. : ia Su eae £\ tM University of Virginia Library — A a e Great and the wi iiUae aha i an S ed e PUES eeE TT re ee padi jigap ain SES Ie aa mee ti pataaoey ceaieoaraee Pesreop BSI ABS! Serna pete rectnon Sonn eee fos paperioaeape oer at poe we; oe a2 SeeerNe ae are See NRE Sate SS eer eee xs PED PU igh Bip se P Dee eRe NR AEH IER EEN par pnpieinin Roa eer ss eae beatae perches peeaie ee Rsk Se oe a RR ae Tea pas Ee phpeeeanpircnbap ladmi = ear a eR Genii i Ei NI a eae nen ee Pere een es Ppa wear VIET Pepnperhg apteiz nits = Raper yer Or ap aD PLIBB Daca hte ntact Spe generar gs Paperenee: taLIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA et a ee FROM THE BOOKS OF PROF. THOMAS WALKER PAGE ACQUIRED BY FUNDS DONATED BY STUDENTS IN ECONOMICS BiFerocus or Mopvern History EDITED BY EDWARD E. MORRIS, M.A., J. SURTEES PHILLPOTTS, B.C.L. AND C. COLBECK, M.A. _ ee FREDERICK THE GREAT and the SEVEN YEARS’ WAR F. W. LONGMANEPOCHS OF ANCIENT HISTORY Edited by Rev. G. W. Cox and Cartes Sankey, M.A, Eleven volumes, 16mo, with 41 Maps and Plans TROY—ITS LEGEND, HISTORY, AND LITERA- TURE. By S. G. W. Benjamin THE GREEKS AND THE PERSIANS. By G. W. Cox. THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE. By G. W. Cox THE SPARTAN AND THEBAN SUPREMACIES. By Charles Sankey. . THE MACEDONIAN EMPIRE. By A. M. Curtess. EARLY ROME. By W. Ihne ; ROME AND CARTHAGE. By R. Bosworth Smith. THE GRACCHI, MARIUS, AND SULLA. By A. H. Beesley. THE ROMAN TRIUMVIRATES. By Charles Meri- vale. THE EARLY EMPIRE. By W. Wolfe Capes. THE AGE OF THE ANTONINES. By W. Wolle Capes. EPOCHS OF MODERN HISTORY Edited by Epwaro E. Morris Eighteen volumes, 16mo, with 77 Maps, Plans, and Tables THE BEGINNING OF THE MIDDLE AGES. By W. Chure hb THE NORMANS IN EUROPE. By A. H. Johnson. THE CRUSADES. By G. W. Cox. THE EARLY PLANTAGENETS. By Wm. Stubbs. EDWARD Ill. Ky W. Warburton THE HOUSES OF LANCASTER AND YORK. By James Guirdner. THE ERA OF THE PROTESTANT REVOLOTION. By Frederic Secbohm THE EARLY TUDORS. By C. E. Moberly. THE AGE OF ELIZABETH. By M. Creighton. THE THIRTY YEARS WAR, 1618-1648. By S. R. Gardiner. THE PURITAN REVOLUTION. By S. R. Gardiner. THE FALL OF THE STUARTS. By Edward Hale. THE ENGLISH RESTORATION AND LOUIS XIV. By Osmond Alry THE AGE OF ANNE. By Edward E. Mormis. THE EARLY HANOVERIANS. By Edward E. Morris. FREDERICK THE GREAT. By F. W. Longman THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND FIRST EM- PIRE. By W. O'Connor Morris. Appendix by Andrew D. White. THE EPOCH OF REFORM, 1830-1850. By Justin Macarthy. R. CHARLES SCRIBNER’S SONSEpochs of Modern ff:story PREDERICK THE GREAE AND THE SEVEN YEARS’ WAR. BY F. W. LONGMAN BALLIOL COLLEGR, OXFORD Author of a Pocket Dictionary of the German an l English Languages NEW YORK: CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS, 1921PREFACE, ALTHOUGH this little book is mainly intended for school- boys, it may perhaps be read by some who will desire a fuller knowledge of Frederick the Great, and of the time in which he lived, than can be derived from its pages: for the sake of these I propose to mention a few of the best books on the subject. Anything like an exhaustive list of the authorities I have laid under contribution would be out of place, for, as may well be supposed, in the case of events which happened in a period so near to us as the middle of the eighteenth century, the literature of the subject is very extensive. All I offer, therefore, is a selected list containing the books which appear most likely to be of use. The first to be mentioned is, of course, Carlyle’s ‘“‘ History of Frederick the Great,’ a noble work which is appreciated most by those who know it best. Much, however, has been written since the publication of its last volume, especially in Germany, where severalvl Preface. books have appeared founded in part on materials that were not accessible to its author. Foremost among these are Arneth’s ‘‘ Geschrchte Maria Theresia’s,” a very important work based on documents in the Vienna archives, from which until recently historical enquirers were jealously excluded, and Schafer’s ‘‘ Geschichte des Siebenjahrigen Kriegs, the most accurate and comprehensive history of the war in existence. Some of Ranke’s works deal with parts of the subject. For the war itself the professor has only a series of short studies, but its origin 1s elaborately investigated in his ‘“‘ Ursprung des Sieben- jahrigen Kriegs.” An excellent account of the early part of Frederick's reign and of the history of Prussia, up to the king’s accession, will be found in his ‘“Zwolf Biicher Preussicher Geschichte,’’ while the later policy of Frederick is discussed in ‘‘ Die Deutsch- en Machte und der Fiirstenbund.” To the works of these great modern writers may be added Preuss’s well-known biography of Frederick the Great, and the king’s own historical writings, of which a separate edition has recently been published in France. For Ferdinand of Brunswick, and that part of the war in which England was directly concerned, the great authority is Westphalen’s ‘“‘ Geschichte der Feld- ziige des Herzogs Ferdinand,” but though this work is invaluable to students, it is altogether unsuited to the general reader, who will find Manvillon’s biography more adapted to his requirementsPreface. vil Of contemporary French history most readers will fnd as much as they want in Voltaire’s ‘Siecle de Louis XV.,’’ and in either Sismondi or Martin. Several recent publications, such as the Duc de Broglie’s ‘‘ Le Secret du Roi,’”’ and the ‘‘ Mémoires et Lettres du Car- dinal de Bernis,’’ possess considerable interest, though the amount of new information which they contribute is somewhat less than has been supposed. For the English history of the period, and for the war regarded from an English point of view, the standard modern work is Lord Mahons “ History of England from the Peace ol Utrecht to the Peace of Versailles,” but here ac iS Gasici as well as more de- sirable for the student to bring himself into contact with some of the original authorities, The following mav be consulted with advantage: Hora Walpole’s Letters and Memoirs,’ “ The Chatham Correspona- ence.” “ The Annual Register,’ and “ The Gentle- man’s Magazine”’ for the years in question. The Me- moirs of Sir Andrew Mit hell. the English ambassador at the Prussian Court, derive great value from the fact that Mitchell accompanied the king throughout the campaigns of the Seven Years War. Among later English works, Coxes ~ House of Austria,’ and Thackeray's “ Life of Pitt,’ are useful though dull. Several of M acaulay'’s Essays 7elate to the period, but that on Frederick is rather to be ad mired for its brilliancy than commended trustworthy. Mr. Lecky’s ‘“ History of England in the Eighteenthvill Preface. Century’ will be read with deep interest by such as already possess some knowledge of the period. For America Bancroft’s ‘‘ History of the United States” is the standard work. Readers who desire a more detailed account of the affairs in India will find in Orme the storehouse whence subsequent historians have drawn their materials. The French side of the story is admirably represented in Colonel Malleson s interesting ‘‘ History of the French in India.”’CONTENTS. CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTORY. PAGE Why the Seven Years’ War is an Ep ch in History . . I CHAPTER II. BRANDENBURG AND PRUSSIA, SECT. _ Foundation of the Margraviate, 920-1449 , ; . 3 2. The Hohenzollerns in the 16th and 17th Centuries, 1440- 1640 : 6 3. The Great Elector, 1640-88. The First King, 1700 , 9 CHAPTER III. THE REIGN OF FREDERICK WILLIAM, 1713-40. Frederick William and the Army : ; ; 16 Frederick William and the Balance of Power . 18 : : : : 24 The Pol | tion War and the Close of Frederick William’s Rel as gn . * . .Contents. CHAPTER IV. FREDERICK THE GREAT AND THE FIRST SILESIAN WAR. SECT. I. 2. 3 4. W BD 0 PAGER Accession and Character of Frederick, 1740 . ; State of Europe at Frederick’s Accession ; 19 The Emperor’s Death and its Results ; . ; 42 The Conquest of Silesia, 1740-2 ; ~ . : 46 CHAITER V. THE SECOND SILESIAN WAR. 1744-5, AND THE PEACE OF AIX-LA-CHAPELLE, 1748 ° . ° . c6 CHAPTER VI. ENGLAND AND FRANCE, The North American Colonies ., “ ° ; : 6 News astle and Pitt ° . . . . . . 69 Breaking out of the Naval War, 1756 . . . 78 CHAPTER VII. POLICY OF AUSTRIA DURING THE PEACE, Kaunitz ; : ; ; ; . ; . : 83 Negotiations with France, 1755-56 .- ; : : B87 Austria and Russia : : - ; c ; ; 90 CHAPTER VIII. COMMENCEMENT OF THE SEVEN YEARS WAR. Frederick's reasons for War - . a . a 93 The Invasion of Saxony, 1756 ; . , ; 99 The War becomes general : e é 103 English Affairs during the Winter, 1756-7SECT ho > W vi >» WwW WN Contents. CHAPTER IX. 1757- The Invasion of Rehe mia : - . The French in North Germany ; . Rossbach, November 5 . : : Silt Sila regainea . . . . . Pitt and the War - ; ; : CHAPTER X. FREDERICK REDUCED TO The Last Year of Off W arfar: K unersdort nsive 17 CHAPTER XI THE WAR IN WESTERN Battle of Minden, August 1, 1759 CHAPTER XIl THE INOUEST OF CANADA AND THE OF TH FRENCH FLEETS Preliminary O rat 17c5 O S r12.17 O ‘ NI mher 20. 1700 The Capitulation of Montreal, 1760 CHAPTER XIll. INDIA, Se GERMANY. . . PAGE ; ; * iis : 120 : ; 7: xen ; : 132 . we X62 EXTKEMITIES, . . 1790 DESTRUCTION ° 175 177 - 186 > > 190Contents. CHAPTER XIV. PAGE THE FALL OF PITT, 1761 . ° 215 CHAPTER XV. END OF THE WAR, SECT. 1. Prussia, 1760-2 . : : ; . ° ° 225 2. England, France, and Spain, 1762 . . . 234 3. The Peace and its Results, 1763. ‘ . ; » 238 CHAPTER XVI. CLOSE OF FREDERICK’S REIGN a . 2 The Partition of Poland, 1772 The Bavarian Succession War, 177 The League of Princes, 1785 Death of Frederick, 1786 MAPS. Europe at the Accession of Frederick ; A To face title T he peat of War a . « e - & oe . = Pp. 17 WOODCUTS. Rossbach . : i ; : : ; : g 120 Leuthen . . . . . . . . . . 137 Minden . . e . . . e . e ¢ I7o Quebec ‘ , + : . . . + « . 179rats a NE eS ep PREDERICK THE GREAT AND THE SEVEN YEARS’ WAK. CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTORY. THE importance of the Seven Years’ War as an epoch in the history of Europe lies chiefly in its bearing on the question of German unity, The war re- Tue Seven sulted in placing the young Prussian king- = Years’ War dom on a footing of equality with the old tI) aS an epoch in the monarchy of the Hapsburgs, and so ralsing his ry of up within Germany a rival and counte! poise pa to Austria, a rallying point round which all opposition to her might gather. It thus laid the foundations of the unification of Germany, which could never have been effected as long as the Austrian supremacy remained un- broken. For though Austria, before the time of Frede- rick the Great, was indisputably the greatest of German powers, she was after all more foreign than German. Her external interests in Hungary, Italy, and elsewhere were too extensive for her to care much for the welfare or union of Germany; in fact, the tendency and avowed aim of her policy was to keep it weak and divided. On I2 Introductory. the other hand, Prussia was thoroughly German; if a large portion of her territory was originally Sclavonic, it had been thoroughly Germanized before the time of Frederick. Her victories first awakened within the German people a yearning for national existence, hile her successful resistance to the foreign enemies that Aus- tria arrayed against her marked her out as its fitting leader. The Seven Years’ War may therefore be looked upon as the first act of the drama that was played out at Sadowa and Sedan. It must not be supposed that Frederick had any visions of a united Germany such as now exists, or that he ever consciously aimed at anything of the kind. The chi i if not the sole object of his policy, like that of every Hohen- zollern before and after him, was the aggrandizement of his own kingdom, and for Germany outside Prussia he cared very little. If on various occasions he appeared as the champion of the smaller German states, that was simply because he desired to limit the influence of Au tria in Germany, and to check her encroachments. But it so happened from the nature of the case that the car- rying out of his policy necessarily conduced to the future welfare, or at any rate to the independence, of Germany. The aggrandizement of Prussia, whether in territory or influence, could in the main only be effected at the expense of Austria, and what Prussia gained at Austria's expense Germany gained too. Therefore, though Fre- derick’s aims were selfish, he was none the less working for Germany as well as for Prussia, and it would have been a calamity for Germany, and for Europe too, if he had been compelled to succumb to the coalition which the not unreasonable jealousy of Austria directed against him. . ahi . irue it is that German unity has not been accom-Introductory. 2 plished in a way or with results altogether satisfactory to Germans themselves or to therest of Europe. For the present, at any rate, Prussia has rather swallowed up Germany than been absorbed in her. But, on the one hand, it must be considered that perhaps in no other way could the fragments have been welded together at all: and, on the other, it may be hoped with some con- fidence that the present condition of the new kmpuire IS merely a phase due to personal causes which are not likely to be permanent. In the history of the world the Seven Years’ War has a yet wider significance. The war whi h England waged with France in alliance with Frederick left her the ab- } solute mistress of the seas, gave her the - ; Phe War (2) French colonies of North America, and 4. an ex founded her empire in India. It de ided a ecaee ‘y the question whether North America and India were to be English or French; and here there is little doubt that the decision was given in the way most accordant with the interests of humar! ity. Furthermore, the acquisition of Canada by England freed her own colonists from the dread ofa pow erful and hostile neigh- bour, and con sequently remoy\ ed their need for depend- ence on the English Crown. Thus the way was paved for the formation, a few years later, of the United States of America. And this, again, had a considerable influ- ence on the French Revolution. CHAPTER II. BRANDENBURG AND PRUSSIA. ¢1. Foundation of the Margraviate of Brandenourg. PRUSSIA is, with the exception of Italy, the youngest of the great European powers. Unlike the other states of4 The Margraviate of Brandenburg. 928- western Europe, which rose out of the ruins of the old Roman Empire, she grew up amid the de- “he king- 7 : ; ae Ta cay of the Romano-German Empire. Her aaa development may be traced step by step from the very beginning, and some slight knowledge of it is necessary for a right understanding of her position at the time of the accession of Frederick the Great The present chapter contains a short account of the Margra- viate of Brandenburg and of the Duchy of East Prussia, the union of which in the seventeenth century gave birth to the modern Prussian kingdom. The early history of Brandenburg is the history of a German colony planted in the midst of a foreign race, of an outpost guarding the north-eastern frontier of the Empire. The year 928 is given as the date of its foun- dation. In that year the Emperor, or rather, to speak correctly, the German king, Henry the Fowler, march- ing in winter across the frozen bogs, took key crea Brannibor, a stronghold of the Wends, a Fricace. tribe of Sclavonian origin inhabiting the lands between the Elbe and the Baltic. The Wends were a barbarous heathen race, and very troublesome neighbours to the more civilized dwellers in the Empire; so Henry appointed a margrave (Markgraf or Warden of the Marches) to hold them in check and keep order along his frontier. The first head-quarters of the mar- grave was Salzwedel, a place on the German side of the Elbe, about sixty miles to the north-west of Albert the > . cr fear ata Brannibor, or Brandenburg as it was aiter- grave and wards called. Elector of Brandenburg, It was not till two centuries later, when 1130-70, the Wends had been brought into tolera- ble subjection, that the margraves took up their re- sidence at Brandenburg. The first of them who did so—r415 The Hohenzollerns. 5 was Albert, Count of Ascanien and Ballenstadt, surnamed the Bear from the device on his shield. From Albert's time onwards the Margrave of Bran- denburg ranks among the leading princes of Germany, and is recognised as an elector, that is to say, as one of the princes to whom the right of choosing the Empe- ror bel nged. Under Albert and his descendants Brandenburg grew and prospered tll the beginning of the fourteenth cen- tury, when the direct line of the house failed, and then followed ninety years of a) lal iy e . icrr I } . . » on on As les . : ‘ ’ ‘ . under two weak dynasties Or ele ors. At } erick of : . cate : Hohenzoll- last, aiter many vicissitudes. the Emperor y Ay - , I el : } »~s : ' : . ‘ re Sigismund gave it to Frederick of Hohen- Si : zollern, Burggrave of Nuremberg, in pledge for various sums of money he had advanced. Four years later . . + - ; e rwye } r y Shes . 1. (April 30, 1415) Sigismund formally conferred the mark and electoral dignity upon Frederick: and with th 4 ony bs ‘m ! ins . . ‘ I - 7 } . ] ; event th reali history of brandenburg may be s lidg tO commence, The new elector came of a family already dist guished in German |] tory. Its founder was a cadet of the Swabian family of Hohenzollern, named if Ouse Conrad, who was made Burevrave of Nur- of Hohe: emberg by th: Emperor Frederick Barbar- “7 ossa, somewhere about the year 1170. Conrad's de- scendants held the burggraviate for two centuries and a half, and gradually acquired large territories in the neighbourhood by purchase or inheritance. Baireuth, Anspach, and Culmbach, afterwards known collectively as Culmbach, thus came into their possession. The activity and enerry of the buregraves. combined with the importance of their office, the central position of their . ; : : . - ; — Y riVvy nr } licen ut - territories, and the powerful matrimonial alliances which R6 The Hohenzollerns, &c. 1415- they had made, enabled them to take a prominent part in all affa:rs of the Empire. Thus, though not electors themselves, they had great influence in the choice of Rudolph, Count of Hapsburg, the first of € mperors, that family to attain the Imperial dignity, owed his elec- tion to the exertions of one of the burggraves. Frederick fi und the country in a very disorganized condition, owing to the On his ar Frederick L., Elector of Branden- burg, 1415- 4°. rival in Brandenburg weakness of its rulers ever since the extinc- tion of the line of Albert the Bear. The nobles, secure in their strong castles, defied the central authority with impunity, inan age when the powers of defence were much stronger than those of attack. support him cordially. The towns, however, were disposi d to They had suffered from the tur- bulence and licentiousness of the nobility, and longed j for the establishment of a strong and settled govern- ment. By means of artillery, then first coming into use in war, Frederick was able to batter down some of the principal castles, and amongst them tl ie great strong- hold of Friesack with walls said to be fourteen feet thick. In the course of a few years, by a judicious mixture of conciliation and severity, he reduced his unruly vassals to obedience, and had little further trouble with them for the rest of his reign. cOs tN tc Miwy le Sie “7 7 yy . p . The flohenzollerns in the fifteenth and sixteenth Between the death of Frederick I. and the accession General charac- terol the Hohen- zgollern Elec- tors, 1440-1640. of the Great Elector there was an interval of exactly two hundred years, during which nine Hohenzollern electors ruled in Bran- None of them can be described denburg. as really great men, but there was only one of con-—1640 spicuous feebleness, The Teutonic Order They seem to have ? been for the most part hard-headed, energetic, unimaginative men, devoting themselves to the internal administration of their mark, enlarging its borders from time to time and never letting With one or two exceptions they mixed very little in tional affairs, and even in the stirring times of the } TO © what they had once fairly grasped. na- a C= formation they played an insignificant part, In common with tl braced Protestantism, not indeed with enthusiasm, 1¢ majority of North German princes they em- but after some hesitation, following instead of leading their people, unquestionably due, in no slight degree, to their having been gradually recognised as the ch impions of tl testant religion in Germany ; remark that for more tha ment of the family rendered it no real During this period ¢ tory ot Re the younger branch s ; The Gets 1 > [Fy = Service. more interest ett ~ 4 electoral led | The present greatness of the Hohenzollerns is ic Pro- it 1s therefore worthy of 1a century after the commence- formation branch of the » the his- attaches t n Culmbach, which yroduced many men of note in their day } - > , : . The Hohen- among whom was Albert the Grandmaster ;,)--,. ( Hox hmelister) of the Teutonic orde Fr who Culmba contributed largely to the rise and progress of his family. The Teutonic Order, founded at the time of the third Crusade, first rose into distinction early in the hip of Her- century, under the Grandmasters mann von conversion of the heathen P the Vistula. lay uc ‘ Salza, who undert country known at present as East and West Pru took ruSS1IAaANS, uanian tribe inhabiting the plains about 5 I thirteenth the a Lith- the mouth of After the Prussians had been converted or exterminated, the knights took possession of tl he whole uSSia,8 The Hohenzcllerns, & c. 1440- They also acquired vast property in Germany; but to them, as to the Templars, wealth brought degeneracy The consequence was that they were worsted after a long struggle with their neighbour, the King 66. ; “hy of Poland, and forced to cede West Prussia, and to do homage to the Polish Crown for East Prussia which they were permitted to retain. The homage was naturally regarded as a grievous in- dignity, and when Albert was elected to the Grandmas- tership he had to take an oath to refuse it. This, how- ever, was easier said than done. From the knights who had exacted the oath, or at least from the great body of them scattered through Germany, he received little or no assistance, and he was at last compelled to come to terms with the King of Poland. The king was his mo- thers brother, and perhaps on that account not indis- ee posed to an amicable settlement of the dif- Ailoert Con- verts East ficulty. At the Peace of Cracow it was Prussia into : ahereditary agreed that the order was degenerate and duchy, 1525. unworthy of further existence, and conse- quently that the Prussian portion of it should be con- sidered as dissolved; further, that Albert should be hereditary Duke of East Prussia, and do homage for it to Poland in that capacity. This arrangement was fa- cilitated by the fact that Albert had recently, from con- viction or interest, become a Protestant. It was of course regarded in Germany as a very nefarious pro- ceeding, and Albert was put to the ban of the Empire ; but he was too far off to be easily got at, so he remained in secure possession of his duchy. Some forty years afterwards the electoral branch of the family obtained the right of succession in the event of male issue failing to Albert, and to the other Culm- bachers. 1568.-1683 Treaty for Partition, &c. 9 Early in the seventeenth century the whole Culmba h line died out, and the electors of Brandenburg became aD possessed of East Prussia. At the same time they came into, what was perhaps moreim- ‘The Cleves inheritince. portant, a well-founded claim to the nch duchies of Cleves and Juliers, Albert's only son having married Maria Eleonora, the eldest daughter of Duke William of Cleves, on whom her father had settled all rt i his lands if the male line of his house should fail. In 1609 the male line did fail, and the whole inheritance ought to have gone to Maria Eleonora and her children. Maria Eleonora herself was dead. but she had left daughters, of whom one was married to the Elector of Brandenburg. The Hohenzoller o ] os en 7 rns claimed the duchies, but their claim was disputed by the Count Palatine of Neuburg, who had married the se nd daughter of Duke William. There were other competitors, and the affair was not settled till long afterwards. when a com- iheritance was di- ,r aa promise was effected by which the vided between the two principal claimants, the Du hy of Cleves with the counties of Mark and Ravensbure Treaty for roing to Brandenburg, Juliers ee f ; 1¢ inheri- and Berg to Neuburg, with a stipulation tance drawn .¢ ; ae p 1624 that if the male line failed in either family srriail ties rr 1666 the other should have the whole. This in- tricate question is of more consequence than perhaps it appears; it is bound up with much of the early history of the Prussian kingdom. @ 3. The Great Elector, 1640-88. In the Thirty Years’ War Brandenburg played a tho- roughly contemptible part. The shifty and vacillating elector, George William, was unable to attach himself de- a ° 9 ‘ : , i . finitely to either side, and saw his lands ravaged by bothIO The Great Elector. 1640— Himself a Calvinist, ruling over a Lutheran population, he was the tool of his Catholic Prime Minister, Schwar zenberg. Even when the King of Sweden, George Wil- » the noble Gustavus Adolphus, landed in liam and : ; tne Thirty Germany, and made the cause of German Years’ War. : Sapeek Pe Protestantism his own, he hesitated long before he could make up his mind to a complete breach with Austria. As soon as Gustavus was dead, he abandoned the Swedes, though they had the hearty sympathy of his subjects, and patched up a peace with the Emperor. Luckily for Brandenburg George William died before the war was quite done, and the reins of government passed into stronger hands. His son and The Great Elector. successor, Frederick William, known as the Great Elector, is, with the exception of his great-grandson, Frederick the Great, by far the most remarkable prince of the line of Hohenzollern. Though only twenty years old at the time of his accession, he had long looked with disfavour on his father’s aimless policy, and at once set himself to undo its fatal results. By degrees he deprived Schwarzenberg of the almost absolute power he enjoyed, and, after freeing his for- tresses from Imperial garrisons, came to terms with the Swedes, and induced them to evacuate the places they still held in Brandenburg. The gradual formation of a standing army secured for him a consideration which had never been shown to his father, and enabled him at the Peace of Westphalia to obtain more favourable terms than could otherwise have pee been hoped for. It is true that he failed to AR get the whole of Pomerania, though he had an undoubted right to it in virtue of an old agreement with the dukes of that country, the last ofy« ry : ° 1688 His l A (le) ali Adi nistrailion. tl whom died during the war. The justice of his claim was admitted, but the Swedes had got possession of Pomera- nia, and it was impossible to dislodge them. A compro- mise had to be made. It was settled that the Swedes should keep Lower Pomerania with Stettin and some other towns that did not properly belong to it. The res: was given to the elector, and to console him for his dis- appointment the sees of Magdeburg, Halberstadt, and Minden were secularized in his favour, thatis to say they were made part of the electoral dominions. He was no loser by the bargain. The Great Elector is deservedly regarded as the founder of the Prussian monarchy) Nurine his long oOouncel Ul Lic ruUSSILAN mn MAIGAIiCILY. i Li bile 1iS ‘ iit « . <> . - ® , reign of forty-eight years he reorganized De) : : : : ‘OLUCYy an 7 } ‘ ’ ) . : . . 9 +, 9 } and consolidated his dominions, strength- adm inistra- : . ‘ . - 2 : t n . ' ening tne central authority in the various Great tee ; ' com Elector provinces over which he ruled. His chi , “ > political success was t complete and formal renunciation of her sovereign rights over his duchy of East Prussia, which was accom- plished by taking part first on one side, then on the other. in a war between Poland and Sweden. In domestic affairs one of his most beneficial measures was the establishment of an excise on arti- | - C . sm + + 7 > “ft } ’ cles of consumption in place of the old direct tax on houses and lands, which pressed very heavily on the towns, depopulated as they were by long continued war. Besides being less burdensome to his subjects, the excise was also more profitable to the cleztor than the old system of taxation, an i gave him the means of maintaining a con- Standing siderable standing army. The maintenance of a standing army in the time of peace was undoubt dly a startling innovation, but it was rightly judge d by theI? The Great Elector. I 640- elector to be indispensable not merely for the security of his own struggling dominions, but also for the protection of the Empire itself against its powerful and ambitious neighbours. His subjects objected to it strongly at first, but they were not insensible to the renown acquired in several successful campaigns, and the elector’s victories tended to cement his territories into an united whole, and to inspire them with the feeling that they were all parts of one nation. At the same time he Economic hicasur©res, conferred on them benefits more tangible than military glory by draining bogs, cut- ting canals, bringing waste-lands into cultivation, and other economic measures. One of the last acts of the elector’s life was calculated to teach German Protestants to look upon Brandenburg as their leader and protector. In 1685 Louis : eeeeeeee XIV. revoked the Edict of Nantes, by which ere, a certain measure of toleration had been eae secured to the French Protestants. Fred- erick William replied to this arbitrary act by the Edict of Potsdam, which offered a home in Bran- denburg to any of the Protestants who could effect their escape. This bold measure threatened to disturb the friendly relations which had hitherto subsisted between Brandenburg and France, and rendered a close alliance with Austria necessary for the former, and thus perhaps explains—what otherwise seems unaccountable—the elector’s renunciation for a trifling equivalent of his really considerable Silesian claims. The Silesian The Silesian claims were twofold. In the cles of first place there was a claim on the duchies Sire MTiice- of Liegnitz, Brieg, and Wohlau, which ac- ra cording to an old agreement ought to have fallen to Brandenburg in 1675. In 1537 Joachim II.,—-1688 The Silesian Claims. 13 Flector of Brandenburg, had made with the Duke of Liegnitz an Erbverbriiderung, or compact of inheritance, by which if the duke's line should die out his duchies of ’ Liegnitz, Brieg, and Wohlau were to go to Brandenburg, and in like manner, if the electoral Hohenzollern line should become extinct, certain fiefs of Brandenburg were to go to Liegnitz. Similar arrangements were frequently made by the German princes; but the then Emperor, Ferdinand I., who was also King of Bohemia, protested avainst this one, on the ground that the dukes of Lieg- nitz had voluntarily constituted themselves vassals of the Bohemian Crown about two centuries before. That they had done so was perfectly true, but their might to dispose of their territories as they pleased had always been acknowledged, and it seems that Ferdinand had no right whatever to interfere with it. He was, however, strong enough to compel the duke to give up the Erbver- briiderung as far as he himself was con erned, though the elector firmly refused to resign his own Claims. Nevertheless when the dukes of Liegnitz became extinct, the Emperor Leopold successfully opposed the succes- sion of the Hohenzollerns. Unwilling to let a strong Protestant power gain a footing in the heart of his hereditary dominions, he took possession of the duchies when they became vacant, and refused to give them up. In the second place there was a weaker claim on the duchy of Jagerndorf. [Early in the sixteenth century Jagerndorf had been granted by the King / 3 - lagerndorf. of Hungary and Bohemiato George of Ans- ~ pach, one of the Hohenzollerns of Culmba extinction of the Culmbach line Jagerndort fell home to h. On the : . i ’ : Sg - the elector of Brandenburg, and was given as an appan- age to a junior member of the family named John14 The Great Elector. 1 700~ George. John George took an active part on the an- ti-imperia! side in the Thirty Years’ War, and ee Jagerndorf was confiscated by the Emperor not altogether in accordance with law and precedent. Frederick William found, after repeated solicitations, that it was impossible to obtain any of these territories from the Emperor, and at last agreed to resign his claims on them and to accept instead a small patch of territory known as the circle of Schwiebus, situated helt to the north of Silesia on the borders of his ee own electorate. Schwiebus was according- ly handed over, but the Austrian Court had no intention of permanently giving up even this miserable little bit of territory. It had previously made a secret agreement with the electoral Prince and had induced him to pro- mise that, if his father should accept Schwiebus, he would restore it when he succeeded him as elector. The prince appears to have been in ignorance of the real strength of the Silesian claims, and to have been led to believe that they were put forward by Bee CEG the French party in his father’s council toral Prince. ; merely with the view of defeating the Aus- secret agreement was that, besides being himself reall . trian alliance. What induced him to consent to the I OD anxious for the alliance, he was anxious to purchase th Emperor's assistance in his domestic affairs. He seems to have feared that his stepmother, who had great influ- ence over the elector, would prevail on her husband to make a will unfavourable to his interests, and providing large appanages for his half-brothers. He might then be glad to have the Emperor’s help in setting the will aside. Soon after his accession to the electorate he dis- covered the deceit that had been practised upon him, and though, for the sake of his promise he restored-1713 The First King. 15 / Schwiebus, he at the same time resumed his claims upon the Silesian duchies. The position to which Brandenburg had been raised by the Great Elector enabled his son Frederick to ae } ' mand the Emperor's permission to assume the title of king. The Emperor gave his consent re- | luctantly. It is said that his ministers were IL, Elec:or bribed freely, but there 1s no certain proof re , ofthat. What weighed with the Emperor was the advantage of securing Frederick's assistance in the Spanish Succession War, then on the point of commencing ; and the price which Frederick demanded for his services was the roy il title. The coronation was performed at K6n}; sberg, the capi- tal city of the duchy of Prussia, which gave its name to ese] fy the new king. The reason why he took his title from Prussia was that it formed no part of the empire. In Prussia therefore he was an independent sovereign, while in respect of the lands he held in Germany he was a vassal of the Emperor. Frederick’s assumption of the royal title is rather a landmark than an epos more than a mere landmark. The royal dignity was a source of moral, if not of mate nh ee terial strength to the H h in history, but it is a great deal Ais ; r . henzollerns. It raised them into the same class as the sovereigns ol Eng- land and France, and brought them into more OF . ‘ ‘ ; of a rivalry with the emperors thems lves. As Frede- . ; L rick the Great very truly remarked, Frederick I. erecting Prussia into a kin rdom sowed a seed of ambi tion in his posterity which was certain to bear fruit sooner or later. Prince Eugene was well aware of this when he said that the ministers who advised the Empe- ror to give his consent to it deserved to be hanged.Frederick William. CHAPTER III. THE REIGN OF FREDERICK WILLIAM, 1713-40. @1. Frederick Wiliam and the A Ymy. THE ‘‘seed of ambition”’ bore no fruit in the time of the first king. Frederick I., a man of somewhat feeble character, was satisfied with giving a lustre to his crown by the splendour of his ceremonials. His son and suc- cessor was of a totally different stamp. A coarse, un- cultivated boor, with a passionate temper and a touch of insanity, Frederick William had never- theless considerable merits as a sovereign. He saw clearly that the dignity of his new- ly-created kingdom, composed as it was of detached provinces, extending from the borders of France on the west to those of Russia on the east, could only be main- Frederick William tained by an army out of all proportion to its population, and he determined to have it. Frugal and simple in his own life, he could not endure that the wealth of the na- tion should be squandered on empty show, and he promptly curtailed the expenditure of the Court, which had been very lavish in his father’s time. and introduced economy into every branch of the public expenditure. The resources thus obtained provided the means for adding regiment after regiment to the army, until from sak 8 the 38,000 which it had numbered at the ac- redaericK William in- cession of Frederick William it rose by de- ‘reases and : a - : ee Felons Phe grees to nearly 84,000. To give it a nation- army. al character and to insure its being kept at the required strength, the whole country was d circles, and each regiment was ivided into assigned to a particular-1740 The Balance of Power. 17 district, from which two-thirds of its members were re- cruited—by forcible enlistment if necessary. owes oe hes os — : Rex ruitin? The recruits for the remaining third were a) raised by so-called voluntary enlistment in the émpire 4 and in foreign countries, or, to speak more correctl: they were in too many cases kidnapped by devices which made the Prussian recruiting sergeant a byword in Europe. Army organization was the one business of Frederick William's life. He took a delight in even the minutest details of the service, and though his mania for tall recruits and the prices he paid for them must pro- voke a smile, he still deserves great credit for the perse- verance with which he went on perfecting the machine until in drill and discipline his army stood far in advance of any in Europe. The efficiency was greatly promoted by the introduction of iron ramrods, an in- vention of Prince Leopold of Anhalt-Des- [ron ram- sau, which enabled the muskets to be load- 1] } v = ] , l, > 5 , ed more rapidly than was possible with the old wooden ones, and so gave the Prussian soldiers an advantage , } » Ff : ur} y } ’ 1, . } ’ ; +} » : Siti iad oft hick yy ikd al tney aerived | i LL1c hecc . ; i superiority was manifested. The eccentric king was too fond of his well-drilled battalions to ris Pa Th of a | l¢ single campaign in Pomerania, he waged 1 ¥ } } them in battle, and with the exce , ; no war on his own account, though he had on one occasion to send a contingent to the army of the Empire. rr = ate so ° whic } The Pomeranian campaign, in which he pomera : : is Pa. } a : . 1) ‘ - was involved against his will, furms the lone war between Charles XII. of Swe- den and18 Frederick William. 1712- i J was the important acquisition of Stettin and some other parts of Swedish Pomerania. ¢ 2. frederick William and the Balance of Power. The reign of Frederick William is an important period in the history of Prussia. It forms the transition from the old condition of entire dependence on Reign of i Frederick the Empire to the complete independence William a . : period of achieved for her by her next sovereign. ee The change was brought about purely by the force of circumstances, and not at all by any delibe- rate intention on the part of Frederick William. Though very sensitive about his rights as an independent sove- reign, he was devotedly loyal to the Empire, and never forgot that he was a prince of it. It was with great re- luctance that he ever placed himself in opposition to the Emperor, badly as the latter often treated him. The war of the Spanish Succession had just been brought to a close when Frederick William ascended the Prussian throne. The Peace of Utrecht State of ; ; bat Europe. recognized the claims of Philip of Anjou, Peace of ~ . a . j ikeche. the French claimant of the Spanish crow n, april, 2715: but at the same time divested the monarchy of several provinces for the benefit of the Austrian claimant, the Archduke Charles, who, upon the death of his brother Joseph, had become Emperor with the title of Charles VI. Charles thereby received Naples, Milan, the ports of Tuscany, and the Spanish Nether- lands, the latter being designed to form a barrier for the protection of Holland against France. England retained Gibraltar and Minorca, which she had conquered during the war. Prussia was recognized as a kingdom by France, and had her borders slightly enlarged by the acquisition of Spanish Guelders.1740 The Great Powers. 19 The peace aimed at preserving a balance of power by preventing either france or Austria from becoming toa powerful; but it really left the preponder- ance with France. France wasa compact _ Balance of and homogeneous nation, grown rich and ; | powerful under a strong and settled government. Aus- tria was not a nation at all, but a collection of nationalities, whose sole bond of union ee lay in the circumstance that they all owed om allegiance to the same man. The Empire was dead in all but name. The strength it seemed still to possess was derived from the power of the House © of Austria, from which for nearly three cen- a ee turies the Emperors had without interruption been chosen. Ever since the Peace of Westphalia the Empe- ror had been little more than the head of a loose con- federation of independent sovereigns, many of them very insignificant, who could never be united for any national purpose. All affairs of importance were settled at the diet to which the princes and Free Cities sent their representatives, and what power the Emperor still had in Germany was used for the furtherance of purely Aus- trian objects. Austria could never have made head against France in the war but for the steady support she received from England. In fact, throughout the war Eng- : England, land rather than Austria appeared as the principal; and one of its most important results was the increased influence that England consequently obtained in Continental affairs. Another important change in the states-system of Europe was at the same time brought about by the rise of Russia, which, under the able Russia. cule of Peter the Great, emerged from barbarism and20 Frederick William. 1713- conquered for itself a commanding position in the north- h the east. The rise of Russia is contemporaneous wit decline of Sweden, at whose expense the aggrandize- ment of the former was effected. These were the four great powers—France, Austria, England, and Russia—but at this period Prussia begins Bayh to take place by their side as a fifth. At fifth great first, of course, she was not a match for any pees one of them, but year by year she ap- proached them more nearly as Frederick William added battalion after battalion to his well-organized army. Throughout his reign Prussia seems, as it were, to be unconsciously preparing for the great struggle which lay before her, and which, owing to the consummate skill and resolution of Frederick the Great, ended in her re- cognition as an equal of the other four powers. The Peace of Utrecht was not a satisfactory settlement of affairs. Many elements of discord remained out- standing, and others soon began to crop up. the peace had failed to reconcile the Emperor and the King of Unsettled . ; ; state of To begin with Europe, Spain, for while Charles refused to recognise Philip as the rightful king of that country, Philip could not bring himself to acquiesce in the loss of the provinces which had been adjudged to the Emperor. Moreover, Philip was bent on securing for a younger son the reversion of the duchies of Parma, Piacenza and Tuscany, and this the Emperor as feudal superior of the duchies was indis- posed to grant. Then Spain had a grudge against Eng- land on the score of Gibraltar and Minorca, and showed it by openly countenancing the Pretender even after his unsuccessful attempt in 1715. To increase the compli- cation, the Emperor managed to offend his allies, Eng- land and Holland, by founding a company at OstendThe Aliitance of Hanover. for the purpose of trading with the East Indies. The commercial jealousy of the English and Dutch was aroused, and they protested vehemently that Charles was violating the conditions on which the Netherlands had been assigned to him. Lastly, a far more serious source of danger lay in the possible extinction of the male line of the House of Hapsburg. Charles VI. was the last male of his house, and, though he had been married some time, he had only daughters. There had been a son, but he had died in infancy. It was feared that there might be a war of the Austrian Succession, as there had been one of the Spanish. The Emperor drew up a Pragmatic Sanction, a document of a very solemn and formal - - i. | : > » } » iracr ; rrature, settling all his vast hereditary pos- Pragmatic ; ? ° Panction sessions on his eldest d Luchter, Maria The- resa, in default of heirs male. It was, however, ex- tremely probable that the validity of this document might be contested by interested parties, unless it could be placed under the protection of Europe, and the Em- peror s whole policy was for many years directed to pro- curing guarantees for it from every European power. A vague feeling of uneasiness pervaded Europe, and it was decided that a congress should be held to s¢ ttle everything. A congress was accordingly held at Cambrai, but, in the midst of its tedious and protracted deliberations, the — re ~— os world was sta by hearing that Spain and Austria had come to a private understanding. All at once the old dread of Austria re vived, the fear lest, leagued close friendship with Spain, she should regain the as- cendancy in Europe which she had enjoyed two centu- ries before. The balance of power was supposed to be in danger, and England, France and Prussia united in22 Frederick Wiliam. 1713- a defensive alliance, known as the Alliance of Ha- nover. Alliance of oe a s Hanover, The King of Prussia was won over by the September 3, ¥ . ; aes ; oy ae 1745. promise of France and Eng} ind to guarantee his succession to Juliers and Berg, Juliers and Berg, it will be remembered, formed part of the Cleves inheritance, which was divided between Juli rs and berg. 3randenburg and Neuburg, with the stipu- lation that if male issue failed to eithér house, the other should inherit the whole. ‘This con- tingency seemed now likely to occur in the case ol Neu- burg, and it was known that the Elector Palatine, the representative of the Neuburg line, wished to bequeath the duchies to the Sulzbach branch of his house. Against the alliance of Hanover the Emperor would of course have been powerless had he not succeeded 1n detaching the King of Prussia from it, a Misgivings ° stroke of policy which proved easier than of Frederick ee might have been expected. The king had hardly consented to the alliance before he began to re- pent of the precipitation with which he had acted, Though he had often been slighted and insulted by the Emperor, he remained ardently loyal to the Empire, and felt uneasy at having joined with its natural enemies the French. He feared that he was being drawn into wide schemes which he would not be able to control, and that he might have to fight for objects in which he had no interest. The balance of power was indeed of vital im- portance to him, more so than to either England or France: but he had no commerce to suffer from the rivalry of the Ostend Company, nor did it matter to him whether Spain or England held Gibraltar. He suspected that England and France were aiming. at the destruction of Austria, and a partition of her dominions, a prospect-1740 Lhe Alliance of Hanover. 23 that filled him with horror, Nor could it escape his penetration that, in the event of war breaking out, he would have to bear the chief brunt of it. England was protected by the sea, France by fortresses, but his terri- tories lay exposed to the ravages of Austrian armies. With thoughts like these in his mind Frederick William sat smoking his pipe one evening in his = ; Tobacco Parliament, as he called the little assemblage of chosen friends whom he Tobacco used to gather round him when the work of the day was over. Looking out from the window, he saw his old friend Count von Seckendorf crossing the esplanade in front of the palace. Seckendorf was a , general in the Austrian service whose a quaintance he had made in the Spanish Succession war. It was not mere chance that had brought him to Ber- Seckendorf, : lin. He was ostensibly passing through on his way to Denmark to transact business there, but his real business was with Frederick William. to whom he had been sent by the Austrian Court to cajole him into abandoning his allies. Seckendorf was an agreeable talker and a pleasant companion, and he soon insinuated himself into the confidence of the simple-minded king over whom for seven years he exercised an almost un- bounded influence. His efforts were secon led by General von Grumbkow, one of Frederick Wiliam’s most trusted advisers, and a constant attendant at the Tobacco Parliament. who nevertheless allowed him to be seduced by a pension from Austria. Frederick William became a mere puppet whose strin at Vienna. The immediate result of Seckendorf's machinatior was the Treaty of Wusterhausen, by which the King of s 4 . — a old _> Were Leia 7 Prussia agreed to abandon the alliance of Hanover and24 Frederick William. Gt te to support the Emperor if he should be attacked in Ger- many. He also guaranteed the Pragmatic Treaty of , ’ : a Wuster- Sanction on condition of receiving a gua- hausen, Oc- : ; na tober 12, rantee for his own succession to Juliers and 1726, serg, or at any rate to Berg. The Emperor readily gave the required promise, though he had already bound himself to the Elector Palatine. After much diplomacy and some little fighting, most of the difficulties which had agitated Europe since the Peace of Utrecht were disposed of by the Treaty of Treaty of Vienna. England and_Holland Vienna, 7 Pa oe March 16, guaranteed the Pragmatic Sanction, while 1731. the Emperor consented to abolish the Os- tend Company, and to admit Spanish garrisons into the fortresses of Parmaand Piacenza. Theactive co-opera- tion of the King of Prussia enabled him to obtain a similar guarantee from the diet of the Empire, though the Electors of Bavaria and Saxony protested against it because they had claims on some of the Austrian terri- tories. The Elector Palatine protested also, because he suspected that the double-dealing Emperor had gua- ranteed Juliers and Berg to Prussia. France was now the only power of importance that refused to consent to the Pragmatic Sanction, Spain and Russia having re- cognised it some time before. ¢ 3. Father and Son. While the balance of power in Europe was being la- boriously adjusted, the Court of Berlin was distracted by ri the most violent dissensions, ending at last atthe Pru in an open breach between the king and a his eldest son, the Crown Prince Frederick, known afterwards as Frederick the Great. The youth of this prince was passed amid surround--174° The Crown Prince. 25 ings of singular unpleasantness, The imperious will and ungovernable temper of Frederick William rendered him an object of dread Phe Court and hatred to his famly, and the gloomy se- verity of his religious views casta dark shadow over their lives. His rude, uncultivated nature banished refine- ment from the Court, while his economical hab generating into sordid parsimony when appli d to the arrangements of his own fh yusehold, divested it of every- thing approaching to luxury. Even the food set upon the royal table was often too nauseous to be eaten. Frederick William purposed to bring up his « ldest son as an exact copy of himself. In his seventh year the prince was taken from the hands of the women and placed under the care of tutors, o Cecna the mode in which he was to spend nis day 5 ) being exactly prescribed by the king. Very little time was left for amusement of any kind, and by way of making him hardy he was even stinted in his food and sleep. His education was to comprise only such things as were practically useful. Latin was strictly forbidden, and of French and German he was to learn only so much as would enable him to express himself with flu- ency. Endowed by nature with an acute and refined mind, it is not surprising that Frederick revs lted from the narrow groove into which his father attempted to force him. Hesoon became disgusted with the inces- sant round of drills and reviews to which he was sub- jected, and he took no pleasure in the great hunting- parties which were the king’s favourite recreation. Beer and tobacco, his father’s invariable evening solace, were alike odious tohim. On the other hand he developed at an early age a taste for literature and music, which rac slur 3 ncifhe hus thea w la Hine ’ eaT Was ONLI) intensified UY the violent efiortSs made to 2Up-26 frederick William. L713- press it. One of his most heinous sins was playing the flute, which to Frederick William appeared a sign of shocking effeminacy. ‘‘Fritz,’’ he said with infinite contempt, ‘‘ Fritz is a fiddler and a poet and will spoil all my labour.”’ Tyranny on one side produced disobedience on the other, and various causes helped to widen the breach between father and son. The king got to detest his heir, and showed his detestation on every possible occa- sion. Once heseized him by the hair, dragged Breach be- him to the window, and would have stran- tween King i and Crown gled him with a cord of the curtain had he Prince. ' not been prevented by a chamberlain. Even in public he treated him with the greatest indig- nity, and would then taunt him with cowardice for not resenting the affronts. Frederick’s position became intolerable, and he re- solved to escape from it by flight. The attempt was The Pri made at a village near Frankfort, on the le rrince ; attempts to occasion of a journey through the Empire escape, ; ; ; August 4, on which he accompanied the king. Fre- 1730 ; derick was then in his nineteenth year. The attempt failed, and the prince lay at the mercy of his enraged father. His crime was aggravated in the king’s eyes by the fact of his being an officer in the . o Prussian army. He was therefore guilty of but fails, and ; ; : is thrown desertion, and the punishment of desertion into prison, : : was death. He was thrown into prison in the fortress of Ciistrin, where he was treated with brutal severity, while his fate and that of his accomplice, Lieu- tenant von Katte, were being decided by a court- martial. Katte was condemned to imprisonment for life in a fortress ; but this sentence was too lenient to satisfy the—1740 The Crown Prince. 27 savage monarch, so he altered it to death, and caused Katte to be executed before the window of the room in which his son was confined. The court then, after pro- testing its incompetence to [ry such a Case, Sentenced sentenced the prince to death, two only Of {6 death bya ‘ts members being in favour of mercy. Whe- Senn . ’ nartial ther the king ever really intended to execute this sentence, it 1S impossible to say; but those who knew him best feared the worst. Such of the European sovereigns as were on friendly terms with him implored him not to stain his hands with so unnatural a crime, and their entreaties were seconded by the remonstrances of his generals. At last he relented, saying | himself that the Emperor's letter had turned sd, solo the scale; but it was more than a year after his attempted flight before he saw his son, and a partial reconciliation was effected. The prince s character had been formed and hardened 4 by his sufferings. He had grown from a boy into aman, proud, reserved, and capable of deep dissi- mulation. He saw the necessity for con- , aciled forming, outwardly at least, to the will « t< 2 ‘ atner. wee. ea: the king, whose favour he gained by apply- ing himself diligently to the affairs entrusted to his ma- nagement, Gradually, too, he came to perceive the good qualities which lav underneath the rugged exterior of his father, who, in his turn, recognized with picasure ; Pee a ne oe the abilities of his son. The prince now obftainea « , ) ? } ¢ . parate establishment, and married soon be - 7 - Marries afterwards the Princess Elizabeth Christine of Brunswick Bevern, whom the king had selected for him. From this time he enjoyed a larger measure of liberty than had hitherto been allotted to him—his main reason for consenting to the marriage; so that he could28 frederick William. 1713- without hindrance cultivate his literary and artistic tastes in the society of friends of his own choice. ¢4. The Polish Election War, and the Close o of Frederick W 1d, liam’ 5S R ton. The treaty of Vienna had not been si: gned much more than two years before a great war broke out. Its cause was the election ofa King of Poland, alw; ays a source of danger to Europe, owing to the intrigues and jealousies of the neighbouring powers. Poland was an aristocratic republic, or, as it has been well put, ‘‘a democracy of nobles” with an elective king possessing a mere shadow of power. In 1697 had chosen the Elector of Saxony, the nobles who be- came king with the title of AG gustus II., but was driven out some years afterwards by Charles XII. of Sweden, who set up in his stead called Stanislaus Lesc zinsky. Stanislaus in his turn w as expelled by Russian influence, and Augustus remained king for the rest of his life. Nothing more would in all probability have been heard of Stanis] XV. married his daughter protector, Poland. a Polish nobleman aus had not Louis , Whereby he found a powerful In 1733 Augustus II. died, and the Polish nobles bribed by French gold, and assured, as they thoucht, of French support, proceeded to elect Stanis- seer laus, though aware that they thereby in- curred the hostilj ty of Russia both of these powers being in Poland. and Austria, jealous of French interference Ten days after the election Stanislaus arrived in Warsaw, but was almost immediately expelled by a Russian army under Marshal Lacy, and compelled take refuge in the fortress of Dantzig. Lacy then-1740 The Polish Election War. 29 caused a faction of the Polish nobles to elect the late king's son, Augustus, Elector of Saxony. Austria took no part in the election, but — Expulsion of it was notorious that she favoured the _ Election of y , Augustus, Saxon candidate, who had gained the Em- peror by agreeing to recognise the Pragmatic Sanction, to which his father had always refused to consent. France then declared war on the Emperor; but, in- stead of burdening herself with the reinstatement of Stanislaus, she marched an army into Lor- : France de- raine. The conquest of this province was, clares war on - . ; 1 the Emperor in fact, her motive for meddling in the ana invades Polish election, and she had shown great ‘rine astuteness in making the election a casus dbe//z, for it was a matter as to which England and Holland were indif- ferent, and therefore unlikely to support the Emperor. Spain and Sardinia joined with the spoiler and attacked the Austrian dominions in Italy. It is obvious that it now became a matter of im port- ance for Austria to secure the friendship of Prussia. , When France declared war, Frederick William. though : , onered to sup- port the Emperor on the Rhine with 30,000 or 40,000 iSiaUs personally inclined to favour Stanis]l men. Such, however, was the infatuation of Austria that she refused this handsome offer fron jealousy of the rising power of Prussia, and ery eave nay ¢ - ' . ai J IStTia. curtly demanded the contingent of 10,000 which Frederick William was bound by treaty to supply. The king was bitterly mortified by the refusal and hy the studied neglect and « ntempt of the Austrian Court, which persisted in regarding him as a sub- ; u Preslonitca ject and an inferior. But he was not yet Frederick 1c: a ae prepared to throw himself into the arms of France, for, apart from the consideration that he would30 Frederick William. 1712— thereby lose the Imperial guarantee of Juliers and Berg, he was too mindful of his position as a prince of the Empire to join with a power engaged in dismembering it. Moreover, he had more regard for treaties than was common at that time. Yet the situation was one from which his more clear-headed and less scrupulous son would assuredly have found means to extract some ad- vantage for Prussia. In June, 1734, Dantzig capitulated, but Stanislaus made his escape into Prussian territory, whereupon the Emperor demanded that he should be given up to the Russians. Frederick William indignantly refused to do anything of the kind; nor was he more disposed to com- pliance when Charles went on to demand the dismissal of the French ambassador from Berlin because the Empire was at war with France. The Polish war marks Prussia tend. 2 St@ge in the transition already alluded to. ing to inde- The demeanour of Austria was forcing Nie a Frederick William to break loose from his old habit of considering every question from the point of view of a prince of the Empire. More and more he came to look upon Prussia as an independent power, though he was never able to bring himself to any defi- nite act of self-assertion. The war ended in the utter discomfiture of the Em- peror, who had to surrender Naples and Sicily to Don Carlos (the second son of the King of End of the Spain), and a portion of Lombardy to Sar- war, 1735. “he : : rH ; dinia. Augustus remained King of Poland, and Stanislaus, whose rights were quietly passed over, though he was permitted to retain the empty title of roy- alty, was compensated by receiving for life the duchies of Lorraine and Bar. After his death they were to pass to France. The Duke of Lorraine, on whom the Em-740 The Polish Election War. 31 peror intended to confer the hand of Maria Theresa, obtained the reversion of Tuscany in compensation for the loss of his hereditary dominions, the Grand-duke of Tuscany, the last of the Medici, being at the point ot death and without heirs. Parma and Piacenza reverted to the Emperor. Finally, France agreed to guarant the Pragmatic Sanction. As Frederick William's life drew to a close he expe- rienced more and more the ill-will of the Austrian Court. Satisfied at last that it was not, and perhaps } } } } aay. I never had been, in earnest about Juliersand Ff, Berg, he had the mortification of feeling that the devotion of a lifetime had been thrown away. One consolation alone remained to him. Pointing to his son, with whom he was now completely reconciled, he said with pride and sorrow, ‘‘ There stands one who will avenge me.” FREDERICK THE GREAT AND THE FIRST SILESIAN WAR. FREDERICK was born on January 24, 1712, and became Loewe oe | : +1 =< ss ; “ ‘ ' king on Ma 1, 1740. In personal appearance he was , } } 1] ratner gvooa-lookKing th in otherwise, wi l|- erson made, though below the average height, peara: : Fr rice and inclined to stoutness. He had the fair hair and blue eyes of the North Germans, recular and delicate features, and a face with great power of expres- At the time of his accession he was little known ex- } : cept to a few intimate friends, and even these had no32 frederick the Great. 1740 idea what manner of man he really was. For some years past he had lived for the most part in retirement at Reinsberg, a palace erected under his Life before . = ; : his acces- Own supervision On an estate purchased for Sion. him by his father. There, surrounded by friends of his own choosing, many of them foreigners, he led a careless convivial life, seemingly engrossed in the pleasures of society, literature, art, music, and the table. No one knew that while amusing himself with concerts and private theatricals, w hile writing French o verses and corresponding with Voltaire, he was apply- ing himself indefatigably to military and political af- fairs, and acquiring a great aptitude for business. No One suspected that beneath the easy-going, intellectual voluptuary there lay concealed a stern, self-willed, am- bitious despot. During the last year at Reinsberg he had been pre- paring for publication a refutation of Machiavelli's “Prince,” The “ Anti- machiavel,” The ‘‘ Anti-Machiavel,”’ as the work was called, contained an elaborate statement of Frederick's notions of what a king should be, and an indignant declamation against ambition, conquest, arbitrary government, and so on. It was published in the autumn of but the authorship was no secret. 1740, anonymously, By the irony of fate it had hardly been published two months before its author was engaged in a war of which ambition was the avowed motive. Men thought that his accession would usher in a golden age of peace and plenty under the beneficent Opinions en- Sway ofa philosopher-king, whose sole care tertained would be the happiness of his subjects. and alout him. whose attention would be directed, not to the preparation for war, but to the cultivation and en-1740 Accession of Frederick. 33 couragement of the arts and sciences. The illusion quickly vanished, though some of the young king's ear- liest acts were calculated to confirm it. Men of eminence in science and literature were invited to Berlin, and Maupertuis, the great French mathematician, was re- quested tO preside over an academy that was shortly to be refounded in the Prussian capital. Within the first few days of his reign, Frederick abolished His innova- legal torture except in a few specified cases, tions. granted complete freedom to the press, and declared himself in favour of universal toleration in rell- gion, in all which matters he was far in advance of his age. He further gave his ministers to understand that he regarded his own interests and those of his people as identical, but that he wished the preference to be given to the latter if ever the two should seem to be incompa- tible. This declaration was followed by a liberal distri- bution of corn from the public granaries at moderate rates to the poor of several famine-stricken provinces. Next came the disbandment of the useless and costly +} regiment of Potsdam giants, which appeared for the last time at Frederick William's funeral, a measure which cave some countenance to the rumour that the army was soing to be reduced Yet Frederick soon showed that he meant to rule with c - } the strong hand, as his father had ruled before him. : , ae | His reforms were merely superficial, and did not touch the fabric of government be- es Frederick's abs aueathed to him by the late king. In this no alteration of any importance was made, except that Frederick took the reins into his own hands far + “p> : Yr) ¥ oles +), ‘Te arin ie ‘- more completely than Frederick William had ever done. To Sune Cf eka enuaratrn &W wawnanen + Pr mee ine power of the sovereign Was Immense in russia.34 frederick the Great. 1740 There was perhaps no country in Europe where the Power ofthe choOWN was, on the one hand, less oversha- Crown in dowed by great nobles or ecclesiastics, and, oe on the other, less limited by popular rights, none which offered such facilities for absolutism to a strong-willed and ambitious prince. The Prussian no- bility was very powerful; but it was not powerful against the sovereign. Its privileges were enormous, and Fre- derick, an intense aristocrat at heart, in spite of his talk about equality, preserved them in their integrity. But it had within its ranks no great families of historical repu- tation, standing close round the throne, as in the.an- cient monarchies of Europe, and exercising upon it an undefined influence. Nor, again, though each province had its own local administration, was there any general assembly of the whole nation which could place a check on the crown. The Prussian monarchy was in fact, as might be expected from its origin, a compound of sepa- rate units welded into a strong centralized state by a century of military despotism. Frederick saw the strength of his position, and availed himself of it to the utmost. When Prince Leopold of Character of /*nhalt-Dessau expressed a hope that he Frederick’s and his sons might be allowed to retain the Goveruoment, ae ; ; ofmces and authority they had enjoyed in the late reign, he replied that they should certainly be continued in their offices, but that he knew of no autho- rity save that which resided in the king. Far from in- tending to reduce the army, he increased it by 16,000 men. The strict economy of the late relgn was in no wise relaxed, though Frederick’s common sense pre- vented it from degenerating into the ridiculous parsimony which had made his father’s court the laughing stock of Furope. It was soon remarked that Frederick as king1740 His Character. 3 vi showed no resentment towards those who had treated im with harshness in the days when as crown prince h he was out of favour with his father. Nor, on the other hand, did he manifest any undue partiality for the friends of his youth, by promoting them to places for which they were unfit. Neither present affection nor gratitude for the past had the least weight with him against the public advantage. Almost all of Frederick William's ministers were left in their posts, though with diminished power and influence. Frederick’s ministers were little more than clerks. He kept all power in his own hands, and superintended every department with the keenest vigi- lance and with untiring energy. This system of super- vision or interference was carried a great deal too far. ’ Frederick did all manner of things himself which might 5 - have been done as well or better by subordinates, an: if his constitution had not been a very strong one, he a > ’ TY) I t h ve hy L iown un ertne w rit f the } 1 : » must have broken agown under the weiginto tne immense 5 1 ; ley 17) . mass of business which he transacted dally. When it : ‘ ' - » kh : ' +} . : ‘ec 1] a passca into Weak Cl ble LIAS, Lilc »>y OLA Ili < ii } Cu. } Frederick possessed a large share of the qualities which make a great ruler: a strong love of order, a very clear insicht into men and things, great aad- las His qualities aS a rule [ ministrative capacities, combined w! fatizable industry, and a mind capable of forming the most extensive s¢ hemes ind of attending at the same time to the minutest details of their execution. ry ‘ . } 3 - . ‘ 1] lo these qualities must be added a rare strength of will “ay ; . | +} ‘ : 4 le ; and a self-reliance that never taiterea i His system of government was doubtless despotic ana paternal, at times even tyrannical; but c } ; e Pater! al for a young country that has to fight for its Patern j 4 7 aespe cist. existence, a paternal despotism is no bad thing, at any rate when the despot identifies himself with36 Frederick the Great. 1740 its welfare so completely as Frederick did. It may be questioned whether under any other form of government Prussia could have weathered the storms of the Seven Years’ War. Nor should it be forgotten that under the shadow of this despotism an unparalleled freedom of ee of speech was permitted. The liberty of the press which Frederick granted at the com- mencement of his reign was no mere empty form. Satires on the king were published in Berlin which would not have been endured in any other capital in Europe. ‘“My people and I,” he said, ‘‘ have come to an agree- ment which satisfies us both. They are to say what they please, and I am to do what I please.” The under- standing was well observed on both sides. Conscious of strength and conscious of possessing the love and esteem of the mass of his subjects, Frederick looked down with serene indifference on all that his enemies might say of him, One day as he rode through Berlin, he saw a crowd of people staring up at something on the wall, and on sending his groom to inquire what it was, found it to be a caricature of himself. The placard was put so high that it was difficult to read it, so Frederick ordered it to be placed lower, in order that the people might not have to stretch out their necks. The words were hardly spoken, when with a joyous shout the placard was pulled down and torn into a thousand pieces, while a hearty cheer followed the king as he rode away. Frederick was a great administrator, but he was some- thing more. He was the most clear-sighted statesman in Europe. What strikes one most about Frederick’s : Bee ae! ; : a his policy is its definiteness, and the limita- ahs tion of his aims to what was practically at- tainable. He never let himself drift. He always knew1740 Fi; Character. 37 what he wanted, and he generally knew how to ret it. If he was not very scrupulous about the means he em- ployed, he must be judged by the standard of the age in which he lived, and that standard was not a high one The skill displayed in the formation of his plans was not more conspicuous than the vigour and rapidity with which they were executed when the proper moment had arrived. When he had made up his mind to strike, he struck at once and with decision. Equally remarkable were the calmness of his judgment and the power he possessed of t iking an unbiassed survey of any situa- tion in which he found himself. Not elated with victory, not disheartened by adversity, he knew how to use the one with moderation and to bear the other with forti- ude. His fortitude was heroic. It never, except once for a , + moment, gave way amid disasters that would have crushed any ordinary man. For years dur- ing the latter part of the Seven Years’ War ae forti- cas he must have lived in the full conviction that, do what he would, he could h irdly escape destruc- tion. Yet he went on with ever-diminishing resources, day after day devising new expedients, and always showing a bold front to the enemy. And he triumphed at last by the sheer force of his relentless will. The bnlliant military talents for which he was distin- guished late in life are a remarkable proof : on the other y * ’ hand, of great mental powers wa -~ r 5 — ~ ~ < of energy and determination. had no inborn gentus for war. His early Campaigns were full of blund rs, and owed their suc . , : ; : ess to the excellence of the Prussian troops and to the ‘2. | skill of the Prussian generals. It was simply by dint of hard study and by long pondering over dearly bought D38 frederick the Great. 1740 experience that he made himself the first commander of his age. Of Frederick's personal character it is not possible to speak in the terms of admiration that may justly be applhed to his character asa ruler. There His personal is, indeed, no reason for believing that the character ~ charges of gross immorality insinuated against him by certain writers have any foundation in fact. On the contrary, with the exception of some youthful indiscretions, his life appears to have been per- fectly pure. But he was not a man to inspire those about him with love and devotion. That he was capa- ble of deep feeling there is no doubt, but he very sel- dom showed it. He was cold, haughty, and reserved. His nature seems to have been soured by the brutal treatment he endured in his boyhood. Onginally gen- tle and lovable, it became hard and selfish. He pos- sessed the dangerous gift of sarcasm, and he used it without mercy Yet when he wished to make himself agreeable no one could be more so. His conversational talents and his wit were really considerable, and he had, when he chose to exert it, a rare charm of manner. With the mass of his subjects I'rederick was certainly popular. His sarcasms were not indulged in at their ex- fils popularity, POMS? To them and especially to his sol- diers he was endeared more and more as his reign went on not more by his exploits, of which they were justly proud, than byhis genial affability, by a certain homely simplicity of manner, an aptitude for humorous re- partee, and by the good humour with which he often al- lowed the most astonishing plain-spoken things to be said to himself. Innumerable stories are told of old “* Father Fritz,’ as hissoldiers loved to call him, illustrating these traits of his character. One anecdote will suffice as an 1in-1740 State of Europe. 39 stance of the extraordinary freedom which common sol- diers were sometumes permitted to use 1n acuqcressing their haughty and imperious sovereign. In the course of the Seven Years’ War, a regiment just about to go into winter quarters was suddenly ordered to march Anecd te, avainst the enemy. Frederick rode by the side of the men as they marched, and overhearing a rrenadier cursing and grumbling at the hardness of their Mesa, Be « alm, my Ch ldre Hn, you shall have all the better winter quarters for it, l only hope you're not lying, Fritz,’’ was the unblushing reply. “No,” said the king, good-humouredly, “ no, really I’m not: | keep my word.” ‘Well then,’’ exclaimed the grenadier, “now we are ready to drive the devil out of hell.” This parti ular anecdote may or may not be ) t be true, but there are SO ma 7% I i LITi¢ KRING Lnat ik 1S impossible to believe all to be fictitious. ¢2. State of Europe at Frederich’s A cI0OMm The question of Juliers and berg, which had played so prominent a partin Frederick William's reign, remained unsettled at the time of leath, t , ' y. . I ¢ ’ advanced age of the Elector Palatine made it ‘3 rs and cry evident that the succession would soon be vacant. Disgusted with the double-dealing of the Em- peror, Frederick William had towards the . reign applied to France for support 3) ance I port in maintaining his Ie te J ad : z » . soem? Ben - oe : rights. His overtures were favourably received. but led to nothing, because France was unwilling to see any stronger power in possession of the important duchies on » ~~ i 14 oe eo <= ; : c > | ¥ e Rhine. Moreove _thew lespread belief that noth ny } ] | F ' would induce the Prussian King to go to wal deprive d him of the consideration that would otherw se have been +) f , } rr ’ ! ’ show nm tO LLic masteél of SO Ihany Dattail JUS. reae;°ric Mh,40 Frederick the Great. 1740 on his accession, sounded both England and France to ascertain how far he might rely on either of them for assistance, but avoided entangling himself in definite alliances, preferring to keep his hands free so that he might act in whatever way seemed most advantageous. At the time of Frederick’s accession the political horizon was tolerably clear. There was war between . England and Spain, but that was far away on bitter taht of the Spanish main, and though it was ex- POPE pected that the King of France would before long espouse the cause of his Spanish kinsman, he had not done so as yet. The peace of Europe remained un- broken, and there were no signs of the coming storm. The Emperor had procured from every state of import- ance a guarantee of his Pragmatic Sanction, and although Prince Eugene had told him that the Em- the only guarantee worth having was an peror. a army of 200,000 men and a full treasury, he fondly hoped that engagements obtained with such diffi- culty would not be lightly repudiated. There was, moreover, no immediate prospect of the good faith of the guarantors being put to the test. Charles VI. was only fifty-five years old and in the enjoyment of perfect health, so much so that he had not yet abandoned the hope of male issue. For this reason he had deferred getting his son-in-law, Francis of Lorraine, Grand-duke of Tuscany, crowned King of the Romans, which would have ensure d his following him as Emperor. This might easily have been done, and would have been quite in accordance with precedent. For some centuries past the I:mperors had usually contrived to get a son or some other near relation crowned King of the Romans in their lifetime, and. when this had been done, the King of the Romans succeeded at once on the Emperor's death, without any1740 War between England and Spain. 4! further coronation or election. Charles, however, not wishing to bar the claims of any son that he might still have, hesitated to get the ceremony performed upon his son-in-law, and the result was, that when he died the elec- tors chose another man instead of Francis of Lorraine. England and France had each for many years been ruled by a single minister. Sir Robert Walpole had been Prime Minister of England for eighteen England and years, and Cardinal Fleury had for almost » >, n the name of Louis XV. Both ministers were distinguished —~- as long a period governed France for their pacific policy, yet each was before the close of his career forced into what he believed to be an unjust or impolitic war. In each case the love of power proved stronger than p < ical principles, and the latter were sa- crificed that the former might be retained. The war between England and Spain arose out of the commercial relations of the two countries. English War hetenen ed by treaties within very narrow limits. but England and Ahad A trade with the Spanish colonies was restrict- ‘ . Dal smuggling went on to such an extent that ~° almost all the commerce of Spanish America was in Enelish hands. Frequent collisions naturally ensued between the English traders and the Spanish coast- suards, who claimed to exercise a right of search over ¢ To wer! . } } sehler . T ’ : English vessels, and public opinion in England was in- flamed by reports of atrocities perpetrated on English ) . Py ~* " ; to ha — - , sailors. The stories were for the most part gross cxag- gerations, but they were implicitly believed, and pro- duced a marvellous effect. So great was 1; ‘] vies iwi Tes wend th NOMS—~RAr ¢, the popular ferment, and so artiuily was it . ; ‘ stimulated by the opposition leaders, that y ] } } . ler? ni , livia : Walpole, against his better judgment, was driven to de- J clare war.42 Death of the Emperor and tts Results. 1740 The near relationship of the Kings of France and Spain made it probable that the latter would not long remain neutral, and it was chiefly the con- sae lest sideration of this risk which made Walpole should join shrink from declaring war. So long as Eng- eB land was at peace, and especially so long as she was at peace with France, there was little if any danger of a Stuart rebellion: the events of 1745-46 are a sufficient justification of Walpole’s policy. The con- tingency which he dreaded—war with France—occurred, but not until both countries were involved in the great war of the Austrian Succession, which broke out on the unexpected death of the Emperor. $3. Death of the Emperor and its Results. Charles VI. died on October 20, 1740, after a very short illness, caused, it is said, by eating a dish of mush- ep rooms. In accordance with the Pragmatic eath o ’ Charles VI. Sanction, his eldest daughter, Maria The- Accession of Maria The- “a tria, Queen of Hungary, Queen of Bohemia, resa, was proclaimed Archduchess of Aus- and under various titles sovereign of all the lands that had owned her father as their lord. She was not yet twenty-four years old when the untimely death of her father suddenly called her to a position as perilous as it was exalted. But young as she was she showed herself fully equal to the emergency, and her own high spirit ‘inspired all about her with enthusiasm, She was strik- ingly handsome, and she combined a most fascinating manner with a powerful and masculine un- a charac- derstanding. Her energy and determination never flagged, and her courage seemed al- ways to rise in proportion to the difficulties she had to contend with. She was a very noble-minded woman,1740 The Bavarian Claims, 43 animated by deep religious principles ana by a strong sense of duty. Later on in life her religious zeal too often took the form of bigotry and intolerance, and, as was the case with Frederick too, her love of power and influence led her to exercise an inquisitorial scrutiny d yet, how- r 1 « over the private afiatrs of her subjects. A ever, these faults were not apparent, In all respects she } 7 . | ’ was a worthy antagonist tor the great Frederick, her ; ] ] 9 ‘ +1 —. ] . ) ’ } ] almost lifelong foe. Itis said that at one time he wished y to marry her; but, apart from the difference of religion, the pride of the Austrian Court and the predilection of Maria Theresa herself for Francis of Lorraine were iIn- superable objections to a marriage which would have altered the whole course of German and European Charles was hardly dead hefore the validity of the ted. A Bavarian envoy Pragmati Sanction was con was ilready on the road to Vienna when the tidings of his decease reached Munich, The envo) had been de- spatched on the 21st, in ant ipation of the event, to pro- f Maria Theresa in the name test agvainst the accession of Charles Albert, Elector of Bavaria. and to assert the Bavarian claims to a large portion of the Austrian dominions. The elector was dac- of Bavana. a lana ti | ‘ OT if I owl “4 11 1. } nc ry | : Will. The Will W 5 DrOaUCCA, a id to th aAlllUd sad 5 «raazement was found to contain the words “lawfully44 Death of the Emperor and tts Results. 1740 begotten (cheliche) (mannliche) descendants.’’ descendants’ instead of ‘‘ male Whether the copy was in- correct or the will itself had been tampered with nobody knows, but it is tolerably certain that Charles Albert himself believed in the justice of his claims. Meanwhile a far more dangerous enemy than the elector was silently preparing for action. Frederick of Prussia saw in the Emperor’s death an opportunity for aggrandizement such as might never occur again, and with characteristic promptitude determined at once to Frederick determines to assert his Silesian claims. utilize claim nitz, Brieg, and Wohlau. > it by seizing Silesia and reviving his son the duchies of Jagerndorf, Lieg- Having formed this resolution, he sent for Podewils and Schwerin, the most trusted of his ministers and his best general, to consult with them as to the mode of execut- ing it. real difficulties would come afterwards. The scizure itself would not be difficult: the After four days’ deliberation it was decided to begin by taking possession of Silesia, peaceable possession if Res Ives to seize Silesia, and then open nego- tiations, for obtaining what they wanted in return. possible, and then to open negotiations with Maria Theresa. The usual practice of the Hohenzollerns had been to offer their ser- vices to Austria, and to trust to her promises The futility of this mode of procedure had been made apparent in the case of Frederick William. services and then broke her promises. Austria accepted his Frederick deter- mined to get his reward first and give her no opportunity for perfidy, The terms he was prepared to offer were the followinc: > His terms. to defend Austria against all other claim- ants ; to assist the Grand-duke of Tuscany in obtaining the Imperial Crown; to resign the Prussian1740 The Seizure of Silesia, 45 claims on Juliers and Ber able sum of ready money. In return he demanded the ind to advance a consider- Y % } ‘ + - mt ; whole or at any rate p irt of Silesia. It re quired some effrontery to offer such terms to the haughty Austrian, ind Frederick had small hope of their being accepted, i ley }, oh + } \ / } ¢] — nf Dut he thought lL advisable to prot eed tius instead OI at once taking up an attitude of irreconcilable hostility, and claiming the four duchies as his right. The propositions were not presented at Vienna until he had already en- tered Silesia at the head of his army. The question whether the seizure of Silesia was or n the most divergent making himself a name was at any rate one of his mo- Ther ; “. ‘ } tives, ire are, however, considerations tf may be urged in extenuation of his conduct. His father had ruaranteed the Pragemat Sanction, but his guarantee was conditional on the Emperor's promise to secure to him the succession to Juliers and Berg. Yet so far was *} r ; 7 ‘ . , Charles from doing this that he actually agreed to allow to the other claimant provisional possession of the : i } » | . Ie ay ; ' VWI if lave een preserved Peas eael K id KRCEDL Q Cl, lee) seracérutar + . | . } 7 _ om has little to justify it. Apart from the probable contin- a . , ~ . ’ ency of the war between England and ©Opain spreading < ' A there was the fact that the Elector .? _ asserted his claims to Austrian territories 4 2 ; oe . ; tar) 1 mere had already determined to back him. Within ten days of the Emperor’s death, Cardinal Fleury said to the Prussian ambassador that France had ven her cuar-6 The Conquest of Silesta. 1740-2 4 q 4 ‘saving the rights of a third party, a reservation’ which, as the ambassador observed, annihilated the guarantee altogether. Moreover, Saxony had claims, too, and if Bavaria moved in the matter, Saxony would move also, and it was almost certain that she would try to obtain that very Silesia over which the Hohenzollerns had an- cient rights. As to these Silesian claims, Frederick does sot say much, though he alludes to them in his ‘ Histoire ‘le mon Temps’ as being incontestable. They were cer- tainly valid in themselves; their weak point was the length of time they had lain dormant. Less excusable than the actual seizure of Silesia was the manner In which it was done; the perfidy with which Frederick concealed his intentions under the mask of friendship; the hypocrisy with which, when his army was occupying Silesia, he pretended to be acting in the interests of Maria Theresa. It may be asked why, if Frederick wanted to seize something, he did not seize Juliers and Berg, where there was no manner of doubt about the justice of his claims. The answer is not far to seek. By occupying the Rhine duchies he would have offended France as well as Aus- tria, whereas France would not care a straw about his aggrandizing himself on the Oder. Then, again, Juliers and Berg were far away, Silesia was close at home, con- tiguous to the main body of his dominions, and in every respect a more valuable acquisition. 4. The Conquest of Silesia. On December 16, 1740, Frederick entered Silesia at the head of 28,000 men, averring that he Frederick ; E se came with no hostile intentions against Aus- \ ; SiLLCN al tria, but merely to guard his own interests chere in the troubled times he saw coming. On hearing ofras The Invasion of Silesta. 47 his preparations, the Austrians had got together a force of 7000 men, which, though unable to keep the field, was sufficient to garrison the fortresses. Three of these, Glogau, Brieg, and Neisse, were strong places, and it was hoped that they would be able to hold out till the spring, when they would be relieved by an Austrian army, especially as a severe frost set in before the close of the year and rendered siege operations impossible. Except from the fortresses, Frederick met with no resistance. The inhabitants were either indifferent or well disposed to his cause. Two-thirds of them were Protestants, and these welcomed him as the champion of Protestantism coming from the north, as Charles XII. of Sweden had come before, to ants wel secure to them the right of worshipping God as they pleased. Of course Frederick had no idea of stirring up a religious war. Such a thing would have been utterly foreign to his nature. He merely announce d that. as in his own dominions, so in Silesia all forms of cligion were to be protected. But to men who had been oppressed and perset uted for their religion, as the Sile- sian Protestants had been, even toleration and equality micht well seem a welcome boon. laf Ln erie Tn wmtenrs sagnarnnri Wh . Sos Wat Before the end of January, Frederick had made him- self master Of all »o lia G€XCept As iu, Brie ry and . j . ” £ , ; ; Neisse, and these fortresses were ciosely D ded : } : ‘ \ . Breslau the capital opened its gates after a mere show of resistance. His negotiations with Austria - A 4 had been less successful. Ma [Theresa f,3,,, absolutely refused to treat with him as long ®soHatl oe ae as he had a man in her dominions. . larly in the sprine the war was resumed. Glogau was taken by storm, and the siege of Neisse had just been commenced, when an Austrian army appeared out of48 The Conquest of Silesia. 1740-2 Moravia under Marshal Neipperg. Frederick was una- eS ware of its approach until it was within a taken by few miles of him, and he narrowly escaped Ie being made prisoner. Gathering in his scattered posts, he retreated with all rapidity on Ohlau, which contained his heavy artillery and stores. But the Austrians were before him, and succeeded in getting between him and Ohlau, in fact, between him and Bran- denburg. He was entirely cut off from his communica- tions, and forced to risk a battle. On the morning of April 10, 1741, Frederick advanced against the Austrians as they lay encamped at Mollwitz. All through the day before the snow had Sic. fallen heavily, and neither army had any April 10, very distinct idea of the other’s whereabouts. ae. Neipperg was taken by surprise, and but for the extreme slowness with which the Prussians manceu- vred, would have been attacked bcfore he had time to form his troops in order of battle. But at first the battle went all in his favour. The Prussian cavalry was no match for the Austrian; it was routed almost at the first onset, and, in spite of the king’s efforts to rally it, it fled in hopeless confusion. Then Field-Marshal Schwerin, who commanded the Prussian infantry, either thinking that the battle was irretrievably lost, or wishing to be rclieved from the responsibility of the king’s presence, implored him to retire from the field. Frederick con- ented, and galloped off towards Oppeln, where he ex- pected to be able to cross the Oder. In the meantime the steadfastness of the Prussian infantry retrieved the day. Again and again the gallant Romer led the Aus- trian cavalry to the charge, but no impression could be made on those serried ranks. Then was seen the ad- vantage of the iron ramrods and of the perfect discipline1741 Belleisle. 49 which had been impressea on the Prussian troops by Frederick William and the Prince of Dessau. [he Prus- sians got five shots to two of the eneiny’s, and fired as steadily as if they had been on the parade-ground. The } ee il Muracrous Austrians were unable to stand against t fire, and at seven o'clock, after five hours fighting, Neipperg gave the signal for retreat. ‘he battle of Mollwitz made a great sensation in Europe. It had never been supposed that the untried troops of Prussia could resist the veterans of Austria, Louis XV., when he heard of Frederick invasion of Silesia, said, ‘‘ The manismad. 7 But Mollwitz showed that the man was n pa mad, and that a new power had arisen in Europe. Frederick’s camp was sought by envoys from almost every « ourt in Europe, an 1 amongst them, on the part of France, came Marshal B lleisle. 4 ) peas - ~ , oe lt née aT : } : Belleisle was a man of brilliantt ilents and boundless ambition. His mind was! ill of the wildest schemes for t > ,crcrre } yoy wt f Fy iif «ck ‘rans IZEMeENL ¢ ry t) ’ S ~cl 7 rere } rs le +} . | ur oination soared OVC! every opstacie thal ic) in his path. His daring projects fascinated even the dull soul of Louis XV. Whent fought, he was making a tour in reg .1 splendour through ’ °* = & ,% . » battle of Moliwitz was the German courts, with the object of preventing the Grand-duke of Tuscany trom being chosen Emperor. He had not quite decided on whom the perilous honour was to be conferred, but the Elector of Bavaria was his * ; . He saw in the difficulties « f tl ie . 7 9 favourite canadidate. s eT pe Ns se wumcedavin ate a i od House of Hapsburg an opportunity for the total ce ty a ae es } = } ‘ : r ; Lion Of its power. I } ted the i lation ofa l ~ 1) ~~ y A Ho} —iar the la larchir “a . aiiian = a ’ unst fr. Sti ic un AWA tne i 1ci' PSilip o! Fran Ce whoich shouid Cmouracc . pain, Prus ld. Ba iria, and per- } ] } ; ’ +} > . ' . ‘ : . : haps — W Paden ailu aX INnYy. Already ne 1IOOKRCU UDO Lic5° The Conquest of Silesia. 740-2 Queen of Hungary as vanquished, and imagined himself dividing her dominions as he pleased. ‘“ He talked,” said Frederick, ‘‘as if all her provinces were up at auc- tion.’ The French were to get the Austrian Netherlands, and Germany was to be cut up into four little kingdoms, which France, the arbiter of Europe, might play off one against the other as she pleased. Frederick was not at all attracted by Belleisle’s pro- gramme. He had no wish to pull down Austria in order to set up France inher place, Yet, situated as he was, it was very difficult for him to refuse the French alliance. He was fully alive to the danger of accept- ete s ing it. The French might use him as a tool, wa and then desert him, as they had deserted Stanislaus in his Polish war. To accept it would be a wide departure from the traditional policy of his house, 17 but he could hardly dispense with French assistance un- less he could make an accommodation with Austria. Austria herself was a power of vast resources, if she only knew how to use them, and it was not yet certain that several of the guarantors of the Pragmatic Sanction would not come to her rescue. England, he knew, would stand by her. She had already supplied the money with which Neipperg’s army was equipped. Fearing that he might be attacked by a coalition, Frederick was eagerly desirous of an honourable peace with Austria. His terms were studiously moderate. He would be content with Lower Silesia and rederick = Breslau, the same that he would have taken , > ilka > with before Mollwitz. His efforts were, however, Austria, In vain, though seconded by England, who was anxious to restore harmony between the two Ger- man powers and to unite them against France, The Court of Vienna, blind to or regardless of the dangers1741 The French and Bavarians. 51 that surrounded it, refused to conciliate this dangerous enemy, who might at that time have been converted into a staunch friend. Relying on Cardinal Fleury's known aversion to war, the Austrian ministers still cherished the belief that France would adhere to her pu lrantee. VW he hi all hopes of a sali fact ry pt ice with Au tria had been exhausted, Frederick entered into a defensive aliiance with France. Che terms of the treaty were exceedingly vague. The main Conclvde 7 : 7 ; w~Al aa ial point >, h wWeVer, WCIC as TOLLOWS ;° I rance with France, june : [ 7 J 5 uaranteed Lower Silesia and Breslau to 5 : ] - . | ley “1 . . : ' 1 . + reae;nr! n and .TCUCTIC A i LLTLCGIUIS Lt Cd h 5S claim On lu- , ‘ f£ I liers and Berg, and promised to vote for the Elector « f Bavaria as Emperor. At the same time he stipulated { ; : } lon oo ] | : ’ ' hat France should without delay send auxiliary troops to the assistance Ol the elector, and induce Swe den to 7 i - , . ~* } - re : declare war on Kussia to prevent her irom succouring France now began to act with energy. In the month of August two French armies crossed the Rhine, each about 40,000 strong. The first marched into Westphalia, and friczhtened George Il. Wend. nto concluding a treaty of neutrality for Hanover, and promising his vote to the Flector of Ba- varia. The second advanced through South Germany on Passau, the frontier city of Bavaria and AScuas A : a : . “ in South d stria 1S soon aS lit a eq on Werman : Germany , + , i tn Fren ' I i ) if l Vi - 1 wh cockat f Bavaria, for it was the cue of , | hee to cl} , I OtTii rT} LuUXil ily, ind the . } } } Nh min il CUiliilic Ga I nel il as &. y <. ted hil t \ From Passau the French and Bavarians } assed intoThe Conquest of Silesia. Upper Austria, and on September I1 entered its capital, Linz, where the elector assumed the title of a French Archduke. Five days later Saxony joined and Dava- # . : tians in the allies. Sweden had already declared Austria. war on Russia. Spain trumped up an old claim and attacked the Austrian dominions in Italy. It seemed as if Belleisle’s schemes were about to be crowned with complete success. Had the allies pushed forward, Vienna must have fallen into their hands. But the French did not wish to be too victorious lest they should make the elector too powerful, and so independent of them. Therefore, after six weeks’ delay, they turned aside to the conquest of Bohemia. Breathing time was afforded to Maria Theresa, but her situation was still very critical. As she could not poe yet resolve to grant terms which would sat- ation of Ma- isfy Frederick, she was obliged to fall back ria theresa on her Hungarian subjects. The Hunga- yians had usually been rather a source of apprehension than of security to the Austrian monarchy, but Maria Theresa won their loyal support by important conces- The H sions. She promised to restore their an- S un- garians cient constitution, which had been abolished support her hg) SOE ; iivalie: by her ancestors, and the Hungarian mag- September. nates, touched by the misfortunes of their young and beautiful sovereign, voted with accla- mation an insurrection or general arming of the country. The insurrection would have been of little use to the queen if her enemics had really desired her destruction. She might easily have been overwhelmed before the Hungarians couldtake the field. But, while the French were holding back for fear of making the Elector of Ba- varia too strong, the King of Prussia allowed himself to1 Charles VII. a Jd be detached from his allies. Frederick had been pursu- Ing avcry tortuous poli y during the suln- 4 ‘ 3 ( mpact mer. In spite of his treaty with France he © ot Klein : ; Schnellen- continued to negotiate with Austria, and on ri. Octu- . October 9 he met Ne ipperg at the Castle of wer Ge Klein Schnellendorf, and azreed to a secret compact. - . , 17 Neipperg was to be allowed to retire unmolested into 7 = © . 7 7 | a ; Moravia, and Neisse was to be delivered to Frederick after a feieoncda om . ihe compact was of great advantage to Maria There- Sa, as it enabled her to concentrate her forces against her remaining encmies. N« Ipperg, released from Sile- Sia, withdrew into Moravia, where he was joined by the Grand-duke Francis with 30,000 men. The combined Austrian army advanced into Bohemia, and, though too late to save Pracue, it was able to prevent any further m . ° 1. T Y 7 conquests. The Irench generalship was very bad. Belleisle oucht before this time Austrian . suc -«. ; - , 77 to have taken command of the allied army, : 1; 1,7 7 | vy , . ’ sv? . r . 2 but he was disabled by rheumatic gout. and forced to 5 Si ; ..* : - . -@eeevpes 4 * @aees resign his post into the hards of Marsha Droslia, aivery < : ee se ‘ . e-« . . 7 “> . * « . . »* y-% Ay : ry? I - : > inadequate SUDSTITUTC, T hx *| re PLSUC Vawarians we “ ‘fT ’ : rsvie . ] »+ it fa : : _ ’ . shut up in Prague, and cut afi trom ther ¢qnquests in : - Biceim ; ; . : = © . ; ** * Se Upper Austria, while» these were mérfacad Dy another . ’ ’ =o ¢@ . e © ge ‘te +r “TTT minder mmf a ‘ a) ue > 8 Au i ian army Unaer;: ( AikL Kit vt : C ‘ ‘ ° ry 77 v ~~ , Khevenhiiller retook Lin 1 Jan 24, 1842, the rer ° j rhy 4 ~] . }) rr a r . - : , ° very day on which Charles Albert, Elector of Bavaria, was raised to the imperial throne with the oat c ei. 7 ry +} title of Charles VII. He had reached the summit of his ambition, and henceforth his fortunes54 The Conquest of Stlesia. 1742 steadily declined. He was head of the Holy Roman Empire, but he was no longer master of his own do- minions. While Khevenhiiller was reconquering Upper Austria the Hungarian Pandours had burst into Bavaria from the Tyrolese mountains, and were spreading de- struction far and wide. Munich fell into their hands (February 13) almost at the very moment when the Emperor was being solemnly crowned at Frankfort. Charles's only hope lay in Frederick, whom he implored to make a diversion in his favour. Frederick had already determined to interfere. His Silesian conquests were secured by no treaty, and it was becoming apparent that Austria had no in- Frederick tention of concluding one. He began to be inieriercs. > ~ alarmed at her successes, and the fact that the compact of Klein Schnellendorf had long since been made public gave him an excuse for resuming hostilities. Early in 1742 he entered Moravia in conjunction with a body of Saxon troops, but the campaign was rendered fruitless by the obstinacy of the Saxon commanders, and when the allies parted it was with feelings of mutual dis- satisfaction. After the departure of the Saxons, Frederick retired into Bohemia, and fell back in the direction of Prague. At. Chredisr he he: ird:that an? »Austrt: in army was advan- cing against him; cundét Prihée. Charles of Lorraine, Maria Theresa's, brether-in-law: + A battle was fought at oe + «*+ eChkotusitzs and agair the Prussians gained a Bactl ee « * complete ‘victory. Austria was now ready or Czaslau, for peace with Prussia. Eneland had ad- Mav 17. vised it all along, but Maria Theresa would not consent to give up Silesia, ‘the fairest jewel of her crown,’ until she had tried her fortune in another battle. By the Peace of Breslau she surrendered all Silesia (with1742 Value of Silesia + the exception of Teschen, Troppau, and Jigerndorf), together with the county of Glatz. The . French were very indignant when they Se Th . heard that their ally had concluded a sepa- June 11. rate peace, but Frederick had good reason for believing that they would have treated him in the same way if they had had the opportunity. The Peace of Breslau added to the Prussian kingdom a province which enlarged its area by one-third, and in- creased its population and revenue by about one-half, a rich and fertile province, full of Value and limit rtance towns and villages, and one which, by its ot Silesia to geographical conditions, no less than on re- ligious grounds, belonged naturally to the northern rather than to the southern German power. From Bohe- mia and Moravia Silesia was cut off by mountain chains through which the passes were few and difficult: the natural highway of its commerce was the broad strea of the Oder, which traverses the country from end t ) end before passing through-the plains of Brandenburg on its way to the Balt he ease with which the conquest of Silesia was effected, and the loyalty with which ld Lat fast to Prussia during the Seven Years’ War, show that > J ~ oe — land ee — the transfer of allegiance gave no violent shock to their feelings, and indicate a consciousness on their part that destiny had bound up their lot with the rising northern power. On the other side of the mountain chain the feeling of the population was unmistakably different The Catholic Bohemians and Moravians were devotedly loyal to Austria, as Frederick found to his cost by the difficulty he experienced in obtaining supplies and in- formation when he had to make war there. ; . - on 1) , ‘1% .*+ . 5 "> YY .¥ . : otrategically me acquisition was Of immense im56 The Second Silesian War. 1742- tance. Silesia, when held by Austria, has been compared to a glacis in front of the great mountain-rampart which protects Bohemia and Moravia on the north-east. As long as Austria possessed it it was hardly possible for a Prussian army to penetrate to Vienna, while the Austrians could at any time march without difficulty into the heart of the Prussian kingdom. CHAPTER V. THE SECOND SILESIAN WAR AND THE PEACE OF AIX-LA-CHAPELLE. THE two years following the Peace of Breslau were years of almost unbroken success for Maria Theresa. England espoused her cause with enthu- yee siasm, and besides providing large subsi- dies sent an army into Germany, which de- feated the French at Dettingen (June 27, 1743). George II. himself was present, and showed great bravery in the battle, the last in which an English sovereign has ever personally taken part. Before the end of the summer of 1743 Bohemia had been recovered, Bavaria conquered, and the tide ef French invasion completely rolled back. In Italy the Austrians more than held their own against the Spaniards. Every one was now ready for peace ex- cept Maria Theresa, who thirsted for revenge, and de- manded compensation for her losses. In- bition ; ; : Ambitious. toxicated with success, she cherished all projects ot ee manner of ambitious ideas. Alsace and 1cresa, Lorraine were to be reconquered from France; Bavaria to be incorporated with Austria. The late imperial election was to be declared null and void, because the Bohemian vote had been excluded. This“1744 Frederick renew, the War. 57 had been done, after full consideration, on the ground that a woman could not be elector, and that therefore it was impossible for Maria Theresa either to vote at the election or to transfer her vote to her husband. Her claim to set aside the election was simply monstrous - she talked as if the Empire were an hereditary posses- sion of her house. Frederick not unnaturally became anxious. He feared lest she might turn her victorious arms against himself, and he had sufficient reasons for believing that she still aimed at the rex onquest of Si- Frederick alarmed V lesia, the Treaty of Breslau notwithstanding. It was, moreover, impossible for him to look on with indifference while the I-mperor, to whose elevation he had largely contributed, was treated in the high-handed manner proposed by Maria Theresa. It yj was, in fact, this consideration, far more to check Austrian than apprehension on his own account, or Salle vyhe desire of « onquest, that induced him to wermany. renew the war. The first Silesian war was undertaken m order to conquer for Prussia a position among the great Powers of Europe. The motive of the second was to secure her influence in Germany. With this object he sought to form a greet union of German princes to uphold the dignity of the Emperor, and to resist the Austrian pretensions. The project failed because patriotism and national life were nearly dead in Germany. The union of Frankfort, ; a a te iat 1c - 7“ =f j Ini, of besides Frederick himself and the Emperor, Union : Frankfort, had only two members—the Landgrave of May 22, : 1744. - oa . : _ ‘ | d Hesse-Cassel and the Elector Palatine. It was hoped that more would join when Prussia was on e in the field. but they never did, and the Emperor's death soon brought the union to an untimely end.58 The Second Silesian War. 1744- Germany failing him, Frederick turned again to France, and there his overtures were favourably received. ; Mortified with the ill-success of their arms, Treaty with France, and stung by the contemptuous manner in ine 5. : see . Lua which Maria Theresa rejected their propo- sals for peace, the French had resolved to prosecute the war with vigour in the spring of 1744. Strange as it may seem, they were still nominally at peace. Hitherto they had acted only as auxiliaries. Now, however, France came forward as a principal, and declared war against England (March 15) and Austria (April 27). Frederick’s plan of operations for the approaching campaign was well devised but not well carried out. He made a serious blunder himself, and the er icad French were shamefully remiss in perform- ing the part assigned to them. It was agreed that France should send two armies into the field, one to act offensively in the Netherlands, the other de- fensively on the Upper Rhine, where it was expected that Austria would make a great effort for the conquest of Alsace. Frederick was then to invade Bohemia. This was certain to cause the recall of the Austrian army from Alsace, which was to be pursued and harassed by the French on its retreat. Everything happened exactly as had been expected, except that when the Austrians retreated the French omitted to pursue them. On the night of June 30, the Austrian army effected the passage of the Rhine by a masterly manceuvre exe- cuted in the face of the enemy. They were commanded nominally by Prince Charles of Lorraine, but really by Count Traun, by far the most skilful of the Austrian eet ae generals. When the news reached Frede- Bohemia. rick, he began to prepare for his invasion of Bohemia. He did not declare war against Austria,—1744 Frederick Renews the War. U1 9 but announced, through his minister at Vienna, his intention of sending auxiliaries for the defence and support of the Emperor. The Prussians marched into Bohemia in three columns converging on Prague. Two passed through Saxony, the third came from Silesia. Frederick had the Emperor's permission to cross the Saxon territory, and he was careful to commit no acts of hostility during his passage, as he still hoped that Saxony might be brought over to his side. Of this, however, there was no chance. Saxony was already in alliance with Austria, and later in the year, after Frederick had met with some reverses, she openly joined the enemy and barred his retreat. Early in September the three Prussian columns met at Prague, and after a week's siege the city surrendered. Frederick then, in deference to the opinion spture of of Marshal Belleisle, but against his own Prague Sep- : . : . temt r i¢ judgment, advanced into the south of Bo hemia with the view of threatening Vienna. He thus exposed himselt to the risk of being cut off from Prague. Yet even so he would probably have been able to main- tain himselfif the French had fulfilled their engagements. But while he was conquering the districts of the Upper Moldau, the Austrian army returned unimpaired from Alsace. The French had allowed it to cros the Rhine unmolested, and haa not mai 7 } the slightest attempt to harass its retreat. They were only too glad to get rid of it themselves In the ensuing operations Frederick was completely outmanceuvred. Traun, without risking a battle, forced him back towards the Silesian frontier. He had to choose between abandoning Prague ou . : . . n vr and abandoning his communications with ™ Silesia, and as the Saxons had cut off his retreat through60 The Second Silesian War. 1744- the Electorate, there was really no choice in the matter. So he fell back on Silesia, abandoning Prague and his heavy artillery. The retreat was attended with consider- able loss. Frederick was much struck with the skill displayed by Traun, and says, in his ‘Histoire de mon Traun, = a ; Temps,’ that he regarded this campaign as his school in the art of war and M. de Traun as his teacher. The campaign may have been an excellent lesson in the art of war, but in other respects it was very disastrous to Frederick. He had drawn upon himself the whole power of Austria and had learnt how little the French were to be depended on. His prestige was dimmed by failure, and even in his own army doubts were enter- tained of his capacity. But, bad as his position already was, it became far worse when the unhappy Death of | Emperor died, worn out with disease and Charles VY re p ek i January 20, calamity. This event put an end to the 1745: union of Frankfort. Frederick could no longer claim to be acting in defence of his oppressed sovereign ; the ground was cut from under his feet. Nor was there any longer much hope of preventing the Im- perial Crown from reverting to Austria. The new Elector of Bavaria was a mere boy. In this altered state of affairs he sought to make peace. But Maria Theresa would not let him off so easily. In order that she might ; use all her forces against him, she granted Peace of . Fiicen. peace to Bavaria, and gave back to the maprnl 22, young elector his hereditary dominions, on condition of his resigning all claim to hers, and pro- mising to vote for her husband as Emperor. While Frederick thus lost a friend in Bavaria, Saxony threw herself completely into the arms of his enemy, and1745 Death of Charles VII. 61 united with Austria in a treaty which had for its object, not the reconquest of Silesia merely, but the , . at Treaty of partition of Prussia and the reduction of the Warnaw, king to his ancient limits as Margrave of may h larger than it Brandenburg. Saxony was then mu is now, but it was not only the number of troops it could send into the field that made its hostility dangerous. It was partly the geographical position of the country, which made it an excellent base for operations against Prussia, but still more the alliance that was (one to subsist between the Elector (King Augustus III. of Po- land) and the Russian Court. It was probable that a Prussian invasion of Saxony would be followed by a Russian invasion of Prussia. Towards the end of May the Austrian and Saxon army, 75,000 strong, crossed the Giant Mountains and descended upon Silesia. The Austrians were again com- manded by Prince Charles, but the wise head of Traun was no longer there to guide him. Confident of success, they marched along with colours flying and bands play- ing, hardly expecting that the Prussians would venture hy to meet them. Meanwhile Frederick, at the an of ly awaited their approach, 70,000 men, calm encouraging as much as possible the notion that he was too dis ted for action, in order that he might lure them on into the heart of his country, and there deliver a great battle. The encounter took place at H henfriedberg, and re- sulted in a complete victory for Pr "The Aunt ins and Saxons lost gooo killed and ds ed a } — 2 : ' j ° Rartle nf and 7000 prisoners, Desides SIXty-SIX CaN- Hohenfried- : berg, Ji ne s nons and seventy-three flags and standards Four days after the battle they were back again in Bo- hemia. Frederick followed, not with the intention of attacking62 The Second Silesian War. 1745 _ them again, but in order to eat the country bare, so that eet it might afford no sustenance to the enemy enters Bohe during the winter. For his own part he was re really anxious for peace. His resources were all but exhausted, while Austria was fed by a con- stant stream of English subsidies. As in the former war, England interposed with her good offices, but without effect: Maria Theresa was by no means disheartened by her defeat, and refused to hear of peace till she had tried the chances of battle once more. On September 13 her husband was elected [Emperor by seven votes out of nine, the dissentients being the ead. King of Prussia and the Elector Palatine. elected Em- _‘ This event raised the spirits of the Empress- ae Queen, as Maria Theresa was henceforth called, and opened a wider field for her ambition. She Seva of sent peremptory orders to Prince Charles to Sohr, Sep- attack Frederick before he retired from Bo- fae hemia. A battle was accordingly fought at Sohr, and again victory rested with the Prussians. The season was now far advanced, and fF rederick returned home, expecting that there would be no more fighting till after the winter. Such, however, was far from being the intention of his enemies. In Threatened invasion Ol bits mi the invasion of Brandenburg itself by three u B- ‘ - the utmost secrecy a plan was concerted for Austrian and Saxon armies acting simulta- neously. It was, of course, impossible that preparations for such extensive operations could go on without excit- ing suspicion; but it was through the indiscretion of Count Briihl, the Prime Minister of Augustus, that Fre- derick first received certain intelligence of the designs against him. He saw directly that he must no longer hesitate about1745 The Peace of Dresden. 63 attacking Saxony, even though he might thereby incur the hostility of Russia. He calculated that the Russians could not be ready for war in — Getermines less than six months, and he hoped that, MACK before that time had expired, he should be re able to dictate peace from within the walls of Dresden. After joining his Silesian army at Liegnitz, 1 rederick hastened northwards to intercept Prince Charies, who, at the head of 40,000 Austrians and Saxons, was advanc- ing through Saxon Lusatia upon | rankfort-on-the Oder. The king’s movements were effected with such rapidity ; : } . y , , = and secrecy that Prince Charles had no suspicion of his | . ] > > eh } 7 } > 5 Fy ’ ] ry being in the neighbourhood. As he marched on in rape oo . ' fat 5 ee one : : careless confidence, with his army extended in a long aie Ae oe Ne eee tel : straggling line, Frederick suddenly fell on |, the Saxon troops who formed his vanguar oat rs- and inflicted on them a severe defeat at the November village of Hennersdorf. Prince Charles had « ‘ - © , . : ' y ; oe ; + to fall back on Bohemia, while I'rederick advanced into Lusatia as far as Bautzen. Some three weeks afterwards the Prince of Dessau di K f es feated a sccon 1 Saxon and Austrian army : moder at Kesselisdortf, a icw mues irom Wresden This victory completed the subjugation [| paxOny, and « : - 7 1 — mrt ¢ +) : Thr . ’ f+ a+ | put an Ci VU Liic Wal. Lill Ce Li YS cA iL V' YVCSS5Ci i ri , 5 . . } rederick entere 1 Dresden, an 1 aston shed every ne ¥ , , by tne ora : si SS of D > be hel I { ‘ | tl . l phOCC- ration of his terms. From Saxony he exacted no ssion , , , of territory, but merely a contribution of 1,000,000 thalers 7 1¢0.000/.) towards the expenses of the wa From Aus- tria he dem La fuarantet t the treaty | f . . . . 1 ' 1 : of B es} I in returt tor wh ; UM ivrTrecu ] i : | nbher 2c to recognize k ranciS as Emperor. Pe ace was signed on Christmas Day, and the King64 The Peace of Dresden. 1748 returning home to the country which he had saved from imminent peril, was hailed by universal acclamation as lrederick the Great. The Peace of Dresden restored tranquillity to the Empire, but the European war was protracted for nearly three years longer. The French won battles Remainder of th: Aus- trian Suuc- the Austrians got the upper hand of their cession W afr, : and took fortresses in the Netherlands, while enemies in Italy. In the summer of 1745 Prince Charles Edward Stuart, son of the Pretender, landed in Scotland, and raised a rebellion which shook the throne of George II. to its foundation. Therebellion was, however, suppressed in the following year, and from that time forth the House of Hanover was freed from all danger from the partisans of the exiled family. The war was at length brought to an end by the ex- haustion of the belligerents. The Peace of Aix-la- Chapelle restored the state of affairs that oh ae had subsisted at the death of Charles VI. pecirie, () to- Peas with only one exception of importance. cr, j J. ¢ i That exception was Silesia, which in spite of the opposition of Austria, was formally guaranteed to Prussia. France gave up her conquests in the Nether- lands, and received back Cape Breton in North America. which had been taken by the English. Parma, Pia- cenza, and Guastalla were erected into a principality in favour of Don Philip, the third son of the King of Spain, and certain cessions of territory that Austria had made to Sardinia were confirmed. The questions that had occasioned the war between England and Spaiu were quietly dropped. Thus ended the war of the Austrian Succession, a war which for Austria and Prussia may be looked upon as the cause of the far greater and more bloody Seven Years’1748 he Peace of Aix la-Chapeile. 65 War. For England and France the two wars were really one, divided into two parts by an ill- ‘ : nnection observed truce of eight years. of the wa) — . . with th Maria Theresa was anything but satisfied ¢ W ar nica with the terms of the peace. Instead of re- joicing that she had saved so much of her father’s in- heritance, she harped on her losses, and, i r , Dissatisfac- forgetful of the great services which the tion of Maria English had rendered her, reproached them with the cessions which, as she asserted, they had compelled her to make. During the latter part of the war, a feeling of ill-will had been spring- ing up between the Empress-Queen and her allies, who complained of her supineness, and expected her to make greater efforts in return for their immense subsidies. This feeling was artfully stimulated by France, who, with her traditional diplomatic skill, contrived to sow dissensions between the allies by pretending to ai Rios ; ; a Aon Ne olan ofter Austria better terms in secret than England was 4k hs) Se - ' a : i¢ s puoiiciy proposing on her Denali. It was : we os : ‘ , - x . ‘ She contem- mere trickery on the Dart OF trance. Dut it . pilates a 1a nea - t water A les i — served the desired purpose. Already Maria change of TY } ' > ¢ — -+ - ; , : ? neresa Degan to entertain a varue idea of ~ } sr ] ry ry } ” le nm Try . ’ “1 +] ] ry rl) ’ ; ’ } HH | adandaonll il r O1d MINCCUON Wilh EA iand and LOl- land, and of reconciling herself with her hereditary enemy, France. Tn Livay nda Ena! 1 an _ ant e hay » ne lo France and Engl ind, on the other hand, the peace 5 ion j . a : ; was very welcome, to France because she was , , thorougen e) ] [ iEngland because , , r o ; she was wea | W LW D i id no ; : — ivia ee ee ee ’ Fog ret . r } ‘ 7 Tt a4 LTit on ie ' Ahi ila iy hid LAiCil iaSiL.Cc * . . - - pea c to conclude peace, the two powers neclected to settle properly a question which was becoming one of > ; > y ] } ’ ; . } ~ rr mn? \e ; ; : ry - ¥ iY re ~~. A baba Ph cA ld 9 ii . te Til rT id tnem iti fresh66 The North American Colont:s. 1748-54 hostilities. This question arose out of the relations of the English and French colonists in North America. CHAPTER VI. ENGLAND AND FRANCE, 6 rr r : ‘ . @1. The North American Colonies. AT the beginning of the eighteenth century, the English colonists in North America were settled along the Atlan- tic seaboard between the thirty-first and for- ee ty-fourth parallels of north latitude. Some of them claimed by their charters a right to the whole continent westward as far asthe Pacific, their boundaries tothe north and south being accurately de- fined. But in reality they extended no further inland than the Alleghany Mountains. The French settlers, insignificant in numbers com- pared with the English, were scattered over a vast tract of territory. They occupied the country orn north of the Great Lakes and of the St. Law- a rence, extending to the south of that river over what is now New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, to- gether with the adjacent islands. Besides this they had settlements in the upper valley of the Mississippi, and at its mouth the colony of Louisiana. By the Peace of Utrecht, France had ceded to England the Hudson’s Bay and Straits, Newfoundland and Aca- dia, or, as it is now called, Nova Scotia. Frontier Unfortunately the boundary of Acadia was disputes. d ; not accurately defined. Its limits had al- ways been very vague, andthe French asserted that they included only the peninsula between the Bay of- 4 j 4 = 5 Braddock. e 7 ui Fundy and the ocean. The question was still pending when the Austrian Succession War broke out, and it was left unsettled by the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, which merely stipulated that the boundaries of the two nations should be as they had been before the war, Commis- sioners were to be appointed to settle the matter, but be- fore anything could be done hostilities broke out between the French and the English on the isthmus connecting the peninsula with the Continent. Nor was this the only cause of hostility subsisting at the time of the peace. The whole frontier line was almost as vague as that of Acadia, and about this period the French set up a claim to the entire basins of the St. Lawrence and Mississippi, thus uniting their own colonies to Canada and Louisiana, and cooping up the English in the narrow strip of land between the Alleghanies and the ocean. This was of course more than could be endured by the English, and, to resist the encroaching spirit of the French, a company was formed in Virginia Onio for the purpose of colonizing the Ohio val- i Company. ley, In March, 1749, the Ohio Company, as it was called, received a grant of 500,000 acres from the crown. The French soon heard of the scheme, and La Gallisonére, the governor of Canada, promptly de- spatched 300 men to trace and occupy the valleys of the Ohio and St. Lawrence. Plates of lead were buried in various places with inscriptions signifying that from the farthest ridge whence water trickled toward the Ohio, the country belonged to France, and the lilies of the Bourbons were nailed to a forest tree in token of pos- session. No active steps were taken by the Ohio Company till the beginning of 1754, when a party of thirty three men was sent to build a fort at the point where the Alleghany68 The North American Colonies. 1755 and Monongahela unite to form the Ohio. A reinforce- 2 ment of 150 Virginian troops, under George 1¢ com - 2 Z pany begins Washington, was shortly afterwards dce- to erecta fort on the ) . Ohio. was driven back by the French, who ap- spatched, but before its arrival the first party peared in great force, and themselves erected a fort on the same spot, and called it Fort Duquesne, after the then governor of Canada. On July 3, the French at- tacked and defeated Washington at a place Water, called Great Meadows. This skirmish, un- important in itself, is memorable not only as being one ofthe main causes of the war which resulted in the expulsion of the French from North America, but also as the first appearance in history of George Wash- ington. The home government was at last roused into activity. Early in 1755 two regiments of the line sailed for Amer- ica, under General Braddock. Braddock, personally brave but a harsh ignorant man and a strict Braddock. ees ; 3 disciplinarian, was altogether unsuited for the irregular warfare of America, and his expedition was badly planned and badly executed. His contemptuous treatment of the friendly Indians, whose warnings he neglected and whose assistance he despised, caused most of them to quit his banner in disgust. The result was that, when within ten miles of Fort Duquesne, the English blundered into an ambuscade and were defeated with terrible slaughter, Braddock himselt ee being mortally wounded. Farther north on the frontiers of Nova Scotia and New Eng- land the English were more successful, but their vioto- ries in this quarter were overshadowed by Braddock's disaster, and consternation prevailed through the colo- nies.Newcastle and Pitt. 69 o , , yy + \ - : ; ; ? de id ast, (Wid Lilt, The government of England was at this juncture in the incompetent hands of Thomas Pelham, Duke of é Newcastle, who after being Secretary of State for thirty years had become First Lord of the Crea UT and Prime Minister upon the death of his brother H« nry in March 7 54- Newcastle had none of the qualities OI a States- man ; he owed his position to his immense New: stile hi reat ‘ parliam< ntal y influens i. Ssuppit mented D5 1 lo\ ec of power wealth, his high connexions, and seldom equalled in its intensity. He was a master of all the little arts by which it could be gained and pre- served; there was nothing he would not stoop to in order to secure it, and his great skill in discerning the Hani per- ed by no scruples. Sir Robert Walpole, his colleague winning side, and in attaching himself to it. was for eighteen years, said of him, “ his name is perfidy.” , li But it was only in the tenacity with which he pursued and « lung to powcl that Newca tle showed strength or determination. In the actual exercise of it he was weak and vaciilating, fussy and pretentious, jealous of every- body, and while peevish and irritable to his friends and dependents, timid in obsequiou ; toward th se whe Sse influence or abilities he dreaded. Indefatigable in the transaction of business, he was, as Horace Walpole says, only always doing it, never did it. Alw iySs In a hurry but seldom punctual, he seemed, as one of his friends observed, to have lost half an hour in the morn- ing, and to be continually pursuing without ever ovecr- taking it. His quick shuffling gait, and the rapid stutter in which he poured forth his confused ideas, were the laughing-stock of his contemporaries. Of his ignorance many anecdotes are told. Thus, when it was suggested I70 Newcastle and Pitt. 1754 to him that something ought to be done for the defence of Annapolis, ‘‘ Annapolis, he replied, ‘‘ Annapohs! oh! yes, Ann: ipolis must be defended: to be sure, An- napolis should be defended—pray where is Annapolis ?” The following yr is even more ludicrous. “ Cape Breton land, wonderful !—show it me in the map. So it My dear sir, you always bring us good an isl is, sure enough. news. I must go and tell the king that Cape Breton is an island! ss Yet in his favour it must be said that in private life he bore a high character, and was generally regarded with affection: also that his ambition was pecuniarily disinterested. His life was spent in corrupting others, but he himself remained incorrupt, and after forty years of office he quitted public life considerably poorer than he entered it. When Henry Pelham died, after a premiership of eleven years, George II. said, “ Now I shall have no more peace,” and the events of the next three years fully justified his fear. Pe lham was no genius, but he man- aged the House of Commons with great Pelham. a adroitness, and by his conciliatory disposi- tion induced men of the most divergent views to serve under him. During the latter part of his administration there had been no opposition whatever, because every one who could possibly be dangerous to the Government was taken into it. There was little chance that the tur- bulent spirits who had yielded to the tact of Pelham would submit to the control of his feeble brother. But the experiment had to be tried. Newcastle’s posi- tion and parliamentary influence made him master of the situation, for he could have brought the Government to a standstill if he had been thrown into opposition. Though the recognised head of the Whig aristocracy, he1754 Whis Opposition to Walpole. had been content with a subordinate position during the lifetime of his brother, whose superior sense and ability he acknowledged; but even of him he had been bitterly je Llous, and there was no one else to whom he would concede the p ilronage ind influence of the , » Newcastle [reasury. A leader of the Commons had Wet Lord then to be appointed, for this post also be- ort : ' ireasury came vacant by Pelham’s death, but it was , + doubtful whether Newcastle could bring himself to rive up enough power to induce any first-rate man to accept i it. There were three men in the House any one of whom might fairly aspire to it—Pitt, Fox, and Murray—and be- sides them none. William Pitt, afterwards Earl of Chatham, was at this period in the forty-sixth year of his age. He was born in November, 1708, the second son of a gentleman of old and respectable family. ses He was educated at Eton and Oxford, but left the uni- . versity without taking a degree, because of the gout from which even at that earlv age he suffered severe ly. After spending some time in foreign travel, he obtained on his return home a cornetcy in the Blues, and in 17 35 entered Parliament as member for the family borough of Old S irum., Walpole was then at the zenith of his power, though the forces which eventually overthrew him were gather- ine strength. The Tories, strong in the country, were ignificant in Parliament but a formidable opposition P] to the great Whig minister was growing up within the ranks of his own followers, of whom many were discon- tented with his measures, or disgusted with Whie cons his monopoly of power. Outside Parliament eee this party was supported by the favour of Fre- ‘ ; , derick, Prince of Wales, who, after the manner of heirs72 Newcastle and Pitt. 1754 apparent in the House of Hanover, had quarrelled with his father, and was then raising the standard of opposi- tion to the Court. Pitt threw in his lot with the discon- tented Whigs, and soon made himself conspicuous by the violence of his invectives. Walpole is reported to have said, ‘We must at all events muzzle this terrible cornet of horse,’”’ and he deprived him of his commis- sion, In the factious proceedings which led to the Spanish War and to the downfall of Walpole (1742), Pitt took a prominent part, but as he was not included in the new administration formed under the leadership of Lord Carteret, he remained in opposition till November, 1744, when the Pelham party in the cabinet obtained the mastery, and succeeded in driving Carteret from office. After securing the victory the Pelhams proceeded to form a government on what was called the “ Broad Bottom” principle of selecting men from all parties alike. High office would then have been offered to Pitt ie but for the extreme dislike which George II. dislike for entertained for him on account of the vehce- ee mence with which he had declaimed against Hanover during Carteret’s ministry. In the early part of the Austrian Succession War there was a very general feeling that the policy of the country was being made subservient to Hanoverian interests. The feeling was in the main a just one, but Pitt, while constituting himself its mouthpiece, had allowed himself to make use of expressions unjustifiable in themselves, and most dis- respectful to the king. He was, however, too formidable to be left in opposition by ministers like the Pelhams, so they pacified him with promises until, by the discredit- able manceuvre of resigning their places in the middle of the Stuart Rebellion, they forced the king to take him.1754 Pitt's Career. 73 Wi Pitt wanted to be Secretary at War, but George stipulated that he should receive no office which would bring him into personal communication with himself, and he was made Vice-Treasurer of Ireland, 1 to the ofthe Pitt made , Paymaster Soon afterwards he was appointec lucrative post of Paymaster of the Forces. This office gave Pitt an opportunity for displaying in a remarkable manner the disinterestedness of his cha- racter. It was customary for the paymaster to retain at his own disposal the floating balance, which was se}dom less than I00,0 o/, The practice was considered dishonourable, and there at thine underhand a he tk ofA thane Gb wiv Was novunlin undgderTnalh( AvUUUL il, LO! thnouegen it ITLIG iit . occasionally cause great inconvenience, it was done openly by every one who held the office. Pitt, however, ea gs ret j o} ; : poor though he was, placed the balan it the Bank of nr | + } - fee ! ’ t la + ' r . nN England and retusea to take a tarthing bey ynd his srular a ne id he : 4 ; revular Salary NOr WOUL n consent » accept the - ‘ , . commission of one-half per cent. which foreign princes ; , , who received subsidies from England were in the habit tion of the House of ( 10ns, and, judging by the iv ‘ 1 ’ ’ : } 11 Ciicit Vil I iis GAau ju i pl r( CU Ss Well : . Diy : is by the fragments which a that re- silane an > > ravor, mains of it now, he may without tear Of ex- ircreration be pronouns bea as test ever he 1 wit! ’ ration De pronounced the Prearest Cvel 1éarda Within ; seen lic \ ’ -m haw . , i. . “ — I walls. Many men have surpassed him in lucid expo- sition or in subtle and profound reasoning; many have : > ’ _ } . ‘% ; ‘n more brilliant in debate; but no one ever moved74 Newcastle and Pitt. 1754 the moment. On such occasions he was wont to be car- ried away by the torrent of his emotions to such an ex- tent that he had to refrain from speaking when he was in possession of a secret that must not be disclosed. ‘‘l must not speak to-night,’” he once said, ‘‘ for when once I am up everything that is in my mind comes out.” Pitt’s speeches owed a great deal to the personal advan- tages and rhetorical skill of the speaker. He was a tall handsome man, graceful in figure, and of a eee: very noble and commanding aspect. When he spoke, his voice, at once majestic and melodious, riveted the attention of his hearers, and the fiery glance of his eye struck terror into the hearts of his opponents; he is known to have disconcerted a hostile speaker by a single look. He was a great master of all the artifices which could enhance the effect of a speech, and although his happiest hits were struck off in the heat of debate, his eloquence was in reality the fruit of long and elaborate training. The¢ harge brought against him of introducing the manners of the stage Into public life. is as deserved as the compliment from an unfriendly critic, that his acting was equal to Garrick's. Oratory was the weapon with which Pitt gained and maintained his position in the House: but his greatness is built up on a more substantial foundation than parlia- ia v1 mentary eloquence. Chose who listened to 1e true di source of his reatness. 4 ’ : nee é mere words, felt them to be the impassioned . his speeches felt that they were more than utterance of a man who would do great things if he could obtain the opportunity. The uprightness and vehement earnestness of his character, his pure and lofty patriot- ism. his nobleness of soul, his sp] -ndid imagination, and his power of animating others with his own enthusiasm —these were the source of his strength and greatness,1754 C/-aracter of Pitt. 75 and the marks that distinguished him from the herd of his contemporaries. In an age of corruption, so degra- ding and universal that members of Parliament were not ashamed to take money for their votes, Pitts stain- less honesty stood out in sharp relief, and won him the confidence of the nation, which, though once or twice it wavered, never really deserted him as long as hi lived. This public confid nce was the basis of the ‘‘Great Com- moner's"’ power, for he had no parliamentary interest, and he was far from being aroyal favourite. Yet he was no seeker after popularity, and althou h his power rested ‘oular favour, he never shrank from risking it by a setting himself in opposition was running. He was intensely ambitious; but if, like - oa | 7 . 7 ] . . rs | . } , , . . . every politician ol his day, he employed fa US Means to obtain office, it was for no mean or personal ends that tion from the despondency 1n \ it was SUNK, a 3 to it the spirit w h it patriot seemed to ] e lost ‘*7T want I 5 fe “to call I 1 ¢ t of that enervat stat i which 20,000 men from France can sl hei And on ano- ther occasion, ‘‘ My Lord,” he s 1 to the Duke of De- vonshire, “‘l am: ire I can save thi untry, and n body »| > can. With great Virtus Pitt had ereat fa its. H career was marred by gross inconsistency, and, though this nce - , “ar , - | selu a tc ) y IncoOnsSsISten< was largely Que > nis €arnes ; \ rs hi« ness and to the facility with which he was *'** ~ " . + la, ~ a } “a° a" } w t) yur ] } * : constantly Carriea awa DY th im ise I er Ree Be 5 ; the moment, it > imposs ie to acaqull him of subordi- nating his principles to ambition and resentment. More- ~ . ~ y y y smile mon Ge ’ no : . he Was arrogant, self-confident and of so over76 Newcastle and Pitt. 1754 bearing a temper that it was very difficult for any one to act with him. The ascendency which he maintained in his cabinet and in Parliament was not due to any tact in conciliating opposition, for of that he was wholly desti- tute, but simply to the fury with which he beat it down. What is more remarkable is that this proud haughty man was absurdly affected. As in public, so in private life and in the most ordinary affairs, he was always act- ing a part, always studying effects. Grotesquely theatri- cal and pompous even in the bosom of his family, he never allowed himself to descend from the lofty pedestal of his dignity. Next to Pitt the foremost men in the House of Com- mons were Fox and Murray. Intellectually Henry Fox was fully the equal of Pitt. Without a spark Fox. . 5 of his impassioned eloquence, he was the best debater in the House, where he had attracted to himself a considerable personal following, and was p looked upon by many as the natural leader of the old Walpolian party. Where he fell immeasurably below his great rival was in political morality. Pitt never had many parliamentary adherents, but his patriotism and integrity made him the idol of the nation. Fox, on the other hand, according to Chesterfield, ‘‘had not the least notion of, or regard for, the public good, but de- spised these cares as the objects of narrow minds or the pretences of interested ones.” William Murray, better known as Lord Mansfield, was Solicitor-General under Henry Pelhain. His silvery eloquence and his clear, calm intelligence Murray. : at ee y would have fitted him to be leader of the Commons; but he was not ambitious of the post, ana he let it be understood that his hopes of advancement were purcly professional.1754 Fox ana Murray. Murray being thus out of the question, there remained * 2 } i . Le ® ; ‘ ' : I itt and I UA. i itt Wad al PaAltl Lil WILE) Lilt FOUL, and, = } ; Y ; : moreover, the KINng hated and Newcastle dreaded hiin, Newcastie accordingly applied to | Ox, Oner- F ter ruitiess Ing him the seals OF wec retary OI otate and negov.lauions +] } — 7 i ] . s j \ VCciwech i1c skeadersnip of the Commons ric, NOW] Ne ustle ; it) r x ever, reserved to himself the disposal of secret service money, and aller a pood a al of prevarica- tion refused to disclose to Fox the manner in which it ‘ ‘ , - : w ~ . : was employed. As this fund was used ior the purpose - ; . , . of bribing members of Parhament, Fox very naturally } , +) ‘ ¢ ‘ 1 ‘ 1 @ 1 Ty ODseTY ed th itit Was ImvpossI1DIe LO 1e€@ag th riouseé mm sucn terms. ‘‘If I am kept in ignorance of this,’ he said, ‘‘how shall I be able to talk to members, wh some may have received gratifications and others not?’ In other matters, too, such as the fillin Ons terial boroughs, Fox found that the duke intended to keep all {ne power in his own hands. He therefore broke off the negotiation, and Newcastle, half glad to have escaped so powerful meee 1] iyvue, at once con ferre : the se Ic d ] : ech: Pat “ : ‘ leade! sHIp of the Commons on olr ! mas Robinson. Robinson was a dull man, of moderate abilities and no parliamentary experience. He had spent most of his life LS id 10 WaTIisSf f(,erman sorte i was utterly unfit for the office with which he { Ls was entrusted ‘‘ The Duke n ht as well send his jackboot to lead us,"’ Pitt exclaimed to Fox in contemptuous indignation. When Parliament met, the rivals, united by a common feeling of resentment, joined in +++ icking the unh iDpvV secretary, and covered him with ridicule night after night. Contumetious On one occasion, Pitt, aiming at Newcastle of P hin f hid the Tance | urare lect if } nica bLLTT) i L ine 1Ou cwa»r»e if i i . ‘degenerate into a little assembly, serving no other78 Breaking out of Naval War. RIS de purpose than to register the arbitrary edicts of ove too powerful széject.’’ He and Fox both held office under Newcastle, but the timidity of the minister prevented their receiving the dismissal they so richly deserved. In January, 1755, Newcastle again opened negotiations with Fox. The terms offered were less favourable than those which he had already rejected. Fox was to have a seatin the cabinet, and to give a general support to Newcastle’s measures, but he was not to be Secretary of State or leader of the Commons. Yet, to the surprise of his friends, and to the indignation of Pitt, who con- sidered himself deserted, Fox accepted the Fox joins offer. Inthe following November he was Newcastle, ~ made Secretary of State. At the same tine Pitt was dismissed from his paymastership in conse- quence of a violent attack upon the Govern- Dismissal of Pitt ment. Of his speech only a fragment is preserved, in which he thus alluded to the coalition of Fox and Newcastle: ‘‘[ remember at Lyons to have been carried to see the conflux of the Rhone and Saone; this a gentle, feeble, languid stream, and though languid of no depth—the other a boisterous and impetu- Ous torrent—but they meet at last; and long may they continue united to the comfort of each other, and to the glory, honour, and security of the nation.” His coalition with Fox propped up a while the tottering fabric of New- castle’s government, but events were approaching waich required statesmen of a very different calibre. 32. Breaking out of the Naval War. In the spring of 1755 it became evident that war with France could not be avoided. The nation was eager for it, but the king was hampered by fear for Hanover. The English navies might sweep the French from the-1955 Dissolution of Austrian Alhance. 79 seas. but the enemy would wreak his vengeance on the defenceless electorate. England was alto- England un- prepared f r . rether unprepared for a continental war. There were positively only three regiments 4‘ mntinental in the country, and Newcastle would not ian: have any more raised from jealousy of the Duke of Cum- berland, who, as Commander-in-Chief, would have the nomination of the colonels. The prospect abroad was equally cheerless. The foreign policy of George Il. and of Newcastle since the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle had consisted chiefly in subsidizing German electors to vote with Hanover in all affairs of the Empire, and to fight for her if required. But now, just at the time when they might have been of some use, the subsidiary treaties with Saxony and Bavaria were on the point of expiring, Austria. too, showed an inclination to desert her old ally. On being asked what she would do for the defence of Hanover and the Netherlands should they be attacked by France, she made all sorts of difficulties, and threw the whole burden of the war on England, whom she recommended to contract subsidiary treaties with Rus- sia, Saxony, Bavaria, Hesse, &c. It soon appeared : : * 77 ; what the meaning of it all was. Austria would support “t England cordially on one condition, namely, that she should join with her in attacking Prussia. Now, though George II. hated his nephew, and dreaded him almost as much as he dre ided France. he was not prepared to go so far as that; and even if he had been, he knew very well that the nation would never consent to such a war. As, however, Austrias determination on this point was final, negotiations were of her alli- broken off, and thus ended an alliance on i sak oles which for three-quarters of a century the June 17 balance of power had been supposed to rest. Yet in this80 Naval War. breakdown of the old system neither George nor kis ministers were capable of devising a fresh Helpless characterof one; they went mechanically on with the English : foreign measures that Austria had recommended. ay" A treaty with Hesse had already been signed; another was being negotiated with Russia, in virtue of which the Czarina was to furnish 55,000 troops for the defence of Hanover, and receive in return 500.- ooo/. a year. The helpless hand-to-mouth character of the English foreign policy is conspicuously displayed by this Russian treaty. The rock on which the Austrian alliance had been wrecked was Prussia, and it was against this very Prussia that the Czarina’s troops were destined to act. The treaty was signed on September 30, and the year was hardly out before it became worse than superfluous. Frederick the Great heard of it and took the alarm. He had for some time been aware, as will presently be shown, that Austria, Russia, and per- haps Saxony, were leagued together for the purpose of partitioning his dominions on the first opportunity, and he foresaw the possibility of the English subsidy setting the combination in motion. He therefore determined to draw closer to England, so that he might either avert the threatened attack, or at any rate have Russia for him ee and not against him when war came. This drew closer was the less difficult since the English Court, peeeen witha curious inconsistency, had made ten- tative overtures to him during the summer at the very time when the Russian treaty was being negotiated. A$ the two powers were equally desirous of Convention : of West- keeping the war out of Germany, there was minster, : - e . . January 16, little difficulty in coming to terms. On Jan- 1756. uary 16, 1756, a Convention of Neutrali- ity was signed at Westminster, by which England andPanic in England. 8r Prussia bound themselves to unite their forces to prevent all foreign troops from entering Germany during the exper ted war with France. The true interests of England were served by this measure, which brought her into 7 union with the power that more than any other was grounds as = marked out on both religious and political her natural ally. The connection was as yet slight, but the course of events soon drew it closer. All through the winter England was harassed by fear of a French invasion ; so great was the panic that Hes- sian and Hanoverian troops were brought . : : Panic : over for the defence of the country. But a Engtand, the invasion never came: the ostentatious ae 735” . preparations made by the French all along - their northern coasts were intended to covera totally different design. On April Io, 1756, a large armament with 16,000 troops on board sailed from Toulon for the conquest of Minorca. Though the English 1 ; The French ministers had received intimation of the ' AtLACKk a ; ; - \ : 1 preparation of this expedition months before, painorce they persisted in regarding it asa mere feint, and did nothing to strengthen the garrison of Port Mahon, which was far too weak for the defence of the island. It was not till three days before the French fleet set sail thata squadron of ten ill-equipped ships was despatched to the Mediterranean under Admiral Byng. There is much justice in the bitter complaint of Horace Walpole, “‘ this was the year of the worst administration that I have seen in England: for now Newcastle’s incapacity was left to its full play.” The feebleness and indecision of the Prime Minister were reflected in his officers. When Byng arrived off Port Mahon, the Castle of St. May IQ. Philip was still holding out against a vastly superior82 Naval War. 1756 besieging force. On May 20, a partial and indecisive engagement was fought by the two fleets, which were nearly equal in strength. The next morning the French were out of sight, but Byng, alleging their super‘ority in weight of metal and in men, sailed away and left Mi- norca to its fate. He seems to have de- Byng leaves i : - . . oy 3 OW perc spaired of relieving the island even before its late. his arrival, and to havethought that any re- inforcements which he might succeed in throwing into St. Philip’s would only serve to swell the number of prisoners that would eventually fall into the hands of the French. Under these circumstances, he conceived it his duty to return and cover Gibraltar, which also was ina very defenceless state. There is no reason for charging Byng with cowardice, and on this count he was acquit- ted by the court-martial by which he was tried and con- demned to death for neglect of duty; but he was certain- ly a weak, irresolute man, incapable of sound judgment and afraid of responsibility. Left to its own resources, St. Philip’s was, after a stub- born resistance, obliged to capitulate, and the best port in the Mediterranean passed into the keep- a Eanes: ing of France. War had already been for- Philip's, mally declared by England on May 17, by June 28. ; ; France on June g. Another and greater war was on the eve of breaking out in the centre of Eu- rope. Frederick of Prussia, satisfied that he was about to be attacked by a coalition, saw his only De'laration hope of safety in anticipating his foes, * and towards the end of August he burst into Saxony at the head of 75,000men. These two wars, ih Keres separate at the outset, soon became blended Years’ War. in one, which is known in history by the name of the Seven Years’ War.Opinion of the Council. CHAPTER VII. POLICY OF AUSTRIA DURING THE PEACE, Oe A i ld fy i ’ , THE occasion of the Seven Years War was the Amer- can quarré | of England and France: its cause was the determination of Maria Theresa to repossess _a of c herself of Silesia. But for this the traditional eve» ji rs vial eter policy of Austria would doubtless have been mination of oe 1 i Maria'‘l resa maintained, and a great alliance might have to recover . been formed between England, Austria, and Prussia, which would have put an effectual curb on the power of France. For this, however, Maria Theresa cared comparatively nothing. As Mary of England said of Calais, so might she have said of Silesia, that the word was written on her heart. It is related that when she saw a native of the province she burst into tears, Its recovery was the cardinal point to which her whole policy after the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle was directed. Soon after the signing of the peace, Maria Theresa held a meeting of her secret council to discuss the future policy of Austria, the members of the council having previously been commanded to send in their opinions in writing. The general sense of the council was in favour of adhering to the traditional system of the monarchy, alliance with the sea-powers, England and Holland; and this course was warmly advocated by the Emperor, who thought it advisable to acquiesce finally in of the Em peror ; ' : i . a , ; i the loss of Siles! au l to seek to enter into more friendly relations with Prussia. Very different was84 Kauntits. 1749 the opinion of Kaunitz, the youngest member of the council, who, in a masterly paper, maintained of Kaunitz. that whereas Austria had hitherto had two great enemies to deal with, France and the Porte, she now had three, and that of these the King of Prussia was by far the most dangerous and irrecon- cilable: that Austria would never be safe until he was crushed, and therefore that the recovery of Silesia was an object never to be lost sight of. At the same time, he added, it must not be attempted until Austria had formed an alliance so powerful that, humanly speaking, there would be no possibility of failure. Russia and Saxony would probably join with her, but that would not be enough, especially as Russian policy was too incon- stant to be depended on, As it was hopeless to think of inducing England to concur in such an undertaking, he recommended that every effort should be made to obtain the alliance of France, which might perhaps be secured by cessions in Italy or in the Netherlands. The idea was not a new one, but Kaunitz was the first statesman who ventured to put it definitely forward as the guiding principle of Austria's foreign policy, and it was Kaunitz who ultimately succeeded in carrying it out. Wenzel Anton, Count, and afterwards Prince, of Kaunitz Riethberg, was at the accession of Maria Theresa a young diplomatist in his thirtieth Pee year. He soon attracted the attention of his sovereign by the clearness of his views and the lucidity of his statements, and, after being employed in various offices of importance, he was sent to Aix-la- Chapelle as plenipotentiary for Austria. On his return thence he obtained the complete confidence of Maria Theresa, and in the autumn of 1750 he went as Austrian ambassador to Paris, whence he was recalled two years1749 Character of Kaunttz. 85 aiterwards to be placed at the head of affairs at Vienna. 3 for the next forty years he directed the foreign policy of Austria. The character of Kaunitz presents a strange mixture In April, 1753, he was appointed Chancellor of State, and of noble and petty qualities. He was haughty and supercilious, vain and ludi rously affected, His charucter, foppish in dress, indolent and luxurious even to effeminacy. Yet the outw ird mask of a Svbarite concealed a remarkably keen-witted states- man, a man of marvellous discretion and great pertina- city, full of resources, and a master of his craft, subtle, wary, and deeply versed in the arts of dissimulation. A perfect if somewhat exaggerated type of the formal and pedantic, but refined, courteous and highly polished, diplomatists of the eighteenth century, his chief intel- lectual defects were his overweening conceit and vanity, which on one celebrated occasion, at any rate, bs trayed him into an obtuseness contrasting strangely with his knowledge and powers. The policy recommended by Kaunitz was cordially approved of by Maria Theresa, who was animated by intense hatred of Frederick the Great. Her- ¥ unitzs self profoundly religious, she detested the policy , = i . Ve 1 by heretical king for his well-known scepticism Mat 7 Ch re i no less than for the wrong he had done her, and regarded itasa duty to bring back Silesia into the fold of the Catholic Church. But mu h as Kaunitz wished it, it was not possible to put his views at once into execution. The political revolution he advocated could only be gradually effected: nor was Austria prepared for in mediate war. Inthe meantime searching reforms were instituted in every branch of the public service. The various \y86 Kaunitz. 1750- - provinces forming the Hapsburg monarchy were brought under a more uniform system of administration; the army was reorganized on the Prussian model, and the finances rearranged with such effect that Maria Theresa drew from her dominions a revenue considerably larger than her father had enjoyed when in the possession of Naples, Parma, Silesia, and Servia. The first step towards the realization of Kaunitzs scheme was taken when he was sent to Paris, with instruction to seek to establish more friend- ee ae ly relations between the Courts of Vienna and Versailles, and to loosen the ties that bound France and Prussia together. In this he made very little direct progress. An enmity of more than two centuries’ standing was not easy to remove, and Prussia was manifestly the best ally that France could have, though it might be urged with plausibility that the long rivalry of Bourbon and Hapsburg had served only to promote the aggrandizement of minor states like Savoy and Brandenburg, and that France and Austria united might dispose of the rest of Europe as they pleased. In- directly, however, Kaunitz did a good deal. He saw the immense influence which Madame de Pompadour, the mistress of Louis XV., exercised over that indolent and enervated monarch, and he took great pains to gain her good will. At no distant date the friendship of the favourite proved of great service to Austria (though not quite to the extent commonly supposed), but at that period Madame de Pompadour meddled very little in politics, and Kaunitz returned to Vienna dispirited and half in- clined to abandon his project. Wavering between fear of losing England and hope of gaining France, he seems to have been really in great perplexity. There is littleou» ~~ 1] v1 5 he English Altiance. 87 doubt that he would have preferred the English alliance to the French if he could have brought Eng- : - st. } K aunitz and land round to his way of thinking about the English , Ya . } 1. , } . ‘ ehAl died aes Prussia : but of that he knew there was little *"“"° chance, and before long he reverted to his original plan. Thus it happened that, when England, in expectation of nth khranre , nea! ] . live far ‘ : War with France, appt Lied to ner old Ally [Ol as5s1Stance, A ustri : red little dist ye AeA st Ag ee 7 AAuStria Showed 1i1ttie Gisposivon to afiorda lit, ine réla- , tions of the Courts of London and Vienna had been somewhat strained during the years that followed the " ” A | ’ | . ry nmi j tla peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, but harmony might easily - have been restored if the interests of the two powers had , Tha 4 iVvVS O] Lic - - e oe ee U aed “- ~ ~* ~ been rTeaily : 7 . Cy! ind Alllance, when OLN Were equ Liy concerned to resist the encroachments of Louis XIV. Chis however, onger the case. England, as of old, wished to 7 c | a parle - ~ eae © . } sabes — make use of Austria against France, while Austria wanted ; 73: 9 i a —— Sy ; 1 : to Cinpioy Gail ie! rors > 3 Sy Linst Pruss! ls WhO h id vee»n , , and would probably 7 rT} , ~~ . 4 o * \ be so still. Therefore as soon as it became certain that allied with France in the late war England would in no case join her in a war against Frederick, Austria ceased to strive for an alliance which } c e no longer had any value for her. Immediately upon the rupture of negotiations with England, Kaunitz renewed his efforts to obtain a French alliance. Count ambassador at Paris, was furnished with a “sho lalious sketch of the proposals that his Court had make, and with a letter from the chancellor to Madame de Pompadour, couched in the most flattering terms, and requesting her intercession on behalf of Austria. It >8§ Negotiations with France. 1755 has frequently been asserted that Maria Theresa herself condescended to address the favourite in a letter, bee Fm | lli- ning with the words ‘‘ Ma cousine,”’ or even ‘‘ Madame ma trés chére sceur,’’ but it is now tolerably Madame de certain that this story, though vouched for Pompa lour . : : and Muria by contemporary authority, is utterly un- I heresa. ” : true. Nor indeed was such a letter in any way needed. The Pompadour was easily induced to espouse the cause of Austria, not only for the sake of her friendship with Kaunitz, but also, and perhaps chiefly, out of spite against Frederick, who had mortally offended her by some satirical verses reflecting on her frailty, and by the contemptuous tone in which he habitually spoke of her. One of his sayings in particular had Her hatred cut her to the quick. Inthesummer of 1750, of Frederick, when Voltaire was starting on a visit to Berlin, she had charged him with a polite message to the king, for whom she entertained a great admiration. Frederick, however, instead of receiving it in the man- ner anticipated, curtly replied, ‘‘I do not know her” (‘Je ne la connais pas’). Voltaire at the time sup- pressed the ungracious reply, but three years after- wards, when he had left Berlin in disgrace, and with feel- ings of bitter disappointment and rage against Frederick this and other delinquencies were faithfully reported. Madame de Pompadour was therefore well disposed to further a scheme which would enable her to revenge herself on a prince who had treated her with contempt, and Louis XV. himself was inclined to look upon it , . favourably. He also had been wounded by the shafts of Louis XV. in- Frederick's wit, and he had, moreover, pri- clinesto Austria | yy eae . r from religious Wate reasons for desiring the Austrian alli- MACKIY ES. ance. Sunk though he was in the lowest depths of debauchery, he was preyed upon _inces-Bernis. 89 religious terrors, and he believed that an > I ~~ ~— o - alliance with Catholic Austria, formed for th purpose ot warring against heretics, might atone for the evil deeds of a life of which he well knew the infamy, without hav- we , to amend it. lhis 1s no matter of , mn tha Cc | sty . bile Lit resolution conjecture: he actually told the Duke of Choiseul, that he believed that God would not damn him, if he as : , ‘ . ; = | . e +} - : : ; king, upheld the Catholic religion, and that it was solely ; for the purpose of destroying Protestantism that he had allied himself with Austria. On receipt of the Austrian proposals the King ap- pointed to confer with Stahremberg the Abbé de Bernis, : ae o + ‘ \A : — le | ryt . 1, ee an Cali, Irle na Ol iid LITL¢ Lit ( ipa uT ~ nf } ] Bernis. a man of considerable omplishments but 4 . + , ¥ , ’ of no great abilities, and, except as amDassador at minor c - s, without experience in the conduct of affairs. For -—< ~ a ~ — ~a oun _ , — - © —_ ~~ pat YQ _ —_ , — ~~ co er — —_ Oo in c = ~~ co “ joe Ww withheld from them altogether, and that the treaty was . : . } , concluded by Louis, the |! lour, Bernis, and Stah- remberg Bernis was the pi pal agent throughout, iin cl : a tl ee a 1¢ cic | IT) 7} iT i i Cat GC il t » Sav 1n 7 . - ] } \ ré | Int of tne necot | ns betore any aeciaec , ¥ , | > ) Was taken, l were responsible for the result. 1) t} i‘ ster the Anctr ’ rey? ] rare ry c rent!) f a; ’ CI Lilie Aus ‘ an prop Sais W re ire gquentry ’ > - . o canvassed, but no great progress was ma le towards a definite agreement till the desire of the French Court for 1 an accommodation was quickened by the conclusion of the Treaty of Westminster between England and Prus- Sila. Even in their altered state of things it proved impossi- > nv >» hear .Y Pe : : a } L ble to draw France into active hostility against Frederick.go Austria and Russia, 1756 The Treaty of Versailles, signed on May 1, 1756, was Shtesty. of purely defensive; but Kaunitz was satisfied Versailles, y } r) c 2 | > = - - Bos ac. with having obtained so much, and regarded it as a stepping-stone to a closer union. Madame de Pompadour also expressed her delight at the settlement of an affair which she regarded as her own work, and assured Stahremberg that she would do her utmost to prevent an undertaking which had com- menced so well from stopping half way. The expecta- tion of Kaunitz was justified, and the promise of Madame de Pompadour redeemed, by the event. A year after- wards France was involved in a great alliance which had for its object the partition of Prussia. " ¢ 3. Austria and Russia, If France was as yet indisposed for an offensive alli- ance with Austria, this was far from being the case with Russia. For some time past the Czarina Austriaand had been prepared to go all lengths with Russia ree: : © Maria Toeresa. As far back as the year 1746, only six months after the Peace of Dresden, a treaty of alliance was signed at St. Petersburg by Treaty of St. : ie : gg Petersburg Austria and Russia which, though defensive June 2, 1746 a ; : in its general tenor, evidently contemplated a renewal of the war against Prussia. Seven years after- wards, a resolution was passed at a meeting Resolution of the Senate at ¥ Moscow, May, effect that it should henceforth be considered 1753 of the Russian Senate at Moscow, to the a fundamental maxim of the Russian Em- pire, not only to resist all further aggrandizement of the King of Prussia, but also to seize the first opportunity of overwhelming the House of Brandenburg by superior force. The virulent animosity against Frederick which was1756 The Czarina Elisabeth. gi felt at St. Petersburg rested on personal as well as on political grounds. The Czarina S Was a handsome, indolent voluptuary, grossly superstitious, and thou means destitute of abilities, gov worthy favourites. Her life was and Frederick unhappily was r of prude nce in the exercise of on Elizabeth and her favourites Elizabeth The Czarina . : Klizabeth, gh by no erned by the most un- only too open to satire, strained by no motives wit. His sharp sayinis . were reported by tale- bearers whose interest it was tO SOW QISSCNSIONS between the two sovereigns, al 1 the acen Saxon Courts omitted nothing brea¢ h, All sorts of stories, som ts of the Austrian and that could widen the e true, some false, were ; told to the Czarina; she was even made to believe that Frederick soucht to have her ass be a mistake to suppose that Eli ated by personal considerat! yns Peter the Great, and ambitious « policy of introducing Russia into much as possible. She could ns assinated. But it would zabeth was solely actu- yf pursuing her father's the afta rs of I urope as t. therefore, look with indifference on the growth of a strong power on her ; : Wen ae “ were introduced. Frederick devoted himself with great assiduity to the study of tactical problems, ee and then caused them to be worked out in practice by his troops. In 1753, 36,000 troops were collected at Spandau for this purpose, and the manceuvres lasted twelve days. Prussian officers were brought from all parts of the kingdom to witness them, but great care was taken to prevent the presence of any unauthorized person. A cordon of sentries was drawn round the manceuvring ground, and the chief magistrate of Spandau was even ordered to permit no one to ascend the church tower. After the Seven Years’ War the manceuvres were not shrouded in such myste- rious secresy, and foreign officers were permitted to be present at them. It was not till 1753 that Frederick became actually aware of the designs that were being formed against him. Towards the end of the previous year his suspi- cions were aroused by information which reached him from Saxony, through the Prussian General Winterfeldt, whereupon he charged Maltzahn, his minister at Dres- den, to investigate the matter by all possible means, Maltzahn succeeded in corrupting a Government clerk, named Menzel, who from Easter 1753 on- Frederick's wards furnished him with copies of various secret sources of important papers in the Saxon archives, and information. ; 3 of all the despatches that came from Vienna and St. Petersburg, together with Briihls answers Frederick thus became acquainted with the ae” Treaty of Warsaw (p. 61,) the Treaty of St. Petersburg (p. 90,) and other documents, which con- vinced him that Austria and Russia harboured designs against him of a serious nature, and further, that Saxony, though she shrank from definitely committing herself,-1756 Perplexity of Frede ick. 95 was nevertheless actively engaged in hounding Russia on. Additional information was derived from Maximi- lian Weingarten, a secretary in the Austrian : . . Weingarten, embassy in Berlin, who was corrupted by Winterfeldt some time in the year 1754. It is manifest that it behooved Frederick, knowing what he did, to act with circumspection, SO as tO av idl giving Austria a pretext for attacking him, It w ri therefore, with great apprehension that he per 1755, that the American quarrel of England and ! Ce was likely to be fought out in Europe, and that the ’ } French would seek to recoup their losses on - - Le sas - : , . ] rth } } ; mces On the Rhine a id in} W is toh Lila Wi tld pr MADLY } , + ru 177 »f 7 4 ’ f hecome the seat of military occupations, and, worst Ol 1] } 1] oy all. he himself would most likely be com | ow eee part in it. His alliance with France was near expiring, ; ; }, : : . 1 ls } . } 9 s | and though it was purely defensive, the French would } »¥t : ls . "7 1, : } ” 4 as aimost certainly INSISt O! his 1oining their attack ON H T) rp 4 mist n ‘ s* y- : .% } : r ’ i anover as a condition OT Us renewal, naeed, Wl Was ' 9 ° ; . . : not long before he received a hint to that effect. But i eer egt ; tnis woulda give A stria the opportunity she wan ed -° if he atta96 frederich’s Reasons for War. 1756 a measure. He began to suspect that France and Aus- tria were secretly coming to an understanding, and therefore, as the best chance of preserving the peace of Europe, he concluded with England the Convention of Neutrality already mentioned. Frederick's main object in concluding the convention was to prevent the invasion of his dominions by Russia, and he was careful to assure France that it was in no spirit of hostility to her that he had signed it, that he pe sull hoped for a renewal of the defensive alli- tries to renew ance, and that though he could not join her a +a against Hanover, there were many other ser- oe vices which he might be able to render. But his representations were without effect: probably Louis had already decided in favour of Austria. Anyhow, the Convention of Westminster was followed by the Treaty of Versailles. The relations of the great powers to one another at this period was curiously complex. It was a time of transition from one system to another, and almost every one of them was in alliance with two others Complexity : | that were mutually hostile. Prussia had allied of th ehh herself with England, but without abandon- Birt Sowers. ing her alliance with France. Similarly, Austria was in league with France, but had not yet defi- nitely separated from England. Nor, again, had Russia, up to this time, broken with England, though she was meditating accession to the treaty of Versailles, and was urging Austria to an immediate declaration against Prussia, the King of England’s ally. The course of events soon tore asunder the old ties, and ranged the powers afresh in two hostile camps. On the one side stood England and Prussia; on the other, France, Aus- tria, and Russia, with several of the minor states.Frederick decitd:s on War. The plot rapidly began to thicken. Frederick had not been immediately alarmed by the Treaty of Ver- sailles: underrating the Power of Madame de Pompa- dour, and knowing that the best French statesmen still wished to renew the Prussian alliance, he believed that the connexion of | rance and Austria would be of short duratic his ambassador at Paris informed him that the int of the mistress grew dal mn. He was, however, soon undeceived, In June, luen Le, 1 } (2 : ] : | iv, and that she and the kK! le were meditating a closer alliance with Austria. At the } 7 1 } +} A ced . + Same tuume De heard from Silesia that the Austrians were o . . ‘ 1 ‘ forming great camps in bohemia and Mora } W . > } ¥ via, while from various quarters there came wv al : s 7 pe immincnt. news of the preparations Ol Russia. the Czarina made no secret of her inte! While deliberating on the best course to ,, pursue under these alarming circumstances, receives a ~ e 9 . ~ ‘ Wari fg Frederick received from St. Petersburg two from S: AtYT ¢ ’ . lattarc ryiiy etincr ¢ mao &! in r rS rE. anonymous IC ilUio pp Ai VULLIIIe LO CULINECG ii) } . ry "“focf nh lay : fy ; ireort ; . + + } s “2 . tne SLi its Si ' bhtiAaVal os il ll a VC Y (ruStW Truly s& UT ‘ } ~} n fart st that tha th bar } ; bee ] which informed him that the tired ened attack Was dec- ferred because the Russian army was not ready eae : A he t it would certainly be made in th fol] + by — - liseela i seb 6) + +) —_ ; : | - a we ere 1S Little doubdDt that the Writer Was the Urand-aquanre 1 , ‘ 2. Peter, the acknowledged heir to the Russian throne, a devoted admirer of Frederick, and consequently a strong, though secret98 Frederick's Reasons for War 1756 faintest hope of preserving peace. The first Silesian war Justice and wisdom of his decision. was voluntary on his part, but this time war was forced upon him, It was a wise deci- sion, because his best chance of escaping destruction Jay in anticipating the attack of his enemies. It was just possible that he might crush Austria in a sin- cr a true that he was playing Austria's le campaign, and nip the coalition in the bud. It is game by attacking her, for he thus enabled her to represent herself as the injured party, and soto call upon France for the suc- cours stipulated for in the Treaty of Versailles. But he had reason to believe that delay would merely serve to * give her time to draw France into an offensive alliance, and, therefore, this consideration was outweighed by the = certain advantages of prompt action. Still, in deference to the wishes of England, Frederick consented to make a final effort for peace before proceed- Frederick makes a last effort for peace. ing to extremities. Klinggraff, his ambas- sador at Vienna, was instructed to demand a private audience of the Empress-Queen, and to ask her whether her camps on the Silesian frontier were formed for the purpose of attack- ing Prussia. The answer was evasive. Klingeoraff was 55 ordered to press for a less oracular reply, and especially to ask Maria Theresa fora definite assurance that she would not attack Prussia that year or the next. Again the answer was evasive. Frederick had expected nothing else, and had made his preparations while awaiting it. It reached him on August 25, and four days afterwards Frederick’ reasons for invading Saxony. had shown him the danger of leaving the electorate he crossed the Saxon frontier. Frederick had two reasons for invading Saxony, one military, the other political. His experience in the second Silesian warFrederick's Plan of Cperations. 99 hostile in his rear. In 1744, after he had passed through it into Bohemia, believing it to be friendly, it Had risen against him, cut off his communications, and placed him in great peril, He was not going to 1 \ ; y commit the same mistake twice, In the second place, = ry yf | 1, 7 \ > , . , o + ] the originals of the Menzel documents were in the Dres- den archives; if he could obtain and publish these, he ; would be able to prove to Europe that he was not tne rrrea ” lt YY : ry Y) ; } ; izgressor. It is sometimes maintained that while he had good ground for making war on Austria, he was not < ° V justifed in attacking Saxony. This view is hardly tena- hla a + ee } ioe lee : ~ Dic oaxony, it 1S true, had not definitely committed lic rsell D) iV DIT) ANY Leatiecs hostile to lrusSsla at any o> o - titioning treaty of Warsaw), but of the +} ’ po hostility of her intentions there was not the smallest ’ : ‘ . ; ¢ UOUDL, Frederick expected no resistance from the Saxon army, and thought that he would be able in a few days either to disarm it. or, as he hoped, to compel the ee King of Poland (Elector of Saxony toyield = ;lanof it up to him ind make common Cause with Prussia. When this had been done and his route se- lec ure > inte to pass into Bohemia and strike a cu q, he inten LO | ' blow att Austrians in combination with Marshal 1 Schwerin. who was to invade the country with a se ond . ; , irmv from Glatz It was not improbable that a great y : aa frnare th victory might be won and Prague captured before the . . ‘ = foile winter The plan was well con: eived, but it Was foiled Id. The Saxon army, numbering no more than 17,000 by an unexpected difficulty on the thresho men, was far too weak to resist the Prussians in the open C . : aT Sta. den oe tire field. but on the first news of thei approach it retired,100 The Invasion of Saxony. 1756 at the instigation of the French ambassador, into a camp of great natural strength. At Pirna, a few The Saxon ; miles above Dresden, the low hills on each Canip at Pirna. side of the Elbe rise into lofty and precipi- tous rocks intersected by chasms and covered with pine woods. Into this natural stronghold Augustus retreated with his army when he heard of Frederick’s advance. The Saxons took up a position on the hills south of the Elbe, their right resting on Pirna, their left on the K6- nigstein, an impregnable fortress built on a high rock overlooking the river. Asthe position was too strong to be forced, Frederick was reduced to the Blockaded by the Prussians. necessity of blockading it. He was in- formed that the Saxons had provisions only for a fortnight, but, as it turned out, they were able, by means of short allowances, to eke them out for a much longer time. The King of Poland steadily refused to disband his army or to suffer it to take an oath of fideli- ty to the King of Prussia; he hoped that before he was starved out relief would come from Austria. From the moment when war became inevitable, the Austrians had pushed on their preparations pee with vigour. In the last days of August, plan of the Marshal Browne began to assemble an army Austrians, ; a : : ; in the neighbourhood of Kollin, while Prince Piccolomini collected a second out of Moravia. and took post near Koniggratz, to resist an invasion of Bohemia from the side of Glatz. Their plan was to remain strictly on the defensive until the spring, to avoid pitched bat- tles, and rather to suffer Frederick to occupy a portion of their territory than to run the risk of encountering him with inferior forces. They were therefore greatly discon- certed when they heard that Augustus had shut himself up @t Pirna, instead of retreating on Bohemia, as hadBattle of Lobostts. ror been arranged. They evensuspected him of meditating an accommodation with Prussia, little guessing what a service he was really rendering them. It was of course impossible to abandon the Saxons to their fate, and Browne was ordered to march to their relief with part of his army, and Open Out a line of retreat if it were still possible. This, how- ever, was easier said than done. On the Browne ordered to ; left bank of the Elbe the way was barred relieve the . “ . . »AXOTLS by the Prussians, and Browne's only chance kre 1d by hia . the rigl was to work round by a circuitous route on the right bank of the river, to the rear of the Saxon posi on al Schandau. Close ly blockaded as the Saxons were, messengers could pass to and from their camps by mountain paths and Browne was able to inform them that he would reach Schandau on October 11. On the S< -~ me day they were to effect the passage of the Elbe under cover of the guns of the Kénigstein, and on the following morning to attack the Prussian posts In front while the Austrians assailed their rear. The intentions of the Austrians were not unperceived by Frederick. He therefore left one half of his army to blockade the Saxons, and advanced into Bohemia with the other. At Lobositz he fell in with | . : Battle of Browne, and a well-contested but inde- Lobositz, cisive battle ensued. The Austrians fought far better than they had ever fought in the Silesian wars. Both sides claimed the victory, but not with equal justice. The loss of the Prussians was greater than that of the enemy, but they drove the Austrians out of Lobositz, and kept possession of the battle-field. To them, therefore, the honour of the day must be ascribed, although the Austrians retreated in good order and unmolested, ind, what was of more importance, Browne was able to carry iH102 The Invasion of Saxony. 1756 out his plan of marching to the relief of the Saxons, just as if nothing had happened. His expedition was, how- ever, a failure. From the first it had been little more than a forlorn hope; the ground was too difficult, and the Prussians too strongly posted, for the Saxons ever to have had much chance of cutting their way Browne at- 2 : tenps to through. As a matter of fact, they hardly deliver the as : Sg ebbs. vue made the attempt. On the appointed day, fails. Browne, with 8,coo picked men, reached Lichtenhayn, a few miles from Schandau, but the Saxons were not ready. Their pontoons had not been forthcoming at the proper time; the narrow mountain roads were choked by their artillery, and the Prussians harassed their retreat. They were two days late in get- ting across the Elbe, and then, wearied, half-starved, and drenched with rain, they were too dispirited to be led tothe attack. Meanwhile, the Prussians had strength- ened their posts on the north side of the river; Browne himself was in danger of being cut off, and had to retreat. Nothing remained for the Saxons but to capitulate at discretion. The terms of the capitulation were severe, The officers were dismissed on giving their Capitulation ea of Pirna, word not to serve against Prussia in the pre- eo sent war, but the rest of the troops were compelled to enlist in the Prussian army—a measure hardly justifiable and anything but successful, for most of them deserted on the first opportunity. Thus misera- bly for Saxony ended the first campaign of the Seven Years’ War. But her sufferings had not been in vain. Fatal as it proved to her own interests, her stubborn re- sistance had saved Austria. By the time the capitula- tion was signed the season was too far advanced for military operations, and the Prussians were obliged to withdraw from Bohemia. Frederick had not come to1756 Zhe Empe-or passes sentence on Frederick. 103 Saxony as a conqueror, but from this time forth he treated the electorate as a conquered coun- frederick try. He took its government entirely into “*«s P . . : s Session oO his own hands, and made it subservient Saxony. to his own policy. Its finances were administered with Prussian economy, and during the whole of the war it afforded him a considerable revenue. $3. The War becomes ceneral, Frederick’s first campaign was undoubtedly a failure. The possession of Saxony was very important from a ; ; military point of view, but he had not suc- 4 : ‘ Results of ceeded in making any impression On Aus- the first : — Campaign, tria, while the violence of his proceedings ; gave his enemies a handle which they were not slow to make use of. The papers found in the Dresden archives enabled him to publish a justification of his conduct, but this had no practical result. It produ ed a considerable impression in France, but upon the French Court it had no effect whatever. The king was completely fascinated by Austria, and the intrigues of Madame de Pomp idour J were now seconded by the prayers of the D 1uphiness, the daughter of the King of Poland, who implored Louis to fly to the rescue of her parents. All through the winter Austria strained every nerve to consolidate her alliances, and she did not scruple to use her position at the head of the Empire, in order to drag that body into the qu irrel that had arisen between two of its members. On its own responsibility, without con- sulting the electors, princes, and cities, the I . . he Empero “mperor passed sentence on Frederick, and : Empe r | es ] } - - ‘- Tele condemned him, unheard, as a disturber of ' n Fred eri _ 7 , . ° ‘ the peace Many of the great cities alto cree. and even104 The War becomes general. among the states generally subservient to Austria there were some that were alarmed at so flagrant a disregard of law and precedent. It may have seemed a sign of what was to be expected should Prussia be annihilated, and no state remain in Germany that dared to lift up its voice against Austria. Nevertheless, in spite of this feel- ing, and in spite of the opposition of nearly all the Pro- testant states, Austria succeeded in inducing the Empire to espouse her cause. In all three colleges of electors, princes, and cities she obtained a majority, and at a diet, held on Jan. 17, 1757, 1t was resolved that The Empire ; declares war on Erussia, for the purpose of making war on Prussia. January 17, ‘ E 1757. Kreder- Some months later Frederick was put to the ick put to the : ; . : , . ban uf the ban of the Empire. But the use of this an- Empire. an army of the Empire should be set on foot tiquated weapon served rather to throw ridicule on those who employed it than to injure him against whom it was launched. While all this was in progress the Court of Vienna was busily concerting measures with the Courts of St. Peters- burg and Versailles. A new treaty was Treaty of ; a alliance with Concluded with the former, on the base of Russia, Febru- ary 2, 1757. * he Russian proposals of the preceding spring (p. go), and Austria bound herself to pay the Cazarina one million roubles (about 180,000/.) a year during the continuance of war. Last of all, after long haggling on both sides, there was signed at Versailles a second treaty between France and Austria, a treaty for the partition of Prussia. Silesia and Glatz, and a certain small portion of Partition- tr aty of Ver- sailles, May, tria. Saxony wasto get Magdeburg, Halle, q-9 1, 1757- Brandenburg, were to be conquered for Aus- and the adjacent districts, as well as the Duchy of Halberstadt, for which, however, she was tooJ 75 7 Partition Treaty of Versailles. IO5 surrender part f Lusatia to Austria. The Prussian lands on the Rhine were to be given to the Elector Palatine, while Sweden, with whom France had already concluded an alliance, was to receive part of Pomerania. France and Austria reciprocally bound themselves not to make peace until these objects had been attained, and France undertook to pay Austria 12,000,000 florins (960,000/.) a year as long as the war lasted. On the other hand, Austria promised that as soon as she had received her share of the spoil she would cede to France a portion of the Netherlands, including the seaport towns of Ostend and Nieuport, and give the remainder to Don Philip of Spain, Louis’s son-in-law, in exchange for his duchies of Such were the main art! les of a treaty that was un- : 11 | 3 | I ’ r semites doubtedly a great triumph for the diplomacy of Kaunitz ‘ > | , } ~ ¢ . and Stahremberg \lmost all the advantage was on the side of Austria. Notonly were the territorial acquisitions which the treaty se- +1 - . , , , cured to her far more considerable than those which were to fall to the share of France, but the latter were contin- ; a a. | [= ‘ i. “> 1 1 — rent on the success of the whole unaertakIng. The loss } T ) . - + 1 of the Netherlands was no great matter for Austria; their remoteness and the conditions under which they were , ; ; } ; : : 7 ‘ he ld made them rather a burden than a ource of ~ ; hh cTre!l th, ind tn IT | T Tl al } | Lui be } it s() ad i Lpi- dated as to be hardly defensible. And it was only a herlands that France was to obtain: the -d to a foreign prince, and it made little difference to France whether that prin were a Bourbon or a Hapsburg. The indirect advan- tages of the treaty to Austria were greater still. If the war should be successful, the only German power that ’ could offer any resistance to her would be annihilated,106 The Viar becomes general. 175 and she would able to extend her influence in Germany to almost any extent; nor would she any longer, as heretofore, be met by French intrigues at every turn. Yet it was for this that France was to spend her blood and treasure; for this that she was to neglect her war with England, to abandon her traditional policy, and to join with her hereditary enemy in destroying a power with which she had no cause of quarrel, and from which she had nothing to fear. The adhesion of Sweden brought little material strength to the allies; but as Sweden was a Protestant power, it had some effect in discountenancing the ru- mour that Austria, France, and the Catholic part of the Empire were combining to put down Protestantism. The rumour had, nevertheless, some foundation in fact. Though nothing was said about it in the treaties, it Is certain that both Maria Theresa: and Louis The rr Tr . . . velisioas war WwOked upon their war against the heretical to some ex- kings of England and Prussia as a religious tent. ; . war; it is little less certain that if it had succeeded, continental Protestantism would have existed only on sufferance. It has been calculated that the population of the States arrayed against Frederick the Great amounted to 9go,- Whe odds 000,000, and that they put 430,000 men into against the field in the year 1757. ~The population Prussia ‘ of Prussia was 4,500,000, her army 200,000 strong; but, after deducting the garrisons of the for- tresses, there remained little over 150,000 men avai able for service in the field. The odds against Frederick were great; but they were not absolutely overwhelming His territories were scattered and difficult of defence, the extremities hardly defensible at all; but he occupied a central position from which he might, by rapidity of—1757 Zhe English All ance. LO7 movement be aole to take his assailants in detail, unless their plans were distin ruished by a harmony i o é 4 His Advantaces unusual in the efforts of a coalition. on her side, country was poor, but so far was it from being burdened with debt, that treasure to the amount of 2,750,000/. had been amassed during the peace. If his troops were lew in numbers compared w ith the hosts of the enemy, they were in quality inferior to none in Europe, and they were « ommanded by the first general of the age. Nor was it aslight advantage for Prussia that the comm snder-in-chief of her forces was al the same time the absolute ruler of the country, and able to dispose of its resources as he would. As such Frederick could run risks and endure defea ceneral could have daret ts that no responsible 1 to incur, or have been able to surmount. Something, too, must be allowed for the enthusiasm likely to be « alled forth by the spectacle of a king leading his own armies Co the battle-field, endu- ring the same hardships, exposed to the same dangers, as the meanest of his followers. In addition to these resources, there was the English alliance: but for the first year of the war, at any rate, there seemed little chance ol Frederick's obtaining much help from England. Later Jina en, when Pitt was 0 mly established power, she came nobly forw urd: but at the opening of “n of 1757, it looked as if Eng! ind was likely the campal ov. o to lean on Prussia rather than Prussia on England j y r f - TqT7 > _ 34 English Affairs during ¢ j r - j * ° rine Lan antm et ef . During the autumn of 1750 te 3 7 5 sae ae er fe ey A eo te) 111 sed was too weak and Cistracteu ¢ ) pa mu } ~. wari 8 j 1 , } ' = os othe great wal mn which it haa Ciailv irk i news } ] if } Tt quent? rs Y aa is . entraat fran P = s retreat irom108 English Affairs during the Winter. 17 56- loss of Minorca, raised a tempest of indignation through- ; out the country. Newcastle bent before the Weakness of ? eo : the English storm, and characteristically sought to divert Voverameat. resentment from himself by stimulating the popular fury against the unfortunate admiral. When a deputation of the city had made representations to him against Byng, he blurted out, ‘‘Oh! indeed he shall be tried immediately—he shall be hanged directly!” But : it was of no avail. The unpopularity of his Fall of ee eo d : oh Newcastle's admunistration grew daily, and when Fox re- Zovernment : i ; 3 R vember Slgned the seals, weary at last of the position ae of a minister without influence, and of being held responsible for measures about which he had not been consulted, no one could be found to take his place, and Newcastle reluctantly made up his mind to resign. Pitt's opportunity had at length arrived. A new ad- ministration was formed, of which the nominal head was the Duke of Devonshire, a nobleman of high Administra- tion of Pitt and Deyon- abilities. Pitt received the seals of Secretary shire, character, but in no way remarkable for his of State, and Earl Temple, whose sister, Lady Hester Grenville, Pitt had recently married, was appointed First Lord of the Admiralty. Henry Lesge became Chancellor of the Exchequer. It was felt from the first that the new ministry would be shortlived. Strong in talent and in the public confidence, it lacked two essen- tial elements of permanence—royal favour and parlia- mentary influence. The King’s aversion to Pitt con- tinued, and Newcastle, out of office, retained great power in both Houses. If, however, Pitt’s tenure of office was Pitt's vigo- : ae rous mea- insecure, he, at any rate, made his weignt ee felt while it lasted, though disabled by the gout during the greater part of the winter. The King’sPitt's Continental Policy. 109 =h, delivered at the opening of Parliament {Decem- Ner 2). was cou hed In atone very different from wh it had been customary of late, and the actions of the min- istry were in harmony with the poli y it enun< iated. 55,000 men were voted for the navy, 45,000 for the army; the Hanoverian troops were sent back to the Continent, and Pitt adopted the bold idea of raising two ; regiments from the Highland clans which had lately been engaged in rebellion against the Crown, a measure which . more than anything else contributed to change the dis- affection of the Highlanders into loyalty. A bill for the organization of a militia was passed th of Parliament, though opposed by the Lords, who im- paired its efficiency by reducing the number of men to = © oe = ~ f “ ; ; . ee be raised to 32,340, one-half of what had been originally proposed. Reinforcements were despat hed to Amcrica, : at a anda darine and comprehensive plan was formed for the prosecution ol T on ‘ 1 atarrratrT cat -— ¢h — Nor was Pitt less determined to carry on tl! war on ] 5 } or 2 r ! ; , the Continent with Vi it, Re irdiess Of his former electorate, anda ted that Hanover ough ) to be as dear to En hmen as Hampshire He was equally resolved on « rdial co-operation with ] i k the Great, w! 1 he d hed, somewhat rh 1S standing ‘‘ the unshaken bulwark of Europe against the most powerful and malignant confederacy that ever yet has threatened the independence of mankind.” Unfor- : 1 . ; ¥ . + \ } > ‘ . + , cate ‘~ ; . 1 ~ + _ : } » ] . ~¢ —T. , + > TY 1 = rn. and the king disliked him too strongly to be much in . + + , + ' , . : 9 \ . — . ‘ha ' ran y fluenced by his opinion in what he considered his own the management oO! ioreign anairs. fm | special department110 English Affairs during the Winter. 1756- The measures for the defence of Hanover were con- certed by the electoral ministers of George II., men without military knowledge, and animated by the tradi- tional Hanoverian jealousy of Prussia. Frederick had suggested that an army should be assembled Frederick's behind the river Lippe, using the strong Prus- plan for the ; 5 defence of sian fortress of Wesel as a place of arms, so Hanover. as to cover both Westphalia and Hanover against a French invasion. His plan was, however, too extensive for the Hanoverians, who alleged against it that it would necessitate their entering the territories of the Elector of Cologne, who would then declare against them, and announced their intention of merely defend- ing the Weser, thus abandoning Westphalia to the enemy. It was in vain that Frederick urged that the Weser was not defensible, as it was fordable in several places, and its right bank, which would have to be main- tained, was everywhere commanded by the left. When he found his arguments to be without effect, He destroys — : - the fortiica- he ordered the fortifications of Wesel to be tions of Wesel. destroyed, its stores and artillery to be brought home, and its garrison of 4,500 men to join the Hanoverian army whenever it should be assem- bled. The Hanoverian ministers were incapable of appreci- ating the military side of “he question; but the chief cause of their want of enterprise was a ne- | » Ad . . . — - . i” r ; pentane gotiation which they were all the time car- 1c allO- < verian rying on with Austria, by which they hoped d > d I ministers. < to secure the neutrality of the electorate by allowing the French troops to pass through it to attack Prussia. George II. never altogether approved of this perfidious scheme, but he allowed himself to dally with it till it was too late to do anything more than make a—1757 Dismissal of Pitt Ir stand on the Weser. For this purpose an army was collected of about 50,000 men, including the An army contingents of some small German princes fon ig which were taken into the pay of Hanover, beh ‘he and of this force the Duke of Cumber- cia land took the command soon after the middle of April, 1757- About three weeks previously a French army, over 100.000 strong, had crossed the frontiers of Ger- many. The departure of the duke from England was the signal for important ministerial changes. The king had for some time wished to get rid of Pitt and S Temple. Of the former he complained that ‘Jhek ng's he made him long speeches, which possibly Pitt and : ; lem} ¢ might be very fine, but were greatly beyond his comprehension, and that his letters were affected, formal and pedantic. As for Temple, he was so disa- greeable a fellow that there was no bearing him. ‘'] do not look upon myself as king,” he said, ‘‘ whilst I am in the hands of these scoundrels.’"” The Duke of Cumber- 1] i land. who had great influence with his father, and fully shared his dislike of Pitt, refused to quit England, leav- ing the king in the hands of a ministry he «ould pk trust. Pitt’s ill health was therefore made use of as a pretext for dismissing him, and the duke went forth with a licht heart to a campaign Dis tissal of which was to bl biing oS disgrace on his country.invasion of Bohemia. CHAPTER IX. 1757. @1. /nvaston of Bohemia. THE year 1757 was the most brilliant of Frederick's life. The later years of the war were perhaps more glorious, the years in which, with dwindling resources, he stood on the defensive against a host of enemics, keeping them at bay by consummate strategy. But the events of 1757 strike the imagination most forcibly ; in no other ycar did the king gain such great victories, in no other 1 he experience so sharply the vicissitudes of fortune. The campaign opened for him with the the year brightest prospects. Entering Bohemia at the head of a vast army, he won a great battle which seemed to lay Austria prostrate at his feet, yct six weeks later he met with a disaster so crushing, as to appear the certain forerunner of his ruin. He was compelled to evacuate Bohemia, while his enemies, en- couraged by the defeat of the hitherto resistless con- queror, closed in upon him from every side. Austrians, French, Russians. Swedes, and Imperialists, all fell upon him at once. His position seemed desperate, when sud- denly rising like a lion from his lair, he scattered his foes by two great victories, each of which resulted in the total rout of the beaten armv. Unable to provide adequate means of-dcefence at all points where attack was threatened, Frederick resolved to concentrate his forces against his principal Invasion of Beats antagonist, and to strike a severe blow a Austria as early in the year as possible. As soon as the snow was melted, and the roads had be- come practicable, an immense Prussian army poured7 e 7 1757 The Prussians before Prague. ti int o Bohemia through the passes of the Met 1l and Giant Mountains. As in 1744, it marched in three columns ~ ‘OY - \* im * . . . : Cc . it converging on Prague; two came from »saxony led by 1, les wicr an tha ly ao . . 7 oc 1 1 the king and the Duke of Brunswick-bevern, the th 1 z = "2 , from Silesia, under the comm ind of Marshal Schwerin, who, at the advanced age of seventy-two, retain¢ d t vivour and energy of youth. The Austrians never divined Frederick's design unt 7 : ~ cr a1 , y +, ninn ] . execution. Affecting great trepid ition, he had masked . ] fe + . 7 Dealt ] re : : his Teal inten IONS, ind i Ai VA Line ; : ; i ms of Lue . . 1 ; ‘ 1 ‘ } 5 enemy to rest, Dy pul r Dresden in a - of defence, rn | P- ey . " ‘ : —_ fe sa : 1 } marking out camps in its vicin! y and erecting palisades ; i ¢ i ; 4 ’ 1 e . ' . . : and abattis on the roads from Bohemia ( cluding , eS } + + es 4 . } : j that he mc int tO COll it NimSeli Witil , i ‘\ - . ; ee } taining Saxony, the Austrians on thei! t . , i - c : ] } ide pre } LI \ > j I ¥ «kS iT) ‘ I 1 t n >t (+ ] ’ * ry tha rr ul T +! Pr a Ci CLOTALC ba I Jil hil \ \ Li W n \ ‘ , ; = , 2 cs | . ; allies had taken the held, | news of the Pru in ad- 7 . ’ 5 y 7 . } . , vance came On Ttnem LKC a Li 1icit icLp L} r troop ‘ | } . eS . ' ] cont El # T) scattered through Dohemia, had 9 fall back on Prague \ | ‘ +1 + ¢ 1] ‘ r } in such has ! ev were unable to carry off or dc- _ SES | Ceres ee a san 11. strov their marazin¢ [In the first « ; of May, the bulk f } +) 1 ] ; 1 1 +] ; ‘ hy y - »o~ r\y ry : . ’ : -} »v7 wr YT There waSTeaiiva . . * 7 ape foes + ; - great commander, W is subDoOradinat dtothe: irt iav rite. ‘ ’ ' 7 | ] , y . y : ’ 7 Meanwhile the Prussian columns were rapidly Closing ° . bes eS eset | 7 nteand May h in on Prartue. Trederick had a inted May 4 as the } ’ 7 no ; ™ | ] | day on which all WCre tO doo' l = I = 1 ’ The Prus- ; : of 4 stare } . i, 5? ; A ’ +. ‘ x the city: on the 6th, if the /\ustrians d r¢ } : ‘fey ‘ ' . 1 ; ’ Ir j - - ; . ay ; . > - 7 their ground, they were tO DE allan 1 and > HL if nanfiolar ' »+pyY Cehweril!l , - (swch Wiis hi > seli-connaence VC LLren. 2 ' nwer>rih Was a114 The Invasion of Bohemia. 1757 1, on uniting his column with a day behind the time, an portion of the king’s carly on the morning of the 6th, begged that his soldiers might be allowed a day’s rest, as they had been on foot since midnight, and had made forced marches for three days. Frederick, however, re- fused to be diverted from his intention of attacking that very day, influenced, there is litthe doubt, not only by the knowledge that a second Austrian army, under Count Leopold Daun, was hovering in the neighbour- hood, and might at any time effect a junction with Prince Charles, but perhaps still more by an obstinate determination to carry out his programme to the letter. The Austrian position was very strong. On the north, where Frederick and Schwerin were, the Ziscaberg was unassailed from its steepness. ‘The eastern ioe slope was much more gentle, but its brow was well dcfended by redoubts, and its base protected by marshy ground intersected by rivulets and by a string of fishponds, from which the water had been drawn off, and which froma distance looked like green pasturage, but were really a treacherous quagmire. Frederick determined, after reconnoitring, to attempt the Ziscaberg on this side, and brought his troops rcund accordingly. The Austrians, who were originally posted along the crest of the hill facing northwards, shifted their ground on percciving his design, and wheeled their rivbt wing round, until it was at right angles to the first position, so as to front the attack instead of being taken in flank, as would otherwise have happened. The battle began at 10 A. M., and for three hours raged pe with the utmost fury round Sterbohol, a Prague, farmstead on the lower slopes of the Zis- ae caberg. The Prussian infantry pressed in- petuously forward, toiling through the marshy ground,1757 The Battle of Prague. 1X5 and mowed down by the well-served Austrian artillery. Again and again they charged, and were as often re- pulsed, till Schwerin, maddened by the sight of his own | regiment in retreat, snat hed the colours from the en- ren.” Almost immediately he fell, struck by five case- shot balls. The king himself brought up the se ond line, At sign and rushed forward crying, ‘‘ This way, my chiid- and, after strenuous cfiorts, Sterbohol was carried the same time the Austrian centre was pierced by a bold attack of General Mannstein up the steep hillside, at the point where their mght wing made an angle with the main body, while the cavalry on their extreme right was routed by Ziethen s hussars. Their ranks were thrown into utter confusion. Prince Charles, while endeavouring to rally his flying squadrons, was seized with a spasm ol the heart, which rendered him unconscious, Browne had already been carried mortally wounded from the feld. The battle was lost to the Austrians, and, though the fresh troops of the left wing still made a ¢ illant resistance, they were § radually forced back into Prague. It was not till eight o’clock that the fighting was all over on the bloodiest day that h id been seen In ful ype Sint e Malplaquet. The Prussians had purchased their victo- ry dearly, with the loss of at least 12,500 of their finest troops, besides old Schwerin, who, as F rederick said, alone was worth above 10,000. The Austrians lost I 3,000, int luding prisoners. The numbers engaged on each side were about equal, the Austrians be ng 65,000, the Prussians 64,000. The victory might have been more complete but for an unlucky accident. A . ee } a * | . considerable portion ol the Pruss! in army Nn id been left on the west bank of the Moldau to guard the line of communications, and prevent an outbre ik of the Prague ‘rt garrison on that side. 15,000 of these, under Prince116 The Invasion of Bvhemta. 1757 Maurice of Dessau, were to have crossed the Moldau, above Prague, in order to fall upon the Austrian vear, and intercept the fugitives; but Maurices pontoon- bridge proved too short, and he was unable to get ove, the river. Consequently the beaten army made good its retreat into the city, with the exception of 13,000, who escaped southwards, and eventually joined Daun. If Frederick had taken the advice of Schwerin, the miscar- riage might probably have been avoided; he would not have had to fight with tired troops, and the nature of the ground would have been better understood; in short, the victory would probably have been more decisive. The immediate result of the battle was the invest- ment of Prague, where 46,000 Austrian troops were cooped up with little hope of escape unless relieved by Daun. Prague was nota strong fortress, but the pre- sence of so large a force within its walls 3lockade of Pracue. made a regular siege almost impossible, and compelled Frederick to have recourse to the slower mode of reduction by famine. The severe cannonade to which the city was subjected was ordered with the view of accelerating the process by destroying its magazines. All over Europe the blockade was watched with intense interest; events seemed to pause in expectation of the result, on which it was everywhere felt that the issue of the war depended. Frederick at first had little doubt that Prague would speedily fall, and intended as soon as it was captured to detach 30,000 troops to march through Germany, disperse Future plans = the army of the Empire, and unite with the of Frederick Hanoverians against the French. Then, after despatching reinforcements to East Prussia, he pro- posed to advance through Moravia, fight Daun, and, if all went well, put an end to the war before the year wasI 757 Movemen fs of the Prussians. I! 7 over. Except Daun's army there was nothing between him and Vienna. The actual course of events was very different. Week after week Prague heid out, giving Daun time to march to its relief. On the day of the battle he was only twenty-five miles off, but on hearing of the Austrian defeat he fell back in the direction of Iglau, followed by Bevern, whom Frederick dé M vements tached with 20,000 men to watch his move ments. Every step that he took backwards brought} reinforcements, until at last he felt strong enough to re- commence his advance. Bevern reported the altered state of affairs at headquarters, and the king h istened to his support with 12,000 or 14,000 men. More could not well have been spared from the bl kade, nor did Frederick think that more were required. Unbroken success had inspired him with too great confidence in himself, and too great contempt for the enemy, till he thought that he could prevail against any odds. On June 18 was fourht the battle which wrecked the plan ; of Freder k the Grea Lé he was not invincible. The Austrians, 54,000 strong, were drawn up in a well-chosen position on a low range of hills to the west of the little town of Kollin, ; and a mile or so south of the great Prague . - and Vienna high-road, along which the } at Prussians were advancing. Their left and at centre were too strong to be attacked, but Frederick saw that an impression might be prod | by throwing |! whole force on their right wing. For this it was neces- sary for the Prussian army to passintront || of the Austrian lines, until it was opposite , ae I ans to their right, its march being not parallel to the enemy’s position, but converging on it by118 The Invasion of Bohemia. L757 means of a movement called the ‘oblique order,” of which Frederick was very fond, and which he employed with signal success at Leuthen six months later. The battle at first went entirely in favour of the Prus- sians, Ziethen’s horse and seven infantry battalions Pee cr under General Hilsen (which formed their Kollin, advance guard when marching into position, ae their extreme left when in order of battle) attacked the Austrian right wing at Kreczor. After some hard fighting they repulsed the enemy, and carried two heights defended by batteries, when they found them- selves confronted by fresh troops, which Daun had brought up by the rear from his left. If at this time they had been properly supported the battle would have been won; it was said that four fresh battalions would have done the work. But no reinforcements were at hand. By some strange mistake, which, notwithstand- ing all that has been written about it, has never been explained, Prince Maurice, who commanded the Prus sian left wing, had directed its attack upon the wrong point. Instead of marching up till he was opposite Kreczor, and then fronting tothe right and commencing his attack, he halted and fronted some 1,000 paces too soon, and assailed the Austrians at a point where they never ought to have been assailed, and where he could be of no use to Hiilsen Nor was this all. Frederick had given the most distinct orders that the right wing should not engage at all, but remain on the high road as a reserve to be called up in case of need. But when the need came it was not to be had; ; the impetuosity of General Mannstein, who commanded a brigade in it, had involved it in a general engagement with the Aus- trian left, and it could not be recalled. These two mis- takes lost the day. Instead of the whole Prussian forceDefeat of the Prusstans. 119 sone sw ihe te ee being massed on the point where most impression could be made, it was broken up into detachments, attacking disjointedly all along the Austrian line. The Prussian soldiers fought splendidly, but they were overpowered by numbers, anc fire of the Austrian artillery. Several regi- ments were almost annihilated. Yet theun- Defeat of the equal contest was long maintained ; and at one time the issue seemed so doubtful that Daun had actually given th sode turned the scale in his favour. In the Austnan army that day there were three Saxon cavalry regiments which had been in Poland at thetime of Pirna. The commander of one of these regiments, Lievtenant-Colo- } > = cr » When , Heyer iba nel Benkendorf, saw his opportunity > . * , ’ : ; } ; 1 1 } i re 1a - . : - es+ ‘% nc ‘¥ eh + . ~~ + ee ing for orders, made a turious onslaught on the shatteret louwes Ds bien 7 a 4 tq Sy . ; ba en oe T Shiewsneiels 6 Peat Prussian battalions. The Saxons charged through their oe le an . ] } , +) _ } 1 +] rv ] ’ , ‘ broker ranks, and, aS tney Savreda them GOwn, ' ried OUL, ac °T) F Cited a , 72 ~— * : } ‘* \ + ' . 7 This is for Stnegau Striegau being the name they | } 7 } ; YT, , , - 7 J , , ' . . TAaAVve to 4 4 i Lic ' | : ‘ CTL pt nm ( i . I > 7 +77 , , . 4 : ‘ } , } cal if nN W ; : \ 1 I 7 ¥ Lilc ¢ I Cl] Ja Nn. a4) ‘ JV ic \ + leur 9 Y wn ¢ 7 +) wrest | —— rae d SU] : iVailTy Cc LS, L (ire ut DecamMme gene- + aT pian Pee | a 1. ‘ 7 ‘ an . Hi ’ 17 Tal. l rederi K } i il] > STEM tHe Ge and Taily } > f ‘ tic 1c wrt ] ] ’ le . Tri? ‘ ahlia 1 Tt Te the fugitives, untill his aladc-ce-Camp Was ODIIg¢ ) Fe- monstrate with Vlajesty mean La > aru > | ne Pp’ ca . . , y 4 Io : + to take the battery alone: The king maae no answer, ; but paused and surveyed the battery with his field-glas then turned away, and, seeing that the battle was irre- trievably lost, drew off the wre k of his army. The car- nage had been frightful. Out of 32,000, the Prussians had nearly 14,000 killed, wounded, and prisoners. and the loss had fallen almost entirely on their matchless oan 4; tear T Weeerney +}, =n oh +) sae Seeaart ; — ont lia ILry. Uuring Lue hil nt Liley revirea LOWaT' 4¥i,is> / © . /120 Lhe French tn North Germany. 1757 ~ had suffered severely. The next day, at evening, the king rejoined the blockading force before Prague. News of the disaster had preceded him, but his soldiers would hardly believe it till they saw him ride into the camp with downcast eyes, followed only by a page. The loss of the battle carried with it the loss of the campaign. Frederick was obliged to raise the blockade of Prague immediately, and to retreat from Retreat from bohemia. Bohemia. The retreat was attended with fresh losses from desertion, and from the unskilful tactics of his brother, the Prince of Prussia, to whom the command of a corps was entrusted: and when the king got back to Saxony, shortly before the end of Juiy, barely 70,000 remained under his banner out of 117,000 who had entered Bohemia three months before. The Austrians followed him and took up a stronger po- sition at Zittau, Just across their own frontier, resisting all his efforts to entice them into giving bat- cece tle. A kind of deadlock ensued. During the greater part of August, Frederick sat confronting the Austrians in the Lusatian hills, barring their way, though unable to dislodge them. But he had other enemies to attend to, and could not sit watching the Austrians forever, so on August 25th he resigned the command in Lusatia to Bevern, in order that he might march in person into Thuringia, where his presence was urgently needed to check the advance of the French and Imperialists. ¢ 2. The French in North Germany. While the events just recorded were in progress the French were making themselves masters The French in- : of nearly all North Germany west of the vade Germany. ? ¢ Elbe. Their principal army, 110,000 strong, took the field before the end of March, crossed the Rhine7577 The French in North Germany. I N — without hindrance, and occupied the Prussian territories in that quarter. The command was then assumed by Marshal D’Estrées, a soldier who had gained sorne repu tation in the Austrian Succession War, but with smail military capacity. Upon the arrival of D’Estrées maga- zines were formed, and the army began to advance towards Hanover, plundering and destroying the pro- perty of friend and foe alike. Its discipline was very slack; many of the officers owed their appointments merely to rank and court favour ; the common soldiers were badly paid, and sought to supply the deficiency by pillage. lo resist the invasion the Duke of Cumberland had hom the Cc — been placed at the head of 50,000 men, of w bulk were Hanoverians and Hessians, the remainder being made up by contingents the Duke of from Brunswick, Saxe-Gotha, and Lippe Biickeburg, with the garrison of the now abandoned fortress of Wesel, which, however, was before long re- . : : | py called by Frederick, in disgust at the pitiful strategy of the g eneral, It was a mixed assemb!l ive, but the ti Ops were brave and well-trained, and under a skilful com- mander micht have offered a successful resistance to the great but badly organized French army. Such, however, His retreat 7 i : Weser. abandoning Hesse without a blow; and when, after long delay caused by want of supplies, bad roads, and the irresolution of their general, the French at last reached that river, he made not the slightest attempt to cispute its passage. era D'Estrées, impelled by urgent despatches Hastenbeck, from home, had at length made up his mind ae to fight, and after crossing the Weser, attacked the122 Lhe Frencn in North Germany. 1757 allied army at Hastenbeck. The battle resulted in a victory for D’Estrées, not a very decisive one in itself, for both armies quitted the field under the im- pression that they had been defeated; but the French reaped as much benefit from it as though it had been a complete success, Cumberland lost his head, and instead of falling back Slowly on Magdeburg, where he might have acted in oo? rue as combination with Frederick, he hurried off -umberianc = retreats on northwards through Minden and Verdun, otade and hardly paused till he had reached the fortress of Stade, near the mouth of the Elbe. Thus Hanover and Brunswick were abandoned to the invader, and the road was left open to the central Prussian do- minions, while the English commander ran blindly into a cul-de-sac, whence he could only hope to escape by an ignominious capitulation. The French, however, con- tented themselves with detaching a small body of troops to follow his movements, and then settled down to the more congenial occupation of gathering in the fruits of their victory. D’Estrées was no longer in command. An order for his recall had arrived a few days after the bat- tle, and with it his successor Marshal Richelieu, an old courtier who had displayed much courage puperedcd and some skill when in command of the EaeaeA be force which conquered Minorca, but wholly SERN: unfit to be placed at the head of a great army. Bad as the discipline had been under D’Estrées, it was far worse under Richelieu. D’Estrées had at any ete rate done what he could to preserve it, but Richelieu plun lers Richelieu set his soldiers an example in pil- lanover: lage. So notorious was his rapacity that when he returned to Paris and built a palace it was nick-1757 The Convention of Kloster-Scven. 123 named by the Parisians the Pavilion of Hanover. After sating himself with plunder, the French general turned northward in pursuit of the allied army, and the Duke of Cumberland began to apprehend that he might be forced to surrender his whole force 24 80s in prisoners of war. Richelieu, on the other the allied hand, feared to drive him to desperation, and doubted whether he could undertake the siege of Stade so late in the year; above all he was anxious to secure peact ful winter quarters for his army. Both com- manders were therefore willing to accept the mediation of the King of Denmark, by whose instrumentality a truce was concluded. The convention of Kloster-Seven, signed on Septem- ber 10, provided that the auxiliaries in Cumberland’s army should be sent home, and that the Hanoverians should be allowed to winter in and around Stade. The convention was,to Seven, Sep- all intents and purposes, a capitulation, but ) Cumberland protested so strongly against the use of the latter word. that Richelieu gave in, without considering the possible consequences of his concession. The differ- ence between a capitulation and a convention Is that the one is a purely military act complete in itself, while the other needs to be ratified by the respective governments. } 1, Cumberland had no idea that his father was likely to disavow his act, but he shrank from the ignominy ol signing a capitulation ; Richelieu -onsidered the matter to be of no great importance, as he expected that the convention would be merely a preliminary to a treaty for the neutrality of Hanover, about which negotiation had for some time been going on at Vienna. The con- vention excited great indignation in England. George II. recalled his son, and treated him on his arrival with124 Rossbach. 1757 marked coldness. In France also it was viewed with disfavour. Certainly, more rigid conditions might have been imposed, but even as it was, North Germany was placed completely prostrate at Richelieu's feet. The convention left him at liberty either to proceed against the Prussian territories of Halberstadt and Magdeburg or t» co-operate with Prince Soubise, who with a second French army was about to attempt the deliverance of Saxony in conjunction with the troops of the Empire. He did both, but ineffectually. Some of his troops oc- cupied the Halberstadt country, but in a desultory man- ner, with an eye to pillage ather than to military opera- tions. He also sent a reinforcement to Soubise, but that did not prevent Soubise from being beaten. 43. Rossbach. The army of the Empire was very slow in assembling, and if Frederick had conquered at Kollin, it would probably never have assembled at all. Pub- Public ; Bae E : 3 opinion in lic opinion in Germany was decidedly in Germany in , : ss ; : Tey favour of Prussia, and in the Protestant Prussia States, at any rate, there was a widespread conviction that the Franco-Austrian alliance would be destructive of the freedom of the Empire and of the Pro- testant religion. The troops of Wiirtemburg, who had been taken into French pay, mutinied, and declared that they would rather be shot than fight for France against Prussia. Nor was this feeling confined to the” Protestant States. After the battle of Pracue, some even of the great Catholic Princes, such as the Elector of Ba- varia, and the Elector Palatine, showed a disposition to withdraw from their connexion with Austria, and to con- clude treaties of neutrality with Frederick. But the King’s defeat at Kollin restored Austria's influence, and1757 The Army of the Empire. 125 this influence was still further strengthened when Sou. bise’s army issued from Alsace, overawing dis iffection, From the end of June onwards, contingents from the various States kept coming in to the rendezvous at [iirth, where they were drilled into something like The army of discipline. \Most of them were short of their ‘ sea the Empire numbers, and in many cases half the men deserted on the way. An army of some sort was, how- ever, collected, and early in August it set out from Furth under the Prince of Hildburghausen, and marched to Erfurt, where Soubise, with the at E irt, French vanguard, had already arrived. The on junction had not long been effected when the allied com- } manders received the alarming intelligence that the Prussian king was marching against Teed es to ; cnacn them in person, and Soubise insisted on falling back to Eisenach to concentrate his army. Their retreat into the hilly and impenetr: ble country about Eisenach was a serious inconvenience to Frede- rick, as it was of vital importance to him to geta battle from them as soon as possibie, 1n OI ler that : 7 ; oe I he might return to defend Silesia against tacked on all the Austrians. His situation was becoming less. From every quarter the tide of inva- 7 dominions. Inthe Fre h were in possession of the Prussian : oleae wy pe Ee territonmes On th thine alG ibs V\ estphalla;: and now : ‘ that they had beaten down the resistance Ol io 7 ; The French Hanovs a, thev 1 rnt ve expected at ny . 4 ; moment to turn their victorious arms against the central p! yvinces Ol he monat hy. I urthnel ‘ l . ; The Aus- there were the ¢ ombined French a ) 5 triav E ee eee list forces irainst W il : Wad then126 Rossbach, 1757 Austrian army ready, as soon as his back was turned, to advance into Silesia, or even into Brandenburg itself. In the extreme east the province of East Prussia was overwhelmed by more than 100,000 Rus- The Rus- a sians, who desolated the country, and com- Sians. / mitted atrocities too frightful for description. The circle of enemies was completed by Sweden, who, when roused into activity by the news of The Swedes. , : : , Kollin, began to ship troops over to Stral- sund for an invasion of Prussian Pomerania. Hemmed in by foes on every side, it seemed as if the fate of Prussia was sealed already. Yet, with nearly a continent in arms against him, Frederick's Frederick’s courage and composure never forsook him. fortitude ; ‘ Resolved not to survive the overthrow of his house, he always carried poison about his person to be used in the last extremity; but in the meanwhile, until that extremity should arrive, he went on without once relaxing his efforts, manfully struggling against ever-increasing difficulties. He never gave way to de- spair, and if death was constantly in his thoughts, he, at any rate, meant to die hard. His burden of cares was aggravated by the loss of his favorite general Winter- feldt, and by domestic troubles, by the death of a mother whom he dearly loved, and by the ill-concealed dissatis- faction with which his brothers viewed his policy, but, strangely enough, in the midst of it all, he was able to ee, find relief and distraction in the composition a. of endless stanzas of indifferent French verses. At no time in his life was he more prolific than in the unhappy months that followed Kollin and pre- ceded Rossbach. After more than two months of anxious waiting, of marching to and fro, of sending out detachmentsSit Mu 110 7] of Ri »sshach - this side and that, Frederick succeeded in bringing matters to an issue with the French and Two months Imperialists. About the middle of Oc- ofanxiety. tober he had been obliged to hurry off homewards on hearing that the Austrians were making a Austrians } dash at Berlin. The affair turned out to be ht OODYDS merely a raid of 3,000 or 4,000 light troops, in berlin, who no sooner heard that the king was marching against them than they departed within twenty-four hours of their arrival, with an installment of the ransom they had demanded, amounting to 28,o00/. In effect it roved I sseful to Frederick, as his retreat emboldened Soubise to come out from the Thuringian hills, and thu ve him the long-sought opportunity for a battle : : os . . . - Ll > The enemy had got as far as Leipzig, and —_ comes out of °. ’ the hills were preparing to besiege when they +} 5 , fT , | 1. r . heard that t kine was coming back after them, where- +) acum ] ' upon they fell back behind the Saale, at 1 awaited his , ; toproach. Frederick followed, and took up a position a 1 5 ; ; . + ; +o —) . _ ; otf couple of miles to the east of the « ynbined army with his right wing resting on Bedra, his left on Rossbach. +) > 7 . The hi villasve of Rossbach, so soon about to be- come a! norable name in German Oistory, les in a ( LCI I l n histor il asso it ns ‘\ few miles to the eastward, just across the fell in the hour of tor’ Not much further off to the south is the fatal field of Jena, where, half a centu after Rossbach, Frederick's work seemed all undone in a single day. Rossbach itself stands on an undulating plain, sloping gently down to the river Saale, which sweeps round it in a semicircle on the south and east at a few miles’ distance from the village. On the south- west the plain 1s bounded by the Unstrut, which falls128 Rossbach. 1757 into the Saale at Naumburg, and is crossed by a bridge at Freiburg, a mile or two above the junction of the rivers. Immediately to the west of Rossbach there isa hollow, through which a small stream winds away north- wards to join the Saale at Merseberg, and beyond the hollow, on rising ground which commanded a view of the Prussian position, was the camp of the French and [inperialists. The two armies were very unequal in numbers. Frederick had only 22,000 men with him; the hostile army was nearly 50,000 strong. Of these Kel ufive two-thirds were French, the remainder beine strength of ; o the two made up of the troops of the Empire and of Armies, - a tew Austrian regiments. Soubise himself was not over-anxious to measure his strength with the great commander, but his officers were eager for battle Faverness of 20d confident of success. Their only doubt the French was whether they could win any glory by eo destroying so small a force as Frederick's: their only fear lest he should retreat and escape them. They had never met him in the field, and they talked contemptuously of doing great honour to this Marquis of Brandenburg by condescending to make a kind of war with him. Early in the morning of November 5 a great stir was observed in the French and Imperialist camp, and soon Pets afterwards a single division, under the Count of the com- of St. Germain, advanced and occupied a eben height opposite to the Prussian position and began cannonading. By 11 o'clock the whole army was seen to be on the march southwards, apparently making for Freiburg and Unstrut bridge. Frederick believing it to be in full retreat, resolved to fall on its rear later on in the day. But it was not retreat that Sou-Rossbach. bise and Hildburghausen were m(‘ -ditati really intended was to work round to the lett: 129 What they e VCI } to the rear of the Prussian position, and then commence On —— 37 * \ Z MUTH EEN. ~ — “SS coe fiieetes 7 ee fi ~ a \ : ri f ‘ AReichart Ferben \ “= deict : f ™ r e Sc) : xX . scp nr ‘ / “ : = : / : \ J fo ae 1 ewer , ae Pettstadt ./ 4 LOR ben “s ; / / ae f _ e S J . pe Go 4 , r y \ ow > / \ j ~-AYs7" ‘ = C , RK! Saale eee a Xs, wh “> Se me J aa ( 5 NS 4 : F a. : — =Nreceyee st — — a 3 5 _—_— Lim. ot ~/ (7 N ‘ > ind ( : ry py / NAUMBURG / J Namen if = aes BATTLE OF ROSSBACH N r 17 a.a. Position of ' ibined Arn é P 1 of I ce. os of to attack Prussians. d. at Us c. | J »¢ f f Pr 1s i i ' a an attack in conjunction with St. Germain. A glance a of this man ce uvre, espe- »?139 Rossbach, 1757 cially when practised against an enemy famed for the rapidity of his movements. The combined army had to move in a great circuit round the Prussian position, ex- posing itself to be taken in flank while attempting to outflank the enemy. This was, in fact, exactly what happened. By half-past two Frederick knew what they were aim- ing at. They had passed through Schevenroda; the heads of their columns had reached Pettstadt and were turning to the left towards Lunstidt. The order to march was given, and in half an hour tents were struck and the whole Prussian army was in marching order. Seidlitz, with the cavalry, was off first, and hastened to gain a position in advance—that is, to the east—of the French columne. Frederick followed with the rest of his forces, leav- ing a detachment to watch St. Germain The move- ments of the Prussians were masked by two low hills, the Janusberg and Pélzenberg, so that the French could see that they were doing something, without being able to tell what it was. Fancying them to be in flight to Merse- Movements or the Prussians berg, and fearing lest the prey should escape when almost within their grasp, they rushed forward in disorderly haste. The cavalry advanced at a sharp trot, and though the infantry followed at the double, they were soon left several hundred paces behind. At half-past three the French, Austrian, and Imperi- ' alist cavalry, 7,000 strong, were mounting the lower 7 slopes of the Janusberg, when suddenly Seid- Bat le of . F 5 Kosshach, litz’s hussars appeared over the crest of the Movember §. Polzenberg, and swept down on them, ‘‘ com- pact as a wall and with an incredible velocity.”’ The attack was utterly unexpected, and only four regiments were able to form in order of battle before the Prussians wereI 75/7 Victory of the Prussians. 131 upon them. In half an hour they were flying in wild disorder. By this time Frederick had got his guns into position and from the top of the Janusberg twenty-two pieces of artillery opened fire upon the front of the French infantry, while seven battalions fell upon their right flank, marching straight up till they were within forty paces, and then delivering their fire. The french regi- ments, huddled together and unable to form properly, soon began to waver. Then Seidlitz, who had reformed his squadrons at Reichartswerben, broke in upon them, and completed the confusion. At half-past four the battle was over. The Imperialist foot never came into action at all; they were swept away by the retreat of the French. Nor did the bulk of the Prussian infantry ; the battle was over before they could get up. The French and Imperialists lost near 3,000 killed and wuunded, be- sides 5, OO prisoners, and the greater part of thell artil- * Ff \ } sal } ] i } .¥ . _¥ , lery ana baggage ; the iosSs Would Nave Deen greater! still if night coming on had not put an end to the pursult. ~ 5 aren On the Prussian side there were 165 killed and 376 wounded. lL here was no sort of order in the enemys retreat. No rallying-place had been appointed, pre- sumably because defeat was a contingency that had never been contemplated. Very few regiments kept to- gether, and the greater part of the army was scattered broadcast all over the country. fect of the battle of Rossbach was marvellous. Jot only in Prussia but in every German land there was reat joy at the victory over the enemy of the whole German race. Never before had the French been de- feated in a great battle by a purely German , army, commanded by a leader of German. siasm at the blood. The rejoicings were intensified by eee the universal disgust which had been excited by the in-I 3 - Silesta Regained, I 75 7 solent and outrageous conduct of the French in countries to which they were supposed to have come as friends and deliverers. The army of Soubise was more disorderly and licentious than the army of Richelieu. Wherever it went there was the same tale of extortion, plunder, and violence ; the doings of the French in Germany were compared with the doings of the Cossacks in East Prus- sia. Even the fact that troops of the Empire had fought side by side with the soldiers of Soubise in no way di- minished the general satisfaction of Frederick's victory. The German people were altogether opposed to the war with Prussia. Feeling that they were not adequately re- presented in the Diet, they were rather pleased than otherwise at the discomfiture of its army. If it helped to overthrow the old order of things in the Empire, so much the better. A new and better structure might arise in its place. ¢ 4. Silesia R evained, Of the remoter consequences of his victory, Frederick thought very little. To him it was chiefly valuable be- cause it set him at liberty to fight another battle in Silesia. It was high time for him to be back there. The Austrians had invaded the country in great force, and but for the timidity of Prince Charles and Frederick marches for Daun, and their frequent disputes, Bevern Silesia. Aus- tran succes- Must have fared even worse than he did. ses there. Eight days after Rossbach, Frederick started from Leipzig with 14,000 picked men, but though he made forced marches, a series of disasters occurred be- fore he could arrive on the scene. _ First, the important fortress of Schweidnitz capitulated after a disgracefully short siege, with a garrison of 6,000 men, and stores of all kinds. Then Bevern was defeated in a great battle, wiuch opened the gates of Breslau to the Austrians.Austrian Successes. 133 Soon afterwards Li -onitz went too. News of these losses kept reaching the king on his march, but nothing daunted he pushed on, resolved to stake all on a battle. Indeed, without a battle and a victory, everything was } : ; : ; as good as lost dirCaay , the Austrians would take up winter quarters in Silesia, and the southern fortresses would certainly fall in the spring, even if want of provi sions did notcompel them to surrender sooner. “T will attack them,” said Frederi k, even ii they stood on the steeples of Breslau.'’ The Austrians played completely into his hands. They had a strong intrenched camp before Breslau, and if they had stayed in it they could hardly have failed to repulse the Prussians, but they thought it a shame to sit still and be attacked by Frede- ’ : } a. ] . ; ; net os rick S Llittie army, RIS Potsdam (ruard-larat Cailed if in Gerision, sot On November 28 Frederick reached Parchwitz, half- Breslau, on the great road that h Silesia from end to end, where he was shortly afterwards joined by the re- Frederick at : : ’ : A Parchwitz mains of Bevern’s army. Bevern himself r + | } 7 ' - was not with them: on the mornin yr aiter nis defeat, he had ridden out to reconnoitre, and had been made intentionally, Frederick thought, but perhaps —< ’ with injustice. After this junction the king had some brought with him—the victors of Rossbach—were ready for anything, but the morale of Bevern’s troops ha + been shaken. and until it was restored, there would be little use in leading them on what must have seemed, even to Frederick himself, almost a forlorn hope. He therefore assembled his generals and staff officers, and addressed them in a few well-chosen and stirring words, K.134 Silesta Regained. Lyf After recounting his recent misfortunes, he appealed to the courage, to the fidelity, and to the patriotism which they had so often manifested. ‘‘ There is hardly one of you,” he continued, ‘‘ who has not distinguished himself by some hononrable action, and | therefore His address king 5 For though r of religion, h was really russlans‘ s 7 . ° ; 130 Silesia Regained. 1757 they were again on the march early, and at daybreak their advanced guard came upon a body of the enemy’s cavalry just before reaching Borne, some seven or eight miles from Neumarkt. After this outpost and upon had been dispersed, Frederick rode up the Borne. Scheuberg, a hill close by, whence he saw 5 the whole Austrian army extended before him. The great Austrian army, over 80,000 strong, was drawn up in a line five or six miles in length, directly at right angles to the high road along which the , Po ron of ; . a . 1 : Ti ies: Prussians were advancing. Its right wing — rested on Nypern and was protected by bogs; its left extended beyond Sagschiitz almost to the Schweid- nitz Water, and was bent back at the extremity to avoid being outflanked. The bulk of the infantry was in the centre with cavalry on each flank, the right wing being commanded by Lucchesi, the left by Nadasty. In front of the first line were two villages, Frobelwitz and Leuthen, which were occupied by infantry and flanked by batteries, especially Frobelwitz, where the main attack was expected. It was not an ill-chosen position; it commanded the two roads to Breslau, and was not easily assailable on either flank; but it had one capital defect —its extreme length. From his position on the Scheuberg Frederick could see the Austrians distinctly, though they were unable to get any clear view of him. The country Frederick : : on the about was a wide, undulating plain, aftord- Scheuberg. ° peso yy eee eh et et ee a 7A ing very few points whence an extensive prospect could be had, and the movements of the Prus- sians were in a great measure concealed by a low chain of hills, of which the Scheuberg was the highest. It was a great advantage to Frederick that he knew every inch of the ground ; his Silesian reviews had made it familiar1757 Baitle of Leuthen. 137 to him. An amusing story is told of how Daun, that morning, when out reconnoitering, asked a peasant the name of some distant object, and how the peasant re- nlied. ‘* That i he hill our king ch ; ha a ie ; ica, i Lal iS tne Aiki OUT np Chases tne Austrians | over when he Is reviewing here, ‘) —\— 5 = =s»<, (2 c aA. ¥ . - = eee : , =) . ae Lae ' . L j ; ee L*~o fs + are oe ; ae a) ~~ oe Re S iS a? “yNypern 2 b ep ee 3 ’ ‘ TJ ‘t » \ ~—, _ 4 = ~wv > 7x = — - se rT - r af ee a al | & | . 1 ae ~ —_ A, al wasn! ° : a , oe a ‘ \ "a oe 7 f Sth r b SS. LEUTHEN c ou > ’ é s i s Oe f - rm ON * . r IQ. . al < -\ aw c ‘ TS 4 : . . ; : S,, u ~ . ; wae “Ss a es ~ ‘ + aa —_ : pe SAL ~d * 7 a ee . BATTLE OF LEUTHEN Dec. 5, 1757: a.a. Austrian Arm 6.6. Austrian tat Borne. ; A cl] nce f } j in Arm\ After a considerable time spent in surveying the Aus- Ns trian lines, Frederick decided to mass his whole force on their left bv means ot his favorite movement, the “ oblique order.”’ Sheltered at first by the Scheuberg hills, the Prus- , sian columns marched some distance southwards from Borne in a course parallel to the enemy’s position, On138 Stlesta Regained. 1757 reaching Lobetintz they formed in “‘ oblique ordcr,”’ and so advanced diagonally against the Austrian The Prus- $ians ad- Zanes to the treme left. Having gained this position, attack. line until they had arrived opposite to its ex- they swiftly wheeled into battle order. The ‘oblique order”’ of attack was a manceuvre invented by Frederick and frequently used by him. er Its advantage consisted in enabling a gene- ral to mass his troops on a given point more rapidly than was possible by any other method, and outflank the enemy without running the risk of being outflanked himself; but it was a manceuvre difficult to execute, and only to be practised with perfectly disci- plined troops. [t may excite some surprise that the Austrians allowed Frederick to execute this manceuvre under their eyes in broad daylight. The fact was that, since the loss of their outpost in Borne, they had been very much in the dark about his intentions, and what they did see only misled them. The movements of the Prussians about Borne and on the Scheuberg were visible, though indis- tinctly, to Lucchesi on their extreme right, and convinced him that the wing he commanded was about to be at- tacked. Upon this he demanded reinforcements urgent- ly, and though Prince Charles and Daun for some time refused to accede to his request, they yielded Movements of at last when he declared that unless rein- the Austrians. forced he would not answer for the conse- quences. Then Daun himself rode to the right with the reserves of the centre, and a large body of cavalry was ordered up from the left, which was thus weakened just when it ought to have been strengthened. Nadasty took a juster view of the situation. When the Prussians be- gan to emerge from behind the hills, he saw clearly tnat itBattle of Leuthen. 139 was he and not T.ucchesi on whom the attack would fall. But it was in vain that he sent messenger after messen- ger imploring succour. Prince Charles was miles away in Frobelwitz, whence only a very impertect view of the Prussian movement could be had. He and all the gene- rals with him believed that the Prussians were retreat ing, so he turned a deaf ear to Nadasty s messape>- o'clock when the battle began. The It was about one Prussians advanced under cover of a well-sustained fire from their artillery, and especially from ten heavy suns taken from the walls of Glogau, and brought up with immense labour. Nadasty made a g illant but inef- fectual resistance. The Prussians pushed cr Decécatofthe on and captured a battery ot fourteen pieces aco trae on a hill behind Sagschutz. When it was Bet late. Prince Charles saw the error he had made in Too i massing troops on his right wing, and sent battalion upon battalion to the succour af his left. But from the had to traverse before ! aching the scene distance the, ind in disorder, and of action, they arrived breathless were swept back with N rdasty’s infantry upon Leuthen. This village now hecame the key of the Austrian po- sition, and the hattle raged about it for an hour or 3 with great fury. By strenuous efforts Prince Charles had succet ded in wheeling his cen- aoe = tre and right round into a fresh position, Te richt angles to the first, and fronting the Prus- nearly al attack. The hottest of the fight was tn T cuthen it- Sian the church, the chur hyard, and every en- closure was crammed with Austrian saidiers. The Prus- self, where sian reserves were brought up, and the enemy were BS aet aF . " sad _ + 1] \ . | } . — driven out of Leuthen ; but stall they stooe their ground : 7? wall caret : , hia 1 ory : ' . pehind the village, crowaca together in dense inasses, and kept the Prussians al bay by the fire of their artil140 Silesia Ri gained. 1757 lery. Then from their right Lucchesi came up with his cavalry to attack what seemed to him the unguarded left flank of the Prussians. But the flank was not unguard- ed. In a hollow close by Frederick had stationed Dries- en with the cavalry of the left wing, and Driesen, watch- ing his opportunity, fell upon the Austrian horse just as they were going to charge. Lucchesi was killed, and his squadrons fled in confusion. The Austrian flank and rear were now exposed, and Driesen plunged into them and completed the ruin. A panic ensued. The Aus- trians flung away their arms, abandoned Rout of the their guns, and thoucht only of saving them- Austrians. 5 : 2 DS selves by flight. When the twilight of the short December day came on, the battle was won. As at Rossbach, the approach of night diminished the losses of the beaten army, but even as it was they were very great. The Austrians left 10,000 killed and wound- ed on the field, and lost besides 12,000 prisoners, 51 flags and standards, and 116 cannon. The Prussian killed and wounded amountcd to 6,300. But the significance of the victory was not to be measured by the number of the slain. What was of importance was that the great Austrian army was so completely beaten that no thought of further resistance entered into the minds of its leaders. At noon on the morrow, Prince Charles commenced his retreat, after throwing rather unwisely a strong garrison into Breslau. The retreat was very disastrous. The weather was miserable, and the Austrians ee had lost their tents, and almost all their bag- Te gage. Thousands either deserted, or were taken by the Prussian cavalry, and when Prince Charles reached Bohemia, he had only 35,000 men under his command. Before the battle he had had, including the garrisons, close upon go,000.7 , ws ” . ‘2 . 26 . \'4 7 /lé Russtans Qld OWe On the 21st Breslau capitulated, and its garrison of ’ 17,000 men, with thirteen generals dmong them, be- 1 Came prisoners Of war. A week aiterwards al : me Surr er of Liegnitz surrendered, so that before the year Recniy arts was out Frederick was again 1n possession Liegnitz. of all Silesia except Schweidnitz. This fortress was block- aded through the winter and taken by storm early in the spring. A few words will suffice to dispose of the king's re- maining enemies. After overrunning a large portion of East Prussia, the Russian commander Aprax- Russia “ } . *-? ~ | in defeated in a pitched battle at Gross-jag- victory at . = . Lol Nf ee le ] : ersdorf Marshal Lehwaldt, to whom with persion 28.000 men the defence of the province had been entrusted. Apraxin might now have advan 1 to Kénigsberg and made himself master of the whole pro- VINCE . but instead of doing so he retur! d home, all ae ing that the country was too exhaustcd support an Irinhy. ADrAXl IN WaS MMNUCHMCCU by political motuves. The Czarina was dan- gerously ill, an 1 if she should die, the policy of Russia would probably be revers -d. as her heir was known to be opposed to the war. | n if she recovered, it was Dy no means certain that the Anglo-P in party in ot . . . ‘ ’ ort th 4 1arina recoy rea ad 1sse \ waxin Irom His TY 1 yr } | ra , 7. +} > rryywu fT , ryyryy Tr ~~ | command, and ordered the afriny tv i mmence Opecra~ ry rj Anre al iS h \ ver beak: if ] » ac Anrax tions at once. nis, however, iS IMpoOsslDle, ds A plar~ in had brought it back in sowretched a state that months ‘ were required for its reorganization. Meanw hile the re- » \~ — A ~ + cand a treat of the Russians enab! The Swe ics, march against the Swedes, who in septem- ber had invaded Prussian Pomerania witl Lehwaldt had little e difficulty in dislodging them fromt42 Pitt and the War. 175) the few places which they had taken, and in forcing them to seek refuge under the guns of Stralsund. Never had Frederick's reputation stood higher than at ae ee the close of this memorable year; Leuthen sults of the alone, as Napoleon said, was cnough to im- whee mortalize and to place him amongst the greatest generals, [Dut his position and prospects were very different from what they had been after the battle of Prague. Then he seemed on the point of forcing his enemies to submission. Rossbach and Leuthen had merely saved him from destruction. 65. Pitt and the War. When we left Pitt at the commencement of the cam- paign, he had just been dismissed from office at the in- stance of the Duke of Cumberland. In less than three months he came back almost on his own ee terms. His dismissal spread consternation if-t S dis- missal from through the country. The stocks fell: the office. . Common Council voted him the freedom of the City. and th chief towns of the kinedom followed the cxample of London by sending him their freedom in gold boxes, ‘‘ For some weeks,” says Horace Walpole, ‘it rained gold boxes.’ Various attempts were made de to form a new ministry, but it was soon per- The country : = without a ceived that a government from which ‘‘ The ee Great Commoner’ was excluded would have little prospect of stability. And Pitt himself had learnt something by experience. He had seen that great talents and popular support, though they might carry him into office, could not keep him there with the king and Parliament both against him. The king’s favour could only be won by degrees, but parliamentary iufluence could be gained at once by a coalition witk1757 Fox. 143 Newcastle. To this therefore Pitt consented. New- castle also was rea y to come to terms, having learnt that in a time of great public excitement the control of . ficient to sustain a minister, votes was insu So the leader of the Whig aristocracy and the great representative of the people sank their mutual hatred ; : kT a era cet tre and ioined forces. They had little difh- culty in marking out t ° ’ as . Lo —- é ‘ : 1 N : : c vinces. Pitt, as oecretary OF otate, with NC ic, Sow : = cmlcme ¢ 4 an) * Holdernes C; a ALICIC Cipaiei, iOl Aiid ‘ _~ leacue, took the entire direction f the war and of > q } ry | . sury, had all the patronage of t Government in his j ; - ‘ ° el i. = — . ! : ; hands, and was entrusted with t ongenial occupation : ’ r , : . of corrupting members of Parliament Their division of i Ne tar writ xzuthority is Wt 1] ex] ressed y Walpole ina le tter written p* ' cRA : ' : the next year toa frien i AaAUTOd 1, Pav AGS ] tl es everye- y } 1. f WY ‘ +! ve ‘ ' \ | rc tn i . { : D N ‘ .*¥ v¥ 4 Cveryt . fr iV) Mis . : > 1 ” W | Lhe K r consent i to the rrangement WV i Té- ] ’ 1 » ‘ - WAT iuctan C LI d ¢ IT pi Lin ib t ry : j rilGdy oT rCWe ’ . ’ ; ‘ 7 —- ; } . = castic, WiO Cells LW L\ | nisca nim never to to | ft un h \ aacrainct | aw : | , i with the P haste! y of 1 Forces. That —_ Fox, after the prominent part he had taken, ld n- sent to serve under his rival iout even a seat in the cabinet, excited great s se- but he was doubtless al- lured by the lucrativen f the office, which afforded the means of repairine a fortune ruined by gambling and of - - ’ ’ 17 7 ; nAInN ‘ wa alup ¢ “4 ~~ haw laxrrnteadniv ++ ~he previain 10Fr a lan ah) LU WasValad £40 Was MCV ULES) allacCiilCU, y oO144 Pitt and the War. 17 7 an By the time the ministry was formed, it was too late for Pitt to exert much Current year. The influence on the war during the campaign in Hanover was hastening to its inglorious close, and ten weeks after Pitt took Condition of England Vv Ne! Pitt took office. of their norca was lost, and In Ameri admiral, declined to engage cAA J mity cession cruising med to be office, the Convention of Kloster-Seven yielded up the electorate to the enemy, together with the alli Brunswick. by ofl Austria, danger to E nglish interests. with nothing but disaster. ed states of Hesse ad French garrisons had already been admitted into Ostend and Nieuport as an earnest In spirit sunk Louisburg with ianc the Meditee the prestige of her na ca the war h ar ¥ that seventeen ships, ‘Fr y “ ad been no less iaroreanee to so low an ebb had public a transfer Ea with Thus far 13 ny 1 had met inean, Mi- dimmed. and an English the enemy because they had eighteen with a greater weight of metal. Newcastle’s pusillani- reflected everywhere, and so deep was the general despondency that Chesterfield, as calm and clear-sighted an observer as ever lived, could write, “Whoever is in or undone: Saw so ppeadhil a prospect.”’ we whoev er is are no longer And yet out, I am a nation. sure we are I never yet , before Pt had been a year in power, he had roused the country from it > let fiery reck Pitt's The secret ot Pitt’s BUCCESS, hargy, and inspired it so completely with his own spirit that the years tary point of view, vading energy, of his oned amonf& the most glorious in its annals. administration may be great triumphs were not due to any pre-eminent skill in the formation of his plans. In fact, from a mili- they were often faulty. The secret of his success lay in his all-per- in his skilful choice manders, and in his marvellous power of propagating of com-: ’ > ~— 1757 itt and the War. 145 his own enthusiasm and inspiring with his own zeal all those who were entrusted with the execution of his de- sisns. As was said long afterwards by one of his bitter- signs est enemies, ‘‘ No man ever entered his closet who did not feel himself, if possible, braver at his return than when he went in. His scheme of the war was judicious and definite. Avoiding the vicious system which in the war of the Austrian Succession had squandered the His scheme resources of England in seeking out France > of the wal on continental battle-fields of her own . ; choosing, just where she was strongest and where least permanent advantage C uld be obt Lined, Pitt concen- trated his efforts on the destruction of her naval power, 7 > } . ; : and the conquest of he! o1ionies. Descents on the vitl } Fren h coast were organized irom time to time, with the object of destroying the enemy s arsenals and distracting \ ' ' ; y > .r> ,* . . , amet . ; P . | 78 h Ss atten pid, WJUAL on the Continent itsell, itt CONHNC™ > uF himself almost entirely to the se ondary part of support- ing Frederick the Great. This support was given directly by means of a handsome subsidy, indirectly by re-estab- lishing the Hanoverian army under an efficient leader, and so covering the king's right flank. Pitt's statesman- like grasp of the situation convinced him that cordial co-operation with Prussia was the best way of saving Hanover: and that, even if Hanover were out of the question, it would be a fatal mistake for England to allow Frederick to be overwhelmed. He therefore in- duced Ge rye ie tO break off the negotations of his Hanoverian ministers for the neutrality of the electorate, to refuse his ratification to the Convention of Kloster- Seven, and to request Ire derick to allow Duke Ferdi- nand of Brunswi k to take command of his electoral army.146 Pitt and the War. 1757 It may be imagined with what joy Frederick acceded to this proposition, which came to hima few days be: fore Rossbach, bringing a ray of hope in the gloomiest period of his own affairs. No better selection could pos- sibly have been made. Ferdinand was an excellent sol- dier, formed in the school of Frederick, whose service he had entered when a boy of nineteen, just Ferdinand : ; a : Ly : Rea before the first Silesian war. With great = steadiness and decision of character he combined the tact and temper needed by the command- er of an army made up of contingents from a variety of states, while his rank and position, as brother of the reigning Duke of Brunswick and a connection by mar- riage of the royal Houses of England and Prussia, gave him peculiar advantages for the difficult post. In December the English Parliainent met, and before the torrent of Pitt's eloquence all opposition died away, Rossbach and Leuthen had materially Opening of strengthened his hand. The English had Parliament, : never wavered in their attachment to the Protestant hero, as they styled Frederick, with a just an- d 4 J r preciation of his political attitude, and in complete igno- rance of his religious sentiments, but they were naturally more disposed to go heartily into the war when they found their ally so capable of supporting Treaty with a : ; ~ Prussia himself. The Hanoverian army was taken April, 1758. ; : : . : ; into English pay, and a treaty of alliance, closer than that already subsisting, was concluded with Prussia, one item of which was the payment to Frederick of a subsidy of 670,000/. a year.1758 Zhe Last Year of Offensive Warfare. CHAPTER A&A. FREDERICK REDUCED TO EXTREMITIES, 1759-9. 1. The last Year of Offensive Warfare. The campaign of 1758, if less fertile in striking incl- Renter tha@er khersreyious year, brin > into promi- | nence the yvreat strateg rical qualities on whi h, lar more than oO! his battles, the military reputation of Frederick is based. Leuthen and Rossbach were masterpieces, but in his other battles there is usually something faulty. His marches and mancu- vres, On the other hand, alway > gave proof of consummate skill. h he nicety with whi h his move- ments were calcul iate d, © Fa daily of their exec ulion, ‘ and the organization hich alone made such rapidity are all above praise. ps issible His plan was still, as of old, to strike swiftly at Aus- tria before her allies could reach him. From the French he had little to fear now that the Hanoverian Hic nl ad army was re-establis hed under Ferdin: ind, 5} 7m ana DCcCcLs | = pros} lt The Russians threatened to be more trouble- some. The Czarina had shown her earnestness and her disgust at Apraxin’s barren campaign by sending Count Fermor in the depth of winter to take possession ¢ f East Prussia. Her armies might be expected in Brandenburg or Silesia as soon as the season was sufficiently ad- yan ed. It was thought by many of the Prussian generals that the more prudent course would have been to remain on the defensive, but the bolder plan was more congenial to Frederick's nature, and preferable on political grounds aS alle rding more hope of an early peace. So as soon as Schweidnitz was recaptured, he plung red into Moravia,148 The Last Year of Offensive Warfare. 1 758 and laid siege to the important fortress of Olmiitz. The siege was not a success; Frederick's sieges were seldom well managed, and this one presented peculiar difficulties, Olmiitz was a strong Olmitz. place, well provisioned and garrisoned, held by a reso lute and experienced commander. It was not easy to invest except by a large army, because the Morawa flow- ing to the east of it was provided with sluices, by means of which the surrounding country could be laid under water. Above all it was situated at an immense distance from the Prussian base of operations. All supplies and munitions of war had to be brought up from Neisse, ninety miles off, and the greater part of the road lay through a rough and hilly country, infested by the light troops of the enemy, and inhabited by a population whose devotion to Austria made it very difficult for the Prussians to procure intelligence. Under these conditions the siege commenced about the middle of May. Daun witha large army hung on the skirts of the investing army, and, while Siege of carefully avoiding a battle, impeded the Op- Dimiutz. ¢ o erations of the besiegers, and threw supplies and reinforcements into Olmiitz, Time and ammunition were wasted at its commencement by a mistake of the chief engineer, who opened his trenches at too great a distance from the fortress. At length, however, after lasting seven weeks, it was approaching completion, when it was suddenly brought to an end by the loss of a great convoy of 3,000 or 4,000 wagons. The officer who destroyed the convoy was Major- General Laudon. Laudon had as yet held only subcrdi- nate commands, but he was by fai the most capable general in the Austrian aimy, and soon eclipsed the fame of the prudent, t:mid Daun, }Laudon.r758 frederick Raises the Stege. 149 the Fabius Cunctator of Austria, as they called him at Vienna. With the exception of Eugene he was the greatest general the Austrians ever had. In rapidity, energy, and inventiveness he was hardly inferior to Fre- derick, and if he had had the same control over the armies and resources ot Austria that Frederick had over hose of Prussia, the Seven Years’ War might not Impro- bably have ended differently. Like Eugene, and like many of the great Austrian soldiers, Laudon was a foreigner. He came of an old Scotch family which had settled in Livonia in the fourteenth « entury, and in 1731, when in his fifteenth year, he entered the Russian army and learned the art of war under the celebrated Marshal Miinnich. In 1742 he quitted the Russian service, and in the following year offered his sword to Frederick of Prussia. Skilful as Frederick usually was in reading character, he failed to discover any merit in Laudon, and contemptuously refused his application for a captaincy, Saying, *‘ the physiognomy of that man is offensive to me. Laudon then repaired to Vienna, obtained a com- mission from Maria Theresa, and eventually became the l k ever had. most formidable enemy Frederic In this re- spect, again, his fortunes present a parallel with those of Eugene, who was refused first a prebend, then a troop of dragoons, by Louis XIV., before he entered the service of Louis’ great enemy The loss of the convoy compelled Frederick to raise the siege of Olmiitz, and placed him in considerable peril. Want of supplies prevented his remainin . , and 25,o00 Austrians were between him and ¢ where he was, : , . . ; ; - =F Fre Fe Silesia, while Daun lay ready to fall on his raises the 3 : Sieve and inv ade - rear as soon as he began to retreat. With * 4 , > toh I : . great intrepidity he abandoned all idea of POnemnD getting straight back to Silesia, and concealing his move- i150 The Last Year of Offensive Warfare. ments with much adroitness, turned his retreat into an advance, and marched into Bohemia, where he main- tained himself until the news of a Russian advance into Brandenburg forced him to evacuate the country. He Bee. then recrossed the mountains, and with against the 14,000 picked men set out for Frankfort on on the Oder. Arriving at Frankfort after ten days of rapid marching, he united his forces with the corps of Count Dohna, and prepared for battle. Fer- mor, hearing of his advent, drew up his army in battle order at the neighbouring village of Zorndorf. He had rather more than 50,000 regular troops, besides a large body of Cossack and Calmuck irregular cavalry. The Prussians were about 32,000 strong. The battle of Zorndorf was the bloodiest in all the war. It lasted ten hours, and was contested on both et cv sides with savage fury. The Russians had Zorndorf, been guilty of great and inexcusable bar- pees a5- barities on their march through Branden- burg, and the Prussian soldiers, many of whom were Brandenburg men, were maddened by the tales of cruelty that were told them, and by the sight of smouldering villages all around; the king himself, usually so calm and passionless, was exasperated into issuing the ruth- less order that no quarter was to be given. The Russians were badly handled, but they fought with dogged cour- age, suffering themselves to be shot and sabred down in their ranks sooner than give way, and the day would probably have been theirs but for the splendid behaviour of the Prussian cavalry, led by the brilliant and dashing Seidlitz. Late in the afternoon, when ammunition was getting scarce, the battle resolved itself into a hand-to- hand struggle, in which the hostile soldiery attacked each other with sabres, with bayonets, and with the butt1758 The Battle of Zorndorf. 1c} ends of their muskets. Men wounded to death employed their last moments in butchering one another, and in one instance a Russian, himself mortally wounded, wa found lying on the prostrate body of a Prussian gnawing it with his teeth. When the approach of night and the exhaustion of the combatants put an end to the slaughter, the Prussians had won, but Frederick had purchased the victory with the blood of 11,500 of his bravest followers : ’ \ of the Russians, 21,000 had fallen. Zorndorf, though not a very complete victory in itself, proved decisive of the Russian campaign of that year. During the night of the 25th the Russians ; : ~ - a : Ketr to maintained a portion of the field, but after the Ru Ss1ans hovering in the neighbourhood for some days Fermor found it necessary to retreat into Poland. As soon as they were fairly off, Frederick was again : © ry + } = rua Tuas -Jj } oan seat n the march, hurryin wards Saxony to the relief of his brother Henry. Daun had taken ad- y ~¢ : =a } ‘ ; ] ] | : Prin Vantage OF his aodsence to invade the elec- He ind : ’ . Maun il torate in conjunct eo 1 th irmy of the Haxony Duke of Zweibriicken. Prince Henry, with some 30,000 men, was threatened by two armies, which were collective- ly nearly four times his strength, and though he occupied an exceedingly well-chosen position, it is obvious tha Daun and Zweibriicken, if they had acted with vigour. might have crushed him before his brother could come to the rescue. Great expectations were cherished in Vienna of what was to be done during Frederick's absence. \apidity, however, was not Daun's forte, and before he had attempted anything against the prince the king returned, having traversed 120 miles in seven days, a rate of speed that in those days was considered extra- ordinary.152 The Last Year of Offensive Warfare. 1758 His return reduced Daun to the defensive and -was follkwed by a month of intricate manceuvring in the Saxon hill-country, the king trying all he Frederick in ore could to draw the Austrian commander J < Vily. into giving battle, the latter as steadily re- fusing it At last Frederick gave his wary enemy a chance. While trying to manceuvre him into fighting or retreating, he recklessly encamped in a position com- pletely commanded by the Austrian army of twice his strength. He was aware of the insecurity of his en- campment at Hochkirch, and intended to move as soon as he had received a convoy of provisions, but did not think the danger great enough to justify a retreat in the face of the enemy; in fact, he entertained an unmer:ted contempt for his antagonist, and thought he might take liberties with him. To Marshal Keith, who said, in re- monstrance, ‘“‘If the Austrians leave us unmolested in this camp, they deserve to be hanged,” he coolly replied, ‘‘It is to be hoped they are more afraid of us than of the gallows.” The Austrians were of Keith's opinion. Daun saw his opportunity, and, while making ostentatious prepara- tions for defence, secretly matured an elaborate plan for a night attack on the Prussian camp. When the church See ok clock of Hochkirch struck five on the morn- Hochkirch, ing of October 14, the unsuspecting Prussians October 14. were roused from their slumbers by the fire of Austrian musketry. Almost any other army would have been ruined, but the discipline of the troops and the presence of mind of the king and his officers saved them from destruction. Notwithstanding the surprise and the darkness, they flew to arms, swiftly but without panic, and made so stubborn a resistance, that after a terrific struggle of five hours they retired in good orderes 7 See Pak > sa? e 159 The Results (/f &/7t€ Battle 153 : SS ne Wa F aes Th. ' from the field, beaten but not routed. The calmness and precision with wiht bh Frederick conducted the retreat excited the adm of his opponent The . } ] } | ; + : y | sSlans, had, DOWCVE cd VOeTCiy Their kill i. wounded, and prison ounted to nearly 9,000. and they nad l Ct Dbesides, IOl Mags and standards. Among th sla “ vlarshal Keith, an excellent | : i Oolmcer, and one (¢ th I ik personal friends that ] . : ; | . }2 oon eu } } Cacti ~ had rs) ii iD Lis perish qd, and iF a ; . , Maurice of Dessau fell, yw ded, into the hands of the enemy. The king nself was slightly wounded, } : | 1 7 or Lae ’ 7 nc , I 1 . . and had a narrow ¢ Lp I eing made prisoner, , } LiL? | - - rt On the same day died Wilhelmina, Margravine of Baireuth, Fredericks favou r, the cy Death of the 5 | 1.) } ] =< companion of his childhood, th ympa- Margravine . 4 a ee - oh ol Bbaircuth, thet friend of his youth, id his fellow- sufferer under paternal tyranny 1un’s victory gave occasion to a ludicrous proceed- ing on the part of the Pope, who t ight fit to present : A - } ‘ ‘ the Austrian ci nander with a se- The Pope crated hat and rd. in recognitio! f his gives Daun ‘ : ; 7 a « nse t h over the heretical 1} 5 id tn crat it : 7 si ' ‘oy and sword. imitation of his predecessors, who had be ae ’ | +] "Wh e9 ’ y stowed similar rewards on the ¢ :ipions of Christendom ” | | the he the ne a = f was not i h Lp} y f he, ; . , ; 1 4] i the age of Crusades was fast, id the Prussians, ‘ 1. = ‘ 1 - } +h "Th . :> ft t l tical, were C itnen i nie papal Pilts ‘ t he laught f Europe instead of its reverence, a hetraved the religious character of the war, which v ist what Frederick always liked to Insist on. “™ ; ywy , , ,* i results of Hochkirch were not a little Tk : vous “he results surprising. The Austrians had won a great 3 eae victory but the Prt ins reaped the fruits c a ] ~ ++] om Fatt . 1 4 a ol -_ of it After tne WALLA Da Ail return ui LU his Oidd Camp,154 The Last Year of Offensive Warfare. 1759 sang a ‘‘ Te Deum”’ for the victory, and then entrenched himself as carefully as if he had been beaten, consider- ing that he did enough if he barred the great highway to Silesia. Frederick, after retiring two miles from the field, called up reinforcements from Dresden, re- organized his army, and prepared’ for a fresh undertak- ing, just as if he had been the victor. ‘‘ Daun has let us out of check,”’ he said; ‘‘the game is not lost. We will rest here for a few days, then go to Silesia and deliver Neisse.”” Daun had no idea of following up an advantage, and Frederick was always greatest when he had to extricate himself from an awkward situ- ation. The situation was indeed awkward. Neisse and Cosel were invested by a second Austrian army, Awkward : position of under General Harsch, and unless they rederick. were soon relieved they would fall, and all Upper Silesia with them, into the hands of the enemy. But between the king and his fortresses was Daun’s vic- torious army, and even if this were evaded, his departure would leave Saxony dangerously exposed. So impossi- ble did it seem for him to march into Silesia that Daun sent word to Harsch that he might go on quietly with his | sieges since he could answer for the king. Frederick ~~ relieves [he apparently impossible, however, hap- Neisse. pened. Frederick managed to circumvent Daun’s great army, set off for Silesia by forced marches, relieved Neisse, and returned in time to save Saxony. The close of this campaign marks a definite stage in the history of the war. To all outward appearance Fre- derick’s prospects were still fairenough. If Poem nape! East Prussia had fallen into the hands of the Russians, and Cleves remained in those of the French, these were losses that had been foreseen2759 Kunersdorf and Maxen. 155 from the first, and. they were more than counterbalanced by his continued occupation of the rich Saxon electorate. On the central provinces of the Prussian monarchy, though they had most of them been the seat of military operations, the enemy had made no permanent impres: sion: the Austrians retained no footing in Silesia; the Russians had retired behind the Vistula: the Swedes, after an ill-concerted incursion into the heart of Branden- burg, had been chased back to Stralsund. But the ap- pearance of strength was ina measure fallacious. The protraction of the war was telling far more on the re- sources of Prussia than on those of the great powers allied against her. Moreover, a new factor had arisen which must henceforth always be taken into account. Zorndorf was a kind of revelation to Frederick. Previ- ously he had thought little of the fighting power of the Russians, but their steadfastness on that stricken field had shown what they were capable of if properly led. 22. Kunersdorf and Maxen. Three years of the war were gone and the ardour of Frederick's enemies showed no signs of abating. The war was unpopular in the Russian army, but the Czari- na thought no sacrifice too ’ her hatred. France was sick of it too, and tottering on the verge of national bankruptcy, but Louts was kept true to his engagements by domes- eae tic influences and by the unbending deter- mination of Maria Theresa never to lay down arms until Prussia was thoroughly humbled. Undoubtedly Maria Theresa was right. Hada peace been con luded at this particular juncture, it must have been on the basis of the status guo. She had everything to gain by perseverance as it was probable that the resources of Prussia might156 Kunersdorf and Maxen,. break down altogether under the more campaigns, Strain of one or two Already Frederick was at his wit’s end for men and money, Of the splendid infantry which had stormed the : heights at Prague, and stemmed the rout of tate of , \~ the Prussian Collin, very little now remained. Nine eee pitched battles, endless skirmishes, severe marches and constant desertion had made great havoc in the Prussian battalions, and the levies from the Prus- Sian dominions were of course inadequate to fill the gaps. Moreover, Austria, relying on her vastly large population, had ceased to exchange prisoners, and after the end of 1759, Russia followed her example. The new levies consisted largely of deserters. prisoners of war pressed into the service, and foreigners enticed or kid- napped into it by outrageous devices. Such men could not be trusted as Frederick trusted his followers at Leuthen. On the other hand, the soldiery of Austria steadily improved, as is always the case with a powcr Improvement ri that has plenty of native material to draw Oo 1¢ a Austrian on. In artillery she had been superior from soldiery. : the first; her cavalry was perhaps intrinsi- cally as good, and only less effective because it lacked leaders like Seidlitz and Ziethen, the former of whom was probably the finest cavalry officer the world has ever seen. It was in infantry that Prussia had the greatest advantage when the war commenced, as she had still more markedly in the Silesian wars, but this advantage had been diminished by the deterioration of the one and the improvement of the other, until by this time it had disappeared altogether. Frederick’s pecuniary difficulties were even ereater still. But for the English subsidy he could hardly have9 Ba tlle of ie ly. ] 5 } | v1 subsisted at all. The treasure hoarded up in the peace had already been expended, and the Prus- : : Frederick's sian domunions, desolated and partially OC- pecuniary ; ificulties. cupied by the enemy, could furnish no more “™““"> than 4,000,000 thalers. England paid the same amount. 7 000,000 thalers and requisitions In kind were extorted from Saxony, and from Mecklenburg-Schwerin, and g other States of the Empire which had taken a prominent part against Prussia, and the rest of the 25,000,000 thalers (3,750,000/.) which were needed for the war was made up by debasing the coinage, Every penny that could be raised went to the army, which even in the worst times was tolerably well fed and regularly paid, so that, in spite of the fearful severity of Prussian discipline, many deserters came over from the enemy to join its ranks. No new taxes were imposed, but all civil officers were left unpaid, receiving instead of their salaries promises to pay on the conclusion of peace. The summer was half gone before there was any serious fighting. Frederick had gottogethel! ‘> a —t « : } ] rn () ning o 125,000 men oT some sort esiades garrison f J i ATT) Yr * bayat } e TT) ] ’ + * ole ry mcr 7 ‘1 rl 7 , t troops, PLAX Al Ah) A\/ id Cl 1¢ . Si , ins enoupil r ign O48 : . 1759 to take the initiative, and the Austrians were equ illy indisposed to atta k without the co-operation of _ . . ' ’ . . P ’ : ne . - their allies. Towards the middle of July the Russians, under Count Soltikoff, issued from Posen, advanced to the Oder, and after defeating a weak Prussian corps near Kay, took possession of Frankfort. It . 7 . on 2 ttle now became necessary for the king to march - f in person against them, the more especially Zdlichau, a July 23 as Laudon with 18,c00 Austrians was on his Before he could reach Frankfort, Laudon, eluding with much dexterity the vigilance of way to join Soltikoff. his enemies, effected his junction, and Frederi k with158 Kunersdorf and Maxen. 1759 48,000 men found himself confronted by an army 78,000 strong. The Russians were encamped on the heights of Kunersdorf, east of Frankfort, carefully en- cee and trenched and provided with a very nu- Beuon at merous artillery. To the westward, closer ea to the Oder, lay Laudon, in the most fa- vourable situation for succouring Soltikoff if he should be beaten. The necessity under which Frederick always laboured of having to deal swiftly with whatever work he had in hand, in order that he might hurry off to the protection of some other part of his dominions and repair the mis- chief which was almost certain to have occurred in his absence, compelled him to hazard an immediate battle, notwithstanding the strength of the enemy's position and their great superiority in numbers. Accord- Frederick % resolves to dingly at noon on August 12, after a long fight and toilsome march circling round the Rus- sian encampment to reach their most vulnerable point, the king led his troops to the attack. The attack was at first brilliantly successful. By three o'clock the Russian left was routed; several thousand 3 4 prisoners and 70 guns were taken. The Battle of j © i Kunersdorf, Prussian generals then besought the kins A igust 12 : : to rest content with the ad vantage he had gained. The day was intensely hot; his soldiers had been on foot for twelve hours, and were suffering severely from thirst and exhaustion; moreover, if the Russians were let alone, they would probably go off quietly in the night, as they had done after Zorndorf. Unhappily Frederick refused to take counsel. He wanted to de- stroy the Russian army, not merely to defeat it; he had seized the Frankfort bridge, and cut off its retreat. So confident was he of victory that he despatched a courier; ° ’ 1759 Frederick's Despair. 159 to Berlin announcing it. His obstinacy cost him dear, The Russians, supported by six Austrian infantry regi- ments, made a desperate stand on the Spitzberg hill ’ I > < — and kept bringing up fresh troops against the jaded Prussian battalions. The cavalry was ordered up, but Seidlitz, who had saved the day at Zorndorf, was disabled by a wound. The king exerted himself to the utmost, ind exposed his person with unusual recklessness. lwo . t horses were shot under him, and a third was hit just as | 1e was about to mount. His clothes were riddled, and a sold case he carried in his pocket was crushed by a 1 7 Dulet. By five o'clock the attack was « omplet lv beaten off. ) ; . = >» y 5] re r ‘ ; . art ' .e Prussians were in full retreat when Laudon swept . ] +1 ee a r ies sae ] qaown upon them wlth Clg hnteen fresh sQudaGa- rons. The retreat became a rout more dis- orderly than in any battle of the war except Rossbach. The king, stupefied with his disaster, could hardly be induced to quit the field, and was heard to mutter, ‘‘Is there then no cursed bullet that can reach me f& ; The defeat was overwhelming. Had it been properly followed up, it must have put an end to the war, and Kunersdorf would have ranked among the decisive battles of the world. Berlin lay ° ae dease - Ai ‘ a\ open to the enemy: the royal family fled to Macdebure. For the first (and last) time in his life Frederick gave way utterly to despair. “I have no resources left,’’ he wrote to the minister Finckenstein the evening after the battle, ‘‘and to tell the truth, I hold all for lost. I shall not survive the ruin of my country. Farewell for ever. The same night he resigned the command of the army to General Finck. 18,50 of his soldiers were killed,160 Kunersdorf and Maxen. 1759 wounded, or prisoners, and the rest were so scattered that no more than 3,000 remained under his commana. All the artillery was lost, and most of his best generals were killed or wounded. The next day he drew up in- structions for Finck, pointing out some slight prospect , of defeating Laudon, should he advance alone on Ber- lin; then after declaring his brother Henry generalissi- mo, and directing that the army should swear allegiance to his nephew, he concludes thus: ‘‘ This is the only advice I am in a condition to give in these unfortunate circumstances. Had I any resources left, I should have remained at my post.’ It is clear that the king contem- plated making use of his phial of poison. The enemy had only to give him the finishing stroke, he afterwards said, By degrees, however, the prospect brightened. The fugitives kept coming in, and the enemy neglected to give the finishing stroke. Frederick shook off his despair and resumed the command Prussian affairs mend, of his army. Artillery was ordered up from Berlin, and the troops serving against the Swedes were recalled from Pomerania. Within a week of Kuners- dorf he was at the head of 33,000 men, and in a posi- tion to send relief to Dresden, which was besieged by an Austrian and Imperialist army. The relief, as it hap- pened, arrived just too late. On the morrow of Kuners- dorf, Frederick had written to Schmettau, the com- mandant, bidding him make terms, and Schmettau, without waiting to see whether the king’s Surrender of =e ireadea: affairs were really as hopeless as they seem- September4. ed at first, entered precipitately into a capit- ulation, and surrendered the city when help was actually close at hand. The rapidity with which Frederick recovered from his9 The Russians go Home. 161 175 defeat is most surprising, but that he should have been allowed time for recovery is more surprising still, It has been surmised, with much probability, that Soltikott had no wish to push him too hard. As the life of the Czarina drew to a close, the party of a ee _ Peter and his consort Catharine afterwal GS Ry the celebrated Empress Catharine II.) grew daily stronger in 5t. Petersburg, and their = su policy was directly opp sed to that of Eliza- — soitikof. beth. But, however this may be, whether Soltikoff was or was not a traitor to his mistress, the y supineness of Daun, who with the main Austrian army lav inactive a few marcnes On, furnished oS ltikoff with : 7} Fie - } . 4} - =% 7 ~ 7 an excellent excuse for doing nothil ix. The loss of the Russians in the battle was hardly less severe than that i< ‘ of the Prussians, though Laudon’s Austrians had suffered comparatively little. No rejoinder was possible when Soltikoff angrily complained that he had done enough in gaining two battles, which had cost Russia 27,000 men, it before doing anything more, he expected the Austrians to win two victories also. Daun’s inactivity after Kunersdorf (and before it too) was in- excusable, and showed plainly that, skilful “Ppo’™ as he was in the Fabian tactics of defensive . : : + - ote ew ee wartare, he was wholly incapable of a vigorous initiative. Had Laudon held the cl f£ enammand the recult would AG zavlliUvll LiCiks Liat ; ey PLAGLAS Lill, tne result WOUILC certainly have been different. 4 + t , ; . } . . 7 e ~ ~ . > ry After a delay whi ive the Prussians time to re it ; ’ . ; p 4% their strength, operations were ré sumed, Upon the fall - i ee ‘ae, cr i nr : ieee zi coos ot Dresde i, = Lin ii NSCIMLCAX to march into Suesia ) . and act in ncert h th ,ustrian com- Se The Rus- " } . si F — . } . mander-in-chief. Still nothing was done. sians go : . cr : . home. Daun’'s indecision afforded great scope to the Su] : trratecry of Frederick and Prince Henry.162 Kunersdorf and Maxen. 1759 rresently Daun moved into Saxony, and the Russians, after demonstrations against Glogau and Breslau, re- tired into Poland, leaving Laudon to find his w: ay home as best he might, by a circuit of 300 miles round Prussian Silesia. Maria Theresa, always slow to withdraw her conf- dence when once she had given it, as was seen in the case of Prince Charles of Lorraine, strove to Oe conceal her mortification at this miserable fiasco, but the popular indignation in Vienna rose to intensity, and vented itself in squibs and lam- poons on Daun’'s dilatoriness. The Countess Daun re- ceived a parcel to be forwarded to her husband, and found on opening it that it contained a nightcap. With the departure of the Russians the campaign would probably have ended, had not Frederick’s desire to close it with a victory led him into a fresh disaster, hardly less serious and far more disgraceful than that of Kunersdorf. Daun, with the main Austrian ice pe army, was in Saxony. Dresden was his. but Henry in the adroit manceuvres of Prince Henry, and ae especially a wonderful march of fifty-eight miles in fifty hours, had prevented his gaining the whole electorate. Winter was coming on, aa the Austrians were already beginning to retire towards Bohemia for winter-quarters, when Dresden, the sole material result of their campaign, would have fallen again into the hands of the l’russians. At this juncture Frederick appeared in his brother's Camp, Just recovered from a bad attack ot gout, slated with his success in getting ba of the Rus- ne sians, and panting for fresh action. With the view of hastening the retreat of the Austrians, and of driving them, if possible, into the diffi-1759 Capitulation of Maxen. 163 cult Pirna country, he ordered General Finck to take post with his corps at Maxen, to bar their direct : 2 Finck takes line of communications with Bohemia. The yost at movement was effected against the advice mae of Prince Henry, and Finck himself, an excellent officer whom Frederick had likened to Turenne, remonstrated avainst its riskiness, till Frederick cut him short with ‘You know I can’t stand making of difficulties; contrive to get it done.” The manceuvre nearly succeeded. Daun, struck with alarm, was on the point of hurrying off homewards, when General Lacy showed him how to cat h the Prus- sians in their own trap. When he perceived his oppor- tunity, his dispositions were niade with his wonted skill. Leaving a portion of his army to hold the camp of Dresden against Frederick, he surrounded Finck with overwhelming numbers, and compelled his . > ¢ Car tul i: 1ole corps to lay down theirarms. 12,000 (Fy. a Prussian soidiers, with Q9 xCNnerais, and over N me Der } soo officers, thus became prisoners of war. Finck saw what was impending, and should have retreated while there was yet time, but he preferred to risk his army rather than incur the king's displeasure by disobeying his orders. Finck behaved like a fool, but the king himself was mainly responsible for the catastrophe, not <¢ much because of his obstinate refusal to take advice, but because his habitual severity in cases of failure para- d the wits of his officers, and made them court disaster by literal obedience to his orders, rather than ke the responsibility of acting against them even when placed in circumstances which the king could not have roreseen. The capitulation of Maxen was no less destructive of Frederick s plans than galling to his pride. The Aus:164 The War tn Western Germany. 1757-8 trians now retained Dresden, a place of great stra- tegical importance, though the king, in the hope of dislodging them, exposed the wrecks of his army to the ruinous hardships of a winter cam- its yesults. paign in weather of unusual severity, and January, 1760. borrowed 12,000 men of Ferdinand of Bruns- wick to cover his flank while so engageu. The new year had commenced before he allowed his harassed troops to go into winter-quarters. The downfall of Prussia seemed impending. The king’s constitution was almost broken down with disease and accumulated calamities. Great discontent prevailed in his army, and even Prince Henry openly accused him of being the cause of all their misfortunes. Unquestion- ably he had made great mistakes, but no less certain is it that his dauntless demeanour had saved the state after Kunersdorf, and that it was nothing but his iron resolu- tion that upheld it still. CHAPTER XI. THE WAR IN WESTERN GERMANY. TuatT Ferdinand of Brunswick should have been able to send 12,000 men to the assistance of Frederick, though not a fact of much importance in itself, is nevertheless significant as marking the change which had taken place since the days of Kloster-Seven, when the French had overrun all North Germany, and were threatening the ae central provinces of the Prussian monarchy. ofFerdinand Fortwo years past Ferdinand had held them Bees steadily in check, and after Rossbach Fred- erick never met them on the field of battle. But for this1758 Ferdinand Ke-crosses the Rhine. 165 relief he must have succumbed; his enemies were almost too strong for hiin as it was. Ferdinand had proved himself worthy of the trust re- posed in him when he was chosen to command the allied army on the eve of Rossbach. After taking part in that battle he repaired to Stade, where he assumed the com- mand of some 32,000 Hanoverians, Hessians, and B:uis- wickers, and though the season was already far ad- vanced, forced the French to retire behind the Aller before going into winter quarters. In the ,, ree in took the field, arena drove them in confusion across the Rhine, the | following February he a - > and on June 23, defeated them at Crefeld on ¢., its right bank. Want of discipline and the 73 *75° inefficiency of its commanders had reduced the great French army to a disorderly mob; Richelieu had been superseded, but his successor, the Count of Clermont, a a | j I > > ) ~ ~ prince of blood, was equally destitute of military capacity. : = =i 7 ‘ 7 “ a ~ ; . After Crefeld. Ciermont aiso Was rec ulled, and repiat ed 1.7 } : a} . co : by a more capable commander in the person of the Mar- quis de Contades. At the same time reinforcements were sent to the army, and Soubise created a diversion een intended to —_— ~ ee r < = . —~— _ — _ ~ 7 — in Hesse with 25,000 t act as auxiliaries to the Austrians in Bohe- ; , ac : Ferdinand re- mia. Ferdinand found himself under the crosses the necessity of recrossing the Rhine and re- tiring into Westphalia. oi : a = : ee Fe At this moment 8,500 J:nglish troops arrived from England to reinforce Ferdinand’s army. Had they a: rived a little sooner he need not have re- passed the Rhine. Had they been more : soallnateg numerous he might have carried the war t nt ' , : AuQU ft into the enemy's country, but it can hardly be doubted that Pitt exercised a wise discretion in limit- MM166 The War in Western Germany. 1758 ing himself to a less ambitious part in the Continental war. It was enough to defend Hanover and draw off thither the strength of France, while England struck a decisive blow at her colonies and commerce. Before the close of the year new life was infused into the French Government by the appointment Choiseul Min- of the Duke of Choiseul, the French ambas- ister of Foreign : : f oe sador at Vienna, to the ministry of foreign affairs in the place of the well-meaning and sagacious but altogether characterless Abbé de Bernis. The Government of*France had for some time been falling more and more into a condition of anarchy. After the death of Cardinal Fleury in 1743, Anarchy in the ” French Gov- the king, then close upon thirty-three years Sere. of age, announced his intention of governing the king. the kingdom himself, as his great-grand- father, Louis XIV., had done before him. But Louis XV. had not inherited his anc estor’s energy and strength of will. He possessed § good abilities, but was too indolent to use them, more anxious to oF ice his ignorance than to acquire information, quick of perception but without the persistence and determination needful to make his will preval il, timid, irresolute and enervated by the sensu- ality of his life. No united action was to be expected from a government where the he ads of the great depart- ments were independent of each other, and often at 1nd when the sovereign, to whom they were was too weak to control them, variance, < nominally responsible, and reduced to intriguing against them in secret, satisfied if he couid prevent any one of them from becoming too powerful. ae chief power in the rez 1lm was engrossed | by Madame de Pompadour, w ho, though for some years * she had ceased to be the king’s mistress, retained her influence over the bored and listless monarch by het17 v1 8 Chotseud. 16) skillin amusing him and ministering to his pleasures The favourite made and unmade ministers, appointed generals to the army, and discussed with the latter the plans of their campaigns. In this medley of conflicting authorities, Choiseul made his weight felt from the first. Proud, resolute, and ! daring, he quickly gained an ascendency Choijseul over the other mini ters, and while StoOopIN ob.ains the y I > to secure his position by complaisance tO t ASCENCENCY, the. favourite, he knew how to use her influence to secure his own ends. For the first time since the death of Flcury there was a Prime Minister in France. Choiseul's accession to offi S&S was signalized by a great outburst of energy. The treaties with Austria were remodelled on terms more favourable ae - = ‘ Ch ise il’s to France, especially in the matter of subsi- energet ic dies. Ships and troops were collected for "5 an invasion of the British Isles, while more than 100,000 men were employed in Germany under Contades and the Duke of Broglie, the best generals that France pos- sessed. The colonies, indeed. were neglected, but Choi- seul proposed to win them back in Hanover and in Eng- land itself. Ch seul came too late into power, Pitt's eloquence had created in England a spirit that carried all before it, and the year 1759 was one of the most fatal in the annals of Frans eS AS it Was one of the most glorious in those of England. The great invasion scheme coll ipsed utte rly, and in Cvery quarter of the gle be the English triumphed. in Germany the advantage was at first all on the side of the French. Soubise got pos- ; 1 ' s€ssion of the tree city of Frankfort by means : rf, January N\A Of a Stratacs mm, securing thereby a most id- vVantageous base for operations on the Lower Rhine168 The War in Western Germany. 1758 and Ferdinand, while attempting to recover it, was beaten by Broglie at Bergen. Contades then advanced into Hesse, and pressed forward on Hano- Battle of ‘ : > ~ : Bergen ver in conjunction with Broglie. Ferdinand, April 13. disheartened by his defeat, shrank from offering battle, frittered away his resources by trying to cover too much, and had to fall back on the Weser. On a July 9 the French surprised Minden. A tuke Min- second occupation of Hanover seemed im- = minent. The archives were sent to Stade, and Frederick expected to see the French once more before the gates of Halberstadt. At this point Ferdinand made a stand. Nothing but a battle could save Hanover, and by some remarkably skilful manceuvres he induced Contades to deliver one on very disadvantageous terms. Towards the end of July the bulk of the French army was encamped close to Minden. Contades, with the main body, lay on the left bank of the Weser, with a chain of wooded hills in his rear, and with Position of the armics towards the end of July. ime o* his front covered partly by a morass, partly by the Bastau, a little stream falling into the Weser at Minden. A large detachment under Broglie was on the right bank of the Weser, and the Duc de Brissac with 8,000 men occupied the passes in the rear of Contades, and guarded the line of communications with Hesse- Cassel. The whole army was about 64,000 strong. The allies lay a little to the northward, numbering 54,000, of whom 10,000 were English, and nearly 2,000 Prussian. The English were commanded by Lord George Sack- ville, with the Marquis of Granby as his second. On July 23, Miinster was taken by the French, but Contades was desirous of avoiding a battle until he had got Lippstadt too, and so secured his communicationsBattle of Minden. yhalia. Ferdinand’'s object was to draw him with Westy from his strong position and make him fight at once, and this he accomplished in a very masterly manner. Though on the point of nand to mak engaging a superior enemy, he had the bold ness to weaken himself by detaching 10,000 men, whom be} ' 1: ao } ~ , 7 } 7 5 ~ 7 ] > y 7 vs , he placed under the command of his nephew the Heredi- Y > r> ES , - Win . ] ~ on . = " ae tarv Priace of Brunswick, and sent round to Gohfeld, in the rear of the French, on the line of their communica- ; tions with Cassel. At the same i his left wing under General Wangenheim, in such a manner that it seemed entirely unsupported by the rest of the army. It was, in fact, separated from it by a gap of: - _ — sane ten oe . } , of three miles, and tae manceuvre would Nave peen a , , = very dangerous one in the presence of an cnemy of Cl lS : | Frederick’s rapidity, but | erdinand judged rightly in venturing it against Contades. Indeed, through ali the movements preceding the battle, and in-his dispositi a : yee co ate Tead : tl ©C© Chat dar l ran aaversary if} i } Lin iil Willa 1 ] : . : y he is likely to do in any ven circumstance - , : ; . , » Warninar ay cted art Contades acted exactly as Ferdinand expected. Fright- ened by the appearance of the Hereditary Prince in his : , 7 rear, and tempted Dy 1 ] ect oft ng ’ . c ntade TC. vantage of WV it la great Dlunder v soives to fight. on the part of his adversary, he made up his mindto fight. Broglie was recalled from across the i l nineteen bridges were thrown across the Bastau a ’ }, nioh r Tasly 27 he FKrenc!] ; r CY > and on the ni rht of ily 31 the French army came 1 aN eon } ate. 8 TO! i) ‘ SLU Lal PVs VY a‘ ats lac) 1 ] 1 | . +] } cur ; : Pe } ‘ on Loe |] LilKo, cil SlLALUULII petwecn, Indau cq Conlide » LO commit a serious crror in the qgisposition Of his jorces,ce eo” \N iy 7 Gi LAS f ' i 2 ~“Ai. Ge o ~~ AN Nh " sling f} J Ex hfeld wa rr BATTLE OF MINDEN August I, 1759. French Army behind Minden, July 31. Broglie’s detachment The Allied Army, July 31. Wangenheim The Duc de Brissac, The Hereditary Prince. French Army in battle order, August 1. Allied Army about to attack, August I, Cavalry under SackvilleBattle of Minden. 171 He placed his infantry in the wings and his cavalry in the centre, cutting the line of infantry 1n two. : | | Battle-order In front of the wings were stationed two of th batteries of twenty-four and thirty guns, French. respectively ; this was another error, for the cavalry and artillery impeded each other's action. Contades’ left wing was protected by the morass and stream which had previously covered its front, and on his extreme =e right, resting on the Weser, a separate corps was sta- tioned under the command of Broglic. Broglie was to commence the battle by attacking the seemingly unpro- tected corps under Wangenheim; and when Wangen- heim had been driven in, the whole French army was to throw itself on Ferdinand's exposed left flank. For the success of this plan it was necessary that Fer- dinand. however, intended to do nothing of the kind. Foreseeing Contades movements, he had made his ar- rangements with reat pre ion the day 8 : a : B (tic rt before, and at ¢t ein the morning of At Minden ‘ A\ i : vust I, aS SOO is the krencnh Were K wn to be stirring, he set his columns in motion. Thus when Broglie began the attack at five o lock, he not only found Wangenheim stronger than he expected, but to his surprise saw the whe le allied army marching up. Half an hour later it was in position, and the gap be- tween Ferdinand’s left and the corps ot Wangenheim, ‘nto which Contades meant to thrust hims¢ lf, was filled up. The brunt of the bat C | } | > 1 ’ . . fantry regiments and three Hanoverian battalions ln the ad fue - je) 4 — 7 4 a c _—— A “ ‘ pa ~ IO — o— p pt ~ one = ~ ’ ’ c } } mr Uy -} } ; nnd them lay, richt centre oO! th Liil al y, whicn round themscives } Te , ; T . vy > ‘ [ opposea to tnt I nc avalry, an MNMCNUSe iidoso ot sixty-three squadrons (7,500 sabres), and got engaged by172 The War in Western Germany. 1759 a mistake before the rest of the army was in line. While the columns were deploying, an order came down from Ferdinand that when the troops advanced it should be with drums beating. General Spércken, who com- manded the right centre, fancying that he was ordered to advance at once with drums beating, set off straight- way with what regiments were formed, leaving the rest to follow as best they could. With the ut Infantry of the 7, ; allies receive Most steadfastness these troops advanced the charge of I renen cavalry,and paces, with the French batteries playing on rout them. ‘ across the plain over an interval of 1,500 their flanks, delivered their fire at ten paces distance, then received the ch; irge of eleven squadrons, and beat them off. The second line erate with as little success. Then the Carabineers and Gendarmerie of the reserve, eighteen squadrons of the choicest troops of France, swept down with tremendous fury on the unyielding battalions. The first line was broken through in several places, but the second received them with so hot a fire that they also had to retire. Then was the opportunity for the cavalry of the allies dash in and complete the ruin. The French centre was in confusion ; their left even yet was not completely formed. The charge of a few squadrons must have routed them utterly, and, hemmed in as they were, be- tween the Weser and the morass, with the Bastau and the hills in their rear, very few indeed could have : escaped. Pe cavalry was not forthcoming Sackville oe refuses to On Ferdinand’s right were fourteen English advance : ¥ ‘ ig 2a wiih he and 1o Hanoverian squadrons (3,331 sabres), Ss) cavalry. ue though under Lord George Sankyilien aide-de-camp after aide-de-caimp was sent to him, Sack- ville could not be induced to advance. At length, Fer- dinand, in despair, sent orders to Lord Granby, whoVictory of the Aliies. 173 commanded the second line; but Sackville hindered him, and the opportunity passed away. Relieved from immediate danger, the French recovered themselves somewhat, but after a tough ; ;° strurcle they were obliged to give way all = g,, ee a ' cs Tic. 6< Ata at - nd retrea long tne line. By ten o'clock they were in AAG retreak d : into Minden. full retreat, but the retreat was covered by Broglie, the grenadiers of France b :having splendidly, and the army of Contades got back into Minden, beaten but not annihilated, as it might have been if Sackville had obeved ee lad oveyea OTFQae;©rs. The victory would not have been decisive, and the French might perhaps have re turned to their old camp | sending his nephew to their reat While the battle was on before Mi 1, the Hereditary Prince defeated the Duc de Brissac and 4. joci- occupied the passes in the hills. At the zea ah ste same time, General Gilsen with a small de tachment from Liibbecke defeated the Duc d’Havré, who guarded the interval between the hills and the morass. The old camp thus beca \ sable, and re- treat by the left bank of the Weser was cut ofl The night after the battle Contades withdrew his army across the Wescr: the next day Minden was surrendered, and the French commenced a hasty and UlSd icriyv retreat upon H »sse-Lasseél They ; ’ the Frencb : . } 7 ASA Lay ] - had Jost 7,086 killed, wounded and prisoners 7 ; +} re. , besides fc three guns, seventeen flags and standards, fee 7 1 } or } a : -< LUC . it tie L t ¢ t tn i Da Ave Che : —_ We ‘ C : ! } 1, ; +! ’ rt «+ — ‘ 1; ; i and Chiciy On the Six imecn wnose steadciastn won the day. These reciments were the 12th, 2oth, 23d, ~+) 7? 1 - ‘ : | 1 » I ce M4 | A 25! hy Lil Lid SI oO] thc line, ind tney vcal WiLNach on ther ( oloul > now,$74 The War in Western Germany, 1759 Great indignation was felt throughout the army at the cowardice of Lord George Sackville, by whose disobe- dience to reiterated orders the victory was moa first jeopardized and ultimately shorn of its completeness; and on the day after the battle general orders were issued by Ferdinand in which a severe though indirect censure was passed on his con- duct. Sackville then wrote home for leave to resign his command, and on his arrival in England demanded a court martial. When the court met in the following February, the fact of his disobedience and of his reluc- tance to go into action were clearly established by the evidence of several of the aides-de-camp who had brought the orders and of other witnesses; but the most damaging testimony of all was that of Lieutenant-Colonel Sloper, who deposed that he had said to Ligonicr (one of the aides-de-camp), ‘‘ or God’s sake repeat your orders that that man may not pretend he does not understand them, for it is now over half an hour since we received orders to march, and yet we are still here. For you see, sir, the condition he is in."’ Sloper’s testimony was con- firmed by Ligonier, who admitted that he had seen the confusion of Lord George Sackville to which Sloper alluded. Sackville conducted his defence in person with great ability and spirit, making the most of a slight dis- crepancy between the orders of two of the aides-de- camp. The facts of the case were, however, too strong for him, and he was pronounced guilty of disobedience and “unfit to serve His Majesty in any military capacity whatever.”Canada. CHAPTER XII. THE CONQUEST OF CANADA, AND THE DESTRUCTION OF THE FRENCH NAVAL POWER. 1. Preliminary Operations. hich we have traced : ‘ the course through four campaigns, down to the point at which Frederick seemed on the point of succumbing to IN the great continental war of w his enemies, the English have very little part. Their energies were employed more profitably in a series of enterprizes, which laid the foundations of the present maritime greatness of England and of her vast colonia‘ empire. The first quarter to which Pitt directed his at- tention was North America. During his ' : Premnch : previous administration, he had formed the French as cenaency *9 idea of conquering Canada, but his tenure America in ’ 1757 t r of office was too short to admit of its realiza- tion, and things went from bad to worse, until by the close of 1757 the Fren h had pretty well made good their lofty claim to the entire basins of the Ohio and St. Lawrence. Everywhere our colonies were hemmed in by a chain of French forts: everywhere they lay ex- posed to incursions trom the Indian allies of France. Various causes had combined to give the preponder- } ance tothe French, although our colonists outnumbered them in the proportion of fifteen to one, and If the French Reasons ‘ far surpassed them in wealth. 7 in Canada were few in numbers, they were if si , = eee hile ee ee all collected under one authority; while the English - °% . ¢ +4 7 la car r ~ «+ - were divided amongst thirteen colonies, each with its own administration, and with scarcely any b nd ¢ —s union, except a common jealousy of interference by the176 Canada. 1757-8 home government, which was not altogether unmerited. At the same time the French, being less engaged in trade, and possessing less realized wealth, were of a more martial disposition, and they were far more suc- cessful in attaching the natives to their side. Their ad- venturous spirit, and their open-hearted genial tempera- ment, attracted and harmonized with the simple nature of the red-skins, who were repelled by the cold haughti- ness and mercantile greed of the English. To these influences must be added the incapacity of the English generals, and the genius of the French com- mander-in-chief, the Marquis of Montcalm, hMontcalm. of a man restless energy and dauntless courage, idolized by his soldiers, and possessed in a re- markable degree of the tact indispensable for managing the Indians. Early in 1758 large reinforcements were sent to Amer- ica, and the Earl of Loudoun, the I-english commander, was recalled. General Abercrombie, who then became senior officer in America, was, unfortunately as it proved, allowed to remain, but Pitt, with a wise discretion, en- trusted his principal expedition to younger men, selected especially for the purpose, with as little regard to the claims of birth and patronage as to those of seniority. ee tc The chief effort was directed against Louis- foranattack burg, the best harbour the French had on = aaa the American coast, the seat of their lucra- tive cod-fishery, and in every respect a position of great importance. Situated on the island of Cape Breton, at the mouth of the St. Lawrence, it commanded in a measure the only channel through which Louisburg. the French in Europe could communicate with their American possessions. The reduction of this stronghold was successfully ac-1759. Quebee. 177 complished by General Amherst, but Montcalm, with a vastly inferior force, inflicted a severe defeat Lic inde- TOxa on Abercrombie near Ticonderoga, where the French had built a strong fort on the narrow neck of land between Lakes George and Cham- plain which commanded the route to Montreal, the second city of Canada. Among the minor incidents of the campaign may be mentioned the taking of Fort Du- quesne, the name of which was altered to 1 ittsburg. $2. Quebec. In the following year, the war in America was prose- cuted with equal vigour and greater success. Amherst, appointed commander-in-chief in place of Plans {i yr 1759 Abercrombie, was directed to renew the at- ack on Ticonderoga, and then, if possible, to advance on Quebec, and co-operate with a second yroaching the city by the river St. Lawrence, ody of provincials and friendly Indians create d force ap] while a | a diversion by besieging Fort Niagara. The command of the second and most hazardous of these enterprises was allotted to General Wolfe, on whom the brilliancy of its execution, as well as the melan holy but glorious circumstances attending its close, have conferred a re- nown that will last as long as the English nation endures. Wolfe was only thirty-three years old, but most of those years had been spent in the service of his country. Born in 1726, he had entered the army : : Wolfe. when barely fourteen, and had served throuch the Austrian Succession War with such credit as to become lieutenant-colonel at twenty-two. During the ensuing peace he devoted himself with much assi- duity to the study of his professi ne and to perfec ting his regiment in drill and discipline. When war broke out,178 Quebec. 1759. he was again employed on active service, and his gal- lautry on the occasion of an abortive expedition against Rochfort, in the summer of 1757, attracted the ever watchful attention of Pitt, and recommended him for employment under Amherst in America. Possessed of every virtue and accomplishment befitting a soldier and a gentleman, Wolfe was at the same time altogether devoid of physical beauty or grace. A lean ungainly figure, red hair, which contrary to the custom of the period was unconcealed by powder, and a shy and awk- ward demeanour, were however counterbalanced by a sweetness and gentleness of disposition, which, com- bined with great strength of character, high principles, and a chivalrous sense of honour, won the love and es- teem of all who knew him, Ill-health, and the hope of enjoying for a time the pleasures of domestic life, brought him home to England after the taking of Louisburg. He was in fact engaged to be married, but as soon as he heard of the honourable command which was destined for him, he cheerfully placed himself at the disposal of his country, and the solemnization of his marriage was de- ferred, as the event proved, for ever. In February, 1759, Wolfe embarked on board the flect of Admiral Saunders, consisting of twenty-two ships of the line, and about an equal number of frigates and smaller vessels of war, besides transports and store ships. After touching at Louis- burg and Halifax, where rcinforcements were taken in, the fleet, with 7,000 troops on board, sailed up the broad stream of the St. Lawrence as far as the Isle of Orleans, a large and fertile island lying just below Quebec. Here the troops disembarked, and marching to its western extremity, found themselves face to face with the beautiful formidable city“> a . wyeay «' ( ‘\\ > 2 BY nal => } a 2 , c it of m i i o J , - m { oO 7 = ” - m j ; olf tlh © at ; ed “is vr f i © (f 0 ~ 3 olay = f my : 5 < < < ~ 4 Y " ~ s ar = ; 4 a ST } a ; a Z , ° = ( a o Fe , er a ae mM my : > Fé | SIEGE OF QUEBEC,480 Quebec. 175g Quebec stands on the left bank of the St. Lawrence, more than 300 miles from its mouth, on and below a rocky promontory formed by the overflow- oe ing of the river St. Charles. Where it flows past the city the St. Lawrence is about a mile in breadth, but below it rapidly expands, and between the Isle of Orleans and the ocean it is nowhere less than fifteen miles across. Behind the city are the famous heights of Abraham, a continuation of the ridge on which it is built, extending for a considerable distance on the stream. Twenty miles above Quebec Montcalm had stationed 2,000 men to take in the rear any force approaching it Sees ON that side, though this danger seemed ex- disposition cluded by the rugged and precipitous cliffs, on iis lores which must first be surmounted. With the remainder of his forces, some 10,000, of whom about half were regulars, Montcalm occupied a strong en- trenched camp below the city, between the St. Charles and Montmorenci Rivers, with the St. Lawrence and its sandbanks in front, and an impenetrable forest in his rear. A bridge of boats across the St. Charles secured his communications with Quebec. It was on:this side that Quebec was thought to be most assailable, but even here great obstacles were presented to a besieging army by the two broad and rapid rivers, and by the roughness of the ground, which, though less precipitous than the heights of Abraham, was still very broken and inter- sected by deep ravines, besides being strengthened arti- ficially at every weak point. Wolfe's first care on arriving before Quebec was to fortify the west point of the Isle of Orleans, ee as a depot for stores, and to occupy and erect de batteries on Point Levy, on the right bank of the St. Lawrence, whence a cannonade was opened1759 Despondency of Wolfe. 181 upon the city. He then transported his troops across the river, and landing below the inlet of the Montmo- renci, encamped opposite the enemy. Every stratagem was employed to entice the French general from his strong position, but Montcalm, though superior in num- bers, wisely remained on the defensive. At . » - = ? Ineffectual lencth Wolfe, feeling that the season was attac] A, slipping away without anything being ac- July 31 complished, led his men to the attack, and was repulsed with heavy loss. The attack had not been well devised, but in any case the obstacles were almost insurmounta- ble: it Was a serious @! r to operate by the Montm )- renci at all. The English began to lose heart, and Wolfe’s health, always very delicate, gave way com- pletely under the shock. Mortification at the failure, and melancholy brooding over the helplessness of the Uy) tuation, brought on a violent fever, and for some weeks ] a . a aée : i. . . > . 2 he lay in a Crit il condition, durin whi h operations . , were almost suspended. . . . 1, 7” —— len . . . y F = As soon as he was partially recovered, Wolfe called his prince ipal OF L ae ' ; : i, LTC) A Was aes ded to 5 7 renew the attack above Quebec. Small = a : Res lves To hopes or success were entertal 1ed : but it ‘ ve . ' (uebec was deemed advisable to ceep the enemy ~*~ -- ] “ = he = ae ‘ . -~ 7 in piay, to prevent his detaching fresh troops against Amherst, who might be In difficulties, as no communi- from him, th uch W fe had heard from French prisoners of his having taken Ticon- — cation had been receivex deroga and Crown Point. Before setting out on his forlorn hope, Wolfe despatched a letter to Pitt detailing the progress of the siege, couched in the gloomiest tones, and W olfe’s concluding with the words Happy if our efforts here can contribute to the success of His Maje ty's i182 Ouebec. 1759 arms in any other parts of America.’’ In a subsequent letter to Lord Holdernesse, the lasi he ever wrote, he says: ‘‘ My constitution is entirely ruined, without the consolation of having done any considerable service to the state, or without any prospect of it.’’ Three days after the first of these letters reached England, an express ar- rived announcing that Quebec was taken and Wolfe slain. When all was in readiness, the whole available Eng- lish force, numbering no more than 3,600 effectives, was transported, under the escort of Admiral Holmes'’s squadron, to a point some miles above Quebec, on the right bank of the St. Lawrence, where a eee fleet of boats was collected to bear them to the assault. Montcalm detached M. de Bou- gainville, with 2,000 men, to watch their movements; but being lured too far up the river by a feint of the admiral’s, he was out of reach when the decisive moment arrived. At one in the morning of September 13, Wolfe em- barked on the boats with half his men—all that could be taken in a single journey—and, under cover of the darkness, steered for a small creek a mile and a half above Quebec, known since as Wolfe’s cove. As the boats dropped silently down the stream on the ebb tide, Wolfe, in a low voice, repeated to the off- Elegy.” cers in his boat Gray's ‘‘ Elegy in a Country ; Churchyard,” and when he had finished said, ‘‘Now, gentlemen, I had rather be the author of that poem than take Quebec.” On gaining the shore the troops found themselves at the base of a steep and thickly wooded cliff or bank, some 250 feet high, up which a winding Landing of the trvuops path, so narrow in places that only two men could go abreast, led to a redoubdt with four guns, held by a French captain and 150 men. In the1759 Battle on the Heights of Abraham, 183 hurry and darkness the path was difficult to find, and the soldiers began scrambling up the face of the cliff as best they could, dragging themselves up by stumps and boughs of trees, and the light infantry under Colonel Howe had nearly gained the summit before the rustling of the branches betrayed their approach to the defenders of the redoubt. Had these been even moderately vigi- VAs lant, they ought to have been able to keep back a host; but the suddenness and strangeness of the attempt filled them with terror, and, after firing a single volley, they took to flight. The remainder of the troops were then disembarked, and by daybreak Wolfe had assembled his whole force on the heights of Abraham, about three quarters of a mile from Quebec. Montcalm had, in the meantime, been kept entirely in the dark as to Wolfe's intentions by the skilful ma- noeuvres of Admiral Saunders, who, as previously ar- ranged, had made a feint against the French camp at = | @he i. ~ | : Beauport. All through the night a severe é " } > ; L- .¥ vF } . | lL. . “e nt acair Cannonade was Kept up Dy the ships, while ! Salose the splashing of oars was heard in variou i a4 i. quarters, especially about the mouth of the Montmo- 1e renci, where Wolfe had made his first attack, on [1 } yt} + si 30, and Montcalm was in constant expectation of an at- tempt to storm his lines, till a horseman from Quebec galloped into his camp at daybreak and announced the landing of the English. Then the French commander hurried across the St. Charles and prepared to give battle to the daring inva- der. How many men he had with him it is impossible tosay. He seems to have been superior to the English in numbers, but many of his troops were only Canadian militia. His wisdom in fighting at once is very much open to ques184 Oucbec. 1759 tion—had he waited a day Bougainville witk his 2,000 would have been in—but there is no doubt that his dis- positions for the battle were worthy of his reputation. Advancing under cover of a cloud of skirmishers, the French came down upon the English left, drove it in, and forced Wolfe to wheel back three bat- talions em Dotence to avoid being outflanked. Montcalm then massed his troops on his own left, and fell with great impetuosity on the English Success of the French. right, which was composed chiefly of irregulars. Here also the advanced pickets were driven back in confusion, anda feeling of discouragement spread through the English ranks, till Wolfe restored confidence by riding in front of the line and assuring the men that the light infantry had retired in obedience to his instructions. He then ordered them to reserve their fire till the ene- my was within forty yards. His orders were obeyed to the letter. The French came on, keeping up an irregular fire as they advanced, but our men remained steady, shouldering their muskets as if on parade, till the enemy was close up, and then a volley was deli- CG} ecked by Wolfe. vered along the whole line. Its effect was marvellous. Vhen the smoke cleared away huge gaps were seen in the French ranks. The enemy began to waver, and Wolfe pressed forward to improve his advantage. As he cheered his men to the charge a musket ball struck him in the wrist, but, wrapping a handkerchief round the wound, he conti- nued to advance at the head of the grenadiers, who charged the enemy at the point of the bayonet. Pre- sently he was hit again in the groin, but, Gallantry of regardless of the pain he suffered, he still Wolfe = remained on the field, animating his men and giving orders with perfect coolness, till a third bal] pierced his neart, and he fell to the ground.1759 Death of Wolfe and Montcalm. 18s By this time the French were everywhere in retreat, and the victory was as good as won. Wolie wascarried dying to the rear, where he lay supported by the grenadier who had borne him from “cs f - ‘ sc Lil the field, listening to the sounds of the bat- as it rolled away towards Quebec, and, till his eye- S rht began to fail, occasionally raising his he id to paze on the spec tac le. Suddenly an OrmMcer Who stood by eCxX- claimed, ‘‘See how they run!”’ ‘‘Who run?” asked Wolfe, eagerly raising himself on his elbow. “ The enemy,”’ replied the officer ; ‘‘ they give way in all direc- tions.” “Run, one of you, to Colonel Burton,” said # Wolfe, “and tell him to march Webb's re- ‘ “4 ‘ ; Jeath « giment downto Charles River withall speed, W Ife ; » as to secure the bridge and cut off the re- treat of the fugitives.” Then, aftera pause, ‘‘ Now God . N ’ D - praised,’ he adde I x | Sil ull aie lappy, and, falling back, he turned on his side and expired. ’ ; a | Montcalm was slain too He was mortally wounded in the action, and died the morning after. On hearing from the surgeon, who attended to his : . . ' ancl of wounds, that he had y a few hours to See se viontcaim, ce € _ } ‘ ] : ; | | Yu, a‘ sal i SU 1h) : ‘ i) er ’ I > Ai =e “1 : nh 1 Liy is to Lille ] - sil n ‘ l ; . . ‘ , ; rr 2 i\ days after the battle Ou capitulated The rT. bt he iT left wil > ' lati | rison ODta i non | Ne Lerins ' le Sti] iation, } ay aA | tn L i . >i Ai ies Lv < i [ 2 } AA St . j i : 7, 1of port of Fran [he greater part of the | p- : ; ry ' { n i nN Li d lioweve Liste ip¢ d into tne : ’ , y : y » lete \ rior, and succeeded in making th way to Mont- , Teal The re} ngs in England, when the news arrived, , ro lL, torht } ar l, : } ] * } 7 . were LiCl rhtened ‘ ’ tn 5 Lehi I ma « pO ( > h d been126 Outil éron. 1757 only three days before. In the words of Horace Wal pole: ‘ The incidents of dramatic fiction Feeling in ingland. could not be conducted with more address to lead an audience from despondency to sud- den exaltation, than accident prepared to excite the pas- sions of awhole people. They despaired—they triumphed —and they wept for Wolfe had fallen in the hour of vic- tory! Joy, grief, curiosity, astonishment, were pictured In every countenance; the more they enquired, the higher their admiration rose. Not an incident but was heroic and affecting!” ¢ 3. Quiberon. The taking of Quebec was the most striking event of the wonderful year 1759, but it was only one of a long tale of English victories Early in the year the French had begun to make preparations for an invasion of the British Isles on alarge scale. Flat-bottomed Threatened in- Db vision of th asion of the oats were built at Havre and other places eee al ong the coasts of Normandy and Brittany, and large fleets were collected at Brest and Toulon, be- sides a small squadron at Dunkirk. A considerable force was assembled at Vannes in the south of Brittany, under the command of the Duc d’Aiguillon, which was to be convoyed to the Irish coasts by the combined fleets of Brest and Toulon, while the flat-bottomed boats trans- ported a second army across the channel under cover of a dark night. The Dunkirk squadron, under Admiral Thurot, a celebrated privateer, was to create a diversion by attacking some part of the Scotch coast. The design was bold and well contrived, Its chances canoe and would not improbably have succeeded of SUCCESS. three or even two years before, but the op- portunity was gone. England was no longer in “‘ that enervate state in which 20,000 men from France could1759 Tne Brest Fleet puts to Sea. 187 shake her.” Hada landing been effected, the regular troops in the country, with the support of the newly created militia, would probably have been equal to the emergency, but a more effectual bulwark was found in the fleet, which watched the whole French coast, ready to engage the enemy as soon as he ventured out of his ports. The first attempt to break through the cordon was made by M. de la Clue from Toulon. The English Mediterranean fleet, under Admiral Boscawen, cruising before that port, was comps lled early in July to retire to Cibraltar to take in water and provisions and to refit some of the ships. Hereupon M. de la Clue put to sea, and hugging the African coast, passed the straits without — ,wever, though his ships were . . molestation. Boscawen, h not vet refitted, at once gave chase. and came up with | the enemy of the coast Ol Portug:. | where an engage- ment took place, 1 which three French ships were taken and two driven on shore an 1 burnt. The remainder took refuge in Cadiz, where they Clucoff ee bh] ’ ; a +% +} : sinter 1 . tl ~ > were blockaded tili the wilt r, when, the E + yr) \. 4] Lat ] s17 , lesirer F 1, > e Wer tarTrr | . tnglish fleet being driven ¢ ff the coast by a storm, tney man ized tf bar k to | wulon. f the Brest fleet under M. de Con- } nplete. On November 9 Ad- flans was even more com re? ie The discomhiture ¢ miral Sir Edward Hawke, who had block- ‘ ’ Pe, her course, passing through the French ships without returning their fire, and going traight for the great 5 leil Royal of 80 guns and 1,200 ’ => Wh men, on which M. de Conflans hoisted his flag. The Soleil Royal was in the midst of the shoals, and the master of the Royal George pointed out to Hawke the danger he ran in following her. Hawke replied, ‘‘ You have done your duty in this remonstrance; you are now to obey my orders and lay me alongside of the French admiral.” After exchanging a few bro idsides the Soleil Royal sheered off, but other Fren h ships closed round the English admiral, and the Royal George was at one ay er a ta a Nuncte Oued eit Dee raced with seven shipsat once but the hring was a time en ; av j ‘—. ho ay ion See ie so wild that only thirtv or forty shots hit her, whue Of the Cc : tain dishonourably ran her ashore 1n the night. t . } . . } — 1. ] - a ee | nainder, seven ships of the line nd four frigates threw where most of them bumped their bottoms outin me hallow water; the rest got away ind took sheiter in the in ~} “aT . oY . | 7 a a ] oy ame oe, Charente, all but one, which was wrecked, but very few a : L7:¢t : ] Swe wae f ay 1, ever cot out again. With two hours more of daylight, : ; eee es Se 7 ss og ; Hawke thought he could have taken or ces! yyved all, as he was almost up with the French van when nightI90 The Capitulation of Montreal. 1759 took him, Two English ships, the Essex 64, and the Resolution 74, went ashore in the ni: ght and could not be got off, but the crews were sav ed, and the victory Ww won with the loss of only 40 killed and 200 wounded. The great invasion scheme was completely wrecked. Thurot had succeeded in getting out from Dunkirk, and for some months was a terror to the northern coast-towns, but early in the following ye as ear an end was put to ne career. For the rest of the war the French never ven- tured to meet the English in battle on the high seas, and could only look on helplessly while their etc, colonies and commerce fell into the hands of their rivals. From the d: ly of the fight in Quibéron Bay the naval and commerc; al supremacy of England was assured. @4. The Capitulation of Montreal Wolfe’s victory and the destruction of the French fleets made the ultimate conquest of Canada a matter until after a gallant attempt to plant the standard of France once more on the walls of Quebec. of certainty, but it was not accomplished After the surrender of the city the English fleet had sailed away, leaving General Murray with 7,000 men to hold it till the ee melting of the ice in the spring should : enable a fresh armament to enter the St. Lawrence. Under the impression that they would be useless in the winter, no ships were Icft—a mistake w hich nearly proved serious, owing to the circumstance that the upper waters of the St. Lawrence are open for navigation long before the Gulf is freed from ice. The French after all their losses could still send into the field 5,000 regular troops, besides 5,000 militia and a few hundred Indians, a mere handful compared with the1760 Defeat of the English. 191 force with which Amherst would surround them in the summer, but enough to make a dash at Quebec with some prospect of success before the English commander- ‘n-chief could take the field. Ac ordingly, as soon as the frost had given sufficiently 4 yi, ibs to open a passage in the m ddle ofthestream “*"° for the store-ships and two frigates with them to descend the river, the Chevalier de Levis, though the snow was still knee-deep on the er 1, April 17, — = ~ ~ set out from M yntreal with his whole force. On April 26 he arrived before Quebec. Scurvy had carried off 1,000 of the garrison, a d disabled a much larver number, so that Murray h id hardly more than i 3,000 effectives. Common prudence would have coun- celled his remaining W ithin by ambition. Eager to finish the the walls of | Juebec, but pru- dence was mastered war at one stroke b fore reinforcements C uld arrive to i battle on share the glory, Murray marched out, delivere: the heights of Abraham ind was defeated ' o Defeat of with the loss of 1,000 men, nd most of his ihe Enolish field urtillery. Th » loss of the fren h 5 April 2 variously stated, but the English nputed it at 2,000. The next day De Levis op 1 trenches against All now turned on the i\rrival of succours., Quebec. Had a French fleet appe 1red first in the St. Lawrence, Quebec would pr ybably have Q ged fallen, but sucha contingency was ren lered unlikely by the victories of Hawke and Boscawen. The siege was soon over; on May 9g, an English frigate anchored in the basin, bringing news that a squadron ; was in the river. On the 15th, a2 SMIP = giece raised of the line and another fricate arrived, and the next morning the two frigates ps De Levis saw at once French ships.Ig2 The Capitulation of Montreal. 1760 that his enterprise was hopeless, and, judging from the boldness of the English frigates, that they were the van- guard of a large reinforcement close at hand, he aban- doned the siege with precipitation, and retired, leaving behind all his artillery and a great part of his ammuni- tion and baggage. De Levis’s march on Quebec was the last scene in the defence of Canada, a defence which had been conducted under circumstances of peculiar difficulty, inferiority of numbers, neglect of the home government, and a dearth of supplies amounting almost to famine, but Heroism of maintained to the last with a gallantry and ly aay devotion worthy of the best days of France. Nothing now remained for Amherst but to draw the toils Capitulation round his prey. In the face of overwhelm- of Mvntreal, ing odds, the French surrendered without oi aca striking a blow, and by the capitulation of Montreal, the whole of Canada was yielded up to the English. Louisiana alone now remained to France of all her vast American possessions. After six years of warfare, a definite answer had been given to the question—one of the greatest of all that were involved in the Seven Years’ war—the question whether North America pcan te ot was to be English or French. Perhaps the result was inevitable in any case, and was only hastened by Pitt's energy and Wolfe’s heroism. It may be that the greater vitality of the English colonies, and their immense superiority in population and wealth, would have assured, sooner or later, the absorption of their weaker neighbour: but if the absorption had been delayed, even for a generation, the development of America might have run in different channels. As it was, the conquest of Canada soon bore fruit that was1760 India. 193 little looked for by the conquerors, Within sixteen years of the capitulation of Montreal, the celebrated Declara- tion of Independence was signed by the thirteen old English colonies. Montcalm foretold it, if a curiously interesting letter, purporting to have been written by him three weeks be- fore his death, may be accepted as genuine. In this letter he dwells on the independent prediction | . #£ | spirit of the English colonists, and their im- patience under restraint, and after observing that nothing but their fear of falling under the power of France had prevented their throwing off the yoke of the mother country long before, predicts that they would row it off within ten years of the conquest ot Canada, th His prediction was almost literally fulfilled, but itis a sionificant fact, and one which Montcalm perhaps did not foresee, that all through the struggle for indepen- dence. even when France was fighting on the side of the revolted colonies, the French Canadians remained, as they have remained ever since, unswerving in loyalty to their new mustress. INDIA. 1. Dupleix. Tue history of the French in India bears a certain re- semblance to the history of their countrymen in North America. Of all the European powers who m ide a seri- ous attempt to secure a share of the trade with the East Indies. the French were the last in the field, and their ) ty ; av. o8 earliest efforts, restricted by the Jealousy of rivals al-194 Dupletx. 1735- ready in possession, and languidly supported by the l.uine government, were rewarded with scanty success. Nevertheless, as in North America, the tact the French and skill displayed by the governors of are their settlements in ingratiating themselves with the native powers, built up for them a position, in some respects far stronger than was enjoyed by their commercial rivals, and one which enabled them to take advantage of the political situation which arose after the break-up of the Mogul Empire in the first half of the eighteenth century. Aurungzebe, the great Emperor who extended Mogul rule over almost the whole of what we cal] India, died in 1707, and his successors inherited nothing of his courage and capacity. They have been compared not inaptly Rt with the successors of Charlemagne. Their the Mogul empire was already crumbling to pieces, er when the invasion of Nadir Shah of Persia dealt it a fatal blow (1739). The viceroys of the great provinces threw off their allegiance to the Court of Delhi, and the Mahrattas, Sikhs. and Pathans, warlike races which had never been really subdued, asserted their in- dependence once more. In the anarchy which set in from end to end of the Peninsula the French settlements throve apace. M. Dumas, the governor of Pondichéry, min- Dumas : Roe en sled: so dexterously in the quarrels of the aa native princes, that, though frequently on the losing side, he greatly enlarged his pos- sessions, without exciting any suspicions of aggressive- ness, and raised the French prestige to a height hitherto undreamt of. There can be no doubt, that at this period the French were in native eyes by far the most consider- able of the European powers that had effected a lodg--1746 La Bourdonnats. 195 ment on the Indian coasts. The English of Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta might drive a more lucrative trade, but it was known through all southern India, that the go- vernor of Pond hery had successfully defied the dreaded Mahrattas, when they swept over the plains of the Car- 1 natic, and that the walls of the French city had afforded a refuge to the widow of the ee of ; : : . : onaichery. Nabob, after her husband had been defe ited and slain. The fame of Dumas reached the Court of Delhi, and the Mogul conferred on him the title of Nabob, with the command of 4,500 horsemen, honours which at the request of the governor, who was then on the point of leaving India, were transferred to his successor. That successor was Joseph Francois Dupleix, one of +7 : 4 7. ’ } 7 } . ‘Y lh, the most illustrious statesmen of his day, distins uished } } . among the many distinguished kuropeans who have ruled in India. He it was who an frst conceived the magnificent idea of building up an European Empire on the ruins of the Mogul, and who it] 1 also the means of Carrying it with the idea perceived al f } sro } ’ Li ; into execution, foreshadowing the policy which has since been ours. The son of a director Ol the French East Indi i , nue Dupl — » 7 “ } »+ . . _ ~~ 1d ndia Company, uUpielx entered its service 1n 1720, ane ture - - 5 - ’ 7 ] ¢ ; Ta 17 sy} lan > had given proof of remarkable Capat ity in subordinate . ‘ . - ait} - when hi ~mnmnintmentr ¢ he vgovernorshil f positions when his appointment to the governorship 9 Pondichéry, the chief of the French settlements in In- . wider field for the exercise of his genius. } ] dia, openea out: C 1G | — } } lan } an 7 11 1 4 j r . WJuplierx had not ion Hneen iunstaliea IN ilis Vernor- ? ; ] + } , ry? r , Ty 5 t } Silip nh : in f nt \ Was Di) f Lt DOE- a , 5 7 tween J Le) WwW | l two Nn > I succession, an untoward contingency, for, strong 4+ , } , > Pondichéry was against a native enemy, Dupleix knew sh “ . - r that it was incapable of coping with an European196 Dupletx. 1746— armament, In direct opposition to the orders of the Di- rectors, who enjoined retrenchment and a War imminent between Eng- IonJ and he commenced erecting a rampart along the France. Suspension of expenditure on fortifications, undefended sea side of the town, but, though workmen laboured at it day and night, the rampart was still unfinished, when news arrived that war had been declared, and that an English squadron was on its way to the Indian sea Dupl elx sought to arrange a tre: ity of neutrality with the En glish settlement, but the Gover- nor of Madras had the same motive for desiring war which the Governor of Pondic héry had for av oiding it. Dupleix’s influence with the natives then Be een stood him in sood stead. He induced the it A PNATIC © protects the Nabob of the Carnatic to forbid the English rencn. to attack the French possessions on the Coromandel coast. Still, the chance that the En. glish would respect the Nabob's prohibition was a frail reed to trust to, and it must have been with feelin; gs of great re- lief that Dupleix learnt that M. de la Bourdonnai is, the Governor piittie [sles of France (Mauritius) and Bourbon, was Sailing to his rescue. La Bourdonnais, on hearing of the danger of Pondi- ee chéry, had, by strenuous exertions, suc- nais sailsto Ceeded in equipping a fleet of nine vessels, eer consi isting mostly of merchantmen pressed into the service, and with these he appeared off the Coro- mandel coast ig July, 1746. The English squadron, though inferior in numbers, ought to have been more than a match for the ill-equipped French ships, but it was Commanded by a man of feeble character, and after an indecisive engagement the English commodore stood out to sea, leaving the way to Pondichéry open. Madras now lay exposed to attack, and was far less—T 7 5° LV GLC capable of defence than Pondichery. Prompé action on the part of La Bourdonnais would probably have resulted in the capture of all the English settlements on the coast. But, with the removal of danger, unforeseen dif- Gculties arose. La Bourdonnais, ardent, and enterprising, accustomed to command, and conscious of ey creat abilities and great services, could not adnan s bring himself to submit to the superior i authority of Dupleix, whom, perhaps, he despised as a mere trader. Dissensions broke out between these two men, which were fatal to the interests of France. Ma- dras was taken, but nothing more. The precious time : was wasted: the English were reinforced, and in 1748, Pondichéry itself was besieged by a very large force, under Admiral Boscawen. Its capture appeared inevt- table, but the marvellous skill and resolution of Dupleix, who, though no soldier, was the soul of the defence, averted its fall and restored the waning prestige of the French. The Governor of Pondichéry was meditating fresh schemes of aggrandizement when news of the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle reached [ndia, and Madras had to be restore d to the Ens lish. Peace was re-established, and the two Companies hoped that their agents would settle down quietly into commercial pursuits; a vain hope, for the passions roused by five years of hostilities could not easily be laid ; Af 4 > ow | mina : } Loreover, tne peace ¢ oming at a time when an ; aside. i’ 5 . ry “ hk T. y- . : ] 1arce > - unusual number of European soldiers were present ir : cas . 7 ee +, . ‘ : ‘ ‘ r India, there was a strong temptation to proviae tor theu maintenance by hiring them out to the native rulers. > ‘ . — | } > 1. r Both nations plunged deeply into the dy- et o r 4] a Je : b nastic quarrels of the neighbouring states, , . . ‘ ~ ‘ 1 . the Enclish at first with no decided pur- tive ; : ; : - é nose. and aiicrwalrUs Olly with the hxed 1déa Ol opv Sing t ’ / rr198 Dupleix. 1750~ the French; the French, on the other hand, with a definite object steadily kept in view by their far-sighted governor. The time was peculiarly favourable for his designs. In 1748 died Nizam-ool-Moolk, Subadar or Viceroy of a the Deccan, feudal lord of the Carnatic, and and the ruler of the vast territory between the Ner- ener budda and Kistna with 35,000,000 inhabi- tants, the most powerful of all the viceroys who were struggling to become independent of the Court of Delhi. On the death of the Subadar, Nazir Jung, one of his sons, had seized the government, but his title was dis- puted by Mozuffer Jung, a grandson of Nizam-ool-Moolk, who had been nominated viceroy by the Mogul. Atthe same time Chunda Sahib, son in-law and relative of a former Nabob, laid claim to the throne of the Carnatic, which had been conferred by the Subadar on Anwaroo- deen, a2 man in no way related to the old family. Dupleix adopted the cause of these pretenders, and sup- ported it with such address and energy that by the end of 1750 both of them were in possession of the govern- ment they aspired to. The installation of the Subadar was celebrated with great pomp at Pondichéry, where, in the presence of the nobles of the Deccan, Dupleix was loaded with honours by Mozuffer Jung, who treated him with the respect due to a superior, and promised to be cuided in all things by his advice. He would even have conferred on him the Nabobship of the Carnatic, but this the wary French- man, who aimed at ruling India by means of her rulers, declined with politic generosity in favour of Chunda Sahib. The Governor of Pondichéry, the setter-up of princes, had become the great- est man inSouthern India. On the spot where his most decisive victory had been gained he Glory of Dupleix.Chive. 199 set up a pillar recording his triumphs in four languages, and round the pillar he caused a city to be built bearing the high-sounding name Dupleix-Futtch-abad, the city of the victory of Dupleix. This was not done from vanity, but from a deep insight into the Indian charac- ter; neither was it from unworthy jealousy that Clive pillar which, in native eyes, stoou fora symbol of the great bren b- ; afterwards razed to the ground the city ind man's power. But one circumstance marred the completeness of the French triumph, and prevented the consolidation of their power. Anwaroodeen had been killed in battle, but his son, Mahomed Ali, had escaped, and still held out in the fortress of Trichinopoly, recognized by the English as Nabob of the Carnatic. As long as this claimant remained unsubdued Chunda Sa- hib sat insecurely on his throne at Arcot. Still the chances of Mahomed Ali appeared very slight. A com- bined French and native army invested Trichinopoly . and an English force sent to relieve it was defeated, and driven to seek refuve within the walls of the fortress. Its oy ] tim ul ; ‘ fall seemed OnLY a ¢ Si n or time, when suaGc nly the art — — } nm ti : +} f +h | : 1, y Wwe. r tide was turned and (th rowth of the French power ar- rested by a young captain in the service of the English East India Company. —" - “ J -_ —_~ ; ty Yt ~ — ~ 1 shire country gentleman He was a wild unmanageable boy, fond of adventure, and addicted to fighting, averse from book learning, though by rT) means »ig7noTranta h *- 15 SOMeCLIMCS TEDIest nted At eighteen he was sent out to India as a writer in the200 Chive. 1751- service of the Company. His first years there were very wretched. He had no friends and little money. He hated the sedentary occupation in which he was engaged, and pined for home. The climate affected his health, and intensified the fits of melancholy which haunted him all his life. One day he attempted to destroy him- self, but :he pistol missed fire twice; then, after satisfy- ing himseif that it was really loaded, he exclaimed that he must surely be reserved for something great. Soon after this occurrence he found more congenial employ- ment as an ensign in the Company’s army. At the siege of Pondichéry and elsewhere he gained experience of active service, and had made himself a name for daring courage, when the emergency arose which enabled him to step forth at once into the foremost rank of the world’s great Captains. Like every one else, Clive saw that unless something was done, Trichinopoly would fall, and with it the last obstacle to French supremacy; he saw, too, with true military instinct, that the only way of saving it was to Blige oeoe) REY. the war into the enemys” country. aes toattack He therefore suggested to Mr. Saunders, Arcot, . e the Governor of Madras, that a dash should be made at Arcot, the capital of the Carnatic, a large open town with 100,000 inhabitants, defended only by a ruinous fort, garrisoned by 1,000 natives. Mr.S vunders entered heartily into Clive’s plan, and placed him with unlimited powers at the head of 200 English troons and 300 Sepoys With this force there were besides Clive only eight officers, of whom six had never been in action, and four were members of the mercantile service, who had volunteered for the occasion On September rt, 1751, Clive appeared before the gatés of Arcot, in the midst of a thunderstorm of extra--I 75 I Chive RK uses LO Su rrender. 201 The garrison, appalled at the bold- ordinary violence. ness of men W ho seemed to sel the elements at dehank eC; had already evacuated the fort. (live en- Cliv takes i tered it withoul opposition, and set to Work nreparation for we . to repair its defences In ! siecee, which he knew he would have to stand. He ex- pected that Chunda Sahib would straightway raise the of Trichinopoly and march against him with his whole ftorce. froin this folly (Chunda Sahib was re- strained by the counsels of Du leix: but he insisted on deta hing some of nis best troops lor the recovery Oot his capital. On October 4, the citadel of Arcot was invested by 10,000 nallves and 100 Frenchmen, under the command of Raiah Sahib, son of the Nabob. [he sicge Was pressea vigorously, and the tort seemed wholly in LI L ble of a prolongs qd resistance; Dut all calculations were set at nought by the spirit of enthusiasm ind confidence ’ lieel . | } . . with which the little garrison had been in- spired by its leader. Clive’s biographer has recorded a touching story of the devotion of his native followers. When provisions had become sq scarce that there was a fear lest hunger might com- } } . ] ~ eat . + / an 9 } nei them to surrender. the Se IOVS nronosed to ( yet if i - . he chould limit them tq the wafer or cruel ) in w as they i+ , rice was boiled. “It is sufficient for our support, id : ‘‘the Europeans require the + mn (Vn the 27th dav af the sieve. 4 nractic ihle hrea h having been effected, Rajah Sahib sent to Clive a pr*o- osal to surrender, offering honourable terms to the gar- rison, and a larce S1irTy) of monev To himcelf . . (~*) > wrtice a omnp inied hy a tnrea nD -tArry ha ‘ 7. | . i. tle , 5° and put the rarrison tr the cwore if ne -tarme + were refused. The garrison was reduced to 120 Europe202 Chve. 1751- ans and 200 Sepoys, but Clive rejected the terms with scorn. A fortnight elapsed before Rajah Sahib could tesolve to execute his threat. Probably he would even then have preferred to let famine do his work, but his movements were quickened by the approach of another enemy. 6,000 Mahrattas, under Morari Rao, were hovering in the neighbourhood, watching the course of events, nominally in alliance with Mahomed Ali, but not caring to commit themselves while his cause looked hopeless. The reroic defence of Arcot ended their hesitation, Kaiah Sahib now made preparations to storm the fort, and at daybreak, on the morning of November 25, his soldiers advanced to the attack. The day was well chosen ; it was onc of those set apart for the commemo- ration of the death of Hosein, days peculiarly sacred to Mussulmans, who believe that all who die on them in battle against unbelievers go straight to the highest Paradise. Wild with religious enthusiasm, and stimu- lated by the intoxicating bang of which they eat plenti- fully during the festival, the Mussulman soldiery rushed upon the fort, driving before them elephants Rajah Sahib : : attacks with plates of iron on their foreheads, to . batter down the gates. Clive received them with a well-sustained fire of musketry. The elephants, salled by the musket-balls, turned and trampled on the multitudes behind, and, after three desperate assaults, the troops of Rajah Sahib retired, having Sa: lost 400 men inan hour. In the ensuing night they raised the siege. Clive pressed his advantage with vigour. Reinforced by Europeans and Sepoys from Madras, and joined by some of Morari Rao’s horsemen, he gave chase to the enemy and inflicted on them two defeats; then repaired—i75! Success of the Eng sh. sas St. David to concett measures for the relief of While thus engaged he 1 from England of to Fort Trichinopoly. of the chief command by the arriv: Major Lawrence, an ofacer of great Indian experient e. At not consent It was feared that the hero of Arcot might t was deprived to serve in a subordinate position, but Clive, sreatly to his creat, cneeriuily placed him- _ 5 7 s Lawrence celf under the orders 0! Major Lawrence, while Lawrence, on his part, without any feelings of jealousy, warmly a lnowledged and fully availed him- self of the genius of the young captain. Lawrence and Clive « arried everythiag before them. Dupleix’s right-hand man, M. de Bussy, the only man riven them trouble, who might have giv was far away in the Deccan, maintaining French influence al the Court of the Subadar. The French were defeated —" + . \ 4 < of under the walls of Trichinopoly, and took ' ’ the Kugitsa. refuze in the islan 1 of Seringham, were ipitulated. Chunda Sahib su rendered they eventually h to the Tanjorean alles of Mahomed Ali, by whom he was put to de ith. Dupleix stall struggled bravely on. fortune freely, 4 1d raised fresh levies; he set up another ; He spent his own WI \ 7 + | >> LK ea =} rmfrearect! ; ; ‘5 ct : +) +) Nabob in the rren h interest, and Dy ntricues with the il - f M in ym d Alt leta hed the M vhratt lS snd Mysoreans from fn 1 Ch Enolish, how r. steadily gain i round Ce} - health bro| wn, id n rated his leaving India; but et ie Hi had impressed on hi soldier and the spirit ke had kindled, survived his departure Dupleix saw the neces ~ — , ef obipesce: inthe Camatic the game Way Dina ; , \ out Hut nis cyinr’ TY) . ‘ eT) +! ec . r Y) re nr -t ry } ‘ } . : smnortant Deccan. Peace would a rd opportunities for the exercise of his master!)204 Chive in Bengal, men like Clive and Lawrence would not always be at hand to frustrate his schemes. What he might have done no one can say, for he never had the opportunity of showing. In the midst of the negotiations there came out from France an order for his recall, and with it his successor, M. Godeheu, a miserable crea- Recall of ; ture, whose sole guiding ideas were hatred Lupleix. = of Dupleix and his policy, and peace at any price with the English. The French Directors were in- capable of entering into Dupleix’s magnificent plans ; they looked for dividends, not for empire. The pro- traction of the war alarmed them, and they were simple enough to give ear to the complaints of the English Company, who represented Dupleix as the sole obstacle to tranquillity. So the order was sent forth which re- called him home with his great work uncompleted, and that order sounded, though no one knew it, the kneil of French rule in India. 23. Clive in Bengal. Dupleix had not long left India when Clive returned to it as Governor of Fort St. David, and with a commis- sion as lieutenant-colonel in the English Clive returns army. His arrival was most opportune. to India. 4 Two or three months after he landed at Fort St. David, appalling news were received from Bengal. The Nabob Surajah Dowlah, a fecble-minded but fero- cious boy, had besieged and taken Calcutta, and its cap- ture had been followed by a frightful atrocity. All the European inhabitants who had not made their escape before the place surrendered, 146 in number, were con- fined on an unusually sultry nicht in a dun- The Black xe Hole June geon called the Black Hole, a room eighteen Dd ue feet square, which communicated with the air only by two small windows barred with iron and ob--1756 Capture of Chandernagore. structed by averandah. The sufferings of the prisoners are too horrible for desi npuion, Oniy twenty-three sur- vived the night, and these came forth in the morning ‘the shastliest forms that were ever seen alive, i When news of the catastrophe reached Madras, an expedition was about to be sent into the Deccan for the purpose Ol expelling Me French, whose au- Clive sent \ Bengal . thority with the subadar had been shaken } set eo by the timid policy ol Dupleix’s success a The expedition was of course abandoned, and the troops intended to serve on it were placed under the command OI UillVe and desputcned to B ngal witha Thai juaAdronNn under Admiral Watson, which happened to be lying off the coast. Early in 1757 Calcutta was recover d, and the native tow ot Hooghly SLOTMeEQa ind Sai lx ¢ ad. Ih act of ae f\- ance enraged the Nabob, who had retired : . ' ( to his capital, Moorshedabad, not imapit ; i ’ ‘ ' ed. } ‘ ; ; ; that the English would dare to invad : Na de dominions. Collecting an army OF 40,000 February 4, nip .13T »} 1) 1 j , ly : } sit? 4757 men, Surajan Vowilan 1 on ‘ itta, 7 ‘ - } . | } ‘ . } Were he was attacked a qa aet q } Vy WILY He now became as frightened as be had been al! nt before, and was rea ine learnt that I ind and France were at wal nd f 7 , + the Ire rm h sh ») iva nin ‘ N ys 1, hey , ¥ , would probably have done h d Dup been at Pondl- dee med it a ivis ible t vsrant him nm A ' } ‘ 7 mile a ‘ . ae s} ‘ niure of \ Pace in ‘ rac;r Oo rain cIMme de at aL K Lie { ¢ = ew ; ; - re French settlement of Chandernagore on the (,; ‘ ve 1¢cidaes Hooghly. : ; in } c ° | nvwi Chandernagore fell after a stout r ance, and Clive was able to prosecute designs with- out fear of interruption from a rival such as haa foiled206 Chive in Bengal. 1756- Dupleix in the Carnatic, His instructions required him to return to Madras in April, but he knew that, if he re- tired with his troops, Surajah Dowlah would never ob- serve thetreaty. Small reliance had been placed on his promises at the first, and it had since been discovered that he had been imploring Bussy to march from the Deccan to his relief. Clive boldly decided to remain in Bengal until he had crushed the Nabob. Fortune played into his hands. The caprice and cruelty of Surajah Dowlah had disgusted even his own een subjects, and a conspiracy was formed to against the dethrone him, with Meer Jaffier, the com- Seat pe the Mander of the forces, at its head. Meer English, Jaffer besought the aid of the English, and after some hesitation the committee which managed the affairs of the settlement accepted his proposals. When the plot was nearly ripe, Clive learned that one of the conspirators was likely to play the traitor. His negotiations had been carried on through Mr. Watts, the English agent at Moorshedabad, and Mr. Watts had employed the services of Omichund, a wealthy Bengalee merchant, who had long resided at Calcutta, and had suffered severe losses in consequence of its capture by the Nabob. Omichund had been promised compensa- tion, but mere compensation would not ee “ef f satisfy his greed. He demanded 300,0c0/, besides, and threatened to reveal the plot to Surajah Dowlah if his terms were not eranted : he further required that an article touching his claims should be inserted in the treaty between Meer Jaffier and the Eng- lish. Clive then stooped to an act of dupli- a eticts. city which has left a dark stain on his repu- tation. He caused two treaties to be drawn up, one on white paper, the other on red. The whitefv, —-1757 Council of War. 207 treaty was the real one, and Omichund's name was not mentioned in it. The1 -d treaty, which was to be shown to Omichund, contained a stipulation in his favour Clive and ral Watson refused to pul his name to the fictitious on Clive knew that its absence Ww uld arouse Omichunds suspicions, and he forged Admiral Watson's signature. ‘ , , ~- . Clive now threw off the mask, wrote a dehant letter to } Surajah Dowlah reproaching him w th his faith and set out for Moorsh labad. The Nabob cane forth to meet him with his wholcarmy, Clive capper Fe ‘o9 foot and 18,000 horse, all splend d- Mo da- 50, | lendi o1 ; Sud é bad ly equipped and accompanied by § » heavy guns, each drawn by 40 or 5 , ; : : or ! an elephant behind to push and assist it over alin ult sround. There were also four small field-pieces s¢ rved by 40 Frenchmen in the Nabob’s pay. Clive had 3,000 men, goo of them ] uropeans, C rht pieces O lery, and two howitzers. ihe dls] enormous, and it was the ib ved t Bi | troops “<> - 7 . } },] . } nr +? ’ ‘ . y were more torm ibie than { the Carnatic. : i . ; For the fir time in his } ‘ eh tate A broad ] } h i oy) river i petwe en i 1 an l t! Cli , And fle Ni WV if 1 io. } ~ ime ‘ Y : 1] TTL a ii ne crossea ind wa mn. ni 1 man would return 5 , . 4 [oO Te 1 the ’ rit | Te ry : : ed ti if VI | fi r } } 7 } ; s] ul Ait rt it) Lb iS GIlVisit 1 OV< D1 WwW iat , , the tim n id ‘ , ' Lire T \ ' r Thia : { lt co ¥ % yy 5 : pout it hil ne? h el ] I \ ' ' ied i < PLaaat | war. and. contrary to usual forms, gave : Clive calls a his own opinion nrst inact ¢ mion was in c I ps ~ ~ . . , , favour of waiting and summoning th Mah- 7 a cc + ee ; oe : : cattas To nis id Tw ve oT nis m1ceTs Snafl d nis views, . Cn = on a } > ‘ - Ack ne Sarath seven ‘' i i itil LCC cL ALLIVEL. i i vy y-TOur h , _ nf -\ ris ro } sik .¥ he r ~~ - “7 “cl ’ a tO nN > cTnryy ours of mature deliberation, OF, accorails le Story,208 Chive in Bengal. 175) after an hour of deep meditation in an adjoining g grove, Clive came over to the Opinion of the minori ity. Long afterwards he said that he had only called one council of war in his life, and that, if he had taken the opinion of that, he would never have conquered Bengal, The river was crossed, and after a march of eight hours the little army arrived at one in the morning of June 23 at the mango grove of P] issey, where the con- tinual sna of drums, clarions, and cymbals told them that they were within a mile of the Nabob’s camp. The battle began at 8 o'clock with a cannonade from both gaa The heavy guns of the Ben: galees eee were badly served and most of their shots June 23, went too high. The English artillery did 1757- good execution, but several hours |} assed without any advantage being gained. At noon a heavy shower wetted ; 1 good deal of the enemy's powder, and about the same time the most faithful of the Nabob’s generals was killed. Surajah Dowlah was a miserable coward. He had kept all the while in his tent out of reach of danger, but he was now over-m: istered by ‘ter- ror, and when one of the conspirators Insidiously recem- mended a retreat he readily acc epted the advice. Clive had made up his mind to keep up the cannonade during the day, and attack the Nabob’s camp in the night, and he had gone to take a few minutes’ rest in a hunting- house in thegrove. Here he heard that the enemy were yoking the trains of oxen to the guns. Hurrying to the front he ordered an immediate advance. Little resist- ance was made except where the forty Frenchmen gal- lantly covered the retreat. Meer Jaffer, seeing how the day was going, drew off his division. and the Nabob, who had suspected him of treac hery all along, mounted a camel and galloped off at full speeed for Moorsheda-1757 Clive Defeais the Dutch. 209 bad. His flight completed the demoralization of his troops. They abandoned their artillery and their bag- gage and fled in all directions. The loss on each side considering how momentous an issue was very slight was decided. Of the beaten army about 500 fell, while >> killed and 50 wounded was all the loss sustained by the English and their sepoys in gaining a victory which may rank among the decisive battles of the world. For nearly three years after Plassey Clive was the vir- tual ruler of Bengal. The terror of his name scattered a formidable native confederacy, and his quick resolu- tion warded off a more serious danger. Me been made Nabob of Ben ral. Behar, and Orissa, but he r J ifher had ’ was uneasy under the thraldom of the ] } about for a new protector to deliver him - ; 3 ieee : . Meer Jafher from his oppressive friends. The French _ intrivues , “ the were no longer a power in Beng il. but the = purch Dutch held a factory at ‘ hinsurah on the Hooghly, while they h .d a strong force at Java, and in days gone by they h id been more powerful in the East than any other European nation. Meer Jaffer begged their help, and it was readily granted by the authorities at Batavia. The arrival in the Hooghly of seven ships from Java with 1,500 troops on board placed Clive ina delicate po- sition. Meer laffier's intrigues with the Dutch were no secret to him, but England was not at war with Hol- land. How then could he stop these ships from going up to Chinsurah? Heh id recently remitted large sums of money to Europe by the Dut h Company, but he was = 5 , a , ee not a man to be influenced Dy private ynsiderations a : when the public interest was at Stake. He decided to : er} the ships from coming up the river. The Dut h prevent landed some of their troops and commenced hostulitieg210 Lally. 1757-61 by land and by water. Clive ordered them to be at- tacked, and every one of their ships were SMS i captured. The authorities at Chinsurah, trembling for their own safety, hastened to acknowledge themselves the aggressors, and agreed to compensate the English for damage done, and to reim- burse their expenses. Clive’s first administration in Bengal was now drawing toaclose. His health broke down again, and early in 1760 he sailed for England. Five years afterwards he returned to root up abuses that grew up after his de- parture, and to place the government of the three pro- vinces more directly under the control of the Coinpany, but this portion of his life does not belong to the period of the Seven Years’ War. It is a curious fact that he Hivatalidean had alre dy foreshadowed the later policy onthe govern- Of the English in India in a letter to Pitt a (dated January 7, 1759), in which he sug- gested that the Crown should take over absolutely the government of the provinces, and indicated the mode in which it might be done, and the advantages which would result from it. Pitt saw difficulties in the way, and the plan was allowed to sleep for 100 years, when Clive’s policy was embodied in the Queen’s proclamation of November 5, 1858, assuming the direct government of India. ¢4. Lally. After the fall of Chandernagore the French made no attempt to check the victorious career of the English in Bengal. It was in the Carnatic, where the struggle for empire had originated, that the contest was finally de- cided. On the breaking out of war in 1750, the French Government announced their intention of making a tre- mendous effort to regain their supremacy in the south of1758. His Ambitious Schemes. 211 India, and of sending thither a large force under the Comte de Lally, an officer of Irish Jacobite extraction f the most distinguished soldiers apd one of tne t es Lhe French in the service of I rancec. Had this resoly eG s l an expe- dition to the been prompUy translated ith) wmcuGm Ju 4 y- i) pOwec! on the (Corom ind 1 ¢ oast. tor both M idras and tort L Dav ick h id b« ih alm St cdi nude d of ti IO Ps to Tu nish ihe would have fare ; | ad } .. : expedition avainst ben ral. But to think and act at ‘3 lay | ee les the same time, Wil ik, as Lally Said, Was pritibariry ne CS sail y Was | rT re A; ibit ‘ 1 ne rovernment ol Lo Lis : 1] ] ] . ' ; } . 41F 5 | 7 v' Fndless delays retaraca the equippiny and des- pat h of the expcd yn, and Lally never got to Pondi- ir the end of April, 1755. Arrived in India, Lally plunged into his work with teristic energy, and with an impetuosity which, , - , d cuccess for the moment, drew fatal 7 . a resuits 1 1tS traln On e very Nn ht of his arriv ne ’ , i"4 Y Pp : sent out a detachmentt ipture t little fort of Cudda- ¥ 7 } ; ; lore, and by the time h h een five weeks in India he ws master of Fort St. Dav 1, the second 11 1 tar . ‘ 1 nrnt ,} ha y importance, ana | Hpabdbly th strong? for 31. David . i> June 7 } } } + leas ¥ ’ r ° tn Ienelish settit ents ¢ the coas « 7 ’ ‘Te i ~ LS Was very hahaa212 Lally. gramme; but he had accomplished it in the teeth of growing difficulties, created not by the enemy but by the ill-will and indifference of the Pondichéry Lally’s difficulties authorities and by his own fiery and over: bearing temper. He had come out to India prepared to find fault. Both the directors of the Company and the ministers of the Crown had intimated to him in the plainest possible terms that corruption of every kind was rampant at Pondichéry, and that he was to put an end to it. Coming therefore as he did with the belief that he had to deal with a nest of robbers, he was not likely to put a favourable construction on the acts of the Pondichéry authorities, and these were of a nature to awaken suspicion in the dullest mind. Though the governor had known for more than a year that he was coming, and though half of his soldiers had arrived eight months before him, none of the necessary prepa~ rations had been made. No transport had been organ- ized, no information collected, no resources provided. Instead of receiving a zealous support, he met with stolid indifference. Lally had an impatient temper and a Sharp tongue, and vented his indignation in bitter sar- casms. No wonder that feelings of mutual distrust and hatred sprang up between the commander-in-chief and the governor and council. Besides all this, Lally knew nothing of India, and his ignorance led him into the commission of a fatal blunder before he had been many days at Pondichéry. To supply the want of transport he ordered a conscription of the native population without any regard to the distinction of castes, and men of all degrees were He alienates the natives. forced to bear burdens in violation of their most sacred feelings. In the same reckless Spirit, not content with razing the fortifications of Fort1758-61 Siege of Madras. 213 St. David and the dwellings of the English inhabitants, he destroyed the native town with a wanton barbarity which increased the alienation of the native population, whose co-operation was necessary for any permanent success. The dissensions of Pondichéry saved Madras. Had Lally been able to march on it straight after the capture of Fort St. David, it must almost cert iinly ra have fallen. What prevented him trom at Poudi doing so was the refusal of D’Aché, the ad- which indeed would in miral, to convey him there by se have been hazardous with the English fleet on the coast), and the inability, real or pretended, of De Leyrit, the funds to transport his governor of Pondichéry, to find fun troops by land. With a Dupleix at Pondichéry, it would not have been long before the funds were forthcoming. The summer was wasted in a predatory expedition against the Rajah of Tanjore, and when Lally at last ber, the English had TY?) appeared before Madras in Decem made good use of the respite by collecting provisions and calling in their scattered garrisons. On January 2, 1759, batterics were opened against Fort St. George, and Lally, in spite of disaffection and want of money and supplies, conducted the siege with great spirit. The opportunity Sr. - had, however, been lost. The English and ie French fleets had both dep irted because of the d inger of wintering off the Coromandel Coast; but, before a breach had been made which the French engineers would pronounce practi able, the vanguard of the Eng- lish squadron returned (February 17, 1759) with rein- forcements and stores from Bombay, and Lally had to raise the siege. For some time after the retreat of the French from P214 Lally. 1761 Madras, operations languished. Lally had ill health and mutiny to contend with, besides want of money and opposition from the civil authorities, and the English possessed no commander of more than ordinary Capa- city till Colonel Eyre Coote arrived from England in the autumn with the 84th Regi- ment. Coote had seen service in Bengal under Clive, and it was he who headed the minority that voted for immediate action in the council held on the eve of Plas- sey. Early in 1760 a great battle was fought < Eyre Coote. Battle of , ; _ Wandewash, at Wandewash, in which the French lost no serpy ae less than 600 Europeans out of 1,500 accord- ing to their own computation, or of 2,250 according to that of the English. Lally was no longer able to keep the field. One by one the mi- Phe, nor French forts fell, and in September January 20, nae Pondichéry itself was closely invested by 76. land and sea. On January 26, 1761, it sur- rendered at discretion. With the surrender of Pondichéry French dominion in India ended. The city was indeed restoied at the peace of 1763, but it was restored with its fortifications razed, its commerce ruined, and its prestige eo gone. Henceforth no European rival dis- withouta rival in puted with England the supremacy in the India. ; Peninsula, and the native powers, helpless in their isolation, fell one after another under her sway. In their struggles against the inevitable doom, French- men were often found fighting by their side and striving to check the growth of the all-absorbing Power, but it was only as auxiliaries that they acted, and after the fall of Pondichéry, France herself never more appeared as a competitor for the splendid empire that once was almost hers.England in 1701. CHAPTER XIV. THE FALL OF PITT. Witu the capture of Pondichéry the last of the three main objects of the war was attained by England. Since the battles of Lagos and Quiberon, the , French navy had ceased to be able to keep — England in 1701, ’ the sea; the subjection of Canada was com- pleted by the capitulation of Montreal, and the surrender of the famous city in the Carnatic left Eugland without a rival in the East. The nation was intoxicated with success, and idolized the minister to whom it was due, In the House of Commons Pitt’s ascendency was undis- puted. Whigs and Tories vied with one another in sup- porting him, and for several years there was nota single division on a party question. The expenditure grew yearly, but the supplies were cheerfully voted, though the lavish extravagance appalled the more cautious members of the administration. Pitt confessedly knew nothing of finance, and as Walpole says, “‘ he kept aloof from all detail, drew magnificent plans, and left others to find the magnificent means."’ He seems even to have exulted in the magnitude of the expense. No doubt h a rd y himself maintained, prompt expenditure is good econo- money was wasted, but the magnificent plans could ly have been executed without waste, and, as Pitt my in war. And the country prospered as it had never prospered before. Pitts conquests opened up markets for English commerce all over the world, and the ex- ports which as usual declined at the commencement of the war recovered with more than the usual rapidity The only dark spot in the brilliant prospect was Prus216 Lhe fall of Pitt. 1751 sia, whose fortunes sank as those of England rose. To- wards the end of 1759 the English Govern- ment had joined Frederick in making over- tures for peace, but the time had not come yet. Austria refused to hear of it, and though France was anxious to Prussia. retire from the war, and make a separate agreement with England, Maria Theresa would allow her to do so only on condition that England should withdraw her support from Frederick. This was impossible, as Pitt, with no less politic wisdom than honour, had repeatedly declared that he would never abandon his ally. Negotiations were therefore dropped till the spring of 1761, when they were resumed by Choiseul, seconded on this occasion by Austria and Russia. The Choiseul ‘ : x propcses English Government sent an envoy to Paris, fees and the French Government sent an envoy to London, to discuss a separate arrangement, which, it was hoped, might lead to a general pacification: but these negotiations, though protracted through the sum- mer, were as fruitless as the last. Pitt had no very Strong desire for peace, and perhaps showed himself too much disposed to press France to the utmost, but the real reason of the failure was that Choiseul had two strings to his bow. If he could have peace on his own terms, well and good; if not, he had expectations of being able to continue the war with a new ally. Since the death of Ferdinand VI. of Spain, and the accession of his half-brother, Charles III, Death of i = 2 the Kingof (Charles IV. of Naples, the Don Carlos to S dALN, . ~— a Ate 1st 10, whom the kingdom of the Two Sicilies had 1759 been assigned in 1735), the Courts of Madrid and Versailles had been drawing closer together, and on August 15, 1761, was signed the celebrated Family Com- pact, by which the Kings of France and Spain declared1761 England and Spain 217 that each would regard the enemies of the other as his and guaranteed each other's posses- own, sions in all parts of the world. This guar. 7 umily il pat antce was extended to the Bourbon Princes August 1 i of Naples and Parma (a son and a brother of the King of Spain). Subjoined to the compact was a very important secret convention, In which the King of iced himself to declare war on England on Spain pledg ace with France May I : 1702, unless she had con¢ luded pe by that time, and the King of France deren} to restore Minorca to Spain as soon as war was declared, and un- dertook to conclude no peace until the King of Spain had I received satisfaction from England wi th regard to cer- tain points that were in dispute. The King of f Portugal was to be invited to accede to the convention, ‘* because not right that he should remain a quiet spectator the two Courts with England, and open it was of the war of his ports to the enemy.” Disputes had arisen between England and Spain on several points. Spain complained of the violation of her neutrality by English cruisers, claimed the right of fishing on the banks of New . cut logwood in Hon- foundland, contested the , right of the English t Matters in duras, and demanded the demolition of set- dispute } } 1 ¢} 1] between tlements they had erected there. lithese England > and Spain. matters were under considerat on, except : th ‘ond. which England flatly denied, and in any Sc yiiU, Lidl hardly important enough to induce a power like Spain, with possessions far larger than the means of defending them, to run the risks of a war with latter had become the : case the vy were England at a moment when the mistress of the seas The proffered restitution of Mr norca, the hope of re: the misfortunes of a near kinsman, -overing Gibraltar, sympathy with and the natural fear218 The Fall of Pitt. 1761 lest the aggrandizement of England should prove a per- manent danger to his own colonies, must Motives of ] } + 1] , | . TRIC > 1 I ril r 77 . iOUDTeECLY lay weighec avl Ww Charlee li], undoubted e weighed heavily with the King of Spain, but it is said that per- sonal considerations weighed more heavily still, and that he sought war with England in revenge for an insult offered to him nearly twenty years before. In 1742, Charles, being King of the Two Sicilies, joined the coalition against Maria Theresa, whereupon an English squadron appeared before Na- Commodore ples, and its commander, Commodore Martin. Martin, demanded in peremptory terms the withdrawal of the king’s troops and his signature to a treaty of neutrality. Placing his watch on the table, the commodore declared that he would bombard the place unless the treaty was signed within an hour. Charles had no choice but to comply, but the affront in- spired him with a deadly hatred of the English, and it is said that that hatred was the cause of the Family Compact. The terms of the treaty were kept studiously secret, but the two Courts took no pains to conceal the fact that they were acting in concert, and on July 15, a month before the Compact was actually signed, the French envoy in London presented to the English Extraordi- E : r , nary de- Government a memorial in which Choiseul mand of the : : French demanded that the questions at issue be- ee tween England and Spain should be settled at the same time as the conclusion of the treaty between France and England. Pitt was astounded at this extraordinary demand made by a nation with which England was at war on behalf of a nation with which England was at peace, and instructed the English ambassador at Madrid to require the Spanish Govern:1761 Temporising of Spain. 219 ment to disavow the action of France, and to give an ex- planation of the armaments which were being equipped in their harbours. The Spanish Government, far from disavowing the action of France, avowed and justified it, temporized about the armaments, but at the same time made professions of friendship which de- 2 ee . . 1 Opalh ceived the English ambassador, the fact being that, though resolved on war, they wanted to gain time to enable their yearly treasure fleet from America to reach Cadiz in safety. Pitt was not deceived by the protestations, and having shortly afterwards rec eived certain information from secret sources of the signing of a treaty between France and Spain advised that twelve or fourteen |, men-of-war should instantly be sent to posesa de Cadiz, and that our ambass idor should be yw oe . ordered to demand a sight of the treaty, and to leave Madrid at once ‘f it should be refused. He insisted (and subsequent events proved his foresight) that war with Spain was ‘nevitable, and that delay would to enable her to choose her opportunity. lor only serve No new England the war would not be an onerous one. armaments would be required, and plans were already formed for an immediate attack on the Sp inish posses- sions of Panama, Havana and the Philippine Is! inds. By striking swiftly the American fleet might be seized before it could get into Cadiz, and its capture W yuld add diminishing those of! to the resources of England, while the enemy. These wise views failed to meet with the approval of the cabinet. Pitt's boldness appeared mad- majority of his colleagues. ness to the cabinet, which had never been Pitt’s influence in his so assured as his power over the House of Commons or220 Lhe Fall of Pitz. 1761 his popularity in the country, had waned considerably since the death of George II. (October 25, pete 1760). George had never liked him, and had struggled against the necessity of tak- ing him as minister, but after Once accepting him, and especially after he had proved his capacity for conduct- ing the war, he had given him staunch support, When Pitt took office in 1757, he said to the king, ‘‘Give me your confidence and I will deserve it.” The king re- plied, ‘“‘ Deserve my confidence and you shall have tes and he kept his word. With the accession of George III. lish politics commenced. grumble that ‘ a new era in Eng- George II., though he might ‘In this country ministers are king,” and Political wonder that the nobles of England should ItICA attitude of choose to be “ footmen of a Duke of New- Geo ge If. and George castle when they might be the friends and AI. counsellors of their sovereign,” had yet never made a serious attempt to shake off the control of the great Whip families to whom the House of Hanover owed their crown. George III. came to the throne with the full intention of emancipating himself from their in- fluence. Pitt was not, properly speaking, a member of the Whig aristocracy, but during the last years of George II. he had been closely united with its leaders, and by reason of his great eminence he was equally obnoxious to a king who was determined to be sovereign in reality as well as in name. The young king started with many points in his favour. Contrast be- To the end of his life George II. was a for- $Teitadl (Gates eigner; he never even mastered the Ene- III. lish language or attempted to conceal his pre- ference for his native electorate. With this drawback, and with his shy, reserved, ungraceful manners1761 George IT. and George Tike 221 e disposition, and his devotion to ugly his avaricious German mistresses, he was little fitted to be an object of ioyalty to the nation. George III. was young and hand- able in manners and of dignified deportment, strictly decorous in his life. Above Englishman. ‘ Born and edu- some, agre truly ahs and all. he was a thorough cated in this country,” he said in the speech at the open- his first Parliament, ‘‘I glory in the name of ing of sculiar hap} piness of my li fe will ever Briton: and the pe consist in promoting the welfare of a people whose loy alty and warm attachment to me I consider as the greatest, and most permanent, secur ity of my power.’ The old Tory families, of whom many at the close of the precedi ing reign wer e Jaco bite at heart, were able without too great a shock to transfer their alleg lance to the third sovereign of the House of Hanover. Yet in some respects he was less fitted to make a good George II., though he h ited ; king than his grandfat ther thoroughly understood his constitutional -avennment position and always scrupulously respected the constitu- tion, and he possessed a politics than any of his ministers except Carteret ; Georg lII., moderately intelligent and very well-inte ntioned, was at the same time ignorant, narrow-minded, and in- Princess-Dowager of tensely obstinate. His mother, the | fuller knowled re of foreign = Wales. either with the intention of preserving her in- Auence over his mind, or from a desire to shield him from the prevailing immorality, had brought him up in the strictest seclusion. Heh: id been surrounded by men of no po litical standing or experience who had carefully ‘nstilled into his mind the idea that he had only to assert himself in order to place himself above all factions and govern as he please ad. Foremost among these advisers was his Groom 0 of the222 The Fall of Pitt. 1761 Stole, John Stuart, Earl of Bute, his mother’s favourite as well as his own. Bute was a man without experience of public life or capacity to take part in it, recommended by a handsome face and figure and by a remarkable talent for private theatricals, a dabbler in science and literature, enjoying a reputation Bute. for wisdom above his deserts by reason of his pompous sententious manner. Frederick, Prince of Wales, in whose household he had a place, described him admira- bly as ‘‘a fine showy man who would make an excellent ambassador in a court where there was no business.” lor the first two or three years of the reign of George Ill. the influence of Bute was paramount. On the second day after the accession he was introduced into the cabinet, and, though at first he took no ministerial office, he at once gave himself airs as being the sole ex- ponent of the king’s wishes, the sole channel of royal favour. After a few months he came more prominently forward. Lord Holdernesse was induced to resign by the promise of a lucrative sinecure, and the favourite accepted the seals of Secre- tary of State. At the same time Legge was dismissed from the Chancellorship of the Exchequer, and other less important changes were made. A violent war of paui- phlets had previously been commenced against Pitt and his foreign policy. Bute and his friends wanted peace merely that they might get rid of the popu- lar minister, and pursue their policy of break- ing up the Whig oligarchy and extending the prerogative: but there were influential men in the cabinet as well as outside it who objected to the war on public grounds, on account of its expense, and from a short-sighted indif- ference to the fate of Prussia. Others were willing to Join with anyone who would put an end to the dictator- Bute Secre- tary of State. His policy.1761 Pitt ard the Cabinet. 223 ship of Pitt, or, like Newcastle, who failed to see that when Pitt had been struck down his own turn would come next, thought, while gratifying their resentment, to serve their interests by devotion to the rising sun, Such was the state of the cabinet when, after two in- decisive discussions, the Spanish question came before it for final decision. Bute and his adhe- The Cabinet ciscusses rents, eagerly desiring to withdraw from the the ©panisn war as soon as possible, no matter on what g: estion, terms, were not likely to approve of a course October 2, as : 1701 which would extend its area, and others be- sides Bute welcomed the opportunity for breaking defi- nitely with Pitt. Pitt repeated his arguments for de laring war, and added, in the haughty style he was wont to assume, tl “if he could not prevail in this instance, he was resolved . that this was the last time he should sit in that council. He thanked the ministers of Pitts : : speech, the late king for their support; said he was himself called to the ministry by the voice of the people, to whom he considered himself account ible for his con- duct: and that he would no Jonger remain in a situation which made him responsible for measures he was no longer allowed to guide. — Lord Granville (Carteret), the president of the council, then replied: ‘I find the gentleman is determined to leave us, nor can I say I am sorry for it, since he would otherwise have compelled moder ats : us to leave him: but if he be resolved to as- us sume the richt of advising his Majesty and directing the operations of the war, to what purpose are we called to this council ? When he talks of being r¢ sponsible to the people, he uses the language of the House of Commons, } . and forgets that at this board he ts reponsible only to the224 The Fall of Pitt. 1761 king. However, though he may possibly have convinced himself of his own infallibility, still it remains that we should be equally convinced before we can resign our understandings to his direction Or join with him in the measure he proposes.’’ On the question being put to the vote, only Pitt and Temple were in favour of the immediate declaration of war. These ministers therefore resigned their offices after delivering their opinions in writing. The king received Pitt very graciously when he waited upon him to give up the seals, but made no attempt to induce,him to withdraw his resig- nation, Pitt and Tem- pie resign, Pitt on retiring accepted a peerage for his wife anda pension of 3,000/. a year for three lives, which for a time impaired his popularity; not that these rewards were held to be undeserved, but because his acceptance of them seemed a falling off from the high disinterestedness which he had always professed and practised. Juster views soon prevailed, especially when the course of events proved conclusively the soundness of his judgment on the point at issue between his cabinet and himself. As soon as the treasure-ships were safely anchored in Cadiz harbour, the Spanish Government threw off the eictani mask, and adopted so haughty a tone that declares war the English ministry were compelled to de- Nahaiee mand explanations concerning the treaty 1762. with France. These were contemptuously refused, and Bute, after a delay which had enabled her to pour troops and stores into her colonies, found himself under the necessity of declaring war against Spain,Precarious Position of Fredertck. 1759-61 CHAPTER AV. END OF THE WAR. ¢ | { P) ussta. UNABLE to avoid fresh entanglements, Bute was only the more determined to w A clause in the yearly Convention with Prussia forbad lude peace without the knowledge or ithdraw his support from Frederick. e either party to cons consent of the other, and it was the con- straint of this clause rather than the burden of the subsidy that he wished to be free from. Therefore, without definitely an- that the connexion between England and nouncing allowed Parliament to break’ Prussia was at an end, he up without renewing the Convention. In the extremity to which Freder! k had been reduced, the defection of the ally, who had poured subsidies into his exhausted coffers and keptthe whole power of France at bay, might well have proved fatal had it not been counterbalanced by another occurrence of Dp even greater significance. For more than _ Pp two years the king had been maintaining a <— mere struggle for existence, Josing g! und inch by inch The year which followed Kun rsdorf was a year of con- tinued disaster. The havoc of that great defeat had hardly been repaired when Fin k’s capitulation at Maxen gave the Austrians a firm footing in Saxony and spread an unprecedented despondency through the ranks of the Prussian army. Fresh misfortunes followed, increasing the ~ desponden-226 Lrussia. cy and diminishing the power of resistance. A Prussian corps under General Fouquet was annihi- rea lated at Landeshut—this loss too, like June 23, Finck’s, being attributable to harsh hasty 1760. orders of the king's too literally obeyed by the touchy general—and soon afterwards the Capture of ; Glatz laid the whole of Upper Silesia open to Capture o Glatz. July the Austrians. Laudon appeared before 22. Breslau, and the Russians advanced unop- posed to the Oder. The situation was one to call forth all the powers of Frederick's genius, which always asserted itself most conspicuously when the need was greatest. After a series of intricate manceuvres, the king hurried from Saxony to Silesia, followed by two Austrian armies under Daun and Lacy, each equal in numbers to his own, Laudon with a third awaited his arrival, and Czernitch- eff with 24,000 of the Russians, crossed the Oder and watched the course of events. Battle of Liegnitz, Aug Is. The three Austrian armies surrounded the Prussians, but before their generals could execute a Joint attack, Frederick suddenly pounced on Laudon and defeated him with great loss. He then wrote a let- ter to Prince Henry, and gave it toa peasant with in- structions to let it be intercepted by Czernitcheff. The letter contained an exaggerated account of the victory, announced the king’s intention of marc} Russians, and begged the prince to d agreed on. ing against the o what had been The peasant obeyed his instructions, with the effect expected by the king. Czernitcheff had already heard a report of Laudon’s defeat, and as soon as he got the letter he recrossed the Oder and broke his bridges. The victory of Liegnitz ch exactly ecked the progress of the1760-61 The Battle of Torgau. enemy in Silesia, but it did nothing more. Frederick could do nothing to prevent a corps d Austrians from m iking a raid on q contribution, though tay there a short ) = of Rus- ‘ : Russians and sians an Austrians iD 1° . Berlin. Berlin, and exacting the news of his approach made their s Meanwhile the whole of Saxony was occupied by Onc. k on his return to the elec- the Austrians, and Frederic torate in October, found all the strong positions in the possession of the enemy. Daun with 65,000 men was carefully entrenched at Torgau, where Frederick with eked him on November ai 44,000 attac and hotly contested. Ziethen, rhe battle was long who was ordered to attack the enemy in the rear, while the king engaged them In front, missed the 4. ue of pattie O road by which he ought to have advanced, ‘Torgau, No- yYemoOcrT 3. nd when the sun set, the Austrians were =f a S , formed the key of till in possession of the heights whicl Frederick and Daun were both wounded, Still, however, the road at last, and at their position. and the carnage had been frightful. battle continued. Ziethen found his lock the welcome news that the heights titz were his was brought to Frederick in a little church near the battle-f 1d. whither he had retired to have his wound dressed and to write despatches. When day broke, the Austrians were seen in full retreat on Dresden. i that if the double attack had been made army must have been The Austrian nine O' of Sip- It is believe simultaneously, their whole Elbe or made prisoner. driven into the camp at Torgau was a stron; yne, but, as F rederick too small for 65,000 men to manceu\ saw at a glance, re in. The next year was one of marc The war was becoming, hes and manceuvres, without a single pitched battle. as Carlyle expresses it, ‘‘like a race between spent ~2:8 Prussia, 1761-62 horses’’ Its chief event was the surprisal of Schweid- nitz, brilliantly performed by Laudon, who, Bibaetdaite however, narrowly escaped a reprimand October I, from Maria Theresa and the Aulic Council, for having done it without their orders, an almost incredible piece of pedantry, which, while show- ing how the Austrian generals were hampered in the field, helps to explain their remissness in making use of the opportunities which their great superiority in num- bers afforded. At no period of the war had the situation of Prussia looked so hopeless as at the close of this year. Probably the king was the only man in all his army nee of who did not despair of ultimate victory. pera The Russians after three ineffectual sieges had reduced by famine the Pomeranian seaport of Colberg, and for the first time in the war took up winter-quarters in Pomerania, and in the New Mark of Brandenburg. The capture of Schweidnitz enabled the Austrians and 20,000 Russians, under Czernitcheff, to do the same in Silesia and Glatz. The Prussian do- minions were slipping from the grasp of the king. Fully half were already occupied by the enemy, and what remained were almost entirely exhausted. Men, horses, supplies, and transport were hardly to be procured. The Prussian army in the field was reduced by the end of the campaign to 60,000 men, and the deterioration in quality was greater still. The splendid well-disciplined troops which had commenced the war existed no longer, and deserters and vagabonds of all kinds were swept into the ranks to fill their places. The utmost severity failed to preserve discipline, and the low moral tone prevailing in the inferior ranks infected even the officers. Peculation was rife; mutiny and desertion constant.Peace between Prussia and Russia 229 stances the loss of the moral and Under these circum ‘land must almost entirely have material support of Eng turned the sc ale against ein the pol cy of Russia. i was Gea De Prussia, but for a sudden and complete chang On January 5, 1762 the Czarina died, anc sath of the by ner Sa Peter, Duke of Holstein- Cz. rina, Jamu . ary 5, %702 grandson on the mother’s side Of Accession ot Cottorp, 4 Peter the coarse and brutal manners, but altogether wanting Great, a poor silly creature of Peter Lil capable of generous im in judgment and discre- pulses, ibeth had been largely tion. The foreign policy of Elizal ] by personal feeling; that of her nephew rested influences on no other foundation whatever. 1 for Frederick the Great an admiration His admira- bordering on idolatry, and as soon as he tion for Frederick was seated on the throne, he hastened to fF his friendly dis} yosition. Frederick Dy soba ng home all his Russian prison- blicly announced his inten- ing all Peter had long enter- tainec assure the king 0 adroitly replied | ers, whereupon the czar pub tion of making peace with Prussia, and of restor had been conquered from her, the territories that made: but half measures On these terms peace was would not satisfy Pe ‘ter's enthusiasm for his Peace between idol, and, without the slightest regard to the Prussia and he entered a Ss! May $ Offensive : nd month later into an offensive and defensive defensive alli- ane e, June 8 Frederick, ana ordered Czerni led from Glatz, and had got honour or interests of Russia, alliance with tcheff, who had been rec 1 as far as Lhorn on his way home, to lead his 20,000 men back to Silesia to fight ap Lin sen in close alliance. » few months back they had be Prussia and Russia gave ow eden st the Austrians, with whom The peace between of retiring from a war which she had ~aa an opportunity W aged without honour or pron Y t, and by the Peace ol Ham-230 Prussia. 1762 burg, signed May 22, she also came to terms with Fred- erick. Ree The changed attitude of Russia, which Prussiaand = woyld have delighted Pitt, caused no- Sweden, May -2. thing but anxicty to Bute, who cared very littke what became of Prussia, but ae of cared very much about putting an end to ite, the war. Thinking that peace could be soonest attained by the unqualified submission of Frede- rick, he regretted the withdrawal of Russia from the war, because it would enable Frederick to protract his struggle with Austria, and baulk him of the object he was willing to purchase by the sacrifice of an ally. eee, Under this impression he sought to moderate Is CXtra- ordinary the enthusiasm of the Czar, representing conduct. ~ that by retaining East Prussia, for a time at least, he could induce Frederick to make the necessary cessions to Austria. At the same time he attempted to renew the old Anglo-Austrian alliance, and intimated his willingness to consent to the cession of Silesia, if the Court of Vienna would make common cause with Eng- land against the whole House of Bourbon, Neither ma- nceuvre succeeded. Austiia with some contempt de- clined to listen to Bute’s overtures, and Peter, in great indignation, acquainted Frederick with the underhand artifices of his ally. Thus England and Prussia drifted apart, and though the breach had little influence on the results Iér+a h hetween of the war, its ulterior consequences were Eng! 1 ar heat i é - ee , Dick: and very important, for it was owing to Bute’s Its con- treachery on this occasion that Frederick sequences, conceived an abiding distrust cf English statesmen and English policy, which caused him to stand aloof years afterwards, when England was herself in1762 Peter and Catharine. 231 need of his alliance, and occasioned that intimate con- nection between Prussia and Russia which with few and slight interrupuions has lasted to this day, and which bore : ts the Partition of Poland. For the present, however, the friendship of Russia out- W elghed the desertion of Engl ind, a fact ¢ le arly recoyg- nized by the Austrians, whe vave up all idea of regaining as its first frul the whole of Silesia, and limite d their programme to the preservation Ol the conquests alre 1dy maac, 7 ar } cs ie are col =) reacriCn took Frederick mmences Opec! tions in Dlicsia For the first lune since 175 On the arrival of his new al the initiative. Silesia, he commenced active opera- with a large army lay en- lies in tions against Daun, ho trenched on the low hills in front of the Giant Mountains covering Schweidnitz. After several weeks of manceu- vring he had all but completed his arrangements for an attack on Dauns position when a courtier arrived from ot. Petersburg announcing the deposition of the Czar, and the recall of the Kussian troops. In the course of six mon Peter had contrived to outrage the national feeling in every con: eivable way. His wife Catharine, a princess of Anhalt-Zerbst, was a ity, but, instead of allow- be cuided and supported by =——* FT i woman of very remarkable abll ing himself to , . - 1] ‘ 1. Peter and sense, he had the folly to make ( ae ee her superior . atnarine 7 . - 1 S , her his enemy by a series of insults, culmi- 1 to decorate his mistress with the nating in a command to a¢ rder F Of “ath “ne ta craat fect | and Lhreant order of St. Catharine ata great festival, and in a threat to shut her up in a convent with her son, whom he stig- matized as illegitimate, or years there had been no love between Peter a! i) wife Het fidelity had been as shameless as | yt Catharine, while despising her husband had put u y with his coarsenes and folly in the hope of one day ruling Russia in his name, It was232 Prussia. 1762 only when this hope was seen to be groundless, and when her own safety and that of her son were threatened, that she began to plot the Czar’s removal. Peter played completely into her hands. Every class was disgusted by his rash innovations. Large but ill- SA considered schemes of reform were mixed gusis all up with trifling and vexatious changes. The Classes. ae army was offended by the preference shown to Holsteiners, and by the Czar’s infatuation for Frede- rick, manifested by dressing up his guards in Prussian uniforms and teaching them the Prussian drill, while he himself appeared on all occasions in the garb of a Prus- sian colonel, as if prouder of a commission bestowed by Frederick than of being the commander of the Russian army. The clergy were at once alarmed bya project for secularizing church lands, and annoyed by an order to shave off their beards. Thus it happened that, when the Czarina’s plot was ready for execution, no one lifted up a hand for the Czar, eae and without a drop of blood being shed, deposed Peter was deposed, and Catharine assumed Hye the sovereignty of Russia. On the day after his deposition, Peter signed a deed of abdication, and was shut up in the castle of Ropscha, where, a few days later, he was strangled by Catharine's lover, Alexis Orloff, At the commencement of her reign Catharine showed an inclination to revert to the policy of Elizabeth, but when, contrary to expectation, she found in Catharine en her husband's papers proof that Frederick peuce with had constantly sought to discourage his russia, : . : ; bu: recalls wild schemes, and exhorted him to treat Czernitcheff his wife with proper respect, she experl- enced a revulsion of feeling in favour of the Prussian king.1762 Peace with the Austrians. 233 Still, though she con Grmed thetreaty of peace with theres- titution of conquests, she was not disposed to recom- mencethe war as his ally, and Czernitcheff was ordered home from Silesia. The order arrive¢ critical moment. Czernitche regard it, but at the request of Frederick, to whom he was well disposed, he consented to keep it secret and lelay his departure for three days. ignorance of the loss the Prus- 1 as has been observed, at a very ff could not venture to dis- C In this way the Austrians were kept In sians had sustained until the attack had been m ide ; the Russians in the Prussian camp, and could they saw ‘there for show. On the not guess that they were only morning of July 21, amid a general demon- stration all along Daun’s line, which kept BA Eee him in uncertainty as to the a Prussian detachment stormed the which formed the key of his real point of 2%) * attack, heights of Burkersdorf, In the evening the frontier, and the next day the Austrians retired towards p sition. 2ussians | the Silesian marched away. Frederick was but the place was so s He then made truce with Daun for the winter, on condition of the latter retiring into Bohe- and hurried off to Saxony, now at liberty to besiege Schweidnitz, tubbornly defended that he did not get it till October. mia and Glatz, i 3 ce with th which Prince Henry was defending against Aiea a - . Austrians n the Austrians and the troops of the Empire. § le-ia and wrest - Saxony: The season was, however, too far advanced Dresden, and truce was here also mace and thus ended what proved to be ’ War. for the siege of with the Austrians ; the last campaign of the Seven YearsEngland, Spain and France. @ 2. England, Spain, and France. Though successful in casting Frederick adrift, Bute found it impossible to bring the war summarily to an end or even to avoid extending its area. In accordance with the policy laid down in the Secret Convention of the preceding year, France and Spain demanded of Portugal that she should join them against England, the common enemy of all maritime nations, and on the demand being Racial te refused, Spanish troops crossed the frontier. wire epee Portugal was not in a condition to resist in Or the detence a of Portugal, vasion, but at the first approach of danger, 1762, her king had appealed to England for help, and Bute, while abandoning Prussia without a scruple, could not refuse assistance to a nation with which Eng- land had been long and intimately connected, and which was now attacked merely because it would not give that connection up. 8,000 English troops were despatched to Lisbon together with money and stores of all kinds, and the Count of Lippe Biickeburg, who had been master of the ordnance to Ferdinand, was brought over from Germany to reorganize the Portuguese army. With the arrival of these succours a check was given to the pro- gress of the invaders, and the season closed without Spain having gained any material advantage from her wanton aggression, while both in the East and West Indies she had to pay dearly for her rashness and dupli- city. When war with Spain was seen to be inevitable, the English Government began to make preparations for an Expedition attack on Havana, and early in March an pgainst expedition sailed from Portsmouth under the mavens command of Admiral Sir George Pocock. A large English force was already in the Caribbean Sea1762 Havana. 235 operating against the French West Indian islands, Martinique, the chief of them, was taken 1n February, and surrender in quick Capture of its fall being followed by the : : Martinique. succession of the lesser French islands, the greater part of the ships and troops engaged in their conquest joined Pocot k on his arrival in the Wes! Indies. Great judgment was shown 1D k, for, being the mart into which all the and whence selecting Havana as the point of atta: randize of Spanish America was poured, mercl 1 on their homeward voyage, the galleons and flota sale: its capture would greatly intercept the re- Havan2. and facilitate the conquest sources of Spain, of her other American possessions. But in proportion to the value of the prize was the difficulty of gaining It. The climate was Very deadiy to Europeans, espe ially at the season of the yeat to which the attempt had been postpont d by the reluctance of the English Government . gutumn betore. The town itself was to declare wal the well fortified, and its harbour, a m ionificent basin capa- ble of holding 1,000 of the largest ships of those days, was approached by a narrow channel half a mile in length, guarded by two strong forts, the Moro and the Puntal. tia, the garrison of the place and tweive cail of the ‘SSC ls: but for soTuc Including the country mili outnumbered the besiegers, line lay in the harbour, besides Spaniards mack south of the harbour, smatlier reason or other the no use of these ex- y sink three of them in the cept ti been almost though it would have English fleet to ferce an entrance. impossible for the with ut OD- : : Fee ; ; On June 7 the English effe ted a landing position on the side of thi Moro, where tneé prin Ipal at- . , , 2 tac k was to be made. (,reat obstacies Were en- rountered by the besicgers- The thinness of te sou236 England, Spain and France. 1762 made it exceeding difficult for them to cover themselves in their approaches, while these progressed Difhcultics ~—_ as slowly. Water had to be brought up from by the be- a great distance ; roads had to be cut through pares thick woods, and the artillery to be dragged several miles over a rough and rocky shore. All preliminary difficulties were, however, surmounted, and on July 1 the batteries opened fire on the Moro, while three of the largest men-of-war placed themselves close under its walls and cannonaded its seaward face. After a bombardment of seven hours, which produced no effect on the Moro, the ships were obliged to retire with heavy loss, but the land batteries ee proved themselves superior to those of the -1e rst at- fs ack on the enemy. By the evening of the second day Moro, ; 4 the fire of the fort was almost silenced when the principal English battery took fire, and as it was con- structed of timber and fascines dried by the intense heat, the flames could not be extinguished Thus the labour of seventeen days was destroyed and all had to be begun again, a misfortune the more mortifying as the army was reduced by sickness to half its strength, and the hurri- cane season was approaching, when the fleet could no longer remain on that shore without exposing itself to almost certain destruction. Operations were, however, recommenced with cheer- ful determination, and by the 2oth it became evident to the governor of Havana that unless something were done the Moro would fal]. A sortie was then ordered, but though conducted with spirit it was = resolutely eae repulsed, and the sappers and miners the Moro, pushed on their works with vigour till July 30. a practical breach was made. The arrival] of long expected reinforcements from New York raised1762 The Philippines. 237 the spirits of the besiegers, and on the j3oth, after a gallant defence, in which the commander of the fort was mortally wounded and his second killed, the Moro was taken by assault. The capture of the Moro made Havana itself unte- nable as soon as batteries were erected and guns brought to bear on it, and on the afternoon of August 11, after a cannonade of six hours, flags of truce were hung out from all quarters of the town. A capitulation ensued by which Havana with a district of 180 miles . : ae Capitulation to the westward was ceded to the English. Havana. The men-of-war and merchantmen in the a harbour were abandoned after an obstinate struggle to save the former, and in ready money, tobacco and other merchandize collected in the town, the loss of the Spaniards amounted to the immense sum of 3,000,000/. In the East Indies an advantage of almost equal im- portance was btained by the conquest of Manilla, the capital of the Philippines, a group of large and fertile islands situated in the northern part of the Fi The Philip- cS Malay Archipelago. Owing tothe decay of Spanish enterprise since the time of Philip — I].. the trade of the Philippines had greatly declined, but the islands were capable of becoming inthe hands of an enterprising power a possession of ext eeding value, not more for their extent and richness than because of their commanding position with rerard tothe trade with China and Japan, which the masters of Manilla could control entirely. By way of offset to the loss of Martinique, Havana, and the Philippines, the French and Spaniards had only trifling ciccesses to boast of, such as a descent on New- foundland, and the capture of the Portuguese colony of Sacramento, while in Germany the advantage was on238 The Peace and its Results. 1762 the side of the allies. Thus the year that followed Pitt’s retirement from office was, with one exception, as rich Victories attributed to Pict. the victories because it Martinique | vana and \ rested on the in victories as any of those during which he had guided the war: but it was vene- rally felt that to him, and not to his successor, must be ascribed. This was not only was known that the expedition against iad been sent out and those against Ha- fanilla resolved on by him. The feeling conviction that the success which crowned these expeditions was due to the lofty spirit which he had revived in th and sailors c gaged. Hor Pitts. and | e nation, and which sent forth its soldiers onfident of victory wherever they were en- ace Walpole was anything but a friend of lorace Walpole writes, ‘‘ The single elo- quence of Mr. Pitt, like an annihilated star, can shine many month Martinico,”’ The negot by the Spani s after it has set. I tell you it has conquered 3. The Peace and its Results. lations with France, which were broken off sh episode in the autumn of 1761, were re- sumed the fallowing year, and presented the curi’ us spectacle of the first minister of a triumphant power, suing for peace as urgently as if his country had been brought to the verge of ruin. Bute was incapable of Bute's eager- regarding the war from a national point of necs for view. He wanted peace for domestic rea- pe ice. it was purcl sons, and cared little by what sacrifices 1ased. Far from being elated by the tri- umphs which shed a lustre on his administration, he looked on them chiefly as possible obstacles in his path. In the negoti ations of the previous year Pitt had insisted that conquests made by either party up to the date of signing the peace should be retained subject to ex-1763 Peace of Paris. 239 changes ; but Bute, at a (me when the capture of Ha- vana and of Manilla was imminent, consented to an article providing that conquests which were not known in Europe when the peace was signed should be restored the same spirit, when he chs without compensation. In heard that Havana had fallen, he wished to have it ted in the list of places to be restored, and simply inse! but for the remonstrances of colleagues who knew the temper of the nation better than he did, he would have had it so inserted sooner than risk a delay in sign- ing the preliminaries by demanding an e juivalent. The French and Spanish Governments wett not slow to take advantage of his pacific zeal, and raised their tone ac- cordingly. Still, though much was thrown away by the headlong haste of the English minister, mut h remained, and the advantages sé ured to England by the peace were really considerable ; as Iso were the indirect gains derived from the war whi .ce were signed on November 3, h no treaty could take away. Preliminarics of pei 1762, and on February I!0, 1763, converted into a defini- tive treaty, known as the Peace of Paris, of which the articles were 1n sybstance as follows: Lr * ~ ‘ + + Peac f North America the Mississippi became the paris. Feb 10 | the, 2770s en boundary between the English and OS ees The French ced i all they had | laimed east of the river, h it is situated, ‘ French. ever possessed or ¢ ent New Orleans and the island on wh! the Mississippi being declared free They, however, ret sined certain rights of fishing off the Gulf of St. Lawrence, cx the navigation Ol coasts of Newfound! ind and in the and the small islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon were given them as shelter for their fishermen, but without permission to erect fortifications. In the WestIndies they were more fortunate. Guada-240 The Peace and tts Results. 1763 loupe and Martinique were both restored, together with some of the lesser islands, so that England kept only Grenada and the Grenadines, besides Tobago, Dominica, and St. Vincent, to which she had an old claim. In Africa, Goree was restored to France, and Senegal retained by England. All the French settlements in In- dia were given back, but under the restriction that no fortifications were to be raised, or soldiers kept, by the French in Bengal. In Europe, France exchanged Minorca for Belleisle (taken in 1761,) and agreed to restore any places in Hanover, Hesse, Brunswick, and Lippe Biickeberg that she might be in possession of; but no compensation was made to Hesse for the damage her troops had done there. It was also agreed that England and France should retire altogether from the German war, and that the lat- ter should evacuate the Prussian fortresses of Wesel, Cleves, and Guelders. Who should take over the for- tresses was, however, left undetermined. There was, therefore, nothing in the treaty to prevent Austrian gar- risons from marching in when the French garrisons marched out, and but for timely precautions taken by Frederick this would actually have happened. Frede- rick protested against the betrayal of his interests and the invidious distinction made between Prussia and the other allies of the King of England; but his protests were without effect. The English Government seemed equally indifferent to the fate of their ally and to the reproach of treachery. Spain, considering how unfortunate she had been in the war, got out of it on easier terms than France. She abandoned her baseless claim on the Newfoundland fishery, and conceded the right of cutting logwood in1763 Peace cf Huberisburg. 241 i Honduras, while England agreed to demolish the forti- fications that hac 1 been erected there. She Conditiors between England and Spain, also restoredto Portug ral the town of Almeida and the colony of Sacramento. These, how- ever, were all minor points ; 1n more 1mMpor- tant matters Spain prevailed. She recovered the Philip- to Bute’s article about restorations, pines pr alls, owing a and she got back Havana in exchange fol Florida, district useful indeed to Eng rland as rounding off her possessions In the North American continent aKot not to be compared for a mol nent with aero neHale like Ha- vana, the loss of which might e: her American possessions. Moreover, isily have been followed by the loss of all an agreement outs! ide the treaty, France gave her by ompensation for the loss of | lorida, Louisiana 1n ¢ The withdrawal of Engl ‘nd and France from the Ger- e to face, for Russia man war left Austria and Prussia face and Sweden had previously retl red from it, and it was hardly necessary to take any account of Saxony and the States of the Empire. It was obviously use- Austria and less for Austria to think of accomplishing posia unassisted that which she had failed achieve with half Europe fighting for her. M aria Theresa avowed herself ready for years might not tO recognized the inev itable, and peace ; but, that the et fforts of seven seem wholly fruitless, she strove hard to county of Glatz, the only portion of Prussian territory which remained in her possession retain the at the end of 1762 Frederick, however, W ho at the lowest ebb aig . Yeace of of his fortunes hi id refused to purchase a peace e by the cession of a single village, was burg | - ary 5 1703 not disposed to be more compliant \ when the tide was running in his favour. He insisted on the re- the sfatus guo ante bellum, and on these storation of242 Lhe Peace and its Re ults. 1763 terms, Austria restoring Glatz, and Prussia evacuating SaxO1.y, a treaty of peace was signed at the Saxon castle of Hubertsburg on February 5, 1763. Looked at from a military point of view, the Seven Years War was a drawn battle as far as Austria and Prussia were concerned, that is tosay, neither Results of . : rhe aa «fee of them gained or lost an inch of territory. Aas Morally it was a great triumph for Frederick. Austria had formed a vast coalition for the purpose of destroying Prussia, and she had signally failed. Against overwhelming odds Frederick had main- tained the position he had conquered for himself in the Silesian wars, and by the splendour of his achievements had drawn upon himself the admiring attention of Ger- many, and inspired it with a longing for national exist- ence. The result of the war was the overthrow of Aus- trian supremacy, and the establishment of Austria and Prussia as equal powers, the ® Dualism,” as Germans called it, which ended a hundred years afterwards in the exclusion of Austria from Germany. The war greatly increased the maritime and colonial Sait ck power of England. Under the protection the war tor of a navy which had cleared the seas of England. ; : hostile fleets, her commerce was largely ex- tended in all quarters, and it was during this period that she began to assert the right of capturing an enemy's goods in neutral ships, which formed the basis of her Maritime Code. Territorially also her gains were-im- mense. Not only was North America secured te her by the peace, but by the events of the wara vast field for English enterprise was opened up in India. The French settlements there were indeed all restored, but it was impossible to replace them in the position they had occupied before the war. The prestige of Pondi-1763-86 Ciose of Frederick's Reign. 243 chéry was destroyed, and English influence was para- mount in all the principal native courts. Sull the posi- tion of England after the Peace of Paris was one of perilous isolation. Her naval power and her claims with regard to neutral shipping arou sed the jealousy of all maritime nations, and she was without a single ally on the Continent. Her old connexion with Austria was at an end, and the new connexion with Prussia was broken off by Bute’s perfidious treatment of Frederick, CHAPTER XVI, CLOSE OF FREDERICK’S REIGN. THE peace of Hubertsburg divides the reign of Frede- rick into two equal parts. The first period of twenty- three years was occupied in gaining for Prussia a position among the great powers of Europe. The second was chiefly devoted to securing that position, and to healing the wounds the country had received in the struggle by which it was gained. The war left Prussia Condition of in a state of exhaustion hardly less frightful or alter than that of Brandenburg after the close of ce the Thirty Years’ War, the traces of which were visible fora century. Her population was diminished by half a million. Large tracts of land had fallen altogether out of cultivation. Towns and villages were wholiy or partially destroyed, and in many districts hardly a trace was left of human habitations. Successive debasings of the currency, and the absorption by the army of all revenue that could be raised, aggravated the miseries wrought by the enemy. From the n ‘ble to the peasant, every class was impoverished. For years all civil244 Close of Frederick's Reign. 1763 officers remained unpaid. The police ceased to exist. A licentious and self-seeking spirit took possession of the people ; law and order gave place to anarchy. In one respect only, in her freedom from debt, could Prussia compare favourably with all the other belligerents except Russia, who was equally fortunate. Her freedom Frederick had borrowed nothing, and when peace came, he had in hand the 25,000,000 thalers which he had provided for the next campaign, should one prove necessary. This sum was judiciously expended in the relief of the most pressing cases of dis- tress. Seed-corn was distributed where it was most needed, and 60,000 artillery, baggage, and commissariat horses were sent to the plough. By degrees the land was again got under cultivation, houses were rebuilt, commercial and industrial undertakings set on foot. Sees Much was done by the king which, accord- economical ing to nineteenth-century ideas, ought to aga have been left to private enterprise, but the truth is, that the country was in such a state of exhaus- tion that private enterprise was dead; and the practical success of Frederick's measures may be taken as a proof of their suitability to the occasion. Politically the chief events of the last half of Frede- rick’s reign were the Partition of Poland, the Bavarian Succession War, and the League of Princes. Frederick's share in the first of these events, and consequently to Close union SOME extent the event itself, is traceable to of Prussia the isolation in which he found himself after and Kussia- ~~ the Peace of Hubertsburg. Deserted by England in a way which destroyed forever his belief in her trustworthiness, he had no choice but to throw him- self into the arms of Russia, with whom, after the peace, he concluded a close alliance. [lis policy then became‘urks Declare War on Russta. 245 in a INeasure subservient to the ambitious sclemes by which the highly gifted young German princess, who sat on the throne of the czars, sought to reconcile her sub- jects to her foreign origin, and make them forget the im- perfection of her title, and the crime by which she had become their sovereign. The Seven Years’ War had the effect of establishing Russian influence in Poland, which, though remaining neutral, was throughout used by the Kussian troops as a base of operations against Prussia; and when Augustus III. died a few months after the peace, the Czarina had little difficulty in seating on the vacant J ‘ Russian in- throne one of her discarded lovers, a Polish fluence in ~ Pol nd. nobleman of no great reputation, named Stanislaus Poniatowskl. Plausible pretexts were easily found for constant interference in the domestic affairs of the republic, and well-considered plans for the reform of its impracticable constitution were frustrated by Kussia and Prussia, to whom the perpetuation of anarchy in Poland appeared a political necessity. Poland was becoming a mere province of Russia when a party of the nobles took up arms in desperation to free their country from foreign dominion. Che . - - : ; Var fac ite Confederates of Bar, as the patriotic party Ba ar were called from the place of their union, were attacked and defeated by Russian troops, who pur- sued them on to Turkish territory. Then the Turks, egged on by France, and fully alive them- ite selves to the danger of Russian prepond r- waron Russia (Octobe 17d ance in Poland, declared war on Russia. They were, however, unabie to sustain the part they h id rashly undertaken, and the Czarinas troops qui “kly overran Moldavia and Wallachia. Hereupon Austria, alarmec at the extent and rapidity vD246 Close of Frederick's Reign. 1772-~ of the Russian conquests, threatened to interfere, and Frederick himself was disturbed by the pros- oe ne pect of hostilities spreading. In accord- ance with his treaty with Russia he paid the Czarina 480,000 thalers a year during her Turkish war; but in the event of Austria taking part in it, he would probably be personally involved, and might be attacked by Austria and France together. On the other hand, it was possible that Catharine might purchase the acqui- escence of Austria in Russian aggrandizement by offer- ing her also large acquisitions of territory at the expense of her ancient enemy the Porte, in which case Frederick would see his powerful neighbours strengthened without any corresponding advantage being secured by himself. A method of reconciling conflicting interests and avoiding a general conflagration was found at the ex- pense of an innocent neighbour. Catherine agreed that bs, Frederick should recompense himself for peel a his risk and for the subsidies he paid by an- adie nexing Polish Prussia, and Austria, when she found that Frederick could not be separated from Russia, drew back and consented to be bought off by a share of the spoil. Russia desisted from her intention of separating Moldavia and Wallachia from the Porte, and took an equivalent in Poland. Neither Catharine nor Frederick betrayed the: slightest compunction at the transaction; but it was with intense repugnance that the noble and high-minded Maria Theresa consented to become a participator in the crime. She, however, no longer exercised the undivided power of former years, but with advancing age and mie declining vigour yielded more and more. though with constant misgivings, to the rest- less ambition of her son Joseph, whom, after he had suc--1772 Value of Polish Prussia. 247 ceeded, in 1765, tothe Empire, she had appointed coad- jutor in the government of the Austrian dominions. By the treaty of partition Frederick obtained all Polish Prussia, except the towns of Dantzic and Thorn, a tract far less extensive than those which fell to the shares of Austria and Russia, but possessing for Prus- sia a value out of all proportion to its area, }alue of Polish because its annexation united the detached __ and hardly defensible province of East Prussia with the central body of the Prussian kingdom. But in the king’s eyes the acquisition of a province, however valuable, was not more important than the alli- ance of the three northern powers which resulted from the partition, and was likely to derive per- if lterior con- sequences ol the partition. manence from the foundation of common guilt on which it rested; and it must be re- garded as a brilliant diplomatic triumph for Frederick that he succeeded, on the one hand, in persuading the Czarina of Russia to allow two other powers to engross portions of a country which she looked upon as almost her own already ; and on the other, in entrapping Austria, against her honour and against her interest into becom- ing his accomplice. Frederick's confidence in the permanence of the con- nexion between Austria, Prussia, and Russia has been justified by the event, for though the concord has occa- sionally been interrupted, the three powers seem ever to be drawn together again by some inexorable necessity, and the triple alliance of 1772 1s represented in the Dreikaiserbund of the other day. Yet in their relations to one another as German pow- ers the antagonism of Austria and Prussia was dur- ing the king's lifetime at any rate, in nowise softened. Opposition to any increase of Austrian territory OF248 Close of Frederick's Reign. 1777-8 influence within Germany was the cardinal prin cipie of Frederick’s policy, and Joseph was always seek- ing occasions for aggrandizement. A favourable oppor- tunity was afforded by the extinction of the pa aranan electoral Bavarian family in consequence of the death of the Elector Maximilian Jo- seph, without issue, on December 30, 1777. His kins- man, the Elector Palatine, who represented the elder branch of the House of Wittelsbach, was generally re- cognized as the rightful successor; but his pretensions were disputed on certain points by Saxony, Mecklen- burg, ward with claims to a large portion of the inheritance, and several minor states. Austria also came for- and lost no time in occupying the districts she proposed to annex. The Austrian claims rested on no very sub- stantial foundation; but they were fortified by an agree- ment with the Elector Palatine, a man of advanced age, without legitimate issue or expectation of it, who shame- fully sacrificed the interests of his presumptive heir, the Duke of Zweibriicken, and consented, in return for cer- tain private advantages, to cede more than half Bavaria to Austria. The great increase of power which would thus have accrued to Austria was hardly more distasteful to Frede- rick than the high-handed conduct of the Emperor in attempting to dismember an electorate without the con- sent of the Empire, and with a promptitude equal to Be Joseph's, he came forward as the champion opposesthe Of Zweibriicken and the other claimants, ret and as the protector of the Constitution of armas 175 the Empire threatened by the Emperor. After several months of negotiation, protracted by his reluctance to go to war, Frederick crossed the Giant Mountains-and entered Bohemia at the head of 100,0001778-9 Bloodless Issue of the Campargn. 2:49 men, while Prince Henry, with a force of equal strength, including a Saxon contingent, invaded the country by the line of the Elbe. [he campaign thus far presents an exact parallel with that of 1866. Then, as eighty-eight years before, the Prussian army, too large to be supplied from - Sy : Comparison a single base, entered Bohemia from Silesia gj thd Have and Saxony, marching in two columns on Pan uees® the important strategical point where the — with the war roads from the passes converge, not far 1 from the now famous village of Sadowa. But here the parallel ends, for while Benedek in 1866 allowed the Prussian armies to effect their junction, in 1778 Laudon and Lacy prevented it. On arriving within a few days’ march of the intended point of union, the king and Prince Henry found them- selves separated by an Austrian army 170,000 strong, encamped in a vast entrenched position, constructed with all the skill for which the Austrian engineers were famous. Frederick judged the position impregnable, and after two months spent in surveying It, Os food and forage being exhausted in the nar- issu of the row district between the mountains and the ee enemy's lines to which they were confined, the Prussians had no choice but to return the way they had come. Whether Frederick's nerve was shaken and his brain tilled by age, as was asserted at the time by ardent spirits in the Prussian army chafing at inaction, or whe ther. as he himself maintained, he thought he could at tain his end as well without bloodshed as with it, canno’ now be determined; but it is certain that his conduct was very different from what it would have been a score of years before. The affair was settled by negotiation in the following“so Close of Frederick's Reign. 1780 spring. The Czarina threatened to interfere on the no Prussian side, and Austria found that she Teschen, May could not count on France. By the Peace nos 779: of Teschen, Austria surrendered the country she had occupied, with the exception of a small district adjoining her frontier; and Saxony and Mecklenburg received compensation for their claims. The disinter- estedness of Prussia contrasted favourably with the ra- pacity of Austria, and though Frederick’s action was as much dictated by motives of self-interest as that of Jo- seph, it was calculated to win the confidence of the mi- nor German states, whose interests for the time being were identical with his own. Soon after the peace Maria Theresa died, and Joseph succeeded to the hereditary Austrian dominions. It is not possible here to dilate on the character Death z ; of Maria or career of this remarkable man. What Theresa. . 7 . - - Nitta ber occurred in Austria in the first five years of 30, 1750, his reign, may perhaps best be understood by comparing it with what occurred in France under the Revolution. Except in the war-office and in the depart- ment of foreign affairs, where his influence was para- mount, he had been shut out from all power as long as his mother lived, and when in his fortieth year he en- tered on full sovereignty, he proceeded with headlong haste to introduce the sweeping reforms he had long meditated in secret. The work of generations was crowded into a few years, and the want of tact and reck- less disregard of rights and feelings with which they were introduced did almost more to create opposition than the reforms themselves. Had Joseph been able to execute all that he conceived, Austria would have become the strongest and most prosperous state in Europe. As it was, much of his work perished: with1783-5 The Fiirstenbund. 251 him, and when he died broken-hearted at the failure of his noble aspirations, he left his dominions in a state of utter confusion. Much of it perished, but not all. The work was done too thoroughly for the old abuses ever to be simply restored, and its beneficial effects are dis- tinctly traceable in the Austrian institutions of to day. In the affairs of the Empire Joseph displayed the same activity that characterized his domestic administra- tion and encountered the same opposition. His efforts to strengthen the Imperial authority awakened general alarm, and even drove the Catholic ecclesiastical states, which had always held by Austria, to draw closer to the Protestant Princes. Towards the end of 1783, a fecling began to spread among the States of the km . The It Mpc r pire that some kind of union was NECeSSAry ceeks ¢ F crease hi if they wished to preserve their privileges owerin the and their independence, and this feeling was Empire, and strengthened when it became known that eta the Emperor had by no means given up the idea of in- corporating Bavaria with his hereditary dominions, It was rumoured that the Elector Palatine had been offered the greater part of the Austrian Netherlands with the title of King of Burgundy in exe hange for Bavaria, and that he had been won over by the alluring offer. Frederick then put himself at the head of the move ment, and succeeded in forming a league of Princes (der Fiirstenbund) modeled to some extent on the Smalkaldic League of the sixteenth century, but differing The Fiirsten- from itin that it comprised Catholics and Pro- pund or testants indiscriminately. The treaty of union oe ‘ was in the first instance signed only by the July 23, three great secular states of the north, Bran- a3 denburg, Hanover, and Saxony; other states joined afterwards on the invitation of the contracting parties.252 Zhe Close of Lrederick’s Reign, 1786 ie Foremost amongst these was the Elector of Mainz, whose adhesion gave the League a majority in the Electoral college, since by the Bavarian vote being merged in the Palatine the number of electors were reduced to eight, and the Elector of Mainz, as Arch-Chancellor of Ger. many, possessed a casting vote when the votes were equal. The immediate object of the Fiirstenbund was resist- ance to Austrian encroachments and the preservation of the s/atus guo in Germany, but it is probable that larger ideas were vaguely present to the minds of its founders. Its possible results. The mere fact that states were invited to join it whose small- ness made them from a military point of view a source of weakness rather than strength shows that something more than a defensive alliance was intended: and in- deed there is good reason for believing that a complete reorganization of Germany was contemplated, involving perhaps even the abolition of the Imperial throne or its transfer from Vienna to Berlin. Great ideas certainly— but requiring a Frederick for their realization, if even he could have accomplished it, and when the time carne a Frederick was not found. The old king’s end was drawing near. A few weeks after the conclusion of the treaty with Hanover and Saxony, he caught a severe cold at a review in Silesia, where he sat on horseback for six hours in a drenching rain without even putting on acloak. From this chill he never recovered. Last illness of Frederick. his health declined. His constitution was ruined already, and all through the winter Yet with failing strength his devotion to the public service never re- laxed. Every morning at half-past four his three cabi- net secretaries caine to receive his answers to the peti-1786 Death of Frederick. 2 ruUSia, ~ character of, 90; cause of her hatred of Frederick the Great, 91 pursues the policy of he: father, r/ dangerous illness of, r41: her persistent dislike to Fr lerick the Great, 155; death of, 229 Empire, the, its condition in 1715 18- declares war against Pru 103; army of, assembles, 1 Saxony, 151; Joseph's enct ments in it, 251 England, her inofl tinent in [71 16 at war with opain, 4! S an lly f Austri ls so; her colonies in North America «4; unprepared for a continenta war, 79; feeble policy of, 80; dis solution of her alliance with Aus- tria, 76.; her treaty with Russia, ° . des Convent har r i + conclu é ‘ ic r Oo A ainster, 7 uVascefl, Of, on of West- f French at war with France, Index. | FRA 81; seeks the aidof Austria against France, 86: sul Prussia, 148; her troops Ferdinand of Brunswick, 165; bravery of E | lish troops in th attie of Miz SLU1Z ‘ ald ed - 172; threatened invasion of Franc ©, 150; declares war ag: t SPAIN, 224 invoived in Warfor defence of Portugal, 234: ureaty of peace with France, 2 ) her | i tion aller the peace, 24: Eugene, Prince, his remaiks, 15: parallel with Laudon, r4 Eu pc, CONUILION OI, in 1740, ) | AMILY Compact, the, a treaty petween tit Nings Ol France and Spain, in 1761, 21¢ Ferdinand I., Em, eror, 12; his will, ‘ Ferdinand of | swick, Duke, in commana or th eiectoral army, 14 feats the Fre nh at Cre- fcid, 1¢ loses the battle of Ber- ge I wins the battle of M n- ci, I7o Fer , Russiar mmander, 147; icleated at Zorndort, 150; retreats in Ce and, 3S! Finck, General, in command of the Prus 1 army aft Kuoersdort, : M x¢ | eury a lal, 41 45 F Miu ly ral a Fox, Henry, talents of, as a debater, ic | moral} " refuses t lership of i Cc from the Duke of New tle, Secretary of Scat ‘ i seals, 108; P aster of the Forces, 14 France, after the peace of Ut e | at VAr W 1c FE © ror a n alliance with Pru i Ciare war ivalnst i re ; \ ia. h r ha t treaty [ Ver a reny f the b ‘ ' Lanai Fee¥u co hOe rei $ r treaties wit Austria, 1 of her ascendancy in America in 1757, 175; loses ULanada, 192 ner Family Compact with opain, 217 makes a treaty of peace with kLng- land, 239 Francis of Lorraine, obtains Tuscany instead of Lorraine, 31; husvandFrederick I., Frederick II, Frederick FRA o. Maria Theresa, 40, 43; elected | Emperor, 62; «is advice to Maria Theresa with r-spect to Silesia, 84; condemns Frederick the Great as a disturber of the peace, 104 Francis of Brunswick, killed at the battle of Hochkirch, 153 Frankfort, the U ion of, 57 capture of, by the French, 167 Elector of Brunden- burg, 6 Elector of Branden- burg, becomes first King of Prus- Sila, I4 the Great, Crown Prince, 24; his character and edu- cation, 25; attempts to from the tyranny of his father, 26; is imprisoned and sentenced to death, 76.; th: seutence reprieved, 27; is reconciled to his father, 74.; marries, 76.; personal appearance, 31; his life before his accession, 32; his innovations, 33; character of his government, 34; qualities as a ruler, 35; freedom of speech per- mitted by him, 35; his statesman- ship, 36; fortitude, 37, 1:6; tary talents, 37; personal charac- ter, 38: popularity, z6.; asserts his claims to Silesia, 44; the question if its seizure by him was justifiable, 45; invad ss Sil-sia, 46; is wel- comed by the Protestants there, 47; surprised by the Marshal Neipperg, 48; wins the battle of Mollwitz, enters into a defensive alliance with France, 1; Makes a secret compact with Ritintecc: s3:; defeats the Aus- trians at Chotusitz, and by the peace of Breslau gains Silesia, 55; makes a treaty with France, 58; the plan of his operations for war with Austria, 75., invades Bohe- mia, 75 ; captures Prague, sg ; out- manceuvred by Marshal Traun, 60; ubandons Prague, 7-; defeats the Austrians and Saxons at Ho- henf, iedbe-g and Sohr, 61; defeats the Austrians and Saxons at Hen- nersdorf, 62 makes peace with Austria and Saxony, 64; hailed by universal acclamati »n as Frederick the Great, 74. ; forms the (‘onven- tion of Westminster with England, 80; his satirical verses on Madamz- as ; 1A Miuil- | Austrians under | Index. escape | de Pompadour, 88; Russian aui- | FRE mosity to, 90; his devotion to the study of military tactics, 94; his secret sources of information, 7 perilous position, 95; tries tu re- new an alliance with France, 96; declares war against Austria, alter a final effort peace, 97; in- vades Saxony, 98; his plan of operations, 99; blockades Saxons at Pirna, 100; fights the battle of Lobositz 101; takes possession of Saxony, 103; is put to the ban of the Empire, 104; his plans for the defence of Hanover, 110: invades Bohemia, 112: wins the battle of Prague, 115; blockades Prague, 116; loses the battle of Kollin, 118; evacuates Bohemia, 120; is sur- rounded on all sides by enemies, 126; writes verses in the midst of his anxieties, 126; wins the battle of Rossbach, 129; attempts to re- gain Silesia, 132; his address to his army at Parchwitz, 134; en- thusiasm of his army, 135; wins the battle of Leuthen, 139; his stra- tegy, 147: lays siege to Olmiitz, 148: raises tne siege and invades ior Bohemia, 150; wins the battle o1 Zorndorf, 24 relieves Niesse, 154; is defeated at Hochkirch, 155; the deterioration of his army, 157; hits pecuniary difficulties, 74 loses the battle of Kunersdorf 158; despairs a.ter his defeat, 159; loses an army at Maxen, 163; precarious position of, 226; wins the battle of Licgnitz, 74.; and of Torgau, 227; sends Russian pri- soners home, 229; wins the battle of Burkersdorf, 233; loses the Eng- lish Alliance, 240; makes peace with Maria Theresa, 241; his po- sition at the end of the war, 242; his economical system, 244; takes part in the partition of Holland, 246-7; espouses the cause of the Duke of Zweibriicken in the Bava- rian succession, 248; forms the Fiirstenbund, 251; death of, 253 ; ; Frederick William, called the Great Elector, 10; his poicy and ad- ministration, 11; offers shelter to French Protestants, 12; resigns his Silesian claims, 14 Frederick William, King of Prussia, 16: his merits us a sovereigtt: 16 his economy, 16; increases and reFRE forms the army, 74.; his one war his reign u pe riod of transition, alliance of Hano- and France, 22 the influence 17; 13, 31 ver with England : bandous 1 under i Seckendorl, 23; and concludes treaty of Wusterhausen with the l.mperor, 23; his Court, 24; educa- tion of his son, 25; breach with his son, 25; Austria, 290: his last years, 30 forms the offers aid to Frederick, Prince of Wales, 71, 222 Fiirstenbund, the, or League of Princes, 251 Fiissen, peace of, & La, r England > ALLISONIE R E. 7 (_,corr< 1! at the battle esteae. 50 dislike of Pitt, 72, 111; foreign policy of, 79; policy in regard to PARGEE 110; di like otf Le in} ple Ii! i iSap- pro val of the conve nt‘on of Kl. ster- even, 123, refuses his ratification to it, 14 political attitude, 220; contrast between him and George IIl., 22 George III.. 221 George William, Elector of Branden- burg, 9 Germany, foundations of its unifica- tion laid, 1; a gainer by Austria's losses. 2° 1M 1723, 5 publi Opinion in, in favour of Prussia, 123; national enthusiasm over the battle of Roxssbach, 131 Gibraltar, 18. 20, 218 Gilsen, General, 173 Glatz, 55; taken by the Austrians, 227 Gloyau, 47; taken by storm, 47 Godeheu, M. 204 Granby, Lord, 168, 173 Granville, Lord, his reply to Pitt, 223 Gross-Jigersdort, Russian victory ¢ 14! Gr imi kow, Uuustavus A } AMBURG, Peace of, 229 Hano er, Alliance of, 22; Pitt’s saying that Hanover should . General von, 23 doiphus, of Sweden, 9 be as dear to Englishmen as Hampshire, 109; perfidy of the Hanoverian ministers, 1:10; the French invade, 120; that co-operation with Prussia w.s index. Pite’s belief 259 KAU the best way of securing Hanover, 145 Harsch 154 Hastenbeck, battle of, 122 cription of, Gi nera! of, 235; siege capitulates to the English, Havana, de of, 230; Havré, Ducd Hawke, A ere imiral Sir E., 187; his vic- tory over the French fleet, 188 Hennes lort, battle ol, 04 Flenry, Prince. brother of Frederick the Great, 151, 163, 164 H ry the Fowler, 4 He “ssc assél “a andgrave of, 57 Highland clans, the, utilized by Pitt for the formation of British soldiers, 109 Hildburghausen, Prince of, 125, 129 Hochkirch, battle of, 152 Hohenfricdberg, battle of, 61 Hohenzollern, house of, its founda- tion, 5; electors from 1440-1040, 0; the Hohenzollerns of Culmbach, 7 Holdernesse, 142 Hooghly, town of, taken by the Eng- isn, 205 Howe, Colonel, Hu bertsburg, Peace ¢ Hulsen, General, 118 f, 141-2 aaa ary, Queen of, - Maria There esa; supports her ’ yally, 53 1 A. rivalries of the French and English in, 193 ¢f seg rival claims of native princes in the Dec- can and Carnatic, 198; England without a rival in, 214 Iron ramrods, introduction of, 17 M a witz, 45 AGERN DORF, 13, 55 Joa {1., Elector of Bran lenbury y, nim 12 John George f JAgerndorf, 14 Jo I1.. son of Maria Theresa, his n ilo in and aspirations, 250 Jul er un BKery,. 9, 22 40; guaran- teed by the Empcror to Prussia, 24; succession iinkely to ve vacant, 39; Frederick resigns his claim to them, 51 Y ATTE, Licutenant von, ¢xecu- tion of, 26 Kaunitz. Prince, counsels Maria Llheresa aS tO Desa, 94; career260 KAY of, i4.: character, 85; his efforts | to establish friendly relations with endeavours to win over France, 8¢ ; Madame de Pompadour, 76. ; makes : lefensive alliance with France, go; triumph of his policy, 105 Kay (or Ziillichau}, battle of, 157 | Keith, Marshal, Prussi an ‘general, ! 152; killed at Ho ycnkirch, 153 “Kes selsdorf, battle o a 03 Khevenmiiller, (¢ ount, 54 Klein-Sch..ellendorf, compact of, 53, , 54 Kloster-Seven, convention of, 123 K iin, battle Ol, 117 Konigsberg, 14 Kuuersdorf, battle of, 155 ste ACY, Russian g Austrian general, neral, 28 163, 226, 249 Lagos, naval fight off, 185 L: lly, Comte de, commander of the French forces in India, 210; cap- tures Fort St. David, 211; his am- | bitious schemes, 7. ; difficulties of, 212; he alicnates the natives, 10.; his ineffectual siege of Madras, 213 Landeshut, battle of, 225 Laudon, Major-General, career and abilities of, 149; joins Soltikoff, rsh; his share in the bh oisia of Kunersdorf, 160; defeated at Lieg- | nitz, 226; takes Schweidnitz, 228 | Lawrence, Major, Clive’s superior officer in his carly military career, Legge Henry, Chancellor of the Ex- chequer, 108; dismissed, 222 Lehwaldt Marshal, def ated by the Russians, 141; drives the Swedes out of Pomerania, 141 Leopold, Emperor, 13 Le pold of Anhalt- Dessau, Prince, inventor of the iron ramrod, 17; Frederick’s answer to him, 34 Leuthen, battle of, 139 Levis, Chevalier de, the French army in besieges Quebec, 2 General Amherst, 192 Liegnitz, 12; taken by the Austrians, 132; recovered, 141; battle of, 226 commander of Canada, 191; | surrenders to Mannstein, General, Lippe Biickeburg, Count of, organizes | ’ i Ortugucse arm » 233 Lobositz, battle of, ror Lorraine, invaded by France, 29; | Martin, Commodore, Index. MAR ceded to Stanislaus, 29; See Francis Loudoun, Earl of, 176 Louis XV., 49; prefers an alliance Duke of. with Austria from religicus mo- tives, 88; pressure put upon him by the Dauphiness in tavour uf Austria, 103; weakness of his cha racter, 166; influence of de Pompadour over him, Louisburg, 176, 178 M ACHIAVELLI’S “Prince, L Frederick's refutation of, 22. Madras, capture of, by the French, Madaiue LOO , 197 Mahomed Ali, son of Anwarocdeen, recognized by the English as Na- bob of the Carnatic, 199 Mahrattas, the, 194, the English, 202; Dupleix, 203 Manilla, capture of, by the English, 236 ; support won over by 195 at the battle of Prague, 115; and at the battle of Kollin, 118 Mancuvre: Mansfield, Maria Theresa, Vi, ar: of, 42; Autumn, L rd, daughter of Charles accession and chiracter refuses to enter into tiations with Frederick the Great respeciing Siesia, 47; loyally supported by the Hungarians, 52; cedes Silesia, 55; her ambitious projects, 56; her dissatisfaction with the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, 65; determines to regain Silesia, 83; approves of Kaunitz’s policy, 93 nepo- 85; her detestation of revere the Great, 14.; her relations with Madame de Pompadour, 88 ; . io gards the war with Prussia and England as a religious war, 1<6; gives a commission to Laud: n, after his rejection by Frederick the Great, 148; determincs to prosecute the war with Pnis 155; her mortification at Laun's dilatoriness, 161; makes peace with Frederick the Great, 241; her repugnance at participating 1 the partition of Poland, 246; death of, 250 Maritime Code of England, 242 his ac.ion atindex. MAK ) Waples im coercing Chariec, King of ihe 1w Martinique Mauperiuis, 33 Maurice ol Dessam wounded aged taken Hockkirch, 153 Maxen,c ulation « M Meer sicilies, 21¢ capture of, 235 : ' : g18; al ‘ ica, Peiuce priseguer ip! 7, G3 ckienbarg-SCk werin, 157 father, ee Mm J Naleoe t Bengal 09: tairngues wita thie Dutch agaamel (0 hugli : M nz i o4 Minden, captere of, by tke Preechk, a battic @! rt Miaurca, 18, 2 captwre ot, by ihe 24 Mogul power, the decline of tke, e9¢ M ilwite, battle of 4 M nt um Mar jus ef. character { iz Jefeats tke Euglise at Ticon der ga a nis delecuc © enec, rao-455; Ceath,! nis pr pa that tke Engik& colo would throw off allegaance (0 tke @ country, <9 Montreal, capitvlatien of, ¢ ‘ Kao, 202 t invaded by Fredenck, 54 Moeravia, 14; Mogufer Jung. Subadur of t can, cr with 19> Mumch, taken by Panmdorrs, 5; M iuster, capture f the Frenck, inks 2U6le Vi vy govern T 168 Murray, Genera, c } , OY W ZT . Dec alter #&S Capture temerity of, 1g1; d¢elcated Dy French, £3 —William 7£,7°92 A act a a of Persia, «54 i Nantes, the edict ef, 12 Nupole mm, Bis Gpimson ot Fre leric’ . 142 Nazir Jueg royship of N ipperg Austrian Neisse, 47; surrend rick be 154 Neuburg, Count Palatine of 7 New astl:, Th Pe-iham Duke ' 5 , ter ; tase é of cuc a claimant of the Vice- tac De ean j Marshal 45 . ' ? Fred rea Ww - y the Austriags wee | Ss 4 ImMmAS (rc asury ; of, hi har ” made First Lord 261 PIR offers Fox the kadership of makes Sir T. of the House, Rk »binson leader 77 > makes Fox Secretary of otate, 77; dismisses Putt fromthe Piuymastcr chip, 75; palutica Capacity ut, his caforce remaguauivD, 100 ‘rcises am infisence whea out ol power co8: coalesce 6 with Pict and returns lo @iace, 1¢4 Niewport, 106; Freach garrison in 144 Nuremberg, Hebesralleru Burg- graves Ol, 5 178, sé Crs erdcc the, 136-8 Oder mver, 5 Ghie Company, the, 67 UOlmUtr, sce i, 14 Qmichued. the ¢raitor, Clive’s du- p itv towards A, One, Alcxis, Straggics Pete! fil. - Ostend, ros; Freach garstson ip, 144 stemnd Cempary, t! 2 22: abo bil lL. 24. pe A TINE, Electer, 27, $7 v jours, iu Bavaria, 54 Parchwitr, Frederick's Spee b at. t . pe f, 2% Par mentary corruption ie Pete's time, 74 cma and Piacenza, 20; Spanish garr v n 24 reweart ¢o tne } iperor Piycn to Don P p of pa , O4 I cam Henry ibility of, as Prime limister, 7 George I1.’s remark deart pv ter yt 1G ur afterward Peter Iti.. of Russa, bis admiration for Frederick ehe Great, 97, : cession of, 228; character of, miaixcs pe e¢ Ww nh Fe cx isguste Cy Ass ot bi | ect 2 is lc po a and murdered It ; c the Great, t7, «9 P lip. Dom, 64 Philip of Anjou King of Spain, 15, Philippiaes, the, 237 ? Ciiza Je rear : caplhiwaluoa ol, 402262 PIT Pitt, William, Earl of Chatham, edu- cation anu early life of, 77; George I{.s dislike t him, 72; Made Paymasier of the Forces, 73; dls Interestedness Ol, 73 talents as an orator, 73; personal appear- auce, 74; true sou of his great- ness, 74; patriotism ol, 75; ii ws in Lis haracter, 75 dism.ssed irom face, 75; maue oecretary the Devonshire admin tration, 105; Vigorous nature Ol his coutinental policy, 103; es- pous warmly the c.u,e of Fred erick the Great, 110; his dismissal from oihc Imi; can-ternabun in th country on his dismissal, 142 coalition with Newcastle, 143; their division of auth rity, 143; conditiono England wh n he Louk ollice IN 1757, 144; Secret Ol the success of his plans, 144; his heme of war, 144; subs. lizes I rederick the AyFGat, 45 5 send English troops to join Ferdinand of Brunswick, 165; his selection of commanders for an at ack on Ca- nuda 170 ; his relations with George lI., 220; resignation of 22 English victories ascribed to polit \ his , 427 Pittsburg 177 Plass y; battle of, 208 Poc ck, Admi-al 224 Poland, constituti of, a8: dis- | sensions among the powers in the election of her king, 28 par- tuon of, and its ulterior conse- quences, 246 Poiish election w r, the, 28 P mmerania livided b« tween Sweden nd Brandenburg, 10 Pomeranian war (1715), I7 Pompadour, Madame de, 85; her hatred of "rederick the Gre: at, § ner WII interference with tters, 97; her influenuec XV o al 6 . prestige at, 17; surrend ; essions 195; sieg English, i english. 214 Poniatowski, olan j.. 244 King Stanislaus, Pope, the, presents 2 consecrated hat and sword to Marshal Daun, for his vi tory at He chkirch, 3 Portugal, attacked by Spain, 234 Index. | ' } ' 12 Powers, the Great, complexity @ their relations, of Pragmatic San. tion, the, 21; condis uons on whicli i ussia. gu. iranteed it, 23, 45; guaranieed by France, alidity contested, 43 ? Prague, Freach and Bavanans be- sieged in, 53; Capture of, by the Prussians, 58; battle of, 114; b OCK ide I, 116 ‘** Prorestant hero,’ 145 cu russia, as a German power, 2; oc ed uy hei the Icutonic Order, 7; taks position Great as a Power, 20, power of the crown jn, 34; paternal cespoiism suited to, IN 1740, 35; periiOou, pesition Of, yg; the odds against Ler in 1757, 106; advantages she pe ssesse =d, 107; attacked on all sides, 126; by England, 147; her es condi the e.d of 1761, $: condition after the Séven > War, 243; her fr. EBEC, situation of, 178; rth of its position, 179; ~~ - . capitulation of, to the Engl ish, 185; the F rench attempt to recap- r Streng 191; bese d by the French, ‘ger ised, 10. Ss Bay, , naval fight in, 186-90 AJAH Sahib, besieges Clive in Arcot, 201; attacks Arcot, 202 Recruiting, Prussian, 17, 156 Reinsberg, 32 Richeli u, Marshal, 1a) rapacity Ol x2 mikes the nvention o Kioster- Seven with ke Duke of ; . umberlan A, 123 leader of spire Sir ‘Thomas, HEE yuse of Commons, 77 Ri : shacks situation of, 127; battle of, 129 Rudolph, Count, of H APSE 5 Russia, rise of, t makes t] rea of St. Petersburg with Austria, e ySAC proposes to Austria the partition f Pruss! her “lms Lil | iaud, 244 Ly sch 2 ed phee t, 132, 141; taken by Lau al h, 4 ’ ’ - 1 ‘ . chwcrin, Mar Ae. MEa* uM Schiwit i Lu I I4 oe cea tv indi nce OY rt ri VV alli Se LitZ, Me : a ed } , I | iscs, I suits f for Au i: al I 2 itwmion Of i’ru Li { ‘ { Sigismund, Emperor, 5 Di ia, Pru co 44,4 sc ire fy I ri of, 48; < l to Pr , } j im rt ; Maria , Lercen S I 1or : | ' n ] ) . ; , : . Licss t ; | r re (or . ~ : t reat, x2 r J t : ee’ i, i in Cll « . } ; ces > i tn I n 4 y hin : "A? eae > > > >. ’ . . ~| ; i y { WAS of Paris w tfi >} } ‘ : rail 172 stah , Lount, Austrian am- t Paris, 87 » 9 ot is, | zi Ky, -eiect 1 King ol ] i cxpu n Stanisiaus 2 HIALOWSKI, Ki Zz ol ko- i i 4 Stetti - tus I i.e Charies Edward, 64 Sur ah ~Dowlal tu icuifa i j > W ol in ‘ } it y of Ve 11L1es 14 I j anti \ ria s war W 1 rus | may? | > | t ' WW I il KcS peace, : , >: 1 } . i ° ul : cu, : 249 ; \/ 7 1 : , - ) : - i I i im, 4 ' ‘ ! nopoly, ic y the Eng- i ; s Y, t Ww rT Witih IAU . 44 — : “ Te H pe I I its j | ‘ ‘ i : ai - - t it ry ich bt alla Voliure, 34,° Ale POLE, Sir Robert, 41, 71 ‘ andewash, Dattie ol, 214 W anvenhe eneral, 1421, 1&9 1 tr264 index. WAT ZWE Watson, Admiral, refuses to sign the] 180; ill health of, 181; and ‘‘ Gray’s fictitious duplicate treaty with | Elegy,’’ 182; his indomitable gul- Mecr Jaffer, 206 | lantry, 184; captures Quebec, 185; Weingarien, Maximilian 95 | his death, 185 Wends, the. subjugation ol, 4 | Wurtemberg. the troops of, mutiny Wesel, 110, 210 rather than fight ayuinst Prussia, Westminster, convention of, 80, 96 124 Westphalia, the peace of, 10 | Wusterhiusen, treaty of, 24 Wilhelmina, Frederick’s sister, death of, 153 Winterfeldt, General, 95; death of,| “ZIETHEN, celebrated cavalry 126 officer, 118, 156, 227 Wolfe, General, career of, 177; cha-| Zorndorf, battle of, 150 racter and appearance, 178; his Zullichau, battle of, 157 first ineffectual assault on Quebec, | Zweibrucken, Duke of, 151, 248 .The volumes contain the ripe results of the studies of men who are authorities in their respective fields,” —THE N {ATION, EPOCHS OF HISTORY EPOCHS OF | EPOCHS OF ANCIENT HISTORY MODERN HISTORY Eleven volumes, 16mo, | Eighteen volumes, 16mo, | The Epoch volumes have most successfully borne the test of experience, and are univers sally acknowledged to be the best series of historical manuals in existence. 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The works are itor on account of some : 4 al! written by authors selected by the « especial qualifications for a} ortrayal of the period they respectively describe. The volumes form an excellent collection, especially adapted to the wants of a general rea ler.” £ The Publishers will taste these volumes ta teachers at SPECIAL NET RATES, and would solicit correspondence concerning Lerrnts for ee and introduction copies. CHARLES SCRIBNER’S. “SONS. Publishers 597-599 Fifth Avenue, New York.MEES Cbs eeck SUCCESS OF hae Sehies is the best proof of its 5 general popularity, and the exceltence of the various volumes is further attested by their having been adopted as text-books in many of our leading educational institu- tions. The publishers beg to call attention to the following list comprising some of the most prominent institutions using volumes of the series: Smith College, Northampton, Mass. Univ. of Vermont, Burlington, Vt. Yale Univ., New Haven, Conn. Harvard Univ., Cambridge, Mass. Bellewood Sem., Anchorage, Ky. Vanderbilt Univ., Nashville, Tenn, State Univ., Minneapolis, Minn. Christian Coll,, Columbia, Mo. Adelphi Acad., Brooklyn, N. Y. Earlham Coll., Richmond, Ind. Granger Place School, Canandaigua, Next Salt Lake Acad.,Salt Lake City, Utah, Beloit Col., Beloit, Wis. Logan Female Coll., Russellville, Ky. No. West Univ., Evanston, Ill State Normal School, Baltimore, Md. Hamilton Coll., Clinton, N. Y. Doane Coll., Crete, Neb. Princeton College, Princeton, N. J. Williams Coll., Williamstown, Mass. Cornell Univ., Ithaca, N. Y. Illinois Coll., Jacksonville, Ill. Univ. of South, Sewaunee, Tenn, Wesleyan Univ., Mt. Pleasant, Ia, Univ. of Cal., Berkeley, Cal. So. Car. Coll., Columbia, S. C. Amsterdam dAcada.,, N. Y. Carleton Coll., Northfield, Minn. Wesleyan Univ., Middletown, Mass, Albion Coll., Albion, Mich. Dartmouth Coll., Hanover, N. H. Wilmington Coll., Wilmington, O. Madison Univ., Hamilton, N. Y. Syracuse Univ., Syracuse, N. Y. Univ. of Wis... Madison, Wis, Union Coll., Schenectady, N. Y. Norwich Free Acad., Norwich, Conn, Amsterdam, Greenwich Acad., Greenwich, Conn. Univ. of Neb., Lincoln, Neb. Kalamazoo Coll., Kalamazoo, Mich, Ol: vet Coll., Olivet, Mich. Amherst Coll., Amherst, Mass, Ohio State Univ., Columbus, O. Free Schools, Oswego, N. Y. ’ &“s Bishop J. F. Hurst, ex-President of Drew Theol. Sem. ‘‘It appears to me that the idea of Morris in his Epochs is strictly in harmony with the philosophy of history—namely, that great movements should be treated not according to narrow geographical and national limits and distinction, but universally, according to their place in the general life of the world. The historical Maps and the copious Indices are welcome additions to toe volumes,”EPOCHS OF ANCIENT HISTORY. A SERIES OF BOOKS NARRATING THE HISTORY OF GREECE AND ROME, AND OF THEIR RELATI ‘(ONS TO OTHER COUNTRIES AT SUCCESSIVE EPOCHS. Edited dy Rev. G. 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Jonnson, M.A. ‘Its pictures of the Normans in their home, of the Scan- dinavian exodus, the conquest of England, and Norman administration, are full of vigor and cannot fail of holding the reader’s attention.” —L£piscopal Regtster. ‘The style of the author is vigorous and animated, and he has given a valuable sketch of the origin and progress of the great Northern movement that has shaped the history of modern Europe.”—Foston Transcript.EPOCHS OF MODERN HISTORY THE CRUSADES. By Rev. G. W. Cox. ‘To be warmly commended for important qualities. The author shows conscientious fidelity to the materials, and such skill in the use of them, that, as a result, the reader has before him a narrative related in a style that makes it truly fascinating.” —Congregationaiist. ‘‘It is written in a pure and flowing style, and its arrange. ment and treatment of subject are exceptional.” —Chrtsiian Intelligencer. THE EARLY PLANTAGENET S—Their Relation to the History of Europe; The Foundation and Growth of Constitutional Government. By Rev. W. Stusss, M.A. ‘Nothing could be desired more clear, succinct, and well arranged. All parts of the book are well done. It may be pronounced the best existing brief history of the constitution for this, its most important period.” — Zhe Nation. *« Prof. Stubbs has presented leading events with such fair- ness and wisdom as are seldom found. He is remarkably clear and satisfactory.” — Zhe Churchman. EDWARD III. By Rev. W. WARBuRTON, M.A, ‘* The author has done his work well, and we commend it as containing in small space all essential matter.” —Mew York Independent. ‘Events and movements are admirably condensed by the author, and presented in such attractive form as to entertain as well as instruct.” —Chicago Jnterior. THE HOUSES OF LANCASTER AND YORK —The Conquest and Loss of France. By JAMES GAIRDNER. ‘‘Prepared in a most careful and thorough manner, and ought to be read by every student.”—Vew York Times. ‘‘It leaves nothing to be desired as regards compactness, accuracy, and excellence of literary execution.”—Sostow Journal,———————— / j FEPOCHS OF MODERN HISTORY. ———__—$_—__—— ~~, THE PURITAN REVOLUTION; and the First Two Stuarts, 1603-1660. By SAMUEL RAWSON GARDINER. ‘‘ The narrative is condensed and brief, yet sufficiently com- prehensive to give an adequate view of the events related.” —Chicago Standard. ‘*Mr. Gardiner uses his researches in an admirably clear and fair way ”’—Congregationaiist. ‘« The -ketcn is concise, but clear and perfectly intelligible.” — Hartford Courant, THE ENGLISH RESTORATION ANDLOUIS XIV., from the Peace of Westphalia to the Peace of Nimwegen. By Osmunp Airy, M.A. ‘* It is crisply and admirably written. An immense amount of information is conveyed and with great clearness, the arrangement of the subjects showing great skill anda thor- ough command of the complicated theme," —Joston Saturday Evening Cazette, ‘¢ The author writes with fairness and discrimination, and has given a clear and intelligible presentation of the time. — New York Evangelsst, THE FALL OF THE STUARTS; and Western Europe. By Rev. Epwarp HALE, M.A. ‘‘ A valuable compend to the general reader and scholar,” —Providence Journal. ‘“It will be found of great value. It is a very graphic account of the history of Europe during the 17th century, and is admirably adapted for the use of students."—JSoston Saturday Evening Cazettle. ‘An admirable handbook for the student.” — 7he Churchman, THE AGE OF ANNE. By Epwarp E. Morris, M.A. ‘The author’s arrangement of the material is remarkably clear, his selection and adjustment of the facts judicious, his historical judgment fair and candid, while the style wins by its simple elegance.""—Chicago Stan lard. ‘“An excellent compendium of the history of an important period.” — Xe Watchman,f ! \ A / EPOCHS OF MODERN HISTORY. THE EARLY HANOVERIANS—Europe from the Peace of Utrechtto the Peace of Aix- la-Chapelle. By Epwarp E. Morris, M.A. ‘* Masterly, condensed, ana vigorous, this is one of the books which it is a delight to read at odd moments; which are broad and suggestive, and at the same time condensed in treatment.” —CAristian Advocate. ‘*A remarkably clear and readable summary of the salient points of interest. The maps and tables, no less than the author’s style and treatment of the subject, entitle the volume to the highest claims of recognition.”"—Boston Datly Ad- verliser, FREDERICK THE GREAT, AND THE SEVEN YEARS’ WAR. By F. W. LoNncman. ‘* The subject is most important, and the author has treated it in a way which is both scholarly and entertaining.’”— 7he Churchman. ‘* Admirably adapted to interest school boys, and older heads will find it pleasant reading.”—Mew York Tribune. THE FRENCH REVOLUTION, AND FIRST EMPIRE. By WILLIAM O’CONNOR Morris. With Appendix by ANDREW D. WHITE, LL.D., ex-President of Cornell University. ‘We have long needed a simple compendium of this period, and we have here one which is brief enough to be easily run through with, and yet particular enough to make entertaining reading.”—New York Evening Post. ‘The author has well accomplished his difficult task of sketching in miniature the grand and crowded drama of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Empire, showing himself to be no servile compiler, but capable of judicious and independent criticism.”— Springfield Republican. FHE EPOCH OF REFORM—1830-1850. By Justin MCCARTHY. ““Mr. McCarthy knows the period of which he writes thoroughly, and the result is a narrative that is at once enter- taining and trustworthy.”—Mew York Examiner ‘‘ The narrative is clear and comprehensive, and told with abundant knowledge and grasp of the subject.”—JSoston Courier.EPOCHS OF MODERN HISTORY THE ERA OF THE PROTESTANT REVO. LUTION. By Fxeperic SEEBOHM. With Notes, on Books in English relating to the Reformation, by Prof. GEORGE P. FISHER, D.D. ‘‘For an impartial record of the civil and ecclesiastical changes about four hundred years ago, we cannot commend a better manual.” —Sunday-School Limes.