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Trrririy —— CL) { | / a i i 5 H | 4 : i . j HN f 4 el ti bl ee er. eee a eon ewe ny yee A) ee ee ee ana = oe)So eei i | : { : | i . ee es Ja ae ery hw tae tee eet re er eee ee ee ere 30 ee Se a a| wrnsnreses din:SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 1912-1923To this study was awarded the George Louis Beer Prize by the American Historical Association in 1925.| 1 ‘ i | 4 f ! i | ee eee a ae eT ee Pe ee Te ean222 ¢— iganc altrov Sn i RS tan Fp ty An Italian jibe at the efforts of the Central Powers to win Italy over by offering Albania while withholding the coveted Trieste, Trentino, and Dalmatia. January, 1915 ear eeSOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 1912-1923 By EDITH PIERPONT STICKNEY Sacramento Junior College Formerly Instructor in History, Goucher College SS STANFORD UNIVERSITY STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS STANFORD UNIVERSITY, CALIFORNIA eRe EE mE eee ei -Copyright 1926 By STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS All Rights Reserved Published December 1926 PUBLISHED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICATO MY MOTHER ee et et ee = eae | / | | } . )| uieuninh ieeePREFACE As the Great War drew to a close it became obvious that among the most insistent, most important, and most difficult problems with which the approaching Peace Conference would have to deal were those relating to nationality, prob- lems involving claims of peoples dissatisfied with their rulers and seeking either independence or union with some kindred race. Self-determination of peoples, proclaimed as one of the chief war aims of the Allies, met with an immediate response. These questions were all problems involving peoples. Looked at from another point of view they centered about the pos- session of territory—they were boundary disputes. Among these problems was the question of Southern Albania or Northern Epirus, one of many long-disputed areas dangerous to the peace of Europe, involving rival nationalist claims, as well as the interests of several of the Great Powers. This essay aims to make a thorough study of the history of the question from 1912, when it first assumed any great diplomatic importance, up to 1923, giving due emphasis to its larger European aspects as well as to those more local national elements which affected the international situation. A history of Albania as such or the local history of even the limited area in question does not properly fall within the limits of this study; and only such facts of Albanian develop- ment as seem essential to a proper understanding of the question as a whole have been included. Chapter I, it should be noted, makes no pretense of being an original study; based on secondary material, it serves merely to give the setting for the essay proper. Much valuable material in government archives is as yet, and doubtless will long be, unpublished and inaccessible. But practically all the printed material obtainable has been at hand in the Hoover War Library of Stanford University, which possesses probably the most complete collection of material on this question, some of which has been obtained especially that this study might be undertaken. Quotations in the text when from a foreign language are given in the author’s own translation. The spelling of geo- [ vil | " rz = Pe ee ee ee oes a a ee eee ed ie eed Se aa et ae a et lee ae lehSOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS graphical names is that used by the very comprehensive [London] Times Survey Atlas of the World (1922). This essay was originally presented as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at Stanford University. The subject was suggested by Dr. E. D. Adams, under whose help- ful guidance the research was carried on and without whose encouragement and aid at every turn it could hardly have been written. Practically all the materials were in the in- valuable collection of the Hoover War Library at Stanford University; to the directors of that Library, and especially to the Librarian, Miss Nina Almond, and to Mr. Robert C. Binkley, Reference Librarian, the author is indebted for un- failing assistance. Grateful acknowledgment is also due Dr. Percy A. Martin and Dr. Frank A. Golder of Stanford University for their thorough criticism of the manuscript. To a former colleague at Goucher College, Dr. Mary W. Williams, sincere appreciation is accorded for her advice and painstaking criticism in the task of revision: without her encouragement the essay would probably not have been sub- mitted for the George Louis Beer Prize, which the American Historical Association awarded this essay at its meeting at Ann Arbor in 1925. Dr. Charles Seymour of Yale University courteously assisted by supplying materials relating to the Commission on Greek Affairs at the Peace Conference, as the Bibliography and Appendix indicate. To this already long list of indebtedness must be added a word of appreciation of the training and inspiration the author received as an undergraduate at Vassar College from her former teachers there, Miss Lucy M. Salmon, Miss Eloise Ellery, and Miss Dorothy Stimson, later an esteemed colleague and friend at Goucher College. Special thanks are also due the faculty of Vassar College for awarding the author a Sutro Fellowship for 1923-24, which made the completion of the work possible. EpItH P. STICKNEY December 1, 1926TABLE OF CONTENTS List oF MAPS I. INTRODUCTION Satis) OF Vehag key Uso as 3. oer o Extent and limitations; Geography; Race; Language; Religion; Economic aspects; Value of territory II. HistToriIcAL SURVEY To 1912 Ancient history; Middle Ages; Turkish Conquest; Albanians in the Greek Revolution; The Crimean War; Congress of Berlin and after; Growth of Albanian nationality; Austrian and Italian rivalry; Greek propaganda; Young Turk Revolution of 1908 Ill. THe LONDON CONFERENCE OF AMBASSADORS AND DE- LIMITATION OF BOUNDARIES, 1912-1914 First Balkan War: Albanian Proclamation of Inde- pendence; Negotiations preceding the Conference of London; Albanian autonomy; Greek and Albanian memoranda; Austria-Hungary and Italy versus Greece and the Entente; Treaty of London, May 30, 1913; French attempts to keep Koritza for Greece; Establishment of commission to delimit boundary; Work of the Boundary Commission; Protocol of Florence, December 1913; Note of the Powers to Greece; Reply of the Greek government; Proclama- tion of the autonomy of Northern Epirus; Note of the Powers providing for evacuation; Demands of the revolutionary government; Agreement of Corfu, May 17, 1914 IV. SOUTHERN ALBANIA AND THE GREAT WAR Situation in Albania at the opening of the war; Italian occupation of Valona and Greek occupation of Northern Epirus; Negotiations with Greece; Aus- tro-Italian negotiations; Italian intervention; Secret Treaty of London; Epirote deputies sent to Greek Chamber; Italian expansion in Northern Epirus; Italian proclamation of Albanian independence; Allied Conference reinstates Greeks under Veni- zelos; Character of Italian régime; The French in Koritza V. GREEK AND ALBANIAN CLAIMS AT THE PEACE CONFERENCE War-aims: self-determination versus the Treaty of London; Establishment of Commission on Greek PAGE xl 19 ol 71SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS VI. VII. VILt. Affairs; The Greek position and delegation; Official Greek claims; Memorandum of the former Provyi- sional Government of Northern Epirus; Other Greek arguments; Greek refutation of Albanian claims; Albanian position and delegation; Albanian claims; Request for an American mandate and plebiscite; Protest against the Treaty of London; Refutation of Venizelos’ claims: Appeals to President Wilson: Conclusions as to Greek and Albanian claims THE PEACE CONFERENCE: THE POWERS AND ALBANIA, 1919-1920 : Adriatic question and Treaty of London; Report of the Commission on Greek Affairs; Tittoni-Venizelos agreement; Question of Koritza; Correspondence re- lating to the Adriatic question; Italian mandate for Albania; Revised proposals partitioned Albania; Wilson protests; Treaty of Rapallo, November 12, 1920; New Albanian government and revolt against Italy; Italo-Albanian treaty signed; Accord of Kapishtica; Summary THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, 1920-1923 : Admission of Albania to the League; Appeal to the Council, June 1921; The question before the Second Assembly; Despatch of a commission by the Coun- cil; Protection of minorities; Decision of Conference of Ambassadors; Allied Declaration in regard to Albania; Reports of the Commission of Enquiry CONCLUSION APPENDIX : : : : ‘ : Report of the Committee on Greek Territorial Claims at the Peace Conference, 1919 BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WorKS CITED INDEX PAGE 106 129 158 164 173LIST OF MAPS Map 1.—RvuSSIAN AND AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN PROPOSALS, DECEM- BER 1912 : a ; ‘ . : : : : : (From Austria-Hungary, Ministerium des Aussern, Diplomatische Aktenstiicke betreffend die Ereig- nisse am Balkan, 13 August 1912 bis 6 November 1913.) Mar 2.—AvustTRO-HUNGARIAN AND ITALIAN CLAIMS, CLAIM OF VENIZELOS, AND LINE DECIDED UPON BY CONFER- ENCE OF AMBASSADORS, AUGUST 1913 : 2 : (Lbid.) Map 3.—FRONTIERS PROPOSED BY BALKAN ALLIES, JANUARY 1913 ‘ : 2 é : : ‘ 5 : (Ibid.) Mar 4.—Map oF NORTHERN EPIRUS (From Memorandum on Northern Epirus, pre- sented to the Peace Conference by the former Provisional Government of Northern Epirus.) Map 5.—ALBANIAN ETHNOGRAPHIC BOUNDARIES ACCORDING TO OFFICIAL ALBANIAN CLAIMS : : 3 ‘ : (From Temperley, A History of the Peace Confer- ence of Paris.) Map 6.—DISTRIBUTION OF RACES AND RELIGIONS IN ALBANIA, ACCORDING TO THE FRENCH MINISTRY OF WAR, 1915 : : ‘ ‘ : : : (From Beratti, La question albanaise.) Map 7.—VARIOUS PROPOSALS OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION ON GREEK AFFAIRS AND THE GREEK CLAIM, 1919 (After map accompanying Rapport présenté au Conseil supréme des Alliés par la commission chargée d’étudier les questions territoriales in- téressant la Gréce.) Map 8,—LINES PROPOSED BY MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION ON GREEK AFFAIRS, 1919 ; i ‘ ; ‘ . (After Map No. 1, accompanying Report of the Committee on Greek Territorial Claims.) PAGE 22 22, 82 96 99 108 109SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 1912-1923 I. INTRODUCTION The area which is known as “Northern Epirus” by the Greeks and their protagonists, and as “Southern Albania” by the Albanians, Italians, and their partisans, cannot be very accurately defined, since its exact limits as put forth by its claimants differ with the changing international situation. Roughly speaking, however, Southern Albania may be defined as that territory extending northward from the northern boundary of Greece as established in 1913 to a line drawn from a point somewhat south of Valona on the Adriatic to Koritza on the east. Estimated at one-fourth of the total area of Albania as established by the London Conference of Ambassadors, the region contains between twenty-five hun- dred and three thousand square miles,! an area slightly larger than that of the state of Delaware, or about one-eighth of the total area of Greece. According to the official statistics of the Greek government, “Northern Epirus” is defined as consist- ing of the departments of Koritza, Argyrocastro, and a part of Janina, or, of the kazas? of Koritza, Starovo, Kolonia, Argyrocastro, Khimara, Delvino, Liaskoviki, Tepeleni, Pre- medi, Pogonio, and Philiataes, and is said to be inhabited by a total population of 228,000. Southern Albania occupies a position of great geographi- cal importance; since it faces the extreme heel of Italy just 1 No accurate territorial survey of Albania has been made. Estimates vary from 10,500 to 11,500 square miles. Albania, Peace Handbook Nowe pail: 2The Turkish Empire was divided for administrative purposes into vilayets or provinces, which again were subdivided into sanjaks or ar- rondissements, these in turn into kazas or cantons, and the kazas into nahiés or communes. , * Grand quartier général hellénique, Carte ethnographique de l’Epire du Nord en 1913, p. 2. [1]SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS below the narrowest point in the neck of the Adriatic, its possessor may control ingress to and egress from that sea. Its position, like that of Albania as a whole, would make it the natural means of entry into and exit from a large part of the western Balkans, were it not for the topography of the country. The only harbor is that of Santi Quaranta, and the coast is for the most part steep and paths to the interior are few.* Lack of natural harbors and difficulty of access inland, then, characterize the dangerous and inhospitable coast. The interior is mountainous; the ranges run from north to south, thus rendering communication north and south easy, but east and west difficult.© The natural routes are the river valleys, of which the Viosa is the most important, with its upper branches forming the fertile valleys of Argyrocastro and Premedi. Wagon roads in these valleys offer the only means of transportation; the main routes connect this interior region with Valona, with Janina, and, through Koritza and Monastir, with Salonika. The race and language of the inhabitants of Albania have long been the subjects of much speculation, but of little serious study. Modern inquiry has, however, shown that these descendants of the ancient Illyrians are an Indo-Euro- pean or Aryan people, speaking a language not descended from the Greek but akin to it to the same degree as Latin and probably intermediate between the two.® It has borrowed a large percentage of its limited vocabulary’ from both Slavs and Greeks.’ Recent investigation has shown that the AIl- banians are taller than the Greeks but less tall than the Bosnians to the north, their average height being 167 centi- meters; that, of all the inhabitants of the Balkans, they are *Newbegin, Geographical Aspects of Balkan Problems, p. 64. * Lyde-Ferryman, The Balkan Peninsula, p. 109. *Thumb, The Modern Greek and His Ancestry, p. 10; Dixon, The Racial History of Man, p. 95. "About 5,000 words. Admiralty (British), Geographical Note on the Balkans, p. 16. * Albanian borrowing of old Greek words belongs to the oldest stra- tum of its language, according to Thumb, “Altgriechische Elemente des Albaniesischen,” Jndo-germanische Forschungen Zeitschrift, XXVI, 11. [2]IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS the most brachycephalic,? with an index of 86; and that, on the whole, they are dark-haired and dark-eyed.?° As in other disputed areas of the Near East where correct ethnographic frontiers are so difficult to draw, the people of this region are much mixed in culture, religion, and language. Nowhere else in Europe is the criterion of spoken language so fallacious as in the Balkan States. “An observer of Al- banian sympathy who relied solely on language as a guide might pass through the country-side and find nothing but Albanians, where an observer of Greek sympathies proceed- ing in the same manner might find nothing but Greeks.” The population, in other words, is largely bilingual, though the women and children often know only Albanian. The Christians of this region, called Tosks, belong to the Greek Orthodox Church, where Greek is the language used and taught. The upper classes generally, whether Moslem or Christian, speak Greek, which, at least at the period when our study begins, was the language of culture and of com- merce. Although it is true that the population belongs to different churches, religious strife is far less prevalent in Southern Albania than in Northern. The Moslems show less fanaticism against Christians here than elsewhere because they are largely descendants of the former Christians who were converted by force to Islam. Moreover, as the nation- alistic movement has increased, the Orthodox Albanians have grown to understand that their religion has been exploited by the Greek Church for political purposes, and that they need not fear the Moslems.‘ Economically considered, Southern Albania, less back- ward than the north, is an agricultural and stock-raising country. The principal crop is maize, suitable for cultivation by the smaller proprietors, while wheat is raised on the land of the large landowners or beys. Next to grain, olive oil is *The older and contrary view is expressed in Ripley, Races of Europe, p. 409. * Pittard, Les peuples des Balkans, pp. 81-84. * Young, in Contemporary Review, CXV, 498. “Woods, Cradle of the War, p. 161. ~eqtieeSOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS the most important product; tobacco is grown in certain dis- tricts (Berat and Tepeleni). The mountain sides afford good grazing land for the cattle- and sheep-raising, which is an important occupation.*® The extensive forests are as yet practically untouched, and the mineral resources which are believed to exist are unexploited. The land is held on the medieval system which generally prevails in the Balkan provinces. The bey, who in the first place received his land from the Sultan, seldom cultivates it himself, but farms it out to tenants, from whom he exacts one-half or one-third of the harvest for himself and an additional one-tenth which he collects in taxes on behalf of the government.*t Under such conditions the Albanian peasant is offered little or no inducement to exert his energies in the direction of agricul- ture, and the Christian population in particular is thus given a cogent reason for emigration.*® Manufactures are of small account and are almost entirely consumed in the country. Separate commercial statistics for Southern Albania are not available; those for Albania as a whole show that, in 1913, vo per cent of her imports came from Austria-Hungary, 25 per cent from Italy, and 5 per cent from Greece, while her principal customer was Austria-Hungary, with Italy next.1¢ For the southern part, however, the relative importance of Austria-Hungary must have been less, and that of Greece and Italy more. It may well be asked what part the economic character of the region played in the frontier dispute. The fertility or prosperity of the territory hardly accounts for the desires of Greece; the underlying basis of her claim is rather to be sought in that strong sentiment for expansion which has been hers from her earliest days as an independent modern state—in this case the source is to be found in idealistic rather than materialistic causes. In the case of Albanian '* Peace Handbook No. 17, pp. 80-83; Markovitch, Le balkan écono- mique, p. 53. “ Peace Handbook No. 17, p. 86. * Le Journal des Hellénes, September 2, 1917. *’ Markovitch, op. cit., p. 54. ayIN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS claims, however, the relative economic value of the region is the greater factor. Since Southern Albania is undoubtedly the most fertile, advanced, and prosperous section of the territory inhabited by Albanians, their desire for its inclusion in an Albanian state naturally has its roots deep in the economic character of the region. The undeniable nation- alistic tinge to Albanian sentiment, therefore, should not blind us to the fact that Southern Albania has a greater economic value to Albania than to Greece. Its economic value to other nations, however, is slight. Italy’s interest is pri- marily strategic, as was also that of Austria-Hungary.Il. HISTORICAL SURVEY TO 1912 A brief account of the history of Southern Albania before 1912 is essential to an adequate comprehension of the prob- lem during the period covered by this essay. Only throug such a study can one understand not merely the character of the inhabitants and their social institutions but also the conflicting interests of the various foreign powers. In view, moreover, of the frequent references to the history of the region in the propagandist literature on the question, an adequate evaluation of the arguments invdlved requires a sound idea of the main outlines of the troubled history of this oft-disputed territory. In ancient times the name Epirus, signifying mainland, in contradistinction to the neighboring island of Corcyra (Corfu), was used vaguely; but the limits usually fixed by ancient writers were the Glossa Promontory on the north and the Gulf of Arta on the south. This region was more fully Hellenized than the territory north of the Viosa.2 The worship of Zeus was early introduced at Pelasgian Dodona, which became famous throughout the Greek world: to this revered oracle the Greeks sent frequent missions, and, sur- viving the destruction of the temple by the Aetolians in 219 B.c., it was still in existence at the time of Pausanias. Tablets on which were inscribed questions presented to the oracle have been found near Janina, as have also the remains of a Greek theater in the same locality. In classical Greek times Epirus maintained occasional relations with the rest of Hellas; we hear especially of Admetus, who hospitably received the banished Themistocles, and of Alcetas, who became a dependent of Dionysius of Syracuse; Philip of Macedon’s marriage to an Epirote princess involved him, too, in the fortunes of the land.* In the third century B.c. (295- ‘Wing, “The Epeiros-Albania Boundary Dispute in Ancient Times,” Annual Report of the American Historical Association (1919), I, 307. ~Ibid., p. 313. * Gardiner, “Dodona,” Encyclopedia Britannica, Eleventh Edition; Tozer, Researches in the Highlands of Turkey, IU, 201. *Bury, History of Greece, II, 239, 306—7. [ 6 ]IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 289), the struggles of Pyrrhus of Epirus against the Romans in Southern Italy gave the district a momentary importance. Whatever may have been the case in early periods, Epirus in the time of Pyrrhus was generally recognized as Greek.® Roman sway was first extended over Epirus after the defeat of Macedonia in the battle of Pydna, 168 B.c. The Roman leader on that occasion, Aemilius Paulus, to secure the submission of the region, ordered a wholesale destruc- tion, from the effects of which Epirus never recovered. A new city, however, was later built there—Nicopolis—by Octavian, the future Augustus, to commemorate his naval victory at Actium. Under the Roman Empire, Epirus and Albania were sometimes united with, sometimes separated from, Mace- donia, according to administrative exigencies; but the line of cleavage was largely political rather than racial or linguistic. Justinian rebuilt many forts in Epirus in his attempt to fortify the Empire, but the coast was nevertheless pillaged by the Ostrogoths under Totila, who plundered Nicopolis and Dodona. During the ancient period, the evidence, then, tends to indicate a racial solidarity among the tribes south of the Glossa-Grammos line and a difference between them and the Illyrian peoples farther north.® During the Middle Ages, with the exception of several intervals, Epirus formed part of the Eastern Roman or Byzantine Empire. It was invaded by the Bulgarians in the tenth century, and in the following century by the Normans, who gained a temporary footing there under Robert Guiscard and his son Bohemond, only to be driven back four years later by the Emperor Alexius Commenus.? With the capture of Constantinople by the crusaders in 1204 and the division of the Empire, Epirus gained an opportunity for independ- ence, and the despotate of Epirus, an independent Greek principality, was accordingly established. The despot Michael * Wing, op. cit., p. 309. °Ibid., p. 312; Finlay, History of Greece, I, 53; Bury, Later Roman Empire, I, xvii, 411; II, 24. "Schevill, History of the Balkan Peninsula, p. 128; Oman, Byzantine Empire, pp. 259-60; Finlay, op. cit., IV, 28. ia)SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS ruled with a strong hand over this country, which was pro- tected from attack by its mountain barriers and inhabited by a variety of unamalgamated races—Slavonians, Vallachians, Albanians, and Greeks—each of them in a different grade of civilization and each intent on defending its own usages and institutions against both its neighbors and the prince. In spite of one unsuccessful alliance with the Frankish lords of Greece against the Greek Emperor, the despotate continued to maintain its independence by an alliance with the Latin princes of southern Greece.*‘ Less than a century later, by 1350, civil wars in the Empire led to a conquest of Epirus by the great Serbian, Stephen Dushan, who captured the stronghold of Janina. The history of the district after this conquest became in- volved in the wars of the Serbians, Albanians, Franks, and Greeks in the neighboring provinces until the whole country fell under the domination of the Turks in the fifteenth century.® But before Albania and Epirus submitted to the Turkish yoke, a heroic resistance was offered by the great Albanian national hero, Scanderbeg, who for years defied the Turk from his mountain fastnesses. On his death in 1468, which found him almost at the end of his resources, Epirus fell into the hands of the Venetians, lords of the sea. But Venice in her single-handed struggle against the Turk was unable to retain her hold long, and in 1501 was forced to recognize the suzerainty of the Sultan over the eastern coast of the Adriatic.*° The Turkish occupation resulted in a large emigration from Albania and Epirus to Italy; many of the best elements, indeed, furnished condottiere to all the states of Europe." Under the Turks many of the Albanians accepted Islam, while others remained Christian. Albania was, indeed, the * Finlay, op. cit., II, 338; IV, 122-23. Oman, op. cit., pp. 304-8. ’ Finlay, op. cit., IV, 129. ’ Brown, Venetian Republic, p. 96; Bourcart, L’Albanie et les AI- banais, p. 106. “ Bourcart, op. cit., p. 110; Iorga, Bréve histoire de l’Albanie et du peuple albanais, p. 51; L’Albanie, April 25, May 25, 1918. [8]IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS only country of the Balkans where religion, at this epoch, did not entirely signify nationality.12 This situation, often overlooked, is of significance in understanding the nationalist movement of the nineteenth century in the Balkans; the fact that the Greeks, Serbians, and Bulgars were Christians, fur- thered their consciousness of nationality and was a bond of union which the Albanians, divided in religion and a large part of them of the same faith as their rulers, lacked. “Where orthodox Albanians and Greeks dwelt together, as in a considerable portion of Southern Epirus, their common lot as Christians exposed them to the same exactions, and effaced the distinction of race.’’!® During the centuries when Albania was nominally under Turkish rule, the central fact of her history is the succession of unsuccessful, because disunited, attempts to win freedom. In their application of the maxim, divide et impera, the efforts of the Turks to stir up one Albanian chieftain against another were nearly fatal to their own rule. Notable among the independent governors of the eighteenth century was Ali Pasha of Janina, a native of Tepeleni. Ambitious to become independent of the Sultan, he coquetted with the various Powers of Europe, now aiding the British admiral, Nelson, to win the battle of Aboukir (1798), again, with the rise of French influence, courting Napoleon. He is especially renowned for his cruel treatment of the Suliotes, those Orthodox Christians of Epirus who won the admiration of Byron. Ali was instrumental in encouraging the Greek revo- lution both by stirring up the Greeks against the Sultan and, through the concentration of the Turkish forces against him, by unwittingly offering the opportunity for Greece to strike a blow for freedom against the Turks. In the Greek revo- lution the inhabitants of Southern Albania were very active; some joined because Greece was a Christian nation fighting against the Sultan; others, followers of Ali, as a means of revenge against their common enemy after their leader’s fall; and still others, out of spite for Ali’s ruthless treatment of “ Bourcart, op. cit., p. 111. * Finlay, op. cit., VI, 40.SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS the Suliotes. Whatever the reason for their participation, the prominent part taken by Albanians in the Greek war of independence is significant.** Toward the end of the war of independence, when the Fourth National (Greek) Assembly was held in July 1829, deputies were sent from Epirus as from other Greek lands still in Turkish hands.*© Yet the great Powers—England, France, and Russia—when finally forced to consent to the establishment of a kingdom of Greece, in their effort to maintain so far as possible the status quo and the “integrity” of the Ottoman Empire because of their own conflicting inter- ests and jealousies, omitted from the new kingdom all of Epirus as well as Thessaly and Crete. The inclusion of these provinces was held by Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg when offered the Greek crown, to be the only effectual mode of pacifying Greece.'® Indeed, from the first the Hellenic gov- ernment evidently regarded Epirus as a Greek land. In the Constituent Assembly of 1843 delegates from Epirus were admitted as from certain other territories outside the king- dom of Greece.’ It is obvious in the light of later events that the establishment of a larger kingdom at this time would have furthered contentment and prosperity, and that irre- dentism would then not have played such a prominent part in later Greek history. Obsessed with the “great idea,” by which was meant the restoration of the Byzantine Empire through the establish- ment of Greek domination on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, and believing it to be a practicable scheme, the men who governed Greece saw in the Crimean War an opportunity for attacking Turkey when her hands were busy elsewhere, for the purpose of annexing the coveted provinces of Thessaly and Epirus. This scheme, obviously to her advantage, was undoubtedly promoted by Russia, which perhaps believed with the Greeks that all the orthodox subjects of the Sultan ‘ Chekrezi, Albania, Past and Present, pp. 39-40, 43—48. ” Miller, The Ottoman Empire, p. 104. ** Sergeant, Greece in the Nineteenth Century, p. 218. " Miller, op. cit., p. 174. [ 10 ]IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS would rise in rebellion the moment a few armed men crossed the border from Greece and displayed the flag of the Cross. But this Greek venture was a failure. A few thousand men crossed the line and plundered the inhabitants of Thessaly and Epirus, who as a consequence felt that the Greek mis- government of the time was not preferable to the Turkish. By the end of four months the Turks had put an end to the invasion, and the result of the episode was the strengthening of Turkish rule in these two provinces.'8 The question of Epirus first assumed real European im- portance at the Congress of Berlin in 1878 at the close of the Russo-Turkish war. During the war Greece was accused by Turkey of encouraging insurrection in the neighboring Otto- man provinces. In 1877 Lord Derby on the request of Turkey asked the Greek government to authorize him to assure the Porte that Greece would not attack Turkey or “connive at attempts to stir up insurrection in the Greek provinces.” The reply of Greece was a qualified pledge, limited to the “‘present”’ time and flatly declining to “discourage” the insurrections.’ Public opinion in Greece demanded an invasion. The Hel- lenic Minister, M. Tricoupis, declared that in his opinion even if a Greek invading force were beaten, Greece would be better off than if she continued to maintain a pacific attitude in the war. The new Greek cabinet announced on February 2, 1878, that it had resolved to occupy provisionally the Greek prov- inces of Turkey; but the contemplated invasion was checked by the news of the Russo-Turkish armistice.?° At the Congress of Berlin the Greek representatives, M. Delyannis and M. Rhangabe, made demands for Thessaly, Epirus, and Crete; the satisfaction of these demands, it was maintained, would fulfil the desires of the populations con- cerned and would give peace to the kingdom. In spite of the virtual promise of England that Greece would not be a loser by remaining outside the struggle, Lord Salisbury, beyond obtaining a seat for her at the Congress, did nothing for ’ Finlay, op. cit., VII, 219, 223. *’ Sergeant, op. cit., p. 276. ” Ibid., pp. 278-79.SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS Greece. The French Plenipotentiary, M. Waddington, on the other hand, since France had been the cultural leader in the Near East since the time of the Crusades, sought to win for Greece practically the whole of Thessaly and Epirus, and in his proposals he had doubtless obtained the preliminary support of Italy, Austria-Hungary, and Russia. These pro- posals, however, failed to win the approval of Lord Beacons- field. Though recognizing the unsatisfactory character of the frontier of 1831, he opposed any improvement, even the inclusion of the purely Greek districts in southern Turkey, and declared cynically that states like Greece which have a future are in a position to be able to wait. In the face, therefore, of the absolute opposition of the English pleni- potentiaries, the proposals fell to the ground, and the article in the Treaty of Berlin covering Epirus merely recommended a rectification of the frontier.?! The claims of Greece as regards her frontier were by the wording of the Treaty of Berlin shadowy and undefined; moreover, the Conservative Government of Great Britain, desirous of recovering its waning influence at Constantinople, refused to exert pressure to bring about a prompt and satisfactory settlement of the Greek frontier problem. This indifference of Lord Salisbury, accordingly, encouraged the Porte in its resistance to any rectification in favor of Greece, and the question was therefore unsettled when Gladstone came into office in 1880. The high hopes which the advent of that statesman raised in the hearts of all opponents of Turkey were destined to be fruitless of result in the case of the Greek frontier. It is true that Lord Granville, who went to the Foreign Office, issued a circular to the Powers asking their co-operation in carrying out those stipulations of the Treaty of Berlin which had been neglected.?? But the Greek cause was seriously injured by the situation in France; the attempts made there to aid Greece were discontinued by ~ Sergeant, op. cit., pp. 286-87; Hansard, 3d ser., CCXLII, 532-33, 564—65. “Schmitt, “British Policy and the Treaty of Berlin, 1878-1887,” in University of Wisconsin Abstracts of Theses, I, 143-45. [12]IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS the Foreign Secretary in the new Ferry Ministry, St.-Hilaire, and French foreign policy, previously well-disposed toward Greece, was reversed.?* Consequently, the Porte, finding the Powers disunited, made a firmer resistance, and the article of the Treaty of Berlin destined to cover Epirus remained a dead letter. On two other occasions Greece attempted to win Epirus. In 1885 when the principality of Bulgaria was formed, both Greece and Serbia, rivals of Bulgaria, demanded territorial compensation at the expense of Turkey. In Greece, three members of the Delyannis cabinet advocated the seizure of territory up to the frontier proposed at the Congress of Berlin; but their policy was not adopted.24 France then advised Greece to accede to the wishes of the Powers, at the same time declaring that she would press Greek claims on a fitting occasion in the future.2° On a later occasion, at the time of the unfortunate Greco-Turkish war of 1897, Greece made another attempt to secure the coveted provinces. Hel- lenic troops were sent into Epirus and Thessaly, but were defeated. Their defeat was made use of by Italy to show the population of Epirus the uselessness of waiting for liberation from Turkish domination at the hands of the Greeks.?¢ The period from the Congress of Berlin to the Balkan Wars witnessed two new phases of the history of Epirus and Albania: first, the growth of Albanian nationalism, and, secondly, the increasingly complex rivalry of European Powers in this region. These two movements, inextricably interwoven, form the very warp and woof of Albanian history during this period and are of prime importance in under- standing her later development. The first step in the growth of Albanian nationalism may be traced to the formation in 1878 of the “Albanian League ~ Miller, op. cit., p. 403; Hanotaux, Contemporary France, IV, 573. “ Miller, op. cit., p. 416. ” Sergeant, op. cit., p. 316. For the whole subject of the revision of the Treaty of Berlin, vide especially Gooch, History of Modern Europe, 1878-1919, chaps. i and iv, passim. * Miller, op. cit., pp. 4836-37; Casanges, Fortnightly Review, CI, 474 (March, 1914). [13 ]SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS for the Defense of the Rights of the Albanian Nationality.” This league, formed to lodge a concerted protest against any transfer of indubitably Albanian soil to neighboring states, resisted the award to Montenegro by the Congress of Berlin of a small Albanian district. The Porte, hoping to prevent the execution of the decisions of the Congress of Berlin, origi- nally favored the League; but when the Sultan discovered it was not merely a convenient tool, but the nucleus of a new national movement, he dissolved it by force.*’ Albanians resident abroad, in Italy, Rumania, and Bel- sium, as well as at Athens, then formed committees to propagate the national idea; these organizations succeeded in smuggling into the country books, pamphlets, and news- papers, forbidden by the Ottoman authorities because pub- lished in the national tongue. Up to 1908 the effect of these movements, in Albania herself, had apparently been neg- ligible, owing chiefly to the lack of popular education as a basis for the growth of a wider patriotic sentiment—so effec- tive was the Turkish prohibition of Albanian nationalist schools.2® In 1904 the first national Albanian Assembly was held at Bucarest, where a list of resolutions was adopted which might have shown the Turks that here was the begin- ning of a movement with which they might some day have to reckon. The attention of Europe was called to the new movement by a memorandum presented by Albanians to the Hague Conference of 1907, but with no results.’® Parallel to this growth of Albanian nationalism was an- other development of great importance for Albania, which brought that country into the arena of European interna- tional politics. As a result of the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary recognized by the treaty of Berlin, Italy became jealous for fear Austrian expansion in the Balkans might be extended to include the farther shore 7* Schevill, op. cit., pp. 464-65; Chekrezi, op. cit., pp. 51-52. * Villari, Balkan Question, p. 161; Bourchier, “Albania,” Encyclo- pedia Britannica, Eleventh Edition. ~For texts, vide Larmeroux, La Politique extérieure de l’Autriche- Hongrie 1875-1914, II, 392-401. [14]IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL APPEARS of the entrance to the Adriatic and thus oppose her desire to make that sea an Italian lake. These years saw the formation of the Triple Alliance in spite of, or perhaps partly because of, Austro-Italian hatred and rivalry. A cardinal point in this Alliance was the provision aimed at preventing either Power from gaining a foothold in Albania. The maintenance of the status quo in the Adriatic was thus provided for; by 1902 it was agreed that if this arrangement should prove impracticable, the two governments would work for the autonomous development of the Balkan States. From this time on the Albanian question was more and more an object of interest to public opinion in Italy, and with the failure of her colonial plans through the French occupation of Tunis in 1880, the cry for the extension of Italy’s sphere of influence on the farther shore of the Adriatic grew more insistent, and every step taken by Austria-Hungary was looked upon with distrust by Italian politicians and journalists.*° In spite of the breathing-spell provided for by the Triple Alliance, the two Powers were not idle, and during the decade preceding the Balkan Wars, especially, the rivals engaged in “peaceful penetration” in Albania. Austria-Hungary had long been influential there, being the protector of the AIl- banian Catholics by virtue of privileges accorded her two centuries before.*! Accordingly, her agents actively cham- pioned a strong Catholic propaganda, utilizing the village priesthood to spread ill-feeling between Moslems and Chris- tians, and by this interference providing an obstacle to the formation of a strong Albanian nationalism.*? In addition to her religious influence, the Dual Monarchy exercised control in Albania through her practical monopoly of the coasting trade, through secret subsidies to the more important beys,** and through the education of Albanian students in Austria- ” Pribram, Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary, Il, 114-15. “Dillon, Contemporary Review (1913), CIII, 732; for a list of treaties, etc., vide Polyvios, L’Albanie et la reunion d’ambassadeurs a Londres, p. 27, note. “ Woods, The Danger Zone of Europe, p. 92. = Schwertfeger, Zur europdischen Politik, Ill, 256.SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS Hungary to become the agents of her intrigue.** The Dual Monarchy seems to have believed that by encouraging dis- order she would be called in to occupy and pacify the country, as had happened in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In her eyes, Albania was only one of the steps in her march toward Salonika.*® In comparison with Austrian penetration, that of Italy was less systematic and less effective. The Dual Monarchy possessed the odds over Italy—as the Italian Foreign Minis- ter, San Giuliano, recognized—in the advantages of her terri- torial nearness, her copious use of money, the greater impor- tance of her trade, the better organization of her marine, and her more cordial relations with the Vatican and the clergy.*® Italy’s method of penetration, on the other hand, was exer- cised by personal ties between leading inhabitants of Albania and directors of policy or of opinion in Italy, and was helped by the emigration of Albanians to Italy after the troubles in Macedonia.** Though at the opening of the twentieth century San Giuliano advised increasing Italian influence in Albania by merchant marine, postal service, consuls and commercial agents, schools, and banks, such a thorough-going program was, it is hardly necessary to state, not realized. Perhaps the most successful Italian penetration took the form of edu- cation; the number of pupils attending Italian schools in Valona, Janina, and Scutari was about three times that of those attending Austrian schools in the same localities;** and Italy, too, had her chair of Albanian.*® While Austrian influ- ence was stronger in Northern Albania, that of Italy made itself felt more especially in the south, a fact that was determined by the relative geographical positions of the two Powers.*® Hence, it was Italy which came into conflict with the neighboring Greek influence. “ Brailsford, Macedonia, Its Races and Their Future, pp. 254-55. *Larmeroux, op. cit., II, 384. * Sosnosky, Die Balkan politik Oesterreich-Ungarns seit 1866, II, 253. ** Larmeroux, op. cit., II, 388. “New York Times, February 1, 1914. ” Brailsford, op. cit., 283, note. “ Cf. the shipping figures given by Larmeroux, op. cit., II, 395, note. | 16 |IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS The hold of Greece in Southern Albania, while stronger than that of either Austria-Hungary or Italy, was most vigor- ously resented by the Albanian nationalists. Her influence in Epirus was furthered by three agencies, the Patriarchate, the Greek schools, and the Hellenic kingdom itself; the aim of her propaganda during the period under survey was, first, the disaffection of the Albanians against Turkey, and, sec- ondly, their Hellenization. In their efforts in these directions, the Greeks were assisted by the Turks, who allowed them a free hand in Southern Albania, thus preventing a united uprising of Albanians by playing off one part of the country against another. The Orthodox Church had a strong follow- ing in this region, and its schools, in which Greek was natur- ally the language spoken and taught, offered practically the only education available. In view of these facts, then, it is obvious that Hellenic influence must have been strong. The extent of this influence, which forms the basis of the Greek claim to the district and hence is fundamental to the whole problem, will appear later. Under the Sultan Abdul Hamid (1876-1909), though Al- banians as individuals were trusted members of the govern- ment, no concessions were made to Albanian nationalism. From the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 Albania at first hoped for greater autonomy, and was in fact about to rally loyally to the call of the Empire*! when the difference be- tween the point of view of the Young Turks and that of Albanian nationalists became apparent. The Albanians con- ceived of the Empire as a sort of federation of autonomous peoples, while the Committee of Union and Progress at- tempted a strongly centralized government. In their efforts to keep their domination over the Albanians as a Mohamme- dan people, the Young Turks made four expeditions against Albania in less than two years. Undoubtedly the aggressive policy of the Young Turks greatly furthered the rapid devel- “Vide the account of the distinguished Albanian deputy, Ismail Kemal Bey, in The Quarterly Review, CCXXVIII, 150-52; also, Delaiji, Les aspirations autonomistes de l’Europe, p. 119; Peace Handbook No. 17, pp. 93-95; Chekrezi, op. cit., p. 63. [17]SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS opment of Albanian nationalism by forcing a united oppo- sition, hitherto unattainable.42 The previous policy of the Albanians, to develop autonomy within the Ottoman Empire as a stepping-stone to complete independence later, was ren- dered impossible by the opposition of the Young Turks and the resultant Balkan Wars. “Ismail Kemal Bey, loc. cit.Il. THE LONDON CONFERENCE OF AMBASSADORS AND DELIMITATION OF BOUNDARIES, 1912-1914 The Albanian question was a chief cause of the first Balkan War, as well as its more immediate occasion, since it acted as the match that was directly responsible for the out- break of the conflagration. When, in 1912, Albania was de- fined territorially in a treaty with Turkey, according to which it was to include the four vilayets of Scutari, Janina, Monas- tir, and Kossovo, the neighboring states resolved to resist the creation of a large Albania which would encroach heavily on their expectations. In view of the fact, on the one hand, of the traditional dislike of the Turks by the Albanians, in- creased by the certainty that an Ottoman victory would result in a vigorous renewal of efforts at Ottomanization, and on the other, of the desire of the Greeks and Serbs, if successful, to partition the country, the Albanians did not take an active part in the war. Between Scylla and Charybdis, they cher- ished an equal hatred both of the Balkan Allies and of the Turks. But as a protest against the Serbian attempt to secure access to the sea at the expense of Albania and in the hope of thus saving themselves from being distributed as spoils of war, in the late autumn of 1912, the Albanians proclaimed their independence. This significant event occurred at Valona on November 28, 1912.2 The president of the Provisional Albanian Government then established, Ismail Kemal Bey, telegraphed to Count Berchtold, the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, as follows: The national assembly composed of delegates of all Albanian regions without distinction of religion, having met today in the city of Valona, has just proclaimed the establishment of the pro- visional Government, charged with defending the rights to exist- ence of the Albanian people, menaced with extermination by the ‘Schevill, History of the Balkan Peninsula, p. 466. * Austria, Diplomatische Aktenstiicke, Ereignisse am Balkan, 1912-13, No. 134, Lejhanec to Berchtold. [19 | oS ee ee eee ee eeeSOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS Serb armies, and with delivering the national soil invaded by the armies of the Allies. Before this meeting was held, Ismail Kemal Bey had dis- cussed the Albanian question with Berchtold at Budapest; the Austrian statesman had approved his views of the Al- banian question and had put a vessel at his disposal. His election as president had been preceded by the dramatic raising of the ancient flag of the national Albanian hero, Scanderbeg, and was followed by notification of the Powers and the Porte of the establishment of the new state and a request for recognition.* Before it could be seen whether this move of the AIl- banians, in which they were supported by Austria, would be effective, steps taken by the European Powers to end the war resulted in the signing of an armistice on December 3 between Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro on the one hand, and Tur- key on the other. The chief reason for the refusal of Greece to sign the armistice was to enable her to transfer her major activity to Epirus, especially against the fortress of Janina. This fact was clearly shown in the declaration of the Greek Minister, Romanos, on the subject of this refusal; the Alhed conditions which were acceptable to Greece, but not to Turkey, had included the surrender of Janina to the former Power.’ The importance for Albania of the prolonged resist- ance of Janina is hardly to be overestimated; it has been said that the resistance of Janina and Scutari made it pos- sible for Europe to establish an autonomous Albania.® In spite of her continuance of the war, Greece nevertheless took ‘Austria, Diplomatische Aktenstiicke, Ereignisse am Balkan, 1912-13, No. 136, November 28, 1912. *Ismail Kemal Bey’s own account, in Dako, Albania, the Master Key to the Near East, pp. 117-19. Scanderbeg’s flag, now the Albanian flag, bore a black double-headed eagle (see front cover of this book). It 1s referred to by Longfellow in the lines: Like a portent in the sky, Iskander’s banner fly, The Black Eagle with double head. *““SKANDERBEG,”’ in Tales of a Wayside Inn. * Le Temps, December 3, 1912. *Young, Nationalism and War in the Near East, p. 201. [ 20 ]IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS part in the Conference of Ambassadors held in London in December, summoned to effect a settlement of the war in the Balkans. The signing of the armistice was soon followed by the announcement that the proposal of Sir Edward Grey for a conference of ambassadors was official, and that France had accepted it.?. The first meeting of the Conference was held on December 18,8 under the presidency of Sir Edward Grey. But before the opening of the Conference, negotiations be- tween the various Powers had resulted in rather well-defined attitudes on the most important matter to be decided, namely, the Albanian question. Austria-Hungary and Italy in particular, as the two Powers chiefly interested in the Albanian problem, had not been idle. As early as November 5 the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London had telegraphed to Berchtold: “In today’s conversation Sir Edward Grey said that Albania must be autonomous, concerning which there is full accord. There now remains only the enlargement of this autonomous terri- tory.”® Italy also was active. The Italian Minister at Cettinje informed the king of Montenegro that the integrity and au- tonomy of Albania formed the basis of Italian policy.?° This statement, applying only to the northern portion, in reality indicated a general principle of Italian policy. Austria-Hun- gary and Italy were in fact succinctly described by Berchtold 6 as “. . . . both parties which are working for the autonomy of Albania.’’!! In the negotiations preliminary to the opening of the Con- ference, the southern boundary, and more especially the vital question of Valona, occupied a conspicuous place, as the cor- respondence of Berchtold with the Austro-Hungarian minis- ters in Athens and in Rome reveals. The claims of Greece in ‘Le Temps, December 6, 1912. ®’ITbid., December 20, 1912. * Austria-Hungary. Diplomatische Aktenstiicke, Ereignisse am Bal- kan, 1912-13, No. 75, Mensdorff to Berchtold. * Ibid., No. 98, von Giesl to Berchtold, November 13, 1912. “ ITbid., No. 147, Berchtold to von Braun, December 3, 1912.ee ee ose — eee nieda oie = -* > 0)? \ = thi As Sea f af i m7 A - ‘ wf? wy ‘ ; « « e) : hey of 4 ‘ . i S AL a ’ ad . « ” - é “ a ig. il. Vorschl inien zugesprochene . 4 Ost. ung. It Alb ¢ + unions- Ke Gebiete It. Beschlutz. ae £m Ee Se ~ * } I . : SN ~~ — os “— _ — — - = A™~ ia —_— —~ = . —_ wo =O ma —_ _ _ ~~ ~~ = ~~ ~ — = ae a. = ~— > ~— ~ ~ ° ~— - ~ _ — — _— tt 6) oo — CO a =o ~ 1 ' a | — —_ ~ — SS - _ — * — _— ~ et a mt Ne ~— oat — — «A — —_— oo — om vy **¥ ; + — ~ ~~ — —_ . — “ -— FO ~ A — ~~ — ~~ A om ~ . = Ne -_ - — * . a . . . . . . > — « — a 7 ~~ cher Vorschlag. - SSIS Ru } ‘ . MAP Map 2 Map 1] + aims, an cl ¢ « i proposed by che Aktenstiicke betreffend ‘ian and Ital —Austro-Hungal 2 in proposals, December 1912. Map "le und Austro-Hungar 1.—Russian ¢é Map claim of Venizelos, and line decided upon by (¢ Balkan Allies, January 191 die Ff lers ront ~ I: 3. Map 3. 1 « idors, August 191 des Aussern, Diplomat * « erence of Ambass * ont rom Austria-Hung is erium { 6 November 1913.) iry, Minis ¢ a 7+ 4 (I 5, o ' is yust 1912 bi . Aur 3 1 an, \ se am Ball creignis 7IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS this region of paramount importance to her found an ardent advocate in her greatest statesman, Venizelos. To the pro- posal of the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, San Giuliano, that Italy and Austria-Hungary should officially declare to the Greek government their inability to allow the annexation of Valona and the island of Sasseno by Greece,!? Venizelos agreed. But at the same time he insisted on the entire penin- sula of Cape Glossa and a port on the bay of Valona for Greece, although he acknowledged the right to existence of an independent Albania on the principle of nationality, pro- vided its boundaries should not encroach upon Greek spheres of interest and Greek language frontiers. These began, he maintained, somewhat north of Valona.!* In their demands as regards Valona and Sasseno, Rome and Vienna received the support of Berlin.‘ To Venizelos’ claims to a share in the bay and a port, the Italian government on December 10 agreed, if Valona were left to Albania. On the same date Berchtold informed the Austro-Hungarian Minister in Rome that he had learned through the Italian Ambassador in Vienna, the Duke of Avarna, that the Consulta had rallied to Poincaré’s proposal in regard to the southern boundary of the new Albania. According to this proposal the line would leave the coast at Butrinto. San Giuliano, viewing the Greek desire to obtain Khimara, the coast region, as an overexpansion of her claims, but considering that Janina must be given to Greece because of Greek Orthodox aspirations, favored the tactics of making the river Kalamas the boundary, and thus allowing Janina to fall to Albania. He reasoned that, ‘‘This would give a basis for discussion, and one could then yield the case with Greece; so that Valona in no case would be left to the Greek kingdom.’ The Austro-Hungarian Minister at Athens, von Braun, reported on December 14 that the idea of Albanian indepen- “ Austria-Hungary. Diplomatische Aktenstiicke, Ereignisse am Bal- kan, 1912-13, No. 75, Mensdorff to Berchtold. * Ibid., No. 154, Berchtold to von Merey, December 8, 1912. “ Ibid., No. 155, SzOgyeny to Berchtold, December 9, 1912. “ Ibid., No. 161, Berchtold to von Merey, December 10, 1912.SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS dence was not well received in Athens, though the idea of partition seemed to have been dropped. Greek statesmen, moreover, constantly stated that they did not wish any part of Albania; but it was not clear what they meant when they referred to Greek Epirus. Von Braun admitted the elasticity of the real frontier between Greece and Albania; Venizelos drew it from the mouth of the Viosa River to a little north of Premedi and farther north of Koritza. But on this point von Braun noted that Venizelos had already yielded, as far as the course of the lower Viosa was concerned, when he gave up his claims to Valona.*® While, prior to the opening of the Conference, the attitude of Austria-Hungary and Italy favored a large and autonomous Albania, and Greece was working for a northward extension of her frontier, the attitude of France was only less well- defined. In opposition to the Triple Alliance, Poincaré wished to see the boundaries of Albania limited as far as possible.*? By the opening meeting of the Conference of Ambassadors, then, the autonomy and neutralization of Albania were prac- tically agreed upon. At the Conference, the instruction given to Mensdorff, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London, placed emphasis, first of all, on an organization for Albania that would admit of her autonomous development. Of sec- ondary importance was the question of whether there should be complete independence or whether the nominal suzerainty of the Sultan should be preserved. In either event Albanian autonomy and neutrality would be declared by all the Great Powers as well as the Balkan States.*® French emphasis, on the other hand, was somewhat different. Poincaré advised the French Ambassador at London, M. Paul Cambon, that he could not accept Albanian autonomy pure and simple, and regretted the mention of this term while omitting any refer- “” Austria-Hungary. Diplomatische Aktenstiicke, Ereignisse am Bal- kan, 1912-13, No. 164, von Braun to Berchtold, December 14, 1912. “ Schreiner, Entente Diplomacy and the World, p. 434. * Austria-Hungary, Diplomatische Aktenstiicke, Ereignisse am Bal- kan, 1912-13, No. 166, Berchtold to Mensdorff. December 15, 1912. [ 24 ]IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS ence to neutralization and control by the Powers. European control, in his eyes, was of prime importance.'® The first work of the Conference in its early meetings was summed up in an official statement issued on December 21 by the British Foreign Office, as follows: The Ambassadors have recommended to their Governments, and the latter have accepted, the principle of Albanian autonomy, together with a provision guaranteeing to Servia commercial ac- cess to the Adriatic. The six Governments have agreed in prin- ciple on those two points.?° During the brief recess which then occurred, Poincaré dealt with the matter in general terms in a speech to the French Senate delivered on December 21. On that occasion, he said, in part: That the Balkans belong henceforth to the Balkan peoples, Bulgarians, Greeks, Serbs, Montenegrins, Albanians, is assuredly, gentlemen, the most natural and equitable solution. It is, conse- quently, that which presents the best guarantees of durability and Stability. In the conversations which have been engaged in at London... . this point will be, I hope, adopted without diffi- culty by all the Powers. From now on, the principle of an autono- mous Albania under the control of all the Great Powers including France is admitted. There remains the determination of the régime and limits of Albania. In this determination we shall see to it that it takes account of the interests of the Greeks, Bul- garians, Serbs, and Montenegrins.?1 Before the Conference resumed its meetings in London on January 2, 1913, the Balkan States interested in the Albanian question and the inhabitants of the territories concerned had been roused to action. The Albanians themselves were eager to recognize the effectiveness of the efforts of Austria-Hun- gary and Italy for Albanian autonomy; Ismail Kemal Bey presented his thanks in person to the consuls of the two nations at Valona, and by letter to Sir Edward Grey and the ” France. Documents diplomatiques, affaires balkaniques, 1912-14, IU, No. 24, Poincaré to Paul Cambon. “ The Times (London), December 21, 1912. “France, Documents diplomatiques, affaires balkaniques, 1912-14, II, No. 472. [ 25 | eee ee Oe Oe ee ae ote ak eeSOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS other ministers of foreign affairs of the Great Powers.22 At the next meeting of the Conference an Albanian memoran- dum was presented to Sir Edward Grey. The claims therein presented gave as reasons “. ... why Albania raises her voice to claim from the European Powers the right to life, and the possibility of orderly and peaceful development,” the facts that the Albanians formed a compact and homogeneous ethnic group, that their backwardness had been due to un- favorable surrounding conditions, and that their submission had been only apparent, inasmuch as they had constantly engaged in struggles to safeguard their liberty. Invoking the formula “the Balkans for the Balkan peoples,” the memoran- dum continued: *‘To place territory where the Albanian popu- lation is in a majority under foreign domination would be to perpetuate germs of discord and trouble.” The frontier then specifically named did not include Northern Epirus. To se- cure cordial relationships with their neighbors, the Albanians suggested a mixed commission for delimitation, on the ground that such a body, being unprejudiced, would arouse no opposition among the neighboring states.?® The Greek government also presented its claims in a mem- orandum on the frontiers of Epirus. Greece emphatically declared that, having engaged not in a war of conquest but of liberation, she desired a durable peace, such as frontiers drawn along strategic, economic, and ethnographic lines would insure. She expressly renounced her claims to Valona, but at the same time declared the possession of Janina abso- lutely necessary. With Janina should naturally go the port of Santi Quaranta, since to leave the coast opposite Corfu to another power would create a permanent danger to Greece. The important district of Argyrocastro Greece also claimed, on the ground that this region, as a result of geographical factors, is tributary to Santi Quaranta, and if separated from that port would be condemned to stagnation. Furthermore, ~ Austria-Hungary, Diplomatische Aktenstiicke, Ereignisse am Bal- kan, 1912-13, No. 190, Lejhanec to Berchtold, December 22, 1912. “TIbid., No. 215, the delegates of the Provisional Albanian Govern- ment to Berchtold. [ 26 |LN -EUROPREA N PNTWE-RINAYL LON A LE, TAVEEZ AIRES the document continued, the valley of Koritza would also be necessary; communicating with the sea only by Janina and Santi Quaranta, it forms with Janina and Argyrocastro an indivisible unit. Besides the strategic and economic argu- ments thus invoked, the memorandum justified the annexa- tion of this territory to Greece on ethnographic grounds, asserting that two-thirds of the inhabitants were Greeks even according to Turkish statistics.*4 The Conference of Ambassadors was deluged with nu- merous other memoranda of similar purport from inhabi- tants of various towns and districts in Northern Epirus. The stream of requests for union with Greece poured in from January to April, from Epirotes in Egypt and the Soudan, from Koritza, Delvino, Khimara, Kolonia, Premedi, and Liaskoviki. As typical of the tone of many of these requests may be singled out that of the people of Koritza presented in February. It asked the Conference to appoint a special com- mission “to examine the aspirations and sentiments of the population of our district,” at the same time declaring that any decision contrary to their aspirations for union with Greece would lead to disaster.?° The effort of the population to make its views known was not eminently successful, for the Conference accorded these requests little attention. During the first two months of the new year, meanwhile, the attention of the Powers was occupied by the question of the northern frontier of Albania. But during this period two important points of view were further developed. As early as January 3, 1913, Berchtold insisted that the boundary itself had already been determined by the Conference in its essen- tial points, and that a boundary commission should, if formed, merely work on the spot to carry out these decisions previously reached.*® Even more significant was the unity decided upon by Austria-Hungary and Italy in opposing the ~“Mémoire sur les frontiéres de V’Epire.” Text in Vellay, L’Jrréden- tisme hellénique, pp. 199-211. ~Vellay, op. cit., p. 220; for texts of other resolutions, vide ibid., pp. 211-57. * Austria-Hungary, Diplomatische Aktenstiicke, Ereignisse am Bal- kan, 1912-13, No. 207, Berchtold to Mensdorff. [ 27 ] a eeeSOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS claims of Greece. Berchtold reported his conversation with the Duke of Avarna in these words: Neither the cabinet of Vienna nor that of Rome could give its consent to the delimitation which the Greek Government has in view, which tends to separate from Albania the territories which the two Governments consider essentially necessary for the vital- ity of the Albanian State.?? On March 6 the thorny question of the northern frontier of Albania was reserved by the Conference, which decided to proceed to the discussion of the delimitation of the southern and southeastern frontier.2 This decision was reached at the very moment when the fortress of Janina fell into the hands of the Greeks. The capture of Janina by the Greeks and the fall of Adrianople, March 26, made possible the establishment of a preliminary basis of peace between the Balkan Allies and Turkey late in March. It was then provided that all the territory situated west of this line (i.e., Enos-Midia) shall be ceded by Turkey to the Allied States, with the exception of Albania, the delimitation and régime of which shall be reserved to the Powers.*® In accepting these conditions of the Powers, the Allies made a reservation to the effect that they ought to know as a necessary preliminary the projected frontiers of Albania, hoping that they will conform to those that were proposed at London.*°® The Powers replied that they were then ready to make known to the Allies the north and northeast delimi- tation of Albania and that the south and southeast will be com- municated to them as soon as they shall have been established.*! But since Albania constituted, with Macedonia, the spoils re- sulting from the expulsion of Turkey from most of her 7 Austria-Hungary, Diplomatische Aktenstiicke, Ereignisse am Bal- kan, 1912-13, No. 217, Berchtold to von Braun, January 6, 1913. *8 Ibid., No. 313, Mensdorff to Berchtold, March 6, 1913. ” France, Documents diplomatiques, affaires balkaniques, 1912-14, IU, No. 194, March 31, 1913. ” Ibid., No. 214, Deville to Pichon, April 5, 1913. “ Tbid., No. 224, Pichon to Bompard, April 9, 1913. | 28 JENE ORORE AN: TNE RENAL LOIN AGE VAgR eR VAVLRGS former European dominions, the Balkan States naturally felt a particular and strong interest in determining the division of those spoils. Therefore, in accepting the mediation of the Powers, they reserved the right during the progress of the negotiations to discuss with the Great Powers questions pertaining ....to the definitive fixing of the frontiers.?2 While the conversations at London were proceeding, but before any decision as to the southern boundaries of Albania had been reached by the Powers of Europe, rumors became rife to the effect that Austria-Hungary and Italy were plan- ning to occupy that country for the purpose of dividing it between them.** This peril France set herself to avert.*4 France was anxious that the Albanian question be regarded as a European problem, not a question for the Powers of the Triple Alliance alone. The French Minister of Foreign Affairs declared: At the demand of Austria and Italy, the Powers decided last December that Albania should be constituted an autonomous state under their guarantee and control. None of them has denounced the agreement reached; they ought then to proceed loyally with its execution. But in case Austria-Hungary and Italy should disembark troops on the Albanian coast he asserted that the other Powers ought to participate in the military operation, to mark its European character and the provisional nature of the occupation.*5 In this opinion, Russia, loyal to her ally, concurred, though expressing the belief that the task of the Powers should be limited to Northern Albania as the southern part had not yet been delimited and was still occupied by Greek troops.*¢ In a desperate effort to prevent the Balkan conflagration from spreading to Europe as it bade fair to do, the British ” Ibid., No. 247, April 21, 1913. “ Ibid., No. 271, Jules Cambon to Pichon, April 30, 1913. * Ibid., No. 287, Pichon to Paul Cambon, May 3, 1913. * Ibid., No. 289, Pichon to Paul Cambon, May 4, 1913. *° Ibid., No. 292, Note de l’ambassade de Russie, May 4, 1913. eae ne nad o artiee ee ee ata Se SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS Foreign Minister, Sir Edward Grey, under whose presidency the meetings of ambassadors in London were held, steadily worked for a compromise between the Greek and the Italian claims on the subject of the southern frontier of Albania. Grey’s efforts were supported by Pichon; but the latter states- man asserted that the official press of Rome did not make his task an easy one, as France was there represented as the adversary of Italy, a view which, he declared, was manifestly contrary to his attitude.” The Powers had not yet been able to settle the Albanian question in a manner satisfactory to their conflicting inter- ests when on May 30 the Treaty of London established peace between Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia on the one hand, and Turkey on the other. Article III of this treaty, accordingly, declared that the Balkan Allies and Turkey should remit to the sovereigns of the Great Powers “the task of regulating the delimitation of the frontiers of Albania and all other questions concerning Albania.’’** The peace as then established proved an insecure one. The second Balkan War, resulting from differences among the Balkan Allies over the division of Macedonia, broke out a month later, but lasted only until the surrender of Bulgaria on July 31, the Peace of Bucharest being signed on August 10. This second war, how- ever, did not materially affect the Albanian situation, but the Powers in London continued their efforts to conclude its settlement in a manner satisfactory to themselves. No sooner had the Treaty of London been signed than the Greek delegation, consisting of Skouloudis, Gennadius, and Streit, sent a declaration to the British Foreign Office. This document requested that when the Powers discussed ques- tions affecting the vital interests of Greece they should con- sent to hear her representatives, and that they take into con- sideration the wishes of the liberated population.*® ‘France, Documents diplomatiques, affaires balkaniques, 1912-14, II, No. 300, Pichon to Deville, May 21, 1913. % Text in Eastern Question, Peace Handbook No. 15, pp. 1382-33. * France, Documents diplomatiques, affaires balkaniques, 1912-14, Il, No. 308, Paul Cambon to Pichon, May 31, 1913. [ 30 |IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS Before the long-postponed solution of the southern fron- tier of Albania was reached, France undertook negotiations in an endeavor to obtain some favorable concession to Greek claims from the Austro-Hungarian and Italian representa- tives. When M. Paul Cambon and Sir Edward Grey discussed this matter, the latter was of the opinion that they could effect a compromise by which the frontier would start at Cape Stylos on the Adriatic, and that an international com- mission should establish the frontier in the direction of Koritza. This procedure Grey suggested to the Minister of Greece, who appeared to approve it. France also asked Greece to allow the retention of Argyrocastro by Albania, with the ex- pectation that Greece might keep Koritza as compensation.*° If Greece were to obtain, in addition to Koritza, the Aegean Islands with the exception of Imbros and Tenedos, Cambon expressed the opinion that France would then be “able to advise her to accept a solution which she ought to consider as favorable.’’** From this time on, in fact, the question of Southern Albania was bound up with that of the Aegean Islands, which were looked upon as offering possible com- pensation to Greece for the denial of her claim to parts of Albania demanded for the new state by the Triple Alliance. In accordance with this French recommendation, then, and in a desire to prove her conciliatory spirit, Greece yielded. On condition of receiving satisfaction for the islands held by Italy and for the enlargement of Albania, Greece declared herself willing to give up claims to the coast as far as Cape Stylos. But she made this great sacrifice only with the reser- vation that in return she should keep the valley of the Drin, Premedi, and Koritza, and should get all the islands, with the exception, at most, of Imbros and Tenedos.?2 In ignorance of the fact that this boundary line had been communicated to Skouloudis by the Greek government,** * Ibid., No. 316, Pichon to French Ambassadors, June 6, 1913. “ Idem. “ Austria-Hungary, Diplomatische Aktenstiicke, Ereignisse am Bal- kan, 1912-13, No. 667, Szecsen to Berchtold, July 5, 1913. “ France, Documents diplomatiques, affaires balkaniques, 1912-14, II, No. 335, Deville to Pichon, June 15. 1903 [ 31 | — 404 Te aie een ee a eee Se nen - ree attSOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS Sir Edward Grey requested the French and Russian ambassa- dors to consult their governments on the suggestion that they establish an international commission to draw a compromise line between those proposed by the Italian government on the one hand, and the Greek on the other, this line to start from Cape Stylos. If the Powers should agree to this proposal, the Cabinet of Athens was to be invited to agree to accept the frontier thus established.** France was willing to accept this proposal provided that the fate of the islands be determined first. Pichon also reiterated his opinion that Koritza should be left to Greece.*® But on this point Austria-Hungary stood firm, true to her policy of a large Albania. From this refusal on the part of the Dual Monarchy to accept the proposal of France a delicate situation resulted—so delicate, in fact, that Cambon spoke of the need of using patience “to avoid above all the rupture of the Conference of London.’”*® France, then, as the protector of Greek interests and the opponent of the Triple Alliance, used all her influence to keep Koritza for Greece. Delcassé, at that time Ambassador of France at St. Petersburg, was particularly in favor of this view: but on being told by Sir Edward Grey that Austria- Hungary raised insuperable objection, Pichon informed Del- cassé that such a solution was impracticable.** In view of the opposition on the part of the Dual Monarchy, Pichon pro- posed to Tittoni on July 3 that Austria-Hungary and Italy should conditionally accept Sir Edward Grey’s proposal for a commission to delimit the frontier, leaving, however, Argyro- castro and Koritza to Albania. Pichon felt forced to submit, and, accordingly, affirmed that he would not object to such a proposal, provided it were to come through Austria-Hungary “France, Documents diplomatiques, II, No. 337, Paul Cambon to Pichon, June 16, 1913. For text of dispatch of Cabinet at Athens to Skouloudis. which was communicated to the Greek Chamber by Venizelos, November 25, 1913, vide Maccas, La Question greco-albanaise, pp. 123-24. © Ibid., No. 341, Pichon to Paul Cambon, June 17, 1913. “6 Tbid., No. 348, Paul Cambon to Pichon, June 21, 1913. ‘T Ibid., No. 363, Pichon to Delcassé, June 28, 1913; Austria-Hungary, Diplomatische Aktenstiicke, Ereignisse am Balkan, 1912-13, No. 667, Szecsen to Berchtold, July 5, 1913. [ 32 ]IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS and Italy.4® Yet his instructions of ten days later to Cambon to support Greece in her refusal to cede Koritza, provided such action did not break up the Conference, showed his irreconciliation.*® In the meeting of the Conference of Ambassadors on August 1 Sir Edward Grey expressed the opinion that an understanding could be arrived at on certain points. Of these the most important were the establishment of an interna- tional commission to delimit the southern and southeastern frontiers of Albania, with instructions to leave Koritza, Stylos, and the island of Sasseno to Albania, and in addition to neutralize the channel of Corfu.*° Accordingly, on August 11, the Conference adopted a somewhat detailed resolution dealing with the question of the boundary and the work of the commission. The most important provisions of this were as follows: 1. The territory over which the work of the commission shall extend, cannot remain undetermined. The limits shall be at the west, the mountains separating the coastal regions attributed to Albania as far as Phtelia, from the valley of Argyrocastro to the northeast the frontier line of the old Ottoman kaza of Koritza. Between these two regions the line indicated in the memorandum presented by M. Venizelos to the Conference shall form the southern limit of the province of the commission, while to the south and southeast it shall extend to the line proposed by Austria- Hungary and Italy. 2. It is now established that the coast region to Phtelia, includ- ing the island of Sasseno, the region situated to the north of the Greek line as well as the old Ottoman kaza of Koritza with the west and south bank of the lake of Ochrida .... shall form an integral part of Albania. 3. The commission shall commence its labors Sept. 1 to end them Nov. 30, 1913. *S Idem. ” France, Documents diplomatiques, affaires balkaniques, 1912-14, Il, No. 395, Pichon to Paul Cambon, July 15, 1913. ” Austria-Hungary, Diplomatische Aktenstiicke, Ereignisse am Bal- kan, 1912-13, No. 771, Mensdorff to Berchtold, August 1, 1913. [ 33 |SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS 4. For the conduct of its work the commission shall proceed by sections, taking account of the natural conformation of the valleys. 5. The delimitation shall be made on ethnographic and geo- graphic bases; for ethnographic determination the maternal tongue of the population shall be determined .... ; the commis- sion shall not take account of attempts at plebiscite or other po- litical manifestations. 7. One month at most after the closing of the work of the com- mission, the evacuation by the Greek troops in the territory given to Albania shall take place.®! On August 12 in the House of Commons Sir Edward Grey discussed the Albanian question as one of the two chief issues on which the Powers had to agree “if they were to keep in touch and friendship with each other and to localise the war.” On the question of frontiers they had met with great difficulty, but they had finally reached an agreement for a delimitation of the southern frontier. [ am quite aware [he said] that when the whole comes to be stated it will be open on many points to a great deal of criticism from anyone with local knowledge who looks at it purely on the merits of the locality itself. It is to be borne in mind that in making that agreement the primary essential was to preserve agreement between the Great Powers themselves, and if the agree- ment about Albania has secured that it has done the work which is most essential in the interests of the peace of Europe.°? The Conference of Ambassadors at London, then, had apparently solved the difficult problem of the Greco-Albanian frontier. Austria-Hungary and Italy were thus successful in setting up an independent state of Albania. Their policy of “* Austria-Hungary, Diplomatische Aktenstiicke, Ereignisse am Bal- kan, 1912-13, No. 809, Berchtold to von Braun, August 12, 1913. * Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 1913, LVI, 2282 ff. For the part of Sir Edward Grey and for a summary of the attitude taken by the various countries at the Conference, vide Lichnowsky, My Mission to London, pp. 6—11, where he says that France backed Greece, that Ger- many took sides with Austria-Hungary and Italy, while Sir Edward Grey, in order not to furnish a pretext for war, hardly ever supported the French or Russian claims. [ 34 ]IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS extending its boundaries, however, met with opposition from Greece, which claimed a northward extension of her territory, chiefly on ethnologic and strategic grounds; in this view she was backed by France. A compromise between the two views was necessary to maintain the peace of Europe. To delimit this compromise boundary line in detail, a commission was provided for. The basis to be taken in this delimitation was the spoken language of the inhabitants, a basis which in a bilingual country was fraught with dangers, the conse- quences of which soon became evident. The solution of the Albanian problem appeared to the Conference of Ambassadors to have been reached with the determination of the southern frontier of the new state in its larger aspects and the establishment of a commission to delimit this boundary in detail on the spot. The question was solved; a compromise acceptable, if not entirely satis- factory, to the Powers had been arrived at; all that remained was to carry out this decision. Herein the Powers, however, were reckoning without their host; they had failed to consult the population concerned as to its wishes. This mistake, coupled with the difficulty, even the impossibility, of deter- mining the language spoken in a bilingual country, spelled almost certain disaster. The commission was slow to assemble; the opening meet- ing was held October 4, one month later than had been planned. Detailed instructions from Vienna to the Austro- Hungarian delegation embodied the Austrian point of view as to the language frontier, and were accompanied by a map representing graphically the territory reserved for the work of the commission, a description of the Greco-Albanian fron- tier as claimed by the Greeks in the memorandum of Veni- zelos, and a statement of the compromise line as worked out by Austria-Hungary and Italy. The Dual Monarchy main- tained that the boundary must be drawn at least twelve kilometers south of Argyrocastro. As arguments in support of this view she adduced the following reasons: first, that the coastal region promised to Albania would be too narrow in proportion if the valley of Argyrocastro were to be given to [ 35 | Wewemyp et panes le = = a . < ~ ed nananNORTHERN EPIRUS SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR another country; secondly, that the road from Delvino to Argyrocastro must remain Albanian in its entirety; and, thirdly, that Argyrocastro is the industrial center for the valley, and Santi Quaranta the port through which the entire territory communicates with the outside world.°*® The Powers notified Albania of the decision to bestow Koritza upon her soon after that decision was made. They also informed Greece, and when the Greeks in Koritza tried to organize local opposition to incorporation in Albania, Austria-Hungary and Italy warned Greece not to oppose this decision.®°* Greece on her part informed Berchtold through the Austro-Hungarian Minister in Athens that she had given very strict orders to local authorities in Epirus that the Southern Albanian boundary commission should not be hin- dered in its work.® The commission at its first meeting on October 4 at Monastir decided upon certain rules of procedure. These included declarations that the commission would refuse to give ear to any Greek or Albanian delegations; that during the inquiries in the various districts, the commission would refuse to be escorted by either Greek or Albanian civil or military officials, and that any necessary escort would remain behind on their entrance to the village; that the services of *“ Austria-Hungary, Diplomatische Aktenstticke, Ereignisse am Bal- kan, 1912-13, No. 839. * Ibid., No. 860, Berchtold to Ambassadors in Berlin, London, Paris, and St. Petersburg, September 8, 1913. °° Tbid., No. 869, Furstenberg to Berchtold, September 16, 1913. The boundary commission was composed of the following members: for England, Lieutenant-Colonel Doughty-Wylie, former consul at Adana and at that time holding the same position at Adis Ababa, assisted by Captain King, R.E., for topographical work; for France, Lieutenant-Colonel Lallemend of the French artillery, and M. Krayer, Vice-Consul at Volo; for Russia, Colonel Gouten, Russian military at- taché at Athens; for Germany, Lieutenant-Colonel Tierry, of the Gen- eral Staff; for Austria-Hungary, Herr Bilinski and Herr Buchberger, who had held the posts of Consul-General and Vice-Consul, respectively, at Janina; for Italy, Signor Labia, former Italian consul at Janina, assisted by Captain Castoldi. Vide Anglo-Hellenic League, Murray, Northern Epirus in 1913, p. 4. [ 36 |IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL. AFFAIRS private persons would not be accepted; that on departure from one town, the decision would then be made as to the next town to be visited; that discussions so far as they were of a diplomatic nature were to be kept secret; that the Greek government was to be informed of these decisions as to procedure in order that the authorities in occupation of the land might be required not to disturb the commission in its work.®® This last provision, aimed against Greece, showed the fear lest the kingdom of Greece should encourage the Greek portion of the population in resistance to incorporation in Albania. Complaints that the delimitation was being thus hampered by the attitude of the population under Greek incitement were made by Austria-Hungary and Italy in iden- tical notes presented to Greece on October 31. In threatening tones the two Powers then informed Greece that instruction had been given their representatives on the commission to regard as Albanian all villages where opposition was en- countered.*? They added that the governments adhered to the conditions laid down by the ambassadors in London regarding the duration of the commission and the evacuation by the Greek army of the territory already apportioned to Albania.®8 The irritation which this note produced was not confined to Greece, since the other Great Powers had been in entire ignorance that any action was contemplated by their Austro- Hungarian and Italian colleagues. Alarm at this independent action on the part of the Ballplatz and the Consulta was expressed both in France and in England, where the London Times characterized such action as “inopportune and even disquieting” on the grounds that it showed a disposition to treat Albania as an Austro-Italian preserve.®® The incident, * Austria-Hungary, Diplomatische Aktenstiicke, Ereignisse am Bal- kan, 1912-13, No. 896, Bilinski to Berchtold, October 5, 1913. * New York Times, November 2, 1913. * Le Temps, November 3, 4, 1913; The Times (London), November 3, 1913. * The Times (London), November 3, 1913. [ 37 ]SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS it was also pointed out, lent color to the reports of serious differences of opinion among the members of the commis- sion, since the Austro-Italian complaint against the Greek officials contrasted strangely with Major Doughty-Wylie’s recent thanks for the facilities which had been given the commission.®® The Greek government, for its part, called the attention of the Powers to the fact that, far from putting difficulties in the way, it had in reality done everything possible to assist the work of the commission.*: Though the Greek reply refrained from any definite protest against the isolated action of the two Powers of the Triple Alliance, the Hellenic note made it clear, according to The Times, that the Greek government looked to the Conference of Ambassadors for instructions rather than to Rome or to Vienna. For the delay of six weeks in starting work by the commission, the Greek government, added The Times, could “hardly be held responsible.’’® The commission did not leave Monastir to begin work until October 14.°* According to the account given by the press representatives who accompanied the commission, that body stayed in the village of Erseka for twenty-two days, during which time it visited only six villages and examined only about a score of persons for the purpose of ascertaining the language spoken by the inhabitants. From what little is known of the acts of the commission, it appears certain that an impasse developed, the delegates aligning themselves in two camps; those of the Triple Alliance maintained that the districts were Albanian, while the Triple Entente took the point of view that, although the older generations in a number of villages spoke Albanian, the entire younger gener- ation was Greek in its industrial and intellectual life, its sentiments, and aspirations.°* While the commission, at a standstill, waited at Liaskoviki, Major Doughty-Wylie tele- © The Times (London), November 3, 1913. * Ibid., November 4, 1913. © ITbid., November 6, 1913. “Idem. “De Jessen, Le Temps, November 13, 1913. { 38 ]IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS graphed to London proposing that the negotiations proceed on a different basis. When his first proposal, apparently assigning certain points to Greece, failed to win the assent of Austria-Hungary and Italy, he suggested a second com- promise by which for the purely linguistic basis were substi- tuted geographic, economic, and strategic bases.®® Although the possibilities of the adoption of a compro- mise were improved by the death of one of the Austro- Hungarian delegates, Bilinski, whose place Vienna intended to fill, it was announced, with a more impartial man, yet the proposed compromise underwent many changes in London before an agreement was reached.*®¢ A mere compromise, however, was not acceptable to the Epirotes; one observer declared that their discontent was such that resistance would be certain. Venizelos, too, was dissatisfied; he declared to the Greek Chamber that he had contracted no official obligation toward the Conference of London, an argument based on the fact that he had told the Powers in the course of the negotiations earlier in London that the extreme limit of Greek concession on the coast still retained Koritza, Argyrocastro, and Premedi for Greece. Accordingly, a few days later the Greek government pre- sented through its representatives abroad a new and more detailed exposé of the disastrous results that would ensue from the proposed compromise.* After further delay Sir Edward Grey came forward with a definite proposal on the subject of Albania and the islands. Recalling the decision of the Conference of London that the work of the delimitation commission should end Novem- ber 30, and that the territory occupied by the Greeks should be evacuated one month thereafter, he suggested that since the commission had not finished its work and therefore the ® Le Temps, November 9, 15, 1913; Dillon, Contemporary Review (1913), CIV, 879-80. “Le Temps, November 24, 1913. % Ibid., November 27, 28, December 4, 1913. It must be remembered that the French press in general, and Le Temps in particular, was strongly pro-Greek. [ 39 |EPIRUS SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN delay of a month provided for evacuation was not possible, some agreement was necessary. In accordance with the com- promise he then proposed, the frontier line would run along the Sarandaporos River to its junction with the Viosa, and thence along the southern boundary of the debatable area to join the established frontier drawn inland from Phtelia Bay.®® This line would leave Koritza to Greece but would exclude a number of Greeks. The cabinet of Athens, in its communication to the British government on this subject, claimed that Greece would thus lose 140,000 Greeks, and pointed out that the new frontier was arbitrarily drawn with- out consideration for local conditions or communications, and in such a way as to leave all the strategic points to Albania; the Greek note disclaimed, however, all intention of resisting the will of Europe.*® Meanwhile the commission had left Southern Albania for Italy. On December 20 came the announcement that the commission had accepted, on December 17, the line proposed by Great Britain in toto. This decision is known as the Protocol of Florence owing to the fact that the commission took this official action in that city.7° The frontier as thus determined started from the southern end of the line settled on August 11; then ran southwest to Mount Kazan in the Grammos Range, the crest of which it followed as far as Mavripetra; thence the new frontier struck across the Saran- daporos River (to the north of Koritza), which stream formed the boundary as far as its junction with the Viosa, whence the line approximately followed the southern bound- ary of the debatable area to join the end of the frontier settled on August 11, inland from Phtelia Bay. According to this frontier, the valley and towns of Argyrocastro, Liaskoviki, Delvino, Santi Quaranta, Tepeleni, Premedi, Koritza, and Cape Stylos were included in Albania." “ Le Temps, December 5, 1913 (text not given; correspondence from Berlin). The Times (London), December 5, 1913. * Idem. " Ibid., December 20, 1913; Le Temps of the same date. ™ Tbid., December 24, 1913. For text of Protocol (in part), vide Godart, L’Albanie en 1921, pp. 261-63. [ 40 ]IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS Although the Protocol of Florence established the south- ern boundary of Albania, which had caused the Powers so much trouble, nearly two months elapsed before the six Powers united in presenting a note to the Greek government on the subject of the Aegean Islands and Epirus. This note stated that nearly all of the islands were to be given to Greece provided that the Greek troops evacuated the terri- tories assigned to Albania at Florence, and that the Greek government pledged itself neither to resist nor to encourage resistance of any kind to the state of things established by the Powers in Southern Albania. The evacuation was to commence March 1 by the withdrawal of the Greek troops from the kaza of Koritza and was to proceed successively until March 31, when it must be completed by the departure of Greek troops from the kaza of Delvino.72 In reply to this long-delayed communication the Greek government expressed its willingness to conform to the de- cisions of the Powers and agreed to order its troops to evacuate the territories assigned to Albania within the time fixed. Greece undertook not to oppose the evacuation but suggested that certain villages in the valley of Argyrocastro Should be given to her, in exchange for an extension of Albanian territory along the coast and the payment to AI- bania of 2,500,000 francs. The note, moreover, suggested that the Epirote population might be calmed in its fear by guar- anties of protection of its institutions. During the process of evacuation and in the difficult period succeeding it, meas- ures should be taken to reassure the people that their prop- erty was not in danger. An annex contained a suggested rectification of the frontier at Koritza.7? “For text, vide Le Temps, February 15, 1914. “ For text, vide ibid., February 23, 1914. Some of these suggestions were a result of a tour of European capitals by Venizelos in December 1913. Vide The Times (London), February 16, 1914. During this whole period under discussion the Anglo-Hellenic League—founded at this time to further the traditional British sentiment of Philhellenism— was active. For expressions of opinion in the House of Commons, vide those of Mr. R. P. O’Connor, May 29, 1913: “Can anything be more monstrous or absurd than to put this large Greek population under the [ 41 ]SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS Rumors soon became rife that certain elements in the Epirote population were resisting with arms inclusion in Albania. On February 16 the British government was asked in the House of Commons “whether seeing that the inhabi- tants of the district are opposed to such inclusion and are determined to oppose it by force of arms, His Majesty’s Gov- ernment are prepared to assent to their coercion?” In reply, the Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs referred to communications then being carried on with the Greek gov- ernment respecting the settlement of the Southern Albanian frontier, and trusted that “no question of coercive measures will arise.’’** But the population of Argyrocastro continued to hope to the last for a revision of the frontier in its region, such as was requested in the Greek note of February 21. Particularly encouraging were the visits of Venizelos to Euro- pean capitals, where the Greek Minister was led to hope that a revision was possible by which satisfaction would be given to the Greek aspirations of a certain number of villages near Argyrocastro. When this news was made known to the popu- lation their hopes were strengthened.” When no immediate reply was forthcoming to the Greek note of February 21 in which revision and guaranties had been suggested, the growing movement for resistance to in- clusion in Albania took shape. The following week witnessed proclamations of the autonomy of Epirus at Khimara, Ar- syrocastro, Santi Quaranta, and Delvino, “despite counsels of delay offered by the Athenian leaders.’’*® The autonomist movement assumed definite form when on February 28 the news that the Greek leader, Zographos, had been appointed president of the provisional government of Autonomous control of another race?” Also of Mr. Walter Guiness, May 8, “Greece demands territory in Southern Albania where the Albanian race is in an overwhelming majority.” Parliamentary Debates, Commons (1913), LIII, 371; LII, 2304. For French contemporary press opinion, vide Le Temps, April 8, 12, 1913 (in favor of a plebiscite). ™ Parliamentary Debates, Commons (1914), LVII, 550. ® Le Temps, March 4, 1914. 7% The Times (London), February 25, 1914; Le Temps, February 26, March 4, 1914. [ 42]IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS Epirus at a public meeting at Argyrocastro was communi- cated to Durazzo, the seat of the International Commission of Control—the body that had been set up by the Powers to govern Albania, with the German prince finally chosen as ruler, William of Wied.77 When on March 2 the independence of Northern Epirus was proclaimed at Argyrocastro, Zogra- phos delivered a speech in which he declared the impossibility of submission to the yoke of a barbarous people, and dramati- cally added that the Epirotes, unable to realize their dream of five centuries, had decided to die for their liberty.” The autonomist movement in Northern Epirus was headed by Zographos and Karapanos, who described themselves as “‘an executive committee acting as a provisional govern- ment.’® The policy of Zographos at the outset was revealed by certain declarations he made on the eve of his departure from Athens for Argyrocastro; the movement, he then as- serted, was provoked by the need to protect the existence of the Epirote population. In his view three means existed for preserving the population from fatal ruin: first, complete autonomy under the scepter of the prince of Albania; or, secondly, very large administrative or cantonal autonomy based on a gendarmerie recruited exclusively among the people of the district concerned; or, thirdly, European occu- pation and administration sufficiently lengthy to clarify the true situation and lasting until withdrawal would involve no danger. If Europe wished to avoid the misfortune of leaving to Albanian invaders only smoking ruins, “she should intervene in time to take measures which without modifying the bases of the decision of the Powers would save a people and safeguard the principles of humanity.’’®° The position of the Greek government during this revo- lution in Northern Epirus was one of. strict neutrality. Promptly, on March 9, it declared a blockade of the port of ‘ Parliamentary Debates, Commons (1914), LIX, 852. * Le Temps, March 5, 1914. ” Anglo-Hellenic League, No. 10, p. 7. For proclamation issued by the Government of Autonomous Epirus, vide Le Temps, March 9, 1914. ” Le Temps, March 3, 1914. [ 43 | . ee ee - ee a ae es cd =e ee ee eeSOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS Santi Quaranta, “‘at present in the hands of insurgents.’*} The Greek government, in fact, prohibited a demonstration in Athens organized by the Labor Party in favor of the Epirotes; this was said to be the first occasion on which such a demonstration had been prevented in Greece.®? The lengths to which the Greek government went in its efforts to maintain a correct attitude are shown in the statement of Zographos, who himself said that he had incurred the hostility of the official circles of Athens, and that the government had strangely misconceived the extent of its obligations towards the Powers. .... It has blockaded Santi Quaranta, hindering our supplies and the victualling of our soldiers. Orders have been is- sued prohibiting officers, soldiers, and others from coming to our aid. Merchants have been warned not to supply us with arms and ammunitions. Despatches and even private letters have been intercepted.® In view of the attitude of the Greek government, the com- mander-in-chief of the Epirote forces, Colonel Doulis, re- signed his commission in the Hellenic army before joining the revolutionists in Epirus.** The suggestion that the Greek government had in any way encouraged the revolutionary movement was formally contradicted by the Greek Minister in London, Gennadius, who in so doing was acting under instructions from Athens. He asserted that as a result of the measures taken by his government, it had strained its re- lations with Zographos to the breaking-point, to say nothing of the feeling aroused in Greece itself. But he finally pointed out that the lamentable conditions, which there was every reason to fear would rapidly grow worse, would have been obviated had the Powers heeded the suggestions in the Greek note of February 21.*° “ British Foreign and State Papers, 1914, Part 1, CVII, 137. = The Times (London), March 23, 1914. *’ Anglo-Hellenic League, No. 10, p. 13. * Le Temps, March 24, 1914. ° The Times (London), April 20, 1914; reprinted in Anglo-Hellenic League, No. 10, p. 1. For further denial of collaboration between Argyro- castro and Athens, vide de Jessen, in Le Temps, April 23, 1914; also The Times (London), April 17, 1914. a2IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS One of the chief causes of the revolt undoubtedly lay in the apparent inability of the Powers to give a definite answer to Greek demands. The Powers, though informed by the Greek government that the gravity of the situation made a prompt decision urgent, and that the method of evacuation was unsatisfactory on account of the inability of the Al- banian gendarmes to maintain order,** continued to make no response. Feeling in Epirus was so intense that evacuation in truth presented the Greek ministers with a serious prob- lem; they considered evacuating without formally handing over the districts to the new authorities, as Greek troops were faced with the option of deserting or of firing on their brothers. Meanwhile both Koritza and Moschopolis had been turned over to Albanian gendarmes under the command of a Dutch officer,*’ but the evacuation of the remaining districts was delayed in hopes of a favorable answer from the Powers. An Austro-Italian reply—the presentation of which, however, was declared to have been due to a misunderstanding, as the Triple Alliance had not intended to separate itself from the concert of Europe in this matter—accepted rectifications in Argyrocastro but not at Koritza; nevertheless its generally unsatisfactory character simply confirmed the extremists in their belief that complete autonomy was the only possible solution.** The government at Athens delivered a further note to the representatives of the Powers on March 30, asking whether, at the moment when Hellenic troops were concen- trating with a view to evacuation, the Powers would not consider it a suitable occasion to make a reply in regard to the guaranties requested for the Epirote population in the Greek communication of February 21.8° The delay of the Powers in making a reply became a political question in the British House of Commons; Sir Edward Grey said on April 2 that the evacuation, to have been completed by March 31, had been proceeding up to within a few days, * Le Temps, March 15, April 23, 1914. “ The Times (London), March 18, 1914; Le Temps, March 4, 18, 19, 1914. * Le Temps, March 14, 1914. * The Times (London), March 31, 1914. [ 49 ]~E R + eeree ee SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS when the Greek Government suggested to the Powers the advisa- bility of delaying the withdrawal of their troops in the interests of public order, pending the conclusion of negotiations between the Albanian Government and the Provisional Government of Northern Epirus. No reply has, as yet, been returned to this proposal.®° Negotiations on the subject of a response were continued in an effort to come to an agreement among the Powers, and finally the reply proposed by the Triple Entente met with acceptance by the Triple Alliance, and on April 24 the Powers save an answer to the Greek note of February 21.” This communication declared that the Powers were ready to exercise all their influence to put into practice the prin- ciple of complete religious and linguistic equality, already decided upon by the Commission of Control, and were dis- posed to recommend to the Albanian government that it consider the suggestion of the Greek government concerning the enrolment of local elements in the gendarmerie. The note further asserted that if an arrangement could be con- summated between the various Powers and Greece in the region of Argyrocastro, they were willing to see it go into effect; but that investigation must be made to See if the wishes of the Greek government could be reconciled with the line adopted by the six Powers for Koritza.°* The result of this communication was the immediate hastening of evacu- ation, which was completed by April 28, five months later than had been originally planned.**? A prompt reply of the Powers would doubtless have been effective in preventing the revolutionary movement, for which a fertile field was pro- vided by the uncertainty and suspense caused by delay. The forces of the revolutionists and those of Albania carried on irregular warfare, although Zographos had early sent a warning to the Commission of Control threatening retaliation if the Albanian gendarmerie overstepped the Epi- ” Parliamentary Debates, Commons (1914), LX, 1320. " Tbid., April 9, 1914; Memorandum on Northern Epirus, 21. ” For text, vide Le Temps, April 26, 1914. *’ Ibid., April 27, 29, 30, 1914. [ 46 |IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS rote boundaries.®* At the end of March the Albanian govern- ment formally requested the Powers to exert their influence with Greece to end the “regrettable situation” existing in Epirus, calling attention to the recent conflicts and further noting that although Greek troops were being withdrawn, their place was taken by bands of comitadjis organized and armed by Greek authorities.** Accounts of robbery and out- rage were reported on both sides.°* In April the Epirote army, to which new recruits were being added daily, was said to number some five thousand men, most of whom had formerly been members of the Greek army. In addition to these “regular” troops were the irregular volunteers about equal in number to the regulars, with which they were being gradually merged.° The program for which the autonomous Epirote govern- ment was struggling was embodied in a list of guaranties and privileges demanded, which was presented officially to the Albanian government. These demands comprised the admin- istration by two governors of Swiss or Dutch nationality, the establishment of a Diet on the model of that of Croatia, the incorporation of Christian elements in the gendarmerie, which should not be sent out of Epirus, complete liberty for Greek schools, complete religious liberty, and the concession to Khimara of all the privileges that district had enjoyed under the Sultan.9 The Albanian government was on the point of discussing terms with the Epirotes on a basis of satisfactory guaranties, though not autonomy, when Essad Pasha, the Albanian Min- ister of War, tried to mobilize against the insurgents. The measures of repression which he proposed, however, failed to win the approval of the Commission of Control, which advised negotiation and the granting of the necessary con- cessions. The British Commissioner, Lamb, especially, put “ The Times (London), March 12, 1914. “ Ibid., March 30, 1914. * Parliamentary Debates, Commons (1914), LX, 5-6. ” Anglo-Hellenic League, No. 10, pp. 10-11. * For text, vide Le Temps, March 28, 1914.SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS before the Albanian government the foolhardiness of such an attempt in the face of the obstacles: the poorly trained army, the unsatisfactory state of the finances of the new state, and the danger of complications with Montenegro.®® The wisdom of this advice was shown by the inability of the Albanians to put down the insurrection in the face of the renewed conflicts between the Albanian and Epirote forces. Zogra- phos, on his part, impressed observers with his moderation and desire to effect a settlement by peaceful means; he insisted only on administrative autonomy, not on union with Greece.1°° His moderation, however, far surpassed that of many of his followers. Negotiations between Albania and the Epirote revolution- ists were not actually begun until early in May. The cessation of hostilities was due to the intervention of the Commission of Control, which offered to meet at Santi Quaranta or else- where to treat of the guaranties demanded, the execution of which should be intrusted to the Commission. When the offer was accepted the members of the Commission accord- ingly left for Santi Quaranta to meet Zographos; but the final negotiations took place on the island of Corfu, away from the immediate scene of action.?®! The Epirotes had fought primarily for autonomy. In addition to their earlier demands, however, they now asked that the governor-general and the higher officials in the chief towns should be Orthodox Christians, that the Epirotes should not be subject to military service even in time of war, that the religious and educational liberty of the Greeks should include Valona and Durazzo, and that the ports of Santi Quaranta and Khimara should be declared free. The guaranties offered by the members of the Commission of Control, on the other hand, included: first, freedom of the * Le Temps, March 29, 1914. The proposed terms were said to have been actually accepted by Epirote delegates—ibid., March 30, 1914; The Times (London), April 8, 1914; Le Temps, April 10, 1914. ™ De Jessen, in Le Temps, April 23, May 1, 1914. 1 Le Temps, May 8, 9, 1914; also ibid., May 10, for favorable com- ment by the Greek press on this intervention. [ 48 ]IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS Orthodox communities to use the Greek language in schools, but requirement of Albanian in the primary schools; sec- ondly, a gendarmerie made up in preference of men of the province; thirdly, the constitution of Koritza and Argyro- castro as administrative cantons with local self-government, but with councils presided over by governors representing the central government and nominated by it; and, fourthly, certain measures for the immediate temporary relief of Argyrocastro.}° The fear, amounting almost to a certainty, that, should the Corfu conference break down, Italian and Austro-Hun- garian troops would occupy Southern Albania, doubtless fa- cilitated the reaching of a compromise.1°? In any case, the Epirote delegates and the Commission of Control represent- ing the new state of Albania, signed, on May 17, 1914, an agreement granting the chief demands of the Epirotes. By the terms of the agreement of Corfu the Epirotes obtained the autonomy for which they had struggled. The execution and maintenance of the new arrangement was intrusted to the International Commission of Control, as was also the organization of public administration and the depart- ments of justice and finance in the autonomous province of Northern Epirus. The Albanian government, in agreement with the Commission of Control, had the power of appoint- ment and dismissal of the governors and high officials, who were to be chosen in proportion to the relative strength of the respective religions. The Commission also had charge of the supervision of the delimitation and subdivision of the two provinces of Koritza and Argyrocastro of which Northern Epirus was composed; when once settled these frontiers could not be modified without the consent of the Powers. Provision was made for a local gendarmerie, to be composed of mem- bers of the various religions in proportion to their numerical “™ Ibid., April 17, May 11, 1914. ™ Vide The Times (London), May 12, 1914, for notification to the Greek government from the Governor of Janina to this effect. Vide also Laloy, Documents secrets, p. 71, for Austro-Italian convention, relative to Albania, of May 8, 1913. [ 49 | ae ee eee ee eeEEE ORF SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS strength, and to serve outside the provinces only for a fixed period and only in case of force majeure as recognized by the Commission. Except in case of war or revolution the use of non-native military units in the southern provinces was prohibited. The rights of the Orthodox communities were recognized; in those communities Greek was to be the lan- suage of the schools, but in the three elementary classes Albanian was to be taught concurrently with Greek, with the exception of religious education, which was to be exclusively in Greek. The use of both Albanian and Greek was to be insured before all the authorities, including the courts and the elective councils. The concluding articles of the agree- ment provided a specific method of occupation, measures for relief, complete amnesty for the Epirotes, and a statement suaranteeing the execution of the foregoing provisions by the Powers. Special dispositions concerning Khimara were appended, maintaining the old privileges which the Khimari- otes enjoyed under the Ottoman régime.'** The agreement of Corfu was ratified by the representatives of the Great Powers at Athens, June 18, and by the Albanian govern- ment, June 23.1 By guaranteeing the rights of the Greek minority in the new state of Albania, the agreement of Corfu seemingly provided a satisfactory solution of the difficulty that had threatened to disturb the peace of Europe by involving the Great Powers. Granted a period of peace with wise appli- cation of the agreement without interference from the king- dom of Greece, the solution might have proved permanent. But before it had been more than ratified and before it had been given a fair trial, the Great War broke out. For text, vide Greece, Delegation Propaganda, Memorandum on Northern Epirus, Appendix No. 2; Greece before the Peace Conference, American Hellenic Society, xxviii ff. ‘ Frangulis, L’Epire du Nord devant la conférence de la paix, pp. 17-18.IV. SOUTHERN ALBANIA AND THE GREAT WAR By July 1914 the Albanian question had become dis- quieting to Europe, and when the Great War broke out, the situation in Albania was very unsettled.t Persecutions and burnings were still occurring in Northern Epirus. The central government of the new ruler of Albania, Prince William of Wied, had not been able to make its authority felt outside of Durazzo. Unfortunate in his dealing with his people, upon which it is not necessary to dwell here, he quietly left the land early in September, never to return.? The country then fell apart into divisions corresponding to its geographical configuration, each under a régime of its own. These were as follows: 1. Scutari and its neighborhood under a local commission. 2. Mirdita under its native prince, Prenk Bib Doda. 3. The district inhabited by the Maltsors under their local chieftains. 4. Durazzo and its neighborhood under its local bey, Essad Pasha. 9. Valona and its neighborhood under the International Commission of Control. During the first year of the war the international situ- ation of Southern Albania was conditioned by the fact that Italy and Greece, the Mediterranean Powers chiefly interested in the new state, were neutral. Interest centers about the efforts made by each of the two camps of belligerents to keep one or other of these two neutral Powers out of the war or to bring them in on its side. The key to the action of the Powers in Albania during this war period is to be found, then, in their attitude toward the war. In the desperate effort made by the Dual Monarchy to keep her former ally, Italy, neutral, Albania played a large *Jonescu, Some Personal Impressions, p. 14. * The exact date is variously given: September 4, according to Tem- perley (editor), A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, IV, 339: September 3, L’Independance Albanaise, November 1, 1915. * Peace Handbook No. 17, Albania, p. 72. [ol ]— ot ee en eee, SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS part. The Austro-Italian agreement concerning Albania pro- viding for joint action to maintain Albanian neutrality,* was theoretically still adhered to, but early in September 1914 there was talk of an Italian occupation of Sasseno, the small island at the entrance to the bay of Valona.® It was hinted to Berchtold that a public statement to the effect that such an occupation had been decided upon by the Triple Alliance would produce “excellent results” by making the Entente Powers understand—‘“probably to their discomfiture’’—that the Triple Alliance was still effective. Berchtold agreed to such an occupation, to be simultaneously announced in Vienna, Berlin, and Rome, but desired that Italy should ap- preciate his consent, since Austro-Hungarian public opinion was “particularly sensitive with regard to all questions con- cerning Albania.’”® Undoubtedly Italy was looking for a pretext to occupy Valona in order to have a possible means of controlling the Adriatic. If we may believe an Austro-Hungarian report, Sgr. de Martino discussed the possibility of bringing about Mohammedan raids on the Epirotes for the purpose of pro- voking an “Epirote” or Greek occupation of Valona; in such a case “the Italian Government would find it impossible to disregard public opinion, which is extremely sensitive on that point.’”’ Statesmen of the Dual Monarchy saw, in a possible Italian expansion in Albania, Italy’s chosen measure of compensa- tion for a possible territorial expansion of Austria-Hungary in the Balkans.’ Such an expansion was regarded in both the Dual Monarchy and Italy as an opportunity to divert Italian public opinion from demonstrations hostile to the Triple * Vide supra, p. 1d. ° Austria-Hungary, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Docu- ments Concerning the Relations of Austria-Hungary with Italy, from July 20, 1914, to May 23, 1915. Macchio to Berchtold, September 11, 1914; Gottfried zu Hohenlohe to Berchtold, September 12, 1914. ° Jbid., Berchtold to Gottfried zu Hohenlohe, September 6, 1914. * Tbid., Macchio to Berchtold, October 6, 1914. *ITbid., Berchtold to Macchio, October 9, 1914.IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL ABRERAILRS Alliance.® The Ballplatz particularly feared it would provide Italy with an opportunity to obtain a foothold in the Balkans with the avowed object of safeguarding the interests of the Balkan States under Italy’s lead at the time of the great settlement of affairs.1° Alleging danger of violation of Al- banian neutrality from Greek troops, the Consulta addressed a circular note to the Italian Ambassadors accredited to the signatories of the London protocol, in which the Italian For- eign Office emphasized its strict adherence to the protocol, and expressed its intention as the only neutral Power among them to prevent any attempts to land expeditions. It was decided, therefore, to have Italian warships cruise off the Albanian coast for the purpose of preventing the importation of foreign arms and ammunition.’ At this point Sir Edward Grey, acting through the British Ambassador at Rome, called the attention of the Italian government to the great misery and famine among the Mo- hammedans in Epirus and the consequent danger of mas- sacre of the Christian population; with this situation the autonomous govern nie W ould \ \nh te; abla Ao cope. Under these circumstances Sir davard | ‘tele hit! V Vebizetos could do no less than send’ ite 5 Inert £0 ngyracastro to avert massacres, under, A {pron} FiSe' CP thy wt a later date Should the Powers so desire; K ee Ni that the Greek government would consent to an Italian occupation of Valona. The Italian Prime Minister, Salandra, while refusing to ac- cept the suggestion of a direct understanding with Greece in the matter of even a temporary occupation of Epirus by Greek troops, said that he would not oppose the sending of one Greek regiment for police purposes, while noting Veni- zelos’ promise to withdraw at a later date. He also reserved the right to carry out at Valona such police operations as might be needed for the welfare of the refugees. But at the * Ibid., Macchio to Berchtold, October 6; Berchtold to Macchio, Oc- tober 22, 1914. ” Ibid., Macchio to Berchtold, October 6, 1914. “ Ibid., Macchio to Berchtold, October 19, 1914. “ Ibid., Berchtold to Macchio, October 22, 1914.EPIRUS SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN same time he declared that these occupations should be tem- porary and should not interfere with the decisions of London with respect to Albania, which would remain in force.*® Accordingly, on October 31 it was announced that Italy had proceeded to the provisional occupation of the island of Sasseno for the effective preservation of Albanian neutral- ity..+ To this step the Greeks at once retaliated by occupying Santi Quaranta, Premedi, and Argyrocastro. Venizelos de- clared to the Greek Chamber that this act was a police meas- ure and did not belong to the category of conquests; its aim was to restore order, to render possible the immediate return of the refugees, and to permit the application of the agree- ment of Corfu as soon as the Powers succeeded in creating the necessary conditions for its application.’ The reception accorded this Italian occupation of Sasseno by the Great Powers was in general noncommittal, as they were all too busy with the war to raise objections. The atti- tude of France was on the whole one of satisfaction, inas- much as that Power viewed the occupation as aimed at her adversaries. The. Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sazo- noff, was frank tm his expression in .an interview granted the Russian correspondent. of. the:Corriere della Sera. He de- clared that Russia had no objection to formulate. But the motive of a sanitary mission appeared to him to be only a pretext; he did not understand why Italy let the Albanian flag float beside hers, as in his eyes there was no Albanian state. Germany and Austria-Hungary were reported to have accepted Venizelos’ action on condition that the occupation should not prove contrary to the decisions of the Conference of London.*? Two months later, on the ground of the prevalence of anarchy in Albania and of an appeal from the government of Durazzo (i.e., Essad Pasha) for the maintenance of order, * Austria-Hungary, Diplomatic Documents, Berchtold to Macchio, Oc- tober 24, 1914. * Ibid., Berchtold to Macchio. “ Vellay, La question de l’ Adriatique, pp. 102-3. 18 Tbid., pp. 95-97. “ Le Temps, October 31, 1914. [ 94 ]IN- EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS Italy proceeded to the occupation of Valona. In the case of Valona, however, the measures were declared to be only pro- visional, and it was stated that Italy had no intention of proceeding to further occupations.1® Any adequate appreciation of developments in Southern Albania necessitates a consideration of the attitude, not only of Italy, but also of Greece, toward the Great War. At the outbreak of hostilities, there were many reasons to suppose that Greek sympathies would be with the Entente: England, France, and Russia were the protecting Powers of Greece to whom she owed her very existence as an independent state; she was united to Russia by ties of religion, and to France by the fact that the French language is the common medium for the exchange of ideas among the educated in Greece as elsewhere in the Near East; Greece looked to England for protection as a sea power whose fleet could control the Medi- terranean, the commercial highway of the Greeks; moreover, she was universally believed to be bound to Serbia by a de- fensive treaty of alliance of 1913, the text of which, however, was not published until two years later; not until 1925 was it revealed that the treaty had been formally abrogated in 1915, when it had seemed certain that Greece would not enter the war on the Entente side.*® In the months preceding the war, it is true, efforts had been made by Viennese statesmen to win over Greece to a closer adhesion to the Central Powers; but a rapprochement failed of realization owing to opposition to the claims of the Greeks in the capitals of both Bulgaria and Turkey.”° As the war progressed, however, it was evident that strong forces were at work to keep Greece neutral; chief among these was King Constantine’s strong conviction that German militarism was bound to win. * Austria-Hungary, Diplomatic Documents, Berchtold to Ambrozy, December 26, 1914. ® First published in Le Temps, August 15, 1916. For texts and nego- tiations, vide Great Britain, War Office, Daily Review of the Foreign Press, Special Greek Supplement, pp. 4-20; New York Times Current History, October 1925, for Ninchitch’s revelation of abrogation. ~ Pribram, Austrian Foreign Policy, 1908-18, pp. 50-51. [ 995 JSOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS Each group of belligerents was anxious to secure the neutrality, at least, of Greece, and each made her offers of territory if she would enter as its ally. Venizelos’ offer to the Entente of all the naval and military resources of Greece, made in August 1914, was refused by Sir Edward Grey, who feared that acceptance would mean the immediate entrance of Turkey and perhaps Bulgaria on the side of the Triple Alliance.*!. Moreover, there was danger of alienating Italy from the side of the Entente, since Greek policy aimed at expansion over territory coveted by the former Power; it was partly for this reason, therefore, that French statesmen wanted Greece to come into the war without any specified conditions, leaving the matter of territorial compensations for the time of settlement.*? The Allies, therefore, hesitated to make definite offers to Greece. On November 22, 1914, however, the Entente made an offer to Greece for her immediate entry in aid of Serbia; act- ing through their ambassadors in Athens, England, France, and Russia offered Greece the southern part of Albania ex- clusive of Valona. For immediate entry Venizelos demanded a sure guaranty from Rumania against an attack of Bulgaria upon Greece; when this guaranty was not given, Greece consequently gave no help to Serbia, and the offer lapsed.?* The Greek minister, Repoulis, declared that the contemplated action on the part of Greece would be equivalent to the sui- cide of Greece.?* According to Venizelos’ own statement, an offer of extension of territory in Southern Albania was also made by Germany, but this offer likewise was refused.?° Greek intervention again became the subject of negotia- tions with the Entente in the spring of 1915, at the beginning of the Dardanelles expedition. In March the Greek govern- “Churchill, The World Crisis, p. 529; Asquith, The Genesis of the War, p. 223. ~ Abbott, Greece and the Allies, 1914-1922, p. 231. ~ Laloy, Documents secrets, pp. 134-35; Hanson, Diplomatie secrete, p. 50. “ Maccas, Ainsi parla Venizelos, p. 25, note 1. “In his speech of August 26, 1917; vide (Venizelos) Vindication of Greek National Policy, p. 76. [ 06 |IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS ment, acting through Zographos, now its Foreign Minister, stated it was willing to assist the Allies if Bulgaria entered the war, on the condition that Greek integrity were guaran- teed and compensation were offered.2* The following month the Greek government was more specific in its demands: the Gounaris Cabinet declared its willingness to enter at once, if the Entente Powers would be ready to commence military operations against Turkey jointly with the Greek troops. Such intervention was made dependent on a formal guaranty of Greek territorial integrity, with the inclusion of Northern Epirus during the whole war and for a definite period after it.27 The proposal fell through. Whether its failure was due, as the French Minister in Athens declared, to the insincerity of the Greek government when the Allies accepted these conditions,** or, on the other hand, as the Greek Foreign Minister stated, to the failure of the Entente to renew the negotiations,”® is not clear. Whatever the reason, Greece pre- served her neutrality. Greece, meanwhile, had obtained a foothold in Northern Epirus by her military occupation authorized by the Allies, an occupation which Venizelos declared to the Chamber in December 1914 would be continued under military adminis- tration as long as might be necessary and as long as “present international circumstances” might continue.*° Though it had been agreed at the time of the Italian and Greek occu- pations that the final settlement of the question should be left to the future peace conference, yet in August 1915 Veni- zelos declared to the Chamber that “only colossal faults” could separate Northern Epirus from Greece.?1 Undoubtedly ” Deville, L’Entente, la Gréce, et la Bulgarie. Notes d’histoire et sou- venirs, p. 142. “Full Texts of Secret Treaties as Revealed at Petrograd, reprinted from the New York Evening Post, p. 8. * Deville, op. cit., p. 144. ~ Full Texts of Secret Treaties, etc., loc. cit. * Maccas, Ainsi parla Venizelos, p. 27, note 3. “* Venizelos’ speech of August 26, 1927; vide his Vindication of Greek National Policy, p. 76. [97 ]ree et fe Nee ee ci ee Ter Er eek SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS both Greece and Italy hoped to keep the territory each then occupied when it came to the final settlement.* While Greece was thus furthering her interests in North- ern Epirus, Austria-Hungary and Italy continued negotiations in an effort to come to an agreement. In these negotiations the part played by Albania shows her importance for these Powers. In January the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Son- nino, took the view that Italy’s interests in Albania consisted solely in preventing others from gaining a foothold there, but not in establishing herself on Albanian soil.*® Austria- Hungary argued that the Italian occupation of Valona gave the Dual Monarchy the right to compensation.** But the Italian Ambassador in Berlin, the Duke of Avarna, declared that that act was not an occupation in the real sense of the word, but that, since order had to be restored there and Albania’s integrity protected, Italy, being neutral, had been the only Power which could accomplish that task in behalf of Europe.*® He further declared that the occupation was only provisional;*® Italy would continue to abide by the agreement with Austria-Hungary as regards Albania and Epirus, and to maintain the decisions of London especially as far as concerned the neutrality and frontiers of Albania.*’ On March 28 the Dual Monarchy made Italy a definite proposal. By its terms Italy was to bind herself to observe benevolent neutrality for the duration of the war, and Aus- * As indicative of public opinion the following extract may be cited from Jl Giornale d'Italia, October 6, 1916: “. ... we intend to secure for ourselves solid pledges which tomorrow will have their value when at the Congress of Peace the question arises of eliminating ambitions harmful to the solid possession of Valona.”—Daily Review of the For- eign Press (Great Britain), October 17, 1916. * Austria-Hungary, Diplomatic Documents, Macchio to Berchtold, January 6, 1915. * Ibid., Berchtold to Macchio, January 12, 1915. * Tbid., Burian to Macchio, February 4, 1915. “ Le Livre vert Italien, correspondance rélative aux evénements qui ont amené la rupture des relations avec l’Autriche-Hongrie, Sonnino to Avarna, February 12, 1915. * Ibid., Avarna to Sonnino, February 12, 1915. [ 98 |EN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS tria-Hungary would cede to her territory in the southern Tyrol including the city of Trent, in return for Italy’s leaving her full freedom of action in the Balkans and renouncing in advance all claims to compensation there, with the exception of Albania, with reference to which the decisions of the London Conference and the existing agreement between Aus- tria-Hungary and Italy were to hold good.*8 These Austro-Hungarian proposals were declared by the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs to be very insufficient and vague. Italy could not give the Dual Monarchy freedom of action in the Balkans without a declaration by the Dual Monarchy to the effect that the latter Power was completely disinterested in Albania. Furthermore, Italy could not engage herself any further than to observe a strict and impartial neutrality, since a benevolent neutrality in favor of Austria- Hungary would lead to the loss of England’s goodwill, with a consequent closing of the Straits of Gibraltar and an ensu- ing lack of the raw material on which many Italian industries depended.*® Sonnino, on the other hand, set forth the terms on which Italy would maintain her neutrality. Among the con- ditions indispensable for a permanent understanding between the two Powers were the recognition by Austria-Hungary of Italy’s unrestricted sovereignty over Valona and its bays, including Sasseno and as much territory in the hinterland as might be required for its defense, and unreserved renuncia- tion of all Austro-Hungarian interests in Albania as defined by the London Conference.*° In reply to these proposals, the Dual Monarchy declared itself ready to discuss with Italy their respective interests in Albania, though the Ballplatz could not renounce its interests there, in a country “so very close to the sphere of Austria- ** Austria-Hungary, Diplomatic Documents, Burian to Macchio, March 28, 1915. * Ibid., Macchio to Burian, March 31, 1915; ibid., Burian to Macchio, April 2, 1915. Livre vert Italien, Sonnino to Avarna, March 31, 1915; ibid., Avarna to Sonnino, April 2, 1915. *” Austria-Hungary, Diplomatic Documents, Burian to Macchio, April 11, 1915; Livre vert Italien, Sonnino to Avarna, April 8, 1915. [99 |SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS Hungary’s most yital concerns.” Moreover, the Albanian question had become a European question. Only by the “concordant will of the Great Powers could the political situation of Albania be modified—an eventuality impossible during the present war.’’*: Austria-Hungary rightly saw that the Adriatic would become an Italian lake if Italy kept pos- session of Valona.* Though on April 20 Salandra stated that Albania would not become the cause of a conflict between the two Allies,** yet when it was reported that negotiations with the Entente were about to be closed, Austria-Hungary made a last des- perate effort to keep Italy neutral. She was willing, in the case of extreme necessity, to declare her disinterestedness in Albania, with the reservation that guaranties must be provided against the establishment of a third Power.** The farthest limits of Austro-Hungarian concessions as outlined from Vienna were to include a declaration of complete dis- interestedness in Albania, with renunciation of all reserva- tions and restrictions.*® But in the meantime negotiations between Italy and the Entente had been progressing. Begun at the instance of the Italian Ambassador in London, Marquis Imperiali, they were conducted by Sir Edward Grey, M. Paul Cambon, and Count Benckendorff for the Allies. Their progress was hindered by the diversity of interests of the Great Powers at London; France, it is reported, found the demands of Italy very much exaggerated, particularly on the southeast coast of the Adri- atic, and accordingly it took six weeks to reach an agreement concerning the regulation of the details of the future terri- torial divisions of Albania and Dalmatia.*® The result of the * Austria-Hungary, Diplomatic Documents, Burian to Macchio, April 16, 1915. Cf. Livre vert Italien, Avarna to Sonnino, April 16, 1915. @ Austria-Hungary, Diplomatic Documents, Burian to Macchio, April 16, 1915. *8 Tbid., Macchio to Burian, April 20, 1915. * Tbid., Burian to Macchio, May 4, 1915. *‘ Tbid., Burian to Macchio, May 5, 1915. ““Hanson, Diplomatie secréte avec une annexe contenant le texte des documents secrets publiés en Russie, p. 42. 60]IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS negotiations was the secret Treaty of London, of April 26, 1915,*? by which Italy joined the Allies. Article 7 concerning Albania ran as follows: Having obtained Trentino and Istria by article 4, Dalmatia and the Adriatic islands by article 5, and also the gulf of Valona, Italy undertakes, in the event of a small, autonomous, and neutralized state being formed in Albania, not to oppose the possible desire of France, Great Britain, and Russia to repartition the northern and southern districts of Albania between Montenegro, Serbia, and Greece. The southern coast of Albania, from the frontier of the Italian territory of Valona to Cape Stilos, is to be neutralized. To Italy will be conceded the right of conducting the foreign relations of Albania; in any case, Italy will be bound to secure for Albania a territory sufficiently extensive to enable its frontiers to join those of Greece and Serbia to the west of Lake Ochrida. By this article, then, the Entente Powers agreed to give Italy, as part of the price of her intervention in the war, the foot- hold in the Balkans she had so long coveted. The negotiations leading up to this secret and nefarious pact have not been published, and in fact the treaty itself was not published until the Bolshevists opened the diplomacy of the Entente to the world. Its terms made it possible for the Allies to reward their friends, Serbia, and Greece (if she should enter); and as Italy was to obtain far-reaching concessions of territory, which, it is true, the Entente governments had not in their power to give, she was satisfied with her side of the bargain. Accordingly, on May 23, Italy entered the war on the side of the Allies. The next important developments involved the other Mediterranean Power, Greece. The Greek occupation of Northern Epirus authorized by the Allies in 1914 at the time of the establishment of Italy in Valona, the settlement of which, it will be remembered, was then expressly left to the Peace Conference, the successors of Venizelos determined to exploit. Deeming it time for a fait accompli, they encouraged “The terms have since been published in a variety of places. Vide Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, LI (1920), 261; Cocks, Secret Treaties and Understandings, pp. 27-28; Temperley, op. cit., V, 384-93. [ 61 ]SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS the population of Northern Epirus to hope that it might par- ticipate in the new national elections.** In December 1915, deputies from Northern Epirus were sent to the Greek Cham- ber for the purpose of claiming international recognition of the union of that province with Greece, and at the opening of the new Chamber, January 11, 1916, the government seated them. In February it proceeded to substitute civil officers for the military authorities of occupation, and the following month the Athenian press announced the signature of a royal decree reuniting completely Northern Epirus with the kingdom of Greece.*® The President of the Council of Min- isters, Skouloudis, openly expressed to the Chamber his conviction that Northern Epirus with its present frontiers constituted an integral part of the kingdom of Greece.*® This action was characterized by the Kiryz, the official press organ of Venizelos, as constituting a Greek success of the first order.®! The incorporation of Northern Epirus in Greece, however, was not, as had been hoped in Greece, accepted by the Entente Powers; though engrossed by war, these Powers demanded an explanation. To their objections the Greek government replied that civil administration was considered necessary to replace the military.** A second Allied note pointed out the incompatibility of Skouloudis’ words in the Chamber with the fact that the region in question had been included in the principality of Albania by decision of the Powers in 1913.°° In reply the Hellenic Minister stated that the cause of the participation of the Epirote deputies was the necessity of granting the Epirotes a voice in the legislature voting the taxes by which the cost of administration had to be met.** As a result of the Allied protests, however, the Greek govern- 48 Venizelos, Cing ans d’histoire grecque, 1912-1917, Discours pro- noncés a la chambre des deputés en aotit 1917, p. 17. ” Laloy, op. cit., p. 141; Le Temps, March 21, 22, 1916. ® Laloy, loc. cit. *! Maccas, Ainsi parla Venizelos, p. 28, note 1. = Laloy, op. cit., p. 143; Christian Science Monitor, April 3, 1916. °’ Le Temps, April 2, 1916. * Laloy, loc. cit. [ 62 ]IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS ment was forced to refuse to allow the participation of the deputies of Northern Epirus.*5 The surrender in May of Fort Roupel to the Central Powers marked the beginning of a period of almost open hostility between the Greek government and the Allies. The result of the consequent loss of Allied confidence in Greece was the expansion of Italy in Northern Epirus, accompanied by a forced retreat of Greece from this coveted area which a Short time before it had seemed that she had been successful in acquiring.*® The Minister of Greece at Rome reported that the Italians were ready to think that Greece would give way to the Bulgarians in Epirus as she had just done in Mace- donia, and that it was useless to place any faith in her “il- lusory guaranties.”°? Accordingly, early in June the Italians occupied Janina,°® a city of Greece proper, not of Northern Epirus, although this action was contrary to the written declaration of the Italian Minister at Athens that the Italian army of Valona would not advance beyond the northern frontier of Greece.*® As a result of the surrender of Fort Roupel, Great Britain, France, and Russia, in their capacity as protecting Powers of Greece, made several demands on the Greek government, chief of which was for demobilization of the army; this latter demand was seconded by Italy in a separate note of June 21, 1916, in which it was assumed that demobilization would be applied not only to the Hellenic kingdom but also to Northern Epirus. A few days later, in accordance with this demand, the new Prime Minister, Zaimis, informed the Italian Min- ister at Athens that the army, including the units in Northern Epirus, was being put on a peace footing.* * Venizelos, Cing ans d’histoire grecque, etc., p. 17; Le Temps, May 6, 1915. “ Venizelos’ speech of August 26, 1917, Vindication of Greek National Policy, p. 137. 7” Livre blanc grec, Traité d’alliance Greco-Serbe; Invasion Germano- Bulgare en Macédoine, Coromilas to Skouloudis, 13/17 May, 1916. °** Le Matin, June 12, 1917. “Le Temps, March 22, 1916. ® Idem. “ Tbid., June 26, 1916.SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS The consequence then of precipitate action by the Skou- loudis government in trying to annex Northern Epirus in 1916 instead of waiting for the end of the war to confirm its possession, and of the mistrust of the Greek government felt by the Allies after the surrender of Fort Roupel, was the loss of Northern Epirus by Greece and the occupation of that province by the rival Power, Italy. Greek hopes were Sshat- tered. The Italian occupation was denounced by one Hellenic paper (the Nea Ellas) as a “stiletto in Greece’s heart,’ but at the same time it was recognized that the real responsibility for the loss rested with Greece. The Estia also lamented the dangers threatening Northern Epirus, contrasting that prov- ince’s safety under Venizelos’ régime with its subsequent position.®? The Italian Minister at Athens assured Politis, however, that the sole object of the Italian occupation was to secure the safety of the Italian army at Valona by prevent- ing the transportation of contraband and stopping espio- nage.®® The Allies pledged themselves, in a note delivered late in December, not to permit armed forces of the Gov- ernment of National Defense (Venizelist) to profit by the retirement of the Royal troops from Thessaly and Epirus by crossing the neutral zone established in agreement with the Greek government.®* Nevertheless the increasing activity of the Italians three months later in their advance toward Ja- nina, startled the Greek government. The continuous advance both of the French troops south of the neutral zone into Thessaly and of the Italians at the River Calamas attracted the attention of the Hellenic government; but while the French advance did not inspire anxiety, inasmuch as it did not purport the occupation of that district, the Italian sup- pression of Greek authorities and teachers, on the other hand, and complaints that the Italian flag was being raised in Epirus, led to a protest to the Italian Minister at Athens embodying demands for the retirement of the Italians from "Daily Review of the Foreign Press (Great Britain), September 11, 1916. *’ Christian Science Monitor, October 9, 1916. “ The Times (London), January 2, 1917. [ 64 |IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS the portions of Epirus recently occupied.*° When, early in June, the Italians entered Janina, the Hellenic government gave orders to the military and civil authorities of the city to leave, and formulated a protest.® This matter was not settled until after King Constantine was driven from the Greek throne by the Allies, June 29, 1917, and Venizelos returned to power. In the meantime, however, another development of importance for Northern Epirus occurred in the Italian proclamation of Albanian independence made by General Ferrero at Argyrocastro, June 3, 1917.67 The whole of Albania was declared united and independent “under the shield and protection” of Italy. This proclamation raised a storm of protest both within Italy and without. It brought to the surface the divergence among members of the Italian National Ministry and caused newspapers to define their attitudes toward war aims and diplomatic methods. Sonnino’s action was a surprise to everybody, his colleagues included. As a protest against his high-handed methods, as well as partly on anti-imperialistic grounds, four ministers, representing the Interventionist Democratic Left, at once tendered their resignations, which, however, they were later persuaded to withdraw.*’ The Italian newspapers differed in their reactions. Moderates sought to limit and define the meaning of the proclamation, to show that the Allies must approve it, and that it would be easy to justify it before Russian and American opinion on nationalistic grounds. Nationalists were full of exultation, the Idea Nazionale declaring Italy had wanted to do this for forty years, but had been prevented by Austria-Hungary from establishing herself in Southern Albania and keeping off the Slavs and Greeks, whose claims in the south had now lost all worth. The radical interventionists showed their * Ibid., March 28, 1917; Daily Review of the Foreign Press, April 5, 1917. (Athenai, March 24, 25, 26.) * Le Temps, June 7, 13, 1917. “ For text, vide Chekrezi, op. cit., p. 161; Christian Science Monitor, July 11, 1917; Le Matin, June 6, 1917. “ Allied Press Supplement (Great Britain), June 27, 1917. [ 69 |SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS hostility to secret diplomacy and imperialism.®® The Italian official point of view was that since the war had annulled her engagements with Austria-Hungary she was free to resume her traditional policy of sympathy for the Albanian nation.’° The attitude of the French press was one of suspicion, on the srounds of the inconsistency of the Italian proclamation with the new era in diplomacy opened by the Russian Revolution and American intervention, of the need of reconciling it with past agreements, and of its relation to the future settlement. It was the latter, according to Le Temps, that “gives this act its real importance.’™? In Russia the proclamation caused a sensation. After Terestchenko, the Foreign Minister in Kerensky’s government, had conferred with the chiefs of the Allied missions, he declared to the congress of soviets that the measure was necessary for military considerations; he added that the Russian government thought that the final fate and organization of Albania ought to be definitely regulated at the close of the war by the application of the principle that peoples have the right to dispose of them- selves.72 Neither Great Britain nor France had been con- sulted beforehand, and they did not give any official recog- nition to the Italian protectorate.*® As the Treaty of London of 1915 was still secret, the incompatibility of the two pro- grams was not at the time publicly apparent. Meanwhile, with the abdication of Constantine and the return to power of Venizelos, it was immediately argued that, as there was no longer any necessity of military security, the [Italian occupation ought to come to an end.** Greco-Italian negotiations were undertaken forthwith between Venizelos and Bosdari, Italian Minister at Athens,*® with the result that © Daily Review of the Foreign Press, June 21, 1917. Le Temps, June 7, 1917. ™ Idem; Allied Press Supplement, June 21, 1917, p. 151. = Le Temps, June 13, 27, 1917. ' Replies of Balfour in the House of Commons, June 21, 27, 1917, Parliamentary Debates, Commons, XCIV, 1944; XCV, 356—57. ‘’ Le Journal des Hellénes, July 1, 1917. "> Le Temps, July 9, 14, 1917. [ 66 |IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AEEFAIRS at the conference of July at Paris the Allies arranged that Italy should withdraw from all but the triangular area of Greek territory through which the road from Santi Quaranti to Koritza runs, and that Italy and Greece should agree upon the re-establishment of civil administration under the au- thority of a commissioner chosen by the Greek government.”® Shortly afterward this commissioner assumed the duties of his post. This Italian evacuation of Janina and Epirus was rightly regarded as a Venizelist victory.” The Italians treated the so-called “territory of security” of Valona and Khimara as a veritable Italian colony. At the time of her installation at Valona, Italy assumed financial administration, criminal jurisdiction, control of customs, and, with the extension of her control, required the Italian visé of the passports of all persons entering Valona.7® Public works were reorganized and made dependent on prefects; the roads opened by the military authorities were constructed with a view to permanency and constituted a great benefit for the Albanians. A local militia, well-instructed and armed, officered by young Albanians, pupils of Italian military schools, was garrisoned in the old castle of Argyrocastro.” In the southeastern part of Albania in the former kaza of Koritza, meanwhile, events of some importance had trans- pired. This region adjoined Macedonia and, occupied by the Greeks in 1914, formed part of the neutral zone between Greece and Albania, which had been established by the Allies during the war to isolate Greece and to protect their front. In 1916 this became the center of intrigues—Italian, Veni- zelist, ““Essadist,’’ Serbian, Royalist—as well as the acknowl- edged foyer of Austro-Bulgarian espionage through which constant communication with King Constantine was main- tained.*° Early in December 1916, the French general in *° Ibid., July 28, 1917. " Ibid., August 6, 1917. * Austria-Hungary, Diplomatic Documents, Von Mayrhauser to Bur- ian, January 29, February 1, 1915; Burian to Macchio, February 4, 1915. “ Chekrezi, op. cit., pp. 183-84; Bourcart, op. cit., p. 145. ” Sarrail, Mon commandement en Orient (1916-1918), p. 220. [ 67 ] ee eee eee et aerate ~ Tee a entees seSOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS Macedonia, Sarrail, sent troops under Colonel Descoins to occupy Koritza for the purpose of pacifying the country, of hindering espionage and contraband, and, above all, of secur- ing the safety of his army. The Provisional Government of Venizelos at Salonika, anxious to add this district to the Macedonian country already more or less rallied under its egis, sent a prefect, M. Argyropoulis, to Koritza.*! But Sarrail asked Venizelos to recall his representative, whose presence augmented the disorder, adding a struggle between Venizelists and Constantinists to the Italian intrigue against Greek occupation.*? The royalist Greeks in control were strongly pro-German, while the native Albanian nationalists, though anti-Greek, were for the most part pro-Austrian and anti-French; this orientation of their policy was due to the philhellenism of France at the London Conference and to the Austro-Hungarian backing of Albania. With the sur- rounding hills in the possession of rival Albanian bands, the Situation for the French seemed critical at the time of their arrival at Koritza. The leader of the Albanian Christians in Koritza, Themis- tocles Germeni, a convinced nationalist, declared that the French would enjoy tranquillity in the land if they would proclaim Albanian independence while continuing to afford military protection.*® On December 10, 1916, accordingly, Albanian delegates drew up a protocol, signed by them and Colonel Descoins, declaring Albanian independence under French military protection. Governmental authority, both legislative and executive, was vested in a commission of fourteen members, of whom half were Christians and half Moslems. The French military authorities were to approve the appointment of the directors of public services. A gen- darmerie and militia were established, which, in case of military necessity, would be placed under French command. Albanian was declared to be the official language, and the * Vaucher, in L’Jllustration, April 7, 1917. “ Bourcart, op. cit., p. 155. “Idem. [ 68 }IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS flag of the Republic was to be the traditional flag of Scander- beg combined with the French tricolor.** Sarrail, when an explanation of these events was de- manded by the Quai d’Orsay under pressure from Rome, replied that he did only what was necessary for the army and that, in accordance with his policy of not meddling with internal politics in the Balkans, he had allowed the popula- tion to do what it pleased.®* Sarrail’s action in thus refusing to serve Constantinist policy was disquieting to Italian im- perialism.*° This French occupation was undoubtedly, as in the case of Italian expansion in Northern Epirus, another consequence of the pro-German policy of the royalist Greek government. The French administration of Koritza was successful in giving the Albanians of this region an opportunity of learn- ing by experience some of the first lessons of self-government under the tutelage of those well disposed toward, and more experienced than, themselves. The central administration, located in the town of Koritza, was reduced to a minimum: the orders of the resident administrator established three territories (Koritza, Pogradec, and the Greco-Albanian neu- tral zone on Greek territory) each having a very large degree of administrative autonomy, with its own direction of serv- ices and its own budget. All the instructions from Paris prescribed a strict neutrality in French dealings with AI- banians and Greeks, and the French minister, to avoid antagonizing the Greeks, refused permission toopen a French lycée at Koritza. But with the closing of Greek schools some two hundred native ones were established in which Albanian and French were the languages of instruc- tion. The impartial justice of the courts was appreciated, and excellent work was done in controlling the feeding of “For text of protocol, vide Kolovani, La Question de Koritza, pp. 8-10. Vide also the account from the Albanian paper, Adriatik, in Aubry, L’Albanie et la France, pp. 45-46. * For telegrams, vide Sarrail, op. cit., pp. 221-22. * Ancel, L’Armée d’Orient, p. 142; Bourcart, op. cit., p. 156; Page, Italy and the World War, p. 300. [ 69 |chhenad mee a ae SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS Pot oh oennetnsietieinatenl ante teeth ell keane aa eee the population, for which purpose a census was taken. A significant fact not to be overlooked was the fact that Chris- tian and Moslem worked side by side.*’ Since the Quai d’Orsay was loth to have the Albanian nationalist movement develop too far under French control,®® on February 16, 1918, when Sarrail was no longer there to protect his work, the protocol of 1916 was abrogated by his successor, General Salle.*® Koritza continued to enjoy sub- stantially the same government, however, as the changes were only nominal. The Albanian flag still floated over Koritza, but it was the military authority, now, that decided upon the administrative measures to be taken.°° Several months later, Greek schools were reopened as a result of Greek influence; the fact that the French administration of the town was forced by order from Paris to apply measures which were in “flagrant contradiction with the wishes of the population” was explained by the growing influence of Venizelos whose adhesion to the Entente must be rewarded.®' When the armistices put an end to hostilities, the French, Italians, and Greeks were permitted to remain in temporary possession of those districts actually occupied at that time: the French in Koritza, the Italians in Valona and a consider- able hinterland, and the Greeks in the rest of Northern Epirus. As the final settlement in this case was considerably delayed, the occupations continued for some time. “ Bourcart, L’Albanie et les albanais, pp. 159-65; Kolovani, op. cit., pp. 10-11, 12, 31-39. “ Bourcart, op. cit., p. 159. “ For text, vide Kolovani, op. cit., pp. 72-73. ” Ibid., p. 16. “Idem; The Nation (London), August 31, 1918.V. GREEK AND ALBANIAN CLAIMS AT THE PEACE CONFERENCE As the war progressed the aims of the belligerents became more and more definitely formulated. In the statements of war aims Self-determination was prominent. In April 1917 the Provisional Government of Russia declared its object was ‘to establish a durable peace on a basis of the rights of na- tions to decide their own destiny.”! Lloyd George’s statement of January 5, 1918, in enumerating the three conditions that must be fulfilled before permanent peace could be hoped for, said that “a territorial settlement must be secured based on self-determination, or the consent of the governed.”? A month later Wilson’s famous speech of February 11 announced that “ “self-determination’ is not a mere phrase. It is an impera- tive principle of action which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril.”* These are but outstanding examples of a host of references to self-determination made in the last two years of the war. A catchword on everyone’s lips, it met with a hearty response from all the small or oppressed peo- ples of the earth. Lloyd George’s words quoted above found a ready echo in the hearts of many. The Greek paper Patris expressed confidence in his words, declaring that The Greek nation have never desired more than this. .... We are not aiming at annexation or imperialistic expansion. But we shall not abandon those who belong to us by historical tradition and ethnological constitution.‘ The Italian government had declared, in its reply to the ‘Scott, Official Statements of War Aims and Peace Proposals, p. 95 (text from The New York Times, April 11, 1917). For summaries of war aims, vide also Blagoyevitch, Le principe des nationalités, pp. 158— 204; Henderson, Aims of Labor, especially pp. 83 ff., and Labor Year Book, 1919, pp. 25-41. “Lloyd George, British War Aims, p. 15. * Wilson, “The Four Principles of Peace,” Address to Congress, Feb- ruary 11, 1918, reprinted in a variety of places from Congressional Record, LVI, 1937. “Allied Press Supplement, February 13, 1918. [71] er ncaa 4 ae i rely tage! fon Po ery cen oe ee esSOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS Russian note of May 1917, that Italy had entered the war for the triumph of the sacred principles of the liberation of op- pressed peoples. .... All spirit of conquest or of domination was excluded from her policy.5 Several statements were made referring particularly to the settlement that the Peace Conference would have to effect as regards the Albanian question. Notable among these was that made in 1914 when the Greek and Italian occupations were authorized; and again that made in 1917 after the [talian proclamation of Albanian independence, when Son- nino declared that the Powers meeting to discuss the peace treaty would have the general task of determining the precise boundaries of the state of Albania in regard to neighboring states. Balfour answering a question in the House of Com- mons, February 18, 1918, said: The arrangements come to in 1913, to which Albania was not a party, have ceased to have binding force, as all the signatory Powers are now engaged in war. As regards the future .... His Majesty's Government would be glad to see the principle of nationality applied as far as possible to this as to the other difficult questions which will have to be settled at the Peace Conference.’ On these two bases, then, that of abstract self-determina- tion and that of definite promises of a settlement of the AI- banian question at the Peace Conference, both Greeks and Albanians founded the high hopes with which they came to Paris. Wilson’s program, in which self-determination figured, was embodied in the armistice agreements, by which the Allies were bound to impose no terms which clashed with > Le Matin, June 20, 1917. ° Daily Review of the Foreign Press, June 23, 1917. ‘Parliamentary Debates, Commons (1918), CIII, 454. Vide also Bal- four’s statement of December 5, 1917, in the House of Commons: “His Majesty’s Government have the warmest sympathy with the Albanian peoples and would welcome any solution, which, accompanied by ade- quate security against future strife, was of a nature to safeguard the full exercise of their national rights.” Jbid. (1917), C, 400.IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL ABRFATRS these principles.’ These terms Wilson considered binding on the Allies, as he showed when he later declared that he did not “feel at liberty to suggest one basis for peace with Ger- many and another for peace with Austria.”® When the terms of the German armistice were under discussion two reserva- tions were made, one by the British on the freedom of the seas, and another by the Italians, who twice protested Point Nine, which provided that a “readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.”” When told that the point was not in question, Orlando said that at the proper moment he would renew the exception he had already taken; but the Italian objection, unlike the British, was not made public until long afterward (May 1, 1919)?° when it was too late to affect the discussion materially. An adequate solution based on principles of nationalism and self-determination would be difficult enough to attain. But the situation at the Peace Conference was not so simple: secret treaties in flagrant contradiction to the openly pro- claimed and accepted aims of the Allies complicated all at- tempts at a solution. The terms of the secret Treaty of Lon- don by which Italy entered the war were obviously contrary to the principle of self-determination. Indeed, the battle of the Peace Conference raged about the question of how much weight was to be given to the secret treaties. Referring to the Treaty of London one authority has said: It was the chief obstacle at the Peace Conference. More actual time was devoted by the Council of Four and other councils and commissions at Paris to the controversies which raged around this treaty than to any other single subject discussed.11 * Vide especially the note from the Government of Austria-Hungary to Secretary Lansing, October 29, 1918. Official U.S. Bulletin, October 31, 1918; reprinted, with related documents, in Jnternational Conciliation, No. 133 (December 1918). ”“Memorandum concerning the Question of the Italian Claims on the Adriatic,” April 14, 1919, Document 35, in Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement, III, 274. ” The Times (London), May 2, 1919. “ Baker, op. cit., I, 52. This controversy will be treated more fully in chapter vi. [ 73 ] ee ee Tee - . . eae te eta | hed tee ee ae dame ee eeeSOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS The publication of the secret treaties by the Bolshevists in November 1917, though comparatively little attention was paid it by the general public, was embarrassing to the Allies. Lloyd George in his speech to the Trade Union Conference of January 5, 1918, in an effort to conciliate radical criticism of the war, said: Much has been said about the arrangements we have entered into with our Allies on this [the partition of Turkey] and other sub- jects. 1 can only say that as new circumstances like the Russian collapse and the separate Russian negotiations have changed the conditions under which those arrangements were made, we are and always have been perfectly ready to discuss them with our Allies.?? When the Peace Conference opened, this was perhaps the most definite pronouncement that had been made on the value that would be attached to the secret treaties. Two months after the armistice, the Peace Conference convened in Paris, with its first plenary session held on January 18, 1919. Greece, as one of the more favored of the smaller belligerent nations in spite of her small part in the war, was given two delegates, but as the delegations voted as a unit, this was of no particular advantage; and, moreover, before the first plenary session was held it had already been decided that the important work of the Conference would be performed by the representatives of the five Great Powers (Great Britain, France, Italy, the United States, and Japan) sitting as a Council of Ten. The Council of Ten, furthermore, overwhelmed with the volume of business and desiring the advice of specialists, instituted commissions of experts to deal with most of the territorial questions. In proposing the establishment of the first of these commissions, the Ruma- nian, Mr. Lloyd George brought forward the extreme diffi- culty of deciding “questions of boundaries on statements, however lucid, made in the course of a Conversation”; he, thereupon, proposed a commission of two experts from each of the four Great Powers, to study the problem and even “ Lloyd George, op. cit., pp. 11-12. aeIN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS suggested authorizing them to consult the representatives of the peoples concerned. In alarm, Orlando attacked this proposed use of specialists. But President Wilson strongly supported the plan as affording the enlightenment he sought. If the resolution was not accepted, he said he would find himself compelled to fight the question merely on the views expressed by the American experts; but he would prefer that these conclusions should be corrected by the views of the French, British, and Italian experts. Speaking of the claims as put forth by the delegates of the various interested states in each problem, Wilson said . It must be remembered that... . these delegates were merely advocates, and they made opposite claims as to the right inference to be drawn from facts. They did not represent their facts in the same way, and there would always be something that was not quite clear.} The Greek claims were presented before the Council of Ten on February 3 and 4 by the official Greek representatives, Venizelos and Politis.14 When these claims had been heard, the following resolution proposed by Lloyd George was adopted: It is agreed that the questions raised in the statement by M. Venizelos on the Greek territorial interests in the peace settlement shall be referred for examination in the first instance to an expert committee composed of two representatives each of the United States of America, British Empire, France, and Italy. It shall be the duty of this committee to reduce the questions for decision within the narrowest possible limits, and make recom- mendations for a joint settlement. The committee is authorized to consult representatives of the peoples concerned.15 The committee thus established was composed of the fol- lowing members: “Secret Minutes, Council of Ten, February 1, 1919. Quoted by Baker, op. cit., I, 185-87. ““Le Temps, February 3, 4, 1919. *’ Manchester Guardian, February De OLS: a nn aaRp Re i te a Sten at tee SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS America: Dr. W. L. Westermann and Mr. Clive Day Great Britain: Sir Robert Borden and Sir Eyre Crowe France: M. Jules Cambon and M. Jean Gout Italy: Signor de Martino and Signor Castoldi*® On February 18 this body examined the claims of Greece.” On February 24 the Council of Ten, after hearing the AI- banian representatives state their claims, referred the matter to this committee." The position of Greece at the Peace Conference was deter- mined by two factors: first, her attitude toward, and part in, the war; and, secondly, the ability and policy of her leading statesman, Venizelos. In so far as the first was inauspicious it was to a large degree offset by the second. Venizelos was highly successful in capitalizing his friendship for the Allies, and with consummate skill he made the most of the interven- tion, though delayed, of Greece on the side of the Allies after his return to power.'® Indeed, his policy of using his participation in the war for the purpose of furthering Greek national aspirations may aptly be compared with the states- manship of Cavour and his use of the European situation in the Crimean War to further the ends for which he worked. Venizelos was naturally the representative of Greece at Paris. With him was associated his Foreign Minister, Politis, a close friend and collaborator in the Provisional Government at Salonika.’® While both ardent nationalists, they were mod- erate in their demands and attitude.*! Politis stated that he conceived of Panhellenism not in the form of absolute an- ‘* Peace Conference. Rapport présenté au Conseil supréme des Alliés par la commission chargé d’étudier les questions territoriales intéres- sant la Gréce, pp. 1-2. * Idem. ™ Manchester Guardian, February 25, 1919. ” For Venizelos’ attitude at the Peace Conference as well as for his biography, vide Gibbons, Venizelos. Chester, Life of Venizelos, was written before the end of the war. ” New York Times Current History, April 1919, p. 21. “ Woods, Cradle of the War, p. 171. [ 76 ]IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS nexations, but of autonomy for certain districts and a régime of guaranties for others.22 He also declared: The national aspirations of Greece may be summed up in a single phrase: the application, pure and simple, of the principle for which the war has been fought and on the basis of which peace is to be made—the great principle of the right of peoples to dispose of themselves.23 Venizelos discreetly left Athens for Paris without dis- closing any information as to the claims he would advance, fearing to arouse hopes that would be unfulfilled.24 There he installed himself in quarters close to the British hotels but far from the headquarters of the other Great Powers: he had decided to play in with the British.2° On January 20, 1919, a statement of Venizelos’ claims appeared in Le Temps, and a fortnight later he presented his claims orally in person before the Council of Ten. At the Peace Conference of 1919, as at no previous gather- ing of its kind, the influence of public opinion was strong and important, and was taken into account by those who wanted anything from the Conference. There were, accord- ingly, several important agencies employed to bring public opinion to bear: the daily press,?° meetings and speeches, so- cieties and their publications, and propaganda of other kinds —books, pamphlets, maps, statistics—distributed to the pub- lic by the various official delegations. All the artifices of propaganda, so familiar and extensive in the Balkans, were employed to varying degrees: vilification of opponents, magnification of self, imagined or cun- ningly distorted statistics, personal pressure of every sort, adul- teration of news, skillful identification of present mediocrity with past genius, reiteration of the false till it seemed to be true.27 “Christian Science Monitor, October 18, 1918. ~ Politis, in Balkan Review, I, p. 246; Politis, Les aspirations natio- nales de la Gréce, p. 3. “ Christian Science Monitor, March 13, 1919. * Gibbons, Venizelos, pp. 332-33. “For the Greek side, especially Le Temps and Christian Science Monitor. 7 Lybyer, Journal of International Relations, X, 412. [77 | eee ee >SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS Of the pro-Greek societies, the important ones were the Anglo-Hellenic League,”® the American Hellenic Society,”® and the Pan-Epirotic Union of America,*® the latter of which took a particularly active part in 1919 in championing the rights of Greece to Northern Epirus. Each delegation presented to the Conference one or more memoranda setting forth the official territorial claims of its government. Besides these documents, the authentic delega- tion propaganda distributed to the public contained in each case a variety of materials gathered from many sources, such as the approved publications of societies, reprints from peri- odicals, as from The Balkan Review and The New Europe, the views of special groups, as those of the Greek socialists, books dealing with the recent, and in some cases the remote, history of the districts claimed, as Puaux’ The Sorrows of Epirus, and, finally, statistics and maps. The official memo- randa constitute the chief primary source for a study of the claims presented, but the other delegation propaganda Is con- stantly of value as illustrating, amplifying, or presenting a more extreme point of view. The official Greek memorandum ostensibly based its claims on the racial character of the populations involved. *Founded in 1913. Its objects were: to defend the just claims and honour of Greece; to remove existing prejudices and prevent future misunderstandings between the British and Hellenic races, as well as between the Hellenic and other races of southeastern Europe; to spread information concerning Greece and to stimulate interest in Hellenic matters; to improve the social, educational, commercial, and political relations of the two countries; to promote travel in Greece and secure improved facilities for it. (Statement from back cover of publications of the Anglo-Hellenic League.) * Founded in 1917 with Nicholas Murray Butler as president. It aimed “to make known the positions, the interests, and the ambitions of Greece, and to promote sympathy with them.” (Preface to publica- tion No. 1, American Hellenic Society, Gauvain, The Greek Question.) * Organized in 1918 “for the general purpose of enlightening Ameri- can public opinion on the national aspirations of the people of Northern Epirus to be united with their mother-country, Greece.” (Inside back cover, publication No. 1, Pan-Epirotic Union, Cassavetes, The Question of Northern Epirus at the Peace Conference; for date of organization, vide p. 117.) [ 78 ]IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAERS The complete victory of the Allied and Associated States affords the occasion to fix the political frontiers of the European States in exact accordance, or as approximately as possible, with their ethnical character. In this way the indispensable basis of the Society of Nations will be created.?1 Of the distribution of the Hellenic nation outside the King- dom of Greece, the document continued, 151,000 Greeks in- habit Northern Epirus, of which the total population was stated to be 230,000. With the separation of those districts whose population is almost entirely Albanian,°? to which no claim was accordingly made, there would remain a mixed population of 120,000 Greeks and 80,000 Albanians. These two elements are so inextricably mixed that a separation along geographical lines would be impossible. Greece maintains that this mixed population ought necessarily to be allotted to her, for it would be contrary to all equity that, in a given people, a majority which possesses a higher form of civili- zation should have to submit to a minority possessing an inferior civilization.?3 The memorandum then assumed that the Albanian state would be unable for the time being at least, “to exist as an independent State except under foreign guardianship.” Therefore, it was reasoned, why should not this mixed popu- lation be placed under the Greek state which already enjoys independent political existence rather than under Albania, incapable at present of an autonomous government? To the objection that a considerable, even the major, part of the Greek population uses Albanian as its native tongue, the reply was that . the democratic conceptions of the Allied and Associated Powers cannot admit of any other standard than national con- sciousness. Only the Germanic conception could substitute for this the standard of race or of language.*4 ** Greece, Delegation Propaganda, Greece before the Peace Congress, p. 3. “ That is, parts of the kazas of Tepeleni and Premedi situated north of the Viosa River and the kaza of Starovo. = ibid. pA: * Idem.SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS Notwithstanding their use of the Albanian tongue, it was maintained that these Greeks have formed part of the Greek family from a time long before the establishment of the King- dom of Greece; reference was made to the military leaders they furnished in the War of Greek Independence, and to the dance of the Suliote women, whose mother tongue was Al- banian but who threw themselves from the mountain height ‘in order not to fall into the hands of the Mohammedan Albanians.” Moreover, attention was called to the fact that several prominent leaders, civil, military, and naval, of Greece today, as well as a majority of the crews of the Greek navy, speak Albanian as their native tongue. The inference was that the use of the Albanian language does not indicate Al- banian nationality. The Greek memorandum advanced special claims to Kortza, which the Albanians today attempt to put forward as the centre of their intellectual movement ‘3 To prove the essentially Greek character of this town, the Greek schools, supported by the community, with their 2,250 pupils before the Balkan Wars, were contrasted with the one Albanian school, which, though under excellent American management, had only about two hundred pupils enrolled. Two instances were cited of legacies refused by the com- muntty in years long past because in the one case acceptance required the teaching of Albanian in the Greek schools, and in the other the word “Greek”? was omitted in the deed.*® The recent history of the region since the Balkan Wars was then reviewed. The establishment of a provisional govy- ernment in 1914, the refusal of Northern Epirus to submit to the Albanian administration, and the recognition of its autonomy by the Protocol of Corfu, were mentioned to show the natural desires of the Epirotes for union with Greece. As a result of the increasing anarchy in Albania with the departure of the Prince of Wied after the outbreak of the Great War, the Greek government was asked to undertake a fresh military occupation of Northern Epirus to re-establish ~ Greece, Delegation Propaganda, Greece before the Peace Congress,IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFEATIRS order; to this request Greece consented when Italian acquies- cence was obtained. Under the auspices of Great Britain, an agreement was come to under which Italy would occupy Valona and Greece Northern Epirus, the duty of pronouncing definitely as to these occupations being left to the Peace Congress. But it was tacitly understood that if, at the time of the general peace, the occupation of Valona by Italy was confirmed, that of Northern Epirus by Greece would become equally definite. Also, while recognizing in the Treaty of London of April 26, 1915, the right of Italy to occupy Valona, the Entente Powers stipulated that the limits of this occupation to the South must not exceed the limits of Northern Epirus.?¢ The entire appeal of the official Greek claims was thus really based on “national consciousness’; that is, an attempt was made to show that the majority of the inhabitants of this region are really Greek in feeling. Arguments based on both race and language were declared fallible; indeed, it has been observed that “the repudiation of the language test of nationality is the most important feature of Hellenic claims.”*? The will of the people was inferred from their history. Fear of Italian expansion was shown in the conclud- ing statements based on the authorized occupations during the war and on the stipulations of the Treaty of London. The moderate tone of the document on the whole contrasts with that of other pro-Greek propaganda, especially with the Memorandum on Northern Epirus, drawn up by the former provisional government. This latter document went into the matter much more fully; its arguments must now be exam- ined in some detail. The memorandum began by stating that it was drawn up and presented by the former government which carried on the struggle for Epirote independence, in 1914, after the populations of the two provinces of Argyrocastro and Koritza had .... been torn against their will from their union with Greece. * Ibid., p. 5. “ Gibbons, Venizelos, p. 346.CARTE DE L’ EPIRE DU NORD \Kustendil himarrg ofh “a ' ht = — nae ~ a." . LEGENDE wana Lankes Of tels ems Lines ¢e [Loire dv Nord Lemites de /Albame daprta Mt protocole dt Florence =e! (fe i Ka = ’ ‘\ \ menor ent Nhe Meee Al mime Linies de Vilayets mimem Linas de Sangaks aan Unites de Cazes CARTON 'D’ENSEMBLE te » « See 5 i | lIATAT Sheth Pf fn KAZA_Of£ FIL ——_————— ‘ Echelle S4teie _ | Faded, Cortagpapte + tea bt Sram Farcy, st —— Map 4.—Map of Northern Epirus. Peace Conference by the former Pr , presented to the pirus + 7 A ‘andum on Northern I (From Memor irus.) piru 4 ‘rernment of Northern E my % al ( “OVISION -IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS By presenting these claims separately, it was not intended to replace the work of the Greek delegates, but . . to set forth the facts concerning Epirus with more freedom than the Hellenic Government in the course of the pending nego- tiations could probably exercise.%§ The principles proclaimed by Wilson were to govern the Conference; “the rights of nations,” the memorandum as- serted, will no longer be exclusively based on the acts of governments making arrangements between States, but on the recognition of the right of populations to govern themselves by a Government of their own choice. The wishes of the population concerned “. . . . have been precisely defined ... . by the last Epirote revolution.” To demonstrate this fact the history of the events of 1913 and 1914 was surveyed. The procedure of the delimitation commission in basing its decision on the language spoken, excluding the “national consciousness of the people,’ was protested against.*® The resulting Epirote revolution took place, the document continued, “without assistance or sup- port, but impelled by an irrepressible national sentiment. ” The settlement at Corfu “recognised that the revolted populations were Epirotes and not Albanians.’’*° The national sentiment of the Epirotes was further shown by the election of deputies to the Greek Chamber in 1915, sent with a mission to claim international recognition of the union of Epirus with Greece. “The aspirations for union with Greece were thus manifested in complete conformity with the most gen- erally recognized principles: an open election. ... .’’4 The memorandum registered a strong protest against the Italian occupation of Northern Epirus; it declared that evacu- ation by the Italian troops “has become imperative” now that ** Greece, Delegation Propaganda, Memorandum on Northern Epirus, p. 3. *° [bid., p. 4. Soi Did.,.p: 6. > Lbid.,.D./.SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS the war is over.*? Italian persecution of the Greeks in this region the memorandum retailed at some length.*? The Ital- ian administration exerted pressure on the Greeks to become Albanized, and in February 1918 closed the Greek schools, refusing permission for those pupils who wished to finish their education in Janina or other Greek towns to depart. Under the Italian occupation, furthermore, the gendarmes were all Mohammedan Albanians. Natives of Greek senti- ment, mostly from Khimara, were sent to Italy because of the influence which they were supposed to exercise and their attachment to the Hellenic idea. The Albano-Italian courts, moreover, were impowered to deal with past offenses, in spite of the amnesty declared at Corfu; no case was known of a judgment having gone against any Mohammedan. Under these conditions, the document continued, the Christian ele- ment naturally wished to emigrate, and its emigration was encouraged by the Italians. In this way many of the principal Greek traders of the district were expelled.** The only good word that was said for the Italian régime was in praise of the improvement in the roads and the erection of public buildings at Santi Quaranta. For such public works as have really benefited the country, the population, it was suggested, would be willing to pay a reasonable indemnity in agreement with Greece.*® “Greece, Delegation Propaganda, Memorandum on Northern Epirus, p. 4. For the same view, vide Le Journal des Hellénes, December 15, 1918: “with the signing of the armistice what reason can justify the prolongation of the Italian occupation of Epirus? When our enemies are freeing their subject nationalities, how can we tolerate an ally maintaining her domination?” ““Comprehensive table indicating violences and crimes committed against the inhabitants of Northern Epirus during the Italian occupa- tion,” Memorandum on Northern Epirus, Appendix. “ Ibid., pp. 8—10. “Ibid., p. 11. The whole tone of this document, especially in its criticism of the Italian administration, is closely paralleled by a protest of Epirotes to the Greek Chamber, published in Le Journal des Hellénes, April 28, 1918. The Greek government, however, evidently did not ap- prove of it, as the document was not communicated to the Chamber until the following December. (Ibid., December 15, 1918): “Italy applies to Northern Epirus a policy opposed to the program of freeing small [ 54 ]IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS The anti-Hellenic actions and tendencies of the Italians in the districts under their control were encouraged, so it was stated, by the action of the French in Koritza. Colonel Descoins made an attempt to organize a local administration and, allowing himself to be surrounded by political adventurers, permitted per- secution of the Greek element. .... Albanisation was pursued with a certain amount of violence, and the experiment continued for some considerable time before the voice of the majority could make itself heard.*é The experiment of the French republic of Koritza was called a “blunder committed by officers in campaign, in too much of a hurry to realize that a dialect spoken in the humble homes of the people does not necessarily indicate their na- tionality. ”* It was pointed out further that Koritza was economically dependent on Monastir and thence on Salo- nika; this fact was shown by the inclusion of this town in the old Ottoman vilayet of Monastir. The junction of the boundaries of Epirus and Macedonia would thus be of eco- nomic, not to mention strategic, advantage.* Moreover, the provisional government pointed out in this memorandum that Epirus had never wished to encroach on its neighbor, notwith- standing the large number of Christians, of Greek sentiment, who have been incorporated in the new Albanian State.48 In conclusion it dwelt upon the constant struggle of the Epirotes to bring up their children in a Christian—the Greek nations, at the same time demanding reunion to the motherland of the oppressed peoples of Trentino and Trieste.” The harsh conditions said to be imposed by the Italians included suppression of the Greek lan- guage in schools, substitution of Catholics and Moslems for Greek clergy, cutting off of communications with Greece, and pillaging of Christians by Albanian bands. “Italian authorities remain insensible to this state of affairs, hoping that before the peace conference the inhabitants will be exterminated.” * Memorandum on Northern Epirus, p. 12. eeibid., ps 13: * Ibid., p. 14.SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS Orthodox—Church, a church which has known “. .. . how to efface herself when the ethnological element has developed sufficiently to permit of the creation of a purely secular State,’ whose schools “ have never been sectarian es- tablishments ... . but houses of refuge. ia aS It rea- sonable, therefore,” the statement concluded, “. . . . to place under self-interested protectors a country where, for cen- turies past, Hellenic nationalism has tended to unite itself under one single government that shall represent Hellenic thought and vitality?’’*® The foregoing consideration of the official claims pre- sented the governmental point of view. Supplementary to these claims was the remaining delegation propaganda, which advanced other facts and arguments in the cause of Hellen- ism in Northern Epirus. Some of these additional arguments must now be considered. Professor André Andréadés of the University of Athens, when on a semi-official mission to the United States marized Greek claims in general as follows: » SUTMD- Greece justifies her claims, in the first place, on the principle of self-determination; secondly, on the promises given by the allied powers; and, finally, on the ground of the sacrifices made by Hellenism, as well as the important part the Greek army played in the achievement of the great victory of last October.5° Northern Epirus was repeatedly claimed for Greece on the basis of self-determination. The majority of the inhabitants had clearly shown their wishes by fighting for union with Greece in 1914. If further evidence was desired, however, there was no objection to a plebiscite. Such a plebiscite should be held, not under the eyes of Italian officials and soldiers, but taken free from any kind of intimidating influence by an impartial com- mission, who should satisfy themselves that any residents who ” Memorandum on Northern Epirus, p. 15. An appendix contains sta- tistics of the population according to religion, as well as figures of school attendance and numbers of churches and priests (ibid., p. 17). * New York Times, May 25, 1919 (Sec. 3, p. 4). [ 86 ]IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS may have had to leave the country during the last two years are allowed to return and vote.5! A true plebiscite uninfluenced by an interested Power would be acceptable to Greece; need Italy ask for more? Only by asking the people themselves what their national sentiment is can one tell which of the factors determining the nationality of a given group of people—race, language, religion, culture, economics, geography, oppression, sympathy—will be the decisive elements at any given time.®? The application of the principle that the peoples should be free to dispose of their own destiny was declared by the Greek socialists to be the only solution of the problem of the Near East.®* Further evidence of the national consciousness of the Epirotes was found by some writers in their public gifts to Athens and Constantinople.*4 Race and language, argued the Greek propagandists, con- stitute no criteria of national consciousness. The claim of Greece was thus shown to be analogous to the claim of France to German-speaking Alsace.*> The large Albanian element in Greece proper was cited to show the possibilities of Greek assimilation and the fact that real Greeks do speak Albanian. The problem is whether the Albanians of Northern Epirus wish to throw in their lot with a partly Albanian and wholly sympathetic Greece or with a predominantly Moslem and mainly uncivilized Albania? Which do they prefer, race and language, or culture and religion ?56 * Greece, Delegation Propaganda, Reeves, An Appeal for the Libera- fion and Union of the Hellenic Race, p. 23. For suggestions of a plebi- scite under similar conditions, vide Burrows, The Unity of the Greek Race, p. 5; Chrussachi, The Greater Greece, p. 11. “ Burrows, Albania and Greece, p. 5 (The New Europe, December 19, 1918). “ Greece, Delegation Propaganda, La Question d’Orient vue par les socialists grecs, p. 8. “Such benefactions as the observatory, the Academy, etc., are listed by Andréadés, La Gréce devant le congrés de la paix, p. 5, note 2; and by Reeves, op. cit., p. 22, note. * Chrussachi, op. cit., p. 10. “We may adopt the epigram of the philosopher who, when asked whether he denied the divinity of Christ, replied that he denied the [ 87 |SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS The incontestable superiority of the Greek culture of North- ern Epirus to the civilization of the Moslem inhabitants was frequently brought forward as constituting a valid reason for giving the region to Greece.*? Are they [the Epirotes] to join their kindred, the race whose genius civilized Europe? Or are they to be handed over to the one race which Europe has not been able to civilise?5§ In addition to these arguments, the Greeks urged geo- graphic, strategic, and economic considerations. They de- clared that Northern Epirus was so cut off from Albania by mountains that its fate was naturally linked with that of Greece. The population had “to look to the Greeks in South- ern Epirus and Macedonia in all trade matters. To cut them off from Greece would be... . absurd economically.’’®® Were Northern Epirus given to Albania, moreover, Janina would be cut off from three important trade arteries, Koritza, Argyrocastro, and Santi Quaranta, and Koritza would be completely isolated from her two main markets, Janina and Monastir-Salonika.®*° Then, too, from the strategic point of view, those excellent natural barriers, the Acroceraunian Mountains, should form the boundary between Albania and (Greek) Epirus.®! If national consciousness, economics, geography, and Strategy all favored the union of Northern Epirus with Greece in the eyes of the Hellenes, so too did history, to whose tribunal they constantly appealed. Epirus, they as- serted, had been the seat of Greek culture in ancient times, had preserved Greek culture in the Middle Ages and under divinity of no man. If we are asked whether we deny the Albanism of Koritza, we might reply that we deny the Albanism of no Greek” (Burrows, Albania and Greece, pp. 4-5). “ Politis, Les aspirations nationales de la Gréce, p. 5. *’ Reeves, Plea for a Civilised Epirus, p. 11. ~ Reeves, An Appeal for the Liberation and Union of the Hellenic Race, p. 21. ” Cassavetes, Epirus and Albania, p. 46. ™ Cassavetes, Question of Northern Epirus at the Peace Conference, p. 87. [ 88 JIN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL ABREATRS the Turk, and had struggled for a century for union with Greece.® Many of the Greek propagandists directly challenged the Albanian claims. They asserted that the alleged lack of an Albanian language was evidence of the lack of an Albanian national consciousness, which, had it existed, “‘would have found expression in... . popular songs and writers.’ The Albanian reasons for the predominance of Greek schools in Southern Albania were that Albanian schools were not allowed by the Turkish government, that the Greek language attracted them by its culture while the Albanian language was less developed, and that Greek is the commercial lan- guage of the Near East. These statements the Greeks tried to refute, saying that the Turks also hindered the other Balkan nations. Had the Albanians been animated by a nationalist spirit, they could easily have forced the Turks to permit the teaching of the Albanian language. .... If the Turks failed for five hundred years to penetrate Albania and impose taxes and conscript the Albanians, how naive it is to contend that the Albanians were deprived of culture because of Turkish interference. Moreover, every inducement was made by Austria-Hungary and Italy to draw the Epirotes from Greek schools. To the last reason of the Albanians, it was replied that the Greek language is not as necessary in the commerce of the Near East as German, French, English, or Italian.¢¢ The Greek point of view, furthermore, repeatedly emphasized the reli- gious and tribal factions in Albania. The “will to co-operate,” which is the essential of nationality, they declared utterly wanting, and they advanced quotations from travelers and writers, dating chiefly fifteen or twenty years back, to prove the “utter absence of any national striving or ideals.”6 A further line of attack consisted in showing that Albania is * Ibid., chap. iii, pp. 9-36, passim. “ Cassavetes, Epirus and Albania, p. 44. “ Cassavetes, The Question of Northern Epirus at the Peace Confer- ence, pp. 79-81. * Cassavetes, Epirus and Albania, pp. 24-25. [ 89 |SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS Moslem, hence Turkish, hence an enemy of the Allies, and therefore deserved no consideration, but rather partition, at the hands of the Conference. The work of one Albanian writer was included in the Greek delegation propaganda to illustrate this point of view, since it contained these words: “Thanks to her large Moslem majority, Albania considers herself still as a little Turkey.’’® From the Greek position and claims at the Conference it is now necessary to turn and to review the claims of Albania. The position of Albania when the Peace Conference opened was a difficult one. Her territory was largely under foreign military occupation, which continued during the period of the Conference. This artificial division prevented the co- operation of her different sections. The presentation of a united front, from which alone Albania could hope to gain anything from the Conference, was well-nigh impossible. In December 1918 a meeting of forty-eight Albanian representa- tives was held at Durazzo. A provisional government was formed of which Turkhan Pasha was elected president, and Prenk Bib Doda vice-president, and twelve other members were elected to compose the new governing body. Some of the members of this government were sent to Paris as the Albanian delegation at the Peace Conference.®’ The position of the Provisional Government of Durazzo was difficult from the outset; the real power it possessed was small and ex- tended only to the administration of a portion of the Italian zone of occupation under Italian influence.® A conspicuous part in the struggle for Albanian inde- pendence was played by societies composed of Albanians resident abroad. The chief of these was the Pan-Albanian Federation of America. Founded as early as 1909, by 1919 it had seventy-two branches in the United States and Canada, and published a monthly magazine, The Adriatic Review. * Basri-Bey, L’Orient débalkanisé et l’Albanie, p. 5. “ For text of the act establishing this provisional government, dated December 25, 1918, vide Albania, Delegation Propaganda, Notes addition- nelles rélatives aux revendications albanaises, pp. 7-9. “Eden, Albania, Its Discontents and Their Origin, Diao. [ 90 |]IN - EUROREAN INTERNA TLONAL "ARR ALRS This society maintained a delegate in Paris in 1919, the Rev. C. Telford Erickson, an American missionary to the Near East. Scarcely second in importance for the Albanian cause was the Anglo-Albanian society, founded shortly before the end of the war for the purpose of obtaining recognition of Albanian independence. This British society did not publish pamphlets of its own but distributed approved publications from other sources, and through meetings, communications to the press, and questions in the House of Commons, strove to attain its ends. Prominent among its officers were the Hon. Aubrey Herbert, president, and Miss M. E. Durham, both ardent friends of Albania. Unlike the American organi- zation it was composed of British citizens interested in Albania but not of Albanian origin. Various groups of Albanians at home and abroad were represented in Paris. The official Albanian delegation already mentioned consisted of Turkhan Pasha, former prime min- ister under the Prince of Wied, and president of the pro- visional government; Mehmed Konitza, later Minister of Foreign Affairs; Dr. Michel Tourtuli of Koritza, a Specialist in tropical diseases; and Mgr. Louis Bumchi, Catholic bishop of Alessio. Attached to the delegation was a bureau of “expert advisers.” Besides the representative of the Pan- Albanian Federation of America mentioned above, there were delegations from the Albanian colonies of Constantinople and of Rumania, and from the territory of Koritza.*® The status of the official delegation was assailed from various quarters. Essad Pasha, perhaps the leading Albanian of his day, for- merly pro-Italian but at this time pro-Serb, declared that the provisional government and its delegation were unauthorized, and under Italianinfluence.?° These insinuations were echoed ® Adriatic Review, March 1919, pp. 267-69. ” Essad Pasha’s self-vindication, Balkan Review, I, 330-26. “It is pre- tended in some quarters that in the month of December last, a new government was installed at Durazzo ....and that I was thereby deprived of my position as President of the Albanian Government. Tourkhan Pasha and his colleagues speak only in the name of an insignificant minority.” Essad continued to sign himself as president of the Albanian government; vide “Lettre adressée par Essad Pacha Aa la [91 | , - , eee ee TT ee - ee Se ee .SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS by the Greeks who made the most of Albanian division; they further asserted that Turkhan was in the pay of Germany and Austria-Hungary. These differences finally culminated in April 1919, when a split occurred between those who be- lieved a satisfactory agreement could be reached with Italy and those who considered it entirely hopeless even to ap- proach the latter Power so long as she insisted on the exaction of the Treaty of London. When these differences were referred to the government of Durazzo, the pro-Italian party was repudiated; two new members were sent to Paris and the delegation was reconstituted. Mgr. Bumchi became president, M. Konitza and Dr. Tourtuli were retained, and Mehdi Frasheri, Louis Gurakugqi, and Lef Nosi made up the remainder of the delegation.” This Albanian delegation presented its claims to the Peace Conference in a series of memoranda. The developing point of view shown in these documents makes a separate treat- ment of each memorandum desirable. The first of these, dated February 12, 1919, expressed faith in the justice of the Conference. To the “Areopagus of the world” Albania came “full of confidence that the prin- ciple of nationality will receive its complete application.” The Albanian race, the oldest in the Balkan Peninsula, it declared, had preserved her national identity and her spirit of liberty in spite of the invasions to which she has always been a prey. During the war her neutrality, guaranteed by the Powers, was violated; like Belgium she has known the horrors of invasion. She fought on the side of the Entente, and was of aid in the retreat of the Serbs.*8 The principle of the status quo, the basis of past congresses, cannot be a satisfactory guide for decision in the case of Albania. The konferénce [sic] de la paix,” in Frangulis, Mémoire sur l’Albanie et ’Epire du Nord présentée devant le conseil de la société des nations dans sa séance du 24 juin, 1921, pp. 27-33. Vide also Durham, The Contemporary Review (1920), CXVIII, 207-215. " Bulletin hellénique, February 28, March 17, 1919. ® Adriatic Review, August 1919, pp. 487-88. " Albania, Delegation Propaganda, Revendications de _ lAlbanie, pp. 1-2. [ 92 ][IN BOROQPEAN INTERNATIONA LE ARE ALRS Congress of Berlin and the Conference of London both “.... sanctioned mutilations of Albanian national territory. ... .” An acceptable solution of the territorial problems of the Balkans was declared to consist in the inclusion in each state of those regions where its nationality was in a majority. On this assumption Albania claimed the “restoration to the Al- banian state of 1913” of the territory incorporated in Monte- negro, Serbia, and Greece, respectively. Rumors were even abroad that certain of the Balkan states were putting forth new claims to territory included in the Albanian state of 1913. While these were declared to be obviously unjust, still their arguments must be considered. As far as the Greek pretensions went, they were based on a mistake; their funda- mental error consisted in counting as Greeks all those who belong to the Greek Orthodox Church. This mistake arose from the fact that in the Turkish statistics all Christians were classed as Greeks quite apart from whether they were of Greek origin or not; religion, not race, was the basis of the classification. The claims Albania made, however, were for those territories of which she had been deprived by the Congress of Berlin and the Conference of London. Albania, it was stated, asked for nothing that was not Albanian; she wanted no groups of other nationalities which could provoke trouble.** The memorandum also asked for indemnification for the large number of villages burned by the Greeks in the south.75 In this first presentation of claims the Albanian delegation took the bull by the horns. Whether these claims were made in the honest belief that their full extent would be realized or on the principle of asking for a great deal in the hope of then getting something as a result of the process of bargain- ing is a matter of conjecture. Probably both factors were present. The significant point of the claims is their calm assumption of the restoration of the Kingdom of Albania of 1913, united and independent. The secret Treaty of London was ignored; the claims of Greece to the southern part of the “ Ibid., pp. 2-4. * Ibid., p. 6.SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS Albanian state as formerly constituted were assumed to be quite unjust and unworthy of emphasis. The real goal sought by the Albanian delegation was to secure an extension of her 1913 frontiers, not to defend her very existence. On February 24 the Albanian claims were presented before the Council of Ten. This second memorandum went more into detail than that of February 12 and showed an obvious realization of the fact that more difficulties would be encountered than had been previously supposed. After the customary appeal to the principles of President Wilson, the document remarked that the Congress of Berlin misunder- stood the rights of the Albanian nation. This misunderstand- ing was due to two facts: first, that Albania had never had a protector like the other Balkan States; and, secondly, that Albania, by her geographical situation, had always been coveted by her neighbors. The Treaty of Berlin, accordingly, deprived Albania, among other districts, of that part of Southern Albania that hes between the gulf of Preveza and the River Kalamas.’® To resist these encroachments on the territory of Albania the League of Prizrend was formed. The energetic resistance it offered forced the Powers to recognize the Albanian character of the region they had decided to concede to Greece, and to put back the Greek frontier to the River Arta. These mutilations were negligible, however, the document continued, in comparison with those perpetrated by the Conference of London. That body gave the region from the gulf of Preveza to Cape Stylos, called Tchameria, to Greece. That district contained forty thousand Albanian Moslems, fourteen thousand Albanian Christians, and nine thousand Greeks, who spoke Greek as their mother-tongue.”’ This second Albanian memorandum then attempted to refute the Greek claims to Southern Albania. The Greek fig- ures for this district—one hundred twenty thousand Greeks and eighty thousand Albanians—were contested. Albania maintained that the Greek-speaking population was less than *® Albania, Delegation Propaganda, Exposé des revendications alba- naises devant le Conseil des Diz, p. 1. " Ibid., p. 2. Dee tlIN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFBPAERS twenty thousand, that it was found only in the valley of Drinopoli and on the plain of Delvino, and that it consisted only of peasants cultivating land belonging to Albanians. Albania also maintained that the view was false which repre- sented all those belonging to the Greek Orthodox Church as Greeks. This claim, the document continued, “has naturally led the Greek clergy to make of religion an instrument of oppression and of tyranny.’ When permission was obtained from Turkey to open an Albanian school at Koritza, the Greek clergy excommunicated those Orthodox parents who sent their children there, and denounced them to the Otto- man government as conspirators. This maneuver caused the deportation of many and the closing of the school in question. Though Orthodox Albanians sent their children to the Greek schools, those of the Moslem and Catholic faiths who were forbidden the rights of instruction in their native tongue frequented Turkish, French, Italian, English, and American schools. The devastation by the Greeks in Epirus in 1913 aimed at the intimidation of the Albanians: its purpose was to make them renounce their claims to Southern Epirus, and especially to the district of Tchameria, essentially Albanian. Furthermore it was maintained that the frontier of Southern Albania “seems to have been traced by nature”; the chain of mountains of the Grammos and the Pindus provided the only frontier which would satisfy the defensive and economic needs of a weak country like Albania.’8 The next move of the Albanians on the great chessboard at Paris was to demand an American mandate with a plebi- scite in view. This request for a plebiscite was formally made in a letter to Clemenceau from Turkhan Pasha, March 7, 1919, and was repeated two months later in an appeal from the delegate of the Pan-Albanian Federation, Mr. Erickson. The request of Turkhan Pasha came as a result, in part at least, of the hearing before the Commission on Greek Affairs on February 27. The haste with which the Commission appeared to be acting impressed the Albanian delegation as * Ibid., pp. 4—7. =e Weert os ee a aot tae whine diewsee ee east eens eee ee oe a a a = Care we J MONTENEGRO | } ° ONkshich ) ay” n( Andriyevit j . < e*~ | 5 . ° e* \ 7 : ONS" Pe — Ne + ery Kleisoura \ 7 \ et > (SS 7 ere ) aks f = K wy? Chimara \Adyro-castrO AF oN ote REFERENCE Boundaries before 1913 .....--.-- New Boundaries of ISI3......-.-- Boundary line proposed 6 Provaasnaal Albanian t eaedrnnel. eee (1919) following ethnographical lines | Ralway$ .. PO OA en LG, / ONO 7 4 ang erenteratieqe 44 oN 5 RAR SI, 2 7 * of . iw PL Of ce = 4 JS 7 LT; Durazzo OLE TA, ME LENA . a Af oe, 4 SA LED Ne Ke Ltt ty GAL & NATO RE PIAA SY COS outs 4 f Pate tia OS . 4 , gene As for the Greek argument that a majority of a superior civilization should not be placed under a minority of an inferior civili- zation, this too was declared utterly without foundation. In this statement Venizelos referred to Christianity and Islam, respectively. But there is no real difference in civilization; the Moslem element of the population was as well educated and furnished as many recruits to the higher professions as did the Christian. Moreover, difference in religion does not constitute a difference in civilization; the civilization of Albania was declared to be essentially one. Furthermore, Albania had already shown that the Moslems numbered a majority of the population of Northern Epirus. The argu- ment that Albania was at the time unable to maintain her independence without foreign guidance was not a reason for annexing Northern Epirus to Greece. Indeed, the very fact that Albania would have the assistance of one of the Allied “ Réfutation des arguments de M. Venizelos pour établir les droits de Vhellénisme en Epire du Nord, pp. 3-4. * Ibid., pp. 5-6. 100 ]IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS Powers during her first years constituted a guaranty of happiness for all the inhabitants of Northern Epirus, superior to that offered them by annexation to Greece.*® This same pamphlet then devoted special attention to Greek claims to Koritza. It confirmed the statements as to the schools and the refusal of legacies, but emphasized cer- tain other facts. Thirty years had passed since the refusal of the legacies, the very period which had witnessed the growth of Albanian nationalism and the diminution of the number of Hellenophiles in the district. From Koritza, indeed, had come many of the Albanian national leaders. There was nothing strange, moreover, in the fact that Greek schools were filled, since Albanian schools were prohibited. The national sentiment of Koritza, furthermore, has been shown by the establishment of Albanian schools under the French in 1917. Today, then, Koritza, the Albanians declared, is not a Greek, but an Albanian, town.*’ Venizelos argued from the events of 1914 that Northern Epirus desired union with Greece. But the revolution of 1914, the pamphlet rejoined, was managed and supported by the Greeks. The pillaging and burning of vallages had been well authenticated by the impartial testimony of the Dutch officers who examined the situation, as had also the use of Cretans and Peloponnesians in the Epirote armies. Would Greek bands have destroyed villages really Greek? Moreover, the anarchy at the beginning of the war, which Venizelos stated was due to the departure of the Prince of Wied, was in reality intentionally fomented by the Greek authorities with the expectation of being called in to pacify and occupy the districts.’s As for the secret treaty of 1915, would the Allies, in their fear of renouncing an agreement contrary to all justice, make of Albania a new Poland?®? The economic reasons invoked by Venizelos, which cen- tered upon the possession of the port of Santi Quaranta, were declared not cogent. But Greece already has, declared the ** Ibid., pp. 7-8. “ Ibid., pp. 11-13. “ Ibid., pp. 8—10. sol bids; p. Ld.SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS pro-Albanian author of this pamphlet, a large number of ports, and, therefore, should not dispute with Albania the rare oullets she has by which to communicate with the rest of the world.®° As the attitude of the Powers assembled at Paris and the difficulties faced by the Albanians emerged from the shadow of mere rumor and fine words into the pitiless daylight of selfish action, groups of Albanians took the step of appealing over the heads of the Council of Ten directly to President Wilson, whom they addressed as “the Apostle of political morality,” “the defender of small oppressed peoples,’ “‘the respected chief of the most powerful democracy,” and “the man who has placed the sentiment of justice far above all interests.’’°? They went on: Today Albania is struggling painfully in the hands of those who wish once more to dismember her and who wish to take possession of territories which do not belong to them and which have never belonged to them. Unfortunately for her, Albania, a poor country, has found no advocate in Europe to take her part. Only a few isolated persons, struck by the injustice committed against our country, have helped us by speech and writing. They do not seem to have found any echo in the chancelleries from which there will issue shortly the destinies of a Europe one would desire to see regenerated.®® To defend Albania against “agreements and treaties of spo- liation and conquest,” President Wilson was asked to occupy with American troops the different Albanian regions under control of the Greeks and Jugo-Slavs, and to proceed to a free and impartial examination of the national character of those regions contested by her adversaries.°* Such appeals, while not falling on deaf ears, resulted in no action on the part of the American delegation. ” Réfutation des arguments de M. Venizelos pour établir les droits de Uhellénisme en Epire du Nord, pp. 15-16. ** Albania, Delegation Propaganda, Notes additionnelles rélatives aux revendications albanaises, p. 18. ~“ Baker, op. cit., I, 7: “S Idem. “ Albania, Delegation Propaganda, Notes additionnelles, etc., p. 18. { 102 |IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS Before the treatment of the Greco-Albanian boundary dispute by the Peace Conference is considered, some com- parison of the two points of view as set forth in the delegation propaganda and summarized above, seems necessary, with an attempt to discover which of the various arguments advanced are sound and what kind of a solution would be equitable. When the two points of view are placed side by side, one fact becomes clear, viz., that the appeals of both were to the same principles: self-determination, nationalism, popular desire, “national consciousness”; call the criterion what you will, the fact remains that both sides ostensibly desired a solution in accord with the wishes of the people concerned. Both Greece and Albania were agreed on this fundamental principle; they differed in its application to the question in hand, each declaring that the popular will favored its pro- posed solution. The problem then is to determine the real will of the population. This might be determined in one of two ways: first, by a plebiscite or other recognized expression of popular opinion; or, secondly, by the investigations of an impartial commission of experts. Though various suggestions for a plebiscite occurred in the pro-Greek literature, the official Greek memoranda were silent on the matter; Albanian delegation propaganda, on the other hand, made repeated efforts to obtain one. Greece maintained, it is to be remarked, that an official expression of the popular will had been given on two occasions: first, that of the Epirote revolution of 1914: and, secondly, that of the election of Epirote deputies to the Greek Chamber in 1915. Neither of these, however, was acceptable to Albania on the grounds that both were unduly influenced by Greece. To be valid, any official expression for the purpose of de- termining the fate of a given population ought certainly to be taken under conditions free from all Suspicion of pressure by the authorities of either interested party to the dispute. Clearly then, there was no such acceptable expression of public opinion; unless the Conference should authorize one to be taken, the solution would have to be made on other grounds. The other approved method of settling such a [ 103 ]SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS dispute —by an impartial investigating commission — was followed by the Conference to a very limited extent. The Commission on Greek Affairs, however, hardly met the hypo- thetical requirement of impartiality. As each of the Allied Powers was represented on it, any decision reached by the Commission was likely to be in the nature of a compromise. Such, at any rate, was the case. In the absence of a decision based on either of these two approved methods of determining the national sentiment of a people, recourse must be had to a consideration of the merits of the case, with an indication of some of the fallacies in the arguments advanced. In the first place, it is quite evident that neither side had a monopoly on truth: the district of Northern Epirus really is a mixed one—mixed as to language, race, and religion, at least, to omit for the present any reference to national senti- ment. Any settlement of the problem seems to involve some injustices: there would be a “minority” either way. But in which case would the minority be the smaller? The statistics quoted on both sides are of small value, as no reliable census has ever been taken and the Turkish figures are based on religions, thus giving no indication of nationality. On this very point, however, the Greeks displayed a lack of candor, assuming that those labeled Greek (in religion) are Greek in national sentiment. Their fallacy in this regard was pointed out by the Albanians. The Greek appeal was based almost entirely on history, more or less recent, in an attempt by this means to demonstrate the Hellenic nationality of the popu- lation. The objection to such reasoning is that the Greeks failed to take into account changing circumstances, for the situation in Albania shows a constant development: nowhere iS an assumption of a static condition more false. Arguments that were applicable in 1912 had lost much of their force by 1919. In view of the fact that Albanian nationalism had always been suppressed under Turkish misrule and that Greece had been given the upper hand with every opportunity to Hel- lenize the population by means of the Greek Orthodox Church [ 104 ]IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS and Greek schools teaching the Greek language, it is surpris- ing that Albanian nationalism had made such headway as has been noted. Under these artificially molded conditions, neither language nor religion can be taken as even a guide, far less as a final criterion. Given freedom to develop natur- ally without restrictions, saving only those that would safe- guard as far as possible the rights of minorities, there can be little doubt that a few years’ time would see “Northern Epirus” thoroughly Albanized. Inclusion of the district in Greece, on the contrary, would probably be opposed by a far stronger Albanian sentiment among the population than had been supposed to exist, and seems contrary to the principle of the independence of small nationalities. On the whole, then, judging the matter solely on the merits of the case, the Albanian argument seems by far the stronger, and is upheld by the reports of an investigating committee sent out later by the League of Nations, the work and views of which will appear in chapter vii.VI. THE PEACE CONFERENCE: THE POWERS AND ALBANIA, 1919-1920 The settlement of the Albanian problem at the Peace Con- ference was complicated by the fact that this problem was but a small part of that larger stumbling-block, the question of the Adriatic, which bound Southern Albania to the Italian- Jugo-Slav dispute. The whole knotty problem hinged on the Treaty of London. That bid for territory by which Italy had entered the war, President Wilson flatly declared in the Coun- cil of Four to be “inconsistent with the general principles of the settlement.”! The United States, he said, which was not bound by the treaty, viewed a solution based on it as quite impossible.? Wilson’s standpoint was that circumstances had altered, since Italy no longer needed to protect herself against the possible aggressions of a non-existent Austria-Hungary in the Adriatic. This opinion of Wilson, that the Treaty of London could no longer apply to the settlement of the eastern boundary of Italy was rejected by the Italian premier, Or- lando.* While in their basic recommendation regarding the Italian settlements, the American experts had agreed that Italy, under the mandate of the League of Nations, would probably need to be left in Valona and its immediate vicinity,° later, in the dispute with Orlando, the President was sup- ported by the American experts who urged him not to yield on the Italian claims and declared that Italy had entered the war “with a demand for loot,” a demand to which France and England had surrendered.® * Baker, op. cit., I, 27-28. Secret Minutes, Council of Four, April 19, 1919. “Idem; also ibid., p. 45, Secret Minutes, Council of Ten, February 1, 1919. *Ibid., Ill, 275, Document 35, Memorandum concerning the Italian claims on the Adriatic, presented by President Wilson to the Italian delegation on April 14, 1919. * Idem. * Tbid., III, 259, 262, Document 31, January 21, 1919. *Ibid., III, 278, Document 36, Letter of Six American Experts to President Wilson, April 17, 1919. [ 106 |IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AEERAERS Questions affecting Greece, it will be recalled, had been referred by the Peace Conference to a Commission estab- lished for that purpose.? This Commission held a series of meetings from February 18 to March 6, when it rendered its report, the delegations from the four countries represented on it, viz., Great Britain, France, Italy, and the United States, each presenting its own proposals. Of these, that of the Ital- ians made no concessions to the Greeks, holding to the line indicated in the Protocol of Florence of 1913; the American proposal assigned a part of the southern portion of Northern Epirus to Greece, but for the northern portion would follow the Florence line; the British was slightly more generous to Greece in the southern section and held to the Florence line in the north; while the French proposal did not differ very materially from the American as to the southern portion, but in the north gave more to Greece for the economic-strategic reason of keeping the road from Koritza to Santi Quaranta, on the sea coast, in Greek hands. To support their case the Italians on the Commission in- troduced a naval expert, Captain Conz, who argued against giving Greece the mainland opposite Corfu, on the grounds that its possession by Greece would make that island so im- pregnable for use as a naval base that Italy would have to strengthen her position correspondingly in the Adriatic. He endeavored to show that Greece desired possession of the coast near Corfu, not for ethnic or commercial reasons, nor because of pressure of emigration; that this last was not the real reason of Greek claims was evidenced, he declared, by the facts that she was gaining a large increase of territory elsewhere, that she had plenty of outlets to the sea, and that this coastal region neither was rich nor did it have connec- tions with the interior; but rather, he maintained, she claimed the region for purely military reasons. To mention only events of the recent war, the naval importance of complete control of Corfu such as the possession of the neighboring mainland would give, was easily shown: before Greece joined the Allies, the Kaiser had made a powerful submarine base "Vide supra, p. 75. [ 107 |NE ee eee TA DuRpaz 200% 4 . f oKavasa b ) STRUVA C ¢—__—— ™ ‘ yon gies : ‘OQ OcHRIDA A 4; ° ie ! Se t —rS => no sh by \ ] DECIN . \ Ocua QA SamtN ‘ie ep.) ae ee a8 Cae ore / 3 x ee js teal / Le > , , ¢ ~ — Ay <> ~ eP, j ° ee ° ", wr ™e , qa TEN . / ea r ~ . Sea VALON ‘ia NZ 2 / ST SASON ~ \\O a tne g Cc ee 2 «*** a ~ ( ‘ «| f * = ~~ ——- ees” \ 4 %* | | | A T ¢ ‘ j U- Ye \ Skeeisouay ar Ensexo | . | ee aN oY ie! eo 5 / - es ee vt ) . ep mi X. Se Ne eon | Cuimar . Cu Ges - Arcrro-CasTa0g. Ne a —al > — ) eh eeeeee GREEK CLAIM , Ss - 7 =m ee FRANCO-BRITISH ESS PROPOSAL <- i il = «oom AMERICAN “ | PROPOSAL ee iis | mee ITALIAN PROPOSAL- =a © SANT! . FOLLOWING 1913 LINE QUARANTA ie ia i a ~~ \ \ CORFU v/ a 4 ) We | : | pra~ | | } ; pe ee sa =‘ | CS, epee ~ OPaghmyTHia - \ \ Map 7.—Various proposals of members of the Commission on Greek Affairs and the Greek claim, 1919. After map accompanying Rapport présenté au Conseil supréme des Alliés par la commission chargée d’étudier les questions territoriales intéressant la Gréce. (Compare with Map 8.)POGRADETSO 7 oe GREEK CLAIM wee FRANCO-BRITISH PROPOSAL osesme DMERICAN PROPOSAL SANTI QUARANTA JANINA YCORFU Eee, TEN — \ OPARAMYTHIA Map 8.—Lines proposed by members of the Commission on Greek Affairs, 1919. After Map No. 1, accompanying Report of the Committee on Greek Territorial Claims. (Compare with Map 7.)SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS of Corfu, and when Greece joined the side of the Entente, Corfu became correspondingly important to the French fleet in its aid of Italy against the Austrians in the Adriatic.® In later meetings, the Commission heard the views of Veni- zelos, for Greece, of Turkhan Pasha, Mehmed Bey Konitza, and Dr. Tourtuli, for Albania, and of Karapanos for the former Provisional Government of Northern Epirus. The dis- cussion centered around the question of the desires of the population, and the insurrection in Northern Epirus in 1914. The Commission was unable to come to a unanimous decision on the question of Southern Albania, as the recom- mendations agreed upon show. The United States, Great Britain, and France accepted the Greek claims in the south- western part, but drew the frontier line between the Viosa and the Zrenos rivers, while Italy voted against the Greek claims there; in the northeastern part, however, Great Britain and France voted to allow the Greek claim, but only as far as a line a little north of Koritza, while the United States and Italy voted to maintain the present northern boundary of Greece. The decision of the French and British delegations in favor of Greece was based on three lines of argument. First, they felt obliged to consider rather the actual reasons for which the frontier of 1913 had not met with the approval of the population, since they regarded the statistics available as offering little practical criterion of the wishes of the peoples concerned, inasmuch as such statistics could only be based on the test of religion or on that of language, the former of which was unfavorable to the Albanians, the latter unfair to the Greeks. The course of events in Southern Albania since the delimitation of that frontier had tended to show that this frontier was unacceptable to very important elements in the regions concerned. Secondly, they cited the evidence given by Venizelos and Karapanos in regard to the Hellenophile senti- * Rapport (avec annexes) présenté au Conseil supréme des Alliés par la commission chargée d’étudier les questions territoriales intéressant la Gréce, Annexe VI, p. 16. (Reproduced in the appendix to this essay, p. 171.) [ 110 ]IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS ments of the greater part of the population, and the economic dependence of the Koritza region on the main road leading to Santi Quaranta. Thirdly, the British delegation was further influenced by the consideration that . . the problem is in effect whether this district shall be given to Greece or to Albania or placed under the protection of some European Power; they are of opinion that for political and stra- tegic reasons it would be unfair to Greece and Serbia to place so vital a point as Koritza under the tutelage and control of another European Power.? The delegation of the United States likewise considered the events of 1913-14, but was unable to accept the history of those troubled years as satisfactory evidence, since foreign intrigue at that time was active, and the testimony of parties to the contest was prejudiced. Accordingly, it based its con- clusions on the reports of observers, corroborated by such statistical evidence as was available. These conclusions were stated as follows: 1. The construction of the road through Premedi to Valona enables the districts of Koritza and of Argyrocastro to be sepa- rated without economic injury. 2. In the district southwest of the Voiussa River the majority of the population appears to be Greek in sentiment and political inclination; and is naturally connected with Greece by relations of transportation and trade. 3. In the district northeast of the Voiussa River the great majority of the population is Albanian not only by speech but also by national consciousness. No sufficient grounds have been adduced for severing from Albania this district, in which the consciousness of Albanian unity and the devotion to the Albanian cause are particularly strong.1° The Italian delegation went still farther in favor of Al- bania, maintaining that the frontiers of 1913 should remain * Report of Committee on Greek Territorial Claims, March 6, 1919, p- 2. (For an incomplete text of the report, vide Frangulis, op. cit., Annex No. 12, pp. 34-35.) The pertinent sections of the report are reproduced in the Appendix to this essay, p. 164. *° Idem. { 111 |SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS in effect. Its detailed reasons followed closely the familiar ones adopted by protagonists of Albania, and included the arguments that the district was inhabited by an Albanian majority, both racial and linguistic, as was proved by the International Commission of 1913; that the Moslems were in a majority over the Christians; that the events of 1914 could not be taken as showing the popular will in favor of annexa- tion to Greece; that differences in religion in Albania do not lead to disagreement from the national point of view; that the greater part of the landed property was in the hands of Albanian Moslems; that the economic life of the country would be completely destroyed if it were deprived of its centers, the principal towns of this district; that the cultural and educational arguments were not valid, because the Otto- man administration never allowed the Albanians their own educational institutions; that the Italian point of view was confirmed by a map published by the French Ministry of War in 1915, which shows only two small groups of Greek in- habitants in the neighborhood of Argyrocastro and Delvino."! No action was taken by the Conference on the recommen- dations of the Commission on Greek Affairs as regards Southern Albania. But in April a lively and heated corre- spondence from Essad Pasha demanding that he, as the rep- resentative of Albania, be heard by the Conference, with recriminations from Turkhan, the regularly designated dele- gate of Albania, and from organizations of Albanians abroad, forced the question upon the attention of the Conference. Repeatedly Essad’s request for a hearing appeared on the agenda of the meetings of the Council of Five during the sec- ond week of May, only to reappear on the subsequent agenda, until on May 14 the question was definitely adjourned. The reason 1s doubtless to be sought in the crisis which the Italian problem had reached in April and May, a crisis which threat- ened to break up the Conference. During this period various proposals and compromises for the solution of the Adriatic problem were suggested, none of which was satisfactory to all the parties concerned. By the proposed compromise of “ Frangulis, op. cif., Annex 2, pp. 7-8. Vide Map 6, supra, p. 99. [112 }IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS May 29, in which Wilson approved a settlement accepted by Orlando, Italy was to have a mandate over Albania; but this decision did not commend itself to the Jugo-Slavs,!2 and a solution again hung fire. Yet, as one observer in close contact with affairs at Paris stated to anxious Albanian representa- tives, nothing could be done about Albania until the Adriatic question between Italy and Serbia was settled.1% When the treaty of peace with Germany was signed and the main Conference disbanded, the remaining problems were left for settlement in the hands of delegates of the Allied Powers. But this informal conference did not attack the Adriatic problem again until December 1919. The resignation of Orlando, meanwhile, and the forma- tion on June 22 of a new Italian cabinet headed by Nitti, opened a new phase in relations between Greece and Italy over Southern Albania. During the early period of the Peace Conference, these relations had been acute. Italy steadily opposed any northward extension of Greek territory, and in the Commission on Greek Affairs held out for the Albanian frontiers of 1913.14 The Greek claims of Venizelos were judged excessive by the Italian press in general, and espe- cially by such papers as the Giornale d’Italia, which sup- ported Sonnino’s policy; but in some quarters there remained hope of the possibility of an understanding between the two Powers.'®> With the change in policy in Italy such an agree- ment was consummated. This agreement, known as the Tittoni-Venizelos accord, was reached on July 29, 1919, be- tween the new Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs and the head of the Greek government. By the terms of this secret arrangement, Italy agreed to support at the Conference the Greek claims to Thrace and her demand for Southern Albania, and in return Greece “The Times (London), January 28, 1920. Herron MSS, Italy and Albania, Document xvill, Herron to Adamidi, March 30, 1919. (Vide Bibliography for comment on this source. ) “Report in Frangulis, Mémoire sur lV’Albanie et VEpire du Nord, Annex No. 12, p. 34. * Bulletin périodique de la presse italienne, February 21, 1919. Pais) ]SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS undertook to support an Italian mandate over Albania and to recognize Italian sovereignty over Valona and a hinterland such as Italy might deem necessary for its defense. Greece was to reimburse the Italian government for the expenses it had incurred for public works of a permanent character, whose value was to be determined by an Italo-Greek com- mission, which was to choose an arbiter in case of disagree- ment. Italy should possess a share in the port of Santi Quaranta for fifty years. If the Greek government itself Should not connect this port with the interior by rail, Italian companies should be given the preference in constructing such a railway line. The neutralization of the straits of Corfu, as stipulated by the Conference of London (1913), was con- firmed. The rights of Mohammedans included in Greece and of Greeks in Albania were specifically protected. In return for satisfaction of her claims in Thrace and Northern Epirus, Greece undertook to renounce in favor of Italy certain claims in Asia Minor. The Greek government declared it would consider the conditions fulfilled even if as a result of the eventual opposition of the United States and in spite of the support of the Italian Government in favor of Greece, Korytsa shall be included in the territory which Greece claims. The agreement ought always to remain secret, since it was not a true treaty but “only the determination of a line of common conduct to follow at the Conference.” The only declaration that the two Ministers can make is that they are resolved to treat with a spirit of conciliation the different questions that interest the two countries before the Conference. [t was further provided that those clauses of the understand- ing which should not be included in the treaties of peace Should form the subject of a special convention between Greece and Italy.‘° Such was the compromise by which the two Mediterranean Powers hoped to satisfy their special in- terests in the Near East. Despite the stress upon secrecy, the terms of the agreement soon became known. * Text, Frangulis, op. cit., Annex No. 14, pp. 40-42. [ 114 ]IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS Announcement of the understanding between Greece and Italy was soon made to Greek officials and citizens in circu- lars issued by the various Hellenic ministers recommending that friendliness be shown Italians generally.1* Later, on the occasion of the visit paid by Venizelos to Rome, Italian com- ments on the new accord were favorable.!8 In his speech in the Italian Chamber on the subject, September 27, Tittoni, after announcing that that they had reached an understand- ing to follow at the Conference a common policy on certain questions of interest to both Italy and Greece, stated, amid applause, that this understanding had already had its eco- nomic results: on September 11, he said, a convention was concluded for the construction of a railway line to connect Rome and Athens, with ferry service across the straits of Otranto. This new line, since it ran through Epirus, would be an important development in commercial relations be- tween the two neighboring countries, thus supplying the region with facilities hitherto entirely lacking. In Greece the understanding was followed by the establishment of a Greco- Italian League with the purpose of intensifying the economic and commercial relations between the two Powers.*® The question of Koritza was a particularly difficult one. Though the report of the Commission on Greek Affairs was not made public, the point of view of the American delegates in favor of Albania was known; the chairman of the Albanian National Committee of Geneva, Dr. Adamidi, stated in a letter to President Wilson, April 7, that the committee wished to express “its gratitude to the American delegates for their noble defense of Albania’s right to Koritza.’’2° But as month “ The Times (London), August 19, 1919. * Bulletin périodique de la presse italienne, [December] 10, 1919. ” Receuil des documents étrangers, pp. 53, 359; Bulletin quotidien de la presse étrangére, November 18, 1919. ” Herron MSS, Italy and Albania, Document xxiii. Cf. Document Xil, Adamidi to Wilson through Herron, March 20, 1919: “The French min- ister in Albania, the Vicomte de Fontenay, twice openly assured us that ‘Koritza is Albanian and will remain Albanian.’ All the French phy- Siclans and officers who have been in Koritza are confessing that this province is Albanian.” [ 115 ] ee . Ne ee eee enSOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS after month dragged by without a decision as to their fate, the suspense of the inhabitants became unbearable. Fear that the French troops still occupying the town might be with- drawn before the fate of the district was decided, with a re- sultant occupation by the Greeks, provided ready fuel for a revolution. The preparations for such an uprising, however, could be stopped, according to Dr. Adamidi, if it were as- certained that the American delegation had decided that the district was to be Albanian.” To such a request for informa- tion on the status of the Albanian question, the reply from the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, dated October 16, was not very definite: In regard to Albania, it is difficult to make any answer, but you are safe in saying that no final decision in regard to the question as a Whole, or in regard to Koritza in particular, has been made.?? When the American delegate, Polk, proposed to the Coun- cil on October 26 that the discussion of the Albanian prob- lem be put on the order of the day for the succeeding meet- ing, the English delegate, Sir Eyre Crowe, remarked that the solution of this problem was so closely bound up with that of the Adriatic in general that it could not be discussed inde- pendently.” But a solution of the Adriatic question was pending. Practically all parties were in a mood for com- promise over that chief obstacle to a settlement, Fiume. Nego- tiations between Washington and Rome were in progress from September to November; the points that were then agreed upon between President Wilson and Sgr. Nitti were embodied in a joint Franco-British-American Memorandum presented to Italy on December 9, 1919, which was the signal for a thorough reopening of the whole controversy. This cor- “Herron MSS, Italy and Albania, Document xxxvi, Adamidi to Her- ron, October 8, 1919. “Ibid., Document xxxvii, Dulles to Herron. In transmitting this reply to Dr. Adamidi, Herron said: “My impression is that no final decision will be made regarding Albania until all the Italian questions are settled, and until all the Greek questions are settled.” Jbid., Docu- ment xxxvill, October 20, 1919. “ Bulletin quotidien de la presse étrangére, October 30, 1919. [ 116 }IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS respondence must now be considered in detail in so far as it relates to Southern Albania. The memorandum of December 9 contained a statement of the main points upon which agreement with Italy had been reached. Those relating to the problem at hand were an Italian mandate over Albania, and full Italian sovereignty over Valona “. . . . with such hinterland as may be strictly necessary to its defence and economic development... .” As regards the first point a full explanation was given, fol- lowed by a separate memorandum on the conditions of such a mandate. A quotation was cited from a telegram to Tittoni from the American Secretary of State, Lansing, on Novem- ber 12, pointing out the conciliatory attitude of the United States; in it occurred these words, showing the express con- sent of the American government to such a mandate: “In our desire to deal generously, even more than generously, we yielded to Italy’s demand for an Italian mandate over AI- bania. ....’ The authors of the memorandum, in outlin- ing the conditions of Italy’s proposed position in Albania, provided for a commission consisting of one representative each from the Italian government, the League of Nations, and the state of Albania, the latter to be designated by the Allies. The purpose of this commission would be to elaborate the terms of the mandate and the organic law of the future state of Albania. At the end of five months it was to make a report to the Council of the League of Nations containing its recom- mendations, but the final decision was to rest with the Coun- cil, acting by a majority vote. The northern and eastern frontiers of Albania were to be those fixed in 1913, but the southern boundary was declared still a matter for negotia- tion. In order, however, not to delay a general settlement by such negotiations, certain provisional arrangements could be adopted, by which, in substance, Greece would be given the district of Argyrocastro.”4 “Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers (1920), LI, “Correspondence Relating to the Adriatic Question.” No. 1, Joint British, French, and American Memorandum, December 9, 1919. Pihs |SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS The proposed Italian mandate over Albania met with ob- jections from the delegates of the Jugo-Slavy state,25> who ex- pressed their views in a note of January 8, 1920. There in- evitably arose in their minds, the delegates said, a compari- son with the mandate given in 1878 to Austria-Hungary over Bosnia and Herzegovina, the evil effects of which the Jugo- Slavs had themselves experienced; hence they feared that the penetration of a great foreign power in the Balkan Penin- sula?® would inevitably result in disastrous consequences. The Jugo-Slavs desired a correction of the northern frontier of Albania in their favor; but in the absence of such a recti- fication they preferred the solution which would maintain Albania in her limits of 1913 as an independent state with an autonomous administration. This they believed Albania was more capable of achieving by herself than under foreign ad- ministration. In the absence of this solution, however, and in case the southern part should be “attributed to other states,” Jugo-Slavia put forth claims to the northern part as far as the River Drin.?’ In its reply dated January 10, 1920, the Italian govern- ment indicated its attitude in regard to the points presented in the memorandum of December 9. The frontier therein indicated, from Tepeleni to the sea, involved a cession to Greece of territory to which the latter Power made no claims, and presented topographic and ethnic inconveniences which should not be overlooked; satisfaction might best be given, “The term “Jugo-Slavia” is used throughout, in deference to eu- phony and current usage, in place of the official “Serb-Croat-Slovene State.” “* Jugo-Slavia would then be bordered by Italian territory on both the north and the south. Her fear of such a position is vividly illus- trated in a poster in the Hoover War Library. It shows a map on which Italian territory is colored red, from which stretch forth bloody arms and hands to strangle the throat of the Slav whose head is symbolically represented as rising from his native land. (Croation poster, “Tako Bi Htjeli Talijani” —*Such are the designs of the Italians.’’) “ Adriaticus, La question adriatique, pp. 78-88. Note of the dele- gation of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, January 8, 1920. Cf. the expression of much the same attitude at the opening of the Peace Conference, Jugo-Slavia, Delegation Propaganda, Albania. [ 118 ]IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS it was stated, to the demands of Greece by an arrangement based on the facts as already presented by Venizelos. One representative each from Greece and Albania could present the arguments before the representatives of the United States, England, France, and Italy, who should then come to a deci- sion which should envisage either the immediate cession of contested territory or recourse to a plebiscite for all or part of such territory. In any case, that part of the Albanian coast which might be ceded to Greece must be neutralized. A special memorandum was attached dealing with the form of an Italian mandate over Albania. The independence of that state within frontiers to be fixed should be recognized, and certain rights of communication were accorded to Jugo- Slavia. The Italian government in consultation with Albanian authorities would elaborate a report dealing with the condi- tions of the mandate and the fundamental laws of the future Albanian state. This report would be put before the Council of the League of Nations within a period of six months. This arrangement should be based on the following principles: first, protection of racial, linguistic, and religious minorities: secondly, organization of legislative and administrative bodies in which the inhabitants should be represented; and, thirdly, the establishment of a police force whose superior officers might be of the nationality of Italy, the mandatory power. Furthermore, Italy should have the right to maintain armed troops in the country for a period of five years from the date of the bestowal of the mandate.2s To the Italian view as thus expressed, certain concessions accordingly were made by the Allies in a memorandum dated January 14. Its provisions relating to Albania reaffirmed both the Italian possession of Valona, as provided for in the Treaty of London, and a mandate over Albania. The bound- aries of Northern Albania were to be readjusted; the AI- banian districts to be administered by the Jugo-Slav state would constitute an autonomous province similar to the “Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers (1920), LI, “Correspondence Relating to the Adriatic Question,” No. 6, Italian memorandum of January 10, 1920. [east 95) veers Peete ee ee eo ee Ser eee om oN en ee ae eee 2 a ae meen ten tnena Sk eleite mareet rey enzer SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS autonomous province of Ruthenia in Czecho-Slovakia. The southern boundary of Albania was to be the line proposed by the French and British delegations on the Commission on Greek Affairs, by which Argyrocastro and Koritza were left to Greece.*® The Jugo-Slav reply to these proposals reiterated a belief that the best solution lay in a local autonomous govy- ernment without the interference of any foreign power. But in case this solution was not accepted, the proposals of Jan- uary 14 would be adopted provided further rectifications of the northeastern frontier were allowed.*° At this stage in the negotiations concerning the Adriatic question, the American Secretary of State raised objections to a settlement in which the United States was not consulted.*: In reply Clemenceau and Lloyd George stated that they had 4 never had the intention of making a definite settle- ment... . without obtaining the views of the American Government.” The proposed settlement differed from that of December 9, to which the United States had been a party, only in two respects, both of which were declared to be of positive advantage to Jugo-Slavia. Regarding one alteration, relating to Albania, the French and British governments declared: As regards Albania, an attempt has been made to afford satis- faction to the necessary requirements of all parties concerned. The details of the administration of this country by Jugo-Slavia, Italy, and Greece have yet to be elaborated. But in working to this end, sight will not be lost of the feelings and future interests of the Albanian people, and every endeavor will be made to carry out the arrangements in full consultation with them.®2 To this arrangement President Wilson strenuously ob- jected, voicing his protests in a lengthy memorandum in which he vigorously opposed the suggested settlement as re- ~ Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers (1920), LI, “Correspondence Relating to the Adriatic Question,” No. 7, “Revised Proposals,” Janu- ary 14, 1920. "Ibid., No. 8, Réponse de la delegation du royaume des Serbes, Croates, et Slovenes, January 20, 1920. " [bid., No. 9, Lansing to Wallace, January 20, 1920. “ Ibid., No. 10, “Clemenceau and Lloyd George to the United States Ambassador for Transmission to Washington,” January 22, 1920. [ 120 ]IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS gards Albania. Whereas the memorandum of December 9 “Iaintained in large measure the unity of the Albanian State,” that of January 14 threatened to partition the AI- banian people “against their vehement protests, among three different alien Powers.’ After reviewing the situation he asserted that The Adriatic issue as it now presents itself raises the fundamental question as to whether the American Government can on any terms co-operate with its European associates in the great work of maintaining the peace of the world by removing the primary causes of war. In conclusion he stated: If it does not appear feasible to secure acceptance of the just and generous concessions offered by the British, French, and American Governments to Italy in the joint memorandum of those Powers of the 9th December, 1919, which the President has already clearly stated to be the maximum concession that the Government of the United States can offer, the President desires to say that he must take under serious consideration the with- drawal of the treaty with Germany and the agreement between the United States and France of the 28th June, 1919, which are now before the Senate and permitting the terms of the European settlement to be independently established and enforced by the Associated Governments.?4 The Franco-British answer to Wilson’s objections ex- plained the contemplated action on the Albanian question by calling attention to the fact that all of Albania was to be brought under the mandatory system; in this way it was believed “the aspirations of the Albanian people for unity and self-government” could eventually be satisfied. In the mean- time, since the Albanian people had never been able to estab- lish a settled government for themselves, and in view of the fact that the northern part is overwhelmingly Christian and the southern part similarly Mohammedan, the responsibility for the government and development of these two parts would best be entrusted to Jugo-Slavia and Italy, respec- * Ibid., No. 12, President Wilson’s note of February 10, 1920. * Idem. ne ee ne Sa ee ae ekeee oe aimee eet SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS tively.*> In other words, “the Entente statesmen explained that they did not mean to do what they had announced, and then went on with their plans.’’*® In his objection to partitioning Albania, however, Wilson stood firm. While realizing that this threefold division of Albania (between Italy, Greece, and Jugo-Slavia) might be most acceptable to Jugo-Slavia, the American government was “. . . . just as vigorously opposed to injuring the Al- banian people for the benefit of Jugo-Slavia as ... . to in- juring the Jugo-Slav people for the benefit of Italy.” More- over, the differences between the two parts of Albania would be accentuated by putting them under the control of different and unlike nations. Since one section, furthermore, would be administered by Italy, a member of the League of Nations represented on the Council, and the other by Jugo-Slavia, which was not thus represented, future alteration or with- drawal of the mandate would be difficult if not impossible.*’ The upshot of the correspondence on the whole Adriatic controversy was that Italy and Jugo-Slavia were left to settle their differences, if they could, by direct negotiations, pro- vided that an agreement in the Fiume region were not made on the basis of compensation elsewhere at the expense of nationals of a third Power, viz., Albania; the results of direct negotiations between the two interested Powers would be satisfactory to President Wilson as falling within the scope of the principle of self-determination.*® This suggestion of Wilson’s that the settlement should be made on its merits was observed. The Treaty of Rapallo of November 12, 1920, between Italy and Jugo-Slavia did not mention the subject of Albania. By its provisions, the ar- *Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers (1920), LI, “Correspondence Relating to the Adriatic Question,” No. 13, Millerand and Lloyd George to Wilson, February 17, 1920. ** Gibbons, Europe Since 1918, pp. 146—47. “Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers (1920), LI, “Correspondence Relating to the Adriatic Question,” Memorandum of Wilson, enclosure in No. 14, Davis to Earl Curzon, February 25, 1920. “Idem; vide also itbid., No. 15, Franco-British memorandum in reply to Wilson, February 26, 1920. [ 122 |IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS rangements in the Treaty of London dealing with Albania fell to the ground, since Italy was no longer to obtain Dalma- tia and certain islands.*® When a solution of the differences between Jugo-Slavia and Italy was thus reached without in- volving Greece and Albania, the question of the frontier be- tween the two latter states lost some of its importance and was left unsettled. This Adriatic controversy, however, did not leave the Albanians unaffected. When Italy had seemed ready, in order to gain Fiume, to allow Jugo-Slavia and Greece to have the northern and southern parts of Albania, respectively, the Al- banians believed Italy had betrayed them. Their suspicions had also been thoroughly aroused by the Greco-Italian pro- posal for the construction of a railway line through Southern Albania, made without consulting the Albanian government; this they took as showing that Italy considered Albania as already an Italian province. Impelled thus by the indigna- tion which the Tittoni-Venizelos accord had occasioned, the Albanians convoked a national assembly at Lushnja on January 28, 1920, which substituted for the government at Durazzo a new one pledged to oppose all foreign interference. A council of regency of limited executive powers was estab- lished, composed of four members representing the religious branches in the country, Roman Catholic, Greek Orthodox, and the two Moslem sects, Sunni and Bektashi. The seat of this new government was at Tirana, an inland city away from the Italian influence particularly felt along the coast.‘ Then followed months of quiet but systematic organiza- tion in preparation for their goal, to free their country entirely from the governmental presence of any and all foreigners. After Italy, Jugo-Slavia and Greece were to be expelled.*t By May this revolt had taken definite form, war- * Ibid., Memorandum of Wilson, Enclosure in No. 14, Davis to Earl Curzon, February 25, 1920. ” Chekrezi, Current History, XII, 083-84; Current History, XII, 600; Rush, Current History, XIX, 249; Bourcart, op. cit., 230-33. “Herron MSS, Italy and Albania, Document xlv, Herron to Count Sforza, June 21, 1920. In this letter Herron presents the substance of the National Albanian Committee’s point of view. “The Albanians have [ £23 ]SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS fare was actually engaged in near Valona, and by June events had come to such a pass through the defeat of the Italians that the Albanian question was of primary importance to Italy. One of the first acts, indeed, of the new Italian cabinet headed by Giolitti to which that of Nitti gave place in June, was an announcement that Italy would withdraw her troops from Albania. On June 24 the new premier declared in Parliament that the government was “not in favor of a protectorate in Albania, but wishes the independence of that country.” This statement he enlarged upon in his speech of June 27, stating that Italy could not abandon Valona until Albania was strong enough to insure that that port would not fall into the hands of some other power.*? This attitude was upheld by Italian opinion generally, but the press in- sisted upon the necessity of keeping Valona. The socialists, however, who had gained notable success at the polls in November 1919, openly objected to the Italian adventure in Albania, and embarrassed the government by their oppo- sition.*® Early in July the Italian government sent Baron Aliotti to negotiate with the Albanians. It was generally expected in Italy that he would be successful in his mission, as he had been the Italian Minister at Durazzo during the regime of Prince William of Wied; but he was unpopular with the come to feel that they are merely a subject of barter between the Great Powers .... they believe themselves able .... to achieve complete autonomy. [They] have no feeling against Italy, ....and they are ready .... indeed, to co-operate with Italy’s Adriatic policy. If Italy will now take the initiative in proclaiming Albanian inde- pendence, there will be no trouble or delay in coming to some satis- factory arrangement about the port of Valona.” “ Bulletin périodique de la presse italienne, July 8, 1920 (Corriere della Sera, June 29); Current History, XII, 784. Cf. the statement of the new Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs: “As for Italy’s Albanian policy, may I ask you to see the declarations the Italian Prime Minister very clearly gave the last days of June in Parliament. You'll find them quite satisfactory.” Herron MSS, Ifaly and Albania, Document xlix, Sforza to Herron, July 7, 1920. © Bulletin périodique de la presse italienne, June 20—21, 1920; August 20, 1920. [ 124 ]IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS Albanians on the grounds that he had conspired with Essad against Prince William, and that he was partly responsible for the Treaty of London of 1915.44 Accordingly, on July 14 he returned empty-handed, and was replaced by Count Manzoni,*® who succeeded in reaching an agreement signed August 2. The terms of this armistice, or treaty, have not been made public; in substance, however, it provided that Italy should abandon Valona, but retain the island of Sasseno, which she might fortify. Provision was also made for an exchange of prisoners and a general amnesty, and, above all, for the recognition and guaranty by Italy of the independence and territorial integrity of Albania.** The effect of this agreement was a substantial increase in the prestige of the provisional Albanian government of Tirana. In Italy, on the other hand, the press and public opinion were almost unanimous in deploring the loss of Valona; one comment may be quoted as indicative of Italian sentiment: It is very sad to witness this débacle after so much noble and generous Italian blood has been given and so many millions have been expended for a great work of civilisation and for the security of our frontiers.4?7 A great obstacle to an understanding between Italy and Albania had been the Tittoni-Venizelos agreement. With the consummation of an Italo-Albanian treaty, the cession of Southern Albania to Greece with Italy’s consent would evi- dently no longer be possible; and, in fact, apparently during the progress of the negotiations with Albania, Italy formally repudiated this agreement with Greece.48 “Herron MSS, Italy and Albania, Document lii, Adamidi to Herron, July 20, 1920. Cf. Current History, XII, 781. * Herron MSS, Italy and Albania, Document liv, Sforza to Orsini, Italian Minister in Berne, July 27, 1920. * Bulletin périodique de la presse italienne, August 13, 1920. “” Bulletin quotidien de la presse étrangére, August 6, 1920; vide also August 9, 1920. “The convention was denounced on July 22. Current History, XII, 1060; Bulletin quotidien de la presse étrangére, July 31, 1920. A Greek [ 125 ] ——! ' See Ree eee a ee nenaSOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS Meanwhile the question of Koritza was temporarily solved. The French troops sent in during the war had remained there at the request of the Albanians*® until May, 1920, when they finally withdrew and left the administration in the hands of an Albanian committee. Under the menace of Greek troops about to enter Koritza, the Moslem Albanians were reported as threatening to massacre the Christian inhabitants.°° To avoid such a contingency, Greece negotiated a convention with representatives of Albania, known as the accord of Kapishtica of May 15. By this agreement the Greeks were not to enter the town until the question should be decided, either by the Peace Conference or by a direct understanding between the Hellenic and Albanian governments. Provision was made for the protection, in the meantime, of the Greeks of the district, who should not be made to suffer for their opinions and whose churches and schools should function freely.” The autumn of 1920, then, found Albania with her fron- tier problem still unsettled. From the Albanian point of view she had gained, but her gains were of a negative kind. The Peace Conference, which had opened with bright hopes for a satisfactory settlement on lines of self-determination, had early been clouded over by the credit that was given to the view of the Albanian revolt against Italy was that the reports of war sent out to the world were merely a smoke screen; that Italy, having convinced the Peace Conference that the Albanians, incapable of self- government, needed a mandate, could not withdraw, but must convince the world that the Albanians were a united people with a highly-devel- oped sense of nationality, who would be able to defeat Greece if the latter Power attempted to enter Epirus; to attain this end, Italy sur- rendered to the Albanians. Letter from president of the Northern Epiro- tic Society of Janina, Christian Science Monitor, July 30, 1920. * Albania, Delegation Propaganda, Notes additionnelles, Turkhan to Clemenceau, April 17, 1919: “‘Our desire is that you maintain your troops at Koritza. .... Greek bands and troops propose to enter Al- bania as soon as the French troops retire, an eventuality which will be the signal for disorders.” “ Christian Science Monitor, July 6, 1920. * Text, Frangulis, op. cit., Annex No. 11, pp. 33-34. [ 126 ]IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS secret Treaty of London of 1915.52 The very fact that the terms of this pact did not in the end prevail—thus making a satisfactory solution still possible—was largely due to the efforts of President Wilson, and, as far as the Greco-Albanian question was concerned, to the point of view of the American representatives on the Commission on Greek Affairs. It is to be noted, however, that the Italians held out on this Commission for the frontier of 1913. The adequacy of this frontier, indeed, was the question actually dealt with by the Commission. Though considerable numbers of Albanians inhabited the areas west of Janina, discussion seems in fact not to have turned on Whether the Albanian frontier was to extend southwards but whether the Greek area was to extend northwards.53 Later, however, Italy, in order to gain her ends elsewhere, compromised on this question with Greece in the Tittoni- Venizelos agreement. When the Adriatic controversy was discussed again in December 1919, all parties were so anxious for a settlement that they decided to sacrifice the rights of the Albanians in so far as an Italian mandate would not grant them full independence. But when, in order to come to an agreement with Jugo-Slavia on other points, France, having special interests in Jugo-Slavia, and Great Britain, favoring Greece in a desire to compensate the Hellenic kingdom for an inde- cisive war with Turkey, agreed to the partitioning of Albania, only the strenuous protests of President Wilson saved Al- bania from suffering a repetition of the fate of Poland at the hands of the Allies. The settlement of the Italo-Jugo-Slav dispute by the Treaty of Rapallo had at least the advantage “ For the credit given the secret treaties, vide Wilson’s statement to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, August 19, 1919: “They (Great Britain and France] felt that they could not recede from them - . + » but when they involved general interests .. . . they were quite willing, and indeed, I think, desirous, that they should be reconsidered with the consent of the other parties. ... .” 66th Congress, 1st Session, Hearings on the Treaty of Peace with Germany, I, 518. ** Temperley, op. cit., IV, 342. gece eee [ 127 ] ee ee ne rte |SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS of not implicating Albania and thus postponing an adverse settlement. A new Albanian government actuated by a strong nationalist policy had been able to expel the Italians from its territory, at the same time forcing the abrogation of the agreement between Greece and Italy at the expense of Al- bania, and to come to a temporary understanding with Greece as regards Koritza, thus adding to its own prestige both at home and abroad.VII. THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, 1920-1923 Among those states which applied to the first Assembly of the League of Nations for admission was Albania. At that time, December 1920, her status was given a careful con- sideration—a consideration which did not fail to include the vital question of frontiers. The committee charged with the examination of appli- cations for new admissions discussed the question of Albania in its meeting of December 4, 1920. The report of the sub- committee on Albania’s application which was read by Lord Robert Cecil, called attention to the fact that the Albanian government then in power had not been recognized de jure or de facto by any of the Powers, and that the Albanian fron- tiers had not yet been determined by international treaties and agreements; though these frontiers existed de facto they “mnight be regarded as having been fixed, subject to modifi- cation by subsequent conventions.” In spite of these facts and in spite of the apparently rudimentary stage of the sovernmental machinery of the state, Lord Robert was in favor of the admission of Albania, emphasizing in support of this view the fact that Albania constituted a nation by virtue of the unanimous desire of its inhabitants. The committee, however, adopted the motion of M. Viviani in favor of postponing the admission of Albania until her inter- national status should be definitely fixed,? and so stated in its report to the Assembly dated December 6.2 This report, among other questions, considered whether the country possessed “settled frontiers.” It noted that Al- bania claimed the boundaries defined by the treaty of 1913, while it observed that in the south the Greeks were in occupation of part of the district of Koritza. . .. » but there again [it continued] it does not appear clearly that there is any claim of right on their part, though by an agree- * Procés-Verbaux of the Committees of the First Assembly of the League of Nations, No. 13, December 11, 1920, pp. 12-13. *Ibid., pp. 14-15. * League of Nations, The Records of the First Assembly, Plenary Meetings, 1920, p. 668. [ 129 } SytheSOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS ment made between the Greeks and Albanians on the spot, the ultimate ownership of the district is reserved for subsequent ne- gotiation. By the frontier provisions of the Treaty of Sevres, of August 10, 1920, the Southern frontier of Jugo-Slavia is described as a line to be subsequently determined, and it is noticeable that Albania is nowhere mentioned in the Treaty. It may, therefore, be considered that those Members of the League which were parties to the Treaty are precluded from regarding the frontiers of Albania as fixed. They may, however, consider that the frontiers as claimed by Albania may be regarded as the de facto frontiers, subject to alteration by subsequent diplomatic action.‘ The opinion of the committee, however, was not endorsed by Lord Robert Cecil; instead, that statesman upheld in a powerful appeal the view that favored the immediate admis- sion of Albania to the League. In the course of this speech he made the statement that The first recognition brings the state into the comity of nations and thereafter that state exists, unless it is extinguished by general consent or by conquest; the Governments may or may not be recognized from time to time, but the State remains.°® In his opinion Lord Robert Cecil was upheld by the Assembly, and by a unanimous vote on December 17, Albania was admitted to the League of Nations.® Thereafter her destiny largely rested in the hands of the League. Though the admission of Albania to the League made it clear that she was a fully self-governing state, and that she ‘League of Nations, The Records of the First Assembly, Plenary Meetings, 1920, p. 669. Vide on the subject of recognition of Albania, the declaration by the Italian representative: “At the present moment the Italian Government has not recognized the Albanian Government, either de jure or de facto. ....” (lbid., p. 670.) On the question of the stability of the Albanian government, the report of Committee No. 5 significantly declared: “On the whole we are of opinion that though the Government of Albania is not of the most elaborate description, yet there is a Government which has a certain degree of authority in all parts of Albania, and it undoubtedly repre- sents a very strong national sentiment which disregards all differences of religion. It seems also clear that the country is inhabited by a defi- nite Albanian race, speaking a common Albanian language.” (Jdem.) ° Ibid., p. 645. * Ibid., p. 651. [ 130 |IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS had given effective guaranties of her sincere intention to observe her international obligations, it should be noted that the country was still unrecognized by the Powers and that her boundaries were no more settled than at the time of the armistice.’ Of the unsettled frontier problems of Albania the dispute with Jugo-Slavia was becoming the more insistent. An appeal from her prime minister, Vrioni, presented to the Council of the League early in March of the following year, urged the evacuation of the considerable portion of Northern Albania then under Jugo-Slav military occupation. A renewed ap- peal, made by Midhat Frasheri, President of the Albanian Delegation, on April 29, 1921, after dilating upon the trouble with Jugo-Slavia, called attention to the difficulties with Greece. This latter state, it was asserted, continued “to occupy a district containing twenty Albanian villages east of Koritza, pending a decision of the Great Powers with regard to its evacuation.”® On June 15, finally, in an appeal by Vrioni avowedly based on Article 11 of the Covenant, the attention of the League was again urgently called to the existing situ- ation between Albania, and Greece and Jugo-Slavia.? The question of the Albanian frontiers, accordingly, was discussed “Woods, Contemporary Review, CXXI, 43. * League of Nations, Official Journal, July—August, 1921, 2nd Year, Nos. 5—6, p. 474. " Ibid., p. 477. Article 11 of the Covenant reads: “Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. In case any such emergency should arise, the Secretary-General shall, on the request of any Member of the League, forthwith summon a meeting of the Council. “It is also declared to be the friendly right of each Member of the League to bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstance whatever affecting international relations which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends.” (Handbook on the League of Nations, 1920-1923, in World Peace Foundation, League of Nations, Vol. V, No. 4 [March 1, 1923], p. 314.) [ 131 ] ‘ - P yo ees aa rea ee ees : Sebati nee eee S504 OTF eA ewe eae ees men ia eens einen ie oe he keteneSOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS by the Council of the League of Nations at its thirteenth session in June 1921. At the public session of June 25 the delegates of Albania, of Greece, and of Jugo-Slavia were given an opportunity to express their respective views around the Council table. Albania was represented by Bishop Fan S. Noli, who was the first to speak. His declaration in behalf of the Albanian government maintained as the basis of its appeal that the frontiers of Albania were those established at London and Florence in 1913, since the “treaties” then made had not been abrogated.?° As regards Southern Albania, the Albanian gov- ernment pointed out that it was then in possession of all the territory defined in 19138, “with the exception of an area encircling the district of Koritza, which was occupied by Greek troops after the withdrawal of the French troops in May, 1920.” The presence of foreign troops on Albanian soil both here in the South and especially on the Jugo-Slav fron- tier, paralyzed—so Bishop Noli stated—all the internal policy of the government.'! In conclusion he urged that, as soon as the Council should have pronounced its decision on the vital question of the evacuation of Albanian territory, the League should dispatch a commission to the spot, for the double purpose of seeing that the decision was carried out and of becoming acquainted with the present situation of the country; in this way Article 15 of the Covenant, providing for a thorough investigation at the request of one of the parties to a dispute between members, would be fulfilled.” The opposing Greek view was ably presented in a speech by the Hellenic delegate, M. Frangulis, in which he made a historical and legal survey of the question of Northern Epirus. In reviewing first the agreements of 1913 and 1914, M. Fran- sulis pointed out that, though by the Protocol of Florence of December 17, 1913, the frontiers of Albania, it 1s true, were traced, this had been done merely on a map, and their actual League of Nations, Minutes of the Thirteenth Session of the Coun- cil, June 17-28, 1921, p. 210. “4 Ibid., p. 211. 3 Ibid., p. 212. [ 132 |IN EUROPEAN INTERNA TION A LE As ALRS delimitation on the ground had never been completed.!? The Greek delegate maintained furthermore that the agreements of 1913 and 1914 were no longer effective for two reasons: first, because the Albanian neutrality then provided for was violated by the participation of Albania in the Great War, since, according to Essad Pasha, she was recognized by the Entente as an Ally; and, secondly, because the terms of the secret Treaty of London of 1915, in which the creation of a small autonomous neutral state of Albania was mentioned, demonstrated that from the point of view of the four Powers who had guaranteed the Albanian State in London in 1913, the de facto conditions which had arisen since that date had brought these arrangements to) ani ends = 4 . 14 In recounting the intricacies of the Albanian question as they had come up before the Peace Conference, M. Frangulis called attention to several facts on which the Greek claim chiefly rested. Among these was the agreement of Kapishtica of May 15, 1920, by which the two parties undertook to con- form to the decision of the Peace Conference with respect to the frontiers, thus recognizing the jurisdiction of the Con- ference.1> Another basic fact emphasized was the report of the Commission on Greek Affairs, in which the British and French delegates had favored the Greek claim. Of prime importance also for the Greek view were the Allied notes of December 9, 1919, by which “the frontier line between Albania and Greece was established,” and of January 14, 1926, by which the line proposed by the British and French delegates on the Commission on Greek Affairs was decided upon as the frontier.‘° This latter note had resulted from a previous meeting at which it was decided, according to M. Frangulis, that the line laid down in the Tittoni-Veniselos Agreement .. . should be the frontier between Albania and Greece. As mentioned ® Ibid., p. 213. © Ibid., p. 216. 4 Ibid., p. 215. © Ibid., p. 210.SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS in the Minutes of the Conference, the President declared that the question was considered as settled.’ When the Treaty of Sevres was about to be signed, August 1920, Venizelos with the “intervention” of the British dele- gation obtained from all the Allied Powers, including Italy, recognition of the binding nature of the Tittoni-Venizelos agreement.?® Finally, continued M. Frangulis, Albania’s admission to the League of Nations “in no way implied that all the fron- tiers .... were finally settled.” Lord Robert Cecil had ‘based his arguments on a de facto situation, which was later to be settled by the establishment of a de jure situation.’’® The Legal Section of the Secretariat, moreover, reported that the agreements of 1914 were no longer in force.”° "League of Nations, Minutes of the Thirteenth Session of the Council, June 17—28, 1921, p. 210. This mistake of assuming that the Correspond- ence on the Adriatic question of December 1919 and January 1920 was in the nature of binding decisions, is one that is frequently made by Greek and pro-Greek (or anti-Albanian) writers. Vide especially Baerlein, Un- der the Acroceraunian Mountains, pp. 55-58: “It will be asked why the Ambassadors’ Conference acted as it did in 1921. Perhaps the decision of 1920 was considered to have lapsed on account of the non-fulfillment of the clauses regarding Fiume. But how could the failure of the Fiume arrangement between Italy and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State affect the validity of the Supreme Council decisions as between Italy and another State?” The author of this book seems ignorant of the nature of this whole correspondence when he calls the tentative pro- > posals therein made, “decisions.” He seems quite unconvinced by the words addressed by the British Foreign Office in September 1921 to the Greek Legation in London, which he quotes: “They held that the decision of January 1920, ‘if decision it can be called, was only an agreement on the part of the other Powers to accept the Venizelos-Tittoni arrange- ment of July 1919. This agreement, however, was invalidated owing to the non-fulfillment of certain conditional clauses, and with it also lapsed the decision of the Supreme Council, which had been based upon its continued validity.’” Mr. Baerlein’s point of view as regards the so-called “decisions” of December 1919 and January 1920 ignores the fact shown here that in June 1921 we find the Greek delegate at the League actually demanding that the competence of the Supreme Council (or Conference of Ambassadors) in this case be recognized. “ [bid., pp. 216-17. Documentary evidence on this point is lacking. - AOLG Ds sak ” Ibid., p. 218. | 134 |IN EUROPEAN INTERNA TLONAL ABE AIRS The conclusion reached, therefore, by M. Frangulis as regards the entrance of Albania into the League was that the decisions of the Peace Conference with regard to the delimitation of Albanian frontiers were in no way preju- diced; her admission “did not imply a renunciation by the Supreme Council of its powers in favour of another juris- diction.” In view of these facts, then, the Greek delegate asked the Council “to state that it is not competent in the definite case submitted to it. By acting thus, the Council will only apply the established rule that the settlement of frontiers is within the competence of the Peace Conference only.’ A conflict of jurisdiction between the League and the Supreme Council would thus be avoided. The Greek delegate was followed by the representative of Jugo-Slavia, M. Jovanovitch. He concurred in the Opinion of M. Frangulis, declaring that “the Peace Conference, i.e., the Allied Supreme Council’ had the power to fix the frontiers of Albania.”?. This opinion did not imply, M. Jovanovitch was careful to add, an alteration of the decision of 1913: Jugo- Slavia only asked “that it should be applied by the compe- tent body.”?3 Attention was particularly called to the fact that the frontier of 1913 was not recognized by the Peace Conference as binding, as was shown not only by the cor- respondence regarding the Adriatic question but more es- pecially by Article 4 of the treaty concerning frontiers Signed at Sevres August 10, 1920; this article declares that the fron- tiers of Jugo-Slavia “with Italy and on the South [shall be] a line to be subsequently determined.’’24 The Jugo-Slay dele- gate reasoned correctly 1 Tbid., p. 219. “ Ibid., p. 222. ~ Ibid., p. 223. To substantiate the fact that Jugo-Slavia had con- sistently desired the Albania of 1913, the declaration to that effect made at the Peace Conference is quoted at length. Vide supra. ““Treaty between the British Empire and Principal Allied and Asso- ciated Powers and Poland, Rumania, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and the Czecho-Slovak State Relative to Certain Frontiers of Those States.” Sevres, August 10, 1920. Great Britain, Foreign Office, British and For- eign State Papers (1920), CXIII, 871. [ 135 ]eee Sen etn ad SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS that the expression “and on the South” affects Albania [as] 1s proved: a) By the fact that the frontier with Greece was laid down by the same article 2 fi.e., section 2 of article 4] and that Greece lies to the South; b) By the fact that on the map No. 3 attached to the said article as an integral part the frontier opposite Albania is de- scribed as an old frontier.*® The Albanian delegate was then given the opportunity further to express his views. In particular, he denied that the secret Treaty of London of 1915 had legal force; not only had it not been published officially [a very doubtful argu- ment] but it had been superseded by the Treaty of Rapallo and the Protocol of Tirana by which Italy renounced Valona and the right to a mandate.2° Therefore, he reasoned, the decision of 1913 remained effective. As to the question of jurisdiction of the Conference of Ambassadors, that body was concerned only with the relations between victors and van- quished; but Albania had remained neutral, Essad Pasha neither having been her real head nor having been recognized by the Great Powers as an Ally. In view of these facts Albania could not recognize the competence of the Conference of Ambassadors.*’? As her frontiers had been originally fixed by the “European Concert,” the question should be decided by its successor, the League of Nations, according to the view of Albania, not by the Conference of Ambassadors; moreover, this latter body “‘was guided by political motives of a transi- tory nature, while the constant aim of the League of Nations was the maintenance of peace and concord between its members.’’?® In reply to Bishop Fan S. Noh, the Greek delegate then reiterated his former statements, concluding with the request that the League “defer its decision.’’?® ~*~ League of Nations, Minutes of the Thirteenth Session of the Coun- cil, June 17-18, 1921, p. 222. Ibid., p. 44. “" Tbid., p. 45. “Idem. ” Idem. [ 136 ]IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS The Albanian delegate then observed that the reason the Convention of May 15, 1920, did not mention the League of Nations, was that Albania had not at that time become a member of that body.*° When all the delegates had been heard, Mr. Fisher, as rapporteur, concluded the discussion at the public session with the following statement: [He said] that there were three parties to this controversy, all Members of the League. The most recent Member was Albania, and in admitting Albania the Assembly had expressly realized that its frontiers had not been definitely fixed. It had been generally agreed that she had been admitted without prejudice to the fron- tier question. That question was at present being considered by the Council of Ambassadors, who proposed to pronounce upon it. He was not prepared to say that the Council of Ambassadors had exclusive competence in the matter, nor that the League would not, in cer- tain cases, be competent to reach a conclusion. He had no doubt. however, that the Council of Ambassadors was competent to fix the frontiers of Albania. Article 89 of the Treaty of St. Germain said: “Austria hereby recognizes and accepts the frontiers of Bul- garia, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Roumania, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and the Czecho-Slovakian State as those frontiers may be determined by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.” The frontiers of Greece and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, however, could not be determined without determining the frontiers of Albania. He did not, therefore, propose to contest the competence of the Conference of Ambassadors. Mr. Fisher was speaking very solemnly on behalf of the British Government, and felt sure that he was expressing the views of the Council when he earnestly adjured the three parties in the con- troversy to abstain from all acts of provocation and hostility until the question of the frontiers was finally settled. They should re- member these solemn obligations which they had undertaken before the eyes of the civilized world as Members of the League of Nations.?1 At a private session that same afternoon, the Council continued its consideration of the frontiers of Albania. Mr. ” Ibid., p. 46. “* Idem,SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS Fisher read the following resolution, which was adopted by the Council: The Council of the League of Nations is informed that the Con- ference of Ambassadors has taken up the Albanian question and that it is discussing it at the present moment. In these circum- stances the Council of the League of Nations considers it inad- visable to take up the question simultaneously. Pending the solution, which will be communicated to it, the Council recommends the three parties, in conformity with the Covenant, strictly to abstain from any act calculated to interfere with the procedure in course. The question will be most carefully watched by the Council of the League of Nations, which will give to the defense of the people and nation of Albania every possible attention. The Council recommends that, in the interests of the general pacification and normal development of Albania, the Conference of Ambassadors should take a decision with the least possible delay.®? To this resolution the representatives of Greece and Jugo- Slavia adhered, but the representative of Albania requested that the question of the competence of the Conference of Ambassadors or of the League of Nations be referred to a committee of jurists, and reiterated his demand that a Com- mission of Enquiry should be sent to Albania. The decision of the League of Nations, he said, would be more readily accepted by the Albanian people than that of the Conference of Ambassadors.*® Mr. Fisher, thereupon, drew the attention of the parties to Article 15 of the Covenant. According to its terms, if a report by the Council is unanimously agreed to by its mem- bers, the members of the League agree not to go to war with any party to the dispute which complies with such recom- mendations. These conditions had now been met; in conse- quence the members of the League were ipso facto debarred from going to war.* “ League of Nations, Minutes of the Thirteenth Session of the Council, June 17-18, 1921, p. 48. “ Idem. *Ibid., pp. 48—49. [ 138 ]IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS The Albanian representative replied that after three years of discussion of the question by the Conference of Ambassa- dors the Albanian people had lost patience. “The Albanian Government bowed before the decision of the Council, but it did not recognize the competence of the Conference of Ambassadors.” He concluded by stating that his government reserved the right to bring the matter before the Assembly of the League.*® Within a few days of the meeting—on June 29—a tele- gram from the Albanian Prime Minister contained a re- iteration of this view. Vrioni declared that Albania did not recognize the competence of the Conference of Ambassadors to reopen the question of the frontiers as settled in 1913, and drew the attention of the Council “to the fact that the Al- banian people will vigorously oppose any decision involving dismemberment” of the frontiers of 1913.°° On July 4 came the proposed appeal of Albania to the Assembly.*? Before this appeal was taken up by that body, however, the Albanian question was further considered by the Council of the League in its fourteenth session. At a private meeting held on September 2, 1921, a report by Mr. Balfour, repre- sentative of Great Britain, was adopted, dealing in general with the three separate phases of which, as he pointed out, the Albanian problem in its entirety consisted—of the status of Albania, her frontiers, and the protection of racial mi- norities. Early in August Albania had protested to the Coun- cil against the invasion of her territory by Jugo-Slav bands. The result of this protest and of the appeal to the Assembly, as Stated by Mr. Balfour, was that the Assembly has been requested by Albania to deal with the determination of the Albanian frontiers, and the Council has been > Ibid., p. 49. * League of Nations, Official Journal, July—August, 1921, 2nd Year, Nos. 5-6, p. 483. “League of Nations, Albania, A. 6, 1921, VII, Request by the AI- banian Government for the Inclusion on the Supplementary Agenda of the Assembly, of the Decision of the Council of June 25th on the AI- banian Question. [ 139 ] ° ee eee eee rs hk eee ed ee eeetree " ha aoheeeeeienetent maintain Totes SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS asked to prevent these frontiers being violated by the action of the Serbs. The two subjects are evidently intimately connected, and it seems absurd to send one of them to the Assembly and the other to the Council. [It was therefore suggested that the Assembly should be asked to deal with both these questions: the violation, as well as the determination of the frontiers.** The question of the status of Albania on which there had been a divided opinion, Mr. Balfour’s report continued, was finally settled by her admission to the League; but the ques- tion of frontiers still awaited solution. This last, which by the decision of June 25 was to be settled by the Conference of Ambassadors, had been since early in July the subject of discussion by a committee appointed by the Conference. The committee, though it was said to have reached complete agreement as to what the territorial frontiers of Albania Should be, had not yet reported the results of its labors to the Conference. As this latter body had adjourned until the end of September, further procedure as regards the frontiers was rendered temporarily impossible; but the announcement of the final views of the Conference might be expected as soon as that body should meet. On the subject of the pro- tection of racial minorities, a separate report would be made. This question, however, should not be embodied in a treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Albania, but would best take the form of a Declaration to be made by Albania to the League. The reason for this is that Albania is not one of the States brought into existence by the Treaties of Peace, and that its special obligations towards minorities arise out of a resolution of the Assembly of the League.*® After an exchange of views the Council approved the report of Mr. Balfour. Thereupon M. Jovanovitch asked for a decision on the question of sending a Commission of Enquiry * League of Nations, Minutes of the Fourteenth Session of the Coun- cil, Part I, August 30—September 3, 1921, Annex 239, p. 35. “ Ibid., pp. 35-36. [ 140 |IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS to Albania, and M. Hymans, the Belgian representative on the Council, expressed the opinion that this matter should be referred to the Assembly, which had just been entrusted with the duty of settling the Albanian question as a whole. In this view the Council concurred.*° On October 4 the Albanian question was considered by the Assembly. The resolutions on the subject adopted in Committee No. VI were then presented by Lord Robert Cecil: one of these recommended Albania to accept the forthcoming decision of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers as to her frontiers; the other proposed that the Council should despatch to Albania a Commission of Enquiry composed of three impartial persons, to report on the execution of the decisions of the Powers and on the disputes which had arisen on the frontiers of Albania. Lord Robert Cecil expressed the hope that the promised decision of the Powers would be taken soon, “as delay in this matter was criminal to the peace of the world.’’#! In the discussion that followed, Bishop Noli declared that Albania would accept the decision of the Conference of Am- bassadors, and would welcome the despatch of a Commission of Enguiry. The Italian and French delegates, while accept- ing the resolutions, doubted whether the Commission should be sent until the frontiers had been fixed by the Conference of Ambassadors. Of the Greek delegates, Frangulis thought that the Commission should be sent by the body which had the Albanian question under consideration, viz., the Conference of Ambassadors; while Casangis suggested that the Commis- sion should be accompanied by one representative each from the three interested parties, Greece, Jugo-Slavia, and Albania. In deference, however, to Lord Robert Cecil, who raised objections to such a procedure, Casangis withdrew his pro- posal. The resolutions were forthwith carried unanimously.*? Ibid., p. 9. “League of Nations, Journal of the Second Assembly, No. 26, Octo- ber 4, 1921, p. 292: “ Ibid., pp. 292-93. The second resolution as adopted runs (in part) as follows: “The Assembly .... requests the Council forthwith to [ 141 ]SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS Accordingly, at its following meeting on October 6, the Council took up the question of despatching a Commission to Albania. Mr. Balfour made a report which, after discussion, the Council adopted with certain modifications. These reso- lutions embodied the proposal of the Assembly for the ap- pointment of a Commission, with power “. ... to appoint impartial observers to enable it to discharge its func- tions.” It was further provided that “. . . . the Commission should arrive in Albania by November Ist, 1921, but that it Should take no action until the decision of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers is given.’’*® This latter stipu- lation was the result of objection on the part of the Marquis Imperiali to the original draft of Mr. Balfour’s resolution, which had read: “The Council is of opinion that the Commission should arrive in Albania between now and No- vember Ist, 1921”; but the Italian representative feared that if no decision should be taken by November 1, serious diffi- culties might arise were the Commission sent under such conditions. Mr. Balfour accordingly made the change in- corporated in the resolution as adopted, declaring that the mention of a definite and early date was essential.‘ Meanwhile the Council in its meeting of October 2 had given consideration to another phase of the Albanian ques- tion, that of the protection of minorities. The British repre- sentative, Mr. Fisher, made a report on this subject, which contained draft stipulations which might form the subject of a declaration to be signed by Albania. Before presenting this draft, Mr. Fisher’s report called attention to the fact that the first Assembly had adopted a recommendation requesting appoint a small Commission of three impartial persons, to proceed immediately to Albania and report fully on the execution of the decision of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers as soon as it is given and on any disturbances which may occur on or near the frontier of Albania. The Commission should have power to appoint observers or other officials being impartial persons to enable it to discharge its functions.’—Ibid., pp. 293-94. “ League of Nations, Minutes of the Fourteenth Session of the Coun- cil, Part II, September 12—October 12, 1921, pp. 122-23. “* Ibid., p. 122. [ 142 ]IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS that Albania, if admitted to the League, should enforce the principles of the minorities treaties, making the necessary arrangements with the Council.*® Albania had been informed of this recommendation at the time she was notified of her admission. The Albanian Prime Minister in reply expressed himself as ready to comply with any recommendation the Council might make, and gave full information on the situ- ation in Albania as regards minorities, at the same time requesting the friendly intervention of the League in favor of the Albanians included in Jugo-Slavia and Greece.** The Greek government, through the Director of the Secretariat of its delegation at Geneva, proposed that not merely members of the Council but also Greece, as the nation principally concerned, be given the right to inform the Council of any violation or danger of violation by Albania of the minorities treaty. This proposal was quite naturally resented by Albania as equivalent to intervention by Greece in her internal affairs, an intervention which, whether open or disguised, Albania could never tolerate. Such a right on the part of Greece the Albanian delegate declared would seriously threaten to com- promise friendly relations between these two neighboring states.*? The terms of the proposed declaration, which was stated to be the fundamental law of the land, and which was placed under the League of Nations, provided in various specified ways complete equality. Full protection was assured all in- habitants without any distinction, whether of “birth, nation- ality, language, race, or religion.” Free exercise of religion was provided. Albanian citizenship was extended to all those habitually resident in Albania before the war, provided they * At its session of December 15, 1920. Recommendation: “In the event of the Baltic and Caucasian States and Albania being admitted to the League, the Assembly requests that they should take the necessary measures to enforce the principles of the Minorities Treaties, and that they should arrange with the Council the details required to carry this object into effect.”—Ibid., p. 159. ** Idem. *T Idem.ee ee : saaehdiete etaieee harkens ott, SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS made application within two years.*® The use of any lan- suage was permitted; adequate facilities must be given those of non-Albanian speech, for the use of their language before the courts. Minorities were also to have an equal right to maintain charitable, religious, and educational institutions, in which they might freely use their own language and exer- cise their own religion. Provision was made for insuring that children of non-Albanian speech be granted facilities in the primary schools for instruction in their own tongue; though it was “understood that this provision does not prevent the teaching of the official language being made obligatory.’’*® This declaration for the protection of minorities was signed by the Albanian delegate, Bishop Noli, who stated that his government had always granted these rights to minori- ties. He again drew the attention of the Council to the question of the protection of Albanian minorities in Greece and Jugo-Slavia.°° The representative of Greece, M. Den- dramis, thereupon stated that the Greek government had signed a minorities treaty at Sévres which was to come into effect at the same time as the treaty regulating the status of Thrace, but that Greece was not responsible for the fact that this treaty was not yet ratified. The view of the Italian sovernment, as explained by the Secretary-General for the Marquis Imperiali, who was unable to be present, was that it would be advisable to invite Greece, since the latter Power was not at the moment bound by the minorities treaty which it had signed, to make a declaration of its readiness to apply to the present case the principle which the Albanian dele- gate had accepted. This suggestion was supported by Mr. Fisher, who proposed inquiring of the Greek government whether it was ready to put into effect immediately the minorities clauses of the Treaty of Sévres. M. Dendramis replied that his government entirely reserved its decision on this point.®! *’ League of Nations, Minutes of the Fourteenth Session of the Coun- cil, Part II, September 12—October 12, 1921, p. 160. ~ i bdia:, D. LOL. ** Tbid., p. 116. = PONss Ps WAGs [144 ]IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS In concluding its consideration of the minorities question, the Council adopted a resolution read by Mr. Fisher, placing the declarations under the guaranty of the League, “as from the date of their ratification by the Albanian Government,” and inviting the Albanian government to inform the Secre- tary-General, as soon as possible, of such ratification.®? The Declaration was ratified by Albania on February 17, 1922, and was registered with the Secretariat of the League on March 22; and on July 7, 1922, the Albanian Minister of Foreign Affairs forwarded to the Secretary-General a report giving detailed information on the situation of minorities; this report was communicated to the Council.®° Serious troubles with Jugo-Slav troops on the northern frontier of Albania, threatening an outbreak of war, caused the British cabinet to bring influence to bear upon the Con- ference of Ambassadors to end its prolonged discussion of Albanian frontiers. Early in November Great Britain took steps to recognize the government at Tirana as the de jure government of the whole of Albania.’ The Conference under the presidency of M. Cambon was able to come to an agree- ment on the question of the frontiers of Albania on Novem- ber 5, and at last, on November 9, 1921, the promised and long-awaited decision of the Conference of Ambassadors was given. This confirmed the frontiers of 1913 with the excep- tion of four very small alterations in the North, three to the advantage of Jugo-Slavia, and one in favor of Albania. It was expressly recognized that the southern frontiers of Albania had been delimited on the spot by the commission which drew up the Protocol of Florence. While no further delimi- tation was therefore needed in the South, provision was made for delimitation of the northern frontier, as the work of 1913 °? Idem. “ League of Nations, Official Journal, 3rd Year, No. 11, Part II (Min- utes of the Twentieth Session of the Council, August 31—October 4, 1922), pp. 1230-31. Vide also Official Journal, 3rd Year, No. 6, Part II, pp. 523-84. (Minutes of the Eighteenth Session of the Council, May 11- 17, 1922.) * Parliamentary Debates, Commons (1921), CXLVIII, 29; Le Temps, November 6, 9, 10, 1921; Woods, Contemporary Review, CXXI, 46. [ 145 | eee ee see nen aenannemmenellSOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS there had been interrupted by the outbreak of hostilities. Furthermore, the signatory governments—the British Em- pire, France, Italy, and Japan—recognized the government of Albania (that of Tirana) as constituting a sovereign and independent state. To this decision of the Powers Albania grudgingly as- sented. The President of the Albanian Delegation to the Conference of Ambassadors, Midhat Frasheri, in a letter dated November 16, 1921, declared that the Albanian Government, being of opinion that foreign invasion endangers the existence of the country, finds itself compelled to submit to the decision taken by the Conference of Ambassadors.*é In reality, however, Albania had obtained, with certain small exceptions in the north, all that she had legitimately claimed. On the same day that the above decision of the four Great Powers was taken—November 9, 1921—these same Powers reached another important decision with regard to Albania, which, however, was not made public until nearly a year later.°’ Recognizing that the question of Albanian frontiers as just established was one of international importance, the violation of which or of her independence would “constitute a danger for the strategic safety of Italy,’ the Powers agreed: first, that in case of difficulty in maintaining intact her terri- torial integrity, Albania should be “free to address a request to the Council of the League of Nations for foreign assist- ance’; secondly, that in the above-mentioned event, their representatives shall be instructed to recommend to the Council that “the restoration of the territorial frontiers of Albania should be entrusted to Italy”; thirdly, that in case of any threat to Albania’s integrity, territorial or economic, and in case Albania had not * League of Nations, Official Journal, December 1921, 2nd Year, No. 12, p. 1195. ” [bid., p. 1210. “ “Declaration by the Governments of the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, in regard to Albania.” Signed at Paris, November 9, 1921. Text in League of Nations, Treaty Series (1922), XII, 383. It was registered with the League October 2, 1922. { 146 ]IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS availed herself within a reasonable time of the right provided for in Article I [of the Covenant], the above-mentioned Government will bring the situation before the Council of the League of Nations; fourthly and finally, that if the Council of the League of Nations decides, by a majority, that intervention is not expedient, the above-mentioned Govern- ments shall reconsider the question in conformity with the prin- ciple enunciated in the preamble to this Declaration, namely, that any modification in the frontiers of Albania constitutes a danger for the strategic safety of Italy. The first and third of these stipulations only reaffirmed what was already provided for by the terms of the Covenant of the League. What was new and significant was the agree- ment of these four Great Powers—constituting one-half the membership of the Council—that they would recommend to the Council that Italy be given the right of intervention in case of a threatened loss of Albanian independence or terri- tory, thus recognizing that Italy’s interests on the eastern shore of the Adriatic were paramount now as they had been before 1914. In case, however, even with their large influence on the Council, these Powers should be unable to obtain a majority in favor of intervention, a loophole was left by the fourth provision stipulating for “reconsideration,” whatever that vague phrase might mean. But perhaps the mere publi- cation of this agreement was deemed sufficient to quiet any fears Italy may have—as she undoubtedly had—expressed; in this way the knowledge possessed by the Council that a permanent agreement existed on the subject of Albania might well be thought sufficient in itself to force intervention under the contingencies contemplated by the Declaration. The Commission of Enquiry—which it will be remem- bered the Council had decided, on October 2, 1921, to appoint —met at Geneva at the beginning of November, and pro- ceeded to Tirana; thence on December 28 it went to Southern Albania, where it visited Valona and Premedi and made a prolonged stay at Koritza. The Commission as originally constituted was composed of three members: Major Meinich [ 147 ]SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS (Norway), Colonel Schaeffer (Luxemburg), M. Thesleff (Fin- land), and was accompanied by a secretary. Later the mem- ber from Finland resigned and was replaced on December 1 by Professor Sederholm of the same country; the member from Luxemburg died during the month of January.®® The Commission as thus reconstituted, however, continued its work, the results of which were embodied in a series of reports, the first of these being presented to the Council on May 12, 1922. The Commission investigated on the spot the situation on the Greco-Albanian frontiers. It observed that there was some uncertainty in regard to the exact definition of the Ottoman kaza of Koritza, the frontiers of which, according to the de- cision of the Conference of Ambassadors, were to constitute the frontier between Greece and Albania. In view of this fact, the Commission proposed to establish on the Greco-Albanian frontier a neutral zone analogous to that already existing on the Jugo-Slav frontier. To this proposal the Conference of Ambassadors, at the request of the Council, dated January 12, 1922, agreed.*® In examining the situation of the Hellenophile minority in Koritza the Commission noted the complete absence of Greek nationals. However, a certain proportion of the popu- lation (less than one-third) was observed to be opposed, for various reasons, to the present regime. This element feared especially that the creation of an Albanian autocephalous Church might cause an open rupture with the Patriarchate of Constantinople. In this connection the inquiry discovered that the expulsion from Koritza of the Greek Metropolitan, Jakapos, who had “used his influence with the Hellenophile minority to start a regular campaign of political propaganda in favour of Greece,” had, in fact, been ordered by the Govern- * “General Report of the Commission of Enquiry, presented to the Council on May 12, 1922,” League of Nations, Official Journal, 3rd Year, No. 6, Part II (Minutes of the Eighteenth Session of the Council, May 11-17, 1922), pp. 572-73. A preliminary report was submitted January 18, 1922. (Ibid., 3rd Year, No. 3, pp. 261 ff.) ~ Ibid., 3rd Year, No. 6, Part II, p. 573. Also rbid., No.*5, Part II, pp. 429, 431. [ 148 }IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS ment of Tirana at the request of a majority of the population, and had been accompanied by no demonstrations. As for the relations of Albania with Greece, the report of the Commission considered that these would always be diffi- cult so long as Greece had not fully recognized the frontiers laid down by the Conference of Ambassadors and the rights of Albania over the region called Northern Epirus—a region which on account of its more advanced culture and its pros- perous economic situation would certainly be called upon to play an important part in the development of the country. In the opinion of the Commission, there can be no doubt that the sreat majority of the population is in favour of the present regime, and constitutes an important factor in the Albanian nationalist movement.®! In the opinion of the Commission, a serious menace to the independence of Albania was the argument that was still being advanced, in spite of her admission to the League, that the Albanians are not inherently a nation, that they will always be unable to exist as an independent, modern State and that sooner or later the country is certain to be divided up among its neighbors.® This pernicious but persistent view was controverted by the Commission, whose study of the problem led to the conclusion ‘not only that an Albanian nation exists, but that its existence is a necessity.” The report continued: That [the Albanians] are united by common customs, age-long traditions, and even language, the difference between the Gheg and the Tosk language being at bottom nothing more than a differ- ence of dialect. .... The sentiment of patriotism is stronger than religious divergences. Moreover, the sufferings endured in common during the Balkan wars and the world war, in all of which Albania was a theatre of operation, gave a new impulse to Albanian nationalism which has extended to all the classes of the populations .. . .83 Acting on the request of the Commission, noted above, the Conference of Ambassadors early in April established a Ibid., 3rd Year, No. 6, Part II, p. 573. @ Ibid., p. 574. ° Ibid., p. 578. ® Ibid., p. 575. [ 149 |SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS neutral zone in the neighborhood of the future Greco-Albanian frontier.®* It also instructed the Delimitation Commission to include in its work (on the northern and eastern frontiers) the determination of the exact boundaries of the former kaza of Koritza. This frontier was not recognized by the Albanian government as that of the former kaza of Koritza; on the strength of documents from Turkish archives, it claimed that the correct frontier lay farther to the east. A considerable number of villages claimed by the Albanians, but not included in the neutral zone, were reported as still in the hands of the Greeks.®° Complaints by the Albanian government that armed irregular bands in the frontier districts aimed to influence and intimidate the Albanian population, the Commission met with the reply that it was not competent, since full responsi- bility for the neutral zone rested with the Delimitation Com- mission sent out by the Conference of Ambassadors. The Commission of Enquiry called the attention of the Council to the situation, declaring that an early delimitation would tend to eliminate danger.*® This report of the Commission of Enquiry was presented to the Council in a public meeting of May 12, 1922, in the presence of representatives of Albania and the members of the Commission. Lord Balfour, as rapporteur, brought the report to the notice of the Council, calling especial attention to the fact that the Commission had decided that Koritza, where there was undoubtedly a Hellenophile minority, was substantially an Albanian town. This was to be regarded as an established fact in future. He dwelt upon the success of “For boundaries and establishment of this neutral zone, vide letter from the President of the Conference of Ambassadors (Poincaré), April 5, 1922. (League of Nations, Official Journal, 3rd Year, No. 6, Part I, pp. 486-87.) © For map showing different boundaries claimed in the Koritza region and the villages occupied by the Greeks, vide League of Nations, Official Journal, 3rd Year, No. 3, p. 265. * Supplementary Report of the Commission of Enquiry in Albania, submitted to the Council on May 12, 1922. (Jbid., 3rd Year, No. 6, Part Il, pp. 580-82.) [ 150 |IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS the League of Nations in the matter of Albania. That body, he said, had done what “no statesman, nation, nor organiza- tion in the world” could have done; the reason he alleged for its success was that all the states concerned were convinced that the various organs of the League were working for wholly unselfish ends.*®? At this meeting the Albanian representative, Frasheri, while pointing out that the Commission had done Albania the greatest service in making the true facts known, em- phasized the fact that there were still difficulties in Southern Albania. The Albanian government, he asserted, was desirous that the Council should send a commissioner to that district to keep in touch with the Delimitation Commission and to settle difficulties that might prove dangerous.®§ This pro- posal was adopted the following day by the Council, which decided to retain for the time being one member of the Com- mission (Professor Sederholm) and a secretary.* Professor Sederholm presented to the Council of the League a further report of the Commission of Enquiry, cov- ering the period from June to December, 1922, and providing further information as to conditions in Southern Albania and relations with Greece. In July, the report stated, Greece rec- ognized the independence of Albania, although “with a reservation concerning the delimitation of boundaries’’; dip- lomatic representatives, however, were not exchanged, appar- ently for reasons of economy. The Greek government co- operated but feebly, and then only under protest, with the Boundary Commission, thus hindering the Commission in its work and making delimitation before the setting in of winter impossible.*° Moreover, as the proposed neutral zone had not yet been evacuated by Greek and Albanian troops, it seemed better, in view of the conditions existing in the Balkans, to leave it as it was rather than run the risk of creating a dis- trict under no sovereignty. The Greek government, further- League of Nations, Official Journal, 3rd Year, No. 6, Part II, p. 522. ~ Lbid;; ps O23: © Ibid., p. 535. Ibid., 4th Year, No. 1, Part II, p. 113. ene ee Pe eel . a aSOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS more, had tried, through the representatives on the Boundary Commission, to bring the Corfu agreement of May 1914 into operation again; such an event would be an encroachment on the sovereignty of the Albanian government. These disputes, and the contention that the Greek Orthodox population in Southern Albania had been persecuted by the authorities there, as long as they remained unsettled, the report con- tinued, disturbed the good neighborly relations between the two countries; since, on the other hand, there appeared to be no conflict of vital interests between them, it seemed pos- sible to lay a firm foundation for a lasting future friendship, by removing all minor causes of disagreement." For this purpose—to try to eliminate all causes of discord between Greece and Albania which might still exist—the Commission wished to start an inquiry into conditions in Southern Albania. Upon the visit of the Secretary of the Commission, Count Moltke, to Athens in August, the Greek government declared itself entirely in favor of the proposed inquiry and expressed its readiness to send a Greek delegate as an observer and as an advocate of the Greek point of view; and, accordingly, in September, M. Casanges came to Tirana for that purpose. But a change in the political situation in Greece, with the result that M. Casanges lost his support at home, and in Albania, where the government objected to allowing the presence of a Greek observer within its territory, caused the inquiry to be postponed. The Commission further noted that the danger of a schism between the Patriarchate and the autocephalous Albanian Church had been averted by sending an exarch from Constan- tinople to arrange for the separation of the new Church.”? This report was supplemented by a telegram from the Commission to the Secretary-General of the League, under date of December 30. The population of the kaza of Koritza, ™“ League of Nations, Official Journal, 4th Year, No. 1, Part II, p. 114. “TIbid., p. 115. For an account of the development of the movement for the formation of an Independent Orthodox Albanian Church, vide the later report of the Commission of Enquiry, Official Journal, 4th Year, No. 5, pp. 492-93. [152]IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS it asserted, still occupied by Greek troops, suffered very much from the unsettled conditions, chiefly due to the difficulty experienced in communicating with their normal commercial centers, the towns of Koritza and Monastir. Either a neutral zone should be formed, or delimitation hastened. The Com- mission endorsed the demand of the population for the in- tervention by the League in the approaching Conference of Ambassadors.” The Council of the League, accordingly, in its meeting of February 3, 1923, decided to forward to the Conference of Ambassadors the recommendation of its Commission of En- quiry, requesting that a decision be taken as soon as possible on the question of the frontiers.” A slightly later report (dated February 1, 1923) from the Commission of Enquiry in Albania embodied the results of further investigations by Professor Sederholm, which con- sisted chiefly of informal conversations with people belonging to many different parties. The relations between Albania and Greece at that time were disturbed by the persistence of the Greek government in not regarding Koritza and Argyrocastro as Albanian, and as a result calling to the colors young men from Southern Albania resident in Greece; only such recruits, however, it was learned, were retained in service as could not establish their Albanian nationality. Much uneasiness in their relations was also of course due to the long delay in the final decision of the delimitation of the boundaries between Koritza and Greek Macedonia; portions of this territory were still occupied by Greek troops, and permission even to enter it was refused the Commission. By February, however, the exchange of diplomatic representatives opened a new era in the relations between Greece and Albania, enthusiastically declared the Commission.*5 * Ibid., 4th Year, No. 1, Part II, pp. 117-18. “Tbid., 4th Year, No. 3 (Minutes of the Twenty-third Session of the Council, January 29-February 3, 1923), pp. 241-42. “ Ibid., 4th Year, No. 5, “Report of the Commission of Enquiry in Albania on Its Activities from December 19, 1922, to February 1, 1923,” pp. 491-92. [153 ]SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS On the question of the general political problem of Southern Albania the Commission noted that while many of the differences of opinion among observers were due to bias, these discrepancies were in the main to be accounted for by the very complicated conditions which prevailed. The whole situation was obscured by the fact that many persons still failed to realize that the status of Southern Albania had been definitely and irrevocably determined by decisions of the Conference of Ambassadors, and that neither the League nor its Commission could take into consideration any memorials which aimed at a change of that status. The Commission, however, was unable to deny that there existed a strong and growling discontent among the Christian population in Southern Albania. One of the manifold causes of this dis- content was found in the prevalent economic depression from which Albania suffered, a depression marked by the decrease of income from emigrants in America, by high prices of necessities, by high taxes and customs on flour, salt, and Sugar, by the moratorium, which worked a serious drawback to the Christian merchants who were the creditors, and by the fact that while the southern provinces paid the greatest part of the Albanian state budget only a small proportion of the total was expended directly for their needs.*® Political disillusionment was also observed. The Helleno- philes, hoping for future change in the political status of the provinces, withdrew from all participation in Albanian poli- tics, while the Albanian nationalists of Orthodox faith also remained more aloof from public life than was desirable; the most active part then was that taken by “re-immigrants” from America. In the town of Koritza, for instance, out of seven or eight thousand Christian voters, only two hundred and twenty took part in the elections, anticipating interfer- ence by the government; since assurances in this regard had been given, it appeared certain that this condition of affairs would be improved in the next election. An important cause for the disillusionment of the Christian population lay in the fact that the existing subdivision of electoral districts placed ** League of Nations, Official Journal, 4th Year, No. 5, p. 497. | 154 ]IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS the Christian minorities at the mercy of the Mohammedan majorities; some system of proportional representation by which they could elect their own representatives was needed to provide a remedy for this situation.’ Many of the points which had hitherto formed the subject of controversy were investigated by the Commission, whose conclusions may reasonably be accepted as the most impartial obtainable. On the question of language Professor Sederholm showed that the statistics of Zographos were too high, since only about one-sixth (35,000—40,000) of the whole population of Southern Albania were found to speak Greek in their homes.’? But the language conditions there were very differ- ent from those in most countries, the Christian population of this region having used Albanian mainly as the language of common intercourse, while Greek has long continued to be the language of religion, of literature, and of commerce, and might thus be regarded as a kind of second mother-tongue for the Christian Tosks of the South.7? As regards the proportion of Mohammedans and Christians, there seems no doubt that they are almost equal in numbers in the region in question.®® Attention was called to the fact, however, that “‘the Hellenophile sentiments of the majority of the Orthodox population of Southern Albania are not to be described as Greek nationalism.’’®! Special attention was devoted to the education question in Southern Albania in its relations to the rights of religious and linguistic minorities. A larger proportion of the children were in the schools than ever before, but the work done was inferior, for the schools were overcrowded. Contrary to the minorities declaration, the Greek offer to pay for more teachers was refused. When the report was made, the teach- “ Tbid., p. 498. * Ibid., p. 494. ® Ibid., p. 496. “ Ibid., p. 500. Vide the discussion of the discrepancies in the number of Christians and Mussulmans in the propaganda pamphlets of different sides. (Ibid., pp. 499-500.) = Idem. [ 155 ] . re PL ee Ce en i cet ene ee Ee é eee esSOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS ing in all the primary schools was being conducted in Al- banian.*? The Commission reached the conclusion that the educational needs of Albania could be adequately met by the aid of a foreign educational expert and by the elimination of politics.*®® The report of the Committee dealt also with the general situation in Southern Albania. It pointed out the lack both of religious fanaticism and of racial feeling in the country.** Moreover, the Commission was certain that no revolutionary movement was then being prepared within Southern Albania. The feelings of the Christian population toward Greece were described as being “not those of an irredenta, but only those for a country which has been the source of their culture and the enemy of the hated Turkish régime.” Insurrectionary movements, then, would only be those that might be started by Pan-Epirotes in Greece; it must be assumed that Greece would prevent such attempts.®®> On the whole, then, the de- cision of the Powers as to the southern frontier was declared to be a just and wise one. It reinforces [the report said] the conviction that the existence of an independent Albania is a necessity to the peace of that part of Europe, and that an independent Albania is only possible if the southern provinces are included.’ The final report stated that there were then “few outstanding questions at issue between Albania and her neighbours which could give rise to anxiety as to the continuation of her good relations with them.’’’’ The outstanding facts, then, as regards the question of Southern Albania before the League of Nations, are of great importance both in the history of this particular issue and in the actual work that the League has accomplished. After the admission of Albania to the League, her frontier problems “ League of Nations, Official Journal, 4th Year, No. 5, pp. 493—95. “ Ibid., p. 496. “ Ibid., p. 500. * Tbid., p. 501. * Ibid., p. 502. * “Final Report of the Commission of Enquiry,” ibid., p. 505. [ 156 jIN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS were brought before both the Council and the Assembly, but the final decision as to the frontiers was left to the Conference of Ambassadors as the successor of the Peace Conference, which had not reached a solution in this case. The decision of the Conference of Ambassadors in favor of the boundaries of 1913 was accompanied by an Allied declaration of the same date which aimed to protect the special strategic inter- ests of Italy in Albania. When the frontier problem had been settled, the Council of the League despatched a Commission of Enquiry, which made an impartial investigation of condi- tions in the country in an apparently successful effort to eliminate any remaining causes of discord between Albania and Greece.VIII. CONCLUSION The survey of the history of Southern Albania prior to 1912 showed the outstanding facts to be the growth of an Albanian national feeling and the development of the in- terests of European Powers there. Conspicuous among the latter was the rivalry of Austria-Hungary and Italy for in- fluence over the strategic territory controlling the mouth of the Adriatic; an agreement of the Triple Alliance, however, provided for the maintenance of the status quo in the Adriatic, and, if this were impossible, for the co-operation of the two Allies in working for an independent Albania. The same pe- riod witnessed frequent attempts on the part of Greece to extend her boundary northward to include territory the ma- jority of whose inhabitants were Albanians. | The Balkan Wars, waged largely over the question of Albania, provided the opportunity which the Albanians and Austria-Hungary and Italy were not slow to seize upon. At the Conference of Ambassadors meeting in London to bring about peace, the rivalries of the European Powers resulted in the establishment of an autonomous Albania, under Euro- pean control, although Greece, of course, opposed such a measure. France did everything in her power, short of break- ing off the negotiations, to keep Koritza for Greece, but the Triple Alliance insisted upon including it in the new state. Though born thus out of the turmoil of international rivalries, the new Albanian state fulfilled the real needs of an ever-growing Albanian nationalism; but the frontiers of the new state seemed to defy agreement. Austria-Hungary and Italy successfully claimed for Albania the coast as far as Cape Stilos, with the aim of neutralizing the coast opposite Corfu in their own interest, but the exact determination of the southern boundary inland from the seaboard was left to a commission on which each of the Great Powers was repre- sented and which was instructed to delimit the frontier on the basis of the language spoken by the population. After very little investigation and much fundamental disagreement among its members, the commission adopted a compromise [ 158 |IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS proposed by the British delegate, by which the two provinces, Koritza and Argyrocastro, were both assigned to Albania, although the southwestern, or Argyrocastro district was in- habited by a Greek majority. Of this decision taken at Florence, the Powers were slow to inform Greece. The delay, due to their inability to act in concert, was culpable, as it was a large factor in causing the unfortunate revolution of the spring of 1914, when the pro-Greek minority of the popula- tion of the disputed provinces, hoping for a revision in their favor, finally openly resisted inclusion in Albania. Though the Greek government remained technically neutral during the uprising, the Albanians correctly maintained that that movement, since it was staged largely under (unofficial) Greek direction, did not conclusively show the will of the people. The revolution was pregnant with evil results, owing to the amount of destruction of property it entailed and the bitter feeling that followed in its wake. The Epirotes forced the Commission of Control acting for Albania to grant the practical autonomy for which they had struggled. If the agreement of Corfu of May 1914, which the Albanians se- cured, had been put into effect, it would have insured for the Greek minority such guaranties as the Great War was to show were essential in districts where a population is mixed in character. But unfortunately the outbreak of the Great War prevented its application. (With the resultant confusion the experiment of an independent Albanian state was post- poned until the advent of peace. The two Mediterranean Powers most vitally concerned in the fate of Southern Albania were less handicapped than the belligerents in that their neutrality during the early period of the Great War gave them an opportunity to secure a coveted foothold there: Italy occupied temporarily Sasseno and, later, Valona, and Greece, Santi Quaranta and Argyrocastro. In the negotiations of both groups of belligerents with Italy over her entrance into the war, Albania played a conspicuous réle. Italy demanded of the Dual Monarchy recognition of her complete sovereignty over Valona and Sasseno and a declara- tion of the complete disinterestedness of Austria-Hungary [159 ]eee a eienbatieenens eaten et eee SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS in Albania. These demands the Ballplatz, short of extreme necessity, was unwilling to grant. Meanwhile the Entente Powers won Italy to their side by a bribe of territory in the Adriatic. The terms of the secret Treaty of London of 1919 by which Italian support was gained, provided for the parti- tioning of Albania among Serbia, Greece, and Italy, and the neutralization of the southern coast. Meanwhile, Greece failed in an attempt to incorporate Northern Epirus in the Hellenic kingdom, owing to the Allies’ distrust of her because of the aid she had given the Triple Alliance by surrendering Fort Roupel. Later, on the return of Venizelos to the head of Greek affairs, most of Northern Epirus was again occupied by Greek troops, the Italians who had advanced being forced to withdraw. A significant development during the Great War was the practice in self-government which Albanians secured under French guidance at Koritza, and, to a less extent, under the Italians in Argyrocastro. In the latter region, too, in 1917, an Italian general had proclaimed an Italian protectorate over an independent Albania, although this movement was not approved by the Italian ministry as a whole or by the European Powers. The Italians, through their unfortunate dealings with the natives, embittered the Albanians against them, in spite of much constructive work. This strong anti- Italian sentiment had important consequences after the war, when the Albanians were able.to combine to drive out their common enemy, the Italians. ‘On the whole, then, the period of the Great War witnessed the growth of an Albanian na- tional spirit. The question of Albania before the Peace Conference was very much complicated by being bound up with the Adriatic question and the whole problem of secret treaties.) At the Conference of Paris the stress upon the principle of self- determination, following the definite pronouncements of Balfour and others during the war in favor of Albania, led the Albanians to be overconfident that their state would be re-established. The Commission on Greek Affairs heard the representatives of the delegations concerned and received [ 160 ]IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS memoranda, but was unable to come to a decision. The Italian representative on this Commission, frankly concerned not with the welfare of the population but with the strategic problem of his country’s national security, favored the fron- tier of 1913. The French and British, in accordance with the secret Treaty of London and in a desire to reward Venizelos for his allegiance to their cause during the war, would have given more territory to Greece; while the Americans would have assigned the coast to the Greeks, but Koritza to the Al- banians. Partly because of this division of opinion, no action was taken by the Peace Conference. In the face of this situa- tion at Paris the helplessness of the Albanians increased as a settlement of their problem was postponed; in reality, how- ever, this very postponement provided the opportunity for a united Albanian movement to gather momentum. After the end of the Conference, in the summer of 1919, Italy and Greece reached an agreement, the Tittoni-Venizelos accord, by which Greece was to get Northern Epirus, and in return Italy was to have a mandate over Albania. These terms were adopted by the Allies in the memorandum of December 9, 1919, in the course of their correspondence over a settlement of the Adriatic question. Indeed, Albania would undoubtedly have been partitioned—though under the man- datory system, it is true—had not President Wilson exerted all his power in her behalf, forcing Italy and Jugo-Slavia to leave Albania out of the settlement of their differences. But before this temporary settlement was reached at Rapallo, the Albanians, forming an anti-foreign nationalist government, forcibly expelled the Italians from their shores and secured Italian recognition of Albanian independence, thus tremen- dously increasing their prestige and vindicating their own right to existence. The Albanians in 1920 also reached a tem- porary understanding with Greece in the Koritza region. When to Italian recognition was added the admission of Albania to the League of Nations, the success of her struggle for independence was assuredy But her boundaries were still undetermined. Serious disturbances on both the northern and southern frontiers led to an appeal to the Council of the { 161 ]SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS League. The fact that the question was carried to the Assem- bly before the Council took action is evidence of the strength of the small nations in the Assembly as against that of the Great Powers on the Council, though the fact is not to be over- looked that Great Britain was a powerful force in securing fair treatment for Albania in the League. ‘Greece and Jugo- Slavia were so far successful in advocating their views that the question of frontiers was declared by the Council not to lie within its province, but to pertain rather to the Conference of Ambassadors, as the successor of the Peace Conference, as well as of the London Conference of Ambassadors, the body which had originally set up Albania as a state. The decision of the Conference of Ambassadors, however, was 1n favor of the Albanian claims, but was obtained only at the cost of an allied declaration, simultaneously signed, safe- guarding Italian interests. While the paramount question of frontiers was left to the Conference, many lesser problems were dealt with by the League. Among these was a minority declaration designed to insure fair treatment of the Greeks included in Albania. The League also did an excellent piece of work in sending a Commission of Enquiry to Albania, which studied the various problems on the spot, and which was successful in smoothing out many of the minor difficul- ties, which, if allowed to fester, might well have proved dangerous to peace. Though beset by difficulties, the question of Southern Albania is by no means insoluble. The population is really very much mixed in character, racially, linguistically, and religiously; but these differences need not obscure the fact that the majority of the inhabitants, since the war at any rate, is strongly Albanian in national feeling. The adoption of the southern frontier of 1913, then, should prove an ade- quate solution, although a rectification in favor of Greece might well have been made along the southwestern coastal region where the Albanians are in a minority. The Greek minority which was inevitably included in the Albanian state seems to be sufficiently protected by guaranties under the [ 162 |[IN EV ROPEAN INTERNA LIONAT. AE RACERS League of Nations. In spite of some further complaints, the Corfu crisis of 1923, and the events of 1924, we may venture to hope that the problem is in a fair way to be solved by the passage of time and that it will soon cease to trouble the peace of the Balkans and of Europe.APPENDIX [The parts of the Report of the Committee on Greek Territorial Claims dealing with Northern Epirus are reproduced herewith from the copy so generously lent by the Yale University Library through the courtesy of Dr. Seymour. It has been hitherto unused by students of the question. Owing to its importance and general inaccessibility it has seemed useful to reproduce it.] REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON GREEK TERRITORIAL CLAIMS 1. NORTHERN Epirus. (SEE Map IL.) Proposal. The British and French Delegations agree on the line shown in green on the map. The United States Delegation are prepared only to accept the modified line as indicated. The Italian Delegation desire to maintain the existing frontier. Argument. The British and French Delegations base their decision on the following reasons :— I. In respect of Southern Albania the statistics available offer little practical criterion of the wishes of the peoples concerned. Such statistics can only be based on the test of religion or on that of language: the former test is unfavorable to the Albanians, the latter is unfair to the Greeks. The British and French Dele- gations therefore feel obliged to take into prior consideration the actual reasons for which the frontier of 1913 has not met with the approbation of the peoples concerned. The course of events in Southern Albania since the delimitation of the above frontier (see historic Summary given in Annex 1) tend to show that this delimitation is inacceptable to very important elements in the regions concerned. Il. At the same time the British and French Delegations are impressed by the evidence given by MM. Venizelos and Carapanos in regard to the Hellenophile sentiments of the greater part of the population, and the economic dependence of the Koritza region on the main road leading to Santi Quaranta. Ill. The British Delegation are also influenced by the con- sideration that the problem is in effect whether this district shall be given to Greece or to Albania or placed under the protection of some European Power; they are of opinion that for political [ 164 |IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS and strategic reasons it would be unfair to Greece and Serbia to place so vital a point as Koritza under the tutelage and control of another European Power. The Delegation of the United States is unable to accept as satisfying evidence the history of the troubled years 1913-14, in which foreign intrigue was active, or the testimony of parties to the contest on either side. They base their conclusions on reports of observers, corroborated by such statistical evidence as 1S available, and state them as follows: 1. The construction of the road through Premedi to Valona enables the districts of Koritza and of Argyrocastro to be separated without economic injury. . In the district southwest of the Voiussa River the majority of the population appears to be Greek in sentiment and political inclination; and is naturally connected with Greece by relations of transportation and trade. 3. In the district northeast of the Voiussa River the great majority of the population is Albanian not only by speech but also by national consciousness. No sufficient grounds have been adduced for severing from Albania this district, in which the consciousness of Albanian unity and the devo- tion to the Albanian cause are particularly strong. The Italian Delegation are anxious that the existing frontier should be maintained for the detailed reasons given in Annex 2. [One appendix; Annexes are part of the Report.] bo ANNEX 1 SUMMARY OF RECENT EVENTS IN NorRTHERN EPIRUS Delimitation of Graeco-Albanian Frontier in 1913.—Having created Albania an independent, autonomous, and hereditary Prin- cipality, the Conference of London entrusted the work of fixing the Graeco-Albanian frontiers to an International Commission, composed of Delegates representing the six Great Powers signa- tories of the London Agreement. The enquiries of this Commis- sion only extended to the language spoken in the home; they excluded all considerations of national consciousness and of the expressed wishes of the inhabitants. Although directly interested, the Hellenic Government was not accorded representation on this Commission. A protest was made on the 13th October, 1913, against this procedure, which took no account of the desiderata which had been formulated in a memo- { 165 ] eee _SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS randum submitted to the Conference of Ambassadors in London. The Greek Government maintained that the drawing of this fron- tier ought to comply with the following conditions: 1. It should provide sufficient guarantees for defence and pos- session, from a strategic point of view. 29. It should allow of the constitution of territorial units, the development and economic progress of which would be a practical possibility. 3. It should unite the zones occupied by Greek populations or under Greek civilisation in such a way as to avoid as far as possible, and with equal care, the union of foreign ele- ments as well as the loss of national entities. The objection may perhaps be raised that Albania also was excluded from this Commission; but, although theoretically in existence, she has not yet materialized. After an enquiry which was very difficult and often hindered by the ill-will of the population, after discussions which were often lengthy, and marked divergences of opinion, the Commis- sion, recognizing incidentally that the test of language was in- applicable, was nevertheless able to finish its work. It was at Florence that it definitely fixed its line (December, 1913)—hence the name of “Florence frontier” by which it is known. The Great Powers communicated the decisions of the Com- mission to the Greek Government, and demanded within a fixed period the withdrawal of the troops which had been there since the Balkan Wars. The territory of Epirus was therefore evacuated. Immediately after the departure of the Greek troops, however, the Albanian Orthodox population of the regions re-united with Al- bania rose and proclaimed themselves an autonomous State, with a provisional Government at Argyrocastro. M. Christaki-Zogra- phos undertook the leadership of this provisional Government with the concurrence of M. Carapanos. Events of 1914.—At this time some very regrettable incidents oc- curred: bands of men who called themselves “Sacred Battalions” ravaged the territories inhabited by the Albanian Moslems and massacred the population. Many villages were completely or par- tially destroyed. As a result more than 20,000 persons left the district to find a refuge from persecution in the neighbourhood of Valona; of these a large proportion were decimated by famine and sickness. The Government at Athens was accused of having favoured this extermination by allowing regular soldiers, some of whom were Cretans, to disguise themselves and enlist in these | 166 |IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS bands. The Commission records this accusation without pro- nouncing an opinion upon its justice. The Agreement of Corfu.—This situation could not continue. The International Control Commission, composed of Delegates of the six Great Powers, which from the first had attempted with the ineffective means at their disposal to re-establish order, finally created an armistice from the provisional Government of Northern Epirus. To avoid a resumption of hostilities, they considered themselves bound to meet as far as possible the views of the Epirote populations in regard to the particular settlements which they demanded, and also those of the Albanian Government. Having previously obtained authorisation from the Governments which they represented, they invited MM. Christaki-Zographos and Carapanos to a Conference at Corfu with this end in view, where certain particular settlements in regard to the territories of the Provinces of Koritza and Argyrocastro were concluded. While reserving the right of the Albanian Government to nominate and recall the governors and high officials of these provinces, in agree- ment with the International Control Commission, this settlement accorded to Northern Epirus a special statute which almost amounted to local autonomy. The execution and the enforcement of these provisions were placed under the guarantee of the Great Powers. The world war prevented the Great Powers from giving their formal assent to these provisions, which were drawn up on the 17th May, 1914. It is well to point out that the Corfu Conference had only reached its decisions with the entire approval of the Prince of Wied, based upon a decision of the Council of Ministers, and that Albania was represented by a delegate who, by his signa- ture, approved the decisions in question. It therefore follows that the Albanian Government as well as the Great Powers, admitted that Northern Epirus was entitled to a separate government which would place her in a privileged position in regard to the rest of the country. Finally, it may be added, to allow the Moslems who emigrated after the persecutions of 1914 to return to their homes and to safeguard them from all further aggression, the Entente Powers asked Greece to reoccupy the regions which she had been com- pelled to evacuate after the fixing of the Graeco-Albanian frontier in 1913.SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS ANNEX 2 ITALIAN RESERVATIONS IN REGARD TO NORTHERN EPIRUS The view of the Italian Delegation on the subject of Greek claims in Albania, as constituted in 1913, is that the frontiers established by the Protocol of Florence should be adhered to for the following reasons: 1. The district is inhabited by an Albanian majority, both racial and linguistic, as was proved by the International Com- mission appointed in 1913 to verify on the spot the ethnical aspect of these provinces. 2. The statistics furnished by the Italian Delegation prove that the comparison between Moslems and Christians is in favour of the former, if account is taken of the emigrants, who left the country as a result of the disturbances of 1914, and a large number of whom will return as soon as an equitable Government is estab- lished. Moreover, a great portion of the Christian population is Albanian in national sentiment, as may be seen from the formation of Albanian societies abroad. 3. The events of 1914 cannot be taken as a revelation of the popular will in favour of Greek desiderata for the reasons already stated to the Commission and recorded in the proceés-verbauz. On the other hand, an argument against annexation by Greece may be found in the atrocities committed at the same time against those inhabitants—Moslem or otherwise—who were Albanian in sentiment. 4. The Albanians have on several occasions proved their de- votion to the national idea and to their language by insurrections against the Ottoman authorities, with the view of obtaining autonomy in those administrative divisions within which they possessed a majority. 5. Differences of religion in this country do not lead to dis- agreement from the national point of view. This may be seen both in Northern and Southern Albania, where the Moslems are intermingled with Catholic and Orthodox. Propaganda coming from without is only very feebly sup- ported by the local rivalry which is inevitable among all races. 6. The greater part of the landed property is in the hands of Albanian Moslems. 7. The economic life of the country would be completely dis- turbed if it were deprived of its centres, namely, the principal towns of this district. { 168 ]IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 8. The cultural argument cannot be advanced against Albania, for the Ottoman administration has never allowed the Albanians their own educational institutions. This was one of the privileges which the Greek Patriarchate at Constantinople guarded most jealously, as may be seen by the struggles of other Balkan States to free themselves from Greek educational propaganda. 9. Neither is the refusal of legacies a valid proof of national sentiment. This was one of the measures adopted by the Greek Orthodox ecclesiastical authorities with a view to preventing the foundation of Albanian schools in these districts. 10. It appears from diplomatic documents relating to the Am- bassadors’ Conference in Berlin in 1880, that the Greek Govern- ment then established as a racial limit for their claims a line which differs very little from the frontier of the Protocol of Florence. The line drawn by the Ambassadors followed the course of the Calamas. The ethnical grounds on which this decision was based are equally valid to-day. 11. In support of all these arguments the Italian Delegation draws attention to a French publication. The Ministere de la Guerre (Geographical Commission of the Army Geographical Serv- ice) brought out in 1915 a pamphlet, entitled ‘““Notice sur lAlbanie et le Monténégro,” which confirms the Italian point of view. A map showing races and religions is appended to it [vide map No. 6 on page 99], according to which the Greek inhabitants form only two small groups in the neighbourhood of Argyrocastro and Delvino—which is, in fact, the exact truth of the matter. The importance of this testimony cannot be denied. The publication in question has the object of providing military commanders with accurate information, to assist them in the fulfilment of their duties in the districts which are now under discussion by the Commission. Paris, March 1, 1919. ANNEX 6 A. PROPOSALS FOR THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN GREECE AND ALBANIA IN EPIRUS Reference International Map 1/1,000,000. Sheet Sofiya (North k. 34). 3rd Provisional edition. 1918. [Vide Map No. 8 on page 109.] 1. American Proposal.—Line leaves the coast-line at a point in approximate latitude 41°13 (Gramala Bay) and runs in an E.N.E. direction till it reaches the watershed between streams draining [ 169 ] CS ee eee ee ee ee eeSOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS to the open sea on the one hand, and to the Ghiri 1 Vlores on the other. The line follows this watershed till it meets the crest of the Chike Dagh in a direction generally parallel to the coast-line to a point in approximate latitude 40°8, whence it bends north- ward following the watershed between the Drin and Sushitse and then eastward along the watershed bounding on the north the basin in which Kardie is situated. At a point in this watershed in approximate latitude and longitude 40°12 N.; 20°2 E. (to be referred to below as point “‘A’’) it bends north along a spur, which it follows to its northern termination. From here the line turns E.N.E, and, crossing the Drin in approximate latitude 40°16, and keeping this direction, ascends to the main watershed which runs nearly parallel to the Drin. The boundary then follows this water- Shed between the Drin on the one hand, and on the other the tributaries of the Viose, and the interior basin whose centre is in approximate latitude and longitude 41°11 N.; 20°12E. until it meets the present Greek-Albanian frontier in approximate latitude and longitude 40°3 N.; 20°25 E. 2. Franco-British Proposal.—tThis line leaves the American line at point “A” (see above) and continues generally N.N.W. along the minor watershed to a point some 3 kilom. S.S.W. of Tepelen, whence it turns E.N.E. and descends to the confluence of the Viose and the Drin. From here it ascends the “thalweg” of the Viose to a point in longitude 20°18 whence it runs generally N.E. to a point on the watershed between the Viose and the Lum i Beratit. It follows this watershed southwards for about 5 kilom. and then descends straight to the “Thalweg” of the Lum i Beratit which it follows downstream to a point in approximate latitude and longi- tude 40°27 N.; 20°24 E, whence it follows the watershed and runs between the two tributaries draining from Ostrovitse Dagh to the Lum 1 Beratit generally N.E. for about 6 kilom. and then generally N. for about 10 kilom. to a point on the main crest of the Ostrovitse Dagh in about 40°34 N.; 20°28 E. The E.-W. watershed of this range is then followed eastward for about 15 kilom. and the line thereafter bends—still following the watershed, and travels some 7 kilom. N.N.E. to point 1147 and then about 7 kilom. N.N.W. From this point it runs generally N. by E. crossing the Devoli River at about longitude 20°38 and continues in the same general direction up a watershed for some 11 kilom. to a point of approximate position 40°52 N.; 20°40 E. From this point the boundary runs generally E. for about 18 kilom. and joins the present Greek-Albanian boundary on the watershed between lakes [ 170 ]IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS Okhrida and Pryespa in approximate latitude 40°52. From here the line follows this frontier to its junction with the Serbian boundary. ANNEXE VI* EXPoSE pU CAPITAINE DE VAISSEAU CONZ AU SUJET DE L’ADRIATIQUE MERIDIONALE Je voudrais démontrer a la Commission que les raisons qui poussent la Gréce a réclamer la cdéte qui s’étend de Vallona a Corfou sont d’ordre militaire. La Gréce ne peut pas étre poussée en effet par les besoins de son émigration, ni par des raisons ethniques et commerciales. En ce qui concerne |’emigration, si la Greéce recoit les terri- toires qu’elle demande en Thrace, en Macédoine, en Asie-Mineure, au Dodécanése, son émigration n’ira pas se concentrer sur ce petit bout de céte qui va de Vallona a Corfou. Au point de vue ethnique, la population de toute cette région, comme j’ai pu m’en rendre compte pendant les longs mois que jal passes la-bas, est entierement albanaise. Ces Albanais sont orthodoxes, et pour cette raison on a tendance a les considérer comme Grecs. La troisieme raison qui aurait pu déterminer la Gréce, ce serait la recherche d’un débouche vers la mer. Or un coup d’oeil sur la conformation géographique de la Gréce exclut cette hypo- these. En effet, ce pays qui a déja tant de débouchés sur la mer ne peut pas étre poussé par lV’idée de s’en créer encore un nouveau sur ce petit morceau de cote. La raison commerciale doit étre également écartée. La céte est tres montagneuse, il n’y a pas de voies de communication avec Vintérieur, ’hinterland n’est pas riche, il n’y a pas de ports le long de la cote. Aussi la recherche d’un débouché commercial sur ce point tres excentrique par comparaison a la Gréce est-elle a rejeter. Reste donc la raison militaire. C’est le noeud de la question. Corfou en effet se trouve si prés de la céte que les deux entrées nord et sud commandent une immense base dans laquelle la plus puissante flotte du monde trouverait toutes les commodités pos- sibles. Sans remonter plus haut, il suffit de rappeler ici que, “From Rapport (avec annexes) présenté au Conseil supréme des Alliés par la commission chargée d’étudier les questions territoriales intéressant la Gréce. 16-17. This annex is not contained in the English version of the report. [a7] eS eee eR eae eeee ee a hese oe SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS pendant la guerre, avant le ralliement de la Grece aux Allies, le Kaiser avait fait de Corfou une puissance base sous-marine et quand la Grece vint avec nous la Flotte francaise put utiliser Corfou dans le but d’aider l’Italie en cas de bataille navale avec les Autrichiens dans |’Adriatique. Pour que cette base prenne toute sa valeur il faut la maitrise des entrées et des sorties, c’est-a-dire la maitrise de la mer tant au nord qu’au sud de Vile. Or cette maitrise ne peut pas etre absolue si on n’a pas l’occupation de la cote. En 1916 j’eus ’honneur de transporter le Prince Alexandre de Serbie d’Italie a Corfou. Je suis passe par le canal Nord. A Corfou je fis visite a l’amiral francais dont Je suis heureux de rappeler ic} Vopinion. “Vous avez commis, me dit-il, une grande imprudence en passant par le canal nord parce que, ne possédant pas la cote de Chimara, nous ne tenons pas les approches de la base du cote nord.” C’est seulement quelques mois apres que la maitrise absolue de l’entree nord fut obtenue, en étroite collaboration avec nos Allies francais, lorsque l’Italie put occuper militairement Port Palerme et Santi Quaranta et empecher ainsi les sous-marins alle- mands de se réefugier dans ce cul-de-sac qui se prolonge le long de la cOte de Vallona jusqu’a Corfou. Lorsque les Alliés ne seront plus a Corfou la base sera toujours magnifique mais, il lui manquera quelque chose pour etre com- plete. Ce quelque chose c’est la cote que la Gréce réclame aujourd’hul. Si la Grece obtient cette cote qu’elle reclame, la base Corfou deviendra complete. Par suite, les conditions stratégiques a l’en- tree de l’Adriatique seront pour |’Italie pires qu’avant la guerre. C’est pour cela que Il’Italie ne peut pas se désintéresser de cette question au point de vue militaire. Si, en effet, une base puissante s’etablit ainsi a l’entrée de l’Adriatique, notre pays devra prendre des mesures de précautions, et au moment méme ou tout le monde cherche a réduire les armements il sera obligé a de nouvelles depenses militaires. Si la cote de Vallona a Corfou est donnée a celui qui posséde Corfou, tout cet ensemble réprésentera une menace. Si au con- traire la cote de Chimara est laissée aux Albanais, cette possession ne representera pas une menace pour la Gréce. Notre intérét ce n’est pas de nous établir sur la cote, c’est seulement d’empécher que ce soit la méme puissance qui posséde et Corfou et la céte qui fait de Corfou une base formidable. 472 7BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WORKS CITED PRIMARY SOURCES I. MANUSCRIPTS HERRON, GEORGE D. Italy and Albania. Correspondence from Feb. 19, 1918, to Dec. 10, 1920. Docs. I to LXIX. In the Hoover War Library, Stanford University. Very valuable for the period of the Peace Conference. Author was in close touch with President Wilson, and tried to mediate between the Albanians and Italians. While the bulk of the Herron manuscripts on Italy are not yet open to research and citation, special permission was secured from Herron for the use of the manuscripts cited in this work. It, PUBLIC DOCUMENTS A. ISSUED OFFICIALLY AUSTRIA-HUNGARY. Ministerium des Atissern. Diplomatische Ak- tenstucke betreffend die Ereignisse am Balkan. 13 August 1912 bis 6 November 1913. Wien: Druck der K. K. Hof-und Staats- druckerei, 1914. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Diplomatic Documents con- cerning the Relations of Austria-Hungary with Italy. From July 20, 1914, to May 23, 1915, n.p., n.d. FRANCE. Ministére des affaires étrangéres. Documents diploma- tiques. Affaires balkaniques. 1912-14. 3 vols. Paris: Impri- merie nationale, 1922. . Ministéres des affaires étrangéres et de la guerre. Bureau de presse etrangere. Bulletin quotidien de presse étrangére. [Paris], 1916-1922. . Ministéres des affaires étrangéres et de la guerre. Recueil de documents étrangers. Supplement périodique aux bulletins de presse étrangére. No. 53. Paris, 25 Oct., 1919. Contains the speech of Tittoni to the Chamber of Deputies on the foreign policy of Italy, delivered on September 27, 1919. . Ministéres de la guerre et des affaires étrangéres. Bulletin périodique de la presse italienne. Paris, 1919-1922. GREAT BrITAIN. Admiralty. Geographical Notes on the Balkan Peninsula: Albania, Bulgaria, Aegean Islands, Montenegro, Rou- mania, Serbia. I1.D. 11744. n.d. “For official use only.” [173 ] ee ee ~ . be yh ne er aSOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS GREAT BRITAIN. Foreign Office. British and Foreign State Papers, 1912, 1913, 1914, 1920. Vols. CV—CVII, CXIII. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1915, 1916, 1917, 1923. . General Staff, War Office. Daily Review of the Foreign Press. Special Greek Supplement dealing with the régime under Constantine. {London, 1918.] —_——., General Staff, War Office. Index to the Daily Review of the Foreign Press with Allied, Neutral, and Enemy Press Sup- plements. July—Dec., 1916, Jan._June, 1917, Nov., 1918—July, 1919. [London.] ——, Hansard. Parliamentary Debates. Third series, CCXLII, 1878. London: Cornelius Buck. ——., Parliamentary Debates. Official Report. Fifth series. House of Commons. Vols. LVI, LII, LIII, LVIII, LIX, LA, XCIV, XCV. (1913-1917.) [London.] . Foreign Office. Parliamentary Paper, 1920. Vol. LI. Cmd. 586. “Correspondence Relating to the Adriatic Ques- tion.” London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1920. Of first importance. GREECE. Grand quartier général hellénique. Etatmajor avant 2™ Bureau. Section des affaires politiques. Carte éthnographique de l’Epire du Nord en 1913. 1919. a . ‘rroupyeiov eri trav éEwrepixa@v. AitA@uaTiKa’” Eyypada, 1913-1917. ‘EAAnvocepBixn LuvOnKnn Xvppaylas. * Evo Bor [epuavofovryapav eis Makedoviav, (éxdocis devtépa.) “Ky "AOnvas, €x Tov eOvixov TuToypadeiov, 1920. LEAGUE OF NATIONS. Procés-Verbaux of the Committees of the First Assembly of the League of Nations. Geneva, 1920. —_— —, The Records of the First Assembly. Plenary Meetings. Geneva, 1920. —_—, Journal of the Second Assembly of the League of Nations. Geneva, 1921. —_——, Minutes of the Council of the League of Nations. 13th, 14th, 15th sessions. [Lausanne, 1924?] —_——., Official Journal. 1921-1923. Especially Vol. II, Nos. 5, 6, 12< Vol; TL. Nos: a. >: G. 11° Vol. IV; Nos: i, 3, 5. -[Geneva, 1921-1923.] [ 174 ]IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS ———. Albania. Request by the Albanian Government for the inclusion on the Supplementary Agenda of the Assembly, of the decision of the Council of June 25th on the Albanian question, A.6, 1921, VII. Geneva, July 4, 1921. . Treaty Series. Publication of Treaties and International Engagements registered with the Secretariat of the League of Nations. Lausanne, 1922. Vol. XII. PEACE CONFERENCE. Conférence des Préliminaires de Paix. Rap- port (avec annexes) présenté au Conseil supréme des Alliés par la commission chargée d’étudier les questions territoriales in- téressant la Gréce. 30 mars, 1919. This very important and rare report was obtained through the courtesy of Dr. Seymour of Yale University and the Library of that institution, as was also the subsequent item. . Report of Committee on Greek Territorial Claims. Paris, March 6, 1919. Same as the foregoing with the exception of the map and the omission of one appendix. UNITED STATES. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Rela- tions, U.S. Senate, 66th Congress, 1st session, on the Treaty of Peace with Germany, signed at Versailles on June 28, 1919, and submitted on July 10, 1919, by the President of the United States. Sen. Doc. No. 106. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1919. . The Adriatic Question. Senate, 66th Congress, 2nd ses- sion, Doc. No. 237 (Serial No. 7671). Washington: Government Printing Office, 1920. Does not contain all the documents printed in the British Parlia- mentary Papers, or in France by Adriaticus. . Congressional Record, LVI, part 2, Jan. 21—-Feb. 14, 1918. . Official U.S. Bulletin. Published daily under order of the President of the United States by Committee on Public Infor- mation, George Creel, Chairman. Complete Record of U.S. Government Activities, Vol. 2. Washington. B. ISSUED UNOFFICIALLY ApRIATICUS. La Question adriatique. Recueil de documents offi- ciels. Paris: Imprimerie typographique, 1920. Contains some documents not printed elsewhere. [175 ]ee ee ee eee ee SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS Cocks, F. Seymour. The Secret Treaties and Understandings. Text of the available documents with introductory comments and explanatory notes. 2nd edition. London: Union of Demo- cratic Control, 1918. 94 pp. FRANGULIS, M. A.-F. Mémoire sur l’Albanie et lEptre du Nord, présenté devant le conseil de la société des Nations dans sa séance du 24 juin 1921. Athénes: Imprimerie nationale, 1921. —_——.. L’Epire du Nord devant la Conférence de la Paix. Mémoire sur les constations faites et les decisions prises par les Pulissan- ces Alliées et associees. Paris. Aout 1921. Valuable as presenting the Greek view, but more especially for the documents annexed, including part of the report of the Com- mission on Greek Affairs at the Peace Conference. Full Texts of Secret Treaties as revealed at Petrograd. Reprinted from the New York Evening Post, 1918. GREECE. Les pourparlers diplomatiques, 1913-17. Le livre blanc grec. Traité d’Alliance Gréco-Serbe. Invasion Germano-Bulgare en Macédoine. (Pages d’histoire, 1914-1918.) Paris: Librairie militaire Berger-Lauvrault. 1918. The Greek White Book. Diplomatic Documents, 1913- 1917. Translated by Theodore P. Ion. American Hellenic So- ciety. Oxford University Press. New York, n.d. Same as the above, both translated from the volume listed under Government Publications. HANSON, ARN. Br. Diplomatic secrete, avec une annexe contenant le texte des documents secrets publiés en Russie. Berne: Wyss, 1918. 61 pp. INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION. Official Documents looking toward Peace. Series No. IV, No. 133. New York, December, 1918. IraLy. Les pourparlers diplomatiques, 9 Dec., 1914-4 Mai, 1915. Le livre vert italien. Correspondence relative sur évenements qui ont amené la rupture des relations avec |’Autriche-Hongrie. (Pages d’histoire, 1914-1915.) Paris: Berger-Lauvrault [19157] 173 pp. LALoy, EmiLe. Les documents secrets des archives du ministére des affaires étrangéres du Russie publiés par les Bolchevtks. Paris: Bossard, 1919. 193 pp. [176 ]IN- EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS PRIBRAM, ALFRED FRANZIS. The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary, 1878-1914. English edition by Archibald Cary Coolidge. Vol. I, Texts of the Treaties and Agreements; Vol. II, Negotiations leading to the Treaties of the Triple Alliance. Translated by J. G. D’Arcy Paul and Denys P. Myers. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1920-21. Valuable for pre-war period. SCHREINER, GEORGE ABEL, editor. Entente Diplomacy and the World. Matrix of the History of Europe, 1909-14. Translated from the original texts in his possession by B. De Siebert, late secretary of the Imperial Russian Embassy at London. New York: Putnam, 1921. 762 pp. Scott, JAMES Brown. Official Statements of War Aims and Peace Proposals. December 1916 to November 1916. Pamphlet No. 31. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Washington, 1921. 515 pp. SCHWERTFEGER, BERNARD. Zur europdischen Politik, 1897-1914. Unveroffentlichte Dokumente in amtlichem Auftrage. Band 3 (1908-1911), Bosnische Krise, Agadir, Albanien. Berlin: Hob- bing, 1919. lil. BOOKS AsguiTtH, H. H. The Genesis of the War. London: Cassell, 1923. 304 pp. BAKER, RAy STANNARD. Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement. Written from his unpublished and personal material. 3 vols. New York: Doubleday, Page, 1922. Of prime importance for the documents published in Vol. III and the quotations from the secret minutes of the Conference. BIssoLaTI, LEoNIpA. La politica estara del l’Italia del 1897 al 1920. Milano: Fratelli Treves, 1923. 442 pp. CHURCHILL, WINSTON S. The World Crisis. New York: Scribner, 1923. 569 pp. DEVILLE, GABRIEL. L’Entente, la Gréce et la Bulgarie. Notes d’his- toire et souvenirs. Paris: Figuier, 1919. 334 pp. Of use for period when the author was minister of France at Athens. aii)SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS FERRERO, TEN. GENERALE GIACINTO. L’Opera dei soldaiti italiani in Albania durante la guerra. Napoli: Riccardo Ricciardi, 1923. 23 pp. GIOLITTI, GIOVANNI. Memorie della mia vita. 2 vols. Milano: Fra- telli Treves, 1922. HENDERSON, ArTHUR. The Aims of Labour. London: Headley [1918]. 108 pp. JONESCU, TAKE. Some Personal Impressions. London: Nisbet [1919]. 264 pp. ISMAIL KEMAL Bey. The Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey. Edited by S. Story. London: Constable, 1920. 410 pp. Deals mostly with the earlier period, that since 1911 being cov- ered only by a reprint of the article by the same author in the Quarterly Review. Labour Year Book, 1919. Issued under the auspices of the Parlia- mentary Committee of the Trades Union Congress, the Execu- tive Committee of the Labour Party, and the Labour Research Department. London, n.d. LICHNOWSKY, PRINCE (KARL MAx). My Mission to London, 1912-14. New York: Doran, n.d. 45 pp. Important for brief statement on attitude of the Powers at the Conference of Ambassadors in London. LLtoyp GeorGE, Davin. British War Aims, Jan. 5, 1918. Authorized version as published by the British Government. New York: Doran, n.d. 12 pp. SARRAIL, GENERAL. Mon commandement en Orient (1916-1918). Paris: Flammarion [1920]. 415 pp. Of importance for French occupation; presents Sarrail’s own rea- sons for the occupation and gives telegrams in full. VENIZELOS, E. Cing ans d’histoire grecque, 1912-1917. Discours prononcés a la chambre des deputés en aout 1917 par E. Veni- zelos, N. Politis, E. Repoulis, G. Cafandaris. Traduction de M. Leon Maccas, autorisée par le Gouvernment grec. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1917. 247 pp. —_—, Greece in Her True Light. Her position in the world-wide war as expounded by E. L. K. Venizelos, her greatest statesman, in two memoranda to King Constantine, in several speeches be- fore the Greek Parliament, an address to the King, and in a [178 ]IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS proclamation to the Greek people. Translated and published by Socrates A. Xanthaky and Nicholas G. Sakillarios. New York, 1916. 288 pp. The Vindication of Greek National Policy, 1912-1917. A report of speeches delivered in the Greek Chamber, August 23 to 26, 1917, by Mr. E. Venizelos and others, with an introduc- tion by J. Gennadius. London: George Allen and Unwin [1918]. IV. DELEGATION PROPAGANDA Items listed under this head were given to the Hoover War Library by the respective delegations at Paris in 1919, with the assurance that the items given accurately represented the claims of the delegation. A. ALBANIA ERICKSON, C. TELFoRD. J appeal! Paris: Desvignes, 1919. 7 pp. . Six Reasons why America should become mandatory for Albania. Paris, May, 1919. KOLOVANI, DEMETRE. La question de Koritza. Paris: Dieval, n.d. 95 pp. Revendications de l’Albanie. Includes following pamphlets: Revendications de l’Albanie. 7 pp. Mémoire sur l’Albanie du Nord. 11 pp. Exposé des revendications albanaises devant le Conseil des Dix. 8 pp. Notes additionnelles relatives aux revendications albanaises. 24 pp. Carte indiquant les villes et villages incendiées par les Grecs. SKENDO, LumMo. Les Albanais chez eux et a létranger. Lausanne, 1919. 27 pp. . Les Revendications albanaises. Extrait de la Revue “Les Peuples Libres.” (Numero d’avril). Lausanne, 1919. 11 pp. B. GREECE ANDREADES, A. La Gréce devant le Congrés de la Paix. Paris: Bureaux de la Revue Politique et Parlementaire, 1919. 23 pp. (Extrait de la Revue Politique et Parlementaire, février, 1919.) Basri-BEy. L’Orient debalkanisé et l Albanie. Origine des derniéres Guerres et Paix future. [Paris, 1919.] 30 pp. [ 179 | eT ee ee n MeSOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS The author describes himself as “Ancien Deputé au Parlement ottoman, Président du second Gouvernement national albanais et Chef du Pouvoir Executif ad interim (1915-1916). Interné dans les garnisons austro-hongroises (1916—1918).” Burrows, RONALD M. Albania and Greece. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode. (Reprinted from The New Europe of December LU, 2ESs)) pp. ———. The Unity of the Greek Race. London: Contemporary Review Co. (1919). 12 pp. (Reprinted from the Contemporary Review, February 1919.) CASSAVETES, NICHOLAS J. Epirus and Albania. London: George S. Vellonis, 1919. 48 pp. CHRUSSACHI, MATTHEW G. The Greater Greece. A lecture delivered at the Royal Colonial Institute on February 21, 1919. [London, 1919.] 26 pp. GAUVAIN, AUGUSTE. The Greek Question. Translated by Carroll N. Brown. From Revue de Paris of June 1, July 1, and July 15, 1917. Published for the American Hellenic Society by Oxford University Press, American Branch, 1918. 107 pp. KARAPANOS, A. K. Memorandum on Northern Epirus, n.p., n.d. 2/ pp. Official claims of the “former Provisional Government of Northern Epirus.” La question d’Oritent vue par les socialistes grecs. Mémoire soumis par les socialistes grecs a la conference socialiste interalliée de Londres. Paris, Nancy: Berger-Levrault, 1918. 31 pp. Ligue francaise pour la défense des droits de VHellénisme. La Gréce devant le Congres, par le General Malleterre, Joseph Reinach, A. Berl, F. Sartiaux. Conferences faites sous la presi- dence de M. Alfred Croiset. Paris: Boivin, 1919. 213 pp. Poutitis, N. Les aspirations nationales de la Gréece. Edition spe- ciale de la paix des peuples. Paris, n.d. 19 pp. PoLyBius [pseudonym for KALOPOTHAKES, D.]. Greece before the Conference. With a preface by T. P. O’Connor and an ethno- logical map. London: Methuen, n.d. 120 pp. PuAux, RENE. The Sorrows of Epirus. London: Hurst and Black- ett, 1918. 159 pp. { 180 |IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REEVES, WILLIAM PEMBER. An Appeal for the Liberation and Union of the Hellenic Race. London: The Anglo-Hellenic League, 1918. 23 pp. Royaume de Grece. Ministere de Economie nationale, direction de la statistique. Dénombrement des habitants des nouvelles provinces de la Grece de 1913. Athenes: Imprimerie nationale, 1915. 94 pp. [VENIZELOS.| Greece before the Peace Congress. 25 pp. C. JUGOSLAVIA Albania. (In English and in French.) n.d. Essap, Pasua. “My Policy for Albania,” in The Balkan Review, I, No. 5, June, 1919. [Essap PasHa.] Mémoire sur l’Albanie. (Paris, 1919.) SECONDARY SOURCES I. GENERAL WORKS AND WORKS RELATING TO EUROPEAN HISTORY BARTHOLOMEW, J. G. The Times Survey Atlas of the World. A comprehensive series of new and authentic maps reduced from the special surveys of travellers and explorers with general in- dex of over two hundred thousand names. London: The Times, 1922. BLAGOYEVITCH, VIDAN. Le Principe des nationalités et son applica- tion dans les Traités de Paix de Versailles et de Saint Germain. Paris: “‘La vie universitaire,” n.d. 457 pp. BoGITSHEVICH, M. Causes of the War. An examination into the causes of the European War with special reference to Russia and Serbia. Amsterdam: Van Langenhuysen, 1919. 135 pp. BowMANn, IsatiAH. The New World: Problems in Political Geog- raphy. Yonkers-on-Hudson, New York: World Book Co., 1921. 632 pp. A valuable study by an American expert at the Peace Conference, with excellent maps. Brown, Horatio. The Venetian Republic. London: Dent, 1902. 211 pp. [ 181 | can i Pe ee ee pe green cy detainee tibien nations nda cleanes as "1 .ee eee . smpese es = meee e seein emanate ns ott he ee ee SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS ++ DELAIJI, FRANCIS. “L’autonomie albanaise,’ in Les aspirations autonomistes en Europe: Albania, etc. Paris: Alcan, 1913. 2//7 pp. DiLLon, E. J. From the Triple to the Quadruple Alliance. Why Italy Went to War. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1915. 242 pp. Unimportant. Drxon, RoLAND B. The Racial History of Man. New York: Scrib- ner, 1923. 503 pp. The most recent authoritative work on the subject. GIBBONS, HERBERT ADAMS. Europe since 1918. New York: Century, 1923. 622 pp. HANOTAUX, GABRIEL. Contemporary France. Translated from the French by E. Sparvel-Bayly. 4 vols. New York: Putnam, 1909. LARMEROUX, JEAN. La Politique extérieure de l’Austriche-Hongrie 1875-1914. 2 vols. Paris: Plon-Nourrit, 1916. PAGE, THOMAS NELSON. ZJtaly and the World War. New York: Scribner, 1920. 422 pp. Popular; of no importance for this study. PRIBRAM, ALFRED FRANCIS. Austrian Foreign Policy, 1908-18, with a foreword by G. P. Gooch. London: George Allen and Unwin (1923). L268 pp. Valuable. RIPLEY, WILLIAM E. The Races of Europe. A sociological study. New York: Appleton, 1899. 624 pp. SoSNOSKY, THEODOR VON. Die Balkanpolitik Oesterreich-Ungarns seit 1866. 2 vols. Stuttgart. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1913-1914. TEMPERLEY, H. W. V. (editor). A History of the Peace Conference of Paris. London: Henry Frowde, 1921-24. 6 vols. A standard work by experts. University of Wisconsin. Abstracts of Theses submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Vol. I, Madison, 1917. VELLAY, CHARLES. La question de l’Adriatique. Paris: Chapelot, 1915. 126 pp. Anti-Austrian. [ 182 ]IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS Il. WORKS RELATING CHIEFLY TO THE BALKANS ANCEL, JACQUES. Les travaux et les jours de larmée d’Orient (1915-1918). Paris: Bossard, 1921. 233 pp. BRAILSFORD, H. N. Macedonia. Its races and their future. London: Methuen [1906]. 340 pp. History of the Eastern Question. Handbooks prepared under the direction of the Historical Section of the Foreign Office, No. 15. London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1920. 160 pp. These handbooks are based on the material used by the British experts at the Peace Conference, re-edited afterwards, under the supervision of Sir George Prothero. LypE, LIONEL W., and MOCKLER-FERRYMAN, A. F. A Military Geog- raphy of the Balkan Peninsula. London: Adam and Charles Black, 1905. 203 pp. MARKOVITCH, BOGDANE. Le Balkan économique. Apercu sur les elements €conomiques du probleme Balkanique. Paris: Impri- merie Graphique, 1919. 280 pp. MILLER, WILLIAM. “The Ottoman Empire and the Balkan Penin- sula,” in Cambridge Modern History, Vol. XII, The Latest Age. New York: Macmillan, 1910. NEWBIGIN, MArIon I. Geographical Aspects of Balkan Problems in their Relation to the Great European War. 2nd impression. New York: Putnam, 1919. 243 pp. Oman, C. W. C. The Byzantine Empire. 3rd edition, 4th impres- sion. London: Unwin [1914]. 364 pp. PITTARD, E. Les peuples des Balkans. Esquisses anthropologiques, avec 4 cartes et quelques figures. Paris: Attinger [1920?]. 142 pp. Presents the results of the most thorough investigations to date. SCHEVILL, FERDINAND. The History of the Balkan Peninsula from the Earliest Times to the Present Day. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1922. 558 pp. The best general survey. Tozer, HENRY FANSHAWE. Researches in the highlands of Turkey; including visits to Mounts Ida, Athos, Olympus, and Pellon, to the Mirdite Albanians, and other remote tribes with notes on the ballads, tales, and classical superstitions of the modern Greeks. London. John Murray, 1869. 2 vols. [ 183 | eee Pee Re eee eeSOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS VILLARI, Lurar (editor). The Balkan Question. The present condi- tion of the Balkans and of European responsibilities by various writers. London: John Murray, 1905. 362 pp. Woops, H. CuHarues. The Cradle of the War: the Near East and Pan-Germanism. Boston: Little, Brown, 1918. 360 pp. Of no importance. ——. The Danger Zone of Europe. Changes and problems in the Near East. Boston: Little, Brown, 1911. 328 pp. [YouNG, GEoRGE]. Nationalism and War in the Near East. (By a Diplomatist.) Edited by Lord Courtney of Penwith. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Division of Economics and History. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1915. 428 pp. An excellent study from the pacifist point of view, dealing with the Balkan Wars. Il. WORKS RELATING CHIEFLY TO GREECE AppoTT, G. F. Greece and the Allies, 1914-1922. London: Methuen, 1922. 242 pp Bury, J. B. A History of Greece to the Death of Alexander the Great. 2 vols. London: Macmillan, 1902. ———. A Hislory of the Later Roman Emptre from Arcadtius to Irene. (395 A.D. to 800 A.D.) London: Macmillan, 1889. 2 vols. CHESTER, S. B. Life of Venizelos. London: Constable, 1921. 321 pp. FINLAY, GEORGE. A History of Greece from its Conquest by the Romans to the Present Times. B.C. 146 to A.D. 1864. A new edition, revised throughout and in part re-written, with con- siderable additions, by the author, and edited by the Rev. H. F. Tozer. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1877. 7 vols. Invaluable for account of what is known of Albania in the middle ages. GARDNER, ERNEST A. “Dodona.” Article in Encyclopedia Britan- nica, 11th ed. GIBBONS, HERBERT ADAMS. Venizelos. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1920. 384 pp. An able biography, strongly pro-Greek. Maccas, LEon. Ainsi parle Venizelos. Etudes de politique ex- térieure grecque. Paris: Plon-Nourrit, 1916. 319 pp. Pro-Greek. . 184 }IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS . “La Gréce et ’Entente (1914-1917)” in Revue générale de droit international public. Vol. 25. Paris, 1918. . La question Gréco-Albanaise, avec une carte hors texte. Nancy-Paris-Strassbourg: Berger-Levrault, 1921. 242 pp. Strongly colored by pro-Greek prejudices. SERGEANT, LEwIS. Greece in the Nineteenth Century. A record of Hellenic emancipation and progress. 1821-1897. London: Unwin, 1897. 400 pp. A detailed history, slightly colored by philhellenism. Tuumps, ALBERT. The Modern Greek and his Ancestry. (Reprinted from the Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, October 1914.) Zi pp: Opposes view that the modern Greek is the direct descendant of the Byzantine Greeks. VELLAY, CHARLES. L’irrédentisme hellénique. Paris: Perrin, 1913. 329 pp. Pro-Greek, but valuable as containing texts of memoranda sub- mitted to the London Conference, 1913, in appendix. IV. WORKS RELATING CHIEFLY TO ALBANIA Albania. Handbooks prepared under the direction of the Histori- cal Section of the Foreign Office. No. 17. London: H. M. Sta- tionery Office, 1920. 100 pp. AuBrY, Euise. La question d’Orient. Articles publiés dans La France. L’albanie et la France. Preface de Guillaume Apolli- naire. 1917. 50 pp. BAERLEIN, HENRY. Under the Acroceraunian Mountains. London: Leonard Parsons (1922). 163 pp. Deals largely with the period since the Peace Conference; untrust- worthy. BourcarT, Jacgues. L’Albanie et les Albanais, avec 19 photo- graphies prises par l’auteur et une carte hors texte. Paris: Bossard, 1921. 264 pp. The author writes from three years spent in Albania during the war in the district occupied by the French. Of considerable value. BouRCHIER, JAMES Davin. “Albania.” Article in Encyclopedia Bri- tannica, 11th ed. [ 185 ]SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS CHEKREZI, CONSTANTINE A. Albania, Past and Present. New York: Macmillan, 1919. 255 pp. The author is an Albanian who has witnessed and participated in many of the recent events he recounts, but is decidedly prejudiced against the Greeks. Dako, Curisto A. Albania, the Master Key to the Near East. Bos- ton: E. L. Grimes, 1919. 290 pp. By an Albanian; valuable as giving his own experiences and for some original material embodied in the narrative; anti-Greek and anti-Italian. EpEN, Morton F. Albania: Its Discontents and their Origin. Lon- don: Lovejoy, n.d. 23 pp. GoDART, JUSTIN. L’Albanie en 1921. Paris: Les Presses Universi- taires de France, 1922. 334 pp. As a result of experience in Albania the author is strongly pro- Albanian. lonGA, N. Bréve histoire de l’ Albanie et du peuple Albanats. (Pub- lications de l’Institut pour l’etude de l’Europe sud-orientale.) Bucarest: Imprimerie “Cultura Hoamului Romanesc,”’ 1919. 68 pp. Chiefly on the mediaeval period. , MYERS, JOHN LINTON. “Epirus.’ nica, 11th ed. Article in Encyclopedia Britan- PoLtyvios, PericLes J. L’Albanie et la Réunion d’ambassadeurs a Londres. (Etudes politique et €conomique.) These pour le doctorat. Paris: Arthur Rousseau, 1914. 153 pp. (Universite de Paris. Faculte de Droit.) Of little value. , THuumps, A. “Altgriechische Elemente des Albanesischen,” in /ndo- germanische Forschungen Zeitschrift fur Indogermanische Sprach und Altertumskunde herausgegeben von Karl Brugmann und Wilhelm Streitberg. 26 Band. Festschrift fiir Karl Brug- mann, Zweiter Teil. Strassburg: Trubner, 1909. WinG, Hersert. “The Epeiros-Albania Boundary Dispute in An- cient Times.” In Annual Report of the American Historical As- sociation for the Year 1919. 2 vols. and a supplemental vol. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1923. [ 186 ]IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS Vv. PUBLICATIONS OF SOCIETIES, PRINTING EITHER REGU- LAR OR OCCASIONAL BULLETINS OR JOURNALS L’Albanie. Organe bi-mensuel de défense des interéts albanais. 2me série, Nos. 1-12, 25 avril 1918-10 juin 1919. ANGLO-ALBANIAN SOCIETY Konitsa, M. The Albanian Question. (London: Williams Lea.) 1918. 27 pp. Laxo, N. Les droits de l’Albanie. Boulogne: février, 1919. 51 pp. La question Albanaise par le Col. Léon Lamouche, Bertrand Bareilles, Edith Durham, Elise Aubry, I.-N. Papinia et D. Ko- lovani. Etudes recueilliés publi¢ées par les soins de Demetre Beratti. (Les droits des petits peuples devant la conference de la paix.) Paris: Henri Dieval, n.d. 109 pp. ANGLO-HELLENIC LEAGUE The Anglo-Hellenic Hansard. A reprint from the official parlia- mentary reports of some questions and debates on Greek affairs in the House of Commons. Nov. 27—Dec. 22, 1916, No. 29. 1917. Burrows, R. M. and REEvEsS, W. P. Answers to Albanian Accusa- tions. Letter appearing in The Morning Post of Nov. 26 [19137] No. 3. Burrows, R. M., and SymMonps, ArTHUR G. Epirus and the Aegean. Letter to the Times [1914] n.d. Published by the Aegean Islands Committee, London. FERRIMAN, Z. D. Autonomous Epirus. The Ulster of Albania. Re- printed from the Daily Chronicle, April 7, 1914, No. 10. The Governor of Epirus. M. Zographos and Greek Ideals. Reprinted from the Daily Chronicle, April 11, 1914. No. 10. . Greek Epirus. The Free and the Unredeemed. Reprinted from the Daily Chronicle, April 3, 1914, No. 10. GENNADIUS, J. Greece and the Epirus Rising. Denial by Greek Minister. From The Times, April 20, 1914, No. 10. GLASGOW, GEORGE. The Janina Murders and the Occupation of Corfuas 1923, No: 53: JESSEN, FRANZ DE. Artificial Frontiers in the Near East. Address delivered to the Anglo-Hellenic League on Mar. 30, 1914, No. 8. [ 187 ] a et tinned eeSOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS JESSEN, FRANZ DE. Mr. Aubrey Herbert Refuted. Reprinted from The World, Nov. 25, 1913. Murray, COLONEL. Address delivered to the Anglo-Hellenic League in the Morley Hall on January 7, 1914, on “Northern Epirus in gis: Lui: REEVES, WILLIAM PEMBER. Albania and Epirus. No. 7. ——, An Appeal for the Liberation and Union of the Hellenic Race. 1918. ——. Home Rule for Epirus. The “Shoot ’Em Down” Policy. Reprinted from the Daily Chronicle of April 31, 1914. ——. A Plea for a Civilized Epirus. Published by The Aegean Islands Committee. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION, AMERICAN BRANCH CASSAVETES, NICHOLAS J. Northern Epirus and the Principle of Nationality. Pamphlet No. 141. Memorandum submitted by the Albanian Delegation to the Peace Conference. No. 138. AMERICAN-HELLENIC SOCIETY GAUVAIN, AUGUSTE. The Greek Question. 1916. (Vide same, under Greek Delegation Propaganda.) “Tonius.” “Greek Claims to Northern Epirus,” in The Balkan Re- view, III, No. 5, June 1920. VENIZELOS, ELEUTHERIOS. Greece before the Peace Congress of 1919: a memorandum dealing with the rights of Greece. A re- vised translation from the French original. New York: Pub- lished for the American Hellenic Society by Oxford University Press, American Branch, 1919. L’independance Albanaise. L’indépendance Albanaise. Bi-mensuel. SOLA. Mar. Lor weld. INO. o; NOV. 1. 1915. No, 13. SKENDO, LuMo. L’affaire de l’Epire. Le martyre d’un peuple. Sophia: Imprimerie de L’indépendance Albanaise, 1915. 48 pp. LIGUE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME ET DU CITOYEN D’Estournelles de Constant, Emile Kahn. L’Albanie et la paix de (Europe, 1920. 72 pp. [188 |IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS Ligue francaise pour la défense des droits de Vhellénisme. La Gréece et l’Epire. Conférence faite le 14 juin 1913 par Robert David. Paris: Lecan, Ondin, 1913. 59 pp. PAN-ALBANIAN FEDERATION OF AMERICA, VATRA (BOSTON) The Adriatic Review. Sept. 1918—Oct. 1919. An Appeal to the Government and People of America by the AI- banian Federation of America. ERICKSON, C. TELFORD. Cutting the Gorgon [sic] knot. Réfutation des arguments de M. Venizelos pour établir les droits de lV’ hellénisme en Epire du Nord. Boulogne: Guerret, 1919. SKENDO, LuMmMo. Albanais et Slaves, avec neuf cartes. Lausanne: Librairie centrale des nationalités, 1919. Statement of the Christian Orthodox Albanians, Natives of the Dis- tricts of Koritza and Kolonia, in reply to the Declaration of the Pan-Epirotic Union in America, of May 1919. August 1919. PAN-EPIROTIC UNION IN AMERICA (BOSTON) CASSAVETES, N. J. Question of Northern Epirus at the Peace Con- ference. . The Case of Northern Epirus. Reprinted from the April issue of the Current History Magazine. New York Times, No. 5. The Question of Northern Epirus. Letter to the United States Senate. Statement of the Natives of Korytsa and Kolona, Members of the Pan-Epirotic Union in America in reply to the declaration of the Pan-Albanian Federation in America. December 1919. VELLIANITES, T. Traveling Notes on Corytsa. Translated by Nicho- las Culolias, 1919. WORLD PEACE FOUNDATION Handbook on the League of Nations, 1920-1923. League of Na- tions, Vol. V, No. 4, Mar. 1, 1923. VI. MISCELLANEOUS PAMPHLETS Comité unis des Albanais Irrédents. Les droits de l’Albanie a ses frontiéres naturelles. Appel aux nations du monde civilisé. Valone: Imprimerie Nationale Albanaise, 1921. 80 pp. [ 189 ]SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS Protestation adressé a la Conférence de la Paix par les Albanais de Bucarest et Constantza, Roumanie, contre les prétentions Grecs sur |’Albanie du Sud. Bucarest: Imprimerie “Jockey- Club.” I. C. Vacaresco, 1919. 20 pp. VII. NEWSPAPERS Christian Science Monitor, Boston. Le Journal de Geneve. Le Journal des Hellénes. Politique, Sociale et Litteraire organe hebdomadaire des colonies helléniques de ’Europe centrale et occidentale. Genéve: 20 aout 1916—dec. 1919. Manchester Guardian. Le Matin, Paris. New York Times. Le Temps, Paris. The Times, London. VIII. ARTICLES IN PERIODICALS CASANGES, C. P. “The Case of Epirus,” in Fortnightly Review, March 1914, CI, 473-478. CASSAVETES, N. J. “Case of Northern Epirus,” in Current History Magazine. New York Times, April 1919, X, Pt. I, 68-69. “Corfu Crisis.”” Source material: Public documents unofficially printed, listed in Foreign Affairs, Dec. 15, 1923, Il, 345. Ditton, E. J. Articles on “Foreign Affairs” in Contemporary Re- view, April 1913; May, June, July, August, October, December, 1914. CIII-CV. DuRHAM, M. E. “The Story of Essad Pasha,” in Contemporary Review, August 1920, CXVIII, 207-215. ISMAIL KemMAL Bey. “Albania and the Albanians,” in Quarterly Review, July 1917, CCXXVIII, 140-168. “The Janina Murders.” Reprinted from The Manchester Guardian in The Nation (New York), January 30, 1924, CXVIII, 125-126. LyYBYER, ALBERT H. “The Balkan Situation,” in The Journal of In- ternational Relations, April 1920, X, 404—424. | 190 |IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS The Nation (London), August 31, 1918, XXIII, 563. SILVA, Pietro. “Italy and the Balkans,” in The New Europe, July 4, 1918, VII, 282-284. “Suppressed Report on Janina Murders.” Report made to the Ambassadors’ Conference by the special Commission appointed to inquire into Janina murders. In The Manchester Guardian Weekly, Dec. 26, 1923. VAUCHER, RoBeErRT. “Les Alliés en Albanie. La jonction des troupes francaises et italiennes. La Republique Albanaise de Koritza.” In L’Illustration, April 7, 1917, pp. 324—326. Woops, H. CwHarzes. “Albania and the League.” In Contemporary Review, January 1922, CXXI, 41-47. YounG, E. Hitton. “Northern Epirus: an Importunate Question.” In Contemporary Review, May 1919, CXV, 497-502. eee ee en ee Danneel| | j Seeiers anes eeeAbdul Hamid, 17 Acroceraunian Mountains, 88 Adamidi, 115, 116 Adriatic, 60, 110, 113, 116, 158, 161 Aegean Islands, 31, 41 Albanian League of 1878, 13, 14 Ali Pasha, 9 Aliotti, 124 Allies (vide also Triple Entente), 64, 65, 67 American Hellenic Society, 78 Andréadeés, 86 Anglo-Hellenic League, 78 Argyrocastro, 1, 2, 33, 35, 36, 39, AQ Al, 42° 43: 49°1564..65;, 67. Lilt. PEAS V7, 159 Arta, gulf, 6 Arta, river, 94 Athens (vide also Greece), 14, 24, 57, 64, 115 Austria-Hungary, 4, 5, 12, 15, 16, Le OTs 29 3 le seo 4sOD: af, 30, 61, 52, 58, 59; 65, 68, 118, 158 Avarna, Duke of, 28, 58 Balfour, 72, 139, 140, 142, 150 Balkan Wars, 19-50 Ballplatz, 37, 53, 59, 160 Beaconsfield, 12 Benckendorff, Count, 60 Berat, 4 " Berchtold, 19, 20, 21, 27, 36, 52 Berlin, Congress of, 11, 12, 93 Berlin, Treaty of, 12, 13, 14, 15 Bey, 3; 15 Bilinski, 39 Bolshevists, 74 Borden, Sir Robert, 76 Bosdari, 66 Boundary Commission, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37 Bucharest, Peace of (August 10, 1913), 30 Bulgaria, 13, 30, 55, 56, 63 Calamas River, 64 Cambon, Jules, 60, 76 Cambon, Paul, 24, 32 Carapanos, 43 INDEX Cecil, Lord Robert, 129, 130, 134, 141 Clemenceau, 120 Comitadjis, 47 Commission of Enquiry, 141 ff. Commission on Greek Affairs, 95, 97, 1077112. 113; 1335160 Condottiere, 8 Conference of Ambassadors (suc- cessor of Peace Conference of Paris), 136, 138, 139, 140, 148, 149, 154, 157 Constantine, King, 55, 56, 65, 66, 67 Consulta, 37, 53 Corfu, 6, 33, 48, 49, 50, 81, 83, 84, 107, 110, 114 Corriere della Sera, 54 Council of Five, 112 Council of Ten, 76, 77, 94, 102 Crimean War, 10, 76 Crowe, Sir Eyre, 76, 116 Dalmatia, 60 Dardanelles, 56 Day, Clive, 76 Delvino, 1, 27, 40, 41, 42, 95, 112 Descoins, 85 Despotate of Epirus, 7, 8 Dodona, 6, 7 Doughty-Wylie, Major, 38 Drinopoli, 95 Durham, Miss M. E., 91 Durazzo, 43, 48, 51, 54, 90, 123, 124 Dushan, Stephen, 8 England, vide Great Britain Erickson, 91, 95 Erseka, 38 Essad Pasha, 47, 51, 54, 91, 112, 133 Ferrero, General, 65 Fisher, Herbert, rapporteur, 138, 142, 144, 145 Fiume, 116, 122, 123 Florence, Protocol of (1913), 40, 41, 107, 132, 145, 159 France, 10, 13, 29, 32, 54, 55, 56, 63, 66, 68, 69, 74, 100, 107, 110, 119, 127, 127, 158 Frangulis, 132, 133, 135, 141 Frasheri, Midhat, 131, 146, 151 [ 193 | 137,SOUTHERN ALBANIA OR NORTHERN EPIRUS Gennadius, 44 Germany, 54, 56, 113, 121 Giolitti, 124 Gladstone, 12 Glossa, 6, 7 Grammos Mountains, 7, 95 Granville, 12 Great Britain, 10, 55, 56, 59, 63, 66, 74, 107, 110, 119, 127, 162 Greco-Turkish War of 1897, 13 Greece: 4, ld. Ahi 20, al, 0s 01, al, al, 66 Gl. bb. 6G: 57, Gl, Gf, 70, An LU eee, LO, Low, Leal, 143, 151, 158, 162 Greek Orthodox Church, 3, 98, 105 Greek War of Independence, 9, 10, 80 Grey, Sir Edward, 21, 25, 26, 29, 31, 32, 34, 39, 45, 53, 56, 60 93, 95, Hague Conference, 1907, 14 Herbert, Aubrey, 91 House of Commons, 42, 45, 72 Imbros, 31 Imperiali, Marquis, 60, 144 International Commission of Con- trol, 43, 46, 47, 48, 49, 51 Ismail Kemal Bey, 19, 20, 25 Istria, 61 italy: 4 6.12, 14. 16, 16. 17,21. 25. aa: She Oe, aa 00, 21, SO. Ol. ba, 58, 59, 65, 67, 70, 74, 84, 106, 107, ee Tie, WO, Del. 123. 135, 147. 158 Japan, 74 Janina, 2, 6, 8, 9, 19, 20, 28, 65, 88 Jugo-Slavia, 102, 113, 118, 119, 120, 122, 123, 12/7, 131, 136, 143, 162 Kapishtica, Accord of (May 15, 1920), 126, 133 Kaza, defined, 1 Kerensky, 66 Khimara, 1, 27, 42, 47 Kolonia, 1, 27 Koritza, 2, 27, 31, 32, 33, 39, 40, 41, 49, 68, 69, 70, 85, 91, 95, 98, 100, 1Ol, 107, 2a. LES Lio. eao. 125. 129, 131, 147, 148, 149, 152, 154, 158, 160 Kossovo, 19 [ 194 ] Lansing, 117 League of Nations, 122, 129-157 Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, 10 Liaskoviki, 1, 27, 38, 40 Lloyd George, 71, 74, 75, 120 London Conference of Ambassa- dors (1913), 1, 24, 26, 27 &.. 33 ff. 38, 39, 68, 93, 114, 132 London, secret treaty of (April 26, 1915), 61, 66, 73, 92, 93, 97, 106, 119, 125, 127, 136, 160, 162 London, Treaty of (May 30, 1913), 30 Lushnja, National sembly, 123 L0G, Ali, LS; Albanian As- Macedonia, 7, 16, 28, 63, 67, 88, 153 Mandate proposed, 120, 161 Martino, de, 76 Mensdorff, 24 Monastir, 2, 19, 36, 38, 88, 153 Montenegro, 21, 30 Moslem, 70, 87, 88, 90, 94, 100 Napoleon, 9 Nelson, 9 Nicopolis, 7 Nitti, 113, 116, 124 Noli, Bishop Fan §., 132, 136 Ochrida, Lake, 33 Orlando, 73, 75, 106, 113 Otranto, Straits of, 115 Ottoman Empire, vide Turkey Pan-Albanian Federation, 90, 91 Pan-Epirotic Union of America, 75 Peace Conference, 61, 71-128 Philiataes, 1 Phtelia, 33 Pichon, 30 Pindus Mountains, 95 Plebiscite, 86, 87 Pogonio, 1 Polk, 116 Premedl, 1, 147 Prenk Bib Doda, 90 Preveza, Gulf of, 94 Poincaré, 23, 24, 25 Politis, 76 2, 27, 39, 40, 54, 111,IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS Pydna, 7 Pyrrhus, 7 Quai d’Orsay, 69, 70 Rapallo, Treaty of (November 12, 1920) 122.127, 136; 161 Roupel, Fort, 63, 64 Rumania, 56 Russia, 10, 12, 29, 54, 55, 56, 63, 66, 71 Russian Revolution, 66 Salandra, 60 Salisbury, 11, 12 Salonika, 2, 16, 68, 88 San Giuliano, 16, 23 Santi Quaranta, 2, 36, 40, 43, 48, 54, 84, 88, 107, 110, 114, 159 Sarandaporos, River, 40 Sarrail, 68, 69 Sasseno, 23, 33, 59, 125, 159 Sazonoff, 54 Scanderbeg, 8, 20 Schools, 16, 17, 80, 89, 95 Scutari, 19; 20; 51 Sederholm, 148, 151, 153, 155 Serbia, 13, 19, 25, 30, 55, 56, 61, 92, 113 Sevres, Treaty of (August 10, 1920), 130, 134, 135, 144 Skouloudis, 62, 64 Socialists, Greek, 87 Sonnino, 58, 59, 65 Starovo, 1, 98 Stylos, Cape, 31, 32, 33, 40, 94 Suliotes, 9, 10, 80 Tchameria, 94, 95, 97 Tenedos, 31 Tepeleni, 14, 40, 118 Terestchenko, 66 Thessaly, 13, 64 Thrace, 114 The Times (London), 38 Tirana, 123, 125, 136, 146, 149, 152 Tittoni, 32 Tittoni-Venizelos Accord, 113, 123, 125, 133; 134, 161 Tosks, 3, 155 Trent, 59 Trentino, 61 Tricoupis, 11 Triple Alliance, 15, 24, 29, 31, 32, 38, 45, 46, 52, 158 Triple Entente, 46, 55, 56, 57, 61 Turkey; il. 145. 173/185 195321. 28: 303,555 5/5027 Turkhan Pasha, 90, 91, 92, 95, 110, LD Tyrol, 59 United States of America, 97, 100, LOGS 1105 415; 1192121 Valona, 2, 19, 23, 48, 51, 55, 56, 59, G15-672 70: L0G. 116) bios 124.125: 159 Venice, 8 Venizelos, 23, 24, 35, 39, 42, 54, 55, 56, 57, 61, 62, 66, 68, 75, 76, 77, 98, 100, 101, 110, 115, 119, 161 Viosa: 2.°65.405 110) 111 Viviani, 129 Voiussa, vide Viosa Vrioni, 131, 139 Westermann, W. L., 76 William of Wied, 43, 51, 81, 102, 124 Wilson, 71, 72, 73, 83, 94, 102, 106, MS LIB L1G. 1205 1225 127 Young Turks, 17, 18 Zaimis, 63 Zographos, 42, 43, 44, 46, 48, 57, 155 Fb dade eae a ete edcas <-t eeep me A A ly St ins pan iene ee: 4 | 5 - 1 BI ‘ i ! | . : ee eee te ere ee ee ee ca a4 a ee So eee tse eee ens toe| ] { : i | . | Se ee ee reas eT See ee eee eee, a ee eenseas etree seesNX OOO 445 elec ; 4 | B 4 i 4 i ) 1 ! H b ey eT ee eee ae a ee oo th tee eee ee eee eel