19 _

STONEWALL JACKSON
VOL. L

.STONEWALL JACKSON
AND THE
AMEBICAN CIVIL WAE
BY
LIEUT.-COL. G. F. E. HENDEESON, C.B.
AUTHOB OP ' THE BATTLE OF SPICBEBEN, A TACTICAL STUDY '
AND ' THE CAMPAIGN OE FKEDEKICKSBDBQ '

WITH AN INTEODUCTION BY FIELD-MARSHAL
THE BIGHT HON. VISCOUNT WOLSELEY, K.P., G.C.B., G.C.M.G. &o.

IN TWO VOLUMES— VOL. L

WITH PORTRAITS, MAPS, AND PLANS

New Impression

LONGMANS, GEEEN, AND CO.
89 PATEENOSTBE EOW, LONDON
NEW YORK AND BOMBAY
1903
AU rights roaerved

TO MY FATHER

INTEODUCTION

Before the great Eepublic of the West had completed a
century of independent national existence, its political
fabric was subjected to the strain of a terrible internecine
war. That the true cause of conflict was the antagonism
between the spirit of Federalism and the theory ol
' States' Eights ' is very clearly explained in the following
pages, and the author exactly expresses the feeling with
which most Englishmen regard the question of Secession,
when he implies tbat had he been a New Englander he
would have fought to the death to preserve the Union,
while had he been born in Virginia he would have done
as much in defence of a right the South believed inalien
able. The war thus brought about dragged on its weary
length from tbe spring of 1861 to the same season of 1865.
During its progress reputations were made that will live for
ever in American history, and many remarkable men came
to the front. Among these not the least prominent was
' Stonewall Jackson,' who to the renown of a great soldier
and unselfish patriot added the brighter fame of a
Christian hero ; and to those who would know what
manner of man this Stonewall Jackson was, and why he
was so universally revered, so beloved, so trusted by
his men, I can cordially recommend Colonel Henderson's
delightful volumes. From their perusal I have derived
real pleasure and sound instruction. They have taught
me much; they have made me think still more; and I
hope they may do the same for many others in the
British Army. They are worth the closest study, for few

Vlll STONEWALL JACKSON
military writers have possessed Colonel Henderson's grasp
of tactical and strategical principles, or his knowledge of
the methods which have controlled their application by the
most famous soldiers, from Hannibal to Von Moltke.
Gifted with a rare power of describing not only great
military events but the localities where they occurred, he
places clearly before his readers, in logical sequence, the
circumstances whieh brought them about. He has
accomplished, too, the difficult task of combining with a
brilliant and critical history of a great war the life-story
of a great commander, of a most singular and remarkable
man. The figure, the character, the idiosyncrasies of the
famous Virginian, as well as the lofty motives which
influenced him throughout, are most sympathetically
pourtrayed. There have been few more fitted by natural instincts,
by education, by study, and by self-discipline to become
leaders of men than Stonewall Jackson. From the day he
joined that admirable school at West Point he may be said
to have trained himself mentally, morally, and physically,
for the position to which he aspired, and which it would
seem he always beheved he would reach. Shy as a lad,
reserved as a man, speaking little but thinking much, he
led his own life, devouring the experiences of great men, as
recorded in military history, in order that when his time
came he should be capable of handling his troops as they
did. A man of very simple tastes and habits, but of strong
religious principles, drawn directly from the Bible ; a child
in purity; a child in faith; the Almighty always in his
thoughts, his stay in trouble, his guide in every difficulty,
Jackson's individuality was more striking and more com
plete than that of all others who played leading parts
in the great tragedy of Secession. The most reckless
and irreligious of the Confederate soldiers were silent in
his presence, and stood awestruck and abashed before this
great God-fearing man ; and even in the far-off Northern
States the hatred of the formidable ' rebel ' was tempered
by an irrepressible admiration of his piety, his sincerity,
and his resolution. The passions then naturally excited

INTEODUCTION ix
have now calmed down, and are remembered no more by a
reunited and chivalrous nation. With that innate love of
virtue and real worth which has always distinguished the
American people, there has long been growing up, even
among those who were the fiercest foes of the South, a
feeling of love and reverence for the memory of this great
and true-hearted man of war, who fell in what he firmly
believed to be a sacred cause. The fame of Stonewall
Jackson is no longer the exclusive property of Virginia and
the South; it has become the birthright of every man
privileged to call himself an American.
Colonel Henderson has made a special study of the
Secession War, and it would be difficult, in my opinion, to
find a man better qualified in every respect for the task he
has undertaken. I may express the hope that he will soon
give us the history of the war from tbe death of Stonewall
Jackson to the fall of Eichmond. Extending as it did over
a period of four years, and marked by achievements which
are a lasting honour to the Anglo-Saxon name, the struggle
of the South for independence is from every point of view
one of the most important events in the second half of the
century, and it should not be left half told. Until the
battle where Stonewall Jackson fell, the tide of success was
flowing, and had borne the flag of the new Confederacy
within sight of the gates of W^ashington. Colonel Hender
son deals only with what I think may be called the period
of Southern victories, for the tide began to ebb when
Jackson fell ; and those who read his volumes will, I am
convinced, look forward eagerly to his story of the years
which followed, when Grant, with the skill of a practised
strategist, threw a net round the Confederate capital, draw
ing it gradually together until he imprisoned its starving
garrison, and compelled Lee, the ablest commander of his
day, to surrender at discretion.
But the application of strategical and tactical principles,
and the example of noble lives, are not the only or even
the most valuable lessons of great wars. There are lessons
which concern nations rather than individuals ; and there
are two to be learnt from the Secession War which are of

X STONEWALL JACKSON
peculiar value to both England and the United States,
whose armies are comparatively small and raised by volun
tary enlistment. The first is the necessity of maintaining
at all times (for it is impossible to predict what to-morrow
may have in store for us) a well-organised standing army in
the highest state of efficiency, and composed of thoroughly-
trained and full-grown men. This army to be large enough for
our military requirements, and adapted to the character, the
habits, and the traditions of the people. It is not necessary
that the whole force should be actually serving during peace :
one half of it, provided it is periodically drilled and exercised,
can be formed into a Eeserve ; the essential thing is that
it should be as perfect a weapon as can be forged.
The second lesson is that to hand over to civilians the
administration and organisation of the army, whether in
peace or in war, or to allow them to interfere in the
selection of officers for command or promotion, is most
injurious to efficiency ; while, during war, to allow them,
no matter how high tlieir political capacity, to dictate to
commanders in the field any line of conduct, after the army
has once received its commission, is simply to ensure
disaster. The first of these lessons is brought home to us by the
opening events of this unreasonably protracted war. As I
have elsewhere said, most military students will admit that
had the United States been able, early in 1861, to put into
the field, in addition to their volunteers, one Army Corps of
regular troops, the war would have ended in a few months.
An enormous expenditure of life and money, as well as a
serious dislocation and loss of trade, would have been thus
avoided. Never have the evil consequences which follow
upon the absence of an adequate and well-organised army
been more forcibly exemplified.
But, alas ! when this lesson is preached in a country
governed alternately by rival political parties, and when
there is no immediate prospect of national danger, it falls
on deaf ears. The demands made by the soldiers to put
the army on a thoroughly efficient footing are persistently
ignored, for the necessary means are almost invariably

INTRODUCTION Xl
required for some other object, more popular at the
moment and in a parliamentary — or party — sense more
useful. The most scathing comment on such a system of
administration is furnished in the story told by Colonel
Henderson. The fearful trials to which the United States
were subjected expose the folly and self-deception of which
even well-meaning party leaders are too often capable.
Ministers bluster about fighting and yet refuse to spend
enough money on the army to make it fit for use ; and on both
sides of the Atlantic the lessons taught by the Peninsula, the
Crimea, and the Secession War are but seldom remembered.
The pleasing notion that, whenever war comes, money
can obtain for the nation all that it requires is still, it
would seem, an article of at least lip-faith with the
politicians of the English-speaking race throughout the
world. Gold will certainly buy a nation powder, pills, and
provisions ; but no amount of wealth, even when sup
ported by a patriotic willingness to enlist, can buy dis
cipline, training, and skilful leading. Without these there
can be no such thing as an efficient army, and success in
the field against serious opposition is merely tbe idle
dream of those who know not war.
If any nation could improvise an army at short notice
it would be the United States, for its men, all round, are
more hardy, more self-reliant, and quicker to learn than
those of older communities. But, notwithstanding this
advantage, both in 1861 and 1898 the United States failed
to create the thoroughly efficient armies so suddenly
required, and in both instances the unnecessary sufferings
of the private soldier were the price paid for the weakness
and folly of the politicians. In 1861 the Governors of the
several Northern States were ordered to call for volunteers to
enlist for ninety days, the men electing then: own officers.
It was generally believed throughout the North that all
Southern resistance would collapse before the great armies
that would thus be raised. But the troops sent out to
crush the rebellion, when they first came under fire, were
soldiers only in outward garb, and at Bull Eun, face to
face with shot and shell, they soon lapsed into the con-

Xll STONEWAUi JACKSON
dition of a terrified rabble, and ran away from another
rabble almost equally demoralised ; and this, not because
they were cowards, for they were of the same breed as the
young regular soldiers who retreated from the same field in
such excellent order, but because they neither understood
what discipline was nor the necessity for it, and because
the staff and regimental officers, with few exceptions, were
untrained and inexperienced.
Mr. Davis, having prevented the Southern army from
following up the victory at Bull Eun, gave the Northern
States some breathing time. Mr. Lincoln was thus able to
raise a new army of over 200,000 men for the projected
advance on Eichmond.
The new army was liberally supplied with guns,
pontoons, balloons, hospitals, and wagons ; but, with the
exception of a few officers spared from the regular army,
it was without trained soldiers to lead it, or staff officers to
move and to administer its Divisions. It must be admitted,
I think, that General McClellan did all that a man could
do in the way of training tbis huge mass. But when the
day came for it to move forward, it was still unfit for an
offensive campaign against a regular army. To the
practised eye of an able and experienced soldier who
accompanied McClellan, the Federal host was an army
only in name. He likened it to a giant lying prone
upon the earth, in appearance a Hercules, but wanting
the bone, the muscle, and the nervous organisation
necessary to set the great frame in motion. Even when
the army was landed in the Peninsula, although the pro
cess of training and organisation had been going on for
over six months, it was still a most unwieldy force. For
tunately for the Union, the Confederate army, except as
regards the superior leaders and the cavalry, was hardly
more efficient.
The United States, fully realising their need of a
larger regular army, are now on the point of increasing
their existing force to treble its present strength.
Their troops, like our own, are raised by voluntary enlist
ment for a short period of service with the colours.

INTRODUCTION Xiii
England has always very great difficulty in filling the
ranks even with undeveloped youths. The United States
obtain as many full-grown men as they require, because
they have the wisdom to pay their men well, on a scale
corresponding to the market rate of wages. Here they are
fortunate ; but men are not everything, and I will still draw
the moral that a nation is more than blind when it deliber
ately elects to entrust its defence to an army that is not as
perfect as training and discipline can make it, that is not
led by practised officers, staff and regimental, and that is
not provided with a powerful and efficient artillery.
Overwhelming disaster is in store for such nation if it
be attacked by a large regular army; and when it falls
there will be none to pity. To hang the ministers who
led them astray, and who believed they knew better
than any soldier how the army should be administered,
will be but poor consolation to an angry and deluded
people. Let me now dwell briefly upon the second of the two
great national lessons taught by the Secession War. I
shall say nothing here upon civilian meddling with army
organisation and with the selection of officers for command,
but I wish particularly to point out the result of interference
on the part of a legislative assembly or minister with the
plans and dispositions of the generals commanding in the
field. Take first the notorious instance of Mr. Lincoln's
interference with McCleUan in the spring of 1862.
McClellan, who was selected to command the army wbich
was to capture Eichmond and end the war, was a soldier of
known ability, and, in my opinion, if he had not been
interfered with by the Cabinet in Washington, he would
probably have succeeded. It is true, as Colonel Henderson
has said, that he made a mistake in not playing up to
Lincoln's susceptibilities with regard to the safety of the
Federal capital. But Lincoln made a far greater mistake
in suddenly reducing McClellan's army by 40,000 men, and
by removing Banks from his jurisdiction, when the plan of
campaign had been approved by the Cabinet, and it was
already too late to change it. It is possible, considering

XIV STONEWALL JACKSON
the political situation, that the garrison of Washington
was too small, and it was certainly inefficient ; but the best
way of protecting Washington was to give McClellan the
means of advancing rapidly upon Eichmond. Such an
advance would have made a Confederate counterstroke
against the Northern capital, or even a demonstration,
impossible. But to take away from McClellan 40,000 men,
the very force with wbich he intended to turn the Yorktown
lines and drive the enemy back on Eichmond, and at the
same time to isolate Banks in the Shenandoah Valley, was
simply playing into the enemy's hands. What Lincoln
did not see was that to divide the Federal army into three
portions, working on three separate lines, was to run a far
greater risk than would be incurred by leaving Washington
weakly garrisoned. I cannot bring myself to believe that
he in the least realised all that was involved in changing
a plan of operations so vast as McClellan's.
Again, look at the folly of which Mr. Benjamin, the
Confederate Secretary of War, was guilty at the same period.
The reader should carefully study the chapter in which
Colonel Henderson describes Stonewall Jackson's resignation
of his command when his arrangements in the field were
altered, without his cognisance, by the Secretary of War.
I should like to emphasize his words : ' That the
soldier,' he says, ' is but the servant of the statesman,
as war is but an instrument of diplomacy, no educated
soldier will deny. Politics must always exercise a supreme
influence on strategy ; yet it cannot be gainsaid that
interference with the commander in the field is fraught
with the gravest danger.' '
The absolute truth of this remark is proved, not only by
many instances in his own volumes, but by the history of
war in all ages, and the principle for which Jackson con
tended when he sent in his resignation would seem too well
founded to be open to the slightest question. Yet there are
those who, oblivious of the fact that neglect of this principle
has been always responsible for protracted wars, for useless
slaughter, and costly failures, still insist on the omniscience
' Vol. i. p. 206.

INTRODUCTION XV
of statesmen ; who regard the protest of the soldier as the
mere outcome of injured vanity, and believe that politics
must suffer unless the politician controls strategy as well
aa the finances. Colonel Henderson's pages supply an
instructive commentary on these ideas. In the first
three years of the Secession War, when Mr. Lincoln
and Mr. Stanton practically controlled the movements
of the Federal forces, the Confederates were generally
successful. Further, the most glorious epoch of the Con
federacy was the critical period of 1862, when Lee was
allowed to exercise the full authority of Commander-in-
Chief ; and lastly, the Northern prospects did not begin to
brighten until Mr. Lincoln, in March 1864, with that
unselfish intelligence which distinguished him, abdicated his
military functions in favour of General Grant. And yet
while Lee and Grant had a free hand over the military
resources of their respective nations the political situation
suffered no harm whatever, no extravagant demands were
made upon the exchequer, and the Government derived
fresh strength from the successes of the armies.
The truth is that a certain class of civilians cannot rid
themselves of the suspicion that soldiers are consumed by
an inordinate and bloodthirsty ambition. They cannot
understand that a man brought up from his youth to
render loyal obedience is less likely than most others to
run counter to constituted authority. They will not see
that a soldier's pride in his own army and in the man
hood of his own race tends to make him a devoted patriot.
They do not realise that a commander's familiarity with
war, whether gained by study or experience, must, unless
his ability be limited, enable him to accommodate his
strategy to political exigencies. Nor will they admit that
he can possess a due sense of economy, although none
knows better than an educated soldier the part played in
war by a sound and thrifty administration of the national
resources. The soldier, on the other hand, knows that his art is
most difficult, that to apply strategical principles correctly
experience, study, knowledge of men, and an intimate

xvi STONEWALL JACKSON
acquaintance with questions of supply, transport, and the
movement of masses, are absolutely necessary. He is aware
that what may seem matters of small moment to the
civilian— such as the position of a brigade, the strength of a
garrison, the command of a detachment — may affect the
whole course of a campaign ; and consequently, even if
he had not the historical examples of Aulic Councils and
other such assemblies to warn him, he would rebel against
the meddling of amateurs. Let it not be forgotten that
an enormous responsibility rests on the shoulders of a
commander in the field : the honour of the army committed
to his charge, the lives ofthe brave men under him, perhaps
the existence of his country ; and that failure, even if he can
plead that he only obeyed the orders of his Government, or
that he was supplied with inadequate means, will be laid at
his door. McDowell received no mercy after Bull Eun,
although he had protested against attacking the Confede
rates ; and it was long before the reputation of Sir John
Moore was cleared in the eyes of the English people.
Such, to my mind, are the most important lessons to be
drawn from this history of the first period of the Secession
War. But it is not alone to draw attention to the teaching
on these points that I have acceded, as an old friend, to
Colonel Henderson's request that I should write an Intro
duction to his second edition. In these days of sensational
literature and superficial study there is a prejudice against
the story that fills more than one volume. But the
reader who opens these pages is so carried away by the
intense interest of the subject, clothed as it is in forcible
and yet graceful language, that he closes them with regret ;
and I am only too glad to ask others to share the very great
pleasure I have myself enjoyed in reading them. I know of
no book which will add more largely to the soldier's know
ledge of strategy and tbe art of war; and the ordinary
reader will find in this Life of Stonewall Jackson, true
and accurate as it is, all the charm and fascination of a
great historical romance.

PEEFACE

To write the life of a great general, to analyse his
methods of war and discipline, to appraise the weight of
his responsibilities, and to measure the extent of his capa
city, it would seem essential that the experience of the writer
should have run on parallel lines. An ordinary soldier,
therefore, who notwithstanding his lack of such experience
attempts the task, may be justly accused of something
worse than presumption. But if we were to wait for those
who are reaUy qualified to deal with the achievements of
famous captains, we should, as a rule, remain in ignorance
of the lessons of their lives, for men of the requisite capacity
are few in a generation. So the task, if it is to be done at
all, must perforce be left to those who have less knowledge
but more leisure.
In the present case, however, the mass of contemporary
testimony is so large that any initial disadvantages, I venture
to think, will be less conspicuous than they might other
wise have been. The Official Eecords of the War of the
Eebellion contain every dispatch, letter, and message, public
or confidential, which has been preserved ; and in the daily
correspondence of the generals on both sides, together with
the voluminous reports of officers of all grades, the tale of
the campaigns is written so plain that none can fail to read.
Again, Stonewall Jackson's military career, either in full or
in part, has been narrated by more than one of his staff offi
cers, whose intercourse with him was necessarily close and
constant ; and, in addition, the literature of the war abounds
with articles and sketches contributed by soldiers of all ranke
VOL. I. a

XVUI STONEWALL JACKSON
who, at one time or another, served under his command.
It has been my privilege, moreover, to visit the battle-fields
of Virginia with men who rode by his side when he won his
victories, to hear on the spot the description of his
manoeuvres, of his bearing under fire, and of his influence
over his troops. I can thus make fairly certain that my
facts are accurate. But in endeavouring to ascertain the
strength of the armies at different periods I have been less
fortunate. For the most part I have relied on the Official
Eecords ; ^ it is to be regretted, however, that, so far as the
Confederates are concerned, there are several gaps in the
series of returns, and I have found it extremely difficult to
arrive at a fair estimate of the approximate strength at any
period within these intervals. For instance, the numbers
at Lee's disposal at the end of August 1862 rest on the
basis of a return dated July 20, and in the meantime
several regiments and batteries had been transferred else
where, while others had been added. I have done my
best, however, to trace all such changes ; and where officers
and ' employed men ' are not included in the returns, I
have been careful to add a normal percentage to the official
totals. As regards Jackson's place in history, my labours have
been greatly facilitated by the published opinions of many
distinguished soldiers — American, English, French, and
German; and I have endeavoured, at every step, as the
surest means of arriving at a just conclusion, to compare
his conduct of military affairs with that of the acknowledged
masters of war. His private life, from his boyhood onwards,
has been so admirably depicted by his widow,' that I have
had nothing more to do than to select from her pages such
incidents and letters as appear best suited to illustrate his
character, and to add a few traits and anecdotes com
municated by his personal friends.
Several biographies have already been published, and
that written by the late Eeverend E. L. Dabney, D.D.,
sometime Major in the Confederate army, and Jackson's
' Referred to in the text as 0. R.
' Memoirs of Stonewall Jackson. The Prentice Press, Louieville, Ky.

PREFACE xix
Chief of the Staff for several months, is so complete and
powerful that the need of a successor is not at once apparent.
This work, however, was brought out before the war had
ceased, and notwithstanding his intimate relations with his
hero, it was impossible for the author to attain that fulness
and precision of statement which the study of the Official
Eecords can alone ensure. Nor was Dr. Dabney a witness of
all the events he so vigorously described. It is only fitting,
however, that I should acknowledge the debt I owe to a
soldier and writer of such conspicuous ability. Not only
have I quoted freely from his pages, but he was good
enough, at my request, to write exhaustive memoranda on
many episodes of Jackson's career.
Cooke's Life of Jackson is still popular, and deservedly
so ; but Cooke, like Dr. Dabney, had no access to the Official
Eecords, and his narrative of the battles, picturesque and
lifelike as it is, can hardly be accepted as sober history.
On the other hand, the several works of the late Colonel
William Allan, C.S.A., in collaboration with Major Hotch
kiss, C.S.A., are as remarkable for their research and
accuracy as for their military acumen ; while the volumes
of the Southern Historical Society, together with the
remarkable series of articles entitled 'Battles and Leaders
of the Civil War,' written by the leading participants^ on
either side, are a perfect mine of wealth to the historical
student. I need hardly add that the memoirs and
biographies of both the Federal and Confederate generals,
of Lee, Grant, Stuart, Sherman, Johnston, Longstreet,
Beauregard, McClellan, Hancock, Pendleton and others,
are a necessary complement to the Official Eecords.
Nevertheless, with all this mass of information at my
command, had it not been for the exceeding kindness of
the friends and comrades of Stonewall Jackson, I much
doubt whether I should have been able to complete my
task. To the late Major Hotchkiss, his trusted staff
officer, whatever of value these volumes may contain
is largely due. Not only did he correct tbe topographical
descriptions, but he investigated most carefully many dis
puted points; and in procuring the evidence of eye-

XX STONEWALL JACKSON
witnesses, and thus enabling me to check and amplify the
statements of previous writers, he was indefatigable. Dr.
Hunter McGuire, Medical Director of Jackson's succes
sive commands, has given me much of his valuable time.
The Eev. J. P. Smith, D.D., Jackson's aide-de-camp, has
rendered me great assistance ; and from many officers and
men of the Stonewall Brigade, of Jackson's Division, and of
the Second Army Corps, I have received contributions to this
memorial of their famous chief. Generals Gustavus Smith,
Fitzhugh Lee, Stephen D. Lee, and N. G. Harris, Colonel
Williams, Colonel Poague, and E. E. Lee, Esq., of Washing
ton, D.C., all formerly of the Confederate States Army, have
supplied me with new matter. Colonel Miller, U.S.A., most
courteously responded to my request for a copy of the
services of his regiment, the First Artillery, in the Mexican
war. The late General John Gibbon, U.S.A., wrote for me
his reminiscences of Jackson as a cadet at West Point, and
as a subaltern in Mexico ; and many officers who fought for
the Union have given me information as to the tactics and
discipline of the Federal armies. The Eeverend J. Graham,
D.D., of Winchester, Virginia ; Dr. H. A, White, of Wash
ington and Lee University, Lexington, Virginia, author of
an admirable life of General Lee ; and the Hon. Francis
Lawley, once Special Correspondent of the Times in the
Confederate States, have been most kind in replying to my
many questions. To Major-General Hildyard, C.B., late
Commandant of the Staff College, I am indebted for much
valuable criticism on the campaigns of 1862 ; and my
warmest thanks are here tendered to the Commander-in-
Chief, Field-Marshal Lord Wolseley, for much information
and more encouragement.
I cannot conceal from myself, however, that notwith
standing the numerous authorities I have been enabled to
consult, as well as the intrinsic interest of my subject,
many of the following chapters will be found excessively
dull by civilian readers. Stonewall Jackson's military
career was not all hard fighting ; nor was it on the battle
field alone that his supreme ability for war was made mani
fest. His time and thoughts were more occupied by

PREFACE XXI
strategy, that is, by combinations made out of the enemy's
sight, than by tactics, that is, by manoeuvres executed in
the enemy's presence. But strategy, unfortunately, is an
unpopular science, even among soldiers, requiring both in
practice and in demonstration constant and careful study of
the map, the closest computation of time and space, a grasp
of many factors, and the strictest attention to the various
steps in the problems it presents. At the same time, it is a
science which repays the student, although he may have no
direct concern with military affairs ; for not only will a
comprehension of its immutable principles add a new
interest to the records of stirring times and great achieve
ments, but it will make him a more useful citizen.
In free countries like Great Britain, her colonies, and
the United States, the weight of intelligent opinion, in all
matters of moment, generally turns the scale ; and if it
were generally understood that, in regular warfare, success
depends on something more than rank and experience,
no Government would dare entrust the command of the
army to any other than the most competent soldier.
The campaigns of the Civil War show how much may
be achieved, even with relatively feeble means, by men
who have both studied strategy and have the character
necessary for its successful practice ; and they also show,
not a whit less forcibly, what awful sacrifices may be
exacted from a nation ignorant that such a science exists.
And such ignorance is widespread. How seldom do we
hear a knowledge of strategy referred to as an indispensable
acquirement in those who aspire to high command ? How
often is it repeated, although in so doing the speakers
betray their own shortcomings, that strategy is a mere
matter of common-sense ? Yet the plain truth is that
strategy is not only the determining factor in civilised
warfare, but that, in order to apply its principles, the
soundest common-sense must be most carefully trained.
Of all the sciences connected with war it is the most dif
ficult. If the names of the great captains, soldiers and
sailors, be recalled, it will be seen that it is to the breadth
of their strategical conceptions rather than to their tactical

XXII STONEWALL JACKSON
skill that they owe their fame. An analysis of the great wars
shows that their course was generally marked by the same
vicissitudes. First we have the great strategist, a Hannibal,
or a Napoleon, or a Lee, triumphing with inferior numbers
over adversaries who are tacticians and nothing more.
Then, suddenly, the tide of victory is checked, and brilliant
manoeuvres no longer avail. Fabius and Scipio, Wellington,
Nelson, and St. Vincent, Grant, Sherman, and Farragut,
have replaced the mere tacticians ; and the superior
resources, wielded with strategical skill, exert their inevi
table effect. Or it may be that fortune is constant through
out to her first favourite; and that a Marlborough, a
Frederick, a Washington, a Moltke, opposed only by good
fighting men, never by an accomplished strategist, marches
from victory to victory. It is impossible, then, to estimate
the ability of any general without considering his strategy.
Moreover, in this age of inventions, of rapid movement, and
of still more rapid communication, the science is more com
plicated and even more important than heretofore ; and it
is deserving, therefore, of far closer attention, from both
soldiers and civilians, than it has hitherto received. It is
for these reasons that I have described and discussed in
such minute detail the strategy of the campaigns with
which Jackson had to do.
I have only to add that should anything in these pages
wound the susceptibilities of any one of those splendid
soldiers and gallant gentlemen who took part in the Civil
War, whether he be Northerner or Southerner, I here tender
him my humblest apologies ; assuring him, at the same
time, that while compiling these pages I have always borne
in mind the words of General Grant : • I would like to see
truthful history written. Such history will do full credit
to the courage, endurance, and ability of the American
citizen, no matter what section he hailed from, or in what
ranks he fought.' I am very strongly of opinion that
any fair-minded man may feel equal sympathy with
both Federal and Confederate. Both were so absolutely
convinced that their cause was just, that it is impossible
to conceive either Northerner or Southerner acting other-

PREFACE XXlll
wise than he did. If Stonewall Jackson had been a
New Englander, educated in the belief that secession
was rebellion, he would assuredly have shed the last
drop of his blood in defence of the Union ; if Ulysses
Grant had been a Virginian, imbibing the doctrine
of States' rights with his mother's milk, it is just as
certain that he would have worn the Confederate grey.
It is with those Northerners who would have allowed
the Union to be broken, and with those Southerners
who would have tamely surrendered their hereditary
rights, that no Englishman would be willing to claim
kinship.

CONTENTS

THE FIEST VOLUME
OHAFTSR PAOB
I. West Point ..,,.,.,, 1
II. Mexico. 1846-47  24
III. Lexington. 1851-61  55
IV. Secession. 1860-61  78
V. Harper's Pbbby  103
VI. The First Battle of Manassas or Bull Run . . 135
VII. Romney  171
VIII. Kernstown  216
IX. M'Dowbll  268
X. Winchester  304
XI. Cross Keys and Poet Republic  357
XII. Review or the Valley Campaign  404

ILLUSTEATIONS IN VOL. I

P0BTBAIT8

Stonewall Jaokbon, Lt.-Gbneral .... Frontispiece
Stonewall Jackson at the Age of 24 (from a

Daguerreotype)

To face p. 54

MAPS

Thk City of Mexico ...,,,
The United States, 1861 ....
Situation, Night of July 17, 1861 .
Dispositions, Morning of July 21, 1861 .
Bull Run 
Sketch of West Virginia in 1861 .
The Valley 
Situation, Night of March 21, 1862
Battle of Kernstown 
Situation, April 30, 1862 . . . , .
Battle of M'Dowell 
Situation, May 18, 1862 
Battle of Winchester 
Battles of Cross Keys and Port Republic .
Virginia and Maryland  at

the

n 46
„ 110
„ 134142 162
„ 186
„ 214286
„ 246
„ 284300
„ 308
„ 340
,, 884
end of vol.

STONEWALL JACKSON

CHAPTEE I
WEST POINT '
In the first quarter of the century, on the hills which stand
above the Ohio Eiver, but in different States of tbe Union,
were born two children, destined, to all appearance, to lives
of narrow interests and thankless toil. They were the sons
of poor parents, without influence or expectations ; their
native villages, deep in the solitudes of the West, and remote
from the promise and possibilities of great cities, offered no
road to fortune. In the days before the railway, escape from
the wilderness, except for those with long purses, was
very difficult ; and for those who remained, if their means
were small, the farm and the store were the only occupa
tions. But a farmer without capital was little better than a
hired hand ; trade was confined to the petty dealings of a
country market; and although thrift and energy, even
under such depressing conditions, might eventually win a
competence, the most ardent ambition could hardly hope
for more. Never was an obscure existence more irretrievably
marked out than for these children of the Ohio ; and yet,
before either had grown grey, the names of Abraham Lincoln,
President of the United States, and of Stonewall Jackson,
Lieutenant-General in the Confederate Army, were house
hold words in both America and Europe. Descendants of
the pioneers, those hardy borderers, half soldiers and half
' Copyright 1897 by Longmans, Green, & Go.
VOL. 1. B

2 STONEWALL JACKSON
farmers, who held and reclaimed, through long years of
Indian warfare, the valleys and prairies of the West,
they inherited the best attributes of a frank and valiant
race. Simple yet wise, strong yet gentle, they were gifted
with all the qualities which make leaders of men.
Actuated by the highest principles, they both ennobled the
cause for which they fought ; and while the opposition of
such kindred natures adds to the dramatic interest of the
Civil War, the career of the great soldier, although a
theme perhaps less generally attractive-, may be followed
as profitably as that of the great statesman. Providence
dealt with them very differently. The one was struck down
by a mortal wound before his task was well begun ; his life,
to all human seeming, was given in vain, and his name will
ever be associated with the mournful memories of a lost
cause and a vanished army. The other, ere he fell beneath
the assassin's stroke, had seen the abundant fruits of his
mighty labours ; his sun set in a cloudless sky. And yet
the resemblance between them is very close. Both dared
For that sweet mother-land which gave them birth
Nobly to do, nobly to die. Their names,
Graven on memorial columns, are a song
Heard in the fu.ture ; . . . more than wall
And rampart, their examples reach a hand
Far thro' all years, and everywhere they meet
And kindle generous purpose, and the strength
To mould it into action pure as theirs.
Jackson, in one respect, was more fortunate than
Lincoln. Although born to poverty, he came of a Virginia
family which was neither unknown nor undistinguished ;
and, as showing the influences which went to form his
character, its history and traditions may be briefly related.
It is an article of popular belief that the State of
Virginia, the Old Dominion of the British Crown, owes
her fame to the blood of the English Cavaliers. The
idea, however, has small foundation in fact. Not a few
of her great names are derived from a less romantic
source, and the Confederate general, like many of his
neighbours in the western portion of the State, traced his

THB JACKSONS OF VIRGINIA 8
origin to the Lowlands of Scotland. An ingenious author
of the last century, himself born on Tweed-side, declares
that those Scotch families whose patronymics end in
•son,' although numerous and respectable, and de
scended, as the distinctive syllable denotes, from the
Vikings, have seldom been pre-eminent either in peace or
war. And certainly, as regards the Jacksons of bygone cen
turies, the assertion seems justified. The name is almost
unknown to Border history. In neither lay nor legend
has it been preserved ; and even in the ' black lists ' of the
wardens, where the more enterprising of the community
were continually proclaimed as thieves and malefactors, it
is seldom honoured with notice. The omission might
be held as evidence that the family was of peculiar
honesty, but, in reality, it is only a proof that it was
insignificant. It is not improbable that the Jacksons
were one of the landless clans, whose only heritages were
their rude ' peel ' towers, and who, with no acknowledged
chief of their own race, followed, as much for protection as
for plunder, the banner of some more powerful house. In
course of time, when the Marches grew peaceful and morals
improved, when cattle-lifting, no longer profitable, ceased
to be an honourable occupation, such humbler marauders
drifted away into the wide world, leaving no trace behind,
save the grey ruins of their grim fortalices, and the inci
dental mention of some probably disreputable scion in a
chapman's ballad. Neither mark nor memory of the
Jacksons remains in Scotland. We only know that some
members, of the clan, impelled probably by religious perse
cution, made their way to Ulster, where a strong colony of
Lowlanders had already been established.
Under a milder sky and a less drastic government
the expatriated Scots lost nothing of their individuality.
Masterful and independent from the beginning, masterful
and independent they remained, inflexible of purpose, im
patient of injustice, and staunch to their ideals. Some
thing, perhaps, tbey owed to contact with the Celt.
Wherever the Ulster folk have made their home, the breath
of the wholesome North has followed them, preserving B 2

4 STONEWALL JACKSON
untainted their hereditary virtues. Shrewd, practical, and
thrifty, prosperity has consistently rewarded them ; and yet,
in common with tbe Irishmen of English stock, they have
found in the trade of arms the most congenial outlet for
their energies. An abiding love of peace can hardly be
enumerated amongst their more prominent characteristics ;
and it is a remarkable fact, which, unless there is some
mysterious property in the air, can only be explained by
the intermixture of races, that Ireland ' within the Pale '
has been peculiarly prolific of military genius. As
England has bred admirals, so the sister isle has bred
soldiers. The tenacious courage of the Anglo-Saxon,
blended with the spirit of that people which above all
others delights in war, has proved on both sides of the
Atlantic a most powerful combination of martial quali
ties. The same mixed strain which gave England Wolfe
and Wellington, tbe Napiers and the Lawrences, has
given America some of her greatest captains ; and not the
least famous of her Presidents is that General Jackson who
won the battle of New Orleans in 1814. So, early in the
century the name became known beyond the seas; but
whether the same blood ran in the veins of the Confederate
general and of the soldier President is a matter of some
doubt. The former, in almost every single respect, save his
warm heart, was the exact converse of the typical Irishman ;
the latter had a hot temper and a ready wit. Both, how
ever, were undeniably fond of fighting, and a letter
still preserved attests that their ancestors had lived in the
same parish of Londonderry.^
John Jackson, the great-grandfather of our hero,
landed in America in 1748, and it was not long before he set
j^^^g his face towards the wilderness. The emigrants
from Ulster appear as a rule to have moved
westward. The States along the coast were already colonised,
and, despite its fertility, the country was little to their taste.
But beyond tbe border, in the broad Appalachian valley
which runs from the St. Lawrence to Alabama, on the
' This letter is in the possession of Thomas Jaokson Arnold, Esq., oi
Beverly, West Va., nephew of General ' Stonewall ' Jaokson.

HIS BIRTH S
banks of tbe great rivers, the Susquehanna, the Ohio,
the Cumberland, and the Tennessee, they found a land
after their own heart, a soil with whose properties tbey
were familiar, tbe sweet grasses and soft contours of
their native hills. Here, too, there was ample room for
their communities, for the West was as yet but sparsely
tenanted. No inconsiderable number, penetrating far into
the interior, settled eventually about tbe headwaters of the
Potomac and the James. This highland region was the
debateable ground of tbe United States. So late as 1756
the State of Virginia extended no further than the crests
of the Blue Eidge. Two hundred miles westward forts
flying French colours dominated tbe valley of the Ohio, and
the wild and inhospitable tract, a very labyrinth of moun
tains, which lay between, was held by the fierce tribes of
the ' Six Nations ' and the Leni-Lenape. Two years later
the French had been driven back to Canada ; but it was
not till near tbe close of the century that the savage was
finally dispossessed of bis spacious hunting grounds.
It was on these green uplands, where fight and foray
were as frequent as once on the Scottish border, that John
Jackson and his wife, a fellow passenger to America, by
name Elizabeth Cummins, first pitched their camp, and
here is still the home of their descendants.
In the little town of Clarksburg, now the county-seat of
Harrison, but then no more than a village in the Virginia
Jan. 21, backwoods, Thomas Jonathan Jackson was born
1824. on January 21, 1824. His father was a lawyer,
clever and popular, who had inherited a comfortable patri
mony. Tbe New World bad been generous to the Jacksons.
The emigrant of 1748 left a valuable estate, and his many
sons were uniformly prosperous. Nor was tbeir affluence the
reward of energy and thrift alone, for the lands reclaimed by
axe and plough were held by a charter of sword and musket.
The redskin fought hard for his ancestral domains. The
stockaded forts, which stood as a citadel of refuge in every
settlement, were often the scene of fierce attack and weary
leaguer, and the nursing mothers of the frontier families
were no strangers to war and bloodshed. The last great

6 STONEWALL JACKSON
battle with tbe Indians east ofthe Ohio was fought in 1774,
but tbe military experience of tbe pioneers was not confined
to the warfare of the border. John Jackson and his sons bore
arms in the War of Independence, and tbe trained rifle
men of West Virginia were welcome recruits in the colonial
ranks. With the exception of the Highlanders of the '45,
who had been deported in droves to the plantations, no race
had less cause to remain loyal to the Crown than tbe men
of Ulster blood. Even after the siege of Londonderry they
had been proscribed and persecuted ; and in the War of
Independence tbe fiercest enemies of King George were the
descendants of the same Scotch-Irish who had held the
north of Ireland for King William,
In Washington's campaigns more than one of the
Jacksons won rank and reputation ; and when peace was
established they married into influential families. Nor
was the next generation less successful. Judges, senators,
and soldiers upheld the honour of the name, and proved
the worth of the ancestral stock. They were marked,
it is said, by strong and characteristic features, by a warm
feeling of clanship, a capacity for hard work, and a decided
love of roving. Some became hunters, others explorers,
and the race is now scattered from Virginia to Oregon. A
passion for litigation was a general failing, and none of them
could resist the fascination of machinery. Every Jackson
owned a mill or factory of some sort — many of them
more than one — and their ventures were not always profit
able. Jackson's father, among others, found it easier to
make money than to keep it. Generous and incautious,
he became deeply involved by becoming security for others ;
high play increased his embarrassments ; and when he died
in 1827 every vestige of his property was swept away. His
young widow, left with three small children, two sons and
a daughter, became dependent on the assistance of her
kinsfolk for a livelihood, and on the charity of the Free
masons for a roof. When Thomas, her second son, was
six years old, she married a Captain Woodson; but her
second matrimonial Venture was not more fortunate than
her first. Her husband's means were small, and necessity

WEST VIRGINIA 7
Boon compelled her to commit her two boys to the care of
their father's relatives. Within a year the children stood
1831 I'onnd her dying bed, and at a very early age our
little Virginian found himself a penniless orphan.
But, as he never regretted his poverty, so he never forgot
his mother. To tbe latest hour of his life he loved to recall
her memory, and years after she had passed away her
influence still remained. Her beauty, her counsels, their
last parting, and her happy death, for she was a woman of
deep religious feeling, made a profound impression on him.
To his childhood's fancy she was the embodiment of every
grace ; and so strong had been tbe sympathy between
them, that even in the midst of his campaigns she was
seldom absent from his thoughts. After her death the
children found a home with tbeir father's half-brother,
who had inherited the family estates, and was one of the
largest slave-owners in the district. Their surroundings,
however, could hardly be called luxurious. Life on tbe
Ohio was very different from life on the coast. The
western counties of Virginia were still practically on the
frontier of the United States. The axe had thinned the
interminable woods; mills were busy on each mountain
stream, and the sunny valleys were rich in fruit and
corn. But as yet there was little traffic. Steam had
not yet come to open up the wilderness. The popu
lation was small and widely scattered ; and the country
was cut off as much by nature as by distance from
the older civilisation of the East. The parallel ranges
of the Alleghanies, witb their pathless forests and great
canons, were a formidable barrier to all intercourse. The
West was a world in itself. Tbe only outlets eastward
were the valleys of the Potomac and tbe James, the one
leading to Washington, the other to Eichmond ; and so
seldom were tbey used that the yeomen of tbe Ohio up
lands were almost as much opposed, both in character and
in mode of life, to tbe planters beyond the Blue Eidge, as
the Covenanters of BothweU Brig to the gentlemen of
Dundee's Life Guards.
Although the sturdy independence and simple habits of

8 STONEWALL JACKSON
the borderers were not affected by contact with wealthier
communities, isolation was not in every way a blessing.
Served by throngs of slaves, the great landowners of East
Virginia found leisure to cultivate the arts wbich make life
more pleasant. The rambling houses on the banks of the
James, the Eappahannock, and the Potomac, built on the
model of English manors, had their libraries and picture-
galleries. A classical academy was the boast of every
town, and a university training was considered as essential
to tbe son of a planter as to the heir of an English squire.
A true aristocracy, in habit and in lineage, the gentlemen
of Virginia long swayed the councils of the nation, and
among tbem were many who were intimate with the
best representatives of European culture. Beyond the
Alleghanies there were no facilities for education ; and
even had opportunities offered few would have had tbe
leisure to enjoy them. Labour was scarce, either slave or
hired. The owners of farms and mills were their own
managers and overseers, and young men had to serve a
practical apprenticeship to lumbering and agriculture. To
this rule, despite his uncle's wealth, Jackson was no excep
tion. He had to fight his own battle, to rub shoulders
with all sorts and conditions of men, and to hold his
own as best he could.
It was a hard school, then, in wbich he grew to man
hood. But for that very reason it was a good school for
the future soldier. For a man who has to push his own
way in the world, more especially if he has to carve it with
his sword, a boyhood passed amidst surroundings which
boast of no luxury and demand much endurance, is the
best probation. Von Moltke has recorded that the comfort
less routine of the Military Academy at Copenhagen inured
him to privation, and Jackson learned the great lesson of
self-reliance in the rough life of his uncle's homestead.
The story of his early years is soon told. As a
blue-eyed child, witb long fair hair, he was curiously
thoughtful and exceedingly affectionate. His temper was
generous and cheerful. His truthfulness was proverbial,
and his little sister found in him the kindest of playmates

HIS BOYHOOD 9
and the sturdiest of protectors. He was distinguished, too,
for his politeness, although good manners were by no
means rare in the rustic West. The manly courtesy of the
true American is no exotic product ; nor is the universal
deference to woman peculiar to any single class. Tbe
farmer of the backwoods might be ignorant of tbe con
ventionalities, but the simplicity and unselfishness wbich
are the root of all good breeding could be learned in West
Virginia as readily as in Eichmond.
Once, tempted by his brother, the boy left his adopted
home, and the two children, for the elder was no more than
twelve, wandered down tbe Ohio to the Mississippi, and
spent the summer on a lonely and malarious island,
cutting wood for passing steamers. No one opposed tbeir
going, and it seems to have been considered quite natural in
that independent community that the veriest urchins should
be allowed to seek their fortunes for themselves. Eeturning,
ragged and fever-stricken, tbe little adventurers submitted
once more to tbe routine of the farm and to tbe intermit
tent studies of a country school. After his failure as a
man of business, our small hero showed no further inclina
tion to seek his fortunes far afield. He was fond of his
home. His uncle, attracted by his steadiness and good
sense, treated bim more as a companion than a child ; and
in everything connected witb the farm, as well as in tbe
sports of the country side, the boy took the keenest interest.
Delicate by nature, with a tendency to consumption inherited
from his mother, bis physique and constitution bene
fited by a life of constant exercise and wholesome toil. At
school he was a leader in every game, and his proficiency
in the saddle proved bim a true Virginian. Fox-hunting
and horse-racing were popular amusements, and his uncle
not only kept a stable of well-bred horses, but had a four-
mile race-course on his own grounds. As a light-weight
jockey the future general was a useful member of the
household, and it was the opinion of the neighbourhood
that ' if a horse bad any winning qualities whatever in
him, young Jackson never failed to bring them out.'
In the management of tbe estate he learned early to put

10 STONEWALL JACKSON
his shoulder to the wheel. Transporting timber from the
forest to the saw-mill was one of bis most frequent tasks,
and tradition records that if a tree were to be moved from
ground of unusual difficulty, or if there were one more
gigantic than tbe rest, the party of labourers was put under
his control, and the work was sure to be effected.
One who knew bim well has described his character.
' He was a youth of exemplary habits, of indomitable will
and undoubted courage. He was not what is nowadays
termed brilliant, but he was one of those untiring, matter-
of-fact persons who would never give up an undertaking
until he accomplished his object. He learned slowly, but
what he got into bis head he never forgot. He was not
quick to decide, except when excited, and then, when he
made up his mind to do a thing, he did it on short notice
and in quick time. Once, while on his way to school, an
over-grown rustic behaved rudely to one of the school-girls.
Jackson fired up, and told him he must apologise at once
or be would thrash him. Tbe big fellow, supposing that
he was more than a match for him, refused, whereupon
Jackson pitched into him, and gave him a severe pounding.'
His surroundings, then, although neither refined nor
elevating, were not unwholesome ; but of tbe moral influ
ences to which be was subjected, so much cannot be said.
Tbe stock of piety that tbe original settlers had brought with
them had long since vanished. Irregularity of life was
the general rule ; religion was simply a matter to wbich men
gave no thought, and young Jackson drifted with the tide.
Yet there was something that preserved him from contamina
tion. His uncle, kindest of guardians, was as unscrupulous
as be was violent. His associates were by no means the
most respectable of the neighbourhood, and the morals of
the sporting fraternity of a frontier settlement are not
likely to have been edifying. That bis nephew, as he himself
declares, was an ardent frequenter of races, 'house-raisings,' '
and country dances is hardly surprising, and it is assuredly
no ground whatever for reproach. But it is strange tbat,
amid much laxity, he should have retained his integrity,
' AnglicA, ' house-warmings.'

HIS BOYHOOD 11
that his regard for truth should have remained untarnished,
and that he should have consistently held aloof from all
that was mean and vile. His mother was no mere memory
to that affectionate nature.
His good qualities, however, would scarcely of them
selves have done more than raise bim to a respectable
rank amongst the farmers of West Virginia. A spur
was wanting to urge him beyond tbe limits of so con
tracted an existence, and that spur was supplied by an
honourable ambition. Penniless and dependent as be was,
he still remembered that his ancestors bad been distin
guished beyond the confines of tbeir native county, and tbis
legitimate pride in bis own people, a far-off reflection,
perhaps, of the traditional Scottish attitude towards name
and pedigree, exercised a marked influence on his whole
career. ' To prove himself worthy of bis forefathers was
tbe purpose of his early manhood. It gives us a key to
many of tbe singularities of bis character ; to bis hunger
for self-improvement ; to bis punctilious observance, from
a boy, of the essentials of gentlemanly bearing, and to tbe
uniform assertion of bis self-respect.' '
It was bis openly expressed wish for larger advantages
than tbose offered by a country school tbat brought about
his opportunity. In 1841, at tbe age of seventeen,
he became a constable of the county, A sort of
minor sheriff, be bad to execute tbe decrees of the justices,
to serve tbeir warrants, to collect small debts, and to
summon witnesses. It was a curious office for a boy, but
a year or two before be bad been seized with some obscure
form of dyspepsia, and tbe idea tbat a life on horseback,
wbich bis duties necessitated, might restore bis health, had
induced his relatives to obtain the post for bim. Jackson
himself seems to have been influenced by tbe bope that
his salary would help towards bis education, and by tbe
wish to become independent of bis uncle's bounty. His
new duties were uncongenial, but, despite bis youth, be
faced bis responsibilities witb a determination which men
of maturer years might well have envied. In everything
¦ Dabney, vol. i. p. 29.

12 STONEWALL JACKSON
he was scrupulously exact. His accounts were accurately
kept ; be was punctuality itself, and his patience was inex
haustible. For two years he submitted cheerfully to tbe
drudgery of his position, re-establishing his health, but
without advancing a single step towards the goal of his
ambition. But before he was nineteen bis hopes were
unexpectedly realised. Tbe Military Academy at West
Point not only provided, at the expense of the nation,
a sound and liberal education, but offered an opening to
an honourable career. Nominations to cadetsbips were
made by tbe Secretary of War, on the recommendation of
J .g members of Congress, and in 1842 a vacancy
occurred which was to be filled by a youth from
the Congressional District in which Clarksburg was in
cluded. Jackson, informed of the chance by a friendly
blacksmith, eagerly embraced it, and left no stone unturned
to attain bis object. Every possible influence tbat could be
brought to bear on the member for the district was immedi
ately enlisted. To tbose who objected that his education
was too imperfect to enable him even to enter the Academy,
he replied tbat he had tbe necessary application, that
be hoped be bad the capacity, and that he was at least
determined to try. His earnestness and courage won upon
all. His application was strongly backed by tbose who
had learned to value bis integrity and exactness, and
Mr. Hays, tbe member for the district, wrote that he would
do all in his power to secure tbe appointment. No sooner
had the letter been read than Jackson determined to go at
once to Washington, in order tbat he might be ready to
proceed to West Point without a moment's delay. Packing
a few clothes into a pair of saddlebags, he mounted his
horse, and accompanied by a servant, who was to bring tbe
animal home, rode off to catch tbe coach at Clarksburg.
It had already passed, but galloping on, he overtook it at
the next stage, and on his arrival at Washington, Mr.
Hays at once introduced him to the Secretary of War. On
presenting bim, be explained tbe disadvantages of bis edu
cation, but begged indulgence for bim on account of his pluck
and determination. The Secretary plied bim with questions,

THE CADET 18
but Jackson was not to be diverted from his purpose ; and so
good was the impression which he made tbat be then and
there received his warrant, accompanied by some excellent
advice. ' Sir,' said tbe Secretary, ' you have a good name.
Go to West Point, and tbe first man who insults you, knock
him down, and have it charged to my account ! '
Mr. Hays proposed that the new-fledged cadet should
stay, with him for a few days in order to see the sights of
Washington. But as the Academy was already in session,
Jackson, with a strong appreciation of tbe value of time,
begged to decline. He was content to ascend to the roof
of the Capitol, then still building, and look once on tbe
magnificent panorama of wbich it is the centre.
At bis feet lay the city, witb its busy streets and im
posing edifices. To tbe south ran the Potomac, bearing
on its ample tide tbe snowy sails of many merchantmen,
and spanned by a bridge more than a mile in length. Over
against the Capitol, looking down on tbat wide-watered
shore, stood the white porch of Arlington, once tbe property
of Washington, and now the home of a young officer of
the United States army, Eobert Edward Lee. Beyond
Arlington lay Virginia, Jackson's native State, stretching
back in leafy bills and verdant pastures, and far and low
upon the western horizon bis own mountains loomed faintly
through tbe summer haze. It was a strange freak of
fortune that placed bim at the very outset of bis career
within sight of tbe theatre of his most famous victories.
It was a still stranger caprice tbat was to make tbe name
of tbe simple country youth, ill-educated and penniless, as
terrible in Washington as the name of the Black Douglas
was once in Durham and Carlisle.
It was in July 1842 tbat one of America's greatest
soldiers first answered to his name on tbe parade-ground
1842 ^* West Point. Shy and silent, clad in Virginia
homespun, witb the whole of bis personal effects
carried in a pair of weatberstained saddlebags, tbe impres
sion tbat he made on bis future comrades, as tbe Secretary
of War appears to have anticipated, was by no means favour
able. Tbe West Point cadets were then, as now, remarkable

14 STONEWALL JACKSON
for their upright carriage, the neatness of their appoint
ments, and tbeir soldierly bearing towards tbeir officers and
towards each other. The grey coatee, decorated with
bright buttons and broad gold lace, the shako with tall
plumes, the spotless white trousers, set off the trim young
figures to the best advantage ; and the full-dress parade of
the cadet battalion, marked by discipline and precision in
every movement, is still one of the most attractive of
military spectacles.
These natty young gentlemen were not slow to detect
tbe superficial deficiencies of the newcomer. A system of
practical joking, carried to extremes, bad long been a
feature of West Point life. Jackson, with the rusticity of
tbe backwoods apparent at every turn, promised the
highest sport. And here it may be written, once for all,
tbat however nearly in point of character tbe intended
victim reached the heroic standard, his outward graces were
few. His features were well cut, his forehead high, his
mouth small and firm, and his complexion fresh. Yet the
ensemble was not striking, nor was it redeemed by grave
eyes and a heavy jaw, a strong but angular frame, a certain
awkwardness of movement, and large hands and fpet. His
would-be tormentors, however, soon found they had mistaken
their man. Tbe homespun jacket covered a natural shrewd
ness whicb had been sharpened by responsibility. The
readiness of resource which had characterised the whilom
constable was more than a match for their most ingenious
schemes ; and baffled by a temper which they were powerless
to disturb, their attempts at persecution, apparently more
productive of amusement to their victim than to them
selves, were soon abandoned,
Eough as was the life of the Virginia border, it had
done something to fit tbis unpromising recruit for the give
and take of his new existence. Culture might be lacking
in the distant West, but tbe air men breathed was at least
tbe blessed breath of independence. Each was what he
made himself. A man's standing depended on his success
in life, and success was within the reach of all. There,
like bis neighbours, Jackson had learned to take his

THE WEST POINT TRAINING 1ft
own part ; like them he acknowledged no superiority
save that of actual merit, and believing that tbe richest
prize might be won by energy and perseverance, without
diffldence or misgiving he faced his future. He knew
nothing of the life of the great nation of which be was so
insignificant an atom, of the duties of tbe army, of tbe
manners of its officers. He knew only tbat even as regards
education he had an uphill task before him. He was
indeed on tbe threshold of a new world, with bis own way
to make, and apparently no single advantage in bis favour.
But be came of a fighting race ; be bad bis own inflexible
resolution to support him, and his determination expressed
itself in bis very bearing. Four cadets, three of whom were
afterwards Confederate generals,^ were standing together
when he first entered tbe gates of the Academy. ' There
was about him,' says one of them, ' so sturdy an expression
of purpose that I remarked, " That fellow looks as if be
had come to stay." '
Jackson's educational deficiencies were more difficult of
conquest than the goodwill of his comrades. His want of
previous training placed bim at a great disadvantage. He
commenced bis career amongst ' tbe Immortals ' (tbe last
section of tbe class), and it was only by tbe most strenuous
efforts tbat he maintained bis place. His struggles at the
blackboard were often painful to witness. In tbe struggle to
solve a problem he invariably covered both bis face and uni
form with chalk, and be perspired so freely, even in tbe
coldest weather, tbat the cadets, witb boyish exaggeration,
declared tbat whenever ' tbe General,' as he had at once been
dubbed in honour of his namesake, tbe victor of New Orleans,
got a difficult proposition he was certain to flood tbe class
room. It was all he could do to pass his first examination.^
' We were studying,' writes a classmate, ' algebra and
analytical geometry that winter, and Jackson was very low
in his class. Just before tbe signal " lights out " he would
pile up bis grate with anthracite coal, and lying prone
before it on the floor, would work away at his lessons by
' A. p. Hill, G. E. Piokett, and D. H. Maury.
2 Communicated by General John Gibbon, U.S.A.

16 STONEWALL JACKSON
the glare of tbe fire, wbich scorched his very brain, till a
late hour of tbe night. Tbis evident determination to
succeed not only aided his own efforts directly, but im
pressed his instructors in his favour. If he could not
master tbe portion of tbe text-book assigned for tbe
day, he would not pass it over, but continued to work at
it till he understood it. Thus it often happened tbat when
he was called out to repeat his task, he had to reply that
he bad not yet reached tbe lesson of the day, but was
employed upon tbe previous one. There was then no alter
native but to mark bim as unprepared, a proceeding wbich
did not in the least affect his resolution,'
Despite all drawbacks, his four years at tbe Academy
were years of steady progress. ' The Immortals ' were soon
left far behind. At the end of the first twelve months he
stood fifty-first in a class of seventy-two, but when be entered
tbe first class, and commenced tbe study of logic, tbat
bugbear to the majority, be shot from near the foot of the
class to tbe top. In the final examination he came out
seventeenth, notwithstanding tbat tbe less successful years
were taken into account, and it was a frequent remark
amongst his brother cadets that if tbe course bad been a
year longer be would have come out first. His own
satisfaction was complete. Not only was his perseverance
rewarded by a place sufficiently high to give bim a com
mission in tbe artillery, but his cravings for knowledge
bad been fully gratified. West Point was much more than
a military school. It was a university, and a university
under the very strictest discipline, where tbe science of tbe
soldier formed only a portion of the course. Subjects
whicb are now considered essential to a military education
were not taught at all. The art of war gave place to
ethics and engineering ; and mathematics and chemistry
were considered of far more importance than topography
and fortification. Yet with French, history, and drawing,
it will be admitted tbat the course was sufficiently com
prehensive. No cadet was permitted to graduate unless he
bad reached a high standard of proficiency. Failures were
numerous. In the four years the classes grew gradually

THE WEST POINT TRAINING 17
smaller, and the survival of the fittest was a principle of
administration whicb was rigidly observed.
The fact, then, tbat a man bad passed tbe final examina
tion at West Point was a sufficient certificate that be bad
received a thorough education, that bis mental faculties
bad been strengthened by four years of bard work, and
tbat he was well equipped to take his place amongst bis
fellow men. And it was more than tbis. Four years of
tbe strictest discipline, for the cadets were allowed only
one vacation during tbeir whole course, were sufficient to
break in even the most careless and tbe most slovenly to
neatness, obedience, and punctuality. Such habits are not
easily unlearned, and tbe West Point certificate was thus
a guarantee of qualities tbat are everywhere useful. It did
not necessarily follow tbat because a cadet won a com
mission he remained a soldier. Many went to civil life,
and tfie Academy was an excellent school for men who
intended to find a career as surveyors or engineers, Tbe
great railway system of tbe United States was then in
its infancy; its development offered endless possibilities,
and tbe work of extending civilisation in a vast and rapidly
improving country bad perhaps more attraction for tbe
ambitious than the career of arms. Tbe training and
discipline of West Point were not, then, concentrated in one
profession, but were disseminated throughout tbe States ;
and it was witb tbis purpose tbat tbe institution of tbe
Academy had been approved by Congress.
In the wars with England tbe militia of tbe different
States had furnished tbe means both of resistance and
aggression, but tbeir grave shortcomings, owing princi
pally to tbe lack of competent officers, bad been painfully
conspicuous. After 1814, tbe principle tbat the militia
was the first line of defence was still adhered to, and tbe
standing army was merely maintained as a school for
generals and a frontier guard. It was expected, however,
that in case of war the West Point graduates would supply
the national forces witb a large number of officers who,
despite tbeir civil avocations, would at least be familiar
with drill and discipline. Tbis fact is to be borne in mind
VOL. I. 0

18 STONEWALL JACKSON
in view of the Civil War. Tbe demands of the enormous
armies then put into tbe field were utterly unprecedented,
and the supply of West Pointers was altogether inadequate
to meet them ; but tbe influence of the Military Academy
was conspicuous throughout. Not a few of tbe most able
generals were little more than boys ; and yet, as a rule,
they were far superior to those who came from tbe militia
or volunteers. Four years of strict routine, of constant
drill, and implicit subordination, at the most impressionable
period of life, proved a far better training for command than
the desultory and intermittent service of a citizen army.
During his stay at West Point Jackson's development
was not all in one direction. He gained in health and
strength. When he joined he had not yet attained his
full height, wbich fell short of six feet by two inches. The
constant drilling developed his frame. He grew rapidly,
and soon acquired tbe erect bearing of tbe soldier ; but
notwithstanding the incessant practice in riding, fencing
and marching, his anatomical peculiarities still asserted
themselves. It was with great difficulty that he mastered
the elementary process of keeping step, and despite his
youthful proficiency as a jockey, tbe regulation seat of tbe
dragoon, to be acquired on the back of a rough cavalry
trooper, was an accomplishment which he never mastered.
If it be added tbat his shyness never thawed, tbat be was
habitually silent, it is hardly surprising to find that he bad
few intimates at tbe Academy. Caring nothing for tbe
opinion of others, and tolerant of association rather than
seeking it, his self-contained nature asked neither sympathy
nor affection. His studious habits never left him. His
only recreation was a rapid walk in the intervals of the
classes. His whole thoughts and his whole energy were
centred on doing his duty, and passing into tbe army
witb all tbe credit he could possibly attain. Although he
was thoroughly happy at West Point, life to him, even at
tbat early age, was a serious business, and most seriously
he set about it.
Still, unsociable and irresponsive as he was, there were
those in whose company he found pleasure, cadets who had

HIS INDEPENDENCE 19
studied subjects not included in the West Point course,
and from_ wbom there was something to be learned. It was
an unwritten law of the Academy that tbose of tbe senior
year should not make companions of tbeir juniors. But
Jackson paid no heed to tbe traditionary code of etiquette.
His acquaintances were chosen regardless of standing, as
often from tbe class below bim as bis own; and in yet
another fashion bis strength of character was displayed.
Towards tbose who were guilty of dishonourable conduct
he was merciless almost to vindictiveness. He had bis
own code of right and wrong, and from one who infringed
it he would accept neither apology nor excuse. His musket,
which was always scrupulously clean, was one day replaced
by another in most slovenly order. He called tbe attention
of his captain to his loss, and described tbe private mark by
which it was to be identified. Tbat evening, at tbe inspec
tion of arms, it was found in tbe bands of another cadet,
who, when taxed with bis offence, endeavoured to shield
himself by falsehood. Jackson's anger was unbounded, and
for tbe moment bis habitual shyness completely disappeared.
He declared tbat sucb a creature should not continue a
member of tbe Academy, and demanded tbat be should be
tried by court-martial and expelled. It was only by means
of tbe most persevering remonstrances on tbe part of bis
comrades and bis officers tbat be could be induced to waive
bis right of pressing the charge. His regard for duty, too,
was no less marked than bis respect for truth. During one
half-year bis room-mate was orderly-sergeant of bis com
pany, and tbis good-natured if perfunctory young gentleman
often told Jackson tbat be need not attend tbe reveille roll-
call, at whicb every cadet was supposed to answer to bis name.
Not once, however, did be avail himself of tbe privilege.'
At tbe same time be was not altogether so uncompro
mising as at first sight he appeared. At West Point, as
in after years, tbose who saw bim interested or excited
noticed that bis smile was singularly sweet, and the cadets
knew tbat it revealed a warm heart within. Whenever,
from sickness or misfortune, a comrade stood in need of
' Communicated by Colonel P. T. Turnley.
02

20 STONEWALL JACKSON
sympathy, Jackson was tbe first to offer it, and he would
devote himself to his help witb a tenderness so womanly
tbat it sometimes excited ridicule. Sensitive he was not,
for of vanity he had not tbe slightest taint ; but of tact
and sensibility be possessed more than bis share. If be
was careless of what others thought of bim, he thought
much of tbem. Though no one made more light of paiu
on his own account, no one could have more carefully
avoided giving pain to others, except when duty demanded
it ; and one of bis classmates ' testifies tbat he went through
the trying ordeal of four years at West Point without
ever having a hard word or bad feeling from cadet or
professor. Nor did his comrades fail to remember that wben he
was unjustly blamed he chose to bear the imputation
silently rather than expose tbose who were really at
fault. And so, even in tbat ligbtbearted battalion, his
sterling worth compelled respect. All honoured bis efforts
and wished bim God-speed. ' While there were many,'
says Colonel Turnley, ' who seemed to surpass bim in
intellect, in geniality, and in good-fellowsbip, there was
no one of our class who more absolutely possessed the
respect and confidence of all; and in the end " Old Jack,"
as he was always called, with his desperate earnestness, his
unflinching straightforwardness, and bis high sense of
honour, came to be regarded by bis comrades witb some
thing very like affection.'
One peculiarity cannot be passed by.
When at study he always sat bolt upright at his table
witb bis book open before bim, and wben he was not using
pencil and paper to solve a problem, he would often keep
bis eyes fixed on tbe wall or ceiling in tbe most profound
abstraction. 'No one I have ever known,' says a cadet
who shared bis barrack-room, ' could so perfectly withdraw
his mind from surrounding objects or influences, and so
thoroughly involve bis whole being in the subject under
consideration. His lessons were uppermost in his mind,
and to thoroughly understand tbem was always his deter-
* Colonel Tuinley.

HIS MAXIMS 21
mined effort. To make tbe author's knowledge bis own
was ever tbe point at which be aimed. This intense
application of mind was naturally strengthened by constant
exercise, and month by month, and year by year, bis
faculties of perception developed rapidly, until he grasped
witb unerring quickness the inceptive points of all ethical
and mathematical problems.'
Tbis power of abstraction and of application is well
worth noting, for not only was it remarkable in a boy, but,
as we sball see hereafter, it had much to do witb tbe making
of tbe soldier.
At West Point Jackson was troubled with the return of
the obscure complaint whicb had already threatened him,
and he there began tbat rigid observance of tbe laws of
health wbich afterwards developed to almost an eccen
tricity. His peculiar attitude when studying was due to
tbe fear tbat if be bent over bis work the compression of his
internal organs might increase tbeir tendency to disease.
And not only did he lay down rules for bis physical
regimen, A book of maxims which be drew up at West
Point has been preserved, and we learn tbat bis scrupulous
exactness, his punctilious courtesy, and bis choice of com
panions were tbe outcome of much deliberation.
Nothing in tbis curious volume occurs to show tbat bis
thoughts bad yet been turned to religion. It is as free
from all reference to tbe teachings of Christianity as tbe
maxims of Marcus Aurelius.
Every line there written shows tbat at tbis period of
Jackson's life devotion to duty was bis guiding rule ; and,
notwithstanding bis remarkable freedom from egotism, tbe
traces of an engrossing ambition and of absolute self-
dependence are everywhere apparent. Many of the senti
ments he would have repudiated in after-life as inconsistent
witb humility ; but there can be no question that it was a
strong and fearless hand tbat penned on a conspicuous
page the sentence : ' You can be what you resolve
to be.' Jackson was already a man in years wben he passed
bis final examination, and bere tbe record of bis boyhood

23 STONEWALL JACKSON
may fitly closa. He bad made no particular mark at the
Academy. His memory, in the minds of bis comrades, was
^g^g associated witb his gravity, his silence, his kind
heart, and his awkward movements. No one sus
pected bim of nobler qualities than dogged perseverance and
a strict regard for truth, Tbe officers and sergeants of tbe
cadet battalion were supplied by the cadets themselves ;
but Jackson was never promoted. In tbe mimic warfare
of tbe playground at Brienne Napoleon was master of the
revels. His capacity for command had already been
detected; but neither comrade nor teacher saw beneath
tbe unpromising exterior of tbe West Point student a trace
of aught save what was commonplace.
And yet there is much in the boyhood of Stonewall
Jackson tbat resembles the boyhood of Napoleon, of all
great soldiers tbe most original. Both were affectionate.
Napoleon lived on bread and water that he might educate
his brothers ; Jackson saved his cadet's pay to give bis sister
a silk dress. Both were indefatigable students, impressed
with tbe conviction that tbe world was to be conquered by
force of intellect. Jackson, burning bis lessons into bis
brain, is but tbe counterpart of the young officer who lodged
witb a professor of mathematics that be might attend his
classes, and who would wait to explain tbe lectures to those
who bad not clearly understood tbem. Both were provin
cial, neither was prepossessing. If tbe West Point cadets
laughed at Jackson's large hands and feet, was not Napoleon,
with bis thin legs thrust into enormous boots, saluted by his
firiend's children, on his first appearance in uniform, with
tbe nickname of Le Chat Botte ? It is bard to say which
was tbe more laughable : tbe spare and bony figure of tbe
cadet, sitting bolt upright like a graven image in a tight
uniform, witb bis eyes glued to tbe ceiling of his barrack-
room, or tbe young man, with gaunt features, round
shoulders, and uncombed hair, who wandered alone about
tbe streets of Paris in 1795.
Tbey bad tbe same love of method and of order. The
accounts of tbe Virginian constable were not more scrupu
lously kept than tbe ledgers of Napoleon's household, nor

COMPARED WITH NAPOLEON 23
could they show a greater regard for economy than the
tailor's bill, still extant, on which tbe future Emperor
gained a reduction of four sous. But it was not on sucb
trivial lines alone that tbey run parallel. An inflexibility of
purpose,^ an absolute disregard of popular opinion, and an
unswerving belief in tbeir own capacity, were predominant
in both. They could say 'No.' Neither sought sym
pathy, and both felt tbat tbey were masters of tbeir own
fate. * You can be whatever you resolve to be ' may be
well placed alongside the speech of the brigadier of five-
and-twenty : ' Have patience. I will command in Paris
presently. What should I do there now ? '
But bere tbe parallel ends. In Jackson, even as a
cadet, self was subordinate to duty. Pride was foreign
to his nature. He was incapable of pretence, and bis
simplicity was inspired by tbat disdain of all meanness
which had been bis characteristic from a child. His brain
was disturbed by no wild visions ; no intemperate ambition
confused his sense of right and wrong, ' Tbe essence of bis
mind,' as bas been said of another of like mould, ' was clear
ness, healthy purity, incompatibility with fraud in any of
its forms.' It was bis instinct to be true and straight
forward as it was Napoleon's to be false and subtle. And
if, as a youth, he showed no trace of marked intellectual
power ; if bis instructors saw no sign of masterful resolution
and a genius for command, it was because at West Point,
as elsewhere, bis great qualities lay dormant, awaiting the
emergency that should call them forth.

24 STONEWALL JACKSON

CHAPTEE II
MEXICO '
On June 80, 1846, Jackson received the brevet rank of
second lieutenant of artillery. He was fortunate from the
very outset of bis military career. The officers
of tbe United States army, thanks to tbe thorough
education and Spartan discipline of West Point, were fine
soldiers ; but tbeir scope was limited. On the western fron
tier, far beyond tbe confines of civilisation, stood a long
line of forts, often hundreds of miles apart, garrisoned by
a few troops of cavalry or companies of infantry. It is
true that there was little chance of soldierly capacity
rusting in these solitary posts. From the borders of
Canada to tbe banks of the Eio Grande swarmed thou
sands of savage warriors, ever watchful for an opportunity
to pay back witb bloody interest tbe aggression of the
whites. Murder, robbery, and massacre followed each
other in rapid succession, and tbe troops were allowed few
intervals of rest. But the warfare was inglorious — a mere
series of petty incidents, tbe punishment of a raid, or the
crushing of an isolated revolt. Tbe scanty butcher's bills
of tbe so-called battles made small appeal to the popular
imagination, and tbe deeds of tbe soldiers in tbe western
wilderness, gallant as they might be, aroused less interest
in tbe States than the conflicts of the police with tbe New
York mob. But although pursuits which carried tbe adver
saries half across the continent, forays wbich were of
longer duration than a European war, and fights against
overwhelming odds, where no quarter was asked or given,
kept tbe American officers constantly employed, tbeir
' Copyright 1897 by Longmans, Green, & Co.

" FRONTIER W^ARFARE 25
training was hardly sufficient for tbe needs of a great
campaign. In tbe running fights against Apache or Black-
foot tbe rules of strategy and tactics were of small account.
Tbe soldier was constrained to acknowledge 'the brave'
and the trapper as bis teachers ; and Moltke himself, witb
all his lore, would have been utterly baffled by tbe cunning
of tbe Indian. Before the war of 1845-6 the strength
of the regular army was not more than 8,500 men ;
and the whole of this force, witb tbe exception of a few
batteries, was scattered in small detachments along tbe
frontier, Tbe troops were never brought together in con
siderable bodies ; and although they were well drilled and
under tbe strictest discipline, neither tbe commanders nor
tbe staff had tbe least experience of handling men in
masses. Many of tbe infantry officers bad never drilled
with a whole battalion since tbey left West Point. A
brigade of cavalry — tbat is, two or three regiments working
together as a single unit — bad never been assembled ; and
scarcely a single general bad ever commanded a force com
posed of the three arms, either on service or on parade.
' During my twenty years of service on tbe frontier,' said
one of tbe most famous of tbe Confederate leaders,' ' I
learned all about commanding fifty United States dragoons
and forgot everything else,'
Nevertheless, this life of enterprise and bard work, tbe
constant struggle against nature, for tbe illimitable space
of tbe inhospitable wilderness was a more formidable
antagonist than tbe stealthy savage, benefited tbe
American soldier in more ways than one. He grew
accustomed to danger and privation. He learned to use
his wits ; to adapt bis means to bis end ; to depend on bis
intelligence rather than on rule. Above all, even tbe most
junior bad experience of independent command before tbe
enemy, A ready assumption of responsibility and a
prompt initiative distinguished the regular officers from
tbe very outset of tbe Civil War ; and these characteristics
bad been acquired on tbe western prairies.
But the warfare of tbe frontier had none of the glamour
' General E. S. EweU.

26 STONEWALL JAOKSON
of the warfare whicb is waged witb equal arms against an
equal enemy, of tbe conflict of nation against nation. To
bring tbe foe to bay was a matter of tbe utmost difficulty,
A fight at close quarters was of rare occurrence, and
the most successful campaign ended in tbe destruction of
a cluster of dirty wigwams, or tbe surrender of a handful
of starving savages. In sucb unsatisfactory service Jackson
was not called upon to take a part. It is doubtful if be
ever crossed tbe Mississippi, His first experience of cam
paigning was to be on a field where gleams of glory were
not wanting, Tbe ink on bis commission was scarcely dry
when tbe artillery subaltern was ordered to join his regi
ment, tbe First Artillery, in Mexico, The war with tbe
Southern Eepublic bad blazed out on the Texan border in
1845, and the American Government bad now decided to
carry it into tbe heart of the hostile territory, Witb the
cause of quarrel we have no concern. General Grant has
condemned tbe war as ' one of tbe most unjust ever waged
by a stronger against a weaker nation.' ' Be tbis as it may,
it is doubtful whether any of Grant's brother officers
troubled themselves at all witb tbe equity of invasion. It
was enough for tbem tbat tbe expedition meant a struggle
with a numerous enemy, armed and organised on tbe Euro
pean model, and witb much experience of war ; tbat it
promised a campaign in a country wbich was the very region
of romance, possessing a lovely climate, historic cities, and
magnificent scenery. Tbe genius of Prescott bad just
disentombed from dusty archives the marvellous story of
tbe Spanish conquest, and tbe imagination of many a youth
ful soldier bad been already kindled by his glowing pages.
To follow tbe path of Cortez, to traverse the golden realms of
Montezuma, to look upon the lakes and palaces of Mexico,
tbe most ancient city of America, to encamp among the
temples of a vanished race, and to hear, while tbe fireflies
flitted through tbe perfumed night, tbe music of the black-
eyed maidens of New Spain — was ever more fascinating
prospect offered to a subaltern of two-and-twenty ?
Tbe companies of tbe First Artillery which had been
' Grant's Memoirs, vol. i. p. 53.

ACTIVE SERVICE 27
detailed for foreign service were first transferred to Point
Isabel, at tbe moutb of tbe Eio Grande. Several engage
ments bad already taken place. Palo Alto, Eesaca de la
Palma, and Monterey were brilliant American victories, won
by hard fighting over superior numbers ; and a vast extent
of territory bad been overrun. But the Mexicans were
still unconquered. Tbe provinces they bad lost were but
tbe fringe of tbe national domains ; tbe heart of the Eepublic
had not yet felt tbe pressure of war, and more than
six hundred miles of difficult country intervened between
the invaders and tbe capital. Tbe American proposals for
peace had been summarily rejected. A new President,
General Santa Anna, had been raised to power, and under
his vigorous administration tbe war threatened to assume
a phase sufficiently embarrassing to tbe United States.
Jackson bad been attached to a heavy battery, and bis
first duty was to transport guns and mortars to the forts
which protected Point Isabel. Tbe prospect of immediate
employment before tbe enemy was small. Operations bad
come to a standstill. It was already apparent tbat a
direct advance upon tbe capital, through tbe northern
provinces, was an enterprise whicb would demand an
army much larger than tbe Government was disposed
to furnish. It seemed as if tbe First Artillery bad come
too late. Jackson was fearful tbat tbe war might come
to an end before bis regiment should be sent to tbe
front. Tbe shy cadet bad a decided taste for fighting.
' I envy you men,' be said to a comrade more fortunate
than himself,' ' who have been in battle. How I should
like to be in one battle ! ' His longing for action was
soon gratified. Mexico bad no navy and a long sea-board.
Tbe fleet of tbe United States was strong, tbeir maritime
resources ample, and to land an army on a shorter route
to the distant capital was no difficult undertaking.
General Winfield Scott, who bad been sent out as
commander-in-chief, was permitted, early in 1847, to
organise a combined naval and military expedition for the
reduction of Vera Cruz, tbe principal port of tbe Eepublic,
' Lieutenant D. H. Hill, afterwards his brother-in-law.

28 STONEWALL JACKSON
whence a good road leads to Mexico. Tbe line of advance
j^g^ would be thus reduced to two hundred and sixty
miles ; and tbe natural obstacles, though numerous
enough, were far less serious than the deserts which barred
invasion from the north. For tbis enterprise most of the
regular regiments were withdrawn from tbe Eio Grande ;
and General Taylor, tbe hero of Palo Alto and Monterey, was
left with a small army, composed principally of volunteers,
to hold tbe conquered provinces. Scott's troops assembled
in tbe first instance at Tampico. Tbe transports, eighty
in number, having embarked tbeir freight, were directed to
rendezvous in the roadstead of Lobos, one hundred and
twenty mUes north of Vera Cruz; and wben tbe whole
had assembled, tbe fleet set sail for Los Sacrificios,
tbe island where Cortez had landed in 1520, three miles
south of tbe city. Tbe army of invasion, in which tbe
First Eegiment of Artillery was included, consisted of
„ , 13,000 men. On the morning of March 9 the
sun shone propitiously on the expedition. The
surf-boats, each holding from seventy to eighty men,
were quickly arrayed in line. Then, dashing forward
simultaneously, with the strains of martial music sweep
ing over the smooth waters of the bay, they neared the
shore. The landing was covered by seven armed vessels,
and as the boats touched the beach tbe foremost men
leaped into tbe water and ran up the sandy shore. In one
hour General Worth's division, numbering 4,500 men, was
disembarked ; and by the same precise arrangements the
whole army was landed in six hours without accident or
confusion. To the astonishment of the Americans the
enemy offered no resistance, and tbe troops bivouacked in
hne of battle on the beach.
Little more than a mile north, across a waste of sand
hills, rose tbe white walls of Vera Cruz, The city was held
by 4,000 men, and its armament was formidable, Tbe
troops, however, but partially organised, were incapable of
operations in the open field. The garrison had not been
reinforced, Santa Anna, on learning that the American
army on the Eio Grande had been reduced, had acted with

FALL OF VERA CRUZ 29
commendable promptitude. Collecting all the troops that
were available he had marched northwards, expecting,
doubtless, to overwhelm Taylor and still to be in time to
prevent Scott from seizing a good harbour. But dis
tance was agaiast him, and his precautions were inade
quate. Even if he defeated Taylor, he would have to
march more than a thousand miles to encounter Scott,
and Vera Cruz was ill provided for a siege. It was
difficult, it is true, for the Mexican general to anticipate
the point at whicb the Americans would disembark.
An army that moves by sea possesses the advantage
that its movements are completely veiled. But Vera
Cruz was decidedly the most probable objective of the
invaders, and, had it been made secure, the venture of
the Americans would have been rendered hazardous.
As it was, with Santa Anna's army far away, the
reduction of the fortress presented little difficulty. An
immediate assault would in all likelihood have proved
successful. Scott, however, decided on a regular siege.
His army was small, and a march on tbe capital was
in prospect. Tbe Government grudged both men and
money, and an assault would have cost more lives than
could well be spared. On March 18 the trenches were
completed. Four days later, sufficient heavy ordnance
having been landed, the bombardment was begun. On the
M roh 27 ^'^^^ ^^^ town surrendered ; the garrison laid
down their arms, and 400 cannon, many of large
calibre, fell into tbe hands of the Americans.
The fall of Vera Cruz was brought about by the heavy
artillery, aided by tbe sailors, and the First Eegiment was
continuously engaged. The Mexican fire, notwithstanding
their array of guns, was comparatively harmless. The
garrison attempted no sortie ; and only 64 of tbe investing
force were killed or wounded. Nevertheless, Jackson's be
haviour under fire attracted notice, and a few months
later he was promoted to first lieutenant ' for gallant and
meritorious conduct at the siege of Vera Cruz.' '
' He had been promoted second lieutenant on March 3. Records of
the First Regiment of Artillery.

so STONEWALL JACKSON
Scott had now secured an admirable line of operations ;
but the projected march upon the city of Mexico was a far
more arduous undertaking than the capture of tbe port.
The ancient capital of Montezuma stands high above the
sea. The famous valley which surrounds it is embosomed
in the heart of a vast plateau, and tbe roads wbich lead to
this lofty region wind by steep gradients over successive
ranges of rugged and precipitous mountains. Between Vera
Cruz and the upland lies a level plain, sixty miles broad,
and covered with tropical forest. Had it been possible
to follow up the initial victory by a rapid advance,
Cerro Gordo, the first, and the most difficult, of the moun
tain passes, might have been occupied without a blow.
Santa Anna, defeated by Taylor at Buena Vista, but return
ing hot foot to block Scott's path, was still distant, and
Cerro Gordo was undefended. But the progress of the
Americans was arrested by tbe difficulties inherent in all
maritime expeditions.
An army landing on a hostile coast has to endure a
certain period of inactivity. Under ordinary circumstances,
as at Vera Cruz, the process of disembarking men is rapidly
accomplished. The field-guns follow with but little delay,
and a certain proportion of cavalry becomes early available.
But the disembarkation of the impedimenta — the stores,
waggons, hospitals, ammunition, and transport animals —
even where ample facilities exist, demands far more time
than the disembarkation of the fighting force. In tbe pre
sent case, as all the animals had to be requisitioned in the
country, it was not till the middle of April that supplies
and transport sufficient to warrant further movement had
been accumulated ; and meanwhile General Santa Anna,
halting in the mountains, had occupied the pass of Cerro
Gordo with 13,000 men and 42 pieces of artillery. The
Mexican position was exceedingly strong. The right rested
on a deep ravine, with precipitous cliffs ; the left, on the hill
of Cerro Gordo, covered with batteries, and towering to the
height of several hundred feet above the surrounding ridges ;
while the front, strongly intrenched, and commanding the

BATTLE OF CERRO GORDO 31
road wbich wound zigzag fashion up the steep ascent,
followed the crest of a lofty ridge.
The Americans reached the foot of the pass without
difficulty. The enemy had made no attempt to check their
passage through the forest. Confident in the inaccessi
bility of his mountain crags, in his numerous guns and
massive breastworks, Santa Anna reserved his strength for
battle on ground of bis own selection.
Several days were consumed in reconnaissance. The
engineers, to whom this duty was generally assigned in
the American army, pushed their explorations to either
flank. At length the quick eye of a young officer. Captain
Eobert Lee, already noted for his services at Vera Cruz,
discovered a line of approach, hidden from the enemy, by
which tbe position might be turned. In three days a rough
road was constructed by which guns could be brought to
bear on tbe hill of Cerro Gordo, and infantry marched round
to strike tbe Mexicans in rear. The attack, delivered at day
light on April 18, was brilliantly successful. The enemy was
completely surprised. Cerro Gordo was stormed with the
. ., ,g bayonet, and Santa Anna's right, assaulted from a
^" ' direction whence he confessed that he had not
believed a goat could approach his lines, was rolled back in
confusion on his centre. 1,200 Mexicans were killed and
wounded, and 3,000 captured, together with the whole of
their artillery.' The next day the pursuit was pushed witb
uncompromising resolution. Amidst pathless mountains,
6,000 feet above the sea, where every spur formed a strong
position, the defeated army was permitted neither halt nor
respite. The American dragoons, undeterred by numbers,
pressed forward along tbe road, making hundreds of
prisoners, and spreading panic in the broken ranks. The
infantry followed, sturdily breasting tbe long ascent ; a
second intrenched position, barring tbe La Hoya pass,
J. J- was abandoned on tbeir approach; the strong
*^ ' castle of Perote, with an armament of 60 guns
and mortars, opened its gates without firing a shot,
' The Americans had about 8,500 men upon the field, and their loss was
431, including two generals. Memoirs of Lieut.-Oeneral Scott.

32 STONEWALL JACKSON
and on May 15 the great city of Puebla, surrounded by
glens of astonishing fertility, and only eighty miles from
Mexico, was occupied without resistance.
At Cerro Gordo the First Artillery were employed as
infantry. Their colours were amongst the first to be
planted on the enemy's breastworks. But in none of the
reports does Jackson's name occur.' Tbe battle, however,
brought him good luck. Captain Magruder, an officer of his
own regiment, who was to win distinction on wider fields,
had captured a Mexican field battery, which Scott presented
to him as a reward for his gallantry. Indian wars had
done but little towards teaching American soldiers the true
use of artillery. Against a rapidly moving enemy, who
systematically forebore exposing himself in mass, and in a
country where no roads existed, only tbe fire-arm was
effective. But already, at Palo Alto and Eesaca, against
tbe serried lines and thronging cavalry of the Mexicans,
light field-guns had done extraordinary execution. The
heavy artillery, hitherto the more favoured service, saw
itself eclipsed. The First Eegiment, however, had already
been prominent on the fighting line. It had won reputation
witb the bayonet at Cerro Gordo, and before Mexico was
reached there were other battles to be fought, and other
positions to be stormed. A youth with a predilection for
bard knocks might have been content with the chances
offered to the foot-soldier. But Jackson's partiality for his
own arm was as marked as was Napoleon's, and the decisive
effect of a well-placed battery appealed to his instincts with
greater force than the wild rush of a charge of infantry.
Skilful manoeuvring was more to his taste than the mere
bludgeon work of fighting at close quarters.
Two subalterns were required for the new battery.
The position meant much hard work, and possibly much
discomfort. Magruder was restless and hot-tempered, and
the young officers of artillery showed no eagerness to go
through the campaign as his subordinates. Not so Jack
son. He foresaw that service with a light battery, under
' According to the Begimental Records bis company (E) was not engaged
in the battle, but only in the pursuit.

MAGRUDER'S BATTERY 33
a bold and energetic leader, was likely to present peculiar
opportunities ; and witb his thorough devotion to duty, his
habits of industry, and his strong sense of self-reliance, he
had little fear of disappointing the expectations of the most
exacting superior. ' I wanted to see active service,' he said
in after years, ' to be near tbe enemy in the fight ; and
when I heard tbat John Magruder had got his battery I
bent all my energies to be with him, for I knew if any
fighting was to be done, Magruder would be "on hand." '
His soldierly ambition won its due reward. The favours
of fortune fall to the men who woo more often than to
those who wait. The barrack- room proverb which declares
that ill-luck follows the volunteer must assuredly have ger
minated in a commonplace brain. It is characteristic of
men who have cut their way to fame tbat they have never
allowed the opportunity to escape tbem. The successful
man pushes to tbe front and seeks his chance ; those
of a temper less ardent wait till duty calls and the
call may never come. Once before, wben, despite his
manifold disadvantages, he secured his nomination to
West Point, Jackson had shown how readily he recognised
an opening; now, when his comrades held back, he
eagerly stepped forward, to prove anew the truth of
the vigorous adage, ' Providence helps those who help
themselves.' The American army was delayed long at Puebla.
Several regiments of volunteers, who had engaged only for
a short term of service, demanded their discharge, and
reinforcements were slow in arriving. It was not until the
. „ first week in August that Scott was able to move
"^' ' upon the capital. The army now numbered 14,000
men. Several hundred were sick in hospital, and 600 con
valescents, together with 600 effectives, were left to garrison
Puebla, The field force was organised in four divisions : the
first, under Major-General Worth ; the second, under Major-
General Twiggs ; tbe third, to which Magruder 's battery
was attached, under Major-General Pillow; the fourth
(volunteers and marines), under Major-General Pierce,
Four field batteries, a small brigade of dragoons, and a still
VOL. I. p

34 STONEWALL JACKSON
smaller siege train ' made up a total of 11,500 officers and
men. During the three months that his enemy was idle
at Puebla, Santa Anna had reorganised his army; and
30,000 Mexicans, including a formidable body of cavalry,
fine horsemen and well trained,'' and a large number of
heavy batteries, were now ready to oppose the advance of
the invaders.
On August 10 the American army crossed the Eio Frio
Mountains, 10,000 feet above the sea, the highest point
between the Atlantic and tbe Pacific, and as the troops
descended tbe western slopes the valley of Mexico first broke
upon their view. There, beneath the shadow of her mighty
mountains, capped with eternal snows, stood
The Imperial city, her far circling walls,
Her garden groves, and stately palaces.
There lay the broad plain of Tenochtitlan, with all its
wealth of light and colour, the verdure of the forest, the
warmer hues of the great corn-fields, ripening to the harvest,
and the sheen and sparkle of the distant lakes. There it
lay, as it burst upon the awe-struck vision of Cortez and
his companions, ' bathed in the golden sunshine, stretched
out as it were in slumber, in the arms of the giant hills.'
On every hand were the signs of a teeming population.
White villages and substantial haciendas glistened in the
woodlands ; roads broad and well-travelled crossed the level ;
and in the clear atmosphere of those lofty altitudes the vast
size of the city was plainly visible. The whole army of Mexico
formed the garrison; bills crowned with batteries com
manded the approaches, while a network of canals on either
flank and a broad area of deep water enhanced the diffi
culties of manauvre. The line of communication, far too
long to be maintained by the small force at Scott's
disposal, had already been abandoned. The army depended
for subsistence on what it could purchase in the country ;
the sick and wounded were carried with the troops, and
' Two 24-pounders, two 8-inch howitzers, and two light pieces. Ripley's
History of the Mexican War.
' It is said, however, that their horses were little more than ponies, and
far too light for a charge. Semmes' Campaign of Qeneral Scott,

THE VALLEY OF MEXICO 36
there was no further reserve of ammunition than tbat
w_^ch was packed in the regimental waggons. Cortez and
his four hundred when they essayed the same enterprise were
not more completely isolated, for, while the Spaniard had
staunch allies in the hereditary foes of the Aztecs, Scott's
nearest supports were at Puebla, eighty miles from Mexico,
and these numbered only 1,200 effective soldiers. The most
adventurous of leaders might well have hesitated ere he
plunged into the great valley, swarming with enemies, and
defended by all the resources of a civilised State. But
there was no misgiving in the ranks of the Americans,
Witb that wholesome contempt for a foreign foe which has
wrought more good than evil for the Anglo-Saxon race, the
army moved forward without a halt, ' Eecovering,' says
Scott, ' from the trance into wbich the magnificent spectacle
had thrown them, probably not a man in the column failed
to say to his neighbour or himself, " That splendid city
shall soon be ours ! " '
The fortifications which protected Mexico on the east
were found to be impregnable, Tbe high ridge of El
Penon, manned by nearly the whole of Santa Anna's army,
blocked the passage between the lakes, and deep morasses
added to the difficulties of approach. To the south, how
ever, on the far side of Lake Chalco, lay a more level tract,
but accessible only by roads which the Mexicans deemed
impracticable. Despite the difficulties of the route, the
manoeuvre of Cerro Gordo was repeated on a grander scale.
After a toilsome march of seven-and-twenty miles from Ayotla,
over the spurs of the sierras, the troops reached the
16-18* gJ^s^it road which leads to the capital from the south.
Across this road was more than one line of forti
fications, to which the Mexican army had been hurriedly
transferred. The hacienda of San Antonio, six miles from
the city, strengthened by field-works and defended by
heavy guns, commanded the highway, Tp the east was a
morass, and beyond tbe morass were the blue waters of Lake
Chalco ; while to the west the Pedregal, a barren tract of
volcanic scoriae, over whose sharp rocks and deep fissures
neither horse nor vehicle could move, flanked the American D 2

86 STONEWALL JACKSON
line of march. The morass was absolutely impassable. The
gloomy solitude of the Pedregal, extending to the mountains,
five miles distant, seemed equally forbidding; but the
engineer officers came once more to the rescue. A road
across the Pedregal, little better than a mule track, was
discovered by Captain Lee. Under cover of a strong
, j^g escort it was rapidly improved, and Pillow's and
Worth's divisions, accompanied by Magruder's
battery, were directed to cross the waste of rocks. Beyond
the Pedregal was a good road, approaching the city from
the south-west ; and by tbis road the post of San Antonio
might be assailed in rear.
Overlooking the road, however, as well as the issues
from tbe Pedregal, was a high ridge, backed by the
mountains, and held by 6,000 Mexicans. Opposite this
ridge the Americans came out on cultivated ground, but all
further progress was completely checked. Shortly after
midday the leading brigade, with Magruder's battery ' on
hand,' reached the summit of a bill within a thousand yards
of the enemy's breastworks. Magruder came at once into
action, and the infantry attempted to push forward. But
the Mexican artillery was far superior, both in number of
pieces and weight of metal, and the groimd was eminently
unfavourable for attack. Two-and-twenty heavy cannon
swept the front ; the right of the position was secured by a
deep ravine ; masses of infantry were observed in rear of
the intrenchments, and several regiments of lancers were
in close support. For three hours the battle raged fiercely.
On the right tbe Americans pushed forward, crossing with
extreme difficulty an outlying angle of the Pedregal, covered
with dense scrub, and occupied the village of Contreras. But
elsewhere they made no impression. They were without
cavahry, and Magruder's guns were far too few and feeble
to keep down tbe fire of the hostile batteries. ' The
infantry,' says Scott, ' could not advance in column without
being mowed down by grape and canister, nor advance in
line without being ridden down by the enemy's numerous
horsemen.' Nor were the Mexicans content on this occasion
to remain passively in their works. Both infantry and

CAPTAIN R. E. LEE 87
cavalry attempted to drive the assailants back upon tbe
Pedregal ; and, although these counterstrokes were success
fully repulsed, when darkness fell the situation of the
troops was by no means favourable. Heavy columns of
Mexicans were approaching from the city ; the remainder
of the American army was opposite San Antonio, five
miles distant, on the far side of the Pedregal, and no
support could be expected. To add to their discomfort, it
rained heavily ; the thunder crashed in the mountains, and
torrents of water choked the streams. The men stood in
the darkness drenched and dispirited, and an attack made
by a Mexican battalion induced General Pillow to withdraw
Magruder's battery from the ridge. The senior subaltern
had been killed. 15 gunners and as many horses had
fallen. The slopes were covered with huge boulders, and it
was only by dint of tbe most strenuous exertions that the
guns were brought down in safety to tbe lower ground,
A council of war was then held in Contreras Church, and,
contrary to tbe traditionary conduct of such conventions, a
most desperate expedient was adopted. The Mexican rein
forcements, 12,000 strong, had halted on the main road, their
advanced-guard within a few hundred yards of the village.
Leaving two regiments to hold this imposing force in check,
it was determined to make a night march and turn the
rear of tbe intrenchments on tbe ridge. The Commander-
in-Chief was beyond tbe Pedregal, opposite San Antonio,
and it was necessary that he should be informed of the
projected movement.
' I have always understood,' says an officer present in
this quarter of the field, 'that what was devised and
determined on was suggested by Captain Lee ; at all events
tbe council was closed by his saying that he desired to
return to General Scott witb the decision, and that, as it
was late, the decision must be given as soon as possible,
since General Scott wished him to return in time to give
directions for co-operation. During the council, and for
hours after, the rain fell in torrents, whilst the darkness
was so intense that one could move only by groping.'
The Pedregal was infested by straggling bands of

88 STONEWALL JACKSON
Mexicans ; and yet, over those five miles of desolation, with
no guide but the wind, or an occasional flash of lightning,
Lee, unaccompanied by a single orderly, made his way
to Scott's headquarters. This perilous adventure was
characterised by the Commander-in-Chief as ' the greatest
feat of physical and moral courage performed by any
individual during the entire campaign.'
The night march, although it entailed the passage of
a deep ravine, and was so slow that one company in two
hours made no more than four hundred yards, was com
pletely successful. The Mexicans, trusting to the strength
of their position, and to tbe presence of tbe reinforce
ments, had neglected to guard their left. The lesson of
Cerro Gordo had been forgotten. The storming parties,
guided by the engineers, Lee, Beauregard, and Gustavus
Smith, established themselves, under cover of the dark
ness, within five hundred paces of the intrenchments,
and as tbe day broke the works were carried at the first
rush. Seventeen minutes after the signal had been given,
tbe garrison, attacked in front and rear simultaneously,
, 20 '^^^ completely dispersed. 800 Mexicans were
captured, and nearly as many killed.' The rein
forcements, unable to intervene, and probably demoralised
by this unlooked-for defeat, fell back to the village of
Churubusco, and San Antonio was evacuated. The pursuit
was hotly pressed. Churubusco was heavily bombarded.
For two hours the American batteries played upon the
church and hacienda, both strongly fortified, and after a
counterstroke had been beaten back a vigorous onslaught,
made by the whole Hne of battle, compelled the enemy to give
way. A brilliant charge of General Shields' brigade dis
persed their last reserves, and the whole of the hostile army
fled in confusion to the city. The American cavalry followed
at speed, using their sabres freely on the panic-stricken
masses, and one squadron, not hearing the recall, dashed
up to the very gates of the city. Scott's losses amounted
to 1,053, including 76 officers. The Mexican casualties
' 4,500 Americans (rank and file) were engaged, and the losses did not
exceed 50. Scott's Memoirs.

BATTLE OF MOLINO DEL REY 39
were 3,000 prisoners, and 3,250 killed and wounded. 37
field-guns were abandoned, and, a still more valuable
capture, a large supply of ammunition fell into the hands
of the victors.
Magruder's battery, it appears, was retained in reserve
throughout the battle of Churubusco, and Jackson's share
in the victory was confined to the engagement of the
previous day. But his small charge of three guns had
been handled with skill and daring. Magruder was more
than satisfied. ' In a few moments,' ran his official report,
' Lieutenant Jackson, commanding the second section of the
battery, who had opened fire upon tbe enemy's works from
a position on the right, hearing our fire still further in
front, advanced in handsome style, and kept up the fire
with equal briskness and effect. His conduct was equally
conspicuous during the whole day, and I cannot too highly
commend him to the Major-General's favourable con
sideration.' Tbe extreme vigour with which the Americans had
prosecuted their operations now came to an untimely pause.
After his double victory at Contreras and Churubusco,
General Scott proposed an armistice. The whole of the
Mexican army had been encountered. It had been decisively
defeated. Its losses, in men and materiel, had been
very heavy. The troops were utterly demoralised. The
people were filled with consternation, and a rapid ad
vance would probably have been followed by an imme
diate peace. But Scott was unwilling to drive his foes
to desperation, and he appears to have beUeved that if
they were spared all further humiliation they would accede
without further resistance to his demands.
The Mexicans, however, were only playing for time.
During the negotiations, in direct defiance of the terms of
tbe armistice, Santa Anna strengthened his fortifications,
rallied his scattered army, and prepared once more to con
front the invader. Scott's ultimatum was rejected, and
on September 5 hostilities were renewed. Three
^^ ¦ ' days later the position of Molino del Eey,
garrisoned by the choicest of the Mexican troops, was

40 STONEWALL JACKSON
stormed at dawn. But the enemy had benefited by his
respite. The fighting was desperate. 800 Americans were
killed and wounded before the intrenchments and strong
buildings were finally carried ; and although the Mexicans
again lost 3,000 men, including two generals, their spirit of
resistance was not yet wholly crushed.
Driven from their outworks, they had fallen back on a
still more formidable line. Behind tbe Molino del Eey
rose the hill of Chapultepec, crowned by the great castle
which had been the palace of Montezuma and of the
Spanish viceroys, now the mihtary college of the Eepublic
and tbe strongest of her fortresses. Three miles from the
city walls, the stronghold completely barred tbe line of
advance on the San Cosme Gate. Heavy guns mounted on
the lofty bastions which encircled the citadel, commanded
every road, and the outflanking movements which had
hitherto set at nought the walls and parapets ofthe Mexicans
were here impracticable. Still, careful reconnaissance had
shown tbat, with all its difficulties, this was the most favour
able approach for the invading army. The gates of Belen
and San Antonio were beset by obstacles even more imprac
ticable. Tbe ground over which the troops would advance to
storm the fortress was far firmer than elsewhere, there was
ample space for tbe American batteries, and if the hill
were taken, the Mexicans, retreating along two narrow
causeways, witb deep marshes on either hand, might easily
be deprived of all opportunity of rallying.
On the night of the 11th four batteries of heavy guns
were established within easy range. On the 12th they
opened fire; and the next morning the American
®P ¦ ¦ army, covered by the fire of the artillery, advanced
to the assault. In the victory of Molino del Eey, Magruder's
battery bad taken little part. Jackson, posted with his
section on the extreme flank of the line, had dispersed a
column of cavalry which threatened a charge ; but, with this
brief interlude of action, be had been merely a spectator.
At Chapultepec he was more fortunate. Pillow's division,
to wbich tbe battery was attached, attacked the Mexicans
in front, while Worth's division assailed them from the

BATTLE OF CHAPULTEPEC 41
north. The 14th Infantry, connecting tbe two attacks,
moved along a road which skirts the base of the hill, and
Magruder was ordered to detach a section of bis battery
in support, Jackson was selected for the duty, and as he
approached the enemy's position dangers multiplied at
every step. The ground alongside was so marshy that
tbe guns were unable to leave the road. A Mexican field-
piece, covered by a breastwork, raked the causeway from
end to end, while from the heights of Chapultepec cannon
of large calibre poured down a destructive fire. Tbe
infantry suffered terribly. It was impossible to advance
along the narrow track ; and when the guns were ordered up
the situation was in no way bettered. Nearly every horse
was killed or wounded, A deep ditch, cut across the
road, hindered effective action, and the only position where
reply to the enemy's fire was possible lay beyond this
obstacle. Despite the losses of his command Jackson
managed to lift one gun across by hand. But his men
became demoralised. They left their posts. The example
of their lieutenant, walking up and down on the shot-swept
road and exclaiming calmly, ' There is no danger : see ! I
am not hit,' failed to inspire them with confidence. Many
had already fallen. The infantry, with tbe exception
of a small escort, wbich held its ground with difficulty,
had disappeared ; and General Worth, observing Jackson's
perilous situation, sent him orders to retire. He replied
it was more dangerous to withdraw than to stand fast,
and if they would give him fifty veterans he would rather
attempt the capture of the breastwork. At this juncture
Magruder, losing his horse as he galloped forward, reached
the road.
The ditch was crowded with soldiers ; many wounded ;
many already dead ; many whose hearts had failed them.
Beyond, on the narrow causeway, tbe one gun wbich
Jackson had brought across the ditch was still in
action. Deserted by his gunners, and abandoned by the escort
which had been ordered to support him, the young subaltern
still held his ground. With the sole assistance of a sergeant.

42 STONEWALL JACKSON
of stauncher mettle than the rest, he was loading and firing
his solitary field-piece, rejoicing, as became tbe son of a
warrior race, in tbe hot breath of battle, and still more
in the isolation of his perilous position. To stand alone,
in the forefront of the fight, defying the terrors from
which others shrank, was the situation which of all others
he most coveted; and under tbe walls of Chapultepec,
answering shot for shot, and plying sponge and handspike
witb desperate energy, the fierce instincts of the soldier
were fully gratified. Nor was Magruder the man to proffer
prudent counsels, A second gun was hoisted across the
ditch ; the men rallied ; the Mexican artillery was gradually
overpowered, and the breastwork stormed, Tbe crisis of
the struggle was already past. Pillow's troops had driven
the enemy from their intrenchments at the base of the
hill, and beneath the shadows of the majestic cypresses,
which still bear the name of the Grove of Monte
zuma, and up the rugged slopes which tower above
them, pressed the assaulting columns. A redoubt which
stood midway up the height was carried. The Mexicans fell
back from shelter to shelter ; but amid smoke and flame
the scaling ladders were borne across the castle ditch,
and reared against the lofty walls were soon covered with
streams of men. The leaders, hurled from the battlements
on to the crowd below, failed to make good tbeir footing, but
there were others to take their places. Tbe supports came
thronging up ; the enemy, assailed in front and flank, drew
back disheartened, and after a short struggle the American
colours, displayed upon the keep, announced to the citizens of
Mexico that Chapultepec had been captured. Yet the
victory was not complete. The greater part of the garrison
had fled from tbeir intrenchments before the castle had
been stormed ; and infantry, cavalry, and artillery, in wild
confusion, were crowding in panic on the causeways. But
their numbers were formidable, and the city, should the
army be rallied, was capable of a protracted defence. Not
a moment was to be lost if the battle was to be decisive of
tbe war. The disorder on Chapultepec was hardly less
than that which existed in the ranks of the defeated

THE CASTLE STORMED 43
Mexicans. Many of the stormers had dispersed in search of
plunder, and regiments and brigades had become hope
lessly intermingled in the assault of the rocky hill. Still
the pursuit was prompt. Towards the San Cosme Gate
several of the younger officers, a lieutenant by name
Ulysses Grant amongst the foremost, followed the enemy
with such men as they could collect, and Jackson's guns
were soon abreast of the fighting line. His teams had been
destroyed by the fire of the Mexican batteries. Those of
bis waggons, posted further to the rear, had partially
escaped. To disengage the dead animals from the limbers
and to replace them by others would have wasted many
minutes, and he had eagerly suggested to Magruder that
the guns should be attached to the waggon-limbers instead
of to their own. Permission was given, and in a few moments
his section was thundering past the cliffs of Chapultepec.
Coming into action within close range of the flying Mexicans,
every shot told on tbeir demoralised masses ; but before the
San Cosme Gate the enemy made a last effort to avert
defeat. Fresh troops were brought up to man the out
works ; the houses and gardens which lined the road were
filled with skirmishers ; from the high parapets of the flat
house-tops a hail of bullets struck the head of the pursuing
column ; and again and again the American infantry,
without cover and with little space for movement, recoiled
from the attack.
The situation of the invading army, despite the brilliant
victory of Chapultepec, was not yet free from peril. The
greater part of tbe Mexican forces was still intact. The
city contained 180,000 inhabitants, and General Scott's
battalions had dwindled to the strength of a small division.
In the various battles before the capital nearly 3,000 officers
and men bad fallen, and tbe soldiers who encompassed
the walls of the great metropolis were spent with fighting.'
One spark of the stubborn courage which bore Cortez
and his paladins through tbe hosts of Montezuma might
have made of that stately city a second Saragossa. It
was eminently defensible. The churches, the convents,
> 862 officers and men fell at Chapultepec. Scott's Metnovrs.

44 STONEWALL JACKSON
the public buildings, constructed with tbat solidity which
is peculiarly Spanish, formed each of them a fortress.
Tbe broad streets, crossing each other at right angles,
rendered concentration at any threatened point an easy
matter, and beyond the walls were broad ditches and a
deep canal.
Nor was the strength of the city tbe greatest of Scott's
difficulties. Vera Cruz, his base of operations, was two hun
dred and sixty miles distant ; Puebla, his nearest supply-
depot, eighty miles. He had abandoned his communications.
His army was dependent for food on a hostile population.
In moving round Lake Chalco, and attacking the city from
the south, he bad burned his boats. A siege or an invest
ment were alike impossible. A short march would place the
enemy's army across bis line of retreat, and nothing would
have been easier for the Mexicans than to block tbe road
where it passes between the sierras and the lake. Guerillas
were already hovering in the hills ; one single repulse before
tbe gates of the capital would have raised the country in
rear ; and hemmed in by superior numbers, and harassed
by a cavalry which was at least equal to the task of cutting
off supplies, the handful of Americans must have cut their
way through to Puebla or have succumbed to starvation.
Such considerations had doubtless been at the root of
the temporising policy wbich bad been pursued after
Churubusco. But the uselessness of half-measures had
then been proved. The conviction had become general .
that a desperate enterprise could only be pushed to a
successful issue by desperate tactics, and every available
battalion was hurried forward to the assault. Before the
San Cosme Gate the pioneers were ordered up, and within
the suburb pick and crowbar forced a passage from house
to house. The guns, moving slowly forward, battered the
crumbling masonry at closest range. The Mexicans were
driven back from breastwork to breastwork ; and a moun
tain howitzer, which Lieutenant Grant had posted on the
tower of a neighbouring church, played witb terrible effect,
at a range of two or three hundred yards, on the defenders
of the Gate.

THE CITY OF MEXICO SURRENDERS 45
By eight o'clock in the evening the suburb had been
cleared, and the Americans were firmly established within
the walls. To the south-east, before the Belen Gate,
another column had been equally successful. During tbe
night Santa Anna withdrew his troops, and when day
dawned the white flag was seen flying from tbe citadel.
After a sharp fight with 2,000 convicts whom the fugitive
President had released, the invaders occupied the city,
and the war was virtually at an end. From Cerro Gordo
to Chapultepec the power of disciphne had triumphed. An
army of 30,000 men, fighting in their own country, and
supported by a numerous artillery, bad been defeated by an
invading force of one-third the strength. Yet the Mexicans
had shown no lack of courage. 'At Chapultepec and
Molino del Eey, as on many other occasions,' says Grant,
' they stood up as well as any troops ever did,' ' But their
officers were inexperienced ; the men were ill-instructed ; and
against an army of regular soldiers, well led and obedient,
their untutored valour, notwithstanding their superior
numbers, bad proved of no avail. They had early become
demoralised, Tbeir strongest positions had been rendered
useless by the able manoeuvres of their adversaries.
Everywhere they had been out-generalled. They bad never
been permitted to fight on the ground which tbey had pre
pared, and in almost every single engagement they had been
surprised. Nor had the Government escaped the infection
which had turned the hearts of the troops to water. The
energy of the pursuit after tbe fall of Chapultepec had wrought
Sept 14 ^*® ^^^ effect, and on September 14 the city of
Mexico was surrendered, without further parley,
to a force whicb, all told, amounted to less than 7,000
men.^ With such portion of his force as had not disbanded
Santa Anna undertook the siege of Puebla; and the
guerillas, largely reinforced from the army, waged a
desultory warfare in the mountains. But these despairing
' Grant's Memoirs, vol. i. p. 169.
' The total loss ir the battles before the capital was 2,703, including S83
officers. Scott's Memoirs.

46 STONEWALL JACKSON
efforts were without effect upon the occupation of the
capital. Tbe Puebla garrison beat back every attack ; and
the bands of irregular horsemen were easily dispersed.
During these operations Magruder's battery remained with
headquarters near tbe capital, and so far as Jackson was
concerned all opportunities for distinction were past. The
peace negotiations were protracted from Septem-
^^^Q_ her to the following February, and in their camps
beyond the walls the American soldiers were fain
to content themselves with tbeir ordinary duties.
It cannot be said that Jackson had failed to take
advantage of the opportunities which fortune had thrown
in his way. As eagerly as he had snatched at the chance
of employment in the field artillery he had welcomed the
tactical emergency which had given him sole command of
his section at Chapultepec. It was a small charge ; but he
had utihsed it to the utmost, and it had filled the cup of
his ambition to the brim. Ambitious he certainly was.
' He confessed,' says Dabney, ' to an intimate friend that
the order of General Pillow, separating his section on the
day of Chapultepec from his captain, bad excited bis abiding
gratitude ; so much so that while the regular officers were
rather inclined to depreciate the general as an unprofessional
soldier, he loved him because he gave him an opportunity
to win distinction.' His friends asked him, long after the
war, if he felt no trepidation when so many were falling
round him. He repUed : ' No ; the only anxiety of which
I was conscious during the engagements was a fear lest I
should not meet danger enough to make my conduct
conspicuous,' His share of glory was more than ample, Contreras
gave him the brevet rank of captain. For his conduct at
Chapultepec he was mentioned in the Commander-in-
Chief's dispatches, and publicly complimented on his
courage. Shortly after the capture of the city. General
Scott held a levee, and amongst others presented to him
was Lieutenant Jackson. When he heard the name, the
general drew himself up to his full height, and, placing his
hands behind bim, said with affected sternness, ' I don't

THE CITY OF MEXICO
AND ENVIRONS.
Scale of Miles
 5 

MoUnodel Rey'

M o /u n t

IValiererBontallsc.

HIS SERVICES REWARDED 47
know that I shall shake hands witb Mr. Jackson.' Jackson,
blushing like a girl, was overwhelmed with confusion.
General Scott, seeing that he had called the attention of
every one in the room, said, ' If you can forgive yourself for
the way in which you slaughtered those poor Mexicans
with your guns, I am not sure that I can,' and then held
out bis band. ' No greater compliment,' says General
Gibbon, ' could have been paid a young officer, and Jackson
apparently did not know he had done anything remarkable
till his general told him so.' ' Magruder could find no
praise high enough for his industry, his capacity, and his
gallantry, and within eighteen months of bis first joining
his regiment he was breveted major. Such promotion
was phenomenal even in the Mexican war, and none of his
West Point comrades made so great a stride in rank. His
future in his profession was assured. He bad acquired
something more than the spurs of a field officer in his
seven months of service. A subaltern, it bas been said,
learns but little of tbe higher art of war in the course
of a campaign. His daily work so engrosses his attention
that he has little leisure to reflect on the lessons in strategy
and tactics which unfold themselves before him. Without
maps, and without that information of the enemy's
numbers and dispositions which alone renders the man
oeuvres intelligible, it is difficult, even where the inclination
exists, to discuss or criticise the problems, tactical
and strategical, with which the general has to deal.
But siege and battle, long marches and rough roads,
gave the young American officers an insight into the
practical difficulties of war. It is something to have
seen how human nature shows itself under fire ; how
easily panics may be generated ; how positions that seem
impregnable may be rendered weak; to have witnessed
the effect of surprise, and to have realised tbe strength of a
vigorous attack. It is something, too, if a man learns bis
own worth in situations of doubt and danger ; and if he
finds, as did Jackson, that battle sharpens his faculties,
and makes his self-control more perfect, his judgment
' Letter to the author.
VOL. I, B

48 STONEWALL JACKSON
clearer and more prompt, the gain in self-confidence is of
tbe utmost value.
Moreover, whether a young soldier learns much or
little from his first campaign depends on his intellectual
powers and his previous training, Jackson's brain, as
his steady progress at West Point proves, was of a capacity
beyond the average. He was naturally reflective. If, at
the Military Academy, he had heard little of war; if,
during his service in Mexico, his knowledge was insufficient
to enable him to compare General Scott's operations with
those of the great captains, he had at least been trained to
think. It is difficult to suppose that his experience was cast
away. He was no thoughtless subaltern, but already an
earnest soldier ; and in after times, wben he came to study
for himself the campaigns of Washington and Napoleon, we
may be certain that the teaching he found there was made
doubly impressive wben read by the light of what he had
seen himself. Nor is it mere conjecture to assert that in
bis first campaign his experience was of peculiar value to
a future general of the Southern Confederacy. Some of
the regiments who fought under Scott and Taylor were
volunteers, civilians, like their successors in the great CivU
War, in all but name, enlisted for the war only, or even for a
shorter term, and serving under their own officers. Several
of these regiments had fought well; others bad behaved
indifferently ; and the problem of how discipline was to be
maintained in battle amongst these unprofessional soldiers
obtruded itself as unpleasantly in Mexico as it had in
tbe wars with England. Amongst the regular officers,
accustomed to the absolute subordination of the army, the
question provoked perplexity and discussion.
So small was the military estabUshment of the States
that in case of any future war, the army, as in Mexico, would
be largely composed of volunteers ; and, despite the high
intelligence and warlike enthusiasm of the citizen battalions,
it was evident tbat they were far less reliable than the
regulars. Even General Grant, partial as he was to the
volunteers, admitted the superiority conferred by drill,
disciphne, and highly trained officers, ' A better army,' he

THE VOLUNTEERS IN MEXICO 4fl
wrote, * man for man, probably never faced an enemy than
the one commanded by General Taylor in the earUer engage
ments of the Mexican war.' ' These troops were all regulars,
and they were those who carried Scott in triumph from the
shores of the Gulf to the palace of Santa Anna. Tbe
volunteers had proved themselves exceedingly liable to
panic. Their superior intelligence had not enabled them
to master the instincts of human nature, and, although
they had behaved well in camp and on the march, in battle
their disciphne had fallen to pieces." It could hardly be
otherwise. Men without ingrained habits of obedience,
who have not been trained to subordinate tbeir will to
another's, cannot be expected to render implicit obedience
in moments of danger and excitement ; nor can they be
expected, under such circumstances, to follow officers in
whom they can have but little confidence. The ideal of
battle is a combined effort, directed by a trained leader.
Unless troops are thoroughly well disciplined such effort is
impossible; the leaders are ignored, and the spasmodic
action of the individual is substituted for the concentrated
pressure of the mass. Tbe cavalry which dissolves into
a mob before it strikes tbe enemy but seldom attains
success ; and infantry out of hand is hardly more effective.
In the Mexican campaign the volunteers, although on
many occasions they behaved with admirable courage,
continually broke loose from control under tbe fire of the
enemy. As individuals they fought well; as organised
bodies, capable of manoeuvring under fire and of combined
effort, they proved to be comparatively worthless.
So Jackson, observant as he was, gained on Mexican
battle-fields some knowledge of the shortcomings inherent
in half-trained troops. And this was not all. The expe
dition had demanded tbe services of nearly every officer in
the army of the United States, and in the toils of tbe march,
in the close companionship of the camp, in the excitement
of battle, the shrewder spirits probed the characters of their
comrades to the quick. In the history of the Civil War
' Grant's Memoirs, vol. i. p. 168.
' Bipley's History of the Mexican War, vol. ii. p. 73, &o.

go STONEWALL JACKSON
there are few things more remarkable than the use which
was made of tbe knowledge thus acquired. The clue to
many an enterprise, daring even to foolhardiness, is to be
found in this, A leader so intimately acquainted with the
character of bis opponent as to be able to predict with cer
tainty what he will do under any given circumstances may
set aside with impunity every established rule of war.
'All the older officers, who became conspicuous in the
rebellion,' says Grant, 'I had also served with and
known in Mexico. The acquaintance thus formed was
of immense service to me in tbe War of the Eebellion — I
mean what I learned of the characters of those to whom
I was afterwards opposed. I do not pretend to say that
all my movements, or even many of them, were made with
special reference to the characteristics of the commander
against whom they were directed. But my appreciation
of my enemies was certainly affected by this knowledge.' '
Many of the generals with whom Jackson became in
timately connected, either as friends or enemies, are named
in Scott's dispatches, Magruder, Hooker, McDowell, and
Ambrose Hill belonged to his own regiment. McClellan,
Beauregard, and Gustavus Smith served on the same staff
as Lee, Joseph E. Johnston, twice severely wounded, was
everywhere conspicuous for dashing gallantry. Shields
commanded a brigade with marked ability. Pope was a
staff officer. Lieutenant D. H. Hill received two brevets.
Lieutenant Longstreet, struck down whilst carrying the
colours at Chapultepec, was bracketed for conspicuous
conduct with Lieutenant Pickett. Lieutenant Edward
Johnson is mentioned as having specially distinguished
himself in the same battle. Captain Huger, together with
Lieutenants Porter and Eeno, did good service with the
artillery, and Lieutenant EweU had two horses killed under
him at Churubusco,
So having proved his mettle and 'drunk deUght of
battle with his peers,' Jackson spent nine pleasant months
in the conquered city. The peace negotiations were pro
tracted. The United States coveted tbe auriferous provinces
' Grant's Memmrs, vol. i. p. 192.

LIFE IN MEXICO 61
of California and New Mexico, a tract as large as a European
kingdom, and far more wealthy. Loth to lose their birth
right, yet powerless to resist, the Mexicans could only
haggle for a price. The States were not disposed to be
ungenerous, but the transfer of so vast a territory could not
be accomplished in a moment, and the victorious army
remained in occupation of the capital.
Beneath the shadow of the Stars and Stripes conqueror
and conquered lived in harmony. Mexico was tired of
war. Since the downfall of Spanish rule revolution had
foUowed revolution witb startling rapidity. The bene
ficent despotism of the great viceroys had been succeeded by
the cruel exactions of petty tyrants, and for many a long year
the country had been ravaged by their armies. Tbe capital
itself had enjoyed but a few brief intervals of peace, and now,
although the bayonets of an alien race were the pledge of
their repose, the citizens revelledin the unaccustomed luxury.
Nor were they ungrateful to those who brought them a respite
from alarms and anarchy. Under the mild administration
of the American generals the streets resumed tbeir wonted
aspect. Tbe great markets teemed with busy crowds.
Across the long causeways rolled the creaking waggons,
laden with the produce of far-distant haciendas. Trade was
restored, and even the most patriotic merchants were not
proof against the influence of the American dollar. Between
the soldiers and the people was much friendly intercourse.
Even the rehgious orders did not disdain to offer their hos
pitality to the heretics. The uniforms of the victorious
army were to be seen at every festive gathering, and tbe
graceful Mexicanas were by no means insensible to tbe
admiration of the stalwart Northerners. Those blue-eyed
and fair-haired invaders were not so very terrible after all ;
and the beauties of tbe capital, accustomed to be wooed
in liquid accents and flowery phrases, hstened without
reluctance to harsher tones and less polished compliments.
Travellers of many races have borne wUling witness to the
charms and virtues of the women of Mexico. 'True
daughters of Spaio,' it has been said, ' they unite the grace
of Castile to the vivacity of Andalusia ; and more sterling

62 STONEWALL JACKSON
qualities are by no means wanting. Gentle and refined,
unaffectedly pleasing in manners and conversation, they
evince a warmth of heart which wins for them the respect
and esteem of all strangers.' To the homes made bright by
the presence of these fair specimens of womanhood Scott's
officers were always welcome ; and Jackson, for the first
time in bis life, found himself within the sphere of feminine
attractions. The effect on the stripling soldier, who, stark
fighter as he was, had seen no more of life than was to
be found in a country viUage or within the precincts of
West Point, may be easily imagined. Who the magnet
was he never confessed ; but that he went near losing his
heart to some charming senorita of sangre azul he more
than once acknowledged, and he took much trouble to
appear to advantage in her eyes. The deficiencies in his
education which prevented his full enjoyment of social
pleasures were soon made up. He not only learned to
dance, an accomplishment wbich must have taxed his per
severance to the utmost, but he spent some months in
learning Spanish ; and it is significant that to the end of
his life be retained a copious vocabulary of those tender
diminutives wbich fall so gracefully from Spanish lips.
But during his stay in Mexico other and more lasting
influences were at work. Despite the delights of her deli
cious climate, where tbe roses bloom the whole year round,
tbe charms of her romantic scenery, and the fascina
tions of her laughter-loving daughters, Jackson's serious
nature soon asserted itself. The constant round of light
amusements and simple duties grew distasteful. The
impress of his mother's teachings and example was there to
guide him, and his native reverence for all that was good
and true received an unexpected impulse. There were not
wanting in the American army men who had a higher ideal
of duty than mere devotion to the business of tbeir pro
fession. The officer commanding the First ArtUlery,
Colonel Frank Taylor, possessed tbat earnest faith which is
not content with solitude. ' This good man,' says Dabney,
' was accustomed to labour as a father for tbe religious
welfare of his young officers, and during the summer cam-

A NEW STANDARD OP LIFE 63
paign his instructions and prayers had produced so much
effect as to awake an abiding anxiety and spirit of inquiry
in Jackson's mind.' The latter had little prejudice in
favour of any particular sect or church. There was no
State Establishment in the United States. His youth had
been passed in a household where Christianity was practi
cally unknown, and with characteristic independence he
determined to discover for himself the rule tbat be should
foUow. His researches took a course which his Presbyterian
ancestors would assuredly have condemned. But Jackson's
mind was singularly open, and he was the last man in tbe
world to yield to prejudice. Soon after peace was de
clared, he had made the acquaintance of a number of priests
belonging to one of the great religious orders of the Cathohc
Church. They had invited him to take up his quarters with
them, and when he determined to examine for himself into
the doctrine of the ancient faith, he applied through them for
an introduction to the Archbishop of Mexico, Several inter
views took place between the aged ecclesiastic and the young
soldier. Jackson departed unsatisfied. He acknowledged
that the prelate was a siucere and devout Christian, and he
was impressed as much with his kindness as his learning.
But he left Mexico without any settled convictions on the
subject which now absorbed his thoughts.
On June 12, peace having been signed at the end of
May, the last of the American troops marched out of the
conquered capital. Jackson's battery was sent to
°°* ¦ Fort HamUton, on Long Island, seven miles below
New York, and there, with his honours thick upon him, he
settled down to tbe quiet life of a small garrison. He had
gone out to Mexico a second lieutenant ; he had come back
a field-officer. He had won a name in the army, and bis
native State had enrolled him amongst her heroes. He
had gone out an unformed youth ; he had come back a
man and a proved leader of men. He bad been known
merely as an indefatigable student and a somewhat un
sociable companion. He had come back with a reputation
for daring courage, not only the courage which glories in
swift action and tbe excitement of tbe charge, but courage

64 STONEWALL JACKSON
of an enduring quaUty. And in that distant country he
had won more than fame. He had already learned some
thing of the vanity of temporal success. He had gone out
with a vague notion of ruling his life in accordance with
moral precepts and philosophic maxims ; but he was to
be guided henceforward by loftier principles than even
devotion to duty and regard for honour, and from the
path he had marked out for himself in Mexico he never
deviated.

.STONEWALL JACKSON, .ET. 24.
[Fr<iin a iJagiitrreolij/j'-'.)

55

CHAPTEE III
LEXINGTON. 1861-1861
Op Jackson's life at Fort HamUton there is little to tell.
His friend and mentor. Colonel Taylor, was in command.
The chaplain, once an officer of dragoons, was
a man of persuasive eloquence and earnest zeal ;
and surrounded by influences which had now become
congenial, the young major of artiUery pursued the re
hgious studies he had begun in Mexico. There was some
doubt whether he had been baptised as a chUd. He
was anxious that no uncertainty should exist as to his
adhesion to Christianity, but he was unwilling that the
sacrament should bind him to any particular sect. On
J the understanding that no surrender of judgment
would be involved, he was baptised and received
his first communion in the Episcopal Church.
Two years passed without incident, and then Jaokson
was transferred to Florida. In his new quarters his
j^ggj stay was brief. In March 1851 he was appointed
Professor of ArtUlery Tactics and Natural Philo
sophy at the Virginia MUitary Institute. His success,
for such he deemed it, was due to his own merit. One of
his Mexican comrades. Major D. H. HUl, afterwards his
brother-in-law, was a professor in a neighbouring institu
tion, Washington College, and had been consulted by tbe
Superintendent of the Institute as to the fiUing of the
vacant chair.
Hill remembered what had been said of Jackson at
West Point : ' If the course had been one year longer he
would have graduated at the head of his class.' This
voluntary testimonial of his brother cadets had not passed

66 STONEWALL JACKSON
unheeded. It had weight, as the best evidence of his
thoroughness and application, with the Board of Visitors,
and Jackson was unanimously elected.
The MUitary Institute, founded twelve years previously
on the model of West Point, was attended by several
hundred youths from Virginia and other Southern States.
At Lexington, in tbe county of Eockbridge, a hundred
mUes west of Eichmond, stand the castellated buUdings
and the wide parade ground which formed the nursery
of so many Confederate soldiers. To the east rise the
lofty masses of the Blue Eidge, To tbe north successive
ranges of rolling bills, green with copse and woodland,
fall gently to the lower levels ; and stretching far away
at their feet, watered by that lovely river which the
Indians in melodious syllables called Shenandoah,
' bright daughter of the Stars,' tbe great Valley of
Virginia, Deep-meadowed, happy, fair with orchard lawns
And bowery hollows,
lies embosomed within its mountain walls. Of all its
pleasant market towns, Lexington is not the least attrac
tive; and in this pastoral region, where the great forests
stand round about the corn-fields, and tbe breezes blow
untainted from the uplands, had been buUt the College
wbich Washington, greatest of Virginians and greatest of
American soldiers, had endowed. Under tbe shadow of
its towers the State had found an appropriate site for her
mUitary school.
The cadets ofthe Institute, although they wore a uniform,
were taught by officers of tbe regular army, were disciplined
as soldiers, and spent some months of their course in camp,
were not destined for a military career. All aspirants for
commissions in the United States army had to pass through
West Point ; and the training of the State colleges — for
Virginia was not solitary in the possession of such an insti
tution — however much it may have benefited both the minds
and bodies of the rising generation, was of immediate value
only to those who became officers of tbe State mihtia.
Still in all essential respects the Military Institute was

WHY HE LEFT THE ARMY 67
little behind West Point, The discipline was as strict, tbe
drUl but httle less precise, Tbe cadets had their own
officers and their own sergeants, and the whole establish
ment was administered on a military footing. No pains
were spared either by the State or the faculty to maintain
the pecuhar character of tbe school; and tbe little
battalion, although the members were hardly hkely to
see service, was as carefully trained as if each private
in the ranks might one day become a general officer. It
was fortunate indeed for Virginia, when she submitted her
destinies to the arbitrament of war, tbat some amongst her
statesmen had been firm to tbe conviction that to defend
one's country is a task not a whit less honourable than to
serve her in the ways of peace. She was unable to avert
defeat. But she more than redeemed her honour ; and
the efficiency of her troops was in no small degree due to
the training so many of her officers had received at the
Mihtary Institute.
StUl, notwithstanding its practical use to the State,
the offer of a chair at Lexington would probably have
attracted but few of Jackson's contemporaries. But
whUe campaigning was entirely to his taste, hfe in bar
racks was the reverse. In those unenlightened days to
be known as an able and zealous soldier was no passport
to preferment. So long as an officer escaped censure his
promotion was sure ; he might reach without further effort
the highest prizes the service offered, and the chances of
the dull and indolent were quite as good as those of the
capable and energetic. The one had no need for, the
other no incentive to, self-improvement, and it was very
generally neglected. Unless war intervened — and nothing
seemed more improbable than another campaign — even a
Napoleon woiUd have bad to submit to the inevitable.
Jackson caught eagerly at the opportunity of freeing
himself from an unprofitable groove.
' He believed,' he said, ' that a man who had turned,
with a good military reputation, to pursuits of a semi-
civUian character, and had vigorously prosecuted bis
mental improvement, would have more chance of success

68 STONEWALL JACKSON
in war than those who had remained in the treadmill of
the garrison.'
It was with a view, then, of fitting himself for command
that Jackson broke away from the restraints of regimental
hfe ; not because those restraints were burdensome or dis
tasteful in themselves, but because he felt that whUst making
the machine they might destroy the man. Those respon
sible for the efficiency of the United States army had not
yet learned tbat the mind must be trained as well as
the body, that driU is not the beginning and the end of
the soldier's education, that unless an officer is trusted
with responsibUity in peace he is but too apt to lose all
power of initiative in war. That Jackson's ideas were
sound may be inferred from the fact that many of tbe
most distinguished generals in the Civil War were
men whose previous career had been analogous to his
own,' His duties at Lexington were peculiar. As Professor
of Artillery he was responsible for little more than the
drUl of the cadets and their instruction in the theory of
gunnery. The tactics of artUlery, as the word is under
stood in Europe, he was not called upon to impart.
Optics, mechanics, and astronomy were his special sub
jects, and he seems strangely out of place in expounding
their dry formulas.
In the well-stocked hbrary of the Institute he found
every opportunity of increasing his professional knowledge.
He was an untiring reader, and he read to learn. The
wars of Napoleon were his constant study. He was an
enthusiastic admirer of his genius; the swiftness, the
daring, and the energy of his movements appealed to his
every instuict. Unfortunately, both for the Institute and
bis popularity, it was not his business to lecture on military
history. We can well imagine him, as a teacher of the
art of war, describing to the impressionable youths around
' Amongst these may be mentioned Grant, Sherman, and McClellan.
Lee himself, as an engineer, had but small acquaintance with regimental life.
The men who saved India for England in the Great Mutiny were of the
same type.

THE PROFESSOR 69
him the 'dramatic incidents of some famous campaign,
following step by step the skilful strategy tbat brought about
such victories as Austerlitz and Jena, The advantage would
then have been with his pupils ; in the work assigned to
him it was the teacher that benefited. He was by no
means successful as an instructor of the higher mathe
matics. Although the theories of light and motion were
doubtless a branch of learning which the cadets particu
larly detested, his methods of teaching made it even more
repellent. A thorough master of his subject, he lacked
altogether the power of aiding others to master it. No
flashes of humour relieved the tedium of his long and
closely-reasoned demonstrations. He never descended to
the level of his pupils' understanding, nor did he appreciate
their difficulties. Facts presented themselves to his intel
lect in few lights. As one of his chief characteristics as a
commander was the clearness with which he perceived the
end to be aimed at and tbe shortest way of reaching it, so,
in his explanations to his stumbling class, he could only
repeat the process by which he himself had solved the
problem at issue. We may well beheve that his self-
reliant nature, trained to intense application, overlooked
the fact that others, weaker and less gifted, could not
surmount unaided the obstacles which only aroused his
own masterful instincts. Nevertheless, his conscientious
industry was not entirely thrown away. To the brighter
inteUects in his class he communicated accurate scholar
ship; and although the majority lagged far behind, the
thoroughness of his mental drill was most useful, to him
self perhaps even more than to the cadets.
The death of his first wife, daughter of the Eev, Dr.
J g^ Junkin, President of Washington College, after they
had been married but fourteen months ; the solu
tion of his religious difficulties, and his reception into the
Presbyterian Church ; a five months' tour in Europe,
through Scotland, England, Germany, Switzerland, and
Italy ; his marriage to Miss Morrison, daughtei
of a North Carolina clergyman : such were the
chief landmarks of his life at Lexington. Ten years,

flO STONEWALL JAOKSON
with their burden of joy and sorrow, passed away, of
intense interest to the individual, but to the world a story
dull and commonplace. Jackson was by no means a man of
mark in Eockbridge county. Although his early shyness
had somewhat worn off, he was still as reserved as he had
been at West Point, His confidence was rarely given
outside his own home. Intimates he had few, either
at the Institute or elsewhere, StUl he was not in tbe
least unsociable, and there were many houses where he
was always welcome. The academic atmosphere of Lexing
ton did not preclude a certain amount of gaiety. The
presence of Washington CoUege and tbe MUitary Institute
drew together a large number of famUies during the
summer, and fair visitors thronged the leafy avenues of the
little town. During these pleasant months tbe officers
and cadets, as became their cloth, were always well to the
fore. Eecreation was tbe order of the day, and a round
of entertainments enlivened the ' Commencements.' Major
Jackson attended these gatherings with unfailing regu
larity, but soon after his arrival he drew the line at
dancing, and musical parties became tbe limit of bis dissipa
tion. He was anything but a convivial companion. He
never smoked, he was a strict teetotaller, and he never
touched a card. His diet, for reasons of health, was of a
most sparing kind ; nothing could tempt him to partake of
food between his regular hours, and for many years he
abstained from both tea and coffee. In those peaceful
times, moreover, there was nothing either commanding or
captivating about the Professor of Artillery. His little
romance in Mexico had given him no taste for trivial
pleasures ; and his somewhat formal manner was not re
deemed by any special charm of feature. The brow and
jaw were undoubtedly powerful ; but tbe eyes were gentle,
and the voice so mild and soft as to belie altogether the
set determination of the thin straight lips. Yet, at the
same time, if Jackson was not formed for general society,
he was none the less capable of making himself exceedingly
agreeable in a restricted and congenial circle. Young and
old, when once tbey had gained his confidence, came under

HIS RELIGION 61
the spell of his noble nature ; and if his friends were few
they were very firm.
Why Jackson should have preferred the Presbyterian
denomination to all others we are nowhere told. But what
ever his reasons may have been, he was a most zealous
and hardworking member of bis church. He was not con
tent with perfunctory attendances at the services. He
became a deacon, and a large portion of his leisure time
was devoted to the work whicb thus devolved on him.
His duties were to coUect alms and to distribute to tbe
destitute, and nothing was permitted to interfere witb
tbeir exact performance. He was exceedingly charitable
himself — one tenth of his income was laid aside for tbe
church, and he gave freely to aU causes of benevolence and
public enterprise. At tbe church meetings, whether for busi
ness or prayer, he was a regular attendant, and between
himself and his pastor existed the most confidential
relations. Nor did he consider that this was all tbat was
demanded of him. In Lexington, as in other Southern
towns, there were many poor negroes, and the condition of
these ignorant and helpless creatures, especially of the
chUdren, excited his compassion. Out of his own means
he estabhshed a Sunday school, in which he and his wife
were the principal teachers. His friends were asked to
send their slaves, and the experiment was successful.
Tbe benches were always crowded, and the rows of black,
bright-eyed faces were a source of as much pride to him as
the martial appearance of the cadet battalion.
Jackson's religion entered into every action of his life.
No duty, however trivial, was begun without asking a
blessing, or ended without returning thanks. 'He had
long cultivated,' he said, ' the habit of connecting the most
trivial and customary acts of life with a sUent prayer.'
He took the Bible as his guide, and it is possible that his
hteral interpretation of its precepts caused many to regard
him as a fanatic. His observance of the Sabbath was
hardly in accordance with ordinary usage. He never read
a letter on that day, nor posted one ; he believed tbat tbe
Government in carrying the mails were violating a divine

62 STONEWALL JACKSON
law, and he considered the suppression of such traffic one
of the most important duties of tbe legislature. Such
opinions were uncommon, even amongst the Presbyterians,
and his rigid respect for truth served to strengthen the
impression that he was morbidly scrupulous. If he un-
intentionaUy made a misstatement — even about some
trifling matter— as soon as he discovered his mistake he
would lose no time and spare no trouble in hastening to
correct it. ' Why, in the name of reason,' be was asked,
' do you walk a mile in the rain for a perfectly unimportant
thing ? ' ' Simply because I have discovered that it was a
misstatement, and I could not sleep comfortably unless I
put it right,'
He had occasion to censure a cadet who had given,
as Jackson believed, the wrong solution of a problem.
On thinking the matter over at home he found that the
pupU was right and the teacher wrong. It was late at
night and in the depth of winter, but he immediately
started off to the Institute, some distance from his quarters,
and sent for the cadet. The delinquent, answering with
much trepidation the untimely summons, found himself to
his astonishment the recipient of a frank apology. Jackson's
scruples carried him even further. Persons who interlarded
their conversation with the unmeaning phrase ' you know '
were often astonished by the blunt interr'uption that he did
not know ; and when he was entreated at parties or receptions
to break through his dietary rules, and for courtesy's sake
to seem to accept some delicacy, he would always refuse
with the reply that he had 'no genius for seeming.'
But if he carried his conscientiousness to extremes, if
he laid down stringent rules for his own governance, he
neither set himself up for a model nor did he attempt to
force his convictions upon others. He was always
tolerant; he knew his own faults, and his own tempta
tions, and if he could say nothing good of a man he
would not speak of him at all. But he was by no means
disposed to overlook conduct of which he disapproved, and
undue leniency was a weakness to which he never yielded.
If he once lost confidence or discovered deception on the

HIS LOVE OF TRUTH 63
part of one he trusted, he withdrew himself as far as
possible from any further dealings with him ; and whether
with the cadets, or with his brother-officers, if an offence
had been committed of which he was called upon to take
notice, he was absolutely inflexible. Punishment or report
inevitably followed. No excuses, no personal feelings, no
appeals to the suffering wbich might be brought upon tbe
innocent, were permitted to interfere with the execution
of his duty.
Such were the chief characteristics of the great Con
federate as he appeared to the little world of Lexington.
The taU figure, clad in the blue uniform of the United
States army, always scrupulously neat, striding to and from
the Institute, or standing in the centre of tbe parade-
ground, while the cadet battalion wheeled and deployed at
his command, was familiar to the whole community. But
Jackson's heart was not worn on bis sleeve. Shy and silent
as he was, the knowledge that even his closest acquaintances
had of him was hardly more than superficial. A man who
was always chary of expressing his opinions, unless they
were asked for, who declined argument, and used as few
words as possible, attracted but little notice. A few re
cognised his clear good sense ; tbe majority considered that
if be said httle it was because he had nothing worth saying.
Because he went bis own way and hved by his own rules
he was considered eccentric ; because he was sometimes
absent-minded, and apt to become absorbed in bis own
thoughts, he was set down as unpractical; his literal
accuracy of statement was construed as the mark of a
narrow inteUect, and his exceeding modesty served to keep
him in the background.
At the Institute, despite his reputation for courage, he
was no favourite even with the cadets. He was hardly in
sympathy with tbem. His temper was always equable.
Whatever he may have felt he never betrayed irritation,
and in the lecture-room or elsewhere he was kindness
itself ; but his own hfe had been filled from boyhood witb
earnest purpose and high ambition. Hard work was more
to his taste than amusement. Time, to his mind, was far
VOL. I, F

64 STONEWALL JACKSON
too valuable to be wasted, and he made few aUowances for
the thoughtlessness and indolence of irresponsible youth.
As a relief possibly to the educational treadmUl, his class
delighted in listening to the story of Contreras and Chapul
tepec ; but there was nothing about Jackson which corre
sponded with a boy's idea of a hero. His aggressive
punctuality, his strict observance of military etiquette, his
precise interpretation of orders, seemed to have as little in
common with the fierce excitement of battle as the un
interesting occupations of the Presbyterian deacon, who
kept a Sunday school for negroes, had with the reckless
gaiety of tbe traditional sdbreur.
' And yet,' says one who knew him, ' they imbibed
tbe principles he taught. Slowly and certainly were they
trained in the direction which the teacher wished. Jack
son justly believed that the chief value of the Institute
consisted in the habits of system and obedience which it
impressed on tbe ductile characters of the cadets, and re
garded any relaxation of the rules as tending to destroy
its usefulness. His conscientiousness seemed absurd to the
young gentlemen who had no idea of the importance of
military orders or of the implicit obedience which a good
soldier deems it his duty to pay to them. But which was
right — the laughing young cadet or the grave major of
artUlery? Let the thousands who in the bitter and
arduous struggle of the Civil War were taught by stern
experience the necessity of strict compliance with aU
orders, to the very letter, answer the question.' '
' As exact as the multiplication table, and as fuU of
things mUitary as an arsenal,' was the verdict passed on
Jackson by one of his townsmen, and it appears to have
been the opinion of the community at large.
Jackson, indeed, was as inarticulate as Cromwell,
Like the great Protector he 'lived sUent,' and like him
he was often misunderstood. Stories which have been
repeated by writer after writer attribute to him the most
grotesque eccentricities of manner, and exhibit his lofty
pifety as the harsh intolerance of a fanatic. He has been
¦ Cooke, p. 28,

HIS REAL NATURE 66
represented as the narrowest of Calvinists ; and so general
was the belief in his stern and mercUess nature that a great
poet did not scruple to link his name with a deed which,
had it actually occurred, would have been one of almost
unexampled cruelty. Such calumnies as Whittier's
* Barbara Fritchie ' may possibly have found their source
in the impression made upon some of Jackson's acquaint
ances at Lexington, who, out of all sympathy with his high
ideal of life and duty, regarded him as morose and morbid ;
and when in after years the fierce and relentless pursuit
of the Confederate general piled the dead high upon tbe
battle-field, this conception of his character was readily
accepted. As he rose to fame, men listened greedily to
those who could speak of him from personal faiowledge ;
the anecdotes which tbey related were quickly distorted ;
the slightest peculiarities of walk, speech, or gesture were
greatly exaggerated ; and even Virginians seemed to vie
with one another in representing the humble and kind-
hearted soldier as the most bigoted of Christians and the
most pitiless of men.
But just as the majority of ridiculous stories which
cluster round his name rest on the very flimsiest founda
tion, so the popular conception of his character during his
life at Lexington was absolutely erroneous. It was only
within the portals of his home that his real nature disclosed
itself. The simple and pathetic pages in which his widow
has recorded the story of tbeir married life unfold an
almost ideal picture of domestic happiness, uncbequered by
the faintest glimpse of austerity or gloom. That quiet
home was the abode of much content ; the sunshine of
sweet temper flooded every nook and corner ; and although
the pervading atmosphere was essentially religious, mirth
and laughter were famUiar guests.
* Those who knew General Jackson only as they saw
him in public would have found it hard to believe tbat
there could be such a transformation as he exhibited in his
domestic life. He luxuriated in the freedom and liberty
of his home, and his buoyancy and joyousness often ran
into a playfulness and abandon that would have been
i3

66 STONEWALL JAOKSON
incredible to tbose who saw him only when he put on his
official dignity.' ' It was seldom, indeed, except under his
own roof, or in the company of his intimates, that his
reserve was broken through ; in society he was always on
his guard, fearful lest any chance word might be miscon
strued or give offence. It is no wonder, then, that Lexing
ton misjudged him. Nor were those who knew him only
when he was absorbed in the cares of command before the
enemy likely to see far below the surface. The dominant
trait in Jackson's character was his intense earnestness,
and wben work was doing, every faculty of his nature was
engrossed in the accomplishment of the task on hand. But
precise, methodical, and matter-of-fact as he appeared, his
was no commonplace and prosaic nature. He had ' the
dehcacy and the tenderness which are the rarest and most
beautiful ornament of the strong.' ^ Beneath his habitual
gravity a vivid imagination, restrained indeed by strong
sense and indulging in no vain visions, was ever at work ;
and a lofty enthusiasm, which seldom betrayed itself in
words, inspired his whole being. He was essentially
chivalrous. His deference to woman, even in a land where
such deference was still the fashion, was remarkable, and
his sympathy with the oppressed was as deep as his loyalty
to Virginia. He was an ardent lover of nature. Tbe
autumnal glories of tbe forest, tbe songs of the birds, the
splendours of the sunset, were sources of unfailing pleasure.
More than all, tbe strength of his imagination carried him
further than the confines of the material world, and he saw
with unclouded vision the radiant heights that lie beyond.
Jackson, then, was something more than a man of
vu'Ue temperament; he was gifted with other qualities than
energy, determination, and common sense. He was not
witty. He had no talent for repartee, and the most
industrious collector of anecdotes wiU find few good things
attributed to bim. But he possessed a kindly humour
which found vent in playful expressions of endearment, or
in practical jokes of the most innocent description; and
if these outbursts of high spirits were confined to the
' Memoirs of Stonewall Jackson, p. 108. ' Marion Crawford.

HIS SERVANTS 67
precincts of his own home, they proved at least that neither
by temperament nor principle was he inchned to look upon
the darker side. His eye for a ludicrous situation was very
quick, and a joke which told against himself always caused
him the most intense amusement. It is impossible to
read tbe letters which Mrs. Jackson has published and to
entertain the belief that his temper was ever in the least
degree morose. To use her own words, 'tbey are the
overflow of a heart full of tenderness ; ' it is true tbat
they seldom omit some reference to that higher life which
both husband and wife were striving hand in hand to lead,
but they are instinct from first to last with tbe serene
happiness of a contented mind.
Even more marked than his habitual cheerfulness was
his almost feminine sympathy witb the poor and feeble.
His servants, as was the universal rule in Virginia, were his
slaves ; but his relations with his black dependents were of
almost a paternal character, and his kindness was repaid
by that chUdlike devotion peculiar to the negro race. More
than one of these servants — so great was his reputation for
kindness — had begged him to buy them from tbeir former
owners. Their interests were his special care ; in sickness
they received all the attention and comfort tbat the house
afforded ; to his favourite virtues, politeness and punc
tuality, they were trained by their master himself, and
their moral education was a task he cheerfully undertook,
' There was one little servant in tbe family,' says Mrs.
Jackson, ' whom my husband took under his sheltering
roof at the solicitations of an aged lady ; to whom tbe
chUd became a care after having been left an orphan.
She was not bright, but he persevered in drilling her into
memorising a child's catechism, and it was a most amusing
picture to see her standing before him with fixed attention,
as if she were straining every nerve, and reciting her
answers with tbe drop of a curtsey at each word. She had
not been taught to do tbis, but it was such an effort for
her to learn that she assumed the motion involuntarily.'
Jackson's home was childless. A little daughter, born
at Lexington, lived only for a few weeks, and her place

68 STONEWALL JACKSON
remained unfilled. His sorrow, although he submitted
uncomplainingly, was very bitter, for his love for chUdren
was very great. ' A gentleman,' says Mrs. Jackson, ' who
spent the night with us was accompanied by his daughter,
but four years of age. It was the first itime the chUd
had been separated from her mother, and my husband
suggested that she should be committed to my care during
tbe night, but she clung to her father. After our guests
had both sunk in slumber, the father was aroused by some
one leaning over bis little girl and drawing the covering more
closely round her. It was only his thoughtful host, who felt
anxious lest his little guest should miss her mother's
guardian care under his roof, and could not go to sleep him
self untU he was satisfied that all was well with the child.'
These incidents are little more than trivial. The
attributes they reveal seem of small import. They are
not such as go towards building up a successful career
either in war or politics. And yet to arrive at a true con
ception of Jackson's character it is necessary that such inci
dents should be recorded. That character will not appear
the less admirable because its strength and energy were tem
pered by softer virtues ; and when we remember the great
soldier teaching a negro child, or ministering to the comfort
of a sick slave, it becomes easy to understand the feelings with
which his veterans regarded him. The quiet home at Lexing
ton reveals more ofthe real man than the camps and conflicts
of the Civil War, and no picture of Stonewall Jackson would
be complete without some reference to his domestic life.
' His life at home,' says his wife, ' was perfectly regular
and systematic. He arose about six o'clock, and first knelt
in secret prayer ; then he took a cold bath, which was
never omitted even in the coldest days of winter. This
was followed by a brisk walk, in rain or shine.
' Seven o'clock was the hour for family prayers, which
he required all his servants to attend promptly and
regularly. He never waited for anyone, not even his wife.
Breakfast foUowed prayers, after which he left immediately
for the Institute, his classes opening at eight o'clock and
continuing to eleven. Upon his return home at eleven

HOME LIFE 69
o'clock he devoted himself to study until one. Tbe first
book he took up daily was his Bible, which he read with a
commentary, and the many pencU marks upon it showed
with what care he bent over its pages. From his Bible
lesson he turned to his text-books. During those hours of
study he would permit no interruption, and stood all
the time in front of a high desk. After dinner be gave
himself up for half an hour or more to leisure and con
versation, and this was one of the brightest periods in
his home life. He then went into his garden, or out to
his farm to superintend his servants, and frequently joined
them in manual labour. He would often drive me to tbe
farm, and find a shady spot for me under the trees,
while he attended to the work of the field. When tbis was
not the case, he always returned in time to take me, if tbe
weather permitted, for an evening walk or drive. In
summer we often took our drives by moonlight, and in
the beautiful Valley of Virginia the queen of night seemed
to shine with more brightness than elsewhere. When at
home he would indulge himself in a season of rest and
recreation after supper, thinking it was injurious to health
to go to work immediately. As it was a rule with him
never to use his eyes by artificial light, he formed the habit
of studying mentally for an hour or so without a book.
After going over his lessons in the morniag, he thus
reviewed them at night, and in order to abstract his
thoughts from surrounding objects — a habit which he had
cultivated to a remarkable degree — he would, if alone with
his wife, ask that he might not be disturbed by any con
versation ; he would then take his seat with his face to the
wall, and remain in perfect abstraction until he finished
his mental task. He was very fond of being read to, and
much of our time in tbe evening was passed in _my
ministering to him in this way. He had a library, whieh,
though smaU, was select, composed chiefly of scientific,
historical, and religious books, with some of a lighter
character, and some in Spanish and French, Nearly all
of them were fuU of his pencil marks, made with a view to
future reference.' Next to the Bible, history, both ancient

70 STONEWALL JACKSON
and modern, was his favourite study. Plutarch, Josephus,
EoUm, Eobertson, Hallam, Macaulay, and Bancroft were
his constant companions. Shakespeare held an honoured
place upon his shelves ; and wben a novel fell into his
hands he became so absorbed in the story tbat he even
tually avoided such literature as a waste of time, ' I am
anxious,' he wrote to a relative, ' to devote myself to study
untU I shall become master of my profession.'
The Jacksons were far from affluent. The professor
had nothing but his salary, and his wife, one of a large
family, brought no increase to tbeir income. But the
traditional hospitality of Virginia was a virtue by no means
neglected. He was generous but unostentatious in his
mode of hving, and nothing gave him more pleasure than
to bid his friends welcome to his own home.
His outdoor recreations were healthful but not exciting.
The hills round Lexington teemed with game, the rivers
with fish, and shooting and fishing were the favourite
amusements of his colleagues. But Jackson found no
pleasure in rod or gun ; and although fond of riding and
a good horseman, he never appears to have joined in any
of those equestrian sports to which the Virginians were
much addicted. He neither foUowed tbe hunt nor tilted at
the ring. His exercise was taken after more utilitarian
fashion, in the garden or the farm.
It need hardly be said that such a lover of order and
method was strictly economical, and the wise administration
of the farm and household permitted an annual expenditure
on travel. Many of the most beautiful localities and famous
cities of the east and north were visited in these excursions.
Sometimes he wandered with his wife in search of health ;
more often the object of their journey was to see with their
own eyes the splendid scenery of their native land. The
associations which were ever connected in Jackson's mind
with his tour through Europe show how intensely he
appreciated the marvels both of nature and of art,
' I would advise you,' he wrote to a friend, ' never to
name my European trip to me unless you are blest with a
superabundance of patience, as its very mention is calculated

HIS FAITH 71
to bring up with it an almost inexhaustible assemblage of
grand and beautiful associations. Passing over the works of
the Creator, which are far the most impressive, it is difficult
to conceive of the influences which even the works of His
creatures exercise over the mind of one who lingers amidst
their master productions. Well do I remember the influ
ence of sculpture upon me during my short stay in Florence,
and how there I began to realise tbe sentiment of the Flor
entine : " Take from me my hberty, take what you will, but
leave me my statuary, leave me these entrancing productions
of art." And simUar to tbis is the influence of painting.'
But delightful as were these holiday expeditions, the day
of Jackson's return to Lexington and his duties never came
too soon. In the quiet routine of his home life, in his work
at the Institute, in tbe supervision of his farm and garden,
in his evenings witb his books, and in tbe services of his
church, he was more than contented. Whatever remained
of soldierly ambition had long been eradicated, Man of
action as he essentially was, he evinced no longing for a
wider sphere of inteUectual activity or for a more active
existence. Under his own roof-tree he found all tbat be
desired. ' There,' says his wife, ' aU that was best in his
nature shone forth ; ' and that temper was surely of the
sweetest which could utter no sterner rebuke than ' Ah !
that is not the way to be happy ! '
Nor was it merely his own gentleness of disposition and
the many graces of his charming helpmate that secured so
large a degree of peace and happiness. Jackson's religion
played even a greater part. It was not of the kind which
is more concerned with the terrors of hell than the glories
of paradise, Tbe world to him was no place of woe and
lamentation, its beauties vanity, and its affections a snare.
As he gazed with dehght on tbe gorgeous tints of the
autumnal forests, and the lovely landscapes of his mountain
home, so he enjoyed to the utmost the life and love which
had faUen to bis lot, and thanked God for that capacity
for happiness with whicb bis- nature was so largely gifted.
Yet it cannot be said that he practised no self-denial. His
life, in many respects, was one of constant self-discipline, and

72 STONEWALL JACKSON
when his time came to sacrifice himself, he submitted with
out a murmur. But in his creed fear had no place. His
faith was great. It was not, however, a mere belief in God's
omnipotence and God's justice, but a deep and abiding
confidence in His infinite compassion and infinite love ; and
it created in him an almost startling consciousness of the
nearness and reality of the invisible world. In a letter
to his wife it is revealed in all its strength :
' You must not be discouraged at the slowness of re
covery. Look up to Him who giveth liberally for faith to
be resigned to His divine wiU, and trust Him for that
measure of health which wiU most glorify Him, and advance
to the greatest extent your own real happiness. We are
sometimes suffered to be in a state of perplexity that our
faith may be tried and grow stronger. See if you cannot
spend a short time after dark in looking out of your window
into space, and meditating upon heaven, with all its joys
unspeakable and full of glory, . , . "All things work
together for good " to God's children. Try to look up and
be cheerful, and not desponding. Trust our kind Heavenly
Father, and by the eye of faith see that all things are right
and for your best interests. The clouds come, pass over us,
and are followed by bright sunshine ; so in God's moral
dealings with us, He permits to have trouble awhUe.
But let us, even in the most trying dispensations of His
Providence, be cheered by the brightness which is a little
ahead.' It would serve no useful purpose to discuss Jackson's
views on controversial questions. It may be weU, however,
to correct a common error. It has been asserted that he
was a fatalist, and therefore careless of a future over which
he believed he had no control. Not a word, however,
either in his letters or in his recorded conversations
warrants the assumption. It is true that his favourite
maxim was ' Duty is ours, consequences are God's,' and
that knowing ' all things work together for good,' he looked
forward to the future without misgiving or apprehension.
But none the less he beheved implicitly that the destiny
of men and of nations is in their own hands. His faith

HIS FAITH 73
was as sane as it was humble, without a touch of that
presumptuous fanaticism which stains tbe memory of
Cromwell, to whom he has been so often compared. He
never imagined, even at the height of his renown, when
victory on victory crowned his banners, that he was ' tbe
scourge of God,' the chosen instrument of His vengeance.
He prayed without ceasing, under fire as in the camp ; but
he never mistook his own impulse for a revelation of the
divine wUl. He prayed for help to do his duty, and he
prayed for success. He knew that
' More things are wrought by prayer
Than this world dreams of ; '
but he knew, also, that prayer is not always answered in
the way which man would have it. He went into battle
with supreme confldence, not, as bas been alleged, that the
Lord had dehvered the enemy into his hands, but that
whatever happened would be the best that could happen.
And he was as free from cant as from self-deception.
It may be said of Jackson, as has been said so eloquently
of the men whom, in some respects, he closely resembled,
that ' his Bible was literally food to his understanding and
a guide to his conduct. He saw the visible finger of
God in every incident of Ufe. . , . Tbat which in our day
devout men and women feel in their earnest moments of
prayer, the devout Puritan felt, as a second nature, in his
rising up and in his lying down ; in the market-place and
in tbe home ; in society and in ' business ; in Parliament,
in Council, and on the field of battle. And feeling this, the
Puritan had no shame in uttering the very words of the
Bible wherein he had learned so to feel ; nay, he would have
burned with shame had he faltered in using tbe words. It
is very hard for us now to grasp what tbis implies. . . .
But there was a generation in which this phraseology was
the natural speech of men.' ' Of this generation, although
later in time, was StonewaU Jackson. To him such
language as he used in his letters to his wife, in conver
sation with his intimates, and not rarely in his official
> Oliver Cromwell, by Frederic Harrison, p. 29,

74 STONEWALL JACKSON
correspondence, was ' the literal assertion of truths which
he felt to the roots of his being,' which absorbed his
thoughts, which coloured every action of his life, and
which, from the abundance of his heart, rose most naturaUy
to his lips.
There is no need for further allusion to his domestic
or religious life. If in general society Jackson was wanting
in geniality ; if he was so little a man of the world that his
example lost much of tbe influence which, had he stood
less aloof from others, it must have exercised, it was the
fruit of his early training, his natural reserve, and his ex
treme humihty. It is impossible, however, that so pure
a life should have been altogether without reflex upon
others. If the cadets profited but indirectly, the slaves
had cause to bless his practical Christianity ; tbe poor and
the widow knew him as a friend, and his neighbours looked
up to him as the soul of sincerity, the enemy of all that
was false and vile. And for himself — what share had
those years of quiet study, of self-communing, and of self-
discipline, in shaping the triumphs of the Confederate arms?
The story of his military career is the reply.
Men of action have before now deplored the incessant
press of business which leaves them no leisure to think out
the problems wbich may confront them in the future.
Experience is of little value without reflection, and lei
sure has its advantages, 'One can comprehend,' says
Dabney, referring to Jackson's peculiar form of mental
exercise, 'how valuable was the trainiug which his mind
received for his work as a soldier. Command over his
attention was formed into a habit which no tempest of
confusion could disturb. His power of abstraction became
unrivalled. His imagination was trained and invigorated
untU it became capable of grouping the most extensive and
complex considerations. The power of his mind was
driUed like tbe strength of an athlete, and his self-concen
tration became unsurpassed.'
Such training was undoubtedly the very best foundation
for the intellectual side of a general's business. War
presents a constant succession of problems to be solved by

HIS INTELLECTUAL TRAINING 76
mental processes. For some experience and resource supply
a ready solution. Others, involving the movements of large
bodies, considerations of time and space, and the thousand
and one circumstances, such as food, weather, roads, topo
graphy, and moral, which a general must always bear in
mind, are composed of so many factors, that only a brain
accustomed to hard thinking can deal with them successfully.
Of this nature are the problems of strategy — those which
confront a general in command of an army or of a detached
portion of an army, and which are worked out on the map.
The problems of the battle-field are of a different order. The
natural characteristics which, when fortified by experience,
carry men through any dangerous enterprise, win the
majority of victories. But men may win battles and be very
poor generals. They may be born leaders of men, and yet ab
solutely unfitted for independent command. Their courage,
coolness, and common sense may accomplish tbe enemy's
overthrow on the field, but with strategical considerations
their intellects may be absolutely incapable of grappling. In
the great wars of the early part of the century Ney and
Blucher were probably the best fighting generals of France
and Prussia, But neither could be trusted to conduct a
campaign. Blucher, pre-eminent on the battle-field, knew
nothing of the grand combinations which prepare and com
plete success. If he was the strong right hand of the Prus
sian army, his chief of the staff was the brain, ' Gneisenau,'
said the old Marshal, 'makes tbe pills which I administer.'
' Ney's best qualities,' says Jomini, who served long on his
staff, ' his heroic valour, his quick coup d'ceil, and his energy,
diminished in the same proportion that the extent of his
command increased his responsibility. Admirable on the
field of battle, he displayed less assurance, not only in
council, but whenever he was not actually face to face
with the enemy.' It is not of sucb material as Ney and
Blucher, mistrustful of their own ability, that great cap
tains are made. Marked intellectual capacity is the chief
characteristic of the most famous soldiers. Alexander,
Hannibal, Cassar, Marlborough, Washington, Frederick,
Napoleon, WeUington, and Nelson were each and all of

76 SrrONEWALL JACKSON
them something more than mere fighting men. Few of their
age rivalled them in strength of inteUect, It was this,
combined with the best qualities of Ney and Blucher, that
made tbem masters of strategy, and lifted them high above
those who were tacticians and nothing more ; and it was
strength of inteUect that Jackson cultivated at Lexington.
So, in that quiet home amidst the Virginian mountains,
the years sped by, peaceful and uneventful, varied only by
the holiday excursions of successive summers. By day, the
lecture at tbe Institute, tbe drill of the cadet battery, the
work of the church, the pleasant toU of the farm and
garden. When night fell, and the curtains were drawn
across the windows that looked upon the quiet street, there
in that home where order reigned supreme, where, as the
master wished, ' each door turned softly on a golden hinge,'
came those hours of thought and analysis which were to fit
him for great deeds.
The even tenor of this calm existence was broken,
however, by an incident which intensified the bitter feeling
whicb already divided the Northern and Southern sections
of the United States. During the month of January, 1859,
Jackson had marched with the cadet battalion to Harper's
Ferry, where, on the northern frontier of Virginia, the
fanatic, John Brown, had attempted to raise an insurrection
amongst the negroes, and had been hung after trial in
presence of the troops. By the South Brown was regarded
as a madman and a murderer ; by many in the North he
was glorified as a martyr ; and so acute was the tension
that early in 1860, during a short absence from Lexington,
Jackson wrote in a letter to his wife, ' What do you think
about the state of the country ? Viewing things at Washington
from human appearances, I think we have great reason for
alarm.' A great crisis was indeed at hand. But if to her who
was ever beside him, while the storm clouds were rising dark
and terrible over the fair skies of the prosperous Eepublic,
the Christian soldier seemed the man best fitted to lead the
people, it was not so outside. None doubted his sincerity
or questioned his resolution, but few had penetrated hia
reserve. As the playful tenderness he displayed at home

HIS RESOLUTE CHARACTER 77
was never suspected, so the consuming earnestness, tbe
absolute fearlessness, whether of danger or of responsibility,
tbe utter disregard of man, and the unquestioning faith in
the Almighty, which made up the individuality which men
called StonewaU Jackson, remained hidden from all but
one. To his wife bis inward graces idealised bis outward
seeming ; but others, noting his peculiarities, and deceived
by bis modesty, saw little that was remarkable and much
that was singular in the staid professor. Few detected,
beneath tbat quiet demeanour and absent manner, the exist
ence of energy incarnate and an iron wUl ; and still fewer
beheld, in the plain figure of the Presbyterian deacon, the
potential leader of great armies, inspiring the devotion of
his soldiers, and riding in the forefront of victorious battle.

78 STONEWALL JACKSON

CHAPTEE IV
SECESSION. 1860-61
Jaokson spent ten years at Lexington, and he was just five-
and-thirty when he left it. For ten years he had seen no
more of mUitary service than the drills of the
cadet battalion. He had lost all touch with the
army. His name had been forgotten, except by his com
rades of the Mexican campaign, and he had hardly seen a
regular soldier since he resigned his commission. But,
even from a military point of view, those ten years had not
been wasted. His mind had a wider grasp, and his brain
was more active. Striving to fit himself for such duties as
might devolve on him, should he be summoned to the field,
like aU great men and all practical men he had gone to the
best masters. In the campaigns of Napoleon he had found
instruction in tbe highest branch of his profession, and had
made his own the methods of war which the greatest of
modern soldiers both preached and practised. Strengthened,
too, by constant exercise was his control over his physical
wants, over his temper and bis temptations, Maturer years
and the search for wisdom had steadied his restless daring ;
and his devotion to duty, always remarkable, had become a
second nature. His health, under careful and self-imposed
treatment, had much improved, and the year 1861 found
him in the prime of physical and mental vigour. Already
it had become apparent that his life at Lexington was soon
to end. The Damascus blade was not to rust upon the
shelf. During the winter of 1860-61 the probability of a
conflict between the free and slave-holding States, that is,
between North and South, had become almost a certainty.
South Carolina, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, Georgia,

THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY 79
Louisiana, and Texas, had formally seceded from the Union ;
and establishing a Provisional Government, with Jefferson
Davis as President, at Montgomery in Alabama, had pro
claimed a new Eepublic, under the title of the Confederate
States of America, In order to explain Jackson's attitude
at this momentous crisis, it will be necessary to discuss the
action of Virginia, and to investigate the motives which led
her to take the side she did.
Forces which it was impossible to curb, and which
but few detected, were at the root of the secession move
ment. The ostensible cause was the future status of the
negro. Slavery was recognised in fifteen States of the Union.
In the North it had long been abolished, but this made
no difference to its existence in the South. The States
which composed the Union were semi-independent com
munities, with their own legislatures, their own magis
tracies, their own militia, and the power of the purse.
How far their sovereign rights extended was a matter of
contention ; but, under the terms of the Constitution, slavery
was a domestic institution, which each individual State
was at liberty to retain or discard at wiU, and over which
tbe Federal Government had no control whatever. Con
gress would have been no more justified in declaring
that the slaves in Virginia were free men than in demanding
that Eussian conspirators should be tried by jury. Nor
was the phUanthropy of the Northern people, generally
speaking, of an enthusiastic nature. The majority re
garded slavery as a necessary evU ; and, if they deplored the
reproach to the Eepublic, tbey made little parade of their
sentiments. A large number of Southerners believed it
to be tbe happiest condition for the African race ; but the
best men, especially in the border States, of which Vir
ginia was the principal, would have welcomed emancipation.
But neither Northerner nor Southerner saw a practicable
method of giving freedom to the negro. Such a measure,
if carried out in its entirety, meant ruin to the South.
Cotton and tobacco, the principal and most lucrative crops,
required an immense number of hands, and in those hands —
VOL. I. a

80 STONEWALL JACKSON
his negro slaves — the capital of the planter was locked up.
Emancipation would have swept the whole of this capital
away. Compensation, the remedy applied by England to
Jamaica and South Africa, was hardly to be thought of.
Instead of twenty mUlions sterling, it would have cost four
hundred miUions, It was doubtful, too, if compensation
would have staved off the ruin of the planters. The labour
of the free negro, naturally indolent and improvident, was
well known to be most inefficient as compared with that of
the slave. For some years, to say the least, after emanci
pation it would have been impossible to work the plantations
except at a heavy loss. Moreover, abolition, in the judg
ment of all who knew him, meant ruin to the negro. Under
the system of the plantations, honesty and morality were
being gradually instilled into the coloured race. But these
virtues had as yet made little progress ; the Christianity of
the slaves was but skin-deep ; and if all restraint were
removed, if the old ties were broken, and the influence of
the planter and his famUy should cease to operate, it was
only too probable that the four miUions of Africans would
relapse into the barbaric vices of their original condition.
The hideous massacres which had followed emancipation
in San Domingo had not yet been forgotten. It is little
wonder, then, that the majority shrank before a problem
involving such tremendous consequences,
A party, however, conspicuous both in New England and
the West, had taken abolition for its watchword, SmaU in
numbers, but vehement in denunciation, its voice was heard
throughout the Union. Zeal for universal hberty rose supe
rior to the Constitution. That instrument was repudiated
as an iniquitous document. The sovereign rights of the
individual States were indignantly denied. Slavery was
denounced as the sum of all vUlainies, the slave-holder
as tbe worst of tyrants ; and no concealment was made
of the intention, should political power be secured, of
compeUing the South to set the negroes free. In the
autumn of 1860 came the Presidential election. Hitherto,
of the two great political parties, the Democrats had
long ruled the councUs of the nation, and nearly the

THE ABOLITIONISTS 81
whole South was Democratic, The South, as regards
population, was numericaUy inferior to the North ; but
the Democratic party had more than held its own at the
baUot-boxes, for the reason that it had many adherents
in the North. So long as the Southern and Northern
Democrats held together, they far outnumbered tbe
EepubUcans. In 1860, however, the two sections of
the Democratic party split asunder. The Eepublicans,
favoured by the schism, carried their own candidate, and
Abraham Lincoln became President. South Carolina at
once seceded and the Confederacy was soon 8'fterwardsi(^^ji^^,_^ ^,
established, ^ulav^ua two.*
It is not at first sight apparent why a change of govern- -Haj.
ment should have caused so sudden a disruption of the <>-**^^-^*.x^^<'-A
Union, The Eepublican party, however, embraced sections JJ^*;^]^ * ***^
of various shades of thought. One of these, rising every day \!^i*{^]^^Vl*j
to greater prominence, was that which advocated immediate j^^. . ^^
abolition ; and to tbis section, designated by the South as ot s«c».AULa.».
'Black Eepublicans,' the new President was believed to i*v*» 4tu*^^
belong. It is possible that, on his advent to office, the U)«.«<x>vt*
political leaders of the South, despite the safeguards of-itA/v;^+trvoi»%
the Constitution, saw in the near future the unconditional **jJ-*jidu.
emancipation of the slaves ; and not only this, but that tbe '^***«-^«t
emancipated slaves would receive the right of suffrage, ^^*'*^ u*^
and be placed on a footing of complete equality with their u^isT^^^ji'^
former masters,' As in many districts the whites were
far outnumbered by the negroes, this was tantamount
to transferring all local government into the hands of the
latter, and surrendering the planters to the mercies of their
former bondsmen.
It is hardly necessary to say tbat an act of sucb gross
injustice was never contemplated, except by hysterical
abohtionists and those who truckled for their votes. It
was certainly not contemplated by Mr. Lincoln ; and it was
hardly likely that a President who had been elected by a
minority of the people would dare, even if he were so in
chned, to assume unconstitutional powers. The Democratic
party, taking both sections together, was still the stronger ;
' Grant's Memovrt, vol. i., p. 214. a 2

82 STONEWALL JAOKSON
and the Northern Democrats, temporarUy severed as they
were from their Southern brethren, would most assuredly
have united with them in resisting any unconstitutional
action on the part of the Eepublicans,
If, then, it might be asked, slavery ran no risk of uncon
ditional abolition, why should the Southern political leaders
have acted with such extraordinary precipitation ? Why,
in a country in which, to aU appearances, the two sections
had been cordially united, should the advent to power of
one political party have been the signal for so much dis
quietude on the part of the other ? Had the presidential
seat been suddenly usurped by an aboUtionist tyrant of the
type of Eobespierre the South could hardly have exhibited
greater apprehension. Few Americans denied that a perma
nent Union, such as had been designed by the founders of
the Eepublic, was the best guarantee of prosperity and peace.
And yet because a certain number of misguided if well-
meaning men clamoured for emancipation, the South chose
to bring down in ruin the splendid fabric which their fore
fathers had constructed. In thus refusing to trust the good
sense and fair dealing of the Eepublicans, it would seem, at a
superficial glance, that the course adopted by the members
of the new Confederacy, whether legitimate or not, could
not possibly be justified.^
Unfortunately, something more than mere political
rancour was at work. The areas of slave and of free
labour were divided by an artificial frontier. ' Mason and
' I have been somewhat severely taken to task for attaching the epi
thets ' misguided,' ' unpractical,' ' fanatical,' to the abolitionists. I see no
reason, however, to modify my language. It is too often the case that men
of the loftiest ideals seek to attain them by the most objectionable means,
and the maxim ' Fiat justitia ruat coelum ' cannot be literally applied to
great affairs. The conversion of the Mahomedan world to Christianity
would be a nobler work than even the emancipation of the negro, but the
missionary who began with reviling the faithful, aud then proceeded to
threaten them with fire and the sword unless they changed their creed,
would justly be called a fanatic. Yet the abolitionists did worse than this,
for they incited the negroes to insurrection. Nor do I think that the ques
tion is affected by the fact that many of the abolitionists were upright,
earnest, and devout. A good man is not necessarily a wise man, and I
remember that Samuel Johnson and John Wesley supported King George
against the American colonists.

THE LABOUR QUESTION 88
Dixon's line,' originally fixed as the boundary between
Pennsylvania on the north and Virginia and Maryland on
the south, cut the territory of the United States into two
distinct sections ; and, little by little, these two sections,
geographically as weU as politically severed, had resolved
themselves into wiiat might almost be termed two distinct
nations. Many circumstances tended to increase tbe cleavage.
The South was purely agricultural ; the most prosperous
part of the North was purely industrial. In the South,
the great planters formed a landed aristocracy ; the claims
of birth were ungrudgingly admitted ; class barriers were, to
a certain extent, a recognised part of the social system, and
the sons of the old houses were accepted as tbe natural
leaders of the people. In the North, on the contrary, the only
aristocracy was that of wealth ; and even wealth, apart
from merit, had no hold on the respect of the community.
The distinctions of caste were shght in the extreme. The
descendants of tbe Puritans, of those English country gen
tlemen who had preferred to ride with Cromwell rather
than with Eupert, to pray with Baxter rather than with
Laud, made no parade of their ancestry ; and among the
extreme Eepublicans existed an innate but decided aver
sion to the recognition of social grades. Moreover, diver
gent interests demanded different fiscal treatment. The
cotton and tobacco of the South, monopolising the markets
of the world, asked for free trade. The manufacturers of
New England, struggling against foreign competition, were
strong protectionists, and they were powerful enough to
enforce their wiU in the shape of an oppressive tariff.
Thus the planters of Virginia paid high prices in order
that miUs might flourish in Connecticut; and the
sovereign States of the South, to their own detriment,
were compeUed to contribute to the abundance of the
wealthier North. The interests of labour were not less
conflicting. The competition between free and forced
labour, side by side on the same continent, was bound
in itself, sooner or later, to breed dissension ; and if it
had not yet reached an acute stage, it had at least

84 STONEWALL JACKSON
created a certain degree of bitter feeling. But more
than all — and the fact must be borne in mind if the
character of tbe CivU War is to be fuUy appreciated — the
natural ties which should have linked together the States
on either side of Mason and Dixon's line had weakened to
a mere mechanical bond. The intercourse between North
and South, social or commercial, was hardly more than
that which exists between two foreign nations. The two
sections knew but little of each other, and that little was
not the good points but the bad.
For more than fifty years after the election of the first
President, whUe as yet the crust of European tradition
overlaid the young shoots of democracy, the supremacy,
social and political, of the great landowners of the South
had been practically undisputed. But when the young
Eepublic began to take its place amongst the nations, men
found that the wealth and talents which led it forward
belonged as much to the busy cities of New England as to
the plantations of Virginia and the Carolinas; and with
the growing sentiment in favour of universal equality began
the revolt against the dominion of a caste. Those who
had carved out their own fortunes by sheer hard work
and ability questioned the superiority of men whose posi
tions were no guarantee of personal capacity, and whose
wealth was not of their own making. Those who had
borne the heat and burden of the day deemed themselves
the equals and more than equals of those who had loitered
in the shade; and, esteeming men for tbeir own worth
and not for that of some forgotten ancestor, they had come
to despise those who toiled not neither did they spin.
Tenaciously the Southerners clung to the supremacy they
had inherited from a bygone age. The contempt of
the Northerner was repaid in kind. In the political
arena the struggle was fierce and keen. Mutual hatred,
fanned by unscrupulous agitators, increased in bitterness;
and, hindering reconciliation, rose the fatal barrier of
slavery. It is true tbat, prior to 1860, the abolitionists were
not numerous in the North ; and it is equaUy true that by

THE ABOLITIONISTS 85
many of tbe best men in the South tbe institution which
had been bequeathed to them was thoroughly detested.
Looking back over the years which have elapsed since
the slaves were freed, the errors of the two factions are
sufficiently manifest. If, on the one band, the abolitionist,
denouncing sternly, in season and out of season, the
existence of slavery on the free soil of America, was un
just and worse to the slave-owner, who, to say the least,
was in no way responsible for the inhuman and short
sighted policy of a former generation ; on the other hand the
high-principled Southerner, although in bis heart deplor
ing the condition of the negro, and sometimes imitating
the example of Washington, whose dying bequest gave
freedom to his slaves, made no attempt to find a
remedy.' The latter had the better excuse. He knew, were
emancipation granted, that years must elapse before the
negro could be trained to the responsibihties of freedom, and
that those years would impoverish the South. It appears
to have been forgotten by tbe abolitionists tbat all races
upon earth have required a protracted probation to fit
them for the rights of citizenship and tbe duties of
free men. Here was a people, hardly emerged from the
grossest barbarism, and possibly, from the very beginning,
' On the publication of the first edition my views on the action of the
abolitionists were traversed by critics whose opinions demand considera
tion. They implied that in condemning the unwisdom and violence of the
anti-slavery party, I had not taken into account the aggressive tendencies of
the Southern politicians from 1850 onwards, that I had ignored the attempts
to extend slavery to the Territories, and that I had overlooked the effect of
the Fugitive Slave Law. A close study of abolitionist literature, however,
had made it very clear to me that the advocates of emancipation, although
actuated by the highest motives, never at any time approached the question
in a conciUatory spirit ; and that long before 1850 their fierce cries for ven
geance had roused the very bitterest feelings in the South. In fact they had
already made war inevitable. Draper, the Northern historian, admits that
so early as 1844 ' the contest between the abolitionists on one side and the
slave-holders on the other hand had become a mortal duel.' It may be argued,
perhaps, that the abolitionists saw that the slave-power would never yield
except to armed force, and that they therefore showed good judgment in
provoking the South into secession and civil war. But forcing the hand of
the Almighty is something more than a questionable doctrine.

86 STONEWALL JAOKSON
of inferior natural endowment, on whom they proposed to
confer the same rights without any probation whatsoever.
A glance at the world around them should have induced
reflection. The experience of other countries was not
encouraging. Hayti, where the blacks had long been
masters of the soU, was still a pandemonium ; and in
Jamaica and South Africa the precipitate action of zealous
but unpractical phUanthropists had wrought incalculable
mischief. Even Lincoln himself, redemption by purchase
being impracticable, saw no other way out of tbe difficulty
than tbe wholesale deportation of the negroes to West Africa.
In time, perhaps, under the influence of such men as
Lincoln and Lee, the nation might have found a solution of
the problem, and North and South have combined to rid their
common country of the curse of human servitude. But
between fanaticism on the one side and helplessness on the
other there was no common ground. The fierce invectives
of tbe reformers forbade all hope of temperate discussion,
and their unreasoning denunciations only provoked resent
ment. And this resentment became the more bitter be
cause in demanding emancipation, either by fair means
or forcible, and in expressiug their intention of making it
a national question, the abolitionists were directly striking
at a right which the people of the South held sacred.
It had never been questioned, hitherto, that the several
States of the Union, so far at least as concerned their
domestic institutions, were each and all of them, under the
Constitution, absolutely self-governing. But the threats
which the ' Black Eepublicans ' held out were tantamount
to a proposal to set the Constitution aside. It was their
charter of liberty, therefore, and not only their material
prosperity, which the States that first seceded believed
to be endangered by Lincoln's election. Ignorant of the
temper of the great mass of the Northern people, as loyal
in reality to the Constitution as themselves, they were
only too ready to be convinced that the denunciations of
the abolitionists were the first presage of the storm that
was presently to overwhelm them, to reduce their States
to provinces, to wrest from them the freedom they had

THE CHARGE AGAINST THE SOUTH 87
inherited, and to make them hewers of wood and drawers
of water to the detested plutocrats of New England.
But the gravamen ofthe indictment against the Southern
people is not that they seceded, but tbat they seceded in
order to preserve and to perpetuate slavery; or, to put
it more forcibly, that the liberty to enslave others was
the right which most they valued. This charge, put
forward by the abolitionists in order to cloak their own
revolt against the Constitution, is true as regards a
certain section, but as regards the South as a nation it
is quite untenable, for three-fourths of the population
derived rather injury than benefit from the presence in
their midst of four mUUon serfs.' ' Had slavery continued,
the system of labour,' says General Grant, 'would soon
have impoverished the soU and left the country poor. The
non-slave-holder must have left the country, and the small
slave-holder have sold out to his more fortunate neighbour.' *
The slaves neither bought nor sold. Their wants were
supplied almost entirely by their own labour ; and the local
markets of the South would have drawn far larger profit
from a few thousand white labourers than they did from
the multitude of negroes. It is true that a party in the
South, more numerous perhaps among tbe political leaders
than among the people at large, was averse to emancipation
under any form or shape. There were men who looked
upon their bondsmen as mere beasts of burden, more valu
able but hardly more human than the cattle in their fields,
and who would not only have perpetuated but have ex
tended slavery. There were others who conscientiously
believed that the negro was unfit for freedom, that he was
incapable of self-improvement, and that he was far happier
and more contented as a slave. Among these were
ministers of the Gospel, in no small number, who, ap
pealing to the Old Testament, preached boldly that the
institution was of divine origin, that the coloured race

¦ Of 8,300,000 whites in the fifteen slave-holding States, only 346,000
were slave-holders, and ot these 69,000 owned only one negro,
' Battles and Leaders, vol. iii., p. 689.

88 STONEWALL JACKSON
had been created for servitude, and that to advocate
emancipation was to impugn the wisdom of the Almighty.
But there were stUl others, including many of those who
were not slave-owners, who, whUe they acquiesced in the
existence of an institution for which they were not person
ally accountable, looked forward to its ultimate extinction
by the voluntary action of the States concerned. It was
impossible as yet to touch the question openly, for the
invectives and injustice of the abolitionists had so wrought
upon the Southern people, that such action would have been
deemed a base surrender to the dictation of the enemy ;
but they trusted to time, to the spread of education, and
to a feeling in favour of emancipation which was graduaUy
pervading the whole country.'
The opinions of tbis party, with which, it may be said,
the bulk of the Northern people was in close sympathy,*
are perhaps best expressed in a letter written by Colonel
Eobert Lee, the head of one of the oldest families in Vir
ginia, a large landed proprietor and slave-holder, and the
same officer who had won such weU-deserved renown in
Mexico. ' In this enlightened age,' wrote the future general-
in-chief of the Confederate army, ' there are few, I beheve,
but wiU acknowledge that slavery as an institution is a
moral and pohtical evil. It is useless to expatiate on its
disadvantages. I think it a greater evil to the white than
to the coloured race, and whUe my feelings are strongly
interested in the latter, my sympathies are more deeply
engaged for the former. The blacks are immeasurably better
off here than in Africa — moraUy, socially, and physically.
The painful discipline they are undergoing is necessary
for their instruction as a race, and, I hope, wUl prepare
tbem for better things. How long their subjection may be
necessary is known and ordered by a merciful Providence.
Their emancipation will sooner result from the mUd and
' There is no doubt that a feeling of aversion to slavery was fast
spreading among a numerous and powerful class in the South. In Mary
land, Kentucky, and Missouri the number of slaves was decreasing, and in
Delaware the institution bad almost disappeared.
' Grant's Memoirs, p. 214.

SLAVERY IN THE SOUTH 89
melting influence of Christianity than from tbe storms and
contests of fiery controversy. This influence, though slow,
is sure. The doctrines and miracles of our Saviour have
required nearly two thousand years to convert but a small
part of the human race, and even among Christian nations
what gross errors still exist ! While we see the course of the
final abolition of slavery is stiU onward, and we give it the
aid of our prayers and aU justifiable means in our power, we
must leave the progress as well as the result in His hands,
who sees the end and who chooses to work by slow thiugs,
and with wbom a thousand years are but as a single day.
The abolitionist must know this, and must see that he
bas neither the right nor the power of operating except
by moral means and suasion ; if he means well to the
slave, he must not create angry feelings in the master.
Although he may not approve of the mode by which it
pleases Providence to accomphsh its purposes, the result
wUl nevertheless be tbe same ; and the reason he gives
for interference in what he has no concern holds good
for every kind of interference with our neighbours when
we disapprove of their conduct.'
With this view of the question Jackson was in perfect
agreement. ' I am very confident,' says his wife, ' that he
would never have fought for the sole object of perpetuating
slavery, , . , He found the institution a responsible and
troublesome one, and I have heard him say that he would
prefer to see the negroes free, but he believed tbat the Bible
taught that slavery was sanctioned by the Creator Himself,
who maketh aU men to differ, and instituted laws for the
bond and free. He therefore accepted slavery, as it existed
in the South, not as a thing desirable in itself, but as
allowed by Providence for ends whicb it was not his business
to determine,' It may perhaps be maintained that to have had no
dealings with ' the accursed thing,' and to have pubhcly
advocated some process of gradual emancipation, would
have been the nobler course. But, setting aside the
teaching of the Churches, and the bitter temper of the
time, it should be remembered that slavery, although its

90 STONEWALL JACKSON
hardships were admitted, presented itself in no repulsive
aspect to the people of the Confederate States. They
regarded it with feelings very different from those of the
abohtionists, whose acquaintance with the condition they
reprobated was small in the extreme. The lot of the
slaves, the Southerners were well aware, was far preferable
to that of the poor and the destitute of great cities, of the
victims of the sweater and the inmates of the fever dens.
The helpless negro had more hands to succour him in
Virginia than the starving white man in New England.
The chUdren of the plantation enjoyed a far brighter exist
ence than the children of the slums. The worn and feeble
were maintained by tbeir masters, and the black labourer,
looking forward to an old age of ease and comfort among
his own people, was more fortunate than many a Northern
artisan. Moreover, the brutalities ascribed to the slave
owners as a class were of rare occurrence. The people
of tbe South were neither less humane nor less moral
than the people of the North or of Europe, and it is
absolutely inconceivable that men of high character and
women of gentle nature should have looked with leniency
on cruelty, or have faUed to visit the offender with some
thing more than reprobation. Had the calumnies ' which
were scattered broadcast by the abolitionists possessed
more than a vestige of truth, men like Lee and Jackson
would never have remained silent. In the minds of the
Northern people slavery was associated with atrocious
cruelty and continual suffering. In the eyes of the
Southerners, on the other hand, it was associated with
great kindness and the most affectionate relations between
the planters and their bondsmen. And if the Southerners
were blind, it is most difficult to explain the remarkable
fact that throughout tbe war, although thousands of plan
tations and farms, together with thousands of women and
children, all of whose male relatives were in the Con
federate armies, were left entirely to the care of the negroes,
both life and property were perfectly secure.
Such, then, was tbe attitude of the South towards
* Uncle Tom's Cabin to wit.

SLAVERY IN THE SOUTH 91
slavery. The institution had many advocates, uncom
promising and aggressive, but taking the people as a
whole it was rather tolerated than approved; and, even
if no evidence to the contrary were forthcoming, we
should find it hard to believe that a civilised community
would have plunged into revolution in order to maintain it.
There can be no question but that secession was revolution ;
and revolutions, as has been well said, are not made for the
sake of ' greased cartridges.' To bring about such unani
mity of purpose as took possession of the whole South,
such passionate loyalty to the new Confederacy, such
intense determination to resist coercion to the bitter end,
needed some motive of unusual potency, and the per
petuation of slavery was not a sufficient motive. The great
bulk of the population neither owned slaves nor was con
nected with those who did ; many favoured emancipation ;
and the working men, a rapidly increasing class, were
distinctly antagonistic to slave-labour. Moreover, the
Southerners were not only warmly attached to the Union,
which they had done so much to establish, but their pride
in their common country, in its strength, its prestige, and
its prosperity, was very great. Why, then, should they
break away ? History supplies us with a pertinent example.
Previous to 1765 the honour of England was dear to
the people of the American colonies. King George had
no more devoted subjects ; his enemies no fiercer foes. And
yet it required very little to reverse the scroll. The right
claimed by the Crown to tax the colonists hardly menaced
their material prosperity. A few shUhngs more or less
would neither have added to the burdens nor have
diminished the comforts of a well-to-do and thrifty people,
and there was some justice in the demand that they should
contribute to the defence of the British Empire, But
the demand, as formulated by the Government, involved a
principle whicb they were unwilling to admit, and in defence
of their birthright as free citizens they flew to arms. So,
in defence of the principle of States' Eights the Southern
people resolved upon secession with all its consequences.
It might be said, however, that South Carolina and her

92 STONEWALL JACKSON
sister States seceded under the threat of a mere faction ;
that there was nothing in the attitude of the Federal Govern
ment to justify the apprehension that the Constitution would
be set aside ; and that their action, therefore, was neither
more nor less than rank rebeUion. But, whether their rights
had been infringed or not, a large majority of the Southern
people believed that secession, at any moment and for any
cause, was perfectly legitimate. The several States of the
Union, according to their political creed, were each and all
of them sovereign and independent nations. The Consti
tution, they held, was nothing more than a treaty which
they had entered into for their own convenience, and
which, in the exercise of their sovereign powers, individu-
aUy or coUectively, tbey might abrogate when they pleased.
This interpretation was not admitted in the North, either by
Eepublicans or Democrats ; yet there was nothing in the
letter of the Constitution which denied it, and as regards
the spirit of that covenant North and South held opposite
opinions. But both were perfectly sincere, and in leaving
the Union, therefore, and in creating for themselves a new
government, the people of the seceding States considered
that they were absolutely within their right.'
It must be admitted, at the same time, that the action
of the States which first seceded was marked by a petulant
haste ; and it is only too probable that the people of these
States suffered themselves to be too easily persuaded that
the North meant mischief. It is impossible to determine
how far the professional pohtician was responsible for the
Civil War, But when we recall the fact that secession
followed close oh the overthrow of a faction which had long
monopohsed the spoUs of office, and that this faction found
compensation in the estabUshment of a new government, it
is not easy to resist the suspicion that the secession move
ment was neither more nor less than a conspiracy, hatched
by a clever and unscrupulous cabal.
It would be unwise, however, to brand the whole, or
even tbe majority, of the Southern leaders as selfish and un-
' For an admirable statement of the Southern doctrine, see Bopes'
History of the Civil War, vol. i., chap. i.

THE REAL CAUSE OP SECESSION 93
principled. Unless he has real grievances on which to work,
or unless those who listen to him are supremely ignorant,
the mere agitator is powerless ; and it is most assuredly
incredible that seven mUlions of Anglo-Saxons, and
Anglo-Saxons of the purest strain — Enghsh, Lowland
Scottish, and North Irish — should have been beguUed by
silver tongues of a few ambitious or hare-brained
demagogues. The latter undoubtedly had a share in
bringing matters to a crisis. But the South was ripe for
revolution long before the presidential election. The forces
which were at work needed no artificial impulse to propel
them forward. It was instinctively recognised that the
nation had outgrown the Constitution ; and it was to tbis,
and not to the attacks upon slavery, that secession was
reaUy due. The North had come to regard the American
people as one nation, and the will of the majority as para
mount.' The South, on the other hand, holding, as it had
always held, that each State was a nation in itself, denied
in toto that the will of the majority, except in certain
specified cases, had any power whatever; and where
political creeds were in such direct antagonism no compro
mise was possible. Moreover, as the action of the aboli
tionists very plainly showed, there was a grovdng tendency
in the North to disregard altogether the rights of tbe
minority. Secession, in fact, was a protest against mob
rule. The weaker community, hopeless of maintaining
its most cherished principles within the Union, was ready
to seize the first pretext for leaving it ; and the strength of
the popular sentiment may be measured by the wiUingness
of every class, gentle and simple, rich and poor, to risk all and
to suffer all, in order to free themselves from bonds which
must soon have become unbearable. It is always difficult
to analyse the motives of those by whom revolution is pro
voked ; but if a whole people acquiesce, it is a certain proof
' ' The Government had been Federal under tbe Articles of Confederation
(1781), but the [Northern] people quickly recognised that that relation was
changing under the Constitution (1789). They began to discern that the
power they thought they had delegated was in fact surrendered, and that
henceforth no single State could meet the general Govemment as sovereign
and equal.'— Draper's History of the American Civil War, vol. i., p. 286.

94 STONEWALL JACKSON
of the existence of universal apprehension and deep-rooted
discontent. The spirit of self-sacrifice which animated
the Confederate South has been characteristic of every
revolution whicb has been tbe expression of a nation's
wrongs, but it bas never yet accompanied mere factious in
surrection. When, in process of time, the history of Secession comes
to be viewed with tbe same freedom from prejudice as tbe
history of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it wUl
be clear that the fourth great Eevolution of the English-
speaking race differs in no essential characteristic from those
which preceded it. It was not simply because the five
members were Ulegally impeached in 1642, the seven bishops
illegally tried in 1688, men shot at Lexington in 1775, or
slavery threatened in 1861, that the people rose. These
were tbe occasions, not the causes of revolt. In each case
a great principle was at stake : in 1642 the liberty of the
subject ; in 1688 the integrity of the Protestant faith ; in
1775 taxation only with consent of the taxed ; in 1861 the
sovereignty of the individual States.'
The accuracy of this statement, as already suggested,
has been consistently denied. That the only principle
involved in Secession was the establishment of slavery on a
firmer basis, and tbat tbe cry of States' Eights was raised
only by way of securing sympathy, is a very general opinion.
But before it can be accepted, it is necessary to make
several admissions ; first, that the Southerners were abso
lutely callous to tbe evils produced by the institution they
had determined to make permanent ; second, that they had
persuaded themselves, in face of the tendencies of civilisa
tion, that it was possible to make it permanent; and
third, that they conscientiously held their progress and
' It has been remarked that States' Rights, as a political principle, cannot
be placed on the same plane as those with which it is here grouped. History,
however, proves conclusively that, although it may be less vital to the
common weal, the right of self-government is just as deeply cherished. A
people that has once enjoyed independence can seldom be brought to admit
that a Union with others deprives it of the prerogatives of sovereignty, and
it would seem that the treatment of this instinct of nationality is one of
the most delicate and important tasks of statesmanship.

SOUTHERiSr AFFECTION FOR THE UNION 95
prosperity to be dependent on its continued existence. Are
we to believe that the standard of morals and inteUigence
was so low as these admissions would indicate ? Are we
to beUeve that if they had been approached in a charitable
spirit, that if the Eepublican party, disclaiming all right
of iuterference, had offered to aid them in substituting, by
some means which would have provided for the control of
the negro and, at the same time, have prevented an entire
coUapse of the social fabric, a system more consonant with
humanity, the Southerners would have stUl preferred to
leave the Union, and by creating a great slave-power earn
the execration of tbe Christian world ?
Unless the South be credited with an unusual measure
of depravity and of short-sightedness, the reply can hardly
be in the affirmative. And if it be otherwise, there remains
but one explanation of the conduct of the seceding States —
viz. the dread that if they remained in the Union they
would not be fairly treated.
It is futile to argue that the people were dragooned into
secession by the slave-holders. What power had the slave
holders over tbe great mass of the population, over the
professional classes, over the small farmer, the mechanic,
the tradesman, the labourer ? Yet it is constantly asserted
by Northern writers, although the statement is virtually an
admission that only tbe few were prepared to fight for
slavery, that the Federal sentiment was so strong among
the Southerners that terrorism must have had a large share
in turning them into Separatists. The answer, putting
aside the very patent fact that the Southerner was not
easily coerced, is very plain. Undoubtedly, throughout
the South there was much affection for the Union ; but so
in the first Eevolution there was much loyalty to the
Crown, and yet it has never been asserted that tbe people
of Virginia or of New England were forced into sedition
against their will. The truth is that there were many
Southerners who, in the vain hope of compromise, would
have postponed the rupture ; but when the right of seces
sion was questioned, and the right of coercion was pro
claimed, aU differences of opinion were swept away, and
VOL. I. H

96 STONEWALL JACKSON 4
the people, thenceforward, were of one heart and mind. The ^
action of Virginia is a striking iUustration.
The great border State, the most important of those
south of Mason and Dixon's hne, was not a member of
the Confederacy when the Provisional Government was
estabhshed at Montgomery. Nor did the secession move
ment secure any strong measure of approval. In fact, the
people of Virginia, owing to their closer proximity to, and to
their more intimate knowledge of, the North, were by no
means inclioed to make of the ' Black Eepublican ' Presi
dent tbe bugbear he appeared to the States which bordered
on the Gulf of Mexico. Whilst acknowledging that the
South bad grievances, they saw no reason to believe that
redress might not be obtained by constitutional means. At
the same time, although they questioned the expediency,
they held no half-hearted opinion as to the right, of secession,
and in their particular case the right seems undeniable.
When the Constitution of the United States was ratified, Vir
ginia, by the mouth of its Legislature, had solemnly declared
' that the powers granted [to tbe Federal Government] under
the Constitution, being truly derived from the people of the
United States, may be resumed by them whenever the same
sball be perverted to their injury and oppression,' And this
declaration had been more than once reaffirmed. As already
stated, this view of the political status of the Virginia
citizen was not endorsed by the North. Nevertheless, it
was not definitely rejected. The majority of the Northern
people held tbe Federal Government paramount, but, at the
same time, they held that it had no power either to punish or
coerce the individual States, Tbis bad been the attitude of
the founders of the Eepublic, and it is perfectly clear that
their interpretation of the Constitution was this : although
the several States were moraUy bound to maintain the
compact into which they had voluntarily entered, the
obligation, if any one State chose to repudiate it, could not
be legaUy enforced. Their ideal was a Union based upon
fraternal affection ; and in the halcyon days of Washington's
first presidency, when the long and victorious struggle
against a common enemy was still fresh in men's minds,
and the sun of liberty shone in an unclouded sky, a

THE BASIS OF UNION 97
vision so Utopian perhaps seemed capable of realisation.
At all events, the promise of a new era of unbroken peace
and prosperity was not to be sullied by cold precautions
against civU dissensions and conflicting interests. The
new order, under which every man was his own sovereign,
would surely strengthen the links of kindly sympathy, and
by tbose links alone it was believed that the Union would
be held together. Such was the dream of the unselfish
patriots who ruled the destinies of the infant Eepublic.
Such were the ideas that so far influenced their delibera
tions tbat, with all their wisdom, tbey left a legacy to
their posterity which deluged tbe land in blood.
Mr. Lincoln's predecessor in the presidential chair had
pubhcly proclaimed that coercion was both illegal and
inexpedient ; and for the three months which inter
vened between the secession of South Carohna and the
inauguration of the Eepublican President, the Government
made not the slightest attempt to interfere with the
peaceable establishment of the new Confederacy. Not a
single soldier reinforced tbe garrisons of tbe military posts
in the South. Not a single regiment was recalled from the
western frontiers ; and the seceded States, without a word
of protest, were permitted to take possession, with few
exceptions, of the forts, arsenals, navy yards and custom
houses which stood on their own territory. It seemed
that the Federal Government was only waiting until an
amicable arrangement might be arrived at as to the terms
of separation. If, in addition to the words in which she had assented
to the Constitution, further justification were needed for
the belief of Virginia in the right of secession, it was
assuredly to be found in the apparent want of unanimity
on so grave a question even in the Eepublican party, and
in the acquiescent attitude of tbe Federal Government,
The people of Virginia, however, saw in the election
of a Eepublican President no immediate danger of the
Constitution being ' perverted to their injury and oppres
sion.' The North, generally speaking, regarded the action
of the secessionists with that strange and good-humoured
b2

98 STONEWALL JACKSON *
tolerance with which the American citizen too often regards »^
internal pohtics. The common-sense of the nation asserted
itself in aU its strength. A Union which could only be
maintained by force was a strange and obnoxious idea to the
majority. Amid the storm of abuse and insult m which
the two extreme parties indulged, the abolitionists on the
one side, the politicians on tbe other, Lincoln,
' The stiU strong man in a blatant land,'
stood calm and steadfast, promising justice to the South,
and eager for reconciliation. And Lincoln represented the
real temper of the Northern people.
So, in the earher months of 1861, there was no sign
whatever that the Old Dominion might be compelled to
use the alternative her original representatives had reserved.
The question of slavery was no longer to the fore. WhUe
reprobating the action of the Confederates, the President,
in his inaugural address (March 4, 1861), had declared that
the Government had no right to interfere with the domestic
institutions of the individual States ; and throughout
Virginia tbe feeling was strong in favour of the Union.
Earnest endeavours were made to effect a compromise,
under which the seceded communities might renew the
Federal compact. The Legislature called a Convention of
the People to deliberate on the part that the State should
play, and the other States were invited to join in a Peace
Conference at Washington.
It need hardly be said that during the period of negotia
tion excitement rose to the highest pitch. The political
situation was the sole theme of discussion. In Lexington
as elsewhere the one absorbing topic ousted all others, and
in Lexington as elsewhere there was much difference of
opinion. But the general sentiment was strongly Unionist,
and in the election of members of the Convention an
overwhelming majority had pronounced against secession.
Between the two parties, however, there were sharp conflicts.
A flagstaff flying the national ensign had been erected
in Main Street, Lexiugton. The cadets fired on the flag.

VIRGINIA 99
and substituting the State colours placed a guard over
them. Next morning a report reached the Institute that
the local company of volunteers had driven off the guard,
and were about to restore the Stars and Stripes, It was a
holiday, and there were no officers present. The drums
beat to arms. The boys rushed down to their parade-
ground, buckling on their belts, and carrying their rifles.
Ammunition was distributed, and the whole battalion,
under the cadet officers, marched out of tbe Institute gates,
determined to lower the emblem of Northern tyranny and
drive away tbe volunteers. A coUision would certainly
have ensued had not the attacking column been met by the
Commandant, In every discussion on tbe action of the State Jackson
had spoken strongly on the side of the majority. In terse
phrase he had summed up his view of the situation. He
was no advocate of secession. He deprecated the hasty
action of South Carolina, ' It is better,' he said, ' for the
South to fight for her rights in the Union than out of it,'
But much as tbey loved the Union, the people of Virginia
revered stiU more the principles inculcated by their fore
fathers, the right of secession and the Ulegality of coercion.
And when the proposals of the Peace Conference came to
nothing, when all hope of compromise died away, and the
Federal Government showed no sign of recognising the
Provisional Government, it became evident even to the
staunchest Unionist that civU war could no longer be post
poned. From the very first no shadow of a doubt had
existed in Jackson's mind as to the side he should espouse, or
the course he should pursue. ' If I know myself,' he wrote,
' all I am and aU I have is at the service of my country.'
According to his pohtical creed his country was his
native State, and such was the creed of the whole
South. In conforming to the Ordinance of Secession
enacted by the legislatures of their own States, the people,
according to their reading of the Constitution, acted as
loyal and patriotic citizens ; to resist that ordinance was
treason and rebeUion ; and in taking up arms ' they were
not, in their own opinion, rebels at all ; they were defending

100 STONEWALL JACKSON
their States — that is, tbe nations to which they conceived
themselves to belong, from invasion and conquest.' '
When, after the incident described above, the cadets
marched back to barracks, it was already so certain that
the Stars and Stripes would soon be torn down from
every flagstaff in Virginia that their breach of discipline
was easUy condoned. They were addressed by the Com
mandant, and amid growing excitement officer after officer,
hardly concealing his sympathy with their action, gave vent
to his opinions on the approaching crisis. Jackson was
sUent. At length, perhaps in anticipation of some amuse
ment, for he was known to be a stumbling speaker, the cadets
called on him by name. In answer to the summons he
stood before them, not, as was his wont in pubhc assemblies,
with ill-dissembled shyness and awkward gesture, but with
body erect and eyes sparkling. ' Soldiers,' he said, ' when
they make speeches should say but few words, and speak
them to tbe point, and I admire, young gentlemen, the
spirit you have shown in rusbiug to the defence of your
comrades ; but I must commend you particularly for the
readiness with which you listened to the counsel and obeyed
the commands of your superior officer. The time may
come,' he continued, and the deep tones, vibrating with
unsuspected resolution, held his audience spellbound,
' when your State will need your services ; and if that time
does come, then draw your swords and throw away the
scabbards.' The crisis was not long postponed. Fort Sumter, in
Charleston Harbour, the port of South Carolina, was held
by a Federal garrison. The State had demanded its sur
render, but no reply had been vouchsafed by Lincoln. On
AprU 8 a message was conveyed to the Governor of the
State that an attempt would be made to supply the troops
with provisions. This message was telegraphed to Mont
gomery, still the capital of the Confederacy, and the Govern
ment ordered the reduction of the fort. On the morniag of
AprU 12 the Southern batteries opened fire, and the next
day, when the flames were already scorching the doors
' History of the Civil War, Ropes, chap, i., p. 3.

VIRGINIA SECEDES 101
of the magazine, the standard of the Union was hauled
down. Two days later Lincoln spoke with no uncertain voice,
75,000 militia were called out to suppress the ' rebellion,'
The North gave the President loyal support. Tbe insult
to tbe flag set the blood of the nation, of Democrat and
Eepublican, aflame. The time for reconciliation was passed.
Tbe Confederates had committed an unpardonable crime.
Tbey had forfeited all title to consideration ; and even in the
minds of those Northerners who had shared their political
creed the memory of their grievances was obliterated.
So far Virginia had given no overt sign of sympathy
with the revolution. But she was now called upon to
furnish her quota of regiments for the Federal army. To
have acceded to the demand would have been to abjure
the most cherished principles of her political existence.
As the Federal Government, according to her political faith,
had no jurisdiction whatever within tbe boundaries of
States which had chosen to secede, it had not the slightest
right to maintain a garrison in Fort Sumter. The action
of the Confederacy in enforcing tbe withdrawal of the
troops was not generally approved of, but it was held to
be perfectly legitimate ; and Mr. Lincoln's appeal to arms,
for tbe purpose of suppressing what, in the opinion of
Virginia, was a strictly constitutional movement, was
instantly and fiercely challenged.
Neutrality was impossible. She was bound to furnish her
tale of troops, and thus belie her principles ; or to secede
at once, and reject with a clean conscience the President's
mandate. On April 17 she chose the latter, deliberately
and with her eyes open, knowing that war would be the
result, and knowing the vast resources of the North. She
was followed by Arkansas, Tennessee, and North Carolina.'
The world has long since done justice to the motives
of Cromwell and of Washington, and signs are not wanting
' Kentucky and Missouri attempted to remain neutral. Maryland was
held in check by the Federal Government, and Delaware sided with the
North. The first three, however, supplied large contingents to the Con
federate armies.

102 STONEWALL JACKSON
that before many years have passed it wUl do justice to the
motives of the Southern people. They were true to their
interpretation of the Constitution ; and if the morality of
secession may be questioned, if South Carolina acted with
undue haste and without sufficient provocation, if certain
of the Southern politicians desired emancipation for them
selves that they might continue to enslave others, it can
hardly be denied that the action of Virginia was not only
fully justified, but beyond suspicion. The wUdest threats
of the ' Black Eepublicans,' their loudly expressed deter
mination, in defiance of the Constitution, to abolish slavery,
if necessary by the bullet and the sabre, shook in no
degree whatever her loyalty to the Union. Her best
endeavours were exerted to maintain the peace between
the hostile sections ; and not till her liberties were
menaced did she repudiate a compact which had become
intolerable. It was to preserve the freedom which her
forefathers had bequeathed her, and which she desired
to hand down unsulhed to future generations, that she
acquiesced in the revolution.
The North, in resolving to maintain the Union by force
of arms, was upheld by the behef that she was acting in
accordance with the Constitution, The South, in asserting
her independence and resisting coercion, found moral
support in the same conviction, and the patriotism of
those who fought for the Union was neither purer nor more
ardent than the patriotism of those who fought for States'
Eights. Long ago, a parUament of that nation to which
Jackson and so many of his compatriots owed their origin
made petition to the Pope that he should require the
English king ' to respect the independence of Scotland, and
to mind his own affairs. So long as a hundred of us are
left alive,' said the signatories, ' we wUl never in any degree
be subjected to the English. It is not for glory, or for
riches, or for honour that we fight, but for liberty alone,
wbich no good man loses but with his life.' More than five
hundred years later, for the same noble cause and in the
same uncompromising spirit, the' people of Virginia made
appeal to the God of battles.

103

CHAPTEE V
habpbe's fbeey
Immediately it became apparent that the North was bent
upon re-conquest Jackson offered his sword to his native
j^ggj State, He was determined to take bis share in
defending her rights and Uberties, even if it were
only as a private soldier. Devotion to Virginia was his sole
motive. He shrank from the horrors of civU strife. The
thought that the land he loved so well was to be deluged
with the blood of her own children, that the happy hearths
of America were to be desecrated by the hideous image of
war, stifled the promptings of professional ambition. 'If
the general Government,' he said, 'should persist in the
measures now threatened, there must be war. It is painful
enough to discover with what unconcern they speak of war,
and threaten it. They do not know its horrors, I have
seen enough of it to make me look upon it as the sum of
all evUs,' The methods he resorted to in order that the conflict
might be averted were characteristic. He proposed to the
minister of his church that aU Christian people should be
caUed upon to unite in prayer ; and in his own devotions,
says his wife, he asked with importunity that, if it were
God's wiU, the whole land might be at peace.
His work, after the Ordinance of Secession had been
passed, was constant and absorbing. The Governor of
Virginia had informed the Superintendent of the Institute
that he shoulfl need the services of the more advanced
classes as drill-masters, and tbat they must be prepared to
leave for Eichmond, under the command of Major Jackson,
at a moment's notice. '

104 STONEWALL JACKSON
The Lexington Presbytery was holdmg its sprmg meet
ing in the church which Jackson attended, and some of the
members were entertained at his house ; but he found no
time to attend a single service — every hour was devoted to
the duty he had in hand.
On the Saturday of that eventful week he expressed
the hope that he would not be called upon to leave tiU
Monday ; and, bidding his wife dismiss from her thoughts
everything pertaining to the war and his departure, they
spent tbat evening as tbey had been accustomed, reading
aloud from rehgious magazines, and studying together the
lesson which was to be taught on the morrow in the
Sunday-school. But at dawn the next morning came a telegram, directing
Major Jackson to bring the cadets to Eichmond imme
diately. He repaired at once to the Institute ; and at one
o'clock, after divine service, at his request, had been held
at the head of the command, tbe cadet battalion marched
to Staunton, on the Virgiaia Central EaUway, and there
took train.
Camp Lee, the rendezvous of the Virguiia army, pre
sented a peculiar if animated scene. With few exceptions,
every man capable of serving in tbe field belonged either to
the militia or tbe volunteers. Some of the companies had
a smattering of driU, but the majority were absolutely un
taught, and the whole were without the slightest conception
of what was meant by discipline. And it was difficult to
teach them. The non-commissioned officers and men of
the United States army were either Irish or Germans, with
out State ties, and they had consequently no inducement
to join the South, With the officers it was different. They
were citizens first, and soldiers afterwards ; and as citizens,
their allegiance, so far as those of Southern birth were con
cerned, was due to their native States. Out of the twelve
hundred graduates of West Point who, at the beginning
of 1861, were stUl fit for service, a fourth were Southerners,
and these, almost without exception, at once took service
with the Confederacy. But the regular officers were almost
aU required for the higher commands, for technical duties.

THE SOUTHERN VOLUNTEERS 105
and the staff; thus very few were left to instruct the
volunteers. The inteUigence of the men was high, for every
profession and every class was represented in the ranks,
and many of the wealthiest planters preferred, so earnest
was their patriotism, to serve as privates ; but as yet they
were merely the elements of a fine army, and nothing
more. Their equipment left as much to be desired as their
training. Arms were far scarcer than men. The limited
supply of rifles in the State arsenals was soon exhausted.
Flintlock muskets, converted to percussion action, were then
supplied ; but no inconsiderable numbers of fowling-pieces
and shot-guns were to be seen amongst the infantry, whUe the
cavalry, in default of sabres, carried rude lances fabricated
by country blacksmiths. Some of the troops wore uniform,
the blue of the militia or the grey of the cadet ; but many
of the companies drUled and manoeuvred in plain clothes ;
and it was not till three months later, on the eve of the first
great battle, that the whole of the infantry had received
their bayonets and cartridge boxes.
An assemblage so motley could hardly be called an army ;
and the daring of the Government, who, with this levee en
masse as their only bulwark against invasion, had defied a
great power, seems at first sight strongly allied to folly.
But there was little cause for apprehension. The Federal
authorities were as yet powerless to enforce the policy of
invasion on which the President had resolved. The
great bulk of the Northern troops were just as far from
being soldiers as the Virginians, and the regular army was
too small to be feared.
The people of the United States had long cherished
the Utopian dream that war was impossible upon their
favoured soil. The mUitia was considered an arcbseological
absurdity. The regular troops, admirable as was their
work upon the frontier, were far from being a source of
national pride. The uniform was held to be a badge of
servitude. The drunken loafer, bartering his vote for a
doUar or a dram, looked down witb the contempt of a
sovereign citizen upon men who submitted to the indignity
of discipline ; and, in denouncing the expense of a standing

106 STONEWALL JAOKSON
army, unscrupulous pohticians found a sure path to popular
favour. So, when secession became something more than a
mere threat, the armed forces of the commonwealth had
been reduced almost to extinction ; and when the flag was
fired upon, the nation found itself powerless to resent the
insult. The mihtary establishment mustered no more than
16,000 officers and men. There was no reserve, no trans
port, no organisation for war, and the troops were scattered
in distant garrisons. The navy consisted of six screw-
frigates, only one of which was in commission, of five
steam sloops, some twenty sailing ships, and a few gun
boats. The majority of the vessels, although weU armed,
were out of date, 9,000 officers and men were the extent of
tbe personnel, and several useful craft, together with more
than 1,200 guns, were laid up in Norfolk dockyard, on
the coast of Virginia, within a hundred miles of Eichmond,'
The cause of the Confederacy, although her white
population of seven mUlion souls was smaUer by two-thirds
than that of the North, was thus far from hopeless. The
North undoubtedly possessed immense resources. But an
efficient army, even when the supply of men and arms be
unhmited, cannot be created in a few weeks, or even in a
few months, least of aU an army of invasion. Undisciplined
troops, if the enemy be iU-handled, may possibly stand
their ground on the defensive, as did Jackson's riflemen at
New Orleans, or the colonials at Bunker's HiU. But fight
ing behind earthworks is a very different matter to making
long marches, and executing comphcated manoeuvres under
heavy fire.. Without a trained staff and an efficient ad
ministration, an army is incapable of movement. Even
with a well-organised commissariat it is a most difficult
business to keep a marching column supplied with food and
forage ; and the problem of transport, unless a railway or

1

Strength of the Federal Navy at different periods :—
March 4, 1861 .... 42 ships in commission.

December 1, 1861
December 1, 1862
December 1, 1863
December 1, 1864

264427688671

THE TASK OF THE NORTH 107
a river be avaUable, taxes the ability of the most experienced
leader. A march of eighty or one hundred mUes into an
enemy's country sounds a simple feat, but unless every detail
has been most carefuUy thought out, it will not improbably
be more disastrous than a lost battle, A march of two or
three hundred mUes is a great military operation ; a march of
six hundred an enterprise of which there are few examples.
To handle an army in battle is much less difficult than to
bring it on to the field in good condition ; and the student
of the Civil War may note with profit how exceedingly
chary were the generals, during the first campaigns, of
leaving their magazines. It was not till their auxUiary
services had gained experience that they dared to manoeuvre
freely ; and the reason lay not only in deficiencies of
organisation, but in the nature of the country. Even
for a stationary force, standing on the defensive, unless
immediately backed by a large town or a raUway, the
difficulties of bringing up supplies were enormous. For
an invading army, increasing day by day the distance
from its base, they became almost insuperable. In 1861,
the population of the United States, spread over a territory
as large as Europe, was less than that of England, and
a great part of that territory was practically unexplored.
Even at the present day their seventy millions are but a
handful in comparison with the size of their dominions,
and their extraordinary material progress is not much more
than a scratch on the surface of the continent. In Europe
Nature has long since receded before the works of man. In
America the struggle between them has but just begun ;
and except upon the Atlantic seaboard man is almost lost
to sight in the vast spaces he has yet to conquer. In many
of the oldest States of the Union the cities seem set in
clearings of tbe primeval forest. The wUd woodland en
croaches on the suburbs, and within easy reach of the very
capital are districts where the Indian hunter might stUl
roam undisturbed. The traveUer lands in a metropolis as
large as Paris ; before a few hours have passed he may find
himself in a wUderness as solitary as the Transvaal ; and
although within the boundaries ofthe townships he sees Uttle

108 STONEWALL JACKSON
that differs from the England of the nineteenth century —
beyond them there is much that resembles the England of
the Eestoration. Except over a comparatively smaU area
an army operating in the United States would meet with
the same obstacles as did the soldiers of Cromwell and
Turenne. Eoads are few and indifferent ; towns few and far
between ; food and forage are not easily obtainable, for the
country is but partiaUy cultivated ; great rivers, bridged at
rare intervals, issue from the barren solitudes of rugged
plateaus ; in many low-lying regions a single storm is suf
ficient to convert the undrained aUuvial into a fetid swamp,
and tracts as large as an English county are covered with
pathless forest. Steam and the telegraph, penetrating even
the most lonely jungles, afford, it is true, such facUities for
moving and feeding large bodies of men that the difficulties
presented by untamed Nature have undoubtedly been much
reduced. Nevertheless tbe whole country, even to-day,
would be essentially different from any European theatre of
war, save the steppes of Eussia ; and in 1861 railways were
few, and the population comparatively insignificant.
The impediments, then, in the way of mihtary operations
were such as no soldier of experience would willingly encoun
ter with an improvised army. It was no petty republic that
the North had undertaken to coerce. The frontiers of tbe
Confederacy were far apart. The coast washed by the Gulf
of Mexico is eight hundred miles south of Harper's Ferry
on the Potomac ; the Eio Grande, the river boundary of
Texas, is seventeen hundred miles west of Charleston on
the Atlantic. And over this vast expanse ran but six
continuous lines of raUway : —
From the Potomac.
1. [Washington,] Richmond, Lynchburg, Chattanooga, Mem
phis, New Orleans.
2. [Washington,] Richmond, Weldon, Greensboro, Columbia,
Atlanta, New Orleans.
(These connected Richmond with the Mississippi.)
From the Ohio,
3. Cairo, Memphis, New Orleans.
4. Cairo, Corinth, Mobile.

THE THEATRE OF WAR 109
5. Louisville, Nashville, Dalton, Atlanta, Mobile.
(These connected the Ohio with the Gulf of Mexico.)
6. Richmond, Wilmington, Charleston, Savannah.
(This connected Richmond with the ports on the Atlantic.)
Although in the Potomac and the Ohio the Federals
possessed two excellent bases of invasion, on which it was
easy to accumulate both men and supplies, the task before
them, even had the regular army been large and well
equipped, would have been sufficiently formidable. The
city of Atlanta, which may be considered as the heart of the
Confederacy, was sixty days' march from the Potomac, the
same distance as Vienna from the English Channel, or
Moscow from the Niemen. New Orleans, the commercial
metropolis, was thirty-six days' march from the Ohio, the
same distance as Berlin from tbe Moselle. Thus space
was all in favour of the South ; even should the enemy
overrun her borders, her principal cities, few in number,
were far removed from the hostile bases, and the important
railway junctions were perfectly secure from sudden attack.
And space, especially when means of communication are
scanty, and the country affords few supplies, is the greatest
of all obstacles. The hostile territory must be subjugated
piecemeal, state by state, province by province, as was
Asia by Alexander ; and after each victory a new base of
supply must be provisioned and secured, no matter at what
cost of time, before a further advance can be attempted. Had
Napoleon in the campaign against Eussia remained for the
winter at Smolensko, and firmly established himself in
Poland, Moscow might have been captured and held during
the ensuing summer. But the occupation of Moscow
would not have ended the war. Eussia in many respects
was not unlike the Confederacy. She had given no
hostages to fortune in the shape of rich commercial
towns ; she possessed no historic fortresses ; and so
offered but few objectives to an invader. If defeated or
retreating, her armies could always find refuge in distant
fastnesses. The climate was severe ; the internal trade
inconsiderable ; to bring tbe burden of war home to the

110 STONEWALL JACKSON
mass of the population was difficult, and to hold the
country by force impracticable. Such were the difficulties
which the genius of Napoleon was powerless to overcome,
and Napoleon invaded Eussia with half a milUon of seasoned
soldiers. And yet with an army of 75,000 volunteers, and
without the least preparation, the Federal Government
was about to attempt an enterprise of even greater magni
tude. The Northern States were not bent merely on
invasion, but on re-conquest ; not merely on defeating the
hostile armies, on occupying their capital, and exacting
contributions, but on forcing a proud people to surrender
their most cherished principles, to give up their own
government, and to submit themselves, for good and all, to
what was practically a foreign yoke. And this was not all.
It has been well said by a soldier of Napoleon, writing of
the war in Spain, that neither the government nor the
army are the real bulwarks against foreign aggression, but
the national character. The downfall of Austria and of
Prussia was practically decided by the first great battle.
The nations yielded without further struggle. Strangers
to freedom, crushed by mihtary absolutism, the prostration
of each and all to an irresponsible despot had paralysed
individual energy. Spain, on the other hand, without an
army and without a ruler, but deriving new strength from
each successive defeat, first taught Napoleon that he was not
invincible. And the same spirit of liberty which inspired
the people of the Peninsula inspired, to an even higher
degree, the people of the Confederate States,
The Northern States, moreover, were about to make a
new departure in war. The manhood of a country has often
been called upon to defend its borders ; but never before
had it been proposed to invade a vast territory with a
civilian army, composed, it is true, of the best blood in the
Eepublic, but without the least tincture of mUitary expe
rience. Nor did the senior officers, professionals though they
were, appear more fitted for the enterprise than the men
they led. The command of a company or squadron against
the redskins was hardly an adequate probation for the

^al/ieyf^BautaUvh

THE RESOURCES OF THE SOUTH 111
command of an army,' or even a brigade, of raw troops
against a weU-armed foe. Had the volunteers been asso
ciated with an equal number of trained and disciplined
soldiers, as had been the case in Mexico,'' they would have
derived both confidence from their presence, and stability
from their example ; had there been even an experienced
staff, capable of deaUng with large forces, and an efficient
commissariat, capable of rapid expansion, they might have
crushed aU organised opposition. But only 3,000 regulars
could be drawn from the Western borders ; the staff was as
feeble as the commissariat ; and so, from a purely military
point of view, the conquest of the South appeared impossible.
Her self-sustaining power was far greater than has been
usuaUy imagined. On tbe broad prairies of Texas, Arkansas,
and Louisiana ranged innumerable herds. The area under
cultivation was almost equal to that north of the Potomac
and the Ohio. The pastoral districts — the beautiful Valley
of Virginia, the great plains of Georgia, the fertile bottoms
of Alabama, were inexhaustible granaries. The amount of
live stock — horses, mules, oxen, and sheep — was actually
larger than in the North ; and if the acreage under wheat
was less extensive, the deficiency was more than balanced
by the great harvests of rice and maize.^ Men of high
abUity, but profoundly ignorant of the conditions whicb
govern military operations, prophesied tbat the South
would be brought back to the Union within ninety days ;
General Winfield Scott, on the other hand, Commander-in-
Chief of the Federal armies, declared that its conquest might
be achieved ' in two or three years, by a young and able
general — a Wolfe, a Desaix, a Hoche — with 300,000 disci-
pliued men kept up to that number.'
Nevertheless, despite the extent of her territory and her
scanty means of communication, the South was peculiarly
vulnerable. Few factories or foundries had been established
' Even after the Peninsular War had enlarged the experience of the
British army. Sir Charles Napier declared that he knew but one general
who could handle 100,000 men, and that was the Duke of Wellington.
' Grant's Memoirs, vol. i., p. 168.
' Cf. U.S. Census Returns, 1860. I 2

112 STONEWALL JACKSON
within her frontiers. She manufactured nothing ; and not
only for all luxuries, but for almost every necessary of Ufe,
she was dependent upon others. Her cotton and tobacco
brought leather and cloth in exchange from England.
Metals, machinery, raUs, rolhng stock, salt, and even medi
cines came, for the most part, from the North. The weapons
which she put into her soldiers' hands during the first
year of the war, her cannon, powder, and ammunition, were
of foreign make. More than all, her mercantUe marine
was very small. Her foreign trade was in the hands of
Northern merchants. She had ship-yards, for Norfolk
and Pensacola, both national establishments, were within
her boundaries ; but her seafaring population was incon
siderable, and shipbuUding was almost an unknown
industry. Strong on land, she was powerless at sea, and
yet it was on the sea that her prosperity depended. Cotton,
the principal staple of her wealth, demanded free access
to the European markets. But without a navy, and
without tbe means of constructing one, or of manning the
vessels that she might easUy have purchased, she was
unable to keep open her communications across the Atlantic.
Nor was it on the ocean alone that the South was at a
disadvantage. The Mississippi, the main artery of her
commerce, which brought the harvests of the plantations
to New Orleans, and which divided her territory into two
distinct portions, was navigable throughout; wbUe other
great rivers and many estuaries, leading into the heart of
her dominions, formed the easiest of highways for the
advance of an invading army. Very early had her fatal
weakness been detected. Immediately Fort Sumter feU,
Lincoln had taken measures to isolate the seceding
States, to close every channel by which they could
receive either succour or supphes, and if need be to starve
them into submission. The maritime resources of the
Union were so large that the navy was rapidly expanded.
Numbers of trained seamen, recruited from the merchant
service and the fisheries, were at once avaUable.
The Northern shipbuUders had long been famous ; and
both men and vessels, if the necessity should arise, might

THE SEA-POWER 113
be procured in Europe. Judicious indeed was the policy
which, at the very outset of tbe war, brought the tremendous
pressure of the sea-power to bear against tbe South ; and,
had her statesmen possessed the knowledge of what that
pressure meant, they must have realised that Abraham
Lincoln was no ordinary foe. In forcing the Confederates
to become the aggressors, and to fire on the national ensign,
he had created a united North ; ia establishing a blockade
of their coasts he brought into play a force, which, like tbe
miUs of God, ' grinds slowly, but grinds exceeding small.'
But for the present the Federal navy was far too small to
watch three thousand miles of littoral indented by spacious
harbours and secluded bays, protected in many cases by
natural breakwaters, and communicating by numerous
channels with the open sea. Moreover, it was stiU an
even chance whether cotton became a source of weakness
to the Confederacy or a source of strength. If the markets
of Europe were closed to her by the hostile battle-ships, tbe
credit of the young Eepubhc would undoubtedly be seriously
impaired ; but the majority of tbe Southern pohticians
believed that tbe great powers beyond the Atlantic would
never allow the North to enforce her restrictive policy.
England and France, a large portion of whose population
depended for their hvelihood on the harvests of the South,
were especially interested ; and England and France, both
great maritime States, were not likely to brook interfer
ence with their trade. Nor had tbe Southern people a
high opiaion of Northern patriotism. They could hardly
conceive that the maintenance of the Union, which they
themselves considered so light a bond, had been exalted
elsewhere to the height of a sacred principle. Least of all
did they believe that the great Democratic party, which
embraced so large a proportion of the Northern people,
and which, for so many years, had been in close sympathy
with themselves, would support the President in his coercive
measures. History, moreover, not always an infaUible guide,
supplied many plausible arguments to those who sought to
forecast the immediate future. In the War of Independence,

114 STONEWALL JACKSON
not only had the impracticable nature of the country,
especially of the South, baffled the armies of Great Britam,
but the European powers, actuated by old grudges and
commercial jealousy, had come to the aid of the insurgents.
On a theatre of war where trained and weU-organised forces
had faUed, it was hardly to be expected that raw levies would
succeed ; and if England, opposed in 1782 by the fleets of
France, Spain, and HoUand, had been compeUed to let the
colonies go, it was hardly hkely that the North, confronted
by the naval strength of England and France, would long
maintaui tbe struggle with tbe South, Trustmg then to
foreign intervention, to the dissensions of their opponents,
and to their own hardihood and unanimity, the Southerners
faced the future with few misgivings.
At Eichmond, fiuaduig himself without occupation. Major
Jackson volunteered to assist in the drilling of the new levies.
The duty to which he was first assigned was distasteful. He
was an iadifferent draughtsman, and a post in the topo
graphical department was one for which he was hardly
fitted. Tbe appoiatment, fortunately, was not confirmed.
Some of bis friends in tbe Confederate Congress proposed
tbat he should be sent to command at Harper's Ferry, an
important outpost on the northern frontier of Virginia.
There was some opposition, not personal to Jackson and of
Uttle moment, but it caUed forth a remark that shows the
estimation in which he was held by men who knew him.
' Who is this Major Jackson ? ' it was asked.
' He is one,' was the reply, ' who, if you order him to
hold a post, will never leave it alive to be occupied by the
enemy.' Harper's Ferry, the spot where the first colhsion might
confidently be expected, was a charge after Jackson's own
heart. ' Last Saturday,' he writes to his wife, * the Governor
handed me my commission as Colonel of Virginia
April 26 Volunteers, tbe post I prefer above all others, and
has given me an independent command. Little
one, you must not expect to hear from me very often, as I
expect to have more work than I ever had in the same

COLONEL OF VOLUNTEERS 116
length of time before ; but don't be concerned about your
husband, for our kind Heavenly Father wUl give every
needful aid.'
The garrison at Harper's Ferry consisted of a large
number of independent companies of infantry, a few light
companies, as they were called, of cavalry, and fifteen smooth
bore cannon of small cahbre. This force numbered 4,500
officers and men, of whom aU but 400 were Virginians.
Jackson's appearance was not haUed with acclamation.
The officers of the State mUitia had hitherto exercised
the functions of command over the ill-knit concourse of
enthusiastic patriots. The mUitia, however, was hardly
more than a force on paper, and the camps swarmed with
generals and field-officers who were merely civUians in
gaudy uniform. By order of the State Legislature these
gentlemen were now deprived of their fine feathers. Every
militia officer above the rank of captain was deposed;
and the Governor of Virgiaia was authorised to fill the
vacancies. This measure was by no means popular. Both
by officers and men it was denounced as an outrage on
freemen and volunteers ; and the companies met in con
vention for the purpose of passing denunciatory resolutions.
Their new commander was a sorry substitute for tbe
brUliant figures he had superseded. The mUitia generals
had surrounded themselves with a numerous staff, and on
fine afternoons, it was said, the official display in Harper's
Ferry would have done no discredit to the Champs-
Elysees. Jackson had but two assistants, who, like
himself, stiU wore the plain blue uniform of the Military
Institute, To eyes accustomed to the splendid trappings
and prancing steeds of his predecessors there seemed
an almost painful want of pomp and circumstance about
the colonel of volunteers. There was not a particle of
gold lace about him. He rode a horse as quiet as him
self. His seat in the saddle was ungraceful. His weU-worn
cadet cap was always tilted over his eyes ; he was sparing
of speech ; his voice was very quiet, and he seldom smiled.
He made no orations, he held no reviews, and his orders
were remarkable for their brevity. Even with his officers

116 STONEWALL JAOKSON
he had Uttle intercourse. He confided his plans to no one,
and not a single item of mformation, useful or otherwise,
escaped his lips.
Some members of the Maryland Legislature, a body
whom it was important to concihate, visited Harper's Ferry
during his tenure of command. They were received with
the utmost poUteness, and in return pUed the general with
many questions. His answers were unsatisfactory, and at
length one more bold than the rest asked him frankly
how many men he bad at his disposal. ' Sir,' was the
reply, ' I should be glad if President Lincoln thought I had
fifty thousand.' Nor was tbis reticence observed only
towards those whose discretion he mistrusted. He was
sUent on principle. In the campaign of 1814, the distribution
of the French troops at a most critical moment was made
known to the aUies by the capture of a courier carrying a
letter from Napoleon to the Empress, There was little
chance of a letter to Mrs. Jackson, who was now in North
Carohna, faUing into tbe hands of the Federals ; but even
in so small a matter Jackson was consistent.
' You say,' he wrote, ' that your husband never writes
you any news. I suppose you mean mUitary news, for I
have written you a great deal about your sposo and how
much he loves you. What do you want with mUitary news ?
Don't you know that it is unmUitary and unlike an officer
to write news respecting one's post ? You couldn't wish
your husband to do an unofficer-hke thing, could you ? '
And then, the claims of duty being thus clearly defined,
he proceeds to describe the roses wbich chmbed round the
window of his temporary quarters, adding, with tbat lover
like devotion which every letter betrays, ' but my sweet little
sunny face is what I want to see most of all.'
Careful as he was to keep the enemy in the dark, he was
exceedingly particular when he visited his distant posts on
the Potomac that his presence should be unobserved. Had
it become known to the Federal generals that the commander
at Harper's Ferry had reconnoitred a certain point of
passage, a clue might have been given to his designs. The
Confederate officers, therefore, in charge of these posts,

DISCIPLINE 117
were told tbat Colonel Jackson did not wish them to
recognise him. He rode out accompanied by a single staff
officer, and the men were seldom aware that the brigadier
had been through their camps.
Never was a commander who fell so far short of the
popular idea of a dashing leader. This quiet gentleman,
who came and went unnoticed, who had nothing to say, and
was so anxious to avoid observation, was a type of soldier
unfamUiar to tbe volunteers. He was duty personified and
nothing more.
But at the same time the troops instinctively felt
that this absence of ostentation meant hard work. They
began to realise tbe magnitude of the obligations they had
assumed. Soldiering was evidently something more than a
series of brilliant spectacles and social gatherings. Here
was a man in earnest, who looked upon war as a serious
business, who was completely oblivious to what people
said or thought ; and his example was not without effect.
Tbe conventions came to nothing ; and when the companies
were organised in battalions, and some ofthe deposed officers
were reappointed to command, the men went willingly to
work. Their previous knowledge, even of driU, was of tbe
scantiest. Officers and men had to begin as recruits, and
Jackson was not the man to cut short essential prelimi
naries. Seven hours' drUl daUy was a heavy tax upon
enthusiasm ; but it was severely enforced, and the garrison
of the frontier post soon learned the elements of manoeuvre.
Discipline was a lesson more difficult than drUl, The
mUitary code, in aU its rigour, could not be at once appUed
to a body of high-spirited and inexperienced civiUans. Undue
severity might have produced the very worst results. The
observance, therefore, of those regulations which were not in
themselves essential to efficiency or health was not insisted
on. Lapses in mihtary etiquette were suffered to pass un
noticed ; no attempt was made to draw a hard and fast
line between officers and men ; and many things which in
a regular army would be considered grossly irregular were
tacitly permitted, Jackson was well aware that volunteers
of the type he commanded needed most delicate and

118 STONEWALL JACKSON
tactful handling. The chief use of minute regulations
and exacting routine is the creation of the instinct of
obedience. Time was wanting to instU such instuict into
the Confederate troops ; and the inteUigence and patriotism
of the men, largely of high class and good position, who
filled the ranks, might be relied upon to prevent serious
misconduct. Had they been burdened with the constant ac
knowledgment of superior authority wbich becomes a second
nature to the regular soldier, disgust and discontent might
have taken tbe place of high spirit and good-will. But
at the same time wUful misbehaviour was severely checked.
Neglect of duty and insubordination were crimes which
Jackson never forgave, and dehberate disobedience was in
his eyes as unmanly an offence as cowardice. He knew
when to be firm as well as when to relax, and it was not
only in the administration of discipline that he showed
his tact. He was the most patient of instructors. So
long as those under bim were trying to do then: best,
no one could have been kinder or more forbearing ; and he
constantly urged his officers to come to his tent when they
required explanation as to the detaUs of their duty.
Besides discipline and iastruction, Jackson had the
entire administration of his command upon his hands.
Ammunition was exceedingly scarce, and he had to provide
for the manufacture of ball-cartridges. Transport there was
none, but the great waggons of the VaUey farmers suppUed
the deficiency. The equipment of the artUlery left much to
be desired, and ammunition carts (or caissons) were con
structed hy fixing roughly made chests on the running gear
of waggons. The supply and medical services were non
existent, and everything had to be organised ds novo. Thus
the officer in command at Harper's Ferry had his hands
full ; and in addition to his administrative labours there
was the enemy to be watched, information to be obtained,
and measures of defence to be considered. A glance at
the map wUl show the responsibihties of Jackson's position.
The Virginia of the Confederacy was cut in two by the
Blue Eidge, a chain of mountains three hundred and thirty
mUes in length, which, rising in North CaroUna, passes

THE SHENAJTOOAH VALLEY 119
under different names through Maryland, Pennsylvania,
New York, and Vermont, and sinks to the level on the
Canadian frontier.
The Blue Eidge varies in height from 2,000 to 6,000 feet.
Densely wooded, it is traversed in Virginia only by tbe
'Gaps,' through which ran three raUways and several
roads. These Gaps were of great strategic importance,
for if they were once secured, a Northern army, moving
up the Valley of the Shenandoah, would find a covered^
line of approach towards the Virguiia and Tennessee railway,
which connected Eichmond with tbe Mississippi. Nor was
this the only advantage it would gain. From Lexington
at its head, to Harper's Ferry, where it strikes the Potomac,
throughout its whole length of one hundred and forty
miles, the VaUey was rich in agricultural produce. It*^
average width, for it is bounded on tbe west by the
eastern ranges of the Alleghanies, is not more than fourV
and-twenty mUes ; but there are few districts of the
earth's surface, of equal extent, more favoured by Nature or
more highly cultivated. It was the granary of Virginia .'Z
and not Eichmond only, but the frontier garrisons,
depended largely for subsistence on the farms of the
Shenandoah. Moreover, if the Valley were occupied by the Federals,
North-western Virginia would be cut off from the Con-/
federacy ; and Jackson's native mountains, inhabited by a '
brave and hardy race, would be lost as a recruiting ground.
In order, then, to secure the loyalty of the mountaineers,
to supply the armies, and to protect the railways, the re
tention of the VaUey was of the utmost importance to the
Confederacy. The key of the communication with tbe
North-west was Winchester, the chief town of tbe lowerj
Valley, twenty-six miles, in an air-line, south-west of Harper'ej
Ferry. From Winchester two highways lead westward,
by Eomney and Moorefield ; four lead east and south-east,
crossing the Blue Eidge by Snicker's, Ashby's, Manassas,^
and Chester's Gaps ; and the first object of the Confederate
force at Harper's Ferry was to cover this nucleus of roads.s
During the month of May the garrison of the frontier

120 STONEWALL JAOKSON
post was undisturbed by the enemy. Lincoln's first call
had been for 75,000 volunteers. On May 3 he asked for an
additional 40,000 ; these when framed, with 18,000 seamen
and a detachment of regulars, would place at his disposal
150,000 men. The greater part of this force had assembled
at Washington ; but a contingent of 10,000 or 12,000 men
under General Patterson, a regular officer of many years'
service, was coUecting in Pennsylvania, and an outpost
of 3,000 men was estabhshed at Chambersburg, forty-five
mUes north of Harper's Ferry.
These troops, however, though formidable in numbers,
were as iU-prepared for war as the Confederates, and no
immediate movement was to be anticipated. Not only
had the Federal authorities to equip and organise their
levies, but the position of Washington was the cause of
much embarrassment. The District of Columbia — the sixty
square miles set apart for the seat of the Federal Govern
ment — lies on the Potomac, fifty mUes south-east of
Harper's Ferry, wedged in between Virginia on the one
side and Maryland on the other.
The loyalty of Maryland to the Union was more than
doubtful. As a slave-holding State, her sympathies were
strongly Southern ; and it was only her geographical situa
tion, north ofthe Potomac, and with no strong frontier to pro
tect her from invasion, which had held her back from joining
the Confederacy. As only a single line of railway connected
Washington with tbe North, passing through Baltimore,
the chief city of Maryland, a very hot-bed of secession
sentiment, tbe attitude of the State was a matter of the
utmost anxiety to the Federal Government. An attempt
to send troops through Baltimore to Washington had
provoked a popular commotion and some bloodshed. Stern
measures had been necessary to keep the railway open.
Baltimore was placed under martial law, and strongly
garrisoned. But despite these precautions, for some weeks
the feeling in Maryland was so hostUe to the Union that
it was not considered safe for the Northern troops to cross
her territory except in large numbers ; and the concentration

THE BALTIMORE AND OHIO RAILWAY 121
at Washington of a force sufficient to defend it was thus
attended with much difficulty.
A single railroad, too, the Baltimore and Ohio, con
nected Washington with the West. Crossing the Potomac
at Harper's Ferry, and following the course of tbe river, it
ran for one hundred and twenty miles within the confines of
Virginia. Thus the district commanded by Jackson em
braced an artery of supply and communication which was
of great importance to the enemy. The natural course
would have been to destroy tbe liue at once ; but tbe sus-
ceptibihties of both Maryland and West Virginia had to be
considered. The stoppage of all traffic on their main trade
route would have done much to aUenate the people from
the South, and there was stiU hope that Maryland might
throw in her lot with her seceded sisters.
The line was therefore left intact, and the company was
permitted to maintain the regular service of trains, including
the maUs. For this privUege, however, Jackson exacted toll.
The Confederate raUways were deficient in rolling stock, and
he determined to effect a large transfer from the Baltimore
and Ohio. From Point of Eocks, twelve miles east of Harper's
Ferry, to Martinsburg, fifteen miles west, tbe line was
double. ' The coal traffic along it,' says General Imboden,
' was immense, for the Washington Government was ac
cumulating supplies of coal on the seaboard. These coal
trains passed Harper's Ferry at all hours of the day and
night, and thus furnished Jackson with a pretext for
arranging a brUUant capture. A detachment was posted at
Point of Eocks, and tbe 5th Virginia Infantry at Martins
burg. He then complained to the President of the
Baltimore and Ohio tbat the night trains, eastward bound,
disturbed the repose of his camp, and requested a change
of schedule that would pass all east-bound trains by
Harper's Ferry between eleven and one o'clock in the day
time. The request was complied with, and thereafter for
several days was heard the constant ro ir of passing trains
for an hour before and an hour after neon. But since the
" empties " were sent up the road at night, Jackson again

123 STONEWALL JACKSON
complained that the nuisance was as great as ever, and, as
the road had two tracks, said he must insist that the west
bound trains should pass during the same hour as those
going east. Again he was obUged, and we then had, for two
hours every day, the livehest railroad in America,
• One night, as soon as the schedule was working at its
best, Jackson instructed the officer commanding at Point of
Eocks to take a force of men across to the Maryland side
of the river the next day at eleven o'clock, and letting all
west-bound trains pass tiU twelve o'clock, to permit none to
go east. He ordered the reverse to be done at Martiasburg.
' Thus he caught aU the trains that were going east or
west between these points, and ran them up to Winchester,
thirty-two mUes on the branch liae, whence they were
removed by horse power to the railway at Strasburg,
eighteen miles further south.' '
This capture was Jackson's only exploit whUst in com
mand at Harper's Ferry. On May 24 he was reheved by
Ma 24 ^^^^^^^ Joseph E. Johnston, one of the senior
^ " officers of the Confederate army. The transfer of
authority was not, however, at once effected. Johnston
reached Harper's Ferry in advance of his letter of ap
poiatment. Jackson had not been instructed that he
was to hand over his command, and, strictly conforming to
the regulations, he respectfuUy declined to vacate his post.
Fortunately a communication soon came from General Lee,
commanding the Virginia troops, in which he referred to
Johnston as in command at Harper's Ferry. Jackson at once
recognised this letter as official evidence that he was super
seded, and from that time forth rendered his superior tbe
most faithful and zealous support. He seems at first to have
expected that he would be sent to North-west Virginia, and
his one ambition at this time was to be selected, as tbe
instrument of saving his native mountains to the South.
But the Confederate Government had other views. At
the beginning of June a more compact organisation was
given to the regiments at Harper's Ferry, and Jackson was
' Battles and Leaders, vol. i.

THE FIRST BRIGADE 123
assigned to the command of the First Brigade of the Army
of the Shenandoah,'
Eecruited in the VaUey of the Shenandoah and the
western mountains, the brigade consisted of the following
regiments : —
The 2nd Virginia, Colonel Allen.
The 4th Virginia, Colonel Preston.
The 5th Virginia, Colonel Harper.
The 27th Virginia, Lieutenant-Colonel Echols.
The 33rd Virginia, Colonel Cummings.
A battery of artillery, raised in Eockbridge County,
was attached to the brigade. Commanded by the Eev. Dr.
Pendleton, the rector of Lexington, an old West Point
graduate, who was afterwards distinguished as Lee's chief
of artillery, and recruited largely from theological colleges,
it soon became peculiarly efficient.''
No better material for soldiers ever existed than the men
of the VaUey. Most of them were of Scotch-Irish descent,
but from the more northern counties came many of English
blood, and from those in the centre of Swiss and German. But
whatever their origin, they were thoroughly well qualified for
their new trade. All classes mingled in the ranks, and all
ages ; the heirs of the oldest famUies, and the humblest ofthe
sons of toil; boys whom it was impossible to keep at school,
and men whose white beards hung below their cross-belts ;
youths who bad been reared in luxury, and rough hunters
from their lonely cabins. They were a mountain people, nur
tured ia a wholesome climate, bred to manly sports, and
hardened by the free hfe of tbe field and forest. To social
distinctions they gave httle heed. They were united for a
common purpose ; they had taken arms to defend Virginia
and to maintain her rights; and tbeir patriotism was
' The Virginia troops were merged in the army of the Confederate
States on June 8, 1861. The total strength was 40,000 men and 115 guns.
O. E., vol. ii., p. 928.
" When the battery arrived at Harper's Ferry, it was quartered in a
church, already occupied by a company, called the ' (3-rayson Dare-devUs,'
who, wishing to show their hospitality, assigned the pulpit to Captain
Pendleton as an appropriate lodging. The four guns were at once
christened Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John.

124 STONEWALL JACKSON
proved by the sacrifice of all personal consideration and
individual interest. Nor is the purity of their motives to
be questioned. They had imphcit faith in the righteousness
of their cause. Slave-owners were few in the VaUey, and the
farms were tiUed mainly by free labour. The abohtion of
negro servitude would have affected but little the population
west of the Blue Eidge. But, nevertheless, west of the Blue
Eidge the doctrine of State Eights was as firmly rooted as in
the CaroUnas, the idea that a State could be coerced into
remaining within the Union as fiercely repudiated; and
tbe men of the Valley faced the gathering hosts of the
North in tbe same spirit that they would have faced tbe
hosts of a foreign foe.
In the first weeks of June the mUitary situation
became more threatening. The Union armies were taking
shape. The levies of volimteers seemed sufficiently trained
to render reconquest practicable, and the great wave of
invasion had already mounted the horizon. A force of
26,000 men, based on the Ohio, threatened North-west
Virginia. There had been coUisions on tbe Atlantic sea
board, where the Federals held Portress Monroe, a strong
citadel within eighty mUes of Eichmond, and Eichmond had
become the capital of the Confederacy. There had been
fighting in Missouri, and the partisans of the South in
that State had already been badly worsted. The vast
power of the North was making itself felt on land, and on
the sea had asserted an ascendency which it never lost.
The blue waters of the Gulf of Mexico were patroUed by a
fleet witb which the Confederates bad no means of copuig.
From tbe sea-wall of Charleston, the great Atlantic port
of the South, the masts of the blockading squadron were
visible in the offing ; and beyond the mouths of the
Mississippi, closing the approaches to New Orleans, the
long black huUs steamed slowly to and fro.
But it was about Manassas Junction — thirty mUes
south-west of Washington and barring the road to Eich
mond — that all interest centred during the first cam
paign. Here was posted the main army of the Con
federacy, 20,000 volunteers under General Beauregard,

JOHNSTON RETIRES 125
the Manassas Gap EaUway forming an easy means of
communication with tbe Army of tbe Shenandoah,
Johnston's force had been gradually iacreased to
10,000 officers and men. But the general was by no
means convinced of the desirabUity of holding Harper's
Ferry. The place itself was insignificant. It had
contained an arsenal, but this had been burnt by the
Federals when tbey evacuated the post ; and it was
absolutely untenable against attack. To the east runs the
Shenandoah ; and immediately above the river stands a
spur of the Blue Eidge, the Loudoun Heights, completely
commanding the little town. Beyond the Potomac is a
crest of equal altitude, covered with forest trees and under
growth, and bearing the name of the Maryland Heights.
Jackson, without waiting for instructions, had taken
on himself to hold and fortify the Maryland Heights. ' I
am of opinion,' he bad written to General Lee, 'that this
place should be defended with the spirit which actuated
tbe defenders of Thermopylae, and if left to myself such is
my determination. Tbe fall of tbis place would, I fear,
result in the loss of the north-western part of the State,
and who can estimate the moral power thus gained to the
enemy and lost to ourselves ? ' '
Lee, also, was averse to evacuation. Such a measure,
he said, would be depressing to the cause of the South, and
would leave Maryland isolated. Tbe post, it was true, could
be easUy turned. By crossing the Potomac, at Williams-
port and Shepherdstown, twenty and ten miles north-west
respectively, the Federals would threaten tbe communica
tions of the garrison with Winchester ; in case they were
attacked, the Confederates would have to fight with their
backs to the Shenandoah, broad, deep, and unbridged ; and
the ground westward of Harper's Ferry was ill adapted for
defence. Attack, in Lee's opinion, would have been best met
by a resolute offensive.^ Johnston, however, believed bis
troops unfitted for active manoeuvres, and he was permitted
to choose his own course. The incident is of smaU import-
' O. B., vol. ii., p. 814.
' Ibid., pp. 881, 889, 897, 898, 901, 923.
VOL. I. ^

126 STONEWALL JACKSON
ance, but it serves to show an identity of opinion between
Lee and Jackson, and a regard for the moral aspect of the
situation which was to make itself manifest, with extra
ordinary results, at a later period. On June 14, Johnston
destroyed the raUway bridge over the Potomac,
"°* ¦ removed tbe machinery that had been rescued from
tbe arsenal, burned the public buUdings, and the next day
retired on Winchester. His immediate opponent. General
Patterson, had crossed the Pennsylvania border, and,
moving through Maryland, had occupied Williamsport with
14,000 men. A detachment of Confederate militia had
been driven from Eomney, thirty-five mUes north-west of
Winchester, and the general forward movement of the
enemy had become pronounced.
On June 20 Jackson's brigade was ordered to de
stroy the workshops of the Baltimore and Ohio EaUway
at Martinsburg, together with the whole of the roUing
stock that might there be found, and to support
""® ¦ the cavalry. The first of these tasks, although
Martinsburg is no more than ten miles distant from
WilUamsport, was easily accomplished. Four locomotives
were sent back to Winchester, drawn by teams of
horses ; and several more, together with many waggons, were
given to the flames. The second task demanded no unusual
exertions. The Federals, as yet, manifested no uitention of
marching upon Winchester, nor was the Confederate cavalry
in need of immediate assistance. The force numbered BOO
sabres. The men were untrained ; but they were first-rate
horsemen, they knew every inch of the country, and they
were exceedingly well commanded. Lieutenant-Colonel
J. E. B. Stuart, who had been a captain of dragoons in
the United States army, had already given token of those
remarkable qualities which were afterwards to make him
famous. Of an old Virginia family, he was the very type
of the Cavalier, fearless and untiring, ' boisterous as March,
yet fresh as May.'
'Educated at West Point, and trained in Indian
fighting in the prairies, he brought to the great struggle
upon wbich he had now entered a thorough knowledge of

STUART 127
Arms, a bold and fertile conception, and a constitution of
body which enabled him to bear up against fatigues which
would have prostrated the strength of other men. Those
who saw him at this time are eloquent in their description
of tbe energy and the habits of the man. They teU how
he remained almost constantly in the saddle ; how he
never failed to instruct personally every squad which went
out on picket ; how he was everywhere present, at aU
hours of the day and night, along the line which he
guarded ; and how, by infusing into the raw cavalry his
own activity and watchfulness, he was enabled, in spite of
the small force which he commanded, to observe the whole
part of the Potomac from Point of Eocks to beyond
WUliamsport. His animal spirits were unconquerable, his
gaiety and humour unfaUing ; he had a ready jest for all,
and made the forests ring with his songs as he marched at
the head of his column. So great was his activity that
General Johnston compared him to that species of hornet
caUed " a yellow jacket," and said that " he was no sooner
brushed off than be lit back again." When the general
was subsequently transferred to the West he wrote to
Stuart : " How can I eat, sleep, or rest in peace without
you upon the outpost ? " ' '
No officer in the Confederacy was more trusted by his
superiors or more popular with the men ; and Jackson was
no more proof than others against the attractions of his
sunny and noble nature. As a soldier, Stuart was a col
league after his own heart ; and, as a man, he was hardly
less congenial. Tbe dashing horseman of eight-and-twenty,
who rivalled Murat in his fondness for gay colours, and to
all appearance looked upon war as a delightful frolic, held
a rule of life as strict as that of his Presbyterian comrade ;
and outwardly a sharp contrast, inwardly they were in the
closest sympathy. Stuart's fame as a leader was to be won
in larger fields than those west of the Blue Eidge, and,
although sprung from tbe same Scotch-Irish stock, he was
in no way connected with the Valley soldiers. But from the
very outbreak of the war he was intimately associated with
1 Cooke, p. 47.
e2

128 STONEWALL JACKSON
Jackson and his men. Fortune seemed to take a curious
delight in bringing tbem together ; they were together in
their first skirmish, and in their last great victory ; and now,
on the banks of the Potomac, watching the hostile masses
that were assembling on the further shore, they first learned
to know each other's worth.
On July 2 Patterson crossed the river. The movement
was at once reported by Stuart, and Jackson, with the
5th Virginia and a battery, advanced to meet the
" ^ ¦ enemy. His instructions from Johnston were to
ascertain the strength of the hostUe force, and then to retire
under cover of the cavalry. Four regiments of his brigade
were therefore left in camp ; the baggage was sent back, and
when the 5th Virginia had marched out a short distance,
three of the four guns were halted. Near Falling Waters,
a country church some five miles south of the Potomac,
Patterson's advanced-guard was discovered on the road.
The country on either hand, like tbe greater part of the
Valley, was open, undulating, and highly cultivated, view
and movement being obstructed only by rail fences and
patches of high timber.
The Virginians were partially concealed by a strip of
woodland, and when the Federal skirmishers, deployed on
either side of the highway, moved forward to the attack,
they were received by a heavy and unexpected fire. As the
enemy fell back, a portion ofthe Confederate line was thrown
forward, occupying a house and barn ; and despite the fire
of two guns which the Federals had brought up, the men,
with the impetuous rashness of young troops, dashed out to
the attack. But Jackson intervened, Tbe enemy, who had
two brigades of infantry well closed up, was deploying a heavy
force ; his skirmishers were again advancing, and the 5th
Virginia, in danger of being outflanked, was ordered to retire
to its first position. 'The movement was misconstrued by
the Federals, and down the high road, in solid column,
came the pursuing cavalry. A well-aimed shot from the
single field-piece sufficed to check tbeir progress ; a con
fused mass of horsemen went flying to the rear ; and the
Confederate gunners turned their attention to the hostUe

PALLING WATERS 129
battery. Stuart, at the same time, performed a notable
feat. He had moved with fifty troopers to attack tbe enemy's
right flank, and in reconnoitring through the woods bad
become detached for the moment from his command. As he
rode along a winding lane he saw resting in a field a company
of Federal infantry. He still wore the uniform of the
United States army ; the enemy suspected nothing, taking
him for one of their own cavalry, and he determined to
effect tbeir capture. Eiding up to the fence he bade one of
the men remove the bars. This was done with respectful
alacrity, and he then gaUoped among tbem, shouting
' Throw down your arms, or you are all dead men ! ' The
stentorian order was at once obeyed : the raw troops
not only dropped their rifles but feU upon their faces, and
the Confederate troopers, coming to tbeir leader's aid,
marched the whole company as prisoners to the rear.
So firm was the attitude of Jackson's command
that General Patterson was thoroughly imposed upon.
Slowly and cautiously he pushed out right and left, and it
was not till near noon that the Confederates were finally
ordered to retreat. Beyond desultory skirmishing there was
no further fighting. The 5th Virginia fell back on the
main body ; Stuart came in with his string of captives,
and leaving tbe cavalry to watch tbe enemy, the First
Brigade went into camp some two miles south of Martins
burg. Patterson reported to bis Government that he had
been opposed by 3,500 men, exactly ten times Jackson's
actual number.' The losses on either side were incon
siderable, a few men killed and 10 or 15 wounded ;
and if tbe Confederates carried off 50 prisoners, the
Federals had the satisfaction of burning some tents which
Jackson had been unable to remove. The engagement,
however, had the best effect on the moral of the Southern
troops, and they were not so ignorant as to overlook the
skill and coolness with which they had been manoeuvred. It
is possible that their commander appeared in an unexpected
light, and that they had watched his behaviour with some
amount of curiosity. They certainly discovered that a dis-
> 0. E., vol. ii., p. 157.

130 STONEWALL JACKSON
taste for show and frippery is no indication of an unwarlike
spirit. In the midst of the action, while he was writing
a dispatch, a cannon ball had torn a tree above his head to
splinters. Not a muscle moved, and he wrote on as if he
were seated in his own tent.
The day after Falling Waters, on Johnston's recom
mendation, Jackson received from General Lee his com-
ji^j g mission as brigadier-general in the Confederate
" ^ ' army. ' My promotion,' he wrote to his wife, ' was
beyond what I had anticipated, as I only expected it to be
in tbe Volunteer forces of the State. One of my greatest
desires for advancement is the gratification it wiU give my
darling, and (the opportunity) of serving my country more
efficiently. I have had all that I ought to desire in the line
of promotion. I should be very ungrateful if I were not
contented, and exceedingly thankful to our kind Heavenly
Father.' Of Patterson's further movements it is unnecessary to
speak at length. The Federal army crawled on to Martias
burg. Haltiag seven miles south-west Jackson was reinforced
by Johnston's whole command ; and here, for four days, the
Confederates, drawn up in line of battle, awaited attack.
But tbe Federals stood fast in Martinsburg ; and on the
fourth day Johnston withdrew to Winchester. The
Virginia soldiers were bitterly dissatisfied. At first even
Jackson chafed. He was eager for further action. His
experiences at Falling Waters had given him no exalted
notion of the enemy's prowess, and he was ready to
engage them single-handed. ' I want my brigade,' he
said, 'to feel tbat it can itself whip Patterson's whole
army, and I believe we can do it,' But Johnston's
self-control was admirable. He was ready to receive
attack, beUeving that, in his selected position, he could
repulse superior numbers. But he was deaf to all who
clamoured for an offensive movement, to the murmurs
of the men, and to the remonstrances of the officers.
The stone houses of Martiasburg and its walled inclosures
were proof against assault, and promised at most a
bloody victory. His stock of ammunition was scanty in

THE STRATEGIC SITUATION 131
tbe extreme ; the infantry had but fourteen cartridges
apiece ; and although his patience was construed by
his troops as a want of enterprise, be bad in truth
displayed great daring in offering battle south of
Martinsburg. The Federal army at Washington, commanded by
General McDowell, amounted to 50,000 men ; a portion
of this force was already south of the Potomac, and
Beauregard's 20,000 Confederates, at Manassas Junction,
were seriously threatened. In West Virginia the enemy
had advanced, moving, fortunately, in the direction of
Staunton, at tbe southern end of the VaUey, and not on
Winchester. On July 11, this force of 20,000 men defeated
a Confederate detachment at Eicb Mountain, not far from
Jackson's birthplace ; and although it was still in
"^ ¦ the heart of the Alleghanies, a few marches,
which there were practically no troops to oppose, would
give it the control of the Upper Valley.
Thus menaced by three columns of invasion, numbering
together over 80,000 men, the chances of the Confederates,
who mustered no more than 32,000 all told, looked small
indeed. But the three Federal columns were widely
separated, and it was possible, by means of the Manassas
Gap EaUway, for Johnston and Beauregard to unite with
greater rapidity than their opponents.
President Davis, acting on the advice of General Lee,
had therefore determined to concentrate the whole available
force at Manassas Junction, and to meet at that point the
column advancing from Washington.' The difficulty was
for the Army of the Shenandoah to give Patterson the slip.
This could easUy have been done while that officer stood
fast at Martinsburg ; but, in Lee's opinion, if the enemy
found that the whole force of the Confederacy was concen
trating at Manassas Junction, the Washington column
would remain within its intrenchments round the capital,
and the Confederates ' would be put to the great dis
advantage of achieving nothing, and leaving the other
points (Winchester and Staunton) exposed.' The concen-
' 0. B., vol. ii., p. 515.

132 STONEWALL JACKSON
tration, therefore, was to be postponed untU the Washington
column advanced.'
But by that time Patterson might be close to Winchester
or threatening the Manassas EaUway, Johnston had thus
a most delicate task before him ; and in view of the
superior numbers which tbe Federals could bring against
Manassas, it was essential that not a man should be wasted
in minor enterprises. Tbe defeat of Patterson, even had
it been practicable, would not have prevented the
Washington column from advancing ; and every Confederate
rifleman who fell in the Valley would be one the less at
Manassas. On July 15 Patterson left Martinsburg and moved in
the direction of Winchester. On the 16th he remained
, J J- halted at Bunker's Hill, nine miles north ; and on
"^ the 17tb, instead of continuiag his advance,
moved to his left and occupied Charlestown, His indecision
was manifest. He, too, had no easy part to play. His
instructions were to hold Johnston in the VaUey, whUe
McDowell advanced against Beauregard, But his instruc
tions were either too definite or not definite enough, and he
himself was overcautious. He believed, and so did General
Scott, that Johnston might be retained at Winchester
by demonstrations— that is, by making a show of strength
and by feigned attacks. For more vigorous action Patterson
was not in the least inclined ; and we can hardly wonder if he
hesitated to trust his ill-trained regiments to the confusion
and chances of an attack. Even in that day of raw soldiers
and inexperienced leaders his troops had an unenviable
reputation. They had enlisted for three months, and their
term of service was nearly up. Their commander had no
influence with them ; and, turning a deaf ear to his appeals,
they stubbornly refused to remain with the colours even for
a few days over their term of service. They were possibly
disgusted with the treatment they had received from the
Government. The men had received no pay. Many were
without shoes, and others, according to their general, were
' without pants ! ' ' They cannot march,' he adds, ' and, un-
> 0. B., vol. ii., p. 507.

THE MARCH TO MANASSAS JUNCTION 133
less a paymaster goes with them, they wUl be indecently
clad and have just cause of complaint.' '
Nevertheless, the Federal authorities made a grievous
mistake when they allowed Patterson and his sans- culottes
to move to Charlestown. McDowell marched against
Beauregard on the afternoon of the 16th, and Patterson
should have been instructed to attack Johnston at any cost.
Even had the latter been successful, be could hardly have
reinforced the main army in time to meet McDowell.
At 1 A.M. on tbe morning of the 18th Johnston received
a telegram from the President to the effect that McDowell
was advancing on Manassas. Stuart was immediately
directed to keep Patterson amused; and leaving
" ^ ¦ their sick, 1,700 in number, to the care of
Winchester, the troops were ordered to strike tents and
prepare to march. No man knew the object of the
movement, and wben the regiments passed through
Winchester, marching southward, with their backs to the
enemy, the step was lagging and the men dispirited. A
few miles out, as they turned eastward, the brigades were
halted and an order was read to them. ' Our gallant army
under General Beauregard is now attacked by overwhelm
ing numbers. The Commanding General hopes that his
troops wUl step out like men, and make a forced march to
save tbe country.' The effect of this stirring appeal was
instantaneous. ' The soldiers,' says Jackson, ' rent tbe air
witb shouts of joy, and all was eagerness and animation.'
The march was resumed, and as mile after mile was passed,
although there was much useless delay and the pace was
slow, the faint outlines of the Blue Eidge, rising high
above the Valley, changed imperceptibly to a mighty wall
of rock and forest. As the night came down a long reach
of the Shenandoah crossed the road. The ford was waist-
deep, but the tall Virginians, plunging without hesitation
into the strong current, gained the opposite shore with little
loss of time. The guns and waggons foUowed in long succes
sion through the darkling waters, and still the heavy tramp of
the toiling column passed eastward through the quiet fields.
' 0. E., vol. ii., pp. 169, 170.

134 STONEWALL JACKSON
The Blue Eidge was crossed at Ashby's Gap ; and at
two o'clock in tbe morning, near the little vUlage of Paris,
the First Brigade was halted on the further slope. They
had marched over twenty miles, and so great was their
exhaustion that the men sank prostrate on the ground
beside their muskets.' They were already sleeping, when
an officer reminded Jackson that there were no pickets
round the bivouac. ' Let the poor feUows sleep,' was the
reply ; ' I wiU guard tbe camp myself.' And so, through
tbe watches of the summer night, the general himself stood
sentry over his unconscious troops.''
' ' The discouragements of that day's march,' says Johnston, ' to one
accustomed to the steady gait of regular soldiers, is indescribable. The views
of military obedience and command then taken both by officers aud
men confined their duties and obligations almost exclusively to the drill-
ground and guards. In camps and marches they were scarcely known.
Consequently, frequent and unreasonable delays caused so slow a rate ol
marching as to make me despair of joining General Beauregard in time to
aid him.' — Johnston's Narrative.
' Letter to Mrs. Jaokson, Memoirs, p. 176.

Winchester

PATTERSON r
14, OOO

Haxper'sH Ferrv/

it

JOHNSTOfl'Ns^
\ II. OOO ^^"^^ X LeesburgO
sjieliby's Cap

Front
Royal

Situation night of July 17th. 1861.
Con/edemte  _  BEB
Federal  ' 1
Scale of Miles
^-^ "  i  -f

Washingto^

-c>

, Centreville_J^;:©j— IMc.DOWELL ..35,700 iiimf

Alexandria

'^iCCeda-r:-^

("MMtassas Junction

iValkej, & Boutail si:

135

CHAPTEE VI
THE FIBST BATTLE OF MANASSAS OB BOLL EUN
At the first streak of dawn, Jackson aroused his men
and resumed the march. Before the column gained the
plain, Stuart's cavalry clattered past, leaving
"^ ¦ Patterson at Charlestown, in ignorance of bis
adversary's escape, and congratulating himself on the suc
cess of his cautious strategy. At Piedmont, a station at
tbe foot of the Blue Eidge, trains were waiting for the convey
ance of the troops ; and at four o'clock in the afternoon
Jackson and his brigade had reached Manassas Junction.
The cavalry, artillery, and waggons moved by road ; and
the remainder of Johnston's infantry was expected to follow
the First Brigade without delay. But in war, unless there
has been ample time for preparation, raUways are not
always an expeditious means of travel. The line was
single; so short notice had been given that it was im
possible to collect enough roUing-stock ; the officials were
inexperienced ; there was much mismanagement ; and on
the morning of Sunday, July 21, only three brigades of
the Army of the Shenandoah — Jackson's, Bee's, and
Bartow's — together with tbe cavalry and artiUery, bad
joined Beauregard. Kirby Smith's brigade, about 1,900
strong, was still upon the railway.
The delay might easily have been disastrous, HappUy,
the Federal movements were even more tardy. Had the
invading army been weU organised, Beauregard would
probably have been defeated before Johnston could have
reached him, McDowell had advanced from Washington on
the afternoon of the 16th with 36,000 men. On the morning
of the 18tb, the greater part of his force was concentrated

136 STONEWALL JACKSON
at CentrevUle, twenty-two mUes from Washington, and five
and a half north-east of Manassas Junction. Beauregard's
outposts had already fallen back to the banks of BuU Eun,
a stream made difficult by wooded and precipitous banks,
from two to three mUes south, and of much the same width
as the Thames at Oxford.
It would have been possible to have attacked on the
morning of the 19tb, but the Federal commander was
confronted by many obstacles. He knew little of the coun
try. Although it was almost within sight of the capital,
tbe maps were iadifferent. Guides who could describe roads
and positions from a mUitary point of view were not forth
coming. AU information had to be procured by personal
reconnaissance, and few of his officers had been trained to
such work. Moreover, the army was most unwieldy,
36,000 men, together with ten batteries, and the requisite
traiu of waggons, was a force far larger than any American
officer had yet set eyes upon ; and the movement of such a
mass demanded precise arrangement on the part of the
staff, and on the part of the troops most careful attention
to order and punctuaUty ; but of these both staff and troops
were incapable. The invading force might have done well
in a defensive position, which it would have had time to
occupy, and where the supply of food and forage, carried
on from stationary magazines, would have been compara
tively easy ; but directly it was put in motion, inexpe
rience and indiscipline stood like giants in the path. The
Federal troops were utterly unfitted for offensive move
ment, and both Scott and McDowell had protested against
an immediate advance. The regiments had only been
organised in brigades a week previously. They had never
been exercised ia mass. Deployment for battle had not yet
been practised, and to deploy 10,000 or 20,000 men for attack
is a difficult operation, even with weU-driUed troops and an
experienced staff. Nor were the supply arrangements yet
completed. The full complement of waggons had not
arrived, and the drivers on the spot were as ignorant as
they were insubordinate. The troops had received no
instruction in musketry, and many of the regiments

MCDOWELL'S ARMY 137
went into action without having once fired their rifles.
But the protests of the generals were of no effect.
The Federal Cabinet decided tbat in face of tbe public
impatience it was impossible to postpone the movement,
' On to Eichmond ' was the universal cry. The halls of
Congress resounded with the fervid eloquence of the
politicians. The press teemed with bombastic articles, in
which tbe Northern troops were favourably compared with
the regular armies of Europe, and the need of discipline and
training for the fearless and intelUgent representatives of
the sovereign people was scornfuUy repudiated. Ignorance
of war and contempt for the lessons of history were to cost
the nation dear.
Tbe march from Washington was a briUiant spectacle.
The roads south of the Potomac were covered with
masses of men, weU armed and well clothed, amply fur
nished with artiUery, and led by regular officers. To the
sound of martial music they had defiled before the Pre
sident. Tbey were accompanied by scores of carriages.
Senators, members of Congress, and even ladies swelled
the long procession. A crowd of reporters rode beside the
columns ; and the return of a victorious army could hardly
have been haUed with more enthusiasm than the departure
of these imtrained and unblooded volunteers. Yet, pitiful
masquerade as the march must have appeared to a soldier's
eye, the majority of those who broke camp that summer
morning were brave men and good Americans, To restore
the Union, to avenge the insult to their country's flag, they
had come forward with no other compulsion than the love
of their mother-land. If their self-confidence was supreme
and even arrogant, it was the self-confidence of a strong
and a fearless people, and their patriotism was of tbe
loftiest kind. It would have been easy for the North, with
her enormous wealth, to have organised a vast army of
mercenaries wherewith to crush the South, But no ! her
sons were not wUUng that their country's honour should
be committed to meaner hands.
As they advanced into Virginia, the men, animated by
their surroundings, stepped briskly forward, and the

138 STONEWALL JACKSON
country-side was gay with fantastic uniforms and gorgeous
standards. But the heat was oppressive, and the roads
lay deep in dust. Knapsack, rifle, and blankets became a
grievous burden. The excitement died away, and un
broken to the monotonous exertion of the march the
three-months' recruits lost all semblance of subordination.
The compact array of the columns was gradually lost, and
a taU of laggards, rapidly increasing, brought up the rear,
Eegiment mingled with regiment. By each roadside brook
the men fell out in numbers. Every blackberry bush was
surrounded by a knot of stragglers ; and, heedless of the
orders of those officers who still attempted to keep them
in the ranks, scores of so-called soldiers sought the cool
shade of the surrounding woods.' When darkness feU the
army was but six miles from its morning bivouacs ; and
it was not tUl late the next day that the stragglers rejoined
their regiments,
McDoweU had intended to attack at once, 'But I
could not,' he says, * get the troops forward earlier than
we did, I wished them to go to CentreviUe the second
day, but when I went to urge them forward, I was told
that it was impossible for the men to march further. They
bad only come from Vienna, about six mUes, and it was not
more than six and a half miles further to CentreviUe, in all a
march of twelve and a half miles ; but the men were foot- weary
— not so much, I was told, by the distance marched, as by the
time they had been on foot, caused by tbe obstructions in
the road, and the slow pace we had to move to avoid
ambuscades. The men were, moreover, unaccustomed to
marching, and not used to carrying even the load of
" light marchuig order." . . . The trains, hurriedly gotten
together, with horses, waggons, drivers, and waggon-masters
all new and unused to each other, moved with difficulty
and disorder, and were the cause of a day's delay in get
ting the provisions forward.' ^
On the morning of tbe 18th, in order to attract the
enemy's attention from bis right, a brigade was sent south,
' Sherman's Memoirs, vol. i., p. 181.
' O. E., vol. ii., p. 324. McDowell's Eeport.

BLACKBURN'S FORD 139
in the direction of BuU Eun, The Confederate outposts fell
back over Blackburn's Ford. The woods about the stream
concealed the defenders' forces, and the Federals pushed
on, bringing artUlery into action. Two Confederate guns,
after firing a few shots, were withdrawn under cover, and
the attacking troops reached the ford. Suddenly, from the
high timber on tbe further bank, voUeys of musketry blazed
out in their very faces, and then came proof that some at least
. of the Federal regiments were no more to be relied upon in
action than on the march. A portion of the force, despite
the strong position of the enemy and the heavy fire,
showed a bold front, but . at least one regiment turned and
fled, and was only rallied far in rear. The whole affair was
a mistake on the part of the commander. His troops had
been heedlessly pushed forward, and General Longstreet,
commandiug the opposing brigade, by carefully con
cealing his infantry, bad drawn him iuto an ambuscade.
The results of tbe action were not without importance.
The Federals feU back with a loss of 83 officers and men,
and the Confederates were much elated at their easy
success. Among some of the Northerners, on tbe other
hand, the sudden check to the advance, and the bold bearing
of the enemy, turned confidence and enthusiasm into
irrational despondency. A regiment and a battery, wbich
had enlisted for three months and whose time was up,
demanded their discharge, and notwithstanding the appeals
of the Secretary of War, * moved to the rear to the sound
of the enemy's cannon.' '
McDowell's plans were affected by the behaviour of
bis troops. He was still ignorant, so skilfully had the
march from the VaUey been carried out, that Johnston
had escaped Patterson. He was well aware, however, that
such movement was within the bounds of possibility, yet he
found himself compelled to postpone attack until the 21st,
The 19th and 20th were spent in reconnaissance, and in
bringing up supplies ; and the lack of organisation made
the issue of rations a long process. But it was the general's
' 0. E., vol. ii., p. 324. McDowell's Eeport.
VOL, I. L

140 STONEWALL JACKSON
want of confidence in his soldiers that was the main cause
of delay. The Confederates were strongly posted. The bridges
and fords across BuU Eun, with tbe exception of Sudley
Ford, a long way up stream to tbe Federal right, were ob
structed with feUed trees, and covered by rude intrench
ments. Even with regular troops a direct attack on a
single point of passage would have been difficult,
McDowell's first idea was to pass across the front of tbe
defences, and turn the right at Wolf Eun Shoals, five mUes '
south-east of Union MUls. The country, however, on this
flank was found to be unfit for the operations of large
masses, and it was consequently determined to turn the
Confederate left by way of Sudley Springs,
The Federal army consisted of five divisions of infantry,
forty-three guns, and seven troops of regular cavalry. Nine
batteries and eight companies of infantry were supplied by
the United States army, and there was a small battalion of
marines. The strength of the force told off for the attack
amounted to 30,000 aU told.'
The Confederates, along the banks of Bull Eun, dis
posed of 26,000 iufantry, 2,500 cavalry, and 66 guns.
Johnston, who had arrived on the 20th, had assumed com
mand ; but, ignorant of the country, he had aUowed Beau
regard to make the dispositions for the expected battle.
The line occupied was extensive, six miles in length,
stretching from the Stone Bridge, where the Warrenton
highroad crosses Bull Eun, on the left, to the ford at
' The rifles (muzzle-loaders) used throughout the war by both Federals
and Confederates compare as follows with more modern weapons : —
Sighted to BfEeotiTe range
American  1,000 yards 250 yards
Needle-gun (1866 and 1870) , 660 „ 250 „
Chassepdt (1870) . . . 1,320 „ 350 „
Martini-Henry .... 2,100 „ 400 „
3,200 „ 600

By effective range is meant the distance where, under ordinary conditions,
the enemy's losses are sufficient to stop his advance. The effective range of
Brown Bess was about 60 yards. The American rifled artillery was effective,
iu clear weather, at 2,000 yards, the 12-pounder smooth-bore at 1,600, the

6-pounder at 1,200,

THE CONFEDERATE POSITION UI
Union MiUs on the right. Besides these two points of
passage there were no less than six fords, to each of which
ran a road from CentrevUle, The country to the north was
undulating and densely wooded, and it would have been
possible for the Federals, especially as the Southern cavalry
was held back south of the stream, to mass before any one
of the fords, unobserved, in superior numbers. Several of
tbe fords, moreover, were weakly guarded, for Beauregard,
who had made up his mind to attack, had massed tbe greater
part of his army near the raUroad. The Shenandoah troops
were in reserve; Bee's and Bartow's brigades between
McLean's and Blackburn's fords, Jackson's between Black
burn's and MitcheU's fords, in rear of the right centre.
The position south of BuU Eun, originally selected
by General Lee,' was better adapted for defence than for
attack. The stream, with its high banks, ran like tbe
ditch of a fortress along the front ; and to tbe south was
the plateau on which stands Manassas Junction. Tbe
plateau is intersected by several creeks, running through
deep depressions, and dividing the high ground into a
series of bold undulations, level on the top, and with
gentle slopes. The most important of the creeks is
Young's Branch, surrounding on two sides the commanding
eminence crowned by tbe Henry House, and joining Bull
Eun a short distance below the Stone Bridge. Tbat part
of the field whicb borders on Flat Eun, and lies imme
diately north of Manassas Junction, is generally thickly
wooded ; but shortly after passing New Market, the Manas-
sas-Sudley road, running north-west, emerges into more
open country, and, from the Henry House onward, passes
over several parallel ridges, deep in grass and corn, and
studded between with groves of oak and pine. Here
tbe large fields, without hedges, and scantily fenced,
formed an admirable manoeuvre ground ; the wide depres
sions of the creeks, separating the crests of the ridges by
a space of fifteen or sixteen hundred yards, gave free play
to the artillery ; the long easy slopes could be swept by
fire, and the groves were no obstruction to the view.
' 0. E,, vol. ii., p. 505. L2

142 STONEWALL JACKSON
The left flank of the Confederate position, facing north,
on either side of the Manassas-Sudley road, was thus an
ideal battle-field.
Sunday morning, the 21st of July, broke clear and warm.
Through a miscarriage of orders, the Confederate offensive
movement was delayed ; and soon after six o'clock the
July 21. Federals opened with musketry and artiUery
6.30 A.M. against the small brigade commanded by Colonel
Evans, whicb held the Stone Bridge on the extreme left of
the Confederate line. An hour later the Shenandoah bri
gades. Bee's, Bartow's, and Jackson's, together with Bon-
ham's, were ordered up in support. The attack was
feebly pressed, and at 8.30 Evans, observing a
heavy cloud of dust rising above the woods to the north of
tbe Warrenton road, became satisfied tbat the movement to
his front was but a feint, and that a column of the enemy
was meanwhile marching to turn his flank by way of Sudley
Springs, about two mUes north-west. Sending back tbis
information to the next brigade, he left four companies to hold
the bridge ; and witb six companies of riflemen, a battahon
caUed the Louisiana Tigers, and two six-pounder howitzers,
he moved across Young's Branch, and took post on
*¦""¦ the Matthews HUl, a long ridge, which, at the same
elevation, faces the Henry HUl.
Evans' soldierly instinct had penetrated the design
of the Federal commander, and his ready assumption of
responsibUity threw a strong force across the path of the
turning column, and gave time for his superiors to alter
their dispositions and bring up the reserves.
The Federal force opposite the Stone Bridge consisted
of a whole division ; and its commander. General Tyler,
had been instructed to divert attention, by means of a
vigorous demonstration, from the march of Hunter's and
Heiotzleman's divisions to a ford near Sudley Springs.
Part of the Fifth Division was retained in reserve at
CentreviUe, and part threatened the fords over BuU Eun
below the Stone Bridge. The Fourth Division had been left
upon the raUroad, seven mUes in rear of CentrevUle, in
order to guard the communications with Washington.

WaUtdr &¦ Boiitali sc

BEE'S INITIATIVE 143
Already, in forming the line of march, there had been
much confusion. The divisions had bivouacked in loose
order, without any regard for the morrow's movements,
and their concentration previous to the advance was
very tedious. The brigades crossed each other's route ;
the march was slow; and the turning column, blocked
by Tyler's division on its way to the Stone Bridge,
was delayed for nearly three hours. At last, however.
Hunter and Heintzleman crossed Sudley Ford ; and after
marching a mile in the direction of Manassas Junction,
the leading brigade struck Evans' riflemen.
. A.M. rjijjg Confederates were concealed by a fringe
of woods, and tbe Federals were twice repulsed. But
supports came crowding up, and Evans sent back for rein
forcements. The fight had lasted for an hour. It was near
eleven o'clock, and the check to the enemy's advance had
given time for the Confederates to form a line of battle on the
Henry HiU. Bee and Bartow, accompanied by Imboden's
battery, were in position ; Hampton's Legion, a regiment
raised and commanded by an officer who was one of the
wealthiest planters in South Carolina, and who became one
of the finest soldiers in the Confederacy, was not far behind ;
and Jackson was coming up.'
Again the situation was saved by the prompt initiative of
a brigade commander. Bee had been ordered to support the
troops at the Stone Bridge. Moving forward towards the
Henry Hill, he had been informed by a mounted orderly
that the whole Federal army seemed to be moving to the
north-west. A signal officer on the plateau who had caught
the glint of tbe brass field-pieces which accompanied the
hostile column, stUl several miles distant, had sent the mes
sage. Bee waited for no further instructions. Ordering
Bartow to follow, he climbed the Henry Hill. The wide
and beautiful landscape lay spread before him ; Evans'
small command was nearly a mile distant, on the Matthews

' Hunter and Heintzleman had 13,200 officers and men ; Tyler, 12,000.
Bee and Bartow had 3,200 officers and men ; Hampton, 630 ; Jackson,
3,000.

144 STONEWALL JACKSON
IliU ; and on the ridges to the far north-west he saw the
glitter of many bayonets.
Eapidly placing his battery in position near the Henry
House, Bee formed a line of battle on the crest above Young's
Branch; but very shortly afterwards, acceding
*¦"¦ to an appeal for help from Evans, he hurried his
troops forward to the Matthews Hill. His new position
protected the rear of the companies which held the Stone
Bridge ; and so long as the bridge was held the two wings of
the Federal army were unable to co-operate. But on tbe
Matthews HiU, the enemy's strength, especiaUy in artUlery,
was overwhelming ; and the Confederates were soon com
peUed to fall back to the Henry HiU. McDowell had already
sent word to Tyler to force the Stone Bridge ; and Sher
man's brigade of this division, passing the stream by a ford,
threatened the flank of Bee and Evans as they retreated
across Young's Branch.
Tbe Federals now swarmed over the Matthews Hill ;
but Imboden's battery, which Bee had again posted on the
Henry Hill, and Hampton's Legion, occupying the
Eobinson House, a wooden tenement on the open spur
which projects towards the Stone Bridge, covered the
retirement of the discomfited brigades. They were not,
however, suffered to faU back unharassed.
A long line of guns, following fast upon their tracks,
and crossing the fields at a gallop, came iuto action on the
opposite slope. In vain Imboden's gunners, with their
pieces well placed behind a swell of ground, strove to divert
their attention from the retreating infantry, now climbing
the slopes of tbe Henry HiU. The Federal batteries, power
ful in numbers, in discipline, and in materiel, plied tbeir
fire fast. The sheUs fell in quick succession amongst the
disordered ranks of the Southern regiments, and not all
the efforts of their officers could stay their flight.
The day seemed lost. Strong masses of Northern
infantry were moving forward past the Stone House on the
Warrenton turnpike. Hampton's Legion was retiring on the
right. Imboden's battery, with but three rounds remaining
for each piece, galloped back across the Henry Hill, and

OCCUPIES THE HENRY HILL 14.5
this commanding height, the key of the battle-ground, was
abandoned to the enemy. But help was at hand, Jackson,
like Bee and Bartow, had been ordered to the Stone Bridge,
Hearing the heavy fire to his left increasing in intensity,
he had tm-ned the head of his column towards tbe most
pressing danger, and had sent a messenger to Bee to
announce his coming. As he pushed rapidly forward, part
of the troops he intended to support swept by in disorder
to the rear, Imboden's battery came dashing back, and
that officer, meeting Jackson, expressed with a profanity
which was evidently displeasing to the general his
disgust at being left without support, ' I'U support your
battery,' was the brief reply ; ' unlimber right here.' At
this moment appeared General Bee, approaching at full
gallop, and he and Jackson met face to face. The
1 .3 A.M. jg^j.j.gj. ^g^g gQ^j g^jj^ composcd ; Bee covered
with dust and sweat, his sword in his hand, and his horse
foaming. ' General,' he said, ' tbey are beating us back ! '
' Then, sir, we will give them the bayonet ; ' tbe thin
lips closed like a vice, and the First Brigade, pressing up
the slope, formed into line on the eastern edge of the
Henry HiU,
Jackson's determined bearing inspired Bee with renewed
confidence. He turned bridle and galloped back to the
ravine where his officers were attempting to reform their
broken companies. Eiding into the midst of the throng, he
pointed with his sword to the Virginia regiments, deployed
in well-ordered array on the height above. ' Look 1 ' he
shouted, 'there is Jackson standing like a stone wall!
Eally behind tbe Virginians ! ' The men took up the cry ;
and the happy augury of the expression, applied at a time
when defeat seemed imminent and hearts were failing, was
remembered when the danger had passed away.
The position which Jackson had occupied was the
strongest that could be found. He had not gone forward
to the crest which looks down upon Young's Branch, and
commands the slopes by which the Federals were advancing.
Prom that crest extended a wide view, and a wide field of
fire; but both flanks would have been exposed. The

146 STONEWALL JACKSON
Henry House was nothing more than a cottage ; neither
here nor elsewhere was there shelter for his riflemen,
and they would have been exposed to the full force of tbe
Federal artiUery without power of reply. But on the eastern
edge of the hill, where he had chosen to deploy, ran a belt
of young pines, affording exceUent cover, which merged into
a dense oak wood near tbe Sudley road.
Along the edge of the pines Jackson placed his regi
ments, with six guns to support them. Lying in rear of the
guns were tbe 4th and 27th Vnginia ; on ihe right was
the 5th; on tbe left the 2nd and 33rd. Both flanks
were in the woods, and Stuart, whom Jackson had called
upon to secure his left, was watching the ground beyond
the road. To the front, for a space of five hundred
yards, stretched the level crest of the hill; and the
ground beyond the Henry House, dipping to tbe vaUey
of Young's Branch, where the Federals were now gathering,
was wholly unseen. But as the tactics of Wellington so
often proved, a position from which the view is limited,
well in rear of a crest line, may be exceedingly strong
for defence, provided that troops who hold it can use the
bayonet. It would be difficult in the extreme for the Federals
to pave the way for their attack with artillery. From the
guns on the Matthews HUl the Virginia regiments were
well sheltered, and the ran^re was long. 'J'n An p-ifp-c.
tive work the hostile l^g,tteriea wnnid have to cross Young's
Branch, ascend the Henry Hill, and come into action
within five hundred yards of Jackson's line... Even if thev
were able to hold their ground at so short a range,
they could make no accurate practice under the fire of
the Confederate marksmen.
In rear of Jackson's line. Bee, Bartow, and Evans
were rallying their men, when Johnston and Beauregard,
^2 compelled, by tbe unexpected movement of the
Federals, to abandon aU idea of attack, appeared
upon the Henry HiU. They were accompanied by two
batteries of artillery, Pendleton's and Alburtis', The
colours of tbe broken regiments were ordered to the front,
and the men rallied, taking post on Jackson's right. The

A CRITICAL MOMENT 147
moment was critical. The blue masses of the Federals, the
dust rolling high above them, were already descending tbe
opposite slopes. The guns flashed fiercely through the
yellow cloud ; and the Confederate force was but a handful.
Three brigades had been summoned from the fords : but
the nearest was four miles distant, and many of tba trnnps
upon the pla.tfia.n wfirn a,lrfifl,dy balf-dfiTmorj^h'sed hy rp.trpia.t.
The generals set themselves to revive the courage of their
soldiers. Beauregard gaUoped along the line, cheering the
regiments in every portion of the field, and then, with tbe
colour-bearers accompanyiag him, rode forward to tbe crest,
Johnston was equally conspicuous. The enemy's shells
were bursting on every side, and the shouts of the Con
federates, recognising their leaders as. tbey dashed across
the front, redoubled tbe uproar. Meanwhile, before tbe
centre of his hne, with an unconcern which had a marvellous
effect on his untried command, Jackson rode slowly to
and fro. Except that his face was a Uttle paler, and his
eyes brighter, he looked exactly as his men had seen him
so often on parade ; and as he passed along the crest above
them they heard from time to time tbe reassuring words,
uttered in a tone wbich betrayed no trace of excitement,
' Steady, men ! steady ! all's well ! '
It was at this juncture, while the confusion of taking
up a new position with shattered and Ul-drUled troops was
at the highest, that the battle lulled. The Federal infan
try, after defeating Bee and Evans, had to cross the deep
gully and marshy banks of Young's Branch, to climb the
slope of the Henry HUl, and to form for a fresh attack.
Even with trained soldiers a hot fight is so conducive of dis
order, that it is difficult to initiate a rapid pursuit, and the
Northern regiments were very slow in resuming their forma
tions. At the same time, too, the fire of their batteries
became less heavy. From their position beyond Young's
Branch the rifled guns had been able to ply the Confederate
lines with shell, and their effective practice had rendered
the work of rallying the troops exceedingly difficult. But
when his infantry advanced, McDowell ordered one half
of his artillery, two fine batteries of regulars, made up

148 STONEWALL JACKSON
principally of rifled guns, to cross Young's Branch. This
respite was of the utmost value to the Confederates. The
men, encouraged by the gallant bearing of their leaders,
fell in at once upon tbe colours, and when Hunter's
regiments appeared on the further rim of the plateau
they were received with a fire which for a moment
drove them back. But the regular batteries were close at
hand, and as they came into action the battle became
general on the Henry HUl. The Federals had 16,000
infantry available ; the Confederates no more than 6,500.
But the latter were superior in artillery, 16 pieces con
fronting 12. The Federal guns, however, were of heavier
calibre ; the gunners were old soldiers, and both friend
and foe testify to the accuracy of their fire, their fine
discipline, and staunch endurance. The infantry, on tbe
other band, was not weU handled. The attack was purely
frontal. No attempt whatever was made to turn the
Confederate flanks, although the Stone Bridge, except for
the abattis, was now open, and Johnston's line might
easUy have been taken in reverse. Nor does it appear that
the cavalry was employed to ascertain where the flanks
rested. Moreover, instead of massing the troops for a deter
mined onslaught, driven home by sheer weight of numbers,
the attack was made by successive brigades, those in rear
waiting tUl those in front had been defeated ; and, in the
same manner, the brigades attacked by successive regi
ments. Such tactics were inexcusable. It was certainly
necessary to push the attack home before the Confederate
reinforcements could get up; and troops who had never
drilled in mass would have taken much time to assume
the orthodox formation of several lines of battle, closely
supporting one another. Yet there was no valid reason,
beyond the inexperience of the generals in dealing with
large bodies, that brigades should have been sent into action
piecemeal, or that the flanks of the defence should have
been neglected. The fighting, nevertheless, was fierce. The
Federal regiments, inspirited by their success on the
Matthews HUl, advanced with confidence, and soon pushed
forward past the Henry House. ' The contest that ensued,'

THE FEDERAL ATTACK 149
says General Imboden, ' was terrific. Jackson ordered me
to go from battery to battery and see that the guns were
properly aimed and the fuses cut the right length. This
was the work of but a few minutes. On returning to the lef<
of the line of guns, I stopped to ask General Jackson's per
mission to rejoin my battery. The fight was just then hot
enough to make him feel well. His eyes fairly blazed. He
had a way of throwing up his left hand with the open palm
tow9,rds the person he was addressing. And, as he told me
to go, he made this gesture. The air was full of flying
missiles, and as he spoke he jerked down his hand, and I
saw that blood was streaming from it. I exclaimed,
"General, you are wounded." "Only a scratch — a mere
scratch," he replied, and binding it hastUy with a hand
kerchief, he galloped away along his line.' '
When the battle was at its height, and across that narrow
space, not more than five hundred yards in width, the
cannon thundered, and the long lines of infantry struggled
for the mastery, the two Federal batteries, protected by
two regiments of infantry on their right, advanced
¦ *¦"¦ to a more effective position. The movement was
fatal. Stuart, stUl guarding the Confederate left, was eagerly
awaiting his opportunity, and now, with 150 troopers, filing
through the fences on Bald Hill, he boldly charged the
enemy's right. Tbe regiment thus assailed, a body of
Zouaves, in blue and scarlet, witb white turbans, was
ridden down, and almost at the same moment the 33rd
Virginia, posted on Jackson's left, charged forward from
the copse in which they had been hidden. The uniforms
in the two armies at this time were much alike, and from
the direction of their approach it was difficult at first for
the officers in charge of the Federal batteries to make
sure that the advancing troops were not their own. A
moment more and the doubtful regiment proved its identity
by a deadly volley, delivered at a range of seventy yards.
Every gunner was shot down ; the teams were almost an
nihUated, and several officers fell killed or wounded. The
Zouaves, already much shaken by Stuart's well-timed
' Battles and Leaders, vol. i., p. 236.

150 STONEWALL JACKSON
charge, fled down the slopes, dragging with them another
regiment of infantry.
Three guns alone escaped the marksmen of the 33rd.
The remainder stood upon the field, silent and abandoned,
surrounded by dying horses, midway between the opposing
lines. This success, however, brought but short relief to the
Confederates. The enemy was not yet done with. Fresh
regiments passed to the attack. The 33rd was driven back,
and tbe thin line upon the plateau was hard put to it to
retain its ground. The Southerners had lost heavily. Bee
and Bartow had been killed, and Hampton wounded. Few
reinforcements had reached the Henry HUl. Stragglers and
skulkers were streaming to the rear. The Federals were
thronging forward, and it seemed that the exhausted
defenders must inevitably give way before the successive
blows of superior numbers. The troops were losing
confidence. Yet no thought of defeat crossed Jackson's
mind. ' General,' said an officer, riding hastUy towards
him, ' the day is going against us.' ' If you think so, sir,'
was the quiet reply, ' you had better not say anything about
it.' And although affairs seemed desperate, in reality the
crisis of the battle had already passed. McDowell had but
two brigades remaining in reserve, and one of these — of
Tyler's division — was still beyond BuU Eun. His troops
were thoroughly exhausted ; they had been marching and
fighting since midnight ; the day was iotensely hot ; they had
encountered fierce resistance ; their rifled batteries had been
silenced, and the Confederate reinforcements were coming
up. Two of Bonbam's regiments had taken post on Jackson's
right, and a heavy force was approaching on the left.
Kirby Smith's brigade, of the Army of the Shenandoah,
coming up by train, had reached Manassas Junction whUe
the battle was in progress. It was immediately ordered to
the field, and had been already instructed by Johnston to
turn the enemy's right.
But before the weight of Smith's 1,900 bayonets could
be thrown into tbe scale, the Federals made a vigorous effort
to carry the Henry HiU, Those portions of the Confederate

THE COUNTERSTROKE 151
line which stood on the open ground gave way before
them. Some of the guns, ordered to take up a position
from which they could cover the retreat, were Umbering up ;
and with the exception of the belt of pines, the plateau was
abandoned to the hostUe infantry, who were beginning to
press forward at every point. The Federal engineers were
already clearing away the abattis from the Stone Bridge, in
order to give passage to Tyler's third brigade and a battery
of artillery ; • and all were certain,' says McDowell, ' that
the day was ours.'
Jackson's men were lying beneath the crest of the
plateau. Only one of bis regiments — the 33rd — had as yet
2 45 p M ^^^^ engaged in the open, and his guns in front
still held their own. Eiding to the centre of his
line, where the 2nd and 4th Virginia were stationed, he gave
orders for a counterstroke. ' Eeserve your fire till they come
within fifty yards, then fire and give them the bayonet ; and
wben you charge, yell like furies ! ' Eight well did the hot
Virginian blood respond. Inactive from the stroke of noon
till three o'clock, with the crash and cries of battle in their
ears, and the shells ploughing gaps in tbeir recumbent ranks,
tbe men were chafing under the stern discipline wbich held
them back from the conflict they longed to join. The
Federals swept on, extending from the right and left, cheer
ing as tbey came, and following the flying batteries in
the ardour of success. Suddenly, a long grey line sprang
from the ground in their very faces; a rolling volley
threw them back in confusion ; and then, with their
fierce shouts pealing high above the tumult, the 2nd and
4th Virginia, supported by tbe 5th, charged forward across
the hill. At the same moment that the enemy's centre was
thus unexpectedly assailed, Kirby Smith's fresh brigade bore
down upon the flank,' and Beauregard, with ready judg
ment, dispatched his staff officers to order a general advance.
The broken remnants of Bee, Hampton, and Evans advanced
upon Jackson's right, and victory, long wavering, crowned
the standards of the South. The Federals were driven past
> General Kirby Smith being severely wounded, the command of this
brigade devolved upon Colonel Elzey.

152 STONEWALL JACKSON
the guns, now finally abandoned, past the Henry House, and
down the slope, McDowell made one desperate endeavour
to stay tbe rout, Howard's brigade was rapidly thrown ia.
But the centre had been completely broken by Jackson's
charge ; the right was giving way, and the Confederates,
manning the captured guns, turned them on the masses
whicb covered the fields below.
Howard, although bis men fought bravely, was easily
repulsed; in a few minutes not a single Federal soldier,
save the dead and dying, was to be seen upon the
plateau, A final stand was made by McDowell along Young's
Branch ; and there, at half-past three, a line of battle
was once more established, the battalion of regular
infantry forming a strong centre. But another Confederate
brigade, under General Early, had now arrived, and again
the enemy's right was overthrown, while Beauregard, leaving
Jackson, whose brigade had lost all order and many men in
its swift advance, to hold the plateau, swept forward
towards the Matthews Hill, The movement was decisive.
McDowell's volunteers broke up in the utmost confusion.
The Confederate infantry was in no condition to pursue, but
the cavalry was let loose, and before long the retreat became
a panic. The regular battalion, composed of young soldiers,
but led by experienced officers, alone preserved its discipline,
moving steadily in close order through the throng of fugitives,
and checking the pursuing troopers by its firm and confident
bearing. The remainder of the army dissolved into a mob.
It was not that the men were completely demoralised, but
simply that discipline had not become a habit. They had
marched as individuals, going just so far as they pleased, and
halting when they pleased ; they had fought as individuals,
bravely enough, but with little combination ; and when they
found that they were beaten, as individuals they retreated,
* The old soldier,' wrote one of the regular officers a week
later, 'feels safe in the ranks, unsafe out of tbe ranks,
and the greater the danger the more pertinaciously he
clings to his place. The volunteer of three months never
attains this instinct of discipline. Under danger, and

-I

y,rlitr a,S^„tdlj,

RETREAT OF THE FEDERALS 153
even under mere excitement, he flies away from his
ranks, and hopes for safety in dispersion. At four o'clock
in the afternoon of the 21st there were more than 12,000
volunteers on the battle-field of Bull Eun who had entirely
lost their regimental organisation. They could no longer
be handled as troops, for the officers and men were not
together. Men and officers mingled together promiscuously ;
and it is worthy of remark that this disorganisation did not
result from defeat or fear, for up to four o'clock we had been
uniformly successful. Tbe instinct of discipline which
keeps every man in his place had not been acquired. We
cannot suppose that the enemy had attained a higher
degree of disciphne than our own, but they acted on the
defensive, and were not equally exposed to disorganisa
tion.' '
' Cohesion was lost,' says one of McDowell's staff ; ' and
the men walked quietly off. There was no special excite
ment except that arising from the frantic efforts of officers
to stop men who paid little or no attention to anything that
was said ; and there was no panic, ui the ordinary sense
and meaning of the word, untU the retiring soldiers, guns,
waggons, Congressmen and carriages, were fired upon, on
the road east of Bull Eun.' ^
At CentrevUle the reserve division stood fast ; and the
fact that these troops were proof against the infection of
panic and the exaggerated stories of the fugitives is in
itself strong testimony to the native courage of the soldiery.
A lack of competent Staff officers, which, earlier in the
day, had prevented an advance on CentrevUle by the Con
federate right, brought Johnston's arrangements for pursuit
to naught. The cavalry, weak in numbers, was soon
incumbered with squads of prisoners ; darkness fell upon
the field, and the defeated army streamed over the roads to
Washington, foUowed only by its own fears.
Why the Confederate generals did not follow up their
success on the foUowing day is a question round wbich
controversy raged for many a year. Deficiencies in com-
' Beport of Captain Woodbury, U.S. Engineers, 0. R., vol. ii., p. 334.
* Qeneral J. B. Fry, Battles and Leaders, vol. i., p. 191. M 2

164 STONEWALL JACKSON
missariat and transport ; the disorganisation of the army
after the victory ; the difficulties of a direct attack upon
Washington, defended as it was by a river a mUe broad,
with but a single bridge, and patroUed by gunboats ; tbe
determination of the Government to limit its mUitary
operations to a passive defence of Confederate territory,
have all been pressed into service as excuses. ' Give me
10,000 fresh troops,' said Jackson, as the surgeon dressed
his wound, ' and I would be in Washington to-morrow.'
Before twenty-four hours had passed reinforcements bad
increased the strength of Johnston's army to 40,000. Want
of organisation had undoubtedly prevented McI)owell from
winning a victory on the 19tb or 20th, but pursuit is a far
less difficult business than attack. There was nothing to
interfere with a forward movement. There were supplies
along the railway, and if the mechanism for their distribu
tion and the means for their carriage were wanting, tbe
counties adjoining the Potomac were rich and fertUe.
Herds of bullocks were grazing in the pastures, and the
barns of the farmers were loaded with grain. It was not
a long supply train that was lacking, nor an experienced
staff, nor even well-disciplined battaUons ; but a general who
grasped tbe full meaniug of victory, who understood how a
defeated army, more especially of new troops, yields at a
touch, and who, above all, saw the necessity of giving the
North no leisure to develop her immense resources. For
three days Jackson impatiently awaited the order to advance,
and his men were held ready with three days' cooked rations
in their haversacks. But his superiors gave no sign, and he
was reluctantly compelled to abandon all hope of reaping
the fruits of victory.
It is true that the Confederates were no more fit for
offensive operations than McDoweU's troops. ' Our army,'
says General Johnston, ' was more disorganised by victory
than that of the United States by defeat,' But it is to be
remembered that if the Southerners had moved into Mary
land, crossing the Potomac by some of tbe numerous fords
near Harper's Ferry, they would have found no organised
opposition, save the dibris of McDoweU's army, between them

THE ERROR OF THE CONFEDERATES 155
and the Northern capital. On July 26, five days after the
battle, the general who was to succeed McDowell arrived in
Washington and rode round the city. ' I found,' he wrote,
' no preparations whatever for defence, not even to the extent
of putting the troops in mUitary position. Not a regiment
was properly encamped, not a single avenue of approach
guarded. AU was chaos, and the streets, hotels, and bar
rooms were filled with drunken officers and men, absent from
their regiments without leave, a perfect pandemonium.
Many had even gone to their homes, their flight from BuU
Eun terminating in New York, or even in New Hampshire
and Maine, There was really nothing to prevent a small
cavalry force from riding into the city, A determined attack
would doubtless have carried Arlington Heights and placed
the city at the mercy of a battery of rifled guns. If the
Secessionists attached any value to the possession of
Washington, they committed tbeir greatest error in not
following up the victory of Bull Eun.' On the same date,
the Secretary of War, Mr. Stanton, wrote as follows :
' The capture of Washington seems now to be inevitable ;
during the whole of Monday and Tuesday [July 22 and 23]
it might have been taken without resistance. Tbe rout,
overthrow, and demoralisation of the whole army were
complete.' '
Of his own share in the battle, either at the time or
afterwards, Jackson said but Uttle. A day or two after the
battle an anxious crowd was gathered round tbe post-office
at Lexington, awaiting intelligence from the front. A letter
was handed to the Eev. Dr. White, who, recognising the
handwriting, exclaimed to the eager groups about him,
' Now we shall know aU the facts,' On opening it he found
the foUowing, and no more :
' My dear Pastor, — In my tent last night, after a fatiguing
day's service, I remembered that I had failed to send you my
contribution to our coloured Sunday school. Enclosed you
will find my check for that object, which please acknowledge
at your earhest convenience, and oblige yours faithfuUy,
T, J. Jackson,' ' McClellan's Own Story, pp. 66, 67.

166 STONEWALL JACKSON
To his wife, however, he was less reserved. 'Yesterday,'
he wrote, we 'fought a great battle and gained a great victory,
for which aU the glory is due to God alone. , , , WhUst great
credit is due to other parts of our gallant army, God made
my brigade more instrumental than any other in repulsing
the main attack. This is|for your information only — say
nothing about it. Let others speak praise, not myself.'
Again, on August 5 : ' And so you think the papers ought
to say more about your husband. My brigade is not a
brigade of newspaper correspondents. I know that the
First Brigade was the first to meet and pass our retreating
forces — to push on with no other aid than the smiles of
God ; to boldly take up its position with the artillery that
was under my command — to arrest the victorious foe in his
onward progress — to hold him in check unti^ the reinforce
ments arrived — and finally to charge bayonets, and, thus
advancing, to pierce the enemy's centre, I am well satisfied
with what it did, and so are my generals, Johnston and
Beauregard, It is not to be expected that I should receive
the credit that Generals Johnston and Beauregard would,
because I was under them ; but I am thankful to my ever-
kind Heavenly Father that He makes me content to await
His own good time and pleasure for commendation —
knowing that aU things work together for my good. If my
brigade can always play so important and useful a part as
it did in the last battle, I trust I shall ever be most grateful.
As you think the papers do not notice me enough, I send a
specimen, which you will see from the upper part of the paper
is a " leader." My darhng, never distrust our God, Who
doeth all things well. In due time He will make manifest aU
His pleasure, which is all His people should desire. You
must not be concerned at seeing other parts of the army
lauded, and my brigade not mentioned. Truth is mighty
and will prevail. When the official reports are pubUshed,
if not before, I expect to see justice done to this noble body
of patriots.' '
These letters reveal a generous pride in the valour of his
¦ Both Johnston and Beauregard, in tbeir official reports, did Ml justice
to Jackson and his brigade.

THE SPOILS OF BATTLE 157
troops, and a very human love of approbation struggles
with the curb wbich his religious principles had placed on
his ambition. Like Nelson, he felt perhaps that before long
he would have ' a Gazette of his own.' But still, of bis own
achievements, of his skilful tactics, of his personal behaviour,
of his well-timed orders, be spoke no word, and tbe victory
was ascribed to a higher power. ' The charge of the 2nd
and 4th Virginia,' he wrote in bis modest report, ' through
the blessing of God, Who gave us the victory, pierced the
centre of tbe enemy.' '
And Jackson's attitude was that of the Southern people.
Wben the news of Bull Eun reached Eichmond, and
through the crowds that thronged the streets passed the
tidings of the victory, there was neither wild excitement
nor uproarious joy. No bonfires lit the darkness of the
night ; no cannon thundered out salutes ; the steeples were
silent till the morrow, and then were heard only the solemn
tones that caUed the people to prayer. It was resolved, on
tbe day following the battle, by the Confederate Congress :
' That we recognise the hand of the Most High God, tbe
King of kings and Lord of lords, in the glorious victory with
which He has crowned our arms at Manassas, and that the
people of these Confederate States are invited, by appropriate
services on the ensuing Sabbath, to offer up their united
thanksgivings and prayers for tbis mighty dehverance.'
The spoils of Bull Eun were large ; 1,500 prisoners, 25
guns, ten stand of colours, several thousand rifles, a large
quantity of ammunition and hospital stores, twenty-six
waggons, and several ambulances were left in the victors'
hands. The Federal losses were 460 kUled and 1,124
wounded ; the Confederate, 387 kUled, 1,582 wounded, and
13 missing. The First Brigade suffered more severely than
any other in tbe Southern army. Of 3,000 officers and
men, 488 were kUled or wounded, nearly a fourth of the
total loss,
A few days after the battle Johnston advanced to
CentreviUe, and from the heights above the broad Potomac
his cavalry vedettes looked upon the spires of Washington.
' 0. B., vol. ii., p. 482.

168 STONEWALL JACKSON
But it was in vain tbat the Confederate troopers rode to
and fro on the river bank and watered their horses within
sight of the Capitol. The enemy was not to be beguiled
across the protecting stream. But it was not from fear.
Although the disaster had been as crushing as unex
pected, it was bravely met. The President's demand for
another army was cheerfully complied with. Volunteers
poured in from every State. The men were no longer
asked to serve for three months, but for three years,
Washington became transformed into an enormous camp ;
great earthworks rose on the surrounding heights ; and
the traioing of the new levies went steadUy forward.
There was no cry for immediate action. Men were not
wantiug who believed tbat tbe task of coercion was im
possible. Able statesmen and influential j ournalists advised
the President to abandon the attempt. But Lincoln, true
to the trust which had been committed to his keeping,
never flinched from his resolve that tbe Union should be
restored. He, too, stood like a wall between his defeated
legions and the victorious foe. Nor was the nation less
determined. The dregs of humiliation had been drained,
and though the draught was bitter it was salutary. The
President was sustained with no half-hearted loyalty. His
political opponents raved and threatened ; but under the
storm of recrimination the work of reorganising the army
went steadily forward, and the people were content tbat
untU the generals declared tbe army fit for action tbe
hour of vengeance should be postponed.
To the South, Bull Eun was a Pyrrhic victory. It
relieved Virginia of the pressure of the invasion ; it proved
to the world that the attitude of the Confederacy was some
thing more than tbe reckless revolt of a small section ;
but it led the Government to indulge vain hopes of foreign
intervention, and it increased the universal contempt for
the military qualities of the Northern soldiers. The hasty
judgment of tbe people construed a single victory aa
proof of their superior capacity for war, and the defeat of
McDoweU's army was attributed to the cowardice of his
volunteers. Tbe opinion was absolutely erroneous. Some

SPIRIT OF THE FEDERALS 169
of the Federal regiments had misbehaved, it is true ; seized
with sudden panic, to which all raw troops are peculiarly
susceptible, tbey had dispersed before the strong counter-
stroke of the Confederates, But the majority had displayed
a sterluig courage. There can be little question tbat the
spirit of the infantry depends greatly on the staunchness of
the artUlery. A single battery, pushed boldly forward into
the front of battle, has often restored the vigour of a waver
ing Une. Although the losses it inflicts may not be large,
the moral effect of its support is undeniable. So long as
the guns hold fast victory seems possible. But when these
useful auxiliaries are driven back or captured a general
depression becomes inevitable. The retreat of the artillery
strikes a chUl into the fighting line which is ominous
of defeat, and it is a wise regulation that compels the bat
teries, even wben their ammunition is exhausted, to stand
their ground. The Federal infantry at BuU Eun had seen
their artillery overwhelmed, the teams destroyed, the
gunners shot down, and the enemy's riflemen swarming
amongst the abandoned pieces. But so vigorous had been
their efforts to restore the battle, that the front ofthe defence
had been with difficulty maintained ; the guns, though they
were eventually lost, had been retaken ; and without the
assistance of their artillery, but exposed to the fire, at closest
range, of more than one battery, tbe Northern regiments had
boldly pushed forward across the Henry Hill. The Con
federates, during the greater part of the battle, were certainly
outnumbered ; but at the close they were the stronger, and
the piecemeal attacks of the Federals neutralised the
superiority which the uivading army originally possessed.
McDowell appears to have employed 18,000 troops in
the attack ; Johnston and Beauregard about the same
number.' A comparison of the relative strength of the two armies,
considering that raw troops have a decided advantage on
the defensive, detracts, to a certain degree, from the credit
of the victory ; and it will hardly be questioned that had
' For the strength of divisions and brigades, see the Note at the end of
tbe chapter.

160 STONEWALL JACKSON
the tactics of the Federals been better the victory would
have been theirs. The turning movement by Sudley Springs
was a skUful manoeuvre, and completely surprised both
Johnston and Beauregard. It was undoubtedly risky, but
it was far less dangerous than a direct attack on the strong
position along BuU Eun.
The retention of the Fourth Division between Washing
ton and CentreviUe would seem to have been a blunder ;
another 5,000 men on the field of battle should certainly
have turned the scale. But more men were hardly wanted.
The Federals during the first period of tbe fight were strong
enough to have seized the Henry HUl, Bee, Bartow,
Evans, and Hampton had been driven in, and Jackson
alone stood fast, A strong and sustained attack, supported
by the fire of the regular batteries, must have succeeded,'
The Federal regiments, however, were practically incapable
of movement under fire. The least change of position broke
them into fragments ; there was much wild firing ; it was
impossible to manoeuvre ; and the courage of individuals
proved a sorry substitute for order and cohesion. The Con
federates owed their victory simply and solely to the fact that
their enemies had not yet learned to use their strength.
The summer months went by without further fighting
on the Potomac ; but the camps at Fairfax and at Centre
viUe saw the army of Manassas thinned by furloughs and by
sickness. The Southern youth had come out for battle,
and tbe monotonous routine of tbe outpost Une and the
parade-ground was Uttle to their taste. The Govern
ment dared not refuse the numberless applications for
leave of absence, the more so that in the crowded camps
tbe sultry heat of the Virginia woodlands bred disease
of a virulent type. The First Brigade seems to have
escaped from aU these evUs. Its commander found his
health improved by his life in the open air. His wound
' ' Had an attack,' said General Johnston, ' been made in force, with
double Une of battle, such as any major-general in the United States service
would now make, we could not have held [the position] half an hour, for
they would have enveloped us on both flanks.' — Campaigns of the Army of
the Potomac, W. Swinton, p. 58.

DRILL AND DISCIPLINE 161
had been painful, A finger was broken, but the hand was
saved, and some temporary inconvenience alone resulted. As
he claimed no furlough for himself, so he permitted no
absence from duty among his troops. ' I can't be absent,'
he wrote to bis wife, ' as my attention is necessary in pre
paring my troops for hard fighting, should it be required ;
and as my officers and soldiers are not permitted to visit
their wives and famiUes, I ought not to see mine. It might
make the troops feel that they are badly treated, and that
I consult my own comfort, regardless of theirs.'
In September his wife joined him for a few days at
CentrevUle, and later came Dr. White, at his invitation,
to preach to his command. Beyond a few fruitless marches
to support the cavalry on the outposts, of active service
there was none. But Jackson was not the man to let the
time pass uselessly. He had his whole brigade under his
hand, a force which wanted but one quaUty to make it an
instrument worthy of the hand that wielded it, and that
quahty was discipline. Courage and enthusiasm it possessed
in abundance; and wben both were untrained the Con
federate was a more useful soldier than the Northerner, In
the South nearly every man was a hunter, accustomed from
boyhood to the use of firearms. Game was abundant, and
it was free to aU. Sport in one form or another was the
chief recreation of the people, and their pastoral pursuits
left them much leisure for its indulgence. Every great
plantation had its pack of hounds, and fox-hunting, an
heirloom from the Enghsh colonists, still flourished. His
stud was the pride of every Southern gentleman, and the
love of horse-flesh was inherent in the whole population.
No man walked when he could ride, and hundreds of fine
horsemen, mounted on steeds of famous lineage, recruited
the Confederate squadrons.
But, despite their skUl with the rifle, their hunter's
craft, and their dashing horsemanship, the first great
battle had been hardly won. The city-bred Northerners,
unused to arms and uninured to hardship, had fought with
extraordinary determination; and the same want of
discipline that had driven them in rout to Washington had

162 STONEWALL JACKSON
dissolved the victorious Confederates into a tumultuous
mob.' If Jackson knew the worth of his volunteers, he
was no stranger to their shortcomings. His thoughts
might be crystallised in the words of Wellington, words
which should never be forgotten by those nations which
depend for their defence on the services of their citizen
soldiery. ' They want,' said tbe great Duke, speaking of the
Portuguese in 1809, ' the habits and the spirit of soldiers,
— the habits of command on one side, and of obedience on
the other— mutual confidence between officers and men.'
In order that during the respite now offered he might
instil these habits into his brigade, Jackson neither took
furlough himself nor granted it to others. His regi
ments were constantly exercised on the parade-ground.
Shoulder to shoulder they advanced and retired, marched
and countermarched, massed in column, formed line to
front or flank, untU they learned to move as a machine,
untU the limbs obeyed before the order had passed from
ear to brain, until obedience became an instinct and
cohesion a necessity of their nature. They learned to
Usten for the word of the officer, to look to him before
they moved hand or foot; and, in that subjection of
their own iudividuality to the wUl of tbeir superior,
tbey acquired tbat steadiness in battle, that energy on
the march, tbat discipline in quarters which made the
First Brigade wortby of the name it had already won.
' Every officer and soldier,' said their commander, ' who is
able to do duty ought to be busily engaged in miUtary pre
paration by hard driUing, in order that, through the blessing
of God, we may be victorious in the hattles which in His
all- wise providence may await us,'
Jackson's tactical ideas, as regards the fire of infantry,
expressed at this time, are worth recording, ' I rather
think,' he said, 'that fire by file [independent firing] is
best on the whole, for it gives the enemy an idea that the
' Colonel Williams, of the 6th Virginia, writes that the Stonewall
Brigade was a notable exception to the general disintegration, and that it
was in good condition for immediate service on the morning after the battle.

TACTICAL IDEAS 163
fire is heavier than if it was by company or battalion
(voUey firing). Sometimes, however, one may be best,
sometimes the other, according to circumstances. But my
opinion is that there ought not to be much firing at all.
My idea is that the best mode of fighting is to reserve
your fire tiU the enemy get— or you get them — to close
quarters. Then deliver one deadly, deliberate fire — and
charge ! '
Although the newspapers did scant justice to the part
played by the brigade in the battle of BuU Eun, Bee's
epithet survived, and Jackson became known as ' Stonewall '
throughout the army. To one of his acquaintances the
general revealed tbe source of bis composure under fire.
' Three days after tbe battle, hearing tbat Jackson was
suffering from his wound, I rode,' writes Imboden, ' to bis
quarters near CentreviUe. Of course the battle was the only
topic discussed during breakfast. " General," I remarked,
" how is it that you can keep so cool, and appear so utterly
insensible to danger in sucb a storm of shell and bullets as
rained about you wben your hand was hit ? " He instantly
became grave and reverential in his manner, and answered,
in a low tone of great earnestness : " Captain, my religious
belief teaches me to feel as safe in battle as in bed. God
has fixed tbe time for my death. I do not concern myself
about that, but to be always ready, no matter when it may
overtake me," He added, after a pause, looking me full in
tbe face : " That is the way all men should Uve, and then
aU would be equally brave." ' '
Although the war upon the borders had not yet
touched the cities of the South, the patriotism of Virginia
saw with uneasiness the inroads of the enemy in that por
tion of the State wbich lies beyond the AUeghanies, especially
the north-west. Tbe country was overrun with Federal
soldiers, and part of the population of the district had
declared openly for the Union. In that district was
Jackson's birth-place, the home of his childhood, and his
mother's grave. His interest and his affections were
bound by many ties to the country and the people, and in
¦ Battles and Leaders, vol. i., pp. 122, 128.

164 STONEWALL JACKSON
the autumn of 1861 he had not yet come to believe that
they were at heart disloyal to their native State. A vigor
ous effort, he believed, might still restore to the Confederacy
a splendid recruiting-ground, and he made no secret of his
desire for employment in tbat region. The strategical ad
vantages of this corner of Virginia were clearly apparent,
as will be seen hereafter, to his perception. Along its
western border runs the Ohio, a river navigable to its
junction with the Mississippi, and giving an easy Une of
communication into the heart of Kentucky. Through its
northern counties passed the Baltimore and Ohio Eaihroad,
the main line of communication between Washington and
tbe West ; and alongside the railway ran the Chesapeake and
Ohio Canal, a second and most important line of supply.
Above all, projecting as it did towards the great lakes
of the North, the north-western angle, or Virginia ' Pan
handle,' narrowed the passage between East and West
to an isthmus not more than a hundred mUes in breadth.
With this territory in the possession of the Confederates,
the Federal dominions would be practically cut in two ; and
in North-western Virginia, traversed by many ranges of
well-nigh pathless mountains, with few towns and stUl
fewer roads, a small army might defy a large one with
impunity. On November 4 Jackson's wish was partially granted.
He was assigned to the command of the Shenandoah VaUey
District, embracing the northern part of the area
between the Alleghanies and the Blue Eidge.
The order was received with gratitude, but dashed by tbe
fact that he had to depart alone, ' Had this communica
tion,' he said to Dr, White, ' not come as an order, I should
instantly have declined it, and continued in command of
my brave old brigade.'
Whether he or his soldiers felt tbe parting most it is hard
to say. Certain it is that the men had a warm regard for
their leader. There was no more about bim at CentrevUle
to attract the popular fancy than there had been at Harper's
Perry. When the troops passed in review the eye of the
spectator turned at once to the trim carriage of Johnston

TRANSFERRED TO THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY 165
and of Beauregard, to the glittering uniform of Stuart,
to the superb chargers and the martial bearing of young
officers fresh from the Indian frontier. The silent professor,
absent and unsmUing, who dressed as plainly as he lived,
had little in common with those dashing soldiers. The
tent where every night tbe general and his staff gathered
together for tbeir evening devotions, where the conversa
tion ran not on tbe merits of horse and hound, on strategy
and tactics, but on the power of faith and the mysteries
of tbe redemption, seemed out of place in an army of high-
spirited youths. But, whUe they smiled at bis pecu
liarities, the Confederate soldiers remembered the fierce
counterstroke on the heights above Bull Eun. If the
Presbyterian general was earnest in prayer, they knew that
he was prompt in battle and indefatigable in quarters. He
had the respect of all men, and from his own brigade he
had something more. Very early in their service, away by
the rippUng Shenandoah, tbey had heard tbe stories of his
daring in Mexico. Tbey had experienced his skill and
coolness at Falling Waters ; they had seen at Bull Eun,
whUe tbe sheUs burst in never-ending succession among
the pines, the quiet figure riding slowly to and fro on
the crest above tbem ; tbey had heard the stern command,
' Wait till they come within fifty yards and then give them
the bayonet,' and they had followed him far in that victo
rious rush into the receding ranks of their astonished foe.
Little wonder that these enthusiastic youths, new to
the soldier's trade, should have been captivated by a nature
so strong and fearless. The Stonewall Brigade had made
Jackson a hero, and he had won more from them than tbeir
admiration. His incessant watchfulness for tbeir comfort
and weU-being ; the patient care with which he instructed
them ; his courtesy to the youngest private ; the tact and
thoughtfulness he showed in aU his relations with them,
had won tbeir affection. His very peculiarities endeared
him to them, ' Old Jack ' or ' StonewaU ' were bis nick
names in the lines of his own command, and stories went
round the camp fire of how he had been seen walking in
tbe woods round CentreviUe absorbed in prayer, or lifting

166 STONEWALL JACKSON
his left hand with that peculiar gesture which the men
beUeved was an appeal to Heaven, but which, in reality,
was made to relieve the pain of his wounded finger.
But while they discussed his oddities, not a man in the
brigade but acknowledged his abihty, and when the time
came not a man but regretted his departure.
His farewell to his troops was a striking scene. The
forest, already donning its gorgeous autumnal robes, shut
in the grassy clearing where the troops were drawn up.
There stood tbe grey columns of the five regiments, witb
the colours, already tattered, waving in the mUd November
air. The general rode up, their own general, and not a sound
was heard. Motionless and silent they stood, a veritable
stone wall, whUst his eye ran along the ranks and scanned
the famiUar faces, ' I am not here to make a speech,' he
said, 'but simply to say fareweU, I first met you at
Harper's Perry, at the commencement of the war, and I
cannot take leave of you without giving expression to my
admiration of your conduct from that day to this, whether
on the march, in the bivouac, or on the bloody plauis of
Manassas, where you gained the weU-deserved reputation
of having decided the fate of battle,
* Throughout the broad extent of country through which
you have marched, by your respect for the rights and
property of citizens, you have shown that you are soldiers
not only to defend, but able and wUling both to defend and
protect. You have already won a brUliant reputation
throughout the army of the whole Confederacy ; and I
trust, in the future, by your deeds in the field, and by the
assistance of the same kind Providence who has hitherto
favoured our cause, you wiU win more victories and
add lustre to the reputation you now enjoy. You have
already gained a proud position in the future history
of this our second War of Independence, I shall look
with great anxiety to your future movements, and I trust
whenever I shall hear of the First Brigade on the field of
battle, it will be of still nobler deeds achieved, and higher
reputation won ! ' Then there was a pause ; general and
soldiers looked upon each other, and the heart of the leader

HIS FAREWELL TO THE FIRST BRIGADE 167
went out to those who had followed bim with such devotion.
He had spoken his words of formal praise, but both he and
they knew tbe bonds between them were too strong to be
thus coldly severed. For once he gave way to impulse ; his
eye kindled, and rising in his stirrups and throwing the
reins upon his horse's neck, he spoke in tones which betrayed
the proud memories that thronged upon him : —
' In the Army of the Shenandoah you were the First
Brigade ! In the Army of tbe Potomac you were the First
Brigade ! In the Second Corps of tbe army you are the First
Brigade ! You are the First Brigade in the affections of
your general, and I hope by your future deeds and bearing
you will be handed down to posterity as the First Brigade
in this our second War of Independence. Fare;ffell ! '
For a moment there was silence; then the pent-up
feeling found expression, and cheer upon cheer burst forth
from the ranks of the VaUey regiments. Waving his hand
in token of fareweU, Jackson galloped from the field.

VOL, I.

168

STONEWALL JAOKSON

NOTE I
The Tboops employed on the Henry Hill

federal.

First Division : Tylbb

Brigade

. Keyes

. Sherman
. . .
»»
. Sohenok
Second Division : Hunter
tf
. Porter f
. Burnside ^
»
Thi/rd Division : Heintzleman
11
. Franilin
If
. Wilcox
¦ , ,
¦n
• . . . Howard
Total 18,000, and 80 guns.
confederate.
Army of the Shenandoah [Johnbton]
Brigade
. Jackson \
»i
. Bee
*t
. Bartow
• *
H
. Kirby Smith,
Army of the Potomac [BsAUBEaARs]
Brigade
.... Bonham \
1,
. Cocke
»,
. Early
7th Louisiana Regiment . }- ¦ ¦
8th
,
Hampton's Legion . . |
Cavafry
'
Total 18,000, and 21 gimi.
4,500
= 6,000
7,500
-8.700
- 9,800
160
NOTE IT
The Cobt of an Inadequate Army
Lord Wolseley has been somewhat severely criticised for asserting
that in the Civil War, ' from first to last, the co-operation of even one
army corps (35,000 men) of regular troops would have given complete
victory to whichever side it fought on.' Whatever may be argued as to
the latter period of the conflict, it is impossible for anyone who under
stands the power of organisation, of discipline, of training, and of a
proper system of command, to dispute the accuracy of this statement
as regards the year 1861, that is, for the first eight months.
It is far too often assumed that the number of able-bodied men is
the true criterion of national strength. In the Confederate States, for
instance, there were probably 750,000 citizens who were liable for
service in the militia, and yet had the United States possessed a single
regular army corps, with a trained staff, an efficient commissariat, and
a fally-organised system of transport, it is difficult to see how these
750,000 Southerners could have done more than wage a guerilla warfare.
The army corps would have absorbed into itself the best of the Northern
militia and volunteers ; the sta£f and commissariat would have given
them mobility, and 60,000 or 70,000 men, moving on Eichmond
directly Sumter fell, with the speed and certainty which organisation
gives, would have marched from victory to victory. Their 750,000
enemies would never have had time to arm, to assemble, to organise,
to create an army, to train a staff, or to arrange tor their supplies.
Bach gathering of volunteers would have been swept away before it
had attained consistency, and Virginia, at least, must have been con
quered in the first few months.
And matters would have been no different if the army corps had
been directed against tbe Union. In the Northern States there were over '
2,000,000 men who were liable for service ; and yet the Union States,
notwithstanding their superior resources, were just as vulner
able as the Coifederacy. Numbers, even if they amount to millions,
are useless, and worse than useless, without training and organisation ;
the more men that are collected on the battle-field, the more crushing
and far-reaching their defeat. Nor can the theory be sustained that
a small army, invading a rich and populous country, would be ' stung
to death ' by the numbers of its foes, even if they dared not oppose it
in the open field. Of what avail were the stupendous efforts of the
French Republic iu 1870-71 ? Enormous armies were raised and
eqmpped ; the ranks were filled with brave men ; the generals were
not unskilful ; and yet time after time they were defeated by the far
inferior forces of their seasoned enemies. Even in America itself, on
two occasions, at Sharpsburg in 1862, and at Gettysburg in 1863, it was
admitted by the North that the Southerners were ' within a stone's
throw of independence.' Aud yet hundreds of thousands of able-bodied a 2

170 STONEWALL JAOKSON
men had not yet joined the Federal armies. Nor can Spain be quoted
as an instance of an unconquerable nation. Throughout the war with
Napoleon the English armies, not only that under Wellington, but
those at Cadiz, Tarifa, and Gibraltar, afforded solid rallying-points for
the defeated Spaniards, and by a succession of victories inspired the
whole Peninsula with hope and courage.
The patriot with a rifle may be equal, or even superior, man for
man, to the professional soldier ; but even patriots must be fed, and to
win victories they must be able to manoeuvre, and to manoeuvre they
must have leaders. If it could remain stationary, protected by earth
works, and supplied by railways, with which the enemy did not
interfere, a host of hastily raised levies, if armed and equipped, might
hold its own against even a regular army. But against troops which
can manoeuvre earthworks are useless, as the history of Sherman's
briUiant operations in 1864 conclusively shows. To win battles and to
protect their country armies must be capable of counter-manceuvre, and
it is when troops are set in motion that the real diflSculty of supplying
them begins.
If it is nothing else, the War of Secession, with its awfcd expenditure
of blood and treasure, is a most startling object-lesson in National
Insurance.

171

CHAPTEE VII
EOMNBV
While the Indian summer stiU held carnival in the forests
of Virginia, Jackson found himself once more on the
1861 Shenandoah. Some regiments of miUtia, the
November, greater part of which were armed with flint-lock
muskets, and a few squadrons of irregular cavalry formed
his sole command.
The autumn of 1861 was a comparatively quiet season.
Tbe North, sUent but determined, was preparing to put forth
her stupendous strength. Scott had resigned; McDowell
had been superseded ; but the President had found a general
who had caught the confidence of the nation. In the same
month that had witnessed McDoweU's defeat, a young officer
had gained a cheap victory over a small Confederate force
in West Virginia, and his grandUoquent dispatches had
magnified the achievement in the eyes of the Northern people.
He was at once nicknamed the ' Young Napoleon,' and his
accession to the chief command of the Federal armies
was enthusiastically approved. General McClellan had
been educated at West Point, and had graduated first of
the class in which Jackson was seventeenth. He bad been
appointed to the engineers, had served on the staff in
the war with Mexico, and as United States Commissioner
with the AUied armies in tbe Crimea. In 1857 he resigned,
to become president of a raUway company, and when the
war broke out he was commissioned by the State of Ohio
as Major-General of Volunteers. His reputation at the
MUitary Academy and in the regular army had been high.
His abUity and industry were unquestioned. His physique
was powerful, and he was a fine horseman. His influence

172 STONEWALL JACKSON
over his troops was remarkable, and he was emphaticaUy
a gentleman. It was most fortunate for the Union at this junc
ture that caution and method were his distinguishing
characteristics. The States had placed at Lincoln's dis
posal sufficient troops to form an army seven times greater
than that which had been defeated at Bull Eun, McClellan,
however, had no thought of committing the new levies to
an enterprise for wbich they were unfitted.* He had deter
mined that the army should make no move till it could do
so with the certainty of success, and the winter months were
to be devoted to training and organisation. Nor was
there any cry for immediate action. The experiment of
a civihan army had proved a terrible failure. The nation
that bad been so confident of capturing Eichmond, was now
anxious for the security of Washington, The war had been
in progress for nearly six months, and yet the troops were
manifestly unfit for offensive operations. Even the crude
strategists of the press had become ahve to the importance
of driU and discipline. A reconnaissance in force, pushed
(contrary to McClellan's orders) across the Potomac,
Oct 21 ^^^ repulsed by General Evans at BaU's Bluff
witb heavy loss; and mismanagement and mis
conduct were so evident that the defeat did much towards
inculcating patience.
So the work went on, quietly but surely, the general
supported by the President, and the nation giving men and
money without remonstrance. The South, on the other hand,
was stiU apathetic. The people, deluded by their decisive
victory, underrated the latent strength of their mighty
adversary. They appear to have believed that the earth
works which had transformed CentreviUe into a formid
able fortress, manned by the Army of Northern Virginia,
as the force under Johnston was now designated, were suffi
cient in themselves to end tbe war. They had not yet
learned that there were many roads to Eichmond, and that a
passive defence is no safeguard against a persevering foe.
The Government, expecting much from the intervention of
tbe European Powers, did nothing to press the advan-

INACTION OF THE CONFEDERATES 173
tage already gained. In vain the generals urged the
President to reinforce the army at CentreviUe to 60,000
men, and to give it transport and supplies sufficient to
permit the passage of the Potomac above Washington.
In vain they pointed out, in answer to tbe reply that
the Government could furnish neither men nor arms, tbat
large bodies of troops were retained at points the occupation
of which by the enemy would cause only a local incon
venience. ' Was it not possible,' they asked the President,
' by stripping other points to the last they would bear, and
even risking defeat at all other places, to put the Virginian
army in condition for a forward movement ? Success,'
they said, 'in the neighbourhood of Washington was
success everywhere, and it was upon the north-eastern
frontier that aU the avaUable force of the Confederacy
should be concentrated.'
Mr. Davis was immovable. Although Lee, who had
been appointed to a command in West Virginia almost
immediately after Bull Eun, was no longer at hand to
advise him, he probably saw tbe strategical require
ments of the situation. That a concentrated attack
on a vital point is a better measure of security than
dissemination along a frontier, that the counter-stroke
is tbe soul of the defence, and that the true policy of
the State which is compeUed to take up arms against a
superior foe is to aUow that foe no breathing-space, are
truisms which it would be an insult to his abUity to say
tbat he did not realise. But to have surrendered territory
to the temporary occupation of the enemy, in order to seek
a problematical victory elsewhere, would have probably
provoked a storm of discontent. The authority of the new
Government was not yet firmly established ; nor was the
patriotism of the Southern people so entirely unselfish as
to render them wiUing to endure minor evils in order to
achieve a great result. They were wUling to fight, but
they were unwUling that their own States should be left
unprotected. To apply Frederick the Great's maxim '
' ' A defensive war is apt to betray us into too frequent detachments.
Those generals who have had but little experience attempt to protect every

174 STONEWALL JACKSON
requires greater strength of will in the statesman than in
the soldier. The cries and complaints of those who find
themselves abandoned do not penetrate to the camp, but
they may bring down an administration. It is easy to
contrive excuses for the inaction of the President, and it
is no new thing to find the demands of strategy sacrificed
to political expediency. Nor did the army which had
suffered so heavily on the banks of Bull Eun evince any
marked desire to be led across the Potomac. Furloughs were
Uberally granted. Officers and privates dispersed to look
after their farms and then plantations. The harvests had to
be gathered, the negroes required the master's eye, and
even the counties of Virginia asked that part of the con
tingents they had furnished might be permitted to return
to agricultural pursuits.
The senior generals of the Virginia army were not
alone in believing that the victory they had won would
be barren of result unless it were at once utilised as a
basis for further action, Jackson, engrossed as he was
with the training of his command, found time to reflect
on the broader aspects of the war. Before he left for the
Shenandoah VaUey he sought an interview with General
G. W. Smith, recently appointed to tbe command of his
division. ' Finding me lying down in my tent,' writes this
officer, ' he expressed regret that I was sick, and said he
had come to confer with me on a subject of great im
portance, but would not then trouble me with it. I told
him tbat I wished to hear whatever he desired to say,
and could rest whilst he was talking. He immediately sat
down on the ground, near the head of the cot on wbich
I was lying, and entered on the subject of his visit.
' " McCleUan," he said, " with his army of recruits, wiU
not attempt to come out against us this autumn. If we
remain inactive they wUl have greatly the advantage over
us next spring. Their raw recruits will have then become
point, while those who are better acquainted with their profession, having
only the capital object in view, guard against a decisive blow, and acquiesce
in smaller misfortunes to avoid greater.' — ^Frederick the Great's Instruetions
to his Generals.

HIS VIEW OF THE SITUATION 175
an organised army, vastly superior in numbers to our own.
We are ready at tbe present moment for active operations
in the field, whUe they are not. We ought to invade their
country now, and not wait for them to make the necessary
preparations to invade ours. If the President would
reinforce this army by taking troops from other points not
threatened, and let us make an active campaign of invasion
before winter sets ia, McCleUan's raw recruits could not
stand against us in the field.
' " Crossing the Upper Potomac, occupying Baltimore,
and taking possession of Maryland, we could cut off the
communications of Washington, force the Federal Govern
ment to abandon the capital, beat McClellan's army if it
came out against us in the open country, destroy industrial
establishments wherever we found them, break up the
lines of interior commercial intercourse, close the coal
mines, seize and, if necessary, destroy the manufactories
and commerce of PhUadelphia, and of other large cities
within our reach ; take and hold the narrow neck of
country between Pittsburg and Lake Erie ; subsist mainly
on the country we traverse, and making unrelenting war
amidst their homes, force the people of the North to
understand what it will cost them to hold the South in the
Union at the bayonet's point."
'He then requested me to use my uifluence with
Generals Johnston and Beauregard in favour of immediate
aggressive operations. I told him tbat I was sure that an
attempt on my part to exert any influence in favour of his
proposition would do no good. Not content with my
answer he repeated his arguments, dwelling more at length
on the advantages of such strategy to ourselves and its
disadvantages to the enemy, and again urged me to use
my influence to secure its adoption. I gave him the same
reply I had already made.
' After a few minutes' thought he abruptly said :
" General, you have not expressed any opinion in regard to
the views I have laid before you. But I feel assured that
you favour them, and I think you ought to do all in your
power to have them carried into effect."

176 STONEWALL JACKSON
' I then said, " I wUl tell you a secret."
' He replied, " Please do not teU me any secret. I would
prefer not to hear it." I answered, " I must tell it to you,
and I have no hesitation in doing so, because I am certain
that it wUl not be divulged," I then explained to him that
these views had already been laid before the Government,
in a conference which had taken place at Fairfax Court
House, in the first days of October, between President
Davis, Generals Johnston, Beauregard, and myself, and
told him the result.
' Wben I had finished, he rose from the ground, on wbich
he had been seated, shook my hand warmly, and said, " I
am sorry, very sorry."
' Without another word he went slowly out to his
horse, a few feet in front of my tent, mounted very
deliberately, and rode sadly away. A few days after
wards he was ordered to tbe Valley.' '
It was under such depressing circumstances tbat Jackson
quitted the army which, boldly used, might have ensured
the existence of tbe Confederacy, His head-
"'¦ ¦ quarters were established at Winchester ; and, in
communication with CentrevUle by road, raU, and telegraph,
although sixty miles distant, he was still subordinate
to Johnston. Tbe Confederate front extended from
Fredericksburg on the Eappahannock to Winchester on
the Opequon. Jackson's force, holding the Valley of
the Shenandoah and the line of the Potomac westward of
Point of Eocks, was the extreme outpost on the left, and
was connected with the main body by a detachment at
Leesburg, on the other side of the Blue Eidge, under bis
brother-in-law. General D. H. HiU.
At Winchester his wife joined him, and of their first
meeting she tells a pretty story : —
' It can readUy be imagined with what deUght General
Jackson's domestic plans for the winter were haUed by me,
and without waiting for the promised " aide " to be sent on
escort, I joined some friends who were going to Eichmond,
where I spent a few days to shop, to secure a passport, and
' Letter of General G. W. Smith to the author.

WINCHESTEK 177
to await an escort to Winchester. The latter was soon
found in a kind-hearted, absent-minded old clergyman.
We traveUed by stage coach from Strasburg, and were told,
before reaching Winchester, that General Jackson was not
there, having gone with his command on an expedition.
It was therefore with a feeling of sad disappoiutment and
loneliness that I alighted in front of Taylor's hotel, at
midnight, in the early part of dreary cold December, and
no husband to meet me with a glad welcome. By the dim
lamplight I noticed a small group of soldiers standing in
the wide hall, but they remained silent spectators, and my
escort led me up the big stairway, doubtless feeling dis
appointed that he still had me on his hands. Just before
reaching the landing I turned to look back, for one figure
among tbe group looked startlingly famUiar, but as he had
not come forward, I felt that I must be mistaken. How
ever, my backward glance revealed an officer muffied up
in a mUitary greatcoat, cap drawn down over his eyes,
following us in rapid pursuit, and by the time we were
upon the top step a pair of strong arms caught me ; the
captive's head was thrown back, and she was kissed
again and again by her husband before she could recover
from the dehghtful surprise be bad given her. The good
old minister chuckled gleefully, and was no doubt a sincere
sharer in the joy and relief experienced by his charge.
When I asked my husband why he did not come forward
when I got out of tbe coach, he said be wanted to assure
himself that it was his own wife, as he didn't want to
commit tbe blunder of kissing a,nybody else's esposa ! '
The people amongst whom they found themselves were
Virginian to the core. In Winchester itself the feeling
agauist the North was exceptionally bitter. The town was
no mushroom settlement ; its history stretched back to the
old colonial days ; the grass-grown intrenchments on the
surrounding hUls had been raised by Washington duruig
the Indian wars, and the traditions of the first struggle for
independence were not yet forgotten. No single section of
the South was more conservative. Although the citizens
had been strong Unionists, nowhere were the principles

178 STONEWALL JACKSON
which their fathers had respected, the sovereignty of the
individual State and the right of secession, more strongly
held, and nowhere had the hereditary spirit of resistance
to coercive legislation blazed up more fiercely. The soldiers
of Bull Eun, who had driven the invader from the soU of
Virginia, were the heroes of the hour, and the leader of tbe
Stonewall Brigade had peculiar claims on the hospitality
of the town. It was to the people of the VaUey that he
owed his command. ' With one voice,' wrote tbe Secretary
of War, 'have they made constant and urgent appeals
that to you, in whom they have confidence, their defence
should be assigned.'
' The Winchester ladies,' says Mrs. Jackson, ' were
amongst the most famous of Virginia housekeepers, and
lived in a good deal of old-fashioned elegance and profusion.
The old border town had not then changed hands with the
conflicting armies, as it was destined to do so many times
during the war. Under the rose-coloured hght in which I
viewed everything that winter, it seemed to me tbat no
people could have been more cultivated, attractive, and
noble-hearted. Winchester was rich in happy homes and
pleasant people ; and the extreme kindness and appreciation
shown to General Jackson by aU bound us to them so
closely and warmly that ever after that winter he called the
place our " war home." '
But amid congenial acquaintances and lovely sur
roundings, with the tumult of war quiescent, and the domestic
happiness so dear to him restored, Jackson allowed no
relaxation either to himself or to his men. His first care was
to train and organise his new regiments. The ranks were
fiUed with recruits, and to their instruction he devoted him
self with unwearied energy. His small force of cavalry, com
manded by Colonel Turner Asbby, a gentleman of Virginia,
whose name was to become famous in the annals of the
Confederacy, he at once despatched to patrol the frontier.
Prompt measures were taken to discipline the troops,
and that this last was a task of no little difficulty tbe
following incident suggests. In the middle of November,
to Jackson's great delight, the Stonewall Brigade had been

DISCIPLINE 179
sent to him from Manassas, and after its arrival an order
was issued which forbade aU officers leaving the camp except
upon passes from headquarters. A protest was immediately
drawn up by the regimental commanders, and laid before
the general. They complained that the obnoxious order
was ' an unwaAranted assumption of authority, disparaged
their dignity, and detracted from that respect of the force
under their command which was necessary to maintain
their authority and enforce obedience.' Jackson's reply
well Ulustrates his own idea of discipline, and of the manner
in which it should be upheld. His adjutant-general wrote
as foUows to the discontented officers : —
' The Major-General Commanding desires me to say that
the within combined protest is in violation of army regula
tions and subversive of mUitary discipline. He claims the
right to give his pickets such instructions as in his opinion
the interests of the service require.
' Colonels  and  on the day that their regiments
arrived at their present encampment, either from incom
petency to control their commands, or from neglect of duty,
so permitted their commands to become disorganised and
their officers and men to enter Winchester without per
mission, as to render several arrests of officers necessary.
' If officers desire to have control over their commands,
they must remain habituaUy with tbem, industriously attend
to their instruction and comfort, and in battle lead them
well, and in such a manner as to command their admira
tion. ' Such officers need not apprehend loss of respect result
ing from inserting in a written pass the words " on duty,"
or "on private business," should they have occasion to pass
the pickets.'
Even the Stonewall Brigade had yet much to learn.
At this time Jackson was besieged with numerous appli
cations for service on his staff. The majority of these were
from persons without experience, and they were made to
the wrong man, ' My desire,' he wrote, ' is to get a staff
speciaUy qualified for their specific duties. I know Mr. 
personally, and was favourably impressed by him. But if

18C STONEWALL JAOKSON
a person desires office in these times, the best thing for him
to do is to pitch into service somewhere, and work witb
such energy, skUl, and success as to impress those round
him with the conviction that such are his merits that he
must be advanced, or the interests of the service must
suffer. . . . My desire is to make merit the basis of my
recommendations.' Social claims had no weight with him whatever. He
felt that the interests at stake were too great to be
sacrificed to favouritism or friendship, and he had seen
enough of war to know tbe importance of staff work.
Nor was he in the unfortunate position of being compelled
to accept the nominees of his superiors, Tbe Confederate
authorities were wise enough to permit their generals
to choose for themselves the instruments on which they
would have to rely for the execution of their designs.
WeUington, in 1815, had forced on him by the Horse
Guards, in the teeth of his indignant remonstrances, in
competent officers whom he did not know and whom he
could not trust. Jackson, in a country which knew little
of war, was aUowed to please himself. He need appoint no
one without learning aU about him, and his inquiries were
searching. Was he inteUigent? Was he trustworthy?
Was he industrious ? Did he get up early ? If a man
was wanting in any one of these qualifications he would
reject him, however highly recommended. That his strict
investigations and his insistence on the possession of
certain essential characteristics bore good fruit it is
impossible to gainsay. The absence of mishaps and errors
in his often comphcated manoeuvres is sufficient proof that
he was exceedingly weU served by his subordinates. Tbe
influence of a good staff is seldom apparent except to tbe
initiated. If a combination succeeds, the general gets all
the credit. If it fails, he gets all the blame ; and while
no agents, however efficient, can compensate by their own
efforts for the weakness of a conception that is radically
unsound, many a briUiant plan has faUed in execution
through the inefficiency of tbe staff. In his selection of
such capable men as his assistants must needs have been

HIS STAFF 181
Jackson gave proof that he possessed one at least of the
attributes of a great leader. He was not only a judge of
character, but he could place men in the positions to which
they were best suited. His personal predilections were never
allowed to interfere. For some months his chief of the
staff was a Presbyterian clergyman, while his chief quarter
master was one of the hardest swearers in Virginia. The
fact that the former could combine the duties of spiritual
adviser with those of his official position made him a
congenial comrade; but it was his energy and ability
rather than this unusual qualification which attracted
Jackson ; and although the profanity of the quartermaster
offended his susceptibUities, their relations were always
cordial. It was to the intelligence of his staff officers, their
energy and their loyalty, that he looked ; for the business in
hand these qualities were more important than their morals.
That a civUian should be found serving as chief of the
staff to a general of division, one of the most important
posts in the miUtary hierarchy, is a curious comment
on the organisation of the Confederate army. The regular
officers who had thrown in their lot with the South
had, as a rule, been appointed to commands, and the
generals of lower rank had to seek their staff officers
amongst the volunteers. It may be noticed, however, that
Jackson was by no means bigoted in favour of his own
cloth. He showed no anxiety to secure their services on
his staff. He thought many of them unfitted for duties
which brought them in immediate contact with the
volunteers. In dealing with such troops, tact and temper
are of more importance than where obedience has become
mechanical, and the claims of rank are instinctively re
spected. In all his campaigns, too, Jackson was practically
his own chief of the staff. He consulted no one. He
never divulged his plans. He gave bis orders, and his staff
had only to see that these orders were obeyed. His
topographical engineer, his medical director, his commis
sary and his quartermaster, were selected, it is true, by
reason of tbeir special qualifications. Captain Hotchkiss,
who filled the first position, was a young man of twenty-

182 STONEWALL JACKSON
six, whose abilities as a surveyor were well known in the
VaUey. Major Harman, his chief quartermaster, was one
of the proprietors of a Une of stage coaches and a large
farmer, and Major Hawks, his commissary, was the owner
of a carriage manufactory. But the remainder of his
assistants, with the exception of the chief of artUlery,
owed their appointments rather to their character than
to their professional abilities. It is not to be understood,
at the same time, that Jackson underrated soldierly
acquirements. He left no complaints on record, like so
many of his West Point comrades, of the ignorance of
the volunteer officers, and of the consequent difficulties
which attended every combination. But he was none the
less alive to their deficiencies. Early in 1862, when the
mUitary system of the Confederacy was about to be reorgan
ised, he urged upon the Government, through the member
of Congress for the district where he commanded, that
regimental promotion should not be obtained by seniority,
unless the applicant were approved by a board of examina
tion ; and it was due to his representations tbat this
regulation, to the great benefit of the army, was shortly
afterwards adopted. With all his appreciation of natural
aptitude for the soldier's trade, so close a student of
Napoleon could scarcely be blind to the fact that the most
heroic character, unsustained by knowledge, is practically
useless. If Napoleon himself, more highly endowed by
nature with every mUitary attribute than any other
general of the Christian era, thought it essential to teach
himself his business by incessant study, how much more is
such study necessary for ordinary men ?
But no man was less Ukely than Jackson to place an
exaggerated value on theoretical acquirements. No one
reaUsed more fuUy that Napoleon's character won more
victories than Napoleon's knowledge. The quaUties he
demanded in his subordinates were those which were con
spicuous in Napoleon, Who was more industrious than
the great Corsican ? Who displayed an intenser energy ?
Whose intelUgence was brighter ? Who understood human
nature better, or handled men with more consummate tact ?

HIS SBLEUTION OF STAFF OFFICERS 183
These were the very attributes which distinguished Jackson
himself. They are the key-note to his success, more so
than his knowledge of strategy and tactics, of the mechanism
of march and battle, and of the principles of the military
art. In selecting his staff officers, therefore, he deemed
character of more importance than erudition.
The men of the Stonewall Brigade had a saying tbat
Jackson always marched at dawn, except when he started
the night before, and it was perhaps this habit, wbich his
enemies found so unreasonable, that led him to lay so much
stress on early rising. It is certain that, like WeUington,
he preferred 'three o'clock in the morning men.' In a
letter to his wife he says : —
' If you will vouch for your brother's being an early
riser during the remainder of the war, I will give him an
aide-ship. I do not want to make an appointment on my
staff except of such as are early risers ; but if you will
vouch for him to rise regularly at dawn, I will offer him the
position.' Another characteristic be looked for was reticence ;
and it was undeniably of the utmost importance, especiaUy
in an army which spoke the same language as the enemy,
where desertion was not uncommon, and spies could easily
escape detection, that the men who might become cognisant
of the plans of the commander should be gifted with dis
cretion. Absolute concealment is generally impracticable
in a camp. Maps must be drawn, and reports furnished.
Eeconnoitring parties must be sent out, roads examined,
positions surveyed, and shelter and supplies requisitioned
in advance. Thus tbe movements of staff officers are a clue
to the projected movements of the army, and the smallest
hint may set a hundred brains to the work of surmise. There
wUl always be many who are just as anxious to discover the
general's intentions as he is to conceal them ; and if, by
any possibility whatever, the gossip and guesses of the
camp may come to the enemy's ears, it is weU that curiosity
should be baulked. Nor is it undesirable that the privacy
of headquarters should be respected. The vanity of a little
brief authority has before now tempted subordinate officers
VOL. I. 0

184 STONEWALL JAOKSON
to hint at weaknesses on the part of their superiors.
Ignorance of war and of the situation has induced them to
criticise and to condemn ; and idle words, greedUy listened
to, and quickly exaggerated, may easily destroy the confl
dence of the soldiery in the abiUties of their leader.
By the middle of December Jackson's smaU army
had become fairly effective. Its duties were simple. To
watch the enemy, to keep open the communication with
Manassas, so as to be ready to join tbe main army
should McClellan advance — such were Johnston's orders.
The Upper Potomac was held by the enemy in force.
General Banks, a volunteer officer, who was yet to learn
more of StonewaU Jackson, was in command. The head
quarters of his division, 18,000 strong, were at Frederick
City in Maryland; but his charge extended seventy-five
mUes further west, as far as Cumberland on tbe Potomac.
In addition to Banks, General KeUy with 5,000 men was at
Eomney, on the South Branch of the Potomac, thirty-five
miles north-west of Winchester by a good road. Tbe
Federal troops guarding the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal
and that portion of the Baltimore and Ohio EaUroad which
was stUl intact were necessarily much dispersed, for the
Confederate guerillas were active, and dam and aqueduct,
tunnel and viaduct, offered tempting objectives to Ashby's
cavalry. StUl the force which confronted Jackson was far
superior to his own ; the Potomac was broad and bridgeless,
and his orders appeared to impose a defensive attitude. But
he was not the man to rest inactive, no matter what the
odds against him, or to watch the enemy's growing strength
without an endeavour to interfere. Within tbe limits of
his own command he was permitted every latitude ; and
he was determined to apply the aggressive strategy which
he was so firmly convinced should be adopted by the whole
army. The Secretary of War, Mr, Benjamin, in detaching
him to the VaUey, had asked him to ' forward suggestions
as to the means of rendering his measures of defence
effectual,' '
The earliest information he had received on bis arrival
' o. E., vol. v., p. 909.

SUGGESTS A PLAN OF CAMPAIGN 186
it Winchester pointed to the conclusion that the enemy
was meditating an advance by way of Harper's Ferry. His
first suggestion thereupon was, that he should be reinforced
by a division under General Loring and a brigade under
Colonel Edward Johnson, which were stationed within the
Alleghanies on the great highways leading to the Ohio, cover
ing Staunton from the west.' His next was to the effect
that he should be permitted to organise an expedition for the
recapture and occupation of Eomney. If he could seize
this viUage, the junction of several roads, more decisive
operations would at once become feasible. It has been said
that the force of old associations urged Jackson to drive the
invader from the soil which held his mother's grave ; but,
even if we had not the evidence of his interview with General
G. W. Smith,' a glance at the map would in itself be sufficient
to assure us that strategy prevaUed with him rather than
sentiment. The plan of campaign which first suggested itself to him
was sufficiently comprehensive.
* WbUe the Northern people and the Federal authorities
were stUl a prey to the demoralisation which had followed
Bull Eun, he proposed to advance with 10,000 troops into
North-west Virginia, where be would reclaim the whole
country, and summon the inhabitants of Southern senti
ment to join his army. His information was extensive
and reliable, and he did not doubt his abUity to recruit
between 15,000 and 20,000 men, enough for his designs.
These were bold and simple. While the enemy was under
the impression that his only object was to reclaim and
occupy North-west Virginia, he would move his whole
force rapidly across to the Monongahela, march down upon
Pittsburg, destroy the United States arsenal, and then,
in conjunction with Johnston's army (which was to cross
the Potomac at Leesburg), advance upon Harrisburg, the
¦ Loring was at Huutergville, Johnson on Alleghany Mountain, not
far from Monterey. General Lee, unable with an inferior force to drive
the enemy from West Virginia, had been transferred to South Oaiolina
on November 1.
' Ante, p. 174. o i

188 STONEWALL JACKSON
capital of Pennsylvania. From Harrisburg he proposed
that the army should advance upon Philadelphia.' '
These suggestions, however, went no further than bis
friends in the Legislative Assembly. Although, for his
conduct at BuU Eun, he had now been promoted to
major-general, the Lexington professor had as yet no voice
in the councils of the young republic. Nevertheless, tbe
President read and approved the less ambitious proposal
for an attack on the Federal force at Eomney.
Eomney, the county seat of Hampshire, lies in a rich
district watered by the South Branch of the Potomac.
For more than a hundred miles, from source to moutb,
the river is bordered by alluvial meadows of extra
ordinary fertility. Their prodigal harvests, together with
the sweetness of the upland pastures, make them the para
dise of the grazier ; the farms which rest beneath the hills
are of manorial proportions, and the valley of the beautiful
South Branch is a land of easy wealth and old-fashioned
plenty. From Eomney an exceUent road runs south-east
to Winchester, and another south-west by Moorefield
and Franklin to Monterey, where it intersects the
great road, constructed by one of Napoleon's engmeers,
that leads from Staunton in the Valley to Parkersburg on
the Ohio.
When Jackson advocated the occupation of this impor
tant point the whole of West Virginia, between the AUe
ghanies and the Ohio, was in possession of the Federals.
The army of occupation, under General Eosecrans,
amounted to 27,000 men and over 40 guns ; but the troops
were dispersed in detachments from Eomney to Gauley
Bridge, a distance of near two hundred miles, their com
munications were exposed, and, owing to tbe mountains,
co-operation was almost impracticable.
5,000 men, based on Grafton, occupied Eomney.
18,700, based on Clarksburg, occupied the passes south
east of Beverley.
9,000, based on the Ohio, were stationed on the Great
' Cooke, p. 87,

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SUGGESTS A SECOND PLAN 187
Kanawha, a river which is navigable for small steamers to
within a few mUes of Gauley Bridge,
4,000 protected the lines of communication,
Jackson's letter to the Secretary of War was as
follows : —
'Deeply impressed with the importance of absolute
secrecy respecting military operations, I have made it a
J. poiat to say but Uttle respecting my proposed
movements in the event of sufficient reinforcements
arriving, but since conversing with Lieutenant-Colonel
Preston [his adjutant-general], upon his return from
General Loring, and ascertaining tbe disposition of the
general's forces, I venture to respectfully urge that after
concentrating aU his troops here, an attempt should be
made to capture the Federal forces at Eomney, The
attack on Eomney would probably induce McClellan to
believe that General Johnston's army had been so weakened
as to justify him in making an advance on CentreviUe ; but
should this not induce him to advance, I do not beUeve
anything will, during this winter.
' Should General Johnston be attacked, I would be at
once prepared to reinforce him with my present force,
iacreased by General Loring's. After repulsing the enemy
at Manassas, let the troops that marched on Eomney return
to the Valley, and move rapidly westward to the waters of
the Monongahela and Little Kanawha. I deem it of very
great importance that North-western Virginia be occupied by
Confederate troops this winter. At present it is to be pre
sumed that the enemy are not expecting an attack there,
and the resources of tbat region, necessary for the sub
sistence of our troops, are in greater abundance than in
almost any other season of the year. Postpone the occu
pation of that section until spring, and we may expect to
find the enemy prepared for us, and the resources to which
I have referred greatly exhausted, I know that what I have
proposed will be an arduous undertaking and cannot
be accomplished without the sacrifice of much personal
comfort ; but I feel that the troops wiU be prepared to make
the sacrifice when animated by the prospects of important

188 STONEWALL JACKSON
results to our cause, and distinction to themselves. It may
be urged against this plan that the enemy wiU advance
[from Beverley and the Great Kanawha] on Staunton or
HuntersviUe. I am weU satisfied that such a step would
but make tbeir destruction sure. When North-western
Virginia is Occupied in force, the Kanawha Valley, unless
it be the lower part of it, must be evacuated by tbe
Federal forces, or otherwise their safety wUl be endangered
by forcing a column across from the Little Kanawha
between them and the Ohio Eiver.
' Admitting that the season is too far advanced, or tbat
from other causes all cannot be accomplished that has been
named, yet through the blessing of God, who has thus far
wonderfully prospered our cause, much more may be ex
pected from General Loring's troops, according to tbis pro
gramme, than can be expected from them where tbey are.' '
This scheme was endorsed by Johnston. ' I submit,'
he wrote, 'that the troops imder General Loring might
render valuable services by taking the field with General
Jackson, instead of going into winter quarters as now pro
posed.' In accordance with Jackson's suggestion, Loring was
ordered to join him. Edward Johnson, however, was with
held. The Confederate authorities seem to have considered
it injudicious to leave unguarded the mountain roads which
lead into the Valley from the west. Jackson, with a wider
grasp of war, held that concentration at Winchester was a
sounder measure of security. ' Should the Federals ' (at
Beverley), he said, 'take advantage of the withdrawal of
Johnson's troops, and cross the mountains, so much tbe
worse for them. WhUe they were marching eastwards,
involving themselves amongst interminable obstacles, he
[Jackson] would place himself on their communications
and close in behind them, making their destruction tbe
more certain the further they advanced towards their
imaginary prize.' "
WhUe waiting for Loring, Jackson resolved to complete
the education of his new battalions in the field. The raw
' O. B., vol. v., p. 965. ' Dabney, vol. i., p. 298

THE FIRST ENTERPRISE 189
troops who garrisoned the Northern border were not formid
able enemies, and a sudden rush upon some Ul-defended
post would give to the staff and soldiery that first taste
of success which gives heart and backbone to inexpe-
Deo 6-9 rienced troops. The first enterprise, however, was
only partially successful. The destruction of a
dam on the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, one of the main
arteries of communication between Washington and the
West, by which coal, hay, and forage reached the Union
capital, was the result of a few days' hard marching and hard
work. Two companies of the Stonewall Brigade volunteered
to go down by night and cut the cribs. Standing waist
deep in the cold water, and under the constant fire of the
enemy, they effected a partial breach ; but it was repaired
by tbe Federals within two days. Jackson's loss was one
man killed. While engaged in this expedition news reached
him of the decisive repulse by Colonel Edward Johnson of
an attack on his position on Alleghany Mountain. Jackson
again asked that this brigade might be sent to his support,
but it was again refused, notwithstanding Johnston's en
dorsement of his request.
Loring reached Winchester on Christmas Day. Once
more the enemy threatened to advance, and information
had been received that he had been largely strengthened.
Jackson was of opinion that the true policy of the
Federals would be to concentrate at Martinsburg, midway
between Eomney and Frederick, and ' to march on Win
chester over a road that presented no very strong positions.'
To counteract such a combination, he determined to antici
pate their movements, and to attack them before they
received additional reinforcements.
On January 1, 1862, 9,000 Confederates marched from
Winchester towards the Potomac, Jackson's first ob-
1862. jectives were the vUlages of Bath and Hancock,
Jan. 1. on the Baltimore and Ohio EaUway, held by
Federal garrisons. By dispersing these detachments he
would prevent support being sent to Eomney ; by cutting
the telegraph along the railroad he would sever the
communication between Banks at Frederick and Eosecrans

190 STONEWALL JAOKSON
in West Vu-ginia, and compel KeUy either to evacuate
Eomney or fight him single-handed. To deal with bis
enemy in detaU, to crush his detachments in succession,
and with superior force, such was the essence of his plan.
The weather when the expedition started was bright
and pleasant, so much so that the troops, with the im
providence of young soldiers, left then: coats and blankets
in the waggons. That very afternoon, however, the
temperature underwent a sudden change. Under cold grey
skies the column scaled the mountain ridges, and on the
winter wind came a fierce storm of snow and hail. In order
to conceal the march as far as possible from the enemy's
observations the brigades had marched by country roads,
and delayed by steep gradients and slippery tracks, it was
not tiU the next morning that the supply waggons came up.
The troops, hurried suddenly from comfortable winter
quarters, suffered much. The bivouac was as cheerless as
the march. Without rations and without covering, the
men lay shivering round the camp fires. The third day out,
even the commander of the Stonewall Brigade took it upon
himself to halt his wearied men. Jackson became restive.
Eiding along the column he found his old regiments
halted by the roadside, and asked the reason for the delay,
' I have halted to let the men cook their rations,'
was General Garnett's reply, 'There is no time for
that.' 'But it is impossible for the men to march
further without them.' 'I never found anything im
possible with this brigade ! ' and Jackson rode on. His
plans admitted of no delay. He intended to surprise the
Jan 3 6nemy, In this expectation, however, he was
disappointed. A few mUes distant from Bath his
advanced-guard fell in with a Federal reconnaissance, and at
nightfall the Confederates had not yet reached the outskirts
of the town. Once more they had to bivouac in the open,
and rations, tents, and blankets were stUl behind. When
the day broke over the Shenandoah Mountains the country
was white with snow, and the sleeping soldiers were covered
as witb a winding-sheet. After a hasty meal an attempt
was made to surround the viUage, and to cut off the retreat

SHEPHERDSTOWN AND HANCOCK 191
of the garrison. The outflanking movements, made in a
blinding storm, faUed in combination. The roads were too
bad, the subordinate commanders too inexperienced ; the
three hostile regiments escaped across the river in their
boats, and only 16 prisoners were captured, StiU, the ad
vantages of tbeir unexpected movement were not altogether
lost to the Confederates. The Federals, ignorant as yet of
the restless energy of the foe who held command at Win
chester, had settled themselves cosily in winter quarters.
The intelUgence of Jackson's march had come too late
to enable them to remove the stores which had been
collected at Bath, and on tbe night of January 4 the
Virgiuians revelled in warmth and luxury. The next morn
ing they moved forward to the river. On the opposite
Jan 5 hank stood the vUlage of Hancock, and after a
demand to surrender had been refused, Jackson
ordered his batteries to open flre.' Shepherdstown, a little
Virginia town south of the Potomac, had been repeatedly
shelled, even when unoccupied by Confederate troops. In
order to intimate that such outrages must cease a few shells
were thrown into Hancock. The next day the bombard
ment was resumed, but with little apparent effect; and
strong reinforcements having joined the enemy, Jackson
ceased fire and withdrew, A bridge was already in
process of construction two miles above the town, but
to have crossed the river, a wide though shallow stream,
in face of a considerable force, would have been a useless
and a costly operation. The annihilation of the Federal
garrison would have scarcely repaid the Southerners for
the loss of life that must have been incurred. At the
same time, while Jackson's batteries had been at work,
his infantry had done a good deal of mischief. Two
regiments had burned the bridge by which the Baltimore
and Ohio EaUway crosses the Great Cacapon Eiver, the canal
dam was breached, and many miles of track and telegraph
were destroyed. The enemy's communications between
Frederick and Eomney were thus effectually severed,
' The Federal commander was granted two hours in which to remove
the women and children.

192 STONEWALL JACKSON
and a large amount of captured stores were sent to Win
chester, It was with the design of covering these operations
that the bombardment bad been continued, and tbe sum
mons to surrender was probably no more than a ruse to
attract the attention of the Federal commander from the
attack on the Cacapon Bridge, On the morning of the 7th
Jackson moved southward to Unger's Store. Here, how
ever, the expedition came to a standstUl, The precaution
of rough-shoeing tbe horses before leaving Winchester had
been neglected, and it was found necessary to refit tbe
teams and rest the men.
After halting for four days the Confederates, on
January 13, renewed their march. The outlook was un-
Jan. 13. promising. Although cavalry patrols had been
despatched in every direction, a detachment of
mUitia, which had acted as flank-guard in the direction of
Eomney whUe Jackson was moving to Unger's Store, had
been surprised and defeated, with the loss of two guns, at
Hanging Eock, The weather, too, grew colder and colder,
and the mountain roads were little more than sheets
of ice. The sleet beat fiercely down upon the crawling
column. The men stumbled and feU on the sUppery
tracks; many waggons were overturned, and the bloody
knees and muzzles of the horses bore painful witness to tbe
severity of the march. The bivouacs were more comfortless
than before. The provision train lagged far in rear.
Axes there were none ; and bad not tbe fence-raUs afforded a
supply of firewood, the sufferings of the troops would have
been intense. As it was, despite the example of their
commander, they pushed forward but slowly through the
bitter weather. Jackson was everywhere ; here, putting his
shoulder to the wheel of a gun that the exhausted team
could no longer move ; there, urging the wearied soldiers,
or rebuking the officers for want of energy. Attentive as
he was to the health and comfort of his men in quarters,
on the line of march he looked only to the success of the
Confederate arms. The hardships of the winter operations
were to him but a necessary concomitant of his designs, and
It mattered but Uttle if the weak and sickly should succumb.

LORING'S INDISCrPLINB 198
Commanders who are over-chary of their soldiers' lives, who
forget that their men have voluntarUy offered themselves as
food for powder, often miss great opportunities. To die doing
his duty was to Jackson the most desirable consummation of
the soldier's existence, and where duty was concerned or
victory in doubt he was as careless of life and suffering as
Napoleon himself. The weU-being of an individual or even
of an army were as nothing compared with tbe interests of
Virgiaia. And, in the end, his indomitable will triumphed
over every obstacle. Eomney viUage came at length in sight,
Jan. 10 ^o^®ly ^^^ deserted amid the mountain snows, for
tbe Federal garrison had vanished, abandoning its
camp-equipment and its magazines.
No pursuit was attempted. Jackson had resolved on
further operations. It was now in his power to strike at the
Federal communications, marching along the Baltimore
and Ohio EaUway in the direction of Grafton, seventy-five
miles west of Eomney. In order to leave all safe behind
him, he determined, as a first step, to destroy the bridge by
whicb the Baltimore and Ohio Eailway crossed the Potomac
in the neighbourhood of Cumberland. The Federal forces
at Williamstown and Frederick drew the greater part of
their supplies from the West ; and so serious an interruption
in the line of communication would compel them to give
up all thought of offensive enterprises in the Valley. But
the sufferings that his green soldiers had undergone
had sapped their discipline. Loring's division, nearly
two-thirds of the command, was so discontented as
to be untrustworthy. It was useless with such troops
to dream of further movements among the inhospitable
hills. Many had deserted during the march from Unger's
Store ; many had succumbed to the exposure of the
bivouacs ; and, more than aU, the commander had been
disloyal to his superior. Although a regular officer of long
service, he had permitted himself a license of speech
which was absolutely unjustifiable, and throughout the
operations had shown his unfitness for his position. Placed
under the command of an officer who had been his junior
in the Army of the United States, his sense of discipline was

194 STONEWALL JACKSON
overborne by the slight to his vanity ; and not for the first
time nor the last the resentment of a petty mind ruined an
enterprise which would have profited a nation. CompeUed
to abandon his projected march against the onemy, Jackson
determined to leave a strong garrison in Eomney and tbe
surrounding district, whUe the remainder of the force with
drew to Winchester. The two towns were connected by a
good high-road, and by estabUshing telegraphic communi
cation between them, he believed tbat despite the Federal
numbers he could maintain his hold on these important
posts. Many precautions were taken to secure Eomney
from surprise. Three mUitia regiments, recruited in the
country, and thus not only famUiar with every road, but
able to procure ample information, were posted in the
neighbourhood of the town; and with the miUtia were
left three companies of cavalry, one of which had already
been employed in this region.
In detaiUng Loring's division as the garrison of Eomney
Jackson seems to have made a grave mistake. He had
much reason to be dissatisfied with the commander, and
tbe men were already demoralised. Troops unfit to march
against the enemy were not the men to be trusted with
the security of an important outpost, within thirty miles of
the Federal camps at Cumberland, far from their supports,
and surrounded by bleak and lonely mountains, A man
of wider sympathy with human weakness, and with less
rigid ideas of discipline, might possibly have arranged
matters so that the StonewaU Brigade might have remained
at Eomney, while Loring and his division were trans
ferred to less exactiag duties and more comfortable
quarters. But Loring's division constituted two-thirds of
Jackson's force, and Eomney, more exposed than Wia-
chester, required the stronger garrison, A general of
Loring's temper and pretensions would scarcely have
submitted to the separation of his brigades, and would
probably have become even more discontented had Garnett,
the leader of the Stonewall Brigade, been left in command
at Eomney, while he himself played a subordinate part at
Winchester, It is only too possible, however, that matters

COMMENTS 196
were past mending. The feeble discipline of Loring's troops
had broken down; their enthusiasm had not been proof
against the physical suffering of these winter operations.
The Stonewall Brigade, on the other hand, was still
staunch, ' I am well assured,' wrote Jackson at this time,
' that had an order been issued for its march, even through
the depth of winter and in any direction, it would have
sustained its reputation; for although it was not under
fire during the expedition at Eomney, yet the alacrity with
whicb it responded to the call of duty and overcame
obstacles showed that it was still animated by the same
spirit that characterised it at Manassas,' But Jackson's
old regiments were now tried soldiers, inspirited by the
memories of the great victory they had done so much
to win, improved by association with Johnston's army,
and welded together by a discipline far stricter than that
which obtained in commands like Loring's.
On January 24 Jackson returned to Winchester. His
strategy had been successful. He had driven the enemy
across the Potomac. He had destroyed for a
^" ¦ time an important line of supply. He had cap
tured a few prisoners and many stores ; and this with a loss
of 4 men kiUed and 28 wounded. The Federal forces along the
border were far superior to his own. The dispersion of these
forces from Cumberland to Frederick, a distance of eighty
mUes, had doubtless been much in his favour. But when he
marched from Winchester he had reason to believe that
8,000 men were posted at Frederick, 2,000 at Hagerstown,
2,000 at WUUamsport, 2,000 at Hancock, and 12,000 at
Cumberland and Eomney, The actual effective strength
of these garrisons may possibly have been smaller than
had been reported, but such were the numbers which he
had to take into consideration when planning his opera
tions. It would appear from the map that whUe he
was at Eomney, 12,000 Federals might have moved
out from WiUiamsport and Harper's Ferry and have
cut him off from Wiachester. This danger had to be
kept in view. But tbe enemy had made no preparations

196 STONEWALL JACKSON
for crossing the Potomac ; the river was a difficult
obstacle ; and Banks was not the man to run risks.'
At the same time, while Jackson was in aU probabiUty
perfectly aware of the difficulties which Banks refused to
face, and counted on that commander's hesitation, it must
be admitted that his manoeuvres had been daring, and
that the mere thought of the enemy's superior numbers
would have tied down a general of inferior abUity to tbe
passive defence of Winchester. Moreover, the results
attained were out of all proportion to the trifling loss whicb
had been incurred. An important recruiting-ground bad
been secured. The development of Union sentiment, which,
since the occupation of Eomney by the Federals, had been
gradually increasing along tbe Upper Potomac, would be
checked by the presence of Southern troops, A base for
further operations against the Federal detachments in
West Virginia had been established, and a fertUe region
opened to the operations of the Confederate commissaries.
These strategic advantages, however, were by no means
appreciated by the people of Virginia. The sufferings of
the troops appealed more forcibly to their imagination than
the prospective benefit to be derived by the Confederacy,
Jackson's secrecy, as absolute as that of the grave, had an
ill effect. Unable to comprehend his combinations, even
his own officers ascribed his manoeuvres to a restless craving
for personal distinction ; whUe civiUan wiseacres, with tbeir
ears full of the exaggerated stories of Loring's stragglers,
saw in the relentless energy with which he had pressed the
march on Eomney not only the evidence of a callous in
difference to suffering, but the symptoms of a diseased mind.
They refused to consider that the general bad shared tbe
hardships of the troops, faring as simply and roughly as any
private in the ranks. He was charged with partiaUty to
' • Any attempt,' Banks reported to McClellan, ' to intercept the enemy
would have been unsuccessful. . . It would have resulted in almost certain
failure to out him off, and have brought an exhausted force into his presence
to fight him in his stronghold at WincheBter. In any case, it promised no
positive prospect of success, nor did it exclude large chances of disaster.'
- 0. B., vol. v., p. 094.

LORmO'S SOLDIERS 197
the Stonewall Brigade. ' It was said that he kept it in the
rear, whUe other troops were constantly thrust into danger ;
and that now, whUe Loring's command was left in mid
winter in an alpine region, almost within the jaws of a
powerful enemy, these favoured regiments were brought
back to the comforts and hospitalities of the town ; whereas
in truth, while tbe forces in Eomney were ordered into
huts, the brigade was three miles below Winchester, in
tents, and under the most rigid discipline.' '
It should not be forgotten, however, that Loring's
troops were little more as yet than a levy of armed
civiUans, ignorant of war ; and this was one reason
the more that during those cruel marches the hand that
held the reins should have been a light one. A leader
more genial and less rigid would have found a means
to sustain their courage. Napoleon, with the captivating
famUiarity he used so well, would have laughed the
grumblers out of their iU-humour, and have nerved the
fainting by pointing to the glory to be won. Nelson would
have struck the chord of patriotism. Skobeleff, taking the
very privates into his confldence, would have enlisted their
personal interest in tbe success of the enterprise, and the
eccentric speeches of ' Father ' Suvoroff would have cheered
them like a cordial. There are occasions when both officers
and men are the better for a little humouring, and the
march to Eomney was one. A few words of hearty praise, a
stirring appeal to their nobler instincts, a touch of sym
pathy, might have worked wonders. But whatever of per
sonal magnetism existed in Stonewall Jackson found no
utterance in words, WhUst his soldiers struggled painfully
towards Eomney in the teeth of the winter storm, his lips
were never opened save for sharp rebuke or peremptory
order, and Loring's men bad some reason to complain of
his fanatical regard for the very letter of tbe law. On the
most inclement of those January nights the captain of a
Virginia company, on whose property they happened to
have halted, had allowed them to use the fence-raUs for
the camp fires. Jackson, ever careful of private rights, had
' Dabney, vol, i., p. 320.
VOL. I. p

198 STONEWALL JACKSON
issued an order that fences should not be burnt, and the
generous donor was suspended from duty on the charge
of giving away his own property without first asking
leave! WeU might the soldiers think that their com
mander regarded them as mere machines.
His own men knew his worth. Bull Eun had shown
them the measure of his courage and his ability ; in a single
battle he had won that respect and confidence which go so
far towards establishing discipline. But over Loring's
men his personal ascendency was not yet established.
They had not yet seen him under fire. The fighting in
the Eomney campaign had been confined to skirmishing.
Much spoil had been gathered in, but there were no
trophies to show in the shape of guns or colours ; no im
portant victory had raised their self-respect. It is not too
much to say that the silent soldier who insisted on sucb
constant exertion and such unceasing vigilance was posi
tively hated.
' They were unaccustomed to a miUtary regimen so
energetic as his. Personally the most modest of men,
officially he was the most exacting of commanders, and
his purpose to enforce a thorough performance of duty,
and his stern disapprobation of remissness and self-
indulgence were veiled by no affectations of politeness.
Those who came to serve near his person, if they were not
wholly like-miaded with himself, usually underwent, at
first, a sort of breaking in, accompanied with no little
chafing to restless spirits. The expedition to Eomney was,
to such officers, just such an apprenticeship to Jackson's
methods of making war. All this was fully known to him ;
but while he keenly felt the injustice, he disdained to
resent it, or to condescend to any explanation,' '
Jackson returned to Winchester with no anticipation that
the darkest days of his military life were close at hand.
' Little Sorrel,' tbe charger he had ridden at Bull Eun,
leaving the senior members of the staff toiling far in
rear, had covered forty miles of mountain roads in one
short winter day. ' After going to an hotel and divesting
' Dabney, vol. i., p. 321.

ESIDISOIPLINE 199
himself of the mud which had bespattered him in his
rapid ride, he proceeded to Dr. Graham's. In order to
give his wife a surprise he had not intimated when he
would return. As soon as the first glad greetings were
over, before taking his seat, with a face all aglow with
delight, he glanced round the room, and was so impressed
with the cosy and cheerful aspect of the fireside, as we all
sat round it tbat winter evening, that he exclaimed : " This
is the very essence of comfort." ' '
He had already put aside the unpleasant memories of
the expedition, and had resigned himself to rest content
with the measure of success that had been attained,
Eomney at least was occupied, and operations might be
effectively resumed at a more propitious season.
Six days later, however, Jackson received a peremptory
message from tbe Secretary of War : ' Our news indicates
that a movement is making to cut off General Loring's
command ; order bim back immediately.' ^
This order had been issued without reference to General
Johnston, Jackson's immediate superior, and so marked a
departure from ordinary procedure could not possibly be
construed except as a severe reflection on Jackson's judg
ment. Nor could it have other than a most fatal effect on
the discipline of the VaUey troops. It had been brought
about by most discreditable means. Loring's officers had
sat in judgment on then: commander. Those who bad
been granted leave at the close of tbe expedition bad
repaired to Eichmond, and had filled the ears of the
Government and the columns of the newspapers with
complaints. Those who remained at Eomney formu
lated their grievance in an official remonstrance, which
Loring was indiscreet enough to approve and forward.
A councU of subordinate officers had the effrontery to record
their opinion tbat ' Eomney was a place of no strategical im
portance,' and to suggest that the division might be ' main
tained much more comfortably, at much less expense, and
with every military advantage, at almost any other place.' '
• Memoirs of Stonewall Jackson. " 0. E., vol. v., p. 1053.
' Ibid., pp. 1046 8. 1- 2

200 STONEWALL JACKSON
Discomfort was the burden of tbeir complaint. They
had been serving continuously for eight months. Their
present position imposed upon them even greater vigilance
and more constant exertion than had hitherto been
demanded of them, and their one thought was to escape
from a situation which they characterised as ' one of the
most disagreeable and unfavourable that could well be
imagined.' Only a single pertinent argument was brought
forward. The Confederate soldiers had enlisted only for
twelve months, and the Government was about to ask them
to volunteer for the duration of the war. It was urged by
Loring's officers that with the present prospect before them
there was much doubt that a single man of the division
would re-enlist. ' With some regard for its comfort,' added
the general, ' a large portion, if not the whole, may be pre
vailed upon to do so.'
It does not seem to have occurred to these officers that
soldiers in the near vicinity of the enemy, wherever they may
be placed, must always be subject to privations, and that at
any other point of the Confederate frontier — at Winchester
with Jackson, at Leesburg with HiU, or at CentreviUe with
Johnston — their troops would be exposed to the same risks
and the same discomforts as at Eomney. That the occu
pation of a dangerous outpost is in itself an honour never
entered their minds ; and it would have been more honest,
instead of reviUng the cUmate and tbe country, had they
frankly declared that they had had enough for the present
of active service, and had no mind to make further sacrifices
in the cause for which they had taken arms. With the
J „, Secretary's order Jackson at once compUed,
Loring was recaUed to Winchester, but before
his command arrived Jackson's resignation had gone in.
His letter, forwarded through Johnston, ran as follows :
' Headquarters, Valley District, Winchester, Va. :
' Jan. 31, 1862.
' Hon. J. P. Benjamin, Secretary of War,
' Sir, — Your order, requiring me to direct General
Loriag to return with his command to Winchester im
mediately, has been received and promptly compUed with.

HIS ACTION JUSTIFIED 201
'With such interference in my command I cannot
expect to be of much service in the field, and, accordingly,
respectfuUy request to be ordered to report for duty to
the Superintendent of the Virginia MUitary Institute at
Lexington, as has been done in the case of other professors.
Should this appUcation not be granted, I respectfully
request that the President wUl accept my resignation from
tbe army.' '
The danger apprehended by the Secretary of War, that
Loring's division, if left at Eomney, might be cut off, did
not exist. General Lander, an able and energetic officer, now
in command of the Federal force at Cumberland, had put
forward proposals for an active campaign in the Shenandoah
VaUey ; but there was no possibiUty of such an enterprise
being immediately undertaken. The Potomac was stiU a
formidable obstacle ; artillery and cavalry were both defi
cient ; the troops were scattered, and their discipline was
indifferent. Lander's command, according to bis official
despatches, was ' more like an armed mob than an army.' "
Eomney, therefore, was in Uttle danger ; and Jackson,
who had so lately been in contact with the Federal troops,
whose cavalry patrolled tbe banks of the Potomac, and
who was in constant receipt of information of the enemy's
attitude and condition, was certainly a better judge of
what was probable than any official in the Confederate
capital. There were doubtless objections to the retention
of Eomney. An enormous army, in the intrenched camp
at Washiagton, threatened CentreviUe; and in the event
of that army advancing, Jackson would be called upon
to reinforce Johnston, just as Johnston had reinforced
Beauregard before BuU Eun. With the greater part of his
force at Eomney such an operation would be delayed by at
least two days. Even Johnston himself, although careful
to leave_ his subordinate a free hand, suggested that the
occupation of Eomney, and the consequent dispersion of
Jackson's force, might enable the enemy to cut in effectively
between the VaUey troops and the main army. It is
beyond question, however, that Jackson had carefully
' O. B., vol. v., p. 1053. « Ibid., pp. 702, 703.

203 STONEWALL JACKSON
studied the situation. There was no danger of his for
getting tbat his was merely a detached force, or of his
overlooking, in the interests of his own projected operations,
the more important interests of the main army ; and if his
judgment of the situation differed from that of his superior,
it was because he had been indefatigable in his search for
information. He had agents everywhere.* His inteUigence was more
ample than tbat supplied by the Confederate spies in
Washington itself. No reinforcements could reach the
Federals on the Potomac without his knowledge. He was
always accurately informed of the strength and movements
of tbeir detachments. Nor had he failed to take the pre
cautions which minimise the evils arising from dissemina
tion. He had constructed a Une of telegraph from Charles
town, within seven mUes of Harper's Perry, to Winchester,
and another Une was to have been constructed to Eomney.
He had established relays of couriers through his district.
By this means he could communicate with Hill at Leesburg
in three hours, and by another line of posts with Johnston
at CentreviUe. But his chief reason for believing that Eomney might be
occupied without risk to a junction between himself and
Johnston lay in tbe impassable condition of the Virginia
roads. McClellan's huge army could not drag its guns
and waggons through the slough of mud which lay between
Washington and CentreviUe. Banks' command at Frederick
was in no condition for a rapid advance either upon Lees
burg or on Winchester ; and it was evident that little was to
be feared from Lander untU he had completed the work, on
which he was now actively engaged, of repairing tbe
communications which Jackson's raid had temporarUy
interrupted. With the information we have now before
us, it is clear that Jackson's view of the situation was
absolutely correct ; that for the present Eomney might be
' ' I have taken special pains,' he writes on January 17, ' to obtain in
formation respecting General Banks, but I have not been informed of his
having gone east. I will see what cau be effected through the Catholic
priests at Martinsburg.' — O. E., vol. v., p. 1036.

SUPPORTED BY JOHNSTON 205
advantageously retained, and recruiting pushed forward in
this section of Virginia. If, when McClellan advanced,
the Confederates were to confine themselves to the de
fensive, tbe post would undoubtedly have to be abandoned.
But if, instead of tamely surrendering the initiative, the
Government were to adopt the bolder strategy which Jack
son had already advocated, and Johnston's army, moving
westward to the VaUey, were to utilise the natural line of
invasion by way of Harper's Ferry, the occupation of
Eomney would secure the flank, and give the invading
force a fertUe district from which to draw supplies.
It was not, however, on the Secretary's misconception
of the situation that Jackson's request for relief was based.
Nor was it the slur on his judgment that led him to resign.
The injury that had been inflicted by Mr. Benjamin's
unfortunate letter was not personal to himself. It affected
tbe whole army. It was a direct blow to discipline, and
struck at the very heart of military efficiency. Not only
would Jackson himself be unable to enforce his authority
over troops who had so successfuUy defied his orders ; but
the whole edifice of command, throughout the length and
breadth of the Confederacy, would, if he tamely submitted
to the Secretary's extraordinary action, be shaken to its
foundations. Johnston, stUl smarting under Mr. Davis's
rejection of his strategical views, felt this as acul ely as did
Jackson. ' The discipline of the army,' he wrote to the
Secretary of War, 'cannot be maintained under such circum
stances. The direct tendency of such orders is to insulate
the commanding general from his troops, to diminish his
moral as well as his official control, and to harass him with
the constant fear that bis most matured plans may be
marred by orders from his Government which it is im
possible for him to anticipate.' '
To Jackson he wrote advising the withdrawal of his
resignation. ' Under ordinary circumstances a due sense of
one's own dignity, as well as care for professional character
and official rights, would demand such a course as yours, but
the character of tbis war, the great energy exhibited
' O. E., vol. v., pp. 1067, 1058.

204 STONEWALL JACKSON
by the Government of the United States, the danger in
which our very existence as an independent people lies,
requires sacrifices from us all who have been educated as
soldiers. * I receive the information of the order of which you
have such cause to complain from your letter. Is not that
as great an official wrong to me as the order itself to you ?
Let us dispassionately reason with the Government on this
subject of command, and if we fail to influence its practice,
then ask to be relieved from positions the authority of
which is exercised by the War Department, while the re
sponsibihties are left to us.
' I have taken the liberty to detain your letter to make
this appeal to your patriotism, not merely from common
feelings of personal regard, but from the official opinion
which makes me regard you as necessary to the service of
the country in your present position.' *
But Johnston, when he wrote, was not aware of the
remonstrance of Loring's officers. His protest, in his letter
to the Secretary of War, deprecated the action of the
department in ignoring the authority of the mUitary
chiefs ; it had no reference to the graver evil of yielding
to the representations of irresponsible subordinates. Con
sidering the circumstances, as he believed them to exist,
bis advice was doubtless prudent. But it found Jackson
in no compromising mood,
' Sacrifices ! ' he exclaimed ; ' have I not made them ?
What is my life here but a daily sacrifice ? Nor shall I
ever withhold sacrifices for my country, where they will
avail anything, I intend to serve here, anywhere, in any
way I can, even if it be as a private soldier. But if this
method of making war is to prevaU, the country is ruined.
My duty to Virginia requires that I shall utter my protest
against it ia the most energetic form in my power, and that
is to resign. The authorities at Eichmond must be taught
a lesson, or the next victims of their meddUng wiU be
Johnston and Lee,'
Fortunately for the Confederacy, the Virginia officers
¦ O. E., vol. v., pp. 1059, 1060.

EXPLAINS HIS ACTION 205
possessed a staunch supporter in the Governor of the State.
Mr. Letcher knew Jackson's worth, and he knew the
estimation in which he was already held by the Virginia
people. The battle of Manassas had attained the dignity
of a great historical event, and those whose share in the
victory had been conspicuous were regarded with the
same respect as the heroes of the Eevolution. In the
spring of 1862 Manassas stood alone, the supreme incident
of the war ; its fame was not yet overshadowed by mightier
conflicts, and it had taken rank in the popular mind with
the decisive battles of the world.
Jackson, at the same time that he addressed Johnston,
wrote to Letcher. It is possible that he anticipated the
course the Governor would adopt. He certainly took care
that if a protest were made it should be backed with
convincing argument,
' Tbe order from the War Department,' he wrote, ' was
given without consulting me, and is abandoning to the
enemy what has cost much preparation, expense, and ex
posure to secure, is in direct conflict with my mUitary plans,
implies a want of confidence in my capacity to judge when
General Loring's troops should fall back, and is an attempt
to control mUitary operations in detaUs from the Secretary's
desk at a distance, ... As a single order like that of the
Secretary's may destroy the entire fruits of a campaign, I
cannot reasonably expect, if my operations are thus to be
interfered with, to be of much service in the field. ... If
I ever acquired, through the blessing of Providence, any
influence over troops, this undoing my work by the Secre
tary may greatly diminish that influence. I regard the
recent expedition as a great success. ... I desire to say
nothing against the Secretary of War. I take it for granted
that be has done what he believes to be best, but I regard
such policy as ruinous.' '
This letter had the desired result. Not content with
reminding Jackson of the effect his resignation would have
on the people of Virginia, and begging him to withdraw it.
Governor Letcher took the Secretary of War to task. Mr.
' Memoirs, pp. 232, 233.

206 STONEWALL JACKSON
Benjamin, who had probably acted in ignorance rather than
in deflance of the military necessities, at once gave way.
Governor Letcher, assured that it was not the intention of
tbe Government to interfere with the plans of the general,
withdrew tbe resignation : Jackson had already yielded to
his representations.' In this transaction,' says his chief of the staff, ' Jack
son gained one of his most important victories for the Con
federate States. Had the system of encouragement to the
insubordination of inferiors, and of interference with the
responsibilities of commanders in the fleld, which was
initiated in his case, become established, military success
could only have been won by accident. By his firmness
the evil usage was arrested, and a lesson impressed both
upon the Government and the people of tbe South.' '
That the soldier is but the servant of the statesman, as
war is but an instrument of diplomacy, no educated soldier
wiU deny. Politics must always exercise a supreme in
fluence on strategy ; yet it cannot be gainsaid that inter
ference with the commanders in the field is fraught witb
the gravest danger. Mr. Benjamin's action was without
excuse. In listening to the malcontents he ignored the
claims of discipline. In cancelling Jackson's orders he
struck a blow at the confidence of the men in their com
mander. In directing that Eomney should not be held he
decided on a question which was not only purely mUitary,
but of which the man on the spot, actually in touch with
the situation and with the enemy, could alone be judge,'
Even Johnston, a most able and experienced soldier,
although he was evidently apprehensive that Jackson's
front was .too extended, forbore to do more than warn.
Nor was his interference the crown of Mr. Benjamin's
' Dabney, vol. i., p. 327.
' The inexpediency of evacuating Eomney was soon made apparent. The
enemy reoccupied the village, seized Moorefield, and, with the valley of
the South Branch in their possession, threatened the rear of Edward
Johnson's position on the Alleghany Mountain so closely that he was com
pelled to retreat. Three fertile counties were thus abandoned io the enemy,
and the Confederate sympathisers in North-west Virginia were proportion
ately discouraged.

THE EVILS OF CIVILLAN CONTROL 207
offence. The omniscient lawyer asked no advice ; but
beUeving, as many still believe, that neither special know
ledge nor practical acquaintance with tbe working of the
mUitary machine is necessary in order to manoeuvre armies,
he had a^cted entirely on his own initiative. It was indeed
time that he received a lesson.
Well would it have been for the Confederacy had the
President himself been wise enough to apply the warning
to its full extent. We have already seen that after the
victory of Manassas, in his capacity of Commander-in-Chief,
he refused to denude the Southern coasts of their garrisons
in order to reinforce Johnston's army and strike a decisive
blow in Northern territory. Had he but once recognised
that he too was an amateur, that it was impossible for one
man to combine effectively in his own person tbe duties of
Head of the Government and of Commander-in-Chief, he
would have banded over the management of his huge
armies, and the direction of aU military movements, to the
most capable soldier the Confederacy could produce.
Capable soldiers were not wanting ; and had the control of
mUitary operations been frankly committed to a trained
strategist, and the military resources of the Southern States
been placed unreservedly at the disposal of either Lee or
Johnston, combined operations would have taken the place
of disjointed enterprises, and the full strength of the country
have been concentrated at the decisive point. It can hardly,
however, be imputed as a fault to Mr, Davis that he did not
anticipate a system which achieved such astonishing success
in Prussia's campaigns of '66 and '70, It was not through
vanity alone that he retaiaed in his own hands the supreme
control of miUtary affairs. The Confederate system of
government was but an imitation of that which existed in
the United States ; and in Washington, as in Eichmond,
the President was not only Commander-in-Chief in name,
but the arbiter on all questions of strategy and organisa
tion ; whUe, to go stiU further back, the Enghsh Cabinet
had exercised the same power since Parliament became
supreme. The American people may be forgiven for their
failure to recognise the deplorable results of the system they

208 STONEWALL JACKSON
had inherited from the mother-country. The EngUsh
people had been equaUy blind, and in their case there was
no excuse. The mismanagement of the national resources
in the war with France was condoned by the victories of
Wellington. The vicious conceptions of the Government,
responsible for so many useless enterprises, for waste
of life, of treasure, of opportunity, were lost in the blaze
of triumph in which the struggle ended. Forty years
later it had been forgotten that the Cabinet of 1815 had
done its best to lose the battle of Waterloo ; the lessons of
the great war were disregarded, and the Cabinet of 1853-4
was allowed to work its wUl on the army of the Crimea.
It is a significant fact that, during tbe War of Secession,
for the three years the control of the armies of the North
remained in the hands of the Cabinet the balance of success
lay with the Confederates, But in March 1864 Grant was
appointed Commander-in-Chief; Lincoln abdicated his
military functions in his favour, and the Secretary of War
had nothing more to do than to comply with his requisi
tions. Then, for the first time, the enormous armies of the
Union were manoeuvred in harmonious combination, and
the superior force was exerted to its full effect. Nor is it
less significant that during the most critical period of the
1862 campaign, the most glorious to the Confederacy, Lee
was Commander-in-Chief of the Southern armies. But
when Lee left Eichmond for the Northern border, Davis
once more assumed supreme control, retaining it untU it
was too late to stave off ruin.
Yet the Southern soldiers had never to complain of
such constant interference on the part of the Cabinet as
had the Northern ; and to Jackson it was due that each
Confederate general, with few exceptions, was henceforward
left unhampered in his own theatre of operations. His
threat of resignation at least effected this, and, although
the President still managed or mismanaged the grand
operations, the Secretary of War was muzzled.
It might be objected that in tbis instance Jackson
showed Uttle respect for the discipline he so rigidly en
forced, and that in the critical situation of the Confederacy

SYMPATHY OF VIRGINIA 209
bis action was a breach of duty wbich was almost dis
loyalty. Without doubt his resignation would have
seriously embarrassed the Government, To some degree at
least the confidence of both tbe people and the army in the
Administration would have become impaired. But Jackson
was fighting for a principle which was of even more im
portance than subordination. Foreseeing as he did the
certain results of civilian meddling, submission to the
Secretary's orders would have been no virtue. His presence
witb tbe army would hardly have counterbalanced the
untrammelled exercise of Mr, Benjamin's mUitary sagacity,
and the inevitable decay of disciphne. It was not the
course of a weak man, an apathetic man, or a selfish
man. We may imagine Jackson eating his heart out at
Lexington, while the war was raging on the frontier,
and the Stonewall Brigade was fighting manfully under
another leader against the hosts of the invader, Tbe
independence of his country was the most intense of all
his earthly desires ; and to leave the forefront of the fight
before tbat desire had been achieved would have been more
to bim than most. He would have sacrificed far more in
resigning than in remaiaing ; and there was always the
possibiUty tbat a brilliant success and tbe rapid termina
tion of tbe war would place Mr. Benjamin apparently in the
right. How would Jackson look then ? What would be the
reputation of the man who had quitted the army, on what
would have been considered a mere point of etiquette, in
the very heat of the campaign ? No ordinary man would
have faced the alternative, and have risked his reputation
in order to teach the rulers of his country a lesson which
might never reach them. It must be remembered, too,
tbat Jackson had not yet proved himself indispensable.
He had done good work at Manassas, but so had others.
His name was scarcely known beyond the confines of his
own State, and Virginia had several officers of higher repu
tation. His immediate superiors knew his value, but tbe
Confederate authorities, as their action proved, placed little
dependence on his judgment, and in all probability set no
special store upon his services. There was undoubtedly

210 STONEWALL JACKSON
every chance, had not Governor Letcher intervened, that
bis resignation would have been accepted. His letter then
to the Secretary of War was no mere threat, the outcome
of injured vanity, but the earnest and dehberate protest
of a man who was ready to sacrifice even his own good name
to benefit his country.
The negotiations which followed his application to
resign occupied some time. He remained at Winchester,
and the pleasant home where he and his wife had found
such kindly welcome was the scene of much discussion.
Governor Letcher was not alone in his endeavours to
alter his decision. Many were the letters that poured in.
From every class of Virginians, from public men and
private, came the same appeal. But untU he was convinced
that Virginia would suffer by his action, Jackson was deaf
to argument. He had not yet realised the measure of
confidence which he had won. To those who sought to
move him by saying that his country could not spare his
services, or by speaking of his hold upon the troops, he
repUed that they greatly overestimated his capacity for
usefulness, and that his place would readily be filled by a
better man. That many of his friends were deeply incensed
with the Secretary of War was only natural, and his conduct
was bitterly denounced. But Jackson not only forbore to
criticise, but in his presence aU criticism was forbidden.
There can be no doubt tbat he was deeply wounded. He
could be angry when he chose, and his anger was none the
less fierce because it was habitually controlled. He never
forgave Davis for his want of wisdom after Manassas ;
and indeed, in future campaigns, the President's action was
sufficient to exasperate the most patriotic of his generals.
But during this time of trouble not a word escaped Jackson
which showed those nearest him that his equanimity was
disturbed. Anticipating tbat he would be ordered to tbe
Military Institute, he was even delighted, says his wife, at
the prospect of returning home. The reason of his calm
ness is not far to seek. He had come to the determination
tbat it was his duty to resign, not, we may be certain,
without prayer and self-communing, and when Jackson

A PEACEFUL SEASON 311
saw what his duty was, aU other considerations were soon
dismissed. He was content to leave the future in higher
hands. It had been so with him when tbe question of
secession was first broached. ' It was soon after the election
of I860,' wrote one of his clerical friends, ' when the
country was beginning to heave in the agony of dissolution.
We had just risen from morning prayers in his own house,
where at that time I was a guest. Filled with gloom, I was
lamenting in strong language the condition and prospect
of our beloved country. " Why," said he, " should Christians
be disturbed about the dissolution of the Union ? It can only
come by God's permission, and wUl only be permitted if
for His people's good. I cannot see why we should be
distressed about such things, whatever be their conse
quence." '
For tbe next month the Stonewall Brigade and its
commander enjoyed a well-earned rest. Tbe Federals, on
Loring's withdrawal, contented themselves with holding
Eomney and Moorefield, and on Johnston's recommenda
tion Loring and part of his troops were transferred else
where. The enemy showed no intention of advancing.
The season was against them. The winter was abnormally
wet ; the Potomac was higher than it had been for twenty
years, and the Virginia roads had disappeared in mud.
In order to encourage re-enlistment amongst tbe men,
furloughs were liberally granted by tbe authorities at
Eichmond, and for a short season the din of arms was
unheard on the Shenandoah.
This peaceful time was one of unalloyed happiness to
Jackson. The country round Winchester — the gently roll
ing ridges, surmounted by groves of forest trees, the great
North Mountains to the westward, rising sharply from the
Valley, the cosy vUlages and comfortable farms, and, in tbe
clear blue distance to the south, the towering peaks of
the Massanuttons — is a picture not easUy forgotten. And
the little town, quiet and old-fashioned, witb its ample
gardens and red-brick pavements, is not unworthy of its
surroundiags. Up a narrow street, shaded by sUver maples,
stood the manse, not far from the headquarter offices ; and

212 STONEWALL JAOKSON
here when his daily work was done Jackson found tbe
happiness of a home, brightened by the winning ways and
attractive presence of his wife. With his host he had much
in common. They were members of the same church, and
neither yielded to the other in his high standard of
morality. The great bookcases of the manse were weU
stocked with appropriate literature, and the cultured
inteUect of Dr, Graham met more than half-way the
somewhat abstruse problems with which Jackson's power
ful brain delighted to wrestle.
But Jackson and his host, even had they been so
inclined, were not permitted to devote their whole leisure
to theological discussion. Children's laughter broke in
upon tbeir arguments. The young staff officers, with
the bright eyes of the Winchester ladies as a lure, found
a welcome by that hospitable hearth, and the war was not
so absorbiag a topic as to drive gaiety afield.
The sedate manse was like to lose its character.
There were times when the house overflowed with music
and with merriment, and sounds at which a Scotch
elder would have shuddered were heard far out in
the street. And the fun and frolic were not confined
to the more youthful members of the household. The
Stonewall Brigade would hardly have been surprised had
they seen tbeir general surrounded by ponderous volumes,
gravely investigating tbe teaching of departed commen
tators, or joining with quiet fervour in the family
devotions. But had they seen him running down the
stairs with an urchin on his shoulders, laughing like a
schoolboy, they would have refused to credit tbe evidence
of their senses.
So the months wore on. ' We spent,' says Mrs.
Jackson, 'as happy a winter as ever falls to the lot of
mortals upon earth.' But tbe brigade was not forgotten,
nor the enemy. Every day the Virginia regiments
improved in drill and discipline. The scouts were busy
on the border, and not a movement of tbe Federal forces
was unobserved. A vigilant watch was indeed necessary.
The snows bad melted and the roads were slowly

THE GENERAL SITUATION 213
drying. The Army of the Potomac, McClellan's great host,
numbering over 200,000 men, encamped around Washing
ton, hardly more than a day's march distant from Centre
viUe, threatened to overwhelm the 32,000 Confederates who
held the intrenchments at CentreviUe and Manassas Junc
tion. General Lander was dead, but Shields, a veteran of
the Mexican campaign, had succeeded him, and the force at
both Eomney and Frederick had been increased. In the
West things were gouig badly for the new Eepublic. The
Union troops had overrun Kentucky, Missouri, and the
greater part of Tennessee. A Confederate army had been
defeated ; Confederate forts captured ; and ' the amphibious
power ' of the North had already been effectively exerted.
Various towns on the Atlantic seaboard had been occupied.
Not one of the European Powers had evinced a decided
intention of espousing the Confederate cause, and the
blockade stiU exercised its relentless pressure.
It was not, however, until the end of February that
the great host beyond the Potomac showed symptoms of
approaching movement. But it had long been evident that
both Winchester and CentrevUle must soon be abandoned.
Johnston was as powerless before McCleUan as Jackson
before Banks. Even if by bringing fortification to their
aid they could hold their ground against the direct at
tack of far superior numbers, they could not prevent
their intrenchments being turned. McClellan had at
his disposal the naval resources of the North. It would
be no difficult task to transfer his army by the broad
reaches of the Potomac and the Chesapeake to some
point on tbe Virginia coast, and to intervene between
CentreviUe and Eichmond. At tbe same time the army of
Western Virginia, which was now under command of
General Fremont, might threaten Jackson in rear by moving
on Staunton from Beverley and the Great Kanawha, whUe
Banks assailed him in front.'
Johnston was already preparing to retreat. Jackson,
' Fortunately for the Confederates this army had been reduced to
18,000 men, and the want of transport, together with the condition of the
mountain roads, kept it stationary until the weather improved.
VOL. I. y

214 STONEWALL JACKSON
reluctant to abandon a single acre of his beloved Valley to
the enemy, was nevertheless constrained to face the possi-
bUities of such a course. His wife was sent back to her
father's home in the same train that conveyed his sick to
Staunton; baggage and stores were removed to Mount
Jackson, half-way up the Shenandoah Valley, and his little
army, which had now been increased to three brigades, or
4,600 men all told, was ordered to break up its camps,
38,000 Federals had gradually assembled between Frederick
and Eomney. Banks, who commanded the whole force,
was preparing to advance, and his outposts were already
established on the south bank of the Potomac,
But when the Confederate column filed through the
streets of Winchester, it moved not south but north.
Such was Jackson's idea of a retreat. To march
towards the enemy, not away from him ; to watch bis every
movement ; to impose upon him with a bold front ; to
delay him to the utmost ; and to take advantage of every
opportunity that might offer for offensive action.
Shortly before their departure the troops received a
reminder that their leader brooked no trifliag with orders.
Intoxicating liquors were forbidden in the Confederate
lines. But the regulation was systematicaUy evaded, and
the friends of the soldiers smuggled in supplies. When
this breach of disciphne was discovered, Jackson put a stop
to the traffic by an order which put the punishment on
tbe right shoulders. ' Every waggon that came into camp
was to be searched, and if any liquor were found it was to
be spUled out, and tbe waggon horses turned over to tbe
quartermaster for the pubhc service,' Nevertheless, when
they left Winchester, so Jackson wrote to his wife, the
troops were in excellent spirits, and their somewhat hypo
chondriacal general had never for years enjoyed more
perfect health — a blessing for which he had more reason
to be thankful than the Federals.

215

NOTE
The Evils of Cxvilun Control
It is well worth noticing that the interference of both the Union
and Confederate Cabinets was not confined to the movements and
location of the troops. The organisation of the armies was very
largely the work ofthe civilian authorities, and the advice of the soldiers
was very generaUy disregarded. The results, it need hardly be said,
were deplorable. The Northern wiseacres considered oavaby an
encumbrance and a staff a mere ornamental appendage. McCleUan,
in consequence, was always in difficulties for the want of mounted
regiments ; and whUe many regular officers were retained in the
command of batteries and companies, the important duties of the staff
had sometimes to be assigned to volunteers. 'The men too, at first, were
asked to serve for three months only ; that is, they were permitted to
take their discharge directly they had learned the rudiments of their
work. Again, instead of the ranis of the old regiments being fiUed up
as casualties occurred, the armies, despite McCleUan's protests, were
recruited by raw regiments, commanded by untrained officers.
Mr. Davis, knowing something of war, certainly showed more wisdom.
The organisation of the army of Northern Virginia was left, in great
measure, to General Lee ; so from the very first the Southerners had
sufficient cavalry and as good a staff as could be got together. The
soldiers, however, were only enUsted at first for twelve months ; yet
' Lee,' says Lord Wolseley, ' pleaded in favour of the engagement
being for the duration of the war, but he pleaded in vain ; ' and it
was not for many months that the politicians could be induced to
cancel the regulation under which the men elected their officers.
The President, too, while the markets of Europe were stiU open,
neglected to lay in a store of munitions of war : it was not till
May that an order was sent across the seas, and then only for 10,000
muskets 1 The commissariat department, moreover, was responsible to
the President and not to the commander of the armies ; this, perhaps,
was the worst fault of aU. It would seem impossible that such mistakes,
in an intelligent community, should be permitted to recur. Yet, in
face of the fact that only when the commanders have been given a free
hand, as was Marlborough in the Low Countries, or Wellington in the
Peninsula, has the English army been thoroughly efficient, the opinion
is not uncommon in England that members of Parliament and
journalists are far more capable of organising an army than even the
most experienced soldier.
Since the above was written the war with Spain has given further
proof of how readily even the most inteUigent of nations can forget the
lessons of the past. Q 2

218 STONEWALL JACKSON

CHAPTEE VIII
KBRNSTOWN
By the end of February & pontoon bridge had been
thrown across the Potomac at Harper's Ferry, and Banks
1862. had crossed to the Virginia shore. An army of
Feb. 27. 38,000 men, includmg 2,000 cavalry, and accom
panied by 80 pieces of artillery, threatened Winchester.
President Lincoln was anxious that the town should
be occupied. Banks believed that the opportunity was
favourable, ' The roads to Winchester,' he wrote, ' are
turnpikes and in tolerable condition. The enemy is weak,
demoralised, and depressed.'
But McCleUan, who held command of aU tbe Federal
forces, had no mind to expose even a detachment to
defeat. The main Confederate army at CentreviUe could,
at any moment, dispatch reuiforcements by raUway to
the Valley, reversing the strategic movement which had
won Bull Eun; while the Army of the Potomac, held
fast by the mud, could do nothing to prevent it. Banks
was therefore ordered to occupy the line Charlestown-
Martinsburg, some two-and-twenty miles from Winchester,
to cover the reconstruction of the Baltimore and Ohio
EaUroad, and to accumulate supplies preparatory to a fur
ther advance. The troops, however, did not approve such
cautious strategy. ' Their appetite for work,' according to
their commander, ' was very sharp,' Banks himself was
not less eager, ' If left to our own discretion,' he wrote
to McClellan's chief of staff, 'the general desire wiU be
to move early,'
On March 7 General D, H. HUl, acting under instruc
tions, feU back from Leesburg, and two days later Johnston,

STRAITS OF THE SOUTH 317
destroying the railways, abandoned CentrevUle. The Con
federate General-in-Chief had decided to withdraw to near
March 9 Grange Court House, trebling his distance from
Waslungton, and surrendering much territory, but
securing, in return, important strategical advantages. Pro
tected by the Eapidan, a stream unfordable in spring, he was
well placed to meet a Federal advance, and also, by a rapid
march, to anticipate any force which might be transported
by water and landed close to Eichmond,
Jackson was now left isolated in the Valley. The
nearest Confederate infantry were at Culpeper Court
House, beyond the Blue Eidge, nearly sixty miles
south-east. In his front, within two easy marches, was
an army just seven times his strength, at Eomney another
detachment of several thousand men, and a large force
in the AUeghanies. He was in no hurry, however, to
abandon Winchester.
Johnston had intended that when the main army fell
back towards Eichmond his detachments should follow
suit. Jackson found a loophole in his instructions which
gave him full Uberty of action.
' I greatly desire,' he wrote to Johnston on March 8, ' to
hold this place [Winchester] so far as may be consistent with
your views and plans, and am making arrangements, by con-
structiag works, &c,,to make a stand. Though you desired
me some time since to fall back in the event of yourself and
General HUl's doing so, yet in your letter of the 5th inst,
you say, " Delay the enemy as long as you can ; " I have
felt justified in remaining here for the present,
' And now. General, that Hill has faUen back, can you
not send him over here ? I greatly need such an officer ;
one who can be sent off as occasion may offer against an
exposed detachment of the enemy for the purpose of cap
turing it, ... I believe that if you can spare HUl, and let
him move here at once, you wUl never have occasion to
regret it. The very idea of reinforcements coming to Win
chester would, I think, be a damper to the enemy, in
addition to the fine effect that would be produced on our
own troops, already in fine spirits. But if you cannot spare

218 STONEWALL JACKSON
HUl, can you not send me some other troops? If we
cannot be successful ia defeating the enemy should he
advance, a kind Providence may enable us to inflict a
terrible wound and effect a safe retreat in the event of
having to faU back, I wiU keep myself on tbe alert witb
respect to communications between us, so as to be able to
join you at the earliest possible moment, if such a move
ment becomes necessary,' '
This letter is characteristic. When Jackson asked for
reinforcements the cause of the South seemed weU-nigh
hopeless. Her Western armies were retiring, defeated and
demoralised. Several of her Atlantic towns had faUen to
the Federal navy, assisted by strong landing parties. The
army on which she depended for the defence of Eichmond,
yielding to the irresistible presence of far superior numbers,
was retreating into the interior of Virginia, There was not the
faintest sign of help from beyond the sea. The opportunity
for a great counterstroke had been suffered to escape. Her
forces were too smaU for aught but defensive action, and it
was difficult to conceive that she could hold her own agaiast
McCleUan's magnificently appointed host, ' Events,' said
Davis at this time, ' have cast on our arms and hopes the
gloomiest shadows.' But from the Valley, the northern out
post of the Confederate armies, where the danger was most
threatening and the means of defence the most inadequate,
came not a whisper of apprehension. The troops that held
the border were but a handful, but Jackson knew enough of
war to be aware that victory does not always side with the
big battalions. Neither Johnston nor Davis bad yet recog
nised, as he did, the weak joint in the Federal harness. Why
should the appearance of HiU's brigade at Winchester dis
courage Banks ? Johnston had fallen back to the Eapidan,
and there was now no fear of the Confederates detaching troops
suddenly from Manassas. Why should the bare idea that
reinforcements were coming up embarrass the Federals ?
The letter itself does not indeed supply a definite
answer. Jackson was always most guarded in his corre
spondence; and, if he could possibly avoid it, he never
> o. E., vol. v., p. 1094.

HIS ORDERS 219
made the slightest allusion to tbe information on which his
plans were based. His staff officers, however, after the
campaign was over, were generaUy enlightened as to the
motive of his actions, and we are thus enabled to fill the
gap,* Jackson demanded reinforcements for the one reason
that a blow struck near Winchester would cause alarm in
Washiagton. The communications of the Federal capital
with both tbe North and West passed through or close to
Harper's Ferry ; and the passage over the Potomac, which
Banks was now covering, was thus the most sensitive point
in the invader's front, WeU aware, as indeed was every
statesman and every general in Virginia, of the state of
public feeling ui the North, Jackson saw with more insight
than others the effect that was likely to be produced should
the Government, the press, and the people of tbe Federal
States have reason to apprehend that the capital of the
Union was in danger.
If the idea of playing on the fears of his opponents by
means of the weak detachment under Jackson ever suggested
itself to Johnston, he may be forgiven if he dismissed it as
chimerical. For 7,600 men ^ to threaten with any useful
result a capital which was defended by 250,000 seemed
hardly within the bounds of practical strategy. Johnston
had nevertheless determined to turn the situation to
account. In order to protect the passages of the Upper
Potomac, McCleUan had been compeUed to disseminate his
army. Between his main body south of Washington and
his right wing under Banks was a gap of fifty mUes, and
this separation Johnston was determined should be main
tained. The President, to whom he had referred Jackson's
letter, was unable to spare the reinforcements therein
requested, and the defence of the VaUey was left to
the 4,600 men encamped at Winchester, Jackson was per
mitted to use his own judgment as to his own position, but
something more was required of him than the mere protec
tion of a tract of territory, ' He was to endeavour to employ
the iavaders in the VaUey without exposing himself to the
1 Letter from Major Hotchkiss to the author,
» Jaokson, 4,600 ; HiU, 3,000.

820 STONEWALL JACKSON
danger of defeat, by keeping so near the enemy as to pre
vent his making any considerable detachment to reinforce
McClellan, but not so near that he might be compeUed to
fight,' >
To carry out these instructions Jackson had at his dis
posal 3,600 iafantry, 600 cavalry, and six batteries of 27
guns. Fortunately, they were all Virginians, with the excep
tion of one battalion, the First, which was composed of Irish
navvies. This force, which had now received the title of the
Army of the Valley, was organised in three brigades : —

First Brigade (' StonewaU ') ;
Brigadier-General Garnett

Second Brigade ; Col. Burks

2nd Virginia Regiment
4th „ „
5th „ „
27th33rd „ „
2lBt42nd „ „
48th 1st Regular Battalion (Irish)

Third Brigade : Col. PuUcerson |gjj ^^§J°'* Regiment
McLaughlin's Battery , . . . 8 guns
Waters' „ .... 4 „
Carpenter's „ .... 4 „
Marye's „ .... 4 „
Shumaker's „ , . . , 4 „
Ashby's Regiment of Cavalry
Chew's Horse-ArtUlery Battery . , , 8 „
The infantry were by this time fairly well armed and
equipped, but the field-pieces were mostly smoothbores of
small calibre. Of the quality of the troops Bull Eun had
been sufficient test. Side by side with the sons of the old
Virginia houses the hunters and yeomen of the VaUey had
proved their worth. Their skUl as marksmen had stood
them in good stead. Men who had been used from boyhood
to shoot squirrels in the woodland found the Federal soldier
a target difficult to miss. Skirmishing and patrolling came
instinctively to those who had stalked the deer and the bear
in the mountain forests ; and the simple hardy life of an
• Johnston's Na/rratme.

THE VALLEY SOLDIERS 221
agricultural community was the best probation for the
trials of a campaign. The lack of discipline and of com
petent regimental officers might have placed them at a dis
advantage had they been opposed to regulars ; but they were
already half-broken to the soldier's trade before they joined
the ranks. They were no strangers to camp and bivouac,
to perU and adventure ; tbeir hands could guard their
heads. Quick sight and steady nerve, unfaUing vigilance
and instant resolve, the very qualities which their devotion
to field-sports fostered, were those which had so often pre
vaUed in the war of the Eevolution over the mechanical
tactics of weU-disciplined battaUons ; and on ground with
which they were perfectly familiar the men of the Shenan
doah were formidable indeed.
They were essentiaUy rough and ready. Their appear
ance would hardly have captivated a martinet. The eye
that lingers lovingly on glittering buttons and spotless
belts would have turned away in disdain from Jackson's
soldiers. There was nothing bright about them but tbeir
rifles. They were as badly dressed, and with as little regard
for uniformity, as the defenders of Torres Vedras or the
Army of Italy in 1796. Like Wellington and Napoleon, the
Confederate generals cared very little what their soldiers
wore so long as they did tbeir duty. Least of aU can one
imagine Stonewall Jackson exercising his mind as to the
cut of a tunic or the polish of a buckle. The only standing
order in tbe English army of the Peninsula which referred
to dress forbade the wearing of the enemy's uniform. It
was the same in the Army of the Valley, although at a later
period even this order was of necessity ignored. As their
forefathers of the Eevolution took post in Washington's
ranks clad in hunting shirts and leggings, so the Confede
rate soldiers preferred the garments spun by theirown women
to those supplied them by the State. Grey, of all shades,
from light blue to butter-nut, was the universal colour.
The coatee issued in the early days of the war had already
given place to a short-waisted and single-breasted jacket.
The blue Mpi held out longer. The soft felt hat which ex
perience soon proved the most serviceable head-dress had

222 STONEWAJiL JACKSON
not yet become universal. But the long boots had gone ;
and strong brogans, with broad soles and low heels, had
been found more comfortable. Overcoats were soon dis
carded. ^ ' The men came to the conclusion that the trouble
of carrying them on hot days outweighed their comfort
when the cold day arrived. Besides, they found that Ufe in
the open air hardened them to such an extent that changes
in temperature were hardly felt.' ' Nor did the knapsack
long survive. ' It was fotmd to gaU the back and shoulders
and weary tbe man before half the march was accompUshed,
It did not pay to carry around clean clothes while waiting for
tbe time to use them,' ^ But the men stUl clung to theii
blankets and waterproof sheets, worn in a roll over the left
shoulder, and the indispensable haversack carried their
whole kit. Tents — except the enemy's — were rarely seen.
The Army of the VaUey generally bivouacked in the woods,
the men sleeping in pairs, rolled in their blankets and rubber
sheets. The cooking arrangements were primitive. A few
frying-pans and skUlets formed the culinary apparatus of a
company, with a bucket or two in addition, and the frying-
pans were generally carried with their handles stuck in the
rifle-barrels ! The tooth-brush was a button-hole ornament,
and if, as was sometimes the case, three days' rations were
served out at a siagle issue, the men usually cooked and ate
them at once, so as to avoid the labour of carrying them.
Such was Jackson's infantry, a sorry contrast indeed to
the soldierly array of the Federals, with their complete
appoiatments and trim blue uniforms. But ' fine feathers,'
though tbey may have their use, are hardly essential to
efficiency in the field ; and whUst it is absolutely true that
no soldiers ever marched with less to encumber them than
the Confederates, it is no empty boast that 'none ever
marched faster or held out longer,'
If the artUlery, with a most inferior equipment, was
less efficient than the infantry, the cavalry was an in
valuable auxiUary, Ashby was the heau-idecd of a captam
of light-horse. His reckless daring, both across-country
and under fire, made him the idol of the army. Nor was
' Soldier Life in the Army of Northern Virginia, chap. ii. * Ibid.

ASHBY 328
his reputation confined to the Confederate ranks. ' I think
even our men,' says a Federal officer, ' had a kind of admi
ration for him, as he sat unmoved upon his horse, and let
them pepper away at him as if he enjoyed it.' His one
shortcoming was his ignorance of drUl and discipline.
But in the spring of 1862 these deficiencies were in a fair
way of being rectified. He had already learned something
of tactics. In command of a few hundred mounted rifle
men and a section of horse-artUlery he was unsurpassed ;
and if his men were apt to get out of hand in battle, his
personal activity ensured their strict attention on the out
posts. He thought little of riding seventy or eighty mUes
within the day along his picket line, and it is said that he
first recommended himself to Jackson by visitiog the Federal
camps disguised as a horse doctor. Jackson placed much
dependence on his mounted troops. Immediately he arrived
in the VaUey he established his cavalry outposts far to
the front. WhUe the infantry were reposing in their
camps near Winchester, the south bank of the Potomac,
forty mUes northward, was closely and incessantly patrolled.
The squadrons never lacked recruits. Witb the horse-
loving Virginians the cavalry was the favourite arm, and the
strength of the regiments was only Umited by the difficulty
of obtaining horses. To the sons of the Valley planters and
farmers Ashby's ranks offered a most attractive career. The
discipline was easy, and there was no time for drill. But of
excitement and adventure there was enough and to spare.
Scarcely a day passed without shots being exchanged at one
point or another of the picket line. There were the enemy's
outposts to be harassed, prisoners to be taken, bridges to be
burnt, and convoys to be captured. Many were the oppor
tunities for distinction. Jackson demanded something more
from his cavalry than merely guarding the frontier. It was
not sufficient for him to receive warning that the enemy was
advancing. He wanted information from which he could
deduce what he intended doing ; information of the strength
of his garrisons, of the dispositions of his camps, of every
movement which took place beyond the river. The cavalry
had other and more dangerous duties than vedette and

224 STONEWALL JAOKSON
escort. To penetrate the enemy's lines, to approach hia
camps, and observe his columns — these were the tasks of
Ashby's riders, and in these they were unrivalled. Many of
them were no more than boys ; but their qualifications for
such a Ufe were undeniable. A more gaUant or high-
spirited body of young soldiers never welcomed the ' boot
and saddle.' Their horses were their own, scions of
good Virginian stock, with the blood of many a well-
known sire — EcUpse, Brighteyes, and Timoleon — in their
veins, and they knew how to care for them. They were
acquainted with every country lane and woodland tract.
They had friends in every village, and their names were
known to every farmer. The night was no hindrance to
them, even in the region of the mountain and the forest.
The hunter's paths were as famiUar to them as the turnpike
roads. They knew the depth and direction of every ford,
and could predict the effect of the weather on stream and
track. More admirable material for the service of intel
Ugence could not possibly have been found, and Ashby's
audacity in reconnaissance found ready imitators. A
generous rivalry in deeds of daring spread through the com
mand. Bold enterprises were succeeded by others yet more
bold, and, to use the words of a gentleman who, although he
was a veteran of four years' service, was but nineteen years
of age when Eichmond feU, ' We thought no more of riding
through the enemy's bivouacs than of riding round our
fathers' farms.' So congenial were the duties of the cavalry,
so attractive the Ufe and the associations, that it was no
rare thing for a Virginia gentleman to resign a commission
in another arm in order to join his friends and kinsmen as a
private in Ashby's ranks. And so before the war had been
in progress for many months the fame of the Virginia
cavalry rivalled that of their Eevolutionary forbears under
•Light-Horse Harry,' the friend of Washington and tbe
father of Lee.
But if the raw material of Jackson's army was aU that
could be desired, no less so was the material of the force
opposed to him. The regiments of Banks' army corps
were recruited as a rule in the Western States ; Ohio,

GENERAL BANKS 226
Indiana, and West Virginia furnished the majority. They
too were hunters and farmers, accustomed to firearms,
and skiUed in woodcraft. No hardier infantry marched
beneath the Stars and Stripes ; the artUlery, armed with
a proportion of rifled guns, was more efficient than that
of the Confederates ; and in cavalry alone were the Federals
overmatched. In numbers the latter were far superior to
Ashby's squadrons ; in everything else they were im
measurably inferior, [Throughout the North horseman
ship was practicaUy an unknown art. The gentlemen of
New England had not inherited the love of their Ironside
ancestors for the saddle and the chase. Even in the forests
of the West men travelled by waggon and hunted on foot.
• As cavalry,' says one of Banks' brigadiers, ' Ashby's men
were greatly superior to ours. In reply to some orders I
had given, my cavalry commander repUed, " I can't catch
them, sir ; they leap fences and walls like deer ; neither
our men nor our horses are so trained," ' '
It was easy enough to fill the ranks of the Northern
squadrons. Men volunteered freely for what they deemed
the more dashing branch of the service, ignorant that its
duties were far harder both to learn and to execute than
those of the other arms, and expecting, says a Federal
officer, that the regiment would be accompanied by an
itinerant Uvery stable ! Both horses and men were recruited
without the sUghtest reference to their fitness for cavalry
work. No man was rejected, no matter what his size or
weight, no matter whether he had ever had anything to do
with horseflesh or not, and consequently the proportion of
sick horses was enormous. Moreover, while the Southern
troopers generally carried a firearm, either rifle or shot-gun,
some of the Northern squadrons had only the sabre, and in a
wooded country the firearm was master of the situation.
During the first two years of tbe war, therefore, the Federal
cavalry, generally speaking, were bad riders and worse horse-
masters, unable to move except upon the roads, and as
inefficient on reconnaissance as in action. For an invading
army, information, ample and accurate, is the first requisite.
> Brook Farm to Cedar Mountain, General G. E. Gordon, p. 136.

226 STONEWALL JACKSON
Operating in a country which, almost invariably, must be
better known to the defenders, bold scouting alone wiU
secure it from ambush and surprise. Bold scouting was
impossible with such mounted troops as Banks possessed,
and throughout the VaUey campaign the Northern general
was simply groping in the dark.
But even had bis cavalry been more efficient, it is doubt
ful whether Banks would have profited. His appointment
was political. He was an ardent Abolitionist, but he knew
nothing whatever of soldiering. He had begun life as a hand
in a cotton factory. By dint of energy and good brains his
rise had been rapid ; and although, when the war broke
out, he was still a young man, he had been Governor of
Massachusetts and Speaker of the House of Eepresentatives.
What the President expected when he gave him an army
corps it is difficult to divine ; what might have been
expected any soldier could have told him. To gratify
an individual, or perhaps to concUiate a political faction, the
Ufe of many a private soldier was sacrificed. Lincoln, it is
true, was by no means solitary in the unwisdom of his selec
tions for command. His rival in Eichmond, it is said, had
a fatal penchoMt for his first wife's relations ; his political
supporters were constantly rewarded by appointments in the
field, and the worst disasters that befell the Confederacy
were due, in great part, to the blunders of officers promoted
for any other reason than efficiency. For Mr. Davis there
was Uttle excuse. He had been educated at West Point,
He had served in the regular army of the United States,
and had been Secretary of War at Washington. Lincoln, on
the other hand, knew nothiag of war, beyond what be had
learned in a horder skirmish, and very little of general
history. He had not yet got rid of the common Anglo-
Saxon idea tbat a man who has pluck and muscle is
already a good soldier, and that the same quahties
which serve ui a street-brawl are aU that is necessary
to make a general. Nor were historical precedents
wanting for the mistakes of the American statesmen.
In both the Peninsula and the Crimea, Uves, treasure,
and prestige were as recklessly wasted as in Virgiaia ; and

JACKSON AND BANKS 227
staff officers who owed their positions to social influence
alone, generals, useless and ignorant, who succeeded to
responsible command by virtue of seniority and a long
purse, were the standing curse of the EngUsh army. At the
same time, it may weU be questioned whether some of the
regular officers would have done better than Banks, He was
no fool, and if he had not studied the art of war, there have
been barrack-square generals who have showed as much
ignorance without one-quarter his ability. Natural common-
sense has often a better chance of success than a rusty braia,
and a mind narrowed by routine. After serving in twenty
campaigns Frederick the Great's mules were stUl mules.
On this very theatre of war, in tbe forests beyond Eomney,
an English general had led a detachment of English soldiers
to a defeat as crushing as it was disgraceful, and Braddock
was a veteran of many wars. Here, too, Patterson, an officer
of Volunteers who had seen much service, had allowed
Johnston to sUp away and join Beauregard on Bull Eun.
The Northern people, in good truth, had as yet no reason to
place imphcit confidence in the leading of trained soldiers.
They had yet to learn that mere length of service is no test
whatever of capacity for command, and that character forti
fied by knowledge is the only charm which attracts success.
Jackson had already some acquaintance with Banks.
During the Eomney expedition the latter had been posted
at Frederick with 16,000 men, and a more enterprising
commander would at least have endeavoured to thwart the
Confederate movements. Banks, supine in his camps,
made neither threat nor demonstration. Throughout the
winter, Ashby's troopers had ridden unmolested along the
bank of the Potomac. Lander alone had worried the Con
federate outposts, driven in their advanced detachments,
and drawn supphes from the Virginian farms. Banks had
been over-cautious and inactive, and Jackson bad not
faUed to note his characteristics.
Up to March 9 the Federal general, keeping his cavalry
in rear, had pushed forward no farther than Charlestown
March 9. ^^^ Bunker Hill, On that day the news reached
McClellan that the Confederates were preparing

228 STONEWALL JAOKSON
to abandon CentrevUle, He at once determined to push
forward his whole army. Banks was instructed to
March 12. ^^q^q q^ Wiachester, and on the morning of the
12th his leading division occupied the town,
Jackson had withdrawn the previous evening. Twice,
on March 7 and again on the 11th, he had offered battle.'
His men had remained under arms all day ia the hope
that the enemy's advanced-guard might be tempted to
attack. But the activity of Ashby's cavalry, and the bold
ness with which Jackson maintained his position, impressed
his adversary with the conviction that the Confederate
force was much greater than it really was. It was reported
in the Federal camps that the enemy's strength was from
7,000 to 11,000 men, and that the town was fortified,
Jackson's force did not amount to half that number, and,
according to a Northern officer, ' one could have jumped
over his intrenchments as easUy as Eemus over the walls
of Eome,' Jackson abandoned Winchester with extreme reluctance.
Besides being the principal town in tbat section of the Valley,
it was strategicaUy important to the enemy. Good roads
led in every direction, and communication was easy with
Eomney and Cumberland to the north-west, and with
Washington and Manassas to the south-east. Placed at
Winchester, Banks could support, or be supported by, tbe
troops in West Virgiaia or the army south of Washington.
A large and fertile district would thus be severed from tbe
Confederacy, and the line of invasion across tbe Upper
Potomac completely blocked. Overwhelming as was the
strength of the Union force, exceeding his own by more
than eight to one, great as was the caution of the Federal
leader, it was only an unlucky accident that restrained
Jackson from a resolute endeavour to at least postpone
the capture of the town. He had failed to induce the
' Major Harman, of Jackson's stafl, writing to his brother on March 6,
says : * The general told me last night that the Yankees had 17,000 men
at the two points, Charlestown and Bunker HUl.' Ou March 8 he writes;
' 3,000 effective men is about the number of General Jackson's force. The
sick, those on furlough, and the deserters from the mUitia, reduce him tc
about that number.' — MS.

HIS FIRST AND LAST COUNCIL OF WAR 229
enemy's advanced guard to attack him in position. To
attack himself, in broad daylight, with such vast dispro
portion of numbers, was out of the question. His resources,
however, were not exhausted. After dark on tbe 12th,
when his troops had left the town, he called a council, con
sisting of General Garnett and the regimental commanders
of the StonewaU Brigade, and proposed a night attack on the
Federal advance. When the troops had eaten their supper
and rested for some hours, they were to march to the
neighbourhood of the enemy, some four mUes north of
Winchester, and make the attack before dayUght, The
Federal troops were raw and inexperienced. Prestige was
on the side of the Confederates, and their moral was high.
The darkness, the suddenness and energy of the attack,
the lack of driU and discipline, would all tend to throw
the enemy into confusion ; and ' by the vigorous use of the
bayonet, and the blessing of divine Providence,' Jackson
believed that he would win a signal victory. In the
meantime, whilst the councU was assembling, he went off,
booted and spurred, to make a hasty call on Dr. Graham,
whose famUy he found oppressed with the gloom that over
spread the whole town. ' He was so buoyant and hopeful
himself that their drooping spirits were revived, and after
engaging with them in famUy worship, he retired, departing
with a cheerful "Good evening," merely sayiag that he
intended to dine with them the next day as usual.'
Wben the councU met, however, it was found that some
one had blundered. The staff had been at fault. The
general had ordered his trains to be parked immediately
south of Winchester, but they had been taken by those in
charge to Kernstown and Newtown, from three to eight
mUes distant, and the troops had been marched back to
them to get their rations,
Jackson learned for the first time, when he met his
officers, that his brigades, instead of being on the outskirts
of Winchester, were already five or six miles away. A
march of ten mUes would thus be needed to bring them
into contact with the enemy. This fact and the disapproval
of the council caused him to abandon his project.
VOL. I. E

230 STONEWALL JACKSON
Before following his troops he once more went back
to Dr. Graham's, His cheerful demeanour during his
previous visit, although he had been as reticent as ever as
to his plans, had produced a false impression, and this he
thought it his duty to correct. He explained his plans to
his friend, and as he detailed the facts which had induced
him to change them, he repeatedly expressed his reluctance
to give up Winchester without a blow, ' With slow and
desperate earnestness he said, " Let me think — can I not
yet carry my plan into execution ? " As he uttered these
words he grasped the hUt of his sword, and the fierce Ught
that blazed in his eyes revealed to his companion a new
man. The next moment he dropped his head and released
his sword, witb the words, " No, I must not do it ; it may
cost the lives of too many brave men. I must retreat and
wait for a better time." ' He had learned a lesson. ' Late
in the evening,' says the medical director of the Valley
army, ' we withdrew from Winchester. I rode with the
general as we left the place, and as we reached a high point
overlooking the town we both turned to look at Winchester,
now left to the mercy of the Federal soldiers. I think that
a man may sometimes yield to overwhelming emotion, and
I was utterly overcome by the fact that I was leaving aU
that I held dear on earth ; but my emotion was arrested
by one look at Jackson, His face was fairly blazuig with
the fire of wrath that was burning in him, and I felt awed
before him. Presently he cried out, in a tone almost
savage, " That is the last councU of war I wiU ever hold ! " '
On leaving Wiachester Jackson fell back to Strasburg,
eighteen mUes south. There was no immediate pursuit.
Banks, in accordance with his instruetions, occupied the
March 18 *°^^' ^^^ awaited further orders. These came on
the 18th,' and Shields' division of 11,000 men witb
27 guns was at once pushed on to Strasburg. Jackson had
already withdrawn, hoping to draw Banks up the Valley,
and was now encamped near Mount Jackson, a strong
position twenty-five mUes further south, the indefatigable
Ashby still skirmishing with the enemy. The unusual
' 0. B., vol. xii., part i., p. 164.

MCCLELLAN'S INACTION 281
audacity which prompted the Federal advance was probably
due to the fact that the exact strength of the Confederate
force had been ascertained in Winchester. At aU events,
all apprehension of attack had vanished. Jackson's 4,500
men were considered a quantity nigligeaUe, a mere corps of
observation ; and not only was Shields sent forward without
support, but a large portion of Banks' corps was ordered to
another field. Its rdle as an independent force had ceased.
Its movements were henceforward to be subordinate to those
of tbe main army, and McClellan designed to bring it into
closer connection with his advance on Eichmond. How his
design was frustrated, how he struggled in vain to correct
the original dissemination of his forces, how his right wing
was held ia a vice by Jackson, and how his initial errors
eventuaUy ruined his campaign, is a strategical lesson of
the highest import.
From the day McCleUan took command the Army of
the Potomac had done practically nothing. Throughout
the winter troops had poured into Washington at the rate
of 40,000 a month. At the end of December there were
148,000 men fit for duty. On March 20 the grand aggre
gate was 240,000.' But during the winter no important
enterprise had been undertaken. The colours of the
rebels were stUl flaunting within sight of the forts of
Washington, and the mouth of the Potomac was securely
closed by Confederate batteries. With a mighty army at
their service it is little wonder that the North became
restive and reproached their general. It is doubtless
true that the first thing needful was organisation. To
discipline and consolidate the army so as to make success
assured was unquestionably the wiser policy. The im
patience of a sovereign people, ignorant of war, is not to
be lightly yielded to. At the same time, the desire of a
nation cannot be altogether disregarded, A general who
obstinately refuses to place himself in accord with the
political situation forfeits the confidence of his employers
and the cordial support of the Administration. The cry
throughout the North was for action. The President took
¦ 0. B., vol. zi., part iii., p, 26, B 2

232 STONEWALL JACKSON
it upon himself to issue a series of orders. The army was
ordered to advance on February 22, a date chosen because
it was Washington's birthday, just as the third and most
disastrous assault on Plevna was delivered on the ' name-
day ' of the Czar. McCleUan secured delay. His plans
were not yet ripe. The Virginia roads were stUl impassable.
The season was not yet sufficiently advanced for active
operations, and that his objections were well founded it is
impossible to deny. The prospect of success depended
much upon the weather. Virginia, covered ia many places
with dense forests, crossed by many rivers, and with most
indifferent communications, is a most difficult theatre of
war, and the amenities of the Virginian spring are not to
be lightly faced. Napoleon's fifth element, 'mud,' is a
most disturbing factor La mUitary calculations. It is related
that a Federal officer, sent out to reconnoitre a road in a
certain district of Virginia, reported that the road was there,
but that he guessed ' the bottom had faUen out.' Moreover,
McClellan had reason to believe that the Confederate army
at Manassas was more than double its actual strength. His
intelligence department, controUed, not by a trained staff
officer, but by a well-known detective, estimated Johnston's
force at 115,000 men. In reality, including the detachment
on the Shenandoah, it at no time exceeded 50,000. But for
all this there was no reason whatever for absolute inactivity.
The capture of the batteries which barred the entrance to
the Potomac, the defeat of the Confederate detachments
along the river, the occupation of Winchester or of Lees
burg, were all feasible operations. By such means the
impatience of the Northern people might have been
assuaged. A few successes, even on a small scale, would
have raised the moral of the troops and have trained them
to offensive movements. The general would have retained
the confidence of the Administration, and have secured the
respect of his opponents. Jackson had set him the example.
His winter expeditions had borne fruit. The Federal
generals opposed to him gave him full credit for activity,
' Much dissatisfaction was expressed by the troops,' says
one of Banks' brigadiers, ' that Jackson was permitted to

WASHINGTON 233
get away from Winchester without a fight, and but little
heed was paid to my assurances that this chieftain would
be apt, before the war closed, to give us an entertainment
up to the utmost of our aspirations.' '
It was not only of McClellan's inactivity tbat the
Government complained. At the end of February he sub
mitted a plan of operations to the President, and with that
plan Mr, Lincoln totally disagreed, McCleUan, basing
his project on the supposition that Johnston had 100,000
men behind formidable intrenchments at Manassas, block
ing the road to Eichmond, proposed to transfer 150,000
men to the Virginia coast by sea ; and landing either at
Urbanna on tbe Eappahannock, or at Fortress Monroe
on the Yorktown peninsula, to intervene between the
Confederate army and Eichmond, and possibly to capture
the Southern capital before Johnston could get back to
save it.
The plan at first sight seemed promising. But in
Lincoln's eyes it had this great defect : during tbe time
McClellan was moving round by water and disembarking
his troops — and this, so few were the transports, would take
at least a month — Johnston might make a dash at Washing
ton. The city had been fortified, A cordon of detached
forts surrounded it on a circumference of thirty miles. The
Potomac formed an additional protection. But a cordon
of isolated earthworks does not appeal as an effective
barrier to the civUian mind, and above Point of Eocks the
great river was easy of passage. Even if Washington were
absolutely safe from a coup de main, Lincoln had stiU good
reason for apprehension. The Union capital was merely
the seat of government. It bad no commercial interests.
With a population of but 20,000, it was of no more practical
importance than Windsor or VersaUles. Compared with
New York, Pittsburg, or Philadelphia, it was Uttle more
than a vUlage, But, in the regard of the Northern people,
Washington was the centre of the Union, the keystone of
the national existence. The Capitol, the White House, the
Treasury, were symbols as sacred to the States as the colours
' General G. H. Gordon.

284 STONEWALL JAOKSON
to a regiment.' If the nation was set upon the fall of Eich
mond, it was at least as solicitous for the security of its own
chief city, and an administration that permitted that security
to be endangered would have been compelled to bow to the
popular clamour. The extraordinary taxation demanded
by the war already pressed heavUy on the people. Stocks
were falling rapidly, and the financial situation was almost
critical. It is probable, too, that a blow at Washington
would have done more than destroy all confidence in the
Government, England and Prance were chafing under the
effects of the blockade. The marts of Europe were hungry
for cotton. There was much sympathy beyond seas with
the seceded States ; and, should Washington faU, the South,
in all likelihood, would be recognised as an independent
nation. Even if the Great Powers were to refuse her active
aid in the shape of fieets and armies, she would at least
have access to the money markets of the world ; and it
was possible that neither England nor France would endure
the closing of her ports. With the breaking of tbe blockade,
money, munitions, and perhaps recruits, would be poured
into the Confederacy, and the difficulty of reconquest would
be trebled. The dread of foreign interference was, therefore,
very real; and Liacoln, foreseeing the panic that would
shake the nation should a Confederate army cross the
Potomac at Harper's Ferry or Point of Eocks, was quite
justified in insisting on the security of Washington being
placed beyond a doubt. He knew, as also did Jackson,
that even a mere demonstration against so vital a point
might have the most deplorable effect. Whatever Une of
invasion, he asked, might be adopted, let it be one that
would cover Washiagton.
Lincoln's remonstrances, however, had no great weight
with McCleUan. The general paid little heed to the political
situation. His chief argument in favour of the expedition by
sea had been the strength of the fortifications at Manassas.
Johnston's retreat on March 9 removed this obstacle from
' For an interesting exposition of the views of the soldiers at Washington,
see evidence of General Hitchcock, U.S.A., acting as Military Adviser to the
President, 0. B., vol. zii., part i., p. 221.

BANKS LEAVES THE VALLEY 235
his path ; but although he immediately marched his whole
army in pursuit, he stUl remained constant to his favourite
idea. The road to Eichmond from Washington involved
a march of one hundred mUes, over a difficult country,
with a single raUway as the line of supply. The route
from the coast, although little shorter, was certainly
easier. Fortress Monroe had remained in Federal hands.
Landing under the shelter of its guns, he would push for
ward, aided by the navy, to West Point, the terminus of the
York Eiver EaUroad, within thirty mUes of Eichmond, trans
porting his supplies by water. Washington, with the gar
rison he would leave behind, would in his opinion be quite
secure. The Confederates would be compelled to concentrate
for the defence of their capital, and a resolute endeavour
on their part to cross the Potomac was forbidden by every
rule of strategy. Had not Johnston, in his retreat, burnt
the raUway bridges ? Could there be a surer indication
that he had no intention of returning ?
Such was McClellan's reasoning, and, putting politics
aside, it was perfectly sound, Liacoln reluctantly yielded,
and on March 17 the Army of the Potomac, withdrawing
by successive divisions from CentrevUle to Alexandria,
began its embarkation for the Peninsula, the region, in
McCleUan's words, ' of sandy roads and short land trans
portation,'' The vessels assembled at Alexandria could
only carry 10,000 men, thus involving at least fifteen
voyages to and fro. Yet the Commander-in-Chief was full
of confidence. To the little force in the Shenandoah VaUey,
flying southward before Shields, he gave no thought. It
would have been nothing short of miraculous had he even
suspected tbat 4,500 men, under a professor of the higher
mathematics, might bring to naught the operations of his
gigantic host. Jackson was not even to be followed. Of
Banks' three divisions. Shields', Sedgwick's, and WUliams',
that of Shields alone was considered sufficient to protect
Harper's Ferry, the Baltimore and Ohio EaUway, and the
Chesapeake Canal,^ Banks, with the remainder of his army,
was to move at once to Manassas, and cover the approaches
' O. B., vol. xi., part iii., p. 7. ' Ibid., p. 11.

236 STONEWALL JACKSON
to Washington east of the Blue Eidge. Sedgwick had
already been detached to join McCleUan ; and on March 20
WUUams' division began its march towards Manassas, while
Shields feU back on Winchester.
On the evening of the 21st Ashby reported to Jackson
that the enemy was retreating, and iaformation came to
March 21. hand that a long train of waggons, containing
the baggage of 12,000 men, had left Winchester
for Castleman's Ferry on the Shenandoah, Further reports
indicated that Banks'whole force was moving eastward, and
Jackson, ia accordance with his instructions to hold tbe
enemy in the VaUey, at once pushed northward,' On the
March 22 22nd, Ashby, with 280 troopers and 8 horse-
artillery guns, struck Shields' pickets about a mUe
south of Winchester. A skirmish ensued, and the presence
of infantry, a battery, and some cavalry, was ascertained.
Shields, who was wounded during the engagement by a
shell, handled his troops ably. His whole division was in
th§ near neighbourhood, but carefully concealed, and Ashby
reported to Jackson that only four regiments of infantry,
besides the guns and cavalry, remained at Winchester.
Information obtained from the townspeople within the
Federal lines conflrmed the accuracy of bis estimate. The
enemy's main body, he was told, had already marched,
and the troops which had opposed him were under orders
to move to Harper's Ferry the next morning.
On receipt of this intelUgence Jackson hurried forward
from his camp near Woodstock, and that night reached
March 23 S^rasburg. At dawn on the 23rd four companies
were despatched to reinforce Ashby ; and under
cover of this advanced guard the whole force followed in
the direction of Kernstown, a tiny village, near which tbe
Federal outposts were established. At one o'clock the
three brigades, wearied by a march of fourteen miles suc
ceeding one of twenty-two on the previous day, arrived
' A large portion of the Army of the Potomac, awaiting embarkation,
stiU remained at CentrevUle. The cavalry had pushed forward towards
the Eapidan, and the Confederates, unable to get information, did not sus
pect that McClellan was moving to the Peninsula until March 25.

Romney,

Q^MILROY 4600

13 Baltimore

as Junction

Situation nig^ht of March 21st. 1862.

MAGRUDER lt,000l
" H^alMe'r 's-Boutallsc.

RESOLVES TO ATTACK 287
upon the fleld of action. The ranks, however, were sadly
weakened, for many of the men had succumbed to their un
usual exertions. Ashby stUl confronted the enemy; but
the Federals had developed a brigade of infantry, supported
by two batteries and several squadrons, and the Confederate
cavalry were slowly giving ground. On reaching the field
Jackson ordered the troops to bivouac. ' Though it was very
desirable,' he wrote, ' to prevent the enemy from leaving the
VaUey, yet I deemed it best not to attack untU morning.'
An inspection of the ground, however, convinced him that
delay was impracticable. ' Ascertaining,' he continued,
' that the Federals had a position from which our forces
could be seen, I concluded that it would be dangerous to
postpone the attack untU next day, as reinforcements might
be brought up during the night,' ' Ashby was directed to
detach half his cavalry * under Major Funsten in order to
cover the left flank ; and Jackson, ascertaining that his men
were in good spirits at the prospect of meeting the enemy,
made his preparations for fighting his first battle.
The position occupied by the Federals was by no means
iU-adapted for defence. The country round Winchester,
and indeed throughout the VaUey of the Shenandoah,
resembles in many of its features an English landscape.
Low ridges, covered with open woods of oak and pine,
overlook green pastures and scattered copses ; and the
absence of hedgerows and cottages gives a parklike aspect
to the broad acres of rich ' blue grass,' But the deep lanes
and hoUow roads of England find here no counterpart.
The tracks are rough and rude, and even the ' pikes,' as the
main thoroughfares are generally called, are flush with the
fields on either hand. The traffic has not yet worn them
to a lower level, and Virginia roadmaking despises such
refinements as cuttings or embankments. The highways,
even the ' VaUey pike ' itself, the great road which ia
inseparably linked with the fame of Stonewall Jackson and
' O. E., vol. xii., part i., p. 381. The staff appears to have been at fault.
It was certainly of the first importance, whether battle was intended or not,
to select a halting-place concealed from the enemy's observation.
" 140 sabres.

238 STONEWALL JACKSON
his brigade, are mere ribbons of metal laid on swell and
swale. Fences of the rudest description, zigzags of wooden
rails, or walls of loose stone, are the only boundaries, and
the land is parcelled out in more generous fashion than in
an older and more crowded country. More desirable ground
for miUtary operations it would be difficidt to find. There
are few obstacles to the movement of cavalry and artUlery,
whUe the woods and undulations, giviag ample cover,
afford admirable opportunities for skUful manoeuvre. In
the spring, however, tbe condition of the soil would be
a drawback. At the date of the battle part of the country
round Kernstown was under plough, and the whole was
saturated with moisture. Horses sank fetlock-deep in
the heavy meadows, and the rough roads, hardly seen for
mud, made marching difficult.
The Federal front extended on both sides of the Valley
turnpike. To the east was a broad expanse of rolling
grassland, stretching away to the horizon ; to the west a
low knoll, crowned by a few trees, which goes by the
name of Pritchard's HiU. Further north was a ridge,
covered with brown woods, behind which hes Winchester.
This ridge, nowhere more than 100 feet in height, runs
somewhat obUquely to the road in a south-westerly direc
tion, and passing within a mUe and a half of Pritchard's
Hill, sinks into the plain three mUes south-west of Kerns
town, Some distance beyond this ridge, and separated
firom it by the narrow valley of the Opequon, rise the tower
ing bluffs of the North Mountain, the western boundary of
the VaUey, sombre with forest from base to brow.
On leaving Winchester, WilUams' division had struck
due east, passiag through the viUage of BerryviUe, and
makiag for Snicker's Gap in the Blue Eidge. The Berry-
vUle road had thus become of importance to tbe garrison
of Winchester, for it was from that direction, if they
should become necessary, tbat reinforcements would arrive.
General KimbaU, commanding La Shields' absence the
division which confronted Ashby, had therefore posted tbe
larger portion of his troops eastward of the pike. A strong
force of infantry, with waving colours, was plainly visible to

HIS PLAN OF ACTION 239
the Confederates, and it was seen that the extreme left was
protected by several guns. On the right of the road was a
line of skirmishers, deployed along the base of Pritchard's
HUl, and on the knoU itself stood two batteries. The
wooded ridge to westward was as yet unoccupied, except by
scouting parties,
Jackson at once determined to turn the enemy's right.
An attack upon the Federal left would have to be pushed
across the open fields and decided by fair fighting, gun
and rifle against gun and rifle, and on that flank the enemy
was prepared for battle. Could he seize the wooded ridge on
his left, the initiative would be his. His opponent would be
compelled to conform to his movements. The advantages
of a carefully selected position would be lost. Instead of
receiving attack where he stood, tbe Federal general would
have to change front to meet it, to execute movements
which he had possibly not foreseen, to fight on ground with
whieh he was unfamiliar ; and, instead of carrying out a
plan which had been previously thought out, to conceive
a new one on the spur of the moment, and to issue
immediate orders for a difficult operation. Hesitation
and confusion might ensue; and in place of a strongly
established line, confidently awaiting the advance, isolated
regiments, in all the haste and excitement of rapid move
ment, or hurriedly posted in unfavourable positions, would
probably oppose the Confederate onset. Such are the ad
vantages which accrue to the force which deUvers an attack
where it is not expected ; and, to all appearance, Jackson's
plan of battle promised to bring them into play to the very
fullest extent. The whole force of the enemy, as reported by
Ashby, was before him, plainly visible. To seize the wooded
ridge, while the cavalry held tbe Federals fast in front ;
to pass beyond Pritchard's Hill, and to cut the line of
retreat on Winchester, seemed no difficult task. The only
danger was the possibility of a counterstroke while the
Confederates were executing their turning movement. But
the enemy, so far as Jackson's information went, was rapidly
withdrawing from the VaUey. The force confronting him
was no more than a rear-guard ; and it was improbable in

240 STONEWALL JAOKSON
the extreme that a mere rear-guard would involve itself in
a desperate engagement. Tbe moment its line of retreat
was threatened it would probably faU back. To provide,
however, against aU emergencies. Colonel Burks' brigade of
three battalions was left for the present in rear of Kernstown,
and here, too, remained four of the field batteries. With the
remainder of his force, two brigades of infantry and a
battery, Jackson moved off to his left. Two companies of
the 5tb Virginia were recruited from Winchester, Early in
the day the general had asked the regiment for a guide
famihar with the locaUty ; and, with the soldier showing
the way, tbe 27th Virgiaia, with two of Carpenter's guns
as advanced-guard, struck westward by a waggon track
3.45 r.M. ^<''^oss the meadows, whUe Ashby pressed the
Federals in front of Kernstown. The main body
followed in two parallel columns, and the Une of march soon
brought them within range of the commanding batteries on
Pritchard's Hill,' At a range of little more than a mile the
enemy's gunners poured a heavy fire on the serried ranks,
and Carpenter, unlimbering near the Opequon Church,
sought to distract their aim.
The Confederate infantry, about 2,000 aU told, although
moving in mass, and delayed by fences and marshy ground,
passed unscathed under the storm of shell, and in twenty
minutes the advanced guard had seized the wooded ridge.
Finding a rocky clearing on the crest, about a mUe
distant from Pritchard's Hill, Jackson sent back for the
artUlery. Three batteries, escorted by two of Burks'
battalions, tbe 21st Virginia and the Irishmen, pushed
across the level as rapidly as the wearied teams could move.
Two guns were dismounted by the Federal fire ; but, coming
into action on the ridge, the remainder engaged the hostUe
batteries with effect, MeanwhUe, breaking their way
through the ragged undergrowth of the bare March woods,
the infantry, in two lines, was pressing forward along the
> No hidden line of approach was avaUable. Movement to the south was
limited by the course of the Opequon. Fulkerson's brigade, with Carpenter's
two guns, marched nearest to the enemy ; the Stonewall Brigade was ou
Fulkerson's left.

THE FEDERAL COUNTER-ATTACK 241
ridge. On the right was the 27th Virginia, supported by
the 21st ; on the left, Fulkerson's two battalions, with the
Stonewall Brigade in second line. The 5th Virginia
remained at the foot of tbe ridge near Macauley's cottage,
in order to connect with Ashby, Jackson's tactics appeared
to be succeeding perfectly. A body of cavalry and infantry,
posted behind Pritchard's Hill, was seen to be withdrawing,
and the fire of the Federal guns was visibly weakening.
Suddenly, in the woods northward of the Confederate bat
teries, was heard a roar of musketry, and the 27th
¦ ^'^' Virginia came reeling back before the onslaught of
superior numbers. But the 21st was hurried to their assist
ance ; the broken ranks ralUed from their surprise ; and a
long line of Federal skirmishers, thronging through the
thickets, was twice repulsed by the Southern marksmen,'
Fulkerson, further to the left, was more fortunate than
the 27th, Before he began his advance along the ridge
he had deployed his two battalions under cover, and when
the musketry broke out on his right front, they were
moving forward over an open field. Half-way across the
field ran a stone wall or fence, and beyond the waU were
seen the tossing colours and bright bayonets of a line of
battle, just emerging from the woods. Then came a race
for the wall, and the Confederates won. A heavy fire, at
the closest range, blazed out ui the face of the charging
Federals, and in a few moments the stubble was strewn
with dead and wounded. A Pennsylvania regiment, leaving
a colour on the field, gave way in panic, and the whole of
the enemy's force retreated to the shelter of the woods. An
attempt to turn Jackson's left was then easUy frustrated ;
and although the Federals maintained a heavy fire, Fulker
son's men held stubbornly to the waU,
In the centre of the field the Northern riflemen were
sheltered by a bank ; their numbers continually increased,
' The Confederate advance was made in the foUowing order : —
23rd Va. 37th Va. 27th Va. 
4th Va. 33rd Va. 2nd Va. ^

Irish Battn.

242 STONEWALL JACKSON
and here the struggle was more severe. The 4th and 83rd
Virginia occupied this portion of the line, and they were
without support, for the 2nd Virginia and the Irish bat
talion, the last avaUable reserves upon the ridge, had been
already sent forward to reinforce the right.
The right, too, was hardly pressed. The Confederate
infantry had everywhere to do with superior numbers, and
the artiUery, in that wooded ground, could lend but small
support. The batteries protected the right flank, but tbey
could take no share in the struggle to the front ; and yet, as
the dusk came on, after two long hours of battle, the white
colours of the Virginia regiments, fixed fast amongst the
rocks, stUl waved defiant. The long grey line, ' a ragged
spray of humanity,' plied the ramrod with stiU fiercer energy,
and pale women on the hills round Winchester listened in
terror to the crashing echoes ofthe leafiess woods. But tbe
end could not be long delayed. Ammunition was giving out.
Every company which had reached the ridge had joined tbe
fighting line. The ranks were thinning. Many of the bravest
officers were down, and the Northern regiments, standing
staunchly to their work, had been strongly reinforced,
Ashby for once had been mistaken. It was no rear
guard that barred the road to Winchester, but Shields'
entire division, numbering at least 9,000 men, A prisoner
captured the day before had admitted that the Confede
rates were under the impression that Winchester had been
evacuated, and that Jackson had immediately moved for
ward, shields, an able officer, who had commanded a
brigade in Mexico, saw bis opportunity. He knew some
thing of his opponent, and anticipating that he would be
eager to attack, had ordered the greater part of his
division to remain concealed. KimbaU's brigade and five
batteries were sent quietly, under cover of the night, to Prit
chard's Hill. SulUvan's brigade was posted in support,
hidden from view behind a wood. The cavalry and Tyler's
brigade were held in reserve, north of the town, at a
distance where they were not likely to be observed by the
inhabitants. As soon as the Confederates came in sight,
and Kimball deployed across the pike, Tyler was brought

THE TROOPS REFUSE TO RALLY 248
through the town and placed in rear of Sullivan, at a point
where the road dips down between two parallel ridges.
Shields himself, wounded in the skirmish of the preceding
day, was not present at the action, although responsible
for these dispositions, and the command had devolved
on Kimball, That officer, when Jackson's design became
apparent, ordered Tyler to occupy the wooded ridge ; and
it was bis five regiments, over 3,000 strong, which had
struck so strongly at the Confederate advance. But although
superior in numbers by a third, tbey were unable to make
headway, KimbaU, however, rose to the situation before
it was too late, Eecognising that Ashby's weak attack was
nothing more than a demonstration, be hurried nearly tbe
whole of his own brigade, followed by three battalions of
Sullivan's, to Tyler's aid, leaving a couple of battalions and
the artillery to hold the pike.
' The struggle,' says Shields, ' had been for a short time
doubtful,' ' but this reinforcement of 3,000 bayonets turned
the scale. Jackson had ordered tbe 5th and 42nd Virginia to
the ridge, and a messenger was sent back to hurry forward
the 48th. But it was too late. Before the 5th could reach
the heights the centre of the Confederate line was broken.
Garnett, the commander of the Stonewall Brigade, without
referring to the general, who was in another part of the
field, had given the order to fall back. Fulkerson, whose
right was now uncovered, was obliged to conform to the rear
ward movement, and moving across from Pritchard's HiU,
two Federal regiments, despite the fire of the Southern
guns, made a vig-'-'Tus attack on Jackson's right. The
whole Confederate line, long since dissolved into a crowd of
skirmishers, and with the various regiments much mixed
up, feU back, stUl fighting, through the woods. Across the
clearing, through the clouds of smoke, came the Northern
masses in pursuit. On the extreme right a hot fire of
canister, at a range of two hundred and fifty yards, drove
back the troops that had come from Pritchard's Hill ; but
on the wooded ridge above the artUlery was unable to bold
its own. The enemy's riflemen swarmed in the thickets,
• 0. B., vol. xii., part i., p. 341.
VOL, I, S

244 STONEWALL JACKSON
and the batteries feU back. As they limbered up one of
the six-pounders was overturned. Under a hot fire, de
livered at not more than fifty paces distant, the sergeant
in charge cut loose the three remaining horses, but the gun
was abandoned to the enemy.
Jackson, before the Federal reinforcements had made
their presence felt, was watching the progress of tbe action
on the left. Suddenly, to his astonishment and wrath, he saw
the lines of his old brigade falter and fall back. GaUoping to
the spot he imperatively ordered Garnett to hold his ground,
and then turned to restore the fight. Seizing a drummer
by the shoulder, he dragged him to a rise of ground, in full
view of the troops, and bade him in curt, quick tones, to
' Beat the rally ! ' The drum rolled at his order, and witb
his hand on the frightened boy's shoulder, amidst a storm of
balls, he tried to check the flight of his defeated troops. His
efforts were useless. His fighting-line was shattered into
fragments; and although, according to a Federal officer,
' many of the brave Virginians lingered in rear of their
retreating comrades, loading as they slowly retired, and
rallying in squads in every ravine and behind every hill —
or hiding singly among the trees,' ' it was impossible to stay
the rout. The enemy was pressing forward in heavy force,
and their shouts of triumph rang from end to end of the
field of battle. No doubt remained as to their over
whelming numbers, and few generals but would have been
glad enough to escape without tempting fortune further.
It seemed almost too late to think of even organising a
rear-guard. But Jackson, so far from preparing for retreat,
had not yet ceased to think of victory. The 5th and 42nd
Virginia were coming up, a compact force of 600 bayonets,
and a vigorous and sudden counterstroke might yet change
the issue of the day. The reinforcements, however, had
not yet come in sight, and galloping back to meet them
he found tbat instead of marching resolutely against the
enemy, the two regiments had taken post to the rear, on
the crest of a wooded sweU, in order to cover the retreat.
On his way to tbe front the colonel of the 5th Virginia had
' Colonel E. H. C. Gavins, 14th Indiana. Battles and Leaders, vol. ii.,p. 307,

RETREAT 245
received an order from Garnett instructing him to occupy
a position behind which the fighting-line might recover its
formation. Jackson was fain to acquiesce ; but the fighting-
line was by this time scattered beyond aU hope of rallying ;
the opportunity for the counterstroke had passed away, and
the battle was irretrievably lost.
Arrangements were quickly made to enable tbe broken
troops to get away without further molestation. A battery
was ordered to take post at the foot of the hill, and
Funsten's cavalry was called up from westward of the
ridge. The 42nd Virginia came into line on the right of
the 5th, and covered by a stone wall and thick timber, these
two small regiments, encouraged by the presence of their
commander, held stoutly to their ground. The attack
was pressed with reckless gallantry. In front of the
5th Virginia the colours of the 5th Ohio changed hands
no less than six times, and one of them was pierced by no
less than eight-and-forty buUets. The 84th Pennsylvania
was twice repulsed and twice raUied, but on the fall of its
colonel retreated in confusion. The left of the 14th Indiana
broke ; but the 13th Indiana now came up, and ' inch by
inch,' according to their commanding officer, the Confede
rates were pushed back. The 5th Virginia was compeUed
to give way before a flanking fire ; but the colonel retired
the colours to a short distance, and ordered the regiment
to re-form on them. Again the heavy volleys blazed out in
the gathering twUight, and the sheaves of death grew thicker
every moment on the bare hUlside, But stUl the Federals
pressed on, and swinging round both flanks, forced the
Confederate rear-guard from the field, whUe their cavalry,
moving up the vaUey of the Opequon, captured several
ambulances and cut off some two or three hundred fugitives.
As the night began to fall the 5th Virginia, retiring
steadUy towards the pike, filed into a narrow lane, fenced by
a stone wall, nearly a mile distant from their last position,
and there took post for a final stand. Their left was com
manded by the ridge, and on the heights in the rear, coming
up from the Opequon valley, appeared a large mass of
Northern cavalry. It was a situation sufficiently un-
8 2

246 STONEWALL JACKSON
comfortable. If the ground was too difficult for the horse
men to charge over in the gathering darkness, a volley from
their carbines could scarcely have faUed to clear the waU.
' A single ramrod,' it was said in the Confederate ranks,
' would have spitted the whole battahon.' But not a shot
was fired. The pursuit of the Federal infantry had been
stayed in the pathless woods, the cavalry was held in check
by Funsten's squadrons, and the 5th was permitted to
retire unmolested.
The Confederates, with tbe exception of Ashby, who
ha'ted at Bartonsville, a farm upon the pike, a mile and a
half from tbe field of battle, fell back to Newtown, three
mUes further south, where the trains had been parked.
The men were utterly worn out. Three hours of fierce
fighting against far superior numbers had brought tbem to
the limit of their endurance. ' In the fence corners, under
the trees, and around the waggons they threw themselves
down, many too weary to eat, and forgot, in profound
slumber, the trials, the dangers, and the disappointments
of the day.' '
Jackson, wben the last sounds of battle had died away,
followed his troops. Halting by a camp-fire, he stood and
warmed himself for a time, and then, remounting, rode
back to BartonsvUle. Only one staff officer, his chief
commissary. Major Hawks, accompanied him. The rest
had dropped away, overcome by exhaustion. ' Turning
from tbe road into an orchard, he fastened up his horse, and
asked his companion if he could make a fire, adding, " We
shaU have to burn fence-raUs to-night." The major soon
had a roaring fire, and was making a bed of raUs, when
the general wished to know what he was doing. " Finding
a place to sleep," was the reply. " You seem determined to
make yourself and those around you comfortable," said
Jackson. And knowing the general had fasted all day,
he soon obtained some bread and meat from the nearest
squad of soldiers, and after they had satisfied their hunger,
they slept soundly on the rail-bed in a fence-corner.'
Such was the battle of Kernstown, in which over
' Jackson's Valley Campaign, Colonel WiUiam Allan, C.S.A., p. 54.

THE CAMP-FIRE 247
1,200 men were kUled and wounded, the half of them
Confederates. Two or three hundred prisoners feU into
the hands of the Federals, Nearly one-fourth of Jackson's
infantry was hers de combat, and be had lost two guns.
His troops were undoubtedly depressed. They had anti
cipated an easy victory ; the overwhelming strength of the
Federals had surprised them, and their losses had been
severe. But no regret disturbed the slumbers of their
leader. He had been defeated, it was true ; but he looked
further than the immediate result of the engagement, ' I
feel justified in saying,' he wrote in his short report, ' that,
though the battle-field is in the possession of the enemy,
yet the most essential fruits of the victory are ours,' As
he stood before the camp-fire near Newtown, wrapped in
his long cloak, his hands behiad bis back, and stirring the
embers with his foot, one of Ashby's youngest troopers
ventured to interrupt his reverie, 'The Yankees don't
seem wiUiag to quit Winchester, General ! ' ' Wiachester
is a very pleasant place to stay in, sir ! ' was the quick
reply. Nothing daunted, the boy went on : 'It was re
ported that they were retreating, but I guess they're
retreating after us.' With his eyes stUl fixed on the
blazing logs : ' I think I may say I am satisfied, sir ! '
was Jackson's answer ; and with no further notice of the
sUent circle round the fire, he stood gazing absently into
the glowing flames. After a few minutes the tall flgure
turned away, and without another word strode off into the
darkness. That Jackson divined the full effect of his attack would
be to assert too much. That he realised that the battle,
though a tactical defeat, was strategically a victory is very
evident. He knew something of Banks, he knew more of
McCleUan, and the bearing of the VaUey on the defence of
Washington had long been uppermost in his thoughts.
He had learned from Napoleon to throw himself into the
spirit of his enemy, and it is not improbable that when he
stood before the fire near Newtown he had already foreseen,
in some degree at least, the events that would foUow the
news of his attack at Kernstown.

248 STONEWALL JACKSON
The outcome of the battle was indeed far-reaching,
' Though the battle had been won,' wrote Shields, • stiU I
could not have beUeved that Jackson would have hazarded
a decisive engagement, so far from the main body, without
expecting reinforcements ; so, to be prepared for such a
contingency, I set to work during the night to bring together
all the troops within my reach, I sent an express after
WUUams' division, requesting the rear brigade, about
twenty mUes distant, to march all night and join me in
the morning. I swept the posts in rear of almost aU their
guards, hurrying them forward by forced marches, to be
with me at daylight.' '
General Banks, hearing of the engagement on his way
to Washington, halted at Harper's Ferry, and he also
ordered Williams' division to return at once to Winchester,
One brigade only,* which the order did not reach, con
tinued the march to Manassas, This counter-movement
met with McCleUan's approval. He now recognised that
Jackson's force, commanded as it was, was something more
than a mere corps of observation, and that it was essential
that it should be crushed. ' Your course was right,' he tele
graphed on receiving Banks' report. ' As soon as you are
strong enough push Jackson hard and drive him well beyond
Strasburg. . . The very moment the thorough defeat of
Jackson wiU permit it, resume the movement on Manassas,
always leaving the whole of Shields' command at or near
Strasburg and Winchester until the Manassas Gap Eailway
is fully repaired. Communicate fully and act vigorously.' '
8,000 men (WilUams' division) were thus temporarUy
withdrawn from the force that was to cover Washington from
the south. But this was only the first step. Jackson's action
had forcibly attracted the attention of the Federal Govern
ment to the Upper Potomac, The President was already
contemplatiag the transfer of Blenker's division from
McCleUan to Fremont ; the news of Kernstown decided the
• O. E., vol. xii., part i., p. 341.
' Abercrombie's, 4,500 men and a battery. The brigade marched to War
renton, where it remained until it was transferred to McDoweU's command,
' 0. B., vol. xii., part iii., p. 16.

RESULTS OF THE BATTLE 849
question, and at the end of March these 9,000 men were
ordered to West Virginia, halting at Strasburg, in case
Banks should then need tbem, on their way.' But even
this measure did not altogether allay Mr, Lincoln's appre
hensions, McClellan had assured him, on April 1, that
73,000 men would be left for the defence of the capital
and its approaches. But in the original arrangement,
with which the President had been satisfied, WilUams
was to have been brought to Manassas, and Shields alone
left in the Shenandoah VaUey. Under the new distri
bution the President found that the force at Manassas
would be decreased by two brigades ; and, at the same time,
that whUe part of tbe troops McCleUan had promised were
not forthcoming, a large portion of those actually available
were good for nothing. The officer left in command at
Washington reported that 'nearly all his force was im
perfectly disciplined; that several of the regiments were
in a very disorganised condition; that efficient artUlery
regiments had been removed from the forts, and that he had
to reUeve them with very new infantry regiments, entirely
unacquainted with the duties of that arm,' * Liacoln sub
mitted the question to six generals of the regular army,
then present in Washington ; and these officers replied
that, in tbeir opinion, ' the requirement of the President
that this city shall be left entirely secure has not been fully
complied with,' '
On receiving this report, Lincoln ordered the First
Army Corps, 37,000 strong, under General McDoweU, to
remain at Manassas in place of embarking for the Peninsula ;
and thus McCleUan, on the eve of his advance on Eich
mond, found his original force of 150,000 reduced by 46,000
officers and men. Moreover, not content with detaching
McDowell for a time, Lincoln, the next day, assigned that
general to an independent command, covering the ap
proaches to Washington ; Banks, also, was withdrawn from
' Blenker's division was at Hunter's Chapel, south of Washington, when
it received the order.
» Eeport of General Wadsworth ; 0. E., vol. xu., part ni., p. 225.
' Letter of Mr. Stanton ; 0. E., vol. xix., part n., p. 726.

260 STONEWALL JAOKSON
McClellan's control, and dfrected to defend the VaUey.
The original dissemination of the Federal forces was thus
gravely accentuated, and the Confederates had now to deal
with four distinct armies, McCleUan's, McDowell's, Banks',
and Fremont's, dependent for co-operation on the orders
of two civilians. President Lincoln and his Secretary of
War, And this was not all, McDowell had been assigned
a most important part in McClellan's plan of invasion.
The road from Fortress Monroe was barred by the forti
fications of Yorktown. These works could be turned, how
ever, by sending a force up the York Eiver, But the pas
sage of the stream was debarred to the Federal transports
by a strong fort at Gloucester Point, on the left bank, and
the capture of this work was to be the task of the First
Army Corps, No wonder that McCleUan, believing tbat
Johnston commanded 100,000 men, declared that in his
deliberate judgment the success of the Federal cause was
imperiUed by the order which detached McDowell from his
command. However inadequately tbe capital might be
defended, it was worse than folly to interfere with the
general's plans when he was on the eve of executing them.
The best way of defending Washington was for McClellan
to march rapidly on Eichmond, and seize his adversary
by the throat. By depriving him of McDoweU, Lincoln
and his advisers made such a movement difficult, and the
grand army of invasion found itself in a most embarrassing
situation. Such was the effect of a blow struck at the right
place and tbe right time, though struck by no more than
8,000 bayonets.
The battle of Kernstown was undoubtedly weU fought. It
is true that Jackson beUeved that he had no more than four
regiments of infantry, a few batteries, and some cavalry
before him. But it was a skUful manoeuvre, which threw
three brigades and three batteries, more than two-thirds of
his whole strength, on his opponent's flank. An ordinary
general would probably have employed only a small portion
of his force in the turning movement. Not so the student
of Napoleon, ' In the general's haversack,' says one of
Jackson's staff, ' were always three books : the Bible,

mS TACTICS AT KERNSTOWN 2S1
Napoleon's Maxuns of War, and Webster's Dictionary— for
his spelling was uncertain — and these books he constantly
consulted,' Whether the chronicles of the Jewish kuigs
threw any light on the tactical problem involved at Kerns
town may be left to the commentators ; but there can _ be
no question as to the Maxims, To hurl overwhelmmg
numbers at the point where the enemy least expects attack
is tbe whole burden of Napoleon's teachmg, and there can
be no doubt but that the wooded ridge, unoccupied save by
a few scouts, was the weakest point of the defence.
The manoeuvre certainly surprised the Federals, and it
very nearly beat them, Tyler's brigade was unsupported
for nearly an hour and a half. Had his battalions been
less staunch, the tardy reinforcements would have been too
late to save the day. Coming up as they did, not in a mass
so strong as to bear all before it by its own inherent
weight, but in successive battalions, at wide intervals
of time, they would themselves have become involved in
a desperate engagement under adverse circumstances.
Nor is KimbaU to be blamed that he did not throw greater
weight on Jackson's turnhig column at an earUer hour.
Like Shields and Banks, he was unable to believe that
Jackson was unsupported. He expected that the flank
attack would be foUowed up by one in superior numbers
from the front. He could hardly credit that an inferior
force would deUberately move off to a flank, leaving its line
of retreat to be guarded by a few squadrons, weakly sup
ported by infantry ; and the audacity of the assaUant had
the usual effect of deceiving the defender.
Kernstown, moreover, wiU rank as an example of what
determined men can do against superior numbers. The
Confederates on the ridge, throughout the greater part of
the fight, hardly exceeded 2,000 muskets. They were
assailed hy 3,000, and proved a match for them. The
3,000 were then reinforced by at least 3,000 more, whUst
Jackson could bring up only 600 muskets to support an
already broken line. Nevertheless, these 6,000 Northerners
were so roughly handled that there was practicaUy no
pursuit. When the Confederates feU back every one of the

262 STONEWALL JACKSON
Federal regiments had been engaged, and there were no fresh
troops wherewith to foUow them. Jackson was perfectly
justified in reporting that 'Night and an indisposition
of the enemy to press further terminated the battle.' '
But the action was attended by features more remark
able than the stubborn resistance of the Virginia regiments.
It is seldom that a battle so insignificant as Kernstown
has been foUowed by such extraordinary results. Fortune
indeed favoured the Confederates. At the time of the
battle a large portion of McCleUan's army was at sea, and
the attack was delivered at the very moment when it was
most dreaded by the Northern Government. Nor was it
to the disadvantage of the Southerners that the real head
of the Federal army was the President, and that his
strategical conceptions were necessarUy subservient to the
attitude of the Northern people. These were circumstances
purely fortuitous, and it might seem, therefore, that Jack
son merely blundered into success. But he must be given
fuU credit for recognising that a blow at Banks might be
fraught with most important consequences. It was witb
other ideas than defeating a rear-guard or detaining Banks
that he seized the Kernstown ridge. He was not yet
aware of McClellan's plan of invasion by sea ; but he knew
well that any movement that would threaten Washington
must prove embarrassing to the Federal Government;
that they could not afford to leave the Upper Potomac UI
secured ; and that the knowledge that an active and enter
prising enemy, who had shown himself determined to take
instant advantage of every opportunity, was within the
Valley, would probably cause them to withdraw troops from
McCleUan in order to guard the river, A fortnight after
the battle, asking for reinforcements, he wrote, ' If Banks
is defeated it may greatly retard McCleUan's movements,' '
Stubborn as had been the fighting of his brigades,
Jackson himself was not entirely satisfied with his officers.
When SuUivan and KimbaU came to Tyler's aid, and
a new line of battle threatened to overwhelm the Stone-

' 0. E., vol. xii., part i., p. 382.
* Hid., part iii., p. 844.

STERN MEASURES 268
wall regiments, Garnett, on bis own responsibUity, had
given the order to retire. Many of the men, tbeir am
munition exhausted, had faUen to the rear. The exertions
of the march had begun to tell. The enemy's attacks had
been fiercely pressed, and before the pressure of his fresh
brigades the Confederate power of resistance was strained
to breaking-point, Garnett had behaved with conspicuous
gallantry. The officers of his brigade declared that he was
perfectly justified in ordering a retreat, Jackson thought
otherwise, and almost immediately after the battle he
relieved bim of bis command, placed him under arrest, and
framed charges for his trial by court-martial. He would not
accept the excuse that ammunition had given out. At the
time the Stonewall Brigade gave back the 5th and 42nd
Virginia were at hand. The men had stUl their bayonets,
and he did not consider the means of victory exhausted
untU the cold steel had been employed. ' He insisted,'
says Dabney, ' that a more resolute struggle might have
won the field.' '
Now, in the first place, it must be conceded that
Garnett had not the sUghtest right to abandon his position
without a direct order.* In tbe second, if we turn to the
table of losses furnished by the brigade commander, we find
that in Garnett's four regiments, numbering 1,100 officers
and men, there fell 153. In addition, 148 were reported
missing, but, according to the official reports, the majority
of these were captured by the Federal cavalry and were
unwounded. At most, then, when he gave the order to
retreat, Garnett bad lost 200, or rather less than 20 per
cent. Such loss was heavy, but by no means excessive. A
few months later hardly a brigade in either army would
have given way because every fifth man had fallen. A
year later and the Stonewall regiments would have con
sidered an action in wbich they lost 200 men as nothing
' Dabney, vol. ii., p. 46.
' He was aware, moreover, that supports were coming up, for the order
to the 5th Virginia was sent through him. Eeport of Colonel W. E. Harman
6th Virginia, 0. E., vol. xii., part i., pp. 391, 392. '

254 STONEWALL JAOKSON
more than a skfrmish,' The truth would seem to be that
the^ Valley soldiers were not yet ' blooded,' In peace the
individual is everything ; material prosperity, self-indul
gence, and the preservation of existence are the general
aim. In war the individual is nothing, and men learn the
lesson of self-sacrifice. But it is only gradually, however
high the enthusiasm which iaspires the troops, that the
ideas of peace become effaced, and they must be seasoned
soldiers who will endure, without flinching, the losses of
Waterloo or Gettysburg, Discipline, which means the
effaeement of the individual, does more than break tbe
soldier to unhesitating obedience ; it trains him to die for
duty's sake, and even the Stonewall Brigade, in the spring
of 1862, was not yet thoroughly disciplined, ' The lack of
competent and energetic officers,' writes Jackson's chief of
the staff, ' was at this time the bane of the service. In
many there was neither an intelUgent comprehension of
their duties nor zeal in their performance. Appointed by
the votes of their neighbours and friends, they would
neither exercise that rigidity in governing, nor that detailed
care in providing for the wants of their men, which are
necessary to keep soldiers efficient. The duties of tbe
drUl and the sentry-post were often negligently performed ;
and the most profuse waste of ammunition and other mUi
tary stores was permitted. It was seldom that these officers
were guilty of cowardice upon the field of battle, but they
were often in the wrong place, fighting as common soldiers
when they should have been directing others. Above aU
was their inefficiency marked in their inability to keep their
men in the ranks. Absenteeism grew under tbem to a
monstrous evil, and every poltroon and laggard found a
way of escape. Hence the frequent phenomenon that
regiments, which on the books of the commissary appeared
as consumers of 500 or 1,000 rations, were reported as
' On March 6, 1811, in the battle fought on the arid ridges of Barossa,
the numbers were almost identical with those engaged at Kernstown. Out
of 4,000 British soldiers there f eU in an hour over 1,200, and of 9,000 French
more than 2,000 were killed or wounded ; and yet, although the victors were
twenty-four hours under arms without food, the issue was never doubtful.

INDISCIPLINE 265
carrying into action 250 or 300 bayonets.' ' It is unlikely
that this picture is over-coloured, and it is certainly no
reproach to the Virginia soldiers that then- discipline was
indifferent. There had not yet been time to transform a
multitude of raw recruits into the semblance of a regular
army. Competent instructors and trained leaders were few
in the extreme, and the work had to be left in inexperienced
hands. One Stonewall Jackson was insufficient to leaven a
division of 5,000 men.
In the second place, Jackson probably remembered that
the Stonewall Brigade at BuU Eun, dashing out with
the bayonet on the advancing Federals, had driven them
back on their reserves. It seems hardly probable, had
Garnett at Kernstown held his ground a little longer, that
the three regiments still intact could have turned the tide
of battle. But it is not impossible. The Federals bad been
roughly handled. Their losses had been heavier than those
of the Confederates. A resolute counterstroke has before
now changed the face of battle, and among unseasoned
soldiers panic spreads with extraordinary effect. So far as
can be gathered from the reports, there is no reason to
suspect that the vigour of tbe Federal battalions was as
yet relaxed. But no one who was not actually present can
presume to judge of the temper of the troops. In every
well-contested battle there comes a moment when the com
batants on both sides become exhausted, and the general
who at that moment finds it in his heart to make one more
effort wiU generally succeed. Such was the experience of
Grant, Virginia's stoutest enemy.^ That moment, perhaps,
had come at Kernstown; and Jackson, than whom not
Skobeleff himself had clearer vision or cooler brain in the
tumult of battle, may have observed it. It cannot be too often
repeated that numbers go for little on the battle-field. It is
possible that Jackson had in his mind, when he declared that
the victory might yet have been won, the decisive counter-
stroke at Marengo, where 20,000 Austrians, pressing forward
in pursuit of a defeated enemy, were utterly overthrown by a
' Dabney, vol. ii., pp. 18, 19.
'' Grant's Memoirs.

266 STONEWALL JACKSON
fresh division of 6,000 men supported by four squad
rons.' Tactical unity and moral are factors of far more im
portance in battle than mere numerical strength. Troops
that have been hotly engaged, even with success, and whose
nerves are wrought up to a high state of tension, are
pecuhariy susceptible to surprise. If they have lost their
order, and the men find themselves under strange officers,
with unfamUiar faces beside them, the counterstroke falls
with even greater force. It is at such moments that cavalry
stiU finds its opportunity. It is at such moments that a
resolute charge, pushed home with drums beating and a loud
cheer, may have extraordinary results. On August 6, 1870,
on the heights of Worth, a German corps d'armie, emerging,
after three hours' fierce fightmg, from the great wood on
McMahon's flank, bore down upon the last stronghold of
the French. The troops were in the utmost confusion.
Divisions, brigades, regiments, and companies were miogled
in one motley mass. But the enemy was retreating; a
heavy force of artillery was close at hand, and the infantry
must have numbered at least 10,000 rifles. Suddenly three
battaUons of Turcos, numbering no more than 1,500
bayonets, charged with wild cries, and without firing,
down the grassy slope. Tbe Germans halted, fired a few
harmless volleys, and then, turning as one man, bolted
to tbe shelter of the wood, twelve hundred yards in
rear. According to an officer of the 14th Indiana, the Federals
at Kernstown were in much the same condition as the Ger
mans at Worth. 'The Confederates feU back in great
disorder, and we advanced in disorder just as great. Over
logs, through woods, over hUls and fields, the brigades,
regiments, and companies advanced, in one promiscuous,
mixed, and uncontroUable mass. Officers shouted them
selves hoarse in trying to bring order out of confusion, but
' The morning after the battle one of the Confederate officers expressed
the opinion that even if the counterstroke had been successful, the Federal
reserves would have arrested it. Jackson answered, ' No, if I had routed
the men on the ridge, they would aU have gone off together,'

HIS AVERSION TO GIVING BATTLE ON SUNDAY 257
all their efforts were unavailing along the front line, or
rather what ought to have been the front line.' '
Garnett's conduct was not the only incident connected
with Kernstown that troubled Jackson, March 23 was a
Sunday, ' You appear much concerned,' he writes to his
wife, ' at my attacking on Sunday, I am greatly concerned
too ; but I felt it my duty to do it, in consideration of the
ruinous effects that might result from postponing the battle
until the morning. So far as I can see, my course was a
wise one ; the best that I could do under the circumstances,
though very distasteful to my feeUngs ; and I hope and
pray to our Heavenly Father that I may never again be
circumstanced as on that day. I believed tbat, so far as
our troops were concerned, necessity and mercy both called
for the battle. I do hope that the war wiU soon be over,
and that I shall never again be called upon to take the
field. Arms is a profession that, if its principles are
adhered to, requires an officer to do what he fears may
be wrong, and yet, according to military experience, must
be done if success is to be attained. And the fact of
its being necessary to success, and being accompanied
with success, and that a departure from it is accompanied
with disaster, suggests that it must be right. Had I fought
the battle on Monday instead of Sunday, I fear our cause
would have suffered, whereas, as things turned out, I con
sider our cause gained much from the engagement.'
We may wonder if his wife detected the unsoundness
of tbe argument. To do wrong — for wrong it was according
to her creed — in order that good may ensue is what it
comes to. The literal interpretation of the Scriptural rule
seems to have led her husband into difficulties ; but the
incident may serve to show with what earnestness, in every
action of his Ufe, he strove to shape his conduct with what
he believed to be his duty.
It has already been observed that Jackson's reticence was
remarkable. No general could have been more careful that
no inkling of his design should reach the enemy. He had
not the slightest hesitation in withholding his plans from
' Colonel E. H. C. Gavins, Battles and Leaders, vol. ii., p. 307.
VOL, X. T

268 STONEWALL JACKSON
eyen his second in command ; special correspondents were
rigorously excluded from his camps ; and even with his
most confidential friends his reserve was absolutely impene
trable. During his stay at Winchester, it was his custom
directly he rose to repair to headquarters and open his
correspondence. When he returned to breakfast at Dr.
Graham's there was much anxiety evinced to hear the
news from the front. What the enemy was doing across
the Potomac, scarce thirty mUes away, was naturally of in
tense interest to the people of the border town. But not
the smallest detaU of intelligence, however unimportant,
escaped his lips. To his wife he was as uncommunicative
as to the rest. Neither hint nor suggestion made the least
impression, and direct interrogations were put by with a
quiet smile. Nor was he too shy to suggest to his superiors
that silence was golden. In a report to Johnston, written
four days after Kernstown, he administered what can
scarcely be considered other than a snub, deUcately ex
pressed but unmistakable : —
' It is understood in tbe Federal army tbat you have
instructed me to keep the forces now in this district and
not permit them to cross the Blue Eidge, and that tbis
must be done at every hazard, and that for the purpose of
effecting this I made my attack. I have never so much as
intimated such a thing to anyone.' '
It cannot be said that Jackson's judgment in attacking
Shields was at once appreciated in the South, The
defeat, at first, was ranked with the disasters in the West.
But as soon as the effects upon the enemy were appre
ciated the tide of popular feeling turned. The gaUantry
of the Valley regiments was fully recognised, and the
thanks of Congress were tendered to Jackson and his
troops. No battle was ever yet fought in exact accordance with
the demands of theory, and Kernstown, great ia its results,
gives openings to the critics. Jackson, it is said, attacked
with tired troops, on insufficient information, and contrary
to orders. As to the first, it may be said tbat his decision
' 0. E., vol. xii., part iii., p. 840.

OKmOISMS 269
to give the enemy no time to bring up fresh troops was
absolutely justified by events. On hearing of his approach
to Kernstown, Banks immediately countermarched a brigade
of WUUams' division from Castleman's Ferry. A second
brigade was recaUed from Snicker's Gap on the morning of
the 24th, and reached Wuichester the same evenmg, after
a march of six-and-twenty mUes. Had attack been deferred.
Shields would have been strongly reinforced.
As to the second, Jackson had used every means in his
power to get accurate intelligence.' Ashby had done
his best. Although the Federals had 780 cavalry present,
and every approach to Winchester was strongly picketed,
his scouts had pushed within the Federal lines, and had com
municated with the citizens of Winchester. Their reports
were confirmed, according to Jackson's despatch, ' from a
source which had been remarkable for its reliabUity,' and
for the last two days a retrograde movement towards
Snicker's Gap had been reported. The ground, it is true,
favoured an ambush. But the strategic situation de
manded instant action. McCleUan's advanced guard was
within fifty mUes of Johnston's position on the Eapidan,
and a few days' march might bring the main armies into
coUision, If Jackson was to bring Banks back to the
VaUey, and himself join Johnston before the expected battle,
he had no time to spare. Moreover, the information to
hand was quite sufficient to justify him in trusting some
thing to fortune. Even a defeat, if the attack were
resolutely pushed, might have the best effect.
The third reproach, that Jackson disobeyed orders, can
hardly be sustained. He was in command of a detached
force operating at a distance from the main army, and
Johnston, with a wise discretion, had given him not orders,
' The truth is that in war, accurate inteUigence, especially when two
armies are in close contact, is exceedingly difficult to obtain. At Jena, even
after the battle ended, Xapoleon believed that the Prussians had put 80,000
men in line instead of 45,000. The night before Eylau, misled by the reports
' of Murat's cavalry, he was convinced that the Eussians were retreating ;
and before Ligny he underestimated Blucher's strength by 40,000. The
curious misconceptions under which the Germans commenced the battles
of Spicheren, Mars-la-Tour, and Gravelotte wiU also occur to the military
reader. T 2

260 STONEWALL JACKSON
but instructions ; that is, the general-in-chief had merely
indicated the purpose for which Jackson's force had been
detached, and left to his judgment the manner in which
that purpose was to be achieved. Johnston had certainly
suggested that he should not expose himself to the danger
of defeat. But when it became clear that he could not
retain the enemy in the Valley unless he closed with him,
to have refrained from attack would have been to disobey
the spirit of his instructions.
Again, when Jackson attacked he had good reason to
believe that he ran no risk of defeat whatever. The force
before him was reported as inferior to his own, and he
might well have argued : ' To confine myself to observation
will be to confess my weakness, and Banks is not likely to
arrest his march to Manassas because of the presence
of an enemy who dare not attack an insignificant rear
guard,' Demonstrations, such as Johnston had advised,
may undoubtedly serve a temporary purpose, but if pro
tracted the enemy sees through them. On the 22nd, for
instance, it was reported to Banks that the Confederates
were advancing. The rear brigade of WiUiams' division
was therefore countermarched from Snicker's Gap to
BerryviUe ; but the other two were suffered to proceed.
Had Jackson remained quiescent in front of Shields, tacitly
admitting his inferiority, the rear brigade would in all
probabiUty have soon been ordered to resume its march ;
and Lincohi, with no fear for Washington, would have
allowed Blenker and McDoweU to join McClellan,
Johnston, at least, held that his subordinate was
justified. In pubUshing the thanks of the Confederate
Congress tendered to Jackson and his division, he ex
pressed, at the same time, ' his own sense of their
admirable conduct, by which they fully earned the high
reward bestowed,'
During the evening of the 23rd the medical director of
the VaUey army was ordered to collect vehicles, and send
the wounded to the rear before the troops continued their
retreat. Some time after midnight Dr. McGuire, findmg
that there were still a large number awaiting removal.

HIS CARE FOR THE WOUNDED 381
reported the circumstances to the general, adding that he
did not know where to get the means of transport, and tbat
unless some expedient were discovered the men must be
abandoned, Jackson ordered him to impress carriages in
the neighbourhood, ' But,' said the surgeon, ' that requires
time ; can you stay tUl it has been done ? ' ' Make yourself
easy, sir,' was the reply, ' This army stays here until the
last man is removed. Before I leave them to tbe enemy I
wiU lose many men more.' Fortunately, before daylight
the work was finished.

262

STONEWALL JACKSON

NOTE

The exact losses at Kernstown were as foUowB :— •

Confederates.

By brigades
StonewaU Brigade .
Burks' Brigade
Fulkerson's Brigade
Cavalry .
ArtiUery ,
By regiments Strength
2nd Va. . 320 N.C.O. and men
4th. . 203 „ „
6th. . 450 „ „
27th. . 170 „ „
88rd. . 275
21st . , 270 officers and men
42nd . 293 „ ,
1st, . 187 „ „
23rd, . 177 „ „
27th, . 397 N.C.O. and men

Eilled Wounded Uisalng Total
40 151 152 343

24 15 1

6
9
2
18 7
11 6
3
12

114 76
17 17
3823
48 20
27
4450
20
14
62

39 71

61
48 4
3514 9
9
21
32
39

177 162 1818
9076
615759
6070
47
49
113

Total casualties - 718-

80 k. including 5 officers ] 13 p.c. k. and w.
[20p.c. k., w., and
j m.

375 w.
.263 m

22
10

Total casualties •- 590

FbDEBAIiS.
118 k. including 6 officers
450 w. „ 27 „
22 m.

6p.c.

According to the reports of his regimental commanders, Jackson
took iuto battle (including 48th Va.) 3,087 N.C.O. and men of infantry,
290 cavalry, and 27 guns. 2,742 iu&ntry, 290 cavalry, and 18 guns
were engaged, and his total strength, including officers, was probably
about 3,500. Shields, in his first report of the battle, put down the
strength of his own division as between 7,000 and 8,000 men. Four days
later he declared that it did not exceed 7,000, viz. 6,000 Infantry, 760
cavalry, and 24 guns. It is probable that only those actuaUy engaged
are included in this estimate, for on March 17 he reported the strength
of the troops which were present at Kernstown six days later as 8,874
infantry, 608 artiUerymen, and 780 cavaky ; total, 9,762.'

O. B., vol. sii., part iii., p. 4.

263

CHAPTEE IX
m'dowhll
The stars were stiU shining when the Confederates began
their retreat from Kernstown. With the exception of seventy,
1862. aU the wounded had been brought in, and the army
March 23. followed the ambulances as far as Woodstock.
There was little attempt on tbe part of the Federals to
improve their victory. The bard fightiug of the Virginians
had left its impress on tbe generals. Jackson's numbers
were estimated at 15,000, and Banks, who arrived in time to
take dfrection of the pursuit, preferred to wait tUl WiUiams'
two brigades came up before he moved. He encamped
that night at Cedar Creek, eight miles from Kernstown.
March 25. '^^^ ^^^^ ^^^ ^^ reached Strasburg. The cavalry
' pushed on to near Woodstock, and there, for tbe
time being, the pursuit terminated. Shields, who remained
at Wmchester to nurse his wound, sent enthusiastic tele
grams announcing tbat the retreat was a flight, and that the
houses along the road were fiUed with Jackson's dead and
dying; yet the truth was that the Confederates were in
nowise pressed, and only the hopeless cases had been left
behind.' Had the 2,000 troopers at Banks' disposal been
sent forward at daybreak on the 24th, something might
have been done. The squadrons, however, incapable of
moving across country, were practicaUy useless in pursuit ;
and to start even at daybreak was to start too late. If the
fruits of victory are to be secured, the work must be put in
hand whUst tbe enemy is stUl reeling under the shock, A
few hours' delay gives him time to recover his equUibrium,
' Major Harman wrote on March 26 that 150 wounded had been brought
to Woodstock. MS.

264 STONEWALL JACKSON
to organise a rear-guard, and to gain many miles on his
rearward march.
On the night of the 26th, sixty hours after the battle
ceased, the Federal outposts were estabhshed along Tom's
March 26 ^^°^^> seventeen miles from Kernstown, On tbe
opposite bank were Ashby's cavalry, whUe Burks'
brigade lay at Woodstock, six miles further south. The
remainder of the Valley army had reached Mount Jackson,
These positions were occupied untU AprU 1, and for six
whole days Banks, with 19,000 men, was content to observe
a force one-sixth his strength, which had been defeated by
just half the numbers he had now at his disposal. This
was hardly the ' vigorous action ' which McClellan had
demanded. ' As soon as you are strong enough,' he had
telegraphed, ' push Jackson hard, drive him well beyond
Strasburg, pursuing at least as far as Woodstock, if possible,
with cavahy to Mount Jackson.' '
In vain he reiterated the message on the 27th : ' Peel
Jackson's rear-guard smartly and push him weU.' Not a
single Federal crossed Tom's Brook, ' The superb scenery
of the VaUey,' writes General G, H, Gordon, a comrade of
Jackson's at West Point, and now commanding the 2nd
Massachusetts, one of Banks' best regiments, 'opened
before us — the sparkling waters of the Shenandoah,
winding between the parallel ranges, the groves of cedar
and pine that lined its banks, the rolling surfaces of the
Valley, peacefuUy resting by the mountain side, and occupied
by rich fields and quiet farms, A mile beyond I could
see the rebel cavalry. Sometimes the enemy amused him
self by throwing shells at our pickets, when they were a
little too venturesome ; but beyond a feeble show of strength
and ugliness, nothing transpired to disturb the dulness of
the camp,' ^
Banks, far from all support, and with a cavalry unable
to procure information, was by no means free from appre
hension. Johnston had already fallen back into the interior
' 0. E., vol. zii., part iii., p. 16. The telegrams and letters quoted in
this chapter, unless otherwise stated, are from this volume.
' From irooi Farm to Cedar Mountain, p. 133.

BANKS INACTIVE 266
of Virginia, and the Army of the Potomac, instead of follow
ing bim, was taking ship at Alexandria. Information had
reached Strasburg that the Confederates were behind the
Eapidan, witb their left at GordonsvUle, Now GordonsvUle is
sixty-five mUes, or four marches, from Mount Jackson, and
there was reason to beUeve tbat remforcements had already
been sent to Jackson from tbat locaUty, On March 25
Banks telegraphed to Mr, Stanton: 'Eeported by rebel
Jackson's aide (a prisoner) that they were assured of rem
forcements to 30,000, but don't credit it,' On March 26 :
' The enemy is broken, but wiU raUy . Their purpose is to unite
Jackson's and Longstreet's ' forces, some 20,000, at New
Market (seven mUes south of Mount Jackson) or Washington
(east of Blue Eidge) in order to operate on either side of the
mountains, and wUl desire to prevent our junction with the
force at Manassas, At present they wUl not attack here.
It will relieve me greatly to know how far the enemy
(i.e. Johnston) wUl be pressed in front of Manassas.' On
the 27th his news was less alarming : ' Enemy is about
four mUes below Woodstock. No reinforcement received yet.
Jackson has constant communication with Johnston, who
is east of the mountains, probably at GordonsviUe, His
pickets are very strong and vigUant, none of the country
people being allowed to pass the lines under any circum
stances. The same rule is applied to troops, stragglers
from Winchester not being permitted to enter their lines.
We shaU press them further and quickly.'
The pressure, however, was postponed ; and on the 29th
McCleUan desired Banks to ascertain the uitentions of the
enemy as soon as possible, and if he were in force to drive
him from the VaUey of the Shenandoah. Thus spurred.
Banks at last resolved to cross the Eubicon. • Deficiency,'
he replied, 'in ammunition for Shields' artiUery detains
us here; expect it hourly, when we shaU push Jackson
sharply.' It was not, however, tUl April 2, four days
later, that Mr. Lincoln's proUgi crossed Tom's Brook.
His advanced-guard, after a brisk skirmish with Ashby,
reached the vUlage of Edenburg, ten mUes south, the
' Commanding a division under Johnston.

266 STONEWALL JACKSON
same evening. The mam body occupied Woodstock, and
McCleUan telegraphed that he was ' much pleased with the
vigorous pursuit ! '
It is not impossible that Banks suspected that
McClellan's commendations were ironical. In any case,
praise had no more effect upon him than a peremptory
order or the promise of reinforcements. He was instructed
to push forward as far as New Market ; he was told that
he would be joined by two regiments of cavahy, and that
two brigades of Blenker's division were marching to
Strasburg. But Jackson, although Ashby had been driven
in, still held obstinately to his position, and from Woodstock
and Edenburg Banks refused to move.
On AprU 4, becoming mdependent of McCleUan,' he
at once reported to the Secretary of War that he hoped
• immediately to strike Jackson an effective blow.' ' Imme
diately,' however, in Banks' opinion, was capable of a very
liberal interpretation, for it was not tiU AprU 17 that he
once more broke up his camps. WeU might Gordon write
that Ufe at Edenburg became monotonous !
It is but fair to mention that duringthe whole of this time
Banks was much troubled about supply and transport. His
magazines were at Winchester, connected with Harper's
Ferry and Washington by a line of railway which had been
rapidly repafred, and on AprU 12 this line had become
unserviceable through the spreading of tbe road-bed.* His
waggon train, moreover, had been diverted to Manassas
before the fight at Kernstown, and was several days late in
reaching Strasburg. The country in which he was operating
was rich, and requisitions were made upon the farmers ; but
in the absence of the waggons, according to his own report,
it was impossible to coUect sufficient suppUes for a further
advance.* The weather, too, had been unfavourable. Tbe
first days of AprU were like summer. ' But hardly,' says
• On this date McCleUan ceased to be Commander-in-Chief.
' The bridges over the raUway between Strasburg and Manassas Gap,
which would have made a second fine available, had not yet been repaired.
' On AprU 3 Jackson wrote that the country around Banks was ' very
much drained of forage.'

RUDE'S HILL 267
Gordon, ' had we begun to feel in harmony with sunny days
and blooming peach trees and warm showers, before a chiU
came over us, bitter as the hatred of the women of Vfrginia :
the ground covered with snow, the air thick with haU,
and the mountains hidden in the chUly atmosphere. Our
shivering sentmels on the outer Imes met at times the gaze
of half-frozen horsemen of the enemy, peering through the
mist to see what the Yankees had been domg within the last
twenty-four hours. It was hard to beUeve that we were in
the " sunny South." '
All this, however, was hardly an excuse for absolute
uiaction. The Confederate position on the open ridge
called Eude's HUl, two and a half mUes south of Mount
Jackson, was certainly strong. It was defended in front
by MiU Creek, swoUen by the snows to a turbulent and
unfordable river ; and by the North Fork of the Shenandoah,
But with aU its natural strength Eude's HUl was but weakly
held, and Banks knew it. Moreover, it was most unlikely
that Jackson would be reinforced, for Johnston's army,
with the exception of a detachment under General EweU,
had left Orange Court House for Eichmond on AprU 5,
'The enemy,' Banks wrote to McCleUan on AprU 6, 'is
reduced to about 6,000 men (sic), much demoraUsed by
defeat, desertion, and the general depression of spfrits rest
ing on the Southern army. He is not in a condition to
attack, neither to make a strong resistance, and I do not
beUeve he wiU make a determiaed stand there. I do not
beUeve Johnston wiU reinforce him,' If Banks had sup
pUes enough to enable bim to remain at Woodstock, there
seems to have been no valid reason why he should not have
been able to drive away a demoraUsed enemy, and to hold
a position twelve mUes further south.
But the Federal commander, despite his brave words,
had not yet got rid of his misgivings. Jackson had lured
him into a most uncomfortable situation. Between the
two branches of the Shenandoah, in the very centre of the
Valley, rises a gigantic mass of mountain ridges, parallel
throughout their length of fifty miles to the Blue Eidge and
the Alleghanies. These are the famous Massanuttons, the

268 STONEWALL JAOKSON
glory of the Valley. The peaks which form their northern
faces sink as abruptly to the level near Strasburg as does
the single hUl which looks down on Harrisonburg. Dense
forests of oak and pine cover ridge and ravine, and
2,500 feet below, on either hand, parted by the mighty
barrier, are the dales watered by the Forks of the
Shenandoah. That to the east is the narrower and less
open; the Blue Eidge is nowhere more than ten mUes
distant from the Massanuttons, and the space between them,
the Luray or the South Fork VaUey, through which a single
road leads northward, is clothed by continuous forest. West
of the great mountain, a broad expanse of green pasture
and rich arable extends to the foothiUs of the AUeghanies,
dotted with woods and homesteads, and here, in the
VaUey of the North Pork, is freer air and more space for
movement. The separation of the two valleys is accentuated by the
fact that save at one point only the Massanuttons are
practicaUy impassable. Prom New Market, in the western
valley, a good road cUmbs the heights, and crossing the lofty
plateau, sinks sharply down to Luray, tbe principal vUlage
on the South Pork, Elsewhere precipitous guUies and
sheer rock faces forbid aU access to the mountain, and a few
hunters' paths alone wind tediously through the woods up
the steep hiUside, Nor are signal stations to be found on
the wide area of unbroken forest which clothes the summit.
Except from the peaks at either end, or from one or two
points on the New Market-Luray road, the view is inter
cepted by the sea of foliage and the rolling spurs.
Striking eastward from Luray, two good roads cross
the Blue Eidge; one running to Culpeper Court House,
through Thornton's Gap ; the other through Fisher's Gap
to GordonsvUle. It was the Massanuttons that weighed on the mmd of
Banks. The VaUey of the South Pork gave the Confede
rates a covered approach against his Une of communica
tions. Issuing from that strait cleft between the mountains
Ashby's squadrons might at any time sweep down upon his
trains of waggons, his hospitals, and his magazines ; and

BANKS EMBARRASSED 369
should Jackson be reinforced, Ashby might be supported
by infantry and guns, and both Strasburg and Winchester
be endangered. It was not withm Banks' power to watch
the defile, 'His cavalry,' he reported, 'was weak in
numbers and spnit, much exhausted with night and day
work.' Good cavahy, he declared, would help incalculably,
and he admitted that in this arm he was greatly inferior
to the enemy.
Nor was he more happy as to the AUeghanies on his
right, Fremont was meditating an advance on Lewisburg,
Staunton, and tbe Virginia and Tennessee EaUway with
25,000 men,* One column was to start from Gauley Bridge,
in the Kanawha VaUey ; the other from the South Branch
of the Potomac. Milroy's brigade, from Cheat Mountam,
had therefore occupied Monterey, and Schenck's brigade
had marched from Eomney to Moorefield. But Moorefield
was thirty mUes west of Woodstock, and between them rose
a succession of rugged ridges, within whose deep valleys
the Confederate horsemen might find paths by which to
reach to Banks' rear.
It was essential, then, that his communications should
be strongly guarded, and as he advanced up the VaUey his
force had diminished at every march. According to his
own report be had, on AprU 6, 16,700 men fit for duty. Of
these 4,100 were detached along the road from Woodstock
to Harper's Ferry. His effective strength for battle was
thus reduced to 12,600, or, including the troops escorting
convoys and the garrison of Strasburg, to 14,500 men, with
40 pieces of artiUery,*
Such were the considerations that influenced the Federal
commander. Had he occupied New Market, as McCleUan
had desired, he would have secured the Luray road, have
opened tbe South Fork Valley to his scouts, and have over
come half the difficulties presented by the Massanuttons. A
vigorous advance woiUd have turned the attention of the
Confederates from his communications to their own ; and
to drive Jackson from the Valley was the best method
¦ See ante, p. 218.
' 0. E., vol. xii., part iii., p, SO,

270 STONEWALL JACKSON
of protecting the trains and the magazines. But Banks
was not inclined to beard the lion in his den, and on
AprU 16 Jackson had been unmolested for more than
three weeks. Ashby's troopers were the only men who
had even seen the enemy. Daily that indefatigable
soldier had caUed to arms tbe Federal outposts. ' Our stay
at Edenburg,' says Gordon, ' was a continuous season
of artiUery brawling and picket stalking. The creek that
separated the outposts was not more than ten yards wide.
About one-fourth of a mile away there was a thick wood, in
which the enemy concealed his batteries until he chose to
stir us up, when he would sneak up behind the cover, open
upon us at an unexpected moment, and retreat rapidly when
we replied.' It was doubtless by such constant evidence of
his vigUance that Ashby imposed caution on the enemy's
reconnoitring parties. The fact remains that Jackson's
camps, six mUes to the rear, were never once alarmed, nor
could Banks obtain any reliable information.
This period of repose was spent by Jackson in re
organising his regiments, in writing letters to his wife, and,
like his old class-mate, Gordon, in admiring the scenery. It
is not to be supposed that his enforced inaction was altogether
to his taste. With an enemy within sight of his outposts
his bold and aggressive spirit must have been sorely tried.
But with his inferior numbers prudence cried patience,
and he had reason to be well content with the situa
tion. He had been instructed to prevent Banks from
detaching troops to reinforce McClellan. To attam an
object in war the first consideration is to make no mis
takes yourself; the next, to take instant advantage of
those made by your opponent. But compliance with this
rule does not embrace the whole art of generalship. The
enemy may be too discreet to commit himself to risky
manoeuvres. If the campaigns of the great masters of war
are examined, it wiU be found that they but seldom
adopted a quiescent attitude, but by one means or another,
by acting on their adversary's maral, or by creating false
impressions, they induced him to make a fe;lse step, and to
place himself in a position which made it easy for them

DIFFERENCES WITH JOHNSTON 271
to attain their object. The greatest general has been defined
as ' he who makes the fewest mistakes ; ' but ' he who
compels his adversary to make the most mistakes ' is a
definition of equal force ; and it may even be questioned
whether the general whose imagmation is unequal to tbe
stratagems which bring mistakes about is worthy of the
name. He may be a trustworthy subordinate, but he can
scarcely become a great leader.
Johnston had advised, wben, at tbe beginning of March,
the retreat of the Confederates from Winchester was deter
mmed on, tbat Jackson should faU back on Front Eoyal,
and thence, if necessary, up the South Fork of the Shenan
doah. His force would thus be in close communication
with the main army behind the Eapidan ; and it was con
trary, in the General-in-Chief's opinion, to aU sound
discretion to permit the enemy to attain a point, such as
Front Eoyal, which would render it possible for him to p-ace
himself between them, Jackson, however, declared his pre
ference for a retreat up the North Fork, in the direction of
Staunton, Why should Banks join McCleUan at all?
McCleUan, so Jackson calculated, had already more men
with him than he could feed ; and he believed, therefore,
that Staunton would be Banks' objective, because, by seizing
tbat town, he would threaten Edward Johnson's rear, open
the way for Fremont, and then, crossing the Blue Eidge,
place himself so near the communications of the main army
witb Eichmond that it would be compeUed to faU back to
defend them. Nor, in any case, did he agree with Johnston
that the occupation of Front Eoyal would prevent Banks
leaving tbe Valley and marching to Manassas, Twenty
miles due east of Winchester is Snicker's Gap, where a good
road crosses tbe Blue Eidge, and eight mUes south another
turnpUie leads over Ashby's Gap, By either of these Banks
could reach Manassas just as rapidly as Jackson could join
Johnston ; and, whUe 4,500 men could scarcely be expected
to detain 20,000, they might very easily be cut off by a
portion of the superior force.
If a junction with the main army were absolutely
necessary, Jackson was of opinion that the move ought to

272 STONEWALL JAOKSON
be made at once, and the Valley abandoned. If, on the
other hand, it was desirable to keep Banks and McCleUan
separated, the best means of doing so was to draw the former
up the North Pork ; and at Mount Jackson, covering the
New Market-Luray road, the Valley troops would be as
near the Eapidan as if they were at Front Eoyal.' The
strategical advantages which such a position would offer —
the isolation of the troops pursuing him, the chance of
striking their communications from the South Fork Valley,
and, if reinforcements were granted, of cutting off their
retreat by a rapid movement from Luray to Winchester —
were always present to Jackson's mind.''
An additional argument was that at the time when these
alternatives were discussed tbe road along South Fork was
so bad as to make marching difficult ; and it was to this
rather than to Jackson's strategical conceptions that
Johnston appears to have ultimately yielded.
Be this as it may, the sum of Jackson's operations was
satisfactory in the extreme. On March 27 he had
written to Johnston, ' I will try and draw the enemy on,'
On AprU 16 Banks was exactly where he wished him, well
up the North Fork of the Shenandoah, cut off by the
Massanuttons from Manassas, and by the Alleghanies from
Fremont, The two detachments which held the VaUey,
his own force at Mount Jackson, and Edward Johnson's
2,800 on tbe Shenandoah Mountain, were in close com
munication, and could at any time, if permitted by the
higher authorities, combine against either of the columns
which threatened Staunton, ' What I desire,' he said to
Mr. Boteler, a friend in the Confederate Congress, ' is to
hold the country, as far as practicable, untU we_ are in a
condition to advance ; and then, with God's blessing, let us
make thorough work of it. But let us start right.'
On AprU 7 he wrote to his wife as follows : —
'Your sickness gives me great concern; but so live
that it and aU your tribulations may be sanctified to you,
remembering that our " light afflictions, which are but for a
' Dabney, vol. ii., pp. 22, 28. 0. E., vol. v., p. 1087.
' Cf. letters of Api-U 5. O. R., vol. xii., part ui., pp. 843-4.

ASHBY 278
mornent, work out for us a far more exceeding and eternal
weight of glory ! " I trust you and aU I have in the hands
of a kind Providence, knowing that all things work together
for the good of His people. Yesterday was a lovely
Sabbath day. Although I had not the privilege of hearing
the word of life, yet it felt like a holy Sabbath day,
beautiful, serene, and lovely. All it wanted was the
church-bell and God's services in the sanctuary to make it
complete. Our gallant little army is increasing in numbers,
and my prayer is that it may be an army of the living God
as well as of its country.'
The troops, notwithstanding their defeat at Kernstown,
were in high spirits. The very slackness of the Federal
pursuit had made them aware that they had inflicted a
heavy blow. They had been thanked by Congress for their
valour. The newspapers were full of their praises. Their
comrades were returning from hospital and furlough, and
recruits were rapidly coming in,' The mounted branch
attracted the majority, and Ashby's regiment soon numbered
more than 2,000 troopers. Their commander, however,
knew Uttle of discipUne, Besides himself there was but one
field-officer for one-and-twenty companies ; nor had these
companies any regimental organisation. When Jackson
attempted to reduce this curiously constituted force to order,
his path was once more crossed by the Secretary of War,
Mr. Benjamin, dazzled by Ashby's exploits, had given him
authority to raise and command a force of independent
cavahy. A reference to this authority and a threat of
resignation was Ashby's reply to Jackson's orders. ' Knowing
Ashby's ascendency over his men, and finding himself thus
deprived of legitimate power, the general was constrained
to pause, and the cavalry was left unorganised and un-
I Congress, on April 16, passed a Conscription Act, under which aU able-
bodied whites, between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five, were compelled
to serve. It was not found necessary, however, except in the case of three
religious denominations, to enforce the Act in the VaUey ; and, in dealing
with these sectarians, Jackson found a means of reconciling their scruples
with their duty to their State. He organised them in companies as team
sters, pledging himself to employ them, so far as practicable, in other ways
than fighting. 0. E., vol. xii., part iii., p. 835.
VOL. I. U

274 STONEWALL JACKSON
disciplined. One half was rarely avaUable for duty. The
remainder were roaming over the country, imposing upon
the generous hospitalities of the citizens, or lurking in
their homes. The exploits of their famous leader were all
performed with a few hundreds, or often scores, of men,
who followed him from personal devotion rather than force
of discipline,' '
By April 15 Jackson's force had increased to 6,000 men,'
McCleUan had now landed an army of over 100,000 at
Fortress Monroe, on the Yorktown Peninsula, and Johnston
had marched thither to oppose him. The weather had at
last cleared ; although the mountain pines stood deep in
snow the roads were in good order ; the rivers were once
April 17 '^ore fordable ; tbe Manassas Gap Eailway bad
been restored as far as Strasburg, and Banks took
heart of grace. On the 17th his forces were put in motion.
One of Ashby's companies was surprised and captured, A
brigade was sent to turn the Confederate left by a ford of
the North Fork; and when the Virginians, burning the
railway station at Mount Jackson, fell back southwards,
the Federal cavalry seized New Market,
For the moment the situation of the Valley army was
somewhat critical. When Johnston marched to the Penin
sula he had left a force of 8,000 men, under General EweU,
on the Upper Eappahannock, and with this force Jackson
had been instructed to co-operate. But with the road
across the Massanuttons in his possession Banks could move
into the Luray Valley, and occupying Swift Eun Gap with
a detachment, out the communication between the two
Confederate generals. It was essential, then, that this
important pass should be secured, and Jackson's men were
Anrilis "^'Ued on for a forced march. On the morning
of the 18th they reached Harrisonburg, twenty-
' Dabney, vol. ii., p. 49.
¦¦¦ On AprU 6 he had over 4,000 infantry. 0. E., vol. xii., pt. iii., p. 844,
The estimate in the text is from Colonel Allan's Valley Ca-mpaigni-p. 64. On
April 9, however, he was so short of arms that 1,000 pikes were ordered
from Eichmond. ' Under Divine blessing,' he wrote, ' we must rely upon the
bayonet when firearms cannot be furnished.' O. E., vol. xii., part iii.,
pp. 843, 845.

JOHNSON AND MILROY 275
five miles from Mount Jackson, and halted the same
AprU 19 6'^6^hig at Peale's, about six mUes east. On the
19th they crossed the Shenandoah at Conrad's
store, and leaving a detachment to hold the bridge, moved
to the foot of Swift Eun Gap, and went into camp in Elk
Eun VaUey. In three days they had marched over fifty
miles. Banks followed with his customary caution, and when,
on the 17tb, bis cavalry occupied New Market he was con
gratulated by the Secretary of War on his ' briUiant and suc
cessful operations.' On the 19th he led a detachment across
the Massanuttons, and seized the two bridges over the South
Pork at Luray, driving back a squadron whicb Jackson had
AprU 22 ^^^ ^^ ^'^'^° tbem. On the night of the 22nd
his cavalry reached Harrisonburg, and he reported
that want of supplies alone prevented him from bringing
the Confederates to bay. On the 26 th he sent two of his
AprU 26 ^^^ brigades to Harrisonburg, the remainder
halting at New Market, and for the last few days,
according to his own despatches, beef, flour, and forage had
been abundant. Yet it had taken him ten days to march
five-and-thirty miles.
On AprU 20 General Edward Johnson, menaced in rear
by Banks' advance, in flank by the brigade which Fremont
had placed at Moorefield, and in front by Milroy's brigade,
A rU20 "^^^^^ ^^^ advanced from Monterey, had faUen
^' ¦ back from the Shen andoah Mountain to West View,
seven mUes west of Staunton ; and to all appearance the
Federal prospects were exceedingly favourable.
Harrisonburg is five-and-twenty miles, or two short
marches, north of Staunton. The hamlet of M'DoweU, now
occupied by MUroy, is seven-and-twenty mUes north-west.
Proper concert between Banks and Fremont should there
fore have ensured the destruction or retreat of Edward
Johnson, and have placed Staunton, as well as tbe Virguiia
Central EaUroad, in their hands. But although not a single
picket stood between his outposts and Staunton, Banks
dared not move. By moving to Elk Eun Valley Jackson
had barred the way of the Federals more effectively than if
he had intrenched his troops across the Staunton road. 0 -i

276 STONEWALL JAOKSON
South of Harrisonburg, where the VaUey widens to five-
and-twenty mUes, there was no strong position. And even
had such existed, 6,000 men, of which a third were cavalry,
could scarcely have hoped to hold it permanently against
a far superior force. Moreover, cooped up inside intrench
ments, the Army of the Valley would have lost all freedom of
action; and Jackson would have been cut off both from
EweU and from Eichmond. But, although direct interven
tion was impracticable, he was none the less resolved that
Banks should never set foot in Staunton. The Elk Eun
VaUey was well adapted for his purpose. Spurs of the
Blue Eidge, steep, pathless, and densely wooded, covered
either flank. Tbe front, protected by the Shenandoah, was
very strong. Communication with both EweU and Eich
mond was secure, and so long as he held the bridge at
Conrad's store he threatened the flank of the Federals
should they advance on Staunton, Strategically the position
was by no means perfect. The Confederates, to use an
expression of General Grant's, applied to a similar situation,
were ' in a bottle.' A bold enemy would have seized the
bridge, 'corking up' Jackson with a strong detachment,
and have marched on Staunton with his main body,
* Had Banks been more enterprising,' says Dabney, 'this
objection would have been decisive.' But he was not enter
prising, and Jackson knew it.^ He had had opportunities
in plenty of judging his opponent's character. The slow
advance on Winchester, the long delay at Woodstock, the
cautious approach to New Market, had revealed enough.
It was a month since the battle of Kernstown, and yet the
Confederate infantry, although for the greater part of the
time they had been encamped within a few miles of the
enemy's outposts, had not fired a shot.
The tardy progress of the Federals from Woodstock to
Harrisonburg had been due rather to the perplexities of
' ' My own opinion,' he wrote, when this movement was in contempla
tion, ' is that Banks wiU not follow me up to the Blue Eidge. My desire
is, as far as practicable, to hold the Valley, and I hope that Banks wiU be
deterred from advancing [from New Market] much further toward Staunton
by the apprehension of my returning to New Market [by Luray], and thus
getting in his rear.'— 0. E., vol. xu., part iii., p. 848.

ELK RUN VALLEY 277
their commander than to the difficulties of supply; and
Banks had got clear of the Massanuttons only to meet with
fresh embarrassments. Jackson's move to Elk Eun VaUey
was a complete checkmate. His opponent felt that he was
dangerously exposed. McClellan had not yet begun his
advance on Eichmond; and, so long as that city was
secure from immediate attack, the Confederates could spare
men to reinforce Jackson. The railway ran within easy
reach of Swift Eun Gap, and tbe troops need not be long
absent from the capital. EweU, too, with a force of un
known strength, was not far distant. Banks could expect
no help from Fremont. Both generals were anxious to
work together, and plans had been submitted to Wash
ington which would probably have secured the capture of
Staunton and the control of the raUway. But the Secre
tary of War rejected all advice. Fremont was given to
understand tbat under no circumstances was he to count
on Banks,' and the latter was told to halt at Harrisonburg,
' It is not the desire of the President,' wrote Mr, Stanton on
AprU 26, ' that you should prosecute a further advance
towards the south. It is possible that events may make
it necessary to transfer the command of General Shields to
the department of the Eappahannock [i.e. to the Ffrst
Army Corps], and you are desired to act accordingly.' To
crown aU, Blenker's division, which had reached Winchester,
instead of being sent to support Banks, forty-five mUes dis
tant by the VaUey turnpike, was ordered to join Fremont
in the AUeghanies by way of Eomney, involving a march
of one hundred and twenty mUes, over bad roads, before
it could reinforce his advanced brigade.
Stanton, in writing to Banks, suggested that he should
not let his advanced guard get too far ahead of tbe main
body ; but he does not appear to have seen that tbe separation
of Banks, Fremont, and Blenker, and the forward position
of the two former, which he had determined to maintain,
was even more dangerous.' His lesson was to come, for
' 0. E., vol. xii., p. 104.
* Jackson had recognised aU along the mistake the Federals had made in
pushing comparatively smaU forces up the VaUey before McCleUan closed in

278 STONEWALL JAOKSON
Jackson, by no means content with arresting Banks' march,
was already contemplating that general's destruction.
The situation demanded instant action, and in order that
the import of Jackson's movements may be fully realised
it is necessary to turn to the main theatre of war.
McClellan, on April 5, with the 60,000 men already landed,
had moved a few mUes up the Peninsula. Near the village
of Yorktown, famous for the surrender of Lord CornwaUis
and his army in 1782, he found the road blocked by a line
of earthworks and numerous guns, Magruder, Jackson's
captain in Mexico, was in command; but Johnston was
still on the Eapidan, one himdred and thirty miles away,
and the Confederates had no more than 15,000 men in
position. The flanks, however, were secured by tbe York
and the James rivers, which here expand to wide estuaries,
and the works were strong. Yorktown proved almost as
fatal to the invaders as to their English predecessors.
Before the historic lines their march was suddenly brought
up. McClellan, although his army increased in numbers
every day, declined the swift process of a storm. Personal
reconnaissance convinced him that ' instant assault would
have been simple foUy,' and he determined to besiege the
intrenchments in due form. On April 10 Johnston's army
began to arrive at Yorktown, and the lines, hitherto held
by a slender garrison, were now manned by 53,000 men.
The Confederate position was by no means impregnable.
The river James to the south was held by the ' Merrimac,'
an improvised ironclad of novel design, which had already
wrought terrible destruction amongst the wooden frigates of
the Federals. She was neutralised, however, by her Northern
counterpart, the ' Monitor,' and after an indecisive action she
had remained inactive for nearly a month. The York
was less securely guarded. The channel, nearly a mile
wide, was barred only by the fire of two forts ; and
on Eichmond. On AprU 5, when Banks was at Woodstock, he wrote!
• Banks is very cautious. As he belongs to McCleUan's army, I suppose that
McCleUan is at the helm, and that he would not, even if Banks so desired,
permit him to advance much farther until other parts of his army are farther
advanced ' (0. E., vol. xii., part iii., p. 843). He did not know that at the date
he wrote the President and Mr. Stanton had relieved McClellan at the hehn.

YORKTOWN 279
that at Gloucester Point, on the north bank, was open to
assault from the land side. Had McClellan disembarked
a detachment and carried this work, which might easily
have been done, the river would have been opened to bis
gunboats, and Johnston's lines have become untenable.
He decided, however, notwithstanding that his army was
more than 100,000 strong, that he had no men to spare
for such an enterprise.
Magruder's bold stand was of infinite service to the Con
federate cause. To both parties time was of the utmost value.
Tbe Federals were stiU over seventy miles from Eichmond ;
and there was always a possibility, if their advance were
not rapidly pressed, that Johnston might move on Washing
ton and cause the recall of the army to protect the capital.
The Confederates, on the other hand, had been surprised
by the landing of McClellan's army. They had been long
aware that the flotUla had saUed, but they had not dis
covered its destination ; tbe detachments which first landed
were supposed to be reinforcements for the garrison of
the fortress ; and wben McClellan advanced on Yorktown,
Johnston was far to the west of Eichmond. The delay
bad enabled him to reach the lines.' But at the time
Jackson fell back to Elk Eun VaUey, April 17-19, fortune
seemed inclining to the Federals.
Lincoln had been induced to relax his hold on the army
corps which he had held back at Manassas to protect the
capital, and McDoweU was already moving on Fredericks
burg, sixty mUes north of Eichmond. Here he was to be
joined by Shields, bringing his force for the field up to
40,000 men ; and the fall of Yorktown was to be the signal
for his advance on the Confederate capital. Johnston still
held the lines, but be was outnumbered by more than two
to one, and the enemy was disembarking heavy ordnance.
It was evident that the end could not be long delayed, and
' The first detachment of Federals embarked at Alexandria on March 16,
and the army was thereafter transferred to the Peninsula by successive
divisions. On March 25 Johnston was ordered to be ready to move to Eich
mond. On April 4 he was ordered to move at once. On that date 50,000
Federals had landed.

280 STONEWALL JACKSON
that in case of retreat every single Confederate soldier,
from the VaUey and elsewhere, would have to be brought to
Eichmond for the decisive battle, Jackson was thus bound
to his present position, close to the railway, and his orders
from Johnston confined him to a strictly defensive attitude.
In case Banks advanced eastward he was to combine with
EweU, and receive attack in the passes of the Blue Eidge.
Sucb cautious strategy, to one so fully alive to the
opportunity offered by McClellan's retention before York-
town, was by no means acceptable. When his orders
reached him, Jaokson was already weaving plans for the
discomfiture of his immediate adversary, and it may be
imagined with what reluctance, although he gave no
vent to his chagrin, he accepted the passive r6le which
had been assigned to him.
No sooner, however, had he reached Elk Eun VaUey
than the telegraph brought most welcome news. In p
moment of unwonted wisdom the Confederate President
had charged General Lee with the control of all mUitary
operations in Virginia, and on April 21 came a letter
to Jackson which foreshadowed the downfall of McCleUan
and the rout of the invaders,
McDoweU's advance from Manassas had already become
known to the Confederates, and Lee had divined what
this movement portended, ' I have no doubt,' he wrote to
., ai Jackson, ' tbat an attempt will be made to occupy
^" ¦ Fredericksburg and use it as a base of operations
against Eichmond. Our present force there is very smaU,
(2,500 men under General Field), and cannot be reinforced
except by weakening other corps. If you can use General
EweU's division in an attack on Banks, it wUl prove a great
relief to the pressure on Fredericksburg.' '
This view of the situation was in exact agreement with
Jackson's own views. He had already made preparation
for combined action with EweU, For some days they had
been in active correspondence. The exact route wbich
EweU should take to the Blue Eidge had been decided on.
The roads had been reconnoitred. Jackson had supplied
' 0. E., vol. xii., part iii,, p. 859.

STANARDSVILLE 281
a map identical with his own, and had furnished an officer
to act as guide. A service of couriers had been established
across the mountains, and no precaution had been neglected.
EweU was instructed to bring five days' rations. He was
warned tbat there would be no necessity for a forced march ;
he was to encamp at cross-roads, and he was to rest on
Sunday.' Jackson, replying to Lee, stated that he was only
waiting a favourable occasion to fall on Banks. ' My object,'
April 23 ^® wrote, 'has been to get in his rear at New
Market or Harrisonburg, if he gives me an oppor
tunity, and this would be the case should he advance on
Staunton with his main body. It appears to me that if 1
remain quiet a few days more he will probably make a
move in some direction, or send a large force towards
Harrisonburg, and thus enable me, with the blessing of
Providence, to successfully attack his advance. If I am
unsuccessful in driving back bis entire force he may be
induced to move forward from New Market, and attempt
to follow me through this Gap, where our forces would have
greatly tbe advantage. . . .
' Under aU the circumstances I wUl direct General EweU
to move to StanardsvUle. Should Banks remain in the
position of yesterday [cavalry at Harrisonburg ; infantry,
&c,, at New Market] I wUl try and seek an opportunity
of attacking successfuUy some part of his army, and if
circumstances justify press forward. My instructions from
General Johnston were to unite with General EweU near
the top of the Blue Eidge, and give battle. The course I
propose would be departing from General Johnston's in
structions, but I do not believe that Banks wUl follow me
to the Blue Eidge unless I first engage him, and I doubt
whether he will then.'
But although authorised to draw EweU to himself, and
to carry out the project on whieh bis heart was set, he stUl
kept in view tbe general situation. After he had despatched
tbe above letter, a report came in which led bim to believe
tbat EweU was more needed on the Eappahannock than in
> 0. K., vol. xii., part iii., pp. 849, 854, 857.

282 STONEWALL JACKSON
the Valley. Lee had already informed him that McDowell's
advanced guard had occupied Falmouth, on the north bank
ofthe river, opposite Fredericksburg, on AprU 19, and that
General Field had faUen back.
Jackson, in consequence, permitted EweU to remain
near GordonsvUle, close to the railway ; assuring Lee tbat
' he would make arrangements so as not to be disappointed
should EweU be ordered to Fredericksburg."
Nor was this the only instance in which he demon
strated his breadth of view. In planning co-operation with
EweU, that general had suggested that he should take a
different road to that which had been recommended by
General Johnston, should necessity for a combined move
ment arise. Jackson protested against the route being
altered, ' General Johnston,' he wrote, ' does not state
why he desires you to go (by this road) , but it may be for
the purpose of deceiving the enemy with regard to your
ultimate destination, to be more distant from the enemy
during the movement, and also to be in a more favourable
position for reinforcing some other points should it be
necessary,' The interests of his own force, here as always,
were subordinated to those of the army which was
defending Eichmond,
The next information received from General Lee was
that the enemy was collecting in strong force at Fredericks
burg. 'For this purpose,' he wrote, 'they must weaken
A rii 25 other points, and now is the time to concentrate
^ ¦ on any that may be exposed within our reach.'
He then suggested that, if Banks was too strong in numbers
and position, Jackson and EweU combined should move
on Warrenton, where a Federal force was reported ; or that
EweU and Field should attack Fredericksburg. • The blow,'
he added, ' wherever struck, must, to be successful, be
sudden and heavy. The troops must be efficient and light.
I cannot pretend at this distance to direct operations
depending on circumstances unknown to me, and requiring
the exercise of discretion and judgment as to time and
' 0. B., vol. xii., part iii., pp. 863-4.

THREE PLANS OF ATTACK 283
execution, but submit these ideas for your considera
tion.' '
On AprU 26, when Banks moved two brigades to Harri
sonburg, EweU was at once called up to StanardsviUe, twelve
mUes south-east of Swift Eun Gap, No opportunity as
., „„ yet had offered for attack, ' I have reason to
AprU zb. jjgjjg^g , ^^^^ Jackson to Lee on the 28th, ' that
Banks has 21,000 men within a day's march of me.* He
has moved his main body from New Market to Harrisonburg,
leaving probably a brigade at New Market, and between
tbat town and the Shenandoah (Luray Gap), to guard agamst
a force getting m his rear. ... On yesterday week there
were near 7,000 men in the neighbourhood of Winchester,
under Blenker ; as yet I have not beard of their having
joined Banks. ... I propose to attack Banks in front if
you wUl send me 5,000 more men. , . , Now, as it appears
to me, is the golden opportunity for striking a blow, UntU
I hear from you I wUl watch an opportunity for striking
some exposed point,' *
The next day, AprU 29, Jackson suggested, if reinforce
ments could not be spared, that one of tbree plans should be
A ril 29 ^'dopted, 'Either to leave EweU here (Swift Eun
^ ' Gap) to threaten Banks' rear in the event of his
advancing on Staunton, and move with my command rapidly
on the force in front of General Edward Johnson ; or else,
co-operating with EweU, to attack the enemy's detached
force between New Market and the Shenandoah, and if
successful in this, then to press forward and get in Banks'
rear at New Market, and thus induce him to fall back ; the
> Jackson himself showed the same wise self-restraint. In his communi
cations with EweU, after that officer had been placed under his orders,
but before they had joined hands, he suggested certain movements as
advisable, but invariably left the ultimate decision to his subordinate's
judgment. ' On AprU 30 Banks aud Shields, who had been reinforced, numbered
20,000 effective officers and men, of whom a portion must have been guarding
the communications. Eeports of April 30 and May 31. O.E., vol. xii., part iii.
* It is amusing to note how far, at this time, his staff officers were
from understanding their commander. On this very date one of them wrote
in a private letter : ' As sure as you and I live, Jackson is a cracked man, and
the sequel wUl show it.' A mouth later he must have been sorry he had
posed as a prophet.

284 STONEWALL JACKSON
third is to pass down the Shenandoah to SperryvUle (east of
the Blue Eidge), and thus threaten Winchester vid Front
Eoyal. To get in Banks' rear with my present force would
be rather a dangerous undertaking, as I would have to cross
the river and immediately cross the Massanutton Mountains,
during which the enemy would have the advantage of position.
Of the three plans I give the preference to attacking the
force west of Staunton [MUroy], for, if successful, I would
afterward only have Banks to contend with, and in doing
this would be reinforced by General Edward Johnson, and
by that time you might be able to give me reinforcements,
which, united with the troops under my control, would
enable me to defeat Banks. If he should be routed and his
command destroyed, nearly all our own forces here could, if
necessary, cross the Blue Eidge to Warrenton, Fredericks
burg, or any other threatened point.'
Lee's reply was to the effect that no reinforcements
could be spared, but that he had carefuUy considered the
three plans of operations proposed, and that the selection
was left to Jackson.
The Army of the Valley, when the Commander-in-
Chiefs letter was received, had already been put in motion.
Three roads lead from Conrad's store in the Elk Eun
Valley to Johnson's position at West View ; one through
Harrisonburg; the second by Port EepubUc, Cross Keys,
and Mount Sidney; the third, the river road, by Port
Eepublic and Staunton. The first of these was already
occupied by the Federals ; the second was tortuous, and
at places almost within view of the enemy's camps ; whUe
the third, though it was nowhere less than ten mUes
distant, ran obliquely across their front. In fact, to all
appearance. Banks with his superior force blocked Jackson's
march on Staunton more effectively than did Jackson his.
On the 29th, Ashby, continually watching Banks, made
a demonstration in force towards Harrisonburg. On the
AprU 30 ^^^^ ^^ drove the Federal cavalry back upon their
camps ; and the same afternoon Jackson, leaving
Elk Eun Valley, which was immediately occupied by
EweU, with 8,000 men, marched up the river to Port

Romney o

Harper's

Baltimore

BLENKER rO.OOO
Winchester '

Woodstodk

Pranklin

•BK?"

Scale of Miles
? '.° gp 3P 4.0

Richmond I

I Confederate
1 Federal

Situation April 30th. 1862.

Yorktown yv ys.
110.000

H^alkerO-Botttalisc.

286 STONEWALL JACKSON
mountain-eagles they looked down upon the wide Virginia
plains. Par off, away to the south-east, the traUs of white
smoke from passiag trains marked the line of the Central
EaUroad, and the line of march led directly to the station at
Mecbum's Eiver, Both officers and men were more than
bewildered. Save to his adjutant-general, Jackson had
breathed not a whisper of his plan. The soldiers only knew
that they were leaving the Valley, and leaving it in the
enemy's possession, Winchester, Strasburg, Front Eoyal,
New Market, Harrisonburg, were full of Northern troops,
Staunton alone was yet unoccupied. But Staunton was
closely threatened ; and north of Harrisonburg the blue-
coated cavalry were riding far and wide. While the women
and old men looked impotently on, vUlage and null and farm
were at the mercy of the invaders. Already the Federal
commissaries had laid hands on herds and granaries. It
is true that the Northerners waged war like gentlemen ; yet
for all that the patriotism of the Valley soldiers was sorely
tried. They were ready to go to Eichmond if the time had
come ; but it was with heavy hearts that tbey saw the Blue y
Eidge rise behind them, and the bivouac on Mecbum's Eiverv
was even more cheerless than the sodden woods near Porty
Eepublic. The long lines of cars that awaited them at
the station but confirmed their anticipations. They were
evidently wanted at the capital, and the need was pressing.
Still not a word transpired as to their destiuation.
The next day was Sunday, and Jackson had intended
that the troops should rest. But early in the morning came
J. , a message from Edward Johnson. Fremont's
*^ ¦ advanced guard was pushing forward. ' After hard
debate with himself,' says Dabney, who accompanied him,
' and with sore reluctance,' Jackson once more sacrificed his
scruples and ordered the command to march. The infantry
was to move by rail, the artUlery and waggons by road. To
tbeir astonishment and deUght the troops then heard, for tbe
first time, that their destination was not Eichmond but
Staunton ; and although they were far from understandmg
the reason for their circuitous march, they began to suspect
that it bad not been made without good purpose.

DISMAY IN THE VALLEY 287
If the soldiers had been heavy hearted at the prospect
of leaving the VaUey, the people of Staunton had been
plunged in the direst grief. For a long time past they had
hved in a pitiable condition of uncertainty. On April 19
the sick and convalescents of the VaUey army had been
removed to GordonsvUle. On tbe same day Jackson had
moved to EUi Eun Valley, leaving the road from Harrison
burg completely open ; and Edward Johnson evacuated bis
position on tbe Shenandoah Mountain. Letters front Jack
son's officers, unacquainted with the designs of their com
mander, had confirmed the apprehension that the Federals
were too strong to be resisted. On the Saturday of this
anxious week had come the news that the army was
crossing the Blue Eidge, and that tbe Valley had been
abandoned to the enemy. Sunday morning was fuU of
rumours and excitement. 10,000 Federals, it was reported,
were advancing against Johnson at West View ; Banks was
moving from Harrisonburg ; his cavalry had been seen from
the neighbouring hUls, and Staunton beUeved that it was
to share the fate of Winchester. Suddenly a train full
of soldiers steamed into the station; and as regiment
after regiment, clad in their own Confederate grey, swept
through the crowded streets, confidence in Stonewall
Jackson began once more to revive.
Pickets were immediately posted on aU the roads lead-
uig to Harrisonburg, and beyond the line of sentries no one,
whatever his busiuess might be, was aUowed to pass. The
foUowmg day the remainder of the division arrived, and
the junction with Johnson's brigade was virtually effected.
May 6 was spent in resting the troops, in making tbe
arrangements for the march, and in getting information.
Tbe next morning brought a fresh surprise to both troops
and townsfolk. Banks, so the rumour went, was rapidly
May 7 approaching ; and it was confidently expected that
the twin hiUs which stand above the town — chris
tened by some early settler, after two simUar heights in far
away Tyrone, Betsy Bell and Mary Gray — would look down
upon a bloody battle. But instead of taking post to defend
the town, the VaUey regiments filed away over the western
VOL. I. X

288 STONEWALL JACKSON
hiUs, heading for the AUeghanies ; and Staunton was once
more left unprotected. Jackson, although informed by
Ashby that Banks, so far from moving forward, was actually
retfring on New Market, was stiU determined to strike first
at Milroy, commanding Fremont's advanced guard; and
there can be little question but that his decision was correct.
As we have seen, he was under the impression that Banks'
strength was 21,000, a force exceeding the united strength
of the Confederates by 4,200 men,' It was undoubtedly
sound strategy to crush the weaker and more exposed of
the enemy's detachments first ; and then, having cleared
his own rear and prevented aU chance of combination
between Banks and Fremont, to strike tbe larger.
There was nothing to be feared from Harrisonburg,
Eight days had elapsed since Jackson had marched frorn^
Elk Eun ; but Banks was still in blissful ignorance of the
blow that threatened Fremont's advanced guard.
On April 28 he had telegraphed to Washington that he
was ' entirely secure,' Everything was satisfactory, ' The
enemy,' he said, ' is in no condition for offensive movements.
Our supplies have not been in so good condition nor my com
mand in so good spirits since we left Winchester, General
Hatch (commanding cavalry) made a reconnaissance in
force yesterday, which resulted in obtaining a complete
view of the enemy's position, A negro employed in Jackson's
tent came in this morning, and reports preparation for
retreat of Jackson to-day. You need have no apprehen
sions for our safety, I think we are just now in a condition
to do all you can desire of us in the Valley — clear the enemy
out permanently,'
On the 30th, when Ashby repaid with interest Hatch's
reconnaissance in force, he reported : ' AU quiet. Some
alarm excited by movement of enemy's cavalry. It appears
to-day that they were in pursuit of a Union prisoner who
escaped to our camp. The day he left Jackson was to be
reinforced by Johnson and attack vid Luray, Another
report says Jackson is bound for Eichmond. This is the
fact, I have no doubt. Jackson is on half-rations, his
' Jaokson, 6,000 ; EweU, 8,000 ; E. Johnson, 2,800.

BANKS ALAEMED 288
supplies having been cut off by our advance. There is
nothing to be done in this Valley this side of Strasburg.'
The same night, ' after fuU consultation with all lead
ing officers,' he repeated that his troops were no longer
requned iu the Valley, and suggested to the Secretary of
War that he should be permitted to cross the Blue Eidge
and clear the whole country north of GordonsvUle.
' Enemy's force there is far less than represented in news
papers—not more than 20,000 at the outside. Jackson's
army is reduced, demoralised, on half-rations. They are
aU concentrating for Eichmond. ... I am now satisfied
that it is the most safe and effective disposition for our
corps. I pray your favourable consideration. Such order
wiU electrify our force.' The force was certainlv to be
electrified, bnt. tbA impnlfift was not, in p.c,m(\ from Mr.
Secretary Stanton,
±Jani£S, It may have been observed, whenever his
superiors wanted him to move, had invariably the best
of reasons for halting. At one time supplies were most
difficult to arrange for. At another time the enemy was
beiag reinforced, and his own numbers were small. But
when he was told to halt, he immediately panted to be
let loose. * Tbe enemy was not half so strong as had been
reported ; ' ' His men were never in better condition ; '
' Supplies were plentiful.' It is not impossible that Mr.
Stanton had by tbis time discovered, as was said of a certain
Confederate general, a protige of the President, that Banks
had a fine career before him until Lincohi ' undertook to
make of him what the good Lord hadn't, a great general.'
To the daring propositions of the late Governor and
Speaker, the only reply vouchsafed was an order to fall
back on Strasburg, and to transfer Shields' division to
General McDoweU at Fredericksburg.
But on May 3, the day Jackson disappeared behind the
Blue Eidge, Banks, to his evident discomfiture, found tbat
bis adversary had not retreated to Eichmond after all.
The dashing commander, just now so anxious for one thing
or the other, either to clear the Valley or to sweep tbe
country north of GordonsvUle, disappeared, 'The re-

290 STONEWALL JACKSON
duced, demoralised ' enemy assumed alarming proportions.
Nothing was said about his half-rations ; and as EweU had
reached Swift Eun Gap with a force estimated at 12,000
men, whUe Jackson, according to the Federal scouts, was
stiU near Port Eepublic, Banks thought it impossible to
divide his force with safety,
Stanton's reply is not on record, but it seems that he
permitted Banks to retain Shields until he arrived at
Strasburg ; and on May 5 the Federals fell back to New
Market, their commander, misled both by his cavalry
and his spies, believing that Jackson had marched to
Harrisonburg, On the 7th, the day that Jackson moved west from
Staunton, Banks' fears again revived. He was stUl anxious
that Shields should remain with him. ' Our cavalry,' he
said, ' from near Harrisonburg report to-night that Jackson
occupies that town, and that he has been largely rein
forced. Deserters confirm reports of Jackson's movements
in this direction,'
Jackson's movements at this juncture are full of
interest. Friend and foe were both mystified. Even his
own officers might well ask why, in his march to Staunton,
he deliberately adopted the terrible road to Port Republic.
From Elk Eun Valley a metalled road passed over tbe
Blue Eidge to GordonsviUe. Staunton by this route
was twenty-four miles further than by Port Eepublic ;
but there were no obstacles to rapid marching, and the
command would have arrived no later than it actually did.
Moreover, in moving to Port Eepublic, eleven miles only
from Harrisonburg, and within sight of the enemy's
patrols, it would seem that there was considerable risk.
Had Banks attacked the bridge whilst the Confederate
artillery was dragging heavily through the mire, tbe conse
quences would probably have been unpleasant. Even if
he had not carried the bridge, the road which Jackson
had chosen ran for several miles over the open plain
which lies eastward of the Shenandoah, and from the
commanding bluffs on the western bank his column could
have been effectively shelled without the power of reply.

PRECAUTIONS 291
In moving to Staunton the Confederate commander
had three objects in view : —
1. To strengthen his own force by combining with
Edward Johnson.
2. To prevent the Federals combinuig by keeping Banks
stationary and defeating MUroy.
3. To protect Staunton.
The real danger that he had to guard against was that
Banks, taking advantage of his absence from tbe Valley,
should move on Staunton, Knowmg his adversary as well
as he did, he had no reason to apprehend attack during
his march to Port Eepublic, But it was not impossible
that when he found out that Jackson had vanished from
the Valley, Banks might take heart and join hands with
MUroy, It was necessary, therefore, in order to pre
vent Banks moving, that Jackson's absence from the
VaUey should be very short; also, in order to prevent
MUroy either joining Banks or taking Staunton, that
Edward Johnson should be reinforced as rapidly as pos
sible. These objects would be attained by makiag use of
the road to Port Eepublic. In the first place, Banks would
not dare to move towards Milroy so long as the flank of his
line of march was threatened ; and in the second place,
from Port Eepubhc to Staunton, by Mecbum's Eiver, was
Uttle more than two days' march. Within forty-eight
hours, therefore, using the railway, it would be possible
to strengthen Johnson in time to protect Staunton, and to
prevent the Federals uniting. It was unlikely that Banks,
even if he heard at once that his enemy had vanished,
would immediately dash forward ; and even if he did he
would stiU have five-and-twenty miles to march before he
reached Staunton, Every precaution had been taken, too,
that he should not hear of the movement across the Blue
Eidge tUl it was too late to take advantage of it ; and, as
we have already seen, so late as May 5 he believed that
Jackson was at Harrisonburg. Ashby had done his work
weU. It might be argued, however, that with an antagonist

282 STONEWALL JACKSON
so supine as Banks Jackson might have openly marched
to Staunton by the most direct route ; in fact, that he need
never have left the VaUey at aU. But, had he taken the
road across the Valley, he would have advertised his pur
pose. Milroy would have received long warning of his
approach, and all chance of effecting a surprise would have
been lost.
On April 29, tbe day on which Jackson began his move
ment, Eichmond was still safe. The Yorktown lines were
intact, held by tbe 53,000 Confederates under Johnston ; but
it was very evident that tbey could not be long maintained.
A large siege train had been brought from Washington,
and Johnston had already learned that in a few days one
hundred pieces of the heaviest ordnance would open fire on
his position. His own armament was altogether inadequate
to cope with such ponderous metal. His strength was not
half his adversary's, and he had determined to retreat with
out waiting to have his works demolished.
But tbe mighty army in his front was not the only
danger. McDowell, with 35,000 men, bad already con
centrated near Falmouth, Johnston, in faUing back on
Eichmond, was in danger of being caught between two fires,
for to oppose McDowell on the Eappahannock Lee had been
unable to assemble more than 12,000 Confederates.
These facts were all known to Jackson. Whether the
march to Mecbum's Eiver was intended by him to have any
further effect on the Federals than surprising Milroy,
and clearing the way for an attack on Banks, it is impos
sible to say. It is indisputable, at the same time, that
his sudden disappearance from the Valley disturbed Mr.
Stanton, The Secretary of War had suspected that
Jackson's occupation of Swift Eun Gap meant mischief,
McDowell, who had been instructed to cross the Eappa
hannock, was ordered in consequence to stand fast at
Falmouth, and was warned that the enemy, amusing
McClellan at Yorktown, might make a sudden dash on
either himself or Banks.
A few days later McDoweU reported that Jackson had
passed GordonsviUe. The news came from deserters, ' very

MCCLELLAN'S STRATEGY 293
intelligent men.' The next day he was informed that
Shields was to be transferred to his command, and that he was
to bear in mind his instructions as to the defence of Wash
ington. Banks had already been ordered back to Strasburg.
Now, a few days previously, Stanton had been talking of
co-operation between McClellan and McDowell. Directly he
learned that Jackson was east of tbe Blue Eidge all thought
of combination was abandoned ; McDoweU was held back ;
Shields was sent to reinforce him ; and the possible danger
to Washington overrode all other considerations.
The weak point of McClellan's strategy was making
itself felt. In advancing on Eichmond by way of the
Peninsula he had deliberately adopted what are called in
strategy 'the exterior lines.' That is, his forces were
distributed on the arc of a circle, of which Eichmond and
the Confederate army were tbe centre. If, landing on the
Peninsula, he had been able to advance at once upon
Eichmond, the enemy must have concentrated for the
defence of his capital, and neither Banks nor Washington
would have been disturbed. But the moment his advance
was checked, as it was at Yorktown, the enemy could
detach at his leisure in any direction that he pleased, and
McCleUan was absolutely unable to support the threatened
point. The strategy of exterior lines demands, for success,
a strong and continuous pressure on the enemy's main
army, depriviag bim of the time and the space necessary for
counterstroke. If tbis is impossible, a skilful foe wUl at
once make use of his central position.
Lincoln appears to have had an instinctive apprehension
tbat McCleUan might not be able to exert sufficient pressure
to hold Johnston fast, and it was for this reason that he
had fought so strongly against the Peninsula line of invasion.
It was the probability that the Confederates would use their
opportunity with which Stanton had now to deal, compli
cated by the fact that their numbers were believed to be
much greater than they really were. StUl tbe problem was
not one of insurmountable difficulty. Banks and Fremont
united had 40,000 men, McDoweU over 30,000. A few
marches would have brought these forces into combination.

294 STONEWALL JACKSON
Banks and Fremont, occupying Staunton, and moving on
GordonsvUle, would have soon taken up communication with
McDoweU; an army 70,000 strong, far larger than any
force the Confederates could detach against it, would have
threatened Eichmond from the north and west, and, at the
same time, would have covered Washington, This plan,
though not without elements of danger, offered some
advantages. Nor were soldiers wanting to advise it. Both
Eosecrans and Shields had submitted schemes for such a
combination. Mr. Stanton, however, preferred to control
tbe chessboard by the light of unaided wisdom ; and while
McDowell was unnecessarily strengthened, both Banks and
Fremont were dangerously weakened.
The only siagle point where the Secretary showed the
slightest sagacity was in apprehendiag tbat the Confederates
would make use of their opportunity, and overwhelm one
of tbe detachments he had so ingeniously isolated.
On AprU 29 Johnston proposed to Davis that his army
should be withdrawn from the Peninsula, and that the
North should be invaded by way of the Valley.' Lee, in
the name of tbe President, replied tbat some such scheme
had been for some time under consideration ; and the burden
of his letters, as we have seen, both to EweU and Jackson,
was that a sudden and heavy blow should be struck at some
exposed portion of the invading armies. Mr. Stanton was
so far right ; but where the blow was to be struck he was
absolutely unable to divine,
' It is believed,' he writes to the Assistant Secretary on
May 8, ' that a considerable force has been sent toward the
Eappahannock and Shenandoah to move on Washington.
Jackson is reinforced strongly. Telegraph McDoweU,
Banks, and Hartsuff (at Warrenton) to keep a sharp look-out.
Tell General Hitchcock to see that the force around Wash
ington is in proper condition.'
It was indeed unfortunate for the North that at this
juncture the miUtary affairs of the Confederacy should have
been placed in the hands of the clearest-sighted soldier in
America. It was an unequal match, Lincohi and Stanton
' 0. E., vol. xi., part iii., p. 477.

MILROY AT M'DOWELL 296
against Lee ; and the stroke that was to prove the
weakness of the Federal strategy was soon to faU. On
May 7 Jackson westward marched in the following order :
Edward Johnson's regiments led the way, several mUes
in advance; the Third and Second Brigades followed;
the ' StonewaU,' under General Winder, a young West Point
officer of exceptional promise, bringing up the rear. ' The
corps of cadets of the Virgiaia Military Institute,' says
Dabney, ' was also attached to the expedition ; and the spruce
equipments and exact drUl of tbe youths, as they stepped
out full of enthusiasm to take their first actual look upon
tbe horrid visage of war, under their renowned professor,
formed a strong contrast with the war-worn and nonchalant
veterans who composed the army.' '
Eighteen mUes west of Staunton a Federal picket was
overrun, and in the pass leading to the Shenandoah
Mountaia Johnson captured a camp tbat had just been
abandoned. Tbe Federal rear-guard fired a few shells, and
the Confederates went into bivouac. Johnson had marched
fourteen and Jackson twenty miles.
That night MUroy concentrated his whole brigade of
8,700 men at M'DoweU, a little viUage at the foot of
the BuU Pasture Mountain, and sent back in haste for
reinforcements. Fremont's command was much strung
out. When MUroy had moved from Cheat Mountain through
Monterey, twelve mUes west of M'DoweU,^ the remainder of
the army had started up the South Branch VaUey to rein
force him. But snowstorms and heavy rains had much
delayed the march, and Schenck's brigade had not
advanced beyond Franklin, thirty-four miles north of
M'Dowell. Fremont himself, with a couple of battalions,
was approaching Petersburg, thirty-five mUes from Prank-
Un ; and Blenker's division, stiU further to the rear, had not
yet quitted Eomney.
' On the following morning,' to quote from Jackson's
JI 8 report, ' the march was resumed. General John
son's brigade still in front. The head of the column
was halted near the top of Bull Pasture Mountain, and
' Dabney, vol. ii., p. 65. ' See am,te, pp. 185, 269, 275.

296 STONEWALL JACKSON
General Johnson, accompanied by a party of thirty men
and several officers, with a view to a reconnaissance of the
enemy's position, ascended Sitlington's HUl, an isolated
spur on the left of the turnpike and commanding a full
view of the viUage of M'Dowell. From this point the
position, and to some extent the strength, of the enemy
could be seen. In tbe valley in which M'DoweU is situated
was observed a considerable force of infantry. To the
right, on a height, were two regiments, but too distant for
an effective fire to that point. Almost a inile in front was
a battery supported by infantry. Tbe enemy, observing
a reconnoitring party, sent a small body of skirmishers,
which was promptly met by the men with General Johnson
and driven back. For the purpose of securing the hUl all
of General Johnson's regiments were sent to him.'
Jackson had no intention of delivering a direct assault
on the Federal position. The ground was altogether un
favourable for attack. The hUl on which his advanced
guard was now estabhshed was more than two mUes broad
from east to west. But it was no plateau. Eugged and
precipitous ridges towered high above the level, and
numerous ravines, bidden by thick timber, seamed the
surface of the spur. To the front a slope of smooth un
broken greensward dropped sharply down ; and five hundred
feet below, behind a screen of woods, the Bull Pasture
Eiver ran swiftly through its narrow valley. On the river
banks were the Federals ; and beyond the vaUey the wooded
mountains, a very labyrinth of hills, rose high and higher
to the west. To the right was a deep gorge, nearly half a
mile across from cliff to cUff, dividing Sitlington's HUl from
the heights to northward ; and through this dangerous defile
ran the turnpike, eventually debouching on a bridge which
was raked by the Federal guns. To the left the country
presented exactly the same features. Mountain after
mountain, ridge after ridge, cleft by shadowy crevasses, and
clothed with great tracts of forest, rolled back in tortuous
masses to the backbone of the AUeghanies ; a narrow pass,
leading due westward, marking the route to Monterey and
the Ohio Eiver.

THE FEDERALS ATTACK 297
Although commanded by Sitlington's HUl, the Federal
position was difficult to reach. The river, swollen by rain,
protected it in front. The bridge could only be approached
by a single road, with inaccessible heights on either hand.
The vUlage of M'DoweU was crowded with troops and guns,
A low hUl five hundred yards beyond the bridge was occu
pied by infantry and artiUery; long lines of tents were
ranged on the level valley, and the hum of many voices,
excited by tbe appearance ofthe enemy, was borne upwards to
the heights. Had tbe Confederate artillery been brought to
the brow of Sitlington's HiU, the vaUey would doubtless soon
haye become untenable, and the enemy have been compelled
to retire through the mountains. It was by no means easy,
however, to prevent them from getting away unscathed.
But Jackson was not the man to leave the task untried,
and to content himself with a mere cannonade. He had
reason to hope that Milroy was ignorant of his junction
with General Johnson, and that he would suppose he had
only the six regiments of the latter witb which to deal.
The day was far spent, and the Valley brigades, toiling
through the mountains, were stUl some miles behind. He
proposed, therefore, whUe his staff explored the mountains
for a track which might lead him the next day to the rear
of the Federal position, merely to hold his ground on Sit
lington's HUl.
His imraediate opponent, however, was a general of
more resource and energy than Banks. MUroy was at least
able to supply himself witb information. On May 7 he
had been advised by his scouts and spies that Jackson and
Johnson had combined, and that they were advancing to
attack him at M'Dow^H. At 10 a.m. the next day Schenck's
brigade arrived from ' rankUn, after a march of thirty-four
miles in twenty-thre; hours, and a little later the enemy's
scouts were observed on the lofty crest of Sitlington's HUL
The day wore on. The Federal battery, with muzzles
elevated and the traUs thrust into trenches, threw occasional
sheUs upon the heights, and parties of skirmishers were
sent across tbe river to develop the Confederate strength.
Johnson, to whom Jackson had confided the defence of the

298 STONEWALL JACKSON
position, kept his troops carefully concealed, merely expos
ing sufficient numbers to repel the Federal patrols. Late
in the afternoon a staff officer reported to Jackson that
he had discovered a rough mountain track, which, passing
through the mountains to the north-west, crossed the Bull-
Pasture Eiver and came out upon the road between
M'DoweU and Franklin. Orders had just been issued to
move a strong detachment of artillery and infantry by tbis
track during the night, when the Federal infantry, who bad
crossed the bridge under shelter of the woods, advanced in
a strong Une of battle up the slopes. Their scouts had
observed what they believed to be preparations for establish
ing a battery on the heights, and Milroy and Schenck, with
a view of gaining time for retreat, had determined on
attack. Johnson had six regiments concealed behind the
crest, in all about 2,800 men. Two regiments of tbe enemy,
under 1,000 strong, advanced against his front; and
shortly afterwards three regiments, bringing the numbers
of the attack up to 2,500 rifles, assailed his left.
The Ohio and West Virginia Eegiments, of which the
Federal force was composed, fought with the vigour which
always characterised the Western troops.' The lofty heights
held by the Confederates were but an iUusory advantage.
So steep were the slopes in front that the men, for the most
part, had to stand on the crest to deliver their fire, and their
line stood out in bold relief against the evening sky. ' On
the other hand,' says Dabney, ' though the Federal troops
had to scale the steep accUvity of the hiU, they reaped the
usual advantage in such cases, resulting from the high firing
of the Confederates,' The 12th Georgia, holding the centre
of Johnson's line, displayed more valour than judgment.
Having been advanced at first in front of the crest, they
could not be persuaded to retire to the reverse of tbe ridge,
where other regiments found partial protection without
' Jackson fully recognised the fine fighting qualities of his compatriots
' As Shields' brigade (division),' he wrote on April 6, ' is composed principally
of Western troops, who are familiar with the use of arms, we must calculate
on hard fighting to oust Banks if attacked only in front, and may meet
with obstinate resistance, however the attack may be made.'

THE ATTACK REPULSED 299
sacrificing the efficiency of their fire. Their commander,
perceiving their useless exposure, endeavoured again and
again to withdraw them ; but amidst the roar of the mus
ketry his voice was lifted up in vain, and when by passing
along the ranks he persuaded one wing of the regiment to
recede, they rushed again to the front while he was gone
to expostulate witb the other. A taU Georgia youth ex
pressed the spirit of his comrades when he replied the next
day to the question why they did not retreat to the shelter
of the ridge : ' We did not come aU this way to Virgmia to
run before Yankees.' ' Nor was the courage of the other
troops less ardent. The 44th Virgmia was placed in reserve,
thirty paces in rear of the centre. ' After the battle became
animated,' says the brigadier, ' and my attention was other
wise directed, a large number of the 44th quit then position,
and, rushing forward, j oined the 58tb and engaged in the fight,
while the balance of the regiment joined some other brigade.' *
Tbe action graduaUy became so fierce that Jackson sent
his Third Brigade to support tbe advanced guard. These
nine regiments now engaged sufficed to hold the enemy in
check ; the Second Brigade, which moved towards them as
darkness fell, was not engaged, and the Stonewall regi
ments were stUl in rear. No counterstroke was delivered.
Johnson himself was wounded, and had to hand over the
command ; and after four hours' fighting the Federals fell
back in perfect order under cover of the night. Nor was
there any endeavour to pursue. The Confederate troops
were superior in numbers, but there was much confusion in
their ranks ; the cavalry could not act on the steep and
broken ground, and there were other reasons which ren
dered a night attack undesirable.
The enemy had been repulsed at every point. The
tale of casualties, nevertheless, was by no means small.
498 Confederates, including 54 officers, had fallen. Tbe
12th Georgia paid the penalty for its useless display of
valour with the loss of 156 men and 19 officers. The
' Dabney, vol. ii., p. 73.
' Eeport of Colonel Seott, iitik Virginia Infantry. 0. E., vol. xii., part i.,
p. 486,

300 STONEWALL JACKSON
Federals, on the other hand, favoured by the ground, had no
more than 256 kiUed, wounded, and missing. Only three
pieces of artUlery took part in the engagement. These were
Federal guns ; but so great was the angle of elevation that
but one man on Sitlington's Hill was struck by a piece of
shell. Jackson, in order to conceal his actual strength, had
declined to order up his artUlery. The approach to the
position, a narrow steep ravine, wooded, and filled with
boulders, forbade the use of horses, and the guns must have
been dragged up by hand with great exertion. Moreover,
the artillery was destined to form part of the turning
column, and had a long night march before it.
' By nine o'clock,' says Dabney, ' the roar of the struggle
had passed away, and the green battle-field reposed under
tbe starhght as calmly as when it had been occupied only
by its peaceful herds. Detachments of soldiers were silently
exploriag the ground for their wounded comrades, while
the tired troops were slowly filing off to their bivouac. At
midnight the last sufferer had been removed and the last
picket posted ; and then only did Jackson turn to seek a
few hours' repose in a neighbouring farmhouse. The
vaUey of M'Dowell lay in equal quiet. The camp-firea of
the Federals blazed ostentatiously in long and regular
lines, and their troops seemed wrapped in sleep. At one
o'clock the general reached his quarters, and threw himself
upon a bed. When his mulatto servant, knowing that he
had eaten nothing since morning, came in with food, he said,
" I want none ; nothing but sleep," and in a few minutes he
was slumbering like a healthy child.'
It seems, however, that the march of the turning
column had already been countermanded. Putting himself
in his enemy's place, Jackson had foreseen MUroy's move
ments. If the one could move by night, so could the other ;
and when he rode out at dawn, the Federals, as he antici
pated, had disappeared. The next day he sent a laconic
despatch to Eichmond : ' God blessed our arms with victory
at M'Dowell yesterday.'
This announcement was doubtless received by the
people of Virginia, as Dabney declares, with peculiar delight.

BATTLE OF MCDOWELL;
Thursday, May 8th. 1862.

Scale

Confederate Federal

Walker &-Botitailst

COMMENTS 801
On May 4 Johnston had evacuated Yorktown. On the 5th
he had checked the pursuit at WUliamsburg, mflicting
heavy losses, but had continued his retreat. On the 9th
Norfolk was abandoned ; and on the 11th the ' Merrimac,'
grounding in the James, was destroyed by her commander.
' The victory of M'DoweU was the one gleam of brightness
athwart aU these clouds.' It must be admitted, however,
that the victory was msignificant. The repulse of 2,500
men by 4,000 was not a remarkable feat ; and it would even
appear that M'DoweU might be ranked with the battles of
lost opportunities. A vigorous counterstroke would probably
have destroyed tbe whole of the attacking force. The
riflemen of the West, however, were not made of the stuff
that yields readUy to superior force. The fight for the bridge
would have been fierce and bloody. TwUight had faUen
before the Confederate reinforcements arrived upon the
scene; and under such conditions the losses must have
fceen very heavy. But to lose men was exactly what Jackson
wished to avoid. The object of his manoeuvres was the
destruction not of Fremont's advanced guard, but of Banks'
army ; and if his numbers were seriously reduced it would be
impossible to attain tbat end. Fremont's brigades, more
over, protected no vital point. A decisive victory at
M'Dowell would have produced but little effect at Washing
ton. No great results were to be expected from operations
in so distant a section of the strategic theatre ; and Jackson
aimed at nothing more than driving the enemy so far
back as to isolate him from Banks.
The next morning the small force of cavalry crossed the
bridge and rode cautiously through the mountain passes,
jj 9 The infantry halted for some hours in M'DoweU
in order that rations might be issued, but the
Federals made three-and-twenty miles, and were already
too far ahead to be overtaken. On the lOtb and the 11th
the Confederates made forced marches, but the enemy set
fire to the forests on the mountain-side, and this desperate
measure proved eminently successful. ' The sky was over
cast with volumes of smoke, which wrapped every distant
object in a veU, impenetrable alike to the eyes and telescopes
VOL, I. Y

302 STONEWALL JACKSON
of the officers. Through this sultry canopy the pursuing
army felt its way cautiously, cannonaded by the enemy from
every advantageous position, whUe it was protected from am
buscades only by detachments of skirmishers, who scoured
the burning woods on either side of the highway. The
general, often far in advance of the column in his eagerness
to overtake the foe, declared that this was the most adroit
expedient to which a retreating army could resort, and that
it entailed upon him all the disadvantages of a night attack.
By slow approaches, and with constant skirmishing, the Fede
rals were driven back to Franklin vUlage, and the double
darkness of the night and the smoke arrested tbe pursuit,' '
On May 12 Jackson resolved to return to the Valley.
Fremont, with Blenker's division, was at hand. It was
May 12. ij^possible to outflank the enemy's position, and
time was precious, ' for he knew not how soon a
new emergency at Fredericksburg or at Eichmond might
occasion the recall of EweU, and deprive him of the power
of striking an effective blow at Banks,' ' Half the day was
granted to the soldiers as a day of rest, to compensate for
the Sunday spent in the pursuit, and the following order was
issued to the command : —
' I congratulate you on your recent victory at
M'Dowell, I request you to unite with me in thanksgiving
to Almighty God for thus having crowned your arms with
success ; and in praying that He wUl continue to lead you
on from victory to victory, until our independence shaU
be established ; and make us that people whose God is the
Lord, The chaplains wUl hold divine service at 10 a.m. on
this day, in their respective regiments,'
Shortly after noon the march to M'DoweU was re
sumed. On the 15th the army left the mountains and
Mav 15 encamped at Lebanon Springs, on the road to
¦ Harrisonburg, " The 16th was spent in camp, the
Confederate President having appointed a day of prayer and
' Dabney, vol. ii., p. 77.
' Ibid., p. 78. On May 9, in anticipation of a movement down the Valley,
he had ordered thirty days' forage, besides other supplies, to be accumulated
at Staunton. Harman MS,

INSUBORDINATION IN THE VALLEY ARMY 308
fasting. On the 17th a halt was made at Mount Solon, and
here Jackson was met by EweU, who had ridden over from
Elk Eun VaUey. Banks had fallen back to Strasburg, and
he was now completely cut off from Fremont. On the
night of the engagement at M'Dowell Captain Hotchkiss
had been ordered back to the VaUey, and, accompanied by
a squadron of Ashby's cavalry, had blocked the passes
by which Fremont could cross the mountains and support
his colleague, ' Bridges and culverts were destroyed, rocks
rolled down, and in one instance trees were feUed along
the road for nearly a mUe,' Jackson's object was thus
thoroughly achieved. AU combination between the Federal
columns, except by long and devious routes, had now been
rendered impracticable ; and there was little fear that in
any operations down the VaUey his own communications
would be endangered. The M'Dowell expedition had
neutraUsed, for the time being, Fremont's 20,000 men; and
Banks was now isolated, exposed to the combined attack of
Jackson, EweU, and Edward Johnson.
One incident remains to be mentioned. During the
march to Mount Solon some companies of the 27th Vir
ginia, who had volunteered for twelve months, and whose
tune had expired, demanded thefr discharge. On this being
refused, as the Conscription Act was now in force, they
threw down their arms, and refused to serve another day.
Colonel Grigsby referred to the General for instructions.
Jackson's face, wben the circumstances were explamed,
set hard as flint. ' Why,' he said, ' does Colonel Grigsby
refer to me to learn bow to deal with mutineers ? He should
shoot them where they stand.' The rest of the regiment
was ordered to parade with loaded muskets; the insub-
ordmate companies were offered the choice of mstant death
or mstant submission. The men knew their commander,
and at once surrendered. ' This,' says Dabney, ' was the last
attempt at organised disobedience in the VaUey army,'
' Frtoont's Eeport, 0. B., vol. xii., part i., p. 11.

V 2

304 STONEWALL JACKSON

CHAPTEE X
WINCHESTER
That week in May when the Army of the VaUey marched
back to the Shenandoah was almost the darkest in the
1862. Confederate annals. The Northern armies, im-
May. proving daily in discipline and in efficiency,
had attained an ascendency which it seemed impossible to
withstand. In every quarter of the theatre of war success
inchned to the Stars and Stripes. At the end of AprU New
Orleans, the commercial metropolis of the South, had faUen
to the Federal navy. Earlier in the month a great battle had
been fought at ShUoh, in Tennessee ; one of the most trusted
of the Confederate commanders had been kUled; ' his troops,
after a gaUant struggle, had been repulsed with fearful
losses ; and the upper portion of the Mississippi, from the
source to Memphis, had faUen under the control of the
invader. The wave of conquest, vast and irresistible, swept
up every navigable river of the South ; and if in the West
only the outskirts of her territory were threatened with
destruction, in Virginia the roar of the rising waters was
heard at the very gates of Eichmond. McClellan, with
112,000 men, had occupied West Point at the head of the
York Eiver ; and on May 16 his advance reached the White
House, on the Pamunkey, twenty miles from the Confederate
capital, McDowell,witb 40,000 men, although stUl north of
the Eappahannock, was but five short marches distant,'
^ Oeneral A, S. Johnston.
' Directly McClellan closed in on Eichmond, McDowell was ordered, as
soon as Shields should join him, to march from Manassas to his assistance.
Lincoln and Stanton had recovered confidence when Jackson retumed to
the VaUey from Mecbum's Station.

THE FEDERAL FLEET 305
The Federal gunboats were steaming up the James ; and
Johnston's army, encamped outside the city, was menaced
by thrice its numbers.
So black was the situation that mUitary stores had
already been removed from the capital, the archives of the
Confederacy had been packed, and Mr. Davis had made
arrangements for the departure of his famUy, In spite of
the protests of the Virginia people the Government had
decided to abandon Eichmond, The General Assembly
addressed a resolution to the President requiriag him to
defend tbe city, if necessary, * until not a stone was
left upon another,' The City Council, enthusiastically
supported by the citizens, seconded the appeal, A depu
tation was sent to Mr, Davis ; but while they conferred
together, a messenger rode in with the news that the
mastheads of the Federal fleet could be seen from the
neighbouring hUls, Davis dismissed the committee, saying :
' This manifestly concludes the matter,'
The gunboats, however, had stUl to feel their way up
the winding reaches of the James, Their progress was
very slow; there was time to obstruct the passage, and
batteries were hastUy improvised. The people made a
mighty effort ; and on the commanding heights of Drewry's
Bluff, six miles below the city, might be seen senators and
merchants, bankers and clergymen, digging parapets and
hauling timber, in company with parties of soldiers and
gangs of slaves. Heavy guns were mounted, A great
boom was constructed across the stream. When the ships
approached they were easily driven back, and men once
more breathed freely in the streets of Eichmond, The
example of the ' Unterrified Commonwealth,' as Virginia
has been proudly named, inspired the Government, and
it was determined, come what might, that Eichmond
should be held. On the land side it was already fortified.
But Lee was unwilling to resign himself to a siege.
McClellan had still to cross the Chickahominy, a stream
which oozes by many channels through treacherous swamps
and an unwholesome jungle ; and despite the overwhelming

306 STONEWALL JACKSON
numbers of the invading armies, it was stiU possible to
strike an effective blow.
Few would have seen the opportunity, or, with a great
army thundering at the gates of Eichmond, have dared to
seize it ; but it was not McCleUan and McDoweU whom Lee
was fighting, not the enormous hosts which they commanded,
nor the vast resources of the North. The power which
gave life and motion to the mighty mechanism of the attack
lay not within the camps that could be seen from the
housetops of Eichmond and from the hUls round Fredericks
burg. Far away to the north, beyond the Potomac, beneath
the shadow of the Capitol at Washington, was the main
spring of the invader's strength. The multitudes of armed
men that overran Virginia were no more the inanimate
pieces of the chess-board. The power wbich controlled
them was the Northern President. It was at Lincoln
that Lee was about to strike, at Lincoln and the North
ern people, and an effective blow at the point which people
and President deemed vital might arrest the progress of
their armies as surely as if the Confederates had been rein
forced by a hundred thousand men.
On May 16 Lee wrote to Jackson: 'Whatever move
ment you make against Banks, do it speedily, and if
successful drive him back towards the Potomac, and
May 16 ''^^^te the impression, as far as possible, that you
design threatening that line.' For this purpose,
in addition to EweU and Johnson's forces, the Army of the
Valley was to be reinforced by two brigades. Branch's and
Mahone's, of which the former had already reached Gordons
vUle. In this letter the idea of playing on the fears of Lincoln
for the safety of his capital first sees the light, and it is
undoubtedly to be attributed to the brain of Lee. Tbat
the same idea had been uppermost in Jackson's mind duriag
the whole course of the campaign is proved not only by
the evidence of his chief of the staff, but by his correspond
ence with headquarters. 'If Banks is defeated,' he had
written on AprU 5, 'it may directly retard McCleUan's
movements.' It is true that nowhere in his correspondence

EWTELL'S DILEMMA 307
is the idea of menacing Washington directly mentioned,
nor is there the slightest evidence that he suggested it to
Lee. But in his letters to his superiors he confines himself
strictly to the immediate subject, and on no single occasion
does be indulge in speculation on possible results. In the
ability of the Commander-in-Chief he had the most implicit
confidence. ' Lee,' he said, ' is the only man I know whom I
would follow blindfold,' and he was doubtless assured that the
embarrassments of the Federal Government were as apparent
to Lee as to himself, Tbat the same idea should have
suggested itself independently to both is hardly strange.
Both looked further than the enemy's camps ; both studied
the situation in its broadest bearings ; both understood
the importance of introducing a disturbing element into
the enemy's plans ; and both were aware that the surest
means of winning battles is to upset the mental equilibrium
of the opposing leader.
Before he reached Mount Solon Jackson had instructed
EweU to caU up Branch's brigade from GordonsvUle. He
intended to foUow Banks with the whole force at his dis
posal, and in these dispositions Lee bad acquiesced.
Johnston, however, now at Eichmond, had once more
resumed charge of the detached forces, and a good deal of
confusion ensued. Lee, intent on threatening Washington,
was of opinion that Banks should be attacked. Johnston,
although at first he favoured such a movement, does not
appear to have realised the effect that might be produced by
an advance to the Potomac. Information had been received
that Banks was constructing intrenchments at Strasburg,
and Johnston changed his mind. He thought the attack too
hazardous, and EweU was directed to cross the Blue Eidge
and march eastward, whUe Jackson ' observed ' Banks,
These orders placed EweU in a dUemma. Under
instructions from Lee he was to remain with Jackson.
Under instructions from Jackson he was already moving
on Luray, Johnston's orders changed his destination.
Taking horse in haste he rode across the VaUey from
Swift Eun Gap to Jackson's camp at Mount Solon.
Jackson at once telegraphed to Lee : ' I am of opinion

308 STONEWALL JACKSON
that an attempt should be made to defeat Banks, but under
instructions from General Johnston I do not feel at liberty
to make an attack. Please answer by telegraph at once,'
To EweU he gave orders that he should suspend his move
ment until a reply was received, 'As you are in the
Valley district,' he wrote, ' you constitute part of my com
mand. . . . You will please move so as to encamp between
New Market and Mount Jackson on next Wednesday night,
unless you receive orders from a superior officer and of a
date subsequent to the 16th instant.'
This order was vreitten at EweU's own suggestion. It was
for this he had ridden through the night to Jackson's camp.
Lee's reply was satisfactory. Johnston had already
summoned Branch to Eichmond, but EweU was to
May 18. ^^^^^^ '> ^^^ ^^^ next morning, May 18, the
Confederates moved forward down the Valley,
The two days' rest which had been granted to Jackson's
troops had fallen at a useful time. They had marches to
look back on which had tried their endurance to the
utmost. In three days, before and after Kernstown, they
had covered fifty-six miles, and had fought a severe
engagement. The struggle with the mud on the Port
Eepublic was only surpassed by the hardships of the march
to Eomney, Prom Elk Eun to Franklin, and from
Franklin to Mount Solon, is just two hundred mUes, and
these they had traversed in eighteen days. But the
exertions which had been then demanded from them were
trifling in comparison with those which were to come.
From Mount Solon to Winchester is eighty miles by the
Valley pike ; to Harper's Ferry one hundred and ten mUes.
And Jackson had determined that before many days had
passed the Confederate colours should be carried in triumph
through the streets of Winchester, and that the gleam of his
camp-fires should be reflected in the waters of the Potomac.
Johnston believed that Banks, behind the earthworks at
Strasburg, was securely sheltered. Jackson saw that his
enemy had made a fatal mistake, and that his earthworks,
skilfully and strongly constructed as they were, were no
more than a snare and a delusion.

WaUitr O- BotHaU tt.

THE MARCH AGAINST BANKS 309
Ashby had already moved to New Market ; and a strong
cordon of pickets extended along Pugh's Eun near
Woodstock, within sight of tbe Federal outposts, and
cutting off aU communication between Strasburg and the
Upper Valley. EweU's cavalry regiments, the 2nd and
6th Virgiaia, held the Luray VaUey, with a detachment
east of tbe Blue Eidge. On the 20tb Jackson arrived
J, „Q at New Market, thirty mUes from Mount Solon.
^^ ' EweU had meanwhUe marched to Luray, and
the two wings were now on either side of the Massanuttons.
On his way to New Market Jackson had been joiaed by the
Louisiana brigade of EweU's division. This detachment
seems to have been made with the view of inducing Banks
to beUeve, should information filter through Ashby's
pickets, that the whole Confederate force was advancing
direct on Strasburg.
The Army of the Valley numbered nearly 17,000 officers
and men.' EweU's effective strength was 7,500 ; Johnson's
2,500 ; Jackson's 6,000 ; and there were eleven batteries.
The troops were now organised in two divisions : —
Jackson's Division.
First (Stonewall) Brigade, General Winder: 2nd Virginia, 4th
Virginia, 5th Virginia, 27th Virginia, 33rd Virginia.
Second Brigade, Colonel Campbell : 21st Virginia, 42nd Virginia,
48th Virginia, Ist Regulars (Irish).
Third Brigade, Colonel Taliaferro : 10th Virginia, 23rd Virginia,
37th Virginia.
Cavalry, Colonel Ashby : 7th Virginia.
Artillery; 5 batteries (1 horse-artiUery), 22 guns.
Ewell's Division.
Taylor's Brigade: 6th Louisiana, 7th Louisiana, 8th Louisiana,
9th Louisiana, Wheat's Battalion (Louisiana Tigers).
Trimble's Brigade : 21st North Carolina, 21st Georgia, 15tb Ala
bama, 16th Mississippi.
Elzey's Brigade : ( 13th Virginia, 31st Virginia, 25th Virginia, 12th
(late Johnson's)
Scott's Brigade : (44th Virginia, 52nd Virginia, 58th Virginia.
' This estimate is Colonel Allan's. Cf. The Valley Campaign, pp. 92-3.
Dabney gives 16,000 men.

310 STONEWALL JACKSON
Maryland Line : 1st Maryland.
Cavalry, General G. H. Steuart : 2nd Virginia, Colonel Munford J
6th Virginia, Colonel Floumoy.
Artillery ; 6 batteries, 26 guns.
For the first time in his career Jackson found himself
in command of a considerable force. The greater part
of the troops were Virginians, and with these he was
personally acquainted. The strange contingents were
Taylor's and Trimble's brigades, and Steuart's cavalry.
These had yet to be broken to his methods of war and
discipline. There was no reason, however, to fear that
they would prove less efficient than his own division.
They had as yet seen little fighting, but they were well
commanded, EweU was a most able soldier, full of dash
and daring, who had seen much service on the Indian
frontier. He was an admirable subordinate, ready to take
responsibiUty if orders were not forthcoming, and executing
his instructions to the letter. His character was original.
His modesty was only equalled by his eccentricity.
'Bright, prominent eyes, a bomb-shaped bald head,
and a nose like that of Francis of Valois, gave him a
striking resemblance to a woodcock; and this was in
creased by a bird-Uke habit of putting his head on one side
to utter his quaint speeches. He fancied that he had
some mysterious internal malady, and would eat nothing
but frumenty, a preparation of wheat ; and his plaintive
way of talking of his disease, as if he were someone else,
was droll in the extreme. " What do you suppose Pre
sident Davis made me a major-general for ? " beginning
with a sharp accent, ending with a gentle lisp, was a usual
question to his friends. Superbly mounted, he was the
boldest of horsemen, invariably leaving the roads to take
timber and water; and with all his oddities, perhaps in
some measure because of them, he was adored by officers
and men,' ' To Jackson he must have been peculiarly
acceptable ,* not indeed as an intimate, for EweU, at this
period of the war, was by no means regenerate, and
swore like a cowboy : but he knew the value of time, and
' Desi/ruction and Reconstruction, General E. Taylor, pp. 38-9.

COMPOSITION OF THE ARMY 811
rated celerity of movement as high as did Napoleon, Hia
instructions to Branch, when the march against Banks
was first projected, might have emanated from Jackson
himself : ' You cannot bring tents ; tent-flies without poles,
or tents cut down to that size, and only as few as are
indispensable. No mess-chests, trunks, &c. It is better to
leave these things where you are than to throw them away
after starting. We can get along without anything but food
and ammunition. The road to glory cannot be foUowed
with much baggage.' '
Trimble, too, was a good officer, an able tactician and
a resolute leader. He had hardly, however, realised as
yet that the movements of a brigade must be subordinated
to those of the whole army, and he was wont to grumble if
bis troops were held back, or were not allowed to pursue
some local success. Steuart was also a West Pointer, but with
much to learn. Taylor and his Louisianians played so im
portant a part in tbe ensuing operations that they deserve
more detailed mention. The command was a mixed one.
One of the regiments had been recruited from the roughs of
New Orleans. The 7th and 9th were composed of planters and
sons of planters, the majority of them men of fortune. ' The
6tb,' writes the brigadier, ' were Irishmen, stout, hardy
fellows, turbulent in camp and requiring a strong hand,
but responding to justice and kindness, and ready to follow
their officers to the death. The 8th were from the Attakapas
— Acadians, the race of whom LongfeUow sings in
"Evangeline" — a home-loving, simple people; few spoke
English, fewer stUlhad ever moved ten miles from tbeir native
cabanas ; and tbe war to tbem was a liberal education. They
had aU the Ught gaiety of the Gaul, and, after the manner
of their ancestors, were born cooks. A capital regimental
band accompanied them, and whenever weather and ground
permitted, even after long marches, they would waltz and
polk ui couples with as much zest as if their arms
encircled the supple waists of the Celestiaes and Melazies
of their native Teche. The Valley soldiers were largely of
the Presbyterian faith, and of a solemn, pious demeanour,
' 0. E., vol. zii., part iii., p. 890.

312 STONEWALL JACKSON
and looked askance at the caperings of my Creoles, hold
ing them to be " devices and snares. " ' '
Taylor himself had been educated at West Point. He
was a man of high position, of unquestioned ability, an
excellent disciplinarian, and a delightful writer. More
than other commanders he had paid great attention to the
marching of bis men. He had an eye to those practical
detaUs which a good regimental officer enforces with so
much effect. Boots were properly fitted; the troops
were taught the advantages of cold water, and how to
heal abrasions; halts upon the march were made at
frequent intervals, and the men soon held that to fall out
on the march was a disgrace. Before a month ' had
passed,' he says, ' the brigade had learned how to march,
and in the Valley with Jackson covered long distances
without leaving a straggler behind.' "
Jackson's first meeting with the Louisiana troops has
been described by their commander : —
'A mounted officer was despatched to report our
approach and select a camp, which proved to be beyond
Jackson's forces, then lying in the fields on both sides of
the Valley pike. Over 3,000 strong, neat in fresh clothing
of grey with white gaiters, bands playing at the head of
their regiments — not a straggler, but every man in his
place, stepping jauntUy as if on parade, though it had
marched twenty miles or more — in open column, with the
rays of the declining sun flaming on polished bayonets, the
brigade moved down the hard smooth pike, and wheeled on
to the camping-ground. Jackson's men, by thousands, had
gathered on either side of the road to see us pass.
'After attending to necessary camp detaUs, I sought
Jackson, whom I had never met. The mounted officer
who had been sent on in advance pointed out a figure
perched on the topmost raU of a fence overlooking the
road and field, and said it was Jackson. Approaching, I
saluted and declared my name and rank, then waited for a
response. Before this came I had time to see a pair of
' Destruction and Reconstruction, pp. 62-3,
» Ibid., j>. 37.

THE LOUISIANA BRIGADE 813
cavalry boots covering feet of gigantic size, a mangy cap
with visor drawn low, a heavy dark beard and weary eyes,
eyes I afterwards saw filled with intense but never briUiant
light, A low gentle voice inquired the road and distance
marched that day, " Keezleton road, six-and-twenty miles,"
" You seem to haveno stragglers," " Never allow straggling,"
"You must teach my people; they straggle badly," A
bow in reply. Just then my Creoles started theur band
for a waltz. After a contemplative suck at a lemon,
"Thoughtless feUows for serious work" came forth. I
expressed a hope that the work would not be less weU done
because of the gaiety. A return to the lemon gave me the
opportunity to retire. Where Jackson got his lemons " No
fellow could find out," but he was rarely without one. To
have lived twelve mUes from that fruit would have disturbed
bim as much as it did the witty dean,' '
The next day, marching in the grey of the mornmg, the
force moved north, the Louisianians in advance. Suddenly,
„ 2j after covering a short distance, the head of the
column was turned to the right; and the
troops, who had confidently expected tbat Strasburg would
be the scene of thefr next engagement, found themselves
moving eastward and crossing the Massanuttons. The
men were utterly at sea as to the intentions of thefr comr
mander. Taylor's brigade had been encamped near Conrad's
Store, only a few mUes distant, not many days before, and
they had now to solve the problem why they should have
made three long marches in order to return to thefr former
position. No word came from Jackson to enUgbten them.
Prom time to time a courier would gallop up, report, and
return to Luray, but the general, absorbed in thought, rode
sUently across the mountain, perfectly obUvious of inqufr-
ing glances.
At New Market the troops had been halted at cross
roads, and they had marched by that which they had least
expected. The camp at Luray on the 21st presented the
same puzzle. One road ran east across the mountains to
Warrenton or Culpeper; a second north to Front Eoyal
' Destruction and Reconstruction, pp. 54-6.

314 STONEWALL JACKSON
and Winchester ; and the men said that halting th^m in
such a position was an ingenious device of Jackson's to
May 23, Prevent them fathoming his plans,' The next day,
the 22nd, the army, with EweU leading, moved
quietly down the Luray Valley, and the advanced guard,
Taylor's Louisianians, a six-pounder battery, and the 6th
Vfrginia Cavalry, bivouacked that night within ten miles
of Front Eoyal, held by a strong detachment of Banks'
small army.
Since they had left Mount Solon and Elk Eun Valley
on May 19 the troops ia four days had made just sixty
mUes. Such celerity of movement was unfamUiar to both
Banks and Stanton, and on the night of the 22nd neither
the Secretary nor the general had the faintest suspicion
that the enemy had as yet passed Harrisonburg, There was
serenity at Washington. On both sides of the Blue Eidge
everything was going well. The attack on Fremont had not
been followed up ; and McClellan, though calUng urgently
for reinforcements, was sanguine of success. Mr. Lincoln,
reassured by Jackson's retreat from FrankUn, had permitted
Shields to march to Falmouth ; and McDoweU, with a por
tion of his troops, had already crossed the Eappahannock.
The President of the Baltimore and Ohio EaUroad, an
important personage at Washington, appears to have been
alone in his apprehension that a storm was gathering in
the summer sky, ' The aspect of affafrs in the Valley of
Vfrginia,' he wrote to Stanton, ' is becoming very threaten
ing, . , , The enterprise and vigour of Jackson are well
known, . . . Under the cfrcumstances wiU it not be more
judicious to order back General Shields to co-operate with
General Banks ? Such a movement might be accompUshed
in time to prevent disaster,' * The Secretary, however, saw
no reason for alarm. His strategical combinations were
apparently working without a hitch. Banks at Strasburg
was in a strong position ; and McDowell was about to lend
the aid which would enable McClellan to storm the rebel
capital. One of Fremont's columns, under General Cox, a
' Compare instructions to EweU, ante, p. 281.
• 0. E., vol. xii., part iii., p. 201.

CONFIDENCE AT WASHINGTON 815
most able officer, which was making good progress towards
tbe Virginia and Tennessee EaUroad, had certainly been
compeUed to halt when Milroy was driven back to Franklin.
Yet the defeated troops were rapidly reorganising, and
Fremont would soon resume his movement. Milroy's
defeat was considered no more than an incident of la petite
guerre. Washington seemed so perfectly secure that the
recruiting offices bad been closed, and the President and
Secretary, anticipating the immediate fall of Eichmond,
left for Fredericksburg the next day. McDoweU was to
march on the 26th, and the departure of his fine army was
to be preceded by a grand review.
Even Banks, though Shields had marched to Fredericks
burg, reducing his force by a half, beUeved that there was
no immediate reason to fear attack. ' I regard it as
certain,' he wrote, ' that Jackson wUl move north as far as
New Market • , , a position which enables him to co
operate with General EweU, who is stUl at Swift Eun Gap,'
Yet he took occasion to remind Mr, Stanton of the ' per
sistent adherence of Jackson to the defence of the VaUey,
and his weU-known purpose to expel tbe Government troops.
This,' he added, ' may be assumed as certain. There is
probably no one more fixed and determiaed purpose in the
whole circle of the enemy's plans.' Banks had certainly
learned something of Jackson by this time, but he did not
yet know aU.
So on this night of May 22 the President and his
people were without fear of what the morrow might bring
forth. The end of the rebellion seemed near at hand.
Washington was fuU of the anticipated triumph. The
crowds passed to and fro in the broad avenues, exchanging
congratulations on the success of the Northern arms and
the approaching downfall of the slaveholders. The theatres
were fiUed with delighted audiences, who haUed every ,
scoffing allusion to the ' Southern chivalry ' with enthusiasm,
and gaiety and confidence reigned supreme. Little dreamt
the hght-hearted multitude that, in the sUent woods of the
Luray Valley, a Confederate army lay asleep beneath the
stars. Little dreamt Lincoln, or Banks, or Stanton, that
VOL. I.

316 STONEWALL JACKSON
not more than seventy miles from Washington, and less
than thirty from Strasburg, the most daring of their
enemies, waiting for the dawn to rise above the mountains,
was pouriag out his soul in prayer,
Appealing from his native sod
In forma pauperis to God :
'Lay bare Thine arm — stretch forth Thy rod.
Amen I ' That's Stonewall's way.
It is not always joy that cometh in the morning, least
of all to generals as ignorant as Banks wben they have to
do with a skUful foe. It was not altogether Banks' fault
that his position was a bad one. Stanton had given him
a dfrect order to take post at Strasburg or its vicinity,
and to send two regiments to hold the bridges at Front
Eoyal. But Banks had made no remonstrance. He bad
either failed to recognise, untU it was too late, that the
force at Front Eoyal would be exposed to attack from the
Luray Valley, and, if the post fell, that his own communica
tions with both Winchester and Washington would be at
once endangered ; or he had lost favour with the Secretary.
For some time past Mr. Stanton's telegrams had been cold
and peremptory. There had been no more effusive praise
of ' cautious vigour ' and ' interesting manoeuvres ; ' and
Banks had gradually fallen from the command of a large
army corps to the charge of a single division.
His 10,000 men were thus distributed. At Strasburg
were 4,500 infantry, 2,900 cavalry, and 16 guns. At
Winchester 850 infantry and 600 cavalry. Two companies
of infantry held Buckton station on the Manassas Gap
Eailway, midway between Strasburg and Front Eoyal.'
At Eectortown, east of tbe Blue Eidge, nineteen mUes from
Front Eoyal, was General Geary with 2,000 infantry and
cavalry ; these troops, however, were independent of Banks.
Front Eoyal, twelve miles east of Strasburg, was com
mitted to the charge of Colonel Kenly, of the 1st Maryland
Eegiment in the Federal service, and 1,000 rifles and
2 guns were placed at bis disposal. The post itself was
> 0. E., vol. xii., part i., pp. 523 and 560.

FRONT ROYAL 81?
indefensible. To the west and south-west, about three
mUes distant, stand the green peaks of the Massanuttons,
whUe to the east the lofty spurs of the Blue Eidge look
down uito the vUlage streets. A mUe and a half north
the forks of the Shenandoah unite in the broad river that
runs to Harper's Ferry, The turnpike to Winchester
crosses both forks in succession, at a point where they are
divided by a stretch of meadows a mUe in width. In
addition to these two bridges, a wooden viaduct carried
tbe railway over the South Fork, whence, passing between
the North Fork and the Massanuttons, it runs south of the
stream to Strasburg, Kenly had pitched his camp between
the town and the river, covering the bridges, and two
companies were on picket beyond the houses.
In front were the dense forests which fiU the Luray
Valley and cover the foothUls of the mountains, and the
view of the Federal sentries was very limited. A strong
patrol of 100 infantry and 30 troopers, which had been
sent out on the 20th, had marched eleven miles south, had
bivouacked in the woods, and had captured a Confederate
straggler. The officer in command had obtained informa
tion, by questioning civUians, that Confederate infantry was
expected, and this was confirmed by his prisoner. Banks,
however, notwitbstanduig this report, could not bring
himself to believe that an attack was imminent, and the
cavalry was called back to Strasburg. For this reason
Kenly had been unable to patrol to any distance on the
22nd, and the security of his camp was practically de
pendent on the vigUance of his sentries.
On tbe morning of May 23 there was no token of
the approaching storm. The day was intensely hot, and
the blue masses of the mountains shimmered in
"¦^ ¦ the summer haze. In the Luray VaUey to the south
was no sign of Ufe, save the buzzards saUing lazUy above
the slumbrous woods. Suddenly, and without the least
warning, a long line of skirmishers broke forward from the
forest. The clear notes of the Confederate bugles, suc
ceeded by the crash of musketry, woke the echoes of
the Blue Eidge, and the Federal pickets were driven in
z2

318 STONEWALL JACKSON
confusion through the viUage. The long roll of the drums
beat the startled camp to arms, and Kenly hastily drew up
his slender force upon a ridge in rear.
The ground in front of his position was fairly open,
and with his two pieces of artiUery he was able to check
the first rush of the Confederate infantry. The guns which
had accompanied thefr advanced guard were only smooth
bores, and it was some time before a battery capable of
making effective reply to the Federal pieces was brought
up. As soon as it opened fire the Southern infantry
was ordered to attack ; and while one regiment, working
round through the woods on the enemy's left, endeavoured
to outflank his guns, four others, in successive lines,
advanced across the plain against his front. The Federals,
undismayed by the disparity of numbers, were fighting
bravely, and had just been reinforced by a squadron of
New York regiment, when word was brought to their com
mander that a regiment of Southern cavalry had appeared
between the rivers to his right rear. He at once gave the
order to retire, Tbe movement was carried out in good
order, under heavy musketry, and the tents and stores were
given to the flames ; but an attempt to fire the bridges
faUed, for the Louisiana infantry, rushing recklessly
forward, darted into the flames, and extinguished the burn
ing brands. Sufficient damage was done, however, to
render the passage of the North Fork by the Confederates
slow and difficult ; and Kenly took post on Guard HUl, a
commanding ridge beyond the stream. Again there was
delay. The smoke of the burning camp, roUing past in
dense volumes, formed an impenetrable screen ; the river
was deep and turbulent, with a strong current ; and the
Federal guns commanded the single bridge. The cavalry,
however, were not long in discovering a practicable ford.
The river was soon alive with horsemen ; and, forcing their
way through the swfrling waters, four squadrons of the
6th Virginia, accompanied by Jackson, gained the further
bank, and formed up rapidly for pursuit. The enemy had
already retired, and the dust of the retreating column was
receding fast down the road to Winchester.

PURSUIT 819
Without waitmg for reinforcements, and without
artUlery, Jackson urged the 6th Virginia forward. The
country through which the turnpike runs is roUing and
well-farmed, and the raU fences on either hand made
movement across the fields by no means easy. But the
Confederate advance was vigorous. The New York cavalry,
pressed at every point, were beginning to waver ; and near
the little hamlet of CedarvUle, some three mUes from his
last position, Kenly gave orders for his infantry to check
the pursuit.
Tbe column had halted. Men were tearing down the
fences, and tbe companies were forming for battle in the
fields, when there was a sudden outcry, the roUing thunder
of many hoofs, and tbe sharp rattle of pistol-shots. A dense
cloud of dust came whirling down the turnpike, and emerg
ing from the yellow canopy the New York troopers, riding
for their Uves, dashed through tbe ranks of the startled
infantry, whUe the Confederate horsemen, extending far
to right and left, came surgiag on their traces,
Tbe leading squadron, keeping to the high road, was
formed four abreast, and the deep mass was wedged tightly
between the fences. The foremost files were mowed down
by a voUey at close range, and here, for a moment, the
attack was checked. But the Virginians meant riding
home. On either flank tbe supporting squadrons galloped
swiftly forward, and up the road and across the fields,
while the earth shook beneath their tread, swept their
charging lines, the men yelluag in their excitement and
horses as fr-enzied as thefr riders. In vain the Federal
officers tried to deploy their companies, Kenly, caUing on
tbem to rally round tbe colours, was cut down with a
dreadful wound. The grey troopers fell on them before
tbey could fix bayonets or form a front, and sabre and
revolver found an easy mark in the crowded masses of
panic-stricken iafantry. One of the guns was surrounded,
and the gunners were cut to pieces ; the other escaped for
the moment, but was soon abandoned ; and with the appear
ance of a fresh Confederate squadron on the scene Kenly's
whole force dispersed in flight. Through woods and orchards

320 STONEWALL JACKSON
the chase went on. Escape was impossible. Hundreds
laid down their arms ; and 250 Virginia horsemen, resolutely
handled and charging at exactly the right moment, had the
honour of bringing in as prisoners 600 Federals, including
20 officers and a complete section of artUlery. The enemy
lost in addition 32 kUled and 122 wounded. The Confede
rate casualties were 11 kUled and 15 wounded, and so
sudden and vigorous was their attack that a Federal colonel
estimated thefr numbers at 3,000,
Colonel Flournoy, a most daring officer, led the
squadrons to the charge ; but that the opportunity was so
instantly utilised was due to Jackson. ' No sooner,' says
Dabney, • did he see the enemy than he gave the order to
charge with a voice and air whose peremptory determina
tion was communicated to the whole party. His quick eye
estimated aright the discouragement of the Federals and
thefr wavering temper. Infusing his own spfrit into his
men, he struck the hesitating foe at the decisive moment,
and shattered them.' ' Yet he took no credit to himself.
He declared afterwards to his staff that he had never, in
all his experience of warfare, seen so gallant and effective a
charge of cavalry, and such commendation, coming from
his guarded lips, was the highest honour that his troopers
could have wished,
WhUe these events were ia progress the remainder of
the Confederate cavalry had also been busy. The 7th
Virginia had moved to Buckton, The raUway was torn up,
the telegraph line cut, and an urgent message to Banks for
reinforcements was intercepted. The two companies of
Pennsylvania infantry, on picket near the station, occu
pied a log storehouse and the embankment. Dismounting
his command, Ashby, after a tierce fight, in which two of
his best officers were kiUed, stormed the building and drove
out the garrison. Two locomotives were standing on the
rails with steam up, and by this means the Federals
attempted to escape. Twice they moved out towards Stras
burg, twice they were driven back by the Confederate
carbines, and eventually the two companies surrendered.
' Dabney, vol. ii., p. 95.

ISOLATION OF KENLIT 331
Jackson's measures had been carefully thought out.
Kenly's patrols had faUed to discover his advance in the
early morning, for at Asbury Chapel, about three and a
half mUes south of the Federal outpost line, he had turned
to the right off the Luray road, and plunging into the
woods, had approached Front Eoyal by a pfrcuitous track,
80 rough that the enemy had thought it hardly worth
whUe to watch it. The main body of the cavafry left tbe
Luray road at McCoy's Ford, and crossing tbe South Fork
of tbe Shenandoah, worked through the forest at the foot of
the Massanuttons. During the night Ashby had withdrawn
tbe 7th Virginia, with the exception of a few patrols, from
in front of Banks, and joining Jackson, by a rough track
across the mountains, before daybreak, had been dfrected
to cut the communication between Front Eoyal and Stras
burg. The 6th Vfrginia had accompanied Jackson, the
2nd, under Colonel Munford, destroyed the railway bridges
eastward of Front Eoyal. Had Kenly retreated on
Strasburg he would have found Ashby on his flank.
Had reinforcements been despatched from Strasburg they
would have had to deal with Ashby before they could
reach Kenly. Had the Federals attempted to escape by
Manassas Gap they would have found Munford across
tbeir path. MeanwhUe another party of cavafry had
cut the telegraph between Front Eoyal and Washington ;
and a strong detachment, scouring the country east of
the Blue Eidge, checked Geary's patrols, and blocked the
entrance to the Gap from the direction of Manassas,
Within an hour after his pickets were surprised Kenly was
completely isolated,'
'_ The ingenuous report of a Federal officer engaged at Front Eoyal is
significant of the effect of the sudden attack of the Confederates. He was
sick at the time, but managed to escape. ' By considerable coaxing,' he
wrote, ' I obtained an entrance to a house near by. I was now completely
broken down — so much so that the gentleman prepared a liniment for me,
and actually bound up some of my bruises, while the female portion of the
household actually screamed for joy at our defeat 1 I was helped to bed,
and next morning was taken by Mr. Bitzer to Winchester in his carriage.
He is a gentleman in all particulars, but his family is the reverse {sic). On
reaching Winchester I found things decidedly squally, and concluded to
get out. I was carried to Martinsburg, and being offered by the agent of 9

320 STONEWALL JACKSON
the chase went on. Escape was impossible. Hundreds
laid down their arms ; and 250 Virginia horsemen, resolutely
handled and charging at exactly the right moment, had the
honour of bringing in as prisoners 600 Federals, including
20 officers and a complete section of artillery. The enemy
lost in addition 32 kUled and 122 wounded. The Confede
rate casualties were 11 kUled and 15 wounded, and so
sudden and vigorous was their attack that a Federal colonel
estimated thefr numbers at 3,000.
Colonel Flournoy, a most daring officer, led the
squadrons to the charge ; but that the opportunity was so
instantly utilised was due to Jackson. ' No sooner,' says
Dabney, ' did he see the enemy than he gave the order to
charge with a voice and air whose peremptory determina
tion was communicated to the whole party. His quick eye
estimated aright the discouragement of the Federals and
thefr wavering temper. Infusing his own spfrit into his
men, he struck the hesitating foe at the decisive moment,
and shattered them.' ' Yet he took no credit to himself.
He declared afterwards to his staff that he had never, in
all his experience of warfare, seen so gallant and effective a
charge of cavafry, and such commendation, coming from
his guarded lips, was the highest honour that his troopers
could have wished.
WhUe these events were in progress the remainder of
the Confederate cavalry had also been busy. The 7th
Vfrginia had moved to Buckton, The railway was torn up,
the telegraph line cut, and an urgent message to Banks for
reinforcements was intercepted. The two companies of
Pennsylvania infantry, on picket near the station, occu
pied a log storehouse and the embankment. Dismounting
his command, Ashby, after a fierce fight, in which two of
his best officers were kiUed, stormed the buUding and drove
out the garrison. Two locomotives were standing on the
rails with steam up, and by this means the Federals
attempted to escape. Twice they moved out towards Stras
burg, twice they were driven back by the Confederate
carbines, and eventually the two companies surrendered.
' Dabney, vol. ii., p. 95.

ISOLATION OF KENLY 331
Jackson's measures had been carefully thought out.
Kenly's patrols had failed to discover his advance in the
early morning, for at Asbury Chapel, about three and a
half mUes south of the Federal outpost liae, he had turned
to tbe right off tbe Luray road, and plunging into the
woods, had approached Front Eoyal by a cfrcuitous track,
BO rough that the enemy had thought it hardly worth
whUe to watch it. The main body of the cavafry left the
Luray road at McCoy's Ford, and crossing the South Pork
of the Shenandoah, worked through the forest at the foot of
tbe Massanuttons. During the night Asbby had withdrawn
the 7tb Virginia, with the exception of a few patrols, from
in front of Banks, and joining Jackson, by a rough track
across tbe mountaias, before daybreak, had been dfrected
to cut tbe communication between Front Eoyal and Stras
burg. Tbe 6th Vfrginia had accompanied Jackson, the
2nd, under Colonel Munford, destroyed the raUway bridges
eastward of Front Eoyal. Had Kenly retreated on
Strasburg he would have found Ashby on his flank.
Had reinforcements been despatched from Strasburg they
would have had to deal with Ashby before tbey could
reach Kenly. Had the Federals attempted to escape by
Manassas Gap they would have found Munford across
their path. MeanwhUe another party of cavafry had
cut the telegraph between Front Eoyal and Washington ;
and a strong detachment, scourmg the country east of
the Blue Eidge, checked Geary's patrols, and blocked the
entrance to the Gap from the dfrection of Manassas.
Within an hour after his pickets were surprised Kenly was
completely isolated.'
. \^^° ingenuous report of a Federal ofScer engaged at Front Eoyal is
significant of the effect of the sudden attack of the Confederates. He was
sick at the time, but managed to escape. ' By considerable coaxing,' he
wrote, 'I obtained an entrance to a house near by. I was now completely
broken down— so much so that the gentleman prepared a liniment for me,
and aotnally bound up some of my bruises, while the female portion of the
household actually screamed for joy at our defeat 1 I was helped to bed
and next morning was taken by Mr. Bitzer to Winchester in his carriage!
He IB a gentleman in all particulars, but his family is the reverse (sic) On
reaching Winchester I found things decidedly squally, and concluded to
get out. I was carried to Martinsburg, and being offered by the agent of 3

323 STONEWALL JACKSON
A faUure in staff duties marred to some extent the Con
federate success. ' A vicious usage,' according to Dabney,
• obtained at this time in the Southern armies. This was
the custom of temporarily attaching to the staff of a general
commanding a division or an army a company of cavalry
to do the work of orderlies. By this clumsy contrivance
the organisation of the cavalry regiments was broken up,
the men detached were deprived of all opportunity for drill,
and the general had no evidence whatever of their special
fitness for the responsible service confided to them. Nay,
the colonel of cavalry required to furnish them was most
likely to select the least serviceable company. At the time
of the combat of Front Eoyal the duty of orderlies was
performed for General Jackson by a detachment from one
of Ashby's undisciplined companies, of whom many were
raw youths just recruited and never under fire. As soon
as the Federal pickets were driven in, orders were
despatched to the rear brigades to avoid the laborious route
taken by the advance, and to pursue tbe direct highway to
the town, a level track of three miles, in place of a steep
byway of seven or eight. The panic-struck boy by whom
the orders were sent was seen no more. When Jackson
sent orders to the artiUery and rear brigades to hurry the
pursuit, instead of being found near at hand, upon the
direct road, they were at length overtaken toiling over the
hUls of the useless cfrcuit, spent with the protracted march.
Thus night overtook them by the time they reached the
vUlage, This unfortunate incident taught the necessity of
a picked company of orderlies, selected for their intelligence
and courage, permanently attached to headquarters, and
owing no subordination to any other than the general and
his staff. Such was the usage that afterwards prevaUed in
the Confederate armies.' '
luggage train to take me to Baltimore, I concluded to accept the offer, and
took a sleeping bunk, arriving in Baltimore the next afternoon.' He then
proceeded to Philadelphia, and sent for his physician. Several of his
officers whom he found in the town he immediately sent back to the
colours ; but as he believed that ' the moral of his regiment was not as it
should be ' he remained himself in Philadelphia.
' Dabney, vol. ii., pp. 98-94. It may be recalled that Wellington
found it necessary to form a corps of the same kind in the Peninsular War;
it is curious that no such organisation exists in regular ar'jnies.

BANKS INCREDULOUS 823
General Gordon has described with much minuteness
how the news of the disaster was received at Strasburg,
The attack had begun at one o'clock, but it was not till
four that Banks was made aware that his detachment was
in jeopardy. Believing that Jackson was at Harrisonburg,
sixty mUes distant, he had certainly no cause for immediate
apprehension. The VaUey towards Woodstock never looked
more peaceful than on that sleepy summer afternoon ; the
sentries dawdled on their posts, and officers and men aUke
resigned themselves to its restful influence. Suddenly a
mounted orderly dashed violently through the camp, and
Strasburg was aroused. By the road to Buckton Banks
hastUy despatched a regiment and two guns. Then came
a lull, and many anxious inqufries : ' What is it ? Is it
StonewaU Jackson, or only a cavalry raid ? '
A few hours later reports came in from the field of
battle, and Banks telegraphed to Stanton that 5,000 rebels
had driven Kenly back on Middletown. 'The force,' he
added, ' has been gathering in the mountains, it is said,
since Wednesday.'
But stUl the Federal general showed no undue alarm.
' Nothing was done,' says Gordon, ' towards sending away
to Wuachester any ofthe immense quantities of pubhc stores
coUected at Strasburg; no movement had been made to
place our sick m safety. It did not seem as if Banks inter
preted tbe attack to signify aught of future or further
movement by the enemy, or that it betokened any purpose
to cut us off from Winchester. I was so fully impressed,
however, with Jackson's purpose, tbat as soon as night set
in I sought Banks at his headquarters. I laboured long to
impress upon bun what I thought a duty, to wit, his imme
diate retreat upon Winchester, carrying aU his sick and
aU his supplies that he could transport, and destroying
the remainder. Notwithstanding aU my soUcUations and
entreaties, he persistently refused to move, ever repeating,
' I must develop the force of the enemy.' '
The force that had been sent out on'the Buckton road
had been soon recalled, without securing further information
' From Brook Farm to Cedar Mmmtain, pp. 191, 192.

324 STONEWALL JACKSON
than that the Confederate pickets were in possession of
every road which led west or north from Front Eoyal,
Again did Gordon, at the request of Banks' chief of
the staff, endeavour to persuade the .general to abandon
Strasburg, • " It is not a retreat," he urged, " but a true
military movement to escape from being cut off ; to prevent
stores and sick from falling into the hands of the enemy,"
Moved with an unusual fire. General Banks, who had met
aU my arguments with the single reply, " I must develop
the force of the enemy," rising excitedly from his seat, with
much warmth and in loud tones exclaimed, " By God, sir,
I wUl not retreat ! We have more to fear, sir, from the
opinions of our friends than the bayonets of our enemies ! "
The thought,' continues the brigadier, ' so long the subject
of his meditations was at last out. Banks was afraid of
being thought afraid, I rose to take my leave, replying,
" This, sir, is not a military reason for occupying a false
position," It was eleven o'clock at night when I left him.
As I returned through the town I could not perceive that
anybody was troubled with anticipation for the morrow.
The sutlers were driving sharp bargains with those who
had escaped from or those who were not amenable to
military discipUne, The strolUng players were moving
crowds to noisy laughter in tbeir canvas booths, through
which the lights gleamed and the music sounded with
startling shrillness. I thought as I turned towards my
camp, bow unaware are all of the drama Jackson is pre
paring for us, and what merriment the morning will
reveal 1 '
Fortunately for his own battalions, the brigadier had
his camp equipage and baggage packed and sent off then
and there to Winchester, and though his men had to
spend the night unsheltered under persistent rain, they had
reason to bless his foresight a few nights later.
At midnight a report was received from one of the Front
Eoyal fugitives : ' Kenly is killed. First Maryland cut to
pieces. Cavalry ditto. The enemy's forces are 15,000 or
20,000 strong, and on the march to Strasburg.'
In forwarding this despatch to Washington Banks

BANKS ELECTRIFIED 326
remarked that he thought it much exaggerated. At 7
^M. on tbe 24th he told Stanton that the enemy's force was
' from 6.000 to 10.000 : tbat it was probably EweU's divifiion.
and tbat .Ta.nkann was still in bis front on tbe Valley
turnpike, TEree hours later he wrote to Gordon, mforming him
that the enemy had fallen back to Front Eoyal during the
night, tbat ample reinforcements had been promised from
Washington, and tbat the division would remain in Stras
burg until further orders.
Up to tbis time he had been convinced that the attack
on I'ront Koval was merely a r-a.ifl, n.nrl t.Vin.t. Ja.p.kHnn wnnld
never dare to insert his whole force between himself acd
McDoweU,' Suddenly, bv what means we are not told, he
was made aware that the Confederates were in over
whelming numbers, and that Jackson was in command.
Scarcely had General Gordon digested the previous
communication when an orderly, galloping furiously to
bis side, dehvered a pencil note from the chief of staff.
' Orders have just been received for the division to move
at once to Middletown, taking such steps to oppose the
enemy, reported to be on the road between Front Eoyal and
Middletown, as may seem proper.' Banks was electrified
at last. Three weeks previously, in writing to Mr. Stanton,
he had expressed his regret that he was ' not to be included
in active operations during the summer.' His regret was
wasted. He was about to take part in operations of which
the activity, on his part at least, was more than
satisfying. Such blindness as Banks had shown is difficult to
explain. His latest information, previous to the attack on
Kenly, told him that Jackson's trains were arriving at
Harrisonburg on the 20th, and he should certainly have
inferred tbat Jackson was in advance of his waggons.
Now from Harrisonburg across the Massanuttons to Front
Eoyal is fifty-five miles ; so it was well within tbe bounds
of possibility that the Confederates might reach the
' Article in Harper's Weekly by Colonel Strother, aide-de-camp to General
Banks.

328 STONEWALL JACKSON
turnpike, had marched more than twenty miles; and
Jackson's own division, which had made four - and -
twenty, was on foot from five in the morning till nine at
night. Banks' natural line of retreat led through Winchester,
and the Confederate advanced guard at CedarvUle was
two miles nearer that town than were the Federals at
Strasburg. But it was still possible that Banks, warned
by Kenly's overthrow, might vyitbdraw by night ; and even
if he deferred retreat untU daylight he might, instead of
falling back on Winchester, strike boldly for Front Eoyal
and escape by Manassas Gap. Or, lastly, he might remain
at Strasburg, at wbich point he was in communication,
although by a long and circuitous road, with Fremont at
Franklin. Jackson had therefore tbree contingencies to provide
against, and during the night which foUowed the capture
of Front Eoyal he evolved a plan which promised to meet
tbem aU. Ashby, at daybreak, was to move witb the 7th
Virginia cavalry in the direction of Strasburg ; and at the
same hour a staff officer, with a small escort, supported
by Taylor's Louisianians, was to ride towards Middletown,
a vUlage five miles north of Strasburg and thirteen from
Winchester, and to report frequently. The 2nd and 6th
Virginia cavalry, under General Steuart, were to advance
to Newtown, also on the Valley turnpike, and eight miles
from Winchester ; whUe EweU, with Trimble's brigade and
his artillery, was to move to Nineveh, two mUes north of
CedarvUle, and there halt, awaiting orders. The remainder
of the command was to concentrate at CedarviUe, pre
paratory to marching on Middletown ; and strong cavalry
patrols were to keep close watch on the Strasburg-Front
Eoyal road.'
From CedarviUe to Middletown is no more than seven
mUes, and Taylor's brigade is reported to have moved at
six A.M., while Ashby had presumably already
®^'"' marched, But notwithstanding tbe fact that
Banks' infantry did not leave Strasburg till ten a.m., aud
¦ Jackson's Eeport. 0. E., vol. zii.j part i., p. 703.

THE MARCH TO MIDDLETOWN 329
that it had five miles to cover before reaching Middle-
town, when tbe Confederates reached the turnpike at
tbat vUlage the Federal main body had already passed, and
only tbe rear-guard was encountered.
It seems evident, therefore, that it was not tUl near noon
that Jackson's patrols came ia sight of Middletown, and
that tbe Confederate advanced guard had taken at least six
hours to cover seven miles. The country, however, between
CedarvUle and the VaUey turnpike was almost a con
tinuous forest; and wood-fighting is very slow fighting.
The advance had met with strong resistance. General
Gordon had prudently sent the 29th Pennsylvania _ to
Middletown at an early hour, with orders to reconnoitre
towards Front Eoyal, and to cover Middletown until the
army had passed through.
Supported by a section of artUlery, the regiment had
moved eastward tUl it struck the Confederate scouts some
7am ^^^^ mUes out on the CedarvUle road. After a long
skfrmish it was withdrawn to Middletown ; but
the 1st Maine cavalry, and a squadron of the 1st Vermont,
about 400 strong, which had been ordered by Banks to
proceed in the same dfrection, made a vigorous demon
stration, and then fell back slowly before the advanced
guard, showing a bold front, using their carbines freely,
and taking advantage of the woods to impose upon the
enemy. These manoeuvres succeeded in holding the Confederates
in check tUl after ten o'clock, for the heavy timber con
cealed the real strength of the Federals, and although
1015 am -^shby, with the 7th Virginia, had marched
to the scene of action, tbe infantry was not yet
up. It is to be remembered that at daybreak the Valley
army was by no means concentrated, Jackson had with
him at CedarviUe only EweU's division ; his own division
havfrig halted near Front Eoyal, This last division, it
appears from the reports, did not leave Front Eoyal until
8 A.M, ; a sufficiently early hour, considering the condition
of the men and horses, the absence ofthe trains, and the fact
that one of the brigades had bivouacked four miles south of

330 STONEWALL JACKSON
the vUlage.' It was not, then, tiU between nine and ten that
the column cleared CedarvUle, and Middletown was distant
nearly three hours' march, by an exceedingly bad road.
In aU probability, if Jackson, at daybreak or soon
afterwards, had marched boldly on Middletown with EweU's
division, he would have been able to hold Banks on the
Valley turnpike untU the rest of his infantry and artUlery
arrived. But he had always to bear in mind that the
Federals, finding their retreat on Winchester compro
mised, might make a dash for Manassas Gap. Now
the road from Strasburg to Manassas Gap was pro
tected throughout its length by the North Fork of the
Shenandoah; and to attack the Federals on the march,
should tbey take this road, the Confederates would have to
move through CedarviUe on Front Eoyal. This was the
only road by which they could reach the river, and the
bridges at Front Eoyal were the only avaUable points of
passage. Jackson, it appears, was therefore reluctant
to leave CedarvUle, within easy reach of the bridges,
untU he received information of his enemy's designs, and
that information, which had to be sought at a distance,
was naturally long in coming.
Criticism, after the event, is easy; but it certainly
seems curious, with his knowledge of Banks, that Jackson
should have believed his opponent capable of so bold a
measure as retreat by way of Manassas Gap, According
to his own report, the feasibUity of such a course did
cross Banks' mind ; but it might seem that on tbis
occasion Jackson lost an opportunity through over-caution.
Nevertheless, in desperate situations even the most mert
characters are sometimes capable of desperate resolu
tions. Although for the time being Banks was permitted
to extricate his infantry from the toils, the remainder
of his command was less fortunate. The general and his
brigades reached Winchester in safety, but the road between
that town and Strasburg was a scene of dire disaster,
" The supply waggons were still eight miles south of Front Eoyal, inthe
Luray Valley,

MIDDLETOWN 331
Steuart, with the 2nd and 6th Virginia, had struck
Newton before noon, and found a convoy of waggons strung
11 30 A M ^^^ °^ *^® Valley turnpike. A few shots threw
everything into confusion. Many of the teamsters
deserted thefr posts, and fled towards Winchester or
Strasburg. Waggons were upset, several were captured,
and others plundered. But the triumph of the Con
federates was short-lived. The Federal infantry had
already reached Middletown ; and Banks sent forward a
regiment of cavalry and a brigade of infantry to clear the
way. Steuart was speedily driven back, and the North
erners resumed their march.
At some distance behind the infantry came the Federal
cavalry, about 2,000 strong, accompanied by a battery and
1215 M ^ small party of Zouaves; but by the time this
force reached Middletown, Ashby, supported by
the Louisiana brigade, had driven in the regiment hitherto
opposed to him, and, emerging from the forest, with infantry
and guns in close support, was bearing down upon the
vUlage. The batteries opened upon the solid columns of
the Federal horse. The Louisiana regiments, deploying at
the double, dashed forward, and the Northern squadrons,
penned in the narrow streets, found themselves assailed by
a heavy fire. A desperate attempt was made to escape
towards Winchester, and a whfrling cloud of dust through
which the sabres gleamed swept northward up the turnpike.
But Ashby's horsemen, galloping across country, headed off
the fugitives; some of the Confederate infantry drew an
abandoned waggon across the road, and others ran forward
to the roadside fences. At such close quarters the effect.pf
tbe musketry was terrible, ' In a few moments tbe turnpike,'
which had just before teemed with life, presented a most
appalling spectacle of carnage and destruction. The road
was literally obstructed with the mingled and confused
mass of struggling and dying horses and riders. Amongst
the survivors the wildest confusion ensued, and they
scattered in disorder in various directions, leaving some
200 prisoners in the hands of the Confederates,' ' Part
' Jackson's Eeport. 0. E., vol. xii., part i., p. 704.
VOL.!, 4^

882 STONEWALL JACKSON
dashed back to Strasburg, where the teeming magazines
of the Federal commissaries were already blazing ; and
part towards the mountains, flying in small parties
by every country track. The rear regiments, how
ever, still held together. Drawing off westward, in the
hope of gaining the Middle road, and of making his way to
Winchester by a circuitous route, General Hatch, com
manding the cavalry brigade, brought his guns into action
on a commanding ridge, about a mUe west of the highway,
and stiU showed a front with his remaining squadrons.
Infantry were with them ; more horsemen came thronging
up ; their numbers were unknown, and for a moment they
looked threatening, Tbe Confederate batteries trotted
forward, and Taylor's brigade, with the Stonewall and
Campbell's in support, was ordered to attack ; whUst Ashby,
accompanied by the Louisiana Tigers and two batteries,
pursued the train of waggons that was flying over the hUls
towards Winchester.
The question now to be solved was whether the cavafry
was the advanced or the rear guard of the Federal army.
No message had arrived from Steuart. But the people of
Middletown supplied the information. They reported that
in addition to the convoy a long column of infantry bad
passed through the vUlage ; and Jackson, directing
his infantry to follow Ashby, sent a message to EweU
to march on Winchester. Some delay took place before
the tbree brigades, which had now driven back the Federal
cavafry, could be brought back to the turnpike and re
formed; and it was well on in the afternoon
when, with the Stonewall regiments leading, the
Confederate infantry pushed forward down the pike.
The troops had been on thefr legs since dawn ; some
of them, who had bivouacked south of Front Eoyal, had
already marched sixteen mUes, the Federals had more
than two hours' start, and Winchester was stUl twelve
miles distant. But the enemy's cavafry had been routed,
and such as remained of the waggons were practicaUy
without a guard. Ashby and Steuart, with three fine
regiments of Vfrginia cavalry, supported by the horse-

INDISCIPLINE 833
artillery and other batteries, were weU to the front, and
' there was every reason to believe,' to use Jackson's own
words, 'that if Banks reached Winchester, it would be
without a train, if not without an army.'
But the irregular organisation of the Valley forces
proved a bar to the fulfilment of Jackson's hopes. On
approaching Newtown he found that the pursuit had been
arrested. Two pieces of artillery were engaging a Federal
battery posted beyond the viUage, but the Confederate
guns were almost wholly unsupported, Ashby had come
up with tbe convoy. A few rounds of sheU had dispersed
the escort. The teamsters fled, and the supply waggons
and sutlers' carts of the Federal army, fiUed with luxuries,
proved a temptation which tbe half-starving Confederates
were unable to resist. 'Nearly the whole of Ashby's
cavalry and a part of the infantry under his command had
turned aside to pUlage. Indeed the firing had not ceased,
ui the first onset upon the Federal cavalry at Middletown,
before some of Ashby's men might have been seen, with a
quickness more suitable to horse-thieves than to soldiers,
breaking from their ranks, seizing each two or three of the
captured horses and making off across the fields. Nor did
the men pause untU they had carried their Ulegal booty
to thefr homes, which were, in some instances, at the
distance of one or two days' journey. That such extreme
disorders could occur,' adds Dabney, 'and that they
could be passed over without a bloody punishment, reveals
the curious inefficiency of officers in the Confederate
army.' '
' Dabney, vol. ii., pp. 101-2. 'The difficulty,' says General Taylor,
speaking of the Confederate cavalry, ' of converting raw men into soldiers
is enhanced manifold when they are mounted. Both man and horse require
training, and facilities for rambling, with temptation to do so, are increased.
There was little time, and it may be said less disposition, to establish camps
of instruction. Living on horseback, fearless and dashing, the men of the
South afforded the best possible material for cavalry. They had every
quality but discipline, and resembled Prince Charming, whose manifold
gifts were rendered useless by the malignant fairy. Assuredly our cavalry
rendered much excellent service, especially when dismounted ; aud such able
officers as Stuart, Hampton, and the younger Lees in the east, Forrest,
Green, and Wheeler in the West, developed much talent for war ; but theii
A A 3

334 STONEWALL JACKSON
Banks, when the pursuit had so suddenly ceased, had
determined to save the remnant of his train. Three
regiments and a couple of batteries were ordered back from
Bartonsville, with Gordon in command ; and tbis rear
guard had not only shown a formidable front, but bad
actually driven the infantry that stUl remained with Asbby
out of Newtown, and into the woods beyond. General Hatchi
who had regained the turnpike with part of his brigade,
bad now come up ; and tbe addition of six squadrons of
cavalry rendered Gordon's force capable of stout resistance.
The Federals held a strong position. Tbe Confederates
had present but 50 cavafry, 150 infantry, and 5 guns.
Nor was there any hope of immediate support, for tbe
remainder of the troops were still several miles in rear,
and Steuart's two regiments appear to have rejoined
General EweU on the road for Nineveh.
Shortly before sunset the Confederate artillery was re
inforced. The Stonewall Brigade had also arrived upon
the scene ; and Gordon, firing such waggons as he could
not carry off, as weU as the pontoons, fell back on Win
chester as the night closed in.
The Confederates had now marched from sixteen to
twenty mUes, and the men had not eaten since the early
morning. But Jackson had determined to press the march
till he was within striking distance of the hills which stand
round Winchester to the south. It was no time for repose.
The Federals had a garrison at Harper's Ferry, a garrison at
Eomney, detachments along the Baltimore and Ohio Eail
way ; and Washington, within easy distance of Winchester by
rail, was fuU of troops.' A few hours' delay, and instead of
Banks' solitary division, a large army might bar the way
to the Potomac. So, with the remnant of Ashby's cavalry
achievements, however distinguished, fell far below the standard that would
have been reached had not the want of discipline unpaired their efforts.' —
Destruction and Reconstruction, pp. 70-71. It is only fair to add, however,
that the Confederate troopers had to supply their own horses, receiving no
compensation for their loss by disease or capture. This in some measure
excuses their anxiety to loot as many chargers as they could lay hands on.
' Twenty regiments of infantry and two regiments of cavalry. 0. E.,
vol. xii., part iii., p. 813.

A NIGHT MARCH 836
in advance, and the StonewaU Brigade in close support,
tbe column toiled onward through the darkness. But
the Federal rear-guard was exceedingly weU handled. The
2nd Massachusetts regiment held the post of honour, and,
taking advantage of stream and ridge, the gaUant New
Englanders disputed every mile of road. At Bartonsville,
where the Opequon, a broad and marshy creek, crosses the
turnpike, they turned stubbornly at bay. A heavy voUey,
suddenly delivered, drove the Confederate cavalry back in
confusion on the mfantry supports. The _ 33rd Virgmia
was completely broken by the rush of flying horsemen;
tbe guns were overridden ; and Jackson and his staff were
left alone upon the turnpike. In the pitch darkness it was
difficult to ascertain the enemy's numbers, and the flashes
of their rifles, dancing along the top of the stone walls, were
the only clue to their position. The Confederate column was
ordered to deploy, and the Stonewall Brigade, pushing into
the fields on either flank, moved slowly forward over the
swampy ground. The stream proved an impassable obstacle
both below and above the Federal position ; but the 27th
Virginia, attacking the enemy in front, drove them back and
crossed to the further bank.
Tbe pursuit, however, had been much delayed ; and the
Massachusetts regiment, although ridden into by their own
cavalry, fell back in good order, protected by a strong line of
skirmishers on either side of the turnpike. The Confederate
order of march was now changed. Three companies, who
were recruited from the district and knew the ground, were
ordered to tbe front. The 5th Virginia, four or five hundred
yards from the skfrmish line, were to foUow in support. The
cavafry and guns were left in rear ; and the troops once
more took up the line of march.
For more than an hour they tramped slowly forward.
The darkness grew more intense, and the chaff and laughter
—for the soldiers, elated by success, had hitherto shown no
sign of fatigue — died gradually away. Nothing was to be
heard but the clang of accoutrements, the long rumble of
the guns, and the shuffle of weary feet. Men feU in the
ranks, overpowered by sleep or faint with hunger, and the

836 STONEWALL JACKSON
skfrmishers, wadfrig through rank fields of wheat and
clover, stumbling into ditches, and climbing painfully over
high stone walls, made tardy progress. Again and again
the enemy's voUeys flashed through the darkness; but
stUl there was no halt, for at the head of the regiments,
peering eagerly into the darkness, their iron-wiUed com
mander still rode forward, as regardless of the sufferings of
his men as of the buUets of the Federal rear-guard, with
but one thought present to his mind — to bring Banks
to battle, and so prevent his escape from Winchester.
The student of Napoleon had not forgotten the pregnant
phrase : ' Ask me for anything but time ! ' The indis
cipline of Ashby's cavafry had already given Banks a
respite ; and, undisturbed by his reverses, the Union
general had shown himself capable of daring measures.
Had the Confederates halted at Newtown or at Bartons
ville, the troops would doubtless have been fresher for the
next day's work, but tbe morning might have seen Banks
far on his way to the Potomac, or possibly strongly rein
forced. When the Confederate infantry had met and over
thrown their enemy it would be time enough to think of
food and rest. So long as the men could stand they
were to follow on his traces. ' I rode with Jackson,' says
General Taylor, ' through the darkness. An officer, riding
hard, overtook us, who proved to be the chief quarter
master of the army. He reported the waggon trains far
behiad, impeded by a bad road in the Luray VaUey. " Tbe
ammunition waggons ? " sternly. " All right, sir. They
were in advance, and I doubled teams on them and brought
them through." " Ah ! " in a tone of relief,
' To give countenance to the quartermaster, if such can
be given on a dark night, I remarked jocosely, " Never mind
the waggons. There are quantities of stores in Winchester,
and the general has invited me to breakfast there to
morrow." Jackson took tbis seriously, and reached out to
touch me on the arm. Without physical wants himself, he
forgot that others were differently constituted, and paid
little heed to commissariat, but woe to the man who faUed

WINCHESTER 887
to bring up ammunition. In advance his trains were left
behind. In retreat he would fight for a wheelbarrow.' '
At Kernstown, behind Hogg Eun, the Federal rear-guard
halted for the last time, but after a short engagement feU
Ma 25 ''^"^ ^^ Winchester. It was now three o'clock, an
*^ ' hour before dawn, and the Massachusetts men
became aware that the enemy had halted. Their skir
mishers stUl pressed slowly forward, and an occasional
shot flashed out in the darkness. But that noise which
once heard on a stUl night is never forgotten, the solid
tramp of a heavy column on a hard road, like the dull
roar of a distant cataract, had suddenly died away. As
the day broke the Confederate advanced guard, passing
Pritchard's HiU and Kernstown battlefield, struck the
Federal pickets on Parkin's Hill, In front was a brook
which goes by the name of Abraham's Creek ; beyond tbe
brook rose the ridge which covers Winchester, and Jackson
at last permitted his men to rest. The coveted heights
were within easy grasp. The Federal army was stiU in
Winchester, and nothing now remained but to storm the
hUls, and drive the enemy in panic from the town.
The Confederates, when the order was given to halt,
had dropped where they stood, and lay sleeping by the
roadside. But their commander permitted himself no
repose. For more than an hour, without a cloak to
protect him from the chilling dews, Ustening to every
sound that came from the front, he stood like a sentinel
over the prostrate ranks. As the davra rose, in a quiet
undertone he gave the word to march. Tbe order was
passed down the column, and, in the dim grey light, the
men, rising from thefr short slumbers, stiff, cold, and
hungry, advanced to battle.
Jackson had with him on the turnpike, for the most
part south of Kernstown, his own division, supported
by the brigades of Scott and Elzey and by nine batteries.
About a mUe eastward on the Front Eoyal road was
EweU, with Trimble's brigade and ten guns. This detach
ment had moved on Winchester the preceding evening,
' Destruction and Reconstruction, p. 66.

338 STONEWALL JACKSON
driving in the Federal pickets, and had halted within three
miles of the town. During the night Jackson had sent
a staff officer with instructions to EweU. The message,
although the bearer had to ride nine- and-twenty miles, by
Newton and Nineveh, had reached its destination in good
time; and as the StonewaU Brigade moved silently past
Pritchard's HUl, Trimble's brigade advanced abreast of it
beyond the intervening woods.
On both the VaUey turnpike and the Front Eoyal road
the Federals were favoured by tbe ground, and tbeir posi
tion, although tbe two wings were widely separated, had
been skilfully selected. On the turnpike and west of it was
Gordon's brigade of four regiments, strengthened by eight
guns, and by a strong force of cavalry in reserve. Watching
the Front Eoyal road was DonneUy's brigade, also of four
regiments, with eight guns and a few squadrons.. The line
of defence ran along a broken ridge, lined in many places
with stout stone waUs, and protected in front by the
winding reaches of Abraham's Creek,
Still, strong as was the Federal position, there was
little chance of holding it. Banks had been joined during
the night by the larger portion of his army, and by the
garrison of Winchester, but he was heavily outnumbered.
At Front Eoyal and at Middletovra he had lost over 1,600
men ; part of his rear-guard had scattered in the moun
tains, and it was doubtful if he could now muster more
than 6,500 effective soldiers. In iafantry and artillery
the Confederates were more than twice his strength ; in
cavafry alone were they inferior.
Jackson's plan of action was simple. His advanced
guard was to hold Gordon in position ; and when EweU
feU on DonneUy, a heavy column would move round
Gordon's right.
The Stonewall regiments led the way. The line of heights,
west of the turnpike and commanding Abraham's Creek, was
6 A.M. occupied by the Federal outposts, and a general
advance of the whole brigade, sweepmg across the
brook and up the slopes, quickly drove in the pickets.
But the enemy, whiether by skiU or good fortune, had

WINCHESTER 839
occupied with his main line a position admirably adapted
for an inferior force. Four hundred yards beyond the ridge
which the Confederates had seized rose a second sweU of
ground ; and eight rifled guns, supported by the 2nd Massa
chusetts, swept the opposite height at effective range.
Jackson immediately ordered up three batteries, posting
them behind the crest ; and as the sun rose, drawing up the
mist from the little stream, a fierce duel of artiUery began
the battle.
The Confederate gunners, harassed by the enemy's
skirmishers, and overwhelmed with shells, suffered heavily ;
one battery was compeUed to retire with a loss of
¦ ^¦"' 17 men and 9 horses ; a second lost all its officers ;
and it was not till near seven o'clock that the enemy's eight
guns, with thefr infantry escort, were finally driven back.
EweU, meanwhile, had come into action on the right ;
but the mist was heavy, and his advanced guard,
received with a heavy fire from behind the stone walls,
was driven back with a loss of 80 officers and men.
Then the fog rose heavUy, and for nearly an hour the
8am engagement on this wing died away. About eight
o'clock EweU's batteries again came into action,
and Trimble moved round to take the enemy in flank. But
Jackson, meanwhUe, was bringing matters to a crisis on the
left. The Federals still held fast in front; but the
Louisiana, Taliaferro's, and Scott's brigades, retaiaed
hitherto with Elzey in reserve, were now ordered to turn the
enemy's flank. Moving to the left in rear of the Stonewall
Brigade, these eleven regiments, three forming a second
line, faced to the front and climbed the heights.
General Gordon, in anticipation of such a movement,
had afready transferred two regiments to his right. The
fire of this force, though dehvered at close range, hardly
checked the Confederate onset. Closing the many gaps,
and preserving an alignment that would have been credit
able on parade, Taylor and Taliaferro moved swiftly for
ward over rocks and walls. The Federal infantry gave way
in great disorder. The cavalry in support essayed a
charge, but the Confederates, as the squadrons rode boldly

340 STONEWALL JACKSON
towards them, halted where they stood, and the roUing
voUeys of the hne of battle drove back the horsemen
witb many empty saddles. Then, as Taylor resumed bis
advance, the Stonewall regiments, with Elzey in close
support, rose suddenly from their covert, and the whole
line swept forward across the ridges. The bright sun of
the May morning, dispersing the mists which veUed the
field, shone down upon 10,000 bayonets ; and for the first
time in the Valley ' the rebel yell,' that strange fierce cry
which heralded the Southern charge, rang high above the
storm of battle.
It was impossible, before so strong an onset, for the
Federals to hold thefr ground. Infantry, artillery, and
cavafry gave way. From east, west, and south the grey
battalions converged on Winchester ; and as the enemy's
columns, covered by the heavy smoke, disappeared into
the streets, Jackson, no longer the imperturbable tactician,
moving his troops like the pieces on a chess-board, but
the very personification of triumphant victory, dashed for
ward in advance of his old brigade. Eiding recklessly
down a rocky slope he raised himself in his stirrups, and
waving his cap in the direction of the retreating foe,
shouted to his officers to ' Press forward to the Potomac ! '
Elzey's, the reserve brigade, was ordered to take up the
pursuit ; and within the town, where the storehouses had
been afready fired, the battle was renewed. The Federal
regiments, with the exception of the 2nd Massachusetts, lost
all order in tbe narrow streets,' The roar of battle followed
close ; and with the rattle of musketry, the crash of sheUs,
and the loud cries of the victors speeding their rapid fiight,
tbe Northern infantry dispersed across the fields. As tbe
Confederates passed through the town, the people of
Winchester, frantic with triumph after their two months of
captivity, rushed out from every doorway to meet tbe
troops ; and with weeping and with laughter, with the
' Banks' aide-de-camp. Colonel Strother, says, ' For several minutes it
looked hke the commencement of a Bull Eun panic. The stragglers,' he
adds, ' rapidly increased in numbers, and many threw down their arms.' —
Harper's Weekly. See also Jackson's Eeport, 0. E., vol. xii., part i., p. 706.

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PURSUIT 341
blessings of women and the fierce shouts of men, the soldiers
of the Valley were urged forward in hot pursuit.
As they emerged from the town, and looked down upon
the open pastures through which the Martinsburg turnpike
10 a M runs, they saw tbe country before them covered
with crowds of fugitives, Jackson. stUl in advance,
turned round to seek bis cavalry, ' Jj'rom the hefl.d of every
street eager coiumna of infa,ntry wp.re pouring, a.nd. de
ploying witbout waiting orders, were pushing hastily across
thfi tip.ldR. Jjut not a squadron was in sight. Ashby,
with the handful of men that still remained with him, had
ridden to BerrvviUe. expecting tbat tbe enemy would
attempt to escape by Snicker s Gan^ Bteuart, with the
two regiments that had done sucn service at Front
Eoyal, was with EweU and Trimble; but although Don
nelly's regiments could be seen retiring in good order,
they were not followed by a single sabre.
Despatching an aide-de-camp to order Steuart to the
front, Jackson caUed up his batteries. The infantry, too,
was hurried forward, in order to prevent the Federals rally
ing. But after a rapid march of two hours the interval
between the Confederates and the enemy was still in
creasing; and it was evident that without cavalry it was
useless to continue thp. pnrHm't. Not only was the infantry
utterly exhausted, but the horses of the artillery were
worn out ; and about five miles out of Winchester the
troops were ordered to halt and bivouac' The Federals,
relieved from the pressure of the hostile fire, gradually
reformed their ranks ; and Jackson, notwithstanding the
extraordinary exertions he had demanded from his troops,
his own skilful manceuvres, and the high spfrit of his men,
saw his opportunity pass away. His impatience was almost
uncontrollable. His staff was despatched in all directions
to urge forward the remainder of the batteries. ' We must
press them to the Potomac ! ' ' Forward to the Potomac ! '
Such was the tenor of every order ; and at length, as the
Federals disappeared in the far distance, he ordered the
' The greater part of the troops had marched over thirty miles in thirty
boars, during which time they had been almost continuously engaged.

342 STONEWAI.L JACKSON
artiUery teams to be unhitched, and the gunners, thus
mounted, to pursue the enemy. But before this strange
substitute for cavalry had moved out, the lagging squadrons
arrived, and with a few fiery words they were sent at speed
down the VaUey turnpike. But it was too late. Banks,
for the second time, was more fortunate than he deserved.
To the misconduct of Ashby's troopers, and to the
pedantic folly of General Steuart, the escape of the Federal
army must be attributed,
' Never have I seen an opportunity when it was in the
power of cavafry to reap a richer harvest of tbe fruits of
victory. Had the cavafry played its part in this pursuit
as weU as the four companies under Colonel Flournoy
two days before in the pursuit from Front Eoyal, but a
small portion of Banks' army would have made its escape
to the Potomac'
So runs Jackson's official report, and when the dis
organised condition of the Federal battaUons, as they fied
north from Winchester, is recalled, it is difficult to question
the opinion therein expressed. The precipitate retreat
from -Strasburg, accompanied by the loss of waggons and
of stores ; the concentrated attack of overwhelming num
bers, followed by the disorderly rush through the streets
of Winchester, had, for the time being, dissolved the bonds
of discipline. It is true tbat some of the Federal regiments
held together ; but many men were missing ; some fell into
the hands of the Confederates, others sought safety by
devious roads, and there can be Uttle doubt but that
those who fled to the Potomac were for the time being
utterly demoralised. Had they been resolutely charged
before they had reformed their ranks, their rifles would no
more have saved them from annihilation than they had
saved Kenly's command at CedarviUe,
But where was the cavafry ? Ashby's 50 men, all
that he had been able to collect, were far away upon
the right ; out of reach of orders, and in any case
too few for effective use. The two regiments under
Steuart, 600 or 700 strong, were the force on which Jack
son had depended, and Steuart had shown himself in-

THE CAVALRY AGAIN FAILS HIM 843
capable of command. He had received Jackson's message
with the reply that he could obey no orders unless they
came through his immediate superior.' Before EweU
could be found, precious time was wasted, and two hours
elapsed before the cavalry took up the chase. But the
Federals had now estabhshed strong rear-guards. The
whole of their cavafry, supported by artiUery, had been
ordered to cover the retreat ; and Steuart, although he
picked up numerous prisoners, and followed as far as
Martinsburg, twenty-two mUes north of Wiachester, found
no opportunity for attack.
Halting for two and a half hours at Martinsburg, the
Federals continued their retreat at sunset, abandoning the
magazines in the town to their pursuers. Before midnight
3,000 or 4,000 men had arrived at Wilhamsport, and by the
ford and ferry, supplemented by a few pontoon boats, the
remnant of Banks' army crossed the broad Potomac,
Although not a single Confederate squadron had followed
him from Martinsburg, the Northern general, elated by his
unexpected escape, spoke of this operation as if it had been
carried out under heavy fire. ' It is seldom,' he reported,
' that a river-crossing of such magnitude is achieved (sic)
with greater success.' But he added, with more candour,
' there were never more grateful hearts, in the same number
of men, than when at mid-day on tbe 26th we stood on the
opposite shore ; ' and then, with the loss of 2,000 men, a
hundred waggons, tbe regimental transport of his cavalry,
nearly 800 sick, and a vast quantity of stores, to traverse his
assertion, he stated that his command ' had not suffered an
attack or rout, but had accomplished a premeditated march
of near sixty mUes in the face of the enemy, defeating
his plans, and giving him battle wherever he was found ! ' *
' Jackson's Eeport.
' Some of Banks' officers shared his opinion. The captain of the
Zouaves d'AErique, the general's body-guard, who bad been cut ofl at
Strasburg, but rejoined on the Potomao,lreported that, ' incredible as it may
appear, my men marched 141 miles in 47 hours, as measured by Captain
Abert,' and concluded by congratulating Banks upon the success of his ' un
paralleled retreat.' The Zouaves, at all events, could not complain that
they had been excluded from' active operations.' Another officer declared that

344 STONEWALL JACKSON
But the Northern people were not to be deceived. The
truth was but too apparent; and long before Banks had
found leisure to write his report, terror had taken possession
of the nation. WhUe the soldiers of the VaUey lay round
Winchester, reposing from their fatigues, and regaling
themselves on the captured stores, the Governors of thir
teen States were calUng on thefr mUitia to march to the
defence of Washington, Jackson had struck a deadly blow.
Lincoln and Stanton were electrified even more effectually
than Banks, They issued an urgent call for more troops.
' There is no doubt,' wrote Stanton to the Governor of
Massachusetts, ' tbat the enemy in great force are marching
on Washington,' In the cities of the North the panic was
indescribable. As the people came out of church the news
boys were crying, ' Defeat of General Banks ! Washington
in danger ! ' The newspaper offices were surrounded by
anxious crowds. In the morning edition of the New York
Herald a leader had appeared which was headed ' Fall of
Eichmond.' The same evening it was reported that the
whole of the rebel army was marching to the Potomac.
Troops were hurried to Harper's Perry from Baltimore
and Washington, The raUways were ordered to place thefr
lines at the disposal of the Government, McDoweU, on
the eve of starting to join McClellan, was ordered to lay
aside the movement, and to send half his army to the
VaUey.' Fremont, who was about to join his column from
the Great Kanawha, was called upon to support Banks,
McCleUan was warned, by the President himself, that the
enemy was making a general movement northward, and
that he must either attack Eichmond forthwith or come
to the defence of Washington. A reserve corps of 50,000
men was ordered to be organised at once, and stationed
permanently near the capital ; and in one day nearly half
a miUion American citizens offered thefr services to save
the Union.
' we have great reason to be grateful to kind Providence, and appland the
skill and energy of our commanding officers for the miraculous escape of
our men from utter annihilation.' 0. E., vol. xii., part i., pp. 573 and 611.
' Shields' and Ord's divisions of infantry, and Bayard's brigade of
cavalry, numbering all told 21,200 officers and men.

ADVANCE ON HARPER'S t'ERRY U^
Jackson's success was as complete as it was sudden.
The second diversion against Washington was as effective
as the first, and the victory at Winchester even more
prolific of results than the defeat at Kernstown. Within
four-and-twenty hours the storm-cloud which had been
gathering about Fredericksburg was dispersed. McDowell's
army of 40,000 men and 100 guns was scattered beyond
the hope of speedy concentration. McCleUan, who had
pushed forward his leit'''wing across the Chickahominy,
suddenly found himself deprived of the support on which
he counted to secure his right ; and Johnston, who had
determined to attack bis opponent before that support
should arrive, was able to postpone operations untU the
situation should become more favourable.
Immediately after his victory Jackson bad sent an
officer to Eichmond with dispatches explaining his views,
and asking for instructions. Lee, in reply, requested bim
to press the enemy, to threaten an invasion of Maryland,
and an assault upon the Federal capital. Early on tbe
May 28 28tb, the StonewaU Brigade advanced towards
Harper's Ferry. At tbat point, crowded with
stores of every description, 7,000 men and 18 guns, under
General Saxton, had already been assembled. At Charles
town, Winder's advanced guard struck a reconnoitring
detachment, composed of two regiments, a section of
artillery, and a cavalry regiment. Within twenty minutes
the Federals, already demoralised by the defeat of Banks,
were retfring in disorder, abandoning arms, blankets, and
haversacks, along the road, and the pursuit was continued
untU their reserves were descried in strong force on the
Bolivar Heights, a low ridge covering Harper's Ferry
from the south. The same evening EweU advanced in
support of Winder ; and, on the 29th, the VaUey army
was concentrated near Halltown, with the exception of the
Louisiana brigade, posted near BerryviUe, the 12th Georgia,
with 2 guns, in occupation of Front Eoyal, and Ashby, on
the road to Wardensville, watching Fremont.
During the afternoon the 2nd Virginia Infantry was
sent across the Shenandoah, and occupying the Loudoun
VOL. I. B B

§46 S-tONEWALL JACKSOK
Heights, threatened the enemy's position on the ridge below.
Saxton, in consequence, withdrew a part of his troops the
same night to the left bank of the Potomac ; but Jackson,
although Harper's Perry and its magazines might easUy
have been taken, made no attempt to foUow, His scouts,
riding far to east and west, had already informed him that
McDowell and Fremont were in motion to cut off his re
treat. Shields' division, leading McDoweU's advance from
Fredericksburg, was approaching Manassas Gap ; while
Fremont, hurrying from Franklin through the passes of
the North Mountain, was ten miles east of Moorefield.
Lee's instructions had already been carried to the extreme
point consistent with safety, and Jackson determined to
retreat by the Valley turnpike. Not only was it the one road
which was not yet closely threatened, but it was the one
road over which the enormous train of captured stores could
be rapidly withdrawn.' The next morning, therefore, the
May 29 ™^i^ hody of the army marched back to Winchester ;
Winder, with the Stonewall Brigade and two
batteries, remaining before Harper's Ferry to bold Saxton
in check. Jackson himself returned to Winchester by the
railway, and on the way he was met by untoward news. As
the train neared Winchester a staff officer, riding at a gallop
across the fields, signalled it to stop, and the general was
informed that the 12th Georgia hafl bpp.n drivpn from
Front Boval. burning the stores, but not the bridges, at
Front Eoyal, and that Shields' division was in possession
of the viUage,
The situation had suddenly become more than critical.
Front Eoyal is but twelve mUes from Strasburg. Not
a single Confederate battalion was within five-and-twenty
mUes of that town, and Winder was just twice as far
away. The next morning might see the "Valley turnpike
blocked by 10.000 Federals under Shields. Another lOlTOQ,
McDowell B Second Division, under General Urd, were
jTready near Front Eoyal ; Fremont, with 15.000._was
' Jaokson, although the harvest was in full swing, had given orders that
all waggons in the valley were to be impressed and sent to Winchester and
Martinsburg.

A DESPERATE SITUATION 847
preHsinpr fni-wg.v.1 frnm t.bft TOfiat ; n.nd Bfl.nkfl H.nd Sa.xton.
with the same number, were moving south from the
Potomac. _ Wit.h rngr»lntA ma.Tia.gprinp.nt it would seem
that 'iSfiOO Federals might have been assembled round
Strasburg by midday of the 31st, and that this force
might hayp bppn I'nfrpaapd tn .'?0,000 bv tbe~eYening of
June 1.' Desperate indeed appeared the Confederate
chances. The waggons wbich conveyed the spoils of Martins
burg and Charlestown were stUl at Winchester, and with
them were more than 2,000 prisoners. With the utmost
expedition it seemed impossible that the Valley army, even
if the waggons were abandoned, could reach Strasburg
before the evening of the 31st ; and the StonewaU Brigade,
with fifty miles to march, would be four-and-twenty hours
later. Escape, at least by the Valley turnpike, seemed abso
lutely impossible. Over Pharaoh and his chariots the waters
were already closing.
But there is a power in war more potent than mere
numbers. The moral difficulties of a situation may render
the proudest display of physical force of no avail. Uncer
tainty and apprehension engender timidity and hesitation,
and if the commander is ill at ease the movements of
his troops become slow and halting. And when several
armies, converging on a single point, are separated by
distance or by the enemy, when communication is tedious,
and each general is ignorant of his coUeagues' movements,
uncertainty and apprehension are inevitable. More than
ever is this the case when the enemy has a character for
swiftness and audacity, and some unfortunate detachment
is stUl reeling under the effects of a crushing and un
expected blow.
Eegarding, then, like Napoleon, the difficulties rather
than the numbers of his enemies, Jackson held fast to
his purpose, and the capture of Front Eoyal disturbed
him little. ' What news ? ' he asked briefly as the staff
officer rode up to the carriage door. ' Colonel Connor
has been driven back from Front EoyaL' Jackson smiled
> For the distribution of the different forces during this period see Note
At end of chapter. n B 2

348 STONEWALL JACKSON
grimly, but made no reply. His eyes fixed themselves
apparently upon some distant object. Then his pre
occupation suddenly disappeared. He read the dispatch
which he held in his hand, tore it in pieces, after his
accustomed fashion, and, leaning forward, rested his head
upon his hands and apparently feU asleep. He soon roused
himself, however, and turning to Mr. Boteler, who tells the
story, said : ' I am going to send you to Eichmond for
reinforcements. Banks has halted at Williamsport, and is
beiag reinforced from Pennsylvania. Dix (Saxton) is in my
front, and is being reinforced by the Baltimore and Ohio
EaUway. I have just received a dispatch informing me of
the advance of the enemy upon Front Eoyal, which is
captured, and Fremont is now advancing towards Wardens-
viUe, Thus, you see, I am nearly surrounded by a very
large force,'
' What is your own, General ? ' asked his friend,
' I will tell you, but you must not repeat what I say,
except at Eichmond, To meet this attack I have only
15,000 effective men,'
' What will you do if they cut you off. General ? '
A moment's hesitation, and then the cool reply : ' I
will fall back upon Maryland for reinforcements,'
' Jackson,' says Cooke, ' was in earnest. If his retreat
was cut off he intended to advance into Maryland, and
doubtless make his way straight to Baltimore and
Washington, depending on the Southern sentiment in that
portion of the State to bring him reinforcements,' That
the Federal Government was apprehensive of some such
movement is certain. The wildest rumours were everywhere
prevalent. Men throughout the North wore anxious faces,
and it is said that one question, ' Where is Jackson ? Has he
taken Washington ? ' was on every lip. The best proof, how
ever, that a movement on Washington was actuaUy antici
pated by the Federals is the dispatch of the Secretary of War
to the Governors of the different States : ' Send forward all
the troops that you can, immediately. Banks completely
routed. Intelligence from various quarters leaves no doubt
that the enemy, in great force, are advancing on Washington.

RETREAT 349
You will please organise and forward immediately all the
volunteer and militia force in your State,' Further, on
receiving the news of Banks' defeat, the President had called
King's division of McDowell's army corps to defend the
capital ; and his telegram of May 25 to McClellan, already
alluded to, ia which that general was warned that he might
have to return to Washington, is significant of what would
have happened had the Confederates entered Maryland.'
McCleUan's vast army, in all human probability, would
have been hurriedly re-embarked, and Johnston have been
free to foUow Jackson.
On the night of the 30th the whole Army of the Valley
was ordered back to Strasburg ; and early next morning
May 31 *^® prisoners, escorted by the 21st Virginia, and
followed by the convoy of waggons in double
column, covering seven miles of road, led the way. Captain
Hotchkiss was sent with orders to Winder to hasten back to
Winchester, and not to halt till he had made some distance
between that place and Strasburg, ' I want you to go to
Charlestown,' were Jackson's instructions to his staff officer,
' and bring up the First Brigade, I wUl stay in Winchester
until you get here, if I can, but if I cannot, and the enemy
gets here first, you must conduct it around through the
mountains,' The march, however, as the general had expected, was
made without molestation, and during the afternoon the
main body reached Strasburg, and camped there for the
night. Tbe StonewaU Brigade, meanwhUe, had passed
through Winchester, halting near Newtown; the 2nd
Virginia Eegiment having marched thfrty-five mUes, and
all the remainder twenty-eight. Little had been seen of
the enemy. Fremont h--^^ passed WardensviUe, and, march
ing through heavy ra^' had halted after nightfaU at Cedar
Creek, six mUes w ^of Strasburg. On the road to Front
Eoyal, only a few scouts had been encountered by the
Confederate patrols, for Shields, deceived by a demon-
' 0. E., vol. xi., part i., p. 31. King's division, when it was found that
Jackson had halted near Winchester, was ordered to Front Eoyal. The
fourth division, McOall's, was left to defend Fredericksburg.

850 STONEWALL JACKSON
stration which the Louisiana Brigade had made from
Wiachester, had let the day pass by without a decisive
movement. The difficulties on which Jackson had
counted had weighted the feet of his adversaries with lead.'
Fremont, with two-and-twenty mUes to march, had
suffered Ashby to delay his progress; and although he
had promised Lincoln that he would be in Strasburg at five
o'clock that evening, he had halted on the mountains six miles
distant. Shields, far ahead of the next division, had done
nothing more than push a brigade towards Winchester, and
place strong pickets on every road by which the enemy might
approach. Neither Federal general could communicate with
the other, for the country between them was held by the
enemy. Both had been informed of the other's whereabouts,
but both were uncertain as to the other's movements ; and the
dread of encountering, unsupported, the terrible weight of
Jackson's onset had sapped their resolution. Both believed
the enemy far stronger than he really was. The fugitives
from Winchester had spread exaggerated reports of the
Confederate numbers, and the prisoners captured at
Front Eoyal had by no means minimised them," Banks,
impressed by the long array of bayonets that had crowned
the ridge at Winchester, rated them at 20,000 infantry, with
cavafry and artUlery in addition, Geary, who had retired
in hot haste from Eectortown, burning his tents and stores,
had learned, he reported, from numerous sources that 10,000
cavalry were passing through Manassas Gap, There were
constant rumours that strong reinforcements were coming
up from Eichmond, and even McDoweU believed that
the army of invasion consisted of 25,000 to 30,000 men.
' Up to the time that they arrived within striking distance of Jaokson
they had acted vigorously. Shields marching eighty miles in five days, and
Fremont seventy over a mountain road.
' According to the Official Eecords, 1S6 men were taken by General Shields.
It is said that when Colonel Connor, in command of the 12th Georgia Eegi
ment, reported to Jackson at Wuichester, and gave rather a sensational
account of his defeat, the General looked up, and asked in his abrupt manner :
' Colonel, how many men had you killed 1 ' ' None, I am glad to say, General.'
' How many wounded ? ' ' Few or none, sir.' ' Do you call that fighting,
sir ? ' said Jackson, and immediately placed him under arrest, from whicb
he was not released for several months.

THE FEDERALS MYSTIFIED 361
Fremont's scouts, as he approached Strasburg, 'repre
sented the Confederate force at 30,000 to 60,000.' Shields,
before he crossed the Blue Eidge and found himself in the
vicinity of his old opponent, had condemned the panic
that had seized his brother generals, and had told
McDowell that he would clear the Valley with his own
division. But when he-reached Front Eoyal the force that
he had scornfully described as insignificant had swelled to
20,000 men. Troops from Eichmond, he telegraphed, were
marching down the Luray Valley ; and he urged that he
should be at once supported by two divisions. It cannot be
said that Lincoln and Stanton were to blame for the indeci
sion of the generals. They had urged Fremont forward to
Strasburg, and Shields to Front Eoyal. They had informed
them, by the telegraph, of each other's situation, and had
passed on such inteUigence of the enemy's movements as
had been acquired at Harper's Perry ; and yet, although
the information was sufficiently exact, both Shields and
Fremont, just as Jackson anticipated, held back at the
decisive moment. The waters had been held back, and the
Confederates had passed through them dry-shod. Such is
the effect of uncertainty in war ; a mighty power in the
hands of a general who understands its scope.
On the morniag of June 1, Jackson's only remaining
anxiety was to bring Winder back, and to expedite the
June 1 retreat of the convoy. EweU was therefore
ordered to support Ashby, and to hold Fremont
in check untU the Stonewall Brigade had passed through
Strasburg, The task was easily accomplished. At seven in
the morning the Confederate pickets were driven in. As
they fell back on their supports, the batteries on both sides
came rapidly into action, and the Federal infantry pressed
forward. But musketry replied to musketry, and finding
the road blocked by a line of riflemen, Fremont ordered
his troops to occupy a defensive position on Cedar Creek.
' I was entirely ignorant,' he says, ' of what had taken place
in the VaUey beyond, and it was now evident tbat Jackson,
in superior force, was at or near Strasburg.' His men, also,
appear to have caught the spirit of irresolution, for a forward

352 STONEWALL JACKSON
movement on the part of the Confederates drove in Blenker's
Germans with the greatest ease. ' Sheep,' says General
Taylor, * would have made as much resistance as we met.
Men decamped without firing, or threw down their arms
and surrendered. Our whole skirmish line was advancing
briskly. I sought EweU and reported. We had a fine game
before us, and tbe temptation to play it was great ; but
Jackson's orders were imperative and wise. He had his
stores to save, Shields to guard against, Lee's grand strategy
to promote. He could not waste time chasing Fremont.' *
Winder reached Strasburg about noon. The troops
that had been facing Fremont were then withdrawn ; and
the whole force, now reunited, fell back on Woodstock ;
Ashby, with the cavalry, holding his old position on
Tom's Brook. The retreat was made in fuU view of the
Federal scouts. On the Confederates retfring from before
him, Fremont had pushed forward a reconnaissance, and
Bayard's cavafry brigade, of McDoweU's army, came up
in the eveniag on the other flank. But attack was useless.
The Confederate trains were disappeariug in the distance,
and heavy masses of aU arms were moving slowly
south. The Federal horsemen were unsupported save by
a single battery. McDoweU, who had reached Front
Eoyal with part of his Second Division in the morning, had
endeavoured to push Shields forward upon Strashurg,
But Shields, fearing attack, had dispersed his troops to
guard the various roads ; and when at last they were assem
bled, misled by erroneous information, he had dfrected
them on Winchester, Before the mistake was discovered
the day had passed away. It was not untU the next morn
ing tbat the Federal columns came into communication,
and then Jackson was afready south of Woodstock,
On Friday morning, May 29, says AUan, 'Jackson
was in front of Harper's Ferry, fifty miles from Strasburg,
Fremont was at Fabius, twenty mUes from Strasburg;
and Shields was not more than twenty miles from Stras
burg, for his advance entered Front Eoyal, which is but
twelve miles distant, before mid-day, while McDowell was
' Destruction and Reconstruction, p. 78.

ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE ARMY OF THE VALLEY 363
foUowing with two divisions. Yet by Sunday night
Jackson had marched between fifty and sixty mUes, though
encumbered with prisoners and captured stores, had
reached Strasburg before either of his adversaries, and had
passed safely between their armies, while he held Fremont
at bay by a show of force, and blinded and bewildered
Shields by the rapidity of his movements.'
From the morning of May 19 to the night of
June 1, a period of fourteen days, the Army of the
Valley had marched one hundred and seventy miles,
had routed a force of 12,500 men, had threatened
the North with invasion, had drawn off McDowell from
Fredericksburg, had seized the hospitals and supply depots
at Front Eoyal, Winchester,' and Martinsburg, and finally,
although surrounded on three sides by 60,000 men, had
brought off a huge convoy without losing a single
waggon. This remarkable achievement, moreover, had been
comparatively bloodless. The loss of 613 officers and men
was a small price to pay for such results."
That Jackson's lucky star was in the ascendant there
can be little doubt. But fortune had far less to do with
his success than skiU and insight ; and in two instances —
the misconduct of his cavafry, and the surprise of the 12th
Georgia — tbe bliad goddess played him false. Not that he
trusted to her favours, ' Every movement throughout the
whole period,' says one of his staff officers, ' was the
result of profound calculation. He knew what his men
could do, and to whom he could entrust the execution of
important orders,' ' Nor was his danger of capture, on his
retreat from Harper's Ferry, so great as it appeared.
May 31 was the crisis of his operations. On that
morning, when the prisoners and the convoy marched out
of Winchester, Shields was at Front Eoyal. But Shields
* Quartermaster's stores, to the value of 25,0002., were captured at Win
chester alone, and 9,354 small arms, besides two guns, were carried back to
Staunton. ^ 68 killed ; 886 wounded ; 3 missing ; 166 captured.
' Letter from Major Hotchkiss.

864 STONEWALL JAOKSON
was unsupported ; Ord's division was fifteen mUes in
rear, and Bayard's cavafry stUl further east. Even
had he moved boldly on Strasburg he could hardly
have seized the town. The ground was in Jackson's
favour. The only road available for the Federals
was that which runs south of the North Fork and
the bridges had been destroyed. At that point, three
mUes east of Strasburg, a small flank-guard might have
blocked the way until the main body of the Confede
rates had got up. And had Fremont, instead of halting
tbat evening at Cedar Creek, swept Ashby aside and
pushed forward to join his colleague, the VaUey army
might easily have effected its retreat. Winder alone would
have been cut off, and Jackson had provided for that
emergency. When the embarrassments under which the Federals
laboured are laid bare, the passage of the Confederates
between the converging armies loses something of its extra
ordinary character. Nevertheless, the defeat of the Front
Eoyal garrison and the loss of the bridges was enough to
have shaken the strongest nerves. Had Jackson then burnt
his convoy, and released his prisoners, few would have
blamed him ; and the tenacity with which he held to his
original purpose, the skill with which he imposed on both
Shields and Fremont, are no less admirable than his percep
tion of his opponents' difficulties. Well has it been said :
' What gross ignorance of human nature do those declaimers
display who assert that the employing of brute force is the
highest qualification of a general I '

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357

CHAPTEE XI
CROSS KEYS AND POET REPUBLIC
By the ignorant and the envious success in war is easily
explained away. The dead mUitary lion, and, for tbat
matter, even the living, is a fair mark for the heels of a
baser animal. The greatest captains have not escaped tbe
critics. The genius of Napoleon has been belittled on tbe
ground that each one of his opponents, except Wellington,
was only second-rate, French historians have attributed
WeUington's victories to the mutual jealousy of the French
marshals ; and it has been asserted that Moltke triumphed
only because his adversaries blundered. Judged by this
rule few reputations would survive. In war, however, it is
as impossible to avoid error as it is to avoid loss of life ; but
it is by no means simple either to detect or to take advantage
of mistakes. Before both Napoleon and Wellington an un
sound pianoeuvre was dangerous in the extreme. None were
so quick to see the slip, none more prompt to profit by it.
Herein, to a very great extent, lay the secret of their success,
and herein Ues the true measure of military genius, A general
is not necessarily incapable because he makes a false move ;
both Napoleon and WeUington, in the long course of their
campaigns, gave many openings to a resolute foe, and both
missed opportunities. Under ordinary circumstances mis
takes may easily escape notice altogether, or at all events
pass unpunished, and the reputation of the leader who
commits them will remain untarnished. But if he is
pitted against a master of war a single false step may lead
to irretrievable ruin ; and he will be classed as beneath
contempt for a fault which his successful antagonist may
have committed with impunity a hundred times over.

358 STONEWALL JACKSON
So Jackson's escape from Winchester was not due simply
to the inefficiency of the Federal generals, or to the ignorance
of the Federal President. Lincoln was wrong in dispatching
McDoweU to Front Eoyal in order to cut off Jackson. When
Shields, in execution of this order, left Fredericksburg, the
Confederates were only five miles north of Winchester, and
had they at once retreated McDowell must have missed them
by many mUes. McDoweU, hotly protesting, declared, and
rightly, tbat the movement he had been ordered to execute
was strategicaUy false. 'It is impossible,' he said, 'that
Jackson can have been largely reinforced. He is merely
creating a diversion, and the surest way to bring him from
the lower Valley is for me to move rapidly on Eichmond. In
any case, it would be wiser to move on GordonsvUle.'' His
arguments were unavailing. But when Jackson pressed
forward to the Potomac, it became possible to intercept him,
and the President did all he could to assist his generals.
He kept them constantly informed of the movements of
the enemy and of each other. He left them a free hand, and
with an opponent less able his instructions would have
probably brought about complete success. Nor were the
generals to blame. They failed to accomplish the task that
had been set them, and they made mistakes. But the task
was difficult ; and, if at the critical moment the hazard of
their situation proved too much for their resolution, it was
exactly what might have been expected. The initial error
of the Federals was in sending two detached forces, under
men of no particular strength of character, from opposite
points of the compass, to converge upon an enemy who was
beheved to be superior to either of them. Jackson at once
recognised the blunder, and foreseeing the consequences
that were certain to ensue, resolved to profit by them. His
escape, then, was the reward of his own sagacity.
when once the actual position of the Confederates had
been determined, and the dread that reinforcements were
coming down the Valley had passed away, the vigour of the
Federal pursuit left nothiag to be desired. Dfrectly it was
found that the Confederates had gone south, on the after-
' O. E., vol. zii., part iii., pp. 220, 229 (letter of S. P. Chase).

THE FEDERAL PURSUIT 359
noon of June 1, Shields was directed on Luray, and
June 1. *^^* night his advanced guard was ten miles
beyond Front Eoyal ; on the other side of the
Massanuttons, Fremont, with Bayard's cavalry heading his
advance, moved rapidly on Woodstock.
The Federal generals, however, had to do with a foe
who never relaxed his vigilance. Whilst Ashby and EweU,
on May 31, were engaged with Fremont at Cedar Creek,
Jackson had expected that Shields would advance on Stras
burg. But not a single infantry soldier was observed on
the Front Eoyal road throughout the day. Such inaction
was suspicious, and the probability to which it pointed had
not escaped the penetration of the Confederate leader. His
line of retreat was the famUiar route by New Market and
Harrisonburg to Port EepubUc, and thence to the Gaps of
the Blue Eidge. There he could secure an unassailable
position, within reach of the raUway and of Eichmond.
But, during the movement, danger threatened from the
valley of the South Fork. Should Shields adopt that line
of advance the White House and Columbia bridges would
give him easy access to New Market ; and while Fremont
was pressing the Confederates in rear, their flank might
be assaUed by fresh foes from the Luray Gap. And
even if the retiring column should pass New Market in
safety, Shields, holding tbe bridges at Conrad's Store and
Port Eepublic, might block the passage to the Blue Eidge.
Jackson, looking at the situation from his enemy's point
of view, came to the conclusion that a movement up the
valley of the South Fork was already in progress, and that
the aim of the Federal commander would be to secure the
bridges. His conjectures hit the mark.
Before leaving Front Eoyal Shields ordered his
cavalry to march rapidly up the valley of the South
Pork, and seize the bridge at Conrad's Store ; the White
House and Columbia bridges he intended to secure himself.
But Jackson was not to be so easily overreached. On the
June 2 night of June 2 the Federal cavalry reached
Luray, to find that they had come too late. The
White House and Columbia bridges had both been burned

860 STONEWALL JACKSON
by a detachment of Confederate horse, and Shields was thus
cut off from New Market. At dawn on the 4th, after a forced
night march, his advanced guard reached Conrad's Store to
find that bridge also gone,' and he was once more foUed.
On his arrival at Luray, the sound of cannon on the other
side of the Massanuttons was plainly heard. It seemed
probable that Jackson and Fremont were already in
collision ; but Shields, who had written a few hours
before to Mr. Stanton that with supplies and forage he
could ' stampede the enemy to Eichmond,' was unable to
stfr a foot to assist his coUeague,
Once again Jackson had turned to account the strategic
possibilities of the Massanuttons and the Shenandoah ; and,
to increase General Shields' embarrassment, the weather
had broken. Heavy and incessant rain-storms submerged
the Vfrginia roads. He was ahead of his supplies ; much
hampered by the mud ; and the South Fork of the Shenan
doah, cutting him off from Fremont, rolled a volume of rush
ing water which it was impossible to bridge without long
delay, MeanwhUe, west of the great mountain, the tide of war,
which had swept with such violence to the Potomac, came
surging back, Fremont, by the rapidity of his pursuit,
made full amends for his lack of vigour at Cedar Creek.
A cloud of horsemen filled the space between the hostile
cobimns. Day after day the quiet farms and sleepy villages
on the Valley turnpike heard the thunder of Ashby's guns.
Every stream that crossed the road was the scene of a fierce
skirmish ; and the ripening corn was trampled under the
hoofs of the charging squadrons. On June 2, the first day of
tbe pursuit, between Strasburg and Woodstock the Federals,
boldly led by Bayard, gained a distinct advantage. A dash
ing attack drove in the Confederate rear-guard, swept away
the horse artillery, and sent Ashby's and Steuart's regi
ments, exhausted by hunger and loss of sleep, flying up the
VaUey. Many prisoners were taken, and the pursuit was
' Of the existence ot the bridge at Fort Eepublic, held by a party o£
Confederate cavalry, the Federals do not appear to have been aware.

THE FEDERAL PURSUIT 861
only checked by a party of infantry stragglers, whom Ashby
had succeeded in rallying across the road.
Next day, June 3, the skfrmishing was continued ; and
the Confederates, burning the bridges across the roads,
June 4. retreated to Mount Jackson. On the 4th the
bridge over the North Pork was given to the
flames, Ashby, whose horse was shot under him, remain
ing to the last ; and the deep and turbulent river placed
an impassable obstacle between the armies. Under a
deluge of rain the Federals attempted to launch their
pontoons; but the boats were swept away by the rising
flood, and it was not till the next morning that the bridge
was made. The Confederates had thus gaiaed twenty-
four hours' respite, and contact was not resumed until the
J g 6th, Jackson, meanwhile, constructing a ferry at
Mount Crawford, had sent bis sick and wounded to
Staunton, thus saving them the long detour by Port Ee
pubUc ; and dispatching his stores and prisoners by the
more circuitous route, had passed through Harrisonburg to
Cross Keys, a clump of buildings on Mill Creek, where, on
the night of the 5th, his infantry and artillery, with the
exception of a brigade supporting the cavalry, went into
bivouac. On the afternoon of the 6th the Federal cavalry followed
Ashby. Some three miles from Harrisonburg is a tract
J g of forest, crowning a long ridge ; and within the
timber the Confederate squadrons occupied a strong
position. The enemy, 800 strong, pursued witbout pre
caution, charged up a gentle hill, and were repulsed by a
heavy fire. Then Ashby let loose his mounted men on the
broken ranks, and the Federals were driven back to within
half a mUe of Harrisonburg, losing 4 officers and 30 men.
Smarting under this defeat, Fremont threw forward a
stUl stronger force of cavafry, strengthened by two batta
lions of infantry, Ashby had already called up a portion of
the brigade which supported him, and met the attack in
a clearing of the forest, Tbe fight was fierce. Tbe Con
federates were roughly handled by tbe Northern riflemen,
and the ranks began to waver, Eiding to the front, where
VOL, I. >¦> 0

362 STONEWALL JACKSON
the opposing lines were already at close range, Ashby
caUed upon his infantry to charge.
As he gave the order his horse feU heavily to the
ground. Leaping to his feet in an instant, again he
shouted, ' Charge, men ! for God's sake, charge ! ' The
regiments rallied, and inspired by his example swept for
ward from the wood. But hardly had they left the covert
when their leader fell, shot through the heart. He was
speedUy avenged. The men who followed him, despite
the heavy fire, dashed at the enemy in front and flank,
and drove them from thefr ground. The cavalry, mean
whUe, had worked round ia rear; the horse artillery
found an opportunity for action ; and under cover of the
night the Federals fell back on Harrisonburg,
The losses of the Union troops were heavy; but the
Confederate victory was dearly purchased. The death of
Ashby was a terrible blow to the Army of the Valley.
From the outbreak of the war he had been employed on
the Shenandoah, and from Staunton to the Potomac his
vvas the most familiar figure in the Confederate ranks.
His daring rides on his famous white charger were afready
the theme of song and story ; and if the tale of his exploits,
as told in camp and farm, sometimes bordered on the mar
vellous, the bare truth, stripped of aU exaggeration, was
sufficient in itself to make a hero. His reckless Courage,
his fine horsemanship, his skill in handling his com
mand, and his power of stimulating devotion, were not
the only attributes which incited admiration, ' With such
qualities,' it is said, ' were united the utmost generosity
and unselfishness, and a delicacy of feeling equal to a
woman's,' His loss came home with especial force to
Jackson, After the unfortunate episode in the pursuit
from Middletown, he had rated his cavalry leader in no
measured terms for tbe indiscipline of bis command ; and
for some days their intercourse, usually most cordial,
had been simply official. Sensitive in the extreme to
any reflection upon himself or his troops, Ashby held
aloof; and Jackson, always stern when a breach of
duty was concerned, made no overtures for a renewal of

DEATH OF ASHBY 888
friendly intercourse. Fortunately, before the fatal fight
near Harrisonburg, they had been fully reconcUed ; and
with no shadow of remorse Jackson was able to offer his
tribute to the dead. Entering the room in Port EepubUc,
whither the body had been brought, he renaained for a
time alone with his old comrade ; and in sending an order
to his cavalry, added, 'Poor Ashby is dead. He feU
gloriously — one of the noblest men and soldiers in the
Confederate army.' A more public testimony was to come.
In his official report he wrote : ' The close relation General
Ashby bore to my command for most of the previous
twelve months wiU justify me in saying that as a partisan
officer I never knew his superior. His daring was pro
verbial, his powers of endurance almost incredible, his
character heroic, and his sagacity almost intuitive in
divining the purposes and movements of the enemy.'
On the 6th and 7th the Confederate infantry rested
on the banks of MiU Creek, near Cross Keys, The
cavalry, on either flank of the Massanuttons, watched both
Fremont's camps at Harrisonburg and the slow advance
of Shields ; and on the southern peak of the mountains
a party of signaUers, under a staff officer, looked down
upon the roads which converged on the Confederate
position. June 7 was passed in unwonted quiet. For the first
time for fifteen days since the storming of Front Eoyal the
June 7. hoom of the guns was silent. The glory of the
summer brooded undisturbed on hill and forest ;
and as the escort which followed Ashby to his grave passed
down the quiet country roads, the Valley lay stiU and
peaceful fri the sunshine. Not a single Federal scout
observed the melancholy cort'ege. Fremont's pursuit had
been roughly checked. He was uncertain in which direc
tion the main body of the Confederates had retreated ; and
it was not tUl evening that a strong force of infantry,
reconnoitring through the woods, struck Jackson's outposts
near the hamlet of Cross Keys. Only a few shots were
exchanged. Shields, meanwhile, had concentrated his troops at
c 0 2

364 STONEWALL JACKSON
Columbia Bridge on the 6th, and presuming that Jackson
was standing fast on the strong position at Eude's HiU,
was preparing to cross the river. Later in the day a
patrol, which had managed to communicate with Fremont,
informed him that Jackson was retreating, and the instruc
tions he thereupon dispatched to the officer commanding
his advanced guard are worthy of record :
' The enemy passed New Market on the 6th ; Blenker's
division on the 6th in pursuit. The enemy has flung
away everything, and their stragglers fill the mountain.
They need only a movement on the flank to panic-strike
them, and break them into fragments. No man has had
such a chance since the war commenced. You are within
thirty miles of a broken, retreating enemy, who stiU hangs
together, 10,000 Germans are on his rear, who hang on
Uke buU-dogs, You have only to throw yourself down on
Waynesborough before him, and your cavalry wiU capture
them by the thousands, seize his traia and abundant
supphes.' '
In anticipation, therefore, of an easy triumph, and, to use
his own words, of 'thunderfrig down on Jackson's rear,*
Shields, throwing precaution to the winds, determined
to move as rapidly as possible on Port EepubUc. He
had written to Fremont urging a combined attack on
' the demoralised rebels,' and he thought that together they
'would finish Jackson.' His only anxiety was that the
enemy might escape, and in his haste he neglected the
warning of his Corps commander. McDowell, on dispatch
ing him in pursuit, had dfrected his attention to the
importance of keeping his division well closed up. Jack
son's predilection for deaUng with exposed detachments
had evidently been noted. Shields' force, however, owing
to the difficulties of the road, the mud, the quick-sands,
and the swoUen streams, was afready divided into several
distinct fractions. His advanced brigade was south of
Conrad's Store ; a second was some miles in rear, and two
were at Luray, retained at that point in consequence of a
report that 8,000 Confederates were crossing the Blue
' 0, B., vol. zii., part iii., p. 362.

SHIELDS IN DANGER 366
Eidge by Thornton's Gap. To correct this faulty formation
before advancing he thought was not worth while. On the
night of June 7 he was sure of his prey.
The situation at this juncture was as follows : Shields
was stretched out over five-and-twenty mUes of road in the
valley of the South Fork ; Fremont was at Harrisonburg ;
EweU's division was near Cross Keys, and the main body
of the VaUey Army near Port EepubUc.
During his retreat Jackson had kept his attention fixed
on Shields. That ardent Irishman pictured his old enemy
flying in confusion, intent only on escape. He would
have been much astonished had he learned the truth.
From tbe moment Jackson left Strasburg, during the
whole time he was retreating, with the ' bull-dogs ' at his
heels, he was meditating a counter-stroke, and his victim
had already been selected. When Shields rushed boldly
up the vaUey of the South Pork it seemed that an oppor
tunity of avenging Kernstown was about to offer. On June 4,
the day that the enemy reached Luray, EweU was ordered
to provide his men with two days' cooked rations and to com
plete thefr ammunition ' for active service,' The next day,
however, it was found that Shields had halted, EweU was
ordered to stand fast, and Jackson wrote despondently to
Lee : ' At present I do not see that I can do much more than
rest my command and devote its time to drilUng.' On the
6th, however, he learned that Shields' advanced guard had
resumed its march ; and, hke a tiger crouching in the jungle,
he prepared to spring upon his prey. But Fremont was
close at hand, and Shields and Fremont between them
mustered nearly 25,000 men. They were certainly divided
by the Shenandoah ; but they were fast converging on
Port Eepublic ; and in a couple of marches, if not actually
within sight of each other's camps, they would come
within hearing of each other's guns. Yet, notwithstanding
their numbers, Jackson had determined to deal with them
in detail. A few miles from the camp at Port Eepublic was a hill
honeycombed with caverns, known as the Grottoes of the
Shenandoah. In the heart of the limestone Nature has

866 STONEWALL .TACKSON
built herself a palace of many chambers, vast, sUent, and
magnificent. But far beyond the beauty of her mysterious
halls was the glorious prospect which lay before the eyes
of the Confederate sentries. Glimmering aisles and dark
recesses, where no sunbeam lurks nor summer wind
whispers, compared but iU with those fruitful vaUeys,
watered by clear brown rivers, and steeped in the glow of
a Vfrginian June, To the north stood the Massanuttons,
with their forests sleeping in the noon-day ; and to the
right of the Massanuttons, displaying, in that transparent
atmosphere, every shade of that royal colour from which
it takes its name, the Blue Eidge loomed large against the
eastern sky. Summit after summit, each more deUcately
penciUed than the last, receded to the horizon, and beneath
their feet, still, dark, and unbroken as the primeval wilder
ness, broad leagues of woodland stretched far away over
a lonely land.
No battle-field boasts a fairer setting than Port
EepubUc; but, lover of Nature as he was, the region
was attractive to Jackson for reasons of a sterner sort.
It was eminently adapted for the purpose he had at
heart. 1. The South Fork of the Shenandoah is formed by
the junction of two streams, the North and South Eivers ;
the village of Port Eepublic lying on the peninsula between
the two,
2, The bridge crosses the North Eiver just above the
jnnction, carrying the Harrisonburg road into Port
Eepublic; but the South Eiver, which cuts off Port
EepubUc from the Luray Valley, is passable only by two
difficult fords,
3. North of the viUage, on the left bank of the Shenan
doah, a line of high bluffs, covered with scattered timber,
completely commands the tract of open country which lies
between the river and the Blue Eidge, and across this tract
ran the road by which Shields was marching.
4, Four miles north-west of Port Eepublic, near the
vUlage of Cross Keys, the road to Harrisonburg crosses
MUl Creek, a strong position for defence.

HIS PLAN OF ACTION 367
By transferring his army across the Shenandoah, and
burning the bridge at Port Eepublic, Jackson could easUy
have escaped Fremont, and have met Shields in the Luray
VaUey witb superior force. But the plain where the battle
must be fought was commanded by the bluffs on the left
bank of tbe Shenandoah; and should Fremont advance
while an engagement was in progress, even though he
could not cross the stream, he might assail the Confederates
in flank witb bis numerous batteries. In order, then, to
gain time in which to deal with Shields, it was essential that
Fremont should be held back, and this could only be done
on the left bank. Further, if Fremont could be held
back until Shields' force was annihilated, the former would
be isolated. If Jackson could hold the bridge at Port
EepubUc, and also prevent Fremont reaching the bluffs,
he could recross when he had done with Shields, and
fight Fremont without fear of interruption.
To reverse the order, and to annihilate Fremont before
faUing upon Shields, was out of the question. Whether he
advanced against Fremont or whether he stood still to
receive his attack, Jackson's rear and communications,
threatened by Shields, must be protected by a strong
detachment. It would be thus impossible to meet Fremont
with superior or even equal numbers, and an army weaker
on the battlefield could not make certain of decisive victory.
Jackson had determined to check Fremont at Mill Creek,
But the situation was still uncertain. Fremont had halted
at Harrisonburg, and it was possible that he might advance
no further. So the Confederates were divided, ready to
meet either adversary ; EweU remaining at Cross Keys, and
the StonewaU division encamping near Port Eepublic.
On the morniag of June 8, however, it was found
that Fremont was moving. EweU's division was
""^ ¦ afready under arms. At 8.30 a.m. his pickets,
about two miles to the front, became engaged, and the
Confederate regiments moved leisurely into position.
The Une ran along the crest of a narrow ridge, com
manding an open vaUey, through which MiU Creek, an
insignificant brook, ran parallel to the front. The further

368 STONEWALL JACKSON
slopes, open and unobstructed except for scattered trees and a
few fences, rose gently to a lower ridge, about a mUe distant.
The ground held by the Confederates was only partiaUy
cleared, and from the Port Eepublic road in the centre, at a
distance of six hundred yards on either flank, were woods
of heavy timber, enclosing the vaUey, and jutting out
towards the enemy. The ridge beyond the vaUey was also
thickly wooded ; but here, too, there were open spaces on
which batteries might be deployed ; and the forest fri rear,
where Ashby had been killed, standing on higher ground,
completely concealed the Federal approach. The pickets,
however, had given ample warning of the coming attack ;
and when, at 10 a,m,, the hostUe artillery appeared on the
opposite height, it was received with a heavy fire, ' Eight
and a half batteries,' says Fremont, 'were brought into
action within thirty minutes,' Against this long array
of guns the Confederates massed only five batteries ; but
these commanded the open ground, and were all in action
from the first,
EweU had with him no more than three brigades. The
Louisiana regiments had bivouacked near Port Eepublic,
and were not yet up. The whole strength of the troops
which held the ridge was no more than 6,000 infantry,
and perhaps 500 cavafry, Fremont had at least 10,000
infantry, twelve batteries, and 2,000 cavafry.
It was then against overwhelming numbers that EweU
was asked to hold his ground, and the remainder of the
army was four miles in rear. Jackson himself was stUl
absent from the field. The arrangements for carrying out
his ambitious plans had met with an unexpected hitch. In
the Luray Valley, from Conrad's Store northwards, the
space between the Blue Eidge and the Shenandoah was
covered for the most part with dense forest, and through
this forest ran the road. Moving beneath the spreading
foliage of oak and hickory. Shields.' advanced brigade was
concealed from the observation of the Confederate cavalry ;
and the signaUers on the mountain, endangered by
Fremont's movement, had been withdrawn.
North of Port Eepublic, between the foot-hiUs of the

A NARROW ESCAPE 369
Blue Eidge and the Shenandoah, lies a level tract of arable
and meadow, nearly a mUe wide, and extending for nearly
three miles in a northerly direction. On the plain were the
Confederate pickets, furnished by three companies of Ashby's
regiment, with thefr patrols on the roads towards Conrad's
Store ; and there seemed little chance that Shields would be
able to reach tbe fords over the South Eiver, much less
the Port Eepublic bridge, without long notice heing given
of his approach. The cavalry, however, as had been already
proved, were not entirely to be depended on. Jackson,
whose headquarters were within the village, had already
mounted his horse to ride forward to Cross Keys, when
there was a distant fire, a sudden commotion in the
streets, and a breathless messenger from the outposts
reported that not only had the squadrons on picket been
surprised and scattered, but that the enemy was afready
fording the South Eiver,
Between the two rivers, south-west of Port Eepublic,
were the Confederate trains, parked in the open fields. Here
was Carrington's battery, with a small escort ; and now the
cavalry had fled there were no other troops, save a single
company of tbe 2nd Vfrginia, on this side the Shenandoah,
The squadron which headed the Federal advanced guard
was accompanied by two guns. One piece was sent towards
the bridge ; the other, unlimbering on the further bank,
opened fire on the church, and the horsemen trotted
cautiously forward into the village street, Jackson, warned
of his danger, bad already made for the bridge, and
crossing at a gallop escaped capture by the barest margin
of time. His chief of artUlery, Colonel Crutchfield, was
made prisoner, with Dr, McGuire and Captain Willis,' and
his whole staff was dispersed, save Captain Pendleton, a
sterling soldier, though hardly more than a boy in years.
And the danger was not over. With the trains was the
whole of the reserve ammunition, and it seemed that a
crushing disaster was near at hand. The sudden appear
ance of the enemy caused the greatest consternation
amongst the teamsters; several of the waggons went off
' All three of these officers escaped from their captors.

370 STONEWALL JACKSON
by the Staunton road; and, had the Federal cavalry
come on, the whole would have been stampeded. But
Carrington's battery was caUed to the front by Captain
Moore, commanding the company of infantry in the village.
The picket, promptly put into position, opened with a
well-aimed volley, and a few rounds checked the enemy's
advance ; the guns came rapidly and effectively into action,
and at this critical moment Jackson intervened with his
usual vigour.' From the left bank of the North Eiver he
saw a gun bearing on the bridge, the viUage swarming
with blue uniforms, and more artillery unlimbering across
the river. He had already sent orders for his infantry to
fall in, and a six-pounder was hurrying to the front. ' I
was surprised,' said the officer to whose battery this piece
belonged, 'to see a gun posted on the opposite bank.
Although I had met a cavalry man who told me that the
enemy were advancing up the river, stiU I did not think it
possible they could have brought any guns into the place in
so short a time. It thereupon occurred to me that the
piece at the bridge might be one of Carrington's, whose
men bad new uniforms something like those we saw at
the bridge. Upon suggesting this to the general, he
reflected a moment, and then riding a few paces to the left
and front, he called out, in a tone loud enough to be heard
by the enemy, " Bring that gun up here ! " but getting
no reply, he raised himself in his stirrups, and in a most
authoritative and seemingly angry tone he shouted, " Bring
that gun up here, I say ! " At this they began to move
the trail of the gun so as to bring it to bear on us, which,
when the general perceived, he turned quickly to the officer
in charge of my gun, and said in his sharp, quick way,
" Let 'em have it ! " The words had scarcely left his lips
when Lieutenant Brown, who had his piece charged and
aimed, sent a shot right among them, so disconcerting them
that theirs in reply went far above us.' *
' According to General Shields' account his cavalry had reported to him
that the bridge at Fort Eepublic had been burned, and he had therefore
ordered his advanced guard to take up a defensive position and prevent the
Confederates crossing the Shenandoah Eiver. It was the head of this
detachment which had dispersed the Confederate squadrons.
' Belated by Colonel Foague, C.S.A.

THE BRIGADE SAVED 371
The Confederate battalions, some of which had been
formed up for inspection, or for the Sunday service, when
the alarm was given, had now come up, and the 37th
Vfrginia was ordered to capture the gun, and to clear the
village. Without a moment's hesitation the regiment
charged with a yell across the bridge, and so sudden was
the rush that the Federal artUlerymen were surprised.
The gun was double-shotted with canister, and tbe head of
the column should have been swept away. But the aim
was high and the Confederates escaped. Then, as the limber
came forward, the horses, terrified by the heavy fire and tbe
yeUs of the charging infantry, became unmanageable ; and
the gunners, abandoning the field-piece, fled through the
streets of Port EepubUc. The 37tb rushed forward with
a yell. The hostile cavafry, foUowing the gunners, sought
safety by the fords ; and as the rout dashed through the
shallow water, the Confederate batteries, coming into action
on the high bluffs west of the Shenandoah, swept the plain
below with shot and shell.
The hostile artiUery beyond the stream was quickly
overpowered ; horses were shot down wholesale ; a second
gun was abandoned on the road ; a thfrd, which had only
two horses and a driver left, was thrown into a swamp;
and a fourth was found on the field without either team or
men. The Federal infantry was not more fortunate. CarroU's
brigade of four regiments was close in rear of the artiUery
when the Confederate batteries opened fire. Catching the
contagion from the flying cavalry, it retreated northward
in confusion, A second brigade (Tyler's) came up in
support ; but the bluffs beyond the river were now occupied
by Jackson's infantry ; a stream of fire swept the plain ;
and as Shields' advanced guard, followed by the Confederate
cavafry, feU back to the woods whence it had emerged,
five miles away on the other flank was heard the roar of
the cannonade whieh opened the battle of Cross Keys,
From the hurried fiight of the Federals it was evident
that Shields' main body was not yet up ; so, placing two
brigades in position to guard the bridge, Jackson sent

872 STONEWALL JACKSON
the remainder to EweU, and then rode to the scene of
action. Fremont, under cover of his guns, had made his prepa
rations for attack ; but the timidity wbich he had already
displayed when face to face with Jackson had once more
taken possession of his faculties. Vigorous in pursuit
of a flying enemy, when that enemy turned at bay his
courage vanished. The Confederate position was un
doubtedly strong, but it was not impregnable. The
woods on either flank gave access under cover to the
central ridge. The superior weight of his artiUery was suf
ficient to cover an advance across the open ; and although
he was without maps or guide, the country was not so inter
sected as to render manoeuvring impracticable.
In his official report Fremont lays great stress on the
difficulties of the ground ; but reading between the lines it
is easy to see that it was the military situation which over
burdened him. The vicious strategy of converging columns,
where intercommunication is tedious and uncertain, once
more exerted its paralysing influence. It was some days
since he had heard anything of Shields, That general's
dispatch, urging a combined attack, had not yet reached
him : whether he had passed Luray or whether he had been
already beaten, Fremont was altogether ignorant ; and, in
his opinion, it was quite possible that the whole of the
Confederate army was before him.
A more resolute commander would probably have
decided that the shortest way out of the dilemma was a
vigorous attack. If Shields was within hearing of the
guns — and it was by no means improbable that he was —
such a course was the surest meaiis of securiug his co-ope
ration ; and even if no help came, and the Confederates
maintained thefr position, they might be so crippled as
to be unable to pursue. Defeat would not have been an
irreparable misfortune, Washington was secure. Banks,
Saxton, and McDoweU held the approaches ; and if Fre
mont himself were beaten back, the strategic situation
could be in no way affected. In fact a defeat, if it had
followed an attack so hotly pressed as to paralyse Jackson

CROSS KEYS 378
for the time being, would have been hardly less valuable
than a victory,
' Fortune,' it has been well said, ' loves a daring suitor,
and he who throws down the gauntlet may always count
upon his adversary to help him,' Fremont, however, was
more afraid of losing the battle than anxious to win it.
' Taking counsel of his fears,' he would run no risks. But
neither could he abstain from action altogether. An enemy
was in front of him who for seven days had fled before him,
and his own army anticipated an easy triumph.
So, like many another general who has shrunk from the
nettle danger, he sought refuge in half-measures, the most
damning course of all. Of twenty-four regiments present on
the field of battle, five only, of Blenker's Germans, were sent
forward to the attack, Thefr onslaught was dfrected against
the Confederate right ; and here, within the woods, Trimble
had posted his brigade in a most advantageous position,
A flat-topped ridge, covered with great oaks, looked down
upon a wide meadow, crossed by a stout fence ; and beyond
the hoUow lay the woods through which the Federals,
already in contact with the Confederate outposts, were
rapidly advancing. The pickets soon gave way, and cross
ing the meadow found cover within the thickets, where
Trimble's three regiments lay concealed. In hot pursuit
came the Federal skfrmishers, with the solid lines of their
brigade in close support. Steadily moving forward, they
climbed the fence and breasted the gentle slope beyond, A
few scattered shots, fired by the retreating pickets, were
the only iadications of the enemy's presence ; the groves
beyond were dark and sUent, The skfrmishers had reached
the crest of the declivity, and the long wave of bayonets,
foUowing close upon thefr tracks, was within sixty paces of
the covert, when the thickets stfrred suddenly with sound
and movement. The Southern riflemen rose swiftly to
thefr feet. A sheet of fire ran along thefr line, followed by
a crash that resounded through the woods ; and the German
regiments, after a vigorous effort to hold their ground, feU
back in disorder across the clearing. Here, on the further
edge, they rallied on their reserves, and the Confederates,

874 STONEWALL JACKSON
who had followed up no further than was sufficient to give
impetus to the retreat, were once more withdrawn.
A quarter of an hour passed, and as the enemy showed
no inclination to attempt a second advance across the
meadow, where the dead and wounded were lying thick,
Trimble, sending word to EweU of his intention, de
termined to complete his victory. More skilful than his
enemies, he sent a regiment against their left, to which a
convenient ravine gave easy access, whUe the troops among
the oaks were held back tiU the fiank attack was fully
developed. The unexpected movement completely surprised
the Federal brigadier. Again his troops were driven in, and
the Confederates, now reinforced by six regiments which
EweU had sent up, forced them with heavy losses through
the woods, compelled two batteries, after a fierce fight, to
limber up, routed a brigade which had been sent by
Fremont to support the attack, and pressing slowly but
continuously forward, threw the whole of the enemy's left
wing, consisting of Blenker's eleven regiments, back to the
shelter of his line of guns, Trimble had drawn the ' bull
dog's ' teeth.
The Confederates had reached the outskirts of the
wood. They were a mile in advance of the batteries in the
centre ; and the Federal position, commanding a tract of
open ground, was strong in itself and stron^y held. A
general counterstroke was outside the scope of Jackson's
designs. He had still Shields to deal with. Tbe
Federal left wing had been heavily repulsed, but only a
portion of Fremont's force had been engaged ; to press the
attack further would undoubtedly have cost many Uves,
and even a partial reverse would have interfered with his
comprehensive plan.
In other quarters of the battle-field the fighting
had been unimportant. The Confederate guns, although
heavUy outnumbered, held thefr ground gallantly for more
than five hours ; and when they eventuaUy retired it was
from want of ammunition rather than from loss of moral.
The waggons which carried thefr reserve had taken a
wrong road, and at the critical moment there were no

CROSS KEYS 376
means of replenishing the supply. But so timid were
Fremont's tactics that the blunder passed unpunished,
WhUe the battle on the left was raging fiercely he had
contented himself elsewhere with tapping feebly at the
enemy's lines. In the centre of the field his skir
mishers moved against EweU's batteries, but were routed
by a bayonet charge ; on the right, Mifroy and Schenck,
the two generals who had withstood Jackson so stubbornly
at M'DoweU, advanced on their own initiative through the
woods, Tbey had driven in the Confederate skirmishers,
and had induced EweU to strengthen this portion of his
line from his reserve, when they were recalled by Fremont,
alarmed by Trimble's vigorous attack, to defend the main
position. The Southerners foUowed slowly. The day was late,
and EweU, although his troops were eager to crown thefr
victory, was too cool a soldier to yield to their impatience ;
and, as at Cedar Creek, where also he had driven back the
' Dutch ' division, so at Cross Keys he rendered the most
loyal support to his commander. Yet he was a dashing
fighter, chafing under the restraint of command, and
preferring the excitement of the foremost line. ' On two
occasions in the Valley,' says General Taylor, ' during the
temporary absence of Jackson, he summoned me to his side,
and immediately rushed forward amongst the skfrmishers,
where sharp work was going on. Having refreshed
himself, he returned with the hope that " Old Jack would
not catch him at it." ' '
How thoroughly Jackson trusted his subordinate may be
inferred from the fact that, although present on the field,
he left EweU to fight his own battle. The only instruc
tions he gave showed that he had fathomed the temper of
Fremont's troops. ' Let the Federals,' he said, ' get very
close before your infantry fire ; they won't stand long.' It
was to EweU's dispositions, his wise use of his reserves, and
to Trimble's ready initiative, that Fremont's defeat was due.
Beyond sending up a couple of brigades from Port Eepublic,
Jackson gave no orders. His ambition was of too lofty a
' Destriiction amd Reconstruction, p. 89.

376 STONEWALL JAOKSON
kind to appropriate the honours which another might
fairly claim ; and, when once battle had been joined,
interference with the plan on which it was being fought did
not commend itself to him as sound generalship. He was
not one of those suspicious commanders who believe that
no subordinate can act intelligently. If he demanded the
strictest compliance with his instructions, he was always con
tent to leave thefr execution to the judgment of his generals ;
and with supreme confidence in his own capacity, he was stUl
sensible that his juniors in rank might be just as able.
His supervision was constant, but his interference rare;
and it was not till some palpable mistake had been committed
that he assumed direct control of his divisions or brigades.
Nor was any peculiar skiU needed to beat back the attack
of Fremont. Nothing proves the Federal leader's want of
confidence more clearly than the tale of losses. The
Confederate casualties amounted to 288, of which nearly
half occurred in Trimble's counterstroke. The Federal
reports show 684 killed, wounded, and missing, and of
these Trimble's riflemen accounted for nearly 500, one
regiment, the 8th New York, being almost annihUated ; but
such losses, although at one point severe, were altogether
insignificant when compared with the total strength ; and
it was not the troops who were defeated but the general.'
EweU's division bivouacked within sight of the enemy's
watch-fires, and within hearing of his outposts ; and
throughout the night the work of removing the wounded,
friend and foe alike, went on in the sombre woods. There
was work, too, at Port Eepublic. Jackson, while his men
slept, was all activity. His plans were succeeding admir
ably. Prom Fremont, cowering on the defensive before
inferior numbers, there was little to be feared. It
was unlikely that after his repulse he would be found
more enterprising on the morrow ; a small force would be
sufficient to arrest his march until Shields had been
crushed ; and then, swinging back across the Shenandoah,
' The Confederates at Kernstown lost 20 per cent. ; the Federals at Fort
Eepublic 18 per cent. At Manassas the Stonewall Brigade lost 16 per cent.,
at Cross Keys EweU only lost 3 per cent, and Fremont 5 per cent.

PLANS FOR THE NEXT DAY 377
the soldiers of the Valley would find ample compensation,
in the rout of thefr most powerful foe, for the enforced
rapidity of their retreat from Winchester. But to fight
two battles in one day, to disappear completely from
Fremont's ken, and to recross the rivers before he had
time to seize the bridge, were manoeuvres of the utmost
delicacy, and needed most careful preparation.
It was Jackson's custom, whenever a subordinate was
to be entrusted with an independent mission, to explain
the part that he was to play in a personal interview. By
such means he made certain, first, that his instructions were
thoroughly understood; and, second, that there was no
chance of their purport coming to the knowledge of the
enemy, EweU was first summoned to headquarters, and
then Patton, whose brigade, together with that of Trimble,
was to have the task of checking Fremont the next day,
' I found him at 2 a,m.,' says Patton, ' actively engaged in
making his dispositions for battle. He immediately
proceeded to give me particular instructions as to the
management of the men in covering the rear, saying : " I
wish you to throw out all your men, if necessary, as
skirmishers, and to make a great show, so as to cause the
enemy to think the whole army are behind you. Hold
your position as well as you can, then fall back when
obliged; take a new position, hold it in the same way,
and I will be back to join you in the morning." '
Colonel Patton reminded him that his brigade was a
small one, and that the country between Cross Keys and
the Shenandoah offered few advantages for protracting
such manceuvres. He desired, therefore, to know for how
long he would be expected to hold the enemy in check.
Jackson repUed, ' By the blessing of Providence, I hope to
be back by ten o'clock,' '
These interviews were not the only business which
occupied the commanding general. He arranged for the
feeding of his troops before their march next day,'' for the
' Southern Historical Society Papers, vol. ix., p. 872.
' Eations appear to have been short, for General EweU reports that when
he marched against Shields the next day many of his men had been with
out food for four-and-twenty hours.
VOL. I. P p

378 STONEWALL JAOKSON
dispositions of his trains and ammunition waggons ; and at
the rising of the moon, which occurred about midnight,
he was seen on the banks of the South Eiver, superintend
ing the construction of a bridge to carry his infantry
dryshod across the stream.
An hour before daybreak he was roused from his short
slumbers. Major Imboden, who was in charge of a mule
battery,' looking for one of the staff, entered by mistake
the general's room.
' I opened the door softly, and discovered Jackson
lying on his face across the bed, fully dressed, with sword,
sash, and boots all on. The low-burnt tallow-candle on
the table shed a dim light, yet enough by which to re
cognise him. I endeavoured to withdraw without waking
him. He turned over, sat upon the bed, and caUed out,
" Who is that ? "
'He checked my apology with, "That is aU right.
It's time to be up. I am glad to see you. Were the men
all up as you came through camp ? "
'"Yes, General, and cooking."
' " That's right ; we move at daybreak. Sit down. I
want to talk to you."
• I had learned never to ask him questions about his
plans, for he would never answer such to anyone. I
therefore waited for him to speak first. He referred very
feelingly to Ashby's death, and spoke of it as an irre
parable loss. When he paused I said, "General, you
made a glorious winding-up of your four weeks with
yesterday." He repUed, "Yes, God blessed our army
again yesterday, and I hope with His protection and
blessing we shall do stiU better to-day." ' ^ Then followed
instructions as to the use of the mule battery in the forests
through which lay Shields' line of advance.
Before 5 a.m. the next morning the StonewaU Brigade
' The mule battery does not appear to have done much more than afford
the Confederate soldiers an opportunity of airing their wit. With the air
of men anxiously seeking for information they would ask the gunners whether
the mule or the gun was intended to go off first 7 and whether the gun was to
fire the mule or the mule the gun 7
' Battles and Leaders, vol. ii., p. 293.

PORT REPUBLIC 379
nad assembled in Port Eepublic, and was immediately
ordered to advance. On the plain beyond, stiU dark in
the shadow of the mountains, where the cavalry formed the
outposts, the fire of the pickets, which had been incessant
throughout the night, was increasing in intensity. The
Federals were making ready for battle.
Winder had with him four regiments, about 1,200
strong, and two batteries. In rear came Taylor with his
Louisianians ; and Jackson, leaving Major Dabney to
stiperintend the passage of the river, rode with the leading
brigade. The enemy's pickets were encountered about a
mile and a half down the river, beyond a strip of woods,
on either side of tbe Luray road. They were quickly
driven in, and the Federal position became revealed. Prom
the foot-hUls of the Blue Eidge, clothed to their crests
with under-growth and timber, the plain, over a mUe in
breadth, extended to the Shenandoah. The ground was
terraced ; the upper level, immediately beneath the moun
tain, was densely wooded, and fifty or sixty feet above the
open fields round the Lewis House. Here was the hostUe
front. The Federal force was composed of two brigades
of infantry and sixteen guns, not more than 4,000 all told,
for Shields, with the remainder of the division, was stUl far
in rear. The right rested on the river ; the left on a ravine
of tbe upper level, through which a shallow stream
flowed down from the heights above. On the northern
shoulder of this ravine was established a battery of seven
guns, sweeping every yard of the ground beneath, and a
country road, which led directly to the Shenandoah,
running between stiff banks and strongly fenced, was lined
with riflemen. Part of the artillery was on the plain, near
the Lewis House, with a section near the river; on the
hiUside, beyond the seven guns, two regiments were con
cealed within the forest, and in rear of the battery was a
thfrd. The position was strong, and the men who held it
were of different calibre from Blenker's Germans, and the
leaders of stauncher stuff than Fremont, Six of the seven
battaUons had fought at Kernstown, Tyler, who on that
day had seen the Confederates retreat before him, was in
D D 2

380 STONEWALL JACKSON
command ; and neither general nor soldiers had reason to
dread the name of StonewaU Jackson. In the sturdy
battaUons of Ohio and West Vfrginia the Stonewall
Brigade were face to face with foemen worthy of their
steel ; and when Jackson, anxious to get back to Fremont,
ordered Winder to attack, he set him a formidable
task. It was first necessary to dislodge the hostile guns.
Winder's two batteries were insufficient for the work,
and two of his four regiments were ordered into the
woods on the terrace, in order to outflank the battery
beyond the stream. This detachment, moving with diffi
culty through the thickets, found a stronger force of
infantry within the forest; the guns opened with grape
at a range of one hundred yards, and the Confederates,
threatened on either flank, fell back in some confusion.
The remainder of Winder's line had meanwhUe met with
a decided check. The enemy along the hollow road was
strongly posted. Both guns and skirmishers were hidden
by the embankment; and as the mists of the morning
cleared away, and the sun, rising in splendour above the
mountains, flooded the valley with light, a long line of
hostile infantry, with colours flying and gleaming arms,
was seen advancing steadily into battle. The Federal
commander, observing his opportunity, had, with rare
good judgment, determined on a counterstroke. The
Louisiana brigade was moving up in support of Winder,
but it was stUl distant. The two regiments which sup
ported the Confederate batteries were suffering from
the heavy artUlery fire, and the skirmishers were already
falling back. ' Below,' says General Taylor, ' EweU was
hurrying his men over the bridge ; but it looked as
if we should be doubled up on him ere he could cross
and develop much strength. Jackson was on the road,
a little in advance of his line, where the fire was hottest,
with the reins on his horse's neck. Summoning a
young officer from his staff, he pointed up the moun
tain. The head of my approaching column was turned
short up the slope, and within the forest came speedUy

PORT REPUBLIC 881
to a path which came upon the gorge opposite the
battery. '
But, as Taylor's regiments disappeared within the forest.
Winder's brigade was left for the moment isolated, bearing
up with difficulty against overwhelming numbers. EweU's
division had found great difficulty in crossing the South
Eiver. The bridge, a construction of planks laid on the
running gear of waggons, had proved unserviceable. At the
deepest part there was a step of two feet between two axle-
trees of different height ; and the boards of the higher stage,
except one, had broken from their fastenings. As the
men passed over, several were thrown from their trea
cherous platform into the rushing stream, until at length
they refused to trust themselves except to the centre
plank. The column of fours was thus reduced to single
file ; men, guns, and waggons were huddled in confusion on
the river banks; and the officers present neglected to
secure the footway, and refused, despite the order of Major
Dabney, to force their men through the breast-high
ford. So, whUe his subordinates were trifling with the time,
which, if Fremont was to be defeated as well as Shields,
was of such extreme importance, Jackson saw his old
brigade assaUed by superior numbers in front and flank.
The Federals, matching the rifles of the Confederate
marksmen with weapons no less deadly, crossed over the
road and bore down upon the guns. The 7th Louisiana,
the rear regiment of Taylor's column, was hastily called
up, and dashed forward in a vain attempt to stem the
tide, A most determined and stubborn conflict now took
place, and, as at Kernstown, at the closest range. The
Ohio troops repelled every effort to drive tbem back.
Winder's line was thin. Every man was engaged in the
1 Destruction amd Reconstruction, p. 90. Jackson's order to the staff
officer (Major Hotchkiss) was brief : ' Sweeping vrith his hand to the east
ward, and then towards the Lewis House, where the Federal guns
wore raking the advance, he said : " Take General Taylor around and take
that battery." '

382 STONEWALL JAOKSON
firing line. The flanks were scourged by bursting sheUs.
The deadly fire from the road held back the front. Men
and officers were falling fast. The stream of wounded
was creeping to the rear ; and after thirty minutes of
fierce fighting, the wavering Une of the Confederates,
breaking in disorder, fell back upon the guns. The
artUlery, firing a final salvo at a range of two hundred
yards, was ordered to Umber up. One gun alone, standing
soUtary between the opposing lines, essayed to cover the
retreat ; but the enemy was within a hundred yards, men
and horses were shot down ; despite a shower of grape,
which rent great gaps in the crowded ranks, the long blue
wave swept on, and leaving tbe captured piece in rear,
advanced in triumph across the fields.
In vain two of EweU's battaUons, hurrying forward to
the sound of battle, were thrown against the flank of the
attack. For an instant the Federal left recoiled, and then,
springing forward with still fiercer energy, dashed back
thefr new antagonists as they had done the rest. In vain
Jackson, galloping to the front, spurred his horse into the
tumult, and caUed upon his men to rally. Winder's line,
for the time being at least, had lost all strength and order ;
and although another regiment had now come up, the
enemy's fire was still so heavy that it was impossible to
reform the defeated troops, and two fresh Federal regi
ments were now advancing to strengthen the attack.
Tyler had ordered his left wing to reinforce the centre ;
and it seemed that the Confederates would be defeated piece
meal. But at this moment the Unes of the assailant came
to a sudden halt ; and along the slopes of the Blue Eidge
a heavy crash of musketry, the rapid discharges of the
guns, and the charging yeU of the Southern infantry,
told of a renewed attack upon the battery on the mountain
side. The Louisianians had come up in the very nick of time.
Pursuing his march by the forest path, Taylor had heard
the sounds of battle pass beyond his flank, and the cheers
of the Federals proved that Winder was hard pressed,
Eapidly deploying on his advanced guard, which, led by

THE FLANK ATTACK 383
Colonel KeUey, of the 8th Louisiana, was already in line,
he led his companies across fhe ravine, Down the broken
slopes, covered with great boulders and scattered trees, the
men slipped and stumbled, and then, splashing through the
stream, swarmed up the face of the bank on which the Federal
artiUery was in action. Breaking through the undergrowth
they threw themselves on the guns. The attention of the
enemy had been fixed upon the fight that raged over the plain
below, and the thick timber and heavy smoke concealed the
approach of Taylor's regiments. The surprise, however, was
a failure. The traUs were swung round in the new dfrection,
the canister crashed through the laurels, the supporting
infantry rushed forward, and the Southerners were driven
back. Again, as reinforcements crowded over the ravine,
they returned to the charge, and with bayonet and rammer
the fight surged to and fro within the battery. For the
second time the Federals cleared their front ; but some of
the Lousiana companies, clambering up the mountain to
the right, appeared upon their flank, and once more the
stormers, rallying in the hollow, rushed forward with the
bayonet. The battery was carried, one gun alone escaping,
and the Federal commander saw the key of his position
abandoned to the enemy. Not a moment was to be lost.
The bank was nearly a mile in rear of his right and centre,
and commanded his line of retreat at effective range.
Sending his reserves to retake the battery, he directed his
attacking line, afready pressing heavily on Winder, to fall
back at once. But it was even then too late. The rest of
EweU's division had reached the field. One of his brigades
had been ordered to sustain the Lousianians ; and across
the plain a long column of infantry and artUlery was hurry
ing northwards from Port Eepublic.
The Stonewall Brigade, relieved of the pressure in front,
had already raUied ; and when Tyler's reserves, with their
backs to the river, advanced to retake the battery, Jackson's
artillery was once more moving forward. The guns cap
tured by Taylor were turned against the Federals — EweU,
it is said, indulging to the fuU his passion for hot work,
serving as a gunner — and within a short space of time

384 STONEWALL JACKSON
Tyler was in full retreat, and the Confederate cavalry were
thundering on his traces.
It was half-past ten. For nearly five hours the Federals
had held their ground, and two of Jackson's best brigades
had been severely handled. Even if Trimble and Patton
had been successful in holding Fremont back, the Valley
soldiers were in no condition for a rapid march and a
vigorous attack, and thefr commander had long since recog
nised that he must rest content with a single victory.
Before nine o'clock, about the time of Winder's repulse,
finding the resistance of the enemy more formidable than
he had anticipated, he had recaUed his brigades from the
opposite bank of the Shenandoah, and had ordered them
to burn the bridge. Trimble and Patton abandoned the
battle-field of the previous day, and feU back to Port
Eepublic, Hardly a shot was fired during tbeir retreat,
and when they took up thefr march only a single Federal
battery had been seen, Fremont's advance was cautious
in the extreme. He was actuaUy aware that Shields had
two brigades beyond the river, for a scout had reached him,
and from the ground about MUl Creek the sound of Tyler's
battle could be plainly heard. But he could get no dfrect
information of what was passing. The crest of the Massa
nuttons, although the sun shone bright on the cliffs below,
was shrouded in haze, completely forbidding all obser
vation ; and it was not till near noon, after a march of
seven miles, which began at dawn and was practicaUy un
opposed, that Fremont reached the Shenandoah, There, in
the charred and smoking timbers of the bridge, the groups of
Federal prisoners on the plain, the Confederates gathering
the wounded, and the faint rattle of musketry far down
the Luray Valley, he saw the result of his timidity.
Massing his batteries on the western bluffs, and turning
his guns in impotent wrath upon the plain, he drove the
ambulances and thefr escort from the field. But the Con
federate dead and wounded had afready been removed, and
the only effect of his spiteful salvoes was that his suffering
comrades lay under a drenching rain untU he retired to
Harrisonburg, By that time many, whom their enemies

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PORT REPUBLIC
June 8th. and 9th. 1862.
English Miles
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RESULTS OF PORT REPUBLIC 886
would have rescued, had perished miserably, and ' not a few
of the dead, with some perchance of the mangled living,
were partially devoured by swine before their burial.' '
The pursuit of Tyler was pressed for nine miles down
the river. The Ohio regiments, dispersed at first by the
Confederate artillery, gathered gradually together, and
held the cavalry in check. Near Conrad's Store, where
Shields, marching in desperate haste to the sound of the
cannonade, had put his two remaining brigades in position
across tbe road, the chase was stayed. The Federal com
mander admits that he was only just in time. Jackson's
horsemen, he says, were enveloping the column ; a crowd of
fugitives was rushing to the rear, and his own cavalry had
dispersed. The Confederate army, of which some of the
brigades and nearly the whole artillery had been halted
far in rear, was now withdrawn ; but, compelled to move by
circuitous paths in order to avoid the fire of Fremont's
batteries, it was after midnight before the whole had
assembled in Brown's Gap, More than one of the regiments
had marched over twenty mUes and had been heavUy engaged.
Port Eepublic was the battle most costly to the Army of
the Valley during the whole campaign. Out of 6,900 Con
federates engaged 804 were disabled,^ The Federal losses
were heavier. The kiUed, wounded, and missing (including
450 captured) amounted to 1,001, or one-fourth of Tyler's
strength. The success which the Confederates had achieved was un
doubtedly important. The Valley army, posted in Brown's
Gap, was now in dfrect communication with Eichmond,
Not only had its pursuers been roughly checked, but
' Dabney, vol. ii.
' The troops actually engaged were as follows : —
4 Begiments of VCinder's Brigade . , . 1,200
The Louisiana Brigade, 6 regiments . . . 2,500
Scott's Brigade, 3 regiments . , , . 900
31st Virginia ) enn
40th Virginia r  *"""
Artillery (S batteries)  300
Cavalry .... , . . > 400
6,900

886 STONEWALL JACKSON
the sudden and unexpected counterstroke, dehvered by an
enemy whom they believed to be in fuU flight, had sur
prised Lincoln and Stanton as effectively as Shields and
Fremont, On June 6, the day Jackson halted near Port
Eepublic, McCaU's division of McDowell's Army Corps,
which had been left at Fredericksburg, had been sent
to the Peninsula by water ; and two days later McDowell
himself, with the remainder of his force, was dfrected to
join McClellan as speedUy as possible overland. Fremont,
on the same date, was instructed to halt at Harrisonburg,
and Shields to march to Fredericksburg, But before
Stanton's dispatches reached their destiuation both
Fremont and Shields had been defeated, and the plans
of the Northern Cabinet were once more upset.
Instead of moving at once on Fredericksburg, and in
spite of McDoweU's remonstrances. Shields was detained
at Luray, and Eicketts, who had succeeded Ord, at Front
Eoyal ; while Fremont, deeming himself too much exposed
at Harrisonburg, fell back to Mount Jackson, It was not
till June 20 that Eicketts and Shields were permitted to
leave the Valley, ten days after the order had been issued for
McDowell to move on Eichmond. For that space of time,
then, his departure was delayed ; and there was worse to
come. The great strategist at Eichmond had not yet done
witb Lincoln. There was stUl more profit to be derived
from the situation ; and from the subsidiary operations in
the Valley we may now turn to the main armies.
By Jackson's briUiant manceuvres McDowell had been
lured westward at the very moment he was about to join
McClellan. The gap between the two Federal armies had
been widened from five to fifteen marches, whUe Jackson at
Brown's Gap was no more than nine marches distant from
Eichmond. McClellan, moreover, had been paralysed by
the vigour of Jackson's blows.
On May 16, as already related, he had reached White
House on the Pamunkey, twenty miles from the Confederate
capital. Ten mUes south, and directly across his path,
flowed the Chickahominy, a formidable obstacle to the
march of a large army.

SEVEN PINES 387
On the 24th, having already been informed that he was
to be reinforced by McDoweU, he was told that the move
ment of the latter for Fredericksburg was postponed untU
the Valley had been cleared. This change of plan placed him
in a most awkward predicament. A portion of his army,
in order to lend a hand to McDoweU, had already crossed
the Chickahominy, a river witb but few points of passage,
and over which, by reason of the swamps, the construction
of mUitary bridges was a difficult and tedious operation.
On May 30, two army corps were south of the Chicka
hominy, covering, in a partially intrenched position, tbe
buildnig of the bridges, while three army corps were stUl
on the further bank.
McCleUan's difficulties had not escaped the observation
of his watchful adversaries, and on the morning of May 31
the Federal lines were heavUy attacked by Johnston. The
left of the position on the south side of the Chickahominy
was protected by the White Oak Swamp, a broad and almost
impassable morass ; but the right, thrown back to the river,
was unprotected by intrenchments, and thinly manned.
The defence of the first line bad been assigned to one corps
only ; tbe second was five mUes in rear, Tbe assaUants
should have won an easy triumph. But if McClellan had
shown but httle skill in the distribution of his troops on
the defensive, the Confederate arrangements for attack
were even more at fault. The country between Eichmond
and the Chickahominy is level and weU wooded. It
was intersected by several roads, three of which led
directly to the enemy's position. But the roads were
bad, and a tremendous rain-storm, which broke on tbe
night of the 30th, transformed the fields into tracts
of greasy mud, and rendered the passage of artillery
difficult. The natural obstacles, however, were not the
chief. The force detaUed for the attack amounted to 40,000
men, or twenty-three brigades. The Federal works were
but five miles from Eichmond, and the Confederates
were ordered to advance at dawn. But it was the first time
that an offensive movement on so large a scale had been

888 STONEWALL JACKSON
attempted ; the woods and swamps made supervision diffi
cult, and the staff proved unequal to the task of ensuring
co-operation. The orders for attack were badly framed.
The subordinate generals did not clearly comprehend what
was expected from them. There were misunderstandings
as to the roads to be followed, and as to who was to command
the wings. The columns crossed, and half the day was
wasted in getting into position. It was not tUl 1 p,m, that the
first gun was fired, and not tUl 4 p,m, that the commanding
general, stationed with the left wing, was made acquainted
with tbe progress of his right and centre. When it was at
last delivered, the attack was piecemeal ; and although suc
cessful in driving the enemy from his intrenchments, it
faUed to drive him from the field. The Federals fell back
to a second line of earthworks, and were strongly rem
forced from beyond the river. During the battle Johnston
himself was severely wounded, and the command devolved
on General G. W. Smith. Orders were issued that the
attack should be renewed next morning ; but for reasons
which have never been satisfactorily explained, only five of
the twenty-three brigades were actively engaged, and the
battle of Seven Pines ended with the unmolested retreat
of the Confederates. Smith feU sick, and General Lee
was ordered by the President to take command of the
army in the field.
McCleUan, thanks to the bad work of the Confederate
staff at the battle of Seven Pines, had now succeeded in
securing the passages across the Chickahominy, But for the
present he had given up all idea of an immediate advance.
Two of his army corps had suffered severely, both in men and
in moral; the roads were practically impassable for artUlery ;
the bridges over the Chickahominy had been much injured
by the floods ; and it was imperative to re-establish the com
munications. Such is his own explanation of his inactivity;
but his official correspondence with the Secretary of War
leaves no doubt that his hope of being reinforced by McDoweU
was a stiU more potent reason. During the first three weeks
in June he received repeated assurances from Mr. Stanton
that large bodies of troops were on their way to join him.

MCCLELLAN'S EMBARRASSMENTS 389
and it was for these that he was waiting. This expectant
attitude, due to McDoweU's non-arrival, entailed on him a
serious disadvantage. If he transferred his whole army to
the right bank of the Chickahominy, his Une of supply, the
railway to West Point, would be exposed ; and, secondly,
when McDoweU approached from Fredericksburg, it would
be possible for Lee to drive that general back before the
Army of the Potomac could give him direct support, or in
any case to cut off aU communication with him. McClellan
was consequently compeUed to retain his right wing north of
the river ; and indeed in so doing he was only obeying his
instructions. On May 18 Stanton had telegraphed : ' You
are instructed to co-operate so as to establish this com
munication [with McDoweU], by extending your right wing
north of Eichmond.'
The Federal army, then, whilst awaiting the promised
reinforcements, was divided into two parts by a stream
which another storm might render impassable. It will thus be
seen that Jackson's operations not only deprived McClellan
ofthe immediate aid of 40,000 men and 100 guns, but
placed him in a most embarrassiog situation. ' The faulty
location of the Union army,' says General Porter, command
ing the Fifth Federal Army Corps, 'was from the first
realised by General McClellan, and became daily an in
creasing cause of care and anxiety ; not the least disturbing
element of which was the impossibility of quickly re
inforcing his right wing or promptly withdrawing it to the
south bank.'*
Seeing that the Confederates were no more than 60,000
strong, whUe the invading army mustered 100,000, it would
seem that the knot should have been cut by an im
mediate attack on the Eichmond Unes. But McClellan,
who had been United States Commissioner in the Crimea,
knew something of the strength of earthworks ; and more
over, although the comparatively feeble numbers developed
by the Confederates at Seven Pines should have enlightened
him, he stiU believed that his enemy's army was far larger
than his own. So, notwithstanding his danger, he pre-
> Battles and Leaders, vol. ii., p. 324.

390 STONEWALL JACKSON
ferred to postpone his advance till Jackson's defeat should
set McDowell free.
Fatal was the mistake which retained McDowell's
divisions in the Valley, and sent Shields in pursuit of
Jackson. WhUe the Federal army, waiting for reinforce
ments, lay astride the noisome swamps of the Chicka
hominy, Lee was preparing a counterstroke on the largest
scale. The first thing to do was to reduce the disparity of
numbers ; and to effect this troops were to be brought up
from the south, Jackson was to come to Eichmond, and
McDowell was to be kept away. This last was of more
importance than the rest, and, at the same time, more
difficult of attainment. Jackson was certainly nearer to
Eichmond than was McDowell; but to defeat McClellan
would take some time, and it was essential that Jackson
should have a long start, and not arrive upon the battle
field with McDoweU on his heels. It was necessary, there
fore, that the greater part of the latter's force should
be detained on the Shenandoah; and on June 8, whUe
Cross Keys was being fought, Lee wrote to Jackson :
' Should there be nothing requfring your attention in the
VaUey, so as to prevent you leaving it in a few days, and
you can make arrangements to deceive the enemy and
impress him with the idea of your presence, please let me
know, that you may unite at the decisive moment with
the army near Eichmond, Make your arrangements
accordingly ; but should an opportunity occur of striking
the enemy a successful blow, do not let it escape
you.' At the same time a detachment of 7,000 infantry was
ordered to the Valley. ' Your recent successes,' wrote Lee
June 11. ^^ *^® 11th, when the news of Cross Keys and
Port EepubUc had been received, ' have been the
cause of the UveUest joy in this army as well as in the
country. The admfration excited by your skUl and bold
ness has been constantly mingled with solicitude for your
situation. The practicabUity of reinforcing you has been
the subject of gravest consideration. It has been deter-

REINFORCEMENTS 891
mined to do so at the expense of weakening this army.
Brigadier-General Lawton with six regiments from Georgia
is on his way to you, and Brigadier-General Whiting with
eight veteran regiments leaves here to-day. The object is
to enable you to crush the forces opposed to you. Leave
your enfeebled troops to watch the country and guard the
passes covered by your cavalry and artUlery, and with your
main body, including EweU's division and Lawton's and
Whiting's commands, move rapidly to Ashland by rail or
otherwise, as you may find most advantageous, and sweep
down between the Chickahominy and the Pamunkey,
cutting up the enemy's communications, &c,, while
this army attacks McCleUan in front. He will then, I
think, be forced to come out of his intrenchments,
where he is strongly posted on the Chickahominy, and
apparently preparing to move by gradual approaches on
Eichmond.' '
Before the reinforcements reached the VaUey both
Fremont and Shields were out of reach. To have followed
them down the Valley would have been injudicious. Another
victory woidd have doubtless held McDowell fast, but it
would have drawn Jackson too far from Eichmond, The
Confederate generals, therefore, in order to impose upon
their enemies, and to maintain the belief that Washington
was threatened, had recourse to stratagem. The departure
of Whiting and Lawton for the VaUey was ostentatiously
announced. Federal prisoners, about to be dismissed upon
parole, were allowed to see the trains fuU of soldiers pro
ceeding westward, to count the regiments, and learn their
destination. Thus Lee played his part in the game of decep
tion, and meanwhile Jackson had taken active measures to
the same end.
Fremont had retfred from Port EepubUc on the morning
of the 10th. On the 11th the Confederate cavalry, now
under Colonel Munford, a worthy successor of the inde
fatigable Ashby, crossed the Shenandoah, and followed the
retreating enemy. So active was the pursuit that Fremont
evacuated Harrisonburg, abandoning two hundred wounded
' 0. B., vol. zii., part iii., p. 910.
VOL, I. E E

392 STONEWALL JAOKSON
in the hospitals, besides medical and other stores, _ ' Sig
nificant demonstrations of the enemy,' to use his own
words, drove him next day from the strong position at
J ne 14 ^oiiiit Jackson ; and on June 14 he fell bapk to
Strasburg, Banks, who had advanced to Middle-
town, being in close support.
On the 12th the Army of the VaUey had once more moved
westward, and, crossing South Eiver, had encamped in
the woods near Mount Meridian. Here for five days, by the
sparkling waters of the Shenandoah, the wearied soldiers
rested, while their fridefatigable leader employed ruse after
ruse to delude the enemy. The cavalry, though far from
support, was ordered to manoeuvre boldly to prevent all
information reaching the Federals, and to follow Fremont
so long as he retreated,' The bearers of flags of truce were
impressed with the idea that the Southerners were ad
vancing in great strength. The outpost line was made as
close as possible ; no civUians were allowed to pass ; and
the troopers, so that they should have nothing to tell if
they were captured, were kept in ignorance of the position
of their own infantry. The general's real intentions
were concealed from everyone except Colonel Munford,
The officers of the staff fared worse than the remainder of
the army. Not only were they debarred from their com
mander's confidence, but they became the unconscious
instruments whereby false inteUigence was spread. ' The
engineers were directed to prepare a series of maps of the
Valley ; and all who acquired a knowledge of this carefully
divulged order told thefr friends in confidence that Jackson
was going at once in pursuit of Fremont, As those friends
told their friends without loss of time, it was soon the well-
settled conviction of everybody that nothing was further
from Jackson's intention than an evacuation of the VaUey.'
June 17. ^^ '^^^^ ^'^ arrived a last letter from Lee : —
' From your account of the position of the enemy
I think it would be difficult for you to engage him iu time to
unite with this army in the battle for Eichmond. Fremont
' ' The only true rule for cavalry is to follow as long as the enemy retreats.'
— Jaokson to Munford, June 18.

STRATAGEMS 893
and Shields are apparently retrograding, thefr troops
shaken and disorganised, and some time wUl be requfred to
set them again in the field. If this is so, the sooner you
unite with this army the better, McCleUan is being
strengthened. . . . There is much sickness in his ranks,
but his reinforcements by far exceed his losses. The
present, therefore, seems to be favourable for a junction of
your army and this. If you agree with me, the sooner you
can make arrangements to do so the better. In moving
your troops you could let it be understood that it was to
pursue the enemy in your front. Dispose those to hold the
VaUey, so as to deceive tbe enemy, keeping your cavafry well
in thefr front, and at the proper tune suddenly descending
upon the Pamunkey. To be efficacious the movement must
be secret. Let me know the force you can bring, and be
careful to guard from friends and foes your purpose and
your intention of personally leaving the VaUey. The
country is full of spies, and our plans are immediately
carried to the enemy.' '
The greater part of these instructions Jackson had
already carried out on his own initiative. There remained
but to give final dfrections to Colonel Munford, who was to
hold the Valley, and to set the army in motion. Munford
was instructed to do his best to spread false reports of an
advance to the Potomac. EweU's division was ordered to
CharlottesvUle, The rest of the VaUey troops were to follow
EweU ; and Whiting and Lawton, who, in order to bewilder
Fremont, had been marched from Staunton to Mount
Meridian, and then back to Staunton, were to take train to
GordonsviUe. It was above all things important that the
march should be secret. Not only was it essential that Lin
coln should not be alarmed into reinforcing McCleUan, but
it was of even more importance that McClellan should not
be alarmed into correcting the faulty distribution of his
army. So long as he remained with half his force on one
bank of the Chickahominy and half on the other, Lee had
a fair chance of concentrating superior numbers against
one of the fractions. But if McClellan, warned of Jackson's
' 0. B., vol. zii., part iii., p. 913. E B 2

894 STONEWALL JACKSON
approach, were to mass his whole force on one bank or the
other, there would be little hope of success for the Confe
derates. The ultimate object of the movement was therefore
revealed to no one, and the most rigorous precautions
were adopted to conceal it. Jackson s letters from Eichmond,
in accordance with his own instructions, bore no more
expUcit address than ' Somewhere.' A long line of cavalry,
occupying every road, covered the front, and prevented
anyone, soldier or civilian, preceding them toward Eich
mond. Far out to either flank rode patrols of horse
men, and a strong rear-guard swept before it camp-
foUowers and stragglers. At night, every road which
approached the bivouacs was strongly picketed, and the
troops were prevented from communicating with the country
people. The men were forbidden to ask the names of the
viUages through which they passed ; and it was ordered
that to all questions they should make the one answer : ' I
don't know.' ' This was just as much license as the men
wanted,' says an eye-witness, 'and they forthwith knew
nothing of the past, present, or future.' An amusing incident,
it is said, grew out of this order. One of General Hood's *
Texans left the ranks on the march, and was cUmbing a fence
to go to a cherry-tree near at hand, when Jackson rode by
and saw him.
' Where are you going ? ' asked the general.
' I don't know,' replied the soldier.
' To what command do you belong ? '
' I don't know.'
' WeU, what State are you from ? '
' I don't know.'
' What is the meaning of aU this ? ' asked Jackson of
another. ' WeU,' was the reply, ' Old StonewaU and General Hood
gave orders yesterday that we were not to know anything
untU after the next fight.'
Jackson laughed and rode on.'
The men themselves, intelligent as they were, were
' Whiting's division. '' Cooke, p. 205.

HE RIDES TO RICHMOND 395
unable to penetrate their general's design. When they
reached Charlottesville it was reported in the ranks that
the next march would be northwards, to check a move
ment of Banks across the Blue Eidge. At GordonsvUle it
was supposed that tbey would move on Washington.
* I recoUect,' says one of the Valley soldiers, * that the
pastor of the Presbyterian church there, with whom Jack
son spent the night, told me, as a profound secret, not to
be breathed to mortal man, that we would move at day
break on Culpeper Court House to intercept a column ofthe
enemy coming across the mountains. He said there could
be no mistake about this, for he had it from General Jack
son himself. We did move at daybreak, but instead of
moving on Culpeper Court House we marched in the oppo
site dfrection. At Hanover Junction we expected to head
towards Fredericksburg to meet McDowell, and the whole
movement was so secretly conducted that the troops were
uncertain of their destination until the evening of June 26,
when they heard A, P, HUl's guns at MechanicsviUe, and
made the woods vibrate with their shouts of anticipated
victory.' '
At GordonsvUle a rumour, which proved to be false,
arrested the march of the army for a whole day. On the 21st
the leading division arrived at FrederickshaU, fifty miles
from Eichmond, and there halted for the Sunday. They
had afready marched fifty miles, and the main body, although
the railway had been of much service, was still distant.
There was not sufficient rolling stock available to transport all
the infantry simultaneously, and, in any case, the cavalry,
artUlery, and waggons must have proceeded by road. The
trains, therefore, moving backwards and forwards along
the line, and taking up the rear brigades in succession,
forwarded them in a couple of hours a whole day's march.
Beyond FrederickshaU the line had been destroyed by the
enemy's cavalry.
At 1 A,M, on Monday morniag, Jackson, accompanied
by a single orderly, rode to confer with Lee, near Eichmond.
He was provided with a pass, which Major Dabney had
¦ Communicated by the Bev, J, W. Jones, D.D.

396 STONEWALL JAOKSON
been instructed to procure from General Whiting, the next
June 23 ^ command, authorising him to impress horses ;
and he had resorted to other expedients to bUnd
his friends. The lady of the house which he had made his
headquarters at FrederickshaU had sent to ask if the general
would breakfast with her next morning. He replied that he
would be glad to do so if he were there at breakfast time ;
and upon her inqufry as to the time that would be most
convenient, he said : ' Have it at your usual time, and
send for me when it is ready,' When Mrs, Harris sent for
him, Jim, his coloured servant, replied to the message :
' Sh ! you don't 'spec' to find the general here at this hour,
do you ? He left here 'bout midnight, and I 'spec' by this
time he's whippin' Banks in the Valley.'
During the journey his determination to preserve his
incognito was the cause of some embarrassment. A few
miles from his quarters he was halted by a sentry. It was
in vain that he represented that he was an officer on duty,
carrying dispatches. The sentry, one of the Stonewall
Brigade, was inexorable, and quoted Jackson's own
orders. The utmost that he would concede was that the com
mander of the picket should be called. When this officer
came he recognised his general. Jackson bound them
both to secrecy, and praising the soldier for his obedience,
continued his ride. Some hours later his horse broke
down. Proceeding to a plantation near the road, he
told his orderly to request that a couple of horses
might be supplied for an officer on important duty.
It was stiU dark, and the indignant proprietor, so
unceremoniously disturbed by two unknown soldiers, who
declined to give their names, refused aU aid. After some
parley Jackson and his orderly, finding argument wasted,
proceeded to the stables, selected the two best horses,
shifted the saddles, and left their own chargers as a
temporary exchange.
At three o'clock in the afternoon, after passiag rapidly
through Eichmond, he reached the headquarters of the
Commander-ui- Chief, It is unfortunate that no record of
the meeting that took place has been preserved. There

THE COUNCIL OF WAR 897
were present, besides Lee and Jackson, the three officers
whose divisions were to be employed in the attack upon
the Federals, Longstreet, A, P. HiU, and D, H, HUl, The
names of the two former are associated with almost every
Confederate victory won upon the soU of Virginia, They
were trusted by their great leader, and they were idolised
by their men. Like others, they made mistakes ; the one
was sometimes slow, the other careless ; neither gave
the sUghtest sign that they were capable of independent
command, and both were at times impatient of control.
But, taking them all in aU, they were gallant soldiers,
brave to a fault, vigorous in attack, and undaunted by
adverse fortune. Longstreet, sturdy and sedate, his * old
war-horse ' as Lee affectionately called him, bore on his
broad shoulders the weight of twenty years' service in the
old army, HUl's slight figure and delicate features, instinct
with Ufe and energy, were a marked contrast to the heavier
frame and rugged lineaments of his older coUeague.
Already they were distinguished. In the hottest of the
fight they had won the respect that soldiers so readily accord
to valour; yet it is not on these stubborn fighters, not
on their companion, less popular, but hardly less capable,
that the eye of imagination rests. Were some great
painter, gifted with the sense of historic fitness, to place on
his canvas the council in the Virginia homestead, two
figures only woidd occupy the foreground : the one weary
with travel, white with the dust of many leagues, and
bearing on his frayed habiliments the traces of rough
bivouacs and mountain roads ; the other, tall, straight,
and stately ; stUl, for aU his fifty years, remarkable for his
personal beauty, and endowed with aU the simple dignity
of a noble character and commanding intellect. In that
humble chamber, where the only refreshment the Com
mander-in-Chief could offer was a glass of milk, Lee and
Jackson met for the first time since the war bad begun.
Lee's hours of triumph had yet to come. The South was
aware that he was sage in council ; he bad yet to prove his
mettle in the field. But there was at least one Virginia
soldier who knew his worth. With the prescient sympathy

898 STONEWALL JACKSON
of a kindred spirit Jackson had divined his daring
and his genius, and although he held always to his
own opinions, he had no wiU but that of his great com-'
mander. With how absolute a trust his devotion was
repaid one of the brightest pages in the history of Virginia
teUs us ; a year crowded with victories bears witness to
the strength begotten of their mutual confidence. So long
as Lee and Jackson led her armies hope shone on the
standards of the South, Great was the constancy of her
people; wonderful the fortitude of her soldiers; but on
the shoulders of her twin heroes rested the burden of the
tremendous struggle.
To his four major-generals Lee explained his plan of
attack, and then, retiring to his office, left them to arrange
the details. It will be sufficient for the present to state
that Jackson's troops were to encamp on the night of
the 25th east of Ashland, fifteen miles north of Eich-!
mond, between the village and the Virginia Central Eailway,'
The day following the interview, the 24th, he returned
to his command, rejoining the column at Beaver Dam
Station, His advanced guard were now within forty miles of Eich
mond, and, so far from McDowell being on his heels, that
June 24 general was still north of Fredericksburg, No
reinforcements could reach McClellan for several
days ; the Confederates were concentrated round Eichmond
in full strength ; and Lee's strategy had been entirely suc
cessful. Moreover, with such skUl had Jackson's march
been made that the Federal generals were absolutely
ignorant of his whereabouts, McClellan indeed seems to
have had some vague suspicion of his approach; but
Lincoln, McDowell, Banks, Fremont, together with the whole
of the Northern people and the Northern press, believed
that he was stUl west of GordonsvUle. Neither scout, spy,
nor patrol was able to penetrate the cordon of Munford's
outposts. Beyond his pickets, strongly posted at New
Market and Conrad's Store, all was dim and dark. Had
Jackson halted, awaiting reinforcements ? Was he already
in motion, marching swiftly and secretly against some

THE FEDERALS BEWILDERED 899
isolated garrison? Was he planning another dash on
Washington, this time with a larger army at his back?
Would his advance be east or west of the Blue Eidge,
across the sources of the Eappahannock, or through the
Alleghanies ? Had he 15,000 men or 50,000 ?
Such were the questions which obtruded themselves
on the Federal generals, and not one could give a satis
factory reply. That a blow was preparing, and that
it would faU where it was least expected, all men knew.
* We have a determined and enterprising enemy to contend
with,' wrote one of Lincoln's generals, ' Jackson,' said
another, 'marches thirty mUes a day.' The successive
surprises of the Valley campaign had left thefr mark ; and
the correspondence preserved in the Official Eecords is in
itself the highest tribute to Jackson's skill. He had gained
something more than the respect of his enemies. He had
brought them to fear his name, and from the Potomac to
the Eappahannock uncertainty and apprehension reigned
supreme. Not a patrol was sent out which did not expect
to meet the Confederate columns, pressing swiftly north
ward ; not a general along the whole line, from Eomney to
Fredericksburg, who did not tremble for his own security.
There was sore trouble on the Shenandoah. The
disasters of M'Dowell and Front Eoyal had taught the
Federal officers that when the VaUey army was reported to
be sixty miles distant, it was probably deploying in the
nearest forest ; and with the rout of Winchester stiU fresh
in their memories they knew that pursuit would be as
vigorous as attack would be sudden. The air was fuU of
rumours, each more alarming than its predecessor, and all
of them contradictory. The reports of the cavafry, of spies,
of prisoners, of deserters, of escaped negroes, told each a
different story.
Jackson, it was at first reported, had been reinforced to
the number of 35,000 men.' A few days later his army
had sweUed to 60,000 with 70 guns, and he was rebuUding
the bridge at Port Eepublic in order to foUow Fremont.
' The telegrams and letters containing the reports quoted on pages
899-400 are to be found in 0, B., vol. zi., part iii., and vol. zii., part iii.

400 STONEWALL JACKSON
On June 13 he was beUeved to be moving through Char
lottesville against one or other of McDowell's divisions, ' He
was either going against Shields at Luray, or King at Cat-
lett's, or Donbleday at Fredericksburg, or going to Eich
mond.' On the 16th it was absolutely certain that he was
within striking distance of Front Eoyal. On the 18th he
had gone to Eichmond, but EweU was still in the Valley with
40,000 men. On the 19th Banks had no doubt but that
another immediate movement down the Valley was intended
* with 30,000 or more,' On the 20th Jackson was said to be
moving on Warrenton, east of the Blue Eidge. On the
22ud ' reliable persons ' at Harper's Perry had learned that
he was about to attack Banks at Middletown ; and on the
same day EweU, who was actually near FrederickshaU, was
discovered to be moving on Moorefield ! On the 25th Fre
mont had been informed that large reinforcements had
reached Jackson from Tennessee ; and Banks was on the
watch for a movement from the west. Fremont heard
that EweU designed to attack Winchester in rear, and the
threat from so dangerous a quarter made Lincoln anxious,
*We have no definite information,' wrote Stanton
to McClellan, ' as to the numbers or position of Jackson's
force. Within the last two days the evidence is strong
that for some purpose the enemy is cfrculating rumours of
Jackson's advance in various directions, with a view to
conceal the real point of attack. Neither McDoweU nor
Banks nor Fremont appear to have any accurate know
ledge of the subject,'
This was on June 25, the day the Valley army halted
at Ashland ; but the climax was reached on the 28th. For
forty-eight hours Jackson had been fighting McClellan, yet
Banks, although 'quite confident that he was not within
thirty mUes, believed that he was preparing for an attack
on Middletown,' To reach Middletown Jackson would have
had to march one hundred and fifty miles !
Under the influence of these rumours the movements of
the Federal troops were erratic in the extreme,
Fremont, who had originally been ordered to remain at
Harrisonburg, had faUen back on Banks at Middletown,

THE FEDERALS BEWILDERED 401
although ordered to Front Eoyal, was most reluctant to
move so far south. Shields was first ordered to stand
fast at Luray, where he would be reinforced by Eicketts,
and was then ordered to fall back on Front Eoyal.
Eeinforcements were ordered to Eomney, to Harper's
Ferry, and to Winchester; andFMcDowell, who kept his
head throughout, struggled in vain to reunite his scat
tered divisions. Divining the true drift of the Con
federate strategy, he realised that to protect Washington,
and to rescue McClellan, the surest method was for his
own army corps to march as rapidly as possible to the
Chickahominy, But his pleadings were disregarded.
Lincoln and Stanton had not yet discovered that the
best defence is generally a vigorous attack. They had
learned nothing from the VaUey campaign, and they were
infected with the fears of Banks and Fremont, Jackson
was weU on his way to Eichmond before Shields and
Eicketts were permitted to cross the Blue Eidge ; and it
was not till the 25th that McDowell's corps was once more
concentrated at Fredericksburg, The Confederates had
gained a start of five marches, and the Northern Govern
ment was stiU ignorant that they had left the Valley.
McClellan was equally in the dark. Faint rumours had
preceded the march of Jackson's army, but he had given
them scant credit. On the morning of the 26th, however,
he was rudely enlightened. It was but too clear that
Jackson, strongly reinforced from Eichmond, was bearing
down upon his most vulnerable point — his right wing,
which, in anticipation of McDowell's advance, remained
exposed on the north bank of the Chickahominy,
Nor was this the sum of his troubles. On this same
day, when his outposts were faUing back before superior
numbers, and the VaUey regiments were closing round
thefr flank, he received a telegram from Stanton, informing
him that the forces commanded by McDoweU, Banks,
and Fremont were to form one army under Major-General
Pope ; and that this army was ' to attack and overcome the
rebel forces under Jackson and EweU, and threaten the

402 STONEWALL JAOKSON
enemy mthe direction of CharlottesviUe ! ' AU hope of succour
passed away, and the ' Young Napoleon ' was left to extricate
himself, as best he could, from his many difficulties ; diffi
culties which were due in part to his own political blindness,
in part to the ignorance of Lincoln, but, in a far larger
degree, to the consummate strategy of Lee and Jackson,

409

NOTE

The Marches in ihe 'Valley Campaign, March 22 to June 25, 1862

March 22. Mount Jaokson — Strasburg
„ 23. Strasburg— Kernstown — New
town 
„ 24-26. Newtown — Mt. Jackson
AprU 17-19. Mt. Jackson— EUi Run VaUey
„ 30-May 3. Elk Run VaUey— Me
cbum's River Station
May 7-8. Staunton — Shenandoah Mt.
„ 9-11. BuU Pasture Mount — Franklin
„ 12-15. FrankUn — Lebanon Springs .
„ 17. Lebanon Springs — Bridgewater .
„ 19-20. Bridgewater — New Market .
„ 21. New Market — Luray .
„ 22. Luray — Milford ....
„ 23. Milford — Front Boyal —
CedarviUe ....
„ 24. CedarviUe — Abraham's Creek .
„ 25, Abraham's Creek — Stevenson's ,
„ 28, Stevenson's — Charlestown .
„ 29. Charlestown — HaUtown
„ 30. HaUtown — Winchester
„ 31. Winchester — Strasburg
June 1. Strasburg — Woodstock
„ 2. Woodstock — Mount Jaokson
„ 3. Mount Jackson — New Market
„ 4-5. New Market — Port RepubUo
>¦ 8 
„ 9. Cross Keys— Brown's Gap .

Station (one rest day)

MUei 22
18 Battle of Kernstown.
35 50

„ 12. Brown's Gap — Mount Meridian
„ 17-25, Mount Meridian — Ashland

60
32 30
40 18
2412 12

Battle of M'DoweU.
Skirmishes,

Front

22 Action at
Boyal.
22 Action at Middletown
and Newtown.
7 Battle of Win
chester,
15 Skirmish.
5 Skirmish.
25 18
12 Skirmish,
12 7
30 Battle of Cross Keys,
16 Battle of Port Ee
pubUc.
10
120
676 miles in 48 marching
days.
Average 14 mUes per
diem.

404 STONEWALL JACKSON

CHAPTEE XII
REVIEW OF THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN
In March, 1862, more than 200,000 Federals were pre
pared to invade Vfrgmia. McCleUan, before McDoweU
was withheld, reckoned on placing 150,000 men at West
Point. Fremont, in West Virginia, commanded 30,000,
including the force in the Kanawha VaUey; and Banks
had crossed the Potomac with over 30,000,
Less than 60,000 Confederate soldiers were available to
oppose this enormous host, and the numerical disproportion
was increased by the vast material resources of the North.
The only advantages which the Southerners possessed were
that they were operating in thefr own country, and that
thefr cavafry was the more efficient. Their leaders, there
fore, could count on receiving more ample and more
accurate information than their adversaries,' But, except
in these respects, everything was against them. In mettle
and in discipline the troops were fairly matched. On both
sides the higher commands, with few exceptions, were held
by regular officers, who had received the same training.
On both sides the staff was inexperienced. If the Con
federate infantry were better marksmen than the majority
of the Federals, they were not so well armed; and the
Federal artiUery, both in materiel and in handling, was
the more efficient.
The odds against the South were great ; and to those
who beUeved that Providence sides with the big battalions,
' ' If I were mindful only of my own glory, I would choose always to
make war in my own country, for there every man is a spy, and the enemy
can make no movement of which I am not informed.' — Frederick the Great's
Instructions to his Generals.

THE 'BIG BATTALIONS' 405
that numbers, armament, discipUne, and tactical efficiency,
are all that is requfred to ensure success, the fall of Eich
mond must have seemed inevitable.
But withui three months of the day that McClellan
started for the Peninsula the odds had been much reduced.
The Confederates had won no startling victories. Except
in the Valley, and there only small detachments were
concerned, the fighting had been indecisive. The North had
no reason to beUeve that her soldiers, save only the cavalry,
were in any way inferior to thefr adversaries. And yet, on
June 26, where were the ' big battalions ? ' 105,000 men
were intrenched within sight of the spires of Eichmond ;
but where were the rest ? Where were the 70,000 ' that
should have aided McCleUan, have encircled the rebel
capital on every side, cut the communications, closed the
sources of supply, and have overwhelmed the starving
garrison? How came it that Fremont and Banks were
no further south than they were in March? that the
Shenandoah VaUey stUl poured its produce into Eichmond ?
that McDowell had not yet crossed the Eappahannock?
What mysterious power had compeUed Lincohi to retain a
force larger than the whole Confederate army ' to protect
the national capital from danger and insult ? '
It was not hard fighting. The VaUey campaign, from
Kernstown to Port EepubUc, had not cost the Federals
more than 7,000 men ; and, with the exception of Cross
Keys, the battles had been well contested. It was not the
difficulties of supply or movement. It was not absence of
information ; for untU Jackson vanished from the sight of
both friend and foe on June 17, spies and ' contrabands ' ^
(i.e. fugitive slaves) had done good work. Nor was it want
of will on the part of the Northern Government, None
> At the date of the action at Front Boyal, May 23, the following was
the strength ot the detached forces : Banks, 10,000 ; Fremont, 25,000 ;
McDoweU (including Shields, but excluding McCall), 35,000.
' The blacks, however, appear to have been as unreliable as regards
numbers as McCleUan's detectives. 'If a negro were asked how many
Confederates he had seen at a certain point, his answer was very likely to
be : "I dunno, Massa, but I guess about amiUion." ' — McCleUan's Own Story,
p. 254.

406 STONEWALL JACKSON
were more anxious than Lincoln and Stanton to capture
Eichmond, to disperse the rebels, and to restore the Union.
They had made stupendous efforts to organise a sufficient
army. To equip that army as no army had ever been
equipped before they had spared neither expense nor
labour ; and it can hardly be denied that they had created
a vast machine, perhaps in part imperfect, but, consider
ing the weakness of the enemy, not iU-adapted for the work
before it.
There was but one thing they had overlooked, and that
was that thefr host would require inteUigent control. So
complete was the mechanism, so simple a matter it
appeared to set the machine in motion, and to keep it in
the right course, that they believed that thefr untutored
hands, guided by common-sense and sound abilities,
were perfectly capable of guiding it, without mishap, to the
appointed goal. Men who, aware of their ignorance, would
probably have shrunk from assuming charge of a squad
of infantry in action, had no hesitation whatever in
attempting to direct a mighty army, a task whieh Napoleon
has assured us requfres profound study, incessant appli
cation, and wide experience,'
They were in fact ignorant — and how many statesmen,
and even soldiers, are in like case ? — that strategy, the art of
manoeuvring armies, is an art in itself, an art which none
may master by the light of nature, but to which, if he is to
attain success, a man must serve a long apprenticeship.
The rules of strategy are few and simple. They may
be learned in a week. They may be taught by famUiar
iUustrations or a dozen diagrams. But such knowledge
wiU no more teach a man to lead an army like Napoleon
' ' In consequence of the excessive growth of armies tactics have lost
in weight, and the strategical design, rather than the detail of the move
ments, has become the decisive factor in the issue of a campaign. The
strategical design depends, as a rule, upon the decision of cabinets, and
upon the resources placed at the disposal of the commander. Consequently,
either the leading statesmen should have correct views of the science of
war, or should make up for their ignorance by giving their entire confidence
to the man to whom the supreme command of the army is entrusted.
Otherwise, the germs of defeat and national ruin may be contained in the
first preparations for war.' — The Archduke Charles of Austria.

MoCLELLAN 407
than a knowledge of grammar wiU teach him to write like
Gibbon. Lincoln, when the army he had so zealously
toiled to organise, reeled back in confusion from Virginia,
set himself to learn the art of war. He collected, says his
biographer, a great library of military books ; and, if it
were not pathetic, it would be almost ludicrous, to read of
the great President, in the midst of his absorbing labours
and his ever-growing anxieties, poring night after night,
when his capital was asleep, over the pages of Jomini and
Clausewitz. And what was the result? In 1864, when
Grant was appointed to the command of the Union armies,
he said : ' I neither ask nor desire to know anything of
your plans. Take the responsibiUty and act, and caU on
me for assistance,' He had learned at last that no man is
a born strategist.
The mistakes of Lincoln and Stanton are not to be con
doned by pointing to McClellan,
McClellan designed the plan for the invasion of
Vfrginia, and the plan failed. But this is not to say that
the plan was in itself a bad one. Nine times out of ten it
would have succeeded. In many respects it was admirable.
It did away with a long Une of land communications,
passing through- a hostUe country. It brought the naval
power of the Federals into combination with the mUitary.
It secured two great waterways, the York and the James,
by which the army could be easUy supplied, which required
no guards, and by which heavy ordnance could be brought
up to bombard the fortifications of Eichmond, But it had
one flaw. It left Washington, in the opinion of the Presi
dent and of the nation, insecure ; and this flaw, which
would have escaped the notice of an ordinary enemy, was
at once detected by Lee and Jackson, Moreover, had
McClellan been left in control of the whole theatre of war,
Jackson's manoeuvres would probably have faUed to produce
so decisive an effect. The fight at Kernstown would not
have induced McClellan to strike 40,000 men off the strength
of the invading army. He had not been deceived when
Jackson threatened Harper's Ferry at the end of May. The
reinforcements sent from Eichmond after Port Eepublic
VOL. I. V w

408 STONEWALL JACKSON
had not blinded him, nor did he for a moment believe that
Washiagton was in actual danger. There is this, however,
to be said : had McClellan been in sole command, public
opinion, alarmed for Washington, would have possibly
compeUed him to do exactly what Lincoln did, and to
retain nearly half the army on the Potomac,
So much for the leading of civUians, On the other
hand, the faUure of the Federals to concentrate more
than 105,000 men at the decisive point, and even to
establish those 105,000 in a favourable position, was
mainly due to the superior strategy of the Confederates.
Those were indeed skUful manoeuvres which prevented
McDoweU from marching to the Chickahominy; and, at
the critical moment, when Lee was on the point of
attacking McCleUan, which drew McDoweU, Banks, and
Fremont on a wUd-goose chase towards Charlottesville.
The weak joint in the enemy's armour, the national anxiety
for Washington, was early recognised. Kernstown induced
Lincoln, departing from the original scheme of operations,
to form four independent armies, each acting on a different
line. Two months later, when McClellan was near Eich
mond, and it was of essential importance that the move
ments of these armies should be combined, Jackson once
more intervened ; Banks was driven across the Potomac,
and again the Federal concentration was postponed. Lastly,
the battles of Cross Keys and Port Eepublic, followed by
the despatch of Whiting and Lawton to the Valley, led the
Northern President to commit his worst mistake. For the
second time the plan of campaign was changed, and
McClellan was left isolated at the moment he most needed
help. The brains of two great leaders had done more for
the Confederacy than 200,000 soldiers had done for the
Union. Without quitting his desk, and leaving the execu
tion of his plans to Jackson, Lee had relieved Eichmond
of the pressure of 70,000 Federals, and had lured the
remainder into the position he most wished to find them.
The Confederacy, notwithstanding the enormous disparity of
force, had once more gained the upper hand ; and from this

STRATEGY 409
instance, as from a score of others, it may be deduced
that Providence is more inchned to side with the big brains
than with the big battaUons.
It was not mere natural ability that had triumphed.
Lee, in tbis respect, was assuredly not more highly gifted
than Lincoln, or Jackson than McClellan. But, whether by
accident or design, Davis had selected for command of the
Confederate army, and had retained in the Valley, two past
masters in the art of strategy. If it was accident he was
singularly favoured by fortune. He might have selected
many soldiers of high rank and long service, who would have
been as innocent of strategical skiU as Lincoln himself.
His choice might have fallen on the most dashing leader,
the strictest disciplinarian, the best driU, in the Confederate
army ; and yet the man who united aU these quaUties might
have been altogether ignorant of the higher art of war,
Mr. Davis himself had been a soldier. He was a graduate
of West Point, and in the Mexican campaign he had com
manded a volunteer regiment with much distinction. But
as a dfrector of mUitary operations he was a greater marplot
than even Stanton. It by no means follows that because
a man has hved his Ufe in camp and barrack, has long ex
perience of command, and even long experience of war, that
he can apply the rules of strategy before the enemy. In the
first place he may lack the character, the inflexible resolu
tion, the broad grasp, the vivid imagination, the power of
patient thought, the cool head, and, above all, the moral
courage. In the second place, there are few schools where
strategy may be learned, and, in any case, a long and
laborious course of study is the only means of acqufring the
capacity to handle armies and outwit an equal adversary.
The Ught of common-sense alone is insufficient ; nor will
a few months' reading give more than a smattering of
knowledge. 'Eead and re-read,' said Napoleon, 'the eighty-eight
campaigns of Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Gustavus,
Turenne, Eugene, and Frederick. Take them as your
models, for it is the only means of becoming a great leader,
and of mastering the secrets of the art of war. Your
F¥2

410 STONEWALL JACKSON
intelUgence, enUghtened by such study, wiU then reject
methods contrary to those adopted by these great men,'
In America, as elsewhere, it had not been recognised
before the CivU War, even by the miUtary authorities, that
if armies are to be handled with success they must be
directed by trained strategists. No Kriegsakademie or its
equivalent existed in the United States, and the officers
whom common-sense induced to follow the advice of
Napoleon had to pursue their studies by themselves. To
these the campaigns of the great Emperor offered an
epitome of all that had gone before; the campaigns of
Washington explained how the principles of the art might
be best applied to their own country, and Mexico had
suppUed them with practical experience. Of the West
Point graduates there were many who had acqufred from
these sources a wide knowledge of the art of generalship,
and among them were no more earnest students than the
three Virginians, Lee, Jackson, and Johnston.
When Jackson accepted an appointment for the Military
Institute, it was with tbe avowed intention of training his
intellect for war. In his retirement at Lexington he had
kept before his eyes, the possibUity that he might some
day be recalled to the Army. He had already acquired
such practical knowledge of his profession as the United
States service could afford. He had become famiUar with
the characteristics of the regular soldier. He knew how
to command, to maintain discipline, and the regulations
were at his fingers' ends. A few years had been suffi
cient to teach him all that could be learned from the
routine of a regiment, as they had been sufficient to
teach Napoleon, Frederick, and Lee. But there remained
over and above the intellectual part of war, and with
characteristic thoroughness he had set himself to master
it. His reward came quickly. The Valley campaign practi
caUy saved Eichmond. In a few short months the quiet
gentleman of Lexington became, in the estimation of both
friend and foe, a very thunderbolt of war ; and his name,
which a year previous had hardly been known beyond the
Valley, was already famous.

HIS FAME 411
It is, perhaps, true that Johnston and Lee had a
larger share in Jackson's success than has been generaUy
recognised. It was due to Johnston that Jackson was
retained in the VaUey when McClellan moved to the
Peninsula ; and his, too, was the fundamental idea of
the campaign, that the Federals in the Valley were to be
prevented from reinforcing tbe army which threatened
Eichmond. To Lee belongs still further credit. From the
moment he assumed command we find the Confederate
operations dfrected on a definite and well-considered plan :
a defensive attitude round Eichmond, a vigorous offensive
in the VaUey, leading to the dispersion of tbe enemy, and a
Confederate concentration on the Chickahominy. His
operations were very bold. When McClellan, with far
superior numbers, was already within twenty miles of
Eichmond, he had permitted Jackson to retain EweU's 8,000
in the VaUey, and he would have given him the brigades of
Branch and Mahone. From Lee, too, came the suggestion
that a blow should be struck at Banks, that he should be
driven back to the Potomac, and that the North should be
threatened with invasion. From him, too, at a moment when
McCleUan's breastworks could be actually seen from Eich
mond, came the 7,000 men under Whiting and Lawton, the
news of whose arrival in the Valley had spread such conster
nation amongst the Federals. But it is to be remembered that
Jackson viewed the situation in exactly the same light as
his superiors. The instructions he received were exactly
the instructions he would have given had he been in com
mand at Eichmond ; and it may be questioned whether even
he would have carried them out with such whole-hearted
vigour if he had not thoroughly agreed with every detail.
Lee's strategy was indeed remarkable. He knew
McClellan and he knew Lincoln, He knew that the
former was over-cautious; he knew that the latter was
over-anxious. No sudden assault on the Eichmond lines,
weak as they were, was to be apprehended, and a threat
against Washington was certain to have great results.
Hence the audacity wbich, at a moment apparently most
critical, sent 17,000 of the best troops in the Confederacy as

412 STONEWALL JACKSON
far northward as Harper's Ferry, and, a fortnight later,
weakened the garrison of Eichmond by 7,000 infantry.
He was surely a great leader who, in the face of an over
whelming enemy, dared assume so vast a responsibUity.
But it is to be remembered that Lee made no suggestion
whatever as to the manner in which his ideas were to be
worked out. Everything was left to Jackson, The swift
manoeuvres which surprised in succession his various
enemies emanated from himself alone. It was his brain
that conceived the march by Mecbum's Station to M'Dowell,
the march that surprised Fremont and bewUdered Banks.
It was his brain that conceived the rapid transfer of the
Valley army from the one side of the Massanuttons to the
other, the march that surprised Kenly and drove Banks
in panic to tbe Potomac, It was his brain that
conceived the double victory of Cross Keys and Port
Eepublic ; and if Lee's strategy was brilliant, that displayed
by Jackson on the minor theatre of war was no less
masterly. The instructions he received at the end of April,
before he moved against Milroy, were simply to the effect
that a successful blow at Banks might have the happiest
results. But such a blow was not easy. Banks was strongly
posted and numerically superior to Jackson, while Fremont, in
equal strength, was threatening Staunton. Taking instant
advantage of the separation of the hostUe columns, Jackson
struck at MUroy, and having checked Fremont, returned
to the Valley to find Banks retreating. At this moment
he received orders from Lee to threaten Washington.
Without an instant's hesitation he marched northward.
By May 23, had the Federals received warning of his
advance, they might have concentrated 30,000 men at
Strasburg and Front Eoyal; or, while Banks was rein
forced, McDowell might have moved on GordonsviUe,
cutting Jackson's line of retreat on Eichmond.
But Jackson took as little count of numbers as did
Cromwell, Concealing his march with his usual skill he
dashed with his 16,000 men into the midst of his enemies.
Driving Banks before him, and well aware that Fremont
and McDoweU were converging in his rear, he advanced

LINCOLN AND HIS POLITICAL GENERALS 413
boldly on Harper's Perry, routed Saxton's outposts, and
remained for two days on the Potomac, with 62,000 Federals
within a few days' march. Then, retreating rapidly up the
Valley, beneath the southern peaks of the Massanuttons he
turned fiercely at bay ; and the pursuing columns, mustering
together nearly twice his numbers, were thrust back with
heavy loss at the very moment they were combining to
crush him,' A week later he had vanished, and when he
appeared on the Chickahominy, Banks, Fremont, and
McDowell were still guarding the roads to Washington,
and McClellan was waiting for McDoweU, 175,000 men
absolutely paralysed by 16,000 ! Only Napoleon's campaign
of 1814 affords a paraUel to this extraordinary spectacle,^
Jackson's task was undoubtedly facilitated by the
ignorance of Lincoln and the incapacity of his political
generals. But in estimating his achievements, this ignorance
and incapacity are only of secondary importance. The his
torians do not dwell upon the mistakes of CoUi, BeauUeu,
and Wurmser in 1796, but on the brilliant resolution with
which Napoleon took advantage of them ; and the salient
features, both of the Valley Campaign and of that of 1796,
are the untiring vigilance with which opportunities were
looked for, the skiU with whicb they were detected, and the
daring rapidity with which they were seized.
History often unconsciously injures the reputation of
great soldiers. The more detaUed the narrative, the less
brUliant seems success, the less excusable defeat. When
we are made fuUy acquainted with the dispositions of both
sides, the correct solution of the problem, strategical or
tactical, is generally so plain that we may easUy be led to
believe that it must needs have spontaneously suggested
itself to the victorious leader ; and, as a natural corollary,
that success is due rather to force of wiU than to force
of intellect ; to vigilance, energy, and audacity, rather than
' ' An operation which stamps him as a military genius of the highest
order.' — Lord Wolseley, North A-msrican Review, vol. 149, No. 2, p. 166.
' ' These brilliant successes appear to me models of their kind, both in
conception and execution. They should be closely studied by all officers
who wish to learn the art and science of war.' — Ibid.

414 STONEWALL JAOKSON
to insight and calculation. It is asserted, for Instance, by
superficial critics that both WeUington and Napoleon, in
the campaign of 1815, committed unpardonable errors.
Undoubtedly, at first sight, it is inconceivable that the one
should have disregarded the probabiUty of the French in
vading Belgium by the Charleroi road, or that the other,
on the morning of the great battle, should never have sus
pected that Blucher was close at hand. But the critic's
knowledge of the situation is far more ample and accurate
than that of either commander. Had either Wellington
before Quatre Bras, or Napoleon on the fateful June 18
known what we know now, matters would have turned out
very differently, ' If,' said Frederick the Great, ' we had
exact information of our enemy's dispositions, we should
beat him every time ; ' but exact information is never
forthcoming, A general in the field literally walks in
darkness, and his success wiU be in proportion to the
facUity with which his mental vision can pierce the ^eU.
His manoeuvres, to a greater or less degree, must always be
based on probabilities, for his most recent reports almost
invariably relate to events which, at best, are several hours
old ; and, meanwhUe, what has the enemy been doing ?
This it is the most essential part of his business to dis
cover, and it is a matter of hard thinking and sound
judgment. From the indications furnished by his reports,
and from the consideration of many circumstances, with
some of which he is only imperfectly acquainted, he must
divine the intentions of his opponent. It is not pretended
that even the widest experience and the finest inteUect confer
infallibility. But clearness of perception and the power of
deduction, together with the strength of purpose which
they create, are the fount and origin of great achievements ;
and when we find a campaign in which they played a pre-
. dominant part, we may fairly rate it as a masterpiece of
war. It can hardly be disputed that these quaUties played
such a part on the Shenandoah. For instance ; when
Jackson left the Valley to march against Milroy, many
things might have happened which would have brought
about disaster : —

MILITARY GENIUS 415
1. Banks, who was reported to have 21,000 men at
Harrisonburg, might have moved on Staunton, joined hands
with Mifroy, and crushed Edward Johnson,
2. Banks might have attacked EweU's 8,000 with
superior numbers.
3. Fremont, if he got warning of Jackson's purpose,
might have reinforced Milroy, occupied a strong position,
and requested Banks to threaten or attack the Confederates
in rear. 4. Fremont might have withdrawn his advanced
brigade, and have reinforced Banks from Moorefield,
5, Banks might have been reinforced by Blenker, of
whose whereabouts Jackson was uncertain,
6, Banks might have marched to join McDowell at
Fredericksburg. 7, McCleUan might have pressed Johnston so closely
that a decisive battle could not have been long delayed,
8. McDoweU might have marched on Eichmond, inter
vening between the Valley army and the capital.
Such an array of possibUities would have justified a
passive attitude on Elk Eun, A calculation of the chances,
however, showed Jackson that the dangers of action were
Ulusory, ' Never take counsel of your fears,' was a maxim
often on his lips. Unlike many others, he first made up
his mind what he wanted to do, and then, and not till
then, did he consider what his opponents might do to
thwart him. To seize the initiative was his chief pre
occupation, and in this case it did not seem difficult to do
so. He knew that Banks was unenterprising. It was
improbable that McDowell would advance until McClellan
was near Eichmond, and McClellan was very slow. To
prevent Fremont getting an inkling of his design in time
to cross it was not impossible, and Lincoln's anxiety for
Washington might be relied on to keep Banks in the Valley.
It is true that Jackson's force was very small. But
the manifestation of miUtary genius is not affected by
numbers. The handling of masses is a mechanical
art, of which knowledge and experience are the key ;
but it is the manner in which the grand principles of

416 STONEWALL JACKSON
war are applied which marks the great leader, and these
principles may be applied as resolutely and effectively with
10,000 men as with 100,000,
'In meditation,' says Bacon, 'aU dangers should be
seen ; in execution none, unless they are very formidable,'
It was on this precept that Jackson acted. Not a single
one of his manoeuvres but was based on a close and
judicial survey of the situation. Every risk was weighed.
Nothing was left to chance. ' There was never a com
mander,' says his chief of the staff, ' whose foresight was
more complete. Nothing emerged which had not been
considered before in his mind ; no possibility was over
looked ; he was never surprised,' ' The character of his
opponent, the moral of the hostUe troops, the nature of the
ground, and the manner in which physical features could
be turned to account, were all matters of the most careful
consideration. He was a constant student of the map, and
his topographical engineer was one of the most important
officers on his staff, 'It could readUy be seen,' writes
Major Hotchkiss, 'that in the preparations he made for
securing success he had fuUy in mind what Napoleon had
done under similar circumstances; resembling Napoleon
especially in this, that he was very particular ia securing
maps, and in acquiring topographical information. He
furnished me with every facility that I desired for securing
topographical information and for making maps, allowing
me a complete transportation outfit for my exclusive use
and sending men into the enemy's country to procure
copies of local maps when I expressed a desire to have
them. I do not think he had an accurate knowledge of the
Valley previous to the war. When I first reported to him
for duty, at the beginning of March 1862, he told me
that he wanted " a complete map of the entire Shenandoah
Valley from Harper's Ferry to Lexington, one showing
every point of offence and defence," and to that task I
immediately addressed myself. As a rule he did not refer
to maps in the field, making his study of them in advance.
He undoubtedly had the power of retaining the topo-
' Dabney, vol. i., p. 76.

TOPOGRAPHY 417
graphy of the country in his imagination. He had spent
his youth among the mountains, where there were but few
waggon roads but many bridle and foot paths. His early
occupation made it necessary for him to become familiar
with such intricate ways; and I think this had a very
important bearing on his ability to promptly recognise the
topographical features of the country, and to recall them
whenever it became necessary to make use of them. He
was quick in comprehending topographical features. I
made it a point, nevertheless, to be always ready to give
him a graphic representation of any particular point of the
region where operations were going on, making a rapid
sketch of the topography in his presence, and using
different coloured pencils for greater clearness in the
definition of surface features. The carefully prepared
map generaUy had too many points of detail, and did not
sufficiently emphasise features apparently insignificant,
but from a military standpoint most important. I may
add that Jackson not only studied the general maps of the
country, but made a particular study of those of any
district where he expected to march or fight, constantly
using sketch maps made upon the ground to inform him
as to portions of the field of operations that did not
immediately come under his own observation. I often
made rough sketches for bim when on the march, or
during engagements, in answer to his requests for in
formation.' '
It is little wonder that it should have been said by his
soldiers that ' he knew every hole and corner of the Valley
as if he had made it himself.'
But to give attention to topography was not aU that
Jackson had learned from Napoleon. *As a strategist,'
says Dabney, 'the first Napoleon was undoubtedly his
model. He had studied his campaigns dUigently, and he
was accustomed to remark with enthusiasm upon the
evidences of his genius, " Napoleon," he said, " was the
first to show what an army could be made to accomplish.
He had shown what was the value of time as an element
¦ Letter to the author.

418 STONEWALL JACKSON
of strategic combination, and that good troops, if well
cared for, could be made to march twenty-five miles daily,
and win battles besides." ' And he had learned more than
this. • We must make this campaign,' he said at the
beginning of 1863, ' an exceedingly active one. Only thus
can a weaker country cope with a stronger ; it must make
up in activity what it lacks in strength, A defensive cam
paign can only be made successful by taking the aggressive
at the proper time. Napoleon never waited for his adversary
to become fuUy prepared, but struck him the first blow,'
It would perhaps be difficult, in the writings of Napoleon,
to find a passage which embodies his conception of war in
terms as definite as these ; but no words could convey it
more clearly. It is sometimes forgotten that Napoleon
was often outnumbered at the outset of a campaign. It
was not only in the campaigns of Italy, of Leipsic, of 1814,
and of Waterloo, that the hostUe armies were larger than
his own. In those of Ulm, AusterUtz, Eckmuhl, and
Dresden, he was numerically inferior on the whole theatre
of war; but whUe the French troops were concentrated
under a single chief, the armies of the AUies were scattered
over a wide area, and unable to support each other. Before
they could come together. Napoleon, moving with the
utmost rapidity, struck the first blow, and they were
defeated in succession. The first principle of war is to
concentrate superior force at the decisive point, that is,
upon the field of battle. But it is exceedingly seldom that
by standing still, and leaving the initiative to the enemy,
that this principle can be observed, for a numerically
inferior force, if it once permits its enemy to concentrate,
can hardly hope for success. True generalship is, therefore,
' to make up in activity for lack of strength ; ' to strike the
enemy in detaU, and overthrow his columns in succession.
And the highest art of all is to compel him to disperse his
army, and then to concentrate superior force against each
fraction in turn.
It is such strategy as this that 'gains the ends of
States and makes men heroes,' Napoleon did not discover
it. Every single general who deserves to be entitled great

OFFENSIVE STRATEGY 419
has used it.« Frederick, threatened by Austria, France,
Eussia, Saxony, and Sweden, used it in self-defence, and
from the Seven Years' War the little kingdom of Prussia
emerged as a first-class Power, It was such strategy
which won back the Peninsula; not the lines of Torres
Vedras, but the bold march northwards to Vittoria,' It
was on the same lines that Lee and Jackson acted.
Lee, in compelling the Federals to keep their columns
separated, manoeuvred with a skill which has seldom
been surpassed ; Jackson, falling as it were from the skies
into the midst of his astonished foes, struck right and
left before they could combine, and defeated in detaU every
detachment which crossed his path.
It is when regarded in connection with the opera
tions of the main armies that the Valley campaign
stands out in its true colours ; but, at the same time, even
as an isolated incident, it is in the highest degree interest
ing. It has been compared, and not inaptly, with the
Italian campaign of 1796, And it may even be questioned
Vifhether, in some respects, it was not more brUUant, Tbe
odds against the Confederates were far greater than
against the French, Jackson had to deal with a homo
geneous enemy, with generals anxious to render each other
loyal support, and not with the contingents of different
States, His marches were far longer than Napoleon's, Tbe
theatre of war was not less difficult. His troops were
not veterans, but, in great part, the very rawest of recruits.
The enemy's officers and soldiers were not inferior to his
own ; thefr leaders were at least equal in capacity to Colli,
BeauUeu, and Alvinzi, and the statesmen who directed them
were not more purblind than the Aulic Council, Moreover,
Jackson was merely the commander of a detached force,
which might at any moment be required at Eichmond.
The risks which Napoleon freely accepted he could not afford.
He dared not dehver battle unless he were certain of success,
' 'In six weeks, Wellington marched with 100,000 men six hundred
mUes, passed six great rivers, gained one decisive battle, invested two
fortresses, and drove 120,000 veteran troops from Spain.' — The War in, the
Pemmula, Napier, vol. v,, p. 132.

420 STONEWALL JACKSON
and his one preoccupation was to lose as few men as possible.
But be this as it may, in the secrecy of the Confederate
movements, the rapidity of the marches, and the skUful
use of topographical features, the Valley campaign bears
strong traces of the Napoleonic methods. Seldom has the
value of these methods been more forcibly iUustrated, Three
times was McDoweU to have marched to join McCleUan :
first, at the beginning of AprU, when he was held back by
Kernstown ; second, on May 26, when he was held back by
Front Eoyal and Winchester ; third, on June 25, when he
was held back by Jackson's disappearance after Port
EepubUc, Above all, the campaign reveals a most perfect
appreciation of the surest means of dealing with superior
numbers. ' In my personal intercourse with Jackson,'
writes General Imboden, ' in the early part of the war, he
often said that there were two things never to be lost sight
of by a military commander. " Always mystify, mislead,
and surprise the enemy, if possible ; and when you strike
and overcome him, never give up the pursuit as long as
your men have strength to follow ; for an army routed, if
hotly pursued, becomes panic-stricken, and can then be
destroyed by half their number. The other rule is, never
fight against heavy odds, if by any possible manoeuvring
you can hurl your own force on only a part, and that the
weakest part, of your enemy and crush it. Such tactics
will win every time, and a small army may thus destroy a
large one in detaU, and repeated victory will make it
invincible." ' And again : " To move swiftly, strike
vigorously, and secure all the fruits of victory, is the secret
of successful war." '
These maxims were the outcome of his studies, ' drawn
absolutely and merely,' says Lord Wolseley, 'from his
knowledge of war, as learned from the great leaders of
former days ; ' * and if he made war by rule, as he had
regulated his conduct as a cadet, it can hardly be denied
that his rules were of the soundest. They are a complete
summary of the tactics which wrought such havoc in the
' Battles and Leaders, vol. ii., p. 297.
' North American Review, vol. 149, p. 168.

HIS MILITARY MAXIMS 421
Valley, The order in which they are placed is interest
ing, ' To mystify, mislead, and surprise,' is the first
precept. How thoroughly it was applied ! The measures
by which his adversaries were to be deceived were as
carefuUy thought out as the maps had been closely studied.
The troops moved almost as often by country roads and
farm tracks as by the turnpikes. The longer route, even
when time was of importance, was often preferred, if it was
weU concealed, to the shorter. No precaution, however
trivial, that might prevent information reaching the enemy
was neglected. In order that he might give his final
instructions to Colonel Munford before marching to Eich
mond, he told that officer to meet him at ten o'clock at
night in Moimt Sidney. ' I wUl be on my horse,' he wrote,
• at the north end of the town, so you need not inquire
after me.' ^ ' Le hon general ordinaire ' would have scoffed
at the atmosphere of mystery which enveloped the Con
federate camp. The march from Elk Eun Valley to Port
Eepublic, with its accompaniments of continuous quagmire
and dreary bivouacs, he would have ridiculed as a most use
less stratagem. The infinite pains with which Jackson
sought to conceal, even from his most trusted staff officers,
his movements, his intentions, and his thoughts, a com
mander less thorough would have pronounced useless.
The long night ride to Eichmond, on June 22, with its
untoward delays and provoking contretemps, sounds Uke
an excess of precaution which was absolutely pedantic.''
But war, according to Napoleon, is made up of accidents.
The country was full of spies ; the Southern newspapers
were sometimes indiscreet ; and the simple fact that Jackson
had been seen near Eichmond would have warned McCleUan
that his right wing was in jeopardy. Few men would have
taken such infinite trouble to hide the departure from the
VaUey and the march across Vfrginia to attack McClellan.
But soldiers of experience, alive to the full hearmg of seem-

> 0. E., vol. zii., part iii., p. 914.
' He instructed the orderly that accompanied him, and who know the
roads, to call him ' Colonel.'

422 STONEWALL JACKSON
ingly petty detaUs, appreciate his skiU.' According to the dic
tum of Napoleon, ' there are no suoh things as trifles in war.'
It was not, however, on such expedients that Jackson
principally relied to keep his enemy in the dark. The use
he made of his cavalry is perhaps the most briUiant
tactical feature of the campaign. Ashby's squadrons were
the means whereby the Federals were mystified. Not
only was a screen estabhshed which perfectly concealed
the movements of the VaUey army, but constant demon
strations, at far distant points, alarmed and bewUdered
the Federal commanders. In his employment of cavalry
Jackson was in advance of his age. His patrols were kept
out two or tbree marches to front and flank ; neither by
day nor by night were they permitted to lose touch of the
enemy ; and thus no movement could take place without
their knowledge. Such tactics had not been seen since the
days of Napoleon. The Confederate horsemen in the VaUey
were far better handled than those of France or Austria in
1859, of Prussia or Austria in 1866, of France in 1870, of
England, France, or Eussia in the Crimea.
In the flank march on Sebastopol the hostile armies
passed within a few mUes, in an open country, without
either of them being aware of the proximity of the other,
and the English headquarter staff almost rode into a
Eussian baggage-train. At Solferino and at Sadowa,
armies which were counted by hundreds of thousands
encamped almost within sight of each other's watch-fires,
without the slightest suspicion that the enemy lay over
the next ridge. The practice of Napoleon had been forgotten.
The great cloud of horsemen which, riding sometimes a hun
dred miles to the front, veiled the march of the Grand Army
had vanished from memory. The vast importance ascribed
by the Emperor to procuring early information of his enemy
and hiding his own movements had been overlooked ; and
it was left to an American soldier to revive his methods.
The appUcation of Jackson's second precept, ' to hurl
' ' The manner,' says Lord Wolseley, ' in which he thus mystified his
enemy regarding this most important movement is a masterpiece,' — North
American Re-view, vol. 149, pp. 166, 167,

TACTICAL SUCCESSES 423
yom' own force on the weakest part of the enemy's,' was
made possible by his vigorous application of the first. The
Federals, mystified and misled by demonstrations of the
cavalry, and unable to procure information, never knew at
what point they should concentrate, and support invariably
came too late. Jackson's tactical successes were achieved
over comparatively small forces. Except at Cross Keys, and
there he only intended to check Fremont for the moment,
he never encountered more than 10,000 men on any
single field. No great victory, like Austerlitz or Salamanca,
was won over equal numbers. No Chancellorsville, where
a huge army was overthrown by one scarce half the size, is
reckoned amongst the triumphs of the Valley campaign.
But it is to be remembered that Jackson was always out
numbered, and outnumbered heavily, on the theatre of war ;
and if he defeated his enemies in detaU, their overthrow
was not less decisive than if it had been brought about at one
time and at one place. The fact that they were unable
to combine their superior numbers before the blow fell is
in itself the strongest testimony to his ability. ' How
often,' says Napier, 'have we not heard the genius of
Buonaparte slighted, and his victories talked of as destitute
of merit, because, at the point of attack, he was superior
in numbers to his enemies ! This very fact, which bas been
so often converted into a sort of reproach, constitutes his
greatest and truest praise. He so directed his attack as
at once to divide his enemy, and to faU with the mass of
his own forces upon a point where thefr division, or tbe
distribution of their army, left them unable to resist him.
It is not in man to defeat armies by the breath of his mouth ;
nor was Buonaparte commissioned, like Gideon, to con
found and destroy a host with three hundred men. He knew
that everything depended ultimately upon physical supe
riority ; and his genius was shown in this, that, though out
numbered on the whole, he was always superior to his
enemies at the decisive point.' '
' The foUowing table, of which the idea is borrowed from The Principles
of Strategy, by Capt. Bigelow, U.S.A., may be found interesting. Under
the heading < Strategic ' appear the numbers available on the theatre
VOL. I. o a

424

STONEWALL JACKSON

The material results of the VaUey campaign were by
no means inconsiderable. 3,500 prisoners were either
paroled or sent to Eichmond. 3,500 Federals were killed
or wounded. An immense quantity of stores was cap
tured, and probably as much destroyed. 9 guns were
taken and over 10,000 rifles, whUe the loss of the Con
federates was no more than 2,500 kiUed and wounded, 600
prisoners, and 3 guns. It may be added that the constant
surprises, together with the successive conflict with superior
numbers, had the worst effect on the moral of the Federal
soldiers. The troops commanded by Fremont, Shields,
Banks, Saxton, and Geary were all infected. Officers
resigned and men deserted. On the least alarm there was
a decided tendency to ' stampede.' The generals thought
only of retreat. Fremont, after Cross Keys, did not think
that his men would stand, and many of his men declared
that it was ' only murder ' to fight without reinforce
ments.' When to those results is added the strategical effect of
the campaign, it can hardly be denied that the success he
achieved was out of all proportion to Jackson's strength.
Few generals have done so much with means so smaU.
Not only were the Valley troops comparatively few in
of operations ; under the heading ¦ Tactical ' the numbers present on the
field of battle. See also note at the end of the volume.

STBAl'EOIO.M'DoweU.

Federal Confederate .

. 30,000
. 17,000

Winchester

Federal Confederate . ,

. 60,000
. 16,000

Federal Confederate .

Croat Keys.
. 23,000
. 13,000

Port Republic.
Federal . . . 22,000
Confederate . . . 12,700
' 0. B., vol. xii., part iii., p. 402.

2,S006,000

7,600
16,000

12,750 8,000

4,500 6,000

THE MARCHES 426
numbers, but they were volunteers, and volunteers of a
type that was altogether novel. Even in the War of the
Eevolution many of the regimental officers, and indeed
many of the soldiers, were men who had served in the Indian
and French wars under the English flag. But there were
not more than half a dozen regular officers in the whole
Army of the VaUey, Except Jackson himself, and his chief
of artillery, not one of the staff had more than a year's
service. Twelve months previous several of the brigadiers
had been civUians, The regimental officers were as green
as the men ; and although mUitary offences were few, the
bonds of discipline were slight. When the march to
M'DoweU was begun, which was to end five weeks later at
Port Eepublic, a considerable number of the so-called ' effec
tives ' had only been driUed for a few hours. The cavalry
on parade was little better than a mob ; on the line of march
they kept or left the ranks as the humour took them. It
is true that the Federals were hardly more efficient. But
Jackson's operations were essentiaUy offensive, and offensive
operations, as was shown at Bull Eun, are ill-suited to raw
troops. Attack cannot be carried to a triumphant issue
unless every fraction of the force co-operates with those on
either hand ; and co-operation is hardly to be expected from
inexperienced officers. Moreover, offensive operations,
especiaUy when a small force is manoeuvring against the
fraction of a larger, depend for success on order, rapidity,
and endurance ; and it is fri these qualities, as a rule, that
raw troops are particularly deficient. Yet Jackson, like
Napoleon at Ulm, might have boasted with truth that he
had ' destroyed the enemy merely by marches,' and his men
accomplished feats of which the hardiest veterans might
well be proud.
From April 29 to June 5, that is, in thirty-eight days,
they marched four hundred mUes, fought three battles and
numerous combats, and were victorious in all. Several
of the marches exceeded twenty-five miles a day ; and in
retreat, from the Potomac to Port Eepublic, the army
made one hundred and four miles between the morning of
May 30 and the night of June 5, that is, fifteen mUes daily
Ge2

426 STONEWALL JACKSON
without a rest day intervening. This record, if we take
into consideration the infamous roads, is remarkable ; and
it well may be asked by what means these half-trained
troops were enabled to accomplish such a feat ? '
Jackson's rules for marching have been preserved.
' He never broke down his men by long-continued move
ment. He rested the whole column very often, but only
for a few minutes at a time. He Uked to see the men lie
flat on the ground to rest, and would say, " A man rests all
over when he lies down." ' ^ Nor did he often call upon his
troops for extraordinary exertions. In the period between
his departure from Elk Eun Mountain to the battle of Port
Eepublic there were only four series of forced marches.*
' The hardships of forced marches,' he said, ' are often
more painful than the dangers of battle.' It was only,
in short, when he intended a surprise, or when a rapid
retreat was imperative, that he sacrificed everything to
speed. The troops marched light, carrying only rifles,
blankets, haversacks, and ammunition. When long dis
tances were to be covered, those men who still retained
their knapsacks were ordered to leave them behind. No
heavy trains accompanied the army. The ambulances and
ammunition waggons were always present ; but the supply
waggons were often far in rear. In their haversacks the
men carried several days' rations ; and when these were
consumed they lived either on the farmers, or on the stores
they had captured from the enemy.
It is not to be supposed, however, that the ranks
I ' Campaigning in France,' says General Sheridan, who was with the
Prussian Headquarter Staff in 1870, ' that is, the marching, camping, and
subsisting of an army, is an easy matter, very unlike anything we had in the
War of the BebeUion. To repeat: the country is rich, beautiful, and
densely populated, subsistence abundant, aud the roads all macadamised
highways ;. thus the conditions are altogether different from those existing
with us. ... I can but leave to conjecture how the Germans would have
got along on bottomless roads — often none at aU — through the swamps and
quicksands of Northern Virginia.' — Me-mfOirs, vol. ii., p. 450.
" Battles aiid Leaders, vol. ii., pp. 297, 298.
' From April 17 to April 19, when he moved to Elk Eun Valley ; May
6 to May 8, when he moved against Milroy ; May 18 to May 25, when he
moved against Banks ; and May 29 to June 1 , when he passed south between
Fremont and Shields.

STRAGGLING 427
remained full. * I had rather,' said Jackson, ' lose one
man in marching than five in fighting,' and to this rule he
rigorously adhered. He never gave the enemy warning
by a deliberate approach along the main roads ; and if there
was a chance of effecting a surprise, or if the enemy was
already flying, it mattered little how many men fell out. And
fall out they did, in large numbers. Between May 17 and
the battle of Cross Keys the army was reduced from
16,500 men to 13,000. Not more than 500 had been kiUed
or wounded, so there were no less than 3,000 absentees.
Many were footsore and found no place in the ambulances.
Many were sick ; others on detachment ; but a large propor
tion had absented themselves without asking leave. Two
days after Winchester, in a letter to EweU, Jackson writes
that ' the evil of straggling bas become enormous.'
Such severe exertion as tbe march against Kenly, the
pursuit of Banks, and the retreat from the Potomac,
would have told their tale upon the hardiest veterans.
When the German armies, suddenly changing direction
from west to north, pushed on to Sedan by forced
marches, large numbers of the infantry succumbed to pure
exhaustion. When the Light Division, in 1813, pressing
forward after Sauroren to intercept the French retreat,
marched nineteen consecutive hours in very sultry weather,
and over forty miles of mountain roads, ' many men fell
and died convulsed and frothing at the mouth, while
others, whose spirit and strength had never before been
quelled, leant on thefr muskets and muttered in sullen
tones that they yielded for the first time.' '
But the men that fell out on the march to Sedan and
in the passes of the Pyrenees were physically incapable of
further effort. They were not stragglers in the true sense
of the term ; and in an army broken to discipline straggling
on the Une of march is practically unknown. The sickly
and feeble may fall away, but every sound man may confi
dently be relied upon to keep his place. The secret of full
ranks is good officers and strict discipline ; and the most
marked difference between regular troops and those hastily
' The War in the Peninsula, Napier, vol. v., p. 244.

428 STONEWALL JACKSON
organised is this — with the former the waste of men wiU
be small, with the latter very great. In all armies, however
constituted, there is a large proportion of men whose hearts
are not in the business.'
When hard marching and heavy fighting are in
prospect the inclination of such men is to make themselves
scarce, and when discipline is relaxed they wUl soon find the
opportunity. But when thefr instincts of obedience are
strong, when the only home they know is with the colours,
when the credit of their regiment is at stake — and even the
most worthless have some feeling for thefr own corps —
engrained habit and famiUar associations overcome thefr
natural weakness. The troop-horse bereft of his rider at
once seeks his comrades, and pushes his way, with empty
saddle, into his place in the ranks. And so the soldier
by profession, faint-hearted as he may be, marches
shoulder to shoulder with his comrades, and acqufres a
fictitious, but not unuseful, courage from his contact with
braver men.
It is true that the want of good boots told heavUy on
the Confederates, A pair already half-worn, such as many
of the men started with, was hardly calculated to last out
a march of several hundred miles over rocky tracks, and
fresh supplies were seldom forthcoming. There was a
dearth both of shoe-leather and shoe-factories in the South ;
and if Mr. Davis, before the blockade was established, had
indented on the shoemakers of Europe, he would have added
very largely to the efficiency of his armies. A few cargoes
of good boots would have been more useful than a shipload
of rifled guns.
Nevertheless, the absentees from the ranks were not all
footsore. The vice of straggling was by no means confined
to Jackson's command. It was the curse of both armies.
Federal and Confederate. Tbe Official Eecords, as well as
the memofrs of participants, teem with references to it.
It was an evil which the severest punishments seemed
incapable of checking. It was in vain that it was de-
> General Sheridan is said to have declared that 25 per cent, of the
Federal soldiers lacked the military spirit.

STRAGGLING 429
nounced in orders, that the men were appealed to, warned,
and threatened. Nor were the faint-hearted alone at
fault. The day after Jackson's victory at M'Dowell,
Johnston, faUing back before McClellan, addressed General
Lee as foUows : —
' Stragglers cover the country, and Eichmond is no
doubt filled with the absent without leave. . . . The men
are full of spirit when near the enemy, but at other times
to avoid restraint leave thefr regiments in crowds.' ' A
letter from a divisional general followed : —
' It is with deep mortification that I report that several
thousand soldiers and many individuals with commissions
have fled to Eichmond under pretext of sickness. They
have even thrown away their arms that tbeir flight might
not be impeded. Cannot these miserable wretches be
arrested and returned to tbeir regiments, where they can
have their heads shaved and be drummed out of the
service ? ' "^
Jackson, then, had to contend with difficulties which a
general in command of regular troops would not have been
called on to provide against ; and in other respects also he
suffered from the constitution of his army. The one thing
lacking in the Valley campaign was a decisive victory over
a considerable detachment of the Federal army, the annihila
tion of one of the converging forces, and large capture of
guns and prisoners. A victory as complete as Eivoli would
have completed its dramatic interest. But for this Jackson
himself was hardly to blame. The misconduct of the Con
federate cavafry on May 24 and 25 permitted Banks to escape
destruction ; and the delay at the temporary bridge near
Port Eepuhlic, due, mainly, to the disinclination of the
troops to face the ford, and the want of resolute obedience
on the part of their commanders, saved Fremont from
the same fate. Had Shields' advanced brigades been driven
back, as Jackson designed, while the day was still young,
the operations of the Valley army would in all probabiUty
have been crowned by a briUiant triumph over nearly
¦ 0. B., vol. xi., part iii., p. 503. » Ibid. p. 506.

430 STONEWALL JACKSON
equal forces. Fremont, already fearful and irresolute, was
hardly the man to withstand the vigour of Jackson's onset ;
and that onset would assuredly have been made if more
careful arrangements had been made to secure the bridge.
This was not the only mistake committed by the staff. The
needlessly long march of the main body when approaching
Front Eoyal on May 23 might well have been obviated.
But for this delay the troops might have pushed on before
nightfaU to within easy reach of the VaUey turnpike, and
Banks have been cut off from Winchester.
It is hardly necessary to say that, even with regular
troops, the same mistakes might have occurred. They are
by no means without parallel, and even those committed
by the Federals have their exact counterpart in European
warfare. At the beginning of August, 1870, the French
army, Uke Banks' division on May 23, 1862, was in two
portions, divided by a range of mountains. The staff was
aware that the Germans were in superior strength, but thefr
dispositions were unknown. Like Banks, they neglected
to reconnoitre ; and when a weak detachment beyond the
mountains was suddenly overwhelmed, they still refused to
believe that attack was imminent. The crushing defeats of
Worth and Spicheren were the result.
The staff of a regular army is not always infallible.
It would be hard to match the extraordinary series of
blunders made by the staffs of the three armies— English,
French, and Prussian — in the campaign of Waterloo, and
yet there was probably no senior officer present in Belgium
who had not seen several campaigns. But the art of war
has made vast strides since Waterloo, and even since 1870,
Under Moltke's system, which has been applied in a
greater or less degree to nearly aU professional armies, the
chance of mistakes has been much reduced. The staff is
no longer casually educated and selected haphazard ; the
peace training of both officers and men is far more thorough ;
and those essential details on which the most brUliant con
ceptions, tactical and strategical, depend for success stand
much less chance of being overlooked than in 1815. It is
by the standard of a modern army, and not of those

TACTICAL SKILL 431
whose only school in peace was the parade-ground, that
the American armies must be judged.
That Jackson's tactical skill, and his quick eye for
ground, had much to do with his victories can hardly be
questioned. At Kernstown and Port Eepublic he seized
the key of the position without a moment's hesitation.
At Winchester, when EweU was checked upon the right,
three strong brigades, suddenly thrown forward on tbe
opposite flank, completely rolled up the Federal line. At
Cross Keys- the position selected for EweU proved too
formidable for Fr6mont, despite his superiority in guns.
At Port Eepublic, Taylor's unexpected approach through
the tangled forest was at once decisive of the engagement.
The cavalry charge at Front Eoyal was admirably timed ;
and the manner in which Ashby was employed throughout
the campaign, not only to screen the advance but to check
pursuit, was a proof of the highest tactical ability. Nor
should the quick insight into the direction of Shields' march
on June 1, and the destruction of the bridges by which he
could communicate with Fremont, be omitted. It is true that
the operations in the Valley were not absolutely faultless.
When Jackson was bent on an effective blow his impatience
to bring the enemy to bay robbed him more than once of
complete success. On the march to M'DoweU Johnson's
brigade, the advanced guard, had been permitted to precede
the main body by seven miles, and, consequently, when
Milroy attacked there was not sufficient force at hand for a
decisive counterstroke. Moreover, with an Ul-trained staff
a careful supervision was most essential, and the waggon-
bridge at Port Eepublic should have been inspected by a
trustworthy staff officer before Winder rushed across to
faU on Tyler,
Errors of this nature, however instructive they may be
to the student of war, are but spots upon the sun ; and
in finding in his subordinate such breadth of view and such
vigour of execution, Lee was fortunate indeed, Jackson
was no less fortunate when Ashby came under his com
mand. That dashing captain of free-lances was undoubtedly
a most valuable colleague. It was something to have a

432 STONEWALL JACKSON
cavalry leader who could not only fight and reconnoitre,
but who had sagacity enough to divine the enemy's
intentions. But the ideas that governed the employ
ment of the cavalry were Jackson's alone. He it was
who placed the squadrons across Fremont's road from
Wardensville, who ordered the demonstrations against
Banks, before both M'DoweU and Front Eoyal, and those
wbich caused Pr6mont to retreat after Port Eepublic,
More admirable stiU was the quickness with which he
recognised the use that might be made of mounted rifle
men. From the Potomac to Port EepubUc his horsemen
covered his retreat, dismounting behind every stream and
along the borders of every wood, checking the pursuers
with their fire, compelling them to deploy their infantry,
and then retreating rapidly to the next position. Day
after day were the Federal advanced guards held in check,
their columns delayed, and the generals irritated by their
sUppery foe. Meanwhile, the Confederate infantry, falling
back at thefr leisure, were relieved of all annoyance. And
if the cavalry was suddenly driven in, support was in
variably at hand, and a compact brigade of infantry,
supported by artiUery, sent the pursuing horsemen to the
right-about. The retreat of the Valley army was managed
with the same skUl as its advance, and the rear-guard
tactics of the campaign are no less remarkable than those
of the attack.
To judge from the Valley campaign, Jackson handled
his horsemen with more skill than any other commander.
Confederate or Federal. A cavalry that could defend
itself on foot as well as charge in the saddle was practically
a new arm, of far greater efficiency than cavalry of the old
type, and Jackson at once recognised, not only its value ;
but tbe manner in which it could be most effectively em
ployed. He was not led away by the specious advantages,
so eagerly urged by young and ambitious soldiers, of the
so-called raids. Even Lee himself, cool-headed as he was,
appears to have been fascinated by the idea of throwing a
great body of horsemen across his enemy's communications,
spreading terror amongst his supply trains, cutting his

THE RULES OF WAR 433
telegraphs, and destroying his magazines. In hardly a
single instance did such expeditions inflict more than
temporary discomfort on the enemy ; and the armies were
led more than once into false manoeuvres, for want of the
information which only the cavalry could supply, Lee at
Malvern HiU and Gettysburg, Hooker at Chancellorsville,
Grant at Spotsylvania, owed defeat, in great measure, to
the absence of thefr mounted troops. In tbe Valley, on
the contrary, success was made possible because the cavalry
was kept to its legitimate duty — that is, to procure infor
mation, to screen all movements, to take part in battle at
the decisive moment, and to carry out the pursuit.
With aU his regard for Napoleon's maxims, Jackson
was no slave to rule. In war, circumstances vary to such
an extent that a manoeuvre, which at one time is
manifestly unsound, may at another be the most judicious.
The so-called rules are never binding ; tbey merely point
out thelrisks which are generally entailed by some particular
course of action. There is no principle on which Napoleon
lays more stress than that a general should never divide
his force, either on the field of battle or the theatre of war.
But when he marched to M'DoweU and left EweU at Swift
Eun Gap, Jackson deUberately divided bis forces and left
Banks between them, knownig that the apparent risk, with
an opponent like Banks, was no risk at all. At the battle
of Winchester, too, there was a gap of a mUe between
the brigades on the left of the Kernstown road and EweU
on the right ; and owing to tbe intervening hills, one
wing was invisible to the other. Here again, Uke
Moltke at Koniggratz, Jackson reaUsed that the principle
might be disregarded not only with impunity but with
effect. He was not like Lord Galway, ' a man who was in
war what MoU^re's doctors were in medicine, who thought
it much more honourable to fail according to rule than to
succeed by innovation.' '
But the triumphs of the VaUey campaign were not due
alone to the orders issued by Lee and Jackson. The Con-
federate troops displayed extraordinary endurance. When
' Macaulay.

434 STONEWALL JACKSON
the stragglers were eliminated thefr stauncher comrades
proved themselves true as steel. In every engagement the
regiments fought with stubborn courage. They some
times failed to break the enemy's line at the first rush ;
but, except at Kernstown, the Federals never drove them
from their position, and Taylor's advance at Winchester,
Trimble's counterstroke at Cross Keys, the storming of the
battery at Port Eepublic, and the charge of the cavalry at
CedarviUe, were the deeds of brave and resolute men.
A retreat is the most exhausting of miUtary movements.
It is costly in men, ' more so,' says Napoleon, ' than two
battles,' and it shakes the faith of the soldiers in their
general and in themselves, Jackson's army retreated for
seven days before Fr6mont, dwindling in numbers at every
step, and yet it never fought better than when it turned at
bay. From first to last it believed itself superior to its
enemies ; from first to last it was equal to the tasks which
its exacting commander imposed upon it, and its spirit was
indomitable throughout. ' One male a week and three
foights a day,' according to one of Jackson's Irishmen, was
the rule in the campaigns of 1862. The forced marches
were not made in luxury. Not seldom only half-
rations were issued, and more often none at all. The
weather, for many days in succession, was abominable, and
the forest bivouacs were comfortless in the extreme. On
May 25 twenty per cent, of Trimble's brigade went into
action barefoot ; and had it not been for the stores captured
in Winchester, the march to the Potomac, and the sub
sequent unmolested retreat to Woodstock, would have been
hardly possible.
If the troops were volunteers, weak in discipline and
prone to straggling, they none the less bore themselves
with conspicuous gallantry. Thefr native characteristics
came prominently to the front. Patient under hardships,
vigorous in attack, and stubborn in defence, they showed
themselves worthy of thefr commander. Their enthusiastic
patriotism was not without effect on their bearing before
the enemy. Every private in the ranks beUeved that he
was fighting in tbe sacred cause of Uberty, and the spirit

THE VALLEY SOLDIERS 435
which nerved the resolution of the Confederate soldier
was the same which inspfred the resistance of their
revolutionary forefathers. His hatred of the Yankee, aa
he contemptuously styled the Northerner, was even more
bitter than the wrath which Washington's soldiers felt
towards England ; and it was intensified by the fact that
his detested foeman had not only dared to invade the
South, but had proclaimed his intention, in no uncertain
tones, of dealing with the Sovereign States exactly as he
pleased. But it was something more than native courage and
enthusiastic patriotism which inspired the barefooted
heroes of Wiachester, It would be difficult to prove that
in other parts of the theatre of war the Confederate troops
were inferior to those that held the VaUey, Yet they were
certainly less successful, and in very many instances they
had failed to put forth the same resolute energy as the men
who foUowed Jackson.
But it is hardly possible to discuss the spirit of an army
apart from that of its commander. If, in strategy whoUy,
and in tactics in great part, success emanates from a single
brain, the moral of the troops is not less dependent on
the influence of one man. ' Better an army of stags,' runs
the old proverb, ' led by a lion, than an army of lions led
by a stag.'
Thefr leader's character had already made a sensible
impression on the VaUey soldiers. Jackson was as un-
theatrical as WeUington. He was hardly to be distinguished,
even by his dress, from the private in the ranks. Soon after
his arrival at Eichmond he caUed on Mrs. Pendleton, the
wife of the reverend captain of the Eockbridge battery. The
negro servant left him standing in tbe hall, thinking that
this quiet soldier, clad in a faded and sunburnt uniform,
need not be treated with fm'ther ceremony.' Headquarters
in camp were an ordinary bell-tent, or a room in the nearest
cottage, and they were often without guard or sentry. In
bivouac the general rolled himself in his blankets, and lay
down under a tree or in a fence corner. He could sleep
' Memoirs of W. N. Pendleton, D.D., Brigadier-Oeneral, C.S.A., p. 201.

486 STONEWALL JACKSON
anywhere, in the saddle, under fire, or in church ; and he
could compel sleep to come to him when and where he
pleased. He cared as little for good quarters as a mountain
hunter, and he was as abstemious as a Eed Indian on
the war-path. He hved as plainly as the men, and often
shared their rations. The majority of the cavalry were
better mounted, and many of his officers were better
dressed. He was not given to addressing his troops, either
in mass or as individuals. His praises he reserved for his
official reports, and then he was generous. In camp he was
as sUent as the Sphinx, and he never posed, except in
action, as the commander of an army. Off duty he was
the gentlest and most unpretentious of men, and the most
approachable of generals. He was always scrupulously
polite ; and the private soldier who asked him a question
might be sure of a most courteous reply. But there was no
man with whom it was less safe to take Uberties ; and where
duty was concerned he became a different being. The gentle
tones grew curt and peremptory, and the absent demeanour
gave place to a most purposeful energy. His vigilance was
marvellous : his eye was everywhere ; he let nothing pass
without his personal scrutiny. The unfortunate officer
accused of indolence or neglect found the shy and quiet
professor transformed into the most implacable of masters.
No matter how high the rank of the offender, the crime met
with the punishment it deserved. The scouts compared him
with Lee. The latter was so genial that it was a pleasure
to report to him. Jackson cross-questioned them on every
detail, treating them as a lawyer does a hostUe witness,
and his keen blue eyes seemed to search their very souls.
Nor did the men escape when they misbehaved.
Ashby's cavafry were reprimanded in general orders for
thefr indiscipline at Middletown, and again at Port
Eepublic ; and if either officer or regiment displeased the
general, it was duly mentioned in his published reports.'
> It is worth remark that Jackson's methods of punishment showed his
deep knowledge of his soldiers. The sentence on the men who were tempted
from their duty, during Banks' retreat, by the plunder on the Winchester road
was that they should not be allowed to serve with the advanced guard until

HIS INFLUENOE ON HIS MEN 437
But the troops knew that thefr grave leader, so uncom
municative in camp, and so unrelenting to misconduct, was
constantly occupied with their well-being. They knew that
he spared them, when opportunity offered, as he never
spared himself. His camaraderie was expressed in some
thing more than words. The hospitals constructed in the
VaUey excited the admiration even of the Federals, and
Jackson's wounded were his first care. Whatever it might
cost the army, the ambulances must be got safely away,
and the sick and disabled soldiers transferred to their own
people. But, at the same time, the troops had long since
learned that, as administered by Jackson, the military code
was a stern reality. They had seen men shot for striking
thefr officers, and they knew that for insubordination or
disobedience it was idle to plead excuse. They had thought
thefr general harsh, and even cruel ; but as their experience
increased they recognised the wisdom of his severity, and
when they looked upon that kindly face, grave and deter
mined as it was, they reaUsed how closely his firmness
was aUied to tenderness. They had learned how highly he
esteemed them. Once, in his twelve months of command,
he had spoken from his heart. When, on the heights near
CentreviUe, he bade fareweU to his old brigade, his pride
in thefr achievements had broken through tbe barriers of
his reserve, and his ringing words had not yet been for
gotten. If he was swift to blame, his general orders and
official dispatches gave full credit to every gallant action,
and each man felt himself a hero because bis general so
regarded him.
They had learned, too, that Jackson's commendation
was worth having. They had seen him in action, the
coolest of them all, riding along the line of battle witb as
much composure as if the hail of buUets was no more than
summer rain. They had seen him far in advance of the
charging lines, cheering them to the pursuit; and they
knew the tremendous vigour of his flank attacks.
But it was not only confidence in the skill of their
further orders. It was considered terribly severe. 0. B., vol. xii., part iii.
p 902.

438 STONEWALL JACKSON
commander that inspired the troops. It was impossible
not to admire the man who, after a sleepless night, a long
march, and hard fighting, would say to his officers, ' We
must push on — we must push on ! ' as unconcernedly as if
his muscles were of steel and hunger an unknown sensation.
Such fortitude was contagious. The men caught something
of his resolution, of his untiring energy, and his unhesi
tating audacity. The regiments which drove Banks to the
Potomac were very different from those that crawled to
Eomney through the blinding sleet, or that fell back with
the loss of one-sixth their number from the Kernstown
Eidge, It has been related of Jackson that when he had
once made up his mind, ' he seemed to discard all idea of
defeat, and to regard the issue as assured, A man less
open to the conviction that he was beaten could not be
imagined.' To this frame of mind he brought his soldiers,
Jackson's brigade at Bull Eun, Jackson's division in the
Valley, Jackson's army corps later in the war, were all
imbued with the characteristics of their leader. The
exertions that he demanded of them seemed beyond the
powers of mortal men, but with Jackson leading them the
troops felt themselves able to accomphsh impossibilities.
' I never saw one of Jackson's couriers approach,' said
EweU, 'without expecting an order to assault the North
Pole ! ' But had the order been given neither EweU nor
the Valley troops would have questioned it.
With the senior officers of his little army Jackson's
relations were in some instances less cordial than with
the men. His staff was devoted to him, for they had
learned to know him. At the beginning of the Valley
campaign some of them thought him mad ; before it was
over they believed him to be a genius. He hved with his
mUitary family on the most intimate terms, and his
unfaUing courtesy, his utter absence of self-assertion, his
sweet temper, and his tactful consideration for others,
no matter how humble their rank, were frresistible. On
duty, indeed, his staff officers fared badly. Tireless him
self, regardless of all personal comforts, he seemed to
think that others were fashioned in the same mould. After

RELATIONS WITH HIS OFFICERS 489
a weary day's marching or fighting, it was no unusual
thing for him to send them for a ride of thirty or forty
mUes through the night. And he gave the order with no
more thought than if he were sending them with a message
to the next tent. But off duty he was simply a personal
friend, bent on making all things pleasant, ' Never,' says
Dr. Hunter McGufre, ' can I forget his kindness and gentle
ness to me when I was in great sorrow and trouble. He
came to my tent and spent hours with me, comforting me
in his simple, kindly, Christian way, showing a depth of
friendship and affection which can never be forgotten.
There is no measuring the intensity with which the very
soul of Jackson burned in battle. Out of it he was very
gentle. Indeed, as I look back on the two years that I was
daUy, indeed hourly, with him, his gentleness as a man,
his tenderness to those in trouble or affiiction — the tender
ness indeed of a woman — impress me more than his
wonderful prowess as a warrior.'
It was with his generals and colonels that there was
sometimes a lack of sympathy. Many of these were older
than himself, EweU and Whiting were his seniors in
point of service, and there can be little doubt that it was
sometimes a little hard to receive peremptory orders from
a younger man. Jackson's secrecy was often irritating.
Men who were over-sensitive thought it implied a want
of confidence. Those overburdened with dignity objected
to being treated like the private soldiers ; and those over-
conscious of superior wisdom were injured because their
advice was not asked. Before the march to Eichmond there
was much discontent. General Whiting, on reaching
Staunton with his division, rode at once to Port Eepublic
to report, ' The distance,' says General Imboden, ' was
twenty mUes, and Whiting returned after midnight. He
was in a towering passion, and declared that Jackson had
treated him outrageously. I asked, " How is that possible.
General ? — he is very polite to everyone."
' " Oh, hang him ! he was polite enough. But he
didn't say one word about his plans. I finally asked
him for orders, telling him what troops I had. He
VOL. I. H H

440 STONEWALL JACKSON
simply told me to go back to Staunton, and he would
send me orders to-morrow. I haven't the slightest idea
what they will be. I believe he has no more sense than
my horse." ' '
The orders, when they came, simply dfrected him to
take his troops by raUway to GordonsviUe, through which
they had passed two days before, and gave no reason what
ever for the movement.
General Whiting was not the only Confederate officer
who was mystified. When the troops left the VaUey not
a single soul in the army, save Jackson alone, knew the
object of thefr march. He had even gone out of his way
to blind his most trusted subordinates.
' During the preceding afternoon,' says Major Hotchkiss,
' he sent for me to his tent, and asked me to bring maps of
the country from Port Eepublic to Lexington (at the head
of the Valley), as he wished to examine them. I took the
maps to his tent, and for about half an hour we talked
concerning the roads and streams, and points of offence
and defence of that region, just as though he had in mind
a march in that direction. After this interval had passed
he thanked me and said that that would do. About half
an hour later he sent for me again, and remarked that
there had been some fighting down about Eichmond,
referring, of course, to the battle of Seven Pines, and that
he would like to see the map of tbe field of the operations.
I brought the maps of the district round Eichmond, and
we spent nearly twice as much time over those, talking
about the streams, the roads, the condition of the country,
and so forth. On retiring to my tent I said to myself,
" Old Jack " is going to Eichmond.' *
Even the faithful Dabney was left in the dark tUl the
troops had reached Mecbum's Station. There, calling him
into a room in the hotel, the general locked the door and
explained the object of his march. But it was under seal
of secrecy ; and EweU, the second in command, complained
to the chief of the staff that Jackson had gone off by train,
leaving him without orders, or even a hint of what was in
' Battles and Leaders, p. 297. " Letter to the author.

HIS SECRECY 441
the wind. In fact, a few days after the battle of Port
Eepublic, EweU had sent some of his staff on leave of
absence, teUing them that large reinforcements were
coming up, and that the next move would be ' to beat up
Banks' quarters about Strasburg.'
When Jackson was informed of the irritation of his
generals he merely smiled, and said, " If I can deceive my
own friends I can make certain of deceiving the enemy.'
Nothing shook his faith in Frederick the Great's maxim,
which he was fond of quoting : ' If I thought my coat knew
my plans, I would take it off and burn it.' An anecdote
told by one of his brigadiers Ulustrates his reluctance to
say more than necessary. Previous to the march to
Eichmond this officer met Jackson riding through Staun
ton. ' Colonel,' said the general, ' have you received the
order ? ' ' No, sir.' ' Want you to march.' ' When, sfr ? '
' Now.' ' Which way ? ' ' Get in the cars — go with
Lawton.' ' How must I send my train and the battery ? '
' By the road.' ' Well, General, I hate to ask questions,
but it is impossible to send my waggons off without knowing
which road to send them.' ' Oh ! ' — laughing — ' send them
by the road the others go.'
At last, when they saw how constant fortune was to
thefr reticent leader, his subordinates ceased to complain ;
but unfortunately there was another source of trouble.
Jackson had no regard whatever for persons. Eeversfrig
the usual procedure, he held that the choleric word of the
soldier was rank blasphemy in the captain ; the higher the
rank of the offender the more severe, in his opinion, should
be the punishment. Not only did he hold that he who would
rule others must himself set the example of punctiliousness,
but that to whom much is given, from him much is to be
expected. Honour and promotion fall to the lot of the
officer. His name is associated in dispatches with the
valorous deeds of his command, whUe the private soldier
fights on unnoticed in the crowd. To his colonels, therefore,
Jackson was a strict master, and stricter to his generals.
If he had reason to believe that his subordinates were
indolent or disobedient, he visited their shortcomings with

442 STONEWALL JACKSON
a heavy hand. No excuse availed. Arrest and report
foUowed immediately on detection, and if the cure was
rude, the plague of incompetency was radically dealt with.
Spirited young soldiers, proud of their high rank, and in
no way underrating their own capacity, rebelled against
such discipline ; and the knowledge that they were closely
watched, that their omissions would be visited on their
heads with unfaltering severity, sometimes created a barrier
between them and their commander.
But it was only wilful disobedience or actual insub
ordination that roused Jackson's wrath. ' If he found in
an officer,' says Dabney, 'a hearty and zealous purpose
to do all his duty, he was the most tolerant and gracious
of superiors, overlooking blunders and mistakes with
unbounded patience, and repairing them through his own
exertions, without even a sign of vexation.' The delay at
tbe bridge on the morning of Port Eepublic, so fatal to
his design of crushing Fremont, caused no outburst of
wrath. He received his adjutant-general's report with
equanimity, regarding the accident as due to the will of
Providence, and therefore to be accepted without com
plaint.' Whether the nobler side of Jackson's character had a
share in creating the confidence which his soldiers afready
placed in him must be matter of conjecture. It was well
known in the ranks that he was superior to the frailties of
human nature ; that he was as thorough a Christian as he
was a soldier ; that he feared the world as Uttle as he did the
enemy.^ In aU things he was consistent ; his sincerity was
as clear as the noonday sun, and his faith as firmly rooted
as the Massanuttons. Publicly and privately, in official
dispatches and in ordinary conversation, the success of his
army was ascribed to the Almighty. Every victory, as
' Dabney, Southern Historical Society Papers, vol. xi., p. 152.
' His devout habits were no secret in the camp. Jim, most faithful ol
servants, declared that he could always tell when there was going to be a
battle. ' The general,' he said, ' is a great man for prayin'. He pray night
and mornin' — all times. But when I see him git up several times in the
night, an' go off an' pray, den I know there is goin' to be somethim' to pay,
an' I go right away and pack his haversack I '

THE CHRISTIAN 443
soon as opportunity offered, was followed by the order :
'The chaplains will hold divine service in their respec
tive regiments.' 'The General Commanding,' ran the
order after Winchester, ' would warmly express to the
officers and men under his command his joy in their
achievements, and his thanks for thefr brilliant gallantry
in action, and thefr patient obedience under the hardships
of forced marches, often more painful to the brave soldier
than the danger of battle. The explanation of the severe
exertions to which the commanding general called the
army, which were endured by them with such cheerful
confidence in him, is now given in the victory of yesterday.
He receives this proof of their confidence in the past with
pride and gratitude, and asks only a similar confidence in
the future.
' But his chief duty of to-day and that of the army is
to recognise devoutly the hand of a protecting Providence
in the briUiant successes of the last three days (which
have given us the results of a great victory without great
losses), and to make the oblation of our thanks to God for
His service to us and our country in heartfelt acts of religious
worship. For this purpose the troops will remain in camp
to-day, suspending, as far as possible, all mUitary exercises ;
and the chaplains of regiments will hold divine service in
their several charges at 4 o'clock p.m.' '
Whenever it was possible Sunday was always set apart
for a day of rest ; and the claims of the day were seldom
altogether disregarded,'' On the morning of Cross Keys it
is related that a large portion of Elzey's brigade were at
service, and that the crash of the enemy's artUlery inter
rupted the ' thfrdly ' of the chaplain's sermon.
It has been sometimes asserted that Jackson was of the
same type as the sauits mUitant who foUowed Cromwell,
who, when they were not slaughtering their enemies,
would expound the harsh tenets of thefr unlovely creed to
the grim circle of belted Ironsides. He has been described
> Dabney, vol. ii., pp. 114-5.
» Sometimes,' says Major Hotchkiss, ' Jackson would keep two or three
Sundays running, so as to make up arrears, and balance the account I '

444 STONEWALL JACKSON
as taking the lead at religious meetings, as distributing
tracts from tent to tent, as acting as aide-de-camp to his
chaplains, and as consigning to perdition all those ' whose
doxy was not his doxy.'
Nothing is further from the truth. ' His views of each
denomination,' says his wife, 'had been obtained from
itself, not from its opponents. Hence he could see excel
lences in aU. Even of the Eoman Catholic Church he had
a much more favourable impression than most Protestants,
and he fraternised with aU Evangehcal denominations.
During a visit to New York, one Sabbath morning, we
chanced to find ourselves at the door of an Episcopal
Church at the hour of worship. He proposed that we
should enter ; and as it was a day for the celebration of
the Communion, he remained for that service, and it was
with the utmost reverence and solemnity that he walked up
the chancel and knelt to receive the elements.'
Jackson, then, was by no means imbued with the belief
that the Presbyterian was the one true Church, and that all
others were in error. Nor did he attempt, in the very
slightest degree, to usurp the functions of his chaplains; :j
Although he invariably went to sleep during their sermons,
he was deeply interested in their endeavours, and gave
them aU the assistance in his power. But he no more
thought of taking thefr duties on himself than of inter
fering with the treatment of the men in hospital. He
spoke no ' words in season,' even to his intimates. He
had no ' message ' for them. Where reUgion was concerned,
so long as duly quaUfied instructors were available, he con
ceived it his business to Usten and not to teach. Morning
and evening prayers were the rule at his headquarters, but
if any of his staff chose to remain absent, the general made
no remark. Yet all suspicion of indifference to vice was
effectually removed. Nothing imgenerous or unclean was
said in his presence without incurruig his displeasure,
always unmistakably expressed, and although he made no
parade of bis piety he was far too manly to hide it.
Yet he was never a prominent figure at the camp
services. Eather than occupy a conspicuous place he

HIS PIETY 448
would seat himself amongst the privates; and the only
share he took in dfrecting the proceedings was to beckon
men to the seats that respect had left empty beside him.
Those who picture him as an enthusiastic fanatic, invading,
like the Puritan dragoons, the pulpits of the chaplains, and
leading the devotions of his troops with the same fervour
that he displayed in battle, have utterly misread his
character. The humblest soldier in the Confederate army
was not more modest and unassuming than Stonewall
Jackson.

448 STONEWALL JACKSON

NOTE

The Federal strength at M'Dowell.
Fremont's return of April 80 is as foUows : —
Miheoy's Brigade  4,807
Schenck's Brigade  3,335
of May 10 :—
MUroy  8,694
Schenck  8,335
of May 31 :—
MUroy  2,914
Schenck ....... 3,335
Schenck reports that the total force engaged at M'DoweU was
1,768 of Milroy's brigade, and about 500 of his own, total 2,268 ; and
that he himself brought to M'DoweU 1,800 infantry, a battery, and
250 cavalry — say, 1,600 men.
Milroy's command may fairly be estimated at 3,500 ; Schenck
brought 1,600 men; there were therefore avaUable for action at
M'DoweU 5,100 Federals. Frimont'a strength at Cross Keys.
The return of May 31 gives : — 13,520 ofl&oers and men.
Fremont, in his report of the battle, says that on May 29 he had
over 11,000 men, which, deducting guards, garrisons, v^orking parties
and stragglers, were reduced to 10,500 combatants at Cross Keys.
But he does not include in this last estimate Bayard's cavalry,
which joined him at Strasburg.
On May 81 Bayard had 1,844 officers and men ; he had suffered
some loss in fighting Ashby, and his strength at the battle may be put
down as 1,750.
AU garrisons, guards and working parties are included in the Con
federate numbers, so they should be added to the Federal estimate.
We may fairly say, then, that at Cross Keys the following troops were
available : —
Fremont  11,000
Bayard  1,750
Total , . 12,760

NOTE

447

Strength of the Federals, May 17-25.

On April 30 Banks' ' effective '
DonneUy's Brigade
Gordon's Brigade .
ArtUlery (26 guns)
Cavalry (General Hatch)
Body-guard

numbers were as foUows :—
2,7473,005 492
2,834 70

On May 23 he had:—
At Strasburg : Infantry
„ Cavalry
„ Artillery (18 guns)
At Front Boyal, Buckton, <fec.
„ Body-guard .
From the Harper's Ferry Garrison :-
At Strasburg : Cavalry
At Winchester: Infantry
„ Cavalry ,

9,148

4,476
2,600 350
1,800 70
300
856 600
10,552

On May 31, after losing 2,019 men at Front Boyal and Winchester,
he had, the Harper's Ferry troops having been added to his
command : —
Infantry  5,124
Cavalry  3,230
ArtUlery (16 guns)  286
Miscellaneous  82

Add

8,722 2,019
10,741

10,500 effectives on May 23 is therefore a fair estimate.
Geary's 2,000 at Eectortown, as they were acting under Mr. Stan.
ton's orders, have not been included.

END OF THB FIRST VOLDMB

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From the Library of
MOREAU DELANO
Yale 1898