas. 197. For exemption provisions, not self- executing, see Green v. Aker, 11 Ind. 223; Speidel v. Schlosser, 13 W. Va. 686. 1 Ex parte Wall. 48 Cal. 279; Attor- ney-General v. Common Council of Detroit, 29 Mich. 108; Davis ». Burke, 179 U. S. 399, 45 L. ed. 249, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 210. The following constitutional provi- sion was held not to be self-executing : “Municipal corporations are hereby classified into cities and villages. All such corporations having a population of five thousand or over shall be cities ; all others shall be villages. The method of transition from one class to the other shall be regulated by law.” Murray v. State, 91 Ohio St. 220, 110 N. E. 471, Ann. Cas. 1916 D, 864. 2The Constitution of the State of Kansas of 1859, art. 12, § 2, pro- vides as follows: ‘‘ Dues from corpora- tions shall be secured by yndividual liability of the stockholders to an addi- tional amount equal to the stock owned by each stockholder ; and such other means as shall be provided by law;...” The portion italicized is self-executing, and enters as a part of the contractual liability of every person who volun- tarily becomes a stockholder in any corporation (except railroad, chari- table, and religious corporations, ex- pressly excepted in later part of above section) created under the laws of Kansas. Whitman v. National Bank of Oxford, 176 U.S. 559, 44 L. ed. 587, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 477, aff. 76 Fed. Rep. 697, and 51 U. S. App. 536, 83 Fed. Rep. 288, 28 C. C. A. 404. But see Woodworth v. Bowles, 61 Kan. 569, 60 Pac. 331, in which it is said that the use of the future tense ‘‘shall be se- cured” indicates that the constitu- tional clause above given is not self- executing. The “double liability clause” of the Minnesota Constitution, which pro- vides that “each stockholder in any corporation (excepting those organized for the purpose of carrying on any kind of manufacturing or mechanical busi- ness) shall be liable to the amount of stock held or owned by him”’ is held to create ex propris vigore an individual liability on the part of each stock- holder. Willis v. Mabon, 48 Minn. 140, sub nom. Willis v. St. Paul Sani- tation Co., 50 N. W. 1110, 16 L. R. A. 281, 31 Am. St. 626. So too no sup- plementary legislation is needed to make effective the provision of the Nebraska Constitution declaring that “every stockholder in a banking cor- poration or institution shall be indi- vidually responsible and liable to its creditors, over and above the amount170 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I [In determining when a constitutional provision is self-executing, there is a distinction between a declarative limitation of legislative power on a given subject, within which legislation may or should be enacted, and positive constitutional inhibition which no legis- lative act can relieve or modify; the former might require future legislation; the latter must, from its nature, be self-executing.! A constitutional provision does not lose its self-executing quality merely because it provides that the legislature shall by appropriate legislation provide for carrying it into effect;? and the mere fact that legislation might supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing provision does not render such provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation.*] The provisions exempting homesteads from forced sale for the satisfaction of debts furnish many illustrations of self-executing provisions, and also of those which are not self-executing. Where, as in California, the constitution declares that “the legislature shall protect by law from forced sale a certain portion of the homestead and other property of all heads of families’, the dependence of the provision on subsequent legislative action is manifest. But where, as in some other States, the constitution defines the extent, in acres or amount, that shall be deemed to constitute a homestead, and expressly exempts from any forced sale what is thus defined, a rule is prescribed which is capable of enforcement. Perhaps even in such cases, legislation may be desirable, by way of providing con- venient remedies for the protection of the right secured, or of regulat- ing the claim of the right so that its exact limits may be known and of stock by him held, to an amount equal to his respective stock or shares so held, for all its “liabilities accruing while he remains such stockholder.’ Farmers’ Loan and T. Co. v. Funk, 49 Neb. 353, 68 N. W. 520. In this con- nection, see note appended to 44 L. ed. U.S. 589, and another on self-execut- ing constitutional provisions in 16 L. R. A. 281. 1 Wren v. Dixon, 40 Nev. 170, 161 Pac. 722, 167 Pac. 324, Ann. Cas. 1918 D, 1064. 2 Gherna v. State, 16 Ariz. 344, 146 Pac. 494, Ann. Cas. 1916 D, 94. A provision that the General Assem- bly “shall levy a capitation tax on every male inhabitant of the State which shall be equal to the tax on property valued at $300 in cash” was held to be self-executing, on the ground that in the execution of such command the General Assembly. acts in a purely ministerial capacity; is made the agent, the accountant of the Constitution, with directions to make a calculation and record it. Kitchin v. Wood, 154 N. C. 565, 70 S. E. 995, overruling Russell v. Ayer, 120 N. C. 180, 27 S. E. 183, 37 L. R. A. 246. A clause in a constitutional provi- sion requiring the legislature to pass such legislation ‘‘as may aid the operation” of the provision, does not mean legislation to put it in operation, but such as will aid its operation, and the provision will not remain in abey- ance until such legislation is enacted. State ex rel. Clark v. Harris, 74 Oreg. 573, 144 Pac. 109, Ann. Cas. 1916 A, 1156. 3 State ex rel. Delgado v. Romero, 17 N. M. 81, 124 Pac. 649, Ann. Cas. 1914 C, 1114.CHAP. IV] CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 171 understood; but all such legislation must be subordinate to the constitutional provision, and in furtherance of its purpose, and must not in any particular attempt to narrow or embarrass it. The provision of a constitution which defines a homestead and exempts it from forced sale is self-executing, at least to this extent, that, though it may admit of supplementary legislation in par- ticulars where in itself it is not as complete as may be desirable, *¢ will override and nullify whatever legislation, either prior or sub- sequent, would defeat or limit the homestead which is thus defined and secured. [Many state constitutions have become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people, and there is a presumption that their provisions are self-executing, and are to be interpreted as such.! A strong reason for this rule is the fact that unless constitutional provisions were so interpreted, it would be in the power of the Legislature to practically nullify a fundamental of legislation.7] We have thus indicated some of the rules which we think are to be observed in the construction of constitutions. It will be perceived that we have not thought it important to quote and to dwell upon those arbitrary rules to which so much attention is sometimes given, and which savor rather of the closet than of practical life. Our observation would lead us to the conclusion that they are more often resorted to as aids in ingenious attempts to make the constitution seem to say what it does not, than with a view to make that instrument express its real intent. All ex- ternal aids, and especially all arbitrary rules, applied to instruments of this popular character, are of very uncertain value; and we do not regard it as out of place to repeat here what we have had occa- sion already to say in the course of this chapter, that they are to be made use of with hesitation, and only with much circumspection.? “In construing so important an in- 1 Winchester v. Howard, 136 Cal. strument as a constitution, especially 432, 64 Pac. 692, 69 Pac. 77, 89 Am. St. Rep. 153; State ex rel. Curtis v. Ross, 144 La. 898, 81 So. 386; State ex rel. Twichell v. Hall, 44 N. D. 459, 171 N. W. 213; Brice v. McDow, 116 S. C. 324, 108 S. E. 84. 2 Way v. Barney, 116 Minn. 285, 133 N. W. 801, 38 L. R. A. (N. 5.) 648, Ann. Cas. 1913 A, 719; Brice ». McDow, 116 S. C. 324, 108 S. E. 84. 3 See People v. Cowles, 13 N. Y. 350, per Johnson, J.; Temple v. Mead, 4 Vt. 535, 540, per Williams, J.; People v. Fancher, 50 N. Y. 291. those parts which affect the vital principle of a republican government, the elective franchise, or the manner of exercising it, we are not, on the one hand, to indulge ingenious specula- tions which may lead us wide from the true sense and spirit of the instru- ment, nor, on the other, to apply to it such narrow and constrained views as may exclude the real object and intent of those who framed it. We are to suppose that the authors of such an instrument had a thorough knowledge172 of the force and extent of the words they employ; that they had a bene- ficial end and purpose in view; and that, more especially in any apparent restriction upon the mode of exercising the right of suffrage, there was some existing or anticipated evil which it was their purpose to avoid. If an enlarged sense of any particular form of expression should be necessary to accomplish so great an object as a con- venient exercise of the fundamental privilege or right, — that of election —such sense must be attributed. We are to suppose that those who were delegated to the great business of dis- tributing the powers which emanated from the sovereignty of the people, and to the establishment of the rules for the perpetual security of the rights of person and property, had the wis- dom to adapt their language to future as well as existing emergencies, so that CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I words competent to the then existing state of the community, and at the same time capable of being expanded to embrace more extensive relations, should not be restrained to their more obvious and immediate sense, if, con- sistently with the general object of the authors and the true principles of the compact, they can be extended to other relations and circumstances which an improved state of society may produce. Qut heret in litera heret in cortice is a familiar maxim of the law. The letter killeth, but the spirit maketh alive, is the more forcible expression of Scripture.”” Parker, Ch. J., in Henshaw v. Foster, 9 Pick. 312. 316. There are some very pertinent and forcible remarks by Mr. Justice Miller on this general subject in Wood- son v. Murdock, 22 Wall. 351, 381, 22 L. ed. 716, 724.CHAPTER V OF THE POWERS WHICH THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT MAY EXERCISE In considering the powers which may be exercised by the legisla- tive department of one of the American States, it is natural that we should recur to those possessed by the Parliament of Great Britain, after which, in a measure, the American legislatures have been modeled, and from which we derive our legislative usages and customs, or parliamentary common law, as well as the precedents by which the exercise of legislative power in this country has been governed. It is natural, also, that we should incline to measure the power of the legislative department in America by the power of the like department in Britain ; and to concede without reflection that whatever the legislature of the country from which we derive our laws can do, may also be done by the department created for the exercise of legislative authority in this country. But to guard against being misled by a comparison between the two, we must bear in mind the important distinction already pointed out, that with the Parliament rests practically the sovereignty of the country, so that it may exercise all the powers of the government if it wills so to do; while on the other hand the legislatures of the American States are not the sovereign authority, and, though vested with the exercise of one branch of the sovereignty, they are nevertheless, in wielding it, hedged in on all sides by important limitations, some of which are imposed in express terms, and others by implications which are equally imperative. “The power and jurisdiction 0 Coke, is so transcendent and absolute, that it cannot be confined, either for persons or causes, within any bounds. And of this high court it may truly be said: ‘Si antiquitatem spectes, est vetustis- sima; si dignitatem, est honoratissima; Sl jurisdictionem, est capacissima.’ It hath sovereign and uncontrolled authority in the making, confirming, enlarging, restraining, abrogating, repealing, reviving, and expounding of laws, concerning matters of all possible f Parliament, says Sir Edward 14 Inst. 36. 173174 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I denominations, ecclesiastical or temporal, civil, military, maritime, or criminal; this being the place where that absolute despotic power, which must in all governments reside somewhere, is intrusted by the constitution of these kingdoms. All mischiefs and grievances, operations and remedies, that transcend the ordinary course of the laws, are within the reach of this extraordinary tribunal. It can regulate or new-model the succession to the Crown, as was done in the reign of Henry VIII. and William III. It can alter the established religion of the land, as was done in a variety of instances, in the reigns of King Henry VIII. and his three children. It can change and create afresh even the constitution of the kingdom and of Parliaments themselves, as was done by the Act of Union, and the several statutes for triennial and septennial elections. It can, in short, do everything that is not naturally impossible; and therefore some have not scrupled to call its power, by a figure rather too bold, the omnipotence of Parliament. ‘True it is, that what the Parlia- ment doth, no authority upon earth can undo; so that it is a matter most essential to the liberties of this kingdom that such members be delegated to this important trust as are most eminent for their probity, their fortitude, and their knowledge; for it was a known apothegm of the great Lord Treasurer, Burleigh, ‘that England could never be ruined but by a Parliament’; and as Sir Matthew Hale observes: “This being the highest and greatest court, over which none other can have jurisdiction in the kingdom, if by any means a misgovernment should anyway fall upon it, the subjects of this kingdom are left without all manner of remedy.’ ” ! The strong language in which the complete jurisdiction of Parlia- ment is here described is certainly inapplicable to any authority in the American States, unless it be to the people of the States when met in their primary capacity for the formation of their fundamental 1 Bl. Com. 160; Austin on Jurispru- strictly subordinate to it. It may dence, Lec. 6; Fischel on English Con- stitution, b. 7, ch. 7. The British legislature is above the constitution, and molds and modifies it at discretion as public exigencies and the needs of the time may require. But in the American system such a thing as unlimited power is unknown. Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655, 663, 22 L. ed. 455, 461; Camp- bell’s Case, 2 Bland Ch. 209, 20 Am. Dec. 360; Missouri Pac. R. Co. »v. Nebraska, Bd. of Transp., 164 U. S. 403, 41 L. ed. 489, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 130. Every American legislature is the creature of the constitution, and participate in making changes as the constitution itself may provide, but not otherwise, and constitutional prin- ciples which the British Parliament will deal with as shall seem needful are inflexible laws in America until the people, under the forms provided for constitutional amendments, see fit to change them. Such radical changes, for example, as recently have been made in the Irish land laws, and such forced modification in contracts, would be impossible in the United States without a change in both Federal and State constitutions.CHAP. V] POWERS LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT MAY EXERCISE 175 law; and even then there rest upon them the restraints of the Constitution of the United States, which bind them as absolutely as they do the governments which they create. It becomes im- portant, therefore, to ascertain in what respect the State legislatures resemble the Parliament in the powers they exercise, and how far we may extend the comparison without losing sight of the funda- mental ideas and principles of the American system. The first and most notable difference is that to which we have already alluded, and which springs from the different theory on which the British Constitution rests. So long as the Parliament is recognized as rightfully exercising the sovereign authority of the country, it is evident that the resemblance between it and American legislatures in regard to their ultimate powers cannot be traced very far. The American legislatures only exercise a certain portion of the sovereign power. The sovereignty is in the people;! and the legislatures which they have created are only to discharge a trust of which they have been made a depositary, but which has been placed in their hands with well-defined restric- tions. Upon this difference it is to be observed, that while Parliament, to any extent it may choose, may exercise judicial authority, one of the most noticeable features in American constitutional law is the care which has been taken to separate legislative, executive, and judicial functions. It has evidently been the intention of the people in every State that the exercise of each should rest with a separate department. The different classes of power have been apportioned to different departments ; and as all derive their authority from the same instrument, there is an implied exclusion of each department from exercising the functions conferred upon the others. There are two fundamental rules by which we may measure the extent of the legislative authority in the States: — 1. In creating a legislative department and conferring upon it the legislative power, the people must be understood to have conferred the full and complete power as it rests in, and may be exercised by, the sovereign power of any country, subject only to such restrictions as they may have seen fit to impose, and to the limitations which are contained in the Constitution of the United States. The legislative department is not made a special agency for the exercise of specifically defined legislative powers, but is intrusted with the general authority to make laws at discretion.” 1 Ante, p. 159. 127 N. E. 102, 9 A. L. R. 1834; Opin- 2 Greenfield v. Russel, 292 Ill. 392, ions of Justices, 103 Me. 506, 69 Atl.176 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I 2. But the apportionment to this department of legislative power does not sanction the exercise of executive or judicial func- tions, except in those cases, warranted by parliamentary usage, where they are incidental, necessary, or proper to the exercise of legislative authority, or where the constitution itself, in specified cases, may expressly permit it.! Executive power is so intimately connected with legislative, that it is not easy to draw a line of separation; but the grant of the judicial power to the department created for the purpose of exercising it must be regarded as an exclusive grant, covering the whole power, subject only to the limitations which the constitutions impose, and to the incidental exceptions before referred to.” While, therefore, the American legislatures may exercise the legislative powers which the Parlia- ment of Great Britain wields, except as restrictions are imposed, they are at the same time excluded from other functions which may be, and sometimes habitually are, exercised by the Parliament.® “The people in framing the constitution,’ says Denio, Ch. J., “committed to the legislature the whole law-making power of the State, which they did not expressly or impliedly withhold. 627, 19 L. R. A. (wn. s.) 422, 18 Ann. Cas. 745. The test of legislative power is con- stitutional restriction. What the peo- ple have not said in the organic law their representatives shall not do, they may do. Russ v. Com., 210 Pa. St. 544, 60 Atl. 169, 1 L. R. A. (w. s.) 409, 105 Am. St. Rep. 825. If the Constitution has limited the exercise of the legislative power to cer- tain times, the attempt to exercise it at other times is necessarily void. Har- mison v. Ballot Com’rs of Jefferson Co., 45 W. Va. 179, 31S. E. 394, 42 L. R. A. 591; Denney »v. State, 144 Ind. 508, 42 N. E. 929, 31 L. R. A. 726. 1 Greenfield v. Russel, 292 III. 392, 127 N. E. 102, 9 A. L. R. 1334. See post, pp. 188, 221, 775 et seq. A statute attempting to confer upon a State board authority to adjudge priorities of claimants to the use of public waters is held not to be uncon- stitutional as conferring judicial power in Farm Investment Co. ». Carpenter, 9 Wyo. 110, 61 Pac. 258, 87 Am. St. 918. The legislature, being otherwise in legal session, is, by the Constitution of Oklahoma, given definite governmen- Plenary tal duties, and has exclusive jurisdic- tion over matters of impeachment, and the actions of the senate and house of representatives, in the exercise of this jurisdiction, are not subject to review or interference by the courts. State ex rel. Trapp v. Chambers, 96 Okla. 78, 220 Pac. 890, 30 A. L. R. 1144. Impeachment under Constitution of Oklahoma defined; effect of impeach- ment of governor, State ex rel. Trapp v. Chambers, 96 Okla. 78, 220 Pac. 890, 30 A. L. R. 1144. 2 See post, p. 180, note. 3 Where jurisdiction is conferred upon a court by the Constitution, it cannot be deprived thereof by the legis- lature. Hedden v. Hand, 90 N. J. Kq. 583, 107 Atl. 285, 5 A. L. R. 1463. ‘The inhibition of a Constitution may be either express or implied; that is the Constitution may expressly pro- hibit any specified act of the legisla- ture, or the Constitution by its inher- ent terms may of necessity prohibit certain acts of a legislature by reason of the inherent conflict that would arise between the terms of the Consti- tution and the power claimed in favor of the legislature. State v. Whisman, 36 S. D. 260, 154 N. W. 707, L. R. A.CHAP. V] POWERS LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT MAY EXERCISE 177 power in the legislature, for all purposes of civil government, is the rule. A prohibition to exercise a particular power is an exception. In inquiring, therefore, whether a given statute is constitutional, it is for those who question its validity to show that it is forbidden. I do not mean that the power must be expressly inhibited, for there are but few positive restraints upon the legislative power contained in the instrument. The first article lays down the ancient limita- tions which have always been considered essential in a constitutional government, whether monarchial or popular; and there are scattered through the instrument a few other provisions in restraint of legisla- tive authority. But the affirmative prescriptions and the general ar- rangements of the constitution are far more fruitful of restraints upon the legislature. Every positive direction contains an implication against anything contrary to it, or which would frustrate or disap- point the purpose of that provision. The frame of the government, the grant of legislative power itself, the organization of the executive authority, the erection of the principal courts of justice, create im- plied limitations upon the law-making authority as strong as though a negative was expressed in each instance; but independently of these restraints, express or implied, every subject within the scope of civil government is liable to be dealt with by the legislature.” * “Tt has never been questioned, so far as I know,” says Redfield, Ch. J., “that the American legislatures have the same unlimited power in regard to legislation which resides in the British Parlia- ment, except where they are restrained by written constitutions. That must be conceded, I think, to be a fundamental principle in the political organizations of the American States. We cannot well comprehend how, upon principle, it should be otherwise. The people must, of course, possess all legislative power originally. They have committed this in the most general and unlimited manner to the several State legislatures, saving only such restrictions as are imposed by the Constitution of the United States, or of the particular State in question.” ? 1917 B, 1. See also Gemmer »v. State, guage employed, or in the evident 163 Ind. 150, 71 N. E. 478, 66 L. R. A. 82: Lawrence E. Tierney Coal Co. v. Smith, 180 Ky. 815, 203 S. W. 731, 4 A. L. R. 1540; State v. Taylor, 33 N. D. 76, 156 N. W. 561, L. R. A. 1918 B, 156, Ann. Cas. 1918 A, 583. “The implied restrictions of the Constitution upon legislative power may be as effectual for its condemna- tion as written words, and such restric- tions may be found either in the lan- VOL. 1—12 purpose which was in view, and the circumstances and historical events which led to the enactment of the par- ticular provision as a part of the organic law.’ Ex parte Lewis, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 1, 73 S. W. 811, 108 Am. St. Rep. 929. 1 People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 532, 543. 2 Thorpe v. Rutland & Burlington Railroad Co., 27 Vt. 140, 142. See178 also Adams v. Howe, 14 Mass. 340, 14 Am. Dec. 216; People v. Rucker, 5 Col. 455; People v. Osborne, 7 Col. 605, 4 Pac. 1074; Leggett v. Hunter, 19 N. Y. 445; Cochran v. Van Surlay, 20 Wend. 365; People v. Morrell, 21 Wend. 563; Sears v. Cottrell, 5 Mich. 251; Beauchamp v. State, 6 Blackf. 299; Mason v. Wait, 5 Ill. 127; People v. Supervisors of Orange, 27 Barb. 575; Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill, 140, per Bronson, J.; State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612, 35 Am. Dec. 44; Andrews »v. State, 3 Heisk. 165; Knoxville, &c. R. R. Co. v. Hicks, 9 Bax. 442; Lewis’s Appeal, 67 Pa. St. 153; Walker v. Cincinnati, 21 Ohio St. 14; People ». Wright, 70 Ill. 388; State v. Birming- ham Southern R. Co., 182 Ala. 475, 62 So. 77, Ann. Cas. 1915 D, 436; Beach v. Bradstreet, 85 Conn. 344, 82 Atl. 1030, Ann. Cas. 1913 B, 946; Van Winkle v. State, 4 Boyce (Del.), 578, 91 Atl. 385, Ann. Cas. 1916 D, 104; State v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 56 Fla. 617, 47 So. 969, 32 L. R. A. (n. s.) 689; Idaho Power, etc., Co. ». Blomquist, 26 Idaho, 222, 141 Pac. 1083, Ann. Cas. 1916 E, 282; Har- der’s Fireproof Storage, etc., Co. ». Chicago, 235 Ill. 58, 85 N. E. 245, 14 Ann. Cas. 536; People v. McCullough, 254 Ill. 9, 98 N. E. 156, Ann. Cas. 1913 B, 995; Greenfield v. Russel, 292 P3922) 127 Ne Bs 102) 9 A: E.R: 1334; Jordan v. Evansville, 163 Ind. 512, 72 N. BE. 544, 67 L. R. A. 613, 2 Ann. Cas. 96; Carr v. State, 175 Ind. 241, 93 N. E. 1071, 32 L. R. A. (w. s.) 1190; Schmitt v. F. W. Cook Brewing Co., 187 Ind. 623, 120 N. E. 19, 3 A. L. R. 270; Ratcliff v. Wichita Union Stockyards Co., 74 Kan. 1, 86 Pac. 150, 118 Am. St. Rep. 298, 6 L. R. A. (wn. s.) 834, 10 Ann. Cas. 1016; Lawrence E. Tierney Coal Co. ». Smith, 180 Ky. 815, 203 S. W. 731, 4A.L. R. 1540; Bayville Village Corp. v. Boothbay Harbor, 110 Me. 46, 85 Atl. 300, Ann. Cas. 1914 B, 1135; Laughlin v. Portland, 111 Me. 486, 90 Atl. 318, 51 L. R. A. (wn. s.) 1148, Ann. Cas. 1916 C, 734; State v. Man- kato, 117 Minn. 458, 136 N. W. 264, 41 L. R. A. (nN. 8.) 111; Williams v. Evans, 139 Minn. 32, 165 N. W. 495, 166 N. W. 504, L. R. A. 1918 F., 542; CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. 1 Ex parte Berger, 193 Mo. 16, 90S. W. 759, 112 Am. St. Rep. 472, 3 L. R. A. (w. s.) 530, 5 Ann. Cas. 383; State v. Merchants Exchange, 269 Mo. 346, 190 S. W. 903, Ann. Cas. 1917 E, 871; Ex parte Boyce, 27 Nev. 299, 75 Pac. 1, 65 L. R. A. 47, 1 Ann. Cas. 66; Hudspeth v. Swayze, 85 N. J. L. 592, 89 Atl. 780, Ann. Cas. 1916 A, 102; Atlantic Coast Electric R. Co. »v. Public Utility Com’rs, 92 N. J. L. 168, 104 Atl. 218, 12 A. L. R. 737; Wright v. Hart, 182 N. Y. 330, 75 N. B. 404) 2: R. A. Ges) 33aea Ann. Cas. 263; Saratoga Springs v. Saratoga Gas, E. L. & P. Co., 191 N. Y. 128, 83 N. BE: 693; 18. Re AS (n. s.) 713, 14 Ann. Cas. 606; Gautier v. Ditmar, 204 N. Y. 20, 97 N. E. 464, Ann. Cas. 1913 C, 960; Jenkins »v. State Board of Elections, 180 N. C. 169, 104 S. E. 346, 14 A. L. R. 1247; State v. Wetz, 40 N. D. 299, 168 N. W. 835, 5 A. L. R. 731; Cleveland ». Clements Bros. Const. Co., 67 Ohio St. 197, 65 N. E. 885, 93 Am. St. Rep. 670, 59 L. R. A. 775; Sanning »v. Cin- cinnati, 81 Ohio St. 142, 90 N. E. 125, 25 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 686; Hockett v. State Liquor Licensing Board, 91 Ohio St. 176, 110 N. E. 485, L. R. A. 1917 B, 7; Stettler v. O'Hara, 69 Oreg. 519, 139 Pac. 743, L. R. A. 1917 CG, 944, Ann. Cas. 1916 A, 217; Russ ». Com., 219 Pa. St. 544, 60 Atl. 169, 105 Am. St. Rep. 825, 1 L. R. A. (w. s.) 409; Com. v. Herr, 229 Pa. St. 132, 78 Atl. 68, Ann. Cas. 1912 A, 422; In re Watson, 17 S. D. 486, 97 N. W. 463, 2 Ann. Cas. 321; State v. Sum- mers, 33 8. D. 40, 144 N. W. 730, 50 L. R. A. (N. s.) 206, Ann. Cas. 1916 B, 860; Wheelon v. South Dakota Land Settlement Board, 43 S. D. 551, 181 N. W. 359, 14 A. L. R. 1145; Long ». State, 58 Tex. Crim. 209, 127 S. W. 208, 21 Ann. Cas. 405; Rio Grande Lumber Co. v. Darke, 50 Utah, 114, 167 Pac. 241, L. R. A. 1918 A, 1193; Willis v. Kalmbach, 109 Va. 475, 64 S. E. 342, 21 L. R. A. (nw. 8.) 1009; Booten v. Pinson, 77 W. Va. 412, 89 S. EB 985) I. Ri A. 1917 A, 1244; State v. Frear, 142 Wis. 320, 125 N. W. 961, 20 Ann. Cas. 633; Nikta v. West- ern Union Tel. Co., 149 Wis. 106, 135 N. W. 492, Ann. Cas. 1913 C, 863.CHAP. V] POWERS LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT MAY EXERCISE 179 “During the process of legislation in any mode,” says Bond, J., “the work of the law makers is not subject to judicial arrest or control, nor open to judicial inquiry.’’] “T entertain no doubt,” says Comstock, J., ‘that, aside from the special limitations of the constitution, the legislature cannot exercise powers which are in their nature essentially judicial or executive. These are, by the constitution, distributed to other departments of the government. in the senate and assembly. It is only the ‘legislative power’ which is vested But where the constitution is silent, and there is no clear usurpation of the powers distributed to other departments, I think there danger in attempting to define the limits of this power. far the power of giving the law may Justice Marshall said: “How would be great difficulty and great Chief involve every other power, in cases where the constitution is silent, never has been, and perhaps never can be, definitely stated.’ * That very eminent judge felt the difficulty; but the danger was less apparent then than it is now, when theories, alleged to be founded in natural reason or inalienable rights, but subversive of the just and necessary powers of government, attract the belief of con- siderable classes of men, and when too much reverence for govern- ment and law is certainly among the least of the perils to which our institutions are exposed. I am reluctant to enter upon this field of inquiry, satisfied, as I am, that no rule can be laid down in terms which may not contain the germ of great mischief to society, by giving to private opinion and speculation a license to oppose them- selves to the just and legitimate powers of government.” ° Other judicial opinions in great number might be cited in support of the same general doctrine ; but as there will be occasion to refer to them elsewhere when the circumstances under which a statute may be declared unconstitutional are considered, we refrain from That the rule as to the extent of legislative power is substantially the game in Canada, see Valin v. Langlois, 3 Can. Sup. Ct. 1; Mayor, &c. v. The Queen, 3 Can. Sup. Ct. 505. The provisions of a State Constitu- tion do not confer any powers upon the legislature, but are mere limitations. The legislature has plenary power in all matters of legislation, except as limited by the Constitution. Idaho Power, etc., Co. v. Blomquist, 26 Idaho, 222, 141 Pac. 1083, Ann. Cas. 1916 E, 282; Schmitt v. F. W. Cook Brewing Co., 187 Ind. 623, 120 N. E. 19, 3 A. L. R. 270; State v. Mankato, 117 Minn. 458, 136 N. W. 264, 41 L. R. A. (n. s.) 111. “The only restraints upon the exer- cise of the legislative prerogative are those expressly or impliedly contained in the Federal and State constitutions, and those immutable principles which lie at the very foundation of society.” Hudspeth v. Swayze, 85 N. J. L. 592, g9 Atl. 780, Ann. Cas. 1916 A, 102. 1 Pitman v. Drabelle, 267 Mo. 78, 183 S. W. 1055, Ann. Cas. 1918 D, 601. 2 Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87, 136, 3 L. ed. 162, 177. 3 Wynehamer 2. People, 13 N. Y. 378, 391.180 further references in this place.! CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [Vvou. 1 Nor shall we enter upon a dis- cussion of the question suggested by Chief Justice Marshall, as above quoted ;” since, however interesting it may be as an abstract ques- tion, it is made practically unimportant by the careful separation of powers and duties between the several departments of the govern- ment which has been made by each of the State constitutions. Had no such separation been made, the disposal of executive and judicial duties must have devolved upon the department vested 1See post, p. 348, and cases cited in notes. 2'The creation of offices and the assignment of their compensation is a legislative function. Glavey v. United States, 182 U.S. 595, 45 L. ed. 1247, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 891; United States v. Andrews, 240 U. S. 90, 60 L. ed. 541, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 349; Coch- nower v. United States, 248 U. S. 405, 63 L. ed. 328, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 137; Ex parte Lewis, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 1, 73 S. W. 811, 108 Am. St. Rep. 929. “The general assembly has the right to prescribe the mode of appointment of all officers created by it.’’ State v. Jackson, 134 La. 599, 64 So. 481, Ann. Cas. 1916 B, 27. The power to distribute the judicial power, except so far as that has been done by the Constitution, rests with the legislature: Commonwealth ». Hipple, 69 Pa. St. 9; State v. New Brunswick, 42 N. J. 51; State v. Brown, 71 Mo. 454; Jackson v. Nimmo, 3 Lea, 608; see Burke v. St. Paul, M. &c. Ry. Co., 35 Minn. 172, 28 N. W. 190; St. Paul v. Umstetter, 37 Minn. 15, 33 N. W. 115; but when the Constitution has conferred it upon certain specified courts, this must be understood to embrace the whole judicial power, and the legislature cannot vest any portion of it elsewhere. Greenough v. Green- ough, 11 Pa. St. 489; State v. May- nard, 14 Ill. 420; Gibson v. Emerson, 7 Ark. 172; Chandler v. Nash, 5 Mich. 409; Succession of Tanner, 22 La. Ann. 90; Gough v. Dorsey, 27 Wis. 119; Van Slyke v. Ins. Co., 39 Wis. 390, 20 Am. Rep. 50; Alexander », Bennett, 60 N. Y. 204; People ». Young, 72 Ill. 411; Jn re Cleveland, oI N. J. L. 311, 17 Atl. 772; Risser v. Hoyt, 53 Mich. 185, 18 N. W. 611; Shoultz v. McPheeters, 79 Ind. 373. And when the Constitution gives the court appellate jurisdiction only, ex- cept in certain specified cases, the legis- lature cannot enlarge the original jurisdiction of the court. Klein », Valerius, 87 Wis. 54, 57 N. W. 1112, 22 L. R. A. 609. Nor can the legislature redistribute the judicial power. Brown v. Circuit Judge, 75 Mich. 274, 42 N. W. 827, 5 L. R. A. 226, 13 Am. St. 438; Watson v. Blackstone, 98 Va. 618, 38 S. E. 939. Cannot confer the power of the court upon a single judge thereof. State v. Woodson, 161 Mo. 444, 61S. W. 252. When the Constitution vests the judicial power in the courts and spe- cifically defines and limits both the original and appellate jurisdiction of the court of last resort, the legislature cannot enlarge or restrict this jurisdic- tion in matters judicial, but may pro- vide by law for the exercise of such jurisdiction. Thompson v. Redington, 92 Ohio St. 101, 110 N. E. 652, Ann. Cas. 1918 A, 1161. Congress may provide that the de- termination by the treasury depart- ment of whether an alien is entitled to land shall be final. Nishimura Ekiu v. U.S., 142 U. S. 651, 35 L. ed. 1146, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 336. The legislature cannot select persons to assist courts in the performance of their duties and act as a commission of appeal. State v. Noble, 118 Ind. 350, 21 N. E. 244; In re Courts of Appeals, 9 Col. 623, 21 Pac. 471. Courts established by the legisla- ture cannot exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of that conferred by the Constitution on other courts. Mon- tross v. State, 61 Miss. 429. See State v. Butt, 25 Fla. 258, 5 So. 597. Buta general provision in the Constitution for the distribution of the judicialCHAP. V] power, not referring to courts-martial, would not be held to forbid such courts by implication. People v. Daniell, 50 N. Y. 274. Nor would it be held to embrace administrative functions of a quasi judicial nature, such as the assessment of property for taxation. State v. Commissioners of Ormsby County, 7 Nev. 392, and cases cited. See Auditor of State v. Atchison, &c. R. R. Co., 6 Kan. 500, 7 Am. Rep. 575. But a court may determine whether a proposed local improvement shall be undertaken. Bryant v. Robbins, 70 Wis. 258, 35 N. W. 545. In the absence of express constitu- tional provision therefor, the legisla- ture cannot assign to the judicial branch of the government any duties other than those that are properly judicial, to be performed in a judicial manner. Thompson v. Redington, 92 Ohio St. 101, 110 N. E. 652, Ann. Cas. 1918 A, 1161. A judge of a superior court cannot be required or empowered to pass upon and modify or approve a plan for the location of a street railway. Norwalk Street R. Co.’s appeal, 69 Conn. 576, 37 Atl. 1080, 39 L. R. A. 794. Nora court to direct how a telegraph or tele- phone company may use the streets of a city. Zanesville v. Zanesville T. & Tel. Co., 63 Ohio, 442, 59 N. E. 109; New York & N. J. Tel. Co. v. Mayor of Bound Brook, 66 N. J. L. 168, 48 Atl. 1022. County board cannot determine which rooms in court house shall be occupied by certain judges. Dahnke v. People, 168 Ill. 102, 48 N. E. 137, 39 L. R. A. 197. Court during its session has full control over that portion of court house necessary to the conven- ient transaction of its business. Vigo County v. Stout, 136 Ind. 53, 35 N. E. 683, 22 L. R. A. 398, and note; and may order repairs to court house, although it cannot order the erection of additions thereto or the rebuilding thereof. White County v. Gwin, 136 mds 5624156) Ne Hs 2374, 22) lua Ba AG 402. It is not competent to confer upon the courts the power to tax: Monday v. Rahway, 43 N. J. L. 338; nor to im- pose on them administrative duties. POWERS LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT MAY EXERCISE 181 Houseman v. Kent Cire. Judge, 58 Mich. 364, 25 N. W. 369. But after thirty-five years of exercise of such power under a statute, it is too late to object. Locke v. Speed, 62 Mich. 408, 28 N. W. 917. The legislature cannot create a “court of visitation’”’ for the control of corporations and endow it with execu- tive, legislative, and judicial powers. State v. Johnson, 61 Kan. 803, 60 Pac. 1068, 49 L. R. A. 662. Nor can it constitute a board of State auditors, which is a purely executive board, a court of review to pass upon the right- fulness of a conviction of crime, and in case conviction be found wrongful to allow damages for the imprisonment consequent thereupon. Allen v. Board of State Auditors, 122 Mich. 324, 81 N. W. 113, 47 L. R. A. 117, 80 Am. St. 573. The power to appoint election com- missioners not having been expressly conferred on any department, the legis- lature may impose the duty of appoint- ment on the county court. People v. Hoffman, 116 Ill. 587, 5 N. E. 596, 8 N. E. 788. Such appointments are upheld in Jn re Citizens of Cincinnati, 2 Flipp. 228;. Russell v. Cooley, 69 Ga. 215. But in Supervisors of Elec- tion, 114 Mass. 247, 19 Am. Rep. 341, a contrary doctrine is laid down. A chief justice cannot be empowered to determine which claimant of an office shall hold it pending a contest. Such power, if executive, cannot be given a judge; if judicial, belongs to a court. In re Cleveland, 51 N. J. L. 311, 17 Atl. 772. The legislature cannot require a court to give its opinions in writing: Vaughn v. Harp, 49 Ark. 160, 4 Sa We 751. Nor to write syllabi to its deci- sions. In re Griffiths, 118 Ind. 83, 20 N. E. 513. It is held in linois that the legis- lature cannot interfere with the power of the courts to regulate the licensing of attorneys. Re Day, 181 Ill. 73, 54 N. E. 646, 50 L. R. A. 519. See also Re Leach, 134 Ind. 665, 34 N. E. 641, PAL by, 18, ANG CAD The legislature cannot define what shall be considered a contempt of court. Bradley v. State, 111 Ga. 168,182 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I with the general authority to make laws ;’ but assuming them to be apportioned already, we are only at liberty to liken the power of the State legislature to that of the Parliament, when it confines its action to an exercise of legislative functions ; and such authority as is in its nature either executive or judicial is beyond its constitu- 36 S. E. 630, 50 L. R. A. 691, 78 Am. St. 157; Hale v. State, 55 Ohio St. 210, 45 N. E. 199, 36 L. R. A. 254, and note, 60 Am. St. 691. On the other hand, a court has no power to enjoin a legislative body. State v. Superior Court of Milwaukee Co., 105 Wis. 651, 81 N. W. 1046, 48 L. R. A. 819. But see Roberts v. Louisville, 92 Ky. 95, 17 S. W. 216, 13 L. R. A. 844, and note. Nor has a court power to determine whether or not a senator of the State legislature whose term has not yet expired, has disqualified himself from further acting as senator. Covington v. Buffett, 90 Md. 569, 45 Atl. 204, 47 L. R. A. 622. Nor to establish rules and regulations for the extension of telephone lines. Michigan Tel. Co. v. St. Joseph, 121 Mich. 502, 80 N. W. 383, 47 L. R. A. 87, 80 Am. St. 520. Upon distinction between legislative and judicial powers, see Re Janvrin, 174 Mass. 514, 55 N. E. 381, 47 L. R. A. 319. The judicial power which the Con- stitution confers upon the courts in- cludes the power to determine the legal sufficiency of evidence to go to the jury, and a statute which prohibits the courts from directing verdicts is void. Thoe v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 181 Wis. 456, 195 N. W. 407, 29 A. L. R. 1280. See also Finkelston v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Co., 94 Wis. 270, 68 N. W. 1005; Chybowski ». Bucyrus Co., 127 Wis. 332, 106 N. W. 833) 7 L: R.A. (x. s:) 357. But see First Nat. Bank v. Strauss, 50 N. D. 71, 194 N. W. 900; Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Stock, 104 Va. 97, 51S. E. 161; Norfolk & Western R. Co. ». Simmons, 127 Va. 419, 103 S. E. 609. The legislature has no power to make a conclusive finding of facts, and there- upon direct a municipality to pay a specified claim. Board of Ed. ». State, 51 Ohio St. 531, 38 N. E. 614, 25 L. R. A. 770, 46 Am. St. 588. The fact that the legislature, in an act mak- ing it a criminal offense for any person to engage in any gift enterprise, de- scribes a legitimate private business enterprise, and provides that any per- son engaged in such business shall be held to be engaged in a gift enterprise within the provisions of the act, will not oust the jurisdiction of the courts to determine the true character of the business so attempted to be prohibited. State ex rel. Hartigan v. Sperry & H. Co., 94 Neb. 785, 144 N. W. 795, 49 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 1128. Where the legislature is authorized to regulate the method of procedure in “Courts below the Supreme Court”’ it has no power over procedure in the Supreme Court. Herndon v. Imperial Fire Ins. Co., 111 N. C. 384, 16 S. E. 465, 18 L. R. A. 547. The legislature can direct a court to appoint certain commissioners and confer upon the commissioners so to be appointed the power to apportion among several cities and towns the cost of a system of sewerage without prescribing any further direction for such apportionment than that it shall be just and equitable. Re Kingman, 153 Mass. 566, 27 N. E. 778, 12 L. R. A. 417. The legislature cannot validate warrants issued under an unconstitu- tional law. Felix v. Wallace Co. Com’rs, 62 Kan. 832, 62 Pac. 667, 84 Am. St. 424. Congress may provide that inspec- tors of customs may finally determine whether immigrants are entitled to land. Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U. S. 651, 35 L. ed. 1146, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 336. 1 Calder v. Bull, 2 Root, 350, and 3 Dall. 386, 1 L. ed. 648; Ross v. Whit- man, 6 Cal. 361; Smith v. Judge, 17 Cal. 547; per Patterson, J., in Cooper v. Telfair, 4 Dall. 19, 1 L. ed. 721; Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 4 L. ed. 97.CHAP. V] POWERS LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT MAY EXERCISE 183 tional powers, with the few exceptions to which we have already referred. It will be important therefore to consider those cases where legislation has been questioned as encroaching upon judicial author- ity; and to this end it may be useful, at the outset, to endeavor to define legislative and judicial power respectively, that we may the better be enabled to point out the proper line of distinction when questions arise in their practical application to actual cases.’ The legislative power we understand to be the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them.’ Laws, in the sense in which the word is here employed, are rules of civil conduct, or statutes, which the legislative will has prescribed. “The laws of a State,’ observes Mr. Justice Story, “are more usually understood to mean the rules and enactments promulgated by the legislative authority thereof, or long-established local customs having the force of laws.” * “The difference between the depart- ments undoubtedly is, that the legislature makes, the executive executes, and the judiciary construes, the law.” 4 And it is said that that which distinguishes a judicial from a legislative act is, that the one is a determination of what the existing law is in relation to some existing thing already done or happened, while the other is a pre- determination of what the law shall be for the regulation of all future cases falling under its provisions.* And in another case it is said: “The legislative power extends only to the making of laws, and in 1In In re Appointment of Revisor, 141 Wis. 592, 598, 124 N. W. 670, 18 Ann. Cas. 1176, the court said: “It is impossible to say at any given place: Here is a line where legislative power ends and judicial power begins; all on one side of this line is legislative and all on the other side is judicial, and no single power can be both.” See also Klein v. Barry, 182 Wis. 255, 196 N. W. 457. 2 State v. Denny, 118 Ind. 382, 21 N. E. 252, 4 L. R. A. 79; State v. Denny, 118 Ind. 449, 21 N. E. 274, 4 L. R. A. 65; Ellingham v. Dye, 178 Ind. 336, 99 N. E. 1, Ann. Cas. 1915 C, 200; State v. Armstead, 103 Miss. 790, 60 So. 778, Ann. Cas. 1915 B, 495; State v. Whisman, 36 S. D. 260, 154 N. W. 707, L. R. A. 1917 B, 1. 3 Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 18, 10 L. ed. 865, 871. 4 Per Marshall, Ch. J., in Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 46, 6 L. ed. 253, 263; per Gibson, Ch. J., in Green- ough v. Greenough, 11 Pa. St. 494. See Governor v. Porter, 7 Humph. 165; State v. Gleason, 12 Fla. 190; Hawkins v. Governor, 1 Ark. 570; Westinghausen v. People, 44 Mich. 265, 6 N. W. 641. 5 Bates v. Kimball, 2 Chip. 77. A prospective determination by a court of the validity of school rules, compiled under legislative authority, is not an exercise of judicial power. In re School Law Manual, 63 N. H. 574, 4 Atl. 878. Power to supersede an ordinance upon petition of taxpayers as contrary to law cannot be conferred upon a court. Shephard »v. Wheeling, 30 W. Va. 479, 4 S. E.635. Nor to fix the salary of a reporter in advance. Smith v. Strother, 68 Cal. 194, 8 Pac. 852. Nor to make upon its own whim a com- petent witness who otherwise would not be. Tillman v. Cocke, 9 Bax. 429.184 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I its exercise it is limited and restrained by the paramount authority of the Federal and State constitutions. It cannot directly reach the property or vested rights of the citizen by providing for their forfeiture or transfer to another, without trial and judgment in the courts; for to do so would be the exercise of a power which belongs to another branch of the government, and is forbidden to the legislative.’! “That is not legislation which adjudicates in a particular case, prescribes the rule contrary to the general law, and orders it to be enforced. Such power assimilates itself more closely to despotic rule than any other attribute of government.”’ ? On the other hand, to adjudicate upon, and protect the rights and interests of individual citizens, and to that end to construe and apply the laws, is the peculiar province of the judicial department.’ “No particular definition of judicial power,” says Woodbury, J., “is given in the constitution [of New Hampshire], and, considering the general nature of the instrument, none was to be expected. Critical statements of the meanings in which all important words were employed would have swollen into volumes; and when those words possessed a customary signification, a definition of them would have been useless. But ‘powers judicial’, ‘judiciary powers’, and ‘judicatories’ are all phrases used in the constitution ; ‘and though not particularly defined, are still so used to designate with clearness that department of government which it was intended should 1 Newland v. Marsh, 19 IIl. 383. 2 Ervine’s Appeal, 16 Pa. St. 256, 266. See also Greenough v. Green- ough, 11 Pa. St. 489; Dechastellux ». Fairchild, 15 Pa. St. 18; Trustees, &c. v. Bailey, 10 Fla. 238. 3 Cincinnati, &c. Railroad Co. »v. Commissioners of Clinton Co., 1 Ohio St. 77. See also King v. Dedham Bank, 15 Mass. 447; Gordon »v. In- graham, 1 Grant’s Cases, 152; People v. Supervisors of New York, 16 N. Y. 424; Beebe v. State, 6 Ind. 501; Greenough v. Greenough, 11 Pa. St. 489; Taylor v. Place, 4 R. I. 324. The judicial power “‘is the power to hear and determine those matters which affect the life, liberty, or prop- erty of the citizens of the State.” Sapulpa v. Land, 101 Okla. 22, 223 Pac. 640, 35 A. L. R. 872. What weight a trial court or an appellate court of general jurisdiction shall give to the verdict of a jury is a judicial matter that cannot be controlled by legislative enactment. State ex rel. Cartmel v. Aitna Casualty & S. Co., 84 Fla. 123, 92 So. 871, 24 A. L. R. 1262. It isalso a part of the function of the judiciary to determine whether &@ proposed constitutional amendment has been in fact adopted under the forms prescribed for such case by the constitution, and the legislative decla- ration that it has been so adopted is null. State v. Powell, 77 Miss. 543, 27 So. 927, 48 L. R. A. 652. But see Worman v. Hagan, 78 Md. 152, 27 Atl. 616, 21 L. R. A. 716, to effect the governor’s proclamation of adoption is conclusive. It is also a proper func- tion of a court to require proper authorities to prescribe rules and regulations for extension of telephone lines, and to pass upon the validity of such rules when properly brought in question. Mich. Tel. Co. »v. St. Joseph, 121 Mich. 502, 80 N. W. 383, 47 L. R. A. 87, 80 Am. St. 520.CHAP. V] interpret and administer the laws. POWERS LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT MAY EXERCISE 185 On general principles, therefore, those inquiries, deliberations, orders, and decrees, which are peculiar to such a department, must in their nature be judicial acts. Nor can they be both judicial and legislative; because a marked dif- ference exists between the employments of judicial and legislative tribunals. The former decide upon the legality of claims and con- duct, and the latter make rules upon which, in connection with the constitution, those decisions should be founded. It is the province of judges to determine what is the law upon existing cases. In fine, the law is applied by the one, and made by the other. To do the first, therefore, — to compare the claims of parties with the law of the land before established, — is in its nature a judicial act. But to do the last — to pass new rules for the regulation of new contro- versies — is in its nature a legislative act ; and if these rules interfere with the past, or the present, and do not look wholly to the future, they violate the definition of a law as ‘a rule of civil conduct’ ;? 11 Bl. Com. 44. The distinction between legislative and judicial power lies between a rule and a sentence. Shrader, Ex parte, 33 Cal. 279. See Shumway v. Ben- nett, 29 Mich. 451; Supervisors of Election, 114 Mass. 247. “The legis- lature may make laws, prescribe rules of action and provide remedies not provided by the Constitution, the judi- ciary alone can administer the rem- edy.” In re Boyett, 136 N. C. 415, 48 S. E. 789, 103 Am. St. Rep. 944, 67 L. R. A. 972, 1 Ann. Cas. 729. ‘‘ While it is extremely difficult to formulate any definition of judicial power which will be applicable to all cases, it may be said in general that it is authority vested in some court, officer, or person to hear and determine when the rights of persons or property or the pro- priety of doing an act are the subject- matter of adjudication.” State ez rel. Standard Oil Co. v. Bloisdell, 22 N. D. 86, 132 N. W. 769, Ann. Cas. 1913 E, 1089. It is not for a court to discuss the wisdom of legislation. United States v. Lanza, 260 U. S. 377, 67 L. ed. 314, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 141. Unless there is a clear and palpable abuse of power, a court will not substitute its judgment for legislative discretion. Allion v. Toledo, 99 Ohio St. 416, 124 N. E. 237, 6 A. L. R. 426. “Tt is a fundamental principle that every person restrained of his liberty is entitled to have the cause of such restraint inquired into by a judicial officer. The judicial department of the government cannot by any legisla- tion be deprived of this power or re- lieved of this duty.” In re Boyett, 136 N. C. 415, 48 S. E. 789, 103 Am. St. Rep. 944, 67 L. R. A. 972, 1 Ann. Cas. 729. The legislature cannot empower election boards to decide whether one by dueling has forfeited his right to vote or hold office. Commonwealth v. Jones, 10 Bush, 725; Burkett »v. McCurty, 10 Bush, 758. Buta board may be empowered to recount votes and make a statement of results. If they have no power to investigate frauds, they do not exercise judicial power. Andrews v. Carney, 74 Mich. 278, 41 N. W. 923. Under a constitu- tional provision allowing the legislature to provide for removal of an election officer for such cause as it deems proper, the power to determine whether the cause exists need not be vested in the courts. People v. Stu- art, 74 Mich. 411, 41 N. W. 1091. See Brown v. Duffus, 66 Iowa, 193, 23 N. W. 396. “To provide by legislative action additional process relevant to the enforcement of judicial authority is the exertion of a legislative and not186 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS the exercise of a judicial power.” Vir- ginia v. West Virginia, 246 U. S. 565, 2 L. ed. 883, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 400. It is not an infringement of judicial power to enact that a jury shall assess the punishment in a murder case. State v. Hockett, 70 Iowa, 442, 30 N. W. 742. Nor that persons sentenced to jail may be employed on roads by county commissioners, under regula- tions to be made by them. Holland v. State, 23 Fla. 123, 1 So. 521. But it is an invasion of judicial power to provide that in case of doubt a statute shall be construed so as to save a lien given by it. Meyer v. Berlandi, 39 Minn. 438, 40 N. W. 513. Power to declare what acts shall be a misdemeanor cannot be conferred on commissioners of vine culture. Hz parte Cox, 63 Cal. 21. A county clerk cannot fix the amount of bail. Gregory v. State, 94 Ind. 384. Failure of a railroad commissioner to require a railway company to sta- tion a flagman at a given crossing cannot be made conclusive proof that the omission to station such flagman is not negligence. Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Ives, 144 U. S. 408, 36 L. ed. 485, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 679. An administrative board may be empowered to adjudicate upon priori- ties of water-rights and to make in- dependent investigations in regard thereto and to declare its findings, pro- vided parties interested in such adju- dications are allowed by the statute a reasonable opportunity to appeal therefrom to the regular courts. Farm Investment Company v. Car- penter, 9 Wyo. 110, 61 Pac. 258, 50 L. R. A. 747. A ministerial officer may be em- powered to investigate land titles, and his findings may be made prima facie evidence. People v. Simon, 176 IIl. 165, 52 N. E. 910, 44 L. R. A. 801, 68 Am. St. 175. For other cases on Torrens Land Registration Acts, see People v. Chase, 165 Ill. 527, 46 N. E. 454, 36 L. R. A. 105; State v. Guilbert, 56 Ohio St. 575, 47 N. BE. 551, 38 L. R. A. 519, 60 Am. St. 756; Tyler v. Court of Registration, 175 Mass. 71, 50 N. E. 812, 51 L. R. A. 433. [VoL. I The courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the claims of rival bodies to be the State senate, and to determine which, if either, is the constitutional senate. Attorney-General v. Rogers, 56 N. J. L. 480, 28 Atl. 726, 29 Atl. 178, 23 L. R. A. 354. The legislature cannot declare a forfeiture of a right to act as curators of a college. State v. Adams, 44 Mo. 570. Nor can it authorize the goy- ernor or any other State officer to pass upon the validity of State grants and correct errors therein; this being judi- cial. Hilliard v. Connelly, 7 Ga. 172. Nor, where a corporate charter pro- vides that it shall not be repealed “unless it shall be made to appear to the legislature that there has been a violation by the company of some of its provisions”, can there be a repeal before a judicial inquiry into the vio- lation. Flint, &c. Plank Road Co. ». Woodhull, 25 Mich. 99. A law which provides that the mere filing of an affidavit charging bias and prejudice is sufficient to disqualify a judge without any hearing or determi- nation of whether the affidavit is true or false is unconstitutional as depriv- ing the court of judicial power and vesting the same in the litigants to that extent. Diehl ». Crump, 72 Okla. 108, 179 Pac. 4,5 A. L. R. 1272. “The question of the custody of minors and their legal restraint has always been recognized as a judicial question to be determined by the courts. Pomeroy’s Equity, sec. 1304. The legislative branch of the government is denied the power to exercise this judicial function or to confer on a father or other person the right to exercise it.’’ Therefore, an act which attempts to give to a father the absolute right to dispose of the custody of his children by deed or will is invalid. Hz parte Tillman, 84S. C. 552, 66 S. E. 1049, 26 L. R. A. (w. 8.) 781. The question whether a withdrawal by a State of a natural product, a common subject of commercial deal- ings, from an established current of commerce moving into the territory of another State, is an interference with interstate commerce, is essentially aCHAP. V] POWERS LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT MAY EXERCISE 187 because no rule of conduct can with consistency operate upon what occurred before the rule itself was promulgated. “Tt is the province of judicial power, also, to decide private dis- putes between or concerning persons; but of legislative power to regulate public concerns, and to make laws for the benefit and wel- fare of the State. Nor does the passage of private statutes conflict with these principles; because such statutes, when lawful, are enacted on petition, or by the consent of all concerned; or else they judicial question. Com. of Pennsyl- vania v. State of West Virginia, 262 U. S. 553, 67 L. ed. 1117, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 658, 32 A. L. R. 300. Local legislative authorities, and not the courts, are primarily the judges of the necessities of local situa- tions calling for police regulation, and the courts can only interfere when such regulation arbitrarily exceeds a reasonable exercise of authority. Schmidinger v. Chicago, 226 U. S. 578, 57 L. ed. 364, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 182, Ann. Cas. 1918 B, 284, affirming 243 Ill. 167, 90 N. E. 369, 44 L. R. A. (n. s.) 632, 17 Ann. Cas. 614; Allion v. Toledo, 99 Ohio St. 416, 124 N. E. 237, 6 A. L. R. 426. “The mere declaration by a legisla- ture that a business is affected with a public interest is not conclusive of the question whether its attempted regula- tion on that ground is justified. The circumstances of its alleged change from the status of a private business and its freedom from regulation into one in which the public have come to have an interest are always a subject of judicial inquiry.” Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus- trial Relations, 262 U. S. 522, 67 L. ed. 1103, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 630, 27 A. L. R. 1280. See also People »v. Weller, 237 N. Y. 316, 143 N. E. 205, 38 A. L. R. 613. But it has been held that a statute authorizing the creation of drainage districts which declares that the drainage of surface waters from agricultural lands shall be con- sidered a public benefit, is not a usur- pation of judicial power. Sisson 2. Board of Sup’rs, 128 Iowa, 442, 104 N. W. 454, 70 L. R. A. 440. The establishment of a railway passenger rate is the making of a rule for the future, and therefore is an act legislative, not judicial, in kind. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 53 L. ed. 150, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 67. See also Interstate Commerce Commission v. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co., 167 U. 8. 479, 42 L. ed. 243, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 896; San Diego Land & Town Co. v. Jasper, 189 U. S. 439, 47 L. ed. 892, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 571; Com. ex rel. Attorney-General v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 106 Va. 61, 55 S. E. 572, 117 Am. St. Rep. 983, 7 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 1086; Concur- ring opinion of Keith, P. in Winchester, etc., R. Co. v. Com., 106 Va. 264, 55 S. E. 692. A State legislature has the power to obtain information upon any subject upon which it has power to legislate with a view to its enlightenment and guidance, but it cannot conduct a public and judicial investigation of any charges made against any institution or individual under the pretense or cloak of its power to investigate for the purpose of legislation. This is true whether the investigation be for the purpose of instituting prosecutions for the aid and benefit of a grand jury in finding indictments, or for the purpose of intentionally injuring or vindicat- ing any institution or individual. Greenfield v. Russel, 292 Ill. 392, 127 N. E. 102, 9 A. L. R. 1334. A board created by statute purely as an administrative agency to bring into being and administer an insur- ance fund is not a court, and the fact that it is empowered to classify persons who come under the law and to ascer- tain facts as to the application of the fund does not vest it with judicial power. State ex rel. Yaple v. Creamer, 85 Ohio St. 349, 97 N. E. 602, 39 L. R. A. (n. 8.) 694.188 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. 1 forbear to interfere with past transactions and vested rights.” ! [In a comparatively recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States Mr. Justice Holmes said: “A judicial inquiry inves- tigates, declares, and enforces liabilities as they stand on present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist. That is its purpose and end. Legislation, on the other hand, looks to the future and changes existing conditions by making a new rule, to be applied thereafter to all or some part of those subject to its power.” 7] With these definitions and explanations, we shall now proceed to consider some of the cases in which the courts have attempted to draw the line of distinction between the proper functions of the legislative and judicial departments, in cases where it has been claimed that the legislature have exceeded their power by invading the domain of judicial authority. Declaratory Statutes. Legislation is either introductory of new rules, or it is declar- atory of existing rules. “A declaratory statute is one which is passed in order to put an end to a doubt as to what is the com- mon law, or the meaning of another statute, and which declares what it is and ever has been.’’* Such a statute, therefore, is always in a certain sense retrospective; because it assumes to determine what the law was before it was passed; and as a declara- tory statute is important only in those cases where doubts have already arisen, the statute, when passed, may be found to declare the law to be different from what it has already been adjudged to be by the courts. Thus Mr. Fox’s Libel Act declared that, by the law of England, juries were judges of the law in prosecutions for libel ; it did not purport to introduce a new rule, but to declare a rule 1 Merrill v. Sherburne, 1 N. H. 199, as there used has reference alone to 203. See Jones v. Perry, 10 Yerg. 69; Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill, 140; Ogden »v. Blackledge, 2 Cranch, 272, 2 L. ed. 276; Dash v. Van Kleek, 7 Johns. 477; Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Pet. 627, 7 L. ed. 542; Leland v. Wilkinson, 10 Pet. 294, 9 L. ed. 430; State v. Hopper, 71 Mo. 425. A statute creating a com- mission to review a tax assessment to be appointed by the circuit judge of the county is not invalid as vesting judi- cial power in the commission in the sense in which that term is used in the Constitution of Wisconsin. The term judicial power as exercised in the administration of the law in actions and proceedings in courts of law and equity. State ex rel. Ellis v. Thorne 112 Wis. 81, 87 N. W. 797, 55 L. R. A. 956. 2 Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U. S. 210, 53 L. ed. 150, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 67. See also Ross v. Oregon, 227 U. S. 150, 57 L. ed. 458, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 220, Ann. Cas. 1914 C, 224. 3 Bouy. Law Dict. “Statute”; Aus- tin on Jurisprudence, Lect. 37.POWERS LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT MAY EXERCISE 189 CHAP. V] already and always in force. Yet previous to the passage of this act the courts had repeatedly held that the jury in these cases were only to pass upon the fact of publication and the truth of the in- nuendoes; and whether the publication was libellous or not was a question of law which addressed itself exclusively to the court. It would appear, therefore, that the legislature declared the law to be what the courts had declared it was not. So in the State of New York, after the courts had held that insurance companies were taxable to a certain extent under an existing statute, the legislature passed another act, declaring that such companies were only tax- able at a certain other rate; and it was thereby declared that such was the intention and true construction of the original statute.’ In these cases it will be perceived that the courts, in the due exercise of their authority as interpreters of the laws, have declared what the rule established by the common law or by statute 1s, and that the legislature has then interposed, put its own construction upon the existing law, and in effect declared the judicial interpretation to be unfounded and unwarrantable. The courts in these cases have clearly kept within the proper limits of their jurisdiction, and if they have erred, the error has been one of judgment only, and has not extended to usurpation of power. Was the legislature also within the limits of its authority when it passed the declaratory statute ? The decision of this question must depend perhaps upon the purpose which was in the mind of the legislature in passing the declaratory statute; whether the design was to give to the rule now declared a retrospective operation, or, on the other hand, merely to establish a construction of the doubtful law for the determination of cases that may arise in the future. It is always competent to change an existing law by a declaratory statute ; and where the statute is only to operate upon future cases, it is no objection to its validity that it assumes the law to have been in the past what it is now declared that it shall be in the future. 1 People v. Supervisors of New York, 16 N. Y. 424. 2 Union Iron Co. v. Pierce, 4 Biss. 327; Pennsylvania v. Wheeling Co., 18 How. 421, 15 L. ed. 435; In re Coburn, 165 Cal. 202, 131 Pac. 352; McCleary v. Babcock, 169 Ind. 228, 82 N. E. 453; In re Johnson, 99 Neb. 275, 155 N. W. 1100, 98 Neb. 799, 154 N. W. 550. The legislature has the power to declare by a later act the meaning and intention of an earlier one, and in such event the legislative interpretation is binding in all cases arising after it has been made manifest. State v. Board of Com’rs, 83 Kan. 199, 110 Pac. 93. Declaratory or defining statutes are to be upheld, except with regard to past transactions, as an exercise of legislative power to enact a law for the future. In re Coburn, 165 Cal. 202, 131 Pac. 352. The legislature may extend the pro- visions of an existing statute to a new subject by an appropriate reference to such statute in the new act. Wichita ». Missouri, etc., Telephone Co., 70190 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I But the legislative action cannot be made to retroact upon past controversies, and to reverse decisions which the courts, in the exercise of their undoubted authority, have made; for this would not only be the exercise of judicial power, but it would be its exercise in the most objectionable and offensive form, since the legislature would in effect sit as a court of review to which parties might appeal when dissatisfied with the rulings of the courts.’ Kan. 441, 78 Pac. 886; Griffin »v. Gesner, 78 Kan. 669, 97 Pac. 794; State v. Board of Com’rs, 83 Kan. 199, 110 Pac. 92. 1 Caddo Parish v. Red River Parish, 114 La. 370, 38 So. 274; Weisberg v. Weisberg, 112 App. Div. 231, 98 N. Y. Supp. 260, 18 N. Y. Ann. Cas. 263; Macartney v. Shipherd, 60 Oreg. 133, 117 Pac. 814, Ann. Cas. 1913 D, 1257; State v. Harden, 62 W. Va. 3138, 58 S. E. 715, 60S. E. 394. In several different cases the courts of Pennsylvania had decided that a testator’s mark to his name, at the foot of a testamentary paper, but without proof that the name was written by his express direction, was not the signa- ture required by the statute, and the legislature, to use the language of Chief Justice Gibson, ‘declared, in order to overrule it, that every last will and testament heretofore made, or here- after to be made, except such as may have been fully adjudicated prior to the passage of this act, to which the testator’s name is subscribed by his direction, or to which the testator has made his mark or cross, shall be deemed and taken to be valid. How this mandate to the courts to establish a particular interpretation of a particu- lar statute can be taken for anything else than an exercise of judicial power in settling a question of interpretation, I know not. The judiciary had cer- tainly recognized a legislative interpre- tation of a statute before it had itself acted, and consequently before a pur- chaser could be misled by its judg- ment; but he might have paid for a title on the unmistakable meaning of plain words; and for the legislature subsequently to distort or pervert it, and to enact that white meant black, or that black meant white, would in the same degree be an exercise of arbi- trary and unconstitutional power.” Greenough v. Greenough, 11 Pa. St. 489, 494. The act in this case was held void so far as its operation was retrospective, but valid as to future cases. And see James v. Rowland, 42 Md. 462; Reiser v. Tell Association, 39 Baw Sts 137 The fact that the courts had pre- viously given a construction to the law may show more clearly a purpose in the legislature to exercise judicial authority, but it would not be essen- tial to that end. As is well said in Haley v. Philadelphia, 68 Pa. St. 45, 47: “Tt would be monstrous to main- tain that where the words and inten- tion of an act were so plain that no court had ever been appealed to for the purpose of declaring their meaning, it was therefore in the power of the legislature, by a retrospective law, to put a construction upon them con- trary to the obvious letter and spirit. Reiser v. William Tell Fund Associa- tion, 39 Pa. St. 137, is an authority in point against such a doctrine. An expository act of assembly is destitute of retroactive force, because it is an act of judicial power, and is in contra- vention of the ninth section of the ninth article of the Constitution, which declares that no man can be deprived of his property unless ‘by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land.’”’ See 8 Am. Rep. 155, 156. The constitution of Georgia entitled the head of a family to enter a home- stead, and the courts decided that a single person, having no others dependent upon him, could not be regarded the head of a family, though keeping house with servants. After- wards, the legislature passed an act, declaring that any single person living habitually as housekeeper to himselfCHAP. V] POWERS LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT MAY EXERCISE 191 As the legislature cannot set aside the construction of the law already applied by the courts to actual cases, neither can it compel the courts for the future to adopt a particular construction of a law which the legislature permits to remain in force. “To declare what the law is, or has been is a judicial power; to declare what the law shall be, is legislative. One of the fundamental principles of all our governments is, that the legislative power shall be separate from the judicial.” 1 If the legislature would prescribe a different rule for the future from that which the courts enforce, it must be done by statute, and cannot be done by a mandate to the courts, which leaves the law unchanged, but seeks to compel the courts to construe and apply it, not according to the judicial, but according to the legislative judgment.” But in any case the substance of the legis- should be regarded as the head of a family. Held void as an exercise of judicial power. Calhoun v. McLen- don, 42 Ga. 405. A legislative act directing the levy and collection of a tax which has already been declared illegal by the judiciary, is void, as an attempted reversal of judicial action. Mayor, &ec. v. Horn, 26 Md. 194; Butler ». Supervisors of Saginaw, 26 Mich. 22. See Forster v. Forster, 129 Mass. 559. This doctrine, however, would not pre- vent the correction of mere errors in taxation by legislation of a retrospec- tive character. See post, p. 774. The words ‘‘former jeopardy” had a settled meaning when the Constitu- tion was adopted which by a declara- tory statute the legislature cannot change. Powell v. State, 17 Tex. App. 345. On the force and effect of declara- tory laws in general, see Salters v. Tobias, 3 Paige, 338; Postmaster- General v. Early, 12 Wheat. 136, 6 L. ed. 577; Union Iron Co. v. Pierce, 4 Biss. 327; Planters’ Bank v. Black, 19 Miss. 43; Gough v. Pratt, 9 Md. 526; McNichol v. U. S., &c. Agency, 74 Mo. 457; Titusville Iron Works v. Keystone Oil Co., 122 Pa. St. 627, 15 Atl. 917; Stebbins v. Com’rs Pueblo Co., 2 McCrary, 196. 1 Dash v. Van Kleek, 7 Johus. 477, 498, per Thompson, J.; Ogden v. Blackledge, 2 Cranch, 272, 2 L. ed. 276; Lambertson v. Hogan, 2 Pa. St. 22; Seibert v. Linton, 5 W. Va. 57; Arnold v. Kelley, 5 W. Va. 446; Me- Daniel v. Correll, 19 Ill. 226; United States v. Salberg, 287 Fed. 208; Weis- berg v. Weisberg, 112 App. Div. 231, 98 N. Y. Supp. 260; State v. Harden, 62 W. Va. 313, 58 S. E. 715, 60S. E. 394. But in Nebraska it has been held that a general statute defining the word ‘‘week’’ as used in the laws of that State was not unconstitutional as an attempt to control judicial deci- sions. In re Johnson’s Estate, 99 Neb. 275, 155 N. W. 1100, 98 Neb. 799, 154 N. W. 550, distinguishing Lincoln Bldg., ete., Asso. v. Graham, 7 Neb. 173. Whether a law is general or special in its nature is a question for the courts, and not for the legislature. Rambo v. Larrabee, 67 Kan. 634, 73 Pac. 915. The legislature cannot dic- tate what instructions shall be given by the court to a jury, except by general law. State v. Hopper, 71 Mo. 425. 2 Governor v. Porter, 5 Humph. 165; People v. Supervisors, &o. 16) Neee 424: Reiser v. Tell Association, 39 Pa. St. 137; O’Conner v. Warner, 4 W. & S. 223; Lambertson v. Hogan, Z Pa. St. 22. An act directing that a certain deposition which had previously been taken should be read in evidence on the trial of a certain cause, notwith- standing informalities, is void. Dupy v. Wickwire, 1 D. Chip. 237, 6 Am. Dec. 729.192 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I lative action should be regarded rather than the form; and if it appears to be the intention to establish by declaratory statute a rule of conduct for the future, the courts should accept and act upon it, without too nicely inquiring whether the mode by which the new rule is established is or is not the best, most decorous, and suitable that could have been adopted." If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the action of the courts, by requiring of them a construction of the law according to its own views, it is very plain it cannot do so directly, by setting aside their judgments, compelling them to grant new trials,” ordering the discharge of offenders,’ or directing what particular steps shall be taken in the progress of a judicial inquiry.* 17n re Coburn, 165 Cal. 202, 131 Pac. 352. 2 Lewis v. Webb, 3 Me. 326; Dur- ham v. Lewiston, 4 Me. 140; Atkin- son v. Dunlap, 50 Me. 111; Bates v. Kimball, 2 Chip. 77; Staniford »v. Barry, 1 Aik. 314; Merrill v. Sher- burne, 1 N. H. 199; Opinion of Judges in Matter of Dorr, 3 R. 1. 299; Taylor v. Place, 4 R. I. 324; De Chastellux v. Fairchild, 15 Pa. St. 18; Young v. State Bank, 4 Ind. 301; Beebe »v. State, 6 Ind. 501; Lanier v. Gallatas, 13 La. Ann. 175; Mayor, &c. v. Horn, 26 Md. 194; Weaver v. Lapsley, 43 Ala. 224; Sanders v. Cabaniss, 43 Ala. 173; Moser v. White, 29 Mich. 59; Sydnor v. Palmer, 32 Wis. 406; People v. Frisbie, 26 Cal. 135; Lawson v. Jeffries, 47 Miss. 686, 12 Am. Rep. 342; Ratcliffe v. Anderson, 31 Gratt. 105, 31 Am. Rep. 716; State ». Owen, 286 Ill. 638, 122 N. E. 1382, 3 A. L. R. 447; Thomas »v. Portland, 40 Oreg. 50, 66 Pac. 4839; McCartney »v. Shipherd, 60 Oreg. 133, 117 Pac. 814, Ann. Cas. 1913, D, 1257; Booten »v. Pinson, 77 W. Va. 412, 89 S. E. 985, L. R. A. 1917 A, 1244. And see post, pp. 808 et seg. and notes. The legislature may control reme- dies, &c., but, when the matter has proceeded to judgment, it has passed beyond legislative control. Oliver »v. McClure, 28 Ark. 555; Griffin’s Ex- ecutor v. Cunningham, 20 Gratt. 31; Teel v. Yancey, 23 Gratt. 690; Hooker v. Hooker, 18 Miss. 599. The legisla- ture has no power to grant a rehearing of a cause after it has been heard and And as a court must determined on the merits. In re Siblerud, 148 Minn. 347, 182 N. W. 168. It is not competent by legisla- tion to authorize the court of final resort to reopen and rehear cases pre- viously decided. Dorsey v. Dorsey, 37 Md. 64, 11 Am. Rep. 528. After an appeal bond was signed by the attorney, the court held bonds so signed bad. A statute validating all prior bonds so _ signed is_ void. Andrews v. Beane, 15 R. I. 451, 8 Atl. 540. A legislative act cannot turn divorces nisi into absolute divorces, of its own force. Sparhawk v. Sparhawk, 116 Mass. 315. 3In State v. Fleming, 7 Humph. 152, a legislative resolve that ‘‘no fine, forfeiture, or imprisonment should be imposed or recovered under the act of 1837 [then in force], and that all causes pending in any of the courts for such offence should be dismissed”, was held void as an invasion of judicial authority. 4 Opinions of Judges on the Dorr Case, 3 R. I. 299; State v. Hopper, 71 Mo. 425. In the case of Picquet, Appellant, 5 Pick. 64, the judge of probate had ordered letters of administration to issue to an applicant therefor, on his giving bond in the penal sum of $50,000, with sureties within the Com- monwealth, for the faithful perform- ance of his duties. He was unable to give the bond, and applied to the legislature for relief. Thereupon a resolve was passed ‘‘empowering”’ the judge of probate to grant the letters of administration, provided the peti-CHAP. V] POWERS LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT MAY EXERCISE 193 act as an organized body of judges, and, where differences of opinion arise, they can only decide by majorities, it has been held that it would not be in the power of the legislature to provide that, in certain contingencies, the opinion of the minority of a court, vested with power by the Constitution, should prevail, so that the decision of the court in such cases should be rendered against the judgment of its members.! tioner should give bond with his brother, a resident of Paris, France, as surety, and “that such bond should be in lieu of any and all bond or bonds by any law or statute in this Common- wealth now in force required”, &c. The judge of probate refused to grant the letters on the terms specified in this resolve, and the Supreme Court, while holding that it was not compulsory upon him, also declared their opinion that, if it were so, it would be inopera- tive and void. In Bradford v. Brooks, 2 Aik. 284, it was decided that the legislature had no power to revive a commission for proving claims against an estate after it had once expired. See also Bagg’s Appeal, 43 Pa. St. 512; Trustees v. Bailey, 10 Fla. 238. In Burt v. Williams, 24 Ark. 91, it was held that the granting of continu- ances of pending cases was the exer- cise of judicial authority, and a legisla- tive act assuming to do this was void. And where, by the general law, the courts have no authority to grant a divorce for a given cause, the legisla- ture cannot confer the authority in a particular case. Simmonds v. Sim- monds, 103 Mass. 572, 4 Am. Rep. 576. And see post, pp. 208, note, 810, and note. To take away by statute a statutory right of appeal is not an exercise of judicial authority. Ex parte Mc- Cardle, 7 Wall. 506, 19 L. ed. 264; Gwin v. United States, 184 U. S. 669, 46 L. ed. 741, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 526; Lake Erie, etc., R. Co. v. Watkins, 157 Ind. 600, 62 N. E. 443; McDowell v. Fuller, 169 Mich. 332, 135 N. W. 265; Moberly v. Roth, 23 Okla. 856, 102 Pac. 182. And it has been held that a statute allowing an appeal in a par- ticular case was valid. Prout v. Berry, 2 Gill, 147; State v. Northern Central VOL. 1—13 R. R. Co., 18 Md. 193. A retroactive statute, giving the right of appeal in cases in which it had previously been lost by lapse of time, was sustained in Page v. Mathews’s Adm’r, 40 Ala. 547. But in Carleton v. Goodwin’s Ex’r, 41 Ala. 153, an act the effect of which would have been to revive discon- tinued appeals, was held void as an exercise of judicial authority. And in Hill v. Sunderland, 3 Vt. 507, And Burch v. Newberry, 10 N. Y. 374, it was held that the legislature had no power to grant to parties a right to appeal after it was gone under the general law. 1In Clapp v. Ely, 27 N. J. L. 622, it was held that a statute which provided that no judgment of the Supreme Court should be reversed by the Court of Errors and Appeals, unless a majority of those members of the court who were competent to sit on the hearing and decision should concur in the reversal, was unconstitutional. Its effect would be, if the court were not full, to make the opinion of the minor- ity in favor of affrmance control that of the majority in favor of reversal, unless the latter were a majority of the whole court. Such a provision in the constitution might be proper and un- exceptionable; but if the constitution has created a court of appeals, without any restriction of this character, the ruling of this case is that the legislature cannot impose it. The court was nearly equally divided, standing seven to six. But the decision of a majority of a court is binding as though unani- mous. Feige v. Mich. Cent. R. R. Co., 62 Mich. 1, 28 N. W. 685. A statute authorizing an unofficial person to sit in the place of a judge who is disqualified was held void in Van Slyke v. Insurance Co., 39 Wis. 390, 20 Am. Rep. 50.194 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. 1 Nor is it in the power of the legislature to bind individuals by a recital of facts in a statute, to be used as evidence against the parties interested. A recital of facts in the preamble of a statute may perhaps be evidence, where it relates to matters of a public nature, as that riots or disorders exist in a certain part of the country ;! but where the facts concern the rights of individuals, the legislature cannot adjudicate upon them. As private statutes are generally obtained on the application of some party interested, and are put in form to suit his wishes, perhaps their exclusion from being made evidence against any other party would result from other general principles; but it is clear that the recital could have no force, except as a judicial finding of facts; and that such finding is not within the legislative province.” We come now to a class of cases in regard to which there has been serious contrariety of opinion; springing from the fact, per- haps, that the purpose sought to be accomplished by the statutes is generally effected by judicial proceedings, so that if the statutes are not a direct invasion of judicial authority, they at least cover ground which the courts usually occupy under general laws con- ferring the jurisdiction upon them. We refer to Statutes empowering Guardians and other Trustees to sell Lands. Whenever it becomes necessary or proper to sell the estate of a decedent for the payment of debts, or of a lunatic or other in- competent person for the same purpose, or for future support, or of a minor to provide the means for his education and nurture, or for the most profitable investment of the proceeds, or of tenants in common to effectuate a partition between them, it will probably be found in every State that some court is vested with jurisdiction to make the necessary order, if the facts after a hearing of the parties in interest seem to render it important. The case is eminently one for judicial investigation. There are facts to be inquired into, in regard to which it is always possible that disputes may arise; the party in interest is often incompetent to act on his own behalf, and his interest is carefully to be inquired into and guarded ; and as the That judicial power cannot be dele- 1 Rex v. Sutton, 4M. & S. 532. gated, see Cohen v. Hoff, 3 Brev. 500. 2 Elmendorf v. Carmichael, 3 Litt. Therefore a commission of appeals 475, 14 Am. Dec. 86; Parmelee »v. created by statute cannot decide Thompson, 7 Hill, 77; Lothrop ». causes in place of the constitutional Steadman, 42 Conn. 583, 592. Supreme Court. State v. Noble, 118 Ind. 350, 21 N. B. 244.CHAP. V] POWERS LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT MAY EXERCISE 195 proceeding will usually be ex parte, there is more than the ordinary opportunity for fraud upon the party interested, as well as upon the authority which grants permission. It is highly and peculiarly proper, therefore, that by general laws judicial inquiry should be provided for these cases, and that such laws should require notice to all proper parties, and afford an opportunity for the presentation of any facts which might bear upon the propriety of granting the applications. But it will sometimes be found that the general laws provided for these cases are not applicable to some which arise ; or, if applic- able, that they do not accomplish fully all that in some cases seems desirable; and in these cases, and perhaps also in some others without similar excuse, it has not been unusual for legislative au- thority to intervene, and by special statute to grant the permission which, under the general law, would be granted by the courts. The power to pass such statutes has often been disputed, and it may be well to see upon what basis of authority, as well as of reason, it rests. If in fact the inquiry which precedes the grant of authority is in its nature judicial, it would seem clear that such statutes must be ineffectual and void. But if judicial inquiry is not essential, and the legislature may confer the power of sale in such a case upon an ex parte presentation of evidence, or upon the representations of the parties without any proof whatever, then we must consider the general laws to be passed, not because the cases fall necessarily within the province of judicial action, but because the courts can more conveniently consider, and more properly, safely, and in- expensively pass upon such cases, than the legislative body to which the power primarily belongs.’ The rule upon this subject which appears to be deducible from the authorities, is this: If the party standing in position of trustee applies for permission to convert by a sale the real property into personal, in order to effectuate the purposes of the trust, and to accomplish objects in the interest of the cestui que trust not otherwise attainable, there is nothing in the granting of permission which is in its nature judicial. To grant permission is merely to enlarge the sphere of the fiduciary authority, the better to accomplish the 1 There are constitutional provisions lands of minors and other persons in Kentucky, Virginia, Missouri, Ore- under legal disability. Perhaps the gon, Nevada, Indiana, Maryland, New general provision in some other con- Jersey, Arkansas, Florida, Illinois, stitutions, forbidding special laws in Wisconsin, Texas, West Virginia, cases where a general law could be Michigan, and Colorado, forbidding made applicable, might also be held special laws licensing the sale of the to exclude such special authorization.196 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I purpose for which the trusteeship exists; and while it would be entirely proper to make the questions which might arise assume a judicial form, by referring them to some proper court for con- sideration and decision, there is no usurpation of power if the legisla- ture shall, by direct action, grant the permission. In the case of Rice v. Parkman, certain minors having become entitled to real estate by descent from their mother, the legisla- ture passed a special statute empowering their father as guardian for them, and, after giving bond to the judge of probate, to sell and convey the lands, and put the proceeds at interest on good security for the benefit of the minor owners. A sale was made accordingly ; but the children, after coming of age, brought suit against the party claiming under the sale, insisting that the special statute was void. There was in force at the time this special stat- ute was passed, a general statute, under which license might have been granted by the courts; but it was held that this general law did not deprive the legislature of that full and complete control over such cases which it would have possessed had no such statute existed. “If,” say the court, “the power by which the resolve authorizing the sale in this case was passed were of a judicial nature, it would be very clear that it could not have been exercised by the legislature without violating an express provision of the constitution. But it does not seem to us to be of this description of power ; for it was not a case of controversy between party and party, nor is there any decree or judgment affecting the title to property. The only object of the authority granted by the legislature was to transmute real into personal estate, for purposes beneficial to all who were interested therein. This is a power frequently exercised by the legislature of this State, since the adoption of the constitution, and by the legislatures of the province and of the colony, while under the sovereignty of Great Britain, analogous to the power exercised by the British Parliament on similar subjects time out of mind. Indeed it seems absolutely necessary for the interest of those who, by the general rules of law, are incapacitated from disposing of their property, that a power should exist somewhere of converting lands into money. For otherwise many minors might suffer, although having property; it not being in a condition to yield an income. This power must rest in the legislature in this Commonwealth; 116 Mass. 326. See the criticism held that where a minor has a guar- of this case in Jones v. Perry, 10 Yerg. dian, it is not competent for the legis- 59, 30 Am. Dec. 430. That case is lature to empower another to sell his out of harmony with the current of lands. Lincoln v. Alexander, 52 Cal. authority on the subject here con- 482, 28 Am. Rep. 639. sidered. In California it has beenCHAP. V] POWERS LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT MAY EXERCISE 197 that body being alone competent to act as the general guardian and protector of those who are disabled to act for themselves. “Tt was undoubtedly wise to delegate this authority to other bodies, whose sessions are regular and constant, and whose structure may enable them more easily to understand the merits of the par- ticular application brought before them. But it does not follow that, because the power has been delegated by the legislature to courts of law, it is judicial in its character. For aught we see, the same authority might have been given to the selectmen of each town, or to the clerks or registers of the counties, it being a mere ministerial act, certainly requiring discretion, and sometimes knowledge of law, for its due exercise, but still partaking in no degree of the characteristics of judicial power. It is doubtless included in the general authority granted by the people to the legislature by the constitution. For full power and authority is given from time to time to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable orders, laws, statutes, and ordinances, directions, and instructions (so as the same be not repugnant or contrary to the constitution), as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the Commonwealth, and of the subjects thereof. No one imagines that, under this general authority, the legislature could deprive a citizen of his estate, or impair any valuable contract in which he might be interested. But there seems to be no reason to doubt that, upon his application, or the application of those who properly represent him, if disabled from acting himself, a beneficial change of his estate, or a sale of it for purposes necessary and convenient for the lawful owner, is a just and proper subject for the exercise of that authority. It is, in fact, protecting him in his property, which the legislature is bound to do, and enabling him to derive subsistence, comfort, and education from property which might otherwise be wholly useless during that period of life when it might be most beneficially employed. “Tf this be not true, then the general laws under which so many estates of minors, persons non compos mentis, and others, have been sold and converted into money, are unauthorized by the constitu- tion, and void. For the courts derive their authority from the legislature, and, it not being of a judicial nature, if the legislature had it not, they could not communicate it to any other body. Thus, if there were no power to relieve those from actual distress who had unproductive property, and were disabled from conveying it them- selves, it would seem that one of the most essential objects of govern- ment — that of providing for the welfare of the citizens — would be lost. But the argument which has most weight on the part of the198 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. 1 defendants is, that the legislature has exercised its power over this subject in the only constitutional way, by establishing a general provision; and that, having done this, their authority has ceased, they having no right to interfere in particular cases. And if the question were one of expediency only, we should perhaps be con- vinced by the argument, that it would be better for all such applica- tions to be made to the courts empowered to sustain them. But as a question of right, we think the argument fails. The constituent, when he has delegated an authority without an interest, may do the act himself which he has authorized another to do; and especially when that constituent is the legislature, and is not prohibited by the constitution from exercising the authority. Indeed, the whole authority might be revoked, and the legislature resume the burden of the business to itself, if in its wisdom it should determine that the common welfare required it. It is not legislation which must be by general acts and rules, but the use of a parental or tutorial power, for purposes of kindness, without interfering with or prejudice to the rights of any but those who apply for specific relief. The title of strangers is not in any degree affected by such an interposition.” ! A similar statute was sustained by the Court for the Correction of Errors in New York. “It is clearly,” says the Chancellor, “within the powers of the legislature, as parens patrie, to prescribe such rules and regulations as it may deem proper for the superin- 1 In Shumway v. Bennett, 29 Mich. 451, the distinction between judicial and administrative power is pointed out, and it is held that the question of incorporating territory as a village can- not be made a judicial question. A like decision is made in State v. Simons, 32 Minn. 540, 21 N. W. 750, and by Chancellor Cooper, in Ex parte Burns, 1 Tenn. Ch. R. 83, though it is said in that case that the organization of cor- porations which are created by legis- lative authority may be referred to the courts. See, on the same subject, State v. Armstrong, 3 Sneed, 634; Galesburg v. Hawkinson, 75 Ill. 152. Compare Burlington v. Leebrick, 43 Iowa, 252, and Wahoo v. Dickinson, 23 Neb. 426, 36 N. W. 813, where it is held the question of extending, after hearing, the limits of a municipality may be decided by a court. That the courts cannot be clothed with legislative authority, see State v. Young, 29 Minn. 474,9 N. W. 737. Compare Ex parte Mato, 19 Tex. App. 112. For the dis- tinction between political and judicial power, see further, Dickey v. Reed, 78 Ill. 261; Commonwealth v. Jones, 10 Bush, 725. And see post, pp. 204 el seq., and notes. In Hegarty’s Appeal, 75 Pa. St. 503, the power of a legislature to authorize a trustee to sell the lands of parties who were sui juris, and might act on their own behalf, was denied, and the case was distinguished from Norris v. Clymer, 2 Pa. St. 277, and others which had followed it. The foreclosure of a mortgage on private property cannot be accom- plished by legislative enactment. Ashuelot R. R. Co. v. Elliott, 58 N. H. 451. Power to try city officers by im- peachment may rest in a city council, the judgment extending only to re- moval and disqualification to hold any corporate office. State v. Judges, 35 La. Ann. 1075.CHAP. V| POWERS LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT MAY EXERCISE 199 tendence, disposition, and management of the property and effects of infants, lunatics, and other persons who are incapable of managing their own affairs. But even that power cannot constitutionally be so far extended as to transfer the beneficial use of the property to another person, except in those cases where it can legally be pre- sumed the owner of the property would himself have given the use of his property to the other, if he had been in a situation to act for himself, as in the case of a provision out of the estate of an infant or lunatic for the support of an indigent parent or other near relative.? 1 Cochran v. Van Surlay, 20 Wend. 365, 373. See the same case in the Supreme Court, sub nom. Clarke »v. Van Surlay, 15 Wend. 436. See also Suydam v. Williamson, 24 How. 427, 16 L. ed. 742; Williamson v. Suydam, 6 Wall. 723, 18 L. ed. 967; Heirs of Holman v. Bank of Norfolk, 12 Ala. 369; Florentine v. Barton, 2 Wall. 210, 17 L. ed. 783. In Hoyt »v. Sprague, 103 U. S. 613, 26 L. ed. 585, it was held competent, by special statute, to provide for the investment of the estate of minors in a manufacturing corporation, and that, after the investment was accordingly made, no account could be demanded on their behalf, except of the stock and its dividends. But the legisla- ture cannot empower the guardian of infants to mortgage their lands to pay demands which are not obligations against them or their estate. Burke v. Mechanics’ Savings Bank, 12 R. I. 513. In Brevoort v. Grace, 53 N. Y. 245, the power of the legislature to author- ize the sale of lands of infants by spe- cial statute was held to extend to the future contingent interests of those not in being, but not to the interests of non-consenting adults, competent to act on their own behalf. In Opinions of the Judges, 4 N. H. 565, 572, the validity of such a special statute, under the constitution of New Hampshire, was denied. The judges say: ‘““The objection to the exercise of such a power by the legislature is, that it is in its nature both legislative and judi- cial. It is the province of the legis- lature to prescribe the rule of law, but to apply it to particular cases is the business of the courts of law. And the thirty-eighth article in the Bill of Rights declares that ‘in the govern- ment of this State the three essential powers thereof, to wit, the legislative, executive, and judicial, ought to be kept as separate from, and independent of, each other as the nature of a free government will admit, or as is con- sistent with that chain of connection that binds the whole fabric of the con- stitution in one indissoluble bond of union and amity.’ The exercise of such a power by the legislature can never be necessary. By the existing laws, judges of probate have very extensive jurisdiction to license the sale of the real estate of minors by their guardians. If the jurisdiction of the judges of probate be not sufficiently extensive to reach all proper cases, it may be a good reason why that juris- diction should be extended, but can hardly be deemed a sufficient reason for the particular interposition of the legislature in an individual case. If there be a defect in the laws, they should be amended. Under our insti- tutions all men are viewed as equal, entitled to enjoy equal privileges, and to be governed by equal laws. If it be fit and proper that license should be given to one guardian, under particu- lar circumstances, to sell the estate of his ward, it is fit and proper that all other guardians should, under similar circumstances, have the same license. This is the very genius and spirit of our institutions. And we are of opin- ion that an act of the legislature to authorize the sale of the land of a par- ticular minor by his guardian cannot be easily reconciled with the spirit of the article in the Bill of Rights which we have just cited. It is true that the200 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I The same ruling has often been made in analogous cases. In Ohio, a special act of the legislature authorizing commissioners to make sale of lands held in fee tail, by devisees under a will, in order to cut off the entailment and effect a partition between them, — the statute being applied for by the mother of the devisees and the executor of the will, and on behalf of the devisees, — was held not obnoxious to constitutional objection, and to be sustainable on immemorial legislative usage, and on the same ground which would support general laws for the same purpose.’ In a case in the Supreme Court of the United States where an executrix who had proved a will in New Hampshire made sale of lands without authority in Rhode Island, for the purpose of satisfying debts against the estate, a subsequent act of the Rhode Island legislature, confirming the sale, was held not an encroachment upon the judicial power. The land, it was said, descended to the heirs subject to a lien for the payment of debts, and there is nothing in the nature of the act of authorizing a sale to satisfy the lien, which requires that it should be performed by a judicial tribunal, or that it should be per- formed by a delegate rather than by the legislature itself. It is remedial in its nature, to give effect to existing rights.2 The case showed the actual existence of debts, and indeed a judicial grant of such a license by the legislature to the guardian is intended as a privi- lege and a benefit to the ward. But by the law of the land no minor is capable of assenting to a sale of his real estate in such a manner as to bind him- self. And no guardian is permitted by the same law to determine when the estate of his ward ought and when it ought not to be sold. In the con- templation of the law, the one has no sufficient discretion to judge of the propriety and expediency of a sale of his estate, and the other is not to be intrusted with the power of judging. Such being the general law of the land, it is presumed that the legislature would be unwilling to rest the justifica- tion of an act authorizing the sale of a minor’s estate upon any assent which the guardian or the minor could give in the proceeding. The question then is, as it seems to us: Can a ward be deprived of his inheritance without his consent by an act of the legislature which is intended to apply to no other individual? The fifteenth article in the Bill of Rights declares that no sub- ject shall be deprived of his property but by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land. Can an act of the legislature, intended to authorize one man to sell the land of another without his consent be ‘the law of the land’ within the meaning of the constitu- tion? Can it be the law of the land in a free country? If the question proposed to us can be resolved into these questions, as it appears to us it may, we feel entirely confident that the representatives of the people of this State will agree with us in the opinion we feel ourselves bound to express on the question submitted to us, that the legislature cannot author- ize a guardian of minors, by a special act or resolve, to make a valid convey- ance of the real estate of his wards.” See also Jones v. Perry, 10 Yerg. 59, 30 Am. Dec. 430; Lincoln v. Alexander, 52 Cal. 482, 28 Am. Rep. 639. 1 Carroll v. Lessee of Olmstead, 16 Ohio, 251. 2 Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Pet. 627, 660; 7 L. ed. 542, 554. Compare Breevort v. Grace, 53 N. Y. 245.CHAP. V] POWERS LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT MAY EXERCISE 201 license for the sale of lands to satisfy them had been granted in New Hampshire before the sale was made. The decision was afterwards followed in a carefully considered case in the same court.!. In each of these cases it is assumed that the legislature does not by the special statute determine the existence or amount of the debts, and disputes concerning them would be determinable in the usual modes. Many other decisions have been made to the same effect.” This species of legislation may perhaps be properly called pre- rogative remedial legislation. It hears and determines no rights; it deprives no one of his property. It simply authorizes one’s real estate to be turned into personal, on the application of the person representing his interest, and under such circumstances that the consent of the owner, if capable of giving it, would be presumed. It is in the nature of the grant of a privilege to one person, which at the same time affects injuriously the rights of no other.’ But a different case is presented when the legislature assumes to authorize a person who does not occupy a fiduciary relation to 1 Watkins v. Holman’s Lessee, 16 Pet. 25, 60, 10 L. ed. 873, 887. See also Florentine v. Barton, 2 Wall. 210, 17 L. ed. 783; Doe v. Douglass, 8 Blackf. 10. 2 Thurston v. Thurston, 6 R. I. 296, 302; Williamson v. Williamson, 11 Miss. 715; McComb v. Gilkey, 29 Miss. 146; Boon v. Bowers, 30 Miss. 246; Stewart v. Griffith, 33 Mo. 18; Estep v. Hutchman, 14 S. & R. 435; Snowhill v. Snowhill, 17 N. J. Eq. 30; Dorsey v. Gilbert, 11 G. & Je Sie Norris v. Clymer, 2 Pa. St. 277; Ser- geant v. Kuhn, 2 Pa. St. 393; Kerr v. Kitchen, 17 Pa. St. 433; Coleman ». Carr, 1 Miss. 258; Davison v. Johon- not, 7 Met. 388; Towle v. Forney, 14 N. Y. 423; Leggett v. Hunter, 19 INERYS 445; Brevoort v. Grace, 53 N. Y. 245; Gannett v. Leonard, 47 Mo. 205; Kibby v. Chetwood’s Adm’rs, 4 fl Monr. 91; Shehan’s Heirs v. Barnett’s Heirs, 6 T. B. Monr. 594; Davis 2. State Bank, 7 Ind. 316; Richardson v. Monson, 23 Conn. 94; Ward v. New England, &c. Co., 1 Cliff. 565; Sohier v. Massachusetts, &c. Hospital, 3 Cush. 483; Lobrano v. Nelligan, 9 Wall. 295, 19 L. ed. 694. Contra, Brenham v. Story, 39 Cal. 179. In Moore v. Maxwell, 18 Ark. 469, a special statute authorizing the ad- ministrator of one who held the mere naked legal title to convey to the owner of the equitable title was held valid. To the same effect is Reformed P. D. Church v. Mott, 7 Paige, 77, 32 Am. Dec. 613. A special act allowing the widow to sell lands of the deceased husband, subject to the approval of the probate judge, is valid. Bruce v. Bradshaw, 69 Ala. 360. In Stanley v. Colt, 5 Wall. 119, 18 L. ed. 502, an act permitting the sale of real estate which had been devised to charitable uses was sustained, — no diversion of the gift being made. A more doubtful case is that of Linsley v. Hubbard, 44 Conn. 109, 26 Am. Rep. 431, in which it was held competent, on petition of tenant for life, to order a sale of lands for the benefit of all concerned, though against remonstrance of owners of the reversion. 3 It would be equally competent for the legislature to authorize a person under legal disability — e.g. an infant — to convey his estate, as to authorize it to be conveyed by guardian. Mc- Comb »v. Gilkey, 29 Miss. 146. See in this connection, Louisville, N. O. & T. R. Co. v. Blythe, 69 Miss. 939, 11 So. 111, 16 L. R. A. 251, and note on constitutionality of private statutes to authorize disposal of property.202 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I the owner, to make sale of real estate, to satisfy demands which he asserts, but which are not judicially determined, or for any other purpose not connected with the convenience or necessity of the owner himself. An act of the legislature of Illinois undertook to empower a party who had applied for it to make sale of the lands pertaining to the estate of a deceased person, in order to raise a certain specified sum of money which the legislature assumed to be due to him and another person, for moneys by them advanced and liabilities incurred on behalf of the estate, and to apply the same to the extinguishment of their claims. Now it is evident that this act was in the nature of a judicial decree, passed on the application of parties adverse in interest to the estate, and in effect adjudging a certain amount to be due them, and ordering lands to be sold for its satisfaction. As was well said by the Supreme Court of Illinois, in adjudging the act void: “If this is not the exercise of a power of inquiry into, and a determination of, facts between debtor and creditor, and that, too, ex parte and summary in its character, we are at a loss to understand the meaning of terms; nay, that it is adjudging and directing the application of one person’s property to another, on a claim of indebtedness, without notice to, or hearing of, the parties whose estate is divested by the act. That the exercise of such power is in its nature clearly judicial, we think too apparent to need argument to illustrate its truth. It is so self- evident from the facts disclosed that it proves itself.” ! 1 Lane v. Dorman, 4 III. 238, 242, 36 Am. Dec. 543. In Dubois v. McLean, 4 McLean, 486, Judge Pope assumes that the case of Lane v. Dorman decides that a special act, authorizing an executor to sell lands of the testator to pay debts against his estate, would be unconsti- tutional. We do not so understand that decision. On the contrary, an- other case in the same volume, Ed- wards v. Pope, p. 465, fully sustains the cases before decided, distinguish- ing them from Lane v. Dorman. But that indeed is also done in the principal case, where the court, after referring to similar cases in Kentucky, say: “These cases are clearly distinguished from the case at bar. The acts were for the benefit of all the creditors of the estates, without distinction; and in one case, in addition, for the purpose of perfecting titles contracted to be made by the intestate. The claims of the creditors of the intestate were to be established by judicial or other satisfactory legal proceedings, and, in truth, in the last case cited, the com- missioners were nothing more than special administrators. The legisla- tive department, in passing these acts, investigated nothing, nor did an act which could be deemed a_ judicial inquiry. It neither examined proof, nor determined the nature or extent of claims; it merely authorized the application of the real estate to the payment of debts generally, dis- criminating in favor of no one creditor, and giving no one a preference over another. Not so in the case before us; the amount is investigated and ascertained, and the sale is directed for the benefit of two persons exclu- sively. The proceeds are to be applied to the payment of such claims and none other, for liabilities said to be incurred, but not liquidated or satis-CHAP. V] POWERS LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT MAY EXERCISE 203 A case in harmony with the one last referred to was decided by the Supreme Court of Michigan. Under the act of Congress “for the relief of citizens of towns upon the lands of the United States, under certain circumstances”, approved May 23, 1844, and which provided that the trust under said act should be conducted “under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the legislative authority of the State’, &c., the legislature passed an act authorizing the trustee to give deeds to a person named therein, and those claiming under him; thus undertaking to dispose of the whole trust to the person thus named and his grantees, and authorizing no one else to be considered or to receive any relief. This was very plainly an attempted adjudication upon the rights of the parties concerned ; it did not establish regulations for the administration of the trust, but it adjudged the trust property to certain claimants exclusively, in disregard of any therefore declared to be void." fied; and those, too, created after the death of the intestate.’’ See also Mason v. Wait, 5 Ill. 127, 134; Daven- port v. Young, 16 Ill. 548; Rozier v. Fagan, 46 Ill. 404. The case of Estep vy. Hutchman, 14 S. & R. 435, would seem to be more open to question on this point than any of the others before cited. It was the case of a special statute, authorizing the guardian of infant heirs to convey their lands in satisfaction of a contract made by their ancestor; and the statute was sus- tained. Compare this with Jones 2. Perry, 10 Yerg. 59, where an act au- thorizing a guardian to sell lands to pay the ancestor’s debts was held void. 1 Cash, Appellant, 6 Mich. 193. The case of Powers v. Bergen, 6 N. Y. 358, is perhaps to be referred to another principle than that of en- croachment upon judicial authority. That was a case where the legislature, by special act, had undertaken to authorize the sale of property, not for the purpose of satisfying liens upon it, or of meeting or in any way provid- ing for the necessities or wants of the owners, but solely, after paying ex- penses, for the investment of the pro- ceeds. It appears from that case that the executors under the will of the former owner held the lands in trust for a daughter of the testator during her natural life, with a vested remain- rights which might exist in others ; and it was And it has also been held that, der in fee in her two children. The special act assumed to empower them to sell and convey the complete fee, and apply the proceeds, first, to the pay- ment of their commissions, costs, and expenses; second, to the discharge of assessments, liens, charges, and incum- brances on the land, of which, however, none were shown to exist; and third to invest the proceeds and pay over the income, after deducting taxes and charges, to the daughter during her life, and after her decease to convey, assign, or pay over the same to the persons who would be entitled under the will. The court regarded this as an unauthorized interference with pri- vate property upon no necessity, and altogether void, as depriving the own- ers of their property contrary to the “law of the land.” At the same time the authority of those cases, where it has been held that the legislature, acting as the guardian and protector of those who are disabled to act for themselves by reason of infancy, lunacy, or other like cause, may con- stitutionally pass either general or private laws, under which an effectual disposition of their property might be made, was not questioned. The court cite, with apparent approval, the cases, among others, of Rice v. Park- man, 16 Mass. 326; Cochran v. Van Surlay, 20 Wend. 365; and Wilkinson204 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I whether a corporation has been guilty of abuse of authority under its charter, so as justly to subject it to forfeiture,! and whether a widow is entitled to dower in a specified parcel of land,? are judicial questions which cannot be decided by the legislature. In these cases there are necessarily adverse parties; the questions that would arise are essentially judicial, and over them the courts possess jurisdiction at the common law; and it is presumable that legislative acts of this character must have been adopted carelessly, and without a due consideration of the proper boundaries which mark the separation of legislative from judicial duties. As well v. Leland, 2 Pet. 627, 7 L. ed. 542. The case of Ervine’s Appeal, 16 Pa. St. 256, was similar, in the principles involved, to Powers v. Bergen, and was decided in the same way. See also Kneass’s Appeal, 31 Pa. St. 87; Maxwell »v. Goetschius, 40 N. J. 383, 29 Am. Rep. 242, and compare with Kerr v. Kitchen, 17 Pa. St. 433; Martin’s Appeal, 23 Pa. St. 433; Hegarty’s Appeal, 75 Pa. St. 503; Tharp v. Fleming, 1 Houston, 580. There is no constitutional objection to a statute which transfers the mere legal title of a trustee to the benefici- ary. Reformed P. D. Church v. Mott, 7 Paige, 77, 32 Am. Dec. 613. 1State v. Noyes, 47 Me. 189; Campbell ». Union Bank, 6 How. (Miss.) 661; Canal Co. v. Railroad Co., 4G. & J. 1, 22; Regents of Uni- versity v. Williams, 9 G. & J. 365. See also Alaska Salmon Co. v. Standard Box Co., 158 Cal. 567, 112 Pac. 454; Western States L. Ins. Co. v. Lock- wood, 166 Cal. 185, 1385 Pac. 496; Nicolai v. Maryland Agricultural, etc., Asso., 96 Md. 323, 53 Atl. 965; Kla- math Lumber Co. v. Bamber, 74 Oreg. 287, 142 Pac. 359, 145 Pac. 650; Canadian Country Club v. Johnson, (Tex. Civ. App.) 176 S. W. 835; Mill- sapsv. Johnson, Tex. Civ. App. 961 S. W. 202; Elliott’s Knob Iron, etc., Co. v. State Corporation Commission, 123 Va. 63, 96 S. E. 353; State v. Howell, 67 Wash. 377, 121 Pac. 861. In Miners’ Bank of Dubuque »v. United States, 1 Morris, 482, a clause in a charter authorizing the legislature to repeal it for any abuse or misuser of corporate privileges was held to refer the question of abuse to the legis- lative judgment. In Erie & North East R. R. Co. v. Casey, 26 Pa. St. 287, on the other hand, it was held that the legislature could not conclude the corporation by its repealing act, but that the question of abuse of corporate authority would be one of fact to be passed upon, if denied, by a jury, so that the act would be valid or void as the jury should find. Compare Flint & Fentonville P. R. Co. v. Woodhull, 25 Mich. 99, 12 Am. Rep. 233, in which it was held that the reservation of a power to repeal a charter for vio- lation of its provisions necessarily pre- sented a judicial question, and the repeal must be preceded by a proper judicial finding. In Carey v. Giles, 9 Ga. 253, the appointment by the legislature of a receiver for an insolvent bank was sustained; and in Hindman ». Piper, 50 Mo. 292, a legislative appointment of a trustee was also sustained in a peculiar ease. In Lothrop v. Steadman, 42 Conn. 583, the power of the legislature as an administrative measure to appoint a trustee to take charge of and manage the affairs of a corporation whose char- ter had been repealed, was affirmed. For a similar principle see Albertson v. Landon, 42 Conn. 209. And Congress has power to declare the forfeiture of a land grant for breach of condition subsequent. Atl. & Pac. R. Co. v. Mingus, 165 U.S. 413, 41 L. ed. 770, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 348. * Edwards v. Pope, 4 Ill. 465. 3’The unjust and dangerous char- acter of legislation of this description is well stated by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania: ‘‘When, in the exer-CHAP. V] POWERS LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT MAY EXERCISE 205 might the legislature proceed to declare that one man is indebted to another in a sum specified, and establish by enactment a con- clusive demand against him.’ We have elsewhere referred to a number of cases where statutes have been held unobjectionable which validated legal proceedings, notwithstanding irregularities apparent in them.? These statutes may as properly be made applicable to judicial as to ministerial proceedings; and although, when they refer to such proceedings, they may at first seem like an interference with judicial authority, yet if they are only in aid of judicial proceedings, and tend to their support by precluding parties from taking advantage of errors which do not affect their substantial rights, they cannot be obnoxious to the charge of usurping judicial power. The legislature does, or may, prescribe the rules under which the judicial power is exercised by the courts; and in doing so it may dispense with any of those formalities which are not essential to the jurisdiction of the court ; and what- ever it may dispense with by statute anterior to the proceedings, we believe it may also dispense with by statute after the proceedings have been taken, if the court has failed to observe any of those formalities. But it would not be competent for the legislature to authorize a court to proceed and adjudicate upon the rights of parties, without giving them an opportunity to be heard before it; and, for the same reason, cise of proper legislative powers, gen- eral laws are enacted which bear, or may bear, on the whole community, if they are unjust and against the spirit of the Constitution, the whole com- munity will be interested to procure their repeal by a voice potential. And that is the great security for just and fair legislation. But when individuals are selected from the mass, and laws are enacted affecting their property, without summons or notice, at the instigation of an interested party, who is to stand up for them, thus isolated from the mass, in injury and injustice, or where are they to seek relief from such acts of despotic power? They have no refuge but in the courts, the only secure place for determining con- flicting rights by due course of law. But if the judiciary give way, and in the language of the Chief Justice in Greenough v. Greenough, in 11 Pa. St. 489, ‘confesses itself too weak to stand against the antagonism of the legisla- ture and the bar’, one independent it would be incompetent for it, by retrospective co-ordinate branch of the government will become the subservient handmaid of another, and a quiet, insidious revo- lution be effected in the administration of the government, whilst its form on paper remains the same.” Ervine’s Appeal, 16 Pa. St. 256, 268. 1 A statute is void which undertakes to make railroad companies liable for the expense of coroners’ inquests, and of the burial of persons dying on the cars, or killed by collision or other acci- dent occurring to the cars, irrespective of any question of negligence. Ohio & M. R. R. Co. v. Lackey, 78 55s 20 Am. Rep. 259. Buta railroad may be made absolutely liable for loss from fires caused by sparks from its locomo- tives, regardless of the question of negligence. Matthews ». St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 121 Mo. 298, 24 S. W. 591, 25 L. R. A. 161, and note. See this case affirmed in 165 U.S. 1, 41 L. ed. 611, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 243. 2 See post, pp. 773-793.206 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [vVoL. 1 legislation, to make valid any proeedings which had been had in the courts, but which were void for want of jurisdiction over the parties. Such a legislative enactment would be doubly objection- able: first, as an exercise of judicial power, since, the proceedings in court being void, it would be the statute alone which would con- stitute an adjudication upon the rights of the parties; and second, because, in all judicial proceedings, notice to parties and an oppor- tunity to defend are essential, — both of which they would be deprived of in such a case.’ And for like reasons a statute validating proceedings had before an intruder into a judicial office, before whom no one is authorized or required to appear, and who could have jurisdiction neither of the parties nor of the subject-matter, would also be void.” 1 In McDaniel v. Correll, 19 Ill. 226, it appeared that a statute had been passed to make valid certain legal pro- ceedings by which an alleged will was adjudged void, and which were had against non-resident defendants, over whom the courts had obtained no juris- diction. The court say: “If it was competent for the legislature to make a void proceeding valid, then it has been done in this case. Upon this question we cannot for a moment doubt or hesitate. They can no more impart a binding efficacy to a void proceeding, than they can take one man’s property from him and give it to another. Indeed, to do the one is to accomplish the other. By the decree in this case the will in question was declared void, and, consequently, if effect be given to the decree, the lega- cies given to those absent defendants by the will are taken from them and given to others, according to our stat- ute of descents. Until the passage of the act in question, they were not bound by the verdict of the jury in this case, and it could not form the basis of a valid decree. Had the decree been rendered before the passage of the act, it would have been as competent to make that valid as it was to validate the antecedent proceedings upon which alone the decree could rest. The want of jurisdiction over the defendants was as fatal to the one as it could be to the other. If we assume the act to be valid, then the legacies which before belonged to the legatees have now ceased to be theirs, and this result has been brought about by the legislative act alone. The effect of the act upon them is precisely the same as if it had declared in direct terms that the lega- cies bequeathed by this will to these defendants should not go to them, but should descend to the heirs-at-law of the testator, according to our law of descents. This it will not be pretended that they could do directly, and they had no more authority to do it in- directly, by making proceedings bind- ing upon them which were void in law.” See, to the same effect, Rich- ards v. Rote, 68 Pa. St. 248; Pryor v. Downey, 50 Cal. 388, 19 Am. Rep. 656; Lane v. Nelson, 79 Pa. St. 407; Shonk v. Brown, 61 Pa. St. 320; Spragg v. Shriver, 25 Pa. St. 282; Israel v. Arthur, 7 Col. 5. 2In Denny v. Mattoon, 2 Allen, 361, a judge in insolvency had made certain orders in a case pending in another jurisdiction, and which the courts subsequently declared to be void. The legislature then passed an act declaring that they “are hereby confirmed, and the same shall be taken and deemed good and valid in law, to all intents and purposes whatsoever.”’ On the question of the validity of this act the court says: ‘‘The precise ques- tion is, whether it can be held to oper- ate so as to confer a jurisdiction over parties and proceedings which it has been judicially determined did not exist, and give validity to acts and processes which have been adjudgedCHAP. V] void. The statement of this question seems to us to suggest the obvious and decisive objection to any construction of the statute which would lead to such a conclusion. It would be a direct exercise by the legislature of a power in its nature clearly judicial, from the use of which it is expressly prohibited by the thirtieth article of the Declara- tion of Rights. The line which marks and separates judicial from legislative duties and functions is often indistinct and uncertain, and it is sometimes difficult to decide within which of the two classes a particular subject falls. All statutes of a declaratory nature, which are designed to interpret or give a meaning to previous enactments, or to confirm the rights of parties either under their own contracts or growing out of the proceedings of courts or public bodies, which lack legal validity, involve in a certain sense the exercise of a judicial power. They operate upon subjects which might properly come within the cognizance of the courts and form the basis of judicial consideration and judgment. But they may, nevertheless, be supported as being within the legitimate sphere of legislative action, on the ground that they do not declare or determine, but only confirm rights; that they give effect to the acts of parties according to their intent; that they furnish new and more efficacious remedies, or create a more beneficial interest or tenure, or, by supplying defects and curing informalities in the proceedings of courts, or of public officers acting within the scope of their authority, they give effect to acts to which there was the express or implied assent of the parties interested. Statutes which are intended to accomplish such pur- poses do not necessarily invade the province, or directly interfere with the action of judicial tribunals. But if we adopt the broadest and most com- prehensive view of the power of the legislature, we must place some limit beyond which the authority of the legislature cannot go without trench- ing on the clear and well-defined boundaries of judicial power.” “Al- though it may be difficult, if not impos- sible, to lay down any general rule POWERS LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT MAY EXERCISE 207 which may serve to determine, in all cases, whether the limits of constitu- tional restraint are overstepped by the exercise by one branch of the government of powers exclusively delegated to another, it certainly is practicable to apply to each case as it arises some test by which to ascertain whether this fundamental principle is violated. If, for example, the prac- tical operation of a statute is to deter- mine adversary suits pending between party and party, by substituting in place of the well-settled rules of law the arbitrary will of the legislature, and thereby controlling the action of the tribunal before which the suits are pending, no one can doubt that it would be an unauthorized act of legis- lation, because it directly infringes on the peculiar and appropriate functions of the judiciary. It is the exclusive province of courts of justice to apply established principles to cases within their jurisdiction, and to enforce their decisions by rendering judgments and executing them by suitable process. The legislature have no power to inter- fere with this jurisdiction in such manner as to change the decision of cases pending before courts, or to im- pair or set aside their judgments, or to take cases out of the settled course of judicial proceeding. It is on this prin- ciple that it has been held that the legislature have no power to grant a new trial or direct a rehearing of a cause which has been once judicially settled. The right to a review, or to try anew facts which have been deter- mined by a verdict or decree, depends on fixed and well-settled principles, which it is the duty of the court to apply in the exercise of a sound judg- ment and discretion. These cannot be regulated or governed by legislative action. Taylor v. Place, 4 R. I. 324, 337; Lewis v. Webb, 3 Me. 326; De Chastellux ». Fairchild, 15 Pa. St. 18. A fortiori, an act of the legislature can- not set aside or amend final judgments or decrees.” The court further con- sider the general subject at length, and adjudge the particular enactment under consideration void, both as an exercise of judicial authority, and also because, in declaring valid the void208 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I Legislative Divorces. There is another class of cases in which it would seem that action ought to be referred exclusively to the judicial tribunals, but in respect to which the prevailing doctrine seems to be that the legisla- ture has complete control unless specially restrained by the State constitution.! The granting of divorces from the bonds of matri- mony was not confided to the courts in England,” and from the earli- est days the Colonial and State legislatures in this country have assumed to possess the same power over the subject which was possessed by the Parliament, and from time to time they have passed special laws declaring a dissolution of the bonds of matri- mony in special cases.’ Now it is clear that “the question of divorce involves investigations which are properly of a judicial nature, and the jurisdiction over divorces ought to be confined exclusively to the judicial tribunals, under the limitations to be prescribed by law’’,* and so strong is the general conviction of this fact, that the people in framing their constitutions, in a majority of the States, have positively forbidden any such special laws.® proceedings in insolvency against the debtor, under which assignees had been appointed, it took away from the debtor his property, ‘“‘not by due process of law or the law of the land, but by an arbitrary exercise of legisla- tive will.” See, further, Griffin’s Ex- ecutor v. Cunningham, 20 Gratt. 109; State v. Doherty, 60 Me. 504. In proceedings by tenants for life, the estate in remainder was ordered to be sold; there was at the time no authority for ordering such a sale. It was held to be void, and incapable of confirmation. Maxwell v. Goetschius, 40 N. J. L. 383, 29 Am. Rep. 242. 1 Barrington v. Barrington, 206 Ala. 192, 89 So. 512, 17 A. L. R. 789; Worthington v. District Ct., 37 Nev. 212, 142 Pac. 230, L. R. A. 1916 A, 696, Ann. Cas. 1916 E, 1097; Cooke v. Cooke, 164 N. C. 272, 80S. E. 178, 49 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 1034; Kenner ». Kenner, 1389 Tenn. 211, 201 S. W. 779, L. R. A. 1918 EH, 587; State v. Duket, 90 Wis. 272, 63 N. E. 83, 48 Am. St. Rep. 928, 31 L. R. A. 515. ? Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190, 31 L. ed. 654, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 723; Wright v. Wright, 2 Md. 429, 56 Am. Dec. 723; Jones v. Jones, 12 Pa. St. 350, 51 Am. Dec. 611. 3’ Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190, 31 L. ed. 654, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 723. 42 Kent, 106. See Levins ». Sleator, 2 Greene (Iowa), 607. 5 The following are constitutional provisions: Alabama: The Ilegisla- ture shall not pass a special, private, or local law in any of the following cases: (1) Granting a divorce. Ar- kansas: The General Assembly shall not have power to pass any bill of divorce, but may prescribe by law the manner in which such cases may be investigated in the courts of justice, and divorces granted. California: No divorce shall be granted by the legis- lature. The provision is the same or similar in Jowa, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, Ne- braska, Oregon, New Jersey, Texas, and Wisconsin. Florida: Divorces from the bonds of matrimony shall not be allowed but by the judgment of a court, as shall be prescribed by law. Georgia: The Superior Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction in all cases of divorce, both total and partial. Illinois: The General Assembly shall not pass... special laws... for granting divorces. Kansas: And power to grant divorces is vested in the District Courts subject to regulationsCHAP. V] POWERS LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT MAY EXERCISE 209 Of the judicial decisions on the subject of legislative power over divorces there seem to be three classes of cases. The doctrine of the first class seems to be this: The granting of a divorce may be either a legislative or a judicial act, according as the legislature shall refer its consideration to the courts, or reserve it to itself. by law. Kentucky: The General Assembly shall have no power to grant divorces, .. . but by general laws shall confer such powers on the courts of justice. Louisiana: The General Assembly shall not pass any local or special law on the following specified objects : Granting divorces. Massachusetts: All cause of marriage, divorce, and alimony... shall be heard and determined by the Governor and Council, until the legislature shall by law make other provision. Missis- sippi: Divorces from the bonds of matrimony shall not be granted but in eases provided for by law, and by suit in chancery. Missouri: The General Assembly shall not pass any local or special law... granting divorces. In Colorado the provision is the same. New Hampshire: All causes of mar- riage, divorce, and alimony . . . shall be heard and tried by the Superior Court, until the legislature shall by law make other provision. New York: . nor shall any divorce be granted otherwise than by due judicial pro- ceedings. North Carolina: The Gen- eral Assembly shall have power to pass general laws regulating divorce and alimony, but shall not have power to grant a divorce or secure alimony in any particular case. Ohio: The Gen- eral Assembly shall grant no divorce nor exercise any judicial power, not herein expressly conferred. Pennsyl- vania: The legislature shall not have power to enact laws annulling the con- tract of marriage in any case where by law the courts of this Commonwealth are, or hereafter may be, empowered to decree a divorce. Tennessee: The legislature shall have no power to grant divorces, but may authorize the courts of justice to grant them for such causes as may be specified by law; but such laws shall be general and uni- form in their operation throughout the State. Virginia: The legislature shall confer on the courts the power to grant vou. 1—14 divorces, . . . but shall not by special legislation grant relief in such cases. West Virginia: The Circuit Courts shall have power, under such general regulations as may be prescribed by law, to grant divorces, . . . but relief shall not be granted by special legisla- tion in such cases. Under the Constitution of Michi- gan, it was held that, as the legislature was prohibited from granting divorces, they could pass no special act author- izing the courts to divorce for a cause which was not a legal cause for di- vorce under the general laws. Teft v. Teft, 3 Mich. 67. See also Clark ». Clark, 10 N. H. 380; Simonds ». Si- monds, 103 Mass. 572, 4 Am. Rep. 576. The case of White v. White, 105 Mass. 325, was peculiar. A woman procured a divorce from her husband, and by the law then in force he was prohibited from marrying again except upon leave procured from the court. He did marry again, however, and the legislature passed a special act to affirm this marriage. In pursuance of a requirement of the constitution, jurisdiction of all cases of marriage and divorce had previously been vested by law in the courts. Held, that this took from the legislature all power to act upon the subject in special cases, and the attempt to validate the mar- riage was consequently ineffectual. That the legislature possesses author- ity to validate marriages and to give legitimacy to the children of invalid marriages, where the constitution has not taken it away, see Andrews ». Page, 3 Heisk. 653 ; post, pp. Mh eo: Constitutional prohibition of legis- lative divorces does not make invalid a statute providing that a sentence to life imprisonment shall operate as absolute divorce. State v. Duket, 90 Wis. 272, 63 N. W. 83, 31 L. R. A. 515, 48 Am. St. 928; and see note hereto in L. R. A. upon effect of sentence upon marriage relation.210 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I The legislature has the same full control over the status of husband and wife which it possesses over the other domestic relations, and may permit or prohibit it, according to its own views of what is for the interest of the parties or the good of the public. In dissolving the relation, it proceeds upon such reasons as to it seem sufficient ; and if inquiry is made into the facts of the past, it is no more than is needful when any change of the law is contemplated, with a view to the establishment of more salutary rules for the future. The inquiry, therefore, is not judicial in its nature, and it is not essential that there be any particular finding of misconduct or unfitness in the parties. As in other cases of legislative action, the reasons or the motives of the legislature cannot be inquired into; the relation which the law permitted before is now forbidden, and the parties are absolved from the obligations growing out of that relation which continued so long as the relation existed, but which necessarily ceased with its termination. Marriage is not a contract, but a status; the parties cannot have vested rights of property in a domestic relation ; therefore the legislative act does not come under condemnation as depriving parties of rights contrary to the law of the' land, but, as in other cases within the scope of the legislative authority, the legislative will must be regarded as sufficient reason for the rule which it promulgates. 1 The leading case on this subject is Starr v. Pease, 8 Conn. 541. On the question whether a divorce is neces- sarily a judicial act, the court say ““A further objection is urged against this act; viz., that by the new consti- tution of 1818, there is an entire separation of the legislative and judi- cial departments, and that the legisla- ture can now pass no act or resolution not clearly warranted by that consti- tution; that the constitution is a grant of power, and not a limitation of powers already possessed; and, in short, that there is no reserved power in the legislature since the adoption of this constitution. Precisely the oppo- site of this is true. From the settle- ment of the State there have been cer- tain fundamental rules by which power has been exercised. These rules were embodied in an instrument called by some a constitution, by others a charter. All agree that it was the first constitution ever made in Con- necticut, and made, too, by the people themselves. It gave very extensive powers to the legislature, and left too much (for it left everything almost) to their will. The constitution of 1818 proposed to, and in fact did, limit that will. It adopted certain general prin- ciples by a preamble called a Declara- tion of Rights; provided for the elec- tion and appointment of certain organs of the government, such as the legisla- tive, executive, and judicial depart- ments; and imposed upon them cer- tain restraints. It found the State sovereign and independent, with a legislative power capable of making all laws necessary for the good of the people, not forbidden by the Consti- tution of the United States, nor op- posed to the sound maxims of legisla- tion; and it left them in the same condition, except so far as limitations were provided. There is now and has been a law in force on the subject of divorces. The law was passed one hundred and thirty years ago. It pro- vides for divorces a vinculo matrimonit in four cases; viz., adultery, fraudulent contract, wilful desertion, and sevenCHAP. V] POWERS LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT MAY EXERCISE 211 The second class of cases to which we have alluded hold that divorce is a judicial act in those cases upon which the general laws confer on the courts power to adjudicate ; and that consequently in those cases the legislature cannot pass special laws, but its full control over the relation of marriage will leave it at liberty to grant divorces in other cases, for such causes as shall appear to its wisdom to justify them." A third class of cases deny altogether the authority of these special legislative enactments, and declare the act of divorce to be in its nature judicial, and not properly within the province of the legislative power.? The most of these decisions, however, lay more years’ absence unheard of. The law has remained in substance the same as it was when enacted in 1667. During all this period the legislature has inter- fered like the Parliament of Great Britain, and passed special acts of divorce a vinculo matrimonit; and at almost every session since the Consti- tution of the United States went into operation, now forty-two years, and for the thirteen years of the existence of the Constitution of Connecticut, such acts have been, in multiplied cases, passed and sanctioned by the constituted authorities of our State. We are not at liberty to inquire into the wisdom of our existing law on this subject; nor into the expediency of such frequent interference by the legis- lature. We can only inquire into the constitutionality of the act under con- sideration. The power, is not pro- hibited either by the Constitution of the United States or by that of this State. In view of the appalling conse- quences of declaring the general law of the State or the repeated acts of our legislature unconstitutional and void, consequences easily conceived, but not easily expressed, — such as bastardiz- ing the issue and subjecting the par- ties to punishment for adultery, — the court should come to the result only on a solemn conviction that their oaths of office and these constitutions im- periously demand it. Feeling myself no such conviction, I cannot pronounce the act void.” Per Daggett, J.; Hosmer, Ch. J., and Bissell, J., con- curring. Peters, J., dissented. Upon the same subject see Crane v. Megin- nis, 1G. & J. 463; Wright v. Wright, 2 Md. 429; Gaines v. Gaines, 9 B. Monr. 295; Cabell v. Cabell, 1 Met. (Ky.) 319; Dickson v. Dickson, 1 Yerg. 110; Melizet’s Appeal, 17 Pa. St. 449; Cronise v. Cronise, 54 Pa. St. 255; Adams v. Palmer, 51 Me. 480; Townsend v. Griffin, 4 Harr. 440; Noel v. Ewing, 9 Ind. 37; and the examination of the whole subject by Mr. Bishop, in his work on Mar- riage and Divorce. A territorial legislature having power covering all rightful subjects of legislation could grant a divorce. Maynard »v. Hill, 125 U. 8. 190, 310L: ed. 654, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 723. 1 Levins v. Sleator, 2 Greene (Iowa), 604; Opinions of Judges, 16 Me. 479; Adams v. Palmer, 51 Me. 480. See also Townsend v. Griffin, 4 Harr. 440. In a well-reasoned case in Kentucky, it was held that a legislative divorce obtained on the application of one of the parties while suit for divorce was pending in a court of competent juris- diction would not affect the rights to property of the other, growing out of the relation. Gaines v. Gaines, 9 B. Monr. 295. A statute permitting divorces for offences committed before its passage is not an ex post facto law in the con- stitutional sense. Jones v. Jones, 2 Overton, 2, 5 Am. Dec. 645. 2 Brigham v. Miller, 17 Ohio, 445; Clark v. Clark, 10 N. H. 380; Ponder v. Graham, 4 Fla. 23; State v. Fry, 4 Mo. 120; Bryson v. Campbell, 12 Mo. 498; Bryson v. Bryson, 17 Mo. 590; Same v. Same, 44 Mo. 232. See also Jones v. Jones, 12 Pa. St. 350, 354. Under the Constitution of Massa-212 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I or less stress upon clauses in the constitutions other than those which in general terms separate the legislative and judicial functions, and some of them would perhaps have been differently decided but for those other clauses. But it is safe to say that the general sentiment in the legal profession is against the rightfulness of special legislative divorces ; and it is believed that, if the question could originally have been considered by the courts, unembarrassed by any considerations of long acquiescence, and of the serious consequences which must result from affirming their unlawfulness, after so many had been granted and new relations formed, it is highly probable that these enactments would have been held to be usurpations of judicial authority, and we should have been spared the necessity for the special constitutional provisions which have since been introduced. Fortunately these provisions render the question now discussed of little practical importance; at the same time that they refer the decision upon applications for divorce to those tribunals which must proceed upon inquiry, and cannot condemn without a hearing.! The force of a legislative divorce must in any case be confined to a dissolution of the relation; it can only be justified on the ground that it merely lays down a rule of conduct for the parties to observe towards each other for the future. It cannot inquire into the past, with a view to punish the parties for their offences against the marriage relation, except so far as the divorce itself can be regarded as a punishment. It cannot order the payment of alimony, for that would be a judgment ;? it cannot adjudge upon chusetts, the power of the legislature to grant divorces is denied. Spar- hawk v. Sparhawk, 116 Mass. 315. See clause in constitution, ante, p. 208, note 2. Where a court is given appellate jurisdiction in all cases, it isnot compe- tent by statute to forbid its reversing a decree of divorce. Tierney v. Tier- ney, 1 Wash. Ter. 568. See Nichols v. Griffin, 1 Wash. Ter. 374. 11f marriage is a matter of right, then it would seem that any particular marriage that parties might lawfully form they must have a lawful right to continue in, unless by misbehavior they subject themselves to a forfeiture of the right. And if the legislature can annul the relation in one case, without any finding that a breach of the mar- Tilage contract has been committed, then it would seem that they might annul it in every case, and even pro- hibit all parties from entering into the same relation in the future. The recognition of a full and complete con- trol of the relation in the legislature, to be exercised at its will, leads inevitably to this conclusion; so that, under the “rightful powers of legislation”? which our constitutions confer upon the legis- lative department, a relation essential to organized civil society might be abrogated entirely. Single legislative divorces are but single steps towards this barbarism which the application of the same principle to every indi- vidual case, by a general law, would necessarily bring upon us. See what is said by the Supreme Court of Mis- souri in Bryson v. Bryson, 17 Mo. 590, 594. 2 Crane v. Meginnis, 1 G. & J. 463; Potter’s Dwarris on Statutes, 486; post, p. 856, note.CHAP. V] POWERS LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT MAY EXERCISE 213 conflicting claims to property between the parties, but it must leave all questions of this character to the courts. Those rights of property which depend upon the continued existence of the relation will be terminated by the dissolution, but only as in any other case rights in the future may be incidentally affected by a change in the law.! Legislative Encroachments wpon Executive Power. If it is difficult to point out the precise boundary which sepa- rates legislative from judicial duties, it is still more difficult to discriminate, in particular cases, between what is properly legislative and what is properly executive duty. The authority that makes the laws has large discretion in determining the means through which they shall be executed ;? and the performance of many duties which they may provide for by law they may refer either to the chief executive of the State, or, at their option, to any other execu- tive or ministerial officer, or even to a person specially named for the duty. What can be definitely said on this subject is this: That 1 Starr v. Pease, 8 Conn. 541. 2In State v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 56 Fla. 617, 47 So. 969, 32 L. R. A. (vn. s.) 639, the court said: “The governmental powers that are divided into the legislative, executive, and judicial departments, and the exercise of which is forbidden to per- sons not properly belonging to the par- ticular department, are those so defined by the Constitution, or such as are inherent or so recognized by immemo- rial governmental usage, and which involve the exercise of primary and independent will, discretion, and judg- ment, subject not to the control of another department, but only to the limitations imposed by the State and Federal Constitutions. The powers of all the departments are exercised by their proper officials through or by the aid of administrative officers. The Constitution provides for and author- izes the legislature to provide for administrative officers who lawfully perform functions and duties and exercise more or less authority under the direction of officers who have real governmental powers, and who may properly belong to different depart- ments of the government. ‘This clearly indicates that all official duties, authority, and functions prescribed or contemplated by law are not neces- sarily governmental powers within the meaning of the constitutional provi- sions separating the powers of govern- ment into departments. The purpose of the Constitution is to secure efficient government by the harmonious co-op- eration of the separate, independent departments. ... The exercise of some authority, discretion, or judg- ment may be incident or necessary to the performance of administrative or ministerial duties; but such authority, discretion, or judgment is subject to judicial review, and is not among the powers of government that the Con- stitution separates into departments.”’ The power accorded the legislature by the Constitution for the purpose of regulating intrastate transportation by common carriers is not confined to making rules and regulations. The legislature has authority to do or cause to be done everything in any manner and by any means requisite to the complete and effectual exercise of the power possessed that is not an undoubted violation of some other provision of the Constitution. State v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 56 Fla. 617, 47 So. 969, 32 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 639. 3This is affirmed in the case of Bridges v. Shallcross, 6 W. Va. 562.214 The Constitution of that State pro- vides that the governor shall nominate, and by and with the advice and con- sent of the Senate appoint, all officers whose offices are established by the Constitution or shall be created by law, and whose appointment or election is not otherwise provided for, and that no such officer shall be appointed or elected by the legislature. The court decided that this did not preclude the legislature from creating a board of public works of which the State officers should be ex officio the members. The power to appoint to office is not inherent in the executive department unless conferred by the Constitution or the legislature, but the creation of officers, the delegation and regulation of powers and duties of officers and prescribing the manner of their ap- pointment or election are legislative functions, which are restrained only by the Constitution. People ». Mc- Cullough, 254 Ill. 9, 98 N. E. 156, Ann. Cas. 1913 B, 995. See also Mayor, ete., of Americus v. Perry, 114 Ga. 871, 40 S. E. 1004, 57 L. R. A. 230. “The general doctrine is that, in the absence of constitutional limita- tions, the legislature may prescribe how and by whom offices shall be filled. ... The main consideration in the selection of officers and agents is the public welfare, and the State, like any other principal, may select its agents, may determine for itself who can best accomplish its purpose, and whose appointment will best subserve the public good. When the Consti- tution prescribes a method, or imposes a limitation, the legislature is to that extent guided and controlled in choos- ing its officers.” Goodrich v. Mitchell, 68 Kan. 765, 75 Pac. 1034, 104 Am. St. Rep. 429, 64 L. R. A. 945, 1 Ann. Cas. 288. The legislature may regulate ap- pointment to statutory offices: People v. Osborne, 7 Col. 605. ‘Where an office is created by statute, it is wholly within the power of the legislature creating it. The length of. term and mode of appointment may be altered at pleasure, and the office may be abolished altogether. People v. Loef- fler, 175 Ill. 585, 51 N. E. 785; People CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I y. Olson, 245 Ill. 288, 92 N. B. 157.” People ex rel. Hayne v. McCormick, 261 Ill. 413, 103 N. E. 1053, Ann. Cas. 1915 A, 338. The general assembly has authority to provide for the appointment of a number of officers to discharge a given duty, and provide that vacancies in such number may be filled by those remaining in office, thus creating a self-perpetuating body. Mayor, etc., of Americus v. Perry, 114 Ga. 871, 40 S. E. 1004, 57 L. R. A. 230. The Legislature may provide a board of civil service commissioners to prescribe qualifications of all officers not provided for by the constitution : Opinion of Justices, 138 Mass. 601. For other cases upon merit system in civil service, see People v. Kipley, 171 Ill. 44, 49 N. B. 229, 41 L. R. A. 775; Chittenden v. Wurster, 152 N. Y. 345, 46 N. E. 857, 37 L. R. A. 809; Re Keymer, 148 N. Y. 219, 42 N. E. 667, 35 L. R. A. 447; Opinion of Justices, 166 Mass. 589, 44 N. E. 625, 34 L. R. A. 58; Newcomb »v. Indianapolis, 141 Ind. 451, 40 N. E. 919, 28 L. R. A. 732; Rogers v. Buffalo, 123 N. Y. 178, 25 N. B. 274, 9 L. R. A. 579; Neu- meyer v. Krakel, 110 Ky. 624, 62 S. W. 518; People v. Mosher, 163 N. Y. 32, 57 N. E. 88, 79 Am. St. 552; People v. Roberts, 148 N. Y. 360, 42 N. E. 1082, 31 L. R. A. 399; People v. Capp, 61 Colo. 396, 158 Pac. 143; People ». McCullough, 254 Ill. 9, 98 N. E. 156, Ann. Cas. 1913 B, 995; Goodrich ». Mitchell, 68 Kan. 765, 75 Pac. 1034, 104 Am. St. Rep. 429, 1 Ann. Cas. 288, 64 L. R. A. 945; Ransom v. Boston, 192 Mass. 299, 78 N. E. 481, 7 Ann. Cas. 733; Hale v. Worstell, 185 N. Y. 247, 77 N. E. 1177, 113 Am. St. Rep. 895; Slavin v. McGuire, 205 N. Y. 84, 98 N. E. 405, Ann. Cas. 1913 C, 881; Barthelmess v. Cukor, 231 N. Y. 4385, 132 N. E. 140, 16 A. L. R. 1404; Jenkins v. Gronen, 98 Wash. 128, 167 Pac. 916, L. R. A. 1918 A, 839; State v. Frear, 146 Wis. 302, 131 N. W. 882, 34 L. R. A. (N. s.) 480. The legislature may appoint a State board, if Constitution does not ex- pressly empower the governor to do so. People v. Freeman, 80 Cal. 233, 22 Pac. 173. See Hovey v. State, 119 Ind.CHAP. V] POWERS LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT MAY EXERCISE 215 such powers as are specially conferred by the constitution upon the governor, or upon any other specified officer, the legislature cannot require or authorize to be performed by any other officer or author- ity; and from those duties which the constitution requires of him he cannot be excused by law.' 386, 21 N. E. 890; Biggs v. McBride, 17 Oreg. 640, 21 Pac. 878; State v. Covington, 29 Ohio St. 102. The power of appointment to a par- ticular office may be vested in the State geologist. State v. Hyde, 129 Ind. 296, 28 N. B. 186, 13 L. R. A. 79. Appointment of police officers can- not be intrusted to a bipartisan board, elected half by one party in city coun- cil and half by another. Rathbone »v. Wirth, 150 N. Y. 459, 45 N. E. 15, 34 L. R. A. 408. But a provision that not more than two of the three mem- bers of a civil service commission shall be of the same political party is valid. Rogers v. Buffalo, 123 N. Y. 173, 25 N. E. 274, 9 L. R. A. 579. 1 Attorney-General v. Brown, 1 Wis. 513. ‘Whatever power or duty is expressly given to, or imposed upon, the executive department, is altogether free from the interference of the other branches of the government. Espe- cially is this the case where the subject is committed to the discretion of the chief executive officer, either by the constitution or by the laws. So long as the power is vested in him, it is to be by him exercised, and no other branch of the government can control its exercise.” An act of the legislature assuming to make an appropriation of public money for the purpose of conducting an inves- tigation by a committee of its own members, as to the measures neces- sary to be taken for the protection of certain property rights of the State, is void as an attempt to confer execu- tive power on members of the legisla- tive department in violation of the Constitution. Stockman v. Leddy, 55 Colo. 24, 129 Pac. 220, Ann. Cas. 1916 B, 1052. Where the Constitution does not prohibit the exercise of the appointing power by the legislature, and makes provision in certain contingencies for the election of certain officers by it, But other powers or duties the the legislature may, if it is not other- wise provided, exercise the appointing power. Cox v. State, 72 Ark. 98, 78 S. W. 756, 105 Am. St. Rep. 17. Under the Constitution of Ohio, which forbids the exercise of any ap- pointing power by the legislature, except as therein authorized, it was held that the legislature could not, by law, constitute certain designated per- sons a State board, with power to appoint commissioners of the State House, and directors of the peniten- tiary, and to remove such directors for cause. State v. Kennon, 7 Ohio St. 546. By the Indiana Constitution all officers whose appointment is not otherwise provided for, shall be chosen in such manner as shall be prescribed by law. The power to ordain the “‘manner”’ does not give the legisla- ture power to appoint. State v. Denny, 118 Ind. 382, 21 N. E. 252, 274,41. R. A. 79; Evansville v. State, 118 Ind. 426, 21 N. E. 267,4L.R. A. 93. And see Davis v. State, 7 Md. 151; O’Connor v. Fond du Lae, 109 Wis. 253, 85 N. W. 327; also cases referred to in preceding note. The governor’s power of appoint- ment cannot be indirectly taken away ; as by abolishing the office or offices and creating another and attaching to it the duties of the office or offices abolished. Johnson v. State, 59 N. J. L. 535, 37 Atl. 949, 38 L. R. A. 373, 39 Atl. 646. As to what are public officers, see State v. Stanley, 66 N. C. 59, 8 Am. Rep. 488. An appointment to office was said, in Taylor ». Commonwealth, 3 J. J. Marsh. 401, to be intrinsically an executive act. In a certain sense this is doubtless so, but it would not follow that the legislature could exercise no appointing power, or could confer none on others than the chief executive of the State. Where the constitution contains no negative words to limit216 the legislative authority in this regard, the legislature in enacting a law must decide for itself what are the suitable, convenient, or necessary agencies for its execution, and the authority of the executive must be limited to taking care that the law is executed by such agencies. See Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 376; State v. Henderson, 4 Wyo. 535, 85 Pac. 517, 22 L. R.A. 751; Fox v. McDonald, 101 Ala. 51, 13 So. 416, 21 L. R. A. 529, 46 Am. St. 98; State v. George, 22 Oreg. 142, 29 Pac. 356, 16 L. R. A. 737, 29 Am. St. 586. The assignment, conformably to Federal statute, of a judge of one Federal district and circuit to perform duty in another district of another cir- cuit does not usurp the power of appointment and confirmation vested by the Federal Constitution in the President and Senate. Lamar ». United States, 241 U. S. 103, 60 L. ed. 912, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 535. That power to appoint City Com- missioners may be given to circuit judges. See Terre Haute v. Evans- ville and T. H. Ry. Co., 149 Ind. 174, 46 N. E. 77, 37 L. R. A. 189; and see note 16 L. R. A. 737 on the constitu- tional power of courts or judges to appoint officers. In Minnesota it has been held that a statute requiring the judges of the district court of a county to appoint the members of the board of control of the county, is unconstitutional, because it imposes upon the judiciary duties and functions which are not judicial and which belong to another department of the government. State ex rel. Young v. Brill, 100 Minn. 499, 111 N. W. 294, 689, 10 Ann. Cas. 425. See also State ex rel. Thompson v. Neble, 82 Neb. 267, 117 N. W. 723, 19 L. R. A. (wv. 8.) 578. With regard to requirements of merit in appointees and competitive examinations for the ascertainment thereof, see People v. Kipley, 171 III. 44,49 N. E. 229, 41 L. R. A. 775; Chittenden v. Wurster, 152 N. Y. 345, 46° N; B. 857, 37 Ls Re A. 809); Re Keymer, 148 N. Y. 219, 42 N. E. 667, 35 L. R. A. 447; Opinion of Justices, 166 Mass. 589, 44 N. BE. 625, 34 L. R. A. 58; People v. Roberts, 148 N. Y. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. 1 360, 42 N. E. 1082, 31 L. R. A. 399; Newcomb v. Indianapolis, 141 Ind. 451, 40 N. B. 919, 28 LL. (R. AS 7825 Rogers v. Buffalo, 123 N. Y. 178, 25 N. E. 274, 9 L. R. A. 579; Neumeyer v. Krakel, 110 Ky. 624, 62 S. W. 518; People v. Mosher, 163 N. Y. 32, 57 N. E. 88, 79 Am. St. 552; People »v. Steward, 249 Ill. 311, 94 N. E. 511, 33 L. R. A. (nN. 8.) 259, Ann. Cas. 1912 A, 135; People v. McCullough, 254 Ill. 9, 98 N. E. 156, Ann. Cas. 1913 B, 995; Barthelmess v. Cukor, 231 N. Y. 435, 132 N. E. 140, 16 A. L. R. 1404; State v. Frear, 146 Wis. 291, 131 N. W. 832, 34 L. R. A. (nw. s.) 480. The mayor of a city may be em- powered to appoint the principal exec- utive officers thereof. Datz v. Cleve- land, 52 N. J. L. 188; 19 Atk t7a7 L. R. A. 481. For other cases on ap- pointing power, see State v. Boucher, 3 N. D. 389, 56 N. W. 142, 21 L. R. A. 539. Where an office is not mentioned in the Constitution, but is a creature of statute, the legislature may abolish it, or may lengthen its term. State ex rel. Hensley v. Plasters, 74 Neb. 652, 105 N. W. 1092, 3 L. R. A. (nN. 8.) 887, 13 Ann. Cas. 154. A statute authorizing the governor to remove a public officer for neglect of duty or misconduct in office, giving him a copy of the charges against him and an opportunity of being publicly heard in his own defense, does not violate the constitutional provision dividing the power of government into the legislative, executive and judicial departments, and declaring that “no person or persons belonging to or constituting one of these departments shall exercise any of the powers prop- erly belonging to either of the others.” McGran v. Gaul, 96 N. J. L. 165, 112 Atl. 603. Where the governor has power to remove an officer for neglect of duty, he is the sole judge whether the duty has been neglected. State v. Doherty, 25 La. Ann. 119, 18 Am. Rep. 131; State v. Johnson, 30 Fla. 433, 11 So. 845, 18 L. R. A. 410; and see Trainor v. Wayne Co. Auditors, 89 Mich. 162, 50 N. W. 809, 15 L. R. A. 95, and note on power of summary removal. TheCHAP. V] courts cannot review his action if it is taken after a hearing: State v. Haw- kins, 44 Ohio St. 98, 5 N. E. 228; but he must afford an opportunity for defence. Dullam v. Willson, 53 Mich. 392, 19 N. W. 112; State v. Johnson, 30 Fla. 433, 11 So. 845, 18 L. R. A. 410; State v. Smith, 35 Neb. 13, 52 N. W. 700, 16 L. R. A. 791; Biggs v. McBride, 17 Oreg. 640, 21 Pac. 878, 5 L. R. A. 115; Ekern v. McGovern, 154 Wis. 157, 142 N. W. 595, 46 L. R. A. (x. s.) 796. Contra, unless the right is expressly secured to the officer. Donahue v. Will Co., 100 Ill. 94, and cases cited. For a case of removal for gross care- lessness in declaring the result of a yote upon a constitutional amend- ment, see Attorney-General v. Jochim, 99 Mich. 358, 58 N. W. 611, 23 L. R. A. 699, 41 Am. St. 606. Provision for impeachment or removal does not prevent virtual removal by legislature through statute abolishing the office and creating another with same duties and powers. State v. Hyde, 129 Ind. 296, 28 N. E. 186, 13 L. R. A. 79. Power of removal cannot be conferred on court. Gordon v. Moores, 61 Neb. 345, 85 N. W. 298. If the governor has power to appoint with the consent of Senate, and to re- move, he may remove without such consent. Lane v. Com., 103 Pa. St. 481; Harman v. Harwood, 58 Md. 1. See, as to discretionary powers, ante, pp. 101-104, notes. The pardoning power is neither naturally nor necessarily an executive power. It is a power of government inherent in the people, who by consti- tutional provision may vest it in whole or in part in any official they choose. Jamison v. Flanner, 116 Kan. 624, 228 Pac. 82. See also State v. Dunning, 9 Ind. 20. But where the power is given to the governor by the Constitu- tion in unrestricted terms, it cannot be taken away; nor can a like power be given by the legislature to any other officer or authority. In re Conditional Discharge of Convicts, 73 Vt. 414, 51 Atl. 10, 56 L. R. A. 658; State ex rel. Hallanan v. Thompson, 80 W. Va. 698, 93 S. E. 810. “The vestiture of the power to grant POWERS LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT MAY EXERCISE 217 reprieves and pardons in the chief executive is exclusive of all other departments of the State, and the legislature cannot, directly or indi- rectly, take it from his control, and vest it in others, or authorize or re- quire it to be exercised by any other officer or authority. It is a power and duty intrusted to his judgment and discretion, which cannot be inter- fered with, and of which he cannot be relieved.” Fite v. State, 114 Tenn. 646, 88 S. W. 941, 1 L. R. A. (w. s.) 520, 4 Ann. Cas. 1108. In Indiana the Supreme Court can- not be invested with power to grant reprieves. Butler v. State, 97 Ind. 373. But the Supreme Court of the United States has held that the prac- tice of granting remissions of pecuni- ary penalties and forfeitures, by Federal officers other than the President, sanc- tioned by statute and acquiescence for nearly a century, as a valid exercise of authority, and no invasion of the power of pardon granted by the Con- stitution to the President, is too firmly established to be questioned. The Laura, 114 U. S. 411, 29 L. ed. 147, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 881. A statute which authorizes a court or justice of the peace to release a fine or jail sentence, imposed as a pun- ishment for an offense, violates the constitutional provision limiting the power to remit fines and penalties and grant reprieves and pardons, after conviction, to the governor; but if the statute does no more than author- ize suspension, for good cause, of so much only of the judgment of convic- tion as requires the prisoner to work on the public roads, it does not violate such constitutional provision. State ex rel. Hallanan v. Thompson, 80 W. Va. 698, 93 S. BE. 810. A statute providing that on an investigation into a certain crime, no person shall be excused from testify- ing on the ground that his evidence might subject him to prosecution or tend to incriminate him, but that such person when so examined shall be altogether pardoned of any and all participation in the crime, does not violate the constitutional provision conferring on the Governor the power218 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. 1 executive cannot exercise or assume except by legislative authority, and the power which in its discretion it confers it may also in its discretion withhold, or confide to other hands.! Whether in those cases where power is given by the constitution to the governor, the legislature have the same authority to make rules for the exercise to grant pardons after conviction. State v. Bowman, 145 N. C. 452, 59 S. E. 74, 122 Am. St. Rep. 464. The executive, it has been decided, has power to pardon for contempt of court. State v. Sauvinet, 24 La. Ann. 119, 18 Am. Rep. 115; Sharp ». State, 102 Tenn. 9, 49 S. W. 752, 43 L. R. A. 788, 73 Am. St. 851; State v. Magee Publishing Co., 29 N. M. 455, 224 Pac. 1028, 38 A. L. R. 142. Under the Federal Constitution the power of the President to pardon extends to criminal contempts of court. Ez parte Grossman, 267 U. S. 87, 69 L. ed. 377, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 332, 38 A. L. R. 131. See also State v. Magee Publishing Co., 29 N. M. 455, 224 Pac. 1028, 38 A. L. R. 142. The President’s power to pardon does not extend to the restoration of prop- erty which has been judicially for- feited. Knote v. United States, 10 Ct. of Cl. 397, and 95 U. S. 149, 24 L. ed. 442; Osborn v. United States, 91 U.S. 474, 23 L. ed. 388. A general power to pardon may be exercised before as well as after con- viction. Lapeyre v. United States, 17 Wall. 191, 21 L. ed. 606; Dominick v. Bowdoin, 44 Ga. 357; Grubb ». Bullock, 44 Ga. 379; Terr. v. Richard- son, 9 Okla. 579, 60 Pac. 244, 49 L. R. A. 440. The pardon may be granted by general proclamation. Carlisle v. United States, 16 Wall. 147, 21 L. ed. 426; Lapeyre v. United States, 17 Wall. 191, 21 L. ed. 606. The delivery of a pardon to the prison warden, makes it operative. Hx parte Powell, 73 Ala. 517. One receiving a full pardon from the President cannot afterwards be re- quired by law to establish loyalty as a condition to the assertion of legal rights. Carlisle v. United States, 16 Wall. 147, 21 L. ed. 426. Nor be prosecuted in a civil action for the same acts for which he is pardoned. United States v. McKee, 4 Dill. 128. Pardon removes all disabilities result- ing from conviction, and may be granted after sentence executed. State v. Foley, 15 Nev. 64, 37 Am. Rep. 458; Edwards v. Com., 78 Va. 39; State v. Dodson, 16 S. C. 453; State v. Martin, 59 Ohio, 812, 52 N. E. 188, 43 L. R. A. 94, 69 Am. St. 762. But a mere executive order to dis- charge from custody is not such a pardon. State v. Kirschner, 23 Mo. App. 349. It does not release from the obligation to pay costs of the prosecution. In re Boyd, 34 Kan. 570, 9 Pac. 240; Smith v. State, 6 Lea, 637. Upon invalidity of legislative par- don, see Singleton v. State, 38 Fla. 297, 21 So. 21, 34 L. R. A. 251, 56 Am. St. 177, and note thereto in L. R. A. 1“Tn deciding this question [as to the authority of the governor], recur- rence must be had to the constitution. That furnishes the only rule by which the court can be governed. That is the charter of the governor’s authority. All the powers delegated to him by or in accordance with that instrument, he is entitled to exercise, and no others. The constitution is a limitation upon the powers of the legislative depart- ment of the government, but it is to be regarded as a grant of powers to the other departments. Neither the executive nor the judiciary, therefore, can exercise any authority or power except such as is clearly granted by the constitution.” Field v. People, 3 Ill. 79, 80. Where an office is created by statute it may be filled by election or by appointment just as the legislature may prescribe. Townley v. Harts- field, 113 Ark. 253, 168 S. W. 140, Ann. Cas. 1916 C, 648. It is competent for the legislature to provide a summary procedure for the removal of public officers whose removal is not provided for in the Constitution. Rankin v. Jauman, 4CHAP. V| POWERS LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT MAY EXERCISE 219 of the power that they have to make rules to govern the proceedings in the courts, may perhaps be a question.’ It would seem that this must depend generally upon the nature of the power, and upon the question whether the constitution, in conferring it, has furnished a sufficient rule for its exercise. Where complete power to pardon is conferred upon the executive, it may be doubted if the legislature can impose restrictions under the name of rules or regulations? Idaho, 53, 36 Pac. 502; People ez rel. Clay v. Stuart, 74 Mich. 411, 41 N. W. 1091, 16 Am. St. Rep. 644; State ez rel. Timothy v. Howse, 134 Tenn. 67, 183 S. W. 510, L. R. A. 1916 D, 1090, Ann. Cas. 1917 C, 1125. 1In Morgan v. Buffington, 21 Mo. 549, it was held that the State auditor was not obliged to accept as conclusive the certificate from the Speaker of the House as to the sum due a member of the House for attendance upon it, but that he might lawfully inquire whether the amount had been actually earned by attendance or not. The legislative rule, therefore, cannot go to the extent of compelling an executive officer to do something else than his duty, under any pretence of regulation. 2 Where the pardoning power is vested exclusively in the governor any law which restricts the power is un- constitutional. Hx parte Ridley, 3 Okla. Crim. Rep. 350, 106 Pac. 549, 26 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 110; In re Condi- tional Discharge of Convicts, 73 Vt. 414, 51 Atl. 10, 56 L. R. A. 658. But provision may be made by legislation which shall render the exercise of the power convenient and efficient. Ez parte Horine, 11 Okla. Crim. Rep. 517, 148 Pac. 825, L. R. A. 1915 F, 548. Whether the legislature can consti- tutionally remit a fine, when the par- doning power is vested in the governor by the constitution, has been made a question; and the cases of Haley »v. Clarke, 26 Ala. 439, and People v. Bircham, 12 Cal. 50, are opposed to each other upon the point. If the fine is payable to the State, perhaps the legislature should be considered as having the same right to discharge it that they would have to release any other debtor to the State from his obligation. It has been decided that to give parties who have been convicted and fined the benefit of the insolvent laws is not an exercise of the pardoning power. Hx parte Scott, 19 Ohio St. 581. And where the constitution pro- vided that ‘‘In all criminal and penal cases, except those of treason and impeachment, [the governor] shall have power to grant pardons after conviction, and remit fines and for- feitures”, &c., it was held that this did not preclude the legislature from passing an act of pardon and amnesty for parties liable to prosecution, but not yet convicted. State v. Nichols, 26 Ark. 74, 7 Am. Rep. 600. The decided weight of authority supports the rule that a statute authorizing the courts to suspend sen- tences does not violate the constitu- tional provision that the governor shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons and to remit fines and for- feitures. Barrett v. State, 18 Ala. App. 246, 90 So. 13; In re Giannini, 18 Cal. App. 166, 122 Pac. 831; Mar- tin v. People, 69 Colo. 60, 168 Pac. 1171; People »v. Stickle, 156 Mich. 557, 121 N. W. 497; Ez parte Bates, 20 N. M. 542, 151 Pac. 698, L. R. A. 1916 A, 1285; People ex rel. Sullivan v. Flynn, 55 Misc. (N. Y.) 639, 106 N. Y. Supp. 925; People v. Goodrich, 149 N. Y. Supp. 406; In re Hart, 29 N. D. 38, 149 N. W. 568, L. R. A. 1915 C, 1169; State v. Teal, 108 S. C. 455, 95 S. E. 69; Baker v. State, 70 Tex. Crim. Rep. 618, 158 S. W. 998; Cook v. State, 73 Tex. Crim. Rep. 548, 165 S. W. 573; King v. State, 72 Tex. Crim. Rep. 394, 162 S. W. 890; Richardson v. Com., 131 Va. 802, 109 S. E. 460; State v. Mallahan, 65 Wash. 287, 118 Pac. 42; State ex rel. Tingstad v. Starwich, 119 Wash. 561, 206 Pac. 29, 26 A. L. R. 393. See also Belden v.220 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. 1 [unless the constitution expressly authorizes it to do so;1] but where the governor is made commander-in-chief of the military forces of Hugo, 88 Conn. 500, 91 Atl. 369. Compare People v. Brown, 54 Mich. 15, 19 N. W. 571. But in a few juris- dictions such a statute is held to be unconstitutional. Hx parte Shalor, 33 Ney. 361, 111 Pac. 291; State ez rel. Summerfield v. Moran, 43 Ney. 150, 182 Pac. 927; State ex rel. Payne v. Anderson, 43 S. D. 630, 181 N. W. 839; State ex rel. Hallanan v. Thompson, 80 W. Va. 698, 93S. E. 810. Sentence may be suspended after conviction, and such suspension may be with- drawn at any time. People v. Monroe Co. Ct., 141 N. Y. 288, 36 N. E. 386, 23 L. R. A. 856. In Oklahoma it has been held that under a constitutional provision con- ferring the pardoning power upon the governor, the governor has exclusive power to parole a convict, with such restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper. Ex parte Ridley, 3 Okla. Crim. Rep. 350, 106 Pac. 549, Zon laa eA (NS Ss!) 110) And in Michigan a statute authorizing sen- tence of a prisoner for an indefinite term not less than the minimum pre- scribed by law nor greater than the maximum with authority to the board of prison control to release on parol after expiration of minimum period and to recommit upon violation of parol has been held void as infringing upon governor’s pardoning power. People v. Cummings, 88 Mich. 249, 50 N. W. 310, 14 L. R. A. 285, and note. But in Ohio an act allowing a prisoner to go on parol, but in legal control of prison managers and subject to recall, has been held valid. State »v. Peters, 43 Ohio St. 629, 4 N. E. 81. A law giving to prisoners certain deductions from their term of imprison- ment for good behavior is not uncon- stitutional as an infringement of the prerogative of the governor to pardon. Ex parte Ridley, 3 Okla. Crim. Rep. 350, 106 Pac. 549, 26 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 110. An act providing for credits on sentences of convicts, where such credits are specifically defined, and where the provisions of the statute operate alone upon sentences of con- victs who have been imprisoned sub- sequent to the passage of the statute, is not an invasion of the constitutional prerogative of the governor. But where the matter of credits is left to the arbitrary discretion of a board of workhouse commissioners it is an unconstitutional delegation of legisla- tive authority. Fite v. State, 114 Tenn. 646, 88 S. W. 941, 1 L. R. A. (n. s.) 520, 4 Ann. Cas. 1108. Where board of pardons has only advisory power, the governor’s par- doning power is in nowise infringed. Rich v. Chamberlain, 104 Mich. 436, 62 N. W. 584, 27 L. R. A. 578. The power to reprieve is not in- cluded in the power to pardon. Hz parte Howard, 17 N. H. 545. Contra, Ex parte Fleming, 60 Miss. 910. In Kansas it has been held that the power to pardon includes the power to grant commutations of sentences, to grant pardons and commutations with or without conditions, and to remit fines and forfeitures. Jamison v. Flanner, 116 Kan. 624, 228 Pac. 82. An act approved by the governor vacating a conviction operates as a pardon. People v. Stewart, 1 Idaho, 546. Pardons may be made condi- tional, and forfeited if the condition is not observed. State v. Smith, 1 Bailey, 283; Lee v. Murphy, 22 Gratt. 789; Re Ruhl, 5 Sawyer, 186; Ken- nedy’s Case, 1385 Mass. 48; Ex parte Marks, 64 Cal. 29, 28 Pac. 109. The governor may annex to a pardon or parole any condition precedent or sub- sequent, provided it be not illegal, immoral, or impossible to be per- formed. Ex parte Horine, 11 Okla. Crim. Rep. 517, 148 Pac. 825, L. R. A. 1915 F, 548. But a pardon obtained by fraud is held conclusive, though afterward declared null by the gov- ernor. Knapp v. Thomas, 39 Ohio St. 377. A pardon does not relieve from for- feiture of bail bond. Dale v. Com- monwealth, 101 Ky. 612, 42 S. W. 93, 38 L. R. A. 808. 1 Several of the State constitutions have provided that the power to par-CHAP. V] POWERS LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT MAY EXERCISE 221 the State, it is obvious that his authority must be exercised under such proper rules as the legislature may prescribe, because the military forces are themselves under the control of the legislature, and military law is prescribed by that department. There would be this clear limitation upon the power of the legislature to prescribe rules for the executive department; that they must not be such as, under pretence of regulation, divest the executive of, or preclude his exercising, any of his constitutional prerogatives or powers. Those matters which the constitution specifically confides to him the legislature cannot directly or indirectly take from his control. And on the other hand the legislature cannot confer upon him judicial authority; such as the authority to set aside the registra- tion of voters in a municipality ;! or clothe him with any authority, not executive in its nature, which the legislature itself, under the constitution, is restricted from exercising.” It may be proper to say here, that the executive, in the proper discharge of his duties under the constitution, is as independent of the courts as he is of the legislature.’ don shall be exercised under such regu- lations as shall be prescribed by law. There are provisions more or less broad to this purport in those of Kansas, Florida, Alabama, Arkansas, Texas, Mississippi, Oregon, Indiana, Lowa, and Virginia. Where the constitution provides that ‘‘the pardoning power shall be vested in the governor, under regula- tions and restrictions prescribed by law”, the legislature may make such regulations and restrictions upon the pardoning power of the governor as it deems best; and a pardon or commu- tation of sentence issued by the gov- ernor without compliance with the regulations and restrictions prescribed is void. Jamison v. Flanner, 116 Kan. 624, 228 Pac. 82. In State v. Dunning, 9 Ind. 20, an act of the legislature requiring the applicant for the remission of a fine or forfeiture to forward to the governor, with his application, the opinion of certain county officers as to the pro- priety of the remission, was sustained as an act within the power conferred by the constitution upon the legisla- ture to prescribe regulations in these cases. And see Branham v. Lange, 16 Ind. 497. 1 State v. Staten, 6 Cold. 233. 2 Smith v. Norment, 5 Yerg. 271. 3An executive officer cannot be enjoined from acting. Smith ov. Myers, 109 Ind. 1; Bates v. Taylor, 87 Tenn. 319. See Lacy v. Martin, 39 Kan. 703, 18 Pac. 957; Kilpatrick v. Smith, 77 Va. 347. But as to the rule in Minnesota, see post, 224 note. “When the governor, in pursuance of his executive authority, recognizes an act as legal, and is proceeding to execute its provisions, the courts can- not directly interfere with the dis- charge of his duties under it, merely because it is alleged that such act is unconstitutional.’ Frost v. Thomas, 26 Colo. 222, 56 Pac. 899, 77 Am. St. Rep. 259. As to mere error of judg- ment on the part of the governor in the exercise of his lawful authority, his acts are not reviewable by the court. Within his jurisdiction, both he and those who act by his direction are immune from judicial remedies. Ekern v. McGovern, 154 Wis. 157, 142 N. W. 595, 46 L. R. A. (wn. s.) 796. As to the jurisdiction of the courts to issue the writ of certiorari to review the action of the governor, see State ex rel. Rawlinson v. Ansel, 76 S. C. 395, 57S. E. 185. 11 Ann. Cas. 618.222 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I [Though the authorities are not in universal agreement as to whether the writ of mandamus will lie to compel the performance of executive duties,! they agree in holding that where the duty sought to be enforced is not merely ministerial, but one involving discretion, it cannot be enforced by the writ.? In Maryland, the proclamation of the governor that a proposed amend- ment to the Constitution has been duly adopted is not subject to review by any other officer or department. Worman v. Hagan, 78 Md. 152, 27 Atl. 616, 21 L. R. A. 716. In Har- tranft’s Appeal, 85 Pa. St. 433, 27 Am. Rep. 667, it was decided that the gov- ernor was not subject to the subpcena of the grand jury. If in the removal of a sheriff the governor was acting in a quasi judicial capacity, a court may examine the proceedings to the extent of ascer- taining whether he acted within his jurisdiction. State ex rel. Rodd ». Verage, 177 Wis. 295, 187 N. W. 830, 23 A. L. R. 491. For effect of clause denying governor power to remove officers for partisan reasons, see People v. Martin, 19 Col. 565, 36 Pac. 548, 24 TiseRe AS 200: A court will not inquire into the motives which prompted a pardoning official to issue a pardon, for to do so would be to usurp the pardoning power; but it will inquire into the authority of the pardoning official to issue the pardon, and as to whether fraud was practised upon such official, and it will interpret and construe the pardon. Jamison v. Flanner, 116 Kan. 624, 228 Pac. 82, 35 A. L. R. 973. That court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion on the part of a railroad commission where such discretion is authorized by law, see Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Common- wealth, 104 Ky. 226, 46 S. W. 707, 47S. W. 598, 48S. W. 416, 43 L. R. A. 541, 549, 550. 1JIn the following cases the power has either been expressly affirmed, or it has been exercised without being ques- tioned. State v. Moffitt, 5 Ohio, 358; State v. Governor, 5 Ohio St. 529; Coltin v. Ellis, 7 Jones (N. C.), 545; Magruder ». Governor, 25 Md. 173; Groome v. Gwinn, 43 Md. 572; Ten- The weight of authority supports nessee, &c. R. R. Co. v. Moore, 36 Ala. 371; Middleton v. Lowe, 30 Cal. 596; Harpending v. Haight, 39 Cal. 189, 2 Am. Rep. 433; Chumasero v. Potts, 2 Mont. 244; Martin v. Ingham, 38 Kan. 641, 17 Pac. 162; Clement »v. Graham, 78 Vt. 290, 63 Atl. 146, Ann. Cas. 1913 EH, 1208. See Hatch »v. Stoneman, 66 Cal. 632, 6 Pac. 734. In the following cases the power has been denied: Hawkins v. Governor, 1 Ark. 570; Low v. Towns, 8 Ga. 360; State v. Kirkwood, 14 Iowa, 162; Dennett, Petitioner, 32 Me. 510; People v. Bissell, 19 Ill. 229; People v. Yates, 40 Ill. 126; People ». Cullom, 100 Ill. 472; State v. Governor, 25 N. J. 331; Mauran v. Smith, 8 R. I. 192; State v. Warmoth, 22 La. Ann. 1, 2 Am. Rep. 712; Same v. Same, 24 La. Ann. 351, 13 Am: Rep: 1265 People v. Governor, 29 Mich. 320, 18 Am. Rep. 89; State v. Governor, 39 Mo. 388; Vicksburg & M. R. R. Co. v. Lowry, 61 Miss. 102; Bates »v. Taylor, 3 Pick. (Tenn.) 319, 11 S. W. 266; People v. Morton, 156 N. Y. 136, 50 N. E. 791, 66 Am. St. 547; State ex rel. Robb v. Stone, 120 Mo. 428, 25 S. W. 376, 23 L. R. A. 194, 41 Am. St. Rep. 705. 2 United States v. Seaman, 17 How. 225, 15 L. ed. 226; United States ». Windon, 137 U. S. 636, 34 L. ed. 811, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 197; United States v. Blaine, 139 U.S. 306, 35 L. ed. 183, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 607; United States v. Lamont, 155 U. S. 303, 39 L. ed. 160, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 97; United States ». Hitchcock, 190 U. S. 316, 47 L. ed. 1074, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 698; American Casualty Ins., ete., Co. ». Fyler, 60 Conn. 448, 22 Atl. 494, 25 Am. St. Rep. 337; Payne v. United States, 20 App. Cas. (D. C.) 581; State v. Wormouth, 23 La. Ann. 76; State v. Board of Liquidation, 33 La. Ann. 124; People v. State Prison, 44 Mich. 187; State ex rel. Rawlinson v. Ansel, 76 S. C. 395, 57 S. EB. 185, 11CHAP. V] POWERS LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT MAY EXERCISE 223 the rule that the governor cannot be compelled by mandamus to perform even a ministerial duty involving no discretion whatever ; and this rule prevails in some states where other officers may be compelled to perform such duties.’ But a strong minority opinion sanctions the doctrine that the governor may be compelled by man- damus to perform purely ministerial duties.” Ann. Cas. 613; Simmons v. State Military Board, 99 Va. 390, 39 S. E. 125. In State ex rel. Rawlinson v. Ansel, 76 S. C. 395, 57 S. E. 185, 11 Ann. Cas. 613, the court says: ‘‘All the authori- ties agree that, in the exercise of a discretionary official act, an executive officer cannot be restrained, coerced or controlled by the judicial department. But as applied to members of the ex- ecutive department, other than the chief executive, jurisdiction is gen- erally asserted by the courts to compel the performance of an official duty imposed by law, which is plainly ministerial and involves no discre- tion.”’ There are many cases holding that the governor cannot be compelled to perform any political or executive duty in relation to which he has a discretion. State v. Henderson, 199 Ala. 244, 74 So. 344, L. R. A. 1917 F, 770; Arizona Insane Asylum v. Wolfly, 3 Ariz. 132, 22 Pac. 383, 38 L. R. A. 188; Harpending v. Haight, 39 Cal. 189, 2 Am. Rep. 432; Greenwood Cemetery Land Co. v. Routt, 11 Colo. 156, 28 Pac. 1125, 31 Am. St. Rep. 284,15 L. R. A. 369; Traynor v. Beck- ham, 116 Ky. 13, 74 8. W. 1105, 76 S. W. 844, 3 Ann. Cas. 388; Miles ». Bradford, 22 Md. 170, 85 Am. Dec. 643; Rice v. Governor, 207 Mass. 577, 93 N. E. 821, 32 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 355; People v. Governor, 29 Mich. 320, 18 Am. Rep. 89; Cooke v. Iverson, 108 Minn. 388, 122 N. W. 251, 52 L. R. A. (x. s.) 415; Pacific R. Co. v. Gov- ernor, 23 Mo. 353, 66 Am. Dec. 673; State v. Rickards, 16 Mont. 145, 40 Pac. 210, 50 Am. St. Rep. 476, 28 L. R. A. 298; State v. Boyd, 36 Neb. 131, 54 N. W: 252; 19 L. R. A. 227: People v. Morton, 156 N. Y. 136, 50 N. E. 791, 66 Am. St. Rep. 547, 41 L. R. A. 231; Mauran v. Smith, 8 R. I. 192, 5 Am. Rep. 564; State ez rel. Rawlinson v. Ansel, 76 S. C. 395, 57S. E. 185, 11 Ann. Cas. 618; Jones- boro, etc., Turnpike Co. v. Brown, 8 Baxt. (Tenn.) 490, 35 Am. Rep. 713; State v. Brooks, 14 Wyo. 393, 84 Pac. 488,6 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 750, 7 Ann. Cas. 1108. 1 Hawkins v. Governor, 1 Ark. 570, 33 Am. Dec. 346; People v. Bissell, 19 lll. 229, 68 Am. Dec. 591; People v. Dunne, 258 Ill. 441, 101 N. E. 560, 45 L. R. A. (wv. s.) 500; Hovey v. State, 127 Ind. 588, 27 N. E. 175, 22 Am. St. Rep. 663, 11 L. R. A. 763; State v. Wormouth, 22 La. Ann. 1, 2 Am. Rep. 712; State »v. Wormouth, 24 La. Ann. 351, 13 Am. Rep. 126; In re Dennett, 32 Me. 508, 54 Am. Dec. 602; Rice v. Governor, 207 Mass. 577, 93 N. E. 821, 32 L. R. A. (w. 8.) 355; People v. Governor, 29 Mich. 320, 18 Am. Rep. 89; Vicksburg, etc., R. Co. v. Lowry, 61 Miss. 102, 48 Am. Rep. 76; State v. Stone, 120 Mo. 428, 25 S. W. 376, 41 Am. St. Rep. 705, 23 L. R. A. 194; People v. Morton, 156 N. Y. 236, 50 N. E. 791, 66 Am. St. Rep. 547, 41 L. R. A. 231; People v. Best, 187 N. Y. 1, 79 N. E. 890, 116 Am. St. Rep. 589, 10 Ann. Cas. 58; Mauran v. Smith, 8 R. I. 192, 5 Am. Rep. 564; Jonesboro, etc., Turnpike Co. v. Brown, 8 Baxt. (Tenn.) 490, 35 Am. Rep. 713; Bates v. Taylor, Govy- ernor, 87 Tenn. 319, 11 S. W. 266, 3 L. R. A. 316. 2 State v. Henderson, 199 Ala. 244, 74 So. 344, L. R. A. 1917 F, 770; Harpending v. Haight, 39 Cal. 189, 2 Am. Rep. 432; Greenwood Cemetery Land Co. v. Routt, 17 Colo. 156, 28 Pac. 1125, 31 Am. St. Rep. 284, 15 L. R. A. 369; Traynor v. Beckham, 116 Ky. 13, 74S. W. 1105, 76 8. W. 844, 3 Ann. Cas. 388; Warfield ». Vandiver, 101 Md. 78, 60 Atl. 538, 4 Ann. Cas. 692; State v. Elder, 31 Neb.224 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I When, however, a judicial question arises the judicial depart- ment is not bound to desist from dealing therewith merely be- cause the alleged wrongdoer is the governor or a person acting by his direction.*] Delegating Legislative Powers. One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to any other body or authority. Where the sovereign power of the State has located the authority, there it must remain; and by the constitutional agency alone the laws must be made until the constitution itself is changed. The power to whose judgment, wisdom, and patriotism this high pre- rogative has been intrusted cannot relieve itself of the responsibility by choosing other agencies upon which the power shall be devolved, nor can it substitute the judgment, wisdom, and patriotism of any other body for those to which alone the people have seen fit to confide this sovereign trust.? AGOMATANE Wir Wil 05 10) Ts Ri: AL 7.96; State v. Boyd, 36 Neb. 181, 54 N. W. 252, 19 L. R. A. 227; State v. Brooks, 14 Wyo. 393, 84 Pac. 488, 6 L. R. A. (n. s.) 750, 7 Ann. Cas. 1108. In Minnesota it has been held that courts cannot, by injunction, man- damus, or other process, control or direct the head of the executive de- partment of the State in the discharge of any executive duty involving the exercise of his discretion; but that where duties purely ministerial in character are conferred upon the chief executive, or any member of the exec- utive department, and he refuses to act, or where he assumes to act in violation of the Constitution and laws of the State, he may be compelled to act or restrained from acting, as the case may be, at the suit of one who is injured thereby in his person or his property, for which he has no other adequate remedy. Chamberlain v. Sib- ley, 4 Minn. 309; Cooke v. Iverson, 108 Minn. 388, 122 N. W. 251, 52 L. R. A. (nN. 8.) 415, explaining or qualifying Rice v. Austin, 19 Minn. 103, 18 Am. Rep. 330; State ex rel. County Treasurer v. Dike, 20 Minn. 363; Western R. Co. v. De Graff, 27 Minn. 1, 6 N. W. 341; State v. Whit- comb, 28 Minn. 50, 8 N. W. 902, and State v. Braden, 40 Minn. 174, 41 N. W. 817. See also Hayne v. Metro- politan Trust Go., 67 Minn. 245, 69 N. W. 916; Higgins v. Berg, 74 Minn. 11, 76 Ni. Wi. 788; 42 1, Re Ae 2455 Davidson v. Hanson, 87 Minn. 211, 91 N. W. 1124, 92 N. W. 98; State v. Hanson, 93 Minn. 178, 100 N. W. 1124, 102 N. W. 209. 1 Hkern v. McGovern, 154 Wis. 157, 142 N. W. 595, 46 L. R. A. (N. s.) 796. The doctrine that a court will not reach the governor of the State, in the performance of his duties, or any one acting under his direction and by his authority in respect to any matters, applies only to acts within the scope of executive authority; outside thereof the principle of equality before the law renders him and his agents lable to judicial remedies the same as any other person, except in so far as the dignity of the place should, and does, protect him and them to some extent from coercive interference by judicial mandate. Ekern ». McGovern, 154 Wis. 157, 142 N. W. 595, 46 L. R. A. (n. s.) 796. 2 “These are the bounds which the trust that is put in them by the society, and the law of God and nature, haveCHAP. V] set to the legislative power of every Commonwealth, in all forms of gov- ernment : — “First. They are to govern by pro- mulgated established laws, not to be varied in particular cases, but to have one rule for rich and poor, for the favorite at court and the countryman at plough. “Secondly. These laws also ought to be designed for no other end ulti- mately but the good of the people. “Thirdly. They must not raise taxes on the property of the people without the consent of the people, given by themselves or their deputies. And this properly concerns only such governments where the legislative is always in being, or at least where the people have not reserved any part of the legislative to deputies, to be from time to time chosen by themselves. “Fourthly. The legislative neither must nor can transfer the power of making laws to anybody else, or place it anywhere but where the people have.”’ Locke on Civil Government, § 142. That legislative power cannot be delegated, see Thorne v. Cramer, 15 Barb. 112; Bradley v. Baxter, 15 Barb. 122; Barto v. Himrod, 8 N. Y. 483; People v. Stout, 23 Barb. 349; Rice v. Foster, 4 Harr. 479; Santo v. State, 2 Iowa, 165; Geebrick v. State, 5 Iowa, 491; State v. Beneke, 9 Iowa, 203; State v. Weir, 33 Iowa, 134, 11 Am. Rep. 115; People v. Collins, 3 Mich. 343; Railroad Company ». Commissioners of Clinton County, 1 Ohio St. 77; Parker v. Common- wealth, 6 Pa. St. 507; Commonwealth v. McWilliams, 11 Pa. St. 61; Maize v. State, 4 Ind. 342; Meshmeier v. State, 11 Ind. 482; State v. Parker, 26 Vt. 357; State v. Swisher, 17 Tex. 441; State v. Copeland, 3 R. I. 33; State v. Wilcox, 45 Mo. 458; Common- wealth v. Locke, 72 Pa. St. 491; Hx parte Wall, 48 Cal. 279; Willis ». Owen, 43 Tex. 41; Farnsworth Co. v. Lisbon, 62 Me. 451; Brewer Brick Co. v. Brewer, 62 Me. 62; State v. Hudson Co. Com’rs, 37 N. J. 12; Auditor v. Holland, 14 Bush, 147; State v. Simons, 32 Minn. 540, 21 N. W. 750; Planer v. Standard Oil Co., 284 Fed. 34; Barrow v. Bradley, VoL. 1—15 POWERS LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT MAY EXERCISE 225 190 Ky. 480, 227 S. W. 1016; Wyeth v. Cambridge, 200 Mass. 474, 86 N. E. 925, 23 L. R. A. (Nw. s.) 147, 128 Am. St. Rep. 439; Boston v. Chelsea, 212 Mass. 127, 98 N. E. 620; Merchants Exchange v. Knott, 212 Mo. 616, 111 S. W. 565; Nalley v. Home Ins. Co., 250 Mo. 452, 157 S. W. 769, Ann. Cas. 1915 A, 283; State v. Dudley, 182 N. C. 822, 109 S. E. 63; State v. Wetz, 40 N. D. 299, 168 N. W. 835, 5 A. L. R. 731; State v. Briggs, 45 Oreg. 366, 77 Pac. 750, 78 Pac. 361, 2 Ann. Cas. 424; State ex rel. Mueller v. Thomp- son, 149 Wis. 488, 137 N. W. 20, 43 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 339; State ex rel. Smith v. Outagamie County Board, 175 Wis. 253, 185 N. W. 184; State v. Lyons, 183 Wis. 107, 197 N. W. 578; People ». Brady, 271 Ill. 100, 110 N. E. 864, Ann. Cas. 1917 C, 1093; Board of Administration v. Miles, 278 Ill. 174, 115 N. E. 841; People ex rel. Gamber v. Sholem, 294 Ill. 204, 128 N. E. 377; State v. Keener, 78 Kan. 649, 97 Pac. 860, 19 L. R. A. (wv. s.) 615; Schaake ». Dolley, 85 Kan. 598, 118 Pac. 80, 37 L. R. A. (wn. s.) 877, Ann. Cas. 1913 A, 254; Barrow v. Bradley, 190 Ky. 480, 227 S. W. 1016; Com. v. Beaver Dam Coal Co., 194 Ky. 34, 237 S. W. 1086, 27 A. L. R. 920; State v. Butler, 105 Me. 91, 73 Atl. 560, 24 L. R. A. (nN. 8.) 744, 18 Ann. Cas. 484; State v. Gau- thier, 121 Me. 522, 118 Atl. 380, 26 A. L. R. 652; In re Opinion of the Justices, 239 Mass. 606, 133 N. E. 453; State v. Bates, 96 Minn. 110, 104 N. W. 709, 113 Am. St. Rep. 612; Williams v. Evans, 139 Minn. 32, 165 N. W. 495, L. R. A. 1918 F, 542; State v. Normand, 76 N. H. 541, 85 Atl. 899, Ann. Cas. 1913 E, 996; Hudspeth v. Swayze, 85 N. J. L. 592, 89 Atl. 780, Ann. Cas. 1916 A, 102; Insurance Co. of North America v. Welch, 49 Okla. 620, 154 Pac. 48, Ann. Cas. 1918 BE, 471; Ex parte Mode, 77 Tex. Crim. Rep. 432, 180 S. W. 708, Ann. Cas. 1918 E, 845; Sabre v. Rut- land R. Co., 86 Vt. 347, 85 Atl. 693, Ann. Cas. 1915 C, 1269; Sutherland v. Miller, 79 W. Va. 796, 91S. E. 993, L. R. A. 1917 D, 1040. In general as to delegation of legislative power, see Am. Bar Assoc. Journ. Vol. 9, p. 177. Upon the legislature the people226 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoOL. 1 have impliedly conferred authority to determine the exigencies or emer- gencies that warrant the exercise of police power to promote the general welfare of the citizens of the State; and it cannot redelegate to any one the ultimate right to determine when, to what extent, and under what cir- cumstances the power may properly be exercised in any given case. Suth- erland v. Miller, 79 W. Va. 796, 91S. E. 993, L. R. A. 1917 D, 1040. The legis- lature has no power to delegate to an administrative board or officer its exclusive power of determining what acts or omissions on the part of an indi- vidual are unlawful. Hz parte Pep- pers, 189 Cal. 682, 209 Pac. 896. An act of Congress authorizing maritime injuries within each State to be governed by the workmen’s compensation act of the State is an unconstitutional delegation of legisla- tive power. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149, 64 L. ed. 834, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 438. See also Washington v. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 68 L. ed. 646, 44 Sup. Ct. Rep. 302; Robins Dry Dock, etc., Co. v. Dahl, 266 U. S. 449, 69 L. ed. 372, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 157. Power of classification of towns and cities cannot be delegated. Jernigan v. Madisonville, 102 Ky. 3138, 43 S. W. 448, 39 L. R. A. 214. Nor power of taxation except as constitution ex- pressly authorizes. State v. Des Moines, 103 Iowa, 76, 72 N. W. 639, 39 L. R. A. 285. The legislature cannot delegate to an official the final authority to de- termine what shall be done to make factories and workshops sanitary. Schaezlein v. Cabaniss, 135 Cal. 466, 67 Pac. 755, 87 Am. St. 122; or the extent of a taking for waterworks. Stearns v. Barre, 73 Vt. 281, 50 Atl. 1086, 87 Am. St. 721. Statute imposing a penalty upon any carrier charging more than a reasonable rate without prescribing any means of determining what is such rate is void. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 99 Ky. 132, 35 S. W. 129, 33 L. R. A. 209, 59 Am. St. 457. Court cannot be empowered to pass upon propriety of incorporation of lands into a village. Re Application of North Milwaukee, 93 Wis. 616, 67 N. W. 1033, 33 L. R. A. 638. Insurance commissioner cannot be empowered to determine the form of standard insurance contract for the State. Dowling v. Lancashire Ins. Co., 92 Wis: 68, 65 Ni W.2788.3t L. R. A. 112; Anderson v. Manchester Fire As. Co., 59 Minn. 182, 63 N. W. 241, 28 L. R. A. 609; O’Neil v. Amer- ican Fire Ins. Co., 166 Pa. 72, 30 Atl. 945, 26 L. R. A. 715, 45 Am. St. 650. Law authorizing release from im- prisonment for drunkenness upon entry of recognizance that convict will take the “Jag Cure’’, and final discharge upon exhibition of certifi- cate of attendance and compliance with rules of the institution is void. Senate of Happy Home Club v. Alpena Co., 99 Mich. 117, 57 N. W. 1101, 23 L. R. A. 144. Where the legislature is directed to regulate the salaries of county clerks in proportion to duties per- formed, and a statute fixes their sala- ries, the legislature cannot authorize county boards to allow the clerks deputies. Dougherty v. Austin, 94 Cal. 601, 28 Pac. 834, 29 Pac. 1092, 16 L. R. A. 161, and note on delegation of legislative powers. Municipality cannot be authorized to modify the jurisdiction of courts. Vesta Mills v. Charleston, 60 S. C. 1, 38 S. E. 226. Right of initiative and referendum cannot be conferred on people of a municipality in respect even of municipal affairs. Elliott v. Detroit, 121 Mich. 611, 84 N. W. 820. For a statute held to be unconsti- tutional in that it delegated a legis- lative function to the Court of Claims, see Williamsburg Say. Bank v. State, 211 N. Y. Supp. 420. An act con- ferring upon the Secretary of State unlimited power to employ agents and incur expense, is unconstitutional. State ex rel. Fargo v. Wetz, 40 N. D. 299, 168 N. W. 835, 5 A. L. R. 731. The terms and conditions upon which corporations may be created, the powers and capital stock they may have, the purposes for which they may increase their capital stock, and theCHAP. V] POWERS LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT MAY EXERCISE 227 It is not always essential that a legislative act should be a com- pleted statute which must in any event take effect as law, at the time it leaves the hands of the legislative department. A statute may be conditional, and its taking effect may be made to depend upon some subsequent event. conditions and limitations thereof are exclusively matters for legislative action, which cannot be delegated. State v. Great Northern R. Co., 100 Minn. 445, 111 N. W. 289, 10 L. R. A. (nN. 8.) 250. A State statute which attempts to make the substantive law of the State in certain particulars change auto- matically so as to conform to new enactments from time to time made by Congress and new regulations issued pursuant to their authority by subsidiary executive or administra- tive officers of the United States, is an unconstitutional delegation of legis- lative power. Jn re Opinion of Jus- tices, 239 Mass. 606, 133 N. E. 453. A Maine statute which adopted as part of the State law the definition of “intoxicating liquor” contained in a Federal statute (Volstead Act) not then enacted, was held unconstitu- tional in that it undertook to delegate general legislative power. State v. Gauthier, 121 Me. 522, 118 Atl. 380, 26 A. L. R. 652. But in Pennsylvania a substantially similar statute was held not to be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. Com. v. Alderman, 275 Pa. St. 483, 119 Atl. 551. For other cases denying right to delegate legislative power, see Brad- shaw v. Lankford, 73 Md. 428, 21 Atl. 66, 11 L. R. A. 582, 25 Am. St. 602; Owensboro & N. R. Co. ». Todd, 91 Ky. 175, 15S. W. 56, 11 L. R. A. 285; Arms v. Ayer, 192 Ill. 601, 61 N. E. 851, 85 Am. St. 357. 1 Brig Aurora v. United States, 7 Cranch, 382, 3 L. ed. 378; Bull »v. Read, 13 Gratt. 78; State v. Parker, 26 Vt. 357; Peck v. Weddell, 17 Ohio St. 271; State v. Kirkley, 29 Md. 85; Walton v. Greenwood, 60 Me. 356; Baltimore v. Clunet, 23 Md. 449; Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U. S. 364, 51 L. ed. 523, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 367; Chicago ». Washingto- Affirmative legislation may in nian Home, 289 Ill. 206, 124 N. E. 416, 6 A. L. R. 1584; McPherson v. State, 174 Ind. 60, 9Q N. E. 610, 31 L. R. A. (nx. s.) 188; Booth »v. State, 179 Ind. 405, 100 N. E. 563, L. R. A. 1915 B, 420, Ann. Cas. 1915 D, 987; Com. ». Beaver Dam Coal Co., 194 Ky. 34, 237, S: WW. 1086; 27% Ay LL; Re.920) Opinions of the Justices, 160 Mass. 586, 36 N. BE. 488, 23 L. R. A. 113; Elwell v. Comstock, 99 Minn. 261, 109 N. W. 113, 698, 7 L. R. A. (wv. s:) 621, 9 Ann. Cas. 270; Hudspeth »v. Swayze, 85 N. J. L. 592, 89 Atl. 780, Ann. Gas. 1916 A, 102; People v. Kennedy, 207 N. Y. 533, 101 N. E. 442, Ann. Cas. 1914 C, 616; State v. Crawford, 36 N. D. 385, 162 N. W. 710, Ann. Cas. 1917 E, 955; Ex parte Mode, 77 Tex. Crim. Rep. 4382, 180 S. W. 708, Ann. Cas. 1918 E, 845; Minne- apolis, etc., R. Co. v. Railroad Com- mission, 136 Wis. 146, 116 N. W. 905, WW die Re eAS i(Ne (S:)) S28) Stately: Frear, 142 Wis. 320, 125 N. W. 961, 20 Ann. Cas. 633; State ex rel. Mueller v. Thompson, 149 Wis. 488, 137 N. W. 20, 43 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 339, Ann. Cas. 1913 C, 774; State ex rel. Board of Regents of Normal Schools ». Zim- merman, 183 Wis. 132, 197 N. W. 823. “The division of governmental powers into executive, legislative, and judicial while of great importance in the creation or organization of a State and from the viewpoint of institutional law and otherwise, is not an exact classification. No such exact delimi- nation of governmental powers is possible. In the process of enacting a law there is frequently necessary the preliminary determination of a fact or group of facts by the legislature ; and it is well settled that the legisla- ture may declare the general rule of law to be in force and take effect upon the subsequent establishment of the facts necessary to make it operative, or to call for its application.” Minne- apolis, etc., R. Co. v. Railroad Com-228 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I some cases be adopted, of which the parties interested are at liberty to avail themselves or not at their option. A private act of incor- poration cannot be forced upon the corporators; they may refuse the franchise if they so choose.! In these cases the legislative act is regarded as complete when it has passed through the constitutional formalities necessary to perfected legislation, notwithstanding its actually going into operation as law may depend upon its subsequent acceptance. [The maxim that power conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated to any other authority does not pre- clude the legislature from delegating any power not legislative which it may itself rightfully exercise.2 It may confer an authority mission, 136 Wis. 146, 116 N. W. 905, ie ts) Rs VAS (N; 'S5))) S21= See also Monroe v. Withycombe, 84 Oreg. 328, 165 Pac. 231. “Where an act is clothed with all the forms of law, and is complete in and of itself, it may be provided that it shall become operative only upon some certain act or event, or, in like manner, that its operation shall be sus- pended; and the fact of such act or event, in either case, may be made to depend upon the ascertainment of it by some other department, body, or officer, which is essentially an adminis- trative act.” Dowling v. Lancashire Fire Ins. Co., 92 Wis. 63, 65 N. W. 738. See also Arms v, Ayer, 192 II]. 601, 61 N. E. 851, 85 Am. St. Rep. 357. It is not a delegation of legislative power to make the repeal of a charter depend upon the failure of the corpora- tion to make up a deficiency which is to be ascertained and determined by a tribunal provided by the repealing act. Lothrop v. Stedman, 42 Conn. 583. See Crease v. Babcock, 23 Pick. 334, 344. Nor to refer the question of extending municipal boundaries to a court where issues may be formed and disputed facts tried. Burlington v. Leebrick, 48 Iowa, 252; Wahoo ov. Dickinson, 23 Neb. 426, 36 N. W. 813. But a court cannot be authorized to create a municipal corporation upon petition of a majority of the inhab- itants of the territory to be incorpo- rated. Terr. v. Stewart, 1 Wash. 98, 23 Pac. 405, 8 L. R. A. 106. It is competent to make an act take effect on condition that those applying for it shall erect a station at a place named. State v. New Haven, &c. Co., 43 Conn. 351. An act taxing corporations of another State doing business within the State as its corporations are taxed in such other State is not an abandon- ment of legislative functions. The law is complete; its operation, con- tingent. Home Ins. Co. v. Swigert, 104 Il. 653; Phoenix Ins. Co. »: Welch, 29 Kan. 672. Contra, Clark v. Mobile, 67 Ala. 217. Statute may require railroad to construct cattle-guards when demand therefor is made by owners of lands through which railroad runs. Bir- mingham M. R. Co. v. Parsons, 100 Ala. 662, 13 So. 602, 27 L. R. A. 268, 46 Am. St. 92. 1 Angell and Ames on Corp. § 81. But in Kentucky it has been held that a statute providing that certain classes of employers shall provide washrooms for their employees after a certain per cent of the employees decide by a vote to notify the em- ployer to erect a washroom, violates a constitutional provision that “no law . shall be enacted to take effect upon the approval of any other au- thority than the General Assembly.” Com. v. Beaver Dam Coal Co., 194 Ky. 34, 237 S. W. 1086, 27 A. L. R. 920. 2 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U.S. 194, 56 L. ed. 729, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 436; Parke v. Bradley, 204 Ala. 455, 86CHAP. V] POWERS LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT MAY EXERCISE 229 in relation to the execution of a law which may involve discretion, but such authority must be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. ‘The legislature must declare the policy of the law and fix the legal principles which are to control in given cases; but an So. 28; Bailey v. Van Pelt, 78 Fla. 337, 353, 82 So. 789; Hunter v. Colfax Consol. Coal Co., 175 Iowa, 245, 154 N. W. 1037, 157 N. W. 145, L. R. A. 1917 D, 15, Ann. Cas. 1917 B, 803; Hurst v. Warner, 102 Mich. 238, 60 N. W. 440, 47 Am. St. Rep. 525, 26 L. R. A. 484; State ex rel. Chicago, ete., R. Co. v. Public Service Com- mission, 94 Wash. 274, 162 Pac. 523; Minneapolis, etc., R. Co., v. Wisconsin R. Commission, 136 Wis. 146, 116 N. W. 905, 17 L. R. A. (w. s.) 821; State ex rel. Smith v. Outagamie County Board, 175 Wis. 253, 185 N. W. 184. 1 Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 693, 36 L. ed. 294, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 495; Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364, 51 L. ed. 523, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 367; Cosmos Exploration Co. v. Great Eagle Oil Co., 190 U. S. 301, 309, 47 L. ed. 1064, 1070, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 692, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 860; Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. ». Stranahan, 214 U. S. 320, 53 L. ed. 1013, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 671; Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. Co., 240 U. S. 1, 60 L. ed. 493, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 236, L. R. A. 1917 D, 414, Ann. Cas. 1917 B, 713; Schaezlein v. Cabaniss, 135 Cal. 466, 67 Pac. 755, 87 Am. St. Rep. 122, 56 L. R. A. 733; Hewitt v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 148 Cal. 590, 84 Pac. 39, 113 Am. St. Rep. 315, 3 L. R. A. (w. s.) 896, 7 Ann. Cas. 750; Arms v. Ayer, 192 Ill. 601, 61 N. E. 851, 85 Am. St. Rep. 357, 58 L. R. A. 277; Klafter v. State Board of Examiners of Architects, 259 Ill. 15, 102 N. E. 193, 46 L. R. A. (N. s.) 532, Ann. Cas. 1914 B, 1221; Chicago v. Washingtonian Home, 289 Ill. 206, 124 N. E. 416, 6 A. L. R. 1584; People ex rel. Gamber v. Sholem, 294 Ill. 204, 128 N. E. 377; Walker v. Towle, 156 Ind. 639, 59 N. E. 20, 53 L. R. A. 749; Arnett v. State, 168 Ind. 180, 80 N. E. 153, 8 L. R. A. @. s.) 1192; Hubbell v. Higgins, 148 Iowa, 36, 126 N. W. 914, Ann. Cas. 1912 B, 822; Hunter v. Colfax Consol. Coal Co., 175 Iowa, 245, 154 N. W. 1037, 157 N. W. 145, L. R. A. 1917 D, 15, Ann. Cas. 1917 E, 803; Welch v. Swasey, 193 Mass. 364, 79 N. E. 745, 118 Am. St. Rep. 523, 23 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 1160; State v. Great Northern R. Co. 100 Minn. 445, 111 N. W. 289, 10 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 250; Williams v. Evans, 139 Minn. 32, 165 N. W. 495, 166 N. W. 504, i. Re Av 1918 By 5425 “Reopleye: Klinck Packing Co., 214 N. Y. 121, 108 N. E. 278; People v. Beakes Dairy Co., 222 N. Y. 416, 119 N. E. 115, 3 A. L. R. 1260; Merkle ». Paschkes, 123 App. Div. 203, 204 N. Y. Supp. 102; State ex rel. Linde »v. Taylor, 33 N. D. 76, 156 N. W. 561, L. R. A. 1918 B, 156, Ann. Cas. 1918 A, 583; Cincinnati, ete., R. Co. »v. Commissioners of Clinton County, 1 Ohio St. 77, 88; Winslow »v. Fleisch- ner, 112 Oreg. 23, 228 Pac. 101, 34 A. L. R. 826; Dowling v. Lancashire Ins. Co., 92 Wis. 63, 65 N. W. 738, 31 L. R. A. 112; Bay City First Nat. Bank v. Fellows, 244 U. S. 416, 61 L. ed. 1233, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 734, L. R. A. 1918 C, 283, Ann. Cas. 1918 D, 1169; Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. United States, 293 Fed. 8. “The legislature may not delegate the power to enact a law, or to declare what the law shall be, or to exercise an unrestricted discretion in applying a law; but it may enact a law com- plete in itself, designed to accomplish a general public purpose, and may expressly authorize designated officials within definite valid limitations to provide rules and regulations for the complete operation and enforcement of the law within its expressed general purpose. ‘This principle of the law is peculiarly applicable to regulations under the police power, since the com- plex and ever-changing conditions that attend and affect such matters make it impracticable for the legislature to230 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I administrative officer or body may be invested with the power to ascertain the facts and conditions to which the policy and principles apply. If this could not be done there would be infinite confusion in the laws, and in an effort to detail and to particularize, they would miss sufficiency both in provision and execution.! prescribe all necessary rules and regu- lations.”” Bailey v. Van Pelt, 78 Fla. 337, 82 So. 789. “The legislature may, without violating any rule or principle of the Constitution, confer upon an adminis- trative board or officer a large measure of discretion, provided the exercise thereof is guided and controlled by rules prescribed therefor.’ People »v. Monterey Fish Products Co., 195 Cal. 548, 234 Pac. 398, 38 A. L. R. 1186. A court may be authorized to direct in what manner its writs shall be served and what notice shall be given. State v. Adams Express Co., 66 Minn. 271, 68 N. W. 1085, 38 L. R. A. 225. A statute authorizing a particular officer to pass upon the question of character, to determine the granting of license is not a delegation of legis- lative power. Delegation of power to determine who are within the oper- ation of the law is not a delegation of legislative power. State v. Thompson, 160 Mo. 333, 60 S. W. 1077, 83 Am. St. 468, 54 L. R. A. 950. So statu- tory delegation of power to incor- porated medical societies to appoint medical examiners to examine and pass upon the fitness of applicants for license to practice medicine is not invalid. Scholle v. State, 90 Md. 729, 46 Atl. 326, 50 L. R. A. 411. See also People v. Witte, 315 Ill. 282, 146 N. E. 178, 37 A. L. R. 672. But it has been held that the legislature is without power to delegate authority to any person or board to grant or refuse a license at his or its discretion, arbi- trarily or capriciously, according to the state of mind of such officer or the persons composing such board. Welch v. Maryland Casualty Co., 47 Okla. 293, 147 Pac. 1046, L. R. A. 1915 E, 708. An Ohio statute committing to a certain officer the duty of issuing a license to one desiring to act as an engineer if “found trustworthy and competent”? was declared invalid be- cause, as the court said, no standard was furnished by the general assembly as to qualification, and no specification as to wherein the applicant should be trustworthy and competent, but all was left to the opinion, finding, and caprice of the examiner. Harmon ». State, 66 Ohio St. 249, 64 N. E. 117, 53 L. R. A. 618. 1 Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470, 48 L. ed. 525, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 349; Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U. S. 364, 51 L. ed. 523, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 367; Monongahela Bridge Co. v. United States, 216 U. S. 177, 54 L. ed. 435, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 356; United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 55 L. ed. 563, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 480; Interstate Commerce Com- mission v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U.S. 194, 56 L. ed. 729, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 436; Mutual Film Corporation v. Industrial Commission, 236 U. S. 230, 59 L. ed. 552, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 387; Mutual Film Corporation v. Hodges, 236 U. S. 248, 59 L. ed. 561, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 393; Sears v. Federal Trade Commission, 169 C. C. A. 323, 258 Fed. 307, 6 A. L. R. 358; State v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 56 Fla. 617, 47 So. 969, 32 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 689; Arnett v. State, 168 Ind. 180, 80 N. E. 153, 8 L. R. A. (W. s.) 1192; Schaake v. Dolley, 85 Kan. 598, 118 Pac. 80, 37 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 877, Ann. Cas. 1913 A, 254; People v. Brazee, 183 Mich. 259, 149 N. W. 1053, L. R. A. 1916 E, 1146; Rock v, Carney, 216 Mich. 280, 185 N. W. 798, 22 A. L. R. 1178; Elwell v. Comstock, 99 Minn. 261, 109 N. W. 113, 698, 7 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 621, 9 Ann. Cas. 270; Williams v. Evans, 139 Minn. 32, 165 N. W. 495, 166 N. W. 504, L. R. A. 1918 F, 542; Saratoga Springs v. Saratoga Gas, ete., Co., 191 N. Y. 123, 83 N. E. 693, 18 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 718, 14 Ann. Cas. 606; Insur- ance Co. of North America v. Welch, 49 Okla. 620, 154 Pac. 48, Ann. Cas.CHAP. V] POWERS LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT MAY EXERCISE 231 Boards and commissions now play an important part in the administration of our laws. The great social and industrial evolu- tion of the past century, and the many demands made upon our legislatures by the increasing complexity of human activities, have made essential the creation of these administrative bodies and the delegation to them of certain powers. Though legislative power cannot be delegated to boards and commissions,‘ the legislature may delegate to them administrative functions in carrying out the 1918 E, 471; State v. Briggs, 45 Oreg. 366, 77 Pac. 750, 78 Pac. 361, 2 Ann. Cas. 424; State ex rel. Board of Regents of Normal Schools v. Zimmer- man, 183 Wis. 132, 197 N. W. 823. “Tt has been well said that to deny to the legislature the right to delegate the power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the enforce- ment of an enactment depends would stop the wheels of government and bring about confusion, if not paralysis, in the conduct of the public business.” Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U. S. 364, 383, 51 L. ed. 528, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 367; Schaake v. Dolley, 85 Kan. 598, 118 Pac. 80, 37 L. R. A. (x. s.) 877, Ann. Cas. 1913 A, 254. Said an eminent judge: “The legis- lature cannot delegate its power to make a law; but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action depend. To deny this would be to stop the wheels of government. There are many things upon which wise and useful legislation must de- pend, which cannot be known to the law-making power, and must, there- fore, be a subject of inquiry and determination outside of the halls of legislation.”’ Agnew, J., in Locke’s Appeal, 72 Pa. St. 491, 498. This language was quoted with approval in the following cases: Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 694, 36 L. ed. 294, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 495; United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506, 520, 55 L. ed. 563, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 480, 484; Bailey v. Van Pelt, 78 Fla. 337, 82 So. 789, 794; Winslow »v. Fleischner, 101 Oreg. 23, 228 Pac. 101, 34 A. L. R. 826; Dowling v. Lancashire Ins. Co., 92 Wis. 63, 65 N. W. 738. See also Welch ». Swasey, 214 U. S. 91, 53 L. ed. 923, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 567; Williams ». Evans, 139 Minn. 32, 165 N. W. 4985, L. R. A. 1918 F, 542; Merchants Ex- change v. Knott, 212 Mo. 616, 111 S. W. 565; Eubank v. Richmond, 110 Va. 749, 753, 67 S. E. 376; State ex rel. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 94 Wash. 274, 162 Pac. 523. 1 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U. S. 194, 214, 56 L. ed. 729, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 436; State v. Billot, 154 La. 402, 97 So. 589; Merchants Exchange ». Knott, 212 Mo. 616, 111 S. W. 565; State v. Orange, 60 N. J. L. 111, 36 Atl. 707; People v. Klinck Packing Con 214ONE Ye L208 N. E. 278, affirming 164 App. Div. 97, 149 IN@ Ye Supp. 504; Winslow v. Fleischner, 112 Oreg. 23, 228 Pac. 101, 34 A. L. R. 826; Klein v. Barry, 182 Wis. 255, 196 N. W. 457; State v. Lyons, 183 Wis. 107, 197 N. W. 578. The legislature cannot delegate au- thority to an administrative board to change a general law for all the people of the commonwealth, where it has no local or special reason for seeking the aid of such a board. Wyeth v. Board of Health, 200 Mass. 474, 86 N. E. 925, 23 L. R. A. (WN. s.) 147, 128 Am. St. Rep. 439. Board of health cannot be authorized to make general rules concerning compulsory vaccination. State v. Burdge, 95 Wis. 390, 70 N. W. 347, 37 L. R. A. 157, 60 Am. St. 123. The legislature cannot delegate the power to fix penalties to a Board of Harbor Commissioners. Board of Harbor Commissioners v. Excelsior Redwood Co., 88 Cal. 491, 26 Pac. 375.232 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I purposes of a statute and various governmental powers for the more efficient administration of the laws.? “The suspension of a statute is a legislative act, unless based upon some condition, contingency, exigency, or state of facts, 1 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U. S. 194, 56 L. ed. 729, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 436; Bay City First Nat. Bank v. Fellows, 244 U.S. 416, 61 L. ed. 1233, 37 Sup. @t. Rep: 734, L. R. A: 1918 C, 283; Ann. Cas. 1918 D, 1169; Roebuck & Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 258 Fed. 307; Liberty Highway Co. ». Michigan Public Utilities Commission, 294 Fed. 703; Parke v. Bradley, 204 Ala. 455, 86 So. 28; Haddad ». State, 23 Ariz. 105, 201 Pac. 847; Clen- daniel v. Conrad, 3 Boyce (Del.) 549, 83 Atl. 1036, Ann. Cas. 1915 B, 968; State v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 56 Fla. 617, 47 So. 969, 32 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 689; People v. Roth, 249 II. 532, 94 N. BE. 953, Ann. Cas. 1912 A, 100; People ex rel. First Nat. Bank v. Brady, 271 Ill. 100, 110 N. E. 864, Ann. Cas. 1917 C, 1093; Durand ». Dyson, 271 Ill. 382, 111 N. E. 143, Ann. Cas. 1917 D, 84; Chicago, etc., R. Co., v. Cavanaugh, 278 Ill. 609, 116 N. E. 128; Public Service Co. v. Recktenwald, 290 Ill. 314, 125 N. E. 271,8 A. L. R. 466; In re McGee, 105 Kan. 574, 185 Pac. 14,8 A. L. R. 831; State Racing Commission v. Latonia Agricultural Ass’n, 1386 Ky. 173, AZ Ss We OSGi 2D line. AL! (. s.) 905; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Lyons, 155 Ky. 396, 159 S. W. 971, 48 L. R. A. (n. s.) 667; State Board of Charities & Corrections v. Hays, 190 Ky. 147, 227 S. W. 282; State v. Board of Trustees, 117 La. 1071, 42 So. 506, 8 Ann. Cas. 945; Railroad Commissioners v. Port- land, etc., R. Co., 63 Me. 269, 18 Am. Rep. 208; McKenny v. Farnsworth, 121 Me. 450, 118 Atl. 237; Com. v. Sisson, 189 Mass. 247, 75 N. E. 619, LOS AmrStashepy 630) i) ii R.A’ (N. 8s.) 752; Rock v. Carney, 216 Mich. 280, 185 N. W. 798, 22 A. L. R. 1178; Elwell v. Comstock, 99 Minn. 261, 109 N. W. 113, 698, 7 L. R. A. (N. s.) 621, 9 Ann. Cas. 270; State ex rel. Dybdal v. State Securities Commission, 145 Minn. 221, 176 N. W. 759; Ex parte Fritz, 86 Miss. 210, 38 So. 722, 109 Am. St. Rep. 700; Bailey v. Wilson, 128 Miss. 49, 90 So. 362; State ez rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. ». Public Service Commission (Mo.), 233 S. W. 425; Public Service Com- mission v. St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co., 301 Mo. 157, 256 S. W. 226; State v. Normand, 76 N. H. 541, 85 Atl. 899, Ann. Cas. 1913 E, 996; Sara- toga Springs v. Saratoga Gas, etc., Co., 191 N. Y. 123, 83 N. E. 693, 18 L. R. A. (N. s.) 713; People v. Klinck Packing Co., 214 N. Y. 121, 108 N. E. 278; People v. Beakes Dairy Co., 222 N. Y. 416, 119 N. E.115,3 A. L. R. 1260; Watkinson v. Hotel Pennsyl- vania, 195 App. Div. 624, 187 N. Y. Supp. 278; In re McAneny, 198 App. Div. 205, 190 N. Y. Supp. 92; State v. Dudley, 182 N. C. 822, 109 S. EB. 63; Hopper v. Oklahoma County, 43 Okla. 288, 143 Pac. 4, L. R. A. 1915 B, 875; Portland Fish Co. v. Benson, 56 Oreg. 147, 108 Pac. 122; Stettler v. O'Hara, 69 Oreg. 519, 139 Pac. 743, L. R. A. 1917 C, 944, Ann. Cas. 1916 A, 217; State v. Gates, 104 Oreg. 112, 206 Pac. 863 ; Woods». State, 130 Tenn. 100, 169 S. W. 558, L. R. A. 1915 F, 531; State v. Eldridge, 71 Vt. 374, 45 Atl. 753; Sabre v. Rutland R. Co., 86 Vt. 347, 85 Atl. 698, Ann. Cas. 1915 GC, 1269; State ex rel. Criswell v. Board of Trustees, 93 Wash. 468, 161 Pac. 361; State v. Frear, 146 Wis. 291, 131 N. W. 832, 34 L: R. A. (w. s.) 480: Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 133 N. W. 209, 37 L. R. A. (Nn. 8.) 489; State v. Johnson, 170 Wis. 218, 175 N. W. 589; (7 A; 1. R. 1617; Cityzo8 Milwaukee »v. Railroad Commission, 182 Wis. 498, 196 N. W. 853; State v. Lyons, 183 Wis. 107, 197 N. W. 578. ““Our whole system of legislative super- vision through the railroad commis- sioners acting as a State police over railroads is founded upon the theory that the public duties devolved upon railroad corporations by their charter are ministerial, and therefore liable toCHAP. V] be thus enforced.” Railroad Com- missioners v. Portland, &c. R. R. Co., 63 Me. 269, 18 Am. Rep. 208. “Tt is generally established at this time that the legislature may enact a law which is complete in itself, having for its aim the accomplishment of some general public purpose, and may, in order to secure the just and equitable operation of the law thus enacted, delegate the power within definite and valid limitations to make necessary investigations, determine preliminary facts, and prescribe suitable rules and regulations intended to accomplish the operation and enforcement of the law in accordance with the express legis- lative will. A familiar illustration of the exercise of this power is where the legislature enacts a law prescribing that rates for services by railroads and other common carriers shall be reason- able, and creates a board or commis- sion with power to investigate and fix rates for such services, subject to re- view by the courts. The reasoning of the opinions is usually based upon the extensive and complex character of the business, involving a multitude of detail, and requiring expert knowledge to intelligently conduct the numerous separate investigations and the neces- sity for frequent changes and adjust- ments in the rates and services, which would render it impossible for the legislature to acquire the necessary information and to fix just and reason- able rates applicable to the varying conditions and circumstances. Direct legislative control has been tried and abandoned because found impossible, for the reason that the business of the common carrier has grown and ex- tended and become such a large and indispensable factor in our complicated social and economic life that the cum- bersome methods of direct action is no longer adequate or possible.” Insur- ance Co. of North America v. Welch, 49 Okla. 620, 154 Pac. 48, Ann. Cas. 1918 BH, 471. See also Georgia R. R. etc., Co. v. Smith, 70, Ga. 694. In Saratoga Springs v. Saratoga Gas, etc., Co., 191 N. Y. 123, 83 N. BE 693, 18 L. R. A. n. s. 713, there was involved the constitutionality of a statute creating a commission to regu- POWERS LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT MAY EXERCISE 233 late the price to be charged for service by gas and electric light companies. After an elaborate review of authori- ties, it was held that fixing the maxi- mum rates of carriers and _ public service corporations was a proper ex- ercise of the police power of the State vested in the Legislature, but that this power was not so inherently or exclu- sively legislative that the legislature might not, in the exercise of its plenary powers and in the absence of any express limitation by the Federal or State Constitution, delegate to and confer upon other branches of the State government the duty not only of executing a law enacted for the pur- pose of regulating rates, but of deter- mining its application to particular cases and the formulating of rules for its exercise. Full recognition, how- ever, was given of the principle that conceding that the legislature might commit to an administrative board the power to fix a tariff of rates the statute must prescribe some standard by which action of the board should be governed, and it was held that this essential qualification was observed in the statute in question by providing that the rates to be fixed by the board must be ‘‘within the limits prescribed by law’? which required that they must be ‘‘reasonable” and not arbi- trary, and that this was a sufficient standard. See also Idaho Power & Light Co. v. Blomquist, 26 Idaho, 222, 141 Pac. 1083, Ann. Cas. 1916 B, 282; State Public Utilities Commission »v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 275 Ill. 555, 114 N. E. 325, Ann. Cas. 1917 C, 50; State ex rel. Webster v. Superior Court, 67 Wash. 37, 120 Pac. 861, Ann. Cas. 1913 D, 78; Minneapolis, ete., R. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 136 Wis. 146, 116 N. W. 905, 17 L. R. A. (w. s.) 821. In creating an administrative board to apply to the details of rate schedules the regulatory police power of the State, the legislature, to prevent its being a pure delegation of legislative power, must enjoin upon it a certain course of procedure and certain rules of decision in the performance of its function. If the board is required as a condition precedent to an order, to make a finding of facts, the validity of234 the order must rest upon the needed finding. Wichita R., ete., Co. ». Public Utilities Commission, 260 U.S. 48, 67 L. ed. 124, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 51. An act conferring powers on a public service commission is valid against the objection that it is a delegation of legis- lative functions, where the power to be exercised by the commission consists simply in the ascertainment of facts on which the general rule of the legis- lature and of the Constitution that reasonable rates shall be adopted, operates. Hunter v. Colfax Consol. Coal Co., 175 Iowa, 245, 154 N. W. 1037, 157 N. W. 145, L. R. A. 1917 D, 15, Ann. Cas. 1917 E, 803. A statute conferring on a transit commission authority to determine by which of two routes a subway tunnel shall be constructed, is not an unconstitutional delegation of legisla- tive power. Codman »v. Crocker, 203 Mass. 146, 89 N. E. 177, 25 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 980. It is within the power of the legisla- ture to create a State insurance board, and to require every fire, tornado, and plate glass insurance company and every insurance company granting insurance against the liability of em- ployees to file with said board a sched- ule of rates charged by it for such risks, and to prohibit a change in such rates except after ten days’ notice to said board of such contemplated change, and authorizing said board, when it shall determine that any rate is exces- Sive or unreasonably high, or that said rate is inadequate to the safety or soundness of the company granting the same, to direct said company to file a higher or lower rate, commensu- rate with the risk and further requir- ing that in every case the rate shall be reasonable, when provision is made for a review of orders of said board by the courts. Insurance Co. of North America v. Welch, 49 Okla. 620, 154 Pac. 48, Ann. Cas. 1918 BE, 471. “The Congress may not delegate its purely legislative power to a com- mission, but, having laid down the general rules of action under which a commission shall proceed, it may re- quire of that commission the applica- tion of such rules to particular situa- CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I tions and the investigation of facts, with a view to making orders in a par- ticular matter within the rules laid down by the Congress.” Interstate Commerce Commission ». Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U. S. 194, 214, 56 L. ed. 729, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 436; Roe- buck & Co. v. Federal Trade Com- mission, 258 Fed. 307, 312. See also State v. Dudley, 182 N. C. 822, 109 S. E. 63; State v. Lyons, 183 Wis. 107, 197 N. W. 578. The legislature may, in the exercise of the police power, create ministerial boards, with power to prescribe rules and impose penalties for their viola- tion and provide for the collection of such penalties, and the exercise of this power by the legislature is not a dele- gation of legislative power. People ex rel. Barmore v. Robertson, 302 Ill. 422, 134 N. BE. 815, 22 A. L. R. 835. Under a general statute giving to the State department of health power to restrict and suppress contagious and infectious diseases, such depart- ment has authority to designate such diseases as are contagious and infec- tious, and the law is not void for this reason on the ground that it delegates legislative power. People ex rel. Bar- more v. Robertson, 302 Ill. 422, 134 N. E. 815, 22 A. L. R. 835; Ez parte McGee, 105 Kan. 574, 185 Pac. 14, J NG Ibe, 18, SRY. In the exercise of its right to regu- late the increase of the capital stock of railway corporations the legislature may enact a statute providing gener- ally for what purposes and upon what terms, conditions, and limitations an increase of capital stock may be made, and confer upon a commission the duty of supervising any proposed increase. It may also delegate to the commission the duty of finding the facts in each particular case, and authorize and require it, if it finds the existence of facts that bring the case within the statute, to allow the proposed increase ; otherwise, to refuse it. Any statute, however, which attempts to authorize the commission in its judgment to allow an increase of capital stock for such purposes and on such terms as it may deem advisable, or in its discre- tion to refuse it, would be unconstitu-CHAP. V] POWERS LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT MAY EXERCISE 2d declared by the legislative enactment to be sufficient to warrant the suspension by an executive or administrative body whose duty it is to execute or administer the law suspended.”’ 1 Under express constitutional provisions, in some jurisdictions, the power of sus- pending statutes can be exercised only by the legislature, or by its authority.2. A constitutional provision restricting the power of suspension to the legislature is not violated by the suspension of an act upon a contingency, when such suspension is expressly pro- vided for in the act itself.*] We have elsewhere spoken of municipal corporations, and of the powers of legislation which may be and commonly are bestowed upon them, and the bestowal of which is not to be considered as trenching upon the maxim that legislative power must not be delegated, since that maxim is to be under- stood in the light of the immemorial practice of this country and of England, which has always recognized the propriety and policy of vesting in the municipal organizations certain powers of local regulation, in respect to which the parties immediately interested tional, as an attempt to delegate legis- lative power. State v. Great North- ern R. Co., 100 Minn. 445, 111 N. W. 289, 10 L. R. A. (wN. s.) 250. A Federal statute empowering the Secretary of Labor to deport aliens convicted of certain charges if after hearing he should find such aliens are “undesirable residents of the United States’, was held not to be an uncon- stitutional delegation of legislative authority, as our history has created a common understanding of the words “undesirable residents’? which gives them the quality of a recognized stand- ard. Mahler v. Eby, 264 U. S. 32, 44 Sup. Ct. Rep. 283, 68 L. ed. 549. The legislature may create an ad- ministrative body and empower it to investigate conditions existing in the mining industry, make findings and reports, and establish rules with reference to the operation thereof, designed, among other purposes, to promote the health and safety of employees and the continuity of pro- duction, so long as the regulations are reasonable and not upon some special ground obnoxious to constitutional provisions. State ex rel. Court of Industrial Relations v. Howat, 107 Kan. 423, 191 Pac. 585. A commission may be empowered to select a site for a public building. People v. Dunn, 80 Cal. 211, 22 Pac. 140; Terr. v. Scott, 3 Dak. 357, 20 N. W. 401. 1 Winslow v. Fleischner, 112 Oreg. 23, 228 Pac. 101, 34 A. L. R. 826. A statute exempting from the appli- cation of the hours of rest law certain employees, “if the Commissioner of Labor in his discretion approves ”’, is unconstitutional, as it vests the Com- missioner with power wholly at his volition to suspend the operation of the statute. People v. Klinck Packing Go. 214 N. Y. 121, 108 N. B3)278; Ann. Cas. 1916 D, 1051. Permitting city councils upon peti- tion of specified portion of voters of respective cities to suspend certain penalties of a prohibitory liquor law is not a delegation of legislative powers, nor is it an infringement of the par- doning power of the executive. State ». Forkner, 94 Iowa, 1, 62 N. W. 572, 28 L. R. A. 206. 2McPherson v. State, 174 Ind. 60, 90 N. E. 610, 31 L. R. A. (w. s.) 188; Ex parte Smythe, 56 Tex. Crim. Rep. 375, 120 S. W. 200, 133 Am. St. Rep. 976, 23 L. R. A. (w. s.) 854; Ex parte Mode, 77 Tex. Crim. Rep. 482, 180 S. W. 708, Ann. Cas. 1918 E, 345. 3 Hx parte Mode, 77 Tex. Crim. Rep. 432, 180 S. W. 708, Ann. Cas. 1918 E, 845.236 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VvoL. I may fairly be supposed more competent to judge of their needs than any central authority. As municipal organizations are mere auxil- ‘aries of the State government in the important business of mu- nicipal rule, the legislature may create them at will from its own views of propriety or necessity, and without consulting the parties interested; and it also possesses the like power to abolish them, without stopping to inquire what may be the desire of the corpora- tors on that subject.’ Nevertheless, as the corporators have a special and peculiar interest in the terms and conditions of the charter, in the powers conferred and liabilities imposed, as well as in the general question whether they shall originally be or afterwards remain incorporated at all or not, and as the burdens of municipal government must rest upon their shoulders, and especially as by becoming incorporated they are held, in law, to undertake to discharge the duties the charter imposes, it seems eminently proper that their voice should be heard on the question of their incorporation, and that their decisions should be conclusive, unless, for strong reasons of State policy or local necessity, it should seem important for the State to overrule the opinion of the local majority. The right to refer any legislation of this character to the people peculiarly interested does not seem to be questioned, and the reference is by no means unusual.” 1 City of Paterson v. Society, &c., 24.N. J. L. 385; Cheany v. Hooser, 9 B. Monr. 330; Berlin v. Gorham, 34 N. H. 266; State v. Holden, 19 Neb. 249, 27 N. W. 120; Attorney-General v. Weimer, 59 Mich. 580, 26 N. W. 773; Hunter v. Pittsburg, 207 U. S. 161, 52 L. ed. 151, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 40; Carrithers v. Shelbyville, 126 Ky. 769; 104 S. W. 744, 17 L. R. A. (w. 8.) 421. 2 Bull v. Read, 13 Gratt. 78; Corn- ing v. Greene, 23 Barb. 33; Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa, 82; City of Paterson v. Society, &c., 24 N. J. L. 385; Gorham v. Springfield, 21 Me. 58; Common- wealth v. Judges of Quarter Sessions, 8 Pa. St. 391; Commonwealth 2. Painter, 10 Pa. St. 214; Call v. Chad- bourne, 46 Me. 206; State v. Scott, 17 Mo. 521; State ». Wilcox, 45 Mo. 458; Hobart v. Supervisors, &c., 17 Cal. 23; Bank of Chenango v. Brown, 26 N. Y. 467; Steward v. Jefferson, 3 Harr. 335; Burgess v. Pue, 2 Gill, 11; Lafayette, &c. R. R. Co. v. Geiger, 34 Ind. 185; Clarke v. Rogers, 81 Ky. 43; Jacksonville v. Bowden, 67 Fla. 181, 64 So. 769, L. R. A. 1916 D, 918, Ann. Cas. 1915 D, 99; Cole v. Dorr, 80 Kan. 251, 101 Pac. 1016, 22 L. R. A. (x. s.) 534; Carrithers v. Shelbyville, 126 Ky. 769, 104S. W. 744, 17L. R.A. (x. s.) 421; Gretna v. Bailey, 141 La. 625, 75 So. 491, Ann. Cas. 1918 E, 566; Cunningham v. Cambridge, 222 Mass. 574, 111 N. E. 409, Ann. Cas. 1917 C, 1100; Cleveland v. Water- town, 222 N. Y. 159, 118 N. E. 500, Ann. Cas. 1918 E, 574; State ex rel. Hunt v. Tausick, 64 Wash. 69, 116 Pac. 651, 35 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 802. As the question need not be submitted at all, the legislature may submit it to the freeholders alone. People v. Butte, 4 Mont. 174, 1 Pac. 414. The right to refer to the people of several munici- palities the question of their consoli- dation was disputed in Smith v. McCarthy, 56 Pa. St. 359, but sus- tained by the court. And see Smyth v. Titeomb, 31 Me. 272; Erlinger ». Boneau, 51 Ill. 94; Lammert »v. Lid- well, 62 Mo. 188; State v. Wilcox, 45 Mo. 458; Brunswick v. Finney, 54CHAP. Vv] POWERS LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT MAY EXERCISE 237 For the like reasons the question whether a county or township shall be divided and a new one formed,! or two townships or school districts formerly one be reunited,” or a city charter be revised,? or a county seat located at a particular place, or after its location removed elsewhere,’ or the municipality contract particular debts, or engage in a particular improvement ° [or a general school law be Ga. 317; Response to House Resolu- tion, 55 Mo. 295; People v. Fleming, 10 Col. 553, 16 Pac. 298; Graham ». Greenville, 67 Tex. 62, 2 8. W. 742. Such reference is now permitted in Minnesota. Hopkins v. Duluth, 81 Minn. 189, 83 N. W. 536. For a con- sideration of various questions arising in regard to such a reference, see State v. Denny, 4 Wash. 135, 29 Pac. 991, 16 L. R. A. 214. An amendment to a municipal charter may be submitted to the vote of the people of the municipality. Keller v. Western Paving Co., (Tex. Civ App) 218) Ss We LOU eA statute providing a scheme of munic- ipal government commonly known as the ‘‘commission plan”’, to be opera- tive only in those cities that adopt its provisions by popular vote, is not void as an attempt to delegate legislative power to the people of such munici- palities. Cole v. Dorr, 80 Kan. 251, 101 Pac. 1016, 22 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 534; State ex rel. Hunt v. Tausick, 64 Wash. 69, 116 Pac. 651, 35 L. R. A. (n. s.) 802. 1 State v. Reynolds, 10 Ill. 1. See State v. McNeill, 24 Wis. 149; Re- sponse to House Resolution, 55 Mo. 205. For other cases on the same general subject, see People v. Nally, 49 Cal. 478; Pike County v. Barnes, 51 Miss. 305; Brunswick v. Finney, 54 Gar 37 2 Commonwealth v. Judges, &c., 8 Pa. St. 391; Call ». Chadbourne, 46 Me. 206; People v. Nally, 49 Cal. 478; Erlinger v. Boneau, 51 Ill. 94. 3 Brunswick v. Finney, 54 Ga. 317. 4 Commonwealth v. Painter, 10 Pa. St. 214; Clarke v. Jack, 60 Ala. 271. See People v. Salomon, 51 Ill. 37; Slinger ». Henneman, 38 Wis. 540; Hall v. Marshall, 80 Ky. 552; post, pp. 243-247. 5Tbere are many cases in which municipal subscriptions to works of internal improvement, under statutes empowering them to be made, have been sustained; among others, Goddin v. Crump, 8 Leigh, 120; Bridgeport v. Housatonic Railroad Co., 15 Conn. 475; Starin v. Genoa, 29 Barb. 442, and 23 N. Y. 439; Bank of Rome ». Village of Rome, 18 N. Y. 38; Pretty- man v. Supervisors, &c., 19 Il. 406; Robertson v. Rockford, 21 Ill. 451; Johnson v. Stack, 24 Ill. 75; Bushnell v. Beloit, 10 Wis. 195; Clark v. Janes- ville, 10 Wis. 186; Stein v. Mobile, 24 Ala. 591; Mayor of Wetumpka »v. Winter, 29 Ala. 651; Pattison »v. Yuba, 13 Cal. 175; Blanding »v. Burr, 13 Cal. 343; Hobart v. Supervisors, &c., 17 Cal. 23; Taylor v. Newberne, 2 Jones Eq. 141; Caldwell v. Justices of Burke, 4 Jones Eq. 323; Louisville, &e. Railroad Co. v. Davidson, 1 Sneed, 637; Nichol v. Mayor of Nashville, 9 Humph. 252; Railroad Co. v. Com- missioners of Clinton Co., 1 Ohio St. 77; Trustees of Paris v. Cherry, 8 Ohio St. 564; Cass v. Dillon, 2 Ohio St. 607; State v. Commissioners of Clinton Co., 6 Ohio St. 280; State »v. Van Horne, 7 Ohio St. 327; State ». Trustees of Union, 8 Ohio St. 394; Trustees, &c. v. Shoemaker, 12 Ohio St. 624; State v. Commissioners of Han- cock, 12 Ohio St. 596; Powers v. Dougherty Co., 23 Ga. 65; San Antonio v. Jones, 28 Tex. 19; Com- monwealth v. McWilliams, 11 Pa. St. 61; Sharpless v. Mayor, &c., 21 Pa. St. 147; Moers v. Reading, 21 Pa. St. 188; Talbot v. Dent, 9 B. Monr. 526; Slack v. Railroad Co., 13 B. Monr. 1; City of St. Louis v. Alexander, 23 Mo. 483; City of Aurora v. West, 9 Ind. 74; Cotton v. Commissioners of Leon, 6 Fla. 610; Copes v. Charleston, 10 Rich. 491; Commissioners of Knox County v. Aspinwall, 21 How. 539, 16 L. ed. 208, and 24 How. 376, 16238 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I accepted in a particular municipality,’] is always a question which may with propriety be referred to the voters of the municipality for decision.2. [The operation of an act creating a municipal court may be made dependent on the approval of the municipal voters ; * and a city may be empowered to decide by vote whether it will take control of the public schools in it.* The legislature may incorporate in the charter of a municipal corporation a provision making the “initiative and referendum” a part of the local form of government.®] The question then arises, whether that which may be done in reference to any municipal organization within the State may not also be done in reference to the State at large. May not any law framed for the State at large be made conditional on an accept- ance by the people at large, declared through the ballot-box? If it is not unconstitutional to delegate to a single locality the power to decide whether it will be governed by a particular charter, must it L. ed. 735; Same v. Wallace, 21 How. 547, 16 L. ed. 211; Zabriskie v. Rail- road Co., 23 How. 381, 16 L. ed. 488; Amey v. Mayor, &c., 24 How. 364, 16 L. ed. 364; Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175, 17 L. ed. 520; Thomson »v. Lee County, 3 Wall. 327, 18 L. ed. 177; Rogers v. Burlington, 3 Wall. 654, 18 L. ed. 79; Gibbons v. Mobile & Great Northern Railroad Co., 36 Ala. 410; St. Joseph, &c., Railroad Co. v. Bu- chanan Co. Court, 39 Mo. 485; State v. Linn Co. Court, 44 Mo. 504; Stew- art v. Supervisors of Polk Co., 30 Iowa, 9 Jolin oy ©y Ree Hs Wi. R. BR. Co:, 35 Ind. 539; Leavenworth County v. Miller, 7 Kan. 479; Walker v. Cin- cinnati, 21 Ohio St. 14; Hz parte Selma, &c. R. R. Co., 45 Ala. 696; S. & V. R. R. Co. v. Stockton, 41 Cal. 149. In several of them the power to authorize the municipalities to decide upon such subscriptions has been con- tested as a delegation of legislative authority, but the courts — even those which hold the subscriptions void on other grounds—do not look upon these cases as being obnoxious to the constitutional principle referred to in the text. In any event the power must be exercised strictly in accord- ance with the conditions attached to the legislative permission. Barnum v. Okolona, 148 U. S. 393, 37 L. ed. 495, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 638. 1 State v. Wilcox, 45 Mo. 458. 2 Whatever powers the legislature may delegate to any public agency for exercise, it may itself resume and exer- cise. Dyer v. Tuscaloosa Bridge Co., 2 Port. 296, 27 Am. Dec. 655; Attor- ney-General v. Marr, 55 Mich. 445, 21 N. W. 883; Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Langlade Co., 56 Wis. 614, 14 N. W. 844; Brand v. Multnomah Co., 38 Oreg. 79, 60 Pac. 390, 50 L. R. A. 389, 84 Am. St. 772. But this must be understood with the exception of those cases in which the constitution of the State requires local matters to be regulated by local authority. Where local matters are required to be submitted to popular vote, if two or more propositions are submitted at one election, they must be so sub- mitted that they may be voted on sep- arately. Denverv. Hayes, 28 Col. 110, 63 Pac: 311: 3 Rutter v. Sullivan, 25 W. Va. 427. 4 Werner v. Galveston, 72 Tex. 22, 7S. W. 726. 6’ Bx parte Pfahler, 150 Cal. 71, 88 Pac. 270, 11 L. R. A. (n. 8.) 1092, 11 Ann. Cas. 911; State ex rel. Wagner v. Summers, 33 S. D. 40, 144 N. W. 730, 50 L. R. A. (n. s.) 206, Ann. Cas. 1916 B, 860. The contrary rule pre- vails in Texas. Ex parte Farnsworth, 61 Tex. Crim. Rep. 353, 185 S. W. 535, 33 L. R. A. (w. s.) 968.CHAP. V] POWERS LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT MAY EXERCISE 239 not quite as clearly be within the power of the legislature to refer to the people at large, from whom all power is derived, the decision upon any proposed statute affecting the whole State? And can that be called a delegation of power which consists only in the agent or trustee referring back to the principal the final decision in a case where the principal is the party concerned, and where perhaps there are questions of policy and propriety involved which no authority can decide so satisfactorily and so conclusively as the principal to whom they are referred ? If the decision of these questions is to depend upon the weight of judicial authority up to the present time, it must be held that there is no power to refer the adoption or rejection of a general law to the people of the State, any more than there is to refer it to any other authority. The prevailing doctrine in the courts appears to be, that, except in those cases where, by the consti- tution, the people have expressly reserved to themselves a power of decision, the function of legislation cannot be exercised by them, even to the extent of accepting or rejecting a law which has been framed for their consideration. “The exercise of this power by the people in other cases is not expressly and in terms prohibited by the constitution, but it is forbidden by necessary and unavoidable implication. The Senate and Assembly are the only bodies of men clothed with the power of general legislation. They possess the entire power, with the exception above stated. The people reserved no part of it to themselves [with that excep- tion], and can therefore exercise it in no other case.” It is there- fore held that the legislature have no power to submit a proposed law to the people, nor have the people power to bind each other by acting upon it. They voluntarily surrendered that power when they adopted the constitution. The government of the State is democratic, but it is a representative democracy, and in passing general laws the people act only through their representatives in the legislature." impracticable and inconsistent with 1Per Ruggles, Ch. J. in Barto v. Himrod, 8 N. Y. 483. See also People v. Kennedy, 207 N. Y. 533, 101 N. E. 442, Ann. Cas. 1914 C, 616. It is worthy of consideration, how- ever, whether there is anything in the reference of a statute to the people for acceptance or rejection which is inconsistent with the representative system of government. To refer it to the people to frame and agree upon a statute for themselves would be equally the representative system; but to take the opinion of the people upon a bill already framed by representatives and submitted to them, is not only practicable, but is in precise accord- ance with the mode in which the con- stitution of the State is adopted, and with the action which is taken in many other cases. The representative in these cases has fulfilled precisely those functions which the people as a240 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I Nor, it seems, can such legislation be sustained as legislation of a conditional character, whose force is to depend upon the happening of some future event, or upon some future change of circumstances. “The event or change of circumstances on which a law may be made to take effect must be such as, in the judgment of the legislature, affects the question of the expediency of the law; an event on which the expediency of the law in the opinion of the law-makers depends. On this question of expediency the legislature must exercise its own judgment definitely and finally. When a law is made to take effect upon the happening of such an event, the legislature in effect declare the law inexpedient if the event should not happen, but expedient if it should happen. They appeal to no other man or men to judge for them in relation to its present or future expediency. They exercise that power themselves, and then perform the duty which the Constitution imposes upon them.” But it was held that in the case of the submission of a proposed free-school law to the people, no such event or change of circumstances affecting the expediency of the law was expected to happen. The wisdom or expediency of the School Act, abstractly considered, did not depend on the vote of the people. If it was unwise or inexpedient before that vote was taken, it was equally so afterwards. The event on which the act was to take effect was nothing else than the vote of the people on the identical question which the constitution makes it the duty of the legislature itself to decide. The legislature has no power to make a statute dependent on such a contingency, because it would be confiding to others that legislative discretion which they are bound to exercise themselves, and which they cannot delegate or commit to any other man or men to be exercised." democracy could not fulfil; and where the case has reached a stage when the body of the people can act without con- fusion, the representative has stepped aside to allow their opinion to be expressed. The legislature is not at- tempting in such a case to delegate its authority to a new agency, but the trustee, vested with a large discretion- ary authority, is taking the opinion of the principal upon the necessity, policy, or propriety of an act which is to govern the principal himself. See Smith v. Janesville, 26 Wis. 291; Fell v. State, 42 Md. 71, 20 Am. Rep. 83; King v. Reed, 43 N. J. L. 186. 1Per Ruggles, Ch. J., in Barto »v. Himrod, 8 N. Y. 483. And see State v. Hayes, 61 N. H. 264; Santo v. State, 2 Iowa, 165; State v. Beneke, 9 Iowa, 203; State v. Swisher, 17 Tex. 441; State v. Field, 17 Mo. 529; Bank of Chenango v. Brown, 26 N. Y. 467; People v. Stout, 23 Barb. 349; State v. Wilcox, 45 Mo. 458; Hx parte Wall, 48 Cal. 279, 313; Brown v. Fleischner, 4 Oreg. 132. Elective franchise cannot be con- ferred upon women upon condition that the statute be approved at a subse- quent election. Re Municipal Suffrage to Women, 160 Mass. 586, 36 N. E. 488, 23 L. R. A. 118, and note thereto on power to make a statute contingent on popular approval. The power to tax cannot be dele- gated except as by the Constitution is permitted. Where the ConstitutionCHAP. V] provided that the General Assembly shall have power to authorize the several counties and incorporated towns to impose taxes for county and corporation purposes respectively, it was held not competent to delegate the power to a school board. Waterhouse v. Public Schools, 9 Bax. 398. But upon this point there is great force in what is said by Redfield, Ch. J., in State v. Parker, 26 Vt. 357: “If the operation of a law may fairly be made to depend upon a future contingency, then, in my apprehension, it makes no essential difference what is the nature of the contingency, so it be an equal and fair one, a moral and legal one, not opposed to sound policy, and so far connected with the object and pur- pose of the statute as not to be a mere idle and arbitrary one. And to us the contingency, upon which the present statute was to be suspended until an- other legislature should meet and have opportunity of reconsidering it, was not only proper and legal, and just and moral, but highly commend- able and creditable to the legislature who passed the statute; for at the very threshold of inquiry into the expedi- ency of such a law lies the other and more important inquiry, Are the people prepared for such a law? Can it be successfully enforced? These questions being answered in the affirmative, he must be a bold man who would even vote against the law; and something more must he be who would, after it had been passed with that as- surance, be willing to embarrass its operation or rejoice at its defeat. “ After a full examination of the ar- guments by which it is attempted to be sustained that statutes made depend- ent upon such contingencies are not valid laws, and a good deal of study and reflection, I must declare that I am fully convinced — although at first, without much examination, some- what inclined to the same opinion — that the opinion is the result of false analogies, and so founded upon a latent fallacy. It seems to me that the dis- tinction attempted between the con- tingency of a popular vote and other future contingencies is without all just foundation in sound policy or sound VOL. I—16 POWERS LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT MAY EXERCISE 241 reasoning, and that it has too often been made more from necessity than choice, — rather to escape from an overwhelming analogy than from any obvious difference in principle in the two classes of cases; for . . . one may find any number of cases in the legis- lation of Congress, where statutes have been made dependent upon the shifting character of the revenue laws, or the navigation laws, or commercial rules, edicts, or restrictions of other countries. In some, perhaps, these laws are made by representative bodies, or, it may be, by the people of these States, and in others by the lords of the treasury, or the boards of trade, or by the proclamation of the sovereign; and in all these cases no question can be made of the perfect legality of our acts of Congress being made dependent upon such contingencies. It is, in fact, the only possible mode of meeting them, unless Congress is kept con- stantly in session. The same is true of acts of Congress by which power is vested in the President to levy troops or draw money from the public treas- ury, upon the contingency of a declara- tion or an act of war committed by some foreign state, empire, kingdom, prince, or potentate. If these illus- trations are not sufficient to show the fallacy of the argument, more would not avail.’’ See also State v. Noyes, 10 Fost. 279; Bull v. Read, 13 Gratt. 78; Johnson v. Rich, 9 Barb. 680; State v. Reynolds, 10 Ill. 1; Robinson v. Bidwell, 22 Cal. 379. In the case of Smith v. Janesville, 26 Wis. 291, Chief Justice Dixon dis- cusses this subject in the following language: ‘But it is said that the act is void, or at least so much of it as per- tains to the taxation of shares in na- tional banks, because it was submitted to a vote of the people, or provided that it should take effect only after approval by a majority of the electors voting on the subject at the next gen- eral election. This was no more than providing that the act should take ef- fect on the happening of a certain future contingency, that contingency being a popular vote in its favor. No one doubts the general power of the legislature to make such regulations242 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I The same reasons which preclude the original enactment of a law from being referred to the people would render it equally incom- petent to refer to their decision the question whether an existing law should be repealed. people of the law-making power and conditions as it pleases with regard to the taking effect or operation of laws. They may be absolute, or con- ditional and contingent; and if the latter, they may take effect on the happening of any event which is future and uncertain. Instances of this kind of legislation are not unfrequent. The law of Congress suspending the writ of habeas corpus during the late rebellion is one, and several others are referred to in the case Jn re Richard Oliver, 17 Wis. 681. It being conceded that the legislature possesses this general power, the only question here would seem to be, whether a vote of the people in favor of a law is to be excluded from the number of those future contingent events upon which it may be provided that it shall take effect. A similar question was before this court in a late case (State ex rel. Attorney-General v. O’Neill, Mayor, &c., 24 Wis. 149), and was very elaborately discussed. We came unanimously to the conclusion in that case that a provision for a vote of the electors of the city of Milwaukee in favor of an act of the legislature, before it should take effect, was a law- ful contingency, and that the act was valid. That was a law affecting the people of Milwaukee particularly, while this was one affecting the people of the whole State. There the law was sub- mitted to the voters of that city, and here it was submitted to those of the State at large. What is the difference between the two cases? It is manifest, on principle, that there cannot be any. The whole reasoning of that case goes to show that this act must be valid, and so it has been held in the best-con- sidered cases, as will be seen by refer- ence to that opinion. We are con- strained to hold, therefore, that this act is and was in all respects valid from the time it took effect, in November, 1866; and consequently that there was no want of authority for the levy and collection of the taxes in question.” 3) If the one is “a plain surrender to the , so also is the other.1 It would This decision, though opposed to many others, appears to us entirely sound and reasonable. See also State ez rel. Van Alstine v. Frear, 142 Wis. 320, 125 N. W. 961, 20 Ann. Cas. 633; State ex rel. Mueller v. Thompson, 149 Wis. 488, 137 N. W. 20, 48 L. R. A. (n.s.) 339, Ann. Cas. 1913 C, 616. A New Jersey statute, by its terms, was to become operative on the fourth Tuesday of November, 1913, provided that those voting for its adoption in a state-wide referendum at the election for members of the general assembly in that year should be a majority of all those voting on the question of the adoption or rejection of the act. It was held that this was not a delega- tion of legislative power to be exercised directly by the people; that it was a perfect piece of legislation in and of itself, and the provision that it should remain inoperative until the legal voters of the state adopted it was simply the contingency or condition upon which the statute should go into effect. The court said: ‘That statutes may be made to take effect upon the happening of contingencies is established. The legislature has made the approval by the people of the chancellor-sheriff jury act the con- tingency upon which that act was to take effect. We find nothing in the Constitution which amounts to a limi- tation of the legislature’s right to do what they have done; and certainly there is no express prohibition against it in that instrument. In the absence of an express limitation upon the legis- lature’s power in this regard, one ought not to be imported into the Consti- tution by implication. There is no ne- cessity for such implication, and, in the absence of express prohibition, only a necessary implication will limit power.” Hudspeth v. Swayze, 85 N. J. L. 592, 89 Atl. 780, Ann. Cas. 1916 A, 102. 1Geebrick v. State, 5 Iowa, 491; Rice v. Foster, 4 Harr. 479; Parker v.CHAP. V] POWERS LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT MAY EXERCISE 243 seem, however, that if a legislative act is, by its terms, to take effect in any contingency, it is not unconstitutional to make the time when it shall take effect depend upon the event of a popular vote being for or against it, — the time of its going into operation being postponed to a later day in the latter contingency.! It would also seem that if the question of the acceptance or rejection of a municipal charter can be referred to the voters of the locality spe- cially interested, it would be equally competent to refer to them the question whether a State law establishing a particular police regula- tion should be of force in such locality or not. Municipal charters refer most questions of local government, including police regulations, to the local authorities ; on the supposition that they are better able to decide for themselves upon the needs, as well as the sentiments, of their constituents, than the legislature possibly can be, and are therefore more competent to judge what local regulations are impor- tant, and also how far the local sentiment will assist in their enforce- ment. The same reasons would apply in favor of permitting the people of the locality to accept or reject for themselves a particular police regulation, since this is only allowing them less extensive powers of local government than a municipal charter would confer ; and the fact that the rule of law on that subject might be different in different localities, according as the people accepted or rejected the regulation, would not seem to affect the principle, when the same result is brought about by the different regulations which municipal corporations establish for themselves in the exercise of an undisputed authority.” It is not to be denied, however, that there Commonwealth, 6 Pa. St. 507. The ease in 5 Iowa was followed in State v. Weir, 33 Iowa, 134, 11 Am. Rep. 115. 1 State v. Parker, 26 Vt. 357. The act under consideration in that case was, by its terms, to take effect on the second Tuesday of March after its passage, unless the people to whose votes it was submitted should declare against it, in which case it should take effect in the following December. The case was distinguished from Barto »v. Himrod, 8 N. Y. 483, and the act sus- tained. At the same time the court express their dissent from the reason- ing upon which the New York case rests. In People v. Collins, 3 Mich. 343, the court was equally divided in a ease similar to that in Vermont, except that in the Michigan case the law which was passed and submitted to the people in 1853 was not to go into effect until 1870, if the vote of the people was against it. 2In New Hampshire an act was passed declaring bowling-alleys, situate within twenty-five rods of a dwelling- house, nuisances, but the statute was to be in force only in those towns in which it should be adopted in town meeting. In State v. Noyes, 10 Fost. 279, this act was held to be constitutional. ‘“As- suming,” say the court, “that the legislature has the right to confer the power of local regulation upon cities and towns, that is, the power to pass ordinances and by-laws, in such terms and with such provisions, in the classes of cases to which the power extends, as they may think proper, it seems to us hardly possible seriously to contend that the legislature may not confer the power to adopt within such munici- pality a law drawn up and framed by244 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I is considerable authority against the right of legislative delegation in these cases. The legislature of Delaware, in 1847, passed an act to authorize the citizens of the several counties of the State to decide by ballot whether the license to retail intoxicating liquors should be per- mitted. By this act a general election was to be held; and if a majority of votes in any county should be cast against license, it should not thereafter be lawful for any person to retail intoxicating liquors within such county; but if the majority should be cast in favor of license, then licenses might be granted in the county so voting, in the manner and under the regulations in said act pre- scribed. The Court of Errors and Appeals of that State held this act void, as an attempted delegation of the trust to make laws, and upon the same reasons which support the cases before cited, where acts have been held void which referred to the people of the State for approval a law of general application. A like decision was made near the same time by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,’ followed afterwards by others in Iowa,’ Indiana,* and California.® But the decision in Pennsylvania was afterwards overruled on full discussion and consideration,® and that in themselves. If they may pass a law authorizing towns to make ordinances to punish the keeping of billiard-rooms, bowling-alleys, and other places of gambling, they may surely pass laws to punish the same acts, subject to be adopted by the town before they can be of force in it.”” And it seems to us difficult to answer this reasoning, if it be confined to such laws as fall within. the proper province of local government, and which are therefore usually referred to the judgment of the municipal authorities or their constit- uency. A similar question arose in Smith v. Village of Adrian, 1 Mich. 495, but was not decided. In Bank of Chenango v. Brown, 26 N. Y. 467, it was held competent to authorize the electors of an incor- porated village to determine for them- selves what sections of the general act for the incorporation of villages should apply to their village. An act em- powering a city, where the legal voters authorize it, to allow Sunday sales of refreshments, is valid. State »v. Francis, 95 Mo. 44, 8S. W. 1. The operation of a park act may be left to the vote of a city. State v. Indiana must, as we think, be District Court, 33 Minn. 235, 22 N. W. 625. So, of a law vesting control of streets in aldermen instead of street commissioners. State v. Hoagland, 51 N. J. L. 62, 16 Atl. 166. So, of a law creating a new county. People »v. McFadden, 81 Cal. 489, 22 Pac. 851. Whether an election to determine upon putting a law in operation shall be called, may be left to the discretion of officers. Johnson v. Martin, 75 Tex. 33, 12S. W. 321. See, further, People v. Salomon, 51 Ill. 37; Burgess v. Pue, 2 Gill, 11; Hammond v. Haines, 25 Md. 541. 1 Rice v. Foster, 4 Harr. 479. 2 Parker v. Commonwealth, 6 Pa. St. 507. See Commonwealth v. McWil- liams, 11 Pa. St. 61. 3 Geebrick v. State, 5 Iowa, 491. See State v. Weir, 33 Iowa, 134, 11 Am. Rep. 115. But see Des Moines 2. Manhattan Oil Co., 193 Iowa, 1096, 184 N. W. 828, 23 A. L. R. 1822. 4 Maize v. State, 4 Ind. 342; Mesh- meier v. State, 11 Ind. 482. 5 Hx parte Wall, 48 Cal. 279, 17 Am. Rep. 425. 6 Locke’s Appeal, 72 Pa. St. 491, 13 Am. Rep. 716.CHAP. V]| deemed overruled also.! POWERS LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT MAY EXERCISE 245 In other States a like delegation of author- ity to the local electors has generally been sustained. Such laws are known, in common parlance, as Local Option Laws. They relate to subjects which, like the retailing of intoxicating drinks, or the running at large of cattle in the highways, may be differently re- garded in different localities, and they are sustained on what seems to us the impregnable ground, that the subject, though not embraced within the ordinary power of the municipalities to make by-laws and ordinances, is nevertheless within the class of police regulations, in 3 respect to which it is proper that the local judgment should control.’ 1 Groesch v. State, 42 Ind. 547. A majority of voters in a ward or township may be allowed by formal remonstrance to prevent the issuance of license to a particular applicant for the sale of liquors therein. State v. Gerhardt, 145 Ind. 439, 44 N. E. 469, 33 L. R. A. 313. 2Commonwealth v. Bennett, 108 Mass. 27; Commonwealth v. Dean, 110 Mass. 357; Commonwealth ». Fredericks, 119 Mass. 199; Bancroft v. Dumas, 21 Vt. 456; Slinger ». Henneman, 38 Wis. 504; Erlinger ». Boneau, 51 Ill. 94; Gunnarssohn v. Sterling, 92 Ill. 569; State v. Morris County, 36 N. J. L.72, 13 Am. Rep. 422: State v. Circuit Court, 50 No dk L. 585, 15 Atl. 274; State v. Wilcox, 42 Conn. 364, 19 Am. Rep. 536; Fellv. State, 42 Md. 71, 20 Am. Rep. 83; State ». Cooke, 24 Minn. 247, 31 Am. Rep. 344; Cain v. Commissioners, 86 N.C.8; Boyd». Bryant, 35 Ark. 69, 37 Am. Rep. 6; Savagev. Com., 84 Va. 619, 5S. E. 565; Caldwell v. Barrett, 73 Ga. 604; Ex parte Kennedy, 23 Tex. App. 77, 3S. W. 114; Schulherr ». Bor- deaux, 64 Miss. 59, 8 So. 201; State v. Pond, 93 Mo. 606, 6 S. W. 469; Terr v. O’Connor, 5 Dak. 397, 41 N. W. 746; Feek v. Bloomingdale, 82 Mich. 393, 47 N. W. 37, 10 L. R. A. 69; Chicago Ter- minal Transfer R. Co. v. Greer, 223 Il. 104, 79 N. E. 46, 114 Am. St. Rep. 313; People v. McBride, 234 Ill. 146, 84 N. E. 865, 123 Am. St. Rep. 82, 14 Ann. Cas. 994; Waugh »v. Glos, 246 Ill. 604, 92 N. E. 974, 138 Am. St. Rep. 259; McPherson v. State, 174 Ind, 60, 90 N. E. 610, 31 L. R. A. (x. s.) 188; Cole v. Dorr, 80 Kan. 251, 101 Pac. 1016, 22 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 534; Gretna v. Bailey, 141 La. 625, 75 So. 491, Ann. Cas. 1918 E, 566; State v. Chicago, ete., R. Co., 195 Mo. 228, 93 S. W. 784, 113 Am. St. Rep. 661; Hudspeth v. Swayze, 85 N. J. L. 592, 89 Atl. 780, Ann. Cas. 1916 A, 102; People v. Kennedy, 207 N. Y. 533, 101 N. E. 442, Ann. Cas. 1914 C, 616, dis- tinguishing Barto v. Himrod 8 N. Y. 483, 59 Am. Dec. 506; Fouts v. Hood River, 46 Oreg. 492, 81 Pac. 370, 1 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 483, 7 Ann. Cas. 1160; Hall v. Dunn, 52 Oreg. 475, 97 Pac. 811, 25 L. R. A. (wv. s.) 193; State v. Summers, 33 S. D. 40, 144 N. W. 730, 50 L. R. A. (vn. s.) 206, Ann. Cas. 1916 B, 860; Ex parte Mode, 77 Tex. Crim. Rep. 432, 180 S. W. 708, Ann. Cas. 1918 E, 845; Henrico County ». Richmond, 106 Va. 282, 55 S. E. 683, 117 Am. St. Rep. 1001; State ». Tausick, 64 Wash. 69, 116 Pac. 651, 35 L. R. A. (n. s.) 802; State v. Frear, 142 Wis. 320, 125 N. W. 961, 20 Ann. Cas. 633; State ex rel. Mueller ». Thompson, 149 Wis. 488, 137 N. W. 20, 43 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 339, Ann. Cas. 1913 C, 774. But see State v. Cope- land, 3 R. I. 33. Local option, as ap- plied to the sale of liquors, has also been sustained in Canada. Mayor, &c. v. The Queen, 3 Can. Sup. Ct. 505. The question of a levee tax may lawfully be referred to the voters of the district. or territory over which it is proposed to spread the tax, regardless of municipal divisions. Alcorn ». Hamer, 38 Miss. 652. Power to grant an exclusive fran- chise in aid of navigation may be dele- gated to a village: Farnum v. Johnson, 62 Wis. 620, 22 N. W. 751; power to determine the penalty to be imposed.246 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I Trrepealable Laws. Similar reasons to those which forbid the legislative department of the State from delegating its authority will also forbid its passing any irrepealable law. The constitution, in conferring the legislative authority, has prescribed to its exercise any limitations which the people saw fit to impose; and no other power than the people can for infraction of a State law may not: Montross v. State, 61 Miss. 429; nor power to increase its representation on a county board, when the constitu- tion ordains that the legislature shall determine such representation: Peo- ple v. Riordan, 73 Mich. 508, 41 N. W. 482. And see, in general, Angell and Ames on Corp. § 30 and note; also post, pp. 389-393. In Washington it has been held that a question cannot be left to an election precinct. It must be submitted to a municipal corporation. Thornton »v. Territory, 3 Wash. Ter. 482, 17 Pac. 896. In Kentucky it has been held that a statute making it unlawful to maintain an industrial school without the con- sent of the majority of the voters in the precinct where the school is to be maintained is violative of a constitu- tional provision prohibiting the en- actment of laws to take effect on the approval of any other authority than the legislature. Columbia Trust Co. v. Lincoln Institute, 188 Ky. 804, 129 S. W. 113; 29 L. R. A. (nv. s.) 53. In a Missouri case the court said: “Local option laws, that is, laws passed by the State which may or may not be taken advantage of and utilized as the people of each locality elect so to ,do or not, must apply to the whole State, and must confer upon the people of each locality a privilege of taking ad- vantage, or not, of those laws as they see fit.”’ State v. Chicago, ete., R. Co., 195 Mo. 228, 93S. W. 784, 113 Am. St. Rep. 661. See State v. Field, 17 Mo. 529; Lammert v. Lidwell, 62 Mo. 188. The following question was sub- mitted to the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts: Is it constitutional to provide in an act granting to women the right to vote in town and city elections, that it shall take effect in a city or town upon its acceptance by a majority vote of the voters of such city or town? The majority of the court answered that such a provision would be unconstitu- tional. Opinions of the Justices, 160 Mass. 586, 36 N. E. 488, 23 L. R. A. 113. The court said: ‘‘It is certainly a difficult question to determine how far the principle of local option can be carried, and to what objects it can be applied. An act granting to women the right to vote in town and city elections does not relate to the powers of towns and cities, which in some respects may well be different in dif- ferent towns and cities on account of the number, wealth, and pursuits of the inhabitants. Such an act relates solely to the persons who should be in- vested with a share of political power. Whether women should be permitted to vote in town and city elections seems to us a matter of general, and not of local concern. There is nothing in the history of Massachusetts which tends to show that the right to vote in towns and cities on town and city affairs has ever been regarded as a matter of police regulation or of merely local interest, or as a right which might be granted or withheld by a licensing board. It always has been deter- mined by the legislature by a general law, in force uniformly throughout the Commonwealth. . . . Considering the nature of the power intended to be conferred, the history of legislation on the subject from the earliest times, and the language of the Constitution, we are of opinion that, if a law is to be enacted such as the question con- templates, it must operate uniformly throughout the Commonwealth.” Dissenting opinions were submitted by Justices Holmes, Barker, and Knowlton.CHAP. V] POWERS LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT MAY EXERCISE 247 superadd other limitations. To say that the legislature may pass irrepealable laws, is to say that it may alter the very constitution from which it derives its authority : since, in so far as one legislature could bind a subsequent one by its enactments, it could in the same degree reduce the legislative power of its successors ; and the process might be repeated, until, one by one, the subjects of legislation would be excluded altogether from their control, and the constitutional provision that the legislative power shall be vested in two houses would be to a greater or less degree rendered ineffectual. “Acts of Parliament,” says Blackstone, “derogatory from the power of subsequent Parliaments, bind not; so the statute 11 Henry VII. c. 1, which directs that no person for assisting a king de facto shall be attainted of treason by act of Parliament or other- wise, is held to be good only as to common prosecution for high treason, but it will not restrain nor clog any parliamentary attainder. Because the legislature, being in truth the sovereign power, is always 1“UJnlike the decision of a court, a legislative act does not bind a subse- quent legislature. Each body pos- sesses the same power, and has the right to exercise the same discretion. Measures, though often rejected, may receive legislative sanction. There is no mode by which a legislative act can be made irrepealable, except it assume the form and substance of a contract. If in any line of legislation a permanent character could be given to acts, the most injurious conse- quences would result to the country. Its policy would become fixed and unchangeable on great national in- terests, which might retard, if not destroy, the public prosperity. Every legislative body, unless restricted by the constitution, may modify or abolish the acts of its predecessors ; whether it would be wise to do so is a matter for legislative discretion.” Bloomer v. Stolley, 5 McLean, 158. See this subject considered in Wall v. State, 23 Ind. 150; State v. Oskins, 28 Ind. 364; Oleson v. Green Bay, &e. R. R. Co., 36 Wis. 383. In Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 814, 820, 25 L. ed. 1079, Chief Justice Waite says: ‘The power of governing is a trust committed by the people to the government, no part of which can be granted away. The people, in their sovereign capacity, have es- tablished their agencies for the pres- ervation of the public health and the public morals, and the protection of public and private rights. These several agencies can govern according to their discretion, if within the scope of their general authority, while in power; but they cannot give away nor sell the discretion of those that are to come after them, in respect to matters the government of which, from the very nature of things, must vary with varying circumstances.” See also, on the same subject, Morgan v. Smith, 4 Minn. 104; Kineaid’s Ap- peal, 66 Pa. St. 411, 5 Am. Rep. 377; Hamrick v. Rouse, 17 Ga. 56, where it was held that the legislature could not bind its successors not to remove a county seat. Bass 2. Fontleroy, 11 Tex. 698; Shaw v. Macon, 21 Ga. 280; Regents of University 2. Williams, 9G. & J. 365; Mott v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 30 Pa. St. 9. In Kellogg v. Oshkosh, 14 Wis. 623, it was held that one legislature could not bind a future one to a particular mode of appeal. In Bank of Republic v. Hamilton, 21 Ill. 53, it was held that, in con- struing a statute, it will not be in- tended that the legislature designed to abandon its right as to taxation. This subject is considered further, post, pp. 572-580.948 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I of equal, always of absolute authority ; it acknowledges no superior upon earth, which the prior legislature must have been if its ordi- nances could bind a subsequent Parliament. And upon the same principle, Cicero, in his letters to Atticus, treats with a proper con- tempt these restraining clauses which endeavor to tie up the hands of succeeding legislatures. ‘When you repeal the law itself,’ says he, ‘you at the same time repeal the prohibitory clause which guards against such repeal.’”’ ! Although this reasoning does not in all its particulars apply to the American legislatures, the principle applicable in each case is the same. There is a modification of the principle, however, by an important provision of the Constitution of the United States, for- bidding the States passing any laws impairing the obligation of contracts. Legislative acts are sometimes in substance contracts between the State and the party who is to derive some right under them, and they are not the less under the protection of the clause quoted because of having assumed this form. Charters of incor- poration, except those of a municipal character, — and which, as we have already seen, create mere agencies of government, — are held to be contracts between the State and the corporators, and not sub- ject to modification or change by the act of the State alone, except as may be authorized by the terms of the charters themselves.” And it now seems to be settled, by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, that a State, by contract to that effect, based upon a consideration, may exempt the property of an indi- vidual or corporation from taxation for any specified period, or even permanently. And it is also settled by the same decisions, that where a charter, containing an exemption from taxes, or an agree- ment that the taxes shall be to a specified amount only, is accepted by the corporators, the exemption is presumed to be upon sufficient consideration, and consequently binding upon the State. Territorial Limitation to State Legislative Authority. The legislative authority of every State must spend its force within the territorial limits of the State. The legislature of one 11 Bl. Com. 90. How. 369, 14 L. ed. 977; Ohio Life 2 Dartmouth College v. Woodward, Ins. and Trust Co. »v. Debolt, 16 How. 4 Wheat. 518, 4 L. ed. 629; Planters’ 416, 432, 14 L. ed. 997; Dodge »v. Bank v. Sharp, 6 How. 301, 12 L. ed. Woolsey, 18 How. 331, 15 L. ed. 401; AAT. Mechanics’ and Traders’ Bank ». *Gordon v. Appeal Tax Court, 3 Debolt, 18 How. 380, 15 L. ed. 458; How. 133, 11 L. ed. 529; New Jersey v. Jefferson Branch Bank ». Skelly, 1 Wilson, 7 Cranch, 164, 3 L. ed. 303; Black, 436, 17 L. ed. 173; Ene Piqua Branch Bank v. Knoop, 16 R. R. Co. »v. Pennsylvania, 21 Wall.CHAP. V] POWERS LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT MAY EXERCISE 249 State cannot make laws by which people outside the State must govern their actions, except as they may have occasion to resort to the remedies which the State provides, or to deal with property situated within the State." It can have no authority upon the high seas beyond State lines, because there is the point of contact with other nations, and all international questions belong to the national government.2 It cannot provide for the punishment as crimes, of acts committed beyond the State boundary, because such acts, if offenses at all, must be offenses against the sovereignty within whose limits they have been done.’ But if the consequences of an unlawful act committed outside the State have reached their ulti- mate and injurious result within it, it seems that the perpetrator may be punished as an offender against such State.* 492, 22 L. ed. 595. See also Hunsaker v. Wright, 30 Ill. 146; Morgan »v. Cree, 46 Vt. 773; Spooner v. McConnell, 1 McLean, 347; post, p. 570. 1 Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Sowers, 213 U.S. 55, 53 L. ed. 695, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 397; Galveston, etc., R. Co. ». Wallace, 223 U.S. 481, 56 L. ed. 516, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 205; Bond v. Hume, 243 U. S. 15, 61 L. ed. 565, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 366; Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial Ace. Commission, 184 Cal. 26, 192 Pac. 1021, 12 A. L. R. 1190; Dougherty v. American McKenna Process Co., 255 Ill. 369, 99 N. E. 619, L. R. A. 1915 F, 955, Ann. Cas. 1913 D, 568; Louisville, etc., R. Co. »v. Burkhart, 154 Ky. 92, 157 S. W. 18, 46 L. R. A. (vn. s.) 687; Faulkner »v. Hart, 82 N. Y. 413, 37 Am. Rep. 574; Snyder v. Yates, 112 Tenn. 309, 79 S. W. 796, 105 Am. St. Rep. 941, 64 L. R. A. 353; International Harvester Co. v. McAdam, 142 Wis. 114, 124 N. W. 1042, 26 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 774, 20 Ann. Cas. 614. 21 Bish. Cr. Law, § 120. The territorial jurisdiction of a State bordering upon the high seas ex- tends one marine league from shore and is subject over that space only to the federal power over navigation. State has full control of the fisheries therein. Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U. S. 240, 35 L. ed. 159, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 559. 3 State v. Knight, 2 Hayw. 109; People v. Merrill, 2 Park. Cr. R. 590; Adams »v. People, 1 N. Y. 173; Tyler v. People, 8 Mich. 320; Morrissey ». People, 11 Mich. 327; Bromley ». People, 7 Mich. 472; State v. Main, 16 Wis. 398; Watson’s Case, 36 Miss. 593; In re Carr, 28 Kan.1. See In re Rosdeitscher, 33 Fed. Rep. 657. And as to crimes on Indian reservations, see United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 30 L. ed. 228, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1109; Ex parte Cross, 20 Neb. 417, 30 N. W. 428; Marion v. State, zd. 233, 20 N. W. 911. 4Tyler v. People, 8 Mich. 320; State v. Wellman, 102 Kan. 503, 170 Pac. 1052, L. R. A. 1918 D, 949, Ann. Cas. 1918 D, 1006. Murder is committed in the District of Columbia if the fatal blow is struck there, though the death occurs else- where. United States v. Guiteau, 1 Mackey, 498. See Hatfield v. Com., 11 Ky. L. 468, 12 S. W. 309. That where a larceny is committed in one State and the property carried by the thief into another, this may be treated as a continuous larceny wher- ever the property is taken. See Com- monwealth v: Cullins, 1 Mass. 116; Commonwealth v. Andrews, 2 Mass. 14, 3 Am. Dec. 17; Commonwealth v. Holder, 9 Gray, 7; Commonwealth ». White, 123 Mass. 430; State v. Ellis, 3 Conn. 185, 8 Am. Dec. 175; State v. Cummings, 33 Conn. 260; State v. Bartlett, 11 Vt. 650; State v. Bennett, 14 Iowa, 479; People v. Williams, 24 Mich. 156; State v. Main, 16 Wis. 398; Hamilton v. State, 11 Ohio, 435; State v. Seay, 3 Stew. 123, 20250 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I Upon the principle of comity, however, which is a part of the law of nations, recognized as such by every civilized people, effect is given in one State or country to the laws of another in a great variety of ways, especially upon questions of contract rights to prop- erty, and rights of action connected with and dependent upon such foreign laws; without which commercial and business intercourse between the people of different States and countries could scarcely exist. [The extent to which comity will be extended is very much a matter of judicial policy to be determined within reasonable limi- tations by each State for itself.?] In the making of contracts, the local law enters into and forms a part of the obligation; and if the contract is valid in the State where it is made,’ any other State will give remedies for its enforcement, unless, according to the standard of such latter State, it is bad for immorality, or is opposed in its provisions to some accepted principle of public policy, or unless its enforcement would be prejudicial to the State or its people,* [or Am. Dec. 66; State v. Johnson, 2 Oreg. 115; Myers v. People, 26 Ill. 173; Watson v. State, 36 Miss. 593; State v. Underwood, 49 Me. 181; Ferrell v. Commonwealth, 1 Duv. 153; Regina v. Hennessy, 35 Up. Can. R. 603; Tramwill v. Com., 148 Ky. 624, 147 Siiwaise) 42s Re AL Gx s.)) 207. Contra, State v. Brown, 1 Hayw. 100, 1 Am. Dec. 548; People v. Gardner, 2 Johns. 477; Simmons v. Common- wealth, 5 Binn. 617; Simpson ». State, 4 Humph. 456; Beal v. State, 15 Ind. 378; State v. LeBlanch, 31 N. J. L. 82; Brown v. United States, 35 App. Dec. (D. C.) 548, Ann. Cas. 1912 A, 388; Ez parte Sullivan, 84 Neb. 493, 121 N. W. 456, 28 L. R. A. (w. s.) 750, 18 Ann. Cas. 1024. And where the larceny took place in a foreign country : Stanley v. State, 24 Ohio St. 166, 15 Am. Rep. 604; Commonwealth ». Uprichard, 3 Gray, 434. 1 Thompson v. Waters, 25 Mich. 214, 225; Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519, 10 L. ed. 274; Bond v. Hume, 243 U.S. 15, 61 L. ed. 565, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 366; Cristilly v. Warner, 87 Conn. 461, 88 Atl. 711, 51 L. R. A. (n. s.) 415; Halloran v. Jacob Schmidt Brewing Co., 137 Minn. 141, 162 N. W. 1082, L. R. A. 1917 E, 777; Snyder »v. Yates, 112 Tenn. 309, 79 S. W. 796, 105 Am. St. Rep. 941, 64 L. R. A. 353; Hall v. Industrial Commission, 165 Wis. 364, 162 N. W. 312, L. R. A. 1917 D, 829. 2 International Harvester Co. ». McAdam, 142 Wis. 114, 124 N. W. 1042, 26 L. R. A. (n. s.) 774, 20 Ann. Cas. 614. ’The contract is made in the State in which the offer is accepted. Holder v. Aultman, Miller & Co., 169 U. S. 81, 42 L. ed. 669, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 269, aff. 68 Fed. Rep. 467. Upon validity of contracts made by foreign corporations which have not complied with statutory conditions pre- scribed as precedent to their right to do business in the State, see Edison Gen. Electric Co. v. Canadian Pace. Nav. Co., 8 Wash. 370, 36 Pac. 260, 24 L. R. A. 315 and note, 40 Am. St. 910. 4 Runyon »v. Coster’s Lessee, 14 Pet. 122, 10 L. ed. 382; Merrick »v. Van Santvoord, 34 N. Y. 208; Saul v. His Creditors, 5 Mart. (n. s.) 569, 16 Am. Dec. 212; Greenwood v. Curtis, 6 Mass. 258, 4 Am. Dec. 145; Galveston, ete. R. Co. v. Wallace, 223 U. S. 481, 56 L. ed. 516, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 205; Bond v. Hume, 243 U.S. 15, 61 L. ed. 565, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 366 ; Union Trust Co. v. Grosman, 245 U. S. 412, 62 L. ed. 368, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 147; Smead v. Chandler, 71 Ark. 505, 76 S. W. 1066, 65 L. R. A. 358; Beauchamp ». Bertig, 90 Ark. 351, 119 S. W. 75, 23CHAP. V] would violate its constitution or statutes.] * POWERS LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT MAY EXERCISE 251 So, though a corpora- tion created by or under the laws of one State has, in strictness, no L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 659; Collins v. Metro- politan L. Ins. Co., 282 Ill. 37, 83 N. E. 542, 122 Am. St. Rep. 54, 14 L. R. A. (vn. s.) 356, 13 Ann. Cas. 129; Clarey v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 143 Ky. 540, 1386S. W. 1014, 33 L. R. A. (x. s.) 881; Corbin v. Houlehan, 100 Me. 246, 61 Atl. 131, 70 L. R. A. 568; Meacham v. Jamestown, etc., R. Co., 211 N. Y. 346, 105 N. E. 653, Ann. Cas. 1915 C, 851; Cannaday »v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 143 N. C. 439, 55 S. E. 836, 118 Am. St. Rep. 821, 8 L. R. A. (nN. 8.) 939; Burrus »v. Witcover, 158 N. C. 384, 74 8S. E. 11, 20) Tae Re AG (anys) L005) Kleme: Keller, 42 Okla. 592, 141 Pac. 1117, Ann. Gas. 1916 D, 1070; Marx ». Hefner, 46 Okla. 453, 149 Pac. 207, Ann. Cas. 1917 B, 656; Winward 2. Lincoln, 23 R. I. 476, 51 Atl. 106, 64 L. R. A. 160; First National Bank of Geneva v. Shaw, 109 Tenn. 237, 70 S. W. 807, 97 Am. St. Rep. 840, 59 L. R. A. 498; Snyder v. Yates, 112 Tenn. 309, 79 S. W. 796, 105 Am. St. Rep. 941, 64 L. R. A. 353; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Thompson, 100 Tex. 185, 97 S. W. 459, 123 Am. St. Rep. 798, 7 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 191; Palmer 2. Palmer, 26 Utah, 31, 72 Pac. 3, 99 Am. St. Rep. 820, 61 L. R. A. 641; National Car Advertising Co. ». Louisville, ete., R. Co., 110 Va. 413, 66 S. E. 88, 24 L. R. A. (w. s.) 1010; Presbyterian Ministers’ Fund ». Thomas, 126 Wis. 281, 105 N. W. 801, 110 Am. St. Rep. 919; Fox v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 138 Wis. 648, 120 N. W. 399, 28 L. R. A. (w. s.) 490; In- ternational Harvester Co. v. McAdam, 142 Wis. 114, 124 N. W. 1042, 26 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 774. In Greenwood v. Curtis, 6 Mass. 258, 4 Am. Dec. 145, Parsons, Ch. J., says the rule that foreign contracts will be enforced in our own courts is subject to two exceptions. One is when the Commonwealth or its citi- zens may be injured by giving legal effect to the contract by a judgment in our courts; and the other is, when the giving of legal effect to the contract would exhibit to the citizens of the State an example pernicious and de- testable. The first he illustrates by a contract for an importation forbidden by the local law, and the second by an agreement for an incestuous marriage. Another illustration under the first head is, where enforcing the foreign contract would deprive a home credi- tor of a lien. Ingraham v. Geyer, 13 Mass. 146. Compare Oliver v. Steiglitz, 27 Ohio St. 355, 22 Am. Rep. 312; Arayo v. Currell, 1 La. 528, 20 Am. Dec. 286. From the fact that a contract could not have been validly made in a State, it does not necessarily follow that it is contrary to the public policy of the State. To be so, the contract must be, by moral standards in the judg- ment of the court, pernicious and in- jurious to the public welfare. Inter- national Harvester Co. v. McAdam, 142 Wis. 114, 124 N. W. 1042, 26 L. R. A. (n. 8.) 774, 20 Ann. Cas. 614. 1Qscanyan v. Winchester Repeat- ing Arms Co., 103 U. S. 261, 26 L. ed. 539; Falls v. United States Savings Loan & Bldg. Co., 97 Ala. 417, 13 So. 25, 38 Am. St. Rep. 194, 24 L. R. A. 174; Rhodes v. Missouri Savings & Loan Co., 173 Ill. 621, 50 N. E. 998, 42 L. R. A. 93; Sondheim »v. Gilbert, 117 Ind. 71, 18 N. E. 687, 10 Am. St. Rep. 23, 5 L. R. A. 432; Moore v. Church, 70 Iowa, 208, 30 N. W. 855, 59 Am. Rep. 439; Galliano v. Pierre, 18 La. Ann. 10, 89 Am. Dec. 643; Corbin v. Houlehan, 100 Me. 246, 61 Atl. 131, 70 L. R. A. 568; Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Genn, 28 Md. 287, 92 Am. Dee. 688; Com. v. Griffith, 204 Mass. 18, 90 N. E. 394, 134 Am. St. Rep. 645, 25 L. R. A. (vn. 8.) 957; Seamans v. Temple Co., 105 Mich. 400, 63 N. W. 408, 55 Am. St. Rep. 457, 28 L. R. A. 430; Ivey v. Lalland, 42 Miss. 444, 97 Am. Dec. 475, 2 Am. Rep. 606; Richardson v. De Giverville, 107 Mo. 422, 17 S. W. 974, 28 Am. St. Rep. 426; Smith-v. Godfrey, 28 N. H. 379, 61 Am. Dec. 617; Varnum v. Camp, 13 N. J. L. 326, 25 Am. Dec. 476; Flagg v. Baldwin, 38 N. J. Eq. 219, 48 Am. Rep. 308; Vanderpoel v. Gorman,252 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I extra-territorial life or authority, and cannot of right insist upon extending its operations within the limits of another, yet this will 140 N.: ¥. 563, 35 N. E:.932, 37 Am. St. Rep. 601, 24 L. R. A. 548; Canna- day v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 143 N. GC. 439, 55 S. E. 836, 118 Am. St. Rep:* 821,78 L. “R- AS (nN; (s5)) 939); Burrus v. Witcover, 158 N. C. 384, 748. #..11,.39 L. R. A. (n. s.) 1005; Swing v. Munson, 191 Pa. St. 582, 43 Atl. 342, 71 Am. St. Rep. 772, 58 L. R. A. 223; Brown v. Browning, 15 R. I. 422, 7 Atl. 403, 2 Am. St. Rep. 908; Gist v. Western Union Tel. Co., 45 S. C. 344, 23S. E. 143, 55 Am. St. Rep. 763; Fidelity Mut. Life Ass’n v. Harris, 94 Tex. 25, 57 S. W. 635, 86 Am. St. Rep. 813; Palmer v. Palmer, 26 Utah, 31, 72 Pac. 3, 99 Am. St. Rep. 820, 61 L. R. A. 641; Presby- terian Ministers’ Fund v. Thomas, 126 Wis. 281, 105 N. W. 801, 110 Am. St. Rep. 919; Fox». Postal Tel. Cable Co., 138 Wis. 648, 120 N. W. 399, 28 L. R. A. (n.s.) 490; International Harvester Co. v. McAdam, 142 Wis. 114, 124 N. W. 1042, 26 L. R. A. (N. s.) 774, 20 Ann. Cas. 614. In Bond v. Hume, 243 U. S. 15, 61 L. ed. 565, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 366, Mr. Chief Justice White, who de- livered the opinion of the court, said: “Elementary as is the rule of comity, it is equally rudimentary that an inde- pendent State under that principle will not lend the aid of its courts to enforce a contract founded upon a foreign law where to do so would be repugnant to good morals, would lead to disturbance and disorganization of the local municipal law, or, in other words, violate the public policy of the State where the enforcement of the foreign contract is sought. It is, moreover, axiomatic that the exist- ence of the described conditions pre- venting the enforcement in a given case does not exclusively depend upon legislation, but may result from a judicial consideration of the subject, although it is also true that courts of one sovereignty will not refuse to give effect to the principle of comity by declining to enforee contracts which are valid under the laws of another sovereignty unless constrained to do so by clear convictions of the existence of the conditions justifying that course. And finally, it is certain that, as it is peculiarly within the province of the law-making power to define the public policy of the State, where that power has been exerted in such a way as to manifest that a violation of public policy would result from the enforcement of a foreign contract validly entered into under a foreign law, comity will yield to the mani- festation of the legislative will and enforcement will not be permitted. It is certain that these principles which govern as between countries foreign to each other apply with greater force to the relation of the several states to each other, since the obligations of the Constitution which bind them all in a common orbit of national unity impose of necessity restrictions which otherwise would not obtain, and exact a greater degree of respect for each other than otherwise by the principles of comity would be expected.” If asale of goods is valid where made though it would not be where the buyer lives and where it is sought to be enforced, it will be upheld in the latter State, unless the seller partici- pates in the reselling there: Feineman v. Sachs, 33 Kan. 621; Parsons Oil Co. v. Boyett, 44 Ark. 230; not if the order was unlawfully solicited in the buyer’s State. Jones v. Surprise, 64 N. H. 243. Gambling contracts as to stocks valid in New York will not be enforced in New Jersey. Flagg v. Baldwin, 38 N. J. Eq. 219. Buta contract limiting a carrier’s liability, valid in New York where made, will be enforced in Penn- sylvania, though invalid if made there. Forepaugh v. Del. L. & W. R. R. Co., 128 Pa. St. 217, 18 Atl. 503. The rule that the law of a place of a contract governs, as to the validity and interpretation, applies to the capacity, including that of married women, to contract. International Harvester Co. v. McAdam, 142 Wis. 114, 124 N. W. 1042, 26 L. R. A. (n. 8.) 774, 20 Ann. Cas. 614.CHAP. V| POWERS LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT MAY EXERCISE 253 be suffered without objection where no local policy forbids; * and the corporation may make contracts, and acquire, hold, and convey 1 The question whether a foreign cor- poration shall be permitted to do business in a State rests wholly with the State which the corporation seeks to enter for that purpose; and if per- mission is granted it may be under such conditions and regulations as the State shall impose, providing matters of a Federal nature are not affected thereby. Crescent Cotton Oil Co. ». Mississippi, 257 U. S. 129, 66 L. ed. 166, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 42; State »v. Hodges, 114 Ark. 155, 168 S. W. 942, L. R. A. 1916 F, 122; International Trust Co. v. A. Leschen, etc., Rope Co., 41 Colo. 299, 92 Pac. 727, 14 Ann. Cas. 861; In re Speed, 216 Ill. 23, 74 N. E. 809, 108 Am. St. Rep. 189; Lehigh Portland Cement Co. v. McLean, 245 Ill. 326, 92 N. E. 248, 137 Am. St. Rep. 322; Prewitt v. Security Life Ins. Co., 119 Ky. 321, 83 S. W. 611, 84 S. W. 527, 115 Am. St. Rep. 264, 1 L. R. A. (n. 8.) 1019, affirmed 202 U. S. 246, 50 L. ed. 1013; 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 619, State v. Hammond Packing Co., 110 La. 180, 34 So. 368, 98 Am. St. Rep. 459; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Assessors of Parish of Orleans, 115 La. 698, 39 So. 846, 116 Am. St. Rep. 179, 9 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 1240; Southern Electric Securities Co. ». State, 91 Miss. 195, 44 So. 785, 124 Am. St. Rep. 638; State v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., 97 Miss. 35, 51 So. 918, 53 So. 454, Ann. Cas. 1912 C, 1150; Cheek v. Prudential Ins. Co., (Mo.) 192 Se Wa 387, a. Re A. 1918) Aly L6G); Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. ». Lewis, etc., County, 28 Mont. 484, 72 Pac. 982, 98 Am. St. Rep. 572; Boston Ice Co. v. Boston, etc. R., 77 N. H. 6, 86 Atl. 356, 45 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 835, Ann. Cas. 1914 A, 1090; Woodward v. Mutual Reserve Life Ins. Co., 178 N. Y. 485, 71 N. E. 10, 102 Am. St. Rep. 519; Williams v. Mutual Re- serve Fund Life Ass’n, 145 N. C. 128, 58 S. E. 802, 13 Ann. Cas. 51; Frink v. National Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 90 S. C. 544, 74S. E. 33, Ann. Cas. 1913 D, 221; Cunnyngham ». Shelby, 136 Tenn. 176, 188 S. W. 1147, L. R. A. 1917 B, 572; Cook v. Howland, 74 Vt. 393, 52 Atl. 973, 93 Am. St. Rep. 912, 59 L. R. A. 338. “The authority of the State to re- strict the right of a foreign corpora- tion to engage in business within its limits or to sue in its courts, so long as interstate commerce be not thereby burdened, is perfectly well settled. Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 181, 19 L. ed. 357, 360; Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 655, 39 L. ed. 297, 300, 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 610, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 207; Bank of Augusta v. Harle, 13 Pet. 519, 589, 591, 10 L. ed. 274, 308, 309; Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co., 191 U.S. 373, 48 L. ed. 225, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 92; Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope, 235 U.S. 197, 208, 59 L. ed. 198, 197, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 57.” Interstate Amuse- ment Co. v. Albert, 239 U. S. 560, 60 Ii. ed. 439; 86 Sup: Ct: Rep: 168: See also Munday v. Wisconsin Trust Co., 252 U. S. 499, 64 L. ed. 684, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 365; Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282, 66 L. ed. 239, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 106; State ea rel. Kimberlite Dia- mond Mining, etc., Co. v. Hodges, 114 Ark. 155, 169 S. W. 942, L. R. A. 1916 F, 122. A State may prescribe conditions upon which a foreign corporation may do business within its borders, and for breach of such conditions may ex- clude the corporation, except where it is doing business of a Federal nature. Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 177 U. S. 28, 44 L. ed. 657, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 518, aff. 19 Tex. Civ. App: 5 44 S. W. 936. Upon admission or exclusion of foreign corporations, see Cone Export and Commission Co. ». Poole, 41 S. C. 70, 19 S. E. 208, 24 L. R. A. 289 and note; exclusion, regulation, and taxation of foreign corporations, note to 24 C. C. A. 13} regulation of business of a foreign cor- poration by State, Boulware v. Davis, 90 Ala. 207, 8 So. 84, 9 L. R. A. 601 and note; and that foreign corpora- tions are amenable to local law, see Talbot v. Fidelity, &c. Co., 74 Md.254 536, 22 Atl. 395, 13 L. R. A. 584; Stone v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 116 U.S. 347, 29 L. ed. 650, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 348; Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 66 L. ed. 1044, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. MR, Gf Ny lb 1 24/8 Thomas v. Wentworth Hotel Co., 158 Cal. 275, 110 Pac. 942, 139 Am. St. Rep. 120; McGuire v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 131 Towa, 340, 108 N. W. 902, 33 L. R. A. (x. s.) 706; In re Consolidated Rendering Co., 80 Vt. 55, 66 Atl. 790, 11 Ann. Cas. 1069. A foreign life insurance company which enters a State and does business therein is bound to observe the laws of that State, and its contracts thus made will be interpreted according to the laws of that State even though the parties expressly stipulate that the contract shall be interpreted ac- cording to the laws of another State. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Cravens, 178 U. S. 389, 44 L. ed. 1116, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 962, aff. 148 Mo. 583, 50 S. W. 519, 71 Am. St. 628; Cook v. Howland, 74 Vt. 393, 52 Atl. 973, 938 Am. St. Rep. 912, 59 L. R. A. 338. A State has power to prescribe the conditions under which a foreign insurance cor- poration may do business within its borders, and to provide and enforce penalties for breach of those condi- tions. Noble v. Mitchell, 164 U. S. 367, 41 L. ed. 472, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 110. And the State may penalize any act done within its borders looking toward the formation of contract re- lations with a foreign corporation which it has forbidden to do business within its borders. Hooper v. Cali- fornia, 155 U. S. 647, 39 L. ed. 297, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 207; but it cannot prevent the doing within its borders by its citizens of acts otherwise lawful which are reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of contracts which such cit- izens have made without its borders, even though they be made with for- eign corporations which the State has forbidden to do business within its borders. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 41 L. ed. 832, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 427. And a requirement that before doing business within the State the foreign corporation shall surrender a right which it derives from the Con- CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I stitution and laws of the United States is void. Southern Pac. Co. v. Denton, 146 U. S. 202, 36 L. ed. 943, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 44. If State taxes its own corporations upon their entire capital, the foreign corporation doing business in the State cannot object to being taxed upon its entire capital, even though it uses only a very small fraction of its capital within the State. Horn Silver Mining Co. v. New York, 143 U. S. 305, 36 L. ed. 164, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 403, aff. 105 N. Y. 76, 11 N. E. 155. A foreign corporation does business in a particular State not by right but by comity, and its license to do so may be revoked at pleasure. State v. Standard Oil Co., 61 Neb. 28, 84 N. W. 413, 87 Am. St. 449; Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co., 94 U. 8. 535, 24 L. ed. 148; Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U. S. 602, 43 L. ed. 569, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 308; Security Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Perwitt, 202 U. 8. 246, 50 L. ed. 1013, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 619, 6 Ann: Cas: ‘Sie Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U. S. 322, 53 L. ed. 530, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 370, 15 Ann. Cas. 645. A railroad corporation whose road lies entirely within one State, but is a link in a through route traversing several States, over which through route interstate commerce is carried on, is engaged in interstate commerce, and no State can exact of it a license before permitting it to open an office within the borders of the State, in which office it transacts only business relating to its interstate commerce. McCall v. California, 186 U. S. 104, 34 L. ed. 392, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 881; Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 136 U. S. 114, 34 L. ed. 394, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 958. For note upon exclu- sion of foreign corporations as an in- terference with interstate commerce, see 24 L. R. A. 311. License for cur- rent year may be revoked for refusal to pay unpaid license fees for previous years. ‘Travelers’ Ins. Co. v. Fricke, 99 Wis. 367, 74 N. W. 372, 78 N. W. 407, 41 L. R. A. 557. The exclusion of a foreign corpora- tion cannot operate to prevent the per- formance of contracts lawfully enteredCHAP. V] POWERS LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT MAY EXERCISE 255 property as it would have a right to do in the State of its origin.’ [By compliance with the Constitution and laws of the State into which it has extended its operations, it may do business within the State at its pleasure, and, when dissatisfied, can withdraw at will.?] into before the order of exclusion was passed, nor impair the right to enforce the obligations arising through such performance. Bedford v. E. B’ld’g & Loan Ass’n, 181 U. S. 227, 45 L. ed. 834, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 597. Upon right to sue in foreign State, see Cone E. & GC. Co. v. Poole, 418. C. 70, 19 S. E. 203, 24 L. R. A. 289, and note therein on recognition or exclu- sion of foreign corporations. On power of a State to prevent foreign corporations operating within its bor- ders from violating its exemption laws by garnishment proceedings in other States, see Singer M’f’g Co. v. Fleming, 39 Neb. 679, 58 N. W. 226, 23 L. R. A. 210, 42 Am. St. 613. An action to exclude a foreign cor- poration from the State is a civil action, and the defendant corporation may be compelled to give evidence against itself. State v. Standard Oil Co., 61 Neb. 28, 84 N. W. 413. For other cases upon foreign cor- porations, see Southern B. & L. Ass’n v. Norman, 98 Ky. 294, 32 S. W. 952, 31 L. R. A. 41, 56 Am. St. 367; Kindel v. Beck & P. Lith. Co., 19 Col. 310, 35 Pac. 538, 24 L. R. A. 311; Gunn ». White S. M. Co., 57 Ark. 24, 20S. W. 591, 18 L. R. A. 206, 38 Am. St. 223; State v. Phipps, 50 Kan. 609, 31 Pac. 1097, 18 L. R. A. 657, 34 Am. St. 152. 1 Silver Lake Bank v. North, 4 Johns. Ch. 370; Jessup v. Carnegie, 80 N. Y. 441; Lumbard v. Aldrich, 8 N. H. 31; Lothrop v. Commercial Bank, 8 Dana, 114; National Trust Co. v. Murphy, 30 N. J. Eq. 408; Elston v. Piggott, 94 Ind. 14; People v. Howard, 50 Mich. 239; Christian Union v. Yount, 101 U.S. 352, 25 L. ed. 888; Armour Packing Co. v. Vinegar Bend Lumber Co., 149 Ala. 205, 42 So. 866, 13 Ann. Cas. 951; American De Forest Wire- less Tel. Go. v. Superior Ct., 153 Cal. 533, 96 Pac. 15, 126 Am. St. Rep. 125, l7/ Ib, 18, AN, @e Sy), Tle roe Portland, 106 Me. 234, 76 Atl. 679, 30 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 576, 20 Ann. Cas. 603; Helena Power Transmission Co. v. Spratt, 35 Mont. 108, 88 Pac. 773, 8 L. R. A. (nN. 8.) 567, 10 Ann. Cas. 1055; McCarter v. Firemen’s Ins. Co., 74.N. J. Eq. 372, 73 Atl. 80, 414, 135 Am. St. Rep. 708, 29 L. R. A. (n. s.) 1194, 18 Ann. Cas. 1048; Booth v. Weigand, 30 Utah, 135, 83 Pac. 734, 10 L. R. A. (n. s.) 693; Cook v. Howland, 74 Vt. 393, 52 Atl. 973, 93 Am. St. Rep. 912, 59 L. R. A. 338. 2 Jennings v. Idaho Ry., ete., Co., 26 Idaho, 703, 146 Pac. 101, L. R. A. 1915 D, 115, Ann. Cas. 1916 H, 359. A foreign corporation has no right to do business in any other State ex- cept by comity and upon the express or implied consent of such other State and upon such conditions as such other State may think proper to impose. But the principle of comity which permits corporations of one State to transact business in another State is one of general acceptance, and is enforced by the courts of every juris- diction until destroyed by the law- making power. People ex rel. Potts v. Continental Beneficial Ass’n, 280 Ill. 113, 117 N. E. 482. But though a corporation organized under the laws of one State is permitted by another State, upon compliance with its laws, to carry on its business there, such permission and compliance does not make it a resident of such other State. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519, 10 L. ed. 277; New York Ins. Co. v. Pike, 51 Colo. 238, 117 Pac. 899; Barbour v. Paige Hotel Co., 2 App. D. C. 174; Boyer v. Northern Pace. R. Co., 8 Idaho, 74, 66 Pac. 826, 70 L. R. A. 691; Jennings v. Idaho Ry., etc., Co., 26 Idaho, 703, 146 Pac. 101, L. R. A. 1915 D, 115, Ann. Cas. 1916 E, 359; Blackstone Mfg. Co. v. Black- stone, 13 Gray (Mass.) 488; Merrick v. Van Santvoord, 34 N. Y. 208; Cowardin v. Universal Life Ins. Co. 32 Gratt. (Va.) 445. The words “doing business’, as used in a constitutional provision for-256 bidding corporations to do business in the State without having a place of business, with an agent on whom process may be served, ete., refer to a general transaction of business, and not to an isolated transaction, or to single, or wholly collateral acts. Booth v. Weigand, 30 Utah, 135, 83 Pac. 734, 10 L. R. A. (x. s.) 693. Tak- ing an order in one State for the de- livery of goods in another is not such a doing of business as to require com- pliance with a statute for filing cer- tificate, &c., before transacting of business by a foreign corporation. Cooper Mfg. Co. v. Ferguson, 113 U: S! 727% 28 li. ed: 1137, 5) Sup: Ct. Rep. 739. Discounting a note sent from another State is not doing busi- ness in the State from which the note is sent. Bamberger & Co. v. School- field, 160 U. S. 149, 40 L. ed. 374, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 225. Nor is filling an order for coal, order being sent from another State, a doing of business in that other State. Delaware & H. Canal Co. v. Mahlenbrock, 63 N. J. L. 281, 43 Atl. 978, 45 L. R. A. 538. Being interested as silent partner in a limited partnership in the State is doing business within it. People »v. Roberts, 152 N. Y. 59, 46 N. E. 161, 36 L. R. A. 756. But prosecuting a suit isnot. St. Louis, A. & T. R. Co. v. Fire Assn. of Phila., 60 Ark. 325, 30S. W. 350, 28 L. R. A. 83. Nor is taking a single mortgage for past-due indebtedness for goods sold at its domicile. Florsheim, &c. Co. v. Lester, 60 Ark. 120, 29S. W. 34, 27 L. R. A. 505, 46 Am. St. 162. Where the foreign corporation has no office or agency within the State, its sale of machinery to a resident and its subse- quent coming into the State and erecting the machinery is only inter- state commerce and not a doing busi- ness within the State which the State can control. Milan M. &. M. Co. ». Gorton, 93 Tenn. 590, 27 S. W. 971, 26 L. R. A. 135. Upon what is doing business within a State, and under what circumstances an agent doing business within the State may be served with process against the corpo- ration, see Connecticut Life Ins. Co. »v. Spratley, 172 U.S. 602, 43 L. ed. 569, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 308, aff. 99 Tenn. 322, 42S. W. 145. As to what constitutes doing business in a State, see also State ex rel. Kimberlite Diamond Mining, ete., Co. v. Hodges, 114 Ark. 155, 169 S. W. 942, L. R. A. 1916 F, 122; Atkinson v. United States Operating Co., 129 Minn. 232, 152 N. W. 410, L. R. A. 1916 E, 241; Saxony Mills v. Wagner, 94 Miss. 233, 47 So. 899, 186 Am. St. Rep. 575, 23 L. R. A. (wv. s.) 834, 19 Ann. Cas. 199; Berger v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 27 R. I. 583, 65 Atl. 261, 9 L. R. A. (n. 8.) 1214, 8 Ann. Cas. 941. Where corporation is foreign and does no business in the State, nor has any agent or property therein, service of summons upon the president tem- porarily within the State is ineffective to give jurisdiction to a Federal circuit court sitting therein, and appearance specially and solely for purpose of petitioning for removal of cause to another Federal court does not waive the objection to insufficiency of sum- mons and service. Goldey v. Morning News, 156 U. S. 518, 39 L. ed. 517, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 559. Foreign corporation doing business within a State thereby subjects itself to the local regulations concerning suits against non-residents. N. Y., L. E. & W. R. Co. v. Estill, 147 U. S. 591, 37 L. ed. 292, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 444. And to local tax laws. Horn Silver Mining Co. v. New York, 143 U.S. 305, 36 L. ed. 164, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 403. And the State may by penalties enforce it to comply with its laws. Moses v. State, 65 Miss. 56. But it is beyond the power of a State to forfeit or extend the corporate existence of a foreign corporation. It can exercise no power or control over the corporation as such. Jennings ». Idaho Ry., etc., Co., 26 Idaho, 703, 146 Pac. 101, L. R. A. 1915 D, 115, Ann. Cas. 1916 E, 359. And after the corporation has completely with- drawn from the State and no longer does any business there, it is not sub- ject to State process. Mutual R. F. Life Assn. v. Boyer, 62 Kan. 31, 61 Pac. 387, 50 L. R. A. 538. Powers not allowed to such a corporation in the State where created, it will not beCHAP. V] POWERS LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT MAY EXERCISE 257 Real estate, however, it can only take, hold, and transmit in accord- ance with the rules prescribed by the law of the State in which the estate is situate;! and the principle of comity is never so far ex- tended as to give force and effect to the penal laws of one political society within the territory of another, even though both belong to one political system.? The question whether a statute giving a right of action for a death occurring within a State can be enforced in another State has given rise to much discussion. In several States it is held that the remedy is purely local, and that the action can only be brought in the State where the killing takes place. But in several the rule is that an action will lie in another State, if the suffered to exercise elsewhere. Stark- weather v. Bible Society, 72 Ill. 50, 22 Am. Rep. 133; Kerr v. Dougherty, 79 N. Y. 327; Thompson v. Waters, 25 Mich. 214. If it acts in excess of its conferred authority, it may be ques- tioned as to its authority only by the State. Migatt v. Ponca City Land, etc., Co., 14 Okla. 189, 78 Pac. 185, 68 L. R. A. 810. 1A rule which applies even to the government itself. United States v. Fox, 94 U. S. 315, 24 L. ed. 192. See State v. Scott, 22 Neb. 628, 36 N. W. 121. Only a State can raise the question whether a foreign corporation can rightfully acquire land for its business purposes. Barnes v. Suddard, 117 Ill. 237, 7 N. E. 477. Failure of such corporation to comply with statutory conditions precedent to doing business does not avoid a conveyance to it so that a private person can attack it col- laterally. Fritts v. Palmer, 132 U. S. 382, 33 L. ed. 317, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 93. Compare Koenig v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co., 27 Neb. 699, 438 N. W. 423. But it has been held that where, in an action by a foreign cor- poration, there is an attempt on the part of such corporation to acquire title to property vested in an individ- ual, such individual may deny its corporate capacity as a defense to its right of recovery. Myatt v. Ponca City Land, ete., Co., 14 Okla. 189, 78 Pac. 185, 68 L. R. A. 810. See also Plummer v. Chesapeake, ete., R. Co., 143 Ky. 102, 136 S. W. 162, 33 L. R. A. (x. s.) 862; Hanna v. Kelsey Realty Voli Ue Co., 145 Wis. 276, 129 N. W. 1080, 140 Am. St. Rep. 1075, 33 L. R. A. (n. s.) 355. 2 Dickson v. Dickson, 1 Yerg. 110, 24 Am. Dec. 444; Scoville v. Canfield, 14 Johns. 338, 7 Am. Dec. 467; First National Bank v. Price, 33 Md. 487, 3 Am. Rep. 204; Lindsey v. Hill, 66 Me. 212, 22 Am. Rep. 564; Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Wallace, 223 U.S. 481, 56 L. ed. 516, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 205; Cristilly v. Warner, 87 Conn. 461, 88 AG ale tol We Re VAS a(NS (ss) 45); Raisor v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 215 Ill. 47, 74 N. E. 69, 106 Am. St. Rep. 153, 2 Ann. Cas. 802; Rogers »v. Western Union Tel. Co., 122 Ind. 395, 24 N. EB. 157, 17 Am. St. Rep. 373; Great Western Machinery Co. v. Smith, 87 Kan. 331, 124 Pac. 414, 41 L. R. A. (vn. s.) 379, Ann. Cas. 1913 E, 243; Gulledge Bros. Lumber Co. v. Wenatchee Land Co., 122 Minn. 266, 142 N. W. 305, 46 L. R. A. (N. s.) 697; Hill v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 77 N. H. 151, 89 Atl. 482, Ann. Cas. 1914 C, 714; Gardner v. Rumsey, 81 Okla. 20, 196 Pac. 941, 25 A. L. R. 1411; Nesbitt v. Clark, 272 Pa. St. 161, 116 Atl. 404, 25 A. L. R. 1406; Brower v. Watson, 146 Tenn. 626, 244 S. W. 362, 26 A. L. R. 991; State v. Peet, 80 Vt. 449, 68 Atl. 661, 180 Am. St. Rep. 998. The Federal courts will not enforce at the suit of a State its penal laws against a foreign corporation. Wis- consin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U. S. 265, 32 L. ed. 239, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1370.258 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [voL. 1 statutes of the latter are substantially like those of the State where the death is caused.! [The Constitution of the United States empowers Congress to exer- cise exclusive jurisdiction over places purchased by consent of the legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings. When the United States acquire lands without such consent, the State jurisdiction is as complete as if the lands were owned by pri- vate citizens; and the State, in giving consent, may reserve the right to serve State process within the territory,” or to tax railroads in it, and its railroad fencing statutes remain in force.’ But offenses within the purchased territory can only be punished by the United States,®° even though death ensues out of the territory ;® and resi- dents within such territory are not citizens of the State.”] Other Limitations of Legislative Authority. Besides the limitations of legislative authority to which we have referred, others exist which do not seem to call for special remark. Some of these are prescribed by constitutions,’ but others spring from 1See Taylor v. Penn. Co., 78 Ky. 348; Debevoise v. New York, L. E. SWE Rea R: Com 98 Ne Yi. 3775 St: Louis, I. M. &e. Co. v. McCormick, 71 Tex. 660, 9 S. W. 540; Dennick »v. Railroad Co., 103 U. S. 11, 26 L. ed. 439; Florida Cent. R. Co. v. Sullivan, bi Cai Cre. 9167, 120) Hed: 799) 61 L. R. A. 410; Weir v. Rountree, 97 C. C. A. 500, 173 Fed. 776, 19 Ann. Cas. 1204; Strait ». Yazoo, etc., R. Co., 126 C. C. A. 105, 209 Fed. 157, 49 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 1068; Weissengoff v. Davis, 171 C. C. A. 52, 260 Fed. 16, 7 A. L. R. 307; Dougherty v. Ameri- can McKenna Press Co., 255 Ill. 369, 99 N. E. 619, Ann. Cas. 1913 D, 568; In re Coe, 130 Iowa, 307, 106 N. W. 743, 114 Am. St. Rep. 416, 8 Ann. Cas. 148,4L. R. A. (n. s.) 814; Renlund »v. Commodore Min. Co., 89 Minn. 41, 93 N. W. 1057, 99 Am. St. Rep. 534; Stewart v. Great Northern R. Co., 103 Minn. 156, 114 N. W. 953, 123 Am. St. Rep. 318; McGinnis v. Missouri Car, etc., Co., 174 Mo. 225, 73 S. W. 586, 97 Am. St. Rep. 553; Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Chambers, 73 Ohio St. 1G /OeNe HO lemllenaehe AS (Ne So) 1012; Dennis v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 70S. C. 254, 49 S. E. 869, 106 Am. St. Rep. 746; Sharp v. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co., 133 Tenn. 1, 179S. W. 375, Ann. Cas. 1917 C, 1212. 2State v. Dimick, 12 N. H. 194; Commonwealth v. Clary, 8 Mass. 72; United States v. Cornell, 2 Mass. 60; Opinion of Judges, 1 Met. 580. 3 Fort Leavenworth R. R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525, 29 L. ed. 264, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 995. 4 Chicago, R. I., &e. Co. v. MeGlinn, 114 U.S. 542, 29 L. ed. 270, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1005. 6 United States v. Ames, 1 Wood. & M. 76; Mitchell v. Tibbetts, 17 Pick. 298. 6 Kelly v. United States, 27 Fed. 616; State v. Kelly, 76 Me. 331. 7 Commonwealth v. Clary, 8 Mass. 72; Sinks v. Roese, 19 Ohio St. 306. 8 The restrictions upon State legisla- tive authority are much more extensive in some constitutions than in others. The Constitution of Missouri of 1865 had the following provision: ‘The General Assembly shall not pass special laws divorcing any named parties, or declaring any named person of age, or authorizing any named minor toCHAP. V| sell, lease, or encumber his or her property, or providing for the sale of the real estate of any named minor or other person laboring under legal disability, by any executor, adminis- trator, guardian, trustee, or other person, or establishing, locating, alter- ing the course, or affecting the con- struction of roads, or the building or repairing of bridges, or establishing, altering, or vacating any street, ave- nue, or alley in any city or town, or extending the time for the assessment or collection of taxes, or otherwise relieving any assessor or collector of taxes from the due performance of his official duties, or giving effect to informal or invalid wills or deeds, or legalizing, except as against the State, the unauthorized or invalid acts of any officer, or granting to any in- dividual or company the right to lay down railroad tracks in the streets of any city or town, or exempting any property of any named person or corporation from taxation. The Gen- eral Assembly shall pass no special law for any case for which provision can be made by a general law, but shall pass general laws providing, so far as it may deem necessary, for the cases enumerated in this section, and for all other cases where a general law can be made applicable.” Art. 4, § 27. We should suppose that so stringent a provision would, in some of these cases, lead to the passage of general laws of doubtful utility in order to remedy the hardships of par- ticular cases; but the Constitution adopted in 1875 is still more restric- tive. Art. 4, § 53. Under a Constitution providing that ‘‘where a general law can be made applicable no special law shall be enacted’, laws of a general nature do not necessarily have to operate upon every locality in the State, but such laws must apply equally to all classes similarly situated and to like conditions and subjects. Sapulpa v. Land, 101 Okla. 22, 223 Pac. 640, 35 A. L. R. 872. “A law is general in the constitu- tional sense, which applies to and op- erates uniformily upon all members of any class of persons, places or things requiring legislation peculiar POWERS LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT MAY EXERCISE 259 to itself in matters covered by the law, while a special law is one which relates and applies to _ particular members of a class, either particular- ized by the express terms of the act or separated by any method of selection from the whole class to which the law might, but for such limitation, be applicable.’’ Clendaniel v. Conrad, 3 Boyce (Del.) 549, 83 Atl. 1036, Ann. Cas. 1915 B, 968, quoting Lewis’ Sutherland Statutory Construction (2nd Ed.) § 196. See also Title, etc., Restoration Co. v. Kerrigan, 150 Cal. 289, 88 Pac. 356, 119 Am. St. Rep. 199, 8 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 682; Mix v. Nez Perce County, 18 Idaho, 695, 112 Pac. 215, 32 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 584; Mathews ». People, 202 Ill. 389, 67 N. E. 28, 95 Am: St. Rep. 241, 63 L. R. A. 73; King v. Com., 194 Ky. 143, 238 S. W. 373, 22 A. L. R. 585; O’Connor »v. St. Louis Transit Co., 198 Mo. 622, 97 S. W. 150, 115 Am. St. Rep. 495, 8 Ann. Cas. 703; State v. Swagerty, 203 Mo. 517, 102 S. W. 4838, 120 Am. St. Rep. 671, 10 L. R. A (wv. s.) 601, 11 Ann. Cas. 725; Hays v. Hogan, 273 Mo. 1, 200 S. W. 286, L. R. A. 1918 GC, 715; Boorum v. Connelly, 66 N. J. L. 197, 48 Atl. 955, 88 Am. St. Rep. 469; Bishop v. Tulsa, (Okla. Crim. Rep.) 209 Pac. 228, 27 A. L. R. 1008; Ladd v. Holmes, 40 Oreg. 167, 66 Pac. 714, 91 Am. St. Rep. 457; In re Washington St., 132 Pa. St. 257, 1OPAGIS 2198 771 Re AS 193)" Use, v. Hiott, 30 S. C. 360, 9 S. E. 338, 14 Am. St. Rep. 910; McEldowney v. Wyatt, 44 W. Va. 711, 30S. E. 239, 45 L. R. A. 609. “Laws which are framed in general terms and are not restricted in locality, but operate equally upon all groups of objects, which, having regard to the purpose of the legislation, are dis- tinguished by characteristics suffi- ciently marked and important to make them a class by themselves, are general. Special legislation is such as relates either to particular persons, places, or things, or to persons, places, or things which, though not particularized, are separated by any method of selection from the whole class to which the law might, but for such legislation, be applied, while a local law is one whose260 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I operation is confined within terri- torial limits, other than those of the whole State or any properly con- stituted class or locality therein.” King v. Com. ex rel. Smith, 194 Ky. 143.1238 S! W. 373, 22, As Lo Re 535: A statute which applies to all per- sons or things of a designated class uniformly throughout the State, omit- ting no person or thing belonging under that classification, is a general law within the meaning of the constitu- tion. Bishop v. City of Tulsa, (Okla. Crim Rep.) 209 Pac. 228, 27 A. L. R. 1008. Thus a statute creating and relating to municipal courts, and providing that the act shall apply to cities having more than 50,000 and less than 80,000 inhabit- ants, as determined by the last pre- ceding Federal census, is a “General Law’’, Bishop v. City of Tulsa, (Okla. Crim. Rep.) 209 Pac. 228, 27 A. L. R. 1008. In State v. Hitchcock, 1 Kan. 178, it was held that the constitutional provision, that ‘‘in all cases where a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted”’, left a discretion with the legislature to de- termine the cases in which special laws should be passed. See, to the same effect, Marks v. Trustees of Purdue University, 37 Ind. 155; State »v. Tucker, 46 Ind. 355, overruling Thomas v. Board of Commissioners, supra; Johnson v. Com’rs Wells Co., 107 Ind. 15; State v. County Court of Boone, 50 Mo. 317, 11 Am. Rep. 415; State v. Robbins, 51 Mo. 82; Hall v. Bray, 51 Mo. 288; St. Louis v. Shields, 62 Mo. 247; Carpenter v. People, 8 Col. 116, 5 Pac. 825; Richman »v. Supervisors, 77 Iowa, 513, 42 N. W. 422; Davis v. Gaines, 48 Ark. 370; Fairfield ». Huntington, 23 Ariz. 528, 205 Pac. 814, 22 A. L. R. 1438; Missouri R. Co. v. State, 92 Ark. 1, 121 S. W. 930, 135 Am. St. Rep. 164, 31 L. R. A. (N. s.) 861; People »v. McBride, 234 Ill. 146, 84 N. E. 865, 123 Am. St. Rep. 82, 14 Ann. Cas. 994; Weston v. Ryan, 70 Neb. 211, 97 N. W. 347, 6 Ann. Cas. 922. Bishop v. City of Tulsa, (Okla. Crim. Rep.) 209 Pac. 228, 27 A. L. R. 1008; Woodall v. Darst, 71 W. Va. 350, 77S. E. 264, 80 S. E. 367, 44 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 83, Ann. Cas. 1914 B, 1278. Compare Hess v. Pegg, 7 Nev. 23; Darling v. Rogers, 7 Kan. 592; Ex parte Pritz, 9 Iowa, 30; Bank of Commerce v. Wiltsie, 153 Ind. 460, 53 N. E. 950, 55 N. EH. 224, 47 L. R. A. 489; State v. Kolsem, 130 Ind. 434, 29 N. E. 595, 14 L. R. A. 566, and note; Richman v. Muscatine County, 77 Towa, 513, 42 N. W. 422,4 L. R. A. 445, 14 Am. St. 308; People v. Levee Dist. No. 6, 131 Cal. 30, 63 Pac. 342; State v. Carter, 30 Wyo. 22, 215 Pac. 477, 28 A. L. R. 1089. But see Silber- man v. Hay, 59 Ohio St. 582, 53 N. E. 258, 44 L. R. A. 264, holding that right of trial by jury is general, and that a law relating thereto and ex- pressly made applicable to a single county is void. Such a constitutional provision does not prohibit the enact- ment of a special statute appropriating money to discharge a moral obliga- tion of the State, for the fact that the legislature acknowledges one such claim as just and equitable is no reason for holding that it must recognize all other claims of a similar nature by passing a general law. The peculiar incidents connected with such claims may, in the judgment of the legisla- ture, strongly differentiate them in relation to the moral obligation pre- sented. ‘For the court to hold that a general law must be passed, if any, under which all claims of a general class of this kind could be presented and paid would . . . unduly interfere with the legislative discretion to determine what is and what is not, in its judgment, a moral, just, and equitable obligation which demands payment at its hands.” State v. Carter, 30 Wyo. 22, 215 Pac. 477, 28 A. L. R. 1089. See also Woodall v. Darst, 71 W. Va. 350, 77 S. E. 264, 44 L. R. A. (n. s.) 88, Ann. Cas. 1914 B, 1278. The fact that an act appropriating money for the relief of an employee of the State who was injured while in the performance of his duty is passed for the benefit of only one individual does not make it special legislation. Fairfield v. Huntington, 23 Ariz. 528, 205 Pac. 814, 22 A. L. R. 1438. See also Munro v. State, 223 N. Y. 208,CHAP. V] 119 N. E. 444; Babcock v. State, 190 App. Div. 147, 180 N. Y. Supp. 3, affirmed without opinion, 231 N. Y. 560, 132 N. E. 888; Kahn ». State, 117 Misc. 186, 190 N. Y. Supp. 894; Mackey v. Reeves, 44 8. D. 153, 182 N. W. 700; Woodall v. Darst, 71 W. Va. 350, 77 S. BE. 264, 80 S. E. 367, 44L.R. A. (n.s.) 83, Ann. Cas. 1914 B, 1278. Gambling cannot be made a crime everywhere except “within the limits or enclosure of a regular race course.” State v. Walsh, 1386 Mo. 400, 37S. W. 1112, 35 L. R. A. 231; see also State v. Elizabeth, 56 N. J. L. 71, 28 Atl. 51, 23 L. R. A. 525. As to when a general law can be made applicable, see Thomas v. Board of Commissioners, 5 Ind. 4; State v. Squires, 26 Iowa, 340; John- son v. Railroad Co., 23 Ill. 202. Where the legislature is forbidden to pass special or local laws regulating county or township business, a special act allowing and ordering payment of a particular claim is void, even though the claim, being merely an equitable one, cannot be audited by any existing board. Williams v. Bidleman, 7 Nev. 68. See Darling v. Rogers, 7 Kan. 592; Dean v. Spartanburg County, 59 S. C. 110, 37 S. BE. 226; Uffert ». Vogt, 65 N. J. L. 377, 621, 47 Atl. 225, 48 Atl. 574; Black v. Gloucester City, (N. J. L.) 48 Atl. 1112. Special tax liens cannot be provided for certain towns only. Burnet v. Dean, 60 N. J. Eq. 9, 46 Atl. 532. Such a provision does not prevent a special act to locate a county seat. State ». Sumter Co., 19 Fla. 518. But one arbitrarily classifying counties is spe- cial. Edmunds »v. Herbrandson, 2 N. D. 270, 50 N. W. 970, 14 L. R. A. 725. So is one changing ward bound- ariesinasingle city. State v. Newark, 53 N. J. L. 4, 20 Atl. 886, 10 L. R. A. 700. A statute forbidding the award of a contract for county printing to a paper which has not been published in the county for one year preceding the awarding of the contract, is not a special law.. State ex rel. Woare v. Board of Com’rs, 70 Mont. 252, 225 Pac. 389. See also Hersey v. Neilson, POWERS LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT MAY EXERCISE 261 47 Mont. 132, 131 Pac. 30, Ann. Cas. 1914 C, 963; Stange v. Esval, 67 Mont. 301, 215 Pac. 807. A statute is not special because it is not universal in operation by reason of earlier special laws not affected by the constitutional provision. Evans v. Phillipi, 117 Pa. St. 226, 11 Atl. 630. And a law which gives to any city hay- ing a special charter the option to adopt the provisions of a general act is not special. Adamsv. Beloit, 105 Wis. 363, 81 N. W. 869, 47 L. R. A. 441. A statute providing for abatement of bawdyhouses, which applies to all persons maintaining and operating bawdyhouses in the State, wherever situated or of whatever nature or class, is neither a special nor a local law. King v. Com. ex rel. Smith, 194 Ky. 148, 238 S. W. 373, 22 A. L. R. 535. An act laying a tax on anthracite coal, but not imposing it upon bi- tuminous coal, is not local or special legislation. Heisler v. Thomas Col- liery Co., 274 Pa. St. 448, 118 Atl. 394, 24 A. L. R. 1215, affirmed 260 U. S. 245, 67 L. ed. 237, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 83. A statute requiring, but only in cities of the second class, notice of injury on a city street, within a specified time thereafter, as a condi- tion to a right of action against the city is not a local or special law. Randolph v. City of Springfield, 302 Mo. 33, 257 S. W. 449, 31 A. L. R. 612. An act creating a criminal court for a particular county is not in conflict with the constitutional prohibition of special legislation. Titel v. State, 33 Ind. 201. See Matter of Boyle, 9 Wis. 264. Nor one allowing recovery from railroad of $5,000 in case of death. Carroll v. Missouri P. Ry. Co., 88 Mo. 239. But one providing for inter- change of judges in a single county is. Ashbrook »v. Schaub, 160 Mo. 87, 60 S. W. 1085. A Sunday law making it a misde- meanor for a baker to engage in the business of baking on Sunday is a special law, and unconstitutional in California. Ex parte Westerfield, 55 Cal. 550, 36 Am. Rep. 47. “The fact that an act authorizing the formation of corporations or con-262 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I ferring powers or privileges on corpora- tions does not apply to every person or corporation in the State, does not render the act special, if it has a uni- form operation as to all persons uni- formly situated. In other words, the fact that an act classifies persons who may form a corporation, or the pur- poses for which corporations may be formed, or the corporations which shall enjoy the powers ‘or. privileges granted, does not render it a special act, if the classification is reasonable, and if the act applies to all persons or corporations falling within particular classes.”? Clendaniel v. Conrad, 3 Boyce (Del.) 549, 83 Atl. 1036, Ann. Cas. 1915 B, 968, quoting Clark & Marshall on Corporations, vol. 1, p. 105. Where special acts conferring cor- porate powers are prohibited, the State cannot specially authorize a school district to issue bonds to erect a school-house. School District v. Insurance Co., 103 U.S. 707, 26 L. ed. 601. See, for another example, Grey v. Newark Plank-Road Co., 65 N. J. L. 51, 603, 46 Atl. 606, 48 Atl. 557. The provision does not forbid legalizing bonds of a city void from want of power to issue them: Read v. Platts- mouth, 107 U. S. 568, 27 L. ed. 414, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 208; nor in Tennessee does it cover municipal corporations : State v. Wilson, 12 Lea, 246; Bur- nett v. Maloney, 97 Tenn. 697, 37 S. W. 689, 34 L. R. A. 541; nor in Wisconsin a commission created under the police power to establish drains: State v. Stewart, 74 Wis. 620, 43 N. W. 947; applies to counties in Nevada: Schweiss v. First Judicial Dist. Ct., 23 Nev. 226, 45 Pac. 289, 34 L. R. A. 602. The word “ corporations”, in a Mississippi statute providing that ‘“‘no special or local law shall be enacted for the benefit of individuals or cor- porations in cases which are or can be provided for by general law”, means private corporations, and does not include municipal corporations. Feemster v. Tupelo, 121 Miss. 733, 83 So. 804. A statute authorizing the merger of gas companies, which applies to all gas companies doing business in the same city, is not violative of a con- stitutional provision prohibiting spe- cial laws granting exclusive privileges to any corporation, association or per- son. People ex rel. Deneen v. People’s Gaslight, etc., Co., 205 Ill. 482, 68 N. E. 950, 98 Am. St. Rep. 244. Where the Constitution provides that ‘“‘the legislature shall not, except as otherwise provided in this Constitu- tion, pass any local or speciallaw . . . regulating the practice or jurisdiction of . . . the courts’’, the jurisdiction and practice of the courts of the same class must be uniform throughout the State. Sapulpa v. Land, 101 Okla. 22, 223 Pac. 640, 35 A. L. R. 872. A constitutional provision that re- quires all laws of a general nature to have uniform operation throughout the State is complied with in a statute applicable to all cities of a certain class having less than one hundred thousand inhabitants, though in fact there be but one city in the State of that class. Welker v. Potter, 18 Ohio St. 85; Wheeler v. Philadelphia, 77 Pa. St. 338; Kilgore ». Magee, 85 Pa. St. 401. Contra, Divine v. Commissioners, 84 Ill. 590. And see Desmond ». Dunn, 55 Cal. 24; Earle v. Board of Education, 55 Cal. 489; Van Riper v. Parsons, 40 N. J. L. 123, 29 Am. Rep. 210; State v. Trenton, 42 N. J. L. 486; State v. Hammer, 42 N. J. L. 435; Worthley v. Steen, 43 N. J. L. 542; Bumsted v. Govern, 47 N.*J. L. 368, 1 Atl. 835; Van Giesen v. Bloomfield, id. 442, 2 Atl. 249; Hightstown v. Glenn, 7d. 105; New Brunswick v. Fitzgerald, 48 N. J. L. 457, 8 Atl. 729; State v. Hoagland, 51 N. J. L. 62, 16 Atl. 166; McCarthy v. Com., 110 Pa. St. 243, 2 Atl. 423; App. of Scranton Sch. Dist., 118 Pa. St. 176, 6 Atl. 158; Wilkes-Barre v. Meyers, id. 395; Reading v. Savage, 124 Pa. St. 328, 16 Atl. 788; Ex parte Falk, 42 Ohio St. 638; State v. Pugh, 43 Ohio St. 98, 1 N. E. 439; State v. Hawkins, 44 Ohio St. 98, 5 N. E. 225; State v. Anderson, id. 247, 6 N. E. 571; Ewing v. Hoblitzelle, 85 Mo. 64; Kelly »v. Meeks, 87 Mo. 396; State v. Co. Court, 89 Mo. 237, 1 S. W. 307; State v. Pond, 93 Mo. 606, 6 S. W. 469; State v. Donovan, 20 Nev. 75,15 Pac. 783; Darrow »v. People, 8 Col. 417, 8 Pac. 661; People v. Hen- shaw, 76 Cal. 436, 18 Pac. 413; Title, etc., Restoration Co. v. Kerrigan, 150 Cal. 289, 88 Pac. 356, 119 Am. St. Rep. 199, 8 L. R. A. (N. s.) 682; In re Martin, 157 Cal. 51, 106 Pac. 235, 26 L. R. A. (Nn. 8.) 242; Clendaniel ». Conrad, 3 Boyce (Del.) 549, 83 Atl. 1036, Ann. Cas. 1915 B, 968; Givens v. Hillsborough County, 46 Fla. 502, 35 So. 88, 110 Am. St. Rep. 104; Mix v. Nez Perce County, 18 Idaho, 695, 112 Pac. 215, 32 L. R. A. (w. 8.) 534; Ritchie v. Wayman, 244 Ill. 509, 91 N. EB. 695, 27 L. R. A. (nN. 8.) 994; State v. Fairmont Creamery Co., 153 Towa, 702, 183 N. W. 895, 42 L. R. A. (n. 8.) 821; State v. Swagerty, 203 Mo. 517, 102 S. W. 483, 120 Am. St. Rep. 671, 10 L. R. A. (vn. s.) 601, 11 Ann. Cas. 725; Bishop v. Tulsa, (Okla. Crim. Rep.) 209 Pac. 228, 27 A. L. R. 1008; Ladd v. Holmes, 40 Oreg. 167, 66 Pac. 714, 91 Am. St. Rep. 457. And on the general subject, see further, Bourland v. Hildreth, 26 Cal. 161; Brooks v. Hyde, 37 Cal. 366; McAunich v. Mississippi, &c. R. R. Co., 20 Iowa, 338; Rice »v. State, 3 Kan. 141; Jackson v. Shaw, 29 Cal. 267; Gentile v. State, 29 Ind. 409; State v. Parkinson, 5 Nev. 15; Ensworth v. Albin, 46 Mo. 450; People v. Wallace, 70 Ill. 680; State v. Cam- den Common Pleas, 41 N. J. L. 495; O’Kane v. Treat, 25 Ill. 557; Common- wealth v. Patton, 88 Pa. St. 258; Cox v. State, 8 Tex. App. 254; State v. Monahan, 69 Mo. 556; State v. Clark, 23 Minn. 422; Speight v. People, 87 Ill. 595; Morris v. Stout, 110 Iowa, 659, 78 N. W. 843, 50 L. R. A. 97; Re Henneberger, 155 N. Y. 420, 50 ING. 61, 42) GR. A: 132) West Chicago Park Com’rs v. McMullen, 134 Ill. 170, 25 N. E. 676, 10 L. R. A. 215; Lodi Twp. »v. State, 51 N. J. L. 402, 18 Atl. 749, 6 L. R. A. 56; State v. Somers’ Point, 52 N. J. L. 32, 18 Atl. 694, 6 L. R. A. 57; Terr. v. School Dist., 10 Okla. 556, 64 Pac. 241; State v. Thomas, 25 Mont. 226, 64 Pac. 503; Lougher v. Soto, 129 Cal. 610, 62 Pac. 184; Fox v. Mohawk & H. R. H. Society, 165 N. Y. 517, 59 N. E. 353, CHAP. v| POWERS LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT MAY EXERCISE 263 Where the legislation shows the legislative intent to be the substitu- tion of isolation for classification, it is invalid. State v. Jones, 66 Ohio St. 453, 64 N. E. 424; State »v. Beacom, 66 Ohio St. 491, 64 N. E. 427. See also upon the general ques- tion, Com. v. Moir, 199 Pa. St. 534, 49 Atl. 351, 85 Am. St. 801. Insane persons having no depend- ents nor persons who could take from them under the law of succession may have their expenses while in the asylum charged upon their estates, while the expenses of other insane persons in the same asylum are paid out of the public funds. Bon Homme Co. ». Berndt, 13 S. D. 309, 83 N. W. 333, 50 L. R. A. 351. Where the Constitution provides that ‘‘corporations other than banking shall not be created by special act”, the extension of an old special charter of such other corporation is equally prohibited. Bank of Gommerce ». Wiltsie, 153 Ind. 460, 53 N. EB. 950, 55 N. E. 224, 47 L. R. A. 489. And where the grant of any special privileges, im- munities, or franchises whatever is prohibited, certain named societies cannot be empowered to appoint designated State officers, e.g. members of a State board of inspectors of the business of licensed commission mer- chants. Lasher v. People, 183 Ill. 226, 55 N. E. 663, 47 L. R. A. 802, 75 Am. St. 103. Nor can the number of deputies for certain county officers be prescribed for some counties and left to the discretion of the county court in others. Weaver »v. Davidson County, 104 Tenn. 315, 59 S. W. 1105. Where classification of cities is per- mitted, it must be for city purposes only. Re Washington St., 132 Pa. St. 257, 19 Atl. 219, 7 L. R. A. 193 and note. Statute providing for cure of inebri- ates at public expense in counties hav- ing fifty thousand population or more is void for arbitrariness. Murray v. Ramsey County Com’rs, 81 Minn. 359, 84 N. W. 103, 51 L. R. A. 828. Bicycle tax levied in certain counties only is void, although proceeds form a special fund for construction of bicycle paths. Ellis v. Frazier, 38 Oreg. 462, 63 Pac. 642,264 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. 1 the very nature of free government. The latter must depend for their enforcement upon legislative wisdom, discretion, and conscience.!_ The legislature is to make laws for the public good, and not for the benefit of individuals. It has control of the public moneys, and should provide for disbursing them only for public purposes. Taxes should only be levied for those purposes which properly constitute a public burden. But what is for the public good, and what are public purposes, and what does properly consti- tute a public burden, are questions which the legislature must decide upon its own judgment, and in respect to which it is vested with a large discretion which cannot be controlled by the courts, except, perhaps, where its action is clearly evasive, and where, under pre- tense of a lawful authority, it has assumed to exercise one that is unlawful.2 Where the power which is exercised is legislative in its character, the courts can enforce only those limitations which the constitution imposes; not those implied restrictions which, resting in theory only, the people have been satisfied to leave to the judg- ment, patriotism, and sense of justice of their representatives.? As to what differences should under- lie a classification, see Cobb v. Bord, 40 Minn. 479, 42 N. W. 396. All classification must be reason- able. An exemption of ex-soldiers and marines, honorably dismissed from the service of the United States, from a pedler’s license tax is void. State v. Garbroski,.111 Iowa, 496, 82 N. W. 959, 82 Am. St. 524. If special legislation is prohibited, a classification such that one class has but one member and, because the classification is based upon a past fact, can never have more, is void. Camp- bell v. Indianapolis, 155 Ind. 186, 57 N. E. 920. And see Knopf v. People, 185 Ill. 20, 57 N. E. 22. An arbitrary exemption from a license tax of all dealers whose busi- ness is less than a thousand dollars a year, others having no equal exemp- tion, is void as class legislation. Com. v. Clark, 195 Pa. St. 634, 46 Atl. 286, 86 Am. St. 694. See also Burnet v. Dean, 63 N. J. Eq. 253, 49 Atl. 503. The erection of a memorial hall to perpetuate the memory of soldiers who dedicated their lives to the service of the country and allowing organiza- tions of veterans to have the exclusive use of such hall, does not violate the constitutional inhibition against the making of a gift of public money or thing of value. Allied Architects Association v. Payne, 192 Cal. 431, 221 Pac. 209, 30 A. L. R. 1029. Where the legislature, for urgent reasons, may suspend the rules and allow a bill to be read twice on the same day, what constitutes a case of urgency is a question for the legisla- tive discretion. Hull v. Miller, 4 Neb. 503. The legislature’s power over its own proceedings cannot be controlled by a statute requiring notice in advance of the session, in case of petition affect- ing private interests. Opinion of Court, 63 N. H. 625. Where the Constitution provides that no county seat shall be changed except by approval of two-thirds of voters voting thereon, the legislature may intensify the requirement, and require the approval of two-thirds of all the voters in the county. State v. White, 162 Mo. 533, 63 S. W. 104. 1 Walker v. Cincinnati, 21 Ohio St. 14, 41. But see The Stratton Claim- ants v. The Morris Claimants, 89 Tenn. 497, 15S. W. 87, 12 L. R. A. 70. 2 As to what are public purposes, see post, p. 1026, note. 3 State v. McCann, 21 Ohio St. 198, 212; Adams v. Howe, 14 Mass. 340, 7CHAP. V] Am. Dee. 216; State v. Smith, 44 Ohio St. 348, 7 N. E. 447, 12 N. E. 829; Mount v. Richey, 90 Ind. 29. See eases, post, pp. 345, 346 et seq. The means and methods of promot- ing a public purpose by legislative enactment are ordinarily for legisla- tive determination. Allied Architects Association v. Payne, 192 Cal. 431, 221 Pac. 209, 30 A. L. R. 1029. “Aside from constitutional restric- tions, the legislature is the sole judge of the wisdom, expedience, and necessity for expending the State’s money, the amount to be expended, and the inauguration of the policy of government under which it is spent. POWERS LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT MAY EXERCISE 265 Com. v. Puder, 261 Pa. St. 129, 136, 104 Atl. 505. The judiciary “cannot run a race of opinions upon points of right, reason, and expediency with the law- making power.’ Com. ex rel. Elkin v. Moir, 199 Pa. St. 534, 542, 53 L. R. A. 837, 85 Am. St. Rep. 801, 49 Atl. 352.” Busser v. Snyder, 282 Pa. St. 440, 128 Atl. 80, 37 A. L. R. 1515. But the decision of the question of whether a tax is for a public purpose is for the courts when there is a manifest at- tempt on the part of the legislature to authorize a levy for a purpose not public. Dodge v. Mission Township, 46 C. GC. A. 661, 107 Fed. 827. See post, p. 1026, et seq.CHAPTER VI OF THE ENACTMENT OF LAWS WHEN the supreme power of a country is wielded by a single man, or by a single body of men, any discussion, in the courts, of the rules which should be observed in the enactment of laws must generally be without practical value, and in fact impertinent; for, whenever the unfettered sovereign power of any country expresses its will in the promulgation of a rule of law, the expression must be conclusive, though proper and suitable forms may have been wholly omitted in declaring it. It is a necessary attribute of sovereignty that the expressed will of the sovereign is law; and while we may question and cross-question the words employed, to make certain of the real meaning, and may hesitate and doubt concerning it, yet, when the intent is made out, it must govern, and it is idle to talk of forms that should have surrounded the expression, but do not. But when the legislative power of a State is to be exercised by a department com- posed of two branches, or, as in most of the American States, of three branches, and these branches have their several duties marked out and prescribed by the law to which they owe their origin, and which provides for the exercise of their powers in certain modes and under certain forms, there are other questions to arise than those of the mere intent of the law-makers, and sometimes forms become of the last importance. For in such case not only is it important that the will of the law-makers be clearly expressed, but it is also essential that it be expressed in due form of law; since nothing becomes law simply and solely because men who possess the legislative power will that it shall be, unless they express their determination to that effect, in the mode pointed out by the instrument which invests them with the power, and under all the forms which that instrument has rendered essential.!. And if, when the constitution was adopted, there were known and settled rules and usages, forming a part of 1 A bill becomes a law only when it sioners of Highways, 54 N. Y. 276; has gone through all the forms made Moody »v. State, 48 Ala. 115, 17 Am. necessary by the constitution to give Rep. 28; Legg v. Annapolis, 42 Md. it validity. Jones v. Hutchinson, 43 203; Walnut v. Wade, 103 U. S. 683, Ala. 721; State v. Platt, 2S. C. 150, 26 L. ed. 526. And where the consti- 16 Am. Rep. 647; People v. Commis- tution prescribes an interval of time 266cHAP. VII OF THE ENACTMENT OF LAWS 267 the law of the country, in reference to which the constitution has evidently been framed, and these rules and usages required the observance of particular forms, the constitution itself must also be understood as requiring them, because in assuming their existence, and being framed with reference to them, it has in effect adopted them as a part of itself, as much as if they were expressly incor- porated in its provisions. Where, for an instance, the legislative power is to be exercised by two houses, and by settled and well- understood parliamentary law these two houses are to hold separate sessions for their deliberations, and the determination of the one upon a proposed law is to be submitted to the separate determination of the other, the constitution, in providing for two houses, has evi- dently spoken in reference to this settled custom, incorporating it as a rule of constitutional interpretation ; so that it would require no prohibitory clause to forbid the two houses from combining in one, and jointly enacting laws by the vote of a majority of all. All those rules which are of the essentials of law-making must be observed and followed; and it is only the customary rules of order and routine, such as in every deliberative body are always under- stood to be under its control, and subject to constant change at its will, that the constitution can be understood to have left as matters of discretion, to be established, modified, or abolished by the bodies for whose government in non-essential matters they exist. Of the Two Houses of the Legislature." In the enactment of laws the two houses of the legislature are of equal importance, dignity, and power, and the steps which result in laws may originate indifferently in either. This is the general rule; to elapse after the adjournment of the legislature, the full period of time must intervene between the date of ad- journment and that on which the law becomes effective. Halbert ». San Saba Springs L. &. L. 8. Ass'n, 89 Tex. 230, 34 S. W. 639, 49 L. R. A. 193. Upon what constitutes presenta- tion of bill to governor after it has duly passed the legislature, and the interval of time within which he must sign it, see State v. Michel, 52 La. Ann. 936, 27 So. 565, 49 L. R. A. 218, 78 Am. St. 364. Where act is void for lack of uni- formity of operation, the defect may be corrected by subsequent amendment making non-uniform portion uniform with rest of original act, and the whole will then be good. Walsh ». State, 142 Ind. 357, 41 N. E. 65, 33 L. R. A. 392. For other cases upon necessity of recognizing prescribed forms of enactment, see Swindell v. State, 143 Ind. 153, 42 N. E. 528, 35 L. R. A. 50; Com. »v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 160 Ky. 745, 170 S. W. 171, L. R. A. 1915 B. 1060, Ann. Cas. 1916 A, 515; State v. Narragansett, 16 R. I. 424, 16 Atl. 901, 3 L. R. A. 295. The power to declare whether an act has become a law is judicial. Wolfe v. McCaull, 76 Va. 876. State vy. Powell, 77 Miss. 543, 27 So. 927. 1 The wisdom of a division of the legislative department has been dem-268 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I but as one body is more numerous than the other, and more directly represents the people, and in many of the States is renewed by more frequent elections, the power to originate all money bills, or bills for the raising of revenue, is left exclusively, by the constitutions of some of the States, with this body, in accordance with the custom in England, which does not permit bills of this character to originate with the House of Lords.! To these bills, however, the other house may propose alterations, and they require the assent of that house to their passage, the same as other bills.?, The time for the meeting onstrated by the leading writers on constitutional law, as well as by gen- eral experience. See De Lolme, Const. of England, b. 2, c.3; Federalist, No. 22; 1 Kent, 208; Story on Const. §§ 545-570. The early experiments in Pennsyl- vania and Georgia, based on Franklin’s views, for which see his Works, Vol. V. p. 165, were the only ones made by any of the original States with a single house. The first Constitution of Ver- mont also provided for a single legis- lative body. 1 There are provisions in the Consti- tutions of Massachusetts, Delaware, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Hamp- shire, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Vermont, Indiana, Oregon, Kentucky, Louisiana, Ala- bama, Arkansas, Georgia, Virginia, Maine, and Colorado, requiring reve- nue bills to originate in the more popular branch of the legislature, but allowing the Senate the power of amendment usual in other cases. A bill to license saloons is a police regulation, not a revenue law. State v. Wright, 14 Oreg. 365, 12 Pac. 708. Money cannot be appropriated by joint resolution in Indiana. May ». Rice, 91 Ind. 546. “Bills for raising revenue ”’, within the meaning of the constitutional requirement that such bills shall origi- nate in the House of Representatives, are bills that levy taxes, in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue. Twin City National Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U. S. 196, 42 L. ed. 134, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 766; Millard v. Rogers, 202 U. S. 429, 50 L. ed. 1090, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 674; Perry Co. v. Selma, 58 Ala. 546; Lang v. Com., 190 Ky. 29, 226 S. W. 379; Northern Counties Invest. Trust v. Sears, 30 Oreg. 388, 41 Pac. 931, 35 L. R. A. 188. An act of Congress providing a national currency secured by a pledge of bonds of the United States, and which, in the furtherance of that object, and also to meet the expenses attending the execution of the act, imposes a tax on the notes in circula- tion of the banking associations organ- ized under the statute, is clearly not a revenue bill within the meaning of the Federal Constitution. Twin City National Bank v. Nebecker, 167 U.S. 196, 42 L. ed. 134, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 766. During the second session of the forty-first Congress, the House of Representatives by their vote denied the right of the Senate under the Con- stitution to originate a bill repealing a law imposing taxes; but the Senate did not assent to this conclusion. In England the Lords are not allowed to amend money bills, and by resolutions of 5th and 6th July, 1860, the Com- mons deny their right even to reject them. Law directing payment of bounties by county treasurer, such payments to be credited to him by state treas- urer, is void under constitutional pro- vision that ‘no money shall be paid out of the treasury except upon appro- priations made by law and on warrant drawn by the proper officer.” Insti- tution for Edu. Mute & Blind v. Hen- derson, 18 Col. 98, 31 Pac. 714, 18 L. R. A. 398. 2The Constitution of the United States, art. 1, § 7, provides that allCHAP. VI] OF THE ENACTMENT OF LAWS 269 of the legislature will be such time as is fixed by the constitution or by statute; but it may be called together by the executive in special session as the constitution may prescribe, and the two houses may also adjourn any general session to a time fixed by them for the holding of a special session, if any agreement to that effect can be arrived at; and if not, power is conferred by a majority of the con- stitutions upon the executive to prorogue and adjourn them. And if the executive in any case undertake to exercise this power to pro- rogue and adjourn, on the assumption that a disagreement exists between the two houses which warrants his interference, and his action is acquiesced in by those bodies, who thereupon cease to hold their regular sessions, the legislature must be held in law to have adjourned, and no inquiry can be entered upon as to the rightfulness of the governor’s assumption that such a disagreement existed." bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments, as on other bills. This provision is not violated by the substitution by the Senate of a tax on incomes of corporations for a tax on inheritance in a bill for raising revenue originating in the House of Repre- sentatives. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 55 L. ed. 389, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 342. Nor is it violated by the fact that a tariff act for raising revenue, originating in the House, is amended in the Senate by a provision imposing an excise tax based on gross tonnage upon the use of foreign-built pleasure yachts. Rainey v. United States, 932 U.S. 310, 58 L. ed. 617, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 429. In this case the court approved and adopted the following statement of the court below: ‘“‘ Hay- ing become an enrolled and duly authenticated act of Congress, it is not for this court to determine whether the amendment was or was not out- side the purposes of the original bill.” Rainey v. United States, 232 WSs 310, 58 L. ed. 617, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 429. 1 This question became important, and was passed upon in People ». Hatch, 33 Ill. 9. The Senate had passed a resolution for an adjourn- ment of the session sine die on a day named, which was amended by the House by fixing a different day. The Senate refused to concur, and the House then passed a resolution express- ing a desire to recede from its action in amending the resolution and re- questing a return of the resolution by the Senate. While matters stood thus, the governor, assuming that such a disagreement existed as empowered him to interfere, sent in his proclama- tion, declaring the legislature ad- journed to a day named, and which was at the very end of the official term of the members. The message created excitement; it does not seem to have been at once acquiesced in, and a protest against the governor’s authority was entered upon the journal; but for eleven days in one house and twelve in the other no entries were made upon their journals, and it was unquestionable that prac- tically they had acquiesced in the action of the governor, and adjourned. At the expiration of the twelve days, a portion of the members came to- gether again, and it was claimed by them that the message of the governor was without authority, and the two houses must be considered as having been, in point of law, in session during the intervening period, and that con- sequently any bills which had before been passed by them and sent to the governor for his approval, and which he had not returned within ten days, Sundays excepted, had become laws under the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that, as the two houses had practically acquiesced in the action of270 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I There are certain matters which each house determines for itself, and in respect to which its decision is conclusive. It chooses its own officers, except where, by constitution or statute, other provi- sion is made;! it determines its own rules of proceeding; ? it de- cides upon the election and qualification of its own members.’ These powers it is obviously proper should rest with the body immediately interested, as essential to enable it to enter upon and proceed with its legislative functions without liability to interrup- tion and confusion. In determining questions concerning contested the governor, the session had come to an end, and that the members had no power to reconvene on their own mo- tion, as had been attempted. The case is a very full and valuable one on several points pertaining to legislative proceedings and authority. Gover- nor’s decision that disagreement exists declared conclusive in Re Legislative Adjournment, 18 R. I. 824, 27 Atl. 324, 22 L. R. A. 716, and see note in L. R. A. upon power as to adjourn- ment of legislature. 1The house, by a majority vote of all members elected, may retire its speaker and elect another. Re Speak- ership, 15 Col. 520, 25 Pac. 707, 11 L. R. A. 241. 2 In French v. Senate, 146 Cal. 604, 80 Pac. 1031, 69 L. R. A. 556, 2 Ann. Cas. 756, the court said: ‘‘The senate has power to adopt any procedure and to change it at any time and without notice. It cannot tie its own hands by establishing rules which, as a matter of power purely, it cannot at any time change and disregard.” $In People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481, it was held that the correctness of a decision by one of the houses, that certain persons had been chosen mem- bers, could not be inquired into by the courts. In that case a law was assailed as void, on the ground that a portion of the members who voted for it, and without whose votes it would not have had the requisite majority, had been given their seats in the house in defi- ance of law, and to the exclusion of others who had a majority of legal votes. See the same principle in State v. Jarrett, 17 Md. 309. See also Lamb v. Lynd, 44 Pa. St. 336; Opin- ion of Justices, 56 N. H. 570. The persons who are to constitute the prima facie house, and to organize and examine into the qualifications of the members, to determine contests, &c., are those who bring certificates of election from the proper officers. Re Gunn, 50 Kan. 155, 32 Pac. 470, 948, 19 L. R. A. 519, a case where two rival bodies each claimed to be the true house of representatives. In Kansas the legislature gave seats to several persons as representatives of districts not entitled to repre- sentation at all. By the concurrent vote of four of these a certain bill was passed. Held, that it was illegally passed, and did not become a law. State v. Francis, 26 Kan. 724. The legislature cannot transfer its power to judge of the election of its members, to the courts. State v. Gilman, 20 Kan. 551, 27 Am. Rep. 189. See Dalton v. State, 43 Ohio St. 652. But courts may procure and present evidence to the legislature. In re MeNeill, 111 Pa. St. 235, 2 Atl. 341. The legislative power to judge of the election of members is not pos- sessed by municipal bodies: People v. Hall, 80 N. Y. 117; nor by boards of supervisors: Robinson v. Cheboy- gan Supervisors, 49 Mich. 321, 13 N. W. 622; except when conferred by law. Mayor v. Morgan, 7 Mart. (n. s.) 1, 18 Am. Dec. 232; Peabody v. School Committee, 115 Mass. 383; Cooley v. Fitzgerald, 41 Mich. 2, 2 N. W. 179. See Commonwealth »v. Leech, 44 Pa. St. 8832; Doran v. De Long, 48 Mich. 552, 12 N. W. 848. To exclude the jurisdiction of the courts, the council’s power must be unequivocal. State v. Kempf, 69CHAP. V1] OF THE ENACTMENT OF LAWS 271 seats, the house will exercise judicial power, but generally in accord- ance with a course of practice which has sprung from precedents in similar cases, and no other authority is at liberty to interfere. Each house has also the power to punish members for disorderly behavior, and other contempts of its authority, as well as to expel a member for any cause which seems to the body to render it unfit that he continue to occupy one of its seats. This power is generally enumerated in the constitution among those which the two houses may exercise, but it need not be specified in that instrument, since it would exist whether expressly conferred or not. It is ‘a necessary and incidental power, to enable the house to perform its high functions, and is necessary to the safety of the State. It is a power of protection. A member may be physically, mentally, or morally wholly unfit; he may be affected with a contagious disease, or insane, or noisy, violent, and disorderly, or in the habit of using profane, obscene, and abusive language.” And, “independently of parliamentary customs and usages, our legislative houses have the power to protect themselves by the punishment and expulsion of a member”; and the courts cannot inquire into the justice of the decision, or even so much as examine the proceedings to see whether or not the proper opportunity for defence was furnished.’ Wis. 470, 34 N. W. 226; State »v. Gates, 35 Minn. 385, 28 N. W. 927. The power of the court to call a new election to elect a member of a general assembly is not precluded by the power of the house to pass upon the election of its members, even though the calling the election is a passing upon the valid- ity of a prior election. State ». South Kingstown, 18 R. I. 258, 27 Atl. 599, 22 L. R. A. 65. While each house judges of the elec- tion and qualifications of its members, and while the duties of canvassing boards are purely ministerial, yet the court will not aid a clearly ineligible candidate by issuing mandamus to the board of canvassers to give the candi- date a certificate of election, even though it is admitted that he received the plurality vote. People ». State Bd. of Canvassers, 129 N. Y. 360, 29 N. E. 345, 14 L. R. A. 646. But it will correct a fraud through which the candidate rightfully entitled is de- prived of his certificate, as that makes him prima facie a member. Ellison v. Barnes, 23 Utah, 183, 63 Pac. 899. 1 Hiss v. Bartlett, 3 Gray, 468. And see Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 5 L. ed. 242; French v. Senate, 146 Cal. 604, 80 Pac. 1031, 69 L. R. A. 556, 2 Ann. Cas. 756. The authority of the house is equally absolute in regard to the rule usually prescribed in the Constitution that any member may have his protest entered upon the journal. If the house neglect to recognize this rule, no outside power can compel it. Turnbull v. Giddings, 95 Mich. 314, 54 N. W. 887, 19 L. R. A. 853. “The power to control and compel the attendance of members of delibera- tive and legislative bodies and their officers is lodged in those bodies and not in the courts.” Concurring opin- ion of Grant, J., in Wilson v. Cleveland, 157 Mich. 510, 122 N. W. 284, 133 Am. St. Rep. 352. “Under our form of government the judicial department has no power to revise even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative depart- ment, or of either house thereof, taken in pursuance of the power com-272 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I Each house may also punish contempts of its authority by other persons, where they are committed in its presence, or where they tend directly to embarrass or obstruct its legislative proceedings ; and it requires for the purpose no express provision of the constitu- tion conferring the authority.!. It is not very well settled what are the limits to this power; and in the leading case in this country the speaker’s warrant for the arrest of the person adjudged guilty of contempt was sustained, though it did not show in what the alleged contempt consisted.? In the leading English case a libellous publi- cation concerning the house was treated as a contempt;* and pun- ishment has sometimes been inflicted for assaults upon members of the house, not committed in or near the place of sitting, and for the arrest of members in disregard of their constitutional privilege. But in America the authority of legislative bodies in this regard is much less extensive than in England, and we are in danger, perhaps, of being misled by English precedents. The Parliament, before its separation into two bodies, was a high court of judicature, possessed of the general power, incident to such a court, of punishing con- tempts, and after the separation the power remained with each body, because each was considered to be a court of judicature and exercised the functions of such a court. American legislative bodies have not been clothed with the judicial function, and they do not therefore possess the general power to punish for contempt; but, as incidental to their legislative authority, they have the power to punish as con- mitted exclusively to that department by the Constitution.” French ». Gray, 226; State v. Matthews, 37 N. H. 450. See also ex parte Wolters, Senate, 146 Cal. 604, 80 Pac. 1031, 69 L. R. A. 556, 2 Ann. Cas. 756. Where a State senate expels a mem- ber thereof in the mode prescribed by the State Constitution, such member is not deprived of his office without due process of law, in violation of the fourteenth amendment to the Consti- tution of the United States. French v. Senate, 146 Cal. 604, 80 Pac. 1031, 69 L. R. A. 556, 2 Ann. Cas. 756. And a resolution or other action of a State Senate resulting in the expulsion of a member is not the issuance of a bill of attainder in violation of the State or Federal Constitution. French v. Sen- ate, 146 Cal. 604, 80 Pac. 1031, 69 L. R. A. 556, 2 Ann. Cas. 756. 1 Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 5 L. ed. 242; Burdett v. Abbott, 14 East, 1; Burnham v. Morrissey, 14 64 Tex. Crim. Rep. 238, 144 S. W. 531, Ann. Cas. 1916 B, 1071. See post, p. 949, note. 2 Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 5 L. ed. 242; questioned and rejected as to some of its reasoning in Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 26 L. ed. 377. And see Gosset v. Howard, 10 Q. B. 451; Stewart v. Blaine, 1 Mc- Arthur, 453. 3 Burdett v. Abbott, 14 East, 1. 4 Mr. Potter discusses such a case in his edition of Dwarris on Statutes, c. 18, and Mr. Robinson deals with the case of an arrest for a criminal act, not committed in the presence of the house, in the preface to the sixth volume of his Practice. As to the general right of Parliament to punish for contempt, see Gosset v. Howard, 10 Q. B. 411.CHAP. VI] OF THE ENACTMENT OF LAWS 273 tempts those acts of members or others which tend to obstruct the performance of legislative duty, the exercise of legislative power.’ 1See the subject considered fully and learnedly in Kilbourn v. Thomp- gon, 103 U. S. 168, 26 L. ed. 377. Said Chief Justice White in deliver- ing the opinion of the court in Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U. S. 521, 61 L. ed. 881, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 448, L. R. A. 1917 F, 279, Ann. Cas. 1918 B, 371, “Certain is it that authority was possessed by the House of Commons in England to punish for contempt directly, that is, without the intervention of courts, and that such power included a variety of acts and many forms of punish- ment, including the right to fix a pro- longed term of imprisonment. Indu- bitable also is it, however, that this power rested upon an assumed blend- ing of legislative and judicial authority possessed by the Parliament when the Lords and Commons were one, and continued to operate after the division of the Parliament into two houses, either because the interblended power was thought to continue to reside in the Commons, or by the force of rou- tine the mere reminiscence of the com- mingled powers led to a continued exer- cise of the wide authority as to con- tempt formerly existing long after the foundation of judicial-legislative power upon which it rested had ceased to exist... . Inthe State governments prior to the formation of the Constitu- tion the incompatibility of the inter- mixture of the legislative and judicial power was recognized and the duty of separating the two was felt, as was manifested by provisions contained in some of the State Constitutions enacted prior to the adoption of the Constitution of the United States. ... No power was expressly con- ferred by the Constitution of the United States on the subject except that given to the House to deal with contempt committed by its own mem- bers. Article 1, § 5. As the rule concerning the Constitution of the United States is that powers not dele- gated were reserved to the people or the States, it follows that no express vou. 1—18 or to defeat, impede, or embarrass authority to deal with contempt can be conceived of. It comes, then, to this: Was such an authority implied from the powers granted? As it is unthinkable that in any case from a power expressly granted there can be implied the authority to destroy the grant made, and as the possession by Congress of the commingled legisla- tive-judicial authority as to contempts which was exerted in the House of Commons would be absolutely destruc- tive of the distinction between legis- lative, executive, and judicial author- ity which is interwoven in the very fabric of the Constitution, and would disregard express limitations therein, it must follow that there is no ground whatever for assuming that any impli- cation as to such power may be de- duced from any grant of authority made to Congress by the Constitution. This conclusion has long since been authoritatively settled and is not open to be disputed. Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 5 L. ed. 242; Kilbourn ». Thompson, 103 U. S. 168, 26 L. ed. 377. Whether the right to deal with contempt in the limited way provided in the State Constitutions may be implied in Congress as the result of the legislative power granted must depend upon how far such limited power is ancillary or incidental to the power granted to Congress. - - - The rule of constitutional interpretation announced in M’Culloch ». Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. ed. 579, that that which was reasonably appropriate and relevant to the exercise of granted power was to be considered as accom- panying the grant, has been so uni- versally applied that it suffices merely to state it. And as there is nothing in the inherent nature of the power to deal with contempt that causes it to be an exception to such rule, there can be no reason for refusing to apply it to that subject... . Without under- taking to inclusively mention the sub- jects embraced in the implied power, we think from the very nature of that274 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I When imprisonment isimposed as a punishment, it must terminate with the final adjournment of the house, and if the prisoner be not then discharged by its order, he may be released on habeas corpus.1 By common parliamentary law, the members of the legislature are privileged from arrest on civil process during the session of that body, and for a reasonable time before and after, to enable them to go to and return from the same. By the constitutions of some of the States this privilege has been enlarged, so as to exempt the persons of legislators from any service of civil process,” and in others their estates are exempt from attachment for some prescribed period.? For any arrest contrary to the parliamentary law or to these provisions, the house of which the person arrested is a member may give sum- mary relief by ordering his discharge, and if the order is not complied with, by punishing the persons concerned in the arrest as for a con- tempt of its authority. power it is clear that it does not em- brace punishment for contempt as punishment, since it rests only upon the right of self-preservation; that is, the right to prevent acts which, in and of themselves, inherently obstruct or prevent the discharge of legislative duty or the refusal to do that which there is an inherent legislative power to compel in order that legislative functions may be performed.” The contempt for which either house of Congress may punish an out- sider may consist of either misbe- havior or of disobedience; but mis- behavior, to constitute a contempt, must be such as to injuriously affect the ability of the house to function; and for disobedience to constitute a contempt, there must be a duty of obedience. Ex parte Dougherty, 299 Fed. 620. 1 Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U. S. 521, 61 L. ed. 881, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 448, L. R. A. 1917 F, 279, Ann. Cas. 1918 B, 371; Jefferson’s Manual, § 18; Prichard’s Case, 1 Lev. 165; 1 Sid. 245, T. Raym. 120. 2“Senators and _ representatives shall, in all cases except treason, felony, or breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest. They shall not be sub- ject to any civil process during the session of the legislature, or for fifteen days next before the commencement The remedy of the member, however, is not confined to this mode of relief. His privilege is not the privilege and after the termination of each ses- sion.”’ Const. of Mich. art. 4, § 7. A like exemption from civil process is found in the Constitutions of Kansas, Alabama, Arkansas, California, Mis- souri, Mississippi, Wisconsin, Indiana, Oregon, and Colorado. Exemption from arrest is not vio- lated by the service of citations or declarations in civil cases. Gentry v. Griffith, 27 Tex. 461; Case v. Rora- bacher, 15 Mich. 537; Phillips ». Browne, 270 Ill. 450, 110 N. E. 601, Ann. Cas. 1917 B, 637. So, of a member of Congress during the ses- sion. Merrick v. Giddings, MacAr. & Mack. 55; Worth v. Norton, 56 S. C. 56, 479, 33 S. E. 792, 35 S. E. 135, 45) 1b. R- Aj 563! 76 Ams (St. 524s But in Miner v. Markham, 28 Fed. 387, a California member en route to Washington was held exempt from service of summons in Wisconsin. 3’ The Constitution of Rhode Island provides that “the person of every member of the General Assembly shall be exempt from arrest, and his estate from attachment, in any civil action, during the session of the General Assembly, and two days before the commencement and two days after the termination thereof, and all process served contrary hereto shall be void.” Art. 4, § 5.CHAP. VI] of the house merely, him to discharge the trust confided to OF THE ENACTMENT OF LAWS 279 but of the people, and is conferred to enable him by his constituents ; * and if the house neglect to interfere, the court from which the pro- cess issued should set it aside on the facts being represented,” and any court or officer having authority to issue writs of habeas corpus may also inquire into the case, and release the party from the unlaw- ful imprisonment.° Each house must also collection of such information discharge of its functions,* be allowed to proceed in its own way in the as may seem important to a proper and whenever it is deemed desirable that witnesses should be examined, the power and authority to do so is very properly referred to a committee, with any such powers short of final legislative or judicial action as may seem necessary or expedi- ent in the particular case. Such a committee has no authority to sit during a recess of the house which has appointed it, without permission to that effect.° [One branch of the legislature, acting alone, may appoint a committee to act during the session ;® but it would seem that it cannot, by its independent action, create a com- 1 Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 27, 3 Am. Dec. 189. 2 Courts do not, however, ex officio notice the privileges of members ; they must be brought to their attention by some proper motion. Prentis v. Com- monwealth, 5 Rand. 697, 16 Am. Dec. 782, and note. 3On this subject, Cushing on Law and Practice of Parliamentary Assem- plies, §§ 546-597, will be consulted with profit. It is not a trespass to arrest a person privileged from arrest, even though the officer may be aware of the fact. ‘The arrest is only void- able; and in general the party will waive the privilege unless he applies for discharge by motion or on habeas corpus. ‘Tarlton v. Fisher, Doug. 671; Fletcher v. Baxter, 2 Aik. 224; Fox v. Wood, 1 Rawle, 143; Sperry 2. Wil- lard, 1 Wend. 32; Wilmarth v. Burt, 7 Met. 257; Aldrich v. Aldrich, 8 Met. 102; Chase v. Fish, 16 Me. 132. But where the privilege is given on public grounds, or for the benefit of others, discharge may be obtained on the motion of any party concerned, or made by the court sua sponte. 4 See Tillinghast v. Carr, 4 McCord, 152; Ex parte Parker, 74 S. C. 466, 55 S. BE. 122, 114 Am. St. Rep. LOTR Ann. Cas. 874; Ex parte Wolters, 64 Tex. Crim. Rep. 238, 144 S. W. 531, Ann. Cas. 1916 B, 1071. 5 Branham v. Lange, 16 Ind. 497; Marshall v. Harwood, 7 Md. 466. See also parliamentary cases, 5 Grey, 374; 9 Grey, 350; 1 Chandler, 50. 6 Dickinson v. Johnson, 117 Ark. 582, 176 S. W. 116, L. R. A. 1916 E, 496, Ann. Cas. 1916 B, 1067; Fergus vy. Russel, 270 Ill. 304, 110 N. E. 130, Ann. Cas. 1916 B, 1120; Ex parte Caldwell, 61 W. Va. 49, 55 S. E. 910, TONER AL (NaB:)) 1725 11 Ann. Cas. 646. In Ex parte Caldwell, 61 W. Va. 49, 55 S. E. 910, 10 L. R. A. (. s.) 172, the Court said: “There can be no question but that during the session one branch can appoint a committee alone to act during the session be- cause each body had power of action during the session to entertain bills, and may use a committee to investi- gate and report upon any matter which may come before it, >. 2 2) wobisgus necessary to enable it to perform its part in the legislative function com- mitted to both houses. The Congress of the United States is composed of a Senate and House of Representatives, and in these two branches the Federal276 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I mittee of investigation with power to sit after the legislature ad- journs. resolution of the legislature.’] Such authority can be conferred only by an act or a joint A refusal to appear or to testify be- fore such committee, or to produce books or papers, would be a con- tempt of the house;? but the committee cannot punish for con- tempt; it can only report the conduct of the offending party to the house for its action.® with the final dissolution of the house appointing it. Constitution vests all legislative power granted by it, as our Constitution vests in the legislature the legislative power of the State. There is no doubt of the power of either branch of Con- gress or legislature to appoint a com- mittee of investigation, without the concurrence of the other branch, to act during the session. Jn re Chap- man, 166 U. S. 661, 41 L. ed. 1154, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 677; Anderson »v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 5 L. ed. 242; Ex parte Dalton, 44 Ohio St. 142, 5 N. E. 136, 58 Am. Rep. 800.”” But in Ohio it has been held that the whole legislative power of the State having been conferred by the Constitution upon the General Assembly as a unit and not upon the Senate or House of Representatives acting separately, a single branch of the General Assembly so acting has no power of independent legislation, except as expressly granted in the Constitution or as necessarily implied in the express grants, and that the Constitution contains no express grant of power to either branch of the General Assembly to appoint a select investigating committee for general legislative purposes and such power is not necessarily implied from the ex- press grants to each house. State ex rel. Robertson Realty Co. v. Guilbert, 75 Ohio St. 1, 78 N. E. 931. 1 Tipton v. Parker, 71 Ark. 193, 74 S. W. 298; Com. v. Costello, 21 Pa. Dist. R. 232; Com. v. McCall, 21 Pa. Dist. R. 238; Ex parte Wolters, 64 Tex. Crim. Rep. 238, 144 S. W. 531, Ann. Cas. 1916 B, 1071; Ex parte Caldwell, 61 W. Va. 49, 55S. E. 910, 10 L. R. A. (Nw. 8.) 172, 11 Ann. Cas. 646. Compare Branham v. Lange, 16 Ind. 497; Marshall v. Harwood, 7 Md. 466. ? In re Falvey, 7 Wis. 630; Burnham The power of the committee will terminate [Where the v. Morrissey, 14 Gray, 226; People v. Keeler, 99 N. Y. 463; State ez rel. Peers v. Fitzgerald, 131 Minn. 116, 154 N. W. 750, 8 A. L. R. 1582; Bz parte Parker, 74S. C. 466, 55S. E. 122, 114 Am. St. Rep. 1011. In People v. Keeler, supra, a statute expressly per- mitted the house to punish for such contempt. But the privilege of a witness to be exempt from a compul- sory disclosure of his own criminal conduct is the same when examined by a legislative body or committee as when sworn in court. Emery’s Case, 107 Mass. 172. An outsider does not owe obedience to an order of either house of Congress to give testimony or produce docu- ments in aid of an investigation judi- cial in character, unless it is an investi- gation in the execution of judicial power expressly conferred. An excep- tion to this is that, where the investi- gation concerns contempt, there is power to punish for contempt. Ez parte Daugherty, 299 Fed. 620. See also Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168, 26 L. ed. 377. On questions of conflict between the legislature and the courts in mat- ters of contempt, the great case of Stockdale v. Hansard, 9 Ad. & El. 1; 8. c. 3 Per. & Dav. 380, is of the high- est interest. See May, Const. Hist. Cie 3 In re Davis, 58 Kan. 379, 49 Pac. 160. But in South Carolina it has been held that a legislative committee has power to commit a witness for contempt upon his refusal to answer a question in relation to a matter which the committee is authorized to investi- gate. Hx parte Parker, 74 S. C. 466, 55 8. E. 122, 114 Am. St. Rep. 1011, 7 Ann. Cas. 874. ‘The general rule undoubtedly isCHAP. VI] OF THE ENACTMENT OF LAWS 277 Constitution provides that when the legislature is convened in special session, there shall be no legislation upon subjects other than those designated in the proclamation of the governor calling such session, or presented to them by the governor, the legislature has no power to appoint committees to investigate matters upon which it cannot legislate and to punish for contempt witnesses who refuse to answer questions relating to such matters.’] Each house keeps a journal of its proceedings, which is a public record, and of which the courts are at liberty to take judicial notice.? If it should appear from these journals that any act did not receive the requisite majority, or that in respect to it the legislature did not follow any requirement of the constitution, or that in any other respect the act was not constitutionally adopted, the courts may act upon this evidence, and adjudge the statute void.® that the powers of committees of legis- lative bodies cease on the final adjourn- ment of the body, unless express pro- vision is made for their continuance; but the legislature has power to confer authority on a committee to continue its labors after adjournment. In re Davis, 58 Kan. 379, 49 Pac. 160. 1Ex parte Wolters, 64 Tex. Crim. Rep. 238, 144 S. W. 531, Ann. Cas. 1916 B, 1071. 2Spangler v. Jacoby, 14 Ill. 297; Turley v. Logan Co., 17 Ill. 151; Jones v. Hutchinson, 43 Ala. 721; State v. Moffit, 5 Ohio, 358; Miller v. State, 3 Ohio St. 475; Fordyce v. Godman, 20 Ohio St. 1; People ». Supervisors of Chenango, 8 N. Y. 317; People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481; Southwark Bank v. Commonwealth, 2 Pa. St. 446; McCulloch v. State, 11 Ind. 480; Osburn v. Staley, 5 W. Va. 85, 18 Am. Rep. 640; State v. Platt, 2 S. C. (nv. s.) 150, 16 Am. Rep. 647; Moody »v. State, 48 Ala. 115; Houston, &e. R. R. Co. v. Odum, 53 Tex. 343; Gardner v. The Collector, 6 Wall. 499, 18 L. ed. 890; South Ottawa v. Per- kins, 94 U. S. 260, 24 L. ed. 154; State v. Joseph, 175 Ala. 579, 57 So. 942, Ann. Cas. 1914 D, 248; Jobe v. Urquhart, 102 Ark. 470, 1438S. W. 121, Ann. Cas. 1914 A, 351; French ». California, 146 Cal. 604, 80 Pac. 1031, 69 L. R. A. 556, 2 Ann. Cas. 756; Amos v. Moseley, 74 Fla. 555, 77 So. 619, L. R. A. 1918 C, 482; Portland v. Yick, 44 Oreg. 439, 75 Pac. 706, 102 But whenever it Am. St. Rep. 633; Heiskell ». Knox County, 182 Tenn. 180, 177 S. W. 483, Ann. Cas. 1916 E, 1281; Gottstein »v. Lister, 88 Wash. 462, 153 Pac. 595, Ann. Cas. 1917 D, 1008. 3 Prescott v. Trustees, &c., 19 Ill. 324; Koehler v. Hill, 60 Iowa, 543, 549, 14 N. W. 738, 15 N. W. 609; Amos v. Moseley, 74 Fla. 555, 77 So. 619, L. R. A. 1918 C, 482; King Lumber Co. v. Crow, 155 Ala. 504, 46 So. 646, 130 Am. St. Rep. 65; Andrews v. People, 33 Colo. 193, 79 Pac. 1031, 108 Am. St. Rep. 76; Adams». Clark, 36 Colo. 65, 85 Pac. 642, 10 Ann. Cas. 774; Palatine Ins. Co. v. Northern Pacific R. Co., 34 Mont. 268, 85 Pac. 1032, 9 Ann. Cas. 579. Upon this question the authorities are not in entire accord. The pre- sumption is, when the act, as signed and enrolled, does not show the con- trary, that it has gone through all necessary formalities : State v. McCon- nell, 3 Lea, 341; Blessing v. Galveston, 42 Tex. 641; State v. Francis, 26 Kan. 724; Clendaniel v. Conrad, 3 Boyce (Del.) 549, 83 Atl. 1036, Ann. Cas. 1915 B, 968; Heiskell v. Knox County, 132 Tenn. 180, 177 S. W. 483, Ann. Cas. 1916 E, 1281; Town of Narrows v. Board of Supr’s, 128 Va. 572, 105 S. BE. 82. And many cases hold, agree- ably to the statement in the text, that this prima facie case may be over- thrown by the journals: Spangler »v. Jacoby, 14 Ill. 297; Houston, &e. R. R. Co. v. Odum, 53 Tex. 343;278 Burr v. Ross, 19 Ark. 250; Smithee v. Campbell, 41 Ark. 471; Jones ». Hutchinson, 43 Ala. 721; Moog »v. Randolph, 77 Ala. 597; Berry v. Baltimore, &c. R. R. Co., 41 Md. 446, 20 Am. Rep. 69; Green v. Weller, 32 Miss. 650; People v. McElroy, 72 Mich. 446, 40 N. W. 750; Brewer v. Mayor, &c., 86 Tenn. 732, 9S. W. 166; State v. Frank, 60 Neb. 327, 61 Neb. 679, 88 N. W. 74, 85 N. W. 956; Lambert v. Smith, 98 Va. 268, 38S. E. 938; State v. Burlington & M. R. Co., 60 Neb. 741, 84 N. W. 254; Andrews v. People, 33 Colo. 193, 79 Pac. 1031, 108 Am. St. Rep. 76; Adams». Clark, 36 Colo. 65, 85 Pac. 642, 10 Ann. Cas. 774; State v. Andrews, 64 Kan. 474, 67 Pac. 870; Ritzman v. Campbell, 93 Ohio St. 246, 112 N. E. 591, L. R. A. 1916 E, 1251, Ann. Cas. 1918 D, 248; Boyd v. Olcott, 102 Oreg. 327, 202 Pac. 431. Under constitutional requirements that journals of the proceedings of the legislative bodies shall be kept and published, where the journal entries as to the legislative proceedings are explicit, and conflict even with legis- lative acts regularly authenticated, the journals are superior, and the courts will be governed by them as to matters clearly, explicitly, and affirmatively stated therein. Amos v. Moseley, 74 Blas 5555 77) So; 619) i. R. A. 1918 ©; 482. The journal entry, if in com- pliance with a constitutional require- ment, is the best evidence of a reso- lution, and cannot be contradicted. Koehler v. Hill, 60 Iowa, 543, 15 N. W. 609. So, as to the entry of the num- ber voting. Wise v. Bigger, 79 Va. 269. And as to which bill was voted on. State v. Wendler, 94 Wis. 369, 68 N. W. 759. An enrolled bill may be impeached on the ground that it has not received a constitutional majority of the mem- bers elect of both branches of the General Assembly, and upon this question the legislative journals must provide the appropriate as well as the conclusive evidence. Ritzman v. Campbell, 93 Ohio St. 246, 112 N. E. 591, L. R. A. 1916 E, 1251, Ann. Cas. 1918 D, 248. The journal cannot be contradicted CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I by parol to show that a mere title or skeleton was introduced as a bill. Attorney-General v. Rice, 64 Mich. 385, 31 N. W. 203. Ifa journal shows an act passed, it cannot be attacked on the ground that some members voting for it were improperly seated. State v. Smith, 44 Ohio St. 348, 7 N. E. 447, 12 N. E. 829. And see Opinions of Justices, 52 N. H. 622; Hensoldt »v. Petersburg, 63 Ill. 157; Larrison »v. Peoria, &c. R. R: Co, 77) 1 i People v. Commissioners of Highways, 54 N. Y. 276; English v. Oliver, 28 Ark. 317; In re Wellman, 20 Vt. 653; Osburn v. Staley, 5 W. Va. 85; Moody v. State, 48 Ala. 115, 17 Am. Rep. 28; State v. Platt, 2S. C. 150, 16 Am. Rep. 647; Worthen v. Badget, 32 Ark. 496; Southwark Bank v. Commonwealth, 26 Pa. St. 446; Fordyce v. Godman, 20 Ohio St. 1; People v. Starne, 35 Ill. 121; Supervisors v. Keenan, 2 Minn. 321; People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481; Berry v. Doane Point R. R. Co., 41 Md. 446. Compare Brodnax ». Groom, 64 N. C. 244; Annapolis ». Harwood, 32 Md. 471. But some cases hold that the enrolled statute is conclusive evidence of its due passage and validity. See Sherman »v. Story, 30 Cal. 253; People v. Burt, 48 Cal. 560; Louisiana Lottery Co. v. Rich- oux, 23 La. Ann. 7438, 8 Am. Rep. 602; Green v. Weller, 32 Miss. 650; Swan v. Buck, 40 Miss. 268; Hx parte Wren, 63 Miss. 512; Pacific R. R. Co. ». Governor, 23 Mo. 353; State v. Swift, 10 Nev. 176; Pangborn v. Young, 32 N. J. L. 29; Evans v. Brown, 30 Ind. 514; Duncombe ». Prindle, 12 Iowa, 1; Terr. v. O’Connor, 5 Dak. 397, 41 N. W. 746; Re Tipton, 28 Tex. App. 438, 13 S. W. 610, 8 L. R. A. 326, and note; Narregang v. Brown County, 14 S. D. 357, 85 N. W. 602; State v. Bacon, 14 S. D. 394, 85 N. W. 605; Yolo County v. Colgan, 132 Cal. 265, 64 Pac. 403; State v. Savings Bank of New London, 79 Conn. 141, 64 Atl. 5; Atchison, ete., R. Co. v. State, 28 Okla. 94, 113 Pac. 921, 40 L. R. A. (x. 8.) 1; State v. Jones, 6 Wash. 452, 34 Pac. 201, 23 L. R. A. 340. It has been held that where the Constitution requires previous notice of an application for a private act,CHAP. VI] OF THE ENACTMENT OF LAWS 279 is acting in the apparent performance of legal functions, every rea- sonable presumption is to be made in favor of the action of a legis- lative body; it will not be presumed in any case, from the mere silence of the journals, that either house has exceeded its authority, or disregarded a constitutional requirement in the passage of legis- lative acts, unless where the constitution has expressly required the journals to show the action taken, as, for instance, where it requires the yeas and nays to be entered." the courts cannot go behind the act to inquire whether the notice was given. Brodnax v. Groom, 64 N. C. 244; Cox v. Pitt County, 146 N. C. 584, 60 See 516516) Lb: R. A. (Ne S:)) 2535 Cravens v. State, 57 Tex. Crim. Rep. 135, 122 S. W. 29, 136 Am. St. Rep. 977. See People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44; Day v. Stetson, 8 Me. 365; M’Clinch v. Sturgis, 72 Me. 288; Davis v. Gaines, 48 Ark. 370, 3S. W. 184; Speer v. Athens, 85 Ga. 49, 11 S. E. 802, 9 L. R. A. 402. In Indiana the courts cannot look beyond the enrolled act and its authen- tication to determine the validity of an act; but in the case of an act passed over the governor’s veto, where no authentication is required, the journals of the two houses of the legislature, upon which the governor’s objections to the bill are required to be entered, and which show the passage of the bill notwithstanding such objections, are proper evidence of the passage of the bill over the veto. Evans v. Browne, 30 Ind. 514; State ex rel. Holt »v. Denny, 118 Ind. 449, 21 N. E. 274. As to use to be made of the journals in determining the true contents of a bill, see Milwaukee County ». Isenring, 109 Wis. 9, 85 N. W. 131. The Supreme Court of the United States applies the rule of conclusive- ness of an enrolled act as applied to acts of Congress and territorial stat- utes, but as to State statutes applies the rule prevailing in the State from which the case comes. South Ottawa v. Perkins, 94 U.S. 260, 24 L. ed. 154; Post v. Supervisors, 105 U. S. 667, 26 L. ed. 1204; Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649; 36 L. ed. 294, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 495; Lyons v. Woods, 153 U. S. 649, 38 L. ed. 854, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 959; Harwood v. Wentworth, 162 U. S. 547, 40 L. ed. 1069, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 890; Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107; 55 L. ed. 389, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 342, Ann. Cas. 1912 B, 1312. As to what papers constitute the journal and what changes may be made in them and when, see Mont- gomery B. B. Works v. Gaston, 126 Ala. 425, 28 So. 497, 51 L. R. A. 396, 1 Miller v. State, 3 Ohio St. 475; McCulloch v. State, 11 Ind. 424; Supervisors v. People, 25 Ill. 181; Hall v. Steele, 82 Ala. 562; Glidewell v. Martin, 11 S. W. 882; People v. Dunn, 22 Pac. 140; State v. Brown, 20 Fla. 407; Matter of Vanderberg, 28 Kan. 243; State v. Peterson, 38 Minn. 1438, 36 N. W. 443; State v. Algood, 87 Tenn. 163, 10 S. W. 310; Hunt v. State, 22 Tex. App. 396, 3 S. W. 233; State v. Joseph, 175 Ala. 579, 57 So. 942, Ann. Cas. 1914 D, 248; Andrews v. People, 33 Colo. 193, 79 Pac. 1031, 108 Am. St. Rep. 76; Adams v. Clark, 36 Colo. 65, 85 Pac. 642, 10 Ann. Cas. 774; Clendaniel »v. Conrad, 3 Boyce (Del.) 549, 83 Atl. 1036, Ann. Cas. 1915 B, 968; Amos v. Moseley, 74 Fla. 555, 77 So. 619, L. R. A. 1918 C, 482; In re Drainage Dist. No. 1, 26 Idaho, 311, 143 Pac. 299, L. R. A. 1915 A, 1210; State v. Akers, 92 Kan. 169, 140 Pac. 637, Ann. Cas. 1916 B, 543; Portland v. Yick, 44 Oreg. 439, 75 Pac. 706, 102 Am. St. Rep. 633. But where a statute can only be enacted by a certain majority, e.g. two-thirds, it must affirmatively appear by the printed statute or the act on file that such a vote was had. People v. Commissioners of Highways, 54 N. Y. 276. It seems that, in Illinois, if one claims that a supposed law was never passed, and relies upon the records to280 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I The law also seeks to cast its protection around legislative sessions, and to shield them against corrupt and improper influences, by mak- ing void all contracts which have for their object to influence legis- lation in any other manner than by such open and public presenta- tion of facts, arguments, and appeals to reason as are recognized as proper and legitimate with all public bodies. While counsel may be properly employed to present the reasons in favor of any public measure to the body authorized to pass upon it, or to any of its committees empowered to collect facts and hear arguments, and parties interested may lawfully contract to pay for this service,! yet show it, he must prove them. [Illinois Cent. R. R. Co. v. Wren, 43 Ill. 77; Grob v. Cushman, 45 Ill. 119; Bedard v. Hall, 44 Ill. 91. The court will not act upon the admission of parties that an act was not passed in the constitu- tional manner. Happel v. Brethauer, 70 Ill. 166; Attorney-General v. Rice, 64 Mich. 385, 31 N. W. 203. The Constitution of Alabama, art. 4, § 27, requires the presiding officer of each house, in the presence of the house, to sign acts ‘after the titles have been publicly read immediately before signing, and the fact of signing shall be entered on the journal.” This seems a very imperative require- ment. But in Colorado a like provi- sion is held directory, and the presump- tion in case of silence of journal is in favor of the act. In re Roberts, 5 Col. 525. That requirement to enter yeas and nays is mandatory, see Com’rs of Stanly Co. v. Snuggs, 121 N. C. 394, 28 S. E. 539, 39 L. R. A. 439. That journals must affirmatively show full compliance with constitutional re- quirements, see Cohn v. Kingsley, 5 Idaho, 416, 49 Pac. 985, 38 L. R. A. 74; Lynch v. Hutchinson, 219 Ill. 193, 76 N. E. 370, 4 Ann. Cas. 904; Pala- tine Ins. Co. v. Northern Pacific R. Co., 34 Mont. 268, 85 Pac. 1032, 9 Ann. Cas. 579; State v. Mickey, 73 Neb. 281, 102 N. W. 679, 119 Am. St. Rep. 894; Union Bank v. Com’rs of Oxford, 119 N.C. 214, 25S. E. 966, 34 L. R.A. 487; George Bollin Co. ». North Platte Val. Irrigation Co., 19 Wyo. 542, 121 Pac. 22, 39 L. R. A. (n. s.) 868. Contra, Lafferty v. Huffman, 99 Ky. 80, 35 S. W. 123, 32 L. R. A, 203 ; McKinnon »v. Cotner, 30 Oreg. 588, 49 Pac. 956. If the journals do not show that an aye and nay vote was taken, as is directed by the Constitu- tion, the act will be void. Montgom- ery Beer Bottling Works v. Gaston, 126 Ala. 425, 28 So. 497, 85 Am. St. Rep. 42, 51 L. R. A. 396; Palatine Ins. Co. v. Northern Pacific R. Co., 34 Mont. 268, 85 Pac. 1032, 9 Ann. Cas. 579; Osburn v. Staley, 5 W. Va. 85, 13 Am. Rep. 640. The court will not declare a statute void because of fraud in procuring its enrolment and the signatures of the proper officers thereto. Such fraud must be corrected by the legislature. Carr v. Coke, 116 N. C. 223, 22 S. E. 16, 28 L. R. A. 737, 47 Am. St. 801. Parol testimony is inadmissible to impeach legislative records. White v. Hinton, 3 Wyo. 753, 30 Pac. 953, 17 L. R. A. 66. Upon conclusiveness of legislative records, see Detroit ». Rentz, 91 Mich. 78, 51 N. W. 787, 16 L. R. A. 59. And upon records of Secretary of State in regard to passage of bills and submission to governor, see Lankford v. Somerset Co., 73 Md. 105, 20 Atl. 1017, 22 Atl. 412, 11 L. R. A. 491. Matters of detail will be presumed properly performed where journal records the doing of the main act and is silent as to the subsidiary matters. Barber Asphalt Co. v. Hunt, 100 Mo. 22,138. W. 98,8 L. R. A. 110, 18 Am. St. 5380. 1See Wildey v. Collier, 7 Md. 273; Bryan v. Reynolds, 5 Wis. 200; Brown v. Brown, 34 Barb. 533; Russell v. Burton, 66 Barb. 539; Houlton »v. Nichol, 93 Wis. 393, 67 N. W. 715,CHAP. VI] OF THE ENACTMENT OF LAWS 281 to secretly approach the members of such a body with a view to influence their action at a time and in a manner that do not allow the presentation of opposite views, is improper and unfair to the opposing interest; and a contract to pay for this irregular and improper service would not be enforced by the law.’ [To render the 33°, R. A. 166; Cole v. Brown- Hurley Hardware Co., 139 Iowa, 487, 117 N. W. 746, 16 Ann. Cas. 846, 18 L. R. A. (wv. s.) 1161; Adams v. East Boston Co., 236 Mass. 121, 127 N. E. 628; Hyland v. Oregon Hassam Paving Co., 74 Oreg. 1, 144 Pac. 1160, L. R. A. 1915 C, 823, Ann. Cas. 1916 E, 941; Herrick v. Barzee, 96 Oreg. 357, 190 Pac. 141; Stansell ». Roach, 147 Tenn. 183, 246 S. W. 520, 29 A. L. R. 148. “A contract for services to be ren- dered by an attorney before the legis- lature or the Congress of the United States, in securing the passage of a law providing for the payment of a just claim, is not unlawful if it does not contemplate the use of improper means and if the services to be rendered are such as to appeal to the reason of those whom it is sought to persuade. Draft- ing the petition to set forth the claim, collecting facts, preparing and sub- mitting arguments either orally or in writing to a committee or other proper authority, and other services of like character, are within the category of professional services. They rest on the same principle of ethics as pro- fessional services rendered in a court of justice and are no more exception- able. Services of such nature are separated by a broad line of demarca- tion from personal solicitation and similar means and appliances.’”’ Her- rick »v. Barzee, 96 Oreg. 357, 190 Pac. 141. See also Hyland ». Oregon Hassam Paving Co., 74 Oreg. 1, 144 Pac. 1160, L. R. A. 1915 C, 823, Ann. Cas. 1916 E, 941. 1 This whole subject was very fully considered in the case of Frost »v. Inhabitants of Belmont, 6 Allen, 152, which was a bill filed to restrain the payment by the town of demands to the amount of nearly $9,000, which the town had voted to pay as expenses in obtaining their act of incorporation. By the court, Chapman, J.: “It is to be regretted that any persons should have attempted to procure an act of legislation in this Commonwealth, by such means as some of these items indi- cate. By the regular course of legisla- tion, organs are provided through which any parties may fairly and openly approach the legislature, and be heard with proofs and arguments respecting any legislative acts which they may be interested in, whether public or private. These organs are the various committees appointed to consider and report upon the matters to be acted upon by the whole body. When private interests are to be affected, notice is given of the hearings before these committees; and thus opportunity is given to adverse parties to meet face to face and obtain a fair and open hearing. And though these committees properly dispense with many of the rules which regulate hear- ings before judicial tribunals, yet com- mon fairness requires that neither party shall be permitted to have secret consultations, and exercise secret influ- ences that are kept from the knowledge of the other party. The business of ‘lobby members’ is not to go fairly and openly before the committees, and present statements, proofs, and argu- ments that the other side has an oppor- tunity to meet and refute if they are wrong, but to go secretly to the mem- bers and ply them with statements and arguments that the other side cannot openly meet, however errone- ous they may be, and to bring illegiti- mate influence to bear upon them. If the ‘lobby member’ is selected because of his political or personal influence, it aggravates the wrong. If his busi- ness is to unite various interests by means of projects that are called ‘log- rolling’, it is still worse. The practice of procuring members of the legisla- ture to act under the influence of what they have eaten and drank at houses of entertainment, tends to render those282 of them who yield to such influences wholly unfit to act in such eases. They are disqualified from acting fairly towards interested parties or towards the public. The tendency and object of these influences are to obtain by corruption what it is sup- posed cannot be obtained fairly. “It is a well-established principle, that all contracts which are opposed to public policy, and to open, upright, and fair dealing, are illegal and void. The principle was fully discussed in Fuller v. Dame, 18 Pick. 472. In several other States it has been applied to cases quite analogous to the present case. “In Pingrey v. Washburn, 1 Aik. 264, it was held in Vermont that an agreement, on the part of a corpora- tion, to grant to individuals certain privileges in consideration that they would withdraw their opposition to the passage of a legislative act touching the interests of the corporation, is against sound policy, prejudicial to correct and just legislation, and void. In Gulick v. Ward, 5 Halst. 87, it was decided in New Jersey that a contract which contravenes an act of Congress, and tends to defraud the United States, is void. A. had agreed to give B. $100, on condition that B. would for- bear to propose or offer himself to the Postmaster-General to carry the mail on a certain mail route, and it was held that the contract was against public policy and void. The general prin- ciple as to contracts contravening public policy was discussed in that case at much length. In Wood». McCann, 6 Dana, 366, the defendant had em- ployed the plaintiff to assist him in obtaining a legislative act in Kentucky, legalizing his divorce from a former wife, and his marriage with his present wife. The court say: ‘A lawyer may be entitled to compensation for writing a petition, or even for making a public argument before the legislature or a committee thereof; but the law should not help him or any other person to a recompense for exercising any personal influence, in any way, in any act of legislation. It is certainly important to just and wise legislation, and there- fore to the most essential interests of CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I the public, that the legislature should be perfectly free from any extraneous influence which may either corrupt or deceive the members, or any of them.’ “In Clippinger »v. Hepbaugh, 5 Watts & S. 315, it was decided in Penn- sylvania that a contract to procure or endeavor to procure the passage of an act of the legislature by using personal influence with the members, or by any sinister means, was void, as being inconsistent with public policy and the integrity of our political in- stitutions. And an agreement for a contingent fee to be paid on the pas- sage of a legislative act was held to be illegal and void, because it would be a strong incentive to the exercise of per- sonal and sinister influences to effect the object. “The subject has been twice adjudi- cated upon in New York. In Harris v. Roof, 10 Barb. 489, the Supreme Court held that one could not recover for services performed in going to see individual members of the house, to get them to aid in voting for a private claim, the services not being performed before the house as a body nor before its authorized committees. In Sedg- wick v. Stanton, 4 Kernan, 289, the Court of Appeals held the same doc- trine, and stated its proper limits. Selden, J., makes the following com- ments on the case of Harris v. Roof: ‘Now, the court did not mean by this decision to hold that one who has a claim against the State may not em- ploy competent persons to aid him in properly presenting such claim to the legislature, and in supporting it with the necessary proofs and arguments. Mr. Justice Hand, who delivered the opinion of the court, very justly dis- tinguishes between services of the nature of those rendered in that case, and the procuring and preparing the necessary documents in support of a claim, or acting as counsel before the legislature or some committee ap- pointed by that body. Persons may, no doubt, be employed to conduct an application to the legislature, as well as to conduct a suit at law; and may contract for and receive pay for their services in preparing documents, col- lecting evidence, making statementsCHAP. VI] of facts, or preparing and making oral or written arguments, provided all these are used or designed to be used before the legislature or some com- mittee thereof as a body; but they cannot, with propriety, be employed to exert their personal influence with individual members, or to labor in any form privately with such members out of the legislative halls. Whatever is laid before the legislature in writing, or spoken openly or publicly in its presence or that of a committee, if false in fact, may be disproved, or if wrong in argument may be refuted ; but that which is whispered into the private ear of individual members is frequently beyond the reach of cor- rection. The point of objection in this class of cases, then, is, the personal and private nature of the services to be rendered.’ “In Fuller v. Dame, cited above, Shaw, Ch. J., recognizes the well- established right to contract and pay for professional services when the promisee is to act as attorney and counsel, but remarks that ‘the fact appearing that persons do so act pre- vents any injurious effects from such proceeding. Such counsel is con- sidered as standing in the place of his principal, and his arguments and representations are weighed and con- sidered accordingly.’ He also admits the right of disinterested persons to volunteer advice; as when a person is about to make a will, one may repre- sent to him the propriety and expedi- ency of making a bequest to a particular person; and so may one volunteer advice to another to marry another person; but a promise to pay for such service is void. “Applying the principles stated in these cases to the bills which the town voted to pay, it is manifest that some of the money was expended for objects that are contrary to public policy, and of a most reprehensible character, and which could not, therefore, form a legal consideration for a contract.” See, further, a full discussion of the same subject, and reaching the same conclusion, by Mr. Justice Grier, in Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co., 16 How. 314, 14 L. ed. 953. That OF THE ENACTMENT OF LAWS 283 contracts for lobby services in pro- curing or preventing legislation are void, see Usher v. McBratney, 3 Dill. 385; Trist v. Child, 21 Wall. 441, 22 L. ed. 623; McKee v. Cheney, 52 How. (N. Y.) 144; Weed »v. Black, 2 MacArthur, 268; Sweeney v. McLeod, 15 Oreg. 330, 15 Pac. 275; Cary ». Western U. Tel. Co., 47 Hun, 610; Adams v. East Boston Co., 236 Mass. 121, 127 N. E. 628; Davis v. Janeway, 55 Okla. 725, 155 Pac. 241, L. R. A. 1916 D, 722; Hyland v. Oregon Has- sam Paving Co., 74 Oreg. 1, 144 Pac. 1160, L. R. A. 1915 C, 823, Ann. Cas. 1916 E, 941; Herrick v. Barzee, 96 Oreg. 357, 190 Pac. 141; Stansell »v. Roach, 147 Tenn. 183, 246 S. W. 520, 29 A. L. R. 148. Or for influence in procuring contracts. Tool Co. »v. Norris, 2 Wall. 45, 17 L. ed. 868. And any contract the purpose of which is to influence a public officer or body to favor persons in the performance of his public duty is void, on grounds of public policy. Ordineal v. Barry, 24 Miss. 9. Compare Cole v. Brown- Hurley Hardware Co., 139 Iowa, 487, 117 N. W. 746, 18 L. R. A. (wv. 8.) 1161, 16 Ann. Cas. 846. The same general principle will be found applied in the following cases: Swayze v. Hull, 8 N. J. L. 54, 14 Am. Dee. 399; Wood ». McCann, 6 Dana, 366; Hatzfield ». Gulden, 7 Watts, 152; Gill v. Davis, 12 La. Ann. 219; Powers v. Skinner, 34 Vt. 274; Frankfort v. Winterport, 54 Me. 250; Rose v. Truax, 21 Barb. 361; Devlin v. Brady, 32 Barb. 518; Oscanyan v. Arms Company, 103 U.S. 261, 26 L. ed. 539; Meguire ». Corwin, 3 MacArthur, 81; Dodson v. McCur- nin, 178 Iowa, 1211, 160 N. W. 927, L. R. A. 1917 C, 1084; Davis v. Jane- way, 55 Okla. 725, 155 Pac. 241, Pree A. 1916 D, 722. See further, post, 1391, note. “Public policy requires that legis- lators or councilmen act solely from considerations of public duty and with an eye single to the public interests, and the courts uniformly hold to be illegal contracts for services that in- volve the use of secret means or the exercise of sinister or personal influ- ences upon lawmakers to secure the passage or the defeat of proposed laws284 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I contract void, it is not necessary that the parties should stipulate for corrupt action to be procured or induced by bribery, or the promise of future monetary gain, or the emolument of office; it is sufficient if the contract when applied to the facts inevitably tends to results which impair not merely the character of the legislature, but the public confidence in its integrity.!. There is conflict among the authorities as to the effect upon a contract for services before legislative bodies of a provision making the compensation therefor contingent upon success in obtaining the desired results. Some cases hold that such a provision will invalidate the contract even though the services to be rendered are entirely legitimate.” or ordinances. This principle applies to common councils or other law- making bodies of municipal corpora- tions to the same extent that it does to Congress or the legislature of a State.” Hyland v. Oregon Hassam Paving Co., 74 Oreg. 1, 144 Pac. 1160, L. R. A. 1915 C, 823, Ann. Cas. 1916 E, 941. Contract of employment in which employee is assured of only a nominal salary and a large addition thereto is made contingent upon the adoption by a city council of a certain ordinance is void. Crichfield v. Bermudez As- phalt Paving Co., 174 Ill. 466, 51 N. E. 552, 42 L. R. A. 347. A sale of a town office, though by the town itself, cannot be the con- sideration for a contract. Meredith v. Ladd, 2 N. H. 517. See Carleton v. Whitcher, 5 N. H. 196; Eddy ». Capron, 4 R. I. 394. A town cannot incur expenses in opposing before a legislative com- mittee a division of the territorial limits: Westbrook v. Deering, 63 Me. 231; or to pay the expenses of a com- mittee to procure the annexation of the town to another. Minot v. West Roxbury, 112 Mass. 1, 17 Am. Rep. 52. But in view of the provision in the Constitution of the United States securing to the people the right to petition the government for the redress of grievances, a contract for services to be rendered by an attorney before Congress in securing the passage of a law providing for the payment of a just claim is not rendered unlawful because it is attempted to be carried out in part by the claimants writing to the senators and representatives in But Congress, upon the advice of their attorney. Herrick v. Barzee, 96 Oreg. 357, 190 Pac. 141. See also Winton »v. Amos, 255 U.S. 373, 65 L. ed. 684, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 342. A contract employing an attorney to prosecute a claim against the Federal Government for property seized by Federal authorities during the civil war is not invalid as a lobby- ing contract on it appearing that the claim was dependent on establishing before the proper committees of the Federal Senate and House of Repre- sentatives the fact that the owner of the property had been a loyal citizen. Pennebaker v. Williams, 136 Ky. 120, 120S. W. 321, 123 S. W. 672. The fact that the manager of a cor- poration was a member of the legisla- ture which authorized the letting of a certain contract will not prevent the corporation’s bidding for it if the manager is not a stockholder, and his pay is in no way affected by the suc- cess or failure of the bid. State »v. Rickards, 16 Mont. 145, 40 Pac. 210, 28 L. R. A. 298, 50 Am. St. 476. An agreement upon a pecuniary consideration to withdraw opposition to granting of a pardon and to give assistance by solicitation and personal influence in procuring the same is against public policy and void. Deer- ing & Co. v. Cunningham, 63 Kan. 174, 65 Pac. 268, 54 L. R. A. 410. 1 Adams v. East Boston Co., 236 Mass. 121, 127 N. E. 628. 2 Hogston v. Bell, 185 Ind. 586, 112 N. E. 883; Crichfield v. Bermudez Asphalt Paving Co., 174 Ill. 466, 51 Ne By 6525-420 Re AG 347 GulenCHAP. VI] OF THE ENACTMENT OF LAWS 285 other cases, especially the most recent, deny this, and hold that if the services contracted for do not involve lobbying or other ques- tionable methods or immoral conduct, and such methods are not resorted to in their performance, the mere fact of the compensation being contingent will not render the contract void.’ For proper Williams, 12 La. Ann. 219, 68 Am. Dec. 767; Houlton v. Dunn, 60 Minn. 26, 61 N. W. 898, 51 Am. St. Rep. 493, 30 L. R. A. 737; Chippewa Valley & S. R. Co. v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 75 Wis. 225, 44 N. W. 17,6 L. R. A. 601. “This rule is based on the ground that, when compensation is directly or indirectly contingent on success before the legislative body, it must necessarily encourage and lead to the use of improper means and the exer- cise of undue influence.” Hogston v. Bell, 185 Ind. 536, 112 N. E. 883. The rule applies as well to the common council of a city as to the legislature of a State. Crichfield v. Bermudez Asphalt Paving Co., 174 Ill. 466, 51 N. E. 652, 42 L. R. A. 347. 1 Where one who had a just and meritorious claim against the govern- ment which could only be paid by act of Congress, contracted with others who had similar claims, based upon the same situations, to represent them at the same time that he presented his own claim in an effort to secure favorable consideration thereof, his expenses and compensation to be dependent upon his success, where no questionable methods were mentioned, no immoral conduct actually resorted to, and no misrepresentations were necessary in order to engage favorable consideration, and where the agent employed was necessarily known to have a personal interest in the appro- priation, it was held that the contracts for contingent compensation were not void as in contravention of public pol- icy. Stansell v. Roach, 147 Tenn. 183, 246 S. W. 520, 29 A. L. R. 143. The court said: ‘It is insisted that any contract the probable tendency of which would be to sully the probity or mislead the judgment of those to whom the high trust of legislation is confided must be pronounced void, and that such tendency must neces- sarily be inferred from an agreement to pay and to receive contingent com- pensation. We entirely agree with the soundness of the proposition that a contract which necessarily implies the exercise of an improper or undue influence upon legislation should be declared void and unenforcible out of consideration of a sound public policy, but we are unable to concur in the conclusion that such a situation is inferable from the mere provisions for contingent compensation. The terms of a contract may be broad enough and used in connection with circumstances and in such a way as to imply secret or dishonest services, and such a law falls within the condemnation of pub- lie policy. ‘But as the law does not presume that a person intends to vio- late its provisions, the general prin- ciple controlling the construction of a contract to influence legislation when the contract itself does not in terms stipulate for improper means seems to be that it will be upheld, unless the use of such means appears by necessary implication. The test is, does the contract, by its terms or necessary implication, require the performance of acts which are of a corrupt charac- ter or which have a corrupting tend- ency. 6R.C.L., pp. 732, 733. Nu- merous cases might be cited where the courts have upheld contracts for services in which compensation was contingent upon success. Reference to a few will suffice to show that the mere fact of contingency does not of itself vitiate the contract.” In sup- port of this rule the court cites the following cases. Wylie v. Coxe, 15 How. 415, 14 L. ed. 753; Wright ». Tebbitts, 91 U. 8. 252, 23 L. ed. 320; Stanton v. Embry, 93 U. S. 548, 23 L. ed. 983; Taylor v. Bemiss, 110 U. S. 42, 28 L. ed. 64, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 441; Nutt v. Knut, 200 U. S. 13, 50 L. ed. 348, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 216;286 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I professional services rendered and expenses incurred in promoting legislation that has for its object and effect the rescue of substantial property interests for a class of beneficiaries under a trust of a publie nature, it is equitable to impose a charge for reimbursement and compensation upon the interests of those beneficiaries who receive the benefit, just as it would be if a like result had been reached through successful litigation in the courts. In either case there is the same curious analogy to the salvage services of the maritime Law.'] The Introduction and Passage of Bills.” Any member may introduce a bill in the house to which he be- longs, in accordance with its rules; and this he may do at any time when the house is in session, unless the constitution, the law, or the rules of the house forbid. ‘The constitution of Michigan provides that no new bill shall be introduced into either house of the legisla- ture after the first fifty days of the session shall have expired ;* and the Constitution of Maryland provides that no bill shall originate in either house within the last ten days of the session.* The purpose of these clauses is to prevent hasty and improvident legislation, and to compel, so far as any previous law can accomplish that result, the careful examination of proposed laws, or at least the affording of opportunity for that purpose; which will not always be done when bills may be introduced up to the very hour of adjournment, and, with the concurrence of the proper majority, put immediately upon their passage. [Where a bill has been introduced within the time limited by the Constitution, an amendment or substituted bill, which is within the general purpose of the original bill, may be intro- Valdes v. Larrinaga, 233 U. S. 708, 58 L. ed. 1168, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 750. See also Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Botsford, 56 Kan. 532, 44 Pac. 3; Pennebaker v. Williams, 136 Ky. 120, 120 S. W. 321, 123 S. W. 672; Stroe- mer v. Van Orsdel, 74 Neb. 113, 103 N. W. 1053, 107 N. W. 125, 121 Am. St. Rep. 713, 4 L. R. A. (n. s.) 212, modifying Richardson v. Scotts Bluff County, 50 Neb. 400, 81 N. W. 309, 80 Am. St. Rep. 682, 48 L. R. A. 294; Herrick v. Barzee, 96 Oreg. 357, 190 Pac. 141. Compare Hyland v. Oregon Hassam Paving Co., 74 Oreg. 1, 144 Pac. 1160, L. R. A. 1915 C, 823, Ann. Cas. 1916 E, 941. Butit has been held that a contract which contemplates the procuring of legislative action for the sole purpose of depreciating the market value of the securities of a cor- poration and provides that any profit, arising from speculating in such secu- rities by selling them short and cover- ing at the anticipated decline, is to be divided between the parties, is void as against public policy and will not be enforced by the courts. Veazey 2. Allen, 173 N. Y. 359, 66 N. E. 103, 62 TR AS S62: 1 Winton v. Amos, 255 U. S. 3738, 65 L. ed. 684, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 342. Upon this subject, see note to 11 L. R. A. 491. 3 Art. 4, § 28. 4 Art. 3, § 26. In Arkansas there is a similar provision, limiting the time to three days. Art. 5, § 24.CHAP. VI] duced after that time has expired. OF THE ENACTMENT OF LAWS 287 But if, in such case, the amend- ment or substituted bill presents a measure that has no relation to the bill as originally introduced, it cannot stand, for it is in sub- stance a new measure or bill.? A bill introduced within the time limited by the Constitution and enacted after the expiration of that time is not invalidated by the fact that it can be sustained only under an amendment to the Constitution that was adopted after the expiration of the time limited for the introduction of bills.*] It is required by the constitutions of several of the States, that no bill shall have the force of law until on three several days it be read in each house, and free discussion allowed thereon; unless, in case of urgency, four-fifths or some other specified majority of the house shall deem it expedient to dispense with this rule.* 1 Davock v. Moore, 105 Mich. 120, 63 N. W. 424, 28 L. R. A. 783; People v. Loomis, 1385 Mich. 556, 98 N. W. 262, 3 Ann. Cas. 751; State v. Ryan, 92 Neb. 636, 139 N. W. 235, Ann. Cas. 1914 A, 224. For a bill to create a township from certain territory may be substituted one to incorporate a city in the same county. People v. McElroy, 72 Mich. 446, 40 N. W. 750. A bill to create a township may be amended after fifty days so as to make the same territory a county. Pack v. Barton, 47 Mich. 520, 11 N. W. 367. 2 People v. Loomis, 135 Mich. 556, 98 N. W. 262, 3 Ann. Cas. 751. A practice has sprung up of evad- ing these constitutional provisions by introducing a new bill after the time has expired when it may constitu- tionally be done, as an amendment to some pending bill, the whole of which, except the enacting clause, is struck out to make way for it. Thus, the member who thinks he may possibly have occasion for the introduction of a new bill after the constitutional period has expired, takes care to intro- duce sham bills in due season which he can use as stocks to graft upon, and which he uses irrespective of their character or contents. The sham bill is perhaps a bill to incorporate the city of Siam. One of the member’s con- stituents applies to him for legislative permission to construct a dam across the Wild Cat River. Forthwith, by amendment, the bill entitled a bill to The journals incorporate the city of Siam has all after the enacting clause stricken out, and it is made to provide, as its sole object, that John Doe may construct a dam across the Wild Cat. With this title and in this form it is passed; but the house then considerately amends the title to correspond with the pur- pose of the bill, and the law is passed and the constitution at the same time saved! This trick is so transparent, and so clearly in violation of the con- stitution, and the evidence at the same time is so fully spread upon the record, that it is a matter of surprise to find it so often resorted to. A bill to create the County of L. out of the County of W. cannot be amended so as to make M. County out of X. County. Re Creation of New Counties, 9 Col. 624, 21 Pac. 472. See, also, Hall v. Steele, 82 Ala. 562, 2 So. 650. A bill substituting K. County for J. County, in a bill creat- ing a board of county auditors for J. County, is a new bill, and, if in- troduced after the time limited by the Constitution, is void. People »v. Loomis, 135 Mich. 556, 98 N. W. 262, 3 Ann. Cas. 751. 3 Morrison v. Kent, 135 Mich. 38, 97 N. W. 45, 67 L. R. A. 965. 4“The purpose of this provision of the Constitution is to inform legisla- tors and people of legislation proposed by a bill, and to prevent hasty legisla- tion.” Smith v. Mitchell, 69 W. Va. 481, 72 S. EB. 755, Ann. Cas. 1913 B, 588.288 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. 1 which each house keeps of its proceedings ought to show whether this rule is complied with or not; but in case they do not, the pas- sage in the manner provided by the constitution must be presumed, in accordance with the general rule which presumes the proper dis- charge of official duty.! [Failure to show that the rule has been complied with, may be corrected by the same legislature, and, when corrected, the journal will stand as if it was originally so made.” The requirement of three readings on different days in each house does not necessarily mean three days in one house, and three differ- ent days in the other house. When duplicate bills are introduced in both houses, they may be read in both on the same days, pro- vided there are three readings on different days in each house.® Where a bill is amended after its first or second reading it need not 1Supervisors of Schuyler Co. v. People, 25 Ill. 181; Miller v. State, 3 Ohio St. 475. In People v. Starne, 35 Ill. 121, it is said the courts should not enforce a legislative act unless there is record evidence, from the journals of the two houses, that every material require- ment of the constitution has been satisfied. And see Ryan v. Lynch, 68 Ill. 160. Contra, State v. McConnell, 3 Lea, 341; Blessing v. Galveston, 42 Tex. 641. The clause in the Constitution of Ohio is: “Every bill shall be fully and distinctly read on three different days, unless, in case of urgency, three- fourths of the house in which it shall be pending shall dispense with this rule;” and in Miller v. State, 3 Ohio St. 475, and Pim ». Nicholson, 6 Ohio St. 176, this provision was held to be merely directory. The distinctness with which any bill must be read cannot possibly be defined by any law; and it must always, from the necessity of the case, rest with the house to determine finally whether in this particular the Consti- tution has been complied with or not; but the rule respecting three several readings on different days is specific, and capable of being precisely complied with, and we do not see how, even under the rules applied to statutes, it can be regarded as directory merely, provided it has a purpose beyond the mere regular and orderly transaction of business. That it has such a pur- pose, that it is designed to prevent hasty and improvident legislation, and is therefore not a mere rule of order, but one of protection to the public in- terests and to the citizens at large, is very clear; and independent of the question whether definite constitu- tional principles can be dispensed with in any case on the ground of their be- ing merely directory, we cannot see how this can be treated as anything but mandatory. See People v. Campbell, 8 Ill. 466; McCulloch v. State, 11 Ind. 424; Weill v. Kenfield, 54 Cal. 111; Chicot Co. v. Davies, 40 Ark. 200; Stockton v. Powell, 29 Fla. 1, 10 So. 688, 15 L. R. A. 42; Rodman-Heath Cotton Mills v. Waxhaw, 130 N. C. 293, 41 8. E. 488; Richmond County Com’rs v. Farmers’ Bank, 152 N. C. 387, 67 S. E. 969, 21 Ann. Cas. 812. Reading twice by title and once at length is sufficient. People v. McEI- roy, 72 Mich. 446, 49 N. W. 750. One reading may be in committee of the whole. Re Reading of Bills, 9 Col. 641, 21 Pac. 477. After bill is amended and passed as amended in the second house, it need not be read three times in first house before amendments are concurred in by that house. State v. Dillon, 42 Fla. 95, 28 So. 781. 2Richmond County Com. ». Farmers’ Bank, 152 N. C. 387, 675. E. 969, 21 Ann. Cas. 812. 3 Smith v. Mitchell, 69 W. Va. 481, 72 S. E. 755, Ann. Cas. 1913 B, 588.CHAP. VI] OF THE ENACTMENT OF LAWS 289 be again read in its entirety on three different days.’ Where a bill has been read twice and referred to a committee who have reported a substitute, which is so germane to the original bill as to be a proper substitute, such substitute need not be read three times; a single reading will suffice.2 A provision of the Consti- tution that in case of urgency two-thirds of the house in which a bill is pending may dispense with the requirement as to reading, applies to amendments as well as to the original bill, and the reading of amendments on three several days may be dispensed with] In the reading of a bill, it seems to be sufficient to read the written document that is adopted by the two houses; even though something else becomes law in consequence of its passage, and by reason of being referred to in it. Thus, a statute which incorporated a military company by reference to its Constitution and by-laws, was held valid notwithstanding the Constitution and by-laws, which would acquire the force of law by its passage, were not read in the two houses as a part of it.2 But there cannot be many cases, we should suppose, to which this ruling would be applicable. [One of the readings of a bill may be on Sunday if a reading on that day is not prohibited by Constitution or statute.® Where the laws of the State have been codified, and certain new provisions introduced, the code may be enacted as a whole by a single 1State v. Dillon, 42 Fla. 96, 28 So. 781; Cleland v. Anderson, 66 Neb. 261, 92 N. W. 306, 96 N. W. 212, 98 INS AWeLOV5s, Slane ZAC Guo is:) 2136); State v. Ryan, 92 Neb. 636, 139 N. W. 235, Ann. Cas. 1914 A, 224; Capito v. Topping, 65 W. Va. 587, 64 S. E. 845, 22 L. R. A. (n. s.) 1089; Smith »v. Mitchell, 69 W. Va. 481, 72 S. E. 755, Ann. Cas. 1913 B, 588. 2 State v. Akers, 92 Kan. 169, 140 Pac. 637, Ann. Cas. 1916 B, 543; Edwards v. Nash County Board, 183 N. C. 58, 110 S. E. 600; Southern R. Co. v. Memphis, 126 Tenn. 267, 148 S. W. 662, 41 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 828, Ann. Cas. 1913 E, 153; Smith »v. Mitchell, 69 W. Va. 481, 72 S. E. 755, Ann, Cas. 1913 B, 588. Where bills which are the same in tenor and substance in their caption and body are introduced into both houses, and the bill as passed by one house is substituted for the bill in the other house which has passed two read- VOL. 1—-19 ings, a single reading of such substi- tuted bill will comply with the re- quirement that a bill shall be read in each house on three separate days. Archibald v. Clark, 112 Tenn. 532, 82 S. W. 310; Heiskell v. Knox County, 132 Tenn. 180, 177 S. W. 483, Ann. Cas. 1916 E, 1281. Tarr v. Western Loan, etc., Co., 15 Idaho, 741, 99 Pac. 1049, 21 L. R. AN (6 BD) TAWA 4 Dew v. Cunningham, 28 Ala. 466. Congress may adopt a law by refer- ence. District of Columbia v. Wash- ington Gas Light Co., 3 Mackey, 343. See, further, Baird v. State, 52 Ark. 326, 12 S. W. 556; Beard v. Wilson, 52 Ark. 290, 12 S. W. 567; Titusville Iron Works v. Keystone Oil Co., 122 Pa. St. 627, 15 Atl. 917. 6 Bibb County Loan Association ». Richards, 21 Ga. 592. And see Pul- ford v. Fire Department, 31 Mich. 458. 6 Ex parte Seward, 299 Mo. 385, 253 S. W. 356, 31 A. L. R. 665.290 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I statute, and when so done it is sufficient to read the enacting statute. The code need not be read at length.*] It is also provided in the constitutions of some of the States that, on the final passage of every bill, the yeas and nays shall be entered on the journal. Such a provision is designed to serve an important purpose in compelling each member present to assume as well as to feel his due share of responsibility in legislation ; and also in furnish- ing definite and conclusive evidence whether the bill has been passed by the requisite majority or not. “The Constitution prescribes this as the test by which to determine whether the requisite number of members vote in the affirmative. The office of the journal is to record the proceedings of the house, and authenticate and preserve the same. clearly imperative. It must appear on the face of the journal that the bill passed by a constitutional majority. These directions are all They are expressly enjoined by the fundamental aw as matters of substance, and cannot be dispensed with by the 9 legislature.” ” [But such a constitutional requirement does not apply to a vote of the house which originated the bill when concur- ring in amendments of the other house.’ that “The bill passed its second reading, ayes 39, noes . . An entry on the journal . eae follows:” followed by a list of those voting in the affirmative, with- out any reference to those voting in the negative, indicates that the 1Central of Georgia R. Co. v. State, 104 Ga. 831, 31 S. E. 531, 42 REAL 51S: ?Spangler v. Jacoby, 14 Ill. 297; Supervisors of Schuyler Co. v. People, 25 Ill. 183; Ryan v. Lynch, 68 Ill. 160; Steckert v. East Saginaw, 22 Mich. 104; People v. Commissioners of High- ways, 54 N. Y. 276; Post v. Super- visors, 105 U. S. 667, 26 L. ed. 1204; Commissioners v. Trust Co., 143 N. COM Sb Sy Ey 442" 118) “Am: ‘St: Rep. 791; Richmond County ». Farmers’ Bank, 152 N. C. 387, 67S. E. 696, 21 Ann. Cas. 812. Fora peculiar case, see Division of Howard County, 15 Kan. 194. As to what is sufficient evidence in a journal of such vote, In re Roberts, 5 Col. 525. An act which is invalid because not passed by the requisite number of votes may be validated indirectly by subsequent legislative action recogniz- ing it as valid. Attorney-General »v. Joy, 55 Mich. 94, 20 N. W. 806. There have been cases, as we happen to know, in which several bills have been put on their passage together, the yeas and nays being once called for them all, though the journal is made to state falsely a separate vote on each. We need hardly say that this is a mani- fest violation of the constitution, which requires separate action in every case; and that, when resorted to, it is usually for the purpose of avoiding another provision of the constitution, which seeks to preclude ‘“‘log-rolling legisla- tion”, by forbidding the incorporation of distinct measures in one and the same statute. 3 State v. Corbett, 61 Ark. 227, 32 S. W. 686; Mechanics’ Bldg. & L. Asso. v. Coffman, 110 Ark. 269, 162 S. W. 1090; State v. Crowe, 130 Ark. 272, 197 S. W. 4, L. R. A. 1918 A, 567, Ann. Cas. 1918 D, 460; McCulloch ». State, 11 Ind. 424; Johnson v. Great Falls, 38 Mont. 369, 99 Pac. 1059, 16 Ann. Cas. 974; Hull v. Miller, 4 Neb. 503.CHAP. VI] OF THE ENACTMENT OF LAWS 291 bill passed by a unanimous vote and that there were no names to be recorded in the negative, and is a compliance with the require- ment that the ayes and noes shall be entered on the journals.’] For the vote required in the passage of any particular law the reader is referred to the Constitution of his State. A simple majority of a quorum is sufficient, unless the Constitution establishes some other rule; and where, by the Constitution, a two-thirds or three- fourths vote is made essential to the passage of any particular class of bills, two-thirds or three-fourths of a quorum will be understood, unless the terms employed clearly indicate that this proportion of all the members, or of all those elected, is intended.2. [A constitu- tional requirement that the assent of two-thirds of the members elected to each house of the legislature shall be requisite to every bill appropriating the public money or property for local or private purposes, is mandatory, and cannot be evaded by calling a bill a ‘Joint resolution.” ° Where the Constitution provides that a specified time must elapse after the passage of a bill before the law becomes operative, the time runs from its adoption by the final house and not from the time of its approval by the governor.’] The Title of a Statute. The title of an act was formerly considered no part of it; and although it might be looked to as a guide to the intent of the law- makers when the body of the statute appeared to be in any respect ambiguous or doubttful,> yet it could not enlarge or restrain the pro- 1Commissioners v. Trust Co., 143 N. C. 110, 55 S. E. 442, 118 Am. St. Rep. 791, overruling Debnam ». Chitty, 131 N. C. 657, 43 S. E. 3. See also Board of Com’rs v. Tollman, 145 Fed. 753. 2Southworth v. Palmyra & Jack- sonburg R. R. Co., 2 Mich. 287; State v. McBride, 4 Mo. 303, 29 Am. Dec. 636; Rushville Gas. Co. 2. Rushville, 121 Ind. 206, 23 N. E. 72, 6 L. R. A. 315, 16 Am. St. Rep. 388; State v. Missouri, etc., R. Co., 96 Kan. 609, 152 Pac. 777, Ann. Cas. 1917 A, 612; Osburn v. Staley, 5 W. Va. 85, 13 Am. Rep. 640. By most of the constitutions either all the laws, or laws on some particular subjects, are required to be adopted by a majority vote, or some other pro- portion of “‘all the members elected ’’, or of “the whole representation.” These and similar phrases require all the members to be taken into account whether present or not. Where a ma- jority of all the members elected is re- quired in the passage of a law, an ineli- gible person is not on that account to be excluded in the count. Satterlee v. San Francisco, 22 Cal. 314. 3Such a requirement is too clear and too valuable to be thus frittered away. Allen v. Board of State Audi- tors, 122 Mich. 324, 81 N. W. 113, 80 Am. St. Rep. 573, 47 L. R. A. 117. 4State v. Mounts, 36 W. Va. 179, 148. E. 407, 15 L. R. A. 243, and note. 5 United States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610, 4 L. ed. 471; Burgett v. Burgett, 1 Ohio, 469; Mundt v. Sheboygan, &c. R. R. Co., 31 Wis. 451; Hastman v. McAlpin, 1 Ga. 157; Cohen ». Bar-292 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. 1 visions of the act itself,' and the latter might therefore be good when it and the title were in conflict. The reason for this was that anciently titles were not prefixed at all, and when afterwards they came to be introduced, they were usually prepared by the clerk of the house in which the bill first passed, and attracted but little attention from the members. They indicated the clerk’s under- standing of the contents or purpose of the bills, rather than that of the house; and they therefore were justly regarded as furnishing very little insight into the legislative intention. Titles to legislative acts, however, have recently, in some States, come to possess very great importance, by reason of constitutional provisions, which not only require that they shall correctly indicate the purpose of the law, but which absolutely make the title to control, and exclude everything from effect and operation as law which is incorporated in the body of the act, but is not within the purpose indicated by the title. These provisions are given in the note, and it will readily be perceived that they make a very great change in the law.? rett, 5 Call, 195; Garrigas v. Board of Com’rs, 39 Ind. 66; Matter of Middle- town, 82 N. Y. 196; Tripp v. Goff, 15 R. I. 299, 3 Atl. 591; Evernham ». Hulit, 45 N. J. L. 53. See Dwarris on Statutes, 502. 1 Hadden v. The Collector, 5 Wall. 107, 18 L. ed. 518. Compare United States »v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 91 U.S. 72, 23 L. ed. 224. The Constitutions of Minnesota, Kansas, Maryland, Nebraska, Ohio, South Dakota, Virginia, and Washing- ton provide that ‘‘no law shall embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title.’ Those of Michigan, New Jersey, and Louisiana are similar, substituting the word object for subject. The Constitutions of South Carolina, Alabama, Tennessee, Arkansas, and California contain simi- lar provisions. The Constitution of New Jersey provides that, “to avoid improper influences which may result from inter- mixing in one and the same act such things as have no proper relation to each other, every law shall embrace but one object, and that shall be expressed in the title.”’ The Constitution of Missouri con- tains the following provision: ‘No bill (except general appropriation bills, which may embrace the various sub- jects and accounts for and on account of which moneys are appropriated, and except bills passed under the third subdivision of section 44 of this article) shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title.’ The exception secondly re- ferred to is to bills for free public- school purposes. The Constitutions of Idaho, Indi- ana, Oregon, and Iowa provide that “every act shall embrace but one sub- ject, and matters properly connected therewith, which subject shall be expressed in the title. But if any subject shall be embraced in an act which shall not be expressed in the title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be expressed in the title.” The Constitution of West Virginia contains a provision that is substan- tially similar, except that it substi- tutes the word object for subject. The Constitution of North Dakota provides that ‘‘no bill shall embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title, but a bill which violates this provision shall be invalidated thereby only as to so much thereof as shall not be so ex- pressed.” The Constitution of Mississippi pro- vides that ‘‘every bill introduced intoCHAP. VI] the legislature shall have a title, and the title ought to indicate clearly the subject-matter or matters of the pro- posed legislation.” The Constitution of Kentucky pro- vides that ‘‘no law enacted by the general assembly shall relate to more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title.” The Constitution of Georgia pro- vides that ‘‘no law or ordinance shall pass which refers to more than one subject-matter, or contains matter different from that expressed in the title thereof.” The Constitution of Florida pro- vides that ‘‘each law enacted in the legislature shall embrace but one sub- ject and matter properly connected therewith, which subject shall be briefly expressed in the title.” The Constitution of Montana pro- vides that ‘‘no bill, except general appropriation bills, and bills for the codification and general revision of the laws, shall be passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title; but if any subject shall be embraced in any act which shall not be expressed in the title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be so expressed.”” The Constitutions of New Mexico, Oklahoma and Wyom- ing contain substantially similar pro- visions. So does the Constitution of Utah, except that it does not contain the provision that only so much of an act shall be void as shall not be ex- pressed in its title. The Constitution of Nevada pro- vides that ‘every law enacted by the legislature shall embrace but one sub- ject, and matters properly connected therewith, which subject shall be briefly expressed in the title.” The Constitutions of New York and Wisconsin provide that “no pri- vate or local bill which may be passed by the legislature shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title.” The Constitution of Illinois is simi- lar to that of Ohio, with the addition of the saving clause found in the Con- stitution of Indiana. The provision in the Constitution of OF THE ENACTMENT OF LAWS 293 Colorado is similar to that of Missouri. In Pennsylvania the provision is that “no bill except general appro- priation bills shall be passed contain- ing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title.” Const. of 1853. “The title is in a legal sense a part of every statute and may be consid- ered in determining its construction.” Wheelwright v. Trefry, 235 Mass. 584, 127 N. B. 528, 37 A. L. R. 920. Whether the word object is to have any different construction from the word subject, as used in these consti- tutional provisions, is a question which may some time require discussion ; but as it is evidently employed for precisely the same purpose, it would seem that it ought not to have. Com- pare Hingle v. State, 24 Ind. 28, and People v. Lawrence, 36 Barb. 177. The present Texas Constitution sub- stitutes subject for object, which was in the earlier one, and it is held that the word is less restrictive, and that an act whose subject is the regulation of the liquor traffic is good though several distinct objects are covered, for in- stance, regulation of liquor shops, col- lection of revenue, &c. Fahey »v. State, 27 Tex. App. 146, 11S. W. 108. But in a Virginia case (the Constitu- tion in that State uses the word object”) the court said: ‘There is more than one subject dealt with in the statute, but they are all con- gruous, have a natural connection with, are germane to, and are reason- ably necessary for the accomplish- ment of the one object of the statute. This satisfies the constitutional re- quirement in question.” Bowman v. Virginia State Entomologist, 128 Va. 351, 105 S. E. 141, 12 A. Rebs In Michigan this provision does not apply to city ordinances. People v. Hanrahan, 75 Mich. 611, 42 N. W. 1124. The Michigan Constitution requires an enacting clause; when this is omitted from the bill as it comes from the first house, the clerk of the next cannot insert it, but the bill must be sent back for the first house to correct it. People v. Dettenthaler, 118 Mich. 595, 77 N. W. 450, 44 L. R. A. 164.294 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. 1 In considering these provisions it is important to regard, — 1. The evils designed to be remedied. The Constitution of New Jersey refers to these as “the improper influences which may result from intermixing in one and the same act such things as have no proper relation to each other.’”’ In the language of the Supreme Court of Louisiana, speaking of the former practice: “The title of an act often afforded no clue to its contents. Important general principles were found placed in acts private or local in their opera- tion; provisions concerning matters of practice or judicial pro- ceedings were sometimes included in the same statute with matters entirely foreign to them, the result of which was that on many impor- tant subjects the statute law had become almost unintelligible, as they whose duty it has been to examine or act under it can well testify. ‘To prevent any further accumulation to this chaotic mass was the object of the constitutional provision under consideration.” ! The Supreme Court of Michigan say: “The history and purpose of this constitutional provision are too well understood to require any elucidation at our hands. The practice of bringing together into one bill subjects diverse in their nature and having no necessary con- nection, with a view to combine in their favor the advocates of all, and thus secure the passage of several measures, no one of which could succeed upon its own merits, was one both corruptive of the legislator and dangerous to the State. It was scarcely more so, however, than another practice, also intended to be remedied by this provision, by which, through dexterous management, clauses were inserted in bills of which the titles gave no intimation, and their passage secured through legislative bodies whose members were not generally aware of their intention and effect. There was no design by this clause to embarrass legislation by making laws unnecessarily restrictive in their scope and operation, and thus multiplying their number; but the framers of the constitution meant to put an end to legislation of the vicious character referred to, which was little less than a fraud upon the public, and to require that in every case the proposed measure should stand upon its own merits, and that the legislature should be fairly satisfied of its design when required to pass upon it.”? The Court of Appeals of New Any material change in title of an 298; Albrecht v. State, 8 Tex. App. act after passing the legislature and 216, 34 Am. Rep. 737. before presentation to the governor, * People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481. renders the act unconstitutional. Weis And see Board of Supervisors v. v. Ashley, 59 Neb. 494, 81 N. W. 318, Heenan, 2 Mich. 336; Davis v. Bank 80 Am. St. 704. of Fulton, 31 Ga. 69; St. Louis ». ‘Walker v. Caldwell, 4 La. Ann. Tiefel, 42 Mo. 578; State v. Losatee, 298. See Fletcher v. Oliver, 25 Ark. 9 Baxt. 584; Bosworth v. State Uni-CHAP. VI] OF THE ENACTMENT OF LAWS 295 York declare the object of this provision to be “that neither the members of the legislature nor the people should be misled by the title.’ 1 The Supreme Court of lowa say: “The intent of this pro- vision of the constitution was, to prevent the union, in the same act, of incongruous matters, and of objects having no connection, no relation. And with this it was designed to prevent surprise in legis- lation, by having matter of one nature embraced in a bill whose title expressed another.’’? And similar expressions will be found in many other reported cases.? It may therefore be assumed as settled that versity, 166 Ky. 436, 179 S. W. 403, L. R. A. 1917 B, 808; Somerset County v. Pocomoke Bridge Co., 109 Md. 1, 71 Atl. 462, 16 Ann. Cas. 874; Vernor v. Martindale, 179 Mich. 157, 146 N. W. 338, Ann. Cas. 1915 D, 128; Provident L. & T. Co. v. Hammond, 230 Pa. St. 407, 79 Atl. 628. The Constitution of Georgia pro- vided that ‘‘no law or ordinance shall pass containing any matter different from what is expressed in the title thereof.”” In Mayor, &c. of Savannah v. State, 4 Ga. 38, Lumpkin, J., says: “TJ would observe that the traditionary history of this clause is that it was inserted in the Constitution of 1798 at the instance of General James Jackson, and that its necessity was suggested by the Yazoo act. That memorable measure of the 17th of January, 1795, as is well known, was smuggled through the legislature under the cap- tion of an act ‘for the payment of the late State troops’, and a declaration in its title of the right of the State to the unappropriated territory thereof ‘for the protection and support of the fron- tier settlements.’’”? The Yazoo act made a large grant of lands to a com- pany of speculators. It constituted a prominent subject of controversy in State politics for many years. 1Sun Mutual Insurance Co. ». Mayor, &c. of New York, 8 N. Y. 239. 2State v. County Judge of Davis Co., 2 Iowa, 280. See State v. Silver, 9 Nev. 227. 3 See Conner v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 5 N. Y. 293; Davis v. State, 7 Md. 151; Clendaniel v. Conrad, 3 Boyce (Del.) 549, 83 Atl. 1036, Ann. Cas. 1915 B, 968; Pioneer Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 8 Idaho, 310, 68 Pac. 295, 101 Am. St. Rep. 201; State v. Dolan, 18 Idaho, 698, 92 Pac. 995, 14 lee Ree Ae (nso) £259)" C@hristyay: Elliott, 216 Ill. 31, 74 N. E. 1035, 108 Am. St. Rep. 196, 1 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 215, 3 Ann. Cas. 487; People »v. McBride, 234 Ill. 146, 84 N. E. 865, 123 Am. St. Rep. 82, 14 Ann. Cas. 994; People v. Chicago, 256 III. 558, 100 N. E. 194, 43 L. R. A. (wn. s.) 954, Ann. Cas. 1913 E, 305; Galpin v. Chicago, 269 Ill. 27, 109 N. E. 713, L. R. A. 1917 B, 176; Parks »v. State, 159 Ind. 211, 64 N. E. 862, 59 L. R. A. 190; Republic Iron, ete., Co. v. State, 160 Ind. 379, 66 N. E. 1005, 62 L. R. A. 736; Knight, etc., Go. v. Miller, 172 Ind. 27, 87 N. E. 823, 18 Ann. Cas. 1146; Moore-Mansfield Constr. Co. v. Indianapolis, etce., R. Co., 179 Ind. 356, 101 N. E. 296, 44 L. R. A. (x. s.) 816, Ann. Cas. 1915 D, 917; Cook v. Marshall County, 119 Iowa, 384, 93 N. W. 372, 104 Am. St. Rep. 283; Sisson v. Buena Vista County, 128 Iowa, 442, 104 N. W. 454, 70 L. R. A. 440; State v. Hutchinson Ice Cream Co., 168 Iowa, 1, 147 N. W. 195, L. R. A. 1917 B, 198; O’Connor v. St. Louis Transit Co., 198 Mo. 622, 97 S. W. 150, 115 Am. St. Rep. 495, 8 Ann. Cas. 703; State v. Brodnax, 228 Mo. 25, 128 S. W. 177, 137 Am. St. Rep. 613; State ». McKinney, 29 Mont. 375, 74 Pac. 1095, 1 Ann. Cas. 579; People v. Howe, 177 N. Y. 499, 69 N. E. 1114, 66 L. R. A. 664; State v. Richardson, 48 Oreg. 309, 85 Pac. 225, 8 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 362; Pierson ». Minnehaha County, 28 S. D. 5384, 134 N. W. 212, 38 L. R. A. (w. 8.) 261; McCormick v. State, 185 Tenn. 218, 186 S. W. 95, L. R. A. 1916 F, 382. The Supreme Court of Indiana also296 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I the purpose of these provisions was: first, to prevent hodge-podge or “log-rolling”’ legislation; second, to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the titles gave no intimation, and which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and, third, to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislative proceed- ings as is usually made, of the subjects of legislation that are being considered, in order that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon, by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire.! 2. The particularity required in stating the object. The general purpose of these provisions is accomplished when a law has but one general object, which is fairly indicated by its title.? To require understand the provision in the Con- stitution of that State to be designed, among other things, to assist in the codification of the laws. Indiana Central Railroad Co. v. Potts, 7 Ind. 681; Hingle v. State, 24 Ind. 28. See People v. Institution, &c., 71 Ill. 229; State v. Ah Sam, 15 Nev. 27, 37 Am. Rep. 454; Harrison v. Super- visors, 51 Wis. 645, 8 N. W. 731; AI- brecht v. State, 8 Tex. App. 216, 34 Am. Rep. 737; Hope v. Mayor, &c., 72 Ga. 246; State v. Ranson, 73 Mo. 78; Bumsted v. Govern, 47 N. J. L. 368, 1 Atl. 135. The form of the title during any stage of the legislation before it be- comes a law is immaterial. Attorney- General v. Rice, 64 Mich. 385, 31 N. W. 203; State v. Ill. Centr. R. R. Co., 33 Fed. 730. These provisions do not apply to a revision of the statutes required by the constitution: State v. McDaniel, 19 S. C. 114; American Indemnity Co. v. Austin, 112 Tex. 239, 246 S. W. 1019. See also Cook v. Marshall County, 119 Iowa, 384, 93 N. W. 372, 104 Am. St. Rep. 283; Johnson »v. Harrison, 47 Minn. 575, 50 N. W. 923, 28 Am. St. Rep. 382; State v. Tie- man, 32 Wash. 294, 73 Pac. 375, 98 Am. St. Rep. 854. Nor to an act antedating the constitution and appearing in a later compilation. Stewart v. Riopelle, 48 Mich. 177, 12 N. W. 36. A statute which refers to more than one subject matter, or contains matter different from what is expressed in its title, becomes, by incorporation in a code, a valid law. Parks v. State, 110 Ga. 760, 36 S. E. 73; Kennedy ». Meara, 127 Ga. 68, 56 S. E. 243, 9 Ann. Cas. 396; Anderson v. Great Northern R. Co., 25 Idaho, 433, 138 Pac. 127, Ann. Cas. 1916 C, 191. 1 State v. Doherty, 3 Idaho, 384, 29 Pac. 855; State v. Dolan, 13 Idaho, 693, 92 Pac. 995, 14 L. R. A. (n. s.) 1259; Moore-Mansfield Const. Co. v. Indianapolis, ete., R. Co., 179 Ind. 356, 101 N. E. 296, 44 L. R. A. (w. s.) 816, Ann. Cas. 1915 D, 917; Fout v. Frederick County, 105 Md. 563, 66 Atl. 488; Somerset County »v. Pocomoke Bridge Co., 109 Md. 1, 71 Atl. 462, 16 Ann. Cas. 874; State v. Hoadley, 20 Nev. 317, 22 Pac. 99; State v. Johnson, 90 Okla. 21, 215 Pac. 945; State v. Superior Ct., 28 Wash. 317, 68 Pac. 957, 92 Am. St. Rep. 831. Referring to the statement in the text, Justice Stewart, in delivering the opinion of the court in State v. Dolan, 13 Idaho, 693, 92 Pac. 995, 14 L. R. A. (n. 8s.) 1259, said: “This text from Judge Cooley is recognized by all the leading cases as a correct statement of the purpose and object of this provi- sion of the Constitution.” * Carter County v. Sinton, 120 U.S. 517, 30 L. ed. 701, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 650; Lindsay v. United States Sav., etc., Ass’n, 120 Ala. 156, 24 So. 171, 42 L. R. A. 783; State v. Sloan, 66 Ark. 575, 53 S. W. 47, 74 Am. St. Rep. 106; Hx parte Lewinsky, 66 Fla. 324, 63 So. 577, 50 L. R. A. (n. s.) 1156;CHAP. VI] OF THE ENACTMENT OF LAWS 297 every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishment of this general object to be provided for by a separate act relating to that alone, would not only be unreasonable, but would actually render legislation impossible. It has accordingly been held that the title of “an act to establish a police government for the city of Detroit” was not objectionable for its generality, and that all matters properly connected with the establishment and efficiency of such a government, including taxation for its support, and courts for the examination and trial of offenders, might constitutionally be included in the bill under this general title. Under any different ruling it was said, “the police government of a city could not be organized without a distinct act for each specific duty to be devolved upon it, and these could not be passed until a multitude of other statutes had taken the same duties from other officers before per- forming them. And these several statutes, fragmentary as they must necessarily be, would often fail of the intended object, from the inherent difficulty in expressing the legislative will when re- stricted to such narrow bounds.’”’! The generality of a title is Van Pelt v. Hilliard, 75 Fla. 792, 78 So. 693, L. R. A. 1918 E, 639; State v. Dolan, 13 Idaho, 693, 92 Pac. 995, Wate Re As (Ne S.)) 1259); Peopleya: McBride, 234 Ill. 146, 84 N. E. 865, 123 Am. St. Rep. 82, 14 Ann. Cas. 994; Public Service Co. v. Reckten- wald, 290 Ill. 314, 125 N. E. 271, 8 A. L. R. 466; Vernor v. Martindale, 179 Mich. 157, 146 N. W. 338, Ann. Cas. 1915 D, 128; State v. Firemen’s Fund Ins. Go., 152 Mo. 1, 52 S. W. 595, 45 L. R. A. 363; State v. Assur- ance Co. of America, 251 Mo. 278, 158 S. W. 640, 46 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 955; Lewis and Clark County v. Industrial Ace. Board, 52 Mont. 6, 155 Pac. 268, L. R. A. 1916 D, 628; Schmalz »v. Wooley, 57 N. J. Eq. 303, 41 Atl. 939, 73 Am. St. Rep. 637, 48 L. R. A. 8; State v. Minneapolis, ete., Elevator Co., 17 N. D. 28, 114 N. W. 482, 138. Am. St. Rep. 691; Oklahoma Light & Power Co. v. Corporation Commis- sion, 96 Okla. 19, 220 Pac. 54; Com. v. Fisher, 213 Pa. St. 48, 62 Atl. 198, 5 Ann. Cas. 92; Shortall v. Puget Sound Bridge, etc., Co., 45 Wash. 290, 88 Pac. 212, 122 Am. St. Rep. 899; Diana Shooting Club v. Lamo- reux, 114 Wis. 44, 89 N. W. 880, 91 Am. St. Rep. 898. “The title of the act must be such as to fairly suggest and advise as to the subject intended to be covered by the act. All matters fairly and reason- ably connected with the act must be indicated by the title... . Anything in an act not germane to the general purpose expressed in the title brings such a statute within this constitu- tional prohibition.’”’ Oklahoma Light & Power Co. v. Corporation Commis- sion, 96 Okla. 19, 220 Pac. 54. Neither the reasons for the enactment of a law, nor its purpose, need be stated in its title. Deyoe v. Superior Ct., 140 Cal. 476, 74 Pac. 28, 98 Am. St. Rep. 73; Tarantina v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., 254 Ill. 624, 98 N. E. 999, Ann. Cas. 1913 B, 1058; Oklahoma Light & Power Co. v. Corporation Commission, 96 Okla. 19, 220 Pac. 54; Bowes v. Aberdeen, 58 Wash. 535, 109 Pac. 369, 30 L. R. A. (N. s.) 709. 1 People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481, 495. See also Powell v. Jackson Com. Council, 51 Mich. 129, 16 N. W. 369; Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa, 82; Whiting vy. Mount Pleasant, 11 Iowa, 482; Bright v. McCulloch, 27 Ind. 223; Mayor, &c. of Annapolis v. State, 30 Md. 112; State v. Union, 33 N. J. L. 350; Humboldt County »v. Churchil)298 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I therefore no objection to it, so long as it is not made a cover to legis- lation incongruous in itself, and which by no fair intendment can be considered as having a necessary or proper connection.! [A title does not contain more than one subject if all its details relate Co. Commissioners, 6 Nev. 30; State v. Silver, 9 Nev. 227; State v. Ranson, 73 Mo. 78; State ex rel. Civello »v. New Orleans, 154 La. 271, 97 So. 440, 33) A. i. R. 260: 1Jndiana Central Railroad Co. v. Potts, 7 Ind. 681; People v. Briggs, 50 N. Y. 553; People v. Wands, 23 Mich. 385; Washington Co. v. Frank- lin R. R. Co., 34 Md. 159; Benz »v. Weber, 81 Il]. 288; Johnson v. People, 83 Ill. 431; Fuller v. People, 92 IIl. 182; Donnersberger v. Prendergast, IP Ml, APA), PAL INT, 1D, ibe Asai, OD, People, 33 Mich. 279; People v. Haug, 68 Mich. 549, 37 N. W. 21; Mont- clair v. Ramsdell, 107 U. S. 147, 27 L. ed. 431, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 391; Jones- boro v. Cairo, &c. R. R. Co., 110 U.S. 192, 28 L. ed. 116, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 67; Ackley School Dist. v. Hall, 113 U. S. 135, 28 L. ed. 954, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 371; Carter Co. v. Sinton, 120 U. S. 517, 30 L. ed. 701, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 650; Daubman v. Smith, 47 N. J. L. 200; Clare v. People, 9 Col. 122, 10 Pac. 799; Ewing v. Hoblitzelle, 85 Mo. 64; Blair v. Chicago, 201 U. S. 400, 50 L. ed. 801, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 427; Alford v. State, 170 Ala. 178, 54 So. 213, Ann. Cas. 1912 C, 1093; Deyoe v. Superior Ct., 140 Cal. 476, 74 Pac. 28, 98 Am. St. Rep. 73; In re Martin, 157 Cal. 51, 106 Pac. 235, 26 L. R. A. (Nw. s.) 242; Ex parte Yun Quong, 159 Cal. 508, 114 Pac. 835, Ann. Cas. 1912 C, 969; In re Schuler, 167 Cal. 282, 189 Pac. 685, Ann. Cas. 1915 C, 706; Monaghan v. Lewis, 5 Penn. (Del.) 218, 59 Atl. 948, 10 Ann. Cas. 1048; Clendaniel v. Conrad, 3 Boyce (Del.) 549, 83 Atl. 1036, Ann. Cas. 1915 B, 968; Banks v. State, 124 Gal155 52/8) B45 2 1K. AS (Nn. S.) 1007; Pioneer [Irrigation Dist. »v. Bradley, 8 Idaho, 310, 68 Pac. 295, 101 Am. St. Rep. 201; State v. Dolan, 13 Idaho, 693, 92 Pac. 995, 14 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 1259; People v. People’s Gas Light, ete., Co., 205 Ill. 482, 68 N. E. 950, 98 Am. St. Rep. 244; People »v. McBride, 234 Ill. 146, 84 N. E. 865, 123 Am. St. Rep. 82, 14 Ann. Cas, 994; People v. Strassheim, 240 III. 279, 88 N. E. 821, 22 L. R. A. (nN. 8.) 1135; People v. Braun, 246 Ill. 428, 92 N. E. 917, 20 Ann. Cas. 448; Tarantina v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., 254 Ill. 624, 98 N. E. 999, Ann. Cas. 1913 B, 1058; Parks v. State, 159 Ind. 211, 64 N. E. 862, 59 L. R. A. 190; South East, ete., R. Co. v. Evans- ville, etc., Electric R. Co., 169 Ind. 339, 82 N. E. 765, 13 L. R. A. (. 8.) 916, 14 Ann. Cas. 214; Knight, etc., Co. v. Miller, 172 Ind. 27, 87 N. E. 823, 18 Ann. Cas. 1146; Moore- Mansfield Constr. Co. v. Indianapolis, etc., R. Co., 179 Ind. 356, 101 N. E. 296, 44 L. R. A. (N. s.) 816; Ann. Cas. 1915 D, 917; Sisson v. Buena Vista County, 128 Iowa, 442, 104 N. W. 454, 70 L. R. A. 440; McGuire v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 131 Iowa, 340, 108 N. W. 902, 33 L. R. A. (n. s.) 706; State v. Hutchinson Ice Cream Co., 168 Iowa, 1, 147 N. W. 195, L. R. A. 1917 B, 198; State v. Topeka Club, 82 Kan. 756, 109 Pac. 183, 29 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 722, 20 Ann. Cas. 320; State v. Akers, 92 Kan. 169, 140 Pac. 637, Ann. Cas. 1916 B, 543; McGlone v. Womack, 129 Ky. 274, 111 S. W. 688, 17 L. R. A. (nw. 8.) 855; In re Schwartz, 119 La. 290, 44 So. 20, 121 Am. St. Rep. 516; Font v. Frederick County, 105 Md. 545, 66 Atl. 487; State v. Loden, 117 Md. 373, 83 Atl. 564, 40 L. R. A. (Ww. s.) 1938, Ann. Cas. 1913 E, 1300; Crouse »v. State, 130 Md. 364, 100 Atl. 361; Mogul v. Gaither, 142 Md. 380, 121 Atl. 32; State v. Evans, 154 Minn. 95, 191) Ne W425; 27 AL Le Resear State v. Great Western Coffee, etc., Co., 171 Mo. 634, 71 S. W. 1011, 94 Am. St. Rep. 802; St. Louis v. Liess- ing, 190 Mo. 464, 89 S. W. 611, 109 Am. St. Rep. 774, 1 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 918, 4 Ann. Cas. 112; O’Connor ». St. Louis Transit Co., 198 Mo. 622, 97 S. W. 150, 115 Am. St. Rep. 495, 8 Ann. Cas. 703; Moler v. Whisman,CHAP. VI] 243 Mo. 571, 1478. W. 985, 40 L. R. A. (x. s.) 629, Ann. Cas. 1913 1D. 392; Nalley v. Home Ins. Co., 250 Mo. 452, 157 S. W. 769, Ann. Cas. 1915 A, 283; State v. McKinney, 29 Mont. 375, 74 Pac. 1095, 1 Ann. Cas. 579; Wilkinson v. Lord, 85 Neb. 136, 122 N. W. 699, 24 L. R. A. (w. 8.) 1104; People v. Howe, 177 N. Y. 499, 69 N. BE. 1114, 66 L. R. A. 664; State Finance Co. v. Mather, 15 N. D. 386, 109 N. W. 350, 11 Ann. Cas. 1112; State v. Olson, 26 N. D. 304, 144 N. W. 661, L. R. A. 1918 B, 975; Oklahoma Light & Power Co. ». Corporation Commission, 96 Okla. 19, 220 Pace. 54; Com. v. Herr, 229 Pa. St. 132, 78 Atl. 68, Ann. Cas. 1912 A, 422; Wheelon v. South Dakota Land Settle- ment Board, 43 S. D. 551, 181 N. W. 359, 14 A. L. R. 1145; Samuelson v. State, 116 Tenn. 470, 95 S. W. 1012, 115 Am. St. Rep. 805; Stonega Coke, ete., Co. v. Southern Steel Co., 123 Tenn. 428, 131 S. W. 988, 31 L. R. A. (x. s.) 278; State v. Superior Ct., 28 Wash. 317, 68 Pac. 957, 92 Am. St. Rep. 831; State v. Sharpless, 31 Wash. 191, 71 Pac. 737, 96 Am. St. Rep. 893 ; State v. Superior Ct., 68 Wash. 572, 123 Pac. 996, 40 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 793; Peet v. Mills, 76 Wash. 487, 136 Pac. 685, L. R. A. 1916 A, 358, Ann. Cas. 1915 D, 154; McNeeley v. South Penn. Oil Co., 52 W. Va. 616, 448. E. 508, 62 L. R. A. 562; Hood ». Wheel- ing, 85 W. Va. 578, 102 S. E. 259. The title was never intended to be an index to the law. All that is re- quired is that the act shall not include legislation which, by fair intendment, cannot be considered germane to the one subject expressed in the title. The main object of the constitutional provision is to apprise the members of the legislature of the contents of the act, to the end that they may not vote unwarily. If the title is such as to fairly apprise them of the general character of the enactment it is suffi- cient. State v. Evans, 154 Minn. 95, 191 N. W. 425, 27 A. L. R. 1165. “Tt is not necessary that the title contain every detail of the entire act. It will be sufficient if it fairly indicates, though in general terms, its scope and purpose. Everything connected with OF THE ENACTMENT OF LAWS 299 the main purpose and reasonably adapted to secure the objects indicated by the title may be embraced in the body of the act without violating the constitutional inhibition.” State ». Topeka Club, 82 Kan. 756, 109 Pac. 183, 29 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 722, 20 Ann. Cas. 320. See also Perkins v. Cook County, 271 Ill. 449, 111 N. E. 580, Ann. Cas. 1917 A, 27; Jackson ». State, (Okla. Crim. Rep.) 211 Pac. 1066. “The title is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or as com- prehensive in matters of detail, but if it fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the provi- sions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the General Assembly or the people, it is a sufficient compli- ance with the constitutional require- ment. Unless the act contains mat- ters having no proper connection or relation to the title, or the title itself contains subjects having no proper relation to each other, the constitu- tional provision is not violated. An act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or for- eign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general object.’”’ Public Service Co. v. Rech- tenwald, 290 Ill. 314, 125 N. E. 271, 8 A. L. R. 466. A title need not disclose the means and instrumentalities provided in the body of the act for accomplishing its purpose. Provisions reasonably neces- sary for attaining the object of the act expressed in the title are considered as included in the title. State ». Moore, 76 Ark. 197, 88 S. W. 881, 70 L. R. A. 671; Robinson v. Kerrigan, 151 Cal. 40, 90 Pac. 129, 121 Am. St. Rep. 90, 12 Ann. Cas. 829; Pioneer Irrigation Dist. ». Bradley, 8 Idaho, 310, 68 Pac. 295, 101 Am. St. Rep. 201; People ». Strassheim, 240 IIl. 279, 88 N. E. 821, 22 L. R. A. (N. Ss.) 1135; People v. Joyce, 246 Ill. 124, 92 N. E. 607, 20 Ann. Cas. 472; People v. Price, 257 Ill. 587, 101 N. EB. 196,300 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I to the same subject.’ But the title must be such as to reasonably apprise the public of the interests that are or may be affected by the statute.”] The legislature must determine for itself how broad and comprehensive shall be the object of a statute, and how much par- ticularity shall be employed in the title in defining it One thing, Ann. Cas. 1914 A, 1154; State ». Cunningham, 130 La. 749, 58 So. 558, L. R. A. 1915 B, 389; Louisiana State Board of Agriculture v. Tanzmann, 140 La. 756, 73 So. 854, L. R. A. 1917 C, 894, Ann. Cas. 1917 E, 217; State v. Smith, 233 Mo. 242, 135 S. W. 465, 33 L. R. A. (Ww. s.) 179; Nalley ». Home Ins. Co., 250 Mo. 452, 157 S. W. 769, Ann. Cas. 1915 A, 283; Jackson v. State, (Okla. Crim. Rep.) 211 Pac. 1066; Rhinehart v. State, 121 Tenn. 420, 117 S. W. 508, 17 Ann. Cas. 254. “It is ordinarily not feasible or required, that the title to an act should set forth the nature and character of the penalties for which provision is made in the body of the act.”’ Jack- son v. State, (Okla Crim. Rep.) 211 Pac. 1066. Workmen’s compensation acts held not to violate the constitutional requirement. Shade ». Ash Grove Lime & Portland Cement Co., 93 Kan. 257, 144 Pac. 249; Mackin v. Detroit Timkin Axle Co., 187 Mich. 8, 153 N. W. 49; Huyett v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 86 N. J. L. 683, 92 Atl. 58; Peet v. Mills, 76 Wash. 437, 136 Pac. 685, L. R. A. 1916 A, 358, Ann. Cas. 1915 D, 154, 4 N. C. C. A. 786. 1Upham v. Bramwell, 105 Oreg. 597, 209 Pac. 100, 25 A. L. R. 919. * People ex rel. Corscadden v. Howe, 177 N. Y. 499, 69 N. E. 1114, 66 L. R. A. 664. “The provisions in the body of the act must be germane to the subject in the title. In other words, they must be closely allied, fit and appropriate, of a similar nature to the subject designated in the title.’ State ». Great Western Coffee, etc., Co., 171 Mo. 634, 71 S. W. 1011, 94 Am. St. Rep. 802. In New Jersey it has been held that the object expressed in the title must give notice of the effect of the legisla- tion to one conversant with the exist- ing state of the law; that the validity of the title is not to be determined by nice distinctions of etymology or definition of words, but by the facts of the case and the history of the legisla- tion. Sawter v. Shoenthal, 83 N. J. L. 501, 83 Atl. 1004. See also Hedden v. Hand, 90 N. J. Eq. 583, 107 Atl. 285, 5 A. L. R. 1463. In Maryland it has been held that a title “should not only fairly indicate the general subject of the act, but should be sufficiently comprehensive in its scope to cover, to a reasonable extent, all its provisions, and must not be misleading by what it says or omits to say.” Somerset County v. Poco- moke Bridge Co., 109 Md. 1, 71 Atl. 462, 16 Ann. Cas. 874. 8’ Woodson v. Murdock, 22 Wall. 351, 22 L. ed. 716; State v. Rogers, 107 Ala. 444, 19 So. 909, 32 L. R. A. 520; O’Connor v. St. Louis Transit Co., 198 Mo. 622, 97 S. W. 150, 115 Am. St. Rep. 495, 8 Ann. Cas. 703; State ». McKinney, 29 Mont. 375, 74 Pac. 1095, 1 Ann. Cas. 579; People v. Howe, 177 N. Y. 499, 69 N. E. 1114, 66 L. R. A. 664; Lovejoy v. Portland, 95 Oreg. 459, 188 Pac. 207. “The ‘subject’ of the act, as that term is used in the Constitution, means the matter or thing forming the groundwork of the act, which may include many parts or things, so long as they are all germane to it and are such that, if traced back, will lead the mind to the subject as the generic head. People v. Soloman, 265 II. 28, 106 N. E. 458.” Perkins v. Cook County, 271 Ill. 449, 111 N. E. 580, Ann. Cas. 1917 A, 27. See also Hx parte Mantell, 47 Nev. 95, 216 Pac. 509. In State v. Bowers, 14. Ind. 195, an act came under consideration, the title to which was, ‘‘An act to amend the first section of an act entitled ‘An act concerning licenses to vend foreign merchandise, to exhibit any caravan,CHAP. VI] menagerie, circus, rope and wire danc- ing puppet shows, and legerdemain ’, approved June 15, 1852, and for the encouragement of agriculture, and concerning the licensing of stock and exchange brokers.” It was held that the subject of the act was licenses, and that it was not unconstitutional as containing more than one subject. But it was held also that, as the licenses which it authorized and required were specified in the title, the act could embrace no others, and consequently a provision in the act requiring con- certs to be licensed was void. In State v. County Judge of Davis County, 2 Iowa, 280, 284, the act in question was entitled “An act in rela- tion to certain State roads therein named.” It contained sixty-six sec- tions, in which it established some forty-six roads, vacated some, and pro- vided for the re-location of others. The court sustained the act. ‘‘The object of an act may be broader or narrower, more or less extensive; and the broader it is, the more particulars will it embrace. ... There is undoubt- edly great objection to uniting so many particulars in one act, but so long as they are of the same nature, and come legitimately under one general deter- mination or object, we cannot say that the act is unconstitutional.” Upon this subject see Indiana Central Rail- road Co. v. Potts, 7 Ind. 681, where it is considered at length. Aiso Brewster v. Syracuse, 19 N. Y. 116; Hall v. Bunte, 20 Ind. 304; People v. McCallum, 1 Neb. 182; Mauch Chunk v. McGee, 81 Pa. St. 433; Monaghan v. Lewis, 5 Penn. (Del.) 218, 59 Atl. 948, 10 Ann. Cas. 1048; Clendaniel v. Conrad, 3 Boyce (Del.) 549, 83 Atl. 1036, Ann. Cas. 1915 B, 968; People v. People’s Gas Light, etc., Co., 205 Ill. 482, 68 N. E. 950, 98 Am. St. Rep. 244; Griffin v. Thomas, 86 Okla. 70, 206 Pac. 604; Ex parte Abrams, 56 Tex. Crim. Rep. 465, 120 S. W. 883, 18 Ann. Cas. 45. But a title and act covering four separate objects is bad. State v. Hey- wood, 38 La. Ann. 689. An act entitled “An act fixing the time and mode of electing State printer, defining his duties, fixing com- pensation, and repealing all laws com- OF THE ENACTMENT OF LAWS 301 ing in conflict with this act”, was sustained in Walker v. Dunham, 17 Ind. 483. In Kurtz v. People, 33 Mich. 279, the constitutional provision is said to be ‘‘a very wise and wholesome provi- sion, intended to prevent legislators from being entrapped into the careless passage of bills on matters foreign to the ostensible purpose of the statute as entitled. But it is not designed to require the body of the bill to be a mere repetition of the title. Neither is it intended to prevent including in the bill such means as are reasonably adapted to secure the objects indicated by the title.’ And see Morton »v. The Controller, 4 8. C. 430. No provision in a statute having natural connection with the subject expressed in the title and not foreign to it is to be deemed within the consti- tutional inhibition. Johnson v. Hig- gins, 3 Met. (Ky.) 566; McReynolds v. Smallhouse, 8 Bush, 477; Annapolis v. State, 30 Md. 112; Tuttle v. Strout, 7 Minn. 465; Gunter v. Dale Co., 44 Ala. 639; Ex parte Upshaw, 45 Ala. 234; State v. Price, 50 Ala. 568; Com- monwealth v. Drewry, 15 Gratt. 1; People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44; State v. Union, 33 N. J. L. 350; State v. Silver, 9 Nev. 227; Burke v. Monroe Co., 77 Ill. 610; Blood v. Mercelliott, 53 Pa. St. 391; Commonwealth v. Green, 58 Pa. St. 226; Walker v. Dunham, 17 Ind. 483; Clendaniel v. Conrad, 3 Boyce (Del.) 549, 83 Atl. 1036, Ann. Cas. 1915 B, 968; State v. Allen, 83 Fla. 214, 91 So. 104, 26 A. L. R. 735; Banks ». State, 124 Ga. 15, 52S. E. 74,2 L. R. A. (n. s.) 1007; Pioneer Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 8 Idaho, 310, 68 Pac. 295, 101 Am. St. Rep. 201; State v. Dolan,13 Idaho, 693, 92 Pac. 995, 14 TR) A (nN! s))) 1259; (Chustyae Elliott, 216 Ill. 31, 74 N. E. 1035, 108 Am. St. Rep. 196, 1 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 215, 3 Ann. Cas. 487; People »v. McBride, 234 Ill. 146, 84 N. E. 865, 123 Am. St. Rep. 82, 14 Ann. Cas. 994; Public Service Co. 2. Reckten- wald, 290 Ill. 314, 125 N. E. 271, 8 A. L. R. 466; McGuire v. Chicago, ete., R. Co., 131 Lowa, 340, 108 N. W. 902, 33 L. R. A. (N. s.) 706; State v. Topeka Club, 82 Kan. 756, 109 Pac.302 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I however, is very plain; that the use of the words “other pur- poses’, which has heretofore been so common in the title to acts, with a view to cover any and every thing, whether con- nected with the main purpose indicated by the title or not, can no longer be of any avail where these provisions exist. As was said by the Supreme Court of New York in a case where these words had been made use of in the title to a local bill: “The words ‘for other purposes’ must be laid out of consideration. They express nothing, and amount to nothing as a compliance with this constitutional requirement. Nothing which the act could not embrace without them can be brought in by their aid.” ! 3. What is embraced by the title. The repeal of a statute on a given subject, it is held, is properly connected with the subject- matter of a new statute on the same subject; and therefore a repealing section in the new statute is valid, notwithstanding the title is silent on that subject.? So an act to incorporate a railroad 183, 29 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 722, 20 Ann. Cas. 320; Kentucky Live Stock, etc., Ass’n v. Hager, 120 Ky. 125, 85 S. W. 738, 9 Ann. Cas. 50; Bosworth v. State University, 166 Ky. 436, 179 S. W. 403, L. R. A. 1917 B, 808; State v. Cunningham, 130 La. 749, 58 So. 558, L. R. A. 1915 B, 389; State v. Loden, 117 Md. 373, 83 Atl. 564, 40 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 193, Ann. Cas. 1913 EK, 1300; Jewel Theater Co. v. State Fire Marshal, 178 Mich. 399, 144 N. W. 835, Ann. Cas. 1915 C, 1212; O’Con- nor v. St. Louis Transit Co., 198 Mo. 622, 97 S. W. 150, 115 Am. St. Rep. 495, 8 Ann. Cas. 703; Nalley v. Home Ins. Co., 250 Mo. 452, 157 S. W. 769, Ann. Cas. 1915 A, 283; Wilkinson v. Lord, 85 Neb. 136, 122 N. W. 699, 24 L. R. A. (nw. 8.) 1104; In re Lee, 64 Okla. 310, 168 Pac. 53, L. R. A. 1918 B, 144; Pacific Milling, ete., Co. ». Portland, 65 Oreg. 349, 133 Pac. 7P): 46 L. R. A. (w. s.) 363; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Ewing, 241 Pa. St. 581, 88 Atl. 775, 49 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 977, Ann. Cas. 1915 B, 157; Sandel v. State, 115 S. C. 168, 104 S. E. 567, 13 A. L. RB. 1268, Samuelson v. State, 116 Tenn. 470, 95 S. W. 1012, 115 Am. St. Rep. 805; Ranson v. Rutherford County, 123 Tenn. 1, 180 S. W. 1057, Ann. Cas. 1912 B, 1856; Borden »v. Trespalacios Rice, etc., Co., 98 Tex. 494, 86 S. W. 11, 107 Am. St. Rep. 640; Hurley »v. Hurley, 110 Va. 31, 65 S. E. 472, 18 Ann. Cas. 968; Bowman »v. Virginia State Entomologist, 128 Va. 351, 105 SOBs 141512 AvioaRe tote 1 Town of Fishkill v. Fishkill & Beek- man Plank Road Co., 22 Barb. 634. See, to the same effect, Johnson »v. Spicer, 107 N. Y. 185; Ryerson »v. Utley, 16 Mich. 269; St. Louis ». Tiefel, 42 Mo. 578. In a title to punish keepers of games of faro, ete., “ete.” does not mean “other purposes”, but ‘and other games.’ Garvin v. State, 13 Lea, 162. Addition of words “and so forth” to title is worthless. Hz parte Lacy, 93 Va. 159, 24S. E. 930, 31 L. R. A. 822. An act entitled “An act to repeal cer- tain acts therein named’’, is void. People v. Mellen, 32 Ill. 181. ? Gabbert v. Railroad Co., 11 Ind. 365; Timm »v. Harrison, 109 Tl. 593. The constitution under which this decision was made required the law to contain but one subject and matters properly connected therewith but the same decision was made under the New York Constitution, which omits the words here italicized; and it may well be doubted whether the legal effect of the provision is varied by the addition of those words. See Guilford v. Cornell, 18 Barb. 615; People v. Father Mathew Society, 41 Mich. 67, 1 N. W. 981.CHAP. VI] OF THE ENACTMENT OF LAWS 303 company, it has been held, may authorize counties to subscribe to its stock, or otherwise aid the construction of the road. So an act to incorporate the Firemen’s Benevolent Association may lawfully include under this title provisions for levying a tax upon the income of foreign insurance companies at the place of its location, for the benefit of the corporation.2 So an act to provide a homestead for widows and children was held valid, though what it provided for was the pecuniary means sufficient to purchase a homestead.* So an act “to regulate proceedings in the county court” was held to properly embrace a provision giving an appeal to the District Court, and regulating the proceedings therein on the appeal.t So an act en- titled “An act for the more uniform doing of township business” may properly provide for the organization of townships.’ So it is held that the changing of the boundaries of existing counties is a matter properly connected with the subject of forming new counties out of those existing.® So a provision for the organization and sitting of courts in new counties is properly connected with the subject of the formation of such counties, and may be included in “an act to authorize the formation of new counties, and to change county boundaries.” 7 [So an act entitled “an act in relation to gas companies” may include a provision authorizing the con- solidation of such companies.? Under the title of an act to “ regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors”’, the legislature may prohibit the sale of such liquors to certain classes of citizens needing special 1 Supervisors, &c. v. People, 25 Ill. 181; Mahomet ». Quackenbush, 117 U. S. 508, 29 L. ed. 982, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 858; Hope v. Mayor, &c., 72 Ga. 246; Connor v. Green Pond, &c. R. R. Co., 23S. C.427. Soa provision for the costs on appeal from a justice is properly connected with the subject of an act entitled “‘of the election and qualification of justices of the peace, and defining their jurisdiction, powers, and duties in civil cases.” Robinson v. Skipworth, 23 Ind. 311. 2Firemen’s Association v. Louns- bury, 21 Ill. 511. Power to tax for school purposes may be given under an act “to regu- late public instruction.” Smith 2. Bohler, 72 Ga. 546. 3 Succession of Lanzetti, 9 La. Ann. 329. 4 Murphey v. Menard, 11 Tex. 673. See State v. Ah Sam, 15 Nev. 27, 37 Am. Rep. 454. 5 Clinton v. Draper, 14 Ind. 295. An act to consolidate the acts as to a city and to define the duty of the Mayor will not allow conferring judi- cial power on him. Brown v. State, 79 Ga. 324,458. E. 861. 6 Haggard v. Hawkins, 14 Ind. 299. And see Duncombe v. Prindle, 12 Iowa, 1; State v. Hoagland, 51 N. J. L. 62, 16 Atl. 166. 7Brandon v. State, 16 Ind. 197. In this case, and also in State v. Bow- ers, 14 Ind. 195, it was held that if the title to an original act is sufficient to embrace the matters covered by the provisions of an act amendatory thereof, it is unnecessary to inquire whether the title of an amendatory act would, of itself, be sufficient. And see Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa, 82. 8 People v. People’s Gas Light, etc., Co., 205 Ill. 482, 68 N. E. 950, 98 Am. St. Rep. 244.304 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I protection.’ The title, “An act to prevent fraud in the sale and disposition of stocks, bonds, or other securities”, is broad enough to cover legislation affecting investment contracts.2 Under the title “An act to protect trade and commerce from unlawful restraints and monopolies”, a combination to prevent competition in insurance may properly be a subject for legislation. Where the one general subject of the title of a statute was the regulation of State banks, it was held that the granting to savings depositors a preference in the distribution of the assets of an insolvent State bank was germane to that subject.‘ So an “act rélating to the teaching of foreign lan- guages’’ may prohibit the teaching of any other language than English.° So a title which evinces the intention to prohibit the manufacture or sale of an article is broad enough to include a prohi- bition of the manufacture or sale of a substitute for the article which is open to the same objection as the article itself.§] Many other cases are referred to in the note, which will further illustrate the views of the courts upon this subject. There has been a general disposition to construe the constitutional provision liberally, rather than to embarrass legislation by a construction whose strictness is unnecessary to the accomplishment of the beneficial purposes for which it has been adopted.’ [The title must be construed with 1Ex parte Lewinsky, 66 Fla. 324, 63 So. 577, 50 L. R. A. (wn. s.) 1156. See also Garrigan v. Kennedy, 19 S. D. 11, 101 N. W. 1081, 117 Am. St. Rep. 927, 8 Ann. Cas. 1125. But in Indi- ana it has been held that under such title the legislature cannot provide for the punishment of persons found in- toxicated. State v. Young, 47 Ind. 150. ? State v. Evans, 154 Minn. 95, 191 ING We 425% 27eAe ls Real Gb; 3State v. American Surety Co., 90 Neb. 154, 91 Neb. 22, 133 N. W. 235, 135 N. W. 365, Ann. Cas. 1913 B, 973, 976. ‘Upham v. Bramwell, 105 Oreg. 597, 209 Pac. 100, 25 A. L. R. 919. 5 Nebraska Dist. of Evang. Lu- theran Synod v. McKelvie, 104 Neb. 93, 175 N. W. 531, 7 A. L. R. 1688. 6 State v. Olson, 26 N. D. 304, 144 N. W. 661, L. R. A. 1918 B, 975. 7 Green v. Mayor, &c., R. M. Charlt. 368; Martin v. Broach, 6 Ga. 21; Protho v. Orr, 12 Ga. 36; Wheeler »v. State, 23 Ga. 9; Hill v. Commissioners, 22 Ga. 203; Jones v. Columbus, 25 Ga. 610; Denham ». Holeman, 26 Ga. 182; Allen v. Tison, 50 Ga. 374; Ex parte Conner, 51 Ga. 571; Brieswick v. Mayor, &c. of Brunswick, 51 Ga. 639; Howell v. State, 71 Ga. 224; People v. McCann, 16 N. Y. 58; Williams v. People, 24 N. Y. 405; People v. Allen, 42 N. Y. 404; Huber v. People, 49 N. Y. 1382; People ». Rochester, 50 N. Y. 525; Wenzler v. People, 58 N. Y. 516; People v. Dud- ley, 58 N. Y. 323; People v. Quigg, 59 N. Y. 83; Harris v. People, 59 N. Y. 599; In re Flatbush, 60 N. Y. 398; People v. Willsea, 60 N. Y. 507; Matter of Met. Gas Light Co., 85 N. Y. 526; People v. Whitlock, 92 N. Y. 191; Ensign v. Barse, 107 N. Y. 329, 14 N. E. 400, 15 N. E. 401; Railroad Co. v. Whiteneck, 8 Ind. 217; Wilkins v. Miller, 9 Ind. 100; Foley v. State, 9 Ind. 363; Gillespie v. State, 9 Ind. 380; Mewherter v. Price, 11 Ind. 199; Reed v. State, 12 Ind. 641; Henry v. Henry, 13 Ind. 250; Igoe v. State, 14 Ind. 239; Sturgeon »v. Hitchens, 22 Ind. 107; Lauer v. State, 22 Ind. 461; Central Plank Road Co. v. Hannaman,CHAP. VI] 22 Ind. 484; Garrigus v. Board of Commissioners, 39 Ind. 66; McCaslin yp. State, 44 Ind. 151; Williams ». State, 48 Ind. 306; Jackson v. Reeves, 53 Ind. 231; Railroad Co. v. Gregory, 15 Ill. 20; Firemen’s Association ». Lounsbury, 21 Ill. 511; Ottawa v. People, 48 Ill. 233; Prescott v. City of Chicago, 60 Ill. 121; People v. Brislin, 80 Ill. 423; McAunich »v. Mississippi, &c. R. R. Co., 20 Iowa, 338; State ». Squires, 26 Iowa, 340; Chiles ». Drake, 2 Met. (Ky.) 146; Phillips ». Bridge Co., 2 Met. (Ky.) 219; Louis- ville, &c. Co. v. Ballard, 2 Met. (Ky.) 177; Phillips v. Covington, &c. Co., 2 Met. (Ky.) 219; Chiles v. Monroe, 4 Met. (Ky.) 72; Hind v. Rice, 10 Bush, 528; Cannon v. Hemphill, 7 Tex. 184; Battle v. Howard, 13 Tex. 345; Robin- son v. State, 15 Tex. 311; Antonio »v. Gould, 34 Tex. 49; Hx parte Hogg, 36 Tex. 14; State v. Shadle, 41 Tex. 404; State v. McCracken, 42 Tex. 383; Laefon »v. Dufoe, 9 La. Ann. 329; State v. Harrison, 11 La. Ann. 722; Bossier v. Steele, 18 La. Ann. 433; Williams v. Payson, 14 La. Ann. 7; Wisners v. Monroe, 25 La. Ann. 598; Whited v. Lewis, 25 La. Ann. 568; State v. Lafayette County Court, 41 Mo. 221; State v. Miller, 45 Mo. 495; State v. Gut, 13 Minn. 341; Stuart v. Kinsella, 14 Minn. 524; Mills ». Charleton, 29 Wis. 400; Evans ». Sharpe, 29 Wis. 564; Single v. Super- visors of Marathon, 38 Wis. 363; Harrison v. Supervisors, 51 Wis. 645, 8 N. W. 731; People v. McCallum, 1 Neb. 182; Smails v. White, 4 Neb. 353; Cutlip v. The Sheriff, 3 W. Va. 588; Shields v. Bennett, 8 W. Va. 74; Tuscaloosa Bridge Co. v. Olmstead, 41 Ala. 9; Weaver v. Lapsely, 43 Ala. 224; Ex parte Upshaw, 45 Ala. 234; Lockhart v. Troy, 48 Ala. 579; Walker v. State, 49 Ala. 329; Simpson v. Bailey, 3 Oreg. 515; Pope ». Phifer, 3 Heisk. 682; Cannon v. Mathes, 8 Heisk. 504; State v. Newark, 34 N. J. L. 264; Gifford v. R. R. Co., 10 N. J. L. Eq. 171; Keller v. State, 11 Md. 525; Parkinson v. State, 14 Md. 184; Ryer- son v. Utley, 16 Mich. 269; People ». Denahy, 20 Mich. 349; People »v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44; Kurtz v. People, 33 Mich. 279; Hathaway v. New Balti- VOL. 1— 20 OF THE ENACTMENT OF LAWS 305 more, 48 Mich. 251, 12 N. W. 186; Attorney-General v. Joy, 55 Mich. 94, 20 N. W. 806; Dorsey’s Appeal, 72 Pa. St. 192; Allegheny County Home’s Case, 77 Pa. St. 77; Morton v. Comp- troller-General, 4 S. C. 480; State v. Gurney, 4S. C. 520; Norman v. Curry, 27 Ark. 440; Division of Howard County, 15 Kan. 194; Simpson ». Bailey, 3 Oreg. 515; Hz parte Wells, 21 Fla. 280; Read v. Plattsmouth, 107 U. S. 568, 27 L. ed. 414, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 208; Otoe Co. v. Baldwin, 111 U.S: 1; 28'L. ed: 331, 4 Sup: Ct Rep. 265; Mobile Dry-Docks Co. ». Mobile, 146 Ala. 198, 40 So. 205, 3 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 822, 9 Ann. Cas. 1229; Beauvoir Club v. State, 148 Ala. 643, 42 So. 1040, 121 Am. St. Rep. 82; Letcher v. State, 159 Ala. 59, 48 So. 805, 17 Ann. Cas. 716; Robinson ». Kerrigan, 151 Cal. 40, 90 Pac. 129, 121 Am. St. Rep. 90, 12 Ann. Cas. 829; Graves v. People, 32 Colo. 127, 75 Pac. 412, 2 Ann. Cas. 6; Monaghan vy. Lewis, 5 Penn. (Del.) 218, 59 Atl. 948, 10 Ann. Cas. 1048; State ex rel. Bonsteel v. Allen, 83 Fla. 214, 91 So. 104, 26 A. L. R. 735; Fitts v. Atlanta, 121 Ga. 567, 49 S. E. 793, 67 L. R. A. 803, 104 Am. St. Rep. 167; Carters- ville v. McGinnis, 142 Ga. 71, 82 S. E. 487, Ann. Cas. 1915 D, 1067; State v. Dolan, 13 Idaho, 693, 92 Pac. 995, 14 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 1259; People v. People’s Gaslight, etc., Co., 205 Ill. 482, 68 N. E. 950, 98 Am. St. Rep. 244; Christy v. Elliott, 216 Ill. 31, TARN@E 10354 1 lb: RAG Gas») 2a, People v. McBride, 234 Ill. 146, 84 N. E. 865, 123 Am. St. Rep. 82, 14 Ann. Cas. 994; People v. William Henning Co., 260 Ill. 554, 103 N. E. 530, 49 L. R. A. (w. s.) 1206; Public Service Co. v. Recktenwald, 290 Ill. 314, 125 N. E. 271, 8 A. L. R. 466; Booth v. State, 179 Ind. 405, 100 N. E. 563, L. R. A. 1915 B, 420, Ann. Cas. 1915 D, 987; Camoras v. Sioux City, 192 Iowa, 372, 184 N. W. 821; State v. Topeka Club, 82 Kan. 756, 109 Pac. 183, 29 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 722, 20 Ann. Cas. 320; Smith v. Com., 175 Ky. 286, 194 S. W. 367; State v. Cunningham, 130 La. 749, 58 So. 558, L. R. A. 1915 B, 389; State v. Fontenot, 132 La. 481, 61 So. 534, Ann. Cas. 1915 A, 76;306 Mitchell ». State, 115 Md. 360, 80 Atl. 1020; Mogul v. Gaither, 142 Md. 380, 121 Atl. 32; Vernor v. Secretary of State, 179 Mich. 157, 146 N. W. 338, Ann. Cas. 1915 D, 128; Jasnaw- ski v. Board of Assessors, 191 Mich. 287, 157 N. W. 891; Elwell v. Com- stock, 99 Minn. 261, 109 N. W. 113, 698, 7 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 621, 9 Ann. Cas. 270; State v. Bridgeman, etc., Co., 117 Minn. 186, 1384 N. W. 496, Ann. Cas. 1913 D, 41; State v. Houghton, 144 Minn. 1, 174 N. W. 885, 176 N. W. 159, 8 A. L. R. 585; State v. Evans, 154 Minn. 95, 191 N. W. 425, 27 A. L. R. 1165; State v. Great Western Coffee, etc., Co., 171 Mo. 634, 71 S. W. 1011, 94 Am. St. Rep. 802; O’Connor v. St. Louis Transit Co., 198 Mo. 622, 97S. W. 150, 115 Am. St. Rep. 495, 8 Ann. Cas. 703; State v. Weber, 205 Mo. 36, 102 S. W. 955, 120 Am. St. Rep. 715, 10 L. R. A. (n. s.) 1155, 12 Ann. Cas. 382; State v. Peyton, 234 Mo. 517, 137 S. W. 979, Ann. Cas. 1912 D, 154; State v. Ross, 245 Mo. 36, 149 S. W. 451, Ann. Cas. 1913 EK, 978; State v. McKinney, 29 Mont. 375, 74 Pac. 1095, 1 Ann. Cas. 579; Worthington v. District Ct., 37 Nev. 212, 142 Pac. 230, L. R. A. 1916 A, 696, Ann. Cas. 1916 E, 1097; State v. Ingalls, 18 N. M. 211, 135 Pac. 1177; State v. Minneapolis, etc., Elevator Co., 17 N. D. 23, 114 N. W. 482, 138 Am. St. Rep. 691; State v. Blaisdell, 18 N. D. 55, 118 N. W. 141, 1388 Am. St. Rep. 741, 24 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 465; State v. Fargo Bottling Works Co., 19 N. D. 396, 124 N. W. 387, 26 L. R. A. (Nn. 8.) 872; State v. Briggs, 45 Oreg. 366, 77 Pac. 750, 78 Pac. 361, 2 Ann. Cas. 424; State ». Richardson, 48 Oreg. 309, 85 Pac. 225, 8 L. R. A. (nN. 8.) 362; Lovejoy v. Portland, 95 Oreg. 459, 188 Pac. 207; Upham v. Bramwell, 105 Oreg. 597, 209 Pac. 100,25 A. L.R.919; Stehle v. Jaeger Automatic Mach. Co., 225 Pa. St. 348, 74 Atl. 215, 133 Am. St. Rep. 884; Com. eg rel. Bell v. Powell, 249 Pa. St. 144, 94 Atl. 746; Guppy ». Moltrup, 281 Pa. St. 343, 126 Atl. 766; Riley ». Charleston Union Station Co., 71S. C. 457, 51S. E. 485, 110 Am. St. Rep. 579; Wheelon »v. South Dakota Land Settlement Board, 43 S. D. 551, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I 181 N. W. 359, 14 A. L. R. 1145; State v. Co-operative Store Co., 123 Tenn. 399, 131 S. W. 867, Ann. Cas. 1912 C, 248; McCormick ». State, 135 Tenn: 218; 186 S! W:. 95, 1. RaeAs 1916 F, 382; Wilson v. State, 143 Tenn. 55, 224 S. W. 168; Ex parte Allison, 99 Tex. 455, 90 S. W. 870, 2 L. R. A. (nw. s.) 1111, 122 Am. St. Rep. 653; Hz parte Abrams, 56 Tex. Crim. Rep. 465, 120 S. W. 883, 18 Ann. Cas, 45; De Silvia v. State, 88 Tex. Crim. Rep. 634, 229 S. W. 542; Hurley ». Hurley, 110 Va. 31, 65 S. E. 472, 18 Ann. Cas. 968; Hathaway v. McDon- ald, 27 Wash. 659, 68 Pac. 376, 91 Am. St. Rep. 889; Shortall v. Puget Sound Bridge, ete., Co., 45 Wash. 290, 88 Pac. 212, 122 Am. St. Rep. 899; State v. Snohomish County Superior Ct., 68 Wash. 572, 123 Pac. 996, 40 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 793; MeNeeley ». South Penn. Oil Co., 52 W. Va. 616, 44S. E. 508, 62 L. R. A.562; Hood »v. Wheeling, 85 W. Va. 578, 102 S. E. 259. In Davis v. Woolnough, 9 Iowa, 104, an act entitled ‘An act for revising and consolidating the laws incorporat- ing the city of Dubuque, and to estab- lish a city court therein”, was held to express by its title but one object, which was, the revising and consoli- dating the laws incorporating the city ; and the city court, not being an un- usual tribunal in such a municipality, might be provided for by the act, whether mentioned in the title or not. “An act to enable the supervisors of the city and county of New York to raise money by tax’’, provided for raising money to pay judgments then existing, and also any thereafter to be recovered; and it also contained the further provision, that whenever the comptroller of the city should have reason to believe that any judgment then of record or thereafter obtained had been obtained by collusion, or was founded in fraud, he should take the proper and necessary means to open and reverse the same, &c. This provi- sion was held constitutional, as prop- erly connected with the subject indi- cated by the title, and necessary to confine the payments of the tax to the objects for which the moneys wereCHAP. VI] intended to be raised. Sharp ». Mayor, &c. of New York, 31 Barb. 572. In O’Leary v. Cook Co., 28 Ill. 534, it was held that a clause in an act incorporating a college, prohibiting the sale of ardent spirits within a distance of four miles, was so germane to the primary object of the charter as to be properly included within it. By the first section of “an act for the relief of the creditors of the Lock- port and Niagara Falls Railroad Com- pany”, it was made the duty of the president of the corporation, or one of the directors to be appointed by the president, to advertise and sell the real and personal estate, including the franchise of the company, at public auction, to the highest bidder. It was then declared that the sale should be absolute, and that it should vest in the purchaser or purchasers of the property, real or personal, of the com- pany, all the franchise, rights, and privileges of the corporation, as fully and as absolutely as the same were then possessed by the company. The money arising from the sale, after paying costs, was to be applied, first, to the payment of a certain judgment, and then to other liens according to priority; and the surplus, if any, was to be divided ratably among the other creditors, and then, if there should be an overplus, it was to be divided ratably among the then stockholders. By the second section of the act, it was declared that the purchaser or purchasers should have the right to sell and distribute stock to the full amount which was authorized by the act of incorporation, and the several amendments thereto; and to appoint an election, choose directors, and organize a corporation anew, with the same powers as the existing company. There was then a proviso, that nothing in the act should impair or affect the subscriptions for new stock, or the obligations or liabilities of the com- pany, which had been made or incurred in the extension of the road from Lock- port to Rochester, &c. The whole act was held to be constitutional. Mosier v. Hilton, 15 Barb. 657. An act for the relief of the village of Clinton covers curative provisions OF THE ENACTMENT OF LAWS 307 relative to the action of commission- ers for village water-supply. Board Water Commissioners v. Dwight, 101 NEY: An act to regulate foreclosure of real estate covers provisions for sales on execution as well as mortgage. Gillitt v. McCarthy, 34 Minn. 318, 25 N. W. 637. One to prohibit sale of liquor covers civil damage provisions. Du- rein v. Pontious, 34 Kan. 353, 8 Pac. 428. And see Mills v. Charleton, 29 Wis. 400, — a very liberal case; Erlinger v. Boneau, 51 Ill. 94; State v. Newark, 34 N. J. L. 236; Smith v. Commonwealth, 8 Bush, 108; State vy. St. Louis Cathedral, 23 La. Ann. 730; Simpson v. Bailey, 3 Oreg. 515; Neifing v. Pontiac, 56 Ill. 172. An act, having for its sole object to legalize certain proceedings of the Common Council of Janesville, but entitled merely ‘‘An act to legalize and authorize the assessment of street improvements and assessments ”, was held not to express the subject, because failing to specify the locality. Durkee v. Janesville, 26 Wis. 697. A title, “An Act to Facilitate the Carriage of Passengers and Property by Railroad Companies” is insufficient to cover.a restriction upon the powers of eminent domain possessed by cer- tain railroad companies. Thomas v. Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co., 40 Fed. 126, 7 L. R. A. 145. And an amendment to “An Act for the Incorporation of Manufacturing Companies”’, which makes it include mercantile companies without chang- ing the title, is void. Eaton v. Walker, 76 Mich. 579, 43 N. W. 638, 6 L. R. A. 102. Word ‘‘purchase”’ does not include expropriation by eminent domain. Enterprise v. Smith, 62 Kan. 815, 62 Pac. 324. A title, ‘An Act to Revise the Code of Civil Procedure of the State of California” does not comply with the constitutional provision that “every act shall embrace but one subject, which subject shall be expressed in the title”, where the act deals with a vast variety of subjects, many of which are totally distinct from each other, and some of which have no relation to civil308 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I reference to the language used in it alone, and not in the light of what the body of the act contains.” }] 4. The effect if the title embrace more than one object. Perhaps in those States where this constitutional provision is limited in its operation to private and local bills, it might be held that an act was not void for embracing two or more objects which were indicated by its title, provided one of them only was of a private and local nature. It has been held in New York that a local bill was not void because embracing general provisions also;2 and if they may constitutionally be embraced in the act, it is presumed they may also be constitutionally embraced in the title. [And plurality of title is not an objection to an act which deals with but one subject. If there is but one subject in the act, and the title expresses more than one, the subject expressed in the title and not embraced in the act will be regarded as surplusage.3] But if the title to the act actually indicates, and the act itself actually embraces, two distinct objects, when the constitution says it shall embrace but one, the whole act must be treated as void, from the manifest impossibility in the court choosing between the two, and holding the act valid as to the one and void as to the other. [The requirement, however, that no act shall embrace more than one subject does not mean that it shall contain only one provision. Its purpose is to prevent the joining in one act of incongruous and unrelated matters, and an act may contain any number of provisions which tend to further its purpose.°] 5. The effect where the act is broader than the title. But if the act is broader than the title, it may happen that one part of it can stand because indicated by the title, while as to the object not indicated by the title it must fail. Some of the State constitutions, it will be perceived, have declared that this shall be the rule; but the declaration was unnecessary ; as the general rule, that so much procedure. Lewis Adm’x of Lewis v. Pioneer Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 8 Dunne, 134 Cal. 291, 66 Pac. 478, 55 L. R. A. 833, 86 Am. St. 257. ‘People v. Joyce, 246 Ill. 124, 92 N. E. 607, 20 Ann. Cas. 472. * People v. McCann, 16 N. Y. 58. An act as to paving Fighth Avenue cannot provide for changing the grade of intersecting streets. In re Blod- gett, 89 N. Y. 392. 3 People v. McBride, 234 III. 146, 84 N. E. 865, 123 Am. St. Rep. 82, 14 Ann. Cas. 994. “Antonio v. Gould, 34 Tex. 49; State v. McCracken, 42 Tex. 383 ; Idaho, 310, 68 Pac. 295, 101 Am. St. Rep. 201; Public Service Co. ». Recktenwald, 290 Ill. 314, 125 N. E. 271, 8 A. L. R. 466. All the cases recognize this doctrine. State v. Fer- guson, 104 La. 249, 28 So. 917, 81 Am. St. 123, furnishes a recent instance. For a valuable discussion and collec; tion of cases upon questions growing out of titles to enactments, see 79 Am. St. 456-486. ‘ Stewart v. Brady, 300 Ill. 425, 133 N. E. 310.CHAP. VI] OF THE ENACTMENT OF LAWS 309 of the act as is notin conflict with the Constitution must be sustained, would have required the same declaration from the courts. If, by striking from the act all that relates to the object not indicated by the title, that which is left is complete in itself, sensible, capable of being executed, and wholly independent of that which is rejected, it must be sustained as constitutional. The principal questions in each case will therefore be, whether the act is in truth broader than the title; and if so, then whether the other objects in the act are so intimately connected with the one indicated by the title that the portion of the act relating to them cannot be rejected, and leave a complete and sensible enactment which is capable of being ex- ecuted.! 1 People v. Briggs, 50 N. Y. 553. See Van Riper v. North Plainfield, 43 N. J. L. 349; Central, &c. R. R. Co. v. People, 5 Col. 39; Foley v. State, 9 Ind. 363; Kuhns v. Kramis, 20 Ind. 490; Grubbs v. State, 24 Ind. 295; State v. Young, 47 Ind. 150; Robin- son v. Bank of Darien, 18 Ga. 65; Williams v. Payson, 14 La. Ann. 7; Weaver v. Lapsley, 43 Ala. 224; Walker v. State, 49 Ala. 329; Boyd ». State, 53 Ala. 601; Hx parte Moore, 62 Ala. 471; State v. Miller, 45 Mo. 495; Wisners v. Monroe, 25 La. Ann. 598; Dorsey’s Appeal, 72 Pa. St. 192; Allegheny County Home’s Case, 77 Pa. St. 77; Tecumseh »v. Phillips, 5 Neb. 305; State v. Lancaster Co., 17 Neb. 85, 22 N. W. 228; Matter of Van Antwerp, 56 N. Y. 261; People v. O’Brien, 38 N. Y. 193; Matter of Metropolitan Gas. Co., 85 N. Y. 526; Lockport ». Gaylord, 61 Ill. 276; Middleport v. Insurance Co., 82 Il. 562; Welch »v. Post, 99 Ill. 471; Don- nersberger v. Prendergast, 128 Ill. 229, 21N.E.1; Davis». State, 7 Md. 151; Stiefel v. Maryland Inst., 61 Md. 144; State v. Banker’s, &c. Assn., 23 Kan. 499; Rader v. Union, 39 N. J. L. 509; Evernham v. Hulit, 45 N. J. L. 53; Miss., &c. Boom Co. v. Prince, 34 Minn. 79, 24 N. W. 344; State ». Palmes, 23 Fla. 620, 3 So. 171; Jones v. Thompson, 12 Bush, 394; Equit. G. Trust Go. v. Donahoe, 3 Penn. (Del.) 191, 49 Atl. 372; Harris v. State, 110 Ga. 887, 36S. E. 232; State ». McDon- ald, 25 Wash. 122, 64 Pac. 912; Re Werner, 129 Cal. 567, 62 Pac. 97; Howard ». Schneider, 10 Kan. App. 137, 62 Pac. 435; People v. Curry, 130 Cal. 82, 62 Pac. 516; State »v. Cornell, 60 Neb. 276, 694, 83 N. W. 72; State v. Davis, 130 Ala. 148, 30 So. 344, 89 Am. St. Rep. 23; Hz parte Knight, 52 Fla. 144, 41 So. 786, 120 Am. St. Rep. 191; Fleming v. Greener, 173 Ind. 260, 90 N. E. 72, 73, 140 Am. St. Rep. 254, 21 Ann. Cas. 959; Bos- worth v. State University, 166 Ky. 436, 179 S. W. 403, L. R. A. 1917 B, 808; Somerset County ». Pocomoke Bridge Co., 109 Md. 1, 71 Atl. 462, 16 Ann. Cas. 874; Vernor v. Martindale, 179 Mich. 157, 146 N. W. 338, Ann. Cas. 1915 D, 128; State v. Candelaria, 283 N. M. 573, 215 Pac. 816; Rowe ». Richards, 32 S. D. 66, 142 N. W. 664, L. R. A. 1915 BE, 1069. In Illinois, by express constitutional provision, if any subject embraced in an act is not expressed in the title, the act will be void only as to so much thereof as is not so expressed. People v. McBride, 234 Ill. 146, 84 N. E. 865, 123 Am. St. Rep. 82, 14 Ann. Cas. 994; Perkins v. Cook County, 271 Il. 449, 111 N. E. 580, Ann. Cas. 1917 A, 27. But in Tennessee and West Vir- ginia it has been held that if an act embraces two or more subjects, only one of which is expressed in the title, the whole act will be void. Cannan v. Mathes, 8 Heisk. 504; State »v. McCann, 4 Lea, 1; Murphy ». State, 9 Lea, 379; Ragio v. State, 86 Tenn. 275,68. W. 401; Cole Manufacturing Co. v. Falls, 90 Tenn. 482, 16 S..W. 1045; State v. Yardley, 95 Tenn. 546,CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 310 [VoL. I As the legislature may make the title to an act as restrictive as they please, it is obvious that they may sometimes so frame it as to preclude many matters being included in the act which might with entire propriety have been embraced in one enactment with the matters indicated by the title, but which must now be excluded because the title has been made unnecessarily restrictive. The courts cannot enlarge the scope of the title; they are vested with no dispensing power ; the constitution has made the title the conclusive index to the legislative intent as to what shall have operation; it is no answer to say that the title might have been made more com- prehensive, if in fact the legislature have not seen fit to make it so.! Thus, “an act concerning promissory notes and bills of exchange” provided that all promissory notes, bills of exchange, or other instru- ments in writing, for the payment of money, or for the delivery of specific articles, or to convey property, or to perform any other stipulation therein mentioned, should be negotiable, and assignees of the same might sue thereon in their own names. It was held that this act was void, as to all the instruments mentioned therein except promissory notes and bills of exchange ;* though it is obvious that it would have been easy to frame a title to the act which would have embraced them all, and which would have been unobjection- able. It has also been held that an act for the preservation of the Muskegon River Improvement could not lawfully provide for the levy and collection of tolls for the payment of the expense of con- structing the improvement, as the operation of the act was carefully 32 S. W. 481, 34 L. R. A. 656; State ex rel. Astor v. Schlitz Brewing Co., 104 Tenn. 715, 59S. W. 1033, 78 Am. St. Rep. 941; Cutlip v. Sheriff, 3 W. Va. 588. “None of the provisions of a statute should be regarded as unconstitutional where they all relate, directly or in- directly, tothe same subject, have a natural connection, and are not for- eign to the subject expressed in the title.” Phillips v. Bridge Co., 2 Met. (Ky.) 219, approved, Smith v. Com- monwealth, 8 Bush, 112. See Ez parte Upshaw, 45 Ala. 234; Stewart v. Father Matthew Society, 41 Mich. 67, 1 N. W. 931. In determining whether provisions contained in a legislative act are embraced in one subject and matter properly connected therewith, the subject to be considered is the one expressed in the title of the act, and every fair intendment and reasonable doubt should be yielded in favor of the validity of the provision; but when an act contains provisions which, after yielding all fair intendments and reasonable doubts, are clearly not embraced in the subject of the act as expressed in the title, or in matter properly connected with that subject, such provisions are inoperative and without effect. Hx parte Knight, 52 Fla. 144, 41 So. 786, 120 Am. St. Rep. 191. 1 Hx parte Knight, 52 Fla. 144, 41 So. 786, 120 Am. St. Rep. 191. 2 Mewherter v. Price, 11 Ind. 199. See also State v. Young, 47 Ind. 150; Jones v. Thompson, 12 Bush, 394; Rushing v. Sebree, 12 Bush, 198; State v. Kinsella, 14 Minn. 524; Grover v. Trustees Ocean Grove, 45 N. J. L. 399.CHAP. VI] OF THE ENACTMENT OF LAWS 311 limited by its title to the future.t So also it has been held that “an act to limit the numbers of grand jurors, and to point out the mode of their selection, defining their jurisdiction, and repealing all laws ‘nconsistent therewith ”, could not constitutionally contain provi- sions which should authorize a defendant in a criminal case, on a trial for any offense, to be found guilty of any lesser offense neces- sarily included therein.? These cases must suffice upon this point ; though the cases before referred to will furnish many similar illus- trations. In all we have said upon this subject we have assumed the con- stitutional provision to be mandatory. Such has been the view of the courts almost without exception.» In California, formerly, a different view was taken, the court saying : “We regard this sec- tion of the Constitution as merely directory ; and, if we were in- clined to a different opinion, would be careful how we lent ourselves to a construction which must in effect obliterate almost every law 1 Ryerson v. Utley, 16 Mich. 269. See further Weaver v. Lapsley, 43 Ala. 924: Tuscaloosa Bridge Co. ». Olm- stead, 41 Ala. 9; Stuart v. Kinsella, 14 Minn. 524; Rogers v. Manuf. Imp. Co., 109 Pa. St. 109. 2 Foley v. State, 9 Ind. 363; Gilles- pie v. State, 9 Ind. 380. See also Indiana Cent. Railroad Co. v. Potts, 7 Ind. 681; State v. Squires, 26 Iowa, 340; State v. Lafayette Co. Court, 41 Mo. 39; People v. Denahy, 20 Mich. 349. Prohibitory enactments are not covered by a title to “regulate” liquor selling. Miller v. Jones, 80 Ala. 89; People v. Gadway, 61 Mich. 285, 28 N. W. 101; People v. Hauck, 70 Mich. 396, 38 N. W. 269; Cantril v. Sainer, 59 Iowa, 26, 12 N. W. 753. See State v. Circuit Court, 50 N. J. L. 585, 15 Atl. 272. Provision for building a court house cannot be included in “an act to incorporate the town of Luverne.” Thompson v. Luverne, 128 Ala. 567, 29 So. 326. For further illustration of provisions held bad because not within the title, see Ragio v. State, 86 Tenn. 272, 6 S. W. 401; In re Paul, 94 N. Y. 497, 20 N. W. 549; Anderson v. Hill, 54 Mich. 477; Northwestern Mfg. Co. v. Wayne Cir. Judge, 58 Mich. 381, 25 N. W. 371; Sewickley v. Sholes, 118 Pa. St. 165, 12 Atl. 302; Jersey City v. Elmendorf, 47 N. J. L. 283; Savan- nah, F. & W. Ry. Co. v. Geiger, 22 Fla. 669; Ex parte Knight, 52 Fla. 144, 41 So. 786, 120 Am. St. Rep. 191. 3 Mobile Dry-Docks Co. v. Mobile, 146 Ala. 198, 40 So. 205, 3 L. R. A. (x. s.) 822, 9 Ann. Cas. 1229; Galpin v. Chicago, 269 Ill. 27, 109 N. E. 713, L. R. A. 1917 B, 176; State v. Haun, 61 Kan. 146, 59 Pac. 340, 47 L. R. A. 369; State v. Burgdoerfer, 107 Mo. 1, 17 S. W. 646, 14 L. R. A. 846; State ». Tibbets, 52 Neb. 228, 71 N. W. 990, 66 Am. St. Rep. 492; Bell v. First Judicial District Court, 28 Nev. 280, 81 Pac. 875, 113 Am. St. Rep. 854, 1 L. R. A. (wn. s.) 843, 6 Ann. Cas. 982; Worthington v. District Ct., 37 Nev. 212, 142 Pac. 230, L. R. A. 1916 A, 696, Ann. Cas. 1916 B, 1097; State vy. Johnson, 90 Okla. 21, 215 Pac. 945; Garrigan v. Kennedy, 19 S) Ds 1100 N. W. 1081, 117 Am. St. Rep. 927, 8 Ann. Cas. 1125; Rowe ». Richards, 32 S. D. 66, 142 N. W. 664, L. R. A. 1915 E, 1069; State ». Burrow, 119 Tenn. 376, 104 S. W. 526, 14 Ann. Cas. 809; Acklen v. Thompson, 122 Tenn. 43, 126 S. W. 730, 135 Am. St. Rep. 851; State »v. Superior Ct., 28 Wash. 317, 68 Pac. 957, 92 Am. St. Rep. 831; Sims v. Sawyers, 85 W. Va. 245, 101 S. E. 467, overruling Shields v. Bennett, 8 W. Va. 74.312 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. 1 from the statute-book, unhinge the business and destroy the labor of the last three years. The first legislature that met under the Constitution seems to have considered this section as directory; and almost every act of that and the subsequent sessions would be obnoxious to this objection. The contemporaneous exposition of the first legislature, adopted or acquiesced in by every subsequent legislature, and tacitly assented to by the courts, taken in connec- tion with the fact that rights have grown up under it, so that it has become a rule of property, must govern our decision.” ! [But since this decision a constitutional provision has been adopted which de- clares the provisions of the Constitution to be “mandatory and pro- hibitory”’ unless expressly declared to be otherwise, and, under it, the provision in question has been held to be mandatory.2] Views similar to those expressed by the California court have also been expressed in the State of Ohio.’ [In Mississippi a like conclusion has been reached as to the provision of the Constitution of that State, but the determination has relation to the peculiar phraseology of that provision.‘] These cases, and especially what is said by the California court, bring forcibly before our minds a fact, which can- not be kept out of view in considering this subject, and which has a very important bearing upon the precise point which these de- cisions cover. The fact is this: that whatever constitutional pro- vision can be looked upon as directory merely is very likely to be treated by the legislature as if it was devoid even of moral obliga- tion, and to be therefore habitually disregarded. To say that a provision is directory, seems, with many persons, to be equivalent to saying that it is not law at all. That this ought not to be so must be conceded; that it is so we have abundant reason and good au- thority for saying. If, therefore, a constitutional provision is to be enforced at all, it must be treated as mandatory. And if the legis- lature habitually disregard it, it seems to us that there is all the more urgent necessity that the courts should enforce it. And it also seems to us that there are few evils which can be inflicted by a strict adherence to the law, so great as that which is done by the 1 Washington v. Page, 4 Cal. 388. 4 The provision of the Constitution See Pierpont v. Crouch, 10 Cal. 315; of Mississippi held to be merely direc- Matter of Boston Mining, &c. Co., tory, declares that the title of a stat- 51 Cal. 624; Weill v. Kenfield, 54 Cal. ute “ought”’ to indicate clearly its 111. subject matter. Jackson v. State, 102 ? Lewis v. Dunne, 134 Cal. 291, 66 Miss. 663, 59 So. 873, Ann. Cas. 1915 Pac. 478, 86 Am. St. Rep. 257, 55 A, 1213; Mississippi University ». L. R. A. 833. Waugh, 105 Miss. 623, 62 So. 827, ’Miller v. State, 3 Ohio St. 475; L. R.A. 1915 D, 588; State v. Phillips, Pim v. Nicholson, 6 Ohio St. 177; 109 Miss. 22, 67 So. 651, L. R. A. 1915 State v. Covington, 29 Ohio St. 102. D, 530.CHAP. VI] OF THE ENACTMENT OF LAWS 313 habitual disregard, by any department of the government, of a plain requirement of that instrument from which it derives its authority, and which ought, therefore, to be scrupulously observed and obeyed. Upon this subject we need only refer here to what we have said concerning it in another place.’ Amendatory Statutes. It has also been deemed important, in some of the States, to pro- vide by their constitutions, that “no act shall ever be revised or amended by mere reference to its title; but the act revised or section amended shall be set forth and published at full length. 92 [If this requirement is not complied with the amendatory act will be 1 Ante, p. 149 et seg. See State »v. Tufly, 19 Nev. 391. 2 This is the provision as it is found in the Constitutions of Indiana, Nevada, Oregon, Texas, and Virginia. In Illinois, Kansas, New Jersey, Ohio, Michigan, Louisiana, Wisconsin, Utah, Missouri, and Maryland there are pro- visions of similar import. In Tennessee the provision is: “All acts which revive, repeal, or amend former laws, shall recite, in their caption or otherwise, the title or substance of the law repealed, re- vived, or amended.”’ Art. 1, § 17. See State v. Gaines, 1 Lea, 734; McGhee »v. State, 2 Lea, 622. The Constitution of Montana pro- vides: ‘No law shall be revised or amended, or the provisions thereof extended by reference to its title only, but so much thereof as is revised, amended or extended shall be re-en- acted and published at length.” Art. 5 § 25. See Palatine Ins. Co. v. North- ern Pacific R. Co., 34 Mont. 268, 85 Pac. 1032, 9 Ann. Cas. 579. The Constitution of Georgia pro- vides: ‘No law, or section of the code, shall be amended or repealed by mere reference to its title, or to the number of the section of the Code, but the amending or repealing act shall distinctly describe the law to be amended or repealed, as well as the alteration to be made.” Art. 3, § 7, par. 17. This provision has no refer- ence to a legislative proposal to amend the Constitution. Cooney v. Foote, 142 Ga. 647, 83 S. E. 537, Ann. Cas. 1916 B, 1001. The provision in Nebraska (Const. of 1875) is peculiar. ‘No law shall be amended unless the new act contains the section or sections so amended, and the section or sections so amended shall be repealed.” Art. 3 § 11. Under a like provision that any section amended is thereby repealed, it is held in Alabama that an amendment to an amended statute is valid. State »v. Warford, 84 Ala. 15, 3 So. 911. So where the amendment impliedly re- pealed the original act, an amendment to the amended act was held valid, as the mistake in referring to a repealed statute should not defeat the intention of the legislature. Com. v. Kenneson, 143 Mass. 418, 9 N. E. 761. See also State v. Blake, 241 Mo. 100, 1448S. W. 1094, Ann. Cas. 1913 C, 1283; Worth- ington v. District Ct., 37 Nev. 212, 142 Pac. 230, L. R. A. 1916 A, 696, Ann. Cas. 1916 E, 1097. But see Lampkin v. Pike, 115 Ga. 827, 42 S. E. 213, 90 Am. St. Rep. 153. Under provisions forbidding enact- ments by reference a law complete in itself may provide for carrying out its purposes by reference to procedure established by other acts. Campbell v. Board, &c., 47 N. J. L. 347; De Camp v. Hibernia R. R. Co., ad. 48. But the act must be complete in all essentials. Christie v. Bayonne, 48 N. J. L. 407, 5 Atl. 805; Donohugh ». Roberts, 15 Phila. 144. In Texas it appears to be held that314 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I void..]_ Upon this provision an important query arises. Does it mean that the act or section revised or amended shall be set forth and published at full length as it stood before, or does it mean only that it shall be set forth and published at full length as amended or revised? Upon this question perhaps a consideration of the purpose of the provision may throw some light. “The mischief designed to be remedied was the enactment of amendatory statutes in terms so blind that legislators themselves were sometimes deceived in regard to their effects, and the public, from the difficulty in mak- ing the necessary examination and comparison, failed to become apprised of the changes made in the laws. An amendatory act which purported only to insert certain words, or to substitute one phrase for another in an act or section which was only referred to, but not published, was well calculated to mislead the careless as to its effect, and was, perhaps, sometimes drawn in that form for the express purpose. Endless confusion was thus introduced into the law, and the Constitution wisely prohibited such legislation.” ? If this is a correct view of the purpose of the provision, it does not seem to be at all important to its accomplishment that the old law should be republished, if the law as amended is given in full, with such reference to the old law as will show for what the new law is substituted. Nevertheless, it has been decided in Louisiana that the constitution requires the old law to be set forth and published ; * the legislature may repeal a definite portion of a section without the re- enactment of the section with such portion omitted. Chambers »v. State, 25 Tex. 307. But quere of this. Where the provisions of an act applying to a certain city are made to apply to another, this is not an amend- ment of the original act. Phoenix Fire Assurance Co. v. Montgomery Fire Dept., 117 Ala. 631, 23 So. 843, 42 L. R. A. 468. Further on this subject see Blake- more v. Dolan, 50 Ind. 194; People v. Wright, 70 Ill. 388; Jones v. Davis, 6 Neb. 33; Sovereign v. State, 7 Neb. 409; Gordon v. People, 44 Mich. 485, 7 N. W. 69; State v. Gerger, 65 Mo. 306; Van Riper v. Parsons, 40 N. J. L. 123, 29 Am. Rep. 210; Fleishner v. Chadwick, 5 Oreg. 152; State v. Cain, 8 W. Va. 720; State v. Henderson, 32 La. Ann. 779; Colwell v. Chamberlin, 43 N. J. L. 387; State v. Beddo, 22 Utah, 432, 63 Pac. 96. 1 People v. Election Com’rs, 221 Ill. 9, 77 N. E: 321, 5 Ann: Cas.75625 Horkey v. Kendall, 53 Neb. 522, 73 N. W. 9538, 68 Am. St. Rep. 623; Beale v. Pankey, 107 Va. 215, 57 S. E. 661, 12 Ann. Cas. 1184; Copland ». Pirie, 26 Wash. 481, 67 Pac. 227, 90 Am. St. Rep. 769. In Wisconsin it has been held that any portion of a section amended which is not contained in the amenda- tory section as set forth and published is repealed. State v. Ingersoll, 17 Wis. 631. 2 People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 497. See Mok v. Detroit, &c. Association, 30 Mich. 511; Bush v. Indianapolis, 120 Ind. 476, 22 N. E. 422. 3 Walker v. Caldwell, 4 La. Ann. 297; Heirs of Duverge v. Salter, 5 La. Ann. 94. The provision in the Constitution of Louisiana has been amended and now provides: ‘‘No law shall be revived or amended by reference to its title, but in such cases the act revived, or section as amended, shall be re-enactedCHAP. V1] OF THE ENACTMENT OF LAWS 315 and the courts of Indiana, assuming the provision in their own Constitution to be taken from that of Louisiana after the decisions referred to had been made, at one time adopted and followed them as precedents.’ It is believed, however, that the general under- standing of the provision in question is different, and that it is fully complied with in letter and spirit, if the act or section revised or amended is set forth and published as revised or amended, and that anything more only brous.” by tends to render the statute unnecessarily cum- It should be observed that statutes which amend others implication are not within this provision; and it is not essential that they even refer to the acts or sections which by implication they amend’ [And the constitutional “requirement does not apply to and published at length.” Nah, 8; §17. Under this provision it has been held that the re-enactment of the law to be amended is not required, but only the re-enactment and publication of the law ‘“‘as amended.” Murphy v. St. Mary Parish Police Jury, 118 La. 401, 42 So. 979. 1 Langdon v. Applegate, 5 Ind. 327; Rogers v. State, 6 Ind. 31. These eases were overruled in Greencastle, &c. Co. v. State, 28 Ind. 382. 2See Tuscaloosa Bridge Co. v. Olm- stead, 41 Ala. 9; People v. Pritchard, 21 Mich. 236; People v. McCallum, 1 Neb. 182; State v. Draper, 47 Mo. 29; Boonville v. Trigg, 46 Mo. 288; State v. Powder Mfg. Co., 50 N. J. L. 75, 11 Atl. 127; Thornton ». Bramlett, 155 Ala. 417, 46 So. 577; Sanchez »v. Fordyce, 141 Cal. 427, 76 Pace. 56; State v. Jones, 9 Idaho, 693, 75 Pac. 819; Murphy v. St. Mary Parish Police Jury, 118 La. 401, 42 So. 979; Wayland v. Herring, 208 Mo. 708, 106 S. W. 984; Johnson v. School Dist., 102 Neb. 347, 167 N. W. 210; State ex rel. Stockwell v. Berryman, 102 Neb. 553, 167 N. W. 790; State v. Lawson, 40 Wash. 455, 82 Pac. 750. A whole act need be set out only when all its sections are amended. State v. Thruston, 92 Mo. 325, 48. W. 930. Under such a constitutional provision where a statute simply re- peals others it is not necessary to set them out. Falconer v. Robinson, 46 Ala. 340. Compare Bird v. Wasco County, 3 Oreg. 282. In Lewis, Adm’x of Lewis, v. Dunne, 134 Cal. 291, 66 Pac. 478, 55 L. R. A. 838, 86 Am. St. 257, an act for the revision of the code of Civil Procedure of the State was held unconstitutional which did not provide for republication where the act amended over 400 sec- tions, repealed nearly 100, and added many new ones. There is a valuable note to this case upon the power of the legislature to enact a code or compila- tion of laws or make extended amend- ments to a system of laws by a single statute. 55 L. R. A. 833. 3 Spencer v. State, 5 Ind. 41; Bran- ham v. Lange, 16 Ind. 497; People »v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481; Lehman ». McBride, 15 Ohio St. 573; Shields v. Bennett, 8 W. Va. 74; Baum »v. Raphael, 57 Cal. 361; Home Ins. Co. v. Taxing District, 4 Lea, 644; Swart- wout v. Railroad Co., 24 Mich. 389; Scales v. State, 47 Ark. 476, 1S. W. 769; Denver Circle R. Co. v. Nestor, 10 Col. 403, 15 Pac. 714; Statev. Cross, 38 Kan. 696, 17 Pac. 190; Evern- ham v. Hulit, 45 N. J. L. 53; Sheridan »v. Salem, 14 Oreg. 328, 12 Pace. 925; Cartersville v. McGinnis, 142 Ga. 71, 82 S. E. 487, Ann. Cas. 1915 D, 1067; Berry v. State, 153 Ga. 169, 111 S. E. 669, 35 A. L. R. 370; Erford v. Peoria, 229 Ill. 546, 82 N. E. 374; People »v. McBride, 234 Ill. 146, 84 N. E. 865, 123 Am. St. Rep. 82, 14 Ann. Cas. 994; Scown »v. Gzarnecki, 264 Ill. 305, 106 N. E. 276, L. R. A. 1915 B, 247, Ann. Cas. 1915 A, 772; Galpin 2. Chicago, 269 Ill. 27, 109 N. BK. 713, L. R. A. 1917 B, 176; State ». Cun- ningham, 130 La. 749, 58 So. 558,316 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I supplemental acts not in any way modifying or altering the original act, nor to those merely adding new sections to an existing act.’ }] But repeals by implication are not favored ; and the repugnancy be- tween two statutes should be very clear to warrant a court in holding that the later in time repeals the other, when it does not in terms purport to do so.? L. R. A. 1915 B, 389; Weston v. Ryan, 70 Neb. 211, 97 N. W. 347, 6 Ann. Cas. 922; Cram v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 84 Neb. 607, 122 N. W. 31, 26 L. R. A. (n. s.) 1022; Wilkinson v. Lord, 85 Neb. 136, 122 N. W. 699, 24 L. R. A. (vw. s.) 1104; Dinuzzo v. State, 85 Neb. 351, 123 N. W. 309, 29 L. R. A. (Nn. 8.) 417; State v. Fargo Bottling Works Co., 19 N. D. 396, 124 N. W. 387, 26 L. R. A. (w. s.) 872; In re Lee, 64 Okla. 310, 168 Pac. 53, L. R. A. 1918 B, 144; Southern R. Co. v. Memphis, 126 Tenn. 267, 148 S. W. 662, 41 L. R. A. (N. s.) 828, Ann. Cas. 1913 E, 153; Will v. Brown, 31 Utah, 473, 88 Pac. 609, 120 Am. St. Rep. 935; Copland v. Pirie, 26 Wash. 481, 67 Pac. 227, 90 Am. St. Rep. 769; Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Pierce County, 51 Wash. 12, 97 Pac. 1099, 23 L. R. A. (N. Ss.) 286; State v. Tausick, 64 Wash. OOPTIGE Pach Golessh nena AL (IN; 8) 802. Compare State v. Wright, 14 Oreg. 365, 12 Pac. 708. But if an act ‘is not complete in itself, and is clearly amendatory of a former statute, it falls within the con- stitutional inhibition, whether or not it purports on its face to be amenda- tory or an independent act.’’ Cop- land v. Pirie, 26 Wash. 481, 67 Pac. 227, 90 Am. St. Rep. 769. See also Sovereign v. State, 7 Neb. 409; Strick- lett v. State, 31 Neb. 674, 48 N. W. 820; Aurora Bd. of Education ». Moses, 51 Neb. 288, 70 N. W. 946; Titusville Iron-Works v. Keystone Oil Co., 122 Pa. St. 627, 15 Atl. 917, 1 L. R. A. 361. And “even though an act professes to be an independent act and does not purport to amend any prior act, still if, in fact, it makes changes in an existing act by adding new provisions and mingling the new with the old on the same subject so as to make of the old and the new a con- nected piece of legislation covering the This rule has peculiar force in the case of laws of same subject, the latter act must be considered an amendment of the former and as within the constitutional prohibition.” Galpin v. Chicago, 269 Til. 27, 109 N. E. 713, L. R. AL 1907 B, 176. See also Badenoch v. Chi- cago, 222 Ill. 71, 78 N. E. 31; Brooks v. Hatch, 261 Ill. 179, 103 N. E. 745. ‘Copland »v. Pirie, 26 Wash. 481, 67 Pac. 227, 90 Am. St. Rep. 769. See also Berry v. Kansas City, ete., R. Co., 52 Kan. 759, 34 Pac. 805; 39 Am. St. Rep. 371; State v. Ginney, 55 Kan. 532, 40 Pac. 926. ? See cases cited in n. 3 on p. 315; also Towle v. Marrett, 3 Me. 22, 14 Am. Dee. 206; Naylor v. Field, 29 N. J. L. 287; State v. Berry, 12 Iowa, 58; Attorney-General v. Brown, 1 Wis. 513; Dodge v. Gridley, 10 Ohio, 173; Hirn v. State, 1 Ohio St. 20; Saul v. Creditors, 5 Mart. (n. s.) 569, 16 Am. Dec. 212; New Orleans v. Southern Bank, 15 La. Ann. 89; Blain v. Bailey, 25 Ind. 165; Water Works Co. v. Burkhart, 41 Ind. 364; Swann v. Buck, 40 Miss. 268; Davis v. State, 7 Md. 151; State v. The Treasurer, 41 Mo. 16; Somerset & Stoystown Road, 74 Pa. St. 61; Kil- gore v. Commonwealth, 94 Pa. St. 495; McCool v. Smith, 1 Black, 459, 17 L. ed. 218; State v. Cain, 8 W. Va. 720; Fleischner v. Chadwick, 5 Oreg. 152; Covington v. East St. Louis, 78 Ill. 548; East St. Louis v. Maxwell, 99 Ill. 489; In re Ryan, 45 Mich. 173, 7 N. W. 819; Connors v. Carp River Iron Co., 54 Mich. 168, 19 N. W. 938; Parker v. Hubbard, 64 Ala. 203; Iverson »v. State, 52 Ala. 170; Gohen v. Texas Pacific R. R. Co., 2 Woods, 346; State v. Commissioner, 37 N. J. L. 240; Attorney-General »v. Railroad Com- panies, 35 Wis. 425; Rounds v. Way- mart, 81 Pa. St. 395; Greeley v. Jack- sonville, 17 Fla. 174; State v. Smith,CHAP. VI1| 44 Tex. 443; Henderson’s Tobacco, 11 Wall. 652, 20 L. ed. 235; Cape Girardeau Co. Ct. v. Hill, 118 U.S. 68, 30 L. ed. 73, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 951; Petri v. F. E. Creelman Lumber Co., 199 U. S. 487, 50 L. ed. 281, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 133; Hx parte Webb, 225 U. S. 663, 56 L. ed. 1248, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 769; Washington v. Miller, 235 U. S. 422, 59 L. ed. 295, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 119; Lewis v. United States, 244 U.S. 134, 61 L. ed. 1039, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 570; United States v. Yugmovich, 256 U. S. 450, 65 L. ed. 1043, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 551; Ex parte Sohcke, 148 Cal. 262, 82 Pac. 956, 113 Am. St. Rep. 236, 2 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 813, 7 Ann. Cas. 475; Navajo County Bank v. Dolson, 163 Cal. 485, 126 Pac. 153, 41 L. R. A. (x. s.) 787; People v. Martin, 188 Cal. 281, 205 Pac. 121, 21 A. L. R. 1399; Hartford F. Ins. Co. v. Redding, 47 Fla. 228, 37 So. 62, 110 Am. St. Rep. 118, 67 L. R. A. 518; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Doyle, 258 Ill. 624, 102 N. E. 260, Ann. Cas. 1914 B, 385; State v. Leich, 166 Ind. 680, 78 N. E. 189, 9 Ann. Cas. 302; State v. Iowa Tele- phone Co., 175 Iowa, 607, 154 N. W. 678, Ann. Cas. 1917 E, 539; State v. Hammond Packing Co., 110 La. 180, 34 So. 368, 98 Am. St. Rep. 459; People v. Marxhausen, 204 Mich. 559, 171 N. W. 557, 3 A. L. R. 1505; Schmitz v. Zeh, 91 Minn. 290, 97 N. W. 1049, 1 Ann. Cas. 322; State »v. Perkins, 141 N. C. 797, 53S. E. 735, 9 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 165; Kearney v. Vann, 154 N. C. 311, 70S. E. 747, Ann. Cas. 1912 B, 1189; State v. Wetz, 40 N. D. 299, 168 N. W. 835, 5 A. L. R. 731; Huston v. Scott, 20 Okla. 142, 94 Pac. 512, 35 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 721; Kuchler v. Weaver, 23 Okla. 420, 100 Pac. 915, 18 Ann. Cas. 462; Ex parte Morgan, 57 Tex. Crim. Rep. 551, 124 S. W. 99, 136 Am. St. Rep. 996; Lavagnino ». Uhlig, 26 Utah, 1, 71 Pac. 1046, 99 Am. St. Rep. 808; Utah University v. Richards, 20 Utah, 457, 59 Pac. 96, 77 Am. St. Rep. 928; Lambert »v. Barrett, 115 Va. 136, 78 S. E. 586, Ann. Cas. 1914 D, 1226; Mesher ». Osborne, 75 Wash. 439, 134 Pac. 1092, 48 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 917; Woodyard »v. Sayre, 90 W. Va. 295, 110 S. E. 689, 24 A.L. R. 1497; In re Masonic Tem- OF THE ENACTMENT OF LAWS 317 ple Soc., 90 W. Va. 441, 1118S. E. 637, 22 A. L. R. 892; Hay v. Baraboo, 127 Wis. 1, 105 N. W. 654, 115 Am. St. Rep. 977, 3 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 84; State v. Milwaukee Electric R. ete., Co., 144 Wis. 386, 129 N. W. 623, 140 Am. St. Rep. 1025; Madison v. Southern Wisconsin R. Co., 156 Wis. 352, 146 N. W. 492, 10 A. L. R. 910; Krueck v. Phoenix Chair Co., 157 Wis. 266, 147 N. W. 41, Ann. Cas. 1916 B, 291. If the two are repugnant in part, the earlier is pro tanto repealed. Hearn v. Brogan, 64 Miss. 334; Jeffer- sonville, &c. R. R. Co. v. Dunlap, 112 Ind. 93, 13 N. E. 403. A law which merely re-enacts a former one does not repeal an inter- mediate act qualifying such former act. The new is qualified like the old. Gaston v. Merriam, 33 Minn. 271, 22 N. W. 614; Powell v. King, 78 Minn. 83, 80 N. W. 850; Hall v. Dunn, 52 Oreg. 475, 97 Pac. 811, 25 L. R. A. (N. s.) 193. This principle, however, is @ mere canon of construction, or aid to the ascertainment of legislative intent, and must yield to the latter. State ex rel. Stearns County v. Klasen, 123 Minn. 382, 143 N. W. 984, 49 LL. R.A. (N- s:)-597. It is a familiar rule that when a new statute is evidently intended to cover the whole subject to which it relates, it will by implication repeal all prior statutes on that subject. See United States v. Barr, 4 Sawyer, 254; United States v. Claflin, 97 U.S. 546, 24 L. ed. 1082; Red Rock v. Henry, 106 U. S. 596, 27 L. ed. 251, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 434; Dowdell v. State, 58 Ind. 333; State v. Rogers, 10 Nev. 319; Tafoya v. Garcia, 1 New Mex. 480; Camp- bell’s Case, 1 Dak. 17, 46 N. W. 504; Andrews v. People, 75 Ill. 605; Clay Co. v. Chickasaw Co., 64 Miss. 534, 1 So. 753; Lyddy v. Long Island City, 104 N. Y. 218; Stingle v. Nevel, 9 Oreg. 62; State v. Studt, 31 Kan. 245, 1 Pac. 635; Boston Ice Co. v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 77 N. H. 6, 86 Atl. 356, 45 L. R. A. (nN. 8.) 835, Ann. Cas. 1914 A, 1090; Pratt Institute ». New York, 183 N. Y. 151, 75 N. E. 1119, 5 Ann. Cas. 198; State ex rel. Milwaukee ». Milwaukee Electric R. etc., Co., 144 Wis. 386, 129 N. W. 623, 140 Am. St.318 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I special and local application, which are never to be deemed repealed by general legislation except upon the most unequivocal manifesta- tion of intent to that effect. It was a parliamentary rule that a statute should not be repealed at the same session of its enactment, unless a clause permitting it was inserted in the statute itself;? but this rule did not apply to repeals by implication,’ and it is possibly not recognized in this country at all, except where it is incorporated in the State Constitu- tion.’ [Under the title of an amendatory act nothing can be enacted but what amends the old law. Matter which might have come under the title of the original act, but did not, cannot be introduced.® In amending an act, it may be designated by its title or chapter in Rep. 1025. But a local option law merely suspends, does not repeal a former liquor law, and after its adop- tion offenses against the latter while in force may be prosecuted. Winter- ton v. State, 65 Miss. 238, 3 So. 735. A statute cannot be repealed by non-user. Homer v. Com., 106 Pa. St. 221; Pearson v. Int. Distill. Co., 72 Iowa, 348, 34 N. W. 1. 1Cass v. Dillon, 2 Ohio St. 607; Fosdick v. Perrysburg, 14 Ohio St. 472; People v. Quigg, 59 N. Y. 83; McKenna v. Edmundstone, 91 N. Y. 231; Clark v. Davenport, 14 Iowa, 494; Oleson v. Green Bay, &ec. R. R. Co., 36 Wis. 383; Covington v. East St. Louis, 78 Ill. 548; Chesapeake, &e. Co. v. Hoard, 16 W. Va. 270; Rounds v. Waymart, 81 Pa. St. 395; Ez parte Schmidt, 24 S. C. 363; New Bruns- wick v. Williamson, 44 N. J. L. 165; McGruder v. State, 83 Ga. 616, 10 S. E. 281; Petri v. F. E. Creelman Lumber Co., 199 U. S. 487, 50 L. ed. 281, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 133; Ez parte United States, 226 U.S. 420, 57 L. ed. 281, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 170; United States v. Winslow, 227 U. S. 202, 57 L. ed. 481, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 253; Washington v. Miller, 235 U. S. 422, 59 L. ed. 295, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 119; Abbate v. United States, 270 Fed. 735; Norwich v. Johnson, 86 Conn, 151, 84 Atl. 727, 41 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 1024; Howard v. Hulbert, 63 Kan. 793, 66 Pac. 1041, 88 Am. St. Rep. 267; State v. Hammond Packing Co., 110 La. 180, 34 So. 368, 98 Am. St. Rep. 459; Jersey City v. Hall, 79 N. J. L. 559, 76 Atl. 1058, Ann. Cas. 1912 A, 696; State v. Wetz, 40 N. D. 299, 168 N. W. 835, 5 A. L. R. 7381; Kuchler v. Weaver, 23 Okla. 420, 100 Pac. 915, 18 Ann. Cas. 462; Key v. Harris, 116 Tenn. 161, 92 S. W. 235, 8 Ann. Cas. 200. 2 Dwarris on Statutes, Vol I. p. 269; Sedgw. on Stat. and Const. Law, 122; Smith on Stat. and Const. Con- struction, 908. 3 Ibid. And see Spencer ». State, 5 Ind. 41. 4 Spencer v. State, 5 Ind. 41; Attor- ney-General v. Brown, 1 Wis. 513; Smith on Stat. and Const. Construc- tion, 908; Mobile & Ohio Railroad Co. v. State, 29 Ala. 573; Strauss’ v. Heiss, 48 Md. 292. The later of two acts passed at the same session controls when they are inconsistent. Thomas v. Collins, 58 Mich. 64, 24 N. W. 553; Watson »v. Kent, 78 Ala. 602. But the fact of later publication when action is taken at the same time will not work a repeal. Jn re Hall, 38 Kan. 670, 17 Pac. 649. Where acts passed on different days are approved on the same day, the presumption is that the one passed last was signed last. State v. Davis, 70 Md. 237, 16 Atl. 529. 5 State v. Smith, 35 Minn. 257, 28 N. W. 241. See also State v. Walker, 105 La. 492, 29 So. 973; Armstrong v. Mayer, 60 Neb. 423, 83 N. W. 401.CHAP. VI1| OF THE ENACTMENT OF LAWS 319 an authorized compilation of statutes. Where an amendment is plain, and can be carried out, it may be held valid, even though the section numbers of the original act and of the amendment are i confusion. That the title of an amendatory act is, of itself, insufficient, is immaterial, if the title of the original act is sufficient to embrace the provision contained in the amendatory act.*] Signing of Bulls. When a bill has passed the two houses, it is engrossed for the signatures of the presiding officers. This is a constitutional re- quirement in most of the States, and therefore cannot be dispensed with;4 though, in the absence o 1 People v. Howard, 73 Mich. 10, 40 N. W. 789; Dagge v. State, 17 Neb. 140, 22 N. W. 348; State v. Berka, 20 Neb. 375, 30 N. W. 267. But see Feibleman v. State, 98 Ind. 516. 2 People ex rel. Comstock v. Judge of Superior Court, 39 Mich. 195. See also State v. Babcock, 23 Neb. 128, 36 N. W. 348; Fenton v. Yule, 27 Neb. 758, 43 N. W. 1140. 3Brandon v. State, 16 Ind. 197; St. Louis v. Tiefel, 42 Mo. 590; State y. Ranson, 73 Mo. 78; State v. Algood, 87 Tenn. 163, 10S. W. 310. 4 Moody v. State, 48 Ala. 115, 17 Am. Rep. 28; State v. Mead, 71 Mo. 266; Burritt v. Com’rs, 120 Ill. 322, 11 N. E. 180; State v. Kiesewetter, 45 Ohio St. 254, 12 N. E. 807; Hunt v. State, 22 Tex. App. 396, 38. W. 2383 ; Monroe v. Green, 71 Ark. 527, 76S. W. 199; Amos v. Gunn, 84 Fla. 285, 94 So. 615; Lynch v. Hutchinson, 219 Ill. 193, 76 N. E. 370, 4 Ann. Cas. 904; State v. Lynch, 169 Iowa, 148, 151 N. W. 81, L. R. A. 1915 D, 119; State v. Mickey, 73 Neb. 281, 102 N. W. 679, 119 Am. St. Rep. 894. The requirement must be complied with while the legislature is in session. Amos v. Gunn, 84 Fla. 285, 94 So. 615. A law cannot be established by the certificates of the clerical officers of the two houses, made after the ad- journment of the legislature sine die. State ex rel. McClay v. Mickey, 73 Neb. 281, 102 N. W. 679, 119 Am. St. Rep. 894. f any such requirement, it would Signature by presiding officers and assistant secretary is enough. State », Glenn, 18 Nev. 34, 1 Pac. 186. In Nebraska it has been held that a bill which is not authenticated by the signature of the presiding officer of either branch of the legislature cannot become a law. State ex rel. McClay v. Mickey, 73 Neb. 281, 102 N. W. 679, 119 Am. St. Rep. 894. But in the same State it has been held that the failure of the presiding officer of the Senate to sign a bill, which was after- wards approved by the governor, and which the Journal of the Senate shows passed the Senate by the constitutional majority, does not affect the validity of the act. Cottrell v. State, 9 Neb. 125, 1 N. W. 1008; Taylor ». Wilson, 17 Neb. 88, 22 N. W. 119; State ex rel. Nebraska State Ry. Commission ». Missouri Pacific R. Co., 100 Neb. 700, 161 N. W. 270, L. R. A. 1918 HE, 346. In Kansas it has been held that failure of the presiding officers to sign a bill does not defeat it, nor in any Manner impair its validity, if it be thereafter duly authenticated and approved by the governor. Aikman ». Edwards, 55 Kan. 751, 42 Pac. 366, 30 L. R. A. 149. After an act has been passed over a veto, it need not be again certified. State v. Denny, 118 Ind. 449, 21 N. E. 274. The bill as signed must be the same as it passed the two houses. People v. Platt, 2S. C. 150; Legg ». Annap-320 seem not to be essential.! CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. 1 And if, by the Constitution of the State, the governor is a component part of the legislature, the bill is then presented to him for his approval.? Approval of Laws. The qualified veto power of the governor is regulated by the constitutions of those States which allow it, and little need be said here beyond referring to the constitutional provisions for informa- tion concerning them. It has been held that if the governor, by statute, was entitled to one day, previous to the adjournment of the legislature, for the examination and approval of laws, this is to be understood as a full day of twenty-four hours, before the hour of the final adjournment.’ It has olis, 42 Md. 203; 59 Miss. 68. But a clerical error that would not mislead is to be over- looked. People v. Supervisor of Onon- daga, 16 Mich. 254. Compare Smith v. Hoyt, 14 Wis. 252, where the error was in publication. And so should accidental and immaterial changes in the transmission of the bill from one house to the other. Larrison v. Rail- road Co., 77 Ill. 11; Walnut v. Wade, 103 U.S. 683, 26 L. ed. 526. See Wen- ner v. Thornton, 98 Ill. 156. But in Arkansas when a mistake in enrolment made an approval void, signatures and approval on a correct roll after the adjournment were held to make the act valid. Dow v. Beidelman, 49 Ark. 325, 5 S. W. 297. In Maryland the governor may refuse to consider any bill sent him not authenticated by the Great Seal. Hamilton v. State, 61 Md. 14. In Nevada where the goy- ernor vetoes an act after the adjourn- ment of the legislature, the next legis- lature may pass it over his veto. Upon such passage, the presiding offi- cers of the two houses must thereupon sign it. State v. Howell, 26 Nev. 93, 64 Pac. 466. ‘Speer v. Plank Road Co., 22 Pa. St. 376. 2 The Brady v. West, constitutional requirement that a bill shall, before becoming a law, be presented to the governor, is man- datory and requires the presentation to be made while the legislature isin ses- sion. Amos v. Gunn, 84 Fla. 285, 94 also been held that, in the ap- So. 615. The bill presented must be that which passed the legislature. Any change after passage and before signature by the governor prevents the bill becoming alaw. State v. Wend- ler, 94 Wis. 369, 68 N. W. 759. See also State v. Green, 36 Fla. 154, 18 So. 334; Weis v. Ashley, 59 Neb. 494, 81 N. W. 318, 80 Am. St. Rep. 704. 5’ Hyde v. White, 24 Tex. 137. See also Carter v. Henry, 87 Miss. 411, 39 So. 690, 6 Ann. Cas. 715. In computing the days allowed the governor within which to return a bill the day on which the bill was pre- sented to him should be excluded and the last day of the specified period included. State ex rel. Dawson ». Sessions, 84 Kan. 856, 115 Pac. 641, Ann. Cas. 1912 A, 796; Carter »v. Henry, 87 Miss. 411, 39 So. 690, 6 Ann. Cas. 715; Beaudeau v. Cape Girardeau, 71 Mo. 392; Opinions of Judges, 45 N. H. 607; Iron Mountain Co. v. Haight, 39 Cal. 540; In re Senate Resolution, 9 Col. 632, 21 Pace. 475. But if the last day falls on Sun- day he may return the bill on Mon- day. In re Senate Resolution, 9 Colo. 632, 21 Pac. 475. Under the Constitution of Kansas which allows the governor ‘‘three days (Sundays excepted)”’ within which to return a bill, he has three full working days to consider and act upon a bill. State ex rel. Dawson v. Sessions, 84 Kan. 856, 115 Pac. 641, Ann. Cas. 1912 A, 796.CHAP. VI] OF THE ENACTMENT OF LAWS 321 proval of laws, the governor is a component part of the legislature, and that unless the Constitution allows further time for the purpose, he must exercise his power of approval before the two houses ad- journ, or his act will be void." Where a Constitution provides that a bill shall become a law, as if signed by the governor, if it is not returned by him within six days after it is pre- sented, Sundays excepted, the time during which the governor may con- sider a bill without its becoming a law is measured by calendar days. State ex rel. Crenshaw v. Joseph, 175 Ala. 579, 57 So. 942, Ann. Cas. 1914 D, 248. Under the Constitution of Connecti- cut which requires a bill to be returned by the governor within three days, Sundays excepted, after it has been presented to him, in order to prevent its becoming a law without his signature, the three days is not necessarily con- fined to the three secular days next after the presentation of the bill, but includes three days during each of which there is an opportunity to re- turn the bill to the house in which it originated, while such house is in actual session. State ex rel. Corbett v. South Norwalk, 77 Conn. 257, 58 Atl. 759. The five days allowed in New Hampshire for the governor to return bills which have not received his assent, include days on which the legislature is not in session, if it has not finally adjourned. Opinions of Judges, 45 N. H. 607. Neither house can, without the con- sent of the other, recall a bill after its transmission to the governor. People v. Devlin, 33 N. Y. 269. In Colorado the legislature may request the return of a bill in the governor’s hands, but he may respond or not as he likes. If he sends back the bill, it may be recon- sidered and amended. Re Recalling Bills, 9 Col. 630, 21 Pac. 474. But in Virginia no such recall is authorized. Wolfe v. McCaull, 76 Va. 876. In a West Virginia case, Smith v. Mitchell, 69 W. Va. 481, 72S. E. 755, Ann. Cas. 1913 B, 588, the court said: “After a bill has passed both branches (of the legislature) and gone to the governor for his action, it cannot be VOL. I—2] [Where a Constitution provides that reconsidered or recalled by the legis- lature, for the reason that it has ended its function and lost control and pos- session, Upon power to withdraw the bill from the governor before he has acted on it and before the expiration of the time given him in which to act upon it, see McKenzie v. Moore, 92 Ky. 216, 17S. W. 483, 14 L. R. A. 251, and note. The delivery of a bill passed by the two houses to the secretary of the Com- monwealth according to custom, is not a presentation to the governor for his approval, within the meaning of the constitutional clause which limits him to a certain number of days after the presentation of the bill to veto it. Opinions of the Justices, 99 Mass. 636. 1 Fowler v. Peirce, 2 Cal. 165. The court also held in this case that, not- withstanding an act purported to have been approved before the actual adjournment, it was competent to show by parol evidence that the actual approval was not until the next day. In support of this ruling, People v. Purdy, 2 Hill, 31, was cited, where it was held that the court might go behind the statute-book and inquire whether an act to which a two-thirds vote was essential had constitutionally passed. That, however, would not be in direct contradiction of the record, but it would be inquiring into a fact concerning which the statute was silent, and other records supplied the needed information. In Indiana it is held that the courts cannot look beyond the enrolled act to ascertain whether there has been compliance with the requirement of the Constitution that no bill shall be presented to the governor within two days next previous to the final adjourn- ment. Bender v. State, 53 Ind. 254. In Maryland a bill may be signed within six days after it is submitted, although the legislature may have adjourned. The bill may even be322 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I if any bill is not returned by the governor within a prescribed number of days after it is presented to him, it shall become a law as if he had signed it, unless the legislature, by its adjournment, prevents its return, the adjournment meant is a final adjournment and not a mere recess.‘] Under a provision of the Constitution of Minnesota, that the governor may approve and sign “within three days of the adjournment of the legislature any act passed during the last three days of the session ”’, it has been held that Sundays 2 were not to be included as a part of the prescribed time ;” and under the Constitution of New York, which provided that, “if any bill shall not be returned by the governor within ten days, Sundays excepted, after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a law, in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the legislature shall, by their adjournment, prevent its return, in which case it shall not be a law ”’, * it was held that the governor might sign a bill after the adjournment, at any time within the ten days. [Where presented after the adjournment. Lankford v. Somerset Co., 73 Md. 105, 20 Atl. 1017, 22 Atl. 412, 11 L. R. A. 491. See upon this question, paper of E. D. Renick and cases cited in it, 32 Am. Law Rev. 208. As to the power of the governor, de- rived from long usage, to approve and sign bills after the adjournment of the legislature, see Solomon v. Cartersville, 41 Ga. 157. If in approving a bill the governor signs in the wrong place, he may sign again after adjournment. Nat. Land and Loan Co. v. Mead, 60 Vt. 257, 14 Atl. 689. 1 State ex rel. Crenshaw v. Joseph, 175 Ala. 579, 57 So. 942, Ann. Cas. 1914 D, 248. 2Stinson v. Smith, 8 Minn. 366. See also Corwin v. Comptroller, 6 Rich. 390. The Constitution of Michigan con- tains a provision similar to that of Minnesota above quoted, except that it provides five days instead of three. Held, that such provision makes a signature good that is attached within the required ten days after passage of bill and not later than five days after adjournment. The question arose in regard to a bill passed less than ten days and more than five days before adjournment, and signed after adjourn- ment, but within ten days after passage of bill. Detroit v. Chapin, 108 Mich. 136, 66 N. W. 587, 37 L. R. A. 391; and upon right of executive to sign bills after adjournment of legislature, see note to this case in L. R. A. In Nevada, upon bills sent to him during last five days of session, gov- ernor may act within ten days after adjournment. State v. Howell, 26 Nev. 93, 64 Pac. 466. In South Carolina a bill sent to the governor on the last day of the first session may be signed by him on the first day of the next regular session, notwithstanding an adjourned session has intervened. Arnold v. McKellur, 98S. C. 335. In Mississippi if a bill is presented within ten days of the adjournment, it may be approved at any time before the third day of the next session. State v. Coahoma Co., 64 Miss. 358, 11 So. 501. 3 See McNeil v. Com., 12 Bush, 727. 4 People v. Bowen, 30 Barb. 24, and 21N.Y.517. See also State v. Fagan, 22 La. Ann. 545; Solomon v. Commis- sioners, 41 Ga. 157; Darling v. Boesch, 67 Iowa, 702, 25 N. W. 887; Seven Hickory v. Ellery, 103 U. S. 423, 26 L. ed. 435. It seems that in Nebraska, in a simi- lar provision, by ‘‘adjournment’’ is meant the final adjournment; and if the same session is adjourned for aCHAP. VI] OF THE ENACTMENT OF LAWS 323 the governor at the request of the legislature or of either house thereof has returned a bill before acting upon it, and the bill is again presented to him for his approval or rejection, he has the full period allowed by the Constitution for the return of bills to con- sider and act upon it." The governor’s approval is not complete until the bill has passed beyond his control by the constitutional and customary mode of legislation; and at any time prior to that he may reconsider and retract any approval previously made.” time —in this case two months the governor must act upon the bill within the specified number of days. Miller v. Hurford, 11 Neb. 377,9 N. W. 477. Where on the tenth day the governor sent a bill with his objections to the house with which it originated, but the messenger, finding the house had adjourned for the day, returned it to the governor, who retained it, it was held that to prevent the bill becoming a law it should have been left with the proper officer of the house instead of being retained by the governor. Har- pending v. Haight, 39 Cal. 189. In response to an unauthorized re- quest, the governor returned a bill without objections. The constitu- tion provided that a bill, if not re- turned in five days, became law with- out his signature. Held, that his return was not covered by the provision, and that the bill became a law notwith- standing. Wolfe v. McCaull, 76 Va. 876. 1State v. Sessions, 84 Kan. 856, 115 Pac. 641, Ann. Cas. 1912 A, 796. 2 People v. Hatch, 19 Ill. 283. An act apportioning the representatives was passed by the legislature and transmitted to the governor, who signed his approval thereon by mis- take, supposing at the time that he was subscribing one of several other bills then lying before him, and claiming his official attention; his private secretary thereupon reported the bill to the legislature as approved, not by the special direction of the governor, nor with his knowledge or special assent, but merely in his usual routine of cus- tomary duty, the governor not being conscious that he had placed his sig- nature to the bill until after informa- tion was brought to him of its having been reported approved; whereupon he sent a message to the speaker of the house to which it was reported, stating that it had been inadvertently signed and not approved, and on the same day completed a veto message of the bill, which was partially written at the time of signing his approval, and trans- mitted it to the house where the bill originated, having first erased his signature and approval. It was held that the bill had not become a law. It had never passed out of the gov- ernor’s possession after it was received by him until after he had erased his signature and approval; and the court was of opinion that it did not pass from his control until it had become a law by the lapse of ten days under the Constitution, or by his depositing it with his approval in the office of the secretary of State. It had long been the practice of the governor to report, formerly through the secretary of State, but recently through his private secretary, to the house where bills originated, his approval of them; but this was only a matter of formal cour- tesy, and not a proceeding necessary to the making or imparting vitality to the law. By it no act could become a law which without it would not be a law. Had the governor returned the bill itself to the house, with his message of approval, it would have passed be- yond his control, and the approval could not have been retracted, unless the bill had been withdrawn by con- sent of the house; and the same result would have followed his filing the bill with the secretary of state with his approval subscribed. also Alle- gany County v. Warfield, 100 Md. 516, 60 Atl. 599, 108 Am. St. Rep. 446. After the governor has delivered a bill to the secretary of state he has lost See324 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [voL. I His disapproval of a bill is communicated to the house in which it originated, with his reasons; and it is there reconsidered, and may be again passed over the veto by such vote as the Constitution pre- seribes.! [A constitutional provision requiring the governor, if he desires to effect the veto of a bill, to file the bill, with his objec- tions thereto, in the office of the secretary of State, within a pre- power of recall. People ». McCul- lough, 210 Ill. 488, 71 N. E. 602; Smith v. Mitchell, 69 W. Va. 481, 72 S. E. 755, Ann. Cas. 1913 B, 588. In Arkansas it has been held that the time allowed the governor for the consideration of bills is a matter of privilege, which he may waive; that he may at any time within the period allowed validly sign a bill or return it to the legislature with a communica- tion stating that it may become a law without his signature. Hunt v. State, 72 Ark. 241, 79 S. W. 769, 105 Am. St. Rep. 34, 65 L. R. A. 71, 2 Ann. Cas. 33; Powell v. Hays, 83 Ark. 448, 104 S. W. 177, 13 Ann. Cas. 220. And that when he signs a bill with the intent of approving it in the manner provided by the Constitution to make it effective, it becomes the law, and his approval cannot be revoked by him or his successor, though the bill remains in the governor’s office, and the time fixed by the Constitution for acting upon it has not expired. Powell v. Hays, 83 Ark. 448, 104 S. W. 177, 13 Ann. Cas. 220. The Constitution of Indiana pro- vides (art. 5, § 14) that, “if any bill shall not be returned by the governor within three days, Sundays excepted, after it shall have been presented to him, it shall be a law without his signature, unless the general adjourn- ment shall prevent its return; in which case it shall be a law unless the governor, within five days next after the adjournment, shall file such bill, with his objections thereto, in the office of the secretary of state”, &c. Under this provision it was held that where the governor, on the day of the final adjournment of the legislature, and after the adjournment, filed a bill received that day, in the office of the secretary of state, without approval or objections thereto, it thereby became a law, and he could not file objections afterwards. Tarlton v. Peggs, 18 Ind. 24, See State v. Whisner, 35 Kan. 271, 10 Pac. 852. 1A bill which, as approved and signed, differs in important particulars from the one signed, is no law. Jones v. Hutchinson, 43 Ala. 721. If the governor sends back a bill which has been submitted to him, stating that he cannot act upon it because of some supposed informality in its passage, this is in effect an objec- tion to the bill, and it can only become a law by further action of the legisla- ture, even though the governor may have been mistaken as to the supposed informality. Birdsall ». Carrick, 3 Nev. 154. If an act passed over a veto is duly authenticated otherwise, the absence of the governor’s signature will not vitiate it. Hovey v. State, 119 Ind. 395, 21 N. E. 21. In practice the veto power, although very great and exceedingly important in this country, is obsolete in Great Britain, and no king now ventures to resort to it. As the Ministry must at all times be in accord with the House of Commons, — except where the responsibility is taken of dissolving the Parliament and appealing to the people, — it must follow that any bill which the two houses have passed must be approved by the monarch. The approval has become a matter of course, and the governing power in Great Britain is substantially in the House of Commons. 1 Bl. Com. 184— 185, and notes. After the bill has been vetoed it is dead unless repassed by the consti- tutional majorities, even though it re- ceived those majorities on its first passage. State v. Crounse, 36 Neb. 835, 55 N. W. 246, 20 L. R. A. 265.CHAP. VI] OF THE ENACTMENT 32 OF LAWS scribed period after the adjournment of the legislature, is man- datory, in respect to both the time and the manner of exercising the power.’| Other Powers of the Governor. The power of the governor as a branch of the legislative depart- ment is almost exclusively confined to the approval of bills. As executive, he communicates to the two houses information concern- ing the condition of the State, and may recommend measures to their consideration, but he cannot originate or introduce bills. He may convene the legislature in extra session whenever extraordinary occasion seems to have arisen; but their powers when convened are not confined to a consideration of the subjects to which their attention is called by his proclamation or his message, and they may legislate on any subject as at the regular sessions.* An exception to this statement exists in those States where, by the express terms of the Constitution, it is provided that when convened in extra ses- sion the legislature shall consider no subject except that for which they were specially called together, or which may have been sub- mitted to them by special message of the governor.* (Such a re- quirement is mandatory, and limits the power of the legislature to 1 Capito v. Topping, 65 W. Va. 587, 64S. E. 845, 22 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 1089. In computing the period after ad- journment allowed by the Constitu- tion for the exercise of the power of executive disapproval, a Sunday occur- ring within the period is to be excluded. Capito v. Topping, 65 W. Va. 587, 64 S. E. 845, 22 L. R. A. (nN. 8.) 1089. 2 Long v. State, 58 Tex. Crim. Rep. 209, 127 S. W. 208, 21 Ann. Cas. 405; State v. Fair, 35 Wash. 127, 76 Pac. 731, 102 Am. St. Rep. 897. The Constitution of Iowa, art. 4, § 11, provides that the governor ‘“‘may, on extraordinary occasions, convene the General Assembly by proclama- tion, and shall state to both houses, when assembled, the purpose for which they have been convened.” It was held in Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa, 82, that the General Assembly, when thus convened, were not confined in their legislation to the purposes specified in the message. ‘When lawfully con- vened, whether in virtue of the provi- sion in the Constitution or the governor’s proclamation, it is the ‘General Assembly’ of the State, in which the full and exclusive legislative authority of the State is vested. Where its business at such session is not restricted by some constitutional provision, the General Assembly may enact any law at a special or extra session that it might at a regular ses- sion. Its powers, not being derived from the governor’s proclamation, are not confined to the special purpose for which it may have been convened by him.” The Constitution of Washington, Art. 3, § 7, authorizing the governor to call an extra session of the legisla- ture for a particular purpose, which shall be stated in the call, does not re- strict legislative action at such session to that purpose, nor has the governor power to do so. State v. Fair, 35 Wash. 127, 76 Pac. 731, 102 Am. St. Rep. 897. 8 Provisions to this effect will be found in the Constitutions of Illinois, Michigan, Missouri, and Nevada; perhaps in some others.326 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I the enactment of such laws as relate to the object stated in the governor’s proclamation or message.! But the limitation should be strictly construed, and should not be given effect as against the general power of the legislature, unless it clearly inhibits the act in question.?| When Acts are to take Effect. The old rule was that statutes, unless otherwise ordered, took effect from the first day of the session on which they were passed ; 3 but this rule was purely arbitrary, based upon no good reason, and frequently working very serious injustice. The present rule is that an act takes effect from the time when the formalities of enact- ment are actually complete under the Constitution, unless it is otherwise ordered, or unless there is some constitutional or statutory rule on the subject which prescribes otherwise.‘ 1McClintock v. Phoenix, 24 Ariz. 155, 207 Pac. 611; Jones v. State, 154 Ark. 288, 242 S. W. 377; Jones v. State, 151 Ga. 502, 107 S. E. 765; Wells v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 110 Mo. 286, 19 S. W. 530, 15 L. R. A. 847: Long v. State, 58 Tex. Crim. Rep. 209, 127 S. W. 208, 21 Ann. Cas. 405. As to what matters are held em- braced in the governor’s proclamation or message, see State v. Shores, 31 W. Va. 491, 7S. E. 413; Baldwin »v. State, 21 Tex. App. 591, 3S. W. 109; Wells v. Mo. Pac. R. Co., 110 Mo. 286, 19'S: W. 530; 15 L. R. A. 847: Chi- cago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Wolfe, 61 Neb. 502, 86 N. W. 441; People v. Curry, 130 Cal. 82, 62 Pac. 516; McClintock v. Phoenix, 24 Ariz. 155, 207 Pac. 611; Jones v. State, 154 Ark. 288, 242 S. W. 377; Jones v. State, 151 Ga. 502, 107 S. E. 765; State v. Woolen, 128 Tenn. 456, 161 S. W. 1006, Ann. Cas. 1915 C, 465; Long v. State, 58 Tex. Crim. Rep. 209, 127 S. W. 208, 21 Ann. Cas. 405. ? State v. Woolen, 128 Tenn. 456, 161 S. W. 1006, Ann. Cas. 1915 GC, 465; Long v. State, 58 Tex. Crim. Rep. 209, 127 S. W. 208, 21 Ann. Cas. 405. Confirmation of appointment by the Senate may be made. The limitation is upon legislation. People v. Bland- ing, 63 Cal. 333. °1 Lev. 91; Latless v. Holmes, 4 T. R. 660; Smith ». Smith, Mart. By the Constitu- (N. C.) 26; Hamlet v. Taylor, 5 Jones L. 36; Floyd County v. Salmon, 151 Ga. 313, 106 S. E. 280; Butts County v. Strahan, 151 Ga. 417, 107 S. BE. 163; Duffy v. Cook, 239 Pa. St. 427, 86 Atl. 1076, Ann. Cas. 1915 A, 550. This is changed by 33 Geo. III. ec. 13, by which statutes since passed take effect from the day when they receive the royal assent, unless otherwise ordered therein. 4 Matthews v. Zane, 7 Wheat. 164, 5 L. ed. 425; Rathbone v. Bradford, 1 Ala. 312; Branch Bank of Mobile »v. Murphy, 8 Ala. 119; Heard v. Heard, 8 Ga. 380; Goodsell v. Boynton, 2 Il. 555; Dyer v. State, Meigs, 237; Parkinson v. State, 14 Md. 184; Free- man v. Gaither, 76 Ga. 741; Gay v. Engelbretson, 158 Cal. 21, 109 Pac. 876, 1389 Am. St. Rep. 67. An early Virginia case decides that “from and after the passing of this act”’ would exclude the day on which it was passed. King v. Moore, Jefferson, 9. Same ruling in Parkinson v. Bran- denberg, 35 Minn. 294, 28 N. W. 919. On the other hand, it is held in some cases that a statute which takes effect from and after its passage, has rela- tion to the first moment of that day. In re Welman, 20 Vt. 653; Mallory v. Hiles, 4 Met. (Ky.) 53; Wood »v. Fort, 42 Ala. 641; Hill v. State, 5 Lea, 725. In a North Carolina case it was said : “While a court will hear evidence andCHAP. VI] OF THE ENACTMENT OF LAWS 327 tion of Mississippi,! “no law of a general nature, unless otherwise provided, shall be enforced until sixty days after the passage thereof.”’ By the Constitution of Illinois,? no act of the General Assembly shall take effect until the first day of July next after its passage, un- less in case of emergency (which emergency shall be expressed in the preamble or body of the act) the General Assembly shall, by a vote of two-thirds of all the members elected to each house, other- wise direct. By the Constitution of Michigan,’ no public act shall take effect, or be in force, until the expiration of ninety days from the end of the session at which the same is passed, unless the legis- lature shall otherwise direct by a two-thirds vote of the members elected to each house. These and similar provisions are designed to secure, as far as possible, the public promulgation of the law before parties are bound to take notice of and act under it, and to obviate the injustice of a rule which should compel parties at their peril to know and obey a law of which, in the nature of things, they could not possibly have heard; they give to all parties the full constitutional period in which to become acquainted with the terms of the statutes which are passed, except when the legislature has otherwise directed ; and no one is bound to govern his conduct by determine the precise moment of time “The general rule followed in the when a statute was enacted, whenever this becomes necessary to prevent a wrong or to assert a meritorious right, in the absence of any such evidence or means of proof the statute will be held effective from the first moment of the day of its enactment.’’ Lloyd »v. North Carolina R. Co., 151 N. C. 536, 66 S. E. 604, 45 L. R. A. (w. 8.) 378. See also Arnold v. United States, 9 Cranch, 104, 3 L. ed. 671; Lapeyre »v. United States, 17 Wall. 191, 21 L. ed. 606; Kennedy v. Palmer, 6 Gray, 316; United States v. Norton, 97 U. S. 164, 24 L. ed. 907; Burgess v. Salmon, 97 U.S. 381, 24 L. ed. 1104; Louisville v. Savings Bank, 104 U. S. 469, 26 L. ed. 775; Arrow v. Hamering, 39 Ohio St. 573. Other cases hold that a statute which takes effect from and after its passage has effect from the moment of its approval by the governor. People v. Clark, 1 Cal. 406. See Jn re Wynne, Chase Dec. 227. An act of the legislature takes effect when the governor signs it, unless the Constitution contains some different provision. Hill v. State, 5 Lea, 725. United States is that, in the absence of constitutional or general statutory provision governing the matter, the statute becomes effective on the day of its passage; that is to say, on the day of its approval by the chief execu- tive, or its passage over his veto, or by his nonaction within the time speci- fied in the Constitution for the return of the bill to the legislature, unless the time for the going into effect of the statute is fixed by the statute itself. It is elementary that the statute itself may fix the day or time when it shall take effect.’ Floyd County v. Sal- mon, 151 Ga. 313, 106 S. E. 280; Butts County v. Strahan, 151 Ga. 417, 107 S. E. 163. 1 Art. 7, §6. See State v. Coahoma Co., 64 Miss. 358. 2 Art. 3, § 23. The intention that an act shall take effect sooner must be expressed clearly and unequivocally; it is not to be gathered by intendment and inference. Wheeler v. Chubbuck, 16 Ill. 361. See Hendrickson v. Hen- drickson, 7 Ind. 13. 3 Art. 4, § 20.328 the new law until that period has elapsed." CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [voL. I And the fact that, by the terms of the statute, something is to be done under it before the expiration of the constitutional period for it to take effect, will not amount to a legislative direction that the act shall take effect at that time, if the act itself is silent as to the period when it shall go into operation.? [A statute providing that it shall take effect from and after a day named takes effect on the day following the day named.}] Constitution of Indiana provides‘ that The no act shall take effect io until the same shall have been published and circulated in the several counties of this State, by authority, except in case of emer- gency; which emergency shall be declared in the preamble, or in the body of the law.” Unless the emergency is thus declared, it is plain that the act cannot take earlier effect.® not inquire too nicely into the mode of publication. But the courts will If the laws are distributed in bound volumes, in a manner and shape not sub- stantially contrary to the statute on that subject, and by the proper 1 Price v. Hopkin, 13 Mich. 318. A provision that ‘‘subsequent to the passage of this act’’ the law should be as declared, does not come into force till after ninety days. Andrews »v. St. Louis Tunnel Co., 16 Mo. App. 299. See, however, Smith v. Morrison, 22 Pick. 430; Stine v. Bennett, 13 Minn. 153. Compare State v. Bond, 4 Jones (N. C.), 9. ?Supervisors of Iroquois Co. »v. Keady, 34 Ill. 293. An act for the removal of a county seat provided for taking the vote of the electors of the county upon it on the 17th of March, 1863, at which time the legislature had not adjourned. It was not expressly declared in the act at what time it should take effect, and it was therefore held that it would not take effect until sixty days from the end of the session, and a vote of the electors taken on the 17th of March was void. See also Rice v. Ruddiman, 10 Mich. 125; Rogers v. Vass, 6 Iowa, 405. And it was also held in the case first named, and in Wheeler v. Chubbuck, 16 II. 361, that ‘the direction must be made in a clear, distinct, and unequivocal provision, and could not be helped out by any sort of intendment or implica- tion’’, and that the act must all take effect at once, and not by piccemeal. 3 State ex rel. Harness v. Roney, 82 Ohio St. 376, 92 N. E. 486, 19 Ann. Cas. 918. See also Floyd County ». Salmon, 151 Ga. 313, 106 S. E. 280. 4 Art. 4, § 28. 5 Carpenter v. Montgomery, 7 Blackf. 415; Hendrickson v. Hendrick- son, 7 Ind. 13; Mark v. State, 15 Ind. 98; State v. Williams, 173 Ind. 414, 90 N. E. 754, 140 Am. St. Rep. 261, 21 Ann. Cas. 986. The legislature must necessarily in these cases be judge of the existence of the emergency. Car- penter v. Montgomery, supra. The Constitution of Tennessee pro- vides that ‘No law of a general nature shall take effect until forty days after its passage, unless the same, or the caption, shall state that the public welfare requires that it should take effect sooner.’’ Art. 1, § 20. Where a law has failed to take effect for want of publication, all parties are chargeable with notice of that fact. Clark v. Janesville, 10 Wis. 136. Where an act is by its express terms to take effect after publication in a specified newspaper, every one is bound to take notice of this fact; and if before such publication nego- tiable paper is issued under it, the purchasers of such paper can acquire no rights thereby. McClure v. Ox- ford, 94 U. S. 429, 24 L. ed. 129; fol- lowing George v. Oxford, 16 Kan. 72.CHAP. VI] OF THE ENACTMENT OF LAWS 329 authority, it will be held sufficient, notwithstanding a failure to comply with some of the directory provisions of the statute on the subject of publication. The Constitution of Wisconsin, on the other hand, provides ? that “no general law shall be in force until published ”’; thus leaving the time when it should take effect to depend, not alone upon the legislative direction, but upon the fur- ther fact of publication. But what shall be the mode of publica- tion seems to be left to the legislative determination. It has been held, however, that a general law was to be regarded as published although printed in the volume of private laws, instead of the volume of public laws, as the statute of the State would require® But an unauthorized publication — as, for example, of an act for the in- corporation of a city, in two local papers instead of the State paper — is no publication in the constitutional sense.* The Constitution of Louisiana provides that “No law passed by the General Assembly, except the general appropriation act, or act appropriating money for the expenses of the General Assembly, shall take effect until pro- mulgated. A law shall be considered promulgated at the place where the State journal is published, the day after the publication of such law in the State journal, and in all other parts of the State twenty days after such publication.” Under similar provisions in the Civil Code, before the adoption of this Constitution, it was held that “the promulgation of laws is an executive function. The mode of promulgation may be prescribed by the legislature, and differs in different countries and at different times. . . . Promul- gation is the extrinsic act which gives a law, perfect in itself, exec- utory force. Unless the law prescribes that it shall be executory from its passage, or from a certain date, it is presumed to be execu- tory only from its promulgation.” ® But it is competent for the legislature to provide in an act that it shall take effect from and after its passage; and the act will have operation accordingly, though not published in the official gazette.© In Pennsylvania, 1State v. Bailey, 16 Ind. 46. See a railroad. Clark v. Janesville, 10 further, as to this constitutional pro- Wis. 136. And see Scott v. Clark, 1 vision, Jones v. Cavins, 4 Ind. 305. Iowa, 70. STATE. 5 S21 An inaccuracy in the publication of 3 Matter of Boyle, 9 Wis. 264. a statute, which does not change its Under this provision it has been substance or legal effect, will not decided that a law establishing a mu- invalidate the publication. Smith »v. nicipal court in a city is a general law. Hoyt, 14 Wis. 252. Matter of Boyle, supra. See Eitel v. 4Clark v. Janesville, 10 Wis. 136. State, 33 Ind. 201. Also a statute for See, further, Mills v. Jefferson, 20 the removal of a county seat. State Wis. 50. v. Lean, 9 Wis. 279. Also a statute 5 State v. Ellis, 17 La. Ann. 390, 392. incorporating a municipality, or 6 State v. Judge, 14 La. Ann. 486; authorizing it to issue bonds in aid of Thomas ». Scott, 23 La. Ann. 689.330 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I whose Constitution then in force also failed to require publication of laws, the publication was nevertheless held to be necessary be- fore the act could come into operation; but as the doings of the legislature were public, and the journals published regularly, it was held that every enactment must be deemed to be published in the sense necessary, and the neglect to publish one in the pamphlet edition of the laws would not destroy its validity. The Constitution of Iowa provides that “no law of the General Assembly, passed at a regular session, of a public nature, shall take effect until the fourth day of July next after the passage thereof. Laws passed at a special session shall take effect ninety days after the adjournment of the General Assembly by which they were passed. If the General Assembly shall deem any law of immediate importance, they may provide that the same shall take effect by publication in newspapers in the State.”’2 Under this section it is not competent for the legislature to confer upon the governor the discretionary power which the Constitution gives to that body, to fix an earlier day for the law to take effect.3 [The mere commencement of a suit to determine the constitution- ality of a statute will not preclude it from going into effect at the time fixed by the Constitution, and this is so whether it has or has not an emergency clause.* Where a State Constitution reserves to the people the initiative power, a law proposed by the initiative will become effective upon the date of its approval by the people, if the Constitution does not otherwise provide, and the legislature is powerless to postpone the time of its taking effect.® Though repealing and saving clauses are expressed in the present tense they will take effect at the same time as the rest of the act.6 Where a Constitution prescribes the time when statutes shall go into effect, a statute is not invalid as a whole because it contains an invalid emergency clause putting it into immediate effect. In such case the statute will go into effect at the time fixed by the Constitution.” The declaration in a statute In Maryland a similar conclusion is reached. Parkinson v. State, 14 Md. 184, 1 Peterman v. Huling, 31 Pa. St. 432. A joint resolution of a general nature requires the same publication as any other law. State v. School Board Fund, 4 Kan. 261. 2 Art. 3, § 26. 17 Iowa, 313. ‘Scott v. Clark, 1 Iowa, 70; Pilkey v. Gleason, 1 Iowa, 522. See Hunt v. Murray, ‘State v. Whisman, 36 S. D. 260, 154 N. W. 707, L. R. A. 1917 B, 1. * Bradley v. Union Bridge, etc., Co., 185 Fed. 544. ®State v. Williams, 173 Ind. 414, 90 N. E. 754, 140 Am. St. Rep. 261, 21 Ann. Cas. 986. ’ State ex rel. Richards v. Whisman, 36 S. D. 260, 154 N. W. 707, L. R.A. 1917 B, 1. An act which merely provides “this act shall take effect on and after itsCHAP. VI] OF THE ENACTMENT OF LAWS 331 of immediate emergency existing at the date of its enactment, fol- lowed by a provision that it shall take effect thirty days thereafter, is not such a contradiction in terms as to make invalid the emergency provision.’ passage and approval’”’ does not ex- press an emergency under the con- stitutional requirement that an emergency shall be expressed in the preamble or body of an act, and the act will take effect at the time pre- scribed by the Constitution. State v. Pacific Express Co., 80 Neb. 823, 115 N. W. 619, 18 L. R. A. (wv. 8.) 664. See also Graham v. Dye, 308 Ill. 283, 139 N. E. 390; Payne v. Graham, 118 Me. 251, 107 Atl. 709, 7 A. L. R. 516. 1State ex rel. Case v. Howell, 85 Wash. 294, 147 Pac. 1159, Ann. Cas. 1916 A, 1231.CHAPTER VII OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH A LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT MAY BE DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In the preceding chapters we have examined somewhat briefly the legislative power of the State, and the bounds which expressly or by implication are set to it, and also some of the conditions necessary to its proper and valid exercise. In so doing it has been made apparent that, under some circumstances, it may become the duty of the courts to declare that what the legislature has assumed to enact is void, either from want of constitutional power to enact it, or because the constitutional forms or conditions have not been observed. In the further examination of our subject, it will be important to consider what the circumstances are under which the courts will feel impelled to exercise this high prerogative, and what precautions should be observed before assuming to do so.! It must be evident to any one that the power to declare a legis- lative enactment void is one which the judge, conscious of the falli- bility of the human judgment, will shrink from exercising in any case where he can conscientiously and with due regard to duty and official oath decline the responsibility. The legislative and judicial are co-ordinate departments of the government, of equal dignity ; each is alike supreme in the exercise of its proper functions, and cannot directly or indirectly, while acting within the limits of its authority, be subjected to the control or supervision of the other, without an unwarrantable assumption by that other of power which, by the Constitution, is not conferred upon it. The Constitution apportions the powers of government, but it does not make any one of the three departments subordinate to another, when exercising the 1 For a very learned discussion of the origin and scope of the American doc- trine of constitutional law treating of the power of the courts to declare the October, 1893, number of the “Harvard Law Review.” 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129. Other views of this sub- ject are presented by Mr. Richard C. statutes void because in conflict with the constitution, see a paper by the late Professor James B. Thayer read before the Congress on Jurisprudence and Law Reform, and published in 332 o McMurtrie in 33 Am. Law Register (N. 8.) 506; by Governor Pennoyer in 28 Am. Law Review, 550 and 856, and by Mr. Allen in the same volume at page 847.CHAP. vil] DECLARING LEGISLATIVE ACTS UNCONSTITUTIONAL trust committed to it.’ 333 The courts may declare legislative enact- ments unconstitutional and void in some cases, but not because the judicial power is superior in degree or dignity to the legislative. Being required to declare what the law is in the cases which come before them, they must enforce the Constitution as the paramount law, whenever a legislative enactment comes in conflict with it.? But the courts sit, not to review or revise the legislative action, but 1Bates v. Kimball, 2 Chip. 77; Bailey v. Philadelphia, &c. R. R. Co., 4 Harr. 389; Whittington v. Polk, 1H. & J. 236; Hawkins v. Governor, 1 Ark. 570; People v. Governor, 29 Mich. 320, 18 Am. Rep. 89. 2 Rice v. State, 7 Ind. 332; Blood- good v. Mohawk & Hudson Railroad Co., 18 Wend. 9; Mulnix v. Mutual Ben. L. Ins. Co., 23 Col. 71, 46 Pac. 123, 33 L. R. A. 827; Adkins »v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U. 8. 525, 67 L. ed. 785, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 394, 24 A. L. R. 1238; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Gildersleeve, 219 Mo. 170, 118 S. W. 86, 16 Ann. Cas. 749; Tuberculosis Hospital Dist. v. Peter, 253 Mo. 520, 161 S. W. 1155, Ann. Cas. 1915 C, 310; State v. Taylor, 33 N. D. 76, 156 N. W. 561, L. R. A. 1918 B, 156, Ann. Cas. 1918 A, 583; Rio Grande Lumber Co. v. Darke, 50 Utah, 114, 167 Pac. 241, L. Re Ac 1918 A, 1193. In Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 67 L. ed. 785, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 394, 24 A. L. R. 1238, the court said: “This court by an un- broken line of decisions from Chief Justice Marshall to the present day, has steadily adhered to the rule that every possible presumption is in favor of the validity of an act of Con- gress until overcome beyond rational doubt. But if, by clear and in- dubitable demonstration, a statute be opposed to the Constitution, we have no choice but to say so. The Con- stitution, by its own terms, is the supreme law of the land, emanating from the people, the repository of ultimate sovereignty under our form of government. A congressional stat- ute, on the other hand, is the act of an agency of this sovereign author- ity, and, if it conflict with the Con- stitution, must fall; for that which is not supreme must yield to that which is. To hold it invalid (if it be invalid) is a plain exercise of the judicial power, — that power vested in courts to enable them to administer justice according to law. From the authority to ascertain and determine the law in a given case there neces- sarily results, in case of conflict, the duty to declare and enforce the rule of the supreme law and reject that of an inferior act of legislation which, transcending the Constitution, is of no effect, and binding on no one. This is not the exercise of a substan- tive power to review and nullify acts of Congress, for no such substantive power exists. It is simply a neces- sary concomitant of the power to hear and dispose of a case or contro- versy properly before the court, to the determination of which must be brought the test and measure of the law.” A trial judge in a State court is bound by the mandate of the Federal Constitution to apply that instrument upon all proper occasions and to hold it to be the supreme law of the land, anything in the Constitution or laws of the State to the contrary notwith- standing. People v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 70 Colo. 90, 198 Pac. 146, 15 A. L. R. 326; People v. Max, 70 Colo. 100, 198 Pac. 150. A provision of a State Constitution declaring that decisions of the court of last resort of the State upon constitu- tional questions may be reviewed by popular vote of the citizens of the State or of one of its municipalities, is void, so far as it relates to decisions upon Federal constitutional questions. People v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 70 Colo. 90, 198 Pac. 146, 15 A. L. R. 326.334 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I to enforce the legislative will; and it is only where they find that the legislature has failed to keep within its constitutional limits, that they are at liberty to disregard its action; and in doing so, they only do what every private citizen may do in respect to the mandates of the courts when the judges assume to act and to render judg- ments or decrees without jurisdiction. “In exercising this high authority, the judges claim no judicial supremacy; they are only the administrators of the public will. If an act of the legislature is held void, it is not because the judges have any control over the legislative power, but because the act is forbidden by the Con- stitution, and because the will of the people, which is therein de- clared, is paramount to that of their representatives expressed in any law.” } Nevertheless, in declaring a law unconstitutional, a court must necessarily cover the same ground which has already been covered by the legislative department in deciding upon the propriety of enact- ing the law, and they must indirectly overrule the decision of that co-ordinate department. The task is therefore a delicate one, and only to be entered upon with reluctance and hesitation.2 It is a solemn act in any case to declare that that body of men to whom the people have committed the sovereign function of making the laws for the commonwealth have deliberately disregarded the limi- tations imposed upon this delegated authority, and usurped power which the people have been careful to withhold; and it is almost equally so when the act which is adjudged to be unconstitutional appears to be chargeable rather to careless and improvident action, or error in judgment, than to intentional disregard of obligation. But the duty to do this in a proper case, though at one time doubted, and by some persons persistently denied, it is now generally agreed that the courts cannot properly decline,’ and in its performance 1 Lindsay v. Commissioners, &c., 2 Bay, 38, 61; People v. Rucker, 5 Col. 5; Russ v. Com., 210 Pa. St. 544, 60 Atl. 169, 1 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 409, 105 Am. St. Rep. 825. ? Jacksonville v. Bowden, 67 Fla. 181, 64 So. 769, L. R. A. 1916 D, 913, Ann. Cas. 1915 D, 99; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. State, 135 Ga. 545, 69 S. E. 725, 32 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 20; Laughlin v. Portland, 111 Me. 486, 90 Atl. 318, 51 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 1143, Ann. Cas. 1916 C, 734; Mt. Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Frankfort Marine, etc., Ins. Co., 111 Md. 561, 75 Atl. 105, 134 Am. St. Rep. 636; Fenster- wald v. Burk, 129 Md. 131, 98 Atl. 358, 3 A. L. R. 1562; Tuberculosis Hospital Dist. v. Peter, 253 Mo. 520, 161 S. W. 1155, Ann. Cas. 1915 C, 310; People v. Beakes Dairy Co., 222 N. Y. 416, 119UNS e115) (3A. Re 1260 State v. Wetz, 40 N. D. 299, 168 N. W. 835, 5 A. L. R. 731; Rio Grande Lumber Co. v. Darke, 50 Utah, 114, 167 Pac. 241, L. R. A. 1918 A, 1193; Willis v. Kalmbach, 109 Va. 475, 64 S. EH. 342, 21 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 1009; Booten v. Pinson, 77 W. Va. 412, 89 S. BE. 985, L. R. A. 1917 A, 1244. ’ Champion v. Ames, 188 U. S. 321, 47 L. ed. 492, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 321;CHAP. VII] DECLARING LEGISLATIVE ACTS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 335 they seldom fail of proper support if they proceed with due caution and circumspection, and under a proper sense as well of their own responsibility, as of the respect due to the action and judgment of the law-makers.! I. In view of the considerations which have been suggested, the rule which is adopted by some courts, that they will not decide a Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U. S. 226, L. ed. 417, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 25 State v. Joseph, 175 Ala. 519, 57 So. 942, Ann. Cas. 1914 D, 248; People v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 70 Colo. 90, 198 Pac. 146, 15 A. L. R. 326; Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Simon, 56 Fla. 545, 47 So. 1001, 16 Ann. Cas. 1234, 20 L. R. A. (N. s.) 126; Davis v. Florida Power Co., 64 Fla. 246, 60 So. 759, Ann. Cas. 1914 B, 965; Jacksonville v. Bowden, 67 Fla. 181, 64 So. 769, L. R. A. 1916 D, 913, Ann. Cas. 1915 D, 99; State »v. Philips, 70 Fla. 340, 70 So. 376, Ann. Cas. 1918 A, 138; Wilkerson v. Rome, 152 Ga. 762, 110 S. E. 895, 20 A. L. R. 1334; People v. Wm. Henning Co., 260 Til. 554, 103 N. E. 530, 49 L. R. A. (n. s.) 1206; Scown v. Czarnecki, 264 Ill. 305, 106 N. E. 276, L. R. A. 1915 B, 247, Ann. Cas. 1915 A, 772; People v. Love, 298 Ill. 304, 131 N. E. 809, 16 A. L. R. 703; McGuire v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 131 Iowa, 340, 108 N. W. 902, 33 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 706; Salisbury Land & Imp. Co. v. Com., 215 Mass. 371, 102 N. E. 619, 46 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1196; State v. Houghton, 134 Minn. 226, 158 N. W. 1017, L. R. A. 1917 F, 1050; Shohoney v. Quincy, etc. R. Co., 231 Mo. 131, 132 S. W. 1059, Ann. Cas. 1912 A, 1148; State »v. Williams, 146 N. C. 618, 61S. E. 61, 17 L. RB. A. (Nn. 8.) 299, 14 Ann. Cas. 562; Bickett v. Knight, 169 N.C: 333, 85S. E. 418, L. R. A. 1915 F, 898, Ann. Cas. 1917 D, 517; Cass County v. Nixon, 35 N. D. 601, 161 N. W. 204, L. R. A. 1917 C, 897; State v. Miller, 87 Ohio St. 12, 99 N. E. 1078, 441. R. A. (Nn. 8.) 712, Ann. Cas. 1913 E, 761; St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. v. Griffin, 106 Tex. 477, 171 S. W. 703, L. R. A. 1917 B, 1108; State v. Howell, 85 Wash. 294, 147 Pac. 1159, Ann. Cas. 1916 A, 1231; Bonnett ». Vallier, 136 Wis. 193, 116 N. W. 885, 48 7 128 Am. St. Rep. 1061, 17 L. R. A. (nx. s.) 486; Thoe v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 181 Wis. 456, 195 N. W. 407, 29 A. L. R. 1280. 1There are at least two cases in American judicial history where judges have been impeached as criminals for refusing to enforce unconstitutional enactments. One of these — the case of Trevett v. Weedon, decided by the Superior Court of Rhode Island in 1786 — is particularly interesting as being the first well-authenticated case in which a legislative enactment was held to be void because of conflict with the State constitution. Mr. Arnold, in his history of Rhode Island, Vol. II. c. 24, gives an account of this case; and the printed brief in opposition to the law, and in defence of the im- peached judges, is in possession of the present writer. The act in question was one which imposed a heavy penalty on any one who should refuse to re- ceive on the same terms as specie the bills of a bank chartered by the State, or who should in any way discourage the circulation of such bills. The penalty was made collectible on sum- mary conviction, without jury trial; and the act was held void on the ground that jury trial was expressly given by the colonial charter, which then constituted the constitution of the State. Although the judges were not removed on impeachment, the legislature refused to re-elect them when their terms expired at the end of the year, and supplanted them by more pliant tools, by whose assistance the paper money was forced into circula- tion, and public and private debts extinguished by means of it. Con- cerning the other case, we copy from the Western Law Monthly, “Sketch of Hon. Calvin Pease”’, Vol. V. p. 3, June, 1863: ‘The first session of the Supreme Court fof Ohio] under the336 constitution was held at Warren, Trumbull County, on the first Tuesday of June, 1803. The State was divided into three circuits. ... The Third Circuit of the State was composed of the counties of Washington, Belmont, Jefferson, Columbiana, and Trumbull. At this session of the legislature, Mr. Pease was appointed President Judge of the Third Circuit in April, 1808, and though nearly twenty-seven years old, he was very youthful in his ap- pearance. He held the office until March 4, 1810, when he sent his resig- nation to Governor Huntingdon. . . . During his term of service upon the bench many interesting questions were presented for decision, and among them the constitutionality of some por- tion of the act of 1805, defining the duties of justices of the peace; and he decided that so much of the fifth section as gave justices of the peace jurisdiction exceeding $20, and so much of the twenty-ninth section as prevented plaintiffs from recovering costs in actions commenced by orig- inal writs in the Court of Common Pleas, for sums between $20 and $50, were repugnant to the Constitution of the United States and of the State of Ohio, and therefore nulland void. .. . The clamor and abuse to which this decision gave rise was not in the least mitigated or diminished by the cir- cumstance that it was concurred in by a majority of the judges of the Supreme Court, Messrs. Huntingdon and Tod. At the session of the legislature of 1807-8, steps were taken to impeach him and the judges of the Supreme Court who concurred with him; but the resolutions introduced into the House were not acted upon during the session. But the scheme was not abandoned. At an early day of the next session, and with almost indecent haste, a committee was appointed to inquire into the conduct of the offend- ing judges, and with leave to exhibit articles of impeachment, or report otherwise, as the facts might justify. The committee without delay re- ported articles of impeachment against Messrs. Pease and Tod, but not against Huntingdon, who in the mean time had been elected governor of the State. .. . CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I The articles of impeachment were pre- ferred by the House of Representa- tives on the 23d day of December, 1808. He was summoned at once to appear before the senate as a high court of impeachment, and he promptly obeyed the summons. The managers of the prosecution on the part of the House were Thomas Morris, afterwards senator in Congress from Ohio, Joseph Sharp, James Pritchard, Samuel Marrett, and Othniel Tooker. : Several days were consumed in the investigation, but the trial resulted in the acquittal of the respondent.” Sketch of Hon. George Tod, August number of same volume: “At the session of the legislature of 1808-9, he was impeached for concurring in de- cisions made by Judge Pease, in the counties of Trumbull and Jefferson, that certain provisions of the act of the legislature, passed in 1805, de- fining the duties of justices of the peace, were in conflict with the Con- stitution of the United States and of the State of Ohio, and therefore void. These decisions of the courts of Com- mon Pleas and of the Supreme Court, it was insisted, were not only an assault upon the wisdom and dignity, but also upon the supremacy of the legislature, which passed the act in question. This could not be endured; and the popular fury against the judges rose to a very high pitch, and the senator from the county of Trumbull in the legislature at that time, Calvin Cone, Esq., took no pains to soothe the offended dignity of the members of that body, or their sympathizing constituents, but pressed a contrary line of conduct. The judges must be brought to justice, he insisted vehe- mently, and be punished, so that others might be terrified by the example, and deterred from committing similar offences in the future. The charges against Mr. Tod were substantially the same as those against Mr. Pease. Mr. Tod was first tried, and acquitted. The managers of the impeachment, as well as the result, were the same in both cases.” In State ex rel. Nuveen ». Greer, 88 Fla. 249, 102 So. 739, 37 A. L. R. 1298, the court said: “Where, in adjudicat-CHAP. VII] DECLARING LEGISLATIVE ACTS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 337 legislative act to be unconstitutional by a majority of a bare quorum of the judges only, — less than a majority of all, — but will instead postpone the argument until the bench is full, seems a very prudent and proper precaution to be observed before entering upon questions so delicate and so important. The benefit of the wisdom and de- liberation of every judge ought to be had under circumstances so grave. Something more than private rights are involved; the fundamental law of the State is in question, as well as the correct- ness of legislative action; and considerations of courtesy, as well as the importance of the question involved, should lead the court to decline to act at all, where they cannot sustain the legislative action, until a full bench has been consulted, and its deliberate opinion 1s found to be against it. But this is a rule of propriety, not of con- stitutional obligation ; and though generally adopted and observed, each court will regulate, in its own discretion, its practice in this particular.’ ing litigated rights under a statute, it appears beyond all reasonable doubt that the statute is in conflict with some express or implied provision of the Constitution, it is then within the power and duty of the court, in order to give effect to the controlling law, to adjudicate the existence of the conflict between the statute and the organic law, whereupon the Consti- tution, by its own superior force and authority, eliminates the statute or the portion thereof that conflicts with organic law, and renders it inopera- tive ab initio, so that the Constitution, and not the statute, will be applied by the court in determining the litigated rights.” In re Thornburgh, 72 Misc. Rep. 619, 132 N. Y. Supp. 268, Surrogate Fowler, who delivered the opinion of the court, said: “The transcendant power of declaring an act of the Legis- lature unconstitutional should never in my opinion be assumed by a court of first instance, except possibly in rare eases involving life or liberty, and where the invalidity of the legislative act is apparent on its face. The exercise of a judicial power to declare acts of the legislature void should, I think, be reserved to the graver courts of the State in solemn session in banc, or held for the final review of such great questions. Otherwise the pro- VOL. I— 22 cesses of the government may be dis- organized by the action of a single judicial officer possessed of a little brief authority. Such an individual exercise of power tends to bring into contempt with the people an historic jurisdiction, approved by the wis- dom of the greatest of mankind — a jurisdiction of fundamental impor- tance to constitutional government when well exercised, and of most evil import when lightly exercised by a single judge animated, perhaps, by some theory squaring with his own conceptions of government or polity. Doubtless the ultimate power to test the validity of legislative enactments by a solemn comparison with dele- gated constitutional powers is oO supreme importance and the keystone of our political fabric. But the power and exercise of the power are distinct.” But see People ex rel. Wogan ». Rafferty, 77 Misc. Rep. 258, 136 Nias Supp. 4; People v. Pray, 87 Misc. Rep. 464, 150 N. Y. Supp. 1061; Syracuse, etc., R. Co. ». Syracuse, 113 Misc. Rep. 28, 183 N. Y. Supp. 757. 1 Briscoe v. Commonwealth Bank of Kentucky, 8 Pet. 118, 8 L. ed. 887. It has been intimated that inferior courts should not presume to pass upon constitutional questions, but ought in all cases to treat statutes as338 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I II. Neither will a court, as a general rule, pass upon a constitu- tional question, and decide a statute to be invalid, unless a decision upon that very point becomes necessary to the determination of the cause. questions when fairly presented, to find such topics. matters collaterally, “While courts cannot shun the discussion of constitutional they will not go out of their way They will not seek to draw in such weighty nor on trivial occasions. It is both more proper and more respectful to a co-ordinate department to discuss constitutional questions only when that is the very lis mota. Thus presented and determined, the decision carries a weight with it to which no extra-judicial disquisition is entitled.” 1 valid. Ortman v. Greenman, 4 Mich. 291. But no tribunal can exercise judicial power unless it is to decide according to its judgment; and it is difficult to discover any principle of justice which can require a magistrate to enter upon the execution of a statute when he believes it to be in- valid, especially when he must thereby subject himself to prosecution, without any indemnity in the law if it proves to be invalid. Undoubtedly when the highest courts in the land hesitate to declare a law unconstitutional, and allow much weight to the legislative judgment, the inferior courts should be still more reluctant to exercise this power, and a becoming modesty would at least be expected of those judicial officers who have not been trained to the investigation of legal and constitutional questions. But in any case a judge or justice, being free from doubt in his own mind, and unfettered by any judicial decision properly binding upon him, must follow his own sense of duty upon constitutional as well as upon any other questions. See Miller v. State, 3 Ohio St. 475; Pim v. Nicholson, 6 Ohio St. 176; Mayberry v. Kelly, : Kan. 116. In Mayberry v. Kelly, Kan. 116, itis said: “It is claimed fe counsel for the plaintiff in error, that the point raised by the instruction is, that inferior courts and ministeri: il officers have no right to Judge of the constitutionality of a law passed by a legislature. But is this law? If SO, a court created to interpret the law must disregard the constitution in forming its opinions. The constitu- In any case, tion is law, — the fundamental law, — and must as much be taken into con- sideration by a justice of the peace as by any other tribunal. When two laws apparently conflict, it is the duty of all courts to construe them. If the conflict is irreconcilable, they must decide which is to prevail; and the constitution is not an exception to this rule of construction. If a law were passed in open, flagrant viola- tion of the constitution, should a justice of the peace regard the law, and pay no attention to the constitu- tional provision? If that is his duty in a plain case, is it less so when the pope ues becomes more diffi- cult?”’ UHodten v. Wood, 9 Ind. 286, 287; Ireland ». Turnpike Co., 19 Ohio St. 369; Smith v. Speed, 50 Ala. 276; Allor v. Auditors, 43 Mich. 76, 4 N. W. 492; Board of Education v. Mayor of Brunswick, 72 Ga. 353; Texas v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 258 U.S. 158, 66 L. ed. 531, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 261; State er rel. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. State Board of Equalizers, 84 Fla. 592, 94 So. 681, 30 A. L. R. 362; Ordelheide v. Modern Brotherhood of America, 226 Mo. 203, 1258. W. 1105, 32 L. R. ‘A. (N. s.) 965; McCoy ». Davis, 38 N. D. 328, 164 ING \Wh Oils Olson v. Ross, 39 N. D. 372, 167 N. W. 385; Threadgill »v. Cross, 26 Okla. 403, 109 Pac. 558, 138 Am. St. Rep. 964; Winslow »v. Fleisch- ner, 112 Oreg. 23, 228 Pac. 101, 34 A. L. R. 826; St. Louis S. W. R. Co. v. State, 113 Tex. 570, 261 S. W. 996, 33 A. L. R. 367. See People v. Kenney 96 N. Y. 294.CHAP. VII] DECLARING therefore, LEGISLATIVE ACTS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 339 where a constitutional question is raised, though it may be legitimately presented by the record, yet if the record also pre- sents some other and clear ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, and thereby render the material to the case, that course will be constitutional question im- adopted, and the question of constitutional power will be left for consideration until a case arises which cannot be disposed of without considering it, and when consequently a decision upon such question will be unavoidable.! III. Nor will a court listen to an objection made to the con- stitutionality of an act by a party whose rights it does not affect, and who has therefore no interest in defeating it.” 1 Ex parte Randolph, 2 Brock. 447; Frees v. Ford, 6 N. Y. 176, 178; Cumberland, &c. R. R. Co. v. County Court, 10 Bush, 564; White v. Scott, 4 Barb. 56; Mobile & Ohio Railroad Co. v. State, 29 Ala. 573; Kansas City v. Union P. Ry. Co., 59 Kan. 427, 53 Pac. 468, 52 L. R. A. 321, aff. sub nom. Clark v. Kansas City in 176 U.S. 114, 44 L. ed. 392, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 284; Berea College ». Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 53 L. ed. 81, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 33; Siler ». Louisville, ete., R. Co., 213 U. S. 175, 53 L. ed. 753, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 451; Light ». United States, 220 U. S. 523, 55 L. ed. 570, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 485; United States ». L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81, 65 L. ed. 516, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 298, 14 A. L. R. 1045; Adkins ». Children’s Hospital, 261 U. 5. 525. 67 L. ed. 785, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 394, 24 A. L. R. 1238; Pensacola Electric Co. ». Soderlind, 60 Fla. 164, 53 So. 722, Ann. Cas. 1912 B, 1251; Rhinehart »v. State, 121 Tenn. 420, 117 S. W. 508, 17 Ann, Cas. 254. The constitutional question may be first raised in the court of review. Monticello D. Co. v. Mayor of Balti- more, 90 Md. 416, 45 Atl. 210. For the contrary doctrine, see Chimgay v. People, 78 Ill. 570; Hopper 2. Chicago, &c. Ry. Co., 91 Iowa, 639, 60 N. W. 487; Delaney ». Brett, 51 NG ¥- 78. 2 People v. Rensselaer, &c. R. R. Co., 15 Wend. 113, 30 Am. Dec. 33; Smith v. Inge, 80 Ala. 283; Clark v. Kansas City, 176 U.S. 114, 44 L. ed. 392, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 284; Albany County Super’s. v. Stanley, 105 U. S. 305, 26 On this ground it L. ed. 1044; Brown v. Ohio Valley R. Co., 79 Fed. 176; Pittsburg, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Montgomery, 152 Ind. 1, 49 N. E. 582, 71 Am. St. 301; Hooker v. Burr, 194 U. S. 415, 48 L. ed. 1046, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 706; District of Columbia v. Brooke, 214 U. S. 138, 53 L. ed. 941, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 560; Citizens National Bank v. Ken- tucky, 217 U.S. 448, 54 L. ed. 832, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 532 ; Brown-Forman Co. v. Kentucky, 217 U. S. 563, 54 L. ed. 883, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 578; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Finn, 235 U. S. 601, 59 L. ed. 379, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 146; Rail, etc., Coal Co. v. Yaple, 236 U.S. 338, 59 L. ed. 607, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 359; Buchanan ». Warley, 245 U. 8S. 60, 62 L. ed. 149, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 16, L. R. A. 1918 C, 210, Ann. Cas. 1918 A, 1201; Heald »v. District of Colum- bia, 259 U. S. 114, 66 L. ed. 852, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 434; Board of Trade ». Olsen, 262 U. S. 1, 67 L. ed. 839, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 470; Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 67 L. ed. 1078, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 597; State v. Sinchuk, 96 Conn. 605, 115 Atl. 33, 20 A. De Re 1515; State v. Philips, 70 Fla. 340, 70 So. 367, Ann. Cas. 1918 A, 138; State ex rel. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. State Board of Equal- izers, 84 Fla. 592, 94 So. 681, 30 A. L. R. 362; Cooper v. Rollins, 152 Ga. 588, 110 S. E. 726, 20 A. L. Re 1105; People v. McBride, 234 Ill. 146, 84 N. E. 865, 123 Am. St. Rep. 82, 14 Ann. Cas. 994; State Public Utilities Commission v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 975 Ill. 555, 114 N. E. 325, Ann. Cas. 1917 CG, 50; Knight, etc., Co; 0: Miller, 172 Ind. 27, 87 N. E. 823, 18340 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. 1 has been held that the objection that a legislative act was unconsti- tutional, because divesting the rights of remainder-men against their will, canta not be successfully urged by the owner of the particular estate, and could only be made on behalf of the remainder-men themselves.! And a party who has assented to his property being taken under a statute cannot afterwards object that the statute is in violation of a provision in the Constitution designed for the protection of private property.” The statute is assumed to be valid, until some one complains whose rights it invades. “ Prima facie, and upon the face of the act itself, nothing will generally appear to show that the act is not valid; and it is only when some person attempts to resist its operation, and calls in the aid of the judicial power to pronounce it void, as to him, his property or his rights, that the objection of unconstitutionality can be presented and sustained. Respect for the legislature, therefore, concurs with well-established Ann. Cas. 1146; Hunter v. Colfax Consol. Coal Co., 175 Iowa, 245, 154 N= W.. 1037, 157 N. W. 145, L. R. A. 1917 D, 15, Ann. Cas. 1917 E, 803 ; Iowa Life Ins. Co. v. Board of Super- visors, 190 Iowa, 777, 180 N. W. 721 State v. McClellan, 155 La. 37, 98 So. 748, 31 A. L. R. 527; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hardison, 199 Mass. 190, 85 N. E. 410, 127 Am. St. ce 478; Wiles v. Williams, 232 Mo. 13395 1Wio 1-34 Te Re AG (nN. 5\) 1080, State v. Blake, 241 Mo. 100, 144S. W. 1094, Ann. Cas. 1913 C, 1283; Greene County v. Lydy, 263 Mo. 77, 172 S. W. 376, Ann. Cas. 1917 C, 274; Cram v. Chicago, ete., R. Co., 84 Neb. 607, 122 N. W. 31, 21 L. Rea A. (N. 8.) 1022: Urbach v. Omaha, 101 Neb. 314, 163 N. W. 397, L. R. a 1917 BE, 1163; Gay »v. District Cts Nev. 330, 171 Bach 15653) A: Ls R 224; People v. Beakes Dairy Cor 222 NE YA 416, 119 N. E. 115, 3. A. iby R. 1260; People v. La Fetra, 230 N. Y. 429, 130 N. E. 601, 16 A. ESR. 152) American Exchange National Bank ». Lacy, 188 N. C. 25, 123 S. E. 475, 36 AST: 'R. 680; State v. Taylor, 33 N. D. 76, 156 N. W. 561, L. R. A. 1918 B, 156, Ann. Cas. 1918 A, 583; State v. Packard, 35 N. D. 298, 160 N. W. 150, L. R. A. 1917 B, 710; Olson v. Ross, 39) Ni DD: 372) 167 N, W. 385; Prentiss v. Dittmer, 93 Ohio St. 314, A2 Ne Ee 1021) 1: R. A. 1917 B, 191; Com. v. Dollar Say. Bank, 259 Pa. St. 138; 102 Atl) 569" 1 AS Teor 1048 ; Pugh v. Pugh, 25 S. D. 7, 124 N. W. 959, 32 L. R. A. (N. s.) 954; State v. Candland, 36 Utah, 406, 104 Pac. 285, 140 Am. St. Rep. 834; State v. Haskell, 84 Vt. 429, 79 Atl. 852, 34 L. R. A. (N. s.) 286; Bowman ». Virginia State Entomologist, 128 Va. 351, 105 S. E. 141, 12 A. L. R. 1121; Sti ate v. Bowen, 86 Wash. 238, 149 Pac. 330, Ann. Cas. 1917 B, 625; State v. Bonham, 93 Wash. 489, 161 Pac. 377, L. R. A. 1917 D. 996. See also Kansas City v. Clark, 59 Kan. 427, 53 Pac. 468, 52 L. R. A. 321. ““A litigant can be heard to ques- tion the validity of a statute only when and in so far as it is applied to his disadvantage.” Rindge Co. ». Los Angeles County, 262 U. S. 700, 67 L. ed. 1186, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 689, citing Dahnke-Walker Co. v. Bondu- rant, 257 U.S. 282, 289, 66 L. ed. 239, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 106. 1 Sinclair v. Jackson, 8 Cow. 543. See also Smith v. McCarthy, 56 Pa. St. 359; Antoni v. Wright, 22 Gratt. 857; Marshall v. Donovon, 10 Bush, 681. 2Embury v. Conner, 3 N. Y. 511; Baker v. Braman, 6 Hill, 47; Mobile & Ohio Railroad Co. v. State, 29 Ala. 586; Haskell v. New Bedford, 108 Mass. 208.CHAP. VII] DECLARING LEGISLATIVE ACTS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 341 principles of law in the conclusion that such an act is not void, but voidable only; and it follows, as a necessary legal inference from this position, that this ground of of by those only who have a right to question the To this extent only is it necessary to act, and not by strangers. avoidance can be taken advantage validity of the go, in order to secure and protect the rights of all persons against the unwarranted exercise of legislative power, and to this extent only, therefore, are courts of justice called on to interpose.’ Nor can a court declare a statute unconstitutional and void, IV. solely on the ground of unjust and oppressive it is supposed to violate the natural, the citizen, unless it can be shown that 71 provisions, or because social, or political rights of such injustice is prohibited or such rights guaranteed or protected by the Constitution.? It is true there are some reported cases, in which judges have been under- stood to intimate a doctrine different from what is here asserted ; 1 Wellington, Petitioner, 16 Pick. 87, 96. And see Hingham, &c. Turn- pike Co. v. Norfolk Co., 6 Allen, 353 ; De Jarnette v. Haynes, 23 Miss. 600; Sinclair v. Jackson, 8 Cow. 548, 579; Heyward v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 8 Barb. 486; Matter of Albany St., 11 Wend. 149; Williamson v. Carlton, 51 Me. 449; State v. Rich, 20 Miss. 393; Jones v. Black, 48 Ala. 540; Com. v. Wright, 79 Ky. 22; Burnside ». Lincoln Co. Ct., 86 Ky. 423, 6S. W. 276. In New York v. Reardon, 204 U. S$. 152, 51 L. ed. 415, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 188, the court said: “Unless the party setting up the unconstitution- ality of the state law belongs to the class for whose sake the constitutional protection is given, oF the class primarily protected, this court does not listen to his objections, and will not go into imaginary cases, notwith- standing the seeming logic of the posi- tion that it must do so, because if for any reason, or as against any class embraced, the law is unconstitutional, it is void as to all.’”’ See also Mohall Farmers’ Elevator Co. v. Hall, 44 N. D. 430, 167 N. W. 131. 2 See State v. Harrington, 68 Vt. 622, 35 Atl. 515, 34 L. R. A. 100; Com. v. Moir, 199 Pa. 534, 49 Atl. 351, 53 L. R. A. 837, 85 Am. St. 801; Cham- pion v. Ames, 188 WW Se S21) 47a: ed: 492, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 321; McCray ». United States, 195 U. S. 27, 49 L. ed. 78, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 769, 1 Ann. Cas. 561; Hirth-Krause Co. v. Cohen, 177 Ind. 1, 97 N. E. 1, Ann. Cas. 1914 C, 708; Schmitt v. F. W. Cook Brewing Co.. 187 Ind. 623, 120 N. E. 19, 3 A. L. R. 270; Hunter v. Colfax Consol. Coal Co., 175 Iowa, 245, 154 N. W. 145, L. R. A. 1917 D, 15, Ann. Cas. 1917 E, 803; Schaake v. Dolley, 85 Kan. 598, 118 Pac. 80, 37 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 877, Ann. Cas. 1913 A 254; Richardson v. McChesney, 128 Ky. 363, 108 S. W. 322. 129 Am. St. Rep. 299; Bangor ». Pierce, 106 Me. 527, 76 Atl. 945, 138 Am. St. Rep. 363, 29 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 770; Daugherty v. Thomas, 174 Mich. 371. 140 N. W. 615, 45 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 699; State v. Mankato, 117 Minn. 458. 136 N. W. 264, 41 L. Re FA (n.s.) 111; State v. Mailen, 140 Minn. 112, 167 N. W. 345, 1 AyD: Reel: State v. Swagerty, 203 Mo. 517, 102 S. W. 483; 120 Am. St. Rep. 671, 10 L. R. A. (n. s.) 601, 11 Ann. Cas. 725; Ex parte Kair, 28 Nev. 127, 80 Pac. 463, 113 Am. St. Rep. 817, 6 Ann. Cas. 893; State 2. Park, 42 Nev. 386, 178 Pac. 399, 3 A. LR, 75; People v. Beakes Dairy Co., 222 N. Y. 416, 119 N. E. 115, 3 AG light. 1260; Kornegay 2. Goldsboro, 180 N. C. 441, 105 S. E. 187; Pennsy!l- vania R. Co. v. Ewing, 241 Pa. St. 581, 88 Atl. 775, 49 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 977; Rio Grande Lumber Co. ».342 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. 1 but it will generally be found, on an examination of those cases, that what is said is rather by way of argument and illustration, to show the unreasonableness of putting upon constitutions such a construction as would permit legislation of the objectionable charac- ter then in question, and to induce a more cautious and patient ex- amination of the statute, with a view to discover in it, if possible, some more just and reasonable legislative intent, than as laying down a rule by which courts would be at liberty to limit, according to their own judgment and sense of justice and propriety, the extent of legislative power in directions in which the Constitution had im- posed no restraint. Mr. Justice Story, in one case, in examining the extent of power granted by the charter of Rhode Island, which authorized the General Assembly to make laws in the most ample manner, “so as such laws, &c., be not contrary and repugnant unto, but as near as may be agreeable to, the laws of England, considering the nature and constitution of the place and people there”, ex- presses himself thus: “What is the true extent of the power thus granted must be open to explanation as well by usage as by con- struction of the terms in which it is given. In a government pro- fessing to regard the great rights of personal liberty and of property, and which is required to legislate in subordination to the general laws of England, it would not lightly be presumed that the great principles of Magna Charta were to be disregarded, or that the estates of its subjects were liable to be taken away without trial, without notice, and without offence. Even if such authority could be deemed to have been confided by the charter to the General Assembly of Rhode Island, as an exercise of transcendental sover- eignty before the Revolution, it can scarcely be imagined that that great event could have left the people of that State subjected to its uncontrolled and arbitrary exercise. That government can scarcely be deemed to be free, where the rights of property are left solely dependent upon the will of a legislative body, without any restraint. The fundamental maxims of a free government seem to require that the rights of personal liberty and private property should be held sacred. At least no court of justice in this country would be war- Darke, 50 Utah, 114, 167 Pac. 241, L. R. A. 1918 A, 1193; Ward Lumber Co. v. Henderson-White Mfg. Co., 107 Va. 626, 59 S. EB. 476, 17 L. R. A. (N. s.) 324; In re Milecke, 52 Wash. 312, 100 Pac. 743, 132 Am. St. Rep. 968, 21 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 259. A court will not declare an em- ployees’ indemnity act invalid on the ground that the scheme it provides is unduly cumbersome; that its adminis- tration will prove unnecessarily costly and burdensome to those whose in- terests are affected by it, and will lead to private and public abuses and con- sequent evils more dangerous to the state than the evil it is sought to cor- rect. State ex rel. Davis-Smith Co. v. Clausen, 65 Wash. 156, 117 Pac. 1101, 37 L. R. A. (Nn. 8.) 466.CHAP. VII] DECLARING LEGISLATIVE ACTS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 343 ranted in assuming that the power to violate and disregard them — a power so repugnant to the liberty — lurked under any genera common principles of justice and civil | grant of legislative authority, or ought to be implied from any general expressions of the will of the people. The people ought not to be presumed to part with rights so vital to their security and well-being, without very strong and direct expressions of such an intention.” “We know of no case in which a legislative act to transfer the property of A. to B. without his consent has ever been held a constitutional exercise of legislative power in any State in the Union. On the contrary, it has been constantly resisted, as inconsistent with just principles, by every judicial tribunal in which it has been attempted to be enforced.” * The question discussed by the learned judge in this case is per- ceived to have been, What is the scope of a grant of legislative power to be exercised in conformity with the laws of England? Whatever he says is pertinent to that question; and the considera- tions he suggests are by way of argument to show that the power to do certain unjust and oppressive acts was not covered by the grant of legislative power. It is not intimated that if they were within the grant, they would be impliedly prohibited because unjust and oppressive. In another case, decided in the Supreme Court of New York, one of the judges, in considering the rights of the city of New York to certain corporate property, used this language: “The inhabitants of the city of New York havea vested right in the City Hall, markets, water-works, ferries, and other public property, which cannot be 1 Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Pet. 627, 657, 7 L. ed. 542, 553. See also what is said by the same judge in Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch, 43, 3 L. ed. 650. “It is clear that statutes passed against plain and obvious principles of common right and common reason are absolutely null and void, so far as they are calculated to operate against those principles.’ Ham v2. McClaws, 1 Bay, 98. But the ques- tion in that case was one of construc- tion; whether the court should give to a statute a construction which would make it operate against com- mon right and common reason. In Bowman v. Middleton, 1 Bay, 282, the court held an act which di- vested a man of his freehold and passed it over to another, to be void “as against common right as well as against Magna Charta.”’ In Regents of University ». Williams, 9 Gill & J. 365, 31 Am. Dec. 72, it was said that an act was void as opposed to fundamental principles of right and justice inherent in the nature and spirit of the social compact. But the court had already decided that the act was opposed, not only to the consti- tution of the State, but to that of the United States also. See Mayor, &c. of Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 376. In Godcharles v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. St. 431, 6 Atl. 354, a statute forbidding payments in store orders was held void as preventing persons sui juris from making their own contracts. A similar rule was laid down in State v. Fire Creek, &c. Co., 33 W. Va. 188, 10 S. E. 288, where mining companies were forbidden to sell to employees merchandise at a higher rate than they sold it to others.344 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I taken from them any more than their individual dwellings or store- houses. Their rights, in this respect, rest not merely wpon the con- stitution, but upon the great principles of eternal justice which lie at the foundation of all free governments.””! The great principles of eternal justice which affected the particular case had been in- corporated in the Constitution ; and it therefore became unnecessary to consider what would otherwise have been the rule; nor do we understand the court as intimating any opinion upon that subject. It was sufficient for the case, to find that the principles of right and justice had been recognized and protected by the Constitution, and that the people had not assumed to confer upon the legislature a power to deprive the city of rights which did not come from the Con- stitution, but from principles antecedent to and recognized by it. So it is said by Hosmer, Ch. J., in a Connecticut case: “With those judges who assert the omnipotence of the legislature in all cases where the Constitution has not interposed an explicit restraint, I cannot agree. Should there exist — what I know is not only an incredible supposition, but a most remote improbability — a case of direct infraction of vested rights, too palpable to be questioned and too unjust to admit of vindication, I could not avoid considering it as a violation of the social compact, and within the control of the judiciary. If, for example, a law were made without any cause to deprive a person of his property, or to subject him to imprison- ment, who would not question its legality, and who would aid in carrying it into effect? On the other hand, I cannot harmonize with those who deny the power of the legislature to make laws, in any case, which, with entire justice, operate on antecedent legal rights. A retrospective law may be just and reasonable, and the right of the legislature to enact one of this description I am not speculatist enough to question.””? The cases here supposed of un- just and tyrannical enactments would probably be held not to be within the power of any legislative body in the Union. One of them would be clearly a bill of attainder; the other, unless it was in the nature of remedial legislation, and susceptible of being defended on that theory, would be an exercise of judicial power, and therefore 1 Benson v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 10 Barb. 223, 244. restrained by the Constitution. It is ? Goshen v. Stonington, 4 Conn. 209, 225. In Booten v. Pinson, 77 W. Va. 412, 89S. E. 985, L. R. A. 1917 A, 1244, the court said: “We do not wish to be understood as saying that it is impos- sible for the legislature to exceed its legitimate powers, unless expressly not omnipotent. It cannot, for in- stance, reverse a judicial decision, although it may repeal the law sup- porting such decision; neither can it take a citizen’s property or levy taxes, for purposes purely private. Because those things do not fall within the legitimate sphere of government.”CHAP. VII] DECLARING LEGISLATIVE ACTS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 345 in excess of legislative authority, because not included in the apportionment of power made to that department. No question of implied prohibition would arise in either of these cases; but if the grant of power had covered them, and there had been no express limitation, there would, as it seems to us, be very great probability of unpleasant and dangerous conflict of authority, if the courts were to deny validity to legislative action on subjects within their con- trol, on the assumption that the legislature had disregarded justice or sound policy. The moment a court ventures to substitute its own judgment for that of the legislature, in any case where the Constitution has vested the legislature with power over the subject, that moment it enters upon a field where it is impossible to set limits to its authority, and where its discretion alone will measure the extent of its interference.’ The rule of law upon this subject appears to be, that, except where the Constitution has imposed limits upon the legislative power, it must be considered as practically absolute, whether it operate according to natural justice or not in any particular case. The courts are not the guardians of the rights of the people of the State, except as those rights are secured by some constitutional provision which comes within the judicial cognizance. The pro- tection against unwise or oppressive legislation, within constitu- tional bounds, is by an appeal to the justice and patriotism of the representatives of the people.? If this fail, the people in their 1 “Tf the legislature should pass a discretion must at last be reposed law in plain and unequivocal language, somewhere. The best and in many within the general scope of their con- cases the only security is in the wis- stitutional powers, I know of no dom and integrity of public servants authority in this government to pro- and their identity with the people. nounce such an act void, merely be- Governments cannot be administered cause, in the opinion of the judicial without committing powers in trust tribunals, it was contrary to the and confidence.’’ Beebe ». State, 6 principles of natural justice; for this Ind. 501, 528, per Stuart, J. And see would be vesting in the court a lati- Johnston »v. Commonwealth, 1 Bibb, tudinarian authority which might be 603; Flint River Steamboat Co. v. abused, and would necessarily lead Foster, 5 Ga. 194; State v. Krutt- to collisions between the legislative schnitt, 4 Nev. 178; Walker ». Cin- and judicial departments, dangerous cinnati, 21 Ohio St. 14; Hills v. Chi- to the well-being of society, or at least cago, 60 Ill. 86; Ballentine »v. Mayor, not in harmony with the structure of &c., 15 Lea, 633; State v. Traders’ our ideas of natural government.” Bank, 41 La. Ann. 329, 6 So. 582. Per Rogers, J., in Commonwealth v. 2McCray 2. United States, 195 McCloskey, 2 Rawle, 374. U. S. 27, 49 L. ed. 78, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. “All the courts can do with odious 769, 1 Ann. Cas. 561; Richardson v. statutes is to chasten their hardness McChesney, 128 Ky. 363, 108 S. W. by construction. Such is the imper- 322, 129 Am. St. Rep. 299; Hx parte fection of the best human institutions, Kair, 28 Nev. 127, 80 Pac. 463, 113 that, mould them as we may, 4 large Am. St. Rep. 817, 6 Ann. Cas. 893;346 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I sovereign capacity can correct the evil; but courts cannot assume their rights... The judiciary can only arrest the execution of a statute when it conflicts with the Constitution. It cannot run a race of opinions upon points of right, reason, and expediency with the law-making power ; * [nor can it consider the motive which inspired Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Ewing, 241 Pa. St. 581, 88 Atl. 775, 49 L. R. A. (Nn. 8.) 977. 1 Bennett v. Boggs, Baldw. 60, 74; Walker v. Cincinnati, 21 Ohio St. 14. “Tf the act itself is within the scope of their authority, it must stand, and we are bound to make it stand, if it will upon any intendment. It is its effect, not its purpose, which must de- termine its validity. Nothing but a clear violation of the constitution a clear usurpation of power prohibited — will justify the judicial department in pronouncing an act of the legisla- tive department unconstitutional and void.” Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Riblet, 66 Pa. St. 164, 169. See Weber v. Reinhard, 73 Pa. St. 370; Chicago, &c. R. R. Co. v. Smith, 62 Ill. 268; People v. Albertson, 55 N. Y. 50, per Allen, J.; Martin v. Dix, 52 Miss. 52, 64, per Chalmers, J.; Bennett v. Boggs, Baldw. 60, 74; United States v. Brown, 1 Deady, 566; Com- monwealth v. Moore, 25 Gratt. 951; Danville v. Pace, 25 Gratt. 1,8; Reith- miller v. People, 44 Mich. 280, 6 N. W. 667; Munn ». Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. ed. 77; Eastman ». State, 109 Ind. 278, 10 N. E. 97. * Perkins, J., in Madison & Indian- apolis Railroad Co. v. Whiteneck, 8 Ind. 217; Bull v. Read, 13 Gratt. 78, per Lee, J.; Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 55 L. ed. 107, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 342, Ann. Cas. 1912 B, 1312; McCray »v. United States, 195 U. S. 2p 49 L. ed. 78, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 769, 1 Ann. Cas. 561; Mutual Loan Co. ». Martell, 222 U. S. 225, 56 L. ed. 175, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 74, Ann. Cas. 1913 B, 529; Brushaber v. Union Pac. R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 60 L. ed. 493, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 236, L. R. A. 1917 D, 414, Ann. Cas. 1917 B, 713; Green ». Frazier, 253 U. S. 233, 64 L. ed. 878, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 499; Thompson v. Van Lear, 77 Ark. 506, 92 S. W. 773,5 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 588, 7 Ann. Cas. 154; People v. Hupp, 53 Colo. 80, 123 Pac. 651, 41 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 792, Ann. Cas. 1914 A, 1177; Young v. Lemieux, 79 Conn. 434, 65 Atl. 436, 600, 129 Am. St. Rep. 193, 20 L. R. A. (n. 8.) 160, 8 Ann. Cas. 452; Clendaniel v. Con- rad, 3 Boyce (Del.) 549, 83 Atl. 1036, Ann. Cas. 1915 B, 968; Delaney ». Plunkett, 146 Ga. 547, 91 S. E. 561, L. R. A. 1917 D, 926, Ann. Cas. 1917 E, 685; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. », Coachman, 59 Fla. 130, 52 So. 377, 20 Ann. Cas. 1047; Davis v. Florida Power Co., 64 Fla. 246, 60 So. 759, Ann. Cas. 1914 B, 965; Wilkerson ». Rome, 152 Ga. 762, 110 S. E. 895, 20 A. L. R. 1334; Pike v. State Board of Land Com’rs, 19 Idaho, 268, 113 Pac. 447, Ann. Cas. 1912 B, 1344; Perkins v. Cook County, 271 Ill. 449, 111 N. EB. 080, Ann. Cas. 1917 A, 27; Spring- field Gas, etc., Co. v. Springfield, 292 Ill. 236, 126 N. E. 739, 18 A. L. R. 929; School Town of Andrews ». Heiney, 178 Ind. 1, 98 N. E. 628, 43 L. R. A. (x. s.) 1023; Pittsburg, etc., R. Co., v. State, 180 Ind. 245, 102 N. E. 25, L. R. A. 1915 D, 458; Schmitt »v. F. W. Cook Brewing Co., 187 Ind. 623, 120 N. E. 19, 3 A. L. R. 270; Bopp ». Clark, 165 Iowa, 697, 147 N. W. 172, 52 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 493, Ann. Cas. 1916 E, 417; Wheeler v. Weightman, 96 Kan. 50, 149 Pac. 977, L. R. A. 1916 A, 846; Kentucky State Journal Co. v. Workmen’s Compensation Board, 161 Ky. 562, 170 S. W. 437, 1166, L. R. A. 1916 A, 389, Ann. Cas. 1916 B, 1273; State v. Mayo, 106 Me. 62, 75 Atl. 295, 26 L. R. A. (nN. 8.) 502, 20 Ann. Cas. 512; Dirken v. Great Northern Paper Co., 110 Me. 374, 86 Atl. 320, Ann. Cas. 1914 D, 396; State v. Mailen, 140 Minn. 112, 167 N. W. 345, 1 A. L. R. 331; State v. J. J. Newman Lumber Co., 102 Miss. 802, 59 So. 923, 45 L. R. A. (n. 8.) 851; State v. Senatobia Blank Book, ete., Co., 115 Miss. 254, 76 So. 258, Ann. Cas. 1918 B, 953; State v. Scullin-Gallagher Iron, etc.,CHAP. VII| DECLARING S. W. 1007, Co., 268 Mo. 178, 186 Hill v. Ray, Ann. Cas. 1918 E, 620; 52 Mont. 378, 158 Pac. 826, L. R. A. 1917 A, 495, Ann. Cas. 1917 BH, 210; Schultz v. State, 89 Neb. 34, 130 N. W. 972, 33 L. R. A. (N. s.) 403, Ann. Cas. 1912 C, 495; Freadrich v. State, 89 Neb. 343, 131 N. W. 618, 34 in Re AS (n. s.) 650; Ex parte Boyce, 27 Nev. 299, 75 Pac. 1, 65 L. R. A. 47, 1 Ann. Cas. 66; Worthington v. District Ct., 37 Nev. 212, 142 Pac. 230, Ty tee 1916 A, 696, Ann. Cas. 1916 BE, 1097; People v. Griswold, 213 N. Y. 92, 106 N. E. 929, L. R. A. 1915 D, 538; People v. Charles Schweinler Press, 914 N. Y. 395, 108 N. E. 639, L. R. A. 1918 A, 1124, Ann. Cas. 1916 D, 1059; Moose v. Alexander County, 172 N.C. 372, 90 S. E. 441, Ann. Cas. 1917 E, 1183; State v. Taylor, 33 N;, Dio; 156 N. W. 561, L. R. A. 1918 B, 156, Ann. Cas. 1918 A, 583; State v. Miller, 87 Ohio St. 12, 99 N. E. 1078, 44 L. R. A. (n. 8.) 712, Ann. Cas. 1913 E, 761; Wessel ». Timberlake, 95 Ohio St. 21, 116 N. E. 43, Ann. Cas. 1918 B, 402; Winston »v. Moore, 244 Pa. St. 447, 91 Atl. 520, L. R. A. 1915 A, 1190, Ann. Cas. 1915 C, 498; Rio Grande Lumber Co. ». Darke, 50 Utah, 114, 167 Pac. 241, L. R. A. 1918 A, 11938; Stillman v. Lynch, 56 Utah, 540, 192 Pac. 272, 12 A. L. R. 552; State v. Sharpless, 31 Wash. 191, 71 Pac. 737, 96 Am. St. Rep. 893; State v. Bonham, 93 Wash. 489, 161 Pac. 377, L. R. A. 1917 D, 996; Booten v. Pinson, 77 W. Va. 412, 89 S. E. 985, L. R. A. 1917 A, 1244; First Wisconsin Na- tional Bank v. John, 179 Wis. 117, 190 N. W. 822, 26 A. L. R. 349. In McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 49 L. ed. 78, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 769, 1 Ann. Cas. 561, Chief Justice White, in delivering the opinion of the court, said: ‘Whilst, as a result of our written Constitution it is axiomatic that the judicial department of the government is charged with the solemn duty of enforcing the Constitution, and therefore, in cases properly presented, of determining whether a given mani- festation of authority has exceeded the power conferred by that instrument, no instance is afforded from the foun- LEGISLATIVE ACTS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 347 dation of the government where an act which was within a power conferred, was declared to be repugnant to the Constitution, because it appeared to the judicial mind that the particular exertion of constitutional power was either unwise or unjust. To announce such a principle would amount to de- claring that, in our constitutional system, the judiciary was not only charged with the duty of upholding the Constitution, but also with the responsibility of correcting every pos- sible abuse arising from the exercise by the other departments of their conceded authority. So to hold would be to overthrow the entire distinction between the legislative, judicial, and executive departments of the govern- ment, upon which our system founded, and would be a mere act of judicial usurpation.” In the absence of constitutional restraint ‘‘the legislative department of a State government has exclusive and ample power to determine the State’s policy. When the legislature, acting within its constitutional powers, has spoken upon a particular subject, its utterance is the public policy of the State upon that subject, and the courts are without power to read into the Constitution a restraint of the legis- lature with respect thereto. The prohibition must be expressed, or necessarily implied from that which is expressed.” Cavender v. Hewitt, 145 Tenn. 471, 239 S. W. 767, 22 A. Re 755. A statute cannot be declared void because against public policy. Julien v. Model B. & L. I. Co., 116 Wis. 79, 92 N. W. 561. So in Canada it is held that an act within the scope of legislative power cannot be objected to as contrary to reason and justice. Re Goodhue, 19 Ch’y (Ont.), 366; Toronto, &c. R. Co. ». Crookshank, 4 Q. B. (Ont.) 318. Ordinarily the courts will not sub- stitute their opinions for the judgment of the legislature as to the reasonable- ness of an act fixing the rate of speed at which motor vehicles may be law- fully driven. Schultz v. State, 89 Neb. 34, 130 N. W. 972, 33 L. R. A. (n. s.) 403, Ann. Cas. 1912 C, 495. is348 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS VOL. I the passage of a statute in determining the question of its validity.1] Any legislative act which does not encroach upon the powers ap- portioned to the other departments of the government, being prima facie valid, must be enforced, unless restrictions upon the legislative authority can be pointed out in the Constitution, and the case shown to come within them.? 1 McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 49 L. ed. 78, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 769, 1 Ann. Cas. 561; Calder v. People of Michigan, 218 U. S. 591, 54 L. ed. 1163, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 122; Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries, etc., Co., 251 U. S. 146, 64 L. ed. 194, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 106; Smith v. Kansas City Title, ete., Co., 255 U.S. 180, 65 L. ed. 577, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 243; Mc- Donald v. Doust, 11 Idaho, 14, 81 Pac. 60, 69 L. R. A. 220; Schmidt »v. Indianapolis, 168 Ind. 631, 80 N. E. 632, 120 Am. St. Rep. 386, 14 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 787; State v. Taylor, 33 N. D. 76, 156 N. W. 561, L. R. A. 1918 B, 156, Ann. Cas. 1918 A, 583; Com. v. Herr, 229 Pa. St. 1382, 78 Atl. 68, Ann. Cas. 1912 A, 422; State v. Bayer, 34 Wtah* 257, 97 Pac. 129) 19 L: R. A. (nN. 8.) 297; Tilly v. Mitchell & Lewis Co., 121 Wis. 1, 98 N. W. 969, 105 Am. St. Rep. 1007. 2 Sill v. Village of Corning, 15 N. Y. 297; Varick v. Smith, 5 Paige, 136; Cochran v. Van Surlay, 20 Wend. 365; Morris v. People, 3 Denio, 381; Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 378; People v. Supervisors of Orange, 17 N. Y. 235; Dow v. Norris, 4 N. H. 16; Derby Turnpike Co. v. Parks, 10 Conn. 522, 548; Hartford Bridge Co. v. Union Ferry Co., 29 Conn. 210; Holden v. James, 11 Mass. 396; Adams v. Howe, 14 Mass. 340; 7 Am. Dec. 216; Norwich v. County Commissioners, 13 Pick. 60; Dawson v. Shaver, 1 Blackf. 206; Beauchamp v. State, 6 Blackf. 299; Doe v. Douglass, 8 Blackf. 10; Maize v. State, 4 Ind. 342; Stocking v. State, 7 Ind. 327; Beebe v. State, 6 Ind. 501; Newland v. Marsh, 19 III. 376, 384; Chicago, &c. R. R. Co. »v. Smith, 62 Ill. 268; Gutman ». Virginia Iron Co., 5 W. Va. 22; Osburn ». Staley, 5 W. Va. 85; Yancy v. Yancy, 5 Heisk. 353; Bliss v. Commonwealth, 2 Litt. 90; State v. Ashley, 1 Ark. 513; Campbell v. Union Bank, 7 Miss. 625; Tate’s Ex’r v. Bell, 4 Yerg. 202, 26 Am. Dec. 221; Andrews v. State, 3 Heisk. 165, 8 Am. Rep. 8; Railroad v. Hicks, 9 Bax. 446; Whittington v. Polk, 1 Harr. & J. 236; Norris v. Abingdon Academy, 7 Gill & J. 7; Harrison v. State, 22 Md. 468; State v. Lyles, 1 McCord, 238; Myers v. English, 9 Cal. 341; Hx parte Newman, 9 Cal. 502; Hobart v. Supervisors, 17 Cal. 23; Crenshaw v. Slate River Co., 6 Rand. 245; Lewis v. Webb, 3 Me. 326; Durham v. Lewiston, 4 Me. 140; Lunt’s Case, 6 Me. 412; Scott v. Smart’s Ex’rs, 1 Mich. 295; Williams v. Detroit, 2 Mich. 560; Tyler v. People, 8 Mich. 320; Weimer v. Bun- bury, 30 Mich. 201; Cotton v. Com- missioners of Leon County, 6 Fla. 610; State v. Robinson, 1 Kan. 17; Santo v. State, 2 Iowa, 165; Morrison v, Springer, 15 Iowa, 304; Stoddart v. Smith, 5 Binn. 355; Moore v. Houston, 38. & R. 169; Braddee v. Brownfield, 2 W. & S. 271; Harvey v. Thomas, 10 Watts, 63; Commonwealth »v. Maxwell, 27 Pa. St. 444; Lewis’s Appeal, 67 Pa. St. 153; Butler’s Ap- peal, 73 Pa. St. 448; Carey v. Giles, 9 Ga. 253; Macon & Western Railroad Co. v. Davis, 13 Ga. 68; Franklin Bridge Co. v. Wood, 14 Ga. 80; Boston v. Cummins, 16 Ga. 102; Van Horne v. Dorrance, 2 Dall. 309, 1 L. ed. 391; Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 1 L. ed. 648; Cooper v. Telfair, 4 Dall. 14, 1 L. ed. 720; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87, 3 L. ed. 162; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 53 L. ed. 97, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 14; Flowers v. Logan County, 138 Ky. 59; 127 S: W. 512; 137 Am: St. Rep. 347; Lawton v. Stewart Dry Goods Co., 197 Ky. 394, 247 8S. W. 14, 26 A. L. R. 686; Corbin v. Houlehan, 100 Me. 246, 61 Atl. 131, 70 L. R. A. 568; State v. Mankato, 117 Minn. 458, 136 N. W. 264, 41 L. R. A. (Nn. s.)CHAP. VU] VY. If the courts are not DECLARING LEGISLATIVE ACTS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 349 at liberty to declare statutes void be- cause of their apparent injustice or impolicy, neither can they do so because they appear to the minds of the judges to violate funda- mental principles of republican government, unless it shall be found that those principles are placed beyond legislative encroachment by the Constitution.’ The principles of republican government are not a set of inflexible rules, vital and active in the Constitution, though unexpressed, but they are subject to variation and modifica- tion from motives of policy and public necessity ; and it is only in those particulars in which experience has demonstrated any depar- ture from the settled practice to work injustice or confusion, that we shall discover an incorporation of them in the Constitution in such form as to make them definite rules of action under all circumstances. It is undoubtedly a maxim of republican government, as we under- stand it, that taxation and representation should be inseparable ; but where the legislature interferes, as in many cases it may do, to compel taxation by a municipal corporation for local purposes, evident that this maxim is applied in the case it is in a much restricted and very imperfect sense only, since the representation of the locality taxed is but slight in the body imposing the tax, and the burden may be imposed, not only against the protest of the local representa- tive, but against the general opposition of the municipality. notwithstanding they are not al- property of women is taxable, The 9 lowed a voice in choosing representatives? The maxim is not entirely lost sight of in such cases, but its application in the particu- 111; Kornegay ». Goldsboro, 180 N. C. 441, 105 S. E. 187; State v. Taylor, 33 N. D. 76, 156 N. W. 561, L. R. A. 1918 B, 156, Ann. Cas. 1918 A, 583; State v. Packard, 35 N. D. 298, 160 N. W. 154, L. R. A. 1917 B, 710; Bishop »v. City of Tulsa, (Okla. Crim. Rep.) 209 Pac. 228, 27 A. L. R. 1008; Cavender v. Hewitt, 145 Tenn. 471, 239 S. W. 767, 22 iXo Ab, 1st. 755; Tilly v. Mitchell, etc., Co., 121 Wis. 1, 98 N. W. 969, 105 Am. St. Rep. 1007; Borgnis ». Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 133 N. W. 209, 37 L. R. A. (n. s.) 489. “Byery rational presumption is made in favor of the validity of a statute. Its conflict with the Con- stitution must be established beyond reasonable doubt before the court can refuse to enforce it.’ Com. ». Slavski, 245 Mass. 405, 140 N. E. 465, 29 A. L. R. 281. Every law found on the statute books is presumptively constitutional, until declared otherwise by the court, and an officer of the executive depart- ment of the government has no right or power to declare an act of the legis- lature to be unconstitutional, or to raise the question of its constitution- ality without showing that he will be injured in person, property, or rights by its enforcement. State ex rel. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. State Board of Equalizers, 84 Fla. 592, 94 So. 681, 30 A. L. R. 362. 1 State v. Mankato, 117 Minn. 458, 136 N. W. 264, 41 L. R. A. (. s.) 111. If a statute does not violate any constitutional provision the courts can- not declare it invalid because it is socialistic. Busser v. Snyder, 282 Pa. 440, 128 Atl. 80, 37 AT. Re. t5ts: 2 Wheeler v. Wall, 6 Allen, 558 ; Smith v. Macon, 20 Ark. de350 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [vou. I lar case, and the determination how far it can properly and justly be made to yield to considerations of policy and expediency, must rest exclusively with the law-making power, in the absence of any definite constitutional provisions so embodying the maxim as to make it a limitation upon legislative authority.! It is also a maxim of republican government that local concerns shall be managed in the local districts, which shall choose their own administrative and police officers, and establish for themselves police regulations; but this maxim is subject to such exceptions as the legislative power of the State shall see fit to make; and when made, it must be pre- sumed that the public interest, convenience, and protection are subserved thereby.? The State may interfere to establish new regulations against the will of the local constituency ; and if it shall think proper in any case to assume to itself those powers of local police which should be executed by the people immediately concerned, we must suppose it has been done because the local administration has proved imperfect and inefficient, and a regard to the general well-being has demanded the change. In these cases the maxims which have prevailed in the government address themselves to the wisdom of the legislature, and to adhere to them as far as possible is doubtless to keep in the path of wisdom ; but they do not con- stitute restrictions so as to warrant the other departments in treat- ing the exceptions which are made as unconstitutional 3 ‘“There are undoubtedly funda- mental principles of morality and jus- tice which no legislature is at liberty to disregard, but it is equally un- doubted that no court, except in the clearest cases, can properly impute the disregard of those principles to the legislature... . This court can know nothing of public policy except from the Constitution and the laws, and the course of administration and decision. It has no legislative powers. It can- not amend or modify any legislative acts. It cannot examine questions as expedient or inexpedient, as politic or impolitic. Considerations of that sort must in general be addressed to the legislature. Questions of policy there are concluded here.” Chase, Ch. J., in License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462, 469, 18 L. ed. 497, 500. “All mere questions of expediency, and all questions respecting the just operation of the law within the limits prescribed by the Constitution, were settled by the legislature when it was enacted.” Ladd, J., in Perry », Keene, 56 N. H. 514, 530. And see remarks of Ryan, Ch. J., in Attorney- General v. Chicago, &c. R. R. Co., 35 Wis. 425, 580. 2 People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 532. See post, pp. 385 ef seq. *In People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481, 500, where the Metropolitan Police Act of Detroit was claimed to be unconstitutional on various grounds, the court say: ‘Besides the specific objections made to the act as opposed to the provisions of the Con- stitution, the counsel for respondent attacks it on ‘general principles’, and especially because violating funda- mental principles of our system, that governments exist by the consent of the governed, and that taxation and representation go together. The taxation under the act, it is said, is really in the hands of a police board, a body in the choice of which the people of Detroit have no voice. This argument is one which might beCHAP. VII] DECLARING LEGISLATIVE ACTS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 351 VI. Nor are the courts at liberty to declare an act void, because in their opinion it is opposed to a spirit supposed to pervade the Constitution, but not expressed in words. “When the fundamental law has not limited, either in terms or by necessary implication, the general powers conferred upon the legislature, we cannot declare a limitation under the notion of having discovered something in the spirit of the Constitution which is not even mentioned in the in- strument.”’ ! pressed upon the legislative depart- ment with great force, if it were true in point of fact. But as the people of Detroit are really represented through- out, the difficulty suggested can hardly be regarded as fundamental. They were represented in the legislature which passed the act, and had the same proportionate voice there with the other municipalities in the State, all of which receive from that body their powers of local government, and such only as its wisdom shall prescribe within the constitutional limit. They were represented in that body when the present police board were ap- pointed by it, and the governor, who is hereafter to fill vacancies, will be chosen by the State at large, including their city. There is nothing in the maxim that taxation and representa- tion go together which requires that the body paying the tax shall alone be consulted in its assessment; and if there were, we should find it violated at every turn in our system. The State legislature not only has a con- trol in this respect over inferior municipalities, which it exercises by general laws, but it sometimes finds it necessary to interpose its power in special cases to prevent unjust or burdensome taxation, as well as to compel the performance of a clear duty. The Constitution itself, by one of the clauses referred to, requires the legislature to exercise its control over the taxation of municipal corporations, by restricting it to what that body may regard as proper bounds. And munic- ipal bodies are frequently compelled most unwillingly to levy taxes for the payment of claims, by the judgments or mandates of courts in which their representation is quite as remote as “Tt is difficult,” says Mr. Senator Verplanck, “upon that of the people of Detroit in this police board. It cannot therefore be said that the maxims referred to have been entirely disregarded by the legis- lature in the passage of this act. But as counsel do not claim that, in so far as they have been departed from, the Constitution has been violated, we can- not, with propriety, be asked to declare the act void on any such general objec- tion.” And see Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 378, per Selden, J.; Benson v. Mayor, &c. of Albany, 24 Barb. 248 et seqg.; Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 376; People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 532; White v. Stamford, 37 Conn. 578. 1 People v. Fisher, 24 Wend. 215, 220; State v. Staten, 6 Cold. 238; Walker v. Cincinnati, 21 Ohio St. 14; State v. Smith, 44 Ohio St. 348, 7 N. E. 447, 12 N. E. 829; People v. Rucker, 5 Col. 455; Whallon v. Ingham Cire. Judge, 51 Mich. 503, 16 N. W. 876; Wooten v. State, 24 Fla. 335, 5 So. 39; Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11, 49 L. ed. 648, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 358, 3 Ann. Cas. 765; Kane v. Erie R. Co., 67 C. C. A. 653, 133 Fed. 681, 68 L. R. A. 788; Ex parte Owens, 148 Ala. 402, 42 So. 676, 121 Am. St. Rep. 67, 8 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 888; Schmitt v. F. W. Cook Brewing Co., 187 Ind. 623, 120 N. E. 19, 3 A. L. R. 270; State v. Mankato, 117 Minn. 458, 136 N. W. 264, 41 L. R. A. (wn. 8.) 111; State v. De Lorenzo, 81 N. J. L. 613, 79 Atl. 839, Ann. Cas. 1912 D, 329; Hockett v. State Liquor Licensing Board, 91 Ohio St. 176, -110 N. E. 485, L. R. A. 1917 B, 7; Russ v. Com., 210 Pa. St. 544, 60 Atl. 169, 105 Am. St. Rep. 825, 1 L. R. A. (. s.) 409; Long v. State, 58 Tex. Crim. Rep. 209, 127 S. W. 208, 21 Ann. Cas. 405; Ward Lumber Co. v. Henderson-White302 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. 1 any general principles, to limit the omnipotence of the sovereign legislative power by judicial interposition, except so far as the ex- press words of a written Constitution give that authority. There Mfg. Co., 107 Va. 626, 59 S. E. 476, 17; Re AS (Ns; 3242 (Walker 9»: Spokane, 62 Wash. 312, 113 Pac. 775, Ann. Cas. 1912 C, 994. But in Idaho it has been held that acts inconsistent with the spirit of the Constitution are as much prohibited by its terms as are acts specifically enumerated and forbidden therein. McDonald v. Doust, 11 Idaho, 14, 81 Pac. 60, 69 L. R. A. 220. In Com. v. Moir, 199 Pa. 534, 49 Atl. 351, 85 Am. St. 801, 53 L. R. A. 837, the above text is quoted and approved. See also Sheppard v. Dow- ling, 127 Ala. 1, 28 So. 791, 85 Am. St. 68. For the purpose of determining questions of constitutionality courts will not consider questions of the jus- tice, advisability, or policy of the act. State ex rel. Smith v. McLellan, 138 Ind. 395, 37 N. E. 799. “To me, it is as plain that the General Assembly may exercise all powers which are properly legislative, and which are not taken away by our own or by the Federal Constitution, as it is that the.people have all the rights which are expressly reserved. We are urged, however, to go further than this, and to hold that a law, though not prohibited, is void if it violates the spirit of our institutions, or impairs any of those rights which it is the object of free government to protect, and to declare it unconstitu- tional if it be wrong and unjust. But we cannot do this. It would be assuming a right to change the Con- stitution, to supply what we might conceive to be its defects, to fill up every casus omissus, and to interpolate into it whatever, in our opinion, ought to have been put there by its framers. The Constitution has given us a list of the things which the legislature may not do. If we extend that list we alter the instrument; we become ourselves the aggressors, and violate both the letter and spirit of the or- ganic law as grossly as the legislature possibly could. If we can add to the reserved rights of the people, we can take them away; if we can mend, we can mar. If we can remove the landmarks which we find estab- ished, we can obliterate them. If we can change the Constitution in any particular, there is nothing but our own will to prevent us from demolish- ing it entirely. The great powers given to the legislature are liable to be abused. But this is inseparable from the nature of human institutions. The wisdom of man has never con- ceived of a government with power sufficient to answer its legitimate ends, and at the same time incapable of mischief. No political system can be made so perfect that its rulers will always hold it to be the true course. In the very best, a great deal must be trusted to the discretion of those who administer it. In ours, the people have given large powers to the legislature, and relied for the faithful execution of them on the wisdom and honesty of that department, and on the direct accountability of the mem- bers to their constituents. There is no shadow of reason for supposing that the mere abuse of power was meant to be corrected by the judiciary. There is nothing more easy than to imagine a thousand tyrannical things which the legislature may do, if its members forget all their duties, dis- regard utterly the obligations they owe to their constituents, and reck- lessly determine to trample upon right and justice.’ Russ v. Com., 210 Pa. St. 544, 60 Atl. 169, 172, 1 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 409, 105 Am. St. Rep. 825, quoting Black, C. J. in Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. St. 147, 59 Am. Dee. 759. For a valuable discussion of the power of courts to declare a law un- constitutional because opposed to the “spirit”’ of the Constitution, see Lex- ington v. Thompson, 113 Ky. 540, 68 S .W. 477, 57 L. R. A. 775.CHAP. VII] DECLARING LEGISLATIVE ACTS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 303 are indeed many dicta and some great authorities holding that acts contrary to the first principles of right are void. The principle is un- questionably sound as the governing rule of a legislature in relation to its own acts, or even those of a preceding legislature. It also affords a safe rule of construction for courts, in the interpretation of laws admitting of any doubtful construction, to presume that the legislature could not have intended an unequal and unjust operation of its statutes. Such a construction ought never to be given to legislative language if it be susceptible of any other more conformable to justice; but if the words be positive and without ambiguity, I can find no authority for a court to vacate or repeal a statute on that ground alone. But it is only in express constitutional provisions, limiting legislative power and controlling the temporary will of a majority, by a permanent and paramount law, settled by the de- liberate wisdom of the nation, that I can find a safe and solid ground for the authority of courts of justice to declare void any legislative enactment. Any assumption of authority beyond this would be to place in the hands of the judiciary powers too great and too unde- fined either for its own security or the protection of private rights. It is therefore a most gratifying circumstance to the friends of regulated liberty, that in every change in their constitutional polity which has yet taken place here, whilst political power has been more widely diffused among the people, stronger and better-defined guards have been given to the rights of property.” And after quoting cer- tain express limitations, he proceeds: “Believing that we are to rely upon these and similar provisions as the best safeguards of our rights, as well as the safest authorities for judicial direction, I cannot bring myself to approve of the power of courts to annul any law solemnly passed, either on an assumed ground of its being con- trary to natural equity, or from a broad, loose, and vague interpre- tation of a constitutional provision beyond its natural and obvious sense.” } The accepted theory upon this subject appears to be this: In every sovereign State there resides an absolute and uncontrolled power of legislation. In Great Britain this complete power rests in the Parliament; in the American States it resides in the people themselves as an organized body politic. But the people, by creat- 1Cochran v. Van Surlay, 20 Wend. Selden, J.; 13 N. Y. 477, per Johnson, 365, 381, 383. See also People v. J.; School Town of Andrews vv. Gallagher, 4 Mich. 244; Benson v. Heiney, 178 Ind. 1, 98 N. E. 628, 43 Mayor, &c. of Albany, 24 Barb. 248; L. R. A. (nN. s.) 1023; In re Milecke, Grant v. Courter, 24 Barb. 232; 52 Wash. 312, 100 Pac. 743, 1382 Am, Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 378, St. Rep. 968, 21 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 259. per Comstock, J.; 13 N. Y. 453, per VOL. I— 23354 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I ing the Constitution of the United States, have delegated this power as to certain subjects, and under certain restrictions, to the Congress of the Union; and that portion they cannot resume, ex- cept as it may be done through amendment of the national Consti- tution. For the exercise of the legislative power, subject to this limitation, they create, by their State constitution, a legislative department upon which they confer it; and granting it in general terms, they must be understood to grant the whole legislative power which they possessed, except so far as at the same time they saw fit to impose restrictions. While, therefore, the Parliament of Britain possesses completely the absolute and uncontrolled power of legisla- tion, the legislative bodies of the American States possess the same power, except, first, as it may have been limited by the Consti- tution of the United States; and, second, as it may have been limited by the constitution of the State. A legislative act cannot, therefore, be declared void, unless its conflict with one of these two instruments can be pointed out.’ It is to be borne in mind, however, that there is a broad difference between the Constitution of the United States and the constitu- tions of the States as regards the powers which may be exercised under them. The government of the United States is one of enumerated powers; the governments of the States are possessed of all the general powers of legislation. When a law of Congress is assailed as void, we look in the national Constitution to see if the 1 People v. New York Central Rail- road Co., 34 Barb. 123; Gentry »v. Griffith, 27 Tex. 461; Danville ». Pace, 25 Gratt. 1, 18 Am. Rep. 663; Davis v. State, 3 Lea, 377; State v. Birmingham Southern R. Co., 182 Ala. 475, 62 So. 77, Ann. Cas. 1915 D, 436; Idaho Power, etc., Co. v. Blom- quist, 26 Idaho, 222, 141 Pac. 1083, Ann. Cas. 1916 E, 282; Schmitt »v. F. W. Cook Brewing Co., 187 Ind. 623, 120 N. B. 19, 3 A. L. R. 270; Law- rence E. Tierney Coal Co. v. Smith, 180 Ky. 815, 203 S. W. 731, 4 A. L. R. 1540; Bayville Village Corp. ». Boothbay Harbor, 110 Me. 46, 85 Atl. 300, Ann. Cas. 1914 B, 1135; Laugh- lin v. Portland, 111 Me. 486, 90 Atl. 318, L. R. A. (Nn. 8.) 1148, Ann. Cas. 1916 C, 734; State ex rel. Simpson v. Mankato, 117 Minn. 458, 136 N. W. 264, 41 L. R. A. (n. s.) 111; Williams v. Evans, 139 Minn. 32, 165 N. W. 495, 166 N. W. 504, L. R. A. 1918 F, 542; State v. Merchants Exchange, 269 Mo. 346, 190 S. W. 903, Ann. Cas. 1917 E, 871; Jenkins v. State Board of Elections, 180 N. C. 169, 104 S. E. 346, 14 A. L. R. 1247; State v. Wetz, 40 N. D. 299, 168 N. W. 835, 5 A. L. R. 731; Com. v. Herr, 229 Pa: St: 132, 78 Atl. 68, Ann. Cas. 1912 A, 422; State v. Summers, 33 S. D. 40, 144 N. W. 730, 50 L. R. A. (N. s.) 206, Ann. Cas. 1916 B, 860; Wheelon v. South Dakota Land Settlement Board, 43 S. D. 551, 181 N. W. 359, 14 A. L. R. 1145; Long v. State, 58 Tex. Crim. Rep. 209, 127 S. W. 208, 21 Ann. Cas. 405; Rio Grande Lumber Co. v. Darke, 50 Utah, 114, 167 Pac. 241, L. R. A. 1918 A, 1193; State v. King County, 67 Wash. 37, 120 Pac. 861, Ann. Cas. 1913 D, 78; Booten v. Pinson, 77 W. Va. 412, 89 S. E. 985, L. R. A. 1917 A, 1244. And see the cases cited, ante, p. 348, note 2.CHAP. VII] DECLARING LEGISLATIVE ACTS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 300 grant of specified powers is broad enough to embrace it; but when a State law is attacked on the same ground, it is presumably valid in any case, and this presumption is a conclusive one, unless in the Constitution of the United States or of the State we are able to discover that it is prohibited. We look in the Constitution of the United States for grants of legislative power, but in the constitution of the State to ascertain if any limitations have been imposed upon the complete power with which the legislative department of the State was vested in its creation. Congress can pass no laws but such as the Constitution authorizes either expressly or by clear im- plication ; while the State legislature has jurisdiction of all subjects on which its legislation is not prohibited.’ “The law-making power of the State,” it is said in one case, “recognizes no restraints, and is bound by none, except such as are imposed by the Constitution. That instrument has been aptly termed a legislative act by the people themselves in their sovereign capacity, and is therefore the paramount law. Its object is not to grant legislative power, but to confine and restrain it. Without the constitutional limitations, the power to make laws would be absolute. These limitations are created and imposed by express words, or arise by necessary im- plication. The leading feature of the Constitution is the separa- tion and distribution of the powers of the government. It takes care to separate the executive, legislative, and judicial powers, and to define their limits. The executive can do no legislative act, nor the legislature any executive act, and neither can exercise judicial authority.” ” It does not follow, however, that in every case the courts, before they can set aside a law as invalid, must be able to find in the Constitution some specific inhibition which has been disregarded, or some express command which has been disobeyed. Prohibitions 1 Sill v. Village of Corning, 15 N. Y. 297; People v. Supervisors of Orange, 27 Barb. 575; People v. Gallagher, 4 Mich. 244; Sears v. Cottrell, 5 Mich. 250; People v. New York Central Railroad Co., 24 N. Y. 497, 504; People v. Toynbee, 2 Park. Cr. R. 490; State v. Gutierrez, 15 La. Ann. 190; Walpole v. Elliott, 18 Ind. 258 ; Smith v. Judge, 17 Cal. 547; Common- wealth v. Hartman, 17 Pa. St. 118; Kirby v. Shaw, 19 Pa. St. 258; Weister v. Hade, 52 Pa. St. 474; Danville v. Pace, 25 Gratt. 1, 9, 18 Am. Rep. 663; Payne v. Providence Gas Co., 31 R. I. 295, 77 Atl. 145, Ann. Cas. 1912 B, 65; State ex rel. Wagner v. Summers, 33 S. D. 40, 144 N. W. 730, 50 L. R. A. (n. s.) 206, Ann. Cas. 1916 B, 860. 2 Sill v. Corning, 15 N. Y. 297, 308. 3“Tegislation contravening what the Constitution necessarily implies is void equally with the legislation contravening its express commands.” Hopper v. Britt, 203 N. Y. 144, 96 N. BY Sie Si) a. R. AS (CN. 8:))820; Ann. Cas. 1913 B, 172. A remarkable case of evasion to avoid the purpose of the Constitution, and still keep within its terms, was considered in People v. Albertson, 55 N. Y. 50306 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I are only important where they are in the nature of exceptions to a general grant of power; and if the authority to do an act has not been granted by the sovereign to its representative, it cannot be necessary to prohibit its being done. If in one department was vested the whole power of the government, it might be essential for the people, in the instrument delegating this complete authority, to make careful and particular exception of all those cases which it was intended to exclude from its cognizance; for without such exception the government might do whatever the people themselves, when met in their sovereign capacity, would have power todo. But when only the legislative power is delegated to one department, and the judicial to another, it is not important that the one should be expressly forbidden to try causes, or the other to make laws. The assumption of judicial power by the legislature in such a case is unconstitutional, because, though not expressly forbidden, it is nevertheless inconsistent with the provisions which have conferred upon another department the power the legislature is seeking to exercise.! And for similar reasons a legislative act which should undertake to make a judge the arbiter in his own controversies would be void, because, though in form a provision for the exercise of judicial power, in substance it would be the creation of an arbitrary and irresponsible authority, neither legislative, executive, nor judi- cial, and wholly unknown to constitutional government.2 It could not be necessary to forbid the judiciary to render judgment without suffering the party to make defence; because it is implied in judicial authority that there shall be a hearing before condemnation# Taxation cannot be arbitrary, because its very definition includes apportionment, nor can it be for a purpose not public, because that would be a contradiction in terms.‘ The right of local self-govern- ment cannot be taken away, because all our constitutions assume its continuance as the undoubted right of the people, and as an inseparable incident to republican government.® The bills of rights in the American constitutions forbid that parties shall be deprived In Taylor v. Commissioners of Ross _ Bigelow on Estoppel, and Freeman on County, 23 Ohio St. 22, the Supreme Judgments. Court of Ohio found itself under the 4 Post, ch. 14. And see Curtis »v. necessity of declaring that that which Whipple, 24 Wis. 350; Tyson ». was forbidden by the Constitution School Directors, 51 Pa. St. 9; Free- could no more be done indirectly than land ». Hastings, 10 Allen, 570; Opin- directly. ions of Judges, 58 Me. 590; People ». * Ante, pp. 175 et seq., and cases cited. Batchellor, 53 N. Y. 128; Lowell »v. * Post, pp. 869 et seq., and cases cited. Boston, 111 Mass. 454; Re Page, 60 * Post, pp. 735 et seg. On this sub- Kan. 842, 58 Pac. 478, 47 L. R. A. 68. ject in general, reference is made to 5 People v. Mayor, &c. of Chicago, those very complete recent works, 51 IIl. 17; People v. Hurlbut, 24CHAP. VII] DECLARING LEGISLATIVE ACTS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 3097 of property except by the law of the land; but if the prohibition had been omitted, a legislative enactment to pass one man’s prop- erty over to another would nevertheless be void. If the act pro- ceeded upon the assumption that such other person was justly en- titled to the estate, and therefore it was transferred, it would be void, because judicial in its nature; and if it proceeded without reasons, it would be equally void, as neither legislative nor judicial, but a mere arbitrary fiat.!. There is no difficulty in saying that any such Mich. 44; State v. Denny, 118 Ind. 449, 21 N. E. 274; State ex rel. Gerry v. Edwards, 42 Mont. 135, 111 Pac. 734, 32 L. R. A. (wv. s.) 1078, Ann. Cas. 1912 A, 1063. Further as to the question of the right to local self- government, see State ex rel. Bulkley v. Williams, 68 Conn. 131, 35 Atl. 24, 421, 48 L. R. A. 465; Rathbone »v. Wirth, 150 N. Y. 459, 45 N. E. 15, 24, 34 L. R. A. 408, 419; O’Connor ». Fond du Lac, 109 Wis. 253, 85 N. W. 327, 53 L. R. A. 831; Com. ez rel. Elkin v. Moir, 199 Pa. 534, 49 Atl. 351, 53 L. R. A. 837, 85 Am. St. 801; State v. Fox, 158 Ind. 126, 63 N. E. 19, 55 L. R. A. 893; State ex rel. White v. Barker, 116 Iowa, 96, 89 N. W. 204, 57 L. R. A. 244; Lexington v. Thompson, 113 Ky. 540, 68 S. W. 477, 57 L. R. A. 775. See cases post, pp. 390, 488. But in Newport v. Horton, 22 R. I. 196, 47 Atl. 312, 50 L. R. A. 330, the court said: ‘‘The broad claim made and so urgently pressed by the peti- tioners cannot be sustained to the ex- tent of holding that the Constitution of the State must be interpreted according to an unwritten theory of local self-government, which so en- tered into its provisions as to make it controlling in construing those provisions.” And in a case in the Supreme Court of the United States, Barnes v. District of Columbia, 91 U. S. 540, 23 L. ed. 440, Mr. Justice Hunt, in delivering the opinion of the court, said: ‘‘A municipal corpora- tion, in the exercise of all its duties, including those most strictly local or internal, is but a department of the State. The legislature may give it all the powers such a being is capable of receiving, making it a miniature State within its locality. Again: it may strip it of every power leaving it a corporation in name only; and it may create and recreate these changes as often as it chooses, or it may itself exercise directly within the locality any or all of the powers usually committed to a municipality.” The doctrine enunciated in this case has the support of the courts in a number of States. Hunter v. Pitts- burgh, 207 U.S. 161, 52 L. ed. 151, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 40; Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U. S. 182, 67 L. ed. 937, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 534, 29 A. L. R. 1471; Mayor, etc., of Americus v. Perry, 114 Ga. 871, 40S. E. 1004, 57 L. R. A. 230; Booth v. McGuinness, 78 N. J. L. 346, 75 Atl. 455; Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Pa. St. 169: Brown v. Galveston, 97 Tex. 1, 75 S. W. 488; Callaghan »v. Tobin, (Tex. Civ. App.) 90S. W. 328; Ex parte Farnsworth, 61 Tex. Crim. Rep. 342, 135 8. W. 538, 33 L. R. A. (x. s.) 968; Meechem »v. Shields, 57 Wash. 617, 107 Pac. 835; State v. Burr, 65 Wash. 521, 118 Pac. 639. 1Bowman v. Middleton, 1 Bay, 252; Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Pet. 627, 7 L. ed. 542; Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch, 43, 3 L. ed. 650; Ervine’s Appeal, 16 Pa. St. 256. “Tt is now considered an universal and fundamental proposition in every well regulated and properly adminis- tered government, whether embodied in a constitutional form or not, that private property cannot be taken for strictly private purposes at all, nor for public uses without a just compensa- tion; and that the obligation of con- tracts cannot be abrogated or essen- tially impaired. These and other vested rights of the citizen are held sacred and inviolable, even against the plenitude of power of the legislative department.” Nelson, J., in People358 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I act, which under pretence of exercising one power is usurping an- other, is opposed to the constitution and void. It is assuming a power which the people, if they have not granted it at all, have re- served to themselves. The maxims of Magna Charta and the com- mon law are the interpreters of constitutional grants of power, and those acts which by those maxims the several departments of government are forbidden to do cannot be considered within any grant or apportionment of power which the people in general terms have made to those departments.! The Parliament of Great Britain, indeed, as possessing the sovereignty of the country, has the power to disregard fundamental principles, and pass arbitrary and unjust enactments; but it cannot do this rightfully, and it has the power to do so simply because there is no written constitution from which its authority springs or on which it depends, and by which the courts can test the validity of its declared will. The rules which confine the discretion of Parliament within the ancient land- marks are rules for the construction of the powers of the American legislatures ; and however proper and prudent it may be expressly to prohibit those things which are not understood to be within the proper attributes of legislative power, such prohibition can never be regarded as essential, when the extent of the power apportioned to the legislative department is found upon examination not to be broad enough to cover the obnoxious authority. The absence of such prohibition cannot, by implication, confer power. Nor, where fundamental rights are declared by the constitution, is it necessary at the same time to prohibit the legislature, in ex- press terms, from taking them away. The declaration is itself a prohibition, and is inserted in the constitution for the express pur- pose of operating as a restriction upon legislative power.2. Many things, indeed, which are contained in the bills of rights to be found in the American constitutions, are not, and from the very nature of the case cannot be, so certain and definite in character as to form rules for judicial decisions; and they are declared rather as guides to the legislative judgment than as marking an absolute limitation of power. The nature of the declaration will generally enable us to determine without difficulty whether it is the one thing or the other. If it is declared that all men are free, and no man can be v. Morris, 13 Wend. 325, 328. See Neff, 52 Ohio St. 375, 40 N. BE. 720, 28 Bank of Michigan v. Williams, 5 Wend. L. R. A. 409. 478. 1 Spann v. Dallas, 111 Tex. 350, 235 Property of a private eleemosynary S. W. 513, 19 A. L. R. 1387. corporation is none the less private 2 Beebe v. State, 6 Ind. 501. This because it is charged with the main- principle is very often acted upon when tenance of a public charity. State v. not expressly declared.CHAP. VII] DECLARING LEGISLATIVE ACTS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 309 slave to another, a definite and certain rule of action is laid down, which the courts can administer ; but if it be said that “the blessings of a free government can only be maintained by a firm adherence to justice, moderation, temperance, frugality, and virtue”, we should not be likely to commit the mistake of supposing that this declaration would authorize the courts to substitute their own view of justice for that which may have impelled the legislature to pass a particular law, or to inquire into the moderation, temperance, frugality, and virtue of its members, with a view to set aside their action, if it should appear to have been influenced by the opposite qualities! It is plain that what in the one case is a rule, in the other is an admonition addressed to the judgment and the conscience of all persons in authority, as well as of the people themselves. So the forms prescribed for legislative action are in the nature of limitations upon its authority. The constitutional provisions which establish them are equivalent to a declaration that the legislative power shall be exercised under these forms, and shall not be exer- cised under any other. A statute which does not observe them will plainly be ineffectual.’ Statutes Unconstitutional in Part. It will sometimes be found that an act of the legislature 1s op- posed in some of its provisions to the constitution, while others, standing by themselves, would be unobjectionable. So the forms observed in passing it may be sufficient for some of the purposes sought to be accomplished by it, but insufficient for others. In any such case the portion which conflicts with the constitution, or in regard to which the necessary conditions have not been observed, must be treated as a nullity. Whether the other parts of the statute must also be adjudged void because of the association must depend upon a consideration of the object of the law, and in what manner and to what extent the unconstitutional portion affects the remainder. A statute, it has been said, is judicially held to be unconstitutional, because it is not within the scope of legislative authority; it may either propose to accomplish something prohibited by the constitu- tion, or to accomplish some lawful, and even laudable object, by means repugnant to the Constitution of the United States or of the 189 a statute cannot authorize a in some way defining what is ‘‘ grossly board of health to annul a physician’s unprofessional conduct.” Mathews ». license “for grossly unprofessional Murphy, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 750, 63 S. W. conduct of a character likely to de- 785, 54 L. R. A. 415. ceive or defraud the public’’ without 2 See ante, pp. 266 et seq.360 State. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [voL. I A statute may contain some such provisions, and yet the same act, having received the sanction of all branches of the legis- lature, and being in the form of law, may contain other useful and salutary provisions, not obnoxious to any just constitutional excep- tion. It would be inconsistent with all just principles of con- stitutional law to adjudge these enactments void because they are associated in the same act, but not connected with or dependent on others which are unconstitutional.?, Where, therefore, a part of a 1Commonwealth v. Clapp, 5 Gray, 97. “A law that is unconstitutional is so because it is either an assumption of power not legislative in its nature, or because it is inconsistent with some provision of the Federal or State Con- stitution.’”? Woodworth, J., in Com- monwealth v. Maxwell, 27 Pa. St. 444, 456 2 Commonwealth v. Clapp, 5 Gray, 97. See to the same effect, Fisher v. McGirr, 1 Gray, 1; Warren v. Mayor, &c. of Charlestown, 2 Gray, 84; Well- ington, Petitioner, 16 Pick. 87; Com- monwealth v. Hitchings, 5 Gray, 482; Commonwealth v. Pomeroy, 5 Gray, 486; State v. Copeland, 3 R. I. 33; State v. Snow, 3 R. I. 64; Armstrong v. Jackson, 1 Blackf. 374; Clark »v. Ellis, 2 Blackf. 8; McCulloch ». State, 11 Ind. 424; People v. Hill, 7 Cal. 97; Lathrop v. Mills, 19 Cal. 513; Rood v. McCargar, 49 Cal. 117; Supervisors of Knox Co. v. Davis, 63 Ill. 405; Myers v. People, 67 Ill. 503; Thomson v. Grand Gulf Railroad Co., 3 How. (Miss.) 240; Campbell v. Union Bank, 7 Miss. 625; Mobile & Ohio Railroad Co. v. State, 29 Ala. 573; South & N. Ala. R. R. Co. ». Morris, 65 Ala. 193; Santo v. State, 2 Iowa, 165; State v. Cox, 3 Eng. 436; Mayor, &c. of Savannah »v. State, 4 Ga. 26; Exchange Bank v. Hines, 3 Ohio St. 1; Robinson v. Bank of Darien, 18 Ga. 65; State v. Wheeler, 25 Conn. 290; People v. Lawrence, 36 Barb. 177; Williams v. Payson, 14 La. Ann. 7; Ely v. Thompson, 3 A. K. Marsh. 70; Davis v. State, 7 Md. 151; State v. Commissioners of Baltimore, 29 Md. 521; Hagerstown v. Dechert, 32 Md. 369; Berry v. Baltimore, &c. R. R. Co., 41 Md. 446, 20 Am. Rep. 69; State v. Clarke, 54 Mo. 17; Lowndes Co. v. Hunter, 49 Ala. 507; Isom v. Mississippi, &c. R. R. Co., 36 Miss. 300; Bank of Hamilton v. Dud- ley’s Lessee 2 Pet. 492, 7 L. ed. 496; Turner v. Com’rs, 27 Kan. 314; In re Groffs, 21 Neb. 647, 33 N. W. 426; State v. Tuttle, 53 Wis. 45, 9 N. W. 791; People v. Hall, 8 Col. 485, 9 Pac. 34; Brazee v. Michigan, 241 U.S. 340, 60 L. ed. 1034, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 561, Ann. Cas. 1917 C, 522; Bowman ». Continental Oil Co., 256 U. S. 642, 65 L. ed. 1139, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 606; Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Go., 261 U. S. 428, 67 L. ed. 731, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 445; Joslin Mfg. Co. »v. Providence, 262 U. S. 668, 67 L. ed. 1167, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 684; Cella Commission Co. v. Bohlinger, 78 C. C. A. 467, 147 Fed. 419, 8 L. R. A. (Nn. 8.) 537; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Westby, 102 C. C. A. 65, 178 Fed. 619, 47 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 97; Gherna v. State, 16 Ariz. 344, 146 Pac. 494, Ann. Cas. 1916 D, 94; Macmillan Co. v. Clarke, 184 Cal. 491, 194 Pac. 1030, 17 A. L. R. 288; Hoxie v. New York, etc., R. @o:, 82 Conn: 352) 73 Atle 7545 a7 Ann. Cas. 324; Clendaniel ». Conrad, 3 Boyce (Del.) 549, 83 Atl. 1036, Ann. Cas. 1915 B, 968; State v. Philips, 70 Fla. 340, 70 So. 367, Ann. Cas. 1918 A, 138; Territory v. Hoy Chang, 21 Hawaii, 39, Ann. Cas. 1915 A, 1115; Scown v. Czarnecki, 264 Ill. 305, 106 N. E. 276, L. R. A. 1915 B, 247, Ann. Cas. 1915 A, 772; State Public Utili- ties Commission v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 275 Ill. 555, 114 N. E. 325, Ann. Cas. 1917 C, 50; Springfield Gas, etc., Co. v. Springfield, 292 Ill. 286, 126 N. E. 739, 18 A. L. R. 929; Hammer v. State, 173 Ind. 199, 89 N. E. 850, 140 Am. St. Rep. 248, 24 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 795, 21 Ann. Cas. 1034; Pitts- burgh, etc., R. Co. v. Chappell, 183CHAP. VII] DECLARING LEGISLATIVE ACTS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 361 statute is unconstitutional, that fact does not authorize the courts to declare the remainder void also, unless all the provisions are connected in subject-matter, depending on each other, operating together for the same purpose, or that it cannot be presumed the legislature would have in meaning, passed the one without the other." Ind. 141, 106 N. E. 403, Ann. Cas. 1918 A, 627; Des Moines v. Man- hattan Oil Co., 193 Iowa, 1096, 184 N. W. 828, 23 A. L. R. 1322; State v. Smiley, 65 Kan. 240, 69 Pac. 199, 67 L. R. A. 903; State v. Ryder, 126 Minn. 95, 147 N. W. 953, 5 A. L. R. 1449; Nalley v. Home Ins. Co., 250 Mo. 452, 157 S. W. 769, Ann. Cas. 1915 A, 283; Hudspeth v. Swayze, 85 N. J. L. 592, 89 Atl. 780, Ann. Cas. 1916 A, 102; State »v. Brooken, 19 N. M. 404, 143 Pac. 479, a ae 1915 B, 213, Ann. Cas. 1916 D, 136; Hathorn v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 194 N. Y. 326, 87 N. E. 504, 128 Am. St. Rep. 555, 23 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 436 16 Ann. Cas. 989; State v. Bickford, 28 N. D. 36, 147 N. W. 407, Ann. Cas. 1916 D, 140; Bishop »v. Tulsa, (Okla. Crim. Rep.), 209 Pac. 228, 27 A. L. R. 1009; Wheelon v. South Dakota Land Settlement Board, 43 S. D. 551, 181 N. W. 359, 14 A. L. R. 1145; Fite v. State, 114 Tenn. 646, 88 S. W. oat 1 i. Re A. (N. s.) 520, 4 Ann. Cas. 1108; Sabre v. Rutland R. Co., 86 Vt. 347, 85 Atl. 693, Ann. Cas. 1915 C, 1269; Bonnett »v. Vallier, 136 Wis. 193, 116 N. W. 885, 128 Am. St. Rep. 1061, 17 L. R. A. (N. s.) 486. “To the extent of the collision and repugnancy, the law of the State must yield; and to that extent, and no further, it is rendered by such repug- nancy inoperative and void.”’ Com- monwealth v. Kimball, 24 Pick. 359, 361, per Shaw, Ch. J.; Norris v. Boston, 4 Met. 282; Eckhart v. State, 5 W. Va. 515. Where the portions are separable, action under the statute will be presumed to have been taken without reference to the invalid pro- visions, and will be upheld so far as it is within the valid portions. Donners- berger v. Prendergast, 128 Ill. 229, 21 N. E. 1. If a statute provides for an uncon- otherwise so connected together The constitutional and uncon- stitutional method of selecting a jury, that fact alone will not necessarily make other portions of the statute invalid. If a construction can be given an act which will render it con- stitutional, that construction will be adopted, even though it may eliminate a part of the act. Bishop v. City of Tulsa, (Okla. Crim. Rep.), 209 Pac. 228, 27 A. L. R. 1008. 1Commonwealth v. Hitchings, 5 Gray, 482. See also Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 36 L. ed. 294, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 495; Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 263, 29 L. ed. 615, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 580; Penniman’s Case, 103 U. S 716, 26 L. ed. 602; Keokuk N. L. Packet Go. v. Keokuk, 95 U.S. 80, 24 L. ed. 377: Com. v. Clark, 195 Pa. 634, 46 Atl. 286, 57 LG. Re Ay 3483 Wheeler v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. Co., 178 U. S. 321, 44 L. ed. 1085, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 949, aff. 70 Conn. 326, 39 Atl. 443; Hill v. Wallace, 259 U. S. 44, 66 L. ed. 822, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 453; Cella Commission Co. ». Boh- linger, 147 Fed. 419; State v. Philips, 70 Fla. 340, 70 So. 367, Ann. Cas. 1918 A, 138; State ex rel. Wilcox v. tyder, 126 Minn. 95, 147 N. W. 953, 5 A. L. R. 1449; People v. Briggs, 50 N. Y. 553; Hathorn v. Natural Car- bonic Gas Co., 194 N. Y. 326, 87 N. E. 504, 23 L. R. A. (N. s.) 436, 128 Am. St. Rep. 555, 16 Ann. Cas. 989, affirming 128 App. Div. 33, 112 N. Y. Supp. 374; American Exchange National Bank v. Lacy, 188 N. C. 25, 123 8. E. 475; O’Neil v. Providence Amuse- ment Co., 42 R. I. 479, 108 Atl. 887, 8 A. L. R. 1590. “A statute bad in part is not neces- sarily void in its entirety. Provisions within the legislative power may stand if separable from the bad.” But a provision inherently unobjectionable cannot be deemed separable unless it appears both that, standing alone,362 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I stitutional provisions may even be contained in the same section, and yet be perfectly distinct and separable, so that the first may stand though the last fall. tained in the same section; The point is not whether they are con- for the distribution into sections is purely artificial; but whether they are essentially and inseparably connected in substance.! If, when the unconstitutional portion is stricken out, that which remains is complete in itself, and capable of being executed in accordance with the apparent legislative intent, wholly independent of that which was rejected, it must be sustained. The difficulty is in determining whether the good and bad parts of the statute are capable of being separated within the meaning of this rule.” If a statute attempts to accomplish two or more objects, and is void as to one, it may still be in every respect complete and valid as to the other. But if its purpose is to accomplish a single object only, and some of its provisions are void, the whole must fail unless sufficient remains to effect the object without the aid of the invalid portion.’ And if they are so mutually connected with and depend- ent on each other, as conditions, legal effect can be given to it and that the legislature intended the provision to stand, in case others included in the act and held bad should fall. Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U. S. 286, 68 L. ed. 686, 44 Sup. Ct. Rep. 323. Conceding that a part of a statute exempting from a wheelage tax vehicles used for the purpose of selling or peddling the products of farm or gar- den was unconstitutional, it was held that it was not so connected with the rest of the act as to render the whole unconstitutional. Fairley v. City of Duluth, 150 Minn. 374, 185 N. W. 390, 32 A. L. R. 1258. “The general rule is that when a proviso in the nature of an exception to a general statute is invalid, the gen- eral provisions of the statute are not invalidated thereby, unless it clearly appears that the provisions of the ex- ception are so intimately and inher- ently related to and connected with the general provisions to which it relates that the legislature would not have enacted the latter without the former.” People v. Monterey Fish Products Co., 195 Cal. 548, 234 Pac. 398, 38 A. L. R. 1186. Although a proviso is ineffectual because unconstitutional, it cannot considerations, or compensations be disregarded when the intention of the legislature is in question. Com- monwealth v. Potts, 79 Pa. St. 164. 1Commonwealth v. Hitchings, 5 Gray, 482; Willard v. People, 5 Ill. 461; Eells v. People, 5 Ill. 498; Robin- son v. Bidwell, 22 Cal. 379; State v. Easterbrook, 3 Nev. 173; Hagers- town v. Dechert, 32 Md. 369; People v. Kenney, 96 N. Y. 294; Berea Col- lege v. Kentucky, 211 U. S. 45, 53 L. ed. 81, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 33; Gherna v. State, 16 Ariz. 344, 146 Pac. 494, Ann. Cas. 1916 D, 94; Scown ». Czarnecki, 264 Ill. 305, 106 N. E. 276, L. R. A. 1915 B, 247, Ann. Cas. 1915 A, 722; Soper v. Lawrence Bros. Co., 98 Me. 268, 56 Atl. 908, 99 Am. St. Rep. 397; State v. Robb, 100 Me. 180, 60 Atl. 874, 4 Ann. Cas. 275; Williams v. State, 81 N. H. 341, 125 Atl. 661, 39 A. L. R. 490; Hudspeth v. Swayze, 85 N. J. L. 592, 89 Atl. 780, Ann. Cas. 1916 A, 102; Nathan v. Spokane County, 35 Wash. 26, 76 Pac. 521, 102 Am. St. Rep. 888, 65 L. R. A. 336. * This is a question of interpreta- tion and of legislative intent. Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286, 68 L. ed. 686, 44 Sup. Ct. Rep. 323. 3 Santo v. State, 2 Iowa, 165; State v. Robb, 100 Me. 180, 60 Atl. 874, 4CHAP. VII] DECLARING LEGISLATIVE ACTS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 363 for each other, as to warrant the belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, and if all could not be carried into effect the legis- lature would not pass the residue independently, then if some parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus dependent, conditional, or connected must fall with them.! Ann. Cas. 275. But perhaps the doc- trine of sustaining one part of a stat- ute when the other is void was carried to an extreme in Santo v. State, supra. A prohibitory liquor law had been passed which was not objectionable on constitutional grounds, except that the last section provided that “the ques- tion of prohibiting the sale and manu- facture of intoxicating liquor’’ should be submitted to the electors of the State, and if it should appear ‘‘that a majority of the votes cast as afore- said, upon said question of prohibi- tion, shall be for the prohibitory liquor law, then this act shall take effect on the first day of July, 1855.” The court held this to be an attempt by the legislature to shift the exercise of legislative power from themselves to the people, and therefore void; but they also held that the remainder of the act was complete without this section, and must therefore be sus- tained on the rule above given. The reasoning of the court by which they are brought to this conclusion is in- genious; but one cannot avoid feeling, especially after reading the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Wright, that by the decision the court gave effect to an act which the legislature did not design should take effect unless the result of the unconstitutional submis- sion to the people was in its favor. See also Weir v. Cram, 37 Iowa, 649. For a similar ruling, see Maize »v. State, 4 Ind. 342; overruled in Mesh- meier v. State, 11 Ind. 482. And see State v. Dombaugh, 20 Ohio St. 167, where it was held competent to con- strue a part of an act held to be valid by another part adjudged unconsti- tutional, though the court considered it “quite probable” that if the legis- lature had supposed they were with- out power to adopt the void part of the act, they would have made an essen- tially different provision by the other. See also People v. Bull, 46 N. Y. 57, where part of an act was sustained which probably would not have been adopted by the legislature separately. It must be obvious, in any case where part of an act is set aside as unconstitutional, that it is unsafe to indulge in the same extreme presump- tions in support of the remainder that are allowable in support of a complete act when some cause of invalidity is suggested to the whole of it. In the latter case, we know the legislature designed the whole act to have effect, and we should sustain it if possible; in the former, we do not know that the legislature would have been willing that a part of the act should be sus- tained if the remainder were held void, and there is generally a presumption more or less strong to the contrary. While, therefore, in the one case the act should be sustained unless the invalidity is clear, in the other the whole should fall unless it is manifest the portion not opposed to the consti- tution can stand by itself, and that in the legislative intent it was not to be controlled or modified in its construc- tion and effect by the part which was void. Noel v. People, 187 Ill. 587, 58 N. E. 616, 52 L. R. A. 287, 79 Am. St. 238: Redell v. Moores, 63 Neb. 219, 88 N. W. 248, 55 L. R. A. 740. 1 Warren v. Mayor, &c. of Charles- town, 2 Gray, 84; State »v. Commis- sioners of Perry County, 5 Ohio St. 497; State v. Pugh, 43 Ohio St. 98; Slauson v. Racine, 13 Wis. 398; Allen County Commissioners v. Silvers, 22 Ind. 491; State v. Denny, 118 Ind. 449, 21 N. E. 274; Eckhart ». State, 5 W. Va. 515; Allen v. Louisiana, 103 U. S. 80, 26 L. ed. 318; Tillman ». Cocke, 9 Bax. 429; Jones v. Jones, 104 N. Y. 234, 10 N. E. 269; Meyer v. Berlandi, 39 Minn. 438, 40 N. W. 513; International Text-Book Co. »v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91, 54 L. ed. 678, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 481, 97. I Rie AS NBs) 493, 18 Ann. Cas. 1103; Replogle v.364 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VvoL. I It has accordingly been held, where a statute submitted to the voters of a county the question of the removal of their county seat, and one section imposed the forfeiture of certain vested rights in case the vote was against the removal, that this portion of the act being void, the whole must fall, inasmuch as the whole was sub- mitted to the electors collectively, and the threatened forfeiture would naturally affect the result of the vote. Little Rock, 166 Ark. 617, 267 S. W. 353, 36 A. L. R. 13833; Eliasberg Bros. Mercantile Co. v. Grimes, 204 Ala. 492, 86 So. 56; Hoxie v. New York, etc., R. Co., 82 Conn. 352, 73 Atl. 754, 17 Ann. Cas. 324; Beach v. Bradstreet, 85 Conn. 344, 82 Atl. 1030, Ann. Cas. 1913 B, 946; State v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 56 Fla. 617, 47 So. 969, 32 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 639; State v. Tampa Waterworks Co., 56 Fla. 858, 47 So. 358, 19 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 183; State v. Philips, 70 Fla. 340, 70 So. 367, Ann. Cas. 1918 A, 138; Scown v. Czarnecki, 264 Ill. 305, 106 N. E. 276, L. R. A. 1915 B, 247, Ann. Cas. 1915 A, 772; Springfield Gas, etc., Co. v. Springfield, 292 Ill. 236, 126 N. E. 739, 18 A. L. R. 929; Gretna v. Bailey, 141 La. 625, 75 So. 491, Ann. Cas. 1918 E, 566; Soper v. Lawrence Bros. Co., 98 Me. 268, 56 Atl. 908, 99 Am. St. Rep. 397; State v. Robb, 100 Me. 180, 60 Atl. 874, 4 Ann. Cas. 275; State v. Rice, 115 Md. 317, 80 Atl. 1026, 36 L. R. A. (N. s.) 344, Ann. Cas. 1913 A, 1247; Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 200 Mass. 482, 86 N. E. 916, 128 Am. St. Rep. 446, 43 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 746; State ex rel. Ragan »v. Junkin, 85 Neb. 1, 122 N. W. 473, 23 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 839; Hudspeth », Swayze, 85 N. J. L. 592, 89 Atl. 780, Ann. Cas. 1916 A, 102; Malin v. La Moure County, 27 N. D. 140, 145 N. W. 582, 50 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 997; Pugh v. Pugh, 25 S. D. 7, 124 N. W. 959, 32 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 954; State v. State Canvassers, 159 Wis. 216, 150 N. W. 542, Ann. Cas. 1916 D, 159. This doctrine is particularly appli- cable to a referendum statute, because of the improbability that a majority of the electors who voted for its adop- tion or rejection would have voted for the adoption of the provisions that do not violate the Constitution, inde- pendently of the provisions subse- quently decreed to be unconstitutional and invalid. Gretna v. Bailey, 141 La. 625, 75 So. 491, Ann. Cas. 1918 B, 566. When a part of a statute is uncon- stitutional, that fact does not compel the courts to declare the remainder void, unless the unconstitutional part is of such import that the other parts of the statute, if sustained without it, would cause results not contemplated or desired by the legislature. The question to be determined is whether the obnoxious part is an inducement of the whole act or whether it is merely an incident thereto. The test to be applied in determining whether the unconstitutional provision in a statute invalidates the whole enactment is the answer to the following questions: (1) Are the constitutional and the unconstitutional parts capable of sep- aration so that each may be read and may stand by itself? (2) Is the uncon- stitutional part so connected with the general scope of the whole as to make it impossible to give effect to the apparent intention of the legislature if the clause or part is stricken out? (3) Is the insertion of words or terms necessary in order to separate the constitutional part from the unconsti- tutional part and to give effect to the former only? State v. Bickford, 28 N. D. 36, 147 N. W. 407, Ann. Cas. 1916 D, 140. Where a statute made the same provision for taxing telegraph mes- sages sent to points within and to points without the State, and was void as to the latter, it was held wholly void. Western Union Tel. Co. ». State, 62 Tex. 630. 1 State v. Commissioners of Perry County, 5 Ohio St. 497. And see Jones v. Robbins, 8 Gray, 329; Mon-CHAP. VII] DECLARING LEGISLATIVE ACTS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 365 And, where a statute annexed to the city of Racine certain lands previously in the township of Racine, but contained an express pro- vision that the lands so annexed should be taxed at a different and less rate than other lands in the city; the latter provision being held unconstitutional, it was also held that the whole statute must fail, ‘nasmuch as such provision was clearly intended as a compensation for the annexation.’ And where a statute, in order to obtain a jury of six persons, pro- vided for the summoning of twelve jurors, from whom six were to be chosen and sworn, and under the Constitution the jury must con- sist of twelve, it was held that the provision for reducing the number to six could not be rejected and the statute sustained, inasmuch as this would be giving to it a construction and effect different from that the legislature designed; and would deprive the parties of the means of obtaining impartial jurors which the statute had intended to give.2 [And where price-fixing features of a State statute, clearly regulatory of interstate commerce, were essential and vital parts of the general plan of the statute to control the purchase of grain and to determine the profit at which it might be sold, and it was appar- ent that without these features the legislature would not have passed the act, it was held that such an essential feature of the law could not be eliminated and the constitutional parts of it saved.*| On the other hand, — to illustrate how intimately the valid and invalid portions of a statute may be associated, — a section of the criminal code of Illinois provided that “if any person shall harbor or secrete any negro, mulatto, or person of color, the same being a slave or servant, owing service or labor to any other persor they reside in this State or in any other State, or Territory, or dis- trict, within the limits and under the jurisdiction of the United States, or shall in any wise hinder or prevent the lawful owner or owners of such slaves or servants from retaking them in a lawful manner, every person so offending shall be deemed guilty of a mis- demeanor ”, etc., and it was held that, although the latter portion of the section was void within the decision in Prigg v. Pennsylvania,’ yet that the first portion, being a police regulation for the preserva- tion of order in the State, and important to its well-being, and capa- ble of being enforced without reference to the rest, was not affected is, whether roe v. Collins, 17 Ohio St. 666, 684; See Commonwealth v. Potts, 79 Pa. Taylor v. Commissioners of Ross St. 164. County, 23 Ohio St. 22, 84. 3 Lemke v. Farmers Grain Co., 258 1Stanson v. Racine, 13 Wis. 398, U.S. 50, 66 L. ed. 458, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. followed in State v. Dousman, 28 Wis. 244. 541. 416 Pet. 539, 10 L. ed. 1060. 2 Campau v. Detroit, 14 Mich. 266.366 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. 1 by the invalidity of the rest. [Where there is a scheme of legislation for a particular purpose, created by the enactment of a law specially referring to the subject, and to other laws required for a complete plan, if the special enactment is the inducing provision and it is unconstitutional, the whole of the legislation is void.?| A legislative act may be entirely valid as to some classes of cases, and clearly void as to others. A general law for the punishment of offenses, which should endeavor to reach, by its retroactive opera- tion, acts before committed, as well as to prescribe a rule of conduct for the citizen in the future, would be void so far as it was retro- spective; but such invalidity would not affect the operation of the law in regard to the cases which were within the legislative control. A law might be void as violating the obligation of existing con- tracts, but valid as to all contracts which should be entered into subsequent to its passage, and which therefore would have no legal force except such as the law itself would allow. [A State statute which interferes with interstate commerce, while invalid in so far as it does so, may be valid in its application to intrastate com- merce.° In response to a question whether a single tax, assessed by a State upon the receipts of a telegraph company derived partly from interstate commerce and partly from commerce within the State, but returned and assessed in gross and without separation or apportionment, was wholly valid or invalid only in proportion and to the extent that the receipts were derived from interstate com- 1 Willard v. People, 5 Ill. 461; Eells v. People, 5 Ill. 498. See Hagerstown v. Dechert, 32 Md. 369. * Huber v. Martin, 127 Wis. 412, 105 N:. W. 1031; 1135; 115 Am. St. Rep. 1023, 3 L. R. A. (wv. s.) 6538, 7 Ann. Cas. 400. 8 Moore v. New Orleans, 32 La. Ann. 726; Leep v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 58 Ark. 407, 25 S. W. 75, 41 Am. St. Rep. 109, 23 L. R. A. 264; John Woods & Sons v. Curl, 75 Ark. 328, 87S. W. 621, 5 Ann. Cas. 423; Terri- tory v. Hoy Chang, 21 Hawaii, 39, Ann. Cas. 1915 A, 1155; State v. Robb, 100 Me. 180, 60 Atl. 874, 4 Ann. Cas. 275; Sault Ste. Marie Hospital v. Sharpe, 209 Mich. 684, 177 N. W. 297. Com- pare Cella Commission Co. v. Boh- linger, 78 C. C. A. 467, 147 Fed. 419, 8 L. R. A. (wn. s.) 537. A law forbidding the sale of liquors may be void as to imported liquors and valid as to all others. Tiernan v. Rinker, 102 U. S. 123, 26 L. ed. 103; State v. Amery, 12 R. I. 64. 4Mundy v. Monroe, 1 Mich. 68; Cargill v. Power, 1 Mich. 369; Brady v. Mattern, 125 Iowa, 158, 100 N. W. 358, 106 Am. St. Rep. 291. In People v. Rochester, 50 N. Y. 525, certain commissioners were appointed to take for a city hall either lands belonging to the city or lands of indi- viduals. The act made no provision for compensation. The commissioners elected to take lands belonging to the city. Held, that the act was not wholly void for the omission to provide compensation in case the lands of individuals had been selected. ’Ratherman »v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 127 U. S. 411, 32 L. ed. 229, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1127; Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Brickell, 233 U. S. 304, 58 L. ed. 974, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 493.CHAP. VII] DECLARING LEGISLATIVE ACTS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 367 merce, the Supreme Court of the United States unanimously an- swered that so far as levied upon receipts derived from interstate commerce the tax was void, but so far as levied upon receipts from commerce wholly within the State it was valid."] In any such case the unconstitutional law must operate as far as it can,” and it will not be held invalid on the objection of a party whose interests are not affected by it in a manner which the Constitution forbids’ If there are any exceptions to this rule, they must be of cases only where it is evident, from a contemplation of the statute and of the purpose to be accomplished by it, that it would not have been passed at all, except as an entirety, and that the general purpose of the legislature will be defeated if it shall be held valid as to some cases and void as to others.’ 1Ratherman v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 127 U.S. 411, 32 L. ed. 229, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1127. This case has been cited repeatedly with ap- proval and its principle accepted. Western Union Telegraph Co. »v. Alabama, 132 U. S. 472, 33 L. ed. 409, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 161; Lehigh Valley R. R. v. Pennsylvania, 145 U.S. 192, 36 L. ed. 672, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 806 ; Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Charleston, 153 U. S. 692, 38 L. ed. 871, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1094; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, 54 L. ed. 355, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 190; Bowman v. Continental Oil Co., 256 U.S. 642, 65 L. ed. 1139, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 606. 2Baker v. Braman, 6 Hill, 47; Regents of University v. Williams, 9 Gill & J. 365, 31 Am. Dec. 72; Re Middletown, 82 N. Y. 196. The case of Sadler v. Langham, 34 Ala. 311, appears to be opposed to this prin- ciple, but it also appears to us to be based upon cases which are not appli- cable. 3State v. Philips, 70 Fla. 340, 70 So. 367, Ann. Cas. 1918 A, 138. The constitutionality of a provision of a statute cannot be tested by a party whose rights or duties are not affected by it, unless the provision is of such a nature that it renders invalid a provision of the statute that does affect the parties’ rights or duties. State ex rel. Clarkson v. Philips, 70 Fla. 340, 70 So. 367, Ann. Cas. 1918 A, 138. 4In United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 23 L. ed. 563, there was a penal statute couched in general language broad enough to cover wrongful acts without as well as within the consti- tutional inhibition, and it was held that the court could not reject the unconstitutional part and retain the remainder, because it was not possible to separate the one from the other. In Williams v. Taladega, 226 U. S. 404, 57 L. ed. 275, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 116, there was a state license tax that operated without exemption or dis- tinction upon the privilege of carrying on a business a part of which was that of an essential governmental agency constituted under a law of the United States. It was held that the tax necessarily included within its opera- tion this part of the business, and since this was unconstitutional, the whole tax was rendered void. In Leloup v. Mobile, 127 U. S. 640, 32 L. ed. 311, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1380, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 134, the court held a general license tax imposed by the State of Alabama upon the busi- ness of a telegraph company in part interstate and in part internal, to be unconstitutional, and held that since the tax affected the whole business without discrimination it could not be sustained with respect to that portion of the business that was internal and therefore taxable by the State. See also Norfolk, etc., R. Co. v. Pennsyl- vania, 136 U.S. 114, 34 L. ed. 394, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 958, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 178; Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S.368 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I [A provision in a statute declaring that the act as a whole shall not be declared invalid because one or more sections may be so declared, provides a rule of construction which may aid in deter- mining the legislative intent, but it is not an inexorable command. Where, however, an act declares each paragraph to be independent and directs that the holding of any paragraph or any part of it invalid shall not affect the validity of the rest, the fact that one or more paragraphs are invalid will not invalidate the whole act.?| Waring a Constitutional Objection. There are cases where a law in its application to a particular case must be sustained, because the party who makes objection has, by prior action, precluded himself from being heard against it. Where a constitutional provision is designed for the protection solely of the 47, 35 L. ed. 649, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 851; Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Texas, 210 U.S. 217, 52 L. ed. 1031, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 638; Western Union Tele- graph Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, 54 L. ed. 355, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 190. Where a Federal statute, though it embraces subjects within the author- ity of Congress to regulate commerce, also includes subjects not within its constitutional power, and the two are so interblended in the statute that they are incapable of separation, the entire statute is unenforcible. How- ard v. Illinois Central R. Co., 207 U.S. 463, 52 L. ed. 297, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 141; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 57 L. ed. 966, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 581. 1 Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286, 68 L. ed. 686, 44 Sup. Ct. Rep. 323. See also Hill v. Wallace, 259 U. S. 44, 66 L. ed. 822, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 453; State v. Carter, 174 Ala. 266, 56 So. 974; State ex rel. Crumpton v. Mont- gomery, 177 Ala. 212, 59 So. 294; Ex parte Schuler, 167 Cal. 282, 139 Pac. 685, Ann. Cas. 1915 C, 706; Springfield Gas, etc., Co. v. Springfield, 292 Ill. 236, 126 N. E. 739, 18 A. L. R. 929. ? Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 261 U. S. 428, 67 L. ed. 731, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 445. See also Snetzer v. Gregg, 129 Ark. 542, 196 S. W. 925, L. R. A. 1917 F, 999; Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 133 N. W. 209, 37 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 466. ’ Shepard v. Barron, 194 U. S. 553, 49 L. ed. 1115, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 737; Humbird v. Avery, 195 U. S. 480, 49 L. ed. 286, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 123; International, etc., R. Co. v. Anderson County, 246 U. S. 424, 62 L. ed. 807, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 370; Hurley ». Commission of Fisheries, 257 U. S. 223, 66 L. ed. 206, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 83; Pierce Oil Corp. v. Phoenix Refin- ing Co., 259 U. S. 125, 66 L. ed. 855, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 440; Hirsh »v. Block, 267 Fed. 614, 50 App. Cas. (D. C.) 56, 11 A. L. R. 1238; Greene County ». Lydy, 263 Mo. 77, 172 S. W. 376, Ann. Cas. 1917 C, 274; Gay v. District Ct., 41 Nev. 330, 171 Pac. 156, 3 A. L. R. 224; Ross v. Lipscomb, 83 S. C. 136, 65 S. E. 451, 1837 Am. St. Rep. 794; Mellen Lumber Co. v. Industrial Com- mission 154 Wis. 114, 142 N. W. 187, L. R. A. 1916 A, 374, Ann. Cas. 1915 B, 997. One who invokes the provisions of a statute cannot attack its constitu- tionality. Moore v. Napier, 64 S. C. 564, 42 S. E. 997. One waives right to object to law under which a grand jury is made up, by pleading in bar to the indictment. United States v. Gale, 109 U. S. 65, 27 L. ed. 857, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1. An officer who has acted and re- ceived money under an act cannotCHAP. VII] property rights of th protection, and to consent to such DECLARING LEGISLATIVE ACTS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 369 e citizen, it is competent for him to waive the action as would be invalid if taken against his will." On this ground it has been held that an act appro- priating the private pro of another, on compensation made, was taken assented thereto; and that he did assent and constitutional privilege, if he recelvec or brought an action to recover ite appropriation of property for a pub be taken than the use requires, although such act w out the owner’s assent, yet with it all [So a person who obtains a license unconstitutionality is removed.’ under a law, and seeks for a time to enjoy the benefits perty of one person for the private purposes vas valid if he whose property waive the 1 the compensation awarded, So if an act providing for the lic use shall authorize more to ould be void with- objection on the ground of thereof, can- not afterwards, and when the license is sought to be revoked, ques- contest its constitutionality. People v. Bunker, 70 Cal. 212, 11 Pac. 703. Where a municipal corporation has entered into a contract with an indi- vidual under and by virtue of a statute which is unconstitutional, and the subject-matter of the contract is not ultra vires, illegal, or malum prohibitum, and the facts are such, as against the corporation, as would estop an indi- vidual from setting up as a defense the unconstitutionality of the statute, the municipal corporation will also be so estopped, Mt. Vernon ». State, 71 Ohio St. 428, 73 N. E. 515, 104 Am. St. Rep. 783, 2 Ann. Cas. 399. 1Shepard v. Barron, 194 Wea: 553, 48 L. ed. 1115, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 737; Humbird v. Avery, 195) U: 3»: 480, 49 L. ed. 286, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 123; Hellen »v. Medford, 188 Mass. 42, 73 N. E. 1070, 108 Am. St. Rep. 459, 69 L. R. A. 314. “Tt is well settled that vidual may waive even constitutional provisions for his benefit when no question of public policy or public morals is involved. Mayor, etc., of New York v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 143 NO Ye 1 87 N. EB. 494.” Musco 2v. United Surety Co., 196 N. Y. 459, 90 N. E. 171, 134 Am. St. Rep. 851. “A person may, by his acts or omission to act, waive a right which he might otherwise have under the Constitution of the United States.” Pierce v. Somerset Ry., 171 U.S. 641, 43 L. ed. 316, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 64. VOT ae an indi- “Provisions of a constitutional nature, intended for the protection of the property owner, may be waived by him, not only by an instrument in writing, upon a good consideration, signed by him, but also by a course of conduct which shows an intention to waive such provision, and where it would be unjust to others to permit it to be set up.” Shepard v. Barron, 194 U. §. 553, 48 L. ed. 1115, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 737. Under some circumstan¢ whose land is assessed for a improvement under a statute which violates his constitutional rights may be held to have waived all right to a a course of conduct which and inequitable to es a person public remedy by renders it unjust others that he should be allowed to complain of the illegality. Shepard ». Barron, 194 U.S. 553, 48 L. ed. 1115, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 737. 2Baker v. Braman, 6 Hill, 47. So, if one has started the machinery a local improvement act. to set going Allegheny, 95 Pa. St. Dewhurst »v. 437. 3 Emburv v. Conner, 3 N. Ya Ol: And see Heyward v. Mayor, &e. of New York, 8 Barb. 486; Mobile & Ohio Railroad Co. v. State, 29 Ala. 573; Detmold v. Drake, 46 N. Y. 318. For a waiver in tax cases resting on a similar principle, see Motz v. Detroit, 18 Mich. 495; Ricketts v. Spraker, 77 Ind. 371.370 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. ¥ tion the constitutionality of the act.1] And where parties were authorized by statute to erect a dam across a river, provided they should first execute a bond to the people conditioned to pay such damages as each and every person might sustain in consequence of the erection of the dam, the damages to be assessed by a justice of the peace, and the dam was erected and damages assessed as pro- vided by the statute, it was held, in an action on the bond to recover those damages, that the party erecting the dam and who had received the benefit of the statute, was precluded by his action from con- testing its validity, and could not insist upon his right to a common- law trial by jury.” In these and the like cases the statute must be read with an implied proviso that the party to be affected shall assent thereto; and such consent removes all obstacles, and lets the statute in to operate the same as if it had in terms contained the condition.’ Under the terms of the statutes which exempt property from forced sale on execution, to a specified amount or value, it is sometimes necessary that the debtor, or some one in his behalf, shall appear and make selection or otherwise participate in the setting off of that to which he is entitled ; and where this is the case, the exemp- tion cannot be forced upon him if he declines or neglects to claim it.‘ In Pennsylvania and Alabama it has been decided that a party may, by executory agreement entered into at the time of contracting a debt, and as a part of the contract, waive his rights under the exemp- tion laws and preclude himself from claiming them as against judg- ments obtained for such debt ; ° [and in Georgia it has been held that a waiver of homestead and exemption, contained in a note signed 1Cofman v. Osterhous, 40 N. D. 390, 168 N. W. 826, 18 A. L. R. 219. See also State v. Seebold, 192 Mo. 720, 91 S. W. 491; Hart v. Folsom, 70 N. H. 213, 47 Atl. 603; Minneapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Nester, 3 N. D. 480, 57 N. W. 510. ? People v. Murray, 5 Hill, 468. See Lee v. Tillotson, 24 Wend. 337. §’Embury v. Conner, 3 N. Y. 511. And see Matter of Albany St., 11 Wend. 149; Chamberlain v. Lyell, 3 make the selection when the debtor fails to do so, and in some the debtor, if a married man, is precluded from waiving the privilege except with the consent of his wife, given in writing. See Denny v. White, 2 Cold. 283; Ross v. Lister, 14 Tex. 469; Vander- hurst v. Bacon, 88 Mich. 669, 31 Am. tep. 328; Gilman v. Williams, 7 Wis. 329. She need not assent as to exemp- tion of stock in trade. Charpentier v. Bresnahan, 62 Mich. 360, 28 N. W. Mich. 448; Beecher v. Baldy, 7 Mich. 488; Mobile & Ohio Railroad Co. v. State, 29 Ala. 573; Detmold v. Drake, 46 N. Y. 318; Haskell v. New Bedford, 108 Mass. 208; Wanser v. Atkinson, 43 N. J. L. 571. ‘See Barton v. Brown, 68 Cal. 11, 8 Pac. 517; Butler v. Shiver, 79 Ga. 172, 4S. E. 115. In some States the officer must 916. 5 Case v. Dunmore, 23 Pa. St. 93; Bowman ». Smiley, 31 Pa. St. 2208 Shelly’s Appeal, 36 Pa. St. 373; O’Neil v. Craig, 56 Pa. St. 161; Thomas’s Appeal, 69 Pa. St. 120; Bibb ». Janney, 45 Ala. 329; Brown v. Leitch, 60 Ala. 313, 31 Am. Rep. 42; Neely v. Henry, 63 Ala. 261. And see Hois- ington v. Huff, 24 Kan. 379.CHAP. VII] DECLARING LEGISLATIVE ACTS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 371 by a partner, in the partnership name, is effectual as against the separate property of the partner signing the note;*] but in other States it is held, on what seems to be the better reason, that, as the exemption is granted on grounds of general policy, an executory agreement to waive it must be deemed contrary to the policy of the law, and for that reason void.? [An employee may, by contract freely and voluntarily made, waive the benefit of a constitutional provision inhibiting the legislature from limiting the amount to be recovered for personal injuries.’] In criminal cases the doctrine that a constitutional privilege may be waived must be true to a very limited extent only. A party may consent to waive rights of prop- erty, but the trial and punishment for public offenses are not within the provinces of individual consent or agreement.‘ Judicial Doubts on Constitutional Questions. It has been said by an eminent jurist, that when courts are called upon to pronounce the invalidity of an act of legislation, passed with all the forms and ceremonies requisite to give it the force of law, they will approach the question with great caution, examine it in every possible aspect, and ponder upon it as long as deliberation and patient attention can throw any new light upon the subject, and never declare a statute void, unless the nullity and invalidity of the act are placed, in their judgment, State Journal Co. v. 1 Perry v. Britt-Carson Shoe Co., 129 Ga. 560, 59 S. E. 216, 121 Am. St. Rep. 232. But in Tribble v. Anderson, 63 Ga. 31, the court said: “ Homestead is favored by the law and usury is noxious to the law. For reasons of public policy, no waiver of home- stead can be effectual where the con- sideration has any taint of usury.” See also Cleghorn v. Greeson, 77 Ga. 343. 2-Maxwell v. Reed, 7 Wis. 582; Kneetle v. Newcomb, 22 N. Y. 249; Recht v. Kelly, 82 Ill. 147, 25 Am. Rep. 301; Moxley v. Ragan, 10 Bush, 156, 19 Am. Rep. 61; Denny ». White, 2 Cold. 283; Branch v. Tomlinson, 77 N. C. 388; Carter’s Adm’r ». Carter, 20 Fla. 558. A woman cannot by ante-nuptial agreement release the special allow- ance made to her as widow by statute ; it being against public policy. Phelps v. Phelps, 72 Ill. 545. 3 Kentucky Workmen’s Compensation Bd., 161 Ky. 562, 170 S. W. 1166, L. R. A. 1916 A, 389. 4See post, p. 674. And as to the waiver of the right to jury trial in civil cases, post, pp. 864-869. When a case involves the punish- ment of a defendant for a crime, the constitutionality of the statute author- izing the prosecution may be ques- tioned at any stage of the proceedings. Com. v. Hana, 195 Mass. 262, 81 N. E. 149, 122 Am. St. Rep. 251, 11 Li: RAY (xn. s.) 799, 11 Ann. Cas. 514; Ex parte Lewis, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 1, 73S. W. 811, 108 Am. St. Rep. 929. A constitutional objection to a criminal statute may be raised on a petition for a rehearing, even though it has not been raised either upon the trial or upon the original appeal. State v. Bickford, 28 N. D. 36, 147 N. W. 407, Ann. Cas. 1916 D, 140.372 beyond reasonable doubt.! CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. 1 A reasonable doubt must be solved in favor of the legislative action, and the act be sustained [But 1 Wellington, Petitioner, 16 Pick. 87, per Shaw, Ch. J.; Alexander v. People, 7 Col. 155, 2 Pac. 894; Crow- ley v. State, 11 Oreg. 512, 6 Pac. 70; State v. Bassett, 100 Conn. 430, 123 Atl. 842, 37 A. L. R. 131; Consumers’ League v. Colorado, etc., R. Co., 53 Colo. 54, 125 Pac. 577, Ann. Cas. 1914 A, 1158; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Coachman, 59 Fla. 130, 52 So. 377, 20 Ann. Cas. 1047; McPherson 2. State, 174 Ind. 60, 90 N. E. 610, 31 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 188; Shaw v. Marshall- town, 131 Iowa, 128, 104 N. W. 1121, 10 L. R. A. (nN. 8.) 825, 9 Ann. Cas. 1039; Sanders v. Com., 117 Ky. 1, 77S. W. 358, 111 Am. St. Rep. 219, 1 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 932; Soper v. Law- rence Bros. Co., 98 Me. 268, 56 Atl. 908, 99 Am. St. Rep. 397; Cochran v. Preston, 107 Md. 220, 70 Atl. 113, 129 Am. St. Rep. 432, 23 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 1163, 15 Ann. Cas. 1048; Pawloski v. Hess, 250 Mass. 22, 144 N. E. 760, 35 A. L. R. 945; State v. Clement National Bank, 84 Vt. 167, 78 Atl. 944, Ann. Cas. 1912 D, 22: State »v. Superior Court, 60 Wash. 370, 111 Pac. 233, 140 Am. St. Rep. 925; Record Pub. Co. v. Monson, 123 Wash. 596, 213 Pac. 13. A law will be upheld unless its unconstitutionality is so clear “as to leave no doubt on the subject.” Kelly v. Meeks, 87 Mo. 396; Robin- son v. Schenck, 102 Ind. 307, 1 N. EB. 698. See also State v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 56 Fla. 617, 47 So. 969, 32): Re Ae (ns) 639; Jenkins v. State Board of Elections, 180 N. GC. 169, 104 S. E. 346, 14 A. L. R. 1247; Ex parte Berry, 84 S. C. 243, 67S. E. 225, 20 Ann. Cas. 1344; Wheelon v. South Dakota Land Settlement Board, 43 S. D. 551, 181 N. W. 359, 14 A. L. R. 1145. “Doubts as to the constitutionality of a statute, though arising from a prior decision, should always be re- solved in favor of constitutionality.”’ Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 274 Pa. St. 448, 118 Atl. 394, 24 A. L. R. 1215, affirmed, 260 U. S. 245, 67 L. ed. 237, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 83. If an act may be valid or not accord- ing to the circumstances, a court would be bound to presume that such cireum- stances existed as would render it valid. Talbot v. Hudson, 16 Gray, 417. It will be presumed that the legis- lature acted with full knowledge of all the facts and conditions essential to valid legislation when it adopted a regulation in the exercise of the police power. Jay Burns Baking Co. v. McKelvie, 108 Neb. 674, 189 N. W. 383, 26 A. L. R. 24. If plaintiffs assail legislation as unreasonable the burden is on them to prove every fact essential to a de- termination of that issue in their favor. Jay Burns Baking Co. »v. McKelvie, 108 Neb. 674, 189 N. W. 383, 26 AL Res 24e “Copper v. Telfair, 4 Dall. 14, 1 L. ed. 721; Dow v. Norris, 4 N. H. 16; Flint River Steamboat Co. v. Foster, 5 Ga. 194; Carey v. Giles, 9 Ga. 253; Macon & Western Railroad Co. v. Davis, 18 Ga. 68; Franklin Bridge Co. v. Wood, 14 Ga. 80; Ken- dall v. Kingston, 5 Mass. 524; Foster v. Essex Bank, 16 Mass. 245; Nor- wich v. County Commissioners of Hampshire, 13 Pick. 60; Hartford Bridge Co. v. Union Ferry Co., 29 Conn. 210; Rich v. Flanders, 39 N. H. 304; Eason v. State, 11 Ark. 481; Hedley v, Commissioners of Franklin Co., 4 Blackf. 116; Stocking v. State, 7 Ind. 326; La Fayette v. Jenners, 10 Ind. 74; Ex parte McCollum, 1 Cow. 550; Coutant v. People, 11 Wend. 511; Clark v. People, 26 Wend. 559; Morris v. People, 3 Denio, 376; N. Ye &c. R. R. Co. v. Van Horn, 57 N. Y. 473; Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 376; Cotton v. Commissioners of Leon Co., 6 Fla. 610; Cheney v. Jones, 14 Fla. 587; Lane v. Dorman, 4 Ill. 238, 36 Am. Dec. 543; Newland ». Marsh, 19 Ill. 376; Farmers’ and Mechanics’ Bank v. Smith, 3S. & R. 63; Weister v. Hade, 52 Pa. St. 474; Sears v. Cot- trell, 5 Mich. 251; Tyler v. People, 8 Mich. 320; Allen County Commis- sioners v. Silvers, 22 Ind. 491; State v. Robinson, 1 Kan. 17; Eyre v. Jacob,CHAP. VII] 14 Gratt. 422; Gormley ». Taylor, 44 Ga. 76; State v. Cape Girardeau, &c. R. R. Co., 48 Mo. 468; Oleson ». Rail- road Co., 36 Wis. 383; Newsom 2. Cocke, 44 Miss. 352; Slack v. Jacob, 8 W. Va. 612; Commonwealth »v. Moore, 25 Gratt. 951; State v. Stand- ard Oil Co., 61 Neb. 28, 84 N. W. 413, 87 Am. St. 449; Isenhour v. State, 157 Ind. 517, 62 N. E. 40, 87 Am. St. 228; Farm Investment Co. v. Carpenter, 9 Wyo. 110, 61 Pac. 258, 87 Am. St. 918; Adkins v. Chil- dren’s Hospital, 261 U. S. 529, 67 L. ed. 785, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 394, 24 A. L. R. 1238; Kane »v. Erie R. Co., F7aG@. G@, A. 653, 133 Fed. 681, 68 L. R. A. 788; Whaley v. State, 168 Ala. 152, 52 So. 941, 30 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 499; State v. Birmingham Southern R. Co., 182 Ala. 475, 62 So. 77, Ann. Cas. 1915 D, 436; Young v. Lemieux, 79 Conn. 434, 65 Atl. 436, 600, 129 Am. St. Rep. 193, 20 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 160, 8 Ann. Cas. 452; Jacksonville vy. Bowden, 67 Fla. 181, 64 So. 769, i RL A. 1916 D; 913; Ann. Cas. 1915 D, 99; Anderson v. Ocala, 67 Fla. 204, 64 So. 775, 52 L. R. A. (. s.) 287; Wilkerson v. Rome, 152 Ga. 762, 110 S. BE. 895, 20 A. L. R. 1334; Achen- bach v. Kincaid, 25 Idaho, 768, 140 Pac. 529; Ex parte Kessler, 26 Idaho, 764, 146 Pac. 113, L. R. A. 1915 D, 322; People v. Rose, 203 Ill. 46, 67 N. E. 746; People v. People’s Gas Light & Coke Co., 205 Ill. 482, 68 N. BE. 950, 98 Am. St. Rep. 244; People v. McBride, 234 Ill. 146, 84 N. E. 865, 123 Am. St. Rep. 82, 14 Ann. Cas. 994; State v. Barrett, 172 Ind. 169, 87 N. E. 7; McPherson ». State, 174 Ind. 60, 90 N. E. 610, 31 L. RB. A. (Nn. s.) 188; Brady ». Mat- tern, 125 Iowa, 158, 100 N. W. 358, 106 Am. St. Rep. 291; McGuire ». Chicago, ete., R. Co., 131 Iowa, 340, 108 N. W. 902, 33 L. R. A. (n. 8.) 706; State v. Butler, 105 Me. 91, 73 Atl. 560, 24 L. R. A. (WN. s.) 744, 18 Ann. Cas. 484; Dirken v. Great Northern Paper Co., 110 Me. 374, 86 Atl. 320, Ann. Cas. 1914 D, 396; Salisbury Land & Imp. Co. v. Com., 215 Mass. 371, 102 N. E. 619, 46 L. R. A. (nN. 8.) 1196; Com. ». Slavski, 245 Mass. 405, 140 N. E. 465, 29 A. L. R. 281; DECLARING LEGISLATIVE ACTS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 373 State v. Ryder, 126 Minn. 95, 147 N. W. 953, 5 A. L. R. 1449; Mathison v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co., 126 Minn. 286, 148 N. W. 71,5 N.C. (Oh AM GyAle State v. J. Newman Lumber Co., 102 Miss. 802, 59 So. 923, 45 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 851; Tuberculosis Hospital Dist. v. Peter, 253 Mo. 520, 161 S. W. 1155, Ann. Cas. 1915 C, 310; State v. Buente, 256 Mo. 227, 165 S. W. 340, Ann. Cas. 1915 D, 879; Greene County v. Lydy, 263 Mo. lt, wiz S. W. 376, Ann. Cas. 1917 C, 274; State v. Scullin-Gallagher Iron, etc., Co., 268 Mo. 178, 186 58. W. 1007, Ann. Cas. 1918 E, 620; Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Lewis & Clarke County, 28 Mont. 484, 72 Pac. 982, 98 Am. St. Rep. 572; State v. Alder- son, 49 Mont. 387, 142 Pac. 210, Ann. Cas. 1916 B, 39; State v. Stewart, 54 Mont. 504, 171 Pac. 755, Ann. Cas. 1918 D, 1101; Gas Products Co. v. Rankin, 63 Mont. 372, 207 Pac. 993, 24 A. L. R. 294; Ez parte Kair, 28 Nev. 127, 425, 80 Pac. 463, 6 Ann. Cas. 893; Jenkins v. State Board of Elections, 180 N. C. 169, 104 S. E. 346, 14 A. L. R. 1247; Steller v. O’Hara, 69 Oreg. 519, 139 Pac. 743, L. R. A. 1917 C, 944, Ann. Cas. 1916 A, 217; Smith v. Cameron, 106 Oreg. 1, 210 Pac. 716, 27 Ace lon he OLO;s State v. Kofines, 33 R. I. 211, 80 Atl. 432, Ann. Cas. 1913 C, 1120; State v. Summers, 33 S. D. 40, 144 N. W. 730, 50 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 206, Ann. Cas. 1916 B, 860; McCoy v. Handlin, 35 S: D: 487, 153 N. W. 361, L. R. A. 1915 E, 858, Ann. Cas. 1917 A, 1046; State vy. Candland, 36 Utah, 406, 104 Pac. 285, 140 Am. St. Rep. 834, 24 Ti Rea (nw. s.) 1260; Willis ». Kalmbach, 109 Va. 475, 64 S. E. 342, 21 L. R. A. (x. s.) 1009; State »v. Pitney, 79 Wash. 608, 140 Pac. 918, Ann. Cas. 1916 A, 209; Duncan ». Baltimore, etc., R. Co., 68 W. Va. 293, 69 S. E. 1004, Ann. Cas. 1912 B, 272; Bon- nett v. Vallier, 136 Wis. 193, 116 N. W. 885, 128 Am. St. Rep. 1061, 177 Lie A. (n. s.) 486; Lawrence University vy. Outagamie County, 150 Wis. 244, 136 N. W. 619, 2 A. L. R. 465; Peter- Widula, 157 Wis. 641, 147 N. W. son v. A. (nN. 8.) 778, Ann. Cas. 966, 52 L. R. 1916 B, 1040374 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I the presumption of validity in favor of the legislative action is not conclusive.’] “The question whether a law be void for its repugnancy to the Constitution is at all times a question of much delicacy, which ought seldom, if ever, to be decided in the affirmative in a doubtful case. The court, when impelled by duty to render such a judgment, would be unworthy of its station could it be unmindful of the solemn obli- gation which that station imposes; but it is not on slight implication and vague conjecture that the legislature is to be pronounced to have transcended its powers, and its acts to be considered as void. The opposition between the Constitution and the law should be such that the judge feels a clear and strong conviction of their incompatibility with each other.” * Mr. Justice Washington gives a reason for this rule, which has been repeatedly recognized in other cases which we have cited. After expressing the opinion that the particular ques- tion there presented, and which regarded the constitutionality of a State law, was involved in difficulty and doubt, he says: “But if I could rest my opinion in favor of the constitutionality of the law on which the question arises, on no other ground than this doubt so felt and acknowledged, that alone would, in my estimation, be a satisfactory vindication of it. It is but a decent respect due to the wisdom, the integrity, and the patriotism of the legislative body by which any law is passed, to presume in favor of its validity, until its violation of the Constitution is proved beyond all reasonable doubt.’ One who assails the classification in a police law or regulation has the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary. New Orleans v. Calamari, 150 La. 737, 91 So. 172. 1 New Orleans v. Toca, 141 La. 551, 75 So. 2388, L. R. A. 1917 EB, 761, Ann. Cas. 1918 B, 1032. The court, in this case, said: “The legislative action will be sustained if the doing so is possible under any reasonably suppos- able state of facts.” ? Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87, 128, 3 L. ed. 162, 175, per Marshall, Ch. J. ?Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213, 6 L. ed. 606. See Adams v. Howe, 14 Mass. 340, 7 Am. Dec. 216; Kellogg v. State Treasurer, 44 Vt. 356, 359; Slack v. Jacob, 8 W. Va. 612; Jacksonville v. Bowden, 67 Fla. 181, 64 So. 769, L. R. A. 1916 D, 913, Ann. Cas. 1915 D, 99; McPherson ». State, 174 Ind. 60, 90 N. E. 610, 31 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 188; Lawrence E. Tierney Coal Co. v. Smith, 180 Ky. 815, 203 S. W. 731, 4 A. L. R. 1540; Laughlin v. Portland, 111 Me. 486, 90 Atl. 318, 57 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 1148, Ann. Cas. 1916 C, 734; Harris v. Allegany County, 130 Md. 488, 100 Atl. 733, L. R. A. 1917 E, 824; Bowman '»v. Virginia State Entomologist, 128 Va. 351, 105°S2 He 141, 12 Ay: Ro ize State v. Superior Court, 60 Wash. 370, 111 Pac. 233, 140 Am. St. Rep. 925. In Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. May, 194 U. S. 267, 48 L. ed. 971, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 638, Justice Holmes says: “Great constitutional provisions must be administered with caution. Some play must be allowed for the joints of the machine, and it must be remem- bered that legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as the courts.”CHAP. VII] DECLARING LEGISLATIVE ACTS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 375 The constitutionality of a law, then, is to be presumed, because the legislature, which was first required to pass upon the question, acting, as they must be deemed to have acted, with integrity, and with a just desire to keep within the restrictions laid by the Consti- tution upon their action, have adjudged that it is so. They area co-ordinate department of the government with the judiciary, in- vested with very high and responsible duties, as to some of which their acts are not subject to judicial scrutiny, and they legislate under the solemnity of an official oath, which it is not to be supposed they will disregard. It must, therefore, be supposed that their own doubts of the constitutionality of their action have been deliberately solved in its favor, so that the courts may with some confidence repose upon their conclusion, as one based upon their best judgment. For although it is plain, upon the authorities, that the courts should sustain legislative action when not clearly satisfied of its invalidity, it is equally plain in reason that the legislature should abstain from adopting such action if not fully assured of their authority to do so. Respect for the instrument under which they exercise their power should impel the legislature in every case to solve their doubts in its favor, and it is only because we are to presume they do so, that courts are warranted in giving weight in any case to their decision. If it were understood that legislators refrained from exercising their judgment, or that, in cases of doubt, they allowed themselves to lean in favor of the action they desired to accomplish, the foundation for the cases we have cited would be altogether taken away. As to what the doubt shall be upon which the court is to act, we conceive that it can make no difference whether it springs from an endeavor to arrive at the true interpretation of the Constitution, or from a consideration of the law after the meaning of the Constitution has been judicially determined. It has sometimes been supposed that it was the duty. of the court, first, to interpret the Constitution, placing upon it a construction that must remain unvarying, and then test the law in question by it; and that any other rule would lead to differing judicial decisions, if the legislature should put one interpretation upon the Constitution at one time and a different one at another. But the decided cases do not sanction this rule,’ and the difficulty suggested is rather imaginary than real, since it is but reasonable to expect that, where a construction has once been 1 See upon this subject what is said 2 Sun Mutual Insurance Co. v. New in Osburn v. Staley, 5 W. Va. 85; York, 5 Sandf. 10; Clark v. People, Tate v. Bell, 4 Yerg. 202,26 Am. Dec. 26 Wend. 599: Baltimore v. State, 15 221; State v. Crawford, 36 N. D. Md. 376; Veterans’ Welfare Board 385, 162 N. W. 718, Ann. Cas. 1917 v. Riley, 189 Cal. 159, 208 Pac. 678, E, 955. 22 A. L. R. 1531.376 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I placed upon a constitutional provision, it will be followed after- wards, even though its original adoption may have sprung from deference to legislative action rather than from settled convictions in the judicial mind.! The duty of the court to uphold a statute when the conflict be- tween it and the Constitution is not clear, and the implication which must always exist that no violation has been intended by the legis- lature, may require it in some cases, where the meaning of the Con- stitution is not in doubt, to lean in favor of such a construction of the statute as might not at first view seem most obvious and natu- ral.2 For as a conflict between the statute and the Constitution is not to be implied, it would seem to follow, where the meaning of the Constitution is clear, that the court, if possible, must give the statute such a construction as will enable it to have effect. This is only saying, in another form of words, that the court must construe the statute in accordance with the legislative intent; since it is always to be presumed the legislature designed the statute to take effect, and not to be a nullity.® The rule of Illinois: 1 People v. Blodgett, 13 Mich. 127; State v. Rice, 115 Md. 317, 80 Atl. 1026, 36 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 344, Ann. Cas. 1913 A, 1247. 2 If the language used in a statute is reasonably susceptible of two con- structions, one rendering it constitu- tional and the other not, the former must be adopted although the other is the more natural. State ez rel. Wilcox v. Ryder, 126 Minn. 95, 147 N. W. 9538, 5 A. L. R. 1449. 3Cheseborough ». San Francisco, 153 Cal. 559, 96 Pac. 288; State v. Savings Union Bank & Trust Co., 186 Cal. 294, 199 Pac. 26; People v. Loch- ner, 177 N. Y. 145, 69 N. E. 373, 101 Am. St. Rep. 773; People v. Ringe, 197 N. Y. 143, 90 N. E. 451, 27 L. R. A. (N. s.) 528. “Every enactment of the legisla- ture must be deemed in harmony with constitutional provisions until the contrary clearly appears.’”’ State »v. Gee Jon, 46 Nev. 418, 211 Pac. 676, 30 A. L. R. 1443. When a legislative enactment is attacked upon the ground that it is dis- criminatory or unreasonable, all pre- sumptions and intendments are in upon this subject is thus stated by the Supreme Court 3 I “Whenever an act of the legislature can be so construed favor of its reasonableness and fair- ness. People v. Monterey Fish Prod- ucts Co., 195 Cal. 548, 234 Pac. 398, 38 A. L. R. 1186. Nothing but the most explicit lan- guage will authorize the courts in interpreting an act of Congress as intended to direct fishing expeditions into private papers on the possibility that they may disclose evidence of crime, as such an_ interpretation would be repugnant to the spirit of the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Federal Trade Com- mission v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U. S. 298, 68 L. ed. 696, 44 Sup. Ct. Rep. 336. A statute requiring notice of injury within thirty days in case of injury on a city street due to the negligence of the city will not be construed to apply to one injured so severely as to be unable to give the notice, as to make the requirement apply to such a person would render the statute un- constitutional as denying him due process of law. Randolph v. City of Springfield, 302 Mo. 338, 257 S. W. 449, 31 A. L. R. 612; McDonald ». Spring Valley, 285 Ill. 52, 120 N. E.CHAP. VII] DECLARING LEGISLATIVE ACTS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 377 and applied as to avoid conflict with the Constitution and give it the force of law, such construction will be adopted by the courts. Therefore, acts of the legislature, in terms retrospective, and which, literally interpreted, would invalidate and destroy vested rights, are upheld by giving them prospective operation only ; for, applied to, and operating upon, future acts and transactions only, they are rules of property under and subject to which the citizen acquires property rights, and are obnoxious to no constitutional limitation ; but as retroactive laws, they reach to and destroy existing rights, through force of the legislative will, without a hearing or judgment of law. So will acts of the legislature, having elements of limitation, and capable of being so applied and administered, although the words are broad enough to, and do, literally read, strike at the right itself, be construed to limit and control the remedy ; for as such they are valid, but as weapons destructive of vested rights they are void; and such force only will be given the acts as the legislature could impart to them.” * The Supreme Court of New Hampshire, a similar question being involved, recognizing their obligation “so to construe every act of the legislature as to make it consistent, if it be possible, with the provisions of the Constitution proceed to the examination of a statute by the same rule, “without stopping to inquire what con- struction might be warranted by the natural import of the language used.” ? And it is said by Harris, J., delivering the opinion of the majority of the Court of Appeals of New York: “A legislative act is not to be declared void upon a mere conflict of interpretation between the legislative and the judicial power. Before proceeding to annul, by judicial sentence, what has been enacted by the law-making power, 476, 2 A. L. R. 1359; Williams v. son v. Colgan, 91 Cal. 649, 27 Pac. Port Chester, 72 App. Div. 505, 76 1089, 14 L. R. A. 459, 25 Am. St. 230, N. Y. Supp. 631, reaffirmed on appeal and note on extrinsic evidence to show in 97 App. Div. 84, 89 N. Y. Supp. unconstitutionality in 25 Am. St. 233. 671, and affirmed without opinion in 1 Newland v. Marsh, 19 Ill. 376, 384. 183 N. Y. 550, 76 N. E. 1116; Murphy See also Bigelow v. West Wisconsin ». Ft. Edward, 213 N. Y. 397, 107 R. R. Co., 27 Wis. 478; Attorney- N. E. 716, Ann. Cas. 1916 ©, 1040,9 General v. Eau Claire, 37 Wis. 400; N. CG. G. A. 279; Forsyth v. Oswego, Coleman v. Yesler, 1 Wash. Ter. 591; 191 N. Y. 441, 84 N. E. 392, 123 Am. Singer Mfg. Co. ». McCollock, 24 St. Rep. 605; Terrell v. Washington, Fed. 667. 158 N. C. 281, 73 S. E. 888; Hart- 2Dow v. Norris, 4 N. H. 16, 18. sell v. Asheville, 166 N. C. 633, 82S. E. See Dubuque ». Illinois Cent. R. R. 946. Co., 39 Iowa, 56; State ». Lapointe, The court will not go beyond the 81 N. H. 227, 123 Atl. 692, 31 A. L. face of the law to seek for grounds, for R. 1212. holding it unconstitutional. Steven-378 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. 1 it should clearly appear that the act cannot be supported by any reasonable intendment or allowable presumption.’’' And this after all is only the application of the familiar rule, that in the expo- sition of a statute it is the duty of the court to seek to ascertain and carry out the intention of the legislature in its enactment, and to give full effect to such intention; and they are bound so to construe the statute, if practicable, as to give it force and validity, rather than to avoid it, or render it nugatory.2 [But in Indiana it has been held that where the provisions of a statute are not ambiguous or uncertain in their meaning there is no room for construction and can be no question as to the legislative intent;* and the Criminal Court of Appeals of Oklahoma has held that though it is the duty of the courts to uphold any statute enacted in the ordinary exercise of the legislative power, unless the constitutional objections to it are clear and indisputable, yet when it is proposed by a statute to deny, modify, or diminish a right or immunity secured to the people by a clear and explicit constitutional provision, then the presump- tion is against the validity of the statute, and the courts should enforce the constitutional provision.*] The rule is not different when the question is whether any por- tion of a statute is void, than when the whole is assailed. The excess of power, if there is any, is the same in either case, and is not to be applied in any instance. And on this ground it has been held that where the repealing clause in an unconstitutional statute repeals all inconsistent acts, the repealing clause is to stand and have effect, notwithstanding the invalidity of the rest.5 But other cases hold that such repealing clause is to be understood as designed to repeal all conflicting provi- sions, in order that those of the new statute can have effect; and ‘People v. Supervisors of Orange, the conclusion that it is unconstitu- 17 N. Y. 235, 241. See also Boisdere v. Citizens’ Bank, 9 La. 506, 29 Am. Dec. 453; State v. Martin, 193 Ind. 120, 189 N. E. 282, 26 A. L. R. 1386. It is the duty of the court to adopt a construction of a statute which, without doing violence to the fair meaning of words, brings it into har- mony with the Constitution. Grenada Co. Supervisors v. Brogden, 112 U. S. 261, 28 L. ed. 704, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 125. * Clarke v. Rochester, 24 Barb. 446. See Marshall v. Grimes, 41 Miss. 27; Morrell v. Fickle, 3 Lea, 79. “A statute must be construed, if fairly possible, so as to avoid not only tional, but also grave doubts upon that score.’ Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 69 L. ed. 819, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 229, 39 A. L. R. 229. 3 State v. Martin, 193 Ind. 120, 139 N. E. 282, 26 A. L. R. 1886. See also State v. Taylor, 33 N. D. 76, 156 N. W. 561, L. R. A. 1918 B, 156, Ann. Cas. 1918 A, 583. 4 Salter v. State, 2 Okla. Crim. Rep. 464, 102 Pac. 719, 139 Am. St. Rep. 935, 25 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 60. 5 Meshmeier v. State, 11 Ind. 482; Ely v. Thompson, 3 A. K. Marsh. 70; Equit. G. & Trust Co. v. Donahoe, 3 Penn. (Del.) 191, 49 Atl. 372.CHAP. VI] DECLARING LEGISLATIVE ACTS UNCONSTITUTIO} that if the statute is invalid, nothing can conflict with it, a fore nothing is repealed.’ Great caution is necessary In so or the rule which was designed to ascertain and effectuate lative intent will be pressed to the extreme of giving effec} of a statute exclusively, when the legislative intent was that’ we part should not stand except as a component part of the whole.” Inquiry into Legislative Motvves. From what examination has been given to this subject, it appears that whether a statute is constitutional or not is always a question of power ; ticular case, in respect to t in which its object is to be accomp it, has kept within the constitutional limits In any case in which this question is answered the courts are not at liberty to inquire into the They must assume that legislative tutional conditions. in the affirmative, proper exercise of the power. discretion has been properly exercised.° 1 Shepardson v. Milwaukee & Beloit Railroad Co., 6 Wis. 605; State »v. Judge of County Court, 11 Wis. 50; Tims v. State, 26 Ala. 165; Sullivan ». Adams, 3 Gray, 476; Devoy ». Mayor, &c. of New York, 35 Barb. 264; Campau v. Detroit, 14 Mich. 276; Childs v. Shower, 18 Iowa, 261; Harbeck v. New York, 10 Bosw. 366; People v. Fleming, 7 Col. 230, 3 Pac. 70; Portland v. Schmidt, 13 Oreg. 17, 6 Pac. 221; State v. Rice, 115 Md. 317, 80 Atl. 1026, 36 L. R: A. Gs) 344, Ann. Cas. 1913 A, 1247; Allen v. Raleigh, 181 N. C. 453, 107 S. E. 3. 2The declaration of Brewer, J., in Chicago, &c. Ry. Co. »v. Wellman, 143 U. S. 348, 345, 36 L. ed. 176, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 400, aff. 83 Mich. 592, 47 N. W. 592, illustrates the hesitation of the courts to determine constitu- tional questions except where the duty is clear. It was raised in this case on an agreed statement of facts. Said Justice Brewer: ‘‘ Whenever in pursu- ance of an honest and actual antagonis- tic assertion of rights by one individual against another, there is presented a question involving the validity of any act of any legislature, State or Federal, and the decision necessarily that is, a question whether the legislature in the par- he subject-matter of the act, the manner lished, and the mode of enacting and observed the consti- If evidence was required, rests on the competency of the legis- lature to so enact, the court must, in the exercise of solemn duties, determine whether the act is constitu- tional or not. But such an exercise of power is the ultimate and supreme function of courts. It is legitimate only in the last resort and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest, and vital controversies between indi- viduals. It never was the thought that by means of a friendly suit a party beaten in the legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the con- stitutionality of the legislative act.” See also, supra pp. 338, 339. 3 People v. Lawrence, 36 Barb. 177; People v. New York Central Railroad Co., 34 Barb. 123; Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 376; Goddin v. Crump, 8 Leigh, 154; Grainger v. Douglas Park Jockey Club, 78 C. C. A. 199, 148 Fed. 513, 8 Ann. Cas. 997; Beach v. Brad- street, 85 Conn. 344 82 Atl. 1030, Ann. Cas. 1913 B, 946; Schmidt »v. Indianapolis, 168 Ind. 631, 80 N. E. 632, 120 Am. St. Rep. 386, 14 L. R. A. (nN. 8.) 787; People v. Lochner, ids N. Y. 145, 69 N. E. 373, 101 Am. St. Rep. 773; People v Griswold, 213 Neayo2, 106,.N: E. 929) Teoh. A: 1915 D, 538; St. Louis Southwestern its380 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I it must be supposed that it was before the legislature when the act was passed ; and if any special finding was required to warrant the passage of the particular act, it would seem that the passage of the act itself might be held equivalent to such finding.” And although it has sometimes been urged at the bar that the courts ought to inquire into the motives of the legislature where fraud and corrup- tion were alleged, and annul their action if the allegation were established the argument has in no case been acceded to by the judiciary, and they have never allowed the inquiry to be entered upon.’ The reasons are the same here as those which preclude an R. Co. v. Griffin, 106 Tex. 477, 171 S. W. 703, L. R. A. 1917 B, 1108: Sabre v. Rutland R. Co., 86 Vt. 347, 85 Atl. 693, Ann. Cas. 1915 C, 1269. “The propriety, expediency, and necessity of a legislative act are purely for the determination of the legislative authority, and are not for determina- tion by the courts.” Jn re Kansas City Ordinance No. 39,946, 298 Mo. 569, 252 S. W. 404, 28 A. L. R. 295. The statement of legislative reasons in the preamble of an act will not affect its validity. Lothrop v. Stead- man, 42 Conn. 583. 1De Camp v. Eveland, 19 Barb. 81; Lusher v. Scites, 4 W. Va. 11. 2 Johnson v. Joliet & Chicago Rail- road Co., 23 Ill. 202. The Constitu- tion of Illinois provided that ‘cor- porations not possessing banking pow- ers or privileges may be formed under general laws, but shall not be created by special acts except for municipal purposes, and in cases where, in the judgment of the General Assembly, the objects of the corporation cannot be attained under general laws.” A special charter being passed without any legislative declaration that its object could not be attained under a general law, the Supreme Court sus- tained it, but placed their decision mainly on the ground that the clause had been wholly disregarded, “and it would now produce far-spread ruin to declare such acts unconstitutional and void.” It is very clearly inti- mated in the opinion, that the legis- lative practice, and this decision sus- taining it, did violence to the intent of the Constitution. A provision in the Constitution of Indiana that ‘‘no act shall take effect until the same shall have been pub- lished and circulated in the several counties of this State, by authority, except in case of emergency”, adds the words, ‘‘which emergency shall be declared in the preamble, or in the body of the law’’; thus clearly making the legislative declaration necessary. Carpenter v. Montgomery, 7 Blackf. 415; Mark »v. State, 15 Ind. 98; Hendrickson v. Hendrickson, 7 Ind. 13. $Sunbury & Erie Railroad Co. »v. Cooper, 33 Pa. St. 278; Ez parte New- man, 9 Cal. 502; Baltimore »v. State, 15 Md. 376; Johnson v. Higgins, 3 Met. (Ky.) 566; McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27, 49 L. ed. 78, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 769, 1 Ann. Cas. 561; Calder v. Michigan, 218 U. S. 591, 54 L. ed. 1163, 31 Sup. Ct: Rep. 122) Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, 55 L. ed. 389, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 342, Ann. Cas. 1912 B, 1312; Dakota Central Telephone Co. »v. South Dakota, 250 U. S. 163, 63 L. ed. 910, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 507; Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries, ete., Co., 251 U. S. 146, 64 L. ed. 194, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 106; Smith v. Kansas City Title, etc., Co., 255 U. S. 180, 65 L. ed. 577, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 243; McDonald v. Doust, 11 Idaho, 14, 81 Pac. 60, 69 L. R. A. 220; Schmidt v. Indianapolis, 168 Ind. 631, 80 N. E. 632, 120 Am. St. Rep. 386, 14 L. R. A. (Nn. 8.) 787; State v. Taylor, 33 N. D. 76, 156 N. W. 561, Ann. Cas. 1918 A, 583, L. R. A. 1918 B, 156; Com. v. Herr, 229 Pa. St. 132, 78 Atl. 68, Ann. Cas. 1912 A, 422; State v. Bayer, 34 Utah, 257, 97 Pac. 129, 19 L. R. A. (nN. 3.) 297; Tilly v. Mitchell & Lewis Co., 121 Wis. 1,CHAP. VII] 98 N. W. 969, 105 Am. St. Rep. 1007. In Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 65 L. ed. 577, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 2438, Mr. Justice Day, who delivered the opinion of the court, said : ‘‘ Nothing is better settled by the decisions of this court than that when Congress acts within the limits of its constitutional authority, it is not the province of the judicial branch of the government to question its motives. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533, 541, 19 L. ed. 482; McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 97, 49 L. ed. 78, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 769 ; Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. 8. 107, 147, 153, 156, 55 L. ed. 389, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 342, and cases cited.” “The courts cannot impute to the legislature any other than public motives for their acts.’’ People ». Draper, 15 N. Y. 532, 545, per Denio, Ch. J. “We are not made judges of the motives of the legislature, and the court will not usurp the inquisitorial office of inquiring into the bona fides of that body in discharging its duties.” Shankland, J., in the same case, Pp. 555. “The powers of the three departments are not merely equal; they are exclusive in respect to the duties assigned to each. They are absolutely independent of each other. It is now proposed that one of the three powers shall institute an inquiry into the conduct of another depart- ment, and form an issue to try by what motives the legislature were governed in the enactment of a law. If this may be done, we may also in- quire by what motives the executive is induced to approve a bill or with- hold his approval, and in case of with- holding it corruptly, by our mandate compel its approval. To institute the proposed inquiry would be a direct attack upon the independence of the legislature, and a usurpation of power subversive of the Constitution.” Wright v. Defrees, 8 Ind. 298, 302, per Gookins, J. ‘We are not at liberty to inquire into the motives of the legislature. We can only examine into its power under the Constitution.’’ Per Chase, Ch. J., in Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. DECLARING LEGISLATIVE ACTS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 381 506, 514, 19 L. ed. 264. The same doctrine is restated by Mr. Justice Hunt, in Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co., 94 U. S. 535, 24 L. ed. 148. : Courts cannot inquire into legis- lative motives “except as they may be disclosed on the face of the acts or be inferable from their operation con- sidered with reference to the condition of the country and existing legisla- tion.” Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703, 28 L. ed. 1145, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 730. See also Com. ex rel. Elkin v. Moir, 199 Pa. 534, 49 Atl. 351, 53 L. R. A. 837, 85 Am. St. 801; Minne- sota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313, 34 L. ed. 455, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 862; Grainger v. Douglas Park Jockey Club, 78 C. C. A. 199, 148 Fed. 513, 8 Ann. Cas. 997. “It is... argued, if a lawful power may be exerted for an unlawful purpose, and thus, by abusing the power, it may be made to accomplish a result not intended by the Constitu- tion, all limitations of power must disappear, and the grave function lodged in the judiciary, to confine all the departments within the authority conferred by the Constitution, will be of no avail. This, when reduced to its last analysis, comes to this: that, because a particular department of the government may exert its lawful powers with the object or motive of reaching an end not justified, there- fore it becomes the duty of the judi- ciary to restrain the exercise of a lawful power wherever it seems to the judicial mind that such lawful power has been abused. But this reduces itself to the contention that, under our constitutional system, the abuse by one department of the government of its lawful powers is to be corrected by the abuse of its powers by another department. The proposition, if sus- tained, would destroy all distinction between the powers of the respective departments of the government, would put an end to that confidence and respect for each other which it was the purpose of the Constitution to uphold, and would thus be full of danger to the permanence of our institutions. . . It is, of course, true, as suggested, that if there be no authority in the judiciary to restrain382 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I inquiry into the motives of the governor in the exercise of a discre- tion vested in him exclusively. He is responsible for his acts in such a case, not to the courts, but to the people.’ Consequences if a Statute ts Void. When a statute is adjudged to be unconstitutional, it is as if it had never been. Rights cannot be built up under it; contracts which depend upon it for their consideration are void ; it constitutes a protection to no one who has acted under it, and no one can be punished for having refused obedience to it before the decision was made.? And what is true of an act void in toto is true also as to any a lawful exercise of power by another department of the government, where a@ wrong motive or purpose has im- pelled to the exertion of the power, that abuses of a power conferred may be temporarily effectual. The remedy for this, however, lies, not in the abuse by the judicial authority of its func- tions, but in the people, upon whom, after all, under our institutions, reli- ance must be placed for the correction of abuses committed in the exercise of a lawful power.” Chief Justice White in McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 769, 49 L. ed. 78, 1 Ann. Cas. 561. The rule applies to the legislation of municipalities. Brown v. Cape Gi- rardeau, 90 Mo. 377, 2 S. W. 302; Grainger v. Douglas Park Jockey Club, 78 C. C. A. 199, 148 Fed. 513, 8 Ann. Cas. 997; Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 139 Cal. 179, 72 Pac. 970, 96 Am. St. Rep. 95; Burlingame v. Thompson, 74 Kan. 393, 86 Pac. 449, 11 Ann. Cas. 64. And see McCulloch v. State, 11 Ind. 424; Bradshaw v. Omaha, 1 Neb. 16; Lyon v. Morris, 15 Ga. 480; People v. Flagg, 46 N. Y. 401; Slack v. Jacob, 8 W. Va. 612, 635; State v. Cardozo, 5 S. C. 297; Humboldt County v. Churchill County Com’rs, 6 Ney. 30; Flint, &c. Plank Road Co. ». Woodhull, 25 Mich. 99; State v. Fagan, 22 La. Ann. 545; State v. Hays, 49 Mo. 604; Luehr- man v. Taxing District, 2 Lea, 425; Kountze v. Omaha, 5 Dill. 443. In Jones v. Jones, 12 Pa. St. 350, the general principle was recognized, and it was decided not to be competent to declare a legislative divorce void for fraud. It was nevertheless held com- petent to annul it, on the ground that it had been granted (as shown by parol evidence) for a cause which gave the legislature no jurisdiction. The legis- lature was regarded as being for the purpose a court of limited jurisdiction. In Attorney-General v. Supervisors of Lake Co., 33 Mich. 289, it is decided that when supervisors and people, having full authority over the subject, have acted upon the question of re- moval of a county seat, no question of motive can be gone into to invalidate their action. But in‘a New York case it was held that the fact that a resolution accept- ing an imperfect sewer was secured by fraud and corrupt influences was a valid defense to an action brought upon the resolution. Weston v. Syra- cuse, 158 N. Y. 274, 53 N. E. 12, 43 L. R. A. 678, 70 Am. St. 472. 1 Attorney-General v. Brown, 1 Wis. 513; Wright v. Defrees, 8 Ind. 298. ?Strong v. Daniel, 5 Ind. 348; Sumner v. Beeler, 50 Ind. 341; Astrom v. Hammond, 3 McLean, 107; Wool- sey v. Commercial Bank, 6 McLean, 142; Detroit v. Martin, 34 Mich. 170; Kelly v. Bemis, 4 Gray, 83; Hover v. Barkhoof, 44 N. Y. 113; Clark ». Miller, 54 N. Y. 528; Meagher ». Storey Co., 5 Nev. 244; Ex parte Rosenblatt, 19 Nev. 439, 14 Pac. 298; Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U. S. 425, 30 L. ed. 178, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1121; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U. S. 559, 57 L. ed. 966, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 581; Hirsh v. Block, 267CHAP. VII] Fed. 614, 11 A. L. R. 1238; Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com- mission, 184 Cal. 26, 192 Pac. 1021, 12 A. L. R. 1190; Hammond ». Clark, 136 Ga. 313, 71 S. E. 479, 38 L. R. A. (x. s.) 77; Board of Highway Com’rs v. Bloomington, 253 Ill. 164, 97 N. EK. 280, Ann. Cas. 1913 A, 471; Hender- son v. Lieber, 175 Ky. 15, 192 8. W. 830, 9 A. L. R. 620; State v. Williams, 146 N. C. 618, 61 S. E. 61, 14 Ann. Cas. 562, 17 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 299; Thomas v. State, 76 Ohio St. 341, 81 N. E. 437, 118 Am. St. Rep. 884, 10 tek. A. (nN. s:) 1112; Threadgill »v. Cross, 26 Okla. 403, 109 Pac. 558, 138 Am. St. Rep. 964; Ex parte Hollman, mos: @. 9160S. EB. 19, 21 I Ree As (n. s.) 242, 14 Ann. Cas. 1100; State vy. Candland, 36 Utah, 406, 104 Pac. 285, 140 Am. St. Rep. 834, 24 L. Riva; (n. s.) 1260; Servonitz v. State, 133 Wis. 231, 113 N. W. 277, 126 Am. St. Rep. 955; Bonnett ». Vallier, 136 Wis. 193, 116 N. W. 885, 128 Am. St. Rep. 1061, 17 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 486. “An unconstitutional act is law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal con- templation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.” Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 30 L. ed. 178, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1121. Where a statute peremptorily re- quires certain stipulations or agree- ments to be inserted in a contract, and the same are, by force of such statute, and because of its provisions, inserted by the contracting parties in their contract, the obligatory and binding force of such stipulations and agreements so inserted depends upon the validity of the statute requiring their insertion; and where such statute is itself unconstitutional such stipula- tions and agreements, although incor- porated in the contract, are in law without any binding force upon the parties to the contract. Cleveland v. Clements Bros. Const. Co., 67 Ohio St. 197, 65 N. E. 885, 93 Am. St. Rep. 670, 59 L. R. A. 775. A void statute can confer no author- ity upon a municipal corporation to enact anordinance. Barnard & Miller v. Chicago, 316 Ill. 519, 147 N. E. 1533. not DECLARING LEGISLATIVE ACTS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 383 But in New Jersey and Maine it has been held that an invalid act of the legislature, until it has received judicial condemnation, is binding upon a citizen. Lang ». Bayonne, 74 N. J. L. 455, 68 Atl. 90, 122 Am. St. Rep. 391, 12 Ann. Cas. 961, 15 L. R. A. (n. s.) 93; State v. Pooler, 105 Me. 224, 74 Atl. 119, 134 Am. St. Rep. 543, 24 L. R. A. (wn. s.) 408. And in a number of States it has been held that where a statute creating an office is unconstitutional, an officer acting under it is, prior to its being adjudged invalid, an officer de facto, and his acts as such are valid as to the public. Brown v. O’Connell, 36 Conn, 4382, 4 Am. Rep. 89; Wendt v. Berry, 154 Ky. 586, 157 S. W. 1115, 45 L. R. A. (n. s.) 1101, Ann. Cas. 1915 C, 493; Riley v. Garfield Township, 58 Kan. 299, 49 Pac. 85; State v. Pooler, 105 Me. 224, 74 Atl. 119, 134 Am. St. Rep. 543, 24 L. R. A. (W. s.) 408; Thompson v. Couch, 144 Mich. 671, 108 N. W. 363; Burt v. Winona, etc., R. Co., 31 Minn. 472, 18 N. W. 285; Lang v. Bayonne, 74 N. J. L. 455, 68 Atl. 90, 122 Am. St. Rep. 391, 15 L. R. A. (n. 8.) 93. Sessums v. Botts, 24 Tex. 335. See also Miller v. Dunn, 72 Cal. 462, 14 Pac. 27, 1 Am. St. Rep. 67 In Iowa, a magistrate who had issued a warrant, and the officer who had served it, for the destruction of liquors, under a city ordinance which the city had no power to adopt, were held to be protected, notwithstanding this want of power in the city. Henke v. McCord, 55 Iowa, 378, 7 N. W. 623. The warrant seems to have been con- sidered “fair on its face;”’ but can process ever be fair on its face when it commands that which is illegal? A North Carolina case, State v. Godwin, 123 N. C. 697, 31 5. E. 221, 44 Am. St. 42, holds that a person acting in reliance upon 4 statute before it has been judicially determined to be unconstitutional cannot be held to answer criminally for such conduct if the conduct would not have been criminal if the statute was valid. If a decision adjudging a statute unconstitutional is afterwards over- ruled, the statute is to be considered384 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I part of an act which is found to be unconstitutional, and which, consequently, is to be regarded as having never, at any time, been possessed of any legal force. as having been in force for the whole period. Pierce v. Pierce, 46 Ind. 86. But see State v. O’ Neil, 147 Iowa, 513, 126 N. W. 454, 33 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 788, Ann. Cas. 1912 B, 691. A statute void for unconstitutional- ity is dead and cannot be vitalized by a subsequent amendment of the Constitution removing the constitu- tional objection, but must be re-en- acted. Seneca Mining Co. v. Secre- tary of State, 82 Mich. 573, 47 N. W. 25,9 L. R. A. 770; Banaz v. Smith, 133 Cal. 102, 65 Pac. 309; Whetstone v. Slonaker, 110 Neb. 343, 193 N. W. 749; Fleming v. Hance, 153 Cal. 162, 94 Pac. 620; State v. Tufley, 20 Nev. 427, 22 Pac. 1054. See also Stock- yards National Bank »v. Banman County Treasurer, 5 F. (2d) 905. But see Re Rahrer, 43 Fed. 556, 10 L. R. A. 444; and this case in the Supreme Court, Wilkerson v. Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545, 35 L. ed. 572, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 865; Re Spickler, 43 Fed. 653, 10 L. R. A. 446; Re Van Vliet, 43 Fed. 761, 10 L. R. A. 451; Ham- mond v. Clark, 186 Ga. 313, 71 S. E. 479, 38 L. R. A. (N. s.) 77; People v. Roberts, 148 N. Y. 360, 42 N. E. 1082.CHAPTER VIII THE SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT In the examination of American constitutional law, we shall not fail to notice the care taken and the means adopted to bring the agencies by which power is to be exercised as near as possible to the subjects upon which the power is to operate. In contradistinction to those governments where power is con- centrated in one man, or one or more bodies of men, whose super- vision and active control extends to all the objects of government within the territorial limits of the State, the American system is one of complete decentralization, the primary and vital idea of which is, that local affairs shall be managed by local authorities, ard general affairs only by the central authority. It was under the control of this idea that a national Constitution was formed, under which the States, while yielding to the national government complete and exclusive jurisdiction over external affairs, conferred upon it such powers only, in regard to matters of internal regulation, as seemed to be essential to national union, strength, and harmony, and with- out which the purpose in organizing the national authority might have been defeated. It is this, also, that impels the several States, as if by common arrangement, to subdivide their territory into counties, towns, road and school districts,! and to confer powers 1The general rules. respecting County, 123 Tenn. 1, 130 S. W. 1057 schools are sufficiently alike in the Ann. Cas. 1912 B, 1356; Spedden ». several States to justify bringing Board of Education, 74 W. Va. 181, together in this place the leading 81 S. E. 724, 52 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 163. authorities concerning them. To It has been sometimes contended what degree the legislature shall pro- vide for the education of the people at the cost of the State or of its munic- ipalities, is a question which, except as regulated by the Constitution, addresses itself to the legislative judg- ment exclusively. Commonwealth ». Hartman, 17 Pa. St. 118. See also Associated Schools, ete., v. Renville County School District No. 83, 122 Minn. 254, 142 N. W. 325, 47 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 200; Ransom v. Rutherford VOL. I—25 385 that it was incompetent to go beyond making provision for general educa- tion in the common branches of learn- ing; but this notion is exploded. High schools may be established: Stuart v. School District, 30 Mich. 69; Richards v. Raymond, 92 Ill. 612, 34 Am. Rep. 151; and so may normal schools and colleges: Powell v. Board of Education, 97 Ill. 375; Briggs v. Johnson Co., 4 Dill. 148; music may be taught: Bellmeyer v. School Dis-386 trict, 44 Iowa, 564; State v. Webber, 108 Ind. 31, 8 N. E. 708. “Common schools”, means schools open to all, rather than those of a definite grade: Roach v. Board, &c., 77 Mo. 484; and the State may confer upon the governing boards such authority as it shall deem wise, but subject to alteration at all times, and to be taken away at the discretion of the State. Rawson v. Spencer, 113 Mass. 40. Many of the State constitutions provide common-school funds, and some provide a fund for higher educa- tion with certain restrictions; what- ever these are they must be observed. People v. Board of Education, 13 Barb. 400; People v. Allen, 42 N. Y. 404; Halbert v. Sparks, 9 Bush, 259; Collins v. Henderson, 11 Bush, 74; State v. Graham, 25 La. Ann. 440; State v. Board of Liquidation, 29 La. Ann. 77; Sun Mut. Ins. Co. v. Board of Liquidation, 31 La. Ann. 175; Littlewort v. Davis, 50 Miss. 403; Weir v. Day, 35 Ohio St. 148; Otken v. Lamkin, 56 Miss. 758; School Dist. No. 20 v. Bryan, 51 Wash. 498, 99 Pac. 28, 20 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 1033. Although it is customary to leave the control of schools in the hands of the school authorities, it is held compe- tent for the State to contract with a publisher to supply all the schools of the State with text-books of a uni- form character and price. Curryer v. Merrill, 25 Minn. 1, 33 Am. Rep. 450; Bancroft v. Thayer, 5 Sawy. 502; People v. Board of Education, 55 Cal. 331; Leeper v. State, 103 Tenn. 500, 53 S. W. 962, 48 L. R. A. 166; State v. Haworth, 122 Ind. 462, 23 N. E. 946, 7 L. R. A. 240. The governing school boards derive all their authority from the statute, and can exercise no powers except those expressly granted, and those which result by necessary implication from the grant. Peers v. Board of Education, 72 Ill. 508; Clark ». School Directors, 78 Ill. 474; Adams v. State, 82 Ill. 1382; Stevenson »v. School Directors, 87 Ill. 255; Manning v. Van Buren, 28 Iowa, 332; Monti- cello Bank v. Coffin’s Grove, 51 Iowa, 350, 1 N. W. 592; State v. Board of CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I Education, 35 Ohio St. 368; State v. Mayor, &c., 7 Neb. 267; Gehling ». School District, 10 Neb. 239, 4 N. W. 1023; Wright v. Board of Education, 295 Mo. 466, 246 S. W. 43, 27 A. L. R. 1061. The board, in exercising its author- ity, must act as such, in regular meet- ings convened for the purpose; it is not sufficient that the members sever- ally give their assent to what is done. State v. Leonard, 3 Tenn. Ch. 117; State v. Tiedemann, 69 Mo. 515; Smith v. Township Board, 58 Mo. 297; Dennison School District v. Padden, 89 Pa. St. 395; Hazen v. Lerche, 47 Mich. 626, 11 N. W. 413. But see Crane v. School District, 61 Mich. 299, 28 N. W. 105; Russell v. State, 13 Neb. 68, 12 N. W. 829. Illegal or unauthorized action by the board cannot be ratified by it, and the fact that the district has the bene- fit of what is done will not amount to a ratification by the district. School District v. Fogelman, 76 Ill. 189; Johnson v. School District, 67 Mo. 319; Board of Education v. Thomp- son, 33 Ohio St. 321; Gibson v. School District, 36 Mich. 404; Wells ». People, 71 Ill. 532. The general control of a school building is in the bodrd, which may maintain all proper suits for possession. Barber v. Trustees of Schools, 51 II. 396; Alderman v. School Directors, 91 Il. 179. The board must not enter into con- tracts with its own members, as these would be void. Pickett v. School District, 25 Wis. 551; Hewitt v. Normal School District, 94 Ill. 528; Flint, &e. R. R. Co. v. Dewey, 14 Mich. 477; Scott v. Williamstown School Dist. No. 9, 67 Vt. 150, 31 Atl. 145, 27 L. R. A. 588. The board is entrusted with the authority to employ teachers, and to remove them under the rules pre- scribed by statute. Crawfordsville v. Hays, 42 Ind. 200; School District v. Colvin, 10 Kan. 283; Directors, &e. v. Burton, 26 Ohio St. 421; Jones v. Nebraska, 1 Neb. 176; Bays ». State, 6 Neb. 167; Parker v. School District, 5 Lea, 505. If a teacher is rightfully dismissed, he cannot recoverCHAP. Vit] SEVERAL GRADES OF for services performed thereafter, though he takes possession of the school-house and continues to teach. Pierce v. Beck, 61 Ga. 413. But if he is wrongfully dismissed, or if he leaves school because of the unjustifiable action of the board, he may recover for his whole time. Ewing v. School Directors, 2 Ill. App. 458; Scott v. School District, 46 Vt. 452. McCutchen v. Windsor, 55 Mo. 149. Contracts for a stated time are sub- ject to the observance of public holi- days, and the teacher is entitled to these without deduction from his salary. School District v. Gage, 39 Mich. 484. The school board may make the contract for teaching extend beyond their own term of office: Wilson »v. School District, 36 Conn. 280; Wait v. Ray, 67 N. Y. 36; provided they act in good faith and do not unreason- ably forestall the action of their suc- cessors. Loomis v. Coleman, 51 Mo. 21; Stevenson v. School District, 87 lll. 255: Hewitt v. School District, 94 Ill. 528: School Directors v. Hart, 4 Ill. App. 224. See Tappan v. School District, 44 Mich. 500, 7 N. W. 73; Athearn v. Independent District, 33 Iowa, 105. The board has general authority to establish for the school such rules and regulations it shall deem wise. Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 376; Spiller v. Woburn, 12 Allen, 127; Board of Education v. Minor, 23 Ohio St. 211: Garvin County School Board Dist. No. 18 v. Thompson, 24 Okla. 1, 103 Pac. 578, 138 Am. St. Rep. 861, 24 L. R. A. (n. 8.) 221, 19 Ann. Cas. 1188. The rules may be enforced by suspensions and expul- sions if necessary. Hodgkins v. Rock- port, 105 Mass. 475; Murphy v. Directors, 30 Iowa, 429; Burdick v. Babcock, 31 Iowa, 562; Board of Education v. Thompson, 33 Ohio St. 321; Rulison v. Post, 79 Ill. 567; Sewell v. Board of Education, 29 Ohio St. 89. But this power is subject to the general principle that the by- laws of all corporations must be reasonable; if a rule is unreasonable, and a pupil is punished for refusal to submit to it, an action will lie. Roe See as MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 387 vy. Deming, 21 Ohio St. 666. See Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36; State v. Vanderbilt, 116 Ind. 11, 18 N. E. 266; Fertich v. Michener, 111 Ind. 472, 11 N. BE. 605; State v. Board of Educa- tion, 63 Wis. 234, 23 N. W. 102; Holman v. School Trustees, 77 Mich. 605, 43 N. W. 996. The board and the teacher have no control of pupils after they have returned to their homes: Dritt v. Snodgrass, 66 Mo. 286; State v. Osborne, 24 Mo. App. 309; Hobbs v. Germany, 94 Miss. 469, 49 So. 515, 99 T.. R. A. (wv. 8.) 9838: Butisee Wright v. Board of Education, 295 Mo. 466, 246 S. W. 438, 27 A. L. R. 1061: State v. District Board of School Dist. No. 1, 135 Wis. 619, 116 N. W. 232, 128 Am. St. tep. 1050, 16 L. R. A. (n. 8s.) 730. But see Voorhees’ ‘“‘ Law of Public Schools’’, § 77. Other- wise while they are on their way home before parental control is resumed. Deskins v. Gose, 85 Mo. 485; Hutton v. State, 23 Tex. App. 386, 5S. W. 122. Mr. Voorhees says: ‘“‘ We find it held that the school authorities have the power to suspend a pupil for an offense committed outside of school hours and not in the presence of the teacher, which has a direct and immediate tendency to influence the conduct of other pupils while in the schoolroom, to set at naught the proper discipline of the school, to impair the authority of the teachers and to bring them into The “ Law of citing cases 1n ridicule and contempt.” Public Schools”’, § 77, Iowa, Missouri, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin The school authorities have the power to classify and erade the pupils in their respective districts and cause them to be taught im such departments as they may deem expedi- ent. They may also prescribe the courses of study and text-books for the use of the schools, and may require prompt attendance, respectful deport- ment, and diligence 1n study. Garvin County School Board Dist. No. 18 v. Thompson, 24 Okla. 1, 103 Pac. 578. 138 Am. St. Rep. 861, 24 L. R. A. (x. s.) 221, 19 Ann. Cas. 1188. The school authorities are required to exer- cise their authority over the pupils388 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [voL. 1 of local legislation upon the people of each subdivision, and also to incorporate cities, boroughs, and villages wherever the circum- stances and needs of a dense population seem to require other regulations than those which are needful for the rural districts. The system is one which almost seems a part of the very nature of the race to which we belong. A similar subdivision of the realm for the purposes of municipal government has existed in England from the earliest ages;! and in America, the first settlers, as if instinctively, adopted it in their frame of government, and no other has ever supplanted it, or even found advocates. In most of the colonies the central power created and provided for the organiza- tion of the towns; in one at least the towns preceded and created the central authority ;* but in all, the final result was substantially with a due regard to the natural and legal rights of the parents. State »v. Ferguson, 95 Neb. 63, 144 N. W. 1039, 50 L. R. A. (nN. 8.) 266. It is held in Wisconsin, Nebraska, and Illinois that parents have a right to excuse their children from taking any particular study in a course, and that teachers cannot refuse to give instruction in other studies of the course to the pupils thus excused. Morrow v. Wood, 35 Wis. 59, 17 Am. Rep. 471; Rulison v. Post, 79 IIL. 567; Lake View School Trustees ». People, 87 Ill. 303; State v. Ferguson, 95 Neb. 63, 144 N. W. 1039, 50 L. R. A. (N. s.) 266. In Oklahoma a parent may make a reasonable selection from the pre- scribed course of study, and this selec- tion must be respected by the school authorities. Garvin County School Board Dist. No. 18 v. Thompson, 24 Okla. 1-103) Bac: 578; 138) Am. St. Rep. 861, 24 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 221, 19 Ann. Cas. 1188. As to the power to discriminate between colored and other children in schools, see post, 807, note. As -to devoting school funds and_ school buildings to religious purposes, see post, 966, note. That towns, &c., may hold in trust moneys given for education, see Piper v. Moulton, 72 Me. 155; Hatheway v. Sackett, 32 Mich. 97. 1 Crabbe’s History of English Law, cy 2) 1) Bie Com. 114" Hallam’s Middle Ages, c. 8, pt. 1; 2 Kent, 278; Vaughan’s Revolutions in English History, b. 2, c. 8; Frothingham’s Rise of the Republic, 14, 15. The early local institutions of England are presented with great fulness and erudition in the Constitutional History by Professor Stubbs. 2 For an interesting history of the legislation in Connecticut on this sub- ject, see Webster v. Harwinton, 32 Conn. 131. In New Hampshire, see Bow v. Allenstown, 34 N. H. 351. The learned note to Commonwealth v. Roxbury, 9 Gray, 503, will give similar information concerning the organization and authority of towns in the Massachusetts provinces. And see People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 98, 9 Am. Rep. 103; Shumway v. Bennett, 29 Mich. 451. Mr. Elliott well says: “The prime strength of New England and of the whole republic was and is in the municipal governments and in the homes.” And he adds, that among the earliest things decided in Massa- chusetts was, “that trivial things should be ended in towns” (1635). Elliott’s New England, Vol. I. p. 182. 3’ Rhode Island; see Arnold’s His- tory, ec. 7. It is remarked by this author that, when the charter of Rhode Island was suspended to bring the colony under the dominion of Andros, “the American system of town governments which necessity had compelled Rhode Island to initiate fifty years before, became the means of preserving the individual liberty ofCHAP. VIII] SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 389 the same, that towns, villages, boroughs, cities, and counties exer- cised the powers of local government, and the Colony or State the powers of a more general nature.’ The several State constitutions have been framed with this sys- tem in view, and the delegations of power which they make, and the express can only be its present existence and anticipated continuance. and implied restraints which they impose thereupon, correctly understood and construed by keeping in view There are few of the general rules of constitutional law that are not more or less affected by the fact that the powers of government, instead of being concentrated in one body of men, are carefully distributed, with a view to being exercised with intelligence, economy, and facility, and as far as possible by the persons most directly and immediately interested. It has already been seen that the legislature cannot delegate its power to make laws ; but fundamental as this maxim is, it is so quali- fied by the customs of our race, and by other maxims which regard local government, that the right of the legislature, in the entire absence of authorization or prohibition, inferior municipal organizations, powers of local government, and the citizen when that of the State or Colony was crushed.” Arnold, Vol. I. p. 487. 1 “The townships,’’ says De Tocque- ville, “‘are only subordinate to the State in those interests which I shall term social, as they are common to all the citizens. They are independent in all that concerns themselves, and among the inhabitants of New England I believe that not a man is to be found who would acknowledge that the State has any right to interfere in their local interests. The towns of New England buy and sell, prosecute or are indicted, augment or diminish their rates, without the slightest opposition on the part of the administrative authority of the State. They are bound, however, to comply with the demands of the community. If a State is in need of money, a town can neither give nor withhold the supplies. If a State projects a road, the township cannot refuse to let it cross its terri- tory; if a police regulation is made by the State, it must be enforced by the town. A uniform system of instruc- to create towns and other and to confer upon them the especially of local taxation and tion is organized all over the country, and every town is bound to establish the schools which the law ordains. Strict as this obligation is, the government of the State imposes it in principle only, and in its performance the township assumes all its inde- Thus taxes are voted pendent rights. are assessed by the State, but they and collected by the township; the existence of a school is obligatory, but the township builds, pays, and super- intends it. In France, the State col- lector receives the local imposts; in America, the town collector receives the taxes of the State. Thus the French government lends its agents to the commune; in America, the town- ship is the agent of the government. This fact alone shows the extent of the differences which exist between the two nations.’”’ Democracy in Amer- ica, c. 5. See Frothingham’s Rise of the Republic, 14-28. On the Right to Local Self-Government, see articles by Amasa M. Eaton in 13 Harv. L. Rev. 441, 570, 638, and 14 Harv. L. Rey. 20, 116.390 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I police regulation usual with such corporations, would always pass unchallenged.? The legislature in these cases is not regarded as delegating its authority, because the regulation of such local affairs as are commonly left to local boards and officers is not understood to belong properly to the State ; and when it interferes, as some- times it must, to restrain and control the local action, there should be reasons of State policy or dangers of local abuse to warrant the interposition.” 1The police powers of the State may be delegated to municipal cor- porations created by the State, to be exercised for the welfare, safety, and health of the public. Cook County v. Chicago, 311 Ill. 234, 142 N. E. 512, 31 A. L. R. 442. 2“Tt seems to be generally conceded that powers of local legislation may be granted to cities, towns, and other municipal corporations. And it would require strong reasons to satisfy us that it could have been the design of the framers of our Constitution to take from the legislature a power which has been exercised in Europe by govern- ments of all classes from the earliest history, and the exercise of which has probably done more to promote civili- zation than all other causes combined ; which has been constantly exercised in every part of our country from its earliest settlement, and which has raised up among us many of our most valuable institutions.” State v. Noyes, 30 N. H. 279, 292, per Bell, J. See also Tanner v. Trustees of Albion, 5 Hill, 121; Dalby v. Wolf, 14 Iowa, 228; State v. Simonds, 3 Mo. 414; McKee v. McKee, 8 B. Monr. 433; Smith v. Levinus, 8 N. Y. 472; People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 532; Burgess v. Pue, 2 Gill, 11; New Orleans v. Tur- pin, 13 La. Ann. 56; Gilkeson v. The Frederick Justices, 13 Gratt. 577; Mayor, &c. of New York v. Ryan, 2 E. D. Smith, 368; St. Louis v. Russell, 9 Mo. 507; Bliss v. Kraus, 16 Ohio St. 55; Trigally v. Memphis, 6 Cold. 382; Durach’s Appeal, 62 Pa. St. 491; State v. Wilcox, 45 Mo. 458; Jones v. Richmond, 18 Gratt. 517; State v. O'Neill, 24 Wis. 149; Bradley »v. M’Atee, 7 Bush, 667, 3 Am. Rep. 309; Burckholter v. M’Connellsville, 20 Ohio St. 308; People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44, 9 Am. Rep. 103; Mills ». Charleton, 29 Wis. 400; Common- wealth v. Coyningham, 65 Pa. St. 76; People v. Kelsey, 34 Cal. 470; Tugman v. Chicago, 78 Ill. 405; Manly v. raleigh, 4 Jones Eq. 370; Stone v. Charlestown, 114 Mass. 214; Hayden v. Goodnow, 39 Conn. 164; Gold- thwaite v. Montgomery, 50 Ala. 486; Stanfill v. Court of Co. Rev., 80 Ala. 287; Robinson v. Schenck, 102 Ind. 307, 1 N. E. 698; Cross v. Hopkins, 6 W. Va. 323; Jacksonville v. Bowden, 67 Fla. 181, 64 So. 769, L. R. A. 1916 D, 913, Ann. Cas. 1915 D, 99; Chi- cago Union Traction Co. v. Chicago, 199 Ill. 484, 65 N. E. 451, 59 L. R. A. 631; Cook County v. Chicago, 311 Ill. 234, 142 N. E. 512, 31 A. L. R. 442; State v. Keener, 78 Kan. 649, 97 Pac. 860, 19 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 615; Downs v. Swann, 111 Md. 58, 73 Atl. 653, 134 Am. St. Rep. 586, 23 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 739 ; Sanning v. Cincinnati, 81 Ohio St. 142, 90 N. EH. 125, 25 I. R. A: (G. s)) 686; State Board of Health v. St. Johnsbury, 82 Vt. 276, 73 Atl. 581, 23 L. R. A. (n. s.) 766, 18 Ann. Cas. 496. Statute for government of cities of certain class may provide for appoint- ment by governor temporarily of an executive officer for said city. Com. v. Moir, 199 Pa. 534, 49 Atl. 351, 53 L. R. A. 837, 85 Am. St. 801. The propriety of establishing a municipality is not a judicial question. People v. Riverside, 70 Cal. 461, 11 Pac. 759. The legislature may delegate to municipal corporations authority ‘to regulate weights and measures. Stege- mann v. Weeke, 279 Mo. 140, 214 S. W. 187, 5 A. L. R. 1060. And may confer upon cities and towns power to license and regulate transportation by motor vehicles of passengers for hire.CHAP. VIII] SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 391 The people of the municipalities, however, do not define for them- selves their own rights, privileges , and powers, nor is there any common law which draws a definite line of distinction between the powers which may be exercised by the State, and those which must be left to the local governments." The municipalities must look to the State for such charters of government as the legislature shall see fit to provide; and they cannot prescribe for themselves the details, though they have a right to expect that those charters will be granted with a recognition of the general principles with which we are familiar. The charter, or the general law under which they D> « exercise their powers, is their constitution, in which they must be able to show authority for the acts they assume to perform. They have no inherent jurisdiction to make laws or adopt regulations of government; they are governments of enumerated powers, acting by a delegated authority; so that while the State legislature may exercise such powers of government coming within a proper designa- tion of legislative power as are not expressly or impliedly prohibited, the local authorities can exercise those only which are expressly or impliedly conferred, and subject to such regulations or restrictions as are annexed to the grant.” Com. v. Theberge, 231 Mass. 386, 121 N. E. 30. It is not an unlawful dele- gation of power to give a city the right to extend its bounds. Kelly v. Meeks, 87 Mo. 396. See cases, post, p. 489. Nor to confer upon it the power to levy license taxes upon occupations, and under such power it may tax brokers, even though they deal in nothing but stocks, and trade only upon the stock exchange. Banta ». Chicago, 172 Ill. 204, 50 N. E. 233, 40 eR. AS 611. The height of buildings in cities may be reasonably regulated by ordi- nances adopted in pursuance of legis- lative authority. Euclid-Doan Bldg. Co. v. Cunningham, 97 Ohio St. 130, 119 N. E. 361, L. R. A. 1918 D, 700; Bebb v. Jordan, 111 Wash. 73, 189 Pac. 553, 9 A. L. R. 1035; State ex rel. Sale v. Stahlman, 81 W. Va. 335, 94S. E. 497, L. R. A. 1918 C, 77. County commissioners may be authorized to provide additional jus- tices of the peace for any precinct above 20,000 inhabitants if ‘‘the needs of the precinct . . . require.’’ Pueblo Co. Com’rs v. Smith, 22 Col. 534, 45 Pac. 357, 33 L. R. A. 465. 1As to the common law affecting these corporate existences, and the effect of usage, see 2 Kent, 278, 279. 2 Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass. 272 ; Willard v. Killingworth, 8 Conn. 247; Abendroth v. Greenwich, 29 Conn 356; Baldwin v. North Branford, 32 Conn. 47; Webster v. Harwinton, 32 Conn. 131; Douglass v. Placerville, 18 Cal. 643; Lackland v. Northern Missouri Railroad Co., 31 Mo. 180; Mays »v. Cincinnati, 1 Ohio St. 263; Frost v. Belmont, 6 Allen, 152; Hess v. Pegg, 7 Nev. 23; Ould v. Richmond, 23 Gratt. 464; Youngblood »v. Sexton, 32 Mich. 406, 20 Am. Rep. 655; Louisiana Constr. & Imp. Co. ». Illinois C. R. Co., 49 La. Ann. 527, 21 So. 891, 37 L. R. A. 661; Attorney General v. Lowrey, 199 U. S. 233, 50 L. ed. 167, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 27; Pawhuska v. Pawhuska Oil & Gas Co., 250 U. S. 394, 63 L. ed. 1054, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 526, P. U. R. 1916 EK, 178; Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 67 L. ed. 937, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 534, 29 A. L. R. 1471; Fort Scott v. W. G. Eads Brokerage Co., 54 C. C. A. 487, 117 Fed. 51; Gambill v. Erdrich Bros. & Marx, 143 Ala. 506, 39 So. 297;392 Cleveland School Furniture Co. »v. Greenville, 146 Ala. 559, 41 So. 862; Porter v. Vinzant, 49 Fla. 213, 38 So. 607, 111 Am. St. Rep. 93; People ». Grover, 258 Ill. 124, 101 N. E. 216, Ann. Cas. 1914 B, 212; McAllen ». Hamblin, 129 Iowa, 329, 105 N. W. 593, 5 L. R. A. (n. s.) 484; Barnard & Miller v. Chicago, 316 Ill. 519, 147 N. E. 384, 38 A. L. R. 1533; State ex rel. Bayer v. Funk, 105 Oreg. 134, 209 Pac. 113, 25 A. L. R. 625; Donable’s Adm’r v. Harrisonburg, 104 Va. 533, 52) Ss) We 174002) 17. RAN. s8:)) 910} 113 Am. St. Rep. 1056; State v. Wertz, 91 W. Va. 622, 114 S. E. 242, 29 A. L. R. 391. “The city is a political subdivision of the State, created as a convenient agency for the exercise of such of the governmental powers of the State as may be intrusted to it.”’ Trenton ». New Jersey, 262 U. S. 182, 67 L. ed. 937, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 534, 29 A. L. R. 1471; Bowler v. Nagel, 228 Mich. 434, 200 N. W. 258, 37 A. L. R. 1154. “Municipal corporations are bodies politic and corporate, created by the legislature as governmental agencies of the State, and they can only exer- cise such power as they derive from their source of creation. ‘The powers which they exercise at all times are subject to legislative control. The State has the power to determine what matters are of general public concern.”’ Sapulpa v. Land, 101 Okla. 22, 223 Pac. 640, 35 A. L. R. 872. The prevention of damages by fire is an object within the scope of munic- ipal authority, either by express grant or by the power delegated to the city to make police regulations. Cook County v. Chicago, 311 Ill. 234, 142 Ifo 10), Gy, Gul AN, Ib 18h, 2D It is within the police power of a municipality to regulate the orderly, sanitary disposal of garbage. Cali- fornia Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works, 199 U. S. 306, 50 L. ed. 204, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 100; Gardner v. Michigan, 199 U. S. 325, 50 L. ed. 212, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 106; Re Zhizhuzza, 147 Cal. 328, 81 Pac. 955; Blakeman v. Wichita, 103 Kan. 763, 175 Pac. 975; Wheeler v. City of Boston, 233 Mass. 275, 123 N. E. 684, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [voL. I 15 A. L. R. 275; Valley Spring Hog Ranch Co. v. Plagmann, 282 Mo. 1, 220 S. W. 1, 15 A. L. R. 266; Bishop v. City of Tulsa, (Okla. Crim. Rep.) 209 Pac. 228, 27 A. L. R. 1008. And under such power it may make pro- visions regulating the removal of ashes or other refuse matter, but such provisions must be reasonable. Good- land v. Popejoy, 98 Kan. 183, 157 Pace. 410; Baltimore v. Hampton Court Co., 138 Md. 271, 113 Atl. 850; Mer v. Ross, 64 Neb. 710, 90 N. W. 869, 57 L. R. A. 895, 97 Am. St. Rep. 676. Charters of municipal corporations have been construed to confer upon them power to prohibit meetings in public streets or parks without a per- mit. Anderson v. Tedford, 80 Fla. 376, 85 So. 673, 10 A. L. R. 1481; Fitts v. Atlanta, 121 Ga. 567, 49S. E. 793, 67 L. R. A. 803, 104 Am. St. Rep. 167; Love v. Judge of Recorders Ct., 128 Mich. 545, 87 N. W. 785, 55 L. R. A. 618; People v. Pierce, 85 App. Div. (N. Y.) 125, 838 N. Y. Supp. 79; Buffalo v. Till, 192 App. Div. (N. Y.) 99, 182 N. Y. Supp. 418; People ex rel. Doyle v. Atwell, 232 N. Y. 96, 133 N. E. 364, 25 A. L. R. 107; Duquesne v. Fincke, 269 Pa. St. 112, 112 Atl. 130. And it has been held that such author- ity may be exercised by a municipality under the police power. Buffalo »v. Till, 192 App. Div. (N. Y.) 99, 182 N. Y. Supp. 418; Com. v. Mervis, 55 Pa. Super. Ct. 178; Com. v. Curtis, 55 Pa. Super. Ct. 184. But in Florida it has been held that a city ordinance which prohibits the holding of any public meeting, or meeting of any character, upon any street of the city or within any city park, without first obtaining permission in writing from the mayor or a majority of the city councilmen, in the absence of any charter provision definitely and specifically empowering the city to prohibit public meetings in the streets or parks of the city, is void for unrea- sonableness. Anderson »v. Tedford, 80 Fla. 376, 85 So. 673, 10 A. L. R. 1481. Where legislature grants right to occupy streets of a city upon getting consent of city council, that body cannot attach conditions to its consentCHAP. VIII] SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 393 The creation of municipal corporations, and the conferring upon them of certain powers and subjecting them to corresponding duties, does not deprive the legislature of the State of that general control over their citizens which was before possessed. It still has author- ity to amend their charters, enlarge or diminish their powers, extend or limit their boundaries, consolidate two or more into one, overrule their legislative action whenever it is deemed unwise, impolitic, or unjust, and even abolish them altogether in the legislative discretion, and substitute those which are different.!_ The rights and franchises unless the conditions are restricted entirely to matters within the city limits. Galveston & W. R. Co. ». Galveston, 90 Tex. 398, 39 S. W. 920, 36 L. R. A. 33 and note. Interest cannot be required upon delayed payments of sewer ments in the absence of statutory authority therefor. Sargent & Co. v. Tuttle, 67 Conn. 162, 34 Atl. 1028, 32 L. R. A. 822. Nor can the city regulate the charges of gas companies for gas furnished private consumers in the absence of a reservation of such power in their charter. Re Pryor, 55 Kan. 724, 41 Pac. 958, 29 L. R. A. 398, 49 Am. St. 280. 18t. Louis v. Allen, 13 Mo. 400; Coles v. Madison Co., Breese, 115; Richland County v. Lawrence County, 12 Ill. 1; Trustees of Schools v. Tat- man, 13 Ill. 27; Robertson v. {ock- ford, 21 Ill. 451; People v. Power, 25 Ill. 187; St. Louis v. Russell, 9 Mo. 507; State v. Cowan, 29 Mo. 330; McKim v. Odom, 3 Bland, 407; Granby v. Thurston, 23 Conn. 416; Harrison Justices v. Holland, 3 Gratt. 247; Brighton v. Wilkinson, 2 Allen, 27; Sloan v. State, 8 Blackf. 361; Mills v. Williams, 11 Ired. 558; Lang- worthy v. Dubuque, 16 Iowa, 271; Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 242; State v. Branin, 23 N. J. L. 484; Patter- son v. Society, &c., 24 N. J. L. 385; Atchison v. Bartholow, 4 Kan. 124; City of St. Louis v. Cafferata, 24 Mo. 94; People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 532; Hawkins v. Commonwealth, 76 Pa. St. 15; People v. Tweed, 63 N. Y. 202; Barnes v. District of Columbia, 91 U. S. 540, 23 L. ed. 440; Laramie Co. v. Albany Co., 92 U. S. 307, 23 L. ed. 552; Aspinwall v. Commis- sioners, &c., 22 How. 364, 16 L. ed. 296; Howard v. McDiamid, 26 Ark. 100; Philadelphia v. Fox, 94 Pa. St. 169; Bradshaw v. Omaha, 1 Neb. 16; Kuhn v. Board of Education, 4 W. Va. 499; Sinton v. Ashbury, 41 Cal. 525; Hess v. Pegg, 7 Nev. 23; Hagerstown v. Schuer, 37 Md. 180; San Francisco vy. Canavan, 42 Cal. 541; State »v. Jennings, 27 Ark. 419; Division of Howard Co., 15 Kan. 194; Martin v. Dix, 52 Miss. 53; Goff v. Frederick, 44 Md. 67: Blessing v. Galveston, 42 Tex. 641; Wiley v. Bluffton, 111 Ind. 152, 12 N. B. 165; True». Davis, 133 lll. 522, 22 N. E. 410; Attorney- General v. Lowrey, 199 U. S. 233, 50 L. ed. 167, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 27; Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U. S. 161, 52 L. ed. 151, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 40, Joslin Mfg. Co. v. Providence, 262 U. S. 668, 67 L. ed. 1167, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 684; Londoner »v. City and County of Denver, 52 Colo. 15, 119 Pac. 156; People v. Grover, 228 Til. 124, 101 N. E. 216, Ann. Cas. 1914 B, 212: People v. McBride, 234 Ill. 146, 84 N. E. 865, 123 Am. St. Rep. 82, 14 Ann. Cas. 994; McSurely ». McGrew, 140 Iowa, 163, 118 N. W. 415, 132 Am. St. Rep. 248; Carrithers v. Shelbyville, 126 Ky. 769, 104 S. W. 744 17 L. R.A. (Nn. 8.) 421; Sweeten v. State, 122 Md. 634, 90 Atl. 180; People ex rel. Simon 2. Bradley, 207 N. Y. 592, 101 N. E. 766; Wharton ». Greensboro, 146 N. C. 356, 59 S. E. 1043; Town of Murphy ». C. A. Webb & Co., 156 N. C. 402, 72 S. E. 460; Pettsburg’s Petition, 217 Pa. St. 227, 66 Atl. 348, 120 Am. St. Rep. 845; Malone v. Williams, 118 Tenn. 390, 103 S. W. 798, 121 Am. St. Rep. 1002.394 Legislature may create a munici- pality of the inhabitants residing near the mouth of a navigable river and compel them to maintain a ship channel therein, although a portion of the benefit thereof is enjoyed by the inhabitants of a much larger area. Cook v. Portland, 20 Oreg. 580, 27 Pac. 263, 13 L. R. A. 533. May com- bine several cities and towns into a sewage district and compel them to construct a system of sewerage. fe Kingman, 153 Mass. 566, 27 N. E. Wide L2G. He Al AL 7 The legislature may in its discre- tion recall to itself and exercise so much of such powers as it has conferred upon municipal corporations as is not secured to them by the Constitu- tion. People v. Pinkney, 32 N. Y. 377. The subject was considered at length in Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472, 26 L. ed. 197, in which was considered the effect of the legislation which abolished the city government of Memphis; and in Amy v. Selma, 77 Ala. 103. The creditors of a county cannot prevent the legislature reducing its limits, notwithstanding their security may be diminished thereby. Wade v. Richmond, 18 Gratt. 583; Luerh- man v. Taxing District, 2 Lea, 425. Compare Milner v. Pensacola, 2 Woods, 632; Galesburg v. Hawkinson, 75 Ill. 152; Rader v. Road District, 36 N. J. L. 273; Wallace v. Sharon Trustees, 84 N. C. 164. A charter may not be repealed to the injury of creditors already entitled to payment. Morris v. State, 62 Tex. 728. This power is not defeated or affected by the circumstance that the municipal corporation was by its charter made the trustee of a charity; and in such case, if the corporation is abolished, the Court of Chancery may be em- powered and directed by the repealing act to appoint a new trustee to take charge of the property and execute the trust. Montpelier v. East Mont- pelier, 29 Vt. 12. And see Harrison v. Bridgeton, 16 Mass. 16; Montpelier Academy v. George, 14 La. Ann. 406; Reynolds v. Baldwin, 1 La. Ann. 162; Police Jury v. Shreveport, 5 La. Ann. 665; Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Pa. St. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [voL. 1 169; Weymouth & Braintree Fire Commissioners v. County Commis- sioners, 108 Mass. 142. As to extent of power to hold property in trust, see Hatheway v. Sackett, 32 Mich. 97. But neither the identity of a cor- poration, nor its right to take property by devise, is destroyed by a change in its name, or enlargement of its area, or an increase in the number of its corporators. Girard v. Philadelphia, 7 Wall. 1, 19 L. ed. 53. Changing a borough into a city does not of itself abolish or affect the existing borough ordinances. Trus- tees of Erie Academy v. City of Erie, 31 Pa. St. 515. Nor will it affect the indebtedness of the corporation, which will continue to be its indebtedness under its new organization. Olney v. Harvey, 50 Ill. 453. So when a city has had a de facto organization, and is afterward reorganized so as to become de jure, its old obligations con- tinue. Shapleigh v. San Angelo, 167 U. S. 646, 42 L. ed. 310, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 957; Ranken v. McCallum, 25 Tex. Civ. App. 83,60S. W.975. Upon municipal bonds and changes in statu- tory construction, see note to 18 L. ed. U.S. 350; also notes to 26 L. ed. U.S. 263, and 35 L. ed. U.S. 344. Property brought within a city by the exercise of legislative discretion is liable for existing municipal indebted- ness. Maddrey v. Cox, 73 Tex. 538, 11S. W. 541. A general statute, containing a clause repealing all statutes contrary to its provisions, does not repeal a clause in a municipal charter on the same subject. State v. Branin, 23 N. J. Li: 484: Where the Constitution prescribes that the charter of a certain city can be amended by its own citizens, the power of the legislature to amend is excluded. St. Louis v. Dorr, 145 Mo. 466, 41 S. W. 1094, 46 S. W. 976, 42 L. R. A. 686, 68 Am. St. 575. Legislature has power to divide counties and to modify their bounda- ries, but such modifications do not modify the boundaries of legislative districts. People v. Board of Super- visors, 147 N. Y. 1, 41 N. E. 563, 30 L. RAL 74:CHAP. VIII] SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 395 of such a corporation, being granted for the purposes of govern- ment, can never become such vested rights as against the State that they cannot be taken away; nor does the charter constitute a con- tract in the sense of the constitutional provision which prohibits the obligation of contracts being violated. [In the absence of a statu- tory provision conferring upon a municipal corporation, in express terms, power to enter into an irrevocable contract with a public serv- ice corporation in relation to rates to be charged by the latter, the legislature, or a public service commission under legislative author- ity, may control such rates, and authorize their increase, notwith- standing a contract between the municipality and the public service corporation fixing the maximum rates which the latter may charge. Such a change of rates is not unconstitutional as depriving the city and its inhabitants of property and rights without due process of law or as impairing the obligation of a contract.?] Restraints on the A constitutional provision authoriz- ing cities of a certain class to frame charters for their own government not in conflict with the Constitution and laws of the State, reserves to the State a general legislative control in the State over such cities, and the general laws of the State pertaining to any rightful subject of legislation of general public concern which con- flict with any charter provisions of such municipalities prevail over such charter provisions. Sapulpa v. Land, 101 Okla. 22, 223 Pac. 640, 35 A. L. R. 872. 1 This principle was recognized by the several judges in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 4 L. ed. 629, and in Meriwether »v. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472, 26 L. ed. 197. And see People v. Morris, 13 Wend. 325; St. Louis v. Russell, 9 Mo. 507 ; Montpelier v. East Montpelier, 29 Vt. 12: Trustees of Schools v. Tat- man, 13 Ill. 27; Brighton v. Wilkin- son, 2 Allen, 27; Reynolds v. Baldwin, 1 La. Ann. 162; Police Jury v. Shreve- port, 5 La. Ann. 665; Mt. Carmel »v. Wabash County, 50 Ill. 69; Lake View v. Rose Hill Cemetery, 70 Iil. 191; Zitske v. Goldberg, 38 Wis. 216; Weeks v. Gilmanton, 60 N. H. 500; Dillon, Mun. Corp. §§ 24, 30, 37; Covington v. Kentucky, 173 U. S. 231, 43 L. ed. 679, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383; Essex Public Road Bd. v. Skinkle, 140 U. S. 334, 35 L. ed. 446, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 790; Attorney-General v. Low- rey, 199 U. S. 233, 50 L. ed. 167, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 27; Hunter v. Pitts- burgh, 207 U. S. 161, 52 L. ed. 151, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 40; Pawhuska »v. Pawhuska Oil & Gas Co., 250 U.S. 394, 63 L. ed. 1054, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 526; Trenton New Jersey, 262 U. S. 182, 67 L. ed. 937, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 534, 29 A. L. R. 1471. 2Meridian Light & R. Co. v. Me- ridian, 265 Fed. 765; Chicago R. Co. vy. Illinois Commerce Commission, 277 Fed. 970; Miller v. Southern Bell Teleph. & Teleg. Co., 279 Fed. 806; Camden v. Arkansas Light & P. Co., 145 Ark. 205, 224 S. W. 444; Hayne v. Chicago & O. P. Elev. R. Co., 294 Ill. 413, 128 N. EB. 587; Washington v. Public Commission, 190 Ind. 105, 129 N. E. 401; Cimarron ». Midland Water, Light & Ice Gor, E10 Kan. 812, 205 Pac. 603; Winfield »v. Court of Industrial Relations, 111 Kan. 580, 207 Pac. 813; Shreveport v. Southwestern Gas & E. Co., 151 La. 864, 92 So. 365; City Water Co. v. Sedalia, 288 Mo. 411, 231 S. W. 942; State er rel. Harrisonville »v. Public Service Commission, 291 Mo. 39. 236 S. W. 802; Hackensack Water Co. v. Public Utility Com’rs, 96 N. J. L. 184, 115 Atl. 528; Public Service Commission v. Pavilion Natu- ral Gas Co., 232 N. Y. 146, 133 N. E. Service396 427; O’Connor v. Public Service Commission, 114 Mise. (N. Y.) 337, 186 N. Y. Supp. 390; New York »v. Richmond Light & R. Co., 183 N. Y. Supp. 922; Re Fleming, 117 Misc. (N. Y.) 373, 191 N. Y. Supp. 586; Durant v. Consumers’ Light & P. Co., 71 Okla. 282, 177 Pac. 361; Sapulpa v. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co., 79 Okla. 196, 192 Pac. 224: Scranton v. Public Service Commission, 268 Pa. St. 192, 110 Atl. 775, affirming 73 Pa. Super. Ct. 192; Wilkinsburg v. Public Service Commission, 72 Pa. Super. Ct. 423; Foltz v. Public Service Commission, 73 Pa. Super. Ct. 24; Landsdowne v. Public Service Commission, 74 Pa. Super. Ct. 203; Edgewood v. Public Service Commission, 75 Pa. Super. Ct. 280; Mitchell v. Railroad Com’rs, 44S. D. 430, 184 N. W. 246; Victoria v. Victoria Ice, Light & P. Co., 134 Va. 134, 114 'S. E. 92; 28 A. LL. R. 562; Richmond v. Chesapeake & P. Teleph. Co., 127 Va. 612, 105 S. E. 127; North Coast Power Co. v. Public Service Commission, 114 Wash. 102, 194 Pac. 587; State ex rel. Spokane v. Kuy- kendall, 119 Wash. 107, 205 Pac. 3. In exercising the power of making contracts with public utilities and in enacting ordinances in_ reference thereto, a city acts as an agent of the State in its governmental character, and it is within the power of the State to withdraw that authority and confer it upon another governmental agency, such as the Court of Indus- trial Relations or the Public Utilities Commission, and such latter govern- mental agency has the power, with the express or implied assent of the utility concerned, to alter the con- tract and other incidental regulations theretofore established by the city. City of Winfield v. Court of Industrial Relations, 111 Kan. 580, 207 Pac. 813. An order of the Corporation Com- mission changing the rate to be charged for gas provided by a franchise granted by the city of Sapulpa, Okla- homa, prior to the admission of Ok- lahoma to statehood, is not void for impairment of contract rights, as the United States granted said franchise through the city as its agent, and as upon statehood the State of Okla- CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I homa became substituted to the rights of the United States, the State has a right to change the provisions thereof, through its representative, the Cor- poration Commission. City of Sa- pulpa v. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co., 79 Okla. 196, 192 Pac. 224. Where a city under a statutory power to contract for electric current enters into a fifteen year contract with a private corporation to furnish it at an agreed price with electricity for its own use and for its distribution to its residents on such terms as it shall see fit, the public utilities com- mission under a statute passed before the making of the contract, giving it power to regulate the charges of public utilities, may authorize an increase in the rates fixed in such contract; that is, it may release the company from the obligation to continue furnishing service at the contract rates. City of Cimarron v. Midland Water, Light & Ice Co., 110 Kan. 812, 205 Pac. 603. Justice Mason, who delivered the opinion of the court in this case, said: “The plaintiff urges that its contract with the company was duly authorized and under the Federal Constitution its obligation cannot be impaired by State law. A rate fixed for a term of years by a franchise contract expressly author- ized by statute between a municipality and a public service corporation can- not be reduced by subsequent legisla- tion, but there is room for doubt as to just what constitutes an express authorization. Note, L. R. A. 1915 C, 261. The prevailing view is that the legislature directly or through a utilities commission may increase franchise rates notwithstanding the existence of a contract valid as be- tween the parties. Notes, 3 A. L. R. 730, 9 A. L. R. 1165. Many deci- sions to that effect are based on this reason, which does not apply to a reduction of rates —the city exists at the will of the State; its rights are subject to unlimited control by the legislature; the State may act for it and in co-operation with the utility may in effect modify the contract. Note, 3 L. R. A. 742. See also Worcester v. Street Railway Co., 196CHAP. VIII] SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 397 legislative power of control must be found in the Constitution of the State, or they must rest alone in the U. S. 549, 49 L. ed. 591, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 327, and Little River Township v. Reno County, 65 Kan. 9, 68 Pac. 1105. A distinction has sometimes been noted, in the matter of the effect of legislation thereon, between a con- tract made by a city for services to itself and one regarding rates to be charged to its residents. Note, 3 AT, R. 735. See, also, City of Charleston v. Public Service Com., 86 W. Va. 536, 103 S. E. 673. It is settled, however, that as far as con- cerns any provision of the Federal Constitution a statutory commission may fix rates to be charged by a public service corporation to an indi- vidual, which will supersede those of an unexpired contract (Union Dry Goods Co. v. Georgia Public Service Corporation, 248 U. S. 372, 63 L. ed. 309, 39 Sup. Ct. 117, annotated in 9 A. L. R. 1423), and this irrespective of whether the statute was passed before or after the contract was made (Producers’ Transp. Co. ». Railroad Com., 251 U. S. 228, 232, 64 L. ed. 239, 40 Sup. Ct. 131; and other cases cited in Nowata County Gas Co. v. Henry Oil Co. (C. C. A.) 269 Fed. 742, 745). We think a city even when (and perhaps especially when) acting in its proprietary capac- ity stands upon no higher ground in this regard than an individual or private corporation, and is subject to the same rule. See City of Washing- ton v. Public Service Commission, 190 Ind. 105, 129 N. E. 401; Leiper v. Baltimore & P. R. Co., 262 Pa. St. 328, 105 Atl. 551; State ». Public Service Comm., 275 Mo. 201, 204 S. W. 497; 3 Dillon on Mun. Corp. § 1303, p. 2134, text to note 35 In respect to its governmental powers a city is absolutely subject to legislative control. If that control is limited where the city acts in its proprietary capacity, it must then be content to accept the same treatment given to a private corporation, rather than claim any degree of immunity growing out of its public character, which it has in a sense laid aside for the time being. legislative discretion.’ If the It cannot well assert at once and with respect to the same transaction the privileges peculiar to each side of its dual capacity.” 1 See ante, pp. 93-94; post, pp. 488- 500. ‘“‘ Where a corporation is the mere creature of legislative will, established for the general good and endowed by the State alone, the legislature may, at pleasure, modify the law by which it was created. For in that case there would be but one party affected, — the government itself, — and therefore not a contract within the meaning of the Constitution. The trustees of such a corporation would be the mere mandatories of the State, having no personal interest involved, and could not complain of any law that might abridge or destroy their agency.” Montpelier Academy v. George, 14 La. Ann. 406. In Trustees of Schools v. Tatman, 13 Ill. 27, 30, the court say: ‘Public corporations are but parts of the machinery employed in carrying on the affairs of the State; and they are sub- ject to be changed, modified, or de- stroyed, as the exigencies of the public may demand. The State may exer- cise a general superintendence and control over them and their rights and effects, so that their property is not diverted from the uses and objects for which it was given or purchased.” And see State v. Miller, 65 Mo. 50. “A municipal corporation, being a creature of the legislature, cannot question the authority of its creator to amend or abrogate its charter, except in so far as the legislature attempts to exceed its own consti- tutional authority. But the General Assembly is as well bound not to vio- late the mandates expressed in the Constitution as a corporation created by the legislature is controlled by its statutes. Hence a municipal cor- poration, having authority to prose- cute and defend suits in the courts, may invoke the protection afforded by the Constitution to prevent 4 violation of its rights.” Gretna v. Bailey, 141 La. 625, 75 So. 491, Ann.398 Cas. 1918 E, 566, overruling Mayor and Council of the City of Carrollton v. Board of Metropolitan Police, 21 La. Ann. 447. As to the effect of legislation abol- ishing a corporation upon its property and debts, see Mount Pleasant »v. Beckwith, 100 U. S. 514, 25 L. ed. 699; Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472, 26 L. ed. 197; Rawson v. Spencer, 113 Mass. 40. Where a municipal corporation is dissolved and a new one for the same general purposes is created containing the same population and property in substance, to which the corporate property passes without consideration, the debts of the old fall upon the new municipality, and with them the power to tax for their payment Mobile v. Watson, 116 U. S. 289, 29 L. ed. 620, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 398; Amy v. Selma, 77 Ala. 103. Upon the division of towns and counties, &c. the legislature may ap- portion the debts as it sees fit. People v. Supervisors, 94 N. Y. 263; Clay Co. v. Chickasaw Co., 64 Miss. 534, 1 So. 753; Dare Co. v. Currituck Co., 95 N. C. 189: Morrow Co. »v. Hendryx, 14 Oreg. 397, 12 Pac. 806. It is a lawful exercise of legislative authority upon such division, to confer a part of the corporate property of the old corporation upon the new, and to direct the old body to pay it over to the new. Harrison v. Bridgeton, 16 Mass. 16; Salem Turnpike v. Essex Co., 100 Mass. 282; Whitney v. Stow, 111 Mass. 368; Stone v. Charlestown, 114 Mass. 214; Sedgwick Co. v. Bunker, 14 Kan. 498; Portwood v. Mont- gomery, 52 Miss. 523; Bristol v. New Chester, 3 N. H. 524; Milwaukee Town v. Milwaukee City, 12 Wis. 93; Marshall Co. Court v. Calloway Co. Court, 3 Bush, 93; Columbus ». Columbus, 82 Wis. 374, 52 N. W. 425, 16 L. R. A. 695, and note. But it seems that an apportionment of property can only be made at the time of the division. Windham v. Port- land, 4 Mass. 384; Hampshire », Franklin, 16 Mass. 76. See Richland v. Lawrence, 12 Ill. 1; Bowdoinham v. Richmond, 6 Me. 112. In Bowdoin- ham v. Richmond, 6 Me. 112, it was CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I held that the apportionment of debts between an old town and one created from it was in the nature of a con- tract; and it was not in the power of the legislature afterwards to release the new township from payment of its share as thus determined. But the case of Layton v. New Orleans, 12 La. Ann. 515, is contra. See also Borough of Dunmore’s Appeal, 52 Pa. St. 374, and School District v. Board of Education, 73 Mo. 627; Johnson v. San Diego, 109 Cal. 468, 42 Pac. 249, 30 L. R. A. 178; Perry County v. Conway County, 52 Ark. 430, 12S. W. 877, 6 L. R. A. 665, and note; which in principle seem to accord with the Louisiana case. In the absence of such legislation each part is entitled to the property falling within it, and to any equitable share of the moneys of the township. Towle v. Brown, 110 Ind. 65, 10 N. E. 626. The old corporation retains all the property within its borders and re- mains subject to the then existing debts, in the absence of any legislative apportionment. McCully v. Tracy, 66 N. J. L. 489, 49 Atl. 436. Where two municipal corporations are consolidated and the new cor- poration receives assets of value, or where one municipality absorbs an- other, and receives property and cash which is liable for the payment of the debts of the absorbed and dissolved corporation, the absorbing munici- pality becomes liable, at least to the amount of the assets it receives, for such pre-existing debts. Walker v. Rome, 6 Ga. App. 59, 64 S. E. 310. Where the legislature creates a new municipal corporation, embracing part of the territory of an existing munici- pal corporation, it may impose on the former the obligation of existing contracts of the latter; but in the absence of legislation to that effect, the old corporation remains liable for pre-existing obligations. Board of Education of Borough of Flemington v. State Board of Education, 81 N. J. L. 211, 81 Atl. 163, affirmed 85 N. J. L. 384, 91 Atl. 1068. Where the legislature amends the charter of a municipality so as to extend its corporate limits and includeCHAP. VIII] SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 399 legislative action in these cases operates injuriously to the munici- palities or to individuals, the remedy is not with the courts. The courts have no power to interfere, and the people must be looked to, to right through the ballot-box all these wrongs." therein contiguous territory previ- ously unincorporated, all the inhabit- ants and their property within the limits so fixed are subject to taxation to raise municipal revenue for all legitimate purposes, without respect to the time when some of the liabilities arose. White v. Atlanta, 134 Ga. 532, 68 S. E. 103. Under such cir- cumstances, unless otherwise provided by law, debts of the corporation con- tracted before the limits were ex- tended are chargeable upon the city as enlarged by the territory added, as well as upon that included in the boundaries before they were extended. White v. Atlanta, 134 Ga. 532, 68S. E. 103. In Burns v. Clarion County, 62 Pa. St. 422. it was held the legislature had the power to open a settlement made by county auditors with the county treasurer, and to compel them to settle with him on principles of equity. See further, Cambridge v. Lexington, 17 Pick. 222; Attorney-General ». Cambridge, 16 Gray, 247; Clark ». Cambridge, &c. Bridge Proprietors, 104 Mass. 236. The legislature has power to lay out a road through several towns, and apportion the expense between them. Waterville v. Kennebeck County, 59 Me. 80; Commonwealth v. Newbury- port, 103 Mass. 129. And it may change the law and redistribute the burden afterwards, if from a change of circumstances or other reasons it is deemed just and proper to do so. Scituate v. Weymouth, 108 Mass. 128, and cases cited. And where a high- way or bridge, although lying outside the territorial limits of a municipality, is especially beneficial to the people thereof, the legislature may compel that municipality to sustain part of the burden of providing and main- taining such highway, and may deter- mine what portion of such expense shall be contributed by such munici- pality. State v. Williams, 68 Conn. This is the general 131, 35 Atl. 24, 421, 48 L. R. A. 465, aff. in Williams v. Eggleston, 170 U.S. 304, 42 L. ed. 1047, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 617. Upon the power of the legisla- ture to impose burdens upon munici- palities, see the cases collected in note to 48 L. R. A. 465. A statute abolishing school dis- tricts is not void on grounds like the following: that it takes the property of the districts without compensation ; that the taxes imposed will not be proportional and reasonable, or that contracts will be affected. Rawson v. Spencer, 113 Mass. 40. See Wey- mouth &c. Fire District v. County Commissioners, 108 Mass. 142. The legislature may lay a penalty upon any county in which a lynching occurs, and may provide that such penalty shall be recovered by the person injured. Champaign Co. ». Church, 62 Ohio St. 318, 57 N. E. 50, 48 L. R. A. 738. 1“‘The correction of these abuses is as readily attained at the ballot-box as it would be by subjecting it to judicial revision. A citizen or a number of citizens may be subtracted from a county free from debt, having no taxation for county purposes, and added to an adjacent one, whose debts are heavy, and whose taxing powers exercised to the utmost extent law, and this, too, without their wishes. It is done every day. Perhaps a majority of the people thus annexed to an adja- cent or thrown into a new county by the division of an old one may have petitioned the legislature for this change; but this is no relief to the outvoted minority, or the individual who deems himself oppressed and vexed by the change. Must we, then, to prevent such occasional hardships, are allowed by consulting deny the power entirely? “Tt must be borne in mind that these corporations, whether established over cities, counties, or townships (where such incorporated subdivisions400 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I rule; and the exceptions to it are not numerous, and will be indi- cated hereafter. Powers of Public Corporations. The powers of these corporations are either express or implied. The former are those which the legislative act under which they exist confers in express terms; the latter are such as are necessary in order to carry into effect those expressly granted, and which must, therefore, be presumed to have been within the intention of the legislative grant. Certain powers are also incidental to corpora- tions, and will be possessed unless expressly or by implication pro- hibited.? Of these an English writer has said: “A municipal cor- poration has at common law few powers beyond those of electing, governing, and removing its members, and regulating its franchises exist), are never intrusted and can never be intrusted with any legislative power inconsistent or conflicting with the general laws of the land, or deroga- tory to those rights, either of person or property, which the Constitution and the general laws guarantee. They are strictly subordinate to the general laws, and merely created to carry out the purposes of those laws with more certainty and efficiency. They may be and sometimes are intrusted with powers which properly appertain to private corporations, and in such matters their power as mere municipal corporations ceases.’”’ City of St. Louis v. Allen, 13 Mo. 400. The propriety, expediency, and necessity of a municipal ordinance authorized by statute is purely for the determination of the legislativesauthor- ity; and not for determination by the courts. In re Kansas City Ordi- nance No. 39, 946, 298 Mo. 569, 252 S. W. 404, 28 A. L. R. 295. 12 Kent, 278, note; Halstead »v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 3 N. Y. 430; Hodges v. Buffalo, 2 Denio, 110; New London ». Brainard, 22 Conn. 552; State v. Ferguson, 33 N. H. 424; McMillan v. Lee County, 3 Iowa, 311; La Fayette v. Gox, 5 Ind. 38; Clark v. Des Moines, 19 Iowa, 199; State v. Morristown, 33 N. J. L. 57; Beaty v. Knowler, 4 Pet. 152, 7 L. ed. 813; Mills v. Gleason, 11 Wis. 470; Chicago v. Washingtonian Home, 289 III. 206, 124 N. E. 416,6 A. L. R. 1584; City National Bank v. Kiowa, 104 Okla. 161, 230 Pac. 894, 39 A. L. R. 206; Chapman »v. Hood River, 100 Oreg. 43, 196 Pac. 467; State ex rel. Bayer v. Funk, 105 Oreg. 134, 209 Pac. 113, 25 A. L. R. 625. When to accomplish a_ general municipal purpose powers are expressly conferred upon a city, and it does not appear that only the powers expressly given are to be exercised, other powers that are incident to or consistent with those expressly given may be implied, when necessary to fully effectuate the express powers and the general pur- poses designed, if such implication may fairly arise from the language used and object desired. Malone ». Quincy, 66 Fla. 52, 62 So. 922, Ann. Cas. 1916 D, 208. 2 “A municipal corporation pos- sesses and can exercise the following powers, and no others: ‘First, those granted in express words; second, those necessary or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted; third, those essential to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation, — not simply convenient but indispensable.’ Chicago v. Blair, 149 Ill. 310, 24 L. R. A. 412, 36 N. E. 829; Wilkie v. Chicago, 188 Ill. 444, 80 Am. St. Rep. 182, 58 N. E. 1004.” Chicago v. Weber, 246 IIl. 304, 92 N. E. 859, 34 L. R. A. (wn. 8.) 306, 20 Ann. Cas. 359.CHAP. VIII] SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 401 and property. The power of its governing officers can only extend to the administration of the by-laws and other ordinances by which the body is regulated.” ' But without being expressly empowered so to do, they may sue and be sued; may have a common seal; may purchase and hold lands and other property for corporate purposes,” and convey the same; may make by-laws whenever necessary to accomplish the design of the incorporation, and enforce the same by penalties ; and may enter into contracts to effectuate the cor- porate purposes.° Except as to these incidental powers, which need not be, though they usually are, mentioned in the charter, the charter itself, or the general law under which they exist, is the meas- ure of the authority to be exercised. And the general disposition of the courts in this country has been to confine municipalities within the limits that a strict construction of the grants of powers in their charters will assign to them; thus applying substantially the same rule that is applied to charters of private incorporation.* The rea- 1 Willcock on Municipal Corpora- New York, 234 N. Y. 377, 138 N. E. tions, tit. 769. 96, 25 A. L. R. 1442. 2Such property as is held by the ‘Any fair, reasonable doubt con- corporation in its public capacity is cerning the existence of the power of a not liable to be taken on execution. municipal corporation is resolved by See Klein v. New Orleans, 99 U.S. the courts against the corporation and 149, 25 L. ed. 430, and other cases in the power is denied. Malone ». note to 35 L. ed. U.S. 556. Quincy, 66 Fla. 52, 62 So. 922, Ann. 3 Angell & Ames on Corp. §§ 111, Cas. 1916 D, 208; Chicago v. Blair, 239; 2 Kyd on Corp. 102: State »v. 149 Ill. 310, 36 N. B. 829, 24 L. R. A. Ferguson, 33 N. H. 424. See Dillon, 412; Wilkie v. Chicago, 188 Til. 444, Mun. Corp., for an examination, in 58 N. EB. 1004, 80 Am. St. Rep. 182; the light of the authorities, of the Chicago ». Weber, 246 Ill. 304, 92 N. several powers here mentioned. BE. 859, 34 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 306, 20 As to the power of a municipality Ann. Cas. 359; Chicago v. M. & M. which has entered into a contract for Hotel Co., 248 Ill. 264, 93 N. E. 753 ; labor to be performed by the other Chicago v. Ross, 257 Ill. 76, 100 N. E. party thereto, to bind itself to grant 159, 43 L R. A. (n. s.) 205; People additional compensation to such party ex rel. Friend v. Chicago, 261 Ill. 16, to induce him not to abandon the 103 N. E. 609, 49 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 438; contract, see Clough ». Verrette, 79 Barnard & Miller v. Chicago, 316 Ill. N. H. 356, 109 Atl. 78; Meech v. 519, 147 N. E. 384, 38 A. L. R. 1533. Buffalo, 29 N. Y. 198; Dockett v. “Doubtful claims of power, oF Old Forge, 240 Pa. St. 98, 87 Atl. doubt or ambiguity in the terms used 421; McGillivrae ». Bremerton, 90 by the legislature, are resolved against Wash. 394, 156 Pac. 23. the corporation.” Stern ». Fargo, 18 The Constitution of New York pro- N. D. 289, 122 N. W. 403, 26 L. R. A; vides that ‘the legislature shall not, (Nn. Ss.) 665. nor shall the common council of any Where a statute specifically enu- city, nor any board of supervisors, merates various powers which the com- grant any extra compensation to any mon council of a municipality may public officer, servant, agent or con- render effectual by means of ordi- tractor.” For a construction of this nances, this enumeration is an implied provision in relation to a contract exclusion of the right to act otherwise made by a city, see McGovern v. than as specifically directed. Cum- VOL. I— 26402 nock v. Little Rock, 154 Ark. 471, 243 S. W. 57, 25 A. L. R. 608. When powers with reference to par- ticular subjects are expressly con- ferred in specific terms, other powers that in their nature or extent would materially increase or be inconsistent with the powers that are expressly given in specific and limited terms are not to be implied, particularly when the powers expressly given do not include all the authority that may have been conferred with reference to the designated subjects. Malone ». Quincy, 66 Fla. 52, 62 So. 922, Ann. Cas. 1916 D, 208. Where a statute expressly enu- merates certain occupations or busi- nesses over which municipalities are given control, other occupations or businesses are excluded. People ez rel. Friend v. Chicago, 261 Ill. 438, 103 N. E. 609, 49 L. R. A. (n. s.) 438. A general clause, conferring power upon a municipality, can give no authority to abrogate the limitations contained in special provisions. Ma- lone v. Quincy, 66 Fla. 52, 62 So. 922, Ann. Cas. 1916 D, 208. Under the welfare provision of its charter a city may exercise broad police power in protecting the public health, safety, and comfort, but to prohibit an owner of property from using it for ordinary business pur- poses, or for any use not in itself a nuisance, where there is no express legislative authority, is not within municipal power. Julian v. Golden Rule Oil Co., 112 Kan. 671, 212 Pac. 884. Express legislative authority is necessary to give cities the power to create zones or restricted residence districts within a city whereby owners of lands therein shall be prohibited from constructing business houses in which to carry on legitimate lines of business. Julian v. Golden Rule Oil Con 112 Kan: 671, 212 Pac. 884. See post 1315 et seg. Under the power conferred upon a municipality to enact such ordinances as are necessary to promote and safe- guard the health, safety, and general welfare of the public, it may require a railroad company to eliminate a grade CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [voL. 1 crossing. Durham »v. Southern R. Cos 185 N: ©5240) ise ns 17, 35 A. L. R. 1313. See also Newport v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., 174 Ky. 799, 192 S. W. 838; State ex rel. Minne- apolis v. St. Paul, ete., R. Co., 98 Minn. 380, 108 N. W. 261, 120 Am. St. Rep. 581, 28 L. R. A. (. s.) 298, 8 Ann. Cas. 1047, affirmed 214 U. S. 497, 53 L. ed. 1060, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 698; Powell v. Seaboard Air Line Ri. Co., 178° N. CG. 243° 1001S) Ep 424; Cincinnati v. Cincinnati Traction Co., 25 Ohio C. C. (n. s.) 513; Chatta- nooga v. Southern R. Co., 128 Tenn. 399, 161 S. W. 1000; Superior ». Roemer, 154 Wis. 345, 141 N. W. 250. But see State ex rel. Indianapolis ». Indianapolis Union R. Co., 160 Ind. 45, 66 N. EB. 168, 60 L. R. A. 831. Under a city charter which author- ized the common council to appoint assessors for the purpose of awarding damages to those through whose property a street might be opened, and to assess such damages on the property benefited, it was decided that the council were not empowered to levy a tax to pay for the other expenses of opening the street. Reed v. Toledo, 18 Ohio, 161. So a power to enact by-laws and ordinances to abate and remove nuisances will not authorize the passing of an ordinance to prevent nuisances, or to impose penalties for the creation thereof. Rochester v. Collins, 12 Barb. 559. A power to impose penalties for obstructions to streets would not authorize the like penalties for en- croachments upon streets, where, under the general laws of the State, the offenses are recognized as different and distinct. Grand Rapids». Hughes, 15 Mich. 54. Authority to levy a tax on real and personal estate would not warrant an income tax, especially when such a tax is unusual in the State. Mayor of Savannah v. Hartridge, 8 Ga. 23. It will appear, therefore, that powers near akin to those expressly conferred, are not, for that reason, to be taken by implication. And see Commonwealth v. Erie & N. E. Railroad Co., 27 Pa. St. 339. This rule has often been ap- plied where authority has been assertedCHAP. VIII] SEVERAL GRADES OF on behalf of a municipal corporation to loanits credit to corporations formed to construct works of internal improve- ment. See La Fayette v. Cox, 5 Ind. 38; Cleburne ». Gulf, &ec. Ry. Co., 66 Tex. 457, 1 S. W. 342. The power to create indebtedness does not by implication carry with it a power to tax for its payment. Jeffries v. Lawrence, 42 Iowa, 498. “Power to license or tax an occu- pation must be expressly granted, _ or be a necessary incident to a power expressly granted.”’ Barnard & Miller v. Chicago, 316 Ill. 519, 147 N. E. 384, 38 A. L. R. 1533. The ordinary powers of a city do not give it authority to grant a street railway franchise. Hichels v. Evans- ville Street Railway Co., 78 Ind. 261. The power “to enact ordinances necessary for government” does not authorize the grant of the franchise of a toll-bridge. Williams v. Davidson, 43 Tex. 1. Like power coupled with that to regulate streets and business does not allow regulation of telephone charges. St. Louis v. Bell Telephone Co., 96 Mo. 623, 10S. W. 197. Power to buy land for public pur- a purchase for an poses does not cover Eufaula v. Mc- agricultural society. Nab, 67 Ala. 588. Power to make health regulations does not permit the erection of a public slaughter-house. Huesing 2. Rock Island, 128 Ill. 465, 21 N. BK. 558. Power to regulate wharves does not cover creating a harbor. Spengler ». Trowbridge, 62 Miss. 46. A power to pass ordinances to pro- hibit the sale or giving away of intoxi- cating liquors in certain special cases is an implied exclusion of the power to prohibit the sale or giving away in other cases. State v. Ferguson, 33 N. H. 424. Power to regulate ten-pin alleys does not authorize their exclusion from all places within fire limits. Hz parte Patterson, 42 Tex. Cr. 256, 58 S. W. 1011, 51 L. R. A. 654. Authority conferred upon a munici- pality to regulate a place of amusement does not include power to require attendance of a fireman for the pur- pose of extinguishing fires and aiding MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 403 the audience in their exit, which relates, not to the place, but to the public attending the place. Chicago v. Weber, 246 Ill. 304, 92 N. E. 859, 34 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 306, 20 Ann. Cas. 359. It is a rational rule that the power of a municipality to provide water for itself and its inhabitants is a necessary and implied power. Gadsden v. Mitch- ell, 145 Ala. 137, 40 So. 557, 117 Am. St. Rep. 20,6 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 781; State er. rel. Ellis v. Tampa Waterworks Co., 56 Fla. 858, 47 So. 358, 19 I: Re Ae (x. s.) 183; Fawcett v. Mt. Airy, 134 N. GC. 125, 45 S. E. 1029, 101 Am. St. Rep. 825, 63 L. R. A. 870, overruling Mayo v. Commissioners, 122 N. ©. 5, 29 S. E. 343, 40 L. R. A. 163, and Edgerton v. Goldsboro Water Co:, 126 N. G. 93, 35 S. E. 248, 48 L. R. A. 444. But see Mayo v. Dover & Fox- croft Village Fire Co., 96 Me. 539, 53 Atl. 62; Huron Waterworks Co. v. Huron, 7 S. D. 9, 62 N. W. 975, 58 Am. St. Rep. 817, 30 L. R. A. 848; Lund v. Salt Lake County, 58 Utah, 546. 200 Pac. 510. Power to contract for a water-supply does not authorize granting an exclusive privilege for twenty-five years. Brenham ». Bren- ham Water Co., 67 Tex. 542, 4S. W. 143. Power to prohibit the use of earth closets cannot be implied from au- thority to regulate their use, or from authority to issue bonds for the con- struction and maintenance of water- works and a “system of sewerage.” Malone v. Quincy, 66 Fla. 52, 62 So. 922, Ann. Cas. 1916 D, 208. Under the general powers “to regulate the inspection, weighing, and measuring of brick, lumber, firewood, coal, hay, and any article of mer- chandise’”’, a city has the authority to test private scales, to maintain public scales, and to appoint a public weigh- master to have charge of the scales and to do the weighing. Chicago »v. Wisconsin Lime & Cement Co., 312 Ill. 520, 144 N. E. 3; Chicago v. Kautz, 313 Ill. 196, 144 N. E. 805, 35 A. L. R. 1050. In Dunham v. Rochester, 5 Cow. 462, 465, it is said: © For all the pur- poses of jurisdiction, corporations are404 like the inferior courts, and must show the power given them in every case. If this be wanting, their proceedings must be holden void whenever they come in question, even collaterally; for they are not judicial and subject to direct review on certiorari. 2 Kyd on Corp. 104-107.” The prescribed method of exercising a power must be strictly followed. Des Moines v. Gilchrist, 67 Iowa, 210, 25 N. W. 136. The approving vote of the citizens cannot give an authority the law has not conferred. McPherson v. Foster, 43 Iowa, 48. See Hackettstown v. Swackhamer, 37 N. J. L. 191. In Nashville v. Ray, 19 Wall. 468, 22 L. ed. 164, four of the eight justices of the Supreme Court denied the power of municipal corporations to borrow money or issue securities unless ex- pressly authorized. Says Bradley, J.: “Such a power does not belong to a municipal corporation as an incident of its creation. To be possessed it must be conferred by legislation, either express or implied. It does not belong, as a mere matter of course, to local government to raise loans. Such governments are not created for any such purpose. Their powers are pre- scribed by their charters, and those charters provide the means for exercis- ing the powers; and the creation of specific means excludes others.’’ Waxahachie v. Brown, 67 Tex. 519, 4S. W. 207; Allen v. La Fayette, 89 Ala. 641, 8 So. 30, 9 L. R. A. 497; Penick v. Foster, 129 Ga. 217, 58S. E. 773, 12 L. R. A. (wn. s.) 1159, 12 Ann. Cas. 346; Butts County v. Jackson Banking Co., 129 Ga. 801, 60 S. E. 149, 121 Am. St. Rep. 244,15 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 567; Rushe v. Hyattsville, 116 Md. 122, 81 Atl. 278, Ann. Cas. 1913 D, 73; Wells v. Salina, 119 N. Y. 280, 23 N. E. 870, 7 L. R. A. 759; Luther ». Wheeler, 73 S. C. 83, 52 S. E. 874, 4 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 746, 6 Ann. Cas. 754. Compare Bank of Chillicothe ». Chillicothe, 7 Ohio, 354; Clark ». School District, 3 R. I. 199; State v. Common Council of Madison, 7 Wis. 688; Mills v. Gleason, 11 Wis. 470; Hamlin v. Meadville, 6 Neb. 227 ; aad See State v. Babcock, 22 Neb. 614, 35 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I N. W. 941. But it has been held that bonds may be issued in payment for property lawfully purchased, although they could not be issued in order to borrow money. Rushville Gas Co. »p, Rushville, 121 Ind. 206, 23 N. E. 72, 6 L. R. A. 315, 16 Am. St. 388. There is no implied power to exempt from taxation. Whiting v. West Point, 88 Va. 905, 14S. E. 698, 15 L. R. A. 860, 29 Am. St. 750, and note. Nor to establish separate schools for white and negro children. Knox »v. Bd. of Education, 45 Kan. 152, 25 Pac. 616, 11 L. R. A. 830. Nor to publish ordinances in foreign languages. Chicago v. McCoy, 136 Ill. 344, 26 N. E. 363, 11 L. Re Al 4135 power to confine patients with infec- tious diseases covers renting a pest- house: Anderson v. O’Conner, 98 Ind. 168. See also Hessin ». Manhattan, 81 Kan. 158, 105 Pac. 44, 25 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 228. And paying nurses: Labrie v. Manchester, 59 N. H. 120; Rae v. Flint, 51 Mich. 526, 16 N. W. 887. Such corporation has implied power to take as trustee for indigent inhabitants: Estate of Robinson, 63 Cal. 620; and to defend its marshal sued for false imprisonment. Cullen v. Carthage, 103 Ind. 196, 2 N. E. 571; Roper v. Laurinburg, 90 N. C. 427. As to the construction of grants of powers in charters, see also Nashville v. Ray, 19 Wall. 468, 22 L. ed. 164; Milhau v. Sharp, 17 Barb. 435, 28 Barb. 228, and 27 N. Y. 611; Douglass v. Placerville, 18 Cal. 643; Mount Pleasant v. Breeze, 11 Iowa, 399; Hooper v. Emery, 14 Me. 375; Mayor, &c. of Macon v. Macon & Western R. R. Co., 7 Ga. 221; Hopple v. Brown, 13 Ohio St. 311; Lackland v. Northern Missouri Railroad Co., 31 Mo. 180; Smith v. Morse, 2 Cal. 524; Bennett v. Borough of Birmingham, 31 Pa. St. 15; Earley’s App., 103 Pa. St. 273; Tucker v. Virginia City, 4 Nev. 20; Leavenworth v. Norton, 1 Kan. 432; Kyle v. Malin, 8 Ind. 34; John- son v. Philadelphia, 60 Pa. St. 445; Kniper »v. Louisville, 7 Bush, 599; Johnston v. Louisville, 11 Bush, 527; Williams v. Davidson, 43 Tex. 1; Burritt v. New Haven, 42 Conn. 174; Logan v. Pyne, 43 Iowa, 524; Field v.CHAP. VIII] SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 405 sonable presumption is that the State has granted in clear and unmistakable terms all it has designed to grant at all. It must follow that, if in any case a party assumes to deal with a corporation on the supposition that it possesses powers which it does not, or to contract in any other manner than is permitted by the charter, he will not be allowed, even though he may have complied with the undertaking on his part, to maintain a suit against the corporation based upon its unauthorized action. Even where a party is induced to enter upon work for a corporation by the false representations of corporate officers in regard to the existence of facts on which by law the power of the corporation to enter upon the work depends, to give a power which in the particular validate a contract otherwise void, ground of action against the corporation ; these false representations cannot have the effect case was wanting, or to and therefore can afford no but every party contract- ing with it must take notice of any want of authority which the public records would show." Des Moines, 39 Iowa, 575; Vance v. Little Rock, 30 Ark. 435; English v. Chicot County, 26 Ark. 454; Pullen v. Raleigh, 68 N. C. 451; Chisholm ». Montgomery, 2 Woods, 584; Bur- meister v. Howard, 1 Wash. Ter. 207; Bell v. Plattville, 71 Wis. 139, 36 N. W. 831; Murphy »v. Jacksonville, 18 Fla. 318; Chicago Union Traction Co. v. Chicago, 199 Ill. 484, 69 N. E. 451, 59 L. R. A. 631; Cortland v. Larson, 973 Ill. 602, 113 N. EB. 51, L. R. A. 1917 A, 314, Ann. Cas. 1916 E, 775; Scott v. La Porte, 162 Ind. 34, 68 N. E. Bis, 69 N. E. 675; Richmond v. Richmond Natural Gas Co., 168 Ind. 82, 79 N. E. 1031, 11 Ann. Cas. 746; Henderson v. Young, 119 Ky. 224, 83 S. W. 583; Hopkins v. Richmond, 117 Va. 692, 86 S. E. 139, Ann. Cas. 1917 D, 1114. 1 The common council of Williams- burg had power to open, regulate, grade, and pave streets, but only upon petition signed by one-third of the persons owning lands within the assess- ment limits. A party entered into a contract with the corporation for im- proving a street, upon the false repre- sentations of the council that such a petition had been presented. Held, that the provision of law being public, and all the proceedings leading to a This is the general rule, and the cases determination by the council to make a particular improvement being mat- ters of record, all persons were charge- able with notice of the law and such proceedings ; and that, notwithstand- ing the false representations, no action would lie against the city for work done under the contract. Swift v. Williams- burg, 24 Barb. 427. “If the plaintiff ean recover on the state of facts he has stated in his complaint, the re- striction and limitations which the legislature sought to impose upon the powers of the common council will go for nothing. And yet these provision are matters of substance, and were designed to be of some service to the constituents of the common council. They were intended to protect the owners of lands and the taxpayers of the city, as well against the frauds and impositions of the contractors who might be employed to make these local improvements, as against the illegal acts of the common council themselves in employing the contractors. But if the plaintiff can recover in this action, of what value or effect are all these safeguards? If the common council desire to make a local improvement, which the persons to be benefited thereby, and to be assessed therefor, are unwilling to have made, the con-406 sent of the owners may be wholly dis- pensed with, according to the plain- tiffs theory. The common council have only to represent that the proper petition has been presented and the proper proceedings have been taken, to warrant the improvement. They then enter into the contract. The improvement is made. Those other safeguards for an assessment of the expenses and for reviewing the pro- ceedings may or may not be taken. But when the work is completed and is to be paid for, it is found that the common council have no authority to lay any assessment or collect a dollar from the property benefited by the improvement. The contractor then brings his action, and recovers from the city the damages he has sustained by the failure of the city to pay him the contract price. The ground of his action is the falsity of the representa- tions made to him. But the truth or falsity of such representations might have been ascertained by the party with the use of the most ordinary care and diligence. The existence of the proper petition, and the taking of the necessary initiatory steps to warrant the improvement, were doubtless referred to and recited in the contract made with the plaintiff. And he thus became again directly chargeable with notice of the contents of all these papers. It is obvious that the re- strictions and limitations imposed by the law cannot thus be evaded. The consent of the parties interested in such improvements cannot be dis- pensed with; the responsibility, which the conditions precedent created by the statute impose, cannot be thrown off in this manner. For the effect of doing so is to shift entirely the burden of making these local improvements, to relieve those on whom the law sought to impose the expense, and to throw it on others who are not liable either in law or morals.” So, where the charter of Detroit pro- vided that no public work should be contracted for or commenced until an assessment had been levied to defray the expense, and that no such work should be paid or contracted to be paid for, except out of the proceeds CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [voL. 1 of the tax thus levied, it was held that the city corporation had no power to make itself responsible for the price of any public work, and that such work could only be paid for by funds ac- tually in the hands of the city treasurer, provided for the specific purpose. Goodrich v. Detroit, 12 Mich. 279, But if the city receives the fund and misappropriates it, it will be liable, Lansing v. Van Gorder, 24 Mich. 456. The best considered cases hold that if a contract with a municipal corpora- tion is ultra vires, the municipality cannot be held liable under an im- plied obligation on its part to pay for the benefits it has received under the unauthorized contract. Thomas ». tichmond, 12 Wall. 349, 20 L. ed. 453; Swanson v. Ottumwa, 131 Iowa, 540, 106 N. W. 9,5 L. R. A. (wn. 8.) 860, 9 Ann. Cas. 1117; Minneapolis, etc., Electric Traction Co. v. Minneapolis, 124 Minn. 351, 145 N. W. 609, 50 L. R. A. (n. s.) 143; Contra, Schipper v. Aurora, 121 Ind. 154, 22 N. E. 878. “The issuing of bills as a currency by”’ a municipal corporation “without authority is not only contrary to posi- tive law, but, being ultra vires, is an abuse of the public franchises which have been conferred upon it; and the receiver of the bills, being chargeable with notice of the wrong, is in pari delicto with the officers, and should have no remedy, even for money had and received, against the corporation upon which he has aided in inflicting the wrong.”’ Thomas v. Richmond, 12 Wall. 349, 20 L. ed. 453. In a Minnesota case, a municipal corporation let a contract for the construction of a sewer without com- plying with charter requirements, and without obtaining the consent of two property owners through whose lands the sewer was to pass or of the Federal authorities for its outlet on govern- ment land. Plaintiff sued for the balance of an account for materials furnished the contractor on a bond given, inter alia, for the benefit of materialmen. The bondsmen inter- posed the defense that the contract was void because ultra vires, and that, therefore, they were not responsibleCHAP. VII| on the bond. It was held that the tendency of judicial opinion to refuse to avoid contracts made by private cor- porations because ultra vires does not apply equally to contracts made by municipal corporations, but that to both classes of contracts that doctrine should be so administered as not to defeat the ends of justice or to work a legal wrong; that a contract ultra vires in the general and primary sense that it is wholly outside the power of the corporation to make under any cir- cumstances is ordinarily void in toto; but that whether a contract strictly within the scope of the corporation’s powers, but ultra vires in the restricted or secondary sense that the power has been irregularly exercised, or that it was beyond the power of the corpora- tion in some particular or through some undisclosed circumstances, is wholly void or not, depends upon the circumstances of the particular case ; that the contract here in issue was ultra vires in the secondary and re- stricted sense only; that the fact that the city had not procured right of way through all the lands of private owners through which it was to pass did not invalidate the contract; that the facts that as to a small portion of the contract with the municipality only it was ultra vires in any sense, and that it had been substantially executed by the parties basing rights of action upon it, are strong if not conclusive considerations for refusing to hold it absolutely void; that neither the dic- tates of public policy nor the analogies of the law justify holding the contract void, as between dealers, who fur- nished material to the contractor in re- liance on the bond, and the sureties thereon, who are in a position favored by the law; that the recital in the bond of the contract as valid and sub- sisting prevented the sureties thereon from asserting that it was ultra vires. Bell v. Kirkland, 102 Minn. 213, 113 N. W. 271, 120 Am. St. Rep. 621, 13 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 793. See also Rogers v. Omaha, 76 Neb. 187, 107 N. W. 214. Parties dealing with the agents or officers of municipal corporations must, at their own peril, take notice of the SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 407 limits of the powers both of the munici- pal corporation, and of those assuming to act on its behalf. State v. Kirkley, 29 Md. 85; Gould v. Sterling, 23 N. Y. 456; Clark v. Des Moines, 19 Iowa, 199; Veeder v. Lima, 19 Wis. 280; Bryan v. Page, 51 Tex. 532, 32 Am. Yep. 637; Tainter v. Worcester, 123 Mass. 311, 25 Am. Rep. 90; Barton »v. Swepston, 44 Ark. 437; Thomas ». Richmond, 12 Wall. 349, 20 L. ed. 453; East Oakland v. Skinner, 94 U. 8. 255, 24 L. ed. 125; Eastern Illinois State Normal School v. Charleston, 271 Ill. 602, 111 N. E. 573, L. R. A. 1916 D, 991; Walker v. Richmond, 173 Ky. 26, 189 S. W. 1122, Ann. Cas. 1918 E, 1084; Westminster Water Co. »v. Westminster, 98 Md. 551, 56 Atl. 990, 103 Am. St. Rep. 424, 64 L. R. A. 630; Bell v. Kirkland, 102 Minn. 213, 113 N. W. 271, 120 Am. St. Rep. 621, 13 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 793; Minneapolis, etc., Electric Traction Co. v. Minneapolis, 124 Minn. 351, 145 N. W. 609, 50 L. R. A. (Nn. 8.) 143; Hicksville v. Blakeslee, 103 Ohio St. 508, 134 N. E. 445, 22 A. L. R. 119; Dillon Mun. Corp. § 381. 3ut a bona fide holder of municipal obligations has a right to rely upon the truth of their recitals, if they appear to be warranted by the legislation under which they are issued. Coloma v. Eaves, 92 U.S. 484, 23 L. ed. 579; Walnut v. Wade, 103 U. S. 683. 26 L. ed. 526; Pana v: Bowler, 107 U.S. 529, 27 L. ed. 424, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 704; New Providence v. Halsey, 117 U. 8. 336, 29 L. ed. 904, 6 Sup. Ct 764; Oregon v. Jennings, 119 U.S. 74, 30 L. ed. 323, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 124; Aberdeen ». Sykes, 59 Miss. 236; and cases post, pp. 471-479. Contract for erecting public build- ings and providing that only union labor shall be employed thereon is void, as unduly restricting competition and thereby increasing the cost of the work. Adams v. Brenan, 177 Ill. 194, 52 N. E. 314, 42 L. R. A. 718, 69 Am. St. 2922. And see in this connection Atlanta v. Stein, 111 Ga. 789, 36 S. E. 932, 51 L. R. A. 335; Fiske v. People, 188 Ill. 206, 58 N. E. 985; People v. Coler, 166 N. Y. 1, 59 N. B. 716, 82 Am, St. 605. tep.CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 408 [VOL. I of unauthorized action which may bind the corporation are excep- tional, and will be referred to further on. Municipal corporations exercise the authority conferred upon them by law through votes of the corporators at public meetings, and through officers and agents duly elected or chosen. The cor- porators are the resident electors, who, under the general laws of the State, may vote at the ordinary elections, though sometimes, in special cases, the franchise has been conferred upon taxpayers exclusively. A meeting of corporators for any purpose of legal action must be regularly convened in such manner or at such time as may have been prescribed by law. If the corporators were to come together at any time without legal permission and assume to act for the corporation, their action would be of no legal force or validity whatever. The State permits them to wield a part of the governmental authority of the State, but only on the conditions which the law has prescribed, and one of these is that it shall be exercised in an orderly manner, at meetings assembled upon due notice and conducted according to legal forms, in order that there may be opportunity for reflection, consultation, and deliberation.? The notice may be either general, and given by the law itself, or it may be special, and given by some corporate officer or agent. An- nual meetings are commonly provided for by general law, which names a time, and perhaps a place for the purpose. Of this general law every corporator must take notice, and the meetings held in pursuance of it are legal, even though a further notice by publication, which the statute directs, has been omitted.2 But for special meet- ings the requirement of special notice is imperative, and it must be given as the statute requires. Sometimes it is directed to be given by publication, sometimes by posted notice, and sometimes by personal notification. If the law requires the order or warrant for the meeting to specify its object, compliance is imperative, and the business which can be lawfully done at the meeting will be strictly limited to the object stated. 1 Chamberlain v. Dover, 13 Me. 466, 29 Am. Dec. 517; Evans v. Osgood, 18 Me. 213; School District v. Atherton, 12 Met. 105; Stone v. School District, 8 Cush. 592; Bethany v. Sperry, 10 Conn. 200; State v. Harrison, 67 Ind. 71; Pike County ». Rowland, 94 Pa. St. 238; State v. Pettineli, 10 Nev. 181; State v. Bonnell, 35 Ohio St. 10; Ross v. Crockett, 14 La. Ann. 811; Goulding v. Clark, 34 N. H. 148. See Stow v. Wise, 7 Conn. 214, 18 Am. Brooklyn ‘Trust Co, ». Dec. 99; Hebron, 51 Conn. 22; Pierce v. New Orleans Building Co., 9 La. 397, 29 Am. Dee. 448; Atlantic De Laine Co. v. Mason, 5 R. I. 463. 2 See People v. Cowles, 13 N. Y. 350; People v. Hartwell, 12 Mich. 508; People v. Brenham, 3 Cal. 477; State v. Orvis, 20 Wis. 235; Dishon v. Smith, 10 Iowa, 212; State v. Jones, 19 Ind. 356. 3 Tuttle v. Cary, 7 Me. 426. 4Little v. Merrill, 10 Pick. 543; Bartlett v. Kinsley, 15 Conn. 327;CHAP. VIII] SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 409 Special charters for corporations usually provide for some govern- ing body who shall be empowered to make laws for them within the sphere of the powers conferred, and perhaps to appoint some portion or all of the ministerial and administrative officers. In the case of towns, school districts, etc., the power to make laws is largely con- fided to the corporators assembled in annual meeting ; * and in the case of counties, in some county board. The laws, whether desig- nated orders, resolutions, or ordinances, are more often in law spoken of as by-laws, and they must be justified by the grant of power which the State has made. Whatever is wltra vires in the case of any delegated authority, is of course void. Whatever is said above respecting notice for corporate meetings is equally applicable to meetings of the official boards, with this exception: that as the board is composed of a definite number of persons, if these all convene and act they may thereby waive the want of notice. But the meeting of a mere majority without notice to the others would be without legal authority.’ Corporations by Prescription and Implication. The origin of many of the corporate privileges asserted and enjoyed in England is veiled in obscurity, and it is more than prob- able that in some instances they had no better foundation than an uninterrupted user for a considerable period. In other cases the royal or baronial grant became lost in the lapse of time, and the evidence that it had ever existed might rest exclusively upon repu- tation, or upon the inference to be drawn from the exercise of cor- porate functions. In all these cases it seems to be the law that the corporate existence may be maintained on the ground of prescription; that is to say, the exercise of corporate rights for a time whereof the memory of man runneth not to the contrary is sufficient evidence that such rights were once granted by competent authority, and are therefore now exercised by right and not by usurpation.’ And this presumption concludes the crown, notwithstanding the maxim that the crown shall lose no rights by lapse of time. If the right asserted is one of which a grant might be predicated, a jury is bound to pre- Atwood ». Lincoln, 44 Vt. 332; Holt’s 2 Gordon v. Preston, 1 Watts, 385, Appeal, 5 R. I. 603; Reynolds »v. New 26 Am. Dec. 75. Salem, 6 Met. 340; Bowen »v. King, 34 3 Introduction to Willcock on Munic- Vt. 156; Haines v. School District, ipal Corporations ; The King v. Mayor, 41 Me. 246; Bloomfield v. Charter &c. of Stratford upon Avon, 14 East, Oak Bank, 121 U. S. 121, 30 L. ed. 348; Robie v. Sedgwick, 35 Barb. 319. 923, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 865. See Londonderry v. Andover, 28 Vt. 1 See Williams v. Roberts, 88 Ill. 111. 416.LIMITATIONS 410 CONSTITUTIONAL [voL. I sume a grant from that prescription.’ In this particular the claim to a corporate franchise stands on the same ground as any claim of private right which requires a grant for its support, and is to be sustained under the same circumstances of continuous assertion and enjoyment.? And even the grant of a charter by the crown will not preclude the claim to corporate rights by prescription; for a new charter does not extinguish old privileges.® A corporation may also be established upon presumptive evidence that a charter has been granted within the time of memory. Such evidence is addressed to a jury, and though not conclusive upon them, yet, if it reasonably satisfies their minds, it will justify them in a verdict finding the corporate existence. “There is a great difference,’ says Lord Mansfield, “between length of time which operates as a bar to a claim, and that which is only used by way of evidence. A jury is concluded by length of time which operates as a bar; as where the Statute of Limitations is pleaded in bar to a debt: though the jury is satisfied that the debt is due and unpaid, it is still a bar. So in the case of prescription. If it be time out of mind, a jury is bound to preclude the right from that prescription, if there could be a legal commencement of the right. But any written evidence, showing that there was a time when the prescrip- tion did not exist, is an answer to a claim founded on prescription. But length of time used merely by way of evidence may be left to the consideration of the jury, to be credited or not, and to draw their inference one way or the other according to circumstances.’ The same ruling has been had in several cases in the courts of this coun- try, where corporate powers had been exercised, but no charter could be produced. In one of these cases, common reputation that a charter had once existed was allowed to be given to the jury; the court remarking upon the notorious fact that two great fires in the capital of the colony had destroyed many of the public records.® In other cases there was evidence of various acts which could only lawfully and properly be done by a corporation, covering a period of thirty, forty, or fifty years, and done with the knowledge of the State and without question. The inference of corporate powers, 1 Mayor of Hull v. Horner, Cowp. See 104, per Lord Mansfield. Compare People v. Maynard, 15 Mich. 463; Allenstown, 34 N. H. 351. Jameson v. People, 16 Ill. 257. 4Mayor of Hull v. Horner, Cowp. State v. Bunker, 59 Me. 366. *2 Kent, 277; Angell & Ames on Corp. § 70, 1 Kyd on Corp. 14. $ Hadduck’s Case, T. Raym. 439; The King v. Mayor, &c. of Stratford upon Avon, 14 East, 348; Bow 0. 104, 108; citing, among other cases, Bedle v. Beard, 12 Co. 5. 5 Dillingham v. Snow, 5 Mass. 547. And see Bow v. Allenstown, 34 N. H. 351; Bassett v. Porter, 4 Cush. 487. § Stockbridge v. West Stockbridge,SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 411 CHAP. VIII] however, is not one of law; but it is to be drawn as a fact by the jury.’ Wherever a corporation is the same rule as to construction of powers, we apprehend, would apply as in other cases. The presumption as to the powers granted would be limited by the proof of the usage, and nothing could be taken by intendment which the usage did not warrant. Corporations are also said sometimes to exist by implication. When that power in the State which can create corporations grants to individuals such property, rights, or franchises, or imposes upon them such burdens, as can only be properly held, enjoyed, con- tinued, or borne, according to the terms of the grant, by a corporate entity, the intention to create such corporate entity is to be pre- sumed, and corporate capacity is held to be conferred so far as is necessary to e est ite the purpose of the grant or burden. On this subject it will be sufficient for our purpose to refer to authorities In these cases the rule of strict construction yplies with unusual force. found to exist by prescription, named in the note.” of corporate powers ap Municipal By-Laws. The power of municipal corporations to make by-laws is limited in various ways. 1. It is controlled by the Constitution of the U nited States and of the State. The restrictions imposed by those instruments, which 12 Mass. 400; New Boston v. Dun- A municipal corporation may “by barton, 12 N. H. 409, and 15 N. H. custom, usage, and prescription” ac- 201; Bow». Allenstown, 34 N. H. 351; quire a Cree name. Ez parte Trott v. Warren, 11 Me. 227. See Keeling, 54 Tex. Crim. Rep. 118, 121 also Henderson v. Davis, 106 N. C. 88, S. W. 605, 130 Am. St. Rep. 884. 11S. E. 573. 1 New Boston v. Dunbarton, 15 In the absence of a statute on the N. H. 201; Bow ». Allenstown, 34 subject, the courts in the exercise of N. H. er Mayor of Hull v. Horner, a wise discretion, upon grounds of 14 East, 102. public policy, should refuse to repeal 2 aciay 00, cited by Lord Kenyon, the charter of a municipal corporation in Russell v. Men of Devon, 2 T. R which has stood chalet ized for a 667, and in 2 Kent, 276; Viner’s period of ten or fifteen years, when the Abr. tit. “Corporation” ; Conservators municipality has acquired property of River Tone v. Ash, 10 B. & C. 349, and contracted debts, and assumed 10B. & GC. 383, citing case of Sutton jurisdiction over the streets § and alleys of the city and undertaken to preserve the public peace of the community. State ex rel. Chandler v. Huff, 105 Mo. App. 354, 79 S. W. 1010. See also People v. Hanker, 197 Ill. 409, 64 N. E. 253; State v. Westport, 116 Mo. 582, 22 S. W. 888; State v. M: ae 99 Mo. App. 146, 72S. W. 4 Hospital, 10 Co. 28; per Kent, Chan- cellor, in Denton v. Jackson, 2 Johns. Ch. 320; Coburn »v. Ellenwood, 4 N. H. 99: Atkinson v. Bemis, 11 INE Ee 44: North Hempstead v. Hempstead, 2 Wend. 109; Thomas v. Dakin, 22 Wend. 9; per Shaw, Ch. J., in Stebbins vy. Jennings, 10 Pick. 172; Mahony ». Bank of the State, 4 Ark. 620.412 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. 1 directly limit the legislative power of the State, rest equally upon all the instruments of government created by the State." If a State cannot pass an ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, neither can any agency do so which acts under the State with delegated authority.’ By-laws, therefore, which in their operation would be ex post facto, or violate contracts, are not within the power of municipal corporations; and whatever the people by the State constitution have prohibited the State government from doing, it cannot do indirectly through the local governments.’ Only where a contract made in good faith cannot otherwise be enforced, will the doctrine of implication be upheld. Blair v. West Point, 2 McCrary, 459, and cases cited. 1TIn relation to the Constitution of the United States a municipal ordi- nance is to be regarded as in effect a statute of the State, adopted under a power granted by the State legisla- ture, and hence it is an act of the State within the Fourteenth Amend- ment. North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 53 L. ed. 195, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 101, 15 Ann. Cas. 276. 2 Angell & Ames on Corporations, §322; Stuyvesant v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 7 Cow. 588; Brooklyn Central Railroad Co. v. Brooklyn City Railroad Co., 32 Barb. 358; Illinois Conference Female College v. Cooper, 25 Ill. 148. Illinois Conference Fe- male College v. Cooper, 25 Ill. 148 was & case where a by-law of an educa- tional corporation was held void, as violating the obligation of a contract previously entered into by the cor- poration in a certificate of scholarship which it had issued. See also Daven- port, &c. Co. v. Davenport, 13 Iowa, 229; Saving Society v. Philadelphia, 31 Pa. St. 175; Haywood v. Savannah, 12 Ga. 404. If an ordinance and its acceptance make a contract, it cannot be impaired by subsequent ordinances. People v. Chicago W. D. Ry. Co., 118 Ill. 113, 7N.E.116; Kansas City v. Corrigan, 86 Mo. 67. ’ Although an ordinance adopted under legislative authority is pre- sumed to be valid, it must neverthe- less be declared invalid if it clearly impairs rights guaranteed by the Con- stitution. State ex rel. Lachtman v. Houghton, 134 Minn. 226, 158 N. W. 1017, L. R. A. 1917 F, 1050. Any exertion of municipal author- ity or of the police power is subject to the provisions of organic law that are designed to conserve private rights. Maxwell v. Miami, 87 Fla. 107, 100 So. 147, 33 A. L. R. 682. “An unreasonable or unnecessary exertion of municipal authority or of the police power in the manner or extent in which private personal or property rights are curtailed, or im- paired, violates organic law, in that it deprives persons of liberty and prop- erty without authority or due process of law. Municipalities are given police powers to conserve, not to impair, private rights.” Maxwell »v. Miami, 87 Fla. 107, 100 So. 147, 33 A. L. R. 682. In some jurisdictions it has been held that general zoning ordinances are a valid exercise of the police power, but upon this question the authorities are not unanimous. See post, pp. 1315— 1318. A municipal ordinance provided that the owners of all vehicles used upon the streets should pay an annual license fee as follows: For each wagon used for the purpose of delivering coal oil, gasolene, or other similar com- modities, $50; for each wagon used for hauling ice, $25 each for the first two owned by an individual, firm, or corporation, and $12.50 each for all wagons over two. The maximum on other vehicles was fixed at $10 each, and some kinds as low as $1.50 each. It was held that the ordinance was invalid, in that it violated a constitu-CHAP. VIII] SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 413 2. Municipal by-laws must also be in harmony with the general laws of the State, and with the provisions of the municipal charter. Whenever they come in conflict with either, the by-law must give way. The charter, however, may expressly or by necessary impli- cation exclude the general laws of the State on any particular subject, tional provision that no privileges or immunities should be granted to any citizen, or class of citizens, which, upon the same terms, should not equally belong to all citizens. Waters- Pierce Oil Co. v. Hot Springs, 85 Ark. 509, 109 S. W. 293, 16 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1035. An ordinance forbidding any per- son “knowingly to associate with persons having the reputation of being thieves is invalid.” Ex parte Smith, 135 Mo. 223, 36 S. W. 628, 58 Am. St. 576, 33 L. R. A. 606. Under the Kansas Constitution no city can by imposing a liquor license tax encourage a forbidden business without incurring a liability to be ousted of its corporate powers. State v. Topeka, 30 Kan. 653, 2 Pac. 587, 31 Kan. 452, 2 Pac. 593. Where an ordinance applies to all citizens alike, the fact that only part of the citizens desire to do the acts prohibited, does not make it class legislation. Thomas v. Indianapolis, 195 Ind. 440, 145 N. E. 550, 35 A. L, R. 1194. An ordinance of the city of New Orleans, prohibiting operators of vehicles for hire from using certain streets as stands for their business, was held not to violate any constitutional provision. New Orleans ». Calamari, 150 La. 737, 91 So. 172, 22 A. L. R. 106. 1 Wood v. Brooklyn, 14 Barb. 425; Mayor, &c. of New York v. Nichols, 4 Hill, 209; Petersburg v. Metzker, 21 Ill. 205; Southport v. Ogden, 23 Conn. 128; Andrews v. Insurance Co., 37 Me. 256; Canton v. Nist, 9 Ohio St. 439; Carr v. St. Louis, 9 Mo. 191; Commonwealth v. Erie & Northeast Railroad Co., 27 Pa. St. 339; Burling- ton v. Kellar, 18 Iowa, 59; Conwell v. O’Brien, 11 Ind. 419; March v. Com- monwealth, 12 B. Monr. 25; Georgia R., etc., Co. v. Railroad Commission, 149 Ga. 1, 98S. BE. 696,5 A. L. R. 1; Mix v. Nez Perce County, 18 Idaho, 695, 112 Pac. 215, 32 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 534; Marengo v. Rowland, 263 IIl. 531, 105 N. E. 285, Ann. Cas. 1915 C, 198; Kansas City v. Jordan, 99 Kan. 814, 163 Pac. 188, Ann. Cas. 1918 B, 273; Dayton v. South Covington, etc., St. R. Co., 177 Ky. 202, 197 S. W. 670, L. R. A. 1918 B, 476, Ann. Cas. 1918 E, 229; Levering v. Williams, 134 Md. 48, 106 Atl. 176, 4 A. L. R. 374; Power v. Nordstrom, 150 Minn. 228, 184 N. W. 967, 18 A. L. R. 733; Mayhew v. Eugene, 56 Oreg. 102, 104 Pac. 727, Ann. Cas. 1912 C, 33; Mantel v. State, 55 Tex. Crim. Rep. 456, 117 S. W. 855, 131 Am. St. Rep. 818; Zucarro v. State, 82 Tex. Crim. Yep. 1, 197 S. W. 982, L. R. A. 1918 B, 354; Puget Sound Traction, etc., Co. v. Grassmeyer, 102 Wash. 482, 173 Pac. 504, L. R. A. 1918 F, 469; Bis- sett v. Littleton, 87 W. Va. 127, 104 So i ong. 20 A. L. R: 1478. Seo Baldwin v. Green, 10 Mo. 410; Cowen v. West Troy, 43 Barb. 48; State ». Georgia Medical Society, 38 Ga. 608; Pesterfield v. Vickers, 3 Cold. 205; Mays »v. Cincinnati, 1 Ohio St. 268; Wirth v. Wilmington, 68 N. C. 24; Flood v. State, 19 Tex. App. 584; Bohmy v. State, 21 Tex. App. 597, 2 S. W. 886; Shreveport v. Prescott, 51 La. Ann. 1895, 26 So. 664, 46 L. R. A. 193; Katzenberger v. Lawo, 90 Tenn. 935. 16S. W. 611, 13 L. R. A. 185, 25 Am. St. 681. Ordinance cannot authorize keeping within city limits a greater quantity of explosives than statute allows. Cameron v. Kenyon-Connell Comm’l Co., 22 Mont. 312, 56 Pac. 358, 44 L. R. A. 508. An ordinance which attempts to regulate the transportation of intoxi- cating liquors within the city for legal purposes, and to prohibit such trans- portation for illegal purposes, but which does not permit the transportation of such liquors for all of the purposes recognized as legal by the law of the414 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [voL. I and allow the corporation to pass local laws at discretion, which may differ from the rule in force elsewhere." But in these cases the control of the State is not excluded if the legislature afterward see fit to exercise it; nor will conferring a power upon acorporation to pass by-laws and impose penalties for the regulation of any specified subject necessarily supersede the State law on the same subject, but the State law and the by-law may both stand together if not incon- sistent. Indeed, an act may be a penal offence under the laws of the State, and further penalties, under proper legislative authority, be imposed for its commission by municipal by-laws, and the enforce- ment of the one would not preclude the enforcement of the other.’ State, is invalid. Kansas City ». Jordan, 99 Kan. 814, 163 Pac. 188, Ann. Cas. 1918 B, 273. Ordinance granting exclusive privi- lege for thirty years to construct and maintain waterworks to supply town with water is void as creating a monopoly. Thrift v. Elizabeth City, 122 N. C. 31, 30S. E. 349, 44 L. R. A. 427. Ordinance cannot penalize the em- ployment of a laborer by a contractor for more than eight hours a day upon city works. Re Kuback, 85 Cal. 274, 24 Pac. 737, 9 L. R. A. 482, 20 Am. St. 226. Where an act is expressly or by implication permitted by the State law, it cannot be forbidden by the corporation. Thus, the statutes of New York established certain regula- tions for the putting up and marking of pressed hay, and provided that such hay might be sold without deduction for tare, and by the weight as marked, or any other standard weight that should be agreed upon. It was held that the city of New York had no power to prohibit under a penalty the sale of such hay without inspection; this being obviously inconsistent with the statute which gave a right to sell if its regulations were complied with. Mayor, &c. of New York »v. Nichols, 4 Hill, 209. An ordinance is not rendered invalid by the fact that a person in violating it, may, at the same time, violate a State statute, if the violation of the ordinance does not necessarily require a violation of the statute. Thomas v. Indianapolis, 195 Ind. 440, 145 N. E. 550, 35 A. L. R. 1194. 1State v. Clark, 1 Dutch. 54; State v. Dwyer, 21 Minn. 512; Coving- ton v. East St. Louis, 78 Ill. 548; Coulterville v. Gillen, 72 Ill.. 599; McPherson v. Chebanse, 114 Ill. 46, 28 N. E. 454; St. Johnsbury v. Thomp- son, 59 Vt. 300, 9 Atl. 571. Peculiar and exceptional regulations may even be made applicable to par- ticular portions of a city only, and yet not be invalid. Goddard, Peti- tioner, 16 Pick. 504; Commonwealth v. Patch, 97 Mass. 221, per Hoar, J.; St. Louis v. Weber, 44 Mo. 547. 2 City of St. Louis v. Bentz, 11 Mo. 61; City of St. Louis v. Cafferata, 24 Mo. 94; Rogers v. Jones, 1 Wend. 261; Levy v. State, 6 Ind. 281; Mayor, &c. of Mobile v. Allaire, 14 Ala. 400; Elk Point v. Vaugn, 1 Dak. 113; People v. Hanrahan, 75 Mich. 611, 42 N. W. 1124; In re Hoffman, 155 Cal. 114, 99 Pac. 517, 132 Am. St. Rep. 75; Seager v. Foster, 185 Iowa, 32, 169 N. W. 681, 8 A. L. R. 690. Whenever the legislature enacts a general law declaring a State policy in regard to the prohibition of gambling or the regulation of the sale of intoxi- cating liquors, such law supersedes any special charter rights that cities within the State have been given in regard thereto. Mix v. Board of Com’rs of Nez Perce County, 18 Idaho, 695; 112 Pace). 215; 32 DL; Re A (Ne s:) 534. 3 Such is the clear weight of author- ity, though the decisions are not We quote from Rogers v. uniform.CHAP. VIII] Jones, 1 Wend. 261: ‘But it is said that the by-law of a town or corpora- tion is void, if the legislature have regulated the subject by law. If the legislature have passed a law regulat- ing as to certain things in a city, I apprehend the corporation are not thereby restricted from making further regulations. Cases of this kind have occurred and never been questioned on that ground; it is only to notice a case or two out of many. The legis- lature have imposed a penalty of one dollar for servile labor on Sunday; the corporation of New York have passed a by-law imposing the penalty of five dollars for the same offence. As to storing gunpowder in New York, the legislature and corporation have each imposed the same _ penalty. Suits to recover the penalty have been sustained under the corporation law. It is believed that the ground has never been taken that there was a conflict with the State law. One of these cases is reported in 12 Johns. 122. The question was open for dis- cussion, but not noticed.” In Mayor, &c. of Mobile v. Allaire, 14 Ala. 400, the validity of a municipal by-law, imposing a fine of fifty dollars for an assault and battery committed within the city, was brought in ques- tion. Collier, Ch. J., says (p. 403): “The object of the power conferred by the charter, and the purpose of the ordinance itself, was not to punish for an offence against the criminal justice of the country, but to provide a mere police regulation, for the enforcement of good order and quiet within the limits of the corporation. So far as an offence has been committed against the public peace and morals, the cor- porate authorities have no power to inflict punishment, and we are not informed that they have attempted to arrogate it. It is altogether imma- terial whether the State tribunal has interfered and exercised its power in bringing the defendant before it to answer for the assault and battery; for whether he has there been punished or acquitted is alike unimportant. The offence against the corporation and the State we have seen are dis- tinguishable and wholly disconnected, SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 415 and the prosecution at the suit of each proceeds upon a different hypothesis ; the one contemplates the observance of the peace and good order of the city; the other has a more enlarged object in view, the maintenance of the peace and dignity of the State.” See also Mayor, &c. of Mobile v. Rouse, 8 Ala. 515; Intendant, &c. of Greens- boro’ v. Mullins, 13 Ala. 341; Mayor, &c. of New York v. Hyatt, 3 E. D. Smith, 156; People v. Stevens, 13 Wend. 341; Blatchley v. Moser, 15 Wend. 215; Amboy ». Sleeper, 31 Ill. 499; State v. Crummey, 17 Minn. 72; State v. Oleson, 26 Minn. 507, 5 N. W. 959; Greenwood v. State, 6 Bax. 567, 32 Am. Rep. 539; Brownville v. Cook, 4 Neb. 101; Levy v. State, 6 Ind. 281; Ambrose v. State, 6 Ind. 351; Law- renceburg v. Wuest, 16 Ind. 337; St. Louis v. Bentz, 11 Mo. 61; St. Louis v. Cafferata, 24 Mo. 94; State v. Gordon, 60 Mo. 383; St. Louis ». Schoenbusch, 95 Mo. 618, 8 S. W. 791; Shafer v. Mumma, 17 Md. 331; Brownville v. Cook, 4 Neb. 101; State v. Ludwig, 21 Minn. 202; Bloom- field v. Trimble, 54 Iowa, 399, 37 Am. Rep. 212; Chicago Packing, &c. Co. v. Chicago, 88 Ill. 221, 30 Am. Rep. 545; Hankins v. People, 106 Ill. 628; Fennell v. Bay City, 36 Mich. 186; McRea v. Americus, 59 Ga. 168; Wong v. Astoria, 13 Oreg. 538, 11 Pac. 295; Hughes v. People, 8 Col. 536, 9 Pac. 50; Greenville v. Kemmis, 58 S. GC. 427, 36S. E. 727, 50 L. R. A. 725: Thiesen v. McDavid, 34 Fla. 440, 16 So. 321, 26 L. R. A. 234; Ogden v. City of Madison, 111 Wis. 413, 87 N. W. 568, 55 L. R. A. 506; Borak v. Birmingham, 191 Ala. 75, 67 So. 389, Ann. Cas. 1916 C, 1061; Chicago v. Union Ice Cream Mfg. Co., 252 Ill. 311, 96 N. E. 872, Ann. Cas. 1912 D, 675; Thomas »v. Indianapolis, 195 Ind. 440, 145 N. E. 550, 35 Ai Th R. 1194; Rossberg v. State, 111 Md. 394, 74 Atl. 581, 134 Am. St. Rep. 626: Brazier v. Philadelphia, 215 Pa. St. 297, 64 Atl. 508, 7 Ann. Cas. 548; Seattle v. McDonald, 47 Wash. 298, 91 Pac. 952, 17 L. R. A. (N. s.) 49. An ordinance passed by a city coun- cil dealing with a subject with which it is authorized to deal by its charter,416 will not be held void because the pen- alty prescribed for violation thereof is in excess of that prescribed by State law for the violation of a State statute creating a similar offense, where the common council of such municipality is authorized to prescribe such penal- ties for the violation of its ordinances as in the opinion of the council may be necessary to enforce obedience thereto. State v. Wertz, 91 W. Va. 622, 114S. E. 242, 29 A. L. R. 391. Under a statute forbidding cities to punish acts punishable by State law, a city may punish selling liquor with- out a city license, as this is not an offense against the State law. Frank- fort v. Aughe, 114 Ind. 77, 15 N. E. 802. On the other hand it was held in State v. Cowan, 29 Mo. 330, that where a municipal corporation was au- thorized to take cognizance of and punish an act as an offense against its ordinances which was also an offense against the general laws of the State, and this power was exercised and the party punished, he could not after- wards be proceeded against under the State law. ‘‘The constitution,” say the court, ‘‘forbids that a person shall be twice punished for the same offence. To hold that a party can be prosecuted for an act under the State laws, after he has been punished for the same act by the municipal corporation within whose limits the act was done, would be to over- throw the power of the Genera] Assem- bly to create corporations to aid in the management of the affairs of the State. For a power in the State to punish, after a punishment had been inflicted by the corporate authorities, could only find a support in the assumption that all the proceedings on the part of the corporation were null and void. The circumstance that the municipal authorities have not exclusive juris- diction over the acts which constitute offences within their limits does not affect the question. It is enough that their jurisdiction is not excluded. If it exists, — although it may be con- current, — if it is exercised, it is valid and binding so long as it is a constitu- tional principle that no man may be punished twice for the same offence.” A similar ruling is laid down in People CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [voL. I v. Hanrahan, 75 Mich. 611, 42 N. W. 1124, and the case seems to be sup- ported by State v. Welch, 36 Conn. 216. The case of Slaughter v. People, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 334, goes still farther. Those which hold that the party may be punished under both the State and the municipal law are within the principle of Fox v. State, 5 How. 410, 12 L. ed. 2138; Moore v. People, 14 How. 13, 14 L. ed. 306. And see Phillips v. People, 55 Ill. 429; State v. Rankin, 4 Cold. 145; Hz parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371, 25 L. ed. 717. Some cases have held that a munic- ipality may not prohibit by ordinance that which is already made penal by State statute, unless there is express and specific legislative authority for the same. In re Sic, 73 Cal. 142, 14 Pac. 405; Menken v. Atlanta, 78 Ga. 668, 2S. E. 559; Thrower v. Atlanta, 124 Ga. 1, 52 S. E. 76, 110 Am. St. Rep. 147, 1 L. R. A. (n. s.) 382, 4 Ann. Cas. 1; Hx parte Bourgeois, 60 Miss. 663; State v. Keith, 94 N. C. 933; Judy v. Lashley, 50 W. Va. 628, 41 S. E. 197, 57 L. R. A. 418. See Loeb v. Attica, 82 Ind. 175. Especially is this so where the Constitution pre- scribes that all prosecutions shall be conducted in the name and by the authority of the State. Hz parte Fagg, 38 Tex. Cr. 573, 44S. W. 294, 40 L. R. A. 212. In Jefferson City v. Courtmire, 9 Mo. 692, it was held that authority to a municipal corporation to ‘‘regulate the police of the city” gave it no power to pass an ordinance for the punish- ment of indictable offences. To the same effect is State v. Savannah, 1 T. U. P. Charl. 235, 4 Am. Dec. 708; Slaughter v. People, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 334; Jenkins v. Thomasville, 35 Ga. 145; Vason v. Augusta, 38 Ga. 542; Reich v. State, 53 Ga. 73; Washington v. Hammond, 76 N.C. 33; New Orleans v. Miller, 7 La. Ann. 651. And see also State v. McNally, 48 La. Ann. 1450, 21 Sos 27ASOnus vera oo: The penal enactments of a corpora- tion, like those of the State, must be several (De Ben v. Gerard, 4 La. Ann. 30), and will be strictly construed. St. Louis v. Goebel, 32 Mo. 295. An ordinance punishing as a crimeCHAP. VIII| SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 417 3. Municipal by-laws must also be reasonable. Whenever they appear not to be so, the court must, as a matter of law, declare them void.! [But it has been held that a by-law expressly authorized by the legislature cannot be held unreasonable ; ” a failure to build a sidewalk is void. Port Huron v. Jenkinson, 77 Mich. 414, 43 N. W. 23. Compare James v. Pine Bluff, 49 Ark. 199, 4 S. W. 760. 12 Kyd on Corporations, 107; Davies v. Morgan, 1 Cromp. & J. 587; Chamberlain of London v. Compton, 7D. & R. 597; Clark v. Le Cren, 9 B. & C. 52; Gosling v. Veley, 12 Q. B. 328; Dunham v. Rochester, 5 Cow. 462; Mayor, &c. of Memphis »v. Winfield, 8 Humph. 707; Hayden v. Noyes, 5 Conn. 391; Waters ». Leech, 3 Ark. 110; White v. Mayor, 2 Swan, 364; Ex parte Burnett, 30 Ala. 461; Craig v. Burnett, 32 Ala. 728; Austin v. Murray, 16 Pick. 121; Goddard, Petitioner, 16 Pick. 504; Common- wealth v. Worcester, 3 Pick. 461; Commissioners v. Gas Co., 12 Pa. St. 318; State v. Jersey City, 29 N. J: UL: 170; Gallatin v. Bradford, 1 Bibb. 209; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Carew, 15 Mich. 525; State »v. Freeman, 38 N. H. 426; Pedrick »v. Bailey, 12 Gray, 161; St. Louis ». Weber, 44 Mo. 550; Peoria v. Cal- houn, 29 Ill. 317; St. Paul v. Traeger, 25 Minn. 248, 33 Am. Rep. 462; Mader v. Topeka, 106 Kan. 867, 189 Pac. 969, 15 A. L. R. 340; State v. Gurry, 121 Md. 534, 88 Atl. 546, 47 L. R. A. (n. 8.) 1087, Ann. Cas. 1915 B, 957; Baltimore v. Hampton Court Co., 138 Md. 271, 113 Atl. 850, 15 A. L. R. 304. An ordinance as to obstructing streets with cars, unreasonable in its operation only in one locality, will be enforced elsewhere. Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Jersey City, 47 N. J. L. 286. “The necessity and reasonableness of an ordinance when passed in pursu- ance of the charter powers of a munic- ipality is primarily committed to the council, and unless the ordinance is purely arbitrary, oppressive, or capri- cious, the courts will not interfere to prevent its enforcement.” Baltimore v. Wollman, 123 Md. 310, 91 Atl. 339; VOL. I—27 9 and where the question Baltimore v. Hampton Court Co., 138 Md. 271, 113 Atl. 850, 15 A. L. R. 304. In Ex parte Bahen, 115 Cal. 372, 47 Pac. 55, 36 L. R. A. 618, an ordinance prohibiting burials on lots not pur- chased before its enactment for such purpose was held void upon the theory that it was unreasonable in that the right to restrain burials rests upon the theory that all burials are injurious to the public. See Barbier v. Con- nolly, 113 U. S. 27, 28 L. ed. 923, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 357. Ordinance penalizing the sale or gift of street railway transfer tickets contrary to regulations of company issuing them is not unreasonable. Ez parte Lorenzen, 128 Cal. 431, 61 Pac. 68, 50 L. R. A. 55. 2 Chicago v. Hebard Express, etc., Co., 301 Ill. 570, 134 N. E. 27, 20 A. L. R. 206; A Coal Float v. Jeffer- sonville, 112 Ind. 15, 13 N. E. 115; Beiling v. Evansville, 144 Ind. 644, 42 N. E. 621, 35 L. R. A. 272; Mader v. Topeka, 106 Kan. 867, 189 Pac. 969, 15 A. L. R. 340; State v. Mayo, 106 Me. 62, 75 Atl. 295, 26 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 502; In re Anderson, 69 Neb. 686, 96 N. W. 149, 5 Ann. Cas. 421; Ros- well v. Bateman, 20 N. M. 77, 146 Pac. 950, L. R. A. 1917 D, 365, Ann. Cas. 1918 D, 426; O’Haver v. Mont- gomery, 120 Tenn. 448, 111 S. W. 449, 127 Am. St. Rep. 1014; Invader Oil & Refining Co. v. Fort Worth (Tex. Civ. App.), 229 S. W. 616. “Usually an ordinance will not be declared unreasonable, if it is within the express power of the municipal authorities which ordain it. The question usually arises regarding a regulatory ordinance claimed to be within the merely implied powers of a municipal corporation.” In re Kan- sas City Ordinance No. 39,946, 298 Mo, 569, 252 S. W. 404, 28 A. Ip, 18? 295. “If a municipal corporation is in specific and defined language, given the power to enact a particular418 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [voL. I of the reasonableness depends upon evidence, and it relates to a subject within the jurisdiction of the corporation, it will be pre- sumed to be reasonable until the contrary is shown.'| To render by-laws reasonable, they should tend in some degree to the accom- plishment of the objects for which the corporation was created and ordinance, that is, if the power and the manner of its exercise are both conferred by the legislature, the courts may not adjudge it invalid merely because it is unreasonable, but only if it is unconstitutional. But if the power be given in general terms or if the method of its exercise is not prescribed, the courts may declare it invalid, if unreasonable, even though it may not contravene any specific constitutional provision.”” Munson v. Colorado Springs, 35 Colo. 506, 84 Pac. 683, 6 L. R. A. (N. s.) 482. 1 Western Union Telegraph Co. ». New Hope, 187 U. S. 419, 47 L. ed. 240, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 204; Atlantic, etc., Telegraph Co. v. Philadelphia, 190 U. S. 160, 47 L. ed. 995, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 817; Sullivan v. Shreveport, 251 U.S. 169, 64 L. ed. 205, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 102; Lusk v. Dora, 224 Fed. 650; Miller v. Birmingham, 151 Ala. 469, 44 So. 388, 125 Am. St. Rep. 31: Ft. Smith v. Hunt, 72 Ark. 556, 82 S. W. 163, 105 Am. St. Rep. 51, 66 L. R. A. 238; Laurel Hill Cemetery v. San Francisco, 152 Cal. 464, 93 Pac. 70, 27 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 260, 14 Ann. Cas. 1080; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Carlin- ville, 200 Ill. 314, 65 N. E. 730, 93 Am. St. Rep. 190, 60 L. R. A. 391; Chi- cago v. Washingtonian Home, 289 III. 206, 124 N. EB. 416, 6 A. L. R. 1284; Iowa City v. Glassman, 155 Iowa, 671, 136 N. W. 899, 40 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 852; Com. v. Patch, 97 Mass. 221; People v. Detroit United Ry., 134 Mich. 682, 97 N. W. 36, 104 Am. St. Rep. 626, 63 L. R. A. 746; People v. Gibbs, 186 Mich, 128, 152 N. W. 1053, Ann. Cas. 1917 B, 830; St. Louis v. Weber, 44 Mo. 547; Peterson v. State, 79 Neb. 132, 112 N. W. 306, 126 Am. St. Rep. 651, 14 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 292; State v. Withnell, 91 Neb. 101, 135 N. W. 376, 40 L. R. A. (n. s.) 898; Fifth Ave. Coach Co. ». New York, 194 N. Y. 19, 86 N. B. 824, 21 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 744, 16 Ann. Cas. 695; Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Grambo, 103 Ohio St. 471, 134 N. E. 648, 20 A. L. R. 1214; Clar- son v. Milwaukee, 30 Wis. 316. To overturn an ordinance as being arbitrary, unreasonable, or discrimina- tory, the evidence of such facts should be clear and satisfactory. Evison v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. R. Co., 45 Minn. 370, 48 N. W. 6, 11 D: ROA 434; Peterson v. State, 79 Neb. 132, 112 N. W. 306, 14 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 292, 126 Am. St. Rep. 651; Standard Oil Co. v. Kearney, 106 Neb. 558, 184 N. W. 109, 18 A. L. R. 95. The courts can declare an ordinance invalid only when it is palpably unreasonable and oppressive. State v. Weddington, 188 N. C. 648, 125 S. H. 257, 377 Aq Re O73: bombe invalid because unreasonable its un- reasonable character must be so clearly apparent as to indicate a mere arbi- trary exercise of the power vested in the council. State v. Barge, 82 Minn. 256, 84 N. W. 911, 53 L. R. A. 428; Wygant v. McLauchlan, 39 Oreg. 429, 64 Pac. 867, 54 L. R. A. 636, 87 Am. St. 673; State v. Robart, 83 Minn. 257, 86 N. W. 938, 333, 54 L. R. A. 947. “Where an ordinance is legally passed with due authority under the organic law of the state and city, the courts will not declare it unreasonable, unless no difference of opinion can exist upon the question. A clear case must be made to authorize the courts to interfere on that ground.”’ Wagner v. St. Louis, 284 Mo. 410, 224 S. W. 413, 12 A. L. R. 495. Unless it appears upon the face of an ordinance establishing rules for the parking of automobiles, that such rules are arbitrary and unreasonable, the courts must assume that they were adopted to meet some existing emer- gency and that the city authorities were warranted in passing them. Kenyon Hotel Co. v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 62 Utah, 364, 220 Pac. 382, 33 A. L. R. 348.CHAP. VIII] its powers conferred.’ stew election day to the freemen of the society, 1, and the office of steward being but that of giving the dinner, — was held not the electors nor required to atten for no other purpose SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 419 A by-law, that persons chosen annually as ards of the Society of Scriveners should furnish a dinner on — the freemen not being connected with the business of the corporation, and not tending to promote its objects, and therefore unreasonable where a statute permitted a municipal corporation and void.2. And to license the sale of intoxicating drinks and to charge a license fee therefor, a by- law requiring the payment of a license fee of one thousand dollars was held void as not advancing the purpose of the law, but as being in its nature prohibitory.® And if a corporation has power to pro- hibit the carrying on of dangerous occupations within its limits, a by-law which should permit one person to carry on such an occupa- tion and prohibit another, who had an equal or which should allow the business to be carried but prohibit the erection of others for it, And aright to license an employment does the same business ; on in existing buildings, would be unreasonable.’ 1‘“‘Whether a particular ordinance is unreasonable, and therefore void, is a question for the court; but in determining it the court will have regard to all the circumstances of the city and the objects sought to be attained, and the necessity which exists for the ordinance. 1 Dillon Mun. Corp. § 327; Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Jacksonville, 67 Ill. 37, 16 Am. Rep. 611; Miller ». Fitchburg, 180 Mass. 32, 61 N. E. 277.” Hopkins ». Richmond, 117 Va. 692, 86 8. E. 139, Ann. Cas. 1917 D, 1114. 2 Society of Scriveners v. Brooking, 3 Q. B. 95. See, on this general sub- ject, Dillon, Mun. Corp. §§ 251-264. 3Bx parte Burnett, 30 Ala. 461; Craig v. Burnett, 32 Ala. 728. Authority to levy a license tax does not authorize the levy of one so heavy as to be prohibitory, where the business upon which it is levied is useful and legitimate. Morton v. Macon, 111 Ga. 162, 36 S. E. 627, 50 L. R. A. 485. A by-law declaring the keeping on hand of intoxicating liquors a nuisance was held unreasonable and void in Sullivan v. Oneida, 61 Ill. 242. That which is not a nuisance in fact cannot be made such by municipal ordinance. Chicago, &c. R. R. Co. right, from pursuing v. Joliet, 79 Ill. 25; State v. Mott, 61 Md. 297, post, p. 1324, note 2. ‘Mayor, &c. of Hudson ». Thorne, 7 Paige, 261. An ordinance which forbids the establishment and maintenance of livery stables within a specified part of the town, and then expressly exempts from its operation the stables already established, is void. Crowley vy. West, 52 La. Ann. 526, 27 So. 53, 47 L. R. A. 652, 78 Am. St. 355. A power to prevent and regulate the carrying on of manufactures dan- gerous in causing OF promoting fires does not authorize an ordinance pro- hibiting the erection of wooden build- ings within the city, or to limit the size of buildings which individuals shall be permitted to erect on their own premises. Ibid. See also Newton v. Belger, 143 Mass. 598, 10 N. E. 464. An ordinance for the destruction of property as a nuisance without a judi- cial hearing is void. Darst ». People, 51 Ill. 286. See cases p. 1324, n. 2; post. An ordinar imprisonment person refusit ing a fire is void. 16 Minn. 431. ice for the arrest and without warrant of a ig to assist in extinguish- Judson v. Reardon,420 CONSTITUTIONAL “IMITATIONS [VoL. I not imply a right to charge a license fee therefor with a view to reve- nue, unless such seems to be the manifest purpose of the power; but the authority of the corporation will be limited to such a charge for the license as will cover the necessary expenses of issuing it, and the additional labor of officers and other expenses thereby imposed. A license is issued under the police power; but the exaction of a license fee with a view to revenue would be an exercise of the power of taxation; and the charter must plainly show an intent to confer that power, or the municipal corporation cannot assume it. A 1 State v. Roberts, 11 Gill & J. 506; Mays v. Cincinnati, 1 Ohio St. 268; Cincinnati v. Bryson, 15 Ohio, 625; Freeholders v. Barber, 6 N. J. Eq. 64; Kip v. Paterson, 26 N. J. L. 298; State v. Hoboken, 41 N. J. L. 71; Bennett v. Borough of Birmingham, 31 Pa. St. 15; Commonwealth »v. Stodder, 2 Cush. 562; Chilvers v. People, 11 Mich. 43; Mayor, &c. of Mobile ». Yuille, 3 Ala. 137; Johnson v. Phila- delphia, 60 Pa. St. 445; State v. Herod, 29 Iowa, 123; Burlington v. Bumgardner, 42 Iowa, 673; Mayor, &c. of New York v. Second Avenue R. R. Co., 832 N. Y. 261; Home Ins. Co. v. Augusta, 50 Ga. 530; Cairo ». Bross, 101 Ill. 475; Muhlenbrinck v. Commissioners, 42 N. J. L. 364, 36 Am. Rep. 518; Mestayer v. Corrigé, 38 La. Ann. 708; Wisconsin Tel. Co. v. Osh- kosh, 62 Wis. 32, 21 N. W. 828, Vansant v. Harlem Stage Co., 59 Md. 330; Ft. Smith v. Hunt, 72 Ark. 556, 82 S. W. 163, 105 Am. St. Rep. 51, 66 L. R. A. 238; Terre Haute v. Kersey, 159 Ind. 300, 64 N. E. 469, 95 Am. St. Rep. 298; State v. Sheridan, 25 Wyo. 347, 170.Pac. 1,1 A. L. R. 955. “We declare the true rule to be, in the case of useful trades and employ- ments, and a fortiori in other cases, that, as an exercise of police power merely, the amount exacted for a license, though designed for regula- tion and not for revenue, is not to be confined to the expense of issuing it; but that a reasonable compensation may be charged for the additional ex- pense of municipal supervision over the particular business or vocation, at the place where it is licensed. For this purpose, the services of officers may be required, and incidental ex- penses may be otherwise incurred in the faithful enforcement of such police inspection or superintendence.” Van Hook »v Selma, 70 Ala. 361, 45 Am. Rep. 85; Standard Chemical & Oil Co. v. Troy, 201 Ala. 89, 77 So. 383, L. R. A. 1918 C, 522. The courts will not inquire very closely into the expense of a license with a view to adjudge it a tax, where it does not appear to be unreasonable in amount in view of its purpose as a regulation. Ash v. People, 11 Mich. 347; Van Baalen v. People, 40 Mich. 458; People v. Russell, 49 Mich. 617, 14 N. W. 568; Wolf v. Lansing, 53 Mich. 367, 19 N. W. 38; Johnson ». Philadelphia, 60 Pa. St. 445; Burling- ton v. Putnam Ins. Co., 31 Iowa, 102; Boston v. Schaffer, 9 Pick. 415; Welch v. Hotchkiss, 39 Conn. 140; State v. Hoboken, 41 N. J. L. 71; Mankato ». Fowler, 32 Minn. 364, 20 N. W. 361; Jackson ». Newman, 59 Miss. 385; Ex parte Gregory, 20 Tex. App. 210; Fayetteville v. Carter, 52 Ark. 301, 12 S. W. 573; Littlefield v. State, 42 Neb. 223, 60 N. W. 724, 28 L. R. A. 588, 47 Am. St. 697; Miller». Birming- ham, 151 Ala. 469, 44 So. 388, 125 Am. St. Rep. 31; Ft. Smith v. Hunt, 72 Ark. 556, 82S. W. 163, 105 Am. St. Rep. 51, 66 L. R. A. 238. Liquor license fee of $2000 in a city of 4000 inhabitants sustained in Ez parte Sikes, 102 Ala. 173, 15 So. 522, 24 L. R. A. 774. Ordinance requiring payment of license fee of $150 per annum by all persons buying claims, held void as to one who bought a few city warrants for purposes of invest- ment only. Bitzer v. Thompson, 20 Ky. L. 1318, 49S. W. 199, 44 L. R. A. 141.CHAP. VII] by-law, to be reasonable, should be certain. for its violation, it would seem that such SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 421 If it affixes a penalty penalty should be a fixed and certain sum, and not left to the discretion of the officer or court A higher license imposed on a non- resident than on a resident for pur- poses of revenue is void. Morgan »v. Orange, 50 N. J. L. 389, 13 Atl. 240. In Illinois the imposition of license fees for revenue has been sustained. U.S. Dist. Co. v. Chicago, 112 Ill. 19, and cases cited. But see Lemont »v. Jenks, 197 Ill. 363, 64 N. E. 362, 90 Am. St. Rep. 172. Under the Cali- fornia Constitution of 1879 licenses may be imposed for regulation or revenue, or both. Jn re Guerrero, 69 Cal. 88, 10 Pac. 261. In some cases it has been held that license fees might be imposed under the police power with a view to operate as a restriction upon the business or thing licensed. Carter ». Dow, 16 Wis. 299; Tenney v. Lenz, 16 Wis. 566; Schmidt »v. Indianapolis, 168 Ind. 631, 80 N. E. 632, 120 Am. St. Rep. 385, 14 L. R. A. (W. 8.) 787 ; Min- neota v. Martin, 124 Minn. 498, 145 N. W. 383, 51 L. R. A. (n. s.) 40, Ann. Cas. 1915 B, 812; Litchville ». Han- son, 19 N. D. 672, 124 N. W. 1119, Ann. Cas. 1912 D, 876. See State v. Cassidy, 22 Minn. 312; Youngblood v. Sexton, 32 Mich. 406, 20 Am. Rep. 654; St. Johnsbury ». Thompson, 59 Vt. 200, 9 Atl. 571; Russellville v. White, 41 Ark. 485. But in such cases, where the right to impose such license fees can be fairly deduced from the charter, it would perhaps be safer and less liable to lead to confusion and difficulty to refer the corporate authority to the taxing power, rather than exclusively to the power of regu- lation. See Dunham »v. Trustees of Rochester, 5 Cow. 462, upon the extent of the police power. Fees which are imposed under the inspection laws of the State are akin to license fees, and if exacted not for revenue, but to meet the expenses of regulation, are to be referred to the police power. Cincinnati Gas Light Co. v. State, 18 Ohio St. 237. A city cannot exact a license fee from a national bank. Carthage v. National Bank, 71 Mo. 508, 36 Am. Rep. 494. see post, 1044; §§ 291-308. 1Kreulhaus v. Birmingham, 164 Ala. 623, 51 So. 297, 26 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 492: District of Columbia v. Keen, 31 App. Cas. (D. C.) 541, 14 Ann. Cas. 1002: Bills v. Goshen, 117 Ind. 221, 20 N. E. 115; State Center v. Baren- stein, 66 Iowa, 249, 23 N. W. 652; St. Paul v. Schleh, 101 Minn. 425, 112 N. W. 532, 118 Am. St. Rep. 638; Helena v. Gray, 7 Mont. 486, 17 Pac. 564; Wasem v. Fargo, 49 N. D. 168, 190 N. W. 546, 25 A. L. R. 758; Atkin- son v. Goodrich Transp. Co., 60 Wis. 141, 18 N. W. 764. What shall be a violation of an ordinance cannot be left to implica- tion. Helena v. Gray, 7 Mont. 486, 17 Pac. 564. Ordinance requiring use of device, which shall prevent escape of sparks as effectually as by any means in use for the purpose, is bad. Atkinson ». Goodrich Transp. Co., 60 Wis. 141, 18 N. W. 764. Under power to prohibit driving at a rate of speed deemed inconsistent with public safety, the city may not prohibit driving at a speed which shall be found to be immoderate under the circumstances. Com. 2. Roy, 140 Mass. 432, 4 N. E. 814. A license fee may not be left to be fixed for each case, or to be determined by the mayor. Bills v. Goshen, 117 Ind. 221, 20 N. E. 115; State Center v. Barenstein, 66 Iowa, 249, 23°Ne We 652. Ordinance requiring that any awn- ing over a sidewalk must be “upon & suitable frame” is void for uncer- tainty. State v. Clarke, 69 Conn. 371, 37 Atl. 975, 39 L. R. A. 670, 61 Am. St. 45. So, one requiring & street railway company to provide ‘“‘in some reason- able manner for the sprinkling of the streets through which their cars run.” State v. New Orleans City & Ri RACo:; 49 La. Ann. 1571, 22 So. 839, 39 L. R. A. 618. Law prescribing different maximum On this subject in general, Dillon, Mun. Corp.422 which is to impose it on conviction ; ! CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [voL. I though a by-law imposing a penalty not exceeding a certain sum has been held not to be void for uncertainty ;* [and it has been held that while an ordinance which prescribes a penalty may leave amargin for the discretion of the court so that the fine or imprisonment imposed may be graded in propor- tion to the aggravation of the circumstances, it is void for uncer- tainty, where it only prescribes a minimum, and not a maximum penalty.’ If a statute or by-law, incorporated by reference into a subsequent by-law, makes the latter certain, it will render it valid, though without the provisions so incorporated it would have been void for uncertainty.‘] So a by-law, to be reasonable, general principles of the common law.5 loads for “‘narrow-tired” and “broad- tired” wagons using specified gravel roads is void for uncertainty in not defining ‘“‘broad-tired” and ‘“narrow- tired.” Cook v. State, 26 Ind. Ap. 278, 59 N. E. 489. Statute authorizing revocation of physician’s license “for grossly unpro- fessional conduct of a character likely to deceive or defraud the public’ is void for uncertainty. Matthews v. Murphy, 23 Ky. L. 750, 63 S. W. 785. An ordinance prohibiting the loca- tion and operation of a woodyard “within 150 feet of any inhabited por- tion of any residence district”, is void for uncertainty. St. Paul v. Schleh, 101 Minn. 425, 112 N. W. 532, 118 Am. St. Rep. 638. An ordinance which provides that no undertaking establishment shall be established or maintained within those parts of the city occupied mainly for residences is invalid because of uncertainty. Wasem v. Fargo, 49 N. D. 168, 190 N. W. 546, 25 A. L. R. 758. 1 Melick v. Washington, 47 N. J. L. 254; State v. Crenshaw, 94 N. C. 877. ? Mayor, &c. of Huntsville v. Phelps, 27 Ala. 55, overruling Mayor, &c. of Mobile v. Yuille, 3 Ala. 137. And see Piper v. Chappell, 14 M. & W. 624. * Arnett v. Cardwell, 185 Ky. 14, 121S. W. 964. * Southern Operating Co. v. Chatta- nooga, 128 Tenn. 196, 159 S. W. 1091, Ann. Cas. 1914 D, 720. ° To be reasonable a by-law should should be in harmony with the If it is in general restraint be equal in its operation. Tugman ». Chicago, 78 Ill. 405; Barling v. West, 29 Wis. 307. In Chicago v. Kautz, 313 Ill. 196, 144 N. E. 805, 35 A. L. R. 1050, the court said: “While a city has, under its general charter power to enact ordinances of a _ regulatory nature, authority to pass all necessary police ordinances to carry into effect these regulations, such regulatory ordinances must be reasonable, and must not unnecessarily contravene the natural rights of individuals affected by them. Under the guise of police regulations the personal rights or liberties of citizens cannot be arbitrarily invaded. In order to hold valid an ordinance of a regula- tory nature, enacted under general charter powers, the court must be able to see that the ordinance tends in some degree toward the prevention of an offense or the preservation of public health, morals, safety, or welfare. Elie v. Adams Exp. Co., 300 Ill. 340, 133 N. E. 243; Cortland v. Larson, 273 Til’ (602; TR. Al A9n7 A. S14 ais N. EB; 51, Ann: Cas: 1916 Ei 775r People v. Weiner, 271 Ill. 74, 110 N. E. 870, L. R. A. 1916 C, 775, Ann. Cas. 1917 C, 1065. If under the guise of protecting the public interests, the ordinance arbitrarily interferes with private business and imposes unusual and unnecessarily restrictive regula- tions upon lawful occupations, it is void. Chicago v. Hebard Exp. & Van. Co., 301 Ill. 570, 134 N. E. 27, 20 A. L. R. 206; McCray v. Chicago,CHAP. vill] SEVERAL GRADES OF 992 Ill. 60, 126 N. E. 557, Haskell v. Howard, 269 Ill. 550, 109 N. E. 992, L. R. A. 1916 B, 893; Frost ». Chi- eago, 178 Ill. 250, 52 N. BE. 869, 49 fe. A. 657, 69) Am. St. Rep. 301; Toledo W. & W. R. Co. v. Jackson- ville, 67 Ill. 37, 16 Am. Rep. Gli The following are cases in which municipal ordinances have been passed upon and their reasonableness deter- mined: Markets: Prohibiting sales outside of. Reasonable — Buffalo »v. Webster, 10 Wend. 99; Bush v. Sea- bury, 8 Johns. 418; Bowling Green ». Carson, 10 Bush, 64; Le Claire v. Davenport, 13 Iowa, 210; Winnsboro y. Smart, 11 Rich. L. 551; St. Louis ». Weber, 14 Mo. 547; State v. Perry, 151 N. C. 661, 65 S. BE. 915, 134 Am. St. Rep. 1002. Unreasonable — Cald- well v. Alton, 33 Ill. 416; Bloomington vy. Wahl, 46 Ill. 489 ; Bethune v. Hayes, 2983 Ga. 560. Compare Hughes ». Recorder’s Court, 75 Mich. 574, 42 N. W. 984, with People »v. Kier, 78 Mich. 98, 43 N. W. 1039. See Gossigi 0. New Orleans, (La. Ann.) 4 So. 15; Ex parte Byrd, 84 Ala. 17. Requiring per- mission to occupy stands. Reasonable —Nightingale, Petitioner, 11 Pick. 167. Imposing tax on stands. Rea- sonable — Cincinnati ?. Buckingham, 10 Ohio, 257. Unreasonable — Kip »y. Paterson, 26 N. J. L. 298. Impos- ing a license fee of $12.50 per quarter for the privilege of selling fresh meats in the city. Unreasonable — Stamps v. Burk, 83 Ark. 351, 104 S. W. 153. Prohibiting wagons standing in market. Unreasonable — Common- wealth v. Brooks, 109 Mass. 359; Com- monwealth v. Wilkins, 121 Mass. 356. Licensing hucksters : Zeasonable — Cherokee v. Fox, 34 Kan. 160 77 ac 625. Unreasonable — Dunham v. Rochester, 5 Cow. 462; St. Paul v. Traeger, 25 Minn. 248, 33 Am. Rep. 462; Muhlenbrinck ». Commissioners, 42 N. J. L. 364, 36 Am. Rep. 518; Frommer v. Richmond, 31 Gratt. 646 ; Barling v. West, 29 Wis. 307, 9 Am. Rep. 576. Auctions: Prohibiting sales at, on streets. Reasonable — White v. Kent, 11 Ohio St. 550. After sunset. Un- reasonable — Hayes v. Appleton, 24 Wis. 542. Imposing heavy license on. MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 423 Reasonable — Decorah v. Dunstan, 38 Iowa, 96; Wiggins v. Chicago, 68 Ill. 372; Fretwell v. Troy, 18 Kan. 271. Making it penal to sell without a license. Reasonable — Goshen v. Kern, 63 Ind. 468. Saloons and Restaurants: Closing for the night. Reasonable — Staats y. Washington, 45 N. J. L. 318; Platteville v. Bell, 43 Wis. 488 ; Smith y. Knoxville, 3 Head, 245; State v. Welch, 36 Conn. 215; State v. Free- man, 38 N. H. 426; Maxwell v. Jones- boro, 11 Heisk. 257; Baldwin v. Chicago, 68 Ill. 418; State v. Calla- way, 11 Idaho, 719, 84 Pac. 27, 114 Am. St. Rep. 285, 4 L. R. A. (N. s.) 109; Paul v. Washington, 134 N.C! 363, 47 S. E. 793, 69 L. R. A. 902. Unreasonable — Ward v. Greenville, 8 Baxt. 228, 35 Am. Rep. 700. Clos- ing on certain days. Unreasonable — Grills v. Jonesboro, 8 Baxt. 247. On Sunday. Reasonable — Gabel ». Houston, 29 Tex. 335; State v. Lud- wig, 21 Minn. 202; Hudson v. Geary, 4 R. I. 485; State v. Calloway, 11 Idaho, 719, 84 Pac. 27, 114 Am. St. Rep. 285, 4 L. R. A. (W. s-) 109. Be- tween certain hours, unless by per- mission of the president of the village. Unreasonable — Little Chute ». Van Camp, 136 Wis. 526, 117 N. W. 1012, 128 Am. St. Rep. 1100. Forbidding sale of liquor at restaurants. Reason- able — State v. Clark, 28 N. H. 176. Forbidding female waiters in saloons. Reasonable — Bergman v Cleveland, 39 Ohio St. 651. Requiring unob- structed view into all parts of interior from street, sunset to sunrise, and prohibiting the letting in or out of any person during the hours when the saloon is lawfully required to be from closed. Unreasonable —Bennett v. Pulaski, (Tenn. Ch. Ap.) 52 S: We 913. 47 L. R. A. 278. Prohibiting use of screens, blinds, etc., to ob- struct view from street into saloon. Unreasonable — Champer 2. Green- 14, 46 castle, 138 Ind. 339, 39 N. E. A. 768. Am. St. Rep. 390, DAT ne Forbidding infants and females in saloons. 2easonable — Com. 2. Price, 123 Ky. 163, 94 S. W. 32, 13 Ann. Cas. 489. Unreasonable — State v. Nelson, 10 Idaho, 522, 79 Pac. 522,424 79, 109 Am. St. Rep. 226, 67 L. R. A. 808, 3 Ann. Cas. 322. Streets and Highways: Limiting weight of vehicles and loads. Rea- sonable — Nagle v. Augusta, 5 Ga. 546; Froelich v. Cleveland, 99 Ohio St. 376, 124 N. E. 212; White ». Turner, 114 Wash. 405, 195 Pac. 240. Unreasonable — Brown v. Nichols, 93 Kan. 737, 145 Pac. 561, L. R. A. 1915 D, 327. Prohibiting traffic in heavily loaded wagons on certain street except upon permission of village trustees. Unreasonable — Cicero Lumber Co. v. Cicero, 176 Ill. 9, 51 N. E. 758, 68 Am. St. Rep. 155, 42 L. R. A. 696. Requiring heavily loaded vehicles to keep to specified portion of street when that portion is unfit for use. Unrea- sonable — State v. Boardman, 93 Me. 73, 44 Atl. 118, 46 L. R. A. 750. Hackney Carriages: Reasonable — to regulate fares. Commonwealth v. Gage, 114 Mass. 328. To put under direction of police. Commonwealth v. Matthews, 122 Mass. 60; St. Paul v. Smith, 27 Minn. 364, 7 N. W. 734, 38 Am. Rep. 296; Veneman »v. Jones, 118 Ind. 41, 20 N. E. 644. To exclude from certain streets. Commonwealth v. Stodder, 2 Cush. 562. To require a license. Brooklyn v. Breslin, 57 N. Y. 591; City Council v. Pepper, 1 Rich. L. 364; Frankfort, &c. R. Co. v. Philadelphia, 58 Pa. St. 119; St. Louis v. Green, 70 Mo. 562. Unrea- sonable — To grant one person exclu- sive right to run omnibuses in the city. Logan v. Pyne, 43 Iowa, 524, 22 Am. Rep. 261. Motor Vehicles: Requiring indem- nity bond as condition precedent to issuing license to operate for transpor- tation of passengers. Reasonable — Hazleton v. Atlanta, 144 Ga. 775, 87 S. E. 1043; Huston v. Des Moines, 176 Iowa, 455, 156 N. W. 883; New Orleans v. LeBlanc, 189 La. 113, 71 So. 248; Com. v. Slocum, 230 Mass. 180, 119 N. E. 687; Com. v. The- berga, 231 Mass. 386, 121 N. E. 30; Ez parte Bogle, 78 Tex. Cr. Rep. 1, 179 S. W. 1198 ; Ex parte Parr, 82 Tex. Crim. Rep. 525, 200 S. W. 404. Unreason- able — State ez rel. Stephenson v. Dil- lon, 82 Fla. 276, 89 So. 558, 22 A. L. R. 227; Jitney Bus Asso. v. Wilkes-Barre, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I 256 Pa. St. 462, 100 Atl. 954. Limiting speed. Reasonable — Com. v. Crow- inshield, 187 Mass. 221, 72 N. E. 963, 68 L. R. A. 245; Brazier v. Philadel- phia, 215 Pa. St. 297, 64 Atl. 508, 7 Ann. Cas. 548. Requiring compli- ance with traffic directions of police force. Unreasonable —St. Louis ». Allen, 275 Mo. 501, 204 S. W. 1083, L. R. A. 1918 F, 1110. Creating one way streets. Reasonable — Com. ». Nolan, 189 Ky. 34, 224 S. W. 506, 11 A. L. R. 202. Regulating parking. Reasonable — Sanders v. Atlanta, 147 Ga. 819, 95 S. E. 695; Pugh v. Des Moines, 176 Iowa, 593, 156 N. W. 892, L. R. A. 1917 F, 345; Kenyon Hotel Co. v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 62 Utah, 364, 220 Pac. 382, 33 A. L. R. 343. Unreasonable — New Orleans v. Badie, 146 La. 550, 83 So. 826. Railroads: Regulating speed of. Reasonable — Pennsylvania Company v. James, 814 Pa. St. 194; Whitson »v. Franklin, 34 Ind. 392; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Carlinville, 200 Ill. 314, 65 N. E. 730, 93 Am. St. Rep. 190, 60 L. R. A. 391; Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Com., 126 Ky. 712, 104 S. W. 771, 17 L. R. A. (w. s.) 561; Peterson ». State, 79 Neb. 132, 112 N. W. 306, 126 Am. St. Rep. 651, 14 L. R. A. (N. s.) 292. Unreasonable — Outside of inhabited portion of city. Meyers v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Co., 57 Iowa, 555, 10 N. W. 896. But see Knobloch ». Chicago, &c. Ry. Co., 31 Minn. 402, 18 N. W. 106. Requiring flagman at crossing which is not dangerous. Unreasonable — Toledo, &c. R. R. Co. v. Jacksonville, 67 Ill. 37, 16 Am. Rep. 611; Southern Indiana R. Co. v. Bedford, 165 Ind. 272, 75 N. E. 268, 6 Ann. Cas. 509. Prohibiting removal of snow by street railway companies without consent of street superintend- ent. Reasonable — Union Railway Company v. Cambridge, 11 Allen, 287. Obstructing streets with cars. Rea- sonable — Penna. R. R. Co. v. Jersey City, 47 N. J. L. 286. Requiring that crossings be kept lighted. Reason- able — Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. »v. Hartford City, 170 Ind. 674, 82 N. E. 787, 85 N. E. 362, 20 L. R. A. (Nn. 8.) 461; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Salem, 170 Ind. 153, 82 N. E. 918, 19 L. R. A.CHAP. VIII] SEVERAL GRADES OF (Nn. s.) 658. Unreasonable — Chicago v. Pennsylvania Co., 252 Ill. 185, 96 N. E. 833, 36 L. R. A. (nN. 8.) 573, Ann. Cas. 1912 D, 400. Burials: Prohibiting in town or city. Unreasonable — Austin v. Mur- ray, 16 Pick. 121; Bryan v. Birming- ham, 154 Ala. 447, 45 So. 922, 129 Am. St. Rep. 63; Wygant v. McLauch- lan, 39 Oreg. 492, 64 Pac. 867, 87 Am. St. Rep. 673, 54 L. R. A. 636. Pro- hibiting within certain limits. Rea- sonable — Coates v. New York, 7 Cowen, 585. Prohibiting burial in city of persons dying therein without per- mit from board of health. Reason- able — Meyers v. Clarke, 122 Ky. 866, 90 S. W. 1049, 93 S. W. 43, 5 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 727. Subjecting pri- vate cemeteries to control of city sexton. Unreasonable — Bogert v. Indianapolis, 13 Ind. 134. Requiring city sexton to expend $500 on the cemetery and to bury paupers free. Unreasonable — Beroujohn v. Mobile, 97 Ala. 58. See p. 1321, n. 2, post. Fire Limits: Establishing. Rea- sonable — King v. Davenport, 98 Il. 305, 38 Am. Rep. 89; Monroe ». Hoffman, 29 La. Ann. 651, 29 Am. Rep. 345; Respublica v. Duquet, 2 Yeates, 493; Wadleigh v. Gilman, 12 Me. 403, 28 Am. Dec. 188; Brady v. Northwest- ern Ins. Co., 11 Mich. 425; Salem v. Maynes, 123 Mass. 372; Troy »v. Winters, 4 Thomp. & C. (N. Y.) 256; McKibbin v. Fort Smith, 35 Ark. 352; St. Louis v. Nash, 266 Mo. 523, 181 S. W. 1145, Ann. Cas. 1918 B, 134; Olympia v. Mann, 1 Wash. 389, 25 Pac. 337, 12 L. R. A. 150. See post, p. 13813. Requiring a building license fee. Reasonable — Welch v. Hotch- kiss, 39 Conn. 140, 12 Am. Rep. 383. Forbidding frame buildings in small towns. Unreasonable — Kneedler ». Norristown, 100 Pa. St. 368. Houses of Ill Fame: Reasonable Prohibiting keeping of. State v. Williams, 11 S. C. 288; Childress »v. Mayor, 3 Sneed, 356; State v. Mack, 41 La. Ann. 1079, 6 So. 808; New Orleans v. Miller, 142 La. 163, 76 So. 596, L. R. A. 1918 B, 331. Imposing penalty on owner of. MeAlister »v. Clark, 33 Conn.91. Licensing. State v. Clarke, 54 Mo. 17, 14 Am. Rep. 471. MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 425 Arresting and fining lewd women. Shafer v. Mumma, 17 Md. 331; Braddy v. Milledgeville, 74 Ga. 516. Unreasonable — Demolishing. Welch v. Stowell, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 332. For- bidding prostitute occupying any room in city. Milliken v. City Coun- cil, 54 Tex. 388, 38 Am. Rep. 629. Forbidding all persons except nearest male relative to associate with prosti- tutes in any public place. Hechinger v. Maysville, 22 Ky. L. R. 486, 57 S. W. 619, 49 L. R. A. 114. But prostitutes may be forbidden to be upon the public streets between the hours of 7 p.m. and 4 a.m. without reasonable necessity for so being. Dunn v. Commonwealth, 105 Ky. 834, 49 S. W. 813, 43 L. R. A. 701. Slaughter Houses: Prohibiting in certain parts of city. Reasonable — Cronin v. People, 82 N. Y. 318, 37 Am. Rep. 564; Metropolitan Board of Health v. Heister, 37 N. Y. 661; Mil- waukee v. Gross, 21 Wis. 241; Zim- merman v. Gritzmacher, 53 Oreg. 206, 98 Pac. 875, 99 Pac. 1135, 21 L. Re A: (x. s.) 299. See Wreford v. People, 14 Mich. 41. Laundries: Forbidding, except in brick or stone buildings, upheld. Matter of Yick Wo, 68 Cal. 294, 9 Pac. 139; rev. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 30 L. ed. 220, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1064. Limited to a certain part of a city. In re Hang Kie, 69 Cal. 149, 10 Pac. 327; and to certain hours. Ex parte Moynier, 65 Cal. 33, 2 Pac. 728. Ordinance prohibiting within certain district, and declaring such as the district nuisances, is In re Hong Wah, are within unconstitutional. 82 Fed. 623. Theaters and Other Places of Amuse- ment: Requiring attendance of fire- man at expense of owner or manage- ment. Reasonable — Tannenbaum »v. Rehm, 152 Ala. 494, 44 So. 532, 11 L. R. A. (n. s.) 700, 126 Am. St. Rep. 52; New Orleans v. Hop Lee, 104 La. 601, 29 So. 214; Harrison v. Baltimore, 1 Gill (Md.) 264. See also Hartford vy. Parsons, 87 Conn. 412, 87 Atl. 736, Ann. Cas. 1916 A, 1182. Unreason- able — Chicago v. Weber, 246 = Iii. 304, 92 N. E. 859, 34 L. RAS (nis) 306, 20 Ann. Cas. 359.426 Distribution of Advertising Matter: Regulating or prohibiting in streets or other public places. Reasonable — Wettengel v. Denver, 20 Colo. 552, 39 Pac. 343; In re Anderson, 69 Neb. 686, 96 N. W. 149, 5 Ann. Cas. 421; People v. Horwitz, 27 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 237, 140 N. Y. Supp. 437. Unreason- able — People v. Armstrong, 73 Mich. 288, 41 N. W. 275, 2 L. R. A. 721, 16 Am. St. Rep. 578. Brick Kilns: Forbidding construc- tion in city. Reasonable — State ex rel. Krittenbrink v. Withnell, 91 Neb. 101) 135) Ne We 376; 40) Re AS (x. s.) 898. Unreasonable — Denver v. Rogers, 46 Colo. 479, 104 Pac. 1042, 25 L. R. A. (N. s.) 247. The following are cases in which municipal ordinances’ have been de- clared reasonable — Prohibiting keep- ing of swine in a city or in thickly populated sections thereof. Com- monwealth v. Patch, 97 Mass. 221; State v. Holcomb, 68 Iowa, 107, 26 N. W. 33; Miller v. Syracuse, 168 Ind. 230, 80 N. EB. 411, 120 Am. St. Rep. 366, 8 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 471; State v. Rice, 158 N. C. 635, 74.8. E. 582, 39 L. R. A. (vn. 8.) 266; Darlington v. Ward, 48 S. C. 570, 26 S. E. 906, 38 L. R. A. 326. Ez parte Botts, 69 Tex. Crim. Rep. 161, 154 8S. W. 221, 44L.R. A. (Nn. s.) 629. But see Com- fort v. Koscinsko, 88 Miss. 611, 41 So. 268, 9 Ann. Cas. 178. Prohibiting swine running at large. Waco v. Powell, 32 Tex. 258; Crosby v. War- ren, 1 Rich. 385; Whitfield v. Longest, 6 Ired. L. 268; Roberts v. Ogle, 30 Ill. 459; Gosselink v. Campbell, 4 Iowa, 296. Prohibiting cattle running at large. Commonwealth v. Bean, 14 Gray, 52. Impounding such and selling after notice. Cartersville v. Lanham, 67 Ga. 753; but only the expense of impounding can be re- tained, not a fine upon the owner. Wilcox v. Hemming, 58 Wis. 144, 15 N. W. 485. Regulating the disposal of garbage or ashes. Baltimore »v. Hampton Court Co., 138 Md. 271, 113 Atl. 850, 15 A. L. R. 304; Wheeler v. Boston, 233 Mass. 275, 123 N. E. 684, 15 A. L. R. 275; Valley Spring Hog Ranch v. Plagmann, 282 Mo. 1, 220 S. W. 1, 15 A. L. R. 266. Making it CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [voL. I unlawful for any one not having a contract with the city to carry on business of collecting and disposing of garbage and providing that city may contract with a suitable person for exclusive right to dispose of garbage. Valley Spring Hog Ranch Co. », Plagmann, 282 Mo. 1, 2208. W. 1, 15 A. L. R. 266. Granting exclusive rights to remove carcasses of animals, dirt, or offal from city. Vandine, Petitioner, 6 Pick. 187, 17 Am. Dec. 351; contra, River Rendering Co. v. Behr, 77 Mo. 91. Requiring consent of mayor to maintain an awning. Pedrick v. Bailey, 12 Gray, 161. Re- quiring sidewalk to be cleared of snow. Goddard, Petitioner, 16 Pick. 504, 28 Am. Dec. 259; Kirby v. Boylston Mar- ket Ass’n, 14 Gray, 249; Kansas City v. Holmes, 274 Mo. 159, 202 S. W. 392, L. R. A. 1918 D, 1016; Helena »v. Kent, 32 Mont. 279, 80 Pac. 258, 4 Ann. Cas. 235; State v. McCrillis, 28 R. I. 165, 66 Atl. 301,9 L. R. A. (wv. s.) 635, 13 Ann. Cas. 701; contra, Gridley v. Bloomington, 88 Ill. 555; State v. Jackman, 69 N. H. 318, 41 Atl. 347, 42 L. R. A. 4388; Chicago v. O’Brien, 111 Tl 532; 53° Am* Rep. 640; McGuire v. District of Columbia, 24 App. (D. C.) 22, 65 L. R. A. 480. Requiring hoist-way to be closed after business hours. New York v. Williams, 15 N. Y. 502. Requiring a drawbridge to be closed after a vehicle had been kept waiting ten minutes. Chicago v. McGinn, 51 Ill. 266. Pro- hibiting laying of gas mains in winter. Northern Liberties v. Gas Co., 12 Pa. St. 318. Requiring hay or coal to be weighed by city weighers. Stokes v. New York, 14 Wend. 87; Yates v. Milwaukee, 12 Wis. 673; O’Maley »v. Freeport, 96 Pa. St. 24. Regulating price and weight of bread. Mayor v. Yuille, 3 Ala. 187, 36 Am. Dec. 441; Page v. Fazackerly, 36 Barb. 392; Guillotte v. New Orleans, 12 La. Ann. 432. Prohibiting peddling without a license. Huntington v. Cheesbro, 57 Ind. 74. Prohibiting sale of adul- terated milk. Polinsky v. People, 73 N. Y. 65. Prohibiting sale of milk without license. Chicago v. Bartree, 100 Ill. 57; People v. Mulholland, 19 Hun, 548, 82 N. Y. 324, 37 Am. Rep.CHAP. VIII] 568. Punishing vagrants. St. Louis »v. Bentz, 11 Mo. 61. Imposing license tax on peddlers. Hx parte Ah Foy, 57 Cal. 92. Prohibiting keeping more than five tons of straw in one block at one time unless in a fire-proof inclos- ure. Clark v. South Bend, 85 Ind. 276. Prohibiting erection of livery stable on a block without consent of the owners of half the block. State v. Beattie, 16 Mo. App. 131. Requir- ing street railway company to report quarterly the number of passengers carried. St. Louis v. St. Louis R. R. Co., 89 Mo. 44, 1 8S. W. 305. Pro- hibiting boys from getting on or off locomotives. Bearden v. Madison, 73 Ga. 184. Prohibiting stopping a vehicle in the street more than twenty minutes. Com. v. Fenton, 139 Mass. 195, 29 N. E.653. Forbidding preach- ing on Boston Common without per- mission. Com. v. Davis, 140 Mass. 485, 4 N. E. 577. Prohibiting cornet playing in street without license. Com. »v. Plaisted, 148 Mass. 375, 19 N. E. 224. Prohibiting public meet- ings on public streets without a per- mit. People ex rel. Doyle v. Atwell, 232 N. Y. 96, 133 N. E. 364, 25 A. L. R. 107; Fitts v. Atlanta, 121 Ga. 567, 49 S. B. 793, 67 L. R. A. 808, 104 Am. St. Rep. 167. See also Love v. Judge of Recorder’s Ct. 128 Mich. 545, 87 N. W. 785, 55 L. R. A. 618. Requir- ing license for collecting, storing, and dealing in rags in thickly settled por- tions of city. Commonwealth v. Hub- ley, 172 Mass. 58, 51 N. E. 448, 42 L. R. A. 403, 70 Am. St. 242. Requir- ing a railroad to light the tracks oper- ated by it within the city limits, and to use the same kind of lights and to light for the same period of the night as in the public streets. Cincinnati, H. & D. R. Co. v. Bowling Green, 57 Ohio St. 336, 49 N. E. 121, 41 L. R. A. 422; upon compelling railroad to light its tracks in city, see note to this case in L. R. A. Prohibiting dogs from run- ning at large in streets and alleys and providing for the summary destruc- tion of all dogs so caught running at large, unless they are ransomed within twenty-four hours, notice to owners of collared dogs being provided for. Hagerstown v. Witmer, 86 Md. 293, SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 427 37 Atl. 965, 39 L. R. A. 649. Punish- ing cruelty to animals in public places. State v. Karstendiek, 49 La. Ann. 1621, 22 So. 845, 39 L. R. A. 520; see upon municipal power as to nuisances affect- ing public morals, decency, peace, and good order, note to this case in L. R. A.; upon nuisances relating to trade or business, note in L. R. A. to Ez parte Lacey, 108 Cal. 326, 41 Pac. 411, 38 L. R. A. 640, 49 Am. St. 93, which holds that the establishment of steam shoddy machines and of steam carpet- beating machines within one hundred feet of churches, &c., may be pro- hibited. Public scavengers may be required to take out licenses and to secure permit from board of health before removing contents of any privy vault. State v. McMahon, 69 Minn. 265. 72 N. W. 79, 38 L. R. A. 675. Making lower water-rates to those who use large quantities. Silkman v. Bd. of Water Com’rs, 152 N. Y. 327, 46 N. E. 612, 37 L. R. A. 827. Requiring garbage-collectors to take out licenses. State v. Orr, 68 Conn. 101, 35 Atl. 770, 34 L. R. A. 279. Requiring milk- venders to take out licenses and have their herds subjected to the “tubercu- lin test.’ State v. Nelson, 66 Minn 166, 68 N. W. 1066, 34 L. R. A. 318, 61 Am. St. 399. Requiring that only police officers may prosecute for viola- tion of a specified ordinance. State v. Robitshek, 60 Minn. 123, 61 N. W. 1023, 33 L. R. A. 33. Where a sewer- assessment has been successfully con- tested, the city may require that the amount of the assessment be paid as a condition precedent to permitting the contestant to connect with the sewer. Herrmann State, 54 Ohio St. 506, 43 N. E. 990, 32 L. R. A. 734. Requiring license fee of $25 per annum from junk-dealers, $50 per annum from pawnbrokers, bonds of $2,000 and $5,000 respectively, indorsements of twelve freeholders upon each appli- cation for license, and prohibiting purchases from boys and from drunk- ards and intoxicated persons, reserving power to revoke license at any time. Grand Rapids v. Brandy, 105 Mich. 670, 64 N. W. 29, 32 L. R. A. 116, 55 Am. St. 472; and upon power to con- trol such dealers, see note hereto in428 L. R. A.; see also Rosenbaum ». Newbern, 118 N. C. 83, 24S. E. 1, 32 L. R. A. 123. Requiring itinerant traders to pay a license fee of $50 per quarter, traders having a fixed place of business being exempt. Re Has- kell, 112 Cal. 412, 44 Pac. 725, 32 L. R. A. 527. Prohibiting use of salt upon street-railway tracks, except at street corner curves. State v. Eliza- beth, 58 N. J. L. 619, 34 Atl. 146, 32 L. R. A. 170. Requiring roofed pas- sageway over sidewalks where build- ings are being constructed above first story. Smith v. Milwaukee B. & T. Exchange, 91 Wis. 360, 64 N. W. 1041, 30 L. R. A. 504, 51 Am. St. 912. Re- quiring boarding-house keepers, &c., to furnish street commissioner with list of boarders liable to poll-tax, and to pay a fine for failuresotodo. Topeka v. Boutwell, 53 Kan. 20, 35 Pac. 819, 27 L. R. A. 593. Forbidding any unmarried minor to enter bar-room unless as agent or servant. State v. Austin, 114 N. C. 855, 19S. E. 919, 25 L. R. A. 283, 41 Am. St. 817. Con- tracting for a supply of gas and water for a reasonable period, although such period extends beyond the official life of any member of the city council. Vincennes v. Citizens’ Gas L. & C. Co., 1382 Ind. 114, 31 N. E. 573, 16 L. R. A. 485; contra, Shelden v. Fox, 48 Kan. 356, 29 Pac. 759, 16 L. R. A. 257, and note. Requiring both driver and conductor on every street car in use on streets. South Covington & C. St. R. Co. v. Berry, 93 Ky. 438, 18 S. W. 1026, 15 L. R. A. 604, and note, 40 Am. St. 161. Regulating weight of loaves of bread offered for sale and punishing sale of short-weight loaves. People v. Wagner, 86 Mich. 594, 49 N. W. 609, 13 L. R. A. 286, and note, 24 Am. St. 141. Prohibiting sus- pension of electric wires over or upon roofs of buildings. El. Impr. Co. »v. San Francisco, 45 Fed. 593, 13 L. R. A. 311, and note on police power. Levying license fee of $5 per month upon venders of fresh meats outside the public markets. Atkins v. Phil- lips, 26 Fla. 281, 8 So. 429, 10 L. R. A 158. Prohibiting keeping or storing of large quantities of inflammable or explosive oils within city limits. Rich- CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [voL, I mond v. Dudley, 129 Ind. 112, 28 N. E. 312, 13 L. R. A. 587, and note, 28 Am. St. 180. Requiring petition of two-thirds of land-owners of a block before permitting a saloon to be opened in it, if none has ever been in the block before. Martens v. People, 186 Ill. 314, 57 N. E. 871. Prohibiting picketing in labor controversies. — In re Williams, 158 Cal. 550, 111 Pace. 1035; Walters v. Indianapolis, 191 Ind. 671, 134 N. E. 482; Thomas ». Indianapolis, 195 Ind. 440, 145 N. E. 550, 35 A. L. R. 1194; Ez parte Stout, 82 Tex. Crim. Rep. 183, 198 S. W. 967, L. R. A. 1918 C, 277. Fixing a mini- mum wage for work done on public improvements. Malette v. Spokane, 77 Wash. 205, 137 Pac. 496, 51 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 686. The following have been held unrea- sonable, — Prohibiting putting up of steam-engine in city. Baltimore ». Redecke, 49 Md. 217, 33 Am. Rep. 239. Prohibiting one person carrying on a certain business and allowing another to carry on the same business. Hud- son v. Thorne, 7 Paige, 261; Tugman v. Chicago, 78 Ill. 405. Prohibiting laying of gas-pipes across the streets. Northern Liberties v. Gas Co., 12 Pa. St. 318. Levying tax for building a sidewalk in uninhabited portion of the city. Corrigan v. Gage, 68 Mo. 541. Prohibiting use of Babcock’s fire ex- tinguishers and imprisoning those who used them. Teutonia Ins. Co. ». O’Connor, 27 La. Ann. 371. Requir- ing every person entering his drain in a sewer to pay his share of the ex- pense of making such sewer. Boston v. Shaw, 1 Metc. 130. Refusing to supply water to certain premises. Dayton v. Quigley, 29 N. J. Eq. 77. Arresting free negroes found on street after 10 p.m. Mayor v. Winfield, 8 Humph. 707. Requiring druggist to furnish the names of parties to whom he sells liquors. Clinton v. Phillips, 58 Ill. 102, 11 Am. Rep. 52. Discrim- inating between dealers within and without the city. Nashville v. Al- thorp, 5 Cold. 554; Ex parte Frank, 52 Cal. 606, 28 Am. Rep. 642. Dis- criminating between railroads as to speed allowable under like circum- stances. Lake View v. Tate, 130 III.CHAP. VIII] a7. 22 IN. BH. (Ol. Forbidding all street parades with music except by permission. Matter of Frazee, 63 Mich. 396, 30 N. W. 72; Anderson v. Wellington, 40 Kan. 173, 19 Pac. 719; contra, Re Flaherty, 105 Cal. 558, 38 Pac. 981, 27 L. R. A. 529. Requiring a license for the doing of any scavenger work whatever. State v. Hill, 126 N. C. 1139, 36 S. E. 326, 50 L. R. A. 473. Prohibiting a saloon keeper, his clerks, agents, and employ- ees, from entering the saloon at any time during Sunday without written permission from mayor. Newbern v. McCann, 105 Tenn. 159, 58S. W. 114, 50 L. R. A. 476. Prohibiting any woman from going into a place where liquor is sold or standing within fifty feet of such place. Gastineau v. Com., 22 Ky. L. R. 157, 56 S. W. 705, 49 L. R. A. 111; for constitution- ality of discriminations against women in police regulations, see note to this ease in L. R. A. Prohibiting the use of colored nettings and similar mate- rials to cover fruits exposed for sale in baskets. Frost v. Chicago, 178 Il. 250, 52 N. E. 869, 49 L. R, A. 657, 69 Am. St. 301. Levying a wheel tax upon all vehicles used upon the streets. Chicago v. Collins, 175 Ll. 445, 51 N. E. 907, 49 L. R. A. 408, 67 Am. St. 224. Discriminating against depart- ment stores. Chicago v. Netcher, 183 Ill. 104, 55 N. E. 707, 48 L. R. A. 261, and see note to this case in L. R. A. upon discriminations against depart- ment stores. Requiring that city shall furnish materials and construct sewer connections up to within three feet of building to be connected. Slaughter v. O’Berry, 126 N. C. 181, 35 S. E. 241, 48 L. R. A. 442. Prohibit- ing suspending any sign whatever above a sidewalk. State v. Higgs, 126 N. C. 1014, 35S. E. 473, 48 L. R. A. 446. Prohibiting the receipt, from a carrier, of intoxicating liquors pur- chased beyond the city limits, until a license tax has been paid upon such liquors. Henderson »v. Heyward, 109 Ga. 373, 34S. E. 590, 47 L. R. A. 366, 77 Am. St. 384. Prohibiting the sale of clothing on Sunday, but permitting that of most other kinds of goods. Denver v. Bach, 26 Col. 530, 58 Pac. SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 429 1089, 46 L. R. A. 848. Imposing un- reasonable and discriminatory license fees upon draymen, hackmen, &c. State v. Finch, 78 Minn. 118, 80 N. W. 856, 46 L. R. A. 437. Requiring a license for business of contracting for public work. Figg v. Thompson, 20 Ky. L. 1322, 49 S. W. 202, 44 L. R. A. 135. Requiring punishment to be by imprisonment alone, instead of permit- ting payment of fine. Calhoun ». Little, 106 Ga. 336, 32 S. E. 86, 43 tT, R. A. 630. 71 Am: St; 2545) Pro- hibiting hackmen and draymen from stopping their vehicles on certain streets, except for purpose of receiving or delivering persons or goods. Ez parte Battis, 40 Tex. Cr. 112, 48 S. W. 513, 43 L. R. A. 863, 76 Am. St. 708. Prohibiting drummers, cabmen, hack- men, &c., from entering a passenger station to solicit custom. Cosgrove v. Augusta, 103 Ga. 835, 31 8S. BK. 445, 42 L. R. A. 711, 68 Am. St. 149. But see Lindsay v. Anniston, 104 Ala. 257, 16 So. 545, 53 Am. St. Rep. 44, 27 L. R. A. 436; Vann ». State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 434, 77 S. W. 813, 108 Am. St. Rep. 961. Prohibiting minors from being upon streets after 9 P.M. unless attended by guardians, or in search of physician. Ex parte McCarver, 38 Tex. Cr. 448, 46 S. W. 936, 42 L. R., A. 587. 73 Am. St. 946. Prohibiting during summer months sale of fresh pork, or sausage made thereof. Hel- ena v. Dwyer, 64 Ark. 424, 42 5S. Wi: 1071, 39 L. R. A. 266, 62 Am. St. 206. Declaring, without regard to time or place, the emission of dense black or thick gray smoke a nuisance. St. Louis v. Heitzeberg P. & P. Co., 141 Mo. 375, 42S. W. 954, 39 L. R. A. 551, 64 Am. St. 516; upon municipal con- trol over smoke as nuisance, see note to this case in L. R. A. Requiring street contractors to use asphaltum controlled by a monopoly. Fishburn v. Chicago, 171 Ill. 338, 49 N. E. 532, 39 L.R. A. 482, 63 Am. St. 236. Plac- ing harassing and arbitrary restrictions on. dealers in second-hand goods. State v. Itzcovitch, 49 La. Ann. 366, 21 So. 544, 37 L. R. A. 673, 62 Am. St. 648. See also Morton v. Macon, 111 Ga. 162, 36 S. E. 627. Prohibiting traffic in second-hand clothing, &c.430 State v. Taft, 118 N. C. 1190, 23S. E. 970, 32 L. R. A. 122, 54 Am. St. 768. Prohibiting a railroad company from fencing its grounds inside the city limits. Grossman »v. Oakland, 30 Oreg. 478, 41 Pac. 5, 36 L. R. A. 5938, 60 Am. St. 832. Prohibiting driving faster than six miles per hour when applied to fire engine. State v. Shep- pard, 64 Minn. 287, 67 N. W. 62, 36 L. R. A. 305. Unreasonable to restrict owner of dead animal to a particular spot outside of city in which to deposit same. Schoen Brothers v. Atlanta, 97 Ga. 697, 25 S. E. 380, 33 L. R. A. 804. Levying license fee of $10 per day on itinerant merchants. Carrol- ton v. Bazzette, 159 Ill. 284, 42 N. E. 837, 31 L. R. A. tequiring the laying of a cement sidewalk where, less than six months before, a duly authorized sidewalk of plank had been constructed and was yet sound and in good condition. Hawes ». Chicago, 158 Ill. 653, 42 N. E. 373, 30 L. R. A. 225. Prohibiting erection of any building or addition to building within city limits, except by permis- sion of building inspector. Sioux Falls v. Kirby, 6 S. D. 62, 60 N. W. 156, 25 L. R. A. 621. General welfare clause does not warrant an ordinance requiring inspection of steam boilers, &c. State v. Robertson, 45 La. Ann. 954, 13 So. 164, 20 L. R. A. 691,40 Am. St. 272. Requiring distance of bill- board from street line to be five feet greater than height of board. C ford v. Topeka, 51 Kan. 756, 33 Pa 476, 20 L. R. A. 692, 37 Am. St. 323. Requiring permission from a city offi- cer for street parades, but exempting from such requirement funerals, fire companies, State militia, and political parties having a State organization. Re Garrabad, 84 Wis. 585, 54 N. W. 1104, 19 L. R. A. 858, and note on ordinances relating to street parades. See also that ordinances vesting arbi- trary powers are void. Richmond ». Dudley, 129 Ind. 112, 28 N. E. 312, 13 L. R. A. 587, 28 Am. St. 180; but see Olympia v. Mann, 1 Wash. 389, 25 Pac. 330, 337, 12 L. R. A. 150, and note; Child v. Bemus, 71 R. I. 230, 21 At 589) 19/1, Re AU 57, Requiring 922. raw- P license fee of $25 per day from auc- CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I tioneers of imported goods. Re Sipe, 49 Ohio St. 536, 31 N. E. 884, 17 L. R. A. 184. Requiring license fee of non- resident peddlers. Sayre v. Phillips, 148 Pa. 482, 24 Atl. 76,16 L. R. A. 49, and note, 33 Am. St. 842. Prohibiting absolutely the making repairs to the amount of $300 or more upon any wooden building within specified limits. Mt. Vernon F. Nat. Bank v. Sarlls, 129 Ind. 201, 28 N. E. 434, 13 L. R. A. 481, and note. Prohibiting importation or sale of second-hand clothing unless owner first proves that it did not come from an infected region. Kosciusko v. Slomberg, 68 Miss. 469, 9 So. 297, 12 L. R. A. 528, 24 Am. St. 281. Permitting fine of $1,000 for visiting a disorderly house. Re Ah You, 88 Cal. 99, 25 Pac. 974, 11 L. R. A. 408, 22 Am. St. 280. Penalizing a mere private trespass. Bregguglia v, Lord, 53 N. J. L. 168, 20 Atl. 1082, 11 L. R. A. 407. Levying license tax upon agents of non-resident insurance companies, but not upon those of local companies. Simrall v. Covington, 90 Ky. 444, 14S. W. 369,9 L. R. A. 556, 29 Am. St. 398. Penalizing breach of contract with city. Newport »v. Newport & C. Bridge Co., 90 Ky. 193, 13S. W. 720, 8 L. R. A. 484. Making arbitrary distinctions. Lake View v. Tate, 130 Ill. 247, 22 N. EF. 791,6 L. R. A. 268. Requiring letting of public printing only to members of Allied Printing Trades Council. Atlanta v. Stein, 111 Ga. 789, 36S. E. 932, 51 L. R. A. 335. Fixing liquor license fee $300 higher for any place on main street than for any other place in town. Harrodsburg v. Renfro, 22 Ky. L. R. 806, 58 S. W. 795, 51 L. R. A. 897. Requiring six inch tires for loaded wagons weighing more than a ton and driven upon parkways. State v. Ro- hart, 83 Minn. 257, 86 N. W. 98, 333, 04 L. R. A. 947. Prohibiting getting off trains or boats at any point within the State at time of yellow fever out- break, as applied to passengers from a non-infected district (board of health rule). Wilson v. Alabama G. S. Ry. Co., 77 Miss. 714, 28 So. 567, 78 Am. St. 543. Restricting employment upon public works to members of labor unions. Fiske v. People, 188 Ill. 206,CHAP. VIII] SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 431 of trade, — like the by-law that no person shall exercise the art of painter in the city of London, not being free of the company of painters, — it will be void on this ground.’ It has been held that a by-law of a from a private corporation : To take an illustration bank, that all payments made or received by the bank must be examined at the time, and mistakes corrected before the dealer leaves, was unreasonable and invalid, and that a recovery might be had against the bank for an over-payment discovered afterwards, 58 N. E. 985. Requiring permit from municipal authorities to authorize keeping of domestic animals within city limits. Hagerstown ?. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., 107 Md. 178, 68 Atl. 490, 126 Am. St. Rep. 382. Prohibit- ing gasoline filling stations for auto- mobiles between designated points. Standard Oil Co. v. Kearney, 106 Neb. 558, 184 N. W. 109, 18 A. L. R. 95. Imposing an annual license fee of $50 for each wagon used for the purpose of delivering coal oil, gasoline, or other similar commodities. Waters- Pierce Oil Co. v. Hot Springs, 85 Ark. 509, 109 S. W. 293, 16 L. R. A. (N. s-) 1035. Permitting inspectors to re- quire coal in process of delivery, which has been weighed by public weigh- masters, to be taken to other scales for re-weighing. Chicago v. Kautz, 313 Ill. 196, 144 N. E. 805, 35 A. L. R. 1050. Requiring contractor install- ing heating system to file bond to in- demnify purchaser. Harrigan & Reid Co. v. Burton, 224 Mich. 564, 195 N. W. 60, 33 A. L. R. 142. Prohibiting the sale of Coca-cola Sunday, though made in connection with a meal. State v. Weddington, 188 N. C. 643, 125 S. E. 257, 37 A. L. RY, GYBY For other ordinances held void for unreasonableness, see Grand Lapids ». Newton, 111 Mich. 48, 69 N. W. 84, 66 Am. St. 387, 35 L. R. A. 226; Ottumwa ». Zekind, 95 lowa, 622, 64 N. W. 646, 58 Am. St. 447, 29 L. R. A. 734; Des Moines C. Ry. Co. »y. Des Moines, 90 Iowa, 770, 58 N. W. 906, 26 L. R. A. 767; Ex part Sing Lee, 96 Cal. 354, 31 Pac. 245, 31 Am. St. 218, 24 L. R. A. 195; Avis v. Vine- land, 55 N. J. L. 285, 26 Atl. 149, 23 L. R. A. 685; State v. Tenant, 110 N. C. 609, 148. E. 387, 28 Am. St. 715, 15 L. R. A. 423; Ex parte Vance, 42 on Tex. Cr. App. 619, 62S. W. 568; Mills vy. Missouri K. T. R. Co., 94 Tex. 242, 59 S. W. 874; Ex parte Patterson, 42 Tex. Cr. App. 256, 58S. W. 1011. 1 Clark v. Le Cren, 9 B. & CG. 52; Chamberlain of London v. Compton, 7 D. & R. 597. Compare Hayden »v. Noyes, 5 Conn. 391; Willard v. Kill- ingworth, 8 Conn. 247. But a by-law is not void, as in re- straint of trade, which requires loaves of bread baked for sale to be of speci- fied weight and properly stamped, or which requires bakers to be licensed. Mavor, &e. of Mobile v. Yuille, 3 Ala. 137. See Buffalo v. Webster, 10 Wend. 99. A by-law forbidding the mainte- nance of slaughter-houses within a city is not void as in restraint of trade. Cronin v. People, 82 N. Y. 318, 37 Am. Rep. 564; Ex part Heilbron, 65 Cal. 609, 4 Pac. 648 Meat sellers in one part of a city may not be allowed to s« ll from shops only, while in another they may sell from wagons also. St. Louis v Spiegel 90 Mo. 587, 2S. W. 839. Without special legislative authority a merchant who has paid his license tax cannot be obliged to keep a sales- book open to inspection Long v2. Taxing District, 7 Lea, 134. An ordinance is bad which forbids importing and dealing in cast-off gar- ments, but which excepts from its pro- visions the sale of such articles when not imported. Greensboro 0. Ehren- reich, 80 Ala. 579. Upon powers of ’ cities to regulate markets, see State v. Sarradat, 46 La. Ann. 700, 15 So. 87, 24 L. R. A. 584, and note, and further upon validity of statutes and ordinances upon the ground of reasonableness or unreason- ableness. See ante, p. 422, n. 5.432 notwithstanding the by-law." CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I So a by-law of a town, which, under pretense of regulating the fishery of clams and oysters within its limits, prohibits all persons except the inhabitants of the town from taking shell-fish in a navigable river, is void as in contravention of common right.?_ And for like reasons a by-law is void which abridges the rights and privileges conferred by the general laws of the State, unless express authority therefor can be pointed out in the corporate charter.® And a by-law which assumes to be a police regulation, but deprives a party of the use of his property without regard to the public good, under the pretense of the preservation of health, when it is manifest that such is not the object and purpose of the regula- tion, will be set aside as a clear and direct infringement of the right of property without any compensating advantages.* 1 Mechanics’ and Farmers’ Bank ». Smith, 19 Johns. 115; Gallatin »v. Bradford, 1 Bibb, 209. Although these are cases of private corporations, they are cited here because the rules governing the authority to make by- laws are the same with both classes of corporations. 2 Hayden v. Noyes, 5 Conn. 391. As it had been previously held that every person has a common-law right to fish in a navigable river or arm of the sea, until by some legal mode of appropriation this common right was extinguished (Peck v. Lockwood, 5 Day, 22), the by-law in effect deprived every citizen, except residents of the township, of rights which were vested, so far as from the nature of the case a right could be vested. See also Mari- etta v. Fearing, 4 Ohio, 427. That a right to regulate does not include a right to prohibit, see also Hx parte Bur- nett, 30 Ala. 461; Austin v. Murray, 16 Pick. 121; Portland v. Schmidt, 13 Oreg. 17; Bronson v. Oberlin, 41 Ohio St. 476. And see Milhau v. Sharp, 17 Barb. 435, 28 Barb. 228, and 27 N. Y. 611, and cases supra, p. 310 et seq. ’ Dunham v. Trustees of Rochester, 5 Cow. 462; Mayor, &c. of New York v. Nichols, 4 Hill, 209; St. Paul »v. Traeger, 25 Minn. 248, 33 Am. Rep. 462. See Strauss v. Pontiac, 40 Ill. 301; Mayor of Athens v. Georgia R. R. Co., 72 Ga. 800. An ordinance granting the exclusive privilege to take every animal which [And where a dies in a city without regard to its being a nuisance is void. River Rendering Co. v. Behr, 77 Mo. 91. Hacks cannot be permitted to stand permanently in a street so as to cut off access to adjoining premises. Brana- han v. Hotel Co., 39 Ohio St. 333. Unless by express authority, a wooden building put up contrary to an ordinance cannot be forfeited. Kneed- ler v. Norristown, 100 Pa. St. 368. Ordinance prohibiting barbers from working on Sunday, but not other shopkeepers, is void. Tacoma ». Krech, 15 Wash. 296, 46 Pac. 255, 34 L. R. A. 68. An ordinance, passed without ex- press legislative authority, which pro- vides that it shall be unlawful to erect a filling station, within a hundred feet of a residence, to be used in fur- nishing customers gasoline and oil for motor vehicles without the consent of the city commissioners, is an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of municipal authority, andisvoid. Julianv. Golden Rule Oil Co., 112 Kan. 671, 212 Pac. 884. See also Standard Oil Co. ». Kearney, 106 Neb. 558, 184 N. W. 109, 18 A. L. R. 95. 4 By a by-law of the town of Charles- town, all persons were prohibited, without license from the selectmen, from burying any dead body brought into town on any part of their own premises or elsewhere within the town. By the court, Wilde, J.: ‘“‘A by-law, to be valid, must be reasonable; it must be legi fidei rationi consona. Now ifCHAP. vii] SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 433 by-law, without express legislative authority, declares that to be a nuisance which is not so in fact, it is void! But the mere fact that this regulation or prohibition had been limited to the populous part of the town, and were made in good faith for the purpose of preserving the health of the inhabitants, which may be in some degree exposed to danger by the allow- ance of interments in the midst of a dense population, it would have been a very reasonable regulation. But it cannot be pretended that this by-law was made for the preservation of the health of the inhabitants. Its re- straints extend many miles into the country, to the utmost limits of the town. Now such an unnecessary re- straint upon the right of interring the dead we think essentially unreasonable. If Charlestown may lawfully make such a by-law as this, all the towns adjoining Boston may impose similar restraints, and consequently all those who die in Boston must of necessity be interred within the precincts of the city. That this would be prejudicial to the health of the inhabitants, es- pecially in the hot season of the year, and when epidemic diseases prevail, seems to be a well-established opinion. Interments, therefore, in cities and large populous towns, ought to be dis- countenanced, and no obstacles should be permitted to the establishment of cemeteries at suitable places in the vicinity. The by-law in question is therefore an unreasonable restraint upon many of the citizens of Boston, who are desirous of burying their dead without the city, and for that reason is void.” Austin v. Murray, 16 Pick. 121, 125. So in Wreford v. People, 14 Mich. 41, the common council of Detroit, under a power granted by statute to compel the owners and occupants of slaughter-houses to cleanse and abate them whenever necessary for the health of the inhabitants, assumed to pass an ordinance altogether prohibit- ing the slaughtering of animals within certain limits in the city; and it was held void. See further, State v. Jersey City, 29 N. J. L. 170. Power to control the erection of dwellings with reference to health does VOL. I— 28 not allow regulation of the thickness of outer walls. Hubbard v. Paterson, 45N. J. L. 310. Municipal by-laws may impose penalties on parties guilty of a viola- tion thereof, but they cannot impose forfeiture of property or rights, without express legislative authority. State v. Ferguson, 33 N. H. 424; Phillips ». Allen, 41 Pa. St. 481. Nor can munici- pal corporations, by their by-laws, take into their own hands the punish- ment of offenses against the general laws of the State. See Chariton ». Barber, 54 Iowa, 360, 6 N. W. 528, 37 Am. Rep. 209; Kirk v. Nowill, 1 T. R. 118; White v. Tallman, 26 N. J. L. 67; Hart ». Albany, 9 Wend. 571; Peoria v. Calhoun, 29 Ill. 317; St. Paul »v. Coulter, 12 Minn. 41. In Chicago, where there is both a city and a town organization, it has been held competent for both to re- quire those who carry on a noisome trade to take out a license. Chicago Packing, &c. Co. v. Chicago, 88 Il. 221, 30 Am. Rep. 545. Upon the whole subject of municipal by-laws, see Angell & Ames on Corp. c. 10; Grant on Corp. 76 et seq. See also Redfield on Railways (3d ed.), Vol. I. p. 88; Dillon, Mun. Corp. c. 12, The subject of the reasonableness of by- laws was considered at some length in People v. Medical Society of Erie, 24 Barb. 570, and Same v. Same, 32 Ni ye 187. See note to Ward v. Green- castle, 35 Am. Rep. 702. 1 Yates v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 497, 19 L. ed. 984; Arkadelphia v. Clark, 52 Ark. 23; Lonoke ». Chicago, etc., R. Co., 92 Ark. 546, 123 S. W. 395, 135 Am. St. Rep. 200; Denver ». Mullin, 7 Colo. 353, 3 Pac. 697; Denver ». Rogers, 46 Colo. 479, 104 Pac. 1042, 95 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 247; Black ». President, etc., of Town of Jackson- ville, 36 Ill. 301; Harmon v. Chicago, 110 Ill. 400, 51 Am. Rep. 698; Car- thage v. Munsell, 203 Ill. 474, 67 N. E. 831; Bushnell v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 259 Ill. 391, 102 N. E. 785, 49 Ty A (n. s.) 718; Cortland v. Larson, 278 Ill. 602, 113 N. E. 51, L. R. A. 1917 A,434 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. 1 a by-law forbids acts heretofore innocent and lawful affords no ground for holding it unreasonable.'] Delegation of Municipal Powers. Another and very important limitation which rests upon municipal powers is that they shall be executed by the municipality itself, or by such agencies or officers as the statute has pointed out. So far as its functions are legislative, they rest in the discretion and judg- ment of the municipal body intrusted with them, and that body cannot refer the exercise of the power to the discretion and judg- ment of its subordinates or of any other authority.? So strictly is 314, Ann. Cas. 1916 E, 775; Evans- ville v. Miller, 146 Ind. 613, 45 N. E. 1054, 38 L. R. A. 161; State ez rel. City of Indianapolis v. Indianapolis Union R. Co., 160 Ind. 45, 66 N. E. 163, 60 L. R. A. 831; Miller v. Syra- cuse, 168 Ind. 230, 80 N. E. 411, 120 Am. St. Rep. 366, 8 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 471; Indianapolis v. Miller, 168 Ind. 285, 80 N. E. 626, 8 L. R. A. (N. s.) 822; Everett v. Council Bluffs, 46 Iowa, 66; Boyd v. Board of Council- men, 117 Ky. 199, 77 S. W. 669, 111 Am. St. Rep. 240; New Orleans ». Lenfant, 126 La. 455, 52 So. 575, 29 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 642; Hagerstown »v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., 107 Md. 178, 68 Atl. 490, 126 Am. St. Rep. 382; St. Louis v. Regina Flour Mill Co., 141 Mo. 389, 42 S. W. 1148; Cross- man v. Galveston, 112 Tex. 303, 247 S. W. 810, 26 A. L. R. 1210. “It is a doctrine not to be tolerated in this country that a municipal cor- poration without any general laws, either of the city or the State, within which a given structure can be shown to be a nuisance, can, by its mere declaration that it is one, subject it to removal by any person supposed to be aggrieved, or even by the city itself. This would place every house, every business, and all the property of the city at the uncontrolled will of the temporary local authorities.”’ Yates v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 497, 19 L. ed. 984. Upon power of municipal corpora- tions to define, prevent, and abate nuisances, see note 36 L. R. A. 593. See also Orlando v. Pragg, 31 Fla. 111, 12 So. 368, 19 L. R. A. 196, and note, 34 Am. St. 17. ‘ Des Moines v. Manhattan Oil Co., 193 Iowa, 1096, 184 N. W. 823, 23 A. L. R. 1322: * A city council cannot delegate to any of its officers discretionary author- ity which is vested by statute or charter in it. People ex rel. Healy v. Clean Streets Co., 225 Ill. 470, 80 N. E. 298, 116 Am. St. Rep. 156, 9L. R. A. (Nn. 8.) 455. Power to prescribe width and other features of sidewalks cannot be dele- gated. McCrowell v. Bristol, 89 Va. 652, 16 S. E. 867, 20 L. R. A. 653. Nor can that to fix street-grade. Zabel v. Louisville B. O. Home, 92 Ky. 89, 17S. W. 212, 13 L. R. A. 668. Nor that to regulate liquor-selling. State v. Trenton, 51 N. J. L. 498, 18 Atl. 116, 5 L. R. A. 352. A municipal board of education cannot confer its powers involving the exercise of discretion on another, and therefore cannot authorize an agent to construct an addition to a school building giving the agent au- thority to determine the character, size, materials, and cost of the addi- tion. County Board of Education »v. Durham, 198 Ky. 733, 249 S. W. 1028. See also New Orleans v. Sanford, 137 La. 628, 69 So. 35, L. R. A. 1916 A, 1228. Butacouncil may by ordinance adopt a code compiled by a city attor- ney. Garrett v. Janes, 65 Md. 260, 3 Atl. 597; Western & A. R. R. Co. v. Young, 83 Ga. 512, 10S. E. 197. And @ person desiring to move a buildingCHAP. vii] SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 435 this rule applied, that when a city charter authorized the common council of the city to make directing any of the streets to be | &c., or for the altering or repairing the same, by-laws and ordinances ordering and yitched, leveled, paved, flagged, “~ithin such time and in such manner as they may prescribe under the superintendence and direction of the city superintendent’, and the common council passed an ordinance directing a certain street to be pitched, leveled, and flagged, “in such manner as the city superintendent, under the direction of the committee on roads of the direct and require’, the ordinance was held common council, shall void, because it left to the city superintendent and the committee of the common council the decision which, under the law, must be made by the council ‘tself. The trust was an important and delicate one, as the expenses of the improvement were, by the statute, to be of the property in front of which it was made. and taxation is the exercise of sovereign author- short of the most positive and explicit language power of taxation ; ity; and nothing paid by the owners It was in effect a could justify the court in holding that the legislature intended to confer such a power, or committee. language, but, on the confining the exercise or permit it to be conferred, on a city officer The statute in question not only contained no such contrary, clearly expressed the intention of of this power to the common council, the members of which were elected by and responsible to those whose property they were thus allowed to tax.’ through the streets may be required to obtain permission of mayor. Wilson v. Eureka City, 173 U.S. 32, 43 L. ed., 603; 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 317, site to Utah, 53, 48 Pac. 41, 150, 62 Am. St. 904. And it is not a delegation of legislative power to require that ‘no person shall, in or upon any of the public grounds, make any public address, .. . except in accordance with a permit from the mayor’’, but merely a casting of an administrative function upon the mayor. Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U. S. 43, 42 L. ed. 71, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 731, aff. 162 Mass. 510, 39 N. E. 113, 26 L. R. A. 712, 44 Am. St. 389. Making grant of privilege depend upon consent of majority of lot owners in the block in which the privilege is to be exercised is not a delegation of power. Chicago v. Stratton, 162 Ill. 494, 44 N. E. 853, 35 L. R. A. 84, 53 Am. St. 325; contra, St. Louis v. Russell, 116 Mo. 248, 22 8. W. 470, 20 L. R. A. 721, and note on delegation of municipal power. But authority to keep a private market conditioned upon the grantee obtaining the con- sent of a majority of the property owners in the neighborhood has been held to be an invalid delegation of power. State v. Garibaldi, 44 La. Ann. 809, 11 So. 36. Compare New Orleans v. Smythe, 116 La. 686, 41 So. 33. 1 Thompson v. Schermerhorn, 6 N. Y. 92. See also Smith ». Morse, 2 Cal. 524; Oakland v. Carpentier, 13 Cal. 540; Whyte v. Nashville, 2 Swan, 364; East St. Louis ». Wehrung, 50 Ill. 28; Ruggles v. Collier, 43 Mo. 353; State v. Jersey City, 25 N. J. L. 309; Hydes v. Joyes, 4 Bush, 464; Lyon »v. Jerome, 26 Wend. 485; State v. Pater- son, 34 N. J. L. 163, 168; State v. Fiske, 9R. I. 94; Kinmundy ». Mahan, 72 Ill. 462; Davis v. Reed, 65 Nv 566);436 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. 1 This restriction, it will be perceived, is the same which rests upon the legislative power of the State, and it springs from the same reasons. The people in the one case in creating the legislative department, and the legislature in the other in conferring the cor- porate powers, have selected the depositary of the power which they have designed should be exercised, and in confiding it to such depositary have impliedly prohibited its being exercised by any other agency. A trust created for any public purpose cannot be assignable at the will of the trustee.! Irrepealable Legislation. Equally incumbent upon the State legislature and these municipal bodies is the restriction that they shall adopt no irrepealable legis- lation. No legislative body can so part with its powers by any proceeding as not to be able to continue the exercise of them. It can and should exercise them again and again, as often as the publie Supervisors of Jackson v. Brush, 77 Ill. 59; Thomson v. Booneville, 61 Mo. 282; In re Quong Woo, 13 Fed. 229; Cornell v. State, 6 Lea, 624; Benjamin v. Webster, 100 Ind. 15; Minneapolis Gaslight Co. v. Minne- apolis, 36 Minn. 159, 30 N. W. 450; Dillon, Mun. Corp. § 60. Compare In re Guerrero, 69 Cal. 88, 10 Pac. 261. 1The charter of Washington gave the corporation authority “to author- ize the drawing of lotteries, for effect- ing any important improvement in the city, which the ordinary funds or revenue thereof will not accomplish; provided that the amount raised in each year shall not exceed ten thou- sand dollars. And provided also that the object for which the money is in- tended to be raised shall be first submitted to the President of the United States, and shall be approved by him.”” Marshall, Ch. J., speaking of this authority, says: “There is great weight in the argument that it is a trust, and an important trust, con- fided to the corporation itself, for the purpose of effecting important im- provements in the city, and ought, therefore, to be executed under the immediate authority and inspection of the corporation. It is reasonable to suppose that Congress, when grant- ing a power to authorize gaming, would feel some solicitude respecting the fair- ness with which the power should be used, and would take as many pre- cautions against its abuse as was compatible with its beneficial exercise. Accordingly, we find a limitation upon the amount to be raised, and on the object for which the lottery may be authorized. It is to be for any im- portant improvement in the city, which the ordinary funds or revenue thereof will not accomplish; and is subjected to the judgment of the President of the United States. The power thus cautiously granted is de- posited with the corporation itself, without an indication that it is assign- able. It is to be exercised, like other corporate powers, by the agents of the corporation under its control. While it remains where Congress has placed it, the character of the corpora- tion affords some security against its abuse, — some security that no other mischief will result from it than is inseparable from the thing itself. But if the management, control, and responsibility may be transferred to any adventurer who will purchase, all the security for fairness which is fur- nished by character and responsibility is lost.” Clark v. Washington, 12 Wheat. 40, 54, 6 L. ed. 544, 549.CHAP. VIII| interests require.’ control ground it tion, for the purposes SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT and embarrass its legislative powers has been held, that a grant of land by a municipal corpora- of a cemetery, with a covenant for quiet 437 Such a body has no power, even by contract, to On this and duties.’ enjoyment by the grantee, could not preclude the corporation, in the exercise of its police powers, from prohibiting any further use of the land for cemetery purposes, when the advance of population threatened to make such use a public nuisance.° 1 Rast Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Co., 10 How. 511; Dillon, Mun. Corp. § 61. 2Georgia R. etc., Co. v. Railroad Commission, 149 Ga. 1, 98S. E. 696, 5 A. L. R. 1; Westminster Water Co. v. Westminster, 98 Md. 551, 56 Atl. 990, 103 Am. St. Rep. 424, 64 mR. A. 630; Brick Presbyterian Church v. Mayor, etc., of New York, 5 Cow. 538; Le Feber v. West Allis, 119 Wis. 608, 97 N. W. 203, 100 Am. St. Rep. 917. A contract by a city, by which the police power is attempted to be for- ever abdicated, is ultra vires and void. State ex rel. Minneapolis v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 98 Minn. 380, 108 N. W. 261, 120 Am. St. Rep. 581, 28 L. R. A. (x. s.) 398, 8 Ann. Cas. 1047. The exercise of the police power in the interest of public health and safety is to be maintained unhampered by contracts in private interests, and un- compensated obedience to laws passed in its exercise is not violative of prop- erty rights protected by the Federal Constitution. New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Drainage Commission, 197 U.S. 453, 49 L. ed. 831, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 471; Chicago, etc. R. Co. »v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 561, 50 L. ed. 596, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 341; Union Bridge Co. v. 204 U.S. 364, 51 L. ed. 523, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 367; Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Minnesota, 208 U.S. 583, 52 L. ed. 630, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 341. But in a Georgia case the court said: “We readily assent to the propo- sition that the regulation of passenger tariffs, the fixing of fares upon street as well as upon steam rail- ways, is a matter falling within the police power, and that neither the legislature of the State nor the legis- United States, railways, So when “a lot is lative body of any municipality can, by ordinances or contracts, abridge the exercise of the police power of the State. but we do not think that in all eases and in reference to every sub- ject which might fall within the police power of the State it is incompe- tent for a municipality or other cor- poration to make a contract in refer- ence to such subject-matter, where the State has not seen fit to exercise the police power in reference thereto.’’ Georgia R., etc., Co. v. Railroad Com- mission, 149 Ga. 1, 98 S. E. 696, 5 A, re Re 1: Permission to build out over and under a sidewalk is a mere revocable license. Winter v. City Council, 83 Ala. 589, 3 So. 235. So with awnings. Augusta v. Burum, 93 Ga. 68, 19S. E. 820, 26 L. R. A. 340, and note, on right to maintain awnings in streets. But after telephone poles have been erected by a company in certain streets desig- nated by the city, it cannot revoke the designation at its mere will. Hud- son Tel. Co. v. Jersey City, 49 N. J. L. 303, 8 Atl. 123. A city which has been authorized to provide for the erection and main- tenance of waterworks, and to that end to contract with parties to build and operate them, may, 1n exercising this power, exclude itself from con- structing and operating waterworks for a period of years. Vicksburg ». Vicksburg Waterworks Co., 202 U. S. 453, 50 L. ed. 1102, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 660, 6 Ann. Cas. 253. See also Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U.S. 1, 43 L. ed. 341, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. ae 3 Brick Presbyterian Church ». City of New York, 5 Cow. 538; Coast v. Mayor, etc., of New York, 7 Cow. 585;438 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I granted as a place of deposit for gunpowder, or other purpose inno- cent in itself at the time; it is devoted to that purpose till, in the progress of population, it becomes dangerous to the property, the safety, or the lives of hundreds; it cannot be that the mere form of the grant, because the parties choose to make it particular instead of general and absolute, should prevent the use to which it is limited being regarded and treated as a nuisance, when it becomes so in fact. In this way the legislative powers essential to the comfort and preser- vation of populous communities might be frittered away into perfect insignificance. To allow rights thus to be parceled out and secured beyond control would fix a principle by which our cities and villages might be broken up. Nuisances might and undoubtedly would be multiplied to an intolerable extent.’ 1 And on the same ground it is held that a municipal corporation, having power to establish, make, grade, and improve streets, does not, by once establishing the grade, preclude itself from changing it as the public needs or interest may seem to require, notwith- standing the incidental injury which must result to those individuals who have erected buildings with reference to the first grade.2 Soa New York v. Second Avenue R. R. Co., 32 N. Y. 261. Compare Kincaid’s Appeal, 66 Pa. St. 411, 5 Am. Rep. 377. ' Coats v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 7 Cow. 585; Davenport v. Richmond, 81 Va. 636. See also Davis v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 14 N. Y. 506; Attorney-General v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 3 Duer, 119; State »v. Graves, 19 Md. 351; Goszler ». Georgetown, 6 Wheat. 593, 5 L. ed. 339; Louisville City R. R. Co. »v. Louisville, 8 Bush, 415. ? Callendar v. Marsh, 1 Pick. 417; Griggs v. Foote, 4 Allen, 195; Graves v. Otis, 2 Hill, 466; Green v. Reading, 9 Watts, 382, 36 Am. Dec. IAA O’Connor v. Pittsburg, 18 Pa. St. 187; Reading v. Keppleman, 61 Pa. St. 233 ; Skinner v. Hartford Bridge Co., 29 Conn. 523; Fellows v. New Haven, 44 Conn. 240, 26 Am. Rep. 447; La Fayette v. Bush, 19 Ind. 326: La Fayette v. Fowler, 34 Ind. 140; Creal v. Keokuk, 4 Greene (Iowa), 47 ; Hen- dershott v. Ottumwa, 46 Iowa, 658; Murphy ». Chicago, 29 Ill. 279; Quincy »v. Jones, 76 Ill. 231; Rounds ». Mumford, 2 R. I. 154; Rome v. Om- berg, 28 Ga. 46; Roll »v. Augusta, 34 Ga. 326; Macon ». Hill, 58 Ga. 595; Reynolds v. Shreveport, 13 La. Ann. 426; White v. Yazoo City, 27 Miss. 357; Humes v. Mayor, &c., 1 Humph. 403; St. Louis v. Gurno, 12 Mo. 414; Taylor v. St. Louis, 14 Mo. 20; Schatt- ner v. Kansas City, 35 Mo. 162; Keasy v. Louisville, 4 Dana, 154, 29 Am. Dec. 395; Blount v. Janesville, 31 Wis. 648; Nevins v. Peoria, 41 Ill. 502; Shawneetown v. Mason, 82 IIl. 337; Weymann »v. Jefferson, 61 Mo. 55, Compare Louisville v. Rolling Mill Co., 3 Bush, 416; Denver v. Vernia, 8 Col. 399, 8 Pac. 656. No legal damage is done by estab- lishing a grade where none had existed. Gardiner v. Johnston, 16 R. I. 94, 12 Atl. 888. A city having power to grade and level streets is not in the absence of a constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary, liable for consequential damages to persons whose lands are not taken. Radcliff’s Ex’rs v. Brook- lyn, 4N. Y. 195; Smith v. Washington, 20 How. 135, 15 L. ed. 858; Snyder »v. Rockport, 6 Ind. 237; Pontiac »v. Carter, 82 Mich. 164; Cole v. Mus- catine, 14 Iowa, 296; Russell v. Bur- lington, 30 Iowa, 262; Burlington v.CHAP. VIII| Gilbert, 31 Iowa, 356; Roberts »v. Chicago, 26 Ill. 249; Delphi v. Evans, 36 Ind. 90; Simmons v. Camden, 26 Ark. 276; 7 Am. Rep. 620; Dor- man v. Jacksonville, 13 Fla. 538, 7 Am. Rep. 253; Dore v. Milwaukee, 42 Wis. 108; Lee v. Minneapolis, 22 Minn. 13; Lynch v. New York, 76 N. Y. 60; Cheever v. Shedd, 13 Blatch. 258; Mead »v. Portland, 200 U.S. 148, 50 L. ed. 413, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 171; Ettor v. Tacoma, 228 U. S. 148, 57 i, ed. 773, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep: 423; Gonzales v. Pensacola, 65 Fla. 241, 61 So. 503, Ann. Cas. 1915 C, 1290; Valparaiso v. Spaeth, 166 Ind. 14, 76 N. E. 514, 8 Ann. Cas. 1021; Morris v. Indianapolis, 177 Ind. 369, 94 N. E. 705, Ann. Cas. 1915 A, 65; Crane ». Harrison, 40 Idaho, 229, 232 Pac. 578, 38 A.L.R.15; Talcott v. Des Moines, 134 Iowa, 113, 109 N. W. 311, 120 Am. St. Rep. 419, 12 L. R. A. (. s.) 696; Criesa v. Des Moines, 158 Iowa, 343, 138 N. W. 922, 48 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 899; Howell v. New York, etc., R. Co., 221 Mass. 169, 108 N. E. 934, L. R. A. 1917 C, 1131; Austin v. Detroit, etc., Ry., 134 Mich. 149, 96 N. W. 35, 2 Ann. Cas. 530; Stocking v. Lincoln, 93 Neb. 798, 142 N. W. 104, 46 L. R. A. (Nn. 8.) 107; Sauer v. New York, 180 N. Y. 27, 72 N. E. 579, 70 L. R. A. 717; Bennett v. Winston-Salem Southbound R. Co., 170 N. C. 389, 87 S. E. 133, L. R. A. 1916 D, 1074; Mayrant v. Columbia, 77 8. C. 281, 57 S. E. 857, 10 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 1094; Kimball v. Salt Lake City, 32 Utah, 253, 90 Pac. 395, 125 Am. St. Rep. 859, 10 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 483; Spokane ». Ladies’ Benev. Soc., 83 Wash. 382, 145 Pac. 443, Ann. Cas. 1916 E, 367. The law would seem to be otherwise de- clared in Ohio. See Rhodes v. Cincin- nati, 10 Ohio, 160; McCombs ». Akron, 15 Ohio, 474; s. c. 18 Ohio, 229; Crawford v. Delaware, 7 Ohio St. 459; Akron v. Chamberlain Co., 34 Ohio St. 328, 32 Am. Rep. 367; Cohen v. Cleveland, 43 Ohio St. 190. See also Nashville v. Nichol, 59 Tenn. 338. It is also otherwise in Illinois under its present Constitution. Elgin v. Eaton, 83 Ill. 5835; Rigney v. Chicago, 102 Ill. 64. In Alabama not every change in grade gives ground for recovery. SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 439 Montgomery v. 489. Under constitutions which provide that private property shall not be damaged for public use without just compensation, or which contain pro- visions of a similar import, a recovery may be had for damages resulting from the grading, or from a change in the grade, of a street or highway. Reardon v. San Francisco, 66 Cal. 492, 6 Pac. 317; Moore v. Atlanta, 70 Ga. 611; Sallden v. Little Falls, 102 Minn. 358, 113 N. W. 884, 120 Am. St. Rep. 635, 13 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 790; Wallen- berg v. Minneapolis, 111 Minn. 471, 127 N. W. 422, 856, 20 Ann. Cas. 873; Harman v. Omaha, 17 Neb. 548, 23 N. W. 503; Stocking v. Lincoln, 93 Neb. 798, 142 N. W. 104, 46 L. R. A. (x. s.) 107; Edwards v. Thrash, 26 Okla. 472, 109 Pac. 832, 138 Am. St. Rep. 975; Kimball v. Salt Lake City, 32 Utah, 253, 90 Pac. 395, 125 Am. St. Rep. 859, 10 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 483; Webber v. Salt Lake City, 40 Utah, 221, 120 Pac. 503, 37 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 1115; Hinkley v. Seattle, 74 Wash. 101, 132 Pac. 855, 46 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 727, Ann. Cas. 1915 A, 580; Crowe v. Charlestown, 62 W. Va. 91, 57 S. E. 330, 18 Ann. Cas. 1110; Kunst ». Grafton, 67 W. Va. 20, 67S. E. 74, 26 L. R. A. (N. Ss.) 1201; Ray v. Hun- tington, 81 W. Va. 607, 95S. E. 23, L. R. A. 1918 D, 931. By statute in a number of the States a recovery may be had for an injury to private property resulting from the grading, or a change in the grade, of a street or highway. Ettor v. Tacoma, 228 U. S. 148, 57 L. ed. 773, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 428; Griswold ». Guilford, 75 Conn. 192, 52 Atl. 742; Gorham »v. New Haven, 76 Conn. 192, 58 Atl. 1; Hyde v. Fall River, 189 Mass. 439, 75 INE he 953; 2. L. Re A (Nts) 269; Ackerman v. Nutley, 70 N. J. L. 438, 57 Atl. 150; Smith v. Boston, etc., R. Co,, 181 N. Y. 132, 73 N. E. 679; In re Borup, 182 N. Y. 222, 74 N. E. 838, 108 Am. St. Rep. 796; In re Grade Crossing Commissioners, 207 N. Y. 52; 100 N. E. 714, Ann. Cas. 1914 C, 271; Scranton Gas, etc., Co v. Scranton, 214 Pa. St. 586, 64 Atl. 84,6 L. R. A. (n. s.) 1033, 6 Ann. Cas. 388; Kimball Townsend, 80 Ala.440 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I corporation having power under the charter to establish and regu- late streets cannot under this authority, without explicit legislative consent, permit individuals to lay down a railway in one of its streets, and confer privileges exclusive in their character and designed to be perpetual in duration.’ v. Salt Lake City, 32 Utah, 253, 90 Pac. 395, 125 Am. St. Rep. 859, 10 L. R. A. (wv. s.) 483. By statute in Indiana a grade causing special injury and dam- age warrants a recovery. Lafayette v. Nagle, 113 Ind. 425, 15 N. E. 1. The Iowa statute is similar. Phillips v. Council Bluffs, 63 Iowa, 576, 19 N. W. 672; Millard v. Webster City, 113 Iowa, 220, 84 N. W. 1044; Rich- ardson v. Webster City, 111 Iowa, 427, 82 N. W. 920. Compare Alexander v. Milwaukee, 16 Wis. 247. City liable in Kansas. Leavenworth v. Duffy, 63 Kan. 884, 62 Pac. 433. Courts will not undertake to control municipal discretion in the matter of improving streets. Dunham v. Hyde Park, 75 Ill. 371; Brush v. Carbondale, 78 Ill. 74. The owner of a lot on a city street acquires no prescriptive right to collat- eral support for his buildings which can render the city liable for injuries caused by grading the street. Mitch- ell v. Rome, 49 Ga. 19, 15 Am. Rep. 669; Quincy v. Jones, 76 Ill. 231, 20 Am. Rep. 248. Contra, Nichols »v. Duluth, 40 Minn. 389, 42 N. W. 84. But the failure to use due care and prudence in grading may render the city liable. Bloomington v. Brokaw, 77 Ill. 194. 1Nor can it contract away the power of the State to oust the corpora- tion grantee from its privileges. State v. Kast Fifth St. Ry. Co., 140 Mo. 539, 41 S. W. 955, 38 L. R. A. 218, 62 Am. St. 742. Ordinance giving right to lay double tracks may be repealed. Lake Roland El. R. Co. v. Baltimore, (7 Md. 352, 26 Atl. 510, 20 L. R. A. 126. For other cases denying power change of to make exclusive grants, see Detroit Citizens’ S. R. Co. v. Detroit, 110 Mich. 384, 68 N. W. 304, 35 L. R. A. 859, 64 Am. St. 350; Vincennes v. Citizens’ Gas L. & C. Co., 132 Ind. 114, 31N. EB. 573, 16 L. R. A. 485; Altgelt v. San In a case where this was attempted, it has Antonio, 81 Tex. 436, 17S. W. 75, 13 L. R. A, 383, and note; Syracuse W. Co. v. Syracuse, 116 N. Y. 167, 22 N. EB. 381, 5 L. R. A. 546. Even where a company has a right, under a contract, to place electric wires beneath the surface of the streets, the right is subject to such reasonable regulations as the city deems best to make for the public safety and con- venience. Missouri ». Murphy, 170 U.S. 78, 42 L. ed. 955, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 505, aff. 130 Mo. 10, 31S. W. 594, 31 L. R. A. 798. Upon power of city to allow subway under street for wires, State v. Murphy, 134 Mo. 548, 358. W. 1132, 56 Am. St. 515, 34 L. R. A. 369, and note; also note to State v. Murphy, 31 L. R. A. 798. Duty to keep streets safe: West. U. Tel. Co. v. State, 82 Md. 293, 33 Atl. 763, 51 Am. St. 464, 31 L. R. A. 572, and note. An ordinance authorizing a railroad company to build bridges of a certain pattern over its roadway, and pro- viding that the beginning to erect such bridges should be deemed an acceptance of the terms of the ordi- nance, and a supersession of all con- tracts existing prior thereto, did not give rise to a contract, but was a mere license, revocable at any time. Wa- bash R. Co. v. Defiance, 167 U. S. 88, 42 L. ed. 87, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 748, aff. 52 Ohio St. 262, 40 N. E. 89. Upon liability for cost of changing grade at railroad crossing, see Kelly v. Minneapolis, 57 Minn. 294, 59 N. W. 304, 26 L. R. A. 92, and note, 47 Am. St. 605. Upon right to regulate the placing and use of telegraph, telephone, and other electric wires in and above streets, see St. Louis v. Western U. Tel. Co., 148 U.S. 92, 37 L. ed. 380, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 485. City cannot authorize the erection in its streets of what amounts to a private nuisance. Chicago G. W. R. Co. v. First M. E. Church, 42 C. C.CHAP. VIII] SEVERAL Ae 178, 102) Fed: 85, 50 b. R. A. 488; Baltimore & P. R. Co. v. Fifth Bapt. Church, 108 U. S. 317, 27 L. ed. 739, 2Sup. Ct. Rep. 719. City cannot levy a wheel tax upon all vehicles used on streets, where the property has already been assessed for taxation under the general property tax. Chi- cago v. Collins, 175 Ill. 445, 51 N. E. 907, 49 L. R. A. 408, 67 Am. St. 224. See also Davis v. Petrinovich, 112 Ala. 654, 21 So. 344, 36 L. R. A. 615. Where a city is bound to maintain sidewalks upon its streets in a safe condition, the obligation extends to boulevards also, even though they are primarily under the control of park and boulevard commissioners. Bur- ridge v. Detroit, 117 Mich. 557, 76 N. W. 84, 42 L. R. A. 684, 72 Am. St. 582. A street may be set apart for use exclusively as a pleasure driveway, and heavily loaded vehicles excluded from it. Cicero Lumber Co. v. Cicero, 176 Ill. 9, 51 N. E. 758, 42 L. R. A. Upon municipal power over nui- sances affecting highways and waters, see Hagerstown v. Witmer, 86 Md. 293, 37 Atl. 965, 39 L. R. A. 649, and note; over nuisances in highways caused by street railroads and other electrical companies, note to 39 L. R. A. 609. City cannot arbitrarily tear up and remove a track which has been laid under permission granted by valid ordinance. Some notice and oppor- tunity to be heard must first be given. Cape May v. Cape M., Del. Bay & S. P. R. Co., 60 N. J. L. 224, 37 Atl. 892, 39 L. R. A. 609. Upon regula- tion of speed of vehicles in streets, see note 36 L. R. A. 305. Reasonable license fees may be exacted for use of streets by vehicles, and fact that vehicles are owned out- side city and only occasionally used within it is immaterial. Tomlinson ». Indianapolis, 144 Ind. 142, 43 N. E. 9, 36 L. R. A. 413, and note; Mason v. Cumberland, 92 Md. 451, 48 Atl. 136 Fenders may be required on street cars. State v. Cape May, 59 N. J. L. 396, 36 Atl. 696, 36 L. R. A.653. And speed of street cars may be regulated. GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 44] Ibid., 59 N. J. L. 393, 36 Atl. 679, 36 L. R. A. 656. Cars may be required to stop before crossing streets. Jbid., 59 N. J. L. 404, 36 Atl. 678, 36 L. R. A. 657. Railroad cannot under general power to regulate streets be compelled to erect gates and keep watchman at crossing. Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Crown Point, 146 Ind. 421, 45 N. E. 587, 35 L. R. A. 684. City cannot divest itself of power to regulate use of streets. State v. Mur- phy, 134 Mo. 548, 35 S. W. 1142, 34 Il RR. A; 369° 56) Am: St. 515>) and that the municipality holds streets, parks, and the like in trust for the public, see St. Paul v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 63 Minn. 330, 63 N. W. 267, 65 N. W. 649, 68 N. W. 458, 34 L. R. A. 184. See also Columbus Gas Light and Coke Co. v. Columbus, 50 Ohio St., 65, 33 N. E. 292, 40 Am. St. 648, 19 L. R. A. 510. On power to regulate use of streets by electric com- panies, see State v. Murphy, 130 Mo. 10, 31 S.W. 594, 31 L. R. A. 798, and note in L. R. A. Rights of owners of abutting prop- erty to access and to light and air can- not be materially impeded. Block v. Salt Lake R. T. Co., 9 Utah, 31, 33 Pac. 229, 24 L. R. A. 610; Lockwood v. Wabash R. Co., 122 Mo. 86, 26 S. W. 698, 24 L. R. A. 516, 43 Am. St 547; Schopp v. St. Louis, 117 Mo. 131, 22 S. W. 898, 20 L. R. A. 783; Moose ». Carson, 104 N. C. 431, 10S. E. 689, 7 L. R. A. 548, and note, 17 Am. St. 681; Gargan v. Louisville, N. A. & @ERE Go. 89 Ky, 212) 12°55 Weazpd: 6 L. R. A. 340. Residents may be re- quired to keep the sidewalks in front of their premises free from snow and ice. Carthage v. Frederick, 122 N. Y. 268, 25 N. E. 480, 10 L. R. A. 178, and note, 19 Am. St. 490. Contractor cannot be granted right to place boxes upon streets and use them for posting bills, even though they are made and maintained without cost to city, and according to specifications of board of public improvements, and designed specially for the reception of litter and refuse that would otherwise be cast into the streets. State v. St. Louis, 161 Mo. 371, 61S. W. 658. For other cases upon regulation of442 cr been said by the court : control and regulate the use of the streets of the city. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [voL. I The corporation has the exclusive right to In this respect it is endowed with legislative sovereignty. The exercise of that sovereignty has no limit, so long as it is within the objects and trusts for which the power is conferred. An ordinance regulating a street is a legislative act, entirely beyond the control of the judicial power of the State. act. But the resolution in question is not such an Though it relates to a street, and very materially affects the mode in which that street is to be used, yet in its essential features it is a contract. to be perpetual in their duration are conferred. Privileges exclusive in their nature and designed Instead of regu- lating the use of the street, the use itself to the extent specified in the resolution is granted to the associates. For what has been deemed an adequate consideration, the corporation has assumed to surrender a portion of their municipal authority, and has in legal effect agreed with the defendants that, so far as they may have occasion to use the street for the purpose of constructing and operat- ing their railroad, the right to regulate and control the use of that street shall not be exercised. . . . It cannot be that powers vested in the corporation as an important public trust can thus be frittered away, or parcelled out to individuals or joint-stock associations, and secured to them beyond control.”’ ! streets, see Argentine v. Atchison T. &S. F. Ry. Co., 55 Kan. 730, 41 Pac. 946, 30 L. R. A. 255; Mt. Carmel »v. Shaw, 155 Ill. 37, 39 N. BE. 584, 27 L. R. A. 580; Indianapolis v. Con- sumers’ Gas Co., 140 Ind. 107, 39 N. BH. 433, 49 Am. St. 183, 27 L. R. A. 514; Tate v. Greensboro, 114 N. C. B92n LO Ss He (Oteaia EU. CAC 671: Savage v. Salem, 23 Oreg. 381, 31 Pac. 832, 37 Am. St. 688, 24 L. R. A. 787; New Haven v. New Haven & D. Ry. Co., 62 Conn. 252, 25 Atl. 316, 18 L. R. A. 256; People v. Ft. Wayne & E. Ry. Co., 92 Mich. 522, 52 N. W. 1010, 16 L. R. A. 752; Chase v. Osh- kosh, 81 Wis. 318, 51 N. W. 560, 29 Am. St. 898, 15 L. R. A. 553, and note (shade trees); American R. Tel. Co. v, Hess, 125 N. Y. 641, 26 N. E. 919, 21 Am. St. 764, 13 L. R. A. 454; State v. Trenton, 53 N. J. L. 182, 20 Atl. 1076, 11 L. R. A. 410; note to 8 L. R. A. 828. 1Milhau v. Sharp, 17 Barb. 485, 8. Cc. 28 Barb. 228, and 27 N. Y. 611; Birmingham, &c. St. Ry. Co. v. Bir- mingham St. Ry. Co., 79 Ala. 465; Nash v. Lowry, 37 Minn. 261; Jack- son, &c. R. Co. v. Interstate, &c. Co., 24 Fed. 306. See also Davis v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 14 N. Y. 506; State v. Mayor, &c., 3 Duer, 119; State v. Graves, 19 Md. 351; Detroit Citizens’ Street R. Co. ». Detroit Ry., 171 U.S. 48, 43 L. ed. 67, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 732; Montgomery First Nat. Bank v. Tyson, 133 Ala. 459, 32 So. 144, 91 Am. St. Rep. 46, 59 L. R. A. 399; Ft. Smith v. Hunt, 72 Ark. 556, 82'S. W. 163, 105 Am. St. Rep. 51, 66 L. R. A. 238; Augusta v. Reynolds, 122 Ga. 754, 50 S. E. 998, 106 Am. St. Rep. 147, 67 L. R. A. 564; People v. Harris, 203 Ill. 272, 67 N. E. 785, 96 Am. St. Rep. 304; People v. Clean St. Co., 225 Ill. 470, 80 N. E. 298, 116 Am. St. Rep. 156, 9L.R. A. (Nn. s.) 455; Sears v. Chicago, 247 Ill. 204, 93 N. E. 158, 139 Am. St. Rep. 319, 20 Ann. Cas. 539; Vandalia R. Co. v. State, 166 Ind. 219, 76 N. E. 980, 117 Am. St. Rep. 370; Lacey »v. Oskaloosa, 143 Iowa, 704, 121 N. W.CHAP. VIII] SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 443 So, it has been held that the city of Philadelphia exercised a por- tion of the public right of eminent domain in respect to the streets within its limits, subject only to the higher control of the State and the use of the people; and therefore 542, 31 L. R. A. (N. s.) 853; Braner ». Baltimore Refrigerating, etc., Co., 99 Md. 367, 58 Atl. 21, 105 Am. St. Rep. 304, 66 L. R. A. 403; Com. »v. Morrison, 197 Mass. 199, 83 N. E. 415, 125 Am. St. Rep. 338, 14 L. R. A. (x. s.) 194; Peters v. St. Louis, 226 Mo. 62, 125 S. W. 1134, 21 Ann. Cas. 1069; Chapman v. Lincoln, 84 Neb. 534, 121 N. W. 596, 25 L. R. A. (nv. s.) 400; Cereghino v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 26 Utah, 467, 73 Pac. 634, 99 Am. St. Rep. 843; Davis v. Spragg, 72, W. Va. 672, 79 S. E. 652, 48 L. R. A. (x. s.) 173; Tilly v. Mitchell, etc., Go., 121 Wis. 1, 98 N. W. 969, 105 Am. St. Rep. 1007. Compare Chi- cago, ete., R:. Co: v. People, 73 Ill. 541. Upon municipal power to impose conditions in granting right to street railway to occupy streets, &c., Galveston & W. R. Co. v. Galveston, 90 Tex. 398, 39 S. W. 96, 36 Re AS 33, and note; rights of street railways to use streets, People v. Newton, 112 N. Y. 396, 19 N. E. 831, 3 L. R. A. 174, and note; Adams v. Chicago, B. &N.R.Co., 39 Minn. 286, 39 N. W. 629, 1L. R. A. 493, and note, 12 Am. St. 644; upon general relations be- tween street railways and municipali- ties, note to 43 L. ed. U.S. 67. Right to lay tracks is subject to regulation by subsequent ordinance. Baltimore v. Baltimore Tr. & G. Co., 166 U. 8. 673, 41 L. ed. 1160, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 696. See also Clarksburg El. L. Co. v. Clarksburg, 47 W. Va. 739, 35 8. E. 994, 50 L. R. A. 142; Cleveland »v. Augusta, 102 Ga. 233, 29 S. E. 584, 43 L. R. A. 638. The power of compel a separation of grades at a railroad crossing cannot be surrendered nor divested, nor abridged nor bartered away. State v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 135 Minn. 277, 160 N. W. 773, L. R. A. 1917 C, 1174. City cannot authorize the perma- nent occupation of a portion of the street for a private purpose, as by see a municipality to a written license granted by an awning. Resolution authorizing such is revocable at any time, although the licensee may have spent a large sum in the erection of the awning. Hibbard, S., B. & Co. v. Chicago, 173 Ill. 91, 50 N. E. 256, 40 L. R. A. 621. Compare Chicago, &c. R. R. Co. »v. People, 73 Ill. 541. Nor can an exclu- sive privilege be granted to a gas company to use the streets. Gas Co. vy. Parkersburg, 30 W. Va. 435, 4S. E. 650: Cincinnati Gaslight Corn: Avondale, 43 Ohio St. 257, 1 N. E. 527; Citizens’ Gas, &c. Co. v. Elwood, 114 Ind. 332, 16 N. E. 624. The consent of the legislature in any such would relieve it of all difficulty, except so far as questions might arise concern- ing the right of individuals to compen- sation, as to which, see post, ch. 15. Although a gas company has per- mission from a municipality to lay its pipes under the streets, it may be required to remove the same at its case own expense in order to make way for a system of drainage which is required in the interest of the public health, and this without compensation. New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Drainage Com- mission, 197 U. S. 453, 49 L. ed. 831, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 471. A grant of an “exclusive privilege of laying pipes for carrying gas in said city”, &e , does not prevent a city’s erecting its own gasworks, particularly where the legis- lature in incorporating the gas com- pany reserved the power to amend, alter, or repeal its charter, and later authorized the city to construct its own gasworks. Hamilton Gaslight & C. Co. v. Hamilton, 146 U. 8S. 258, 36 L. ed. 963, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 90. In Milhau v. Sharp, 17 Barb. 439, s. c. 28 Barb. 228, and 27 N. Y. 611, it was held that a corporation, with au- thority “from time to time to regulate the rates of fare to be charged for the carriage of persons’, could not by resolution divest itself thereof as to the carriages employed on astreet rail- way.444 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I the city, though upon a valuable consideration, authorizing the holder to connect his property with the city railway by a turnout and track, was not such a contract as would prevent the city from abandoning or removing the railway whenever, in the opinion of the city authorities, such action would tend to the benefit of its police." [An ordinance which allows a claim and directs its payment may be repealed at any time before payment is made.?] While thus held within the limitations which govern the legisla- tive authority of the State, these corporations are also entitled to the protections and immunities which attend State action, and which exempt it from liability to those who may incidentally suffer damage in consequence. As no State does nor can undertake to protect its people against incidental injuries resulting from its adopt- ing or failing to adopt any proposed legislative action, so no similar injury resulting from municipal legislative action or nonaction can be made the basis of a legal claim against a municipal corporation. The justice or propriety of its opening or discontinuing a street, of its paving or refusing to pave a thoroughfare or alley, of its erect- ing a desired public building, of its adopting one plan for a public building or work rather than another, or of the exercise of any other discretionary authority committed to it as a part of the governmental machinery of the State, is not suffered to be brought in question in an action at law, and submitted to the determination of court and jury.* If, therefore, a city temporarily suspends useful legisla- ’ Branson v. Philadelphia, 47 Pa. St. form school). McAndrews v. Hamil- 329. Compare Louisville City R. R. Co. v. Louisville, 8 Bush, 415. And see Stevens v. Muskegon, 111 Mich. 72, 69 Whe MWe PPG QUAI by 18 IN, G2/7/. ? State ex rel. Bayer ». Funk, 105 Oreg. 134, 209 Pac. 113, 25 A. L. R. 625. ’A municipal corporation is not liable in an action for false imprison- ment where imprisonment was under a judgment for violation of an ordi- nance, even though the judgment was erroneous or even void. Bartlett v. Columbus, 101 Ga. 300, 28 S. E. 599, 44 L. R. A. 795. Nor for the destruc- tion of property in time of flood in order to prevent still greater loss. Aitken v. Wells River, 70 Vt. 308, 40 Atl. 829, 41 L. R. A. 566, 67 Am. St. 672. Nor for injury resulting from the negligence of the employee of a public institution maintained by the county as a governmental agency (re- ton County, 105 Tenn. 399, 58 S. W. 483. 4 Atlantic, etc., Tel. Co. v. Philadel- phia, 190 U.S. 160, 47 L. ed. 995, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 817; Dobbins ». Los An- geles, 139 Cal. 179, 72 Pac. 970, 96 Am. St. Rep. 95; Schmidt v. Indianapolis, 168 Ind. 631, 80 N. E. 632, 120 Am. St. Rep. 385, 14 L. R. A. (wn. s.) 787; Gardiner v. Bluffton, 173 Ind. 454, 89 N. E. 853, 90 N. E. 898, Ann. Cas. 1912 A, 713; Wilson v. Ottumwa, 181 Iowa, 303, 164 N. W. 613, L. RB. A. 1918 B, 468; Dudley v. Flemingsburg, 115 Ky. 5, 72 S. W. 327, 103 Am. St. Rep. 253, 60 L. R. A. 575, 1 Ann. Cas. 958; Claussen v. City of Luverne, 103 Minn. 491, 115 N. W. 648, 15 L. R. A. (N. s.) 698, 14 Ann. Cas. 673; Cassidy v. St. Joseph, 247 Mo. 197, 152 S. W. 306; Kansas City v. Liebi, 298 Mo. 569, 252 S. W. 404, 28 A. L. R. 295; Mansfield v. Bristor, 76 Ohio St. 270,CHAP. VIII] SEVERAL GRADES OF 81 N. E. 631, 118 Am. St. Rep. 852, 10 L. R. A. (x. 8.) 806, 10 Ann. Cas. 767; Marth v. Kingfisher, 22 Okla. 602, 98 Pac. 436, 18 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1238; Howard v. Philadelphia, 250 Pa. St. 184, 95 Atl. 388, L. R. A. 1916 B, 917; Douglass v. Greenville, 92 S. C. 374, 75 S. E. 687, 49 L. R. A. (W. s.) 958; Tilley v. Mitchell, etc., Co., 121 Wis. 1, 98 N. W. 969, 105 Am. St. Rep. 1007. But see Havre De Grace ». Fletcher, 112 Md. 562, 77 Atl. 114; Consolidated Apartment House ». Baltimore, 131 Md. 523, 102 Atl. 920. In Griffin v. New York, 9 N. Y. 456, 459, in which it was held that an action would not lie against a city for injury occasioned by a failure to keep its streets free from obstructions, the following remarks are made: “The functions of a common council as applied to this subject are those of a local legislature within certain limits, and are not of a character to render the city responsible for the manner in which the authority is exercised, or in which the ordinances are exe- cuted, any more than the State would be liable for the want of adequate ad- ministrative laws, or from any imper- fections in the manner of carrying them out.’ “A doctrine that should hold the city pecuniarily liable in such a case would oblige its treasury to make good to every citizen any loss which he might sustain for the want of adequate laws upon every subject of municipal jurisdiction, and on account of every failure in the perfect and in- fallible execution of those laws. There is no authority for such a doctrine, and we are satisfied it does not exist.” See also Evansville v. Senhenn, 151 Ind. 42, 47 N. E. 634, 51 N. E. 88, 41 L. R. A. 728, 68 Am. St. 218. Where a city under proper authority has vacated part of a street, an abutter on another part of it has no ground of complaint. Whitsett v. Union D. & R. Co., 10 Col. 248, 15 Pac. 339. A court cannot control the discre- tion of a city in opening and working streets. Bauman v. Detroit, 58 Mich. 444, 25 N. W. 391. So, where a city was sued for an injury sustained in the destruction of property by a mob, in consequence of the failure of officers to MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 445 give adequate protection, the court, in holding that the action will not lie, say: “It is not the policy of the government to indemnify individuals for losses sustained either from the want of proper laws, or from the in- adequate enforcement of laws.’’ West- ern College v. Cleveland, 12 Ohio St. 375, 377. See also Chicago v. Chicago League Base Ball Club, 196 Ill. 54, 63 N. E. 695, 89 Am. St. Rep. 243; Wallace v. Norman, 9 Okla. 339, 60 Pac. 108, 48 L. R. A. 620; Fluckiger v. Seattle, 103 Wash. 330, 174 Pac. 456, L. R. A. 1918 F, 780; Long v. Neenah, 128 Wis. 40, 107 N. W. 10, 8 Ann. Cas. 463. But liability for such losses may be cast by statute on munici- palities. Chicago v. Manhattan Ce- ment Co., 178 Ill. 372, 53 N. E. 68, 45 L. R. A. 848, 69 Am. St. 321. See also Chicago v. Sturges, 222 U.S. 313, 56 L. ed. 215, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 92, Ann. Cas. 1913 B, 1349, affirming 237 Ill. 46, 86 N. E. 683; Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Jersey City, 207 Fed. 871, af- firmed 219 Fed. 699, 135 C. C. A. 371. Dawson Soap Co. v. Chicago, 234 Il. 314, 84 N. E. 920, 14 Ann. Cas. 1131; Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Chicago, 242 Ill. 178, 89 N. EB. 1022, 134 Am. St. Rep. 316, 44 L. R. A. Iola v. Birnbaum, 71 Kan. 600, 81 Pac. 198, 6 Ann. Cas. 267; Cherry- vale v. Hawman, 80 Kan. 170, 101 Pac. 994, 133 Am. St. Rep. 195, 23 L. R. A. (x. s.) 645, 18 Ann. Cas. 149; Blake- man v. Wichita, 93 Kan. 444, 144 Pac. 816, L. R. A. 1915 C, 578, Ann. Cas. 1916 D, 188; Easter v. El Dorado, 104 Kan. 57, 177 Pac. 538, 13 A. L. R. 744; Sanger v. Kansas City, 111 Kan. 262, 206 Pac. 891, 23 A. L. R. 294; Butte Miners’ Union »v. Butte, 58 Mont. 391, 194 Pac. 149, 13 A. L. R. 746; Adamson v. New York, 188 N. Y. 255, 80 N. E. 937, 117 Am. St. Rep. 863, 10 L. R. A. (Nn. 8s.) 925, 11 Ann. Cas. 183, affirming 110 App. Div. 58, 96 N. Y. Supp. 907. A city is not liable for the destruc- tion of a house by fire set by sparks from an engine which was by its or- ~— (nN. 8.) 358; dinances a nuisance subject to abate- ment. ‘In the exercise of such powers a city is not bound to act unless it chooses to act.’’ Davis v. Montgom-446 ery, 51 Ala. 139, 23 Am. Rep. 545. Nor for failure to enforce a fire limits ordinance whereby adjoining property is burned. Hines v. Charlotte, 72 Mich. 278, 40 N. W. 333. Nor for failure to prohibit manufacture of fireworks. McDade v. Chester, 117 Pa. St. 414, 12 Atl. 421. Nor is it liable for neglect to construct a proper system of drainage, in consequence of which plaintiff’s store was overflowed in an extraordinary rain. Carr v. Northern Liberties, 35 Pa. St. 324; Flagg v. Worcester, 13 Gray, 601. A city is not liable for the failure to provide a proper water supply for the extinguishment of fires: Grant v. Erie, 69 Pa. St. 420, 8 Am. Rep. 272; Tainter v. Worster, 123 Mass. 311, 25 Am. Rep. 90; Wright v. Augusta, 7 Ga. 241, Black v. Columbia, 19 S. C. 412; Vanhorn v. Des Moines, 63 Iowa, 447, 19 N. W. 293; Mendel v. Wheel- ing, 28 W. Va. 233; Butterworth »v. Henrietta, 25 Tex. Civ. App. 467, 61 S. W. 975; Allen, etce., Mfg. Co. v. Shreveport Waterworks Co., 113 La. 1091, 37 So. 980, 104 Am. St. Rep. 525, 68 L. R. A. 650, 2 Ann. Cas. 471; nor for the inefficiency of its firemen: Wheeler v. Cincinnati, 19 Ohio St. 19, 2 Am. Rep. 368; Patch v. Covington, 17 B. Mon. 722; Greenwood »v. Louisville, 13 Bush, 226, 26 Am. Rep. 263; Haf- ford v. New Bedford, 16 Gray, 297; Fisher v. Boston, 104 Mass. 87, 6 Am. Rep. 196; Jewett v. New Haven, 38 Conn. 368; Torbush v. Norwich, 38 Conn. 225, 9 Am. Rep. 395; How- ard v. San Francisco, 51 Gal. 52; Heller v. Sedalia, 53 Mo. 159, 14 Am. Rep. 444; McKenna »v. St. Louis, 6 Mo. App. 320; Robinson v. Evans- ville, 87 Ind. 334; nor for not pre- venting ‘‘coasting”’ in its streets, to the injury of individuals: Shepherd ». Chelsea, 4 Allen, 113; Pierce v. New Bedford, -129 Mass. 534; Ray v. Manchester, 46 N. H. 59; Altvater »v. Baltimore, 31 Md. 462; Hutchinson v. Concord, 41 Vt. 271; Calwell »v. Boone, 51 Iowa, 687, 2 N. W. 614, 33 Am. Rep. 154; Schultz v. Milwaukee, 49 Wis. 254, 5 N. W. 342, 35 Am. Rep. 779; Burford v. Grand Rapids, 53 Mich. 98, 18 N. W. 571; Weller ». Burlington, 60 Vt. 28, 12 Atl. 215; CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [voL. I Lafayette v. Timberlake, 88 Ind. 330; Wilmington v. Van De Grift, 1 Marvel, 5, 29 Atl. 1047, 25 L. R. A. 538, 65 Am. St. 256; Dudley v. Flemingsburg, 115 Ky. 5, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 1804, 72 S. W. 327, 103 Am. St. Rep. 253, 60 L. R. A. 575. But see Taylor v: Cumberland, 64 Md. 68, 20 Atl. 1027; nor for fitting a path for ‘‘coasting”’ in public grounds, where a collision occurs with a person passing it: Steele v. Bos- ton, 128 Mass. 583; nor for not pre- venting the running at large of dogs when hydrophobia is epidemic: Smith v. Selinsgrove, 199 Pa. St. 615, 49 Atl. 213. See also Addington ». Littleton, 50 Colo. 623, 115 Pac. 896, 34 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 1012, 24 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 753; nor for failure to light the streets sufficiently: Freeport v. Isbell, 83 Ill. 440, 25 Am. Rep. 407; Miller v. St. Paul, 38 Minn. 134, 36 N. W. 271; Williams v. Washington, 142 Ga. 281, 82 S. E. 656; Green- boro v. Robinson, 19 Ga. App. 199, 91 S. E. 244; Palestine v. Siler, 225 Ill. 630, 80 N. E. 345, 8 L. R. A. (nN. 8.) 205; Spencer v. Mayfield, 43 Ind. App. 134, 85 N. E. 23; Blain ». Montezuma, 150 Iowa, 141, 129 N. W. 808, 32 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 542, Ann. Cas. 1912 D, 480; Gee’s Adm. v. Hopkins- ville, 154 Ky. 263, 157 S. W. 30; Dudley v. Smithland, 174 Ky. 248, 192 S. W. 21; Hodgins v. Bay City, 156 Mich. 687, 121 N. W. 274, 132 Am. St. Rep. 546; Brady v. Randle- man, 159 N. C. 4384, 74 S. E. 811; Herndon v. Salt Lake City, 34 Utah, 65, 95 Pac. 646. See Randall v. Eastern R. Co., 106 Mass. 276, 8 Am. Rep. 327. Compare Baltimore v. Beck, 96 Md. 1838, 53 Atl. 976; nor for granting to a railroad a right of way along one of its streets: Daven- port v. Stevenson, 34 Iowa, 225; Frith v. Dubuque, 45 Iowa, 406; Stevenson v. Lexington, 69 Mo. 157; nor for failure to compel such railroad to maintain safety gates: Kistner v. Indianapolis, 100 Ind. 210; nor for failure to enact proper ordinances for keeping its sidewalks in repair, or to enforce them if enacted: Cole ». Medina, 27 Barb. 218. Conira, At- lanta v. Hampton, 139 Ga. 389, 77 S. E. 393; Brown v. Chillicothe, 122CHAP. VIII] SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 447 tion ;! or orders and constructs public works, from which incidental injury results to individuals ;* or adopts unsuitable Iowa, 640, 98 N. W. 502; Madison- ville v. Pemberton’s Admr., 25 Ky. L. Rep. 347, 75 S. W. 229; Goodwyn ». Shreveport, 134 La. 820, 64 So. 762; McDevitt v. St. Paul, 66 Minn. 14, 68 N. W. 178, 33 L. R. A. 601; Gil- lard v. Chester, 212 Pa. St. 338, 61 Atl. 929; nor for failure to prohibit bicycle riding upon sidewalks: Jones v. Williamsburg, 97 Va. 722, 34S. EH. 883, 47 L. R. A. 294; nor for failure to build footwalks adjoining a bridge: Lehigh Co. v. Hoffort, 116 Pa. St. 119, 9 Atl. 177; nor for allowing a shooting- gallery to be maintained. Hubbell v. Viroqua, 67 Wis. 343, 30 N. W. 847; nor for permitting cannon firing: Wheeler v. Plymouth, 116 Ind. 158, 18 N. E. 532; Lincoln v. Boston, 148 Mass. 578, 20 N. E. 329; Robinson v. Greenville, 42 Ohio St. 625; O’Rourk vy. Sioux Falls, 4 S. D. 47, 54 N. W. 1044,19 L. R. A. 789, 46 Am. St. 760; nor for the discharge of fireworks: Ball v. Woodbine, 61 Iowa, 83, 15 N. W. 846; Bartlett v. Clarksburg, 45 W. Va. 393, 31S. BE. 918, 43 L. R. A. 295, 72 Am. St. 817; Aron v. Wausau, 98 Wis. 592, 74 N. W. 354, 40 L. R. A. 733; Love v. Raleigh, 116 N. C. 296, 21S. E. 503, 28 L. R. A. 192; Fifield v. Phoenix, 4 Ariz. 283, 36 Pac. 916, 24 L. R. A. 480; Kerr v. Brookline, 208 Mass. 190, 94 N. E. 257, 34 L. R. A. (vn. s.) 464; nor for damage done on adjoining property by its failure to remove a dangerous wall: Kiley v. Kansas City, 87 Mo. 103; Anderson »v. Bast, 117 Ind. 126, 19 N. E. 726; Cain v. Syracuse, 95 N. Y. 83; other- wise for injury therefrom to a per- son on the street. Duffy v. Dubuque, 63 Iowa, 171, 18 N. W. 900. But the city as owner of vacant lots is subject to same duties in regard thereto as a private owner. Pekin »v. McMahon, 154 Ill. 141, 39 N. E. 484, 27 L. R. A. 206, 45 Am. St. 114. And where the city permits cattle to roam the streets to such an extent that they amount to a nuisance, it may be liable for an injury to a person on the street, caused by a cow running at large. Cochrane v. Frostburg, 81 Md. 54, or insufficient 31 Atl. 703, 27 L. R. A. 728, 48 Am. St. 479, and see note in L. R. A. But city is not responsible for de- fective condition of a bathing beach, the duty to maintain which is thrust upon it by law. McGraw v. Dist. of Columbia, 3 App. D. C. 405, 25 L. R. A. 691. Where it lawfully acts as private contractor in furnishing water to steam-heating plant, it is liable for breach. Watson v. Needham, 161 Mass. 404, 37 N. E. 204, 24 L. R. A. 287. 1Such as an ordinance forbidding fireworks within a city: Hill v. Char- lotte, 72 N. C. 55, 21 Am. Rep. 451; or forbidding cattle running at large: Livers v. Augusta, 65 Ga. 376, 38 Am. Rep. 787. A city is not liable for a loss by fire which might have been prevented if the city had not cut off the water from one of its hydrants. Tainter v. Worcester, 123 Mass. 311. 2 Brewster v. Davenport, 51 Iowa, 427, 1 N. W. 737; Wehn v. Commis- sioners, 5 Neb. 494, 25 Am. Rep. 497 (case of a jail, complained of as offen- sive in the neighborhood); Carroll v. St. Louis, 4 Mo. App. 191; Saxton »v. St. Joseph, 60 Mo. 153; Wicks v. De Witt, 54 Iowa, 130, 6 N. W. 176; White v. Yazoo City, 27 Miss. 357; Vincennes v. Richards, 23 Ind. 381; Highway Com’rs v. Ely, 54 Mich. 173, 19 N. W. 940; Fort Worth v. Craw- ford, 64 Tex. 202; Gaylor v. Bridge- port, 90 Conn. 235, 96 Atl. 936; Bow- den v. Jacksonville, 52 Fla. 216, 42 So. 394; Atlanta v. Williams, 15 Ga. App. 654, 84 S. E. 139; Indianapolis v. Williams, 58 Ind. App. 447, 108 N. E. 387; Shreveport v. McClure, 132 La. 468, 61 So. 530; Campbell Lumber Co. v. Levee Dist., 186 Mo. App. 371, 172 S. W. 64; Linton Pharmacy v. McDonald, 96 N. Y. Supp. 675, 48 Misc. Rep. 125; Goodrich v. Otego, 145 N. Y. Supp. 497, 160 App. Div. 349; Casel v. New York, 153 Ni Y- Supp. 410, 167 App. Div. 831; Wood v. Duke Land & Imp. Co., 165 N. C. 367, 81 S. E. 422; Mangum v. Todd, 42 Okla. 343, 141 Pac. 266; Ettor v.448 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I plans for public bridges, buildings, sewers, or other public works ; ! or in any other manner, through the exercise or failure to exercise its political authority, causes incidental injury to individuals, an action will not lie for such injury. The reason is obvious. The mainte- nance of such an action would transfer to court and jury the discre- tion which the law vests in the municipality, but transfer them not to be exercised directly and finally, but indirectly and partially by Tacoma, 77 Wash. 267, 137 Pac. 820; Thorpe v. Spokane, 78 Wash. 488, 139 Pac. 221. There can be no recovery for an injury caused by blasting in the course of a public work, in the absence of negligence in the city’s agent. Blumb v. Kansas City, 84 Mo. 112; Murphy v. Lowell, 128 Mass. 396. Contra, Joliet v. Harwood, 86 Ill. 110. Nor, except by force of statute, even in case of negligence. Howard v. Worcester, 153 Mass. 426, 27 N. E. 11, 12 L. R. A. 160. Where a city has a right to erect an incinerator and to maintain it for the benefit of the public in the exer- cise of a governmental duty, it will not be held civilly liable to individuals for injuries resulting therefrom, when properly built and operated, upon the theory of a trespass, in absence of some legislative authority or a statute conferring such right of action. But the denial of a right to recover against & municipality for an alleged injury, upon the theory of its constituting a trespass, does not militate against the right of recovery for a taking or ap- propriating, in whole or in part, of property for a public use without due compensation. Dayton v. Asheville, 185 N. C. 12, 1158S. BE. 827,30 A. L. R. 1186. Determination of city council that poles for electric light wires shall be erected in street cannot be questioned. Palmer v. Larchmont El. Co., 158 N. Y. 231, 52,N. E. 1092, 43 L. R. A. 672. In Kentucky it has been held that a city may be liable for establishing a pesthouse near the residence of a person. Clayton v. Henderson, 103 Ky. 228, 44 S. W. 667, 44 L. R. A. 474. 1 Mills v. Brooklyn, 32 N. Y. 489; Carr v. Northern Liberties, 35 Pa. St. 324; Fair v. Philadelphia, 88 Pa. St. 309; Collins v. Philadelphia, 93 Pa. St. 272; Lynch v. New York, 76 N. Y. 60; Larkin v. Saginaw, 11 Mich. 88; Detroit v. Beckman, 34 Mich. 125; Lansing v. Toolan, 37 Mich. 152; Davis v. Jackson, 61 Mich. 530, 28 N. W. 526; Foster v. St. Louis, 4 Mo. App. 564; Denver v. Capelli, 4 Col. 25, 34 Am. Rep. 62; Allen »v. Chippewa Falls, 52 Wis. 430, 9 N. W. 284; McClure v. Redwing, 28 Minn. 186, 9 N. W. 767; French v. Boston, 129 Mass. 592, 37 Am. Rep. 393; Johnston v. Dist. Columbia, 118 U. S. 19, 30 L. ed. 75, 6 Sup. Ct Rep. 923; Hughes v. Auburn, 161 N. Y. 96, 55 N. E. 389, 46 L. R. A. 6836; Hume ». Des Moines, 146 Iowa, 624, 125 N. W. 846, 29 L. R. A. (nN. 8.) 126, Ann. Cas. 1912 B, 904; Hart v. Neillsville, 125 Wis. 546, 104 N. W. 699, 1 L. R. A. (N. s.) 952, 4 Ann. Cas. 1085. In Nebraska it is held that where a city in the erection of a public work exercises reasonable care and judgment, and adopts plans approved and recom- mended by engineers having all the knowledge that skill and experience in such work would naturally give them, it should not be held liable in damages on account of an alleged defect in the plan, unless the construc- tion is so manifestly dangerous that all reasonable minds must agree that it was unsafe. Watters v. Omaha, 76 Neb. 855, 107 N. W. 1007, 110 N. W. 981, 14 Ann. Cas. 750. A city is not liable if in rebuilding a walk an abutter follows the original plan. Urquhart v. Ogdensburg, 91 N. Y. 67. But if he deviates from it, the fact that the city suffers the walk to remain does not constitute an adop- tion! Of ity uid, 97 Nee 2oSen Kansas a city may be liable if the plan is manifestly unsafe. Gould v. To-CHAP. VIII] SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 449 the retroactive effect of punitive verdicts upon special complaints. The probable consequence is well stated in a case in which action was brought against a city for neglect to construct a proper system of drainage. “Any street may be complained of as being too steep or too level; gutters as being too deep or too shallow; or as being pitched in a wrong direction ; and there may be evidence that these things were carelessly resolved upon, and then a tribunal that is foreign to the municipal system will be allowed to intervene and peka, 32 Kan. 485, 4 Pac. 822. In Indiana it is liable for negligence in plan, but not for mere errors of judg- ment. Seymour v. Cummins, 119 Ind. 148, 21 N. E. 549,5 L. R.A. 126, and note; Rice v. Evansville, 108 Ind. 7,9 N. BE. 139; Terre Haute v. Hud- nut, 112 Ind. 542, 13 N. E. 686. In Hill v. Boston, 122 Mass. 344, 23 Am. Rep. 332, a child attending one of the public schools in the third story of a school building fell over the rail- ing to the staircase, and brought suit for the consequent injury, alleging that the railing was made dangerously low. The court held no such action main- tainable, and asserted the “general doctrine that a private action cannot be maintained against a town or other quasi corporation for a neglect of corporate duty, unless such action is given by statute’’; citing White »v. Phillipston, 10 Met. 108; Sawyer v. Northfield, 7 Cush. 490; Reed v. Belfast, 20 Me. 246; Eastman ». Meredith, 36 N. H. 284; Hyde v. Jamaica, 27 Vt. 443; Chidsey »v. Canton, 17 Conn. 475; Taylor v. Peckham, 8 R. I. 349, 5 Am. Rep. 578; Bartlett v. Crozier, 17 Johns. 439; Freeholders of Sussex County v. Strader, 18 N. J. L. 108; Warbiglee v. Los Angeles, 45 Cal. 36; Highway Commissioners v. Martin, 4 Mich. 557, and a great number of other cases. It is also said in the same case that, in Massachusetts, the same doctrine is applied to incorporated cities. See further Hyde v. Jamaica, 27 Vt. 443; State v. Burlington, 36 Vt. 521; Chidsey v. Canton, 17 Conn. 475; Taylor v. Peckham, 8 R. I. 349, 5 Am. Rep. 578. If the water of a stream becomes polluted by the emptying into it of city sewers, so that a riparian pro- VOL. 1— 29 prietor cannot use it in his business as he has been accustomed to do, or if the property of such a proprietor is otherwise injured by such sewers, he cannot recover against the city for the injury, so far as it is attributable to the plan of sewerage adopted by the city, but he can recover so far as it is attributable to the improper con- struction or unreasonable use of the sewers, or the negligence or other fault of the city in the care and management of them. Merrifield v. Worcester, 110 Mass. 216, 14 Am. Rep. 592, citing Emery v. Lowell, 104 Mass. 13; Child v. Boston, 4 Allen, 41; Valpa- raiso v. Hagen, 153 Ind. 337, 54 N. E. 1062, 48 L. R. A. 707, 74 Am. St. Rep. 305; Richmond v. Test, 18 Ind. App. 482, 48 N. E. 610; Metz v. Asheville, 150 N. C. 748, 64S. E. 881, 22L.R. A. (x. s.) 940; Blizzard v. Danville, 175 Pa. St. 479, 34 Atl. 846; Owens v. Lancaster, 182 Pa. St. 257, 37 Atl. 858. See also Atlanta v. Warnock, 91 Ga. 210, 18S. E. 135, 23 L. R. A. 301, and note, 44 Am. St. 17; Bulger v. Eden, 82 Me. 352, 19 Atl. 829, 9 L. R. A. 205, and note. But a city may not empty a sewer into a mill pond without acquiring the right in some lawful way. Vale Mills »v. Nashua, 63 N. H. 136. In Kansas it has been held that in the construction of sewers emptying into a river, a city is not required to provide against phenomenal floods which are beyond reasonable anticipa- tion, but is required to guard against floods such as have occasionally oc- curred, and which may be reasonably expected to occur again, and, failing to make such provision, it is liable for the consequences of its negligence. Kansas City v. King, 65 Kan. 64, 68 Pac. 1093.450 control the town officers. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I And the end is not yet; for if a regulation be altered to suit the views of one jury, the alteration may give rise to another case, in which the new regulation will be likewise con- demned. This theory is so vicious that it cannot possibly be ad- mitted.””! The alternative is—and the only course consistent with principle — to leave the municipal corporation to judge finally in the exercise of such political power as has been confided to it.? 1 Carr v. Northern Liberties, 35 Pa. St. 324, 329. See Detroit v. Beck- man, 34 Mich. 125. 2 Louisville v. Hyatt, 2 B. Mon. 177, 36 Am. Dec. 594. Cities are under a political obliga- tion to open such streets and build such market-houses as the convenience of the community requires; but they cannot be compelled to perform these duties, or be held responsible for non- performance. Joliet v. Verley, 35 Til. 58. See, further, Little Rock »v. Willis, 27 Ark. 572; Duke v. Rome, 20 Ga. 635; Tate v. Railroad Co., 64 Mo. 149; Bennett v. New Orleans, 14 La. Ann. 120; Commissioners v. Duckett, 20 Md. 468; Randall »v. Eastern R. Corp., 106 Mass. 276; Hughes v. Baltimore, Taney, 243; Weightman v. Washington, 1 Black, 39; 17 Li. ed. 52. A city is not liable to an abutter for allowing a street to be used for market purposes. Henkel v. Detroit, 49 Mich. 249,13 N. W.611. But this doctrine does not deprive an individual of remedy when by reason of the neg- ligent construction of a public work his property is injured, or when the necessary result of its construction is to flood or otherwise injure his prop- erty in a manner that would render a private individual liable. See Van Pelt v. Davenport, 40 Iowa, 308, 20 Am. Rep. 622, and note, p. 626; Merrifield v. Worcester, 110 Mass. 216, 14 Am. Rep. 592; Mayo uv. Springfield, 186 Mass. 10; Weyman v. Jefferson, 61 Mo. 55; Broadwell v. Kansas City, 75 Mo. 213; Union »v. Durkes, 38 N. J. L. 21; Hewison ». New Haven, 37 Conn. 475, 9 Am. Rep. 342; Hines v. Lockport, 50 N. Y. 236; Hardy v. Brooklyn, 90 N. Y. 435; Weightman v. Washington, 1 Black, 39, 17 L. ed. 52; Simmer v. St. Paul, 23 Minn. 408; Ross v. Clinton, 46 Iowa, 606; Inman »v. Tripp, 11 R. 1 520; Damour v. Lyons City, 44 Iowa, 276; Thurston v. St. Joseph, 51 Mo. 510, 11 Am. Rep. 463; Little Rock v. Willis, 27 Ark. 572; Princeton ». Gieske, 93 Ind. 102; Denver », Rhodes, 9 Col. 554, 13 Pac. 729; Keating v. Cincinnati, 38 Ohio St. 141; Mayor, &c. Savannah v. Spears, 66 Ga. 304; Miles v. Worcester, 154 Mass, 511, 28 N. EB. 676, 13 L. R. A. 841, 26 Am. St. 264; Selma v. Jones, 202 Ala. 82, 79 So. 476, L. R. A. 1918 F, 1020; Chicago Sanitary Dist. v. Ray, 199 Ill. 63, 64 N. E. 1048, 93 Am. St. Rep. 102; Taylor v. Balti- more, 130 Md. 133, 99 Atl. 900, L. R. A. 1917 C, 1046; Keene v. Hunting- ton, 79 W. Va. 713, 92 S. EB. 119; L. R. A. 1917 F, 475. A city is liable for negligence in repairing a sewer. Fort Wayne v. Coombs, 107 Ind. 75, 7 N. E. 743; Kranz v. Mayor, &c. of Baltimore, 64 Md. 491, 2 Atl. 908; Stanchfield v. Newton, 142 Mass. 110, 7 N. E. 703; and a State may be, if it has assumed to make one. Ballou v. State, 111 N. Y. 496, 18 N. E. 627. If a city cuts a sewer in such a manner as to cause the collection of a large quantity of water which other- wise would not have flowed there, and to cast it upon the premises of an in- dividual to his injury, this is a trespass for which the city is liable. Ashley ». Port Huron, 35 Mich. 296, citing many eases. See also Bloomington v. Bro- kaw, 77 Ill. 194; Elgin v. Kimball, 90 Ill. 356; Dixon v. Baker, 65 Ill. 518, 16 Am. Rep. 591; Rowe v. Ports- mouth, 56 N. H. 291, 22 Am. Rep. 464; Burton v. Chattanooga, 7 Lea, 739; Rhodes v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio, 159, 36 Am. Dec. 82; West Orange v. Field, 37 N. J. Eq. 600; Crawfords-CHAP. VIII] SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 451 And as the State is not responsible for the acts or neglects of public officers in respect to the duties imposed upon them for the public benefit, so one of these corporations is not liable to private suits for either the non-performance or the negligent performance of the public duties which it is required to assume, and does assume, for the general public, and from which the corporation itself receives neither profit nor special privilege.' And the same presumption ville v. Bond, 96 Ind. 236; Lehn v. San Francisco, 66 Cal. 76, 4 Pac. 965; Rychlicki v. St. Louis, 98 Mo. 497, 11 S. W. 1001; Blakely v. Devine, 36 Minn. 53, 25 N. W. 342; Seifert v. Brooklyn, 101 N. Y. 136, 4 N. E. 321; Albany v. Sikes, 94 Ga. 30, 20 S. E. 257, 26 L. R. A. 653; Shaw »v. Sebastopol, 159 Cal. 623, 115 Pac. 213; Milledgeville »v. Sternbridge, 139 Ga. 692, 78S. E. 35; Atlanta v. Holcomb, 20 Ga. App. 601, 93 S. E. 259; Valparaiso v. Spaeth, 166 Ind. 14, 76 N. E. 518; Cromer v. Logans- port, 38 Ind. App. 661, 78 N. E. 1045; Fitzgerald v. Sharon, 143 Iowa, 730, 121 N. W. 523; Hume ». Des Moines, 146 Iowa, 624, 125 N. W. 846, 29 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 126; Daley v. Watertown, 192 Mass. 116, 71 N. E. 143; Whitten v. Haverhill, 204 Mass. 95, 90 N. E. 409; Diamond ». Attle- borough, 219 Mass. 587, 107 N. E. 445; Weber v. Minneapolis, 132 Minn. 170, 156 N. W. 287; Vicksburg v. Richard- son, 90 Miss. 1, 42 So. 234; Sandy ». St. Joseph, 142 Mo. App. 330, 126 S. W. 989; Naysmith v. Auburn, 95 Neb. 582, 146 N. W. 971; Dobrmann v. Hudson County Board, etc., 84 N. J. L. 689, 87 Atl. 463; Bloom ». Orange, 91 N. J. L. 376, 103 Atl. 395; Prime v. Yonkers, 192 N. Y. 105, 84 N. E. 571; Miles v. Brooklyn, 90 N. Y. Supp. 702, 98 App. Div. 195; Haley & Lang Co. v. Huron, 36 S: D: 6, 153 N. W. 891; Houston ». Rich- ardson, 42 Tex. Civ. App. 147, 94 8. W. 454; McHenry ». Parkersburg, 66 W. Va. 533, 66 S. E. 750; Kunst v. Grafton, 67 W. Va. 20, 67S. E. 74, DGulee RevAG(Ne Ss.) L201 lutzae: Charleston, 76 W. Va. 657, 86 S. E. 561; Knapp »v. Deer Creek, 162 Wis. 168, 155 N. W. 940. As to the liability for increasing the flow of surface water on land by grad- ing streets, compare the following cases where it was denied: Bronson v. Wal- lingford, 54 Conn. 513, 9 Atl. 393; Stewart v. Clinton, 79 Mo. 603; Kehrer v. Richmond, 81 Va. 745; Meth. Ep. Ch. v. Wyandotte, 31 Kan. 721, 3 Pac. 527; Morris v. Council Bluffs, 67 Iowa, 343, 25 N. W. 274; Kennison v. Beverly, 146 Mass. 467, 16 N. E. 278; Heth v. Fond du Lac, 63 Wis. 228, 23 N. W. 495; Jordan v. Benwood, 42 W. Va. 312, 26 S. E. 266, 36 L. R. A. 519, 57 Am. St. 859; Miles v. Brooklyn, 90 N. Y. Supp. 702, 98 App. Div. 195; Harp v. Bara- boo, 101 Wis. 368, 77 N. W. 744; with the following cases where it was sustained: Peters v. Fergus Falls, 35 Minn. 549, 29 N. W. 586; Gray ». Knoxville, 85 Tenn. 99, 1 S. W. 622; Gilluly v. Madison, 63 Wis. 518, 24 N. W. 137; Addy v. Janesville, 70 Wis. 401, 35 N. W. 931; Nevins ». Peoria, 41 Ill. 502, 89 Am. Dec. 392; Aurora v. Gillett, 56 Ill. 132; Aurora v. Reed, 57 Ill. 29, 11 Am. Rep. 1; Dixon v. Baker, 65 Ill. 518, 16 Am. Rep. 591; Bloomington v. Brokaw, 77 Ill. 194; Wilber v. Fort Dodge, 120 Iowa, 555, 95 N. W. 186; Hume v. Des Moines, 146 Iowa, 624, 125 N. W. 846, 29 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 126; Beatrice v. Leary, 45 Neb. 149, 63 N. W. 370, 50 Am. St. Rep. 546. 1Bastman v. Meredith, 36 N. H. 284; Hill v. Boston, 122 Mass. 344, 23 Am. Rep. 332; Markey v. Queens County, 154 N. Y. 675, 49 N. E: 39 L. R. A. 46; Moran v. Pullman Palace Car Co., 134 Mo. 641, 36S. W. 659, 33 L. R. A. 755, 56 Am. St. 543; Snider v. St. Paul, 51 Minn. 466, 53 N. W. 763, 18 L. R. A. 151. Nor does it change the rule that the duty is not specially imposed, but igs assumed under a general law. Wixon v. Newport, 13 R. I. 454.452 “The decisions draw a distinction between the acts of municipalities done in their corporate character, or business capacity, and those which they perform as functions of govern- ment, delegated by the state to its agencies as public instrumentalities ; regarding the first, the municipality may be held liable for the acts of its representatives or employees, while as to the second, there is generally an immunity from liability, based on grounds of public policy.” Scibilia ». City of Philadelphia, 279 Pa. St. 549, 124 Atl. 273, 32 A. L. R. 981. A city is not liable for the negligent management of its hospitals: Rich- mond v. Long, 17 Gratt. 375; Benton v. Trustees, &c., 140 Mass. 13, 1 N. E. 836; Watson v. Atlanta, 136 Ga. 370, 71 S. E. 664; Tollefson v. Ottawa, 228 Ill. 134, 81 N. BE. 823; Having »v. Covington, 25 Ky. L. Rep. 1617, 78 S. W. 431; Twyman’s Adm’r ». Frankfort, 117 Ky. 518, 78 S. W. 446, 64 L. R. A. 572; or for the adminis- tration of impure vaccine virus under an ordinance compelling vaccination: Wyatt v. Rome, 105 Ga. 312, 3158. E. 188, 42 L. R. A. 180, 70 Am. St. 41; or for an injury arising from defective machinery in an asylum which the State compelled it to maintain: Hughes v. County of Monroe, 147 N. Y. 49, 41 N. E. 407, 39 L. R. A. 33. See also Freel v. School City of Craw- fordsville, 142 Ind. 27, 41 N. E. 312, 37 L. R. A. 301, and note thereto in L. R. A. ; or for negligence in not main- taining proper poles in fire-signal sys- tem: Pettingell v. Chelsea, 161 Mass. 368, 37 N. EB. 380, 24 L. R. A. 426; nor is it liable for injuries resulting to persons confined in jails and police stations from improper construction thereof or negligence in their manage- ment. Evans v. Kankakee, 231 Ill. 223, 83 N. E. 223; Bowling Green »v. Rogers, 142 Ky. 558, 1384 8. W. 921; Braunstein v. Louisville, 146 Ky. 777, 143 S. W. 372; Mains v. Fort Fair- field, 99 Me. 177, 59 Atl. 87; Wilcox v. Rochester, 190 N. Y. 137, 82 N. E. 1119; Carty’s Adm’r v. Winooski, 78 Vt. 104, 62 Atl. 45,2 L. R. A. (Nn. 8.) 95; Shaw v. Charleston, 57 W. Va. 433, 50 S. E. 527. But in North CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I Garolina it has been held that a city is liable for injury to the health of a prisoner whom it confines in a damp, cold, filthy prison. Shields v. Dur- ham, 118 N. C. 450, 24S. E. 794, 36 L. R. A. 298, and note. Compare Nichols v. Fountain, 165 N. C. 166, 80 S. E. 1059, and Hobbs v. Washing- ton, 168 N. C. 298, 84S. E. 391. A county is not liable for personal injuries sustained by reason of the imperfect construction of its court- house. Kincaid v. Hardin, 53 Iowa, 430, 50 N. W. 589, 36 Am. Rep. 236; Hollenbeck v. Winnebago Co., 95 III. 148, 35 Am. Rep. 151. See further, Little v. Madison, 49 Wis. 605, 6 N. W. 249, 35 Am. Rep. 793; Dawson ». Aurelius, 49 Mich. 479, 13 N. W. 824. And compare post, pp. 513-528, and notes. A city is not liable for the torts of its police officers: Cook v. Macon, 54 Ga. 468; M’Elroy v. Albany, 65 Ga. 387, 38 Am. Rep. 791; Grumbine v. Washington, 2 McArthur, 578, 29 Am. Rep. 626; Harman v. Lynchburg, 33 Gratt. 37; Buttrick v. Lowell, 1 Allen, 172; Elliott v. Philadelphia, 75 Pa. St. 347; Norristown v. Fitzpatrick, 94 Pa. St. 121; Caldwell v. Boone, 51 Iowa, 687, 2 N. W. 614; Attaway v. Cartersville, 68 Ga. 740; Worley ». Columbia, 88 Mo. 106; Hathaway v. Everett, 205 Mass. 246, 91 N. E. 296, 137 Am. St. Rep. 4386; Lamont ». Stavanaugh, 129 Minn. 321, 152 N. W. 720, L. R. A. 1915 E, 460; Aldrich v. Youngstown, 106 Ohio St. 342, 140 N. E. 164, 27 A. L. R. 1497; Lawton v. Harkins, 34 Okla. 545, 126 Pac. 727, 42 L. R. A. (Nn. 8.) 69; or for their negligence: Pollock’s Adm’r v. Louis- ville, 18 Bush, 221, 26 Am. Rep. 260, and note; Little v. Madison, 49 Wis. 605, 6 N. W. 249, 35 Am. Rep. 793; Jolly v. Hawesville, 89 Ky. 279, 12 S. W. 313; Pasadena v. Railroad Commission, 183 Cal. 526, 192 Pac. 25, 10 A: LL. R. 1425: Dooney, ye: Sioux City, 163 Iowa, 604, 145 N. W. 287, 51 L. R. A. (Nn. 8.) 546; Jones ». Sioux City, 185 Iowa, 1178, 170 N. W. 445° 10 Av i: R. 474; Wrankling Seattle, 112 Wash. 671, 192 Pac. 1015, 12 A. L. R. 247; Long v. Neenah, 128 Wis. 40, 107 N. W. 10, 8 Ann.CHAP. VIII] Cas. 463. But see contra, Carring- ton v. St. Louis, 89 Mo. 208, 1S. W. 240; or for malfeasance or nonfeas- ance in relation to the maintenance or operation of its fire department; Long v. Birmingham, 161 Ala. 427, 49 So. 881, 18 Ann. Cas. 507; Judson v. Winsted, 80 Conn. 384, 68 Atl. 999, 15 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 91; Brown v. Dis- trict of Columbia, 29 App. D. C. 273, 95 L. R. A. (Nn. 8.) 98; Rogers »v. Atlanta, 143 Ga. 158, 84 S. EH. 555; Miller v. Macon, 152 Ga. 648, 110 S. E. 873; Wilcox v. Chicago, 107 Til. 334; Aschoff v. Evansville, 34 Ind. App. 25, 72 N. E. 279; Jennie De Pauw Memorial M. E. Church v. New Albany Waterworks, 193 Ind. 368, 140 N. E. 540; Bradley »v. Oska- loosa, 193 Iowa, 1072, 188 N. W. 896; Hazel v. Owensboro, 30 Ky. L. Rep. 627, 99 S. W. 315, 9 L. R. A. (NW. 8.) 235; Small v. Frankfort, 203 Ky. 188, Priest We 1111 33 Ae Lb: Rs 692) Burrill v. Augusta, 78 Me. 118, 3 Atl. 177; Brink v. Grand Rapids, 144 Mich., 472, 108 N. W. 430; Hodgins v. Bay City, 156 Mich. 687, 121 N. W. 274, 132 Am. St. Rep. 546; Grube v. St. Paul, 34 Minn. 402, 26 N. W. 228: Hillstrom v. St. Paul, 134 Minn. 451, 159 N. W. 1076, L. R. A. 1917 B, 548; Hattiesburg v. Geigor, 118 Miss. 676, 79 So. 846; Heller v. Sedalia, 53 Mo. 159, 14 Am. Rep, 444; Hawkins v. Springfield, 194 Mo. App. 151, 186 S. W. 576; Gillespie v. Lincoln, 35 Neb. 34, 52 N. W. 811, 16 L. R. A. 349; Smith v. Rochester, 76 Ni Y: 506; Gaetjens v. New York, 132 App. Div. 394, 116 N. Y. Supp. 759; Pe- terson v. Wilmington, 130 N. C. 76, 40 S. B. 853, 56 L. R. A. 959, 11 Am. Neg. Rep. 332; Mack v. Charlotte City Waterworks, 181 N. C. 383, 107 S. E. 244, 20 N.C. C. A. 823; Ald- rich v. Youngstown, 106 Ohio St. 342, 140 N. BE. 164, 27 A. L. R. 1497, overruling Fowler v. Cleveland, 100 Ohio St. 158, 126 N. E. 72,9 A. L. R. 131; Dodge v. Granger, 17 R. I. 664, 24 Atl. 100, 15 L. R. A. 781; 33 Am. St. Rep. 901; Blankenship ». Sher- man, 33 Tex. Civ. App. 507, 76 S. W. 805; Brown v. Salt Lake City, 33 Utah, 222, 93 Pac. 970, 14 L. R. A. (n. 8.) 619, 126 Am. St. Rep. 828, SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 453 14 Ann. Cas. 1004; Walsh v. Rutland, 56 Vt. 228, 48 Am. Rep. 762; Lynch v. North Yakima, 37 Wash. 657, 80 Pac. 79, 12 Lb. Re Ay (ne sy zon: Cunningham v. Seattle, 40 Wash. 59, 82 Pac. 148, 4 L. R. A. (N. s.) 629, 19 Am. Neg. Rep. 55, on rehearing 42 Wash. 134, 84 Pac. 641, 4 L. R. A. (x. s.) 633, 7 Ann. Cas. 805; Highway Trailer Co. v. Janesville Electric Co., 178 Wis. 340, 190 N. W. 110, 27 A. L. R. 1168. Compare Bowden ». Kansas City, 69 Kan. 587, 77 Pac. 573, 66 L. R. A. 181, 105 Am. St. Rep. 187, 1 Ann. Cas. 955, 16 Am. Neg. Rep. 339; Davidson v. Hine, 151 Mich. 294, 115 N. W. 246, 15 L. R. A. (n. 8.) 575, 123 Am. St. Rep. 267, 14 Ann. Cas. 352, and Wagner v. Port- land, 40 Oreg. 389, 60 Pac. 785, 67 Pac. 300. See contra, Maxwell ». Miami, 87 Fla. 107, 100 So. 147, 33 A.L.R. 682; or for the negligence of its bridge-tender: Corning v. Sagi- naw, 116 Mich. 74, 74 N. W. 307, 40 L. R. A. 526; or for the torts of other officers: Hunt v. Boonville, 65 Mo. 620, 27 Am. Rep. 299; Wallace ». Menasha, 48 Wis. 79, 4 N. W. 101, 33 Am. Rep. 804; Trustees v. Schroeder, 58 Ill. 353; Cumberland v. Willison, 50 Md. 138; Cooney v. Hartland, 95 Ill. 516; Corsicana v. White, 57 Tex. 382; Gray v. Griffin, 111 Ga. 361, 36 Stone 799: 51 Lb. RK. A. 13+ lor tox their errors or neglects: Wallace v. Menasha, 48 Wis. 79, 4 N. W. 101, 33 Am. Rep. 804; Collins v. Philadelphia, 93 Pa. St. 272; Hart v. Bridgeport, 13 Blatch. 289; McCarthy v. Boston, 135 Mass. 197; Tindley v. Salem, 137 Mass. 171; Summers v. Com’rs Da- viess Co., 103 Ind. 262, 2 N. E. 725; Abbett v. Com’rs Johnson Co., 114 Ind. 61, 16 N. E. 127; Wakefield »v. Newport, 60 N. H. 374; Condict v. Jersey City, 46 N. J. L. 157; Donnelly v. Tripp, 12 R. I. 97; Bd. of Com’rs Jasper Co. v. Allman, 142 Ind. 573, 42 N. B. 206, 39 L. R. A. 58; A’Hern v. Iowa St. Agr’l Society, 91 Iowa, 97, 58 N. W. 1092, 24 L. R. A. 655; Wil- liamson v. Louisville Ind. School, 95 Ky. 251, 24S. W. 1065, 23 L. R. A. 200, and note, 44 Am. St. 243; Whit- field v. Paris, 84 Tex. 431, 19 S. W. 566, 15 L. R. A. 783, and note, 31 Am.454 St. 69; Brown v. Guyandotte, 34 W. Va. 299, 12S. BE. 707, 11 L. R. A. 121; Culver v. Streator, 130 Ill. 238, 22 N. nm Sl0; 6 Lb. Re AS 270> butesee Sprague v. Tripp, 13 R. I. 38; or for illegal action of officers under an ille- gal ordinance: Trammell v. Russell- ville, 34 Ark. 105, 36 Am. Rep. 1; Hoggard v. Monroe, 51 La. Ann. 683, 25 So. 349, 44 L. R. A. 477. But it is liable if in obedience to orders an officer acts under such ordinance: Durkee v. Kenosha, 59 Wis. 123, 17 N. W. 677; Schussler v. Hennepin Co. Com’rs, 67 Minn. 412, 70 N. W. 6, 64 Am. St. 424, 39 L. R. A. 75. And it may be liable if the negligent person is to be regarded as its servant, and not as a public officer: Muleairns v. Janesville, 67 Wis. 24, 29 N. W. 565; Waldron v. Haverhill, 143 Mass. 582, 10 N. BE. 481; Perkins v. Lawrence, 136 Mass. 305; Semple »v. Vicksburg, 62 Miss. 63. Upon the question of the liability of a municipality for injury resulting from the operation by one of its offi- cers of a municipal automobile, the decisions are not in complete accord and cannot be wholly reconciled. In Jones v. Sioux City, 185 Iowa, 1178, 170 N. W. 445, 10 A. L. R. 474, it was held that a municipality is not relieved from liability for the negli- gence of the driver of an automobile hauling policemen to their beats; so in Opocensky v. South Omaha, 101 INeDy 3505 16a ING Wi G20. 1s, RR. Al 1917 E, 1170, the court held that a municipality was liable for the un- lawful operation of a municipal auto- mobile by a municipal officer while engaged in testing it. So in Hewitt v. Seattle, 62 Wash. 377, 113 Pac. 1084, 32 L. R. A. (N. s.) 632, where a person was injured by the negligent operation of a municipal automobile driven by the superintendent of streets in the performance of his duty, it was held that the municipality was liable; so in Brown v. Wilmington, 4 Boyce (Del.) 492, 90 Atl. 44, a municipality was held liable for an injury resulting from the unlawful operation of its automobile police patrol, and in Johnston v. Chicago, 258 Ill. 494, 101 N. BE. 960, 45 L. R. A. (nN. 8.) 1167, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I Ann. Cas. 1914 B, 339, 4 N. C. C. A. 40, it was held that a municipality was liable for the negligent operation of one of its automobiles by a municipal public library employee engaged in hauling books from the main library to substations; but in Engel v. Mil- waukee, 158 Wis. 480, 149 N. W. 141, a municipality was held not to be liable for the negligent driving by its employee of an automobile in the service of the city’s department of fire and police alarm system; and in Stater v. Joplin, 189 Mo. App. 383, 176 S. W. 241, where injury was caused by a municipal motor patrol wagon driven by a municipal employee, it was held that the municipality was not liable, and that this was so whether the in- jury resulted from the negligence of the driver or from defects in the vehicle. In the management of the private property held by the corporation for its own profit or advantage, it is held to the same responsibility that private citizens are. Moulton v. Scarborough, 71 Me. 267, 36 Am. Rep. 308, and cases cited; Rowland v. Kalamazoo Supts., 49 Mich. 5538, 14 N. W. 494. But not where the acquisition and holding of such property is ultra vires. Duncan v. Lynchburg (Va.), 34 S. EB. 964, 48 L. R. A. 331. A city is liable for negligent man- agement of market buildings which it may erect, but is not compelled to: Barron v. Detroit, 94 Mich. 601, 54 N. W. 273, 19 L. R. A. 452, and note, 34 Am. St. 366. In some jurisdictions it has been held that a city is liable for negli- gent management of its waterworks. Esberg-Gunst Cigar Co. v. Portland, 34 Oreg. 282, 54 Pac. 664, 43 L. R. A. 435, 75 Am. St. 651; Augusta v. Mackey, 113 Ga. 64, 38 S. E. 339. But in New York it is held that a city is not liable for insufficiency of its water-works: Springfield F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Keeseville, 148 N. Y. 46, 42 N. E. 405, 30 L. R. A. 660, 51 Am. St. 667. If a city lets a public building for hire, it is liable for negligence in man- aging it. Worden v. New Bedford, 131 Mass. 23. See also Toledo v. Cone, 41 Ohio St. 149, and note to 39CHAP. VIII] SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 455 that legislative action has been devised and adopted on adequate information and under the influence of correct motives, will be ap- plied to the discretionary action of municipal bodies, and of the State legislature, and will preclude, in the one case as in the other, all collateral attack.’ Among the implied powers of such an organization appears to be that of defending and indemnifying its officers where they have in- curred liability in the bona fide discharge of their duty. It has been decided in a case where irregularities had occurred in the assessment of a tax, in consequence of which the tax was void, and the assessors had refunded to the persons taxed the moneys which had been col- lected and paid into the town, county, and State treasuries, that the town had authority to vote to raise a sum of money in order to refund to the assessors what had been so paid by them, and that such vote was a legal promise to pay, on which the assessors might main- tain action against the town. “The general purpose of this vote,” it was said, “was just and wise. The inhabitants, finding that three of their townsmen, who had been elected by themselves to an office, which they could not, without incurring a penalty, refuse to accept, had innocently and inadvertently committed an error which, in strictness of law, annulled their proceedings, and exposed them to a loss perhaps to the whole extent of their property, if all the inhab- itants individually should avail themselves of their strict legal rights, — finding also that the treasury of the town had been supplied by the very money which these unfortunate individuals were obliged to refund from their own estates, and that, so far as the town tax went, the very persons who had rigorously exacted it from L. R. A. 33, upon liabilities of counties Madisonville ». Bishop, 113 Ky. 106, in action for torts and negligence. 67S. W. 269, 57 L. R. A. 180. See The same doctrine of immunity also Aron v. Wausau, 98 Wis. 592, 74 from private suit applies to public N. W. 354, 40 L. R. A. 733; Seanlon officers who. are compelled to serve v. Wedger, 156 Mass. 462, 31 N. E. without compensation where their 642, 16 L. R. A. 395. duties are quasi-judicial. Daniels ». 1Milhau v. Sharp, 15 Barb. 193; Hathaway, 65 Vt. 247, 26 Atl. 970, 21 Re A. 377. Mayor duly acting as court is not liable for maliciously issuing an er- roneous order. Scott v. Fishblate, 117 N. C. 265, 23S. E. 436, 30 L. R. A. 696. Statute made municipality liable for injuries done by “riotous or tu- multuous assemblages of people.” Held, not necessary that there should be any common intent, in those com- posing such assemblage, to injure in order that municipality be liable. New York, &c. R. R. Co. v. New York, 1 Hilton, 562; Buell v. Ball, 20 Iowa, 282; Freeport v. Marks, 59 Pa. St. 253; Decatur v. Barteau, 260 Ill. 612, 103 N. E. 601. Compare State »v. Cincinnati Gas Co., 18 Ohio St. 262. See cases ante, pp. 378-384. But in Weston v. Syracuse, 158 N. Y. 274, 53 N. By: 12.43 L. R. A. 678) 7OzAm* St. 472, it was held that a resolution accepting an imperfect sewer was void because secured by fraud and cor- ruption.[voL. I 456 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS the assessors, or who were about to do it, had themselves shared in due proportion the benefits and use of the money which had been paid into the treasury, in the shape of schools, highways, and various other objects which the necessities of a municipal institution call for, — concluded to reassess the tax, and to provide for its assessment in a manner which would have produced perfect justice to every individ- ual of the corporation, and would have protected the assessors from the effects of their inadvertence in the assessment which was found to be invalid. The inhabitants of the town had a perfect right to make this reassessment, if they had a right to raise the money orig- inally. The necessary supplies to the treasury of a town cannot be intercepted, because of an inequality in the mode of apportioning the sum upon the individuals. Debts must be incurred, duties must be performed, by every town; the safety of each individual depends upon the execution of the corporate duties and trusts. There is and must be an inherent power in every town to bring the money necessary for the purposes of its creation into the treasury; and if its course is obstructed by the ignorance or mistakes of its agents, they may proceed to enforce the end and object by correcting the means; and whether this be done by resorting to their original power of voting to raise money a second time for the same purposes, or by directing to reassess the sum before raised by vote, is immaterial ; perhaps the latter mode is best, at least it is equally good.”’ ! It has also been held competent for a town to appropriate money to indemnify the school committee for expenses incurred in defend- 1 Per Parker, Ch. J., in Nelson v. Milford, 7 Pick. 18, 23. See also See People v. Supervisor of Onondaga, 16 Mich. 254. Baker v. Windham, 13 Me. 74; Fuller v. Groton, 11 Gray, 340; Board of Commissioners v. Lucas, 93 U. S. 108, 23 L. ed. 822; State v. Hammonton, 38 N. J. L. 430, 20 Am. Rep. 404; Miles v. Albany, 59 Vt. 79, 7 Atl. 601. The duty, however, must have been one authorized by law, and the matter one in which the corporation had an interest. Gregory v. Bridgeport, 41 Conn. 76, 19 Am. Rep. 485. In Bristol v. Johnson, 34 Mich. 123, it appeared that a township treasurer had been robbed of town moneys, but had accounted to the township there- for. An act of the legislature was then obtained for refunding this sum to him by tax. Held, not justified by the constitution of the State, which forbids the allowance of demands against the public by the legislature. No indemnity can be given an offi- cer for a loss arising through his neg- ligence. Thorndike v. Camden, 82 Me. 39, 19 Atl. 95, 7 L. R. A. 463. Where local improvements within the power of the legislature to author- ize are made under an act later ad- judged unconstitutional, and the as- sessment made thereunder fails, the legislature may authorize a reassess- ment of the cost of the improvement. Chester v. Black, 182 Pa. St. 568, 19 Atl. 276, 6 L. R. A. 802, and note. A municipal corporation, it is said, may offer rewards for the detection of offenders within its limits; but its promise to reward an officer for that which without such reward, it was his duty to do, is void. Dillon Mun. Corp. § 91, and cases cited. And see note, p. 459, post.CHAP. VII] SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 457 ing an action for an alleged libel contained in a report made by them in good faith, and in which action judgment had been rendered in their favor. And although it should appear that the officer had exceeded his legal right and authority, yet, if he has acted in good faith in an attempt to perform his duty, the town has the right to adopt his act and to bind itself to indemnify him.2 And perhaps the legislature may even have power to compel the town, in such a case, to reimburse its officers the expenses incurred by them in the honest but mistaken discharge of what they believed to be their duty, not- withstanding the town, by vote, has refused to do so.® 1 Fuller v. Groton, 11 Gray, 340. See also Hadsell v. Inhabitants of Hancock, 3 Gray, 526; Pike v. Mid- dleton, 12 N. H. 278. 2 A surveyor of highways cut a drain for the purpose of raising a legal ques- tion as to the bounds of the highway, and the town appointed a committee to defend an action brought against the surveyor therefor, and voted to defray the expenses incurred by the com- mittee. By the court: “It is the duty of a town to repair all highways within its bounds, at the expense of the inhabitants, so that the same may be safe and convenient for travelers; and we think it has the power, as inci- dent to this duty, to indemnify the surveyor, or other agent, against any charge or liability he may incur in the bona fide discharge of this duty, al- though it may turn out on investiga- tion that he mistook his legal rights and authority. The act by which the surveyor incurred a liability was the digging a ditch, as a drain for the security of the highway; and if it was done for the purpose of raising a legal question as to the bounds of the highway, as the defendants offered to prove at the trial, the town had, nevertheless, a right to adopt the act, for they were interested in the subject, being bound to keep the highway in repair. They had, therefore, a right to determine whether they would de- fend the surveyor or not; and having determined the question, and ap- pointed the plaintifis a committee to carry on the defense, they cannot now be allowed to deny their liability, after the committee have paid the charges incurred under the authority of the town. The town had a right to act on the subject-matter which was within their jurisdiction; and their votes are binding and create a legal obligation, although they were under no previous obligation to indemnify the surveyor. That towns have an authority to defend and indemnify their agents who may incur a liability by an inadvertent error, or in the per- formance of their duties imposed on them by law, is fully maintained by the case of Nelson v. Milford, 7 Pick. 18.” Bancroft v. Lynnfield, 18 Pick. 566, 568. And see Briggs v. Whipple, 6 Vt. 95; Sherman v. Carr, 8 R. I. 431. A collector may be indemnified for public money stolen from him. Fields v. Highland Co. Commissioners, 36 Ohio St. 476. Compare Bristol v. Johnson, 34 Mich. 123. 3 Guilford v. Supervisors of Che- nango, 13 N. Y. 143. See this case commented upon by Lyon, J., in State v. Tappan, 29 Wis. 664, 680. On the page last mentioned it is said: “We have seen no case, except in the courts of New York, which holds that such moral obligation gives the legislature power to compel payment.”’ The case in New York is referred to as authority in New Orleans v. Clark, 95 U.S. 644, 24 L. ed. 521. Where officers make themselves liable to penalties for refusal to perform duty, the corporation has no author- ity to indemnify them. Halstead v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 3 N. Y. 430; Merrill v. Plainfield, 45 N. He 26; See Frost v. Belmont, 6 Allen, 152; People v. Lawrence, 6 Hill, 244; Vin- cent v. Nantucket, 12 Cush. 103.CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [voL. I Construction of Municipal Powers. The powers conferred upon municipalities must be construed with reference to the object of their creation, namely, as agencies of the State in local government.t The State can create them for no other purpose, and it can confer powers of government to no other end, without at once coming in conflict with the constitutional maxim, 1“While the courts will give due weight to a legislative determination of what is a municipal purpose, yet where the purpose declared by stat- ute to be such may in fact be not a municipal purpose, or where the pur- pose may be by the Constitution ex- pressly or by implication excluded as a municipal purpose, or where the execution of the purpose may involve a violation of organic law, the courts will ultimately determine whether it is or is not a permissible municipal purpose, and in doing so will consider the pertinent facts that may be pecul- iar to the particular case as well as the controlling law in the premises.” Bradentown v. State (Fla.), 102 So. 556, 36 A. L. R. 1297. Under the police power cities and villages may enact reasonable ordi- nances to preserve health, suppress nuisances, prevent fires, regulate the use and storing of dangerous articles, and similar uses and purposes. Cook County v. Chicago, 311 Ill. 234, 142 N. E. 512, 31 A. L. R. 442. The powers of municipal govern- ment must be exercised to conserve the interests of the inhabitants and taxpayers, and tax levies are legal only in so far as they are clearly au- thorized by law for proper public purposes. Bradentown »v. State (Fla.), 102 So. 556, 36 A. L. R. 1297. A somewhat peculiar question was involved in the case of Jones v. Rich- mond, 18 Gratt. 517. In anticipation of the evacuation of the city of Rich- mond by the Confederate authorities, and under the apprehension that scenes of disorder might follow which would be aggravated by the oppor- tunity to obtain intoxicating liquors, the common council ordered the seiz- ure and destruction of all such liquors within the city, and pledged the faith of the city to the payment of the value. The Court of Appeals of Vir- ginia afterwards decided that the city might be held liable on the pledge in an action of assumpsit. Rives, J., says: “By its charter the council is specially empowered to ‘pass all by- laws, rules, and regulations which they shall deem necéssary for the peace, comfort, convenience, good order, good morals, health, or safety of said city, or of the people or property therein.’ It is hard to conceive of larger terms for the grant of sovereign legislative powers to the specified end than those thus employed in the char- ter; and they must be taken by neces- sary and unavoidable intendment to comprise the powers of eminent do- main within these limits of prescribed jurisdiction. There were two modes open to the council: first, to direct the destruction of these stores, leaving the question of the city’s liability therefor to be afterwards litigated and determined; or secondly, assuming their liability, to contract for the values destroyed under their orders. Had they pursued the first mode, the corporation would have been liable in an action of trespass for the dam- ages; but they thought proper to adopt the latter mode, make it a mat- ter of contract, and approach their citizens, not as trespassers, but with the amicable proffer of a formal re- ceipt and the plighted faith of the city for the payment. In this they seem to me to be well justified.” Judge Dillon doubts the soundness of this decision. Dillon, Mun. Corp., § 371, note. The case seems to us analogous in principle to that of the destruction of buildings to stop the progress of a fire. In each case private property is destroyed to anticipate and prevent an impending public calamity. Jones v. Richmond is overruled in Wallace v. Richmond, 94 Va. 204, 26 S. HB. 586,CHAP. VIII] SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 459 that legislative power cannot be delegated, or with other maxims designed to confine all the agencies of government to the exercise of their proper functions. And wherever the municipality shall at- tempt to exercise powers not within the proper province of local self- government, whether the right to do so be claimed under express legislative grant, or by implication from the charter, the act must be considered as altogether wltra vires, and therefore void. A reference to a few of the adjudged cases will perhaps best illus- trate this principle. The common council of the city of Buffalo undertook to provide an entertainment and ball for its citizens and certain expected guests on the 4th of July, and for that purpose en- tered into contract with a hotel-keeper to provide the entertainment at his house, at the expense of the city. The entertainment was furnished and in part paid for, and suit was brought to recover the balance due. The city had authority under its charter to raise and expend moneys for various specified purposes, and also “ to defray the contingent and other expenses of the city.’ But providing an entertainment for its citizens is no part of municipal self-government, and it has never been considered, where the common law has pre- vailed, that the power to do so pertained to the government in any of its departments. The contract was therefore held void, as not within the province of the city government.’ 36 L. R. A. 554. 1117,1296-1298. Village may offer reward for arrest and conviction of incendiaries. People vy. Holly, 119 Mich. 637, 78 N. W. 665, 44 L. R. A. 677, 75 Am. St. 435. 1 Hodges v. Buffalo, 2 Denio, 110. See also the case of New London ». 3rainard, 22 Conn. 552, which follows and approves this case. The cases differ in this only: that in the first, suit was brought to enforce the illegal contract, while in the second the city was enjoined from paying over moneys which it had appropriated for the purposes of the celebration. The cases of Tash v. Adams, 10 Cush. 252; Hood v. Lynn, 1 Allen, 103, and Austin v. Coggeshall, 12 R. I. 329, 34 Am. Rep. 648, are to the same effect. In Stegmaier v. Goeringer, 218 Pa. St. 499, 67 Atl. 782, 11 Ann. Cas. 973, in which it was held that the general welfare clause in the Pennsylvania statute relating to cities of the third class was broad enough to confer the express power to make an appropria- See post, pp. 1114- tion for the commemoration of events of great public interest, the court said: “The custom of commemorat- ing important historical, military, and civil events is as old as mankind, and at common law the right of munici- palities to make appropriations out of the public funds for the proper ob- servance of such occasions was rec- ognized for centuries. There is no reason why a municipality, unless re- stricted by statute, should not be per- mitted to make reasonable appropri- ations in order to fitly commemorate public events in which all the citizens thereof are, orshould be, interested. . . . It must not be understood, however, that because in a proper case, and for a proper purpose, 4 municipality has the power to make such an appropria- tion it can do so without any limi- tations or restrictions. ‘The general rule that a public corporation cannot make a contract to provide an enter- tainment for its citizens or guests is freely conceded; also that it is not within the power of cities of the460 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I The supervisors of the city of New York refused to perform a duty imposed upon them by law, and were prosecuted severally third class to make appropriations for expenses incurred in providing re- freshments, entertainments and din- ners for delegates to a convention; or for entertaining guests at a supper or ball; or, indeed, for the purpose of extending hospitality or furnishing social pleasures either to citizens or invited guests. While these limita- tions have been very properly imposed upon municipalities, it does not follow that they do not have the power to make an appropriation to fittingly decorate and otherwise ornament the streets and public buildings, and to provide suitable conveniences for the accommodation of the public in the enjoyment of the ceremonies incident to the occasion.” A town, it has been held, cannot offered by a vote of the town for the apprehension and conviction of a per- son supposed to have committed mur- der therein. Gale v. South Berwick, 51 Me. 174. See also Hawk v. Marion County, 48 Iowa, 472; Hanger v. Des Moines, 52 Iowa, 193, 2 N. W. 1105, 35 Am. Rep. 266; Board of Com- missioners v. Bradford, 72 Ind. 455, 37 Am. Rep. 174; Patton v. Stephens, 14 Bush, 324; Felker v. Elk County, 70 Kan. 96, 78 Pac. 167, 3 Ann. Cas. 156; Luchini v. Police Jury, 126 La. 972, 53 So. 68, 21 Ann. Cas. 59. Con- tra, Borough of York v. Forscht, 23 Pa. St. 391; and see, People v. Holly, 119 Mich. 637, 78 N. W. 665, 44 L. R. A. 677, 75 Am. St. Rep. 435. In Louisiana it has been held that a police jury, having the power to prohibit the sale of intoxicants in a parish, has power to offer rewards for evidence of violations of its ordinances, and that the fact that the prosecutions for these violations are carried on in the name of the State does not affect its power to offer the rewards. Lu- chini v. Police Jury, 126 La. 972, 53 So. 68, 21 Ann. Cas. 59. As to the power of a municipality to bind itself by the offer of a reward, see further, Crawshaw v. Roxbury, 7 Gray, 374; Lee v. Flemingsburg, 7 Dana, 28; Loveland v. Detroit, 41 Mich. 367, 1 N. W. 952; Janvrin »v. Exeter, 48 N. H. 83; Murphy v. Jack- sonyville, 18 Fla. 318. An officer cannot claim an offered reward for merely doing his duty. Pool v. Boston, 5 Cush. 219. See Stamp »v. Cass County, 47 Mich. 330, 11 N. W. 188. Under its general authority to raise money for “necessary town charges”, a town is not authorized to raise and expend moneys to send lobbyists to the legislature. Frank- fort v. Winterport, 54 Me. 250; Mead v. Acton, 1389 Mass. 341, 1 N. E. 4138. Nor, under like authority, to furnish a uniform for a volunteer military company. Claflin v. Hopkinton, 4 Gray, 502. Under power to raise money for celebration of holidays and ‘other public purposes’’, it may raise it for public concerts. Hubbard v. Taun- ton, 140 Mass. 467, 5 N. EB. 157. County cannot lease rooms of court-house to be used for private pur- poses. State v. Hart, 144 Ind. 107, 43 °N. EB: i) co ln Re AS lS) suppor lease of public buildings for private purposes, see note to this case in L. Re AY Where a municipal corporation en- ters into a contract ultra vires, no im- plied contract arises to compensate the contractor for anything he may have done under it, notwithstanding the corporation may have reaped a benefit therefrom. McSpedon v. New York, 7 Bosw. 601; McDonald »v. Mayor, 68 N. Y. 23; Zottman v. San Francisco, 20 Cal. 96; Niles Water Works v. Mayor, 59 Mich. 311, 26 N. W. 525; Swanson v. Ottumwa, 131 Iowa, 540, 106 N. W. 9, 5 L. R. A. (x. s.) 860, 9 Ann. Cas. 1117; Min- neapolis, ete., Electric Traction Co. v. Minneapolis, 124 Minn. 351, 145 N. W. 609, 50 L. R. A. (N. s.) 148. Compare East St. Louis v. East St. Louis, etc., Co., 19 Ill. App. 44; Montgomery ». Montgomery Water Works, 79 Ala. 233.CHAP. VIII] SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 461 and judgment recovered for the penalty which the law imposed for such refusal. The board of supervisors then assumed, on behalf of the city and county, the payment of these judgments, together with the costs of defending the suits, and caused drafts to be drawn upon the treasurer of the city for these amounts. It was held that these drafts upon the public treasury to indemnify officers for disregard of duty were altogether unwarranted and void, and that it made no difference that the officers had acted conscientiously in refusing to perform their duty, and in the honest belief that the law imposing the duty was unconstitutional. The city had no interest in the suits against the supervisors, and appropriating the public funds to satisfy the judgments and costs was not within either the express fact appropriating the public money for or implied powers conferred upon the board.’ It was in private purposes, and a tax levied therefor must consequently be invalid, on general princi- ples controlling t another place. tive charter provisions, a municipality has the } he right of taxation, which will be considered in [But it has been held that in the absence of prohibi- power to reimburse a police officer for expenses and attorney’s fees incurred in the defense of an action for false imprisonment ; acting in good faith in the exercise of his official duties.’] “No instance occurs to us in which it would be lowa case it is said : competent for [a municipal corporation] accommodation paper for the benefit of 3 and where it cannot loan its credit ally without power to appropriate treasury for such purposes, or by the conduct of execute private enterprises 7 to private undertakings, it is equ the moneys in its it appearing that the officer was In an to loan its credit or make its citizens, to enable them to its officers to subject itself to implied obligations." (In a Florida 1 Halstead v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 3 N. Y. 430. Seea similar case in People v. Lawrence, 6 Hill, 244. See also Carroll v. St. Louis, 12 Mo. 444; Vincent v. Nantucket, 12 Cush. 103; Parsons v. Goshen, 11 Pick. 396; Merrill v. Plainfield, 45 N. H. 126. 2 Moorhead v. Murphy, 94 Minn. 123, 102 N. W. 219, 110 Am. St. Rep. 345, 68 L. R. A. 400, 3 Ann. Cas. 434. See also Cullen v. Carthage, 103 Ind. 196, 2 N. E. 571, 53 Am. Rep. 504; Bancroft v. Lynnfield, 18 Pick. 566, 29 Am. Dec. 623; Fuller ». Groton, 11 Gray, 340; Pike v. Middleton, 12 N. H. 278; Bradley v. Hammonton, 38 N. J. L. 430, 20 Am. Rep. 404 ; Sherman ». Carr, 8 R. I. 431. 3 Clark v. Des Moines, 19 Iowa, 199, 224: Carter v. Dubuque, 35 Towa, 416. See Tyson v. School Directors, 51 Pa. St. 9; Freeland v. Hastings, 10 Allen, 570; Thompson v. Pittston, 59 Me. 545; Kelly v. Marshall, 69 Pa. St. 319; Allen v. Jay, 60 Me. 124, Am. Law Reg., Aug., 1873 with note by Judge Redfield, 11 Am. Rep. 185. 4“JTn determining whether the sub- ject-matter is within the legitimate authority of the town, one of the tests is to ascertain whether the expenses were incurred in relation to a subject specially placed by law in other hands. 5c It is a decisive test against the validity of all grants of money by towns for objects liable to that objec- tion, but it does not settle questions arising upon expenditures for objects“at a 462 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I case it was held that in view of the rule that the authority of munic- ipalities to act, and particularly to levy a tax, must be made clearly to appear, and that doubts, if any, as to the power sought to be exercised, must be resolved against the municipality, it was not evident that the power to issue bonds to acquire land for an enlarged golf course in a city was included in the charter and general statu- tory powers of the city to purchase property for public parks and playgrounds and for any other municipal purpose the city council might deem proper, and to issue bonds for any purpose stated, and for any municipal purpose authorized by the charter and general law ; the issuing of bonds to construct a golf course being more in the nature of a corporate than of a governmental function."| The powers conferred upon the municipal governments must also be construed as confined in their exercise to the territorial limits em- braced within the municipality ;? and the fact that these powers are conferred in general terms will not warrant their exercise except within those limits. A general power “to purchase, hold, and con- vey estate, real and personal, for the public use” of the corporation, will not authorize a purchase outside the corporate limits for that purpose.’ Without some special provision they cannot, as of course, not specially provided for. In such cases the question still will recur, whether the expenditure was within the jurisdiction of the town. It may be safely assumed that, if the subject of the expenditure be in furtherance of some duty enjoined by statute, or in exoneration of the citizens of the town from a liability to a common burden, a contract made in reference to it will be valid and binding upon the town.” Allen v. Taunton, 19 Pick. 485, 487. See Tucker v. Virginia City, 4 Nev. 20. It is no objection to the validity of an act which authorizes an expendi- ture for a town-hall that rooms to be rented for stores are contained in it. White v. Stamford, 37 Conn. 578. 1 Bradentown v. State (Fla.), 102 So. 556, 36 A. L. R. 1297. In a head- note in this case, prepared by the court, it is stated that “while the leg- islature might authorize municipali- ties, within appropriate limitations for the protection of taxpayers, to purchase and maintain golf courses to be impartially conducted in the interest of the local public, thereby declaring it to be a municipal purpose, the courts should not, by deducing such authority from general powers conferred upon municipalities, antici- pate express legislation conferring upon municipalities the specific power to establish and maintain golf courses.” Compare Capen v. Portland, 112 Oreg. 14, 228 Pac. 105, 35 A. L. R. 589. 2 State v. Eason, 114 N. C. 787, 19 S. E. 88, 41 Am. St. 811, 23 L. R. A. 520, and note upon boundary of mu- nicipality upon navigable stream. “The general rule is that a munici- pal corporation cannot acquire real estate beyond its territorial limits, or lawfully perform any act beyond such limits, unless the power to do so is expressly given by law.’’ Langley »v. Augusta, 118 Ga. 590, 45 S. E. 486, 98 Am. St. Rep. 133. In Wisconsin it is held that the gen- eral rule that the authority of a mu- nicipal corporation does not extend be- yond its corporate boundaries does not apply to its mere business func- tions, but does to its governmental authority. Schneider v. Menasha, 118 Wis. 298, 95 N. W. 94. 5 Riley v. Rochester, 9 N. Y. 64. It is competent for a municipal corporation to purchase land outsideCHAP. VIII] SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 463 possess any control or rights over lands lying outside;1 and the taxes they levy of their own authority and the moneys they expend, must be for local purposes only.” But the question is a very different one how far the legislature of the State may authorize the corporation to extend its action to objects outside the city limits, and to engage in enterprises of a public nature which may be expected to benefit the citizens of the municipality in common with the people of the State at large, and also in some special and peculiar manner, but which neverthe- less are not under the control of the corporation, and are so far aside from the ordinary purposes of local governments that assistance by the municipality in such enterprises would not be warranted under any general grant of power for municipal government. For a few years past the sessions of the legislative bodies of the several States have been prolific in legislation which has resulted in flooding the country with municipal securities issued in aid of works of public improvement, to be owned, controlled, and operated by private parties, or by corporations created for the purpose ; the works them- selves being designed for the convenience of the people of the State at large, but being nevertheless supposed to be specially beneficial to supply itself with water. Newman v. Ashe, 9 Bax. 380. Or to provide drainage. Langley v. Augusta, 118 Ga. 590, 45 S. E. 486, 98 Am. St. Rep. 133; Coldwater v. Tucker, 36 Mich. 474, 24 Am. Rep. 601. See Rochester vy. Rush, 80 N. Y. 302; Houghton »v. Huron Copper M. Co., 57 Mich. 547, 24 N. W. 820. 1Per Kent, Chancellor, Denton ». Jackson, 2 Johns. Ch. 320. And see Bullock v. Curry, 2 Met. (Ky.) 171; Weaver v. Cherry, 8 Ohio St. 564; North Hempstead v. Hempstead, Hopk. 288; Concord v. Boscawen, 17 N. H. 465; Coldwater v. Tucker, 36 Mich. 474. In Virginia it is held that, in the absence of express authority, a munici- pal corporation has no power to operate a stone quarry outside of its corporate limits, though the stone is to be used for the repair of streets which it is required to keep in order. Don- able’s Adm’r v. Harrisonburg, 104 Va. 533, 52 S. E. 174, 2 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 910. But in Wisconsin it is held that a city having express authority to grade and pave streets and to pur- chase and hold real estate necessary or convenient for its use, has, by implication therefrom, authority to purchase a stone quarry without its corporate limits for the purpose of ob- taining therefrom raw material from which to manufacture crushed rock. Schneider v. Menasha, 118 Wis. 298, 95 N. W. 94. A city may be authorized to take land outside for a park. Matter of Application of Mayor, 99 N. Y. 569. See also Quitmann ». Jelks & McLeod, 139 Ga. 238, 77S. E. 76. But neither the legislature of the home State nor that of a sister State can authorize the city to construct and control a high- way in the sister State. Becker »v. La Crosse, 99 Wis. 414, 75 N. W. 84, 40 L. R. A. 829, 67 Am. St. 874. 2In Parsons v. Goshen, 11 Pick. 396, the action of a town appropriating money in aid of the construction of a county road was held void and no protection to the officers who had expended it. See also Concord vv. Boscawen, 17 N. H. 465. A town cannot lay a tax for the benefit of a cemetery which it does not control. Luques v. Dresden, 77 Me. 186.464 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I to certain localities because running near or through them, and there- fore justifying, it is supposed, the imposition of a special burden by taxation upon such localities to aid in their construction. We have elsewhere * referred to cases in which it has been held that the legislature may constitutionally authorize cities, townships, and counties to subscribe to the stock of railroad companies, or to loan them their credit, and to tax their citizens to pay these subscriptions, or the bonds or other securities issued as loans, where a peculiar benefit to the municipality was anticipated from the improvement. The rulings in these cases, if sound, must rest upon the same right which allows such municipalities to impose burdens upon their citi- zens to construct local streets or roads, and they can only be de- fended on the ground that “the object to be accomplished is so obviously connected with the [municipality] and its interests as to conduce obviously and in a special manner to their prosperity and 3 But there are advancement.” 1Jn Merrick v. Inhabitants of Am- herst, 12 Allen, 500, it was held com- petent for the legislature to authorize a town to raise money by taxation for a State agricultural college, to be located therein. The case, however, we think, stands on different reasons from those where aid has been voted by municipalities to public improve- ments. See it explained in Jenkins ». Andover, 103 Mass. 94. And see similar cases referred to, post, p. 486, n. 3. 2 Ante, pp. 236-239. 3 Talbot v. Dent, 9 B. Monr. 526. See Hasbrouck v. Milwaukee, 13 Wis. 37. It seems not inappropriate to re- mark in this place that the three au- thors who have treated so ably of municipal constitutional law (Mr. Sedgewick, Stat. & Const. Law, 464), of railway law (Judge Redfield), and of municipal corporations (Judge Dillon), have all united in condemning this legislation as unsound and unwar- ranted by the principles of constitu- tional law. See the views of the two writers last named in note to the case of People v. Township Board of Salem, 9 Am. Law Reg. 487. And Judge Dillon well remarks in his Treatise on Municipal Corporations (§ 104) that, “regarded in the light of its effects, there is little hesitation in affirming authorities which dispute their that this invention to aid private en- terprises has proved itself baneful in the last degree.”’ If we trace the beginning of this legislation, we shall find it originating at a time when there had been little occasion to consider with care the limitations to the functions of munic- ipal government, because as yet those functions had been employed with general caution and prudence, and no disposition had been manifested to stretch their powers to make them embrace matters not usually recog- nized as properly and _ legitimately falling within them, or to make use of the municipal machinery to further private ends. Nor did the earliest decisions attract much attention, for they referred to matters somewhat local, and the spirit of speculation was not as yet rife. When the construction of railways and canals was first en- tered upon by an expenditure of public funds to any considerable extent, the States themselves took them in charge, and for a time appropriated large sums and incurred immense debts in enterprises, some of which were of high importance and others of little value, the cost and management of which threatened them at length with financial disaster, bankruptcy, and possible repudiation. No long ex- perience was required to demonstrateCHAP. VIII] that railways and canals could not be profitably, prudently, or safely man- aged by the shifting administrations of State government; and many of the States not only made provision for disposing of their interest in works of public improvement, but, in view of a bitter experience of the evils already developed in undertaking to construct and control them, they amended their constitutions so as to prohibit the State, when again the fever of specu- lation should prevail, from engaging anew in such undertakings. All experience shows, however, that men are abundant who do not scruple to evade a constitutional provision which they find opposed to their de- sires, if they can possibly assign a plausible reason for doing so; and in the case of the provisions before re- ferred to, it was not long before per- gons began to question their phrase- ology very closely, not that they might arrive at the actual purpose, — which indeed was obvious enough, — but to discover whether that purpose might not be defeated without a viola- tion of the express terms. The pur- pose clearly was to remand all such undertakings to private enterprise, and to protect the citizens of the State from being taxed to aid them; but while the State was forbidden to en- gage in such works, it was unfortu- nately not expressly decla red that the several members of the State, in their corporate capacity, were also forbid- den to do so. The conclusion sought and reached was that the agencies of the State were at liberty to do what was forbidden to the State itself, and the burden of debt which the State might not directly impose upon its citizens, it might indirectly place upon their shoulders by the aid of municipal action. The legislation adopted under this construction some of the courts felt compelled to sustain, upon the ac- cepted principle of constitutional law that no legislative authority is for- bidden to the legislature unless for- bidden in terms; and the voting of municipal aid to railroads became al- most a matter of course wherever a plausible scheme could be presented voL. 1—30 SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 465 by interested parties to invite it. In some localities, it is true, vigorous pro- test was made; but as the handling of a large amount of public money was usually expected to make the fortune of the projectors, whether the enter- prise proved successful or not, means either fair or unfair were generally found to overcome all opposition. Towns sometimes voted large sums to railroads on the ground of local benefit where the actual and inevitable result was local injury, and the projectors of one scheme succeeded in obtaining and negotiating the bonds of one munici- pality to the amount of a quarter of a million dollars, which are now being enforced, though the work they were to aid was never seriously begun. A very large percentage of all the aid voted was paid to “work up the aid”, sacrificed in discounts to purchasers of bonds, expended in worthless under- takings, or otherwise lost to the tax- payers; and the cases might almost be said to be exceptional in which munici- palities, when afterwards they were called upon to meet their obligations, could do so with a feeling of having received the expected consideration. Some State and territorial governors did noble work in endeavoring to stay this reckless legislative and municipal action, and of the States at length rendered such action impossi- ble by constitutional provisions so plain and positive that the most in- some genious mind was unable to misun- derstand or pervert them. When the United States entered upon a scheme of internal improve- ment, the Cumberland road was the first important project for which its revenues were demanded. The prom- ises of this enterprise were of con- tinental magnificence and importance, but they ended, after heavy national expenditures, in a road no more na- tional than a thousand others which the road-masters in the several States have constructed with the local taxes; and it was finally abandoned to the States as a common highway. When next a great national scheme was broached, the aid of the general gov- ernment was demanded by way of subsidies to private corporations, who466 presented schemes of works of great public convenience and utility, which were to open up the new Territories to improvement and settlement sooner than the business of the country would be likely to induce unaided pri- vate capital to do it, and which con- sequently appealed to the imagination rather than to facts to demonstrate their importance, and afforded abun- dant opportunity for sharp operators to call to their assistance the national sentiment, then peculiarly strong and active by reason of the attempt re- cently made to overthrow the gov- ernment, in favor of projects whose national importance in many cases the imagination alone could discover. The general result was the giving away of immense bodies of land, and in some cases the granting of pecuniary aid, with a recklessness and often with an appearance of corruption that at length startled the people, and aroused a public spirit before which the active spirits in Congress who had promoted these grants, and sometimes even demanded them in the name of the poor settler in the wilderness who was unable to get his crops to market, were compelled to give way. The scandalous frauds connected with the Pacific Railway, which disgraced the nation in the face of the world, and the great and disastrous financial panic of 1873, were legitimate results of such subsidies; but the pioneer in the wilderness had long before discovered that land grants were not always sought or taken with a view to an im- mediate appropriation to the roads for the construction of which they were nominally made, but that the result in many cases was that large tracts were thereby kept out of the market and from taxation, which otherwise would have been purchased and occupied by settlers who would have lessened his taxes by contribut- ing their share to the public burdens. The grants, therefore, in such cases, instead of being at once devoted to improvements for the benefit of set- tlers, were in fact kept in a state of nature by the speculators who had secured them, until the improve- ments of settlers in their vicinity CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I could make the grantees wealthy by the increase in value which such im- provements gave to the land near them. In saying this the admission is freely made that in many cases the grants were promptly and honestly appropriated in accordance with their nominal purpose; but the general verdict now is that the system was necessarily corruptive and tended to invite fraud, and that some persons of influence managed to accumulate great wealth by grants indirectly se- cured to themselves under the un- founded pretense of a desire to aid and encourage the pioneers in the wilderness. Some States also have recently in their corporate capacity again en- gaged in issuing bonds to subsidize private corporations, with the natural result of serious State scandals, State insolvency, public discontent, and in some cases, it would seem, almost in- evitable repudiation. Their govern- ments, amid the disorders of the times, have fallen into the hands of strangers and novices, and the hobby of public improvement has been ridden furi- ously under the spur of individual greed. It has often been well remarked that the abuse of a power furnishes no argument against its existence; but a system so open to abuses may well challenge attention to its foundations. And when those foundations are ex- amined, it is not easy to find for them any sound support in the municipal constitutional law of this country. The same reasons which justify subsi- dies to the business of common carriers by railway will support taxation in aid of any private business whatsoever. It is sometimes loosely said that railway companies are public corpora- tions, but the law does not so regard them. It is the settled doctrine of the law that, like banks, mining com- panies, and manufacturing companies, they are mere private corporations, supposed to be organized for the bene- fit of the individual corporators, and subject to no other public supervision or control than any other private as- sociation for business purposes to which corporate powers have beenCHAP. VIII] granted. Dartmouth College v. Wood- ward, 4 Wheat. 518, 4 L. ed. 629; Bon- aparte v. Camden & Amboy Re ReiCo:; Baldw. 216; Eustis v. Parker, 1 N. H. 2a; Ohio &c. R. R. Co. v. Lidge, 5 Blackf. 78; Cox v. Louisville, &c. R. R. Co., 48 Ind. 178, 189; Roanoke, &c. R. R. Co. v. Davis, 2 Dev. & Bat. 451; Dearborn v. Boston, c. & M. R. R. Co., 4 Fost. 179; Trustees, we. v. Auburn, &c. R. R. Co., 3 Hill, 567; Tinsman v. Belvidere, &c. R. R. Co., 26 N. J. L. 148; Thorpe v. Rutland, &e. R. R. Co., 27 Vt. 140; Alabama R. R. Co. v. Kidd, 29 Ala. 221; Turnpike Co. v. Wallace, 8 Watts, 316; Sey- mour v. Turnpixe Co., 10 Ohio, 477; Ten Eyck v. D. & R. Canal, 3 Harr. 200; Atlantic, &c. Telegraph Co. v. Chicago, &c. R. R. Co., 6 Biss. 158; A. & A. on Corp. §§ 30-36; Redf. on Railw. c. 3, § 1; Pierce on Railroads, 19, 20. Taxation to subsidize them cannot therefore be justified on the ground of any public character they possess, any more than to subsidize banks or mining companies. It is truly said that it has long been the settled doctrine that the right of eminent domain may be employed in their behalf, and it has sometimes been insisted with much earnestness that wherever the State may aid an enterprise under the right of eminent domain, it may assist it by taxation also. But the right of taxa- tion and the right of eminent domain are by no means co-extensive, and do not rest wholly upon like reasons. The former compels the citizen to con- tribute his proportion of the public burden; the latter compels him to part with nothing for which he is not to receive pecuniary compensation. The tax in the one case is an exaction, the appropriation in the other is only a forced sale. To take money for private purposes under pretense of taxation is, as has been often said, but robbery and plunder; to appropriate under the right of eminent domain for a private corporation robs no one, be- cause the corporation pays for what is taken, and in some cases, important to the welfare and prosperity of the com- munity, and where a public conven- ience is to be provided, — as in the SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 467 case of a grist mill, — it has long been held competent to exercise the one power, while the other was conceded to be inadmissible. Few persons would attempt to justify a tax in aid of a mill-owner, on the ground that laws appropriating lands for his bene- fit, but at his expense, have been sup- ported. The truth is, the right to tax in favor of private corporations of any description must rest upon the broad ground that the power of the legisla- ture, subject only to the express re- strictions of the constitution, is su- preme, and that, in the language of some of the there the least possibility that making the gift will be promotive in any degree of the public welfare, it becomes a question of policy, and not of natural justice, and the determination of the legisla- ture is conclusive.” (Post, p. 1030.) But nothing is better settled on au- thority than that this strong lan- guage, though entirely when it refers to the making provision for those things which it falls within the province of government to provide for its citizens, or to the payment for cases, “ if be true services performed for the State, or the satisfaction of legal, equitable, or moral obligations resting upon it, is wholly inadmissible when the purpose is to impose a burden upon one man for the benefit of another. Many such cases might be suggested in which there would not only be a “‘possi- bility”, but even a strong probability, that a small burden imposed upon the public to set an individual up in busi- ness, or to build him a house, or other- wise make him comfortable, would be promotive of the public welfare; but in law the purpose of any such burden is deemed private, and the incidental benefit to the public is not recognized as an admissible basis of taxation. In Allen v. Inhabitants of Jay, 60 Me. 124, 11 Am. Rep. 185, it became necessary to reaffirm a doctrine, often declared by the courts, that however great was the power to tax, it was ex- ceeded, and the legislature was at- tempting the exercise of a power not legislative in its character, when it undertook to impose a burden on the public for a private purpose. Andit was468 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I soundness, and it cannot be denied that this species of legislation has been exceedingly mischievous in its results, that it has created a also held that the raising of money by tax in order to loan the same to private parties to enable them to erect mills and manufactories in such town, was raising it for a private purpose, and therefore illegal. Appleton, Ch. J., most truly remarks in that case, that ‘all security of private rights, all pro- tection of private property, is at an end, when one is compelled to raise money to loan at the will of others for their own use and benefit, when the power is given to a majority to lend or give away the property of an unwilling minority.”” And yet how plain it is that the benefit of the local public might possibly have been promoted by the proposed erections. See, to the same effect, Loan Association v. To- peka, 20 Wall. 655, 22 L. ed. 455, where the whole subject is carefully considered and presented with clear- ness and force, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Miller ; also Commercial Bank v. Iola, 2 Dill. C. C. 355; 9 Kan. 689; Weismer v. Douglas, 64 N. Y. 91, 21 Am. Rep. 586; Parkersburg v. Brown, 106 U.S. 487, 27 L. ed. 238, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 442; Cole v. La Grange, 113 U. S. 1, 28 L. ed. 896, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 416, and cases cited; Mather v. Ottawa, 114 Ill. 659, 3 N. E. 216. These cases are not singular: they are representative cases; and they are cited only because they are among the most recent expressions of judicial opinion on the subject. With them may be placed Lowell v. Boston, 111 Mass. 454, 15 Am. Rep. 39, in which the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, after the great fire of 1872 in Boston, denied the power of the Common- wealth to permit taxation in order to loan the moneys out to the person who had suffered by the fire. Like decisions are found in State v. Osaw- kee, 14 Kan. 418, and Feldman »v. City Council, 23 S. C. 57. These decisions of eminent tribunals indicate a limit to legislative power in the matter of taxation, and hold, what has been decided very many times be- fore, that it is not necessary the con- stitution should forbid expressly the taxing for private purposes, since it is implied in the very idea of taxation that the purpose must be public, and a taking for any other purpose is un- lawful confiscation. Cooley on Taxa- tion, 67 et seq. One difference there undoubtedly is between the case of a railroad corpora- tion and a manufacturing corporation; that there are precedents in favor of taxing for the one and not for the other. But if the precedents are a departure from sound principle, then, as in every other case where principle is departed from, evils were to have been expected. A catalogue of these would include the squandering of the public domain; the enrichment of schemers whose policy it has been, first, to obtain all they can by fair promises, and then avoid as far and as long as possible the fulfillment of the promises; the corruption of legisla- tion; the loss of State credit; great public debts recklessly contracted for moneys often recklessly expended; public discontent because the enter- prises fostered from the public treas- ury and on the pretense of public bene- fit are not believed to be managed in the public interest; and, finally, great financial panic, collapse, and disaster. At such a cost has the strong expres- sion of dissent which all the while has accompanied these precedents been dis- regarded and set aside. Where legislature is prohibited from making a gift to any private person or corporation, it cannot release a debt due to State from such person or cor- poration: Matter of Stanford, 126 Cal. 112, 54 Pac. 259, 58 Pac. 462, 45 L. R. A. 788. An appropriation for “‘re- lief” of a street contractor is void. Conlin v. San Francisco, 99 Cal. 17, 33 Pac. 753, 21 L. R. A. 474, 37 Am. St. 17; so one for benefit of sufferers from flood: Patty v. Golgan, 97 Cal. 251, 31 Back 33; 18) bs Re Av. (44° and one for relief of employee of State injured through negligence of his su- perior officer: Bourn v. Hart, 93 Cal. 321, 28 Pac. 951, 15 L. R. A. 431, 27 Am. St. 203.CHAP. VIII] SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 469 great burden of public debt, for which in a large number of cases the anticipated benefit was never received, and that, as is likely to be the case where municipal governments take part in projects for- eign to the purposes of their creation, it has furnished unusual facilities for fraud and public plunder, and led almost inevitably, at last, to discontent; sometimes even to disorder and violence. In some of the recent revisions of State constitutions, the legislature has been expressly prohibited from permitting the municipalities to levy taxes or incur debts in aid of works of public improvement, or to become stockholders in private corporations.' 1The following States have such provisions in their constitutions: Col- orado, Connecticut, Illinois, Missis- sippi, Missouri, and New Hampshire. Many of the State constitutions ex- pressly forbid State aid to private cor- porations of any sort, and it is prob- able that their provisions are broad enough in some cases to prohibit aid by the municipalities also. Upon what is an indebtedness within constitutional and statutory restric- tions upon indebtedness of municipal corporations, see Beard v. Hopkins- ville, 95 Ky. 239, 24S. W. 872, 44 Am. St. 222, 23 L. R. A. 402, and note; South Bend v. Reynolds, 155 Ind. 70, 57 N. E. 706, 49 L. R. A. 795; La Porte v. Gamewell F. A. T. Co., 146 Ind. 466, 45 N. E. 588, 58 Am. St. 359, 35 L. R. A. 686; Brashear v. Madison, 142 Ind. 685, 36 N. E. 252, 42 N. E. 349, 33 L. R. A. 474; Lamar W. & E. L. Co. v. Lamar, 128 Mo. 188, 31 S. W. 756, 32 L. R. A. 157; McBean vy. Fresno, 112 Cal. 159, 44 Pac. 358, RS) Am. St. 191, 31 L. RK: A. 794; Kelley ». Minneapolis, 63 Minn. 125, 65 N. W. 115; Hodges ». Crowley, 186 Ill. 305, 57 N. E. 889. Where the constitution denies to municipalities the power to incur debts for any except necessary expenses un- less specially authorized by the legis- lature and by popular vote, a debt for the purchase of an electric lighting plant for public purposes is within the restriction. Mayo v. Washington, 122 N. C. 5, 29S. E. 343, 40 L. R. A. 163. The prohibition mentioned in the text above does not extend to con- struction of public improvements which shall be the property of the municipality. Sun P. & P. Assn. ». New York, 152 N. Y. 257, 46 N. E. 499, 37 L. R. A. 788. But it prevents a city from becoming part owner. Ampt v. Cincinnati, 56 Ohio, 47, 46 N. E. 69, 35 L. R. A. 737, and note. Prohibition of aid to any corpora- tion applies only to private corpora- tions. Does not prevent gift to United States. Lancey v. King Co., 15 Wash. 9, 45 Pac. 645, 34 L. R. A. 817. Where the constitution forbids the loan of the public credit for private benefit a statute authorizing the issue of bonds to pay for a local improve- ment, the cost thereof to be recovered by the levy of annual installments upon the property benefited, is void. Martin v. Tyler, 4 N. D. 278, 60 N. W. 392, 25 L. R. A. 838. By becoming a member of a mutual insurance company a municipality does not become the owner of any stock or bonds of the company in vio- constitutional provision prohibiting any municipality from owning any stock or bonds of any as- sociation or corporation; and by giv- ing premium notes for the payment of assessments to incurred by such an insurance company, the municipality does not loan its credit to the company in violation of a con- stitutional prohibition against doing Millville, 66 N. J. L. lation of a losses meet so. French 1 392, 49 Atl. 465 For a contract between a munici- pality and a transportation company which was held not to violate a con- stitutional provision prohibiting any city from giving any money or prop- erty or loaning its money oF credit to470 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [voL. 1 Assuming that any such subscriptions or securities may be au- thorized, the first requisite to their validity would seem, then, to be a special legislative authority to make or issue them; an authority which does not reside in the general words in which the powers of local self-government are usually conferred,! and one also which or in aid of any individual, association or corporation, see Admiral Realty Co. v. New York, 206 N. Y. 110, 99 N. E. 241. A constitutional prohibition against making a donation directly to a rail- road precludes a municipality from making such a donation indirectly by compensating citizens who have al- ready paid over money to the cor- poration. Adel v. Woodall, 122 Ga. 535, 50S. E. 481. Upon the general subject of munici- pal bonds, when they may be issued, for what purposes, etc., see notes to 37 L. ed. U.S. 145, and 34 L. ed. U.S. 344. 1 Bullock v. Curry, 2 Met. (Ky.) 171. A general power to borrow money or incur indebtedness to aid in the con- struction of “any road or bridge” must be understood to have reference only to the roads or bridges within the municipality. Stokes v. Scott County, 10 Iowa, 166; State ». Wa- pello County, 13 Iowa, 388; Lafay- ette v. Cox, 5 Ind. 38. Power to submit to village voters raising money for extraordinary pur- poses does not cover the submission of railroad aid. Perrin v. New Lon- don, 67 Wis. 416, 30 N. W. 623. There are decisions in the Supreme Court of the United States which appear to be to the contrary. The city charter of Muscatine conferred in detail the usual powers, and then authorized the city “to borrow money for any object in its discretion”, after a vote of the city in favor of the loan. In Meyer v. Muscatine, 1 Wall. 384, 17 L. ed. 564, the court seem to have construed this clause as authorizing a loan for any object whatever; though such phrases are understood usually to be confined in their scope to the specific objects before enumerated; or at least to those embraced within the ordinary functions of municipal gov See Lafayette v. ernments. Cox 5 Ind. 38. The case in 1 Wallace was followed in Rogers v. Burlington, 3 Wall. 654, 18 L. ed. 79, four justices dissenting. See also Mitchell v. Bur- lington, 4 Wall. 270, 18 L. ed. 350, But in Brenham v. German American Bank, 144 U. S. 173, 549, 36 L. ed. 390, 399, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 559, 975, it was held that power conferred upon a municipality to borrow money “for general purposes” on the credit of the municipality, only gave power to borrow money for ordinary govern- mental purposes, such as are generally carried out with revenues derived from taxation, and Rogers v. Burling- ton, supra, and Mitchell v. Burlington, supra, were expressly overruled. It has been held that a municipal corporation having power to borrow money may make its obligations pay- able wherever it shall agree. Meyer v. Muscatine, 1 Wall. 384, 17 L. ed. 564; Lynde v. County, 16 Wall. 6, 21 L. ed. 272. But some cases hold that such obligations can only be made payable at the corporation treasury, unless there is express legis- lative authority to make them pay- able elsewhere. People v. Tazewell County, 22 Ill. 147; Pekin v. Rey- nolds, 31 Ill. 529. If the power to issue bonds is given, power to tax to meet them is impliedly given, unless a clear intent to the con- trary is shown. Quincy v. Jackson, 113 U. S. 332, 28 L. ed. 1001, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 544; Scotland Co. Court v. United States, 140 U. S. 41, 35 L. ed. 351, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 697; United States v. Saunders, 124 Fed. 124, 59 C. C. A. 394; Rose v. McKie, 145 Fed. 584, 76 C. C. A. 274; State v. Bristol, 109 Tenn. 315, 70S. W. 1031; Booten v. Pinson, 77 W. Va. 412, 89 S. BE. 985, L. R. A. 1917 A, 1244. See also Minden-Edison Light & Power Co. v. Minden, 94 Neb. 161, 142 N. W. 673. But power to borrow money on the credit of the city does not of itselfCHAP. VIII] SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 471 must be carefully followed by the municipality in all essential par- ticulars, or the subscription or security will be void. And while mere irregularities? of action, not going to the essentials of the power, would not prevent parties who had acted in reliance upon the securities enforcing them, yet as the doings of these corporations are matters of public record, and they have no general power to include power to issue negotiable bonds therefor. Brenham v. German Ameri- can Bank, 144 U.S. 173, 549, 36 L. ed. 390, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 559, 975; Merrill ». Monticello, 138 U. S. 673, 34 L. ed. 1069, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 441; Folsom v. School Directors, 91 Ill. 402; Heins »v. Lincoln, 102 Iowa, 69, TACN] We 18y: In some States, however, the con- trary rule prevails. Schmutz v. Little Rock Special School Dist., 78 Ark. 118, 95 S. W. 438; Buch’s Ex’r v. Fluvanna County, 86 Va. 452, 10 S. E. 532. 1See Harding v. Rockford, &c. R. R. Co., 65 Ill. 90; Dunnovan ». Green, 57 Ill. 63; Springfield, &c. R. R. Co. v. Cold Spring, 72 Ill. 603; People v. County Board of Cass, 77 Ill. 438; Cairo, &c. R. R. Co. v. Sparta, 77 505; George v. Oxford, 16 Kan. 72 Hamlin v. Meadville, 6 Neb. 227 McClure v. Oxford, 94 U. S. 429, 2 L. ed. 129; Bates Co. v. Winters, 9 U. S. 83, 24 L. ed. 933; Buchanan t Litchfield, 102 U.S. 278, 26 L. ed. 138; Bissell v. Spring Valley, 110 U.S. 162, 28 L. ed. 105, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 555; Keith County v. Citizens’ Savings & Loan Ass’n, 116 Fed. 13, 53 C. C. A. 525; Aurora v. Hayden, 23 Colo. App. 1 126 Pac: 1109: Hartzler v. Good- land, 97 Kan. 129, 154 Pac. 265; Brownfield v. Kearney 94 Neb. 419, 143 N. W. 475; Burwell v. Lillington, 171 N. GC. 94, 87S. E. 970; McAndrew v. Dunmore Borough, 254 Pa. St. 101, 91 Atl. 237; Simpson v. Nacogdoches, (Tex. Civ. App.) 152 S. W. 858; State v. Clausen, 87 Wash. 111, 151 Pac. 251. Bonds cannot run a longer time than the legislature has given per- mission for. Barnum v. Okolona, 148 U. S. 393, 37 L. ed. 495, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 638. Strict compliance with all conditions necessary. Lytle v. Lans- ing, 147 U. S. 59, 37 L. ed. 78, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 254; Stewart v. Lansing, 104 U. S. 505, 26 L. ed. 866; People v. Van Valkenburg, 63 Barb. 105; Case v. Sullivan, 222 Ill. 56,78 N.E.37. But power to issue interest-bearing bonds carries with it power to issue negoti- able coupons for the interest. Board of Ed. v. De Kay, 148 U. S. 591, 37 L. ed. 573, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 706. Where the statute requires that the bonds shall recite the purposes for which they are issued, it is not sufficient to recite that they are is- sued by virtue of a specified ordinance in which is contained a statement of the purpose for which the bonds are to be issued. Bonds containing no further or more specific recital of pur- pose are void in the hands of every holder. Barnett v. Denison, 145 U. S. 135, 36 L. ed. 652, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 819. Where question submitted to popu- lar vote was on bonds bearing interest payable annually, making interest payable semi-annually invalidates the bonds. Skinner v. Santa Rosa, 107 Cal. 469, 40 Pac. 742, 29 L. R. A. 512. Where statute prescribes that they shall be payable ‘‘in gold coin or law- ful money of the United States ”’, mak- ing them payable in gold coin invali- [bid., and see note hereto in L. R. A. Place of payment of cou- pons cannot be varied. Middleton v. St. Augustine, 42 Fla. 287, 29 So. 421. 2 Like error in copying a single word in the title of a statute, or a mis- recital of the name of the obligor cor- poration. Board of Ed. v. De Kay, 148 U.S. 591, 37 L. ed. 573, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 706. And any improper or fraudulent action taken by the munici- pality in regard to the proceeds of the bonds after their issue cannot in- validate them. Cairo v. Zane, 149 U. S. 122, 37 L. ed. 673, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 803. dates them.472 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. 1 issue negotiable securities,’ any one who becomes holder of such securities, even though they be negotiable in form, will take them with constructive notice of any want of power in the corporation to issue them, and cannot enforce them when their issue was unauthor- ized.” 1 Thomson v. Lee County, 3 Wall. 327, 18 L. ed. 177; Police Jury v. Brit- ton, 15 Wall. 566, 21 L. ed. 251; Wells v. Supervisors, 102 U. S. 625, 26 L. ed. 122; Claiborne Co. v. Brooks, 111 U. S. 400, 28 L. ed. 47, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 489 ; Carter Co. v. Sinton, 120 U. S. 517, 30 L. ed. 701, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 650; Starin v. Genoa, 23 N. Y. 439; People v, Supervisors, 11 Cal. 170; Dively »v. Cedar Falls, 21 Iowa, 565; Smith ». Cheshire, 13 Gray, 318; People ». Gray, 23 Cal. 125; Bradbury v. Idaho Falls, 32 Idaho, 28, 177 Pac. 388; Reed v. Cedar Rapids, 136 Iowa, 191, 113 N. W. 773; Schieffelin v. Hylan, 124 N. Y. Supp. 506. See Thomas ». Richmond, 12 Wall. 349, 20 L. ed. 453; Katzenberger v. Aberdeen, 121 U. S. 172, 30 L. ed. 911, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 947; Emery v. Mariaville, 56 Me. 315; Sherrard v. Lafayette Co., 3 Dill. 236. The power to tax in aid of railroads does not necessarily give power to issue negotiable bonds. Concord ». Robinson, 121 U.S. 165, 30 L. ed. 885, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 937; Kelly v. Milan, 127 U.S. 139, 32 L. ed. 77, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1101. Compare Savannah v. Kelly, 108 U. S. 184, 27 L. ed. 696, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 468; Richmond ». McGirr, 78 Ind. 192. 2 There is considerable confusion in the cases on this subject. If the cor- poration has no authority to issue ne- gotiable paper, or if the officers who assume to do so have no power under the charter for that purpose, there can be no doubt that the defense of want of power may be made by the corpora- tion in any suit brought on the securi- ties. Smith v. Cheshire, 13 Gray, 318; Gould v. Sterling, 23 N. Y. 456; An- dover v. Grafton, 7 N. H. 298; Clark v. Des Moines, 19 Iowa, 199; M’Pher- son v. Foster, 43 lowa, 48; Bissell v. Kankakee, 64 Ill. 249; Big Grove »v. Wells, 65 Ill. 263; Wade v. La Moille, 112 Ill. 79; Elmwood v. Marcy, 92 U. S. 289, 23 L. ed. 710; Concord ». Portsmouth Savings Bank, 92 U. S. 625, 23 L. ed. 628; St. Joseph v. Rogers, 16 Wall. 644, 21 L. ed. 328; Pendleton Co. v. Amy, 13 Wall. 297, 20 L. ed. 579; Marsh v. Fulton Co., 10 Wall. 676, 19 L. ed. 1040; East Oakland v. Skinner, 94 U. S. 255, 24 L. ed. 125; South Ottawa v. Perkins, 94 U. S. 260, 24 L. ed. 154; McClure v. Oxford, 94 U. S. 429, 24 L. ed. 129; Swanson v. Ot- tumwa, 131 Iowa, 540, 106 N. W. 9, 5 L. R. A. (n. s.) 860, 9 Ann. Cas. 1117; Schmitz v. Zeh, 91 Minn. 290, 97 N. W. 1049, 1 Ann. Cas. 322. And in any ease, if the holder has received the securities with notice of any valid defense, he takes them subject thereto. Lytle v. Lansing, 147 U.S. 59, 37 L. ed. 78, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 254; Stewart ». Lansing, 104 U. S. 505, 26 L. ed. 866; St. Lawrence Tp. v. Furman, 171 Fed. 400, 96 C. C. A. 356, 17 Ann. Cas. 1244. If the issue is without authority, the doctrine of protection to a pur- chaser in good faith has no application. Merchants’ Bank v. Bergen Co., 115 U. S. 384, 29 L. ed. 430, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 88. Where a legislative enactment pur- ports to confer upon a municipality authority to issue bonds, and such authority is in conflict with express or implied provisions of the Constitu- tion, the enactment confers no author- ity, and bonds issued thereunder are void in the hands of bona fide holders, and the municipality is not estopped to deny the validity of the bonds. State ex rel. Nuveen v. Greer, 88 Fla. 249, 102 So. 739, 37 A. L. R. 1298. But where the corporation has power to issue negotiable paper in some cases, and its officers have assumed to do so in cases not within the charter, whether a bona fide holder would be chargeable with notice of the want of authority in the particular case, or on the other hand, would be entitled to rely on the securities themselves as sufficient evidence that they were properly is-CHAP. VIII] sued when nothing appeared on their face to apprise him of the contrary, is a question still open to some dispute. Where the amount of indebtedness is limited by the State Constitution and the bonds contain a recital that the total amount of the issue does not exceed the limit, and the bonds do not show on their face the amount of the issue, it has been held that the mu- nicipality will be estopped by the re- cital as against a bona fide purchaser. Chaffee Co. v. Potter, 142 U.S. 355, 35 L. ed. 1040, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 216; Board of Commissioners v. E. H. Rol- lins & Sons, 173 U. S. 255, 43 L. ed. 689, 19 Sup. Ct. 390. Compare Dixon Go. v. Field, 111 U. S. 83, 28 L. ed. 360, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 315; Lake Co. ». Graham, 130 U.S. 674, 32 L. ed. 1065, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 654; Sutliff v. Board of County Commissioners, 147 U. S. 230, 37 L. ed. 145, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 318; St. Lawrence Tp. v. Furman, 171 Fed. 400, 96 C. C. A. 356, 17 Ann. Cas. 1244; Schnell v. Rock Island, 232 III. 89, 83 N. E. 462, 14 L. R. A. (w. s.) 874; Eddy Valve Co. v. Crown Point, 166 Ind. 613, 76 N. E. 536, 3 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 684. In South Bend v. Reynolds, 155 Ind. 70, 57 N. BE. 706, 49 L. R. A. 7985, it was held that where the debt arises under a continuing contract of lease and the annual installments, together with all other running expenses, are within the current revenues of the city, such debt does not pass the pre- scribed limit of indebtedness, no mat- ter how great the aggregate during the life of the contract. For other cases upon limitation of indebtedness, see Kiehle v. South Bend, 44 U. S. App. 687, 36 L. R. A. 228; Rauch v. Chapman, 16 Wash. 568, 48 Pac. 253, 36 L. R. A. 407, 58 Am. St. 52; Grand Island & N. W. R. Co. »v. Baker, 6 Wyo. 369, 45 Pac. 494, 34 L. R. A. 835, 71 Am. St. 926; Saleno »v. Neosho, 127 Mo. 627, 30S. W. 190, 27 L. R. A. 769, 48 Am. St. 653; Brooke v. Philadelphia, 162 Pa. 123, 29 Atl. 887, 24 L. R. A. 781; Beard v. Hop- kinsville, 95 Ky. 239, 24S. W. 872, 44 Am. St. 222, 23 L. R. A. 402, and note; Crowder v. Sullivan, 128 Ind. 486, 28 IN. H. 94, 13°. RA. 647; Quill»: SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 473 Indianapolis, 124 Ind. 292, 23 N. E. 788, 7 L. R. A. 681. In Stoney v. American Life Insur- ance Co., 11 Paige, 635, it was held that a negotiable security of a cor- poration which upon its face appears to have been duly issued by such cor- poration, and in conformity with the provisions of its charter, is valid in the hands of a bona fide holder thereof without notice, although such secur- ity was in fact issued for a purpose, and at a place not authorized by the charter of the company, and in viola- tion of the laws of the State where it was actually issued. In Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175, 203, 17 L. ed. 520, 524, the law is stated as follows: ‘‘ When a corpora- tion has power, under any circum- stances, to issue negotiable securities, the bona fide holder has a right to pre- sume they were issued under the cir- cumstances which give the requisite authority, and they are no more liable to be impeached for any infirmity in the hands of such holder than any other commercial paper.’’ See also Aspinwall v. Daviess Co., 22 How. 364, 16 L. ed. 296; Bissell v. Jeffersonville, 24 How. 287, 16 L. ed. 664; Lexington v. Butler, 14 Wall. 282, 20 L. ed. 809; Moran v. Commissioners of Miami Co., 2 Black, 722, 17 L. ed. 342; De Voss ». Richmond, 18 Gratt. 338; San Antonio v. Lane, 32 Tex. 405; State v. Com- missioners, 37 Ohio St. 526. In Farmers’ & Mechanics’ Bank ». Butchers’ & Drovers’ Bank, 16 N. Y. 125, 129, it is said: “A citizen who deals directly with a corporation, or who takes its negotiable paper, is pre- sumed to know the extent of its cor- porate power. But when the paper is, upon its face, in all respects such as the corporation has authority to issue, and its only defect consists in some extrinsic fact, — such as the purpose or object for which it was issued, — to hold that the person taking the paper must inquire as to such extra- neous fact, of the existence of which he is in no way apprised, would obviously conflict with the whole policy of the law in regard to negotiable paper.” In Madison & Indianapolis Railroad Co. v. The Norwich Savings Society,474 24 Ind. 457, this doctrine is approved ; and a distinction made, in the earlier case of Smead v. Indianapolis, &c. Railroad Co., 11 Ind. 104, between paper executed wltra vires and that executed within the power of the cor- poration, but, by an abuse of the power in that particular instance, was re- pudiated. In St. Joseph v. Rogers, 16 Wall. 644, 21 L. ed. 328, it was decided that where power is conferred to issue bonds, but only in a particular manner, or subject to certain regulations, conditions, or qualifications, and the bonds are ac- tually issued with recitals showing compliance with the law, the proof that any of the recitals are incorrect will not constitute a defense to a suit on the bonds, ‘“‘if it appears that it was the sole province of the municipal officers who executed the bonds to de- cide whether or not there had been an antecedent compliance with the regu- lation, condition, or qualification which it is alleged was not fulfilled.” And see Moran v. Commissioners of Miami Co., 2 Black, 722, 17 L. ed. 342; Pen- dleton Co. v. Amy, 13 Wall. 297, 20 L. ed. 579; Chute v. Winegar, 15 Wall. 355, 21 L. ed. 170; Coloma v. Eaves, 92 U. S. 484, 23 L. ed. 579; Venice »v. Murdoch, 92 U. S. 494, 23 L. ed. 583; Marcy v. Oswego, 92 U. S. 687, 23 L. ed. 748; Humboldt v. Long, 92 U. S. 642, 23 L. ed. 752; Douglas Co. »v. Bolles, 94 U. S. 104, 24 L. ed. 46; Johnson Co. v. January, 94 U. S. 202, 24 L. ed. 343; Scotland Co. v. Thomas, 94 U. S. 682, 24 L. ed. 219; Wilson »v. Salamanca, 99 U.S. 499, 25 L. ed. 330; Menasha v. Hazard, 102 U. S. 81, 26 L. ed. 85; Lincoln v. Iron Co., 103 U. S. 412, 26 L. ed. 518; Bonham ». Needles, 103 U. S. 648, 26 L. ed. 451; Cairo v. Zane, 149 U.S. 122, 37 L. ed. 673, 138 Sup. Ct. Rep. 803; Stanly County v. Coler, 190 U.S. 487, 47 L. ed. 1126, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 811; Hitch- cock v. Platt, 201 U. S. 646, 50 L. ed. 903, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 761; Aurora »v. Gates, 208 Fed. 101, 125 C. C. A. 329, L. R. A. 1915 A, 910; Chinak »v, Burnside, 150 Ga. 556, 104 S. B. 435; Greene v. Rienzi, 87 Miss. 463, 40 So. 17, 112 Am. St. Rep. 449; Weil »v. Newbern, 126 Tenn. 223, 148 S. W. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [voL. I 680, L. R. A. 1915 A, 1009, Ann. Cas. 1913 EB, 25. That neither irregularities in issuing bonds nor fraud in obtaining them will be a defense in the hands of bona fide holders, see foregoing cases, and also Maxcy v. Williamson Co., 72 Ill. 207; Nicolay v. St. Clair, 3 Dillon, 163; East Lincoln v. Davenport, 94 U. S. 801, 24 L. ed. 322; Copper v. Mayor, &e., 44 N. J. L. 634; Aberdeen v. Sykes, 59 Miss. 236; Lynchburg »v. Slaughter, 75 Va. 57; Givens v. Hillsborough County, 46 Fla. 502, 35 So. 88, 110 Am. St. Rep. 104. But when one in whose hands the bonds are invalid puts them in course of trade so that they get into the hands of a bona fide holder and are enforced against the obligor, he is liable to such obligor for the tort. Winona & St. P. R. Co. ». Plainview, 143 U. S. 371, 36 L. ed. 191, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 530. Where recitals in county bonds plainly import that the bonds are is- sued for courthouse or jail purposes by order of the county commissioners’ court, in conformity with specified acts of the legislature, the county is estopped to assert, as against a bona fide holder, that the bonds are not within the limit authorized by the legislature, or are not issued for the purposes contemplated by the stat- utes. Presidio County v. Noel-Young Bond, etc., Co., 212 U. S. 58, 53 L. ed. 402, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 237. See, further, that there may be an estoppel by the recitals in favor of a bona fide holder: Ottawa v. Nat. Bank, 105 U. S. 342, 26 L. ed. 1127; Pana v. Bowler, 107 U. S. 529, 27 L. ed. 424, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 704; Sherman Co. ». Simons, 109 U. S. 735, 27 L. ed. 735, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 502; New Providence v. Halsey, 117 U. 8. 336, 29 L. ed. 904, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 764; Oregon v. Jen- nings, 119 U. S. 74, 30 L. ed. 323, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 124; State v. Mont- gomery, 74 Ala. 226; Shurtleff v. Wiscasset, 74 Me. 130; Gunnison Co. Com’rs v. Rollins & Sons, 173 U. S. 255, 43 L. ed. 689, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 390; Harper Co. Com’rs v. Rose, 140 U.S. 71, 35 L. ed. 344, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 710; Chaffee Co. Com’rs v. Potter, 142 U.S. 355, 35 L. ed. 1040, 12 Sup.CHAP. VIII] Ct. Rep. 216; Huron v. 2d Ward Sav. Bk., 57 U. S. App. 593, 86 Fed. Rep. 272, 30 C. C. A. 38, 49 L. R. A. 534; Flagg v. School District No. 70, 4 N. D. 30, 58 N. W. 499, 25 L. R. A. 363; Hutchinson & S. R. Co. v. Fox, 48 Kan. 70, 28 Pac. 1078, 15 L. R. A. 401; Waite v. Santa Cruz, 184 U. S. 302, 46 L. ed. 552, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 327; School Dist. No. 11 v. Chapman, 205 U. S. 545, 51 L. ed. 923, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 792; Henderson County ». Travelers’ Ins. Co., 128 Fed. 817, 63 GC: A. 467: Platt v: Hitchcock County, 139 Fed. 929, 71 C. C. A. 649; Aurora v. Gates, 208 Fed. 101, 125 C. GC. A. 329, L. R. A. 1915 A, 910; Newbern v. National Bank, 234 Fed. 209, 148 C. C. A. 111, L. R. A. 1917 B, 1019; Baxter v. Dickinson, 136 Cal. 185, 68 Pac. 601; Cripple Creek »v. Adams, 36 Colo. 320, 85 Pac. 184; White v. Chalfield, 116 Minn. 371, 133 N. W. 962; Weil v. Newbern, 126 Tenn. 223, 148 S. W. 680, L. R. A. 1915 A, 1009, Ann. Gas. 1913 E, 25. But see Evans v. McFarland, 186 Mo. 703, 85 S. W. 873; Montpelier Bank & Trust Co. v. School Dist. No. 5, 115 Wis. 622, 92 N. W. 439. Such estoppel only applies to mat- ters of procedure which the corporate officers had authority to determine and certify. It cannot supply the lack of statutory authority: Northern Bank v. Porter Township, 110 U. S. 608, 28 L. ed. 258, 4Sup. Ct. Rep. 254; Dixon Co. v. Field, 111 U. S. 83, 28 L. ed. 360, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 315; School Dis- trict v. Stone, 106 U.S. 183, 27 L. ed. 90, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 84; Parkersburg »v. Brown, 106 U. S. 487, 27 L. ed. 238, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 442; Hayes v. Holly Springs, 114 U. S. 120, 29 L. ed. 81, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 785; Hedges v. Dixon County, 150 U. S. 182, 37 L. ed. 1044, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 71; Sutliff v. Bd. of Co. Com., 147 U. S. 230, 37 L. ed. 145, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 318; Cass County ». Wilbarger County, 25 Tex. Civ. App. 52, 60 S. W. 988; Wilkes County ». Yoler, 190 U. S. 107, 47 L. ed. 971, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 738; Hamilton County v. Montpelier Savy. Bank, 208 U. S. 617, 52 L. ed. 647, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 569; Aurora v. Gates, 208 Fed. 101, 125 C: ©. A. 329; L. R.A. 1915 A, 910; SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 475 State ». School Dist. No. 50, 18 N. D. 616, 120 N. W. 555, 138 Am. St. Rep. 787; Weil v. Newbern, 126 Tenn. 223, 148 S. W. 680, L. R. A. 1915 A, 1009, Ann. Cas. 1913 E, 25; nor avoid the effect of actual knowledge of invalid- ity. Ottawa v. Carey, 108 U.S. 110, 27 L. ed. 669, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 361. Nor can receipt of proceeds of issue of invalid bonds estop the city from pleading lack of authority to issue the same. Merrill v. Monticello, 138 U. S. 673, 34 L. ed. 1069, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 441. Where a municipal corporation, not wholly lacking in power to do so, issues bonds and puts them in circu- lation, and their validity is sanctioned and vouched for by the payment of interest for a number of years, the taxpayers are estopped from ques- tioning the validity of the bonds. Schmitz v. Zeh, 91 Minn. 290, 97 N. W. 1049, 1 Ann. Cas. 322. Where unauthorized issue was made in aid of railway company, and bonds were sold by such company and proceeds used in erection of railway structures within the limits of the town, an action for ‘‘money had and received”’ will not lie against the town to recover the money paid for the bonds. ‘Travelers’ Ins. Co. v. John- son City, 99 Fed. Rep. 663, 49 L. R. A. 123. Where unauthorized bonds were issued for railway stock the purchaser of bonds from the railway company for practically full value was, after failure in an attempt to enforce the bonds against the town issuing them, subrogated to the town’s right to the stock. Illinois G. T. R. Co. v. Wade, 140 U.S. 65, 35 L. ed. 342, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 709. A holder cannot recover if the bonds show on their face their issue under a void act: Cole v. La Grange, 113 U. S. 1,28 L. ed. 896, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 416; or show non-compliance with an en- abling act: Gilson v. Dayton, 123 U. S. 59, 31 L. ed. 74, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 66; Barnum v. Okolona, 148 U.S. 393, 37 L. ed. 495, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 638; or if, when they contain no recitals, their invalidity could be learned from the records. Merchants’ Bank »v—" : 476 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. 1 Bergen Co., 115 U. S. 384, 29 L. ed. 430, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 88; Daviess Co. »y Dickinson, 117 U. S. 657, 29 L. ed. 1026, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 897; Sutliff v. Bd. of Co. Com., 147 U. S. 230, 37 ln eds 145" 13) Sup) Ct. Rep: ols; Doon Township v. Cummins, 142 U. S. 366, 35 L. ed. 1044, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 220; Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Mead, 13 S. D. 37, 82 N. W. 78, 48 L. R. A. 785, 79 Am. St. 876. In Halstead v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 5 Barb. 218, action was brought upon warrants drawn by the corpora- tion of New York upon its treasurer, not in the course of its proper and le- gitimate business. It was held that the corporation under its charter had no general power to issue negotiable paper, though, not being prohibited by law, it might do so for any debt contracted in the course of its proper legitimate business. But it was also held that any negotiable securities not issued by the .defendants in their proper and legitimate business, were void in the hands of the plaintiff, al- though received by him without actual notice of their consideration. This decision was affirmed in 3 N. Y. 430. In Gould v. Town of Stirling, 23 N. Y. 456, it was held that where a town had issued negotiable bonds, which could only be issued when the written assent of two-thirds of the resident persons taxed in the town had been obtained and filed in the county clerk’s office, the bonds issued without such assent were invalid, and that the purchaser of them could not rely upon the recital in the bonds that such assent had been obtained, but must ascertain for himself at his peril. Say the court: ‘‘One who takes a nego- tiable promissory note or bill of ex- change, purporting to be made by an agent, is bound to inquire as to the power of the agent. Where the agent is appointed and the power conferred, but the right to exercise the power has been made to depend upon the exist- ence of facts of which the agent may naturally be supposed to be in an es- pecial manner cognizant, the bona fide holder is protected; because he is pre- sumed to have taken the paper upon the faith of the representation of the agent as to those facts. The mere fact of executing the note or bill amounts of itself, in such a case, to a representation by the agent to every person who may take the paper that the requisite facts exist. But the holder has no such protection in re- gard to the existence of the power itself. In that respect the subsequent bona fide holder is in no better situa- tion than the payee, except in so far as the latter would appear of necessity to have had cognizance of facts which the other cannot [must ?] be presumed to have known.” And the case is distinguished from that of the Farmers’ & Mechanics’ Bank v. Butchers’ & Drovers’ Bank, 16 N. Y. 125, where the extrinsic fact affecting the au- thority related to the state of accounts between the bank and one of its cus- tomers, which could only be known to the teller and other officers of the bank. See also Brady v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 2 Bosw. 173; Hopple v. Brown Township, 13 Ohio St. 311; Veeder v. Lima, 19 Wis. 280. The subject is reviewed in Clark v. Des Moines, 19 Iowa, 199. The ac- tion was brought upon city warrants, negotiable in form, and of which the plaintiff claimed to be bona fide as- signee, without notice of any defects. The city offered to show that the war- rants were issued without any author- ity from the city council and without any vote of the council authorizing the same. It was held that the evi- dence should have been admitted, and that it would constitute a com- plete defense. See further, Head »v. Providence, &c. Co., 2 Cranch, 127, 2 L. ed. 229; Royal British Bank v. Tur- quand, 6 El. & Bl. 327; Knox County v. Aspinwall, 21 How. 539, 16 L. ed. 208; Bissell v. Jeffersonville, 24 How. 287, 16 L. ed. 664; Sanborn v. Deer- field, 2 N. H. 251; Alleghany City v. McClurkan, 14 Pa. St. 81; Morris Canal & Banking Co. v. Fisher, 9 N. J. Eq. 667; Clapp v. Cedar Co., 5 Iowa, 15; Commissioners, &e. v. Cox, 6 Ind. 403; Madison & Indianapolis R. R. Co. v. Norwich Savings Society, 24 Ind. 457; Birdv. Daggett, 97 Mass., 494. It is of course impossible to recon- t i : ; H iCHAP. VIII] cile these cases. In Cagwin ». Han- cock, 84 N. Y. 532, 5 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 150, on a review of the New York authorities it is declared to be the law of that State that there can never be a bona fide holder of town bonds, within the meaning of the law applicable to negotiable paper, as such bonds are always issued under special statutory authority, and are only valid when the statute is complied with. To the same effect are Craig v. Andes, 93 N. Y. 405, and Lyons v. Chamberlain, 89 N. Y. 578. See Fish v. Kenosha, 26 Wis. 23. That the powers of the agents of municipal corporations are matters of record, and the corporation not liable for an unauthorized act, see fur- ther Baltimore v. Eschbach, 18 Md. 276; Johnson v. Common Council, 16 Ind. 227. That bonds voted to one railroad company and issued to an- other are void, see Big Grove v. Wells, 65 Ill. 263. Those who deal with a corporation must take notice of the restrictions in its charter, or in the general law, regarding the making of contracts. Brady v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 2 Bosw. 173, 20 N. Y. 312; Swilt »v. Williamsburg, 24 Barb. 427; Zabris- kie v. Cleveland, &c. R. R. Co., 23 How. 381; Hull ». Marshall County, 12 Iowa, 142; Clark v. Des Moines, 19 Iowa, 199; McPherson v. Foster, 43 Iowa, 48; Marsh v. Supervisors of Fulton Co., 10 Wall. 676, 19 L. ed. 1040. If they are not valid, no sub- sequent ratification by the corpora- tion can make them so. Leaven- worth v. Rankin, 2 Kan. 357. Where the recitals in bonds neither expressly nor by necessary implication import a compliance with conditions precedent, it is open to the munici- pality to show that the conditions had not been performed when the bonds were issued, and have never since been performed. Citizens’ Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Perry County, 156 U. S. 692, 39 L. ed. 585, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 547. But in Chiniquy ». People, 78 Tll. 570, it was held that if bonds are voted upon a condition, and issued before the condition is complied with, this, as to bona fide holders, is a waiver SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 477 of the condition. Compare Super- visors of Jackson v. Brush, 77 Iu. 59. In some States, after paper has been put afloat under laws which the courts of the State have sustained, it is very justly held that the validity and obligation of such paper will not be suffered to be impaired by subse- quent action of the courts overruling the former conclusions. See Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175, 17 L. ed. 520; Steines v. Franklin County, 48 Mo. 167; Osage, &c. R. R. Co. v. Morgan County, 53 Mo. 156; Smith v. Clark Co., 54 Mo. 58; State v. Sutterfield, 54 Mo. 391; Columbia Co. v. King, 13 Fla. 421; Same v. Davidson, 13 Fla. 482: McCullough v. Com. of Va., 172 U. S. 102, 43 L. ed. 382, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 134; Wilkes County v. Coler, 180 U. S. 506, 45 L. ed. 642, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 458. Where bonds are issued by a de facto municipal corporation, which receives the full consideration therefor, it cannot set up as a defense to an ac- tion by a bona fide holder for interest on the bonds the fact that it was never legally incorporated. Tulare Irrigation District »v. Shepard, 185 U. S. 1, 46 L. ed. 773, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 531. Bonds issued by a de facto municipal corporation are valid and, after it has been dissolved for the defect in its organization, they may be enforced against the municipalities into which the territory of the de facto corpora- tion has been distributed. Gatzow ». Buening, 106 Wis. 1, 81 N. W. 1003, 80 Am. St. 17, 49 L. R. A. 483. Where a municipality is authorized by statute to issue bonds for refunding “binding, subsisting, legal obligations of such” municipality, and in accord- ance therewith it issues @ series of bonds, each of which refers to the statute and recites that ‘this bond is issued for the purpose of funding and retiring certain binding, subsisting, legal obligations of said county which remain outstanding and unpaid ”’, &c., without describing such outstanding obligations more particularly, and the said bonds comply with all statutory requirements of form, execution, reg- SST TL - aceoo ues 478 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I In some of the cases involving the validity of the subscriptions made or bonds issued by municipal corporations in aid of internal improvements, there has been occasion to consider clauses in the State constitutions designed to limit the power of the legislature to incur indebtedness on behalf of the State, and which clauses, it has been urged, were equally imperative in restraining indebtedness on behalf of the several political divisions of the State. The Constitu- tion of Kentucky prohibited any act of the legislature authorizing any debt to be contracted on behalf of the Commonwealth, except for certain specified purposes, unless provision should be made in such act for an annual tax sufficient to pay such debt within thirty years; and the act was not to have effect unless approved by the people. It was contended that this provision was not to apply to the Commonwealth as a mere ideal abstraction, unconnected with her citizens and her soil, but to the Commonwealth as composed of her people, and their territorial organizations of towns, cities, and counties, which make up the State, and that it embraced in principle every legislative act which authorized a debt to be contracted by any of the local organizations of which the Commonwealth was com- posed. The courts of that State held otherwise. “The clause in question,” they say, “applies in terms to a debt contracted on be- half of the Commonwealth as a distinct corporate body; and the distinction between a debt on behalf of the Commonwealth, and a debt or debts on behalf of one county, or of any number of counties, is too broad and palpable to admit of the supposition that the latter istration, &c., they are valid in the hands of a bona fide holder for value before maturity, even though some of the purported obligations retired by their issue were in fact invalid. Graves v. Saline Co., 161 U.S. 359, 40 L. ed. 732, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 526. See, to like effect, Evansville v. Dennett, 161 U. S. 484, 40 L. ed.4760, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 613; Andes v. Ely, 158 U. S. 312, 39 L. ed. 996, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 954. See also Waite v. Santa Cruz, 184 U. S. 302, 46 L. ed. 552, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 327; Independent School Dist. »v. Rew, 111 Fed. 1, 49 C. C. A. 198, 55 L. R. A. 364; Fairfield ». Rural Inde- pendent School Dist. 116 Fed. 838, 54 C. C. A. 342; Bradford v. Cameron, 145 Fed. 21, 76 C. C. A. 21; Tyler »v. Tyler Building & Loan Assn., 99 Tex. 6, 86 S. W. 750. _ Bonds issued for purpose of refund- ing an existing indebtedness cannot be considered as increasing the indebt- edness of the municipality. Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Mead, 13S. D. 37, 82 N. W. 78, 48 L. R. A. 785, 79 Am. St. 876; contra, Doon Tp. v Cummins, 142 U. S. 366, 35 L. ed. 1044, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 220, in case issue is not in ex- change for outstanding evidence of indebtedness. Irregularities in the conduct of the election held to secure a popular au- thorization of a proposed bond issue are a sufficient ground for enjoining the issue. Murphy »v. San Luis Obispo, 119 Cal. 624, 51 Pac. 1085, 39 L. R. A. 444. See an interesting case upon municipal bonds in Knox County v. Ninth Nat. Bk., 147 U.S. 91, 37 L. ed. 93, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 267, where it became necessary to determine under which of two legislative authoriza- tions the bonds were actually issued.CHAP. vull| SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 479 class of debts was intended to be embraced by terms specifically designating the former only.’ ’ The same view has been taken by the courts of Iowa, Wisconsin, Illinois, and Kansas, of the provi- sions in the constitutions of those States restricting the power of the legislature to contract debts on behalf of the State in aid of internal improvements ;? but the decisions of the first-named State have since been doubted,’ and those in Illinois, it would seem, overruled.‘ In Michigan it has been held that they were inapplicable to a con- stitution adopted with a clear purpose to preclude taxation for such enterprises.° Another class of legislation, which has recently demanded the attention of the courts, has been little less troublesome, from the new, varied, and peculiar questions involved, than that in relation 1Slack v. Railroad Co., 13 B. Monr. 1. 2 Dubuque County v. Railroad Co., 4 Greene (Iowa), 1; Clapp »v. Cedar County, 5 Iowa, 15; Clark v. Janes- ville, 10 Wis. 136; Bushnell v. Beloit, 10 Wis. 195; Prettyman v. Super- visors, 19 Ill. 406; Robertson v. Rock- ford, 21 Ill. 451; Johnson v. Stark County, 24 Ill. 75; Perkins v. Lewis, 3utler v. Dunham, 27 IIl. Co. v. Miller, 7 24 Ill. 208; 474; Leavenworth Kan. 479. 3 State v. Wapello County, 13 Iowa, 388. And see People v. Supervisor, &c., 16 Mich. 254. 4 In People v. Mayor, &c. of Chicago, 51 Ill. 17, 35, it is held expressly that the provision of the State constitu- tion prohibiting the State from creat- ing a debt exceeding fifty thousand dollars without the consent of the peo- ple manifested at a general election, would preclude the State from creating a like debt against a municipal cor- poration, except upon the like con- ditions. And it was pertinently said: “The protection of the whole implies necessarily the protection of all its organized parts, and the whole cannot be secure while all or any of its parts are exposed to danger. What is the real value of this provision of the con- stitution if the legislature, inhibited from incurring a debt beyond fifty thousand dollars on behalf of the State, may force a debt tenfold or one hun- dred-fold greater —for there is no limit to the power— upon all the cities of the State? We can perceive none.”’ We do not see how this can be reconciled with the earlier Illinois cases, and it is so manifestly right, it is hoped the learned court will never make the attempt. 6 The following extract from the opinion in Bay City v. State Treasurer, 23 Mich. 499, 504, is upon this point: “Our State had once before had a bit- ter experience of the evils of the gov- ernment connecting itself with works of internal improvement. In a time of inflation and imagined prosperity, the State had contracted a large debt for the construction of a system of railroads, and the people were op- pressed with heavy taxation in con- sequence. Moreover, for a portion of this debt they had not received what they bargained for, and they did not recognize their legal or moral obliga- tion to pay for it. The good name and fame of the State suffered in con- sequence. The result of it all was that a settled conviction fastened itself upon the minds of our people, that works of internal improvement should be private enterprises; that it was not within the proper province of govern- ment to connect itself with their con- struction or management, and that an imperative State policy demanded that no more burden should be imposed upon the people by State authority, for any such purpose. Under this conviction they incorporated in the constitution of 1850, under the sig- nificant title of ‘Finance and Taxa- tion’, several provisions expressly480 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. 1 prohibiting the State from being a party to, or interested in, any work of internal improvement, or engaged in carrying on any such work, except in the expenditure of grants made to it; and also from subscribing to, or being interested in, the stock of any com- pany, association, or corporation, or loaning its credit in aid of any person, association, or corporation. Art. XIV. §§ 9, 8, and 7. ‘‘All these provisions were incor- porated by the people in the consti- tution, as precautions against inju- dicious action by themselves, if in another time of inflation and excite- ment they should be tempted to incur the like burdensome taxation in order to accomplish public improvements in cases where they were not content to wait the result of private enterprise. The people meant to erect such effec- tual barriers that if the temptation should return, the means of inflicting the like injury upon the credit, reputa- tion, and prosperity of the State should not be within the reach of the author- ities. They believed these clauses of the constitution accomplished this purpose perfectly, and none of its provisions had more influence in rec- ommending that instrument to the hearty good-will of the people. “Tn process of time, however, a majority in the legislature were found willing, against the solemn warning of the executive, to resort again to the power of taxation in aid of internal improvement. It was discovered that though ‘the State’ was expressly in- hibited from giving such aid in any form, except in the disposition of grants made to it, the subdivisions of which the State was composed were not under the like ban. Decisions in other States were found which were supposed to sanction the doctrine that, under such circumstances, the State might do indirectly through its subdivisions what directly it was for- bidden todo. Thus a way was opened by which the whole purpose of the constitutional provisions quoted might be defeated. The State could not aid @ private corporation with its credit, but it might require each of its town- ships, cities, and villages to do so. The State could not load down its people with taxes for the construction of a public improvement, but it might compel the municipal authorities, which were its mere creatures, and which held their whole authority and their whole life at its will, to enforce such taxes, one by one, until the whole people were bent to the burden. “Now, whatever might be the just and proper construction of similar pro- visions in the constitutions of States whose history has not been the same with our own, the majority of this court thought when the previous case was before us, and they still think, that these provisions in our constitu- tion do preclude the State from loaning the public credit to private corpora- tions, and from imposing taxation upon its citizens or any portion thereof in aid of the construction of railroads. So the people supposed when the constitution was adopted. Constitu- tions do not change with the varying tides of public opinion and desire; the will of the people therein recorded is the same inflexible law until changed by their own deliberative action; and it cannot be permissible to the courts that, in order to aid evasions and cir- cumyentions, they shall subject these instruments, which in the main only undertake to lay down broad general principles, to a literal and technical construction, as if they were great public enemies standing in the way of progress, and the duty of every good citizen was to get around their pro- visions whenever practicable, and give them a damaging thrust whenever convenient. They must construe them as the people did in their adop- tion, if the means of arriving at that construction are within their power. In these cases we thought we could arrive at it from the public history of the times.” The State cannot provide indirectly for payment for work of internal im- provement by authorizing a township to raise money for it by taxation. Anderson v. Hill, 54 Mich. 477, 20 N. W. 549. And see Oren v. Pingree, 120 Mich. 550, 79 N. W. 814, 46 L. R. A. 407, where an act attempting to au- thorize the creation of a public boardCHAP. VIII] SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 481 to municipal subscriptions in aid of internal improvements. As the power to declare war and to conduct warlike operations rests in the national government, and that government is vested with unlimited control of all the resources of the country for those pur- poses, the duty of national defense, and, consequently, the duty to defend all the citizens as well as all the property of all the municipal organizations in the several States, rests upon the national author- ities. This much is conceded, though in a qualified degree, also, and subordinate to the national government, a like duty rests doubtless upon the State governments, which may employ the means and services of their citizens for the purpose. But it is no part of the duty of a township, city, or county, as such, to raise men or money for warlike operations, nor have they any authority, without express legislative sanction, to impose upon their people any burden by way of taxation for any such purpose.’ Nevertheless, when a war arises which taxes all the energies of the nation, which makes it necessary to put into the field a large proportion of all the able-bodied men of the country, and which renders imperative a resort to all available means for filling the ranks of the army, recruiting the navy, and re- plenishing the national treasury, the question becomes a momentous one, whether the local organizations — those which are managed most immediately by the people themselves — may not be made im- portant auxiliaries to the national and State governments in accom- plishing the great object in which all alike are interested so vitally ; and if they are capable of rendering important assistance, whether there is any constitutional principle which would be violated by making use of these organizations in a case where failure on the part of the central authority would precipitate general dismay and ruin. Indeed, as the general government, with a view to convenience, econ- for the purpose of acquiring and oper- ating the street railways of Detroit was held void. Where the State cannot engage in the erection of works of internal im- provement, a statute providing for the erection of a State grain elevator and warehouse is void. Rippe v. Becker, 56 Minn. 100, 57 N. W. 331, 221i. RR: AL S57. 1 Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass. 272; Gove v. Epping, 41 N. H. 539; Crowell v. Hopkinton, 45 N. H. 9; Baldwin v. North Branford, 32 Conn. 47; Web- ster v. Harwinton, 32 Conn. 131. See also Claflin v. Hopkinton, 4 Gray, 502; Cover v. Baytown, 12 Minn. 124; VOL. I—3l Fiske v. Hazzard, 7 R. I. 488; Alley v. Edgecomb, 53 Me. 446; People v. Supervisors of Columbia, 43 N. Y. 130; Walschlager v. Liberty, 23 Wis. 362; Burrill v. Boston, 2 Cliff. 590. But the service rendered by the or- ganized troops of the State in aid of the civil authorities of a county in enforcing law and order in the county at the request of the county authori- ties is for a county purpose, and pay- ment therefor by the county does not violate the organic provision for ‘“‘a uniform and equal rate of taxation.” Rushton v. State ez rel. Collins, 75 Fla. 422, 78 So. 345.482 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I omy, and promptness of action, will be very likely to adopt, for any purposes of conscription, the existing municipal divisions of the States, and its demand for men to recruit its armies will assume a form seeming to impose on the people whose municipal organization embraces the territory covered by the demand, the duty of meeting it, the question we have stated may appear to be one rather of form than of substance, inasmuch as it would be difficult to assign reasons why a duty resting upon the citizens of a municipality may not be considered as resting upon the corporation itself of which they are the constitutents, and if so, why it may not be assumed by the municipality itself, and then be discharged in like manner as any other municipal burden, if the legislature shall grant permission for that purpose. One difficulty that suggests itself in adopting any such doctrine is, that, by the existing law of the land, able-bodied men between certain specified ages are alone liable to be summoned to the per- formance of military duty; and if the obligation is assumed by the municipal organizations of the State, and discharged by the payment of money or the procurement of substitutes, the taxation required for this purpose can be claimed, with some show of reason, to be taxation of the whole community for the particular benefit of that class upon whom by the statutes the obligation rests. When the public funds are used for the purpose, it will be insisted that they are appropriated to discharge the liabilities of private individuals. Those who are already past the legal age of service, and who have stood their chance of being called into the field, or perhaps have actually rendered the required service, will be able to urge with considerable force that the State can no longer hon- orably and justly require them to contribute to the public defense, but ought to insist that those within the legal ages should perform their legal duty ; and if any upon whom that duty rests shall actually have enrolled themselves in the army with a view to discharge it, such persons may claim, with even greater reason, that every con- sideration of equality and justice demands that the property they leave behind them shall not be taxed to relieve others from a duty equally imperative. Much may be said on both sides of this subject, but the judicial decisions are clear, that the people of any municipal corporation or political division of a State have such a general interest in relieving that portion of their fellow-citizens who are liable to the perform- ance of military duty, as will support taxation or render valid in- debtedness contracted for the purpose of supplying their places, or of filling any call of the national authorities for men, with volun-CHAP. VIII] SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 483 teers who shall be willing to enter the ranks for such pecuniary in- ducements as may be offered them. The duty of national defense, it is held, rests upon every person under the protection of the govern- ment who is able to contribute to it, and not solely upon those who are within the legal ages. The statute which has prescribed those ages has for its basis the presumption that those between the limits fixed are best able to discharge the burden of military service to the public benefit, but others are not absolved from being summoned to the duty, if at any time the public exigency should seem to demand it. Exemption from military duty is a privilege rather than a right, and, like other statutory privileges, may be recalled at any time when reasons of public policy or necessity seem to demand the re- call... Moreover, there is no valid reason, in the nature of things, why those who are incapable of performing military service, by reason of age, physical infirmity, or other cause, should not contrib- ute, in proportion to their ability, to the public defense by such means as are within their power; and it may well happen that taxa- tion, for the purpose of recruiting the armies of the nation, will dis- tribute the burden more equally and justly among all the citizens than any other mode which could be devised. Whether it will be just and proper to allow it in any instance must rest with the legis- lature to determine; but it is unquestionably competent, with legislative permission, for towns, cities, and counties to raise money by loans or by taxation to pay bounty moneys to those who shall volunteer to fill any call made upon such towns, cities, or counties to supply men for the national armies.” 1 See post, p. 793, and cases cited in town, &c. Volunteers are therefore note. by law to be accepted in relief of the 2“The power to create a public municipality from a compulsory serv- debt, and liquidate it by taxation, is ice to be determined by lot or chance. too clear for dispute. The questionis, Does this relief involve the public wel- therefore, narrowed to a single point: fare or interest? The answer rises Is the purpose in this instance a public spontaneously in the breast of every one? Does it concern the common one in a community liable to the mili- welfare and interest of the municipal- tary burden. It is given, not by the ity? Let us see. Civil war was rag- voice of him alone who owes the serv- ing, and Congress provided in the ice but swells into a chorus from his second section of the act of 24th Feb- whole family, relatives, and friends. ruary, 1864, that the quota of troops Military service is the highest duty of each ward of a city, town, township, and burden the citizen is called to precinct, &c., should be as nearly as obey or to bear. It involves life, possible in proportion to the number limb, and health, and is therefore a of men resident therein liable to render greater ‘burden’ than the taxation of military service. Section three pro- property. The loss or the injury is vided that all volunteers who may not confined to the individual him- enlist after a draft shall be ordered, self, but extends to all the relations shall be deducted from the number he sustains. It embraces those bound ordered to be drafted in such ward, to him in the ties of consanguinity,— a 484 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I Relief of the community from an impending or possible draft is not, however, the sole consideration which will support taxation by the municipal corporations of the State to raise money for the pur- pose of paying bounties to soldiers. Gratitude to those who have entered the military service, whether as volunteers or drafted men, or as substitutes for others who were drafted or were liable to be, is a consideration which the State may well recognize, and it may compensate the service either by the payment of bounty moneys directly to such persons, or by provision for the support of those dependent upon them while they shall be absent from their homes. Whether we regard such persons as public benefactors, who, having taken upon themselves the most severe and dangerous duty a citi- zen is ever called upon to perform, have thereby entitled themselves to public reward as an incentive to fidelity and courage, or as per- sons who, having engaged in the public service for a compensation inadequate to the toil, privation, and danger incurred, are deserving of the bounty as a further recognition on the part of the community of the worth of their services, there seems in either case to be no sufficient reason to question the right of the legislature to authorize the municipal divisions of the State to raise moneys in any of the friendship, and interest; to the com- munity which must furnish support to his family, if he cannot, and which loses in him a member whose labor, industry, and property contribute to its wealth and its resources; who as- sists to bear its burdens, and whose knowledge, skill, and public spirit con- tribute to the general good. Clearly the loss of that part of the population upon whom the greatest number de- pend, and who contribute most to the public welfare by their industry, skill, and property, and good conduct, is a common loss, and therefore a general injury. These are alike subject to the draft. The blind and relentless lot respects no age, condition, or rank in life. It is, therefore, clearly the interest of the community that those should serve who are willing, whose loss will sever the fewest ties and pro- duce the least injury. “The bounty is not a private trans- action in which the individual alone is benefited. It benefits the public by inducing and enabling those to go who feel they can best be spared. It is not voluntary in those who pay it. The community is subject to the draft, and it is paid to relieve it from a burden of war. It is not a mere gift or reward, but a consideration for services. It is therefore not a confiscation of one man’s property for another’s use, but it is a contribution from the public treasury for a general good. In short, it is simply taxation to relieve the municipality from the stern demands of war, and avert a public injury in the loss of those who contribute most to the public welfare.” Speer ». School Directors of Blairsville, 50 Pa. St. 150, 159. See also Waldo v. Port- land, 33 Conn. 363; Bartholomew ». Harwinton, 33 Conn. 408; Fowler ». Danvers, 8 Allen, 80; Lowell v. Oliver, 8 Allen, 247; Washington County ». Berwick, 56 Pa. St. 466; Trustees of Cass v. Dillon, 16 Ohio St. 38; State v. Wilkesville, 20 Ohio St. 288. Also Opinions of Justices, 52 Me. 505, in which the view is expressed that towns cannot, under the power to raise money for ‘‘necessary town charges’’, raise and pay commutation moneys to relieve persons drafted into the military service of the United States.CHAP. VIII] SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 485 usual modes, for the purpose of paying bounties to them or their families, in recognition of such services.' And if a municipal corpo- ration shall have voted moneys for such purpose without legislative authority, it is competent for the legislature afterwards to legalize their action if it shall so choose.” The cases to which we have referred in the notes assume that, if the purpose is one for which the State might properly levy a tax upon its citizens at large, the legislature would also have power to apportion and impose the duty, or confer the power of assuming it, upon the towns and other municipal or political divisions. And the rule laid down is one which opens a broad field to legislative discre- tion, allowing as it does the raising and appropriation of moneys, whenever, in the somewhat extravagant words of one of the cases, there is “the least possibility that it will be promotive in any degree of the public welfare.’ 3 The same rule, substantially, has been recognized by the Court of Appeals of New York. “The legislature is not confined in its appropriation of the public moneys, or of the sums to be raised by taxation in favor of individuals, to cases in which a legal demand exists against the State. It can thus recog- 1 The act under which the Pennsyl- vania case, cited in the preceding note, was decided, authorized the borough to contract a debt for the payment of three hundred dollars to each non- commissioned officer and private who might thereafter volunteer and enter the service of the United States, and be credited upon the quota of the borough under an impending draft. The whole purpose, therefore, was to relieve the community from the threatened conscription. But in the case of Brodhead v. Milwaukee, 19 Wis. 624, 652, it was held constitu- tional, not only to provide for the future by such municipal taxation, but also to raise moneys to pay bounties to volunteers previously en- listed, and even to those who should thereafter procure substitutes for themselves, and have them credited on the municipal quota. 2 Booth v. Town of Woodbury, 32 Conn. 118; Bartholomew v. Harwin- ton, 33 Conn. 408; Crowell »v. Hop- kinton, 45 N. H. 9; Shackford v. Newington, 46 N. H. 415; Lowell v. Oliver, 8 Allen, 247; Ahl v. Gleim, 52 Pa. St. 432; Weister v. Hade, 52 Pa. St. 474; Coffman v. Keightley, 24 Ind. 509; Board of Commissioners v. Bearss, 25 Ind. 110; Comer ». Ful- som, 13 Minn. 219; State v. Demo- rest, 32 N. J. L. 528; Taylor v. Thomp- gon, 42 Ill. 9; Barbour v. Camden, 51 Me. 608; Hart v. Holden, 55 Me. 572; Burnham v. Chelsea, 43 Vt. 69; Butler v. Poultney, 42 Vt. 481. In State v. Jackson, 33 N. J. L. 450, a statute authorizing a town to raise money by tax to relieve its inhabit- ants from the burden of a draft un- der a law of Congress, was held void as tending to defeat the purpose of such law. The decision was made by a bare majority of a bench of eleven judges. Compare O’Hara v. Car- penter, 23 Mich. 410, in which a con- tract of insurance against a military draft was held void on grounds of public policy. 3 Booth v. Woodbury, 32 Conn. 118, 128, per Butler, J. “To make a tax law unconstitu- tional on this ground, it must be appar- ent at first blush that the community taxed can have no possible interest in the purpose to which their money is to be applied.” Sharpless »v. Mayor, &c., 21 Pa. St. 147, 174, following Cheaney v. Hooser, 9 B. Monr. 330.486 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I nize claims founded in equity and justice in the largest sense of these terms, or in gratitude or charity. Independently of express con- stitutional restrictions, it can make appropriations of money when- ever the public well-being requires or will be promoted by it, and it is the judge of what is for the public good. It can, moreover, under the power to levy taxes, apportion the public burdens among all the taxpaying citizens of the State, or among those of a particular section or political division.” 1 And where citizens have voluntarily advanced moneys for the purpose of paying bounties to recruits who fill the quota of a municipal corporation, on an understanding, based upon informal corporate action, that the moneys should be refunded when a law should be passed permitting it, a subsequent act of the legislature authorizing taxation for this purpose is valid.” However broad are the terms employed in describing the legis- lative power over taxation in these cases, it is believed that no one of them has gone so far as to sanction taxation or the appro- priation of the public revenue in order to refund to individuals moneys which they may have paid to relieve themselves from an impending draft, or may have voluntarily contributed to any public purpose, from motives purely personal to themselves, with- out any reason to rely upon the credit of the State, or of any mu- nicipal corporation, for reimbursement, and where the circumstances are not such as fairly to challenge the public gratitude. Taxa- tion in such a case, where no obligation, honorary or otherwise, rests upon the public, would be nothing else than a naked case of appropriating the property of the taxpayer for private purposes, and that, too, without reference to anticipated public benefits.® to draft under the law of the United States was called, and an association formed, called the Halifax Bounty Association, which levied an assess- 1 Guilford v. Supervisors of Che- nango, 13 N. Y. 148, 149. See New Orleans v. Clark, 95 U. S. 644, 24 L. ed. 521. The payment by a city of a recog- nized moral obligation assumed by it for services rendered at its request is within the legislative power to au- thorize, and does not constitute a do- nation or appropriation of the public funds. Morris & E. R. Co. v. Mayor, etc., of Newark, 76 N. J. L. 555, 70 Atl. 194. 2 Weister v. Hade, 52 Pa. St. 474. And see People v. Sullivan, 43 Ill. 412; Johnson v. Campbell, 49 Ill. 316. Compare Susquehanna Depot v. Barry, 61 Pa. St. 317. * Tyson v. School Directors, &e., 51 Pa. St. 9. A meeting of persons liable ment of thirty dollars on each per- son liable to military duty in the township, and solicited contributions from others. Afterwards, an act was passed by the legislature, with a pre- amble reciting that certain citizens of Halifax township, associated as the Halifax Bounty Association, for free- ing the said township from the late drafts, advanced moneys, which were expended in paying bounties to volun- teers to fill the quota of the township. The act then authorized and required the school directors to borrow such sums of money as would fully reim- burse the said Halifax Bounty Asso-CHAP. VI] SEVERAL GRADES OF ciation for moneys advanced to free said township from the draft, and then further authorized the school directors to levy and collect a tax to repay the sums borrowed. The court say: ‘‘We are bound to regard the statute as an authority to reimburse what was intended by the Association as advances made to the township with the intent or understanding to be reimbursed or returned to those contributing. This was the light in which the learned judge below re- garded the terms used; and unless this appears in support of the present levy by the school directors, they are acting without authority. But the learned judge, if I properly compre- hend his meaning, did not give suffi- cient importance to these terms, and hence, I apprehend, he fell into error. He does not seem to have considered it material whether the Association paid its money voluntarily in aid of its own members, or expressly to aid the township in saving its people from a draft, with the understanding that it was advanced in the character of a loan if the legislature chose to direct its repayment, and the school directors chose to act upon the authority con- ferred. This we cannot agree to. Such an enactment would not be legis- lation at all. It would be in the na- ture of judicial action, it is true; but, wanting the justice of notice to parties to be affected by the hearing, trial, and all that gives sanction and force to regular judicial proceedings, it would much more resemble an im- perial rescript than constitutional legislation: first, in declaring an obli- gation where none was created or pre- viously existed; and next, in decree- ing payment by directing the money or property of the people to be seques- tered to make the payment. The legislature can exercise no such des- potic functions; and as it is not appar- ent in the act that they attempted to do so, we are not to presume they did. They evidently intended the advance- ments to be reimbursed to be only such as were made on the faith that they were to be returned.” See also Cro- well v. Hopkinton, 45 N. H. 9; Miller v. Grandy, 13 Mich. 540; Pease v. MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 487 Chicago, 21 Ill. 500; Landram, 5 Bush, minster, 97 Mass. Ferguson v. 230; Esty v. West- 324; Cole v. Bed- ford, 97 Mass. 326; Usher v. Colches- ter, 33 Conn. 567; Perkins v. Milford, 59 Me. 315; Thompson ». Pittston, 59 Me. 315; Kelly v. Marshall, 69 Pa. St. 319. The legislature cannot ratify the action of a town in agreeing to repay those who paid money to avoid the draft. Bowles v. Landaff, 59 N. H. 164. In Freeland v. Hastings, 10 Allen, 570, it was held that the legislature could not empower towns to raise money by taxation for the purpose of refunding what had been paid by in- dividuals for substitutes in military service. In Mead v. Acton, 139 Mass. 341, 1 N. E. 413, it was held that an act passed in 1882 was void, which per- mitted taxation to pay bounties to those who re-enlisted in 1864, as being for a private purpose. In Cass v. Dillon, 16 Ohio St. 38, it was held that taxes to refund bounties previously and voluntarily paid might be authorized. See also State v. Harris, 17 Ohio St. 608. In a New York case it was held that an act authorizing a county to raise by taxation money to pay to men drafted and serving in Union ar- mies in Civil War, or to their heirs, specified sums of money was void, as authorizing a devotion of public moneys to private purposes. Bush ». Bd. of Supervisors of Orange Co., 159 N. Y. 212, 53 N. EB. 1121, 45 L. R. A. 556, 70 Am The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in a well-reasoned of State v. Tappan, 29 Wis. 664, deny the power of the State to compel a municipal cor- poration to pay bounties where it has not voted to do so. In Wheelock v. Lowell, 196 Mass. 220, 81 N. E. 977, Chief Justice Rugg, in delivering the opinion of the court, said: ‘‘ Municipalities are the creatures of the legislature, with powers as to the raising and expending of money strictly limited to the public purposes for which they are created. They have no power expend money, St. 538. Case to488 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I But it has been held by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts that towns might be authorized by the legislature to raise moneys by taxation for the purpose of refunding sums contributed by individuals to a common fund, in order to fill the quota of such towns under a call of the President, notwithstanding such moneys might have been contributed without promise or expectation of reimbursement. The court were of opinion that such contribu- tions might well be considered as advancements to a public object, and, being such, the legislature might properly recognize the ob- ligation and permit the towns to provide for its discharge. On a preceding page we have spoken in strong terms of the complete control which is possessed by the legislative authority of the State over the municipal corporations. There are never- theless some limits to its power in this regard, as there are in vari- ous other directions limits to the legislative power of the State. Some of these are expressly defined; others spring from the usages, customs, and maxims of our people; they are a part of its history, a part of the system of local self-government, in view of the continu- ance and perpetuity of which all our constitutions are framed, and of the right to which the people can never be deprived except through express renunciation on their part. One undoubted right of the people is to choose, directly or indirectly, under the forms and restric- tions prescribed by the legislature for reasons of general State policy, the officers of local administration, and the board that is to make the local laws. This is a right which of late has sometimes been en- croached upon under various plausible pretenses, but almost which can only come into their treas- uries through taxation, for any other than purely public uses. In its last analysis any other principle is a taking of private property, through the me- dium of a public official, for a private use, which is contrary to fundamental conceptions of good government.’’ See also McManus v. Petoskey, 164 Mich. 390, 129 N. W. 681; Holley v. Mt. Vernon, 126 N. Y. Supp. 460, 141 App. Div. 823; Naylor v. McColloch, 54 Oreg. 305, 103 Pac. 68. In delivering the opinion of the court in Wolcott v. Mayor, etc., of Wilmington, 11 Del. Ch. 1, 15, 95 Atl. 303, Chancellor Curtis says: ‘‘The leg- islative power over municipal corpora- tions is large and ordinarily its deter- mination of what is a public purpose for taxation, or the appropriation of money, is uncontrollable by the courts. But where the legislature clearly de- votes public funds to an object in no sense public, the judiciary may, and should, declare its action invalid.” The question of the right to pension school teachers was before the court in Hibbard v. State, 65 Ohio, 574, 64 N. E. 109, and the right denied as in- volving the taking of private property without due process of law and be- cause the particular act was not uni- form in its operation. See also Mahon v. Board of Education, 171 N. Y. 263, 63 N. E. 1107, 89 Am. St. Rep. 810. But see Hughes v. Traeger, 246 Ill. 612, 106 N. E. 431; Hammitt v. Gaynor, 144 N. Y. Supp. 123. 1Freeland »v. Hastings, 10 Allen, 570, 585. And see Hilbish v. Cather- man, 64 Pa. St. 154, and compare Tyson v. School Directors, 51 Pa. St. 9.CHAP. VIII] SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 489 always with the result which reasonable men should have antici- pated from the experiment of a body at a distance attempting to govern a local community of whose affairs or needs they could know but: little, except as they should derive information from sources likely to have interested reasons 10On this subject reference is made to what is said by Campbell, Ch. J., in People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44, 87 et seq.; also p. 97. Sees. c. 9 Am. Rep. 103. In the absence of a grant in the constitution authorizing the appoint- ment of municipal officers by the legis- lature or the governor, such power is denied by implication arising from the history and traditions which time out of mind have conferred local self- government on municipalities. Hz parte Lewis, 45 Tex. Co. Rep. 1, 73 S. W. 811, 108 Am. St. Rep. 929. But see Brown v. Galveston, 97 Tex. 1, 75 S. W. 488. Much has been said concerning the necessity of legislative interference in some cases where bad men were com- ing into power through universal suf- frage in cities, but the recent experi- ence of the country shows that this has oftener been said to pave the way for bad men to obtain office or grants of unusual powers from the legislature than with any purpose to effect local reforms. And the great municipal scandals and frauds that have pre- vailed, like those which were so noto- rious in New York City, have been made possible and then nursed and fostered by illegitimate interference at the seat of State government. Some officers, usually of local appointment, are undoubtedly to be regarded as State officers whose choice may be confided to a State authority without any invasion of local rights; such as militia officers, officers of police, and those who have charge of the execu- tion of the criminal laws; but those who are to administer the corporate funds and have the control of the corporate property, those who make the local laws and those who execute them, cannot rightfully be chosen by the central authority. Dillon, Mun. Corp. § 33. See People v. Com. Coun- cil of Detroit, 28 Mich. 228. for misleading. Another is the The legislature cannot appoint a board to have charge of the public works, streets, and fire department of acity. State v. Denny, 118 Ind. 382, 2 N. BH. 252; 274, 4 L:. RAN os Evansville v. State, 118 Ind. 426, 21 N. E. 267, 4 L. R. A. 93. A statute creating boards of park commissioners in cities of the first class, authorizing their appointment by the governor, and empowering them to raise by taxation the money neces- sary for carrying out their work, vio- lates the theory of local self-govern- ment which, in Montana, is established as a fundamental principle of govern- ment. State ex rel. Gerry v. Edwards, 42 Mont. 135, 111 Pac. 734, 32 L. R. A. (n. 8.) 1078, Ann. Cas. 1912 A, 1063. An act establishing a bureau of pub- lic safety for a municipality, the mem- bers to be appointed by the governor, and conferring upon it the entire con- trol and management of the police and fire departments, was held to be, as to the fire department, an unconstitu- tional interference with the munici- pality’s right to local self-government. Davidson v. Hine, 151 Mich. 294, 115 N. W. 246, 123 Am. St. Rep. 267, 15 L. R. A. (nN. 8.) 575, 14 Ann. Cas. 352. See also Lexington v. Thompson, 113 Ky. 540, 68 S. W. 477, 101 Am. St. Rep. 361, 57 L. R. A. 775. But see State v. Broatch, 68 Neb. 687, 94 N. W. 1016, 110 Am. St. Rep. 477. A city board may not control the police of neighboring townships which are not represented on it. Metr. Police Board v. Wayne County Audi- tors, 68 Mich. 576, 36 N. W. 743. But the State may provide for the appointment of police officials in a city. Com. v. Plaisted, 148 Mass. 374, 19 N. E. 224, 12 Am. St. 566, 2 L. R. A. 142; State v. Seavey, 22 Neb. 454, 35 N. W. 228; Newport v. Horton, 22 R. I. 196, 47 Atl. 312, 50 L. R. A. 330; Americus v. Perry, 114490 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I right of the local community to determine what pecuniary burdens it shall take upon its shoulders.! of the case there must be some limitations. But here from the very nature The municipalities do not exist wholly for the benefit of their corporators, but as a part of the machinery of State government, and they cannot be permitted to decline a performance of their duties or a discharge of their obligations as_ such.? Ga. 871, 40 S. E. 1004, 57 L. R. A. 230; Arnett v. State, 168 Ind. 180, 80 Ne Ha l533 6 ls be Ae (Ne S:)) 192): Lexington v. Thompson, 113 Ky. 540, 68 S. W. 477, 101 Am. St. Rep. 361, 57 L. R. A. 775; Davidson v. Hine, 151 Mich. 294, 115 N. W. 246, 123 Am. St. Rep: 267, 15 L. R. A: (nN. 14 Ann. Cas. 352; State v. Jost, Mo. 51, 175 S. W. 591, Ann. Cas. 1917 D, 1102; State v. Broatch, 68 Neb. 687, 94 N. W. 1016, 110 Am. St. Rep. 477; Horton v. Newport, 27 R. I. 283, 61 Atl. 759, 1 L. R.A. (Nn. 8.) 512,8 Ann. Cas. 1097. Not so in Wis- consin. O’Connor v. Fond du Lae, 109 Wis. 253, 85 N. W. 327. See State v. Hunter, 38 Kan. 578, 17 Pac. 177. And it may empower a board of water commissioners, created by itself, to bond a city. David v. Portland Water Com., 14 Oreg. 98, 12 Pac. 174. In Ohio it is held no infraction of the right of local self-government to allow the governor to appoint a board of public affairs for cities. State v. Smith, 44 Ohio St. 348, 7 N. E. 447, 12 N. E. 829. In Com. v. Plaisted, supra, the court say, ‘We cannot declare an act of the legislature invalid because it abridges the exercise of the privilege of local self-government in a particular in re- gard to which such privilege is not guaranteed by any provision of the Constitution.” A West Virginia statute amending the charter of a city by changing the plan of its government from the ordi- nary form, administered by a mayor and councilmen, to a government by five commissioners, and authorizing the governor to appoint the first com- missioners, to hold office for a period of two years, and providing for the election of their successors by the s.) 575, 265 They cannot abolish local government; voters of the city, at the first election provided for in the statute, was held to be valid and not to violate the spirit of the Constitution. Booten »v. Pinson, 77 W. Va. 412, 89 S. E. 985, L. R. A. 1917 A, 1244. In Texas a municipal charter was so amended as to do away with the city council and create a board of five commissioners, two to be elected and three to be appointed by the governor, one of whom he was to designate as president. Vacancies on the board were to be filled by appointment by the governor. The charter was held to be valid. Brown v. Galveston, 97 Tex. 1, 75 S. W. 488. The right of local self-government is not involved where a public duty is laid upon a municipality, the proper discharge of which will benefit the State at large or an indefinite portion of it. The municipality may be com- pelled to submit to a tax levied upon it by the legislature for the support of a local board of health, created by the legislature. Davock v. Moore, 105 Mich. 120, 63 N. W. 424, 28 L. R. A. 783. 1 Where the Constitution prohibits the levy by the legislature of any tax upon a municipality for municipal purposes, the municipality cannot be required to purchase, when it shall determine to own a water plant, only from a private water company to which it has granted a franchise. Helena Cons. Water Co. v. Steele, 20 Mont. 1, 49 Pac. 382, 37 L. R. A. 412. 2A county may be compelled to establish and maintain a high school. State v. Freeman, 61 Kan. 90, 58 Pac. 959, 47 L. R. A. 67. Anda city, a park. Knowlton v. Williams, 174 Mass. 476, 55 N. E. 77, 47 L. R. A. 314.CHAP. VIII] SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 491 they cannot refuse to provide the conveniences for its administra- tion; they cannot decline to raise the necessary taxes for the purpose; they cannot repudiate pecuniary obligations that justly rest upon them as a local government. Over these matters the legis- lature of the State must have control, or confusion would inevitably be introduced into the whole system. But beyond this it is not often legitimate for the State to go except in moulding and shaping the local powers, and perhaps permitting the local authorities to do certain things for the benefit of their citizens which under the gen- eral grants of power would be inadmissible.’ On this general subject we shall venture to lay down the following propositions as the result of the authorities : — 1. That the legislature has undoubted power to compel the municipal bodies to perform their functions as local governments under their charters, and to recognize, meet, and discharge the duties and obligations properly resting upon them as such, whether they be legal, or merely equitable or moral; and for this purpose it may require them to exercise the power of taxation whenever and wherever it may be deemed necessary or expedient.” 1This subject is discussed with some fullness in Cooley on Taxation, ch. xxi. 2In support of this, we refer to the very strong case of Guilford v. Super- visors of Chenango, 18 Barb. 615, s. c. 13 N. Y. 143, where a town was com- pelled by the legislative authority of the State to reimburse its officers the expenses incurred by them in the honest but mistaken endeavor to dis- charge what they believed to be their duty; approved in New Orleans »v. Clark, 95 U. S. 644, 24 L. ed. 521; also to Sinton v. Ashbury, 41 Cal. 525, 530, in which it is said by Crocket, J., that ‘it is established by an over- whelming weight of authority, and I believe is conceded on all sides, that the legislature has the constitutional power to direct and control the affairs and property of a municipal corpora- tion for municipal purposes, provided it does not impair the obligation of a contract, and by appropriate legisla- tion may so control its affairs as ulti- mately to compel it, out of the funds in its treasury, or by taxation to be imposed for that purpose, to pay a demand when properly established, which in good conscience it ought to pay, even though there be no legal lia- bility to pay it” (citing Blanding »v. Burr, 13 Cal. 343; Beals v. Amador Co., 35 Cal. 624; People v. Super- visors of San Francisco, 11 Cal. 206; Sharp v. Contra Costa Co., 34 Cal. 284; People v. McCreery, 34 Cal. 432; People v. Alameda, 26 Cal. 641, and holding that a city might be compelled to pay the claim of persons who had acted as commissioners in the exten- sion of certain of its streets); also to Borough of Dunmore’s Appeal, 52 Pa. St. 374, in which the legislature sumed the right of apportioning indebtedness of a town among the boroughs carved out of it; supported by Layton v. New Orleans, 12 La. Ann. 515; People v. Alameda, 26 Cal. 641; and Burns v. Clarion. County, 62 Pa. St. 422: also to People v. Flagg, 46 N. Y. 401, in which the legislative power to direct the construction of a public road, and to compel the creation of a town debt for the purpose, was fully sustained; to People v. Power, 25 Ill. 187; Waterville v. County Commissioners, 59 Me. 80; and to numerous other cases cited, ante, p. 395, note, and which we will not occupy space by repeating here. as- the$$ 492 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I In Joslin Mfg. Co. v. Providence, 262 U. S. 668, 67 L. ed. 1167, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 684, Justice Sutherland, who delivered the opinion of the court, said: ‘It is contended that the statute imposes a burden upon the taxpayers of the city of Providence by author- izing an expenditure, which in part is for the benefit of other municipalities or of companies outside the city, that are either not required to contribute to such expenditure or whose contribu- tions do not constitute just compen- sation. The basis of this complaint, in so far as it relates to other munici- palities and districts is that they are given the right to take water upon payment of fair wholesale rates there- for, and that these rates need bear no relation to the additional cost in- cident to the contingency of their coming in. That the taxpayers of one municipality may not be taxed arbitrarily for the benefit of another may be assumed; but that is not the ease here presented. The communi- ties to be supplied are those within the drainage area of the waters au- thorized to be taken. These waters are under the primary control of the State and in allowing the city of Providence to appropriate them, it was entirely just and proper for the legislature to safeguard the neces- sities of other communities who might be dependent thereon, and to that end to impose upon the city of Providence such reasonable conditions as might be necessary and appropriate. Municipalities are political subdivi- sions of the State, and are subject to the will of the legislature (Trenton »v. New Jersey, 262 U. S. 182, 67 L. ed. 937, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 534); and may be compelled not only to recognize their legal obligations but to discharge obli- gations of an equitable and moral na- ture as well (Guthrie National Bank »v. Guthrie, 173 U. S. 528, 43 L. ed. 796, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 513). The require- ment here in question is one well within the rule. Specifically, it is objected that the act does not require these other communities to bear a propor- tionate part of the cost of acquisition, construction and maintenance. The special facts which led the legislature to direct payment at wholesale rates, instead of upon the basis of sharing in the cost of the enterprise, or of some other, we need not consider. It may have been, as suggested, that there were inherent difficulties in the way of making such an apportion- ment. But it is enough to say that the method selected is one within the scope of legislative discretion and not obnoxious to the Federal Constitution. See County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691, 703-704, 26 L. ed. 238; Williams v. Eggleston, 170 U. S. 304, 42 L. ed. 1047, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 617; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. 8S. 97, 106, 24 L. ed. 616. The legislature is not precluded from putting a burden upon one municipality because it may result in an incidental benefit to an- other. County of Mobile v. Kimball, supra, 102 U.S. at pages 703, 704, 26 L. ed. 238. Moreover, we cannot as- sume that the fair wholesale rates to be paid by these outside communities will be less than just compensation for what they get.” The legislature may impose upon a municipal corporation liability for injury to person or property from riots or mobs, irrespective of its power to have prevented the violence or of negligence in the use of its power. Chicago v. Sturges, 222 U. S. 318, 56 L. ed. 215, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 92, Ann. Cas. 1913 B, 1349; Dawson Soap Co. v. Chicago, 234 Ill. 314, 84 N. E. 920, 14 Ann. Cas. 1131; Iola v. Birnbaum, 71 Kan. 600, 81 Pac. 198, 6 Ann. Cas. 267; Butte Miners’ Union »v. Butte, 58 Mont. 391, 194 Pac. 149, 13 A. L. R. 746. A workmen’s compensation act which compels municipal corpora- tions to compensate all workmen ac- cidentally injured while in the employ of the corporation, is valid. Wood v. Detroit, 188 Mich. 547, 155 N. W. 592, L. R. A. 1916 C, 388; Borgnis v. Falk €o:, 147 Wis. 327, 133 N. W- 209, 37 L. R. A. (w. s.) 489. Although an act authorizing towns to repair and grade highways made no provision as to damages that might result to property owners from the undertaking, an act providing for the recovery of such damages from aCHAP. VIII] SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 493 2. That in some cases, in view of the twofold character of such bodies, as being on the one hand agencies of State government, and on the other, corporations endowed with capacities and permitted to hold property and enjoy peculiar privileges for the benefit of their corporators exclusively, the legislature may permit the incur- ring of expense, the contracting of obligations, and the levy of taxes town is not invalid. Jn re Borup, 182 N. Y. 222, 74 N. E. 838, 108 Am. St. Rep. 796. The legislature may validate an unauthorized issue of bonds, thereby taking away an inequitable defense against a holder of them in good faith, and enabling him to enforce them. Read v. Plattsmouth, 107 U. S. 568, 27 L. ed. 414, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 208. So far as an act creates a liability which did not exist, it is void; so far as it provides a means for enforcing a pre- existing liability, it is valid. Super- visors of Sadsbury v. Dennis, 96 Pa. St. 400. The legislature cannot im- pose taxation to pay what a county does not owe: Board of Supervisors v. Cowan, 60 Miss. 876; nor to be- stow a gratuity; otherwise if there is an equitable obligation to pay. Fuller v. Morrison Co., 36 Minn. 309, 30 N. W. 824. See State v. Foley, 30 Minn. 350, 15 N. W. 375; Caldwell Co. v. Harbert, 68 Tex. 321, 4S. W. 607. Where the Constitution provides that no county shall give any money or property in aid of any individual, association, or corporation, the legis- lature cannot authorize the retrial of a demand against a county where judgment upon the first trial was for the county. Re Greene, 166 N. Y. 485, 60 N. E. 183. In Creighton v. San Francisco, 42 Cal. 446, it is said that the power of the legislature to appropriate the money of municipal corporations in payment of equitable claims to indi- viduals, not enforceable in the courts, depends on the legislative conscience, and the judiciary will not interfere unless in exceptional cases. But the Constitution of California now pro- hibits such action on the part of the legislature. Conlin v. San Francisco Bd. of Supervisors, 99 Cal. 17, 33 Pac. 753, 21 L. R. A. 474, 37 Am. St. 17. See also other cases to same subject, note 3, p. 464, and note 1 on p. 469, ante. Unquestionably the legislature may decide what taxes shall be levied for proper purposes of local government. Youngblood v. Sexton, 32 Mich. 406. And a territorial legislature may com- pel the payment of debts incurred for public purposes by the inhabitants of a town before the organization of territorial and municipal governments. Guthrie National Bank v. Guthrie, 173 U.S. 528, 43 L. ed. 796, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 513; Guthrie v. Oklahoma, 1 Okla. 188, 31 Pac. 190, 21 L. R. A. 841. See also Cooper v. Springer, 65 N. J. L. 594, 48 Atl. 605. That penalties recoverable at suit of party injured may be laid upon counties in which lynchings occur, see Bd. of Com’rs of Champaign Co. v. Church, 62 Ohio St. 318, 57 N. E. 50, 48 L. R. A. 738. The Legislature may compel a city to acquire or construct and to pay for bridges and ferries within their limits or contiguous to them, but it cannot compel a county to pay the debts of a city within it. Simon »v. Northup, 27 Oreg. 487, 40 Pac. 560, Si 1b, iy, AN yale The legislature cannot fix by statute the price which a city must pay for materials or property that it may need, or the compensation that it must pay for labor or other services that it may be obliged to employ, when such regulations increase the cost beyond that which it would be obliged to pay in the ordinary course of business. Street v. Varney Electrical Supply Co., 160 Ind. 338, 66 N. E. 895, 98 Am. St. Rep. 325, 61 L. R. A. 155; People ex rel. Rodgers v. Coler, 166 N. Y. 1, 59 N. E. 716, 82 Am. St. Rep. 605, 52 L. R. A. 814.494 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL.- 1 which are unusual, and which would not be admissible under the powers usually conferred. Instances of the kind may be mentioned in the offer of military bounties, and the payment of a dispropor- tionate share of a State burden in consideration of peculiar local benefits which are to spring from it.! [Where, however, a State constitution prohibits municipal corporations from levying taxes except for their necessary expenses, unless by a vote of the majority of the electors, the legislature cannot authorize a municipal cor- poration, without a vote of the people, to levy a tax for a purpose other than its necessary expenses.?] 1The subject of military bounties has been sufficiently referred to al- ready. As to the right to permit a municipal corporation to burden itself with a local tax for a State object, we refer to Merrick v. Amherst, 12 Allen, 500; Marks v. Trustees of Purdue University, 37 Ind. 155; Hasbrouck v. Milwaukee, 13 Wis. 37. The first was a case in which, in consideration of the local benefits expected from the location of the State agricultural college in a certain town, the town was permitted to levy a large local tax in addition to its proportion of the State burden, for the erection of the necessary buildings. The second case was of a similar nature. The third was the case of permission to levy a city tax to improve the city harbor, —a work usually done by the general government. See also Sinclair v. Lincoln, 101 Neb. 163, 162 N. W. 488, L. R. A. 1917 E, 842. There are cases which go further than these, and hold that the legisla- ture may compel a municipal corpora- tion to do what it may thus permit. Thus, in Kirby v. Shaw, 19 Pa. St. 258, it appeared that by an act of April 3, 1848, the commissioners of Bradford County were required to add $500 annually, until 1857, to the usual county rates and levies of the borough of Towanda in said county, for the purpose of defraying the ex- penses of the courthouse and _ jail, then in process of erection in that borough. The act was held consti- tutional on the principle of assess- ment of benefits. In Gordon v. Cornes, 47 N. Y. 608, a law was sustained which “‘authorized and required” the village of Brock- port to levy a tax for the erection of a State normal school building at that place. It is to be said of this case, however, that there was to be in the building a grammar-school free to all the children of proper acquirements in the village; so that the village was to receive a peculiar and direct bene- fit from it, besides those which would be merely incidental to the location of the normal school in the place. But for this circumstance it would be distinctly in conflict with State v. Haben, 22 Wis. 660, where it was held incompetent for the legislature to appropriate the school moneys of a city to the purchase of a site for a State normal school; and also with other cases cited in the next note. It must be conceded, however, that there are other cases which support it. And see, as supporting the last case, Livingston County v. Weider, 64 III. 427; Burr v. Carbondale, 76 Il. 455; Livingston County v. Darlington, 101 U. S. 407, 25 L. ed. 1015. * Ketchie v. Hedrick, 186 N. C. 392, 119 S. E. 767, 31 A. L. R. 491. As to what are necessary expenses within the meaning of such a consti- tutional provision, see Fawcett v. Mt. Airy, 184 N. C. 125, 45 S. E. 1029, 63 L. R. A. 870, 101 Am. St. Rep. 825; Jones v. Madison County, 137 N. C. 579, 599, 50 S. E. 291, 298; Collie v. Franklin County, 145 N. C. 171, 59 S. E. 44; Keith v. Lockhart, 171 N. C. 455, 88 S. E. 642, Ann. Cas. 1918 D, 916; Ketchie v. Hedrick, 186 N. C. 392, 119 S. E. 767, 31 A. L. R. 491.CHAP. VII] SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 495 3. But it is believed the legislature has no power, against the will of a municipal corporation, to compel it to contract debts for local purposes in which the State has no concern, or to assume obligations not within the ordinary functions of municipal govern- ment. Such matters are to be disposed of in view of the interests of the corporators exclusively, and they have the same right to determine them for themselves which the associates in private cor- porations have to determine for arise for their corporate action. themselves the questions which The State in such cases may re- move restrictions and permit action, but it cannot compel it.’ 1A city cannot be compelled to erect buildings for a county; but it may be permitted to do it if it so elects. Callam v. Saginaw, 50 Mich. 7, 14.N. W. 677. There are undoubtedly some cases which go to the extent of holding that municipal corporations and organiza- tions are so completely under the legis- lative control, that whatever the legis- lature may permit them to do, it may compel them to do, whether the cor- porators are willing or not. A leading case is Thomas v. Leland, 24 Wend. 65. In that case it appeared that certain citizens of Utica had given their bond to the people of the State of New York, conditioned for the payment into the canal fund of the sum of $38,615, the estimated difference between the cost of connecting the Chenango Canal with the Erie at Utica, instead of at Whitesborough, as the canal com- missioners had contemplated; and it was held within the constitutional powers of the legislature to require this sum to be upon the taxable property of the city of Utica, supposed to be benefited by the canal connection. The court treat the case as ‘“‘the ordinary one of local taxation to make or improve a public highway ’”’, and dismiss it with few words. If it could be considered as merely a case of the apportionment between a number of municipalities of the ex- pense of a public highway running through them, it would have the sup- port of Waterville v. County Commis- sioners, 59 Me. 80; Commonwealth v. Newburyport, 103 Mass. 129; and also what is said in Bay City v. State Treasurer, 23 Mich. 499, where it is assessed admitted that over the matter of the construction of such a highway, as well as the apportionment of expense, the State authority must necessarily be complete. It has been considered in subsequent New York as a case of apportionment merely. See People v. Brooklyn, 4 N. YY: 419; Howell v. Buffalo, 37 N. Y. 267. The cases of Kirby v. Shaw, 19 Pa. St. 258, and Gordon v. Cornes, 47 N. Y. 608, referred to in the preceding note, it will be perceived, were also treated as merely apportionment. How that can be called a case of ap- portionment, however, which singles out a particular town, and taxes it for benefits to be expected from a highway running the State, without doing the same by any other town in the State, it is not easy to per- celve. In Commissioners of Revenue v. The State, 45 Ala. 399, it appeared that the legislature had created a local board consisting of the president of the county commissioners of revenue of Mobile County, the mayor of Mo- bile, the president of the Bank of Mobile, the president of the Mobile Chamber of Commerce, and one citizen of Mobile, appointed by the governor, as a board for the improvement of the river, harbor, and bay of Mobile, and required the commissioners of revenue of Mobile County to issue to them for that purpose county bonds to the amount of $1,000,000, and to levy a tax to pay them. Here was an ap- pointment by the State of local officers to make at the expense of the locality an improvement which it has been customary for the general government cases cases of across496 to take in charge as one of national concern; but the Supreme Court of the State sustained the act, going farther, as we think, in doing so, than has been gone in any other case. In Hasbrouck v. Milwaukee, 13 Wis. 37, approved and defended in an able opinion in Mills v. Charleton, 29 Wis. 400, the power of the legislature to compel the city of Milwaukee to issue bonds or levy a tax for the improvement of its harbor was dis- tinctly denied, though it was conceded that permission might be given, which the city could lawfully act upon. Compare also Knapp v. Grant, 27 Wis. 147; State v. Tappan, 29 Wis. 664, 9 Am. Rep. 622; Atkins v. Randolph, 31 Vt. 226. In People v. Batchellor, 53 N. Y. 128, the Court of Appeals, through an able and lucid opinion by Grover, J., denied the validity of a mandatory statute compelling a town to take stock in a railroad corporation, and to issue its bonds in exchange therefor. The authority to permit the town to do this was not discussed, but, taking that as admitted, it is declared that municipal corporations, in the making or refusing to make arrangements of the nature of that attempted to be forced upon the town in question, were entitled to the same freedom of action precisely which individual citi- zens might claim. This opinion re- views the prior decisions in the same State, and finds nothing conflicting with the views expressed. In Asbury v. Albemarle, 162 N. Co (247, 78) So be 146) 441, R. A. (nN. 8.) 1189, it was held that an act which provides that before construct- ing its water plant a municipality shall acquire by purchase or condem- nation a system maintained in its corporate limits by a private corpora- tion was an unconstitutional interfer- ence by the legislature. In People v. Mayor, &c. of Chicago, 51 Ill. 17, 2 Am. Rep. 278, it was de- nied, in an opinion of great force and ability, delivered by Chief Justice Breese, that the State could empower a board of park commissioners of State appointment to contract a debt for the city of Chicago, for the purposes of a CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoOL. I public park for that city, and with- out the consent of its citizens. The learned judge says (p. 31): ‘‘While it is conceded that municipal corpora- tions, which exist only for public pur- poses, are subject at all times to the control of the legislature creating them, and have in their franchises no vested rights, and whose powers and privileges the creating power may alter, modify, or abolish at pleasure, as they are but parts of the machinery employed to carry on the affairs of the State, over which and their rights and effects the State may exercise a general super- intendence and control (Richland County v. Lawrence County, 12 Ill. 8; Trustees of Schools v. Tatman, 13 Ill. 30), we are not of the opinion that that power, such as it is, can be so used as to compel any one of our many cities to issue its bonds against its will, to erect a park, or for any other improvement to force it to create a debt of millions; in effect, to compel every property owner in the city to give his bond to pay a debt thus forced upon the city. It will hardly be contended that the legislature can compel a holder of property in Chicago to execute his individual bond as security for the payment of a debt so ordered to be contracted. A city is made up of individuals owning the property within its limits, the lots and blocks which compose it, and the structures which adorn them. What would be the universal judg- ment, should the legislature, sua sponte, project magnificent and costly structures within one of our cities, — triumphal arches, splendid columns, and perpetual fountains, —and re- quire in the act creating them that every owner of property within the city limits should give his individual obligation for his proportion of the cost, and impose such costs as a lien upon his property forever? What would be the public judgment of such an act, and wherein would it differ from the act under considera- tion?’”’ And again: ‘Here, then, is a case where taxes may be assessed, not by any corporate authority of the city, but by commissioners, to whom is intrusted the erection, em-CHAP. VIII] SEVERAL GRADES OF bellishment, and control of this park, and this without consent of the prop- erty owners. “We do not think it is within the constitutional competency of the legislature to delegate this power to these commissioners. If the principle be admitted that the legislature can, uninvited, of their mere will, impose such a burden as this upon the city of Chicago, then one much heavier and more onerous can be imposed; in short, no limit can be assigned to legislative power in this regard. If this power is possessed, then it must be conceded that the property of every citizen within it is held at the pleasure and will of the legislature. Can it be that the General Assembly of the State, just and honest as its members may be, is the depository of the rights of property of the citizen? Would there be any sufficient security for property if such a power was con- ceded? No well-regulated mind can entertain the idea that it is within the constitutional competency of the legis- lature to subject the earnings of any portion of our people to the hazards of any such legislation.” This case should be read in connec- tion with the following in the same State, and all in the same direction. People v. Common Council of Chicago, 51 Ill. 58; Lovingston v. Wider, 53 Ill. 302; People v. Canty, 55 Ill. 33; Wider v. East St. Louis, 55 Ill. 133; Gage v. Graham, 57 Ill. 144; East St. Louis v. Witts, 59 Ill. 155; Mar- shall v. Silliman, 61 Ill. 218; Cairo, &e. R. R. Co. v. Sparta, 77 Ill. 505; Barnes v. Lacon, 84 Ill. 461. See also People v. Common Council of Detroit, 28 Mich. 228; State v. Edwards, 42 Mont. 135, 111 Pac. 734, 32 L. R. A. (w. s.) 1078, Ann. Cas. 1912 A, 1063. But in Massachusetts it has been held that the legislature may compel a city to purchase and maintain a pub- lic park. Attorney-General ». Wil- liams, 174 Mass. 476, 55 N. E. 77, 47 L. R. A. 314. See also Jn re opinion of the Justices, 34 R. I. 191, 83 Atl. 3. That the legislature may compel a municipality to levy a tax for a local road, see Wilcox v. Deer Lodge Co., 2 Mont. 574. And where a high- VOL. I—32 MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 497 way or bridge is beneficial to sev- eral municipalities, the legislature may compel them to contribute to the expense of providing and maintaining it, even though no portion of it lies within the boundaries of some of the contributories; and the legislature may apportion the expense. State vy. Williams, 68 Conn. 131, 35 Atl. 24, 421, 48 L. R. A. 465, aff. in Williams v. Eggleston, 170 U. S. 304, 42 L. ed. 1047, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 617. Upon power of legislature to impose burdens of this character on municipalities, see cases collected in note to 48 L. R. A. 465. The case of People v. Batchellor, 53 N. Y. 128, seems to us clearly in- consistent with Thomas »v. Leland, supra. But, on the other hand, the case of Duanesburgh v. Jenkins, 57 N. Y. 177, goes to the full extent of holding that a subscription of a town to a railroad, made on condition of subsequent assent of the town thereto, may be relieved of the condition by the legislature and enforced against the town, though the original subscrip- tion was by a commission which the town did not choose. It is a little difficult, therefore, to determine what the law of New York now is on this subject, especially as in New York, &c. R. R. Co. v. Van Horn, 57 N. Y. 473, the power of the legislature to make valid an ineffectual individual con- tract is denied. Other New York cases bearing on the subject are Wil- liams v. Duanesburg, 66 N. Y. 135; Horton v. Thompson, 71 N. Y. 521; Rogers v. Rochester, etc., RR. Con2i Hun, 46; Thompson v. Mamakating, 37 Hun, 402. But leaving out of view the New York cases, and a few others which were decided on the ground of an apportionment of local benefits, we think the case in Alabama will stand substantially alone. Before that de- cision the Supreme Court of Illinois were able to say, in a case calling for a careful and thorough examination of the authorities, that counsel had “failed to find a case wherein it had been held that the legislature can compel a city against its will to incur a debt by the issue of its bonds for a local improvement.’ People v.498 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [voL. I 4. And there is much good reason for assenting also to what sev- eral respectable authorities have held, that where a demand is asserted against a municipality, though of a nature that the legis- lature would have a right to require it to incur and discharge, yet if its legal and equitable obligation is disputed, the corporation has the right to have the dispute settled by the courts, and cannot be bound by a legislative allowance of the claim. Having concisely stated these general views, we add merely, that those cases which hold that the State may raise bounty moneys Mayor, &c., 51 Ill. 17, 31. See also cases, pp. 1031-1037, infra. And see Cook Farm Co. v. Detroit, 124 Mich. 426, 83 N. W. 130, holding that citi- zens must be permitted to pass upon the proposition to allow a board the power of local taxation, decided on authority of Park Commissioners v. Detroit, 28 Mich. 228. 11t was held in People v. Hawes, 37 Barb. 440, that the legislature had no right to direct a municipal corpora- tion to satisfy a claim made against it for damages for breach of contract, out of the funds or property of such corporation. In citing the cases of Guilford v. Supervisors of Chenango, 13 N. Y. 148, and People v. Supervisors of New York, 11 Abb. 14, a distinction is drawn by which the cases are sup- posed to be reconciled with the one then under decision. ‘Those cases and many others,” say the court, p. 455, “related not to the right or power of the legislature to compel an individual or corporation to pay a debt or claim, but to the power of the legislature to raise money by tax, and apply such money, when so raised, to the payment thereof. We could not, under the decisions of the courts on this point, made in these and other cases, now hold that the legislature had not authority to impose a tax to pay any claim, or to pay it out of the State treasury; and for this purpose to impose a tax upon the property of the whole State, or any portion of the State. This was fully settled in People v. Mayor, &c. of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419; but neither that case nor the case in 13 N. Y. 143, in any manner gave a warrant for the opinion that the legislature had a right to direct a mu- nicipal corporation to pay a claim for damages for breach of a contract out of the funds or property of such cor- poration, without a submission of such claim to a judicial tribunal.” If by this is meant that the legislature has power to compel a corporation to tax its citizens for the payment of a demand, but has not the authority to make it a charge against the cor- poration in any other mode, the dis- tinction seems to be one of form rather than of substance. It is no protection to the rights of property of a municipal corporation to hold that the legislature cannot determine upon a claim against it, if at the same time the corporation may be compelled by statute to assume and discharge the obligation through the levy of a tax for its satisfaction. But if it is only meant to declare that the legislature cannot adjudicate upon disputed claims, there can be no good reason to find fault with the decision. It is one thing to determine that the nature of a claim is such as to make it proper to satisfy it by taxation, and another to adjudge how much is justly due upon it. The one is the exercise of legislative power, the other of judicial. See Sanborn v. Rice, 9 Minn. 273; Commonwealth v. Pittsburgh, 34 Pa. St. 496; Plimpton »v. Somerset, 33 Vt. 283; Gage v. Graham, 57 Ill. 144. But the power to decide upon the breach of a contract by a corporation, and the extent of the damages which have resulted, is less objectionable and less likely to lead to oppression, than the power to impose through taxation a claim upon a corporation which it never was concerned in creat- ing, against which it protests, andCHAP. VIII] SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 499 by taxation, to be paid to persons in the military service, we think stand by themselves, and are supported by different principles from any which can fairly be summoned to the aid of some of the other cases which we have cited. The burden of the public defense un- questionably rests upon the whole community; and the legislature may properly provide for its apportionment and discharge in such manner as its wisdom may prescribe. But those cases which hold it competent for the legislature to give its consent to a municipal corporation engaging in works of public improvement outside its territorial limits, and becoming a stockholder in a private corpora- tion, must be conceded on all hands to have gone to the very limit of constitutional power in this direction; and to hold that the legisla- ture may go even further, and, under its power to control the taxa- tion of the political divisions and organizations of the State, may compel them, without the consent of their citizens, to raise money for such or any other unusual purposes, or to contract debts therefor, seems to us to be introducing new principles into our system of local self-government, and to be sanctioning a centralization of power not within the contemplation of the makers of the American con- stitutions. We think, where any such forced taxation is resisted by the municipal organization, it will be very difficult to defend it as a proper exercise of legislative authority in a government where power is distributed on the principles which prevail here. Legislative Control of Corporate Property. The legislative power of the State controls and disposes of the property of the State. How far it may also control and dispose to apportion the taxes collected in a county between a city therein and the remainder of the county, and that the which is unconnected with the ordi- nary functions and purposes of munici- pal government. In Borough of Dunmore’s Appeal, 52 Pa. St. 374, a decision was made which seems to conflict with that in People v. Hawes, supra, and with the subsequent case of Baldwin v. Mayor, &e. of New York, 42 Barb. 549. The Pennsylvania court decided that the constitutional guaranty of the right to jury trial had no application to “municipal corporations, and a commission might be created by the legislature to adjust the demands between them. See also Jn re Penn- sylvania Hall, 5 Pa. St. 204; Layton v. New Orleans, 12 La. Ann. 515. In People v. Power, 25 Ill. 187, it was held competent for the legislature county revenues “ must necessarily be within the control of the legislature for political purposes.’’ And see Port- wood v. Montgomery Co., 52 Miss. 523. In Louisiana it has been held that while the legislature may compel a municipal corporation to pay 4 debt which is equitable in character, though not binding in law, it has no power to compel such a corporation to pay @ claim with respect to which it is under no obligation moral or equitable; and the less so where the issue of obligation vel non has been finally decided be- tween the parties, by a court of last resort, and where the fund from which500 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I of the property of those agencies of government which it has cre- ated and endowed with corporate powers, is a question which happily there has been very little occasion to discuss in the courts. Being created as an agency of government, it is evident that the munici- pality cannot in itself have that complete and absolute control and power of disposition of its property which is possessed by natural persons and private corporations in respect to their several posses- sions. For it can hold and own property only for corporate pur- poses,! and its powers are liable at any time to be so modified by legislation as to render the property no longer available. More- over, the charter rights may be altogether taken away; and in that case the legislature has deprived the corporation of its property by depriving it of corporate capacity to hold it. And in many ways, while the corporation holds and enjoys property, the legislature must possess power to interfere with its control, at least incidentally; for the mere fact that the corporation possesses property cannot de- prive the State of its complete authority to mold and change the corporate organization, and enlarge or diminish the powers which it possessed before. But whether the State can directly intervene and take away the corporate property, or convert it to other uses than those for which it was procured, or whether, on repealing a charter of incorporation, it can take to itself the corporate property, and dis- pose of it at its discretion, are different questions from any raised by the indirect and incidental interference referred to. In the leading case, in which it was decided by the Supreme Court of the United States that a private charter of incorporation, granted by a State, was a contract between the State and the cor- porators, not subject to modification or repeal, except in pursuance of a right expressly reserved, but that the charter of a municipal corporation was not such a contract, it was at the same time de- clared, as the opinion of the judges, that the legislature could not deprive such municipal corporations of their vested rights in prop- erty. “It may be admitted,” says one of the judges, “that cor- porations for mere public government, such as towns, cities, and counties, may in many respects be subject to legislative control. But it will hardly be contended that even in respect to such corpora- the payment is claimed has been 1 Such property is held subject to a placed, by the Constitution, under a trust in behalf of the public, and the particular control, and dedicated to municipality is incapable of alienating particular uses which do not include it unless expressly authorized thereto. the payment of the claim in question. See Huron Waterworks Co. v. Huron, Forman v. Sewerage and Water 8S. D. 169, 65 N. W. 816, 30 L. R. A. Board, 135 La. 1031, 66 So. Sole aR S48 A. 1915 D, 927.CHAP. VIII] SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 501 tions the legislative power is so transcendent that it may, at its will, take away the private property of the corporation, or change the uses of its private funds acquired under the public faith. Can the legislature confiscate to its own use the private funds which a municipal corporation holds under its charter, without any default or consent of the corporators? If a municipal corporation be capable of holding devises and legacies to charitable uses, as many municipal corporations are, does the legislature, under our forms of limited government, possess the authority to seize upon those funds and appropriate them to other uses, at its own arbitrary pleasure, against the will of the donors and donees? From the very nature of our government, the public faith is pledged the other way, and that pledge constitutes a valid compact; and that compact is sub- ject only to judicial inquiry, construction, and abrogation.’ ? “The government has no power to revoke a grant, even of its own funds, when given to a private person or corporation for special uses. It cannot recall its own endowments, granted to any hospital or college, or city or town, for the use of such corporations. The only authority remaining to the government is judicial, to ascertain the validity of the grant, to enforce its proper uses, to suppress frauds, and, if the uses are charitable, to secure their regular administra- tion through the means of equitable tribunals, in cases where there would otherwise be a failure of justice.” ” “Tn respect to public corporations,” says another judge, “which exist only for public purposes, such as towns, cities, etc., the legis- lature may, under proper limitations, change, modify, enlarge, or restrain them, securing, however, the property for the use of those for whom and at whose expense it was purchased.” * These views had been acted upon by the same court in preceding cases. They draw a distinction between the political rights and privileges con- ferred on corporations and which are not vested rights in any sense implying constitutional permanency, and such rights in prop- 1 Story, J., in Dartmouth College v. In People ». Common Council of Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 694, 695, Detroit, 28 Mich. 228, this subject 4 L. ed. 629. was largely considered, and the court 2 Story, J., in Dartmouth College ». denied the right of the State to compel Woodward, 4 Wheat. 698, 4 L. ed. 629. a municipal corporation to contract a 3 Washington, J., in Dartmouth debt for a mere local object; for ex- College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. ample, a city park. Compare People 663, 4 L. ed. 629. v. Board of Supervisors, 50 Cal. 561. 4Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch, 43, 3 In Texas it is held that municipal L. ed. 650: Town of Pawlet v. Clark, corporations have a constitutional 9 Cranch, 292, 3 L. ed. 735. See also right to protection in their property as State v. Haben, 22 Wis. 660, referred against State legislation. Milam Co. to, ante, p. 494, note; Aberdeen v. v. Bateman, 54 Tex. 153. Saunderson, 16 Miss. 663.502 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I erty as the corporation acquires, and which in the view of these decisions are protected by the same reasons which shield similar rights in individuals.’ When the municipal divisions of the territory of the State are changed in their boundaries, two or more consolidated in one, or one subdivided, it is conceded that the legislature possesses the power to make such disposition of the corporate property as natural equity would require in view of the altered condition of things. The fact that a portion of the citizens, before entitled to the benefits spring- ing from the use of specific property for public purposes, will now be deprived of that benefit, cannot affect the validity of the legisla- tive act, which is supposed in some other way to compensate them for the incidental loss. And in many other cases the legislature properly exercises a similar power of control in respect to the cor- porate property, and may direct its partition and appropriation, in order to accommodate most justly and effectually, in view of new circumstances, the purposes for which it was acquired. The rule upon the subject we take to be this: when corporate powers are conferred, there is an implied compact between the State and the corporators that the property which they are given the capacity to acquire for corporate purposes under their charter shall not be taken from them and appropriated to other uses.? If the State grants property to the corporation, the grant is an exe- 1 “Tt is an unsound and even absurd proposition that political power con- ferred by the legislature can become a vested right, as against the government, in any individual or body of men. It is repugnant to the genius of our in- stitutions, and the spirit and meaning of the Constitution; for by that funda- of a city to park commissioners for boulevard or park purposes. People v. Walsh, 96 Ill. 232, 36 Am. Rep. 135. See Matter of Woolsey, 95 N. Y. 135. 2 Bristol v. New Chester, 3 N. H. 524; Attorney-General v. Lowrey, 199 U. S. 238, 50 L. ed. 167, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 27; Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 mental law, all political rights not there defined and taken out of the exercise of legislative discretion, were intended to be left subject to its regula- tion. If corporations can set up a vested right as against the government to the exercise of this species of power, because it has been conferred upon them by the bounty of the legislature, so may any and every officer under the government do the same.” Nelson, J., in People v. Morris, 13 Wend. 325, 331. And see Bristol v. New Chester, 3 N. H. 524; Benson v. Mayor, &e. of New York, 10 Barb. 223. It is competent for the legislature to transfer the control of the streets Uo S: 161552 1. eds 1515 28) Sup. Cr Rep. 40; Hammond ». Clark, 136 Ga. 313, 71S. E. 479, 38 L. R. A. (N. s.) 77; Pennsylvania Co. v. Pittsburgh, 226 Pa. St. 322, 75 Atl. 421, 134 Am. St. Rep. 1063. And see ante, pp. 395- 399, notes; post, p. 507, note 1. 5If land is dedicated as a public square, and accepted as such, a law devoting it to other uses is void, be- cause violating the obligation of contracts. Warren v. Lyons City, 22 Towa, 351. As there was no attempt in that case to appropriate the land to such other uses under the right of eminent domain, the question of the power to do so was not considered.CHAP. VIII] cuted contract, which cannot be revoked. SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 503 The rights acquired, either by such grants or by any other legitimate mode in which such a corporation can acquire property, are vested rights, and cannot be taken away. Nevertheless if the corporate powers should be re- pealed, the corporate ownership would necessarily cease, and even when not repealed, a modification of those powers, or a change in corporate bounds, might seriously affect, if not altogether divest, the rights of individual corporators, so far as they can be said to have any rights in public property. And in other ways, incidentally as well as by direct intervention, the State may exercise authority and control over the disposition and use of corporate property, ac- cording to the legislative view of what is proper for the public inter- est and just to the corporators, subject, however, to this restriction, that the purpose for which the property was originally acquired shall be kept in view, so far as the circumstances will admit, in any dis- position that may be made of it. 1 This principle is asserted and sus- tained in Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U. S. 514, 25 L. ed. 699, in an elab- orate opinion by Mr. Justice Clifford. Also in Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472, 26 L. ed. 197. And see North Yarmouth v. Skillings, 45 Me. 133. “That the State may make a con- tract with, or a grant to, a public mu- nicipal corporation, which it could not subsequently impair or resume, is not denied; but in such case the corpora- tion is to be regarded as a private company. A grant may be made to a public corporation for purposes of private advantage; and although the public may also derive a common benefit therefrom, yet the corporation stands on the same footing, as respects such grant, as would any body of persons upon whom like privileges were conferred. Public or municipal cor- porations, however, which exist only for public purposes, and possess no powers except such as are bestowed upon them for public political pur- poses, are subject at all times to the control of the legislature, which may alter, modify, or abolish them at pleasure.” Trumbull, J., in Richland County v. Lawrence County, 12 Ill. 18. “Public corporations are but parts of the machinery employed in carrying on the affairs of the State; and they are subject to be changed, modified, or destroyed, as the exigencies of the public may demand. The State may exercise a general superintendence and control over them and their right and effects, so that their property is not diverted from the uses and objects for which it was given or purchased.” Trustees of Schools v. Tatman, 13 Ill. 27, 30, per Treat, Ch. J. And see Harrison v. Bridgeton, 16 Mass. 16; Rawson v. Spencer, 113 Mass. 40; Montpelier v. East Montpelier, 27 Vt. 704; Same v. Same, 29 Vt. 12; Benson v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 10 Barb. 223; City of Louisville v. Uni- versity, 15 B. Monr. 642; Weymouth & Braintree Fire District v. County Commissioners, 108 Mass. 142; Mor- gan v. Beloit, 7 Wall. 613; Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U. S. 182, 67 L. ed. 937, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 534, 29 A. L. R. 1471 In Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 67 L. ed. 937, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 534, 29 A. L. R. 1471, the court said: “The power of the state, unrestrained by the contract clause or the Four- teenth Amendment (of the Federal Constitution), over the rights and property of cities held and used for governmental purposes cannot be questioned.” In Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U. S. 179, 52 L. ed. 151, 28 Sup. Ct:504 Rep. 40, Justice Moody, who delivered the opinion of the court, said: ‘ Mu- nicipal corporations are political sub- divisions of the State, created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the State as may be entrusted to them. For the purpose of executing these powers properly and efficiently they usually are given the power to acquire, hold and manage personal and real property. The number, nature, and duration of the powers conferred upon these corporations and the territory over which they shall be exercised rests in the absolute discretion of the State. Neither their charters, nor any law conferring governmental pow- ers, or vesting in them property to be used for governmental purposes, or authorizing them to hold or manage such property, or exempting them from taxation upon it, constitutes a contract with the State within the meaning of the Federal Constitution. The State, therefore, at its pleasure, may modify or withdraw all such powers, may take without compensa- tion such property, hold it itself, or vest it in other agencies, expand or contract the territorial area, unite the whole or a part of it with another municipality, repeal the charter and destroy the corporation. All this may be done, conditionally or uncon- ditionally, with or without the con- sent of the citizens, or even against their protest. In all these respects the State is supreme, and its legisla- tive body, conforming its action to the State Constitution, may do as it will, unrestrained by any provision of the Constitution of the United States. Although the inhabitants and prop- erty owners may, by such changes, suf- fer inconvenience, and their property may be lessened in value by the burden of increased taxation, or for any other reason, they have no right by contract or otherwise, in the unaltered or continued existence of the corpora- tion or its powers, and there is nothing in the Federal Constitution which pro- tects them from these injurious con- sequences. The power is in the State, and those who legislate for the State are alone responsible for any unjust CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I or oppressive exercise of it.... It will be observed that, in describ- ing the absolute power of the State over the property of municipal cor- porations, we have not extended it beyond the property held and used for governmental purposes. Such cor- porations are sometimes authorized to hold property for the same purposes that property is held by private cor- porations or individuals. The dis- tinction between property owned by municipal corporations in their polit- ical and governmental capacity and that owned by them in their private capacity, though difficult to define, has been approved by many of the State courts (Dill. Mun. Corp. 4th ed. §$66 to 66a inclusive; cases cited in note to State ex rel. Bulkeley v. Williams, 48 L. R. A. 465), and it has been held that, as to the latter class of property, the legislature is not omnipotent. If the distinction is recognized it suggests the question whether property, of a municipal cor- poration owned in its private and proprietory capacity may be taken from it against its will and without compensation. Mr. Dillon says truly that the question has never arisen directly for adjudication in this court. But it and the distinction upon which it is based have several times been noticed.” In Higginson v. Treasurer & School House Commissioners, 215 Mass. 583, 99 N. E. 523, 42 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 215, the court said: ‘The property of which a city or town has acquired ab- solute ownership as an agency of the State, and which it holds strictly for public uses, is subject to legislative control. It may be transferred to some other agency of government charged with the same duties, or it may be devoted to other public pur- poses. The property which a municipality holds in its private capac- ity is not subject to the unrestricted authority of the legislature, and no person can deprive it of such property rights against its will, except by the exercise of eminent domain with pay- ment of full compensation.” See also Agawam v. Hampden, 130 Mass. 528; Mount Hope Cemetery v.CHAP. VIII] SEVERAL GRADES OF Boston, 158 Mass. 509, 33 N. E. 695; Springfield ». Springfield Street Rail- way, 182 Mass. 41, 64 N. E. Worcester v. Worcester Consolidated Street Railway, 182 Mass. 49, 64 N. E. 581; Ware v. Fitchburg, 200 Mass. 61, 85 N. E. 951; Codman v. Crocker, 203 Mass. 146, 89 N. E. 177. In State v. St. Louis County Court, 34 Mo. 546, the following remarks are made by the court, in considering the cause shown by the county in answer to an application to compel it to meet a requisition for the police board of St. Louis: ‘“‘As to the second cause shown in the return, it is understood to mean, not that there is in fact no money in the treasury to pay this requisition, but that as a matter of law all the money which is in the treasury was collected for specific pur- poses from which it cannot be diverted. The specific purposes for which the money was collected were those here- tofore directed by the legislature; and this act, being a later expression of the will of the legislature, controls the subject, and so far as it conflicts with previous acts repeals them. The county is not a private corporation, but an agency of the State govern- ment; and though as a public cor- poration it holds property, such hold- ing is subject to a large extent to the will of the legislature. Whilst the legislature cannot take away from a county its property, it has full power to direct the mode in which the prop- erty shall be used for the benefit of the county.’ For like views, see Palmer v. Fitts, 51 Ala. 489, 492. Compare People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481; Richland Co. v. Richland Cen- ter, 59 Wis. 591, 18 N. W. 497. It will be observed that the strong expression of legislative power is generally to be found in cases where the thing actually done was clearly and unquestionably competent. In Payne v. Treadwell, 16 Cal. 220, 233, this language is used: ‘The agents of the corporation can sell or dispose the property of the corporation only in the way and according to the order of the legislature; and therefore the legislature may by law operating im- mediately upon the subject dispose of R77 « oll; MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 505 this property, or give effect to any previous disposition or attempted disposition. The property itself is a trust, and the legislature is the prime and controlling power, managing and directing the use, disposition, and direction of it.’’ Quoted and ap- proved in San Francisco v. Canavan, 42 Cal. 541, 558. These strong and general expressions should be com- pared with what is said in Grogan ». San Francisco, 18 Cal. 590, in which the right of municipal corporations to constitutional protection in their prop- erty is asserted fully. The same right is asserted in People v. Batchellor, 53 N. Y. 128; People v. Mayor, &c. of Chicago, 51 Ill. 17; People ». Tappan, 29 Wis. 664; People v. Hurl- but, 24 Mich. 44; and very many other cases. See Dillon, Mun. Corp. §§ 39 et seg., and cases referred to in notes. And see Hewison New Haven, 37 Conn. 475, and New Or- leans, &c. R. R. Co. v. New Orleans, 26 La. Ann. 517, as to the distinction between the public or governmental character of municipal corporations, and their private character as respects the ownership and management of their own property. A park acquired in fee by a city by the exercise of the power of emi- nent domain, is held by the city as an agency of government, and the legis- lature has the power to appropriate it or any part of it to another public use without the consent of the city. Hig- ginson v. Treasurer and School House Commissioners, 212 Mass. 583, 99 N. E. SA? 1; Re A; (Ne Be) aloe But see State ex rel. Gerry v. Edwards, 42 Mont. 135, 111 Pac. 734, 32 L. R. A. (n. s.) 1078, Ann. Cas. 1912 A, 1063. The obligation of a street railroad company to the city to pave and re- pair streets occupied by it, based on accepted conditions of a municipal ordinance granting right of location, is not private property beyond the legislative control of the State, and State legislation taxing the company, and thereby relieving it from its obliga- tion to the city to pave and repair such streets, is not void as violating the contract clause of the Federal Constitution. Worcester v. Worcester 523506 Consol. Street R. Co., 196 U. S. 539, 49 L. ed. 591, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 327. A legislative grant to a city of the power to regulate rates to be charged to a city and its inhabitants by a gas company may be withdrawn by the State from the city and conferred upon a commission, and thereby no ques- tion is presented under the contract clause of the Federal Constitution. Pawhuska v. Pawhuska Oil & Gas Co., 250 U.S. 394, 63 L. ed. 1054, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 526, P. U. R. 1916 E, 178. In Mississippi it has been held that the legislature has the power to divest a municipality of all control over its streets, and authorize their use by a corporation without compensation to the municipality. Canton v. Canton Cotton Warehouse Co., 84 Miss. 268, 36 So. 266, 105 Am. St. Rep. 428, 65 L. R. A. 561. With regard to contracts for the purchase of property or the employ- ment of labor, counties, cities, and towns stand much upon the same foot- ing as private corporations; and they cannot be compelled by an act of the legislature to pay for any species of property more than it is worth, or more than its market value at the time and in the place where it is contracted for. The power to confis- cate the property of the citizens and taxpayers of a county, city, or town, by forcing them to pay for any com- modity, whether it be merchandise or labor, an arbitrary price, in excess of the market value, is not one of the powers of the legislature over munici- pal corporations, nor the legitimate use of such corporations as agencies of the State. Street v. Varney Electrical Supply Co., 160 Ind. 338, 66 N. E. 895, 98 Am. St. Rep. 325, 61 L. R. A. 154; People v. Coler, 166 N. Y. 1, 59 N. E. 716, 82 Am. St. Rep. 605, 52 L. R. A. 814. One of the strongest illustrations of the power of legislation over munici- pal corporations is to be found in the statutes which have been passed in some States to compel these corpora- tions to make compensation for losses occasioned by mobs and riots. The old English law made the hundred responsible for robberies, and this was CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I extended by the Riot Act of 1 Geo. I. to cover damages sustained at the hands of persons unlawfully, riotously, and tumultuously assembled. See Radcliffe v. Eden, Cowp. 485; Wilmot v. Horton, Doug. 701, note; Hyde »v. Cogan, Doug. 699, an action growing out of the riot in which Lord Mans- field’s house was sacked and his library destroyed. Similar statutes it has been deemed necessary to enact in some of the States, and they have received elaborate judicial examina- tion and been sustained as important and beneficial police regulations, based upon the theory that, with proper vigilance on the part of the local au- thorities, the disorder and injury might and ought to have been prevented. Donoghue v. Philadelphia, 2 Pa. St. 230; Commissioners of Kensington ». Philadelphia, 13 Pa. St. 76; Allegheny County v. Gibson, 90 Pa. St. 397, 35 Am. Rep. 670; Darlington v. New York, 31 N. Y. 164; Ely v. Niagara Co., 36 N. Y. 297; Folson v. New Orleans, 28 La. Ann. 936; Street v. New Orleans, 32 La. Ann. 577; Under- hill v. Manchester, 45 N. H. 214; Chadbourne v. New Castle, 48 N. H. 196; Chicago v. Manhattan Cement Co., 178 Ill. 372, 53 N. E. 68, 45 L. R. A. 848, 69 Am. St. 321; Chicago v. Sturges, 222 U.S. 313, 56 L. ed. 215, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 92; Ann. Cas. 1913 B, 1349; Dawson Soap Co. v. Chicago, 234 Ill. 314, 84 N. E. 920, 14 Ann. Cas. 1131; Iola v. Birnbaum, 71 Kan. 600, 81 Pac. 198, 6 Ann. Cas. 267; Blake- man v. Wichita, 93 Kan. 444, 144 Pace. 816, L. R. A. 1915 C, 578, Ann. Cas. 1916 D, 188; Easter v. El Dorado, 104 Kans Sielidd Pace oa6y lov Ane los gee 744; Sauger v. Kansas City, 111 Kan. 262, 206 Pac. 891, 23 A. L. R. 294; Butte Miners’; Union v. Butte, 58 Mont. 391, 194 Pac. 149, 138 A. L. R. 746. Municipal corporations may be made liable for lynchings that occur within their boundaries. Brown v. Orangeburg Co., 55 S. C 45, 32S. E. 764, 44 L. R. A. 734; see, in this connection, Champaign Co. v. Church, 62 Ohio St. 318, 57 N. E. 50, 48 L. R. A. 738. Upon liability for destruction by mobs, see note to 24 L. R. A. 592.CHAP. vill] SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 507 This restriction is not the less applicable where corporate powers are abolished than it is in other cases; and whatever might be the nature of the public property which the corporation had acquired, and whatever the purpose of the acquisition, the legislature, when by taking away the corporate authority it became vested with the control of the property, would be under obligation to dispose of it in such manner as to give the original corporators the benefit thereof by putting it to the use designed, if still practicable, or to some kin- dred or equally beneficial use having reference to the altered condi- tion of things. The obligation is one which, from the very nature of the case, must rest for its enforcement in great measure upon the legislative good faith and sense of justice; and it could only be in those cases where there had been a clear disregard of the rights of the original corporators, in the use attempted to be made of the property, that relief could be had through judicial action. No such restriction, however, can rest upon the legislature in regard to the rights and privileges which the State grants to munici- pal corporations in the nature of franchises, and which are granted only as aids or conveniences to the municipality in effecting the purposes of its incorporation. These, like the corporate powers, must be understood to be granted during pleasure.’ Towns and Counties. Thus far we have been considering general rules, applicable to all classes of municipal organizations possessed of corporate act was passed giving these moneys to There is no such liability in the ab- the Aberdeen Female Academy. The Western College sence of statute. v. Cleveland, 12 Ohio St. 375. Nor act was held void, on the ground that is there for loss of life at hands of the original grant was of a franchise rioters, in absence of statute. New which constituted property, and it could not be transferred to another, though it might be repealed. The case cites Bailey v. Mayor, &c., 3 Hill, 531, and St. Louis v. Russell, 9 Mo. Orleans v. Abagnatto, 62 Fed. Rep. 240, 26 L. R. A. 329; Gianfortone »v. New Orleans, 61 Fed. Rep. 64, 24 L. R. A. 592. 1 Bast Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Co., 10 How. 511, 13 L. ed. 518. On this subject see ch. ix., post. The case of Trustees of Aberdeen Academy v. Mayor, &c. of Aberdeen, 13 S. & M. 645, appears to be contra. By the charter of the town of Aberdeen in 1837, the legislature granted to it the sole power to grant licenses to sell vinous and spirituous liquors within the corporate limits thereof, and to appropriate the money arising there- from to city purposes. In 1848 an 507, which seem to have little rele- vancy; also 4 Wheat. 663, 698, 699, 4 L. ed. 665, 674, and 2 Kent, 305, note, for the general rule protecting municipal corporations in their vested rights to property. The case of Benson v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 10 Barb. 223, also holds the grant of a ferry franchise to a municipal cor- poration to be irrevocable, but the authorities generally will not sus- tain this view. See post, p. 576, and note.508 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I powers, and by which these powers may be measured, or the duties which they impose defined. In regard to some of these organiza- tions, however, there are other and peculiar rules which require separate mention. Some of them are so feebly endowed with cor- porate life, and so much hampered, controlled, and directed in the exercise of the functions which are conferred upon them, that they are sometimes spoken of as nondescript in character, and as occupy- ing a position somewhere between that of a corporation and a mere voluntary association of Counties, townships, school districts, and road districts do not usually possess corporate powers under special charters; but they exist under general laws of the State,’ which apportion the territory of the State into political di- visions for convenience of government, and require of the people residing within those divisions the performance of certain public duties as a part of the machinery of the State; and, in order that they may be able to perform these duties, vest them with certain corporate powers. Whether they shall assume those duties or ex- ercise those powers, the people of the political divisions are not al- lowed the privilege of choice; the legislature assumes this division of the State to be essential in republican government, and the duties are imposed as a part of the proper and necessary burden which the citizens must bear in maintaining and perpetuating constitu- tional liberty.? Usually their functions are wholly of a public citizens. 1A constitutional provision that the legislature shall pass no special act conferring corporate powers, ap- plies to public as well as private cor- porations. State v. Cincinnati, 20 Ohio St. 18; Clegg v. School District, 8 Nev. 178; School District v. Insur- ance Co., 103 U.S. 707, 26 L. ed. 601; Longview v. Crawfordsville, 164 Ind. UG (3 Ne B78, 68) io. Re A. 622, 3 Ann. Cas. 496; Ferry v. King County, 43 Wash. 61, 86 Pac. 210, 9 Ann. Cas. 1170. 2 Granger v. Pulaski County, 26 Ark. 37; Scales v. Chattahoochee County, 41 Ga. 225; Palmer v. Fitts, 51 Ala. 489; Rogers Locomotive Machine Works v. American Emigrant Co., 415, 132 Am. St. Rep. 248; Yamhill County v. Foster, 53 Oreg. 124, 99 Pac. 286. ‘“**A county is one of the civil divi- sions of the State for political and ju- dicial purposes, created by the sover- eign power of the State of its own will, without the consent of the people who inhabit it. 7 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2d Ed.), 900. It is quasi cor- porate in character, but has only such powers as are expressly provided by law or are necessarily implied by those expressed.’ Independent Pub. Co. v. Lewis & Clark County, 30 Mont. 83, 75 Pac. 860. In Board of Commissioners v. Watson, 7 Okla. 174, 54 Pac. 441, it is said: ‘A county 164 U.S. 559, 41 L. ed. 552; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 188; Board of Commissioners v. Wheeler, 39 Colo. 207, 89 Pac. 50; Cook County v. Chicago, 311 Ill. 234, 142 N. E. 512, 31 A. L. R. 442: State v. Board of Commissioners, 170 Ind. 595, 85 N. E. 513; McSurely v. McGrew, 140 Iowa, 163, 118 N. W. is but a subordinate political sub- division of sovereignty created for governmental purposes and for greater convenience in carrying on the public affairs.’ . .. Legislative power over counties is supreme, except in so far as it is restricted by the Constitution in express terms or by necessary im-CHAP. VIII] SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 509 nature, and there is no room to imply any contract between them and the State, in their organization as corporate bodies, except that which springs from the ordinary rules of good faith, and which re- quires that the property they shall acquire, by local taxation or otherwise, for the purposes of their organization, shall not be seized by the State, and appropriated in other ways. They are, therefore, sometimes called quasi corporations,’ to distinguish them from the corporations in general, which possess more completely the func- tions of an artificial entity. in speaking of school districts, has said, Chief Justice Parker, of Massachusetts, “That they are not bodies, politic and corporate, with the general powers of corporations, must be admitted; and the reasoning advanced to show their defect of power is conclusive. The same may be said of towns and other municipal societies ; which, although recognized by various statutes, and by immemorial usage, as persons or aggregate corporations, with precise duties which may be enforced, and privileges which may be maintained by suit at law, yet are deficient in many of the powers incident to the general character of corporations. They may be considered, under our institutions, as quasi corporations, with limited powers, coextensive with the Nelson, 47 plication.” Hersey ». 30, Ann. Cas. Mont. 132, 131 Pac. 1914 C, 963. 1 Riddle v. Proprietors, &c., 7 Mass. 169, 187; School District v. Wood, 13 Mass. 192; Adams v. Wiscasset Bank, 1 Me. 361; Denton v. Jackson, 2 Johns. Ch. 320; Todd v. Birdsall, 1 Cow. 260, 13 Am. Dec. 522; Beardsley v. Smith, 16 Conn. 367; Eastman »v. Meredith, 36 N. H. 284; Hopple ». Brown, 13 Ohio St. 311; Commission- ers of Hamilton Co. v. Mighels, 7 Ohio St. 109; Ray County ». Bentley, 49 Mo. 236; Pasadena School Dist. v. Hollywood City School Dist., 156 Cal. 416, 105 Pac. 122, 26 L. R. A. (x. s.) 485, 20 Ann. Cas. 87; Pasadena School Dist. v. Pasadena, 166 Cal. 7, 184 Pac. 985, 47 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 892, Ann. Cas. 1915 B. 1039; Mac- Millan Co. v. Clarke, 184 Cal. 491, 194 Pac. 1030, 17 A. L. R. 288; Hassett »v. Carroll, 85 Conn. 23, 81 Atl. 1013, Ann. Cas. 1913 A, 333; Jackson County v. Kaul, 77 Kan. 717, 96 Pac. 45,17 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 552; Hersey v. Nelson, 47 Mont. 132, 131 Pac. 30, Ann. Cas. 1914 C, 963; Davie ». Douglas County, 98 Neb. 479, 153 duties imposed upon N. W. 509, L. R. A. 1916 B, 1261; O’Brien Rockingham County, 80 N. H. 522, 120 Atl. 254; Smith ». Robersonville Graded School, 141 N. GC. 143, 53 S. E. 524, 8 Ann. Cas. 529; Pittsburg v. Sterrett Subdistrict School, 204 Pa. St. 635, 54 Atl. 463, 61 L. R. A. 183 ; Crabb l Celeste School Dist., 105 Tex. 194, 146 S. W. 528, 39 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 601, Ann. Cas. 1915 B, 1146; Howard v. Tacoma School Dist., 88 Wash. 167, 152 Pac. 1917 D, 792; McGil- vra v. Seattle School Dist., No. 1, 113 Wash. 619, 194 Pac. 817, 12 Ay Trane 917; Herald v. Board of Education, 65 W. Va. 765, 65 S. E. 102, 31 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 588. In Nebraska counties are not mu- nicipal corporations. Sherman Co. v. Simons, 109 U. S. 735, 27 L. ed. 1093, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 502. It is not competent to organize a town of parcels of territory which are 1004, Ann. Cas not contiguous. Chicago, &c. Rail- way Co. ». Oconto, 50 Wis. 189, 6 N. W. 607, 36 Am. Rep. 840. See Smith v. Sherry, 50 Wis. 210, 6 N. Wie 561.510 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I them by statute or usage, but restrained from the general use of authority which belongs to these metaphysical persons by the com- mon law. The same may be said of all the numerous corporations which have been from time to time created by various acts of the legislature; all of them enjoying the power which is expressly be- stowed upon them, and perhaps, in all instances where the act is silent, possessing, by necessary implication, the authority which is requisite to execute the purposes of their creation.” “It will not do to apply the strict principles of law respecting corporations in all cases to these aggregate bodies which are created by statute in this Commonwealth. By the several statutes which have been passed respecting school districts, it is manifest that the legislature has supposed that a division of towns, for the purpose of maintaining schools, will promote the important object of general education ; and this valuable object of legislative care seems to require, in construing their acts, that a liberal view should be had to the end to be effected.” ! Following out this view, the courts of the New Eng- land States have held, that when judgments are recovered against towns, parishes, and school districts, any of the property of private owners within the municipal division is liable to be taken for their discharge. The reasons for this doctrine, and the custom upon which it is founded, are thus stated by the Supreme Court of Con- necticut : — “We know that the relation in which the members of municipal corporations in this State have been supposed to stand, in respect to the corporation itself, as well as to its creditors, has elsewhere been considered in some respects peculiar. We have treated them, for some purposes, as parties to corporate proceedings, and their individuality has not been considered as merged in their corporate connection. Though corporators, they have been holden to be parties to suits by or against the corporation, and individually liable for its debts. Heretofore this has not been doubted as to the inhabitants of towns, located ecclesiastical societies, and school districts. “From a recurrence to the history of the law on this subject, we are persuaded that the principle and usage here recognized and followed, in regard to the liability of the inhabitants of towns and other communities, were very early adopted by our ancestors. And whether they were considered as a part of the common law of England, or originated here, as necessary to our state of society, it is not very material to inquire. We think, however, that the principle is not of domestic origin, but to some extent was operative 1 School District v. Wood, 13 Mass. 192, 197.CHAP. VIII] SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 511 and applied in the mother country, especially in cases where a stat- ute fixed a liability upon a municipality which had no corporate funds. The same reasons and necessity for the application of such a principle and practice existed in both countries. Such corpora- tions are of a public and political character; they exercise a portion of the governing power of the State. Statutes impose upon them important public duties. In the performance of these, they must contract debts and liabilities, which can only be discharged by a resort to individuals, either by taxation or execution. Taxation, in most cases, can only be the result of the voluntary action of the corporation, dependent upon the contingent will of a majority of the corporators, and upon their tardy and uncertain action. It affords no security to creditors, because they have no power over it. Such reasons as these probably operated with our ancestors in adopting the more efficient and certain remedy by execution, which has been resorted to in the present case, and which they had seen to some extent in operation in the country whose laws were their inheritance. “The plaintiff would apply to these municipal or quasi corpo- rations the close principles applicable to private corporations. But inasmuch as they are not, strictly speaking, corporations, but only municipal bodies, without pecuniary funds, it will not do to apply to them literally, and in all cases, the law of corpora- tions." “The individual liability of the members of quasi? corporations, though not expressly adjudged, was very distinctly recognized in the case of Russell 1. The Men of Devon.? It was alluded to as a known principle in the case of the Attorney-General v. The City of Exeter,? applicable as well to cities as to hundreds and parishes. That the rated inhabitants of an English parish are considered as the real parties to suits against the parish is now supposed to be well settled; and so it was decided in the cases of The King v. The Inhabitants of Woburn, and The King v. The Inhabitants of Hard- wick.® And, in support of this principle, reference was made to the form of the proceedings; as that they are entitled ‘against the in- habitants,’ &e. “In the State of Massachusetts, from whose early institutions we have borrowed many valuable specimens, the individual re- sponsibility of the inhabitants of towns for town debts has long been established. Distinguished counsel in the case of the Mer- 1 School District v. Wood, 13 Mass. 82 Russ. 45. 192. 410 East, 395. 22 Term Rep. 660. 511 East, 577.512 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I chants’ Bank v. Cook,! referring to municipal bodies, say: ‘For a century past the practical construction of the bar has been that, in an action by or against a corporation, a member of the corpora- tion is a party to the suit.’ In several other cases in that State the same principle is repeated. In the case of Riddle v. The Pro- prietors of the Locks and Canals on Merrimack River,’ Parsons, Ch. J., in an allusion to this private responsibility of corporators, remarks: ‘And the sound reason is, that having no corporate fund, and no legal means of obtaining one, each corporator is liable to satisfy any judgment obtained against the corporation.’ So in Brewer v. Inhabitants of New Gloucester,’ the court say: ‘As the law provides that, when judgment is recovered against the inhabitants of a town, execution may be levied upon the property of any in- habitant, each inhabitant must be considered as a party.’ In the case before referred to of the Merchants’ Bank v. Cook, Parker, Ch. J., expresses the opinion of the court upon this point thus: ‘Towns, parishes, precincts, etc., are but a collection of individuals, with certain corporate powers for political and civil purposes, with- out any corporate funds from which a judgment can be satisfied ; but each member of the community is liable, in his person and estate, to the execution which may issue against the body; each individual, therefore, may be well thought to be a party to a suit brought against them by their collective name. In regard to banks, turn- pike, and other corporations, the case is different.’ The counsel concerned in the case of Mower v. Leicester,’ without contradic- tion, speak of this practice of subjecting individuals as one of daily occurrence. The law on this subject was very much consid- ered in the case of Chase v. The Merrimack Bank,® and was applied and enforced against the members of a territorial parish. ‘The question is’, say the court, ‘whether, on an execution against a town or parish, the body or estate of any inhabitant may be law- fully taken to satisfy it. This question seems to have been settled in the affirmative by a series of decisions, and ought no longer to be considered as an open question.’ The State of Maine, when sepa- rated from Massachusetts, retained most of its laws and usages, as they had been recognized in the parent State; and, among others, the one in question. In Adams v. Wiscasset Bank,® Mellen, Ch. J., says: ‘It is well known that all judgments against quase corporations may be satisfied out of the property of any individual inhabitant.’ 14 Pick. 405. 49 Mass. 247. 27 Mass. 187. 5 19 Pick. 564. 314 Mass. 216. 6 1 Greenl. 361.CHAP. VIII] SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 513 “The courts of this State, from a time beyond the memory of any living lawyer, have sanctioned and carried out this usage, as one of common-law obligation; and it has been applied, not to towns only, but also, by legal analogy, to territorial ecclesiastical societies and school districts. The forms of our process against these communities have always corresponded with this view of the law. The writs have issued against the inhabitants of towns, societies, and districts as parties. As early in the history of our jurisprudence as 1705, a statute was enacted authorizing commu- nities, such as towns, societies, etc., to prosecute and defend suits, and for this purpose to appear, either by themselves, agents, or attorneys. If the inhabitants were not then considered as parties individually, and liable to the consequences of judgments against such communities as parties, there would have been a glaring impropriety in permitting them to appear and defend by themselves ; but, if parties, such a right was necessary and indispensable. Of course this privilege has been and may be exercised.’ “Our statute providing for the collection of taxes enacts that the treasurer of the State shall direct his warrant to the collectors of the State tax in the several towns. If neither this nor the further proceedings against the collectors and the selectmen authorized by the statute shall enforce the collection of the tax, the law directs that then the treasurer shall issue his execution against the inhab- itants of such town. Such an execution may be levied upon the estate of the inhabitants; and this provision of the law was not considered as introducing a new principle, or enforcing a novel rem- edy, but as being only in conformity with the well-known usage in other cases. The levy of an execution under this statute produced the case of Beers v. Botsford.2 There the execution, which had been issued against the town of Newtown by the treasurer of the State, had been levied upon the property of the plaintiff, an inhabitant of that town, and he had thus been compelled to pay the balance of a State tax due from the town. He sued the town of Newtown for the recovery of the money so paid by him. The most distinguished professional gentlemen in the State were engaged as counsel in that ease; and it did not occur, either to them or to the court, that the plaintiff’s property had been taken without right: on the con- trary, the case proceeded throughout on the conceded principle of our common law, that the levy was properly made upon the estate of the plaintiff. And without this the plaintiff could not have re- covered of the town, but must have resorted to his action against 11 Swift’s System, 227. 23 Day, 159. VOL. I—33514 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I the officer for his illegal and void levy. In Fuller v. Hampton,! Peters, J., remarked that, if costs are recovered against a town, the writ of execution to collect them must have been issued against the property of the inhabitants of the town; and this is the invari- able practice. The case of Atwater v. Woodrich,’ also grew out of this ancient usage. The ecclesiastical society of Bethany had been taxed by the town of Woodrich for its moneys at interest, and the warrant for the collection of the tax had been levied upon the property of the plaintiff, and the tax had thus been collected of him, who was an inhabitant of the located society of Bethany. Brainerd, J., who drew up the opinion of the court, referring to this proceeding, said: ‘This practice with regard to towns has pre- vailed in New England, so far as I have been able to investigate the subject, from an early period, — from its first settlement, — a prac- tice brought by our forefathers from England, which had there ob- tained in corporations similar to the towns incorporated in New England.’ It will here be seen that the principle is considered as applicable to territorial societies as to towns, because the object to be obtained was the same in both, — ‘that the town or society should be brought to a sense of duty, and make provision for pay- ment and indemnity’; a very good reason, and very applicable to the case we are considering. “The law on this subject was more distinctly brought out and considered by this court in the late case of McCloud v. Selby,’ in which this well-known practice, as it had been applied to towns and ecclesiastical societies, was extended and sanctioned as to school districts; ‘else it would be breaking in upon the analogies of the law.’ ‘They are communities for different purposes, but essentially of the same character.’ And no doubt can remain, since the decision of this case, but that the real principle of all the cases on this subject, has been, and is, that the inhabitants of quasi corporations are parties individually, as well as in their cor- porate capacities, to all actions in which the corporation is a party. And to the same effect is the language of the elementary writers.’’ * the enforcement of city debts in the same mode was sustained. For a more recent case in Massachusetts than these cited, see Gaskill v. Dudley, 6 Met. 546. 15 Conn. 417. 26 Conn. 223. 310 Conn. 390-395. 4 Beardsley v. Smith, 16 Conn. 375, citing 2 Kent, 221; Angell & Ames on Corp. 374; 1 Swift’s Dig. 72, 794; 5 Dane’s Abr. 158. And see Dillon, Mun. Corp. c. 1. It was held compe- tent in the above case to extend the same principle to incorporated cities; and an act of the legislature permitting A statute allowing judgments against a town to be collected from the goods of individuals is due process of law under the fourteenth amendment. Eames v. Savage, 77 Me. 212.CHAP. VIII] SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 515 So far as this rule rests upon the reason that these organiza- tions have no common fund, and that no other mode exists by which demands against them can be enforced, it cannot be con- sidered applicable in those States where express provision is made by law for compulsory taxation to satisfy any judgment recovered against the corporate body, — the duty of levying the tax being imposed upon some officer, who may be compelled by mandamus to perform it. Nor has any usage, so far as we are aware, grown up in any of the newer States, like that which had so early an origin in New England. More just, convenient, and inexpensive modes of enforcing such demands have been established by statute, and the rules concerning them are conformed more closely to those which are established for other corporations. On the other hand, it is settled that these corporations are not liable to a private action, at the suit of a party injured by a neglect of their officers to perform a corporate duty, unless such action is given by statute.1 This doctrine has been frequently applied where suits have been brought against towns, or the highway officers of towns, to recover for damages sustained in consequence of defects in the public ways. The common law gives no such ac- tion, and it is therefore not sustainable at all, unless given by stat- ute.2 A distinction is made between those corporations which are created as exceptions, and receive special grants of power for the peculiar convenience and benefit of the corporators, on the one hand, and the incorporated inhabitants of a district, who are by statute invested with particular powers, without their consent, on the other. In the latter case, the State may impose corporate du- ties, and compel their performance, under penalties; but the cor- porators, who are made such whether they will or no, cannot be considered in the light of persons who have voluntarily, and for a consideration, assumed obligations, so as to owe a duty to every person interested in the performance.’ 1 On right of action given to injured party to sue for damages where sheriff fails to prevent lynching, see Cham- paign Co. v. Church, 62 Ohio St. 318, 57 N. E. 50, 48 L. R. A. 738. 2 This rule, however, has no applica- tion to the case of neglect to perform those obligations which are incurred by the political subdivisions of the State when special duties are imposed on them by law. Hannon »v. St. Louis Co. Court, 62 Mo. 313. But such liability is strictly construed. Where a county is chargeable with highway repairs, it is not liable for injury to one on the highway caused by the fall of a dead tree which had stood near the road. Watkins v. County Court, 30 W. Va. 657, 5 S. E. 654. 3 Mower v. Leicester, 9 Mass. 247; Bartlett v. Crozier, 17 Johns. 439; Farnum v. Concord, 2 N. H. 392; Adams v. Wiscasset Bank, 1 Me. 361; Baxter v. Winooski Turnpike, 22 Vt. 114; Beardsley v. Smith, 16 Conn. 368; Chidsey v. Canton, 17 Conn. 475; Young v. Commissioners, &c., 2 N. & McC. 537; Commissioners of516 Highways v. Martin, 4 Mich. 557; Morey v. Newfane, 8 Barb. 645; Loril- lard v. Monroe, 11 N. Y. 392; Galen v. Clyde and Rose Plank Road Co., 27 Barb. 543; Reardon »v. St. Louis, 36 Mo. 555; Sherbourne v. Yuba Co., 21 Cal. 113; State v. County of Hudson, 30 N. J. L. 137; Hedges v. Madison Co., 6 Ill. 567; Granger v. Pulaski Co., 26 Ark. 37; Weightman v. Washington, 1 Black, 39, 17 L. ed. 52; Ball v. Win- chester, 32 N. H. 435; Eastman ». Meredith, 36 N. H. 284; Waltham »v. Kemper, 55 Ill. 346; Sutton v. Board, 41 Miss. 236; Cooley v. Freeholders, 27N. J. L. 415; Bigelow v. Randolph, 14 Gray, 541; Symonds »v. Clay Co., 71 Ill. 355; People v. Young, 72 Ill. 411; Frazer v. Lewiston, 76 Me. 531; Altnow v. Sibley, 30 Minn. 186, 14 N. W. 877; Yeager v. Tippecanoe, 81 Ind. 46; Abbett v. Com’rs Johnson Co., 114 Ind. 61, 16 N. E. 127; Logan County v. Adler, 69 Colo. 290, 194 Pac. 621, 20 A. L. R. 512; Cook County ». Chicago, 311 Ill. 234, 142 N. E. 512, 31 A. L. R. 442; Beeks v. Dickinson County, 131 Iowa, 244, 108 N. W. 311, 6 L. R. A. (Nn. 8.) 831, 9 Ann. Cas. 812; Wood v. Boone County, 153 Iowa, 92, 133 N. W. 377, 39 L. R. A. (nN. 8.) 168, Ann. Cas. 1913 D, 1070; Shawnee County v. Jacobs, 79 Kan. 76, 99 Pac. 817, 21 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 209; Ernst »v. West Covington, 116 Ky. 850, 76S. W. 1089, 105 Am. St. Rep. 241, 63 L. R. A. 652, 3 Ann. Cas. 882; Smith ». Louisville Sewerage Commissioners, 146 Ky. 562, 143 S. W. 3, 38 L. R. A. (N. 8s.) 151; Stanley v. Sangerville, 119 Me. 26, 109 Atl. 189, 9 A. L. R. 348; Daniels v. Board of Education, 191 Mich. 339, 158 N. W. 23, L. R. A. 1916 F, 468; Dick v. Board of Educa- tion, (Mo.), 238 S. W. 1073, 21 A. L. R. 13827; Davie v. Douglas County, 98 Neb. 479, 153 N. W. 509, L. R. A. 1916 B, 1261; Wheeler v. Gilsum, 73 N. H. 429, 62 Atl. 597, 3 L. R. A. (n. gs.) 185; O’Brien v. Rockingham County, 80 N. H. 522, 120 Atl. 254; Buckalew v. Chosen Freeholders, 91 N. J. G: 517, 104 Atl. 308; 2A. L: R: 718; Howard v. Tacoma School Dist. No. 10, 88 Wash. 167, 152 Pac. 1004, Ann. Cas. 1917 D, 792; Juul v. School Dist., 168 Wis. 111, 169 N. W. 309, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I 9 A. L. R. 904. These cases follow the leading English case of Russell v. Men of Devon, 2 T. R. 667. In Gates v. Milan, 76 N. H. 135, 80 Atl. 39, 35 L. R. A. (nv. s.) 599, the court said: ‘‘‘The liability of towns in respect to highways does not differ in character or extent from that which would attach to the State if it provided and maintained highways directly. It depends upon the same conditions. It is limited to that which the State permits, as set forth in the statutes on the subject.’ Sargent v. Gilford, 66 N. H. 543, 27 Atl. 306. See Hall ». Concord, 71 N. H. 367, 52 Atl. 864; O’Brien v. Derry, 73 N. H. 198, 203, 60 Atl. 843; Wheeler v. Gilsum, 73 N. H. 429, 62 Atl. 597. It has also been determined that towns possess a private corporate capacity in accord- ance with which they perform certain acts as a private corporation might, and in consequence of which their liability for damages to others is tested by the principles applied to private persons. O’Brien v. Derry, supra; Lockwood v. Dover, 73 N. H. 209, 61 Atl. 32. ‘Soas to the motive of municipal corporations, the theory of their dual character is too firmly imbedded in the common law to be removed, except by the law-making power.’ Rhobidas v. Concord, 70 N. H. 90, 114, 47 Atl. 82. When they act in a private capacity, they are subject to the same legal obliga- tions as a private corporation; when they exercise purely governmental functions, they are not ordinarily and in the absence of express statutory authorization held responsible in dam- ages for injuries suffered by others in consequence of their negligent per- formance of those functions. The recognized rule for determining whether a city or town is responsible for the acts of any particular officers or agents is the character of the duty in the performance of which they were engaged at the time of the injury. If it is a public, governmental duty, in the performance of which the cor- poration is clothed with sovereignty, then the officer is not to be regarded as the agent of the corporation, for whose negligence it can be held responsible.CHAP. VIII] SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 517 The reason which exempts these public bodies from liability to private actions, based upon neglect to perform public obligations, does not apply to villages, boroughs, and cities, which accept special charters from the State. Fe ieee The grant of the corporate franchise, in these cases, is usually made only at the request of the citizens to be incorporated, and it is justly assumed that it confers what to them is a valuable privilege. duties which the charter imposes. This privilege is a consideration for the Larger powers of self-govern- ment are given than are confided to towns or counties; larger privileges in the acquisition and control of corporate property; and special authority is conferred to make use of the public highways for the special and peculiar convenience of the citizens of the munic- ipality in various modes not permissible elsewhere. The grant by the State to the municipality of a portion of its sovereign powers, and their acceptance for these beneficial purposes, is regarded as raising an implied promise, on the part of the corporation, to per- form the corporate duties, and as imposing the duty of performance, not for the benefit of the State merely, but for the benefit of every individual interested in its performance.’ But if it is a private, municipal duty, — one voluntarily undertaken by the corporation for its particular local advantage or pecuniary profit, —then the officer, as respects that duty, is the agent of the corporation, for whose negligence it is liable, as in the case of private corporations or parties. Lockwood v. Dover, supra, 213.” A county engaged in building a bridge upon a public highway acts as a subdivision of the State government, and is not liable for the negligent performance of such work, unless expressly made so by statute. Shaw- nee County v. Jacobs, 79 Kan. 76, 99 Pac. 817, 21 L. R. A. (N. s.) 209. A county is not liable for obstructing a river: White Star Co. v. Gordon Co., 81 Ga. 47, 7S. E. Rep. 231; nor for failure of its treasurer to pay to city money belonging to the latter. Marquette Co. v. Ishpeming Treas., 49 Mich. 244, 13 N. W. 609. In the very carefully considered case of Eastman v. Meredith, 36 N. H. 284, it was decided, on the principle above stated, that if a building erected by a town for a town-house is so im- perfectly constructed that the floor- In this respect these ing gives way at the annual town- meeting, and an inhabitant and legal voter, in attendance on the meeting, receives thereby a bodily injury, he cannot maintain an action against the town to recover damages for this injury. The case is carefully distin- guished from those where corporations have been held liable for the negli- gent use of their own property by means of which others are injured. The familiar maxim that one shall so use his own as not to injure that which belongs to another is of general ap- plication. A similar ruling was made after careful consideration in &@ case where a child was injured by the un- safe condition of a school building which a city was obliged to maintain. The duty being one to the public im- posed by law, there is no liability in the absence of statute. Hill v. Boston, 122 Mass. 344. So if the duty is assumed under a general law but not expressly imposed. Wixon v. New- port, 13 R. I. 454. See Wild v. Paterson, 47 N. J. L. 406, 1 Atl. 490, and cases supra, p. 451. 1 Selden, J., in Weet v. Brockport, 16 N. Y. 161, note. See also Mayor of Lyme v. Turner, Cowp. 86; Henley ».518 Lyme Regis, 5 Bing. 91; s. c. in error, 3 B. & Adol. 77, and 1 Bing. N. C. 222; Mayor, &c. of New York v. Furze, 3 Hill, 612; Rochester White Lead Co. v. Rochester, 3 N. Y. 463; Hutson »v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 9 N. Y. 163; Conrad v. Ithaca, 16 N. Y. 158; Mills v. Brooklyn, 32 N. Y. 489; Barton »v. Syracuse, 36 N. Y. 54; Lee v. Sandy Hill, 40 N. Y. 442; Clark v. Washing- ton, 12 Wheat. 40, 6 L. ed. 544; Riddle v. Proprietors of Locks, &c., 7 Mass. 169; Bigelow v. Inhabitants of Randolph, 14 Gray, 541; Mears v. Commissioners of Wilmington, 9 Ired. 73; Browning v. Springfield, 17 Ill. 143; Bloomington v. Bay, 42 Ill. 503; Springfield v. LeClaire, 49 Ill. 476; Peru v. French, 55 Ill. 317; Pittsburg v. Grier, 22 Pa. St. 54; Jones v. New Haven, 34 Conn. 1; Stackhouse v. Lafayette, 26 Ind. 17; Brinkmeyer v. Evansville, 29 Ind. 187; Sawyer v. Corse, 17 Gratt. 230; Richmond »v. Long, 17 Gratt. 375; Noble v. Rich- mond, 31 Gratt. 271, 31 Am. Rep. 726; Blake v. St. Louis, 40 Mo. 569; Scott v. Mayor, &c. of Manchester, 37 Eng. L. & Eq. 495; Smoot». Wetumpka, 24 Ala. 112; Albrittin v. Huntsville, 60 Ala. 486, 31 Am. Rep. 46; Detroit v. Corey, 9 Mich. 165; Rusch v. Daven- port, 6 Iowa, 443; Commissioners v. Duckett, 20 Md. 468; Covington v. Bryant, 7 Bush, 248; Weightman ». Washington, 1 Black, 39, 17 L. ed. 52; Chicago ». Robbins, 2 Black, 418, 17 L. ed. 298; Nebraska v. Campbell, 2 Black, 590, 17 L. ed. 271; Galveston v. Posnainsky, 62 Tex. 118; Hutchin- son v. Olympia, 2 Wash. 314; Kellogg v. Janesville, 34 Minn. 1382; Winona v. Botzet, 169 Fed. 321, 94 C. C. A. 563, 23 L. R. A. (N. s.) 204; Davoust v. Alameda, 149 Cal. 69, 84 Pac. 760, 5 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 586, 9 Ann. Cas. 847; Chafor v. Long Beach, 174 Cal. 478, 163 Pac. 670, L. R. A. 1917 B, 685, Ann. Cas. 1918 D, 106; Pasadena »v. Railroad Commission, 183 Oal. 526, 192 Pac. 25, 10 A. L. R. 1425; Denver v. Spencer, 34 Colo. 270, 82 Pac. 590, 114 Am. Sts Rep 158) 2) LG. R. At (N. s.) 147, 7 Ann. Cas. 1042; Denver v. Davis, 37 Colo. 370, 86 Pac. 1027, 19) Am: Sta Rep: 293) 6) 0: oR. “AG (nN. 8.) 1013, 11 Ann. Cas. 187; Den- CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I ver v. Maurer, 47 Colo. 209, 106 Pac. 875, 185 Am. St. Rep. 210; Judson v. Winsted, 80 Conn. 384, 68 Atl. 999, 15 Lb. R. A. (w: s:)) OL: Carsoney: Genesee, 9 Idaho, 244, 74 Pac. 862, 108 Am. St. Rep. 127; Eaton v. Weiser, 12 Idaho, 544, 86 Pac. 541, 118 Am. St. Rep. 225, 9 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 524, 10 Ann. Cas. 444; Gath- man v. Chicago, 236 Ill. 9, 86 N. E. 152, 19 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 1178, 15 Ann. Cas. 830; Johnston v. Chicago, 258 Ill. 494, 101 N. E. 960, 45 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 1167, Ann. Cas. 1914 B, 339; Jones v. Sioux City, 185 Iowa, 1178, 170 N. W. 445, 10 A. L. R. 474; Davis v. New Orleans Public Belt R. Co., 155 La. 504, 99 So. 419, 31 A. L. R. 1303; Libby »v. Portland, 105 Me. 370, 74 Atl. 805, 26 L. R. A. (nN. 8s.) 141, 18 Ann. Cas. 547; Dickin- son v. Boston, 188 Mass. 595, 75 N. E. 68, 1 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 664; Keever v. Mankato, 113 Minn. 55, 129 N. W. 158, 33 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 3389; Barree v. Cape Girardeau, 197 Mo. 382, 95 S. W. 330, 114 Am. St. Rep. 763, 6 L. R. A. (nN. 8.) 1090; Munick v. Dur- ham, 181 N. C. 188, 106 S. E. 665, 24 A. L. R. 538; Aldrich v. Youngstown, 106 Ohio St. 342, 140 N. E. 164, 27 A. L. R. 1497; Northwest Steel Co. v. School Dist., 76 Oreg. 321, 148 Pac. 1134, Ann. Cas. 1917 B, 1086, L. R. A. 1915 F, 629; Armstrong v. Philadel- phia, 249 Pa. St. 39, 94 Atl. 455, Ann. Cas. 1917 B, 1082; Brown ». Salt Lake City, 33 Utah, 222, 93 Pac. 570, 126 Am. St. Rep. 828, 14 L. R. A. (x. s.) 619, 14 Ann. Cas. 1004; Engel- king v. Spokane, 59 Wash. 446, 110 Pac. 25, 29 L. R. A. (n. 8.) 481; Piper v. Madison, 140 Wis. 311, 122 N. W. 730, 133 Am. St. Rep. 1078, 25 L. R. A. (n. 8.) 239; Highway Trailer Co. v. Janesville Electric Co., 178 Wis. 340, 190) Na W. 110) 27 A. i Ry 1268: And see Kent v. Worthing Local Board, L. R. 10Q. B. D. 118. The same rule applies to cities existing under a gen- eral law. Boulder v. Niles, 9 Col. 415, 12 Pac. 632. A city is liable for a defect in a side- walk maintained by it though in fact outside the highway line: Mansfield »v. Moore, 124 Ill. 133, 16 N. E. 246; for negligence of an abutter who forCHAP. VIII] his own purposes renders a sidewalk unsafe, if it has notice. Philadelphia v. Smith, (Pa. St.), 16 Atl. Rep. 493. See Dooley v. Sullivan, 112 Ind. 451, 14 N. E. 566. That legislature may exempt municipal corporations from such liability, see Wilmington »v. Ewing, 2 Penn. (Del.) 66, 43 Atl. 305, 45 L. R. A. 79. In the Case of Detroit v. Blackeby, 21 Mich. 84, this whole subject is considered at length; and the court (one judge dissenting) deny the sound- ness of the principle stated in the text, and hold that municipal corporations existing under special charters are not liable to individuals for injuries caused by neglect to perform corpo- rate duties, unless expressly made so by statute. This case is referred to and dissented from in Waltham v. Kemper, 55 Ill. 347, and approved in Navasota v. Pearce, 46 Tex. 525; Young »v. Charleston, 20 S. C. 116, and Arkadel- phia v. Windham, 49 Ark. 139, 4S. W. 450. The rule it sanctions is consid- erably modified in Michigan by later cases. See Barron v. Detroit, 94 Mich. 601, 54 N. W. 273, 34 Am. St. Rep. 366, 19 L. R. A. 452; Hodgins v. Bay City, 156 Mich. 687, 121 N. W. 274, 132 Am. St. Rep. 546. In South Carolina it is held that an action for tort cannot be maintained against a municipal corporation unless it is expressly authorized by statute. Ir- vine v. Greenwood, 89 S. C. 511, 72 S. E. 228, 36 L. R. A. (w.s.) 363; Trip- lett v. Columbia, 111 S. C. 7, 96S. E. 675, 1 A. L. R. 349. In Murtaugh v. St. Louis, 44 Mo. 479, 480, Currier, J., says: “The general result of the adjudications seems to be this: When the officer or servant of a municipal corporation is in the exercise of a power conferred upon the corporation for its private benefit, and injury ensues from the negligence or misfeasance of such of- ficer or servant, the corporation is liable, as in the case of private cor- porations or parties; but when the acts or omissions complained of were done or omitted in the exercise of a corporate franchise conferred upon the corporation for the public good, and not for the private corporate advan- SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 519 tage, then the corporation is not liable for the consequences of such acts or omissions.” Citing Bailey v. New York, 3 Hill, 531; Martin v. Brooklyn, 1 Hill, 550; Richmond v. Long’s Adm’r, 17 Gratt. 375; Sherbourne ». Yuba Co., 21 Cal. 113; Dargan v. Mo- bile, 31 Ala. 469; Stewart v. New Orleans, 9 La. Ann. 461; Prother ». Lexington, 13 B. Monr. 559. In Bulger v. Eden, 352, 357, 19 Atl. 829, 9 L. R. A. 205, the court said: “The liabilities of municipal corpora- tions for the torts or negligent acts of their officers are fixed by statute. They are to be held liable for the negligence or misconduct of their of- ficers only when made so by express statute, or [when] the act out of which the claim originates was within the scope of their corporate powers, and was directly and expressly ordered by the corporation.” Quoted with approval in Waugh ». Prince, 121 Me. 67, 115 Atl. 612. In Massachusetts it has been held that the work of removing ashes from dwelling houses in accordance with the direction of an ordinance by teams of the sanitary division of the street department of a city, without charge, is of a public nature, and the city is not liable to a person injured through the negligence of the driver of such a team while engaged in this work. Haley v. Boston, 191 Mass. 291, 77 N. E. 888, 5 L. R. A. (nv. 8.) 1005. See also Bruhnke v. La Crosse, 155 Wis. 485, 144 N. W. 1100, 50 L. R. A. (n. s.) 1147. Where a street is roped off by order of a court, a city is not liable for an injury caused thereby. Belvin »v. Richmond, 85 Va. 574, 8 S. E. 378. And as to exemption from liability in exercising or failing to exercise legisla- tive authority, see ante, pp. 444-450, and notes. As to who are to be re- garded as municipal officers, see Maxi- milian v. New York, 62 N. Y. 160, 20 Am. Rep. 468, and cases there cited. Upon remedy over by municipality against wrongdoer after payment of damages for injury done by him or through his negligence, see Washington Gas Light Co. v. District of Columbia, 161 U.S. 316, 40 L. ed. 712, 16 Sup. Ct.520 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I corporations are looked upon as occupying the same position as private corporations, which, having accepted a valuable franchise, on condition of the performance of certain public duties, are held by the acceptance to contract for the performance of those duties. In the case of public corporations, however, the liability is contin- gent on the law affording the means of performing the duty, which, in some cases, by reason of restrictions upon the power of taxation, they might not possess. But, assuming the corporation to be clothed with sufficient power by the charter to that end, the liability of a city or village, vested with control of its streets, for any neg- lect to keep them in repair, or for any improper construction, has been determined in many cases.’ Rep. 564, and note tos. c. in 40 L. ed. U.S. 712. 1 Weet v. Brockport, 16 N. Y. 161, note; Hickok v. Plattsburg, 16 N. Y. 161; Nelson v. Canisteo, 100 N. Y. 89; Morey v. Newfane, 8 Barb. 645; Browning v. Springfield, 17 Ill. 143; Hyatt v. Rondout, 44 Barb. 385; Lloyd v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 5 N. Y. 369; Rusch v. Davenport, 6 Iowa, 443; Denver v. Maurer, 47 Colo. 209, 106 Pac. 875, 185 Am. St. Rep. 210; Addington »v. Littleton, 50 Colo. 623, 115 Pac. 896, 34 L. R. A. (n. 8.) 1012, Ann. Cas. 1912 C, 753; Carl v. New Haven, 93 Conn. 622, 107 Atl. 502, 13 A. L. R. 1; Carson ». Genesee, 9 Idaho, 244, 74 Pac. 862, 108 Am. St. Rep. 127; Sand Point v. Doyle, 11 Idaho, 642, 83 Pac. 598, 4 L. R. A. (n. 8.) 810; Miller v. Mullan, 17 Idaho, 28, 104 Pac. 660, 19 Ann. Cas. 1107; Sherwin v. Aurora, 257 Ill. 458, 100 N. E. 938, 43 L. R. A. (n. 8.) 1116; Wheeler v. Ft. Dodge, 131 Iowa, 566, 108 N. W. 1057, 9 L. R. A. (x. 8.) 146; Jones v. Sioux City, 185 Iowa, 1178, 170 N. W. 445, 10 A. L. R. 474; Harrodsburg v. Abram, 138 Ky. 157, 127S. W. 758, 29 L. R. A. (Nn. 8.) 199; Louisville, etce., R. Co. v. Mul- verhill, 147 Ky. 360, 144 S. W. 83, Ann. Cas. 1913 D, 183; Covington v. Lee, 28 Ky. L. Rep. 492, 89 S. W. 493, 2L. R. A. (nN. 8.) 481; McCormack »v. Robin, 126 La. 594, 52 So. 779, 139 Am. St. Rep. 549; Nessen v. New Orleans, 134 La. 455, 64 So. 286, 51 L. R. A. (n. 8.) 324; Sundell v. Tintah, 117 Minn. 170, 184 N. W. 639, 38 L. R. And a similar liability would A. (nN. 8.) 1127; Ackeret v. Minneapo- lis, 129 Minn. 190, 151 N. W. 976, L. R. A. 1915 D, 1111; Briglia v. St. Paul, 134 Minn. 97, 158 N. W. 794, L. R. A. 1916 F, 1216; Hillstrom »v. St. Paul, 134 Minn. 451, 159 N. W. 1076, L. R. A. 1917 B, 548; Conner v. Nevada, 188 Mo. 148, 86 S. W. 256, 107 Am. St. Rep. 314; Barree v. Cape Girardeau, 197 Mo. 382, 95 S. W. 330, 114 Am. St. Rep. 763, 6 L. R. A: (x. 3.) 1090; Randolph v. Springfield, 302 Mo. 33, 257 S. W. 449, 31 A. L. R. 612; Tewksbury v. Lincoln, 84 Neb. 571, 121 N. W. 994, 23 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 282; Updike v. Omaha, 87 Neb. 228, 127 N. W. 229, 30 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 589; Chaney v. Riverton, 104 Neb. 189, 177 N. W. 845, 10 A. L. R. 244; Oklahoma City v. Reed, 17 Okla. 518, 87 Pac. 645, 33 L. R. A. (nv. s.) 1083; Marth »- Kingfisher, 22 Okla. 602, 98 Pac. 436, 18 Ll. R. A. (ne s:)) 12883) Rowe: Richards, 32 S. D. 66, 142 N. W. 664, L. R. A. 1915 E, 1069; Schuler ». Mobridge, 44 S. D. 488, 184 N. W. 281; Norberg v. Hagna,’46 S. D. 568, 195 N. W. 488, 29 A. L. R. 841; Berger v. Salt Lake City, 56 Utah 403, 191 Pac. 233, 13 A. L. R. 5; Fifield’s Adm’x v. Rochester, 89 Vt. 329, 95 Atl. 675, Ann. Cas. 1918 A, 1016; Hewitt v. Seattle, 62 Wash. 377, 113 Pac. 1084, 32 L. R. A. (w. 8.) 632. And see Dillon, Mun. Corp. c. 18, and cases cited in the preceding note. See also Gibson v. Huntington, 38 W. Va. 177, 18S. E. 447, 22 L. R. A. 561, and note. But in some jurisdictions it hasCHAP. VIII] been held that such liability does not exist in the absence of statute. Col- lier v. Ft. Smith, 73 Ark. 447, 84S. W. 480, 68 L. R. A. 237; Milton v. Bangor R. ete., Co., 103 Me. 218, 68 Atl. 826, 125 Am. St. Rep. 293, 15 L. R. A. (n. s.) 203; Miller v. Detroit, 156 Mich. 630, 121 N. W. 490, 132 Am. St. Rep. 537, 16 Ann. Cas. 832; Price v. Goldsboro Tp., 172 N. C. 8 89 S. E. 1066, L. R. A. 1917 A, 99: See also Gates v. Milan, 7 80 Atl. 39, 35 L. R. A. (Nv. 8.) 599. The cases of Weet v. Brockport, and Hickok v. Plattsburg, were criti- cized by Mr. Justice Marvin, in the case of Peck v. Batavia, 32 Barb. 634, where, as well as in Cole v. Medina, 27 Barb. 218, he held that a village merely authorized to make and repair side- walks, but not in terms absolutely and imperatively required to do so, had a discretion conferred upon it in re- spect to such walks, and was not re- sponsible for a refusal to enact ordi- nances or by-laws in relation thereto ; nor, if it enacted such ordinances or by-laws, was it liable for damages aris- ing from a neglect to enforce them. The doctrine that a power thus con- ferred is discretionary does not seem consistent with the ruling in some of the other cases cited, and is criticized in Hyatt v. Rondout, 44 Barb. 385. But see ante, pp. 444-450, and notes. In Kentucky it has been held the city is not liable for the negligence of its employees in charge of an engine and roller engaged in street work. Danville v. Fox, 142 Ky. 476, 134 S. W. 883, 32 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 636. In Iowa it has been held that clearing an alley of weeds is an exer- cise of the police power and that the city is not liable for injury resulting from the negligence of one whom it employs to do this. McFadden ». Jewell, 119 Iowa, 321, 93 N. W. 302, 97 Am. St. Rep. 321, 60 L. R. A. 401. A municipality is liable for injuries caused by negligence in not keeping its streets in a reasonably safe condi- tion for lawful uses, and for injuries caused by negligent operations or conditions upon the streets that amount to a nuisance. Maxwell ». Miami, 87 Fla. 107, 100 So. 147. SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 521 A city is liable to a pedestrian negli- gently run down and injured by its superintendent of streets while driving an automobile in the performance of his duty. Hewitt v. Seattle, 62 Wash. 377, 113 Pac. 1084, 32 L. R. A. (Nn. 8.) 632. In Harris v. District of Columbia, 256 U.S. 650, 65 L. ed. 1146, 41 Sup. Gt: “Rep: 610; 14 A. LE: R227 Justice McReynolds, in delivering the opinion of the court, said: “It is established doctrine that when acting in good faith municipal corporations are not liable for the manner in which they exercise discretionary powers of a public or legislative character. A different rule generally prevails as to their private or corporate powers. Dillon on Municipal Corporations (5th Ed.), § 1626 et seqg., and cited. Application of these general principles to the facts of particular cases has occasioned much difficulty. The circumstances being stated, it is not always easy to determine what power a municipal corporation is exercising. But, nothing else appear- ing, we are of that, when sweeping the streets a municipality is cases opinion exercising its discretionary powers to protect public health and comfort and is not performing a special cor- porate or municipal duty to keep them in repair.”’ Justice Holmes, Jus- tice Brandeis, and Justice Clarke dissented. See also Bruhnke v. La Crosse, 155 Wis. 485, 144 N. W. 1100, 50 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 1147. A city is not, as a rule, bound to make safe for travel the area outside of a public street, nor to erect barriers to prevent travelers from straying off the street to adjoining land upon which there may be dangerous places. It is bound to provide such guards only where the street itself is unsafe, for travel by reason of the close proximity of excavations, embank- ments, and the like. Briglia v. St. Paul, 134 Minn. 97, 158 N. W. 794, L. R. A. 1916 F, 1216. Calling public meetings for political or philanthropic purposes is no part of the business of a municipal corpora- tion, and it is not liable to one who, in lawfully passing by where the522 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [voL. I exist in other cases where the same reasons would be applicable. But if the ground of the action is the omission by the corpora- tion to repair a defect, it would seem that notice of the defect should be brought home to the corporation, or to officers charged with some duty respecting the streets, or that facts should appear sufficient to show that, by proper vigilance, it must have been known.1 On the other hand, if the injury has happened in consequence of de- meeting is held, is injured by the discharge of a cannon fired by persons concerned in the meeting. Boyland v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 1 Sandf. 27. The noise of a cannon fired outside a highway is not a defect in the way for which a city is liable. Lincoln v. Boston, 148 Mass. 517, 20 N. E. 329. In Minnesota it has been held that the legislature may relieve a municipal corporation from liability for injuries caused by the neglect of the municipal authorities to keep the streets in proper repair, or it may impose or recognize the liability upon such con- ditions as it thinks advisable. Schig- ley v. Waseca, 106 Minn. 94, 118 N. W. 259, 19 L. R. A. (nN. 8.) 689, 16 Ann. Cas. 169. 1 Hart v. Brooklyn, 36 Barb. 226; Dewey v. City of Detroit, 15 Mich. 307; Garrison v. New York, 5 Bosw. 497; McGinity v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 5 Duer, 674; Decatur v. Fisher, 53 Ill. 407; Chicago v. McCarthy, 75 Ill. 602; Requa v. Rochester, 45 N. Y. 129; Hume v. New York, 47 N. Y. 639; Springfield v. Doyle, 76 IIl. 202; Rosenburg v. Des Moines, 41 Iowa, 415; Vandersliste v. Philadel- phia, 103 Pa. St. 102; Dotton ». Albion, 50 Mich. 129, 50 N. W. 46; Davis v. Guilford, 55 Conn. 351, 11 Atl. 350; Montgomery v. Conner, 155 Ala. 422, 46 So. 761, 21 L. R. A. (nN. 8.) 951; Daytona v. Edson, 46 Fla. 463, 34 So. 954, 4 Ann. Cas. 1000; Jaines v. Tampa, 52 Fla. 292, 42 So. 729, 120 Am. St. Rep. 203, 11 Ann. Cas. 510; Bovey v. Dublin, 145 Ga. 339, 89 S. E. 197, Ann. Cas. 1918 E, 176; Eaton v. Weiser, 12 Idaho, 544, 86 Pac. 541, 118 Am. St. Rep. 225; Miller v. Mullan, 17 Idaho 28, 104, Pac. 660, 19 Ann. Cas. 1107; Beviness v. Missouri Valley, 162 Iowa, 720, 144 N. W. 628, 51 L. R. A. (w. 8.) 218% Covington v. Lee, 28 Ky. L. Rep. 492, 89 S. W. 498, 2 L. R. A. (w. s.) 481; American Dist. Tel. Co. v. Oldham, 148 Ky. 320, 146 S. W. 764, Ann. Cas. 1913 E, 376; Ashland v. Baggs, 161 Ky. 728, 171 S. W. 461, Ann. Cas. 1916 B, 1005; Magaha v. Hagerstown, 95 Md. 62, 51 Atl. 832, 93 Am. St. Rep. 317; Boutlier v. Malden, 226 Mass. 479, 116 N. E. 251, Ann. Cas. 1918 C, 910; Allen v. West Bay City, 140 Mich. 111, 103 N. W. 514, 6 Ann. Cas. 35; Schigley v. Waseca, 106 Minn. 94, 118 N. W. 259, 16 Ann. Cas. 169; Engel v. Minneapolis, 138 Minn. 488, 165 N. W. 278, L. R. A. 1918 B, 647; Dougherty v. St. Louis, 251 Mo. 514, 158 S. W. 326, 46 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 330; Sheets v. McCook, 95 Neb. 139, 145 IN- We 252, 01 le Re AG (NES!) ocie Fox v. Manchester, 183 N. Y. 141, 75 N. E. 1116, 2 L. R. A. (nN. 8.) 4743 Cohen v. New York, 204 N. Y. 424, 97 N. E. 866, 39 L. R. A. (Nn. 8.) 985; Stern v. International R. Co., 220 N. Y. 284, 115 N: BE: 759; 2A. D. Re 48% White v. New Bern, 146 N. C. 447, 59 S. E. 992, 125 Am. St. Rep. 476, 13 L. R. A. (Nn. 8.) 1166; Jackson ». Grand Forks, 24 N. D. 601, 140 N. W. 718, 45 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 75; Columbus v. Penrod, 73 Ohio St. 209, 76 N. E. 826, 112 Am. St. Rep. 716, 3 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 386; Shawnee v. Sears, 39 Okla. 789, 137 Pac. 107, 50 L. R. A. (n.-s.) 885; New Castle v. Kurtz, 210 Pa. St. 183, 59 Atl. 989, 105 Am. St. Rep. 798, 69 L. R. A. 488, 1 Ann. Cas. 943; Beall v. Seattle, 28 Wash. 593, 69 Pac. 12, 92 Am. St. Rep. 892, 61 L. R. A. 583; Blankenship v. King County, 68 Wash. 84, 122 Pac. 616, 40 L. R. A. (Nn. 8.) 182. Notice of defect is notice of the facts, whether the authorities consider them as constituting a defect orCHAP. VIII] SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT fective construction, notice is not essential, as the facts must be supposed to have been known from the first.’ In regard to all those powers which are conferred upon the cor- poration, not for the benefit of the general public, but of the cor- porators, — such as the power to construct works to supply a city with water, or gas-works, or sewers, and the like, — the corpora- tion is held to a still more strict liability, and is made to respond in damages to the parties injured by the negligent manner in which the work is constructed, or guarded, even though, under its charter, the agents for the construction are not chosen or controlled by the corporation, and even where the work is required by law to be let to the lowest responsible bidder. In Bailey v. Mayor, etc., of New York,” an action was brought against the city by one who had been injured in his property by the careless construction of the Croton dam for the purpose of supplying the city with water. The work was constructed under the control of water commissioners, in whose appointment the city had no voice; and upon this ground, among others, and also on the ground that the city officers were acting in a public capacity, and like other public agents, not responsible for the misconduct of those necessarily appointed by them, it was insisted the city could not be held liable. Nelson, Ch. J., examining the position that, “admitting the water commissioners to be the appointed agents of the defendants, still the latter are not liable, inasmuch as they were acting solely for the State in prosecuting the work in question, and therefore are not responsible for the conduct of those necessarily employed by them for that purpose,” says: “We admit, if the defendants are to be regarded as occupying this relation, and are not chargeable with any want of diligence in the selection of agents, the conclusion contended for would seem to follow. They would then be entitled to all the immunities of public officers charged with a duty which, from its nature, could not be executed without availing themselves of the services of others; and the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to such cases. If a public officer authorize the doing of an act not within the scope of his authority, or if he be not. Hinckley v. Somerset, 145 Mass. 366; Hinckley v. Somerset, 145 Mass. 326, 14 N. E. 166. 326, 14 N. E. 166; Corbin ». Benton, When excavation is made by city 151 Ky. 483, 1525. W. 241, 43 L. R. A. employees acting under proper au- (N. s.) 591; Stewart v. Woodmere thority, city must be deemed to have Cemetery Ass’n, 211 Mich. 282, 178 notice. Wilson v. Troy, 135 N. Y. 96, N. W. 654. 32 N. E. 44, 18 L. R. A. 449, 31 Am. 23 Hill, 531; 8. c. inerror, 2 Denio, St. 817. 433. 1 Alexander v. Mt. Sterling, 71 IIL.524 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I guilty of negligence in the discharge of duties to be perrormed by himself, he will be held responsible; but not for the misconduct or malfeasance of such persons as he is obliged to employ. But this view cannot be maintained on the facts before us. The powers conferred by the several acts of the legislature, authorizing the execution of this great work, are not, strictly and legally speaking, conferred for the benefit of the public; the grant is a special, pri- vate franchise, made as well for the private emolument and advan- tage of the city as for the public good. The State, in its sovereign character, has no interest in it. It owns no part of the work. The whole investment, under the law, and the revenue and profits to be derived therefrom, are a part of the private property of the city, as much so as the lands and houses belonging to it situate within its corporate limits. “The argument of the defendants’ counsel confounds the powers in question with those belonging to the defendants in their char- acter as a municipal or public body, — such as are granted exclu- sively for public purposes to counties, cities, towns, and villages, where the corporations have, if I may so speak, no private estate or interest in the grant. “As the powers in question have been conferred upon one of these public corporations, thus blending, in a measure, those con- ferred for private advantage and emolument with those already possessed for public purposes, there is some difficulty, I admit, in separating them in the mind, and properly distinguishing the one class from the other, so as to distribute the responsibility attaching to the exercise of each. “But the distinction is quite clear and well settled, and the process of separation practicable. To this end, regard should be had, not so much to the nature and character of the various powers conferred, as to the object and purpose of the legislature in conferring them. If granted for public purposes exclusively, they belong to the corporate body in its public, political, or mu- nicipal character. But if the grant was for purposes of private advantage and emolument, though the public may derive a com- mon benefit therefrom, the corporation quo hoc is to be regarded as a private company. It stands on the same footing as would any individual or body of persons upon whom the like special franchises had been conferred.! ‘Citing Dartmouth College »v. Sumn. 297; People v. Morris, 13 Wend. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 668, 672, 4 L. 331-338, 2 Kent’s Com. 275 (4th ed.) ; ed. 629; Philips ». Bury, 1 Ld. Raym. United States Bank ». Planters’ Bank, 8, 2 T. R. 352; Allen ». McKeen, 1 9 Wheat. 907, 6 L. ed. 244; Clark ».CHAP. VIII] SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 525 “Suppose the legislature, instead of the franchise in question, had conferred upon the defendants banking powers, or a charter for a railroad leading into the city, in the usual manner in which such powers are conferred upon private companies, could it be doubted that they would hold them in the same character, and be subject to the same duties and liabilities? I These powers, in the eye of the law, would be but they would. cannot doubt entirely distinct and separate from those appertaining to the de- fendants as a municipal body. So far as related to the charter thus conferred, they would be regarded as a private company, and be subject to the responsibilities attaching to that class of institutions. The distinction is well stated by the Master of the Rolls in Moodalay v. East India Co.,! in answer to an objection made by counsel. There the plaintiff had taken a lease from the com- pany, granting him permission to supply the inhabitants of Madras Corp. of Washington, 12 Wheat. 40, 6 L. ed. 544; Moodalay v. East India Co., 1 Brown’s Ch. R. 469. See, in addition to the cases cited by the court, Touchard v. Touchard, 5 Cal. 306; Gas Co. v. San Francisco, 9 Cal. 453; Richmond v. Long, 17 Gratt. 375; Atkins v. Randolph, 31 Vt. 226; Small v. Danville, 51 Me. 359; Oliver v. Wor- cester, 102 Mass. 489, 3 Am. Rep. 485; Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Pa. St. 169; Detroit v. Corey, 9 Mich. 165; People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44, 9 Am. Rep. 103; Western College v. Cleveland, 12 Ohio, (N. s.) 375; Hewinson v. New Haven, 37 Conn. 475, 9 Am. Rep. 342; People v. Batchellor, 53 N. Y. 128; Welsh v. St. Louis, 73 Mo. 71; Winona v. Botzet, 94 C. C. A. 563, 169 Fed. 321, 23 L. R. A. (n. s.) 204; Davoust v. Alameda, 149 Cal. 69, 84 Pac. 760, 5 L. R. A. (nN. 8s.) 536, 9 Ann. Cas. 847; Judson v. Winsted, 80 Conn. 384, 68 Atl. 999, 15 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 91; Eaton v. Weiser, 12 Idaho, 544, 86 Pac. 541, 118 Am. St. Rep. 225; Stedwell »v. Chicago, 297 Ill. 486, 1380 N. E. 732, 17 A. L. R. 829; Miller Grocery Co. v. Des Moines, 195 Iowa, 1310, 192 N. W. 306; 28 A. L. R. 815; Hinze v. Iola, 92 Kan. 779, 142 Pac. 947; Ann. Cas. 1916 B, 281; Hodgins v. Bay City, 156 Mich. 687, 121 N. W. 274, 132 Ann. St. Rep. 546; Johnson v. Bay City, 164 Mich. 251, 129 N. W. 29, Ann. Cas. 1912 B, 866; Keever v. Mankato, 113 Minn. 55, 129 N. W. 158, 775, 33 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 339, Ann. Cas. 1912 A, 216; Frasch v. New Ulm, 130 Minn. 41, 153 N. W. 121, L. R. A. 1915 E, 749; Emmons v. Virginia, 152 Minn. 295, 188 N. W. 561, 29 A. L. R. 860; Riley v. Inde- pendence, 258 Mo. 671, 167 S. W. 1022, Ann. Cas. 1915 D, 748; Henry v. Lincoln, 93 Neb. 331, 140 N. W. 664, 50 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 174; Oakes Mfg. Co. v. New York, 206 N. Y. 221, 99 N. E. 540, 42 L. R. A. (Nn. 8.) 286; Fisher v. New Bern, 140 N. C. 506, 53 S. E. 342, 111 Am. St. Rep. 857, 5 L. R. A. (Nn. 8.) 542; Minnick »v. Durham, 181 N. C. 188, 106 S. E. 6655024 A. LL: RR: 538s Piqua: Morris, 98 Ohio St. 42, 120 N. E. 300, 7 A. L. R. 129; Brown v. Salt Lake City, 33 Utah, 222, 93 Pac. 570, 126 Am. St. Rep. 828, 14 L. R. A. (N. 8s.) 619, 14 Ann. Cas. 1004; Giuricevic »v. Tacoma, 57 Wash. 329, 106 Pac. 908, DSi oR: A. (N. 8.) beds Bjorky eo: Tacoma, 76 Wash. 225, 135 Pac. 1005, 48h Re A (N. 8:) doll? (Wogale: Parkersburg, 74 W. Va. 25, 81 S. E. 554, 52 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 465; Piper v. Madison, 140 Wis. 311, 122 N. W. 730, 133 Am. St. Rep. 1078, 25 L. R. A. (n. s.) 239. But see Irvine v. Green- wood, 89 S. C. 511, 72 S. E. 228, 36 L. R. A. (Nn. 11 Brown’s Ch. R. 469. . 2862 S.) 500.526 with tobacco for ten years. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [voL. I Before the expiration of that period, the company dispossessed him, and granted the privilege to another. The plaintiff, preparatory to bringing an action against the company, filed a bill of discovery. One of the objections taken by the de- fendants was, that the removal of the plaintiff was incident to their character as a sovereign power, the exercise of which could not be questioned in a bill or suit at law. The Master of the Rolls ad- mitted that no suit would lie against a sovereign power for anything done in that capacity; but he denied that the defendants came within the rule. ‘They have rights,’ he observed, ‘as a sovereign power; they have also duties as individuals; if they enter into bonds in India, the sums secured may be recovered here. So in this case, as a private company, they have entered into a private contract, to which they must be liable.’ It is upon the like distine- tion that municipal corporations, in their private character as owners and occupiers of lands and houses, are regarded in the same light as individual owners and occupiers, and dealt with accordingly. As such, they are bound to repair bridges, highways, and churches; are liable to poor rates; and, in a word, to the discharge of any other duty or obligation to which an individual owner would be subject.” ! 12 Inst. 703; Thursfield v. Jones, Sir T. Jones, 187; Rex v. Gardner, Cowp. 79; Mayor of Lynn v. Turner, Cowp. 87; Henley v. Mayor of Lyme Regis, 5 Bing. 91; s. c. in House of Lords, 1 Bing. N. C. 222. See also Lloyd v. Mayor, &e. of New York, 5 N. Y. 369; Commissioners v. Duckett, 20 Md. 468. “The corporation of the City of New York possesses two kinds of powers, — one governmental and pub- lic, and, to the extent they are held and exercised, is clothed with sover- eignty; the other private, and, to the extent they are held and exercised, is a legal individual. The former are given and used for public purposes, the latter for private purposes. While in the exercise of the former, the cor- poration is a municipal government, and while in the exercise of the latter, is a corporate, legal individual.” Per Foot, J. in Lloyd v. Mayor, etc., of New York, 5 N. Y. 369. See upon this point also Western Fund Saving Society v. 175; Philadelphia, 31 Pa. St. Louisville v. Com., 1 Duvall, 295; People v. Common Council of Detroit, 28 Mich. 228; ante, pp. 490-495, and notes. “The dual capacity of New Eng- land towns as municipal corporations, in the absence of special legislation, is firmly established, and has been recognized for many years (Libby v. Portland, 105 Me. 370, 74 Atl. 805, 26 L. R. A. (n.s.) 141, 18 Ann. Cas. 547; Eastman v. Meredith, 36 N. H. 284, 72 Am. Dec. 302; Oliver v. Worcester, 102 Mass. 499, 3 Am. Rep. 485), and the same dual capacity has been recog- nized elsewhere (Bailey v. New York, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 531, 38 Am. Dec. 669). In their governmental capacity, as political subdivisions of the State, they discharge certain public duties imposed upon them by the legislature ; and for the better discharge of those duties the inhabitants meet in town meeting for the choice of officers, for action upon reports of such officers, or committees, for the transaction of the necessary business connected with the discharge of the public duties im- posed, and for the discussion of publicCHAP. VIII] SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 527 In Storrs v. City of Utica,! it was held that a city, owing to the public the duty of keeping its streets in a safe condition for travel, was liable to persons receiving injury from the neglect to keep proper lights and guards at night around an excavation which had been made for the construction of a sewer, notwithstanding it had contracted for all proper precautions with the persons executing the work. And in the City of Detroit v. Corey,? the corporation was held liable in a similar case, notwithstanding the work was required by the charter to be let to the lowest bidder. Manning, J., in speaking to the point whether the contractors were to be considered as the agents of the city, so that the maxim respondeat superior should apply, says: “It is to be observed that the power under which they acted, and which made that lawful which would other- wise have been unlawful, was not a power given to the city for gov- ernmental purposes, or a public municipal duty imposed on the city, as to keep its streets in repair, or the like, but a special legislative grant to the city for private purposes. The sewers of the city, like its works for supplying the city with water, are the private property of the city; they belong to the city. The corporation and its cor- porators, the citizens, are alone interested in them; the outside public or people of the State at large have no interest in them, as they have in the streets of the city, which are public highways. “The donee of such a power, whether the donee be an individ- ual or a corporation, takes it with the understanding — for such are the requirements of the law in the execution of the power — that ‘t shall be so executed as not unnecessarily to interfere with the § 1655 (974).” Stanley v. Saugerville, 119 Me. 26, 109 Atl. 189, 9 A. L. R. 348. affairs. The town upon such occasions acts in a legislative capacity and as a political body, and no action lies against a town for what is done by it as a political body and as a part of the administration of the government. In its corporate capacity as the owner of property held for its profit and advantage, the rights and liabil- ities of the town are measured strictly by the laws which determine all pri- vate rights and liabilities, and under the same conditions as a private cor- poration. Libby v. Portland, 105 Me. 370, 74 Atl. 805, 26 L. R. A. (NN: 8) 141, 18 Ann. Cas. 547; Oliver ». Worcester, 102 Mass. 489, 500, 3 Am. Rep. 485; Woodward v. Water Dis- trict, 116 Me. 86, 91, 100 Atl. 317, L. R. A. 1917 D, 678. The maxim of respondeat superior may apply to them. 4 Dillon, Mun. Corp. (5th ed.) If a town, holding common land within its limits, which is not required at the time for any public purpose, lays out such land in house lots, which it leases to tenants for a substantial rental, it will be liable to one of its tenants, in the same way that a private owner would be, for injuries sustained by reason of its negligence in maintain- ing a defective and dangerous plank walk for the common use of such tenants. Davis v. Rockport, 213 Mass. 279, 100 N. E. 612, 43 L. Re Ae (N. s.) 1139. Inti Ne 104. 29 Mich. 165. Compare Mills ». Brooklyn, 32 N. Y. 489; Jones ». New Haven, 34 Conn. 1.528 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I rights of the public, and that all needful and proper measures will be taken, in the execution of it, to guard against accidents to per- sons lawfully using the highway at the time. He is individually bound for the performance of these obligations; he cannot accept the power divested of them, or rid himself of their performance by executing them through a third person as his agent. He may stipulate with the contractor for their performance, as was done by the city in the present case, but he cannot thereby relieve himself of his personal liability, or compel an injured party to look to his agent, instead of himself, for damages.”’ And in answer to the objection that the contract was let to the lowest bidder, as the law required, it is shown that the provision of law to that effect was introduced for the benefit of the city, to protect it against frauds, and that it should not, therefore, relieve it from any liability. 1 See also Rochester White Lead Co. v. City of Rochester, 3 N. Y. 463; Grant v. City of Brooklyn, 41 Barb. 381; City of Buffalo v. Holloway, 14 Barb. 101, and 7 N. Y. 493; Lloyd v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 5 N. Y. 369; Delmonico v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 1 Sandf. 222; Barton v. Syra- cuse, 37 Barb. 292; Storrs v. Utica, 17 N. Y. 104; Springfield v. LeClaire, 49 Ill. 476; Blake v. St. Louis, 40 Mo. 569; Baltimore v. Pendleton, 15 Md. 12; St. Paul v. Seitz, 3 Minn. 297; Denver v. Rhodes, 9 Col. 554, 13 Pac. 729; Wilson v. Wheeling, 19 W. Va. 323; Birmingham v. McCary, 84 Ala, 469, 4 So. 630; Logansport v. Dick, 70 Ind. 65; Brasso v. Buffalo, 90 N. Y. 679; Turner v. Newburgh, 109 N. Y. 301, 16 N. E. 344; Circle- ville v. Neuding, 41 Ohio St. 465; Jacksonville v. Drew, 19 Fla. 106; Joslyn v. Detroit, 74 Mich. 458, 42 N. W. 50; McCoull v. Manchester, 85 Va. 579, 8 S. E. 379; Langley »v. Augusta, 118 Ga. 590, 45 S. E.; 486, 98 Am. St. Rep. 133; Hines v. Nevada, 150 Iowa, 62, 130 N. W. 181, 32 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 797; Hart v. Neillsville, 125 Wis. 546, 104 N. W. 699, 1 L. R. A. (N. s.) 952, 4 Ann. Cas. 1085: also numerous cases collected and classified in Dillon on Municipal Cor- porations. But this doctrine seems not to obtain in Pennsylvania: School Dist. v. Fuess, 98 Pa. St. 600; Susque- hanna Depot v. Simmons, 112 Pa. St. 384, 5 Atl. 434. If the injury arises from something not collateral to the work, the city is not liable, as where horses are fright- ened by the noise of blasting in an adjoining street: Herrington v. Lan- singburgh, 110 N. Y. 145, 17 N. E. 728; or a person is injured by the blasting. Blumb v. Kansas City, 84 Mo. 112; Murphy v. Lowell, 128 Mass. 396. Compare Joliet v. Harwood, 86 Ill. 110. A municipal corporation is not liable for neglect to devise and con- struct a proper system of drainage. Carr v. Northern Liberties, 35 Pa. St. 324. See ante, pp. 444, 447, and notes. Cities are not liable for the illegal conduct of officials in the discharge of duty. Dillon, Mun. Corp. §§ 774-778, and cases cited; Grumbine v. Wash- ington, 2 McArthur, 578. The following cases including some very recent ones, in which the liability of municipal corporations for neglect of public duties has been considered: For nuisance in highway, sewer, &c. : Todd v. Troy, 61 N. Y. 506; Master- ton v. Mt. Vernon, 58 N. Y. 391; Mer- rifield v. Worcester, 110 Mass. 216, 14 Am. Rep. 592; Woodward »v. Worcester, 121 Mass. 245; Chicago v. Brophy, 79 Ill. 277; Chicago v. O’Brennan, 65 Ill. 160; Wilkins »v. Rutland, 61 Vt. 336, 17 Atl. Rep. 735; Kibele v. Philadelphia, 105 Pa. St. 41; Duffy v. Dubuque, 63 Iowa, 171, 18 N. W. 900; Kunz ». Troy,CHAP. VIII] 104 N. Y. 344, 10 N. B. 442; Langan ». Atchison, 35 Kan. 318, 11 Pac. 38: Dalton v. Wilson, 118 Ga. 100, 44 Si 830) 98 Am. St. Rep: 101; 566, 146; 263, 190; Wheeler v. Ft. Dodge, 131 Iowa, 108 N. W. 1057, 9 L. R. A. (N. s.) McDowell v. Preston, 104 Minn. 116 N. W. 470, 18 L. R. A. (nN. s.) Chaney v. Riverton, 104 Neb. 189, 177 Ne Wa 845, 10) A. GL. He 244; Charles Eneu Johnson Co. v. Philadel- phia, 336 Pa. St. 510, 84 Atl. 1014, 42 L. R. A. (n. s.) 512, Ann. Cas. 1914 A, 68. See Stock v. Boston, 149 Mass. 410, 21 N. E. 871; Ray »v. St. Paul, 40 Minn. 458, 42 N. W. 297. For invasion of private right or property: Sheldon v. Kalamazoo, 24 Mich. 383; Babcock v. Buffalo, 56 N. Y. 268; Lee v. Sandy Hill, 40 N. Y. 442; Phinizy v. Augusta, 47 Ga. 260; Helena v. Thompson, 29 Ark. 569; Kobs v. Minneapolis, 22 Minn. 159; Louisville v. Hekemann, 161 Ky. 171 S. W. 165, L. R. A. 1915 C, - Kelley v. Boston, 186 Mass. tN. B. 299; 66 LR. AS 429; nson v. Somerville, 195 Mass. POG 81 N. E. 268, 10 L. R. A. ) 715; Gillmor v. Salt Lake 2 Utah, 180, 89 Pac. 714, 12 OR: A. (nN: 537, 13 Ann. Cas. Sehy v. Salt Lake City, 41 |, 535, 126 Pac. 691, 42 L. R. A. ei 8.) 915; Cunningham ». Se¢ ae 40 Wash. 59, 82 Pac. 143, 4 L. R. J (n. s.) 629, 42 Wash. 134, 84 ae 641; Lowe v. Conroy, 120 Wis. 151, 97 N. W. 942, 102 Am. St. Rep. 983, 66 L. R. A. 907, 1 Ann. Cas. 341. For negligent construction of sew- ers: Nims v. Troy, 59 N. Y. 500; Van Pelt v. Davenport, 42 Iowa, 308; Rowe v. Portsmouth, 56 N. H. 291; Ashley v. Port Huron, 35 Mich. 296, 20 Am. Rep. 628, note; Noonan »v. 523, 747 ; 165, 7 Joh s.) Albany, 79 N. Y. 470, 35 Am. Rep. 540; Chicago v. Hesing, 83 Ill. 204, 25 Am. Rep. 378; Post v. Boston, 141 Mass. 189, 4 N. EB. 815; Larson Bros. Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Kansas City, 115 Kan. 589, 224 Pac. 47; Pevear v. Lynn, 249 Mass. 486, 144 N. E. 379; Mitchell Realty Co. »v. West Allis,184 Wis. 352, 199 N. W. 390. For negligence in construction and improvement of streets: Pekin »v. VoL. 1— 34 SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 529 Winkel, 77 Ill. 56; Brokaw, 77 Ill. 194; 67 Ill. 477; Chicago v. Langlass, 66 Ill. 361; Mead v. Derby, 40 Conn. 205; Milledgeville v. Cooley, 55 Ga. 17: Prentiss v. Boston, 112 Mass. 43: Saltmarsh v. Bow, 56 N. H. 428; Sewall v. St. Paul, 20 Minn. 511; Kentworthy v. Ironton, 41 Wis. 647; Hoyt v. Hudson, 41 Wis. 105; Talbot Taunton, 140 Mass. 552, 5 N. E. Bloomington »v. Pekin v. Brereton, 616; Gray v. Danbury, 54 Conn. 574, 10 Atl. 198; Allen v. McCalman, 229 Ill. App. 221; Pikeville v. Riddle, 200 Ky. 395, 255 S. W. 63; Ashland ». Williams, 203 Ky. 300, 262 S. W. 273; Frankfort v. Bowen’s Adm’x, 205 Ky. 309, 265 S. W. 785; Bowen’s Adm’x »v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., 205 Ky. 314, 265 S. W. 787; Berry v. Durham, 186 N. C. 421, 119 S. E. 748; Graham v. Charlotte, 186 N. C. 649, 1208S. E. 466. For defective sidewalk: Springfield v. Doyle, 76 Ill. 202; Champaign v. Pattison, 50 Ill. 62; Townsend v. Des Moines, 42 Iowa, 657; Rice v. Des Moines, 40 Iowa, 638 ; McAuley ». Boston, 113 Mass. 503; Harriman v. Boston, 114 Mass. 241; Morse v. Boston, 109 Mass. 446; Hanscom v. Boston, 141 Mass. 242, 5 N. E. 249; McLaughlin v. Corry, 77 Pa. St. 109; Boucher v. New Haven, 40 Conn. 456; Congdon v. Norwich, 37 Conn. 414: Stewart v. Ripon, 38 Wis. 584; Chapman v. Macon, 55 Ga. 566; Moore v. Minneapolis, 19 Minn. 300; Furnell v. St. Paul, 20 Minn. 117; Omaha v. Olmstead, 5 Neb. 446; Hi- gert v. Greencastle, 43 Ind. 574; Providence v. Clapp, 17 How. 161, Leavenworth, 15 Kan. 81; Atchison v. King, 9 Kan. 550; Gillison v. Charleston, 16 W. Va. 282, 37 Am. Rep. Cromarty v. Boston, 127 Mass. 329, 34 Am. Rep. 381: Sherwood v. Dist. Columbia, 3 Mack cey, 276; Saulsbury v. Ithaca, 94 N. Y. 27; Pomfrey v. Saratoga, 104 N. i ee 11 N. E. 43; Cloughessey »v. Waterbury, 51 Conn. 405; Denver »v. Burrows, 76 Colo. 17, 227 Pac. 840; Burgess v. Plainville, 101 Conn. 68, 124 Atl. 829; Norman v. Sioux City, 197 aos 1310, 197 N. W. 18; Jor- dan v. Lexington, 133 Miss. 440, 97 So. 758; Megson v. St. Louis, (Mo.), Smith v. 15 L. ed. 72 ee (09;530 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I [Upon the ground that municipal corporations are not liable for negligence in the performance of governmental functions, the greater weight of authority supports the rule that a city which provides free to its inhabitants instrumentalities for diversion or exercise in a public park, is not liable to persons injured while using such in- strumentalities, because defective or out of repair, due to negli- gence of the city, its servants or agents;1 but in some of the States it has been held that under such circumstances a city will be liable for injuries resulting from its negligence.?| 264 S. W. 15; De Pledge v. New York, 203 N. Y. Supp. 428, 208 App. Div. 10; Kuhn »v. East Syracuse, 204 N. Y. Supp. 697, 209 App. Div. 186; Anderson v. Jamestown, 50 N. D. 531, 196 N. W. 753; Quapaw v. Hol- den, 96 Okla. 281, 222 Pac. 680; Heather v. Mitchell, 47 S. D. 281, 198 N. W. 353; Erle v. Norfolk, 139 Va. 38, 123 S. E. 364; Clausing v. Kershaw, 129 Wash. 67, 224 Pac. 573. For allowing sidewalk to remain in icy condition: Beane v. St. Jo- seph, 215 Mo. App. 554, 256 S. W. 1093. See also Gerrie v. Port Huron, 226 Mich. 630, 198 N. W. 236; Heather v. Mitchell, 47 S. D. 281, 198 N. W. 353; Randall v. Hot Springs, 47 S. D. 357, 199 N. W. 40; Beaudin ». Oconto, 183 Wis. 341, 197 N. W. 792. For injury by limb falling from tree overhanging street: Jones v. New Haven, 34 Conn. 1. See Gubasko ». New York, 1 N. Y. Supp. 215. For injury by fall of an awning over sidewalk: Bohen v. Waseca, 32 Minn. 176, 19 N. W. 730; Larson v. Grand Forks, 3 Dak. 307, 19 N. W. 414. For failure to keep street in repair: Gorham v. Cooperstown, 59 N. Y. 660; Hines ». Lockport, 50 N. Y. 236; Bell v. West Point, 51 Miss. 262; Chicago »v. McGiven, 78 Ill. 347; Alton v. Hope, 68 Ill. 167; Centralia v. Scott, 59 Il. 129; Winbigler v. Los Angeles, 45 Cal. 36; Market v. St. Louis, 56 Mo. 189; Willey v. Belfast, 61 Me. 569; Bill v. Norwich, 39 Conn. 222; Lind- holm v. St. Paul, 19 Minn. 245 ; Shartle v. Minneapolis, 17 Minn. 308; O’Leary v. Mankato, 21 Minn. 65; Griffin ». Williamstown, 6 W. Va. 312; King v. Beaumont, 296 Fed. 531; Humboldt County v. Dakota City, 197 Iowa, 457, 196 N. W. 53; Donahoe v. Webster Groves, (Mo. App.), 259 S. W. 505; Cooper v. Caruthersville, (Mo. App.), 264 S. W. 46; Quapaw v. Holden, 96 Okla. 281, 222 Pac. 680; Armstrong v. Tulsa, 102 Okla. 49, 226 Pac. 560; Heather v. Mitchell, 47 S. D. 281, 198 N. W. 353; Neagle v. Tacoma, 127 Wash. 528, 221 Pac. 588. For failure to keep sewers in repair: Munn ». Pittsburg, 40 Pa. St. 364; Jersey City v. Kiernan, 50 N. J. L. 246, 13 Atl. 170; Bigham »v. Pitts- burgh, 83 Pa. Super. Ct. 449. 1 Kellar v. Los Angeles, 179 Cal. 605, 178 Pac. 505; Pennell v. Wil- mington, 7 Penn. (Del.) 229, 78 Atl. 915; Cornelisen v. Atlanta, 146 Ga. 416,918. E. 415; Warrenton v. Smith, 149 Ga. 567, 101 S. EB. 681; Hibbard v. Wichita, 98 Kan. 498, 159 Pac. 399, L. R. A. 1917 A, 399; Board of Park Com’rs v. Prinz, 127 Ky. 460, 105 S. W. 948; Bolster v. Lawrence, 225 Mass. 387, 114 N. E. 722, L. R. A. 1917 B, 1285; Heino ». Grand Rapids, 202 Mich. 363, 168 N. W. 512, L. R. A. 1918 F, 528; Emmons ». Virginia, 152 Minn. 295, 188 N. W. 561, 29 A. L. R. 860; Caughlin v. Omaha, 103 Neb. 726, 174 N. W. 220; Bisbing v. As- bury Park, 80 N. J. L. 416, 78 Atl. 196, 33 L. R. A. (nN. 8.) 523; Blair v. Granger, 24 R. I. 17, 51 Atl. 1042; Nashville v. Burns, 131 Tenn. 281, 174 Sh Wyo bt), i, 1, ZN, TONG 1D), THOS < Nelson v. Spokane, 104 Wash. 219, 176 Pac. 149; Bernstein v. Milwaukee, 158 Wis. 578, 149 N. W. 382, L. R. A. 1915 C, 435, 8 N. CC. A. 624; Gensch v. Milwaukee, 179 Wis. 95, 190 N. W. 843. 2 Canon City v. Cox, 55 Colo. 264,CHAP. VIII] SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 531 Validity of Incorporation Proceedings. We have not deemed it important, in considering the subject embraced within this chapter, to discuss the various questions which might be suggested in regard to the validity of the pro- ceedings by which it is assumed in any case that a municipal cor- poration has become constituted. These questions are generally questions between the corporators and the State, with which private individuals are supposed to have no concern. In pro- ceedings where the question whether a corporation exists or not arises collaterally, the courts will not permit its corporate character to be questioned, if it appear to be acting under color of law, and recognized by the State as such. by the State Such a question should be raised itself, by quo warranto or other direct proceeding.’ And the rule, we apprehend, would be no different, if the constitu- tion itself prescribed the manner of incorporation. Even in such a case, proof that the corporation was acting as such, under legislative action, would be sufficient evidence of right, except as against the State; and private parties could not enter upon any question of regularity. And the State itself may justly be precluded, on the 133 Pac. 1040; Ft. Collins v. Roten, 72 Colo. 182, 210 Pac. 326; Kokomo v. Loy, 185 Ind. 18, 112 N. E. 994; Sarber v. Indianapolis, 72 Ind. App. 594, 126 N. E. 330; Capp v. St. Louis, 251 Mo. 345, 158 S. W. 616, 46 L. R. A. (x. 8.) 731, Ann. Cas. 1915 @. 2455 Healy v. Kansas City, 277 Mo. 619, 2118S. W. 59; Silverman v. New York, 114 N. Y. Supp. 59; Bloom v. Newark, 3 Ohio N. P. (n.s.) 480; Anadarko v. Swain, 42 Okla. 741, 142 Pac. 1104; Guilmartin v. Philadelphia, 201 Pa. St. 518, 51 Atl. 312; Rhine v. Philadel- phia, 24 Pa. Super. Ct. 564; Haithcock v. Columbia, 115 S. C. 29, 104 S. E. 335; Norberg v. Hagna, 46S. D. 568, 195 N. W. 438, 29 A. L. R. 841. 1 State v. Carr, 5 N. H. 367; Presi- dent, &c. of Mendota v. Thompson, 20 Ill. 197; Hamilton v. President, &c. of Carthage, 24 Ill. 22. These were prosecutions by municipal cor- porations for recovery of penalties imposed by by-laws, and where the plea of nul tiel corporation was interposed and overruled. See also Kayer v. Bremen, 16 Mo. 88; Ket- tering v. Jacksonville, 50 Ill. 39; Bird v. Perkins, 33 Mich. 28; Worley »v. Harris, 82 Ind. 493; Coe v. Los Angeles, 42 Cal. App. 479, 183 Pac. 822; Velasquez v. Zimmerman, 30 Colo. 355, 70 Pac. 419; People »v. 93 N. E. 244; Kan. 263, 94 Bowman, 247 Ill. 276, State v. Shufford, 77 Pac. 137: Black v. Early, 208 Mo. 281. 106 S. W. 1014; State v. Bell- flower, 129 Mo. App. 138, 108 8. VW 117; State v. Small, 131 Mo. App. 470, 109 S. W. 1079; Salem v. Young, 142 Mo. App. 160, 125 S. W. 857; State v. Gooch, 175 Mo. App. 270, 157 S. W. 846; Morris v. Fagan, 85 N. J. L. 617, 90 Atl. 267; Prankard v. Cooley, 132 N. Y. Supp. 289, 147 App. Div. 145; State v. Butterfield, 92 Ohio St. 428, 111 N. E. 279; Mitch- ell v. Carter, 31 Okla. 592, 122 Pac. 691; Adler v. Jenkins, 33 Okla. 117, 124 Pac. 29; Ex parte Koen, 58 Tex. Cr. App. 279, 125 S. W. 401; Board of Education v. Berry, 62 W. Va. 438, 59 S. E. 169. But see Waldrop ». Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 131 Ark. 453, 199 S. W. 369; Albershart v. Donaldson, 149 Ky. 510, 149 S. W. 873; Hurley v. Motz, 151 Ky. 451, 152 S. W. 248.532 principle CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I of estoppel, from raising such an objection, where there has been long acquiescence and recognition.! 1Jn People v. Maynard, 15 Mich. 463, 470, where the invalidity of an act organizing a county, passed several years before, was suggested on con- stitutional grounds, Campbell, J., says: “Tf this question had been raised immediately, we are not prepared to say that it would have been altogether free from difficulty. But inasmuch as the arrangement there indicated had been acted upon for ten years before the recent legislation, and had been recognized as valid by all parties in- terested, it cannot now be disturbed. Even in private associations the acts of parties interested may often estop them from relying on legal objections, which might have availed them if not waived. But in public affairs, where the people have organized themselves under color of law into the ordinary municipal bodies, and have gone on year after year raising taxes, making Improvements, and exercising their usual franchises, their rights are properly regarded as depending quite as much on the acquiescence as on the regularity of their origin, and no ex post facto inquiry can be permitted to undo their corporate existence. What- ever may be the rights of individuals before such general acquiescence, the corporate standing of the community can no longer be open to question. See Rumsey v. People, 19 N. Y. 41; and Lanning v. Carpenter, 20 N. Y. 474, where the effect of the invalidity of an original county organization is very well considered in its public and private bearings. There have been direct legislative recognitions of the new division on several occasions. The exercise of jurisdiction being notorious and open in all such cases, the State as well as county and town taxes being all levied under it, there is no principle which could justify any court, at this late day, in going back to inquire into the regularity of the law of 1857.” See also Clapp »v. Otoe County, 104 Fed. 473, 45 C. C. A. 579; State v. Butterfield, 92 Ohio St. 428, 111 N. E. 279. A similar doctrine has been applied in support of the official character of persons who, without authority of law, have been named for municipal of- ficers by State legislation, and whose action in such offices has been ac- quiesced in by the citizens or authori- ties of the municipality. See People v. Salomon, 54 Ill. 51; People v. Lothrop, 24 Mich. 235. Compare Kimball v. Alcorn, 45 Miss. 151. But such acquiescence could not make them local officers and representatives of the people for new and enlarged powers subsequently attempted to be given by the legislature. People »v. Common Council of Detroit, 28 Mich. 228. Nor in respect to powers not purely local. People v. Springwells, 25 Mich. 153. And see People ». Albertson, 55 N. Y. 50.CHAPTER IX PROTECTION TO PERSON AND PROPERTY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES As the government of the United States was to be one of enu- merated powers, it was not deemed important by the framers of the Constitution that a bill of rights should be incorporated among its provisions. If, among the powers conferred, there was none which would authorize or empower the government to deprive the citizen of any of those fundamental rights which it is the object and the duty of government to protect and defend, and to insure which is the sole purpose of bills of rights, it was thought to be at least unimportant to insert negative clauses in that instrument, inhibiting the government from assuming any such powers, since the mere failure to confer them would leave all such powers be- yond the sphere of its constitutional authority. And, as Mr. Ham- ilton argued, it might seem even dangerous to do so. “For why declare that things shall not be done which there is no power to do? Why, for instance, should it be said that the liberty of the press shall not be restrained, when no power is given by which restrictions may be imposed? I will not contend that such a pro- vision would confer a regulating power; but it is evident that it would furnish, to men disposed to usurp, a plausible pretense for claiming that power. They might urge, with a semblance of rea- son, that the Constitution ought not to be charged with the ab- surdity of providing against the abuse of an authority which was not given, and that the provision against restraining the liberty of the press afforded a clear implication that a right to prescribe proper regulations concerning it was intended to be vested in the national government. This may serve as a specimen of the nu- merous handles which would be given to the doctrine of construc- tive powers, by the indulgence of an injudicious zeal for bills of rights.’’ ! It was also thought that bills of rights, however important under a monarchical government, were of no moment in a consti- tution of government framed by the people for themselves, and 1 Federalist, No. 84. 533534 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I under which public affairs were to be managed by means of agen- cies selected by the popular choice, and subject to frequent change by popular action. “It has been several times truly remarked, that bills of rights are, in their origin, stipulations between kings and their subjects, abridgments of prerogative in favor of privilege, reservations of rights not surrendered to the prince. Such was Magna Charta, obtained by the barons, sword in hand, from King John. Such were the subsequent confirmations of that charter by succeeding princes. Such was the Petition of Right, assented to by Charles the First, in the beginning of his reign. Such also was the Declaration of Right presented by the Lords and Commons to the Prince of Orange in 1688, and afterwards thrown into the form of an act of Parliament, called the Bill of Rights. It is evi- dent, therefore, that, according to their primitive signification, they have no application to constitutions professedly founded upon the power of the people, and executed by their immediate repre- sentatives and servants. Here, in strictness, the people surrender nothing; and, as they retain everything, they have no need of particular reservations. ‘WE, THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES, to secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of Amer- ica.’ This is a better recognition of popular rights than volumes of those aphorisms which make the principal figure in several of our State bills of rights, and which would sound much better in a treatise of ethics than in a constitution of government.” * Reasoning like this was specious, but it was not satisfactory to many of the leading statesmen of that day, who believed that “the purposes of society do not require a surrender of all our rights to our ordinary governors; that there are certain portions of right not necessary to enable them to carry on an effective government, and which experience has nevertheless proved they will be con- stantly encroaching on, if submitted to them; that there are also certain fences which experience has proved peculiarly efficacious against wrong, and rarely obstructive of right, which yet the govern- ing powers have ever shown a disposition to weaken and remove.” ? And these governing powers will be no less disposed to be ag- gressive when chosen by majorities than when selected by the accident of birth, or at the will of privileged classes. Indeed if, during the long struggle for constitutional liberty in England, covering the whole of the seventeenth century, importance was justly attached to a distinct declaration and enumeration of individual rights on the part of the government, when it was still in the 1 Federalist, No. 84, by Hamilton. 2 Jefferson’s Works, Vol. III. p. 201.CHAP. IX] PROTECTION TO PERSON AND PROPERTY 535 power of the governing authorities to infringe upon or to abrogate them at any time, and when, consequently, the declaration could possess only a moral force, a similar declaration would appear to be of even more States, where it would value in the Constitution of the United constitute authoritative law, and be subject to no modification or repeal, except by the people them- selves whose rights it was designed to protect, nor even by them except in the manner by the Constitution provided.! 1 Mr. Jefferson sums up the objec- tions to a bill of rights in the Constitu- tion of the United States, and answers them as follows: “1. That the rights in question are reserved by the man- ner in which the federal powers are granted. Answer: A constitutive act may certainly be so formed as to need no declaration of rights. The act itself has the force of a declaration, as far as it goes; and if it goes to all material points, nothing more is want- ing. In the draft of a constitution which I had once a thought of propos- ing in Virginia, and printed after- wards, I endeavored to reach all the great objects of public liberty, and did not mean to add a declaration of rights. Probably the object was im- perfectly executed; but the defi- ciencies would have been supplied by others in the course of discussion. But in a constitutive act which leaves some precious articles unnoticed, and raises implications against others, a declara- tion of rights becomes necessary by way of supplement. This is the case of our new federal Constitution. This instrument forms us into one State, as to certain objects, and gives us a legislative and executive body for these objects. It should therefore guard us against their abuses of power, within the field submitted to them. 2. A positive declaration of some essential rights could not be obtained in the requisite latitude. Answer: Half a loaf is better than no bread. If we cannot secure all our rights, let us secure what we can. 3. The limited powers of the federal govern- ment, and jealousy of the subordi- nate governments, afford a security, which exists in no other instance. Answer: The first member of this seems resolvable into the first objec- tion before stated. The jealousy of the subordinate governments is a precious reliance. But observe that those governments are only agents. They must have principles furnished them whereon to found their opposi- tion. The declaration of rights will be the text whereby they will try all the acts of the federal government. In this view it is necessary to the fed- eral government also; as by the same text they may try the opposition of the subordinate governments. 4. Ex- perience proves the inefficacy of a bill of rights. True. But though it is not absolutely efficacious, under all circumstances, it is of great potency always, and rarely inefficacious. A brace the more will often keep up the building which would have fallen with that brace the less. There is a re- markable difference between the char- acters of the inconveniences which attend a declaration of rights, and those which attend the want of it. The inconveniences of the declaration are, that it may cramp government in its useful exertions. But the evil of this is short-lived, moderate, and repar- able. The inconveniences of the want of a declaration are permanent, afflic- tive, andirreparable. They are in con- stant progression from bad to worse. The executive, in our governments, is not the sole, it is scarcely the principal, object of my jealousy. The tyranny of the legislatures is the most formid- able dread at present, and will be for many years. That of the executive will come in its turn; but it will be at a remote period.’’ Letter to Madison, March 15, 1789, Jefferson’s Works, Vol. III. p. 4. See also same volume, pp. 13 and 101; Vol. II. pp. 329, 358.CHAP. IX] PROTECTION TO PERSON AND PROPERTY 537 properly constituted to try with coolness, caution, and impartiality a criminal charge, especially in those cases in which the popular feeling is strongly excited, — the very class of cases most likely to be prosecuted by this mode. And although it would be conceded that, if such bills were allowable, they should properly be presented only for offenses against the general laws of the land, and be pro- ceeded with on the same full opportunity for investigation and defense which is afforded in the courts of the common law, yet it was remembered that in practice they were often resorted to be- cause an obnoxious person was not subject to punishment under the general law,! or because, in proceeding against him by this mode, some rule of the common law requiring a particular species or degree of evidence might be evaded, and a conviction secured on proofs that a jury would not be suffered to accept as overcoming the legal presumption of innocence. Whether the accused should necessarily be served with process; what degree or species of evidence should be required ; whether the rules of law should be followed, either in determining what constituted a crime, or in dealing with the accused after conviction, — were all questions which would necessarily ad- dress themselves to the legislative discretion and sense of justice ; and the very qualities which are essential in a court to protect individuals on trial before them against popular clamor, or the hate of those in power, were precisely those which were likely to prove weak or wanting in the legislative body at such a time.” And what could be more obnoxious in a free government than the exercise of such a power by a popular body, controlled by a mere majority, fresh from the contests of exciting elections, and quite too apt, 1 Cases of this description were most as horrible in barbarity as possible, numerous during the reign of Henry _ the list of the proscribed was carefully VIII. and among the victims was kept secret until after the time fixed Cromwell, who is said to have first for their appearance! Macaulay’s advised that monarch to resort to History of England, c. 12. this objectionable proceeding. Even 2This was equally true, whether the dead were attainted, as in the the attainder was at the command of case of Richard III., and later, of the the king, as in the case of Cardinal heroes of the Commonwealth. The Pole’s mother, or at the instigation of most atrocious instance in history, the populace, as in the case of Went- however, only relieved by its weak- worth, Earl of Strafford. The last ness and futility, was the great act infliction of capital punishment in of attainder passed in 1688 by the England under a bill of attainder was Parliament of James II., assembled in upon Sir John Fenwick, in the reign Dublin, by which between two and of William and Mary. It is worthy three thousand persons were attainted, of note that in the preceding reign Sir their property confiscated, and them- John had been prominent in the at- selves sentenced to death if they tainder of the unhappy Monmouth. failed to appear at a time named. Macaulay’s History of England, ec. 5. And, to render the whole proceeding538 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I under the most favorable circumstances, to suspect the motives of their adversaries, and to resort to measures of doubtful propriety to secure party ends? Nor were legislative punishments of this severe character the only ones known to parliamentary history ; there were others of a milder form, which were only less obnoxious in that the consequences were less terrible. Those legislative convictions which imposed pun- ishments less than that of death were called bills of pains and penalties, as distinguished from bills of attainder; but the consti- tutional provisions we have referred to were undoubtedly aimed at any and every species of legislative punishment for criminal or supposed criminal offenses; and the term “bill of attainder’’ is used in a generic sense, which would include bulls of pains and pen- alties also.! The thoughtful reader will not fail to discover, in the acts of the American States during the Revolutionary period, sufficient reason for this constitutional provision, even if the still more moni- tory history of the English attainders had not been so freshly re- membered. Some of these acts provided for the forfeiture of the estates, within the Commonwealth, of those British subjects who had withdrawn from the jurisdiction because not satisfied that grievances existed sufficiently serious to justify the last resort of an oppressed people, or because of other reasons not satisfactory to the existing authorities; and the only investigation provided for was an inquiry into the desertion. | Others mentioned particular persons by name, adjudged them guilty of adhering to the enemies of the State, and proceeded to inflict punishment upon them, so far as the presence of property within the Commonwealth would enable the government to do so.?” These were the resorts of a time 1 Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87; 1. Story on Constitution, § 1344; Cum- mings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 18 L. ed. 356; Ez parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L. ed. 366; Drehman »v. Stifle, 8 Wall. 595, 601, 19 L. ed. 508. “T think it will be found that the following comprise those essential They were convictions and sen- tences pronounced by the legislative department of the government, instead of the judicial. 2. The sentence pro- nounced and the punishment inflicted were determined by no previous law or fixed rule. 3. The investigation into the guilt-of the accused, if any elements of bills of attainder, in addi- tion to the one already mentioned [which was that they declared certain persons attainted and their blood cor- rupted, so that it had lost all heritable property], which distinguish them from other legislation, and which made them so obnoxious to the states- men who organized our government: such were made, was not necessarily or generally conducted in his presence or that of his counsel, and no recog- nized rule of evidence governed the inquiry.” Per Miller, J., in Hx parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 388, 18 L. ed. 366. 2See Belknap’s History of New Hampshire, c. 26; 2 Ramsay’s His-CHAP. IX] PROTECTION TO PERSON AND PROPERTY 539 of extreme peril; and if possible to justify them in a period of revolution, when everything was staked on success, and when the public safety would not permit too-much weight to scruples concern- ing the private rights of those who were not aiding the popular cause, the power to repeat such acts under any conceivable cir- cumstances in which the country could be placed again was felt to be too dangerous to be left in the legislative hands. So far as pro- ceedings had been completed under those acts, before the treaty of 1783, by the actual transfer of property, they remained valid and effectual afterwards; but so far as they were then incomplete, they were put to an end by that treaty.’ The conviction of the propriety of this constitutional provision has been so universal, that it has never been questioned, either in legislative bodies or elsewhere. Nevertheless, cases have recently arisen, growing out of the attempt to break up and destroy the gov- ernment of the United States, in which the Supreme Court of the United States has adjudged certain action of Congress to be in violation of this provision and consequently void.? The action tory of South Carolina, 351; 8 Rhode Island Colonial Records, 609; 2 Arnold’s History of Rhode Island, 360, 449; Thompson »v. Carr, 5 N. H. 510; Sleght v. Kane, 2 Johns. Cas. 236; Story on Const. (4th ed.) § 1344, note. On the general subject of bills of attainder, one would do well to con- sult, in addition to the cases in 4 Wallace, those of Blair v. Ridgeley, 41 Mo. 63 (where it was very elaborately examined by able counsel); State v. Staten, 6 Cold. 233; Randolph ». Good, 3 W. Va. 551; Ex parte Law, decided by Judge Erskine, in the United States District Court of Geor- gia, May Term, 1866; State v. Adams, 44 Mo. 570; Beirne v. Brown, 4 W. Va. 72; Peerce v. Carskadon, 4 W. Va. 234; People v. Hayes, 140 N. Y. 484, 35 N. E. 951, 37 Am. St. Rep. 572, 23 L. R. A. 830. 1 Jackson v. Munson, 3 Caines, 137. 2 On the 2d of July, 1862, Congress, by ‘“‘an act to prescribe an oath of office, and for other purposes”, enacted that “hereafter every person elected or appointed to any office of honor or profit under the government of the United States, either in the civil, military, or naval departments of the public service, excepting the President of the United States, shall, before entering upon the duties of such office, take and subscribe the following oath or affirmation: I, A B, do solemnly swear or affirm that I have never voluntarily borne arms against the United States since I have been a citizen thereof; that I have volun- tarily given no aid, countenance, counsel, or encouragement to persons engaged in armed hostility thereto; that I have neither sought nor ac- cepted, nor attempted to exercise, the functions of any office whatever, under any authority or pretended authority in hostility to the United States; that I have not yielded a voluntary sup- port to any pretended government, au- thority, power, or constitution within the United States, hostile or inimical thereto. And I do further swear or affirm that, to the best of my knowl- edge and ability, I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faith- fully discharge the duties of the office540 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoOL. I referred to was designed to exclude from practice in the United States courts all persons who had taken up arms against the gov- ernment during the recent rebellion, or who had voluntarily given aid and encouragement to its enemies; and the mode adopted to effect the exclusion was to require of all persons, before they should be admitted to the bar or allowed to practice, an oath negativing any such disloyal action. This decision was not at first universally accepted as sound; and the Supreme Courts of West Virginia and of the District of Columbia declined to follow it, insisting that per- mission to practice in the courts is not a right, but a privilege, and that the withholding it for any reason of State policy or personal unfitness could not be regarded as the infliction of criminal punish- ment.! The Supreme Court of the United States has also, upon the same reasoning, held a clause in the Constitution of Missouri, which, among other things, excluded all priests and clergymen from prac- ticing or teaching unless they should first take a similar oath of loyalty, to be void, overruling in so doing a decision of the Supreme Court of that Statel? on which [ am about to enter, so help me God.” On the 24th of January, 1865, Congress passed a supplemen- tary act as follows: ‘No person after the date of this act shall be admitted to the bar of the Supreme Court of the United States, or at any time after the 4th of March next shall be admitted to the bar of any Circuit or District Court of the United States, or of the Court of Claims, as an attorney or counselor of such court, or shall be allowed to appear and to be heard in any such court, by virtue of any prevyi- ous admission, or any special power of attorney, unless he shall have first taken and subscribed the oath” aforesaid. False swearing, under each of the acts, was made perjury. See 12 Statutes at Large, 502; 13 Stat- utes at Large, 424. In Ez parte Gar- land, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L. ed. 366, a majority of the court held the second of these acts void, as partaking of the nature of a bill of pains and penalties, and also as being an ez post facto law. The act was looked upon as inflicting a punishment for past conduct; the exaction of the oath being the mode provided for ascertaining the parties upon whom the act was intended to operate. See Drehman v. Stifle, 8 Wall. 595, 19 L. ed. 508. The conclu- sion declared by the Supreme Court of the United States in Ex parte Gar- land had been previously reached by Judge Trigg, of the United States Cir- cuit Court, in Matter of Baxter; by Judge Busteed, of the District Court of Alabama, in Matter of Shorter et al.; and by Judge Erskine, of the District Court of Georgia, in Ex parte Law. An elector cannot be excluded from the right to vote on the ground of being a deserter who has never been tried and convicted as such. Huber v. Reily, 53 Pa. St. 112; McCafferty v. Guyer, 59 Pa. St. 109; State v. Symonds, 57 Me. 148. See ante, p. 139, note. 1See the cases Hx parte Magruder, American Law Register, Vol. VI. N. s. p. 292; and Hx parte Hunter, Ameri- can Law Register, Vol. VI. N. s. 410; 2 W. Va. 122; Ha parte Quarrier, 4 W.\Va. 210. See also Cohen v. Wright, 22 Cal. 298. 2 Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 18 L. ed. 356. See also the case of State v. Adams, 44 Mo. 570, in which it was held that a legislative act declar- ing that the board of curators of St.CHAP. IX] PROTECTION TO PERSON AND PROPERTY 541 Ex post facto laws are also, by the same provisions of the national Constitution already cited,! forbidden to be passed, either by the States or by Congress. At an early day it was settled by authoritative decision, in opposition to what might seem the more natural and obvious meaning of the term ex post facto, that in their scope and purpose these provisions were confined to laws respecting criminal punish- ments, and had no relation whatever to retrospective legislation of any other description. And it has, therefore, been repeatedly held, that retrospective laws, when not of a criminal nature, do not come in conflict with the national Constitution, unless ob- noxious to its provisions on other grounds than their retrospective character. “The prohibition in the letter,” says Chase, J., in the leading case,” “is not to pass any law concerning or after the fact; but the plain and obvious meaning and intention of the prohibition is this: that the legislatures of the several States shall not pass laws after a fact done by a subject or citizen, which shall have relation to such fact, and punish him for having done it, The prohibition, considered in this light, is an additional bulwark~in favor of the personal security of the subject, to protect his person from pun- ishment by legislative acts having a retrospective operation, I do not think it was inserted to secure the citizen in his private rights of either property or contracts. The prohibitions not to make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts, and not to pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts, as required by the constitution was void. In Beirne v. Brown, 4 W. Va. 72, and Peerce v. Carskadon, 4 W. Va. 234, an act excluding persons from the privilege of sustaining suits in the courts of the State, or from proceed- ings for a rehearing, except upon their taking an oath that they had never Charles College had forfeited their office, was of the nature of a bill of attainder and void. The Missouri oath of loyalty was a very stringent one, and applied to electors, State, county, city and town officers, officers in any corporation, public or private, professors and teachers in educational institutions, attorneys and counselors, bishops, priests, deacons, ministers, been engaged in hostile measures elders, or other clergymen of any de- against the government, was SUS- nomination. The Supreme Court of tained. And see State v. Neal, 42 Missouri had held this provision valid Mo. 119. Contra, Kyle ». Jenkins, in the following cases: 6 W. Va. 371; Lynch v. Hoffman, 7 resche, 36 Mo. 256, case of an attor- W. Va. 553. The case of Peerce v. ney; State v. Cummings, 36 Mo. 263, Carskadon was reversed in 16 Wall. 234, 21 L. ed. 276, being held covered case of a minister, reversed as above stated; State v. Bernoudy, 36 Mo. by the case of Cummings ». Missouri. State v. Ga- 279, case of the recorder of St. Louis; State v. McAdoo, 36 Mo. 452, where it is held that a certificate of election is- sued to one who failed to take the oath 1 Constitution of United States, art. 1, §§ 9 and 10. 2 Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 390, 1 L. ed. 648.542 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I were inserted tosecure private rights ; but the restriction not to pass any ex post facto law was to secure the person of the subject from injury or punishment, in consequence of such law. If the prohibi- tion against making ex post facto laws was intended to secure personal rights from being affected or injured by such laws, and the prohibi- tion is sufficiently extensive for that object, the other restraints I have enumerated were unnecessary, and therefore improper, for both of them are retrospective. “T will state what laws I consider ex post facto laws, within the words and the intent of theprohibition. 1st. Everylawthat makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was inno- cent when done, criminal, and punishes such action. 2d. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was when committed. 3d. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less or different testimony than the law re- quired at the time of the commission of the offense, in order to con- vict the offender. All these and similar laws are manifestly unjust and oppressive. In my opinion, the true distinction is between ex post facto laws and retrospective laws. Every ex post facto law must necessarily be retrospective, but every retrospective law is not an ex post facto law; the former only are prohibited. Every law that takes away or impairs rights vested, agreeably to existing laws, is retrospective and is generally unjust, and may be oppressive; and there is a good general rule, that a law should have no retrospect ; but there are cases in which laws may justly, and for the benefit of the community, and also of individuals, relate to a time antecedent to their commencement; as statutes of oblivion or of pardon. They are certainly retrospective, and literally both concerning and after the facts committed. But I do not consider any law ex post facto, within the prohibition that mollifies the rigor of the criminal law; but only those that create or aggravate the crime, or increase the punishment, or change the rules of evidence for the purpose of conviction. Every law that is to have an operation before the making thereof, as to commence at an antecedent time, or to save time from the statute of limitations, or to excuse acts which were unlawful, and before committed, and the like, is retrospective. But such laws may be proper or necessary, as the case may be. There is a great and apparent difference between making an un- lawful act lawful, and the making an innocent action criminal, and punishing it as a crime. The expressions ex post facto laws are technical; they had been in use long before the Revolution,CHAP. IX] PROTECTION TO PERSON AND PROPERTY 543 and had acquired an appropriate meaning, by legislators, lawyers, and authors.” ! Assuming this construction of the constitutional provision to be correct, — and it has been accepted and followed as correct by 1 See also Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87, 3 L. ed. 162; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213, 6 L. ed. 606; Satterlee v. Mathewson, 2 Pet. 380, 7 L. ed. 458; Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet. 88, 8 L. ed. 38; Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420, 9 L. ed. 773; Carpenter v. Pennsylvania, 17 How. 456, 15 L. ed. 127; Cummings v. Mis- souri, 4 Wall. 277, 18 L. ed. 356; Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L. ed. 366; Baugher v. Nelson, 9 Gill, 299; Woart v. Winnick, 3 N. H. 473; Locke v. Dane, 9 Mass. 360; Dash ». Van Kleek, 7 Johns. 477; Evans v. Montgomery, 4 W. &S. 218; Tucker v. Harris, 13 Ga. 1; Perry’s Case, 3 Gratt. 632; Municipality No. 1 v. Wheeler, 10 La. Ann. 745; New Orleans v. Poutz, 14 La. Ann. 853; Huber v. Reily, 53 Pa. St. 115; Wilson y. Ohio, &c. R. R. Co., 64 Dll. 542; Rooney v. North Dakota, 196 U. S. 319, 49 L. ed. 494, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 264, 3 Ann. Cas. 76; Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227, 56 L. ed. 1066, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 613; Malloy v. South Carolina, 237 U. S. 180, 59 i. ed. 905, 35) Sup. Ct. Rep: 507; Bankers’ Trust Co. v. Blodgett, 260 U. S. 657, 67 L. ed. 489, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 233; Frisby v. United States, 38 App. Cas. (D. C.) 22, 37 L. R. A. (nN. 8s.) 96; Fairfield v. Huntington, 23 Ariz. 528, 205 Pac. 814, 22 A. L. R. 1438; Frisby v. United States, 38 App: Cas. (D. C.) 22, 37 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 96; State v. Tyree, 70 Kan. 203, 78 Pac. 525, 3 Ann. Cas. 1020; In re Clark, 86 Kan. 539, 121 Pac. 492, 39 L. R. A. (n. s.) 680, Ann. Cas. 1913 C, 317; Durrett v. Davidson, 122 Ky. 851, 93S. W. 25,8 L. R. A. (N. 8S.) 546; Eckles v. Wood, 143 Ky. 451, 136 S. W. 907, 34 L. R. A. (Nn. 8s.) 832; Com. v. Phelps, 210 Mass. 78, 96 N. E. 349, 37 L. R. A. (w. s.) 566, Ann. Cas. 1912 C, 1119; People v. Badjack, 210 Mich.. 443, 178 N. W. 228; Glad- ney v. Sydnor, 172 Mo. 318, 72 S. W. 554, 95 Am. St. Rep. 517, 60 L. R. A. 880; Brearley School v. Ward, 201 N. Y. 358, 94 N. E. 1001, 40 L. R. A. (N. Ss.) 1215, Ann. Cas. 1912 B, 251. A prohibition law, in so far as it prohibits the sale of liquors in exist- ence at the time of its passage, is not an ex post facto law, “Since, if it lessens the value of such liquors, such civil consequence does not make it retro- act criminally in such sense as to bring it within the constitutional prohibition.” Gherna v. State, 16 Ariz. 344, 146 Pac. 494, Ann. Cas. 1916 D, 94. A law making it unlawful for a per- son to intoxicating liquors which, previously to its enactment, he had lawfully acquired for consump- tion as a beverage in his home, and subjecting them to seizure and de- struction, is not an ex post facto law. Samuels v. McCurdy, 267 U. S. 188, 69 L. ed. 371, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 264, of Aw: Re 1378: Where a statute prescribes the qualifications of a physician, and pro- scribes the grossly immoral, and author- izes the cancellation of any certificate issued by such persons, the application of this law to one whose habits were grossly immoral before the passage of the law is not in the nature of a punishment, and therefore not ex post facto, but has in view only the quali- fications of the physician and protec- tion of public morals. Meffert v. State Board of Medical Registration and Examination, 66 Kan. 710, 72 Pac. 247, 1 L. R. A. (N. s.) 811, affirmed 195 U. S. 625, 49 L. ed. 350, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 790. That an act providing for the punishment of an offense in respect to which prosecution is already barred is ex post facto, see Moore v. State, 43 ING 203: Before a right to an acquittal has been “absolutely acquired by the com- pletion of the period of limitation, that period is subject to enlargement or repeal without being obnoxious to the possess544 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I the courts ever since, — it would seem that little need be said rela- tive to the first, second, and fourth classes of ex post facto laws, as enumerated in the opinion quoted.! It is not essential, however, in order to render a law invalid on these grounds, that it should ex- constitutional prohibition.’”” Com. v. Duffy, 96 Pa. St. 506. “An ex post facto law does not in- volve, in any of its definitions, a change of the place of trial of an alleged of- fense after its commission.” Gut »v. Minnesota, 9 Wall. 35, 19 L. ed. 573, quoted and affirmed in Cook v. United States, 188 U.S. 157, 34 L. ed. 906, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 268. Nor of the time when sentence shall be executed. Helden v. Minnesota, 137 U. S. 483, 34 L. ed. 734, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 143. Privilege existing at time of com- mission of offense (e.g. privilege of earning a shortening of sentence by good behavior) cannot be taken away by subsequent statute. Murphy v. Commonwealth, 172 Mass. 264, 52 INF: 505) 43 Li: Re Ae 1545-70) Am: St. 266; State v. Tyree, 70 Kan. 203, 78 Pac. 525, 3 Ann. Cas. 1020. Right to secure change of magis- trate or place of preliminary examina- tion upon affidavit of accused that he believes magistrate is prejudiced against him may be withdrawn. People v. McDonald, 5 Wyo. 526, 42 Pac. 15, 29 L. R. A. 834. Law shortening time between sen- tence and execution is ex post facto with regard to past crimes. Re Tyson, 13 Col. 482, 22 Pac. 810, 6 L. R. A. 472. But providing that State may appeal from an order granting a new trial is not. Mallett ». North Caro- lina, 181 U.S. 589, 45 L. ed. 1015, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 730, aff. 125 N. C. 718, 34 8S. E. 651. An amendatory act increasing the penalty of a bond essential to the sus- pension of sentence in a prosecution against a husband for abandonment is ex post facto as to prior offenses. State v. McCoy, 87 Neb. 385, 127 NG We 13% 29) los Re Ae (NU IS.) 583) If when the act was committed one could escape the death penalty by pleading guilty and a law changes this before trial, it is bad. Garvey »v. People, 6 Col. 559. So if the option of a jury to inflict death or life im- prisonment is taken away, and the former is made the only penalty. Marion v. State, 16 Neb. 349, 20 N. W. 289. See Lindzey v. State, 65 Miss. 542, 5 So. 99. Otherwise, of an act which allows a prisoner to elect be- tween death and imprisonment. Mce- Inturf v. State, 20 Tex. App. 335. An act which renders competent, in a trial for violation of the prohibi- tion laws, the general reputation of the defendant as a violator of those laws, and makes this provision applicable to the prosecution of offenses commit- ted before its passage, is an ex post factolaw. Culbertson v. Com. 137 Va. 752,119S. E. 87. But wherea statute does not permit any fact to be intro- duced in evidence against the accused which could not have been proved against him under the law as it stood at the time of the alleged commission of the offense, but merely changes the rules of evidence so as to permit an already admissible fact to be proved in a different way it is not an ex post facto law. Culbertson v. Com. 137 Va. 752, 119 S. E. 87. 1See Kring v. Missouri, 107 U. S. 221, 27 L. ed. 506, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 443. A constitutional amendment changed the judicial rule that conviction of one grade of murder bars a subsequent conviction of a higher grade. Before it took effect a crime had been com- mitted. After it on a plea of guilty the prisoner was convicted of murder in the second degree, but the convic- tion was reversed, and on new trial he was convicted in the first degree. A bare majority of the court held the act ex post facto as to him, as altering the rules of evidence and the punish- ment. The minority considered the change one in procedure, and as the evidence in question, viz., his conviction in the second degree, of the effect of which he was deprived, came into existence after the amendment, held the act good.CHAP. IX| PROTECTION TO PERSON AND PROPERTY 545 pressly assume the action to which it relates to be criminal, or pro- vide for its punishment on that ground. If it shall subject an in- dividual to a pecuniary penalty for an act which, when done, in- volved no responsibility,’ or if it deprives a party of any valuable right — like the right to follow a lawful calling — for acts which were innocent, or at least not punishable by law when committed,? the law will be ex post facto in the constitutional sense, notwithstand- ing it does not in terms declare the acts to which the penalty is attached criminal.® But how far a law may change the punishment for a criminal offense, and make the change applicable to past of- fenses, is certainly a question of great difficulty, which has been increased by the decisions made concerning it. As the constitutional provision is enacted for the protection and security of accused par- ties against arbitrary and oppressive legislative action, it is evident that any change in the law which goes in mitigation of the punish- ment is not liable to this objection.‘ 1 Falconer v. Campbell, 2 McLean, 195; Wilson v. Ohio, &c. R. R. Co., 64 Ill. 542. Statute allowing punitive damages where none had been theretofore al- lowed is ex post facto with regard to pastacts. Frenchv. Deane, 19 Col. 504, 36 Pac. 609, 24 L. R. A.387. But the Supreme Court of the United States has held that a statute imposing a penalty on property for nonpayment of taxes thereon is not within the constitu- tional prohibition. Bankers’ Trust Co. v. Blodgett, 260 U.S. 647, 67 L. ed. 439, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 233. The court said: “The penalty of the stat- ute was not in punishment of a crime, and it is only to such that the constitu- tional prohibition applies. It has no relation to retrospective legislation of any other description. Johannessen v. United States, 225 U. 8. 227, 242, 56 L. ed. 1066, 32 Sup. Ct. Bankers’ Trust Co. v. Blodgett, 260 U. S. 647, 67 L. ed. 439, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 233. See also Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Traubarger, 238 U. S. 67, 59 L. ed. 1204, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 678. 2Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 18 L. ed. 356; Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L. ed. 366. But a divorce is not a punish- ment, and it may therefore be au- thorized for causes happening previous to the passage of the divorce act. VOL. I—35 But what does go in mitigation Jones v. Jones, 2 Overt. 2, 5 Am. Dec. 645; Carson v. Carson, 40 Miss. 349. An act providing for destruction of liquor as a means of abating an exist- ing liquor nuisance does not authorize a criminal proceeding, and is not ez post facto. McLane v. Bonn, 70 Iowa, 752, 30 N. W. 478. See Drake ». Jordan, 73 Iowa, 707, 36 N. W. 653. A statute providing that one who has been convicted of crime is ineligible as a medical practioner is not invalid as to a case where the conviction was prior to the enactment of the statute. People v. Hawker, 152 N. Y. 234, 46 N. E. 607, aff. 170 U.S. 189, 42 L. ed. 1002, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 573. See also Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. 8. 114, 32 L. ed. 623, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 231, distinguishing Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 18 L. ed. 356, and explain- ing Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L. ed. 366. 3The repeal of an amnesty law by a constitutional convention was held in State v. Keith, 63 N. C. 140, to be ex post facto as to the cases covered by the law. An act to validate an invalid conviction would be ex post facto. In re Murphy, 1 Woolw. 141. 4Strong v. State, 1 Blackf. 193; Keen v. State, 3 Chand. 109; Boston v. Cummins, 16 Ga. 102; Woart »v. Winnick, 3 N. H. 473; State v. Arlin, 39 N. H. 179; Clarke v. State, 23 Miss.546 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [voL. I of the punishment? If the law makes a fine less in amount, or im- prisonment shorter in point of duration, or relieves it from some oppressive incident, or if it dispenses with some severable portion of the legal penalty, no embarrassment would be experienced in reach- ing a conclusion that the law was favorable to the accused, and there- fore not ex post facto. But who shall say, when the nature of the punishment is altogether changed, and a fine is substituted for the pillory, or imprisonment for whipping, or imprisonment at hard labor for life for the death penalty, that the punishment is dimin- ished, or at least not increased by the change made? What test of severity does the law or reason furnish in these cases ¢ and must the judge decide upon his own view of the pain, loss, ignominy, and collateral consequences usually attending the punishment? or may he take into view the peculiar condition of the accused, and upon that determine whether, in his particular case, the punishment pre- scribed by the new law is or is not more severe than that under the old. In State v. Arlin,! the respondent was charged with a robbery, which, under the law as it existed at the time it was committed, was subject to be punished by solitary imprisonment not exceeding six months, and confinement for life at hard labor in the State prison. As incident to this severe punishment, he was entitled by the same law to have counsel assigned him by the government, to process to compel the attendance of witness, to a copy of his indict- ment, a list of the jurors who were to try him, &c. Before he was brought to trial, the punishment for the offense was reduced to soli- tary imprisonment not exceeding six months, and confinement at hard labor in the State prison for not less than seven nor more than thirty years. By the new act, the court, af they thought proper, were to assign the respondent counsel, and furnish him with process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf; and, acting under this discretion, the court assigned the respondent counsel, but de- clined to do more; while the respondent insisted that he was en- titled to all the privileges to which he would have been entitled had the law remained unchanged. ‘The court held this claim to be un- founded in the law. “It is contended,” they say, “that, notwith- 261; Maul v. State, 25 Tex. 166; facto. People v. Hayes, 140) Ne We Rooney v. North Dakota, 196 U. S. 484, 35 N. E. 951, 23 L. R. A. 830, 319, 49 L. ed. 494, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 37 Am. St. 572. To provide an alter- 264, 3 Ann. Cas. 76; Malloy v. native punishment of a milder form is South Carolina, 237 U.S. 180,59 L. ed. not ex post facto. Turner v. State, 40 905, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 507. Ala. 21. Statute diminishing the minimum 139 N. H. 179. period of imprisonment is not ex postCHAP. IX] PROTECTION TO PERSON AND PROPERTY 047 standing the severity of the respondent’s punishment was mitigated by the alteration of the statute, he is entitled to the privileges de- manded, as incidents to the offense with which he is charged, at the date of its commission ; in other words, it seems to be claimed, that, by committing the alleged offense, the respondent acquired a vested right to have counsel assigned him, to be furnished with process to procure the attendance of witnesses, and to enjoy all the other privileges to which he would have been entitled if tried under laws subjecting him to imprisonment for life upon conviction. This position appears to us wholly untenable. We have no doubt the privileges the respondent claims were designed and created solely as incidents of the severe punishment to which his offense formerly subjected him, and not as incidents of the offense. When the punishment was abolished, its incidents fell with it; and he might as well claim the right to be punished under the former law as to be entitled to the privileges connected with a trial under it.” ? In Strong v. State,” the plaintiff in error was indicted and con- victed of perjury, which, under the law as it existed at the time it was committed, was punishable by not exceeding one hundred stripes. Before the trial, this punishment was changed to imprison- ment in the penitentiary not exceeding seven years. The court held this amendatory law not to be ex post facto, as applied to the “The words ex post facto have a definite, technical significa- tion. The plain and obvious meaning of this prohibition is, that the legislature shall not pass any law, after a fact done by any citizen, which shall have relation to that fact, so as to punish that which was innocent when done, or to add to the punishment of that which was criminal, or to increase the malignity of a crime, or to retrench 7a Se. mony of a single witness, and another law unobjectionable on this score which deprived a party, when put on trial for a previous act, of all the usual opportunities of exhibiting the facts and establishing his innocence? Un- doubtedly, if the party accused was always guilty, and certain to be con- victed, the new law must be regarded as mitigating the offense; but, as- 1 With great deference it may be suggested whether this case does not overlook the important circumstance, that the new law, by taking from the accused that absolute right to defense by counsel, and to the other privileges by which the old law surrounded the trial, — all of which were designed as securities against unjust convictions, — was directly calculated to increase the party’s peril, and was in conse- quence brought within the reason of the rule which holds a law ex post facto which changes the rules of evidence after. the fact, so as to make a less amount or degree sufficient. Could a law be void as ex post facto which made a party liable to conviction for per- jury in a previous oath on the testi- suming every man to be innocent until he is proved to be guilty, could such a law be looked upon as “mollifying the rigor” of the prior law, or as favorable to the accused, when its mollifying circumstance is more than counter- balanced by others of a contrary char- acter. 21 Blackf. 193.548 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [voL. I the rules of evidence so as to make conviction more easy.” “ Apply this definition to the act under consideration. Does this statute make a new offense? It does not. Does it increase the malignity of that which was an offense before? It does not. Does it so change the rules of evidence as to make conviction more easy? This cannot be alleged. Does it then increase the punishment of that which was criminal before its enactment? We think not.” * So in Texas it has been held that the infliction of stripes, from the peculiarly degrading character of the punishment, was worse than the death penalty. “Among all nations of civilized man, from the earliest ages, the infliction of stripes has been considered more de- grading than death itself.” * While, on the other hand, in South Carolina, where, at the time of the commission of a forgery, the punishment was death, but it was changed before final judgment to fine, whipping, and imprisonment, the new law was applied to the case in passing the sentence.’ These cases illustrate the difficulty of laying down any rule which will be readily and universally accepted as to what is a mitigation of punishment, when its character is changed, and when from the very nature of the case there can be no common standard, by which all minds, however educated, can measure the relative severity and ignominy. In Hartung v. People,‘ the law providing for the infliction of capital punishment had been so changed as to require the party liable to this penalty to be sentenced to confinement at hard labor in the State prison until the punishment of death should be inflicted ; and it further provided that such punishment should not be in- flicted under one year, nor until the governor should issue his war- 1Mr. Bishop says of this decision: “But certainly the court went far in this case.” 1 Bishop, Crim. Law, § 219 (108). 2 Herber v. State, 7 Tex. 69. 3 State v. Williams, 2 Rich. 418. In Clark v. State, 23 Miss. 261, defendant was convicted of amayhem. Between the commission of the act and his conviction, a statute had been passed changing the punishment for this of- fense from the pillory and a fine to imprisonment in the penitentiary, but providing further, that ‘‘no offense committed, and no penalty and for- feiture incurred previous to the time when this act shall take effect shall be affected by this act, except that when any punishment, forfeiture, or penalty should have been mitigated by it, its provisions should be applied to the judgment to be pronounced for offenses committed before its adop- tion.”’ In regard to this statute the court say: ‘‘We think that in every case of offense committed before the adoption of the penitentiary code, the prisoner has the option of selecting the punishment prescribed in that code in lieu of that to which he was liable be- fore its enactment.’’ But inasmuch as the record did not show that the defendant claimed a commutation of his punishment, the court confirmed a sentence imposed according to the terms of the old law. On this subject, see further the cases of Holt v. State, 2 Tex. 363; Dawson »v. State, 6 Tex. 347. 07) INI, NC Os}, OEYCHAP. IX] PROTECTION TO PERSON AND PROPERTY 549 rant for the purpose. The act was evidently designed for the benefit of parties convicted, and, among other things, to enable advantage to be taken, for their benefit, of any circumstances sub- sequently coming to light which might show the injustice of the judgment, or throw any more favorable light on the action of the accused. Nevertheless, the court held the act inoperative as to offenses before committed. “In my opinion,” says Denio, J., “it would be perfectly competent for the legislature, by a general law, to remit any separable portion of the prescribed punishment. For instance, if the punishment were fine and imprisonment, a law which should dispense with either the fine or the imprison- ment might, I think, be lawfully applied to existing offenses; and so, in my opinion, the term of imprisonment might be reduced, or the number of stripes diminished, in cases punishable in that man- ner. Anything which, if applied to an individual sentence, would fairly fall within the idea of a remission of a part of the sentence, would not be liable to objection. And any change which should be referable to prison discipline or penal administration as its primary object might also be made to take effect upon past as well as future offenses; as changes in the manner or kind of employment of convicts sentenced to hard labor, the system of supervision, the means of restraint, or the like. Changes of this sort might operate to increase or mitigate the severity of the punishment of the convict, but would not raise any question under the constitutional provision we are considering. The change wrought by the Act of 1860, in the punishment of existing offenses of murder, does not fall within either of these exceptions. If it is to be construed to vest in the gov- ernor a discretion to determine whether the convict should be exe- cuted or remain a perpetual prisoner at hard labor, this would only be equivalent to what he might do under the authority to commute a sentence. But he can, under the Constitution, only do this once for all. If he refuses the pardon, the convict is executed according to sentence. If he grants it, his jurisdiction of the case ends. The act in question places the convict at the mercy of the governor in office at the expiration of one year from the time of the conviction, and of all of his successors during the liftetime of the convict. He may be ordered to execution at any time, upon any notice, or without notice. Under one of the repealed sections of the Revised Statutes, it was required that a period should intervene between the sentence and execution of not less than four, nor more than eight weeks. If we stop here, the change effected by the stat- ute is between an execution within a limited time, to be prescribed by the court, or a pardon or commutation of the sentence during550 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [voL. I that period, on the one hand, and the placing the convict at the mercy of the executive magistrate for the time, and his successors, to be executed at his pleasure at any time after one year, on the other. The sword is indefinitely suspended over his head, ready to fall at any time. It is not enough to say, even if that can be said, that most persons would probably prefer such a fate to the former capital sentence. It is enough to bring the law within the con- demnation of the Constitution, that it changes the punishment after the commission of the offense, by substituting for the pre- scribed penalty a different one. We have no means of saying whether one or the other would be the most severe in a given case. That would depend upon the disposition and temperament of the convict. The legislature cannot thus experiment upon the criminal law. The law, moreover, prescribes one year’s imprisonment, at hard labor in the State prison, in addition to the punishment of death. In every case of the execution of a capital sentence, it must be preceded by the year’s imprisonment at hard labor. True, the concluding part of the judgment cannot be executed unless the governor con- curs by ordering the execution. But as both parts may, in any given case, be inflicted, and as the convict is consequently, under this law, exposed to the double infliction, it is, within both the definitions which have been mentioned, an ex post facto law. It changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment than that which the law annexed to the crime when committed. It is enough, in my opinion, that it changes it in any manner except by dispensing with divisible portions of it; but upon the other definition announced by Judge Chase, where it is implied that the change must be from a less to a greater punishment, this act cannot be sustained.” This decision has since been several times followed in the State of New York,! and it must now be regarded as the settled law of that State, that “a law changing the punishment for offenses committed before its passage is ex post facto and void, under the Constitution, unless the change consists in the remission of some separable part of the punishment before prescribed, or it is referable to prison dis- cipline or penal administration as its primary object.”? And this rule seems to us a sound and sensible one, with perhaps this single qualification, — that the substitution of any other punish- 1 Shepherd v. People, 25 N. Y. 406; rule in Oklahoma. Jones v. State, 9 Ratzky v. People, 29 N. Y. 124; Okla. Crim. Rep. 646, 133 Pac. 249, 48 Kuckler v. People, 5 Park. Cr. Rep. L. R.A. (Nn. s.) 204; Alberty v. State, 212. 10 Okla. Crim. Rep. 616, 140 Pac. 2 Per Davies, J., in Ratzky v. People, 1025, 52 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 248. See 29 N. Y. 124. See Miles v. State, 40 also State ez rel. Gregory v. Jones, 128 Ala. 39. This would seem to be the Fed. 626. :CHAP. Ix] PROTECTION TO PERSON AND PROPERTY 551 ment for that of death must be regarded as a mitigation of the penalty." [The Supreme Court of the United States has held, in a case where the punishment prescribed for murder, at the time of the commission of the crime, was death by hanging within the county jail, or its in- closure, in the presence of specified witnesses, that a subsequent act changing the mode of producing death to electrocution and fixing the place of execution within the penitentiary, and permitting the presence of more invited witnesses than had theretofore been al- lowed, was not ex post facto. Mr. Justice McReynolds, who deliv- ered the opinion of the court, said: “The constitutional inhibition of ex post facto laws was intended to secure substantial personal rights against arbitrary and oppressive legislative action, and not to obstruct mere alteration in conditions deemed necessary to the orderly infliction of humane punishment.” * The same court has held that a statute which substitutes the penitentiary for the county jail as the place of confinement of one convicted of murder in the first degree pending execution, and also as the place of execu- tion and which requires the execution to be had on a day not less than six or more than nine months after the entry of judgment in lieu of the requirement of the existing law that it be had in not less than three or more than six months, is not ex post facto as applied to one who was convicted before its passage.’ So far as mere modes of procedure are concerned, a party has no more right, in a criminal than in a civil action, to insist that his case shall be disposed of under the law in force when the act to be investigated is charged to have taken place. Remedies must al- ways be under the control of the legislature, and it would create endless confusion in legal proceedings if every case was to be con- 1See 1 Bishop, Crim. Law. § 219 264, 3 Ann. Cas. 76, affirming 12 N. (108). D. 144, 95 N. W. 513. A statute changing the punishment In Colorado it has been held that for murder from death to imprison- an act passed after the offense is not ment for life is not ex post facto. ex post facto which in a capital case McGuire v. State, 76 Miss. 504, 25 directs that the imprisonment after So. 495. See, in this connection, sentence, and the execution shall be in Storti v. Com., 180 Mass. 57,61 N. E. a penitentiary instead of a jail. Jn re 759, 52 L. R. A. 520. Tyson, 13 Col. 482, 22 Pac. Rep. 810. 2Malloy v. South Carolina, 237 U. But in California it has been held that S. 180, 59 L. ed. 905, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. a statute providing that persons con- 507, affirming 95 S. C. 441, 78 S. E. victed of murder and awaiting execu- 995, Ann. Cas. 1915 C, 1053. See tion shall be confined in the State’s also Alberty v. State, 10 Okla. Crim. prison and executed within its walls Rep. 616, 140 Pac. 1025, 52 L. R. A. is invalid as applied to one convicted (N. s.) 248. prior to its enactment. People »v. 3 Rooney v. North Dakota, 196 U.S. McNulty, 93 Cal. 427, 29 Pace. 61. 319, 49 L. ed. 494, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep.552 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I ducted only in accordance with the rules of practice, and heard only by the courts, in existence when its facts arose. The legislature may abolish courts and create new ones, [may reduce the number of judges required to preside at a trial,] and it may prescribe alto- gether different modes of procedure in its discretion, though it cannot lawfully, we think, in so doing, dispense with any of those substantial protections with which the existing law surrounds the person accused of crime.’ Statutes giving the government addi- tional challenges,? [or modifying the grounds of challenge,’ or re- ducing the number of peremptory challenges allowed to the accused,"] and others which authorized the amendment of indictments,® have 1 Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U. S. 86, 53 L. ed. 417, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 220; Frisby v. United States, 38 App. Cas. (D. C.) 22, 37 L. R. A. (N. s.) 96; People ex rel. Foote v. Clark, 283 Ill. 221, 119 N. E. 329; Hellen v. Medford, 188 Mass. 42, 73 N. E. 1070, 108 Am St. Rep. 459, 69 L. R. A. 314; Com. v. Phelps, 210 Mass. 78, 96 N. E. 349, 37 L. R. A. (n. 8.) 567, Ann. Cas. 1912 C, 1119; People v. Green, 201 N. Y. 172, 94 N. E. 658, Ann. Cas. 1912 A, 884. Jurisdiction may be transferred from one court to another. State v. Cooler, 30 S. C. 105, 8 S. E. 69; People v. Clark, 283 Ill. 221, 119 N. E. 329. Taking from the jury power to judge of the law is a matter of procedure. Marion v. State, 20 Neb. 233, 29 N. W. 911. A constitutional provision that crimes less than capital shall be tried by a jury of eight is ex post facto with regard to crimes committed before its enactment. Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S. 348, 42 L. ed. 1061, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 620. A mere change in the con- stitution of the trial court which leaves unchanged all the substantial pro- tections which the law in force at the time of commission of the alleged of- fense threw about the accused is not ex post facto. Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U. S. 377, 38 L. ed. 485, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 570. As to what is merely a change in procedure, see dissenting opinions in Kring v. Missouri, 107 U. S. 221, 27 L. ed. 506, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 443, cited supra, p. 375, note 1; Drake v. Jordan, 73 Iowa, 707, 36 N. W. 653. 2 Walston v. Commonwealth, 16 B. Monr. 15; Jones v. State, 1 Ga. 610; Warren v. Commonwealth, 37 Pa. St. 45; Walter v. People, 32 N. Y. 147; State v. Ryan, 13 Minn. 370; State v. Wilson, 48 N. H. 398; Common- wealth v. Dorsey, 103 Mass. 412; Harris v. United States, 4 Okla. Crim. Rep. 317, 111 Pac. 982, 31 L. R. A. (n. s.) 820, Ann. Cas. 1912 B, 810. 3 Stokes v. People, 53 N. Y. 164. 4 Dowling v. State, 13 Miss. 664; Harris v. United States, 4 Okla. Crim. Rep: 317, 111 Pac: 98231 bs Rivas (nN. 8s.) 820, Ann. Cas. 1912 B, 810. 6State v. Manning, 14 Tex. 402; Lasure v. State, 19 Ohio St. 43; Sulli- van v. Oneida, 61 Ill. 242. See State v. Corson, 59 Me. 137. The defendant in any case must be proceeded against and punished under the law in force when the proceeding is had. State v. Williams, 2 Rich. 418; Keene v. State, 3 Chand. 109; People v. Phelps, 5 Wend. 9; Rand v. Com- monwealth, 9 Gratt. 738. A law is not unconstitutional which precludes a defendant in a criminal case from taking advantage of vari- ances which do not prejudice him. Commonwealth »v. Hall, 97 Mass. 570; Lasure v. State, 19 Ohio St. 48. Nor one which, though passed after the commission of the offense, author- izes a change of venue to another county of the judicial district. Gut v. State, 9 Wall. 35, 19 L. ed. 573. Nor one which merely modifies, sim- plifies, and reduces the essential alle- gations in a criminal indictment, retaining the charge of a distinct of- fense. State v. Learned, 47 Me. 426;CHAP. Ix] PROTECTION TO PERSON 553 AND PROPERTY been sustained and applied to past transactions, as doubtless would be any similar statute, calculated merely to improve the remedy, and in its operation working no injustice to the defendant, and de- priving him of no substantial right." And a law is not objectionable as ex post facto which, in providing for the punishment of future offenses, authorizes the offender’s con- duct in the past to be taken into the account, and the punishment to be graduated accordingly. Heavier penalties are often provided by law for a second or any subsequent offense than for the first ; and it has not been deemed objectionable that, in providing for such heavier penalties, the prior conviction authorized to be taken into the account may have taken place before the law was passed.” In such case, it is the second or subsequent offense that is punished, State v. Corson, 59 Me. 137. And see People v. Mortimer, 46 Cal. 114. In the absence of statutory permis- sion, if a court allows an indictment to be amended by striking out words as surplusage, it must be resubmitted to the jury. Ez parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 30 L. ed. 849, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 781. But a statute providing that the rule of law precluding a conviction on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice should not apply to cases of misdemeanor, it was held could not have retrospective operation. Hart. v. State, 40 Ala. 32. 1But the legislature can have no power to dispense with such allega- tions in indictments as are essential to reasonable particularity and cer- tainty in the description of the of- fense. McLaughlin v. State, 45 Ind. 338; Brown v. People, 29 Mich. 232; People v. Olmstead, 30 Mich. 431; State v. O’Flaherty, 7 Nev. 153. A State may between the time of commission of an offense and the time of trial modify the rules of evidence regarding the proof of handwriting. Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U. S. 380, 43 L. ed. 204, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 922; aff. 132 Mo. 301, 34S. W. 31. A State may enact that jurors shall be selected from “persons of good in- telligence, sound judgment, and fair character.’ Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U. S. 565, 40 L. ed. 1075, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep.- 904. May change mode of accusation from indictment to infor- mation. Re Wright, 3 Wyo. 478, 27 Pac. 565, 13 L. R. A. 748, 31 Am. St. 94. A statute repealing a law providing that applications for separate trial by persons jointly accused should be granted as matter of course, and re- adopting the common law practice of allowing the judge to grant such ap- plications in his discretion after hear- ing was held not ex post facto as ap- plied to persons who had been jointly indicted for a crime committed before the passage of the act. Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U. S. 167, 70 L. ed. —, 46 Sup. Ct. Rep. 68. In Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.S. 589, 45 L. ed. 1015, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 730, it is held that a provision for an appeal by the State from an order granting a new trial is not ex post facto as applied to a criminal case tried be- fore the statute was passed, the order for a new trial having been made after the enactment of the statute. The opinion cites the principal cases on the constitutional prohibition of ex post facto laws in the Federal Supreme Court. Upon ex post facto laws, see notes to 1 L. ed. U.S. 648, and 4 L. ed. U.S. 529. 2 Rand v. Commonwealth, 9 Gratt. 738; Ross’s Case, 2 Pick. 165; People v. Butler, 3 Cow. 347; Ex parte Guiterrez, 45 Cal. 429; McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U. S. 311, 45 L. ed. 542, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 389; Gra- ham v. West Virginia, 224 U. S. 616, 56 L. ed. 917, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 583; Carlesi v. New York, 233 U. S. 51,554 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I not the first;! and the statute would be void if the offense to be actually punished under it had been committed before it had taken effect, even though it was after its passage.” [A statute is valid which imposes a heavier penalty upon a second offender, though the penalty is imposed where the first conviction was had under the laws of another State or country.’ An act of Congress, by construing a former act as leaving in force criminal laws which the Federal Supreme Court has declared to have been repealed, cannot give retrospective criminality to acts which were done before the construing act was passed and that were not criminal except for the laws held to have been repealed.* The prohibition against ex post facto laws is directed against legis- lative action only, and does not reach erroneous or inconsistent decisions by the courts.°] Laws Impairing the Obligation of Contracts. The Constitution of the United States also forbids the States passing any law impairing the obligation of contracts.® 58 L. ed. 843, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 576; State ez rel. Gregory v. Jones, 128 Fed. 626; People v. Coleman, 145 Cal. 609, 79 Pac. 238; In re Miller, 110 Mich. 676, 68 N. W. 990, 64 Am. St. Rep. 376, 34 L. R. A. 398; Jones v. State, 9 Okla. Crim. Rep. 646, 133 Pac. 249, 48 L. R. A. (N. s.) 204; State v. Le Pitre, 54 Wash. 166, 103 Pac. 27, 18 Ann. Cas. 922. See also Com- monwealth v. Groves, 155 Mass. 163, 29 N. E. 579, 16 L. R. A. 256; Mc- Donald v. Massachusetts, 180 U. S. 311, 45 L. ed. 542, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 389, affirming 173 Mass. 322, 53 N. E. 874. Extradition treaties may provide for the surrender of persons charged with offenses previously committed. In re De Giacomo, 12 Blatch. 391. 1 Rand v. Commonwealth, 9 Gratt. 738; State ex rel. Gregory v. Jones, 128 Fed. 626; Jones v. State, 9 Okla. Crim. Rep. 646, 133 Pac. 249, 48 L. R. A. (Nn. 8.) 204. ? Riley’s Case, 2 Pick. 171; State ex rel. Gregory v. Jones, 128 Fed. 626; Jones v. State, 9 Okla. Crim. Rep. 646, 133 Pac. 249, 48 L. R. A. (Nn. 8.) 204. * Such a statute and the imposition It is re- of the heavier penalty under it were upheld in a case where the former con- viction was of an offense against the United States and the offender had been pardoned by the President. Carlesi v. New York, 233 U. S. 51, 58 L. ed. 843, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 576. 4 United States v. Stafoff, 260 U.S. 477, 67 L. ed. 358, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 197. 5 Ross v. Oregon, 227 U. S. 100, 57 L. ed. 458, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 225, Ann. Cas. 1914 C, 224; Frank ». Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 59 L. ed. 969, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 582. But see State v. O’Neil, 147 Iowa, 513, 126 N. W. 545, 33 L. R. A. (Nn. 8.) 788, Ann. Cas. 1912 B, 691; State v. Longino, 109 Miss. 125, 67 So. 902, Ann. Cas. 1916 E, 371. 6 Const. art. 1, § 10. ‘A State can no more impair the obligation of a contract by her organic law than by legislative enactment; for her consti- tution is a law within the meaning of the contract clause of the National Constitution.” New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U.S. 650, 672, 29 L. ed. 516, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 252; Fisk v. Jefferson Police Jury, 116 U.S. 131, 29 L. ed. 587, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep.CHAP. Ix] 329; St. Tammany Water Works v. New Orleans Water Works, 120 U. S. 64, 30 L. ed. 563, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 405; Russell v. Sebastian, 233 U. S. 195, 58 L. ed. 912, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 517, Ann. Cas. 1914 C, 1282; Slade v. Lex- ington, 141 Ky. 214, 132 S. W. 404, 32 L. R. A. (Nn. 8.) 201; and see cases, ante, p. 89, note 2. A _ contract authorized under the interpretation and construction put upon the State constitution by the highest court of the State at the time thecontract is entered into cannot be impaired by any subsequent amendment of the consti- tution or by any change in its construc- tion by the courts of the State. Los Angeles v. Los Angeles City Water Co., 177 U. S. 558, 44 L. ed. 886, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 736. See also Thomas v. State, 76 Ohio St. 341, 81 N. E. 487, 118 Am. St. Rep. 884, 10 L. R. A. (we is) 11125 But sea erally op; Burckhartt, 299 Ill. 19, 132 N. E. 280, 18 A. L. R. 992; McCroy v. Miller, 78 Okla. 16, 186 Pac. 1089. Upon impairment of obligation of contract by State constitution, see note to 10 L. R. A. 405; by change in interpretation of constitution, note to 16 L. R. A. 646, and one to 44 L. ed. U. S. 886. In the connection, see New Orleans v. Warner, 175 U.S. 120, 44 L. ed. 96, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 44; and s. c. 167 U. S. 467, 42 L. ed. 239, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 892. The law which impairs must be one passed after the formation of the con- tract. Lehigh Water Co. v. Easton, 121 U. S. 388, 30 L. ed. 1059, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 916; Oshkosh Waterworks Co. v. Oshkosh, 187 U. S. 437, 47 L. ed. 249; 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 234; Black- stone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189, 47 L. ed. 439, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 277; Corbin »v. Houlehan, 100 Me. 246, 61 Atl. 131, 70 L. R. A. 568; Bedard v. Mahoney, 30 R. I. 469, 76 Atl. 113, 136 Am. St. Rep. 965. Provision operating only on contracts thereafter formed cannot impair their obligation. Galveston, H. &.S. A. R. Co. v. Texas, 170 U.S. 226, 42 L. ed. 1017, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 603, aff. 89 Tex. 340, 34 S. W. 746. The obligation of a contract is impaired by a statute which alters its terms by imposing new conditions or PROTECTION TO PERSON AND PROPERTY 555 dispensing with existing conditions, or which adds new duties, or releases or lessens any part of the contractual obligation, or substantially defeats its ends. Jn re Fidelity State Bank, 35 Idaho, 797, 209 Pac. 449, 31 A. L. R. 781. It is not within the constitutional power of the legislature to enact a valid statute abrogating a contract of special deposit between a highway district and a bank, making in lieu thereof a contract of general deposit whereby the title of the highway dis- trict’s money is passed to the bank, and such money becomes a part of its general assets, subject to distribution among its depositors and creditors in case of insolvency, imposing upon the highway district the status of a creditor entitled to receive only its pro rata share of the assets of the bank upon liquidation. Jn re Fidelity State Bank, 35 Idaho, 747, 209 Pac. 449, 31 A. L. R. 781. Where a State by statute, and for a valuable consideration, prescribes the terms and conditions upon which it assents to a railroad company’s con- structing and operating its road through limited portions of its terri- tory, it cannot, subsequently, with- draw such assent; nor can the right of the company to enjoy the privileges so obtained be burdened with condi- tions not prescribed in the assenting act, except such as the State, in the exercise of its police powers for pur- poses of taxation, and for other public objects, may legally impose in respect to business carried on and property situated within its limits. New York, etc., R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 153 U. S. 628, 38 L. ed. 846, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 952. Where a railroad company accepts & charter and subsequent legislation en- titling it to construct a line of railroad and thereby earn certain grants of land, and enters upon the construc- tion of the road, and actually com- pletes an important part of it by the time a new constitution for the State is adopted, that constitution cannot impair the right of the company to earn the lands attaching, under the charter and legislation above referred506 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I markable that this very important clause was passed over almost without comment during the discussions preceding the adoption of that instrument, though since its adoption no clause which the Constitution contains has been more prolific of litigation, or given rise to more animated and at times angry controversy. It is but twice alluded to in the papers of the Federalist;* and though its great importance is assumed, it is evident that the writer had no conception of the prominence it was afterwards to hold in consti- tutional discussions, or of the very numerous cases to which it was to be applied in practice. to, to the remainder of the line there- after constructed. Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Texas, 170 U. S. 243, 42 L. ed. 1023, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 610, rev. 90 Tex. 607, 40 S. W. 402. A law requiring a State bank to pay over to the State, as depository, savings deposits which have long remained unclaimed, if the procedure is appropriate, does not violate any right of the bank under the contract clause of the Constitution. Provi- dent Institute for Savings v. Malone, 221 U.S. 660, 55 L. ed. 899, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 661, 34 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 1129; Security Sav. Bank v. California, 263 U. S. 282, 68 L. ed. 301, 44 Sup. Ct. Rep. 108, 31 A. L. R. 391. A statute appropriating money for the relief of an employee of the State who was injured while in the per- formance of his duty does not impair the obligation of a contract. Fair- field v. Huntington, 23 Ariz. 528, 205 Pac. 814, 22 A. L. R. 1438. A New York law prohibiting the sale of lottery tickets is not invalid because a lottery, the tickets in which are sold, is legal in Louisiana. People v. Noelke, 94 N. Y. 187. Ordinances of a city are laws of the State within the meaning of this pro- vision of the Constitution. Penn Mu- tual Life Ins. Co. v. Austin, 168 U. S. 685, 42 L. ed. 626, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 223. In Detroit v. Detroit Cit. St. Ry. Co., 184 U. S. 368, 46 L. ed. 592, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 410, the lines of the railway company were constructed under a statute authorizing construc- tion ‘under such regulations and upon such terms and conditions as the munic- ipal authorities may from time to time prescribe.” The city in its agreement with the company for the construction authorized a particular rate of fare. It subsequently passed an ordinance for the reduction of the rate so fixed. The ordinance was held invalid as impairing the obligation of contract. A city in granting to a water com- pany power to lay pipe in the streets and to supply the citizens with water at reasonable rates, &c., has power to bind itself for a limited period not to erect any competing waterworks. Subsequent ordinance providing for the erection of a system of waterworks by the city within the limited period is invalid, and its execution may be enjoined. Walla Walla v. W. W. Water Co., 172 U.S. 1, 43 L. ed. 341, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 77. See also Hamil- ton, &c. Co. v. Hamilton, 146 U. S. 258, 36 L. ed. 963, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 90; Southwest Mo. L. Co. v. Taplin, 113 Fed. 817; Skaneateles W. W. Co. ». Skaneateles, 161 N. Y. 154, 55 N. EH. 562; Syracuse W. Co. v. Syracuse, 116 N. Y. 167, 22 N. E. 381, 5 L. R. A. 546; Re Brooklyn, 143 N. Y. 596, 38 N. BE. 983, 26 L. R. A. 270; Wes- terly W. W. v. Westerly, 75 Fed. Rep. 181. See on what laws are void as im- pairing the obligation of contracts, note to 3 L. ed. U. S. 162; on what contracts are within the rule, note to 10 L. R. A. 405. That the prohibition does not apply to Congress, see Mitchell v. Clark, 110 U. S. 633, 28 L. ed. 279, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 170, 312; New York v. United States, 257 U.S. 591, 66 L. ed. 385, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 239. 1 Federalist, Nos. 7 and 44.CHAP. IX] PROTECTION TO PERSON AND PROPERTY 557 The first question that arises under this provision is, What is a contract in the sense in which the word is here employed? In the leading case upon this subject, it appeared that the legislature of Georgia had made a grant of land, but afterwards, on an allega- tion that the grant had been obtained by fraud, a subsequent legis- lature had passed another act annulling and rescinding the first conveyance, and asserting the right of the State to the land it covered. “A contract”’, says Ch. J. Marshall, “is a compact be- tween two or more parties, and is either executory or executed. An executory contract is one in which a party binds himself to do or not to do a particular thing. Such was the law under which the conveyance was made by the governor. A contract executed is one in which the object of the contract is performed; and this, says Blackstone, differs in nothing from a grant. The contract between Georgia and the purchasers was executed by the grant. A contract executed, as well as one which is executory, contains obligations binding on the parties. A grant, in its own nature, amounts to an extinguishment of the right of the grantor, and implies a contract not to reassert that right. A party is, therefore, always estopped by his own grant. Since then, in fact, a grant is a contract executed, the obligation of which still continues, and since the Constitution uses the general term ‘contract’ without distinguishing between those which are executory and those which are executed, it must be construed to comprehend the latter as well as the former. A law annulling conveyances between individuals, and declaring that the grantors should stand seized of their former estates, notwithstanding those grants, would be as repugnant to the Constitution as a law discharging the vendors of property from the obligation of executing their contracts by conveyances. It would be strange if a contract to convey was secured by the Constitution, while an absolute con- veyance remained unprotected. If, under a fair construction of the Constitution, grants are comprehended under the term ‘con- tracts’, is a grant from the State excluded from the operation of the provision? Is the clause to be considered as inhibiting the State from impairing the obligation of contracts between two indi- viduals, but as excluding from that inhibition contracts made with itself? The words themselves contain no such distinction. They are general, and are applicable to contracts of every description. If contracts made with the State are to be exempted from their operations, the exception must arise from the character of the con- tracting party, not from the words which are employed.’”’ And the court proceed to give reasons for their decision, that violence should not “be done to the natural meaning of words, for the purpose of558 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I leaving to the legislature the power of seizing, for public use, the estate of an individual, in the form of a law annulling the title by which he holds that estate.”’ ? It will be seen that this leading decision settles two important points: first, that an executed contract is within the provision, and, second, that it protects from violation the contracts of States equally with those entered into between private individuals.” 1 Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87, 136, 3 L. ed. 162. 2 This decision has been repeatedly followed. In the founding of the Colony of Virginia the religious es- tablishment of England was adopted, and before the Revolution the churches of that denomination had become vested, by grants of the crown or colony, with large properties, which continued in their possession after the constitution of the State had forbidden the creation or continuance of any religious establishment possessed of exclusive rights or privileges, or the compelling the citizens to worship under a stipulated form or discipline, or to pay taxes to those whose creed they could not conscientiously believe. By statute in 1801, the legislature asserted their right to all the property of the Episcopal churches in the re- spective parishes of the State; and, among other things, directed and au- thorized the overseers of the poor and their successors in each parish, wherein any glebe land was vacant or should become so, to sell the same and appro- priate the proceeds to the use of the poor of the parish. By this act, it will be seen, the State sought in effect to resume grants made by the sover- eignty, —a practice which had been common enough in English history, and of which precedents were not wanting in the History of the American Colonies. The Supreme Court of the United States held the grant not re- vocable, and that the legislative act was therefore unconstitutional and void. Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch, 43, 3 L. ed. 650. See also Town of Pawlet v. Clark, 9 Cranch, 292, 3 L. ed. 735; Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 203, 21 L. ed. 447; Hall v. Wisconsin, 103 U. S. 5, 26 L. ed. 302; People »v. Platt, 17 Johns. 195; Montgomery »v. Kasson, 16 Cal. 189; Grogan »v. San Francisco, 18 Cal. 590; Rehoboth v. Hunt, 1 Pick. 224; Lowry v. Fran- cis, 2 Yerg. 534; University of North Carolina v. Foy, 2 Hayw. 310; State v. Barker, 4 Kan. 379 and 485; In re Fidelity State Bank, 35 Idaho, 797, 209 Pac. 449, 31 A. L. R. 781; Jones Hollow Ware Co. v. Crane, 134 Md. 103; 106 Atl: 2743 Aji Re 1658; State v. Krahmer, 105 Minn. 422, 117 N. W. 780, 21 L. R. A. (N. 8s.) 157. When a State descends from the plane of its sovereignty and contracts with private persons, it is regarded pro hac vice as a private person itself, and is bound accordingly. Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 203, 21 L. ed. 447; Georgia Pen. Cos. v. Nelms, 71 Ga. 301. The lien of a bondholder, who has loaned money to the State on a pledge of property by legislative act, cannot be divested or postponed by a sub- sequent legislative act. Wabash, &c. Co. v. Beers, 2 Black, 448, 17 L. ed. 327. An agreement to receive coupons of State bonds in payment for State taxes is binding. Hartman v. Green- how, 102 U. S. 672, 26 L. ed. 271; Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270, 29 L. ed. 185, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 903, 962. See Keith v. Clark, 97 U. S. 454, 24 L. ed. 1072. When State officers acting under authority of a statute have received in payment of obligations due to the State warrants drawn on the State treasury, there is an executed contract, and the obligation is discharged, even though the warrants were illegal and void, as being issued with the intention that they circulate as money or as bills of credit or in aid of rebellion. For the courts of the State to place upon a statute thereafter passed aPROTECTION TO CHAP. IX] PERSON AND PROPERTY 559 And it has since been held that compacts between two States are in like manner protected.’ These decisions, however, do not fully determine what under all circumstances is to be regarded as a construction which will treat such payments as void and revive the obli- gation is to impair the obligation of the contract, and therefore to vio- late the Federal Constitution. Hous- ton & T. C. R. Co. v. Texas, 177 U.S. 66, 44 L. ed. 673, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 545, rev. 41S. W. 157. Any statute which impairs any of the substantial rights secured to the holder of a tax certificate by the exist- ing laws is unconstitutional. State ex rel. National Bond & Security Co. v. Krahmer, 105 Minn. 422, 117 N. W. 180) 24. Rie Az (N-/S:) Loz: After a State has granted lands to a company, and the grantee has ful- filled the conditions of the grant and earned the lands, a further enactment, that the lands shall not be transferred to the company till its debts of a certain class are paid, is void. De Groff v. St. Paul, &c. R. R. Co., 23 Minn. 144; Robertson v. Land Com- missioner, 44 Mich 274, 6 N. W. 659. After a contract made by a city with a company allowing it to build a railroad in certain streets, has been partly completed, the legislature can- not make the right to finish it condi- tional on the consent of property owners. Hovelman v. Kansas City Ry. Co., 79 Mo. 632. The power to withdraw a franchise does not give a legislature power to authorize a city to require a horse railroad company to pave outside its rails, when the city had contracted with it to pave only inside the rails. Coast Line R. Co. v. Savannah, 30 Fed. Rep. 646. See New Orleans v. Great South Tel. Co., 40 La. Ann. 41, 3 So. 533; McGee v. San Jose, 68 Cal. 91, 8 Pac. 641; Chicago Union Tr. Co. v. Chicago, 199 Ill. 259, 65 N. E. 248. Where a statute abandons an in- complete contract made by the State, the obligation of the contract remains as before, and forms the measure of the other party’s right to recover from the State for the damages sus- tained. Brown v. Colorado, 106 U. S. 95, 27 L. ed. 132, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 175; Hays v. Port of Seattle, 251 U. S. 233, 64 L. ed. 248, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 125; Caldwell v. Donaghey, 108 Ark. 60, 156 S. W. 839, 45 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 721, Ann. Cas. 1915 B, 133. But where the statute under which a State grants permission to a foreign corporation to do business within its borders pro- vides that such permission may be revoked upon violation of the statute by the corporation, a forfeiture of the permission because of such violation does not impair the obligation of any contract. Waters-Pierce Oil Co. »v. Texas, 177 U.S. 28, 44 L. ed. 657, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 518, aff. 19 Tex. Civ. App. 1, 44S. W. 936. An application for the purchase of State lands under an act governing the sale of such lands, and the expenditure of money in accordance with its pro- visions for the survey of the lands, does not, before any part of the pur- chase price is paid, create a contract binding on the State and protected against impairment. Banning Co. ». California, 240 U. S. 142, 60 L. ed. 569, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 338. See also Wisconsin, etc., R. Co. v. Powers, 191 U. S. 379, 48 L. ed. 229, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 107. A railroad company was organized under general statutes which provided for the alteration, amendment, or repeal of corporate charters. Filing a map of a proposed route does not vest in it any right to condemn lands upon the proposed rout, such that the State is precluded from taking these lands for other purposes without im- pairing, to the damage of the company, the obligation of a contract. Adiron- dack R. Co. v. N. Y., 176 U. S. 335, 44 L. ed. 492, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 460, aff. 160 N. Y. 225, 54 N. E. 689. 10n the separation of Kentucky from Virginia, a compact was entered into between the proposed new and the old State, by which it was agreed ‘that all private grants and interests of560 contract.! CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I A grant of land by a State is a contract, because in making it the State deals with the purchaser precisely as any other vendor might; and if its mode of conveyance is any differ- ent, it is only because, by virtue of its sovereignty, it has power to convey by other modes than those which the general law opens to private individuals. But many things done by the State may seem to hold out promises to individuals which after all cannot be treated as contracts without hampering the legislative power of the State in a manner that would soon leave it without the means of performing its essential functions. The State creates offices, and appoints persons to fill them; it establishes municipal corporations with large and valuable privileges for its citizens; by its general laws it holds out inducements to immigration; it passes exemption laws, and laws for the encouragement of trade and agriculture; and under all these laws a greater or less number of citizens expect to derive profit and emolument. But can these laws be regarded as contracts between the State and the officers and corporations who lands, within the said district, derived from the laws of Virginia, shall remain valid and secure under the laws of the proposed State, and shall be deter- mined by the laws now existing in this State.” After the admission of the new State to the Union, ‘‘occupy- ing claimant’’ laws were passed by its legislature, such as were not in exist- ence in Virginia, and by the force of which, under certain circumstances, the owner might be deprived of his title to land, unless he would pay the value of lasting improvements made upon it by an adverse claimant. These acts were also held void; the compact was held inviolable under the Constitution, and it was deemed no objection to its binding character, that its effect was to restrict, in some directions, the legislative power of the State entering into it. Green »v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1, 5 L. ed. 547. See also Hawkins v. Barney’s Lessee, 5 Pet. 457, 8 L. ed. 190. 1 Authority to construct and main- tain a dam for the purpose of improy- ing a water-power is only a license and may be revoked at any time. St. Anthony Falls W. P. Co. v. Bd. of Water Com’rs, 168 U. S. 349, 42 L. ed. 497, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 157. Rate of interest allowed upon an unpaid judgment is not contractual unless the judgment is upon a con- tract to pay interest at a given rate until the debt is paid, and in all other cases it may be changed at any time by the State, and such changed rate will be operative thenceforth. Morley y. Lb. S: & Me S! Re Cot 146 Us sc: 162, 36 L. ed. 925, 138 Sup. Ct. Rep. 54, aff. 95 N. Y. 667, and following O’Brien v. Young, 95 N. Y. 428, 47 Am. Rep. 64. Contra, Butler v. Rockwell, 17 Col. 290, 29 Pac. 458, 17 L. R. A. 611, and note; Wyoming Nat. Bk. v. Brown, 7 Wyo. 494, 53 Pac. 291, 9 Wyo. 153, 61 Pac. 465, on rehearing, holds that contract is merged in judgment, and rate of interest on Judgment is not contrac- tual. Judgment upon a tort is not a con- tract, and power to levy taxes may be so restricted as to make such judgment against a city practically worthless. Sherman v. Langham, 92 Tex. 13, 40 S. W. 140, 42 S. W. 961, 39 L. R. A. 258; Louisiana v. New Orleans, 109 U. S. 285, 27 L. ed. 936, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 211; Louisiana »v. Police Jury, 111 U. S. 716, 28 L. ed. 574, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 648. An appeal bond is a contract within the constitutional prohibition. Schus- ter v. Weiss, 114 Mo. 158, 21 S. W. 438, 19 L. R. A. 182.CHAP. IX] PROTECTION TO PERSON AND PROPERTY 561 are, or the citizens of the State who expect to be, benefited by their passage, so as to preclude their being repealed ? On these points it would seem that there could be no difficulty. When the State employs officers or creates municipal corporations as the mere agencies of government, it must have the power to dis- continue the agency whenever it comes to be regarded as no longer important. “The framers of the Constitution did not intend to restrain the States in the regulation of their civil institutions, adopted for internal government.” ’ They may, therefore, dis- continue offices or change the salary or other compensation, or abolish or change the organization of municipal corporations at any time, according unless forbidden by v. Woodward, ed. 629, 658, 1 Dartmouth College 4 Wheat. 518-629, 4 L. per Marshall, Ch. J. 2 Butler v. Pennsylvania, 10 How. 402. 13 L. ed. 472; United States »v. Hartwell, 6 Wall. 385, 18 L. ed. 830; Newton v. Commissioners, 100 U. S. 557, 25 L. ed. 710; Warner v. People, 2 Denio, 272; Conner v. New York, 2 Sandf. 355, and 5 N. Y. 285; People v. Green, 58 N. Y. 295; State v. Van Baumbach, 12 Wis. 310; Coffin ». State, 7 Ind. 157; Benford v. Gibson, 15 Ala. 521; Perkins v. Corbin, 45 Ala. 103; Evans v. Populus, 22 La. Ann. 121; Commonwealth v. Bacon, 6 S. & R. 322; Commonwealth »v. Mann, 5 W. & S. 403, 418; Koontz v. Franklin Co., 76 Pa. St. 154; French v. Commonwealth, 78 Pa. St. 339; Augusta v. Sweeney, 44 Ga. 463; County Commissioners v. Jones, 18 Minn. 199; People v. Lippincott, 67 Ill. 333; In re Bulger, 45 Cal. 553; Opinions of Justices, 117 Mass. 603; Kendall ». Canton, 53 Miss. 526; Williams v. Newport, 12 Bush, 438; State v. Douglass, 26 Wis. 428; State v. Kalb, 50 Wis. 178, 6 N. W. 557; Robinson v. White, 26 Ark. 139; Alexander v. McKenzie, 2 S. C. 81; Harvey v. Com’rs Rush Co., 32 Kan. 159, 4 Pac. 153; Com. v. Bailey, 81 Ky. 395; McDonald v. New Haven, 94 Conn. 403, 109 Atl. 176, 10 A. L. R. 193; Attorney General ». Tufts, 239° Mass. 458, 131 N. E. 573, 17 A. L. R. 274; Saginaw County Board of Sup’rs v. Hubinger, 137 Mich. 72, VoL. 1— 36 to the existing legislative view of State policy their own constitutions from doing so.? And 100 N. W. 261, 4 Ann. Cas. 792; State v. Plasters, 74 Neb. 652, 105 N. W. 1092, 13 Ann. Cas. 154; State v. Murphy, 30 Nev. 409, 97 Pac. 391, 18 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 1210; People »v. State Board of Tax Commissioners, 174 N. Y. 417, 67 N. E. 69, 105 Am. St. Rep. 674, 63 L. R. A. 884; Mial ». Ellington, 134 N. C. 131, 46S. E. 961, 65 L. R. A. 697; Shawnee v. Hewett, 37 Okla. 125, 130 Pac. 546, 4 A. L. R. 195; Malone v. Williams, 118 Tenn. 390, 103 S. W. 798, 121 Am. St. Rep. 1002; Tanner v. Edwards, 31 Utah, 80, 86 Pac. 765, 120 Am. St. Rep. 919, 10 Ann. Cas. 1091; Booten v. Pinson, 77 W. Va. 412, 89 S. E. 985, L. R. A. 1917 A, 1244. Compare People »v. Bull, 46 N. Y. 57, 7 Am. Rep. 302; Wyandotte v. Drennan, 46 Mich. 478, 9 N. W. 500. “The people of the State by con- stitutional provision may abolish any office at any time.... The office- holder has no vested right therein, nor does he hold thesoffice by contract.” Luckett v. Madison County, 137 Miss. 1, 101 So. 851, 37 A. L. R. 314. ‘““Where an office is created by statute, it is wholly within the con- trol of the legislature. The term, the mode of appointment, and the com- pensation may be altered at pleasure, and the latter may be even taken away without abolishing the office. Such extreme legislation is not to be deemed probable in any case. But we are now discussing the legislative power, not its expediency or propriety.562 Having the power, the legislature will exercise it for the public good, and it is the sole judge of the exigency which demands its interference.” Per Sand- ford, J., 2 Sandf. 355, 369. “The selection of officers who are nothing more than public agents for the effectuating of public purposes is matter of public convenience or neces- sity, and so, too, are the periods for the appointment of such agents; but neither the one nor the other of these arrangements can constitute any obligation to continue such agents, or to reappoint them, after the meas- ures which brought them into being shall have been found useless, shall have been fulfilled, or shall have been abrogated as even detrimental to the well-being of the public. The prom- ised compensation for services actually performed and accepted, during the continuance of the particular agency, may undoubtedly be claimed, both upon principles of compact and of equity; but to insist beyond this upon the perpetuation of a public policy either useless or detrimental, and upon a reward for acts neither desired nor performed, would appear to be recon- cilable with neither common justice nor common sense.” Daniel, J., in Butler v. Pennsylvania, 10 How. 402, 416, 13 L. ed. 472. ‘But after services have been rendered under a law, resolution, or ordinance which fixes the rate of compensation, there arises an implied contract to pay for those services at that rate. This contract is a completed contract. Its obliga- tion is perfect, and rests on the reme- dies which the law gives for its enforce- ment’, and cannot be impaired by a change in the State constitution. Fisk v. Jefferson Police Jury, 116 U. 131, 29 L. ed. 587, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 3 See also Barker v. Pittsburgh, 4 Pa. St. 49; Standiford v. Wingate, 2 Duv. 443; Taft v. Adams, 3 Gray, 126; Walker v. Peelle, 18 Ind. 264; People v. Haskell, 5 Cal. 357; Dart v. Houston, 22 Ga. 506; Williams ». Newport, 12 Bush, 438; Territory v. Pyle, 1 Oreg. 149; Bryan v. Cattell, 15 Iowa, 538. If the term of an office is fixed by the Constitution, the legislature can- S. 29. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. 1 not remove the officer, — except as that instrument may allow, — either directly, or indirectly by abolishing the office. People v. Dubois, 23 Ill. 547; State v. Messmore, 14 Wis. 163; Commonwealth v. Gamble, 62 Pa. St. 343, 1 Am. Rep. 422; Lowe v. Com- monwealth, 3 Met. (Ky.) 240; State v. Wiltz, 11 La. Ann. 489; Goodin v. Thoman, 10 Kan. 191; State ». Draper, 50 Mo. 353; Adams v. Roberts, 119 Ky. 364, 83 S. W. 1035; Morris v. Glover, 121 Ga. 751, 49S. E. 786; Hall ». Tarver, 128 Ga. 410, 57 S. E. 720; Conner v. Gray, 88 Miss. 489, 41 So. 186, 9 Ann. Cas. 120; Magee v. Brister, 109 Miss. 183, 68 So. 77; State v. Douglass, 33 Nev. 82, 110 Pac. 177; State ex rel. Burke »v. Hinkel, 144 Wis. 444, 129 N. W. 393. Or by shortening the constitutional term. Brewer v. Davis, 9 Humph. 212. Compare Christy v. Commis- sioners, 39 Cal. 3. But if after the election of a justice, his town becomes part of a city, his office ceases. Ger- tum v. Board, 109 N. Y. 170, 16 N. E. 328. Nor can the legislature take from a constitutional officer a portion of the characteristic duties belonging to the office, and devolve them upon an office of its own creation. State v. Brunst, 26 Wis. 413, 7 Am. Rep. 84, disapproving State v. Dews, R. M. Charl. 397. See also People v. How- Jands 155) Ne Ye 2705 49) Neb aio; 41 L. R. A. 888; Cameron v. Parker, 2 Okla. 277, 38 Pac. 14. Compare Warner v. People, 2 Denio, 272; People v. Albertson, 55 N. Y. 50; People v. Raymond, 37 N. Y. 428; King v. Hunder, 65 N. C. 603, 6 Am. Rep. 754. Nor, where the office is elective, can the legislature fill it, either directly, or by extending the term of the incumbent. People ». Bull, 46 N. Y. 57; People v. McKin- ney, 52 N. Y. 374. Where the con- stitution prohibits the removal of an officer during his term except for cause, it equally prohibits the transfer of the duties and emoluments of the office. State Prison v. Day, 124 .N. C. 362, 32 S. E. 748, 46 L. R. A. 295. See also on these points cases, p. 139, supra. Compare People v. Flanagan, 66. N.Y. 237,CHAP. IX] although municipal corporations, PROTECTION TO PERSON AND PROPERTY 563 as respects the property which they hold, control, and manage, for the benefit of their citizens, are governed by the same rules and subject to the same liabilities as individuals, yet this property, so far as it has been derived from the State, or obtained by the exercise of the ordinary powers of government, must be held subject to control by the State, but under the restriction only, that it is not to be appropriated to uses foreign to those for which it has been acquired. And the franchises con- ferred upon such a corporation, for the benefit of its citizens, must be liable to be resumed at any time by that authority which may mold the corporate powers at its will, or even revoke them alto- gether. The greater power will comprehend the less.’ If, however, As to control of municipal corpora- tions, see further Marietta v. Fearing, 4 Ohio, 427; Bradford v. Cary, 5 Me. 339; Bush v. Shipman, 5 Ill. 186; Trustees, &c. v. Tatman, 13 Ill. 27; People v. Morris, 13 Wend. 325; Mills v. Williams, 11 Ired. 558; People v. Banvard, 27 Cal. 470; ante, ch. vii. But where the State contracts as an individual, it is bound as an individual would be: Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 203, 21 L. ed. 447; even though the con- tract creates an official relation. Hall v. Wisconsin, 103 U.S. 5, 26 L. ed. 302. A public office is not property, and a provision that “no person shall be deprived of property without . the judgment of his peers”’ is not applicable to a lawful removal from office upon a charge of gross im- morality. Moore v. Strickling, 46 W. Va. 515, 33 S. E. 274, 50 Ty eee 279. That notice is necessary to a valid removal of an elected officer, see Jacques v. Litle, 51 Kan. 300, 33 Pac. 106, 20 L. R. A. 304. 1 East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Go, 10) How, 511, is i: ed. 518; Saginaw County v. Hubinger, 137 Mich. 72, 100 N. W. 261, 4 Ann. Cas. 792; State v. Superior Court, 67 Wash. 37, 120 Pac. 861, L. R. A. 1915 C, 287, Ann. Cas. 1913 D, 78. In East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Co., 10 How. 511, 533, 13 L. ed. 518, Mr. Justice Woodbury, in speaking of the grant of a ferry franchise to a municipal corporation, says: “Our opinion is... that the parties to this grant did not by their charter stand in the attitude towards each other of making a contract by it, such as is contemplated in the Constitution, and as could not be modified by sub- sequent legislation. The legislature was acting here on the one part, and public municipal and political corpora- tions on the other. They were acting, too, in relation to a public object, being virtually a highway across the river, over another highway up and down the river. From this standing and relation of these parties, and from the subject-matter of their action, we think that the doings of the legislature as to this ferry must be considered rather as public laws than as contracts. They related to public interests. They changed as those interests de- manded. The grantees, likewise the towns, being mere organizations for public purposes, were liable to have their public powers, rights, and duties, modified or abolished at any moment by the legislature. They are incor- porated for public, and not private, objects. They are allowed to hold privileges or property only for public purposes. The members are not shareholders nor joint partners in any corporate estate which they can sell or devise to others, or which can be attached and levied on for their debts. Hence, generally, the doings between them and the legislature are in the nature of legislation rather than compact, and subject to all the legisla- tive conditions just named, and there- fore to be considered as not violated by subsequent legislative changes.—— 564 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I It is hardly possible to conceive the grounds on which a different result could be vindicated, without destroy- ing all legislative sovereignty, and checking most legislative improve- ments and amendments, as well as supervision over its subordinate public bodies.” A different doctrine was advanced by Mr. Justice Barculo, in Benson »v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 10 Barb. 234, who cites in support of his opinion, that ferry grants to the city of New York could not be taken away by the legislature, what is said by Chancellor Kent (2 Kent’s Com. 275), that ‘‘pub- lic corporations . . . may be em- powered to take and hold private property for municipal uses; and such property is invested with the security of other private rights. So corporate franchises attached to public cor- porations are legal estates, coupled with an interest, and are protected as private property.” This is true in a general sense, and it is also true that, in respect to such property and fran- chises, the same rules of responsibility are to be applied as in the case of individuals. Bailey v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 3 Hill, 531. But it does not follow that the legislature, under its power to administer the govern- ment, of which these agencies are a part, and for the purposes of which the grant has been made, may not at any time modify the municipal powers and privileges, by transferring the grant to some other agency, or revoking it when it seems to have become unimportant. A power to tax is not private property or a vested right which when once con- ferred upon a municipality by legisla- tive act cannot be subsequently modi- fied or repealed. The grant of such power is not a contract. Williamson v. New Jersey, 130 U.S. 189, 32 L. ed. 915, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 453; Richmond v. Richmond, &c. R. R. Co., 21 Gratt., 604, 611. See ante, p. 515, note 3. In People v. Power, 25 Ill. 187, 191, Breese, J., in speaking of a law which provided that three-fourths of the taxes collected in the county of Sangamon, with certain deductions, should be paid over to the city of Springfield, which is situated therein, says: ‘‘ While private corporations are regarded as contracts which the legislature cannot constitu- tionally impair, as the trustee of the public interests it has the exclusive and unrestrained control over public cor- porations; and as it may create, so it may modify or destroy, as public exigency requires or the public interests demand. Coles v. Madison County, Breese, 115. Their whole capacities, powers, and duties are derived from the legislature, and subordinate to that power. If, then, the legislature can destroy a county, they can destroy any of its parts, and take from it any one of its powers. The revenues of a county are not the property of the county, in the sense in which revenue of a private person or corporation is regarded. The whole State has an interest in the revenue of a county; and for the public good the legislature must have the power to direct its application. The power conferred upon a county to raise a revenue by taxation is a polit- ical power, and its application when collected must necessarily be within the control of the legislature for political purposes. This act of the legislature nowhere proposes to take from the county of Sangamon, and give to the city of Springfield, any property belonging to the county, or revenues collected for the use of the county. But if it did it would not be objectionable. But, on the contrary, it proposes alone to appropriate the revenue which may be collected by the county, by taxes levied on property both in the city and county, in certain proportions ratably to the city and county.” It is held in People v. Ingersoll, 58 N. Y. 1, that the franchise to levy taxes by a county for county purposes was not exercised by the county as agent for the State, but as principal. And see Bush v. Shipman, 5 III. 186; Richland County v. Lawrence County, 12 Ill. 1; Sangamon Co. v. Spring- field, 63 Ill. 66; Borough of Dun- more’s Appeal, 52 Pa. St. 374; Guil- ford v. Supervisors of Chenango, 18 Barb. 615, and 18 N. Y. 148; ante, pp. 499-507, and cases cited. Statute exempting city’s waterworks from taxation is not irrepealable.CHAP. IX| PROTECTION TO PERSON AND PROPERTY 565 a grant is made to a municipal corporation charged with a trust in favor of an individual, private corporation, or charity, the interest which the cestui que trust has under the grant may sustain it against legislative revocation; a vested equitable interest being property in the same sense and entitled to the same protection as a legal. Those charters of incorporation, however, which are granted, not as a part of the machinery of the government, but for the pri- vate benefit or purposes of the corporators, stand upon a different footing, and are held to be contracts between the legislature and the corporators, having for their consideration the liabilities and duties which the corporators assume by accepting them; and the Covington v. Kentucky, 173 U.S. 231, 43 L. ed. 679, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383. 1See Town of Pawlet v. Clark, 9 Cranch, 292, 3 L. ed. 735, and Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch, 43, 3 L. ed. 650. The municipal corporation holding property or rights in trust might even be abolished without affecting the grant; but the Court of Chancery might be empowered to appoint a new trustee to take charge of the property, and to execute the trust. Montpelier v. East Montpelier, 29 Vt. 12. Power to repeal a charter cannot be exercised so as to injure creditors already entitled to payment. Morris v. State, 62 Tex. 728. A municipal corporation, like the State, may enter into contracts by legislative action. Where, for ex- ample, a village by ordinance grants to a railroad company permission to use the streets of the village for its road- bed, on condition of grading and graveling them at its own expense, the ordinance when accepted con- stitutes a contract from which neither party can withdraw. Cincinnati, &c. R. R. Co. v. Carthage, 36 Ohio St. 631. See also Hovelman v. Kansas City Ry. Co., 79 Mo. 632; Coast Line Ry. Co. ». Savannah, 30 Fed. Rep. 646; Los Angeles v. Water Co., 61 Cal. 65; Chicago, Mun., &c. Co. v. Lake, 130 Ill. 42, 22 N. EB. 616; Cleveland v. Cleveland Electric R. Co., 194 U. 8. 517, 48 L. ed. 1102, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 764; Vicksburg v. Vicksburg Water- works Co., 202 U. S. 453, 50 L. ed. 1102, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 660, 6 Ann. Cas. 253; Vicksburg v. Vicksburg Waterworks Co., 206 U. S. 496, 51 L. ed. 1155, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 762; Boise, etc., Water Co. v. Boise City, 230 U.S. 84, 57 L. ed. 1400; 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 997; New York Electric Lines Co. v. Empire City Subway Co., 235 U. S. 179, 59 L. ed. 184, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 72, L. R. A. 1918 B, 874, Ann. Cas. 1915 A, 906; Northern Ohio Traction, etc., Co. v. Ohio, 245 U. S. 574, 62 L. ed. 481, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 196, L. R. A. 1918 E, 865; Omaha Water Co. ». Omaha, 147 Fed. 1, 77 C. C. A. 267 12 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 736, 8 Ann. Cas. ’ 614; Stockton Gas & Electric Co. v. San Joaquin County, 148 Cal. 313, 83 Pac. 54,5 L. R. A. (w. 8.) 174, 7 Ann. Cas. 511; Colorado, etc., R. Co. v. Fort Collins, 52 Colo. 281, 121 Pac. 747, Ann. Cas. 1913 D, 646; Washing- ton v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 136 Ga. 638, 71 S. E. 1066, 38 L. R. A. (nx. s.) 867; Rushville v. Rushville Natural Gas Co., 164 Ind. 162, 73 N. E. 87, 3 Ann. Cas. 86; Shreveport Traction Co. v. Shreveport, 122 La. 1, 47 So. 40, 129 Am. St. Rep. 345; Northwestern Tel. Exch. Co. v. Ander- son, 12 N. D. 585, 98 N. W. 706, 102 Am. St. Rep. 580, 65 L. R. A. 771, 1 Ann. Cas. 110; Cincinnati v. Public Utilities Commission, 98 Ohio St. 320, 121 N. E. 688, 3 A. L. R. 705. Grant to a public corporation of all moneys received by a certain county from fines and penalties may be re- voked at pleasure of legislature. Watson Seminary v. Co. Ct. of Pike Co., 149 Mo. 57, 50 S. W. 880, 45 L. R. A. 675.566 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [voL. I grant of the franchise can no more be resumed by the legislature, or its benefits diminished or impaired without the consent of the gran- tees, than any other grant of property or valuable thing, unless the right to do so is reserved in the charter itself." As the power to 1 Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 4 L. ed. 629; Trustees of Vincennes University v. Indiana, 14 How. 268, 14 L. ed. 416; Planters’ Bank v. Sharp, 6 How. 301, 12 L. ed. 447: Piqua Bank v. Knoop, 16 How. 369, 14 L. ed. 977; Binghamton Bridge Case, 3 Wall. 51, 18 L. ed. 137; Norris v. Trustees of Abingdon Acad- emy, 7 G. & J. 7; Grammar School v. Burt, 11 Vt. 632; Brown v. Hummel, 6 Pa. St. 86; State v. Heyward, 3 Rich. 389; People v. Manhattan Co., 9 Wend. 351; Commonwealth »v. Cullen, 13 Pa. St. 132; Commercial Bank of Natchez v. State, 14 Miss. 599; Backus v. Lebanon, 11 N. H. 19; Michigan State Bank v. Hastings, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 225; Bridge Co. ». Hoboken Co., 13 N. J. Eq. 81; Miners’ Bank v. United States, 1 Greene (Iowa), 553; Edwards v. Jagers, 19 Ind. 407; State v. Noyes, 47 Me. 189; Bruffet v. G. W. R. R. Co., 25 Ill. 353; People v. Jackson & Michigan Plank Road Co., 9 Mich. 285; Bank of the State v. Bank of Cape Fear, 13 Ired. 75; Mills v. Williams, 11 Ired. 558; Hawthorne v. Calef, 2 Wall. 10, 17 L. ed. 776; Wales v. Stetson, 2 Mass. 143; Nichols v. Bertram, 3 Pick. 342; King v. Dedham Bank, 15 Mass. 447; State v. Tombeckbee Bank, 2 Stew. 30; Central Bridge v. Lowell, 15 Gray, 106; Bank of the Dominion v. Mc- Veigh, 20 Gratt. 457; Sloan v. Pacific R. R. Co., 61 Mo. 24; State v. Rich- mond, &c. R. R. Co., 73 N. C. 527; Turnpike Co. v. Davidson Co., 3 Tenn. Ch. 397; Detroit v. Plank Road Co., 43 Mich. 140, 5 N. W. 275; Penn. R. R. Co. v. Baltimore, &c. R. R. Co., 60 Md. 263; Com. v. Erie & W. Tr. Co., 107 Pa. St. 112; Houston & T. C. Ry. Co. v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 70 Tex. 649, 8 S. W. 498; City R. Co. ». Citizens’ Street R. Co., 166 U. S. 557, 41 L. ed. 1114, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 653; Mich. Tel. Co. v. St. Joseph, 121 Mich. 502, 80 N. W. 383, 47 L. R. A. 87; Ingersoll ». Nassau Electric R. Co., 157 N. Y. 453, 52 N. BE. 545, 43 L. R. A. 236; Franklin Co. Grammar School v. Bailey, 62 Vt. 467, 20 Atl. 820, 10 L. R. A. 405, and note; Nashville, M. & S. Turnp. Co. v. Davidson County, 106 Tenn. 258, 61 S. W. 68; State v. Lebanon & N. Turnp. Co. (Tenn.), 61S. W. 1096; Arkansas Stove Co. v. State, 94 Ark. 27, 125 S. W. 1001, 140 Am. St. Rep. 103, 27 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 255; Mt. Carmel Public Utility, etc., Co. v. Public Utilities Com- mission, 297 Ill. 303, 130 N. E. 693, 21 A. L. R. 571; Street v. Varney Electrical Supply Co., 160 Ind. 338, 66 N. E. 895, 98 Am. St. Rep. 325, 61 L. R. A. 154; Shreveport Traction Co. v. Shreveport, 122 La. 1, 47 So. 40, 129 Am. St. Rep. 345; Yoncalla State Bank v. Gemmill, 134 Minn. 334, 159 N. W. 798, L. R. A. 1917 A, 1223; Somerville v. St. Louis Min., etc., Co., 46 Mont. 268, 127 Pac. 464, L. R. A. 1915 B, 811; Mohall Farmers’ Elevator Co. v. Hall, 44 N. D. 480, 176 N. W. 181. The charter of a corporation con- stitutes not only a contract between the state and the corporation, but also a contract between the corporation and its stockholders and between the stockholders inter se, which latter con- tracts are entitled to protection under the Federal constitutional prohibition against any law impairing the obliga- tion of contracts. Mohall Farmers’ Elevator Co. v. Hall, 44 N. D. 430, 176 N. W. 181. The doctrine that the charter of a corporation is a contract, entitled to protection under the constitutional prohibition, is applicable to corpora- tions organized under a general cor- poration law. Mohall Farmers’ Ele- vator Co. v. Hall, 44 N. D. 430, 176 N. W. 131. The mere passage of an act of incorporation, however, does not make the contract; and it may be repealed prior to a full acceptance by the corporators. Mississippi Society v. Musgrove, 44 Miss. 820, 7 Am. Rep.CHAP. Ix] 723. Or amended, Cincinnati, H. & I. R. R. Co. v. Clifford, 113 Ind. 460, 15 N. EB. 524. See, further, Chincle- clamouche L. & B. Co. v. Com., 100 Pa. St. 438. After the adoption of a constitu- tional amendment allowing amend- ment and repeal of charters, a corpora- tion, previously chartered, accepted acts of the legislature. Held that its charter thereby became subject to alteration under the amendment, and that it was affected by a constitutional amendment passed thereafter. Penn. R. R. Co. v. Duncan, 111 Pa. St. 352. In affirming this decision it is held that the corporation took its charter sub- ject to changes in the constitution and general laws of the State. Penn. R. R. Co. v. Miller, 1382 U. S. 75, 33 L. ed. 267, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 34. An act, passed after the granting of a charter, allowing the corporation in a proper case to be wound up, is valid. A corporation is subject to such reason- able regulation as the legislature may prescribe short of a material inter- ference with its privileges. Chicago Life Ins. Co. v. Needles, 113 U. S. 574, 28 L. ed. 1084, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 681. Until the corporation has entered upon the execution of a general power granted to it (e.g. to mortgage its property) the legislature may modify at will the conditions under which that power may be exercised (e.g. may enact that subsequent judgments against the corporation shall be prior liens upon its property). East Tenn., V. &G. R. Co. v. Frazier, 139 U. S. 288, 35 L. ed. 196, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 517. The provision in a railroad charter prescribing the manner in which it may take lands for its purposes, only gives a remedy which may be altered. Mis- sissippi R. R. Co. ». McDonald, 12 Heisk. 54. Giving the right of cumulative voting to stockholders in a corporation with an irrepealable charter, which provides that each share shall have one vote, is a violation of contract. State v. Greer, 78 Mo. 188. A statute relieving a street railway company from the obligation to repair PROTECTION TO PERSON AND PROPERTY 567 any portion of the streets over which its tracks are laid, does not impair the obligation of a contract. Springfield v. Springfield St. Ry. Co., 182 Mass. 41,64 N. E. 577; Worcester v. Worces- ter St. Ry. Co., 182 Mass. 49, 64 N. E. 581. As to the right to regulate charges for transportation of persons and property, see post, p. 1300. It is under the protection of the decision in the Dartmouth College Case that the most enormous and threatening powers in our country have been created; some of the great and wealthy corporations actually having greater influence in the country at large, and upon the legislation of the country, than the States to which they owe their corporate existence. Every privilege granted or right conferred — no matter by what means or on what pretense — being made inviolable by the Constitution, the government is frequently found stripped of its author- ity in very important particulars, by unwise, careless, or corrupt legislation ; and a clause of the Federal Constitu- tion, whose purpose was to preclude the repudiation of debts and just con- tracts, protects and perpetuates the evil. In Mills v. Williams, 11 Ired. 558, 561, Pearson, J., states the difference between the acts of incorporation of public and private corporations as follows: ‘The substantial distinction is this: Some corporations are created by the mere will of the legislature, there being no other party interested or concerned. To this party a portion of the power of the legislature is delegated, to be exercised for the general good, and subject at all times to be modified, changed, or annulled. Other corporations are the result of contract. The legislature is not the only party interested; for, although it has a public purpose to be accom- plished, it chooses to do it by the instrumentality of a second party. These two parties make a contract. The legislature, for and in considera- tion of certain labor and outlay of money, confers upon the party of the second part the privilege of being a corporation, with certain powers and capacities. The expectation of benefit568 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I grant unamendable and irrepealable charters is one readily sus- ceptible of being greatly abused, to the prejudice of important public interest, and has been greatly abused in the past, the people in a majority of the States, in framing or amending their constitu- tions, have prudently guarded against it by reserving the right to alter, amend, or repeal all laws that may be passed, conferring cor- porate powers. These provisions give protection from the time of their adoption, but the improvident grants theretofore made are beyond their reach.’ to the public is the moving considera- tion on one side; that of expected remuneration for the outlay is the con- sideration on the other. It is a con- tract, and therefore cannot be modified, changed, or annulled, without the consent of both parties.’ An incorporated academy, whose endowment comes exclusively from the public, is a public corporation. Dart v. Houston, 22 Ga. 506. Com- pare State v. Adams, 44 Mo. 570. The grant of a franchise by a municipality to a water company will not preclude the municipality from constructing an independent system of waterworks of its own. Knoxville Water Company v. Knoxville, 200 U. S. 22, 50 L. ed. 353, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 224; Meridian v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 143 Fed. 67, 74 C. C. A. 221, 6 Ann. Cas. 599. See also Skaneateles Waterworks Co. v. Skane- ateles, 184 U. S. 354, 46 L. ed. 585, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 400, affirming, 161 ING Ye 1545 55) Ne Bs 562; 46) . R: A; 687. Compare Westerly Waterworks v. Westerly, 75 Fed. Rep. 181. Indeed, so strictly are such franchises con- strued that it has been held that an exclusive franchise granted to a water company for a period of years as against ‘‘any other person or corpora- tion” will not preclude the city itself from building waterworks of its own. Knoxville Water Company v. Knox- ville, 200 U. S. 22, 50 L. ed. 353, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 224. Compare Vicks- burg Waterworks Co. v. Vicksburg, 185 U.S. 65, 46 L. ed. 808, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 585; Vicksburg v. Vicks- burg Waterworks Co., 202 U. S. 453, 50 L. ed. 1102, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 660, 6 Ann. Cas. 253. In many States the constitutions also pro- A State Constitution provided that in any city where there were no public works owned by the municipality for supplying the same with water, any individual or corporation of the State should have the privilege of using the public streets and laying down pipes, etc., for the purpose, subject to the right of the municipal government to regulate the charges. It was held that this provision, coupled with the duty imposed on the governing body to fix water rates annually, and the corresponding duty of the water company to comply with the regula- tions, both under severe penalties, did not import a contract that a cor- poration constructing works as in- vited should not be subject to com- petition from the public source. Madera Waterworks v. Madera, 228 U. S. 454, 57 L. ed. 915, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 571. The grant of a franchise to a water company which does not purport to be exclusive will not preclude the grant of a franchise to a competing company. Syracuse Water Company v. Syracuse, 116 N. Y. 167, 22 N. EB. 381, 5 L. R. A. 546; In re Brooklyn, 143 N. Y. 596, 38 N. E. 983, 26 L. R. A. 270, affirmed in 166 U. S. 685, 41 L. ed. 1165, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 718; Skaneateles Water Works Co. v. Skaneateles, 161 N. Y. 1545 55 N. Bi 562) 46 1. Re AS 6s7, affirmed 184 U. S. 453, 46 L. ed. 585, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 400. 1 Respecting the power to amend or repeal corporate grants, some trouble- some questions are likely to arise which have only as yet been hinted at in the decided cases. Corporations usually acquire property under their grants; and any property or any rights whichCHAP. IX] become vested under a legitimate exercise of the powers granted, no legislative act can take away. Com- monwealth v. Essex Co., 13 Gray, 239; Railroad Co. v. Maine, 96 U. S. 499, 24 L. ed. 836; Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700, 25 L. ed. 496; Attorney- General v. Railroad Companies, 35 Wis. 425; Detroit v. Detroit & Howell P. R. Co., 43 Mich. 140, 5 N. W. 275; Stanislaus County v. San Joaquin, etc., Co., 192 U. S. 201, 48 L. ed. 406, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 241; New York, etc., R. Co. v. Williams, 199 N. Y. 108, 92 N. E. 404, 139 Am. St. Rep. 850, 35 L. R. A. (nx. s.) 549; State v. Bancroft, 148 Wis. 124, 134 N. W. 330, 38 L. R. A. (N.s.) 526. See post, pp. 1240-1242. But a legislature may grant to another corporation the franchises of an exist- ing one, and may authorize the taking of its property upon compensation made. Greenwood». Freight Co., 105 U. S. 18, 26 L. ed. 961; People v. Calder, 153 Mich. 724, 117 N. W. 314, 126 Am. St. Rep. 550. Where under the rights reserved in a State Constitution, a water com- pany’s franchise is subject to altera- tion, a new Constitution may allow water rates to be fixed by a public board, although the company had under the law of its organization the right of representation upon the board. Spring Valley Water Works v. Schottler, 110 U. S. 347, 28 L. ed. 173, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 48. In many cases the property itself becomes valueless unless its employ- ment in the manner contemplated in the corporate grant may be continued ; as in the case, for instance, of railroad property; and whatever individual owners of such property might do with- out corporate powers, it must be com- petent for the stockholders to do after their franchises are taken away. Without speculating on the difficulties likely to arise, reference is made to the following cases, in which the reserved power to alter or repeal corporate grants has been considered or touched upon; Worcester v. Norwich, &c. R. R. Co., 109 Mass. 103; Railroad Com- missioners v. Portland, &c. R. R. Co., 63 Me. 269, 18 Am. Rep. 208; State v. Maine Cent. R. R. Co., 66 Me. 488; PROTECTION TO PERSON AND PROPERTY 569 Ames v. Lake Superior R. R. Co., 21 Minn. 201; Sprigg v. Telegraph Co., 46 Md. 67; Statev. Com’rs of R. R. Taxa- tion, 37 N. J. L. 228; State v. Mayor of Newark, 35 N. J. L. 157; West Wis. R. R. Co. v. Supervisors, 35 Wis. 257; Union Improvement Co. v. Com- monwealth, 69 Pa. St. 140; Ill. Cent. R. R. Co. v. People, 95 Ill. 318, 1 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 188; Rodemacher v. Milwaukee, &c. R. R. Co., 41 Iowa, 297, 20 Am. Rep. 592; Gorman ». Pacific R. R. Co., 26 Mo. 441; Gard- ner v. Hope Ins. Co., 9 R. I. 194, 11 Am. Rep. 238; Yeaton v. Bank of Old Dom., 21 Gratt. 593; Tomlinson »v. Jessup, 15 Wall. 454, 21 L. ed. 204; Tomlinson v. Branch, 15 Wall. 460, 21 L. ed. 189; Miller v. State, 15 Wall. 478, 21 L. ed. 101; Holyoke Co. v. Lyman, 15 Wall. 500, 21 L. ed. 133; Detroit v. Detroit & H. P. R. Co., 43 Mich. 140, 5 N. W. 275; Ashuelot R. R. Co. v. Elliott, 58 N. H. 451; Hamil- ton Gaslight & Coke Co. v. Hamilton, 146 U. S. 258, 36 L. ed. 963, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 90; Stanislaus County ». San Joaquin, etc., Co., 192 U.S. 201, 48 L. ed. 406, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 241; Fair Haven, etc., R. Co. v. New Haven, 203 U. S. 379, 51 L. ed. 237, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 74; Berea College v. Ken- tucky, 211 U. S. 45, 53 L. ed. 81, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 33; Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U. S. 322, 53 L. ed. 530, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 370, 15 Ann. Cas. 645; Missouri Pacific R. Co. ». Kansas, 216 U. S. 262, 54 L. ed. 472, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 330; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Wisconsin, 238 U. 8. 491, 59 L. ed. 1423, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 869, L. R. A. 1916 A, 1133; International Bridge Co. v. New York, 254 U. S. 126, 65 L. ed. 176, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 56; Omaha Water Co. v. Omaha, 147 Fed. to77aG@. GC. A. 267, 12 Lb. Re As (Ni: Ss.) 736. 8 Ann. Cas. 614; Randle ». Winona Coal Co., 206 Ala. 254, 89 So. 790, 19 A. L. R. 118; Arkansas Stove Co. v. State, 94 Ark. 27, 125 S. W. 1001, 140 Am. St. Rep. 103, 27 L. R. A. (n. s.) 255; Southington v. Southington Water Co., 80 Conn. 646, 69 Atl. 1023, 138 Ann. Cas. 411; Venner v. Chicago City R. Co., 246 Ill. 170, 92 N. E. 643, 138 Am. St. Rep. 229, 20 Ann. Cas. 607; Webster ».570 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [voL. I hibit special charters, and all corporations are formed by the volun- tary association of individuals under general laws." Perhaps the most interesting question which arises in this dis- cussion is, whether it is competent for the legislature to so bind up its own hands by a grant as to preclude it from exercising for the future any of the essential attributes of sovereignty in regard to any of the subjects within its jurisdiction ; whether, for instance, it can agree that it will not exercise the power of taxation, or the police power of the State, or the right of eminent domain, as to certain specified property or persons; and whether, if it shall undertake to do so, the agreement is not void on the general prin- ciple that the legislature cannot diminish the power of its successors by irrepealable legislation, and that any other rule might cripple and eventually destroy the government itself. If the legislature has power to do this, it is certainly a very dangerous power, exceed- ingly liable to abuse, and may possibly come in time to make the constitutional provision in question as prolific of evil as it ever has been, or is likely to be, of good. Susquehanna Pole Line Co., 112 Md. 416, 76 Atl. 254, 21 Ann. Cas. 357; People v. Calder, 153 Mich. 724, 117 N. W. 314, 126 Am. St. Rep. 550; State v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., 97 Miss. 35, 51 So. 918, 53 So. 454, Ann. Cas. 1912 C, 1150; Somerville v. St. Louis Min., etc., Co., 46 Mont. 268, 127 Pac. 464, L. R. A. 1915 B, 811; McCarter v. Hudson County Water Co., 70 N. J. Eq. 695, 65 Atl. 489, 118 Am. St. Rep. 754, 14 L. R. A. (n. 8.) 197, 10 Ann. Cas. 116; Shelton y. Erie R. Co., 73 N. J. L. 558, 66 Atl. 403, 118 Am. St. Rep. 704, 9 L. R. A. (n. Ss.) 727, 9 Ann. Cas. 883; People v. Gass, 190 N. Y. 323, 83 N. E. 64, 123 Am. St. Rep. 549, 13 Ann. Cas. 678; Lord v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S., 194 N. Y. 212, 87 N. E. 443, 22 L. R. A. (n. s.) 420; New York, etc., R. Co. v. Williams, 199 N. Y. 108, 92 N. E. 404, 189 Am. St. Rep. 850, 35 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 549; People v. Beakes Dairy Co., 222 N. Y. 416, 119 N. E. 115, 3 A. L. R. 1260; Dallas Ry. Co. v. Galler, 114 Tex. 484, 271 S. W. 1106; affirming, (Tex. Civ. App.) 245 S. W. 254; Lawrence v. Rutland R. Co., 80 Vit: 370) 670 Atl) 10915 LL. R.A. (w. 8.) 350, 13 Ann. Cas. 475; Huber v. Martin, 127 Wis. 412,105 N. W. 1031, 115 Am. St. Rep. 1023, 3 L. R. A. (nN. Ss.) 653, 7 Ann. Cas. 400; State v. Bancroft, 148 Wis. 124, 1384 N. W. 330, 38 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 526. After subscribers to stock have paid for it in full, the legislature cannot increase their liabilities. Enterprise Ditch Co. v. Moffit, 58 Neb. 642, 79 N. W. 560, 45 L. R. A. 647. Where no power to amend a charter has been reserved, amendments may nevertheless be made with the consent of the corporation, but the corporation cannot bind its shareholders by the acceptance of amendments which effect fundamental changes in its character or purpose. See Gray v. Navigation Co., 2 W. & S. 156, 37 Am: Dec: 500; Stevens v. Rutland, &c. R. R. Co., 29 Vt. 545; Perkins v. Coffin, 84 Conn. 275, 79 Atl. 1070, Ann. Cas. 1912 C, 1188. Where such power has been reserved, the mode of electing directors may be so modified as to permit cumu- lative voting in order to secure pro- portional representation on the board of directors. Looker v. Maynard, 179 U.S. 46, 45 L. ed. 79, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 21. 1 Where corporations are thus formed, the articles of association, taken in connection with the GeneralCHAP. IX] PROTECTION TO PERSON AND PROPERTY 571 So far as the power of taxation is concerned, it has been so often decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, though not without remonstrance on the part of State courts,’ that an agree- ment by a State, for a consideration received or supposed to be received, that certain property, rights, or franchises shall be exempt from taxation, or to be taxed only at a certain agreed rate, is a con- tract protected by the Constitution, that the question can no longer be considered an open one.? In any case, however, there must be Statute under which they are entered into, constitute the charter. 1 Mechanics’ & Traders’ Bank v. Debolt, 1 Ohio St. 591; Toledo Bank v. Bond, 1 Ohio St. 622; Knoop ». Piqua Bank, 1 Ohio St. 603; Milan & R. Plank Road Co. v. Husted, 3 Ohio St. 578; Piscataqua Bridge v. N. H. Bridge, 7 N. H. 35; Brewster »v. Hough, 10 N. H. 138; Backus »v. Lebanon, 11 N. H. 19; Thorpe ». R. & B.R. R. Co., 27 Vt. 140; Brain- ard v. Colchester, 31 Conn. 407; Mott v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 30 Pa. St. 9; East Saginaw Salt Manuf. Co. v. East Saginaw, 19 Mich. 259; West Wis. R. Co. v. Supervisor of Trempe- leau Co., 35 Wis. 257, 265; Attorney- General v. Chicago, &c. R. R. Co., 35 Wis. 425, 572. See also the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Miller, in Wash- ington University v. Rouse, 8 Wall. 439, 441, 19 L. ed. 498, in which the Chief Justice and Justice Field con- curred. Also Raleigh, &c. R. R. Co. v. Reid, 64 N. C. 155. The right of a State legislature to grant away the right of taxation, which is one of the essential attributes of sovereignty, has been strenuously denied. See Debolt v. Ohio Life Ins. and Trust Co., 1 Ohio St. 563; Me- chanics’ and Traders’ Bank v. Debolt, 1 Ohio St. 591; Brewster v. Hough, 10 N. H. 138; Mott v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 30 Pa. St. 9. And see Thorpe v. Rutland and B. Railroad Co., 27 Vt. 140; ante, p. 570 and note. 2 New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch, 164, 3 L. ed. 303; Gordon v. Appeal Tax Court, 3 How. 133, 11 L. ed. 529; Piqua Bank v. Knoop, 16 How. 369, 14 L. ed. 977; Ohio Life & Trust Co. v. Debolt, 16 How. 416, 14 L. ed. 997; Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 3315157 ed. 401; Mechanics’ & Traders’ Bank v. Debolt, 18 How. 380, 15 L. ed. 458; Mechanics’ & ‘Traders’ Bank ov. Thomas, 18 How. 384, 15 L. ed. 460; McGee v. Mathis, 4 Wall. 148, 18 L. ed. 314; Home of the Friendless v. Rouse, 8 Wall. 430, 19 L. ed. 495; Washington University v. Rouse, 8 Wall. 439, 19 L. ed. 498; Wilmington R. R. Co. v. Reid, 13 Wall. 264, 20 L. ed. 568; Raleigh & Gaston R. R. Co. v. Reid, 13 Wall. 269, 20 L. ed. 570; Humphrey v. Pegues, 16 Wall. 244, 21 L. ed. 326; Pacific R. R. Co. v. Maguire, 20 Wall. 36 22 L. ed. 282; New Jersey v. Yard, 95 U.S. 104; 24 L. ed. 352; Farrington v. Tennessee, 95 U. S. 679, 24 L. ed. 558; University v. Illinois, 60) De Ss: 309) 25 Ll: ed: 3875, New Orleans v. Houston, 119 U. S. 265, 30 I ea. 411, 7 Sup: Ct. Rep: 198; Choate v. Trapp, 224 U. S. 665, 56 L. ed. 941, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 565. See also Atwater v. Woodbridge, 6 Conn. 223; Osborne v. Humphrey, 7 Conn. 335; Parker v. Redfield, 10 Conn. 490; Landon v. Litchfield, 11 Conn. 1; Herrick v. Randolph, 13 Vt. 525; Armington v. Barnet, 15 Vit: 745; O’Donnell v. Bailey, 24 Miss. 386; St. Paul, &c. R. R. Co. v. Parcher, 14 Minn. 297; Grand Gulf R. R. Co. v. Buck, 53 Miss. 246; Central R. R. Co. v. State, 54 Ga. 401; St. Louis, &c. R. R. Co. v. Loftin, 30 Ark. 693; Prop’rs Mt. Auburn Cem. v. Cambridge, 150 Mass. 12, 22 N. E. 66 (where an exemption from all public taxes was held to cover a sewer assessment) ; Mobile & O. R. Co. v. Tennessee, 153 U. S. 486, 38 L. ed. 793, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 968; Stearns ». Minnesota, 179 U. S. 223, 45 L. ed. 162, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 73; Berger ». United States Steel Corp., (N. J. L.), 53 Atl. 68. Where the legislature has reserved the right to amend, alter, or repeal any 49 2557/2 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. fT a consideration, so that the State can be supposed to have received a beneficial equivalent; for it is conceded on all sides that, if the ex- emption is made as a privilege only, it may be revoked at any time.’ And it is but reasonable that the exemption be construed with strictness.” and all corporate charters, the with- drawal of an exemption from taxation does not impair the obligation of any contract. Louisville Water Co. v. Glark= 143) Ue S: 1) 36) lis eds 55) 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 346. See also Pratt Institute v. New York, 183 N. Y. 151, 75 N. E. 1119, 5 Ann. Cas. 198. But taxes cannot, after revocation of an exemption, be levied for any part of the time prior to such revocation. Louisville Water Co. v. Kentucky, 170 U. S. 127, 42 L. ed. 975, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 571, rev. 18 Ky. L. Rep. 620, 37S. W. 576. 1 Christ Church v. Philadelphia, 24 How. 300, 16 L. ed. 602; Brainard »v. Colchester, 31 Conn. 407; Wisconsin, etc., R. Co. v. Powers, 191 U. S. 379, 48 L. ed. 229, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 107; Seton Hall College v. South Orange, 242 U. S. 100, 61 L. ed. 170, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 54; Monaghan »v. Lewis, 5 Penn. (Del.) 218, 59 Atl. 948, 10 Ann. Cas. 1048; Rochester v. Rochester R. Co., 182 N. Y. 99, 74 N. E. 953, 70 L. R. A. 773. See also Common- wealth v. Bird, 12 Mass. 442; Dale v. The Governor, 3 Stew. 387; Com’rs Calhoun Co. v. Woodstock Iron Co., 82 Ala. 151, 2 So. 182; Grand Lodge of Louisiana v. New Orleans, 166 U. S. 143, 41 L. ed. 951, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 523. But see Farrington v. Tennessee, 95 U.S. 679, 24 L. ed. 558, and Bk. of Commerce v. Tennessee, 161 U. S. 134, 40 L. ed. 645, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 456, both of which seem to overlook the necessity for a consideration. In Banning Co. v. California, 240 U. S. 142, 60 L. ed. 569, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 338, the court said: ‘It was pointed out in Wisconsin & M. R. Co. v. Powers, 191 U. S. 379, 386, 48 L. ed. 229, 231, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 107, that the offer of a State does not necessarily imply a contract. It may be of encouragement merely, ‘holding out a hope, but not amounting to a The offer of the State covenant.’ was an exemption from taxation, and the asserted acceptance of the offer which was said to consummate a con- tract was the building of a railroad, and it was observed that the ‘building and operating of the railroad was a sufficient detriment or change of posi- tion to constitute a consideration if the other elements were present. But the other elements are that the promise and the detriment are the conventional inducements each for the other. No matter what the actual motive may have been, by the express or implied terms of the supposed con- tract, the promise and consideration must purport to be the motive each for the other, in whole or at least in part. It is not enough that the prom- ise induces the detriment or that the detriment induces the promise, if the other half is wanting.’ The ‘offer’ and ‘acceptance’ we held not to constitute a contract.” 2 See Cooley on Taxation, 146, and cases cited; Hoge v. Railroad Co., 99 U.S. 348, 25 L. ed. 303; Railway Co. v. Philadelphia, 101 U. S. 528, 25 L. ed. 912; Vicksburg, S. & P. R. R. Co. v Dennis, 116 U. S. 665, 29 L. ed. 770, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 625; Chicago, B. & K. C. Ry. Co. v. Guffey, 120 U. S. 569, 30 L. ed. 732, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 693; Yazoo & M. R. R. Co. v. Thomas, 132 U. S. 174, 33 L. ed. 302, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 68; Bk. of Commerce v. Ten- nessee, 163 U. S. 416, 41 L. ed. 211, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1113, mod. s. c. 161 U. S. 184, 40 L. ed. 645, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 456; St. Paul, M. & M. R. Co. ». Todd County, 142 U.S. 282, 35 L. ed. 1014, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 281, aff. 38 Minn. 163, 36 N. W. 109; Chicago Theological Seminary »v. Illinois, 188 U. S. 662, 47 L. ed. 641, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 386; New York v. State Board of Tax Commissioners, 199 U. S. 11, 50 L. ed. 65, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 705, 4 Ann. Cas. 381, affirming 174 N. Y. 417, 67 N. E. 69, 63 L. R. A. 884; St. LouisCHAP. IX] v. United Railways Co., 210 U.S. 266, 52 L. ed. 1054, 28 Sup. Ct. ont 630; New York v. aa 237 Wee 20: 59 L. ed. 951, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 549; Robinson ». Tadic, etc., Lumber, etc., Co., 128 Ark. 550, 194 S. W. 870, 3 A. L. R. 1426; People v. Bennett Medical College, 248 Ill. 608, 94 N. E. 110, 140 Am. St. Rep. 237; Vogt v. Louisville, 173 Ky. 119, 190 S. W. 695, Ann. Cas. 1918 E, 1040; Sibley, etc., R. Co. v. Elliott, 1386 La. 793, 67 So. 884, Ann. Cas. 1916 D, 1228; New Standard Club v. McGowen, 111 Miss. 92, 71 So. 289, Ann. Cas. 1918 E, 274: Scottish Rite Bldg. Co. v. Lan- caster County, 106 Neb. 95, 182 N. W. Ra 7 A. Lb: R. 1020- St; Paulis Church v. Concord, 75 N. H. 420, 75 Atl. 531, 27 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 910, Ann. Cas. 1912 A, 350; Northwest Auto Co. v. Hurlburt, 104 Oreg. 398, 207 Pac. 161; Camas Stage Co. v. Kozer, 104 Oreg. 600, 209 Pac. 95, 25 A. L. R. 27; Stillman v. Lynch, 56 Utah, 540, 192 Pac. 272, 12 A. L. R. 552; In re Ferrel, 112 Wash. 231, 192 Pac. 10, 11 A. L. R. 820; M. E. Church Baraca Club v. Madison, 167 Wis. 207, 167 N. W. 258, L. R. A. 1918 D, 1124. See also Wheeling & B. Bridge Co. ». Wheeling Bridge Co., 138 U. S. 287, 34 L. ed. 967, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 301; Joy v. St. Louis, 138 U.S. 1, 34 L. ed. 843, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 243, ande Free- port W. Co. v. Freeport, 180 U.S. 587, 45 L. ed. 679, 21 Sup. Ct. Ree vias Exemption will not be presumed. New Orleans, etc., R. Co. v. New Orleans, 143 U. S. 192, 36 L. ed. 121, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 406; Northwest Auto Co. v. Hurlburt, 104 Oreg. 398, 207 Pac. 161. But the rule of strict construction as applied to exemption statutes will not be so strictly applied as to render the exempting language so narrow and restricted as to defeat the apparent legislative purpose. St. Paul’s Church ». C ancora) wb) Nee ee 420, 75 Atl. 531, 27 L. R. A. s.) 910, Ann. Cas. 1912 A, 350. If an exemption from taxation exists in any case it must be the re sult of a deliberate intention to relinquish this prerogative of sovereignty, distinctly manifested. Easton Bank »v. Com- monwealth, 10 Pa. St. 450; Providence PROTECTION TO PERSON AND PROPERTY 573 Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 514, 7 L. ed. 939; Christ Church v. Philadelphia, 24 How. 300, 16 L. ed. 602; Gilman v. Sheboygan, 2 Black, 510, 17 L. ed. 305; Louisville & N. R. R. Co. v. Palmes, 109 U. S. 244, 27 L. ed. 922, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 193; Memphis Gaslight Co. »v. Shelby Co., 109 U.S. 398, 27 L. ed. 976, é Sup. Ct. Rep. 205; Chicago, B. & K. ». Ry. Co. v. Guffey, 120 U.S. 569, 30 L ed. 732, 7Sup. Ct. Rep. 693; State . Hilbert, 72 Wis. 184, 39 N. W. 326 ; Herrick v. Randolph, 13 Vt. 525; E ast Saginaw Salt Manuf. Co. v. ae Sagi- naw, 19 Mich. 259; in error, 13 Wall. 373, 20 L. ed. 611; People v. Roper, 35 N. Y. 629; People v. Commissioners of Taxes, 47 N. Y. 501; People v. Daven- port, 91 N. Y. 574; Lord ». Litchfield, 36 Conn. 116, 4 Am. Rep. 41; Erie Railway Co. v. Commonwealth, 66 Pa. St. 84, 5 Am. Rep. 351; Bradley ». McAtee, 7 Bush, 667, 3 Am. Rep. 309; North Missouri R. R. Co. v. Maguire, a Mo. 490, a a Rep. 141; Illinois Cent. R. R. v. Irvin, 72 a aba: Covington v. a itucky, ra 3 U. 31, 43 L. ed. 679, 19 Sup. Rep a Citizens’ Sav. Bk. »v. Geeta 173 U. S. 636, 43 L. ed. 840, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 530, 571; Louisville v. Bk. of Louisville, 174 U. S. 439, 43 L. ed. 1039, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 753. Grant of ‘powers, rights, and capacities” of old corporation to new does not include exemptions enjoyed by old. Covington & L. Turnpike Road Co. v. Sandford, 164 U. 8. 578, 41 L. ed. 560, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 198. An act giving a new corporation ‘“‘all the . . . powers, rights, reserva- tions, restrictions and liabilities given to and imposed the old, does not convey to the an exemption from taxation enjoyed by the old. Home Ins. & T. Co. v. Tennessee, 161 U. S. 198, 40 L. ed. 669, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 476, following Phenix F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Tennessee, above; People, &c. v. Cook, 148 U. S. 397, 37 L. ed. 498, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 645, aff. 110 N. Y. 443, 18 N. E. 113, 47 Hun, 467. See also Wilmington & W. R. Co. v. Alsbrook, 146 U. S. 279, 36 L. ed. 972, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 72. In Wright v. Georgia Railroad, etc., Co., 216 U. S. 420, 54 L. ed. 544, 30 upon”’ new574 Sup. Ct. Rep. 242, the court says: ‘“ Whatever doubt may have existed as to the effect of the transfer to one company of the powers and privileges of another in conferring a tax exemption possessed by the latter is set at rest by Rochester R. Co. ». Rochester, 205 U. S. 286, 51 L. ed. 784, 791, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 469, 474. Mr. Justice Moody ...sums the matter up by saying: ‘We think it is now the rule, notwithstanding earlier decisions and dicta to the contrary, that a statute authorizing or directing the grant or transfer of the “‘privi- leges’’ of a corporation which enjoys immunity from taxation or regula- tion should not be interpreted as including that immunity.’” Com- pare Memphis & L. R. R. Co. »v. R. R. Com’rs, 112 U.S. 609, 28 L. ed. 837, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 299; St. Louis Iron M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Berry, 113 U. S. 465, 28 L. ed. 1055, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 529; Tennessee v. Whitworth, 117 U.S. 139, 29 L. ed. 833, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 645. See Detroit St. Ry. Co. v. Guthard, 51 Mich. 180, 16 N. W. 328. Grant of ‘‘all the rights and privi- eges”’, omitting ‘‘and immunities”, impliedly excludes the grant of exemp- tion from taxation enjoyed by old company. Phoenix F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Tennessee, 161 U.S. 174, 40 L. ed. 660, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 471, aff. 91 Tenn. 566. And where a corporation is exempt from taxation and becomes insolvent and its charter is sold under judicial decree, but not the shares of stock of the stockholders, the purchasers ac- quire only the right to reorganize as a corporation, subject to all the laws then in force, including a constitutional amendment passed after the organ- ization of the original corporation and prior to the sale of the charter. Mer- cantile Bank v. Tennessee, 161 U. S. 161, 40 L. ed. 656, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 466, aff. 95 Tenn. 212, 31S. W. 989. Delay in accepting a charter con- taining exemptions from taxation until after a constitutional provision pro- hibiting exemptions has been passed is fatal. Planters’ Ins. Co. v. Tennessee, 161 U. S. 198, 40 L. ed. 667, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 466, aff. 95 Tenn. 203, 31 S. W. 992. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I Where a corporation authorized to carry on an insurance business takes advantage, after the adoption of a constitutional provision prohibiting exemptions from taxation, of a statute permitting it to do a banking business, it so radically changes the character of its business as to lose its exemption from taxation. Memphis City Bank v. Tennessee, 161 U. S. 186, 40 L. ed. 664, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 468, aff. 91 Tenn. 574, 19S. W. 1045. And when two corporations are consolidated, a new corporation is formed, and if before the consolidation takes place a constitutional prohibition of exemp- tions from taxation has been made, the legislative grant to the consolidated corporation of all the ‘“‘rights, privi- leges, and immunities” of the old corporations is ineffective to exempt the new from taxation. Keokuk & W. R. Co. v. Missouri, 152 U.S. 301, 38 L. ed. 450, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 592, aff. 99 Mo. 30, 12 S. W. 290; Yazoo & M. V. R. R. Co. v. Adams, 180 U.S. 1, 45 L. ed. 395, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 240, aff. 77 Miss. 302, 305, 315, 24 So. 200, 317, 28 So. 956. The new corporation is subject to all the laws existing at the time of its organization. People, &c. v. Cook, 148 U. S. 397, 37 L. ed. 498, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 645, aff. 110 N. Y. 443,18 N. E. 113, 47 Hun, 467. Exemption of shares of stock from taxation exempts the company unless the contrary expressly appears. State v. Heppenheimer, 58 N. J. L. 633, 34 Atl. 1061, 32 L. R. A. 648. Exemption from taxation of lands granted by Congress until such lands are sold by railroad, extends only to time when equitable title is conveyed, although legal title may not be given until long after. Winona & St. Peter Land Company v. Minnesota, 159 U. S. 526, 40 L. ed. 247, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 83. Exemption of the capital of a bank does not include property bought in on foreclosure of its stock and stock- loan mortgages. Louisiana v. Bd. of Assessors, 167 U.S. 407, 42 L. ed. 215, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1000; Bk. of Com- merce v. Tennessee, 161 U. S. 134, 40 L. ed. 645, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 456; Shelby Co. v. Union & Planters’ Bank,CHAP. IX] PROTECTION TO PERSON AND PROPERTY 575 The power of the legislature to preclude itself in any case from exercising the power of eminent domain is not so plainly decided. It must be conceded, under the authorities, that the State grant exclusive franchises, — like the right to construct the railroad which shall be built between certain termini; or the may only only bridge which shall be permitted over a river between specified limits ; or to own the only ferry which shall be allowed at a certain point,’ — but the grant of an exclusive privilege will not prevent the legis- lature from exercising the power of eminent domain in respect thereto. Franchises, like every other thing of value, and in the nature of property, within the State, are subject to this power ; and any of their incidents may be taken away, or themselves alto- gether annihilated, by means of its exercise.” And it is believed that an express agreement in the charter, that the power of eminent domain should not be so exercised as to impair or affect the franchise granted, if not void as an agreement beyond the power of the legis- lature to make, must be considered as only a valuable portion of the privilege secured by the grant, and as such liable to be appropriated under the power of eminent domain. 161 U. S. 149, 40 L. ed. 650, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 558. A State statute provided that the property of a terminal company should be assessed, in conformity with an agreement between the company and the municipality, ‘‘at the amount of the capital stock of said company, and no more.” It was held, in view of the general attitude of the courts toward claims of exemption, the fact that a subsequent agreement between the company and the municipality showed that the parties concerned did not suppose that they had an irrevo- cable grant, and the further fact that the Constitution of the State provided that all general laws and special acts, under which corporations were formed or by which they were created, might be altered or repealed, that the repeal of the statute did not impair the obli- gation of a contract. New York v. Mealy, 254 U.S. 47, 65 L. ed. 123, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 17. 1 West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 16 Vt. 446, and 6 How. 507, 12 L. ed. 535; Binghamton Bridge Case, 3 Wall. 51, 18 L. ed. 137; Shorter »v. Piscataqua Bridge H. 35; Boston Smith, 9 Ga. 517; v. N. H. Bridge, 7 N. The exclusiveness of the grant, Water Power Co. v. Boston & Worces- ter R. R. Co., 23 Pick. 360; Boston & Lowell R. R. v. Salem & Lowell R. R., 2 Gray, 1; Costar v. Brush, 25 Wend. 628; California Telegraph Co. v. Alta Telegraph Co., 22 Cal. 398; Williams v. Wingo, 177 U. S. 601, 44 L. ed. 905, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 793; Vallejo Ferry Co. Solano Aquatic Club, 165 Cal. 255, 131 Pac. 864, Ann. Cas. 1914 C, 1197; Warner v. Ford Lumber, etc., Co., 123 Ky. 103, 93 S. W. 650, 12 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 667; Muncy Elec., etc., Co. v. People’s Elec., etc., Co., 218 Pa. St. 636, 67 Atl. 956; Sistersville Ferry Co. v. Russell, 52 W. Va. 356, 43 S. E. 107, 59 L. R. A. 513; State v. Fandre, 54 W. Va. 122, 46 S. BE. 269, 102 Am. St. Rep. 927, 63 L. R. A. 877, 1 Ann. Cas. 104. 2Matter of Kerr, 42 Barb. 119; Enfield Toll Bridge Co. v. Hartford & N. H. R. R. Co., 17 Conn. 40, 454; West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 16 Vt. 446. and 6 How. 507, 12 L. ed. 535; Philadelphia & Gray’s Ferry Co.’s Appeal, 102 Pa. St. 123; Appleton Water Works Co. v. Railroad Com- mission, 154 Wis. 121, 142 N. W. 476, 47 L. R. A. (n. s.) 770, Ann. Cas. 1915 B, 1160.576 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [voL. 1 and the agreement against interference with it, if valid, constitute elements in its value to be taken into account in assessing compen- sation; but appropriating the franchise in such a case no more vio- lates the obligation of the contract than does the appropriation of land which the State has granted under an express or implied agree- ment for quiet enjoyment by the grantee, but which nevertheless may be taken when the public need requires. 1 All grants are subject to this implied condition; and it may well be worthy of inquiry, whether the agreement that a franchise granted shall not after- wards be appropriated can have any other or greater force than words which would make it an exclusive franchise, but which, not- withstanding, would not preclude a subsequent grant on making compensation.” 1 Alabama, &c. R. R. Co. v. Kenney, 39 Ala. 307; Baltimore, &c. Turnpike Co. v. Union R. R. Co., 35 Md. 224; Eastern R. R. Co. v. Boston, &c. R. R. Co., 111 Mass. 125, 15 Am. Rep. 13; Com. v. Broad St. R. Co., 219 Pa. St. 11, 67 Atl. 950. A way may be condemned through a cemetery in spite of a contract to the contrary. In re Twenty-second St., 15 Phila. 409, 102 Pa. St. 108. The use of land held by the State may be condemned. Tait’s Exec. v. Central Lunatic Asylum, 84 Va. 27, 4 S. E. 697. That property has been acquired by a corporation under the right of eminent domain does not prevent further appropriation of it under the same right. Chicago, &c. R. R. Co. v. Lake, 71 Ill. 333; Peoria, &e. R. R. Co. v. Peoria, &e. Co., 66 II. 174; Eastern R. R. Co. v. Boston, &eo RR. Cos nl Mass: 125: post, pp. 1115, note 4, 1190, note 2 and cases referred to. 2 Mr. Greenleaf, in a note to his edi- tion of Cruise on Real Property, Vol. II. p. 67, says upon this subject: “In regard to the position that the grant of the franchise of a ferry, bridge, turnpike, or railroad is in its nature exclusive, so that the State cannot interfere with it by the creation of another similar franchise tending ma- terially to impair its value, it is with great deference submitted that an See important distinction should be ob- The words of the grant are as much in the way served between those powers of goy- ernment which are essential attributes of sovereignty, indispensable to be al- ways preserved in full vigor, such as the power to create revenues for public purposes, to provide for the common defense, to provide safe and convenient ways for the public neces- sity and convenience, and to take private property for public uses, and the like, and those powers which are not thus essential, such as the power to alienate the lands and other prop- erty of the State, and to make con- tracts of service, or of purchase and sale, or the like. Powers of the former class are essential to the constitution of society, as without them no political community can well exist; and neces- sity requires that they should continue unimpaired. They are intrusted to the legislature to be exercised, not to be bartered away; and it is indispen- sable that each legislature should assemble with the same measure of sovereign power which was held by its predecessors. Any act of the legisla- ture disabling itself from the future exercise of powers intrusted to it for the public good must be void, being in effect a covenant to desert its para- mount duty to the whole people. It is therefore deemed not competent for a legislature to covenant that it will not, under any circumstances, open another avenue for the public travel within certain limits, or in a certain term of time; such covenant being an alienation of sovereign powers, andCHAP. Ix] of the grant of a conflicting franchise in other. PROTECTION TO PERSON AND PROPERTY 577 the one case as in the It has also been intimated in a very able opinion that the police power of the State could not be alienated even by express grant. a violation of public duty.” See also Redfield on Railways (3d ed.), Vol. I. p. 258. That the intention to relinquish the right of eminent domain is not to be presumed in any legislative grant, see People v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 32 Barb. 102; Illinois & Michigan Canal v. Chicago & Rock Island Rail- road Co., 14 Ill. 314; Eastern R. R. Co. v. Boston, &c. R. R. Co., 111 Mass. 125, 15 Am. Rep. 13; Turnpike Co. v. Union R. R. Co., 35 Md. 224. 1“ We think the power of the legis- lature to control existing railways in this respect may be found in the general control over the police of the country, which resides in the law- making power in all free States, and which is, by the fifth article of the Bill of Rights of this State, expressly de- clared to reside perpetually and in- alienably in the legislature, which is perhaps no more than the enunciation of a general principle applicable to all free States; and which cannot therefore be violated so as to deprive the legislature of the power, even by express grant to any mere public or private corporation. And when the regulation of the policy of a city or town, by general ordinances, is given to such towns and cities, and the regu- lation of their own internal police is given to railroads, to be carried into effect by their by-laws and other regulations, it is, of course, always, in all such cases, subject to the su- perior control of the legislature. That is a responsibility which legislatures cannot divest themselves of, if they would.” Thorpe v. R. & B. R. R. Co., 27 Vt. 140, 149, per Redfield, Ch. J. In Northern Pacific R. Co. ». Minnesota, 208 U. S. 583, 52 L. ed. 630, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 341, Mr. Justice Day, who delivered the opinion of the court, said: ‘‘There can be no question as to the attitude of this court upon this question, as it has been uniformly held that the right to VOL. I—37 exercise the police power is a continu- ing one; that it cannot be con- tracted away, and that a requirement that a company or individual comply with reasonable police regulations without compensation is the legiti- mate exercise of the power, and not in violation of the Constitutional in- hibition against the impairment of the obligation of contracts. In New Works & Nh: RH. Coy #: Bristol, 151 U.S. 556, 567, 38 L. ed. 269, 272, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 437, 440, the doc- trine was thus laid down by Chief Justice Fuller, speaking for the court: ‘It is likewise thoroughly established in this court that the inhibitions of the Constitution of the United States upon the impairment of the obliga- tions of contracts, or the deprivation of property without due process, or of the equal protection of the laws, by the States, are not violated by the legitimate exercise of legislative power in securing the public safety, health, and morals. The governmental power of self-protection cannot be contracted away, nor can the exercise of rights granted, nor the use of property, be withdrawn from the implied liability to governmental regulations in par- ticulars essential to the preservation of the community from injury. Bos- ton Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25, 24 L. ed. 989; Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U. S. 659, 24 L. ed. 1036; Barbier v. Con- nolly, 113 U. S. 27, 28 L. ed. 923, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 357; New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Louisiana Light & H. P. & Mfg. Co., 115 U. S. 650, 29 L. ed. 516, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 252; Mug- ler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 31 L. ed. 205, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 273; Budd ». New York, 143 U. S. 517, 36 L. ed. 247, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 45, 72 Sup. Ct. Rep. 468.’’’ See also New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Drainage Commission, 197 U. S. 453, 49 L. ed. 831, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 471; Chicago, ete., R. Co. v. Tranbarger, 238 U. S. 67, 59 L. ed.578 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I And this opinion is supported by those cases where it has been held that licenses to make use of property in certain modes may be re- voked by the State, notwithstanding they may be connected with grants and based upon a consideration.!_ But this subject we shall recur to hereafter. 1204, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 678; Pennsyl- vania Hospital v. Philadelphia, 245 U.S. 20, 62 L. ed. 124, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 35; Ft. Smith v. Hunt, 72 Ark. 556, 82 S. W. 163, 105 Am. St. Rep. 51, 66 L. R. A. 238; Colorado, etc., R. Co. v. Fort Collins, 52 Colo. 281, 121 Pace. 747, Ann. Cas. 1913 D, 646; Black- man Health Resort v. Atlanta, 151 Ga: 507, 107, S: Be 525; 17 A. LL. R- 516: Ohio, ete., R. Co. v. McClelland, 25 Ill. 140; Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Kercheval, 16 Ind. 84; Hunter ». Colfax Consol. Coal Co., 175 Iowa, 245, 154 N. W. 1037, 157 N. W. 145, PraRAG old Dy 1b;eAnn: Cas; 1917 E, 803; Board of Education v. Phillips, 67 Kan. 549, 73 Pac. 97, 100 Am. St. Rep. 475; Dirken v. Great Northern Paper Co., 110 Me. 374, 86 Atl. 320, Ann. Cas. 1914 D, 396; State v. Hyman, 98 Md. 596, 57 Atl. 6, 64 L. R. A. 637, 1 Ann. Cas. 742; Jones Hollow Ware Co. v. Crane, 134 Md. 103, 106 Atl. 274, 3 A. L. R. 1658; State »v. New England Furniture, etc., Co., 126 Minn. 78, 147 N. W. 951, 52 L. R. A. (Nn. 8.) 932, Ann. Cas. 1915 D, 549; Oxford Bank v. Love, 111 Miss. 699, 72 So. 133, 8 A. L. R. 894; Wal- lace v. Reno, 27 Nev. 71, 73 Pac. 528, 103 Am. St. Rep. 747, 63 L. R. A. 337; Ex parte Boyce, 27 Nev. 299, 75 Pac. 1, 65 L. R. A. 47, 1 Ann. Cas. 66; Interurban R., ete., Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 98 Ohio St. 287, 120 N. E. 831, 3 A. L. R. 696; Sabre v. Rutland R. Co., 86 Vt. 347, 85 Atl. 693, Ann. Cas. 1915 C, 1269; In re Guerra, 94 Vt. 1, 110 Atl. 224, 10 A. L. R. 1560; Victoria v. Victoria Ice, etc., Co., 134 Va. 1384, 114S. E. 92, 28 AG Latkes 562: The legislature cannot make an irrepealable contract as to that which affects public morals or public health, so as to limit the exercise of the po- lice power over the subject-matter. Butcher’s Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746, 28 L. ed. 585, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 652. See State v. Noyes, 47 Me. 189, on the same subject. In Bradley v. McAtee, 7 Bush, 667, 3 Am. Rep. 309, it was decided that a provision in a city charter that, after the first improvement of a street, repairs should be made at the expense of the city, was not a contract; and on its repeal a lot-owner, who had paid for the improvement, might have his lot assessed for the repairs. Com- pare Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. St. 146, 3 Am. Rep. 615. upon this subject, Brick Presbyterian Church v. Mayor, &e. of New York, 5 Cow. 538; Vanderbilt v. Adams, 7 Cow. 349; State »v. Sterling, 8 Mo. 697; Hirn »v. State, 1 Ohio St. 15; Calder v. Kurby, 5 Gray, 597; Brimmer v. Boston, 102 Mass. 19. A statute authorizing the suspension of a license to operate a motor vehicle pending the determination of a charge of driving while intoxicated is valid; People v. Stryker, 206 N. Y. Supp. 146. The power of the State, after grant- ing licenses for the sale of liquors and receiving fees therefor, to revoke the licenses by a general law forbidding sales, has been denied in some cases. See State v. Phalen, 3 Harr. 441; Adams v. Hachett, 27 N. H. 289; Boyd v. State, 36 Ala. 329. But there is no doubt this is entirely com- petent. Freleigh v. State, 8 Mo. 606; State v. Sterling, 8 Mo. 697; Calder »v. Kurby, 5 Gray, 597; Met. Board of Excise v. Barrie, 34 N. Y. 657; Baltimore v. Clunet, 23 Md. 449; Fell v. State, 42 Md. 71, 20 Am. Rep. 83; Commonwealth v. Brennan, 103 Mass. 70; McKinney v. Salem, 77 Ind. 213; Moore v. Indianapolis, 120 Ind. 483, 22 N. E. 424; La Croix v. Co. Com’rs, 50 Conn. 321; Brown v. State, 82 Ga. 224, 7S. E. 915; Beer Company v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25, 24 L. ed. 989; Gherna v. State, 16 Ariz. 344, 146 Pac. 494, Ann. Cas. 1916 D, 94; Sarlo v. Pulaski County, 1 See,CHAP. Ix] PROTECTION TO PERSON od AND PROPERTY 579 It would seem, therefore, to be the prevailing opinion, and one based upon sound reason, that the State cannot barter away, or in any manner abridge or weaken, any of those essential powers which are inherent in all governments, and the existence of which in full vigor is important to the well-being of organized society; and that any contracts to that end are void upon general principles, and can- not be saved from invalidity by the provision of the national Con- stitution now under consideration. If the tax cases are to be re- garded as an exception to this statement, the exception is perhaps to be considered a nominal rather than a real one, since taxation is for the purpose of providing the State a revenue, and the State laws which have been enforced as contracts in these cases have been sup- posed to be based upon consideration, by which the State receives the benefit which would have accrued from an exercise of the relin- quished power in the ordinary mode. 76 Ark. 336, 88 S. W. 953; Cassidy v. Macon, 133 Ga. 689, 66 S. E. 941; Gillesby v. Canyon County, 17 Idaho, 586, 107 Pac. 71; Boerner v. Thomp- son, 278 Ill. 153, 115 N. E. 866; State v. Hill, 177 Iowa, 270, 158 N. W. 518; Newman v. Lake, 70 Kan. 848, 79 Pac. 675; Cassidy v. Drake, 154 Ky. 25, 156 S. W. 1032; Clark v. Tower, 104 Md. 175, 65 Atl. 3; George »v. Travis, 185 Mich. 597, 152 N. W. 207, L. R. A. 1915 E, 408; Claussen »v. Luverne, 103 Minn. 491, 115 N. W. 643, 15 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 698, 14 Ann. Cas. 673; State v. Parker Distilling Co., 236 Mo. 219, 237 Mo. 1038, 139 S. W. 453; Dinuzzo v. State, 85 Neb. 351, 123 N. W. 309, 29 L. R. A. (N. 8s.) 417; Ex parte Deats, 22 N. M. 536, 166 Pac. 913; State v. De Silva, 105 Tex. 95, 145 S. W. 330; State v. Bur- lington Drug Co., 84 Vt. 243, 78 Atl. 882; Krueger v. Colville, 49 Wash. 295, 95 Pac. 81. Compare State v. Coake, 24 Minn. 247; Pleuler ». State, 11 Neb. 547, 10 N. W. 481. An additional license may be re- quired within the period covered by a former one. Rowland v. State, 12 Tex. App. 418. A merchant’s license may be re- voked by a police regulation incon- sistent with it. State v. Burgoyne, 7 Lea, 173. But a municipality cannot add to the statutory grounds for revo- cation. Lantz v. Hightstown, 46 N. J. L. 102. Grants of the right to establish lotteries are mere privileges, and as such are revocable. Bass v. Nashville, Meigs, 421, 33 Am. Dec. 154; State v. Morris, 77 N. C. 512; Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 814, 25 L. ed. 1079; Justice v. Com., 81 Va. 209; State v. Woodward, 89 Ind. 110; Douglas v. Kentucky, 168 U. S. 488, 42 L. ed. 553, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 199. But if they are authorized by the con- stitution, they cannot be abolished by the legislature. New Orleans v. Hous- ton, 119 U.S. 265, 30 L. ed. 411, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 198. In short, the State cannot by any legislation irrevocably hamper itself in the exercise of its police power. Toledo, &c. R. R. Co. v. Jacksonville, 67 Ill. 37; Chicago Packing Co. v. Chicago, 88 Ill. 221; Beer Company v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25, 24 L. ed. 989; Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U. S. 659, 24 L. ed. 1036; Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 814 25 L. ed. 1079; People »: Commissioners, 59 N. Y. 92. An act requiring all underground electric lines to be laid under the orders of a commission violates no contract rights of their owners. Peo- ple v. Squire, 107 N. Y. 593, 14 N. E. 820. No doubt if a license is revoked for which the State has collected money, good faith would require that the money be returned. Hirn »v. State, 1 Ohio St. 15.580 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I Exclusive Privileges. Under the rulings of the Federal Supreme Court, the grant of any exclusive privilege by a State, if lawfully made, is a contract, and not subject to be recalled As every exclusive privilege is in the nature of a monopoly, it may at some time become a question of interest, whether there are any, and if so what, limits to the power of the State to grant them. In former times, such grants were a favorite resort in England, not only to raise money for the personal uses of the monarch, but to reward favorites; and the abuse grew to such enormous magnitude that Parliament in the time of Elizabeth, and again in the times of James [., interfered and prohibited them. What is more important to us is, that in 1602 they were judicially declared to be illegal.2 These, however, were monopolies in the ordinary occupations of life; and the decision upon them would not affect the special privileges most commonly granted. Where the grant is of a franchise which would not otherwise exist, no question can be made of the right of the State to make it exclusive, unless the constitution of the State forbids it; because, in contemplation of law, no one is wronged when he is only excluded from that to which he never had any right. An exclusive right to build and maintain a toll bridge or to set up a ferry may therefore be granted; and the State may doubtless limit, by the requirement of a license, the number of persons who shall be allowed to engage in employments the entering upon which is not a matter of common right, and which, because of their liability to abuse, may require special and extraordinary police supervision. The business of selling intoxicating drinks and of setting up a lottery are illustra- tions of such employments. But the grant of a monopoly in one of the ordinary and necessary occupations of life must be as clearly illegal in this country as in England; and it would be impossible to defend and sustain it, except upon the broad ground that the legisla- ture may control and regulate the ordinary employments, even to the extent of fixing the prices of labor and of commodities. As no one pretends that the legislature possesses such a power, and as its existence would be wholly inconsistent with regulated liberty, it must follow that lawful grants of special privileges must be con- fined to cases where they will take from citizens generally nothing which before pertained to them as of common right.3 Changes in the General Laws. We have said in another place that citizens have no vested right in the existing general laws of the 1 Ante, p. 570, and cases cited; 710, 27 L. R. A. 545; White v. Hol- Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, man, 44 Oreg. 180, 74 Pac. 933, 1 Ann. 74, 21 L. ed. 394, 408. Cas. 843. gare, v. Allain, 11 Rep. 84. _ The grant of an exclusive privilege n re Lowe, 54 Kan. 757, 39 Pac. in slaughtering cattle in the vicinityCHAP. IX] PROTECTION TO PERSON AND PROPERTY 581 State which can preclude their amendment or repeal, and that there is no implied promise on the part of the State to protect its citizens against incidental injury occasioned by changes in the law.! Never- theless there may be laws which amount to propositions on the part of the State, which, if accepted by individuals, will become binding contracts. by which the State promises the payment of a gratuity to any one who will do any particular act supposed to be for the State interest. Unquestionably the State may repeal such a law at any time;? Of this class are perhaps to be considered bounty laws, but when the proposition has been accepted by the performance of the act before the law is repealed, the contract would seem to be complete, and the promised gratuity becomes a legal debt. And where a State was owner of the stock of a bank, and by the law its bills and notes were to be received in payment of all debts due to the State, it was properly held that this law constituted a contract with those who should receive the bills before its repeal and that a repeal of the law could not deprive these holders of the right which it assured. Such a law, with the acceptance of the bills under it, “comes within the definition of a contract. upon a good and valuable consideration, — a consideration bene- It is a contract founded of New Orleans was upheld as an ex- ercise of the police power, in the Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 21 L. ed. 394. See also White v. Hol- man, 44 Oreg. 180, 74 Pac. 933, 1 Ann. Cas. 843. But the legislature could not by a grant of this kind make an irrepealable contract. In regard to public health and public morals a legislature cannot by any contract limit the exercise of the police power to the prejudice of the general wel- fare. Butcher’s Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U. S. 746, 28 L. ed: 585, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 652. An irrepealable contract giving ex- elusive privileges with reference to lighting a city, may be made. New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U. S. 650, 29 L. ed. 516, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 252; Louisville Gas Co. v. Citizens’ Gas Co., 115 U.S. 683, 29 L. ed. 510, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 265. So as to the privilege of furnishing water. New Orleans Water Works v. Rivers, 115 U.S. 674, 29 L. ed. 525, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 273; St. Tammany Water Works v. New Orleans Water Works, 120 U. S. 64, 30 L. ed. 563, 7 Sup. Ct. Water Co. v. 55 Conn. 1, 10 Rep. 405; Citizens’ Bridgeport, &c. Co., Atl. 170. 1 Quoted in Graves v. Howard, 159 N. C. 594, 601, 75S. E. 998, Ann. Cas. 1914 C, 565. 2 Christ Church v. Philadelphia, 24 How. 300, 16 L. ed. 602; East Sagi- naw Salt Manuf. Co. v. East Sagi- naw, 19 Mich. 259, 2 Am. Rep. 82, and 13 Wall. 373, 20 L. ed. 611. The repeal of a statute granting an annuity or pension for past services or providing a system of pensions or annuities for public officers does not violate the obligation of a contract. Pennie v. Reis, 132 U. S. 464, 33 L. ed. 426, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 149, affirming 80 Cal. 266, 22 Pac. 176; Dale v. Governor, 3 Stew. (Ala.) 387; People v. Coler, 173 N. Y. 103, 65 N. E. 956; State v. Policemen’s Pension Fund, 121 Wis. 44, 98 N. W. 954. 3 People v. Auditor-General, 9 Mich. 327; Smith v. Auditor-General, 80 Mich. 205, 45 N. W. 136. See Mont- gomery v. Kasson, 16 Cal. 189; Adams v. Palmer, 51 Me. 480.582 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I ficial to the State; as its profits are increased by sustaining the credit, and consequently extending the circulation, of the paper of the bank.” ! [Soa law which makes coupons on State bonds receivable for all taxes and dues is a contract, the obligation of which no subse- quent law can impair ;? and an act, changing after issue the place of payment of municipal bonds, is invalid.’] That laws permitting the dissolution of the contract of marriage are not within the intention of the clause of the Constitution under discussion, has been many times affirmed.‘ It has been intimated, however, that, so far as property rights are concerned, the contract must stand on the same footing as any other, and that a law passed after the marriage, vesting the property in the wife for her sole use, would be void, as impairing the obligation of contracts.® But cer- tainly there is no such contract embraced in the marriage as would prevent the legislature changing the law, and vesting in the wife solely all property which she should acquire thereafter; and if the property had already become vested in the husband, it would be protected in him, against legislative transfer to the wife, on other grounds than the one here indicated. “The obligation of a contract,” it is said, “consists in its binding force on the party who makes it. This depends on the laws in exist- ence when it is made; these are necessarily referred to in all con- tracts, and forming a part of them as the measure of the obligation to perform them by the one party, and the right acquired by the other. There can be no other standard by which to ascertain the extent of either, than that which the terms of the contract indicate, 1 Woodruff v. Trapnall, 10 How. interest upon its warrants already 190, 13 L. ed. 383. See Winter issued. State v. Barrett, 25 Mont. v. Jones, 10 Ga. 190; Furman »v. 112, 63 Pac. 1030. Nichol, 8 Wall. 44, 19 L. ed. 370; South Carolina v. Stall, 17 Wall. 3 Dillingham v. Hook, 32 Kan. 185, 4 Pac. 166. So it has been held, is 425, 21 L. ed. 650; Keith v. Clark, 97 U. S. 454, 24 L. ed. 1071; State »v. Sneed, 9 Baxt. (Tenn.) 472; Clark v. Keith, 8 Lea (Tenn.) 703. 2 Antoni v. Wright, 22 Gratt. 833; Hartman v. Greenhow, 102 U. S. 672, 26 L. ed. 271, Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S: 270; 29 L: ed. 185, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 903, 962; McCullough ». Virginia, 172 U.S. 102, 43 L. ed. 382, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 184, and many cases therein cited. Compare Cornwall v. Com., 82 Va. 644; Com. v. Jones, 82 Va. 789; Ellett v. Com., 85 Va. 517, 8 8. E. 246. So of county warrants. People v. Hall, 8 Col. 485, 9 Pac. 34. State cannot lower the rate of one requiring bonds payable to bearer to be registered. Priestly v. Watkins, 62 Miss. 798. See People v. Otis, 90 N. Y. 48. But compare Gurnee »v. Speer, 68 Ga. 711. 4 Per Marshall, Ch. J., Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 629, 4 L. ed. 629; Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 31 L. ed. 654, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 723; Maguire v. Maguire, 7 Dana, 181; Clark v. Clark, 10 N. H. 380; Cronise v. Cronise, 54 Pa. St. 255; Carson v. Carson, 40 Miss. 349; Adams v. Palmer, 51 Me. 480; Worth- ington v. District Court, 37 Nev. 212, 142 Pac. 230, L. R. A. 1916 A, 696. 5’ Holmes v. Holmes, 4 Barb. 295.CHAP. IX] PROTECTION TO PERSON AND PROPERTY 583 according to their settled legal meaning; when it becomes consum- mated, the law defines the duty and the right, compels one party to perform the thing contracted for, and gives the other a right to enforce the performance by the remedies then in force. If any sub- sequent law affect to diminish the duty or to impair the right, it necessarily bears on the obligation of the contract, in favor of one party, to the injury of the other; hence any law which in its operations amounts to a denial or obstruction of the rights accruing by a contract, though professing to act only on the remedy, is directly obnoxious to the prohibition of the Constitution.” ! 1McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 608, 612, 11 L. ed. 397. See also Myers v. Knickerbocker Trust Co., 139 Fed. 111, 71 C. C. A. 199, 1 L. R. A. (Nn. 8.) 1171; Board of Education v. Littrell, 173 Ky. 78, 190 S. W. 465; Graves v. Howard, 159 N. C. 594, 601, 75 S. E. 998, Ann. Cas. 1914 C, 565; Blakemore v. Cooper, 15 N. D. 5, 106 N. W. 566, 125 Am. St. Rep. 574, 4 L. R. A. (nN. 8.) 1074; Milwaukee Mechanics’ Insurance Co. v. Russell, 65 Ohio St. 230, 62 N. E. 338, 56 L. R. A. 159; Cincinnati v. Public Utilities Commission, 98 Ohio St. 320, 121 N. E. 688, 3 A. L. R. 705; Barton v. Wichita River Oil Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 187 S. W. 1048. “The obligation of a contract .. . is the law which binds the parties to perform their agreement. The law, then, which has this binding obligation must govern and control the contract, in every shape in which it is intended to bear upon it, whether it affects its validity, construction, or discharge. It is, then, the municipal law of the State whether that be written or un- written, which is emphaticaily the law of the contract made within the State, and must govern it throughout, whenever its performance is sought to be-enforced.”” Washington, J., in Og- den v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213, 257, 259. ‘‘As I understand it, the law of the contract forms its obligation.” Thompson, J., ibid. 302. ‘The obli- gation of the contract consists in the power and efficacy of the law which applies to, and enforces performance of, the contract, or the payment of an equivalent for non-performance. The obligation does not inhere and subsist “Tt is in the contract itself, proprio vigore, but in the law applicable to the con- tract. This is the sense, I think, in which the Constitution uses the term ‘obligation.’” Trimble, J., ibid. 318. And see Van Baumbach v. Bade, 9 Wis. 559; Johnson v. Higgins, 3 Met. (Ky.) 566; People v. Ingersoll, 5S) Neave 4: A law does not impair the obliga- tion of a contract within the mean- ing of the Constitution, if neither party is relieved thereby from _per- forming anything of that which he ob- ligated himself to do. But if either party is absolved from performing any of these things, such obligation is impaired, whether absolution is af- fected directly and expressly or in- directly, and only as the result of some modification of the legal pro- ceedings for enforcement. State ez rel. National Bond & Security Co. »v. Krahmer, 105 Minn. 422, 117 N. W. 780, 21 L. R. A. (nN. 8.) 157. The assurance held out by the rey- enue laws of a State to purchasers at tax sales that the tax sale certificates and tax deeds issued to them would be prima facie evidence of the regu- larity of the tax proceedings, although relating to the remedy, was held to constitute a substantial inducement to the purchase, entering into the con- tract with the State, and so materially affecting its value that it could not be taken away by subsequent legislation without impairing its obligation. Fisher v. Betts, 12 N. D. 197, 96 N. W. 132; Blakemore v. Cooper, 15 N. D. 5, 106 N. W. 566, 125 Am. St. Rep. 574, 4 L. R. A. (nN. 8.) 1074. Requirement of a license tax for584 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [voL. I the civil obligation of contracts which [the Constitution] is designed to reach; that is, the obligation which is recognized by, and results from, the law of the State in which it ismade.’ If, therefore, a con- tract when made is by the law of the place declared to be illegal, or deemed to be a nullity, or a nude pact, it has no civil obligation; because the law in such cases forbids its having any binding efficacy or force. spondent legal duty on the other It confers no legal right on the one party, and no corre- . There is no means allowed or recognized to enforce it; for the maxim is ex nudo pacto non oritur actio.? But when it does not fall within the predicament of being either illegal or void, its obligatory force is coextensive with its permission to do what a contract with the city gives authority to do, without “let, molestation, or hindrance’’, is void. Stein v. Mobile, 49 Ala. 362, 20 Am. Rep. 283. But licenses in general are subject to the taxing power. Home Ins. Co. v. Augusta, 93 U. S. 116, 23 L. ed. 825; Reed v. Beall, 42 Miss. 472; Cooley on Taxation, 386, and cases cited. A law taxing a debt to the debtor and making him pay the tax and de- duct the amount from the debt is valid. Lehigh V. R. R. Co. v. Com., 129 Pa. St. 429, 18 Atl. 410. So where the debtor, a foreign corpora- tion, has paid for the privilege of being exempt from taxation. New York, L. E. & W. R. R. Co. v. Com., 129 Pa. St. 463, 18 Atl. 412. A law giving interest on debts, which bore none when contracted, was held void in Goggans v. Turnispeed, 1 S. C. (nx. s.) 40, 7 Am. Rep. 23. The legislature cannot authorize the compulsory extinction of ground rents, on payment of a sum in gross. Pa- lairet’s Appeal, 67 Pa. St. 479, 5 Am. Rep. 450. A State law, discontinuing a public work, does not impair the obligation of contracts, the contractor having his just claim for damages. Lord ». Thomas, 64 N. Y. 107. A law giving an abutter a right to damages when a railroad is laid in the street is valid as to changes there- after made by a railroad, though a city ordinance had given it the right to use the street. Drady v. Des Moines, &c. Co., 57 Iowa, 393, 10 See also Mulholland »v. N. W. 754. Des Moines, &c. Co., 60 Iowa, 740, 13 N. W. 726. A statute providing for reversion of land condemned for railroad pur- poses if work on the road has ceased for eight years is valid. The property right does not attach to the land inde- pendent of its use for public purposes. Skillman v. Chicago, &c. Ry. Co., 78 Iowa, 404, 43 N. W. 275. Where at the time a contract was made a judgment for damages for breach thereof was renewable indefi- nitely, a later enacted statute limiting absolutely the life of the judgment is void with regard to this contract. Bettman v. Cowley, 19 Wash. 207, 53 Pac. 53, 40 L. R. A. 815, and see also Palmer v. Laberee, 23 Wash. 409, 63 Pac. 216. Warrant of attorney to holder of note to enter judgment against maker upon default of payment, and issue execution, etc., valid when note was made cannot be invalidated by sub- sequent statute. Second Ward Sav- ings Bank v. Schranck, 97 Wis. 250, 73 N. W. 31, 39 L. R. A. 569. 1 Quoted in Graves v. Howard, 159 N. C. 594, 601, 75 S. E. 998, Ann. Cas. 1914 C, 565. 2 Zane v. Hamilton County, 189 U. S. 370, 47 L. ed. 858, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 5388; Griffith v. Connecticut, 218 U. S. 563, 54 L. ed. 1151, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 132; Reynolds v. Lee, 180 Ala. 76, 60 So. 101; Hammond ». Clark, 186 Ga. 318, 71S. E: 479) 38! Ly Reece (x. s.) 77; Hord v. State, 167 Ind. 622, 79 N. BE. 916; Noble v. Davison, 177 Ind. 19, 96 N. EB. 325; West- minster Water Co. v. Westminster,CHAP. IX] PROTECTION TO PERSON AND PROPERTY 585 stipulations.”’! [The settled judicial construction of a constitutional provision or a statute, so far as contract rights are thereunder ac- quired, is to be deemed a part of such provision or statute, and enters into and becomes a part of the obligation of the contract ; and no subsequent change in construction can be suffered to defeat or impair the contract.?| Such being the obligation of a contract, it is obvious that the rights of the parties in respect to it are liable to be affected in many ways by changes in the laws, which it could not have been the inten- tion of the constitutional provision to preclude. “There are few laws which concern the general police of a State, or the government of its citizens, in their intercourse with each other or with strangers, which may not in some way or other affect the contracts which they have entered into or may thereafter form. For what are laws of evidence, or which concern remedies, frauds, and perjuries, laws of registration, and those which affect landlord and tenant, sales at auction, acts of limitation, and those which limit the fees of pro- fessional men, and the charges of tavern-keepers, and a multitude of others which crowd the codes of every State, but laws which may affect the validity, construction, or duration, or discharge of con- tracts?”’® necessarily affecting the obligation of contracts. But the changes in these laws are not regarded as Whatever belongs 98 Md. 551, 56 Atl. 990, 103 Am. St. An ordinance which in effect denies Rep. 424, 64 L. R. A. 630; State v. any contract obligation is not a law Missouri Pac. R. Co., 242 Mo. 339, impairing the obligation of contract 147 S. W. 118; Missouri, etc., R. Co. though the obligation does exist. v. Bailey, 53 Tex. Civ. App. 295, 115 still be S. W. 601; State v. Superior Court, 67 Wash. 37, 120 Pac. 861, Ann. Cas. 1913 D, 78; Baltimore, ete., R. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 81 W. Va. 457, 94S. E. 545, L. R. A. 1918 D, 268. 1 Story on Const. § 1380. Slave contracts, which were legal when made, are not rendered invalid by the abolition of slavery; nor can the States make them void by their The contract may enforced if found to exist notwithstanding such denial. St. Paul Gaslight Co. v. St. Paul, 181 U.S. 142, 45 L. ed. 788, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 575, aff. 78 Minn. 39, 80 N. W. 774, 877. 2 Douglass v. Pike County, 101 U.S. 677, 25 L. ed. 968, and cases cited; Louisiana v. Pilsbury, 105 U. S. 278, 26 L. ed. 1090; Los Angeles v. Los Angeles City Water Co., 177 U. S. 558, 44 L. ed. 886, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. constitutions, or deny remedies for their enforcement. White v. Hart, 13 Wall. 646, 20 L. ed. 685; Osborn »v. Nicholson, 13 Wall. 654, 20 L. ed. 689; Jacoway v. Denton, 25 Ark. 641. An act of indemnity held not to relieve a sheriff from his obligation on his official bond to account for moneys which had been paid away under military compulsion. State v. Gatzweiler, 49 Mo. 17, 8 Am. Rep. 119. 736; Levy litsche, 40 La. Ann. 500, 4 So. 472. But such construction is not “‘settled’’ by a single decision. McLure v. Melton, 24 8. C. 559. 3 Washington, J., in Ogden v. Saun- ders, 12 Wheat. 213, 259, 6 L. ed. 606, 621. As to the indirect modification of contracts by the operation of police laws, see ante, pp. 576-579, notes; post, pp. 1225-1270.586 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I merely to the remedy may be altered according to the will of the State, provided the alter ation does not impair the obligation of the contract ;! and it does not impair it, provided it leaves the parties a substantial remedy, according to the course of justice as it existed at the time the contract was made.” 1Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311, 316, 11 L. ed. 143, 145, per Taney, Ch. J. See Aled Bernheimer v. Con- verse, 206 U.S. 516, 51 L. ed. 1163, 27 Sup. Ct. Rone 755, 11 Ann. Cas. 589; Ettor v. Tacoma, 228 U. S. 148, 5 L. ed. 773, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 428; Myers v. Knickerbocker Trust Co., 139) Rede thi Gi ©: ©. At 199) 1 Tee AS NaS)! tid Boswell) o: Security Mut. Life Ins. Co., 193 N. Y. 465, 86 N. B. 532, 19 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 946; Graves v. Howard, 159 N. C. 594, 75 S. E. 998, Ann. Cas. 1914 C., 565; Boggess v. Buxton, 67 W. Va 679, 69 S. E. 367, 21 Ann. Cas. 289. Whether impairing remedy impairs obligation of contract, see note to 26 L. ed. U.S. 132. 2 Stocking v. Hunt, Van Baumbach »v. Bade, 9 Wis. 559: Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 316, 11 L. ed. 143; McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 608, 11 L. ed. 397; Butler »v. Palmer, 1 Hill, 324; Van Rensselaer v. Snyder, 9 Barb. 302, and 13 N. Y. 299; Conkey v. Hart, 14 N. Y. 22; Guild v Rogers, 8 Barb. 502; Story v. Furman, 25 N. Y. 214; Coriell v. Ham, 4 Greene (Iowa), 455; Heyward v. Judd, 4 Minn. 483; Swift v. Fletcher, 6 Minn. 550; Maynes v. Moore, 16 Ind. 116; 3 Denio, 274; Smith v. Packard, 12 Wis. 371; Gros- venor v. Chesley, 48 Me. 369; Van Rensselaer v. Ball, 19 N. Y. 100; Van Rensselaer v. Hays, 19 N. Y. 68; Litchfield v. McComber, 42 Barb. 288; Paschal v. Perez, 7 Tex. 348; Auld v. Butcher, 2 Kan. 185; Kenyon v. Stewart, 44 Pa. St. 179; Clark ». Martin, 49 Pa. St. 299; Rison »v. Farr, 24 Ark. 161; Oliver v. McClure, 28 Ark. 555; Holland v. Dickerson, 41 Iowa, 367; Chicago Life Ins. Co. »v. Auditor, 101 Ill. 82; Wales v. Wales, 119 Mass. 89; Sanders v. Hillsborough Insurance Co., 44 N. H. 238; Hunt- zinger v. Brock, 3 Grant’s Cases, 243; Mechanics’, &c. Bank Appeal, 31 Conn. 63; Garland v. Brown’s Adm’r, 23 Gratt. 173; Chattaroi Ry. Co. ». Kinner, 81 Ky. 221; Myers v. Knicker- bocker Trust Co., 139 Fed. 111, 71 C. C. A. 199, 1 L. R. A (Ww. s:) tia Baltimore Sav. Bank v. Weeks, 110 Md. 78, 72 Atl. 475, 22 L. R. A. (Nn. 8.) 221; Andrews v. Grand Lodge of Masons, 189 N. C. 697, 128 S. E. 4; Graves v. Howard, 159 N. C. 594, 75 S. E. 998, Ann. Cas. 1914 C, 565; Klein v. Hutton, 49 N. D. 248, 191 N. W. 485; Flagg v. Locke, 74 Vt. 320, 52 Atl. 424. “Statutes concerning remedies are such as relate to the course and mode of procedure to enforce or defend a substantive right. Matters which be- long to the remedy are subject to change and alteration, and even repeal provided the legislation does not oper- ate to impair a contract or deprive one of a vested property right. If the changing or repealing statute leaves the parties a substantial remedy, the legislature does not exceed its author- ity. Rights and remedies shade one into the other so that it is sometimes difficult to say that a particular act creates a right or merely gives @ remedy. So, also, a statute, under the form of taking away or changing a particular remedy, may take away an existing property right, or impair the obligation of a contract.” Ettor v. Tacoma, 228 U. S. 148, 57 L. ed. 773, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 428. An act declaring that the power of sale contained in a mortgage shall be inoperative when the note it secures is barred by the statute of limitations, which is applicable to contracts which existed at the time of its becoming operative, affects, as to such contracts, only an existing remedy, and does not impair the obligation of the contract, when a reasonable time has elapsed thereafter within which the action could have been instituted. Graves v. Howard, 159 N. C. 594, 75S. E. 998, Ann. Cas. 1914 C, 565.CHAP. IX] Changes in Remedies. PROTECTION TO PERSON AND PROPERTY 587 It has accordingly been held that laws changing remedies for the enforcement of legal contracts, or abolish- ing one remedy where two or more existed, may be perfectly valid, even though the new or the remaining remedy be less convenient than that which was abolished, or less prompt A requirement that before a manda- mus shall issue to compel the receipt in accordance with contract of coupons for taxes, the petitioner shall pay the tax, and on proving the genuineness of the coupons shall have it refunded, is valid, though adopted after the formation of the contract. Antoni v. Greenhow, 107 U.S. 769, 27 L. ed. 468, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 91; Moore v. Green- how, 114 U. S. 338, 29 L. ed. 240, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1020. See Rousseau ». New Orleans, 35 La. Ann. 557. A statute providing for a review of judgments does not enter into con- tracts so that it may not be changed. Rupert v. Martz, 116 Ind. 72, 18 N. E. 381. See United Co’s v. Weldon, 47 N. J. L. 59; State v. Slevin, 16 Mo. App. 541. But the collection of a special tax cannot be hindered by requiring, after it is voted, a special collection bond with local sureties: Edwards v. Williamson, 70 Ala. 145; or a new and cumbrous mode of col- lection. Seibert v. Lewis, 122 U. S. 284, 30 L. ed. 1161, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1190. 1 Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213, 6 L. ed. 606; Beers v. Haughton, 9 Pet. 329, 9 L. ed. 145; Tennessee v. Sneed, 96 U. S. 69, 24 L. ed. 610; Bumgardner v. Circuit Court, 4 Mo. 50; Tarpley v. Hamer, 17 Miss. 310; Danks v. Quackenbush, 1 Denio, 128, 3 Denio, 594, and 1 N. Y. 129; Bronson v. Newberry, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 38; Rockwell v. Hubbell’s Adm’rs, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 197; Evans v. Montgomery, 4 W. & S. 218; Hollo- way v. Sherman, 12 Iowa, 282; Sprecker v. Wakeley, 11 Wis. 432; Smith v. Packard, 12 Wis. 371; Porter v. Mariner, 50 Mo. 364; Morse v. Goold, 11 N. Y. 281; Penrose v. Erie Canal Co., 56 Pa. St. 46; Smith v. Van Gilder, 26 Ark. 527; Coosa River St. B. Co. v. Barclay, 30 Ala. 120; Baldwin v. Newark, 38 N. J. L. 158; Moore v. State, 43 N. J. L. 203 ; Newark and speedy. Forman, 33 N. J. Simpson v. Savings Bank, 466; Wilson v. Standefer, 399, 46 L. ed. 612, 22 Sup. 384; Waggoner v. Flack, 188 U. S. 595, 47 L. ed. 609; 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 345; Bernheimer v. Con- verse, 206 U. S. 516, 51 L. ed. 1163, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 755, 11 Ann. Cas. 589; Graves v. Howard, 159 N. C. 594, 75 S. BE. 998, Ann. Cas. 1914 C, 565; Slover v. Union Bank, 115 Tenn. 347, 89 S. W. 399, 1 L. R. A. (n. s.) 528; Kirkman ». Bird, 22 Utah, 100, 61 Pac. 338, 83 Am. St. Rep. 774, 58 L. R. A. 669; Smith v. Northern Neck Mut. Fire Asso. of Virginia, 112 Va. 192, 70S. E. 482, 38 L. R. A. (Nn. 8.) 1016; Boggess v. Buxton, 67 W. Va. 679, 69 S. E. 367, 21 Ann. Cas. 289. “Tt is true that the remedy for the enforcement of a contract some- times enters into the contract itself, but that is where an endeavor has been made to so change the existing remedy that there is no effective and enforceable one left, or the remedy is so far impaired that the party desirous of enforcing the contract is left prac- tically without any efficient means of doing so; but in the case of an altera- tion of a remedy, if one is left or pro- vided which is fairly sufficient, the obligations of a contract are not im- paired, although the remedies existing at the time it was entered into are taken away.’ Waggoner »v. Flack, 188 U. S. 595, 47 L. ed. 609, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 345. In Nebraska it is held that “a legislative act does not impair the obligation of a contract, entered into before the act became operative, merely because such act abrogates or holds in abeyance an existing remedy for the collection of debts, provided another equally adequate remedy is substituted that does not lessen the value of the contract.” Jn re Davis, 103 Neb. 703, 173 N. W. 695. Savings Bank v. Eq. 486; 56 N. H. 184 U.S. Ct. Rep.588 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [voL. I “ Without impairing the obligation of the contract, the remedy may certainly be modified as the wisdom of the nation shall direct.” ! To take a strong instance: although the law at the time the contract is made permits the creditor to take the body of his debtor in execu- tion, there can be no doubt of the right to abolish all laws for this 1 Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 200, 4 L. ed. 529, 549, per Mar- shall, Ch. J.; Ward v. Farwell, 97 Ill. 593. “There is a broad distinction be- tween laws impairing the obligation of contracts and those which simply undertake to give a more efficient remedy to enforce a contract already made.’’ Bernheimer v. Converse, 206 U. S. 516, 51 L. ed. 1163, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 755, 11 Ann. Cas. 589. A statute allowing the defense of want of consideration in a sealed instrument previously given does not violate the obligation of contracts. Williams v. Haines, 27 Iowa, 251. See further Parsons v. Casey, 28 Iowa, 431; Curtis v. Whitney, 13 Wall. 68, 20 L. ed. 513; Cook v. Gregg, 46 N. Y. 439. Right accruing under stipulation in a note to waive process and confess judgment may be taken away. Wor- sham v. Stevens, 66 Tex. 89, 17 S. W. 404. A statutory judgment lien may be taken away. Watson v. New York @entral’ Re ne Cone4“ Ne 157: Woodbury v. Grimes, 1 Col. 100. Contra, Gunn v. Barry, 15 Wall. 610, 21 L. ed. 212. The law may be so changed that a judgment lien shall not attach before a levy. Moore Holland, 16 8S. C. 15. It may be ex- tended before it has expired. Ellis ». Jones, 51 Mo. 180. The mode of per- fecting a lien may be changed before it has actually attached. Whitehead v. Latham, 83 N. C. 232. The value of a mechanic’s lien may not be materially affected by a statute making consummate a_ previously inchoate right of dower. Buser ov. Shepard, 107 Ind. 417, 8 N. E. 280. The obligation of the contract is not impaired if a substantial remedy remains. Richmond v. Richmond, &e. R. R. Co., 21 Gratt. 611. See Mabry v. Baxter, 11 Heisk. 682; Edwards ». Kearzey, 96 U.S. 595, 24 L. ed. 793; Baldwin v. Newark, 38 N. J. L. 158; Augusta Bank v. Augusta, 49 Me. 507; Thistle v. Frostbury Coal Co., 10 Md. 129. It is competent to provide by law that all mortgages not recorded by a day specified shall be void. Vance ». Vance, 32 La. Ann. 186; aff. 108 U.S. 514, 27 L. ed. 808, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 854. See Gilfillan v. Union Canal Co., 109 U. S. 401, 27 L. ed. 977, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 304; Gurnee v. Speer, 68 Ga. 711. But an act which postpones an existing valid mortgage lien and makes a subsequently created lien superior to the mortgage lien, impairs the obligation of the contract. Na- tional Bank of Commerce v. Jones, 18 Okla. 555, 91 Pac. 191, 12 L. R. A. (nw. s.) 310, 11 Ann. Cas. 1041. Where the individual liability of officers or stockholders in a corpora- tion is a part of the contract itself, it cannot be changed or abrogated as to existing debts. Hawthorne v. Calef, 2 Wall. 10, 17 L. ed. 776; Corning v. McCullough, 1 N. Y. 47; Story ». Furman, 25 N. Y. 214; Norris »v. Wrenshall, 34 Md. 494; Brown »v. Hitcheock, 36 Ohio St. 667; Provi- dence Savings Institute v. Skating tink, 52 Mo. 452; St. Louis, &ec. Co. v. Harbine, 2 Mo. App. 134; Bern- heimer v. Converse, 206 U. S. 516, 51 L. ed. 1163, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 755, 11 Ann. Cas. 589; Myers v. Knicker- bocker Trust Co., 139 Fed. 111, 71 @. @. AY 199; 1 bs Re Aa Ne Ss) elias Pusey & Jones Co. v. Love, 6 Penn. (Del.) 80, 66 Atl. 1013, 130 Am. St. Rep. 144, 11 L. R. A. (@w. 8s.) 953. But where it is imposed as a penalty for failure to perform some corporate or statutory duty, it stands on the footing of all other penalties, and may be revoked in the discretion of the legislature. Union Iron Co. »v. Pierce, 4 Biss. 327; Bay City, &c. Co. ». Austin, 21 Mich. 390; Breitung ». Lindauer, 37 Mich. 217; Gregory »v.CHAP. IX] PROTECTION TO PERSON AND PROPERTY 589 purpose, leaving the creditor to his remedy against property alone. “Confinement of the debtor may be a punishment for not perform- ing his contract, or may be allowed as a means of inducing him to perform it. But the State may refuse to inflict this punishment, or may withhold this means, and leave the contract in full force. Imprisonment is no part of the contract, and simply to release the prisoner does not impair the obligation.’ *1 Nor is there any con- stitutional objection to such a modification of those laws which exempt certain portions of a debtor’s property from execution as shall increase the exemptions to any such extent as shall not take away or substantially impair the remedy, nor to the modifications being made applicable to contracts previously entered into. The State “may, if it thinks proper, direct that the necessary implements of agriculture, or the tools of the mechanic, or articles of necessity in household furniture, shall, like wearing-apparel, not be liable to execution on judgments. Regulations of this description have always been considered, in every civilized community, as properly belonging to the remedy, to be exercised or not, by every sover- eignty, according to its own views of policy and humanity. It must reside in every State to enable it to secure its citizens from unjust and harassing litigation, and to protect them in those pursuits which are necessary to the existence and well-being of every community.’ Denver Bank, 3 Col. 332. See Coffin v. Rich, 45 Me. 507; Weidenger v. Spruance, 101 Ill. 278. And the legislature may give additional reme- dies to make the obligation of the stockholder effectual, so long as his original undertaking is not enlarged. Bernheimer v. Converse, 206 U. S. 516, 51 L. ed. 1163, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 755, 11 Ann. Cas. 589. Where formerly when building sub- ject to mechanic’s lien stood upon mortgaged premises, it had upon fore- closure of lien to be sold and removed from premises, provision may be made by statute that the court when deeming it to be for best interests of parties may order land and building sold at the same time, giving mort- gagee priority of claim upon proceeds of land and lien or priority upon those of buildings. Red Riv. V. Nat. Bk. v. Craig, 181 U. S. 548, 45 L. ed. 994, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 703. 1 Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 4 L. ed. 529, per Marshall, Ch. J.; Mason v. Haile, 12 Wheat. 370, 6 L. ed. 2 660; Beers v. Haughton, 9 Pet. 329, 9 L. ed. 145; Penniman’s Case, 103 U.S. 714, 26 L. ed. 602; Sommers 4 Vt. 278, 24 Am. Dec. 604; Ware v. Miller, 9 S. C. 13; Bronson v. Newberry, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 38: Maxey v. Loyal, 38 Ga. 531; Kirkman v. Bird, 22 Utah, 100, 61 Pac. 338, 83 Am. St. Rep. 774, 58 L. R. A. 669. A special act admitting a party imprisoned on a judgment for tort to take the poor debtor’s oath was sustained in Matter of Nichols, 8 R. I. 50. v. Johnson, 2Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311, 315, per Taney, Ch. J.; Rockwell v. Hubbell’s Adm’rs, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 197; Quackenbush v. Danks, 1 Denio, 128. 3 Denio, 594, and 1 N. Y. 129; Morse v. Goold, 11: N. Y. 281; Sprecker v. Wakeley, 11 Wis. 432; Cusic v. Douglas, 3 Kan. 123; Maxey v. Loyal, 38 Ga. 531; Hardeman »v. Downer, 39 Ga. 425; Hill v. Kessler, 63 N. C. 437; Farley v. Dowe, 45 Ala. 324; Sneider v. Heidelberger, 45 Ala. 126; Inre Kennedy, 2 8..C. 216; Mar-590 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I But a homestead exemption law, where none existed before, cannot be applied to contracts entered into before its enactment ;’ and in several recent cases the authority to increase exemptions and make them applicable to existing contracts has been altogether denied,” on the ground that, while professedly operating upon the remedy only, they in effect impair the obligation of the contract. [A statute providing that a general assignment for the benefit of credi- tors shall dissolve all attachments made within ten days prior thereto, is invalid as applied to contracts made when the right of attachment was absolute.*] Laws which change the rules of evi- dence relate to the remedy only; and while, as we have elsewhere shown, such laws may, on general principles, be applied to existing causes of action, so, too, it is plain that they are not precluded from such application by the constitutional clause we are considering.° And it has been held that the legislature may even take away a tin ». Hughes, 67 N. C. 293; Maull v. Vaughn ,45 Ala. 134; Breitung v. Lindauer, 37 Mich. 217; Coleman ». Ballandi, 22 Minn. 144. Assignments for purpose of evading exemption laws may be prohibited. Sweeney v. Hunter, 145 Pa. 363, 22 Atl. 653, 14 L. R. A. 594. 1Gunn v. Barry, 15 Wall. 610, 21 L. ed. 212; Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595, 24 L. ed. 793; Homestead Cases, 22 Gratt. 266; Lessley v. Phipps, 49 Miss. 790; Foster v. Byrne, 76 Iowa, 295, 35 N. W. 513, 41 N. W. 22; Squire v. Mudgett, 61 N. H. 149; Brearley School v. Ward, 201 N. Y. 358, 94 N. E. 1001, 40 L. R. A. (wn. 8.) 1215, Ann. Cas. 1912 B, 251; Davidson v. Richardson, 50 Oreg. 323, 89 Pac. 742, 91 Pac. 1060, 126 Am. St. Rep. 738, 17 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 319. It may, however, be made applicable to previous rights of action for torts. Parker v. Savage, 6 Lea, 406; McAfee v. Covington, 71 Ga. 272. 2 Johnson v. Fletcher, 54 Miss. 628, 28 Am. Rep. 388; Wilson v. Brown, 58 Ala. 62, 29 Am. Rep. 727; Duncan v. Barnett, 11 S. C. 333, 32 Am. Rep. 476; Harris v. Austell, 2 Bax. 148; Wright v. Straub, 64 Tex. 64; Coch- ran v. Miller, 74 Ala. 50; Cohn ». Hoffman, 45 Ark. 376; Re Estate of Heilbron, 14 Wash. 536, 45 Pac. 153, See also Canadian 35 L. R. A. 602. & A. M. & Trust Co. v. Blake, 24 Wash. 102, 63 Pac. 1100. 3 Statutes pertaining to the remedy are merely such as relate to the course and form of proceedings, but do not affect the substance of a judgment when pronounced.”’ Per Merrick, Ch. J., in Mortun v. Valentine, 15 La. Ann. 150. See Watson v. N. Y. Central R. R. Co., 47 N. Yo om Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595, 24 L. ed. 793. The Supreme Court of the United States has held that a statute which undertook to exempt from the ante- cedent debts of an insured policies on his life and their proceeds payable to his estate, was a violation of the constitutional prohibition. Bank of Minden, v. Clement, 256 U. S. 126, 65 L. ed. 857, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 408. But if after the debt is contracted and before judgment upon it, the debtor marries, it is held im’Tennessee that he is thereby entitled to the exemption in land owned by him before. Dye v. Cook, 88 Tenn. 275, 12 S. W. 631. 4 Peninsular Lead, ete. Works ». Union Oil, ete., Co., 100 Wis. 488, 76 N. W. 359, 69 Am. St. Rep. 934, 42 L. R. A. 331. 5 Neass v. Mercer, 15 Barb. 318; Rich v. Flanders, 39 N. H. 304; How- ard v. Moot, 64 N. Y. 262; Henry »v. Henry, 31S. C. 1, 9S. E. 726; Reitler v. Harris, 223 U. S. 487, 56 L. ed. 497,CHAP. Ix] PROTECTION TO PERSON AND PROPERTY 591 common-law remedy altogether, without substituting any in its place, if another and efficient remedy remains. Thus, a law abolish- ing distress for rent has been sustained as applicable to leases in force at its passage ;' and it was also held that an express stipula- tion in the lease, that the lessor should have this remedy, would not prevent the legislature from abolishing it, because this was a sub- ject concerning which it was not competent for the parties to contract in such manner as to bind the hands of the State. In the language of the court: “If this is a subject on which parties can contract, and if their contracts when made become by virtue of the Constitu- tion of the United States superior to the power of the legislature, then it follows that whatever at any time exists as part of the ma- chinery for the administration of justice may be perpetuated, if parties choose so to agree. That this can scarcely have been within the contemplation of the makers of the Constitution, and that if it prevail as law it will give rise to grave inconveniences, is quite obvi- ous. Every such stipulation is in its own nature conditional upon the lawful continuance of the process. The State is no party to their contract. It is bound to afford adequate process for the enforce- ment of rights; but it has not tied its own hands as to the modes by which it will administer justice. Those from necessity belong to the supreme power to prescribe; and their continuance is not the 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 248; post, pp. 777- 782. On this subject see the discus- sions in the Federal courts. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 4 L. ed. 529; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213, 6 L. ed. 606; Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311, 11 L. ed. 143; McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 608, 11 L. ed. 397; Curtis v. Whitney, 13 Wall. 68, 20 L. ed. 513. “So far as the Federal Constitution is concerned, it is within the acknowl- edged power of every legislature to prescribe the evidence which shall be received, and the effect of that evi- dence, in the courts of its own gov- ernment.” State v. Lapointe, 81 N. He 2278 123) Atl: 6925 31 As bn he 1212. A statute making the entry upon the official record of the forfeiture of school land for default in payment of the purchase price prima facie, but not conclusive, evidence that all preliminary steps essential to a valid forfeiture were properly taken, and that the forfeiture was duly declared, does not offend against the contract clause of the Constitution, even where the change is made applicable to pending causes. Reitler v. Harris, 223 U.S. 437, 56 L. ed. 497, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 248. An act declaring that no policy of life insurance shall be received in evidence, when the application is referred to in it, unless a copy thereof is attached to it, is valid. New Era Life Ass. v. Musser, 120 Pa. St. 384, 14 Atl. 155. But the rule that failure to register evidences of titles shall not render them inadmissible in evidence, cannot be changed by a new constitution. This is put on the ground that the only means to estab- lish and enforce the contract would be thus destroyed. Texas Mex. Ry. Co. v. Locke, 74 Tex. 370, 12 S. W. 80. 1 Van Rensselaer v. Snyder, 9 Barb. 302, and 13 N. Y. 299; Guild v. Rogers, 8 Barb. 502; Conkey »v. Hart, 14 N. Y. 22.592 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I subject of contract between private parties. In truth, it is not at all probable that the parties made their agreement with reference to the possible abolition of distress for rent. The first clause of this special provision is, that the lessor may distrain, sue, re-enter, or re- sort to any other legal remedy, and the second is, that in cases of distress the lessee waives the exemption of certain property from the process, which by law was exempted. This waiver of exemption was undoubtedly the substantial thing which the parties had in view; but yet perhaps their language cannot be confined to this object, and it may therefore be proper to consider the contract as if it had been their clear purpose to preserve their legal remedy, even if the legislature should think fit to abolish it. In that aspect of it the contract was a subject over which they had no control.” ? But a law which deprives a party of all legal remedy must neces- sarily be void. “If the legislature of any State were to undertake to make a law preventing the legal remedy upon a contract lawfully made and binding on the party to it, there is no question that such legislature would, by such act, exceed its legitimate powers. Such an act must necessarily impair the obligation of the contract within the meaning of the Constitution.”’? This has been held in regard to those cases in which it was sought to deprive certain classes of persons of the right to maintain suits because of their having par- 1Conkey v. Hart, 14 N. Y. 22, 30; citing Handy v. Chatfield, 23 Wend. 35; Mason »v. Haile, 12 Wheat. 370, 6 L. ed. 660; Stocking v. Hunt, 3 Denio, 274; and Van Rensselaer »v. Snyder, 13 N. Y. 299. See Briscoe »v. An act withdrawing all the property of a debtor from the operation of legal process, leaving only a barren right to sue, is void. State v. Bank of South Carolina, 1 S. C. 63. As the States are not suable except Anketell, 28 Miss. 361; Manteleone at their own option, the laws which v. Seaboard, etc., Ins. Co., 126 La. they may pass for the purpose they 807, 52 So. 1032; Scott »v. Barnes may repeal at discretion. Railroad County, 15 N. D. 259, 107 N. W. 61. 2Call v. Hagger, 8 Mass. 430. See Co. v. Tennessee, 101 U. S. 337, 25 L. ed. 960; Railroad Co. v. Alabama, Osborn v. Nicholson, 13 Wall. 662, 20 L. ed. 695; U.S. v. Conway, Hempst. 313; Johnson v. Bond, Hempst. 533; West v. Sansom, 44 Ga. 295; Grif- fin v. Wilcox, 21 Ind. 370; Penrose »v. Erie Canal Co., 56 Pa. St. 46; Thomp- son v. Commonwealth, 81 Pa. St. 314; Oshkosh Waterworks Co. v. Oshkosh, 187 U. S. 487, 47 L. ed. 249, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 234; Waggoner v. Flock, 188 U. S. 595, 47 L. ed. 609, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 345; National Surety Co. »v. Architectural Decorating Co., 226 U. S. 276, 57 L. ed. 221, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 17; ante, p. 517. 101 U. S. 832, 25 L. ed. 973; State v. Bank, 3 Bax. 395; In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 448, 31 L. edi 216, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 164; Baltzer v. North Carolina, 161 U. S. 240, 40 L. ed. 684, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 500, and this even after suit has been instituted. Horne »v. State, 84 N. C. 362; Railroad Co. v. Ten- nessee, supra. The more so where the judgment of the court is only recom- mendatory. Baltzer v. North Caro- lina, 161 U.S. 240, 40 L. ed. 684, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 500.CHAP. IX] PROTECTION TO PERSON AND PROPERTY 593 ticipated in rebellion against the government.’ And where a statute does not leave a party a substantial remedy according to the course of justice as it existed at the time the contract was made, but shows upon its face an intention to clog, hamper, or embarrass the pro- ceedings to enforce the remedy, so as to destroy it entirely, and thus impair the contract so far as it is in the power of the legislature to do it, such statute cannot be regarded as a mere regulation of the remedy, but is void, because a substantial denial of right.2 But a judgment for a tort is not a contract, since it is not based upon the assent of parties. Mc- 116; 1 Rison v. Farr, 24 Ark. 611; Farland v. Butler, 8 Minn. Jackson v. Butler, 8 Minn. 117. But there is nothing to preclude the people of a State, in an amendment to their constitution, taking away rights of action, or other rights, so long as they abstain from impairing the obligation of contracts, and from imposing punishments. The power to do so has been exercised with a view to the quieting of controversies and the restoration of domestic peace after the late civil war. Thus, in Missouri and some other States, all rights of action for anything done by the State or Federal military authorities during the war were taken away by constitutional provision; and the authority to do this was fully supported. Drehman v. Stifle, 41 Mo. 184, in error, 8 Wall. 595, 19 L. ed. 508. And see Hess v. Johnson, 3 W. Va. 645. A remedy also may be denied to a party until he has performed his duty to the State in respect to the demand in suit; e.g. paid the tax upon the debt sued for. Walker ». Whitehead, 43 Ga. 538; Garrett v. Cordell, 43 Ga. 366; Welborn v. Akin, 44 Ga. 420. But this is denied as regards contracts entered into be- fore the passage of the law. Walker v. Whitehead, 16 Wall. 314, 21 L. ed. 357; Lathrop v. Brown, 14 Fed. Cas. No. 8, 108, 1 Woods, 474; Macon, etc., R. Co. v. Little, 45 Ga. 370; Vanduzer v. Heard, 47 Ga. 624; Mitchell ». Cothrans, 49 Ga. 125; Gardner ». Jeter, 49 Ga. 195; Kimbro v. Fulton Bank, 49 Ga. 419; Shaw v. Robinson, 111 Ky. 715, 64S. W. 620. 2Oatman v. Bond, 15 Wis. 20. VOL. I—38 S ee also Hendrickson v. Apperson, 245 U. S. 105, 62 L. ed. 178, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 44. As to control of remedies, see post, p. 754. The remedy to enforce a contract is a part of the contract, and any sub- sequent law of the which so affects the remedy as to substantially impair and lessen the value of the contract is such an impairment of the obligation of the contract as to bring it within the inhibition of the Constitu- tion. Re Fidelity State Bank, 35 Idaho, 797, 209 Pac. 449, 31 A. L. R. State 781. See also Myers v. Knicker- bocker Trust Co., 139 Fed. 111, 71 @oGi A. 199: 1: Re Ay Gs) 1a: Harrison v. Remington Paper Co., 140 Fed. 385, 72 C. C. A. 405, 3 L. R. A. (nx. s.) 954, 5 Ann. Cas. 314; Blake- 15 N. D. 5, 106 N. W. 141. R. A. more v. Cooper, 15 566, 125 Am. St. Rep. 57 (nN. s.) 1074. 3ZLouisiana v. New Orleans, 109 U.S. 285, 27 L. ed. 936, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 211; Freeland v. Williams, 131 U. S. 405, 33 L. ed. 193, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 763; Peerce v. Kitzmiller, 19 W. Va. 564. In the former case a judgment for injury done by a mob became un- collectible by the diminution by legis- lation of the taxing power of the city. In the two latter, recovery for a tort committed as an act of war was for- bidden after judgment by constitu- tional amendment. Both the enact- ment and the amendment were upheld. See also Douglass v. Loftus, 85 Kan. 720, 119 Pac. 74, Ann. Cas. 1913 A, 378, L. R. A. 1915 B, 797; State ». New Orleans, 38 La. Ann. 119, and cases post, p. 757, note 1. A judgment for damages for a594 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [voL. I It has also been held where a statute dividing a town and incor- porating a new one enacted that the new town should pay its pro- portion towards the support of paupers then constituting a charge against the old town, that a subsequent statute exonerating thenew town from this liability was void, as impairing the contract created by the first-mentioned statute;+ but there are cases which have reached a different conclusion, reasoning from the general and almost unlimited control which the State retains over its munici- palities.2 In any case the lawful repeal of a statute cannot consti- tutionally be made to destroy contracts which have been entered into under it; these being legal when made, they remain valid not- withstanding the repeal.? So where, by its terms, a contract provides for the payment of money by one party to another, and, by the law then in force, property would be liable to be seized, and sold on execution to the highest bidder, to satisfy any judgment recovered on such contract, a subsequent law, forbidding property from being sold on execution for less than two-thirds the valuation made by appraisers, pursuant to the directions contained in the law, though professing to act only on the remedy, amounts to a denial or obstruction of the rights accruing by the contract, and is directly obnoxious to the prohibi- tion of the Constitution.* trespass to real estate, where the tort benefited the tortfeasor’s estate to the full extent of the actual damages recovered by the injured party, is not a judgment upon a tort, pure and sim- ple, but upon a cause of action so far contractual as to bring the judgment within the protection of the provisions of the Federal Constitution against legislation impairing the obligation of a contract. Douglass v. Loftus, 85 Kan. 720, 119 Pac. 74, L. R. A. 1915 B, 797, Ann. Cas. 1913 A, 378. 1 Bowdoinham v. Richmond, 6 Me. 112. 2See ante, pp. 395-399, and cases cited in notes. *Tuolumne Redemption Co. ». Sedgwick, 15 Cal. 515; McCauley ». Brooks, 16 Cal. 11; Commonwealth v. New Bedford Bridge, 2 Gray, 339; State v. Phalen, 3 Harr. 441; State v. Hawthorn, 9 Mo. 389. “McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 608, 11 L. ed. 397; Willard v. Long- street, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 172; Rawley v. Hooker, 21 Ind. 144. So a law which takes away from mort- So a law which, as to existing mort- gages forecloseable by sale, prohibits the sale for less than half the appraised value of the land, is void for the same reason. Gantly’s Lessee v. Ewing, 3 How. 707, 11 L. ed. 794; Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311, 11 L. ed. 143. See to like effect, Robards v. Brown, 40 Ark. 423; Collins v. Collins, 79 Ky. 88. So one which takes away the power of sale. O’Brien v. Krenz, 36 Minn. 136, 30 N. W. 458. And a law authorizing property to be given up in satisfaction of a contract is void. Abercrombie v. Baxter, 44 Ga. 36. The “‘scaling laws ’’, so called, under which contracts made while Con- federate notes were the only currency, are allowed to be satisfied on payment of a sum equal to what the sum called for by them in Confederate notes was worth when they were made, have been sustained, but this is on the assumption that the contracts are enforced as near as possible accord- ing to the actual intent. Harmon ». Wallace, 2 S. C. 208; Robeson »v.CHAP. IX] PROTECTION TO PERSON AND PROPERTY 595 gagees the right to possession under their mortgages until after foreclosure, is void, because depriving them of the right to the rents and profits, which was a valuable portion of the right secured by the contract. “By this act the mortgagee is re- quired to incur the additional expense of a foreclosure, before obtain- ing possession, and is deprived of the right to add to his security, by the perception of the rents and profits of the premises, during the time required to accomplish this and the time of redemption, and during that time the rents and profits are given to another, who may or may not appropriate them to the payment of the debt, as he chooses, and the mortgagee in the meantime is subjected to the risk, often considerable, of the depreciation in the value of the security.” Brown, 63 N. C. 554; Hillard v. Moore, 65 N. C. 540; Pharis »v. Dice, 21 Gratt. 303; Thorington »v. Smith, 8 Wall. 1, 19 L. ed. 361. A statute is bad which permits in such case a recovery of what a jury may think is the fair value of the property sold. Effinger v. Kenney, 115 U. S. 566, 29 L. ed. 495, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 179. 1 Mundy v. Monroe, 1 Mich. 68, 76; Blackwood v. Vanvleet, 11 Mich. 252. Compare Dikeman v. Dikeman, 11 Paige, 484; James v. Stull, 9 Barb. 482; Cook v. Gray, 2 Houst. 455. A statute relative to mortgage fore- closure sales is unconstitutional as to existing mortgages as impairing the obligation of the contract, in so far as it requires the sheriff to postpone the sale for one year and gives the mortgagor possession of the premises during that time, when the former law gave the mortgagee the right to an immediate sale with the right of possession during the period of re- demption. Strand v. Griffith, 63 Wash. 334, 115 Pac. 512. But in Berthold v. Fox, 13 Minn. 501, it was decided that in the case of a mortgage given while the law allowed the mortgagee possession during the period allowed for redemption after foreclosure, such law might be so changed as to take away this right. A redemption law cannot take from the mortgagee the right to recover rents from the owner in possession after foreclosure sale. Travelers Ins. 1 So a law is void which extends the time for the redemp- Co. v. Brouse, 83 Ind. 62. But the debtor’s tenant in possession may be made primarily liable to the mort- gagee instead of to the debtor. Ed- wards v. Johnson, 105 Ind. 594, 5 N. E. 716. In Baldwin v. Flagg, 43 N. J. L. 495, it was held that where bond and mort- gage had been given, it was not competent to provide by subsequent legislation that the mortgage should be first foreclosed, and resort to the bond only had in case of deficiency. Nor that the foreclosure sale should be opened if a judgment is had upon the bond. Coddington v. Bispham, 36 N. J. Eq. 574. See Morris v. Carter, 46 N. J. L. 260; Toffey v. Atcheson, 42N. J. Eq. 182, 6 Atl. 885. A stipulation in a chattel mortgage that the mortgagee may take posses- sion whenever he deems himself inse- cure, is not to be impaired by subse- quent legislation forbidding him to do so without just cause. Boice v. Boice, 27 Minn. 371, 7 N. W. 687. Reducing the rate of interest payable on redemption to the foreclosure purchaser violates no contract with the mortgagee. Conn. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cushman, 108 U. S. 51, 27 L. ed. 648, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 236. A statute which provides that mortgages and deeds of trust shall, notwithstanding any provision therein, be foreclosed by action is remedial and does not violate the prohibition against impairing the obligation of a contract. Schwertner v. Provident596 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I tion of lands sold on execution, or for delinquent taxes, after the sales have been made; for in such a case the contract with the pur- chaser, and for which he has paid his money, is, that he shall have title at the time then provided by the law; and to extend the time for redemption is to alter the substance of the contract, as much as would be the extension of the time for payment of a promissory note.} So a law which shortens the time for redemption from a mortgage, after a foreclosure sale has taken place, is void; the rights of the party being fixed by the foreclosure and the law then in force, and the mortgagor being entitled, under the law, to possession of the land until the time for redemption expires.2, And where by statute a purchaser of lands from the State had the right, upon the Mut. Building-Loan. Assoc., 17 Ariz. 93, 148 Pac. 910. See also Scott v. District Court, 15 N. D. 259, 107 N. Wel: A law changing the requirements as to the notices of a mortgage fore- closure sale is valid, since it merely af- fects the remedy and not the obligation of the contract. Strand »v. Griffith, 63 Wash. 334, 115 Pac. 512. In Cook v. Gray, 2 Houst. 455, it was held that a statute shortening the notice to be given on foreclosure of a mortgage under the power of sale, from twenty- four to twelve weeks, was valid as af- fecting the remedy only; and that a stipulation in a mortgage that on de- fault being made in payment the mortgagee might sell “according to law”, meant according to the law as it should be when sale was made. But see Ashuelot R. R. Co. v. Eliot, 52 N. H. 387, and what is said on the general subject in Cochran v. Darcy, 5 Rich. 125. ‘Robinson v. Howe, 13 Wis. 341; Dikeman v. Dikeman, 11 Paige, 484; Goenen v. Schroeder, 8 Minn. 387; January v. January, 7 T. B. Monr. 542, 18 Am. Dec. 211; Greenfield v. Dorris, 1 Sneed, 550; Barnitz v. Beverly, 163 U. S. 118, 41 L. ed. 93, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1042, rev. 55 Kan. B06; 42mbacy (25,031 lee A. (74. Rott v. Steffins, 229 Mich. 241, 201 N. W. 227, 88 A. L. R. 224; Pace v. Wight, 25 N. W. 276, 181 Pac. 430. See also Welsh v. Cross, 146 Cal. 621, 81 Pac. 229, 106 Am. St. Rep. 63, 2 Ann. Cas. 796. But see Stone v. Basset, 4 Minn. 298; Hey- ward v. Judd, 4 Minn. 483; Freborn v. Pettibone, 5 Minn. 277; Davis ». Rupe, 114 Ind. 588, 17 N. E. 163. A provision that the right to redeem from a pre-existing mortgage shall not expire if a creditor of the mortgagor comes into equity and gets a decree to enable him to fulfill the conditions of the mortgage and hold the property, is void as against the mortgagee. Phinney v. Phinney, 81 Me. 450. So, on the other hand, a law is void which takes away an existing right of a creditor of the mortgagor to redeem from the sale. O’Brien v. Krenz, 36 Minn. 136, 30 N. W. 458. 2 Cargill v. Power, 1 Mich. 369; Turk v. Mayberry, 32 Okla. 66, 121 Pac. 665. The contrary ruling was made in Butler v. Palmer, 1 Hill, 324, by analogy to the Statute of Limitations. The statute, it was said, was no more in effect than saying: “Unless you redeem within the shorter time prescribed, you shall have no action for a recovery of the land, nor shall your defense against an action be allowed, provided you get posses- sion.””’ And in Robinson v. Howe, 13 Wis. 341, 346, the court, speaking of a similar right in a party, say: “So far as his right of redemption was concerned, it was not derived from any contract, but was given by the law only; and the time within which he might exercise it might be short- ened by the legislature, provided a reasonable time was left in which toCHAP. Ix] PROTECTION TO PERSON AND PROPERTY 597 forfeiture of his contract of purchase for the non-payment of the sum due upon it, to revive it at any time before a public sale of the lands, by the payment of all sums due upon the contract, with a penalty of five per cent, it was held that this right could not be taken away by a subsequent change in the law which subjected the forfeited lands to private entry and sale.' And a statute which authorizes stay of execution, for an unreasonable or indefinite period, on judgments rendered on pre-existing contracts, is void, as post- poning payment, and taking away all remedy during the continu- ance of the stay.” And a law is void on this ground which declares a forfeiture of the charter of a corporation for acts or omissions exercise it, without impairing the obligation of any contract.” And see Smith v. Packard, 12 Wis. 371, to the same effect. An increase of the rate of interest to be paid on redemption of a pre- existing mortgage is bad.- Hillebert v. Porter, 28 Minn. 496, 11 N. W. 84. 1State v. Commissioners of School and University Lands, 4 Wis. 414. A right to reimbursement if a tax purchase is set aside cannot by sub- sequent legislation be taken away from the purchaser of a tax title. State v. Foley, 30 Minn. 350, 15 N. W. 310: 2 Chadwick v. Moore, 8 W. & S. 49; Bunn v. Gorgas, 41 Pa. St. 441; Townsend v. Townsend, Peck, 1, 14 Am. Dec. 722; Stevens v. Andrews, 31 Mo. 205. Hasbrouck v. Shipman, 16 Wis. 296; Jacobs Smallwood, 63 N. C. 112; Webster v. Rose, 6 Heisk. 93; Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U.S. 595, 24 L. ed. 793. A law permitting a year’s stay upon judgments where security is given was held valid in Farnsworth v. Vance. 2 Cold. 108; but this decision was over- ruled in Webster v. Rose, 6 Heisk. 93, 19 Am. Rep. 583. A statute was held void which stayed all proceedings against volun- teers who had enlisted ‘‘during the war”’, this period being indefinite. Clark v. Martin, 3 Grant’s Cas. 393. But in Breitenbach v. Bush, 44 Pa. St. 313, and Coxe v. Martin, 44 Pa. St. 322, it was held that an act stay- ing all civil process against volun- teers who had enlisted in the national service for three years or during the war was valid, — ‘during the war” being construed to mean unless the war should sooner terminate. See also State v. Carew, 13 Rich. 498. A general law that all suits pending should be continued until peace be- tween the Confederate States and the United States was held void in Burt vy. Williams, 24 Ark. 94. See also Taylor v. Stearns, 18 Gratt. 244; Hudspeth v. Davis, 41 Ala. 389; Aycock v. Martin, 37 Ga. 124; Coff- man v. Bank of Kentucky, 40 Miss. 29; Jacobs v. Smallwood, 63 N. C. 112; Cutts v. Hardee, 38 Ga. 350; Sequestration Cases, 30 Tex. 688. In Johnson v. Higgins, 3 Met. (Ky.) 566, it was held that the act of the Ken- tucky legislature of May 24, 1861, which forbade the rendition in all the courts of the State, of any judgment from date till January Ist, 1862, was valid. It related, it was said, not to the remedy for enforcing a contract, but to the courts which administer the remedy; and those courts, in a legal sense, constitute no part of the remedy. A law exempting soldiers from civil process until thirty days after their discharge from military service was held valid as to all contracts subse- quently entered into, in Burns ». Crawford, 34 Mo. 330. And _ see McCormick v. Rusch, 15 Iowa, 127. A statute suspending limitation laws during the existence of civil war, and until the State was restored to her proper relations to the Union, was sustained in Bender v. Crawford, 33 Tex. 745. Compare Bradford v. Shine, 13 Fla. 393.598 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [voL. I which constituted no cause of forfeiture at the time they occurred.’ And it has been held that where a statute authorized a municipal corporation to issue bonds, and to exercise the power of local taxa- tion in order to pay them, and persons bought and paid value for bonds issued accordingly, this power of taxation is part of the con- tract, and cannot be withdrawn until the bonds are satisfied; that an attempt to repeal or restrict it by statute is void; and that unless the corporation imposes and collects the tax in all respects as if the subsequent statute had not been passed, it will be compelled to do so by mandamus. And it has also been held that a statute repealing a former statute, which made the stock of stockholders in a corpora- tion liable for its debts, was, in respect to creditors existing at the time of the repeal, a law impairing the obligation of contracts.’ In each of these cases it is evident that substantial rights were affected ; and so far as the laws which were held void operated upon the rem- edy, they either had an effect equivalent to importing some new stipulation into the contract, or they failed to leave the party a sub- stantial remedy such as was assured to him by the law in force when the contract was made. In Pennsylvania it has been held that a statute authorizing a stay of execution on contracts in which the debtor had waived the right was unconstitutional ; 4 but it seems to 1People v. Jackson & Michigan 67 C. C. A. 142; Welch Water, etc., Plank Road Co., 9 Mich. 285, per Co. v. Welch, 64 W. Va. 373, 62 S. E. Christiancy, J.; State v. Tombeckbee 497. Compare Arkansas Southern Bank, 2 Stew. 30. See Ireland v. R. Co. v. Louisiana, etc., R. Co., 218 Turnpike Co., 19 Ohio St. 369. U. S. 431, 54 L. ed. 1097, 31 Sup. Ct. 2Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. Rep. 56; People ex rel. Booth »v. 535, 18 L. ed. 403; Murray v. Charles- Opel, 244 Ill. 317, 91 N. E. 458. ton, 96 U.S. 432, 24 L. ed. 760; Lou- The liability cannot be escaped by mand v. New Orleans, 102 U. S. 203, turning a city into a mere taxing dis- 26 L. ed. 132; Wolff v. New Orleans, trict. Mobile v. Watson, 116 Us: 103 U. S. 358, 26 L. ed. 395; Nelson 289, 29 L. ed. 620, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. v. St. Martin’s Parish, 111 U. S. 716, 398; O’Connor ». Memphis, 6 Lea, 28 L. ed. 574, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 648; 730. See also Soutter ». Madison, Beckwith v. Racine, 7 Biss. 142; 15 Wis. 30; Smith v. Appleton, 19 Folsom v. Greenwood County, 137 Wis. 468; Rahway ». Munday, 44 Fed. 449, 69 C. C. A. 473; People N. J. L. 395; Seibert v. Lewis, 122 ex rel. O’Connell v. Chicago, etc., R. U.S. 284, 30 L. ed. 1161, 7 Sup. Ct. Co., 256 Ill. 388, 100 N. E. 35; Gib- Rep. 1190. For a similar principle, bons v. Hood River Irr. Dist., 66 Oreg. see Sala v. New Orleans, 2 Woods, 188. 208, 133 Pac. 772; Fremont, etc., 3 Hawthorne v. Calef, 2 Wall. 10, R. Co. v. Pennington County, 20S. D. 17 L. ed. 776; Knickerbocker Trust 270, 105 N. W. 929. See also Louis- Co. v. Myers, 133 Fed. 764, affirmed iana ex rel. Hubert v. New Orleans, 139 Fed. 111, 71 C. C. A. 199, 1 L. R: 215 U.S. 170, 54 L. ed. 144, 30Sup.Ct. A. (Nn. s.) 1171. Upon individual Rep. 40; Hendrickson v. Apperson, liability of stockholders for debts of 245 U. S. 105, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 44, corporation, see note to 40 L. ed. U. 62 L. ed. 178; Ft. Madison v. Ft. S. 751. Madison Water Co., 134 Fed. 214, ‘Billmeyer v. Evans, 40 Pa. St.CHAP. IX] PROTECTION TO PERSON AND PROPERTY 599 us that an agreement to waive a legal privilege which the law gives as a matter of State policy cannot be binding upon a party, unless the law itself provides for the waiver.! Where, however, by the operation of existing laws, a contract cannot be enforced without some new action of a party to fix his liability, it is as competent to prescribe by statute the requisites to the legal validity of such action as it would be in any case to pre- scribe the legal requisites of a contract to be thereafter made. Thus, though a verbal promise is sufficient to revive a debt barred by the Statute of Limitations or by bankruptcy, yet this rule may be changed by a statute making all such future promises void unless in writing.2 It is also equally true that where a legal impediment exists to the enforcement of a contract which parties have entered into, the constitutional provision in question will not preclude the legislature from removing such impediment and validating the con- tract. A statute of that description would not impair the obliga- tion of contracts, but would perfect and enforce it. And for similar reasons the obligation of contracts is not impaired by continuing the charter of a corporation for a certain period, in order to the proper closing of its business.* State Insolvent Laws. In this connection some notice may seem requisite of the power of the States to pass insolvent laws, and the classes of contracts to which they may be made to apply. As this whole subject has been gone over very often and very fully by the Supreme Court of the United States, and the important questions seem at last to be finally set at rest, and moreover as it is compara- 324; Lewis v. Lewis, 47 Pa. St. 127. 968. As where the defense of usury See Laucks’ Appeal, 24 Pa. St. 426; toa contract is taken away by statute. Case v. Dunmore, 23 Pa. St. 93 Welsh v. Wadsworth, 30 Conn. 149; Bowman v. Smiley, 31 Pa. St. 225. Curtis v. Leavitt, 15 N. Y. 9; Ewell 1See Conkey v. Hart, 14 N. Y. 22; v. Daggs, 108 U. S. 148, 27 L. ed. 682, Handy v. Chatfield, 23 Wend. 35. 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 408; Peterson »v. 2 Joy v. Thompson, 1 Doug. (Mich.) Berry, 125 Fed. 902, 60 C: C. A. 610) 373; Kingley v. Cousins, 47 Me. 91. Hurley v. Hurley, 110 Va. 31, 65S. E. 3 Satterlee v. Matthewson, 2 Pet. 472, 18 Ann. Cas. 968. And see 320. 7 L. ed. 458; Randall v. Kreiger, Wood v. Kennedy, 19 Ind. 68, and 23 Wall. 137, 23 L. ed. 124; Courtner the cases cited, post, pp. 779-782. ». Etheredge, 149 Ala. 78, 43 So. 368; But the validation of an invalid con- Swartz v. Andrews, 137 Iowa, 261, 114 tract cannot be made to relate back so N. W. 888, 126 Am. St. Rep. 285; as to take precedence of a lien which Provident Bank, etc., Co. v. Saxon, attached after the invalid contract 123 La. 243, 48 So. 922; Wingert ». was created, but before it was vali- Zeigler, 91 Md. 318, 46 Atl. 1074, dated. Merchants’ Bank of Danville 80 Am. St. Rep. 453, 51 L. R. A. »v. Ballou, 98 Va. 112, 32S. E. 481, 44 316; Chestnut v. Shane, 16 Ohio, 599, L. R. A. 306. 47 Am. Dec. 387; Hurley v. Hurley, 4 Foster v. Essex Bank, 16 Mass. 110 Va. 31, 65S. E. 472, 18 Ann. Cas. 245.600 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [voL. I tively unimportant whenever a federal bankrupt law exists, we con- tent ourselves with giving what we understand to be the conclusions of the court. 1. The several States have power to legislate on the subject of bankrupt and insolvent laws, subject, however, to the authority conferred upon Congress by the Constitution to adopt a uniform system of bankruptcy, which authority, when exercised, is para- mount, and State enactments in conflict with those of Congress upon the subject must give way.’ 2. Such State laws, however, discharging the person or the property of the debtor, and thereby terminating the legal obligation of the debts, cannot constitutionally be made to apply to contracts entered into before they were passed, but they may be made appli- 1 Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 4 L. ed. 529; Farmers’ & Me- chanics’ Bank v. Smith, 6 Wheat. 131, 5 L. ed. 224; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213, 6 L. ed. 606; Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223, 17 L. ed. 531; Brown v. Smart, 145 U. S. 454, 36 Peed) ia. 12 Sup, Ct. Rep: 9038; aff. 69 Md. 320, 17 Atl. 1101; Ketcham v. McNamara, 72 Conn. 709, 46 Atl. 146, 50 L. R. A. 641; In re Watts, 190 U.S. 1, 47 L. ed. 933, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 718; Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U. S. 605, 62 L. ed. 507, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 215; In re Macon Sash, etc., Co., 112 Fed. 323; Carling v. Seymour Lumber Co., 113 Fed. 483, 51 C. C. A. 1; In re Stork Lumber Co., 114 Fed. 360; In re Rogers, 116 Fed. 435; In re F. A. Hall Co., 121 Fed. 992; In re Mertens, 131 Fed. 507; In re Salmon, 143 Fed. 395; In re Sage, 224 Fed. 525; In re Clothing Co., 238 Fed. 58, 151 C. C. A. 1384; In re Brinn, 262 Fed. 527; Baxter County Bank ». Copeland, 114 Ark. 316, 169 S. W. 1180; Rockville National Bank v. Latham, 88 Conn. 70, 89 Atl. 1117; Boston Mercantile Co. v. Ould-Carter Co., 123 Ga. 458, 51S. E. 466; Capital Lumber Co. v. Saunders, 26 Idaho, 408, 148 Pac. 1178; Pogue v. Rowe, 236 Ill. 157, 86 N. E. 207; Duffy v. Credi- tors, 122 La. 600, 48 So. 120; Little- field v. Gay, 96 Me. 422, 52 Atl. 925; Rogers v. Boston Club, 205 Mass. 261, 91 N. E. 321, 28 L. R. A. (wv. 8.) 743; Singer v. National Bedstead Mfg. Co., 65 N. J. Eq. 290, 55 Atl. 868; Sabin v. Chrisman, 79 Oreg. 191, 154 Pac. 908; Hasbrouck v. La Febre, 23 Wyo. 367, 152 Pac. 168. “ After an adjudication in bank- ruptey, an action in replevin in a State court cannot be commenced and main- tained against the bankrupt to recover property in the possession of and claimed by the bankrupt at the time of that adjudication, and in the possession of a referee in bankruptcy at the time when the action of replevin is begun ;” and if under such attempted action in replevin, any such property is seized, “the district court sitting in bank- ruptey”’ has ‘‘jurisdiction by summary proceedings to compel the return of the property seized.” Per Gray, J., in White v. Schloerb, 178 U. S. 542, 44 L. ed. 1183, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1007. Bankruptcy law merely suspends State insolvency laws, so that when it is repealed they revive. Butler v. Gorely, 146 U. S. 303, 36 L. ed. 981, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 84, aff. 147 Mass. 8, 16 N. E. 734. And upon effect of removal of a Federal bar to operation of a State statute, see Blair v. Ostrander, 109 Iowa, 204, 80 N. W. 330, 47 L. R. A. 469. That supersession of State in- solvency law may be only partial, see State v. Superior Court for King Co., 20 Wash. 545, 56 Pac. 35, 45 L. R. A. 177, and upon relation of bankruptcy law to State laws upon insolvency and assignments, see note to this case Inia ReasCHAP. IX] PROTECTION TO PERSON AND PROPERTY 601 cable to such future contracts as can be considered as having been made in reference to them.’ 3. Contracts made within a State where an insolvent law exists, between citizens of that State, are to be considered as made in refer- ence to the law, and are subject to its provisions. But the law can- not apply to a contract made in one State between a citizen thereof and a citizen of another State,” nor to contracts not made within the State, even though made between citizens of the same State,’ except, perhaps, where they are citizens of the State passing the law. And where the contract is made between a citizen of one State and a citizen of another, the circumstance that the contract is made pay- able in the State where the insolvent law exists will not render such contract subject to be discharged under the law.® If, however, the creditor in any of these cases makes himself a party to proceedings under the insolvent law, he will be bound thereby like any other party to judicial proceedings, and is not to be heard afterwards to object that his debt was protected by the Constitution from the reach of the law.® The New Amendments to the Federal Constitution. New provi- sions for personal liberty, and for the protection of the right to life, liberty, and property, are made by the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution of the United States; and these will be referred to in the two succeeding chapters.’ Themost impor- tant clause in the fourteenth amendment is that part of section one which declares that all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.’ This provision very properly puts an end to any question of the title of the freed- 1 Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213, 3 McMillan v. McNeill, 4 Wheat. 6 L. ed. 606; Brown». Smart, 145U.S. 209, 4 L. ed. 552. 454, 36 L. ed. 773, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 4 Marsh v. Putnam, 3 Gray, 551. 958, aff. 69 Md. 320, 17 Atl. 1101; 5 Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223 Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1, 33 L. ed. 531; Baldwin v. Bank of New- L. ed. 842, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 504; bury, 1 Wall. 234, 17 L. ed. 534; Lace v. Smith, 34 R. I. 1, 82 Atl. 268, Gilman »v. Lockwood, 4 Wall. 409, Ann. Cas. 1913 E, 945. 18 L. ed. 432. See also Norris ». 2 Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213, Atkinson, 64 N. H. 87, 5 Atl. 710. 6 L. ed. 606; Springer v. Foster, 2 6 Clay v. Smith, 3 Pet. 411, 7 L. ed. Story, 383; Boyle v. Zacharie, 6 Pet. 723; Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223, 348. 8 L. ed. 423; Woodhull v. Wag- 17 L. ed. 531; Gilman v. Lockwood, ner, Baldw. 296; Suydam »v. Broadnax, 4 Wall. 409, 18 L. ed. 432; Perley v. 14 Pet. 67 10 L. ed. 357; Cook v. Mason, 64N.H.6,3 Atl. 629. Moffat, 5 How. 295, 12 L. ed. 160; 7 See ante, pp. 15-17; post, pp. 607, Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223,17 L.ed. 821. 531; Hammond Beef & P. Co. »v. 8 The complete text of this section Best, 91 Me. 431, 40 Atl. 338, 42 L. R. is as follows: ‘‘Section 1. All persons A. 528. born or naturalized in the United 5602 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I men and others of their race to the rights of citizenship; but it may be doubtful whether the further provisions of the same section sur- round the citizen with any protections additional to those before possessed under the State constitutions; though, as a principle of State constitutional law has now been made a part of the Constitu- tion of the United States, the effect will be to make the Supreme Court of the United States the final arbiter of cases in which a viola- tion of this principle by State laws is complained of, inasmuch as the decisions of the State courts upon laws which are supposed to violate it will be subject to review in that court on appeal.’ States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States, and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or en- force any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, lib- erty, or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” A child of alien parentage born in this country is a citizen. Wong Kim Ark’s Case, 169 U. S. 649, 42 L. ed. 890, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 456. See Fong Yue Ting v. U. S., 149 U. S. 698, 37 L. ed. 905, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1016. 1See ante, pp. 24-46. Notwith- standing this section, the protection of all citizens in their privileges and immunities, and in their right to an impartial administration of the laws, is just as much the business of the individual State as it was before. This amendment of the Constitution does not concentrate power in the general government for any purpose of police government within the States; its object is to preclude legis- lation by any State which shall “abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States”’, or ‘‘deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law’’, or “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws’’; and Congress is empowered to pass all laws necessary to render such unconstitutional State legislation ineffectual. This amendment has re- ceived a very full examination at the hands of the Supreme Court of the United States in the Slaughter-House Case, 16 Wall. 36, 21 L. ed. 394, and in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 23 L. ed. 588, with the con- clusion above stated. See Story on Const. (4th ed.) App. to Vol. II.CHAPTER X OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY AuTHoUGH the people from whom we derive our laws now possess a larger share of civil and political liberty than any other in Europe, there was a period in their history when a considerable proportion were in a condition of servitude. Of the servile classes one portion were villeins regardant, or serfs attached to the soil, and transferable with it, but not otherwise,’ while the other portion were villeins in gross, whose condition resembled that of the slaves known to modern law in America.2. How these people became reduced to this unhappy condition, it may not be possible to determine at this distance of time with entire accuracy ;* but in regard to the first class, we may suppose that when a conqueror seized the territory upon which he found them living, he seized also the people as a part of the lawful prize of war, granting them life on condition of their cultivating the soil for his use; and that the second were often persons whose lives had been spared on the field of battle, and whose ownership, in ac- cordance with the custom of barbarous times, would pertain to the Many other causes also contributed to persons of their captors. At the beginning of the reign of reduce persons to this condition.* works; and belonging, they and their children and effects, to the lord of the soil, like the rest of the stock or cattle upon it.’”” Reeves, History of Eng- lish Law, Pt. I. c. 1. See also Holds- worth’s History of English Law, Vol. II. pp. 41-43, 264, Vol. III. p. 491, 1 Litt. § 181; 2 Bl. Com. 92. “They originally held lands of their lords on condition of agricultural service, which in a certain sense was servile, but in reality was not so, as the actual work was done by the theows, or slaves. They did not pay rent, and were not removable at pleasure; they went with the land and rendered services, uncertain in their nature, and therefore opposed to rent. They were the originals of copy- holders.” Note to Reeves, History of English Law, Pt. I. ec. 1. 2 Litt. § 181; 2 Bl. Com. 92. “These are the persons who are described by Sir William Temple as ‘a sort of people who were in a con- dition of downright servitude, used and employed in the most servile 603 et seq. 3As to slavery among the Anglo- Saxons, see Stubbs, Const. Hist. of England, ch. V; Holdsworth’s History of English Law, Vol. II. pp. 40-43. 4 For a view of the condition of the servile classes, see Wright, Domestic Manners and Sentiments, 101, 102; Crabbe, History of English Law (ed. of 1829), 8, 78, 365; Hallam, Middle Ages, Pt. II. c. 2; Vaughan, Revolu- tions in English History, Book 2, ec. 8; Broom, Const. Law, 74 et seq.604 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I John it has been estimated that one-half of the Anglo-Saxons were in a condition of servitude, and if we go back to the time of the Conquest, we find a still larger proportion of the people held as the property of their lords, and incapable of acquiring and holding any property as their own.’ Their treatment was such as might have been expected from masters trained to war and violence, accus- tomed to think lightly of human life and human suffering, and who knew little of and cared less for any doctrine of human rights which embraced within its scope others besides the governing classes. It would be idle to attempt to follow the imperceptible steps by which involuntary servitude at length came to an end in England. It was never abolished by statute,” and the time when slavery ceased altogether cannot be accurately determined. The causes were at work silently for centuries; the historian did not at the time note 1 Hume, History of England, Vol. I. App. l. 2 Barrington on ed.), 272. $Mr. Hargrave says, at the com- mencement of the seventeenth century. 20 State Trials, 40; May, Const. Hist. e. 11. And Mr. Barrington (on the Statutes, 3d ed. p. 278) cites from Ry- mer a commission from Queen Elizabeth in the year 1574, directed to Lord Burghley and Sir Walter Mildmay, for inquiring into the lands, tenements, and other goods of all her bondmen and bondwomen in the counties of Cornwall, Devonshire, Somerset, and Gloucester, such as were by blood in a slavish condition, by being born in any of her manors, and to compound with any or all of such bondmen or bondwomen for their manumission and freedom. And this commission, he says, in connection with other cir- cumstances, explains why we hear no more of this kind of servitude. And see Crabbe, History] of English Law (ed. of 1829), 574. This author says that villeinage had disappeared by the the Statutes (3d time of Charles II. Hurd says in 1661. Law of Freedom and Bondage, Vol. I. p. 136. And see 2 Bl. Com. 96. Lord Campbell’s Lives of the Chief Justices, c. 5. Macaulay says there were traces of slavery under the Stuarts. History of England, ec. 1. Hume (History of England, c. 2 9 3) thinks there was no law recognizing it after the time of Henry VII., and that it had ceased before the death of Eliza- beth. Froude (History of England, c. 1) says in the reign of Henry VIII. it had practically ceased. Mr. Chris- tian says the last claim of villeinage which we find recorded in our courts was in 15th James I. Noy, 27; 11 State Trials, 342. Note to Blackstone, Book 2, p. 96. Mr. Holdsworth says: ‘“Villein status, then, had become merely a survival of an older social and economic order by the middle of the fifteenth century. Its life had been prolonged to the end of the sixteenth century because it served the purposes of the lawless, and because it sometimes gave to lords valuable rights over persons who prospered either on the land or in some other pursuits which afforded careers to the ambitious. When the Tudor dynasty had fulfilled its mission by restoring peace and good govern- ment to the country, when lords had made what they could out of their prosperous villeins by selling charters of manumission, this status, always frowned upon by the law, after a long and dishonorable old age, at length died a natural death. The law of villein status was never repealed. It simply fell into disuse because the persons to whom it applied had ceased to exist.’ Holdsworth’s History of English Law, Vol. III, p. 508.CHAP. X] PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY 605 them: the statesman did not observe them; they were not the sub- ject of agitation or controversy; but the time arrived when the philanthropist could examine the laws and institutions of his coun- try, and declare that slavery had ceased to be recognized, though at what precise point in legal history the condition became unlawful he might not with certainty specify. Among the causes of its abro- gation he might be able to enumerate: 1. That the slaves were of the same race with their masters. There was therefore not only an absence of that antipathy which is often found existing when the ruling and the ruled are of different races, and especially of different color, but instead thereof an active sympathy might often be sup- posed to exist, which would lead to frequent emancipations. 2. The common law presumed every man to be free until proved to be otherwise; and this presumption, when the slave was of the same race as his master, and had no natural badge of servitude, must often have rendered it extremely difficult to recover the fugitive who denied his thraldom. 3. A residence for a year and a day in a cor- porate town rendered the villein legally free;1 so that to him the towns constituted cities of refuge. 4. The lord treating him as a freeman — as by receiving homage from him as tenant, or entering ‘nto a contract with him under seal — thereby emancipated him, by recognizing in him a capacity to perform those acts which only a freeman could perform. 5. Even the lax morals of the times were favorable to liberty, since the condition of the child followed that of the father; and in law the illegitimate child was nullius filius, — hadnofather. And,6. Theinfluence of the priesthood was generally against slavery, and must often have shielded the fugitive and influenced emancipations by appeals to the conscience, especially when the master was near the close of life and the conscience natu- rally most sensitive.’ And with all these influences there should be 1 Crabbe, History of English Law of the mother: but this was changed (ed. of 1829), 79. But this was only in the time of Henry I. Crabbe, as to third persons. The claim of the History of English Law (ed. of 1829), lord might be made within three years. 78; Hallam, Middle Ages, Pt. lhc. 2: Ibid. And see Mackintosh, History 3 In 1514, Henry VIII. manumitted of England, ec. 4. two of his villeins in the following 2 Barrington on Statutes (3d ed.), words: “Whereas God created all 276, note; 2 Bl. Com. 93. Butinthe men free, but afterwards the laws and very quaint account of ‘“‘Villeinage customs of nations subjected some and Niefty’’, in Mirror of Justices, under the yoke of servitude, we think § 28, it is said, among other things, it pious and meritorious with God to that ‘those are villeins who are manumit Henry Knight, a tailor, and begotten of a freeman and a nief, and John Herle, 2 husbandman, our born out of matrimony.” The ancient natives, as being born within the rule appears to have been that the manor of Stoke Clymercysland, in our condition of the child followed that county of Cornwall, together with all606 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I noted the further circumstance, that a class of freemen was always near to the slaves in condition and suffering, with whom they were in association, and between whom and themselves there were fre- quent intermarriages,' and that from these to the highest order in the State there were successive grades; the children of the highest gradually finding their way into those below them, and ways being open by which the children of the lowest might advance themselves, by intelligence, energy, or thrift, through the successive grades above them, until the descendants of dukes and earls were found cultivating the soil, and the man of obscure descent winning a place among the aristocracy of the realm, through his successful exertions at the bar or his services to the State. Inevitably these influences must at length overthrow the slavery of white men which existed in England,” and no other ever became established within the realm. Slavery was permitted, and indeed fostered, in the colonies; in part because a profit was made of the trade, and in part also because it was supposed that the peculiar products of some of them could not be profitably cultivated with free labor;* and at times masters brought their slaves with them to England and removed them again without question, until in Sommersett’s Case, in 1771, it was ruled by Lord Mansfield that slavery was repugnant to the common law, and to bring a slave into England was to emancipate him.' their issue born or to be born, and all their goods, lands, and chattels ac- quired, so as the said persons and their issue shall from henceforth by us be free and of free condition.’”’ Barring- ton on Statutes (8d ed.), 275. See Mackintosh, History of England, ec. 4 Compare this with a deed of manu- mission in Massachusetts, to be found in Sumner’s Speeches, II. 289; Memoir of Chief Justice Parsons, by his son, 176, note. 1 Wright, Domestic Manners and Sentiments, 112. * Macaulay (History of England, ec. 1) says the chief instrument of eman- cipation was the Christian religion. Mackintosh (History of England, ec. 4), also, attributes to the priesthood great influence in this reform, not only by their direct appeals to the conscience, but by the judges, who were ecclesi- astics, multiplying presumptions and rules of evidence consonant to the equal and humane spirit which breathes throughout the morality of the Gospel. Hume (History of Eng- land, ce. 23) seems to think emancipa- tion was brought about by selfish con- siderations on the part of the barons, and from a conviction that the returns from their lands would be increased by changing villeinage into socage tenures. ® Robertson, America, Book 9; Bancroft, United States, Vol. I, e. 5. 4 Lofft, 18 ; 20 Howell State Trials, 1; Life of Granville Sharp, by Hoare, c. 4; Hurd, Law of Freedom and Bondage, Vol. I. p. 189. The judgment of Lord Mansfield is said to have been delivered with evident reluctance. 20 State Trials, 79; per Lord Stowell, 2 Hagg. Adm. 105, 110; Broom, Const. Law, 105. Of the practice prior to the decision Lord Stowell said: ‘‘The personal traffic in slaves resident in England had been as public and as authorized in London as in any of our West India Islands. They were sold on the Exchange, and other places of public resort, by parties themselves resident in London, and with as little reserve as they would have been in any of our West India possessions.CHAP. X| PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY 607 The same opinion had been previously expressed by Lord Holt but without authoritative decision.’ In Scotland a condition of servitude continued to a later period. The holding of negroes in slavery was indeed held to be illegal soon after the Sommersett Case; but the salters and colliers did not acquire their freedom until 1799, nor without an act of Parliament.? A previous statute for their enfranchisement through judicial pro- ceedings had proved ineffectual.* The history of slavery in this country pertains rather to general history than to a work upon State constitutional law. Throughout the land involuntary servitude is abolished by constitutional amend- ment, except as it may be imposed in the punishment of crime.‘ Such a state of things continued with- out impeachment from a very early period up to nearly the end of the last century.” The Slave Grace, 2 Hagg. Adm. 105. In this case it was decided that if a slave, carried by his master into a free country, voluntarily re- turned with him to a country where slavery was allowed by the local law, the status of slave would still attach to him, and the master’s right to his service be resumed. Mr. Broom collects the authorities on this subject in general, in the notes to Sommersett’s Case, Const. Law, 105. Upon this subject see also Holdsworth’s History of English Law, Vol. VI. pp. 264, 265. 1‘‘As goon as a slave comes into England, he becomes free; one may be a villein in England, but not a slave.” Holt, Ch. J., in Smith »v. Brown, 2 Salk. 666. See also Smith v. Gould, Ld. Raym. 1274; Ss. Cc. Salk. 666. There is a learned note in Quincy’s Rep. 94, collecting the English authorities on the subject of slavery. 239 Geo. III. c. 56. ? May’s Const. Hist. ec. 11. 4 Amendments to Const. of U.S. art. 13. See Story on the Constitution (4th ed.), c. 46, for the history of this article, and the decisions bearing upon it. “The words involuntary servitude have a larger meaning than slavery. ; The plain intention was to abolish slavery of whatever name and form and all its badges and incidents ; to render impossible any state of bondage; to make labor free, by pro- hibiting that control by which the personal service of one man is disposed of or coerced for another’s benefit, which is the essence of involuntary servitude.” Mr. Justice Hughes in delivering the opinion of the court in Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U. S. 219, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 145, 55 L. ed. 191, re- versing 161 Ala. 75, 49 So. 886. See also Shaw v. Fisher, 113 S. C. 287, 102 S. E. 325. The Maryland act for the apprentic- ing of colored children, which made important and invidious distinctions between them and white children, and gave the master property rights in their services not given in other cases, was held void under this article. Matter of Turner, 1 Abb. U.S. 84. A law authorizing the hiring out of a vagrant to the highest bidder for a specified term is void. Thompson ». Bunton, 117 Mo. 83, 22 S. W. 863, 20 L. R. A. 462. Contracts for personal services cannot, as a general rule, be enforced, and application to be discharged from service under them on habeas corpus is evidence that the service is involun- tary. Cases of apprenticeship and cases of military and naval service are exceptional. A person over twenty-one years of age cannot bind himself as apprentice. Clark’s Case, 1 Blackf. 122, 12 Am. Dec. 213. When the state, as parens patriae, in a proper case, through its constituted officers or agencies, takes under its control an infant, the law authorizing such child to be bound to service un-608 der proper instructions is not a viola- tion of the constitutional prohibition against slavery and involuntary servi- tude. Kennedy v. Meara, 127 Ga. 68, 56 S. E. 243, 9 Ann. Cas. 396. The protection of the Thirteenth Amendment does not extend to the case of seamen compelled to serve in fulfillment of their contracts. Robert- son v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 41 L. ed. 715, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 326. Dissent by Harlan, J. a “Peonage’ is a status or condition of compulsory service based upon the indebtedness of the peon to the master. The service is enforced unless the debt be paid, and, however created, it is ‘involuntary servitude’ within the prohibition of the 13th Amendment.” Goode v. Nelson, 73 Fla. 29, 74 So. 17. See also Clyatt v. United States, 197 U. S. 207, 49 L. ed. 726, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 429; United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 59 L. ed. 162, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 86; United States v. McClel- lan, 127 Fed. 971; In re Peonage Charge, 138 Fed. 686. A clear dis- tinction exists between peonage and the voluntary performance of labor or rendering of services in payment of a debt. In the latter case, the debtor, though contracting to pay his in- debtedness by labor or service, and subject like any other contractor to an action for damages for breach of that contract, can elect at any time to break it, and no law or force compels per- formance or a continuance of the services. Clyatt v. United States, 197 U. S. 207, 49 L. ed. 726, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 429; United States ». Reynolds, 235 U. S. 188, 59 L. ed. 162, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 86. Under the 13th Amendment a crime to be punished by imprisonment cannot lawfully be predicated upon the breach of a promise to perform labor or service. Goode v. Nelson, 73 Fla, 29, 74 So. 17. Although the purpose of a statute in terms is to punish fraud, yet if its natural and inevitable effect is to expose to conviction for crime those who simply fail or refuse to perform contracts for personal service in liquidation of a debt, and it seeks in this way to provide the means of CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [voL. I compulsion through which performance of such service may be secured it is unconstitutional. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U. S, 219, 55 L. ed. 191, 31 Sup: Ct. Rep. 145, reversing 161 Ala. 75, 49 So. 886. See also Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 49 L. ed. 726, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 429; Peonage Cases, 123 Fed. 671; Ex parte Drayton, 153 Fed. 986; Toney »v. State, 141 Ala. 120, 37 So. 332, 109 Am. St. Rep. 23, 67 L. R. A. 286, 3 Ann. Cas. 319; State v. Armstead, 103 Miss. 790, 60 So. 778, Ann. Cas. 1915 B, 495; Ez parte Hollman, 79S. C. 22, 60S. E. 19, 21 L. R. A. (N. s.) 249, 14 Ann. Cas. 1109. Compare Phillips v. Bell, 84 Fla. 225, 94 So. 699. But a statute of a state requiring every able-bodied man within its jurisdiction to labor for a reasonable time on public roads near his residence without direct com- pensation and making his failure to do so punishable by fine or imprisonment does not violate the 13th Amendment. Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 60 L. ed. 672, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 258, affirming 67 Fla. 405, 66 So. 150. Mr. Justice McReynolds, who delivered the opin- ion of the Court, speaking of the 13th Amendment, said: ‘It introduced no novel doctrine with respect of services always treated as exceptional, and certainly was not intended to interdict enforcement of those duties which individuals owe to the State, such as services in the army, militia, on the jury, etc. The great purpose in view was liberty under the protection of effective government, not the destruc- tion of the latter by depriving it of essential powers.’’ See also Angelus ». Sullivan, 246 Fed. 54; Claudius ». Davie, 175 Cal. 208, 165 Pac. 689. This thirteenth amendment conferred no political rights, and left the negro under all his political disabilities. Marshall v. Donovon, 10 Bush, 681. See also United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 23 L. ed. 588. It is not open to doubt that Congress may enforce the 13th Amendment by direct legislation, punishing the holding of a person in slavery or in involuntary servitude except as a punishment for crime. Clyatt v. United States, 197 U. S. 207, 49 L. ed. 726, 25 Sup. Ct.CHAP. X] PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY 609 Nor do we suppose the exception will permit the convict to be sub- jected to other servitude than such as is under the control and direc- tion of the public authorities, in the manner heretofore customary. The laws of the several States allow the letting of the services of the convicts, either singly or in numbers, to contractors who are to employ them in mechanical trades in or near the prison, and under the surveillance of its officers ; but it might well be doubted if a regu- lation which should suffer the convict to be placed upon the auction block and sold to the highest bidder, either for life or for a term of years, would be in harmony with the constitutional prohibition. It is certain that it would be open to very grave abuses, and it is so inconsistent with the general sentiment in countries where slavery does not exist, that it may well be believed not to have been within the understanding of the people in incorporating the exception with the prohibitory amendment.! The common law of England permits the impressment of seafaring men to man the royal navy ;? but this species of servitude was never Rep. 429; United States v. Reynolds, 235 U. S. 133, 59 L. ed. 162, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 86; United States v. McClel- lan, 127 Fed. 971. 1The State has no power to im- prison a child in a house of correction who has committed no crime, on a mere allegation that he is ‘‘destitute of proper parental care, and is growing up in mendicancy, ignorance, idleness, and vice.”” People v. Turner, 55 II. 280, 8 Am. Rep. 645. But a female child who begs in public or has no proper parental care, may be confined in an industrial school. County of Mc- Lean v. Humphrey, 104 Ill. 378; citing Milwaukee Industrial School v. Super- visors, 40 Wis. 328; Roth v. House of Refuge, 31 Md. 329. See, further, that under proper safeguards vagrant children may beso committed. House of Refuge v. Ryan, 37 Ohio St. 197; Prescott v. State, 19 Ohio St. 184, 2 Am. Rep. 388; Farnham ». Pierce, 141 Mass. 203, 6 N. E. 830; People v. N. Y. Catholic Protectory, 101 N. Y. 195, 4 N. E. 177. That in cases of commitment of vicious and incorri- gible youth to reform schools jury trial is unnecessary, see State v. Brown, 50 Minn. 353, 52 N. W. 935, 16 L. R. A. 691, and note; also Lee v. McClelland, 157 Ind. 84, 60 N. E. 692. VOL. I—39 Court has no power in civil action for damages to person to compel plaintiff to submit her body to inspec- tion by defendant’s physicians outside of court for purpose of obtaining evidence. All such inspection must be made in court. U. P. Ry. Co. »v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 35 L. ed. 734, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1000. Contra, Lane v. Spokane Falls & N. R. Co., 21 Wash. 119, 57 Pac. 367, 46 L. R. A. 153; Wanek v. Winona, 78 Minn. 98, 80 N. W. 851, 46 L. R. A. 448; Ala. G.S. R. Co. v. Hill, 90 Ala. 71, 8 So. 90, 9 L. R. A. 442, 24 Am. St. 764. See in this connection Lyon v. Manhattan R. Co., 142, N. Y. 298, 37 N. E. 118, 25 L. R. A. 402; McQuigan v. Delaware, L. &. W. Re Coe 129) N. Y. 50; 29 N. Be 2305 14 L. R. A. 466, and note, 26 Am. St. 507; Camden & S. R. Co. v. Stetson, 177 U. S. 172, 44 L. ed. 721, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 617. But sheriff may law- fully photograph his prisoner and take physical measurements of him, etce., for purposes of future identification. State v. Clausmeier, 154 Ind. 599, 57 N. EB. 541, 50 L. R. A. 73. 2 Broadfoot’s Case, 18 State Trials, 1323; Fost. Cr. Law, 178; Rex v. Tubbs, Cowp. 512; Hz parte Fox, 5 State Trials, 276; 1 Bl. Com. 419; Broom, Const. Law, 116.610 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS : : say recognized in the law ot America. tis country in her wars; but the common law as r allowed arbitrary discriminations for this compelled to serve | adopted by us has neve [voL. I The citizen may doubtless be purpose between persons of different avocations. Unreasonable Searches and Seizures. Near in importance to exemption from any arbitrary control of the person is that maxim of the common law which secures to the citizen immunity in his home against the prying eyes of the govern- ment, and protection in person,” property, and papers against even 1 There were cases of impressment in America before the Revolution, but they were never peaceably acquiesced in by the people. See Life and Times of Warren, 55. 2 Sheriff may take measurements, etc., of for purposes of future identification. State v. Clausmeier, 154 Ind. 599, 57 N. E. 541, 50 L. R. A. 73. But a person cannot be lawfully arrested merely because he is a ‘‘suspicious person”, and any statute which attempts to authorize such arrest is void under the clause prohibiting unreasonable seizures. Stoutenburgh v. Frazier, 16 D. C. App. 229, 48 L. R. A. 220. Prisoner discharged upon parol may be summarily arrested and recommitted. Fuller v. State, 122 Ala. 32, 26 So. 146, 45 L. R. A. 502. Arrest under warrant not supported by oath or affirmation is illegal. State v. Higgins, 51S. C. 51, 288. E. 15, 38 L. R. A. 561. But witness refusing to testify before grand jury may be summarily imprisoned by a justice of the peace upon complaint of the grand jury. Re Clark, 65 Conn. 17, 31 Atl. 522, 28 L. R. A. 242. Such power to imprison is judicial, however, and cannot be conferred upon a county attorney. Re Sims, 54 Kan. 1, 37 Pac. 135, 25 L. R. A. 110, ‘45 Am. St. 261; nor upon a board of tax com- missioners. Langenberg v. Decker, 131 Ind. 471, 31 N. E. 190, 16 L. R. A. 108. A peace officer, who upon state- ments made to him by others has reasonable grounds to suspect and does suspect that a felony has been com- mitted and that a certain person was photographs, his prisoner guilty of it, lawfully may arrest such person without a warrant. Com. »v. Phelps, 209 Mass. 396, 95 N. E. 868, Ann. Cas. 1912 B, 566. “A peace officer may, without a warrant there- for, arrest one who, in his presence, breaches the peace or threatens so to do.” Pavish v. Meyers, 129 Wash. 605, 225 Pac. 633. Statute may authorize arrest without warrant in case of misdemeanor committed in presence of officer, as well as in case of breach of peace. Burroughs v. Eastman, 101 Mich. 419, 59 N. W. 817, 24 L. R. A. 859, 45 Am. St. 419. “The government may search the person of the accused when legally arrested, to discover and seize the fruits or evidences of crime.’’ People v. Chaigles, 237 N. Y. 193, 142 N. E. 583, 32 A. L. R. 676. With regard to inspection of person to procure eVi- dence, see note 1, page 648, post. Person cannot be surrendered to foreign government except in accord- ance with treaty stipulations. Hz parte McCabe, 46 Fed. Rep. 363, 12 L. R. A. 589. Chairman of board of county com- missioners may be authorized by statute to remove summarily to the pauper’s place of legal settlement any pauper who applies for public support. Lovell v. Seeback, 45 Minn. 465, 48 N. W. 23, 11 L. R. A. 667. Person arrested without extradition process in sister State is illegally detained and is entitled to be dis- charged upon habeas corpus. Re Rob- inson, 29 Neb. 135, 45 N. W. 267, 8 L. R. A. 398, 26 Am. St. 378; but see cases cited in note. Person brought ,CHAP. X] PROTECTIONS TO the process of the law, except in a few specified cases. that “every man’s house is his castle PERSONAL LIBERTY 611 The maxim 1 is made a part of our con- stitutional law in the clauses prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures, and has always been looked upon as of high value to the citizen.” into State by extradition proceedings and there tried or discharged cannot be arrested upon civil process until a reasonable time has elapsed in which he might have returned to the State from which he was brought. Moletor v. Sinnen, 76 Wis. 308, 44 N. W. 1099, 7L. R. A. 817, 20 Am. St. 71. Person arrested without warrant can be detained only so long as is reasonably necessary to obtain a legal warrant. Leger v. Warren, 62 Ohio St. 500, 57 N. E. 506, 51 L. R. A. 193. 1 Broom’s Maxims, 321; Llsley v. Nichols, 12 Pick. 270; Swain v. Mizner, 8 Gray, 182; People v». Hubbard, 24 Wend. 369, 35 Am. Dec. 628; Curtis v. Hubbard, 4 Hill, 437; Bailey v. Wright, 39 Mich. 96. The eloquent passage in Chatham’s speech on General Warrants is famil- iar: ‘‘The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm may enter; the rain may enter; but the King of England may not enter; all his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement.’’ And see Lieber on Civil Liberty and Self-Government, ce. 6. That officer may not break and enter to serve a writ of replevin, see Kelly »v. Schuyler, 20 R. I. 432, 39 Atl. 893, 4 L. R. A. 435. Householder may kill in defending his house against attack. Wilson v. State, 30 Fla. 234, 11 So. 556, 17 L. R. A. 654. As to when officer may enter without warrant, see Delafoile v. State, 54 N. J. L. 381, 24 Atl. 557, 16 L. R. A. 500, and note. See also Voorhees on Arrest, Ch. VII. 2 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 58 L. ed. 652, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 341, L. R. A. 1915 B, 834; Shall ». Minneapolis, etc., R. Co., 156 Wis. 195, 145 N. W. 649, 50 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 1151. All unlawful searches and seizures are ‘‘unreasonable’’, within the mean- ing of the constitutional provision for- bidding unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Wills, 91 W. Va. 659, 1148S. BE. 261, 24 A. L. R. 1398. Search made by permission of agent or servant in possession is not un- reasonable, nor is the taking away of an article there found, the agent consent- ing thereto, a prohibited seizure. State v. Griswold, 67 Conn. 290, 34 At 1046; 30 Ui. Re A: 227. Where a boiler exploded, killing several persons and wounding many others, and the person in charge was prosecuted for criminal negligence, the property owner may object to an order of court delivering the wreck and premises into the custody of a police officer, charged to keep them un- molested until the time of trial, al- though it is probable that in the absence of such custody, much valu- able real evidence will be lost. New- berry v. Carpenter, 107 Mich. 567, 65 N. W. 530, 31 L. R. A. 163, 61 Am. St. 346. The court cannot compel a plaintiff to submit a horse, over whose condi- tion the controversy arises, to the inspection of a veterinary surgeon, even though the inspection is to be made in the presence of the plaintiff or his agent. Martin v. Elliott, 106 Mich. 130, 63 N. W. 998, 31 L. R. A. 169; but astatute requiring one person to submit his property to inspection of another for purpose of procuring evidence to aid that other in enforc- ing his rights is valid. Montana Co. v. St. Louis Mining and M. Co., 152 U. S. 160, 38 L. ed. 398, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 506. In Potter v. Beale, 50 Fed. Rep. 860, the order of a court that a master should search the trunk of the presi- dent of an insolvent national bank and deliver to such president his private papers, and to the receiver all belonging to the bank, was held to be612 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I If in English history we inquire into the original occasion for these constitutional provisions, we shall probably find it in the abuse of executive authority, and in the unwarrantable intrusion of executive agents into the houses and among the private papers of individuals, in order to obtain evidence of political offenses either committed or designed. The final overthrow of this practice is so clearly and succinctly stated in a recent work on the constitutional history of England, that we cannot refrain from copying the account in the note below.! in violation of the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. Money in possession of prisoner under arrest can be taken from him only when there are reasonable grounds for believing it to be connected with the crime charged or that it may be used as evidence. Ex parte Hurn, 92 Ala. 102, 9 So. 515, 13 L. R. A. 120, 25 Am. St. 23. Pawnbroker may be compelled to take out license, and to keep list of property received and persons from whom received, and to exhibit such property and list to inspection of mayor and police officers. Shuman v. Fort Wayne, 127 Ind. 109, 26 N. E. 560, 11 L. R. A. 378, and note. Statute authorizing vendors of liquors to sue out search warrants to secure bottles not returned by cus- tomers is unconstitutional. Lippman v. People, 175 Ill. 101, 51 N. E. 872. 1“ Among the remnants of a juris- prudence which had favored preroga- tive at the expense of liberty was that of the arrest of persons under general warrants, without previous evidence of their guilt or identification of their persons. This practice survived the Revolution, and was continued with- out question, on the ground of usage, until the reign of George III., when it received its death-blow from the boldness of Wilkes and the wisdom of Lord Camden. This question was brought to an issue by No. 45 of the ‘North Briton’, already so often men- tioned. There was a libel, but who was the libeller? Ministers knew not, nor waited to inquire, after the accus- tomed forms of law; but forthwith Lord Halifax, one of the secretaries of state, issued a warrant, directing four messengers, taking with them a con- stable, to search for the authors, printers, and publishers; and to apprehend and seize them, together with their papers, and bring them in safe custody before him. No one hay- ing been charged or even suspected, — no evidence of crime having been of- fered, —no one was named in this dread instrument. The offense only was pointed at, not the offender. The magistrate who should have sought proofs of crime deputed this office to his messengers. Armed with their roving commission, they set forth in quest of unknown offenders; and, unable to take evidence, listened to rumors, idle tales, and curious guesses. They held in their hands the liberty of every man whom they were pleased to suspect. Nor were they triflers in their work. In three days they arrested no less than forty-nine persons on suspicion, — many as innocent as Lord Halifax himself. Among the number was Dryden Leach, a printer, whom they took from his bed at night. They seized his papers, and even apprehended his journeymen and servants. He had printed one number of the ‘North Briton’, and was then reprinting some other numbers; but as he happened not to have printed No. 45, he was released without being brought before Lord Halifax. They succeeded, however, in _ arresting Kearsley, the publisher, and Balfe, the printer, of the obnoxious number, with all their workmen. From them it was discovered that Wilkes was the culprit of whom they were in search; but the evidence was not on oath; and the messengers received verbal directions to apprehend Wilkes under the generalCHAP. X] PROTECTIONS TO warrant. Wilkes, far keener than the crown lawyers, not seeing his own name there, declared it ‘a ridiculous warrant against the whole English nation’, and refused to obey it. But after being in custody of the messengers for some hours, in his own house, he was taken away in a chair, to appear before the secretaries of state. No sooner had he been removed than the messengers, returning to his house, proceeded to ransack his drawers, and carried off all his private papers, including even his will and his pocket-book. When brought into the presence of Lord Halifax and Lord Egremont, questions were put to Wilkes which he refused to answer; whereupon he was committed close prisoner to the Tower, denied the use of pen and paper, and interdicted from receiving the visits of his friends, or even of his professional advisers. From this imprisonment, however, he was shortly released on a writ of habeas corpus, by reason of his privilege as a member of the House of Commons. ‘Wilkes and the printers, supported by Lord Temple’s liberality, soon questioned the legality of the general warrant. First, several journeymen printers brought action against the messengers. On the first trial Lord Chief Justice Pratt—not allowing bad precedents to set aside the sound principles of English law — held that the general warrant was illegal; that it was illegally executed; and that the messengers were not indemnified by statute. The journeymen re- covered three hundred pounds dam- ages; and the other plaintiffs also obtained verdicts. In all these cases, however, bills of exceptions were ten- dered and allowed. Mr. Wilkes himself brought an action against Mr. Wood, under-secretary of state, who had personally superintended the execu- tion of the warrant. At this trial it was proved that Mr. Wood and the messengers, after Wilkes’s removal in custody, had taken entire possession of his house, refusing admission to his friends; had sent for a blacksmith, who opened the drawers of his bureau ; and having taken out the papers, had carried them away in a sack, without taking any list or inventory. All his PERSONAL LIBERTY 613 private manuscripts were seized, and his pocket-book filled up the mouth of thesack. Lord Halifax was examined, and admitted that the warrant had been made out three days before he had received evidence that Wilkes was the author of the ‘North Briton.’ Lord Chief Justice Pratt thus spoke of the warrant: ‘The defendant claimed a right, under precedents, to force persons’ houses, break open escritoires, and seize their papers upon a general warrant, where no inventory is made of the things thus taken away, and where no offenders’ names are specified in the warrant, and therefore a dis- cretionary power given to messengers to search wherever their suspicions may chance to fall. If such a power is truly invested in a secretary of state, and he can delegate this power, it certainly may affect the person and property of every man in this king- dom, and is totally subversive of the liberty of the subject.’ The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff, with one thousand pounds damages. “Four days after Wilkes had ob- tained his verdict against Mr. Wood, Dryden Leach, the printer, gained another verdict, with four hundred pounds damages, against the messen- gers. A bill of exceptions, however, was tendered and received in this as in other cases, and came on for hearing before the Court of King’s Bench in 1765. After much argument and the citing of precedents showing the prac- tice of the secretary of state’s office ever since the Revolution, Lord Mansfield pronounced the warrant illegal, saying: ‘It is not fit that the judging of the information should be left to the discretion of the officer. The magistrate should judge, and give cer- tain directions to the officer.’ The other three judges agreed that the war- rant was illegal and bad, ‘believing that no degree of antiquity can give sanction to an usage bad in itself.’ The judgment was therefore affirmed. “Wilkes had also brought actions for false imprisonment against both the secretaries of state. Lord Egremont’s death put an end to the action against him; and Lord Halifax, by pleading privilege, and interposing other delays614 unworthy of his position and character, contrived to put off his appearance until after Wilkes had been outlawed, when he appeared and pleaded the outlawry. But at length, in 1769, no further postponement could be con- trived; the action was tried, and Wilkes obtained no than four thousand pounds damages. Not only in this action, but throughout the proceedings, in which ag- grieved by the general warrant had sought redress, the government offered an obstinate and vexatious resistance. The defendants were harassed by every obstacle which the law per- mitted, and subjected to ruinous costs. The expenses which government itself incurred in these said to have amounted to one hundred thousand pounds. “The liberty of the subject was further assured at this period by another remarkable judgment of Lord Camden. In November, 1762, the Earl of Halifax, as secretary of state, had issued a warrant directing certain messengers, taking a constable to their assistance, to search for John Entinck, clerk, the author or one concerned in the writing of several numbers of the ‘Monitor, or British Freeholder’, and to seize him, together with his books and papers, and bring him in safe custody before the secretary of state. In execution of this warrant, the mes- sengers apprehended Mr. Entinck in his house, and seized the books and papers in his bureau, writing-desk, and drawers. ‘This case differed from that of Wilkes, as the warrant specified the name of the person against whom it was directed. In respect of the person, it was not a general warrant, but as regards the papers, it was a general search-warrant, — not specifying any particular papers to be seized, but giving authority to the messengers to take all his books and papers according to their discretion. “Mr. Entinck brought an action of trespass against the messengers for the seizure of his papers, upon which a jury found a special verdict, with three hundred pounds damages. This less persons various actions were special verdict was twice learnedly argued before the Court of Common CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I Pleas, where, at length, in 1765, Lord Camden pronounced an elaborate judg- ment. He even doubted the right of the secretary of state to commit per- sons at all, except for high treason; but in deference to prior decisions, the court felt bound to acknowledge the right. The main question, however, was the legality of a search warrant for papers. ‘If this point should be determined in favor of the jurisdic- tion’, said Lord Camden, ‘the secret cabinets and bureaus of every subject in this kingdom will be thrown open to the search and inspection of a mes- senger, whenever the secretary of state shall see fit to charge, or even to suspect, a person to be the author, printer, or publisher of a seditious libel.’ ‘This power, so assumed by the secretary of state, is an execution upon all the party’s papers in the first instance. His house is rifled; his most valuable papers are taken out of his possession, before the paper, for which he is charged, is found to be criminal by any competent jurisdic- tion, and before he is convicted either of writing, publishing, or being con- cerned in the paper.’ It had been found by the special verdict that many such warrants had been issued since the Revolution; but he wholly denied their legality. He referred the origin of the practise to the Star Chamber, which, in pursuit of libels, had given search-warrants to their mes- senger of the press, — a practice which, after the abolition of the Star Cham- ber, had been revived and authorized by the licensing act of Charles II., in the person of the secretary of state. And he conjectured that this practice had been continued after the expira- tion of that act, — a conjecture shared by Lord Mansfield and the Court of King’s Bench. With the unanimous concurrence of the other judges of his court, this eminent magistrate now finally condemned this dangerous and unconstitutional practice.’”’ May’s Constitutional History of England, ec. 11. See also Semayne’s Case, 5 Coke, 91: 1 Smith’s Lead. Cas. 183; En- tinck v. Carrington, 2 Wils. 275, and 19 State Trials, 1030; note to same case in Broom, Const. Law, 613; Money ».CHAP. X] PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY 615 The history of this controversy should be read in connection with that in America immediately previous to the American Revolution, in regard to writs of assistance issued by the courts to the revenue officers, empowering them, in their discretion, to search suspected places for smuggled goods, and which Otis pronounced “the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English lib- erty and the fundamental principles of law, that ever was found in an English law book”’; since they placed “the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer.”’ 1 All these matters are now a long way in the past; but it has not been deemed unwise to repeat in the State constitutions,? as well as in the Constitution of the United States,’ the principles already settled in the common law upon this vital point in civil liberty.* Leach, Burr. 1742; Wilkes’s Case, 2 Wils. 151, and 19 State Trials, 1405. For debates in Parliament on the same subject, see Hansard’s Debates, Vol. XV. pp. 1393-1418; Vol. XVI. pp. 6 and 209. In further illustration of the same subject, see De Lolme on the English Constitution, c. 18; Story on Const. §§ 1901, 1902; Bell v. Clapp, 10 Johns. 263, 6 Am. Dec. 339; Sailly v. Smith, 11 Johns. 500. 1 Works of John Adams, Vol. II. pp. 523, 524: 2 Hildreth’s U. S. 499; 4 Bancroft’s U. S. 414; Quincy, Mass. Reports, 51. See also the appendix to these reports, p. 395, for a history of writs of assistance. 2Rose v. State, 171 Ind. 662, 87 N. E. 103, 17 Ann. Cas. 228; Buckley v. Beaulieu, 104 Me. 56, 71 Atl. 70, 991) KR. A. (Nn; 8:) 819% Reople: Marxhausen, 204 Mich. 559, 171 N. W. 557. orAw das HE 1505); Voorhies v. Faust, 220 Mich. 155, 189 N. W. 1006, 27 A. L. R. 706; People v. Case, 220 Mich. 379, 190 N. W. 289, 27 A. L. R. 686; State v. Anderson, 270 Mo. 533, 194 S. W. 268, L. R. A. 1917 EB, 833; State v. Quinn, 111 S. C. 174, 975. E. 62, 3 A. L. R. 1500; State v. Wills, 91 W. Va. 659, 114 S. E. 261, 24 A.L.R. i398; State v. Kees, 92 W. Va. O77, 114A Soy 617, 27 At Ln he GShs Hoyer v. State, 180 Wis. 407, 103 N. W. 89, 27 A. L. R. 673. 3U. S. Const. 4th Amendment. The scope of this work does not call for any discussion of the searches of private premises, and seizures of books [The protection afforded by these and papers, which are made under the authority, or claim of authority, of the revenue laws of the United States. Perhaps, under no other laws are such liberties taken by ministerial officers ; and it would be surprising to find oppressive action on their part so often submitted to without legal con- test, if the facilities they possess te embarrass, annoy, and obstruct the merchant in his business were not borne in mind. The federal decisions, however, go very far to establish the doctrine that, in matters of revenue, the regulations Congress sees fit to establish, however unreasonable they may seem, must prevail. For a very striking case, see Henderson’s Dis- tilled Spirits, 14 Wall. 44, 20 L. ed. 815. 4The immunity from search and seizure is not from all search and seizure, but from search and seizure unreasonable in the light of common law traditions. Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298, 65 L. ed. 647, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 261; People »v. Castree, 311 Ill. 392, 143 N. E. 112, 32 A. L. R. 357; People v. Chaigles, 237 N. Y. 193, 142 N. E. 583, 32 A. L. R. 676. The Fourth Amendment denounces only such searches or seizures as are unreasonable, and it is to be construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted, and in a manner which will conserve public interests as well as the interests and rights of individ-616 ual citizens. It has been construed, practically since the beginning of the Government, as recognizing a neces- sary difference between a search of a store, dwelling-house or other struc- ture in respect of which a proper official warrant readily may be ob- tained, and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or automobile, for con- traband goods, where it is not practi- cable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 69 L. ed. 543, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 280, 39 A. L. R. 790. The provision in the Constitution of West Virginia was adopted for the purpose of guaranteeing to citizens the rights and immunities enjoyed under the common law. State v. Kees, 92 W. Va. 277, 1148S. E. 617, 27 A. L. R. 681. ““When a man is legally arrested for an offense, whatever is found upon his person or in his control which it is un- lawful for him to have and which may be used to prove the offense may be seized and held as evidence in the prosecution.”’ Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 69 L. ed. 543, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 280. ““An arresting officer has the right to search the person of a prisoner law- fully arrested, and take from his person and hold for the disposition of the court any property connected with the offense for which he is ar- rested that may be used as evidence against him, or any weapon or thing that might enable the prisoner to escape or do some act of violence.”’ Youman v. Com., 189 Ky. 152, 224 We S60) 13eAn take 1303; But the search and seizure in such case to be lawful must be incidental to the arrest, and it is not incidental if it is made in a building other than the one in which the arrest wasmade. Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20, 46 Sup. Ct. Rep. 4, 70 L. ed.—. As to when the search and seizure is in- cidental to the arrest, see also Paulas v. United States, 8 Fed. (2d) 120; Argetakis v. State, 24 Ariz. 599, 212 Pac. 372; People v. Cona, 180 Mich. CONSTITUTIONAL [voL. I LIMITATIONS 641, 147 N. W. 525; People v. Wood- ward, 220 Mich. 525, 190 N. W. 721; People v. Conway, 225 Mich. 152, 195 N. W. 679; People v. Manko, 189 N. Y. Supp. 357; People v. Kalnin, 189 N. Y. Supp. 359; Davis v. State, (Okla. Crim.), 234 Pac. 787; People v. Laundy, 103 Oreg. 443, 204 Pac. 958; 206 Pac. 290; Gamble v. Keyes, 35S. D. 644, 153 N. W. 888. Search without a warrant of an automobile, and seizure therein of liquor subject to seizure and destruc- tion under the Prohibition Act, do not violate the Fourth Amendment, ~if made _ upon probable-cause,.7.e., upon a belief reasonably arising out of cir- cumstances known to the officer, that the vehicle contains such contraband liquor. Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 182, 69 L. ed. 548, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 280, 39 A. L. R. 790. The provision in section 26, Title II, of the National Prohibition Act, authorizing seizure by an officer when he ‘‘discovers”’ any one in the act of transporting liquor by automobile or other vehicle, when construed, as it has been, not to limit the officer to what he learns of the contents of a passing automobile by the use of his senses at the time, is consistent with the Fourth Amendment. Carroll »v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 69 L. ed. 543, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 280, 39 A. L. R. 790. If an officer sees an article or im- plement that it is unlawful to have possession of in the possession of any person, or in felony cases, when the officer has reasonable grounds for believing that the person has com- mitted a felony, he may without a warrant of arrest make the arrest and take possession of the unlawful things on the person arrested, but he has no lawful right to search on suspicion, either the person or baggage or per- sonal belongings of a suspected person. Youman v. Com. 189 Ky. 152, 224 S. W. 860, 13 A. L. R. 13808. Letters voluntarily written by the defendant in a criminal prosecution while in the penitentiary for a prior offense which came into the posses- sion of the officials of the penitentiary under established practice, reasonablyCHAP. X] PROTECTIONS TO provisions applies only to governmental action. PERSONAL LIBERTY 617 It has no applica- tion to searches or seizures by individuals without governmental sanction.! The provisions prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures “should receive a liberal construction, so as to prevent stealthy encroachment upon or ‘gradual depreciation’ of the rights secured by them, by imperceptible practice of courts or by well-intentioned, but mistakenly overzealous, executive officers.” ? designed to promote the discipline of the institution, were not acquired by unreasonable search and _ seizure. Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15, 64 L. ed. 103, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 50. A safe deposit box is not within the protection of the constitutional pro- hibition. Carples v. Cumberland Coal, etc=) Co: 240 IN. YY. 187, 1489 NC OE: An ordinance authorizing the sum- mary seizure and destruction of milk not conforming to the standard fixed by law is not unconstitutional. Nel- son v- Minneapolis, 112 Minn. 16, 127 N. W. 445, 29 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 260. The prohibition of the Constitu- tion of the United States against un- reasonable searches and seizures does not apply to the states. National Safe Deposit Co. v. Stead, 232 U. S. 58, 58 L. ed. 504, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 209; Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 58 L. ed. 652, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 341, L. R. A. 1915 B, 884, Ann. Cas. 1915 C, 1177; Banks v. State, 207 Ala. 179, 93 So. 293, 24 A. L. R. 1359; People v. Mayen, 188 Cal. 237, 205 Pac. 435, 24 A. L. R. 13883; Johnson »v. State, 152 Ga. 271, 109 S. E. 662, 19 A. L. R. 641; Tucker v. State, 128 Miss. 211, 90 So. 845, 24 A. L. R. 1377; People v. Adams, 176 N. Y. 351, 68 N. E. 636, 98 Am. St. Rep. 675, 63 L. R. A. 406; Hoyer v. State, 180 Wis. 407, 193 N. W. 89, 27 A. L. R. 673; State v. Peterson, 27 Wyo. 185, 194 Pac. 342, 13 A. L. R. 1284. 1 Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 58 L. ed. 652, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 341, L. R. A. 1915 B, 834, Ann. Cas. 1915 C, 1177; Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U. S. 465, 65 L. ed. 1048, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 574, 13 A. L. R. 1159; Cohn »v, State, 120 Tenn. 61, 109 S. W. 1149, 17 L. R. A. (nN. 8.) 451, 15 Ann. ‘ But they should Cas. 1201; Hughes v. State, 145 Tenn. 544, 238 S. W. 588, 20 A. L. R. 639; State v. Peterson, 27 Wyo. 185, 194 Pac. 342, 138 A. L. R. 1284. The constitutional provision against unreasonable searches and seizures contemplates only searches and sei- zures made through governmental agencies and under statutes attempt- ing to authorize it, and has no bearing upon the unauthorized acts of private persons, or petty officers of the law, and the evidence secured by the un- lawful acts and trespasses of such persons is admissible against the accused. Cohn v. State, 120 Tenn. 61, 109 S. W. 1149, 17 L. R. A. (Nn. 8.) 451, 15 Ann. Cas. 1201. “The mere fact that a man is an officer, . gives him no more right than is possessed by the ordinary private citizen to break in upon the privacy of a home and subject its occupants to the indignity of a search for the evidences of crime, without a legal warrant procured for that pur- pose.’ McClurg v. Brenton, 123 Iowa 368, 98 N. W. 881, 101 Am. St. Rep. 323, 65 L. R. A. 519. Subject to the exception that an arresting officer has the right to search the person of the prisoner lawfully arrested, and take from his possession property connected with the offense, or any weapon or thing that might enable the prisoner to escape or do violence, it is as great a violation of the Constitution for an officer to search a person or baggage carried about by him, without a warrant authorizing it, as it is to search his premises. Youman v. Com., 189 Ky. 152, 224 S. W. 860, 13 A. L. R. 1303. 2 Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298, 65 L. ed. 647, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 261.618 be so construed rights."] For the service CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [voL. I as to conserve public as well as individual of criminal process, the houses of private parties are subject to be broken and entered under circumstances which are fully explained in the works on criminal law, and need not be enu- merated here. And there are also cases where search-warrants are allowed to be issued, under which an officer may be protected in the like action. ingly arbitrary in character, except for very urgent and But as search-warrants are a species of process exceed- and which ought not to be resorted to satisfactory reasons, the rules of law which pertain to them are of more than ordinary strictness; and if the party acting under them expects legal protection, it is essential that these rules be carefully observed. In the first place, they are only to be granted in the cases expressly authorized by law; and not generally in such cases until after a showing made before a judicial officer, under oath, that a crime has been committed, and that the party complaining has reasonable cause to suspect that the offender, or the property which was the subject or the instrument of the crime, is concealed in some specified house or place.’ 1 Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 69 L. ed. 543, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 280. 2“The wording of the Fourth Amendment implies that search war- rants were in familiar use when the Constitution was adopted and, plainly, that when issued ‘upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirma- tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized’, searches and seizures made under them are to be regarded as not unreasonable and therefore not prohibited by the amendment.”’ Gouled v. United States, 255 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 261. 32; Hale; PB: ©: 142 Bishop, Cr. Pro. §§ 716-719; Archbold, Cr. Law, 147; People v. Castree, 311 Ill. 392, 143 N. B. 112, 32 A. L. R. 357; State v. Derry, 171 Ind. 18, 85 N. E. 765, 131 Am. St. Rep. 237; Rose »v. State, 171 Ind. 662, 87 N. E. 103, 17 Ann. Cas. 228. See also State v. Peterson, 27 Wyo. 185, 194 Pac. 342, 13 A. L. R. 1284. It is competent for the legislature to declare that a certain showing shall U. S. 298, 65 L. ed. 647, And the law, in requiring a showing of reasonable constitute probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, pro- vided the complaint thus prescribed does not require less to be shown than was required for the issuance of such a warrant at common law. State v. Kees, 92 W. Va. 277, 114 S. E. 617, 27 A. L. R. 681. A statute which directs the seizure and retention of property alleged to be used as a bawdyhouse, which seizure is without notice and without a hearing to determine whether such place be a nuisance in fact, is unconsti- tutional in that it violates the security of persons in their houses by directing an unreasonable seizure of the same. State ex rel. Herigstad v. McCray, 48 N. D. 625, 186 N. W. 280, 22 A. L. R. 530. Though a statute does not expressly require a complaint for a search war- rant to be sworn to, it is not violative of a constitutional provision providing that ‘no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by affida- vit’’, where the statutes require all complaints for criminal offenses to be verified. State v. Peterson, 27 Wyo. 185, 194 Pac. 342, 13 A, L. R. 1284. iO iy SS OT tae aeCHAP. X] PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY 619 cause for suspicion, intends that evidence shall be given of such facts as shall satisfy the magistrate 1 that the suspicion is well founded ; for the suspicion itself is no ground for the warrant except as the facts justify it.? States has stated the rule thus: (In a recent case, the Supreme Court of the United “Tf the facts and circumstances before the officer are such as to warrant a man of prudence and cau- tion in believing that the offense has been committed, it is suffi- 1 The issuance of a search warrant is a matter for judicial determination and not within the much more limited field of the discretion vested in executive or administrative officers. Hoyer v. State, 180 Wis. 407, 193 N. We so) 27 AW Ie Re 6735 State oe: Peterson, 27 Wyo. 185, 194 Pac. 342, 13 A. L. R. 1284. “In the contemplation of the law the probable cause which must be supported by oath or affirmation must be submitted to the committing magis- trate himself. The official accuser cannot be the judge. It is the magis- trate who must exercise his own judg- ment on the sufficiency of the ground shown, and this must amount to probable cause of belief... . The rule results that it is beyond the power of a magistrate to authorize a search warrant to issue upon an affidavit based on mere belief.’ Burtch v. Zeuch, 200 Iowa 49, 202 N. W. 542, 39 A. L. R. 1349. A statute which provides that the question of probable cause shall be determined by the prosecuting at- torney or prohibition commissioner is invalid. State v. Peterson, 27 Wyo. 185, 194 Pac. 342, 13 A. L. R. 1284. 2 Commonwealth v. Lottery Tickets, 5 Cush. 369; Else v. Smith, 1 D. & R. 97; Giles v. United States, 284 Fed. 208: Atlantic Food Products Cor- poration v. McClure, 288 Fed. 982; United States v. Harnich, 289 Fed. 256; Colley v. Com., 195 Ky. 706, 243 S. W.913; Waltingly v. Com., 197 Ky. 583, 247 S. W. 938; People v. Effel- berg, 220 Mich. 528, 190 N. W. 727; People v. Knopka, 220 Mich. 540, 190 N. W. 731; People v. Thompson, 221 Mich. 618, 192 N. W. 560; State ex rel. Samlin v. District Ct., 59 Mont. 600, 198 Pac. 362; In re Liquors seized at Auto Inn, 204 App. Div. 185, 197 N. Y. Supp. 758; State ez rel. Register v. McGahey, 12 N. D. 535, 97 N. W. 865, 1 Ann. Cas. 650. In United States v. Lepper, 288 Fed. 136, 138, the court said: “It is not required that the evidence should show that a crime was actually com- mitted or that the facts should be alleged strong enough to convict the defendant. It is enough if probable cause exists, or a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves, to warrant a discreet and prudent man in believing that a crime is being com- mitted.” The fact that the complainant, in the information upon which a search warrant is issued, shows that the reason for his belief that an offense is being committed upon certain prem- ises is information conveyed to him, instead of facts known to him per- sonally, will not invalidate the same. State v. Kees, 92 W. Va. 277, 1145S. E. 617, 27 A. L. R. 681. See also United States v. Bookbinder, 278 Fed. 216; Collins v. Lean, 68 Cal. 284, 9 Pac. 173. A statute which provides that a complaint for a search warrant can be made upon information and belief, is violative of a constitutional provision that “no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by affida- vit.’ State v. Peterson, 27 Wyo. 185, 194 Pac. 342, 13 A. L. R. 1284. Where an experienced prohibition agent saw cases labeled “whisky ”’, which looked to him like whisky cases, being unloaded at a building which, as he ascertained, had no permit to store whisky, there was probable cause for warrant and seizure. Steele »v. United States No. 1, 267 U. S. 498, 69 L. ed. 761, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 414.620 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS cient.” [VOL. I But in some jurisdictions it has been held that an affida- vit on information and belief is sufficient without setting out the : ane: 3 facts upon which the belief is based.”] In the next place, the warrant which the magistrate issues must particularly specify the place to be searched* and the object for which the search is to be made. If a building is to be searched, the name of the owner or occupant should be given ;* or, if not occupied, it should be particularly described, so that the officer will be left to no discretion in respect to the place ; and a misdescription in regard to the ownership,’ or a description so general that it applies equally well 1 Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 69 L. ed. 543, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 280. See also Steele v. United States No. 1, 267 U. S. 498, 69 L. ed. 761, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 414; Dumbra United States, 268 U. S. 435, 69 L. ed. 1032, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 546. 2Rose v. State, 171 Ind. 662, 87 N. E. 103, 17 Ann. Cas. 228; Watson v. State, 109 Neb. 48, 189 N. W. 620; Cochran v. State, 105 Ohio St. 541, 138 N. E. 54. In Ohio it has been held that a search warrant for the seizure of in- toxicating liquors or property designed for the manufacture of intoxicating liquors may lawfully be issued upon complying with the statutory require- ments by filing an affidavit With a magistrate particularly describing the house or place to be searched, the person to be seized, and the things to be searched for, and alleging sub- stantially the offense in relation there- to and that affiant believes and has good cause to believe that such things are there concealed, without any supporting testimony of the truth of such affidavit and without any find- ing of probable cause on the part of the magistrate. Rosanski v. State, 106 Ohio St. 422, 140 N. E. 370. In West Virginia it has been held that it is competent for the legislature to declare that a certain showing shall constitute probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, provided the complaint thus prescribed docs not require less to be shown than was required for the issuance of such a walrant at common law. State »v. Kees, 92 W. Va. 277, 114 S. E. 617, 27 A. L. R. 681. 3 United States v. Borkowski, 268 Fed. 408; Toole v. State, 170 Ala. 41, 54 So. 195; Purkey v. Mabey, 33 Idaho, 281, 193 Pac. 79; People v. Castree, 311 Ill. 392, 143 N. E. 112, 32 A. L. R. 357. A search without a warrant is an unreasonable search, and a search of a place not described is without a warrant and is unreasonable. People v. Castree, 311 Ill. 392, 143 N. E. 112, 32 A. L. R. 357. A search warrant sufficiently de- scribes the place to be searched if it enables the officer, with reasonable effort, to identify it. Steele v. United States No. 1, 267 U. S. 498, 69 L. ed. 761, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 414. 4Stone v. Dana, 5 Met. 98. See Bell v. Rice, 2 J. J. Marsh. 44, 19 Am. Dec. 122; Miller v. State, 129 Miss. 774, 93 So. 2. But see United States v. Camarota, 278 Fed. 388, and Bar- ber’s Petition 281 Fed. 550. 6 Sandford v. Nichols, 13 Mass. 286; s.c. 7 Am. Dec. 151; Allen v. Staples, 6 Gray, 491; United States v. Innelli, 286 Fed. 731. In Nebraska it has been held that a search warrant provided for by a statute of that state, being primarily for the search of particular premises for intoxicating liquors and the bring- ing of the person found in charge thereof before the magistrate for exam- ination, the same particularity in describing the owner and occupant of the premises, thought to be in posses- sion of the liquor, is not required as 1s necessary in warrants solely for the apprehension of persons. Watson ». State, 109 Neb. 43, 189 N. W. 620. ett etCHAP. X] PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY 621 to several buildings or places, would render the warrant void in law.! (Thus a warrant issued against an apartment house where many families reside is invalid where it is not claimed that the whole premises should be searched.?| Search-warrants are always obnox- ious to very serious objections ; and very great particularity is justly required in these cases before the privacy of a man’s premises is allowed to be invaded by the minister of the law.‘ a designation of goods to be searched for as “ 3 And therefore goods, wares, and mer- chandises’’, without more particular description, has been regarded as insufficient, even in the case of goods supposed to be smuggled,* 1 Toole v. State, 190 Ala. 41, 54 So. 195. A search warrant is_ insufficient which fails to describe any houses, buildings or real property to be examined or to designate the county in which the writ is to be executed. Smith v. McDuffee, 72 Oreg. 276, 142 Pac. 558, 143 Pac. 929, Ann. Cas. 1916 D, 947. A warrant to search the “houses and buildings of Hiram Ide and Henry Ide’’, is too general. Humes v. Tabor, 1 R. I. 464. See McGlinchy ». Barrows, 41 Me. 74; Ashley v. Peter- son, 25 Wis. 621; Com. v. Intox. Liquors, 140 Mass. 287, 3 N. EH. 4. So a warrant for the arrest of an un- known person under the designation of John Doe, without further descrip- tion, is void. Commonwealth ». Crotty, 10 Allen, 403. In Steele v. United States No. 1, 267 U.S. 498, 69 L. ed. 761, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 414, a description, in a search warrant, of a building as a garage used for business purposes, giving its street and one of its two house num- bers, was held sufficiently definite, under the circumstances, for search of the whole building, which had three street entrances, and means of access between its parts on the ground and upper floors, and was used in conduct- ing an automobile garage and storage business. For descriptions held sufficient, see Wright v. Dressel, 140 Mass. 147, 3 N. E. 6; Com. v. Certain Liquors, 146 Mass. 509, 16 N. E. 298; Barber’s Petition, 281 Fed. 550; United States v. Boasberg, 283 Fed. 305; United States v. Lepper, 288 Fed. 136; Toole v. State, 170 Ala. 41, 54 So. 195; People v. Flemming, 221 Mich. 609, 192 N. W. 625; State v. Hesse, 154 Minn. 89, 191 N. W. 267; Jn re Hol- comb, 117 Misc. (N. Y.) 356, 192 N. Y. Supp. 407; affirmed 202 App. Div. 784, 194 N. Y. Supp. 944; State v. Montgomery, 94 W. Va. 153, 117S. E. 870. For descriptions held insufficient, see United States v. Alexander, 278 Fed. 308; Pressley v. United States, 289 Fed. 477; United States v. Rykowski, 267 Fed. 866; United States v. Innelli, 286 Fed. 731; In re Graham, 203 App. Div. 172, 196 N. Y. Supp. 276. 2 United Fed. 128. 3 A warrant for searching a dwelling- house will not justify a forcible entry into a barn adjoining the dwelling house. Jones v. Fletcher, 41 Me. 254; Downing v. Porter, 8 Gray, 539; Bishop, Cr. Pro. §§ 716-719. The search of a dwelling under a warrant particularly describing a store is unreasonable, and violative of the constitution. People v. Castree, 311 Tll. 392, 143 N. E. 112, 32 A. L. R. 357. As to necessity and sufficiency of state- ment of time of events described in affidavit, see Baker v. Com., 204 Ky. 536, 264 S. W. 1091; People v. Musk, 231 Mich. 187, 203 N. W. 865; Arm- strong v. State, 150 Tenn. 416, 265 S. W. 672. 4 Sandford v. Nichols, 13 Mass. 286, 7 Am. Dec. 151; Archbold, Cr. Law, 143. A description of the articles to be searched for as ‘‘cases of whisky” is specific enough. Steele v, United States v. Mitchell, 274[VOL. I 622 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS where there is usually greater difficulty in giving description, and where, consequently, more latitude should be permitted than in the case of property stolen. Lord Hale says: “It is fit that such warrants to search do express that search be made in the daytime; and though I do not say they are unlawful without such restriction, yet they are very inconvenient without it; for many times, under pretense of searches made in the night, robberies and burglaries have been committed, and at best it creates great disturbance.” ! And the statutes upon this subject will generally be found to provide for searches in the daytime only, except in very special cases. The warrant should also be directed to the sheriff or other proper officer, and not to private persons; though the party complainant may be present for the purposes of identification,” and other assist- ance can lawfully be called in by the officer if necessary. The warrant must also command that the goods or other articles to be searched for, if found, together with the party in whose custody they are found, be brought before the magistrate, to the end that, upon further examination into the facts, the goods, and the party in whose custody they were, may be disposed of according to law.° And it is a fatal objection to such a warrant that it leaves the dispo- sition of the goods searched for to the ministerial officer, instead of requiring them to be brought before the magistrate, that he may pass his judgment upon the truth of the complaint made; and it would also be a fatal objection to a statute authorizing such a war- rant if it permitted a condemnation or other final disposition of the States No. 1, 267 U. S. 498, 69 L. ed. (615745) Sup; Cts dReps 414: “A certain quantity of rum being about and not exceeding 100 gallons” is sufficient. State v. Fitzpatrick, 16 R. I. 54, 11 Atl. Rep. 767. Under a constitutional requirement that the affidavit for a search warrant must particularly describe the prop- erty sought an affidavit describing the property as ‘‘personal goods and prop- erty, to wit, certain paraphernalia’’, was held insufficient. People v. Mayen, 188 Cal. 237, 205 Pac. 435, 24 A. L. R. 1383. And under such a requirement a designation of the property as ‘‘in- toxicating liquor”, without descrip- tion as to kind, quantity, ete., is in- sufficient. State v. Peterson, 27 Wyo. 185, 194 Pac. 342, 13 A. L. R. 1284. See Giles v. United States, 284 Fed. 208; United States v. Lepper, 288 Fed. 136; Walters v. Com., 199 Ky. 182, 250 S. W. 839; Voorhies v. Faust, 220 Mich. 155, 189 N. W. 1006, 27 A. L. R. 706; People v. Musczynski, 220 Mich. 536, 19 N. W. 730. 12 Hale, P. C. 150. See Archbold, Cr: Law (7th ed); 1455 Com: wv: Hinds, 145 Mass. 182, 13 N. E. 397. 22 Hale, P. C. 150; Archbold, Cr. Law (7th ed.), 145. 8 2 Hale, P. C. 150; Bell v. Clapp, 10 Johns. 263, 6 Am. Dec. 339; Hibbard v. People, 4 Mich. 126; Fisher v. McGirr, 1 Gray, 1. If the statute ordains that the warrant shall require the officer to make an inventory, one omitting this command is no protection, though in fact an inventory is made by the officer. Hussey v. Davis, 58 N. H. 317. ONT eet an raeCHAP. X] PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY 623 goods, without notice to the claimant, and without an opportunity for a hearing being afforded him.' The warrant is not allowed for the purpose of obtaining evidence of an intended crime; but only after lawful evidence of an offense actually committed. 1 The ‘Search and Seizure” clause in some of the prohibitory liquor laws was held void on this ground. Fisher v. McGirr, 1 Gray, 1; Greene ». Briggs, 1 Curtis, 311; Hibbard v. People, 4 Mich. 126. See also Matter of Morton, 10 Mich. 208; Sullivan »v. Oneida, 61 Ill. 242; State v. Snow, 3 R. I. 64, for a somewhat similar principle. An act which declared that all nets, &c., used in catching fish in violation thereof should be forfeited, and might be seized and destroyed or sold by the peace officer, was declared void in Hey Sing Jeck v. Anderson, 57 Cal. 251. But in an Indiana case it is said: “By the fundamental law no one may be deprived of anything the law recog- nized as property without notice and an opportunity to defend it. There are, however, some things, having a commercial value, which from their very nature are under legal condemna- tion, or outlawry, and which the law pursues, rather than protects, because of their pernicious effect upon the public health and morals; for instance, counterfeit money, obscene pictures, vile books, and the like. Such things are regarded by the law as mala per se, because there is no condition or cir- cumstances under which they may come to the possession or attention of the individual without tending to the corruption and prejudice of the public morals and welfare. Such articles cannot be kept, used or exhibited for any useful or innocent purpose. Burglar’s tools and counterfeiting apparatus are generally put in the same class. Being inherently evil, no absolute dominion or property right can exist in them, and, outside the statute, courts have authority, under their police powers, to destroy them for the protection of society. State v. Robins, 124 Ind. 308, 24 N. E. 978, 8 L. R. A. 438; Spaulding ». Preston, 21 Vt. 9, 50 Am. Dec. 68; Nor even then is it allowable to invade one’s Com. v. Coffee, 9 Gray (Mass.) 140; Police Com’rs v. Wagner, 93 Md. 182, 48 Atl. 455, 52 L. R. A. 775, 86 Am. St. Rep. 423.’ But where articles are “capable of two uses — one law- ful and the other unlawful — neither ministerial officers nor courts can upon mere view deprive them of their characteristics as property and put them under legal condemnation. Such a proceeding would be clearly un- constitutional. See State v. Robins, 124 Ind. 308, 24 N. E. 978, 8 L. R. A. 438; Wagner v. Upshar, 95 Md. 519, 52 Atl. 509, 93 Am. St. Rep. 412; Lowrey v. Rainwater, 70 Mo. 152, 35 Am. Rep. 420; Sullivan v. Oneida, 61 Ill. 242; Daniels v. Homer, 139 N. G: 219) 51'S: BE: 992) 3 Lb: Ra A: (n. 8.) 997; Woods v. Cottrell, 55 W. Va. 476, 47S. E. 275, 65 L. R. A. 616, 104 Am. St. Rep. 1004; 20 Cyc. p. 920.”’ State v. Derry, 171 Ind. 18, 85 N. E. 765, 131 Am. St. Rep. 237. See also McConnell v. McKillup, 71 Neb. 712, 99 N. W. 505, 115 Am. St. Rep. 614, 65 L. R. A. 610, 8 Ann. Cas. 898. In a Missouri case it has been held that it is not competent by law to empower a magistrate on mere information, or on his own per- sonal knowledge, to seize and destroy gaming-tables or devices without a hearing and trial. Lowry v. Rain- water, 70 Mo. 152, 35 Am. Rep. 420. After seizure of money and acquittal of larceny, the money must be deliv- ered to defendant. State v. Williams, 61 Iowa, 517, 16 N. W. 586. 2We do not say that it would be incompetent to authorize, by statute, the issue of search warrants for the prevention of offenses in some cases; but it is difficult to state any case in which it might be proper, except in such cases of attempts, or of prepara- tions to commit crime, as are in them- selves criminal. Slot machine to be used as a gam- bling device. Its seizure justified to- 624 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I privacy for the sole purpose of obtaining evidence against him,! except in a few special cases where that which is the subject of the crime is supposed to be concealed, and the public or the complainant has an interest in it or in its destruction. * Those special cases are familiar, and well understood in the law. Search warrants have heretofore been allowed to search for stolen goods, for goods supposed to have been smuggled into the country in violation of the revenue laws, for implements of gaming * or counterfeiting, for lottery tickets or prohibited liquors kept for sale contrary to law,’ for obscene books and papers kept for sale or circulation, and for powder or other explosive and dangerous material so kept as to endanger the public prevent the offense. Board of Police Com’rs v. Wagner, 93 Md. 182, 48 Atl. 455, 52 L. R. A. 775. 1 Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 65 L. ed. 647, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 261. The fourth amendment to the Con- stitution of the United States, found also in many State constitutions, would clearly preclude the seizure of one’s papers in order to obtain evidence against him; and the spirit of the fifth amendment — that no person shall be compelled in a criminal case to give evidence against himself — would also forbid such seizure. In State v. Slamon, 73 Vt. 212, 50 Atl. 1097, 87 Am. St. 711, it was held a violation of the constitutional right to take a letter while searching for stolen goods by virtue of a search watrant. * Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298, 65 L. ed. 647, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 261. The police authorities may be properly invested with power to seize and destroy public nuisances, and to seize such instruments and devices as are designed and intended for use in the commission of crime. J. B. Mullen & Co. v. Mosley, 13 Idaho, 457, 90 Pac. 986, 121 Am. St. Rep. Pith, APG, WR IN (nN. s.) 894, 13 Ann. Cas. 450. * J. B. Mullen & Co. v. Mosley, 13 Idaho, 457, 90 Pac. 986, 121 Am. St. Rep. 277, 12 L. R. A. (n. s.) 394, 13 Ann. Cas. 450; Frost ». People, 193 Ill. 635, 61 N. E. 1054, 86 Am. St. Rep. 352; Woods »v. Cottrell, 55 W. Va. 476, 47 S. EB. 275, 104 Am. St. Rep. 1004, 65 L. R. A. 616, 2 Ann. Cas. 933. 4 Kirkland v. State, 72 Ark. 171, 78 S. W. 770, 105 Am. St. Rep. 25, 65 L. R. A. 76, 2 Ann. Cas. 242; Delaney ». Plunkett, 146 Ga. 547, 91 S. E. 561, L. R. A. 1917 D, 926, Ann. Cas. 1917 EK, 685; Himes v. Stahe, 79 Kan. 88, 99 Pac. 273, 131 Am. St. Rep. 280, 20 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 1118, 17 Ann. Cas. 298; Youman v. Com., 189 Ky. 152, 224 S. W. 860, 138 A. L. R. 1803; Ash ». Com., 193 Ky. 452, 236 S. W. 1032. A search and seizure of intoxicating liquors possessed in violation of the provisions of the National Prohibition law upon a warrant satisfying the requirements of the Fourth Amend- ment and the Espionage Act and issued upon probable cause shown is not an unreasonable search and seizure within the constitutional pro- vision and is in accordance with the Constitution and statutes of the United States. Steele v. United States, 267 U. S. 505, 69 L. ed. 761, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 414; Dumbra v. United States, 268 U. S. 485, 69 L. ed. 1032, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 546. The fact that one has a permit, under the National Prohibition Act, to make and sell wines on his premises for non-beverage purposes, and is under bond, and the premises subject to inspection by internal revenue of- ficers during business hours, does not preclude the issuance of a warrant, upon probable cause, to search the place for wines there possessed ille- gally for beverage purposes. Dumbra v. United States, 268 U. S. 435, 69 L. ed. 1032, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 546.CHAP. X] safety.’ PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY 625 A statute which should permit the breaking and entering a man’s house, and the examination of books and papers with a view to discover the evidence of crime, might possibly not be void on con- stitutional grounds in some other cases ; but the power of the legis- lature to authorize a resort to this procéss-is one which can properly be exercised only in extreme cases, and it is better oftentimes that crime should go unpunished than that the citizen should be liable to have his premises invaded, his desks broken open, his private books, letters, and papers exposed to prying curiosity, and to the misconstructions of ignorant and suspicious persons, — and all this under-the direction of a mere ministerial officer, who brings with him such assistants as he pleases, and who will select them more often with reference to physical strength and courage than to their sensitive regard to the rights and feelings of others. To incline against the enactment of such laws is to incline to the side of safety.” 1 These are the most common cases, but in the following, search warrants are also sometimes provided for by statute: books and papers of a public character, retained from their proper custody; females supposed to be con- cealed in houses of ill-fame; children enticed or kept away from parents or guardians; concealed weapons; counterfeit money, and forged bills or papers. See cases under English statutes specified in 4 Broom and Hadley’s Commentaries, 332. 2 Instances sometimes occur in which ministerial officers take such liberties in endeavoring to detect and punish offenders, as are even more criminal than the offenses they seek to punish. The employment of spies and decoys to lead men on to the commission of crime, on the pretense of bringing criminals to justice, cannot be too often or too strongly condemned; and that prying into private corre- spondence by officers which has some- times been permitted by post-masters, is directly in the face of the law, and cannot be excused. The importance of public confidence in the inviolability of correspondence through the post- office cannot well be overrated; and the proposition to permit letters to be opened at the discretion of a minis- terial officer, would excite general indignation. See Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 24 L. ed. 877. voL. 1— 40 In Maine it has been decided that a telegraph operator may be compelled to disclose the contents of a message sent by him for another party, and that no rule of public policy would forbid. State v. Litchfield, 58 Me. 267. The case is treated as if no other considerations were involved than those which arise in the ordinary case of a voluntary disclosure by one private person to another, without necessity. Such, however, is not the nature of the communication made to the operator of the telegraph. That instrument is used as a means of corre- spondence, and as a valuable, and in many cases an indispensable, sub- stitute for the postal facilities; and the communication is made, not because the party desires to put the operator in possession of facts, but because transmission without it is impossible. It is not voluntary in any other sense than this, that the party makes it rather than deprive himself of the benefits of this great invention andimprovement. The rea- sons of a public nature for maintaining the secrecy of telegraphic communica- tion are the same with those which protect correspondence by mail ; and though the operator is not a public officer, that circumstance appears to us immaterial. He fulfills an impor- tant public function, and the propriety of his preserving inviolable secrecy in626 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I In principle they are objectionable ; in the mode of execution they are necessarily odious; and they tend to invite abuse and to cover the commission of crime. We think it would generally be safe for the legislature to regard all those searches and seizures “unreason- able’? which have hitherto been unknown to the law, and on that account to abstain from authorizing them, leaving parties and the public to the accustomed remedies.’ regard to communications is so ob- vious, that it is common to provide statutory penalties for disclosures. If on grounds of public policy the operator should not voluntarily dis- close, why do not the same considera- tions forbid the courts compelling him to do.so? Or if it be proper to make him testify to the correspondence by telegraph, what good reason can be given why the postmaster should not be made subject to the process of subpoena for a like purpose, and com- pelled to bring the correspondence which passes through his hands into court, and open it for the purposes of evidence? This decision has been followed insome other cases. Henisler v. Freedman, 2 Pars. Sel. Cas. (Pa.) 274; First National Bank of Wheeling v. Merchants’ National Bank, 7 W. Va. 544; Hx parte Brown, 72 Mo. 83, 37 Am. Rep. 426; Woods v. Miller, 55 Iowa, 168, 7 N. W. 484; U.S. ». Hunter, 15 Fed. Rep. 712. See Gray, Communication by Telegraph, ch. v. We should suppose, were it not for the opinions to the contrary by tri- bunals so eminent, that the public could not be entitled to a man’s private correspondence, whether obtainable by seizing it in the mails, or by com- pelling the operator of the telegraph to testify to it, or by requiring his servants to take from his desks his private letters and journals, and bring them into court on subpena duces tecum. Any such compulsory process to obtain it seems a most arbitrary and unjustifiable seizure of private papers; such an ‘‘unreasonable seizure” as is directly condemned by the Constitution. In England, the secretary of state sometimes issues his warrant for opening a particular letter, where he is possessed of such facts as he is satisfied would justify him with the public; but no American officer or body possesses such authority, and its usurpation should not be tolerated. Letters and sealed packages subject to letter postage in the mail can be opened and examined only under like warrant, issued upon similar oath or affirma- tion, particularly describing the thing to be seized, as is required when papers are subjected to search in one’s own household. Hz parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 727, 24 L. ed. 877. See this case for a construction of the law of Congress for excluding improper matter from the mails. For an account of the former and present English practice on opening letters in the mail, see May, Constitutional History, c. 11; Todd, Parliamentary Government, Vol. I. p. 272; Broom, Const. Law, 615. 1A search warrant for libels and other papers of a suspected party was illegal at the common law. See 11 State Trials, 313, 321; Archbold, Cr. Law (7th ed.), 141; Wilkes v. Wood, 19 State Trials, 1153. In Robinson v. Richardson, 13 Gray (Mass.) 454, 456, Merrick, J., said: ‘“Search warrants were never recog- nized by the common law as processes which might be availed of by individ- uals in the course of civil proceedings or for the maintenance of any mere private right; but their use was con- fined to cases of public prosecutions, instituted and pursued for the sup- pression of crime or the detection and punishment of criminals. Even in those cases, if we may rely on the authority of Lord Coke, their legality was formerly doubted; and Lord Camden said that they crept into the law by imperceptible practice. But their legality has long been considered to be established on the ground of public necessity, because without themCHAP. X] felons and other malefactors would escape detection. Entick v. Carring- ton, 19 Howell’s State Trials, 1067; 1 Chitty’s Crim. Law, 64. All searches, therefore, which are in- stituted and pursued upon the com- plaint or suggestion of one party into the house or possessions of another, in order to secure a personal advan- tage, and not with any design to afford aid in the administration of justice in reference to acts or offenses in viola- tion of penal laws, must be held to be unreasonable, and consequently under our Constitution unwarrantable, il- legal, and void.’”’ See also People ex rel. Robert Simpson Co. v. Kempner, 208 N. Y. 16, 101 N. E. 794, 46 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 970, Ann. Cas. 1914 D, 169; Cohn »v. State, 120 Tenn. 61, 109 S. W. 1149, 17 L. R. A. (Nn. 8.) 451, 15 Ann. Cas. 1201. “To enter a man’s house,’ said Lord Camden, “by virtue of a name- less warrant, in order to procure evidence, is worse than the Spanish Inquisition, — a law under which no Englishman would wish to live an hour.” See his opinion in Entick »v. Carrington, 19 State Trials, 1029; s. c. 2 Wils. 275, and Broom, Const. Law, 558; Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils. 205; Leach v. Money, 19 State Trials, 1001; s. c. 3 Burr. 1692; and 1 W. Bl. 555; note to Entick v. Carring- ton, Broom, Const. Law, 613. An order compelling one to deliver his private papers to another who has no ownership in them is in violation of the constitutional provision against unwarrantable seizures. Hx parte Clarke, 126 Cal. 235, 58 Pac. 546, 77 Am. St. 176. A search and seizure of one’s private papers by a government officer who has obtained entrance to his house or office by stealth, or through social acquaintance, or in the guise of a business call, and whether the owner be present or not when he enters, is an ‘unreasonable’ search and seizure within the prohibition of the Federal Constitution. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 65 L. ed. 647, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 261. A statute which, though no suit be pending, empowers a private person PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY 627 in his own interest to demand of a corporation which has discharged him disclosure to him of its private cor- respondence is unconstitutional. St. Louis, etc. R. Co. v. Griffin, 106 Tex. Alt, Wil Ss: W. 703, E.R ALO 1108. As to right of parties litigant to inspect books and records of opposing parties, see Federal Mining, etc., Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 26 Idaho, 391, 143 Pac. 1173, L. R: A: 1917 F, 1195; Dalton v. Calhoun County Dist. Court, 164 Iowa, 187, 145 N. W. 498, Ann. Cas. 1916 D, 695; State ex rel. Boston, etc., Min. Co. v. District Court, 27 Mont. 441, 71 Pac. 602, 94 Am. St. Rep. 831. As to constitutionality of com- pulsory production of the books and papers of a corporation before a court or grand jury. See Interstate Com- merce Commission v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25, 48 L. ed. 860; 24 Sup. Ct. Rep 563; Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 50 L. ed. 652, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 370; Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Ver- mont, 207 U.S. 541, 52 L. ed. 327, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 178, 12 Ann. Cas. 658; Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322, 53 L. ed. 5380, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 370, 15 Ann. Cas. 645; Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 55 L. ed. 771, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 538, Ann. Cas. 1912 D, 558; American Lithograph Co. v. Werckmeister, 221 U. S. 603, 55 L. ed. 873, 31 Sup. Ct. 2ep. 676; Baltimore, ete., R. Co. »v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 221 U. S. 612, 55 L. ed. 878, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 621; Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 57 L. ed. 309, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 158; Grant v. United States, 227 U. S. 74, 57 L. ed. 423, 33 Sup. %t. Rep. 190; Ex parte Gould, 60 Tex. Crim. Rep. 442, 1382 S. W. 364, 31 L. R. A. (nN. 8.) 835; In re Con- solidated Rendering Co., 80 Vt. 55, 66 Atl. 790, 11 Ann. Cas. 1069. A statute making it a crime to have in possession for use or sale certain bottles or other vessels without the written consent of the owner, and pro- viding for a search warrant to seize and restore such property to the owner, is unconstitutional. State v. Schmuck, 77 Ohio St. 438, 83 N. E. 797, 122 ~] t If628 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I [But in a recent case the Supreme Court of the United States has held that there is no special sanctity in papers as distinguished from other forms of property, to render them immune from search and seizure, if only they fall within the scope of the principles of the cases in which other property may be seized, and if they be adequately described in the affidavit and warrant; and that contracts may be so used as instruments or agencies for perpetrating frauds upon the government as to give the public an interest in them which will justify the search for and seizure of them, under a search warrant, for the purpose of preventing further frauds.! The mere fact that papers seized under a properly issued search warrant have no pecuniary value does not render their seizure invalid.” Since the Eighteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution became effective by the enactment of the Volstead Act, there have been a great number of cases in both the Federal and State courts in which it was necessary to interpret the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures and to determine under what exceptional circumstances a search for and seizure of intoxicat- ing liquors may be made without a warrant. These cases hold that as a general rule a search of one’s person or premises for this purpose, without a warrant, is illegal,® but that it is warranted under certain Am. St. Rep. 527, 14 L. R. A. (n. s.) 1128. A municipal officer, who has arrested an alleged violator of a municipal Fed. 128; Holmes v. United States, 275 Fed. 49; United States v. Arm- strong, 275 Fed. 506; Connelly v. United States, 275 Fed. 509; Berry v. ordinance, has no power, without United States, 275 Fed. 680; United other authority than the warrant Statesv. Ray & Schultz, 275 Fed. 1004; against the accused, to take and carry away the property of a third person from the latter’s premises on the ground that the property of such third person so seized may contain evidence to be used against the defendant in the warrant. Such a seizure is a vio- lation of the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures. Owens v. Way, 141 Ga. (OO S252 0E Loose Re Ay 1015 EK, 399, Ann. Cas. 1915 C, 963. 1 Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 65 L. ed. 647, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 265. See also People v. Chaigles, 237 N. Y. 193, 142 N. EB. 083, 32 A. L. R. 676. * Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 65 L. ed. 647, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 261. ’ United States v. Kehih, 272 Fed. 484; United States v. Mitchell, 274 O’Connor v. Potter, 276 Fed. 32; Cen- tral Consumers Co. v. James, 278 Fed. 249; United States v. Alexander, 278 Fed. 308; United States v. Boasberg, 283 Fed. 305; Giles v. United States, 284 Fed. 208; United States »v. Jajeswiec, 285 Fed. 789; Salata v. United States, 286 Fed. 125; United States v. Innelli, 286 Fed. 731; United States v. Kaplan, 286 Fed. 963; United States v. Casino, 286 Fed. 976; Jozwich v. United States, 288 Fed. 831; Pressley v. United States, 289 Fed. 477; Tillman »v. State, 81 Fla. 558, 88 So. 377; Youman v. Com., 189 Ky. 152, 2248S. W. 860, 13 A. L. R. 1303; Mabry v. Com., 196 Ky. 626, 245 S. W. 129; Mills v. Com., 195 Ky. 813, 248 S. W. 1022; People »v. Effelberg, 220 Mich. 528, 190 N. W. 727; People v. Knopka, 220 Mich: 540, 190 N. W. 731; Miller v. State,CHAP. X] PROTECTIONS TO circumstances. PERSONAL LIBERTY 629 Thus it has been held that where one is legally arrested his person may be searched without a warrant ;* so where a business is carried on under a license or by permission of the gov- ernment, the government may inspect it to determine whether the prohibition law is being violated.” And an automobile or other vehicle in transit may be searched for contraband liquors by officers without a warrant if they have probable cause for believing that such vehicle is carrying such liquors.* A statute authorizing a seizure of property under a civil attach- 129 Miss. 774, 93 So. 2; Butler ». State, 129 Miss. 778, 93 So. 3; State ex rel. Samlin v. District Ct., 59 Mont. 600, 198 Pac. 362; In re Graham, 203 App. Div. (N. Y.) 172, 196 N. Y. Supp. 276; In re Liquors seized at Auto Inn, 204 App. Div. (N. Y.) 185, 197N. Y. Supp. 758; State v. Gibbons, 118 Wash. 171, 203 Pac. 390; State v. Wills, 91 W. Va. 659, 114 S. E. 261, 24 A. L. R. 1398; Hoyer v. State, 180 Wis. 407, 193 N. W. 89, 27 A. L. R. 673. 1 United States v. Kraus, 270 Fed. 578: Baron v. United States, 286 Fed. 822: Gatlin v. State, 27 Ga. App. 627, 109 S. E. 522; Youman ». Com., 189 Ky. 152, 224 S. W. 860, 13 A. L. R. 1303; People v. Burt, 224 Mich. 171, 194 N. W. 547; Hughes »v. State, 145 Tenn. 544, 238 S. W. 588, 90 A. L. R. 639; Gurski v. State, 93 Tex. Crim. Rep. 612, 248 5S. W. 353. See ante. 2 United States v. Hilsinger, 284 Fed. 585; Sufee v. Buffalo, 204 App. Div. 561, 198 N. Y. Supp. 646; Salt Lake City v. Wight, 60 Utah, 108, 205 Pac. 900; Finsky v. State, 176 Wis. 481, 187 N. W. 201; Silber v. Bloodgood, 177 Wis. 608, 188 N. W. 84. Compare United States v. Kraus, 270 Fed. 578; and United States ». Porazzo Bros., 272 Fed. 276. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 69 L. ed. 543, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 280: Patrick v. Com., 199 Ky. 83, 250 S. W. 507; People v. Chyc, 219 Mich. 273, 189 N. W. 70; People v. Case, 220 Mich. 379, 190 N. W. 289; People v. De Cesare, 220 Mich. 417, 190 N. W. 302; Houck v. State, 106 Ohio St. 195, 140 N. E. 112; Hughes ». State, 145 Tenn. 540, 238 S. W. 588; Brown v. State, 92 Tex. Cr. 147, 242 S. W. 218. Compare Hoyer ». State, 180 Wis. 407, 193 N. W. 89. In Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 69 L. ed. 543, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 280, Chief Justice Taft, who delivered the opinion of the court, said: “The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures by the Fourth Amendment has been construed, practically since the begin- ning of the government, as recogniz- ing a necessary difference between a search of a store, dwelling house, or other structure in respect of which a proper official warrant readily may be obtained and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon, or automobile for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant, because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdic- tion in which the warrant must be sought. Having thus established that contraband goods concealed and il- legally transported in an automobile or other vehicle may be searched for without a warrant, we come now to consider under what circumstances such search may be made. It would be intolerable and unreasonable if a authorized prohibition agent were to stop every automobile on the chance of finding liquor, and thus subject all persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a search. Travelers may be stopped in crossing an inter- national boundary because of national self-protection reasonably requiring one entering the country to identify himself as entitled to come in, and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought in. But those law-630 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I ment to enforce the payment of a debt or penalty does not come within the constitutional prohibition."] We have said that if the officer follows the command of his war- rant, he is protected ; and this is so even when the complaint proves to have been unfounded.? But if he exceed the command by search- ing in places not described therein, or by seizing persons or articles not commanded, he is not protected by the warrant, and can only justify himself as in other cases where he assumes to act without process.? QObeying strictly the command of his warrant, he may break open outer or inner doors, and his justification does not depend upon his discovering that for which he is to make search.‘ [If he acts without a warrant he will be liable in damages therefor.*] In other cases than those to which we have referred, and subject to the general police power of the State, the law favors the complete and undisturbed dominion of every man over his own premises, and protects him therein with such j ealousy that he may defend his possession against intruders, in person or by his servants or guests, even to the extent of taking the life of the intruder, if that seem essential to the defense.® fully within the country, entitled to use the public highways, have a right to free passage without interruption or search unless there is known to a competent official, authorized to search, probable cause for believing that their vehicles are carrying contra- band or illegal merchandise.” * State v. Marshall, 100 Miss. 626, 56 So. 792, Ann. Cas. 1914 A, 434. ? Barnard v. Bartlett, 10 Cush. 501; Appling v. State, 95 Ark. 185, 128 S. W. 866, 28 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 548; Kal- loch v. Newbert, 105 Me. 23, 72 Atl. 736; Ingraham v. Booton, 117 Minn. 105, 184 N. W. 505, Ann. Cas. 1913 D, 212; Kinseley v. Ham, 39 Okla. 623, 136 Pac. 427, 49 L. R. A. (n. s.) 770. After the goods seized are taken before the magistrate, the officer is not liable for them to the owner. Collins ». Lean, 68 Cal. 284, 9 Pac. 173. * Crozier v. Cudney, 9 D. & R. 224; Same case, 6 B. & C. 232; State v. Brennan’s Liquors, 25 Conn. 278. Where the warrant was for the search of the person, and the goods were found on the floor of the room where he was, their seizure was held lawful. Collins v. Lean, 68 Cal. 284, 9 Pac. 173. (2 Hale; P) C. 151" Barnard@y: Bartlett, 10 Cush. 501. 5’ McClurg v. Brenton, 123 Iowa, 368, 98 N. W. 881, 101 Am. St. Rep. 325, 65 L. R. A. 519; Devlin v. McAdoo, 49 Misc. (N. Y.) 57,96 N. Y. Supp. 425; Gardner v. Neil, 4 N. C. 104; Regan v. Harkey, 40 Tex. Civ. App. 16, 87 S. W. 1164; Lawton v. Cardell, 22 Vt. 524; Shall v. Minneapolis, etc., R. Co., 156 Wis. 195, 145 N. W. 649, 5ONL. RepAS (Ness) ous 6 That in defense of himself, any member of his family, or his dwelling, a man has a right to employ all neces- sary violence, even to the taking of life, see Shorter v. People, 2 N. Y. 193; Yates v. People, 32 N. Y. 509; Logue v. Commonwealth, 38 Pa. St. 265; Pond v. People, 8 Mich. 150; Maher v. People, 24 Ill. 211; Bohannan »v. Commonwealth, 8 Bush, 481, 8 Am. Rep. 474; Bean v. State, 25 Tex. App. 346; Hall v. State, 113 Ark. 454, 168 S. W. 1122; Bailey v. People, 54 Colo. 337, 180 Pac. 832, 45 L. R. A. (n. s.) 145, Ann. Cas. 1914 C, 1142; McCray v. State, 134 Ga. 416, 68S. E. 62, 20 Ann. Cas. 101; People ». Osborne, 278 Ill. 104, 115 N. EB. 890; Steele v. Com., 192 Ky. 223, 232 S. W.CHAP. X] PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY 631 [Where one voluntarily consents to a search of his person or premises he is precluded from raising the question of its validity, and has no right of action against the officer.’ estoppel, however, where the consent is not voluntary.” There is no such “A consent accorded to a show of arms even though no open objection be made, will not be regarded as voluntary.’ ’3 And “where a peace officer presents to a citizen a warrant against him, regular on its face, and reads or offers to read it to him, and the latter agrees for him to pro- ceed under it by a search of the premises, it cannot be said that such consent is voluntary. The officer is acting under color of authority, and in agreeing for him to proceed the accused is merely submitting to the authority-of the law, and not agreeing to waive his constitu- tional rights.”’ * 646; Young v. State, 74 Neb. 346, 104 N. W. 867, 2 L. R. A. (W. 8.) 66; State v. Gray, 162 N. C. 608, 77S. E. 833, 45 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 71; Armstrong v. State, 11 Okla. Cr. Rep. 159, 143 Pac. 870. But except where a forcible felony is attempted against person or property, he should avoid such con- sequences, if possible, and cannot justify standing up and resisting to the death, when the assailant might have been avoided by retreat. People v. Sullivan, 7 N. Y. 396; Carter v. State, 82 Ala. 13, 2 So. 766. But a man assaulted in his dwelling is under no obligation to retreat; his house is his castle, which he may defend to any extremity. And this means not simply the dwelling-house proper, but includes whatever is within the curti- lage as understood at the common law. Pond »v. People, 8 Mich. 150; State v. Middleham, 62 Iowa, 150, 17 N. W. 446; State v. Scheele, 57 Conn. 307, 18 Atl. 256; Parrish v. Com., 81 Va. 1. If a man’s barn is his ‘‘castle” from which he may lawfully expel an in- truder and deny him re-entrance, the expulsion once accomplished, it is his duty to cease the display of force and permit the intruder to depart. State v. Baker, 157 Iowa, 126, 185 N. W. 1097. In deciding what force it is neces- sary to employ in resisting the assault, a person must act upon the circum- stances as they appear to him at the time; and he is not to be held criminal because on a calm survey of the facts afterwards it appears that the force employed in defense was excessive. See the cases above cited; also Schnier v. People, 23 Ill. 17; Patten v. People, 18 Mich. 314; Hinton v. State, 24 Tex. 454; People v. Flanagan, 60 Cal. 2. But the belief must be bona fide and upon reasonable grounds. State v. Peacock, 40 Ohio St. 333. If while one is in his automobile he is violently attacked in a manner in- volving serious danger both to himself and his guests, he has the right to ex- ert himself to the utmost for their com- mon defense and protection. State v. Borwick, 193 Iowa, 639, 187 N. W. 460. 1Maldonado v. United States, 284 Fed. 853: Windsor v. United States, 286 Fed. 51; Smuk v. People, 72 Colo. 97, 209 Pac. 636; McClurg v. Brenton, 123 Iowa, 368, 98 N. W. 881, 101 Am. St. Rep. 323, 65 L. R. A. 519; Faulk v. State, 127 Miss. 894, 90 So. 481; Smith v. McDuffee, 72 Oreg. 276, 142 Pac. 558, 143 Pac. 929, Ann. Cas. 1916 D, 947; State v. Guest, 118 S. C. 130, 110 S. E. 112. 2 Amos v. United States, 255 U. S. 313, 65 L. ed. 654, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 266; United States v. Marquette, 271 Fed. 120: Mattingly v. Com., 199 Ky. 30, 250 S. W. 105. As to suf- ficiency of evidence to prove voluntary consent to search, see Shall v. Minne- apolis, etc., R. Co., 156 Wis. 195, 145 N. W. 649, 50 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1151. 3 United States v. Marquette, 271 Fed. 120. 4Mattingly »v. 250 S. W. 105. Com., 199 Ky. 30,632 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I The Supreme Court of the United States has declared that evi- dence obtained from one accused of crime by an officer or agent of the government, by means of an illegal search and seizure, is not admissible in a criminal action against the accused. The same rule has been declared by the courts of last resort in many of the states in construing the provisions of the State constitutions relating to searches and seizures;2 butin about an equal number of states the courts have held that evidence so obtained is admissible in such an action.’ 1 Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 29 L. ed. 746, 6 Sup. Ct. Rey 524: Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 388, 58 L. ed. 652, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 341, L. R. A. 1915 B, 834, Ann. Cas. 1915 C, 1177; Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298, 65 L. ed. 647, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 261; Silverthorn Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 64 L. ed. 319, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 182 ; Essgee Co. v. United States, 262 U. S. 151, 67 L. ed. 917, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 514; Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 1382, 69 L. ed. 548, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 280; Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20, 46 Sup. Ct. Rep. 4, LOW eds ——: also Burns v. United States, 296 Fed. 468; United States v. Madden, 297 Fed. 679; United States v. Pappadementro, 6 Alaska, 769. 2 Atz v. Andrews, 84 Fla. 43, 94 So. 329; People v. Castree, 311 Ill. 392 145 Ne Be 2* 32) Ae: Re 357° Flum v. State, 193 Ind. 585, 141 N. E. 353; Youman v. Com., 189 Ky. 152, 224 We S608 Ac i Re 1303); Banks v. Com., 202 Ky. 762, 261 S. W. 262; Nestor v. Com., 202 Ky. 748, 261 S. W. 270; People v. Thompson, 221 Mich. 618, 192 N. W. 560; People v. Case, 220 Mich. 379, 190 N. W. 289; Taylor v. State, 129 Miss. 815, 93 So. 355; State v. Patterson, 130 Miss. 680, 95 So. 96; State v. Owens, 302 Mo. 348, 259 S. W. 100; State ex rel. Sadler v. District Ct., 70 Mont. 378, 225 Pac. 1000; Klein v. State, (Okla. Crim. Rep.) 223 Pac. 201; Cravens v. State, 148 Tenn. 517, 256 S. W. 431; State v. Wills, 91 We Vas 659) 1145S! e2Gi OA A 1. R. 1398; State v. Massie, 95 W. Va. 233, 120 S. E. 514; Hoyer »v. State, 10 See In expressing the opinion of the Supreme Court of the 180 Wis. 407, 193 N. W. 89, 27 A. L. R. 673; State v. Jokosh, 181 Wis. 160, 193 N. W. 976; ‘Wiggin v. State, 28 Wyo. 480, 206 Pac. 373; Tucker v. State, 128 Miss. 211, 90 So. 845, 24 AST Regs 3 Banks v. State, 207 Ala. 179, 93 So. 293, 24 A. L. R. 1359; Jones »v. State, 19 Ala. App. 232, 96 So. 721; State v. Chuchola, (Del.) 120 Atl. 212; Williams v. State, 100 Ga. 511, 28 S. E. 624, 39 L. R. A. 269; Lester v. State, 155 Ga. 882, 118 S. E. 674; Williams v. State, 156 Ga. 285, 119 S. E. 614; State v. Rowley, 197 Iowa, 977, 195 N. W. 881, 187 N: Wea; State v. Johnson, 116 Kan. 58, 226 Pac. 245; State v. Johnson, 116 Kan. 179, 226 Pac. 251; State v. Davis, 154 La. 405, 97 So. 590; State »v. Johnson, 154 La. 597, 97 So. 874; Com. v. Donnelly, 246 Mass. 507, 141 N. E. 500; State v. McLean, 157 Minn. 359, 196 N. W. 278; Boro v. State, 111 Neb. 706, 197 N. W. 431; State v. Chin Gin, 47 Nev. 431, 224 Pac. 798; State v. Lyons, 99 N. J. L. 301, 122 Atl. 758; People v. Chiagles, 204 App. Div. 706, 199 N. Y. Supp. 256, affirmed in 237 N. Y. 193, 142 N. E. 583, 32 A. L. R. 676; Rosanski v. State, 106 Ohio St. 442, 140 N. E. 370; State v. Maes, 127 S. C. 397, 120 S. E. 576; Lott v. State, 94 Tex. Crim: Rep: 630; 251 S: W. 1070; Sanchez v. State, 94 Tex. Crim. Rep. 606, 252 S. W. 548; State v. Aime, 62 Utah, 476, 220 Pac. 704, 32 A. L. R. 375; Casey v. Com., 138 Va. 714, 121 S. E. 513; People v. Mayen, 188 Cal. 237, 205 Pac. 435, 24 A. L. R. 1383; State v. Pluth, 157 Minn. 145, 195 N. W. 789. See also People v. Strollo, 191 N. Y. 42, 83 N. E. 573.CHAP. X] PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY 633 United States on this question Justice Bradley said: “In order to ascertain the nature of the proceedings intended by the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution under the terms ‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ it is only necessary to recall the contemporary or then recent history of the controversies on the subject, both in this country and in England. The practise had obtained in the colonies of issuing writs of assistance to the revenue officers, em- powering them, in their discretion, to search suspected places for smuggled goods, which James Otis pronounced ‘the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty and the fundamental principles of law, that ever was found in an English law book’: since they placed ‘the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer.’ This was in February, 1761, in Boston, and the famous debate in which it occurred was perhaps the most promi- nent event which inaugurated the resistance of the colonies to the oppressions of the mother country. ‘Then and there,’ said John Adams, ‘then and there was the first scene of the first act of opposi- tion to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain. Then and there the child of Independence was born.’ These things, and the events which took place in England immediately following the argument about writs of assistance in Boston, were fresh in the memories of those who achieved our independence and established our form of government.” After speaking of the famous case of John Wilkes, Justice Bradley continued: “The case, however, which will always be celebrated as being the occasion of Lord Camden’s memorable discussion of the subject, was that of Entick v. Carrington and Three Other King’s Messengers, reported at length in 19 How. St. Tr. 1029. The action was trespass for entering the plaintiff’s dwelling-house in November, 1762, and breaking open his desks, boxes, etc., and searching and examining his papers. The jury rendered a special verdict, and the case was twice solemnly argued at the bar. Lord Camden pro- nounced the judgment of the court in Michaelmas term, 1765, and the law, as expounded by him, has been regarded as settled from that time to this, and his great judgment on that occasion is con- sidered as one of the landmarks of English liberty. It was wel- comed and applauded by the lovers of liberty in the colonies as well as in the mother country. It is regarded as one of the permanent monuments of the British Constitution, and is quoted as such In Connecticut it has been held that and by a trespass, may be introduced property of the accused, other than in evidence against him. State »v. his papers, even though seized upon Griswold, 67 Conn. 290, 34 Atl. 1046, his own premises without authority 33 L. R. A, 227.634 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I by the English authorities on that subject down to the present time. “‘Asevery American statesman, during our revolutionary and for- mative period as a nation, was undoubtedly familiar with this monu- ment of English freedom, and considered it as the true and ultimate expression of constitutional law, it may be confidently asserted that its propositions were in the minds of those who framed the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, and were considered as sufficiently explanatory of what was meant by unreasonable searches and seizures. We think, therefore, it is pertinent to the present subject of discussion to quote somewhat largely from this celebrated judg- ment. After describing the power claimed by the Secretary of State for issuing general search-warrants, and the manner in which they were executed, Lord Camden says: “‘“Such is the power, and therefore one would naturally expect that the law to warrant it should be clear in proportion as the power is exorbitant. If it is law, it will be found in our books; if it is not to be found there it is not law. “““The great end for which men entered into society was to secure their property. That right is preserved sacred and incommunicable in all instances where it has not been taken away or abridged by some public law for the good of the whole. The cases where the right of property is set aside by positive law are various. Distresses, execu- tions, forfeitures, taxes, etc., are all of this description, wherein every man by common consent gives up that right for the sake of justice and the general good. By the laws of England every inva- sion of private property, be it ever so minute, is a trespass. Noman can set his foot upon my ground without my license, but he is liable to an action, though the damage be nothing, which is proved by every declaration in trespass where the defendant is called upon to answer for bruising the grass or even treading upon the soil. If he admits the fact, he is bound to show, by way of justification, that some positive law has justified or excused him. The justification is submitted to the judges, who are to look into the books, and see if such justification can be maintained by the text of the statute law, or by the principles of the common law. If no such excuse can be found or produced, the silence of the books is an authority against the defendant, and the plaintiff must have judgment. According to this reasoning, it is now incumbent upon the defendants to show the law by which this seizure is warranted. If that cannot be done, it is a trespass. ~ “Papers are the owner’s goods and chattels; they are his dearest property, and are so far from enduring a seizure, that they willCHAP. X] PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY 635 hardly bear an inspection; and though the eye cannot by the laws of England be guilty of a trespass, yet where private papers are removed and carried away the secret nature of those goods will be an aggravation of the trespass, and command more considerable damages in that respect. Where is the written law that gives any magistrate such power? I can safely answer, there is none; and therefore it is too much for us, without such authority, to pronounce a practice legal which would be subversive of all the comforts of society. “But though it cannot be maintained by any direct law, yet it bears a resemblance, as was urged, to the known case of search and seizure for stolen goods. I answer that the difference is apparent. In the one, I am permitted to seize my own goods, which are placed in the hands of a public officer until the felon’s conviction shall entitle me to restitution. In the other, the party’s own property is seized before and without conviction, and he has no power to reclaim his goods, even after his innocence is declared by acquittal.’ . . “Then after showing that these general warrants for search and seizure of papers originated with the Star Chamber, and never had any advocates in Westminster Hall except Chief Justice Scroggs and his associates, Lord Camden proceeds to add: “““Tastly it isurged asan argument of utility that such a search is a means of detecting offenders by discovering evidence. I wish some cases had been shown where the law forceth evidence out of the owner’s custody by process. ‘There is no process against papers in civil causes. It has been often tried, but never prevailed. Nay, where the adversary has by force or fraud got possession of your own proper evidence there is no way to get it back but by action. In the criminal law such a proceeding was never heard of; and yet there are some crimes, such, for instance, murder, rape, robbery and house-breaking, to say nothing of forgery and perjury, that are more atrocious than libeling. But our law has provided no paper- search in these cases to help forward the conviction. Whether this proceedeth from gentleness of the law toward criminals, or from a consideration that such a power would be more pernicious to the innocent than useful to the public, I will not say. It is very certain that the law obligeth no man to accuse himself, because the neces- sary means of compelling self-accusation, falling upon the innocent as well as the guilty, would be both cruel and unjust ; and it would seem that search for evidence is disallowed upon the same principle. Then, too, the innocent would be confounded with the guilty.’ “ After a few further observations, his lordship concluded thus: ““25) Ez parte demeanors, willfully standing mute Watson, 1 Okla. Crim. 595, 99 Pac. 161; Ex parte Newby, 13 Okla. Crim. 161, 162 Pac. 1134; Hx parte Calmes, (Okla. Cr.) 217 Pac. 893; Ex parte Dexter, 93 Vt. 304, 107 Atl. 134. 1 The magistrate in taking bail exer- cises an authority essentially judicial. Regina v. Badger, 4 Q. B. 468; Linford v. Fitzroy, 13 Q. B. 240. As to his duty to look into the nature of the charge and the evidence to sustain it, see Barronet’s Case, 1 El. & BI. 1. See Carmody v. State, 105 Ind. 546, 5 N. E. 679, as to fixing amount of bail in advance for different classes of cases. 24 Bl. Com. 324. In treason, petit felony, and mis- was equivalent to a conviction, and the same punishment might be im- posed; but in other cases there could be no trial or judgment without plea; and an accused party might therefore sometimes stand mute and _ suffer himself to be pressed to death, in order to save his property from for- feiture. Poor Giles Corey, accused of witcheraft, was perhaps the only person ever pressed to death for refusal to plead in America. 3 Bancroft’s U.S. 93- 2 Hildreth’s U. S. 160. For English cases, see Cooley’s Bl. Com. 325, note. Now in England the court enters a plea of not guilty for a pris- oner refusing to plead, and the trial proceeds as in other cases.646 of the court.? CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [voL. I In this country, where officers are specially appointed or elected to represent the people in these prosecutions, their posi- tion gives t > hem an immense power for oppression; and it is to be feared they do not always sufficiently appreciate the responsibility, and wield the power with due regard to the legal rights and privileges of the accused. When a person charged with crime is willing to proceed at once to trial, no delay on the part of the prosecution is reasonable, except only that which is necessary for proper prepara- tion and to secure the attendance of witnesses. Very much, how- ever, must be left to the judgment of the prosecuting officer in these cases: and the court would not compel the government to proceed to trial at the first term after indictment found orinformation filed, if the officer who represents it should state, under the responsibility of his official oath, that he was not and could not be ready at that time But further delay would not generally be allowed without a more specific showing of the causes which prevent the State pro- ceeding to trial, including the names of the witnesses, the steps taken to procure them,® and the facts expected to be proved by them, in 1 Speedy trial is said to mean a trial so soon after indictment as the prose- cution can, by a fair exercise of rea- sonable diligence, prepare for trial; regard being had to the terms of court. United States v. Fox, 3 Mont. 512; Creston v. Nye, 74 Iowa, 369, 37 N. W. 777; Morris v. State, 193 Ala. 1, 68 So. 1003; Bell ». State, 120 Ark. 530, 180 S. W. 186; State v. Tyre, 22 Del. 348, 67 Atl. 199; People »v. Jonas, 234 Ill. 56, 84 N. E. 685; State v, Stanfield, 34 Okla. 524, 126 Pac. 239; Arrowsmith v. State, 131 Tenn. 480, 175 S. W. 545, L. R. A. 1915 E. 363; State v. Keefe, 17 Wyo. 227, 98 Pac. 122, 22 L. R. A. (N. s.) 896, 17 Ann. Cas. 161. If it becomes neces- sary to adjourn the court without giving trial, the prisoner should be bailed, though not otherwise entitled to it. Hz parte Caplis, 58 Miss. 358. 2 It is the duty of the prosecuting at- torney to treat the accused with ju- dicial fairness: to inflict injury at the expense of justice is no part of the purpose for which he is chosen. Un- fortunately, however, we sometimes meet with cases in which these officers appear to regard themselves as the counsel for the complaining party rather than the impartial representatives of public justice. But we trust it is not often that cases occur like one in Tennessee, in which the Supreme Court felt called upon to set aside a verdict in a criminal case, where by the artifice of the prosecuting officer the prisoner had been induced to go to trial under the belief that certain witnesses for the State were absent, when in fact they were present and kept in concealment by this function- ary. Curtis v. State, 6 Cold. 9. 3See this discussed in Ez parte Stanley, 4 Nev. 113, and Jn re Be- gerow, 133 Cal. 349, 65 Pac. 828, 85 Am. St. 178. A valuable mono- graphic note to this case discussing the law of this clause of the constitu- tion is found at pages 187 to 204 inclusive of 85 Am. St. 4 Watts v. State, 26 Ga. 231. 5 The Habeas Corpus Act, 31 Ch. II. ce. 2, § 1, required a prisoner charged with crime to be released on bail, if not indicted the first term after the commitment, unless the king’s wit- nesses could not be obtained; and that he should be brought to trial as early as the second term after the commitment. The principles of this statute are considered as having been adopted into the American commonCHAP. x] PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY 647 order that the court might judge of the reasonableness of the appli- cation, and that the prisoner might, if he saw fit to take that course, secure an immediate trial by admitting that the witnesses, if present, would testify to the facts which the prosecution have claimed could be proved by them” It is also requisite that the trial be public. By this is not meant that every person who sees fit shall in all cases be permitted to attend criminal trials; because there are many cases where, from the char- acter of the charge and the nature of the evidence by which it is to be supported, the motives to attend the trial on the part of portions of the community would be of the worst character, and where a regard to public morals and public decency would require that at least the young be excluded from hearing and witnessing the evi- dences of human depravity which the trial must necessarily bring to light. The requirement of a public trial is for the benefit of the accused ; that the public may see he is fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned, and that the presence of interested spectators may keep his triers keenly alive to a sense of their responsibility and to the importance of their functions; and the requirement is fairly observed if, without partiality or favoritism, a reasonable propor- tion of the public is suffered to attend, notwithstanding that those persons whose presence could be of no service to the accused, and who would only be drawn thither by a prurient curiosity, are ex- cluded altogether.” But a far more important requirement is that the proceeding to establish guilt shall not be inquisitorial. A peculiar excellence of law. Post, p.717. See Inre Garvey, is void. State v. Berkley, 92 Mo. 41 7 Col. 502, 4 Pac. 758; Inre Edwards, 4S. W. 24. 35 Kan. 99, 10 Pac. 539. 2See People v. Kerrigan, 73 Cal. 1Such an admission, if made by 222, 14 Pac. 849; People v. Swafford, the prisoner, is binding upon him, and dispenses with the necessity of pro- ducing the witnesses. United States v. Sacramento, 2 Mont. 239, 25 Am. Rep. 742; Hancock v. State, 14 Tex. App. 392; State v. Fooks, 65 Iowa, 452, 21 N. W. 773. But in general the right of the prisoner to be con- fronted with the witnesses against him cannot be waived in advance. Bell v. State, 2 Tex. App. 216, 28 Am. Rep. 429. Nor can he be forced to admit what an absent witness would testify to. Wills v. State, 73 Ala. 362. A statute forbidding a continuance if the prosecutor admits that defend- ant’s absent witness would testify as stated in the affidavit for continuance, 65 Cal. 223, 3 Pac. 809; Grimmett v. State 22 Tex. App. 36, 2S. W. 631; State v. Brooks, 92 Mo. 542, 5 S. W. 257, 330; People v. Hartman, 103, Cal. 242, 37 Pac. 153, 42 Am. St. Rep. 108; People v. Letoile, 31 Cal. App. 166, 159 Pac. 1057; Robertson »v. State, 64 Fla. 437, 60 So. 118; Tilton v. State, 5 Ga. App. 59, 62 S. E. 651; Wendling v. Com., 143 Ky. 587, 137 S. W. 205; Dutton v. State, 123 Md. 373, 91 Atl. 417, Ann. Cas. 1916 C, 89; State v. Callahan, 100 Minn. 63, 110 N. W. 342; Carter v. State, 99 Miss. 435, 54 So. 734; State v. Keeler, 52 Mont. 205, 156 Pac. 1080, L. R. A. 1916 E, 472, Ann. Cas. 1917 E, 619; Roberts v. State, 100 Neb. 199, 158648 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [voL. I the common-law system of trial over that which has prevailed in other civilized countries, consists in the fact that the accused is never compelled to give evidence against himself. Much as there was in that system that was heartless and cruel, it recognized fully the dangerous and utterly untrustworthy character of extorted con- fessions, and was never subject to the reproach that it gave judg- ment upon them.’ N. W. 930, Ann. Cas. 1917 E, 1040; State v. Myhus, 19 N. D. 326, 124 N. W. 71, 27 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 487; State v. Hensley, 75 Ohio St. 255, 79 N. E. 462, 116 Am. St. Rep. 734, 9 L. R. A. (x. s.) 277, 9 Ann. Cas. 108. “The trial should be public in the ordinary common-sense acceptation of the term. The doors of the court- room are expected to be kept open, the public are entitled to be admitted, and the trial is to be public in all re- spects . . . with due regard to the size of the courtroom, the conveniences of the court, the right to exclude objec- tionable characters and youth of tender years, and to do other things which may facilitate the proper conduct of the trial.” People v. Hartman, 103 Cal. 242, 37 Pac. 153, 42 Am. St. Rep. 108. The Federal Circuit Court of Ap- peals has held that it is not reversible error to exclude the spectators at a criminal trial when there is no show- ing whatever that the defendant was prejudiced thereby, or deprived of the presence, aid, or counsel of any per- son whose presence might have been of advantage to him. Reagan v. United States, 202 Fed. 488, 120 C. C. A. 627, 44 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 583. See also State v. Johnson, 26 Idaho, 609, 144 Pac. 784. In Kentucky it has been held that the right to a public trial does not mean that all of the public who de- sire to be present shall have oppor- tunity to do so, or that the trial judge may not without favor or discrimina- tion limit the spectators to the capacity of the room in which the trial is had; and where the orderly conduct of the trial requires it, the court may have policemen or officers stationed at convenient places to preserve order, and limit admissions to the court room to persons holding tickets of admission. Wendling v. Com., 143 Ky. 587, 137 S. W. 205. See also State v. Osborne, 54 Oreg. 289, 103 Pac. 622, 20 Ann. Cas. 627. But it has been held that right to a public trial is violated where citizens and taxpayers are excluded from court room to such an extent that only a very few are admitted, while there is ample room for them in the court room, and many apply for admission and are refused. People »v. Murray. 89 Mich. 276, 50 N. W. 995, 14 L. R. A. 809, and note, 28 Am. St. 294. Not only is the accused entitled to a public trial, but also, that such trial shall be in a court in which each step shall be in the presence of the presiding judge of the court who has full authority to protect his every legal right. Where the judge calls an attorney to the bench and leaves him in charge while the judge absents himself from the court room for a quarter of an hour, the trial going on in the meantime, there is a dissolution of the court, and the trial is void, and a new trial will be ordered. Ellerbee v. State, 75 Miss. 522, 22 So. 950, 41 L. R. A. 569, and see note to this case in L. R. A. upon when temporary absence of judge is fatal to the trial. “Public trial’ means trial by jury, perhaps including the rendition of judgment; but, after the accused is convicted and sentenced, the trial is over.” Therefore the right to a public trial is not violated by a statute which excludes reporters and representatives of newspapers from witnessing the execution of a death sentence. State v. Pioneer Press Co., 100 Minn. 173, 110 N. W. 867, 117 Am. St. Rep. 684, 9 L. R. A. (n. s.) 480, 10 Ann. Cas. 351. 1 See Lieber’s paper on Inquisitorial Trials, Appendix to Civil Liberty andCHAP. X] Self-Government; Wigmore on Evi- dence, Vol. 4, §§ 2250, 2251. Also the article on Criminal Procedure in Scotland and England, Edinb. Review, Oct., 1858, and one in 15 Harv. L. Rev. 610, on the History of the Priv- ilege against Self-Crimination. See also an article on ‘Physical Exami- nations in Divorce Cases” in 35 Am. L. Rev. 698, and one on ‘Physical Examinations in Personal Injury Cases” in 1 Mich. L. Rev. 193, 277. And for an illustration of inquisitorial trials in our own day, see Trials of Troppman and Prince Pierre Bona- parte, Am. Law Review,. Vol. V. p. 14. Judge Foster relates from White- locke, that the Bishop of London hay- ing said to Felton, who had assassi- nated the Duke of Buckingham, “If you will not confess you must go to the rack,’ the man replied, ‘‘If it must be so, I know not whom I may accuse in the extremity of my torture, — Bishop Laud, perhaps, or any lord of this board.” ‘‘Sound sense,’’ adds Foster, ‘“in the mouth of an enthusiast and rufiian.’”’ Laud having proposed the rack, the matter was shortly debated at the board, and it ended in a ref- erence to the judges, who unani- mously resolved that the rack could not be legally used. De Lolme on Constitution of England (ed. of 1807), p. 181, note; 4 Bl. Com. 325; Broom, Const. Law, 148; Trial of Felton, 8 State Trials, 368, 371; Fortescue De Laud, ec. 22, and note by Amos; Brodie, Const. Hist. c. 8. As to the use of torture to extort confessions, see also Holdsworth’s History of Eng- lish Law, Vol. 5, p. 194. A legislative body has no more right than a court to make its exami- nation of parties or witnesses inquisi- torial. Emery’s Case, 107 Mass. 172. See further, Horstman v. Kauf- man, 97 Pa. St. 147; Blackwell ». State, 67 Ga. 76; State v. Lurch, 12 Oreg. 95, 6 Pac. 405. The Fifth Amendment to the Con- stitution of the United States em- bodying the rule that the accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself should receive a lib- eral construction, so as to prevent encroachment upon the rights secured PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY 649 by it. Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298, 65 L. ed. 647, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 261. The right to refuse to answer any question, the answer to which might incriminate the witness, is not suf- ficiently preserved by a statute which provides merely that such answer shall never be given against the wit- ness in any trial to which he may be subjected. If it is desired to compel him to answer such question, he must be made absolutely exempt from trial and punishment for any offense thus disclosed in pertinent response to the question which he is compelled to answer. This applies to proceed- ings before grand juries and legislative committees as well as trial juries. See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547, 35 L. ed. 1110, 12 Sup. Ct. Yep. 195, where the subject is fully discussed by Mr. Justice Blatchford. See review of Counselman v. Hitch- cock, 5 Harv. L. Rev. 24. In re Walsh, 104 Fed. Rep. 518; In re Scott, 95 Fed. Rep. 816, and In re Rosser, 96 Fed. Rep. 305, are decided on author- ity of Counselman v. Hitchcock, supra. See also Foot v. Buchanan, 113 Fed. 156; People ex rel. Lewisohn »v. O’Brien, 176 N. Y. 253, 68 N. E. 353, 5 Am. Crim. Rep. 97, affirming 81 App. Div. 51, 80 N. Y. Supp. 816; Mackel v. Rochester, 102 Fed. 314, seems opposed to the doctrine of Counselman v. Hitchcock; and the decisions in Arkansas and Georgia are also opposed to it. Lockett v. State, 145 Ark. 415, 224 S. W. 952; -Higdon v. Heard, 14 Ga. 255; Kneeland »v. State, 62 Ga. 395; Wheatley v. State, 114 Ga. 175, 39S. E. 877. The general rule is that a witness before a grand jury cannot be com- pelled to testify as to any matter that will incriminate him and his refusal to do so does not constitute contempt of court. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547, 35 L. ed. 1110, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 195, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 816; People v. Spain, 307 Ill. 283, 138 N. E. 614; Ex parte January, 295 Mo. 653, 246 S. W. 241; Com. ». Bolger, 229 Pa. St. 597, 79 Atl. 113. A person compelled to testify before the grand jury cannot be indicted650 upon evidence so secured. State v. Gardiner, 88 Minn. 130, 92 N. W. 529. A witness may be compelled to answer a pertinent question if he is made absolutely exempt from trial and punishment for any offense thus disclosed. Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591, 40 L. ed. 819, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 644, 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 369; Ez parte Cohen, 104 Cal. 524, 38 Pac. 364, 26 (Te) WA 423° 43 Am. St. 127; Re Buskett, 106 Mo. 602, 17 S. W. 753, 14 L. R. A. 407, and note, 27 Am. St. 378; Bradley v. Clarke, 133 Cal. 196, 65 Pac. 395; Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 50 L. ed. 652, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 370; Re Kittle, 180 Fed. 946. For a case where the court was extremely tender of the recalcitrant witness, see Hx parte Miskimins, 8 Wyo. 392-008 bac. 40 49 1. R.A. Sal: and see also the dissenting opinion of Knight, J. To permit a demand to be made on a defendant in a criminal case, in the presence of a jury, to produce a paper or document referred to, containing incriminating evidence against him, is a violation of the immunity secured to him by the constitutional provision that no person in a criminal shall be compelled to give evidence against himself which will tend to incriminate him, even though no order for the production of the paper is made. Gillespie v. State, 5 Okla. Crim. ep. 546, 115 Pac. 620, 35 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 1171, Ann. Cas. 1912 D, 259. See also McKnight v. United States, 54 C. C. A, 358, 115 Fed. 972, affirmed 61 C. C. A. 112, 122 Fed. 926. Witness is privileged not to be compelled to testify against himself in contempt proceedings. Ex parte Gould, 99 Cal. 360, 33 Pac. 1112, 21 L. R. A. 751, 37 Am. St. 57. Officer of corporation cannot be compelled to report under oath whether corporation has violated Anti- Trust Act. State v. Simmons Hard- case ware Co., 109 Mo, 118, 18S. W. 1125, 15 L. R. A. 676. In a prosecution for an attempt to administer poison testimony by the sheriff that he compared defendant’s shoe with certain tracks, and that it CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [voL. I fitted, was held not to violate the constitutional prohibition against any person being compelled to be a wit- ness against himself, even though the sheriff compelled defendant to re- move her shoe and made adjustment himself. State v. Griffin, 129 S. C. 200; 124.8: E: 81, 35 A. Ls Re i227- See also People v. Breen, 192 Mich. 39, 158 N. W. 142; People v. Van Wor- mer, 175 N. Y. 188) 67 N. 3299- Rickelts v. State, (Okla. Crim. Rep.) 215 Pac. 212; State v. McIntosh, 94S. C. 489, 78 S. E. 327; State v. Harley, 107 S. C. 304, 92 S. E. 1034; State v. Green, 121 S. C. 230, 1148S. E. 317. Butin the same case the sheriff’s testimony that he compelled the de- fendant to put her foot in a certain track, and that she would not do it in the right way, but attempted to ob- literate the tracks, was held to be in- admissible. State v. Griffin, 129 S. ©: 200; 124 S\ He Sl 35, Ani be 1227. The court said: ‘This evi- dence falls on the wrong side of the line of cleavage. If conformity had been perfect, that fact would have appeared from the enforced conduct of the defendant, clearly testimonial compulsion. If otherwise, as ap- peared, the inference of guilt from the effort to obliterate the track would have been a legitimate basis of com- ment; it would have been supplied by the defendant, a clear-cut case of testimonial compulsion.” See also Elder v. State, 143 Ga. 363, 85 S. E. 97. Testimony as to marks and scars introduced to identify prisoner is not inadmissible because obtained by forcible examination of prisoner’s body. O’Brien v. State, 125 Ind. 38, 25 N. W137 9 ER Ae 32357and note. But see State v. Height, 117 Iowa, 650, 91 N. W. 935, in which case physicians making a compulsory physical examination of the accused were not permitted to testify. The constitutional provision that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself applies to a witness in a civil case. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 UW. S) 547, sbi ined) 11105 12) Sup: Ct. Rep. 195; McCarthy ». Arnd-CHAP. X] PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY 651 It is the law in some of the States, when a person is charged with crime, and is brought before an examining magistrate, and the wit- nesses in support of the charge have been heard, that the prisoner may also make a statement concerning the transaction charged against him, and that this may be used against him on the trial if supposed to have a tendency to establish guilt. But the prisoner is to be first cautioned that he is under no obligation to answer any question put to him unless he chooses, and that whatever he says and does must be entirely voluntary.’ He is also to be allowed the presence and advice of counsel; and if that privilege is denied him it may be sufficient reason for discrediting any damaging statements he may have made.’ When, however, the statute has been complied with, and no species of coercion appears to have been employed, the statement the prisoner may have made is evidence which can be used against him on his trial, and is generally entitled to great weight. And in any other case stein 266 U. S. 34, 69 L. ed. 158, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 16. See also People v. Butler St. Foundry, etc., Co., 201 Ill. 236, 66 N. E. 349; Korel v. Conlan, 155 Wis. 221, 144 N. W. 266, 49 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 826. And see upon this subject Wigmore on Evi- dence, Vol. 4, § 2257. But in Ne- braska it has been held that an action to exclude a foreign corporation from the State is a civil action, and the defendant corporation may be com- pelled to give evidence against itself. State v. Standard Oil Co., 61 Neb. 28, 84 N. W. 413. And in California it has been held that the accused in a proceeding to disbar an attorney may be compelled to testify. In re Vaughan, 189 Cal. 491, 209 Pac. 353, 24 A. L. R. 858. By filing bankruptcy schedules without objection the bankrupt does not waive his constitutional privilege. Arndstein v. McCarthy, 254 U. S. 71, 65 L. ed. 138, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 26. The protection against forced self- incrimination was not removed by section 7 of the Bankruptcy Act (Comp. St. § 9591), providing that no testimony given by the bankrupt shall be offered in evidence against him in any criminal proceeding, as it would not prevent the use of his testi- mony to search out other testimony to be used in evidence against him or his property. Arndstein v. McCarthy, 254 U.S. 71, 65 L. ed. 138, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 26; People v.. Elliott, 123 Mise. 602, 206 N. Y. Supp. 54. As to ad- missibility of evidence obtained by an illegal search and seizure, see supra, p. 632. 1 See Rey. Stat. of New York, Pt.’4, c. 2, tit. 2, §§ 14-16. 2 Rex v. Ellis, Ry. & Mood. 482. However, there is no absolute right to the presence of counsel, or to publicity in these preliminary examinations, unless given by statute. Cox v. Coleridge, 1 B. & C. 37. 3 It should not, however, be taken on oath, and if it is, that will be sufficient reason for rejecting it. Rex v. Smith, 1 Stark. 242; Rex v. Webb, 4 C. & P. 564; Rex v. Lewis, 6 C. & P. 161; Rex v. River, 7 C. & P. 177: Regina v. Pikesley, 9 C. & P. 124; People v. McMahon, 15 N. Ya 384. “The view of the English judges, that an oath, even where a party is in- formed he need answer no questions unless he pleases, would, with most persons, overcome that caution, isk think, founded on good reason and experience. I think there is no coun- try — certainly there is none from which any of our legal notions are borrowed — where a prisoner is ever examined on oath.” People v.652 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I except treason! the confession of the accused may be received in evidence to establish his guilt, provided no circumstance accom- panies the making of it which should detract from its weight in producing conviction. But to make it admissible in any case it ought to appear that-it was made voluntarily, and that no motives of hope or fear were employed to induce the accused to confess.” The evidence ought to Thomas, 9 Mich. 314, 318, per Camp- bell, J. In Wilson v. United States, 162 U. S. 613, 40 L. ed. 1090, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 895, Chief Justice Fuller, who de- livered the opinion of the court, said: “The same rule that the confession must be voluntary is applied to cases where the accused has been examined before a magistrate, in the course of which examination the confession is made, as allowed and restricted by statute in England, and, in this country, in many of the states. Greenl. Ey. (15th ed.) § 224. But it is held that there is a well-defined distinction between an examination when the person testifies as a witness and when he is examined as a party accused (People v. Moudon, 103 N. Y. 211, 8 N. E. 496; State v. Garvey, 25 La. Ann. 221); and that, where the accused is sworn, any confession he may make is deprived of its voluntary character, though there is a contrariety of opinion on this point. (Greenl. Hv. (15th ed.) § 225; State v. Gil- man, 51 Me. 215; Com. v. Clark, 130 Pa. St. 641, 18 Atl. 988; People ». Kelly, 47 Cal. 125). The fact that he is in custody and manacled does not necessarily render his statement involuntary, nor is that necessarily the effect of popular excitement shortly preceding. Sparf v. U.S., 156 U.S. 51, 39 L. ed. 343, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 273; Pierce v. U.S., 160 U.S. 355, 40 L. ed. 454, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 321; State v. Gor- ham, 67 Vt. 365, 31 Atl. 845; State v. Ingram, 16 Kan. 14,... Inthe case at bar defendant was not put under oath, and made no objection to an- Swering the questions propounded. The commissioner testified that the statement was made freely and volun- tarily, and no evidence to the con- trary was adduced. Nor did defend- ant, when testifying on his own behalf, testify to the contrary. He testified, merely, that the commissioner ex- amined him ‘without giving him the benefit of counsel, or warning him of his right of being represented by counsel, or in any way informing him of his right to be thus represented.’ He did not testify that he did not know that he had a right to refuse to answer the questions, or that, if he had known it, he would not have answered. His answers were explana- tions, and he appeared not to be un- willing to avail himself of that mode of averting suspicion. It is true that, while he was not sworn, he made the statement before a commissioner who was investigating a charge against him, as he was informed. He was in custody, but not in irons. There had been threats of mobbing him the night before the examination. He did not have the aid of counsel, and he was not warned that the statement might be used against him, or advised that he need not answer. These were matters which went to the weight or credibility of what he said of an in- criminating character; but, as he was not confessing guilt, but the con- trary, we think that, under all the circumstances disclosed, they were not of themselves sufficient to re- quire his answers to be excluded on the ground of being involuntary, as a matter of law.” See upon the general subject, Greenleaf on Evidence, ed. 16, § 333 a, and notes; Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. 4, § 2276. 1TIn treason there can be no con- viction unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court. Const. of United States, art. 3, § 3. 2See Smith v. Commonwealth, 10 Gratt. 734; Shifflet v. Commonwealth,CHAP. X] PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY 653 be clear and satisfactory that the prisoner was neither threatened nor cajoled into admitting what very possibly was untrue. Under the excitement of a charge of crime, coolness and self-possession are to be looked for in very few persons; and however strongly we may reason with ourselves that no one will confess a heinous offense of which he is not guilty, the records of criminal courts bear abundant testimony to the contrary. If confessions could prove a crime beyond doubt, no act which was ever punished criminally would be better established than witchcraft;! and the judicial executions 14 Gratt. 652; Page v. Common- wealth, 27 Gratt. 954; Williams »v. Commonwealth, 27 Gratt. 997 ; United States v. Cox, 1 Cliff. 5, 21; Jordan’s Case, 32 Miss. 382; Runnels »v. State, 28 Ark. 121; Commonwealth v. Holt, 121 Mass. 61; Miller v. People, 39 Ill. 457; Perovich v. United States, 205 U.S. 86, 51 L. ed. 722, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 456; Holt v. United States, 218 U. S. 245, 54 L. ed. 1021, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 2, 20 Ann. Cas. 1138; Ziang Sung Wan »v. United States, 266 U.S. 1, 69 L. ed. 131, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1; State v. Carta, 90 Conn. 79, 96 Atl. 411, L. R. A. 1916 B, 634; State v. Adams, 85 Kan. 435, 116 Pac. 608, 35 L. R. A. (Nn. 8.) 870; Com. v. Mc- Clanahan, 153 Ky. 412, 155 S. W. 1131, Ann. Cas. 1915 C, 132; Com. v. Killion, 194 Mass. 153, 80 N. E. 222, 10 Ann. Cas. 911; Johnson v. State, 107 Miss. 196, 65 So. 218, 51 L. R. A. (x. s.) 1183; Territory v. Lobato, 17 N. M. 666, 134 Pac. 222, L. R: At 1917 A, 1226; State v. Foster, 25 N. M. 361, 183 Pac. 397, 7 A. L. R. 417; People v. Scott, 195 N. Y. 224, 88 N. EB. 35, 133 Am. St. Rep. 789; Berry v. State, 4 Okla. Crim. 202, 111 Pac. 676, 31 L. R. A. (N. 8S.) 849; Miller v. State, 13 Okla. Crim. 176, 163 Pac. 131, L. R. A. 1917 D, 383; State v. Nagle, 25 R. I. 105, 54 Atl. 1063, 105 Am. St. Rep. 864; State »v. Brown, 103 S. C. 437, 88 S. E. 21, L. R. A. 1916 D, 1295; State ». Danelly, 116 S. C. 113, 107 S. E. 149, 14 A. L. R. 1420; Parker v. State, 46 Tex. Crim. 461, 80 S. W. 1008, 108 Am. St. Rep. 1021, 3 Ann. Cas. 893; Campbell v. State, 63 Tex. Crim. 595, 141 S. W. 232, Ann. Cas. 1913 D, 858; Harkey v. State, 90 Tex. Crim. 212, 234 S. W. 221, 17 A. L. R. 1276; State v. Moore, 41 Utah, 247, 126 Pac. 322, Ann. Cas. 1915 C, 976; State v. Seott, 86 Wash. 296, 150 Pac. 423, L. R. A. 1916 B, 844; State v. Zac- cario, (W. Va.) 129 S. E. 763; Long v. State, 178 Wis. 114, 189 N. W. 558, 24 A. L. R. 690. “In the federal courts, the requisite of voluntariness is not satisfied by establishing merely that the confession was not induced by a promise or a threat. A confession is voluntary in law if, and only if, it was, in fact, voluntarily made. ... A confession obtained by compulsion must be excluded whatever may have been the character of the compulsion, and whether the compulsion was applied in a judicial proceeding or otherwise.” Ziang Sung Wan v. United States, 266 U. S. 1, 69 L. ed. 131, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1. See also People v. Quan Gin Gow, 23 Cal. App. 507, 1388 Pac. 918; People v. Prestidge, 182 Mich. 80, 148 N. W. 347; Ammons v. State, 80 Miss. 592, 32 So. 9, 18 L. BR AS (x. s.) 768; State v. Powell, 266 Mo. 100, 180 S. W. 851; State v. Monich, 74.N. J. L. 522, 64 Atl. 1016. 1 See Mary Smith’s Case, 2 Howell’s State Trials, 1049; Case of Essex Witches, 4 Howell’s State Trials, 817; Case of Suffolk Witches, 6 Howell’s State Trials, 647; Case of Devon Witches, 8 Howell’s State Trials, 1017. It is true that torture was employed freely in cases of alleged witchcraft, but the delusion was one which often seized upon the victims as well as their accusers, and led the former to freely confess the most monstrous and impossible actions. Much curious and valuable information on this sub-654 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I which have been justified by such confessions ought to constitute a solemn warning against the too ready reliance upon confessions as proof of guilt in any case. A observed ’’, s “Mr. while holding one of his circuits, “ Justice Parke several times too great weight ought not to be attached to evidence of what a party has been supposed to have said, as it very frequently happens, not only that the witness has misunderstood what the party has said, but that by uninten- tionally altering a few of the expressions really used, he gives an effect to the statement completely at variance with what the party really did say.” 1 And when the admission is full and positive, it perhaps quite as often happens that it has been made under the influence of the terrible fear excited by the charge, and in the hope that confession may ward off some of the consequences likely to fol- low if guilt were persistently denied. A confession alone ought not to be sufficient evidence of the corpus delicti. committed ; party’ ject may be found in “‘ Force’’, by Lea; lems”, by Elam; of Rationalism. 1 Note to Earle v. Picken, 5 C. & P. 542. See also 1 Greenl. Ev. § 214, and note; Commonwealth v. Curtis, 97 Mass. 574; Derby v. Derby, 21 N. J. Eq. 36; State v. Chambers, 39 Iowa, 179. 2In Stringfellow v. State, 26 Miss. 157, a confession of murder was held not sufficient to warrant conviction, unless the death of the person alleged to have been murdered was shown by other evidence. In People v. Hen- nessy, 15 Wend. 147, it was decided that a confession of embezzle ment by a clerk would not warrant a conviction where that constituted the sole evi- dence that an embezzlement had been committed. So on an indictment for blasphemy, the admission by the de- fendant that he spoke the blasphemous Superstition and ‘A Physician’s Prob- and Lecky, History charge, is not sufficient evidence of the uttering. People ». Porter, 2 Park. Cr. R. 14. And see State v. Guild, 10 N. J. L.163, 18 Am. Dec. 404; Long’s Case, 1 Hayw. 524; People v Lambert, 5 Mich. 349; Ruloff v. State, 179; 18 N. Y. Hector v. State, 2 There should be other proof that a crime has actually been and the confession should only be allowed for the pur- pose of connecting the defendant with the offense.? And if the s hopes or fears are operated upon to induce him to make it, Mo. 166, 22 Am. Dee. 454; Roberts v. People, 11 Col. 213, 17 Pac. 637; Winslow v. State, 76 Ala. 42; Jaynes v. People, 44 Colo. 535, 99 Pac. 325, 16 Ann. Cas. 787; Bines v. State, 118 Ga. 320, 45 S. E. 376, 68 L. R. A. 33; People v. Ranney, 153 Mich. 293, 116 N. W. 999, 19 L. R. A. (N. s.) 443; Spears v. State, 92 Miss. 6138, 46 So. 166, 16 L. R. A. (N. s.) 285; Blacker v. State, 74 Neb. 671, 105 N. W. 302; 121 Am: "St. Reps Spencer v. State, 132 Wis. 509, 112 N. W. 462, 122 Am. St. Rep. 989, 13 Ann. Cas, 969. ‘Bourne v, The King, 7 Ad. & El. 58; Lowenberg v. People, 27 N. Y. 336; Hartung v. People, 26 N. Y. 167; Elliott ». People, 13 Mich. 365; Ez parte Page, 49 Mo. 291; Christian v. Commonwealth, 5 Met. 530; Ez parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163, 21 L. ed. 872; McDonald v. State, 45 Md. 90. See also Whitebread v. The Queen, 7 Q. B. 582; Rex v. Fletcher, Russ. & Ry. 58. It is competent, however, to pro- vide by statute that on setting aside an erroneous sentence the court shall proceed to impose the sentence which the law required. Wilson v. People, 24 Mich. 410; McDonald v. State, 45 Md. 90. 2 See Kane v. People, 8 Wend. 203. When one has been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment, it is not competent, after the period of his sentence has expired, to detain him longer in punishment for misbehavior in prison; and a statute to that effect is unwarranted. Gross v. Rice, 71 Me. 241. The whole measure of punishment must be imposed at once. The judgment cannot be split up. People v. Felker, 61 Mich. 110, 114, 27 N. W. 869, 28 N. W. 83. Cumulative punishment may be imposed: Lillard v. State, 17 Tex. App. 114; State v. O'Neil, 58 Vt. 140, 2 Atl. 586, sustained in 144 U. S. 328, 36 L. ed. 450, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 693, but with very vigorous dissenting opinions from Field, Harlan, and Brewer, JJ.; Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U. S. 616, 56 L. ed. 917, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 583; Badders v. United States, 240 U. S. 391, 60 L. ed. 706, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 367; People ».CHAP. X] PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY 697 From very early days a class of men who have made the laws of their country their special study, and who have been accepted for the confidence of the court in their learning and integrity, have been set apart as officers of the court, whose special duty it should be to render aid to the parties and the court ! in the application of the law to legal controversies. These persons, before entering upon their employ- ment, were to take an oath of fidelity to the courts whose officers they were, and to their clients ; ” and it was their special duty to see that no wrong was done their clients by means of false or prejudiced Elliott, 272 Ill. 592, 112 N. E. 300, Ann. Cas. 1918 B, 391. But see State v. Whitaker, 48 La. Ann. 527, 19 So. 457, 35 L. R. A. 561 Ex parte Keeler, 45 S. C. 537, 23S. E. 865, 31 L. R. A. 678, 55 Am. St. 785, and People ez rel. Tweed v. Liscomb, 60 N. Y. 559, 19 Am. Rep. 211; so increased punish- ment for second offense may be im- posed. Kelly v. People, 115 IIll., 583, 4 N. E. 644; Chenowith v. Com., 11 Ky. L. 561, 12 S. W. 585; Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 56 L. ed. 917, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 583. 1—In Commonwealth v. Knapp, 9 Pick. 498, the court denied the applica- tion of the defendant that Mr. Rantoul should be assigned as his counsel, because, though admitted to the Common Pleas, he was not yet an attorney of the Supreme Court, and that court, consequently, had not the usual control over him; and, besides, counsel was to give aid to the court as well as to the prisoner, and there- fore it was proper that a person of more legal experience should be as- signed. 2‘Byvery countor is chargeable by the oath that he shall do no wrong nor falsity, contrary to his knowledge, but shall plead for his client the best he can, according to his understanding.” Mirror of Justices, c. 2, § 5. The oath in Pennsylvania, on the admission of an attorney to the bar, ‘to behave himself in the office of an attorney, according to the best of his learning and ability, and with all good fidelity, as well to the court as to the client; that he will use no falsehood, nor delay any man’s cause, for lucre or malice”, is said, by Mr. Sharswood, to present a comprehensive summary of his duties as a practitioner. Shars- wood’s Legal Ethics, p. 3. The advocate’s oath, in Geneva, was as follows: ‘‘I solemnly swear, before Almighty God, to be faithful to the tepublic, and to the canton of Geneva; never to depart from the respect due to the tribunals and authorities; never to counsel or maintain a cause which does not appear to be just or equitable, unless it be the defence of an accused person; never to employ, knowingly, for the purpose of main- taining the causes confided to me, any means contrary to truth, and never to seek to mislead the judges by any artifice or false statement of facts or law: to abstain from all offensive per- sonality, and to advance no fact con- trary to the honor and reputation of the parties, if it be not indispensable to the with which I may be charged; not to encourage either the commencement or continuance of a suit from any motives of passion or interest; nor to reject, for any con- sideration personal to myself, the cause of the weak, the stranger, or the oppressed.” In ‘The Lawyer's Oath, its Obligations, and some of the Duties springing out of them”, by D. Be- thune Duffield, Esq., a masterly analysis is given of this oath; and he well says of it: ‘Here you have the ereed of an upright and honorable lawyer. The clear, terse, and lofty language in which it is expressed needs no argument to elucidate its principles, no eloquence to enforce its obligations. It has in it the sacred savor of divine inspiration, and sounds almost like a restored reading from Sinai’s original, but broken tablets.”’ causeCONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I 698 witnesses, or through the perversion or misapplication of the law by the court. Strangely enough, however, the aid of this profession was denied in the very cases in which it was needed most, and it has cost a long struggle, continuing even into the present century, to rid the English law of one of its most horrible features. In civil causes and on the trial of charges of misdemeanor, the parties were entitled to the aid of counsel in eliciting the facts, and in presenting both the facts and the law to the court and jury; but when the government charged a person with treason or felony, he was denied this privilege! Only such legal questions as he could suggest was counsel allowed to argue for him; and this was but a poor privilege to one who was himself unlearned in the law, and who, as he could not fail to perceive the monstrous injustice of the whole proceeding, would be quite likely to accept any perversion of the law that might occur in the course of it as regular and proper, because quite in the spirit that denied him a defense. Only after the Revolution of 1688 was a full defense allowed on trials for treason,” and not until 1836 1 “From a very early period persons accused of treason or felony were re- fused the help of counsel. This rule was sternly insisted upon all through this period; and when its justice began to be questioned, Coke justified it partly on the ground that the court was counsel for the prisoner — a view which was clearly not acted upon in the important state trials of the period; and partly on the ground that, it being for the prosecutor to prove his case so clearly that no defense to it was possible, no counsel was therefore needed.” Holdsworth’s History of English Law, Vol. 5, p. 192. When an ignorant person, unaccus- tomed to public assemblies, and perhaps feeble in body or in intellect, was put upon trial on a charge which, whether true or false, might speedily consign him to an ignominious death, with able counsel arrayed against him, and all the machinery of the law ready to be employed in bringing forward the evidence of circumstances indicat- ing guilt, it is painful to contemplate the barbarity which could deny him professional aid. Especially when in most cases he would be imprisoned immediately on being apprehended, and would thereby be prevented from making even the feeble preparations which might otherwise have been within his power. A “trial”? under such circumstances would be only a judicial murder in very many cases. The spirit in which the old law was administered may be judged of from the case of Sir William Parkins, tried for high treason before Lord Holt and his associates in 1695, after the statute 7 Wm. III. c. 3, allowing counsel to prisoners indicted for trea- son, had been passed, but one day before it was to take effect. He prayed to be allowed counsel, and quoted the preamble to the statute that such allowance was just and reasonable. His prayer was denied; Lord Holt declaring that he must administer the law as he found it, and could not anticipate the operation of an act of Parliament, even by a single day. The accused was convicted and executed. See Lieber’s Hermeneutics, ce. 4, §15; Sedgwick on Stat. and Const. Law, 81. In proceedings by the Inquisition against suspected her- etics the aid of counsel was expressly prohibited. Lea’s Superstition and Force, 377. 2 See an account of the final passage of this bill in Macaulay’s “England”, Vol. IV. c.21. Itissurprising that the effort to extend the same right to allCHAP. X] PROTECTIONS TO persons accused of felony was so stren- uously resisted afterwards, and that, too, notwithstanding the best lawyers in the realm admitted its importance and justice. ‘I have myself,” said Mr. Scarlett, ‘‘often seen persons I thought innocent convicted, and the guilty escape, for want of some acute and intelligent counsel to show the bearings of the different circumstances on the conduct and situation of the prisoner.” House of Commons De- bates, April 25, 1826. ‘It has lately been my lot,” said Mr. Denman, on the same occasion, ‘‘to try two pris- oners who were deaf and dumb, and who could only be made to understand what was passing by the signs of their friends. The cases were clear and simple; but if they had been circum- stantial cases, in what a situation would the judge and jury be placed, when the prisoner could have no coun- sel to plead for him.’ The cases looked clear and simple to Mr. Den- man; but how could he know they would not have looked otherwise, had the coloring of the prosecution been relieved by a counter-presentation for the defense? See Sydney Smith’s article on Counsel for Prisoners, 45 Edinb. Rev. p. 74; Works, Vol. II. p. 353. The plausible objection to extending the right was, that the judge would be counsel for the prisoner, — a pure fallacy at the best, and, with some judges, a frightful mockery. Baron Garrow, in a charge to a grand jury, said: “It has been truly said that, in criminal cases, judges were counsel for the prisoners. So, un- doubtedly, they were, as far as they could be, to prevent undue prejudice, to guard against improper influence being excited against prisoners; but it was impossible for them to go fur- ther than this, for they could not suggest the course of defense prisoners ought to pursue; for judges only saw the deposition so short a time before the accused appeared at the bar of their country, that it was quite im- possible for them to act fully in that capacity.” If one would see how easily, and yet in what a shocking manner, a judge might pervert the law and the evi- PERSONAL LIBERTY 699 dence, and act the part of both prosecutor and king’s counsel, while assuming to be counsel for the prisoner, he need not go further back than the early trials in our own country, and he is referred for a specimen to the trials of Robert Tucker and others for piracy, before Chief Justice Trott at Charleston, S. C., in 1718, as reported in 6 State Trials (Emlyn), 156 et seq. Especially may he there see how the statement of prisoners in one case, to which no credit was given for their exculpation, was used as_ hearsay evidence to condemn a prisoner in another case. All these abuses would have been checked, perhaps altogether prevented, had the prisoners had able and fearless counsel. But with- out counsel for the defense, and under such a judge, the witnesses were not free to testify, the prisoners could not safely make even the most honest explanation, and the jury, when they retired, could only feel that returning a verdict in accordance with the opinion of the judge was merely matter of form. Sydney Smith’s lecture on “The judge that smites contrary to the law” is worthy of being carefully pondered in this connection. “If ever a nation was happy, if ever a nation was visibly blessed by God, if ever a nation was honored abroad, and left at home under a government (which we can now conscientiously call a liberal government) to the full career of talent, industry, and vigor, we are at this moment that people, and this is our happy lot. First, the Gospel has done it, and then justice has done it; and he who thinks it his duty that this happy condition of existence may remain, must guard the piety of these times, and he must watch over the spirit of justice which exists in these times. First, he must take care that the altars of God are not polluted, that the Christian faith is retained in purity and in perfection ; and then, turning to human affairs, let him strive for spotless, incorruptible justice; praising, honoring, and loving the just judge, and abhorring as the worst enemy of mankind him who is placed there to ‘judge after the law, and who smites contrary to the law.’ ”700 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I was the same privilege extended to persons accused of other felonies.? With us it is a universal principle of constitutional law, that the prisoner shall be allowed a defense by counsel.? And generally it will be found that the humanity of the law has provided that, if the prisoner is unable to employ counsel, the court may designate some one to defend him who shall be paid by the government; ? but when no such provision is made, it is a duty which counsel so designated owes to his profession, to the court engaged in the trial, and to the cause of humanity and justice, not to withhold his assist- ance nor spare his best exertions, in the defense of one who has the double misfortune to be stricken by poverty and accused of crime. No one is at liberty to decline such an appointment,‘ and few, it is to be hoped, would be disposed to do so. In guaranteeing to parties accused of crime the right to the aid of counsel, the Constitution secures it with all its accustomed incidents.°® 1 By statute 6 & 7 Wm. IV. c. 114; 4 Cooley’s Bl. Com. 355; May’s Const. Hist. ec. 18. ? The right to counsel is permissive and conditional upon the pleasure of the accused. ‘“Preferring the pro- tection of the court, or choosing to rely upon his own skill and ability, he may not desire the assistance of counsel.”’ State v. Yoes, 67 W. Va. 546, 68 S. E. 181, 140 Am. St. Rep. 978. See also Dietz v. State, 149 Wis. 462, 136 N. W. 166, Ann. Cas. 1913 C, 732. *“ When a court is called upon to appoint counsel for a defendant in a criminal case who is unable to employ counsel for himself, it is the duty of the court to see that counsel is assigned having sufficient ability and experi- ence to fairly represent the defendant, present his defense, and protect him from undue oppression.”’ People vv. Blevins, 251 Ill. 381, 96 N. EB. 214, Ann. Cas. 1912 C, 451. ‘Vice v. Hamilton County, 19 II. 18; Wayne Co. v. Waller, 90 Pa. St. 99, 35 Am. Rep. 636; House v. White, 5 Baxt. 690; Barnes v. Com., 92 Va. (94; 23'S: B. 784: It has been held that, in the ab- sence of express statutory provisions, counties are not obliged to compensate counsel assigned by the court to defend poor prisoners. Bacon v. Wayne Among these is that County, 1 Mich. 461; Wayne Co. ». Waller, 90 Pa. St. 99, 35 Am. Rep. 636. But there are several cases to the contrary. Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13; Hall v. Washington County, 2 Greene (lowa), 473; Carpenter v. Dane County, 9 Wis. 277. But we think a court has a right to require the service, whether compensation is to be made or not; and that counsel who should decline to perform it, for no other reason than that the law does not pro- vide pecuniary compensation, is un- worthy to hold his responsible office in the administration of justice. Said Chief Justice Hale in one case: ‘Al- though serjeants have a monopoly of practice in the Common Pleas, they have a right to practice, and do practice, at this bar; and if we were to assign one of them as counsel, and he was to refuse to act, we should make bold to commit him to prison.’”’ Life of Chief Justice Hale, in Campbell’s Lives of the Chief Justices, Vol. II. ‘The right to the aid of counsel includes the right to communication and consultation with him. Ez parte Rider, 50 Cal. App. 797, 195 Pac. 965; A. C. Batchelor v. State, 189 Ind. 69, 125 N. E. 773; T. M. Batchelor »v. State, 189 Ind. 701, 125 N. E. 778; Bielich v. State, 189 Ind. 127, 126 N. BK. 220; Mays v. Com., 25 Ky. L. Rep. 646, 76 S. W. 162; State ex rel.CHAP. Xx] PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY 701 shield of protection which is thrown around the confidence the re- lation of counsel and client requires, and which does not permit the disclosure by the former, even in the courts of justice, of communications which may have been made to him by the latter, with a view to pending or anticipated litigation. This is the client’s privilege; the counsel cannot waive it; and the court would not permit the disclosure even if the client were not present to take the objection.’ Tucker v. Davis, 9 Okla. Crim. Rep. 94, 130 Pac. 962, 44 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1083; Com. v. Boyd, 246 Pa. St. 529, 92 Atl. 705, Ann. Cas. 1916 D, 201; Mothaf v. State, 91 Tex. Crim. Rep. 378, 239 S. W. 215, 23 A. L. R. 1374; Turner v. State, 91 Tex. Crim. Rep. 627, 241 S. W. 162, 23 A. L. R. 1378. Where a person is confined in jail pending a trial upon a criminal pros- ecution, he has the right to have an opportunity to consult freely with his counsel without having any person present to hear what passes between them, whose presence is objectionable to him. It is the duty of officers having custody of such a prisoner to afford him a reasonable opportunity to privately consult his counsel, and no officer has the right to be present and hear what is said during such consultation. As to just when and where consultations between prisoners and their attorneys may be had will vary with the circumstances of each case, within the discretion of the officer having the custody of the prisoner; but this discretion is subject to the review of the courts, and it must not be arbitrarily used. State ex rel. Tucker v. Davis, 9 Okla. Crim. 94, 130 Pac. 962. 44 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1083. 1 The history and reason of the rule which exempts counsel from disclosing professional communications are well stated in Whiting v. Barney, 30 N. Y. 330. And see 1 Phil. Ev., by Cowen, Hill, and Edwards, 130 et seg.; Wig- more on Evidence, Vol. 5, §§ 2290, 2291; Earle v. Grant, 46 Vt. 113; Machette v. Wanless, 2 Col. 169; Blackburn v. Crawford, 3 Wall. 175, 18 L. ed. 186; Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Smithhart, 183 Ky. 679, 211 S. W. 441,5 A. L. R. 972; Doherty v. O’Cal- laghan, 157 Mass. 90, 31 N. E. 726, 34 Am. St. Rep: 258, 17 LR. 7a 188. The privilege would not cover com- munications made, not with a view to professional assistance, but in order to induce the attorney to aid in a criminal act. People v. Blakely, 1 Park. Cr. R. 176; Bank of Utica v. Mersereau, 3 Barb. Ch. 398; Standard F. Ins. Co. v. Smithhart, 183 Ky. 679, 2118S. W. 441,5 A. L. R.972. See also State v. Wilcox, 90 Kan. 80, 132 Pac. 982, 9 A. L. R. 1091; Hewitt »v. Prince, 21 Wend. 79; Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. 5, § 2298. Nor com- munications before a crime with a view to being guided as to it. Orman v. State, 22 Tex. App. 604, 3 S. W. 468; People v. Van Alstine, 57 Mich. 69, 23 N. W. 594; Standard Ins. Co. v. Smithhart, 183 Ky. 679, 211 S. W. 441, 5 A. L. R. 972; Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. 5, § 2298. But it is not confined to cases where litigation is begun or contemplated: Root ». Wright, 84 N. Y. 72; Alexander ». United States, 138 U. S. 353, 34 L. ed. 954, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 350. See Wig- more on Evidence, Vol. 5, § 2294 et. where a fee is re- seq.; or to cases ceived: Andrews v. Simms, 33 Ark. 771; Bacon »v. Fisher, 80 N. Y. 394, 36 Am. Rep. 627; Bruley v. Garvin, 105 Wis. 625, 81 N. W. 1038, 48 L. R. A. 839; and is not waived by the party becoming a witness for himself : Dettenhofer v. State, 34 Ohio St. 91, 32 Am. Rep. 362; Sutton v. State, 16 Tex. App. 490; Montgomery »v. Pickering, 116 Mass. 227; Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. 5, § 2327; but see Jones v. State, 65 Miss. 179, 3 So. 379; In re Young’s Estate, 59 Oreg. 348, 116 Pac. 95, 1060, Ann. Cas. 1913 B, 1310. But if the party voluntarily introduces testimony in regard to his702 communications to his attorney, or himself testifies in relation thereto, the privilege is waived. Hunt ». Blackburn, 128 U. S. 464, 32 L. ed. 488, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 125; People ». Gerald, 265 Ill. 448, 107 N. E. 165, Ann. Cas. 1916 A, 636; Kelly v. Cummens, 143 Iowa, 148, 121 N. W. 540, 20 Ann. Cas. 1283; Ez parte Gfeller, 178 Mo. 248, 77 S. W. 552; Gick v. Stumpf, 126 App. Div. 548, 110 N. Y. Supp. 712; Yardley »v. State, 50 Tex. Crim. 644, 100 S. W. 399, 123 Am. St. Rep. 869; Grant v. Harris, 116 Va. 642, 82 S. E. 718, Ann. Cas. 1916 D, 1081; Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. 5, § 2327. See also In re Burnette, 73 Kan. 609, 85 Pac. 575. Communications to a State’s at- torney with a view to a prosecution are privileged. Vogel v. Gruaz, 110 U. S. 311, 28 L. ed. 158, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 12; Michael v. Matson, 81 Kan. 360, 105 Pac. 537, L. R. A. 1915 D, 1. See also Centoamore v. State, 105 Neb. 452, 181 N. W. 182. But see Fisher ». State, 149 Ark. 48, 231 S. W. 181; Riggins v. State, 125 Md. 165, 93 Atl. 437, Ann. Cas. 1916 E, 1117. Communications extraneous or im- pertinent to the subject-matter of the professional consultation are not pri- vileged. Dixon v. Parmelee, 2 Vt. 185; Denunzio v. Schlatz, 117 Ky. 182, 77 S. W. 715, 4 Ann. Cas. 529. See Brandon v. Gowing, 7 Rich. 459. Compare Surface v. Bentz, 228 Pa. St. 610, 77 Atl. 922, 21 Ann. Cas. 215. On this subject, see also Wigmore on Bvidence, Vol. 5, § 2310. Or com- munications publicly made in the presence of others. Hartford F. Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 36 Mich. 502; Gallagher v. Williamson, 23 Cal. 331, 83 Am. Dec. 114; Scott ». Aultman Con, 211M. 612571 N. Ee: 1112 108 Am. St. Rep. 215; Champion ». McCarthy, 228 Ill. 87, 81 N. E. 808, 11 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 1052, 10 Ann. Cas. 517; Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. oO § 2311. See Perkins v. Grey, 55 Miss. 153; Moffatt v. Hardin, 22 S. C. 9; Kramer v. Kister, 187 Pa. 227, 40 Atl. 1008, 44 L.R. A. 482. Or communi- cations made to or by the attorney when acting for both parties. Hanlon oZE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [voL. I v. Doherty, 109 Ind. 37, 9 N. E. 782; Cady v. Walker, 62 Mich. 157, 28 N. W. 805; Goodwin, &c. Co.’s Appeal, 117 Pa. St. 514, 12 Atl. 736; Standard F. Ins. Co. v. Smithhart, 183 Ky. 679, 211S. W. 441,5 A. L. R. 972; In re Cunnion, 201 N. Y. 128, 94 N. E. 648, Ann. Cas. 1912 A, 834; Kirchner v. Smith, 61 W. Va. 434, 58 S. E. 614, 11 Ann. Cas. 870. But see Stewart v. Todd, 190 Iowa, 283, 173 N. W. 619, 20 A. L. R. 1272. On this subject see Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. 5, § 2312. Ortoan attorney if he acts as a mere scrivener. Smith »v. Long, 106 Ill. 485; Todd v. Munson, 53 Conn. 579, 4 Atl. 99. See also Turner v. Turner, 123 Ga. 5, 50S. E. 969, 107 Am. St. Rep. 76; Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. 5, § 2297. Or facts within the personal knowledge of counsel, such as the dating of a bond. Rundle v. Foster, 3 Tenn. Ch. 658. The privilege extends to communi- cations by other means than words: State v. Dawson, 90 Mo. 149, 1S. W. 827; Ex parte McDonough, 170 Cal. 230, 149 Pac. 566, L. R. A. 1916 C, 593, Ann. Cas. 1916 E, 327; Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. 5, § 2306; and some cases hold that it extends to communications to a legal adviser, who is not a licensed attorney. Bene- dict v. State, 44 Ohio St. 679, 11 N. E. 125; Ladd v. Rice, 57 N. H. 374. See also People v. Barker, 60 Mich. 277, 27 N. W. 539, 1 Am. St. 501. But see Schubkagel v. Dierstein, 131 Pa. St. 46, 18 Atl. 1059, 6 L. R. A. 481; 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, ed. 16, § 239, and cases cited; Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. 5, § 2300 e¢ seg. It is waived by asking the attorney who drew a will to be a witness to it. Matter of Coleman, 111 N. Y. 220, 19 N. E. 71. It has been intimated in New York that the statute making parties wit- nesses has done away with the rule which protects professional communi- cations. Mitchell’s Case, 12 Abb. Pr. R. 249; note to 1 Phil. Ev., by Cowen, Hill, and Edwards, 159 (marg.). Supposing this to be so in civil cases, the protection would still be the same in the case of persons charged with crime, for such persons cannot beCHAP. X] PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY 703 [The accused has the right to have all his counsel represent him during his entire trial and it is reversible error to exclude them, or any one of them, from the courtroom at any stage of the trial."] Having once engaged in a cause, the counsel is not afterwards at liberty to withdraw from it without the consent of his client and of the court; and even though he may be impressed with a belief in his client’s guilt, it will nevertheless be his duty to see that a con- viction is not secured contrary to the law.? The worst criminal is entitled to be judged by the laws; and if his conviction is secured by means of a perversion of the law, the injury to the cause of public justice will be more serious and lasting in its results than his being allowed to escape altogether.’ compelled to give evidence against themselves, so that the reason for protecting professional confidence is the same as formerly. 1 Jackson v. State, 55 115 S. W. 262, 1381 Am. St. Rep. 792. In this case the court said: ‘‘The fact that appellant may have been ably defended by other counsel does not abridge his right to have counsel of his own selection and as many as he may see proper to employ to defend him. Nor can he be deprived of the advantage of his selected counsel by placing them under the rule as wit- nesses. If this rule should obtain, then the state could place counsel of accused under the rule as witnesses in behalf of the State and deprive him of such counsel as he might see proper to select or employ.” 2 If one would consider this duty and the limitations upon it fully, he should read the criticisms upon the conduct of Mr. Charles Phillips on the trial of Courvoisier for the murder of Lord William MRussell. See Sharswood, Legal Ethics, 46; Littell, Living Age, Vol. XXIV. pp. 179, 230; Vol. XXV. pp. 289, 306; West. Rev. Vol. XXXV. Tex. Cr. 79, 8 There may be cases in which it will become the duty of counsel to interpose between the court and the accused, and fearlessly to brave all consequences personal to himself, where it appears to him that in no other mode can the law be vindicated and justice done to his client; but these cases are so rare, that doubtless they will stand out in judicial history as notable exceptions to the ready obedience which the bar should yield to the authority of the court. The famous scene between Mr. Justice Buller and Mr. Erskine, on the trial of the Dean of St. Asaph for libel,—5 Campbell’s Lives of the Chancellors, ec. 158; Erskine’s Speeches, by Jas. L. High, Vol. I. p. 242,—will readily occur to the reader as one of the exceptional cases. Lord Campbell says of Erskine’s conduct: “This noble stand for the independence of the bar would alone have entitled Erskine to the statute which the profession affectionately erected to his memory in Lincoln’s Inn Hall. We are to admire the decency and propriety of his demeanor during the struggle, no less than its spirit, and the felicitous precision with which he meted out the requisite and justifiable portion of defiance. His example has had a salutary effect in illustrating and establishing the rela- tive duties of judge and advocate in England.’”’ And elsewhere, in speak- ing of Mr. Fox’s Libel Act, he makes the following somewhat extravagant remark: ‘I have said, and I still think, that this great constitutional triumph is mainly to be ascribed to Lord Camden, who had been fighting in the cause for half a century, and uttered his last words in the House of Lords in its support; but had he not received the invaluable assistance of Erskine, as counsel for the Dean of St. Asaph, the Star Chamber might have been re-established in this country.”704 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I But how persistent counsel may be in pressing for the acquittal of his client, and to what extent he may be justified in throwing his own personal character as a weight in the scale of justice, are questions of ethics rather than of law. No counsel is justifiable who defends even a just cause with the weapons of fraud and false- hood, and no man on the other hand can excuse himself for accepting the confidence of the accused, and then betraying it by a feeble and heartless defense. And in criminal cases we think the court may sometimes have a duty to perform in seeing that the prisoner suffers nothing from inattention or haste on the part of his counsel, or impatience on the part of the prosecuting officer or of the court itself. Time may be precious to the court; but it is infinitely more so to him whose life or whose liberty may depend upon the careful and patient consideration of the evidence ; when the counsel for the defense is endeavoring to sift the truth from the falsehood, and to subject the whole to logical analysis, so as to show that how suspi- cious soever the facts may be, they are nevertheless consistent with innocence. Often indeed it must happen that the impression of the prisoner’s guilt, which the judge and the jury unavoidably receive when the case is opened to them by the prosecuting officer, will, insensibly to themselves, color all the evidence in the case, so that only a sense of duty will induce a due attention to the summing up for the prisoner, which after all may prove unexpectedly convincing. Doubtless the privilege of counsel is sometimes abused in these cases ; we cannot think an advocate of high standing and character has a right to endeavor to rob the jury of their opinion by asseverating his own belief in the innocence of his client; and cases may arise in which the court will feel compelled ie impose some reasonable re- straints upon the address to the jury ;! but it is better in these cases And Lord Brougham says of Erskine: tion be still recognized as a patriot, “He was an undaunted man; he was_ and not doomed to die the death of a an undaunted advocate. To no court traitor, —let us acknowledge with did he ever truckle, neither to the gratitude that to this great man, under court of the King, neither to the court Heavy fen, we owe this felicity ‘of the of the King’s Judges. Their smiles times.” Sketches of Statesmen of the and their frowns he disregarded a like Time of George III. A similar in- in the fearless discharge of his duty. stance of the independence of counsel He upheld the liberty of the peers is narrated of that eminent advocate, against the one; he defended the rights Mr. Samuel Dexter, in the reminis- of the people against both combined to cences of his life by “Sigma’’, pub- destroy them. If there be yet tamongst lished at Boston, 1857, p- 61. See us the power of freely discussing the Story on Const. (4th ed.) § 1064, note. acts of our rulers; if there be yet the 1 Thus it has been held, that, even privilege of meeting for the promotion though the j jury are the judges of the of needful reforms; if he who desires law in criminal cases, the court may wholesome changes in our Constitu- refuse to allow counsel to read law-CHAP. X] PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY 705 to err on the side of liberality ; and restrictions which do not leave to counsel, who are apparently acting in good faith, such reasonable time and opportunity as they may deem necessary for presenting their client’s case fully, may possibly in some cases be so far erro- neous in law as to warrant setting aside a verdict of guilty. Whether counsel are to address the jury on questions of law in criminal cases, generally, is a point which is still in dispute. If the jury in the particular case, by the Constitution or statutes of the State, are judges of the law, it would seem that counsel should be allowed to address them fully upon it,” though the contrary seems to have been held in Maryland:* while in Massachusetts where it is expected that the jury will receive the law from the court, it is nevertheless held that counsel has a right to address them upon the law.* It is unquestionably more decorous and more respectful to the bench that argument upon the law should always be addressed to the court; and such, we believe, is the general practice. The jury hear the argument, and they have a right to give it such weight as it seems to them properly to be entitled to. For misconduct in their practice, the members of the legal pro- fession may be summarily dealt with by the courts, who will not fail, in all proper cases, to use their power to protect clients or the public, as well as to preserve the profession from the contamination and dis- books to the jury. Murphy ». State, 6 Ind. 490. And see Lynch ». State, 9 Ind. 541; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Allen, 11 Mich. 501; Walkley v. State, 133 Ala. 183, 31 So. 854; New v. State, 19 Ala. App. 140, 96 So. 720; State v. Main, 75 Conn. 55, 52 Atl. 257; Clark v. State, 8 Ga. App. 757, 70 S. E. 90; Reed v. Com., 140 Ky. 736, 131 S. W. 776; Smithson v. State, 127 Tenn. 357, 155 S. W. 133; Perkins v. State, 65 Tex. Cr. 311, 144 S. W. 241. 1 In People v. Keenan, 13 Cal. 581, a verdict in a capital case was set aside on this ground. 2 Lynch v. State, 9 Ind. 541; Mur- phy v. State, 6 Ind. 490; Bluett ». State, 151 Ala. 41, 44 So. 84; Mitchell v. State, 18 Ala. App. 471, 93 So. 46; People v. Hatch, 163 Cal. 368, 125 Pac. 907; People v. Routh, 182 Cal. 561, 189 Pac. 436; Henwood »v. People, 57 Colo. 544, 143 Pac. 373, Ann. Cas. 1916 A, 1111; Cribb v. State, 118 Ga. 316, 45 S. E. 396; People v. Conners, 246 Ill. 9, 92 N. E. 567; Cavanaugh ». Com., 172 Ky. 799, 190 S. W. 123; VOL. 1—45 Harris v. State, 74 Tex. Cr. 652, 169 S. W. 657; Goldsberry v. State, 92 Tex. Cr. 108, 242 S. W. 221. Counsel may read law to the jury, with so much of the facts stated in an opinion as may be necessary to illus- trate the principle ruled, but it is not permissible, by such use of authority, to introduce evidence, or thus indi- rectly to establish facts which might influence the jury. Cribb v. State, 118 Ga. 316, 45 S. E. 396. 3 Franklin v. State, 12 Md. 236. What was held there was, that counsel should not argue the constitutionality of a statute to the jury; and that the Constitution, in making the jury judges of the law, did not empower them to decide a statute invalid. This ruling corresponds to that of Judge Chase in United States v. Cal- lendar, Whart. State Trials, 688, 710. But see remarks of Perkins, J., in Lynch »v. State, 9 Ind. 542. 4 Commonwealth v. Porter, 10 Met. 263; Commonwealth v. Austin, 7 Gray, 51.706 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I grace of a vicious associate! A man of bad reputation may be expelled for that alone;* [and, speaking generally, misconduct indicative of moral unfitness for the profession, whether it be pro- fessional or nonprofessional, justifies disbarment ;*] and counsel who 1 “Asa class, attorneys are supposed to be, and in fact have always been, the vindicators of individual rights, and the fearless assertors of the principles of civil liberty, existing, where alone they can exist, in a government, not of parties nor of men, but of laws. On the other hand, to declare them irre- sponsible to any power but public opinion and their consciences, would be incompatible with free govern- ment. Individuals of the class may, and sometimes do, forfeit their pro- fessional franchise by abusing it; and a power to exact the forfeiture must be lodged somewhere. Such a power is indispensable to protect the court, the administration of justice, and themselves. Abuses must neces- sarily creep in; and, having a deep stake in the character of their profes- sion, they are vitally concerned in preventing it from being sullied by the misconduct of unworthy members of it. No class of the community is more dependent on its reputation for honor and integrity. It is indispensable to the purposes of its creation to assign it a high and honorable stand- ing; but to put it above the judiciary, whose official tenure is good behavior and whose members are removable from office by the legislature, would render it intractable; and it is there- fore necessary to assign it but an equal share of independence. In the ab- sence of specific provision to the con- trary, the power of remoyal is, from its nature, commensurate with the power of appointment, and it is con- sequently the business of the judges to deal with delinquent members of the bar, and withdraw their faculties when they are incorrigible.” Gibson, Ch. J., In re Austin et al., 5 Rawle, LOLS 2035 28) Ams Dees 657. See State v. Kirke, 12 Fla. 278; Rice’s Case, 18 B. Monr. 472; Walker »v. State, 4 W. Va. 749. An attorney may be disbarred for a personal attack upon the judge for his conduct as such; but the attorney is entitled to notice, and an opportunity to be heard in defense. Beene ». State, 22 Ark. 149; Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Muncie, ete., Traction Co., 166 Ind. 466, 77 N. E. 941, 9 Ann. Cas. 165; State Board of Law Examiners v. Hart, 104 Minn. 88, 116 N. W. 212, 17 L. R. A. (WN. 8.) 585; 15 Ann: Cast 197; State Bar Commission v. Sul- livan, 35 Okla. 745, 131 Pac. 703, L. R. A. 1915 D, 1218; In re Sherwood, 259 Pa. St. 254, 103 Atl. 42, L. R. A. 1918 D, 447; In re Hilton, 48 Utah, 172, 158 Pac. 691, Ann. Cas. 1918 A, 271; In re Robinson, 48 Wash. 153, 92 Pac. 929, 15 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 525, 15 Ann. Cas. 415. See Jn re Wallace, L. R. 1 P. C. 283; Hx parte Bradley, 7 Wall. 364, 19 L. ed. 214; Withers v. State, 35 Ala. 252; Matter of Moore et al., 63 N. C. 397; Ez parte Biggs, 64 N. C. 202; Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335; Dickens’s Case, 67 Pa. St. 169. 2 For example, one whose reputation for truth and veracity is such that his neighbors would not believe him when under oath. Matter of Mills, 1 Mich. 393. See In re Percy, 36 N. Y. 651; People v. Ford, 54 Ill. 520. 3 Wernimont v. State, 101 Ark. 210, 142 S. W. 194, Ann. Cas. 1913 D, 1156; In re Durant, 80 Conn. 140, 67 Atl. 497, 10 Ann. Cas. 539; People v. Smith, 200 Ill. 442, 66 N. E. 27, 93 Am. St. Rep. 206; People v. Macauley, 230 Ill. 208, 82 N. E. 612, 120 Am. St. Rep. 287; People v. Baker, 311 III. 66, 142 N. HE: 554, 31 A. LR. 73c: Nelson v. Com., 128 Ky. 779, 109 S. W. 337, 16 L. R. A. (N. s.) 272; Lenihan ». Com‘, 165) Ky: 935,176) Ss We 19438: i. R. A. 1917 B; 1132" In resCany- 146 Minn. 80, 177 N. W. 801, 9. A. L. R. 1272; In re Reily, 75 Okla. 192, 183 Pac. 728, 7 A. L. R. 89; In re Sherwood, 259 Pa. St. 254, 103 Atl. 42. Ty; R., A. gl9l8) Dy 447 inare Hilton, 48 Utah, 172, 158 Pac. 691, Ann. Cas. 1918 A, 271. But seeCHAP. X] PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY 707 has once taken part in litigation, and been the adviser or become intrusted with the secrets of one party, fered to engage for an opposing party, will not afterwards be suf- notwithstanding the original employment has ceased, and there is no imputation upon his mo- tives.! In re Sherin, 27 S. D. 232, 130 N. W. 761, 40 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 801, Ann. Cas. 1913 D, 446. An attorney convicted and pun- ished for perjury, and disbarred, was refused restoration, notwithstanding his subsequent behavior had been unexceptionable. Ex parte Garbett, 18 C. B. 403. See Matter of Mc- Carthy, 42 Mich. 71, 51 N. W. 963; Ind. 461. An for collusion to Walls, 64 disbarred Ex parte attorney procure false testimony. Matter of Gale, 75 N. Y. 526. See Matter of Eldridge, 82 N. Y. 161, 37 Am. Rep. 558. For inducing a commissioner to admit to bail without right a convicted prisoner. State v. Burr, 19 Neb. 593, 28 N. W. 261. For antedating jurat and acknowledgment. Matter of Arc- tander, 26 Minn. 25, 1 N. W. 43. For embezzlement of client’s papers, though he has settled with client. In re Davies, 93 Pa. St. 116. For want of fidelity to client. Matter of Wool, 36 Mich. 299; Strout v. Proctor, 71 Me. 288; Slemmer v. Wright, 54 Towa, 164, 6 N. W. 181; People Murphy, 119 Ill. 159, 6 N. E. 488; People v. Sullivan, 279 Ill. 634, 117 Ne bh. 134) 0. R. A. 1918 A, 1136; People v. Martin, 288 Ill. 615, 124 Ne BS 340" 147A; EL: R. 8545 In re Cary, 146 Minn. 80, 177 N. W. 801, 9 A. L. R. 1272; In re Marron, 22 Ne Mie 2527160) Pac! oO, Hea: But see Jn re Robertson, 8S. D. 70, 1382 N. W. 684, 36 L. R. A. (n. s.) 442. If he commits a crime in his professional capacity he may be disbarred, though he has not been convicted of the crime. State v. Winton, 11 Oreg. 456, 5 Pac. 337; In re Thresher, 33 Mont. 441, 84 Pac. 876, 114 Am. St. Rep. 834, 8 Ann. Cas. 845. Even if it is not com- mitted asan attorney. The rule is not inflexible that he must be convicted before disbarment. Hz parte Wall, 107 U. S. 265, 27 L. ed. 552, 2 Sup. Ct. 1917 B, 378. Rep. 569; Delano’s Case, 55 eet v. Smith, 290 Il. N. E. 807,9 A. L. R. 183; In re Sherin 27 S. D. 232, 130 N. W. 761, 40 L. R. A. (N. Ss.) 801, Ann. Cas. 1913 D, 446. See Ex parte Steinman, 95 Pa. St. 220. One may be disbarred for publish- a libel on the court unless some constitutional or statutory provision forbids. State v. McClaugherty, 33 W. Va. 250, 10 S. E. 407. But in South Dakota it has been held that an attorney should not be disbarred for acts of immorality, though such as to unfit him to be a member of the bar, if many years have since elapsed, during which he has live d an exemplary ing life. In re ae rin, Moe ee 232, 130 N. W. 761, 40 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 801, Ann. Cas. 1913 7 446. 1 Strong v. International Bldg. etc., Assoc. 183 Ill. 97, 55 N. E. 675, 47 L. R. A. 792; People v. Gerald, 265 Ill. 448, 107 N. E. 165, Ann. Cas. 1916 A, 636; Derlin v. Derlin, 142 Md. 352, 121 Atl. 27; Peirce; ». Palmer, 31 R. I. 432, 77 Atl. 201, Ann. Cas. 1912 B, 181; Hasford v. Eno, 41 S. D. 65, 168 N. W. 764, L. R. A. 1918 F, 831. See also King Const. Co. ». Mary Helen Coal Corp., 194 Ky. 435, 939 S. W. 799, 22 A. L. R. 535. In Gaulden v. State, 11 Ga. 47, the late solicitor-general was not suffered to assist in the defense of a criminal case, because he had, in the course of his official duty, instituted the prosecu- tion, though he was no longer con- nected with it. And see Wilson v. State, 16 Ind. 392. A late city attorney for accepting a retainer not to appear for the city in certain cases against it, appealed by him while such attorney, was suspended for six months from prac- tice. In re Cowdery, 69 Cal. 32, 10 Pac. 47. “The general rule that an attorney may not at the same time represent parties whose interests conflict is708 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I And, on the other hand, the court will not allow counsel to be made the instrument of injustice, nor permit the client to exact of him services which are inconsistent with the obligation he owes to the court and to public justice, — a higher and more sacred obligation than any which can rest upon him to gratify a client’s whims, or to assist in his revenge.! subject to an exception, where he so acts with the full knowledge and con- sent of both.’”’ Todd v. Rhodes, 108 Kan. 64, 193 Pac. 894, 16 A. L. R. 423. 1 Upon this subject the remarks of Chief Justice Gibson in Rush v. Cava- naugh, 2 Pa. St. 189, are worthy of being repeated in this connection. The prosecutor in a criminal case had refused to pay the charges of the counsel employed by him to prosecute in the place of the attorney-general, because the counsel, after a part of the evidence had been put in, had con- sented that the charge might be withdrawn. In considering whether this was sufficient reason for the refusal, the learned judge said: ‘‘The material question is, did the plaintiff violate his professional duty to his client in consenting to withdraw his charge, . . . instead of lending him- self to the prosecution of one whom he then and has since believed to be an innocent man? “Tt is a popular but gross mistake to suppose that a lawyer owes no fidelity to any one except his client, and that the latter is the keeper of his profes- sional conscience. He is expressly bound by his official oath to behave himself in his office of attorney with all due fidelity to the court as well as to the client; and he violates it when he consciously presses for an unjust judgment; much more so when he presses for the conviction of an inno- cent man. But the prosecution was depending before an alderman, to whom, it may be said, the plaintiff was bound to no such fidelity. Still he was bound by those obligations which, without oaths, rest upon all men. The high and honorable office of a counsel would be degraded to that of a mercenary, were he compellable to do the bidding of his client against the dictates of his conscience. The origin of the name proves the client to be subordinate to his counsel as his patron. Besides, had the plaintiff succeeded in having Crean held to answer, it would have been his duty to abandon the prosecution at the return of the recognizance. As the office of attorney-general is a public trust which involves, in the discharge of it, the exercise of an almost bound- less discretion by an officer who stands as impartial as a judge, it might be doubted whether counsel retained by a private prosecutor can be allowed to perform any part of his duty; cer- tainly not unless in subservience to his will and instructions. With that restriction, usage has sanctioned the practice of employing professional assistants, to whom the attorney- general or his regular substitute may, if he please, confide the direction of the particular prosecution; and it has been beneficial to do so where the prosecuting officer has been over- matched or overborne by numbers. In that predicament the ends of justice may require him to accept assistance. But the professional assistant, like the regular deputy, exercises not his own discretion, but that of the attorney- general, whose locum tenens at suf- ferance he is; and he consequently does so under the obligation of the official oath.’ And see Meister ». People, 31 Mich. 99; Jn re Durant, 80 Conn. 140, 67 Atl. 497, 10 Ann. Cas. 539; People v. Martin, 288 Ill. 615, 124 N. E. 340, 14 A. L. R. 854; Han- son v. Grattan, 84 Kan. 848, 115 Pac. 646, 34 L. R. A. (nN. s:) 240; In re Macy, 109 Kan. 1, 196 Pac. 1095, 14 A. L. R. 848; Huggins »v. Field, 196 Ky. 501, 244 S. W. 903, 29 A. L. R. 1268; In re Bergeron, 220 Mass. 472, 107 N. E. 1007, Ann. Cas. 1917 A, 549; Berman v. Coakley, 243 Mass. 348, 1387 N. E. 667, 26 A. L. R. 92;CHAP. X] PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY 709 The Right of Compulsory Process to Secure Witnesses. [The right to compulsory process by which to secure witnesses in his favor is also an important right of the accused.!. Where the Constitution secures this right, the witnesses thus compelled to appear do not thereby become entitled to claim their fees of the county.2. Where important witnesses for the accused are absent from the court without his fault, a continuance must be granted until they can be brought in. But after a reasonable time and opportunity have been allowed for this purpose, the prosecution may be allowed to proceed upon the admission of the prosecutor that the witnesses for the accused would, if present, testify as accused alleges they would. testimony is true.*] It is not necessary to admit that such The Writ of Habeas Corpus. It still remains to mention one of the principal safeguards to personal liberty, and the means by which illegal restraints upon it are most speedily and effectually remedied. To understand this guaranty, and the instances in which the citizen is entitled to appeal to the law for its enforcement, we must first have a correct idea of Lynde v. Lynde, 64 N. J. Eq. 736, 52 Atl. 694, 97 Am. St. Rep. 692, 58 L. R. A. 471; Ingersoll v. Coal Creek Coal Co., 117 Tenn. 263, 98 S. W. 1178, 119 Am. St. Rep. 1003, 9 L. R. A. (N. Ss.) 282, 10 Ann. Cas. 829; Cooper v. Bell, 127 Tenn. 142, 153 S. W. 844, Ann. Cas. 1914 B, 980 Armstrong v. Morrow, 166 Wis. 1, 163 N. W. 179, Ann. Cas. 1918 E, 1156. In furtherance of the full discharge of the duties which an attorney owes to his client and to the court, he is granted certain privileges. One is to be exempt from the service of process while attending upon the court and in going to and returning from the same. Hoffman v. Judge of Circuit Court, 113 Mich. 109, 71 N. W. 480; 38 L. R. A. 663; 67 Am. St. 458. Similar exemption in regard to service of summons and other civil process extends to parties and witnesses. Mulhearn v. Press Publishing Co., 53 N. J. L. 153, 21 Atl. 186, 11 L. R. A. 101. 1 Pitman v. State, 51 Fla. 94, 41 So. 385, 8 L. R. A. (Nn. 8.) 509; Lee v. State, 2 Ga. App. 481, 58 S. E. 676; State v. Rice, 7 Idaho, 762, 66 Pac. 87; State v. Campbell, 73 Kan. 688, 85 Pac. 784, 9 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 5338, 9 Ann. Cas. 1203; State v. Hornsby, 8 Rob. (La.) 554, 41 Am. Dec. 305; State v. Furco, 51 La. Ann. 1082, 25 So. 951; Commonwealth v. Haskell, 140 Mass. 128, 2 N. E. 773; State v. Sheltrey, 100 Minn. 107, 110 N. W. 353, 10 Ann. Cas. 245; State v. Hensley, 75 Ohio St. 255, 79 N. E. 462, 116 Am. St. Rep. 734, 9 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 277, 9 Ann. Cas. 108; McCrear v. State, 49 Tex. Cr. 228, 94S. W. 899. 2 Henderson, Petitioner, in State v. Evans, 51 S. C. 331, 29 S. E. 5, 40 L. R. A.; Whittle v. Saluda Co., 59 S. C. 554, 38S. E. 168. $ Ryder v. State, 100 Ga. 528, 28 S. E. 246, 38 L. R. A. 721, 62 Am. St. 334. 4 Atkins v. Commonwealth, 98 Ky. 539: 38 Si W. 948, 32D: RA: 10s); Hoyt v. People, 140 Ill. 588, 30 N. E. 315, 16 L. R. A. 239, and note; State v. Gibbs, 10 Mont. 213, 25 Pac. 289, 10 L. R. A. 749, and note.LIMITATIONS 710 CONSTITUTIONAL [voL. I what is understood by personal liberty in the law, and inquire what restraints, if any, must exist to its enjoyment. Sir William Blackstone says, personal liberty consists in the power of locomotion, of changing situation, or moving one’s person to whatsoever place one’s own inclination may direct, without imprisonment or restraint, unless by due course of law.1_ It appears, therefore, that this power of locomotion is not entirely unrestricted, but that by due course of law certain qualifications and limitations may be imposed upon it without infringing upon constitutional liberty. Indeed, in organized society, liberty is the creature of law, and every man will possess it in proportion as the laws, while impos- ing no unnecessary restraints, surround him and every other citi- zen with protections against the lawless acts of others.” In examining the qualifications and restrictions which the law imposes upon personal liberty, we shall find them classed, accord- ing to their purpose, as, first, those of a public, and, second, those of a private nature. The first class are those which spring from the relative duties and obligations of the citizen to society and to his fellow-citizens. These may be arranged into sub-classes as follows: (1) Those imposed to prevent the commission of crime which is threatened; (2) those in punishment of crime committed; (3) those in punishment of con- tempts of court or legislative bodies, or to render their jurisdiction effectual; (4) those necessary to enforce the duty citizens owe in defense of the State;* (5) those which may become important to 11 Bl. Com. 134. Montesquieu says: ‘In govern- ments, that is, in societies directed by laws, liberty can consist only in the power of doing what we ought to will, and in not being constrained to do what we ought not to will. We must have continually present to our minds the difference between independence and liberty. Liberty is a right of doing whatever the laws permit, and if a citizen could do what they forbid, he would no longer be possessed of liberty, because all his fellow-citizens stand. Liberty exists in proportion to wholesome restraint; the more re- straint on‘others to keep off from us, the more liberty we have. It is an error to suppose that liberty consists in a paucity of laws. If one wants few laws let him go to Turkey. The Turk enjoys that blessing. The work- ing of our complex system, full of checks and restraints on legislative, executive, and judicial power, is favorable to liberty and _ justice. Those checks and restraints are so many safeguards set around individual would enjoy the same power.’ Spirit of the Laws, Book 11, ec. 3. 2 “Liberty,”’ says Mr. Webster, ‘is the creature of law, essentially different from that authorized licentiousness that trespasses on right. It is a legal and a refined idea, the offspring of high civilization, which the savage never understood, and never can under- rights and interests. That man is free who is protected from injury.” Works, Vol. II. p. 398. 8In Judson v. Reardon, 16 Minn. 431, a statute authorizing the members of a municipal council to arrest and im- prison without warrant persons refus- ing to obey the orders of fire wardens at a fire was held unwarranted and void.CHAP. X] PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY 711 protect the community against the acts of those who, by reason of mental infirmity, are incapable of self-control. All these limitations are well recognized and generally understood, but a particular dis- cussion of them does not belong to our subject. The second class are those which spring from the helpless or dependent condition of individuals in the various relations of life. 1. The husband, at the common law, is recognized as having legal custody of and power of control over the wife, with the right to direct as to her labor, and to insist upon its performance. The pre- cise nature of the restraints which may be imposed by the husband upon the wife’s actions, it is not easy, from the nature of the case, to point out and define; but at most they can only be such gentle restraints upon her liberty as improper conduct on her part may appear to render necessary ;' and the general tendency of public sentiment, as well as of the modern decisions, has been in the direc- tion of doing away with the arbitrary power which the husband was formerly supposed to possess, and of placing the two sexes in the marriage relation upon a footing nearer equality. It is believed that the right of the husband to chastise the wife, under any cir- cumstances, would not be recognized in this country ; and such right of control as the law gives him would in any case be forfeited by such conduct towards the wife as was not warranted by the relation, and which should render it improper for her to live and cohabit with him, or by such conduct as, under the laws of the State, would entitle her to a divorce. And he surrenders his right of control also, when he consents to her living apart under articles of separation.’ 2. The father of an infant, being obliged by law to support his child, has a corresponding right to control his actions, and to employ his services during the continuance of legal infancy. The child may be emancipated from this control before coming of age, either by 12 Kent, 181. See Cochran’s Case, Martilla v. Quincy Min. Co., 221 Mich. 8 Dowl. P. C. 630. 525, 191 N. W. 193, 30 A. L. R. 1249; The husband, however, is under no Grimsted v. Johnson, 61 Mont. 18, obligation to support his wife except 201 Pac. 314, 25 A. L. R. 351. In at his own home; and it is only when such a case his liability to supply her he wrongfully sends her away, or so with necessaries cannot be restricted conducts himself as to justify her in by giving notice to particular persons leaving him, that he is bound to sup- not to trust her. Bolton v. Prentice, port her elsewhere. Rumneyv. Keyes, 2 Strange, 1214; Harris v. Morris, 4 7 N. H. 570; Allen». Aldrich, 29N.H. Esp. 41; Watkins v. De Armond, 89 63; Shaw v. Thompson, 16 Pick. 198; Ind. 553. Clement »v. Mattison, 3 Rich. 93; 2 Hutcheson v. Peck, 5 Johns. 196; Denver Dry Goods Co. v. Jester, 60 Love v. Moynahan, 16 Ill. 277. Colo. 290, 152 Pac. 903, L. R. A. 1917 3 Saunders v. Rodway, 16 Jur. 1005, A, 957; Brown v. Durepo, 121 Me. 13 Eng. L. & Eq. 463. 226, 116 Atl. 451, 27 A. L. R. 551;712 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I the express assent of the father, or by being turned away from his father’s house, and left to care for himself ; though in neither case would the father be released from an obligation which the law im- poses upon him to prevent the child becoming a public charge, and which the State may enforce whenever necessary. The mother, during the father’s life, has a power of control subordinate to his; but on his death,2 or conviction and sentence to imprisonment for felony,? she succeeds to the relative rights which the father possessed before.’ [A statute which declares the consent of public officers, or any guardian, to the adoption of a child a legal substitute for the consent of living, natural parents is an unconstitutional deprivation of rights.°| 1 Whiting v. Earle, 3 Pick. 201, 15 Am. Dec. 207; McCoy v. Huffman, 8 Cow. 841; State v. Barrett, 45 N. H. 15; Wolcott v. Rickey, 22 Iowa, 171; Fairhurst v. Lewis, 23 Ark. 435; Hardwick v. Pawlet, 36 Vt. 320; Swift v. Johnson, 138 Fed. 867, 71 GiC@A} 6191 1: Re AS (Ni s:) LIGL; Vance v. Calhoun, 77 Ark. 35, 90 S. W. 619, 113 Am. St. Rep. 111; Smith »v. Gilbert, 80 Ark. 525, 98 S. W. 115, 8 L. R. A.- (Nn. s.) 1098; Rounds ». McDaniel, 133 Ky. 669, 118 S. W. 956, 184 Am. St. Rep. 482, 19 Ann. Cas. 326; Lufkin v. Harvey, 131 Minn. 238, 154 N. W. 1097, L. R. A. 1916 B, 1111; Hunycut v. Thompson, 159 IN: (@; 29) 74S: 628; 40 L. R.A. (nN. s.) 488, Ann. Cas. 1913 E. 928. 2? Dedham v. Natick, 16 Mass. 135; Com’rs Harford Co. v. Hamilton, 60 Md. 340; McGarr v. National, etc., Worsted Mills, 24 R. I. 447, 53 Atl. 320, 96 Am. St. Rep. 749, 60 L. R. A. 122. 3 Bailey’s Case, 6 Dowl. P. C. 311. If, however, there be a guardian ap- pointed for the child by the proper court, his right to the custody of the child is superior to that of the parent. Macready v. Wolcott, 33 Conn. 321. 4Upon the principle that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure, the State is asserting more and more control over children allowed by their parents to grow up in evil associations, and for the prevention of crime to which such courses so strongly tend recent statutes authorize the summary arrest and detention, in reform schools and like institutions, of youth of in- corrigibly vicious habits. Such deten- tion is not looked upon as imprison- ment and punishment to the validity of which a jury trial is necessary. State v. Brown, 50 Minn. 353, 52 N. W. 935, 36 Am. St. 651, 16 L. R. A. 691, and note on commitment of minors to reformatories without conviction of crime. To the same effect, see Lee v. McClelland, 157 Ind. 84, 60 N. E. 692. 5 Lacher v. Venus, 177 Wis. 558, 188 N. W. 613, 24 A. L. R. 403. The court said: “The unit of the State is the individual, its foundation the family. To protect the unit in his constitutionally guaranteed right to form and preserve the family is one of the basic principles for which organized government is established. Cooley, Torts, 3d ed. p. 27. That natural parenthood implies both sub- stantial responsibilities and gives sub- stantial rights needs no discussion. That willful neglect to perform the one may properly result in the forfeiture of the other is also not open to debate, and not here for consideration. A natural affection between the parents and offspring, though it may be naught but a refined animal instinct and stronger from the parent down than from the child up, has always been rec- ognized as an inherent natural right, for the protection of which, Just as much as for the protection of the rights of the individual to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness, our government is founded.”CHAP. X] PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY 713 € 3. The guardian has a power of control over his ward, corre- sponding in the main to that which the father has over his child, though in some respects more restricted, while in others it is broader. The appointment of guardian, when made by the courts, is of local force only, being confined to the State in which it is made, and the guardian would have no authority to change the domicile of the ward to another State or country. But the appointment commonly has reference to the possession of property by the ward, and over this property the guardian is given a power of control which is not possessed by the father, as such, over the property owned by his child. 4. The relation of master and apprentice is founded on a contract between the two, generally with the consent of the parent or party standing in loco parentis to the latter, by which the master is to teach the apprentice some specified trade or means of living, and the apprentice, either wholly or in part in consideration of the in- struction, is to perform services for the master while receiving it. This relation is also statutory and local, and the power to control the apprentice is assimilated to that of the parent by the statute law.? 5. The power of the master to impose restraints upon the action of the servant he employs is of so limited a nature that practically it may be said to rest upon continuous voluntary assent. If the servant misconducts himself, or refuses to submit to proper control, the master may discharge him, but cannot resort to confinement or personal chastisement. 6. The relation of teacher and scholar places the former more nearly in the place of the parent than either of the two preceding relations places the master. While the pupil is under his care, he has a right to enforce obedience to his commands lawfully given in his capacity of teacher, even to the extent of bodily chastisement or confinement. And in deciding questions of discipline he acts judi- cially, and is not to be made liable, either civilly or criminally, unless he has acted with express malice, or been guilty of such excess in punishment that malice may fairly be implied. All presumptions favor the correctness and justice of his action.’ 1 Cooley’s Bl. Com. 462, and cases 222; Nickerson v. Howard, 19 Johns. cited. 113; Tucker v. Magee, 18 Ala. 99. 2 The relation is one founded on per- 3 State v. Pendergrass, 2 Dev. & Bat. sonal trust and confidence, and the 365; Cooper v. McJunkin, 4 Ind. 290; master cannot assign the articles of Commonwealth v. Randall, 4 Gray, apprenticeship except by consent of 38; Anderson »v. State, 3 Head, 455; the apprentice and of his proper Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114; Morrow guardian. Haley v. Taylor, 3 Dana, v. Wood, 35 Wis. 59; Patterson »v.714 "7 és CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [voL. I Where parties bail another, in legal proceedings, they are regarded in law as his jailers, selected by himself, and with the right to his legal custody for the purpose of seizing and delivering him up to the officers of the law at any time before the liability of the bail has become fixed by a forfeiture being judicially declared on his failure to comply with the condition of the bond.’ This is a right which the bail may exercise in person or by agent, and without resort to judicial process.” 8 The control of the creditor over the person of his debtor, through the process which the law gives for the enforcement of his demand, is now very nearly abolished, thanks to the humane provi- sions which have been made of late by statute or by constitution. In cases of torts and where debts were fraudulently contracted, or where there is an attempt at a fraudulent disposition of property with intent to delay the creditor, or to deprive him of payment, the body of the debtor is allowed to be seized and confined; but the reader must be referred to the constitution and statutes of his State for specific information on this subject.’ Nutter, 78 Me. 509, 7 Atl. 273; Sheehan v. Sturges, 53 Conn. 481, 2 Atl. 841; Vanvactor v. State, 113 Ind. 276, 15 N. EB. 341. 1 Harp v. Osgood, 2 Hill, 216; Com- monwealth v. Brickett, 8 Pick. 138; Worthen v. Prescott, 60 Vt. 68, 11 Atl. 690; Metograph Mfg. Co. v. Scru- gham, 197 N. Y. 377, 90 N. E. 962, 134 Am. St. Rep. 886, 27 L. R. A. (N. s.) 333; Carr v. Sutton, 70 W. Va. 417, 748. B. 239, Ann. Cas. 1913 E, 453. The principal may be followed, if necessary, out of the jurisdiction of the court in which the bail was taken, and arrested wherever found. Parker v. Bidwell, 3 Conn. 84. Even though it be out of the State. Harp v. Osgood, supra; Sallee v. Werner, 171 Ill. App. 96. And doors, if necessary, may be broken in order to make the arrest. Read v. Case, 4 Conn. 166, 10 Am. Dec. 110; Nicolls v. Ingersoll, 7 Johns. 145. After the recognizance is defaulted, surrender does not discharge the bail. State v. McGuire, 16 R. I. 519, 17 Atl. 918. Nor will surrender discharge surety on bond for the support of a deserted wife. Miller v. Com., 127 Pa St. 122: 17 Atl. 364. *Parker v. Bidwell, 3 Conn. 84; 145; Nicolls v. Ingersoll, 7 Johns. Worthen v. Prescott, 60 Vt. 68, 11 Atl. 690; Carr v. Sutton, 70 W. Va. 417, 74 S. E. 239, Ann. Cas. 1913 EH, 453. 3A statute making it a punishable offense to issue a check with no funds to meet it does not impose imprison- ment for debt. Hollis v. State, 152 Ga. 182, 108 S. E. 783; State »v. Avery, 111 Kan. 588, 207 Pac. 838, 23 A. L. R. 453; State v. Pilling, 53 Wash. 464, 102 Pac. 230, 132 Am. St. Rep. 1080. Obligation arising under order of court to pay money for support of a husband, is not a debt. Livingston v. Los Angeles Sup. Ct., 117 Cal. 6338, 49 Pac. 836, 38 L. R. A. 175. And a defendant may be imprisoned for refus- ing to pay alimony as ordered. Bar- clay v. Barclay, 184 Ill. 375, 56 N. E. 636, 51 L. R. A. 351; State v. Cook, 66 Ohio, 566, 64 N. E. 567; Lane v. Lane, 27 App. D. C. 171; Lamar ». Lamar, 123 Ga. 827, 51 S. E. 763, 107 Am. St. Rep. 169, 3 Ann. Cas. 294; Perry v. Pernet, 165 Ind. 57, 74 N. E. 609, 6 Ann. Cas. 5383; Bowman ». Wayne Circuit Judge, 214 Mich. 518, 183 N. W. 232; Cain v. Miller, 109 Neb. 441, 191 N. W. 704, 30 A. L. R. 125; In re Phillips, 43 Nev. 368, 187a CHAP. X] PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY 71 These, then, are the legal restraints upon personal liberty. For any other restraint, or for any abuse of the legal rights which have been specified, the party restrained is entitled to immediate process from the courts, and to speedy relief. The right to personal liberty did not depend in England on any statute, but it was the birthright of every freeman. As slavery ceased it became universal, and the judges were bound to protect it by proper writ when infringed. But in those times when the power of Parliament was undefined and in dispute, and the judges held their offices only during the king’s pleasure, it was almost a matter of course that rights should be violated, and that legal redress should be impracticable, however clear those rights might be. But in many cases it was not very clear what the legal rights of parties were. The courts which proceeded according to the course of the common law, as well as the courts of chancery, had limits to their authority which could be understood, and a definite course of pro- ceeding was marked out for them by statute or by custom; and if they exceeded their jurisdiction and invaded the just liberty of the subject, the illegality of the process would generally appear in the proceedings. But there were two tribunals unknown to the com- mon law, but exercising a most fearful authority, against whose abuses it was not easy for the most upright and conscientious judge in all cases to afford relief. These were, 1. The Court of Star Chamber, which became fully recognized and established in the time of Henry VII., though originating long before. Its jurisdiction extended to all sorts of offenses, contempts of authority and dis- orders, the punishment of which was not supposed to be adequately provided for by the common law; such as slanders of persons in authority, the propagation of seditious news, refusal to lend money to the king, disregard of executive proclamations, etc. It imposed fines without limit, and inflicted any punishment in the discretion of its judges short of death. Even jurors were punished in this court for verdicts in State trials not satisfactory to the authorities. Al- though the king’s chancellor and judges were entitled to seats in this court, the actual exercise of its powers appears to have fallen into the Pac. 311; Adams v. Adams, 80 N. J. West, 126 Va. 696, 101 S. E. 876; Eq. 175, 83 Atl. 190; Hoffman Smith v. Smith, 81 W. Va. 761, 95 Hoffman, 28 Ohio C. C. 658; In re S.E.199,8 A. L. R. 1149. Whallon, 6 Ohio App. 80; State Person removing baggage from hotel English, 101 S. C. 304, 85 S. E. 721, or lodging-house when such baggage is L. R. A. 1915 F, 979; Fritz v. Fritz, subject to lien for unpaid bills may be 45 S. D. 392, 187 N. W. 719; Ex parte punished by imprisonment. State v. Davis, 101 Tex. 607, 111 S. W. 394, Engle, 156 Ind. 339, 58 N. E. 698. 17 L. R. A, (w. s.) 1140; West ».716 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [voL. I hands of the king’s privy council, which sat as a species of inquisi- tion, and exercised almost any authority it saw fit to assume.! The court was abolished by the Long Parliament in 1641. 2. The Court of High Commission, established in the time of Elizabeth, and which exercised a power in ecclesiastical matters corresponding to that which the Star Chamber assumed in other cases, and in an equally absolute and arbitrary manner. This court was also abol- ished in 1641, but was afterwards revived for a short time in the reign of James II. It is evident that while these tribunals existed there could be no effectual security to liberty. A brief reference to the remarkable struggle which took place during the reign of Charles I. will perhaps the better enable us to understand the importance of those common- law protections to personal liberty to which we shall have occasion to refer, and also of those statutory securities which have since been added. When the king attempted to rule without the Parliament, and in 1625 dissolved that body, and resorted to forced loans, the grant of monopolies, and the levy of ship moneys, as the means of replen- ishing a treasury that could only lawfully be supplied by taxes granted by the commons, the privy council was his convenient means of enforcing compliance with his will. Those who refused to con- tribute to the loans demanded were committed to prison. When they petitioned the Court of the King’s Bench for their discharge, the warden of the Fleet made return to the writ of habeas corpus that they were detained by warrant of the privy council, informing him of no particular cause of imprisonment, but that they were com- mitted by the special command of his majesty. Such a return pre- sented for the decision of the court the question, “Is such a warrant, which does not specify the cause of detention, valid by the laws of England?” The court held that it was, justifying their decision upon supposed precedents, although, as Mr. Hallam says, “it was evidently the consequence of this decision that every statute from the time of Magna Charta, designed to protect the personal liberties of Englishmen, became a dead letter, since the insertion of four words in a warrant (per speciale mandatum regis), which might be- come matter of form, would control their remedial efficacy. And 1See Hallam, Constitutional His- Empire, to which the reader is re- tory, c.1and8; Todd, Parliamentary ferred for more particular information. Government in England, Vol. II. c. 1. As to the origin of this court, its his- The rise and extension of authority of tory, membership, procedure, jurisdic- this court, and its arbitrary character, tion and abolition, see also Holds- are very fully set forth in Brodie’s worth’s History of English Law, Vol. Constitutional History of the British I, pp. 493-516.CHAP. X] PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY 717 this wound was the more deadly in that the notorious cause of these gentlemen’s imprisonment was their withstanding an illegal exaction of money. Everything that distinguished our constitu- tional laws, all that rendered the name of England valuable, was at stake in this issue.” 4 This decision, among other violent acts, led to the Petition of Right, one of the principal charters of English liberty, but which was not assented to by the king until the judges had intimated that if he saw fit to violate it by arbitrary commit- ments, they would take care that it should not be enforced by their aid against his will. And four years later, when the king committed members of Parliament for words spoken in debate offensive to the royal prerogative, the judges evaded the performance of their duty on habeas corpus, and the members were only discharged when the king gave his consent to that course.” The Habeas Corpus Act was passed in 1679, mainly to prevent such abuses and other evasions of duty by judges and ministerial officers, and to compel prompt action in any case in which illegal imprisonment was alleged. That act gave no new right to the sub- ject, but it furnished the means of enforcing those which existed before.2 The preamble recited that “whereas great delays have been used by sheriffs, jailers, and other officers to whose custody any of the king’s subjects have been committed for criminal or supposed criminal matters, in making returns of writs of habeas corpus, to them directed, by standing out on alias or pluries habeas corpus, and some- times more, and by other shifts to avoid their yielding obedience to such writs, contrary to their duty and the known laws of the land, whereby many of the king’s subjects have been and hereafter may be long detained in prison in such cases, where by law they are bailable, to their great charge and vexation. For the prevention whereof, and the more speedy relief of all persons imprisoned for any such criminal or supposed criminal matters’’, the act proceeded to make elaborate and careful provisions for the future. ‘The important pro- visions of the act may be summed up as follows: That the writ of habeas corpus might be issued by any court of record or judge thereof, either in term-time or vacation, on the application of any person confined, or of any person for him; the application to be in writ- ing and on oath, and with a copy of the warrant of commitment attached, if procurable; the writ to be returnable either in court 1 Hallam, Const. Hist. c.7. Seealso Beeching’s Case, 4B. & C. 136; Matter Brodie, Const. Hist. Vol. II. c. 1. of Jackson, 15 Mich. 436. For a 2 Hallam, Const. Hist. c.8; Brodie, valuable article on the History of the Const. Hist. Vol. I. c. 8. Writ of Habeas Corpus, see 18 Law 3Hallam, Const. Hist. c. 13; Quar. Rev. 64.718 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [voL. I or at chambers; the person detaining the applicant to make return to the writ by bringing up the prisoner with the cause of his deten- tion, and the court or judge to discharge him unless the imprison- ment appeared to be legal, and in that case to take bail if the case was bailable; and performance of all these duties was made com- pulsory, under heavy penalties. Thus the duty which the judge or other officer might evade with impunity before, he must now per- form or suffer punishment. The act also provided for punishing severely a second commitment for the same cause, after a party had once been discharged on habeas corpus, and also made the send- ing of inhabitants of England, Wales, and Berwick-upon-Tweed abroad for imprisonment illegal, and subject to penalty. Important as this act was,! it was less broad in its scope than the remedy had been before, being confined to cases of imprisonment for criminal or supposed criminal matters;* but the attempt in Parliament nearly a century later to extend its provisions to other cases was defeated by the opposition of Lord Mansfield, on the express ground that it was unnecessary, inasmuch as the common-law remedy was sufficient ;3 as perhaps it might have been, had officers been always disposed to perform their duty. Another attempt in 1816 was successful.4 The Habeas Corpus Act was not made, in express terms, to extend to the American colonies, but it was in some expressly, and in others by silent acquiescence, adopted and acted upon, and all the subse- quent legislation in the American States has been based upon it, and has consisted in little more than a re-enactment of its essential provisions. What Courts Issue the Writ. The protection of personal liberty is for the most part confided to the State authorities, and to the State courts the party must apply for relief on habeas corpus when illegally restrained. There are only a few cases in which the Federal courts can interfere; and those are cases in which either the illegal imprisonment is under pre- tense of national authority, or in which this process becomes impor- tant or convenient in order to enforce or vindicate some right, or authority under the Constitution or laws of the United States. ‘Mr. Hurd, in the appendix to his Wils. 198; Wilson’s Case, 7 Queen’s excellent treatise on the Writof Habeas Bench Rep. 984. Corpus, gives a complete copy of the 3 Life of Mansfield by Lord Camp- act. See also appendix to Lieber, bell, 2 Lives of Chief Justices, c. 35; Civil Liberty and Self-Government; 15 Hansard’s Debates, 897 et seq. Broom, Const. Law, 218. 4 By Stat. 56 Geo. III. c. 100. See *See Mayor of London’s Case, 3 Broom, Const. Law, 224.CHAP. X] PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY 719 The Judiciary Act of 1789 provided that each of the several Federal courts should have power to issue writs of scire facias, habeas corpus, and all other writs not specially provided for by statute, which might be necessary for the exercise of their respective juris- dictions, and agreeable to the principles and usages of law; and that either of the justices of the Supreme Court, as well as the dis- trict judges, should have power to grant writs of habeas corpus for the purposes of an inquiry into the cause of commitment; provided that in no case should such writs extend to prisoners in jail, unless where they were in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States, or were committed to trial before some court of the same, or were necessary to be brought into court to testify... Under this statute no court of the United States or judge thereof could issue a habeas corpus to bring up a prisoner in custody under a sen- tence or execution of a State court, for any other purpose than to be used as a witness. And this was so whether the imprisonment was under civil or criminal process.* During what were known as the nullification troubles in South Carolina, the defect of Federal jurisdiction in respect to this writ became apparent, and another act was passed, having for its object, among other things, the protection of persons who might be prose- cuted under assumed State authority for acts done under the laws of the United States. This act provided that either of the justices of the Supreme Court, or a judge of any District Court of the United States, in addition to the authority already conferred by law, should have power to grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases of a prisoner or prisoners in jail or confinement, where he or they shall be com- mitted or confined on or by any authority of law, for any act done or omitted to be done, in pursuance of a law of the United States, or any order, process, or decree of any judge or court thereof.’ ment charging him under the laws of Kentucky with murder. He averred and offered to show that the act with which he was charged was done by 11 Statutes at Large, 81. 2 Ex parte Dorr, 3 How. 103, 11 L. ed. 514. 34 Stat. at Large, 634. See Ez parte Robinson, 6 McLean, 355, 1 Bond, 39. Robinson was United States marshal, and was imprisoned under a warrant issued by a State court for executing process under the Fugitive Slave Law, and was dis- charged by a justice of the Supreme Court of the United States under this act. See also United States v. Jailer of Fayette Co., 2 Abb. U. S. 265. The relator in that case was in custody of the jailer under a regular commit- him under the authority of the United States, and in execution of its laws. The Federal district judge entered upon an examination of the facts on habeas corpus, and ordered the relator dis- charged. A similar ruling has been made where a marshal was charged in a State court with murder committed while protecting a Justice of the Su- preme Court from an attack. In re Neagle, 39 Fed. Rep. 833, aff. 135 U.720 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I In 1842 further legislation seemed to have become a necessity, in order to give to the Federal courts authority upon this writ over cases in which questions of international law were involved, and which, consequently, could properly be disposed of only by the jurisdiction to which international concerns were by the Constitu- tion committed. The immediate occasion for this legislation was the arrest of a subject of Great Britain by the authorities of the State of New York, for an act which his government avowed and took the responsibility of, and which was the subject of diplomatic correspondence between the two nations. An act of Congress was consequently passed, which provides that either of the justices of the Supreme Court, or any judge of any District Court of the United States in which a prisoner is confined, in addition to the authority previously conferred by law, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases of any prisoner or prisoners in jail or confinement, where he, she, or they, being subjects or citizens of a foreign State, and domiciled therein, shall be committed, or con- fined, or in custody, under, or by any authority, or law, or process founded thereon, of the United States or of any one of them, for or on account of any act done or omitted under any alleged right, title, authority, privilege, protection, or exemption, set up or claimed under the commission, or order, or sanction of any foreign State or sovereignty, the validity or effect whereof depends upon the law of nations, or under color thereof. In 1867 a further act was passed, which provided that the several courts of the United States, and the several justices and judges of such courts, within their respective jurisdictions, in addition to the authority already conferred by law, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the Constitution, or of any treaty or S. 1, 34 L. ed. 55, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 658. Wulzen, 235 Fed. 362, Ann. Cas. See also Hx parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 25 L. ed. 676; Ex parte Siebold, LOO PUSS) OG Zone eds 77 Ex parte Clark, 100 U. S. 399, 25 L. ed. 715; Ez parte Bridges, 2 Woods, 428; Ex parte McKean, 3 Hughes, 23; Ex parte Jenkins, 2 Wall. Jr. 521; United States v. Lewis, 200 U. S. 1, 50 L. ed. 343, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 229; Hunter ». Wood, 209 U. S. 205, 52 L. ed. 747, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 272; West Virginia v. Laing, 133 Fed. 887, 66 C. C. A. 617, affirming 127 Fed. 213; In re Leaken, 137 Fed. 680; United States v. Lipsett, 156 Fed. 65; In re 1917 A, 274; Castle v. Lewis, 254 Fed. 917, 166 C. C. A. 279. 15 Stat. at Large, 589. McLeod’s Case, which was the immediate occa- sion of the passage of this act, will be found reported in 25 Wend. 482, and 1 Hill, 377, 37 Am. Dec. 328. It was reviewed by Judge Talmadge in 26 Wend. 663, and a reply to the review appears in 3 Hill, 635. For a con- struction of the act see also Horn ». Mitchell, 223 Fed. 549, affirmed 232 Fed. 819, 147 C. C. A. 18, and appeal dismissed, 243 U.S. 247, 61 L. ed. 700, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 298.CHAP. X] law of the United States. PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY 721 [The Circuit Court of Appeals is a court created by statute, and is not endowed with original jurisdiction, and since there is no language in the statute which can be construed into a grant of power to issue a writ of habeas corpus, unless it is one in aid of the jurisdiction already existing, the court is not authorized to issue original or independent writs of habeas corpus.”] These are the cases in which the national courts and judges have 1R.S. U.S. § 751 et seg. See In re Brosnahan, 18 Fed. Rep. 62; In re Ah Jow, 29 Fed. Rep. 181; Jn re Chow 300 Pooi, 25 Fed. Rep. 77; Hz parte Terry, 128 U. S. 289, 32 L. ed. 405, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 77; Howard v. Fleming, 191 U. S. 126, 48 L. ed. 121, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 49; Carfer v. Caldwell, 200 U. S. 293, 50 L. ed. 488, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 264; Rogers v. Peck, 199 U. S. 425, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 87, 50 L. ed. 256 ; Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U. 8. 192, 51 L. ed. 148, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 111, 7 Ann. Cas. 1047; Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 59 L. ed. 969, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 582; Collins v. Johnston, 237 U.S. 502, 59 L. ed. 1071, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 649; Hz parte Green, 114 Fed. 959; Ez parte Moebus, 137 Fed. 154; Ex parte Brown, 140 Fed. 461; Ex parte Munn, 140 Fed. 782; Ez parte Moebus, 148 Fed. 39; Connella v. Haskell, 158 Fed. 285, 87 C. C. A. 111; Ex parte Connort, 188 Fed. 398; Ex parte Jaunszewski, 196 Fed. 123; Ex parte Larsen, 233 Fed. 708; Ez parte Ramsey, 265 Fed. 950; United States v. Briggs, 266 Fed. 434. Except in cases of peculiar emer- gency the Federal courts should not exercise the power to grand writs of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of the restraint of liberty of any person under authority of a State, in violation of the constitution, laws or treaties of the United States, but should leave the person to pursue his remedy by writ of error to the Federal Supreme Court, after final determina- tion of his case in the State courts. Tinsley v. Anderson, 171 U. S. 101, 43 L. ed. 91, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 805. While in advance of trial in a State court for an offense against a State law which is void under the Federal Con- stitution, a Federal court may dis- charge a defendant, yet ordinarily when VOL. I— 46 bail is granted it will not do so. Ez parte Royall, 117 U. S. 241, 254, 29 L. ed. 868, 872, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 734, 742. “‘In cases involving the deportation of aliens the district courts of the United States may issue the writ of habeas corpus to determine whether the alien who is held by the immigra- tion officials of the government for deportation, as not being entitled to enter or remain in this country, has had a fair hearing under the immigra- tion acts.” United States ez rel. Carapa v. Curran, 297 Fed. 946, 36 A. L. R. 877. See also Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276, 66 L. ed. 938, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 492. 2 Whitney v. Dick, 202 U. S. 132, 50 L. ed. 963, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 584. The court said: ‘“‘The writ of habeas corpus is not the equivalent of an appeal or writ of error. It is not a proceeding to correct errors which may have occurred in the trial of the case below. It is an attack directly upon the validity of the judgment, and, as has been frequently said, it cannot be transformed into a writ of error. It is doubtless true that if the language of the Court of Appeals Act was fairly susceptible of two construc- tions, one granting and one omitting to grant power to issue a writ of habeas corpus, the great importance of the writ might justify a construction uphold- ing the grant. . .. But in the Court of Appeals Act there is no mention of habeas corpus, no language which can be tortured into a grant of power to issue the writ, except in cases where it may be necessary for the exercise of a jurisdiction already existing.” See also Ex parte Lamar, 274 Fed. 160, 24 A. L. R. 864, affirmed 260 U. S. 711, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 251, 67 L. ed. 476.{Pe CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [voL. I jurisdiction of this writ: in other cases the party must seek his rem- edy in the proper State tribunal.’ And although the State courts formerly claimed and exercised the right to inquire into the lawful- ness of restraint under the national authority,? it is now settled by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, that the question of the legality of the detention in such cases is one for the determination, exclusively, of the Federal judiciary, so that, although a State court or judge may issue this process in any case where illegal restraint upon liberty is alleged, yet when it is served upon any officer or person who detains another in custody under the national authority, it is his duty, by proper return, to make known to the State court or judge the authority by which he holds such person, but not further to obey the process; and that as the State judiciary have no authority within the limits of the sovereignty assigned by the Constitution to the United States, the State court or judge can proceed no further with the case.* 1 Ez parte Dorr, 3 How. 103, 11 L. ed. 514; Barry v. Mercein, 5 How. 103, 12 L. ed. 70; De Krafft v. Barney, 2 Black, 704, 17 L. ed. 350. See United States v. French, 1 Gall. 1; Ez parte Barry, 2 How. 65, 11 L. ed. 181. For valuable note upon habeas corpus, collecting many cases, see 43 L. ed. U.S. 92. 2 See the cases collected in Hurd on Habeas Corpus, B. 2, c. 1, § 5, and in Abb. Nat. Dig. 609, note. *Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506, 16 L. ed. 169; In re Lee Loak, 146 Cal. 567, 80 Pac. 858; In re Thomp- son, 85 N. J. Eq. 221, 96 Atl. 102. See Norris v. Newton, 5 McLean, 92; United States v. Rector, 5 McLean, 174; Spangler’s Case, 11 Mich. 298; In re Hopson, 40 Barb. 34; Ex parte Hill, 5 Nev. 154; Ez parte Le Bur, 49 Cal. 159. Notwithstanding the decision of Ableman v. Booth, the State courts have frequently since assumed to pass defi- nitely upon cases of alleged illegal re- straint under Federal authority, and this, too, by the acquiescence of the Federal officers. As the remedy in the State courts is generally more expedi- tious and easy than can be afforded in the national tribunals, it is possible that the Federal authorities may still continue to acquiesce in such action of the State courts, in cases where there can be no reason to fear that they will take different views of the questions involved from those likely to be held by the Federal courts. Nevertheless, while the case of Able- man v. Booth stands unreversed, the law must be held to be as there de- clared. It has been approved in Tarble’s Case, 13 Wall. 397, 20 L. ed. 597, Chief Justice Chase dissenting. An agent of a State to receive from another State a person under extradi- tion proceedings is not an officer of the United States, nor is his detention of the prisoner so far under national authority that a State court may not compel him to bring in the prisoner for an inquiry into the legality of his detention; that is, whether the warrant and the delivery to the agent were in conformity to the Federal statutes. In summing up the dis- cussion Harlan, J., says: ‘Subject, then, to the exclusive and paramount authority of the national government, by its own judicial tribunals, to de- termine whether persons held in custody by authority of the courts of the United States, or by the com- missioners of such courts, or by officers in the general government, acting under its laws, are so held in con- formity with law, the States have the right, by their own courts, or by the judges thereof, to inquire into theCHAP. X] PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY 723 The State constitutions recognize the writ of habeas corpus as an existing remedy in the cases to which it is properly applicable, and designate the courts or officers which may issue it; but they do not point out the cases in which it may be employed. Upon this sub- ject the common law and the statutes must be our guide; and although the statutes will be found to make specific provision for particular cases, it is believed that in no instance which has fallen under our observation has there been any intention to restrict the remedy, and make it less broad and effectual than it was at the common law. We have elsewhere referred to certain rules regarding the validity of judicial proceedings.” In the great anxiety on the part of our legislatures to make the most ample provision for speedy relief from unlawful confinement, authority to issue the writ of habeas corpus has been conferred upon inferior judicial officers, who make use of it sometimes as if it were a writ of error, under which they might correct the errors and irregularities of other judges and courts, what- ever their relative jurisdiction and dignity. Where a party who is in confinement under of the writ is an abuse.?® grounds upon which any person, within their respective territorial lim- its, is restrained of his liberty, and to discharge him, if it be ascertained that such restraint is illegal; and this, not- withstanding such illegality may arise from a violation of the Constitution or the laws of the United States.’”’ Robb v. Connolly, 111 U. S. 624, 28 L. ed. 542, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 544. 1See Matter of Jackson, 15 Mich. 417, where this whole subject is fully considered. “Statutes regulating the use of the writ do not preclude the operation of common law principles in the use of the writ unless such intent is manifest in the statutes.’ Porter v. Porter, 60 Fla. 407, 53 So. 546, Ann. Cas. 1912 C, 867. The application for the writ is not necessarily made by the party in person, but may be made by any other person on his behalf, if a sufficient reason is stated for its not being made by him personally. The Hottentot Venus Case, 13 East, 195; Child’s Case, 29 Eng. L. & Eq. 259; Ez parte Dostal, 243 Fed. 664; Addis v. Apple- gate, 171 Iowa, 150, 154 N. W. 168, Ann. Cas. 1917 E, 332; In re Mould, Any such employment 162 Mich. 1, 126 N. W. 1049; People v. Bond, 104 App. Div. 47, 93 N. Y. Supp. 277; Winnovich v. Emery, 33 Utah, 345, 93 Pac. 988. A wife may have the writ to release her husband from unlawful imprison- ment, and may herself be heard on the application. Cobbett’s Case, 15 Q. B. 181, note; Cobbett v. Hudson, 10 Eng. L. & Eq. 318; s. c. 15 Q. B. 988. Lord Campbell in this case cites the case of the wife of John Bunyan, who was heard on his behalf when in prison. See note to 43 L. ed. U.S. 92. 2 See post, p. 845 et seq. 3x parte Clay, 98 Mo. 578, 11 S. W. 998; State v. Hayden, 35 Minn. 283, 28 N. W. 659; Willis v. Bayles, 105 Ind. 363, 5 N. E. 8; State v. Orton, 67 Iowa, 554, 25 N. W. 775; People v. Liscomb, 60 N. Y. 559, 574; Petition of Crandall, 34 Wis. 177; Ex parte Van Hagan, 25 Ohio St. 426; Ex parte Shaw, 7 Ohio St. 81; Ez parte Parks, 93 U. S. 18, 23, 23 L. ed. 787; Perry v. State, 41 Tex. 488; Matter of Underwood, 30 Mich. 502; Matter of Eaton, 27 Mich. 1; Jn re Burger, 39 Mich. 203; Hz parte Simmons, 62 Ala. 416; Re Stupp, 12 Blatch. 501; Ex parte Winslow, 9794 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [voL. I Nev. 71; Ez parte Hartman, 44 345, 93 Pac. 988; Smith v. Sullivan, Cal. 32; In re Falvey, 7 Wis. 630; 33 Wash. 30, 73 Pac. 793; Franklin v. Petition of Semler, 41 Wis. 517; In re Stokes, 5 Sup. Ct. (N. Y.) 71; Pro- hibitory Amendment Cases, 24 Kan. 700; Ex parte Thompson, 93 Ill. 89; Ex parte Fernandez, 10 C. B. (N. s.) 2, 37; Dimmick v. Tompkins, 194 U. S. 540, 48 L. ed. 1110, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 780; Felts v. Murphy, 201 U.S. 123, 50 L. ed. 689, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 366; Whitney v. Dick, 202 U. S. 1382, 50 L. ed. 963, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 584; In re Lincoln, 202 U. S. 178, 50 L. ed. 984, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 602; Toy Toy v. Hopkins, 212 U. S. 542, 53 L. ed. 644, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 416; Peckham v. Henkel, 216 U.S. 483, 54 L. ed. 579, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 255; Wise v. Henkel, 220 U. S. 556, 55 L. ed. 581, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 599; Williams v. Walsh, 222 U. S. 415, 56 L. ed. 253, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 137; Johnson v. Hoy, 227 U. S. 245, 57 L. ed. 497, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 240; Ex parte Spencer, 228 U.S. 652, 57 L. ed. 1010, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 709; Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U. S. 447, 57 L. ed. 1274, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 945, 46 L. R. A. (nN. s.) 397; Collins ». Johnston, 237 U.S. 505, 59 L. ed. 1071, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 649; York v. Willing- ham, 205 Ala. 303, 88 So. 219; Jn re Silvas, 16 Ariz. 41, 140 Pac. 988; Ex parte Williams, 99 Ark. 475, 138 S. W. 985; Hz parte Smith, 161 Cal. 208, 118 Pac. 710; Crooke v. Van Pelt, 76 Fla. 20, 79 So. 166; Blackstone v. Nelson, 151 Ga. 706, 108 S. E. 114; In re Davis, 23 Idaho, 473, 130 Pac. 786; Busse v. Barr, 1382 Iowa, 468, 109 N. W. 920; Jn re Sellers, 186 Mass. 301, 71 N. E. 542; In re Joseph, 206 Mich. 659, 173 N. W. 358; State v. Rice, 145 Minn. 359, 177 N. W. 348; Buckley v. Hall, 215 Mo. 98, 114 S. W. 954; In re Gomez, 52 Mont. 189, 156 Pac. 1078; Ex parte Tani, 29 Nev. 385, 91 Pac. 137, 13 L. R. A. (wn. 8.) 518% Ex parte Cica, 18 N. M. 452, 137 Pac. 589, 51 L. R. A. (N. s.) 873; People v. Atwell, 232 N. Y. 96, 133 N. E. 364, 25 A. L. R. 107; State v. Dunn, 159 N. C. 470, 74 S. E. 1014; State v. West, 139 Tenn. 522, 201 S. W. 743, Ann. Cas. 1918 D, 749; Ex parte Gordon, 89 Tex. Cr. 125, 232 S. W. 520; Winnovich v. Emery, 33 Utah, Brown, 73 W. Va. 727, 81 S. E. 405, L. R: A. 1915 (C, S50) Exe pare Beavers, 80 W. Va. 34, 91S. E. 1076; Arnold v. Schmidt, 155 Wis. 55, 143 N. W. 1055. See also Ez parte Lamar, 274 Fed. 160, 24 A. L. R. 864, affirmed, 260 U. S. 711, 67 L. ed. 476, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 251. This is so, even though there be no appellate tribunal in which the judg- ment may be reviewed in the ordinary way. Ez parte Plante, 6 Lower Can. Rep. 106. The writ cannot be used to prevent the commission upon a trial of antic- ipated errors. Ex parte Crouch, 112 U. S. 178, 28 L. ed. 690, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 96. “Habeas Corpus and supervisory control are not concurrent remedies, and one cannot be invoked in aid of the other. The former challenges the jurisdiction of the lower court, while the latter concedes jurisdiction.” State v. Fergus County Tenth Judicial Dist. Ct., 51 Mont. 195, 149 Pac. 973. It is worthy of serious consideration whether, in those States where the whole judicial power is by the con- stitution vested in certain specified courts, it is competent by law to give to judicial officers not holding such courts authority to review, even in- directly, the decisions of the courts, and to discharge persons committed under their judgments. Such officers could exercise only a special statutory authority. Yet its exercise in such cases is not only judicial, but it is in the nature of appellate judicial power. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States to issue the writ in eases of confinement under the order of the District Courts, was sustained in Ex parte Bollman & Swartwout, 4 Cranch, 75, 2 L. ed. 554, and Matter of Metzger, 5 How. 176, 12 L. ed. 104, on the ground that it was appellate. It is original only where a State is a party, or an ambassador, minister, or consul. Ex parte Hung Hang, 108 U. S. 552, 27 L. ed. 811, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 863. See also Hx parte Kearney, 7 Wheat. 38, 5 L. ed. 391; Ez parte Watkins, 7 Pet. 568, 8 L. ed. 786; HzCHAP. X] PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY 725 judicial process is brought up on habeas corpus, the court or judge before whom he is returned will inquire: 1. Whether the court or officer issuing the process under which he is detained had jurisdic- tion of the case, and has acted within that jurisdiction in issuing such process.! If so, mere irregularities or errors of judgment in the exercise of that jurisdiction must be disregarded on this writ, and must be corrected either by the court issuing the process, or on regular appellate proceedings.’ parte Milburn, 9 Pet. 704, 9 L. ed. 280; Matter of Kaine, 14 How. 103, 14 L. ed. 345; Matter of Eaton, 27 Mich. 1; Matter of Buddington, 29 Mich. 472. 1 People ex rel. Doyle v. Atwell, 232 N. Y. 96, 133 N. E. 364, 25 A. L. R. 107. The validity of the appointment or election of an officer de facto cannot be inquired into on habeas corpus. Ex parte Strahl, 16 Iowa, 369; Russell v. Whiting, 1 Wins. (N. C.) 463; Ez parte Ward, 173 U. S. 452, 43 L. ed. 765, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 459; Shore ». Splain, 258 Fed. 150, 49 App. (D. C.) 6; Ex parte Washington, 13 Ala. App. 609, 68 So. 686; Hx parte Gerino, 143 Cal. 412, 77 Pac. 166, 66 L. R. A. 249; Allen’s Application, 31 Idaho, 295, 170 Pac. 921; State v. Robinson, 132 La. 1017, 62 So. 126; State v. Bailey, 106 Minn. 138, 118 N. W. 676, 130 Am. St. Rep. 592, 19 L. R. A. (nN. 8.) 775, 16 Ann. Cas. 338; Ex parte Sim- mons, 34 Nev. 493, 125 Pac. 697; State v. Ely, 16 N. D. 569, 113 N. W. 711,14 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 638; Ex parte Douros, 97 Oreg. 39, 191 Pac. 319; Ex parte Settle, 114 Va. 715, 77 S. E. 496; Smith »v. Sullivan, 33 Wash. 30, 73 Pac. 793. Otherwise if a mere usurper issues process for the imprison- ment of a citizen. Ez parte Strahl, supra; State v. Bailey, 106 Minn. 138, 118 N. W. 676, 130 Am. St. Rep. 592, 19 L. R. A. (n. s.) 775, 16 Ann. Cas. 338; People v. Hayes, 86 Misc. 88, 149 N. Y. Supp. 115. If the record shows that relator stands convicted of that which is no crime, he is of course entitled to his discharge. Ex parte Kearney, 55 Cal. 212; Henry v. Henkel, 235 U.S. 219, 59 L. ed. 203, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 54; In re Robinson, 73 Fla. 1068, 75 So. 604, L. R. A. 1918 B, 1148; In re If the process is not void for Siegel, 263 Mo. 375, 173 S. W. 1, Ann. Cas. 1917 C, 684; Ha parte Rickey, 31 Nev. 82, 100 Pac. 134, 185 Am. St. Rep. 651; Miskimmins v. Shaver, 8 Wyo. 392, 58 Pac. 411, 49 L. R. A. 831. So if punished for contempt in dis- obeying a void order of court. In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443, 31 L. ed. 216, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 164; Ez parte Fisk, 113 U. S. 713, 28 L. ed. 1117, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 724. So if he is held under a sentence which contravenes an express constitutional immunity, when sentenced a second time for the same offense. Nielsen, Petitioner, 131 U. S. 176, 33 L. ed. 118, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 672. See, also, Ex parte Royall, 117 U. S. 241, 254, 29 L. ed. 868, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 734, 742; In re Dill, 32 Kan. 648, 5 Pac. 39; Brown »v. Duffus, 66 Towa, 193, 23 N. W. 396; Ez parte Rollins, 80 Va. 314; Ez parte Rosen- blatt, 19 Nev. 439, 14 Pac. 298. The question of jurisdiction of a court of limited jurisdiction is open upon this writ. People v. The Warden, &c., 100 N. Y. 20, 2 N. E. 870. 2People v. Cassels, 5 Hill, 164; Bushnell’s Case, 9 Ohio St. 183; Ez parte Watkins, 7 Pet. 568, 8 L. ed. 786; Matter of Metzger, 5 How. 176, 12 L. ed. 104; Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651, 28 L. ed. 274, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 152; Ez parte Harding, 120 U. S. 782, 30 L. ed. 824, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 780; Petition of Smith, 2 Nev. 338; Ex parte Gibson, 31 Cal. 619; Hammond v. People, 32 Ill. 472, per Breese, J.; Hoadly v. Chase, 126 Fed. 818; State v. Gunter, 11 Ala. App. 399, 66 So. 844; Inre Farrell, 22 Colo. 461, 45 Pac. 428; State ». Callahan, 93 Kan. 172, 144 Pac. 189; State »v. Theisen, (Mo. App.) 142 S. W. 1088; State v. Buckner, 198 Mo. App. 230, 200 S. W. 94; People ex rel. Doyle ». as726 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VOL. I want of jurisdiction, the further inquiry will be made, whether, by law, the case is bailable, and if so, bail will be taken if the party offers it; otherwise he will be remanded to the proper custody.! This writ is also sometimes employed to enable a party to enforce a right of control which by law he may have, springing from some one of the domestic relations; especially to enable a parent to obtain the custody and control of his child, where it is detained from him by Atwell, 232 N. Y. 96, 1383 N. E. 364, 25 A. L. R. 107; Children’s Home ». Fetter, 90 Ohio St. 110, 106 N. E. 761; Ex parte Barnett, 74 Tex. Cr. 136, 167 S. W. 845; State v. Yakima County Super. Ct., 108 Wash. 15. 183 Pac. 63. In State v. Shattuck, 45 N. H. 211, Bellows, J., states the rule very correctly as follows: “If the court had jurisdiction of the matter embraced in these causes, this court will not, on habeas corpus, revise the judgment. State v. Towle, 42 N. H. 541; Ross’s Case, 2 Pick. 166; and Riley’s Case, 2 Pick. 171; Adams v. Vose, 1 Gray, 51. Ifinsuch case the proceedings are irregular or erroneous, the judgment is voidable and not void, and stands good until revised or annulled in a proper proceeding instituted for that purpose; but when it appears that the magis- trate had no jurisdiction, the proceed- ings are void, and the respondent may be discharged on habeas corpus. State v. Towle, before cited; Ex parte Kellogg, 6 Vt. 509. See also State v. Richmond, 6 N. H. 232; Burnham ». Stevens, 33 N. H. 247; Hurst v. Smith, 1 Gray, 49.” “A writ of habeas corpus cannot take the place or perform the functions of an appeal from a judgment of con- viction. The court before which a person is brought under such writ simply inquires whether the court rendering the judgment had jurisdic- tion todoso. If that fact appears, and the mandate under which the defend- ant is held be regular upon its face the writ must be dismissed. People ex rel. Hubert v. Kaiser, 206 N. Y. 46, 99 N. E. 195.”” People ex rel. Doyle v. Atwell, 232 N. Y. 96, 133 N. E. 364, 25 A. L. R. 107. If the court has jurisdiction of an offense, its judgment as to what acts are necessary to constitute it cannot be reviewed. In re Coy, 127 U. S. 731, 32 L. ed. 274, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1263. ‘State v. Bauman, 87 Neb. 273, 126 N. W. 857; State v. Burnette, 173 N. C. 734, 91 S. E. 634; Ez parte Burdine, (Tex. Cr.) 117 S. W. 152. It is not a matter of course that the party is to be discharged even where the authority under which he is held is adjudged illegal. For it may appear that he should be lawfully confined in different custody; in which case the proper order may be made for the transfer. Matter of Mason, 8 Mich. 70; Matter of Ring, 28 Cal. 247; Ex parte Gibson, 31 Cal. 619; Givens v. Zerbst, 255 U.S. 11, 65 L. ed. 475, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 227; State v. Megs, 165 Ala. 136, 51 So. 758; Ez parte McGuire, 135 Cal. 339, 67 Pac. 327, 87 Am. St. Rep. 105; State v. Ross, 24 N. D. 586, 189 N. W. 1051; Ea parte Vass, 90 W. Va. 220, 110 S. B. 558. See People v. Kelly, 97 N. Y. 212. And where he is detained for trial on an imperfect charge of crime, the court, if possessing power to com- mit de novo, instead of discharging him, should proceed to inquire whether there is probable cause for holding him for trial, andif so, should order accord- ingly. Hurd on Habeas Corpus, 416. See also Iasigi v. Van de Carr, 166 U. S. 391, 41 L. ed. 1045, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 595; Ez parte Severin, 188 Cal. 348, 205 Pac. 101; Lanford v. Alfriend, 147 Ga. 799, 95 S. E. 688; Ex parte Moody, 104 Miss. 836, 61 So. 741; In re Jones, 46 Mont. 122, 126 Pac. 929; Eureka County Bank Habeas Corpus Cases, 35 Nev. 80, 126 Pac. 655, 129 Pac. 308; Connors v. Pratt, 38 Utah, 258, 112 Pac. 399. A discharge on habeas corpus is, apart from statute, conclusive upon State. the People v. Fairman, 59CHAP. X] some other person. PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY (27 The courts, however, do not generally go farther in these cases than to determine what is for the best interest of the child; and they do not feel compelled to remand him to any custody where it appears not to be for the child’s interest. The theory of the writ is, that it relieves from improper restraint ; and if the child is of an age to render it proper to consult his feelings and wishes, this may be done in any case;! and it is especially proper in many cases where the parents are living in separation and both desire his custody. The right of the father, in these cases, is gen- erally recognized as best; but this must depend very much upon circumstances, and the tender age of the child may often be a con- trolling consideration against his claim. The courts have large discretionary power in these cases, and the tendency of modern decisions has been to extend, rather than restrict it.’ Mich. 568, 26 N. W. 569; State v. Miller, 97 N. C. 451; Gagnet »v. Reese, 20 Fla. 438; Turgeon v. Bean, 109 Me. 189, 83 Atl. 557, Ann. Cas. 1913 E, 567. A refusal to discharge is not conclusive. Application may be made to another judge. Jn re Snell, 31 Minn. 110, 16 N. W. 692; Jn re Kopel, 148 Fed. 505; Rogers v. San Francisco Super. Ct., 145 Cal. 88, 78 Pac. 344; People v. Siman, 284 Ill. 28, 119 N. E. 940; Jn re Clark, 208 Mo. 121, 106 S. W. 990, 15 L. R. A. (x. s.) 389; In re Webers, 275 Mo. 677, 205 S. W. 620; Notestine ». Rogers, 18 N. M. 462, 138 Pac. 207; Knapp v. Tolan, 26 N. D. 23, 142 N. W. 915,49 L. R. A. (N. s.) 83; Ex parte Burton, 58 Okla. 754, 161 Pac. 532; Ex parte Justus, 3 Okla. Cr. 111, 104 Pac. 933, 25 L. R. A. (WN. 8.) 483; In re Turner, 92 Vt. 210, 102 Atl. 943. Contra, Perry v. McLendon, 62 Ga. 598; McMahon v. Mead, 30 S. D. 515, 189 N. W. 122. But a statute making such refusal conclusive, unless reversed on appeal, is valid. Hz parte Hamilton, 65 Miss. 98, 3 So. 68; Ford v. Dilley, 174 Iowa, 243, 156 N. W. 513; State v. Whitacher, 117 Wis. 668, 94 N. W. 787, 98 Am. St. Rep. 968; Heller v. Franke, 146 Wis. 517, 1381 N. W. 991. See Ez parte Cuddy, 40 Fed. 62. 1Commonwealth v. Aves, 18 Pick. 193; Shaw v. Nachwes, 43 Iowa, 653 ; Garner v. Gordan, 41 Ind. 92; People v. Weissenbach, 60 N. Y. 385; State v. West, 139 Tenn. 522, 201 S. W. 743, Ann. Cas. 1918 D, 749. 2 Barry’s Case may almost be said to exhaust all the law on this subject. We refer to the various judicial de- cisions made in it, so far as they are reported in the regular reports. 8 Paige, 47, 25 Wend. 64; People »v. Mercein, 3 Hill, 399; 2 How. 65, 11 L. ed. 181; Barry v. Mercein, 5 How. 104, 12 L. ed. 70. See also Adams »v. Adams, 1 Duv. 167. For the former rule, see The King v. De Manneville, 5 East, 221; Ex parte Skinner, 9 J. B. Moore, 278. The rules of equity prevail at present in England on the question of custody. In re Brown, L. R. 13 Q. B. D. 614. Cases illustrating the doctrine that the good of the child will control : Com. v. Hart, 14 Phila. 352; Ex parte Murphy, 75 Ala. 409; Sturtevant v. State, 15 Neb. 459; Bonnett »v. Bonnett, 61 Iowa, 199, 16 N. W. 91; Jones v. Darnall, 103 Ind. 569, 2 N. E. 229. Where the court is satisfied that the interest of the child would be sub- served by refusing the custody to either of the parents, it may be con- fided to a third party. Chetwynd ». Chetwynd, L. R. 1 P. & D. 39; In re Goodenough, 19 Wis. 274. See Matter of Heather Children, 50 Mich. 261, where the guardian of their estate was refused the custody of their persons.728 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [VoL. I There is no common-law right to a trial by jury of the questions of fact arising on habeas corpus; but the issues both of fact and of law are tried by the court or judge before whom the proceeding is had ;? though without doubt a jury trial might be provided for by statute, and perhaps even ordered by the court in some cases.” Right of Discussion and Petition. The right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances is one which “would seem unnecessary to be expressly provided for in a republican government, since it results from the very nature and structure of its institutions. It is impossible that it could be practically denied until the spirit of liberty had wholly disappeared, and the people had become so servile and debased as to be unfit to exercise any of the privileges of freemen.” * But it has not been thought unimportant to protect this right by statutory enactments in England; and indeed it will be remembered that one of the most notable attempts to crush the liberties of the kingdom made the right of petition the point of at- tack, and selected for its contemplated victims the chief officers in the Episcopal hierarchy. The trial and acquittal of the seven bishops in the reign of James II. constituted one of the decisive battles in English constitutional history ;4 and the right which was then vindicated is “a sacred right which in difficult times shows itself in its full magnitude, frequently serves as a safety-valve if judiciously treated by the recipients, and may give to the repre- sentatives or other bodies the most valuable information. It may right many a wrong, and the deprivation of it would at once be felt by every freeman as a degradation. The right of petitioning is indeed a necessary consequence of the right of free speech and deliberation, — a simple, primitive, and natural right. As a privi- 1 See Hurd on Habeas Corpus, 297- 302, and cases cited; Baker v. Gordon, 23 Ind. 209; In re Neagle, 135 U.S. it 34 L. ed. 55, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 658; United States v. Lipsett, 156 Fed. 65; Robertson v. Bass, 52 Fla. 420, 42 So. 243; Belch v. Manning, 55 Fla. 229, 46 So. 91; Sumner v. Sumner, 117 Ga. 229, 43 S. E. 485; Graves’ Case, 236 Mass. 493, 128 N. E. 867; In re Palmer, 26 R. I. 222, 58 Atl. 660 ; Pittman v. Byars, 51 Tex. Civ. App. 83, 112 S. W. 102; Ex parte Fuller, ose lex: Civ. Apps217,81938 Sw. 204. See Matter of Hakewell, 22 Eng. Li. & Wig, S95hes cy 12k@s Ba 2ser People v. Hendrick, 215 N. Y. 339, 109 N. E. 486; In re Palmer, 26 R. I. 222, 58 Atl. 660. Compare Hz parte Crowley, 268 Fed. 1016. 3 Story on the Constitution, § 1894. ‘See this case in 12 Howell’s State Trials, 183: 3 Mod. 212. Also in Broom, Const. Law, 408. See also the valuable note appended by Mr. Broom, p. 493, in which the historical events bearing on the right of petition are noted. Also, May, Const. Hist. cd) 1 Bi Coma 143:CHAP. X] PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY 729 lege it is not even denied the creature in addressing the Deity.” * Happily the occasions for discussing and defending it have not been numerous in this country, and have been largely confined to an exciting subject now disposed of.? Right to Bear Arms. Among the other safeguards to liberty should be mentioned the right of the people to keep and bear arms.* A standing army is peculiarly obnoxious in any free government, and the jealousy of such an army has at times been so strongly manifested in England as to lead to the belief that even though recruited from among them- selves, it was more dreaded by the people as an instrument of oppres- sion than a tyrannical monarch or any foreign power. So impatient did the English people become of the very army that liberated them from the tyranny of James II. that they demanded its reduction even before the liberation became complete; and to this day the British Parliament render a standing army practically impossible by only passing a mutiny act from session to session. The alterna- tive to a standing army is “a well-regulated militia” ; but this can- not exist unless the people are trained to bearing arms. The Federal and State constitutions therefore provide that the right of the people to bear arms shall not be infringed; but how far it may be in the power of the legislature to regulate the right we shall not undertake to say. Happily there neither has been, nor, we may hope, is 1 Lieber, Civil 1443, it was held that a provision in Liberty and Self- Government, c. 12. 2 For the discussions on the right of petition in Congress, particularly with reference to slavery, see 1 Benton’s Abridgement of Debates, 397; 2 Benton’s Abridgement of Debates, 57-60, 182-188, 209, 436-444; 12 Benton’s Abridgement of Debates, 660-679, 705-743; 13. Benton’s Abridgement of Debates, 5-28, 266- 290, 557-562. Also Benton’s Thirty Years’ View, Vol. I. c. 135, Vol. II. ec. 32, 33, 36, 37. Also the current political histories and biographies. The right to petition Congress is one of the attributes of national citizen- ship, and as such is under the protec- tion of the national authority. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 552, 23 L. ed. 588, 591, per Wazte, Ch. J. In Spoyd v. Ringing Rock Lodge, 270 Pa. St. 67, 113 Atl. 70, 14 A. L. R. the by-laws of a beneficial association which provided for the expulsion of a member, if he used his “influence to defeat any action by the national legislative representative”’ of the asso- ciation, was void in so far as it re- stricted the right of a member to petition the legislature to repeal an act of assembly. No such proceeding as a petition of right to a court to determine the con- stitutionality of astatute is now recog- nized. In re Miller, 5 Mackey, 507. A political convention is an assem- blage within the meaning of a con- stitutional provision that the right of the people to assemble to consult for the common good shall never be abridged. State v. Junkin, 85 Neb. 1, 122 N. W. 473, 23 L. R. A. (nN. 8.) 839. 31 Bl. Com. 143. 4 See Wilson v. State, 33 Ark. 557.73 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS [voL. I likely to be, much occasion for an examination of that question by the courts. 1JIn Bliss v. Commonwealth, 2 Lit. 90, the statute to “prevent persons wearing concealed arms”’ was held un- constitutional, as infringing on the right of the people to bear arms in defense of themselves and of the State. But see Nunn »v. State, 1 Kelly, 243; State v. Mitchell, 3 Blackf. 229; Ayn- ette v. State, 2 Humph. 154; State »v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18; Carroll v. State, 28 Ark. 99, 18 Am. Rep. 538; State v. Jumel, 13 La. Ann. 399; 1 Green, Cr. Rep. 481; Owen v. State, 31 Ala. 387; Cockrum »v. State, 24 Tex. 394; Andrews v. State, 3 Heisk. 165, 8 Am. Rep. 8; State v. Wilburn, 7 Bax. 51; State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612; State v. Shelby, 90 Mo. 302, 2 S. W. 468; State v. Keet, 269 Mo. 206, 190 SWeoloslin Rel} 191 7C: 160! A statute prohibiting the open wear- ing of arms upon the person was held unconstitutional in Stockdale v. State, 32 Ga. 225, and one forbidding carry- ing, either publicly or privately, a dirk, sword-cane, Spanish stiletto, belt or pocket pistol or revolver, was sus- tained, except as to the last-mentioned weapon; and as to that it was held that, if the weapon was suitable for the equipment of a soldier the right of carrying it could not be taken away. See also Ex parte Thomas, 21 Okla. 770, 97 Pac. 260, 20 L. R. A. (Nn. s.) 1007, 17 Ann. Cas. 566. In Idaho it has been held that a statute prohibiting private persons from carrying deadly weapons within the limits of a municipality violates the constitutional right to bear arms. Jn re Brickley, 8 Idaho, 597, 70 Pac. 609, 101 Am. St. Rep. 215, 1 Ann. Cas. 55. In Kansas it has been held that the constitutional guaranty of the right to bear arms is a limitation on legisla- tive power to enact laws prohibiting the bearing of arms in the militia, or any other military organization pro- vided for by law, but is not a limita- tion on legislative power to enact laws prohibiting and punishing the pro- miscuous carrying of arms or other deadly weapons. Salina ». Blaksley, 72 Kan: 230, 83 Pac. 619, 115 Am. St. Rep. 196, 3 L. R. A. (N. s.) 168, 7 Ann. Cas. 925. In California it has been held that the constitutional right to keep and bear arms protects only the bearing of arms by citizens in defense of a com- mon cause and not their use in private broils and affrays. Hx parte Rame- niz, 193 Cal. 633, 226 Pac. 914, 34 AL Reo: Under the guise of protection of game the legislature of a State may not disarm any class of persons falling within the constitutional guaranty of the right to bear arms in defense of themselves. People v. Zerillo, 219 Mich. 635, 189 N. W. 927, 24 A. L. R. 1115. Where the Constitution of a State grants to aliens who are bona fide residents of the State the same rights in respect to the possession, enjoy- ment, and inheritance of property as native-born citizens, and to every person the right to bear arms for the defense of himself and the State, the legislature has no power to make it a crime for a person, alien or citizen, to possess a revolver for the legitimate defense of himself and his property. People v. Zerillo, 219 Mich. 635, 189 N. W. 9275 247 AY Th. Re 6s dis- tinguishing Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 281, 58 L. ed. 539, which affirmed 231 Pa. St. 46, 79 Atl. 928. Compare State v. Rheaume, 80 N. H. 319, 116 Atl. 758, and Bandi v. McKay, 87 Vt. 271, 89 Atl. 228, Ann. Cas. 1916 C, 130. As bearing also upon the right of self-defense, see Ely v. Thompson, 3 A. K. Marsh, 73, where it was held that the statute subjecting free persons of color to corporal punishment for “lifting their hands in opposition” to a white person was unconstitutional. And see, in general, Bishop on Stat. Crimes, c. 36, and cases cited. Unauthorized bodies of men may be prohibited the right to drill or parade with arms, and to associate as a military organization. Com. v. Mur- phy, 166 Mass. 171, 44 N. E. 138, 32 L. R. A. 606. ;i iy i i H a HPRINTEDINU.S.A. GAYLORDBOOKS 4°28 LENT FOR TWO WOOKS F “»-h Dav after the Date MX OOO 144 003