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HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.

 

 

“* Ne te queefiveris extra ;
Eque fuis latebris demerfum protrahe Verum,”Se oe en. cae ross

 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
   

Hp DUBLIN EDITION.

IT would be fuperfiuous to aad any thing to recommend
the following ABSTRACT of Mr, Locke’s celebrated
Effay on Human Underftanding, after I have affured
my Readers that it was drawn up by no lefs a Man than
the late Lord Chief Baron GILBERT.

“ To this Advertifement the prefent Editor only
<¢ adds, that as the Tract was communicated to him
“‘ by a refpected Friend, and is now, he believes, little

‘© known, he agreed in fentiment with that Friend (to

a

«© whom he is obliged alfo for the Difcovery of the

«< Portrait of GirBeRT, and for the Knowledge of
‘his having been a Fellow of the Roya Socrery)
“that ic might with obvious Fropriety accompany
Soe LAW GF EVIDENCE. -Tphat in ittell
‘merited to be reprinted, he believes few, if any,
‘of the Readers will deny.”OF
Me,. £2 0.C-K. Es £28 Sane
HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.

 

¥ EN come into the World without any Inga

 

or Principle, either fpeculative or practical :
but all our Ideas arife either from SENsatTION or RE-
FLECTION.
An Idea is whatfoever is perceived or thought on:
and is either,
BS Ae Ao SIMIRL Es
Piha ce.
“4” J, A simpLe Ipga is one uniform Ap-

CoMPLEX:

pearance, Reprefentation, or Perception of the Mind:
without Alteration or Variety.

Here three Things are to be confidered :

Firft; the Manner of their Gonveyance or being in
the Mind ;

Secondly, the Objeéis from without that affect the
Mind ;

Thirdly, the Mind itfelf.

Firstr—The Manner of their Conveyance into the
Mind :—

Some fimple Ideas come in by Senfation only ; fome
by Reflection only; fome both by Senfation and Re-
flection. :

f 5. By

BR, Uw. FE 26

Il. i. §2g035
4 5s

Ibid. 8. € 83* T.H. M.
C.F. § 4.

q § 5.
| T.H.M.
Cc. Ti, § Qe

ce
OMT: § 3
prop. 4.

II. 5.

jj Hi. r3, § Jbid.
§ 5, 6.

V. inf.

Prim. Qual.

® II. 20.
e Ibid. 7
Ibid.

Secondary Quae
ities.

; § 11.
Hi. S. S03 727
25

other tan

i By SEnsa’ and thefe either, dy the
on of one Poni as Light and Colour by the
Eye, * Sound by the Ear, Jafte|| by the Palate,

Odours by the Nofe;+ and the Ideas of Solidity and

gible Qualities,

ION only:

Heat, Cold, &c. by the

Touch 3;—

of feveral Senfes: as the Ideas of Motion and

r,

Reft; Space, || Extenfion, and Figure. §

2, By REFLECTION only,

Volition + or Willing 3

e oO
Ins 3 5

Simple IpEas, both by SENSATION and REFLEC-

tion: and thefe are, Pain, * Pleafure, Exiftence, °
Unity.
SeconpLy, Oxsyects from without that affedt the

Mind: and they are,

1. Primary Qualities of —fuch as Motion,

are in the Bodies

s to produce feveral
Colours, Sounds, Taftes,

&c. 3; which are indeed only Senfations produced in the

Senfations iH US;

Animal the Operat

Qualities.

by ion or Action of fuch primary

Toirpiy, the Minn itfelf: and the

Faculties.uff, of PERCEPTION;
adly, of RETENTION; which is twofold:
ift, Either the keeping ‘* of”? the fame Ideas ac-
tually in View, which we call Contemplation ; or,
2. Reviving them when they are gone; which we

call Memory.

3dly, of DiscERNMENT: which contains a threefold
Power :

1, of comparing the feveral Ideas, and on fuch Com-
parifon obferving their Refemblances, which 1s called,
Wit, or obferving their manifeft Differences, which
is called, Judgement:

9, The Power of compounding our Ideas: which is,

1. By carrying feveral fimple Ideas into the fame
Reprefentation ; Or,

2. By the Repetition of the fame Idea; which is
called enlarging :

3.| The Power of abftrafing : which ts the feparat-
ing of any Idea from the Circumftances of real Ex-

‘tence; as from Time, Place, and other concomi-

tant Ideas.
Seier id

 

meee

So exquifite is the firucture of
our minds, that avobole group of
ideas foall Jo perfectly coalefce into
one as to appear but a fimple Idea ;
and fingle Words may be fo con-
netted with Juch groups as to excite
shem with the fame certainty ang

diflin&nefs as if they had been ori-
ginally fimple Jenfations.

How complex, for inflance, are
the ideas expreffed by the terms
awhith denote the feveral employ-
ments, offices, azd profeflions.
The ideas annexed to thefe terms

=m TO,

a § I.

eee § 6.

rasa rene Aap sei eS
‘ é 5 en poe
a IM ag taco shan hsb Vag pase aad 53wa § Se

tbid. ——— §. Ze

«BIT, CompLtex peas conjijt of feveral fimple

 

Leas united in the fame Reprefentation, Appearance, or

Perception: and they either come into the Mind thus

united, from the Operation of Things without us; as

the Idea “ of” Solidity and Figure is caufed by the

fame Ball; therefore in the complex Idea of the Ball

we * confider” fuch Ideas as co-exiftent and concomi-

tant; or elfe,

2, When fuch fimple Ideas are united by the Mind 5

uae a Z
as in the Idea of Law, Obligation, ‘‘ Evidence,” occ.

Complex Ideas ave of three Sorts:

uff, of Mones;

ndly, SuBSTANCES 3

3dly, RELATIONS.

First, of Modes: which are again twofold:

i/t, Simple 5

adly, mixt.

It, jimple Modes are the feveral different Manners

under which any /imple Idea may appear to the Mind:

and thefe either come in,

 

muft be an epitome of the defini-
tions of them; andif they be ac-
quired without defin tions, by means
of a feries of obfervations, he
ideas will be frill more complex.

Let a child be introduced to the
theatre, and fee a company of per-
fons from time to time in a great
variety of chara&ers, and let him
be told that he muft call them
players. That word will excite

' an epitome, as it were, of all that

be has feen them perform: and if

he attend tothat complex idea, evex
the features and mop firiking gef~
tures of the prinsipal performers
will be confpicuous in it: and by
degrees, as all thefe particuiars get
intermixed and completely affociateds
ewhatever belonged to the feparate
perfons will be dropped, and fome-
thing will remain annexed to the
term, when it is explained with
due precifion, that had been obferved
in them all.

1, By

af1. By Senfation only: as the feveral Modes of Space,
a Yard, a Furlong, a Mile; or, fet out by vifible
Marks and Boundaries, as the feveral Places of Bodies,

br)

or “as” the feveral Modes of Numbers, a Score, a
- Grofs, a Dozen.
2. By Reflection only: as the feveral Modes of
thinking, which are either,
1. Without Pain or Pleafure;
2. Or with it.

1. WitHout Pain or Pleafure: and whoever ob-
ferves his Mind, will find a perpetual Revolution of
Ideas while he is awake. The ftopping ‘‘ of” any of
them, and confidering it on all fides, we call

Aitention ; ||

The letting “of” the Mind run adrift in the con-

ftant Rotation of Ideas and Objects before us is called
Remiffion ; +

And there are in the Mind conftant Degrees of 4t-
tention and Remiffion, according to the different Degrees
of Confideration the Mind employs concerning the
Objects before it.

2. The Modes of thinking witH Pleafure and Pain:
and thefe are called the Pajsons. The Pleafure we

 

This is the Proce/s that is call-  dedudtion from fenjfible ideas being
ed, Abftraction: and it is by too remote and objcure to be appa-
means of this proce/s chiefly, that rent, or fo much as fufpeGed, at
ave acquire thofeideas which have firft fight.
been referred to Reflection.; their

f 3 find

 

jf. E36

II. 19,

Ibid. 20.

\\ II. 10. 8 4s

—— 39, § 3540

tk, 20, § je

PRIESTLEY’S
3d Introd, Ess,
tu the Turory
of the H,
Minp, XXXiv,V,Thid. § 4.

V. HopBeEs
on H. N.
©: Vil. and
IX.

— §9.

—— §7.

find in any Idea, prefent ** or” abfent, we call,

 

Love 3

The Pleafure we find in the Thought of any future
Enjoyment that we think probable to affect us, we

call,
Hope ;
The Pleafure we find upon the near Approach of

any Pleafure, of whofe Poffeflion we think ourfelves

affured, we call,
TOY 3

Whatfoever does or is like to affect us with Pleafure,

we call,
Goop;

The Thought of Pain, which any Thing prefent
or abfent is apt to produce in us, we call,

Hatrep or Averfion ;

The Uneafinefs we find upon the Abfence of any
Thing that might affect us with Pleafure, we call,

Defire ;

eal aa Gel a c . “ . ae
The Uneafinefs of Mind upon a Good loft, which
we might have longer enjoyed, we call,

SOTTOW

Th 3 of i
Phe Uneafinefs of Mind upon Thought of future

Pain, we call,The Uneafinefs of Mind on the Thought of a
Good we defire, obtained by another, we call,

Envy ;

If fuch Good relates to the Enjoyment of Men and

Women, it is called,

Fealoufy ;

A fudden Uneafinefs of Mind, on a fudden Pain
produced in us by another, together with a certain
Purpofe to produce Pain in return, is called,

Anger ;

If conftant, and the Purpofe of returning Pain be
continuing, it is called,

Malice ;

The Uneafinefs that arrives from the Thought of

any unattainable Good, ‘ or’’ which is fuppofed to be

fuch, ‘¢ or” from the Dread of any Evil really inevi-
table, or fuppofed fo to be, is called,
‘¢ Defpondency, or Defpair ,

WHATSOEVER caufes Pain, or is likely to produce it

in us, is called, BAD, or EviL.

3. Simple Modes coming in by Senfation and Re-
flection: hence we have the Ideas
1, of Power,
2. of Time,
f 4

more SERS

wae § 125

om § re

IJ. 23. § 42.

lie 2%

Il. 14 & 34,
Se
—— Ibid. § 28,

Sire PRE ORE ES ot 5 re poe "
Si cI TT

es se re hat n> of ‘ pacer ayer
Pil bE N a  Sciaict it aba n a Ap etl Oa ns ME r panIIs 17° 35 44

JI.23. § 22.

T, C. 21
§ Bae 8

7H. M. 9d
Introd, Eff.
P+ XXXVI, Vile
Hobbes, in
Prieftley’s Dif.

3. of Eternity,
4. of Infinity.

1. The Idea of PowER: | which is formed from the

Ability that we find in ourfelves of flopping any Idea

‘n the Revolution of Ideas within us, oF the “ Abi-

lity,” by a Thought, of moving our Bodies: which
is called,

The WiLLe

The Power of acting or wot acting according to fuch
Determination of a Man’s owas Thought, is called,

Liberty.

So that Liberty is the Abfence of all Impediments that
hinder aéfing or not aching, according to the Preference of
bis own Will, |

That which moves the Will iS

Uneafine/s 3

But fuch Motions may be controuled by the Power we

have within us of omitting any Action till we have

confidered its Con/equences, and find them either

Good or Evil.

 

\| In fad the Idea of Power is
the fame complex ldea with that of
Caufation or Efficiency, derived
from Experience and Obfervation

in the innumeraéle infiances which

lity of the Agent.

quifitions, 1.2. furround and perpetualy fprike us.

5 ee ee ee ee

‘The

   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
    
      

gq Liberty is the Ab fence of all Im-
peaiments to Action that are not
contained in the Natur

) ature and Qua

al

SThe acting or not acting according as the Fudge-
senty upon a due and impartial Confideration, doth

find fuch Act or Omiffion to be good or evil, is that

wherein confifts,

INNOCENCE;

And the not fufpending ‘of’ fuch A@ion till we
have confidered it as we might do, is called,

GUILT.

2. The Idea of Power from Senfation is, when there
is any Alteration in our fimple Ideas by the AGtion of
Bodies one upon another: that Body which makes the
Alteration we conceive to have the Pewer of making

it, and the other a Power of receiving it.

Of Time.

2. of Time: which is a certain Revolution of Ideas
in our own Mind, meafured by the Motion of Things

without; and chiefly by the Motion of the Leavenly
Bodies, as being more conftant and equal,

Of ETERNITY.

3. Erernity 7s the Repetition of fuch feveral Revo-
lutions, together with a Refietiion on our Power to add on

without coming to an End.

Of

il. 27.4 § Ag
Vi. Ne

IT, 14. § T Joes
21, &c.

Il, 14. § a8ees ee ee a ee ety:
on bau ov" a Og ad again ease sss i eae anal

——— Ibid. § 3;

i. 12> § 6.

      
  
  
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
  
  
 
  
 
 
   

OF CINFINETY.

7

4. Inrinity is the fame Repetition of our Ideas of
Space or Number ;—“‘ i. e.” witha Reflection on our

4

own Power to add on without coming to an End
oD

And fuch Repetition of our Idea of Space is, by a
peculiar Name, called, :

IMMENSITY.

II]. Of mixep Mopszs:

Which are, /everal diftin& fimple Ideas united into tbe
fame Combination by the Mind: and are therefore called
Notions: as a Lie, Obligation, Law, ‘* Proof,” &c.
And thefe the Mind unites for the greater Difpatch in
the Bufinefs of Civil Life: and therefore only con-
fiders the poffible Union of fuch fimple Ideas; whether

it has ever feen them a&tually fo united or not.

Seconpuy, fhe Ideas of Sussrances: and thefe
are either,

ift, feparate, or,
2dly, collective.

ft, feparate Subfiances: and that is, the Union or
Co-exiftence of feveral fimple Ideas in one and the fame
Place: which is all the Notion we have of Sudfancenus the Union of the Idea of Extenfion, Soli-
dity, Figure, and a Difpofition to produce the Idea
of Colour in us, is what we call,

Body ;

The Union or Co-exiftence of the Ideas of Per-
ception, reflecting, chufing, and Self-motion, is what
we Call,

Spirit 5

But what-are the Sufrata of thefe Properties and

Powers “is” to us equally unintelligible.

adly, collective:
Which is, when feveral Subftances are collected

into the fame Reprefentation: as an Army, Triumph,

Proceffion, €9¢.

Tuirpiy, of ReLations: which is, 72e come
paring of feveral Ideas, whether fimple or of Modes,
“6 gy? Subftances one with the other, and confidering the

Denominations which may arife from fuch Compartfon.

For fince the Order of Nature is fuch that there is a
Dependence of Things one upon another, fo do they
convey to the Mind an Idea of fuch Dependence: and

whatever Notion we have of fuch Dependence of

 

 

The Term Thing or Subftance Idea whatever. For when we
fignifies nothing more than that to exclude a: Properties, we at the
avhich Properties are afcribed ; fame time excuce from or Mind
and is itfelf abfolutely unknown, all Ideas of Subitance, ana have
and incapable of fuggefling any nothing left.

Things

Ils 23, § 3.

Thid.

Il. 25>

III. Disa: 176II. 26.

2
“I

oO

bm)
¢

V. fupray p. 10s
and
L.P. U. XIII:

Things one on the other, or of the Connection or

Repugnance of Ideas one to the other, gives us the
Idea of Relation.

All Words that refer to a certain Standard, either of
Duration or Size, are relative Terms: as old, young,
ftrong, weak, &c.; which relate to the ufual Duration

or Conftitution of each living Creature, as the Standard

to which we compare the Thing mentioned.

But the moft noted Relations are thefe :

iff, of Caufe and Effect ;

adly, Identity and Diverfty ;

galy, Moral Relations ;

athly, the Relations of our Ideas themfelves.

f Cause and EFFect.

it,

That which produces any fimple ** or complex’ Idea
‘© whether of Subftance, of Mode, or of Relation,”
call Cause; and that which is produced we call the

Wwe
EFFECT.

2dly, of Ipentity and Diversity.

Identity cannot well be defined, but by Induétion of Par-~

ticulars, which differ according to ibe Subject Matter to
which the Teri is applied,

And here the Identity of Bodies arifes from the
Samenefs of Parts, which produce the fame fimple

Ideas in the Beholder;

TheThe Identity of Vegetables arifes from the fame Or-
ganization of the Parts, whether exactly confifting of

the fame Matter or not;

Identity of Animals confilts in the fame Organization
of Parts and the fame conftant and continued “ indivi-

dual” Life.

And the Identity of Perfon, Mind, or Spirit, confjfts,
as far as we can apprehend it, iz baving the fame Con-
feioufnefs of Ideas, Powers, and Aétions, “* whether
that Confcioufnefs be univerfal or partial, continued

or renewed.”

gdly, of MORAL RELATIONS;

The Notion of which arifes from comparing our

Aétions to a Rule: and that is threefold :
tft, the Laws of the Country;
ad, the Laws of Opinion or Reputation ;
3d, the Law of GOD: which is twofold:

1. Natural,

2. Revealed.

1. The Law of Nature; which is, the Rule which
Reafon “ immediately” difcovers to us touching the Fitnefs
or Conveniency of any Aéfion.

2. The Law revealed; which is @ more full and ex-

plicit Difcovery of our Duty, on more extenfive Motives,

and authoritative San&ions.
FouRTHLY,iia ee
nT ere ee eben eens eee
RU ee Ne . fs eid 4

  
  

It. 29,——33.  4thly, the ReLaTIons of cur IpEas themfelves :

   
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
   
   
   

and they relate either,
1. Zo the Perception of our own Minds;
2. Lo the Things they are fuppofed to represent ;

3. The cafual “* or affociated” Relations of fuch Ideas

one to another ** obtaining’’ in the Mind.

I. 1. Of Ivzas relating to the Perception of our
own Mind:
And they are faid to be either,
(1) Clear, or
(2) Confufed.

1. A clear Idea is that wherein the Mind perceives a

qT, 2Qe

| Difference from all others.
2. A confufed Idea is fuch as is not fuffciently diftin-

46, guifbable from other Ideas different from it.

II. 2. Of Ipeas relating to Tuincs they are fup-
pofed to reprefent: and they are,

(1) 1. Real, or

35° 9, Fantaftical:

gle DB. fi Adequate,

2. Inadequate.

ek. ree,
Falfe.

LEE AE RED LRN TS SHARON1. Of reat or fantaftical IpeEas.

1, All our fimple Ideas are real: becaufe produced
by the Operation of Things in us.
2. Mixed Modes are all real, being a Combination made

by the Mind; if the Co-exiltence of fuch Ideas be
only toffible.

3. The Ideas of Subjtances are real, if we have ever
found the fimple Ideas ““ of which they confit” come into
our Mind “‘ neceffarily’ fo united © from aliual Expe-
vience and certain Obfervation of any Subftance;” other-

wife they are fantaftical.

2, Of ADEQUATE and inadequate Ipzas,

a Adequate Ideas are fuch as perfectly reprefent thofe

Archetypes or Patterns to which the Mind refers.
b. Inadequate Ideas are a partial or incomplete Repre-

fentation of fuch Patterns,

1. & Adequate univerfaliy.” 1. Al fimole Ideas:

a. “ Adequate abfolutely.” 2. All mixed Modes : be-
caufe they refer to no Archetypes or Patterns; but

only to a certain Combination mace in the Mind:

3. © Inadequate relatively.” But fo far they may
be inadequate as they refer to a fuppofed Combination
made in the Minds of other Perfons fignified under

the fame Name.
4. In-

NF ae

il, 30. 4 24

—— § 4,

Il. 30. § 5

if, QT § Ie13.

§ 6

II. 32 § 4, §

§ ow——— 126

fi. 63, *
T.H. M.

I. prop. 13.
Ee prop. 15,

> §3- pre EBs
pr: 20, 152
5: pre et.
Ge cpr, 20. ef
ae in toto,
and Introd. Esse
Lie

ES

4. Inadequate wniverfally tous. All Ideas of Sub-

frances: becaufe they have reference to Patterns whofe

real Effence we know not.

Of true and falfe IpEAs.
. Ideas are faid to be TRUE that are conformable to
ba Exiftence § |

b. falfe, that have no Conformity to fuch Exiftence
any where found.

And, relatively to others, our Idéas are faid to be
true, when they are conformable to the Ideas fignified
under the fame Name by others:. ** but this is obvioufly
“an hypothetical and precarious Truth: or, in other
Words, an Acquiefcence of Opinion.”

II]. Of casuaL* or associaTEeD RELATIONS of fuca
Ideas one to another “‘ obtaining” in the Mind.

And this is by Cuflom ¢* or Habit.”
1. The putting together of Ideas according to theif

apparent or probable Agreement or Difagreement is,
Reafoning ;

2. The connecting of independent Ideas by Cuftom,
which have no vifible ‘* or perceived juft?? Conne@tion
in themfelves is an infirmity of the Mind that wants a
Name, wulefs it bé called) vAusz AssoctaTIoN oF
babitual Prejupices; as where a Man has an Imagi-
nation of an infallible Man, by Education and Cuftom.

The connecting ‘* of” repugnant Ideas is MapneEss
‘* or Deliratio; unlefs where it is done implicitly in
compliance with received Authority, and then this
Weakoefs, Error, or Pravity of the Mind, which
ever it may be, al/o wants a Name.”

 

* Thereis nothing cafual, inthe that cafual of which we do not

Jenfe of jomething that baste trace the Dejign and Concatenation
without Caufe or Conneétion: of Caufes.

though in popular Idea we call
< Lhe“The Want of Power to ab@ra@

or compound
Ideas is

Iptocy ;”

€ . ; ‘

‘The compounding of them (though not repug-
nantly upon Principles once affumed, yet) Soliercaly
without juft Ground for the Afumption of fuch Prin-
ciples, is, Diforder of Imagination, and in its ex-
treme

Lunacy or FRENzy 3”

<¢ The abftracting and compounding o
defectively, and inconfequently. is
Fo.t.y ;”

“* Aéting withor ut foficient Re afon is
prattical FOLLY ;”

“¢ Affluming right Principles without duly regarding
the Reafons why they ought to be entertained as
fuch is,

PREPOSSESSION ;””

*¢ A Condué contrary to the Perfuafion of a Man’s
Mind, or to his Apprehenfion of what he ought to
do or to avoid, is

Vices”

“© Prepoffefion, Error, Prejudice, and Vice, Or ac-
tical Folly, and even Madnejs in its various offi live
Kinds (when not the Confequence ee bodily Diforders)
refult from” fale Associations of Ipgas, “ which”
by Habit and Cufiom make ‘ gradually” a perpetual
“< however unnatural’ Conneétion in the Mind: {

ee Art
KLiQgFAL.

 
  
 
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
  
  
  
    
 

that they perpetually appear together in the fame
Gang, and as much affect our Reafonings, Opinions,
and Judgements, as if they were naturally united:
“«< eybile by ibeir Origination from our Paffions, and their
“ reflex Agency upon them (to which 1s owing in great mea-
<< fure both the Rife, and the Strength, of the Affociation)
“¢ they often more ftrongly influence our PRACTICE.”

Of tHe Means of COMMUNICATING IDEAS.

“¢ Thus far of the Ortcin and the two great Sources
“Sof Ipzas: mext of the Means peculiar to Man,—of the
** known Species on this Earth,—by which Ideas are commu-
“* nicated and retained, and which are effentially conducive
** to the Exercife, in a requifite Extent, of the Faculties of
“* abftratling, compounding, and comparing thofe Ideas ;°°

&¢ And: this:is”

LANGUAGE:

“A 1. Articulate, unwritten, or phonic;

B 2. Written, femiotic, or graphic.”

4 1. Men were not created to live folitary and inde-
pendently on each other, as feveral Kinds of Brutes do,
‘nor to be confined to their Senfations and the Simple
““ Ideas accompanying them or direétly refulting from
‘* them,” but for mutual Intercourfe and Society, ** and

“* for the full Improvement of the human Faculties,
“ tending to the higheft ultimate Happinefs both of the

‘ Fan Aga 24/9 | Gs LO as °
“‘ Inaevidual and of the Species :” and therefore it was not

enough

BEE NEES TET RG LINER. RE eeenough for Nature to furnifh the Mind with Objedis
from without, which are invifible in the Mind; but it
was alfo necefflary that we fhould be furnifhed with a
ready Method of communicating {uch Ideas.
** To this is neceffary,
“a. The Power of articulate Utterance, or SpEErcu,
“* with a Confcioufnefs of the Ipeas annexed to the
“© particular Sounds fo uttered ;”
2. The Senfe of bearing:
3. For complete and accurate Communication, the Fa-
culty of writing :
Whereby we are capable of receiving feveral Sounds
and connecting them with the Ideas in the Mind; and
farther are, by the Tongue, capable of making fuch
Sounds Sicns of /uch Ipzas; “* and, by writing and
“< the improvements founded on it, of giving them per-
“-manence and progrefive diffufion, with authenticity ;”
fo that Language is nothing elfe but the Connection of fuch
Sounds to Ideas, in order, :
“©, primarily,” 40 make the Ideas of one Man under-
food by another ;
“ And, 2. fecondarily, or incidentally,
«< 79 enable Lim to preferve, multiply, and exalt to ge-
&t neral Principles of SCIENCE, [peculative or practical, the

59

Teas which be cultivates within bis own Breoft.

“Of abfrad Terms.”
Becaufe feveral Objects excite in us the fame Idea,

os 33 ‘
therefore Names are made general ‘* or abjirad?,” to ex-
cite in the Hearer fuch an Idea as is framed in the

i 199
Mind of the Speaker, * and meant to be conveyed
: = Z fs a 4 5 ? oO 5
from whatfoever particular Object fucn Idea was formed

in

2

og

Ill, $.

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   

sealoaaane cami cenetaamamen soa,in the Mind of the Speaker: for in connecting the

n~ ,

ound “S with”? the Idea, the Mind hath no farther

n

4

C

C)

onfideration than of the Idea itfelf as it ftands in
the Mind of the Speaker, by whatfoever Thing from
without it was formed in him: and were it otherwife,
it were impoflible to regifter the Particularity of
Things, and to accommodate Names to them; fince
“hardly” any Man hath-the fame Idea from the fame
particular Object which another has.

Befides, that if Names were as particular as Things,
fuch Signs would become altogether ufelefs: fince the
42

Particularity of Things “ is* infinite, and therefore

would incumber the Mind with infinite Things which
could not be remembered, nor would be of ufe for
Intercourfe or Communication.

B 2. TbeU/e of the Hand and the Faculty of writing
is requifite to the Communication of Ideas by giving Per-

manency to the Signs of them: which advantage is wone
derfully facilitated and enbanced by Printing,

(@pemecnmey goes

{n Lancuace four Things are confiderable
First, the Expreffion of independent Ideas ,
SECONDLY, /he Exoreffion of the Conneétion and Re-
pugnancy of Ideas ;
aan f, ip
Tuirpiy, the lnperfections of Language ;
FourtTuty, the Abu fe of it.

1, Of the Expreffion a independent Ideas: and that
is threefold, “* acre

eably to the Divifion of the Clafles

of Ideas themfelves.’

 

 

 

Harrtis’s LANGUAGE is @ Sytem of articulate Sounds fF

i | 5 fienifican e
Hermes. PACT. Significant by Com
B.lil. C. 3.

 Exoreffion”“< Exprefion” of, 1. Simple Ideas,
2. Mixed Modes,
2. Subfiances.

1. The Names’ of fimple Ideas: which cannot be
defined or explained per notiora; fince Definition 1s
refolving the Thing to be defined into its moft fimple Ideas.

But complex Ideas may be defined: becaufe they

may be refolved into their fmple Ideas.

And fimple Modes may be defined: being the Man-
ner in which thefe /imple Ideas are combined; and
therefore the Mind may “ limit and afcertain” fuch

precife Combination:
2. The Names of mixed Modes.

And they being arbitrarily made in the Mind for
the Ends of Civil Life, and Names added to them
for the Difpatch of Converfation, we may define the
particular Combination of which they confit ; and

being made without any Relation to Archetypes with-

out, it is the Name that holds together the Com-

bination.

3. The Names of Subjiances.

And here the Name ftands for the precife Collection
of fimple Ideas in the Mind of the Speaker: which is
the nominal Effence, though it has Relation to iome-
out, capable of raifing that precife Collection

thing with
nd, which are the Patterns or Ar-

of Ideas in the Mi
chetypes of fuch nominal E.ffencee

Bat

 
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
    

iit. 6.

I, 4, § 4

Ibid. § 12, 3.

Tit: 5° § 3.qt. 8, § 2.

V. Hermes,
Bout. C. 2,
and the Nute
p- 259, 60.

V. the Letter to
Mr. DuNNING
and the
FIIEA TITE-
POENTA.

sut the real Effence, which is the internal “ pri-
mary” Conftitution of Parts on which fuch Properties
depend, is perfectly unknown, and therefore not ex-
preffed in the Name.

Il. The Exprefion of the Conneétion and Repugnancy
of Ideas: and this is three ways:

fi. By inventing Words of Affirmation and Negation,
to be figns of the Expreffion of fuch Conneétion and
Repugnancy.

2dly, By the Invention of abftraG and concrete Terms.

The abfrad Term or Subftantive is the Sign of an
Idea independent of any other.

The concrete Term or Adjeéfive is the Expreffion of
the Idea with the Relation of its Co-exiftence with
others: ‘* as EvipEenceE is the Abfirad : ~inadmifib!
weak, competent, and conclufive, is the concrete,
reference to particular Evidence adduced.

Cs

with

3dly. By the Invention of Particles :* which are fions

that connect the Train of Ideas one to anothers; that

 

ete ee

* To thefe the Greek Language Dependence; the LuvaPeva of Dif
is much indebted for its elegant courfe. Their Ufe
Precifion and Harmony of Com- lently fhewn
pojition. Not that Harmony whch Harris: to devellope their et yao
engages the Bar (though in this logical Origin was referved for
Superior to wll other Languages); one of the mo? acute ¢ p

of the phi-

iz

6y CLARKE and

but that which is perceived Ly the lofopbical Critics of our’ prefent
OUnderjianding, from a juft Con- Day,
tinuty and beautifuly coniiructed

they

¢

i cial Nt ee ue ete an athey may be received into the Mind of the Hearer in
the fame Order ‘‘ and with the fame Limitations” in
which they {tand in the Mind of the Speaker.

  
 
  
 

Ill. Of the Imperfettion of Language. III. 9,

And here:

iff. Of fimple Ideas :

“¢ In thefe” the Connection is made between the Name
and the Idea, by fhewing the Odjed which exhibits it:
and therefore here we are not very liable to miftake;
fince thefe Ideas are regularly produced from Things
without; and the fame Ideas are formed in all Men
having the fame Organs: and there is no Difference
between the Archetypes and the Idea; the Object
without regularly creating that Idea in the ** Mind”

to which the Name is annexed,

2dly. The Names of mixed Modes.
Thefe are often fubject to Perplexity and Con-

fufion : .
1. ** Becaufe’”’ there is ‘ often” great Variety in

the Combination; fo that the /zmple Ideas of which
the Name confifts cannot be remembered ;

2. Becaufe we cannot go to the Archetypes to cor-
rect Miftakes about them.

gdly. The Names of Subftances.

<¢ And thefe” are liable: to great Imperfections :
becaufe we know not the real Conftitution of Things:
and therefore cannot underitand what precife Combi-
nation of /imple Ideas is co-exiftent; which have all
the fame Right to be made a Part of the xominal
Effence.

AV. The

\bid, § 6, Je

Ibid. § 13, 40TLE. 104

— ibid, § Se

dil. 12.

Ibid, § 12.

Ibid. § 8

qT S21 SITs

IV. The Abufe. of Words.

Ibid. §2,3,4. Uf. Byufing Words without Ideas:

. 7. qJi2 ’ T aes V A d, ;
2dly. By varying the Combinations of Ideas, and keep-

~

RM,

ng the fame Name.

34. ** By ufing diferent Names for the fame Combi-
nation.”

4ibly. By referring Words to an affumed”’ Reality of
Things, and not to our own Ideas; which is, putting
together fuch Ideas in our Minds as united in Things
without us as have not come in ** with any Evidence of
their being actually”? co-exiftent,

siby. Affected Obfcurity,

** REMEDY.”
The Remedy of thefe Abufes, is—

1. By defining the precife Combination of Ideas to
which the Name is annexed :

2. By ufing the Words invariably for the [ame Combina-
tion of Ideas:

** 3+ By ufing no more than one Word (in ftrifi Reafoning
“* on philofopbical Subjetis, or any in which complete Pre-
“* cifton is required) for one Combination of Ideas.”

“4. By neither inventing nor continuing Names which
S* reprefent the Figments of Imagination as real Exiftences.”?

“g. The fifth zs in the Power of whatever Writer bas
Pruths of /uffic:ent Importance to convey to excmpt bim

GG ”

“* from tbe Temptation of magnifying Appearances ; for the

“* Want of Realities, which will bear to be reprejenied as

‘* they arein Nature: be will they ufeWoras in their known,

J MAIR KRY AA is sae avis s . ee is
< ana common Meaning, where that is Sufficiently exaét.”

“ OF

  

i ee ne Sepa“ Of the Comparison of Ipzas,” IV. 1.20.

Having thus confidered our Ideas, which are the
Materials of our Knowledge, and our Language,
aD z “ :
which is the Manner of conveying them, the laft

Thing is to confider,

Flow our Ideas are put together and compared one with

another :

And herein,

 

I. Of KnowLepcE,. and Opinion ; 1V. r= 14.

II. Of Reason, and Error; Ibid. re-——7.
ZOe«

II. Of Fartu, and Enthufiafm. Ibid. 18.

I. Of KNOWLEDGE,

7

Knowledge is the comparing of two or more Ideas, ana
viewing their Connection or Agreement, Kepugnancy or

and it is twofold:

 

Difagreement:

o
1. Lntuitive, LV. 2.) Gh
aD. a - 1 .
2. Demonftrative. Ibid. § 2.

nic raa KWOUIER POT bak ar Rice
1, Intuitive Knowledge is where the Agreement or 1¢

270)

pugnancy of several Ideas appears upon View.

2. Demonftrative Knowledge is where ibe Agreement or
Repugnancy of Ideas doth not appear upon View; but by
d

2 « ° } : ct <7 b
Comparifon with fome intermediate Ilea: thus, we de

Ve riand! a
monftrate that all the Angles of a Triangie are equal to

s ? pe ay
rianele between Parallels,

two right, by fetting the TriangIV. 14. § 3.

Thid. 4.

IV.r §5.

Ibid, § 6.

and comparing the Angles at the upper Point of In-
terfection with the Angles of the Triangle and two
Right Angles.

“Crasses of Agreement or Difagreement in Ine as.”

The Agreement or Difagreement of our Ideas is of

four Sorts :

it, of Identity, or Diverfity ;
2dly, Relation ;

adly, Co-exiftence ;

4thly, Real Exiftence,

ult, Identity or Diverfity is known by Intuition: as

we know by View that one Colour or Magnitude is not

another.

adly, the Ideas of Relation are known from
or Demonjiration : as in

*© Review™
the inftance before mentioned.

3dly, Co-exiftence or Non-exifience is feldom known

from the general Comparifon of our Ideas - for fince we
do not know the general Subftances of Things,

we do
not know what Ideas “of them’?

ar€ compatible with

and therefore here we have no Knowledge
2
from the general Con

each other:

deration of our Ideas ;

but
from Trial, Obfervation, and Ewperience only,

 

Ne ee ew tee ee ee iia4tbly, Real Exiftence :

And here we have Knowledge,

1. of ourfelves;—by Intuition, ** or immediate Per-
ception.

2. of the Being of a Gov ;—by Demonftration:

As thus:

The Abfence of Being cannot produce Being ; *

ergo, fomething eternal.

Abfence of Thought cannot produce Thought:
we think; ergo there is Thought without Beginning:

eternal Thought we call, Gop.

We begin to think: ergo, not from Matter, where
there is no Thought; ergo, the Mind created by
eternal Thought.

And whatever could produce a Being to fee and
feel muft be prefumed, as a lefs Effect of his Power,
to produce the Things felt and vifible.

3aly, of the Being of all other Things ;—by Senfation.
Having thus confidered the Odjec?s of our Know-
ledge, the next Things to be confidered are,
Firft, the Extent ;
Secondly, ibe Reality; and,

Thirdly, the Univerfality of our Knowledve.

 

lV. Faz

Ibid. § 3 4

Ibid. § 5.

V. Harries.
and Remarks,
Jess, I ages

IV. 3.
Ibid. 4e

* fQ , “1p lex oA rper f erent. ft
& From this firj? Propofition Dr. Prieftley deduces the Proof of a@ Letters to a
~ a j a ; Fes a nr Pp ab 13/7 E TIL Fy INBE
FIRST-CAUSE, the fupreme aefigning Liesl cence avbich MbiujE PAVE Putt. UNBEL.

ae tae
iven rife to the Univer fe.

&>

2

   

1... fit?

 

EE De 35

43.Extent of our KNOWLEDGE: and

iff, No farther than we have Ideas:

2dly, No farther than we can find their Agreement or

Difagreement, by comparing them with intermediate Ideas.

Secondly: The Reatity of our KNowLeDGE:

“1. Of fimple Modes,”

though our Knowledge be only of Ideas, yet

Cys

Ca

Nn

be

PS

“

thofe Ideas having Relation to Objects without us, it
is in fome Meafure real: for all /imple Modes being the
Product of the Operation of Things themfelves upon

our own Minds, all our Knowledge about them mutt

oR

e real Kuno: wledg re,

Of mixed Modes.”

2. Mixed Medes are intended to have Relation to
Ideas in our own Mind: and therefore our Knowledge
aoe them’ has no other Reality but upon the

Suppofition of the Exiftence of fuch Modes “ora
real and natural Ground for fuch Combinations”. con-
formable to our Ideas.

4 39

3. Of Subftances.

Of Subfiances our Knowledge “ is” fo far real as
we ce together Ideas co-exiftent in the fame Place,
and that have come into our Minds thus united; but
as far as we refer them to the reg/ internal Canftitution
of Things, fo far our Ideas of Subftances are not real,

becaufe their Conftitutions are unknow

       

£0 Us.

SS A SY See OES pee

** DeErFi-* DeErFiniTions of Trutu, abfolute and relative.”

1. Jn the Mind.

Trutsa therefore in the Mind is the inward Perceptia
of the Agreement or Difagreement of our Ideas; together
with a like Perception of the pafi, prefent, or future
Lxifeence of Things themfelves, fo conjoined or feparated

in Nature.

In this Definition of Truth is comprehended a two-
fold Certainty.

“?? 4 Certainty of Knowledge: which isthe Percep-
tion of the Agreement or Difagreement of our own
ideas :

“oh? 4 Certainty of Exiftence: which is the Perception
of the Things themfelves exifting, conjoined or fe-
parate, as we have put them together.

2. In Words.

Truth in Words is the conjoining the Signs of the

Ideas together as the Ideas themfelves lie in the Mind

of the Speaker.
3. In Ideas.
2. * Truth of Ideas isthe Conformity they bear to rea:

Exiftence.””

1 to

f C ar We TP) oe te
Thirdly, Of the UNIVERSALITY o our KNOWLEDGE.

Ny ] Er {v "yr
In fimple Ideas, where the real and nominal Effence
}

46

' Tf 7. Y . es ak : j th as
© ! 4 WA Pf e ¢ CH PY 7 { ” 104 u #4 ee
is the fame, there all our Knowledge is general ak

ue thal Thee oe
ver fal; becaufe there 1S 7 40 sll ALTA bie Tt Ldeas J VO:

med,

cvbatfoever Objects they ar

 

AVs Be

Ibid, $8, rE.* Roh any

   

2. Jn mixed Modes our Knowledge is general and uni-
verfai: for thefe being Combinations made by the Mind,
not with Relaticn to an affual, but only a poffible Exiftence,
all our Knowledge concerning them is univerfal , fince the

fame Agreement or Difagreement muf? happen wherever
they are found,

 
  
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
  
   
   
    
 
   
  

IV.6.§5—— 3. Of Subftances our Knowledge, as far as relates
: to their Effence, is all particular 5 fince it goes no farther
than our Trial and Cbfervation * concerning” the Bodies
before us: “* for? not knowing the. real and internal Con-

fittuiton of Things, we cannot rank them, « otberwife
than bypoibetically,” into any general Sorts or Claffes, and

therefore we are not capable of any unwverfal Knowledge
°* with refpect to” them,

For to make univerfal Propofitions it is neceflary we
should know the abfolute Bounds of each particular
Phing which we comprehend under that general Name:
and that we cannot know without looking into the in-
ternal Confitution of Things; which in this State and
Condition we cannot do,

But concerning” the nominal Effence of Subftances
€ may make univerfal Propofitions: but thefe are
Oniy identical and trifling,

and fignify no more than

ideas we comprehend under that Name:

>
Cf
Ss

hen we favGold is yellow, fufible, fixed, &c. that

1o1€ 18 equal to all its parts taken together; that

whatfoever is, j

}
?

; and that it js impoMible for the
fame Thing to be and not to be.

Cf

  

te atin ei ae eS VS kw ett, ue aes ceThefe three laft, however they have got the Repu-,
tation of Maxims, are nothing but identical Propo-
fitions including what we comprehend under the Name
of Whole or Being, as the other comprehends what
we include under the Name or Term of Gold: by
confequence fuch Maxims are of little Ufe for the In-
vention of Knowledge; but may ferve “ to filence”
fuch as wrangle or ‘* wantonly” oppofe “known and
manifeft Truths.”

** Thofe Propofitions, however, of this Kind which

€

n

relate to Subjtances, have a nearer Affinity to real

“* Knowledge: as they reprefent, when rightly framed,

the Refule of Experience, in fo far as the actual

6

é

a

Trial hath extended, and enable us from fome one

€¢

known Property to infer others; though as we ad-

** vance in experimental Knowledge the Univerfality of

€

wn

certain fuppofed Properties gradually diminifhes, and

** our Definition becomes more |imited.”’

“© Thus, from a Multitude of Trials with various
“© Menfiruums, Andiffolubility might have been a fup-
*“ pofed univerfal Property of Gold, till on farther

6

wv

Trial an Exception appeared of gua Regia: and

€

an

after, fome other Exceptions.”

“© A certain /pecific Gravity feems to have a yet nearer
«¢ Approximation to the unknown Effence of Gold:

g

a

yet in this Platina furprifingly approximates to it:
while by its Want, or extreme Difficulty, of Fuf-
bility, it is found difinéively differenced from that
Metal.”

“

6

&

nob Of Opinion, as oppofea to KNOWLEDGE. '

IV. 15. § 3- Opinion is the Perception of the probable Agreement or

Difagreement of our Ideas.

Of Probability.

Ibid. § 1. Probability is where the Conneétion or Agreement, or
Repugnancy or Difagreement, is not found from the In-

Lore Bf Oo 3 J
tuition or View of the Ideas themfelves, or from the

niuilion PC a, Idea with which they are it

or Ee gnancy ; but fuch Ye or Seen is
found by Obfervation and Experience only; which could

hy

not be Ape from any View or Fuxta-poftiton of the Ideas
themfelves in our own Minds: “* and is therefore firong or

WEAK cabal to the Number and Confonancy of In-

Thus we know that our Meat nourifhes: not from

any general Ideas of the internal Conftitution of Meat

vy ] ie hs 4 ‘ain _f } f f
GAUGE 0} ive LLGLG GL 5 out bec au fe we have ound it true
Cc 7
from Experience
Tait nere Vee eninie canGta 1a
UE TCG We iluLt CUlMIGCEr=——

3
1. Tbe feveral Criteria or Marks of Probability arif-

ano S© ganeneAraAtelw 7 79}
ing ““immedtately” from our own Experience ;

1. The feveral Criteria or Marks of Probability

rift fi i
arifing from our own Experience.

1. Wheni. When fuch Experience is general “or” univerfal,
ve no more doubt of fuch Truths than of toofe that
appear from the Intuition of the Ideas themfelves: be-
caufe fuch Experience furnifhes the Mind with a con-
ftant Perception of the Agreement or Difagreement

of fuch Ideas as if it had rifen from the Intuition of
fuch Ideas themfelves.

2. If fuch Experience hath failed in fingle Inftances,
then the Agreement or Difagreement of fuch Ideas is
judged from the Number of the Inftances, one Way
“Sand the other, that have fallen under our Expe-
rience: for then we efteem fuch Ideas to agree or dif-
agree onewith the other as we have generally found to
do fo; but every Inffance to the contrary is the Caufe of
fome Doubt in the Mind.

Fience it is, that what may feem probable to one
Man, or in fome Places, appears ¢mprobable in others ;
according to the Difference of their Odfervation and
Lixperience: as that Water fhould be hard enough in
Winter to bear Carts and Horfes may feem probable
in England and Holland, but would not feem probable
under the Line where they were never ufed to fuch Qb-

fervations.

All our Knowledge touching Sub/fances goes no far-
ther than Probability: becaufe we have no Ideas of
the iternal Conftitution of fach Subftances ‘ fo as to

enable us” to compare ‘* them”’ with each other :

And therefore our Reafoning * concerning” the
Co-exiftence or Non-co-exiftence of fuch Ideas is founded,

1. Upon the Trial and Experience of fuch their Co-
exiftence ; :

  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
    

Ibid. § 5.eR Ey eo ee Se ay at ae EN os Re eS te,

   
   
   
   
   
    
   
  
   
   
  
   
  
 
  
    

2. Upon Analozy: whereby upon the Obfervation of
the Co-exifience of like Ideas we judge, that where fuch
like Ideas are found there will follow ibe. fame ‘* confe-
quences” which at other times we bave “* experienc

TV.16 $9 I. The feveral Crirerta or Marks of Probability
arifing from the Expericnce of others.

A. Of Verifimilitude as applied to common Life.

Bere 2: 1. As we judge by our own “ immediate” Experience,
TIntrod.Ch, 1,2. °

B,H. P, fo alfo we judge by the Sight, Obfervation, and Ex-

 

$0 Ch. 2.34. perience of others: and this is called Testimony.
pe 281 3026

le
ak

And in this eigo¢ Things are confiiderab

1. The Number

9. The Iniegrity

. Lhe Skill

“6 The” true Defign and Intent
“¢ The” Confiftency

Contrary Teftimonies

Am B bw

<< Verifimilitude or Congruity”’

oN]
®
oe en LAAT SNE A, oS aa acetic aD
S
SS
&
4
Sa
as
TA
“
3
SS
ce
Coy

. Information

“The bree firft explain themfelves ; the fourth re-
“* Jates to the true Interpretation of the. meaning of the
« Evidence given: the jifth is twofold

Ey € 4 / Ha f ; ) :
The “ Confylency” of Witneffes with themfelves” in

ru &

ibe parts and circumftances of their Relation ;

“2. The Confiftency of Witneffes on the fame fide, eack
with the other.”

The fixth explains it/elf :

The /eventh is twofold:

“4: Fidn-

The Foundation of our Faith in that it may Le de pended upon: it

r
Teftimony, philofophically confi- having been Duka that there is
dered, arifes from our experience gener ally a corre/pondence between

what
Ho@ar ee me tee es pet ee Te ae Ree gh
III ALANIS A DEN TE TN CS hi ane Bn aioe eet a ees sei Se etn r
H j ry , 4 Peat

gt” a)Sen;

12 C
object of

Wicnefles,

1. fiauctal, or relative, from the Chara&er of
the WV itneffes.”
RA 7 Lan Lb 5 r ] yi
‘© 2, Material, or abfolute, from the Thing ~itfelf
fn 0 ef as iF - : y :
fet: ed, as conionant to our Experience.
a Se be i Q e .
Uhe etgbté hath relpect to the means of Information
pofleffed by the Witneffes :
A d } ie 2 {" 1 ; £ 1 e :
And this alfo 1s twofold: either,
¥ C591 hy) ° ‘ e } : :
A oUmnpie 3 by perther of I, Direét,
boi) Boda i which
iWoumilerlia : Sepals:
«a 2 é cumpbantiareda ° § may be oO. Traditional:
Of fimple direc? Evidence.
Simple dire€&t Evidence to points which are- the

fe depends merely on the Integrity of the

Of circumftantiated.

pe
it

but in its inferior degrees
cious, or pofitively unwor

r . .
iV igeRce 18 0%

depends on facts not within t

f various force: in

1 ar

heir power to falfify:
it may be very weak, fulpi-

thy of Credit.

Of traditional Evidence.

se With refpect to Zra

dit

onal

eA

Evidence, unlefs in

« +hofe inftances where it is fupported by the clear

“© Dependence of fubfequent
‘and moft liable to

6S efeé& of? the Diftance o

Alloy
f

i
Events, it is the weakett

view

 

avhat is afferted by men, and the
things or events which their af-
fertions refpe. Thus if one per-
fon tells me that another faid or
did fo or fo, and I jind. by any
other evidence (for infrance, that
of my own fenfes) that he aGiually
did fay or do what I was informed
of, I am fatisfied that the affertion

fs & om
T heard was true. If I fiad by

4

repeated experience that the Jame
person never does aeceive me, I
conclude that there muft be a fuf-
ficient caufe for this conftant ap-
pearance, and that in the /ame
circumfiances the Jame effe may be
depended upon. In common lan-
guage I fay, that my informer is a
man of veracity, aud that he
will not deceive me. Inthe fame

MANHED 5

IV, 16, § IO,heey HU, TV,
16, § IO,

X

  

view of the Thing which they atte: “that the Proof”

is * proportidnably” weakened as they themfelves take

; ° ee i e a
it from others, and the Thing related doth not fall
under their own View or Experience.

B Of Verifimilitude

as applied to Revelation.

Thefe are the Criteria of Probability touching Facts
depending on mere human Agents. For Verifimilitude
or Congruity with Experience muft be underftood with
relation to the fuppofed Agent and End.

And therefore in Things depending “upon the
Power of GOD the feventh Criterion of Probability in
its fecond Ground. of Confonancy fo common Expe-
rience” 1s not to be taken into “the Account in” our weigh=
img and confidering fuch Faéfs: becaufe our Obferva~

 

 

 

tion

 

 

 

 

manner, if, notwithfianding a
numoer OF im pofitions, I find that
among Mankind at large a regard
to Truth great.y prevails over
Jalfebood, Lf conc.uae that there iS,
rm general, Si ft ent cround for
Faith in Teitimony. Sxamining
this intere fling appearance more
clofely, I fiad in what € afes 'Tetti-
mony zs moft apt to be fallacious ;
as thefe in which men have not
had fufficient opportunity of being
well informed themfelves, or thofe
in which they have an intere/? in
deceiving others: and Separating
thefe from other Cajes of buman
Teftumony, L find a fill Pronger
ground of Afient ix rhe remaining
Ca/fes.* Le may add to these fources
of Credit in Teftimony shat rhe
CONSTITUTION and Circumffances
of Human Narure are, on the
avhole, Sach as, without particular
sverpowering bias, firongly 7acline
to VRuTug on that fide are the
Affociations of Courage, Wifdom,
Magnanimity, Honour, Security ;
on the other, of Cowardice, Cratt,
Meannefs, Shame, Danger. He

therefore who gives fale Tefti-
mony mufP (even independent of
municipal Jandions) ag contrary
to uiany trong ana general Motives
of Condu. And the Confidera-
tion Of bis certainly much ex-
hances the Credibility of Attefta.
tion,

l| 42 may not be amifs to take no-
tice of a Rule obferved
LAW of ENGLAND s which zs,
that thouch the attetted Copy ofa
Record Ze @ good Proof, yet the
Copy of 3 Copy never fe awel)
altefied, and Ly never fo many UW 1t-
niffes, wzil not be admitted as a
Proof in Fudicature. his is fa
generally approved as reafonable,
and fuited to the wifdom and cau-
tion to be ufed in our enquiry after
material truths, that J never yes
heard of any one that blamed a,
This Pra&ice, tf it be allowable
in the decifion of right and WTORL
carries this ebfervation along with
st: that any T'eftimony,the farther
off it is from the original Truth,
the lefs force and proof it has,
The being and exipence of the

L bing

in thetion and Expertence extends no farther than the ordi-
nary Courle of Nature: and not to ‘* fuch Things
as” Almighty GOD can do in an exiraordinary Manner
for the Confirmation of Deétrines of great Impor-
tance, and which he hath thought fit to reveal: but
in its fiz/# Ground it is, on the Credidility of the Wit-
nefles: and in that part of the fecond which relates to
the Nature of the Thing, the fixft, fecond, third, and
eighth Criteria are at the fame time to be regarded,
and the Abjence of the fixth: together with the Di-
{tinétion of traditional Evidence verified by a State of
Things not otherwife explicable but as refulting from
the reality of the Facts attefted.

II a Of Reason.

“© Reafon” is that Faculty of the Mind whereby we dif-
cover the Conneétion or Repugnancy of cur Ideas in them-
felves, or their probable Conneétion or Repugnance one to
the other: ‘* by finding, arranging, and comparing the in-
‘© sermediate Ideas , and thence drawing the juft Inference.”

th b OF Baro:

“ Error? arifes from the cafual Affoctation of Ideas
by “© Paffion,” Habit, or Cuftom, “* whether contraéed
in the fubfequent Periods of Life or imbibed” by Educa-
tion in our Minority: ‘‘ whence we are led to conjoin
or feparate Ideas” otherwife than fuch Ideas are con-

“Joined

 

T hing itfelf is what T call the and the more hands the Tradition
original Truth. A credible Man has fucceffively paffed through, the

weuching his knowledge of it 1s a lefs Strength and Evidence does, oa

good proof: but if another equally receive from them. ‘* Nggp
credible do witne/s it from his Re- bility can rife higher gfe
port, it is weaker; anda third origin.” What has gp we
that attefts the hearfay of an hear- dence than the fing Mil

  
 
 

fay is yet le/s confilerable: Jo that one only Witness mug,
in traditional Truths each remove by his only Teftiniegy
weakens the force of the proof; good, bad, or indMegs

bos ony of

| Bane or fame
;

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
    
      
            
     

AE

Ybid. § 2, 3.

EL, to PF.
P.U. L.A

4 $+

IV. 2¢.7¢@ + : a
Thid. § 37. 9?

  
 
   
   
  
    

 

by Nature, “* or, are induced
dly on the igi of others, with-
ini ying that we’? perceive the Con-
lection at fuch Ideas ** as are ne oe to a Know-
Jedge of the Subject,” or “ fo much as” the probable
Sethe of them: and yet conjoin or feparate them

ing to fach Authorit ity, where there is no Con-
lection or cee iance in the Ideas themfelves ; form-

ing P ropofitions in T hings of which we have no Ideas

Purer’s Dis. . DY Sh hah n of them with the Ideas we have; con-

as oS £
a oo cluding without intermediate Proofs, or without fuf-
P- 49s 9. ficient Confideration of them :
[Mea OF Pair.
= . © rm 7° e E es ee 2
iv. 18. Faith is the Belief of any Truth comin Jrom GOD,

the Author of ** revealed? Truth
find this ts either,

t. By original 7 ae
Sika the od > Revelation.
2. Lreadttiona’ 5

1. Of original Revelation.

Original Revelation is the immediate Delivar éry of Truth
Jrom Almighty GOD into the Minds of Men:

Which is done a a manner to us inconceivable:
for how GOD Alm vghty may deliver himfelf in ways

different from ‘the nataee Conveyance of Knowe

ledge is not by us to be underftood.

 

though cited afterwards by bun- Evidence to a number of inde
areds of others, one after another, pendent particulars, conftity ting
is fo far from receivi mg any together the Proof of one £. vent,
fr ength thereby 7

» that it is only fee a curious and valuable e Paper
ihe ea

inthe PHILO tS
* Lowthorp, Of this, and of the A ws TRANS ACT ILO NS. *
ea * Abr, TL, ie Aa ag > ay +. Wes } "
e He OF concurrent Leftimon and of

  

Dice

A

SG rater) satat oa i AER en eT a i2. Of traditional Revelation.

Zraditional Revelation is the Belief of a Truth coming
from GOD, without immediate Revelation to curfelves,
upon the Teitimony of hacis which muft of neceffity pro-
ceed from the Power of GOD.

1. Suck Things revealed cannot be contrary to ea
becaufe it were abfurd to fuppofe that dimighty

S
Os
oS

fhould dictate one Thing in the ordinary Sout a
Nature, and another by fuch extraordinary Revelation.

Nor could fuch a Revelation be believed: fince the
Truth of its ** proceeding” from GOD could not be
more evident than the ConneCtion or Repugnance of
the Ideas themfelves in their own Nature.

But, 2. fuch Revelation is of Things above Reafon
that is, of fuch Things of which Reafon is Mokihes
filent, ‘* or does not make fuch Difcovery as may be
“* clear, certain, and univerfal, according to the ordi-

*‘ nary Talents and Opportunities of Mankind.”

For fuch Revelation were to no purpofe, if it 1¥. 18: § 4's.
taught nothing farther than what wee be ‘* gene-
rally” found by the “ common” ufe_of our natural
Faculties, though it may enforce, “confirm, or afcer-
tain” fuch Things as are “recognized” to be Truths
by our natural Faculties, from Confiderations which
could never be ‘* traced” by them. And as far as ie
doth fo, it is above and beyond what Reafon teaches.

Il b Of Eathufiafin.

Enthufiafm is an opinion that our Fancies and Imagina+ *¥- 19
tions are Revelations from GOD.

1. If fuch perfons cannot, by extraordinary
fe&ts coming from GOD, give credit to fuch pre-
tended Revelations, all Men are left at liberty whe-
ther they will believe them or not.

2. If fuch Revelation be er to Reafon, or
contrary to former Revelations, attefted by Facts

coming
POMineg
3 : )le ee ee ae leila a ee miler  ctit|

   

coming from GOD, fuch Revelation cannot be from
GOD: becaufe GOD cannot be the Author of Con-
tradictions.

3. If fuch pretended Revelation contain nothing
more than what Reafon teaches, or what has been
already taught by a former Revelation attefted by the
divine Power, then fuch Revelation cannot be from
GOD: unlefs it be attefted by Facts flowing from the
fame Power, “if the influence of a former Revela-
““ tion require to be extended and revived, or unlefs
“it add clearnefs, certainty, and facility of univerfal
“Reception, to former inferences of Reafon :” fince

we cannot fuppofe that to be done by GOD in a
worfe and lefs evident manner, “ or fuperfluoufly,”

which has been done in a better and more apparent
manner, “ or as effectually,” already.

ve

ly re-editing this ABST R Ae ics rOss, in Three Po

Additions and Alterations are di- To LAW the l
fiinguifbed, as in the LAW OF the Art of reasoning, and of com-
EVIDENCE itfelf, by inverted municating eur Ideas, is of more
Commas. Notes are fubjoined, and taportance than perhaps to any
References inferted. The Refe- other prafical Study. And parti-
wences are not to Volumes and tularly in the weighing of Ey.
Pages, but to Books, Chapters, GENCE and the Lnvefigation of
and Seétions, as being more fuit- the Principles of Proof. The ad-
ablt Go the fJubje@, and Serving, mirable Essay on THE Human
at the fame time, for every god UNDERSTANDING js only @ more -
Edition of the Essay. The Ed:- pure, philofophic, and tranfcendant
tion ufed on this oceafion was the hoore. 0, 2.

very elecant one of Eninsurcu,

lumes, 12mo.

Ve of LOGIC,. ‘az

TE EEE are epee

Abbreviated REFERENCES,

BOT WE dons’. Effay on Human Underftanding,
oe Ee Or ale ne

EY'S Theory of the Human
Mind: edited b

y Prresriey,
L.P.U. Lerrers fog Poilofophical Unbeliever,esas ae

Ne ees

——

Tae dens cian ee a

Senn etceaimaenn ere Ankg- oceairaes nee

eye ners nen pom ‘
. ee eee
2 Ceara Seen eo oan re
, eee
aay ed

ee

= een ae

EJ ee ee

jaa ARES ccc =,

PLEASE RETURN TO
\. = ALDERMAN LIBRARY

<

oe Ree. DUE _ DUE

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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