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Battle of Monmouth

BY THE LATE

WILLIAM SYSTRYKER
ADJ UTANT-GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY
PRESIDENT OF THE NEW JERSEY SOCIETY OF THE CINCINNATI

PRESIDENT OF THE NEW JERSEY HISTORICAL SOCIETY, ETC.

Edi ted by
WILLIAM STARR MYERS, Pu.D.,

PROFESSOR OF POLITICS, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

 

PRINCETON
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

 

~~

19NCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

    
  
   

COPYRIGHT, 1927, BY PRI

PRINTED AT THE PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

PRINCETON NEW JERSEY, U.S.A.WITH THE GRACIOUS PERMISSION OF
MRS. STRYKER

rHIS BOOK IS DEDICATED TO

The Offi ers and —Alembers of the

Monmouth County Historical ~Assoctation

WHOSE EFFORTS ARE SUCCESSFULLY
DIRECTED TOWARD THE PRESERVATION
OF THE MEMORIES OF THE GREAT EVENTS

MADE THEIR COUNTY FAMOUSAUTHOR'S PREFACE

HE kind reception accorded to my work on “The

Battles of Trenton and Princeton” has induced me
to follow it with a history of that other great battle of the
Revolutionary War on New Jersey soil. Under the direc-
tion of the late Professor George H. Cook, State Geologist
of New Jersey, in the year 1885, a special survey of five
square miles of the battle-field of Monmouth was made
for me and this survey was afterward used in the series of
fine geological maps of our State issued by this distin-
guished scientist. I then had a most accurate relief map
made from this survey and with this map I began a study
of the varied features of the fight. The topography of this
tract of land has altered very little since Revolutionary
times, and the high ground, the water courses, the ra-
vines and marshes are virtually the same as they were a
century ago. Taking up, in the first place, the “General
Court-Martial of Major-General Charles Lee,’ all the
movements of Lee, of Dickinson, of Lafayette and of
Washington were carefully determined and marked on the
topographical map, in the light of all the sworn testimony
of officers who took part in the battle. Continuing this
plan, every contemporaneous document and diary and all
the traditions current in the neighborhood were examined,
the marching of the different detachments of troops traced
on the map and the accuracy of each statement verified
by the facts furnished in the trial of General Lee. Repre-
sentina the State as one of the members of the Monmouth
Monument Commission, in the erection of the beautiful
memorial shaft at Freehold, I became almost as interested
in the Battle of Monmouth as in the fight on the streets
of Trenton. With some confidence, therefore, I send forth
this companion volume for the perusal of all lovers of
history.

WeS.s:
TRENTON, NEW JERSEY

JUNE 28, 1899INTRODUCTORY NOTE

 

ORE than twenty-seven years ago the late Gen-

eral William Scudder Stryker prepared a full and
exhaustive account of the Battle of Monmouth Court
House, but his untimely death, a short time after its com-
pletion, prevented its publication. Mrs. Stryker, with
great generosity, has recently placed this manuscript in
my hands for publication by the Princeton University
Press, leaving ite method of preparation entirely to my
discretion, with the one reservation that General Stryker
should get the credit he so richly deserved for the exten-
sive research and painstaking work he successfully ac-
complished. In substantiation of this, the following pages
speak for themselves.

Other conditions of publication have mz ide necessary
the partial abridgement of the narrative and also the
omission of some hundreds of pages of documents most of
which are now easily accessible in the various libraries
throughout the country. I have made the endeavor to in-
clude everything of especial value and also, in making
minor corrections, to preserve the original form and style
of presentation as far as possible. A choice has been made
among the large number of illustrations of persons and
places which General Stryker had intended should be in-
cluded in the book.

In bringing the narrative up to date and adding ce rtain
matters of contemporary interest, I have been greatly
assisted by Mr. Samuel Craig Cowart, of Fre -eholc i New
Jersey, himself an enthusiastic student of the history of
the battle, who kindly spent several hours with me in
examining the battle-fiel j on a recent August day which
most appropriately, was intensely hot and sultry.

WixiiAM Srarr Myers
PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY
auGusT 18, 1926CHAPTEK I

S a prelude to the history of a great battle in the war

for the independence of America fought on the soil
of old Monmouth County, it is necessary to note some of
the events which immediately preceded it and to give
some outline sketches of life in the hostile armies during
the one hundred days prior to that memorable hot Sunday
in June. The great feature of camp life in the American
Army in 1777 and 1778, the first thought which comes to
the mind when the name of Valley Forge is spoken, is the
wonderfully patient endurance of keen physical suffering
by the soldiers of the young republic in those huts on the
bleak hillside of the Schuylkill River. At the same period
Philadelphia must forever be associated with a winter of
the gayest revelry, of wild dissipation of every kind, of
flagrant vice, of a demoralization of discipline in the Brit-
ish Army caused by the idle and dissolute character of
their commanding general. The toils, the trials, the bitter
hardships and exposure in the cold and cheerless encamp-
ment of the one stands out in sharpest contrast to the ease
and warmth, the luxury and pleasure of the troops in the
other army in the Quaker City.

The closing months of the year 1777 were crowded with
events important to America in the struggle for national
freedom. On September 11 the army of Britain came to
close quarters with General Sullivan’s column of Conti-
nentals on the left bank of the Brandywine, and after
giving and receiving some severe punishment, the patriot
army was obliged to retreat. In the morning of September
26 Lord Cornwallis, at the head of the British Line and
of the German contingent, marched into the capital city
of Philadelphia, scattered the Federal Congress and as-
signed his army to quarters in the homes of the people.
On October 4 the Continental troops of General SullivanTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
and General Wayne rushed furiously on the embattled
ranks of the British Foot and their Light Infantry detach-
ments and drove them through the streets of Germantown,
and sturdy old Maxwell with his Jersey Blues sent volleys
of leaden hail at the vigorous defenders of the Chew
House. But the result of that battle was another disaster
to the American arms and the patriot blood spilled in those
streets makes a sad page in history. Then followed the
operations on the Delaware River at Red Bank, at Fort
Mifflin and Fort Mercer, until these positions, important
because they controlled the water route from the ocean to
the great city, finally yielded to determined assault and
the heavy guns of the British fleet at close range. On the
fourth day of December the British troops moved out of
the city for the purpose of drawing the American Army
from the camp at White Marsh. During the three follow-
ing days they tried to provoke a battle, but failed to do
more than receive into their own breasts the bullets fired
by Morgan’s riflemen; then they withdrew for the season
into the festive city of Philadelphia. But amid all the dis-
asters of the latter part of the year 1777 there came from
the upper waters of the Hudson River the glad news of
General Stark’s victory with his Green Mountain boys
over a combined force of English, of Germans and of
Indians, and of the surrender of General Burgoyne and
his entire army on the field of Saratoga.

Notwithstanding this victory which Providence had
vouchsafed to the northern army, the “end of our war-
fare—independence, liberty and peace,’ as Washington
announced, seemed still not likely to be realized in the
immediate future. The chieftain then thought it necessary
to say that he did not dread the force of Britain exerted
alone, that the soldiers of America were full of fortitude
and patience under the fatigues they were called upon to
endure and that France had already shown a kindly dispo-
sition to grant them every aid they asked.

But the winter was upon them, with all its bitter cold,

EaTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
its dreadful trials, its impending sufferings, and something
must be done to furnish quarters for the little army and
keep them together for another campaign. Where should
the place be which would “most effectually prevent dis-
tress and give the most extensive security ?’”* Some officers,
at a council of war held November 30, urged Wilmington,
Delaware, a place too far south, however, for any effective
stroke at an enemy crossing the Jerseys; others said, form
the winter camp at Reading and Lancaster, Pennsylvania,
and in the country lying between those villages; still other
officers favored Trenton, New Jersey, a place which might
constantly have been menaced by a strong naval force on
the Delaware River. According to Washington’s custom,
the opinions of the general officers of the army were re-
quired and given with great detail in writing, and after
much careful study he issued his own decision in orders.
With great wisdom, as all military students now agree, he
selected a place in Pennsylvania near enough to Philadel-
phia to be a daily menace to the British Army, far enough
away for the American troops to feel themselves secure
from any unexpected attack by the light horse of the
enemy, and with a fair advantage in rapid pursuit of the
British Army if they should march at any time toward the
north or start out on a southern campaign.

On the sixteenth day of December, 1777, the advance
of the American Army reached Valley Forge on the west
bank of the Schuylkill River, about twenty-two miles by
wagon road from the city of Philadelphia. On December
19 the army under General Washington had arrived there
and by his orders, issued the previous day, commenced
the erection of huts for their winter encampment and dug
intrenchments for its defence. On the rugged hillside in
this “‘wilderness,”’ as De Kalb described it, the log huts,
fourteen by sixteen feet in size, were built in the midst of
thick woods by the confluence of the frozen waters of

1 From the Orderly Book, December 17, 1777, Sparks’ Writings of Wash-
ington, Vol. V, Appendix, p. 523-

Eee)THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

Valley Creek and the Schuylkill River. With great patience
and severe toil the soldiers yoked themselves to wagons,
because horses were scarce, and in this way brought the
timber on the ground. Thus in a few days the forest was
changed into a hutted camp. The encampment was not
completed until January 15, 1778. Potts’ Forge was situ-
ated at this point in the Great Valley and a few cottages
thereabout made up a very primitive village on the Old
Gulf Road. The headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief
were at Isaac Potts’ two-story stone house near the mouth
of Valley Creek.

The action of General Washington in thus placing his
troops in winter cantonment was not without protest from
some of the people of the colonies. Even the Legislature
of Pennsylvania took action on the subject and a com-
munication was sent to Washington remonstrating against
his conduct in the matter. In this document such expres-
sions are used as that by the proposed encampment a
“sreat part of this State, particularly that on the east side,
together with the State of New Jersey, must be left in the
Power of the Enemy, subject to their ravages’—“that
many of our People are so disaffected already that nothing
but the neighborhood of the Army keeps them subject to
Government.’”” This drew from General Washington a
prompt and pertinent letter addressed to the President of
Congress, December 23, 1777, couched in such stirring
language as this: “I can assure those gentlemen, that it is
a much easier and less distressing thing to draw remon-
strances in a comfortable room by a good fireside, than to
occupy a cold, bleak hill, and sleep under frost and snow,
without clothes or blankets. However, although they seem
to have little feeling for the naked and distressed soldiers,
I feel superabundantly for them, and, from my soul, I
pity those miseries, which it is neither in my power to
relieve or prevent.””®

2 Pennsylvania Archives, First series, Vol. VI, p. 104.
8 Ford’s Writings of George Washington, Vol. VI, p. 261.

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1899

I

TAKEN FEBRUARY

FROM PHOTOGRAPHTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

And the snow fell, the storms of wind and sleet in-
creased, the bitter cold became still more intense, until the
soldiers of the poor army had really to struggle for bare
existence. The feeling of patriotism, however, was still
alive in these rude huts, but the spirit of every champion
of liberty was sorely tried in the struggle to keep from
perishing, without the very necessities of life. Even while
they were building their huts, one-half the army, it is said,
had no proper shoes and stockings and their bleeding feet
crimsoned the snowdrifts. Their clothing was by no means
suitable for wintry weather—so thin and tattered had it
become. Very few of the men had blankets to wrap around
them at night, many had no breeches and were compelled
to huddle around the fires and so pass away the long un-
comfortable hours of night in uneasy sleep. One writer
describes some of the men as with “a dirty blanket around
them attached by a leathern belt around the waist.” An-
other visitor in camp speaks of “twenty-six men in a
New York regiment without a shirt.”” And still another
says, “A few of the men wear long linen hunting shirts
reaching to the knee, but of the rest no two are dressed
alike, not half have shirts, a third are barefoot, many are
in rags.” On one occasion—referring to six commissioned
officers and two hundred and fifty-five men of his com-
mand as unable to do any duty—General Wayne said, “‘of
those returned sick present is for want of clothing, being
too naked to appear on the parade; our officers in particu-
lar are in a most wretched condition.” General Washing-
ton said to a friend, ““Through the want of shoes and stock-
ings and the hard frozen ground you might have tracked
the army from White Marsh to Valley Forge by the blood
of their feet.” And just before Christmas he wrote, “few
men having more than one shirt, many only the moiety of
one and some none at all. . . . We have by a field-return
this day made no less than two thousand eight hundred

ess ZITHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
and ninety-eight men now in camp unfit for duty, because
they are barefoot and otherwise naked.”’*

In addition to the great want of clothing, arms and
equipments in the American Army, there came also a ter-
rible scarcity of food. The utter failure of the commissary
department to supply the necessary rations was fully dis-
cussed at general headquarters and various stern and quick
methods were suggested to avert the impending famine.
Some of these plans were tried but not always found eftec-
tive. The suffering from hunger increased as the weary
days of the dull winter dragged along until the cheerless
hour arrived when the officer in charge of the supplies
was forced to say that he had not a single head of cattle
for the butcher’s ax and that not twenty-five barrels of
flour could be had in all the camp.

Cold, naked and hungry, without pay, without provi-
sions, without rum, sleeping on the bare earth in their huts,
the army kept together in a pitiable existence. In their
dire adversity sickness came in their midst and the death
rate increased week after week. With great reluctance
General Washington then began a system of compulsory
requisition. It is only necessary to read his letters at this
time to see how distressing these plans were to his mind,
but as a temporary expedient they had to be put in force.
General Washington issued orders to all the farmers within
ten miles of Valley Forge, requiring them to thrash out
one-half of their grain by the first day of February and
the other half by the first day of March, under penalty of
having “all that shall remain in sheaves seized by the
Commissaries & Quartermasters of the army and paid for
as straw.’””” Many loyalist farmers refused to obey, defend-
ing their grain with their rifles and burning what they
could not defend. To these Tories it seemed far better to
sell to the British Army in Philadelphia and receive pay
in gold than to give their grain to the men at Valley

4 Ford, Vol. VI, p. 260.
5 Proclamation December 20, 1777, Ford, Vol. VI, p. 248.

[eoTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
Forge and be paid in certificates for which Congress had as
yet failed to provide any mode of redemption. Wonderful
indeed was the love of country displayed in these trying
hours, when the brave men and zealous patriots gathered
around Washington’s quarters, looking to him as the only
resource in their dire extremity. Surely no sketch of these
times has exaggerated their condition. And what must
have been the sorrow of the great chieftain as he witnessed
their calamity and felt that he was not fully supported by
the power of the government—as every day the currency
became more and more depreciated and he himself could
do but little to mitigate their distresses ? Certainly nowhere
in the annals of the world can it be shown that a party of
half-naked and hungry men bore their trials with greater
fortitude and truer resignation in the name and on behalf
of liberty.CHAPTER Tl

ibs is well to make a brief note of events that occurred
during the early part of the year 1778, among the peo-
ple and with the militia in the southern part of New Jersey
so soon to aid in harrassing the march of the British Army
across their own farm lands. On March 21 a detachment
of the British Army, while on a foraging expedition, made
an attack on the troops of Cumberland and Salem Coun-
ties at a place now known in history as Hancock’s Bridge,
and again, two days later, at Quinton’s Bridge. The Jer-
seymen were severely repulsed. The next day Colonel
Charles Mawhood, the same officer who had led the British
foot at Princeton’s battle, wrote the American officer in
command that, “induced by motives of humanity,” he
asked them “‘to lay down their arms and depart each man
to his own home.” If they did not do so, he threatened to
put arms in the hands of their Tory neighbors, to burn
their houses, and reduce their wives and children to beg-
cary. He added to his letter a list of the “first objects to
feel the vengeance of the British nation’ —the names of
the principal men and most active patriots in that section
of the State.* Colonel Elijah Hand, of the First Battalion
of Cumberland Militia, replied to these strange “motives
of humanity,” accusing the British not only of “denying
quarters, but butchering our men who surrendered them-
selves prisoners in the skirmish at Quinton’s bridge” and
“bayonetting at Hancock’s bridge, in the most cruel man-
ner, in cold blood, men who were taken by surprise,”
adding the remark, “‘to wantonly destroy will injure your
cause more than ours: it will increase your enemies and our
army.” These little affairs were of no great importance,

 

1 Johnson’s Historical Account of Salem in West Jersey, p. 159.
2 Barber and Howe’s Historical Collections of the State of New Jersey,
p. 421.

Es:JTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
but they exhibited the temper and spirit of the Jersey
troops at this critical time in the Revolutionary struggle.
The object of these expeditions of the British was prob-
ably more to gather corn and steal cattle than to inflict
any special punishment or to gain any glory to their arms.
The farmers of the State, embodied in her militia, sought
only to resist a spoliation of their garnered grain and a
raid upon their fattened herds.

While the mind of General Washington was filled with
grave concern regarding the deplorable condition of his
army, he began to realize that a strong intrigue was form-
ing to supplant him in the chief command of the military
force of the republic. Enemies about him in the camp,
men actuated by sinister motives in Congress, began to
talk of battles fought which only ended in disaster, of
movements of troops executed which only proved useless
and ill-judged. The laurels gained over Burgoyne at the
capitulation of Saratoga, although we now know that Gen-
eral Schuyler more properly deserved them, made General
Gates aspire to be placed in the supreme command of the
army. Joined with Gates were several other officers who
were jealous of Washington’s prominent position before
the American people and of the glory that was sure to rest
upon him and his reputation in after years should he suc-
ceed in wresting this young nation from the thraldom of a
kingly power. In an indirect way a little coterie of men
sought to interfere with the proper workings of the several
departments of the army, and they prepared important
documents in Washington’s name, which he had never
seen and never signed. As a willing abettor of the victor of
Saratoga’s battle, there was a foreign officer, General
Thomas Conway, an Irishman by birth, but of late a
colonel in the army of France, a “worthless soldier’ as
General Greene called him, who stirred up this intrigue
most vehemently, hoping in some way to gain promotion
in the success of Gates, who had just been made President
of the Board of War. An attempt was made to induce

[ED 2]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

Lafayette to join in this conspiracy and the Board tried
to flatter the young French officer with a separate com-
mand, organized without consultation with Washington,
for the purpose of invading Canada. But Lafayette re-
fused the honor and the service unless he could report
direct to the chieftain whom he had learned to love. Many
prominent men were more or less connected with this
secret plot, ever afterward known as the ‘Conway Cabal,”
and Congress did nothing to crush it but rather encouraged
it by commissioning Conway a Major-General and
Inspector-General of the army over his seniors in com-
mission. The movements of this malignant faction at
length became public and reached the ear of one of Gen-
eral Washington’s truest friends, Major-General Lord
Stirling, and the dire machinations were stopped by the
public sentiment that was quickly aroused. The desire to
affect the standing of Washington with his army utterly
failed and the insidious plot only cemented more closely
the bond between him and his trusted followers. The gal-
lant Philadelphia soldier, General Cadwalader, checked
General Conway’s career with the bullet of a duellist on
July 4, 1778, and caused him, in view of his expected
death, to beg pardon for his wrong-doing. He had already
tendered his resignation to Congress, April 28, and on re-
covering from his wound returned to France. It seems sad
indeed that in addition to the daily sight of sick, ragged
and hungry men whom General Washington longed so
much to assist, his mind should be harrassed with the
knowledge that some of his general officers desired to
injure forever his fame. But through all these intrigues he
preserved his dignified bearing, which, while it annoyed
his enemies, encouraged his friends, who rallied closer
around him; and nothing could shake the confidence of
the people nor supplant him in the affections of the rank
and file of the army.°

8 For particulars concerning the cabal, see Sparks’ Writings of George
Washington, Vol. V, Appendix, p. 483 e¢ seq.

[ 10 |THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

In June, 1777, seven letters were published in London
under the title of ““Letters from General Washington to
several of his Friends in the year 1776. In which are set
forth a fairer and fuller view of American Politics, than
ever yet transpired, or the Public could be made acquainted
with through any other Channel.” These letters were
spurious, and when brought to the attention of the
Commander-in-Chief he immediately denounced the for-
gery ; but just at this trying period of the war they caused
the General great anxiety, as may be seen by an extract
from his letter to Richard Henry Lee, of date May 25,
1778.— “If anything of greater moment had occurred,
than declaring that every word contained in the pam-
phlet, which you were obliging enough to send me, was
spurious, I should not have suffered your favor of the 6th
instant to remain so long unacknowledged. These letters
are written with a great deal of art. The intermixture of
so many family circumstances (which, by the by, want
foundation in truth) gives an air of plausibility which ren-
ders the villany greater; as the whole is a contrivance to
answer the most diabolical purposes—Who the author of
them is, I know not.’’* The letters referred to, purporting
to be written by General Washington, one to Mrs. Wash-
ington, one to John Parke Custis and five to Lund Wash-
ington, and captured with a servant at Fort Lee in 1776,
3, under the

were reprinted in New York City in 177
auspices of the loyalists, for the purpose of wider circula-
tion in America and to show that the real feelings of
Washington were widely different from his pronounced
opinions, and in this way do the patriot cause infinite
damage. During the rest of his life General Washington
had to combat this attack from time to time and as late
as the year 1796 the letters were republished. On March
2, 1797, General Washington, then about to retire from
the Presidency, wrote a strong letter to Colonel Timothy
Pickering, Secretary of State of the United States, which

4Ford’s Writings of George Washington, Vol. VII, p. 22.

Ema JTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
he desired to be deposited in the Department of State, in
which he denied with great emphasis that his servants,
any part of his baggage or any of his attendants, with
these letters in their possession, had ever been captured
during the whole course of the war. He ended this state-
ment with the “solemn declaration that the letters herein
described are a base forgery and that I never saw or heard
of them until they appeared in print.’ In the midst of
all the hardships, dangers and cabals of Valley Forge,
General Washington had to bear this cruel attack with
equanimity and to appear to his soldiers calm, unmoved
and self-reliant under every change of fortune or base
charge of his enemies.°

On April 20, 1778, General Washington addressed
a letter to all the general officers on duty at Valley Forge,
in which he expressed this opinion: “There seem to be
but three general plans of operation, which may be pre-
meditated for the next campaign; one, the attempting to
recover Philadelphia and destroy the enemy’s army there;
another, the endeavouring to transfer the war to the
northward by an enterprise against New York; and a
third, the remaining quiet in a secure, fortified camp, dis-
ciplining and arranging the army till the enemy begin their
operations and then to govern ourselves accordingly.—
Which of these three plans shall we adopt?” The replies
to these letters were all promptly sent in to headquarters
and were very different in the views expressed. Generals
Maxwell, Wayne and Paterson favored an early demon-
stration on Philadelphia, according to the first of Wash-
ington’s suggestions. Generals Varnum, Knox, Poor and
Muhlenberg desired to endorse the second plan and push
across the State of New Jersey, to threaten and attack

> Ford, Vol. XIII, p. 378.

®In Ford, Vol. IV, p. 132, these letters are ascribed to “John Randolph,
the last royal attorney general of Virginia and long the ablest lawyer in
the colony. He went to England in 1775.” The letters are to be found in
the same volume, pp. 132, 160, 177, 219, 254, 264 and 288.

7 Sparks, Vol. V, p. 319.

[12]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
New York City. General Lord Stirling would try both
plans, and Generals von Steuben, Lafayette and Dupor-
tail, the foreign officers, were decided in their opinion of
the inexpediency of an attack on the British at this time.
They thought every effort should first be made to com-
plete, if possible, the arming, equipping and disciplining
of the force, so that success might be made more certain.
General Greene differed somewhat from all these opinions,
for he would have a special column of four thousand se-
lected men to push rapidly to New York, to be joined
there by the militia from New England, and have the
commander-in-chief go in person with this division and
General Lee remain in command of the rest of the army in
the camp at Valley Forge.

After a full study of the views advocated by all these
officers, General Washington decided to remain at pres-
ent where he was intrenched and await events.

On May 11 and 12, 1778, the officers of the Conti-
nental Army took the new oath of allegiance as required
by a resolution of Congress dated February 3, 1778.° The
resolution is in these words:

“Resolved, That every officer who holds or shall here-
after hold a commission or office from Congress shall take
and subscribe the following oath or affirmation: I do
acknowledge the United States of America to be free,
independent and sovereign States, and declare that the
people thereof owe no allegiance or obedience to George
the third, King of Great Britain; and I do renounce, refuse
and abjure any allegiance or obedience to him; and I do
swear (or affirm) that I will to the utmost of my power
support, maintain and defend the said United States
against the said King George the third, and his heirs, and
successors, and his and their abettors, assistants and ad-
herents, and will serve the said United States in the office
of which I now hold, with fidelity, according to the

 

 

8 Pennsylvania Magazine, Vol. I, p. 174, and Lossing’s Field Book of the
Revolution, Vol. Il, p. 146.

je ia]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
best of my skill and understanding. So help me God.’”

The officers of the army, according to an order of Gen-
eral Washington issued the previous day, met at the
General’s headquarters at eleven o’clock in the morning
of May 12 and took the required oath.

There were a few officers not on duty at Valley Forge
at the time, or on duty but not in the camp, who did not
take the oath of allegiance that day. Among these was
Major-General Lee, who had not yet returned from Y ork,
Pennsylvania. On June g these officers also renewed their
oaths to Congress. At this time a very singular thing
happened, especially pertinent to the events soon to fol-
low. As the officers came before General Washington to
subscribe to this renewed profession of fealty to the cause
of national independence for which they had taken up
arms and risked their lives to maintain, it was noticed that
General Lee withdrew his hand from the Bible. General
Washington asked him why he did this singular act. He
replied, ‘“As to King George, I am ready enough to absolve
myself from all allegiance to him, but I have some scruples
about the Prince of Wales.” The officers all laughed at
this very odd remark, but it clearly displayed his opinion
of the ultimate failure of the cause. It was a faint expres-
sion of the treason in his heart which had already devel-
oped itself while he was a prisoner of war. As soon as
silence had been restored after this unusual episode, Gen-
eral Lee took the oath of allegiance with no doubt a
wicked mental reservation that he would act as he thought
his own personal interests required.

Before we turn away from the dreary picture of life at
Valley Forge, let us speak of one auspicious event which
for a moment diffused joy among the suffering soldiers in
the huts on the Schuylkill River.

The news of the surrender of Burgoyne, which reached
Paris December 4, 1777, seems to have given great pleas-
ure to the court at Versailles. On December 12 a meeting

9 Journal of Congress, Vol. IV, p. 66.

eas |THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
took place between the American Commissioners and the
Count de Vergennes, then Minister of Foreign Affairs of
France. At this meeting the preliminaries of a treaty of
alliance and commercial intercourse were discussed. On
February 6, 1778, Louis XVI of France, prompted by a
desire to humble the power of England, determined to
acknowledge the independence of America and a treaty
was signed in which it was stated that it was the desire
of France “to maintain effectually the liberty, sovereignty
and independence, absolute and unlimited of the United
States as well in matters of government as commerce.”
To accomplish this important act, Doctor Benjamin
Franklin, Silas Deane and Arthur Lee had been laboring
with all the diplomacy they could command and they were
efficiently aided by Pierre Augustine Caron de Beaumar-
chais, the intimate friend of Count de Vergennes. Silas
Deane wrote of him as one ‘“‘to whom the United States are
on every account greatly indebted; more so than to any
other person on this side of the water.’ The news of the
signing of this treaty was not known in London even dur-
ing the celebrated debate in Parliament on the American
question February 17; but when it was announced in that
city it was regarded as a declaration of war and Lord
Stormont, the English Ambassador, was instructed to leave
the French court immediately. In anticipation of this
event, a French squadron was in readiness which started
from Toulon about the middle of April under the com-
mand of the Count Charles Henry Theodat d’Estaing,
and sailed toward the United States. The flag-ship of the
squadron carried Monsieur Conrad Alexandre Gérard,
first minister of France to the United States, and Silas
Deane, one of the American commissioners. On March 20
Benjamin Franklin and his associates had been received at
court as the representatives of an independent nation.

On April 13, Simeon Deane, a brother of the diplomat

10 wharton’s Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the United
States, Vol. II, p. 201.
uy JTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
Silas Deane, arrived in Falmouth harbor, now the city of
Portland, Maine, in the fast-sailing French frigate “La
Sensible,” Captain Marigny, and brought the news of
the recognition by France of American independence and
the promise of a military contingent and an efficient fleet
to assist in securing the rights of the American people.

It was not until May 2 that the news of the signing of
the treaty reached York, Pennsylvania, where the Conti-
nental Congress was in session, and it infused new life in
the breasts of the patriot statesmen assembled there. When
it was announced at Valley Forge the previous day it
aroused wild excitement among the soldiers in that camp.
Throughout the whole country this action of the French
king diffused great joy among the American people.

On May 4 Congress resolved unanimously to ratify the
treaty of amity, commerce and alliance between the most
Christian King of France and Navarre and the United
States of America, and they desired the commissioners rep-
resenting the States in that country to present the grate-
ful acknowledgments of Congress to him and to assure
him that “‘it is sincerely wished that the friendship so hap-
pily commenced between France and these United States
may be perpetual.’* General Washington issued his quaint
and characteristic order, May 6, for a due celebration of
this auspicious event to be made the day following. By his
direction divine worship was conducted by the chaplains
of the army at nine o’clock in the morning; at ten o’clock
he reviewed the troops under arms, and one o’clock that
day a Continental salute of thirteen guns was fired, fol-
lowed by a running fire of musketry through the whole
front line of the army and a return fire on the second
line. A loud huzza was given—‘“Long live the King of
France!” The huzza was repeated with the shout ‘‘Long
live the friendly European Powers!” and a third time the
artillery fired and the fez de jod of infantry rattled along

11 Journals of Congress from January 1, 1778, to January 1, 1779, Vol.
Vie Ps 25//-

li 16) 3]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
the lines as the troops cheered to the sentiment, ‘“Prosper-
ity to the United States of America.” In the afternoon
General Washington gave a collation to the officers of the
army, at which Lady Washington and Lady Stirling as-
sisted, and toasts and cheers followed each other until the
party broke up at five o’clock with loud shouts of “Long
live General Washington!”

On May 8 an address was ordered by Congress to be pre-
pared and copies of it scattered among the people of the
country announcing the joyful news of a powerful ally
willing and ready to aid the young struggling nation, and
urging upon them strenuous, unremitting exertions to fur-
ther the cause in which they were engaged.

So an alliance was formed with a strong Continental
power fully able to send an army and a navy, with ma-
terial of war to aid in securing the independence of the
United States. War was then declared with England by
the King of France and an agreement made with the Con-
tinental Congress that neither nation should cease its war-
fare until the freedom of America was secured.CHAPTER iil

URNING now from the encampment on the hillside
of Valley Creek, we look for a moment at the gay life
of the young British officers in the former rebel capital of
Philadelphia. One of their own number, Charles Stedman,
has said in his history that they “killed dull hours at the
dance, the faro-table and the theatre.” Utterly regardless
of the duty they owed their king, to crush out armed rebel-
lion among his colonists, these young soldiers, led by their
commanding general, busied themselves to find new ways
of pleasure. They made gay feasts, they invited the Tory
families to merry dances. Every week the ball-room at the
City Tavern was crowded with fair women and their sol-
dier gallants in the minuet and noisy with the hilarity of
the Virginia reel. Every few days a crowd of choice spirits
would gather at the cock-pit on Moore’s Alley. Some of
the royal officers could be found every night at the Bunch
of Grapes and the Indian Queen in wild gambling parties,
or engaged in great convivial merriment at the brilliantly
lighted rooms of the London Coffee House. From January
to May the officers had weekly entertainments in the
wooden building of the Old South theater, and Captain
John André, of the Twenty-sixth regiment of foot, and
Captain Oliver De Lancey, of the Seventeenth regiment
of light dragoons, led off on the boards in ““No one’s enemy
but his own,” ““The Mock Doctor” and ‘““The Deuce is in
him.” Then when the beauty and wit of the city, who had
applauded their efforts to amuse, had retired, the gay
actors sought wine, revelry and a night’s carouse in the
club room of the City Tavern. In this way, with pleasant
days and festive nights, they killed the dull routine duties
of a soldier’s life.
During the spring the British made one effort to show
that they had been sent to America to subdue a rebellion.

[ 18 ]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
In the early hours of May 7 two large galleys, with sev-
eral flat-boats, containing about six hundred men of the
Second battalion, British light infantry, Major John
Maitland commanding, went to Bordentown, New Jersey,
near the head of tide-water on the Delaware River. On
this raid the enemy burned or sunk in Barnes’, Watson’s
and Crosswicks’ creeks two large frigates, one made for
thirty-two and the other for twenty-eight guns, nine large
ships, three privateers for sixteen guns each, twenty-three
brigantines and several sloops and schooners. They burned
the store-house that contained the commissary supplies
and made themselves free in the handsome residence of
Francis Hopkinson, a signer of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence. This house they fired, but Captain Johann
Ewald of the Hessian Yagers, allowed the citizens to ex-
tinguish the flames. The British also destroyed the resi-
dence in Bordentown of Colonel Joseph Borden, formerly
of the First regiment, Burlington County New Jersey
Militia, and of Colonel Joseph Kirkbride, of the First
battalion, Bucks County Pennsylvania Militia, on the
Pennsylvania side of the river. Although his entire prop-
erty was destroyed, Colonel Kirkbride was able to write
this patriotic sentence in a letter to Thomas Wharton,
President of the Supreme Executive Council of the Com-
monwealth of Pennsylvania,—‘Notwithstanding, I can
say with Sincerity I had rather loose ten such Estates than
to be suspected to be unfriendly to my Country.” The
next day the British went up to Biles Island intending to
raid on Trenton, but hearing that a force under Major-
General Philemon Dickinson, commanding officer of the
New Jersey Militia, had arrived there and was ready to
oppose them, they abandoned their object. Eight men
were killed and four cannon captured on this expedition.
The British fleet returned on Sunday, May 10, with all

1 Pennsylvania Archives, First Series, Vol. VI, p. 503.

[E97]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
their booty and were received with great hilarity in
Philadelphia.*

On February 17 Lord Frederick North, Prime Min-
ister of England, made his great speech in the British
House of Commons, in which, in the most eloquent man-
ner, he advocated the passage of two bills for the purpose
of conciliating the American people. One bill was “For
removing all Doubts and Apprehensions concerning Taxa-
tion by the Parliament of Great Britain in any of the
Colonies and Plantations of North America” and one of
the distinct features thereof was that the duty on tea was
to be removed and the government pledged not to
impose a tax of any kind whatever on His Majesty’s
colonies except such duties as were necessary to be levied
to regulate commerce, and even the moneys derived
therefrom were to be used only for the benefit of the
colonies. The other bill appointed five commissioners with
extraordinary powers, among which were, to grant par-
dons, to suspend any Act of Parliament passed in refer-
ence to America since February 10, 1763, to appoint Gov-
ernors of the colonies, to proclaim, if they saw proper, a
cessation of hostilities on sea and land, for any period and
under such conditions as they might deem best, and, in
fine, “to agree upon the means of quieting the disorders
now subsisting in certain of the Colonies of America.”

The speech of Lord North, the action of the House of
Commons March 3, and the royal assent proclaimed from
the throne March 11, 1778, may be summed up in this
way: The British authorities, alarmed at first by the sur-
render of Burgoyne and then by the French alliance, were
at last willing to agree to any form of conciliation, except
absolute independence, and to accomplish this they were
ready to repeal any law, relinquish any heretofore asserted
right and acquiesce in any plan which would end the
quarrel and still preserve the territory to the crown.

2 For a minute description of this affair, see Woodward’s History of
Burlington County, New Jersey, p. 464 et seq.

[ 20 ]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

These conciliatory bills were sent across the ocean,
reached New York City on April 14 and were proclaimed
by the royal Governor, William Tryon of New York, on
the following day. The Governor, filled with the usual
zeal of an ardent Tory and thinking that now a settlement
of every difficulty and an end of the war would soon be
made and that he would commend himself to the King for
his activity, with unblushing coolness wrote a letter, dated
April 17, to General Washington at Valley Forge, and
sent him a package of the “Bills,” urging him, a most
“extraordinary and impertinent request,” to assist in dis-
tributing them among his troops and among the people of
America. In the American camp it was at first supposed to
be a forgery and it was but the work of a moment for the
General to decide what was best to do with this bundle
and he packed it off by an express rider to Congress at
York, Pennsylvania.

It is quite plain, however, that General Washington
had some fears as to the effect these documents, called by
the patriots “‘deceptionary bills,” might produce upon the
people of the several states at this time. He knew well that
many were anxious for peace, and to know that this end
could be reached by the acceptance of the very terms first
demanded by the colonies, would perhaps tempt the weak-
hearted, who were weary of fighting. If this spirit should
gain much ground, cause disaffection among the people,
distraction in public councils and interference in the ap-
proaching campaign, longer and more grievous would be
the struggle for freedom, and the result more uncertain.
Therefore, in his letter transmitting the package, he begged
Congress to make every effort to counteract their malig-
nant influence.

From a letter of General Washington, dated April 21,
to John Banister, a delegate to the Continental Congress,
we find this strong remark, ““The enemy are beginning to
play a game more dangerous than their efforts by arms
(though these will not be remitted in the smallest degree)

[21 ]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

which threatens a fatal blow to the independence of Amer-
ica and of course to her liberties. They are endeavoring to
ensnare the people by specious allurements of peace. . . .
Nothing can be more evident than that a peace on the
principles of dependence however limited, after what has
happened, would be to the last degree dishonourable and
ruinous. . . . Nothing short of independence, it appears
to me, can possibly do. A peace on other terms would, if
I may be allowed the expression, be a peace of war. The
injuries we have received from the British nation were so
unprovoked and have been so great and so many, that they
can never be forgotten.”

When the patriot Governor of New York, George
Clinton, heard of the propositions looking toward peace,
he said, “Lord North is two years too late with his polit-
ical maneuvres.”’

Governor Trumbull, of Connecticut, wrote, ‘“There was
a day when even this step might have been accepted with
joy and gratitude, but that day, sir, is passed irrevocably.”

Robert Morris said, “No offers ought to have a hearing
of one moment unless preceded by acknowledgment of
our independence.”

According to the official return now on file in the Public
Record Office in London, the British force in Philadelphia
March 26, 1778, was,—British, 13,078; Germans, 5,202;
Provincials, 1,250, making a total of 19,530 men.

General Washington estimated the force in Philadel-
phia to be about 10,000 men and this he thought might
be increased to 14,000 by relieving the troops then on duty
in New York City. Following this opinion of General
Washington, we find Marshall in his history computing
the British effective force in Philadelphia as 10,000; Gor-
don, as from 9,000 to 10,000 rank and file, and Irving, as
from 9,000 to 10,000 men. Von Elking, in his valuable
work, says they had scarcely 13,000; but Captain John
Montresor, the Chief Engineer on the staff of General

8 Sparks’ Writings of George Washington, Vol. V, p. 323.

[ 22 ]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

Howe, says than on June 6 the British Army in Philadel-
phia consisted of 20,000 effectives, 17,600 of whom were
fighting men.’ Justice Thomas Jones, of the Supreme
Court of the Province of New York, with a proneness to
exaggerate, says in his history of New York, ‘Sir Henry
crossed the Delaware with his whole army, nearly 30,000
men.”

On August 15, 1778, a return of the British Army was
made, and from this it appears that the troops in and about
New York numbered 19,586, an increase since the return
of March 26 of 9,130 men; on Long Island they num-
bered 8,117, which is an increase by that amount; in
Rhode Island, 5,789 men, an increase of 2,019. Leaving
out the twoGerman regiments that went to New York in
the ships, perhaps 1,000 men, we arrive at the conclusion
that Clinton had more than 18,000 men ready to march
and give battle outside of Philadelphia.

It appears strange indeed that with a large fleet® to
cover with its guns the city of Philadelphia, Sir William
Howe, with his magnificent army, did not make a vigorous
demonstration in force on the impoverished camp at Valley
Forge, only a day’s march distant, and scatter with one
blow the ragged and starving soldiers who, as an army,
represented the military power of the republic. In the
warm houses of Philadelphia General Howe thought of
the intense cold, the heavy snows, and the toil and trouble
of a winter attack. He knew that his foe were starving,
freezing and dying by the side of the icy river, but the
habit of easy procrastination and inactivity took posses-
sion of his soul and the opportunity slipped away. The
Americans could not have remained in the fortified can-

4 Pennsylvania Archives, Vol. II, p. 290.

5 The British fleet on the Delaware River consisted of the Phoenix,
a 40-gun ship, the Eagle, a 24-gun ship, the frigates Andromeda, Lizard
and Thomas, the packets Cadiz and Harriet, the galleys Cornwallis and
Hussar, the sloops Porcupine, Fanny, Brune, Camilla, Somerset, Liverpool,
Roebuck, Daphne, Nautilus, Isis, Alert, Maidstone, Pearl, Richmond, Tri-

dent, Vigilant, Active, and thirty other small sailing vessels, in all one
hundred and twenty vessels, anchored off Philadelphia in June, 1778.

aaaTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

tonment for many days if they had been surrounded, for
they would soon have died of starvation. They could not
have sallied out without the loss of large numbers of the
half-naked soldiery and they could not have retreated
with safety to any place where they could with more cer-
tainty have made a good defence. As week after week
passed by and no attempt was made to break up their win-
ter retreat, the foreign officers, Generals von Steuben and
Lafayette, Duportail and De Kalb, expressed themselves
as astonished that Howe failed to make a demonstration.
General Duportail had frequently told his brother officers
that Howe could have exterminated the American force
at any time after the fight at Brandywine. But Howe ex-
cused himself on the ground that it was “imprudent until
the season should afford a prospect of reaping the advan-
tages that ought to have resulted from success in that
measure but having good information in the spring that
the enemy had strengthened the camp by additional works
and being certain of moving him from thence when the
campaign should open, he dropped thought of an attack.”
He said also, “that he must receive large reinforcements
from England if he attempted what was clearly expected
of him.” The Tory history before referred to says on this
subject, ‘“To put an end to the rebellion the only object
should have been the destruction of the army under Wash-
ington, . . . and to the surprise of everybody Howe
never attempted to beat up the rebel quarters.’’* Colonel
Henry Lee puts the case in the most pointed language,—
“Knowing, as sir William ought to have known, the suf-
ferings and wants of every kind to which Washington
was exposed at Valley Forge, as well as that his army was
under inoculation for the small-pox, while he himself was
so abundantly supplied with every article requisite to give
warmth and comfort to his troops, it is wonderful how he
could omit venturing a winter campaign, to him promis-

6 Jones’ History of New York, Vol. I, pp. 236-7.

[2474THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
ing every advantage, and to his antagonist, menacing
every ill.’”’

On April 19 General Howe wrote to the British min-
ister, ““Ihe enemy’s position continues to be at Valley
Forge and Wilmington. Their force has been diminished
during the course of the winter by desertion and by detach-
ments to the back settlements where the Indians make
constant inroads; but the want of green forage does not
yet permit me to take the field, and their situation is too
strong to hazard an attack with a prospect of success.’”*

And so the winter wore away in inaction and in revelry
in the gay city during which the gallant officers forgot war
and war’s alarms. But one morning they knew that this
wild life must come to a sudden end as the news rapidly
spread around the city that General Howe was ordered to
report in England and that his command would soon be
assumed by Sir Henry Clinton.

Great was the grief among the young officers of his army
and the lively, fun-loving belles of the city when they
learned that Sir William Howe had been superseded.
What should they do to testify to the beloved commander
the feelings with which they regarded him? After many
consultations a great scheme was decided upon by twenty-
two of the commissioned officers “‘to exhibit a something
before unknown to the New World, perhaps to the Old.’”
On May 18 the famous Mischianza was fully carried out,
with the wildest folly and extravagance, on the streets,
on the river, in private grounds, in the public halls of
Philadelphia. General Howe accepted with great pleasure
this fulsome adulation, knowing full well, however, that
it was a severe and open criticism of the action of his king.

While the merry dancers were engaged in their mid-
night frolic, Major-General the Marquis de Lafayette
was leading a chosen body of troops toward Philadelphia

7 Lee’s Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department, p. 32.

8 Parliamentary Register, Vol. XI, p. 465.
® Jones’ History of New York, Vol. I, p. 241.

[25 ]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

for the purpose of restraining the British forage parties
and obtaining some intelligence of their intended move-
ments. It was not many hours before the news reached
General Howe’s quarters that Lafayette’s “tattered reti-
nue had abandoned their mud-holes” and with twenty-five
hundred men and eight cannon had crossed over the
Schuylkill River and were moving between that stream
and the Delaware River. At half-past ten on the night
of May 19 a party of fifty-three hundred men under
General James Grant, consisting of the Second battalion,
British light infantry, the Queen’s rangers, the Sixteenth
and Seventeenth regiments of light dragoons and the First
and Second brigades of British foot, were despatched to
capture the American detachment. After promising the
ladies of Philadelphia to bring Lafayette back to dine with
them, General Howe started out the next morning with
fifty-seven hundred more troops, accompanied by Clinton
and Knyphausen and his own brother, Lord Howe. But
Lafayette was not so easily entrapped, for he eluded their
movements in an orderly style; the men, responding
quickly to the tactics in which they had been disciplined,
made “‘a handsome retreat” in great order over the Schuyl-
kill at Matson’s Ford, and General Howe returned to
Philadelphia after a fruitless march to Barren Hill. The
whole affair was generally considered a fine display of
tactical knowledge by Lafayette and it certainly was an
event of keen disappointment to the British.CHAPTER IV
IR Henry Clinton reached Philadelphia May 8 but

did not immediately assume command of the British
Army in that city. On May 11 General Sir William Howe
issued an order to his troops announcing the change of
commander.

On March 21 instructions had been sent Sir Henry
Clinton from London with reference to his future move-
ments. These orders reached him May 23. After giving
directions to send certain troops to the British West Indies
and to Florida, the order reads, ““When these detachments
shall have been made or while they are making, Philadel-
phia is to be evacuated; all the troops to be embarked,
with everything belonging to the army, and to proceed
thence to New York, where they will wait the issue of the
negotiation, which the commissioners have been author-
ized to propose to the Congress.’”*

In the secret despatches of March 8, sent by Lord
George Germaine, Colonial Secretary, the following pas-
sage occurs: “It is recommended not to pursue an offensive
warfare against the interior, but leave men enough to de-
fend the posts and embark a detachment on board the
King’s ships and attack the harbours along the coast be-
tween New York and Halifax. . . . If this service can-
not be executed, without detaching so many men from
Philadelphia as to leave that place insecure, then such a
post may be taken on the Delaware River and fortified,
as may be defended by a small number of men, the ship-
ping thereby protected and the navigation of the river
obstructed. Philadelphia may then be evacuated, leaving
only a garrison at the above post and taking the remaining
troops to New York, except such as are wanted for the
expedition against the northern seaports. Not that the

1 Sparks’ Writings of George Washington, Vol. V, Appendix, p. 550.

27 |THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

retaining of Philadelphia is not thought a very important
object and it is to be abandoned only on the condition that
the northern service cannot be effected without it.”*

It is quite certain that Clinton would have preferred to
have taken his whole army in vessels by way of the Dela-
ware River and Bay and up the New Jersey coast to New
York City. The heavy baggage, cannon and shells had been
placed on the transports on May 14; but Clinton soon
found that with all the sail he had they would not be able
to carry one-half the soldiers and citizens, whom it was
necessary to take with them, and the vast materiel of war,
the horses, wagons and incumbrances of various kinds. He
therefore wrote Lord Germaine that he “found it imprac-
ticable to embark the forces in order to proceed to New
York by water, as there are not transports enough to re-
ceive the whole at once and therefore a great part of the
cavalry, all our provision train and the persons whose
attachment to the government has rendered them objects
of vengeance to the enemy must have been left behind.
. . . These reasons have induced me to resolve on march-
ing through Jersey.”

General Clinton found it necessary to vacate the city of
Philadelphia as soon as he possibly could do so. In the
early part of June he learned that a French fleet had sailed
from Toulon for the Capes of the Delaware and that if he
wished to escape with his army by water or even to allow
some of his baggage and heavy munitions of war to be
transported in that way to New York and the New Eng-
land coast he must act instantly, before it became too late.
He saw clearly that he must place his army as soon as
possible in a city on the seaboard, which could not so
easily be blockaded by a hostile fleet. Every hour’s delay
made safety more uncertain. He dared not cherish the
idea, as his predecessor did, that he could at any time attack
Washington in his quarters at Valley Forge, but must get

2 Sparks, Appendix, Vol. V, p. 549.
8 7bid., Vol. V, p. 396, footnote.

[ 28 JTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

away quickly from a city known to contain partisans of
the rebel cause, who were not slow in giving the patriot
chieftain information of all the movements in the ship-
ping on the river.

The various orders issued by General Howe during the
closing days of his administration and the instructions
given by General Clinton when he assumed command pre-
paratory to the movement of his army from Philadelphia
are interesting at this point in the narrative.

After a review of the British troops the following con-
eratulatory order was issued by General Howe on May 4:
“The Commander-in-Chief desires that Lieutenant-Gen-
eral Knyphausen and the Hessian Troops under His
Excellency’s command will please to accept of his ac-
knowledgments and thanks for the magnificent appearance
they exhibited this day of which he shall not fail to make
the most faithful report to His Majesty.”

On May 3 Captain John Montresor, General Howe's
chief engineer, began to erect defences on Cooper’s Creek
in New Jersey, under the protection of the galley-ship
Cornwallis and the Fifty-fifth and Sixty-third regiments
of the British foot. It took three days to finish these re-
doubts and then the Pennsylvania and Maryland regi-
ments of loyalists joined the troops just mentioned in
earrisoning the forts. On May 8 Brigadier-General Alex-
ander Leslie was sent over the Delaware River with an
escort of Captain Richard Hovendon’s Provincial com-
pany of light dragoons, to take command of the British
force on Cooper’s Creek. On May 14 some of the heavy
impedimenta of the army was ordered to be prepared for
shipment, the officers were directed in this way “to lighten
their baggage for the field as much as possible,” and on
May 20 the general officers of the army were ordered to
see that all the tents, baggage and stores not necessary in
field service were placed on the transport ships.

This was the condition of affairs when Sir Henry Clin-
ton received his orders, May 23, took command of the

E264THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

army and abandoned the plan of taking them by water to
New York. At nine o’clock in the morning of May 25
orders were issued, dated the previous day, for all the men,
women and children unfit to march to be instantly placed
on the transports “under the command of a careful non-
commissioned officer and to report the number, that pro-
visions may be ordered,” and that these boats fall down
the river at one o’clock that day. On May 26 an order was
issued for the marching troops to carry twenty days’ pro-
visions in wagons and four days’ food in their packs. On
May 28 the Seventh and Twenty-sixth regiments of foot
were ordered to report to General Leslie in the redoubts
on Cooper’s Creek and the Fifteenth regiment to report to
Brigadier-General Courtlandt Skinner, commander of the
brigade of New Jersey volunteers (loyalists) stationed at
the fort at Billingsport, New Jersey. On May 29 a “Te-
view of arms, accoutrements, ammunition and necessaries
took place at three o’clock in the afternoon.” According
to order, the men brought to this review their camp kettles,
canteens, tomahawks and every article they were to carry
on the march.* At this time General Leslie became alarmed
to find that the New Jersey militia was hovering around
his post and he ordered “‘roll to be called often, no one
allowed to quit camp, no soldier to go beyond the senitries
as the regiments may be subject to sudden alarms and the

4The staff of Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Clinton on May 30, 1778,
consisted of James Paterson, Sixty-third regiment, colonel and adjutant-
general, relieved to go to England June 19, 1778, by Lieutenant-Colonel
Lord Francis Rawdon, who was made adjutant-general; Stephen Kemble,
major and deputy adjutant-general; George Hutchinson, Twenty-third
regiment, captain and deputy adjutant- general; James Cramond, Forty-
second regiment, lieutenant and assistant adjutant-general; Lord Francis
Rawdon, volunteers Ireland, lieutenant-colonel and aide-de-camp pro-
moted; Duncan Drummond, regiment artillery, major and aide-de-camp;
William Sutherland, Fifty-fifth regiment, captain and aide-de-camp; Lord
William S. Cathcart, Seventeenth dragoons, captain and aide-de-camp ;
William Crosbie, Thirty-eighth regiment, captain and aide-de-camp ;
Wilmousky, Prince Carl regiment, captain and aide-de-camp; Frederick
Ernst von Munchausen, regiment Louisburg, captain and aide-de-camp;
John Smith, Thirty-seventh regiment, captain and military secretary;
Andrew Bell, deputy muster-master of provincial forces.

[ 30 J]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

men’s accoutrements must be hung up conveniently so that
they may be able to turn out instantly and form in front
of their huts.”

All night of June 8 the baggage wagons of the British
Army were being transported over the Delaware River and
placed under the care of General Leslie. This fact, how-
ever, soon became known to the Americans, for Brigadier-
General Joseph Reed, hearing of it, wrote to his wife
June 9,—“‘Many persons are very sanguine that the enemy
must evacuate Philadelphia after having sent their bag-
gage off.’ At two o'clock in the morning of June 9, the
Hessian battalions of Anspach and Bayreuth were placed
on board the transports. These battalions were sold by the
Margrave Charles Alexander to the British king. In
March, 1777, they had mutinied at Ochsenfurth on the
Main, the little village from which they afterward em-
barked for America. The Margrave was then brought to
them by express, and with a keen view of the £18,000
soon to be his and of the pleasure this would bring him, he
soon quelled with threats this incipient riot. These bat-
talions were now put in vessels at Philadelphia instead of
crossing New Jersey. The diary of Quartermaster Johann
Heusser, of the von Lossberg regiment, says it was “‘be-
cause they were unable to march,” but the British re-
ports show that Clinton did not trust them. He feared
they would all desert. These organizations, however, re-
mained in the service and were captured at the battle of
Yorktown.’”*

On June g the Forty-sixth British regiment joined Gen-
eral Leslie at Cooper’s Creek. On the evening of June 11
“the sick of the army absolutely unable to march’ were
ordered to be “at the lower ferry at five A.M. precisely
to-morrow morning in order to their being sent on board
the hospital ships.’’ On June 12 the last of the wagons, all

SLowell’s The Hessians and the other German Auxiliaries of Great
Britain in the Revolutionary War, p. 47. Johnston’s The Yorktown Cam-
paign, p. 119.

E gt alTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

the light artillery, and on June 14 and 15 all the horses
of the army, draft as well as officers’ horses, were ferried
over into New Jersey. On the latter day, “with deep ex-
pressions of discontent at the movement,” a brigade of
Hessian troops, accompanied by the Thirty-third regiment
of British foot, went over the river in flat-boats. On June
16 the Sixteenth and Seventeenth regiments of light dra-
goons, with Generals Knyphausen and Grant, passed over
the Delaware River. The Hessian regiments of grenadiers
also went with them by a misinterpretation of orders, as
it was intended that they should form a rear guard.

During all these movements General Washington made
no attempt to prevent the British from securing a foothold
in New Jersey, so as to begin a march across that State.
He preferred, rather, as a German writer says, “to build
a bridge of gold for a flying enemy.’”

As has been mentioned, General Howe had received
despatches April 9, directing him to return to England.
Notwithstanding his military abilities and his soldierly
presence and bearing, being tall, with fine figure, pleasing
countenance and dignified appearance, he was constitution-
ally inert and procrastinating, always reluctant to engage
in anything but his own personal pleasures. Withal, he
was not a favorite of Lord Germaine, the Colonial Secre-
tary, and although he claimed a relationship with the
king, George III did not care to protect him from the
hatred of his executive officer. In the early morning of
May 24, General Howe turned over the command of the
army to Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Clinton, and at
half-past one in the afternoon he went on board the frigate
Andromeda, Commodore Brine, with Captain Frederick
George Mulcaster, Forty-third regiment of foot, his mili-
tary secretary. The sorrow of the young officers in Phila-
delphia was very great as they bade adieu to their boon

® For details of these movements of the British Army, see journal of
Captain John Montresor, Pennsylvania Magazine of History, Vol. VI,
p. 189 et seq.

E a2 4THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

companion, as well as military chief, who had set them an
example of wild license and of heavy gambling, instead
of at least assuming a spirit of adventure in an attempt to
surround and destroy the ill-clad and poorly fed army of
America a few miles distant. General Knyphausen, repre-
senting the older soldiers, attempted to say some words of
compliment and farewell, but his feelings overcame him
and he had to stop his remarks.

After leaving the wharf, the British frigate made but
little headway down the river against a fresh southerly
wind and it was not until May 26 that she cleared the
Capes of the Delaware. The vessel reached England July
2, 1778. Horace Walpole remarked, when he heard of the
arrival of General Howe, that he was “much richer in
money than in laurels.”

Sir Henry Clinton was now in full command of the
troops in and about Philadelphia. He was an officer rather
under size in stature, portly, with a prominent nose, some-
what reserved in his manner and not given to much inti-
macy with his other general officers. Consequently, he
never became very popular with them and perhaps ap-
peared more cool and distant than he really was, coming
so close after and in such strong contrast to the affable and
friendly manners of Howe. The German soldiers liked
him because he spoke their language. He had studied and
practised the art of war and as aide-de-camp to Ferdi-
nand, Duke of Brunswick, had seen much service in the
Seven Years’ War. He was slow and very cautious for a
general officer but forty years of age, yet he was personally
a very brave man and in his eagerness for victory, never
hesitated to assume any personal risk or danger.

In speaking of General Clinton, it is well not to omit
mention of General Cornwallis, who was without doubt
the best equipped soldier the British government had in
the United States. He was an officer of great influence in
war circles on account of his family connections and rank.
Although much like Clinton in figure, he had a pleasing

E33 3THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

face and expression and was greatly admired and loved
by the men of his command. His lordship, who had left
Philadelphia for England December 19, 1777, returned
to Philadelphia in the same vessel with the Commissioners
for peace, at eleven o’clock on the morning of June 6,
1778.

On Saturday night, June 6, in the midst of a fierce rain
storm, the three commissioners referred to in Lord North’s
conciliatory bills, to “treat, consult and agree upon the
Means of quieting the Disorders now subsisting in certain
of the Colonies, Plantations and Provinces of North
America,” having sailed from England April 22, arrived
at Philadelphia in the English vessel Trzdent. General
Clinton announced their arrival in General Orders that
evening and ordered the army to pay them every respect.
When General Lafayette heard of their arrival, he said
he feared these men more than ten thousand troops. In
this, however, he was mistaken. In the early morning of
June 7 a salute was fired in their honor and the commis-
sioners entered the city, the heavy rain of the night making
a cheerless reception. These officials were, Frederick How-
ard, Earl of Carlisle, George Johnstone, once Governor
of West Florida, and Sir William Eden, afterward Lord
Auckland, a member of Parliament and Under-Secretary
of State. To this commission it was proposed to add Lord
Howe and General Howe, and General Clinton took the
place of the latter officer. Doctor Adam Ferguson, Pro-
fessor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Edin-
burgh, came with the commission as their secretary. On
June 9, through Sir Henry Clinton, they requested General
Washington’s permission and safe-conduct for Doctor
Ferguson, whom they desired to send to New York with a
letter and a copy of their instructions to Congress. This
request was refused. These documents, however, were sent
to the Continental Congress the next day, were received
June 13, and by that act the commission gave Congress its
official and rightful recognition. It may be noted that the

[a4 elTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

letter of the commission was sealed with “the image of a
fond mother caressing her children.”

In these communications to Congress they guaranteed
freedom of legislation and internal government, represen-
tation in parliament, exemption from the presence of a
military force, except with their own permission, in fact,
the gratification of every wish that the Americans had ever
expressed, save only that of independence. In after years
the King said that many of these offers were made without
authority. It may with truth be stated, however, that at
the time they were made all these concessions seemed more
a sign of weakness than of any real desire to benefit the
colonists. The letter from the commissioners was read in
Congress at York, Pennsylvania, but elicited no favorable
response. A slight reflection on the conduct of the King
of France caused an interruption, the further reading was
stopped and the business laid over.

The committee in Congress, to which these letters and
documents were referred, said it was quite evident that
these concessions were intended to create diversions and
defections in the ranks of those who had so zealously
espoused the cause and that in their opinion “these United
States cannot with propriety hold any conference or treaty
with any commissioners on the part of Great Britain, un-
less they shall, as a preliminary thereto either withdraw
their fleets and armies, or else in positive and express
terms acknowledge the independence of the said States.’’’

The commissioners found at the very beginning of their
labors that Congress had previously acted on the purpose
of their mission, that the Americans were feeling new
spirit at the news of the strong alliance with France and
that an order from Lord Germaine had preceded them to
quit Philadelphia at an early day. From the very first hour
they could not but feel that their mission was doomed to
failure. They complained bitterly to the home government

7 Journals of Congress, January 1, 1778, to January 1, 1779, Vol. IV,

P. 347 to 354.

L351THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

in thus embarrassing them at the outset by giving up to the
Americans the forttier capital of their country, and said
that this retreat dispelled every hope of success they had
cherished.

These unexpected measures of the ministry of England
excited astonishment and indignation in the British Army.
The officers thought it a personal indignity that the com-
missioners were willing to concede so much. These con-
ciliatory bills seemed to them a kind of substitute for the
reinforcement of 20,000 men which they had been led to
expect. The loyalists thought, and so intimated to the com-
missioners, that all their public and private hopes and
the expected gratification of their personal resentments
were cut off at a blow.

In this way, and because of these attempted negotia-
tions, the march of Sir Henry Clinton’s army and the
abandonment of Philadelphia were delayed from day to
day. The army was kept in check for the sake of diplo-
macy. General Gates Soaked, June 17, ‘““Thank Heaven
for the precious time the enemy have so foolishly lost.””*

During the time the commissioners were urging their
plans upon Congress and the American people, a curious
attempt was made by them, through a Mrs. Ferguson,
to bribe General Joseph Reed, President of Pennsylvania,
with the offer of ten thousand pounds sterling. He indig-
nantly spurned the effort with the caustic reply, that he
was not worth purchasing, but such as he was, the King of
Great Britain was not rich enough to do it.

On August 11, 1778, notice was taken in Congress of
the plans of the commissioners by the adoption of the
following resolution:

“Resolved, That Congress will not in any degree nego-
tiate with the present commissioners in America for restor-
ing peace.” This was in the form of a declaration and was
ordered to be published to the world.

8 For Washington’s opinion of the conciliatory bills, see letter to John
Banister, Delegate in Congress from Virginia,—Sparks, Vol. V, p. 321.

[536 3THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

The action on the part of those loyalists who had de-
termined to leave Philadelphia with the troops was equiva-
lent to the sacrifice of their property, except so much
thereof as they were allowed to carry on ship-board. To
quit the city was to exile themselves, bid farewell to for-
mer friends and associates and to begin life anew in some
untried locality. To those loyalists who preferred to re-
main, it meant ostracism by the patriots, who would soon
return, and, as it afterward proved, imprisonment and
death to some of them. Von Elking says, and certainly
with much truth, that they “contemplated the arrival of
the colonists with terror and stupefaction.”

On June 2, even before his army had possession of
Philadelphia, General Washington advised the greatest
moderation, forbearance and charity toward those who
would remain. He warned Congress that for want of the
offer of protection, “hundreds, nay thousands of people
and among them many valuable artisans, with large quan-
tities of goods, will be forced from Philadelphia who
otherwise would willingly remain. From report, their re-
luctance and distress upon this occasion are scarcely to be
paralleled.” And the loyalists said, as they gathered up
their movable property, “If Philadelphia is left to the
rebels, independence is acknowledged and America lost.”
The poor Tories were indeed in a terrible plight, for their
faint hearts were filled with dread of patriot revenge. The
loyalist ladies who, with their beauty and presence had
made the winter gay for the young soldiery of Britain, saw
that the end of their jollity had come and that they must
keep in close retirement, if indeed they remained at all in
the city soon to be in control of the American arms.CHAPTER V

GAIN looking for a moment at the camp at Valley
Forge, we find that early in May the warm sunshine
followed the chilling blasts of winter, and spring infused
joy and good spirits into the ranks of the worn soldiers of
the republic. Yet it must be remembered that it was during
that long season of intense cold and suffering, borne with
sublime heroism, that the American Army first learned the
discipline of the true soldier. Baron von Steuben, who had
been taught the art of war under the great Frederick and
who joined Washington’s army February 23, had begun
in March to recreate an army, and every day and all day
he labored to make a force of skilled soldiers. He thought
that under tattered clothing he saw good material for a
fighting column, and he tried to develop it. With strange
German oaths he drilled the awkward squad, himself act-
ing as sergeant, and when his own vocabulary of sharp
profanity became exhausted he called on his aide, Captain
Benjamin Walker, to assist him in words adequate to the
occasion. The men saw that he was sincere and they ad-
mired him. In after days they thanked him from their
patriotic souls when they saw that they were brought to
victory by the methods which he had so carefully taught
them. On March 28, as we find by Washington’s orderly
book, von Steuben had begun to exercise the duties of In-
spector-General of the army, in the place of General
Conway, although it was not until May 5 that he was
commissioned to that office, with the rank of Major-
General, by the Continental Congress. On May 30,
Colonel Jacob Morgan of the Pennsylvania militia wrote,
“regiments of the army perform manoeuvres with great
exactness and dispatch and are well disciplined.”
The Quartermaster’s department was now working
more smoothly under the management of the noble-hearted

esrTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

General Greene. He was ably seconded by Colonel John

Cox and Colonel Charles Pettit, Assistant Quartermaster-

Generals, and by Colonel Clement Biddle and Colonel
.

Jeremiah Wadsworth in the department of the Com-

missary.

With a better supply of food and clothing the men for-
got their past sufferings, turned with cheerfulness to the
school of the soldier, and were drilled into a force fit to
cope with any of the troops of Britain.

About the last of April some six hundred men joined
the army from the New England States and Lieutenant-
Colonel Eleazer Oswald wrote from the Artillery Park at
Valley Forge, May 15, to Colonel John Lamb, the com-
manding officer of the Second regiment Continental artil-
lery, “Our army is now very formidable, but not such as
enables Gen’] Washington to attack the enemy in Phila-
delphia. . . . Reinforcements have lately arrived—a few
more will give us superiority of our enemy.”

On June 10 the soldiers left their winter huts and
pitched tents for the few days they expected to remain
on that soil.

General William Maxwell’s Continental brigade was
ordered May 7 to march to New Jersey and be prepared to
harass the enemy in case they proceeded to New York by
land through that State. The whole army, as General

1The Staff of General Washington consisted of Alexander Scammell,
colonel and adjutant- general; Neral Greene, major-general and
quartermaster-general ; Frederick William Augustus von Steuben, major-
general and inspector-general ; Louis ee béque Duportail, brigadier-general
and chief of engineers; Henry Knox, brigadier-general and chief of artil-
lery ; John Lawrence, colonel and judge advocate-general ; Jeremiah Wads-
worth, colonel and commissary-general of purchases ; ‘Charles Stewart,
colonel and commissary-general of issues; Clement Biddle, colonel and
commissary-gene ral of forage ; Alexander Hamilton, lieutenant-colonel and
aide-de-camp; Richard K. Meade, ieRERDAnE CONG. and aide-de-camp ;
John Laurens, lieutenant-colonel l and aide-d e-camp ; John Fitzgerald, lieu-
tenant-colonel and aide-de-camp; Tench Tilghman, lieutenant-colonel and
aide-de-camp; Robert H. Harrison, lieutenant-colonel and military secre-
tary; James McHenry, assistant secretary ; Joseph Reed, brigadier-general
and volunteer aide-de-camp; John Cadwalader, brigadier-general and

volunteer aide-de-camp.
E39 3THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

Washington says, was placed under marching orders the
same day.

The Continental Congress ordered a council of war to
be held at Valley Forge. This was done on May 8. At this
meeting there were present Major-Generals Gates, Greene,
Stirling, Mifflin, Lafayette, De Kalb, von Steuben and
Armstrong, and Brigadier-Generals Knox and Duportail.
The council was called at General Washington’s quarters
to determine the plan for the general operations of the
army during the approaching campaign, and especially
to decide whether it was best to attempt any important
movement at that time. It was then determined “that the
line of conduct most consistent with sound policy and
best suited to promote the interests and safety of the
United States, was to remain on the defensive and await
events, and not attempt any offensive operation against
the enemy, till circumstances should afford a fairer oppor-
tunity for striking a successful blow.” The storming of
Philadelphia had been suggested but this was deemed very
imprudent and impracticable with the present force, and
for the same reason siege could not be laid against that
city. When General Lee arrived in camp twelve days after
the council he agreed to the policy of avoiding all offensive
demonstrations and so gave his signature to the written
action of the meeting of general officers. The very discus-
sion of the subject, however, proves that at the opening
of spring the American officers began to feel that they
were nearly ready to commence some bold operations on
the enemy.

The common topic in the huts of the American Army
at this time was, the probable destination of Clinton’s
Army. As early as May 18 Washington wrote Lafayette
that the “enemy were preparing to evacuate Philadel-
phia.”’ Some thought it possible even then that the British
would march into interior Pennsylvania, make a demon-
stration on the American cantonment and disperse the
Congress at York. Some supposed they would move south-

[ 40 J]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
ward and others thought they intended eae on the
Hudson River. General Gates expressed the last opinion
and added that he thought they intended to carry desola-
tion through New England.

On May 2 27 the following notice appeared in the New
Jersey Gazette: “The militia of this State are desired to
be particularly attentive to signals, as a movement of the
enemy is soon expected.”

Christopher Marshall wrote in his diary May 28, “It
was thought the army intended to make a push across the
Jerseys for Amboy.”

On May 29 General Washington wrote to Governor
Clinton, as follows: ““That the enemy mean to evacuate
Philadelphia is almost reduced to a certainty. It is as much
so, as an event can be, that is contingent. Their baggage
and stores are nearly if not all embarked; and, from our
intelligence, there is reason to conclude that many days
will not elapse before they abandon it.’

Sir Henry Clinton could not conceal the fact that he
was about to make some great strategic movement, but the
place of his operations he tried to keep secret. General
Washington, however, was thoroughly apprised by his
true friends in Philadelphia of every intended movement
of Clinton’s forces. He knew when the attempt to take
them by water to New York was abandoned and when it
was determined to march the troops across the State of
New Jersey. On June 2 he wrote Major General Philemon
Dickinson, commanding the New Jersey Militia,—“‘ap-
pearances and a thousand circumstances induce a belief,
that they intend to pass through the Jerseys to New
ork."

About this time Dep ae Quartermaster-General Moore
Furman wrote a letter from Trenton, New Jersey, to Wil-
liam Lowrey, a quartermaster at Flemington,—a docu-
ment still preserved by his descendants in Trenton—

2 Sparks’ Writings of George Washington, Vol. V, p. 387.
8 ibid., p. 395.

C41 JTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

informing him that the British would soon cross the State
of New Jersey and that the American Army would go in
pursuit of them. It is evident that General Washington
had informed his trusted friend at Trenton so that sup-
plies for his army might be collected immediately.

The total strength of the American Army under the
immediate control of General Washington was about
16,000 men.

On June 24, 1778, General Washington wrote that he
had “on the ground 10,648 rank and file, besides the ad-
vanced brigade under General Maxwell of about 1200,
and 1200 Militia in New Jersey.” To this force must be
added the commissioned officers, non-commissioned offi-
cers and musicians of the army. The historian Marshall
computed the American Army at between 10,000 and
11,000 effectives. General de Peyster, in a very careful
computation, estimates the American Army as at least
one-fourth larger than the British force in Philadelphia.

It is quite apparent that the number as stated above is
very close to the full strength of the army, counting every
soldier under General Washington’s control. The official
field return of the army on June 22, 1778, herein fully
displayed, gives a total of 13,503 officers and men.* Add
to this the number of men who appear on the return of
July 4 as “present fit for duty” in General Maxwell’s
brigade, namely 1297, and from 800 to 1000 New Jersey
militia, and the grand total of all organizations and all
arms of the service under Washington’s direct command
must have been about 16,000 men. Probably from this
gross amount we should deduct about 2000 or 2500 as
men on leave of absence, on detailed duty, and in hospitals
and we then have Washington’s effective force, between
13,000 and 14,000 men. These are about the figures esti-
mated by General de Peyster in his critical articles on the
Battle of Monmouth, and by Winthrop Sargent in his
life of André.

4See Appendices I and II.

[ 42 J]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

On April 23 a distinguished officer of the Continental
Army, Major-General Charles Lee, arrived at Valley
Forge after more than fifteen months’ captivity within the
British lines. He left Philadelphia on his parole of honor
April 5 and was declared exchanged April 21 for Major-
General Richard Prescott of the British Army. He received
from the officers and men in the American Army an ova-
tion too great for his past services, and very inappropriate
in the light of his conduct during the subsequent three
months.” As he appears so prominent in the pages of this
work it seems proper that some mention should be made of
the previous history of the senior Major-General of the
American Army.° In November 1776, General Lee com-
manded a column of troops at White Plains, New York,
which were ordered to reinforce the army under General
Washington on the west bank of the Delaware River. On
the morning of December 13 he was surrounded and taken
prisoner by a detachment of the Sixteenth regiment,
Queen’s light dragoons, near Baskingridge, Somerset
County, New Jersey, four miles outside of his own lines.
During his long confinement, he seems to have revived
his esteem for his former comrades, his love of the glory of
the British arms and to have expressed again and again
his contempt for the apparent weakness of the force con-

5 The Honorable Elias Boudinot, LL.D., in after years the President of
the Continental Congress and signer of the treaty of peace with Great
Britain gives this description of the entrance of General Lee into the lines
of the patriot army: “All the principal Officers of the Army were drawn
up in two lines, advanced of the Camp about 2 miles towards the Enemy.
Then the troops with the inferior Officers formed a line quite to head
Quarters. All the Music of the Army attended. The General with a great
number of principal Officers and their Suites, rode about four miles on
the road towards Philadelphia and waited till Gen’l Lee appeared. Gen.
Washington dismounted & rec’d Gen. Lee as if he had been his brother.
He passed thro’ the Lines of Officers & the Army, who all paid him the
highest military Honours to Head Quarters, where Mrs. Washington was
and here he was entertained with an Elegant Dinner and the Music Play-
ing the whole Time. A Room was assigned him back of Mrs. Washington’s
Sitting Room and all his Baggage was stowed in it. . . . Gen’l Washington
gave him the command of the Right Wing of the Army, but before he took
charge of it, he requested leave to go to Congress at York Town, which
was readily granted.”—The Boudinot Journal, p. 78.

6 See Appendix III.
[43 JTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

tending in liberty’s name. But worse than all is the dis-
covery made by the learned historiographer, the late
Doctor George H. Moore, that on March 29, 1777, he
submitted a “plan” to the commanding officers of the army
and navy of the Crown as to the best mode of conquering
America. Among other things he said, “If the Province of
Maryland or the greater part of it is reduc’d or submits,
and the People of Virginia are prevented or intimidated
from marching aid to the Pensylvania Army the whole
machine is dissolv’d and a period put to the War,” and
he advised that ‘four thousand men be immediately em-
bark’d in transports, one half of which shou’d proceed up
the Potomac and take post at Alexandria, the other half
up Chesepeak Bay and possess themselves of Annapolis.
. . . These Posts may with ease support each other, as it
is but two easy days march from one to the other, and if
occasion requires by a single days march. They may join
and conjunctly carry on their operations wherever it shall
be thought eligible to direct ’em, whether to take posses-
sion of Baltimore or post themselves on some spot on the
Westward bank of the Susquehanna, which is a point of
the utmost importance.’”’

These few lines give us some idea of the plans which
this bold, unscrupulous man, while a prisoner of war, had
the impudence to offer for the consideration of the repre-
sentatives of England’s power in America. These words
give an outline of his treasonable scheme to subvert and
destroy the future liberties of a people struggling in a holy
cause, to “unhinge and dissolve the whole system of de-
fense” and thus end the war. It is clear that by thus be-
traying the cause in which he was engaged his idea was
that when the whole plan of self-government had been
acknowledged a failure, it would be his fortune not only
to have secured his own personal safety and protection but
also, perhaps, his old commission, with pay attached. For
he expected that the humanity of his Majesty’s Commis-

7 Moore’s Treason of General Lee, p. 87.

E444THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
sioners would “incline ’em” in that supreme moment of
victory to “have consideration for Individuals who have
acted from Principle.”* If they would only act as he sug-
gested, he ventured to assert with the pe nalty of his life
that the war would end in less than two months.

It appears that for some time General Washington had
been making very active exertions to have General Lee ex-
changed, becau se, as he said, he had never been “more
wanted by him than at the present moment.” But the inter-
view which Colonel Elias Boudinot, Commissary General
of Prisoners, had with Lee, wherein Lee said to him, “It is
in vain for Congress to withstand british Troops in the
Field,” and indeed the whole conversation, proves him not
to have been a true and zealous patriot.”

General Lee was exchanged April 21, as has been said,
received with great honor in the American camp April 23,
left immediately for the Continental Congress then in ses-
sion at York, Pennsylvania, and on the twentieth day of
May again reported for duty at Valley Forge. Ten days
thereafter he was ordered to command the First Division
of the army.”

This is the man who was destined to take so prominent a
part in two war counc Is of the patriot army in the ensuing
campaign and who was to play such a questionable rdle
on the field of Monmouth. General Lee, with overweening
vanity, thought that at the suggestion of General Howe
and Lord Howe, General Clinton would certainly follow
the plan suggested by a soldier of such merit and exper-
ience as himself, and march ts army toward the lower
parts of the Susquehanna River. From some of the dis-
positions of General Howe there is no doubt that at one

8 tbid., p. 85.

9 Boudinot’s Life and Services of Elt oudtinot, Vol. I, p. 140 e¢ seq.

10 The staff of General Lee cons iste a of Lieuten ant-Col ynel John Brooks
of the Eighth Massac hus etts reg ment, adjutant-g veneral; Colonel the Mar-
quis Francis de Malmedy, mail r John Francis Mercer, formerly Captain of
the Third Virginia regimer Maj or George Turberville, formerly Cap-

tain of the Fifteenth ini inia regiment, and Captain Ev: an Edwards, of
Hartley’s Continental regiment, aides-de-camy

E4s aTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

time he intended to do so. Fully impressed with this
opinion, having “particular reasons” to think they
would do so, and anxious, if such a movement were
made, to be able to say that he himself had predicted it,
General Lee wrote a letter to General Washington June
15, in which he gave his professional opinion of the situa-
tion, what he thought the British would do and the way
the Americans should act in the predicted contingency.

General Washington replied to General Lee’s artful
communication the same day. It was a very courteous
letter, but it is clear that the Commander-in-Chief was not
shaken in his belief that the design of the British officers
was to march across New Jersey.”

11 Lee Papers, New York Historical Society Collections, 1872, pp. 399, 402.CHAPTER VI

N June 16 Sir Henry Clinton determined to start

immediately on his march through New Jersey by
way of Brunswick to the city of New York. That very
evening he sent General Stirn with a small command
across the Delaware River into New Jersey. The visit of
the British conciliatory commissioners to America and
their efforts to negotiate a peace had proved an utter fail-
ure, and there was now no reason to delay the execution
of the instructions Clinton had received. He therefore
issued the following orders:

Head-Quarters, Philadelphia, June 16, 1778.

Lieutenant-General Kniphausen and Major-General Grant will
cross the river to-morrow at 4 with the following regiments:
Yagers, mounted and dismounted, Queen’s Rangers, Hessian Gren-
adiers, Second Battalion New Jersey Volunteers, Maryland Loyal-
ists, Volunteers of Ireland and the Caledonian Volunteers. All
waggons and carts, with the waggons and bat-horses belonging to
the general and staff Officers, are to be embarked this afternoon at
half-past 3, at the upper coal wharf and to-morrow at 6 all the
saddle horses belonging to the general and staff Officers are to be
embarked at the same place, except two for the commander-in-chief
and one for each of the general Officers. All the Sick that are abso-
lutely unable to march are to be at Primrose’s wharf to-morrow
morning at 5 o'clock, where they will be received on board the
Actiue—Webb, Master.

By this order General Clinton opened his first campaign
as commander-in-chief of the British Army in America and
the first military movement of the year 1778 with what
was virtually a retreat. Between eight and nine o'clock in
the evening of June 17 all the artillery, and all the com-
missary stores of the army which the boats had not carried

1 From order book of Seventh regiment British foot, Lieutenant-Colonel

Alured Clarke, commanding, found on the battlefield of Monmouth, and
[1899] in possession of the [late] Hon. John D. Buckelew, of Jamesburg,
New Jersey.

a7 alTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
away were transported over the river at Cooper’s Ferry and
the supplies placed in wagons under the protection of the
3000 grenadier and light infantry troops of General Les-
lie’s command. The baggage of the army that had not been
taken away by the boats had been placed on New Jersey
soil the previous day. After the artillery and stores had
been transported across the river, the Queen’s rangers
were sent over, a watchful guard was set against alarms
and all the British troops were ordered to sleep on their
arms, ready to resist a surprise.

It was a busy, but quiet night in Philadelphia as the
remainder of the army prepared to evacuate the Quaker
city where they had enjoyed a winter of gay revelry and
freedom from military hardships. The night was clear and
lovely and the air balmy and still. It was with great reluc-
tance that the young officers and men of the British line
bade adieu to the fair loyalists who had helped so to
lighten the dull monotony of a soldier’s ordinary life. At
three o’clock in the morning of June 18 the order was given
for the first of the transports, which contained the re-
mainder of the army, to push off for the New Jersey shore.
The navy, under command of Admiral Lord Richard
Howe formed a line on the southerly side of the ferry
route across the river and so protected the transports from
any hostile demonstration. The army crossed mostly in
open boats, without the slightest hindrance from Ameri-
cans on either side of the river. In this way the remainder
of the “more than 17,000 effective troops,’ as Bancroft
estimates them, which had been stationed in and around
Philadelphia, having marched down toward League
Island, crossed over before ten o’clock in the morning to
Gloucester Point, four miles below what is now the city
of Camden. They made no noise in evacuating the city
but at the last moment left in the greatest haste, fearing
perhaps that the Americans had heard of their intended
departure and would attack them. A lady who saw them

[ 48 JTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

leave said “they did not go away, they vanished.”? One
of their number, Lieutenant-Colonel the Honorable
Cosmo Gordon, of the Third regiment, British foot guards,
the gossip of the day has not allowed us to forget. Stupid,
no doubt, from the debauch of the previous nig sht, he slept
too late, and when he awoke, after ten o ‘clock, his com-
rades had gone over the river and the Americans were en-
tering the city. With great haste he escaped, the last man
to ve the gay city, aad was taken over the river to his
command by an active Tory boatman.* At eleven o’clock
in the morning of June 18 the fleet of Lord Howe weighed
anchor for New York. His flag-ship was the Eagle, and
the three special commissioners were on the Trdent. Before
sailing they had issued a manifesto to the American people,
of Sich the Earl of Carlisle said, in a letter dated Octo-
ber 23, 1778, “’Tis a sort of last dying speech of the
Commission.” The patriot Governor Livingston, of New
Jersey, made a kite of the commission’s proclamation for
his son to play with.

The weather was fine and the wind northerly. Captain
John Montresor, the Chief Engineer of the army, went
with the fleet, as he had just been badly ruptured. On
June 21 the fleet lay off Reedy Island, but le tt there the
following day, and after sailing three hours was becalmed.

On June 18, just before noon, the Hessian grenadiers
with General Knyphausen in command, took the right of

2Du Simitiere to Colonel Lamb, November 24, 1778, in Leake’s Memoirs
of the Life and Times of Gener ral John Lamb, p. 213.

8 This is the same officer of whom it was said in the British House of
Commons, February 2, 1775: “Mr. Cosmo Go yrdon was against any com-
promise or lenient measures with America until she has entirely sub-
mitted.” (Force’s American Arc hives, Fourth Series, Vol. I, p. 1547). He
was the officer who, early in the morning of June 23, 17 780, received a rose

from Miss Susan Livingston, daughter of Governor William Livingston,
probably as a pledge of protection of her father’s hovthe! Liberty Hall,
Elizabeth Town (Sedgwick’s Life of William Livingston, p. 352), and who,

for his conduct the same day at the battle of Gacte field, was tried by
General Court Martial August 22, 1782, and finally acquitted. (The trial
of the Hon. Col. Cosmo Gordon of the Third regiment of Foot Guards for
neglect of duty, London, 1783). He afterward shot and killed his accuser,
Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Thomas.

[ 49 JTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

the marching column, and advanced six miles that day to
Haddonfield, on Cooper’s Creek in old Gloucester County.
General Alexander Leslie’s force brought up the baggage
and supplies and turned them over to General Knyphausen
an hour after that officer arrived in Haddonfield. The
Fifteenth regiment of British foot, which had been posted
at Billingsport, also marched up and joined the main
army. During the after part of the day the rest of Sir
Henry Clinton’s troop reached the vicinity of the village
of Haddonfield.
The following order was issued by Sir Henry Clinton
that evening at Haddonfield:
Head Quarters Haddenfield
18th June 1778

The Commanding Off’rs of Corps will strictly inform all others
relating to Discipline and good Order, and it being the General’s
Intention to have the Army as amply Supply’d as there Situation
can admit of, he desires it may be understood that he is fully de-
termined to execute upon the spot every man detected in maraud-
ing or who shall quit his company upon the March, or shall be
found beyond the outposts of the Camp without Permission.

All Persons who have Permission to follow the Army are Imme-
diately to give in their Names to the Late Town Major of Phila-
delphia specifying their Country and by whom Recommended.*

General Carrington says of this movement from Phila-
delphia across New Jersey, and with great truth, “It was
no temporary diversion, to entice Washington from his
stronghold to a combat in the field, but it was a surrender
of the field itself to his control.” And again he remarks,
“the moral effect of the evacuation was in Washington’s
favor.””®

The British fleet off Philadelphia at this time consisted
of fifty-seven transports and merchantmen, and with these
boats was the squadron of war vessels and armed ships
hereinbefore mentioned, expected to act as convoys to the
transports. On these boats had been placed a large quan-

 Lieutenant-Colonel Clarke’s order book.
5 Carrington’s Battles of the American Revolution, p. 412.

Eso-a]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

tity of stores, gathered at Philadelphia and the country
contiguous thereto, and some of the baggage and heavy
ordnance of the army. A portion of the Hessian cavalry,
with two Anspach regiments, about 1000 men,—not con-
sidered very reliable if they had to march through an open
country,—were placed on the transports. It appears that
many of these men had formed tender attachments during
the winter and it was expected that they would desert at
the very first opportunity, if placed with the marching
column. When the time arrived for them to embark, many
of those who had married Philadelphia maidens concealed
themselves until the fleet and army had departed. Hessian
documents state that they had shown their inability to
march.® It was estimated by the Earl of Carlisle that
3000’ of the miserable Tories of Philadelphia, men, women
and children, justly indignant at the British under whose
protection they had placed themselves, left with the boats
to try their fortunes in some other part of the country. It
must have been sad indeed, to see those refugees in such
numbers voluntarily exiling themselves upon the approach
of the patriots whom they probably knew so well; yet they
had reason to fear that the protection papers they held
would be considered merely as proofs of their disloyalty
and only serve to bring punishment upon them.

On Friday morning, June 19, Sir Henry Clinton, with
the Third, Fourth and Fifth brigades of the British line,
left Haddonfield, passing in front of General Knyphau-
sen’s command. The army proceeded only six miles, as far
as Evesham* and went into quarters, it having rained very
severely all the afternoon and night. Another portion of
the army, marching up the King’s Highway from Haddon-
field, over the North branch of the Penisauken Creek,
through Ellisburg and through great forests of gnarled
chestnut trees and swamp maples, encamped that night in

6 Manuscript journal of Quartermaster Johann Heusser of the Fusilier
Regiment von Lossberg.

7 This number is also stated in the German records.

8 Now Evesboro, in Evesham township, Burlington County.

elTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

and near the Friends’ Meeting House in Moorestown,
Burlington County. They plundered the inhabitants of
their household goods, their grain, horses and cattle in that
section of the State at every opportunity. It was with the
greatest difficulty that the quiet people thereabouts were
able to conceal anything of value. They succeeded, how-
ever, in concealing in Deer Park Swamp a number of
horses, cows and sheep. General Knyphausen with his
Hessian grenadiers and the First and Second British bri-
gades remained behind in Haddonfield that day.

It may be mentioned here that when Clinton’s advance,
consisting of the brigade of General Leslie, with the Hes-
sian yagers in front, came within sight of the little village
of Evesham, a little party of the New Jersey militia made
an attack on the British light infantry. It was sudden and
unexpected, but there is no record in British journals of
the effect produced. In this encounter two houses in the
village were burned and Captain Jonathan Beesley of the
First battalion Cumberland County militia was severely
wounded by a yager sharpshooter and fell into British
hands. He was a brave and gallant patriot and thought
more of duty than of his personal safety. The English
officers carried him to headquarters and then demanded of
their wounded foe such information as he had of the con-
dition, situation, and probable movements of Washing-
ton’s army and especially of General Dickinson’s forces,
which they knew by this time were gathering just in front
of them. Captain Beesley deliberately refused to answer
any of their questions or to give any information which
might endanger his country’s cause. He died on the even-
ing of that day in the house owned and occupied for many
years by Hinchman Haines, now deceased. The house is
still standing [1899] near Evesboro, Burlington County.
Captain Beesley was buried that same night with all the
honors of war, for General Clinton said, “he was a brave
man and should not be treated with indignity.” His body

[52]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
was afterward removed to the Friends’ burying ground at
Haddonfield.

As the guards were fixed on the night of June 19 the
parole was “Jersey” and the countersign “Brunswick,”
showing that they had that town still in mind as the route
they expected to take to the seaboard.

The orders for the march were then issued:

Head Quarters, Evesham 19 June, 1778

The troops to be under arms to-morrow morning at 4 o'clock
and to take up the same Orders of March by the right as this day.
They will receive Orders to move off their ground from his Ex-
cellency Lieut. Gen’l Cornwallis.

In the early hours of Saturday morning, the British col-
umn began to move toward Mount Holly under the direct
orders of Lord Cornwallis. It still rained furiously and so
continued until the middle of the afternoon and the storm
was followed by intense heat. The seven miles to Mount
Holly, marching about a mile an hour were finally covered
and the column halted in order that the remainder of the
troops might come up. One gill of extra rum was ordered
to be issued to each soldier that night from the Commis-
sary store headquarters. General Leslie directed in orders,
“the advance sentries on no account to allow any soldier to
pass the outposts, unless parties with arms on duty, as the
enemy has patrols all around to take up stragglers.” This
statement shows that the British light troops were already
feeling the effective nearness of the Jersey farmers and
their rifles.

General Clinton spent Sunday, June 21, at Mount
Holly and the army again tried to plunder, but found that
the citizens had removed most of their valuables. Before
leaving, however, they destroyed the iron works, the main
industry of the village, and the dwelling houses of Colonel
Israel Shreve’ and Peter Tallman.”

® Lieutenant-Colonel Clarke’s order book.

10 Commanding officer of the Second regiment of New Jersey Contl-

nental line. :
11 Chairman of the Committee of Observation of Burlington County.

E 53.3

<THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

Referring to this wanton act Sir Henry Clinton said in
general orders at Crosswicks June 23, ““The Houses of Mr.
Shreve and Mr. Tallman having been burnt this morning,
the Commander-in-Chief will (if the destruction of the
houses was intentional ) give a reward of 25 guineas to any
one who will discover the Person or Persons who set fire
to the above Houses, so that they may be brought to the
Punishment due to acts, so disgraceful to the army. The
Commander-in-Chief gives notice that any Person that
may hereafter be found committing such Disorders will be
delivered to the Provost Marshall for immediate execu-
GlOniee

In this connection, and calling attention to the bad con-
duct of one of these British regiments, it is well to insert
here the morning orders, June 21, of the Seventh regiment
British foot, also called the Royal Fuzileer regiment:

No Regiment having been formerly more Conspicuous for its
Discipline than the Royal Fusileers, Lt. Col. Clarke is the more
Mortif’d at observing the great Irregularity and excesses that have
been committed within these few days—and as nothing is more
Disgraceful in a Corps than such humiliating Proceedings he
flatters himself the Officers will Exert themselves to the utmost to
prevent its happening again, and he Desires the Soldiers may
understand, that he is Determined to Punish with the utmost Sever-
ity any man or follower of the Reg’t who shall be Detected in
Marauding or Stragling without the limits of the Encampment.
When the Reg’t comes to its Ground after a march an Of? is to
remain with each Comp’ till the hutts are finished and to report
there being so to the Commanding officer then in Camp. The Men
are to put their black Stocks into their Knapsacks every morning
when they are to march with a clean false collar fixed to it so as
they may be put on at a Minute’s notice. The lace of the Mens
Hatts to be well Clean’d against Evening Roll calling and the
Hatts to be well Cocked.12

Soon after daylight June 21, General Knyphausen’s
division, with the stores and baggage, left Haddonfield
and, marching by the Chester meeting house of the Society

12 Lieutenant-Colonel Clarke’s order book.
13 55
thid.

GaraTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
of Friends on the Moorestown road, joined General Clin-
ton at Mount Holly soon after nine o’clock in the morn-
ing. That night a terrific thunderstorm took place and the
roads became very heavy.

The order was then issued for the march of June 22. It
was in these words:

Head Quarters, Mount Holly, June 21st ’78
The following Corps are to be under arms at 3 O'clock to morrow
morning and are to March in the Order in which they are men-
tion’d: 90 Mounted Hessian Yagers, and all the Dismounted, the
Queen’s Rangers, an Off’r and 20 Pioneers, ist Battalion Light
Infantry, 60 Pioneers with 2 waggons of the Engineer’s intrench-
ing tools, Queen’s Light Dragoons, British Grenadiers, Hessian
Grenadiers, 2 12 Pounders and 1 Howetzer, Brigade of Guards,
ard Brigade British, 3 Battalions of the Fourth brigade British,
6 Pontoons, the Remainder of the Engineer’s intrenching Tools,
bat horses of the Army, Baggage of the General Offr’s and of the
army, according to the line of March, Cattle, sth Brig* British,
Havendon’s"* Troop of Provincial Cavalry are to be under the
Command of Brig’™ Gen” Leslie——One Battalion from the 4th
Brigade to flank the Baggage on the left, Lt. Col. Hallem Corps
will flank it on the right, Lt. Col. Vandike’s Corps will March in
the center of the Baggage: the remainder of the army will receive
their Orders from Lt General Kniphausen."*

On June 22, the entire force, now reunited, marched
seven miles in the rain from Mount Holly through Slab-
town to Black Horse, now Columbus, Burlington County.
More than forty-eight hours passed before the last man
of the British Army had left the village of Mount Holly.

Major-General Philemon Dickinson’s New Jersey
Militia and Brigadier-General William Maxwell’s New
Jersey Continentals had, as Clinton himself said, “de-
stroyed every bridge on the road” and as the country
through which the British force had to pass abounded in
many little streams it was necessary to keep a full corps
of engineers constantly busy repairing the means of pas-

14 Captain Richard Hovendon of Hovendon’s Pennsylvania light dra-

goons.
15 Lieutenant-Colonel Clarke’s order book.

esTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

sage over these streams and over the marshes. In this severe
toil, in the heat and in the storm, the skilled officers and
men suffered greatly. Over Cooper’s Creek, Moor’s Creek,
Ballybridge Creek, Ancocus Creek and Bird Creek entirely
new bridges or causeways had to be built. Much of the
roadway was very narrow and the sand very deep through
which the wagons had to pass.

To a superficial observer it ay seem that Sir Henry
Clinton’s march was exceedingly slow, but when we think
of the heat, the rain, the enormous bagg: rage train and other
impedimenta, the bad roads, the numerous creeks just re-
ferred to, the annoyances made by the little bands of
Jerseymen always near them “harassing and impeding their
motions so as to allow the Continental Troops to come up
with them,” breaking down bridges, blowing up cause-
ways, filling up wells of water along the route, we must
conclude that Clinton was doing all that a good soldier
could to press to his journey’s end with the vast caravan
which it was necessary to move with so much caution.”

British reports afterward complimented Sir Henry Clin-
ton for voluntarily assuming this heavy encumbrance.
They called it foresight and wisdom, because he knew he
would pass through an unfriendly country and could not
count on obtaining supplies. He knew that his march
would be delayed by the patriot militia of the State, and,
therefore, he thought proper to carry all his necessities
with him.

6 The New Jersey Gazette of July 1, 1778, says that on June 22, twenty-

seven British grenadiers were captured and sent to Trenton for confine-
ment and thirty- -six soldiers were sent to Princeton.CHAPTER VII

HILE all was excitement in Philadelphia over the

evacuation of the city by the British soldiery, Gen-
eral Washington, being fully impressed with the idea that
a move toward the great harbor was to be made in a few
days, called his general officers together June 17 to a
council of war at his quarters at Valley Forge. He had
already formed in his own mind a plan of operations, but,
as was his custom, he asked the opinion of his subordinate
general officers as to the best method of procedure in case
the British crossed the Delaware River. The following
questions were propounded, to which he desired answers in
writing the next morning:

I. Whether any enterprise ought to be undertaken against the
enemy in their present circumstances ?

II. Whether the army should remain in the position it now holds,
till the final occupation of the city, or move immediately towards
the Delaware ?

Ill. Whether any detachment of it shall be sent to reinforce the
brigade in the Jerseys, or advanced towards the enemy to act as
occasion shall require, and endeavor to take advantage of their
retreat ?

IV. If the enemy march through Jersey, will it be prudent to
attack them on the way, or more eligible to proceed to the North
River in the most direct and convenient manner, to secure the im-
portant communication between the eastern and southern States ?

V. In case such measures should be adopted, as will enable this
army to overtake the enemy in their march, will it be prudent, with
the aid which may reasonably be expected from the Jersey militia,
to make an attack upon them, and ought it to be a partial or a gen-
eral one?

All the answers of the nine general officers present at the
council, were received at about nine o’clock on the morn-
ing of June 18 and read by General Washington. Among
these we may state that Major-General Lee, Major-
General von Steuben and Brigadier-General Duportail

iB 57THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
thought it almost criminal to hazard a general engagement
at that time with such a brilliant and well-appointed army.
Brigadier-General Wayne and Brigadier-General Cad-
walader appeared to be strongly in favor of making as bold
a demonstration as possible on the enemy and punishing
them in every way and at every point. Major-General
Lafayette was inclined to adopt the opinion expressed by
General Wayne, but did not press it very strongly in his
communication. General Greene said everything should
be undertaken to injure the enemy that could possibly be
attempted and if this led to a general fight, then fight it
out.

It was scarcely daylight on the morning of June 18 when
George Roberts left the Middle Ferry, on the Schuylkill
River, where he had crossed from Market Street, Phila-
delphia, and putting spurs to his bay horse dashed along
on the road to the encampment on Valley Creek. He was
accompanied by some light horse from an American scout-
ing party which had been hovering some days within sight
of the city. In the early dawn they had seen the bustle on
the other side of the river and with their glasses had ob-
served the crossing of Clinton’s battalions over the Dela-
ware River. About noon Captain Allen McLane of the
Delaware partisan company of foot marched his men to
the floating bridge at the Middle Ferry and so entered the
city. He had with him a few light horse and as they gal-
loped with drawn swords through Second street with about
a hundred men in the party he succeeded in capturing a
captain, a provost-marshal, one of the army guides and
thirty enlisted men. This he did without any loss to his
own command. Afterward a little party of British were
picked up at the corner of Ninth and South streets. When
Captain McLane reached the center of the city, he hastily
wrote to General Washington giving him an idea of the
probable movement of the British troops as understood
by the patriots of Philadelphia, and informing him of the

[as S. aTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
condition of the city as they had left it. This was des-
patched by an express rider to Valley Forge.

All was wild commotion in the tents in the American
encampment at half-past eleven o’clock in the morning
when George Roberts and his little party of mounted men
reined up at Potts’ house at the Forge. All the soldiers were
glad at the prospect of any change from the place where
they had endured such suffering, and they were ready and
eager for a grand chase across the Jerseys to stop Clinton.

The question of attacking the enemy in New Jersey
was now the only pertinent one to be decided and acted
upon. In less than three hours most of the official answers
on which General Washington’s officers had studied and
labored during the past night were rendered valueless.
The impression among the American soldiers was, that
now by a bold stroke some measure of success might be
gained against a foe which voluntarily gives up a city
without a battle for its possession and takes a hasty flight
across an open country in which it will be compelled to
act entirely on the defensive.

General Washington immediately issued the following
orders to Major-General Lee, a portion of which, as will
be seen, had been previously prepared:

Head Quarters, 30 May, 1778
SIR:

Poor’s, Varnum’s, and Huntington’s brigades are to march in
one division under your command to the North River. The quarter-
master-general will give you the route, encampment, and halting
days, to which you will conform as strictly as possible, to prevent
interfering with other troops, and that I may know precisely your
situation every day. Leave as few sick and lame on the road as
possible. Such as are absolutely incapable of marching with you
are to be committed to the care of proper officers, with directions to
follow as fast as their condition will allow.

3e strict in your discipline, suffer no rambling, keep the men in
their ranks and the officers with their divisions, avoid pressing
horses as much as possible, and punish severely every officer or
soldier, who shall presume to press without proper authority.
Prohibit the burning of fences. In a word you are to protect the

cc se) 4THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
persons and property of the inhabitants from every kind of insult
and abuse.

Begin your march at four o'clock in the morning at the latest,
that it may be over before the heat of the day, and that the sol-
diers may have time to cook, refresh, and prepare for the ensuing
day—I am, &c.

Go. WASHINGTON.

P.S.—June 18th.—The foregoing instructions may serve you for
general directions, but circumstances have varied since they were
written. You are to halt on the first strong ground after passing
the Delaware at Coryell’s Ferry,’ till further orders, unless you
should receive authentic intelligence, that the enemy have pro-
ceeded by a direct route to South Amboy, or still lower. In this case
you will continue your march to the North River, agreeably to for-
mer orders, and by the route already given you. If my memory does
not deceive me, there is an advantageous spot of ground at the
ferry to the right of the road leading from the water.

ORDER OF MARCH AND ROUTE OF THE ARMY FROM CAMP
VALLEY FORGE TO NEWBURG ON THE NORTH
RIVER OPPOSITE FISHKILL
Poor
Varnum 1st Lee Coryells
Huntington

1st Pennsa

20 do 2nd Mifflin? Sherard
Late Conway
Woodford
Scott

No. Carolina

Qu

Marquis Coryells

Oo
=

+ New Hope, Pennsylvania, to Lambertville, New Jersey,

2 It was announced in orders, May 26, 1778, that Major-General Thomas
Mifflin was permitted by the Continental Congress to repair to and serve
in the army, and to take command of the division lately in charge of
Major-General Benjamin Lincoln. He reported at Valley Forge May 19. On
the fourth day of June, Lieutenant-Colonel Francis Barber of the Third
New Jersey regiment was made the adjutant-general of his division. The
Continental Congress passed a resolution June 11, directing General Wash-
ington to make inquiry as to the conduct of General Mifflin in the office of
quartermaster-general, and if the distresses of the army appeared to be
chargeable to his misconduct to order a court-martial. General Mifflin
undoubtedly had to ask for leave of absence in order to obtain material
to answer the charge. It does not appear that he ever took command, be-
cause Brigadier-General Anthony Wayne led the Second division of the

army.
[GorTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
Glover

Patterson 4 deKalb® Easton
Larned

Weedon

Muhlenberg 4
1s Maryld 2
2d do

Stirling Coryells

The Detachmt under Colo. Jackson to move to and take posses-
sion of Philadelphia and prevent plundering & any abuse of Per-
sons. Van Scoicks Regiment to replace the 8th Pennsylvania Regt
in the Pennsylvania Brigade—The 2d State Regiment of Virginia
to replace the 13th Regiment in Scott’s Brigade—Park of Artillery
to be attached to the Several Divisions Equally and march with
them.

The ist & 2d Divisions to move the morning after Intelligence
is received of the Enemy’s Evacuation of the City.

The 3rd & 4th Divisions the morning after these, & the 5th
Division the morning succeeding—every day’s march to begin at
4 o'clock, A.M. at furthest.

Go. WASHINGTON.

ist, 3d & 5th Divisions by Coryell’s Ferry & thro the Clove by
Smiths.

femenmeteand Cross. +. = « » «| @ + aidays
Halt se ke ye ee 1
White House a ee ee A 1
2 miles beyond the Cross Roads l

4 miles beyond Morristown l
Halt os l
BRMTTEIROR LODO 6 i i a ee
Sufferans ee eee I
Near Smith’s Tavern cif ee en
Halt if necessary pitts ope ee ok ao ere
Newborough Be at er a ee

2d Division by Sherard’s Ferry and Sussex Court House.

Halt ; ‘ :

To Sherard’s Ferry and Cross eee ee
1
Union Iron Works 1

8 The Fourth division was commanded by Major-General the Baron John
De Kalb. This officer was taken sick in camp at Valley Forge in the early
part of May 1778, and in July he was removed to Philadelphia. He, there-
fore, took no part in the battle of Monmouth.

le er JTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

FialketselOWON@ sce. pS
Sussex Court House

Halt ee

4 M. beyond Col. Martin’s

Warwick a

5 M. beyond Chester

Halt if necessary

Newborough

peed pees mdf peed

|
a
Oo

4th Division by Easton and Sussex Court House.
To Easton 3
Halt Bele i a oe err
Crossing oe eer ss CU
6 miles beyond Carrs 1
Sussex Court House l
Halt : ‘ ; 1
Then as in 2d Division 5
Regard to be had to the convenience of Water as well as
distance.*

During the afternoon of June 18, the commander-in-
chief issued these additional instructions for the next day:

ORDERS RELATIVE TO THE MARCH FROM VALLEY FORGE,
JUNE 1770, AFTER GEN. LEE’S AND GEN. MIFFLIN’S
DIVISNS HAD MARCHED.

The Army is to March to Morrow & till further Orders in the
following Order.

The Marquis De Woodford’s

LaFayette is to Scotts Brigades
lead with N’th Car’a

The Baron Glovers

De Kalb Pattersons Brigades
next with Learneds

The Artillery Park and spare Ammunition

Weedons
Lord Stirling with Muhlenbergs
ene ist Maryland
| 2d Maryland

_ *The Lee Papers, Vol. II, pp. 406-8, Collections of the New York Histor-
ical Society.

[ 62 ]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
The disposition for the baggage of the army to be as follows:
Che Commander in Chief’s Baggage is to march in the front of

the column of Waggons—The Adjutant General's, Paymaster Gen-
eral’s Engineers Muster Master General Auditor of Accounts The
Baggage of the Marquis De La Fayettes DeKalbs Division the
Baggage of Lord Stirlings Division and then the Waggons of the
Quarter Master Generals Department Flying Hospital & lastly the
Comy & Forage Master General’s Waggons—The whole Baggage
to fall in the Rear of the Column of Troops. The Genl officers
commanding the Grand Division to appoint such guards upon the
baggage as shall be necessary for the Security thereof—They will
also, appoint a party of Pioneers to move in front of the Columns,
to assist the Artificers in repairing Bridges and bad places in the
roads.

There will be a party of Artificers to go in front & rear of the
whole, to mend Bridges and repair the Broken Carriages; which
will take their Orders from the Q.M. Genl.

The sub Inspectors are to assist the Quarter Master General in
regulating the order of March, encampment and planting of Guards
and to accompany and follow his Directions accordingly.

Go. WASHINGTON.

Note—the Light Horse is to March in front and upon the Right
flank a days and encamp in the Rear of the Troops o Nights.

The new guards will form the advanced guards of the army and
the old guards the rear guard. Each regiment will send out a flank
guard on the right flank in the proportion of a sergeant and 12

men to every 200 men.°

Special instructions were also issued by General Wash-
ington to Brigadier-General Anthony Wayne:

SIR:

You are to proceed with the first and second Pennsylvania regi-
ments,® and the brigade, late Conway’s, by the direct route to
Coryell’s Ferry, leaving a proper interval between your division
and General Lee’s, so as to prevent their interfering with each
other. The instructions given to General Lee, are to halt on the first
strong ground after passing the Delaware at the said ferry, until
further orders, unless he should receive authentic intelligence, that
the enemy have proceeded by the direct road to South Amboy, (or

5 Lee Papers, Vol. II, p. 410.

6 This is probably a clerical mistake for “brigades,” for General Wayne
certainly commanded Mifflin’s Second Division on the march.

fe OsnAlTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
still lower) ; in this case he is to continue his march to the North
River. E

Given at Headquarters, this 18th day of June, 1778.
Go. WASHINGTON.’

Instructions were also sent to Colonel Daniel Morgan,
who was then posted with his riflemen at Radnor in Dela-
ware County, Pennsylvania:

Head Quarters, Valley Forge, 18th June, 1778.
SIR:

I am informed this morning, that the enemy’s rear are evacuat-
ing the city. You will immediately send down a small party of
horse under a good officer, on this side, in order to ascertain the
matter, or to gain intelligence. The result of his inquiry you will
transmit as soon as possible, and hold yourself in readiness to join
this army on the first orders.

l am, sir, your very humble servant,

Go. WASHINGTON.

Verbal orders were immediately given Major-General
Benedict Arnold, although he was still disabled by
wounds (his thigh bone having been broken at the battle
of Saratoga), to enter the city of Philadelphia with
Colonel Henry Jackson’s regiment, about four hundred
Continentals, and take command of it. He started at once
to assume this duty, accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel
Tench Tilghman, aide-de-camp of General Washington,
and his own aides, Majors David S. Franks and Matthew
Clarkson. Brigadier-Generals John Cadwalader, Joseph
Reed and Henry Knox, and Colonel Stephen Moylan also
went with him to Philadelphia.

Immediately upon his arrival there Arnold dispatched
the gallant Captain McLane over the river into New Jer-
sey. In disguise, he passed through the British camp at
Haddonfield that same night and the next day reported
their situation and condition.

General Reed says: “the city exhibited a new and cur-
lous scene; some gloomy countenances, but more joyful

7 Ford’s Writings of George Washington, Vol. VI, p. 70.

OnTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
ones. Shops shut up and all in great anxiety and suspense.’
General von Steuben, who was at York when he heard that
the city had been evacuated, started immediately for
Philadelphia. He found the city in a most deplorable con-
dition and the filth everywhere about him made even this
old soldier’s stomach rebel at the thought of eating and
drinking. He started immediately up the river for Wash-
ington’s Army.

At this time Philadelphia was the most influential city
in the young republic. It had been the seat of the new gov-
ernment and its society contained decidedly the most cul-
tured people in the country. The old Quaker families
residing there and the wealthy and educated adherents of
the English church made a social force which had a potent
influence upon all the neighboring communities.

On the morning of June 19, General Arnold received
instructions from the commander-in-chief. This order gave
him great discretionary power in governing anew the aban-
doned city.

The same day General Arnold caused a proclamation
to be issued to the people of Philadelphia and had it
posted in various parts of the city. This bulletin recited
the Act of Congress, which had been passed two weeks pre-
viously, in relation to the proper government of the city,
and ordered an inventory of all merchandise to be made
immediately, so that it might soon be ascertained what
would be needed for the use of the army and what might
belong to some of the fugitive loyalists.

The Tories who remained in Philadelphia suffered
ereatly from the persecutions of their patriotic neighbors.
For a time this ostracism was very severe and nothing was
too violent to be inflicted upon the despised loyalists. This,
of course, was directly contrary to the wishes and orders
of General Washington. At one time twenty-five persons
were indicted under the laws of the State for having
offered aid to the enemy. On the fourth day of November,
1778, Abraham Carlisle, a carpenter by trade, and John

5 3]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

Roberts,* a miller, both members of the Society of Friends,
having been tried for treason, were found guilty of fur-
nishing secret aid to the British, and were publicly hanged.
Carlisle had been in commission under General William
Howe to give permission to all persons to pass the British
lines during their occupancy of Philadelphia, and many
patriots had suffered vile imprisonment on what was
known to have been his report. Roberts had been one of
the men who guided the British troops to General Lacey’s
position at Crooked Billet. During the late summer and
fall, after the battle which is herein described, the people
of New Jersey, especially in that portion of the State con-
tiguous to Philadelphia, entered on the same kind of abuse
and persecution, and seventeen men were brought to trial
and found guilty of treason. Gov ernor William Living-
ston lof New Jersey |, however, “from motives, as he
thought, of policy,”’ pardoned each one of these as soon as
condemned. Actuated by the same feelings, he also went
to Philadelphia, and tried to save the lives of Carlisle and
Roberts, but in vain.

When General Wayne was at Mount Holly, New Jer-
sey, during the latter part of February and in March, he
had with fin Colonel Israel Shreve’s Second regiment of
the New Jersey Continental line. This organization re-
mained in New Jersey after General W ayne returned to

Valley Forge and it was principally employed about Bur-
lington, Mount Holly and as far down as Haddonfield in
stopping supplies from going into Philadelphia. This they
succeeded in doing to some extent.

We have already noted that General Maxwell had been
ordered on T hursday, May 7, to leave the main army and
with his New Jersey brigade march for Bristol and Dunk’s
Ferry and so cross the Delaware River to Burlington to be
joined by Colonel Shreve’s regiment at Mount Holly.
Within three hours after the brigade was ordered on this

8 Copy of warrant for arrest of John Roberts, Pennsylvania Magazine,
Vol. XXIV, No. 1, p. 117.

[ 66 JTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

tour of duty, it was ready to march; but a very heavy rain
began that day at noon, and the movement was delayed by
orders until the next day.

On May 11, recruits enrolled from several of the county
militia organizations in New Jersey, and embodied in an
organization known as New Jersey State Troops, for nine
months’ service, were ordered to join the New Jersey Con-
tinental regiments in the field. The greater part of these
men reported at Mount Holly before June 5.

A considerable detachment of New Jersey militia, fa-
miliar, as it was, with partisan warfare, had been called
out about May 1 by Governor Livingston, under the law
of April 14, 1778, forat hirty days’ tour of duty. This de-
tachment was relieved in June by a second contingent
which was now engaged in watching the advance of the
British Army. “The Militia of New Jersey were in the
highest spirits and almost to a man in arms.” Major-
General Philemon Dickinson, of Trenton, New Jersey, was
in command of these battalions of New Jersey State troops
and militia under orders to annoy the British in their
march in every possible manner. He was in Burlington
County when he was joined by the Continental troops
under General Maxwell, who had been ordered to co-
operate with him in any plan which seemed best to them
for annoying the British.

This was the state of the military forces in New Jersey
when at three o’clock in the afternoon of June 18, Major-
General Charles Lee marched from Valley Forge with the
brigades of General Huntington, General Poor and Gen-
eral Varnum. After the trials of the terrible winter, it is
remarkable that in four hours after orders were issued a
portion of the American Army was on the march. It shows
that Washington was ready for the movement and that he
had his force so well disciplined that they acted promptly.
At five o’clock General Wayne left with his own command,
the First and Second Pennsylvania brigades and the bri-
gade lately commanded by General Conway. Colonel

[e677]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
Morgan’s command joined Wayne before he crossed the
river. The orders both Lee and Wayne received were, to
march toward Coryell’s Ferry, now that point on the river
between New Hoy »e, Pennsylvania, and Lambertville,
New Jersey, and to |} halt on the first strong ground after
passing the Delaware River.

These divisions of the army proceeded three miles be-
yond the bridge over the Schuylkill River, and camped
for the night, General Lee, of course, in supreme command
of the six brigades. What must have been the feelings of
General Lee as he started from Valley Forge, knowing
well for the first time that his “plan” of March 29, 1777,
to the British leaders had been utterly ignored or forgotten,
and that his letter to General Washington of June 15,
1778, was incorrect and valueless?

It was just after daylight on Friday, June 19, when the
main army broke camp and left Valley Forge, under the
immediate command of General Washington. They
marched by the York road to Doylestown and that night
pitched their tents in three divisions, one on the ridge near
the Presbyterian church, one on the road to Coryell’s ferry
ten miles distant, and the ee division on the westerly
side of Main street in the village. General Washington had
his marquee near the ee of Jonathan Fell, a short
distance east of the village, and the headquarters of the
army that evening were at Doctor Sherman's

Colonel Philip Van Cortlandt of the Second New York
regiment was left at Valley Forge in command. He had
there nearly 3000 sick or disabled men. However, he soon
sent 2500 of them to Philadelphia, and kept with him
about 500, still too feeble to leave the camp hospitals.

All day Friday it rained heavily and this hindered not
only the corps under Was hington’s command, but those
which preceded it, the divisions of Lee and Wayne. But
the spirits of the men, notwithstanding the storm, were
greatly elated over the escape from the dull monotony of
camp life, and every man felt a strong incentive to push

[ 68 JTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
rapidly toward the British and, if possible, deal a bold
stroke for liberty.

The two advance divisions just referred to, reached the
river bank late on Friday night and on Saturday afternoon
and evening, crossed the Delaware River as ordered, at
Coryell’s Ferry, and after marching three miles, quar-
tered at Amwell, in Hunterdon County, New Jersey.

General Washington had his headquarters at Bucking-
ham, on Saturday, June 20, and issued orders that night
for a gill of spirits to be served out to each man “‘if the
commissariers are provided.”

He also wrote an official letter to Major-General Hora-
tio Gates, who was in command of the Northern army at
Peekskill, apprising him of the movements of his army and
those of the enemy.°

9 Ford, Vol. VII, p. 70.CHAP RET Vali

HE main army, under Washington’s immediate com-

mand, having been greatly impeded in their march
by the heavy rains, crossed the Delaware River at Coryell’s
Ferry (now New Hope, Pennsylvania) to Lambertville,
New Jersey, and at Howell’s Ferry, somewhat over three
miles above, during the afternoon of Sunday, June 21, and
the early morning of the next day. These ferries were by
road about thirty-three miles from Philadelphia and
forty miles from Valley Forge. The baggage of the army
was brought over the river the same morning and the
troops remained near the Delaware River all day Mon-
day, General Washington being engaged writing the re-
port of his movements to Congress. He also issued the
following instructions to his subordinate officers:

Headquarters, Coryell’s Ferry, June 22, 1778.

Field returns are to be made this afternoon under the immediate
inspection of the Brigadiers and officers commanding brigades,
who are to be responsible for their exactness. These returns to
comprehend those men only who are actually on the spot fit for
duty in time of action, among which the guards will be included.
The unarmed men to be distinguished from the others.

The soldiers will have their arms well cleaned, and afterwards
carefully inspected, together with their ammunition, by their
respective officers.

The tents and heavy baggage, if there be any, will be separated
from the Army for some days. The officers will content themselves
with a few necessaries during that time. The Quartermaster-
General will make his arrangements accordingly. He will give
orders respecting the movement of the separated baggage. None but
invalids and men unfit for the fatigues of a march are to go as
guards to the baggage.

Intrenching tools are to be assigned to the brigades in due pro-
portion, and delivered to the care of the Brigade Quartermasters.
When circumstances will permit, the artificers and pioneers will
advance before the van-guard of the Army and repair the roads

eyoTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

with fascines and earth, instead of rails, which serve to cripple the
horses.

The Quartermaster General will fall upon some method to have
straw equally and regularly distributed to the men when they
arrive at the ground of encampment, to prevent confusion and
waste.

On a march the Major General of the day will pay particular
attention that the column advances in compact order, and not so
fast in front as to fatigue and distress the rear.

The Brigadier of the day, with the officers ordered to remain in
the rear, will see that everything is properly conducted there; the
guards kept to their duty and all damage to the fruit trees pre-
vented, of which the whole road hitherto exhibits such shameful
proof.

Commanding officers of companies will see that their men fill
their canteens before they begin the march, that they may not be
under the necessity of running to every spring and injuring them-
selves by drinking cold water when heated with marching.

Each brigade is to furnish an active-spirited officer and twenty-
five of its best marksmen immediately. These parties to join Colonel
Morgan’s corps, and continue under his command till the enemy
pass through the Jerseys, after which they are to rejoin their regi-
ments without farther orders.

The general will beat at 3 o’clock in the morning, and the Army
march at 4 o'clock precisely—The Quartermaster General will
communicate the order of march and the route, and will acquaint
the Major Generals with their respective commands.

AFTER OrpERS: The following brigades, during the march, are
to compose the right wing of the Army, and to be commanded by
Major General Lee’s, Woodford’s, Scott’s, North Carolina, Poor’s,
Varnum’s and Huntington’s.—1st Pennsylvania, 2d Pennsylvania,
late Conway’s, Glover’s, Learned’s and Patterson’s, are to compose
the left wing, and to be commanded by Major General Lord
Stirling.

The second line is to consist of 1st and 2d Maryland, Muhlen-
berg’s, Weedon’s and Maxwell’s, (when it joins) and to be com-
manded by Major General the Marquis de La Fayette.

The Army is to march from the left. The Quartermaster General
will furnish guides. A Field officer is to take charge of the baggage
guard. If the weather should prove very rainy in the morning, the
troops are not to march; in any case, if they march the tents are to
be left standing, and when they dry the baggage guard is to strike
and load them in the wagons.—Lieutenant Colonel Coleman will
take command of the baggage guard.

enTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

The officers and twenty-five men from each brigade who are to
be annexed to Colonel Morgan’s corps are to be sent to his quarters
early to-morrow morning about a mile in front of the Army. The
two Light Infantry companies in the North Carolina Brigade will
be attached to Colonel Morgan’s corps instead of the twenty-five
there mentioned in the first order of this day.

Lieutenant Colonel Barrett is appointed Bringer-up, vice Lieu-
tenant Colonel Coleman.’

General Lee was still writing to General Washington
and proffering his advice. He wrote a letter of this kind
June 22” and Washington received it soon after he had
reached the New Jersey side of the river. Governor Wil-
liam Livingston of New Jersey, had written from Prince-
ton to General Lee giving him all the information that he
had been able to obtain from Major-General Dickinson,
and other trusted Jerseymen, of the movements of the
British the previous day.° Lee forwarded this communi-
cation to Washington, with his own letter just referred to.

On Tuesday, June 23, the entire American Army was
at and near the village of Hopewell in Hunterdon, now
Mercer, County, about fourteen miles from Trenton and
eight miles from Princeton. General Washington had his
headquarters at the house owned by Joseph Stout, Jr. The
same morning Lieutenant-Colonel Marinus Willett of the
Third New York Continental regiment, then stationed at
Fort Stanwix, appeared at Hopewell with a letter from
Major-General Gates, then at Peekskill, giving a return
of the men, ammunition and stores he had under his con-
trol. Desiring to see active service, Colonel Willett, with
Washington’s permission, joined General Scott’s staff, as
a volunteer aide-de-camp.

Information was received during the day from General
Arnold concerning the condition of Philadelphia and the
enrolment of volunteers for General Cadwalader’s de-
tachment, to join the main army. Colonel Henry Jackson’s

1 General Edward Hand’s orderly book, p. 285.
2 Lee Papers, Vol. Il, p. 411.
8 tbid., p. 412.

Lae aTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
Continental regiment was also ordered to march to Wash-
ington’s command.

The latest knowledge of the movements of the British
Army came to General Washington by a letter from
Colonel Stephen Moylan of the Fourth regiment Conti-
nental dragoons. This letter was brought by General
Joseph Reed, and supplemented, of course, by the state-
ments of Reed himself, who had seen the enemy. Both
these officers had left Philadelphia for Washington’s
Army on June 22.

The American Army remained at Hopewell all day
Wednesday, June 24, disposing of their heavy baggage,
cleaning their fire-locks, placing themselves in the best
light marching order and preparing two days’ extra cooked
rations. It is quite evident that General Washington, now
within a day’s march of the Raritan River, was reserving
his strength for the probable, if not the intended, battle.

At three o’clock in the afternoon of June 23, Brigadier-
General John Cadwalader, who had distinguished himself
in the Battle of Princeton, January 3, 1777, as the gallant
commander of the three battalions of Philadelphia Asso-
ciators, left Philadelphia with Jackson’s Continental
regiment, about 400 strong, and nearly a hundred militia,
which had been organized by General Arnold at a meeting
of the inhabitants of that city, held the previous day. This
contingent carried to the American Army a new supply of
cartridges, which the troops greatly needed. These cart-
ridges had been made by the deft fingers of patriotic
women in Philadelphia during the four days previous,
using, for paper wrappers, it is said, some of the sermons
on defensive warfare by the famous minister Gilbert Ten-
nent, preached during the French war for the purpose of
enlisting men for that struggle. These sermons had been
stowed away in Benjamin Franklin’s printing room and
were brought forth to wrap the ammunition to be fired on
the plains of Monmouth.

Brigadier-General John Lacey was also very busy in

EsTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
enrolling some volunteers from the militia regiments of
Colonels Watt and Smith of Cumberland County and
from the company of Captain Pugh of Bucks County,
Pennsylvania. These volunteers narened under Cadwala-
der. Colonel Thomas Procter’s Fourth regiment, Conti-
nental artillery, and the invalids sent from the hospitals
at Valley Forge, with some small parties of Pennsylvania
militia, replaced the above detachments in guarding the
City of Philadelphia and in preserving order there.”

On the day General Cadwalader left Philadelphia he
wrote to the Commander-in-Chief, and the same night
General Washington sent by an express rider a letter writ-
ten by Lieutenant-Colonel Hamilton to General Cad-
walader, in which he manifested a great desire to know
every movement of the enemy.

On June 23, the following order was issued by General
Washington:

Headquarters, Hunt’s House, June 23, 1778.

The troops will cook their provisions and in every respect be in
the greatest readiness possible for a march or action very early in
the morning.

When the general beats, the Army is to be put in immediate
readiness to march; on beating the troop, the march begins.

4 General Knox to his brother, William Knox:
“Hopewell ‘Township, New Jersey,
“4 o'clock A.M., 25th June, 1778.
The enemy evacuated Philadelphia on the 19th. Lucy and I went in,
but it stunk so abominably that it was impossible to stay there, as was
her first design. The enemy are now at Allen Town, about ten miles
southeast of Princeton, and we are about six miles north (of) Prince-
ton, so that the two armies are now about nineteen or twenty miles
apart. We are now on the march towards them, and their movements
this day will determine whether we shall come in close contact with
each other. We have now very numerous parties harassing and teasing
them on all quarters. Desertion prevails exceedingly in their army,
especially among the Germans. Above three hundred German and En-
glish have deserted since they left Philadelphia. Had we a sufficiency
of numbers, we should be able to force them to a similar treaty with
Burgoyne; but, at present, have not quite such sanguine hopes. If gen-
eral actions had no other consequences than merely the killed ‘and
wounded, we should attack them in twenty-four hours. But the fate of
posterity, and not the illusive brilliancy of military glory, governs our
Fabian commander, the man (to whom), under God, America owes her
present prospects of peace and happiness.”

ea al

“THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

The wings and the second line are each to furnish two Captains,
three subalterns, three Sergeants, three Corporals, and one hun-
dred and seventeen privates for guard daily, till further orders.

The Commissary of military stores will deliver our arms to-
morrow agreeably to the returns signed by commanding officers
of regiments or corps, who will send very early to the Artillery
park for such numbers as are wanting to complete their men now
on the ground fit for duty.°®

And on the twenty-fourth this order was promulgated:

Headquarters, Hunt’s House, June 24, 1778.

Officers are on no account to be absent from their encampment,
and are to be particularly vigilant to prevent their men from
straggling.

The troops, in point of provision and every other respect, are to
be held in constant readiness for moving when the general beats,
which will be the signal for marching.

The commanding officers of corps are to make accurate returns
of the axes, tomahawks, and such other tools in possession of their
corps.®

On the top of a hill overlooking the village of Hope-
well the late Colonel Joseph Stout had built a large and
imposing dwelling. When General Washington reached
Hopewell, he took possession of this building for his head-
quarters. At nine o’clock in the morning of June 24, while
the sun was in eclipse,’ a council of war was called by him
in this house.°

5 General Edward Hand’s orderly book, p. 287.

8 thid., p. 288. ;

7Spark’s Life of David Rittenhouse, Vol. VII, First Series, American
Biography, and Barton’s memoirs of David Rittenhouse, p. 275 and
Appendix, p. 591. The last reference shows that Rittenhouse at the
College in Philadelphia, assisted by John Lukens, Owen Biddle and the
Rey. Doctor William Smith, saw this eclipse and made the published
record of their observations.

8 The first house on this site was erected in 1706 by Jonathan Stout,
one of the first settlers of Hopewell. In that dwelling the Baptist
church of Hopewell was organized April 23, 1715. The property came
into possession of Colonel Joseph Stout, and when the congregation of
the Baptist church desired to build a meeting house in 1747 Colonel
Stout wished to have them erect it on a high hill on his farm. The con-
gregation decided to build in the valley, where the church now stands,
and Colonel Stout, taking offence, declared that he would build a
larger house for himself than their proposed church. This he did in
1752, making it forty-five feet front and thirty-five feet deep, five feet

ek 75 4THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

All the general officers attended this meeting. General
Washington having, as usual, formed his own opinion of
the situation and what was the best line of conduct to
pursue, asked the judgment of his compatriots as to
whether it was advisable to hazard a general engagement
with the British forces. He informed them as to the latest
position and strength of the enemy and the force which
he could bring against them. General Lee® again vehe-
mently urged that a comparatively small detachment, if
any, be sent to aid General Dickinson and General Max-
well in their operations on the enemy’s flanks, while the
main column take up the march toward the Hudson River.
He said he thought it would be better to build a bridge of
gold for the use of the British Army than to attack or in
any way hinder the passage across the country of a force
so well-disciplined ; that if, as he supposed, the armies were
about the same in numerical strength, to risk an engage-
ment with the enemy would appear to him very criminal.
He thought the late alliance with France would be a more
effective step toward independence than any act of the
army, however bold it might be in conception, and that it
would be better not to hazard any engagement at present.
He did not doubt that if a partial demonstration were
made, it would soon become a general one with an enemy
so well prepared for battle. As General Lee was the oldest
larger each way than the church. It occupied a fine position overlooking
the Hopewell valley. The first story was divided into four large rooms,
separated by a wide hall. The council of war was held in the south-
east room. This room had a large fireplace and its walls were entirely
covered with wood panel work. The front southwest room was occu-
pied by General Washington and the room in the rear by General
Lafayette. Colonel Stout died in 1767, and the house was bequeathed to
his son, Joseph Stout, Jr. It was conveyed to Wilson Stout in 1789, to
John Weart, Sr., in 1799, bequeathed to his son, John Weart, in 1822,
and in 1851 to Spencer S. Weart, by whom it was taken down in 1853
and replaced on the same site by a new dwelling, much of the same
material being used in its construction. The farm was afterward owned
by Spencer A. Weart, a son of Spencer S. Weart.—From notes in the
family record, furnished by the Hon. Jacob Weart, of Jersey City, N.J.

®In a dwelling a quarter of a mile down the hill from the house

where the council of war was held, General Lee had his quarters on
the night of June 23, 1778. In this house David Stout resided.

E78 3THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
of the major-generals in rank and was thought to have had
great military experience, his counsel at this time was very
weighty and many of the younger generals followed his
expressed opinion. He seems to have been strenuous in his
efforts to give the enemy an uninterrupted march across
the State; but there were others, such as General Greene,
General Lafayette and General Wayne, who were in favor
of sending a large force instantly to annoy the British, and
to follow this detachment with the whole army in easy
supporting distance. General Lafayette said it ‘“would be
disgraceful and humiliating to allow the enemy to cross
the Jerseys in tranquillity.” At last it was decided to send
1500 men to reinforce the parties now harassing the left
flank and rear of the British column. Very reluctantly
General Lee assented to this compromise, and unwillingly
signed the written opinion of the Council; General La-
fayette and General Greene signed it because, forsooth,
they thought it the first step only toward the accomplish-
ment of their wishes, and General Wayne, always eager
for a fight with his country’s foes, declined flatly to affix
his signature because he believed that a strong force should
be sent to annoy the enemy and, if circumstances were
favorable, let it lead to a pitched battle. So thoroughly
impressed were Generals Greene, Lafayette and Wayne
with the idea that the Council had not gone far enough in
their opinions as expressed in writing to General Wash-
ington, that they each sent him a letter giving more fully
their own views on this important matter. General La-
fayette in his communication also represented the opin-
ions of General von Steuben and General Duportail.

It does not appear very clear to the military student of
today why Washington was accustomed so often to call
his officers into council. He certainly was an officer of
experience, as much so as many of them, he was accus-
tomed to assume responsibility, he had rare decision of
character. He may have wished to explain his own views
to his subordinates and hear and weigh their objections, if

7a 4THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
any ; he may have wished those on whom he depended to
understand the situation as he knew it and so to act
promptly and intelligently as a unified force; he may have
wished to show them that he had confidence in their firm
support when the crucial moment arrived. But it is doubt-
ful, as we look at it today, whether any one of the coun-
cils held in this campaign, contributed substantially to the
success of the movement in New Jersey.

It is quite certain that General Washington had ma-
tured in his own mind a plan for the campaign. He knew
well that the patriotic people demanded of him as bold a
stroke against the enemy as prudence would allow. No.op-
position of General Lee could change what he saw clearly
to be a duty, that the army of Great Britain should not be
allowed to make a holiday march across the State. It does
not appear that the judgment of General Lee, who had
seen much of foreign wars, embarrassed General Wash-
ington’s mind a moment. In a prompt and practical way
he began to carry out his own views, supported, as he now
knew he was, by those upon whose opinions he relied. And
this he did in the full realization of his own personal re-
sponsibility, regardless of strong and open opposition.

As soon as the Council adjourned, as if in compliance
with some of its recommendations, General Washington
sent out Colonel Daniel Morgan with his corps of riflemen,
six hundred strong, to attach themselves to General Max-
well’s brigade and operate on the enemy’s right and rear.

Cautious yet enterprising, and relying on his own
opinion of the situation, General Washington detached
Brigadier-General Charles Scott, later on in the day, June
24, with 1440 chosen men to annoy the British left and
rear. This force included the splendid regiments of Con-
tinentals, First New Hampshire, Colonel Joseph Cilley;
Ninth Pennsylvania, Colonel Richard Butler; First Vir-
ginia, Colonel Richard Parker, and Fourth Maryland,
Lieutenant-Colonel Samuel Smith.

General Washington relied greatly on the exertions of

Eze: aTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
Major-General Philemon Dickinson, that patriotic New
Jersey soldier who commanded her militia, and his confi-
dence was not misplaced. He wrote General Dickinson
some instructions from Hopewell at half-past four in the
morning of June 24 and received from him the next day a
statement of the manner in which he had disposed of his
force.’” This force was composed of detachments from six-
teen organizations of State troops and militia, and it was
commanded by some of the most zealous and efficient
officers in the service.

He also dispatched that reliable officer, Major-General
von Steuben, to ascertain, if possible, the exact position
and intentions of the British Army. He hoped in this way
to obtain the opinion of a skillful soldier and one accus-
tomed to viewing with an experienced eye the movements
of the armies of Europe. It was a rare compliment to von
Steuben’s soldierly judgment.

On the morning of Thursday, June 25, General Wash-
ington moved his entire army from Hopewell, leaving
their tents behind, and proceeded about seven miles to
Rocky Hill,’ Somerset County, and Kingston,"* Middle-
sex County. He dispatched from Rocky Hill a third de-
tachment of 1000 selected men, under command of Briga-
dier-General Anthony Wayne, to harass and impede the
march of the British Army. This detachment included
Brigadier-General Enoch Poor’s splendid brigade of Con-
tinentals. Major-General the Marquis de Lafayette was
sent forward with General Wayne under orders to take
command of all the troops hovering around the advancing
column of the foe. Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander Hamil-
ton, of Washington’s staff, accompanied Lafayette for the
purpose of keeping his chief well informed of the progress
of events. General Washington had his headquarters at

10 Lee Papers, Vol. Il, p. 413. :

11 Five and a half and three miles northeast of Princeton, respec-
tively, and two and a half miles apart. Kingston is ten miles east of
Hopewell.

yooTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

Kingston on the night of June 25, and he gave the parole
as “Monmouth,” showing that he had given up the idea
of Brunswick as the destination of the enemy.

General Washington gave the following instructions to
General Lafayette on placing him in command of the ad-
vance corps:

SIR:

You are immediately to proceed with the detachment commanded
by Gen. Poor, and form a junction (as expeditiously as possible)
with that under the command of Genl. Scott. You are to use the
most effectual means for gaining the enemy’s left flank and rear,
and giving them every degree of annoyance. All Continental par-
ties, that are already on the lines, will be under your command,
and you will take such measures, in concert with Genl. Dickinson,
as will cause the enemy the greatest impediment and loss in their
march. For these purposes you will attack them as occasion may
require by detachment, and, if a proper opening shd be given, by
operating against them with the whole force of your command.
You will naturally take such precautions, as will secure you against
surprise, and maintain your communication with this army. Given
at Kingston, this 25th day of June, 1778.

Go. WASHINGTON.””

The advance detachments numbered now over 5000
men and constituted a command much larger than the
ordinary force often assigned in continental times to a
major-general. General Lee by right should have been of-
fered this command as the post of honor, but his opinions
expressed at the Council and afterward more pointedly to
his friends, that all these plans must come to nought and
that defeat, perhaps utter rout would befall the American
Army in the near future, made General Washington hesi-
tate and at last give to another the position nearest the
enemy. General Lee said he was well pleased to be free
from all responsibility for a plan which he was sure would
fail. General Lafayette accepted the place with enthus-
iasm, and riding by the side of General Poor he left the
main army for the purpose of attacking the enemy with

12 Ford’s Writings of George Washington, Vol. VII, Pp. 73.

[ 80 J]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
the advance continental and militia regiments—the whole
force of his command.

While General Washington was still at Kingston a
splendid white horse was brought to his quarters and pre-
sented to him with the compliments of William Living-
ston, the war Governor of New Jersey. General Wash-
ington rode this horse into the Battle of Monmouth where
he fell, exhausted by the heat.

The main army left Kingston for Cranbury soon after
sunset of Thursday, June 25. A small detachment of the
Fourth regiment New Jersey Continental infantry,
Colonel Ephraim Martin in command, was left behind in
charge of the heavy baggage of the army.CHAPTER IX

HE night of June 22 was spent by the principal part
of the British Army at Black Horse, now Columbus,
and around Mansfield, Burlington County. The orders of
General Clinton in the morning were from Black Horse
and those at sunset for the march of the next day were
dated at Mansfield.
The following is a copy of the orders:

Camp at the black horse June 22nd 1778.

The Troops will immediately send to the Provision Park mess

head Quarters for the day’s Provisions, the one fresh, the other salt
and rum to the 24th Inclusive.

Head Qts Mansfield 22nd June ’78.
The army will march to-morrow in two columns, Gen’l Leslie's
corps reinforced by Havendon’s Dragoons forming the Van Guard
of the left Column will be ready to March at 4 o’clock. The first
Division will form the left Column and will be ready to march
at 3 o'clock in the same order as this day. His Excel” Gen’l Knip-
hausen’s Divisions led by the Second Light Infantry form the right
Column and will be ready to march at 4 o'clock, it is to move as
soon as the first Division is off their ground. The Right column
will pay every attention to the right flank, the Provincial troops will
have the same Station as in the Day’s March and the Baggage will
move in the same Order as this morning.’

In the march of June 23, Lieutenant-General the Earl
Cornwallis had command of the First Division, and Sir
Henry Clinton and his staff were with Cornwallis.

The necessity for pushing forward the great force with
its immense baggage and supply train seemed more urgent
every hour. As General Clinton saw for the fourth time
this great train of fifteen hundred wagons’ start out on
the journey, it is said,—with what truth cannot now be

1 Lieutenant-Colonel Clarke’s order book.
P : Genet Knyphausen to Frederick II, Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, July
» 1779.

[ 82 ]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
determined,—that for a moment he had it in mind to order
the whole thing destroyed. It seemed a terrible encum-
brance and he longed to rid himself of its responsibility.
But the thought that this would appear to his men a sign
of weakness, aroused his military pride and he resolved
to push it through to the seaboard with all the skill he
could command. Had General Clinton destroyed his bag-
gage and all the loot of the army at this time he would
undoubtedly have been able to fall upon the army of
General Washington with terrific energy and effect. Had
he possessed the great decision of character necessary to
do such an act, a week later, instead of decamping in the
night from a battle-field on which he had been worsted,
he might have punished the American Army so severely as
to have secured an early peace.

Besides this vast train of baggage, the large number of
loyal camp followers who had to be protected by the troops
made an additional encumbrance. Of these followers the
women constituted the most troublesome part. On May
26 General Clinton had in orders “permitted commanding
officers of companies to take two women per company”
with them on the march, provided that they were “known
to be good marchers—as no carriages will be allowed for
them or their baggage.’’ Although he had thus been precise
as to the number and qualifications of these women nearly
every day on the march he was compelled to make some
reference to them in his orders.

On June 16 he says “If any Reg’t has more women than
allowed, the Commanding officer is Desired to send them
down to the ships, if he can Possibly get an opportunity;
if not, they are to march with the army, but by way of
Punishment, will be allowed no Provisions.” The next day,
“The women of each Regm’t to march at the head of it,
under an Escort of a Non-Commiss’d Officer & 6 men who
will take Care that they do not go out of the road on any
account.’’ On June 18 he ordered “The Women of the
Army always to March upon the flanks of the Baggage of

ie 63.4]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
their Respective Corps, and the Provost marshal has Re-
ceived positive orders to Drum out any Women who shall
dare to Disobey this Order.’ Again on June 23 he was
compelled to revert to the same subject: “Many of the
women who were sent on Board the Transports from Phila-
delphia, being at Present with the army, the Commanding
Officers will give in returns of such women in their respec-
tive Corps, and they will specify by whose Permission those
Women rejoyned the Army.”

These women apparently were not under the control of
the officers in command and are said to have been perfectly
lawless and to have gathered up much of the stolen prop-
erty on the line of march. Von Elking, the German his-
torian, in speaking of this party remarks, “A soldier of
to-day could have no conception of such a procession.”

On the march of June 23 the military execution took
place of Drummer John Fisher of the Twenty-eighth
regiment British foot, who had been captured badly
wounded, June 20, had been tried and found guilty of de-
serting and bearing arms in the rebel service.

Very early in the morning of June 23 General Leslie
entered Bordentown with his advance corps, consisting
principally of the Fifth British brigade and the Hessian
yagers, and, marching through the village passed out on
the road to Crosswicks. As they approached Watson’s
Ford they found the Jersey militia guarding it and the
floor-boards of the bridge removed. The Jerseymen had
also raised the draw, erected some little redoubts and were
prepared to defend the ford for a short time. The remains
of these entrenchments between the high ground and the
creek, south of White Horse, can still be seen [1899]. A
little skirmish with the Sixteenth British regiment light
dragoons ensued just at dawn, the Jerseymen being under
strict orders to harass but not to give battle to the enemy.
During this affair four men were killed and several badly
wounded, and the militia moved off under the pressure of

8 Lieutenant-Colonel Clarke’s order book.

C4 7THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

superior numbers and the near approach of an overwhelm-
ing force. Brigade Major William Gamble of General
Dickinson’s staff received a gunshot wound in the breast
during the skirmish. As a strategic point a very competent
military critic says, “The position at the draw-bridge is
an excellent one, as is the line of Crosswicks generally on
either side for defence. The only chance for an attacking
force, if the whole line was held, would be above Groveville,
and then only by the simultaneous destruction of all the
dams on the creek, the threatening of several points and
the crossing of one in force. At the draw-bridge with artil-
lery the militia could have been held sufficiently back to re-
pair the crossing.” During the day a forage party went up
on Black’s Creek to Lewis Mills, took all the bread-stuffs in
the building and then burned it. Passing on toward Cross-
wicks by a road south of the creek General Cornwallis
found the roads thereabouts encumbered with felled trees,
and a part of Maxwell’s New Jersey brigade firing at his
marching men from every point which offered the slight-
est concealment. General Maxwell had sent all the bag-
gage of his brigade, in charge of Lieutenant John Shreve
of the Second New Jersey regiment, to the barracks at
Trenton and his force was now in light marching order,
and able to annoy the enemy greatly at this point. At last
it became so unpleasant, that Lieutenant-Colonel John
Graves Simcoe, with the Queen’s rangers, was sent for-
ward to disperse the rebels. This he was able to do after
some time and the Americans retired to the shelter of a
wood on the north bank of the Crosswicks Creek. The
sluices of this creek had been closed below and it was not
fordable at this place. From the appearance of the Amer-
ican force in that position Sir Henry Clinton judged that
they were about to give battle, so he formed his men in
order to resist an attack and ordered up his batteries and
cavalry. He found also that the draw on this bridge had
been raised, although the bridge had not been entirely
destroyed as was intended. The militia tried hard to com-

aes |THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

plete its destruction before the enemy reached it. In cut-
ting away the sleepers of the bridge a young patriot named
Job Clevenger, of the First Burlington militia, lost his
life, being shot in the head with a musket-ball and falling
into the creek just as the little skirmish commenced. The
British engineers were now called to the front and under
the protection of some light artillery the bridge was
repaired.

Captain Charles Stevenson, with a company of light
infantry, had been posted on the left of the flanking party.
Simcoe formed his corps behind the meeting-house, and
under the protection of Lieutenant Alexander McLeod’s
detachment of the Forty-second regiment British foot and
three pieces of light artillery, the dragoons dismounted
and so passed over the bridge. The First battalion of light
infantry then crossed over to pursue the Americans. This
they did gallantly for some distance, receiving severe fire
at times from the retreating troops on the right. In this
little skirmish a musket ball struck Captain Charles Stev-
enson of the Queen’s rangers, a very gallant and at this
time conspicuous officer who was reconnoitering the bridge
and the position of the Americans, and inflicted a bad
wound in his left breast, which was thought at the time
to be mortal. He recovered, however, and was among the
first to enter Crosswicks with the reconnoitering party,
only to be shot by Private Caleb Shreve of the Burlington
County militia from the cellar window of a house in
Crosswicks.* The report is that four of the British were ser-
iously wounded in this little affair, and it is known that
Colonel Elias Dayton of the Third New Jersey Conti-
nental regiment had his horse shot from under him.

The British encamped that night around Crosswicks
and their column extended out on the road to Gibbstown,
now Ellisdale, in Monmouth County.

4 This house was on the southwest corner of the road leading from the

Quaker meeting-house to the bridge and the road leading from Bordentown
to what is now the village of Ellisdale.

[ 86 JTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

Sir Henry Clinton spent the night at the house of Mrs.
Bunting in Crosswicks, and there is a tradition in her
family, confirmed by papers still preserved, that the Brit-
ish commanding general became intoxicated during the
evening. The description of the mishap which occurred to
him is copied from these papers and is believed to be
correct:

But she (Mrs. Bunting) was not allowed to indulge in her sad
reflections for many moments before she was summoned to the
room below to supply bucket, clothes and all things necessary to
remove the mud from the august person of the British General.
He, it seemed, had an attack of nightmare caused by the carouse
of the evening, and probably imagining that the Yankees were upon
him, had started from his bed, and rushing through the door,
which was opened on account of the heat, dashed down the hill,
and before the astonished sentinel could decide whether he had
seen a ghost or not, his noble commander was floundering knee
deep among the mud and mallows of the little creek. The plunge
awakened him, and his loud outcries brought officers and soldiers
rushing from their tents in full expectation of finding themselves
attacked by the Rebel army. The shouts and curses, the confusion,
the rushing here and there of half-dressed men, formed a scene at
once alarming and ridiculous. But the cause being at length dis-
covered, the discomfited General was led back to his quarters, and
with Mrs. Bunting’s aid was cleansed, and half stupified as he
still was, placed again in the clean, comfortable bed which he had
occupied. Order was restored in the camp and silence reigned un-
broken till reveille aroused the slumbering host.°®

Whether this be true or not, the order for the march on
June 24 was issued in Clinton’s name on the night spent
at Crosswicks. It was in the following words:

Head Quarters, Crosswick, 23rd June 1778.

The Army will march tomorrow morning.

The Corps of Brigadier Gen’! Leslie will if possible join the
Division at Crosswick at six o'clock. The 2nd Division under the
Command of His Excellency Lt Gen” Kniphausen will begin its
march at 4 o'clock, the 1st Division will be in readiness to march at
six o'clock in the same order as this day.®

5 Woodward’s History of Burlington, p. 28.
6 Lieutenant-Colonel Clarke’s order book.

a7 aTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

In compliance with this order the troops of General
Cornwallis and General Knyphausen crossed Crosswicks
Creek at Walnford, on a bridge of their own construction,
early on the morning of June 24; the former marched to
Allentown about four miles, encamping at “Eglinton,” the
homestead of Robert Montgomery, at Cabbage Town,’
and Knyphausen’s men went to Imlaystown and camped
in a wheat field of Peter Imlay’s farm. These little vil-
lages were about three miles apart. During the day Gen-
eral Leslie brought up his light troops from Bordentown
to Imlaystown.

Again during this short day’s march the British found
the bridge over Doctor’s Creek torn up. The troops of
Generals Maxwell and Dickinson were still swarming in
front of the enemy and the performance of the previous
day had to be repeated by the Queen’s rangers and the
light infantry battalions. The light batteries of the Brit-
ish were this day brought actively into service.

A gentleman who was with the New Jersey militia in
these little skirmishes said in a letter published at the
time: “. . . the Militia saved in my opinion Trenton and
the country adjacent from rapine and desolation. In short
their conduct during the whole time gave me the most
pleasing ideas of the strong love of liberty which is natural
to the human soul. Surely while the farmers of the coun-
try are induced by the mere fondness of freedom to leave
all their domestic concerns at this season of the year and
undergo the hardships of a soldier’s life—to suffer the
severest fatigues and with pleasure face every danger, I
say while this continues Americans must and will be free.”

James McHenry, a Secretary of General Washington,
wrote of these little affairs with the British: “Thirty or
forty were killed in the different skirmishes with our
militia and flying parties.”

The afternoon and evening of June 24 were excessively

7 Now Canton, a mile northeast of Allentown, in Upper Freehold Town-
ship, Monmouth County.

[ 88 JTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

warm; not the slightest breeze tempered the heat on the
weary march.

It was nownecessary for Sir Henry Clinton to determine
which of the two routes to New York it would be better
for him to take. One road led to the Raritan River, to Am-
boy and across Staten Island, and the other by Monmouth
Court House, Middletown Point and Sandy Hook. He
charged Lieutenant-Colonel Simcoe to procure him intel-
ligence of the exact whereabouts of Washington’s Army
and its movements through some of his loyal Jersey troop-
ers and their refugee friends who followed them, and this
Simcoe essayed to do immediately. During the night of
June 24 all the information of this nature that Clinton
needed was obtained for him, and two Monmouth County
men from Simcoe’s regiment were selected as the guides
for the army during the rest of their march in New Jersey.
It was evident at this time that General Washington ex-
pected Clinton to attempt the passage of the Raritan
River, and he knew that Clinton’s rich baggage train would
be a grand prize for the poor Continental sufferers of Val-
ley Forge. Sir Henry Clinton, however, suspected that
General Gates was marching down the Hudson River
toward Brunswick to meet him. Consequently, he deter-
mined to take the road leading to the hills of the Navesink
and so frustrate, if possible, the plans of the American
officers, and carry out with more expedition the orders of
his Majesty, the King.

A change in the order of march was now made, and
General Knyphausen, with the Hessian mercenaries, who
had constituted the rear guard, and the Second Division in
charge of the heavy baggage and stores of both divisions,
were placed on the advance and Lord Cornwallis and his
splendid division, freed from all impedimenta, took the
left of the column.

Sir Henry Clinton spent the night of June 24 at Allen-
town and issued his order for the march of the next day.
This is the text of the order:

[ 89 JTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

Head Quarters Allen’s Town June 24th 1778.
The Baggage to be loaded and the Army to be in readiness to
move at 4 o clock to-morrow morning. The 1st Division will march
by half companies from the left in the following order—Briga-
dier General Leslie’s Corps, consisting of the §th Brigade and
Hovendon’s dragoons, pontoons and Baggage, Cattle, 4th Brigade,
3rd Brigade, Guards, Artillery, Hessian Grenadiers, British Grena-
diers, Queen’s Dragoons, Light infantry, Corps of Yagers, Allen’s
Corps to flank the Baggage of the left; the Army will receive one
day’s fresh and one day’s salt Provision as soon as they come to
their Ground. The women to march with the baggage according to
this day’s order.®

In this way the march of June 25 was made. Along a
space of nearly twelve miles there followed in close suc-
cession all the soldiers of Clinton’s Army, foot, horse and
artillery, provision train, baggage, army wagons, numer-
ous private carriages, a large number of bat-horses,” baker-
ies, laundries and blacksmiths’ shops on wheels, large
hospital supplies, boats, bridges, magazines,—withal a
crowd of female camp followers and “every kind of use-
less stuff.” With this immense train it required the best
of generalship to ensure the safety of the column, which
Clinton himself thought was “‘vulnerable.”

Ata very early hour General Knyphausen gave his order
to march and his heavily equipped veterans started on the
road to Monmouth Court House. Soon after five o’clock in
the morning the remainder of the army were on the march.
The advance halted on the roadway about four miles from
Monmouth Court House,—while Sir Henry Clinton made
his headquarters at the Rising Sun Tavern, six miles far-
ther south.

It has been thought that Sir Henry Clinton made his
great mistake on this day and that when a clear and easy
retreat was really all he desired, he should have taken the
short march to the Raritan. He certainly had not perfectly
correct information of the position of the entire American

8 Lieutenant-Colonel Clarke’s order book.

®In the British Army, a horse for carrying baggage belonging to an
officer or to the baggage trains.—Cent. Dict.

[ 90 JTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

force for in after years he replied to his critics as follows:
“Gates in front beyond the Raritan; Washington in the
rear and left behind the Millstone Creek, with the Fords
of the Raritan on his left to join or be joined by Gates.”
General Gates was not with his troops at this time “‘in
front beyond the Raritan,” but on his way from Peekskill
to White Plains, New York.

General Washington said that Clinton’s movements had
the “air of design.” Possibly Washington did not fully
appreciate the difficulties under which Clinton labored
and, therefore, his march seemed slow. General Greene, it
seems, agreed with General Washington that Clinton was
anxious to draw the American Army toward Mount Holly
where in the “lower country” he could have a good oppor-
tunity to use his artillery and his horse to advantage
and then, perhaps, by a quick movement with his light
troops gain the hilly country in Somerset and Morris Coun-
ties. The vast encumbrance in Clinton’s train was not then
fully appreciated and General Washington, declining
what he thought Clinton’s seeming challenge, and confi-
dent of his ability to check him later, tarried at Hopewell
to give his men some rest.

During the day of June 25 the American Continentals
from Washington’s Army hovered around the British col-
umn in greater numbers than before. Especially was this
the case in the rear of their column. General Cadwalader
with the Pennsylvania militia, and Jackson’s Massachu-
setts Continental troops had come up, reported to General
Lafayette and took part in capturing stragglers and ma-
rauders from the British Army. General Scott was also
there with his selected brigade, and Lieutenant-Colonel
Anthony Walton White’s detachment of the Fourth regi-
ment of Continental cavalry, kept close on the British rear,
a target for the ribald abuse of the women camp followers
of Clinton’s Army. Lieutenant Wickham, of the Queen’s
rangers, while patrolling with a small force, captured two
countrymen who thought from their green uniform that

oryTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

they were troopers of Light Horse Harry Lee. After tell-
ing all they knew about the movements of the American
Army they were astonished to find themselves hustled off
to the British headquarters under guard.

No modern writer explains the situation at this time
with more accuracy than the eminent battle historian Gen-
eral de Peyster, and his language is here quoted : ‘““Wash-
ington was nearer to Brunswick, could move on interior
lines through a denser, friendly population, where he
could find supplies. If Clinton, who had to carry his food
with him, still prosecuted his march to Brunswick he might
find himself in a cul-de-sac with the Raritan in front; the
South River and extensive and impassable marshes extend-
ing for miles southward; to his right Lawrence Brook,
then a much more important stream, embarrassing his im-
mediate communications; while Washington could come
in on his left flank and rear. . . . In this position Wash-
ington expected to hold him until the Northern Army,
under Gates, could be brought down from the Hudson, to
prevent the escape of the British, until the militia could
be assembled from every quarter. Thus between his own
army, that of Gates and the militia, Sarotoga might be re-
peated and Clinton be swarmed out—Burgoyned.””””

All day of Thursday the twenty-fifth the British Army
was continually harassed and had to defend itself
against Colonel Morgan’s riflemen operating on its right
flank, General Maxwell’s Continental Jerseymen on its
left flank and General Scott’s detachment with the troops
from Philadelphia constantly assaulting its rear guard.
Just in front of General Knyphausen’s division was Gen-
eral Dickinson’s Jersey militia, now joined by a new party
of levies under Brigadier-General Nathaniel Heard, of
Middlesex County, and they were doing all they could to
destroy bridges and check the progress of the army. The
Hessian records speak of the great heat of this day and

10 General de Peyster in the “Affair of Freehold” in Old Times in Old
Monmouth, p. 60.

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AhTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

say that nearly one-third of their troops were so overcome
as to fall by the roadside." Withal, swarms of mosquitoes
attacked these soldiers and their faces were swollen with
the poisonous sting.”

General Clinton issued this order that night from the
Rising Sun Tavern for the march of June 26: “The army
will march to-morrow morning at 4 o’clock in the same
Order as this Day.’’**

According to orders General Knyphausen marched his
Hessian troops a short distance, hardly four miles, on
June 26, and encamped just beyond the Monmouth Court
House. At ten o’clock in the morning the rest of the army,
greatly overcome with the heat, came up to the village of
Freehold by the road from Crosswicks and the Rising Sun
Tavern. This road crossed what is now [1926] the farm
of the estate of James B. Vredenburgh to where the Pres-
byterian Church now stands in Freehold and enters the
Main street at the point where Henry L. Jones now re-
sides. The British Army pitched their tents on each side of
the road by which they had travelled.

The army then stretched out in a long line from West
Freehold to the junction of Dutch Lane Road and what is
now the road to Marlboro. The headquarters of the Com-
mander-in-Chief were established in the stone dwelling of
Thomas Tomson, Sr., four miles west of Freehold. He
spent the day of June 26 in this house, leaving there late
in the afternoon.”

About five miles to the rear of the British column Gen-
eral Lafayette was quartered at Robin’s Tavern, and from

11 Johann Heusser’s manuscript journal.

12 Ewald’s Belshrungen [Belehrungen?®], Vol. II, p. 352.

13 Lieutenant-Colonel Clarke’s order book.

14 Mr. Tomson built the house in 1765 and he was occupying it at this
time. It is still standing and now [1926] owned by Charles M. Higgins.
Some of the general and staff officers of the British Army remained in the
Tomson house the night of June 26, much against the wishes of the patriot
owner, and tradition tells us that they had a drunken carnival and dance
that night. It was with difficulty that many of the officers could attend to

ee military duties the next day. [This house has been known since then
“General Knyphausen’s headquarters.” ]

[93 J]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

this post he was directing the operations of his select corps,
which, though almost starving, were still watching the
movements of the British, with the eager desire and firm
intention of attacking them the next morning.

During the day there was much skirmishing between the
Hessian yagers and the American advance troops. At
times this looked very serious and the Queen’s rangers
were ordered into service on both flanks of the yagers,
whose guns had no bayonets, so as to prevent a sudden
assault of the Continental light troops.

Up to this hour it would appear that Clinton did not
wish Washington to think he was running away, nor that
he had the slightest fear, but never once did he act as if
he were desirous of battle.

This order was issued for the next day:

Head Quarters, Monmouth Court House 26 June ’78.

The army will remain to-morrow in its Present Position.—One
Day’s Salt and one Day’s fresh Provisions will be issued to the
Army early to-morrow morning.*®

The night of June 26 was very rainy and sharp light-
ning and heavy thunder prevailed until nearly daylight.

General Clinton remained in the Tomson house until
late in the afternoon of June 26 and then moved two
miles and a half nearer Freehold to the house of William
Covenhoven. He made his headquarters at this house until
his army vacated Freehold at midnight after the battle.
It appears that his retinue sorely abused this house and
its occupants during their stay in it.”®

The position of the British Army at this time was one
of great strength, so much so that even Washington as-
serted that “it was too strong to be assaulted with any
prospect of success.”

The extreme right of the army, held by the Hessian sol-

15 Lieutenant-Colonel Clarke’s order book.

16 Affidavit of Mrs. Elizabeth Covenhoven, seventy-five years of age,
wife of William Covenhoven, in New Jersey Gazette of August 12, 1778.

[The house is still standing at the western edge of Freehold, is in excel-
lent repair, and is owned by the estate of William Moreau, 1926.]

[ 94 J]z c e ry? : I
Present appearance of house of William Covenhoven, now owned

by the estate of William Moreau, on western edge f Freehold, on
the Freehold and Smithburg road. This house was General Clin-
ton’s headqu urters on the night of June 26 and until midnight
of June 28.

PHOTOGRAPHED BY W.S.M., SEPTEMBER 17, 1926THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
diery was at the junction of the roads leading to Middle-
town Point and to Colt’s Neck, Holmdel and Shrewsbury
and was on the edge of an extensive tract of woodland.
A low swampy bottom fully protected a considerable
part of the left side of the army. General Washington
said, “Their right flank lay on the skirt of a small wood
while their left was secured by a very thick one, a morass
running towards their rear, and their whole front covered
by a wood, and for a considerable extent towards the left,
with a morass.”* The left of the army lay along the road
leading from Allentown to Monmouth Court House and
four miles west of the court house. The British Army had
marched some sixty-seven miles since leaving Philadel-
phia, and the American Army, then at Englishtown, had
passed over more than eighty miles since they had aban-
doned the cantonment at Valley Forge.

On account of the rain and heat, the British remained
Inactive in their tents after ten o'clock Friday morning
and all day Saturday, June 27, except for sending out a
few foraging parties who plundered the neighboring farms
of supplies of food, grain and hay and, by way of amuse-
ment, pulled down the bell in the court house and demol-
ished the steeple of the English church. The picket guards,
however, were well established, and during the day the
soldiers were engaged in cleaning their arms, the intense
heat and occasional rain making a quiet and listless en-
campment. The British officers felt that at any time by a
quick march of sixteen miles they could reach the high
ground about Middletown and then be secure against
attack. It is not easy to explain why they did not make the
march on June 27, regardless of the heat. A strong physical
exertion and the great object of the march would have
been attained. The delay of Sir Henry Clinton looks to us
today almost as if he courted a fight. He certainly lost
forty hours of valuable time when he might have saved his

17 Sparks’ Writings of George Washington, Vol. V, p. 424.

BehaTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
army from an inopportune engagement and his baggage
from danger.

Sir Henry Clinton issued orders on the afternoon of
June 27 to break camp before dawn of the following day,
press as rapidly as possible on the Middletown road to
the coast and take the strong position there which could
so easily be defended. The parole for the night was “Ber-
wick” and the countersign ‘“Coblentz.” The following
was the order for the march:

Head Quarters Monmouth Court house 27 June 1778.

The Army will move to-morrow morning. The 2nd Division
under his Excellency Lt. Gen’] Kniphausen, will march at 3 o’clock
and the ist Division at 5. The Baggage of the whole Army will go
with the second Division, except the Bat horses of the 1st, which
may march with it. The Baggage of the 1st Division will follow
that of the 2nd in the order which they have hitherto moved. 27th
Regim’t to join its Brigade before the hour of march to-morrow
morning. Colonel Innis, Inspector Gen’l of the Provincial Forces
will follow the Light Infantry of the 2nd Division, with a Corps of
safe Guards, Consisting of a Detachm’t of Dragoons and 150 of
Chalmers’s Corps; the Corps of yagers, will join Lt. Gen! Knip-
hausen to-morrow to take such situation in his line of march as
his Excellency shall think Proper to order.

If any disorderly People attempt to force the safe Guards, or to
Plunder where they are Posted, the Guard is to make them Prison-
ers, and to fire at them if they should attempt to resist them.**

The night of June 27 was very hot and no breeze from
the woods or from the not far distant ocean relieved the
intense deadness of the air. A heavy thunderstorm came
up in the night, worse even than the storm of June 26. The
pickets of the British Army, however, were on the alert,
as they had been instructed to keep close watch. The whole
army lay on their arms. A deserter had been brought into
headquarters and he had said to Clinton, “‘the rebels are
extended along our left flank and are very numerous.”

During the passage of the British Army through Mon-
mouth County they burned the residences of Doctor
Thomas Henderson, Peter Forman, General David For-

18 Lieutenant-Colonel Clarke’s order book.

[ 94 ]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

man, Benjamin Covenhoven, George Walker, William
Solomon, David Covenhoven, Garret Vanderveer and
David Clayton.

Doctor Nathaniel Scudder, the patriot physician, sol-
dier and statesman, the only member of the Continental
Congress who gave his life in battle for the liberty of his
country, wrote July 13, 1778, to the Honorable John
Flart, the Speaker of the New Jersey House of Assembly:
“Great plunder and devastation have been committed
among my friends in this quarter, but through the dis-
tinguishing goodness of Providence my family and prop-
erty escaped and almost in a miraculous manner.”

Doctor Thomas Henderson, the physician of the coun-
try around Monmouth Court House,” says in the New
Jersey Gazette, after giving a list of the names of the
owners of the dwelling-houses burned, as just enumer-
ated (the house of Benjamin Van Cleave also being
added ),—“‘John Benham’s house and barn they wantonly
tore and broke down so as to render them useless. It may
not be improper to mention that my own and Benjamin
Covenhoven’s houses, adjoined the farm and were in full
view of the place where General Clinton was quartered.
In the neighbourhood below the court house they burnt
the houses of Matthias Lane, Cornelius Covenhoven, John
Antonidas and one Emmons; these were burnt the morning
before their defeat.’

19 Doctor Henderson was afterward a member of the Continental Con-
gress. He was the man who appears hereafter in this narrative as the
“countryman,” giving Washington information of General Lee’s retreat.

20 See letter dated Monmouth, July 18, 1778, in*the New Jersey State
Gazette of August 5, 1778.CHAPTER X

HE details of all the movements of the British
forces, with a settlement of the question whether
Sandy Hook or Amboy was the route determined upon by
Sir Henry Clinton, were sent by General von Steuben and
received by General Washington June 25 at Kingston, a
little village three miles northeast of Princeton. General
von Steuben also gave some important advice to General
Scott. General Washington gave immediate orders for a
night march, without the heavy baggage, toward English-
town and Monmouth. At nine o’clock in the morning of
June 26 they arrived at Cranbury’ in a very heavy rain
storm, and this, with the extreme heat, made farther
marching impracticable without entailing great suffering
on the men. The American Army, therefore, remained near
Cranbury all day, though some detachments advanced to
take new and more favorable positions against the enemy.
During June 25 and June 26 General Lafayette wrote
very frequently to General Washington informing him of
the movements of his command and the position of the
British Army. The first of this series of letters was writ-
ten at Cranbury at half-past nine in the evening of the
twenty-fifth, although the document is not dated. General
Lafayette was at that time somewhat worried lest he could
not reach and attack the foe. His rations were running low
and rum seemed necessary for the fast and early march
he had ordered for the morrow. The march, however, was
begun about four o’clock in the morning of the twenty-
sixth, although he remained in Cranbury until five o’clock
to write another letter to Washington. He had in the
meantime received instructions from his chief to press on
rapidly and overtake the enemy. General David Forman,

1 About ten miles southeast of Kingston.

E 98.3]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

of Monmouth County, was now with Lafayette to give
him all possible information about the roadsof the country
he knew so well. Lafayette was filled with military ardor
and hoped to deal a sharp blow at the enemy. He evi-
dently wished to feel before he engaged in battle that
Washington and the main army were near for his support.
Lafayette rode on two miles to Hightstown and after
seven o'clock he wrote again to General Washington.’

At the noon hour, June 26, Hamilton wrote Wash-
ington a letter from Robin’s Tavern. At that time the
American Army had halted, under sore distress for food,
with the rear of the British Army only four miles in ad-
vance of them on the road toward Shrewsbury. Hamilton
was then exerting himself to the utmost to procure intelli-
gence which might be of use to the cause.

General Lafayette came up to Robin’s Tavern and he
also began to write to Washington at half-past four. The
main army had then reached Cranbury. Colonel Morgan
was still annoying the foe on their right flank and General
Dickinson’s militia was harassing them on their left.

Hamilton wrote his second letter of the day to his
Chief from the same tavern at four o’clock in the after-
noon. This letter added little to the information then well
known. He knew that the British Army had reached Mon-
mouth Court House and had encamped. The hostile forces
were then seven miles apart. While he was writing this
letter some instructions came from Washington to Lafay-
ette, Hamilton read them and closed his letter by inform-
ing Washington that the advance detachment would
march toward Englishtown*® at three o’clock in the morn-
ing of June 27.

It was half-past ten that night when General Lafay-
ette began his fourth letter of the day to Washington. He
must have been greatly fatigued for he dated his letter the

* Lafayette spelled the name “Ice Town” in his despatches. It is situ-

ated about a mile and a half south of Cranbury.
8 Ten miles east of Cranbury.THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

twenty-eighth instead of the twenty-sixth. He said little
more than to reiterate the statement of Hamilton that
the detachment would move forward at an early hour the
next morning.

Before leaving Kingston General Lee became convinced
that he was allow’ ing “the young French officer to occupy
too long the post of honor nearest the foe, and his jealous
heart and professional pride began to assert themselves.
He spoke constantly to those about him of the wrong that
was being done him by allowing Lafayette so great a com-
mand. He began also to feel that his military reputation
would suffer if a junior officer were allowed to hold such
an important place in the movements of the campaign and
he regretted his first decision in declining the honor. It is
also said that Major-General Lord Stirling showed some
disposition to interpose his claim. In talking with his
peend: General Lee coupled the name of Lord Stirling —
and he might also have said Major-General Greene—with
the assertion that great injustice was being done by Gen-
eral Washington in neglecting older and more experienced
officers; but the opinions which Lee had so often and so
forcibly expressed rendered him unfit for the important
service to which Lafayette had been assigned. At the same
time, Lee now wished to escape from his unfortunate posi-
tion even by accepting a duty which he felt would result
disastrously. At last on the evening of June 25, General
Lee requested General Washington to place him in com-
mand of the advance corps. Of course the commander-in-
chief was much vexed at this turn of affairs at such a
critical time, but, by a singularly false estimate of Lee’s
character, he immediately instituted a plan to please him.
He wrote to Lee* from Cranbury the next morning pro-
posing an expedient by which he could favor him and yet
not wound the feelings of Lafayette. This plan was for
Lee to join Lafayette with two more brigades and then by
virtue of his rank assume command of the corps, without

4Ford’s Writings of George Washington, Vol. VII, p. 75.

i too 7THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
detaching Lafayette from the force now under his control.
General Washington also followed this letter to Lee with
one to Lafayette® advising him of what he had done and
expressing the wish that this plan would not interfere
with any desire he had to annoy the enemy. Had not
General Lafayette been a devoted friend of Washington,
this change just on the eve of battle could hardly have
taken place without causing an unpleasant scene. But
neither at this time, nor ever afterward did General La-
fayette show himself other than the true soldier and the
close friend and admirer of General Washington. By this
correspondence and these orders a young officer, as Gen-
eral Greene said, with “great thirst for glory,” whose
whole heart was in the impending contest was supplanted
by one who, though greatly his superior in experience, was
thoroughly opposed to the movement he was under orders
to make immediately.

General Lee was now ordered in command of the divi-
sion of General Lafayette, but with instructions from
General Washington to allow Lafayette to carry out any
plan he had formed to damage the enemy. The brigades
formerly commanded by Generals Scott and Varnum were
ordered to accompany General Lee and join the advance
division. The brigades of Maxwell and Wayne which had
been following the rear and flanks of the British were
ordered up from the Rising Sun Tavern, about six miles
from Allentown, where they had rested, and were directed
to report to General Lee near Englishtown. This they did
promptly on the morning of June 27. This command had
come to General Lee through the kind courtesy of General
Lafayette and that officer had good reason to think that
General Lee would carry out the plans then being exe-
cuted. From that hour, however, Lafayette’s plans were
ignored.

General Lee saw very clearly that General Washington
and his dashing young French assistant might, perhaps,

5 Lafayette’s Correspondence, Amer. ed., Vol. I, p. 180.

f tor 4THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

severely punish the distended column of the British, and
the glory of such an action would not only win the ap-
plause of the country, but would prove that his advice at
the council board was not the best for the cause. Perhaps,
too, he was actuated by a desire to be in the very advance
himself, where only by his own orders could distress be
given to Sir Henry Clinton. And if, perchance, any vig-
orous orders were issued to him by General Washington,
perhaps he thought he would carry them out in his own
way, and, by dilatory ,action or by inaction, give the
British the march “on velvet”® which his own policy
approved.

It was clearly a mistake in General Washington to sup-
plant the young and enthusiastic Lafayette, who was
eager to fight and who had under him lieutenants who
knew well how to fight, by an officer who did not believe
it was proper to attack the British on their transit through
the Jerseys.

The precepts found in the Art of War are very perti-
nent to the action of General Washington in reference to
General Lee. ‘““To commit the execution of a purpose to
one who disapproves of the plan of it, is to employ but
one-third of the man; his heart and his head are against
you; you have command only of his hands.” “An unwil-
ling commander, it is said, is half beaten before the battle
begins, therefore an officer who is in favor of the measure
is to be preferred for the execution of it to one who dis-
approves of the plan; and one who volunteers to carry it
out is to be preferred to either, supposing the qualifications
of all three to be on a par in other respects.’”’

During the afternoon of June 26 General Washington
was impressed with the fact that General Lafayette had
placed his division too far to the right to command the
aid of the main army in case of necessity, and that it would
be better for efficient service that he take position more

6 Clinton in Anbury’s Travels, Vol. II, p. 382.
7 Jomini’s Précis de 1’ Art de la Guerre.

fh 102) 3THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

to the left and nearer to Englishtown: so he ordered this
to be done, and at a very early hour on June 27 Lafayette
took the new position as directed by Washington.CHAPTER XI

URING the whole day of June 27 General von

Steuben was reconnoitering the enemy. This he did
very closely and reported all he saw during the morning to
General Ww ashington. After sending this communication,
he continued his investigations during the afternoon, but
as he approached the encampment of the Hessian grena-
diers, he was discovered and nearly taken prisoner. Tn his
eagerness to escape he lost his hat. He would doubtless
have been shot had it not been for General Knyphausen
who recognized him and prevented it. During the evening
he was directed to attach himself to the division under

General Lord Stirling.
On Saturday, June 27, the force under General Wash-

DT
ington’s immediate commé ind marched at sunrise on the
Cranbury road to within five miles of Englishtown, at
which village General Lee was posted with his advance
corps. Here General Lee receiv ed an order from Washing-
ton to halt his column. General Washington had his head-
quarters at Penelopen, now Manalapan. Englishtown was
five miles by road from Monmouth Court House. All the

various detachments sent out by General Washington soon
after crossing the Delaware River had reported to General
Lee, except Colonel Morgan’s Virginia riflemen w ho were
still on the British right flank at Richmond Mills, now
Blue Ball, three miles from Freehold, and General Dick-
inson’s New Jersey militia, who were on their left flank.
During that day the American Army cooked two days’
rations and in every way prepared themselves for the issue
of a fight, which they knew was imminent.
That night orders were issued at follows:
Head Quarters, Penelopen, 27th June 1778.

, As we are now near the Enemy and of consequence V igilance and

Precaution more essentially necessary the Commander-in-chief

[ 104 J]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
desires and enjoins it upon all officers to keep their Posts and their
soldiers compact, so as to be ready to form and march at a moment’s
warning, as circumstances may require.

The drums to beat on the march. When the rear is to come up,
a common march; to quicken the march, a grenadier march. These
signals to begin in the rear under the direction of the brigadier of
the day, and are to be repeated by the orderly drum of every bat-
talion from rear to front. An orderly drum to be kept ready braced
with each battalion for this purpose. When the whole line is to halt
for refreshment the first part of the General will beat, and this to
be repeated by every orderly drum down to the rear.

It does not appear that any of these signals on the
batter-head of a drum were obeyed during the march, and
in the retreat and battle of the next day. It was, perhaps,
too late to familiarize the various corps with these orders.

The parole of the American Army the previous night
had been “Lookout” and the countersign “Sharp and
keen,’ and these were good mottoes to bear in mind all day
of June 27.

It may not have been strictly a military necessity for
General Washington to fight the British Army, but it was
clearly a political necessity. France had acknowledged the
independence of America and it might have been possible
for America to wait until French troops and French sailors
could be at hand to give efficient aid. But it was far better
that the Americans should strike a strong blow for them-
selves when so good an opportunity offered, for even an
attempt to punish the royal army would show that the
Americans were still struggling to be free and were not
content with simply keeping an army together without
any aggressive movement, waiting for a foreign nation to
help them. In addition to this, it was necessary for Gen-
eral Washington, if he would not sink his military repu-
tation into obscurity and drop out of public sight as a
leader in this fearful struggle for a young nation’s life, to
promptly exert himself and show that the army at least
had confidence in its chief and would follow where he led

1 Washington’s order book, in the Congressional Library.

padey aTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

the way. It was unavoidably necessary, if he would retain

the support of the patriots at home and in the field, to

prove the falsity of the insinuations made in Congress and

the charges of incapacity arising in jealous army circles.

General Washington must assume the responsibility of

risking an engagement although some of his general off-

cers had advised against it. He must seek a fight, and this

was the time to do so. The soldiers of the army felt that

Washington had the necessary confidence in his own abil-
ity to command, and he had full confidence in their ability
to execute any operation against the best troops in the
world, if properly led. He knew that he could bring his
entire army, foot, horse, artillery, regulars and militia,
‘nto service for direct attack and he was well assured that
Sir Henry Clinton could not take from a safe line of
retreat more than one-half his force; the other half, being
necessary to protect his baggage train, must act entirely on
the defensive. In this state of affairs it was important
that Washington should show that he did not fear to offer
battle to the formidable Briton. Twice on New Jersey soil
he had punished their detachments, and must he now by
inaction efface the glory of those victories? After the
cabals at Valley Forge and the professional advice of Gen-
eral Lee at the council of war, it would not do to allow
the soldiers drilled by von Steuben to shrink from a bold
assault. Indeed, he was eager for the hour to pit his drilled
regulars, full of patriotic ardor, against the Byitish
veterans.

Very soon after noonday, June 27, General Washington
called General Lee to his headquarters to inform him that
he had determined to assume the responsibility of attack-
ing the British column the next morning. He desired Lee
to prepare to strike the enemy at the first favorable oppor-
tunity. While General Washington was giving General
Lee his instructions he sent for General Lafayette, General
Maxwell, General Wayne and General Scott to come to
his quarters. These officers instantly complied and they

fp 106 7]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

heard the commander-in-chief direct General Lee to at-
tack the rear of the enemy on the morrow with his select
division, promising to support him promptly with the main
body of the army. The chief did not specify that the object
of attack should be a mere rear guard or covering party,
but even if they were the very flower of the British troops
he wished the picked force of the American Army to en-
gage them promptly. The full meaning and intention of
these orders all the officers, except Lee, it appears, fully
understood and agreed to. General Washington then made
two requests—one, that on this occasion they should for
the day waive their respective dates of rank and fight at
any point where it was deemed most desirable by General
Lee—and the other, that General Lee should hold a con-
ference with the general officers of his division during the
afternoon and arrange some of the necessary details of the
attack. As they were leaving, General Washington re-
marked that General Maxwell was the oldest in commis-
sion and perhaps should have the preference in the attack,
if he so desired, although as many of his troops were re-
cruits and there was a great scarcity of cartouch boxes in
the brigade, as shown in the returns, perhaps some other
brigade would have to be placed on the advance. At all
events he thought an attack, if begun by a “picked corps
would probably give a very happy impression.” Upon
Washington again urging a conference for the purpose of
forming a plan of attack on the enemy, General Lee named
five o’clock in the afternoon at his quarters.

At the appointed hour Generals Lafayette, Maxwell
and Wayne dismounted at Lee’s quarters and they had a
few moments’ talk together. General Lee said, that at
present the numbers and exact situation of the enemy were
mere conjecture, that the country thereabouts had not been
carefully reconnoitered and that if they formed any pre-
cise plan for the next morning the least unexpected event
might embarrass, distract, and lead them astray. Any plan
now agreed upon might in a moment become invalid. In

E1977]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

his judgment it seemed best to move cautiously and rely
on the vigilance of his officers and the prompt obedience
of the men whenever it was found desirable to make any
movement which the circumstances might require. In the
meantime, each of them must hold his force subject to
march at a moment’s warning. General Lafayette ex-
pressed the desire to be with General Lee on the morrow,
and Lee said he was gratified that Lafayette wished to do
so and it should be as he desired. He then entreated them
to avoid all disputes about rank, as General Washington
had suggested, as it might happen that the oldest officer in
rank might be ordered on the left and his junior on the
right and he expected to be obeyed; that if they felt ag-
erieved at his orders they must comply with them first and
complain afterward.

While he was thus talking, General Washington, who
had ridden over to Englishtown and was on his return to
his own quarters, having just passed over the bridge of
Wemrock Brook and being in sight of General Lee’s camp,
sent Lieutenant-Colonel John Fitzgerald of his staff to
Lee to direct him so to draw up his troops on the ground
on which he was posted, that he might be prepared at any
time that night to repel an attack. Washington told his
aide to say to Lee that he did not think it probable that an
attack would be made but, the enemy being very near, it
was not impossible. He directed General Lee to keep his
force on their arms during the night and to send word to
General Dickinson and Colonel Morgan informing them
how he wished them to cooperate with his division the next
day. Washington also expressed the hope that Lee’s gen-
erals had been in conference and had agreed upon such
plans as would make a successful attack. Colonel Fitz-
gerald rode rapidly up the hill to General Lee’s tent and
found him with the general officers already stated. He
called Lee out of his quarters and gave him General Wash-
ington’s orders. General Lee said he thought from what he
knew of the British commanders that they would not let

E168 7THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
the night pass without making an attack on him, and that
although his men were greatly fatigued he would before
dark put them in the very best position to receive an attack,
General Lee went back into his tent and the conference
ended. No plan whatever had been agreed upon; he had
assumed to himself the entire control of the movement
without informing his generals of any proposed disposi-
tion of his force.

It does not appear that during the night of June 27 he
made the slightest effort to possess himself of such infor-
mation of which, as he confessed at the council, he was
ignorant and which certainly he sorely needed. Surely
during the next ten hours he could have ascertained for
himself the strength and situation of the hostile camp
and even had maps made of the contour of the land on
which the engagement had been ordered and must of
necessity take place. A prudent, patriotic general would
have tried to obtain these facts.

As General Maxwell mounted his horse to leave Gen-
eral Lee’s quarters a young officer touched his hat and
asked leave of absence the next day to visit his brother
who was dying at the tavern at Black Horse, now Colum-
bus, New Jersey. “Yes, yes,” was the answer of the bluff
old general, “it happens very well for you, Major Howell,
we'll have a hot fight tomorrow.” The officer felt the re-
buke in the consent thus given by his veteran commander
and he staid by his men through all the fight on the hot
day that followed. This soldier, but twenty-four years of
age, was Major Richard Howell of the Second New Jersey
Continental regiment, in after years the distinguished
Governor of the State.”

As soon as his guests had gone, General Lee left his
quarters to make some disposition of his division before
sunset. He was, therefore, absent when General Scott came

2 The brother referred to was Lewis Howell, the surgeon of the regi-
ment, who died at the tavern mentioned, June 29, 1778, the morning after
the battle, soon after Major Howell was able to reach his bedside. They

were twin brothers.
[ 109 ]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

to his tent at half-past five, having evidently a wrong im-
pression of the hour of the conference. But later in the
evening General Scott called again, and Lee repeated
what he had already stated to Lafayette and the other
officers. He said he had no other orders for him and only
wished him to comply with such requests as regards rank
as he had just expressed to him.

By General Washington’s direction Lieutenant-Colonel
Hamilton wrote a letter to General Lee late in the eve-
ning of June 27 directing him to detach a party of obser-
vation to lie very near the enemy.”

This letter was taken by Captain-Lieutenant Edward
Dunscomb of the Fourth New York regiment, an officer of
General Lee’s guard, and delivered to Captain Evan Ed-
wards of General Lee’s staff about half-past one in the
morning of June 28. General Washington at that time
apprehended from some information he had received, that
the British would decamp during the night and he wished
General Lee to detail from six to eight hundred men as a
party of observation to give the very first intelligence of
any movement, to skirmish with the foe, to stop their
march, if possible, and give time for the army to come up
to the conflict. This letter was but an order, in the same
line of direction that Lee had already received, to attack
the enemy as soon as they began to march. The orders
which Washington wished sent to General Dickinson and
Colonel Morgan were in accordance with his plan to give
the enemy a blow.

By direction of General Lee, Captain Edwards imme-
diately wrote instructions to General Dickinson informing
him what General Washington desired and expected him

8 Hamilton’s testimony at Lee’s court-martial, p. 11. Hamilton said he
did not keep a copy of this important official communication; it does not
appear among the papers of General Lee published by the New York His-
torical Society; it is not in the “Official and other papers of the late
Major-General Alexander Hamilton, compiled from the originals in the
possession of Mrs. Hamilton,” nor in the Works of Alexander Hamilton,
edited by John C. Hamilton.

Eke) 4THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

to undertake in conjunction with orders which he had just
given General Lee. He wrote also to Colonel Grayson
that he had selected him to command the “party of obser-
vation” suggested by General Washington. Captain Mer-
cer, by authority of General Lee, sent a messenger to
Colonel Morgan to advance with his troops near the
enemy and attack them when they moved. He gave him
discretion how to act, except that he must not so expose
his men as to render them incapable of acting with Gen-
eral Lee should he at any time during the day require their
services.

During the early hours of the night of June 27 the
sentinel near George Washington’s headquarters chal-
lenged a gentleman who evidently did not have the coun-
tersign. To the officer of the guard, when he approached
the sentinel, this man introduced himself as ‘“Doctor Grif-
fith, chaplain and surgeon in the Virginia line, on business
highly important with the commander-in-chief.” The offi-
cer said, ““No, Sir, no, impossible—intensely engaged; my
orders are positive; the General cannot be seen on any
account.” In persuasive tones Doctor Griffith said to the
officer, “Present, Sir, my humble duty to his Excellency
and say that Doctor Griffith waits on him with secret and
important intelligence and craves an audience of only five
minutes’ duration.””’ When General Washington learned
that the reverend doctor was so very anxious for an inter-
view at that unseasonable hour, he directed that he be
admitted. The conference was very brief, but it was said
at the time that Doctor Griffith warned the commander-
in-chief of the probable conduct of General Lee on the
morrow from information which had come to him from
trusted friends and patriots. He did not mention the names
of those who had given him this information, but he begged
the general to be on his guard the next day against the bad
conduct of those on whose military skill he was obliged
to depend for the execution of his orders. Doctor Griffith

ii]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
left a deep impression on the commander-in-chief and the
next day proved that the warning was timely.’

4 Doctor David Griffith was the surgeon of the Third regiment of the
Virginia line and he also acted as chaplain of General Weedon’s brigade.
In after years he was the pastor of Christ Church, in which General
Washington worshipped in Alexandria. He died in the city of Philadelphia
on August 3, 1789, and was buried the next day in Christ Churchyard in
that city, having lived a life of ardent piety, great learning and most
exalted patriotism.CHAPTER XII

HAT portion of the old county of Monmouth on

which the battle was fought is a somewhat elevated
table land about one hundred and seventy feet above the
ocean. In the northeastern part of the county are the
highlands of the Navesink. The village of Middletown is
situated on the highest ground with the most uneven sur-
face around it of any land in that portion of the State.
That part of the county near ae Hook and Middle-
town was infested with Tories during the Revolutionary
period and it was the great objective point in New Jersey
for forage parties to plunder the inhabitants and make off
across the harbor in safety to New York.

The village of Monmouth Court House or Freehold’
was situated nearly in the central portion of the county.
In the year 1778 it contained about forty houses. The two
most prominent buildings in the village were the court
house, on what is now Main Street, and the old English
church still standing, in front of the station of the Penn-
sylvania Railroad on Throckmorton Street. Besides these
pub slic buildings the village had a blacksmith shop, a
wheelwright’s shop, two taverns, two school-houses, three
stores and about thirty dwelling houses.

Between Monmouth Court House and Englishtown the
main roadway of the county passed over three ravines or
morasses and near the old Tennent Church and graveyard.”

1“In old times when Freehol ld is spo yken of the township is generally
meant. The present town of Freehold had no existence until 1715 when
the court house was built here, and even then and down until the Revo-

lutionary war Freehold village was called the Monmouth Court House.” —
James S. Yard in his Old Times in Old Monmouth, p. 248.

' 2This church, erected in the year 1751, was named after the great but
eccentric preacher, William Tennent who, for many years had been a
great power for good in the church and in the community. He died in
1777, the year previous to the battle and so was not a witness to the con-
flict around his own dwelling and near the edifice which had resounded

E aug yTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

A stream, now called Wemrock Brook winds across the
battle-field, runs through the west ravine and branches off
toward Hartshorne’s Pond.

Much of the ground in the year 1778 was covered with
dense woods, some of it with thick briars and heavy under-
brush, and a part of it was open and in fine cultivation.
The soil itself, the very best in the State for farming
purposes, was, in the month of June, fully covered with
the promise of an abundant harvest.

In a critical study of the Battle of Monmouth the his-
torian and the reader must give great care to the exact
positions of the various bridges, causeways, roads, defiles,
hills, morasses, and ravines. It is at times very perplexing
to localize all these features of the battle-field with any
certainty. The topography of the ground has undergone
and is now undergoing such changes that it is often quite
difficult to ascertain the various points referred to by par-
ticipants in the battle. Scarcely a single definite name is
given in history to any of the various localities.

Also, there is another hindrance to the careful study of
this important engagement. General Lee seems to have
assigned and reassigned his general officers to different
detachments from the ones they commanded in the march
from Valley Forge across New Jersey. For instance, Gen-
eral Wayne first had command of the First and Second
brigades of Pennsylvania Continentals, and Conway’s
brigade, constituting Mifflin’s Second Division; it is often
called his detachment. Afterward he was assigned to an-
other detachment, consisting of two brigades, and still
later, to three regiments of selected troops. General Scott
was in the field in person, but he did not take charge of his
own brigade of Virginians. Most of them were in the de-
tachment of Colonel William Grayson. Writers on the
battle often confound General Scott’s brigade with Scott’s
detachment. Brigadier-General Varnum was not present in

with the tones of his matchless eloquence. He was buried under the
central aisle of this historic building. [See frontispiece.]

[114]Monm uth Court House

‘ROM THE PAINTING BY MRS. CARRIE A. SWIFT, OF FREEHOLD, N.J.THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

the fight, yet his name, associated so closely with his bri-
gade, leads many map-makers, as well as writers, to speak
of and note him as at certain places in person. Colonel
John Durkee, and, later, Lieutenant-Colonel Jeremiah
Olney commanded Varnum’s Rhode Island brigade.

On the eve of the battle it is well to note the exact
force which the American chieftain could bring on the
fighting line. From a return dated on the day of the battle,
we find that under General Washington’s immediate com-
mand were 665 commissioned officers and 7,159 enlisted
men, in all 7,824 soldiers. Add to this 6,000 men under
General Lee, and we have an active force of more than
13,000 men.

It is somewhat difficult to determine the exact available
strength of General Lee’s division at this time. No return
of the number of troops in this division was ever filed in
the War Office and Lieutenant-Colonel Robert H. Har-
rison, General Washington’s military secretary, says that
no report thereof was made by General Lee. Lee himself
said that he had thought he had 4,100 men, but afterward
discovered he had considerably less. Lieutenant-Colonel
John Brooks, Lee’s adjutant-general, who must be con-
sidered good authority, makes this statement of the force:

Brigadier-General Scott’s detachment, 1440 men,
Brigadier-General Wayne’s detachment, 1000 men,
Brigadier-General Maxwell’s brigade, goo men,
Brigadier-General Varnum’s brigade,

between 300 and 350 men,
Brigadier-General Scott’s brigade, less than 300 men,
Colonel Jackson’s detachment, 200 men.

This statement would make—say about 4,190 men. He
quoted General Maxwell as authority for his own brigade
and Lieutenant-Colonel Olney for General Varnum’s
brigade. General Wayne corrected this list by making
Maxwell’s brigade 1,000 men, Varnum’s brigade 600 men,
Scott’s own brigade, which included also a small detach-
ment from General Woodford’s brigade, 600 men, But-

EeTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

ler’s and Jackson’s regiments 400 men, and, with the men
connected with the twelve pieces of artillery and the little
squad of light horse, in all about 5,000 men. Lieutenant-
Colonel Laurens, an aide to General Washington, con-
sidered the division to be 5,000 men, and Lieutenant-
Colonel Alexander Hamilton, another of his aides, stated
them to be 5,000 rank and file, with Colonel Morgan’s
600 riflemen and General Dickinson’s 800 militia subject
to his orders for cooperation. Lieutenant-Colonel Har-
rison, just mentioned (and he had such knowledge as
would make him correct), thought Lee’s forces amounted to
5,000 men exclusive of the corps under Colonel Morgan.
Certainly, taking Lieutenant-Colonel Brook’s statement,
virtually General Lee’s idea, if we include Colonel Mor-
gan’s riflemen and General Dickinson’s militia, both of
which would have responded to orders intelligently issued,
General Lee had nearly 6,000 men whom he could have
brought into action, and these men were fully equal
numerically to the force which Sir Henry Clinton could
bring to bear offensively against him,—exclusive of the
Hessian contingent guarding the baggage.CHAPTER XIII

T was about three o’clock in the morning of June 28

when Colonel William Grayson with his Virginia Con-
tinental regiment was ordered by General Lee to assume
command, as senior officer, of a detachment from General
Scott’s own brigade and General Varnum’s brigade, with
four pieces of artillery under Lieutenant-Colonel Eleazer
Oswald of the Second regiment Continental artillery,
amounting in all to 600 men, and prepare tomarch without
delay. His men immediately broke camp on the heights
back of Englishtown, leaving behind their packs and many
of them their coats, and Colonel Grayson reported himself
to General Lee for further orders. He was then directed
to proceed toward Monmouth Court House by way of
Englishtown and General Lee told him that he would
meet him at the latter village. It was just six o’clock when
this advance detachment entered the little town and
Colonel Grayson rode off to find General Lee. He was
there, as he had promised, and he directed Colonel Gray-
son to advance on the old road by way of the meeting-
house toward the court house and to keep him constantly
informed of his march and what he learned of the move-
ments of the foe. General Lee’s adjutant-general, Lieu-
tenant-Colonel John Brooks, at this time handed Colonel
Grayson a copy of so much of Lieutenant-Colonel Ham-
ilton’s letter of the previous day as directed Lee, by Wash-
ington’s order, to detach a “‘party of observation” as a
check to a possible night attack. At that hour it could
hardly be called even a formal compliance with General
Washington’s instructions. It was too late then to take
position against an assaulting column at night, for the
morning had dawned and the British, without thought of
an encounter with General Lee’s division, were just awak-
ing in the fierce sunlight of a sultry Sabbath morning. But

fe 1175]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
in this way General Lee selected Colonel Grayson’s de-
tachment as the party which General Washington desired
to march toward the enemy at least five hours previous.
This was the way he obeyed the first order of the day.

Unfortunately Colonel Grayson was detained some con-
siderable time at Englishtown waiting for a suitable guide,
but one was at last furnished him in the person of Briga-
dier-General David Forman of the New Jersey militia.
This gallant officer had greatly distinguished himself at
the Battle of Germantown and he was the chosen leader
of the patriot bands in Monmouth County, which had all
they could do to protect their homes during the long war
from the incendiary attacks and murderous assaults of the
pine robbers and armed Tory refugees of the New Jersey
coast.

At half-past four in the morning General Dickinson,
ever vigilant and active, who had been watching all night
in the woods, sent one of his staff officers to General Wash-
ington and to General Lee, to inform them that the enemy
were in motion. This information was correct. The for-
ward movement was the one which Lieutenant-General
Knyphausen had received orders from Sir Henry Clinton
to make at daylight on Sunday morning. It was of the
greatest importance to the British Army that the baggage
train which Knyphausen guarded should be pushed on
beyond the ridges on the Middletown road at the very
earliest moment. This message came into the hands of
General Lee just at five o’clock and was in accordance
with the instructions which General Dickinson had re-
ceived the previous evening from General Lee, through
Captain Mercer, to inform him of the first movement of
the British toward Middletown, as he proposed to make
an immediate attack. Captain Mercer had impressed the
idea on the mind of General Dickinson that it was of vital
importance that his information should be perfectly au-
thentic and promptly transmitted, that Lee would depend
upon receiving it and that the result of this after move-

le rRS a]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
ments would be governed strictly by what he heard from
him. General Dickinson had replied to Captain Mercer
that General Lee might be assured his Jerseymen would
bring him the best and most reliable facts and that he
should have the information at the earliest possible
moment.

Although orders were issued at five o’clock to be ready
to march it was not until seven o’clock that General
Lee’s division was fairly started on the road to meet the
enemy. They left in their camp the sick, the lame, and all
those who appeared to be worn out with the marching
hitherto, as well as some soldiers in charge of the baggage,
in all about four or five hundred men. At seven o’clock
General Wayne’s detachment, General Scott’s detach-
ment, General Maxwell’s brigade and Colonel Jackson’s
detachment marched in the order thus given. Receiving
his order at five o’clock to be in readiness to march, Gen-
eral Maxwell reported himself ready very soon thereafter
to General Lee in person. Lee was greatly surprised that
he had not started and told him he must now take the rear
of the column. Immediately returning to his brigade he
gave the order to march, filed out into the main road and
found himself and his command even then in advance of
both General Wayne’s and General Scott’s detachments,
contrary to his instructions. Colonel Jackson’s detach-
ment, following after Scott’s detachment, continued in
their rear, instead of behind Maxwell’s men as they had
been ordered.

It may be noted here that General Lee was, as he
confessed, almost an utter stranger to the names and faces
of the commanding officers of the respective corps, and
that he did not know the designations of his command as
they marched off to do battle under his generalship.

As Colonel Grayson’s detachment was leaving English-
town, Captain Evan Edwards of General Lee’s staff came
into the village and reported that the enemy had disap-
peared. After marching a little over two miles General

e a9) 4]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
Lee, through an aide, had ordered Colonel Grayson to
move cautiously, but soon after, Captain Edwards came
up and directed a more rapid advance. This, of course,
was in compliance with the report Edwards had just
brought in. Grayson’s detachment had passed the old
meeting-house, crossed the bridge at the west ravine’ and
was ascending the hill beyond when the six light horse-
men who accompanied him, a litle distance in front, espied
General Dickinson and his New Jersey militia engaged
in a little skirmish with the enemy.

Just before this skirmish with the British troops General
Dickinson had sent his aide to General Washington, as we
have already noticed, to inform him that the enemy had
left their camp ground and had commenced their march
toward Middletown. On the way to General Washington
the aide had given this intelligence to General Lee. Wash-
ington immediately ordered all the troops with him—called
by him the main body of the army’—to march by the same

1 General Carrington in his work on the Battles of the American Revolu-
tion speaks of the west, middle and east ravines. He is entirely correct and
exceedingly explicit in this description. The same titles will be used in this
work to designate these ravines.

2“rield Return of Troops under the immediate command of his Excel-
lency Gen’] Washington.

 

 

“Ponolopon [Manalapan] Bridge winicte en
June 28, 78 PRESENT
LIEUT CAP- SUB- SER- FIT FOR
BRIGADES. COLONELS. COLONELS. MAJORS. TAINS. ALTERNS. GEANTS. ACTION.
Woodford 3 2 9 30 46 385
North Carolina 2 2 1 7 16 28 369
Poor 3 2 16 37 57 639
Huntington 2 2 3 14 22 80 509
ist Maryland 2 1 2 9 47 72 657
2nd Maryland 2 2 2 9 17 41 529
Muhlenberg 2 4 2 13 35 80 575
Weedon 3 2 3 15 56 59 449
ist Pennsylvania 3 3 2 9 14 46 352
2nd Pennsylv2 2 ) 1 10 20 51 401
ard Pennsylv2 3 4 10 22 56 343
Glover 3 3 1 19 37 61 512
Larnade 1 1 2 12 21 42 204
Patterson 2 2 2 19 34 69 357
Total 24 33 29 171 408 788 6,371
“ENDORSED—Field Return 28th June 1778 ““ALEXR SCAMMELL,
“Exclusive of detachment under General Lee &c.” “Adj’t Gen'l

zo: aTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
road as had been travelled by Colonel Grayson’s advance
detachment. He also sent word by his aide, Lieutenant-
Colonel Richard K. Meade, to direct General Lee to re-
lieve his men of their packs and blankets, but this had
already been done by Lee’s order. Washington also told
Lieutenant-Colonel Meade to say to General Lee in the
most distinct manner that he “desired he would bring on
an engagement, or attack the enemy as soon as possible,
unless some very powerful circumstance forbid it, and that
he would soon be up to his aid.”*® This order, it will be
noticed, was not peremptory. It was quite evident to
Meade, however, that General Washington was anxious
to bring on a general engagement and that he intended to
support General Lee’s division with all his force as soon
as General Clinton developed his plans for the battle.

The discretion which General Washington gave General
Lee in the order, Lee afterwards took advantage of, and
although no one but himself saw any “powerful reasons”
against making an attack, he could plead that discretion-
ary power, which he afterwards did, as an excuse for his
conduct.

Lieutenant-Colonel Meade mounted his horse and rode
toward Englishtown. He passed through the village, but
General Lee had left there soon after eight o’clock. At
last Meade found him not quite a mile distant on the road
toward the meeting-house. Here he learned that Lee had
obtained new information through Captain Benjamin
Walker, aide to Major-General the Baron von Steuben,
who had informed him that the British had not yet
marched. Von Steuben, it is believed, had seen only the
rear guard of the enemy and had concluded that the main
body had not yet started as previously reported by Gen-
eral Dickinson. This information, however, caused Gen-
eral Lee to halt his command. With some hesitation, now
that the situation had apparently changed, Colonel

8 From Meade’s testimony at Lee’s court-martial, p. 11.

i 12 4]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

Meade gave the orders with which General Washington
had intrusted him. Lee replied that he “would endeavour
to answer his intentions.’”* At the same time General Lee
was very angry because the information he was receiving
was so contradictory. The next moment, however, fearing
that he was pushing Colonel Grayson’s men too hastily
into great danger he sent back for General Wayne, gave
him a few timely instructions and, relieving him from his
own detachment, directed him to gallop up to the advance
guard, the post of honor, and take command.

There was a delay at this point of nearly half an hour
and during this time General Dickinson’s militia was en-
gaged in annoying the British pickets. This little skirmish
of the militia of New Jersey was the very opening scene
in the Monmouth battle. These farmer boys were then
engaged in harassing the outposts of the Fortieth regiment
of British foot and a detachment of the Seventeenth regi-
ment of British light dragoons, who were attempting to
conceal and cover the withdrawal of the army. It was a
daring act for these undisciplined yeomen to pit themselves
for one moment against the very best troops of Britain.
But for some time they sent irregular volleys among the
red-coats. In the end, however, they were compelled to
give way and General Dickinson, seeing Colonel Grayson’s
detachment approaching, sent word to him to support his
retreating column. Grayson instantly complied, taking his
own Virginia regiment forward with quick step, and
Lieutenant-Colonel Oswald followed with one of his field-
pieces. When Colonel Grayson reached the top of the hill
the enemy, no doubt apprised of a well-disciplined force
approaching, had fled and were even then out of sight.
This was shortly after eight o’clock and General Lee was
just leaving Englishtown. Captain Edwards came up to
Grayson’s detachment during Lee’s absence and told
Colonel Durkee, the senior officer, to post his troops in the

4Lee’s defence at his court-martial, p. 201.

[225]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
best way possible on an eminence nearby until he could
inform General Lee what was occurring at that point.
Colonel Durkee did so and meeting General Lee with
General Wayne on the highway they. all rode to the west
ravine together. In the me: intime, Colonel Grayson re-
turned to the main road and General Dickinson accom-
panied him. Upon reaching that point, still very high
ground, they met General Lee and that part of his divi-
sion which had Just been witness to the closing scene of
Dickinson’s skirmish. On the ride down the hill General
Dickinson had expressed the opinion to Colonel Grayson
that the enemy would send two columns after General
Lee’s division, one on the right and the other on the left
flank, and that he had better not advance farther until he
informed himself fully of the present situation of the
British troops. He thought it well for himself to “shuffle
it out with his militia’’® on the left and annoy them as
much as possible. He also told General Lee when they
joined him half an hour afterward what he thought of the
situation.

Annoyed, as he said, by false alarms and contradictory
intelligence, General Lee accosted General Dickinson with
ae erah le warmth, as being the first cause of his mental
confusion. The same kind of information was still coming
to Lee every moment, first that the enemy were retreating,
then that they were on the American flank, and then that
they were about to attack the advance line. General Lee
told General Dickinson that, being a Jerseyman, he had
been told to look to him for the most reliable intelligence
and he would like to know why and by what means such
uncertain information was brought to him. General Dick-
inson, naturally irritated by Lee’s tone and manner, re-
plied with equal spirit, that his advices were frequent and
perfectly consistent and he asserted confidently that the
enemy were still near the Monmouth Court House. Gen-

5 Grayson’s testimony at Lee’s court-martial, p. 41.

[ 123 JTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

eral Dickinson closed the conversation by saying, “Gen-
eral Lee, you may believe or not, but if you march your
party beyond the ravine now in your rear, which has only
one passage over it, you are in a perilous situation.’”

General Dickinson made a slight mistake here. He
thought he had struck the advance party of the British
Army returning to engage the Americans, whereas it was
only one of their flanking parties. Captain Lord William
Cathcart had brought an order to Lieutenant-Colonel
Simcoe to “‘take his Huzzars and try to cut off a reconnoi-
treing party of the enemy (supposed to be M. Fayette)
who was upon a bald hill not far from his left.’”’ In this
skirmish, although of brief duration, two huzzars and
three men of the light infantry battalion were wounded.
One of the former died afterward in the hospital, the En-
lish church, in the village. Captain Philip Snook of the
First Hunterdon County regiment, and Captain Moses
Estey of the Fourth Hunterdon County regiment, New
Jersey militia, also received severe wounds.

It must be noted here that the right and left of the re-
treating British became the left and right flanks of the
same troops as they faced toward the American advance
and afterward marched in pursuit of the troops of Gen-
eral Lee falling back to another position.

While on the march with the main body of General
Lee’s division, General Maxwell determined to take the
position in line to which he had been assigned in orders
and he halted his brigade for a few moments to allow
General Wayne’s detachment and General Scott’s detach-
ment to pass him. General Wayne did so and General
Scott had just saluted General Maxwell when Captain
Mercer dashed up and directed Maxwell to march his
brigade by the Covenhoven road toward Craig’s Mills,
now called Baker’s Mills,’ at which point Captain Mercer
told him he would strike a direct road leading to Mon-

6 Lee’s defence at his court-martial, p. 205.
7 John Craig’s mill was near his house. See p. 155.

fe ea]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

mouth Court House, and to remain near the forks of the
road until further orders were sent him. Captain Mercer
gave General Maxwell a rude tracing on paper which
mapped out the roads in that direction as nearly as he had
been able to ascertain them. This sketch General Max-
well took with him. The order which he had received from
General Lee by the hands of Captain Mercer was in con-
sequence of the information which Lee had received from
General Dickinson’s scouts, who reported that the enemy
were still at Monmouth Court House and that it was
possible that they might endeavor to come in on the Amer-
ican rear at Englishtown by the upper road. General
Maxwell immediately complied with General Lee’s orders
and marched half a mile up the road where he was halted
by Lieutenant-Colonel Meade, one of General Washing-
ton’s aides, who, as a favor to General Lee, carried an
order to General Maxwell to march his brigade back and
take his position again in the column. General Maxwell
brought his command back to the old road and waited a
long time at the junction of the roads near the meeting-
house before the detachments of General Wayne and of
General Scott came up and passed him. As soon, however,
as this was done, he again took position on the left of the
column. By this time Colonel Jackson’s detachment, as
will hereafter be seen, had been ordered by General Lee
(General Wayne’s aide, Captain Benjamin Fishbourne
conveying the order), to take position on the extreme ad-
vance, and General Lafayette had received a written order
from General Lee by Captain Mercer, to put himself at
the head of Wayne’s and Scott’s detachments.

Two long halts had already been made between En-
glishtown and the meeting-house, the first consuming
nearly an hour and the second quite half an hour. This
delay in advancing toward the enemy was very damag-
ing to any plans which General Washington had ordered
General Lee to execute. A month after these events and
in reference to these halts General Lee said, ‘“The first

FedsTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
halt I made, in consequence of the advice I received from
General Dickinson of the whole force being ranged in bat-
talia, was censurable. I must do his Excellency the justice
to declare, that he never gave me, directly or indirectly,
such orders—they would have been unworthy of a man
many thousand degrees his inferior in understanding.””®

While General Maxwell was making the little diversion
with his brigade which has just been noticed, aconsiderable
body of men was observed on the left of the column and
somewhat to the rear and report flew along the line that
this was a party of the enemy. But the alarm was soon
over when Colonel Frederick Frelinghuysen emerged from
an orchard with his own battalion of Somerset County
militia and the Middlesex County militia regiments of
Colonels Henry Van Dike and John Webster. As soon as
General Lee became aware that they were patriot troops
he despatched them on the same detour upon which he had
sent General Maxwell’s men and had them posted on a
high hill looking toward Craig’s Mills. In this way Max-
well was relieved from this duty.

Still, as General Lee remained near the bridge over the
west ravine, the only place which General Dickinson told
him was passable for artillery, all kinds of informa-
tion was brought him by Monmouth farmers and other
patriotic men who were anxious to do some service to the
cause. But their opinions were unmilitary and although
often correct, as has since appeared, were not technically
stated and so were misunderstood. Why did not General
Lee even then send out officers on whom he could rely to
obtain certain facts that he needed, regardless of Dickin-
son or of zealous countrymen, and in this way partly re-
pair his neglect of the past twenty-four hours? To make
any effective movements at this time he needed the most
authentic information.

General Wayne was now in command of General Scott’s

8 Lee’s defence at his court-martial, p. 201.

b 12673]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

own brigade, not his detachment, and also General Var-
num’s brigade, the force which up to this time had been in
charge of Colonel Grayson as senior officer. When Gen-
eral Wayne assumed direct charge of these troops one
brigade was on each side of the bridge spanning the west
ravine.

But a short distance behind them was the detachment
formerly commanded by General Wayne and the detach-
ment now commanded by General Scott. This force was in
charge of General Lafayette. Although he said he con-
sidered himself a volunteer, so anxious was he to meet the
British grenadiers in battle, that General Lee looked to
him during the day to execute one of his most important
movements. General Lafayette had this day taken a hur-
ried breakfast at the house of Joseph Story, two miles from
Englishtown, and had hastened up to this advance column
with the eager desire to take a prominent part in the battle
he saw was impending.

About this time General Lee and General Wayne as-
cended the hill on the east of the ravine for the purpose
of reconnoitering the enemy, if possible.

An order was soon after issued by General Lee, and
carried by Captain David Lennox, Wayne’s aide-de-
camp, who was accompanied by Captain John Mercer,
Lee’s own aide, directing Colonel Richard Butler, of the
Ninth Pennsylvania Continental regiment, to march this
splendid organization to the extreme right, and ordering
Colonel Henry Jackson’s detachment, which consisted of
his own regiment and Lee’s regiment of Continental in-
fantry, Lieutenant-Colonel William S. Smith command-
ing, on the extreme rear of Lee’s column, to join Colonel
Butler’s force. While Colonel Butler’s command was com-
ing with rapid step to the right of the division the Colonel
rode forward to meet General Lee and General Wayne.
He was instructed by them to keep his party as much con-
cealed as possible, and General Wayne directed him to
attack the British wherever he happened to meet them.

[E27 alTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
With a sergeant’s guard in front, and as many soldiers on
each flank a little in advance, and marching the right of
platoons by files, Colonel Butler led his men directly to-
ward the British, posted at the court house. Seeing him
start off with these tactics General Lee changed the order
and directed him to march from the center by files. In this
way they advanced some distance, but finding it incon-
venient, Butler returned to his own assignment of march-
ing order. They marched on the road to Forman’s Mills,
passed the pond now known as Hartshorne’s pond” and
the mill there, and came out in the elder William Wikoff’s
fields. There was much wooded country on the left of the
roadway but on the right there appeared considerable
cleared ground. Colonel Butler was obliged then to skirt
the left road as closely as possible.

Colonel Jackson’s detachment, being furnished with a
guide, started on what was afterwards thought too rapid
a march for so warm a day to join Colonel Butler on the
advance. In this way they marched what seemed to Gen-
eral Wayne and Colonel Jackson about four miles until
they saw the court house in the distance and the enemy
near it. This was just at the time when the main body of
Sir Henry Clinton’s army was passing out of sight toward
Middletown, with their left just beyond the Allentown
road. General Lee, who had then come up to Butler’s de-
tachment, ordered General Wayne’s advance troops to
form in front of a wood while he took observation of the
enemy. Having done this, he ordered the whole of the
advance guard to move forward and at the same time
Colonel Butler and his party were detached from the ad-
vance and moved more to the left, out of direct sight of
Colonel Jackson’s men.

_ ®Edmund Williams of Shrewsbury bought this grist mill and land ad-
jacent to the pond in 1777 and owned it until 1801.

2s a]CHAPTER XIV

IR Henry Clinton was impressed with the idea that

General Washington and the American Army, which he
thought numbered 20,000 men, did not desire to fight his
brave grenadiers and fierce Hessian auxiliaries, but that
the plunder of his army stores and the capture of his bag-
gage train was the grand object of their rapid march in the
past forty-eight hours.

In his manuscript notes Clinton says, ““Washington, so
little desirous does he seem to have been of risking a gen-
eral action, had passed the South river and put three or
four of its marshy, boggy branches between his army and
that of the British.”

The British Army had passed a night without alarm and
General Knyphausen moved his division of Hessians and
loyalists, with General Grant’s brigade, which had the
special charge of the stores, the bat-horses, the wheel car-
riages, and the personal baggage, soon after four o’clock
in the morning of Sunday. The British camp around the
court house was noisy that Sabbath morning with the
shouts of the team drivers, the confusion incident to get-
ting the boisterous camp followers on the march at so early
an hour and the stern commands of the German officers as
they drove their heavily-laden men into line. When this
train was fully on the march it extended over more than
eight miles. Sir Henry Clinton gave his order at eight
o'clock for the rest of his command, except a small cover-
ing party, to follow by the route taken by General Knyp-
hausen and try to gain the higher ground near Middle-
town sixteen miles distant, by way of “‘a plain’’ as Clinton
said, “near three miles in length and about one mile in
breadth.” The location of this plain is now somewhat ob-
scure, but it must be the ground between what we know as

[ 129 ]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
the east ravine and Briar Hill.* He had with him the very

flower of the soldiery of the crown in the division under

the immediate control of Lieutenant-General the Earl

Cornwallis. In this division were the Third, Fourth and

Fifth brigades, British foot, the First and Second bat-

talions of British grenadiers, the Hessian grenadiers, the

British foot guards, the First battalion light infantry and

the Sixteenth regiment of light dragoons. Although in the

order of the previous day they were included among those

who were to join Knyphausen’s division, it appears that the
Second battalion light infantry and the Queen’s rangers
were also with Cornwallis’ division during the day of
June 28.

Sir Henry Clinton well understood his position. Gen-
eral Lee, as it appears, had not posted himself at all about
the topography of the country, but Clinton knew what
ground, made up of ravines and marshes, lay between him
and his foe. He had his spies and scouts at work on Satur-
day and the country around the court house was fully
mapped out for his information. Late the previous night
and early in the morning of June 28 he had learned the
proximity of Washington’s entire army and began to think
that vigorous exertions were necessary, but still he believed
that General Washington “after having always hitherto
so studiously avoided a general action would not now give
in to it against every dictate of policy.” He could only
suppose that his views were directed against his baggage.
He says that he knew Washington had come up with his
whole army, estimated at about 20,000 men, with which
was also the northern division under General Gates. It
seems somewhat strange to us today that Clinton was so
misled as to suppose that so large a force as he imagined it
simply wished to sack the baggage and plunder the pro-
vision train, rather than to strike a strong blow for free-
dom. With Clinton’s mind clearly astray as to the intention
of the Americans, with his attention fully concentrated in

1 About two miles east of the court house.

aor]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
great anxiety upon the safety of his train in Knyphausen’s
division, and upon this alone, what a happy opportunity
presented itself for a bold, sharp attack, such as General
Washington desired, upon the long extended column of
British troops!

In consequence of the contradictory reports that reached
General Lee, the brigade named after General Varnum but
under command of Colonel John Durkee of the Fourth Con-
necticut regiment and the brigade of General Scott, passed
and repassed the bridge at the west ravine several times.
This bridge is often spoken of in sketches of the battle as
the “long causeway” and is near the late residence of John
I. Conover. General Lee remarked afterward, in refer-
ence to these movements at the bridge, that he was “teased.
mortified and chagrined” by these “little marches and
counter-marches, from one hill to another, over the ravine
as it gave an awkward appearance to our first manoeu-
vres.”* When General Lafayette came up with his detach-
ments to the bridge where General Lee was, Lee deter-
mined after a brief conversation with him, that he would
act regardless of alarms and the strange intelligence he
had been receiving from countrymen that heavy columns
of the enemy were advancing on the right and then that
they had not marched at all, that the main body of the
foe had marched northward and that those left behind at
the court house were merely a covering party. General
Lee told one of these self-appointed couriers to go about
his business and not bring him any such reports. Lee then
decided to go forward and find the enemy, see for him-
self what their situation really was, and govern himself
accordingly. Lieutenant-Colonel John Laurens, of Wash-
ington’s staff, who had been reconnoitering with some
light horse, and Lieutenant-Colonel the Marquis Francis
de Malmedy, General Lee’s aide-de-camp, gave him some
trusty intelligence just at this time and he sent out some of
his staff to urge on the immediate advance of his division.

2 Lee’s defence at his court-martial, p. 204.

Ease 3THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

Colonel Grayson’s regiment and Lieutenant-Colonel
Oswald’s battery again assumed their positions in the
marching column. The route was then eastward from the
west ravine, marching in platoons of sub-divisions, about
two miles without making a single halt, crossing on the
way a piece of low ground, covered with much thicket.
This was what will be called herein the “middle ravine.”
Every effort was made in this march to keep as concealed
as possible. General Lee instructed Lieutenant-Colonel
Oswald to keep his guns in the woods and as much out of
sight as he could, because he did not yet wish the enemy to
know that he had any artillery. This he was able to do and
having pulled down some fence he was in good position
to sight his two pieces of artillery at the foe.

When General Lee’s troops arrived at the edge of the
open fields near and in sight of the court house, they were
halted and began to prepare for an attack. A deep morass
which we will call the “east ravine” began on the open
ground near the court house and extended some distance to
a heavy wood on the extreme left of the American advance.
This ravine is not now as clearly defined as it was in the
Revolutionary period. General Lee was not at all aware
of this dangerous ravine, and his guides had not thought
to tell him of it. General Knox first informed him of its
existence, and Lee simply remarked, “that he was not
sufficiently informed of the ground before that he came on
it, and that the morass was a disagreeable circumstance
but that he would endeavour to make the best of it.””* The
enemy were clearly to be seen near the court house and
from appearances they consisted of some light dragoons
with several detachments of foot soldiers supporting them.
It was certainly not the main body of the British Army
and could only be considered to be a covering party to the
main column and to the baggage train which was known
to be on the advance toward the coast. The British, both
cavalry and infantry, did not appear to be arranged in

8 Knox’s testimony at Lee’s court martial, p. 179.

E 132 JTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
very soldierly order and this fact rather astonished the
American officers at first sight. However, they moved
toward the left as if to make a dash at Gener al Lee’s
advance troops.

General Lee and General Wayne passed out some dis-
tance toward the front and carefully reconnoitered the
situation. General Lee was at this time in considerable
poo danger, but to all who saw him he appeared cool,

self-possessed and brave.

An immediate order was then sent to Colonel Richard
Butler, who had halted with his Ninth Pennsylvania regi-
ment at the cross-road which led from the court house to
Amboy, to move forward and attack the enemy. He pre-
pared to obey with great alacrity notw ithstanding the heat
was becoming intense and his men were suffering greatly.
Colonel Grayson’s detachment with Patton’s regiment
Continental infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel John Parke
commanding, were then marched on toward Colonel But-
ler’s line as a supporting force. When they reached his
position the skirmishing had already begun. On being
asked by General Lee how many men General W ayne’s
new command would consist of Captain Mercer replied,
about 550 soldiers. General Lee thought this was not
Pouch. Salone Henry Jackson’s detachment would have
been ordered to accompany Colonel Butler’s command,
instead of Lieutenant-Colonel Parke’s regiment, had they
not been short of cartridges, having only fourteen rounds
per man. The sergeants of Colonel Jackson’s detachment
under the charge of one of General Lee’s staff officers
were ordered to collect a cartridge each from the rest of
the troops near them and so make up the deficiency. This
took some time, and Colonel Jackson, therefore, did not
go instantly forward to Butler’s new position. General
Wayne then ordered him to support Lieutenant-Colonel
Oswald’s two guns which were pushed to the front in the
woods on the left. This was promptly accomplished. It
was difficult to move artillery and ammunition wagons

[a3 4THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
over the rough and miry road, but Oswald succeeded at
last in getting his guns in a good position. While Oswald
was doing this and before Colonel Jackson’s men had
arrived he was unsupported in his advance by any infantry
and was so uneasy about it that he begged Lieutenant-
Colonel Laurens to apply to General Lee in his name for
troops to cover his battery. Before this could be done,
Jackson’s men appeared.

General Lee noticed a regiment in the distance (prob-
ably Butler’s), and supposing it was the enemy, detached
Lieutenant-Colonel Jeremiah Olney, Second Rhode
Island regiment of General Varnum’s brigade, to go out
and attack them. They soon discovered the mistake and
the regiment was then ordered by General Lee to the
support of Lieutenant-Colonel Oswald’s battery accord-
ing to the request conveyed by Laurens. In the attempt
to secure the position several men were killed and wounded
by the shot from the British batteries. Colonel John Dur-
kee, Fourth Connecticut regiment, who commanded Var-
num’s brigade, was severely injured in his right arm so
that he lost the use of it entirely. His suffering was so great
that he was obliged to turn over the brigade to Lieutenant-
Colonel Jeremiah Olney of the Second Rhode Island regi-
ment. Major Simeon Thayer of the Second Rhode Island
regiment lost an eye by the windage of a cannon-ball and
Second Lieutenant Nathan Weeks of the same regiment
was killed.

General Lee was now very confident that his movements
had been correctly made and that the capture of the Brit-
ish party would soon be accomplished. He told Lieutenant-
Colonel Jeremiah Gilman of the First New Hampshire
regiment to inform General Washington that he was in
hopes of cutting off all the rear guard of the enemy. This
confident message Gilman delivered to the commander-in-
chief about a mile west of the meeting-house and General
Washington, of course, received the impression that all
was going well at the front.

[eeeTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

The Queen’s rangers, a partizan corps organized in
America for the British Army and commanded by the gal-
lant Lieutenant-Colonel John Graves Simcoe, had again
formed in line on the northwest side of the open field and
between the American troops and the court house building.
They were supported by the Sixteenth regiment, light dra-
goons, which formed part of the rear guard of the army.
This position was near Hartshorne’s pond a short dis-
tance from the elder Mr. Wikoff’s house. The light horse
of the American troops, being very few in number, were
kept concealed for the present in the woods at the rear,
while the foot soldiers were wheeled to the right, so as to
face the British line. The infantry detachments of the
enemy were somewhat to the rear of the rangers and to
General Wayne they hardly appeared within fair support-
ing distance. At a glance Wayne supposed the dragoons
to be about three hundred in number and that there were
fully twice as many infantry troops. When Colonel But-
ler’s regiment passed well up on the right of General
Lee’s force, about a quarter of a mile in column from the
center, they received a scattering discharge from the fire-
arms of the two flank companies of the rangers. A file of
Butler’s men fired a terrific volley in return, although they
had been instructed to reserve their fire, and then they
attempted to push rapidly forward. This fire of the Ninth
Pennsylvania regiment caused the severe wounding of
eight of the Queen’s rangers, among whom was their com-
mander himself, who received a musket-ball wound in his
arm; his horse was injured, frightened and ran away with
him.* After this the dragoons gave way and hurried
through the village of Freehold “in great disorder and
confusion,” as General Wayne considered, but, as Colonel
sutler thought, in “regular order.” Colonel Butler’s men
followed them to a point near an orchard on the left of

4 The Monmouth Battle Monument in the Borough of Freehold is erected
on ground which was the theater of this little skirmish at the opening of

the battle.
E 1354THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
the roadway toward the court house. General Wayne was
informed by Captain Thomas Langhorne Byles, Third
Pennsylvania battalion, who had been watching the Brit-
ish from close quarters, of the exact position and surround-
ings of the rangers and he expressed the opinion that if
Wayne or General Lee wished to make a bold attack on
the foe, now was the time to do it. Butler’s men were then
posted in a clump of woods a little space to the left of the
retreating enemy. In taking this new position, with some
artillery and detachments of infantry on their flanks, the
movement, so near the British, was performed in good
order and in correct military style.

As soon as General Wayne was fully apprized of the
result of Colonel Butler’s advance, he sent Captain David
Lennox of his staff to inform General Lee that the Brit-
ish had fallen back and then halted, and that he desired
more troops to be sent to the front. When General Lee
was informed of what had happened he merely replied to
Captain Lennox that it was a customary movement of re-
treating troops and that General Wayne need pay no very
ereat attention to it. But soon after this General Lee sent
Captain Mercer to General Wayne to direct him to ad-
vance his command and attack the rear of the enemy and
prevent them if possible from retreating to the main body
of the army or from obtaining any reinforcement. Colonel
Henry Jackson’s detachment, strengthened also by Pat-
ton’s regiment Continental infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel
John Parke commanding, had not at this time come up nor
had Lieutenant-Colonel Oswald’s battery. General Wayne
said to Captain Mercer, on giving him the order Just re-
ferred to, ‘send me a cannon and I will engage to stop
them.” The guns he wished and an additional force were
at that moment near at hand and soon after the force
reported to him.

Colonel Jackson’s detachment was again ordered to re-
port to Colonel Butler and Lieutenant-Colonel de Mal-
medy of General Lee’s staff was sent to guide them to the

[136 3THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
part of the field where he was posted. It seemed to Colonel
Jackson quite a mile and a half to the left in front, but
could hardly have been much more than half that distance.
Colonel Jackson’s command took a very quick step and
soon came within one hundred yards of Colonel Butler’s
men just as General Wayne directed him to march his

gallant force out of the edge of the wood, through a small
orchard to an open plain where the enemy then seemed to
be forming. This was some five hundred yards away on

Colonel Jackson’ s right flank. Colonel Jackson then called
out to his party with a design to inspire them, “My lads,
if there are any of you who have not a mind to go into
action, now is the time for you to fall out.” Just at this
moment a cavalryman rode up in great excitement and
begged Colonel Jackson, with many strong expletives, to
form his men instantly or they would all be cut to pieces
by the British light horse. Jackson’ s Massachusetts men
then wheeled into line and formed, Colonel Butler being
also in position about three hundred feet to their left. But
the American light horse, a few of which were then pro-
tecting each flank of Wayne’s detachment, seemed to be
the rae object of attack for the Queen’s rangers
and the light dragoons who, when they saw them, charged
violently to within forty yards of Colonel Butler’s line.
Here they received a severe volley into their ranks, and
with a discharge of their horse- -pistols they galloped off.
After ten minutes’ halt at this position both regiments
wheeled into divisions under Colonel Butler’s orders and
marched across the open field, still keeping the same re-
spective distance apart as before. At this very moment (Sir
Henry Clinton says it was about ten o’clock in the morn-
ing), the Americans could hear the cannonading going on
between Oswald and the enemy. Captain Thomas Seward

of the Third regiment Continental artillery thought the

covering party of the British had ten cannon,one twelve-
pounder and nine six-pounders. The British artillery fired

a dozen rounds at General Wayne’s men as they crossed

[a7 alTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

the open ground and one of the shots took off the arm of
one of Jackson’s men. Colonel Butler then took his regi-
ment into a wood near by and Colonel Jackson marched
his detachment obliquely to the left under cover of the
same piece of woods. This brought some of the men on the
low ground of the east ravine, the left flank in a morass
and the right under a hill. At this time Colonel Grayson’s
own regiment was posted directly in the rear of Colonel
Jackson’s detachment. Colonel Butler noticed that the
British troops were apparently withdrawing and again he
sent word to General Wayne by Captain Byles that it was
a good time to strike the enemy. Butler’s troops then
crossed a small morass, three-quarters of a mile north and
east of the court house, and General Wayne, coming up
at this time, ordered them to advance and place a piece
of artillery on a little hill in their front. This was done.
The British gunners had just set fire to a barn in front of
their lines, and the burning of this building made a con-
spicuous object on this part of the battle-field. In descrip-
tions of the battle in after days it served well to locate
the various skirmishes.

It was now clearly the plan of General Lee to surround
the rear party or covering detachment of the enemy which
appeared in his front and apparently removed some dis-
tance from the main body. He said that if this was all or
nearly all of their rear guard, instead of pushing them too
hard and obliging them to fall back on the main body, he
would rather press them a little and keep them occupied in
front while he himself, with a considerable portion of his
force, would seek to find an intermediate space between
them and the main portion of the British column, which
was unprotected, and thus be able to take the whole of
their rear guard prisoners. He felt confident that he could
do it. It is quite clear that General Lee wished only to
make a slight demonstration and that he never had in
mind any direct attack on the British forces. Instruction
was then given General Wayne not to push them too im-

[ 138 JTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
petuously, lest the covering party fall back on the main
body, nor to force a portion of the main body to come back
to the relief of the covering party, but to affect shyness and
diffidence rather than confidence, to keep them amused and
make them halt. To have General Wayne attack too pre-
cipitately would “subvert that plan and disappoint his
intentions.”* He proposed to manoeuver rather than to
fight. While General Wayne made a feint of attacking,
Lee intended to have General Varnum’s brigade press the
enemy on their right flank with General Scott’s own bri-
gade as a support, expecting—(it is strange that he ex-
pected, since he had kept up no line of couriers) —that
Colonel Daniel Morgan’s corps would come up somewhere
on the American right and press the British on their left
flank. General Lee then intended to put himself at the
head of the column of troops, with General Scott’s detach-
ment in the lead, and marching through a close wood on
the left push his force between the two bodies of the Brit-
ish troops and thus capture the whole of their covering
party. Could this have been done, he said, “the enemy
would have been caught in a forceps.” General Lee gave
all his orders for these movements as if assured of com-
plete success. He believed at that time that the rear guard
of the enemy was but little, if any, more than 1500 men
and all British reports show that this was a correct esti-
mate at the time. Had he handled his command promptly,
General Lee might have executed his plan successfully.
But the parts of his division were not working in harmony
and he was trying to carry out his ideas without imparting
to any of his subordinates his ulterior designs. This was a
very difficult thing to do at that time with men who held
opposite views as to what was best to do, and it is not to
be wondered that he failed. He had not, withal, the in-
fluence over his officers and men that an officer should
have who has such an important command in the front of

 

5 Edward’s testimony at Lee’s court-martial, p. 189.

139° 4THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

the army. This subtle power must be possessed by a com-
mander who expects to execute with success any plan he
may have formed.

General Lee’s division was now in position, with its
right flank covered by a small wood in front of the vil-
lage. The right of the British force opposed to Lee’s men
was at this time at the juncture of the cross-roads leading
to Shrewsbury and to Middletown; their left flank, at
which point their light horse was concentrated, was ex-
tended to the open field close to the village.

In pursuance of the general plan of General Lee, to
capture the covering party of the British, Lieutenant-
Colonel Oswald was ordered to the front with his guns to
fire on the enemy. For a short time he had Colonel Jack-
son’s detachment as a support but this was removed and
Lieutenant-Colonel Malmedy reported the fact that Os-
wald’s battery was without cover. As the British light
dragoons, which had just received Colonel Butler’s fire,
were moving off, Oswald sent four or five cannon shot to
hurry them along, and then Captain Thomas Wells of the
Third regiment of artillery limbered up the pieces while
Oswald explored the nature of the east ravine. As soon
as this was Rane understood, the artillery was passed
over a causeway of the ravine into a field of grain, and
another cannonade commenced. It was now quite evident
that the enemy had brought into action more guns than
Oswald commanded and their fire was, therefore, more
severe. In this engagement the American battery lost two
matrosses® killed and several wounded. Two of their
horses were also killed and the men were falling by the
wayside utterly prostrated by fatigue and the intense heat.
By this time one of their guns had become entirely dis-
abled and all the round shot had been expended. On his
rear Oswald observed Varnum’s brigade and he fell back

6 Matross. Formerly, one of the soldiers in a train of artillery who were
next to the gunners, and assisted them in loading, firing, and sponging the
guns. They carried firelocks, and marched with the store-wagons as guards
and assistants. Cent. Dict.—Ed.

140 5]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
under its cover, taking with him his large ammunition
wagon, which up to rn time had not followed him over
the causeway,—it being thought unsafe.

About this time Captain Edwards, who had been off
with two light horsemen on a reconnaissance, again re-
ported to General Lee that the enemy were retreating.
General David Forman also gave his opinion of the situa-
tion of the enemy and offered to guide a column of Lee’s
troops by a road to the left which would bring them in
front of the retreating rear-guard of the British. General
Lee said to General Forman in a petulant manner, “I
know my business,” and did not accept his offer ; but Cap-

tain Mercer was sent out to explore ihe road and to see if
artillery as well as infantry eatin move along the road to
the left, then concealed from view. He w ent some distance
along the route, saw the place where the neighboring farm-
ers told him two thousand of the British had spent the pre-
vious night and had just broken camp and gone toward the
village. Captain Mercer thought se road was practicable
and so Bed. Captain Edwards was then instructed by
General Lee to take Varnum’s brigade, and two pieces of
artillery and guide them around on the right of the enemy.
He did so, taking them as far as he had reconnoitered,
and then, strange to say, left them, and went over to join
General Wayne’s command.

General Lee’s confidence must have been great when he
said to Dr. James McHenry, General Washington’s Sec-
retary, “Inform his Excellency that the enemy do not ap-
pear to well understand the roads; that the route he was
then on cut off two miles; that the rear of the enemy was
composed of 1500 or 2000 men; that he expected to fall
in with them and had great certainty of cutting them off.”
He then gave McHenry a hasty idea of the present posi-
tion of the two forces, described how he himself intended
immediately to take a detachment by a short route, and
get in between the two bodies of the enemy. “‘Say also to

raneTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
him,” he added, ‘“‘that the enemy are constantly changing
their front, which is a usual thing with those who retreat.’””

General Lee was nearly correct in his estimate of the
force in front of him at that moment. He was fully im-
pressed with the success of his plans and he had imparted
his confidence to those around him. One of his aides said
to General Lafayette, “The rear guard of the enemy is
ours.”’ General Lee also said to the same officer, “My dear
Marquis, I think those people are ours.” On leaving
Colonel Grayson, after giving him some minute directions,
Lee also exclaimed with much animation, “By God, I will
take them all.’

While General Wayne was pushing on in the advance,
General Scott, with by far the largest detachment of Gen-
eral Lee’s division, was marching toward the court house.
When they came within sight of it and of the enemy near
it, they moved out of an orchard, crossed the east ravine
and halted. General Scott then directed Colonel Joseph
Cilley of the First New Hampshire regiment to form his
men in line of battle while he went forward with General
Wayne to examine the situation. When General Scott re-
turned to his troops, he ordered them to march from right
of battalion, recross the ravine and form on the back of it
by the side of a hill covered with a dense wood. This was
done and Scott’s detachment took post on the left of the
other troops of the division. He was not able, however, to
bring up his artillery to this position. General Lee then
formed what he called “‘a potence”’ for the better security
of his front and flanks. General Wayne did not think, as
he examined the appearance of the hostile force in sight,
that it could possibly be over 2000 men, and to him and
General Scott they seemed to be moving to gain the higher
ground beyond, on the line of the Middletown road.

General Maxwell also marched his brigade, with a few

7 McHenry’s testimony at Lee’s court-martial, pp. 89-90.
8 Lafayette’s testimony at Lee’s court-martial, p. 17.
® Grayson’s testimony at Lee’s court-martial, p. 45.

[ 142 ]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
light horsemen of the New Jersey militia attached to his
command, in the same route taken by General Scott’s de-
tachment, keeping in the woods as much as possible, which
General Lafayette told him was General Lee’s wish.
About two miles eastward from the meeting-house the
brigade turned into a road on the left and at last came out
in a large open field in full view of the court house. Gen-
eral Maxwell led his column in person but he received no
orders from General Lee to form his brigade at any par-
ticular place. It is quite apparent that all the movements
of Lee’s forces were loosely made and very uncertain. All
the morning Maxwell had been following General Scott’s
lead without any definite or special orders having been
given him. On the open ground he halted his brigade five
minutes and found that he had a morass, or what was the
east ravine, on his right flank and a very dense thicket on
his left. General Scott’s detachment was but one hundred
yards ahead of him and had already formed as General
Maxwell saw the enemy approaching on the extreme right
of his position. Oswald’s guns were firing at the British as
General Maxwell formed his line. It was thought by
Maxwell that General Scott would move his men to the
right and fill up the intervening space between them. Just
at this moment he saw General Scott galloping up to see
him and to consult about the situation.

While these movements were being made the enemy
had formed on an eminence and were preparing to make
a dash at the American light horse. They advanced some
distance beyond Colonel Butler’s line with the design of
luring him on to an attack—which proved effective. The
Queen’s rangers, about 300 men, with about 200 foot
soldiers to support them, again made a charge and the
American horse gave way. But General Wayne’s com-
mand, and especially the Ninth Pennsylvania regiment,
still efficient, received them with a well-directed, deadly
fire, so that the rangers broke and retreated rapidly. Gen-
eral Wayne shouted to his men to encourage them to rush

[E 14374]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
quickly forward and use the bayonet on the Tory troopers.
The support which the rangers expected to get from the
British foot failed them in this crisis and they fled from
Colonel Butler’s fire, broke up the line of the enemy’s in-
fantry and put the whole rear-guard into much disorder.
Colonel Butler’s men pursued them about two hundred
yards when three or four pieces of the enemy’s artillery
opened on them again and they were obliged to stop fur-
ther pursuit. The halt was made in a slight depression,
which was covered with underbrush. Here they remained
some fifteen minutes, the enemy’s artillery all the while
firing at them. The British column seemed after this to be
bearing toward the American right and to desire to gain
possession of some high ground near the court house. At
last they succeeded and as each detachment came up on
the eminence it halted and formed. General Wayne sent
Captain Byles to bring up Varnum’s brigade to his sup-
port. He also sent Captain Fishbourne to General Lee to
beg for more troops to be sent to him. The Captain came
up to General Lee about half a mile in the rear of Wayne's
advance, but Lee made no response to the request.

Just at this juncture in the action a curious incident
occurred. Lieutenant-Colonel David Rhea, Fourth regi-
ment New Jersey Continental line, was some distance away
from his command reconnoitering the enemy. A British
dragoon caught sight of him and dashed toward him.
Colonel Rhea, observing him about fifty yards distant,
drew his pistol and took deliberate aim, but missed the
dragoon. With drawn sword and mounted on a fine horse
the dragoon dashed directly toward him and the Colonel
was compelled to use spurs to his steed and fly abruptly.
A barn was in the direct line of his retreat and the Colonel
rode around it, then through its open doors and back to
his regiment for shelter. As the trooper left the barn a
hundred muskets were fired at him but he escaped them
all, gave up the chase and took his place in his squadron,
unscathed.

[ 144 J]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

After nearly another hour had elapsed, General Wayne,
always ready for a fight, again sent Captain Benjamin
Fishbourne to General Lee to inform him that the British
were retreating, that there was nothing to fear in making
a bold advance and to urge him to push on his troops.
General Lee was found by General Wayne’s aide near an
orchard, a mile and a half from the court house. On being
informed of Wayne’s opinion and wishes he said “pho!
pho! it is impossible!’ and gave no orders but said he
would see General Wayne himself. A short time after this
General Wayne saw General Scott, who also had no orders,
and they directed Captain Thomas L. Byles and Captain
David Lennox to find General Lee and to beg him again
in the strongest terms to push on the troops against the
enemy. These staff officers rode two miles to the rear and
found General Lee with a body of troops retreating before
the British. The whole plan had by that time changed.

General Lee afterward laughed at General Wayne’s
anxiety to push up the troops, quoting him as saying, “that
the enemy were precipitately retiring and that then was
the time to press them; another instant when they made a
halt, he was as fully convinced that it was their intention
to attack, and of course a reinforcement was equally neces-
sary.” “I could not help being surprised and expressing
my surprise that every appearance of retreat in the enemy,
and every halt they made, should pass upon him, the one
as the effect of fright and necessity and the other as a
serious design.’”"” General Lee said that General Wayne
thought the whole executive duties of the day were trans-
ferred to him and that he had nothing to do but make such
call for troops as his idea of affairs at the moment indi-
cated. But General Wayne really thought and so stated
afterward that General Lee could have brought into action
all the troops he had near the east ravine and that at this
very time when he needed reinforcements he could have
ordered 3000 men into action.

10 Lee’s defence at his court-martial, pp. 222-3.

fe 1aTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

There was, evidently, considerable dissatisfaction con-
cerning General Lee among his subordinate officers at the
front. He did not seem to them to be acting as quickly
and effectively as they thought he might. A French officer,
Captain Pierre Charles L’Enfant, of the Continental En-
gineers, seemed surprised at the inactivity displayed and
remarked it in General Lee’s hearing. Lee replied, “I have
orders from Congress and the Commander-in-Chief not to

engage.”

General Wayne’s annoyance at General Lee’s want of
action cannot easily be described. Fighting man that he
was, he felt that if victory was desired it must be earned
by the conflict of battle, and, for himself, he was always
ready. The glory that the ambitious soldier coveted was
‘n full view of his eager eye and, although obedient, he
was irritated by the only instructions he had received,
which ordered him merely to feign an attack. He felt, too,
that his position required him to fight, fight boldly and
without feint, otherwise give way instantly his important

post in the formation.

11 L’Enfant’s testimony at Lee’s court-martial, p. 112.

[ae OlCHAPTER v

FE numerical strength of the rear guard of the Brit-

ish Army opposed to General Lee’s division appears

to have been about 2000 men. Of this number 300 were

light dragoons. Conte mporary opinions, however, differed

materially on this point and it can only be accounted for

by the fact that Sir Henry Clinton, as he says in his report,

ordered a reinforcement from the main body of the army

to join the rear guard, and that this force, from the various

points of vantage of the American o fficers appeared from
time to time in very different numbers.*

1 Lieutenant-Colonel Hamilton thought the rear guard did not exceed 800
infantry and cay alry, if so many, and Lieutenant-Colonel Meade, also of
General Washin; gton’s staff, thought this was about the maximum; Brigadier-
General Forman, of the New Jersey State troops, who was at all parts of
the field and ett have been able to form a correct opinion, said he
judged they did not exceed 1000 mich General Wayne said the enemy
increased from 600 to 2000 men while he was looking at them. Lieutenant-
Colonel Laurens, Washington’s ae e-camp, who had several good views
of the enemy, said they never had more than 2000 infantry, cavalry and
artillery and this was even after they left the vill: age in pursuit of Lee’s
division. Lieutenant-Col lonel Fitzgerald, another of Washington’s aides,
named 1500 as his highest estimate of their number, and Lieutenant-
Colonel Harrison, Washington’s military secretary, said he did not see
2000 of the enemy at any time that day, and this number included their
cavalry. The Baron von Steuben conceived them to be 1500 infantry and
150 horse. Captain Edwards, aide to General Lee, estimated them at 2000
but could not see to their rear, and Colonel Cilley, of the New Hampshire
line, saw about 800 men at first and afterward their number increased to
about 2000 or 2500 in sig oie General Scott named 2500 soldiers the horse
included, and Lieutenant-Colonel Oswald, of the artillery, about the same
number. Colonel Butler, of the Pennsylvania line, thought there might be
1500 foot and 200 horse although he saw 500 or 600 other foot soldiers
afterw ard. Captain Lennox, of General Wayne’s staff, said 1000 foot, 300
horse and a considerable reinforcement coming up. Colonel Jackson, of
Massachusetts, estimated them at 3000, and, like Captain Edwards, did not
see to their rear. He En DBGEC d there were many more. Lieutenant Colonel
Olney, of the Rhode Island regiment, and Captain Seward, of the artillery,
gave still higher figures which cert ainly must have been far from correct.
The former nz ea 4000 or 5000 as the first party, with the reinforcement
of 2000 approaching; the latter said 800 to 1000 cavalry and from 6000 to
8000 infantry and 10 pieces of cannon, one 12-pounder and the rest
6-pounders.

General Lee told his aide, Captain Mercer, during the fight that he sup-
posed them to be between 1500 and 2000 men, although Captain Mercer

considered them 3000 strong.
[ 147 J]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

General Lee said he made different estimates of their
force at different times during the day, knowing that they
tried, as he did, to conceal their numbers. He could only
infer their strength from their manoeuvers, and then de-
cide what was best for him to do according to the size of
their party. He claimed that the British guards, the Brit-
ish grenadiers, the Hessian grenadiers, the British light
infantry, the Hessian yagers, the Queen’s rangers, and
indeed all the British cavalry, with two brigades of British
foot, comprised the party directly in his front. Of course
this has since been proved fallacious.

Up to this time all the advantage had been with the
American arms, and it needed now to be followed up by
intelligent orders correctly and enthusiastically executed,
in order to inspire the troops to quick action.

Sir Henry Clinton at this time fully believed that the
Americans were about to attack the right and left flanks
of General Knyphausen’s division. He thought his baggage
train was the weak place in his column and was fully im-
pressed with the idea that the Americans preferred to
plunder his army rather than to give battle to the very
flower of the British troops on this continent. He therefore
determined to charge the American front with such vigor
as to compel them to recall their flanking parties to the aid
of their more seriously threatened main column. General
Lafayette was the first officer to see this new movement
of Clinton and he wished to lead an attack promptly on
the British left. He expressed his desire to General Lee
and that officer said, “Sir, you do not know British soldiers;
we cannot stand against them; we shall certainly be driven
back at first and we must be cautious.”* Lafayette did not
like this kind of talk in the very face of the foe and he
brusquely replied, “It may be s0, General, but British
soldiers have been beaten and they may be again; at any
rate, I am disposed to make the trial.”* Then Lafayette

2 Custis’ Recollections of Washington, p. 218.
8 Lossing’s Field-book of the Revolution, Vol. II, p. 151.

[ 148 JTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

sent word to General Washington that his presence was
needed on the field. Twice, also, were messages of a
similar nature sent to the Commander-in-Chief by Lieu-
tenant-Colonel Laurens of his staff.

Soon after Lafayette left him General Lee himself
began to be impressed with the idea that his plan of getting
in between the divisions of the British Army had been
completely frustrated by this new movement of Clinton
and that he must make some show of interference with the
changed plan of the enemy. The British column was then
marching directly toward the court house, a movement
which threatened the American right flank, and General
Lee requested Lieutenant-Colonel Hamilton, who was
riding near him, to direct General Lafayette to take three
regiments of General Wayne’s detachment, then on the
center, the Thirteenth Pennsylvania regiment, Colonel
Walter Stewart, commanding; the Fourth New York regi-
ment, Colonel Henry B. Livingston, commanding; and
the Ninth Massachusetts regiment, Colonel James Wes-
son, commanding; and some light artillery, Captain
Thomas Seward of the Third Continental artillery regi-
ment in command, in all about 800 men, and to march
toward the enemy, attack their left flank and cover the
right of the army. Colonel Morgan had not reported, as
General Lee said he expected he would, and it was quite
apparent that if the enemy pushed hard on the American
right flank the situation would soon become very danger-
ous. General Lafayette and his force immediately crossed
the east ravine, emerged from a copse and marched for
formation near the wooden court house building with their
right along a thick wood. Colonel Stewart’s regiment
marched in column, eight men in front, and took position
on the right side of a ravine and a wood with a large open,
unbroken plain in front and their right flank leading up to
the line of the Middletown road. To the rear of the ex-
treme right flank, as they faced the British, was Freehold

[ 149 JTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
village. They were then but six hundred yards from the
enemy.

Just at this situation of affairs, some accounts of the
battle relate that General Lafayette, mounted on a white
horse, a very conspicuous object in battle, advanced with
his aides some distance in front of his troops in order the
better to reconnoiter the enemy. The British artillerists
espied this prominent figure in the scene before them and
were just sighting their guns for the party of the distin-
guished Frenchman, when Sir Henry Clinton’s order
caused them to desist, and possibly thus Lafayette’s life
was spared.

Not so fortunate, however, were some of Lafayette’s
command. Several of his men were killed by the bullets
of the British advance and Colonel James Wesson, of the
Ninth Massachusetts regiment, was severely injured in
the shoulders and back by a shot from the enemy’s twelve-
pounders. Just at this time General Lafayette was greatly
surprised to see some of Lee’s troops going quickly toward
the village, though this could have afforded little or no
protection against any hostile demonstration, the build-
ings being mostly of wood instead of stone, as was at first
supposed. This movement of General Lee’s troops had a
singular look to the force on the extreme American left
flank. To Generals Scott and Maxwell, and Colonels
Grayson and Jackson it seemed like a retreat. They
watched it carefully with their glasses and the longer they
looked the more they began to fear that they themselves
would soon be cut off from the main body. This induced
them at last to make a retrograde movement through a mis-
understanding of Lee’s first orders and by reason of his
failure to send them any subsequent orders for their
guidance.

About this time, half-past eleven o'clock in the morn-
ing, a body of fresh troops joined the British rear guard.
They had marched that morning on the Middletown road
with the main body but were now called back by General

[150° 3]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
Clinton to reinforce the covering party. This new body
consisted of the entire Second brigade of British foot and
the Seventeenth regiment of light dragoons. Lord Corn-
wallis was with this detachment and it was well known
that “he never hesitated a moment to accept a battle when
the opportunity was given him.” This force had no such
numbers as some of the American officers imagined, yet
they were good troops and marched slowly and in regular
order to the support of their comrades near the court
house, who had all the morning borne the rattling fire of
the American riflemen as well as the terrible heat, made
all the more oppressive by the severe exertions of a con-
flic t. Within fifteen minutes they had placed themselves
on the right of the advanced corps of ce American Army
and were rapidly gaining | Cornw allis was now in
supreme command of the corps resisting Lee’s force, and
so continued the remainder of the day.

General Lee was quickly apprised of this movement but
he made no effort to secure the cooperation of the different
parts of his command for the purpose of resisting it.

General Clinton still believed that the baggage train
was the plunder which the American Army desired, and
from reports which he had received he thought that
Colonel Morgan’s men might be lurking on one flank and
General Dickinson’s militia on the other. He therefore
considered it wise to increase the size of his covering party
and give a severe blow to the troops harassing his rear
Before all the outside detachments could be called in to
support them. He considered from what he had heard
from his scouts, that the main army under General Wash-
ington, which he thought 20,000 strong, having two
marshes to cross, could hardly reach them before he had
severely punished their advance. He believed that General
Lee could not now bring into the field more than Lord
Cornwallis could fully attend to. This was his plan and he
intended to put it into execution with diligence, hoping,
however, that it might not lead to a general engagement.

etsTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

The preservation of the baggage seems to have been
ever present in the mind of Clinton, whereas he should
have dismissed it from his thoughts, called a strong con-
tingent of Knyphausen’s division from the charge of it
and then have struck a sharp blow for the continued su-
premacy of Great Britain in the western world.

As already stated, General Lafayette had seen some
of General Lee’s troops going toward the village, which
was behind him, and he was astonished. He also noticed
a battery of artillery leaving its advanced post for want
of ammunition and, not knowing the cause of this move-
ment, thought it looked like a retreat. He found that but
one regiment of his own command, the Fourth New York
Continental infantry, Colonel Livingston, had followed
him, or, at least, the other regiments had failed to come
up. Lafayette was at a loss to know what the movements
meant, but in the distance he heard orders being given to
troops to post themselves farther back and to go into the
woods so as to annoy the approaching enemy. Captain John
Stith, an officer of the Fourth Virginia Continental in-
fantry, detailed for duty with Colonel George Baylor's
Third regiment of light dragoons, then came up to the rear
of General Lafayette’s detachment, and desired that
Lafayette should be informed that General Scott’s detach-
ment had retired from the left flank. This information
puzzled General Lafayette still more and he felt that
perhaps he had been crowding Colonel Livingston’s regi-
ment too closely against the enemy. Just at this time a
strong cannonade was being made by the British batteries
and one of Colonel Walter Stewart’s men lost a leg by a
round shot as the Thirteenth Pennsylvania regiment was
passing over the open ground. Lieutenant-Colonel Lau-
rens, General Washington’s aide, who had been in conver-
sation with General Lee, rode up to General Lafayette at
Lee’s request, informed him that it had been found neces-
sary to retire to the village and gave him Lee’s order to
that effect.

a Gea]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

Colonel Laurens, who had busied himself all the morn-
ing in obtaining information, received a letter about this
time from Colonel Fitzgerald, written by Washington’s
direction, desiring to know the condition of affairs and
adding that he was ready to support Lee with the main
army. General Lee told Laurens he did not know what to
Say in reply.

Major Jamair, Lafayette’s aide, then carried eas
order to the commanding officers of the three regiments in
this detachment to slowly fall back and form in an orchard
on the right of the village. The detachment immediately
obeyed the order, and then Major Aaron Ogden, General
Maxwell’s brigade major, came riding up very rapidly
at the special request of General Lee and directed Colonel
Stewart to retire to a wood still farther in the rear of the
orchard pointed out by Major Jamair. Colonel Stewart
marched his men, some on the right and some on the left
of the roadway, and the other regiments in the detach-
ment followed in the same order. This, however. was
soon found to break the command too much and an at-
tempt was made to keep them more together. They re-
treated then in some disorder. As these regiments were re-
tiring, Colonel Stewart met General Lee, who was Just in
their rear near the house occupied the previous night by
the British General, James Grant, and asked him to desig-
nate the wood in which he wished his men to be posted.
Seeing the wearied men, he pointed toward an orchard
near by and said, “Take them to any place to save their
lives.””* Afterward Captain Edwards came up to General
Lafayette’s command and ordered them in General Lee’s
name to a wood still farther back and on the other side of
the ravine.

Lafayette did not like all these movements. He thought
he knew General Lee’s character and ambition, and he had
carefully watched him during the morning, so he sent

* Stewart's testimony at Lee’s court-martial, p. 47

eee]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

word to General Washington that his presence was needed
immediately at the front.

As they were crossing the east ravine just back of the
court house the British light horse again appeared and
Colonel Stewart hastily formed his regiment to receive
them; but they soon wheeled off and returned to the large
detachment of foot now marching up from the village.
About this time General Lafayette found himself alone
with Colonel Livingston’s regiment, about a quarter of a
mile beyond Freehold. Colonel Stewart’s and Colonel
Wesson’s commands had gotten into another portion of the
column in the general disorder which prevailed.

So the retreat of Lafayette’s detachment was begun
and by constant orders to fall back they at last were
merged into the column of retreating troops who were
making their way back toward the meeting-house.

General Lee said he merely sent General Lafayette the
‘nformation that General Scott’s detachment was falling
back, and not that he was to do so too, but he upbraided
himself that he had not done so promptly on finding his
left had been uncovered.

Colonel Richard Butler, of the Ninth Pennsylvania
regiment, was the last to give way from the ground on
which he had been contending so well. At the moment he
did so the enemy were in his front and on his left and a
morass was on his right. The ground on which he was
posted was considerably lower than that occupied by the
enemy, though not enough to be of any serious danger, but
being hemmed in on three sides, his situation was perilous
‘ndeed and there was no one near from whom he could
obtain orders. General Wayne had gone with General
Scott to the edge of an orchard near the village to watch
the movements of the enemy. Colonel Butler then sum-
moned the two field officers in his detachment, Major
Francis Nichols of his own Ninth Pennsylvania regiment
and Major Benjamin Ledyard of the First New York
regiment, and they had a brief council. They concluded

Ee aiga adPresent Appearance of John Craig’s HouseTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

that it was best to act promptly and Major Ledyard went
off some distance in the rear to see, if possible, where the
other part of the division had gone. Before he returned,
however, Colonel Butler felt compelled to order the retro-
grade movement, which was somewhat perilous, being so
close to large bodies of the British. Butler’s men then
passed through the east ravine and took the road by the
way of Forman’s Mills. On arriving at this point they
made a long halt to try to refresh the weary soldiers to
some extent. On the route there Major Ledyard reported
the retreat of all of General Lee’s division, and then, after
they had rested, Colonel Butler marched his men still
farther westward to Craig’s house® and mill and there
found that they were on the extreme left of the main body
of General Washington’s Army.

Just as General Wayne was moving off the ground in
retreat a messenger came riding up to him from Colonel
Daniel Morgan, who all the morning had been listening
impatiently to the sound of the enemy’s cannon while he,
without orders of any kind that day, felt it his duty to
stay where he had been posted at Richmond Mills, on
Squanbrook, one of the streams leading into Manasquan
River at least three miles away from the battle-field. Gen-
eral Wayne’s only answer to the inquiry of the officer for
orders from General Lee was that he could himself see
the situation, that the American troops were being drawn
off and that Colonel Morgan must govern himself accord-
ingly. It is singular that this hasty remark of General
Wayne was in any way misunderstood and that when
Colonel Morgan heard it he delayed a single moment to
strike the flank of the advancing foe.

Colonel Morgan had with him that day, to guide him
if he received orders, the Monmouth County patriots
Colonel Samuel Forman, Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph

5 The John Craig farm and the property where the Craig mill stood is

now owned by Samuel Craig Cowart, of Freehold. The farm is about two
miles west of Freehold and the house, which is still standing (1926), was

built in 1710.
Eas a]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

Haight and Sergeant Tunis Forman, of the Second regi-
ment militia.

The orders given Colonel Morgan for the day are found
in the following item, incorrectly dated, from General
Lee’s trial on July 21, page 138:

Major-General Lee produces to the Court a letter from Colonel

Morgan, which being read, the part admitted as evidence is as

follows:
Gale “Manasquan Brook, June 29, 1778.

“SIR:

“General Lee wrote me yesterday, at one o'clock in the evening,
he intended to attack the enemy’s rear this morning and ordered
me to attack them at the same time on their right flank.”

Colonel Morgan, of course, heard the firing, because
the day was clear, the artillery was very active and he was
near the scene of action. In a biography of Morgan, we
find an attempted apology for the singular conduct of this
gallant soldier. The excuse cannot be considered of any
importance when we know that it was clearly impossible
for the Forman brothers and Lieutenant-Colonel Haight
who were with him, to lead him astray a single rod in a
section of the county so well known to them. Referring
to General Dickinson and Colonel Morgan, Graham says,
“They had already partially engaged the enemy, when the
latter were observed retracing their steps toward Mon-
mouth. Soon after, and while the din of the conflict that
ensued was heard in the distance, Morgan received orders
to join the army. Unfortunately, he took a route on his
return which diverged somewhat from that leading to the
field of battle: and from this cause, with the late hour of
the day at which he commenced a march of some miles
through a broken country, he did not reach the American
army till night.’”

Lieutenant-Colonel Oswald, the artillerist, having suf-
fered much in men and horses killed and by his men fall-
ing at their guns overcome by the heat, began to retreat
toward the west ravine, with his field pieces. General Lee

6 Graham’s Life of General Daniel Morgan, p. 211.

E1564THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
afterward said that this act caused him great surprise. He
said he knew Oswald to be a most excellent soldier and
that it must be some very substantial reason that would
induce him to retreat before the enemy. General Lee then
rode up to Oswald and in a most excited manner asked him
why he retired. Oswald replied that he had expended all
his round shot, that one piece was entirely disabled and
that his heavy ammunition wagon had not yet come up to
the causeway on the other side of the east ravine. At thi:
time he could see no infantry on his right or left flank
that was in position as his supporting force. It seems
strange indeed that even General Lee would allow this
state of affairs to remain for a moment. It certainly re-
flected sorely on his ability to command troops in battle.
As has been stated, General Scott was posted with his
detachment on the west side of the east ravine at the ede

of a wood about half a mile from the court house and
about a hundred yards in front of Maxwell’s brigade.
When the enemy came so close to the village they passed

on General Scott’s right flank and almost at his rear. This
made his position very precarious as the British seemed
to be getting between him and the main body of General
Lee’s force. He received no orders from General Lee and
he could only observe the strange movements of the other
American troops without any apparent attempt on Lee’s
part to carry out the plan he so boastfully said he proposed
to lead in person. General Scott then had a conference with
General Wayne and also one with General Maxwell, and
Scott’s staff officer Lieutenant-Colonel Marinas Willett
went on some slightly higher ground near by, leaving
Colonel Cilley of the First New Hampshire regiment in
command, and reconnoitered the enemy. Soon after this,
seeing a backward movement on the extreme right, Gen-
eral Scott called out to Lieutenant-Colonel Brooks, Lee’s
adjutant-general, who was riding within call, and asked
him for orders from General Lee. He said he had none
and General Scott called his attention to the American

fe sy |THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

troops going off the field in the direction of the court house.
After waiting about half an hour General Scott gave the
order to retreat by left of battalion in columns and this
detachment, after passing through a wood, soon joined the
remainder of the division retiring on the old road. They
had barely left their post when Captain Mercer rode over
to the west side of the ravine with a message from General
Lee to General Scott to the effect that there was no need
of pushing his detachment more to the left and rear of the
enemy, as they were already now in the rear of the enemy's
advancing column, but to hold his position until further
orders. Just as Captain Mercer was nearing the place
where he expected to find General Scott and his men he
met Colonel Jackson’s regiment and was informed that
General Scott had gone. Soon after General Lee had sent
Captain Mercer off with this message he also despatched
Captain Edwards with the same message to General Scott,
so anxious was he that the order should be delivered with-
out mistake or failure. Captain Edwards met Captain
Mercer returning, and Mercer told him what he had found
out in reference to General Scott’s detachment. They both
returned to General Lee and told him that General Scott
had left the woods where he had been stationed and that
the enemy were pushing their force rapidly in that direc-
tion. General Lee was very indignant and appeared as-
tonished and disconcerted at this news as he said he was
about to go and put himself at the head of his troops on
his left flank. He said he could not conceive that Gen-
eral Scott’s detachment was in any danger whatever.
This action on General Lee’s part, it will be remembered,
was according to his original plan, although it would seem
that he was not very prompt in its execution. General
Lee remarked when he heard of Scott’s movement that
“his orders not being obeyed might or would prove the
ruin of the day.”’ It was only seven minutes, Captain
Mercer said, after he reported Scott’s retreat that he saw

7 Captain Compston’s testimony at Lee’s court-martial, p. 162.

fe se

UO

dTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
General Lafayette’s troops on the right already falling
back some distance behind the court house.

It appears that General Lee did not know at this time
where General Scott’s detachment had gone; nor did he
attempt to find them. He was asked one day why he dic |

not seek for them, and he pleaded a scarcity of staff off

cers, that he “was uncertain to what point t he was een
and I did not choose to dispatch one of my aide-de-camps
on an errand which might prove as fruitless as the for-
mer.’ He thought General Scott culpable in not reporting
the cause and direction of his movement, and in this Gen-
eral Lee was certainly right. Whether General Scott had
a good reason for moving his command or not, he should
instantly have informed General Lee and also notified him
of his situation from time to time, and asked for further
orders.

When General Scott met General Maxwell he told him
that he had seen the American troops retiring on the right
and that if Maxwell was obliged to retreat he would send
his battery of artillery to report to him. Then he said he
would try to get his command over the east ravine, if it
was possible before the enemy approached. General Max-
well was well convinced that if he did not get his own as
well as General Scott’s cannon over the causeway at the
ravine and the enemy should make a quick dash on him,
he would lose all his guns. He, too, as General Scott had
done, called out to Lieutenant-Colonel Brooks, as he rode
by, for some orders, but Brooks had none to give him.
Maxwell then took his brigade from the open field to the
cover of an adjoining wood. Shortly after this General
Maxwell gave the order to retreat and his brigade was
soon marching in fair style. Several battalions were now
pushing rapidly over the ravine and taking the old road
back to the meeting-house. Lieutenant-Colonel Brooks
again came up to General Maxwell and remarked that the
woods then in their front would make a good position from

8 Lee’s defence at his court-martial, p. 226.

rons]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

which he could cover a retreating force and that if he
placed his batteries there they would be able to take an
approaching enemy on their flank. General Maxwell’s
brigade filed through the ravine as the enemy were ad-
vancing toward them and in ten minutes not a continental
soldier was to be seen in their old position on the left of
the army.

Colonel Henry Jackson and his detachment had been
posted on the westerly slope of the east ravine with no
orders to move forward or fall back and when a heavy
column of the enemy advanced toward the American right,
he naturally became very anxious about the dangerous
position his men occupied. Lieutenant-Colonel Oswald
was still keeping up a desultory fire, yet it did not interfere
with the march of the British. However, he ceased firing
soon after and retreated, as has been stated. Colonel Jack-
son thought the hill just in front of him rendered his posi-
tion in the ravine very precarious and he believed he ought
to move his command even without orders. Lieutenant-
Colonel William S. Smith hoped he would not do it unless
he obtained General Lee’s orders and it was then agreed
that Smith should attempt to find Lee. So he rode off for
that purpose. But while he was gone Captain Mercer came
near the detachment, as he was searching for General
Scott, and Colonel Jackson told him that Scott had gone.
After thoroughly reconnoitering the enemy Captain Mer-
cer directed Colonel Jackson, in General Lee’s name, to
move his detachment to the woods on the left. He did so
instantly going through the ravine, which was deep and
very miry. Marching from the left this brought Lieu-
tenant-Colonel William S. Smith who had then returned,
not having found General Lee, on the lead of the party.
This column had to make many short halts to refresh the
men, who had had severe marching all day. In this way,
from time to time, they marched on until they were merged
in the ranks of the grand retreating division.

General Lee then ordered Colonel Jackson, through

[: 160! 4THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
Mr. John Clark, an auditor of accounts of the American
Army, but now voluntarily assisting him, to form his
men against a rail fence to check the enemy’s cavalry.
Colonel Jackson remarked when he heard this order that
his men were greatly fatigued and could not form, but
Lieutenant-Colonel Smith still in the advance of the
detachment succeeded in getting at least one-half of Jack-
son’s men in line of battle. After a few moments spent at
the fence General Lee ordered them again to retire some
little distance and form in line behind another fence. Still
later General Lee met Colonel Jackson in person and up-
braided him, with much profanity, for not promptly obey-
ing his orders, though they were conveyed by a gentleman
unknown to Jackson and not in the military line. General
Lee himself then ordered the detachment to retire, saying
he “meant to effect a retreat.” So Colonel Jackson’s men
were again caught in the current of the retreating column
and he heard the soldiers behind him in the other regi-
ments crying out to hasten his slow steps, “Colonel Jack-
son, march on! march on!”

Colonel Grayson’s detachment had been posted well up
to the front on the left and had been concealed in a wood.
General Wayne, however, had ordered him to take Posi-
tion in the open field, which order caused Captain Mercer
to tell Colonel Grayson that General Wayne had no
right to command him but that he must look for orders di-
rect to General Lee. Colonel Grayson remarked that he
would return to the woods if Captain Mercer so requested,
but he did not do it.

While Captain Mercer was watching the movements of
the British Colonel, Grayson called out to Colonel Jack-
son who was in his rear in the low ground of the east
ravine to come up and form on his left on Briar Hill,
about three-quarters of a mile beyond the court house, but
seeing that Grayson had no artillery with him, Colonel
Jackson did not think it best to comply with his request.
At this moment Colonel Grayson threatened General

zor 7THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

Knyphausen’s command. The covering party of the Brit-
ish appeared at considerable distance from them, first
drawn up in line with the cavalry on their flanks and then
moving on the American right toward the court house.

Between the detachment of Colonel Grayson and the
enemy a house was on fire and between this fire and a wood
on the left the party which had turned back to reinforce
the covering detachment of the British column was clearly
to be seen. After viewing the situation thoroughly Captain
Mercer returned to where Colonel Grayson was riding at
the head of his detachment and seeing Colonel Jackson’s
men retreating over the ravine he ordered Colonel Grayson
in General Lee’s name to follow in the rear of Jackson’s
detachment. This was done. Both of these detachments
then crossed the ravine and came up to where Scott’s de-
tachment was posted on the skirt of a wood on the westerly
side of the morass. The enemy was plainly to be seen from
this point marching in considerable force. A few moments
later and all the American troops on that part of the field
were in full retreat. Colonel Grayson halted his men only
fifteen minutes, after a two-mile march, in an orchard in
front of the house of Mr. Hart. The retreat of this party
was in good order, the marching being as good as could
be expected in such sultry weather.CHAPTER XVI

HE American troops had moved away from the
court house and from the v illage of F reehold in some
order, but the battalions were promis d so close that Gen-
eral Duport: ul feared that if the enemy sent their grape-
shop among them the havoc would be terrific. General
a ee came away from the vill age with these troops. When
> heard that General Scott and Ge neral vee ell had
a he said that obliged him to leave the eround he
had chosen and to make the best of a b: id bargain, but
he took no steps to meet a derangement of his plans. He
allowed the retreat to goon w ithout any determined effort
to make a stand. In fact. while crossing Mr. Rhea’s fields
General Forman said Lee urged some of the battalions to
make more haste in their retreat. In this w ay, through a
cloud of dust that hid the movements of the troops, over
roads only wide enough to accommodate a platoon, the
men struggled on their weary way in the ae of that
terrible day until they reached a fence by William Ker’s
[or Carr] house. This was about two and a half miles
from the court house. Near this house a halt of nearly half
an hour was made by some of the battalions.

General Lee was found by those who sought him near
the ravine which was in front and to the left of Mr. Ker’s
house, and surrounded by a number of mounted staff offi-
cers and men. He remained in that place about twenty
minutes but during that time gave no special directions
and only said that matters were all in confusion. He had
no message to send to General Washington by his aide,
Lieutenant-Colonel Meade, who found him there, and
Meade, strange to say, went toward the court house to
reconnoiter the enemy instead of hurrying back to his
chief to report the situation.

As Lieutenant-Colonel Marinus Willett, General

ie 16383)THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

Scott’s volunteer aide, passed General Lee, he heard him
say to those around him, who were discussing the condi-
tion of affairs and bemoaning the retreat, “It does not
signify, the enemy have too much cavalry for us.’””*

The nature of the retreat up to this time is somewhat
difficult to determine. It appears, however, from the state-
ments of various officers who saw the retreat at different
times that parts of it were performed in good order, with
no apparent straggling, and that other parts were quite
disorderly, the men moving along with no system, utterly
regardless of their destination, overcome with distress and
heat, and the regimental and brigade commands much
broken. It does not appear that any general or field officer,
excepting Colonel Stewart, saw his own command in any
disorder, but always another part of the force. General
Scott said the retreat appeared in confusion; the men were
running and the horses trotting with the field pieces. Gen-
eral Forman saw much confusion and irregularity among
the troops. Colonel Cilley thought they retreated rapidly,
and the rear went off on a trot. He thought they must have
seen something he did not see. He said he saw nothing
which could occasion them to go off in that manner. To
Captain Fishbourne the retreat seemed in much disorder
and with much scattering. It seemed to be in small parties,
although sometimes a regiment or two might be together.
Lieutenant-Colonel Hamilton considered the retreat as
made in tolerable order, but as chance should direct, with-
out system or design. Lieutenant-Colonel Meade saw the
troops a good deal scattered—no order observed. Lieu-
tenant-Colonel Tilghman thought the column was in great
confusion and said that a line could not be formed in that
situation. They neither kept proper intervals, nor were
heads of columns ranged. Colonel Gavion of the Engineer
Department said the troops were retreating in great dis-
order. Captain Mercer did not see troops in disorder until
the party was broken up on the hill; he thought all the

1 Narrative of the military actions of Colonel Marinus Willett, p. 68.

[ 164 JTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
troops in perfectly good order as far as the heat of the
weather would permit. Lieutenant-Colonel Olney thought
the men were extremely fatigued, but there were few
stragglers. All the men he saw kept their platoons and
divisions with the greatest exactness. Lieutenant-Colonel
Brooks said the retreat from the court house to Ker’s
house was performed as far as he saw it, with great de-
liberation and in good order; that in general the troops
retired in columns by battalion, some by brigade. Captain
Edwards reported that the troops marched in great order
and took post regularly except some at the last part of the
line which was broken by a charge of the enemy. Lieu-
tenant-Colonel Fitzgerald thought the troops retreated
in disorder, some scattered, some in column—but more
from ignorance of a place to go to than from the retreat
itself. Colonel Stewart said the troops he was with re-
treated in a disorderly manner and that, on the order
being given to retreat, the regiments seemed anxious to
move with expedition. Lieutenant-Colonel Laurens spoke
of them “as retreating and in disorder.” General Wash-

lisorder and confusion.” General von

,

ington called it “<
Steuben said they were “retreating in great disorder.’
Lieutenant-Colonel Hamilton wrote, a few days after the
battle: “After changing their position two or three times
by retrograde movements, our advanced corps got into a
general confused retreat and even rout would hardly be
too strong an expression.”’ General Knox asked General
Lee why the troops retreated from the court house, and
he said “he could not tell for he never saw such disorder,
for every one took upon himself to give orders without his
knowledge.”

It is a pertinent fact, as Lieutenant-Colonel Laurens
wrote, that “all this disgraceful retreating passed without
the firing of a musket, over ground which might have been
disputed inch by inch.’

We must, therefore, conclude that some parts of the re-
treating column fell back in as good shape as was possible

[E 165 JTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

for even the best disciplined soldiers on such a sultry day,
and that in other instances, as was afterward adjudged,
the battalions made a disorderly retreat; that the division
as an entirety was much broken, but that the men were not
wholly panic-stricken.

The numbers of the British seemed the greatest just
when they came out of Monmouth Court House and
advanced down the highway toward the Americans, then
approaching William Ker’s house. Up to the time when
they reached the village, the covering party, reinforced by
a large column under Lieutenant-General the Earl Corn-
wallis, had been marching with the cavalry on their right
flank and in their front. After that they changed their front
to the left and marched across the open fields between
Freehold and Ker’s house in two columns, well closed up,
and with their cavalry and light artillery moving between
the columns.

The land was more open near the village and beyond
it, and, therefore, at this phase of the battle more of the
troops of the British Army were in plain view than at any
other hour during the day. After this the battle was en-
acted on low ground, from elevated positions and on the
highway skirted with thick woods. In this way no very
large numerical force was ever in position at ony one
place.

By way of apology for his own lack of soldierly ability,
if it isnot judged to have been treachery, General Lee told
his aides that several of the battalions had retreated
without his knowledge and some contrary to his orders.
He also said that although this was “extremely unsol-
dierly he believed it to be a very happy thing for the army
as the enemy were so much superior both in infantry and
cavalry, in cavalry especially; for had that not been the
case that whole detachments at least must have been
sacrificed.’”®

Captain Mercer, General Lee’s aide, said that Lee ex-

2 Lieutenant-Colonel Brooks’ testimony at Lee’s court-martial, p. 171.

166; 4THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
pected to meet only the covering party of the enemy but
that the British general had his whole force drawn up to
receive them. This, of course, was not true.

General Lee afterward said in referring to the retreat,
“When I called to mind the several circumstances of this
day the only omission with which I can justly upbraid
myself is, that I did not, on first receiving intelligence of
General Scott’s having abandoned the wood on our left,
immediately order a retreat on the right.’”*

We must conclude, however, that General Lee’s own
bad management was the immediate cause of the retreat;
that it was not so much the disobedience of his orders
which caused it as the absolute want of proper orders at
the proper time.

General Carrington in his “historical and military criti-
cism”’ of this retreat says, “It is to be noticed that there
was nothing of the nature of a panic. No commander knew
why he retreated only that such were understood to be the
orders and that others retreated. . . . General Lee de-
serves credit for self-possession and a real purpose to bring
the men away in safety, when he found he could not
handle the division.”’ And again he says, with much truth,
~ While all narratives agree that the advance of subordi-
nate commanders was prompt and orderly, however
blindly conducted and in a direction favorably to success,
it is equally clear that General Lee made no adequate
effort to concentrate his division, promulgated no definite
orders; and in the conducts of his movements and the pre-
cipitate retreat, absolutely failed to control his army and
keep it in hand. His presence inspired none, discouraged
many, and absolutely left the division to work their own
way out of confusion, as if there were no officer in general
command. A careful examination of the facts seems to
exclude the idea that Lee was guilty of any overt act of
treason; while it is equally true, that upon the basis of
his antecedent opinion, and his expectation of failure, he

Lee’s defence at his court-martial, p. 222.

EE way 3

/THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

did not make the proper effort to render that failure the
least disastrous possible, and thus fulfill the obligations
of high command.’”*

No criticism, in our opinion, could be more correct and
none more fully cover the bad condition of the American
Army at this juncture.

It may be noted here that up to this time General Lee
was defeated, as he had predicted any one would be who
attempted to cope with the British light infantry.

General Lee’s plan was first to take position on the
westerly margin of the east ravine with the village of
Monmouth Court House to cover the right flank. This he
was unable to accomplish because the village was not built
of such materials as would protect the flanks of an army,
although there was an apple orchard and some woods
near the town. But it was found that the artillery of the
enemy on the eastern side of the ravine would command
the ground on the western slope, and Lee was therefore
obliged to abandon the idea of forming his men there.
The giving way of the left flank of the division necessi-
tated the retreat, as he thought, to the middle ravine.
General Wayne claimed that it was a good position to hold
but General Lee emphatically expressed his professional
opinion against it, and thought that to adopt such a course
would not only be censurable but criminal. Reports at this
time reached General Lee that his right flank had actually
been pierced by the British, but after investigation Gen-
eral Duportail assured him that there was no truth in this
rumor. Then General Lee asked General Duportail, the
chief engineer of the army, to examine the hills back of
the middle morass which seemed to them both at first a
good place to check the enemy. He made a hasty recon-
naissance and reported that he thought the position would
answer the purpose. General Lee had a high opinion of
the Chevalier Duportail’s abilities and said he thought
him “a real acquisition to the continent.’’ Nevertheless,

*Carrington’s Battles of the American Revolution, p. 417.

E168 4THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

when General Lee himself came to the rising ground he
Mee ued the position untenable, because, he said, high
land on the left and front commanded the position. Gen-
eral Lee at last pronounced it “an execrable position, ’—
and so the retreat continued.

General Lee, however, with a view to giving the ad-
vancing column of the British some slight check at this
point, so as to save the lives of the great body of his
retreating soldiers, directed Captain Edwards to post
some pieces of artillery on a hill near by, and Colonel
Stewart’s Thirteenth Penns ylvania regime nt and Patton’s
Continental regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Parke still in
command, were ordered to attempt to protect the retreat-
ing men. The wood on his right was so insignificant that
it afforded slight protection and he felt that if a squad-
ron of the British dragoons aero piee to strike a blow on
his flank, they would push all his force against that bridge
over the west ravine which General Dickinson. six hours
previously, had so emphatic ‘ally impressed on his mind
was the only place thereabouts where that morass could
e crossed, at least by artillery.

Just at this time one of the residents of this part of the
county, Captain Peter Wikoff,° of the Second regiment
Monmouth County militia, came up, probably not in uni-
form, and, saluting General Lee, told him that his farm
was next adjoining William Ker’s, that he was thoroughly
acquainted with that section of the country, and asked if
he could be of any service to him or to the cause. General
Lee said he considered himself fortunate to have such a
man near him and begged him to tell him where there
Was a position near by where his flanks would be pro-
tected from the British cavalry and the men could be
screened from the intolerable heat. Captain Wikoff
howed him a wood south of Ker’s house, but General Lee

This officer is often referred to in history and on mz ips as the “younger

Wikoff,” to distinguish him from his fath er W Villiam Wikoff, who owned ;
thousand-acre farm near Briar Hill and who appears as the “elder wikoft”

on maps of the battle.
E160) 3]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

said that ‘“‘there was not time to take them there; that
the enemy were pressing too close upon us.”" Lee asked him
for some other place and then directed Captain Wikoff’s
attention to Combs’ Hill in the distance. This hill had a
ravine in front and a heavy wood in the rear. To attack a
party posted on this eminence an enemy must come in on
the right after making a circuit of at least three miles. To
attain this position, however, a rough causeway must
immediately be built of fence rails, as the most available
material, because the artillery and the ammunition
wagons could not be pulled through the mire of the morass.
General Lee said there was not time to do this now and
that no time should be lost in getting the men under the
protection of some cover from the enemy and from the
heat. There was a small timber tract somewhat nearer
than Combs’ Hill and at Lee’s request Captain Wikoft
began immediately to guide the troops in that direction,
with the expectation, as he afterward said, of placing them
later in the day on Combs’ Hill. The first part of the re-
treat was over and the second phase, in somewhat more
confusion, began as they passed away from William Ker’s
house. The enemy was now approaching rapidly and
General Lee directed Colonel Stewart, whose regiment,
as we have seen, had been supporting some artillery on the
right, to place his troops, with the Third Maryland regi-
ment, Lieutenant-Colonel Nathaniel Ramsay command-
ing, on the left of the highway so as to protect the retiring
column and to check the quick advance of the foe. Colonel
Henry B. Livingston, with the Fourth New York regi-
ment, although greatly worn out by the labors of the day
promptly obeyed an order to relieve Colonel Stewart in
the support of the artillery. His command then took
position on each side of the light batteries. Lieutenant-
Colonel William S. Smith’s regiment, all that was left of
Colonel Jackson’s detachment that had not been worn out
with the heat or caught in the retreating column, was then

8 Wikoff’s testimony at Lee’s court-martial, p. 198.

EE r7e 4dTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

posted on the left of Colonel Livingston’s regiment; and
Varnum’s brigade, Lie utenant-Colonel Olney still in com-
mand, by General Lee’s direct orders, conv eyed by Lieu-
tenant-Colonel Brooks, quickly took position behind <
fence near by to protect the batteries in case the y were
compelled to give way under a sudden charge of the
British.

Soon after this Varnum’s brigade and the detachments
under General Lafayette marched off to the ee leaving
Scott’s own brigade and Colonel Jackson’s detachment on
the left flank. Captain Thomas Seward’s battery of the
Third regiment of artillery, by order of General Knox,
communicated by his Brigade- Major, Samuel Shaw, then
retreated over the middle ravine and took post on the hill
on the western slope of the morass. Here C aptain Seward
opened his guns and fired some fifty shot at the British
advance, under cover of which the last half of the retreat-
ing Americans got safely over the causeway. Captain
David Cook’s battery of the Third regiment of artillery
also took part in the cannonade. He received the first
orde -T to retreat, and the battery with other pieces of artil-
lery, under Lieutenant-Colonel Oswald, took a new posi-
tion under direction of Captain Edwards, of Lee’s staff.
While this was being done Captain Seward fired forty
more shots and then he too fell back to Osw ald’s position.

During these trying hours General Lee’s self-possession
and coolness, under the greatest difficulties, never left
him. This is fully established by the opinions of his subor-
dinates. General Maxwell saw no appearance of his being
disconcerted ; General Knox thought him perfectly master
of himself and General Lafayette said he seemed by his
voice and features to be as he was in general. Colonel
Stewart asserted that Lee “‘appeared as usual, without
being disturbed” ; Lieutenant-Colonel Fitzgerald thought
he “appeared serious and thoughtful” but Lieutenant-
Colonel Smith said he was perfectly calm. Lieutenant-
Colonel Olney clearly stated that Lee appeared to possess

Een 4THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

as much coolness and calmness as any officer he was
ever in action with and did not appear to be confused.
Lieutenant-Colonel Oswald thought him calm and in-
trepid and fully possessed of himself; Captain Stith
thought he appeared possessed of himself and not in the
least disconcerted. Of his three staff officers, who, al-
though they had the best opportunities of judging, were,
of course, prejudiced in his favor—Lieutenant-Colonel
Brooks said he appeared through the whole course of the
day to be cool and deliberate and thoroughly to possess
himself; Captain Edwards “did not observe the least
embarrassment”’ in him, but quite the reverse as he deliv-
ered every order with the same coolness as when out of the
field; Captain Mercer could not but think him exceed-
ingly composed, “‘as several circumstances happened dur-
ing the time that evidently evinced it.”

The only officers who were disposed to think General
Lee was not as self-possessed as was necessary in an officer
so high in command were Lieutenant-Colonel Laurens
and Lieutenant-Colonel Hamilton. The former thought
him a good deal embarrassed and his orders indistinct.
This embarrassment he believed was due to want of pres-
ence of mind. Although Hamilton had once remarked to
Captain Mercer that he thought General Lee self-
possessed to a very high degree, he afterward said he heard
him give two orders under a hurry of mind. There ap-
peared to be “no want of that degree of self-possession,
which proceeds from a want of personal intrepidity,” but
only a “hurry of spirits which may proceed from a temper
not so calm and steady as is necessary to support a man
in such critical circumstances.”

From all these opinions, expressed by officers whose judg-
ment must have been reliable and who uttered these state-
ments under very solemn surroundings, it is fair to con-
clude that General Lee was personally brave and intrepid,
that he did not hesitate to expose himself in danger, that
he was perfectly calm and self-possessed in action, and

[EgerTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

that he was disturbed only because of the extreme heat
and its demoralizing effect upon his men, who were ex-
posed to the scorching rays of the sun.

Up to the time General Lee left Ker’s house he had not
reported the fact of his retreat to General Was shington nor
that he was about to throw a body of worn-out men upon

the head of the ad\ rancing main army. General Lee after-
ward tried to defend himself from this criminal neglect
by saying that although the land in that v icinity had been
un-reconnoitered, he hoy ed every moment to find a suit-
able position where he could receive the enemy and resist
their attack. He declared he never meant to make a gen-
eral retreat, and said, “The retreat in the first instance
was contrary to my intentions, contrary to my orders and
contrary to my wishes.” But when it did begin he thought
hrst of making the stand on the westerly side of the east
ravine with the court house on the right flank, but this
position on further examination appeared to be an “execra-
ble” one. The next position was on the hills near William
Ker’s house and this was abandoned for equally good rea-
sons, and the third position he had just told Captain Mer-
er that he was about to take when he met Washington
in person. General Lee said that when he met General
ington he was about to send a messenger to him, but
to have done it before would have been merely to let him
snow that he was simply looking for a suitable position
and that would have conveyed no useful information. He
complained bitterly that he had so few attendants but this
surely seems without cause. He had such aides as his rank
entitled him to, he used some of the light-horse officers as
aides, twice he conveyed his messages by the aides of other
zeneral officers, many times his orders were taken by
members of General Washington’s staff who were at hand,
he had the volunteer services of two officers of the militia
of the County of Monmouth, and he certainly had power
to detail any officer from the line at any moment to act as

7 Lee’s defence at his court-martial, p. 219.

VagsaiTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

an aide. General Lee said he never expected that General
Washington would move his main army beyond English-
town, and in this opinion he was confirmed by a letter
from Lieutenant-Colonel Fitzgerald to Lieutenant-
Colonel Laurens, which Laurens showed to him. If Gen-
eral Washington, Lee said, had only posted his force in
Englishtown that would have been near enough and it
Was in such a situation as would have well supported him
in the stand he was about to make on the west side of the
west ravine. He added that to have sent word to General
Washington that he wished him to support him would
have been presumptuous.

174

baalCHAPTER XVII

ENERAL Washington partook of a late breakfast

at the residence of Doctor James English in the vil-
lage of Englishtown. While he was at this meal the troops
of the main army were passing Davis’ Tavern and coming
up to the village. Before leaving the Doctor’s hospitable
mansion a remark was made to General Washington in the
hearing of Lieutenant William Schanck of the First regi-
ment Monmouth County militia, that it was apparent that
a Sunday battle would soon ensue and the General said “‘he
did not like fighting on the Sabbath, but he must yield for
the good of his country.” General Washington remained
in Englishtown some time after his troops had left the little
village and wrote a short letter to the President of Con-
eress.’ In this letter he gave the situation as he knew it
just before noon of the day of the battle, and, in reference
to the enemy distinctly states that General Lee “had

ct

orders to attack their rear if possi When General
Washington left the village his host, Doctor English.
accompanied him on horseback and remained with him
during all the exciting scenes of the day
General Washington was giving ler to one of his
the march of his troops when
Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Henderson, the leading
physician of that part of the county, noted always in his-
tory as a ‘countryman,’ whose residence had been burned
the previous day by the British, rode by and told him that
the Americans were retreating. Up to this moment Gen-
eral Washington had believed that everything was going
well with Lee’s division. He had heard of no repulse and
had no reason to doubt Lee’s success. The General was
astounded at the information given by Doctor Henderson

le.

an or¢
aides to make some change in

1 Ford, Writings of George Washington, Vol. VII, p. 76.

/
= Tilghman’s testin at Lee’s court-martial, p. 91.

fee te Sia |THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

and asked him who told him that the advance division
was retreating. He said that a fifer who was trudging on
just behind had so informed him. The fifer, greatly fright-
ened, had been early in the retreat and was taking good
care to place himself as far away from the British as possi-
ble. His dress must have been very unsoldierly for Wash-
ington asked him if he belonged to the army. The man
replied in the affirmative and the General showed his great
surprise and indignation. He could not believe it and told
the poor fifer that if he spread such a report among his
men he would have him whipped. To prevent any alarm
of this kind, however, he directed a light horseman of his
guard to take charge of the musician and keep his depress-
ing news from going further. To get at the truth of the
report General Washington sent out his old Secretary,
Lieutenant-Colonel Harrison, on whose judgment he was
so accustomed to rely, and his gallant aide, Lieutenant-
Colonel Fitzgerald, both of whom had been at times with
Lee during the morning, and instructed them to ride ahead
rapidly, ascertain the situation and report to him as
quickly as possible. General Washington rode on some
fifty yards and met several other men, one in uniform, all
of whom gave him the same information, that General
Lee’s division was retreating. General Washington still
thought these men the ordinary stragglers of an army and
entirely discredited their stories.

The two aides-de-camp of General Washington put
spurs to their horses and soon came in sight of the west
ravine and rode down to the bridge across that morass.
Here they met a small portion of Colonel Grayson’s regi-
ment, and Captain Cleon Moore and Captain Strother
Jones of that command gave them the first authentic news
of the great retreat. They tried to excuse themselves by
saying that the men were very much fatigued and had been
ordered back to refresh themselves. Next came Colonel
John Patton’s Second North Carolina regiment in some
disorder, the men barely able to walk and greatly dis-

Re leloy 4THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
tressed by the fatiguing tramp and the excessive heat.
Then came Grayson’s regiment, also in disorder, and
Colonel Henry Jackson’s regiment followed. They had
left their post on the left of the batteries and of Colonel
Livingston’s New York regiment, according to orders.
The commanding officer, on being asked, said ie could give
10 reason for the retreat as he h: id lost but one man. hen
came Maxwell’s New Jersey brigade and Colonel Mat-
ities Ogden of the First regiment, a brave and gallant
soldier who, in great anger called out to Harrison, “By
God! they are flying from a shadow.’ ’ Riding with Max-
well’s brigade they saw Captain Mercer, General Lee’s
aide, and Harrison asked him, as an officer who should
be well posted, “For God’s sake, what is the cause of this
retreat ¢”” Mercer replied, “If you will go further you will
see the columns of the enemy’s foot and horse and that was
reason enough for the retreat.”’ As Harrison hurried on he
retorted that he presumed they were not greater than
as they left Philadelphia and that the Americans all
ume to that field to meet columns of foot and horse. Then
the two aides passed still farther along the line of the
New Jersey troops and met er nant-Colonel David
I
'

thea of the Fourth regiment. He appeared greatly agi-

ted, for all this disaster, from w which he expected

uch glory, was taking place on soil perfectly familiar to
him, in the neighborhood of his own homestead and among
a people whom he knew and loved. He expressed his dis-
approbation of this movement in strong terms; at the
same time he was greatly concerned for his men. Next
they saw bluff old Maxwell in the rear of his brigade and
he could give no reason for the retreat, had no orders from
anyone and was just moving on with the column uncertain
what was expected of him in this crisis. At last they came
up to General Lee and he had nothing to say to them

which was important enough for them afterward to re-
BR cenber except that he wished to know where General
Washington was.

[ae aTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

As General Washington advanced in person toward the
bridge he became, as Gordon says, “exceedingly alarmed
at what he saw when he came up” and he, as his aides had
done, spoke first to Colonel Grayson’s and Colonel Pat-
ton’s men and received the same statement of the great
weariness of the troops. He ordered them to go into a
wood near by and directed a ration of rum to be issued. He
desired that captains of companies should see that their
men were kept well together. The plethoric Colonel
Israel Shreve, Second New Jersey regiment, then came up,
his horse worn out with the weight of the huge soldier he
had carried all day, and that officer himself almost ex-
hausted by the intense heat of the day. He told General
Washington in a most significant manner that he did not
know why they retreated; that he had done so by order,
but by whose order he did not say. Major Richard Howell,
of the same regiment, expressed himself with great earn-
estness concerning the retreat of the division and said he
had never seen anything like it. Lieutenant-Colonel Rhea
told General Washington he knew the farms well, that he
thought it good ground to make a stand and that he would
be glad to serve him in any way.

It is proper to state, that it appears from what General
Lee afterward said of this retreat that he was unaware of
a large body of his troops having at this time crossed the
bridge at the west ravine. It is true that they followed
each other without orders from him, but he should have
informed himself of what they were doing if he had any
real disposition to make a final stand.

Just at this time, as he clearly saw the condition and
position of his advance corps, “‘suspicion flashed across
Washington’s mind” as Irving says, “of wrong-headed
conduct on the part of Lee, to mar the plan of attack
adopted contrary to his counsels.””®

After riding on a little farther just behind the New
Jersey brigade General Washington reined up his horse in

SIrving’s Life of George Washington, Vol. III, p. 454.

Eke 3THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
front of General Lee who was riding forward to meet him.
In a stern voice and with bitter emphasis he said to Lee,
“I desire to know, sir, what is the reason, whence arises
this disorder and confusion?’* Confused by the angry
manner and appearance of his chief and in his embarrass-
ment not clearly understanding what he had said to him,
General Lee stammered out, “Sir—sir!’® In an impatient
but decided tone General Washington repeated his ques-
tion, “What is all this confusion for and what is the cause
of this retreat?” Still disconcerted by the manner of Gen-
eral Washington, General Lee replied that he received a
variety of contradictory intelligence with regard to the
numbers and situation of the enemy, that he knew of no
confusion except such as resulted from his orders not being
obeyed and that in this way only matters had been thrown
into some disorder. He added that it was not to the in-
terest of the army or America to have a general action
brought on and that he did not desire to attack the whole
British Army with troops in such a situation. He also said
the whole plan of any attack was against his expressed
opinion. He made this statement with much apparent em-
barrassment. General Washington, still very angry, re-
plied that “whatever his opinion might have been he
expected his orders would have been obeyed.’ He told
Lee that he had certain information that it was but a
strong covering party of the enemy. General Lee said it
might be so but they were rather stronger than he was and
he did not think it was proper to risk so much. General
Washington said “‘he was sorry that General Lee undertook
the command unless he meant to fight the enemy.’’* Wash-

 

4 Lee’s defence at his court-martial, p. 219. This was two miles from Free-
hold, on the Freehold and Englishtown turnpike. “Washington met the first
of Lee’s retreating troops on the Herbert farm, now [1926] owned by the
estate of George Du Bois, and met Lee himself on the Thompson farm,
now owned by John M. Laird.”—S. C. Cowart.

5 McHenry’s testimony at Lee’s court-martial, p. go.

6 Tilghman’s testimony at Lee’s court-martial, p. 93.

7 Brooks’ testimony at Lee’s court-martial, p. 169.

EW) 4THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

ington then rode on toward the rear of the retreating
troops.*

In addition to this conversation some historians claim
that General Washington called General Lee “a damned
poltroon.” It will be observed by those who carefully
examine the proceedings in the trial of General Lee that
Lee never asserts that Washington spoke to him in this
manner, and that not a single officer puts into the mouth
of the commander-in-chief any words of profanity or even
of doubtful taste as applied by one officer to another. It
seems, however, to be the universal opinion that General
Washington used profane language on this occasion, but
this is all based on the statement made by General Lafay-
ette, forty-six years after this event, while he was on a
visit to America. It does not appear that General Lafay-
ette was present when this interview took place, his
memoirs even giving the impression that he was at another
part of the field, and it is quite likely that in after years
General Lafayette thought Lee deserved such language.
It may have been a camp rumor, or, perhaps Lafayette,
who in his evidence at the trial did not refer to this inter-
view, supposed that in his great indignation General
Washington gave vent to epithets altogether foreign to his
life and hal sits. In after years, in reply to the question,
“did Washington swear?” Brigadier-General Scott said,
the habit of profanity being strong in his own speech,
“Yes, sir, he did once, it was at Monmouth and on a day
that would have made any man swear. Yes, sir, he swore
that day till the leaves shook on the trees, charming, de-
lightful! Never have I enjoyed such swearing before or
since. Sir, on that memorable day he swore like an angel

8 John Fiske quotes an eye-witness as having heard Washington say,
““My God! General Lee, what are you about 2?’ General Lee began to make
some EEPienaton + but General Washington impatiently interrupted him,
and with his hand still raised high above his head, waving it angrily, ex-
claimed, ‘Go to the rear, sir,’ spurred his horse and rode rapidly forward.
The whole thing occurred as quickly as I can tell it to you. Essays His-
torical and Literary, Vol. I, pp. 91-2 (note).

EE soraTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
from heaven!”° General Scott does not appear to have
been present at Washington’s interview with Lee, and, in
any case, he should have been with his own command.

Before General Washington reached the rear of the
retreating division he met Lieutenant-Colonel Harrison
then on his return to report to him, and Harrison told him
the British advance was pressing on hard and would be
up with them within fifteen minutes. This was the first
intelligence Washington had had of the near approach of
the enemy. Lieutenant-Colonel Fitzgerald, the aide who
had accompanied Harrison, was at this moment a little
distance off in a grain-field, on slightly rising ground,
with Lieutenant-Colonel De Hart, of the Second New
Jersey regiment, trying to reconnoiter the enemy. He
joined Harrison and General Washington a few minutes
thereafter. General Washington and his aides then re-
traced their ride, Washington giving orders rapidly and
his efficient aides seeing that they were executed. Colonel
Shreve and his Second New Jersey regiment, as has been
said, took post on a hill, and Colonel Grayson’s Virginia
regiment and Patton’s regiment, Continental infantry,
were ordered to form with Colonel Shreve’s command.
Lieutenant-Colonel David Rhea was ordered to report to
General Washington for special duty, as he had volun-
teered. The regiment of Colonel Livingston, the Fourth
New York Continental infantry, was directed to form at
the hedge row.

The retreating parties at this time took up such a broad
extent of country that a battalion on the extreme left,
some distance from the highway, attracted Washington’s
attention and he feared it was a force of the enemy, but
he was undeceived by the report of General Cadwalader
and Lieutenant-Colonel Tilghman whom he sent out to
ascertain what they were.

8 This subject is well discussed in Carrington’s Washington the Soldier,
pp. 235-7. See also John Fiske, “Charles Lee, the Soldier of Fortune,” in
Essays Historical and Literary, Vol. I, pp. 53-98, for an able and scholarly
discussion of the career of Lee.

relyCHAPTER XVIII

T’ is now necessary to return to the main body of the

army, fresh troops, unburdened with knapsacks or
blankets, slowly advancing from Englishtown by the same
highway which General Lee had taken in the early morn-
ing. General Nathanael Greene, the Quartermaster-
General, but now in direct command of troops, had first
received orders to turn off on a road to the right of the
meeting-house and so come in on the south of the Mon-
mouth Court House. Lord Stirling and his division were
to keep to the main road and in this way take a position on
the left of General Greene’s column. But all this was
changed during the halt of a few moments near the
Tennent church. At that time Lee’s retreat, with all its
dangerous consequences, began fully to appear to these
officers. Then General Greene was ordered to take a very
advantageous position, as General Washington thought,
on the extreme right of the army, to prevent the enemy
from approaching on that flank. Major-General Lord
Stirling, with whom General Washington had been riding
from Englishtown, was ordered to post his division on a
hill on the left of the army, with the west ravine in front,
and with orders to prevent any surprise on the upper road.
These two bodies of troops were a little over half a mile
apart.

At this time all the troops of Lee’s division having
passed beyond Ker’s house, the British cavalry came up,
determined to hasten the steps of the retiring Americans
across Robert Rhea’s farm and the plantation of the late
Reverend William Tennent.’ They charged the few horse
which still endeavored to keep guard over the patriots
and to warn them of the approach of the foe. These troop-

1 The “parsonage farm” is about two miles west of Freehold, and is now
[1926] owned by Joseph Brakely.

[ie S82 alTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
ers they dispersed without much difficulty. But just when
this was accomplished the British espied Colonel Gray-
son’s detachment, formed as a support to the artillery and
the retreating infantry troops, behind a fence which af-
forded a sure protection against the charge of horsemen.
[It took but a moment for them to see their danger from
the fire of Grayson’s men which opened on them and they
immediately wheeled off and returned to the British corps
to which they were attached.

The position which General Duportail had been
anxious for General Lee to occupy and to defend was now
virtually abandoned. General Lee was still disposed to
continue his retreat and he had his eye, as it was after-
ward asserted, on the hills pointed out to him by Captain
Wikoff, which, unknown to General Lee, were already
being occupied by Washington’s forces.

General Washington was now giving his orders rapidly
and the troops, hailing his clear commands with great en-
thusiasm and rallying quickly when they felt the influence
of his strong, self-reliant personality, were soon placed in
position and the retreat checked. The British troops were
now in sight, rapidly pressing nearer. The first American
officers Washington personally recognized were Colonel
Walter Stewart, of the Thirteenth Pennsylvania regiment
and Lieutenant-Colonel Nathaniel Ramsay, of the Third
Maryland regiment, and, taking Ramsay by the hand and
calling him by name he said, “I shall depend on your im-
mediate exertions to check with your two regiments the
progress of the enemy till I can form the main army.” The
reply he received from Colonel Ramsay was characteristic
of the man, “We shall check them.” His men rallied
with the greatest alacrity, within two hundred yards of
the approaching enemy—no soldiers ever responded more
cheerfully or with better spirit. They clearly understood

2 Dr. James McHenry’s writing on the margin of his own copy of Mar-
shall’s Life of George Washington, Vol. II, p. 473.

[ 1963 4THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

now the reason for the orders given and assumed a posi-
tion with a determination to hold it until overpowered.

General Washington, as has been said, saw Colonel
Walter Stewart, the brave Pennsylvanian, crossing the
morass with his men. He had been unable in the course of
the retreat to reach General Wayne’s detachment, where
he belonged, but having gradually inclined his regiment
toward the left under cover of a corner of woods, he found
himself on the right of General Lee’s division. His regi-
ment did not again join Colonel Livingston’s and Colonel
Wesson’s commands, with which it had for some hours
been associated. General Lafayette was riding with
Colonel Stewart when they met General Washington, and
Lafayette gave him a hasty account of the situation and
approach of the British.

General Washington also met General Wayne and they
agreed on a place on the left, near a wood, where they
would make an attempt to stop the British force.

Soon after this decision had been made and General
Washington had left for another part of the field, Captain
Mercer rode up to General Wayne with an order from
General Lee for him to “defend the position to the last.”
General Wayne having received his orders from a higher
authority, brusquely asked him whom he came from.
Mercer told him and added that General Lee had again
assumed command. Wayne, however, paid no attention to
the message nor the explanation but turned away to the
conflict now impending.

General Wayne was now smarting under the loss of
personal glory which he had hoped to gain that morning.
He was indignant at the retreat because of the loss of
prestige to the American arms; but he was prompt in
placing the regiments of Colonel Stewart and Lieutenant-
Colonel Ramsay in a wood on the left of the roadway. He
thought the idea of checking the advance of the enemy
“exceedingly practicable, provided any effort or exertion
was made for the purpose.”’ He was confident that “‘a very

E SaraTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
select body of men had been that d. 1y drawn off from a
body far inferior in number.”

The light infantry battalions of the British and their
grenadier regiments were at that time hardly four hun-
dred yards distant from the rear of General Lee’s re-
treating column.

The appearance of General Washington as he rallied
his broken army was described by General Lafayette in
these words: “Never was General W ashington greater in
war than in this action. His presence stopped the retreat;
his dispositions fixed the victory; his fine appearance on
horseback, his calm courage roused to animation by the
vexations of the morning, gave him the air best calculated
to excite enthusiasm.”* At another time Lafayette said
that he “rode along the lines, amid the shouts of the sol-
diers, cheering them by his voice and example and restor-
ing to our standard the fortunes of the fight. I thoug sht
then as now that never had I beheld so SHES rb) a man.
It is quite certain that his own personal faith and courage
aroused a like spirit of confidence in his men and his voice
and every act inspired the confidence of victory.

At the be ginning ; of Stewart’s and Ramsay’s defence of
their new position Colonel Walter Stewart, of the Thir-
teenth Pennsylvania regiment, was sorely wounded and
carried off the field of battle.

The British party now in their immediate front was
composed of large detachments of Lieutenant-Colonel the
Honorable William Harcourt’s command, the Sixteenth
regiment, light dragoons, and of the Seventeenth regi-
ment, light dragoons, Lieutenant-Colonel Samuel Birch
commanding. This latter regiment had been constantly in
the saddle since it left the Quaker city and had taken part
in all the hard service required of the cavalry, with the
American troops constantly hovering on their rear and on

3 Harrison’s testimony at Lee’s court-martial, p. 85.

* Headley’ s Life of General Lafayé tte , P- 94.
Custis’ R Heng ns of Was ington, Pp. 220.

r 185 iTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

their flanks. Now it was recalled from the main body to
aid the Sixteenth dragoons in pressing on the flight of
the retreating patriots.

Lieutenant-Colonel Ramsay, however, held vigorously
to his position with his own regiment and Stewart’s regi-
ment, of which Lieutenant-Colonel Lewis Farmer was in
command after Colonel Stewart had been borne off the
battle-field.

The British dragoons pressed stubbornly on Ramsay,
but he was able with great efforts to check and engage
them for a little time while the main army gained a few
needed moments for preparation. At last, by the pressure
of superior numbers, Ramsay’s force was compelled to
fall back, which they did, fighting and in good order.
Ramsay was the last man to leave the position. His horse
had been killed under him and while dismounted he was
attacked by one of the British dragoons who attempted
to shoot him with his pistol. It missed fire, however, and
the dragoon made a desperate assault with his saber. Then
in the very front of the advancing British Army a duel of
life and death took place. Ramsay with his short-bladed
sword,’ cut the dragoon down from his horse and was
about to mount the animal when a number of the com-
rades of the disabled trooper came up. Even then the brave
Marylander did not hesitate to fight the party. This he
did with great courage, inflicting some wounds and being
himself wounded. But he was at last overpowered and
taken prisoner. Sir Henry Clinton was told the next
day of the personal gallantry of Ramsay, and, with a true
soldier’s love of brave deeds he released him on his
parole.’ In this little episode, brief though it was, Lieu-
tenant-Colonel Ramsay did all in his power to hinder the

6 This weapon is still preserved in Ramsay’s family as a relic of the
engagement.

7 Ramsay soon again entered the American camp, was conveyed to Prince-
ton and remained at the house of Mrs. Jonathan Sergeant.

[ke 186THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
advance of the foe. The check of a single minute was at
this time invaluable.®

It is well to add that Lieutenant-Colonel John Laurens,
Washington’s aide, who was active in aiding Ramsay in
this engagement, was himself badly wounded and also had
a horse shot under him.

General Washington ordered two more pieces of artil-
lery to take position on the right of the troops of Stewart
and Ramsay. They had hardly unlimbered before they
found the British artiller ry sending shot among the men
of the Thirteenth Pennsylvania regiment in the woods.
Lieutenant-Colonel Oswald now had two field- “pieces
belonging to General Varnum’s brigade with Captain
John Compston of the Third regiment artillery in com-
mand, two pieces of Captain Thomas Seward’s battery
of the same regiment and two guns of his own Second regi-
ment, in all six pieces of artillery. The men of these com-
panies were in great distress from heat and fatigue, but
still they kept replying to the British cannonade. The
desperate eae of these matrosses was very apparent
to Carel Knox.

The musketry and artillery fire between the two lines
now became very general and the British advance party,
in two distinct columns, pushed forward steadily and
evidently gained ground on the little force attempting
vainly to check them. Oswald at this moment feared he
might lose his guns since the infantry commands just
spoken of were out of good supporting distance. He ap-
pealed to General Knox to procure him some support.
Before this could be obtained, however, Oswald was or-
dered by General Lee, the order being delivered by Bri-

gade-Major Shaw, to retreat. This he Aide slowly for ‘about
forty yards while the soldiers near him were shouting,
‘drive on! drive on!” Regardless of this he directed his

8 See very complete and interesting Sketch of Colonel Nathaniel Ram-
say of the Maryland Line, by Isaac R. Pennypacker, of Philadelphia, Pa.,

privately printed.
E187 4THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

drivers to move steadily. General Knox then appealed to
his friend Colonel Henry Jackson to come up and cover
the guns, but before he could get his men up as a support-
ing party on the right of the batteries, the whole artillery
line was obliged again to retreat as the enemy had g gained
the wood on the left and the British dragoons were closing
in on the right. Even in this retreat the ¢ cannon were fre.
quently unlimbered and shot sent among the enemy. All
this time men on horseback on the roadway, seeing the
danger to which Oswald’s command was exposed, were
shouting to him to “retreat! retreat!” His danger was
certé 1inly imminent but as he was moving off General Lee
directed him to remain there and keep firing until he had
direct orders to retreat. Oswald’s guns began to fire again
when some aides from General Lafayette came up ‘ang
ordered him to retreat. This order he disregarded for a
time because of General Lee’s superior orders Just given
him. He said to Lafayette’s aides, “I will remain here and
until I have General Lee’s orders to retreat I cannot re-
treat.” The aides of Lafayette replied that they had
General Lee’s orders that he should now retreat and that
they should conduct him to a new position in the rear.

During the cannonade at the place they were about to
leave, one of the pi cturesque incidents of this battle took
place,—a battle full of dramatic scenes w orthy of the
painter’s brush and the chisel of the sculptor.

The story of Molly Pitcher is related in many different
ways.

In Barber and Howe’s Historical Collections of New
Jersey the episode is told somewhat in this manner: Dur-
ing the engagement Molly, the wife of a cannonier, was
busy carrying water from a neighboring spring to refresh
the weary artillerists. While engaged in this work her
husband fell dead at his gun. An officer about this time
ordered the gun to the rear. “No,” said the woman. “the
cannon shall not be removed for the want of someone to
serve it; since my brave husband is no more I will use my

fe eS!THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
utmost exertions to avenge his death.” She then performed
the duties of cannonier and attracted the attention of all
in sight. Washington gave her the rank of Lieutenant,
and half-pay for life. She wore an epaulette afterward
and was called Captain Molly.

Custis, in his Recollections. relates very much the same
story but gives this as the woman’s expression, “Lie there,
my d. ling, while I revenge ye.”

The version of the story given by Lossing in his Field
Book and in his notes to Custis’ Recollections makes her
a young Irishwoman, twenty-two years of age and a
sturdy camp-follower. When she heard the order for the
removal of ae gun, she seized the rammer and with skill
and courage tried to avenge her husband’s death. The
next morning, covered with blood and dirt, she was pre-
sented by General Greene to General Washington. who
gave her a piece of gold and conferred upon her a com-
mission as sergeant. The fame of ‘Sergeant Molly’
spread throughout the army and the French soldiers, in-
terested in her story, filled her chapeau with silver coin
as she passed in front of their ranks.

The Journal of Doctor Albigence Waldo, dated in camp
opposite Brunswick on July 3, 1778, gives probably the
most accurate account of the incident in these words: ‘‘One
of the camp women I must give a little praise to. Her
gallant, whom she attended in battle, being shot down.
she immediately took up his gun and cartridges and like a
Spartan heroine fought with astonishing eet dis-
charging the piece with as much regularity as any soldier
present. This a wounded officer, whom I dressed, told me
he did see himself, she being in his platoon, and assured
me I might depend on its truth.”

Now this statement of Doctor Waldo represents the
woman as the sweetheart of an infantry soldier, who fell
dead in his platoon, instead of the wife of an artillerist,
serving his cannon. A most diligent search of the pension
records of the Old War Office at Washington fails to

fe 186 4]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

show a pension given, or half-pay for life allowed, to any
woman for the death of her lover or husband at the Battle
of Monmouth under any of the names by which Molly
Pitcher has been known—Molly Maban, Molly Hanna,
Molly Hayes or Molly McCauley.

An incident of a similar character occurred at Fort
Washington, November 16, 1776. The Supreme Execu-
tive Council of Pennsylvania on June 29, 1779, directed
that an order be drawn “in favour of Margaret Corbin for
Thirty Dollars to relieve her present necessities she having
been wounded and utterly disabled by three Grapeshott,
while she filled with distinguished Bravery the post of her
Husband, who was killed by her side, serving a piece of
Artillery at Fort Washington.” In the Pennsylvania
Colonial Records’ we find that after reciting her services
in the language just stated, the Council ordered, “‘that she
be recommended to a further consideration of the Board
of War, This Council being of the opinion, that notwith-
standing the rations which have been allowed her, she is
not Provided for as her helpless situation really requires.”
In the Second Series of Pennsylvania Archives we find
her name in Colonel Lewis Nicolas’ Invalid Regiment as
discharged at the close of the war in April 1783, and thus
Margaret Corbin must have been carried on the regimental
rolls of the Continental Army for all those years after
her heroic exploit in November 1776."

Mention should also be made of the record concerning
“Captain Molly” which is found in Boynton’s Héstory of
West Point (page 166). In this work the story is told of
her firing the last gun at the British when Fort Clinton
was taken October 6, 1777. Then follows the anecdote of
her good conduct at Monmouth, nine months afterwards,
in the same language as given in Barber and Howe’s His-
torical Collections of New Jersey. In addition to this story,

2 Vol. XII; p: 34.

LONV ON X15 Di 277.

11 Magazine of American History, Vol. I, p. 90, and Vol. XVI, pp. 299,
401.

Roe aTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
however, extracts are given from manuscript notes made
at the Academy by Major George Fleming, Ordnance and
Military eee These notes are dated October 7,
1786, April 2 1, June 12 and July 8, 1787, and relate to
lodging and food furnished her at the village of Swins-
town, now called Buttermilk Falls. This cle -arly shows
that four years after the Revolution the Secret: iry of War,
General Knox, attended to the maintenance of a woman
called Molly Pitcher at the government’s expense.

The story which is now gener: uly eee which has
same incidental record proof and which is likely to be re-
garded in the future as the true account, m: iy be related in
this wise: Mary Ludwig, daughter of John George L udwig
who came to this country with the Palatinates, was born
October 13, 1744. In the year 17068 she was employed as
a domestic in the family of Wi ill; iam Irvine, of Carlisle,
Pennsylvania, afterward a dis stinguished general in the
Revolutionary War. On July 24, 1769, Mary Ludwig
married ee Casper Hayes, a barber of Carlisle.’ On
December 1, 1775, her husband, his soldier name being
John Hayes, enlisted in Colonel Thomas Procter’s First
Pennsylvania regiment artillery and served therein one
year. He then enlisted in January, 1777, in Captain
John Alexander’s Company of Colonel William Irvine’s
Seventh Pennsylvania regiment.* It appears that Molly
Hayes followed her husband to the war, as we have seen
was the custom in the British Army, and to some extent
in the American troops. These women nursed the sick and
assisted in the cooking and washing. Private Hayes was
probably detailed on the battle-field of Monmouth from
infantry service to help one of the batteries. His wife
was aiding the cause by carrying pitchers of water for the
heated and wounded men. When John Hayes was
wounded at the gun she took his place and performed

12 Pennsylvania Archives, Second Series, Vol. II, p. 181.
18 ghid., Vol. XI, p. 176.
14 thid., Vol. X, p. 614.

E197 4THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

some act of unusual heroism.” On the death of John
Hayes after the war Molly Hayes married a worthless
fellow named John McCauley. Molly McCauley, known
familiarly in Carlisle as “Molly Pitcher,” lived on the
corner of North and Bedford Streets in a house which since
has been demolished. On February 27, 1822, the Penn-
sylvania Legislature granted her the sum of forty dollars
and an annuity of the same amount.” She died January
22, 1832, and is buried in the old Carlisle cemetery. On
the one hundredth anniversary of the Declaration of In-
dependence the citizens of Carlisle erected a neat monu-
ment over the heroine’s grave,’ with the following
inscription:
MOLLY MCCAULEY
RENOWNED IN HISTORY AS
“MOLLY PITCHER,
THE HEROINE OF MONMOUTH.
DIED JANUARY 22, 1833%°
AGED SEVENTY=NINE YEARS.
ERECTED BY THE CITIZENS OF CUMBERLAND
COUNTY, JULY THE FOURTH 1876.1°

15 “T am satisfied that this spring was in the edge of Gordon’s woods
near what is known as Gordon’s Bridge on the Pennsylvania Railroad, and
not where ‘Mollie Pitcher’s Well’ is today pointed out, for the reason
that Ramsay’s guns were near these woods and the well was not dug until
fifty years after the battle, by Dr. J. C. Thompson, who himself. years
later told me he dug it.” Samuel C. Cowart, in conversation with Ed.,
August 12, 1926.

16 Laws of Pennsylvania 1821-22, p. 32.

17 Egle’s Some Pennsylvania Women in the War of the Revolution, p. 85.

18 The date should be January 22, 1832. The Carlisle Republican in its
issue of January 26, 1832, says: “Died on Sunday last in this borough, at
an advanced age, Mrs. Molly McCauly,” &c.

19 For a number of years I spent a part of each summer in Carlisle. In
1905 I met there Miss Caroline Ege, a life-long resident, who died in the
year 1909 at the advanced age of  eighty-se ven. As a child she had known
Molly McCauley, remembered her well, and told me interesting facts in
regard to her. In re sponse to a letter of inquiry to a member of Miss Ege’s
family I received the following reply (August 1926): “Yes, you are correct
in quoting— “Molly was a rough, common woman who swore like a
trooper.’ She smoked and chew ed tobacco, and had no education whatever.
She was hired to do the most menial work, such as scrubbing, etc. I think
there are some of her descendants still living in Carlisle.’—W.S.M.

fe 12 4]CHAPTER XIX

Y order of General Lee a march of about a quarter of

a mile was made by Oswald’s men, during which time
four more guns were added to his command. These came
from General Maxwell’s brigade, which was then emerg-
ing from a wood and marching up a hill, and formed the
battery attached to his brigade and the battery of Scott’s
detachment, which General Scott had entrusted two hours
previously to the care of Maxwell’s troops. Lieutenant-
Colonel Oswald, the brave commander, who had gained
so much honor on this field had now his own two-gun
battery, Captain Compston’s two guns, Captain Cook’s
two guns, Captain Seward’s two guns and Captain Well’s
two guns,—in all ten pieces of artillery.

Colt Henry B. Livingston and his Fourth New York
regiment then received orders from General Lee to sup-
port Oswald’s artillery as from time to time they fired
on the enemy and then retreated. Every moment it was
expected that the British would make another fierce cav-
alry charge for the purpose of capturing these batteries
and their gunners. A mistake occurred, however, in refer-
ence to the position Livingston’s regiment was to take
and it was not placed at the post to which it had been
assigned. The batteries continued to retreat, and Colonel
Livingston’s men, still attempting to support them, re-
treated oe them to a hedge fence and there took position
on the right side of Varnum’s brigade, which Lieutenant-
Colonel Mee r Hamilton had assisted Lieutenant-
Colonel Olney, the commanding officer, in forming there.
General Lee was at this moment in great personal danger
from the flying shots of the British, but he appeared brave
and self-reliant, although in retreat.

General Washington had ordered General Wayne, who
was still enraged at the part he had been obliged to take

le 198 4THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
during the morning, to make a strong stand along the
hedge fence with Colonel Stewart’s regiment, Colonel Liv-
ingston’s regiment, Just referred to, a part of General
Scott’s own brigade and two pieces of artillery, and to
dispute every foot of the advance of the foe. It did not
take General Wayne many moments to bring his light
infantry troops in line of battle, and they immediately
began firing on the advancing column of British foot and
dragoons. The fighting soon became quite animated and
considerable execution was done in the ranks of the red-
coats. On the American side Captain Joseph McCracken,
of the Fourth New York regiment, lost his left arm.

General Lee noticed in the distance the active move-
ments of the brilliant and true-hearted Pennsylvania
soldier and he rode up to Wikoff’s house, near which
Wayne’s command had formed, and inquired of that offi-
cer why he formed in a position so exposed to the enemy's
cannon. “By General Washington's orders,” Wayne re-
plied, “and he instructed me to defend the post as long
as possible till he could form the troops.” General Lee
remarked as he rode away, that he had “nothing more to
Say.

Colonel Livingston’s regiment was now entirely over-
come with heat and fatigue, and although they had tried
as best they could to protect the artillery, they really in-
terfered at times with the proper handling of the pieces.
They seemed not to be able to move quickly right and left
and so give free opening for the discharge of the guns. The
Colonel himself had received a slight wound.

Lieutenant-Colonel William S. Smith, in command of
Lee’s Continental regiment, received an order from Gen-
eral Lee that ‘“‘the blue regiment must form behind the
fence,” and one-half of his men turned about to the rear
and went behind the hedge as directed. Colonel Henry
Jackson was angry when he saw the right wing of the
regiment separated from the left, and ordered it back to
its former post. Meeting General Lee soon after, Colonel

EtOHTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
Jackson made some remarks about the broken state of the
command. Lee was overheard to say angrily to Jackson,
with his hand on his sword, that these movements were
contrary to his directions, that he meant to effect a re-
treat, and proposed to station these troops at the fence
merely to cover the retreat. Major John S. Tyler, who led
the right wing of the detachment, then marched it back
and the parts were again united. General Washington,
riding near, ordered Lieutenant-Colonel William S. Smith
to advance the regiment five hundred yards to a wood, to
protect the men from the sun and to give them some ad-
vantage if the enemy should advance in that direction.
Soon afterward, Colonel Jackson ordered his detachment
to file off and retire from the ground.

While the weary soldiers were seeking water at the
parsonage well, young Captain Henry Fauntleroy, of the
Fifth Virginia regiment, stopped at the well to quench his
burning thirst. Seeing the parched and weary enlisted
men crowding around and begging for a drink of water
he waived his turn again and yet again. As he stood aside
unselfishly while others took the cooling draught, a round
shot came bounding toward him, shattered his hip and
threw him to the ground mangled and dying. He was
creatly mourned by his regimental commander, Colonel
Josiah Parker, and by the men of his very gallant
regiment.

All this time General Maxwell had received no orders
to form his New Jersey brigade, and he kept on retreating,
expecting every moment that he would be halted by
General Lee and posted where he could do some effective
service. The officers of his brigade, as has been seen, were
still enraged when they passed in column by Washington’s
aides, and afterward when they saw the General himself.
No disposition to turn about and face the enemy was yet
apparent in any of the movements, although they had re-
treated until they were in sight of the meeting-house.
Where then, they wondered, was this backward movement

E aos 4THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
to stop! The gallant young Colonel Matthias Ogden
begged of General Maxwell that he might be allowed to
halt his regiment on the left of a hedge in a small wood
near by and in this way to help cover some of the retreat-
ing force. His brother, Major Aaron Ogden, General Max-
well’s brigade-major, who distinguished himself in the
siege of Yorktown, and in after years was made the Gov-
ernor of New Jersey, rode up and offered to aid Colonel
Ogden in forming his men. Maxwell gave Colonel Ogden
his consent and the First New Jersey regiment was soon
in position near the road which led to the causeway over
the west ravine, with a morass on their left. Soon after
this General Maxwell sent Major Ogden to General Lee
for orders. Major Ogden found him in an orchard not far
from Ker’s house and told him that Maxwell had posted
Colonel Ogden’s regiment to cover the retreat. He also
expressed the opinion that his brother’s troops would give
the enemy a warm reception. General Lee impatiently
replied, “Don’t tell me of what they will do, but tell it
to me after they have done it!” At the same time he ex-
pressed a wish that they might succeed in checking the
foe. Captain Mercer was then sent by General Lee to
Colonel Ogden with orders for him to hold his position to
the last extremity and cover, if possible, the movement
of Lee’s division over the narrow bridge.

General Lee told Major Ogden to say to General
Maxwell, in response to his request for orders, that he
desired him to place his brigade, now consisting of the
Second, Third and Fourth New Jersey Continental regi-
ments, in the woods on the right. To do this General Max-
well must needs break through the line of the retreating
column and make even more confusion than was now
visible. General Maxwell was angry with his brigade-
major, for he felt that either General Lee did not know
his present position or Major Ogden had brought an in-
correct message. Maxwell left his brigade in charge of

1 Ogden’s testimony at Lee’s court-martial, p. 109.

fy 196 4THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

Colonel Israel Shreve for a few moments and rode over to
where Ogden had informed him that General Lee was
riding with his staff. He met General Lee in a large wheat
field, and Lee merely repeated the orders as conveyed by
Major Ogden. The situation was explained, and General
Lee corrected his orders by asking Maxwell to remain on
the left side where his brigade then was. He also told him
to get water for his men, and, if possible, to shelter them
in the underbrush from the intense heat. Brigade-Mayjor
Samuel Shaw of the artillery was witness to this interview
and afterward had occasion to refer to it under oath.
General Maxwell then returned to his brigade and they
crossed a defile, the only causeway over the marsh, and
marched into the woods, that they might guard the road on
the side which led up from Forman’s mill. When they
reached their position the retreating column was still
moving on both sides of the main roadway and crowding
across the ravine in the rear of Maxwell’s brigade. The
General left his brigade for a moment to reconnoiter the
enemy in person, and while he was absent Captain Wikoft
rode up and directed Colonel Shreve, by order of General
Lafayette, to take his own regiment, the Second New
Jersey, over the ravine in the rear of the brigade as then
posted. Colonel Shreve instantly marched his men toward
the place designated. When General Maxwell returned
he halted the regiment, but after the matter was explained
to him ordered Lafayette’s wishes to be complied with
and directed the battery of two guns, which was attached
to his brigade and which Lieutenant-Colonel Oswald had
just returned, to go with Colonel Shreve and his regiment
to the edge of the woods and cover the passage at the west
ravine. After some time had elapsed the two other regi-
ments of Maxwell’s brigade crossed the defile, followed
‘n the route taken by Colonel Shreve and then joined the
Second regiment on the westerly side of the defile, leaving
one regiment between the road and the marsh and to
cover the road that led from Forman’s mill. After all the

E107, 4THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
troops of Lee’s division had passed over the bridge Gen-
eral Maxwell’s brigade was ordered to form in the rear of
General Lord Stirling’s command on the hill, which was
promptly done.

General Lee had been continuing to give orders to the
troops, but was checked by his aide, Captain Mercer, who
told him that General Washington was now giving orders
direct to the officers of his division and that he should be
cautious lest the orders conflict. General Lee thought the
suggestion wise, for he had already noticed that General
Washington’s orders were gradually superseding all that
he had issued. When, therefore, he was next asked about
the movements of the troops he said that he supposed Gen-
eral Washington meant he should have no further com-
mand, and that he scarcely thought he had the right to
give any orders. Soon after this he observed General Wash-
ington, who had already passed him, crossing the bridge at
the west ravine. He rode toward the commander-in-chief,
and found him forming the troops for the final conflict of
the day. He heard his words of cheer to the men, imparting
new faith and confidence to all about him. General Wash-
ington noticed General Lee approaching, and in a calmer
tone than he had used at their former meeting, asked
whether Lee would take the command here, or if he should
do it himself. If General Lee would command, Washing-
ton said that he would return to the main body and still
further arrange them on the next height back. Up to this
moment General Washington had not formally deprived
Lee of his division, although his own direct orders seemed
to supersede Lee’s authority. General Lee replied that
His Excellency had given him the command before and it
was equal with him where he commanded. General Wash-
ington then said that he expected him to take proper meas-
ures for checking the enemy at that place, and General
Lee answered that his orders should be obeyed, that he
would do everything in his power and would not be the
first to leave the field. General Lee then rode off toward

[ 198 JTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
the right wing and was thus expected, with selected
troops, to give the enemy a check sufficient to enable the
rest of his division to cross the bridge.

During the fighting which followed, and before General
Lee was relieved, both of his aides, Captain Mercer and
Captain Edwards, had their horses badly wounded, and
the horses of Lieutenant-Colonel Brooks and Lieutenant-
Colonel de Malmedy were nearly dead with fatigue. Thus
these officers of General Lee’s staff were dismounted and
were carrying his orders on foot. General John Cadwala-
der had been active in every part of the field, aiding Gen-
eral Washington, and General Joseph Reed had been on
the fighting line so often that his horse had been killed
under him.

General Washington had just finished his conversation
with General Lee and ridden away when his youthful
aide-de-camp, Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander Hamilton,
full of his iasm, came up to General Lee flourishing his
sword and exclaiming with great ardor, “I will stay here
with you, my dear General, and we will all die here with
you on the spot. Let us die here rather than retreat.” In a
most composed manner and in strong contrast to what he
called Hamilton’s “frenzy of valour’ General Lee asked
him if he did not think he looked calm enough to deter-
mine what was best to be done in this crisis, and that after
he had properly arranged the Continental troops in his
comm: al he would be as ready to die as Hamilton could
possibly be. He also said, “When I have taken proper
measures to get the main body of them in a good position
I will die with you on this spot, if you please.” Lieu-
tenant-Colonel Hamilton testified a month later, that he
was near General Lee for a short time afterward,” but
heard no directions given, nor saw any measures taken
By him to fulfill his promise to General Washington or

2 Lee’s defence at his court-martial, p. 230. ;

8 Not long after his conversation ann General Lee, Colonel Hamilton’s
horse was struck by a bullet and fell, disabling its rider so that he was
incapacitated for further service that day.

le 199 4THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
to carry out the purposes which he had just stated to him.
Lieutenant-Colonel Fitzgerald said that he was near
General Lee for nearly half an hour, but heard no orders
given.

Lieutenant-Colonel Oswald had by this time, returned
the battery belonging to Varnum’s brigade as well as that
belonging to Maxwell's brigade, and Captain Thomas
Wells’ battery of the Third Continental artillery had been
ordered toward Englishtown, the men being entirely dis-
abled by the heat and toil. Oswald then appealed to Lieu-
tenant-Colonel Fitzgerald, who was riding near him, to
ask General Washington to send up a fresh artillery force.
General Knox, however, coming up just at this moment,
promised to see that it was attended to immediately, and
ordered Oswald to retire again to a better position a few
rods back. The battery of Captain Thomas Seward of the
Third regiment of artillery was placed on a little hill
back of the hedgerow where the continentals had formed.
While the infantry were engaged, the artillery fired grape-
shot at the advancing columns of the British through an
opening in the fence and over the heads of the line of
Americans. Captain Compston’s two guns of Varnum’s
brigade also did excellent service at this time under Gen-
eral Knox’s direction. It was a bold and vigorous cannonade
at short range and was one of the most effective exploits
of the battle. First Lieutenant James McNair, a gallant
New York officer, attached to Captain Andrew Porter's
company of the Second Continental artillery regiment
had his head shot off by a cannon-ball.

We left Lieutenant-Colonel Olney in command of Gen-
eral Varnum’s brigade‘ at the hedge fence in front of the
bridge over the west ravine. Captain David Cook’s bat-
tery of the Third Continental artillery regiment was at-

4A sketch of Lieutenant-Colonel Olney and of Varnum’s brigade, espe-
cially the Second Rhode Island regiment and two companies of the First
Rhode Island regiment, in this battle, has been prepared by Colonel Asa

Bird Gardiner, President of the Society of the Cincinnati in the State of
Rhode Island and filed with the archives of said society.

le 200; 4]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

tached to this brigade, and in the position just stated was
relied upon to support it. It had but eight matrosses now
on duty, yet they stood to their guns ready for the supreme
moment. General Knox rode up and down the line and all
the guns were loaded with grape under his instructions.
On the American right the British dragoons were trotting
rapidly up to the charge, and from a copse on the left the
enemy could be seen massing their troops for a desperate
assault. The contending forces were now within short
musket range, and the conflict of the day, the real battle,
was impending. Shots were already being exchanged be-
tween some eager American marksmen and the British,
as the worn-out regiments of Stewart and Ramsay passed
the ravine covered by the guns of Olney’s men. Large
numbers of Colonel Livingston’s men would not march
by, but crowded in on the right of Varnum’s brigade to
continue the contest while powder and lead remained.

Just at this time General Wayne learned of a road which
led by Taylor’s Tavern and he hastily sent to General
Washington suggesting that troops should be posted there
so as to prevent. the British from turning the American
right flank. Wayne was thoughtful of the whole army,
even though the enemy was about to attack his own
position.

The heat was still intense. The mercury registered
ninety-six degrees in the shade and the sun beat mercilessly
upon the heads of the soldiers exposed to its rays, and upon
the wounded and the dying as they fell upon the bloody
field. Many, without a wound, crawled along the stream
at the west ravine to drink and to die from the heat and
fatigue. Doctor Samuel Forman, one of the leading physi-
cians of the county, who was on the battle-field to aid the
suffering, said afterward that the tongues of many of the
men were so swollen by thirst that it rendered them
almost incapable of articulation. The Hessian soldiers,
loaded down with heavy clothing, with arms and the
weighty and oppressive equipments which they were

lk Bode aITHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
obliged to carry, swore that they would not fight in such
fervid heat. It is not surprising that these men felt the
intense heat of the day when we read a description of their
stiff and heavy clothing and the great amount of material
they had to carry.*

While the battle was raging around the parsonage a
number of people were gathered on the roof and in the
steeple of the church, somewhat more than a mile away,
anxiously gazing upon the field. Even as they looked a
shot came whirling through the graveyard and struck a
man who was seated on a stone, wounding him severely.
He was immediately carried into the meeting-house and
placed in a pew, but expired there within the same hour.
Many years afterward the blood stains on the pew and
floor were shown to visitors, and the old grave-stone on
which the man sat, and which was broken by the cannon-
ball, is still a well-known memento of the incident.

At this stage of the battle an incident of a most ludi-
crous character occurred.® It appears that General Wash-
ington’s body servant, Billy Lee, who was a fine horseman,
with handsome figure, came proudly up on a little hill
with a gay party of servants following him. Here he drew
forth the General’s great spy-glass from its case and pro-
ceeded in fine military style to reconnoiter the British
column. The enemy discovered the little group, apparently
of important officers, spying out their position. General
Washington also saw the party collected on the rising
ground beyond, and he remarked to his staff: “See those

5In Dunlap’s History of the American Theatre we find a description of
their appearance on the streets of New York City during the Revolutionary
period. “The Hessian with his towering brass-fronted cap, mustachios col-
oured with the same material that coloured his shoes, his hair plastered
with tallow and flour, and tightly drawn into a long appendage reaching
from the back of the head to his waist, his blue uniform almost covered by
the broad belts sustaining his cartouch-box, his brass-hilted sword and
his bayonet; a yellow waistcoat with flaps and yellow breeches were met
at the knees by black gaiters and thus heavily equipped he stood an
automaton and received the command or cane of the officer who inspected
him.”

6 See Custis, Recollections of Washington.

ls 202) 3]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
fellows collecting on yonder height: the enemy will fire
on them to acertainty.” A shot from a British six-pounder
followed his remark and struck the branches of a sycamore
tree near the group, and the proud Billy and his mulatto
followers scampered off in undignified haste, causing the
General to smile even in this hour of anxiety and danger.
It may be added that Billy remained with Washington
throughout the war, attended him during his administra-
tion as President and was remembered by him in his will.CHAPTER XX

HE passage of the retreating division over the west

ravine, about half a mile southeast of the meeting-
house, was practically completed. The troops had fought
with great gallantry to cover their brethren, and had sus-
tained some losses. A retreat had been made, as General
Lee afterward asserted, for the purpose of gaining a better
position, and he boasted that it had been done without the
loss of a single piece of artillery or the capture of even
part of a battalion. Now, however, contrary to his plans
and expectations, his command was about to be absorbed
in the main body of the army. He passed the bridge over
the deep morass, being the last officer in the column.
Colonel Ogden, with his First New Jersey regiment, in an
orchard near the bridge, covered the last of the retreat,
and then they, too, put the ravine between themselves
and the enemy.

Seeing General Washington approaching, General Lee
saluted him and said, “Sir, here are my troops! how is it
your pleasure that I should dispose of them 2 Shall I form
them in your front, align them with your main body or
draw them up in your rear?”* General Washington an-
swered that he should march them to the rear of English-
town Creek and then arrange them. General Lee instantly
gave the order to march toward Englishtown, his pet
spaniel, which always accompanied him, was called to his
side and the balance of the division not already on the
march wearily struggled through the tramp of nearly
three miles which led them to the little village on the west
side of Wemrock Brook.

When his command at the front ended, General Lee
said that he thought he merited and had won the praise
and congratulation of the army and the country. He did

1 Lee’s defence at his court-martial, p. 217.

[ 204 |THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

not consider himself beaten nor in any way disgraced. He
thought he had done nothing worthy of censure, or merit-
ing the reception that Washington had given him, but
that he and the troops he commanded deserved and
would receive great honor from the people of America. He
considered that although the reports he had received were
contradictory and often false, and some of his officers
had made mistakes or had been disobedient—all of them
being ignorant of the country—and despite the weakness
of his division in the cavalry arm, the fact that in the
face of the very flower of the British Army he had been
able to withdraw his men to a better position without
material loss, was proof that he deserved the applause of
the commander-in-chief and the public.

General Lee was correct in his assertion that the country
had not been reconnoitered or mapped out by the Amer-
ican officers, but that no reconnaissance had been made in
the neh of June ay aa d early the following morning was
certainly his own neglect. He believed that the ground was
well known to the enemy and was quite right in this sur-
nise. Sir Henry Clinton had carefully drawn maps of
the county, in constant use.”

It was soon after this last interview between the com-
mander-in-chief and General Eee, that the white horse
ae Governor William Livingston had presented to

General Washington while he was at Kingston, June 25,
a arene fell and died, utterly overcome with the intense

heat and the severe toil to which he had been subjected

;
by the anxious exertions of his rider. Billy Lee, having
now somewhat recovered from his fright, brought up the
General’s own “chestnut blood mare with long mane and
tail.’ and during the rest of the battle General Wash-
ington rode this splendid ane as he dashed about from
point to point where the varying fortunes of the day led
him.

The detachment commanded by General Scott had

2 Copies of these maps are now on file in the Library of Congress.

[ 2e5, ||THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
passed on with the retreating column over the west ravine,
without receiving orders of any kind from General Lee,
but just in front of the meeting-house they were halted
by General Washington’s order, taken out of Lee’s divi-
sion and sent up on the rising ground to report to General
Lord Stirling and form in the line of his command. Lieu-
tenant-Colonel Oswald was also sent up on the hill to
report to Lord Stirling.

Major-General Lafayette was now directed to take
command of the second line, the troops in reserve in the
rear of General Greene and General Lord Stirling. All
day Lafayette had been greatly chagrined at the part he
had been compelled to play in the contest. Eager to be in
the very front, where laurels were to be won, he had sought
the advance post, but his visions of conquering the flower
of British soldiery had been rudely dispelled by the order
to retreat.

Varnum’s brigade, with Lieutenant-Colonel Olney still
‘n command, and a portion of Colonel Jackson’s detach-
ment, both of which had just borne the brunt of an assault
at the hedge fence, were ordered to march to the rear, to
refresh themselves, and to prepare, if it became necessary,
for renewing the fight later in the day. These men were
utterly exhausted with thirst, with fatigue, and with the
extreme heat, and slowly and wearily they plodded back
by the same road upon which they had advanced in the
morning, and at last reached camp at Englishtown.

General Maxwell’s brigade, after reaching the hill in
the rear of Lord Stirling’s position, was also ordered to
proceed to Englishtown and form there.

During the fighting of Varnum’s brigade and of the
regiments of Stewart, of Livingston and of Ramsay, under
Wayne, the right and left wings of the main army erad-
ually unfolded, took position and were ranged on good
cround in order of battle. The various inequalities of the
field and the many attempts to possess and repossess fav-
orable elevations account for the ever-changing features

jz 206: 4|THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
of this battle. The charges and counter-charges were per-
formed in full view of the main army, and had the effect
of gaining the needed time while plans were being matured
and formations made in advantageous positions for the
final conflict of the day.

While General Wayne was posting his force at the
hedge fence, about twelve rods back and northeast of the
parsonage, Sir Henry Clinton advanced a strong column
of light infantry troops with the Forty-second foot and
the Royal Highland regiment on his right flank, with the
intention of attacking Major-General Lord Stirling’s
position on the left wing of the American Army, then
being aligned on high ground west of the west ravine.
The British battalions, eager and ready for another fight
with the brave Continentals, pressed rapidly forward,
passing through young John Craig’s fields. As they ap-
proached that part of the rising ground which lay between
Mr. Sutsin’s house and that of Mr. Perrine, they were
creeted with a heavy discharge of shot and shell from
the batteries posted on the right of Stirling’s division and
commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Carrington,
First regiment Continental artillery. The British also
brought up their light guns and soon the fight on this part
of the line became general. Never was artillery better
served during the war. It was said at the time to have been
the ‘‘severest artillery fire ever heard in America.”’ The
infantry organizations known as Weedon’s brigade, Briga-
dier-General Peter Muhlenberg’s brigade and the First
and Second Maryland brigades immediately became en-
gaged in the conflict and volley after volley of musketry
could be heard between the regular discharges of the artil-
lery. Lord Stirling® himself was very active in this part

8Surgeon Waldo’s diary at Valley Forge speaks of Lord Stirling as
follows: “Major General Lord Stirling is a man of a very noble presence
and the most martial Appearance of any General in the Service; he much
resembles the Marquis of Granby—by his bald head—the make of his face,
and figure of his Body. He is mild in his private conversation and
vociferous in the Field.”

[ 207 JTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

of the engagement and was assisted by the presence of
General Washington. They moved along the line, accom-
panied by General von Steuben, and did all they could
to encourage the men, to make them forget the burning
heat, to keep their energies fixed and their whole souls
Glled with the clear duty of giving the British a well-
merited punishment.

It was a bold and daring manoeuver on the part of the
British and it shows to what a state of discipline this
“body of troops not equaled if to be surpassed by any in
the world” had attained that they dared to attack the
fresh troops under Lord Stirling, some of the best drilled
of the veterans of the Continental Army and in a position
well chosen for defence.

The fighting was terrific for nearly an hour on this part
of the line. The artillery hurled the round shot and shell
upon the charging ranks of the enemy and the volleys of
the foot soldiers carried death into the British columns;
but the British replied with great vigor and amid the
storm of shell and the rain of lead the form of General
Washington could be seen urging his troops to the con-
test, inspiring them with his own confidence, and by his
cheering voice and firm commands bringing order out of
what a few hours before had been confusion, and winning
a victory where all had been hopeless retreat and defeat.

In the very heat of this conflict on the hill,, the Vie
ginia troops lost a splendid young officer, Major Edmund
B. Dickinson, of Colonel Richard Parker’s First Virginia
regiment, who was fearfully shattered by a cannon-ball
and instantly killed. He was a soldier of great valor,
greatly beloved by his men, distinguished for his courage
and daring, an educated gentleman in private life, and a
hero in the fight. His sad fate was sincerely mourned by
all the Virginians in Muhlenberg’s brigade. Lieutenant-
Colonel Francis Barber of the Third New Jersey regi-
ment, at this time on Lord Stirling’s staff, was badly
wounded by a ball passing through his body at the same

fe 2os |THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
time Major Dickinson was killed, and the gallant young
Jerseyman had to be carried off the field just as he was
winning new laurels. Major James Monroe, one of Lord
Stirling’s aides, afterward President of the United States,
took Lieutenant-Colonel Barber’s place and acted as Stir-
ling’s adjutant-general during the rest of the battle.

On the British side a popular and brilliant young officer,
Lieutenant Harry Gilchrist, of the Forty-second regiment
of foot, received a severe wound.

It will never be known exactly how much the veteran
Major-General von Steuben contributed to the firm sup-
port of Lord Stirling’s line. The school of the soldier at
Valley Forge now developed its teachings and its value
was evident in the thorough discipline which was shown
in every movement of the troops. The Continental soldiers
who had received von Steuben’s instruction now recog-
nized his soldierly presence, his familiar voice, his cool
words of command, and responded quickly to the orders
of formation. They had full confidence in his ability to
post them in the proper position for battle. Although
sorely pressed by the enemy they wheeled into line with
as much precision as on an ordinary parade and with the
coolness and intrepidity of veteran troops. And this dis-
cipline was maintained after they had been formed and
when the battle was raging. Afterward, in referring to
their good conduct, Colonel Hamilton said he had “never
known or conceived the value of military discipline till
that day.”’

It may be mentioned here that while General von Steu-
ben was aiding General Lord Stirling in the formation of
his line, General Lee passed him without recognition of
any kind. A few minutes thereafter, and while the charge
on Stirling’s line was impending, General Washington
ordered von Steuben to ride to Englishtown and form the
retreating troops as a reserve. He obeyed promptly, and,
accompanied by his aides, Major James Fairlee, Captain

[ 209 |]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
Benjamin Walker and Mr. Jean Baptiste Ternant” he
galloped rapidly to Englishtown, passing General Lee
on horseback in front of a house in that village.

As the enemy pressed sharply on the right of Lord
Stirling’s division, a party of light infantry, with Colonel
Cilley’s First New Hampshire regiment, Colonel Parker’s
First Virginia regiment and Lieutenant-Colonel Dear-
born’s Third New Hampshire regiment, passed out
through the thick woods, over two rail fences, and struck
the extreme right flank of the British column with great
impetuosity. When they charged they were within sixty
yards of the enemy and had Just received their severe fire
without return. The British gave way as the Americans
charged on them and fell back to the low land of the
west ravine where they formed again.

In the Reverend Doctor William Gordon’s history, the
movement of the British infantry and cavalry against the
American left wing is graphically described: “The check
the British received gave time to make a disposition of the
left wing and second line of the main army in the wood,
and on the eminence to which Lee had been directed and
was retreating. On this were placed some batteries of
cannon by Lord Stirling, who commanded the left wing,
which played upon the British with great effect, and,
seconded by parties of infantry, detached to oppose them,
effectually put a stop to their advance. . . . The British
finding themselves warmly opposed in front, attempted
to turn the American left flank, but were repulsed.”

Lieutenant-Colonel Aaron Burr, then but twenty-two
years of age, commanded Malcolm’s regiment, Conti-
nental infantry, attached to a brigade in General Lord
Stirling’s division. In the midst of the fight of this division
Burr observed a party of the enemy issuing from a copse
some distance to the south of the other attacking British

4 On September 25, 1778, Jean Baptiste Ternant was commissioned Lieu-
tenant-Colonel and Inspector, Continental Army.
5 Gordon’s History of the American Revolution, Vole Leaps Suit:

fz 210;THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
force, and he started his command under orders to check
their advance. The Third Pennsylvania regiment, Lieu-
tenant-Colonel Rudolph Bunner in command, was the
leading regiment in this brigade. The brigade crossed a
small bridge over a ravine, and then halted while Lieu-
tenant-Colonel Bunner, Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Miller
of the Second Pennsylvania regiment, and Lieutenant-
Colonel Caleb North of the Eleventh Pennsylvania regi-
ment ascended a small hill to get a good view of the
British. They were gone only a moment, but the enemy
opened upon the brigade a most terrific fire. Several men
were killed, and many wounded. Burr’s valuable horse
was severely wounded and Burr was thrown to the ground.
Lieutenant-Colonel Bunner arrived from his tour of obser-
vation just in time to be pierced by a musket-ball and to
fall dead from his horse. The orders to advance were
then countermanded and the brigade was withdrawn just
when the fire of the enemy slackened and they retreated.

Doctor James McHenry, afterwards Secretary of War,
said of Bunner in a letter written soon after the battle,
“On our part Lieutenant-Colonel Bunner was killed hav-
ing very much distinguished himself on the field.”

In a letter written by Captain George Gardner, of
Malcolm’s regiment, to William Ross, member of the
New York Assembly, in relation to Aaron Burr’s military
service we find this reference, “In the battle of Mon-
mouth our regiment suffered very much nearly one-third
having been killed or wounded—and Colonel Burr had
his horse shot under him.”

When the British failed to break the left wing of the
American Army, General Cornwallis ordered another col-
umn,° which by this time had come up, to attack the
position of Major-General Greene on the right of the

6 This column consisted of the battalion of grenadiers, the Thirty-
seventh and Forty-fourth regiments of foot, the Coldstream guards and
the battalion of the guards commanded by those distinguished soldiers
Lieutenant-Colonel Sir John Wrottesley and Lieutenant-Colonel Cosmo
Gordon.

fe 2, 3]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
American line. This force was the very flower of the rear
division and of the army and its movements were di-
rected in person by the distinguished Lord Cornwallis.
Early in the day, as we have seen, General Greene had
been ordered to file off by the church and to move by the
old Monmouth road to a position as near as possible to
the rear of the court house, so that any attempt to turn the
right flank of the main army on the march might be frus-
trated. Before he could do this, however, the knowledge
that Lee had retreated came to him, and caused him
instantly to range his division on some high and advan-
tageous ground on the right, just beyond the church and
near Mr. Hugin’s house. The British had not proceeded
far in their effort to attack Greene’s position when they
were struck by shot straight across their alignment from
the six-gun battery in charge of Brevet Lieutenant-
Colonel the Chevalier Thomas Antione de Mauduit du
Plessis, Brigade Adjutant of General Knox. This is the
officer who had greatly distinguished himself in the fight
at Red Bank, October 22, 1777, and at Monmouth he did
equally good service in directing the severe enfilading fire
from Combs Hill, which was somewhat over a quarter of
a mile from the British. General Knox took personal
charge of the artillery on Combs Hill, and General Wood-
ford’s brigade of Virginia Continentals supported the
battery. The infantry of General Greene’s division also
opened on the approaching enemy and between the quick
fire of the rifles and the constant discharge of shot and
shell the British suffered greatly. So accurate was the gun-
nery, it is said, that a round shot from one of the pieces
struck the muskets from an entire platoon. A number
of distinguished officers of the British Army were either
killed or wounded on this part of the field. Here Lieu-
tenant Archibald Kennedy of the Forty-fourth foot met
his fate and Colonel Henry Trelawney, Commandant of
the Coldstream regiment of foot guards and Lieutenant-
Colonel Robert Abercromby in command of the Thirty-

(e2ior iTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
seventh regiment of the line received severe wounds. Cap-
tain John Powell of the Fifty-second regiment, but now
attached to the grenadier battalions, was badly wounded
and died a few days after the battle while he was a
prisoner of war. Lieutenant Francis Grose of the same
regiment also serving with the grenadiers, who had just
recovered from wounds received in the Battle of German-
town, October 4, 1777, and had been with his command
but a few days, received new injuries. In reference to
Captain Powell’s death we find in Moorson’s history of
the Fifty-second British regiment that General Hunter
said he was the fourth captain of grenadiers that the
Fifty-second regiment had lost during the American war
and that the drummer of his company was heard to ex-
claim, “Well, I wonder who they’ll get to accept of our
grenadier company now. I’1] be damned if I would!” At
this time in the war each regiment of the British foot was
made up of one grenadier company, one light infantry
company and eight companies of the line. The Fifty-
second regiment lost Captains Nicholas Addison, Wil-
liam Davison and George Amos Smith at the Battle of
Bunker Hill, Captain Andrew Neilson at the Battle of
Long Island and Captain Thomas Williamson soon after
the Battle of Princeton, although not in the fight itself.
This we find from Lieutenant George Inman’s manu-
script list. The remark of General Hunter refers to one
of the captains killed at Bunker Hill, who commanded
the grenadier company of that regiment in the battle, and
to the deaths of Captains Neilson, Williamson and
Powell.

On the American side Hospital Surgeon Samuel Ken-
nedy, formerly Surgeon of the Fourth Pennsylvania Con-
tinental battalion, lost his life. Captain Edmund Munro
of the Fifteenth Massachusetts regiment was killed, and
Captain Paul Ellis of the same regiment had his leg shot
off by a cannon-ball and bled to death before assistance
arrived.

ie 203 4THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

In describing this attack on Greene’s lines, Botta the
historian says, ‘they endeavored to surround’”’ the Ameri-
can troops. This can hardly be said to be correct as the
British had not men enough in the immediate neighbor-
hood to effect such a result.

The efficient services of the artillery in breaking the
British column in this attack and in creating such demoral-
ization among them drew from General Washington this
remark in his General Orders the next day, “It is with
peculiar pleasure that the commander-in-chief can inform
General Knox and the officers of Artillery that the enemy
have done them the justice to acknowledge that no artil-
lery could be better served than ours.”

The British column was driven back and no attempt
was again made upon General Greene’s division. The dis-
position of his troops and the manner in which he had
resisted the assault proved him, as usual, to be one of the
most efficient soldiers in the American service.

Simultaneously with the attack on General Greene’s
division a fierce charge was made by the grenadier bat-
talions, the light infantry battalions and the light dra-
goons. It was directed at the American soldiers on what
might be called the center of the battle-field, on slightly
rising ground around the Tennent parsonage. The troops
were partly in Mr. Sutsin’s orchard, sheltered by the barn,
which was about twelve yards back of the parsonage, and
at the hedge fence.° So confident were the British of suc-
cess. so certain that if they made but one grand effort, the
American force under Wayne would again be turned to

7 Botta’s History of the War of Inde pendence, Vol. Il, Pp. 516.

8 This parsonage, which was taken down in 1861, is described as “a low
building, large on the ground, with four lower rooms, two on each side
of the hall, with kitchen attached in the rear. Above was the attic room,
sloping on one side with rafters, and with a window facing the north,
which, as is said, was used as a study by both Mr. Tennent and Mr. Wood-
hull. During the battle of June 28, 1778, a round shot came through the
roof into this room while the conflict raged furiously around the house
and in the adjoining orchard.” Ellis’ History of Monmouth County, N.J.,

p. 686.
9 This hedge fence was in 1778, as it is today, the dividing line between
the parsonage farm and a farm on the east of it.

Ena 4THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
flight, that they pressed close to the line of the hedge. But
the patriots were now strong in their position and re-
sponded to the ringing orders of the brave Pennsylvanian,
who felt that now at least he had an independent fighting
command, and they poured a terrific volley at close
range into the advancing British corps. It was a sudden
and staggering rain of lead. The fire-locks of the Conti-
nentals did wonderful execution and numbers of the red-
coats fell dead and dying on the burning soil that summer
afternoon. When the smoke lifted, a young lieutenant of
artillery, brave Thomas L. Vaughan, lay dying beside
his smoking gun, and Captain Thomas Wills of the
Twenty-third foot and Captain Patrick Bellew of the
First regiment of foot guards were suffering greatly from
deep bullet wounds. Captain Bellew was taken prisoner
by the Americans.

The British soldiers instantly formed again, and pre-
pared for a second desperate charge. The gallant Wayne,
with keen audacity, let these strong battalions of trained
veterans approach near his fence line by the orchard and
at the barn, and then the grape-shot from the guns and the
leaden balls from the rifles of his own First Pennsylvania
brigade and the Rhode Island brigade, wrought havoc in
the ranks of the enemy. Numbers of the men from Max-
well’s and Scott’s brigades, under orders to pass to the
rear, had stopped a moment to join their comrades in the
impending fight. Again the British line gave way and fell
back before the deadly fire. In this second charge the “high
sergeant,” a British grenadier, seven feet four inches in
height, the tallest man in the army, was slain. More than
an hour passed while these two attacks were made and
before another charge was attempted.

Again, however, for a third time, the line was formed
and at the head of the British attacking party appeared
the gallant Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Monckton, of the
Forty-fifth foot, and now in command of the Second bat-
talion of grenadiers. He was the brother of Earl Galway,

aus 2]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
and a man of irreproachable private character, a brave and
skilled soldier, admired by all his men. He had been shot
through the body by a musket-ball at the Battle of Long
Island, August 27, 1776, and lay for many weeks on the
verge of death. He recovered, however, rejoined his com-
mand, and now by his brave act and untimely death was
to make his name immortal in history. Monckton was well
on the right of the attacking line and the words of hearty
cheer which he spoke to his men could distinctly be heard
by the Americans near the parsonage and in the orchard.
The two lines were now, it is said, scarcely thirty rods
apart. Monckton gave the command to charge the patriot
line in solid column. With drawn sword he shouted, ““For-
ward to the charge, my brave Grenadiers.” They dashed
forward with great fury, led by his presence and inspiring
voice. But “Mad Anthony” Wayne, eager for his men to
hold their fire, and demoralize the British by wounding
their officers, called along the line, “Steady, steady, wait
for the word, then pick out the King birds.” This was
done and the terribly destructive volley flew straight at
the breasts of the charging red-coats. The First Pennsyl-
vania regiment, Colonel James Chambers commanding,
was the organization which stood the brunt of the assault.
In this conflict, by a desperate exertion, they secured the
colors of the Royal grenadiers.

This charge was still more important in its fatality on
the British side. Captain John Gore, a brave, experienced
officer of the Fifth foot, then in command of the First
battalion of grenadiers, fell dead at the head of his men.
Young Harry Ditmas, a popular officer of the Fifteenth
foot, received a severe wound, and Captain Andrew Cath-
cart, of the same regiment, had his right arm badly
shattered. But more conspicuous than all, their gallant
leader, Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Monckton, lay dead
on the field of honor.’® His body fell about forty yards

10 “Character of the late Hon. Lieutenant-Colonel Monckton.
“The Hon. Hen. Monckton, late lieutenant-colonel to the forty-fifth regi-

E 2i@ 4]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
northeast of the parsonage, and so close to the hedge fence
that the Continentals, recognizing it, leaped out from
their line, coatless and with shirt sleeves rolled up, and
made a bold rush for the possession of the body of the
dead soldier and for the colors carried near him. His
own men, who loved him so well, made every exertion at
close quarters, to keep the patriots away. The struggle
was desperate but Monckton’s body was finally secured
and hastily carried off by the Americans. Captain William

ment, of the noble family of the Viscounts Galway, of the kingdom of
Ireland, and brother to the present Lieutenant-General Monckton, was a
man by nature formed for military greatness, his memory retentive, his
judgment deep, his comprehension amazingly quick and clear, his consti-
tutional courage not only uniform and daring perhaps to an extreme, but
he possessed that higher species of it, strength, steadiness and activity of
mind, which no difficulties could obstruct, nor danger deter; free from
pride, with the greatest independence of spirit, generous to a degree, a
constant friend to the deserving soldier, whose concerns he always at-
tended to in preference to his own: inferior officers experienced his friendly
generosity ; he was by temper rather reserved, yet kind and gentle in his
manners, and to crown all, sincerity and candor, with a true sense of honor
and justice, seemed the inherent principles of his nature, and the uniform
tenor of his conduct. He betook himself early in life to the profession of
arms, obtaining an ensigncy in the first regiment of guards, in the year
1760 and afterwards a lieutenancy in the same corps. In the year 1769, he
purchased the majority of the forty-fifth regiment of foot from Mr.
Gates, since so famous for the part he has taken against his country ; and
in the year 1771, he purchased the lieutenant-colonelcy, remaining with
the regiment (then in Ireland) until the breaking out of this unnatural
re oe in 1775, when he embarked with it for North America. Upon the
army leaving Srialra the late commander-in-chief, conscious of his
courage and abilities, appointed him to the command of the second bat-
talion of grenadiers. In ‘the action on Long Island, the 27th of Aug. 1776,
he received a dangerous wound, being shot through the body as he was lead-
ing on his battalion to charge a much superior number of the rebels. On
this occasion he gave a re markable > proof of that intrepidity that always
distinguished him; upon his falling an officer of his b attalion came to his
assistance, which he nobly re in these terms: ‘Sir, leave me, I am of
no consequence at present, go on with the grenadiers.’ At Bro r wns he
received a slight wound in his knee; he continued in the command of his
battalion of gre nadie rs till the 28th of June, 1778, when upon the rear
guard of the army’s being engaged with the greatest part of the rebel
force, in the march through Jersey he gloriously fell in the front of
that battalion, nobly exerting himself in the cause of his country, and is
now universally regretted by every officer and soldier that knew him, or
ever had the honor of serving under his command.’—From the London
Chronicle of September 19-22 and printed in the Pennsylvanta Magazine
of History, Vol. XIV, p. 47.
EyTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
Wilson™ and his company of the First Pennsylvania regi-
ment at the same time captured the colors, as has been
stated. This flag is now [1899] in possession of one of
Captain Wilson’s descendants, Captain William Potter
Wilson of Bellefonte, Pennsylvania.”

Adolphus, the historian, with strange embellishment,
says that “relays of erenadiers buried his body, taking
turns during the battle and using bayonets for shovels,
mingling tears with the earth they cast upon his body.”
The British bayonet of that day would have made an
indifferent tool for grave-digging and the body of their
brave commander was wanting as they shed tears to his
memory during the excitement of a battle!

A short distance away, on the main roadway, was the
old Tennent Church, founded, it is believed, about the
year 1692. It is now known as “The First Presbyterian
Church of the County of Monmouth.” This building with
shingled sides and roof, can today be seen from the windows
of the fast trains moving pleasure-seekers to the sea-side
resorts. The great evangelists Brainerd and Whitefield,
and both the Tennents, had uttered their solemn warn-
ings from its sacred desk.

In the yard annexed to this church the body of Lieu-
tenant-Colonel Monckton was carried the day after the
battle and was buried there, with those of the other
British officers who fell into the hands of the Americans.
Full military honors were given to his remains and his
crave is within ten feet of the westerly corner of the
church.

11 Captain Wilson resided in Chillisquaque, Northumberland County,

Pennsylvania, and after the war he was an Associate Justice of the Court

of that county.

12Jn a sketch of this flag given in the American Historical Record,
June 1874, p. 263, it appears that it is of a light yellow heavy corded silk,
five feet four inches by four feet eight inches in size, with the crosses of
St. George and St. Andrew on a blue ground twenty inches square. The flag
has the appearance of having been wrenched from its staff and bears some
traces of blood-stains.

18 This assertion is repeated in Stedman’s History of the American War,

Vol. II, p. 23.
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ns a0 aoTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
Several years after the battle Mr. William R. Wilson,“
a Scotchman, called familiarly “Dominie Wilson’ be-
cause he had once been a clergyman, set up a rude monu-
ment to mark Monckton’s grave. It was a large board
painted red with this inscription in black letters—
spelling the English soldier’s name incorrectly, as is
usua]—
HIC JACET
COL. MONKTON
KILLED 28 JUNE
1778
W.R.W.
The marble monument standing in the graveyard today
has the following inscription:

HIC JACET
LT. COL. HENRY MONCKTON
WHO, ON THE PLAINS OF
MONMOUTH, JUNE 28, 1778, SEALED
WITH HIS LIFE HIS DUTY AND DEVO-
TION TO HIS KING AND COUNTRY.
““COURAGE IS ON ALL HANDS CON-
SIDERED AS AN ESSENTIAL OF HIGH CHARACTER.

THIS MEMORIAL ERECTED BY
SAMUEL FRYER WHOSE FATHER, A
SUBJECT OF GREAT BRITAIN,
SLEEPS IN AN UNKNOWN GRAVE,

There were many men who particularly distinguished
themselves in the fight at the hedgerow. The old families
of Monmouth still relate traditions of the desperate en-
counters and wonderful escapes of their grandfathers and
of their neighbors, who lived in this house or on that farm.
It is said of William Lyons, who lived on the battle-field,
that he locked bayonets with an English soldier at the
brush fence and was about to be overpowered when an

14 William R. Wilson was the schoolmaster at the little schoolhouse near
the church. He is often erroneously confounded in histories with the
daring soldier Captain Wilson, just spoken of. Mr. Wilson was afterward
buried by the side of Monckton.

[ 219 ]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
American officer clove the head of the Britisher with his
sword and rescued Lyons.

General Arthur St. Clair, as we find in William Henry
Smith’s life and public services of this soldier of the
Revolutionary War “participated in this engagement
and continued with the army without regularly assigned
duties.” Although we do not find mention in any account
of the battle of his active participation therein he wrote
an account of the engagement which is given in part in
the Historical Register, Vol. 1, No. 4. In this paragraph
‘+ is stated that First Lieutenant David Ziegler, of the
First Pennsylvania regiment, so distinguished himself in
the charge for Monckton’s body and the flag that he re-
ceived special meritorious mention in the brigade reports
for that day.

Soon after the defeat and death of Lieutenant-Colonel
Monckton, a large reinforcement came up to the help of
the British, and the Americans found themselves com-
pletely out-flanked at the hedge fence. It was then neces-
sary for them to retire from the eround which they had
defended so bravely and where they had inflicted such
severe punishment on the enemy. This movement was
made in good order but at that hour it really gave the
British no special advantage. The two lines of General
Lord Stirling and General Greene were too firmly posted
to be at all affected by any of the smaller detachments
whose business it had been to hold back the advancing
force until the American Army could be properly formed.CHAPTER xXx!
OTWITHSTANDING all the toil and suffering

of the day, General Washington quickly resolved to
put some fresh troops in the advance and send them to
attack the British before they found an encampment for
the night. This was at about fifteen minutes before five
o'clock in the afternoon. Brigadier-General Enoch Poor,
of New Hampshire, was selected to lead this body of
picked troops, and his own brigade, still covered with the
glory of Saratoga’s battle, went with him; also the North
Carolina troops, under command of Colonel Thomas
Clark. Brigadier-General William Woodford led a party,
composed chiefly of his own brigade, to skirmish on the
left of Poor’s command. Soon after starting they learned
from scouts that the British force had retreated about a
mile and a half toward Freehold village and seemed about
to take position on the east side of the middle ravine with
a narrow causeway in front of the ravine, and thick woods
on each side of the troops. The Americans marched over
the bridge at the west ravine and then the two general
officers separated, though they kept within sight of each
other. General Poor took his command over toward the
British left and General Woodford’s detachment passed
off to their right. They intended to attack the British
flanks simultaneously. A battery of light artillery, with
proper support, continued on the highway, with orders to
post themselves on the high ground in front, with the
morass between them and the enemy.

Being obliged to leave the main road and march right
and left in loose sandy fields, it was just at dusk when the
infantry force came within range of the British troops and
too late to do any effective work before the night shadows
covered them. It was then resolved to lay there with their
arms at hand, just west of the middle ravine and close to

[en 227 3THE. BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
the enemy, and await the coming of daylight for an attack.
Orders were soon afterward received from General Wash-
ington confirming this plan of General Poor and directing
that the British be attacked in camp promptly at the first
moment of dawn. The Americans were now less than a
quarter of a mile from the British encampment and the
sentinels of either army could distinguish one another
without difficulty.

The countersign on the night of the battle was
“Monckton” and the parole “Bunner and Dickinson.”

According to orders General von Steuben had been
forming all the troops he could collect between the
meeting-house and Englishtown. In this way he at last
found himself in that village and there met General Lee,
who had previously received the same orders. It was im-
portant to place that part of the army in some proper
position for the close of the day, or, as Lee remarked, “‘in
case of any disaster to the army.” By his own exertion and
that of his aides, von Steuben was able to get a number of
battalions ready for immediate service. General Lee saw
him engaged in this work, and asked what his orders were.
Finding that they were the same as his own, he expressed
himself as glad that von Steuben had taken that labor on
himself, as he was tired out. In this way some of Max-
well’s brigade which had not tarried with their comrades
to fight at the hedge—General Maxwell being with them
—and a part of Scott’s detachment, were placed in bat-
talion line and posted behind the creek at Englishtown.
Late in the afternoon General von Steuben received orders
from General Washington to march the force which he
had gathered back to the main army, so as to be ready to
renew the attack on the British in the morning.

Before dismounting at Englishtown General Lee ob-
served to his aides and the gentlemen standing near him,
that it had all happened as he had expected: that it was
folly to make such an attempt as had been made that day
against an enemy which was so superior in cavalry and

le 222 3THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
that it was not possible to be successful against such a
well-equipped force. From this it is quite evident that he
thought the result of the day’s battle would be disgrace-
ful to the army and to the cause. He considered the Amer-
ican officers and men brave, patriotic, and devoted, but
besides their lack of light-horse, he thought them wanting
in discipline. On this very point, however, it had been
General von Steuben’s duty all the previous winter to
instruct the men and the Continental troops had acquired
a degree of discipline but little inferior to that of the
British line. If, as it certainly appears, Sir Henry Clinton
had out-manoeuvered the American advance, the blame
was Lee’s alone. Lee further said that he had given counsel
contrary to a general engagement and thought it very
imprudent to bring one on; that the late treaty with
France would soon secure independence to the colonies and
that it was impolitic to risk so much. He thought the Con-
tinental Congress would be displeased to have a battle
brought on at this time, when it was sure to result dis-

astrously.

In a letter to Richard Henry Lee dated the night of
the battle but probably written the next day, General
Lee made these comments on the fight: ““What the devil
brought us into this level country (the very element of the
enemy) or what interest we can have (in our present cir-
cumstances) to hazard an action, somebody else must tell
you, for I cannot. I was yesterday ordered (for it was
against my opinion and inclination) to engage. I did, with
my division, which consisted of about four thousand men.
The troops, both men and officers, showed the greatest
valour! the artillery did wonders! but we were outnum-
bered! particularly in cavalry, which was, at twenty dif-
ferent times, on the point of turning completely our flanks.
This consideration naturally obliged us to retreat! but
the retreat did us, I will venture to say, great honour. It
was performed with all the order and coolness which can
be seen on a common field day. Not a man or officer

E 228: 3]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
hastened his step, but one regiment regularly filed off
from the front to the rear of the other. The thanks I re-
ceived from his excellency were of a singular nature. I can
demonstrate that had I not acted as I did, this army, and
perhaps America, would have been ruined.’”*

It was six o'clock when Lieutenant-Colonel de Gimat,
an aide-de-camp of General Lafayette, galloping rapidly
to Englishtown, brought the welcome news that the enemy
were falling back, and an order from Washington to bring
up reinforcements. It did not take many moments for
General von Steuben to wheel his men out into the road-
way. He left General Maxwell in immediate command of
the troops, which had just been augmented by the arrival
of General John Paterson, with three brigades of the sec-
ond line. These were placed on elevated sround, behind
the position of Maxwell's own brigade. A battery was then
unlimbered on the right wing, in front of the second bri-
sade, commanded by General Smallwood. Having seen
that these dispositions of the troops were being made,
General von Steuben with three brigades of fresh troops,
which had all day constituted the reserve of the main
army, set out, with quick step, for the meeting-house and
the battle-field.

Passing through Englishtown, he saw General Lee a sec-
ond time that day and Lee asked where he was going with
the troops. He was informed of General Washington’s
order and also that the enemy were retreating in confusion.
General Lee said they could not be in confusion, that
they must be only resting and that there must be some mis-
take in this order to advance with all these men. One of the
brigades under General Muhlenberg was halted and Cap-
tain Walker, von Steuben’s aide, handed General Lee the
original order which Lieutenant-Colonel de Gimat had
brought. General Lee was satisfied and said, “then you are

1 Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Lee’s Memoirs of the War in the Southern
Department of the United States, p. 37.

[ 224 ]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
to march,” and the command instantly continued on the
route to the front.

As soon as General von Steuben had started his force,
General Lee had fresh horses procured by his aides, and,
being somewhat refreshed, he returned to the field of
battle. Finding General Washington near the meeting-
house he offered his services for any duties which might
be required of him. The battle was over, however, for the
day, and he was not needed.

Strange indeed must it have been to General Lee, who
had asserted at noon that the Americans could not stand
before the British grenadiers—and they had not done so
while under his immediate command—to find that by
night these same invincible soldiers had been beaten and
he himself had come up to take part in the pursuit of a
retreating foe.

Every act of General Washington in the battle was tac-
tically right. Every move of his, so far as we can now
ascertain, was performed in the best possible way. Every
disposition of his force after he took immediate control of
it has been pronounced correct by skilled military critics
who were familiar with the country.

Had the American Army possessed a powerful body of
trained cavalry they might have made their success more
important and valuable. But such light horsemen as they
had, had been for a week in constant active service harass-
ing the enemy, carrying reports of their situation, and in
this way had become greatly scattered.

After a whole day of fighting, the longest battle of the
war, in the intense heat of the summer sun, in desultory
conflicts, in fierce, desperate charges, the American Army
was glad to seek such repose as the ground afforded and
such a canopy as the stars. Worn out with fatigue the men
soon dropped asleep and the night was unbroken by any
alarm or by the sound of the challenging picket.

General Washington lay beneath the spreading branches

[ 225 ]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
of an oak.” His staff were near him and his young friend
General Lafayette lay by his side, a cloak thrown over
them both. The dead were all around them as they slept.
General Washington must have felt confident of a victory
on the morrow. He had seen his men disorganized, re-
treating, then forming in embattled ranks, stern and
defiant, punishing the enemy. He knew then that the
discipline acquired at Valley Forge was to be depended
upon and that his weary troops would awake on Mon-
mouth fields in strength and good spirits again to punish
the British line.

2 “washington used old Tennent Church and Tennent Parsonage as his
field hospitals and afterwards also the Court House. He slept under a
tree in front of the house on the Herbert (now DuBois) farm the night
after the battle.” Samuel Craig Cowart.CHAPTER XXII

T was but a short sleep, if any, that the British troops

were allowed to take after the battle. At about ten
o'clock, according to British accounts, but at least mid-
night, according to Washington’s surmise, General Clin-
ton ordered his army to march toward the Highlands.
They moved stealthily, by battalions and brigades, leaving
the tired sentries of the Americans none the wiser for their
absence, and the standards of the Union proudly floating
over the victorious field. By dawn they had put thirteen
miles between themselves and the bivouac of the patriots.
In the morning the ground they had left presented every
evidence of a hasty exit. The dead were lying there un-
buried, and the whole line of retreat was strewn with arms,
knapsacks and accouterments. They also left behind them
fifteen prisoners captured from the American Army.

Stedman records the remark that “just as the British
were beginning to move, some horses or cattle were strag-
gling through a wood, and a battalion of light infantry,
taking them for the enemy, began a fire upon them which
continued for five minutes.”* This certainly must be an
error, for a discharge of musketry for that length of time
would without doubt have awakened the American ad-
vance corps and could hardly have failed to alarm the
entire main army, little more than a mile distant.

The moon was four days old on the night of June 28
and set at 10:55 o'clock. It is quite likely that Sir Henry
Clinton gave order to his subordinates at about ten o’clock
and that he took some advantage of the few minutes of
moonlight after that hour, and the partial light which fol-
lowed it, to withdraw some of the troops farthest removed
from the American sentinels; but it is hardly to be sup-
posed that he withdrew his own guards, started his artil-

1 Stedman’s History of the American War, Vol. II, p. 23.THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
lery, his caissons and his supply wagons at an hour when
he could easily have been seen. Yet he succeeded in mov-
ing off as noiselessly as General Washington had slipped
away from Lord Cornwallis on the banks of the Assun-
pink Creek in Trenton, eighteen months before, when he
performed the great flank movement and effected the sur-
prise at Princeton.

Andrew Bell, Military Secretary to Sir Henry Clinton,
who must be considered good authority, says in his Journal
that the British Army marched at twelve o’clock at night.
Sir Henry Clinton, however, in his report to his King,
asserts that, “having reposed the troops until ten at night,
to avoid the excessive heat of the day I took advantage of
the moonlight to rejoin Lieutenant-General Knyphausen,”’
&c. These moonlight flittings of Sir Henry were the sub-
ject of jest as long as he remained in America.”

Sir Henry Clinton claimed that he had accomplished
all in his power in an offensive demonstration during the
day, and that it was right for him to take advantage of the
night to push on toward his baggage train and to hasten to
New York. But doubtless the punishment he had received

2 4 familiar verse written by Colonel Trumbull, in his poem “M’ Fingal,”

became quite current in those days in reference to this march. It runs as
follows:
“tre forms his camp with vain parade,

Till ev’ning spreads the world with shade,

Then still, like some endanger’d spark,

Steals off on tiptoe in the dark;

Yet writes his King in boasting tone

How grand he march’d by light of moon i

And again General Clinton is thus apostrophized in the same poem:

“Go on, great Gen’ral, nor regard
The scoffs of ev’ry scribbling Bard,
Who sing how Gods, that fatal night,
Aided, by miracles, your flight ;
As once they used, in Homer's day,
To help weak heroes run away ;
Tell how the hours, at awful trial,
Went back, as erst on Ahaz dial,
While British Joshua stay’d the moon
On Monmouth’s plain for Ajalon;
Heed not their sneers or gibes so arch,
Because she set before your march.”

fp 228) 3THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

and the loss of many brilliant officers made him reluctant
to spend another day in the neighborhood of American
rifles and well-sighted guns. Although, as Lieutenant
James Moody of the First battalion of New Jersey vol-
unteers (Loyalists), says, Clinton’s “intentions seldom
lasted longer than the day,” in this case his plan of first
making his precious baggage secure had been his constant
thought day and night for ten days.

The retreat of Clinton does not seem to have been an
imperative necessity. His army as an entirety had not been
vanquished and it is hardly to be called a brave act to
abandon the field with such a force in the manner he did.
But the fine carriages of good citizens of Philadelphia
had to be placed on the streets of New York, the baggage
of the army, the plunder of the Quaker City, had to be
safely transferred over the great harbor, and hence his
anxiety to reach his destination.

Captain Arthur Ross, of the Queen’s rangers, com-
manded the rear guard of Clinton’s retreating column that
night. As he passed out of the village of Freehold he lib-
erated fifteen of the citizens of Monmouth County whom
they had arrested the previous day. They carried off with
them such of the sick and wounded as they could move
with safety, but left four officers and forty enlisted men,
with their own surgeons, and these were taken to the En-
glish church® in the village [still standing 1926], which
had been turned into a hospital; a few were placed in a
barn near by, some in the Court House* and others in pri-
vate houses on the main street of the little hamlet. Both
the Tennent Church and parsonage were used as hospitals;

8 The corporate title of this church is St. Peter’s Church. In Mie the
Reverend William Ayres was missionary or rector of the church, also of
the church at Spotswood, New Jersey, and so continued up to 1799. He
lived in Spotswood on property purchased by the two cong sregations. _

4The Court House was a wooden buil« ling nearly on the present site.
It was similar to the English Church with its sides as well as its roof
covered with shingles. Of course it was in the very center of the town.

E 229 *]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
also William Ker’s house, all traces of which have dis-
appeared. All the soldiers left behind in the village were
badly wounded, so that the British surgeons had not fin-
ished binding up their wounds at sunset on Monday.

The dead of the British Army were, of course, left in
the possession of the Americans, who held the field of
battle. Those who died on the battle-field were buried
there or in the Tennent churchyard; those who died near
Freehold, or in the hospitals there, were buried by the
Americans in a pit on the southeast corner of what is now
Main and Throckmorton Streets in Freehold.

General Knyphausen, in command of the strong column
protecting the baggage train, and accompanied by General
Grant, had been active all day Sunday, as they pushed
northward, and “great plunder and devastation had been
committed among the friends of liberty in that quarter of
the country.” Before nine o’clock that night they reached
Nut Swamp, about three miles from the little village of
Middletown, and there encamped in what they considered
a very secure position. To this post Clinton hastened to
force Lord Cornwallis’ division to march that night. Soon
after sunrise on Monday he came up with the rear of
Knyphausen’s command. At ten o’clock in the morning
Clinton marched on three miles to Middletown.

During the afternoon of June 29 Sir Henry Clinton
sent back a message under flag of truce to General Wash-
ington, commending the wounded which he had left be-
hind to his tender mercies and thanking him for the honors
which he had just heard had been paid to the gallant
Monckton.

In the morning of June 29 all the fleet except the Roe-
buck, which was at her station off the Delaware Bay,
sailed from the Capes off the Delaware, and with wind
south, southeast, and then southwest, at about six knots
an hour, they made sail all day and night for Sandy Hook.
The British fleet commanded by Lord Howe consisted of

L 230 JTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
six men-of-war of 64 guns each, three of 50 guns each,
two of 40 guns each, and some frigates and sloops.”

When the British Army had marched from Middle-
town toward the Highlands of the Navesink on the eve-
ning of the thirtieth they found that Sandy Hook had
been converted into an island by the force of the ocean
wind and tide. Captain John Montresor, the engineer-in-
chief of the army, with large details of sailors from the
fleet, formed a bridge of boats across the inlet.

Lord Howe’s fleet made the Highlands at about ten
o’clock on the morning of June 30, and found the Scorpion
cruising off the Hook. They anchored just outside of Sandy
Hook for a short time but soon after sailed inside of the
bay and anchored near the frigate Amazon, which for a
long time had been the guard-ship to the defences of New
York.

In leaving Philadelphia, this fleet had barely escaped
an encounter with the French naval vessels, twelve ships
of the line® and six large frigates, with about 4,000 troops
on board, under command of the Count Charles Hector
D’Estaing, which left Toulon April 30 and arrived off
the Capes of the Delaware July 8. The British fleet ar-
rived in safety, however, on Tuesday morning, and were
distinctly seen by the British force as they marched that
evening to Sandy Hook. They encamped that night at the
Highlands under protection of the guns of the fleet.

On July 5 the British Army passed over the bridge of
boats which had been constructed, as before mentioned,
and were taken on transports and conveyed to New York.

The morning of June 29 dawned with the same sultry

5 The Roebuck joined the fleet at a later day, so that when the British
Army reached New York City the squadron at Sandy Hook consisted of the
following vessels: Eagle, the flag-ship of Lord Howe, Somerset, Roebuck,
St. Albans, Nonesuch, Pearl, Venus, Preston, Isis, Richmond, Experiment,
Trident, Ardent, Phoenix, Vigilant and the Vesuvius and Aetna, fire-ships.

6 These vessels were as follows: Languedoc, 90 guns; Tonnant, 80;
Caesar, 74; Guerriere, 74; Protecteur, 74; Provence, 64; Valliant, 64;
Saggitaire, 54; Chiniere, 30; L’Engeante, 26; L’Alemence, 26; L’Arimable,

26.
E 2aTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

heat that had characterized the Sabbath, and the soldiers
of the American Army awoke only to find that the enemy
had stolen away. General Washington and his officers
thought that, after such an interval of time, to pursue
them would be “impracticable and fruitless.” It would
have cost them the lives of many of their best men and
have been barren of results, as they knew that the British
Army would soon be under the protection of the guns of
Lord Howe’s fleet.

General Washington found that many of his men had
died during the night from prostration, even those who
had not been wounded. During the early morning Gen-
eral David Forman, Colonel Thomas Henderson and
Colonel Nathaniel Scudder, the two latter being physi-
cians as well as officers, of the State troops, and other prom-
‘nent citizen soldiers of Monmouth County, called on Gen-
eral Washington and expressed the opinion that the
American Army could now do the British no injury, no
matter in what force they attempted it, on the barren sand
reef of Sandy Hook. This opinion is expressed more fully
in the letter written by General Washington from English-
town, July 1, to the President of Congress: “Being fully
convinced by the gentlemen of this country that the enemy
cannot be hurt or injured in their embarkation at Sandy
Hook, the place to which they are going, and unwilling
to get too far removed from the North River, I put the
troops in motion early this morning. ”

The New Jersey brigade under General Maxwell and
the rifle corps under Colonel Morgan were sent out to
keep near the British rear, to prevent them from sending
out forage parties or detachments to annoy the patriot
farmers and, if possible, to encourage desertions from the
British Army, which were daily on the increase.

In reference to this action of General Washington, in
not pursuing the British with all his force, Colonel Henry
Lee remarked, “The enemy having united his columns on
the heights of Middletown, an attempt to dislodge him

[ 232 1]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
would have been blind temerity. Had sir Henry Clinton
not possessed this vast advantage, the victory would have
been improved; and in any other period of the retreat
might have been made decisive in all probability.’”’

The fatigue parties of the American Army were busy
all day June 29 gathering up the dead of both armies. Two
brigades of Continental troops were posted near the court
house to cover the burial parties. In this work the whole
day passed and just before five o’clock the men on fatigue
duty and their guard, joining the rest of the army near
the old meeting-house, marched to Englishtown and to
the fields where they had left their camp equipage and
dropped their blankets and knapsacks in the early morn-
ing of the previous day.

General Washington made this preliminary official re-
port to the Honorable Henry Laurens, President of the
Continental Congress:

Fields, near Monmouth Ct. House
29 June, 1778.
SIR:

I have the honour to inform you, that, about seven o’clock
yesterday morning, both armies advanced on each other. About 12
o'clock they met on the grounds near Monmouth Court House,
when an action commenced. We forced the enemy from the field
and encamped on their ground. They took a strong post in our
front, secured on both flank by morasses and thick woods where
they remained till about 12 at night, and then retreated. I cannot
at this time go into a detail of matters; when opportunity will
permit, I shall take the liberty of transmitting to Congress a more
particular account of the proceedings of the Day. | have the honour
to be, with gt. resp’t

Sir, your most obt. servt.
Go. WASHINGTON.

To Hon. Henry Laurens, Esq., Xc., Xc.

7 Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Lee’s Memoirs of the War in the Southern
Department of the United States, p. 37.

[ 233 JTHE BATILE OF MONMOUTH
General Washington also issued this order to his troops
on Monday:

Headquarters, Freehold
29th June 1778.

The Commander-in-Chief congratulates the Army on the Victory
obtained over the Arms of his Britannic Majesty yesterday, and
thanks, most sincerely, the gallant officers and men who distin-
guished themselves upon the occasion and such others as, by their
good order and coolness, gave the happiest presages of what might
have been expected had they come to action.

General Dickinson and the Militia of this State are also thanked
for the noble spirit which they have shown in opposing the enemy
on their march from Philadelphia, and for the aid which they have
given by harrassing and impeding their motions so as to allow the
Continental troops time to come up with them.

A Party consisting of two hundred men to parade immediately to
bury the slain of both Armies; Gen'l Woodford’s Brigade to cover
this party.

The officers of the American Army are to be buried with military
honours, due to men who have nobly fought and died in the cause
of Liberty and their Country.

Doctor Cochran will direct what is to be done with the wounded
and the sick. He is to apply to the Quarter Master General and
Adjutant General for necessary assistance. The several detach-
ments (except those under Col. Morgan) are to join their re-
spective Brigades immediately, and the lines to be formed agree-
able to the order of the 22d instant. The Army is to march from
the left, the second line in front, the Cavalry in the rear. The
march to begin at five o'clock this afternoon.

A Sergeant, Corporal and twelve men from General Maxwell’s
Brigade to parade immediately to guard the sick to Princetown
Hospitals. Doctor Craig will give directions to the guard.

Colonel Martin is appointed to superintend collecting the sick
and wounded on the Army’s route through Jersey, between Cor-
yell’s and Monmouth and send them to Princetown Hospitals—he
will call immediately at the orderly office for further orders.

It is with peculiar pleasure, in addition to the above, that the
Commander-in-Chief can inform General Knox and the officers of
Artillery that the enemy have done them the justice to acknowledge
that no artillery could be better served than ours.*

The army remained perfectly quiet all day June 30 in
and around Englishtown, resting from the severe labors

8 General Edward Hand’s Orderly Book, Continental Army, p. 288.

lp 234 4THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

of the two previous days and preparing for the long march
about to be made in the summer heat.
General Washington then issued the following order:

Headquarters, Englishtown
goth June 1778.
The men are to wash themselves this afternoon and appear as
clean and decent as possible. Seven o'clock this evening is ap-
pointed that we may publickly unite in thanksgiving to the
Supreme Disposer of human events for the victory which was
obtained on Sunday over the Flower of the British Troops. Accu-
rate returns of the killed, wounded and missing in the Battle of
Monmouth are immediately to be made to the Adjutant General’s
Office. The troops are to be completed with provisions for to-
morrow and have it cooked to-day. The whole Army, except
Maxwell’s Brigade, is to move at two o’clock to-morrow morning—
and every thing is to be in the most perfect readiness tonight. Gen-
eral Maxwell will apply at Headquarters for particular orders.
Complaint having been made to the Commander-in-Chief that
certain persons belonging to the army have seized the property of
inhabitants which had been concealed in order to escape the ravages
of the enemy, he calls upon the commanding officers of corps to
order a strict search of the soldiers’ packs at parade time, that the
offender may be discovered and brought to condign punishment.
Such articles as may be found agreeable to a list left at the Adju-
tant General's are to be sent to his office that they may be returned
to their owners.
The General further gives notice that the detestable crime of
marauding will henceforth be punished with instant death.®

General Washington deemed it best to move around
New York harbor and up the Hudson River and on the
first day of July the entire army left Englishtown, and
passing through thick pine woods they reached the village
of Spotswood. Men dropped by the roadway continually,
overcome by the heat, and were placed in the army wagons
and carried on the march. Upon their arrival the following
brief order was promulgated:

9 zbid., p. 290.THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
Head Quarters Spottswood,
Wednesday July 1st 1778.

The General will beat at twelve o’clock, troop at half-past
twelve and the march begins at one. The troops are in the mean
time to take as much sleep and refreshment as possible that they

may be the better prepared.

On July 2 the army marched to Brunswick and en-
camped on the north and south banks of the Raritan River,
and remained there until after the Fourth.

General Maxwell and his New Jersey brigade, Colonel
Morgan and his rifle corps, Colonel Moylan’ s dragoons
and Captain Allan McLane’s Delaware partisan company
of foot were detached, as we have seen, to do what damage
they could to the retreating enemy.

On July 6 this force just started on their return to the
main army which, having marched by the way of Para-
mus, Bergen County, New Jersey, and Haverstraw, New
York, was at that time approaching King’s Ferry. They
took with them a number of prisoners, some horses and

cattle, and much stores and baggage which they had cap-

tured. Upon reaching Elizabethtown General Maxwell’s
brigade was halted and remained there and at Woodbridge
and Newark for some time, while Morgan’s corps and the
rest of the command marched on to the main army.

Immediately after the battle the militia of New Jersey
were discharged from the tour of duty on which they had
been called out, and they returned to their homes. This
body of militia was the second contingent of the summer

campaign and their “thirty days’ expired June 30.

It may be noted here that General Greene, who in time
of battle was commander of a division, was also Quarter-
master-General of the Continental Army in the field and
had to busy himself for several weeks after the fight at
Monmouth in procuring a large number of horses to re-
place those killed and disabled at the time of the battle.

The ability of the Continental line to fight the best
troops of Great Britain, was fully established on Mon-

[ 236 JTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
mouth battle-field. When they came under the leaders
with whom they had practised the school of the soldier at
Valley Forge they were fit to cope with the best of Euro-
pean soldiery. The fight at the hedge fence, with the flash-
ing of bright bayonets in the fierce sunlight, in the hands
of those who in all the world knew best how to use them,
was enough to try the stoutest patriot heart. But they
stood the onset well and no unfavorable criticism can ever
be made on their conduct as fighting men. The American
patriot proved himself the right material from which to
make a good soldier, the American artillerist proved him-
self a match for the batteries of Britain, the American
general officer proved himself able to manoeuver his men
In a crisis, and to hold his troops against a fierce assaulting
column. The American Chieftain appeared reliable in
every contingency, and with a fertility of resource and
strategic skill equal to any emergency which might arise.
General Washington himself, as has been said, was the
hero of Monmouth.

In a letter published in the Gazette at Trenton, July 3,
1778, General Lee says, “the behaviour of the whole
army, both men and officers, was so equally good, that it
would be unjust to make distinctions; tho’ I confess it is
difficult to refrain from paying compliments to the artil-
lery, from General Knox and Colonel Oswald, down to
the very driver.”’

General Knox wrote to Colonel Lamb, July 19, “Our
corps, as usual did themselves the justice to behave like
men, contending in the great cause of liberty and their
country.”

The fighting of that portion of Sir Henry Clinton’s
Army which left Freehold in pursuit of the retreating
forces of General Lee was all that could be expected of
such superb troops.*® The commanding officers of the Brit-

10 Referring to the Royal regiment which he commanded, General James
Pattison said, in orders, “The very handsome and obliging terms in which

the General officers and others have repeatedly spoken of the appearance,
discipline and good conduct of the Corps of Artillery, and particularly of

ear dlTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
ish foot, of the Guards and of the Dragoons handled their
men with the skill and ability which years of study and
experience had given them. No better drilled and disci-
plined force had ever been placed in line of battle, and
they fought with all possible courage. They were clearly
superior to any fighting men in the world at that time. To
defeat such soldiers at any time, and under any circum-

stances, to cause such men to abandon the battle-field was

glory enough for any army.

Opinions varied as to Clinton’s course in the march
from Philadelphia to New York. Mr. Coke, in the House
of Commons, said, that the whole march from Philadel-
phia to New York “was universally allowed to be the
finest thing performed during the present war.”

The Earl of Shelburne called it “the shameful retreat
from Philadelphia when the General escaped with his
whole army rather by chance and the misconduct of the
enemy than by the natural ability of the force under his
command.”

Baron von Ochs, the Hessian general officer, in “Reflec-
tions on the Art of War,” said, that “Clinton's march
across New Jersey was more remarkable than the march
of Moreau across the Black Forest in October 1796.”

Clinton himself afterward said, in reference to having
so long a baggage train, “I was certainly to blame for per-
mitting it. I lost not a cart however.” In reference to the
battle, he said to Major Thomas Clarke, of the Cold-
stream regiment of foot guards, “Tell General Phillips
that on that day I fought upon velvet; he will fully
understand me.”

Referring to Washington, Stedman, the English his-
the conduct, care and attention of all the officers who have been detached
with the several Brigades and Battalion guns, cannot fail to be pleasing
and satisfactory to the Brigadier-General. He therefore takes this occasion
to give them his best thanks and to express further his entire approbation
of the regularity and observance of duties that have been shown by all
ranks during the late march and of the cheerfulness and alacrity with
which they have undergone the great fatigue of it.’ Duncan’s History of
the Royal Regiment of Artillery, Vol. I, p. 322.

[ 238 JTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

torian, says: “Having come up with the main body of his
army, fresh and untired troops, he should have endeavored
to turn one of General Clinton’s flanks. Had he succeeded,
that part of the British army must have been des troyed.”’
But Clinton made light of this remark about turning his
flanks by saying, ‘“When the author knows the country a
little better, and possibly military movements in it a little
better this ques ae may be answered.’

Horace W alpole wrote to Sir Mawn, “The Royal
army has Saved an escape.””* Clinton himself writes thus,
as we find in his manuscript notes: “Sir Henry Clinton
had been ordered to embark the army at Philadel; hia and
proceed to New York. For various reasons he ani to
disobey the King’s commands, and by that disobedience
saved both army and navy. The principle of the British
army was retreat at this period. Washington’s avant
guarde passes to marshy boggy branches at single bridges
and attacks the British rear-guard ; prob: ibly w ith no other
intent than to amuse while another corps attempted the
baggage. The British rear-guard forces Lee back over al]
these branches beyond the Lake. Lee is met by W ashing-
ton arriving in column from Englishtown. Here of course
the business would have finished: but the ungovernable
impetuosity of the light troops had drawn them over the
morass, and till they returned it became necessary to mask
the 4th (west) ravine to prevent the enemy from passing
it and cutting the above corps; and the 1st Guards and
33rd regiment under Col. Medows and Webster, main-
tained the ground exposed to a cross-fire, and with severe
loss, till the light troops had retired over the bog in
safety.”

In the same manuscript Sir Henry Clinton gives the

 

11 Stedman’s History of the American War, Vol. Il, p. 24.

12 Walpole Correspondence, Vol. III, p. 96.

18“It took Clinton and his red coats from June 18th to June 27th to
travel sixty miles from Philadelphia to Freehold, nine d: 1ys—less than
seven miles a day—but after the battle of Monmouth was fought on the
28th of June it only took him one d: ay to reach Sandy Hook, which was
twenty-four miles away.” S. C. Cowart.

E 239 JTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
opinion of Frederick the Great, as if in confirmation of
his conduct in the battle. After Frederick had read of
Lee’s trial and Clinton’s report to his King, he said,
“When two opposite gentlemen agree in describing the
eround and the events of the day, they must both be
right.”CHAPTER XXIII

HATEVER General Lee’s real motives may have

been on the field of battle he could not but feel
during the evening of June 28 that his conduct was dis-
pleasing to many of the officers of the army, and his proud,
arrogant nature could not brook the thought that he
should be criticised by provincial troops who had never
drawn sword in any of the Continental wars. His educa-
tion as a soldier, his experience in bloody engagements
forbade the idea that he had done anything wrong. He
said to his staff around him that night that he was thor-
oughly persuaded that he had more than done his duty,
and that he had obeyed the instructions he had received
to the utmost of his power. He felt also, and so expressed
himself, that he had extricated his command by a retro-
grade movement, from a most dangerous situation, with
the loss of but few men and no material and that he had
baffled and checked the enemy. Then why not congratu-
lation and applause from his comrades, and why these
slights and reproaches which he could not but feel in the
conduct of his subordinates? As the officers gathered to-
gether at the evening meal, and as the soldiers lay down in
groups in the early moonlight, they talked over the events
of the day and few were found to say a word in favor of
General Lee. This gossip of the camp did not fail to reach
Lee’s ear and, withal, the stern words of the chief, whom
he envied, kept his mind in active thought that Sabbath
night. He said that all day on Monday, he expected Gen-
eral Washington would have made him some apology
when he had become better informed of the facts, but no
such words came from His Excellency. Before Lee retired
for the night, his mind harassed by the current topic of
conversation in all the army outside his own quarters, and
when all his boasted self-control had certainly left him,

E 24a" 2]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
he wrote a disrespectful letter to General Washington,
which, in his agitation, he dated July 1 when it should
have been June 29. It is generally believed that this letter
did not come into Washington’s hands until the next
morning.

On June 30 General Washington replied to General
Lee’s discourteous letter and charged him with misbe-
havior before the enemy in not attacking them, and in
making an unnecessary retreat.

On receipt of this letter from General Washington, by
the hands of Lieutenant-Colonel John Fitzgerald, of his
staff, General Lee requested him to remain while he wrote
a reply. This second offensive letter, while apologizing for
a former error, he also misdated, making it the very day
of the battle instead of two days afterward, June 30, when
it was actually written. In his letter he expresses a desire
to retire from the active service in the army until his vin-
dication can be secured.

During the afternoon of the same day General Lee
wrote a third letter to the commander-in-chief on the same
subject. At last he had ascertained the correct date.’ In
this letter he asked for a court of inquiry, but states that
he would prefer a court-martial. His preference was com-
plied with.

General Washington was prompt in dealing with Gen-
eral Lee. The court-martial was ordered on the first halt
in the march of the army, and the charges exhibited. On
the afternoon of June 30, General Washington’s gallant
adjutant-general, who afterward gave his life for free-
dom’s cause in the trenches before Yorktown, Virginia,
served a copy of the charges upon General Lee, with the
following letter:

1 The mistake in dates is admitted by Lee, in a letter addressed to the
President of Congress, under date of October 16, 1778. See Lee Papers,

Vol. III, p. 242.THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
Head Quarters, Englishtown, 30 June 1778.
SIR:

Your letter by Colonel F itzgerald and also one of this date have
been duly received. I have sent Colonel Scammell, the Adjutant
General, to put you in arrest, who will deliver you a copy of the
charges on which you will be tried.

l am, Sir, your most obedient servant

Go. WASHINGTON

Major GENERAL LEE.

The charges against General Lee were, First: For dis-
obedience of orders, in not attacking the enemy on June
28, agreeable to repeated instructions.

Secondly: For misbehavior before the enemy on the
same day, by making an unnecessary, disorderly and
shameful retreat.

Thirdly: For disrespect to the Commander-in-Chief in
two letters dated July 1 and June 28.

On the same day, June 30, Brigadier-Generals Anthony
Wayne and Charles Scott addressed an important letter
to General Washin gton, giving their version of General
Lee’s conduct in the retreat. This letter was not referred
to in the trial, but was no doubt care fully considered by
General Washington when he framed the charges.’

On the following day the general orders convening the
court were promulgated.

Head Quarters, Spotswood, 1 July 1778.

A General Court Martial, whereof Lord Stirling is appointed
President will set in Brunswick tomorrow (the hour and place to
be appointed by the President) for the trial of M: ijor-Ge ea Lee.
Brigadier- Generals Smallwood, Poor, Woodford and Huntington
and Colonels Grayson, Johnston, Wigglesworth, Febiger, Swift,
Angel, Clarke and Williams are to attend as Membe rs.

By order of the Commander-in-Chief

ALEXANDER SCAMMELL
Adjutant General.

* This letter, with those exchanged between Lee and Washington, may
be found in Appendix IV to this volume.

[243THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

It was not until Saturday, July 4, however, that the
court first convened, at the inn of Hyndert Voorhees, in
the town of Brunswick, New Jersey, in the same room in
which the Provincial Congress of New Jersey held its
meetings from January 31 to March 2, 1777. In the mean-
time, the members of the court had been somewhat
changed by orders, but on that day they were all present
and sworn.°

The court-martial held twenty-six sessions, three at
Brunswick, and six at Paramus church, in New Jersey;
three at Peekskill, and fourteen at North Castle in New
York.

General Lee pleaded not guilty.

Twenty-six persons testified against him in the trial.”

On behalf of the defence thirteen witnesses were called
and gave their testimony.”

8 The members of the court were: Major-General Lord Stirling, Presi-
dent; Brigadier-Generals William Smallwood, Enoch Poor, William Wood-
ford, and Jedediah Huntington; Colonels William Irvine, Seventh Penn-
sylvania regiment, William Shepard, Fourth Massachusetts regiment,
Herman Swift, Seventh Connecticut regiment, Edward Wigglesworth,
Thirteenth Massachusetts regiment, Israel Angell, Second Rhode Island
regiment, Thomas Clark, First North Carolina regiment, Otho H. Williams,
sixth Maryland regiment, Christian Febiger, Second Virginia regiment, and
Colonel John Lawrence, Judge Advocate.

4 Witnesses against General Lee: Major-Generals the Marquis de Lafay-
ette and the Baron von Steuben; Brigadier-Generals Charles Scott, Anthony
Wayne, David Forman, and William Maxwell; Colonels Joseph Cilley,
First New Hampshire regiment, William Grayson, Grayson’s Continental
regiment, Walter Stewart, Thirteenth Pennsylvania regiment, Richard
Butler, Ninth Pennsylvania regiment, and Matthias Ogden, First New
Jersey regiment; Lieutenant-Colonels John Fitzgerald, Richard K. Meade,
Alexander Hamilton, John Laurens, Robert H. Harrison, Tench Tilghman,
all on Washington’s staff, Samuel Smith, Fourth Maryland regiment, David
Rhea, Fourth New Jersey regiment, and William S. Smith, Jackson’s Con-
tinental regiment; Captains David Lennox and Benjamin Fishbourne, of
Wayne’s staff; Brigade-Major Aaron Ogden, of Maxwell’s staff; Doctors
James McHenry, of Washington’s staff, and David Griffith, of Woodford’s
staff, and Monsieur Langfrang (probably Captain Pierre Charles L’Enfant,
of the Continental Engineers).

5 Witnesses for General Lee: Brigadier-Generals Louis Lebeque Duportail
and Henry Knox; Colonel Henry Jackson, Jackson’s Continental regiment ;
Lieutenant-Colonel Jeremiah Olney, Second Rhode Island regiment, Jere-
miah Gilman, First New Hampshire regiment, Eleazer Oswald, Second Con-
tinental artillery regiment, and John Brooks, of Lee’s staff; Captains John
F. Mercer of Lee’s staff, John Compston and Thomas Seward, Third Conti-

[ 244 ]THE BATTLE OF MONMOI TH

General Lee read to the court, on August Q, a carefully
prepared paper in defence of his conduct.

On August 12, M: 1jor-General Lord Stirling announced
the decision of th e court-martial, as follows:

The Court havi ng seer the first charge against Major-
General Lee, the evidence and his defence. are of opinion, that he
is guilty of ‘isnbedienee of orders, in not attacking the enemy on
the 28th of June, agreeable to repeated instructions: being a
breach of the latter part of Article sth Section 2d of the Articles
of War.®

The Court having considered the second charge against Major-
General Lee the evidence and his defence, are of opinion he is
guilty, of misbehaviour before the enemy on the 28th of June, by
making an unnecessary, and in some instances, a disorderly re-
treat ;* being a breach of the 13th Article of the 13th Section of
the Articles of War.

The Court having considered the third charge against Major-
General Lee, are of opinion that he is gu ilty of disrespect to the
Commander-in-Chief in two letters dated the 1st of July and the
28th of June: being a breach of the 2d Article
Articles of War.

The Court do sentence Major General Lee to be suspended from
any command in the Armies of the United States of North America,
for the term of twelve months.

, Section 2d of the

nental artillery regiment, Evan Edwards, of Lee’s staff, and John Stith,
serving with the Third Continental light dragoons: Brigade-] Major Samuel
Shaw, of Knox’s staff.

The affidavit of Captain Peter Wikoff, Second regiment Monmouth
County militia, was also received.

®The paragraphs in the Articles of War, adopted by the Continental
Congress, September 20, 1776, and referred to in above finding, are:

Section IT, Article 5. Any officer or soldier who . . . shall disobey any
lawful command of his superior officer shall suffer death or such other
punishment as shall according to the nature of his offence. be inflicted
upon him by the sentence of a court-martial.

Section XIII, Article 13. Whatsoever officer or soldier shall misbehave
himself before the enemy and run away or shamefully abandon any
fort or guard which he or they shall be demanded to defend or speak
words inducing others to do the like . . . every such offender being duly
convicted thereof ... shall leath or such other punishment, as by
a general court-martial f d on him.

Section II, Article 2. Any officer or soldier who shall behave hims« lf with

   

 

contempt or disrespect towards the general or ther com aay r-in-chief
of the forces of the United States or s} spe ae words tending to his hurt
or dis honor shall be punis| ed act rdir > to tl nature of his often se by
the judgment < if a court-martial.

7™The word “shameful” in the charge was omitted.

[THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

After much delay by the Continental Congress, in ses-
sion at Philadelphia, the sentence of the court-martial of
General Lee was approved December 5, 1778, by a vote
of thirteen to seven, or rather, five states voting aye, two
states voting nay, and the rest divided or not voting. The
order of Congress was in these words: “Resolved, That the
sentence of the General Court Martial upon Major Gen-
eral Lee be carried into execution.””*

General Lee received this sentence with bitter abuse
and severe reproaches. Doctor James Thacher says that,
pointing to his dog, he said, “Oh that I was that animal,
that I might not call man my brother.’”® During the rest
of his life he was bitter and abusive in conversation and
his letters were devoted to detraction of the army and of
General Washington.

General Lee had no sympathy with the Commander-in-
Chief. He did not appreciate his greatness of character, he
was thoroughly jealous of his power and position and
was not disposed to do anything that would reflect honor
on the head of the army.

Charles Botta the historian very justly remarks, “Never-
theless the court martial found him guilty of all the
charges, bating the epithet of shameful, which was ex-
punged, and sentenced him to be suspended for one year;
a judgment certainly too mild if Lee was guilty, or too
severe, if innocent.”

General Carrington says, “If he had been in sympathy
with Washington he would have received no censure. If
he had exercised reasonable self-control at the close of the
action he would have saved his commission.’

It is apparent that on the evening of the battle Wash-
ington had determined to give Lee no further reproof.
General Lee’s conduct after their first interview in doing
what he could to check the retreat which his incompetency

8 Journals of Congress, Vol. IV, pp. 488 ef seq.

9 Thacher’s Military Journal, Appendix, p. 462.

10 Rotta’s History of the War of Independence, Vol. II, p. 520.
11 Carrington’s Battles of the American Revolution, p. 445.

lk 24679THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
or indifference had caused, was quite evident even to
General Washington, whose deep sense of gratitude for
the heroic endurance and fortitude of his soldiers had dis-
pelled all feeling of anger. Had it not been for Lee’s arro-
gant and disrespectful letters after the fight, Washington
would certainly have passed over his strange conduct on
the battle-field. Even as late as the morning of June 30
General Washington named Lee in general orders as the
Major-General for July 1. But the reproof Lee had pub-
licly received, which had now become the gossip of the
camp, annoyed and fretted him and he felt that he had
been badly used. He worked himself into a bitter state of
mind which prompted him to write discourteous letters,
assuming the authority of a superior, and requiring repara-
tion for injury sustained. If General Lee had waited until
the next day and in a calm and respectful manner made
a full explanation of his conduct on the battle-field. in-
stead of writing petulant and unbecoming letters to the
commander-in-chief, the outcome of his affairs would un-
doubtedly have been very different. Lee’s downfall com-
menced from that hour and his military career was at an
end.

In this connection we quote from the memoirs of

Henry Lee:

The records of the court martial manifest on their face the error
of the sentence; and it is wonderful how men of honour and of
sense could thus commit themselves to the censures of the inde-
pendent and impartial. If General Lee had been guilty of all the
charges as affirmed by their decision, his life was forfeited: and
its sacrifice only could have atoned for his criminality. He ought
to have been cashiered and shot; instead of which the mild sen-
tence of suspension, for a short time, was the punishment in-
flicted. The truth is, the unfortunate general was only guilty
of neglect in not making timely communication of his departure
from orders, subject to his discretion, to the commander-in-chief,
which constituted no part of the charges against him. This was cer-
tainly a very culpable omission: to which was afterwards added
personal disrespect, where the utmost respect was not only due,
but enjoined by martial law, and enforced by the state of things;

aay.THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
brink of battle, himself intrusted with
yortion of one of them, for the very

hhold the necessary explana-
tions from his chief, and to set the example of insubordination by
his mode of reply to an interrogatory, indispensably though
warmly, put to him, merited punishment. But this offence was
different, far different from “disobedience to orders,” or a ‘““shame-
ful retreat,” neither of which charges were supported by testi-
mony ; and both of which were contradicted by fact.**

two armies upon the very
the direction of an important |
purpose of leading into action, to wit

In Belsham’s memoirs the following passage occurs:
“It was suspected that the commander-in-chief was not
displeased at the dismissal of a man so haughty and im-
practicable; nor did the army in whose estimation he had
been visibly lessened since the disaster which had befallen
him, appear much to regret his loss. For though the cap-
ture of general Lee was merely fortuitous, misfortune is
‘n the minds of men nearly allied to disgrace, disgrace
produces contempt, and contempt verges towards aliena-
tion and hatred.”

In the edition of Leudrum’s history, published in Bos-
ton in 1795, we find this statement: “Many were dis-
pleased with this sentence because it had been submitted
to his discretion whether to attack or not, and likewise
when and in what manner; and they thought that suspen-
sion from command was not a sufficient punishment for
his crimes, if guilty. They therefore inferred his innocence
from the lenient sentence of his judges.”

Chief Justice Marshall remarks, “Whatever judgment
may be formed on the propriety of retreating before the
enemy, it seems difficult to justify either the omission to
keep the commander-in-chief continually informed of his

situation and intentions or the rude letters written after
the action was over.”””

In his comments on the trial, General de Peyster says,

12 Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Lee’s Memoirs of the War in the Southern
Department of the United States, p. 38.

18 Belsham’s Memoirs of the Reign of George III, Vol. Ils ps 352:

14 Leudrum’s History of the American Revolution, Vol. IT, p. 71.
15 Marshall’s Life of George Washington, Vol. III, p. 418.

[ 248 JTHE BATTLE OF MONMOI TH

“The decision of this Court js very unsatisfactory. If
guilty Lee’s punishment was altogether too mild for the
offences ch iarged; and if innocent it was totally unjusti-
fied:’”**

It may also be remarked that General Lee’s defence was
a masterly one. He endeavored to prove that any other
course than that which he pursued would have given the
enemy great advantage and have hazarded the de struction
of the entire army. Re _ ited distinctly that at “‘the sev-
eral councils of war, held both in Penns ylvania and on
this side of the Delaware. on the subject of the operations
to be pursued in the Jerseys, he rep! robated the idea of
risking a general engagement, as a measure highly absurd
in the present or rather then circumstances of America (for
since a time these councils were held, circumstances are
much altered). . . . The most sanguine of these coun-
cils only recommended to seek and seize some favourable
opportunity of striking some important but partial
blow.”

The Honorable Elias Boudinot made this criticism on
Lee’s conduct:

Gen’l Lee had considerable Milit: iry Knowledge & did very well
on a small scale,—but I have no doubt that wh. never an Aen 1g on
a very large scale struck him, that a partial I sunacy took place. His
behaviour 1 this morning aise red this state of mind, whieh iene

have been increased from the peculi: irity of his situation, and his
exalted idea of the prowess of British T roops. In the midst of the
Engagement, he ae up to a Lt. Coll. of my ac ju eee who had
a single field piece firing and called to him Coll. have you seen
anything i improper in my Conduct this morning? the Coll. (who
had been convinced of sor nething wrong in the Gen’! all the morn-
ing, yet not choos sing to acknowledge >it) answered no, by no means
—well then said the General Aan you remember that.—Such an
Extraordinary Question form a Commander in Chief of a division,
under such Extraordinary Circumstances, is full proof that he
must have felt something unusual in himself. The issue was that
he was beat, and had not Gen’l] W ashington have come up in a

16 De Peyster’s “Consideration of the Case of Lee” in Old Times in Old
Monmouth, Dp. 43.

’ Lee’s defence at his court-martial, p. 199.

fe 240 4THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
lucky moment & turned the fortune of the Day, It might have been
fatal to America.*®
After a careful study of the conduct of General ieee
from the time he marched his division from Washington’s
camp at Valley Forge until he reached Englishtown after
the close of the battle, it is difficult to prove that he ex-
hibited one traitorous act. General Lee was a professional
soldier, personally a brave man, and his life had been
spent in studying in the schools and in practising on
the field the art of war. His experience in Continental
wars warranted the American Congress in bestowing upon
him his high rank. Experienced soldiers were needed in the
patriot army and the people looked to General Lee to
furnish that peculiar skill which they were ready to believe
was not found in any of our general officers, not even in
Washington. That he was not true to the cause of Amer-
ican independence is conclusively proved by his conduct
in the previous year while a prisoner of war in New York.
His suggestive plans, an eight-page manuscript endorsed
“Mr. Lee’s plan,” dated March 29, 1777, and addressed
to the British commanding general show that he was at
that time full of treason to the sacred cause, although it
does not appear that any of his compatriots at this time
had the slightest idea of the extent of his turpitude.
That his heart was not perfectly true to General Wash-
ington in the high office which he held needs no particular
proof, but that any of his acts during that period exhibited
the disposition of a traitor is questionable. He promptly
obeyed the order to march to the banks of the Delaware
River, he crossed the river with his division without delay,
the halt at Hopewell was not by his order, and the opinion
expressed by him at the council of war in that village was
concurred in by other well-known patriot officers. It was
at least a worthy ambition, if there was to be a fight with
the British Army, to desire to lead at the very front, his
orders from Washington were to some extent discretion-

18 Boudinot’s Journal of Events in the Revolution, p. 81.

le 25e 2]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
ary, and his plan of carefully attacking the rear of the
covering party, or rather inviting them to attack him while
he could take a force from his left flank, divide the British
column, and so, if possible, surround them, had been suc-
cessfully tried in other battles, and was certainly feasible
at that time. That General Lee was not equal to the man-
agement of 5000 men in such a country, so full of thickets,
woods, and marshes was his misfortune and not due to
treachery. He certainly failed to use his force as he might
have done, because he had not the sharp cooperation of
Dickinson’s New Jersey militia nor of Morgan’s rifle
corps. They had no orders when the fighting began and so
were inactive at the very moment Lee needed them. He
had given his general officers no idea of his plans before
the battle, and evidently had matured no plans in his
own mind. When General Lee saw his right column re-
treating he gave his left no orders of any kind. When he
found Scott had fallen back he did not attempt to change
his movements. In this he was grievously wrong. His
whole force was not handled with skill and seems virtu-
ally to have taken care of itself. He failed to concentrate
and control his forces, and by distinct, definite orders to
keep his troops well in hand. At last, when he found his
division giving way, he said he had it in mind to secure a
new line of defence, where he might check the foe for the
time, and although his troops seemingly got out of his
control in their retrograde movement, he said ( probably
an after-thought in his defence) that he hoped to re-form
them on the very ground where Washington was at that
moment bringing up his supporting column. Before he
was able to make his statement good, the control of the
division had passed out of his hands by the presence of
superior rank. Lee’s reply to Washington, his indignant
exclamation, was not traitorous, his indirect supervision
of the first fighting at the hedge fence was certainly all
that could be expected of him, for he obeyed General
Washington’s orders and the fighting of his weary troops

Ragy 4THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
was superb. His head and heart might not have been
thoroughly in accord with what Washington expected of
him in the hour of battle, but he apparently executed to
the best of his ability the reasonable plans which an ex-
perienced general should form at such a time. General
Lee may have supposed that Clinton was in too great force
for him to attack him with any hope of success. Perhaps
he thought that his division was likely to be overwhelmed
before Washington could come to his support, and, there-
fore, judged that a short retreat was best. Although he
differed from Washington in his plans for the day, his
orders were discretionary, and, of course, his judgment
was not infallible. Certain it is that the active work of a
more skillful leader was imperatively needed at the front
that day. It will be noticed that Washington, although
amazed at Lee’s unexpected retreat, did not promptly
relieve him of command. It was over two hours later that
Lee was sent to the rear with a body of weary troops.

It is not generally thought by students of this battle
that the brigade commanders did their full duty in sup-
porting General Lee. It is difficult at this time to explain
why they lacked confidence in him, for it does not appear
that he had publicly done anything to specially detract
from his great military reputation. It is certain, however,
that General Lee thought it advisable to make only a
partial demonstration against the foe. According to his
discretionary orders, which he interpreted to be almost
unlimited, he did not think it best to attack the main army.
It is also possible that he did not at that time care to have
such a measure of success as would turn the whole British
column upon him, or in any way disprove his predictions
given at the council of war a week previous.

It may be well to note that the life of General Lee was
full of complaints, of disagreements with his comrades,
and of quarrels with his superior officers. His temper was
rough and vindictive, his morals bad, his manner snarling
and cynical and his conversation full of impiety and pro-

[ 252 ]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
fanity. His correspondence, which seems to have been
large for that time, was always in a critical, complaining,
or vindictive style.

But with all these personal characteristics, with full
knowledge of his nationality and early training, keeping
in mind also the ‘“‘Plan,”’ which he had beforehand given
to General Howe for the subjugation of America. it is
scarcely just to assert that in his conduct on the battle-
field Lee exhibited one disloyal act, that he did anything
that his military judgment might not have approved, or
that any other general officer perfectly true to the cause
might not have done.

In addition to the court-martial of Major-General Lee,
a Court of Enquiry was ordered, to “enquire into and state
Facts relative to the conduct of Col. Henry Jackson at
the battle of Monmouth he thinking his character much
injured and his Reputation highly reproached.” The com-
plaint was signed by sixteen officers, ten of his own
regiment, four of Colonel David Henley’s regiment Con-
tinental infantry, and two of Colonel Lee’s regiment
Continental infantry. His complaint is dated July 26,
1778. The court was held at the court house in Providence,
at as late a date as April 17, 1779, by order of Major-
General Horatio Gates. After the testimony had been
taken, the court did not resume its sessions in Providence
until July 5, 1779, when Colonel Jackson made an ad-
dress to the court in his defence, and the following deci-
sion was rendered:

The Court upon fully and maturely considering the Evidence &
Col. Jackson’s Defence and also the Confusion of the advanced
Corps of Gen’l Lee’s Division on that Day are of opinion that
there appears not anything against Col. Jackson suffici ‘ntly repre-
hensible to call him before a Court Martial.

After General Lee’s trial and conviction Major-
General the Baron von Steuben took exception to the

19 Complete proceedings of this Court in the / Papers, Vol. III, pp.
209 ef seq.
Vea a
[ 253 JTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
statements of General Lee at the trial, and toward the
close of the year some bitter correspondence took place
between them. Von Steuben’s letter was written in French
and was dated in Philadelphia, December 2, 1778.”

The grievance of General von Steuben was in conse-
quence of words used by General Lee in the written docu-
ment he read in his defence, and for this expression von
Steuben desired satisfaction on the field of honor. “Of
all the very distant spectators of the manoeuvers on this
day and those a very trifling part of them, the Baron

Steuben is, I think, the only gentleman who has stepped
forth to prove their demerits. He has certainly shown a
very laudable zeal for bringing a criminal officer to con-
dign punishment; but the next time he takes the field of
prosecution in the cause of an injured community I hope
his prudence will dictate to him the necessity of being
furnished with a better apparatus.”

General Lee replied to von Steuben’s challenge and his
explanation seems to have been satisfactory for we find
that the subject was dropped.

On December 3, 17 1778, General Lee published, in the
Pennsylvania Packet of Philadelphia, a lengthy and care-
fully written “vindication to the public” of his character
and conduct ° pay on the feld of Monmouth.”

ee Lee also received a challenge from Lieutenant-
Colonel John L aurens, of Washington’s military family,
on account of Lee’s constant pe sonal abuse of the char-
acter and conduct of General Washington. The challenge
was accepted and the duellists met on the Point-no-Point
Road in a woods near the four-mile stone just below
Philadelphia, at half-past three in the afternoon of De-
cember 23, 1778. Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander Hamil-
ton was Lauren’s second and Captain Evan Edwards, of

20 Lee Papers, Vol. III, p. 253.

21 Lee’s defence at his court-martial, 2

22 Washington, in a letter of Decembe 12, 1778, to Joseph Reed President
of ecaugls ania, charges Lee with downri cht falsehood. This letter may

x

be found in Ford, Writings of Washington, ate VII, p. 280.

C 254 J

32.THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
Lee’s staff, was his second. They fired at six paces distance
and General Lee was slightly wounded in his ri: ght side.

Soon after General Lee left his command in the army,
he retired to a farm near Shepherdstown, Berkele y County,
[now West] Virginia, and spent his time in seclusion in
a miserable, dilapidated house, a servant and a large num-
ber of dogs his only companions.”* He continued, howeve i
even from this forlorn retreat, which he called Prato Rio,
to send out to the public venomous attacks on General]
Washington which were powerless to injure him, and
scarcely even annoyed him.

During the year 1779 Gene ral Lee still continued his
severe and contemptible criticisms of Washington in con-
versation with his friends and with those who were w illing
to listen to his scathing aspersions. When Congress had
made some movement toward striking his name from the
army lists, he wrote to the President of Congress a weak
and undignified letter, undated, from his farm in Berke-
ley County, Virginia.*

When Congress received this letter from General Lee
the following resolution was passed:

Monday January 10, 1780.—‘Resolved That Major General
Lee be informed, that Congress has no further occasion for his
services in the army of the United States.’

General Lee replied to this action of Congress in a letter
addressed to its President, dated January 30, 1780. He
apologized for his former communication and attempted
to justify himself by the peculiar circumstances under
which he had written the letter, the fact that he was not

28 The narrative of this duel is found in the Lee Papers, Vol. III, pp. 283
et Bees
‘He had led a kind of Bemis life on his estate;
were his favorite cearanidas is house is described as bs

destitute of comforts and convenience. For want of partition

parts were designated by lines chalked on the floor. In «

bed ; in another was his books; his saddles an dl larness in a

served as a kitchen.” Irving’s Life of George Washington,
25 Lee Papers, Vol. III, p. 405.

26 ibid., p. 407.
E255 olTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
well, that he dictated and did not write himself and that
he was just at the moment about to leave his home. His
object in writing this last letter is not very clear,—but
it apparently had no effect upon Congress.

During the year 1779 Lee had written many articles
for the journals of the day, attacking General Sullivan
and General Wayne, abusing his former friend General
Reed, and making gross insinuations against the military
skill of General Washington. One of the most widely
circulated of these attacks was published in the Maryland
Journal and Baltimore Advertiser, July 6, 1779, “con-
taining twenty-five queries political and military humbly
offered to the consideration of the public.” This docu-
ment he dated from Philadelphia. It created much excite-
ment at the time.”

In the latter part of the year 1782, this soldier of for-
tune, tired of his poor life on the old Virginia plantation,
convinced, too, that at that time the cause he had despised,
if not tried to betray, had become triumphant, came to
Philadelphia and took lodgings in a small inn. Here he
was taken with lung disease, which after five days’ illness
proved fatal and he died at ten o’clock on the evening of
Wednesday, October 2, 1782, aged fifty-one years. His
thoughts to the very last were of the soldier life he had
led and he expired shouting, as he supposed to his troops,
“Stand by me, my brave grenadiers!” His funeral on
October 4, from the City Tavern, was attended by a large
gathering of the people of Philadelphia and officers of the
army, and apparently more respect was shown him at his
death than he had received in the last four years of his
life. In his will he desired not to be buried in any church-
yard or within a mile of any Presbyterian or Anabaptist
meeting-house giving the following reason: “I have kept
so much bad company while living, that I do not choose
to continue it when dead.” His body, however, was buried
in Christ Churchyard, Philadelphia.

27 The Lee Papers, Vol. III, pp. 341 et seq.

E2562]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
Thus, in a little room in the ‘‘Canastoga Wagon” tav-
ern, in the capital of the country he had so poorly served,
ended a life which, as has been said, “was little less than
the history of disputes, quarrels and duels in every part
of the world.”CHAPTER XXIV

HE desertions from the British Army on their pas-

sage through New Jersey were very many. On July 4
General Arnold made a return of the number which had
come back to Philadelphia and he makes the list include,
136 British and 440 Hessians, in all 576 men. This was
afterward increased to over 600 men, as Washington says
in one of his letters. He also added the statement that
many of the Germans came over to the American Army,
others wandered into the country from the line of march
so that he “believed the whole number of deserters may be
estimated as about 800.”

Judge Jones, in his Tory history, says of the British
Army that “from the intense heat, different skirmishes, and
desertion, it consisted upon its arrival at the Hook, of at
least 1,500 men less, than it contained when it left
Philadelphia.”

Captain Montresor, in his Journal, says that “350 Ger-
mans deserted from us on the march,” and General Knyp-
hausen wrote Frederick II, Landgrave of Hesse Cassel
July 6, 1778, that 236 of his men had deserted in New
Jersey.

General Washington wrote to General Arnold from
Brunswick, July 6, that he believed that from desertion
and the action ‘‘Clinton’s Army had experienced a diminu-
tion of 2000 men at least since it left Philadelphia.” Of
course, this number included the 300 killed, 800 wounded
and 100 prisoners.

It is quite evident that these desertions were princi-
pally from the ranks of the German mercenaries, and that
they preferred to go back to their sweethearts and wives

1 Jones’ History of New York during the Revolutionary War, Vol. I,
p. 263.

E 258 7THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
in Philadelphia rather than continue in the ranks of an
army employed to crush out freedom in America.

Surgeon James Thacher, of the American Army, gives
this strange, and we must conclude very inaccurate, ac-
count of the British losses: “If reports are accurate, the
loss of the royalists consists of four officers and two hun-
dred and forty-five rank and file killed, and left in the
field, buried by our people; one thousand two hundred and
fifty-five wounded; one hundred and seventeen prisoners ;
and one thousand five hundred and seventy-two deserted
during the march; total of their loss, after they left Phila-
delphia, according to accounts circulated, three thousand
one hundred and eighty-nine. Of the Continentals. accord-
ing to returns, sixty-nine were killed, one hundred and
forty-two wounded and about one hundred missing. The
intense heat of the weather, great fatigue, and drinking
cold water, proved fatal to about sixty or eighty men of
each party.’”

Stedman says, “three sergeants and fifty-six men died
without a wound.” This refers to the British Army and
was a result of the intense heat.*

In Lamb’s Journal we find the following remark: ‘““The
total disagreement between the British and American ac-
counts of this action, is not a little perplexing to the im-
partial narrator; both parties claim the advantage; but
the Americans, particularly at that time, had their reasons
for their misrepresentations—reasons which did not at all
influence the reports of the British commanders.”* Are we
then to conclude that General Washington designedly
misstated to Congress in an official letter the real loss of
the British column? This is manifestly improbable.

In Mackinnon’s History of the Coldstream Regiment
of Foot Guards, it is mentioned that while Sir Henry
Clinton made a full report of the names and casualties

2 Thacher’s Military Journal, p. 165.
8 Stedman’s History of the American War, Vol. II. Dez:
*Lamb’s Journal of Occurrences during the Late American War. p. 242.

[ 259 ]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
among his officers, “no separate return was made of the
loss in men.” This statement seems to be correct. The Brit-
ish records do not appear to show the names of the enlisted
men killed and wounded in this fight. We are, therefore,
left to conclude that Clinton either did not estimate cor-
rectly, or did not wish to know, and made no effort to get
the exact number of his loss before the next muster of ie
command: and that he then neglected to send it to Lord
Germaine. Consequently, we must accept the report of
General Washington as more nearly correct, for he had
ample o pportunity to get the exact numbers from his own
burial parties.
Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Lee remarks concerning the
British dead, ‘Judging from the official statements w rhich
were pub lished, the loss was trifling and not very unequal ;
but the stubborn fact of burying the dead, manifests a
great error in the report made by Sir Henry Clinton to his
government. He rated his dead and missing at one hun-
dred and eighty-eight: whereas we buried on the field of
battle two hundred and forty-nine.”
The following is the official return of the killed,
wounded and missing of the American Army:

Kitiep. /nfantry—1 lieutenant-colonel, 1 major, 3 captains, 2

lieutenants, 1 sergeant, §2 rank and file. Artz//ery—1 lieutenant,
7 mattrosses, 1 bombadier.

Wounpeb. /nfantry—2 colonels, 8 captains, 4 first lieutenants, 2
second lieutenants, 1 ensign, 1 adjutant, 8 sergeants, 1 drummer,
120 rank and file. es captain, 1 sergeant, 1 corporal, 1
gunner, 10 mattrosses.

Missino. Infantry—3 sergeants, 126 rank and file. Artillery—
1 mattross.

Some of the missing dropped through fatigue and hardship,
since come in. Six horses killed and two w ounded.

This return was made by General Washington July 1,
and it was not complete, especially in reference to the
wounded officers. It shows 8 officers and 61 enlisted men

5 Lee’s Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of the United

States, p. 37.
le 200%]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
killed, 19 officers and 142 enlisted men wounded, and

30 enlisted men missing, a total of 300 casualties. F iske
the historian says, 362 loss. Bancroft gives the number of
killed and wounded as 229. A carefully prepared roster of
the casualties of the American Army in the battle, will be
found in the appendix to this work. This roster is not taken
from any report, but has been compiled from pages of his-
tory, biography, genealogy, and especially from pension
records. All the commissioned officers killed and w ounded,
except one ensign wounded, are now identified. Many of
those numbered and named as missing and those recorded
as sent to hospital on account of the heat and fatigue after-
ward rejoined their regiments.° In addition to the horses
reported as abe killed and wounded, it may be noticed
that a large number became utterly prostrated by the heat
and died or fe to be abandoned. For weeks afterward
their dead bodies made the air of the battle-field intoler-
able.

The following is the official return of the killed,
wounded, missing, &c., of the British Army:

Total British—1 lieutenant-colonel, 1 captain, 2 lieutenants, 4
sergeants, 56 rank and file killed; 3 sergeants, 45 rank and file died
with fatigue; 1 colonel, 1 lieutenant-colonel, 1 major, 7 captains,
g lieutenants, 7 sergeants, 137 rank and file wounded : 3 sergeants,
61 rank and file missing.

Total German—1 rank and file killed, 11 rank and file died with
fatigue, 11 rank and file wounded.

General Total—1 lieutenant-colonel, 1 ‘aptain, 2 lieutenants, 4
sergeants, 57 rank and file killed: 3 sergeants, 56 rank and file
died with fatigue; 1 c lonel, 1 lieutenant-colonel, 1 major, 7 cap-
tains, § lieutenants, 7 sergeants, 148 rank and file wounded: 2 ser-
geants, 61 rank and file missing.

This return of 4 officers and 61 enlisted men killed. 15
officers and 155 enlisted men wounded, 64 enlisted men
missing and 59 enlisted men died of fatigue, a total of
358 casualties, was made by Sir Henry Clinton July 5 and
accompanied his official report of the battle. A report was
made to General Washington the day after the battle as

8

} Appendix V.

EE 261 7THE BATTLE OF MONMO UTH
to the number of British and American soldiers who had
been interred by the American burial parties that day,
under charge of Lieutenant-Colonel Cornelius Van Dyck,
of the First regiment, New York Continental infantry.
This report gives the number as 217 British and 29
Americans and this does not include those of the enemy
buried by the British themselves. A roster of such casual-
ties among the officers as have been found among the
records of Great Britain has been compiled from the “Army
lists of British officers Serving in America,” and while it
is by no means complete, every effort has been made to
make it accurate as far as the records give us information.
After the return was forwarded one Lieutenant-Colonel
and one Captain were found to have been wounded.’

The historian Fiske says 416 loss, and according to Mr.
Bancroft the number of killed and wounded was more
than 400.

The third day after the battle General Washington sent
his official report to Honorable Henry Laurens, President
of the Continental Congress.

Englishtown, 1 July 1778.
SIR,

1 embrace this first moment of leisure to give Congress a more
full and particular account of the movements of the army under
my command since its passing the Delaware, than the situation of
our affairs would heretofore permit. I had the honour to advise
them that on the appearance of the enemy’s intention to march
through Jersey becoming serious, I had detached General Maxwell’s
brigade, in conjunction with the militia of that State to interrupt
and impede their progress by every obstruction in their power, so as
to give time to the army under my command to come up with them
and take advantage of any favorable circumstances that might pre-
sent themselves. The army having proceeded to Coryell’s Ferry
and crossed the Delaware at that place, I immediately detached
Colonel Morgan with a select corps of six hundred men to rein-
force General Maxwell and marched with the main body towards
Prince Town. The slow advance of the enemy had greatly the air
of design and led me, with others to suspect that General Clinton,
desirous of a general action was endeavouring to draw us down

7 Appendix VI.

le 202; qjTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
into the lower country in order, by a rapid movement, to gain our
right, and take possession of the strong grounds above us. This
consideration and to give the troops time to repose and refresh
themselves from the fatigues they had experienced from rainy and
excessively hot weather, determined me to halt at Hopewell town-
ship about five [eight] miles from Princeton where we remained
till the morning of the 25th. On the preceding day I made a second
detachment of fifteen hundred chosen troops under Brigadier
General Scott to reinforce those already in the vicinity of the
enemy, the more effectually to annoy and delay their march. The
next day the army moved to Kingston ; and having received intel-
ligence that the enemy were prosecuting their route towards Mon-
mouth Court House, I despatched a thousand select men under
Brigadier-General Wayne and sent the Marquis de Lafayette to
take the command of the whole advanced corps, including Max-
well’s brigade and Morgan’s light infantry, with orders to take the
first opportunity of attacking the enemy's rear. In the evening of
the same day the whole army marched from Kingston where our
baggage was left with intention to preserve a proper distance for
supporting the advanced corps, and arrived at Cranberry [Cran-
bury] early the next morning. The intense heat of the weather and
a heavy storm unluckily coming on, made it impossible to resume
our march that day without great inconvenience and injury to the
troops. Our advanced corps, being differently circumstanced, moved
from the position it had held the night before and took post in the
evening on the Monmouth road about five miles from the enemy’s
rear, in expectation of attacking them next morning on their march.
The main body having remained at Cranberry, the advanced corps
was found to be too remote, and too far upon the right to be sup-
ported in case of an attack either upon or from the enemy ; which
induced me to send orders to the Marquis to file off by his left
towards English Town which he accordingly executed early in the
morning of the 27th. The enemy in marching from Allentown, had
changed their disposition, and placed their best troops in the rear,
consisting of all the grenadiers, light infantry, and chasseurs of
the line. This alteration made it necessary to increase the number
of our advanced troops ; in consequence of which I detached Major
General Lee with two brigades to join the Marquis at English
Town, on whom of course the demand of the whole devolved,
amounting to about five thousand men. The main body marched
the same day and encamped within three miles of that place. Mor-
gan’s corps was left hovering on the enemy’s right flank; and the

Jersey militia, amounting at this time to about seven or eight

hundred men, under General Dickinson, on their left. The enemy

were now encamped in a strong position with their right extending

[ 263 JTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
about a mile and a half beyond the Court-House to the parting of
the roads leading to Shrewsbury and Middletown, and their left
along the road from Allentown to Monmouth, about three miles
on this side of the Court-House. Their right flank lay on the skirt
of a small wood, while their left was secured by a very thick one,
a morass running towards their rear, and their whole front cov-
ered by a wood, and for a considerable extent towards the left,
with a morass. In this situation they halted till the morning of the
28th. Matters being this situated and having had the best infor-
mation, that, if the enemy were once arrived at the Heights of
Middletown, ten or twelve miles from where they were, it would be
impossible to attempt any thing against them with a prospect of
success, I determined to attack their rear, the moment they should
get in motion from their present ground. I communicated my inten-
tion to General Lee and ordered him to make his disposition for the
attack, and to keep his troops constantly lying upon their arms to
be in readiness at the shortest notice. This was done with respect
to the troops under my immediate com nand. About five in the
morning General Dickinson sent an express informing that the
front of the enemy had begun their march. | instantly put the
army in motion and sent orders by one of my aids to General Lee
to move on and attack them unless there should be very powerful
reasons to the contrary, acquainting him at the same time, that I
was marching to support him and for doing it with the greater ex-
pedition and convenience, should make the men disencumber them-
selves of their packs and blankets. After marching about five miles,
to my surprise and mortification, I met the whole advanced corps
retreating, and as I was told, by General Lee’s orders, without
having made any opposition, except one fire, given by a party
under the command of Colonel Butler, on their being charged by
the enemy’s cavalry, who were repulsed. | proceeded immediately
to the rear of the corps, which | found closely pressed by the
enemy, and gave directions for forming part of the retreating
troops, who by the brave and spirited conduct of the officers aided
by some pieces of well-served artillery, checked the enemy’s ad-
vance, and gave time to make a disposition of the left wing and
second line of the army upon an eminence, in a wood a little in
the rear, covered by a morass in front. On this were placed some
batteries of cannon by Lord Stirling, who commanded the left
wing which played upon the enemy with great effect, and seconded
by parties of infantry detached to oppose them effectually put a
stop to their advance. General Lee being detached with the advanced
corps the command of the right wing for the occasion was given to
General Greene. For the expedition of the march, and to counteract
any attempt to turn our right I had ordered him to file off by the

le 2640THE BATTLE OF MONMOL TH

new church, two miles from Englishtown and fall into the Mon-
mouth road, a small distance in rhe rear of the Court-House, oat
the rest of the column moved directly on towards the Court-House.
On intelligence of the retreat he marched up and took a very advan-
tageous position on the right. The enemy by this time,
themselves warmly oj pposed i in front, made an atten npt to turn our
left flank; but they were bravely repulsed and driven back by de-
tached parties of infantry. They also made a movement to our
right with as little success, General Greene having advanced a
body of troops with artillery to a commanding piece of ground;
which not only disappointed their design of turning our right, but
severely enfiladed those in front of the left wing. In addition to
this, General W ayne advanced with a bod} ' of troops, and kept up
so severe and well- directed a fire that the en emy wire

pelled to retire behind the defile where the first stand in the
ening of the action had been made. In this situation the enemy
had both their flanks secured by thick woods and mo
their front could only be approached through

finding

soon com-

rasses, while

1 nh a narrow pass. [|
resolved nevertheless to attack them: and for that purpose ordered
General Poor, with his own and the Carolina brigade to move
round upon their right and General W oodford ape their left and
the aifiliery to eall t them in front. But the i pediments in their
way prevented their getting within reach before it was dark. They
remained upon the ground they had been directed to occupy during

the night with the intention to beg Be attack early the next
morning; and the army continued ip ing upon their arms in the
field of action, to be in readiness to sul pport them. In the mean time
the enemy were employed i moving their wounds a and about
twelve o’clock at night n eared away in such silence that though

General Poor lay extremely near hen , they effected their retreat
without his knowledge. The y carried off all their wounded, except
four officers and about forty privates, whose wounds were too
dangerous to permit their removal. The extreme heat of the
weather, the fatigue of the men from their march through a deep
sandy country almost entirely destitute of water, and the distance
the enemy had gained by marching in the night, made a pursuit
impracticable and fruitless. It would have answered no valuable
purpose, and would have been fatal to numbers of our
several of whom died the preceding day with heat. Were I to con-
clude my account of this day’s econ vithout expressit
obligations to the officers of the ny in general I should do in-
justice to their merit and vipleres to my own feelings. They
seemed to vie with each other in manifesting their zeal and brave ry.
The catalogue of those who cea themselves is too long
to admit of particularizing individuals. I cannot, however, forbear

[E2657 7THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

mentioning Brigadier General Wayne, whose good conduct and
bravery through the whole action deserves particular commenda-
dation. The behaviour of the troops in general, after they recovered
from the first surprise occasioned by the retreat of the advanced
corps, was such as could not be surpassed. All the artillery, both
officers and men that were engaged distinguished themselves in a
remarkable manner. Enclosed Congress will be pleased to receive
a return of our killed, wounded and missing. Among the first were
Lieutenant-Colonel Bunner of Pennsylvania and Major Dickinson
of Virginia both officers of distinguished merit and much to be re-
gretted. The enemy’s slain, left on the field and buried by us,
according to the return of the persons assigned to that duty were
four officers and two hundred and forty-five privates. In the former
number was the honourable Colonel Monckton. Exclusive of these,
they buried some themselves, as there were several new graves near
the field of battle. How many men they may have had wounded
cannot be determined; but, from the usual proportion the number
must have been considerable. There were a few prisoners taken.
The peculiar situation of General Lee at this time requires that |
should say nothing of his conduct. He is now in arrest. The charges
against him, with such sentence as the court-martial may decree
‘n his case shall be transmitted for the approbation or disapproba-
tion of Congress as soon as it shall be passed. Being fully con-
vinced by the gentlemen of this country, that the enemy cannot be
hurt or injured in their embarkation at Sandy Hook, the place to
which they are going, and unwilling to get too far removed from
the North River, I put the troops in motion early this morning and
shall proceed that way, leaving the Jersey brigade, Morgan’s corps
and other light parties (the militia being all dismissed) to hover
about them, to countenance desertion, and to prevent depredations
as far as possible. After they embark, the former will take post
in the neighborhood of Elizabeth Town, the latter rejoin the corps
from which they were detached. I have the honor to be,

Go. WASHINGTON.

On July 7, 1778 “Congress took into consideration the
letter of June 29th and that of July 1st from General
Washington, giving an account of his movements from
Valley Forge to Monmouth Court-House, in the state of
New Jersey, in pursuit of the enemy, and of a victory ob-
tained over the British army commanded by general sir
H. Clinton, in a battle near Monmouth Court-House, on
the 28th of June; whereupon

fr 266; 4]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

“Resolved, unanimously, That the thanks of Congress
be given to Gener W eehan gton for the activity with
which he marched from the Camp at Valley Forge, in pur-
suit of the enemy; for his distinguished exertions in form-
ing the line of battle ; and for his great good conduct in
leading on the attack and gaining the important victory
of Miearouth over the British grand army, under the
command of general sir H. @iaron in their march from
Philadelphia to New York.

“Resolved, That General Was shington be directed to
signify the thanks of Congress to the gallant officers and
men under his command, who distinguished themselves
by their conduct and valour at the battle of Monmouth.’

In acknowledgment of this action of the Continental
Congress General Washington wrote to the President of
Congress:

Camp, at Paramus, 12 July 1778.
SIR,

The vote of approbation and thanks which Congress have been
pleased to honour me with gives me the highest satisfaction and
at the same time demands a return of my sincerest acknowledg-

ments. The other resolution I communicated with great pleasure to
the army at large in yesterday’s orders.

I have the honor to hee
Go. WASHINGTON.

Sir Henry Clinton also sent his report of the engage-
ment to Lord George Germaine, Colonial Secretary of
George III.

78.

4i

New York, 5 July, 1
My Lorp:

I have the honour to inform your lordship that pursuant to his
majesty’s instructions I evacuated Philadel; yhia on the 18th of
June at three o’clock in the morning and proceeded to Gloucester
Point without being followed by the ene my. Every thing from
thence being passed in safety across the Delaware, through the
excellent dis osition made by our admiral to secure our passage
the army eres at ten o'clock and reached Haddonfield the

G7 aTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

same day. A strong corps of the enemy having upon our approach
abandoned the difficult pass of Mount Holly, the army proceeded
without any interruption from them, except by what was occa-
sioned by their having destroyed every bridge on our road. As the
country is much intersected with marshy rivulets, the obstructions
we met with were frequent; and the excessive heat of the weather
rendered the labour of repairing the bridges severely felt. The
advanced parties of our light troops arriving unexpectedly at
Crosswicks, on the 23rd, after a trifling skirmish, prevented the
enemy from destroying a bridge over a large creek at that village:
and the army passed it the next morning. One column under the
command of his excellency Lieutenant General Knyphausen, halted
near Imlay’s town; and as the division train and heavy artillery
were stationed in that division, the other column, under Lieuten-
ant General Earl Cornwallis, took a position at Allen’s town, which
covered the other encampment. Thus far, my lord, my march
pointed equally toward Hudson River and Staten Island, by the
Raritan. | was now at the juncture when it was necessary to decide
ultimately what course to pursue. Encumbered as | was by an
enormous provision train, &c., to which impediment the proba-
bility of obstructions and length of march obliged me to submit, |
was led to wish for a route less liable to obstacles than those above
mentioned. I had received intelligence that Generals Washington
and Lee had passed the Delaware with their army, had assembled
a numerous militia, from all the neighboring provinces; and that
Gates with an army from the northward, was advancing to join
them on the Raritan. As I could not hope that, after having always
hitherto so studiously avoided a general action, they would now
give in to it, against every dictate of policy, I could only suppose
his views were directed against my baggage &c. in which part I
was indeed vulnerable. This circumstance alone would have
tempted me to avoid the difficult passage of the Raritan ; but when
| reflected that from Sandy Hook I should be able, with more ex-
pedition to carry his majesty’s further orders into execution, I did
not hesitate to order the army into the road which leads through
Freehold to the Navisunk. The approach of the enemy's army
being denoted by the frequent appearance of their light troops on
our rear, I requested his excellency Lieutenant General Knyp-
hausen to take the baggage of the whole army under the charge
of his division, consisting of the troops mentioned in the margin.®
Under the head of baggage was comprised not only all the wheel-
carriages, of every department, but also the bat-horses; a train

8 seventeenth light dragoons, 2nd battalion of light infantry, Hessian
Yagcers, ist and 2nd brigades British, Stirn’s and Loo’s brigades of Hessians,
Pennsylvania Loyalists, New Jersey Volunteers, Maryland Loyalists.

268) 3]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

which, as the country admitted but of one route for carriages, ex-
tended near twelve miles. The indispensable necessity I was under
of securing these is obvious, and the difficulty of doing it, in a
most woody country, against an army far superior in numbers,
will I trust be no less so. I desired Lieutenant General Knyphausen
to move at daybreak on the 28th; and that I might not press upon
him, in the first part of the march, in which we had but one route,
I did not follow him with the other division® until near eight
o'clock. Soon after I had marched reconnoitering parties of the
enemy appeared on our left flank. The Queen’s Rangers fell in
with and dispersed some detachments among the woods in the same
quarter. Our rear-guard having descended from the heights above
Freehold into a plain near three miles in length, and about one
mile in breadth, several columns of the enemy appeared likewise
descending into the plain; and about ten o'clock they began to
cannonade our rear. Intelligence was this moment brought me that
the enemy were discovered marching in force on both our flanks. I
was convinced that our baggage was their object; but it being
in this juncture engaged in the defiles, which continued for some
miles, no means occurred of parrying the blow, but attacking the
corps which harassed our rear and pressing it so hard as to oblige
the detachments to return from our flanks to its assistance. | had
good information that General Washington was up with his whole
army, estimated at about 20,000; but as I knew there were two de-
files between him and the corps at which I meant to strike. I judged
that he could not have passed them with a greater force than what
Lord Cornwallis’s division was well able to engage; and had |
even met his whole army in the passage of these defiles, I had but
little to apprehend but his situation might have been critical. The
enemy's cavalry commanded it is said by M. Lafayette, having
approached our reach, were charged with great spirit by the Queen’s
Light Dragoons. They did not wait the shock, but fell back, in
confusion, upon their own infantry. Thinking it possible that the
event might draw to a general action, I sent for a brigade of
British and the 17th Light Dragoons, from Lieutenant General
Knyphausen’s division: and having directed them on their arrival,
to take a position effectually covering our right flank of which I
was most Jealous, I made a disposition of attack on the plain. But
before I could advance, the enemy fell back and took a strong posi-
tion on the heights above Freehold court-house. The heat of the
weather was intense and our men already suffered severely from
fatigue. But our circumstances obliged us to make a vigourous

® Sixteenth light dragoons, 1st battalion of British grenadiers, 2nd ditto.
Ist battalion of light infantry, Hessian grenadiers, guards. ard, 4th, sth

brigades British.
[ 269 JTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

exertion. The British Grenadiers, with their left to the village of
Freehold, and the Guards on the right of the Grenadiers, began the
attack with such spirit, that the enemy gave way immediately.
The second line of the enemy stood the attack with great obstinacy,
but was likewise completely routed. They then took a third posi-
tion, with a marshy hollow in front, over which it would have
been scarcely possible to have attacked them. However, part of the
second line made a movement to the front, occupied some ground
on the enemy’s left flank and the Light Infantry and Queen’s
Rangers turned their left. By this time our men were so overpowered
with fatigue that I could press the affair no further; especially as
I was confident the end was gained for which the attack had been
made. I ordered the Light Infantry to rejoin me, but a strong de-
tachment of the enemy having possessed themselves of a post
which would have annoyed them in their retreat, the 33rd regiment
made a movement toward the enemy; which, with a similar one
made by the first Grenadiers, immediately dispersed them. I took
the position from which the enemy had been first driven, after they
had quitted the plain; and having reposed the troops until ten at
night, to avoid the excessive heat of the day, I took advantage of
the moonlight to rejoin Lieutenant General Knyphausen, who had
advanced to Nut Swamp, near Middeltown. Our baggage had
been attempted by some of the enemy’s light troops, who were
repulsed by the good dispositions made by Lieutenant General
Knyphausen and Major General Grant, and the good countenance
of the goth regiment, whose piquets alone were attacked and one
troop of the 17th Light Dragoons. The two corps which had
marched against it, (being, as I since learn, a brigade on each flank)
were recalled, as I had suspected, at the beginning of the action. It
would be sufficient honour to the troops to barely say that they
had forced a corps, as | am informed of near 12,000 men, from
two strong positions: but it will, I doubt not, be considered doubly
creditable when I mention they did it under such disadvantages of
heat and fatigue, that a great part of those we lost fell dead as they
advanced. Fearing that my order had miscarried, before I quitted
the ground I sent a second, for a brigade of infantry, the 17th
Light Dragoons and the 2nd battalion of Light Infantry to meet
on the march, to which additional force had General Washington
shown himself the next day, I was determined to attack him; but
there being not the least appearance of an enemy I suspected he
might have passed a considerable corps to a strong position, near
Middeltown: I therefore left the rear-guard on its march and de-
tached Major General Grant to take post there, which was effected
on the 29th. The whole army marched to this position the next day,
and then fell back to another near Navisunk; where I waited two

E 27ondlTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
days in the hope that Mr. Washington might have been tem pted to
advance to the position near Wiiddeltore n, which we had site
in which case | might have attacked him to ady antage. During this
time the sick and wounded were embarked and preparations nmede
for passing to Sandy Hook island, by a bridge, which by the
extraordinary labours of the men was soon completé -d, and over
which the whole e army passed, in about two hours time; the horses
and cattle having been previously transported. Your fords hip will
receive he rewith | a return of the killed, wounded, missing Xc. of
his majesty’s troops, on the 28th of last month. That of the enemy
is supposed to have been more considerable especially in killed. The
loss of Lieutenant Colonel Monckton, who commanded the 2d
battalion of Grenadiers, is much to be lamented. | am much
indebted to Lord Cornwallis for his zealous services on every
occasion; and I found great support from the activity of Major
General Grey, Brigadier | Generals M sine w, Leslie and Sir William
Erskine. I beg leave to refer your lordship, for any other particu-
lars which you may wish to be a Enea of, to Colonel Patterson,
who will have the honour to deliver these despatches, and whose
services in this country entitle him to every mark of your lordship’s
favour.
I have the honour to be, &c.

H. CLINTON.

Lord George Germaine made this reply to the official
report of Sir Henry Clinton:

Whitehall, 2nd September 1778.
Sir Henry Clinton
SIR,

On the 22d of last Month I had the pleasure to receive your
Dispatches No. § and 6, by Colonel Beeson and immediately
laid them before The King. His M: aje sty’s reliance on the Valour and
Affection of His Troops, and His Confidence in the Zeal & Ability
of His General, had not suffered a Doubt to arise in His Royal
Breast that your march through the Jersies would be other than
successful from the time your former Letter was received; but it
was with the greatest satisfaction His Majesty dwelt upon every
Circumstance of your very difficult Passage, so fully and clearly
detailed in your Dispatch ; and was graciously pleased to express
the highest Approbation of your whole Conduct in the Dispositions
you made, and the Spirit and Address with which you effected
your purpose. The Wisdom of your Choice of the Route by Free-
hold to < Sandy Hook was particularly remarked by His Majesty, t o

E27 4THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

which and the highly Military and spirited Resolution you took of
attacking the Enemy in their Main Body, and your forming so true
a Judgement of the Effect of that Operation in obliging the Enemy
to recall the Detachments which were ordered to attack the Corps
under the command of Lieut. General Knyphausen, His Majesty
imputes the unexampled Event of conducting an Army, encumbered
with so long a Train of Baggage thro’ a very difficult Country, in
the Face of a numerous Enemy, without the loss of a single Car-
riage. The Commendations you so properly give to the Officers
and Soldiers under your Command appear to His Majesty to have
been fully merited and it is His Majesty's Command that you
acquaint them that their Intrepidity & Perseverance in so arduous
a Service, is highly approved by The King. It would however, be
injustice to Lieut. Generals Knyphausen & Earl Cornwallis, as well
as to Major General Grey and Brigadier Generals Mathew, Leslie
and Sir William Erskine, whose services you distinguish, were |
not to acquaint you that His Majesty desires you will convey to
each of them in particular, His fullest Approbation. The Arrival
of Mor. d’Estaing’s Squadron on the Coast was undoubtedly a
sufficient Reason for Lord Howe to defer making the Embarkations
directed in His Majesty’s Secret Instructions of the 21st March
and as you will soon have heard that Admiral Byron’s Squad-
ron which followed the French Fleet, had the Misfortune of being
separated in a Gale of Wind off Newfoundland, the propriety of
that step will be still more evident. But I trust so many of Ad-
miral Byron’s Fleet will have kept together, as, when joined to
the Ships with Lord Howe will have enabled his Lordship to act
with Success against Mor. d’Estaing, and that an opportunity will
then have offered of carrying those Instructions into Execution.

lam &c.

Gero. GERMAINE.

On July 4, the anniversary of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, the army being still on the south bank of the
Raritan River at Brunswick, celebrated the day by firing
thirteen pieces of artillery and a few de jove of firearms
along the whole line drawn up on the bank of the river
at five o'clock in the afternoon.

On July 7 the whole army was in motion and marched
to Scotch Plains, Springfield, Aquackanonk, Paramus,
Haverstraw, and then across the Hudson River at King’s
Ferry on July 17, 18, and 19. On Friday, July 24, the
army joined the division of General Gates at White Plains.

[ 272 ]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
General Washington sums up his opinion of the whole
campaign, nearly two months after the battle, in a letter

to General Nelson of Vir; ginia, August 20, 1778: “After
two years’ manoeuvreing and undergoing the strangest
vicissitudes, that perhaps ever attended any one contest
since the creation, both armies are brought back to the
very point they set out from, and that which was the
offending party in the beginning is now reduced to the use
of the spade and pick-axe for defence.’’””

In commenting on this battle it will suffice to m: ike a
few clear statements the truth of which will be apparent
to any one who enters carefully into the study of the affair
in all its changing phases.

The Battle of Monmouth was the very first fruits of the
good cheer which the new alliance with the French nation
had Ras, to the hearts of every patriot soldier. It de-
stroyed the cabal which had hounded the Commander-in-
Chief, it cheered the patriots at home, it gave new cour-
age to the patriots in the field, it gave new confidence to
Congress.

It was the strong, unequivocal reply which the American
Army made to the offer of the British Government for
peace and the proposals for conciliation tendered by the
Commissioners.

It was the hour of ee a ue establishment of the
regular military service of America. It demonstrated the
fact to the men ented to the Cee and to the
world (although Edmund Burke had said “‘it is evident
they cannot look standing armies in the face’) that the
soldiers of the regular Continental Line did not hesitate
for a moment to make a stand in front of or to attack a
body of British regulars and that they possessed an equal
amount of courage and endurance, of drill and discipline.
This fact is to the honor and glory of the first American
soldiers.

It was, as General de Peyster has truly asserted, the last

10 Ford’s Writings of George Washington, Vol. XII, p. 761.

E273 3THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

battle in which 10,000 men in the British Army and at
least 10,000 men in the American Army fought or were
present. It was the only battle of the Revolutionary War
in the open field wherein the main forces of both armies,
with a majority of their most brilliant officers, partici-
pated.

It is quite clear that the early part of the fight was lost
because of Lee’s failure to grasp the situation in the man-
ner in which an officer who enjoyed such a reputation as
he seems to have had in America should have done. He
certainly did not even execute the plan of the day which
he professed to have in his own mind.

It is apparent that the second part of the battle was
turned to victory by the personal magnetism of General
Washington. The soldiers certainly made a prompt re-
sponse to every order he gave. They had full faith in his
ability to bring them out of confusion and to vanquish
the approaching enemy.

It was a simple escape which Sir Henry Clinton accom-
plished and this in no sense can be called a victory for
him. It is true that he secured a safe retreat, the end he
asserts he most desired, but this was not a victory. It is
also quite true that the British soldier displayed on this
field all the courage and all the discipline for which he has
ever been celebrated. No better troops in that day marched
to the field of battle than the light infantry, the guards
and the grenadiers of the British Army. To cope with
such men on the open field was glory indeed for Washing-
ton, and for Greene, Stirling, Lafayette, Wayne and
Knox.

The American Army made their camp on the battle-
field and the nation had a right to call such an act a
victory. The next day the patriot army buried the dead
pf both armies—the unpleasant duty of victors.

By this battle the soil of New Jersey became indeed, as
has been said, the great battle-ground of the Revolution.
Trenton and Princeton and Red Bank had brought mili-

E 274 JTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
tary fame to the State. Monmouth added new luster to

those victories and secured to the Commonwealth im-
mortal honor.APPENDIX I

A Weekly Return of the Continental Army under the Command of
His Excellency Georce WasHINGTON Eso’r, General and Com-
mander in Chief of the Armies of the Independent States of
America. (An extract very carefully prepared.)

  
  
     
     
        

Camp June 13, 1778.

 

 

a:
2 4 o z z 2 28
BRIGADE g § 5 - = 3 2 : z e
8 5 z 3 a & 2 s ak
Woodford I l 13 33 16 = 66 30 | 494
Scott 2 2 I 21 26 19 89 33 478
Ist Pennsyla. 2 i 3 14 27 12 64 46 442
2nd Pennsyla. 3 2 7 11 12 40 28 260
Poor 3 4 1S. 37 1s O48 49) 0d
Glover zz 4 I 2 51 14 go 46 703
Larned I 2 2 12 30 13 56 33. 450
Patison 3 2 2 iS; Ma 14 2 OS San
Weedon 3 3 4 22 49 19 83 40 667
Muhlenberg 3 5 5 21 49 21 91 49 783
Maxwell
Ist Maryl’d 2 2 10 52 21 97 35 913
2nd Maryl’d 2 2 2 12 19 13 47 20) 7
Conway 2 3 4 12 34 25 2 55 509
Huntington 2 3 2 21 326 7 iG 50 903
Varnum I 3 15 26 8 80 43 688
N. Carolina 2 2 I 11 29 11 49 29 «=: 683
Jackson’s Detach’t 1 I 9 17 3 22 27 +226
Vanchaicks Reg’t I I I 6 16 5 21 12 327
Silen’s Comp’y 2 3 8 2 21
At Fish Kills. 2 6 4 GF yaa 24, 287 I) 1.820
Hartleys Reg’t I I 4 7 2 27 15 121
a ,

Total, 34 49 388 276 744 285 1.566 792 12,776THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

Return of part of the Corps of Artillery in the service of the United

 

 

 

States.

ad
a n
a = a eaten a
3 a — x z 4a 2
z 3 gS a eee é
BRIGADE g 7 mR i e a z 5 Sz &
8 § z 3 B 5 S 880 o

g Companies Col.

Crane’s 6 26 3 37 98 154
5 Companies Col.

Lamb’s 1 4 14 16 39 70
Col. Proctors Reg’t 1 1 1 2 15 4 14 57 68
Col. Harrison’s

Reg’t I 1 1 12 29 6 24. 107) 2207
Capt. Kingsbury’s

Co. 1 4 5 14 9

Total, 2 2 2 25 88 13 96 315 508

 

Return from Fisk Kill dated May 16t, Hartleys May 31**t. No re-
turn of Gen’! Maxwell’s brigade.

ALEx. SCAMMELL, Adj’t. Gen!

[Endorsed by General Washington on the back of the original. |
Weekly & Gen! Return 13°" June 1778.APPENDIX II

   

Field Return of the Troops under the Command of His ney

 

 

GENERAL WASHINGTON at Corya[e]]Il’s Ferry, June 22, ’78.
OFFICERS PRESENT, FIT FOR DUTY
COMMIS- NON COM-
FIELD SIONED MISSIONED
ee ——— =
2 aS
ee oF
2 . 2 & Zz z, =
3 z a z z < <
z 5 F a 4 a ue
BRIGADES g . Ss ~ Be = a s o
S 5 = 5 a a S a
Woodford’s 3 2 11 33 61 25 502
Scott’s l 2 l 19 37 81 42 518
Ist Pennsylvania 1 1S 29 58 ct 61d
2nd Pennsylvania 3 4 3 17 26 66 45 664
Poor’s 2 4 l 18 46 76 46 871
Glover’s 2 4 1 26 51 83 50 = 781
Larnd’s 2 2 2 13 2 55 36=—s 561
Paterson’s 3 2 2 21 45 85 Al 57
Weedon’s 4 3 5 20 46 81 42 664
Muhlenberg’s 3 5 4 19 49 80 My oh
Late Conway’s I 3 4 12 2 88 54 §41
Huntington’s 2 2 2 18 40 94 SO ks
Varnum’s 1 3 16 2 73 48 674
No. Carolina 2 2 I 11 27 47 2AS 28
ist Maryland 1 2 11 49 93 40 1,000
2nd Maryland 2 2 1 11 21 §2 26 «542
Total, 28 39 35 258 583 1,173 691 10,697
ALEXD®. SCAMMELL,

Adjt Genl.APPENDIX III

A SKETCH OF MAJOR-GENERAL LEE

GENERAL Charles Lee had been a soldier almost from his birth.
His father was colonel of the Forty-fourth regiment British foot,
and it is said that the son held a commission in the British service
when he was but eleven years of age. In 1751, at the age of twenty,
we find him on the army list as a lieutenant in the regiment which
his father, who died the previous year, had commanded, and he
came with that organization to America in 1754. He was present
at the disastrous defeat of Braddock on the Monongahela River,
and became a captain in his regiment in June, 1756. At the assault
on Ticonderoga, July 8, 1758, he was badly wounded by a musket-
ball, breaking his ribs and passing through his body. During the
following year, however, he took part in the attack on the French
Army in garrison at Niagara, and in 1760 he was with General
Amherst at the fall of Montreal.

Returning to England immediately thereafter, he was made
major of the One hundred and third regiment of foot, then suc-
cessively major and lieutenant-colonel on half-pay. In 1762 he
was in the service of the King of Portugal under General Bur-
goyne, and in “a very gallant action” surprised the Spaniards in
camp on the south bank of the Tagas, near the castle of Villa
Velha, and gathered up many prisoners and much valuable booty.
In 1769 he was a major-general by the King of Poland, and in 1773
he appears again in America as a private citizen, although still
borne on the half-pay list of Britain.

His appearance was described by Dr. Thomas Girdlestone, in a
work published in London in 1813, to prove that Lee was the
author of the Junius letters, as “‘a remarkably thin man.” The
book is illustrated with a most singular caricature of General Lee.
Another description of him was, ‘“‘as plain in his person, even to
ugliness, and careless in his manners, even to a degree of rudeness:
his nose was so remarkably acquiline that it appeared as a real
deformity. His voice was rough, his garb ordinary, his deportment
morose. He was ambitious of fame, without the dignity to support
it. In private life he sank into the vulgarity of the clown.”

His character was that of a self-sufficient, overbearing,
abusive officer. He delighted to ridicule his superiors in rank,
and to write words of keen satire against those who stood in the
way of his rapid advancement. He was rude in his actions, very

fi, 280) 7e“AAPPENDIX III

profane in his language, yet withal, was able to impress everyone
with the idea of his great military genius, skill, and experience,
and this faculty never failed him. As Alexander Hamilton said
of him in after years, he had “a certain preconceived and pre-
posterous notion of his being a very great man,” and Tom
Paine remarked, “that he was above all monarchs and below
all scum.”

This, then, is the idea we have of the officer who solicited a
high command in the provincial army, and received it June 17,
1775. Congress soon after took great pains to compensate him
for his pecuniary loss in dropping his British commission and tak-
ing up his sword on behalf of America.

In the fall of 1776, although ordered by General Washing-
ton, who had retreated through New Jersey and over the Dela-
ware River, to join his feeble force on the west bank of that
river, he tardily left the Hudson River with his division, and
leisurely passed on toward Morristown and New Jersey. A few
hours’ rapid march would have enabled him to reinforce his
commander-in-chief, but he cared not to sink his separate com-
mand in the main army. He was captured unceremoniously by
a detachment of British dragoons, December thirteenth, and
without hat, coat or boots, the British troopers hurried away
with their odd-looking captive, and carried him off to Penning-
ton and then to Brunswick. Great rejoicing was made at the
British posts when they heard that he who was considered the
“American Paladium” had been taken prisoner, and consequent
dejection followed in the army of the republic, where he was
the “idol of the officers and possessed still more the confidence
of the soldiers.”” At the British headquarters in New York Gen-
eral Lee was considered, and at first treated, as a deserter from
their army, and thrice under orders was he placed on shipboard
to be sent to England for trial. This, however, was never done.
[For a sound and able study of Charles Lee, see John Fiske, Essays, Hise

torical and Literary, Vol. I, pp. 53-98. Also see Stryker’s The Battles of
Trenton and Princeton, pp. 53-9.]APPENDIX IV

GENERAL LEE TO GENERAL WASHINGTON

Camp, English Town, 1 July, 1778

SIR:

From the knowledge I have of your Excellency’s character I
must conclude that nothing but the misinformation of some very
stupid or misrepresentation of some very wicked person could have
occasioned you making use of so very singular expressions as you
did on my coming up to the ground where you had taken post: they
implied that I was guilty either of disobedience of orders, of want
of conduct or want of courage; your Excellency will therefore
infinitely oblige me by letting me know on which of these articles
you ground your charge, that | may prepare for my justification,
which I have the happiness to be confident I can do to the army, to
the Congress, to America and to the world in general. Your Ex-
cellency must give me leave to observe that neither yourself nor
those about your person could from your situation be in the least
judges of the merits or demerits of our manoeuvres; and, to
speak with a becoming pride, I can assert, that to these manoeuvres
the success of the day was entirely owing. I can boldly say that
had we remained on the first ground or had we advanced or had the
retreat been conducted in a manner different from what it was, this
whole army and the interests of America would have been risked
being sacrificed. I ever had and hope ever shall have the greatest
respect and veneration for General Washington: I think him
endowed with many great and good qualities: but in this instance
I must pronounce that he has been guilty of an act of cruel injus-
tice towards a man who certainly has some pretensions to the
regard of every servant of this country; and I think, Sir, I have
a right to demand some reparation for the injury committed, and,
unless I can obtain it, I must, in justice to myself, when this cam-
paign is closed (which I believe will close the war) retire from a
service at the head of which is placed a man capable of offering
such injuries : but, at the same time, in justice to you, I must repeat,
that I from my soul believe, that it was not a motion of your own
breast, but instigated by some of those dirty ear-wigs who will for-
ever insinuate themselves near persons in high office; for I really
am convinced, that when General Washington acts for himself no

lp 282) aAPPENDIX IV

man in his army will have reason to complain of injustice or
indecorum.

I am, sir, and hope ever shall have
Reason to continue your most sincerely
Devoted, humble servant
CHARLES LEE
HIS EXCELLENCY GENERAL WASHINGTON.

GENERAL WASHINGTON TO GENERAL LEE

Head Quarters, English-Town 30 June 1778.
SIR:

I received your letter (dated through mistake the 1st of July)
expressed, as I conceive, in terms highly improper. I am not con-
scious of having made use of any very singular expressions at the
time of my meeting you, as you intimate. W hat I recollect to have
said was dictated | by duty and warranted by the occasion. As soon
as circumstances will permit, you shall have an opportunity either
of justifying yourself to the army, to Congress, to America and
to the world in general or of conv incing teh that you were guilty
of a breach of orders and of misbehaviour before the enemy on the
28th inst., in not attacking them as you had been directed and in
making an unnecessary, disorderly and shameful retreat.

I am, sir, your most ‘obedient servant

Go. WASHINGTON.
MAJOR GENERAL LEE.—

GENERAL LEE TO GENERAL WASHINGTON

Camp, 28 June 1778
SIR:

I beg your Excellency’s pardon for the inaccuracy in mis-d: iting
my fetter. You cannot yar me greater pleasure than in giving
me the opportunity of showing to America the sufficie ncy nf hee
respective servants. I trust that the temporary power of office, and
the tinsel dignity attending it, will not be able by all the mists
they can raise, to offiscate the bright rays of truth: in the mean
time your Excellency can have no objection to my retiring from
the army.—

I am, sir, your most obedient

Humble servant
CHARLES LEE.—
GENERAL WASHINGTON.—THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH
GENERAL LEE TO GENERAL WASHINGTON

Camp, 30 June, 1778
SIR:

Since I had the honour of addressing my letter by Colonel Fitz-
gerald to your Excellency I have reflected on both your situation
and mine and beg leave to observe, that it will be for our mutual
convenience that a court of inquiry should be immediately ordered:
but I could wish it might be a court-martial, for if the affair is
drawn into length, it may be difficult to collect the necessary evi-
dences and perhaps might bring on a paper war betwixt the ad-
herents to both parties, which may occasion some disagreeable
fends on the continent, for all are not my friends, nor all your
admirers. 1 must entreat, therefore, from your love of justice, that
you will immediately exhibit your charge, and that on the first
halt, I may be brought to a trial, and am, sir, your most obedient,
humble servant,

CHARLES LEE.—
HIS EXCELLENCY GENERAL WASHINGTON.—

GENERALS WAYNE AND SCOTT TO GENERAL
WASHINGTON

Englishtown, 30th June, 1778
SIR:

We esteem it a duty, which we owe to our country, ourselves and
the officers and soldiers under our command, to state the following
facts to your Excellency:

On the 28th instant, at five o’clock in the morning we received
orders to march with the following detachments, namely, Scott’s
and Varnum’s brigades, Colonels Butler and Jackson in front,
amounting to seventeen hundred men; Colonels Wesson, Living-
ston, and Stewart, with one thousand men, commanded by General
Wayne; a select detachment of fourteen hundred men, rank and
file, under General Scott, with ten pieces of Artillery properly dis-
tributed among the whole.

About eight o’clock, the van under Col Butler arrived on the left
of Monmouth Court House, on the rear of the left flank of the
enemy, who were in full march, moving in great haste and con-
fusion. At this time our main body under General Lee, were formed
at the edge of a wood about half a mile distant from the Court
House. General Wayne, who was in front reconnoitring the enemy,
perceiving that they had made a halt and were preparing to push
Colonel Butler with their horse and a few foot, gave direction for

[ 284 JAPPENDIX IV
him to form and receive them and at the same time sent Major
Byles to General Lee, requesting that those troops might be ad-
vanced to support those in front, and for the whole to form on the
edge of a deep morass, which extends from the east of the Court
House on the right a very considerable distance to the left. The
troops did arrive in about an hour after the requisition, and were
generally formed in this position.

About the same time General Scott’s detachment had passed the
morass on the left, and the enemy’s horse and foot that had charged
Colonel Butler, were repulsed. The number of the enemy now in
view might be near two thousand, though at first not more than
five hundred exclusive of their horse. The ground we now occu-
pied was the best formed by nature for defence of any, perhaps in
the country. The enemy advanced with caution, keeping at a con-
siderable distance in front. General Scott, having viewed the posi-
tion of the enemy, as well as the ground where about twenty-five
hundred of our troops were formed, repassed the morass and took
post on the left, in a fine open wood, covered by said morass in
front.

Whilst this was doing, General Wayne perceiving that the troops
on the right from the wood to the Court House, were retreating,
sent Major Fishbourne to General Lee, requesting that the troops
might return to support him. In the interim General Wayne re-
passed the morass, leaving Colonel Butler’s regiment to keep post
on the right flank of the enemy. Generals Scott and Wayne then
went together along the morass to the Court House, when Major
Fishbourne returned, and said that General Lee gave no other
answer, than that he would see General Wayne himself, which
he never did. The enemy having now an opening on the right of
General Scott began to move on, when General Wayne and Gen-
eral Scott sent to General Lee to request him at least to form, to
favor General Scott’s retreat, but this requisition met with the
same fate as the last. The troops kept still retreating, when Gen-
eral Scott perceiving that he would not be supported, filed off to the
left. General Wayne ordered Colonel Butler to fall back also. Thus
were these several select detachments unaccountably drawn off
without being suffered to come to action, although we had the most
pleasing prospect from our number and position, of obtaining the
most glorious and decisive victory. After this we fortunately fell
in with your Excellency. You ordered us to form part of those
troops, whose conduct and bravery kept the enemy in play until
you had restored order.
~ We have taken the liberty of stating these facts, in order to con-
vince the world that our retreat from the Court House was not
occasioned by the want of numbers, position, or wishes of both

eesTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

officers and men to maintain that post. We also beg leave to men-
tion that no plan of attack was ever communicated to us, or notice
of a retreat, until it had taken place in our rear, as we supposed
by General Lee’s order. We are &c.
ANTHONY WAYNE.
CHARLES SCOTT.

MAJOR-GENERAL LEE TO ROBERT MORRIS

Brunswick, July ye 3" 1778.—
My Dr. Sir,

To use the words of my Lord Chatham, have we not a gracious
Prince on the Throne 2 is he not still the same ?—I trust he is: but
there is something rotten betwixt him and his People—not content
with robbing me and the brave men under my command of the
honour due to us—a most hellish plan has been formed (and I may
say at least not discourag’d by Head Quarters) to destroy for
ever my honour and reputation—I have demanded a Court Martial
which has fortunately been granted—if I had been let alone, I
should with patience has suffered ’em to pick up the laurels which
I had shaken down and lay’d at their feet; but the outrageous at-
tacks made are enough to drive patience itself to madness—I shall
not trouble you at present with a detail of the action, but by all
that’s sacred Gen’] Washington had scarcely any more to do in it
than to strip the dead—by want of proper intelligence we were
ordered to attack the covering party supposed to consist only of
fifteen hundred men—Our intelligence as usual was false—it
proved to be the whole flower of the British Army, Grenadiers, L
Infantry Cavalry and Artillery amounting in the whole to Seven
thousand men—by the temerity, folly, and contempt of orders of
General Wain we found ourselves engaged in the most extensive
plain in America—separated from our main body the distance of
eight miles—The force we cou’d bring to action not more than three
thousand men—in danger every moment of having our flanks
turn’d by their Cavalry—it required the utmost presence of mind
and courage to extricate ourselves out of this dangerous situation,
and on this occasion it is no crime to do justice to myself. Upon
my Soul I feel I know the whole Army saw and must acknowledge
that I did exhibit great presence of mind and not less address—
altho’ my order’s were perpetually counteracted I manoeuvred my
antagonists from their advantageous ground into as disadvan-
tageous a one—no confusion was seen, the Battalions and artillery
supported and were supported by each other through a plain of
four miles, without losing a single gun, a single color, or sacrific-
ing a single Battalion until I led ’em totally exhausted into the

[a 286) 4APPENDIX IV

ground where the general was posted, who had as I observ’d before
nothing to do but strip the dead—it is true they cannonaded
each other for some time but the Enemy were so completely worn
down that they cou’d never attempt the least impression—The
General has the madness to charge me with making a shameful
retreat—I never retreated in fact (for ’till I join’d him it was not
a retreat but a necessary and I may say in my own defence masterly
manoeuvre) I say I never retreated but by his positive order who
invidiously sent me out of the field when the victory was assur’d—
Such is my recompense for having sacrificed my Friends, my con-
nexions, and perhaps my fortune for having twice extricated this
man and his whole army out of perdition, and now having given
him the only victory he ever tasted. Do not my Dr. Friend, imagine
I talk in this heated manner to every man—to you I venture to pour
out my indignation—but I give you my word I am so sensible of
my ticklish situation that I am with others perfectly moderate and
guarded—the cool parts of this letter I wish you wou’d read to
Richard Henry Lee and Duar, to what others you think prudent.—
I am most sincerely and affectionately Yours

C. Ler.?
1The Lee Papers, Vol. II, p. 457.APPENDIX V

A ust, compiled, of the filled, wounded, missing and died of
fatigue of the American Army.

KILLED

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL RupoLpH BuNNER, Third Pennsylvania
regiment.

Major EpMunp B. Dickinson, First Virginia regiment.

Captain PAUL ELLIS, Fifteenth Massachusetts regiment.

Captain Henry Faunt Leroy, Fifth Virginia regiment.

Caprain EpMUND Munro, Fifteenth Massachusetts regiment.

First LIEUTENANT JAMES McNair, of Captain Andrew Porter's
company, Second Artillery regiment, head shot off by cannon-
ball.

SeconD LIEUTENANT NaTHAN WEEKS, of Lieutenant-Colonel
Jeremiah Olney’s company, Second Rhode Island regiment.

SURGEON EBENEZER HAVILAND, Second New York regiment.

HospiTaL SURGEON SAMUEL KENNEDY, formerly surgeon of the
Fourth Pennsylvania battalion.

SERGEANT JOSEPH KENYON, of Captain William Allen’s company,
Second Rhode Island regiment.

CorporaAL THOMAS TRUMBULL, of Captain Seth Drew’s company,
Second Massachusetts regiment.

Firer Davip McCraren, of Captain John Davis’s company, Fourth
New York regiment.

Mattross REUBEN Eis, of Captain Andrew Porter’s company,
Second artillery regiment.

PrivATE THOMAS ATKERSON, of Captain Reuben Lipscomb’s com-
pany, Seventh Virginia regiment.

PrivaTE JoHN Bates, of Captain Samuel Mattock’s company,
Eighth Connecticut regiment.

Private McInTIRE BENJAMIN, of Captain Nathaniel Tomm’s
company, Malcolm’s regiment.

PrivaTE AZELL BENNETT, of Lieutenant-Colonel Jeremiah Olney’s
company, Second Rhode Island regiment.

Private JoHN Buys, of Lieutenant-Colonel Peter R. Fell’s bat-
talion, New Jersey State troops.

PrivaTE GEORGE Brown, of Captain Christopher Darrow’s com-
pany, First Connecticut regiment.

[E 283.4APPENDIX V

PRIVATE MATTHEW Burve, of Captain Joseph McCracken’s com-
pany, First New York regiment.

PRIVATE Patrick Caton, of late Captain Sylvenus Shaw’s com-
pany, Second Rhode Island regiment.

PRIVATE MICHAEL FIELD, First regiment Middlesex county New
Jersey militia, wounded, prisoner of war, and died the day after
the battle. i

PRIVATE JOHN FINNEY, of Captain Seth Drew’s company, Second
Massachusetts regiment.

PRIVATE JAMES P. FitcH, of Captain Abner Bacon’s company,
Fourth Connecticut regiment.

PRIVATE ANSEL Fox, of an artillery regiment.

PRIVATE CHRISTIAN GuTHRIE, of Captain John Copp’s company,
First New York regiment.

PRIVATE SAMUEL HALL, of Major Theodore Woodbridge’s com-
pany, Seventh Connecticut regiment.

PRIVATE JOHN HAMILTON, of Captain Jonathan Forman’s com-
pany, Fourth New Jersey regiment.

PRIVATE NATHANIEL JESUP, of Captain Sylvanus Brown’s com-
pany, Eighth Connecticut regiment.

PRIVATE AARON Monson, of Major David Smith’s company,
Eighth Connecticut regiment.

PRIVATE GEORGE Munro, of Captain Edmund Munro’s company,
Fifteenth Massachusetts regiment.

PRIVATE JOHN PARKERSON, of Captain Reuben Lipscomb’s com-
pany, Seventh Virginia regiment.

PRIVATE EBENEZER Rocers, of late Captain Elisha Lee’s company,
Fourth Connecticut regiment.

PRIVATE WILLIAM P. Stewart, of Captain Peter Dolliver’s com-
pany, Jackson’s regiment.

PRIVATE JOHN WALKER, of Captain John Sandford’s company,
Malcolm’s regiment.

WOUNDED

CoLONEL JOHN DurKEEF, Fourth Connecticut regiment, wounded in
right hand, permanently disabled.

CoLonEL Henry B. LivincstTon, Fourth New York regiment.

CoLONEL WALTER STEWart, Thirteenth Pennsylvania regiment.

CoLoNEL JAMES Wesson, Ninth Massachusetts regiment, cannon-
ball grazed his shoulder and back.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL FRaNciIS BarBER, adjutant-general to
Major-General Lord Stirling, musket-ball passed through his

body.
[ 289 JTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL JoHN LAURENS, aide-de-camp to General
Washington.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL NATHANIEL Ramsay, Third Maryland
regiment.

ToussaRD, lost an arm.

Major Simeon THayeER, Second Rhode Island regiment, lost the
sight of an eye, by the windage of a cannon-ball.

Major BENJAMIN TiTcoMB, First New Hampshire regiment.

CapTAIN THOMAS BuTLER, Third Pennsylvania regiment.

Captain Davip Cook, Third artillery regiment.

Captain Moses Estey, Fourth regiment Hunterdon county New
Jersey militia, in thigh.

CapTAIN JosEPpH McCRAcKEN, First New York regiment, left arm
shot off by a cannon-ball.

CAPTAIN JEREMIAH MILLER, First Massachusetts regiment.

Captain WILLIAM SATTERLEE, Second Canadian regiment.

Captain RoBERT SMITH, Malcolm’s regiment.

CAPTAIN PHILIP SNooK, First regiment Hunterdon county New
Jersey militia.

Captain ANDREW WAGGONER, Twelfth Virginia regiment.

ADJUTANT PETER TAULMAN, Malcolm’s regiment, shot in the
throat.”

First LIEUTENANT ANDREW JOHNSON, quartermaster First Penn-
sylvania regiment, right leg.

First LIEUTENANT JAMES MoNELL, Malcolm’s regiment, lost an
eye.

First LIEUTENANT ABRAHAM NEELY, Malcolm’s regiment, right
thigh.®

First LIEUTENANT CHARLES Parsons, First New York regiment.

First LIEUTENANT JONATHAN Pucu, Fifth Pennsylvania regiment.

SECOND LIEUTENANT EZEKIEL HoweELt, of Captain Andrew Por-
ter’s company, Second artillery regiment.

SEconD LIEUTENANT DANIEL McLangE, Second artillery regiment.

GrorcE WALKER, a volunteer, acting as an officer, “with reputa-
tion, without pay,’ Second New Jersey regiment (commissioned
as an ensign in same organization September 12, 1778), wounded
in the side.

SERGEANT Henry BECKER, of Captain Jonathan Pearcy’s company,
Fourth New York regiment, died of his wounds July 27, 1778.

1 Colonel Joseph Phillips, First regiment Hunterdon County New Jersey
militia, certified to the War Department that Captain Snook had the “honor
of receiving a shot through the thigh” in this battle.

2 See Barber and Howe’s Historical Collections of New Jersey, p. 342.

8 thid., p. 343.

[ 290 JAPPENDIX V

SERGEANT Battus Co..ins, of Captain Gibbs Jones’ Pennsylvania
artillery company, left arm and leg.

SERGEANT Burr GILBERT, First Connecticut regiment.

SERGEANT ATCHISON MELLEN, of Captain Michael Simpson’s com-
pany, First Pennsylvania regiment.

SERGEANT THOMAS SNOWDEN, of Captain Thomas B. Bowen’s
company, Ninth Pennsylvania regiment, ball shattered his ankle.

SERGEANT Davip WEtcH, First artillery regiment, right foot.

Corporal JOHN WILLIAMS, of Captain John Anderson’s company,
Fourth New Jersey regiment, wounded four times.

CorPoRAL WILLIAM WoopruFF, Fifth Connecticut regiment.

Mattross JoHN KEtty, of Captain Andrew Moodie’s company,
Second artillery regiment. He died of his wounds July 19, 1778.

DRUMMER Robert LetForD, First Pennsylvania regiment.

GUNNER Henry SMITH, of Captain Andrew Moodie’s company,
Second artillery regiment.

PrivATE RICHARD ALLISON, of Captain John Smith’s company,
Fourth New York regiment, prisoner of war, severely wounded
on head and neck with a sword.

PRIVATE NICHOLAS BEarzs, of Captain Thomas Butler’s company,
Third Pennsylvania regiment.

PRIVATE JOSHUA BENNETT, of late Captain Benjamin Pelton’s Com-
pany, Second New York regiment, died of his wounds October
1778.

PRIVATE JOHN BLAIN, Fourth Pennsylvania regiment.

PRIVATE JAMES BopEN, of Captain William Tucker’s company,
First regiment Hunterdon county New Jersey militia.

PRIVATE JOSEPH Cox, Fifteenth Massachusetts regiment, lost right
leg.

PRIVATE JOHN Davis, Second Pennsylvania regiment.

PRIVATE WILLIAM ELBERTSON, of Captain David Van Ness’s com-
pany, First New York regiment.

PRIVATE JOHN FLEMING, of Captain William Helm’s company,
Second New Jersey regiment, wounded on head and right
shoulder by saber cut, and right arm became useless.

PRIVATE BENJAMIN Gray, of Captain Benjamin Walker’s com-
pany, Fourth New York regiment. He died of his wounds July 5,
1778.

PRIVATE WILLIAM HowELlt, Fourth New Jersey regiment.

PRIVATE ELIJAH Hoyt, Thirteenth Massachusetts regiment, right
side by a bayonet.

PRIVATE CAESAR JOWLER, of Captain Sylvanus Brown’s company,
Eighth Connecticut regiment. He died of his wounds August 8,

1778.
[ 291 ]THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

PrivaTE James KirKpATRIcK, of Captain John Mott’s company,
Third New Jersey regiment.

PRIVATE JoHN LorarNne, of Captain Francis Nichols’ company,
Ninth Pennsylvania regiment.

PRIVATE EPHRAIM MarsuH, (probably First) regiment Essex
county New Jersey militia, wounded in the stomach by saber,
died from the effects of the wound.

PRIVATE ALEXANDER MCQUILLEN, of Captain Jacob Weaver’s com-
pany, Tenth Pennsylvania regiment.

PrivaTE NicHOLAS Mooney, of Captain Andrew Waggoner’s com-
pany, Twelfth Virginia regiment.

Private BARNEY Murpny, Ninth Pennsylvania regiment, elbow
of right arm.

PRIVATE WILLIAM OrMmonpD, Second Maryland regiment, right
hand.

PRIVATE ROBERT SAUNDERS, of Captain John Graham’s company,
First New York regiment.

PRIVATE JAMES SEARCH, of Captain Ephraim Anderson’s company,
Second New Jersey regiment.

PrivATE JoHN LeonarD Spanc, of Captain John Doyle’s com-
pany, Eleventh Pennsylvania regiment.

PRIVATE CAESAR SPRAGUE, Fourth Massachusetts regiment, left foot
shot off by cannon-ball.

PrIvATE ROBERT VERNON, Second Pennsylvania regiment, right
arm.

Private AARON ForMAN WALKER, First regiment Monmouth
county New Jersey militia, in the side.

MISSING

Captain THomas THEODORE Butss, Second artillery regiment,
prisoner of war.

SEcoND LIEUTENANT THOMAS LitTLE, Third regiment Monmouth
county New Jersey militia, taken prisoner June 27, 1778.

SERGEANT RoBERT Gore, of Captain Joseph McClellan’s company,
Ninth Pennsylvania regiment.

SERGEANT ANDREW HALuipay, of Captain John Stith’s company,
Fourth Virginia regiment.

PRIVATE JOHN BriTTON, of Captain Daniel Nevin’s company, Mal-
colm’s regiment.

PRIVATE PETER CHAPMAN, of Captain George Wall’s company,
Fourth Virginia regiment.

PRIVATE JoHN Dempsey, of Captain Daniel Nevin’s company,
Malcolm’s regiment.

[ 292 ]APPENDIX V

PrivaTE THomas Kipper, of Captain Joshua Brown’s company,
Fifteenth Massachusetts regiment.

PRIVATE SAMUEL Post, of late Captain Jonathan Pearcy’s com-
pany, Fourth New York regiment.

PRIVATE ANDREW SKILLING, of Captain George Wall’s company,
Fourth Virginia regiment.

DIED OF FATIGUE

SERGEANT HeENry BAKER, Lieutenant-Colonel’s company, died July
27, 1778.

SERGEANT STEPHEN WHITE, First North Carolina regiment, on June
28, 1778.

Corporal SAMUEL ANDREWS, of Captain Daniel Barnes’ company,
Fifteenth Massachusetts regiment, on July 1, 1778.

Corpora JAMES BuTLER, of Captain Samuel Darby’s company,
Second Massachusetts regiment, on July 1, 1778.

PRIVATE JAMES BEAL, of Captain Caleb Robinson’s company,
Second New Hampshire regiment, on June 29, 1778.

PrivaTE Davip Brack, of Captain Davis’s company, Fourth New
York regiment, on July 9, 1778.

PRIVATE ELIAKIM Brooks, of Captain James Keith’s company,
Eighth Massachusetts regiment, on July 1, 177

PRIVATE SAMUEL BurcH, of Captain McKean’s company, First
New York regiment, on July 20, 1778.

PRIVATE JOHN P. Crark, of Captain Joshua Eddy’s company,
Fourteenth Massachusetts regiment, on July 1, 1778.

PRIVATE JOHN Cooper, of Captain George Dunham’s company,
Second Massachusetts regiment, on June 30, 1778.

PRIVATE JAMES CRATON, of Captain William Rowell’s company,
Second New Hampshire regiment, on June 30, 1778.

PrivaTE WILLIAM Davis, of Captain George Wall’s company,
Fourth Virginia regiment, on July 2, 1778.

PRIVATE JOEL DENSLOw, of Captain Abner Prior’s company, Fifth
Connecticut regiment, on July 1, 1778.

PRIVATE JOHN Depew, of Captain Wright’s company, Second New
York regiment, in August, 1778.

PRIVATE JOSEPH Desitve, of Captain Moses Knapp’s company,
Fourth Massachusetts regiment, on June 28, 1778.

PRIVATE JOHN P. Dressar, of Captain Joseph Hodgkins’ company,
Fifteenth Massachusetts regiment, on June 29, 1778.

PRIVATE ANDREW Gace, of late Captain James Gray’s company,
Third New Hampshire regiment, on July 1, 1778.

PRIVATE JOHN GROVEHAM, of Captain Reuben Lipscomb’s com-
pany, Seventh Virginia regiment, on June 30, 177

L 293 JTHE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH

PRIVATE WILLIAM Habock, of Captain Samuel Sackett’s company,
Fourth New York regiment, on June 29, 1778.

PRIVATE PETER HarDISON, of Captain Daniel Pilsbury’s company,
Thirteenth Massachusetts regiment, on July 1, 1778.

PRIVATE WILLIAM Harrick, of Captain Samuel Sackett’s company,
Fourth New York regiment, on June 29, 1778.

PRIVATE BENJAMIN Lanp, of Captain Hallett’s company, Second
New York regiment, in July 1778.

PrrvaATE KENDRICK LENT, of Captain Hallett’s company, Second
New York Regiment, on July 10, 1778.

PRIVATE WILLIAM MaHANnE, of Major William Scott’s company,
First New Hampshire regiment, on July 1, 1778.

PrivATE JoHN Main, of Captain Phineas Beardeley’s company,
Seventh Connecticut regiment, on June 30, 1778.

PrivaTE LAURENCE NEAL, of Captain George Wall’s company,
Fourth Virginia regiment, on July 5, 1778.

PRIVATE JOHN P. Orzotton, of Captain Joseph Stetson’s company,
Fourteenth Massachusetts regiment, on June 28, 1778.

Private Moses RANDALL, of Captain Smith’s company, Fourth
New York regiment, on July 22, 1778.

PrivATE MatTHew Ruoapes, of Captain John Van Anglen’s com-
pany, First New Jersey regiment, on June 29, 1778.

PRIVATE JOHN SHEELY, of Captain Finn’s company, First New
York regiment, on July 9, 1778.

PRIVATE SAMUEL SPICER, of Major Benjamin Throop’s company,
First Connecticut regiment, on July 1, 1778.

PrivaATE NATHAN TERRELL, of Captain Abner Prior's company,
Fifth Connecticut regiment, on June 30, 1778.
Private PETER P. Tosry, of Captain Joseph Wadsworth’s com-
pany, Fourteenth Massachusetts regiment, on June 30, 1778.
PRIVATE JosEPH TucKER, of Captain Joseph Pettingill’s company,
Ninth Massachusetts regiment, on July 1, 1778.

PRIVATE WiLLIs Upton, Second North Carolina regiment, on July
Ly 17705

PRIVATE SAMUEL WATERMAN, of Captain Ten Eyck’s company,
Second New York regiment, in July 1778.

Private TimotuHy Witcott, of Captain Thomas Willington’s
company, Thirteenth Massachusetts regiment, on July 1, 1778.

SICK IN HOSPITAL

Caprain DANrEL BARNES, Eighth Connecticut regiment, exhaus-
tion from the heat.

First LIEUTENANT JoHN Grace, First Massachusetts regiment,
suffering from his great exertions in the excessive heat.

[ 294 JAPPENDIX V
QUARTERMASTER-SERGEANT WILLIAM Love, Third New Jersey
regiment, ruptured.
CORPORAL WILLIAM ANDERSON, Fifth Connecticut regiment, in-
capacitated by the heat.
Corporat Asa Bunce, Third Connecticut regiment, exhausted.
FirER JAcop Loomes, Second Massachusetts regiment, incapaci-
tated by the heat.
FIFER GIDEON NoBLE, Second Connecticut regiment, ruptured.
PRIVATE BENJAMIN PRESSEY, Ninth Massachusetts regiment, con-
vulsions caused by the intense heat.APPENDIX VI

A ust, compiled, of the killed and wounded officers of the British
Army.

KILLED

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL THE HoNoRABLE HENRY MONCKTON,
Forty-fifth regiment of foot, in command of the Second battalion
of grenadiers.

CapTaIN JoHN Gore, Fifth regiment of foot, in command of the
First battalion of grenadiers.

LIEUTENANT ARCHIBALD KENNEDY, Grenadier company of the
Forty-fourth regiment of foot.

LIEUTENANT THOMAS L. VAUGHAN, Royal regiment of artillery,

WOUNDED

CotonrL HENRY TRELAWNEY, Coldstream regiment of foot
guards.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL ROBERT ABERCROMBY, Thirty-seventh regi-
ment of foot.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL JOHN GrRAvES SIMcoE, Captain Fortieth
regiment of foot, lieutenant-colonel commanding Queen’s rang-
ers, wounded in the arm.

Major WiLi1aM GarDINER, Tenth regiment of foot.

CapTAIN PaTRICK BELLEW, First regiment of foot guards, prisoner
of war.

CAPTAIN WILLIAM BRERETON, Seventeenth regiment of foot.

CapTrain ANDREW CaTHCaRT, Fifteenth regiment of foot, right
arm.

Caprain Harry Ditmas, Fifteenth regiment of foot, on duty with
the Second battalion of grenadiers.

Captain BALDWIN LEIGHTON, Forty-sixth regiment of foot.

CapTAIN JOHN Lioyp, Forty-sixth regiment of foot.

CAPTAIN JOHN PowELlL, Fifty-second regiment of foot, prisoner
of war, and died soon afterward on account of his wounds.

CapTaIn THOMAS WILLS, Twenty-third regiment of foot, or Royal
Welsh Fuzileers.

LIEUTENANT PaTrRICK BELLEY, of the Guards.

[ 296 ]APPENDIX VI

LIEUTENANT ———— Dessoroucu, of the Marines, on duty with
the Second battalion of grenadiers.

LIEUTENANT Harry GILCHRIST, Forty-second regiment of foot, or
Royal Highland regiment.

LIEUTENANT Francis Grose, Fifty-second regiment of foot. He
had also been wounded in the fight at Forts Clinton and Mont-
gomery, October 6, 1777.

LIEUTENANT GeorcE KeLty, Grenadier company of the Forty-
fourth regiment of foot.

LIEUTENANT Munco Paumirr, Forty-sixth regiment of foot.INDEX
ARNOLD, Benedict, 64-5, 72-3.

Bay or, Col. George, 152.

Beesley, Capt. Jonathan, Gz,

Boudinot, Elias, 45, 249-50.

Brooks, Lieut.-Col., 171.

Burr, Lieut.-Col. Aaron, 210-11.

Butler, Col. Richard, 78, 127-8, 135-6, 138, 143-4, 154-5.
Byles, Capt. Thomas L., 144-5.

CADWALLADER, Gen. John, 10, 58, 73, 74, 91, 199.

Carlisle, Abraham, 65-6.

Cilley, Col. Joseph, 78, 142, 157, 164, 210.

Clarke, Lieut.-Col. Alured, 54.

Clinton, Sir Henry, assumes command, 27-8, 29-32; character,
33-4; evacuates Philadelphia, 41, 47-9; march through New
Jersey, 49-56, 82-97; at Battle of Monmouth, 129-31, 147-8,
151-2, 186, 238; retreat, 227-32; official report, 267-71.

Continental Congress, treaty with France, 16-17; British peace
commission, 34-7; orders council of war, 40; approves Lee
sentence, 245, 255; congratulates Washington, 266-7.

“Conway Cabal,” 8-9.

Conway, Gen. Thomas, 9.

Cornwallis, Lord, 33-41, 53, 82, 88, 89, 131, 166, 211.

DE PEYSTER, Gen., quoted, 92.

Dickinson, Maj. Edmund B., 208-9.

Dickinson, Gen. Philemon, 19, 41, 54, 67, 79, 88, 104, 110,
118-19, 122-6.

Duportail, Gen., 24, §7, 77, 168, 183.

Durkee, Col. John, 131, 134.

Epwarps, Capt. Evan, 141, 153, 158, 169, 171, 172, 254-5.
English, Dr. James, 175.

FISHBOURNE, Capt. Benjamin, 144-5.

L 299 JINDEX

Fisher, John, 84.

Fitzgerald, Lieut.-Col., 176, 181.
Forman, Gen. David, 141, 163-4, 232.
Freehold, N.J., 113.

Gates, Gen. Horatio, 9, 40, 69, 72.

Germaine, Lord George, 27-8, 271-2.

Gilman, Lieut.-Col. Jeremiah, 134.

Gordon, Lieut.-Col. Cosmo, 49.

Gordon, Rev. William, quoted, 210.

Grant, Gen. James, 26, 32, 129, 230.

Grayson, Col. William, 117-18, 119-20, 122-6, 133, 161-2, 177.

Greene, Gen. Nathaniel, 38-9, 40, 58, 77, 182, 206, 211-12, 214,
236.

Griffith, Dr. David, 110-11.

HAMILTON, Lieut.-Col. Alexander, 74, 79, 99, 110, 116, 117, 149,
164, 165, 172, 199-200, 254-5.

Hancock’s Bridge, 8-9.

Hand, Col. Elijah, 7.

Harrison, Lieut.-Col., 176-7, 181.

Hayes, Molly, see Molly McCauley.

Henderson, Dr. Thomas, 97, 175, 232.

Hopewell, N.J., 75-8.

Howe, Admiral, 48, 49, 230-1.

Howe, Sir William, 23-6, 27, 29, 31-2.

Howell, Maj. Richard, 109.

Jackson, Col. Henry, 72, 127-8, 133, 136-8, 140, 160-2, 170-1,

188, 194-5, 253.
Jamair, Maj., 153.

KIRKBRIDE, Col. Joseph, 19.

Knox, Gen. Henry, 132, 171, 187-8, 201, 212.

Knyphausen, Lieut.-Gen., 26, 32, 49-50, 52, 54-5, 88, 89, 90, 93,
104, 118, 129, 230.

Lacey, Brig.-Gen. John, 73-4.
Lafayette, Marquis de, 10, 13, 24, 25-6, 40, 58, 77, 79, 80, 91;
98-103, 106-8, 131, 142-3, 148-50, 152-4, 180, 185, 206, 226.

[ 300 JINDEX

Laurens, Lieut.-Col. John, 131-2, 134, 149, 152-3, 165, 173-4,
187, 254-5.

Lee, Billy, 202-3.

Lee, Gen. Charles, oath of allegiance, 13-14; advises delay, 40,
57, 80; joins American Army, 43-46; marches from Valley
Forge, 67-8; at Hopewell, 76-8; requests command of ad-
vance, 100-3; ordered to attack, 106-8; at Battle of Mon-
mouth, 117-28, 132-46, 148-62, 163-74, 177-81, 183, 193-9,
204-6, 222-5; correspondence with Washington, 241-3,
282-4; court-martial, 244-5; last years, 246-57; biographical
sketch, 280-1; letter to Robert Morris, 286-7.

Lee, Col. Henry, 24-5, 247-8.

L’Enfant, Capt. Pierre, 146.

Lennox, Capt. David, 127, 136.

Leslie, Brig.-Gen. Alexander, 29, 30-2, 47, 50, 52, 53, 84, 88.

Livingston, Col. Henry B., 149, 152.

Livingston, Gov. William, 66, 67, 72, 81, 170, 181, 193-4.

Ludwig, Mary, see Molly Pitcher.

McCau ey, Molly, 188-92.

McHenry, James, 141-2, 211.

McLane, Capt. Allen, 58, 64, 236.

Maitland, Maj. John, 19.

Malmedy, Lieut.-Col. Marquis de, 131-2, 136-7, 140.

Mawhood, Col. Charles, 8.

Maxwell, Gen. William, 2, 12, 39, 54, 66-7, 85, 88, 92, 106-8,
109, 119, 124-6, 142-3, 157-9, 177, 195-8, 206, 222, 236.

Meade, Lieut.-Col. Richard K., 121, 163-4.

Mercer, Capt. John, 127, 133, 136, 158, 164-5, 177, 198.

Molly Pitcher, see Molly McCauley.

Monckton, Lieut.-Col. Henry, 215-19.

Montresor, Capt. John, 29, 49.

Morgan, Col. Daniel, 64, 67-8, 78, 92, 104, 110, 155-6, 236.

Moylan, Col. Stephen, 73, 236.

Nort, Lord, 19.

OcpDEN, Maj. Aaron, 196-7.
Ogden, Col. Matthias, 177, 196-7.

[ger 4INDEX

Olney, Lieut.-Col. Jeremiah, 134, 199-200, 206.
Oswald, Lieut.-Col. Eleazer, 117, 122, 132, 134, 140, 156-7, 171,
172, 187-8, 200, 206.

Parke, Lieut.-Col. John, 133, 136, 169.
Parker, Col. Richard, 78, 210.

Peace Commissioners (British), 34-7-
Poor, Brig.-Gen. Enoch, 79, 80, 221.

Ramsay, Lieut.-Col. Nathaniel, 170-1, 183, 186.
Reed, Gen. Joseph, 36, 73, 199.-

Rhea, Lieut.-Col. David, 144, 177, 181.
Roberts, George, 58-9.

Roberts, John, 65-6.

Scott, Brig.-Gen. Charles, 78, 91, 92, 106-8, 110, 114, 119,
142-3, 157-9, 180-1, 205-6, 284-6.

Scudder, Dr. Nathaniel, 97, 232.

Seward, Capt. Thomas, 140, 171, 187, 200.

Shreve, Israel, 53-4, 66, 178, 181.

Simcoe, Lieut.-Col. John Graves, 85-6, 89, 124, 135.

Smith, Lieut.-Col. Samuel, 78.

Smith, Lieut.-Col. W. S., 127, 160-1, 194-5.

Steuben, Gen. von, 24, 38-9, 40, 57; 65, 77, 79, 98, 104, 208-9,
222, 224-5, 253-5.

Stevenson, Capt. Charles, 86.

Stewart, Col. Walter, 149, 152-4, 163-4, 169, 170, 183, 185.

Stirling, Lord, 10, 13, 40, 182, 206-8, 209-10.

Stout, Col. Joseph, 75.

TALLMAN, Peter, 53-4.
Tryon, Gov. William, 21.

VALLEY Forge, 2-7, 38-9, 57-8, 59-68.
Van Cortlandt, Col. Philip, 68.

Watpo, Dr. Albigence, 189.
Washington, George, chooses Valley Forge camp, 2-4; requisi-
tion of supplies, 6-7; intrigue against, 9-12; campaign

strategy, 12-13; questions Lee’s oath, 14; celebrates French

[ 302 JINDEX
alliance, 16-17; on British conciliation, 21-2; urges modera-
tion toward Tories, 37, 65-6; council of war at Valley Forge,
§7-8; evacuates Valley Forge, 59-68; march to Delaware
River, 67-71; council of war at Hopewell, 75-8; march to
Englishtown, 98-103, 104; decides to attack, 105-6, 120-1;
at Battle of Monmouth, 134, 175-81, 182-7, 193-9, 204-6,
221-2, 225-6; report to Congress, 233, 262-6; congratulates
army, 234; march to Hudson River, 235-6, 272; correspon-
dence with Lee, 241-3, 282-4; opinion on Monmouth, 273.

Wayne, Gen. Anthony, 1, 4, 12, 58, 63-4, 66, 67, 77, 79, 106-8,
114, 119, 123, 127-8, 133, 135, 136-9, 142-6, 154-5, 168, 184,
193-4, 201, 206-7, 216, 284-6.

Wells, Capt. Thomas, 140, 200.

Wesson, Col. James, 149-50.

Wikoff, Capt. Peter, 169-70.

Willett, Lieut.-Col. Marinus, 72, 157, 163-4.

Wilson, William R., 219.

Women with British Army, 83-4.

Woodford, Brig.-Gen., 221.ALDERMAN LIBRARY

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