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BOUGHT WITH THE INCOME
OF THE
Society of the Cincinnati
Fund

38j> t&e Same &ttt!)ot\
THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVI LLE. With Maps. 8vo,
#3.00. It is not easy to say which part of this book is best, for it is all good.
— The Nation {New York).
A BIRD'S EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. With Maps and
Illustrations. New and Revised Edition. i2mo, $3.00.
A clearer, more vivid view, a more accurate outline, than any other
available record. — London Saturday Review.
PATROCLUS AND PENELOPE: A Chat in the Saddle. With
Phototypes. 8vo, $3.00. Popular Edition. With woodcuts from
instantaneous photographs. Crown 8vo, $1.25.
The spirit of a sportsman pervades it throughout. — London Field.
GREAT CAPTAINS. With Maps, etc. 8vo, $2.00.
The conciseness and sharpness of these pictures make them very
effective. — New York Tribune.
ALEXANDER. A History of the Origin and Growth of the Art of
War, from the Earliest Times to the Battle of Ipsus, b. c. 301 ; with
a detailed account of the Campaigns of the great Macedonian. With
237 Charts, Maps, Plans of Battles and Tactical Manoeuvres, Cuts
of Armor, Uniforms, Siege Devices, and Portraits. 8vo, $5.00.
A series of chapters full of instruction. — The A tlietuzum {London).
HANNIBAL. A History of the Art of War among the Carthaginians
and Romans, down to the Battle of Pydna, 168 B. c. ; with a de
tailed account of the Second Punic War. With 227 Charts, Maps,
Plans of Battles and Tactical Manoeuvres, Cuts of Armor, Wea
pons, and Uniforms. 8vo, $5.00.
Aside from its value as a military study, Colonel Dodge's book is
most interesting. — yoiirnal of tlte Military Service Institution.
C>ES AR. A History of the Art of War among the Romans, from the
Second Punic War down to the Fall of the Roman Empire ; with a
detailed account of the Gallic and Civil Wars. With 275 Charts,
Maps, Plans of Battles and Tactical Manoeuvres, and other Cuts.
8vo, $5.00.
His lucid style and easy mastery of his material afford an explanation
of the peculiar interest that attaches to his volumes. — N. Y. Times.
GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS. A History of the Art of War from its
revival after the Middle Ages to the end of the Spanish Succession
War, with a detailed account of the Campaigns of the great Swede,
and the most famous Campaigns of Turenne, Cond^, Eugene, and
Marlborough. With 234 Charts, Maps, Plans of Battles, and Tac
tical Manoeuvres, and Cuts of Uniforms and Weapons. 8vo, two
volumes in one, $5.00.
Every one interested in the study of the art of war is beholden to
Colonel Dodge for the work that he is doing. — Atnerican Histori
cal Review.
RIDERS OF MANY LANDS. Profusely illustrated by Remington,
and from photographs of Oriental subjects. 8vo, $4.00. {Harder
& Bros.)
A book that will gladden the heart of every lover of horses. — Bos
ton Herald.

IN PREPARATION:
Uniform in style with the above volumes:
FREDERICK THE GREAT. NAPOLEON.
The series of six volumes (Alexander to Napoleon) will cover the
History of the Art of War from the earliest times down to 1815.
HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPANY,
Boston and New York.

A BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF
OUR CIVIL WAR

BY
THEODORE AYRAULT DODGE
BREVET LIEUTENANT-COLONEL UNITED STATES ARMY, RETIRED LIST J AUTHOR OF
"THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE," " PATROCLUS AND PENELOPE"
" A CHAT IN THE SADDLE," " GREAT CAPTAINS " " ALEXANDER"
"HANNIBAL," " OESAR," " GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS "
ETC., ETC.

NEW AND REVISED EDITION

BOSTON AND NEW YORK
HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPANY
1897

Copyright, 1883,
Bt JAMES R. OSGOOD & CO.
Copyright, 1897,
Bt THEODORE A. DODGE.
All rights reserved.

The Riverside Press, Cambridge, llfass., XT. S. A,
Printed by H. O. Houghton and Company.

CONTENTS,

PAGE
Introductory Letter  vn
I. The Casus Belli  1
II. The Opening Situation  5
III. The First Clash of Arms  13
IV. Bull Bun  16
V. The Mighty West Moves  21
VI. The Fiest Confederate Line Broken . . . .25
VII. New Madeid and Island No. 10  29
VIII. The Blockade  33
IX. Early Outskirt Opeeations  36
X. The Advance of the Western Armies. — Shiloh . 42
XI. McClellan Moves to the Peninsula . . . .49
XII. The Peninsular Campaign in Jeopardy. — Fair Oaks . 55
XIII. The Seven Days  62
XIV. Pope's Campaign  69
XV. Btjell and Bragg  82
XVI. Iuka and Corinth  89
XVII. Grant's Failuee against Vicksbueg . . . .93
XVIII. Sheeman's Failuee against Vicksbueg . . . .99
XLX. Lee's Fiest Invasion. — Antietam  102
XX. Again to the Rappahannock  108
XXI. The Horroe of Fbedericksburg  110
XXII. The Soldier of North and South . . . .116
XXIII. Roseceans and Bragg. — Stone's River . . . 122
XXIV. Chancellorsville  127
XXV. Lee's Second Invasion ....... 132
XXVI. Gettysburg  136
v

Vl CONTENTS. page
XXVII. Grant again Moves on Vicksburg . . . .142
XXVIII. Grant Turns Pemberton's Left . . . .145
XXIX. Grant Drives Pemberton into Vicksburg . . 151
XXX. Siege of Vicksburg .  156
XXXI. Banks and Poet Hudson  162
XXXII. Sparring for a Hold. — Mine Run . . . .167
XXXIII. Roseceans Moves upon Beagg  172
XXXIV. Chickamauga  179
XXXV. The Battle of Chattanooga  184
XXXVI. Further Outskirt Operations  190
XXXVII. The Wilderness  197
XXXVIII. Spotsylvania  204
XXXIX. The Minor Armies  209
XL. Again by the Flank. — Stalemate .... 213
XLI. More Blood. — Cold Harbor ..... 217
XLII. Sherman Looks Toward Atlanta .... 223
XLIII. Sherman Moves on Atlanta  227
XLIV. On to Marietta  231
XLV. Marietta  235
XLVI. Kenesaw  239
XLVII. Grant's Change of Base ...... 244
XLVIII. Petersburg. — The Mine Fiasco . . . .248
XLIX. Washington in Alarm for the Last Time . . 252
L. Atlanta  255
LI. A Protracted Siege  263
LII. Sheridan in the Valley  269
LIII. Hood Takes the Offensive  279
LIV. Hood Makes for Tennessee  282
LV. Sherman Astonishes Hood  286
LVI. Sherman's Goal . . ..... 291
LVII. Hoop Seeks to Crush Schofield. — Franklin . 293
LVIII. Hood Broken by Thomas. —Nashville . . . 297
LIX. Sherman Moves Through the Carolinas . . 302
LX. The Final Campaign  310
LXI. A Few Stray Items  320
Glossary ......... 327
Index  339

MAPS AND CHAETS.

1. Bull Run, July 21, 1861 . . .
2. Forts Henry and Donelson, Feb. 6 and 16, 1862
3. New Madrid and Island No. 10, March, 1862
4. Pea Ridge, March 5-8, 1862 .
5. Shiloh (or Pittsburg Landing), April 6 and 7, 1862
6. Williamsburg, May 5, 1862 ....
7. Fair Oaks, May 31, June 1, 1862 .
8. Seven Days, June 26, July 2, 1862 .
9. Pope's Campaign (1), Aug. 24, 1862
10. Pope's Campaign (2), Aug. 28, A.M.
11. Pope's Campaign (3), Aug. 28, 6 P.M.
12. Pope's Campaign (4), Aug. 29, Noon
13. Perryville, Oct. 8, 1862 .
14. Iuka, Sept. 19, 1862 .
15. Corinth, Oct. 3, 4, 1862 .
16. Memphis to Vicksburg, 1862, 1863
17. Antietam, Sept. 16, 17, 1862
18. Fredericksburg, Dec. 13, 1862
19. Stone's River, Dec. 31, 1862 .
20. Chancellorsville, May 2, 1863
21. Chancellorsville, May 3, 4, 5, 1863
22. Gettysburg, July 1, 1863
23. Gettysburg, July 2, 3, 4, 1863
24. Campaign against Vicksburg in 1863
25. Mine Run, Nov. 26-30, 1863 .
26. Rosecrans' Manoeuvre, Aug. 20-Sept. 17, 1863
27. Chickamauga, Sept. 19, 20, 1863 .
28. Chattanooga, Nov. 23, 24, 25, 1863

page . 17
27 30 31
44 5359
. 63
. 71 75
. 76
. 778790
. 9196
105
. 113
. 123
. 129
. 130
. 136 138
. 146
. 170
. 175
180
. 186

viii ' MAPS AND CHARTS. PAGE
29. Wilderness, May 5-6, 1864  201
30. Spotsylvania, May 8-21, 1864  204
31. North Anna, May 23-26, 1864  214
32. Cold Harbor, May 31, June 12, 1864  219
33. Pickett's Mills and New Hope Church, May 25-27, 1863 . 232
34. Operations about Marietta, June 14-28, 1864 . . 237
35. Operations about Petersburg, June, 1864, to April, 1865 . 249
36. Operations about Atlanta, July 17-Sept. 2, 1864 . 257
37. Winchester (or Opequon), Sept. 19, 1864 .... 272
38. Fishee's Hill, Sept. 22, 1864  273
39. Cedar Creek, Oct. 19, 1864  276
40. Franklin, Nov. 30, 1864  . 296
41. Nashville, Dec. 15, 16, 1864  298

MAPS SPECIALLY PREPARED FOR THIS WORK.
1. General Map of the Theatre of War . . Front Covers
2. Map of the United States in 1860-61 (showing the States
that seceded to form the Confederate States) . . . 4-5
3. Map of the Theatre of the Western Campaigns . . 24-25
4. Map of the Theatre of the Georgia and Carolina
Campaigns ... . . ... 34-35
5. Map of the Theatre of the South-western Cam
paigns ... ... ... 82-83
6. Map of the Theatre of the Virginia Campaigns . Back Covers

DEDIOATOEY LETTER.

To Robert Elkik Neil Dodge: —
My dear Neil, — Few of the generation to which you
belong will ever become familiar with the details of the
gigantic struggle through which your father's generation
fought. But every young American should know its out
lines. The following pages are what I long ago promised
you, when you should be of an age to take an interest in the
subject. They are too few to make any pretence to being a
history of the war ; nor have they anything to do with its
political aspect.
A soldier can discuss calmly victory or defeat. Politics do
not seem to be treated with equal good-temper. Each side
in our great Civil War believed itself in the right, and fought
with the courage so engendered. You need not busy yourself
with the asperities of the political field of twenty years ago.
The causes which brought about the war have been stated in
the briefest manner only.
The principal military events are herein grouped in such
sequence that a careful reading, with the maps before you, will
yield you a fair knowledge of what modern war is, and what
our Civil War was. Many interesting minor operations have
been barely mentioned ; some altogether omitted. All impor
tant ones have due space allotted to them as even-handedly
as the matter and the general purpose of the work will allow.
Many of the manoeuvres about Petersburg in the last year of
the war were on a scale so vast that they rank almost as
separate campaigns. But although they called for endurance

x INTRODUCTORY LETTER.
and skill of the highest order and for enormous sacrifices, as
they were really parts of one great whole, less space has in
some instances been devoted to these than to other lesser
but independent conflicts. The skeleton thus presented, can
readily be clothed from the standard histories.
To know this subject well requires the diligent study of
many volumes. I have tried to give you a good general idea
in one.
No claim to originality is made for this book. The facts,
and many of the opinions, have been gleaned from the pages
of numerous authors. Their patient labors have made the
history of our Civil Strife the property of the public ; and to
all of them my thanks are due.
The maps are accurate enough for the purposes of the book.
To convey a rapid general idea of the various battle-fields is
their aim rather than the greater exactness which may be
found in more extended works. The small rectangles, repre
senting troops, indicate general position only. Too great
detail has been purposely avoided.
The few technical terms, which for convenience and greater
conciseness have been used in the book, all but explain them
selves. And few, indeed, are the firesides in this country
which have not at least one member who can interpret the
ordinary manoeuvres of grand-tactics or strategy. A short
glossary is appended.
Though but twenty years have elapsed since these events
were enacted, the authorities on our Civil War constantly
disagree as to numbers and localities ; frequently even as
to dates. Errors have probably crept into this volume.
But they will be found, it is hoped, neither many nor
grave. The intelligent treatment of military operations necessi-

INTRODUCTORY LETTER. XI
tates more or less criticism. That which has here been
indulged in is meant to be temperate as well as honest. It
is made with a full appreciation of the unusual difficulties
which beset our generals, with a sincere admiration of their
qualities and services, and in that spirit of diffidence which
should become a soldier who bore but a modest part in the
great struggle which they conducted to a successful issue.
Our Civil War was full of dramatic incident. Every war
is. But the narrow limits of this work forbid the devotion of
any space to what others have sufficiently painted. My aim
has been to give the layman a clear idea of the war as a mili
tary whole, paying no heed to individual heroism nor dwelling
upon the war as a spectacle. Regimental histories have
already done, and will continue to do, this. Names are given
only to elucidate operations.
While holding the conviction that the cause of the North
was right, I yield to no Southerner in my admiration of the
splendid gallantry of our old enemy, now our brother ; and I
believe that no one will accuse me of intentional partiality in
my narration of events.
I need not ask you, my dear Neil, to study these pages,
for you are now old enough to desire an intelligent knowledge
of our great war.
Your affectionate father,
THEODORE AYRAULT DODGE.
Brookline, Mass., 1883.

PREFACE,

IN correcting the figures given in this new edition, the latest
War Department publications, the invaluable work of Colo
nel Fox, and other well-known sources have been consulted. It
must be remembered that no war statistics can be absolutely
accurate. Records were not kept in the same manner in the
Northern and Southern armies ; many have been lost ; some
were never made. Should two equally competent and honest
men figure up, from the material at hand and by the same
rules, the combatants and casualties of half-a-dozen battles,
they would vary more or less. Even the War Department
has, from time to time, altered the figures in many of its
tables. But reasonable accuracy can be attained ; and the
author desires, among other sources of information, to express
his peculiar indebtedness to the valuable work of Col. Thomas
L. Livermore, whose tables of forces and casualties have been
laid under free contribution. Colonel Livermore has figured out
the numbers for the Northern and Southern armies on the same
basis. His studies are intended to enrich the archives of the
Military Historical Society of Massachusetts ; and his tabula
tion of figures of the Civil War is singularly accurate and
suggestive. The facts stated have been diligently compared with the
Official Records of the Rebellion by Capt. Edward B. Robins,
for many years Secretary of the same Society; and, owing to
his valuable labor, for which my earnest thanks are due, every
such fact can now be substantiated from the record.
The author alone is responsible for the opinions expressed.
New maps have been prepared from the Government sur
veys and charts. These have equally passed under the
scrutiny of Captain Robins. They are all north and south.
The author hopes that, in its new dress, the work may con
tinue to give the same satisfaction which, from its constant sale
in a more expensive form, he is assured that it has so far done.
Brookxine, October, 1896.

THE CASUS BELLI.
FOE many years a great political strife had been grad
ually undermining the ties of tradition and mutual
interest betwixt North and South. The rival sections had
fought side by side in conquering our independence and in
maintaining it. Every reason, commercial and national,
should have held us together. The slighter differences of
opinion had been mainly about tariff protection to the
Northern manufacturers, and kindred financial subjects.
Differences like these could scarcely have involved serious
results. The real cause of the growing animosity was
associated with the questions attending slavery.
With whatever unanimity servile labor may now be con
demned as a social and commercial mistake, — leaving its
moral aspect entirely out of the question, — the institution
of slavery, in the decade preceding the war, was asserted
by the Southern States to be the keystone of their success
in the same measure that paid labor was held in the North
to have built up the wealth of its manufacturing communi
ties and to have opened the wheat fields of the West.
The difference in climate and products yielded each section
abundant sources of argument for its own peculiar views.

2 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR.
But the matter did not stop at discussion. The South,
to acquire additional political power, desired to extend the
institution into the rapidly growing Territories of the
Union ; the North, for similar reasons, desired to have it
excluded from all but those States where it had taken such
firm root that it could not be extirpated without too great
upheaval. There was of course in each section a minority
of very bitter opponents and favorers of slavery, whose
extreme utterances and acts bred more or less ill-feeling.
But the general question was confined to the territorial
extension or restriction of slave labor.
For many years the pro-slavery men North and South
had held possession of the reins of government!. But the
party of free labor, owing to immigration, which prefer
ably sought the Northern and Western States, was thought
to be on the point of dispossessing them. The Republican
party, which desired to restrict slavery to the limits it al
ready occupied, existed mostly in the North. The Demo
crats of the South wished to extend slavery ; their political
allies in the Northern States aimed to prevent rupture by
concessions to the Southern idea.
In 1860 a new President had to be chosen. The Demo
crats North and South outnumbered the Republicans. If
they worked together, they could scarcely fail to elect their
candidate. But the Southern Democrats demanded a plat
form which should recognize both slavery as a national
institution, and the right of secession. This latter was no
new doctrine. Secession had been threatened before, and
the abstract right of a State to rupture its relations with
the Union had been stoutly maintained and denied on the

THE CASUS BELLI. 3
one and the other side. The demands of the Southern wing
led to a breach in the Democratic party, the result of which
was that four presidential candidates came into the field, —
two Democrats, Douglas representing the North and
Breckenridge the South ; a Whig, Bell, representing the
party of concession; and a Republican, Lincoln.
Out of nearly 4,700,000 votes, Mr. Lincoln received
1,900,000. This fell short of an actual majority, but was
much more than any other candidate received, and the
usual machinery of election gave the Republican candidate
the suffrages of the electoral college. He was legally
chosen President.
Still, despite their defeat, the Democrats would retain a
majority in Congress, and could assert their rights in am
ple measure. But this power was not ample enough.
The ultra men among the Southern leaders determined
upon actual secession as a remedy, hoping to retrieve
by threats of force what they had lost by their political
rupture with the Northern Democracy. Many opposed
this course. But in vain. The passions of the South
ern people were at fever heat. Secession measures were
at once put in play. And as the National administra
tion, until the succeeding March, was still Democratic,
the South reaped many advantages from the weakness,
and in some instances outright dishonesty of United States
officials. Compromises were attempted. But matters had gone
too far. Before New Year of 1861 had dawned, South
Carolina had set up as an independent power. The other
Southern States in turn passed ordinances of secession, a

4 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR.
Confederacy was formed, and North and South were openly
arrayed against each other.
But it must be remembered that while slavery had been
at the root of the trouble, the actual casus belli was the
%gJ^nLs.pLcpflsion, to maintain and to prevent which our Civil
War was really waged. As the struggle grew in intensity,
the final extirpation of slavery became an element in the
calculations of the North, and even a means of encouraging
its people. But at the outset the contest was solely a War
for the Union.

n.

THE OPENING SITUATION.
A BIRD'S-EYE view of Our Civil War shows a
threefold division of military operations. The
mightier conflicts had their scene in the States bordering
on the East or on the West of the Alleghany Mountains.
Most minor hostilities were waged on the outskirts of the
Confederacy. Many of the latter had so little, if any,
bearing upon the general result, that they may be briefly
dismissed from sight without affecting an intelligent view of
the whole. Some bore a weighty share in our eventual
success. It will be remembered that, in a general way, the offen
sive was ours, the defensive the Confederate share of the
struggle. But as the best defense is often a vigorous at
tack, so the Confederates waged sometimes an offensive-
defensive warfare, as in the case of Lee's incursions across
the Potomac in 1862 and 1863, or Bragg's march to the
Ohio river in 1862. But the general policy pursued by
the Confederates was formulated by Jefferson Davis when
he said that " all we ask is to be let alone."
In the East the two rival capitals faced each other at no
great interval, and were hungrily fought for over the nar-
5

6 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1861.
row territory lying between them. Here, too, was the
great Confederate captain, and under him served the elite
of the Southern legions. In the West there was no such
topographical limitation. The possession of the Mississippi
river was our primary objective, both as a base for opera
tions into the interior and to cut off from the enemy the
supplies he gathered from beyond. The outskirt operations
consisted mostly of lodgments on the coast, which were not
utilized to any greater extent than to keep the blockade of
the Southern ports intact.
Munitions of war were the prime necessity of the Seces
sionists. Within the boundaries of each State there had at
various times been granted to the National Government
certain small tracts of land for forts, arsenals, and navy-
yards. These had been kept more or less liberally sup
plied with arms, ammunition, and stores of all kinds. A
large part of this material fell into the hands of the seced
ing States. It was claimed that the act of secession
revested in each State the title to the land so granted to
the Government ; and, wherever possible, the claim was
made good by taking possession of this national property.
In some instances the garrisons of the forts held their own,
and preserved these coigns of vantage to the United States..
i South Carolina had been the most prominent State in
warlike activity. But the forts in Charleston harbor were
still in possession of the National Government and under
command of Major Anderson. Without these citadels
the new-born power of South Carolina would be unable to
control the entrance to its only seaport. After the act of
secession, therefore, negotiations were opened with Presi-

1861.] THE OPENING SITUATION. 7
4
dent Buchanan for yielding up their posses
sion. Vacillating though he was, the '
President could not consent to this. He prolonged the
discussion. Anderson, with soldierly decision, cut the knot
of the difficulty by abandoning the shore fortresses and
transferring his small force of one hundred
. t-i o • December 26.
and twenty-eight men to Fort Sumter, in
the centre of the harbor, prepared to hold it to the last.
Months elapsed in inaction. Anderson's commissariat
began to fail. Attempts were made by the
t, . , t f „ , , Jan-> APJ-> 1861-
President to revictual the fort, but they were
unsuccessful. Finally South Carolina struck the blow. Always a
leader in the South, she now had at her back the moral
support of the • other seceding States. After summoning
Fort Sumter to surrender, fire was opened April 12.
upon it from the rrflabilitated United States
forts, and from shore batteries erected during the inter
regnum of three months. A bloodless bombardment of
two days resulted in a conflagration which, added to the ex
haustion of his ammunition, obliged Anderson to capitulate.
This he did, and, marching out with all the honors of war,
he embarked his troops for the North. This
first act of war was, however, more a politi
cal than a military combat.
The Northern people had until this moment disbelieved
in a final rupture. But their eyes were now opened, and
Fort Sumter was the signal for an universal uprising to
avenge the insult to the National flag. President Lincoln
at once issued a call for volunteers. The response was

8 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1861.
unmistakable in its intensity. The busy merchant, the
plodding farmer, the mechanic and the professional man,
each dropped his avocation to enter the ranks, and, as if by
magic, the peaceful North became one vast camp.
In the South preparations were much further advanced,
but recruitment was no more speedy. Both sides donned
their armor for the now inevitable fray.
The navy-yard at Norfolk contained much material of
war sadly needed at the South. By a series of blunders
this valuable possession was allowed to fall into the hands
of the new Confederacy, much to our'dis-
April20. comfiture and eventual danger. Harpers
Ferry, too, an arsenal containing the most necessary ma
chinery for producing arms and ammunition
April 18. owned by the United States, was evacuated
and destroyed by its garrison.
The city of Washington stood in no little peril. A
vigorous raid from Virginia could readily have seized
the capital at any time during the first month of hos
tilities. But gradually troops from the North arrived
and rescued the seat of government from danger. In
Baltimore sentiment was strongly for secession. The
government of Maryland was on the point of leading the
State in the wake of her erring sisters. The passage
through Baltimore of the first Northern regiment occasioned
a serious riot, and the regiments that followed had to be
transported by way of Annapolis, until Bal
timore was occupied by a sufficient force to
control its unruly population.
All these events, and many other minor circumstances,

1861. J THE OPENING SITUATION. 9
were mere incidents to the opening of hostilities, and need
but a casual reference. They scarcely belong to the mili
tary history of the war.
The new belligerents proposed to make their primary
line of defense along the Ohio river and the northern
boundary of Maryland. A glance at the map shows how
large is the territory so covered, as compared with the
loyal States, and quells our wonder at the opinion which
foreigners at first held as to the probable issue of our
struggle, although the census of 1860 shows nearly two
thirds of the population to be in the North.
But the conditions under which the Southern people
lived were doubtless such as to enable it to organize an
efficient army with more celerity. And this fact was over
estimated abroad, while the knowledge of where resided
the sinews of war was naturally more limited than at
present. For be it remembered that, thirty-five years
ago, we occupied no more important place in the eyes of
even intelligent Europeans than do at present the South
American States in ours.
There lurked no doubt in the minds of the Southern
leaders that Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri would join
the Confederacy, while Virginia was considered one body
indivisible. But they were as early destined to disap
pointment as they were to eventual miscarriage of the
bitterest. In the seething of political uncertainties, Ken
tucky was saved to the Union. Even the western half
of Virginia followed her water-courses and affiliated with
Ohio rather than with her slave-holding twin ; while the
troubles in Baltimore culminated in the half-willing re-

10 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1861.
demption of Maryland. The Potomac thus became a
Northern barrier instead of a Southern base. The Con
federates were driven to substitute for it the Rappahan
nock, in Virginia; while west of the AUeghanies, as the
Ohio river remained in our control, they were forced to
adopt an irregular line across the State of Kentucky, on
which to make their first defense.
This line was, however, weak, because it is tapped by
the Mississippi, the Cumberland, and the Tennessee riv
ers ; and these became at once available to our armies as
lines of operation and supply. And the early control by
us of both banks of the Ohio river, together with the res
cue of Missouri from secession government
April and May. by Blair and gallant Lyon, enabled us to
keep the war off loyal territory.
Confederate General Pillow had occupied New Madrid on
the Mississippi. The intention of the Con
federates had been to seize upon all impor
tant points about the mouth of the Ohio
river, and shortly a move was made from New Madrid to
Columbus by fifteen thousand men, under Polk, who from
thence attempted to grasp Paducah, where the Tennessee
empties into the Ohio. This and Cairo were two points of
, great military value.
General John C. Fremont was at this time in command
in the West. His ancient reputation, beyond his abilities,
at least in regular warfare, had placed him where he was.
Under orders from him, Grant, early appointed a brigadier-
September 2 general, anticipated Polk by seizing Cairo,
and 6. j i -„
and a day or two later Paducah. He had a

1861.] THE OPENING SITUATION. 11
force of about fourteen thousand men ; Polk some five
thousand more. This move on Grant's part checkmated
the Confederate plans, and saved this important strategic
centre to the Union.
The Confederates were, however, reluctant to yield up
control of Kentucky, and were equally anxious to forestall
our use of the, to them, all-important rivers above-named.
They speedily fortified Columbus, New Madrid, and Island
No. 10 on the Mississippi, erected Fort Henry on the Ten
nessee, and Fort Donelson on the Cumberland, and estab
lished a strong camp of observation at the railroad centre
of Bowling Green as an outpost to their main position at
Nashville, while Zollicoffer was sent through Cumberland
Gap to form a flying right wing. This was the first Con
federate line of defense in the West, after the Ohio river
had been lost beyond hope of recovery.
It will be borne in mind that in a country whose sparse
population prevents its sustaining large armies, and where
each contestant has to be victualled from his own base,
lines of operation must follow navigable rivers or railroads.
These will always be observed in our war to play a larger
part than in European campaigns, where provisions and
forage are abundant enough for an army to live upon the
country through which it is operating, and roads are such
as to allow supplies to be readily collected and troops
moved. Upon our side, preparations were at once entered into
for piercing the Confederate Line in Kentucky. A river
flotilla was built. It consisted of Eads' " turtle " gun-boats,
which were stern-wheelers of some five hundred tons bur-

12 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1861.
den, light draught, and with hull barely a foot out of
water, carrying an iron-plated casemate eight feet high
armed with a dozen guns ; of remodelled river steamboats ;
of flat-boats carrying heavy mortars and towed by tugs,
and of a motley assortment of other vessels.
On their side, the Confederates were not behind us in
vigor, though they lacked our mechanical apphances, and
their fleet was supplemented with several cigar-shaped
rams. While in the West weapons are being wrought for con
flict, let us turn to the East.

m.
THE FTRST CLASH OF ARMS.
HOSTILITIES were initiated in the East by General
Geo. B. McClellan's campaign in West Virginia.
It was essential to preserve intact the new-born State from
the aggression of her ancient partner, and to organize her
forces. A movement culminating in a small success at
Philippi gave a happy inspiration to our
¦n June 3.
arms, and did something to save the Balti
more and Ohio Railroad to the Federals. To recover
possession of or interrupt this great highway, of impera
tive necessity to us, was the cause of constant Southern
raids thereafter. Following upon Philippi, early in the
summer, McClellan, with Rosecrans as his second, won an
easy triumph over Garnett and Pegram at July H.
the battle of Rich Mountain, and definitely
rescued West Virginia from the control of Confederate
troops. This first success, though obtained by simple
means, was lauded as a great strategic feat. It gave both
McClellan and Rosecrans a reputation which did them
eventual injustice, inasmuch as it thrust them into promi
nent positions which no officer in the country was equal to
without the experience of many months and frequent fail-
13

14 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1861.
ures. The nation was utterly uneducated in war. Gen
eral Winfield Scott, our Commander-in-Chief, whose native
ability was unquestioned, had outlived his powers. Few
of our officers had commanded even a regiment. Our
only recent training had been in the Mexican War, a
distinctly fine campaign, but of limited scope. The work
now to be done required armies such as none since Napo
leon had seen under his control. Unlucky they who were
early placed in high command. The conditions of failure
were strong in both themselves and the people for whom
they fought.
Inspired by McClellan's success, General Patterson, ap
pointed to command Pennsylvania forces, projected a plan
for recapturing Harper's Ferry, now held by General Jos. E.
Johnston. This proved easy of accomplish-
JunelS. r j tr
ment, for Johnston evacuated the place as
untenable, destroyed the works, and retired upon Win
chester. Not far away, Patterson, after sundry counter-
marchings, sat down before his opponent, under exphcit
instructions from General Scott to bring him to battle, or in
any event to stand athwart his path and prevent his rein
forcing the main body of the enemy, in the movement now
being projected toward Centreville.
Encouraged by certain logistic successes at Annapolis
and Baltimore, General Butler, who had been transferred to
Fortress Monroe, managed to make his first
June 10. °
military fiasco at Big Bethel. This affair,
which was an attempt to break up a Confederate camp at
that place, amounted to no more than to display incom
petency in conception and conduct. But it greatly elated

1861.] THE FIRST CLASH OF ARMS. 15
the South, as did also Schenck's quasi-picnic reconnoissance
on railroad cars to Vienna, Va., about the June 17.
same time, in which he was preceded by
neither vanguard nor flankers, and was surprised and
routed by a party of the enemy who concealed themselves
in the woods for the purpose-

IT.
BULL RUN.
IT was between the rival capitals that public opinion first
worried our army into serious operations. The forces
in the field at this time had grown to unusual proportions.
On the Union side close upon two hundred thousand men
bore arms ; on the Confederate, all but one hundred
thousand. The Union fleet consisted of sixty-nine vessels,
carrying one thousand three hundred and forty-six guns.
There lay along the Potomac a full one hundred thousand
men. But the eager champions of either belligerent wrere
yet far from being soldiers.
McDowell, who commanded the army in
June. the field in front of Washington, though he
had little confidence in the discipline of his troops, was
constrained into action by pressure from the War Depart
ment and the President, who in their turn responded only
to the clamor of the impatient North. He accordingly set
a column of about thirty thousand men
July. in motion against the Confederate general,
Beauregard, who withdrew behind Bull Run with a some
what inferior force. Each was determined to measure
swords with his ancient comrade.
16

1861.]

BULL RUN.

17

When the armies have been brought into tactical contact,
each commander plans a manceuvre by which to turn the
other's left. The Federals are earlier in the
. Julv21.
execution of theirs, crossing Bull Run above
the Stone Bridge, and come very near to crushing the Con-

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federate left, which has been depleted by Beauregard in
order to strengthen his right ; for with the latter wing he
proposes to cross the stream at Blackburn's Ford and
Union Mills, and to fall upon McDowell's left at Centre-
ville. A small force of the enemy has gallantly held the
Manassas plateau against our advance, but only with

18 BIRD'S-ETE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1861.
grievous loss. It is here that Thomas J. Jackson well
earns the soubriquet of " Stonewall " by his solid defense.
Victory seems to declare for McDowell. It is almost
within his grasp. The Southern outlook is desperate.
But Beauregard recalls his scattered forces from the right.
The plateau is secured. The conflict is again renewed and
with vigor. The raw troops on both sides have fought
with a gallantry premonitory of bloodier contests. Officers
have fallen in great numbers. Both contestants have been
quickly exhausted, and on either side there is wanting but
a trifling cause to incline towards victory or defeat.
But Patterson's senility works our ruin. In lieu of
barring Johnston's passage, his one obvious duty, he has
left an open road for this wily soldier to escape him in the
Valley and to march to the assistance of Beauregard.
Johnston, with a portion of his troops, is already present.
The rest are coming up by the railroad.
It is 2.30 P.M. The dust of an approaching column is
seen on the horizon. Is it Patterson ? Or is it Kirby Smith,
with the balance of the Army of the Shenandoah ? Beau
regard prepares for retreat, for he fears it is the Federal
column. But the stars and bars are finally descried. The
Confederate hour of triumph has come. The arrival on
the field of this last detachment throws eight thousand fresh
troops upon the Union flank and rear, and turns the tide.
The laurels which McDowell should have added to his
always solid reputation are lost in a confused retreat, and
this, before the vicinity of Washington is reached, becomes
utter rout. The enemy is, however, in a similar strait,
and no idea of pursuit is entertained. The losses, twenty-

1861.] BULL RUN. 19
seven hundred on ours and nearly as much on the enemy's
side, show that the field has been, neither won nor lost
without stubborn contest. Patterson, after this disgrace
ful lapse, retires to Harper's Ferry, where he is super
seded by Banks.
After Bull Run, McClellan, fresh from his too quickly
won laurels in West Virginia, was placed in supreme
command, and sat down to the giant's task of making a
mob an army. The South, lulled into the exultant belief
that this one victory would suffice to close the war,
really suffered worse than the consequences of a defeat in
allowing self-applause to take the place of a vigorous
course of discipline. Bull Run worked benefit to the
Union in as great measure as it damaged the Confederate
cause. The minds of all in the Northern States were
cemented by this disaster into the one purpose of crushing
out the heresy of secession.
Generals Rosecrans and R. E. Lee lay
. . . August.
facing each other in West Virginia, with
some ten thousand men apiece. There are but three roads
across the AUeghanies in this State. One, near the
Potomac, the Federals had kept ; one, further south, at
Great Pass, McClellan's campaign had secured ; the
third, by way of Sewell's Mountain, was still open. While
Rosecrans had moved south, against Floyd, , September 10.
at (xauley river, who retired after a combat
at Carnifex Ferry, Lee sought to overcome J. J. Reynolds'
brigade, which alone was left in his front at
Great Pass. But his method showed none
of the wonderful vigor he later on exhibited, and, after

20 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1861.
fairly surrounding Reynolds, he failed to attack him, and
returned t& make head against Rosecrans. He thus
enabled Reynolds to assume the offensive against his
lieutenant. But Reynolds' attack at Green
brier River had no results. Meanwhile
Rosecrans, though with a weaker force, had succeeded in
shutting Lee up in the defiles of Sewell's Mountain,
but lacked numbers sufficient to warrant attack. Lee
was recalled to other duties. After a couple
October. „ . „ , .
of minor engagements on the (jrreenbner,
New, and Gauley Rivers, which had small importance,
winter put an end to operations in this barren region.
This disjointed campaign proved of value in that it
enabled us to maintain our hold on the new State of West
Virginia. But the tools of war were in raw hands, and
the operations were as incomplete as the country was
rugged, and the means of transportation difficult.
We must now turn to what the active West has
accomplished.

V.

THE MIGHTY WEST MOVES.
THE operations in Missouri command but a passing
notice, as all trans-Mississippi manoeuvres bore small
relation to the general strategy of the more important
fields. Yet, as the possession of any part of that State
by the enemy would have made the opening of the Mis
sissippi river a much more onerous task for us, the work
of rescuing its entire territory from Confederate control
deserves its due credit among the efforts of the war.
General Lyon had assumed control of affairs in Mis
souri, and had dispersed the forces of seced-
. June 17.
ing Governor Jackson at Booneville, while
Sigel, an ancient German officer, had been very active in
raising a small force of volunteers in the lower counties,
and had crossed swords with the enemy at July 5.
Carthage ; but, meeting with a reverse, he
was fain to retire to Springfield under the aegis of his
chief. The effect of these and other lesser operations
had narrowed the control of the Confederates to the
south-west corner of the State, whither Lyon had pushed
his little army. It was not long, however, before
Lyon, unsupported by his superior, Fremont, found
21

22 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1861.
that the advance of the Confederates Price
July' and McCulloch upon his position at Spring
field with a large force was seriously compromising his
safety. To rescue himself he boldly assailed the enemy at
Wilson's Creek. Sigel was sent by a circuit to fall
upon the enemy's rear, but his men,
August 10. " .
largely three months volunteers, whose time
was nearly up, fought half-heartedly, and his own lack
of conduct resulted in defeat. Lyon was outnumbered
two to one. The battle fought here was one of the
most stubborn minor contests of the war. The Federals
lost the field, and gallant Lyon his life, while heading a
charge to retrieve the disasters of the day. The little
army was barely rescued from destruction by a summary
retreat, happily without pursuit, to Springfield, under
command of Major Sturgis. Out of six thousand men
our casualties were twelve hundred. The enemy lost a
less number out of twelve thousand. The Southerners
have named this victory " Oak Hills."
The Confederates were soon able to score an additional
triumph in Missouri by the capture of Lexington, of
which place Colonel Mulligan was in corn-
September 20. . °
mand. Price advanced from Wilson's
Creek. With some three thousand men, Mulligan bravely
held the town against Price with twenty thousand, until
his water supply was cut off, when he surrendered
what remained of his force. The enemy had thus re
covered for a time a substantial part of the State.
After many delays Fremont finally took the field

1861.] THE MIGHTY WEST MOVES. 23
with forty thousand men, and advanced to Springfield,
the Confederates having already retired. He seems to
have expected to fight a battle here, though the enemy
was actually some sixty miles away ; but on the eve
of this hypothetical combat he was super- November 2.
seded by Hunter, and retired to St. Louis.
Fremont undoubtedly possessed ability, and had in
former days exhibited brilliant qualities in irregular war
fare ; but his conduct in the Civil War lacked every
element of usefulness.
Meanwhile, in July, General Pope took command in
Northern Missouri, which, by a few vigorous blows with
sword and pen, he cleared from open and secret rebels.
He later rescued the region between the
„ , . . „ „ July-December.
Osage and the Missouri rivers from Con
federate control. He was building for himself the repu
tation which soon placed him in command beyond his
powers. All these stirring events in Missouri evinced the
greatest activity ; but their only effect on the general
struggle lay in the moral weight the possession of this
State gave to our arms.
In the shifting of commanders, so constant in the
first years of the war, General Halleck early became
chief player on the chess-board west of the Appalachians,
while his subordinates accomplished, in November.
great part, the results attributed to his
strategic ability. Halleck was a most scholarly soldier.
In the cabinet none was more astute. But his action
was slow. In the field he personally brought to pass

24 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1861.
nothing. Subsequently, as Commander-in-Chief at Wash
ington, his peculiar methods more than once induced
disaster. General Sherman had succeeded Anderson in Ken
tucky. General Grant began to display
his activity, and enabled the troops under
his orders to learn something of warfare, in an expedition
against Belmont. With a force of three
November 7. _. .
thousand men he moved from Cairo against
the Confederate camp at that place, and, though obliged
after a day's skirmishing to retire with a loss of five
hundred men, he nevertheless broke up the insurgents'
stronghold. The Confederates may lay such claim to
victory as the possession of the field of battle always
gives. No permanent gain was accomplished by Grant,
and he was forced to retire to Cairo.

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VI.
THE FIRST CONFEDERATE LINE BROKEN.

A

T the beginning of the new year the Union armies
were five hundred and seventy-six January, 1862.
thousand strong, backed by a fleet of two
hundred and twelve vessels. McClellan lay quiet upon
the Potomac all winter, drilling, organizing, disciplining
the Army of the Potomac. In his front was Joe Johns
ton, with a much smaller force, pushing forward with
equal energy the schooling of his soldiers.
The Western generals were more active. Albert Sid
ney Johnston, perhaps the most promising Southern offi-
cer,was in command in the West, with head-quarters at
Bowling Green. Buell lay in Johnston's November.
front, having superseded Sherman, whose (1861.)
("crazy" suggestion that two hundred and fifty thousand
men would be required for operations on the Western field
had lost him the confidence of his superiors. There was
abundant method in his madness, as time all too fully
showed. In Eastern Kentucky the Confederate Humphrey Mar
shall had been creating more or less political trouble, and
General Garfield was sent against him with some two
25

26 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1862.
thousand men. Marshall somewhat outnumbered Gar
field ; but in a vigorous January campaign,
culminating at Prestonburg, Garfield quite
dispersed his forces, and drove him into the mountains.
About the same time, Zollicoffer, who had held the
extreme right of the Confederate line in advance of Cum-
berland Gap, had retired from his post and joined Crit
tenden near Mill Springs, in Central Kentucky ; and to
General George H. Thomas was committed the duty of
disposing of them. With a somewhat superior force
Thomas moved upon the enemy, and in a sharp engage
ment at Logan's Cross Roads, utterly broke
up their army. Zollicoffer was killed. This
first of our substantial Western victories (called " Fish
ing Creek" by the enemy) was a great encouragement
to our arms. Our loss was two hundred and fifty, to
the enemy's five hundred. Crittenden withdrew his troops
across the Cumberland, abandoning his
January^20. artillery and trains. Eastern Kentucky
was thus freed from the Confederates.
Halleck's first task as commander of the Western armies
was to penetrate the Confederate line of defense. This
could be done by breaking its centre or by turning one of
its flanks. The former appeared most feasible to Grant
and Commodore Foote, who commanded the naval forces.
Under instructions from Halleck, seven of
February. the gun-boat flotilla, with Grant's seventeen
thousand men in reserve, moved up the Tennessee river to
attack Fort Henry and essay the value of gun-boats in am
phibious warfare. Grant landed below the fort, and Foote

1862.]

FIRST CONFEDERATE LINE BROKEN.

27

February 6.

then opened fire upon it. Tilghman, in command, fore
seeing its capture, was shrewd enough to send off the bulk
of his force to Fort Donelson. He himself
made a mock defense with a handful of men,
surrendering the fort after the garrison was well on its way.
Without the twin citadel of Donelson, however, Fort
Henry was but a barren triumph, for no column could ad
vance up the Tennessee river while this garrison threat
ened its flank. It was here that Grant earned his first
laurels as a stanch soldier, by compelling, after a stubborn
fight, the surrender of this second fortress with its entire
garrison. Every effort had been made by Johnston to hold the
place. He must here fight for the possession of Nashville.
Fort Donelson was strongly fortified and garrisoned.

Forts Henry and Donelson. Feb. 6 and 16, 1862.

Grant moved against it from Fort Henry with fifteen thou
sand men, six thousand less than the enemy.
The ground is difficult ; the troops are green. But heavy

28 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1862.
reinforcements and the fleet come to Grant's aid. The
fort is fully invested, under great difficulties from severity
of weather and the inexperience of the men. Happily
there is not much ability in the defence. Floyd, the
senior officer, determines to cut his way out. He falls
heavily upon Grant's right, held by McClernand and
backed by Wallace, thinking to thrust them aside from the
river and to escape over the road so won. A stubborn
resistance defeats this sortie, though but narrowly. A
general assault is ordered, which effects a lodgment in the
works. Divided responsibilities between Floyd, Buckner,
and Pillow weaken the defense so as to oper-
February 16. ate a surrender.
Our loss was two thousand eight hundred. The Con
federates captured were nearly fifteen thousand men.
These successes broke through the centre of the Con
federate line, established with so much pains, and compro
mised its flanks. Johnston found that he must retire to a
new line. This lay naturally along the Memphis and
Charleston Railroad. He had retreated from Bowling
Green on receipt of the news of the fall of
Februaiy 14. Fort Henry, and was forced thereby to cede
to Buell possession of Nashville, and practically of Ken
tucky. The advanced flank on the Mississippi at Colum
bus was likewise compromised, and with the bulk of the
armament was withdrawn to Island No. 10, some sixty
miles below Cairo. We could congratulate ourselves upon
a very substantial gain.

VII.
NEW MADRID AND ISLAND NO. 10.
THE left flank of the Confederate line, thus entrenched
at New Madrid and Island No. 10, is still too far
advanced to be safely held more than a short time. Pope
receives orders to reduce the place, and in March 3.
less than two weeks puts in an appearance
at New Madrid. He has some twenty thousand men, well
equipped and officered. The enemy is under command
of General McCown, later replaced by General Mackall,
with a much inferior force.
The Mississippi here makes one of its gigantic double
loops. Island No. 10 lies at the bottom of the southerly
loop, and New Madrid at the bottom of the northerly.
Across the isthmus of the upper loop is about three miles ;
across the lower, four. In rear of Island No. 10 on the
mainland to the south is swampy ground, making exit pos
sible only by the river, by New Madrid, or by a single road
at Tiptonville. Pope's first effort is devoted to rendering
New Madrid untenable, by effecting a lodgment at Point
Pleasant below the town, and by erecting
J ° March 6.
siege batteries near New Madrid so as to cut it
off from its source of supply. By this action he compels its
29

30

BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1862.

March 14.

surrender. Commodore Foote now comes
upon the scene from above, and supplements
Pope's efforts, by attacking the defenses of Island No. 10

New Madrid and Island No. 10. March, 1862.

with his heavy guns. The river is exceptionally high;
gun-boats can fire across country. The possession of
the river and of New Madrid has left the enemy only
the Tiptonville road to escape upon. To secure this,
Pope must procure transports to get his men across the
river. The transports are all above Island No. 10 and
cannot be run past the batteries. With gigantic labor a
• canal is cut across the isthmus, through heavily wooded
country, from a point opposite New Madrid to that place,

1862.]

NEW MADRID AND ISLAND NO. 10.

31

and the transports are floated through, thus
escaping Island No. 10. Two gun-boats
run the batteries. Pope transfers Paine's division to the
Tennessee shore, and Foote again attacks with his flotilla.
Entirely cut off from succor or retreat, the whole force
surrenders, consisting of seven thousand men.
Pope received hearty congratulations for this brilliant
exploit, which had lasted but thirty days, and accomplished
such excellent results.
In Missouri General Curtis still held all the ground
which had been gained, against Price and Van Dorn,
defeated the insurgents, and drove them into the Bos-

Pea Ridge. March 5-8, 1862.

ton Mountains in the north-western part of Arkansas.
They here accumulated a motley force of not far

32 BIRD'S EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1862.
from thirty thousand men. Curtis had but eleven thou
sand. But in a two days' conflict at Pea Ridge (Confed
erate "Elk Horn") in which Van Dorn
commanded the enemy, Curtis defeated him
with a loss of three thousand men. Ours was much less.
Price, before the commencement of the battle, had
managed to get into Curtis' rear, and stood across the
post-road, his only line of retreat. This obhged Curtis
to change front to rear. The first day's combat was dis
advantageous to the Federals ; they were placed where
they must beat the enemy or surrender. The Confeder
ates had met with heavy losses, and on the second day
did not exhibit the discipline of the first. Sigel was
thrown upon their flank, and after brilliant conduct on both
sides, Curtis wrested victory from a desperate strait.
This good fortune definitely relieved the Federals of any
anxiety regarding Missouri, and did great credit to Curtis'
endurance and capacity.
After this campaign the enemy never made his appear
ance in force in that State. Curtis shortly undertook a
march across country to the Mississippi
July 9. river, and arrived in due time at Helena,
Ark. During the spring and summer of this year the Depart
ment of Missouri was under command of
June to September. General Schofield. But there were no
larger operations, though numerous bodies of guerillas, and
some organized forces, were dispersed, and the State was
brought to a condition of greater quiet under his sensible
and vigorous administration.

VIII.
THE BLOCKADE.
WITHIN the territory of the Southern Confederacy
there was an abundance of corn and cotton. The
former sufficed to feed the people and the armies. The
latter was useless unless it could be marketed ; for there
were no cotton factories in the South. If the Confederacy
could sell its cotton at its vastly appreciated price in the
English marts, it could buy materials of war which might
help it indefinitely to prolong the contest. Cost was the
last thing thought of in the manufacturing towns abroad,
which must have the raw material, or starve ; and the
exceptional profit to be made in this traffic induced
numberless vessels to ply from European ports, or
from Nassau, Havana, and Bermuda, to the Southern
outlets, laden with all manner of goods, from Arm
strong guns to quinine, which they could exchange for
cotton. The United States adopted the usual military means of
preventing this trade by employing its abundant naval
resources to blockade the Southern ports ; and the embargo
was more or less effective during the whole war. Still,
many merchantmen did manage to run in and out of
33

34 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR.
Southern ports, and yet other vessels, built and armed in the
Confederacy and abroad, preyed upon our commerce under
letters of marque from the Confederate Government. By
the latter these cruisers were regarded as men-of-war.
We called them pirates, because we denied the validity of
their commissions. These vessels captured all merchant
men sailing under American colors, and sold or destroyed
them and their cargoes. We kept a fleet on all the great
highways of commerce to prevent this depredation, but
only partially succeeded. The eventual result was that our
merchant marine was ruined. In 1861 we were the great
ocean-carriers of the world; by 1865 nearly all freight
was carried in English bottoms.
Our navy at the outbreak of the war was in very poor
condition ; but with the greatest vigor it was at once
taken in hand, and the gaps filled temporarily, until more
substantial vessels could be constructed. Craft of all
kinds were pressed into service ; even ferry-boats made
up into effective men-of-war. A converted Fulton ferry
boat captured the "Circassian" off Havana, — an ex
ceedingly valuable prize. The types of vessel which came
mostly into use were converted merchantmen, sloops, gun
boats, double-enders, and iron-clads.
To declare the Southern ports blockaded was a bold
step with the limited means at our command. The recent
Declaration of Paris had been to the effect that, to be
binding, a blockade must be a substantial danger to the
a i ot ,oc1 Passers in and out- Still, with our national
April 27, 1861. adaptiveness to circumstances, we managed,
after announcing the blockade in the spring, to make it

Longitude

— ^iSP

.CityToint

THE BLOCKADE. 35
de facto during the summer, and at the most important
points within a month.
The theory of the United States was, of course, that the
Southern hostilities were an insurrection, and not a war.
But the enormous extent of the uprising obliged us to
construe this theory very liberally, and to do many things
on a war scale. The position was often inconsistent, but
was fairly well maintained. By 1864 we were blockading
a coast three thousand miles in extent, — a thing utterly
unprecedented. The blockade was naturally not heard as much of as the
land operations, nor had it the same effect in suppressing
insurrection ; but it necessitated a vast amount of hard
ship and danger. Nor must its services be under
rated. There were often naval fights of importance with
vessels built in the blockaded ports to run out and break
up the emhargo. A typical combat was that between the
Atlanta and Weehawken. The former left June 17, 1863.
Savannah to attack the blockading fleet.
Much was expected from her efforts. But she fell foul
of the Weehawken, whose heavy ordnance proved quickly
too much for her. In fifteen minutes, and with but five
shots from the 15-inch guns, she was disabled and capt
ured. It must not be forgotten that this was still the day of
the old naval regime. To-day a navy cannot be created
in less than a dozen years ; then, the wooden ship was
still the type of fighting craft, and a few weeks sufficed
to convert a merchantman into a very useful man-of-war.

LX.
EARLY OUTSKIRT OPERATIONS.
THE briefest mention of the principal outskirt opera
tions must suffice.
Hatteras Inlet had become a place of much resort for
Confederate cruisers and blockade runners. To break up
this rendezvous, General Butler, whose military reputation
was then still reasonably intact, and Commo
dore Stringham, with a land force and small
fleet, were despatched thither from Fort Monroe. After
a bombardment of two days, the forts protecting the
Inlet were captured and garrisoned by our troops. Be
yond this nothing was undertaken.
Fort Pickens, near Pensacola, had at the outbreak of
the war been preserved to the Union, and was held by a
October 9, small force of troops. Some interchange of
November 22-23. hostilities took place at this point, with no
result beyond giving us a yet firmer foothold, which was
not, however, utilized to push operations into the interior.
In this same month fifteen thousand men, under corn-
October and mand of General T. W. Sherman, and in con-
November. TOy of Admiral Dupont, were sent to Port
Royal, S.C. Fort Walker, on Hilton Head, was capt-
36

1861-2.] EARLY OUTSKIRT OPERATIONS. 37
ured by the fleet, and Beaufort, S.C., abandoned by the
enemy. Sherman fortified Hilton Head, and Dupont took
Tybee Island at the entrance to Savannah. But no orders
were issued for following up these successes, and whatever
could have been accomplished was forfeited. General
Parke captured Fort Macon, defending April 26, 1862.
Beaufort, N.C., while Reno made a
barren expedition towards the rear of Norfolk.
Early in the new year Burnside and Goldsborough, with
twelve thousand men and a fleet of light- January, 1862.
draught gun boats, set sail for Pamlico and
Albemarle Sounds, N.C., with a purpose similar to the
Port Royal expedition. General Wise commanded the
Confederates at this point. After much danger from
storms, and delay from the difficulty of passage into the
Sound, Roanoke Island was captured, and a portion of
the fleet took possession of Elizabeth City. February and
Later New Berne was taken by Foster, as March.
well as the town of Washington near by. But again no
sensible demonstration into the interior was attempted.
About the same time Capt. C. H. Davis made a recon
noissance of Fort Pulaski, the main defense January, 1862.
of the city of Savannah. As a consequence,
some works were erected on adjacent islands, for the pur
pose of isolating Pulaski ; and, two months after, Wright
and Dupont visited and garrisoned several
1 . March, 1862.
points on the coast of Florida.
General Hunter succeeded Sherman. Gilmore was the
engineer officer in immediate charge of the March, 1862.
operations against Fort Pulaski. After

38 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1861-2.
some time spent in preparation he got ready
pl 'to begin his bombardment from Tybee Island,
and two days sufficed to reduce the place. Thenceforth
Savannah was isolated from the outside world.
The fight between the Merrimac and the Monitor —
the first combat of iron-clads — opened a new era in naval
warfare. The Merrimac had been built in Norfolk. She
was a huge, iron-plated, casemated hulk, whose armor could
resist all artillery then known. She was probably not
seaworthy enough for a cruise ; but she could make her
self mistress of the Chesapeake ; she would have prevented
troops from landing on the Peninsula ; and she might have
approached and bombarded Washington. Great apprehen
sion was felt about her. The only worthy antagonist of
this terrible vessel was the Monitor, — a low-decked craft
with a turret, " a raft with a cheese-box on it," as she was
laughingly called, — Which was building at the same time
in Brooklyn. The contest was as much a race between
mechanics at the start, as between seamen at the close.
The earliest constructed vessel should win the laurels.
The Merrimac made her appearance first. Leaving Nor
folk she steamed for Newport News, near
March 8, 1862. r
Fort Monroe, destroyed the United States
frigates Cumberland and Congress, and forced the Min
nesota aground, before the Monitor came up. The latter
reached the scene of action during the night. Next day a
gallant struggle ended in what has been called a drawn
battle ; but the Merrimac put back into Norfolk disabled.
She had been "neutralized," and the class of iron-clads, of
which the Monitor was the first, became the type from

1861-2.] EARLY OUTSKIRT OPERATIONS. 39
which grew a large fleet. We could fairly claim the
victory, as the Monitor had nipped the career of the
Merrimac in the bud.
The blockade at New Orleans had been peculiarly dif
ficult to keep intact, and several privateers, as well as many
merchantmen, had been able to break Oct.-Dec., 1861.
through. Among these the ram Ma
nassas steamed down the river, and made a sudden diver
sion among the blockading squadron; but it was of no
great duration, and quite without result. December.
Towards the close of the year Ship Island,
near New Orleans, had been occupied by Union troops.
General Butler had charge of this department, but had
brought nothing to a head. Admiral Farragut, with
Porter second in command, reached the placer February, 1862.
in the early spring to see what could be
done. The capture of New Orleans would not only exert
a very depressing effect upon the Confederates, but the
city would also serve as a base for operations up the
Mississippi, in connection with those already moving
down.
> The approaches to New Orleans by the main channel
were held by two strong works, Forts Jackson and St.
t Philip, and the river was patrolled by a flotilla. Farragut
moored his mortar-boats below the forts, April 18.
;;• back of a bend in the river, and for six days
bombarded Fort Jackson ; but, impatient to secure the city,
i he determined to try the experiment of running his fleet
;,; past the forts, and thus to isolate them. This was a feat
idi, never before attempted and of questionable result. But, to

40 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1861-2.
the utter astonishment of the Confederates, it was success
fully accomplished, and the next day Farra
gut took possession of New Orleans, evacu
ated by General Lovell on his approach.
Porter shortly afterwards received the surrender of the
forts, — it is claimed, on account of a mutiny
April 28. of the garrison of lort Jackson, — and they
were duly occupied. Butler then took possession of the
city with his troops.
It must be said in praise of Butler, that in provost-mar
shal work, such as he was called upon to perform in New
Orleans, he showed remarkable capacity. The city was
never healthier or in finer condition than under his regime.
There was, however, just complaint against him in matters
connected with trade ; nor did he make the least attempt
to mix suavity of method with strength of action in his
government of the city.
This long series of coast operations, none of which,
except Farragut's, had any immediate effect upon the war,
was yet not without its uses. It was essential to keep up
a strict blockade, for, by the law of nations, none but an
effective one is a blockade at all ; and it was a sine qua non
to forestall any disposition on the part of foreign nations to
aid the enemy. All these ends were subserved to a con
siderable extent. And as the only enlightened military
policy is to concentrate against and destroy the large armies
in the field, it is perhaps well that no greater numbers
were taken from the all-important work, to be frittered
away on minor operations on the coast. Still some of the
expeditions were in such force that they really drained

1861-2.] EARLY OUTSKIRT OPERATIONS. 41
the large armies ; and it seems as if they might have
annoyed the enemy by frequent incursions on a large scale
into the country, thus drawing troops from the armies in
front of those of their comrades who were fighting the
more sanguinary battles of the war, but often to no good
purpose. In the early part of 1862 the Confederate general,
Sibley, undertook a campaign against the
Union forces, occupying the forts in New
Mexico under command of Canby. He advanced up the
Rio Grande, with considerable physical labor, but met with
brilliant success in several combats where his hardy Texans
proved more than a match for Canby's regulars. The con
duct of the regulars did on this occasion no justice to the
splendid record they made for themselves during the war.
But Sibley's triumphs were resultless. He found that
he could not maintain himself in that territory, and he was
eventually forced to abandon it to the Federal forces and
make a disastrous retreat.

X.

THE ADVANCE OF THE WESTERN ARMIES. —
SHILOH.
NO sooner had untiring Grant ruptured the Confeder
ate fine at Donelson, than he proposed to ascend the
Tennessee and essay to break their new defence along the
Memphis and Charleston Railroad. The key points of this
line were Memphis on one flank, with Fort Pillow up the
river as an outpost ; Chattanooga on the other flank, and
Corinth as a centre. While McClellan was making vast
preparations for his Peninsular campaign, Grant quietly
transported his army to Pittsburgh Landing,
March, 1862. , m
on the Tennessee, and Halleck despatched
Buell, with thirty-seven thousand men, from Nashville
across the country to join him. General Mitchel, with a
division, was sent out as a flying left flank to seize and
hold some point on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad,
where the Confederates were not in force. This railroad
was the great central east and west artery of the Confed
eracy. South of it all raihoad transportation had to go
by way of Mobile. And it was of the last importance to
the enemy.
Mitchel, with great celerity, proceeded upon his task,

1862.] ADVANCE OF THE WESTERN ARMIES. 43
captured Huntsrille, and despatched parties
along the road east and west to hold bridges pl
and destroy material of war. Alarmed at his movements,
Beauregard sent a cavalry detachment to operate against
him, while Halleck, apparently unable to handle two
simultaneous problems, afforded him no support. His
position was precarious ; but, burning the bridge at
Decatur, he moved eastward, and occupied Bridgeport.
With proper reinforcements Mitchel could have seized
Chattanooga, and have even raided on Rome and Atlanta,
and there destroyed the foundries and arsenals, — an inter
ruption which would have been of grave consequence to
the insurgents ; but his operations were neglected by
Halleck, as of secondary importance.
Beauregard, who held a species of second command
under A. S. Johnston, had formed certain ambitious plans
for an advance on Cairo and St. Louis. Not so Johnston,
whose soldier's wit told him that the armies in the field
must be first beaten before conquest could follow, and who
preferred to make solid preparation for a decisive struggle
near Corinth.
These movements lead to the first of those desperately
contested battles in which Americans have shown them
selves preeminent. While McClellan is laboriously dig
ging his way into Yorktown, Johnston ad- April.
vances from Corinth, purposing a descent
upon Grant's army at Pittsburgh Landing, before the
arrival of Buell. Grant has under his command forty-
five thousand effectives. Buell is yet two marches dis
tant. Johnston's force is forty thousand men. With a

44 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1862.
suddenness we had in those early days not learned to
o-uard ao-ainst, Johnston falls upon our
Pn army. The onslaught bears our lines back.
We have been taken unawares. The troops are not
well in hand. Grant is, for the moment, absent. Wal-

Shiloh (or Pittsburg Landing). April 6 and 7, 1862.

lace is at Crump's Landing, with seventy-five hundred
men, useless for the emergency.

1862.] AD VANCE OF THE WESTERN ARMIES. 45
Johnston's plan is simple. Attack constantly by the
right and drive the Federals from the Landing and into
the angle made by Snake Creek and the river. Beaure
gard, Hardee, Bragg, his lieutenants, are well able to
second him. The onset is full of fire. Sherman, on our
right, struggles manfully to hold Shiloh Church ; but it is
wrenched from his grip. Prentiss is surrounded and
captured. The left is almost crushed. Recognizing the
serious emergency, Sherman, with McClernand to back
him up, fights desperately to hold the road across Snake
Creek, by which Wallace can join them. At this juncture
Johnston is killed. His place there is no one to fill. The
Confederate lines begin to show huge gaps from casualties,
and yet greater ones from stragglers, tempted by the prizes
in the abandoned Federal camps. But the army, still in
line, strikes lustily for its goal almost won, — Pittsburgh
Landing. Happily for us, success itself has disorganized the
enemy's ranks. A number of heavy guns have been
massed at the Landing. The ground is favorable. The
advance brigade of Buell's army puts in an appearance. All
is not yet lost. And Beauregard, who succeeds to the
command, under the impression that Buell is still distant,
and wishing to reform his troops and complete the victory
on the morrow, suspends the battle.
But the situation yet is critical. Buell is near at hand,
but he must be got across the river and on the field.
Sherman, on the right, is in much disorder. The rest of
the Union Army is fairly huddled into a narrow space
near the Landing. Our fortunes still bear a questionable

46 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1862.
aspect, but faint-heartedness possesses no one. Happily,
transports can be procured for Buell ; and by early dawn
on the morrow he is able to put twenty-four thousand fresh
soldiers in array against the wearied Confederates.
The second day dawns. Beauregard
struggles hard to keep what has already
been fairly won ; and bis troops, though decimated, second
his purpose nobly. At one moment, though greatly out
numbered, he succeeds in all but turning the Union left
by the same tactics which won so much on yesterday.
But Buell's men have profited by their rigid discipline.
Their ranks are adamant. They will not be denied. An
order for a general advance is given. Wallace comes
up on the right. Victory shifts to the stars and stripes.
The exhausted Confederates are forced in confusion from
the field.
The losses at Shiloh were thirteen thousand on our side,
two thousand less on the Confederate ; but this does not
count the grievous loss by the death of Johnston. With a
reputation for skill which experience in the Black Hawk
and Mexican Wars, and the expedition to Utah,
had fully warranted, he was deemed by the South the
choicest of her soldiers ; and better could the enemy
have spared thousands of her sons than this one.
Returning to Corinth, unpursued by Grant, Beauregard
heavily fortifies the place. He is leisurely followed up by
Halleck, who has assumed personal command of the forces
under Grant, Buell, and Pope, the latter
May 1. . ' l '
having joined from a projected attack on
Fort Pillow. Halleck very deliberately opens the siege,

1862.] ADVANCE OF THE WESTERN ARMIES. 47
with his forces recruited up to one hundred thousand men,
while Beauregard numbers fifty thousand effectives. Op
erations would have sooner culminated had Halleck left
their direction to his more energetic second in command,
Grant. Corinth was naturally strong, and easily victualled.
By very slow degrees the several divisions worked their
way nearer the town. Beauregard contested every inch,
while preparing constantly for evacuation. Finally our
troops had reached a position from which assault was
feasible. But Beauregard, who had har- May 30.
bored no idea of permanent defense, aban
doned the place as untenable.
This was alleged to be a strategic manoeuvre on his
part ; but in what manner is not clear, for, beyond
detaining Halleck some weeks, he can scarcely claim to
have accomplished any good end by the defense of Corinth,
and the Confederacy lost with Corinth its main line of
communication, east and west. Its voluntary evacuation
seems to be without purpose. A stubborn defense might
as well have been made here as at any other point ; and
to yield the Memphis and Charleston Railroad without a
struggle was surely a lame military proceeding.
The natural result of these successes fol- June 5.
lowed. Fort Pillow was evacuated, and
Memphis surrendered to Davis and the flotilla, after a
smart battle with the Confederate fleet. The
 June 6.
Mississippi river was now open down to
Vicksburg. In little more than a year the western armies had accom-

48 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. 1862.
plished a task to which they could point with just pride.
The public could see the result of their labors, and natu
rally yielded to them the palm. In the East apparently
no gain had been made. The different conditions under
which each army worked were not fully considered. Aa
in all human affairs, the victor wore the crown.

McCLELLAN MOVES TO THE PENINSULA.
OUR attention is now due to the Army of the Potomac.
Since McClellan had been in command the army
had grown rapidly in discipline and efficiency. As an
organizer McClellan was in his element. Few have ever
done more substantial work than he ; and well did the
Army of the Potomac testify to his ability in its subsequent
campaigns. Little memorable had occurred for months,
save the Ball's Bluff disaster narrated below. The
enemy had lain encamped at Manassas and Centreville.
Geary's brigade had obtained a slight success at Harper's
Ferry. Every one was impatient to cross swords in ear
nest. Seven strong divisions garrisoned the fortifications of
Washington, or occupied the banks of the Potomac from
Alexandria up, in all some one hundred and fifty thousand
men. McClellan has seventy-five thousand effec- October 16, 1861.
tives who can be spared for the field. He
reconnoitres with his right wing across the Potomac. No
enemy is found north of Centreville. Stone is ordered to
patrol his front, to ascertain the whereabouts of the enemy
and develop his strength. He sends a regiment across the
49

50 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1861-2.
river at Ball's Bluff, with Baker's brigade in support, to
capture Leesburg. But with singular bhndness he fails to
provide a sufficient means of recrossing in an emergency.
The river is high and the current strong. The advance
regiment feels the enemy near Leesburg and falls back.
Stone insanely crosses more men, two thou-
October 21. sand in all, to follow up what he deems a
success. Without means of retreat, these troops are
attacked by the enemy in force, driven back to the
Potomac, and, before they can cross or scatter, are crowded
upon the narrow banks of the river, below a bluff on
which stand the Confederates. After a gallant attempt at
defense barely one-half the force are able to save them
selves from this slaughter-pen, — a success which greatly
inspirited the South. General Stone is imprisoned to
appease the Northern public.
A handsome combat and victory by Ord,
at Dranesville, a few weeks later, where
about an equal number on each side came in collision, com
pensated partly for this defeat.
After a variety of plans discussed, and manifold delays in
arriving at one satisfactory to the President
March 8, 18S2. °
and himself, McClellan had concluded to
transfer his forces to the Peninsula between the York and
James rivers, and had received the President's sanction to
the scheme. No sooner was this decision reached than Joe
Johnston, who had been in command of all the troops in
front of Washington since Bull Run, evacuated Manassas,
March 9 anc^ anticipated McClellan in his march.
Secrecy was not one of our then virtues.

1862.] McClellan moves to the peninsula. 51
The newspapers were able to publish all prospective move
ments with scandalous accuracy ; and what these were
unable to learn, secession sympathizers at the capital
appeared constantly to unearth for the benefit of their
Southern friends.
Stonewall Jackson, now in command in January, 1862.
the Shenandoah, had essayed a winter
campaign against our General Lander, but when Manassas
was evacuated he fell back up the Valley. General
Shields succeeded Lander, and, desiring to engage Jack
son, devised a plan to lure him back by a simulated retreat.
Followed up by Ashby's cavalry, a stand is made at Kerns-
town. Jackson arrives, expecting to crush a small
detachment. Banks is absent, Shields has been wounded ;
but our troops, well led by subordinates, invite attack, and
inflict on Jackson a smart defeat, with a loss
of five hundred men on each side. Jackson
again retires up the Valley. Even the Confederates
admitted that this eminent soldier had for once been
entrapped, — a thing of rare occurrence.
Vigor half equal to his ability should months ago have
enabled McClellan to crush his enemy at Centreville ; for,
with sixty thousand men, Johnston had for eight months
, bidden defiance to our capital, surrounded with one hundred
and eighty thousand armed men. Such vigor should have
cleared the Potomac of the impertinent blockade. It
should have captured Norfolk, — that nest of Merrimacs
and gun-boats. It should have brought him to the very
gates of Richmond. Had but a part of these results been
accomplished, MoClellan would have enjoyed the full con-

52 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1862.
fidence and support of all in power. But now other
influences were beginning to work. Fremont, for whom
some harmless place must be made, was put in command
of the " Mountain Department," in West Virginia, and
furnished with an army to confront an imaginary enemy.
Banks kept twenty odd thousand men to defend the Valley
against Jackson's eight thousand ; and the President wanted
at lowest fifty thousand men in the immediate vicinity of
Washington, heedless of the fact recognized by all military
minds that to keep the enemy busy was the only sure
defense of the capital.
In consequence of all this no sooner had McClellan
fairly embarked on his expedition than he found a large
part of his available force taken from him. He had
planned a " rapid movement," and had been led to expect
the cooperation of the navy on the York river, as well as
that of McDowell's forty thousand men on the Fredericks
burg route. Both these were to fail him.
With early spring McClellan embarked his troops,
transferred them to the vicinity of Fort
March and .
Monroe, and began to move up the renm-
April. sula. But no sooner was he on the way
than his progress was arrested by some twelve thousand
men, under Magruder, on the banks of the Warwick river.
The position could have been forced without
April 5. L
great effort. In fact, a small body did cross
and effect a lodgment on the other side, and, if supported,
could have held it. But the conduct of affairs was weak,
and this slight check enabled the enemy to arrest the
progress of the entire Army of the Potomac, and cul-

1862.] McClellan moves to the peninsula-

53

minated in the defence and siege of Yorktown. Indeed,
McClellan seems to have anticipated such an event, for he
was accompanied by siege artillery, which in a "rapid
movement " would seem superfluous.
But, being checked, he sat down to capture Yorktown by
regular investment, all of which was done with scientific
accuracy. Still, no sooner had he completed his parallels
and got ready to bombard the place, than the
enemy evacuated it. They had detained us
a precious month. Our columns followed on in pursuit,
McClellan remaining in Yorktown, busy with questions
of transportation.

May 3.

Williamsburg. May 5, 1862.
The enemy under Longstreet had awaited our approach
at Williamsburg. Hooker first attacked, having been
brought to a stand by a work known as Fort Magruder,
and kept up a heavy pounding all the fore
noon. Kearny came to his rescue when
Hooker's men were all but spent. Hancock moved

May 5.

54 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1862.
around the enemy's left, seized some abandoned redoubts,
and made a brilliant diversion. But there was no coopera
tion in our attack ; no one on the field was in supreme
command, and the day was fruitlessly spent in partial blows.
The enemy retreated at night. Our loss was two thousand
two hundred ; theirs some six hundred less. McClellan then
leisurely moved up the Peninsula on the east side of the
Chickahominy. Franklin moved as a separate body up the
York river, intending a demonstration from White House.
None was made, the enemy having passed
May 7. this vicinity in his retreat before the Fed
erals were ready to attack.

XLT.
THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN IN JEOPARDY.—
FAIR OAKS.
WHILE all this is taking place, Jackson, who seems
to have been created especiaUy to
become the unknown quantity in the problem
of the Army of the Potomac, again begins, with twenty-five
thousand men, his restless manoeuvring in the Valley.
A glance at the map will show the peculiar relation of
the Shenandoah Valley to the Virginia campaigns. Lying
between the two ranges of the AUeghanies, and running
down in a north-easterly direction towards the Potomac,
this valley not only afforded the enemy a hidden and secure
means of marching from their base at the upper end down
towards Maryland and Pennsylvania, at the mere expense
of watching the eastern gaps to hold in check detachments
, from the Army of the Potomac, but led their column for
every day's march closer to the rear of Washington ;
while a march up the Valley, on the contrary, was taking
a Federal army further away from the vicinity of Rich
mond. To the Confederates the Valley was a sally-port
which we must be constant in watching. Its strategic
value to the Confederates^was often great ; but this was
55

56 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1862.
not all. The Valley was also the granary of Virginia ;
for no portion of her soil yielded such abundant harvests
as the smiling plains along the Shenandoah. No wonder
the Confederates clung tenaciously to its possession.
As usual in the Valley, our forces were on this occasion,
also, scattered about in detachments which could not sus
tain one another. -Moving the Army of the Shenandoah
sharply upon Milroy and Schenck, Jackson
May 8. inflicted upon them near the town of
McDowell, despite four hours' resistance, a defeat which
forced them sharply back. He then turned upon Banks,
who prudently and promptly retired. Following him up,
Jackson fell upon one of his detachments at
May 23. Front Royal, destroyed it, and sent Banks,
May 25. after a stinging defeat at Winchester, whirl
ing back to the Potomac.
Bred of unreasoning fears for the safety of Washing
ton, action was immediately taken by the President,
upon receipt of the news of Banks' defeat, to deprive
McClellan of the assistance of McDowell, against the
protest of both. The latter, who with his forty
thousand men was to have reinforced McClellan's
right as a flying wing, and would have added moral
strength far beyond the actual assistance, was hurried to
the Valley to assist in " trapping Jackson." This blow to
the morale of the army, or rather of its commander, weak
ened still more the conduct of this campaign.
McClellan had reached the Chickahominy,
and crossed with his left wing. He had been building all
his hopes upon McDowell's aid on his right.

1862.] PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN IN JEOPARDY. 57
Nor was McDowell's march to the Valley of any avail.
Jackson was the last man to be trapped. Fremont moved
upon him from the west ; Shields from the east. But the
bold raider, determined to complete the scare at Washing
ton, which was so rapidly spoiling the prospects of the
Peninsular campaign, made a diversion on Harper's Ferry,
paused but to make capture of abundant stores, and
reached Strasburg in advance of Fremont, who was to have
closed that outlet as Shields actually did the one at Front
Royal. Jackson amused Fremont by a few demonstra
tions, while he got his columns and trains beyond reach,
and started up the Valley. Pursuit was made ; but Jack
son's marching capacity was beyond theirs, as it was
beyond that of any other soldier during the war,
and, though harassed by our cavalry, he reached
in due time Port Republic. Here he was antici
pated by CarroU's brigade, and had this June 7.
officer destroyed the bridge across the
Shenandoah at that point, Jackson's safety would have
been seriously compromised. But in war no man's judg
ment is infallible, and the situation at other points is rarely
known. The bridge was left standing. This mistake gave
Jackson the opportunity to drive Carroll away and occupy it.
Jackson was now beyond danger, his means of retreat
being assured. But, like himself, he could not leave
without dealing a final blow. While his lieutenant,
Ewell, defeated Fremont at Cross Keys, June 8 and 9.
with a loss of seven hundred men, Jackson
crossed the Shenandoah river at Port Republic, burned the
bridge behind him, and attacked Tyler and Carroll, who

58 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1862.
had a bare quarter of Jackson's twelve thousand men.
These brigades held him in check many hours, but were
finally driven into retreat.
In this short passage of arms Jackson had lost but six
hundred men, and had kept three armies playing at hide-
and-seek, the presence of but one of which might have
turned the tide of victory towards the banners of the Army
of the Potomac. So soon as the enemy had left the Valley,
Fremont, Banks, and McDowell, each retraced his steps,
disheartened and decimated by useless countermarching.
The effect, meanwhile, of this brilliant campaign was to
sink McClellan's offensive on the Peninsula to the rank of
mere self-protection ; and the Battle of Fair Oaks, which
occurred at this time, was but the prelude to the Seven
Days' Retreat.
Following the thunderclap of McDowell's detachment,
McClellan sent Fitz John Porter to clear away a Confed
erate force threatening his right at Hanover Court House,
under command of Branch. This was ac-
May 27. complished in Porter's usual good style;
the road to our forces at Fredericksburg was opened, and
some bridges over the Pamunky and South Anna rivers,
by which the enemy could approach our rear, were
destroyed. McClellan had thrown Keyes' corps across the Chicka
hominy, followed by Heintzelman's, leaving Sumner's,
Franklin's, and Porter's on the left bank. Unless the
means of crossing the river were reliable, and so ample
that the wings could have mutual support in any emer
gency, this was a dangerous division of the army. The

1862.] PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN IN JEOPARDY.

59

reports showed a total of one hundred and twenty-five
thousand men and two hundred and eighty guns.
Johnston, -tvhose forces had been recruited from every
section of the Confederacy to help him meet the imminent
danger to its capital, found himself in command of about
ninety thousand men. For the defense of Richmond this
was a fair match for the Army of the Potomac. Johnston
wisely determined to take summary advantage of McClel
lan's perilous situation astride the river, and to attack the
isolated left wing. He had just received information that

Fair Oaks. May 31-June 1, 1862.
McDowell had been arrested in his movement to McClel
lan's aid, and sent to the Valley. He ordered the bulk of
his force to fall upon Keyes and Heintzelman, while a
small body watched the crossings of the Chickahominy
above to prevent a junction by the other three corps. Our
left wing had entrenched at Seven Pines, just beyond Fair
Oaks, and had daily indulged in picket skirmishing with
the enemy.

60 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1862.
In pursuance of these orders Longstreet
May 31' and Hill feU heavily upon Casey, whose divis
ion was in the advance. Huger was to have attacked the
left flank of Casey, by a circuit ; but his progress was ar
rested at streams swollen by ar heavy storm of the previous
day. It is now well proven that Casey's men fought stanchly ;
but they were overmatched and soon driven in ; sad con
fusion took possession of their ranks ; destruction seemed
imminent ; and only by heavy reinforcements from Heint-
zelman were we able by nightfall to reform and hold a line
Dear Savage Station. We had been driven back more
than a mile. The enemy could claim a brilliant victory.
Had he been more vigorous, the two corps, so largely
outnumbered, might have been driven into the Chicka-
hominy. Happily, at the outbreak of the action, McClel
lan had ordered Sumner across the river to sustain the
right of Keyes and Heintzelman, and the brave old
sabreur, after many difficulties and a heavy fight, man
aged to join his line to that formed of the relics of the two
defeated corps, and held Smith in check.
The following morning the battle was
renewed. Longstreet soon comprehended
that the chance of completing his triumph had been for
feited, and did not attempt much ; the Federals not only
held their own, but drove the enemy from the ground
occupied the day before. Had Franklin and Porter
crossed on this day, a vigorous push might have carried
us into Richmond ; but a rise in the river prevented
their so doing. Our loss had been five thousand out of
forty-five thousand engaged ; the enemy's in excess of six

1862.] PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN IN JEOPARDY. 61
thousand out of an equal force ; three thousand men on
each side was the loss of the first day. General Johnston
was wounded. G. W. Smith, who had commanded the
Confederate left, replaced him.
For a term of three weeks' bad weather, McClellan now
waited for the again promised reinforcement of McDowell.
During this period great excitement was created by a bold
cavalry raid of Stuart's, during which he June 13-15.
rode entirely around our lines, and escaped
unharmed after doing some damage to our supplies. Mc
Clellan was still pressing forward his lines toward Rich
mond inch by inch, and every day promising himself an
assault for the morrow. And the last heavy June 25.
picket fight enabled him to gain ground to
within four miles of the Confederate capital. To the un
initiated, success seemed already within our grasp. To
those in a situation to know, the outlook appeared far
from promising.

xm.
THE SEVEN DAYS.
/'"N, ENERAL Lee, who had succeeded wounded John-
V^n ston, took advantage of the lull following Fair Oaks,
and not intending to afford McClellan breathing-time to
recover from the weakness engendered of McDowell's
removal, called upon Jackson to rejoin him from the
Valley ; but at the same time he actually sent him rein
forcements as a blind. Troops were put on the cars in full
view of some of our prisoners in Libby, who were just
about to be exchanged, and these, on reaching our lines,
spread the story of a new operation by Jackson in the
Valley. The corps of the Army of the Potomac lay as follows :
Porter, north of the river at Gaines' Mill, Franklin joining
him on the south, with Sumner on his left as far as Fair
Oaks ; then Heintzelman, on to White Oak Swamp, and
Keyes in reserve. This line was in the arc of a circle,
whose centre was at Bottom's Bridge. The five corps
numbered some one hundred thousand men.
Lee had the divisions of Longstreet, A. P. Hill, Huger,
Magruder, and D. H. Hill, about seventy thousand, not
counting Jackson, who was to join with twenty-five thou-
62

1862.]

THE SEVEN DAYS.

63

Seven Days. June 26-July 2, 1862.

sand more. Huger and Magruder were opposite Sumner
and Heintzelman. A. P. Hill confronted Franklin, while
Longstreet and D. H. Hill lay in reserve. Jackson,
never loth to be afoot, leaving a simple rear-guard at

64 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1862.
Harrisonburg, to keep up appearances and deceive some
sixty or seventy thousand men who were watching him, put
his men aboard the cars, joined the Richmond
forces, and marched around McClellan's right
at Mechanics ville, ready to further Lee's plan of crushing
his opponent's flank.
Meanwhile A. P. Hill fell upon our right at Meadow
Bridge. McCall made a stubborn resistance, inflicting
grievous loss upon the enemy, but at night he was with
drawn to Gaines' Mill. Next day McClellan received the
enemy's assault at the latter place. The blow lit on
Porter, whose task was to prevent the Confederates from
crossing the river. Lee was manifestly in earnest. He
intended no child's play. Porter was reinforced by
Slocum's division, and had nearly thirty thousand men,
including a body of regulars. Longstreet, A. P. Hill,
D. H. Hill, and Jackson were twice as
June 27. many. Porter had the advantage of posi
tion on heights in front of Grapevine Bridge ; but was
isolated, and with a defile in his rear, — a critical
situation in case of disaster. The enemy's attacks
were furious to the last degree, but Porter's line was
tempered steel. Not until nightfall was any
June 27. . ° J
breach made in his ranks ; nor could the
enemy penetrate the one they made. His loss was seven
thousand men ; Lee's, seven hundred more. Stancher
defence to more brilliant assault was never made.
While this was going on beyond the river, Magruder
hammered away at the force south of the Chickahominy, to
engage McClellan's attention, and prevent his sending

reinforcements to sore-pressed Porter. In this he was
successful. Porter withdrew during the night and burned
the bridges.
While the battle of Gaines' Mill was in progress
McClellan might have swung his left into Richmond,
whose defences were sparsely held while the bulk of Lee's
army was in action north of the Chickahominy ; and it
was for this object that gallant Porter beheved that he was
fighting his single corps against Lee's army. But, still
again, McClellan was misled by his secret-service chief as
to the number of the enemy, as he had been often before ;
and believing that he had one hundred thousand men
between himself and the Southern capital instead of Magru-
der's mere handful, he sat down to figure out the itinerary
of the predetermined retreat to the James river, in lieu of
pushing through this film of troops and into Richmond.
It is true that McClellan always contemplated as a
possibility a change of base to the James ; but he surely
never dreamed of making it under such immense pressure.
Lee had based all his estimates upon McCleUan's retreat
ing by his right over the road he had come. But
McClellan's manoeuvre was by his left, thus frustrating his
opponent's calculations and robbing his pursuit of two
days' initiative. This was a great, but very natural, error
on Lee's part. His intuitions were, as a rule, singularly
near the truth.
The base at White House was abandoned ; supplies
were sent round to the James by transports, and all
unremovable stores were burned. Eight days' rations and
a large drove of beeves were sent on ahead. The hospital

66 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1862.
at Savage Station had to be abandoned. It contained some
twenty-five hundred sick and wounded, with surgeons and
attendants, who had not yet been transported to White
House. The enemy behaved with humanity to these men.
Keyes led the advance, protecting the right flank of the
interminable line of wagon-trains. The
June 28. .
first day passed without any serious action.
To the enemy it was a wasted day, owing to Lee's error.
He had put his forces still further down the left bank of
the Chickahominy in imaginary pursuit.
Porter followed Keyes. Next morning
June 29. J &
these two corps, with McCall and Slocum,
stood at Glendale. Huger alone was in their front, and
throughout the day no shot was fired. Huger was kept
diverted by a curtain of horse. But Long-
June 29. street and Hill, as soon as Lee had dis
covered his mistake, retraced their steps by forced marches,
crossed the Chickahominy by New Bridge and took post
in rear of Huger ; while Jackson still remained at work,
rebuilding Grapevine Bridge.
Sumner and Smith, of Franklin's Corps, could not
escape a heavy combat with Magruder at Allen's Farm,
and another at Savage Station. They must fight to secure
the retreat. Heintzelman, who was on Sumner's left,
extending down to White Oak Swamp, in lieu of sus
taining them, left his two brother-officers to bear the
brunt of the action, and began, before he was so
ordered, to move his corps through the swamp, along
a second road which had been happily discovered
by Kearny. As good luck would have it, Jackson

1862.] THE SEVEN DAYS. 67
had not reached the ground. Rebuilding Grapevine
Bridge was an all day's job. At night- June 29.
fall, Frankhn crossed the swamp, and, last
of all, old Sumner, loth to leave.
Lee's cavalry was absent at White House, — a circum
stance which saved us much complication. As soon as the
other corps began to arrive at Glendale, Keyes was moved
down to Turkey Bend. Porter edged to the left, making
room for the third corps. Franklin defended White Oak
Bridge against Jackson. Lee now hurled Longstreet and
Hill, with Huger and Magruder in support, down the
three avenues which tapped our line, massed along the
Quaker Road. Foreseeing the imperative June 30.
need of securing Malvern Hill, McClellan
moved Porter down to that point.
Our line, weU posted at Glendale (Confederate
" Frazier's Farm ") , stoutly resisted the attacks of the
enemy, which fell particularly upon McCall. But once
during the day was a break effected by the Confederates,
and Kearny promptly filled the gap. Thus Franklin was
holding Jackson at bay at White Oak Swamp, while
Sumner and Heintzelman repulsed the vigorous onslaught
of Longstreet and Hill.
At night all the corps retreated to Malvern Hill. The
seven bloody days were to end here. Our July 1.
troops occupied a high plateau, and were
disposed in convex order, with the flanks resting on the
river. We were warmly sustained by the fire of the gun
boats in our rear, whose heavy shell passed over our heads
and exploded far beyond in the enemy's columns. It was

68 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1862.
here that the Army of the Potomac received the parting
onsets of the enemy. These were dehvered in an isolated
manner, though ftdl of Southern elan. But, desperate as
were these assaults, repeated at intervals during the entire
day, and hardy as was the courage of the assailants, no
impression could be made upon our ranks. Lee retired,
weary and in confusion, from the field. The Army of
the Potomac had been saved.
During the seven days' operations the enemy, who had
been the attacking party, lost over twenty thousand men.
Our loss was under sixteen thousand. Brilliant as had
been the conduct of the Confederate army, its performance
fell short of satisfying the Richmond public, which
demanded the annihilation or capture of the Army of the
Potomac. The insatiability of nations for the results of
military skill and endurance is hard to be explained.
The impossible alone appears to equal the anticipations of
laymen ; and, were the impossible accomplished, more
would be apt to be demanded. Even old soldiers, famil
iar with the difficulties which hedge about all military
exploits, will often join in this unreasoning clamor, when
not themselves engaged.
In this retreat McClellan showed undoubted ability.
But it was not the ability which accomplishes results.
He could fight for existence, and fight stanchly ; but not
for conquest. And when Halleck, wearing the laurels of his
Western lieutenants, became general-in-chief, it was all
over with the Peninsular campaign. Lee quickly appreci
ated this fact, and at once set on foot a new campaign
towards the old battle-ground of Bull Run.

XIV.
POPE'S CAMPAIGN.
THE Army of Virginia, under Pope, is now to bear the
brunt of Lee's assault, while the Army of the Poto
mac is dismembered and sent back whence it came, to add in
driblets to Pope's effective. To the provoking changeable-
ness of the President and his advisers, during McClellan's
campaign, may be largely ascribed its failure. Who does
not recognize Mr. Lincoln's keen perception of the gen
eral bearing politics should have on the operations in
the field, as well as his military obtuseness ? Harassed
by a people at his back which demanded action, he was
naturally unable to preserve his confidence in a general
who would not act. And before McClellan did act, the
confidence had ebbed away. "General McClellan did not
give to the will of the President and the demands of the
people that weight in the formation of his plans of cam
paign to which they were entitled." (Webb.)
The Western armies are resting on their laurels, well
earned by the recovery of Kentucky, Tennessee, Missouri,
and so material a part of the Mississippi river. General
Pope's overestimated if brilliant success at Island No. 10
has persuaded Halleck to call him to the command of the
69

70 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1862.
Virginia forces. A new army is created for him, and he
is unfortunate enough to open his Eastern
career by a general order so ill-judged as to
rob him from the start of the confidence as well as sympathy
of his subordinates. The new Army of Virginia consists
of the corps of McDowell, Banks, and Sigel — the latter
having been Fremont's — which are all assembled from
their several departments.
McClellan has under his command ninety thousand men.
They are in a position which must compel Lee
July. to stay in Richmond. He urges the capture of
Petersburg, at the portals of which two years later so much
blood will be spilled, and is allowed to believe that his
operations are to be continued from his present base. But
Halleck's will is now law, and Pope is his favorite. The
sacrifices and labors of the Army of the Potomac are
abandoned, and the troops put in motion for Acquia Creek.
Gordonsville is the key to the southern entrances of the
Shenandoah Valley. Anticipating a new march by Jackson
towards his favorite campaigning ground,
Pope directs his scattered forces on this
town. But Jackson gets ahead of him. Lee has been
filling up his attenuated ranks ; he has got together eighty
thousand men. He sends A. P. Hill to reinforce Jackson.
So soon as Lee ascertains that McClellan's forces are
certainly to leave the James, he orders Jackson to assail
Pope's van, at Culpeper, without further delay. Jackson
Au ust 9 advances with twenty-eight thousand men.
Banks meets him near Cedar Mountain
(Confederate "Cedar Run") with less than half this

1862.]

POPE'S CAMPAIGN.

71

force, and, attacking without discretion but with much
vigor, he almost compasses a victory. Jackson retires
across the Rapidan. Our losses are twenty- four hundred,
against thirteen hundred of the enemy's.
Lee now moves Longstreet to the new field of operations,
while one-third of the Army of the Potomac is on the march
to sustain Pope. Overrating the numerical
-r, August 17-18.
superiority of Lee, Pope follows up the

Pope's Campaign. (1.) August 24, 1862.

opening boast of his campaign by a retreat to the Rappa
hannock. Here, under Halleck's orders, he is committed
to the very hazardous policy of protecting two divergent

72 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1862
hnes in his rear, — one to Washington, whence come his
supplies ; one to Acquia Creek, whence are to come his re
inforcements from the Army of the Potomac ; and he is
promised immediate and large accessions of troops. If
from defeat, or for good tactical or strategic reasons, he is
constrained to abandon the position so taken up, it need not
be pointed out that he thus uncovers either one or both of
these lines. Such a scheme is full of disadvantages if not
positive dangers. It is rarely permissible.
Lee, with Jackson on the left and Longstreet on the
right, advances upon him. Seeing no chance
August 21. . . .
of forcing the river to advantage, Lee orders
Jackson far around the Bull Run range to the left, to fall
upon Pope's flank through Thoroughfare Gap.
It must be remembered that Halleck was keeping both
McClellan and Pope ignorant of the true state of affairs,
while promising the latter reinforcements beyond his power
to send. Pope had partially divined Lee's tactics, but
believed Jackson's destination to be the Shenandoah VaUey,
and proposed to counter this manoeuvre and attack Lee by
crossing the river while he was isolated from his lieutenant.
But the river rose, — as rivers can rise only in Virginia, —
August 22. hy a heavy storm, and Pope had again to
August 23. change his plan. This was done under the
excitement of a swoop by Stuart on Catlett's Station, which
carried off Pope's head-quarter papers, spread alarm among
the whole body of camp followers, and set the War Depart
ment in a panic.
McDowell had arrived at Warrenton. Porter was
marching along up the Rappahannock from Acquia Creek.

1862.] POPE'S CAMPAIGN. 73
Sigel was at Waterloo ; Banks at Sulphur
Springs. Heintzelman sent part of his corps °
on from Alexandria. The men were already leg-weary
and disheartened.
Lee meanwhile had given his troops a long rest while
waiting for Jackson to complete his flank march, and the
rise in the river had enforced some quiet upon Jackson near
Waterloo, before he could safely get his August 25.
corps across.
Pope had it in his power to neutralize Jackson's march
by occupying Thoroughfare Gap. But again he was
slower than the Confederate general. Anticipating a
crossing by Lee, as the waters were subsiding, he began
a new movement to place himself on the Orange and Alex
andria Railroad facing westerly to protect his communi
cations with Acquia Creek. While thus manoeuvring,
new advices as to Jackson being on the march reached him
and almost induced him to make another attempt on Lee
across the river. But his forces were happily too much
scattered to be got in hand.
Meanwhile Jackson, with Stuart protecting his right and
front, after a march of fifty miles in thirty-six hours, de
bouches from Thoroughfare Gap and descends upon Bristoe
and Manassas Stations. Here are Pope's supplies and
munitions of war. Jackson makes an utter wreck of them
all. Up to this moment Pope has appar- August 26.
ently never thought of Thoroughfare Gap.
His consternation is complete, while Washington is at the
end of its wits.
Jackson had placed himself in extreme peril. In all the

74 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1862.
campaigns he conducted under the orders of Lee, he showed
himself peculiarly fond of manoeuvres which can not but
be condemned by the logic of warfare, and which an
opponent who was his equal in audacity and skill could
repeatedly have turned to his all but destruction. But the
celerity of Jackson's manoeuvres, and the fact that he was
never pitted against any antagonist ready to take summary
advantage of his breach of the rules of strategy, saved him
"and his reputation harmless. His genius was as eccentric
as he himself was daring ; his soldierly qualities were of the
highest, and brilliant success stamped him the ablest lieuten
ant of the war. And after all must not the strictest methods
of strategy subordinate themselves to the one rule of doing
the most apt thing at the proper moment ? This Stonewall
Jackson invariably did.
But if Jackson was in danger, so was Pope cut off from
his base. Halleck, aghast, was utterly ignorant as to what
force was in Pope's rear. Franklin had arrived at Alexan
dria and a brigade was sent out to Bull Run to reconnoitre.
Here these troops were waylaid by Jackson and fell back to
Centreville, spreading consternation on every side.
This flank march accomplished in his usual splendid style,
Jackson occupies the old Bull Run battle
August 27. ,
ground and gives his men an ample rest
while he awaits the arrival of his chief. His corps is in the
highest spirits, and each man's haversack is filled with rare
good provender. Pope hurries hither and yon in the hope
of striking the, to him, invisible foe. The two armies are
about to close and wrestle over the familiar ground.
Pope has had good reason to rely on Halleck to pro-

1862.]

POPE'S CAMPAIGN.

75

tect his right and rear. The capture of Manassas unde
ceives him. But he can now make Jackson pay dearly for
his venture by striking him before his chief comes up to
his aid ; for Longstreet has set out to march towards him by
the same long circuit. But he goes to work in the wrong
way. Pope should evidently plant himself between Jack
son and Thoroughfare Gap. This is the one thing needful
to be done, and Gainesville is the strategic key of the op-

Pope's Campaign. (2.) August 28, A.M.

eration. McDowell appreciates the fact and does occupy
both Gainesville and Haymarket. He then proposes to
demonstrate on Jackson and develop his position. All this
is well to the purpose and shows foresight and activity.
Longstreet is thus cut off from Jackson. The Army of

76 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1862.
Northern Virginia is actually in bad case.
August 28. pope o]Jy needg t0 advanCe his left to com
pass absolute success. But a strange infatuation makes him
again conceive a fear for his right flank and robs him of the
power of gauging his advantage. He withdraws McDow-

Pope's Campaign. (3.) August 28, 6 P.M.

ell with other troops from GainesviUe to the vicinity of
Manassas. Exhausted, confused, and dispirited, this new
and puzzling march is made by the divisions concerned.
Only Ricketts remains at the key-point, McDowell having
left him to observe Thoroughfare Gap.
Jackson could ask no better treatment. He has taken
position from Sudley Springs to Groveton, and utilizing
a new railroad grade as defence, he sends Hill towards Cen-

1862.]

POPE'S CAMPAIGN.

77

August 28.

treville as a ruse to draw Pope away. Ricketts is driven
from Thoroughfare Gap at the same moment
he is recalled. King, of McDowell's corps,
has a sharp battle with Jackson's right, but retires at night.
The Federals have lost all they possessed the day before.
Jackson and Lee can now shake hands, while
Pope scarcely knows what has become of all
his troops.
Having blundered away his advantage, the thing for Pope
to do now is to take position north of BuU Run and receive

August 29.

Pope's Campaign. (4.) August 29, Noon.

the enemy on strong ground, where he can be securely
joined by the balance of the Army of the Potomac, and can
rest and victual his men. But he now, at this late hour,

78 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1862.
endeavors to reoccupy Gainesville, so as to separate Lee and
Jackson. Heintzelman and Reno are to pass the stone
bridge. McDoweU and Porter are to go to GainesvUle.
Sigel and Reynolds will be the centre. All this is too late.
Pope is already tactically defeated.
Sigel arrives and attacks Jackson's right.
Starke holds him off; reinforcements come
up, but the combat is not heavy. Longstreet puts in his.
appearance. Groveton becomes the centre of the Confed
erate line, whUe Longstreet works graduaUy around our left.
McDowell and Porter are barred from the road Pope has
ordered them to pursue. Porter faces Longstreet astride
the raUroad. McDoweU gets his corps together and
marches towards the booming of the guns at Groveton.
Pope still hugs the delusion that Longstreet is far away, and
that McDowell and Porter can turn Jackson's right. As
suming that they have actually got at this work, Hooker
and Kearny are thrown upon Jackson's railroad defences,
but repulsed by Hill and Early. Pope again sends an order
to Porter to attack Jackson's right, and again assuming
that he has received and acted on it, once more hurls Kearny
and Reno on the embankment. These divisions capture it,
but being without reserves, must fall back with useless
slaughter. McDowell appears at Groveton and attacks,
but he falls foul of Longstreet's veterans and can make no
impression. Porter remains inactive. He might create a
diversion in Pope's favor by attack, but the operation is deli
cate. His orders are nullified by the facts which Pope ig
nores. WhUe our troops have had the advantage of the no-hiinc

1862.] POPE'S CAMPAIGN. 79
on this day, they are now out of rations and
should be withdrawn. But Pope determines to ugus
fight again on the morrow, with the fifty odd thousand men
left him. He strengthens his right wing by de-
i • i -r-> August 30.
pieting his left, and attacks at noon. Porter is
brought to the centre and launched upon the enemy. His
gaUantry, which no one has ever questioned, can effect
nothing. Lee assumes the offensive. Despite hard blows
the Unionists are forced back all along the fine. Had not
a successful stand been made by a hurriedly assembled force
massed on the Henry House HiU, the disaster would have
been fatal to the Army of the Potomac.
Pope retires to Centreville. August 30.
Here Jackson again outflanks him. By a August 31.
march around his right to Chantilly, he is nearer Fair
fax than Pope. A still more hurried retreat towards
Alexandria foUows. Pope is barely saved from this new
destruction by the successful head made against Jackson at
the battle of Chantilly by the divisions of Kearny (in
making which this vreux chevalier's life „ , ,
° -* September 1.
is lost) and Reno.
During this campaign we lost fourteen out of eighty
thousand men ; the enemy nine out of fifty-four thousand.
Thus, despite the gallantry of the troops, the Federals
have been sent whirling back towards the capital, having
fought half-a-dozen battles to no purpose whatsoever. Lee
can not further follow Pope. He must also revictual his
army, and give his gallant men time for recuperation.
Pope should not be held alone to blame for the issue of
this campaign. He was brave, light-hearted under adver-

80 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1862.
sity, and sanguine. That he was unable to cope with Lee's
steady purpose and Jackson's splendid marching capacity
must not rob him of what he fairly deserves. He was
utterly outgeneralled ; he never knew where his enemy
was ; he fought to no purpose. But when he did fight, it
was with a will beyond his discretion ; and he would have
cheerfully marched out again to meet his late antagonists so
soon as he had reached the protection of the defences of
Washington. It was HaUeck's secretiveness, and his
illusory promises of reinforcements, dangerous because he
kept the actual facts both from Pope and McClellan so that
neither could sustain the other, that were the actual causes
of failure ; whUe Pope's lack of power to divine Lee's
manoeuvres and his exhausting energy in parrying the
thrusts he vainly imagined to be aimed at him, were im
mediately at fault. But from Cedar Mountain to Chantilly,
the conduct of our troops stands out in brfiliant relief from
the tactics of their commander ; whUe we cannot sufficiently
wonder at the courage, patience, and muscular legs of the
Southern veterans. Mere words cannot do them justice.
Pope attributed his overthrow to the failure of Fitz John
Porter to obey orders to attack Longstreet on August 29.
Facts now well known exonerate this officer, and his
splendid service whenever called upon has deserved better
of the nation. That Porter should have more definitely
developed, by a reconnoissance in force, the fact, which he
knew by scouts, of Longstreet 's presence in his front, or
perhaps have attacked him as a diversion, is almost the only
criticism that can be honestly and inteUigently brought
home to him by his opponents. And, confronting as he

1862.] POPE'S CAMPAIGN. 81
did, half of Lee's army, unknown to Pope, such a course
might have proved highly disastrous. What other citizen,
during our entire history, ever suffered for so slight an
error? Moreover every corps commander in the army was
at that time in utter daze at the eccentric tactical combina
tions of Pope ; whUe the troops were exhausted, hungry,
and without confidence in their chief.

XV.
BUELL AND BRAGG.
AGAIN to return to the West, where we left the Union
Army to recruit from the fatigues of their successes
against Beauregard. After the fall of Corinth the Confed
erates dispersed their forces over a considerable area. As
Halleck made no effort to follow up his advantages by a
forward movement, this necessitated a simUar disposition
on his part.
It is altogether probable that, starting from Corinth, a
column of ten thousand or fifteen thousand men could have
captured Vicksburg. But enterprise in the field was not one
of Halleck's virtues, and the enemy was able to erect defences
both there and at Port Hudson which checked our opera
tions for at least a year.
When summer opened HaUeck stood at
June, 1862. r
the head of one hundred and seventy-five
thousand men, of which one hundred and ten thousand
were carried on his Morning Report as " for duty." In
addition to this Mitchel was at HuntsvUle on the Memphis
and Charleston Railroad with seven thousand ; Morgan at
Cumberland Gap with nine thousand; and Curtis with
ten thousand more was, after the battle of Pea Ridge, ap-

1862.] BUELL AND BRAGG. 83
proaching the Mississippi river. Our forces were much
elated by recent victories, which had a correspondingly
depressing effect upon the enemy. With this force at his
command, it seems as if Halleck might have marched at
wiU to MobUe and neutralized the entire belt of country
for a hundred nnles east of the Mississippi.
Beauregard was south of Corinth with one hundred and
twelve thousand men, fifty-three thousand " for duty," and
in addition eleven thousand in East Tennessee, with head
quarters in KnoxvUle, and ten thousand in Jackson and
Vicksburg. The Arkansas forces had been ordered to
Corinth against the protest of the governor of that state.
There were two roads open to HaUeck by which to
pierce the heart of the Confederacy ; one down the great
river, one from Chattanooga to Atlanta and beyond. He
had the numerical ability to control both, and each being
a highway to the North, it behooved him to protect both.
The Memphis and Charleston RaUroad was in his hands.
His army was strong enough to divide and yet hold the
keys to each of these strategic routes. The bulk of his
force was stiU disposable for whichever route he might
choose to advance upon.
But HaUeck was feeble in movement. BueU could weU
have been despatched towards Chattanooga to secure what
Mitchel had already seized. This would have left Halleck
plenty of force with which to attack Beauregard. But
Halleck's whole scheme is formulated in his own words :
" I think the enemy wUl continue his retreat, which is aU
I desire."Not so the Confederates. While HaUeck, with his

84 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1862.
forces disjointedly strung out, was losing precious time in
repairs on the railroad and in contemplating his past tri
umphs, Bragg sent his thirty-five thousand men by rail via
Mobile to Chattanooga. This foresight pro-
July 21-30. , , _ . , „ . ,
longed the Western contest indefinitely, and
enabled Bragg to control events until Grant, more than a
year later, had freed the Mississippi and could devote
his active energies to the interior. »
The cards are again shuffled, during which operation
every one is without definite instructions ; there is no one
head, and the Western armies are practically put on the
defensive. Pope is transferred to Virginia,
June 26-27. and Rosecrans is given the Army of the Mis
sissippi ; Buell retains the Army of the Ohio ; Halleck's
questionable strategy in the field is rewarded by the supreme
control of the Union forces in the War De-
July 16-17. partment — work for which he is better fitted.
To Grant's lot falls the Army of the Mississippi in addition
to the Army of the Tennessee, forty-two thousand effec
tives, with which to keep open his communications with
Buell and guard the railroad from Memphis to Decatur.
While Grant and Sherman devote their energies to the line
of the Mississippi, Buell is ordered to regain East Tennes
see, where the loyal population is in extreme suffering.
Mitchel's capture of HuntsvUle and of some hundred
miles of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, which he
had held, together with all territory north of the Ten
nessee River, had been full of possibilities. Had he but
received the authority, he might readily have anticipated
Bragg in taking possession of Chattanooga, and have

1862.] BUELL AND BRAGG. 85
saved much subsequent blood and treasure. For this
town is the key to that entire strategic field.
Buell desired to establish his base of supplies at Nash-
viUe and to make an immediate advance upon Chattanooga
from thence. Halleck insisted on his ad-
. June 15 to Aug. 1.
vancing along the Memphis and Charleston
RaUroad and putting it in thorough repair as he went.
This he did ; but it was the delay so caused which enabled
Bragg to seize the coveted prize, and A. S. Johnston had
weU filled the place with stores when he had found himself
obliged to abandon Nashville months before.
BueU had barely reached a position in which he could
confront Bragg, when the Confederate partisans Forrest
and Morgan began their equally brUliant and troublesome
raids against his communications. These BueU was unable
to meet for entire lack of horse. But he took up a line
calculated to protect NashvUle as weU as to threaten Bragg,
who lay in advance of the Tennessee.
BueU supposed that Bragg would attempt to turn his
right in order to obtain possession of NashvUle. He there
fore concentrated the bulk of his force at
Murfreesborough. Thomas, then command
ing a wing of the Army of the Ohio, whose military intui
tions were as keen as his judgment was reliable, and who was
always the safest adviser either BueU, Rosecrans or Sherman
ever had, was shrewd enough to recognize Bragg's cross
ing of the Tennessee river as a threat to invade Kentucky.
Not so Buell, to his sorrow.
By a sudden movement, Bragg steals a march around
Buell's left through the Sequatchie Valley August 28.

86 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1862.
and marches straight toward LouisvUle,
August 30. whUe KirbySmjtn turn8 Cumberland Gap,
defeats Nelson at Richmond and makes for Cincinnati.
This is all in pursuance of the plan of A. S. Johnston,
which he had pm-posed to put into execution, when, as he
confidently believed, he should have beaten our army at
Shiloh. Thoroughly alarmed, as is also the country, BueU at
once swings his left in pursuit of Bragg, whUe he endeavors
to retain his grasp on NashvUle with his right. Bragg has
the shorter line and the start. But he is
Sept. 14-17. delayed a day or two by the capture of
Munfordville, and by scattering his forces instead of
pushing home. This is a serious fault on Bragg's part.
He fairly holds success in his hand, but forfeits it by
this delay. After some rapid marching and manoeuvring,
BueU enters LouisvUle just ahead of his opponent.
The authorities in Washington have lost all confidence
in Buell. He is summarily relieved from
September 29. .
command and Thomas appointed to succeed
him. But this magnanimous soldier, though far from
always agreeing with the methods of his chief, declines the
proffered honor, and, at his earnest solicitation, BueU is
reinstated. The Army of the Ohio marches out to meet
Bragg, with Thomas second in command.
Bragg expects to defend the line of the Kentucky and
Duck rivers, but divides his forces, leaving Kirby Smith
near Frankfort. Buell makes a demonstration upon
Bragg's communications. After some cautious feeling,
BueU comes upon Hardee with only sixteen thousand

1862.]

BUELL AND BRAGG.

87

THOMAS AND
CRITTENDEN WER
WOT ENC-AbtO

men , at Perry-
ville, where, had
he at once at
tacked he could
have punished
Bragg severely
for this division.
But, owing to
lack of water,
one-half of Buell's
army is distant
from the field,
and he in turn
pays the penalty
of lack of con
centration. Polk
joins Hardee and they both fall heavily upon McCook,
who holds Buell's left, and bear him back.
But they cannot break the Union centre ;
and after a stubborn conflict Bragg retires, leaving
to our forces the field. Our right has not been en
gaged. The loss is : Buell, forty-two hundred ; Bragg
thirty-four hundred ; a fifth of the men actually en
gaged. On being followed up, Bragg re
treats through Cumberland Gap, and leaves
Kentucky and Tennessee once more in our possession.
His retreat ends only at Chattanooga.
What Bragg expected to obtain in Kentucky was a vast
accession of recruits and horses, as did Lee in Maryland.
Both fell short of their calculations, though Bragg carried
off a goodly, train of supplies. Forgetful of what he had

Perryville. October 8, 1862.

October 8.

October 13.

88 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [186k
really done, the South was bitter in its criticism of Bragg's
failure to hold Eastern Tennessee and Kentucky. But his
campaign had really placed him in a position in Buell's
front far superior to the one he had occupied before he
marched for the Ohio, morally and materially. And it
was beyond reason to anticipate his holding any consider
able part of these States in permanency.
Halleck now insists that BueU shall undertake a cam
paign in East Tennessee, still occupied by the enemy. But
Buell alleges the utter impossibility of subsisting his troops
so far from the raihoad, and again concentrates at Nash
ville. Here he is relieved and Gen. Rose-
October 30. -ii
crans is appointed to the command.
During this campaign every one lost confidence in Buell
except his stanch lieutenant, Thomas, who, though he
could have had the command, aUowed his sense of justice
as well as his very singular distrust of the great powers he
possessed to stand in his own light. Thomas desired nothing
less than to have an independent charge. A rare union
indeed of ability and modesty.
Buell was a thorough soldier and a fine disciplinarian.
The effectiveness of the divisions he had led was due to
his care and skUl in organization in as full measure as that
of the Army of the Potomac to McClellan. More than
one soldier of our war acquired fame and achieved success
on a basis less sound than his. But he had served in the
bureau more than with troops, and the marshal's baton was
bestowed upon him too early. Had he possessed the
experience of moderate field command before he worked
in so large a sphere, he might have compassed final success
of much more enduring character.

xvr.
IUKA AND CORINTH.
WHEN Bragg had confronted BueU in Tennessee with
the purpose of operating towards the Ohio, as just
narrated, it became necessary for him to adopt measures to
prevent Rosecrans or Grant from detaching reinforcements
to, or indeed from making a junction in force with, their as
sociate. He therefore sent orders to Price, whom he had
left south of Corinth, to advance upon the Federals and di
vert their attention. Price, deeming himself too weak to
cope single-handed with the Army of the Mississippi, re
quested Van Dorn to lend his assistance to the enterprise.
Grant is meanwhUe anticipating that the enemy wiU
make an attack upon Corinth, where the bulk of our force
is stationed, whUe we have heavy detachments at Memphis
and Bolivar. But Rosecrans' cavalry discovers Price's van
guard in Iuka. WeU aware that Van Dorn September 15.
is at least four marches distant, Grant de
termines to crush Price singly, and feels that he has nu
merical strength enough to divide his forces. He sends
Rosecrans to make an attack upon Price along roads reach
ing Iuka from the south, whUe another column from the
north shall intercept him and if possible drive him back
89

90

BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR.

[1862.

upon the Tennessee river. Grant accompanies the latter
body under command of Ord.
Bad roads and worse maps of the country

September 19.

delay Rosecrans.

^ORD (.NOT £NC.iO
%

Iuka. September 19, 1862

And when he finally does
attack, it is in so
disjointed a way
that only a por
tion of his force
can engage the
enemy. Rose
crans' task is to
seize both roads
running south
from Iuka ; but
he manages only
to reach one. On
the other Price escapes unharmed. The loss on either
side is not far from eight hundred men.
Grant has, all told, some forty-eight thou
sand men, seven thousand being under Sher
man at Memphis, twelve thousand under Ord at Bolivar,
twenty-three thousand under Rosecrans at Corinth, and
six thousand at head-quarters at Jackson.
Price and Van Dorn in due time join their forces, twenty-
two thousand men, at Ripley, the latter as
senior taking command. He is wise enough
to see that a successful attack upon isolated Corinth wUl
thrust Grant back, as Bragg has served Buell, and neutralize
allhis victories. FuU of his purpose Van Dorn with hiswonted
energy moves upon Corinth and marshals his army on the

October 1.

September 28.

1862.]

IUKA AND CORINTH.

91

north-west of the town. His position sev
ers Rosecrans' force from Grant's. Van SePtembcr 30-
Dorn's plan is to feint upon Rosecrans' left, thereby drawing
troops from his right, and then to throw Price upon the
depleted wing and crush it. He attacks. At an early
stage of the battle a gap is opened in Rosecrans' line. Into
this breach Van Dorn is not slow to press. Our left and
centre is borne back, but the right remaining
intact, wheels and threatens Van Dorn's ex
posed flanks. Darkness brings the combat to a close.
The forces of each are about equal. The night is spent
in reforming the troops for the morrow. Van Dorn pur-

October 3.

Corinth. October 3-4, 1862.

poses to assault at dawn, but is belated by subordinates.
When however, he does attack, it is with characteristic
vio-or. Part of his troops actually enter the city, and for

92 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1862.
about an hour cannot be ejected. But Rosecrans holds his
own ; Van Dorn finds that he cannot worst him, and, fear
ing an attack upon his rear, determines on retreat. This
he skilfully effects, under cover of renewed
October 4. attack.
Rosecrans makes no motion to follow. In falling back
Van Dorn runs across Ord at the fords of the Hatchie river,
and had Rosecrans been at his heels, Van Dorn might have
been badly used up. But by ably manoeuvring his rear
guard, Van Dorn manages to elude Ord, crosses the
Hatchie a trifle to the east and escapes.
The Confederate loss and ours were not far from two
thousand five hundred each. We took two thousand
prisoners. Shortly after, Van Dorn was displaced by Pemberton,
while Rosecrans was promoted to Buell's
October 30. .
command. In subordinate positions Van
Dorn rendered excellent service to the Confederacy untU
the close of the war. It is not saying much to assert that
had he remained in command of the Vicksburg forces,
Grant's task would have proved a harder one than with
Pemberton in his front.

s

xvn.
GRANT'S FAILURE AGAINST VICKSBURG.
OON after Farragut had passed into New Orleans, he
moved up the river to Baton Rouge and
-vr i t • • i i • May 8> 1862-
Natchez. In connection with this movement
a land force had made its way to Vicksburg, under com
mand of General WUliams, hoping to capture the place by
a coup de main; but its batteries, during
r . b May 18.
the weeks just elapsed, had been completed,
and General M. L. Smith made show of so good a defense
that Williams deemed it unwise to attack. Farragut having;
run the batteries, then incomplete, both up and down river,
returned to New Orleans. The next month the importance
of the new fortress was the occasion of putting June.
Van Dorn in command.
Subsequently Admiral Porter was or- June 25.
dered up the river by Farragut, and
Williams began to dig the afterwards famous canal, which
its projectors imagined would make Vicksburg an inland
town bv diverting the current of the Missis-
J ° . June 28.
sippi. At this time Farragut again ran the
batteries with his fleet up river, at a loss of some sixty men,
satisfying himself that he could at any time perform this feat.
93

94 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1SG2.
But he was bv no means strong enough to successfully
engage the tons without cooperation of a land force.
The ram Arkansas had been budding in the Yazoo river,
above Vicksburg. Farragut had hoped for a chance to
destrov the vessel ; but the ram eluded his watchfulness.
and sought refuge under the Vicksburg guns, much to Far-
ragut's disgust. He again ran down past the batteries, in
tending to destroy the ram, but vainly. Later he was
ordered back to New Orleans : WUliains re-
Julv 25. turned to Baton Rouge, and Admiral Davis
moved up the river, leaving Vicksburg mistress of the
situation. This invited Van Dorn to make a raid from Vicks
burg on Baton Rouge, which he entrusted to Brecken
ridge. A stubborn resistance succeeded in holding the
city, though WiUiams was killed in the de-
Aufirust 5. " J"
fense. But Breckenridge actually accom
plished his purpose by securing an avaUable point for
another fortress below the mouth of the Red river, to wit.
Port Hudson. Baton Rouge was, in consequence, shortly
abandoned by us. as at the time comparatively of no value.
WhUe Rosecrans was planning a campaign against Chat
tanooga, Grant, in immediate command of the Thirteenth
Army Corps, as it was now called, suggested the capture of
Vicksburg to the general-in-chief. There was a force of
not far from fifty thousand men in this vicinity. With
Halleck's half-approval Grant made a forward move : but was
no sooner under wav than he stopped and de-
November 2. cided to wait for some twenty thousand rein
forcements promised hini. Hereupon Halleck placed aU

1862.] GRANT'S FAILURE AGAINST VICKSBURG. 95
the forces in the Department under his orders, and told
him "to fight the enemy where he pleased."
Grant's fifty-seven thousand men still lay
substantially as they had, with Pemberton in their front.
A threatened complication of serious nature arose in a
half promise extorted from Mr. Lincoln and the Secretary
of War by General McClernand, that the latter should have
a separate command to operate down the Mississippi;
and while Grant and Halleck were planning one thing,
Secretary Stanton and McClernand were secretly confer
ring about another. These cross-purposes were, however,
for the time being, arrested by Grant's mov-
• NoT- 26~27-
rng on HoUy Springs, Sherman at the same
time starting from Memphis, and Hovey crossing from
Helena to threaten Grenada on Pemberton's flank and rear.
Some skirmishing was had with the enemy's outposts, but
without results. Pemberton had established his head-quar
ters at Jackson, Miss., with Van Dorn out as vanguard at
HoUy Springs. All told, he had some forty thousand men
under his command.
Grant's line of operations was long and weak ; he could
get no locomotives nor cars so as to utilize the railroad, nor
did support, moral or material, reach him from Halleck.
He had desired to bring Pemberton to battle, but the latter
retired behind the Tallahatchie. And, lest McClernand
should actuaUy receive the command of the Mississippi ven
ture, whUe he himself was left to fight on the overland route
single handed, Grant devised a new plan. This contem
plated that Sherman should take the bulk of the forces at
Memphis, at once descend the river in transports, and, in

96

BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR.

[1862.

connection with Admiral Porter, assail the works at Vicks
burg, while he himself would push the enemy down the line
of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, and if they retired to
that fortress, endeavor to enter the city with them.

*OB0UVAH\
/ Vpurov

OACri&ON

MILE.*.

fMCRlDIAN

10 iO 30

4-0 :,o

Memphis to Vicksburg. 1862-63.

This double attack was certainly not strategically sound.
None of the attendant circumstances warranted such a divi
sion of forces. But, at that stage of the war, it was not
deemed possible to subsist an army very far from its base,

1SSS2.] <;S.l.Vr'S FAILURE AGAINST VrCKSBURG. 97
nor at all upon the country. And McClernand was so very
uncertain and disturbing a factor in Grant's calculations
that the latter deemed any action preferable to delay.
McClernand meanwhile had received the sole command
of the rivev expedition. But. as it fell out. Sherman got
under way before the news could reach him. About the
same time Joe Johnston was put iu command of all Con
federate forces between the AUeghanies and the Mississippi
river. While Sherman and Porter are moving down the river,
with thirty thousand men and sixty guns, beside the
flotilla of eight gun-boats. Grant pushes forward to Oxford,
while Pemberton retires to the line of the Yallabusha at
the town of Grenada. Grant's line of operations is pro
tected at various points along the railroad by strong
detachments. Van Dorn, now commanding a eavalry
division, and Forrest, the noted Confederate raider, join
forces to operate against Grant's communi-
r - , December, IStC.
cations, and during the last ten days of the
vcar. while Forrest demonstrates against Jackson. Term.,
Van Dorn attacks, and with scarcely any opposition from
its negligent commander, captures Holly Springs, with
lar^e stores of food. arms, and ammunition. Several
important bridges in Grant's rear are at the same time
destroyed. The whole scene is suddenly changed. Grant's advance
is made impossible, for starvation stares him in the face.
He is obliged to fall back to reestablish his base, wlnle
Pemberton in his turn retires to defend Vicksburg from
Sherman and Porter. This raid has not only destroyed

98 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1862.
Grant's supplies, but also his abUity to accumulate more
for the moment. A courier is at once despatched to
Sherman to notify him of this disaster, but does not
overtake him with the news. Grant is ordered by HaUeck
to foUow Sherman down the river. This he proceeds to
do by way of Memphis.
It took all Grant's patience to bear up under this utter
faUure of his campaign, and especially to brook the
appointment of McClernand. But his zeal and activity
never flagged. Grant possessed the rare power of stand
ing firm under the hardest conditions of disappointment or
defeat.

xvirr.
SHERMAN'S FAILURE AGAINST VICKSBURG.
MEANWHILE Sherman, convoyed by Porter and
his fleet on some sixty transports, had reached the
mouth of the Yazoo river. Next day he ^ , „.
' December 2o.
moved up stream to effect a landing, expect
ing that Grant was near at band or else was holding the
enemy on the Yallabusha. Halleck had also promised
Banks' cooperation from New Orleans ; but fortunately no
immediate reliance was placed upon this promise.
A line of bluffs runs for many hundred miles along the
east bank of the Mississippi river. From Vicksburg
north these bluffs leave the river to join it again at Mem
phis. The land between the river and the bluffs is low,
much cut up by bayous, and like to an impenetrable morass.
Its waters all flow into the Yazoo. Some fifteen mUes
above Vicksburg, where the bluff abuts on the Yazoo,
Haines Bluff, as it is there called, is some two hundred
feet high, and all but inaccessible. The ground in front is
of the same low character, and is diversified by the presence
of several small lakes connected by Chickasaw Bayou.
There were no maps of the ground in Sherman's posses
sion. It was terra incognita. And it was equally un-
99

100 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1862.
known to him that strong works had been erected all along
the bluffs, the few approaches to which were specially
defended. Sherman had hoped to get in rear of Vicksburg
by this route ; to cut the railroad and to isolate Pemberton,
whom he imagined at the moment to be confronting Grant.
Our success depended entirely on a surprise. But Pember
ton was actuaUy in Vicksburg and fuUy aware of Sherman's
every move. We were already checkmated, but did not
know it. Sherman has with him four good divisions,
December 28. . .
He makes a reconnoissance, to ascertain the
best point of attack. It is thought that a lodgment can
be effected on the bluff.
Two weU-pushed attacks are made. Some
December 29. .
of the enemy's defences come near to being
taken. But after an all-day struggle to get a suitable force
across the open and up the perpendicular bluffs from which
the resistance of the enemy is steadily maintained, and with
absurd ease, our troops fall back with a loss of nearly two
thousand men. The Confederate casualties are nominal.
Sherman then makes an attempt further up and nearer the
Yazoo, but as Porter can not cooperate with the flotiUa he
is unable to accomplish material results.
This disheartening faUure was not caused by want of
courageous effort or intelligent action. Even had Sherman
taken the bluffs, as he thinks might have been done, it is
doubtful if he could have held them.
Grant's subsequent success goes far to show that a cam
paign overland with aU forces in one body would have come
much nearer to compass the end than these two isolated

1863.] SHERMAN'S FAILURE AGAINST VICKSBURG. 101
attempts by land and water. A division of forces requires
a background of good luck. It can not face bad fortune or
accidents. McClernand now joined the army on the Yazoo and
assumed command under his general orders
, January 4, 1863.
to that effect.
An attack on Arkansas Post had already been planned
by Sherman and Porter, and McClernand as commanding
officer having assented, they now proceeded to put it into
effect. Fort Hindman, as the Confederates caUed it, lay
some distance up the Arkansas river, and was a constant
threat to the rear of any force operating against Vicksburg.
It was at this time garrisoned by some seven thousand men,
under command of General ChurchiU.
The troops embark and in a few days reach the scene of
action. A landing is effected below, and next January 11.
day the heavy guns of the fleet, after a few
hours' bombardment, sUence the artillery in the fort. An
assault is in contemplation when (as it is afterwards claimed
by the enemy, under a mistake) white flags are raised along
the parapet, and the fort is surrendered with nearly five
thousand prisoners. Our loss was about one thousand.
This very brilliant and cheap success was in the nature
of a compensation for the grievous faUure at Chickasaw
Bayou. McClernand arrogated its accomplishment to him
self, and proceeded to project a visionary movement into
the heart of Arkansas. But this expedition was nipped in
the bud by Grant, who under authority from Halleck
ordered the forces back to the Mississippi. McClernand
sullenly obeyed.

XIX.
LEE'S FIRST INVASION. — ANTIETAM.
LEAVING Grant to profit by his failure, and to study
up a new means of compassing the reduction of
Vicksburg, we wUl see what is doing in Virginia.
The natural sequence of Pope's reverse was an incursion
by Lee across the Potomac. Active Bragg had just
marched around BueU's left flank and made his way into
Kentucky. The Army of Northern Virginia had utterly
worsted both McCleUan and Pope. Confederate prestige
was high. In Southern eyes " My Maryland " was groan
ing under the tyrant's heel. And were there not corn, and
horses, and shoes, as well as perhaps recruits, to be had in
exchange for liberation?
No sooner then had the disjecta membra of the short
lived Army of Virginia been gathered within the defences
of Washington, than McCleUan, informaUy reinstated by
unspoken verdict of army and people alike, found it neces
sary to move up the left bank of the Potomac to encounter
the divisions which a few weeks since he had fought within
o
the suburbs of their own capital.
Rather than march on Baltimore, Lee had chosen a cam
paign in the mountainous region of Maryland. D. H. Hill
102

1862.] LEE'S FIRST INVASION. 103
was the first to cross the Potomac, and within three days
the whole Confederate Army was put over, and occupied
the line of the Monocacy.
The disenchantment of the Marylanders at the ragged-
ness of the Southern chivalry was only equalled by the
mortification of these gallant soldiers at their lukewarm
reception, and Lee's campaign from the start wore the
signs of faUure. Harper's Ferry barred his communication
up the VaUey with a garrison of eleven thousand men, and
offered a tempting bait as weU. With reckless contempt
of his foe, Lee once again divided his forces, sending
Jackson back across the river to capture this position.
Harper's Ferry, with Lee in Maryland, was worse than
useless to the Federals. It was a mere key to gates
already broken down. Lee, of course, expected to see
it evacuated. But to HaUeck's soul this position was
always dear. To lose it was to endanger the republic ;
he ordered it held at any sacrifice.
MeanwhUe McCleUan was moving from Washington
into Maryland by his right, reorganizing the crestfallen
but stUl resolute Army of the Potomac as he went. The
troops had received the return of "Little Mac" as a
harbinger of success, though it was a bitter task to foUow
the enemy into loyal territory.
McCleUan occupied Frederick, moving September 12.
with more than his usual caution on account
of HaUeck's absurd fears that he would uncover the
capital. Here unexampled good luck put into his pos
session a copy of Lee's order of march to tember 13
his division commanders. To secure the

104 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1862.
fruit of this good chance he had but to extend his hand.
An immediate march through the then undefended South
Mountain passes would have enabled him to crush Long-
street, separated from Jackson by the broad Potomac.
But McClellan was incapable of moving rapidly. He
loitered till the enemy occupied and he had to force
these passes, at equal sacrifice of men and opportunity.
Reno finds Hill in force in Turner's Gap. Reinforced
by Hooker, a heavy fight enables them to gain a domi
nating foothold. HU1 retires. On the
September 14. .
same day Franklin forces Cobb out of
Crampton's Gap. These two actions, known as the
Battle of South Mountain, cost us eighteen hundred men.
The enemy's loss was much larger, for we captured some
twelve hundred prisoners.
MeanwhUe Jackson has cooped up eleven thousand
Federals in the cul de sac at Harper's Ferry. The
heights on both sides of the river are occupied. The
bombardment begins. But within an hour Colonel Miles,
the commander, who could have cut his way out, as did
his cavalry, surrenders. His death, by almost the last
shot fired, iU atones for this weakness. Jackson, with
a part of his force, at once starts to rejoin
September 16. his chief in Maryland. The rest foUows
after completing the detaUs of the capitulation.
McClellan's inertia had thus permitted Lee to capture
eleven thousand men and to reunite his separated corps.
The Army of Northern Virginia now takes up at Sharps-
burg a strong defensive position, covered by the Antietam.
Lee had over fifty thousand muskets, every one of

1862.]

LEE'S FIRST INVASION.

105

which was as usual put to use. McClellan had eighty-seven
thousand, but he not only failed to deceive Lee as to his
tactical dispositions, but managed to use barely two-thirds
his men, while his successive instead of massed attacks
enabled Lee to fight what English roughs would call a

KttOtSVIULC ^

¦SHEPME.AOSTO

Antietam. September 16 and 17, 1862.
"one down t'other come on" sort of battle. Wherever
engaged, the Confederates were equal to the Federals in
number. The main attack is by the Federal right. Hooker crosses
the Antietam, and opens the battle by a sharp assault on

106 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1862.
Lee's left. Next morning the attack is re
newed, but is stopped by Jackson at Dunker
Church. AU day the tide ebbs and flows over this ground.
Meade and Sumner and Mansfield fight their men to the
best advantage, though in isolated columns. The lack of
single purpose is manifest. Lee heavUy reinforces this
wing. But hard fighting across the Antietam is neutralized by
Burnside's sluggish movement on the left flank. Ordered
to cross at 7 A.M., he barely works out his task, against
feeble opposition, by 3 P.M., when our ex-
September 17. .
hausted right has ceased to struggle, and the
balance of Jackson's corps comes upon the field from the
Harper's Ferry triumph. Both combatants need rest, and
Lee next day withdraws from a tacticaUy drawn battle and
a strategic defeat.
Our loss in this battle of Antietam (Confederate " Sharps-
burg ") was twelve thousand five hundred ; Lee's over ten
thousand. Except ShUoh, no such sanguinary struggle had
stained the sod of the civUized New World.
McCleUan's pursuit was feebler than his critics deem it
should have been. But he had under him many raw troops,
and his best were the men who had been disheartened
by the Richmond faUure and Manassas ; who scarcely now
felt the elation of victory, and were exhausted by labors
such as critics oftener impeach than perform.
Lee crossed into Virginia without losing a
Sept. 18-19. & °
man.
The Confederates had, during the summer of 1862, as
sumed a bold offensive all along the line, at Corinth, into

1862.] LEE'S FIRST INVASION. 107
Kentucky and into Maryland. Each campaign terminated
in disaster about the same time ; by Lee's September 17.
withdrawal from Antietam ; by Van Dorn's „ ,
J October 4.
defeat at Corinth ; by Bragg's check at Per- October 8.
ryviUe. After this date, a strong offensive,
with any chance of success, was never undertaken by the
enemy.

XX.
AGAIN TO THE RAPPAHANNOCK.
THE elation of the North was equalled by the bitter
disappointment of the South at the faUure of the
Maryland campaign. McClellan moved to Harper's Ferry,
but did not attempt to cross the army. As a shadow of
the great struggle, Stuart made a sudden raid into Mary
land and Pennsylvania with a couple of regi-
Oct. 9-12. J r o
ments of horse. He penetrated as far as
Chambersburg, remounted his troopers and retired again
across the river, making the entire circuit of the Army
of the Potomac. Our cavalry was unable to follow or
cope with him, though great efforts were made to head him
off. For some weeks, McCleUan paused to rest and reor
ganize. The Potomac having risen so as to be in the nature of a
protection to Maryland, McClellan began to cross the army,
intending to move down the eastern slope of
October 26. ° L
the Blue Ridge untU he struck the Manassas
Gap Railroad, where he would be in direct communication
with Washington, and successively to occupy all the de
bouches of the mountains. Lee retired up the vallev on
108 ^ J

1862.] AGAIN TO THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 109
the western side of the range. Beyond a successful cav
alry combat by Pleasonton against Stuart November 5.
m the valley, no blood was spUt.
Six weeks after the close of the Maryland November 6.
campaign the Army of the Potomac was con
centrated near Warrenton. McCleUan was ready to move
upon Culpeper. There was good ground for thinking the
prospect brighter than ever before, when suddenly he was
relieved, and Burnside appointed to command.
McClellan " was an excellent strategist, and in many
respects an exceUent soldier. He did not use his own
troops with sufficient promptness, thoroughness and vigor
to achieve great and decisive results, but he was often ei
successful than unsuccessful with them, and he so conducted
affairs, that they never suffered heavUy without inflicting
heavy loss upon their adversaries  There are
strong grounds for believing that he was the best com
mander the Army of the Potomac ever had. . . . WhUe
the Confederacy was young, and fresh, and rich, and its
armies were numerous, McCleUan fought a good, wary,
damaging, respectable fight against it. . . . Not to men
tion such lamentable faUures as Fredericksburg and Chan-
ceUorsviUe, it is easy to beheve that with him in command,
the Army of the Potomac would never have seen such
dark days as those of the WUderness and Cold Harbor."
(Palfrey.)

XXI.
THE HORROR OF FREDERICKSBURG.
FROM McCleUan's hyper-caution, a quahty from which
he seemed to be gradually weaning himself, to
Burnside's utter recklessness, is a disheartening step.
McCleUan had followed up Lee rather charUy, but his
position and plans were good.
Longstreet was but one day's march in our front. A
sudden attack in force might have proven fatal to him, for
Jackson was in the valley, beyond supporting distance.
The Army of the Potomac numbered one hundred and
twenty-two thousand men. McCleUan had purposed to
cross the Rappahannock, drive the enemy to GordonsvUle,
and then, by a sudden movement to the east, anticipate
him in a march on Richmond by way of Bowling Green.
Later events proved the soundness of McClellan's method.
It is dangerous to shift commanders on the eve of battle,
and our cavalry had already engaged the Confederates' ; it
is more dangerous to change the plans of troops moving
in the vicinity of the enemy. But as if impeUed to do
some new thing, for no reason dictated a change of the
movement already in course of execution (which was, by
the way, the first of McClellan's ever approved by Hal-
110

1862.] THE HORROR OF FREDERICKSBURG. Ill
leek) , the new commander of the Army of
the Potomac determined upon a flank move
ment by his left on the north of the river towards Fred
ericksburg. To be sure, the lines of operation and supply by way of
Acquia Creek were shorter, but this was the only advan
tage, and McCleUan's plan embraced this factor when he
should march eastward. Burnside was on the wrong side
of the Rappahannock, and was widening the one great
obstacle in his path for every nnle of distance. Only by
movements equaUy wary and rapid, as weU as by sure
means of crossing the river, could Burnside's manceuvre
possibly succeed. In this last element he counted on Hal
leck, and, of course, faUed. The promised pontoons did
not, and could scarcely have been expected to come.
Arrived at Fredericksburg, Burnside stiU
° November 16-18.
might have crossed by the fords, for the water
was low. And once in possession of the heights beyond the
city, he could afford to wait. But slower than even his pre
decessor, Burnside sat down at Falmouth, on the north
side of the river, whUe Lee, having learned of his move
ment, by forced marches concentrated his army on the
opposite bank, and prepared to erect impregnable defences
in his front.
Burnside had reorganized the Army of the Potomac into
three Grand Divisions, the Centre Grand Division under
Hooker, and the Right and Left under Sumner and Frank
lin respectively. These were in their system of responsi
bility practically separate armies, and robbed the whole
body of elastic force and mobUity.

112 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1862.
Before Burnside got ready to take any active steps,
Marye's Heights, back of Fredericksburg, had been
crowned by a triple line of works, and Lee had brought
together seventy-four thousand troops to man them. Two
canals and a stone wall in front of the left, as well as open,
sloping ground on both flanks, served to retain an attack
ing party for a long period under fire. To assault these
works in front was simple madness. To turn them below
necessitated the crossing of a wide and now swoUen river,
in the face of a powerful enemy in his immediate front, an
operation always attended with the greatest risk, and con
sidered one of the most delicate in war. To turn them above
was practicable, but it was a confessed return to McCleUan's
plan. Burnside chose the first.
Preparations for crossing were begun. The
December 10. better part of three days was consumed in
throwing the bridges and putting over the two Grand Di
visions of Franklin and Sumner, aU of which was accom
plished under fire.
But Lee was by no means unwilling to meet the Army
of the Potomac after this fashion. Such another happy
prospect for him was not apt soon again to occur. He did
not dispute the crossing in force.
Burnside's one chance in an hundred lay in a concen
trated assault sharply pushed home before the enemy could
oppose an equal force. But in lieu of one weU-sustained
attack or of two quite simultaneous, Burnside frittered
away this single chance by putting in Frankhn on the
left and Sumner on the right, without concerted ac
tion. Nearly one hundred thousand men were in line.

1862.]

THE HORROR OF FREDERICKSBURG.

113

Our artillery opens the affair and, as always, proves
superior to the enemy's. From Franklin's December 13.
front Reynolds assaults with a well-massed

Fredericksburg. December 13, 1862.

column. Meade, who is in the lead, drives in A. P.
Hill, but being unsupported, Doubleday and Gibbon having

114 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1862,
been delayed, is hurled back by Early, whose advance is
in turn balked by Birney's division.
In Sumner's front French is arrested at the stone wall.
Hancock comes up and makes a manful struggle to pass it.
Both attacks are easUy repulsed. Hunt with his artUlery
on the north side essays to silence the guns on Marye's
heights. It is too distant for his field ordnance. Hooker
is ordered across. Under protest, and yet Hooker lacked
not stomach for a fight, he obeys the useless order, and
leads his men into the slaughter-pen. Humphreys again
assaults the stone waU with all the gaUantry and coolness
which distinguish him. All is in vain. Even the Army
of the Potomac cannot do the impossible. The defeated
troops are huddled into Fredericksburg, and gradually
withdrawn across the river.
Burnside was insane enough to wish to repeat the assault
next day. But the counsels of his officers prevaUed on him
to desist.
No such useless slaughter, with the exception, perhaps,
of Cold Harbor, occurred during our war, and thirteen
thousand men paid the penalty. The enemy's loss was but
two in five of ours. He had exulted in a fiery holiday.
Well were his paeans sung ! He had been obhged to put
in but a few divisions.
Lee was taken to task for not advancing from his defences,
and completing the destruction of the Army of the Potomac.
But he believed that the attack would be renewed, for he
did not know how heavy our losses had been, and was un-
wUling to risk the advantage of position which had already
gained him so much. The Southern public was quite as

1862.] THE HORROR OF FREDERICKSBURG. 115
unreasonably critical of military events as our own, and
Lee's splendid achievements were scarcely ever appreciated
at a fraction of their true value. In view of the difficulty
to-day, with all the facts before us, of withholding from
General Lee our sincere homage as the great soldier of our
CivU War, of the difficulty we meet in passing any criticism
upon his conduct as a soldier, it seems strange that, during
the war, when it was he, whose unfaUing equipoise and
sturdy courage prolonged the life of the Confederacy from
month to month, many of his feUow-citizens should have
been bitterly arrayed against him. And yet this was the
case. A dispassionate judgment places Robert E. Lee
on the level of such captains as Turenne, Eugene, Marl
borough, Wellington, and Moltke.

xxn.
THE SOLDIER OF NORTH AND SOUTH.
" T | iHERE can be no doubt about the proposition that
-L greater results were habitually achieved by a
certain number of thousands or tens of thousands of Lee's
army than by an equal number of the Army of the Potomac.
The reason for this is not to be found in any difference in
patriotic zeal in the two armies. The first reason probably
was that the different modes of life at the South and at the
North made the Southern soldiers more fond of fighting
than the Northern men. Not to mention the intense and
more passionate character of the Southerner as compared
with that of the Northerner, the comparatively lawless (not
to speak invidiously) life at the South, where the popula
tion was scattered and the gun came ready to the hand,
made the Southern man an apter soldier than the peaceful,
prosperous, steady -going recruit from the North. The
Southerners showed that they felt the gaudium certaminis.
With the Northerners it was different. They were ready
to obey orders, they were ready to do the work to which
they had set their hands, they were ready to die in their
tracks if need be, but they did not go to battle as to a
feast. They did not like fighting. Sheridan, Hancock,
116

1862.] THE SOLDIER OF NORTH AND SOUTH. 117
Humphreys, Kearny, Custer, Barlow, and such as they,
were exceptions ; but the rule was otherwise." (Palfrey.)
Other reasons are alleged. The Confederate soldier was
as a rule Ul fed and clothed, worse shod and rarely had
luxuries. And as a field won meant to him these sadly
needed shoes and clothing and blankets and rations as well
as arms and ammunition, — not indeed to mention money
and other valuables, — this motive may fairly be said to have
weighed also as an incentive to the fight. The very rags and
starvation of the Southerner made him the better fighter and
the quicker marcher. "'I can whip any army that is fol
lowed by a flock of cattle,' said Jackson, and it was a preg
nant saying. " (Ibid.) The Federal was embarrassed by
his riches, and the difficulty of transporting aU he had. The
Confederate was always in light marching order, and all too
often captured his rations on the field.
General Palfrey has struck the key-note of this inter
esting discussion. But there are stUl other reasons. The
marked degrees of the Southern social scale as readUy assigned
to the enlisted man his musket as to the officer his side-arms.
Wherever a regiment was raised, the men who had always
been leaders at home were with rare exceptions chosen
leaders for the field ; they were uniformly the best men for
the places, and the habit of command and obedience was
instinctive. It must not be forgotten, moreover, that the
early conscription laws kept under the Confederate colors
the hardened men, making discipline more a matter of course
than in our ranks where the individual soldiers were con
stantly changing.
That he accomplished more is true. But that the

118 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1862.
Southerner was a better soldier cannot be claimed. Even
Friedrich's regiments at Leuthen showed devotion no
greater than our own battalions at Marye's Heights ; and
desperate as was the Prussians' task as they marched in
parade order upon the Austrians' left flank, had they not
Vater Fritz to lead them, and the pregnant threats of
Friedrich the King to keep them to their work? While
every soldier in the ranks on that fatal thirteenth of
December could see the hopeless nature of his struggle,
and was far indeed from fighting for king and fatherland.
In this most famous of Friedrich's victories he, the attack
ing party, lost six thousand two hundred men out of
thirty thousand, aU of whom were actually, and at the
crisis simultaneously, engaged. At Fredericksburg, with
out incentive, the Army of the Potomac laid at the foot of
the heights ten thousand nine hundred dead and wounded,
out of not much more than sixty thousand men actually in
the assault. Hancock lost two thousand and twenty-nine
out of forty-eight hundred and thirty-four.
Not that the presumption is attempted of comparing the
two battles as such. Leuthen is the most splendid piece
of grand-tactics of the last century, perhaps of modern
times ; Fredericksburg was a tactical blunder of the purest
water. But Leuthen is often cited to show the grand fidel
ity of the Prussian infantry ; in this respect the comparison
is not odious.
Nor is it hard to parallel Fredericksburg more than once
during our war. What shall be said of Grant's " hammer
ing " campaign of 1864, in which the Army of the Poto
mac from May 5 to June 10 lost little short of sixty thou-

1862.] THE SOLDIER OF NORTH AND SOUTH. 119
sand men, killed and wounded, in front of Lee's intrenched
lines, out of a total of one hundred and twenty thousand
under arms ? Or of the thirteen thousand out of forty-three
thousand at Stone's River ? Or of Chickamauga's sixteen
thousand out of sixty-two thousand men on the field ? Or of
Porter's loss of seven thousand out of twenty-nine thousand
at Gaines' Mill? Or of Sherman's loss of thirty thousand
men out of one hundred thousand in his four months' cam
paign from Dalton to Atlanta ? Shall further comparison
be made ? That the elation of the battle-field engendered
of a sunny climate can be offset by the sturdier virtues of
the patient North is the constant verdict of history.
Moreover, in Virginia, it was leadership which accom
plished such results with so feeble resources. Look at
other battle-fields, and, man for man, where commanders
were of equal weight, what difference can be traced? The
arithmetical value of the Southron as compared with the
Yankee, which used to be so constantly rolled as a sweet
morsel under the tongue by our ancient foemen, can to-day,
I ween, be dismissed with a friendly shake of the hand as
we shoulder our crutch for the rising generation, and show
how fields were won.
It is a noteworthy fact that a list of the fifty most severe
battles during the Civil War shows ten drawn and twenty
victories to each side. At the point of fighting contact, in
these fifty battles, the forces were within two per cent, of
being equal.
In thirty-four battles the Union forces remained in pos
session of the field, and buried the enemy's dead ; the
Confederates did the like in twenty-nine. In eleven assaults

120 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1862.
by large forces, the Union troops won ; in eleven the Con
federates drove them back ; in eight the Federals repulsed
such assaults.
The strongest reason for the acknowledged truth that
the Southerner accomplished more with less means than we
did lies in the fact that he was fighting for the preservation
of his own soil. It needs not history to teach us what this
incentive can accomplish. Every bra-ve man carries it in
the deepest recesses of his heart, and reads his willing duty
in the eyes of the wife, the child, the mother, or the sweet
heart, to preserve whose sacred right to a peaceful home
his life stands always a ready sacrifice.
The North, thank God, was never called upon for the
effort, the self-denial of the South. That it is capable of
yielding it when so called needs not to be asserted. And
there is sufficient to be proud of in American manhood not
to draw lines of politics or climate in comparing either the
intelligence or the hardihood of the men who marched
and fought through our Civil War beside or against each
other. To attempt to give the American his proper place among
the soldiers of other nations, ancient or modern, is an
inquiry demanding a volume by itself. But the stanchness
of the American in battle may be measured- to a fair extent
by a few statistics. Courage is only one of the necessary
virtues of the soldier ; but it is an important one, and, if
we take the average number of killed and wounded in the
prominent battles of the past century and a half, we arrive
at a conclusion reasonably secure.
Frederick and Napoleon are the two captains of modern

1862.] THE SOLDIER OF NORTH AND SOUTH. 121
times who have fought their men au fond. Their losses
are the heaviest; but ours follow hard upon.
The following percentages of men killed and wounded
comprise the most noted battles since 1745. Only those
whose full statistics are wanting are omitted : —
Up to Waterloo, the French, in nine battles (Napoleon's),
lost in killed and wounded of the number engaged . . 22.38 per cent.
Since, in nine battles  8.86 "
Up to Waterloo, the Prussians, in eight battles (mostly Fred
erick's), lost  18.42 "
At Koniggratz they lost  3.86 "
Up to Waterloo, the Austrians, in seven battles, lost . . 11.17 "
Since, in two battles  8.56 "
The Germans, since 1745, in eight battles .... 11.53 "
The English, in four battles  10.36 "
During our Civil War, the Union forces lost in fourteen pitched
battles, in which numbers and casualties are well ascer
tained  14.48 "
The Confederate forces, in twelve, ditto .... 18 "
Of very severe losses in small bodies, perhaps the most often
quoted is that of the Light Brigade at Balaclava, viz. . 36.7 per cent.
At Metz the Gardeschiitzen battalion lost .... 46.1 "
At Mars La Tour, the Sixteenth Infantry (Westphalian) lost, 49.4 "
During our Civil War, there were lost, in some one action by
one Union regiment, out of the men taken into action . 82 "
By three Union regiments . . between 70 per cent, and 80 "
By seventeen Union regiments, " 60 " " 70 "
By forty-one " " . " 50 " " 60 "
These numbers are all taken from the muster rolls on file in the War Depart
ment, where each man is accounted for by name.
The severest loss in the Civil War was by a Confederate regi
ment at Gettysburg, 720 out of 800 men .... 90 per cent.
Another lost in one battle  82 "
Three " " ... between 60 per cent, and 70 "
Nine " " ..." 50 " " 60 "
Twenty-nine lost in one battle  over 50 "
Longstreet's Division lost at Gaines' Mill and Glendale
4,438 out of 8,831 men  over 50 per cent.
Several divisions lost in some one action . . . " 40 "
It thus appears that in ability to stand heavy pounding,
since Napoleon's Waterloo campaign, the American has
shown himself preeminent. Of course there are other
factors in the problem. But these figures may surely be
looked upon with pride — even if no absolute conclusion
can be drawn from them.

XXHT.
ROSECRANS AND BRAGG. — STONE'S RIVER.
ROSECRANS was called to the command of the
Department of the Cumberland in the place of
Buell, as already stated. The forces operat-
October 30, 1862. . .
ing on this line were hereafter to be knowrn
as the Army of the Cumberland. The name of Army of the
Ohio was to be borne by the troops in the East Tennessee
Valley. Much was expected of Rosecrans. His many friends
claimed for him up to this date the only record of uniform
success. His brUliant, if somewhat erratic, method was
thought to embody the soldierly instinct, not so apparent in
more quiet natures.
Rosecrans made many changes. He gave the command
of his right wing to McCook ; of his left to Crittenden ; of
his centre to sturdy Thomas. The position of the army
about Nashville was not modified.
Towards the middle of November, Bragg, somewhat
reinforced, advanced to Murfreesborough and laid distant
siege to NashvUle. Beyond this movement, except for
some minor operations, — another notable
Nov.- Dec. raid of J. H. Morgan among them, — there
was no attempt to cross swords for two months.
122

1862.]

ROSECRANS AND BRAGG.

123

December 26.

Braxton Bragg's rank as a soldier is hard to gauge. He
was put and kept in place by the personal favor of President
Davis. Not lacking audacity or mUitary skUl, he was
uniformly beaten, and, like all unsuccessful generals, he
received no credit for what he did accomplish. It is easy
to forgive errors to the eventually successful ; hard to allow
any credit for even good work which comes to nothing.
Rosecrans' objective was of course Chattanooga, as had
been BueU's. But he must first clear the enemy from his
front. In the last days of the year, in three
columns, he advanced upon Bragg's posi
tion. Not intending active operations, Bragg had already
put his army
into winter-
quarters over
a considerable
area ; but no
sooner aware of
Rosecrans' in
tentions, than
he concentrated
his troops
across the lat-
ter's path.
After some
outpost skir
mishing, the
armies con-
fronted each Stone's River- December 31, 1862.
other north of Murfreesborough, intent upon a prompt

124 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1862.
struggle for mastery. The Army of the Cumberland was
in a position facing substantially south-east. Stone's River,
the turnpike, and the raUroad, all near together, ran north
westerly from the town at right angles to the position of
Rosecrans and near his left flank. The river wras fordablc
in places. The country was alternate woods and clearing.
Rosecrans' plan of battle was to throw Crittenden across
Stone's River upon Bragg's right in force, while McCook
should hold our right where it lay. Upon his strict per
formance of this duty depended success, and McCook
protested his abUity to hold his lines at least three hours
against any odds. Curiously enough, Bragg contemplated
precisely the same field tactics, to wit : to crush our right.
Under these conditions, other things being equal, whoever
moved first upon his enemy with sufficient vigor would win
the day. Rosecrans ordered the men to breakfast and the
movement to begin at 7 A.M. Bragg ordered the attack
to begin at daylight.
There was some carelessness in the disposition of the
troops on McCook's wing, which Rosecrans should have
personally known and rectified. He placed too much
rehance on this officer's assertion that he
December 31. could hold his own.
Bragg's left, under Hardee, overlapped our right. His
onset was made with true Southern e'lan, and immediately
thrust back McCook, whose resistance Ul bore, out his
boast. Scarcely had Rosecrans crossed Stone's River and
launched Crittenden's columns upon Breckenridge than he
was forced to recaU them to the assistance of his already
routed right wing. There was no let up to the Confederate

1863.] ROSECRANS AND BRAGG. 125
attack. Hardee was in his element. Every success was
quickly foUowed up, and McCook was driven in confusion
upon the centre. The situation was grave.
But Thomas was of other stuff. He was not to be so
easUy disposed of. Forming his own divisions along the
turnpike at right angles to our first line, he fought with his
never flagging coolness and determination. Rosecrans'
feverish activity served to reanimate the troops. Sheridan's
division reflected the mettle of its commander. Young,
and as yet unused to large commands, he seconded Thomas
with the instinct of the soldier glowing in every fibre. Our
lines struggled through the rest of the day against almost
certain defeat. The success of the Confederates elated
them, but in no sort demoralized the Federals. The fight
ing on either side was desperate.
Night fell. AU we could, claim was that we had not
been driven from the field. A council of war was held.
Neither Rosecrans nor Thomas would consider the question
of retreat. A fresh conflict was settled for the morrow,
the first day of the new year.
But Bragg's success had bred more disorganization than
our defeat. He was in no condition to attack. His men
and officers had exhausted themselves in the splendid efforts
which had so nearly destroyed the Army of the Cumberland.
New Year's passed without a demonstration on either side.
Next day, Bragg essayed an attack on Rosecrans' left, but
was thrown back. Unable to force defeat t. January 2, 1863.
upon the stubborn- battahons which Buell
had drilled, he withdrew into Murfreesborough, with a loss
of ten out of thirty-eight thousand men against thirteen out

126 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1863.
of forty-three thousand on our side. Bragg could show
as trophies some twenty-eight guns.
Both parties laid claim to victory. But Bragg retreated
from Murfreesborough as a consequence of this battle, and it
was occupied by our troops.
Bragg was apt to throw blame upon his subordinates for
his own shortcomings. On this occasion he gave as the
cause of his faUure that Breckenridge did not promptly
obey orders in reinforcing Hardee when sore pressed.
But as the usual test of a general is success, or at least
results, small attention can be given to the easily invented
explanations of faUure. Under equal conditions none but
the victor may wear the laurel. Against overwhelming
odds alone can defeat add honor to the soldier's name.

XXIV-
CHANCELLORSVILLE.
THE Army of the Potomac was never so demoralized
as after the horror of December 13th, at Fredericks
burg. Succeeding this battle a fine spell of weather
invited a renewal of aggressive movements. But Burn
side aUowed the favorable time to pass. Just as the
elements ceased to be propitious he began a manoeuvre
— it was on McCleUan's plan — to turn Lee's left. But
Virginia roads and rivers are treacherous. One day's
down-pour of rain sufficed to destroy the
* J January 20 to 24
possibUity of success, and the farcical ending
. of the so-called Mud March gave the enthusiasm of the
army its coup de grace. A new commander became
essential, and Hooker was promoted from his Grand
Division, — Franklin and Sumner being overslaughed.,
At this time, so lax had been its discipline, some
eighty-five thousand officers and men ap-
° January 26, 1863.
peared on the rolls of the Army of the
Potomac as absent without leave. But " Fighting Joe "
grasped the reins with firmness and in organization gave
proof of great skill. A rare favorite among the men,
and with solid record, it was only those who judged
127

128 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1863.
with exceptional insight and long knowledge of the man
who mistrusted the result. And even their apprehensions
were in part allayed by Hooker's steadiness.
By the beginning of April the recuperative power of
the stanch old army had again made it equal to any
effort. It lay in its cantonments about Falmouth, whUe
Lee watched it from his ever strengthening heights
back of Fredericksburg, with confidence bred of the
knowledge that under him served sixty thousand of the
hardiest troops which ever laughed at hunger, cold, or
danger. ..Hooker initiated the ChancellorsvUle campaign by a
cavalry raid on Lee's communications intended to move
about his left and far to his rear ; but sheer blundering
robbed this diversion of any good results. He followed
up this raid by a feint under Sedgwick below Fredericks
burg, while he himself so cleverly stole a march on Lee by
the upper Rappahannock, that within four
April 30. days he had massed forty thousand men on
the enemy's left flank at ChancellorsvUle, before the latter
had begun to divine his purpose.
But here Hooker paused. Indecision seized his mind.
He frittered away a precious day, and when he finally
advanced on Lee, the latter had recovered himself and was
prejjared to meet him. After barely feeling his adver
sary, " Fighting Joe " retired into the Wilderness to invite
attack, while Lee, with half his force but thrice his nerve,
sharply followed him up. The terrain to which the Army
of the Potomac had been thus withdrawn was well named.
It was one vast entanglement of second growth timber

1863.]

C BANC ELL ORS VILLE.

129

and chapparal, to the last degree unfitted for the ma
noeuvres of an army.
With his wonted rashness, but relying on his adver
sary's vacillation, Lee divided his army and sent Jackson
around Hooker's right to take him in reverse and cut him
off from United States Ford, while his own constant feints
on the centre should cover the move. Meanwhile Hooker
weakened his right by blind demonstrations in his front,

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and enabled Jackson to complete his manoeuvre and to
crush at a blow the Eleventh corps, which held that flank,
and to throw the army into utter confusion.
In this moment of his greatest triumph Jack
son fell at the hand of his own men.
On the morrow, by dint of massed blows, with " Jack
son " for a watchword, upon Hooker's lines, where but one
man in three was put under fire, Lee fairly drove our army
May 2.
130

BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR.

[1863.

into a corner, from whence its dazed commander, with
eighty thousand men, cried aloud for succor to Sedgwick's
one corps fifteen miles away, stUl fronting the defenses at

Falmouth

Chancellorsville. May 3, 4, 5, 1863.

May 3.

Fredericksburg. Under quite impossible orders this gal
lant soldier captured Marye's Heights, where
Burnside had lost thirteen thousand men,
and advanced towards his chief. But Lee, trusting to
Hooker's panic to keep him bottled up, turned upon Sedg-
May4. wick, drove him across the river after an all
May 5. day's fight, and again confronted Hooker,
who, dizzy and nerveless, sought safety in retreat to his
old camps.
This ten days' passage at arms was glorious to the Con
federate soldier's valor and to his leader's skUl, while we
lost all save honor. With an effective only half as o-reat
Lee had actually outnumbered Hooker whenever he

1863.] CHANCELLORSVILLE. 131
had struck him. While a fraction of our forces were being
decimated, the rest were held by Hooker in the leash at
places where they were uselessly fretting to join their
brothers in the fray.
It is true that Hooker was accidentally disabled May 3 ;
but rather than turn over the command to his second,
Couch, he chose to retain the responsibility.
Of this splendid campaign every American may make his
boast. Every Northerner must keenly deplore it. Our
losses were seventeen thousand out of one hundred and
five thousand engaged, and the enemy's thirteen thousand
out of sixty-one thousand.
Jackson's reputation as a soldier is national. It is
almost supererogatory to add anything to what has been
narrated about this remarkable man. Untried in large
command, his powers as a captain can only be judged from
his successes in the VaUey. But as a lieutenant he was far
beyond any officer who fought on either side during our
Civil War.
Hooker and Hooker's partisans have endeavored to shift
the responsibility of this defeat on Howard, for allowing
his corps to be surprised on the right ; and on Sedgwick,
for not fighting an impossible battle and making an impos
sible march in the middle of the night. But neither can be
so saddled. Hooker himself must bear the load, however
heavy, and however well he has otherwise deserved our
admiration. And this may be said with sincere apprecia
tion of Hooker's services as a corps commander, and of his
splendid gaUantry on many a hard-fought field.

XXV.
LEE'S SECOND INVASION.
1VTOW supervenes another rest in the thrice-reoccupied
-i-M Falmouth camps, whUe Lee plans with questionable
political or strategic foresight a second raid into the North
ern States. StUl grasping with his right the old defenses
at Fredericksburg, he covertly advances his left, under
Ewell, to Culpeper, and thence into the Shenandoah
Valley. Hooker became aware of an impending movement, and
threw his entire force of cavalry across the Rappahannock on
a forced reconnoissance. At Beverly Ford
a smart combat with Stuart, the loss on
our side being some eight hundred men, on theirs half aa
many, revealed Lee's intentions.
Ewell, followed warily by the centre, pushed rapidly on
down the Valley. At one moment the line of the Army of
June 13. J
Northern Virginia stretched from Fredericks
burg to Winchester, — a distance of one hundred miles.
This was a very dangerous extension, and Hooker sug
gested to his timid chief in Washington the obvious pro
priety of recalfing Lee from bis now evident objective by
. 132 y

&

1863.] LEE'S SECOND INVASION. 133
crushing his right wing, thus seriously compromised at
Fredericksburg. But he was forbidden this safest of opera
tions, for Mr. Lincoln's idea of fighting a divided army
was that of " an ox jumped half over a fence and liable to
be torn by dogs front and rear, without a fair chance to
gore one way or to kick the other," while HaUeck's one
notion of defending Washington was by the presence of
the entire army between it and the enemy.
Thus Hooker was chained to the hackneyed strategy
of moving by his right towards the Potomac, while Ewell
trapped Milroy at Winchester and captured some four
thousand prisoners and much material.
r . June 13-15.
From here EweU marched boldly into Penn
sylvania, where his cavalry levied heavy contributions in
stock and grain on the terrified farmers.
So soon as Lee saw Hooker fairly started in pursuit of
EweU, he let go of Fredericksburg, and urged Longstreet
and HiU to their utmost speed to rejoin him. Halleck had
got the Union forces parceUed out in wretched driblets all
over the map from West Virginia to the Peninsula, and
could stiU not rise beyond his one idea of preserving
Harper's Ferry. Within his restrictions Hooker's march
had been conducted with logistic skill and discretion. He
was simply hand-tied, whUe the enemy was free to ravage
Pennsylvania. However fretted by EweU's presence in the
loyal States, Hooker could not cross the Potomac until he
knew that none of Lee's three corps was left in Virginia.
The Army of the Potomac was put over a day after
the Confederates and was concentrated at
¦ • June 25-27.
Frederick, from which point Hooker could

134 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1863.
debouch on Lee's rear through South Mountain, or else
move upon him on the line of the Susquehannah. For
intelligent concentration Halleck had substituted pitiful
fault-finding, all of which had resulted in the enemy's
reaching the vicinity of Harrisburg without opposition
worthy the name. And unable to control events within
his own reach, Hooker requested on the eve of engagement
to be relieved. This was an act scarcely to be condoned,
but for its happy outcome.
Few words sum up Hooker's military standing. As a
corps commander, or with orders to obey, unless jealousy
warped his powers, he was unsurpassed in bravery, devo
tion and skill. For the burden of supreme command he
had neither mental calibre nor equipoise. Self-sufficiency
stood in lieu of self-reliance.
Into Hooker's place quietly stepped business-like Meade,
and unhampered by Halleck, whose favorite
June 28. .
he was, continued to follow up the invaders.
Ewell was at York and Carlisle and might cross the Sus-
quehannah and capture the capital of the State. Meade,
therefore, moved northward from Frederick, intent upon
loosening Lee's grip on that river. This he effected, and
Longstreet and Hill were ordered, not towards Harris
burg, but through the South Mountain passes. For Lee,
so soon as he knew of Meade's direction, became fearful for
his communications. And he was moreover troubled by
the naked defense of Richmond, which prize could have
been secured by a vigorous attack by General Dix from
Fort Monroe with more ease than at any time durino- the
o
war, had the attempt been made. Lee, therefore deter-

1863.] LEE'S SECOND INVASION. 135
mined to draw back and make a diversion east of the South
Mountain range to engage Meade's attention.
Lee's plan of invasion had been thwarted ; but his army
must be defeated.
Having divined the purpose of his adversary, Meade
selected the general fine of Pipe" Creek for his defense, and
threw his left wing, preceded by cavalry, forward to
Gettysburg as a mask. Lee also aimed to secure this
point, for it controUed the roads towards the Potomac.
The encounter was near at hand.

XXVI.

GETTYSBURG.

THE First and Eleventh corps met the van of Lee's
Army under A. P. Hill, on the north of the now
historic town. A severe engagement ensued,
in which doughty Reynolds lost his life, and
the Federals, after Ewell came upon the field, were driven

July 1.

Gettysburg. July 1, 1863.
back through the town, with heavy loss, but unpursued.
Hill and Ewell waited for Longstreet.
136

1863.] GETTYSBURG. 137
This check to the enemy's advance led to results worth
aU the sacrifice.
Few conflicts of modern times have become so familiar,
in art and story, as the battle of Gettysburg. Only its
chief features need be recalled. South of the quiet little
town, covering the road to Baltimore, lies a chain of hil
locks and bluffs shaped hke a fish-hook. At the barb rises
Culp's HiU, along the back what is known as Cemetery
HiU, and the shank, running north and south, is formed
by a hUly slope terminating in a rocky, wooded peak, caUed
Round Top, having Little Round Top as a spur. For
Hancock and Howard alike has been claimed the credit
of selecting this ever memorable position. Perchance
Reynolds' keen eye gauged its value as he hurried through
the town to stem the approaching tide. On this eligible
ground the retreating Unionists were raUied, and speedUy
reinforced, while Meade, at Hancock's suggestion, brought
the army forward from Pipe Creek to secure it.
MeanwhUe Lee cautiously advanced his own troops, and
forgetting that he had promised his corps commanders that
he would not in this campaign assume a tactical offensive,
resolved to give battle. Longstreet's preference was to
seize the Emmetsburg road beyond the Union left, and
manceuvre Meade out of his position by compromising his
communications with Washington. But there lurked in
the healthy body of the Army of Northern Virginia a
poisonous contempt of its adversary. This was the natural
outcome of Manassas, Fredericksburg, and Chancellors
vUle. Lee was morally unable to decline battle. He
could not imperil the high-strung confidence of his men.

138 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1863.
As the second day dawned he must, however,
July2' have watched with throbbing anxiety the
Federal line rapidly throwing up defences on just such a

Gettysburg. July 2, 3, 4, 1863.

formidable crest as himself had held at Marye's Heio-hts.
For Lee gauged better than his men the fighting qualities
of his foe.

1863.] GETTYSBURG. 139
His general fine lay along Seminary Ridge, paraUel to
Cemetery HiU, and about a mUe distant, with his left
thrown round and through the town to a point opposite
Culp's, in order Longstreet, HUl, Ewell. He was thus
formed in concave order of battle, the Army of the
Potomac having been thrown by the lay of the land into
substantiaUy the convex order.
By noon Lee had perfected his plans, and Longstreet
opened an attack on a weak salient thrown out by Sickles
from the general line of our left towards the Emmetsburg
road. The possession of Round Top would take the
Federal line in reverse, and Sickles' position, an outward
angle, could be enfiladed in both directions, and if lost
would seriously compromise this point. Longstreet was
not slow to clutch at the advantage thus offered. But the
foresight of Warren, after a desperate struggle, secured
Round Top ; and though Longstreet wrested from Sickles
his salient, he secured only an apparent benefit not com
mensurate with his loss.
On the Union extreme right, EweU had meanwhUe
gained a foothold on Culp's HUl, and, as night fell, Lee
was justified in feehng that the morrow would enable him
to carry the entire ridge. For he beheved that he had
effected a breach in both flanks of the Army of the
Potomac. Indeed at the close of the second day the gravity
of the situation induced Meade to call a council of his corps
commanders. It was determined to abide the result at
that spot. Officers and men were in good spirits and
equal to any work.
Lee was tacticaUy in error as to Longstreet's supposed

140 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1863.
success on the left. It had in reality rectified Sickles'
position. Our real line was undisturbed. And Meade at
daylight attacked Ewell in force, and after a
hard tussle wrenched from him the ground
commanding Culp's. Thus Lee had faUed to effect a per
manent lodgment on our either flank, and we had thrown
up strong field works to defend them. There was no
resource for him but to break our centre.
He accordingly massed nearly one hundred and fifty
guns along Seminary Ridge, and at 1 P.M. opened
fire. Owing to the limited space for the batteries, barely
eighty guns from our side could answer this spirited chal
lenge. For two hours lasted the fiery duel, when Lee
launched Pickett, " the Ney of the rebel army," with a
column of thirteen thousand men, to drive a wedge into
the centre of the Union line. A column charged with so
desperate a duty — the forlornest of forlorn hopes — should
contain none but picked troops. Pettigrew's division in
the assaulting column was unable to hold its own. And
though Pickett's Virginians actually ruptured Hancock's
line and a few of the men penetrated some fifty yards
beyond, he met an array in front and flank which roUed
him back with fearful loss. Lee's last chance of success
was wrecked.
The instinct of a great commander might have seized
this moment for an advance in force upon the broken
enemy. But Meade cautiously held what he had already
won, rather than gain more at greater risk.
Jul i Beaten but not dismayed, Lee spent all
the morrow and untU after daylight next day

1863.] GETTYSBURG. 141
preparing for retreat, and yet in a mood to invite attack.
And he would have met it stoutly. But Meade was
content. He would adventure nothing. He had won the
credit of defeating his enemy ; he lost the chance of
destroying him. He may be justified in this ; but not in
fading to follow up Lee's dehberate retreat with greater
vigor. It must however be admitted that in almost all
campaigns, a simUar criticism maybe passed, — after the
event. There is always a term to the endurance and ac
tivity of armies and their commanders.
In this most stubborn battle of modern days we lost
twenty-three thousand out of ninety-three thousand en
gaged ; the Confederates twenty-two thousand five hundred
out of eighty thousand men, beside fifty-four hundred
prisoners. The loss in killed and wounded, twenty-two
and a half per cent., is unexampled in so large a force.
Lee retreated by way of Williamsport, undisturbed save
at a distance, and after some days was followed across the
Potomac by Meade.

xxvn.
GRANT AGAIN MOVES ON VICKSBURG.
WHILE the old year closed with the tragedy of
Fredericksburg and the drawn battle of Mur
freesborough, the new year opened with
1862 and 1863. , .
Grant's second advance on Vicksburg, and
with General Banks creating a base for operations at
New Orleans.
Grant was now in sole command of the forces operating
down the Mississippi. His army consisted of the Thirteenth
corps under McClernand, the Fifteenth under Sherman,
the Sixteenth under Hurlbiit, and the Seventeenth under
McPherson, a body comprising the veterans of the West.
We have seen how his overland march on Vicksburg was
cut short by severed communications, and neutralized Sher
man's efforts at Chickasaw Bayou. This only served how
ever to whet his determination to capture the place, which,
and Port Hudson below, were the only serious obstacles
to the free navigation of the great river. But they were
serious indeed.
Hurlbut was detached to watch the Memphis and Charles
ton Railroad wliUe Sherman and McClernand moved to
Young's Point, and McPherson was ordered soon to foUow.
142

1863.] GRANT AGAIN MOVES ON VICKSBURG. 143
From here Grant would have preferred to work around the
city by the north, but the Yazoo lowlands were quite under
water, and aU reconnoissances pointed to grave difficulties
in the way of such an operation.
It wUl be remembered that Vicksburg is situated at the
bight of a great loop made by the Mississippi. Across the
loop, at its narrowest point, does not much exceed a mile.
Before reaching the ground Grant had given orders to con
struct another canal across this loop, as
. . February.
WiUiams had done a year before, but when,
towards early spring, he arrived and (McClernand protest
ing) assumed command, he discovered the uselessness of
such an attempt. Work on the canal, however, was kept
up by the troops for six weeks, when a heavy freshet washed
away the embankments and utterly destroyed
t • • • March 7.
it. It is improbable that as a water-way it
could ever have been utUized, for it was not in such a loca
tion as to aUow the current of the river to flow freely
into it.
During this period the monotony of the canal work was
enlivened by various naval exploits on the river. Admiral
Porter, who commanded the fleet cooperating with Grant,
sent several of his vessels down past the Vicksburg batteries.
Among these was prominent the feat of Colonel EUet,
already noted for much exceUent work with the flotUla. In
the Queen of the West he ran below the town, attacked
and all but destroyed the rebel ram, City of Vicksburg.
Being unable to return he proceeded down the river, and
after numerous adventures, joined the forces under Banks.
Grant's task was one full of contingencies. Strangely

144 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1863.
enough, he seems to have had no settled plan at this time.
But he set on foot various projects for weakening the ap
proaches to Vicksburg, or for opening a water-course around
so as to isolate it. He dug a canal from the Mississippi to
Providence Lake, hoping to make a practicable channel
through the Tensas, Black, Red and Atchafalaya rivers to
a point below Port Hudson. He opened another channel
from the river to Moon Lake, purposing to run light-
draught boats down the Tallahatchie and Yazoo. For not
only was there a shipyard at Yazoo city, where some ves
sels were building, but it was a considerable depot of
stores. The latter route, if practicable, not only afforded an
opportunity of destroying this depot, but would also enable
Grant to take Haines' Bluff in reverse, and capture the hills
which are the key to Vicksburg. A demonstration by land
forces as weU as the navy was made in connection with this
scheme. But aU these attempts, which con-
March and April. sumed over two months, resulted fruitlessly.
The enemy was able to check each movement in its turn.

XXVIII.
GRANT TURNS PEMBERTON'S LEFT.
PEMBERTON had at Vicksburg some twenty-two thou
sand men, stationed from Haines' Bluff above, to
Grand Gulf below ; at Grenada, eleven thousand ; at Jack
son, Miss., five thousand. Johnston, though in supreme
command of the forces west of the AUeghanies, was person-
aUy at Chattanooga, deeming that field of most importance
to the fortunes of the Confederacy ; and Van Dorn, with
his cavalry, had likewise joined Bragg.
Having fruitlessly attempted all methods of approach to
Vicksburg from the north and west, Grant now deter
mined to place his army below the fortress and to turn
Pemberton's left. His position was a trying one. The fickle
pubhc was aU but ready to tire of him also, as it had on
less pretext of so many of his brother soldiers. Since Don
elson, he had fought only the battle of ShUoh, — a most
questionable triumph. Iuka and Corinth had been quite
forgotten, or such credit as a minor victory yields had been
ascribed to Rosecrans. For a year Grant had been floun
dering about with no substantial success to show. Some-
thing was demanded of him. _
Grant must look the matter squarely in the face. Assault
145

146

BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR.

[1863.

promised ill-success from any point, while involving the
certainty of heavy losses. To go back and try the really

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most feasible route, along the Mobile and Ohio Railroad,
seemed like failure acknowledged, and would therefore be

1863.] GRANT TURNS PEMBERTON'S LEFT. 147
politically ruinous, though strategically sound. To turn
Pemberton's left was a desperate undertaking. Its only
merit lay in that it showed no sigfl of turning back, for,
while to do the unexpected is a sound maxim of w7ar, this
plan in no sense partook of the nature of a surprise. Sup
plies must come by a most circuitous route, liable to fatal
interruption, and the fleet must run the Vicksburg batteries.
Choice was difficult. But with his usual disregard of obsta
cles Grant adopted the latter plan. He could face a difficult
problem rather than a simple one. His courage grew with
opposition. He could assume any risk. In this case it proved
a virtue ; but not so a year later, in Virginia. This type
of courage often lacks the tempering element of caution.
Part of Sherman's corps was sent up the river to make
a diversion which might take Haines' Bluff in reverse.
This was ably done, as was all work this
• March 14-27.
general had in hand. McClernand was
° March 29.
ordered to New Carthage, below Vicksburg.
Communication with Milliken's Bend, from which place
Grant drew his supplies, was kept up by flat-boats along
the innumerable bayous, and a haul overland of some
twenty-five miles. The transports and gun-boats needed
for operations below were safely run past the batteries.
Towards the end of the month, after infinite trouble with
the roads, Grant joined McClernand at New Carthage and
from there marched to a point opposite Grand
„ ., TTT April 24, 1863.
Gulf, twenty miles south of Vicksburg, at
the mouth of the Big Black. Grand Gulf had been fortified,
though not with the strength of Haines' Bluff, for Pember
ton was vastly more concerned for his right than his left

148 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1863.
flank, and, having no cavalry, was much in the dark as to
the plans of his opponent.
But the passage of the fleet revealed Grant's purpose,
and reinforcements which had been ordered to Bragg, on
the supposition that Grant would not soon attack, were at
once recaUed.
As a means of diverting attention from his movements,
and to disturb the enemy's line of supplies from the east,
Grierson had been despatched on a raid from Lagrange south
ward, with a cavalry brigade of one thousand seven hundred
men. This enterprising officer, starting in light order, made
his way along roads some twenty miles east
of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, detailing
parties right and left to destroy tracks and telegraph, stores
and munitions of war, and by his clever devices kept the
enemy utterly in the dark as to his direction and purposes.
He finally turned up at Baton Rouge, having
May 2. marched six hundred miles in sixteen days,
and having created vast confusion, of no httle assistance
to Grant in safely crossing the Mississippi.
The presence of the Federals opposite Grand Gulf, as well
as on his right, made a problem which Pemberton was not
soldier enough to solve. Though he seems to have known
all about Grant's manoeuvre, he was incapable of action
that met the conditions confronting him.
The fortifications of Grand Gulf were incomplete, but
Porter could not destroy the works from his o-un-boats.
Unable to get over, owing to their fire, Grant dropped
down a few miles further to Bruinsburg, where by crossing
he could take Grand Gulf in reverse.

1863.] GRANT TURNS PEMBERTON' S LEFT. 149
First McClernand with eighteen thousand
° April 30.
men is ferried over and marches towards
Port Gibson. Pemberton promptly puts in an appearance
and arrests his advance four miles this side May 1.
of the place. Without waiting for Mc
Pherson, who is coming up, McClernand attacks. We
have already twenty-four thousand men on the field, the
Confederates but eight thousand five hundred. But they
make none the less a stubborn defense. The ground is
very broken and difficult for the troops. Despite his
numbers, McClernand makes small headway for hours,
when McPherson arrives and the Confederate right is
turned. Thus thrust back, the enemy retires beyond and
burns the bridges over Bayou Pierre. The loss on each
side is not far from eight hundred.
Next day our forces enter Port Gibson, May 2.
and repair and rebuUd the bridges burned
by Pemberton. The enemy is now obliged to evacuate
Grand Gulf, which Porter speedUy occupies.
Sherman had been left behind as rear guard. WhUe Mc
Clernand and McPherson were marching on Port Gibson,
he had been making a stUl more noisy dem- May 1.
onstration at Haines' Bluff. Pemberton was
thus kept from sending reinforcements from the city.
Matters were now much facUitated by all- water com
munication with the base of supplies. This had been
laboriously opened by the engineers from Milhken's Bend
to New Carthage and thence to Grand Gulf.
Grant had at the beginning of his campaign been led to
believe that Banks would before now be in position to

150 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1863.
cooperate with him from below. But Banks was delayed
by operations at Port Hudson ; and Grant, seeing that to
wait would only aUow the enemy to accumulate as much in
reinforcements as Banks' presence would afford to himself,
concluded to push matters to an issue.

XXIX.
GRANT DRIVES PEMBERTON INTO VICKSBURG.
PEMBERTON had now got out seventeen thousand
men to thwart Grant's further progress. But he
found himself compeUed to place the Big Black between
his army and the Federals. MeanwhUe McPherson and
McClernand went into bivouac to wait for Sherman.
Grant was once more on dry ground, and had
actuaUy turned Pemberton's left. But this was only a
beginning. He must strike hard and fast to secure the
fruits of his bold manceuvre. Numbers were practically
equal, but the local advantages were all on the Confederate
6ide. They were within their own territory, near their
supplies, on the defensive. Grant was obliged to get his
supplies over seventy mUes of treacherous country. But
on the other hand Grant had a navy at his back, and above
aU good lieutenants, while Pemberton's mUitary abihty
never proved equal to heavy strain.
Grant now advanced from Hawkinson's May 7.
Ferry along the Big Black, keeping to the
east of the river and cutting loose from his base at Grand
Gulf. He supplied the troops with five days' rations, trust
ing to reestablish himself within no great time on a new
151

152 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1863.
base by defeating the enemy. UntU then he must sustain
himself largely on the country, which could furnish him
beeves and some corn.
The enemy was posted at Jackson as well as Vicksburg,
and Grant calculated to thrust himself between the two
bodies of the enemy at these places. McPherson com
manded the right wing, Sherman, who had come up, the
centre, McClernand the left. The advance was more or
less irregular according to the opposition encountered and
the roads pursued. McPherson pushed for
May 12. Raymond, and after a smart combat, in which
we lost four hundred men, took possession of the place.
Grant now made up his mind to secure the town of
Jackson before the enemy could erect defences about it.
This would give him a point from which to threaten the
rear of Vicksburg and to protect his own.
It was learned about this time that Joe Johnston was on
his way with reinforcements to assume personal command.
He could not be allowed possession of Jackson. Grant
promptly moved Sherman and McPherson on that point
while Pemberton was concentrated at Edwards' Depot,
expecting him to attack there.
Jackson was readily captured with a loss of three hun
dred men, and Johnston, thus forestalled,
May 14. was obhged on his arrival to move round by
the north to seek to join forces with Pemberton.
Johnston, who was really in supreme command, had per
emptorily ordered Pemberton to come out of Vicksburg
and attack Grant's flank at Clinton. But Pemberton did
not seem to feel that Johnston held over him exactly the

1863.] PEMBERTON DRIVEN INTO VICKSBURG. 153
authority of a commanding-officer, and considered it the
best policy to hold on to Vicksburg, not seeing, as John
ston did, that to beat Grant was the only means to retain
possession of it. But a few days later, and too late, he
made up his mind to attack as suggested. Strangely
enough he conceived the plan of moving away from John
ston, to demonstrate against Grant's rear. Here then we
have the spectacle of two armies, of equal resources, one
solid and compact, the other split into several detachments,
in Vicksburg, under Johnston, and under Pemberton. No
mUitary problem has ever been more often solved. With
out serious blunder or mishap the concentrated army must
win. Pemberton, soon made aware of his mistake, endeavored
to retrace his steps. But Grant was already upon him.
The enemy takes up position at Champi
on's HiU (Confederate "Baker's Creek"),
between Vicksburg and Jackson. Grant moves upon him
along the three roads from Raymond and Bolton. The
divisions of Hovey, Logan, and Crocker assault his left
posted on the hiU. Pemberton brings forces from his right
to sustain this key position, but forgets that a vigorous
movement along the two Raymond roads could brush away
this depleted wing and seize the fords over Baker's Creek
in his rear. The battle wavers over the hiU-slopes aU day,
with alternate success. Meanwhile McClernand, on our
left, in lieu of pushing through Loring's division and thus
helping Grant surround the enemy, wastes the day in mere
skirmishing, with a loss of barely one hundred and fifty men.
Towards night Pemberton is driven from the hill.

154 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1863.
Had the victory on the right been less complete, he might
not have retired, and could still perhaps have been cooped
up. But to be driven back upon the fords before McCler
nand has seized them is his one element of safety.
Our loss was two thousand four hundred. The Con
federates lost an equal number in prisoners alone, fourteen
hundred killed and wounded, and twenty-four guns.
Pemberton escaped in confusion beyond the Big Black,
where, at all the principal passages, he had already con
structed bridge-heads. Grant in pursuit arrived at some
of the crossings as soon as Pemberton, but the latter
secured the railroad bridge.
Loring's division had been entirely cut off from Pember
ton at Champion's Hill, and after some days joined John
ston by a circuitous march. Pemberton had charged Loring
with the duty of defending the raUroad bridge-head in case
of need, and in the perplexities of retreat, Loring being
absent, there was some confusion in supplying his place.
Sherman moved up to Bridgeport to turn
May 17. r b l
the enemy's new left, and effected a crossing
there. Everything was at sixes and sevens in the Confed
erate army. Pemberton's defences at the railroad bridge
were maladroitly placed nearly a mile in advance of the
. crossing, without supports, and with an open plain behind
the works. For troops to pass this plain under fire would
prove certain destruction. The soldiers were well aware of
the fact and made but a sorry resistance.
May 17. J
finally dwindling away with an unnecessarily
heavy loss, our own being but three hundred. They
burned the railroad bridge behind them.

1863.] PEMBERTON DRIVEN INTO VICKSBURG. 155
Twenty-four hours were consumed in rebuilding the
bridges. During this time, Pemberton had faUen back
within his Vicksburg defences. Here he reassembled barely
twenty thousand men of the force he had led out.
Thus in two weeks, Grant had driven his antagonist into
Vicksburg, with a loss of over five thousand men, not
counting Loring's division ; had prevented the enemy from
reuniting his forces, and held the key of the situation.
And this on five days' rations. A splendid record !
Pemberton found that he must abandon the bluffs north
of the city. These Sherman occupied, thus
. . May 19.
reaching once more the Yazoo river, but this
time on the bluffs, and not at the foot of them. Pember
ton had notified Johnston that he could not continue to
hold these bluffs. Johnston replied that in that event he
had much better leave Vicksburg to its fate, — for Walnut
HUls was the key to the city, — and join forces with him.
But Pemberton was already cooped up. Vicksburg had
been invested.
On the same day Sherman gained the ridge beyond Fort
Hill, and rested his right on the Mississippi. On his left
stretched McPherson's line. Beyond him McClernand.
The city was now besieged from the east, after the Feder
als had made its complete circuit by the west and south.
Altogether it has been a strange mUitary manoeuvre,
which success will justify ; failure utterly condemn. But
it has exhibited on Grant's part exceptional self-reliance
and knowledge of his opponent.

SIEGE OF VICKSBURG.
THE logistic situation was now simplified by a change
of Grant's base to the Yazoo. And, about these
days, Porter found that time was ripe for an expedition
up to Yazoo City, where he finally got at and destroyed
the stores and the vessels building and being armed for
river warfare, as well as the means of replacing them.
No sooner had the city been invested than, relying upon
the demorahzation of the Confederate troops, Grant deter
mined upon an immediate assault. Preparations were yet
far from complete, and to Sherman's share
May 19. L _
alone fell any severe fighting. McClernand
and McPherson had not yet moved near enough to cooper
ate efficiently -with him. And though these generals were
enabled to seize an advanced position, the works proved
everywhere too strong to be carried.
The troops in Vicksburg were hardened veterans, who
had acquired the peculiar instinct of the soldier. In the
recent conflicts in the field they had felt the want of that
strong leadership without which the lives of the men are
always at stake, and had behaved accordingly. But arrived
behind good defences, where each man's intelligence and
156

1863.] SIEGE OF VICKSBURG. 157
experience under fire came into play, they fought with their
accustomed nerve, and no impression could be made upon
them. Our loss was nearly a thousand men.
Grant's success, like not a few of Napoleon's, had
been aided by his opponent's incapacity. Had Lee and
Jackson been in his front, his triumph would have been
earned at the expense of much harder blows, if at all.
Later on in Virginia, with only half Grant's effective
strength, Lee was able to hold him at bay for a fuU year,
despite courage which laid in front of Lee's field-works as
many dead and wounded Federals as the entire Army of
Northern Virginia had under the colors.
The assault has failed, but Grant is not made of stuff
to recognize defeat. A second assault is ordered. He
feels confident that the works can be carried. The troops
are eager for it, and are unwUling to settle down to the
spade, until they have again tried the bayonet. Johnston
may do something which wUl oblige Grant to raise the
siege. The investment is not yet quite complete on the
south. Every reason seems to demand prompt action,
and Grant's tendency is always towards hard blows.
Two or three brigades form the storming party from each
corps front, backed up by substantially the entire force.
The first rush faUs, though individual soldiers reach the
parapet and plant their colors upon it. The
. May 22.
men are withdrawn. At this moment Grant
receives a misleading message from McClernand to the
effect that he has made a lodgment in the works in his
front, and asking Sherman's and McPherson's help by a
renewed effort. McClernand has really only got posses-

158 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1863.
sion of an outwork, which he can not retain. But Grant,
supposing him to know what he asserts, orders the men in
again with the hope of sustaining him. This second
assault adds to the loss of life to no effect. Our casualties
have been over three thousand ; the enemy's barely five
hundred. But the failure has caused no loss of morale.
Grant found himself driven to regular siege operations.
The topography of Vicksburg is singularly cut up. The
country is full of ravines. The Confederate line lay along
ridges surrounding the town. The fortifications were skU-
fully constructed and well armed and manned. Everything
indicated that starvation alone would reduce the town.
Our engineers got speedUy to work and some twelve mUes
of trenches and nearly an hundred batteries were in due
time constructed.
Within the city Pemberton was soon obliged to econo
mize victuals, and then cut down to half and quarter rations.
The firing from our lines and the fleet was continuous.
Many thousand shot and shell were daily thrown into the
city. In Vicksburg ammunition had necessarily to be
more sparingly used. Johnston now took the field, and Grant,
May 26. obliged to hold the lines of the Big Black
and the Yazoo for the safety of his rear and flank, detailed
Blair with six brigades to operate against him.
Reinforcements began to arrive from Memphis, and from
Burnside and Schofield, and swelled our force to seventy
thousand men and two hundred and fifty guns. This
enabled Grant to complete the investment at all points.
With every day Johnston's chance of successful diversion

1863.] SIEGE OF VICKSBURG. 159
was disappearing. He had thirty-one thousand men " for
duty," but he made no active attempt to aid Pemberton,
despite constant pressure from Richmond, and appeals from
his comrades within the waUs of Vicksburg.
A momentary scare was created at this time by an
expedition from Arkansas against our base June 6 to 8.
of supplies at Milliken's Bend. But no
result of value was accomplished by the enemy.
McClernand had never been satisfied with his loss of
command on the Mississippi, and at times gave cause for
serious complaint by bis erratic conduct. At last, on the
occurrence of an act of actual insubordination, Grant sum
marily relieved him, and appointed Ord to his place.
One of the forts on the north-east front had been mined,
and, hoping for a practicable breach, was
' ^ 5 * . June 25.
blown up. But the enemy's countermine
weakened the explosion and their loss was not severe.
Our subsequent assault was met with the usual stubborn
courage and shared the same faUure as the others.
Mining operations were vigorously carried on. Counter
mining by the enemy was almost uniformly unsuccessful.
Starvation was fast approaching . The end must speedily come
unless Johnston could accomplish something substantial.
Towards the end of June, Johnston did get ready to
attack. He was lying in the vicinity of Canton and
Jackson. Grant sent Sherman with twenty-four thousand
men to watch his movements, with instructions to attack him
at once if the next assault on Vicksburg, which he set for
July 6 , should eventuate in success . But Johnston attempted
nothing which proved helpful towards raising the siege.

160 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1863.
The garrison by the end of June was much reduced by lack
of victuals.
In May, Johnston urged evacuation so as to save the
army ; in June he promised aid and suggested a sortie. But
the men were in no condition to cut their way through well-
fed troops. They had in fact circulated a petition for surren
der. Mutiny was feared. All Pemberton's officers advised
capitulation, and Johnston finally notified Pemberton that
he saw no chance to afford him relief. There
being no alternative, Pemberton, after some
interchange of letters with Grant, surrendered with thirty-
seven thousand men as prisoners of war.
His total loss during this campaign was thus above fifty
thousand. Ours, in the movement from Port Gibson on,
some eight thousand men.
Sherman's force was at once increased to forty-nine
thousand men. He crossed the Big Black and marched on
Johnston, who retired into Jackson. Here
Sherman sat down before him and destroyed
the raUroads north and south of the town.
Owing to Grant having laid waste the entire country
around Vicksburg for fifty miles, as a means of self-protec
tion, Johnston was unable long to maintain himself. No
provision had been made for a siege. Johnston indulged
hopes that Sherman would assault ; but finding him disin
clined to do so, he quietly slipped away
towards the east, and Grant withdrew Sher
man from pursuit. The loss of each in this subsidiary cam
paign had been about one thousand men.
Johnston's conduct during these hostilities was not

1863.] SIEGE OF VICKSBURG. 161
marked with vigor. He arrived at Jackson, as he tele
graphed the Richmond authorities, "too late" to retrieve
the campaign ; but it was quite within his power to join his
forces to Pemberton's, or faUing this, to make a stout effort
to raise the siege.
Johnston, with all his ability, was never distinguished as a
fighter. His tendency was dilatory rather than active, the
very reverse of Grant's. He was never quite ready to at
tack. Compare this inactivity with any of the campaigns
of the Army of Northern Virginia. At Chancellorsville
Lee had but about two men to five of Hooker's. For aU
that, his very audacity gained him one of the most brilhant
successes of the war. Here Johnston had all but the same
force as Grant ; yet he made no active attempt whatever
to solve the problem. To be sure, Pemberton's obstinate
hold on Vicksburg did not coincide with Johnston's views ;
but it was consistent with the Confederate programme. And
Pemberton's feeling that Johnston had no more than a right
to advise as to his movements, and not to give him orders,
resulted in a disastrous lack of cooperation. None the less
Johnston owed more assistance to the troops within the
waUs than he rendered ; and he had it in his power very
seriously to hamper Grant's operations.
Grant had won the great success of the war. And he
received his weU-earned reward in the plaudits of the
people. Thus ends the drama of Vicksburg, fit companion for the
glorious victory at Gettysburg I Both triumphs occurred
on our national holiday.

XXXI.
BANKS AND PORT HUDSON.
YERY early in the war it was determined to open
some of the ports on the Gulf to serve as bases for
operations extending into the interior. New Orleans was
the most important of these, and its possession was of
great use in wresting the control of the Mississippi river
from the enemy. It was expected that MobUe would
shortly after fall into our possession, and sundry efforts
were made to capture it. But until near the close of the
war we did not enter the city.
MobUe was the point of next military importance to
New Orleans. From here an advance on the line of the
MobUe and Ohio Railroad could have been made by a
strong force towards the armies operating from the Ten
nessee river. The capture or destruction of the railroad
centre at Meridian from this base would have seriously af
fected the ability of the enemy to detain our forces at
Vicksburg ; or indeed an advance in force towards Mont
gomery would more than once have weakened the conduct
of the Confederate campaigns in Tennessee and Kentucky.
And as after we had broken the Memphis and Charleston
Railroad there was no all-rail route east and west except
162

1863.] BANKS AND PORT HUDSON. 163
•
via MobUe, the importance of a lodgment here is
apparent. But up to this date, none of the operations on the Gulf-
coast, excepting notably those of the navy under Farragut,
had been conducted with such vigor as to accomplish re
sults. The utmost that was done was to obtain a foot
hold at sundry points, which was made useful only to
prevent supplies from entering the enemy's territory from
abroad, and the shipment of cotton in return. AU this
was of course helpful to the Union cause, but it was
negative helpfulness only.
Towards the close of 1862 Banks had saUed from New
York with an army of twenty thousand men, and had
relieved Butler at New Orleans. Some results were ex
pected from his activity. He had at once
1 . . Dec. 14-17.
despatched Grover with ten thousand men
to Baton Rouge. Banks had, including the troops already
at this station, a total effective of thirty thousand ; the
whole force being consolidated into the Nineteenth army
corps. But after he had made details from his troops for
necessary garrisons, only fifteen thousand remained with
which to operate against Port Hudson, which was his
immediate objective. This force being deemed insufficient
for direct attack, Banks formed a plan to cut off supplies
from the place by tapping the Red river, down which the
bulk of them was received.
The Confederates held Brashear City, and "various
points along the Atchafalaya river, to Alex-
1 b J Jan.-Feb., 1863.
andria. Two expeditions were sent out,
one under Weitzel to move up Bayou Teche and one

naught.

164 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1863.
under Emory up the Atchafalaya. Both came to
Banks himself then moved to Baton
Rouge, and Grover, with twelve thousand
men, started for Port Hudson. He was to create a
diversion while Farragut could run the Port Hudson bat
teries, so as to be able to patrol the river above and inter
cept supplies. Farragut made the attempt
March 14. ,
with seven ships. Owing to various mis
haps only two contrived to pass above, while the rest,
barring the Mississippi, which was blown up, were dis
abled and fell below. Still with these two, Farragut was
able to blockade the Red river.
Banks projected a new expedition along the Atchafalaya.
This time he was more successful. The army moved by
the railroad west to Brashear City. Three
April 9-11. days later Fort Bisland was taken. In an
other week we occupied Opelousas, and later, with Ad
miral Porter's cooperation, captured Alex-
May 7. andria, at a loss aU told of not exceeding
six hundred men.
HaUeck found fault with Banks for pushing his Red
River schemes in lieu of cooperating with Grant in the
reduction of Vicksburg. But Banks was in the right.
General Taylor was not far from New Orleans in some
force, and had not Banks taken measures to keep him at a
distance as well as to garrison this city with sufficient
troops, it might easily have fallen into the hands of the
enemy. This, even temporarily, for of course it could
have been recaptured, would have been a sad blow to

1863.] BANKS AND PORT HUDSON. 165
Federal prestige. As it was, no sooner had Banks left
the vicinity of New Orleans than Taylor appeared upon
the ground and blockaded the river below Port Hudson
for quite a period. Not until the fall of that place was
Banks enabled to get rid of him.
The correspondence between Banks and Grant during
this campaign was conducted by couriers up and down the
river. It proved very misleading, for the intervals be
tween despatches were considerable. Each at one time
had reasonable ground to expect that the other would sup
plement his efforts in his own special task ; and each con
tinued to count upon the other after the changed conditions
had made cooperation impossible.
Banks finally concentrated at Port Hud-
son, bringing from the Red River country
the divisions of Grover, Emory, and Weitzel, and passing
around the city by the north, while Augur and T. W.
Sherman moved up from Baton Rouge. The works
were strong and ably defended. Gardner had recently
been in command of some seventeen thousand men, but
Pemberton, in whose department he was, had withdrawn
reinforcements and left him only four thousand effectives.
Indeed, at the moment Banks completed his investment,
Johnston had ordered Gardner to evacuate the place, in
tending that he should reinforce his own command at
Jackson. No sooner on the ground than Banks May 27.
orders an assault all along the line. But,
despite good conduct, failure results. The loss is two
thousand men.

166 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1863.
A second assault has no better fortune.
June 14. -gut t^e jggue -n gaijjjjjg an advanced line
may have been worth the further loss of eighteen hundred
men. The investment is continued, and the monotony of
regular siege operations is the order of the day.
In this condition matters remain for a month. News of
the surrender of Vicksburg comes to hand, and Gardner
capitulates, on similar terms, with a large
July 8. number of prisoners.
The loss by sickness had been enormous, exceeding
vastly the casualties of the siege. The army left to
General Banks after the surrender mustered barely one
third " for duty " which had appeared on the rolls two
months before.
Just prior to the surrender of Port Hudson, Confeder
ate General Holmes, with nine thousand troops, arrived
before Helena, Ark., held by Prentiss with half the num
ber. Holmes trusted to capture the gar-
July 4. . .
rison and to erect a new citadel there.
But his project came to naught, with a loss of nearly two
thousand men. Very shortly after this event the steamer
July. Imperial from St. Louis arrived at New
Orleans, with a load of freight. The Great River could be
said to be fairly emancipated from its bonds.
During the remainder of the war only partisan hostilities
were waged upon the Mississippi.

SPARRING FOR A HOLD. — MINE RUN.
LEE retired from his defeat at Gettysburg, by way of
the Shenandoah Valley. Meade crossed the Poto
mac and marched along the route followed
by McClellan in 1862, east of the Blue July 17"18"
Ridge. The pursuit was begun late, but once afoot it was
expeditious enough to have enabled Meade to strike Lee's
flank by debouching through Manassas Gap. This he at
tempted to do, but, owing to the delay of French's corps,
the opportunity was lost. Lee retired to Culpeper.
Meade advanced to the line of the Rappahannock.
Not anticipating any immediate demonstration by Meade,
Lee sent Longstreet to help out Bragg, who apparently was
overmatched by Rosecrans in Tennessee. Meade, however,
was preparing for an active campaign, and shortly put the
army across the Rappahannock. But the battle of Chicka
mauga, in which Bragg turned the tables on Rosecrans,
alarmed the War Department, and Hooker with the Elev
enth and Twelfth corps was taken from the Army of the
Potomac and hurried out to Chattanooga. Meade was
thus reduced to the strict defensive.
Overestimating Meade's depletion, Lee resolved to try
167

168 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1863.
on the Army of the Potomac a manceuvre simUar to the one
practised on Pope the year before, and to seize the Orange
and Alexandria RaUroad in its rear. He
Octqber9. . . . .
accordmgly put across the river by the up
per fords. So soon as Meade fully learned
October 11. .
this fact, he in turn withdrew across the
Rappahannock. In lieu of retreat, by a bold stroke Meade might have
fallen upon Lee's rear, and thus have caught him in the
execution of his manoeuvre, — a moment always critical,
because the troops are not so well in hand. But Meade
was a sound rather than a bold soldier ; he deemed it
best to retire. Upon which, and not untU then, Lee
forged rapidly ahead, feeling safe for his own communi
cations. He had won a point.
Meade assumed that Lee had abandoned his purpose and
was still at Culpeper. Anxious to bring him to a general
engagement if he could force it upon favorable ground, the
Army of the Potomac was again put across the Rappahan
nock. But no sooner over than the appearance of Stuart
on his right laid bare the facts, and he promptly retraced
his steps.
Now follows a race for the possession of the Orange and
Alexandria RaUroad. Lee aims for Bristoe Station. He
has the longer road, but also the clearer purpose. Meade,
not understanding his intention, must divine if he would
anticipate it.
Warren acts as rear guard. Meade reaches and passes
Bristoe en route to Centreville. Warren arrives there
only to find himself alone in presence of Lee's entire force.

1863.] SPARRING FOR A HOLD. 169
As the boldest is often the best means of extricating one's
self from peril, he smartly attacks Hill, who is in his im
mediate front. A brilliant combat results . October 14.
in Warren's favor. Under cover of this
demonstration he retires in safety to join the army.
Meade is now too strongly posted at CentrevUle for Lee
to push him further. The Confederate chieftain's efforts
have been foUed. But throwing out a curtain of troops
along BuU Run he destroys the railroad south from that
point and leisurely retires. Meade follows,
•n n ¦ i -r, October 18.
repairing as he goes. Reaching the Rap
pahannock, he crosses, after being obhged to force the pas
sage. Lee at once puts the Rapidan between November 7.
himself and the Army of the Potomac.
This unsatisfactory manoeuvring served to demonstrate
that if Meade was not always ready to take advantage of
Lee's openings, neither could Lee make him lose his head,
as he had done Pope.
The country stiU demanded action. Meade appreciated
the fact and sought opportunity again to try conclusions
with Lee. The latter had put his troops into cantonments
for the winter over a considerable area of country. A
number of the lowrer fords of the Rapidan were left
open, but Lee had defended his right flank by a line of
intrenchments facing Mine Run, at right angles to that
river. Meade deems it possible to turn this position, and
seriously cripple Lee in detaU by a sudden blow before he
can call in his scattered forces. Time and distance are
carefully computed. The Army of the Potomac is to cut

170

BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR.

[1863.

loose from its base with ten days' rations for a flying
campaign. The several corps are simultaneously to cross
at the various
fords. The
strict execution
of marching
orders seems to
promise suc
cess. But suc
cess can be
compassed by
nothing short
of minute ac-

Mine Run. November 26-30, 1863.

curacy. It is never

well to risk too much upon mathematical compliance
with the order of march. In an ancient country,
where turnpikes and bridges provide easy marching,
such calculations may be made. On such terrain as
was covered by our campaigns, abundant leeway was
always essential. Here, however, the estimates appear
liberal, and the movement is simple.
But again French is at fault. Pie is
three hours late. And the pontoon train
has been prepared without accurately estimating the depth
of the stream. From the start ill-luck attends a well-
conceived plan.
Lee catches the alarm, and hastily concentrates. Meade
November 28. Scts into Position tw0 da7s later than he
calculated to do. The army is not ready

November 26.

1863.] SPARRING FOR A HOLD. 171
for attack tUl the fourth day. Lee has made his position
impregnable. Recognizing faUure, Meade ruefuUy withdraws. Each
army resumes its old location, and the troops go into
winter quarters.

xxxm.
ROSECRANS MOVES UPON BRAGG.
TTTOR full six months the Army of the Cumberland
-L lay quietly in and near Murfreesborough, still
facing Bragg. None but minor operations
anuaiy were undertaken. An occasional raid was
July, 1863. made by the cavalry of either combatant.
The Union horse, under Stanley, had begun to give a
better account of itself than heretofore.
Among other such operations was one by Forrest and
Wheeler against Fort Donelson in which
Feb. 3. °
these brUliant troopers came nigh to snatch
ing a marked success, but as the event turned, suffered
defeat. And the most remarkable cavalry raid of the
war was undertaken during the early summer of this year
by J. H. Morgan, the Confederate partisan. With some
three to four thousand mounted men this officer ranged at
large through the States of Kentucky, Indiana, and Ohio,
for about a month, destroying and capturing
Jul 26 property wholesale. He was finally corralled
and taken prisoner with his whole force.
The consternation of the districts through which he rode
was beyond anything which occurred in the North, except
during the Gettysburg campaign.
172

1863.] ROSECRANS MOVES UPON BRAGG. 173
The Army of the Cumberland was in good condition to
take the field. HaUeck had been urging Rosecrans to open
the campaign. The latter in turn advised that "two great
and decisive battles should not be risked at the same time,"
meaning by Grant's army on the Mississippi and by his
own. This was scarcely a fair interpretation of a maxim
often apphcable to the operations of a single body of
troops. Grant was particularly anxious to have Rosecrans attack
Bragg so as to prevent his detaching reinforcements to
Vicksburg. Rosecrans, however, insisted that the sounder
policy was merely to threaten Bragg. He was positive
that this course would retain him in force in his own front.
Bragg pursued the same policy. Each appeared to dread
the struggle which sooner or later must come.
Towards midsummer Rosecrans was finaUy
. , , TT J™e 23.
constrained to move upon the enemy. He
had seventy thousand men ; Bragg lay at Shelbyville with
some forty-seven thousand. Rosecrans feinted with his
right against Bragg's position, in front of which some con
siderable skirmishing was done, to enable Thomas, whose
route lay through Hoover's Gap, to move upon Manchester
and thus turn Bragg's right. On Thomas' arrival at Man
chester, after tedious marching over heavy roads, Bragg,
who had been watching his front and had forgotten his
flanks, was obliged hurriedly to retire from his well-fortified
works at Shelbyville. Hereupon Thomas
, i no , • i • June 28.
again marched around Bragg s right, cutting
his communications atDecherd, and the Con- June 30.
federate found that it would be prudent to

174 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1863.
evacuate Tullahoma, which had been his depot of sup
plies, and move his head-quarters to Chat-
July 7. tanooga.
The casualties in this short campaign, in which Rose
crans fairly manoeuvred Bragg out of positions which might
have cost great loss by direct assault, were not much over
five hundred men. The operation had been skUfully
conducted and reflects credit upon the commanding general,
as well as upon Thomas, whose pertinent advice and stanch
methods always figured as an important factor in the
success of the Army of the Cumberland.
During the summer Burnside, with the forces which were
now caUed the Army of the Ohio, had advanced from Ken
tucky across the mountains into the Valley
August. of East Tennessee. Buckner was in com
mand of this VaUey, but retired towards Bragg on the
approach of Burnside, who thereupon oc-
September 2. .
cupied KnoxvUle. He was now in position
to afford protection to the left of the forces operating
against Chattanooga, and his position cut Lee off from his
easiest route to the Western armies.
Rosecrans had before him the task of flanking Bragg out
of Chattanooga. A glance at the map wUl show the im-
possibUity of taking the city from the front short of a pro
tracted siege. An attempt to turn Bragg's right would
necessitate a long and tedious march away from our raUroad
communications, and through a country beset with diffi
culties. Pie would have to move some seventy-five miles
up the Tennessee river before he could cross. This was,
however, the way Bragg expected the attack, on account of

1863.]

ROSECRANS MOVES UPON BRAGG.

175

Burnside's presence at KnoxvUle. And it was on cogent
grounds that he assumed that Rosecrans would attempt to join
those forces to his own before attacking him in his stronghold.
But Rosecrans was planning a different manceuvre. He
guessed that Bragg would count on his moving by his left,
and knew that
to do what
your enemy
does not ex
pect is to half
acco mplish
your purpose.
He proposed
to himself to
cross the Ten
nessee west of
Chattanooga,
pass the moun
tain ranges
belowthecity, and take
Bragg in re-
verse from an unexpected quarter.
This was no easy problem. He had before him a wide
river and several parallel ranges of rugged mountains
traversed only by the roughest of roads. He was provided
with poor transportation. Yet he must calculate on forag
ing his beasts, and feeding his men for at least three weeks,
and must provide ammunition for several encounters, if not
one or more pitched battles.

Rosecrans' Manoeuvre. Aug. 20-Sep. 1 7, '63.

176 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1863.
Still this seemed to him, all things considered, the prefer
able route. He accordingly sent Crittenden
with the left wing up the Sequatchie Valley
to make a demonstration on Bragg's right, to confirm the
latter in his theory that this was the real point of attack,
while himself with Thomas and McCook made ready to march
towards the most available crossing-places of the Tennessee
near Bridgeport. He was about to place himself in the
enemy's country, with insecure means of retreat in case of
disaster, insufficient supplies, and a treacherous knowledge
of the terrain; while the conditions prescribed a march in
several columns. A bold but hardly a prudent scheme.
Bragg had just been reinforced from Mississippi, and
expected Longstreet from Virginia. He was quite intent
on watching Crittenden's movement toward his right.
Rosecrans was unopposed in crossing the
September 4. Tennessee, and in putting Thomas and Mc
Cook over the Raccoon range into Lookout Valley. There
being but three practicable wagon roads, he ordered Thomas
by way of Trenton over Lookout Mountain and Missionary
Ridge into McLemore's Cove, while McCook moved by way
of Valley Head into the open country beyond Lookout
Mountain, and south of Chattanooga.
This eccentric route separated McCook by nearly three
days' march from Thomas. Crittenden, meanwhile, had
returned and had followed Thomas across the river.
On reaching Alpine, McCook threw out a reconnoitring
party, but without encountering the enemy
September 10. in force. To reach McCook, Thomas must
pass through one of the gaps in Pigeon Mountain. In

1863.] ROSECRANS MOVES UPON BRAGG. Ill
attempting Dug Gap his van was attacked, and he drew
back, as he must force the defile in order to advance, —
always a delicate operation, — and was in •September 11.
the dark as to McCook's whereabouts.
So soon as Thomas and McCook had reached Lookout
Valley, Bragg had seen the necessity of evacuating Chatta
nooga. Hereupon Crittenden moved up the river, took
possession of the town, and advanced twelve miles south to
Gordon's Mills. But the situation was scarcely bettered.
Rosecrans' army was still divided into three parts, each
separated from the others by a serious distance in the
presence of the enemy.
From Chattanooga Bragg had moved to LaFayette from
whence he at once sent out detachments to hold the
Pigeon Mountain Gaps. It was one of these which
Thomas' head of column had encountered.
Rosecrans' position was perilous in the extreme ; Bragg
was afterwards severely blamed by many for not taking
summary advantage of it. But the game of war is not
based on mathematical exactness. What appears feasible
on paper is often far from practicable in the field. Nor
are aU good soldiers great strategists. The heavy work of
the world has to be done by the average abilities. And
even brilliant genius does not always compass the most
useful ends. In medio tutissimus.
The lack of maps and his unfamUiarity with the country
was Rosecrans' only excuse for having placed himself in
such jeopardy. He had got his right wing September 14.
separated from his centre by three marches,
and these through a long and dangerous defile. His left

178 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1863.
was equally distant from the centre. Thomas could not
go to either wing without endangering the other. He
must wait for each of them to rally upon him. If Bragg
could but overwhelm Thomas singly, he could at once
turn upon Crittenden with good assurance of crushing him,
and still have ample time to retrace his steps and to cut
McCook off from retreat across the river.
To have done this would have stamped Bragg as the
equal of Lee. And while McCook or Crittenden would
have stood a sorry chance against Bragg single-handed, it
is much easier to talk of crushing Thomas than it ever
proved to do it. If Bragg had undertaken this operation,
so obvious to his critics, he might have faUen far short of
its performance. Though indeed it was the thing to attempt,
for any action would have compromised Rosecrans stUl fur
ther. But Bragg did not act, and Rosecrans escaped from
his peril.
By a long and arduous march, McCook joined Thomas,
and Crittenden soon after came within hail.
Bragg must now fight the Army of the
Cumberland as~one body.
The position of Rosecrans lies facing Chick-
September 18. amauga Creek from a point in advance of
Rossville Gap in Missionary Ridge, through which passes
the road to Chattanooga, southerly past Gordon's Mill tow
ards Dug Gap. He has finally manoeuvred himself in front
of the captured city. But he must fight for its preserva
tion. And Bragg proposes to make him fight au fond.

XXXIV.
CHICKAMAUGA.
LONGSTREET is now approaching the field. Bragg
marshals his forces on the east bank of Chickamauga
Creek. His purpose is to cross on the morrow, crush our
left, seize the Rossville road, and thus cut us off from both
retreat and Chattanooga. But Thomas has anticipated this
probability and firmly covers Rossville. Rosecrans awaits
attack. Bragg crosses Chickamauga Creek a day
• it i mi September 19.
later than intended, and falls upon Thomas,
whom circumstances have placed in control of the left of
the army. The fighting is stubborn, and during the day
Thomas is somewhat thrust back ; but by nightfall he re
gains his old position. Bragg's tactics have now become
quite intelligible to him, and he re-forms during the night
in such wise as to protect more securely the Rossville road,
the enemy's evident goal.
Next day Polk commands on the enemy's right, Long-
street on the left. In the forenoon Polk September 20.
forces the fighting. Thomas exhibits a stay
ing quality of the highest order, and though repeatedly thrust
back, shows no symptom of weakening. Towards midday
179

180

BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR.

[1863.

a serious breach is made in our line on the right of the
centre, by the removal of Wood's division, through mis
taken orders. Into this cleft quickly pours a stream of

ftOSS^PLLE.

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Chickamauga. September 19-20, 1863.
Southern regiments. The right under McCook is isolated,
taken in reverse and, as at Murfreesborough, speedily hud
dled into shapeless masses.
The absence of the instinct of command is apparent.
Thomas' flank is completely turned. The fate of the
1863. ] CHICKAMA UGA. 1 8 1
battle hangs by a hair. No aid can now come from the
right. Thomas re-forms by a retrograde movement upon
Horse Shoe Ridge. Granger's divisions advance oppor
tunely from Rossville Gap, which Longstreet might have
seized, thus forces the latter back, and occupies a ridge
on Thomas' right. Ammunition is getting low. Cold
steel is used. The enemy is unremitting in his blows :
his onslaught is redolent of success. As at Stone's River,
everything seems lost. The entire right of the army, with
Rosecrans and his staff, is driven from the field in utter
rout. But, unknown even to the commanding general,
Thomas, the Rock of Chickamauga, stands there at bay,
surrounded, facing two to one. Heedless of the wreck of
one-half the army, he knows not how to yield. No more
splendid spectacle appears in the annals of war than this
heroic stand of Thomas in the midst of a routed army,
and in the face of an enemy the power of whose blows is
doubled by the exultation of victory. Slowly riding up
and down the lines, with unruffled countenance and cheery
word, it is his own invincible soul which inspires his men
for the work they have to do. It is on his courage that
every soldier leans.
Rosecrans' frantic efforts to raUy the right are wasted.
The rout is complete, disgraceful. The panic-stricken regi
ments pour by, heedless of entreaty or command. Reaching
Rossville, in the belief that Thomas too has been routed,
Rosecrans sends Garfield, his chief of staff, to hunt
him up and bid him to protect the rear with whatever
force he can collect. He himself rides back to Chatta
nooga, thinking there to rally and re-form his troops

182 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1863.
to meet the pursuing foe. Unhappy day for Rosecrans'
fame !
Night supervened. Bragg had torn his columns into use
less shreds by dashing them against immovable Thomas.
Nor was he able to follow Thomas up, when, with broken
but undaunted ranks, this silent hero led back his men to
RossvUle. Here he re-formed at his leisure. And before
morning he was joined, after a weary circuit over the hiUs,
by Sheridan, who had been cut off in Rosecrans' disordered
retreat, but who had kept bis troops together, and was stUl
in condition and temper to do efficient service.
Next day Bragg could do no more than
Sept. 21. observe our movements with his cavalry,
Sept. 22. . J
and thirty-six hours later, the Army of the
Cumberland was concentrated at Chattanooga, and in fair
shape for service.
Rosecrans had been badly worsted on the field of battle.
Chickamauga was one of the direst mishaps of the war.
But the result of the campaign was that he had manoeuvred
Bragg out of his key-position, and Thomas' stanch de
fense had so weakened him that he could not, for some time
at least, undertake the offensive. On the other hand, Bragg
had practically got Rosecrans cooped up in Chattanooga.
Honors were easy between them.
Rosecrans ascribed his unfortunate division of forces to
the failure of his subordinates to obey orders. Both Mc
Cook and Crittenden were relieved from command till a
Court of Inquiry could make disposition of their cases.
In this bloody battle, the Army of the Cumberland lost
sixteen thousand out of 8ixt7-two thousand men on the

1863.] CHICKAMAUGA. 183
field, thirty-six guns and much material. Bragg's loss
was over eighteen thousand out of a considerably larger
effective. There is no doubt much difference of opinion as to Rose
crans' abUity. He also belongs to that large number of
excellent generals upon whom Fortune did not smile.
Without being a great soldier, he possessed many of the
qualities of one. He was tried in the balance and found
wanting. But was the balance itself true ? " It was inev
itable that the first leaders should be sacrificed to the na
tion's ignorance of war." At that time our public would
not exhibit the patience which became necessary in after
days if success was to be enticed to our banners.
The Army of the Cumberland in Chattanooga was really
in a state of siege. The Confederate Army held the south
bank of the Tennessee, and from the end of the railroad
which supplied our troops, at Bridgeport, around the long
bend here made by the river, was a haul of sixty mUes.
This distance was over roads axle-deep in mud, and daily
hable to interruption by cavalry raids. Rations began
speedily to faU short. The situation was grave.
Under these circumstances, the arrival of Hooker with
fifteen thousand men from the Army of the Potomac was
by no means an unmixed gain ; but Rosecrans soon found
use for his corps in an operation designed to open commu
nications across the loop of the river, via Brown's Ferry.

XXXV.
THE BATTLE OF CHATTANOOGA.
THE Departments of the Ohio and the Cumberland
were now merged into the Military Division of the
Mississippi under Grant. Rosecrans was
Oct. 16-20. 1 r
relieved and Thomas became commander of
the Army of the Cumberland.
The advantage of opening the Brown's
October 27. .
Jb erry road was manifest, and with the
cooperation of Hooker, the left bank of the Tennessee
opposite Bridgeport was seized by a coup de main, and
his command, consisting of the Eleventh and Twelfth
corps, was posted on the spot.
The enemy had been unable to interrupt the movement,
though made under his very eyes ; but loth to have the
city so easily revictualled, Longstreet got
Oct. 28-29. . Ob
together his troops and assaUed Hooker in
force. He must be driven from his ground, or starvation
in Chattanooga would no longer be the Confederates' ally.
A short and sharp action at Wauhatchie ensued ; Hooker
drove Longstreet back ; the road was finished, and the
siege of Chattanooga was raised.
Bragg now despatched Longstreet into East Tennessee
184

1863.] BATTLE OF CHATTANOOGA. 185
to dispose of Burnside, who was stiU in the vicinity of
KnoxvUle, where he was a constant threat to Bragg's right.
Grant ordered Sherman to join him at Chattanooga with
the Fifteenth army corps. The other three corps of the
army which captured Vicksburg remained on the Missis
sippi. While his enemy's forces were depleted was the time
for Grant to push home with his sixty thousand men.
How to drive Bragg's army from our front was the im
mediate problem before him, and Grant's restless activity
would not aUow him to sit down and wait.
Bragg's right lay substantiaUy along Missionary Ridge,
its advance strongly entrenched at Tunnel HiU ; his centre
across Chattanooga VaUey ; his left holding the supposed
inaccessible heights of Lookout Mountain. In whichever
direction the eye was cast formidable defenses had to be
pierced, and these were manned by forty thousand muskets.
The battles of Chattanooga, Lookout Mountain, and
Missionary Ridge, which shortly came about, may be con
sidered as parts of one single engagement, having for object
to drive Bragg from the position he had chosen. The plan
of action was as foUows : Sherman was to move up the
river on the north side with four divisions, cross near the
mouth of Chickamauga Creek, under cover of artUlery, on
a pontoon-bridge to be thrown for the purpose, attack and
capture the north end of Mission Ridge, and advance along
it. Thomas was to concentrate in Chattanooga VaUey and
feel the enemy strongly to hold him there in force ; whUe
Hooker's share was to patrol Lookout Valley and make a
diversion to assist Sherman. For on the latter Grant sup
posed the main task was to fall and desired that it should.

186

BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1863.

Knowing Sherman's method better than that of his
newer lieutenants, Grant felt that he could rely on the
work being done as it should be if entrusted to him.

Xk'
Xih
Tu. ? I ± o
'"gig*! 2
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e iX
"b- = J:
ft

Chattanooga. November 23, 24, 25, 1863.

November 24.

Some delay occurred in Sherman's crossing, but two days
later than ordered he put over his command
and drove the enemy from the north end of
the ridge. The entire range had been supposed to be con
tinuous ; but Sherman found a deep gap which must be

1863.] BATTLE OF CHATTANOOGA. 187
passed before he could arrive at Tunnel Hill, and his pur
pose was summarily arrested by this unexpected physical
obstacle, of which the enemy had taken full advantage for
defense. MeanwhUe Thomas makes a reconnoissance in force in
the Valley, which develops the enemy in his front, and suc
ceeds in advancing his line some distance, while Hooker
pushes round the end of Lookout Mountain November 24.
and fights his eccentric Battle above the
Clouds, driving the enemy from every position. Next day
Hooker operates towards Rossville on Bragg's left, while
Sherman makes another heavy onslaught on the enemy in
his front. Being met with stubborn oppo-
° " November 25.
sition from Hardee's troops, Thomas is or
dered to attack" seriously aU along the defenses in his
front. This attack is meant by Grant to be merely in the na
ture of a diversion to lighten Sherman's task. But the
Army of the Cumberland, eager to show that lack of stom
ach did not lose the fight of Chickamauga, as well as jeal
ous of the glory to be won, assaUs the field-works at the
foot of Mission Ridge and captures them at the point of
the bayonet. Breckenridge is quite unable to hold head
against them. After which triumph, the troops, emulating
each other's ardor, and without orders, press gallantly on
up the ridge in full view of both armies, with deafening
cheers, heedless of the deadly fire belched into their very
faces, and overrun the works at the summit like a torrent,
capturing thirty-five guns and prisoners wholesale. It has
aU been the work of an hour, and so completely has it

188 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1863.
flanked the line opposing Sherman, that he is at once re
lieved of opposition.
In this triple action Sherman's loss was fifteen hundred ;
Thomas' nearly four thousand ; Hooker's not great. Bragg,
thus worsted at every point, found it necessary to withdraw
to Ringgold with a loss of sixty-six hundred men.
Grander, with fifteen thousand men, was now sent to
Burnside's assistance. Longstreet was besieging the Army
of the Ohio in Knoxville, and had made a very heavy
assault on the place. Alarming reports corn-
November 29. ing from thence, especially as to the want
of provisions, Sherman was also despatched to his aid. But
as Longstreet retired towards Virginia on his approach,
Sherman shortly returned to Chattanooga. He had not
found Burnside in so great a strait as reported.
During the succeeding winter months minor operations
alone were undertaken. Early next year Schofield succeeded to
February, 1864. » /-. •
the command of the Army of the Ohio.
Transportation being difficult, the troops had suffered bit
terly from lack of victuals during the winter. As spring
approached Longstreet was withdrawn to the more im
portant field of operations in Virginia, and Schofield became
free to join Sherman. That beau sabreur, Forrest, about these
March, 1864. days made another of his chronic raids,
notorious on account of the Massacre at Fort Pillow. The
furthest point reached by him was Paducah, where a stub
born resistance rendered threats and attacks alike vain.
On the return march, he visited Fort PUlow, garrisoned by

1863.] BATTLE OF CHATTANOOGA. 189
negro troops. Here he at first met a stout rebuff; but
during a subsequent parley for surrender of the garrison on
honorable terms, the Confederates advanced their lines while
hostilities had ceased, and, thus surrounded, April 12, 1864.
the fort was surprised and captured. It is
not probable that Forrest personally had anything to do
with the events which followed. But his troops, maddened
by the sight of their ancient slaves in arms, began butcher
ing wholesale after surrender had been made. It is a black
page in the story of the war, and one to be quickly turned.

XXXVT.
FURTHER OUTSKIRT OPERATIONS.
"TV "TO more than a bare mention can be made of a few
JL 1 of the numerous small expeditions which were under
taken on the outskirts of the Confederacy.
For about a year from the beginning of the war, the
town of Norfolk was held by the enemy. But shortly
after the fight of the Merrimac and Monitor
May-Oct., 1862. . .
it again fell into our hands, completing for
us the possession of the mouth of the Chesapeake.
After the capture of Fort Sumter the enemy held un
disputed possession of Charleston for a twelvemonth. It
was then deemed advisable in Washington to make some
attempt to recover possession of this politically, if not
strategically, important city. Admiral Dupont and Gen
eral Hunter first tried their hand at the
May, 1862. work, but made no headway ; and Hunter
was relieved by Mitchel. The latter soon after died,
and Hunter resumed command of the
, anuaiy . Department of the South. Three months
April 7. t
thereafter Hunter made a further attempt
upon the city, which again had no result, and Gilmore
superseded him so far as the operations
June 12. * x
against Charleston were concerned.
190

1S62-S.] FURTHER OUTSKIRT OPERATIONS. 191
During the next month, Gilmore made
a lodgment, with Dahlgren's assistance, on
Morris Island in Charleston Harbor, and Fort Wagner — a
strong work there situated — was attacked.
Failure followed two assaults with a loss of
some eighteen hundred men. Fort Sumter was demolished
by the fire of the fleet, and though a naval
i .-..¦», , Aug. 2S-Sept- 9.
assault on it failed, the enemy evacuated
Morris Island. Farther operations were then suspended,
and the city of Charleston remained in the possession of
the enemy until Sherman marched through the Carolinas
nearly two years later.
General Foster made a raid from his base
a^ ™ *-, , ^ . , -.t .r. , Dec- H-38, 1862.
at .New Berne on (ioldsborough, N.C, but
accomplished no result which proved to be of permanent
value. A minor campaign between Generals Blunt and Hind-
man in Missouri took place at the close of
, December, 1862.
the second year. .Blunt had marched some
seven thousand Union troops from Missouri into Arkansas,
driving the Confederate horseman Marmaduke before him.
Hindman, who was in general command, deeming it
essential to arrest his progress, advanced and confronted
Blunt, whom a body under Herron was on the way to rein
force. Hindman was held in check for two days. The
Confederate then feinted on the Union front, stole by its
left and attacked Herron at Prairie Grove ; hut being held
up for three hours, Blunt reached his rear, and the two, in
a sharp action, in which over one thousand
men were lost by each combatant, forced

192 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1863-4.
Hindman to permanently withdraw south of the Arkansas
river. September, 1863. Steele occupies Little Rock, Arkansas.
An expedition from New Orleans against
Sabine Pass, Louisiana, fails.
Blunt and Cabell indulge in a skirmishing
September. campaign in Arkansas.
The guerilla Quantrell assails Lawrence, Kansas, but
is driven off after creating great confusion
August 21. among the settlers.
Banks sends out an expedition which takes
November 6, Brownsville, at the mouth of the Rio Grande.
Gilmore despatches Seymour and six thousand men to
Jacksonville, Florida. From here an advance is made
into the country, and at Olustee an engage-
Feb. 20, 1864. . ° °
ment with the enemy results disastrously
for our arms, with a loss of one-quarter the effective force.
But Jacksonville is held.
Galveston had early been occupied by the
October, 1862. T, . „ , ^ ,, ' . .
Union forces; but Magruder recaptured it
somewhat later, and it was thenceforth held
by the Confederates.
An attempt to release our prisoners at Libby Prison,
Richmond, was made by the cavalry gen-
„, , ' n ,0„. eral, Kil patrick. But this operation, made
March 3, 1864. r r '
noteworthy at the time by the death of
Colonel Dahlgren, fell short of success.
The Red River expedition deserves perhaps a larger
treatment. But as it had no influence upon the great
strategic fields, a passing notice must suffice.

1864.] FURTHER OUTSKIRT OPERATIONS. 193
As the third year began General Banks conceived the
idea that the trade of Western Louisiana 1864.
could be opened by the medium of the Red
river, and projected an expedition to take possession of the
country adjacent to its course. This river is open for navi
gation by larger vessels, only during the high water of
March and AprU. Porter was to command the fleet of
twenty of the finest vessels on the Mississippi, and Sherman
was persuaded to lend some of his troops for the purpose.
A. J. Smith was to start from Vicksburg with ten thousand
men, whUe Banks would proceed up river from New
Orleans, with FrankUn's division. Steele from Little
Rock was to operate towards Shreveport to join the main
army. Kirby Smith was in command of the enemy's forces in
Shreveport ; Taylor led an army in the field.
The fleet started up the Red River in company with the
transports carrying A. J. Smith's column. March 14.
Fort De Russy was captured, the enemy re
tiring before our troops, and Alexandria and March 16.
Natchitoches fell into our hands as the joint April 2.
force advanced. Banks put in an appearance
a week later. There was more or less skirmishing with
the enemy's horse and outposts along the entire route ; and
near Mansfield, at Sabine Cross-Roads, the vanguard met
the enemy in force. Sufficient care had not
J . April 8.
been taken to keep the several bodies con
centrated. Taylor fell smartly on Franklin, defeated and
drove him back with a loss of three thousand out of eight
thousand engaged. Emory stopped the Confederates, but

194 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864.
we fell back on our supports. At Pleasant Hill, A. J.
Smith made a stand for the possession of what had been so
far gained, but despite stanch fighting the
P" result could not be changed. An immedi
ate retreat was made, without waiting to bury the dead.
The casualties now numbered about four thousand men.
The situation was threatening.
The fleet meanwhile had reached Grand
Mid-April. Ecore. High water was coming to an end,
and Porter was obliged to return down river,
to Alexandria. Here it was found that most of the vessels
were of too heavy draught to pass the falls below the town ;
and the loss of most of them w^ould have been certain, but
for a dam and water-way ably constructed by Colonel
Bailey, an engineer remarkably fertile in ex-
May 12-13. _J & X .
pedients. By means of this device the fleet
was safely floated over.
On the retreat, Alexandria was burned by accident,
traceable to no particular cause, though, nat-
May 15. uraUy enough, laid by the Confederates to
our spirit of revenge.
The failure of this expedition came near to fataUy com
promising the force of General Steele, who had begun his
march down from Little Rock, and to whom no word of our
disaster could be conveyed. But with good luck his small
army was eventually withdrawn in safety, though with the
loss of much material.
The harbor of MobUe was protected by three works,
Forts Gaines, Morgan, and Powell. It was determined to
make a joint land and naval attack upon them, to break up

1864-5.] FURTHER OUTSKIRT OPERATIONS. 195
the illicit commerce of the city and, if possible, to reduce
the place. Farragut's fleet was increased by the addition
of some monitors, and he rendezvoused in the harbor with
Gordon Granger, selected by Canby to command the land
forces for this purpose. Farragut proposed
• • r* • i r August 5.
to employ his old tactics of isolating the forts
by running by them in column. This was done, — the
gallant Admiral in command of the flag-ship Hartford, —
with the loss of only one vessel. The Confederate ram
Tennessee made a brave resistance, but was captured.
Fort Gaines surrendered to Granger ; Fort
ii August 5, 23.
Powell was abandoned ; and Fort Morgan
surrendered later. But the city itself, though cut off from
the outside world, maintained itself against Granger's
efforts, and was not reduced till the close of April 11, 1865.
the war. It then surrendered to Canby.
Price makes an extensive raid into Missouri and pene
trates to within less than one hundred miles
of St. Louis. Curtis defeats him and drives „ , ,„„,
October, 1864.
him from the State.
A noteworthy combat between the Confederate cruiser
Alabama and the United States ship Kearsarge occurred off
Cherbourg, France. Among the vessels June 19.
depredating on our commerce three English-
built cruisers had been preeminent, the Alabama, Florida,
and Georgia. The two last were captured respectively in
Bahia Harbor and at sea.
The Alabama, under command of Captain Semmes, had
been sought by the Kearsarge, Captain Winslow, and
sailed out of Cherbourg to accept her challenge. The

196 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864.
tonnage and crews of each were about equal. The arma
ment of each was what the English and we considered
the best for war vessels of that size. They were typical
craft. The Alabama was an English vessel, mounting
English guns and carrying an English crew ; the Kearsage
an American vessel, with American guns, and out of one
hundred and sixty officers and men all but eleven were
American-born citizens. Both were wooden vessels, but
the Kearsarge hung her chain cables over the sides to protect
her engines.
It was a fair fight, but of short duration. The fire of
the Kearsage was the more dehberate and proved very
destructive. The Alabama surrendered within an hour in
a sinking condition. Semmes was picked up in the water
by an English vessel, and escaped capture. The loss of
the Alabama was about forty men. On the Kearsarge,
which was but slightly injured by her opponent's fire, only
three men were wounded.

xxxvn.
THE WILDERNESS.
FOR three long years the operations of our armies had
been conducted without united effort. The campaigns
of the East and West, though nominally directed by
HaUeck, had really been of so isolated a character that the
enemy could at need detach troops from Virginia to Ten
nessee, or the reverse, according as the tide might turn on
each strategic field. The nation had now learned that war
could not be carried on by political methods alone ; that
the South must be exhausted before peace could be won ;
that systematic warfare was the least costly means of bring
ing this to pass ; and that the unhampered work of one
man, in whom the confidence of aU could be centred, was
essential to a successful issue.
The choice of the nation feU naturaUy upon General
Grant. He was commissioned Lieutenant March 9, 1864.
General and placed in supreme command.
Grant gave over the control of events in the West to
Sherman. For himself he reserved the special field of
Virginia. He knew that he left in Sherman's hands a well-
o
tempered weapon with which to fight.
Grant's own success on other fields not unnaturally led him
197

198 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864.
to believe that the Army of the Potomac had never been
fought au fond; he imagined that Lee and the Army of
Northern Virginia could be beaten by the same means as
Pemberton and Bragg, and he set himself the task to make
the rugged old army do that which he thought it never yet
had done. Moreover Grant at this time openly gave his
preference to hard blows over manoeuvring. " Continuous
hammering " was his motto. His belief seems to have been
that the use of skilful tactics exhibits weakness. Other
and greater soldiers have sometimes for a while been sub
ject to this delusion. He was to discover his error in his
first clash of arms, and to recognize the fact that he had
never yet faced a captain such as was the man who through
so many campaigns had borne the proud banner of the
South on the Old Dominion soU, nor yet had led stouter
hearts against more valiant foes.
Grant's objective was Lee's army. So long as Lee held
to the defense of Richmond, this city was the goal. But
to destroy Lee's army was the work cut out. " On to
Richmond " was an empty phrase.
The Army of the Potomac lay in and about Culpeper ;
the Army of Northern Virginia around Orange. A move
ment by our right possessed the manifest advantage of more
open ground, and the yet greater disadvantage of grad-
uaUy lengthening our lines of communication and supply.
A movement by our left gave the Army of the Potomac
lines of operation easy to keep open, because the base
could be constantly shifted to points on the coast in rear of
the operations actually going on, but it carried the army
through a country essentially unfitted for manoeuvring.

1864.] THE WILDERNESS. 199
Grant had in theory favored moving on Richmond from
the James river. The overland route he deemed too cost
ly in time and men. But he eventually adopted a plan
savoring of both. Only his great numerical superiority
could excuse his dividing his forces. Concentric operations
are always weak, because the several detachments are liable
to be separately overwhelmed.
The plan was this. Grant, with the Army of the Poto
mac under Meade, and the Ninth corps under Burnside, was
to take the overland route on the east of Richmond. Butler,
with thirty thousand men (the Army of the James) , was to
move up James River. Sigel, who was near the Potomac at
the mouth of the Valley, and Crook, who was in the Ka
nawha region, were to operate from the debouches of the
Shenandoah. The Army of the Potomac had had five corps. These
were now consolidated into three, perhaps unwisely. For
the new ones became too bulky for the difficult country
through which they were to operate, and the esprit de corps
of the ancient organizations was destroyed by their dis-
bandment and merger into the new.
There were now Hancock's Second Corps, Warren's
Fifth, Sedgwick's Sixth, and Sheridan's Cavalry Corps.
These, with the Ninth, numbered one hundred and twenty-
two thousand men " for duty equipped " and over three hun
dred guns. Head-quarters were at Culpeper Court House.
Lee confronted this splendid army with the corps of
Longstreet, HiU, and Ewell, not far from seventy thousand
men and over two hundred guns. He was ready for the
fray. But he must have anxiously watched for the first

200 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864.
sign of the movement of his new opponent, whose set pur
pose he knew as weU as the strength of the army he led.
Grant purposed to turn Lee's right. No time was lost.
Marching orders were issued. The army was perfect in
discipline, equipment, and material. One
day sufficed to put the hundred thousand
men across the Rapidan. Warren led, Sedgwick followed
over Germanna Ford; Hancock crossed at Ely's, further
east. Burnside was to remain in camp for a day later.
Grant's route was through the WUderness, due south.
This was the same dense forest where the Army of the
Potomac, just one year before, had been so nearly wrecked.
Lee made no effort to dispute Grant's crossing, but pur
posed to strike him wliUe traversing these dreary woods.
From Orange towards the route pursued by Grant were
two parallel roads, known as the Plank road and the Turn
pike, which cut the north and south roads used by us at
right angles to our line of march.
Meeting with no opposition in crossing the river, Grant
beheved that Lee had retreated to more favorable ground.
He had no idea of fighting here, in the forest which had
proved so nearly fatal to Hooker. On the
May 4-5. night succeeding the passage of the Rapi
dan both armies camped near by each other, Grant un
suspicious of the close presence of the enemy, and far from
assured that Lee would accept battle when his position
was turned. But orders were issued to
May 5. attack, and next day Ewell is met by
Warren, who is moving by the flank through the wood
roads. Grant and Meade, at Old Wilderness Tavern,

1864.]

THE WILDERNESS.

201

suppose this to
be the affair
of a simple rear
guard. At
this moment,
had Ewell
been vigor- o
ously pushed
by Warren,
he might have
been badly
used up, for
he was unsup
ported. But
as the resist
ance to Ewell
was propor
tioned only to
Grant's idea of
his strength,
before Sedg-
wick could

Wilderness. May 5-6, 1864.

come up on
Wan-en's right, Ewell had inflicted a loss of three thousand
men upon the Fifth corps. Still Warren clung tenaciously
to ground in advance of Old Wilderness Tavern.
Grant's eyes begin to open, but, with his usual determi
nation, he Is ready to accept the gage of battle here.
Sedgwick is ordered to join on to Warren's right. Han
cock, away off at Chancellorsville, with his head of column

202 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864.
at Todd's Tavern, is hurried up along the Brock road. On
his arrival he promptly moves out the plank road, south of
Warren, and attacks HUl. Both the Warren-Ewell and
Hancock-Hill combats are isolated. No tactical connection
exists between them. In fact grand-tactics are impossible
on this ground. Night closes the engagement.
Both Grant and Lee determine to attack on the morrow.
Burnside is ordered up to take place between Warren and
Hancock. Lee awaits the arrival of Longstreet, whom he
will place opposite Hancock's right.
The Wilderness is covered by a scrub growth of small
trees and underbrush, so dense that one can see but a few
hundred feet in the clearest places. Cavalry can not leave
the roads, which are few and poor. Artillery is useless,
except occasionally where a section may fire down a road.
There are next to no clearings. Manoeuvring is impossible.
Bodies of troops have to march by the compass. Success
or faUure can only be guessed from the advance or recession
of the infantry fire. In this blind place, famUiar enough
to Lee, but quite unknown to Grant, the two old enemies
are again to grapple.
Grant orders an attack along the whole line at 5 A.M.
Lee determines, so soon as Longstreet shall have ar
rived, to turn Grant's left and throw him back upon the
river. To divert attention from Longstreet's absence, he
strongly feels our right.
Hancock falls upon Hill at five, and drives him over a
mile down the plank road. Confusion among the troops is
natural in these woods. Hancock stops to rearrange the
ranks. He has been cautioned to beware lest Longstreet

1864.] THE WILDERNESS. 203
fall upon his left along the Brock road, for Grant considers
it probable that Lee may use this approach. Part of the
Second corps has thus been kept there, the presence of which
in the advance might have insured a larger success against
Hill. While thus pausing, Longstreet comes upon the
field. The suddenness of his assault takes Hancock
unawares, and drives him back to his old lines on the Brock
road. Here he rallies. Longstreet is wounded. The
violence of the attack subsides.
Later in the afternoon, Lee again attacks Hancock.
Aided by afire in the woods, which the wind blows into our
faces, he drives our line in some distance, but once more
we rally and retake the ground so lost. Night again
supervenes. Nothing has been decided. Grant's loss of
eighteen thousand men should make him rate his own new
army and his adversary's skUl at a higher value than he
did two days ago. Lee's loss is probably less by several
thousand men.
Beyond a cavalry fight by Sheridan against Stuart there
are no further operations on this ground. Both armies are
exhausted. Neither has gained aught but added respect for
the other's mettle.
Note. — Anderson succeeded Longstreet. But, for convenience, this
Corps is still referred to by the name of its old commander.

XXXVIII.

SPOTSYLVANIA.

a RANT, having found that Lee is able to check any
direct advance upon his lines, concludes to resort to
manoeuvring, and attempts to oust the Army of Northern

Spotsylvania. May 8-21, 1864.

Virginia from its position by a flank movement. It is
painfully apparent that no gain can be made by continuous
hammering here. He orders his trains to Chancellorsville,
204

1864.] SPOTSYLVANIA. 205
and heads the left of his army for Spotsylvania Court-
House. Warren is to lead and march by the Brock road
upon that place ; Hancock to follow ; Sedgwick and Burn
side to march on roads leading in the same direction from
ChancellorsvUle. Warren's advance was unfortunately delayed by a block
ade of the roads and by some opposition of the enemy's
cavalry. The trains of so large an army can not be speedily
or quietly moved. Lee soon became aware that Grant was
about to shift his ground and divined that it would be
either towards Spotsylvania or Fredericksburg. Longstreet
was ordered to protect Spotsylvania.
By a lucky accident for him Longstreet started so as to
reach the place before Warren. A summary attack might
have brushed him away. But our troops were weary and
by no means in high spirits. So Warren waited for
Sedgwick. Before the latter's arrival, night had fallen.
Hancock had been kept back some hours May 8.
by Meade, lest Lee should attack our rear,
which Meade thought not unlikely. As a consequence of
aU these mishaps, Lee had managed to plant himself athwart
Grant's path.
The Army of the Potomac files into line in front of Lee's
position, — in order from the right, Hancock, Warren,
Sedgwick, Burnside. One of the first mis-
° . May 9.
fortunes on this fatal ground is the death of
gallant Sedgwick. Wright succeeds to the command of
the Sixth corps.
Hancock is ordered to make a demonstration south
of the Po, but is withdrawn without accomplishing any

206 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864.
result. The loss is severe. Although probably too late to
turn the enemy's left, the manoeuvre, having been begun,
should have been pushed home. Towards
May 10. evening two assaults are made on a position
in Warren's front. It can not be carried, even at a loss of
five or six thousand men. Further on the left Upton does
manage to* effect a lodgment. But unsupported he can
not hold it.
Up to this moment Grant's hard blows have punished
only the Army of the Potomac. Lee is neither Pemberton
nor Bragg. Grant has met his match in aU but material
resources. Among Grant's qualities is wonderful staying power.
Up to a certain point this is one of the highest virtues of a
soldier. But it can be pushed too far. Grant is altogether
too blind to the advantages of combining manoeuvring wdth
direct assault. He can not believe that Lee has even
greater endurance than himself; that the Army of Northern
Virginia can longer resist his masses. He has yet to learn
how tough is the grain of that wonderful body of men.
An attack in force upon the centre is or-
May 12. dered. Hancock, in two lines of columns
of regiments, at early dawn, assaults the Confederate posi
tion, where the first line is thrown out in a sahent. The
troops rush over the intrenchments with a cheer, capturing
four thousand prisoners and many guns. But the second
line still remains. It too must be taken. The elated men,
without pausing to re-form, push forward, intent upon the
fruits of victory. But our loose-strung lines are met by the
enemy with serried ranks, and break against their waU of

1864.] SPOTSYLVANIA. 207
steel. A countercharge hurls us back to the salient.
With extreme difficulty these works are held, the Sixth
corps sustaining Hancock's right.
Grant, who by this stubborn defense has got the impres
sion that Lee has weakened his right and left to sustain his
centre, orders an immediate attack by Warren and Burn
side. Though stoutly made, each fails with grievous loss.
Lee determines to recapture the salient at any sacrifice.
Five distinct assaults are made during the day. The
defences are taken and retaken again and again. The
breastworks are alternately crowned by the rival flags.
For twenty hours the tide has surged doubtfully to and
fro. Our loss this day has been eighty-five hundred men.
Grant might readUy flank the enemy out of his position.
But he can not give up the contest. He wUl not yield to
Lee. He knows him to be vastly his inferior in men, and
wUl not believe that he can not be crushed by weight alone.
For a week after he makes partial attacks at all points,
shifting divisions from place to place along the line, seek
ing a weak point in the harness of the Army of Northern
Virginia through which to thrust his weapon. Lee meets
his every onset. No impression can be made.
The assaUant labors under the disadvantage of attacking
intrenchments. To offset this he is able secretly to mass
his men and attack a single point, while his enemy must
keep all portions of his line equally manned until he divines
where the blow is to fall. To attack without studying your
opponent's position is to throw away this manifest advan
tage, to refuse to add skill to mere strength of arm.
In this short campaign of little over two weeks, Grant has

208 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864.
lost thirty-six thousand men in casualties, nearly one in
three of his " for duty " force. He has accomplished nothing
which manoeuvring could not have compassed, unless he has
weakened the morale of his antagonist more than he has
his own. This he has not done. The Army of Northern
Virginia is elated at its successful defense. The Army of
the Potomac is disheartened at its losses with so little tan
gible result.
But for all that, the courage and sense of duty of our
brave old army are unshaken. It knows that the hopes of
the nation are in its keeping, and not a weak heart beats in
its ranks.
Courage is a common virtue in the soldier. That com
bination of physical and moral courage which enables a
general to inflict and unflinchingly to resist heavy blows is
the rarest and best. But this courage must be tempered
with skUl to be of the greatest use, and skill implies a dis
creet use of power. Though it was Falstaff hiding behind
his shield at the battle of Shrewsbury who exclaimed that
the better part of valor is discretion, yet there is, for the
commanding general of a great army, a far deeper meaning
in these pregnant words.
Fading to make any impression by hard
blows, Grant again issues orders to move by
the left — straight on Richmond.

THE MINOR ARMIES.
DURLNG aU this heavy fighting, the like of which has
not been seen since Borodino, the minor armies were
cooperating towards the general goal.
Sheridan, with the cavalrv corps, started
£1. May 9.
on a raid around to the west of Richmond.
At intervals he measured swords with Stuart, with uniform
success, for he largely outnumbered him. Finally after
much destruction of roads, bridges, and material of war, he
turned up on the James river, where Butler's army lay,
and from thence rejoined the Army of the May 25.
Potomac. Butler, with his new command, moved to May 4.
City Point and Bermuda Hundred, and in
trenched. His instructions were vague. When Grant,
in his overland march, should reach the vicinity of Rich
mond, Butler was to cooperate from this point and
move so as to lean with his left upon the James beyond
the city. This plan appears weak because Butler's rear
would thus be quite at the mercy of Beauregard, who
was certain to approach from North Carolina, as Gilmore
had beeri withdrawn from there to join the Army of the
209 •

210 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864.
James. Without the possession of Petersburg and the
line of the Appomattox, there was no safety whatever in
Butler's position.
But the capture of Petersburg was, strangely enough, no
part of Grant's plan at this time. He perhaps thought
that Lee could be annihilated before the vicinity of this city
was reached. And before Butler himself saw the necessity
of so protecting his rear, Beauregard had
May 7. reached the place and Butler's demonstra
tions against it became useless.
Butler now moves toward Richmond.
The enemy's fine extends from the river at
Drury's Bluff westerly. We purpose to
attack. But Beauregard is again too quick. He plans to
break Butler's right and seize his communications. The
attack falls heavily on the centre, but meets with no suc
cess. A dense fog prevents intended combinations on both
sides. A diversion from Petersburg against the Army of the
James fails. But Butler is none the less compeUed to
withdraw, for his position is compromised.
He has in this battle of Drury's Bluffs lost four thousand
men to Beauregard's three thousand. He retires to Ber
muda Hundred. Here, as Grant expresses it, he is "bottled
up," and the greater part of his force is ordered to the Army
of the Potomac, whUe the rest remains to hold a footing on
the James.
The other force cooperating with the Army of the Poto
mac from the Valley, consisting of Crook's Kanawha Army
and Sigel's troops, were under command of the latter. The
work cut out for this command was to destroy the raUroads

1864.] THE MINOR ARMIES. 211
in the Valley so as to cut Lee from his communications
with the West by way of the East Tennessee Railroad and
from his source of supplies in the Shenandoah. Sigel lay
along the Potomac ; Crook in the Kanawha region.
The latter was the first to get to work, and debouching
into the Valley he and Averell did some May.
exceUent work in demolishing the raUroads.
Sigel moved southward about the same time, but sud
denly brought up against Breckenridge at TVTf) TT 15
New Market. Here he suffered a sharp de
feat, and retired to the line of Cedar Creek,
where he was superseded by Hunter.
This general again moves up the VaUey,
and runs across Imboden at Piedmont. In
a smart combat he defeats the enemy, capt-
i June 8.
urmg one thousand five hundred prisoners,
and occupies Staunton. Crook and AvereU now join him,
making his effective some eighteen thousand
° . June 12.
men. Four days later he reaches Lexing
ton, and should have at once advanced to Lynchburg. But
delays supervene and when he does leave June 16.
Buchanan to march towards this key of the
VaUey, he finds that he is too late.
Lee can by no means afford to lose Lynchburg. Breck
enridge occupies its defences in force, and Early is hurried
from Cold Harbor to strike the VaUey in Hunter's rear
with Jackson's old corps.
But first Early throws his troops into Lynchburg.
Hunter assaults, but is thrust back, and June 18.
retires, foUowed by Early, who is so placed

212 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864.
as to be able readily to cut off Hunter's line of retreat down
the Valley. Hunter, who is entirely out of provisions,
determines to retire by way of the Kanawha, where Crook
has left a supply-camp at Meadow Bridge. But on reaching
the place he finds that a skilful guerUla-raid has destroyed
the depot. Luckily, a train of supplies reaches him at
Gauley River. From here Hunter moves
June 27. around the mountains to the upper Potomac.
The march is fuU of difficulties.
Sheridan had been sent out from the Army of the Potomac
to work in unison with Hunter, but he could not success
fully cope with Early, and he returned to White House,
after considerable interchange of hostUities with the enemy
and a loss of not far from one thousand men.
The cooperation of the Valley forces with Grant's main
army had thus been summarUy cut short, in part by Ul luck
and in part by Lee's clever dispositions.

XL.
AGAIN BY THE FLANK. — STALEMATE.
/~^\ RANT'S flank operations were uniformly well con-
VZJ ducted. They exhibited skill in conception and exe
cution, and commanded success which his favorite method of
hammering as uniformly faded to compass when his opponent
was his equal. The orders after Spotsylvania were for
Hancock to withdraw from the right, and,
, i . May 20.
marching behind the other corps, to push
towards Bowling Green. Lee was not slow to divine the
movement, but was too weak to attack during its prosecution.
To meet the threatened danger, however, he started
Longstreet on the paraUel turnpike in the same general
direction. When Warren followed Hancock, EweU fol
lowed Longstreet ; Wright and Burnside
80 . May 21.
brought up the rear, HUl foUowed suit.
As a result, the roads being somewhat shorter for Lee,
when the Army of the Potomac reached the North Anna, it
descried the Army of Northern Virginia
. . . May 23.
drawn up to welcome it on the opposite side.
Our left column under Hancock strikes the North Anna
near the raUroad crossing; Warren, with the right, at
Jericho Ford. The latter finds his passage undisputed and
213

214

BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR.

[1864.

crosses some troops at once. On the other side he has a
sharp exchange with the enemy, the result of which is to
capture one thousand prisoners. Hancock finds that the
enemy occupies a bridge-head and some strong field-works,
formerly erected, on the other side. He
forces the passage at considerable loss, and
puts his corps across.

Mav 24.

North Anna. May 23-26, 1864.

Lee's position is masterly. His centre is thrown forward
and holds the river. The wings form an obtuse angle, with
their flanks well supported on difficult natural obstacles.
Burnside attempts to force a crossing at the centre but quite
without success. Hancock is across on the left. So is
Warren on the right. But each is separated from the centre
by the river, and from the other wing by Lee's army. A
more complete stalemate can not be imagined. There
is not even a chance to hammer, unless Lee should now

1864.] AGAIN BY THE FLANK. 215
assume this role. But Lee is wise enough to refrain. He
is better suited with Grant's pursuing this policy.
The Army of the Potomac must again
¦ i i 1 • , i., , ¦ i May26.
withdraw. At night, speedUy but cautiously,
the Second corps acting as rear guard, the operation is carried
out. A wide easterly circuit is made to strike the Pamunkey.
While the army was at Spotsylvania, its base had been
at Fredericksburg. On moving to the North Anna, the
base was transferred to Port Royal. It wUl now be estab
lished at White House, on the York river.
No time is lost. The order of march is systematicaUy
carried out. The entire army reaches Han-
, i i ™ May 27.
overtown next day and crosses the Pamun
key. But Lee is again on hand, facing north-easterly and
covering the line of the Chickahominy.
Grant develops his position by reconnoissances. From
Hanovertown there are direct roads leading to Richmond.
These Lee defends with his entire force. It is evident that
only a hard struggle, or the cleverest tactics, will dislodge
him. His position can not well be broken,
r May 28.
and Grant again moves across Tolopotomoy
Creek and towards Cold Harbor.
Lee does the same, and his interior fines enable him to
excel the speed of the Army of the Potomac.
Lee is of course glad to have Grant bear the brunt of at
tack. Grant has been steadUy playing this part. But an
effort can be made so to manoeuvre as to make Lee attack.
Opportunities are not wanting. To match Lee in skUful
movements, if we can not break him down by fighting, is
indeed an honor worth the seeking.

216 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864.
The two armies are on the old ground. Gaines' Mill is
close by. Singularly enough, each army occupies the
position its opponent held at the beginning of the Seven
Days. But we are now the assailants. Two years ago it
¦was Lee who forced the fighting. He had not then to hus
band his means so stingily. Now he can afford to fight
only when pushed, or when the advantage is manifestly
his.

XLI.
MORE BLOOD.— COLD HARBOR.
SHERIDAN with his cavalry has seized Cold Harbor, a
centre of roads of great value. The Sixth corps is
despatched from the right to this point with orders to hold
it. MeanwhUe General Smith, with sixteen thousand men
from Butler's force, has arrived and is ordered to cooperate
with Wright. Lee has divined the manoeuvre and has
moved Longstreet to the same cross-roads. Wright and
Smith are forced to drive him out'of a commanding position
beyond Cold Harbor at a loss of two thousand men before
they can secure the place. But the roads are held. Han
cock moves to the left of the Sixth corps ; Warren remains
on the right, with Burnside in support. Sheridan protects
the lower fords of the Chickahominy, and the roads
towards White House.
Grant is impelled to try one more blow. His faith is
yet strong that he can break Lee's lines by sheer mo
mentum. This might still be possible if he would call to
his aid the resources of grand-tactics. He ought to seek
the key of his enemy's position and mass his assault there.
But, unlike the Army of the Potomac, he has not learned
the wonderful vitality of Lee and his veterans. Orders
217

218 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864.
are once more issued to attack along the
June 2' whole line at 4.30 A.M. on the morrow.
The want of definite plan is painfully apparent. Skilful
manoeuvring might more than once have placed Lee where
he would have to be the assaulting party or forfeit his stake.
New Bridge over the Chickahominy could have been seized
at this very time with this result.
Grant in his despatches stated that Lee would not come
out of his intrenchments to fight. But Grant had never
tried the proper means to make him do so. In lieu of
moving upon Lee's communications and thus compelling
him to leave his works for the open, Grant had constantly
hurled his men against field-works which he should have
learned, by the experience he had recently been through,
that he could not take. Grant's method was just what Lee
preferred. He was right in not coming out of his intrench
ments to fight.
Moreover an "assault all along the line "was useless.
To obtain advantages from the great loss of life which
was inevitable, the dominating point of the line should have
been developed and the assault massed there. No reserves
were apparently ready to follow up any advantages wluch
might be gained. The extreme care in arranging detaUs
which should have been exercised was not to be seen. No
picked troops were selected for the heaviest work. The
orders were only for " an assault aU along the line." The
rank and file did not even know Cold Harbor was to be a
battle. The old method of selecting your point of attack,
picking your troops, and properly supporting them, is by no
means obsolete. But Grant did not deem its use advisable.

1864.]

MORE BLOOD.

219

Within a few
moments of the
appointed time ss*^
this general assault
takes place. Out
of the grey dawn,
eighty thousand
men rush forward
upon the enemy in
his intrenched
lines, meet a
bloody repulse,
and retire to cover
themselves with
such works as they
can most speedily
erect to hold the
advanced ground
which some of
them have gained.
The assault has
faded in a brief ten Cold Harbor. May 31-June 12, 1864.
minutes. All the
fighting is over in less than an hour. Six thousand men
have fallen. The enemy has lost but a tithe of this num
ber. It would have been proper on this day for Grant to ask
a truce to bury the dead and care for the wounded who
lay between the lines.
It wras not pleasant to acknowledge defeat ; but it was

220 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864.
the part of humanity. And no great mUitary necessity
called for the continuance of the battle for the succeeding
four days. But during all this time the wounded lay upon
the field. Many perished from hunger and exposure.
Grant at first proposed to himself to take the position by
regular siege approaches. But he soon abandoned this idea
and reverted to the old plan of a transfer of the Army to the
James. The object of Grant's overland campaign was to capture
or to destroy Lee's army. He had done neither. But he
had lost sixty thousand men in five weeks without inflicting
corresponding loss upon the enemy. The Second corps
alone had lost four hundred men a day, from the time of
leaving the Rappahannock. The full significance of this is
apparent when the force of each army at the inception of
the campaign is called to mind. Grant had numbered one
hundred and twenty-two thousand men ; Lee some seventy
thousand. This fearful loss was the result of assaults in
mass undertaken without the aid of that skill which Grant
knew well how to employ, though he neglected to do so.
Whenever Grant resorted to manoeuvring, he succeeded
measurably. Whenever he attacked all along the line, he
failed utterly. "Turenne," says Napoleon of the campaign
of 1655, "constantly observed the two maxims: first,
Never attack a position in front when you can obtain
it by turning it ; second, Avoid doing what the enemy
wishes, and that simply because he does wish it. Shun
the field of battle which he has reconnoitred and studied and
more particularly that in which he has fortified and in
trenched himself."

1864.] MORE BLOOD. 221
The theory has been advanced that there had to be about
so much hammering, about so much loss of life, and con
sumption of energy and material, before we could hope to
3nd the war ; that so long as the South had any men or
means, the struggle would continue. There is a ground
work of truth in this. The Confederacy was practically
exhausted before it yielded.
But the corollary is likewise true. If the South would
certainly succumb when exhausted, it behooved us, on
merely humanitarian grounds, to fight on conditions so
nearly equal as to inflict the same loss upon the enemy as
we ourselves must suffer. This had not been done. And
the student of this final campaign in Virginia looks in vain
for the master-stroke by which our forces, numbering two
to one of the enemy, could compel the surrender of the
Army of Northern Virginia without losses to us greater in
number than the total effective of that gallant body. Lee
undoubtedly was fighting at a great advantage, on interior
fines, in his own State, on the defense. But how was he
overmatched in force !
Criticism can not depreciate the reaUy great qualities or
eminent services of General Grant. His task was one to
tax a Bonaparte. That he was unable to put an end to
the struggle by means less costly in lives and material, if
not indeed by some brilliant feat of arms, can not detract
from the praise actually his due for determined, unflinching
courage. It rather adds to the laurels of Lee. It cannot
be asserted that any other Northern general could here
have accomplished more against the genius of this soldier.
And it was Grant who, in the face of the gravest difficul-

222 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864.
ties, political and military, was able to hold the confidence
of the nation and to prevent that party at the North, which
was clamoring for peace, from wrecking our success now
all but won. But his truest admirers, indeed he himself,
admit Cold Harbor to have been a grievous mistake. And
all who appreciate at its solid worth Grant's ability as a
leader, regret that, in this great struggle with Lee, he
should have failed to employ the full resources he so abun
dantly possessed.

XLU.
SHERMAN LOOKS TOWARDS ATLANTA.
WE have seen three parallel columns, west of the
AUeghanies, slowly working their way southward
from the Ohio river into the heart of the Confederacv.
The Army of the Tennessee had hugged the Mississippi.
The Army of the Cumberland had advanced with varied
success and failure along the railroad from LouisvUle to
NashvUle and thence to Chattanooga, branching off for a
whUe to ShUoh and Corinth, where its identity was merged,
for the moment, in the great body there manoeuvring
under Halleck. The Army of the Ohio had left Eastern
Kentucky by way of Cumberland Gap , and had long had
its head-quarters at KnoxvUle. In the winter of 1863-4
these armies were commanded respectively by Sherman,
Thomas and Schofield, under the supreme control of
Grant. When, towards the end of 1861, the Department of the
Ohio was first created and Buell was placed in command,
his forces had been known as the Army of the Ohio.
A year later the Department of the Cumberland was
created for Rosecrans, and Buell's old army, now ad
vanced to Nashville, became the Army of the Cumber-
223

224 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864.
land. Later still, the Department of the Ohio was
narrowed to Eastern Kentucky and Eastern Tennessee, and
the troops in the new command received the old name of
Army of the Ohio.
Opposite Thomas, at Dalton, Ga., lay Joe Johnston,
now devoting himself to the personal command of Bragg's
old army. For this and the army of Northern Virginia
were then the sole forces on which the South could rely to
save the Cause from its threatening doom, if saved it might
be. Longstreet, untU ordered back to the Army of North
ern Virginia, confronted Schofield.
Sherman, who had rejoined McPherson and Hurlbut at
Vicksburg, was commissioned to capture Meridian, in
Eastern Mississippi, and destroy the railroads there center
ing. This work he accomplished in so thorough a manner
that the State of Mississippi was rendered
February 3, to , , „ . ~ ,
M h 6 1864 harmless tor interference in the campaign
immediately to ensue. He was severely
held to task by the Southern press for what were termed his
ruthless methods of warfare. But Sherman was a soldier,
and when he had work to do, he did it without fear, favor,
or affection. An instance of unnecessary cruelty or
destruction of property by him has yet to be substantiated.
After the Meridian campaign the bulk of Sherman's force
was rendezvoused at HuntsvUle, Ala., to join in the great
onset towards Atlanta.
Sherman assumed Command of the above named three
armies upon Grant's appointment as Lieutenant-General,
and to McPherson fell the command of the Army of the
Tennessee. Joe Johnston still lay at Dalton.

1864.] SHERMAN LOOKS TOWARDS ATLANTA. 225
Grant and Sherman had agreed to act in concert.
WhUe the former should thrust Lee back upon Richmond,
his late lieutenant was to push Johnston towards Atlanta.
And Banks was to transfer his forces from New Orleans to
MobUe and thence move towards and join hands with the
Western armies.
Sherman devoted his earliest energies to the question of
transportation and railroads. Baggage was reduced to the
lowest limits, the higher officers setting the example.
Actual supplies and fighting-material were alone to he
carried. Luxuries were to be things of the past ; comforts
to be forgotten. War's stern reality was to he each one's
lot. Probably no officer in such high command ever lived
so entirely from hand to month as did Sherman and his
military family during the succeeding campaigns. The
entire equipment of his army head-quarters would have
shamed the shabbiest regimental outfit of 1861.
Spring was to open with a general advance. It was
agreed to put and keep the Confederates May.
on the defensive by a policy of constant
hammering. Bragg had been removed to satisfy public opinion in the
South, but was nominally called to Richmond to act as Mr.
Davis' chief-of-staff. Johnston, as commander - of the
Department, had personaUv undertaken to hold head
against Sherman. But the fact that he possessed neither
the President's good wUl nor that of his new adviser,
militated much against a happy conduct of the campaign.
Sherman's forces held a front twenty
miles lonor in advance of Rinffsrold. inst

226 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864.
south of Chattanooga. McPherson and the Army of the
Tennessee was on the right with twenty-five thousand men
and one hundred guns. Thomas and the Army of the
Cumberland held the centre with sixty thousand men and
one hundred and thirty guns. Schofield and the Army of
the Ohio formed the left wing. His command was
fifteen thousand men and thirty guns. This grand total of
one hundred thousand men and two hundred and sixty guns
formed an army of as good stuff as ever bore arms, and
the confidence of the leader in his men and of the men in
their leader was unbounded.
Johnston himself foresaw the necessity of a strictly
defensive campaign, to which his far from sanguine
character as well as his judgment as to what the existing
conditions demanded, made him peculiarly suited.
Counted after the same fashion as Sherman's army,
Johnston had some sixty-five thousand men. Recog
nizing the difference in the strength of each, and knowing
that Sherman must follow the railroad, Johnston was wise
in adopting this Fabian policy. He could divine what
Sherman's general strategy must be. The tactics of each
manoeuvre he could meet as occasion offered. He was
able to calculate his task,' and he acted accordingly. He
intrenched every step he took ; he fought only when
attacked ; he invited battle only when the conditions were
largely in his favor. Subsequent events showed how wise
beyond his critics he could be.

XLHT.
SHERMAN MOVES ON ATLANTA.
SHERMAN took the measure of the intrenchrnents at
Dalton with care, and though he outnumbered his
antagonist, preferred not to hazard an engagement at such
odds when he might force one on better ground. This
conduct shows in strong contrast with Grant's, when the
latter first met his opponent at this same moment in
Virginia. Sherman despatched McPherson towards Resaca, on the
railroad in Johnston's rear, with instructions to capture the
town if possible. Combined with this flanking movement, a
general advance was made upon the Con-
^11 1^ ¦ , • May 7 to 12-
federate lines, and after tactical maneeuvrrng
of several days in front of Rocky Face Ridge, Johnston
concluded to retire from his stronghold. McPherson had
strangely faUed to seize Resaca, though an excellent chance
had offered, and at this place the Confederate army took up
its new stand. Had McPherson been a trifle more bold,
Johnston would have been reduced for supplies and retreat
to the poor roads to the east of Dalton ; and at the very
outset of this campaign might, perhaps, have been seriously
compromised.

228 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864.
This was Sherman's first earnest bout with Johnston. The
former was by nature eager, sanguine, restless, and venture
some ; the latter of quiet, steady nerves, unsuited to attack,
unsurpassed on the defense. Yet Sherman was to beat
him at his own game of patience. Nothing characterizes
Sherman's versatile ability more than this.
Sherman faced his antagonist on the line of Camp Creek
in front of Resaca, with his right flank resting on the
Oostanaula. From this position he operated by uninter-
mitted tapping upon Johnston's defences at constantly
varying points, without, however, bringing on a general
engagement. The latter, well aware that Sherman could
make his position untenable by crossing the Oostanaula
below, as indeed Sherman was preparing to do, evacuated
Resaca and crossed the river. Sherman
May 15. speedily followed.
Sherman's uniform tactics during this campaign, varied
indefinitely in details, consisted, as wUl be seen, in forcing
the centre of the army upon Johnston's lines, whUe with
the right or left he operated upon either flank as chance
or ground best offered.
Johnston did not propose to hazard an engagement unless
all conditions were in his favor. He attempted a stand at
AdairsvUle, twenty miles south of Resaca, but shortly
withdrew to Kingston and CassvUle. Each captain manoeu
vred for a chance to fight the other at a disadvantage.
Each was too wary. But either would have welcomed
the other's attack in force, if only on his own chosen
terms. Johnston, in fact, here issued an order lookinc JO
to a general engagement, but some dissensions between

1864.] SHERMAN MOVES ON ATLANTA. 229
himself and his lieutenants, Hardee, Hood and Polk,
operated to change his mind. Both Hood and Hardee
bitterly opposed Johnston's defensive policy. Its expedi
ency appeared later.
Opportunities were not infrequent for an attack on
one or other wing of the Union Army, which, from the
exigencies of the manoeuvring or the march, might become
isolated at a distance from the rest of the May 18.
army. But Sherman had abundant faith in
his lieutenants, and believed that under almost any condi
tions either of them could hold Ms own long enough to
enable him to bring up his other forces to their assistance.
And Sherman was eager for a general action, if only it
could be brought about on ground not all too favorable to
his enemy. For he desired to weaken the Confederates by
the attrition of battle before he forced them in retreat too
far from his own base.
From CassviUe, Johnston retired across May 20.
the Etowah. So far this campaign had been
one of manoeuvres. Neither combatant had suffered ma
terial loss. Like two wrestlers, as yet ignorant of each
other's strength or quickness, they were sparring for a hold.
Neither would risk giving odds.
Field comforts had been very sparse, but the men had
borne their privations cheerUy. The example of their
superiors and especially the promise of the campaign had
made it easy to bear with short rations and the discomforts
of the rainy season. And within the enemy's lines, the
brave men were accustomed to look upon privation as a
daily necessity. Though in this campaign, the Confederate

230 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864.
army had in the fertUe fields of Georgia an immediate
source of supply usuaUy much more rare.
The Union army was growing skilful. Local difficulties,
multiplied many fold by bad maps and hostile population,
were overcome in considerable measure by an able corps of
topographical engineers. Their peculiar duty was to accom
pany the daUy reconnoitring parties and furnish detaUed
information as to the ground on which approaching manoeu
vres were apt to be conducted.
The division of engineers under Colonel Wright became
singularly expert. To the enemy fell the duty of destroying
as they feU back ; to us the task of reconstructing. Bridges
were uniformly burned and railroads wrecked by the re
treating Confederates. To save delays in rebuUding, so far
as possible, trestles were fitted in the rear to a scale with
interchangeable timbers, so that bridges could be constructed
with a speed never before dreamed of. No sooner had the
Confederates put torch to a bridge, than a new one arose
as by magic, and the whistle of the locomotive always fol
lowed hard upon the heels of the army.
Johnston was never in a better situation for attack than
about these days. For every mUe that Sherman advanced,
the Federal army was losing in numbers, by leaving de
tachments to protect its lengthening line of operations.
Johnston, on the contrary, was gathering in his own and
was daUy gaining in effective strength. If he was to fight,
the occasion was good. But Sherman would give him no
opening.

XLIV.
ON TO MARIETTA.
MARIETTA was Sherman's next objective. But to
advance upon it along the railroad was impracticable.
The Etowah river as well as Allatoona Pass lay athwart his
path. He had in ante bellum days become familiar with
this section, and had no mind to force a passage of the river
and defile beyond, if he could manoeuvre Johnston out of
this strong defensive position. He knew that the water-shed
between the Etowah and Chattahoochee offered an easier
route. Leaving to his enemy the possession of the raUroad east
of the Etowah, he put over his army at various points
south of Kingston, and moved direct towards Dallas,
intending from here to operate on Marietta.
° r May 23.
Thomas, in the centre, was the column of
direction. Johnston accepted the change of route and shifted
position to the east of DaUas on the fine of Pumpkin
Vine Creek. Here the rival armies closed in a struggle
of more or less severity, almost rising to the dignity of
a general engagement. WhUe Hooker at- Ma „ „
tacked the enemy's lines at New Hope 231

232

BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864.

Church, Howard essayed to break them at Pickett's
Mills. We had not as yet been weaned from the old ideas of
'.tack in columns of brigades. The Napoleonic theory of
momentum, well suited
to the short range mus
ket and open ground,
will not work against
arms of precision and
intrenched field-works.
Neither Hooker's nor
Howard's columns were
able to effect a breach
in the enemy's lines ;
and except once there-
Pickett's Mills and New Hope Chur-eh. afte at Kenesaw, this
May 25-27, 1864. '
formation for assault
was abandoned. A single line, followed by a second
one at a suitable distance, and yet another, proved to be
more effective, and saved much loss. This is the origin
of the successive slender lines of infantry, each able to take
advantage of the accidents of the ground in moving to the
assault, that were later employed against the still more
accurate weapon of the day.
Our Civil War was full of suggestions as to methods of
coping with the rapidly growing dcstructiveness of
small arms and artillery, both on land and at sea. As
arms of precision and heavy guns were not at that time
perfected, neither did we leave perfect means to the future
soldier. But nearly all the changes in the tactical forma-

1864.] ON TO MARIETTA. 233
tions of later European armies had their prototype in
methods adapted by us to the conditions then existing.
American ingenuity is by no means confined to the
machine-shop. It has been said that, in this campaign, one man behind
field-works proved equal, on whichever side, to three in
attack. Two would be nearer the truth. And every mile
of ground from Dalton to Atlanta was covered with sub
stantial works, erected whenever and wherever either army
halted in the presence of the other.
During this three days' fight along Pumpkin Vine Creek,
Sherman proved Johnston's line too strong to carry by
direct assault. He must resort to his old tactics and turn
Johnston's right. For this purpose he withdrew his own
right wing piecemeal towards his left. Johnston seized
the opportunity himself to attack during this
J! ° May 28.
manoeuvre. But he was repulsed in good
style by Schofield.
For a month the troops had now been unceasingly under
fire. Nothing more nearly approaching a general engage
ment than New Hope Church and Pickett's Mills had been
brought on, but Sherman had suffered a loss of fifteen
hundred killed and seven thousand five hundred wounded,
and Johnston a similar loss of five thousand five hundred.
Contact with the enemy had never ceased. Skirmishing
had been severe and incessant, and the troops were kept
on the alert every minute of the time. But the health of
the army remained excellent.
By Sherman's movement towards his left, the Army of
the Cumberland and the Army of the Ohio had forced

234 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864.
themselves into a position in which they enfiladed a salient
in Johnston's line. The latter once more deemed it
expedient to retire to a new position nearer Marietta,
between Lost, Pine and Brush Mountains and in advance
of Kenesaw. Sherman followed him sharply up by a
movement towards his left ; Schofield standing fast, while
Thomas and McPherson passed in his rear. The new
disposition threw Schofield on the right, Thomas in the
centre, and McPherson on the left. Johnston opposed it
with Hardee on the left, Polk in the centre, and Hood on
the right.
By this flank operation Sherman reached and reestablished
his line along the railroad ; the supply-trains
June 6-9. quickly appeared, and a new base of
supplies was set up at Ackworth. Thus ended the first
stage of this campaign.
If Sherman had exhibited great vigor and patience in
pushing Johnston back, so had Johnston shown wonderful
dexterity in parrying Sherman's powerful lunges, and in
preventing an antagonist of such superior strength from
opening a weak spot in his harness.
The forces had been about as three to two.

XLV.

MARIETTA.

ALLATOONA is now made a secondary base from
which operations against Johnston may be con
ducted.
During this entire campaign Sherman sought constantly
to compel his antagonist to an open field engagement, sure
that his heavier battalions would carry the day. With
praiseworthy shrewdness Johnston as constantly declined.
The open ground to the east of Marietta again tempted
Sherman to move by his left in the hope of bringing John
ston to battle. But, inasmuch as an eastward movement
might afford Johnston too ready an opportunity to strike at
his line of communications, which such a direction would
somewhat uncover, Sherman determined to forego his pur
pose and to operate by his right instead.
This campaign resembles a bout with the foUs. Both
fencers are in guard. Sherman is constantly at play with
his weapon, disengaging, cutting over, beating, lunging,
using every art to draw into action his antagonist. John
ston warily follows every disengagement, skilfully parries
each lunge his strong-armed adversary makes, with an
occasional cautious riposte, which in turn is invariably
235

236 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864.
countered. Johnston constantly retires, Sherman as con
stantly advances. At every retrograde movement you
expect Johnston to make a return assault. But it never
comes. Nor can all Sherman's skill find the weak side of
his guard, or an opening through which he can manage to
plant his button squarely on his breast.
The rains had been continuous and heavy. Only those
acquainted with the soil and streams of the South appreciate
the full meaning of this statement. By the utmost energy
only could artillery be moved, or supplies and ammunition
be distributed to the troops. The lines had been laboriously
advanced close to the enemy's works and a partial demon
stration upon his front was begun. The situation promised
serious pounding.
Sherman gives the word. Thomas throws the Army of
the Cumberland upon the enemy's position ; Hooker gal
lantly assaults, but is foiled by the intrench-
June 14. ments at Pine Mountain, while Cox makes a
partial lodgment in the line near Gilgal.
June 15. The fire on the advanced posts is irritating in
the extreme. Blair effects a breach in a part of Hood's
works. The latter retires behind Noonday
June 17. J
Creek. Again on the morrow Hardee with
draws his left to a new set of previously thrown up intrench-
ments, followed smartly by Sherman's right.
Johnston's line is weakened by several salients which the
successful issue of the partial attacks of the last few days
have left. He is on the point of fallino-
June 19. °
back, when Sherman launches Howard's
corps upon him, and quickens his retreat. The new Con-

1864]

MARIETTA.

237

federate works are nearer Marietta, with Hardee on the left,
Hood on the right, and Loring (temporary successor of
Polk) holding Kenesaw in the centre.
Since the first of the month there has been an uninter
rupted downpour of rain. All the streams are swollen, and
the artillery and wagon trains fairly engulfed. Movements

Operations about Marietta. June 14-28, 1864.

are correspondingly slow. The question of supplies be
comes more than troublesome. The long line of operations
is in danger of being cut. Several Confederate raids have
already interfered with the communications, though skilful
management has quickly repaired the damage. And it is
not feasible to cut loose from the rail, owing to the impossi
bility of using the country roads for heavy amounts of
transportation.

238 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864.
The left is advanced, while the entire army
prepares for attack, moving by the right.
This manoeuvre is continued to such a point as to seriously
jeopardize Johnston's left. Hood is consc-
June 20-21. J r
quently transferred from the right to the ex
treme left. No sooner on the line, than, fretted with inac
tivity, he rushes like a hound unleashed upon Hooker and
Schofield, in an effort to regain lost ground.
June 22. t, , . , ""
But he is handsomely met. His impetuous
onslaught is repulsed with a loss of a thousand men, our
own being slight.

XLVT.
KENESAW.
SHERMAN had left no stone unturned to bring on a
general engagement upon favorable ground. But
wily Johnston had never afforded him an opportunity to
fight unless he was behind field-works too sohd to promise
aught but fruitless slaughter. Johnston would not be
drawn into the open. Since Hood had been transferred
from the right, however, the defences at Kenesaw were not
so fully manned.
Inaction would not do. Sherman must choose either to
move about Johnston's left, which the bad state of the roads
scarcely warranted, or else to break through his lines.
FaUure to take some decisive action would allow Johnston
time to operate seriously against our communications.
Sherman decided to try once more the fortunes of assault,
and selected for the attempt the bluffs of Kenesaw, as the
key of the situation.
Schofield makes a heavy demonstration ¦r. June 26.
on the right to draw troops, if possible,
away from Kenesaw. In so doing he is able to seize some
advanced ground which compromises the security of Hood's
239

240 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864.
left. This he defends by a strong redoubt. At the same
tune an attack in force is ordered to be made on Kenesaw.
McPherson entrusts the details of his front, to Logan, who
presses in with M. L. Smith and Walcutt.
Howard pushes Newton forward in column
from his front, and Palmer sends in Davis on Newton's
right in like formation. Hooker is in reserve. Meanwhile,
on the right, Schofield supports this onset by pushing his
advantage against Hood to the utmost, with the railroad
south of Marietta as a goal.
The attack on Kenesaw has been preceded by general
artillery fire ; and the columns advance with confidence.
But, as was demonstrated a month ago, heavy masses are
found useless against intrenched lines and rapid musketry.
Newton and Davis both fail to effect a lodgment, but with
obstinate gaUantry each holds and intrenches a line within
a few hundred feet of the works from which they have
recoiled. Smith carries and holds the skirmish pits, but is
brought up standing against the works of the line.
The enemy has quickly comprehended that the real
attack is against the key of their position at Kenesaw, and
so soon as the first rush is over, and the works still remain
theirs, the lines are at once reinforced and all chance of
success is past.
The loss has not been as great as might have been ex
pected. Our own adds up about three thousand men ;
the enemy's barely five hundred. Whether the works
could have been carried by a sturdier onset is uncertain.
But the days of massed columns are numbered. Their
weakness has now been doubly proven. The only gain

186*-1 KENESAW. 241
has been by Schofield on the right. The enemy has won
the battle of Kenesaw Mountain.
It has been alleged that the impossible nature of the task
made the assault on Kenesaw unjustifiable ; and the loss
of life has been characterized as mere wUful slaughter.
It is difficult to answer such criticism. But if it has any
weight, what can be said of Fredericksburg or of Cold
Harbor? Who shall decide upon what is justifiable in
war? What, indeed, becomes of the art of war itself?
Must not all swords be forthwith beaten into ploughshares
and all spears into pruning-hooks ? The same criticism
has been passed on other soldiers — notably on Gustavus
Adolphus for his assault on the Alte Veste. But Gustavus
was in the right, and so was Sherman.
The rainy period now came to an end. The roads again
began to harden. Sherman saw that his advantage lay in
moving around Johnston's left, as he could now with less
danger leave the vicinity of the railroad. Johnston began
to fortify Atlanta and make new lines to defend the Chatta
hoochee. For this purpose he employed large bodies of
negroes, always fortifying positions in the rear to which he
could withdraw at wUl. McPherson was moved to the
right of the army, as the first step in a new flank march.
But Johnston did not wait ; he evacuated July 1-2.
Marietta. Thomas at once advanced
through the town, while McPherson moved on Turner's
Ferry, obliging Johnston to defend the crossing.
The casualties in June had been seventy-five hundred
men, of which fifty-five hundred were from the Army of
the Cumberland. This meant a daily loss of some two

242 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864.
hundred men in the constant bickering at the advanced
posts. Johnston's may have been five thousand men.
The habit of both contestants had been to intrench the
skirmish as well as the main line. Every advance on
either side called for the capture of field-works.
The only great physical obstacle now in Sherman's path
is the Chattahoochee. Beyond this lies Atlanta. But his
problem is a grave one. To cross this river in face of
an enemy intrenched and well equipped is no simple
matter. Johnston had spent a month on his tete de pont at the
main Chattahoochee crossing. But he could not presume
to hold it beyond a few days, for he was exposed to being
turned out of it by Sherman's putting over a part of his
force above or below to move on Atlanta, whUe observing
Johnston with the balance.
Sherman, after some days, discovered an
unused crossing above the railroad near Soap
Creek, and passing over a few regiments, intrenched a
bridge-head on the east bank. Other fords above were
utUized, and the cavalry kept up a constant demonstration
below to distract the enemy's attention from the operations
up the river. Rousseau was despatched on a cavalry raid
south of Atlanta. Stores were accumulated at Marietta.
Johnston now entirely withdrew from the
July 9. . J
west side of the Chattahoochee. Sherman,
after long deliberation, made ready to cross his army by the
left around the north of Atlanta. By this means he might,
after seizing the railroad, intercept any reinforcements
which should be sent from Virginia. In this movement,

1864.] KENESA W. 213
Thomas was to cross and establish the Army of the
Cumberland as the new right, and press towards Atlanta ;
while McPherson was to pass in his rear and manceuvre
towards the left, breaking the raUroad at Decatur.
Schofield was to foUow and faU into line in the centre.
Some Southern historians claim this entire campaign
from Dalton to Atlanta as a Confederate success.
Johnston " had brought his armv to Atlanta after inflicting
a loss upon the enemy five times as great as his own ; and
he had performed the almost marveUous feat of conducting
a retreat through a difficult and mountainous country more
than a hundred miles in extent without the loss of material
or of a single gun. Gen. Johnston held Atlanta more
firmly than Lee held Richmond. Sherman was unable to
invest the city, and to withdraw he would have to pass over
a single road, one hundred and thirty-five miles long,
traversing a wUd and broken country. Johnston held him,
as it were, suspended for destruction. The situation was
briUiant for the Confederates." [PoUard.J It does not
appear that such deductions from the facts do Johnston the
justice he deserves for the very able conduct of the
campaign now soon to close. To allow Sherman the
credit due him for exceptional skill and vigor certainly
throws Johnston's defense into higher relief.
The situation of the Confederate army was far from
briUiant. The advantage was with the Federals.

June 11.

XL VII.
GRANT'S CHANGE OF BASE.
WE last saw the Army of the Potomac when it was
about to leave the fatal ground on which Cold
Harbor had been fought. Let us return to it.
Gradually moving successive corps from the right, Grant
extended his left down towards the crossings of the Chicka
hominy. Warren seized Long Bridge, crossed, and demon
strated along all the roads leading towards
Richmond, in order to mislead Lee. Han
cock pushed his corps over the same bridge towards the
James. Burnside and Wright crossed lower down and
marched to Charles City. Smith had already
June 12. moved by water from White House to Ber
muda Hundred, whence he was sent out to seize Petersburg
with his own and other troops.
June 15. The Army of the Potomac reached the
James in two marches, and, with a day's delay, was put
over to the south side. Lee had not been
June 14-15. slow to discover Ixrant s purpose, and, pur
suing the same policy as heretofore, he foUowed on paraUel
roads and crossed the James, near Drury's Bluff, one day
later than Grant put over his troops below.
244

1504.] GRANT'S CHANGE OF BASE. 245
The City of Petersburg acts as an advanced fortress to
protect the communications of Richmond with the interior.
It is a strategic point of the greatest value. No operations
on the James can be secure without its possession.
But neither Hancock, who was first ordered forward from
the Army of the Potomac in the direction of the place, nor
indeed Meade, appears to have known that Grant intended
that Petersburg should be at once captured. Specific or
ders had not been issued to this effect. Smith had taken
the outer works, but had not foUowed up his June 15.
success, though opposed only by mUitia.
Hancock should at once have been sent to finish the opera
tion ; but the orders eventuaUy issued did not reach him in
season, and before he was prepared to act, Lee had already
thrown some old troops into the city.
Even then an immediate assault gave some promise of
success. But Hancock's dispositions had not sufficient
vigor to command a satisfactory result.
Burnside now comes upon the ground. He and Hancock
twice assault the enemy's lines, with some gain of ground,
but without material result. Their loss is
„ . , . . , . J°ne 16-17.
four thousand men. A third attempt is
made, but stUl fruitlessly. Lee retires to the interior lines.
The losses in these four days aggregate
eleven thousand four hundred men.
The Second and Sixth corps are now ordered to extend
their lines to the left so as to gain ground weU south of the
town, and towards the Weldon RaUroad. During this ma
noeuvre, the Second corps, on the extreme flank and in the
thickets, moves so far beyond the Sixth that it opens a gap

246 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864.
between the two corps. Into this gap Hill,
une "' wide awake for a chance to cheek our ad
vance, immediately thrusts a force, taking both exposed
flanks in reverse, and captures a number of guns and sonic
seventeen hundred prisoners. The extension has proven
costly. Sheridan was out on his expedition in aid of Hunter's
march on Lynchburg. In his absence WUson and
Kautz, with then- cavalry divisions, were ordered to
operate against the Weldon and Southside raUroads.
These are Lee's two important lines of supply. Moving
in light order these officers proceeded on their task,
reached their objective and destroyed a large amount of
rolling stock, track, and other property.
June 22-July 2. ° f l .'
Wilson on the return trip got rather roughly
handled by the enemy's horse, near Reams' Station, and suf
fered largely in casualties and prisoners. The damage in
flicted to the raUroad was not of a permanent nature.
There was now no hope of carrying Petersburg by
assault. The losses had reached sixteen thousand men.
Regular siege operations must be resorted to.
The army was not in good condition for any severe work.
It needed recuperation, if any army ever did. In a little over
six weeks sixty-two thousand men, out of one hundred and
twenty-two thousand with which it left the Rappahannock,
had fallen in their tracks. The drain had been particularly
severe in experienced officers. To be sure, these rents had
been to a certain extent patched by reinforcenicnts ; but they
were none the less appaUing. It was no longer the proud
Army of the Potomac.

1864] GRANT'S CHANGE OF BASE. 247
Nor do these figures cover aU. The casualties of the
Eighteeenth corps and the Army of the James had been
ten thousand men besides. The forces now about to lay
siege to Petersburg had lost in battle over one-half of their
effective strength in this short space of time.
Success might have justified this awful sacrifice. But
there had been no success for the Arrny of the James.
StiU less had there been for the Army of the Potomac. Its
every manoeuvre had been checkmated ; its every attack re
pulsed. No wonder that its confidence had begun to ebb.
But there was work in it yet if caUed out in the
right way. AU that it needed was to know that the reason
was good, and it was ready for any effort. The American
volunteer was too inteUigent not to recognize when blood-
shedding had gone too far, and too independent not to show
Iris conviction. But his courage would not let him turn
his face from work to which he had once put his hand.

XLVELT.
PETERSBURG. — THE MINE FIASCO.
PETERSBURG was not besieged. It was only ob
served. All its lines of communication were open.
Its defences began far beyond Grant's extreme left, and ex
tended round to the Appomattox. From the further side
of this river the works continued northward so as to keep
the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad safe from the attacks
of Butler, who was stUl at Bermuda Hundred ; and from
a force under Foster at Deep Bottom on the north bank
of the James.
Grant could operate against Richmond at pleasure, whUe
observing Petersburg. Or he could organize a force to
act as a flying column against the railroads west of the
latter place. The second plan would interfere with Lee's
supplies, and was the most dangerous thing both for the
Army of Northern Virginia and the Confederate capital.
For to procure supplies was already Lee's hardest problem.
By a variety of movements Grant could keep Lee on the
qui vive. But meanwhUe, some weeks must
July. , „
be spent to perfect a system of works in
which the army could defend itself from sorties by the
enemy. 248

1864.]

PETERSBURG.

249

In the prosecution of this work, Burnside had run a mine
under one of the Confederate forts in his front. It was de
termined to fire this mine and to follow the explosion by an

250 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864.
assault, in the hope that the crest beyond^ which dominated
the city, might be carried by the troops. ¦ Hancock, with his
corps and, two divisions of cavalry, had been across -the
James river on an expedition against -the dfe-
Jnly 26-29. ,."- ¦'T - ' ~X' ,' ;¦
fences of Richmond, which, .though it had
failed, had drawn a large force 'from Petersburg te,cjieck it.
The' time was opportune. . 'I ,..-• S fi~2*> I
But the -die-positions were , ndt carefuir^The jjtorniing
column, which should} have beeh chosen from, the fc^st stuff
of the army, was actually selected by lot-vfrom^aipong the
divisions in the immediate front of the mine. Th#se were

i' \

by no means the best, anclthe actual column of alsaailt con
tained poor material and was not well led. $6 special in
structions were issued.' /There was no p^ce d'ajrmes on
which the men could speedUy deploy for/the at/ack after
filingjout of their intrenchments. No conpmunitypf action
was Apparent. All.the preparations werM wanting .in skiU

and care.
The mine was exploded early in the-JBcbrning. Heavy
artUlery fire had silenced the 'enemy's guns in
the surrounding forts. But in lieu of the
storming column taking advantage of the surprise by a
rapid advance, it debouohed 'slowly frorn its position, and
far from rushing for the crest to be captured, sought refuge
in the crater made by t\ev exploded mine 1
More troops were pushed in only to make the slaughter-
pen more bloody. The enemy was not long in recovering
from his astonishment and began to pour a heavy artillery
fire into the crater. A few partial charges were headed by
some of the more courageous officers in the me" tee, but no

1864.] PETERSBURG. 251
semblance of efficient work was done. It was purely a
case of bad management and worthless leadership. The
mass extricated itself as best it might with a loss of four
thousand men. The preparations had been such that noth
ing short of faUure could weU ensue.

XLIX.
WASHINGTON LN ALARM FOR THE LAST TIME.
THE opposing forces in front of Petersburg at this
time had dwindled to much smaller proportions.
They numbered about seventy-five thousand on the Union
to fifty thousand on the Confederate side. But their
purpose was none the less set.
Hunter's eccentric retreat had offered the enemy an ex
ceUent chance to resort to the old Washington scare, for
the VaUey was defended by only Sigel's small division.
Early is accordingly instructed to force
July 1. his way into Maryland. Sigel retires from
his front across the Potomac at Shepherdstown. Early
confines him to Maryland Heights, and
July 3. . .
moves around his flank to Frederick.
Early has fifteen thousand veterans, just
fitted for the work. There is nothing of any moment to
withstand him, but General Lew. Wallace assembles a
motley force of hundred-days' men and mUitia, and boldly
plants himself athwart Early's path.
Ricketts arrives opportunely in Baltimore, for Grant, on
Jul 8 receiving the news of the invasion, has at
once hurried the Sixth corps by water to
252

1864.] WASHINGTON IN ALARM. 253
the capital. The Nineteenth corps, from Fortress Monroe,
has taken the same direction. Wallace, and Ricketts with
two brigades, at Monocacy Junction make a
n i -r, July 9.
gallant stand to cover Baltimore, losing seven
hundred men killed and wounded, and then retire to Elli-
cott's Mills, to oppose Early's advance on the capital. But
the Confederates push on to the gates of
itt i • -i -i July 11.
Washington without serious loss.
At this moment Early's vanguard might easUy enter the
city. For Washington has for its defense not much else
than citizen-soldiery, improvised from department clerks and
non-combatants. But seeing the fortifications of the capi
tal weU-manned, Early imagines that troops from the Army
of the Potomac are on hand, and delays his attack to make
proper disposition of his corps. This delay is fatal.
When he actuaUy moves to the assault, the Sixth and Nine
teenth corps have put in their appearance,
and his one chance of making the most
briUiant stroke of the war has vanished.
Early ruefuUy retires by way of the Valley. Lee's di
version has not budged Grant from Petersburg, and has
therefore faded of its main purpose.
Hunter reappears at Harper's Ferry before Early gets
well back to the VaUey. Wright is also on his heels. It
seems as if Early might, in his turn, be trapped. But he
slips from between these corps, suffering only from a
cavalry attack by AvereU, whUe he repels
J J July 15-20.
one by Thoburn.
At Strasburg, Early's retreat ends. Not so however his
activity. A few days later Crook crosses swords with

July 12.

254 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864.
his forces at Kernstown, on the same ground
uy ' where Shields had defeated Jackson. But
the result is different. Crook loses twelve hundred men
and is driven back upon the Potomac.
McCausland again crosses the river with a body of Con
federate horse. Couch makes a show of de-
July 29. fending Chambersburg, but McCausland
occupies the town and levies a contribution of $500,000
upon it. In default of payment of this sum, which cannot
be raised upon the instant, the Confederate leader deliber
ately puts torch to the town.
This act was utterly indefensible, for Chambersburg had
committed no overt act of war.
From here McCausland escapes to West Virginia, while
our infantry forces are marching purposeless hither and
yon. At Moorfield he encounters Averell,
August 7. ,
who in a smart combat inflicts heavy loss
upon him, but cannot prevent his escape.

ATLANTA.
THE Richmond government had become alarmed at the
results of the unaggressive policy of Johnston. Able
as had been his retreat in the face of Sherman's heavier
battaUons, retreat was the last thing which the Confederacy
and its foreign policy demanded. A bolder front and more
fighting seemed strategically desirable, — politicaUy essen
tial. So judged at least the Southern President and his
Chief of Staff, Bragg.
Mr. Davis was a West Pointer, and while he had no per
sonal experience in war, he believed military affairs to be
bis strong point. He certainly interfered constantly in the
conduct of the Confederate campaigns, and often with dis
astrous results.
Hood had aU along been critical of Johnston's Fabian
tactics and was par excellence a fighting general. He
was accordingly put in command in Johnston's stead,
though, it is claimed, with reluctance on his part. It was
expected that he would show what aggressiveness could
accomplish. Hood was certainly a stanch soldier, but his bravery ex
ceeded his discretion. He could not brook delay. He was
255

256 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864.
impatient in method ; and his whole war creed was summed
up in the belief that a well-planned attack driven home can
shatter any obstacle. He was the very reverse of Johnston,
— every inch a fighter, but lacking Johnston's cool calcu
lation and singular absence of flurry. The one quality
necessary to oppose Sherman's restless activity was the
power of waiting. This Hood had not. What made Lee
so great was that he had both this quality and the added
power of striking a blow often marvelous when the smaU
weight of his army is considered.
Johnston had already prepared to fall upon our forces as
they filed into fine along Peach-Tree Creek. Hood, on
acceding to the command, decided to carry through the
plan of his late chief. Stewart's (late Polk's) corps was
on the left; Hardee's in the centre, and Cheatham's (late
Hood's) on the right. His line lay in a semi-circle about
the north suburbs of Atlanta.
So soon as the Army of the Cumberland has passed
the Chattahoochee, it falls into position as a
July 17-18. pivot on which the rest of the army shall
wheel into fine, and soon gains a foothold south of Peach-
Tree Creek, — a very formidable obstacle,
July 20. — with three heads of column. Meanwhile
Schofield and McPherson are executing their delicate ma
noeuvre of passing Thomas' rear and filing into line on his
left. Owing to the broken nature of the ground they are
cautiously feeling their way to their appointed places.
Hood, whose scouts keep him well informed of aU that is
going on, proposes to push a column in between these two
and Thomas, and to faU in force upon the latter before hia

1864.]

ATLANTA.

257

associates can come to his assistance. The character of the
terrain separates the several detachments of the Federals
and opens a gap of dangerous projjortions in the centre of

lllll|ll|ll|]IVSB!;\-„-,-N-,-s-

Operations about Atlanta. July 17-September 2, 1864.

July 20.

our line. Into this gap Hood thrusts Hardee with a heavy
force. This general faUs upon Newton at
Clear Creek and on Ward, Geary and
WUliams. His intention is to force a general engagement
while Sherman is getting into line. This is a moment of

258 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864.
great danger at all times for an army in the immediate pres
ence of the enemy.
But McPherson has marched with more expedition than
Hood expects. The sound of heavy firing between him
and Thomas quickens his stride stiU more. He drives his
vanguard sharply in upon Hood's right flank. To meet
this inopportune diversion, Hood is forced to call for Cle
burne's division from Hardee's corps. So considerable a
drain cripples Hardee in his onslaught on the Army of the
Cumberland. Hood has only done the essential. Had he
paused, McPherson might have moved into Atlanta unop
posed. But Hardee, thus weakened, cannot
wrest any ground from sturdy Thomas. The
first aggressive tactics of the new general have been foiled,
with a loss of perhaps double our two thousand.
The armies of the Cumberland and Ohio now unite upon
a new line nearer Atlanta. A strong hill is seized and forti
fied by Leggett's division, from which the city can be plainly
seen. Hood withdraws into his main Atlanta works.
The siege begins by another advance of Thomas and Scho
field, while the engineers are bridging the river, and heavy
guns are coming to the front.
McPherson has extended the extreme left around to a
point southeast of the city. Hood, still determined to carry
things with the strong hand, assigns the task of dislodging
him to Hardee. This general, familiar with the ground,
makes a circuit of McPherson's exposed flank before the
latter has fully completed his field-works, and falls upon his
T , „„ rear. In the confusion McPherson is killed
July 22. Logan assumes command. The troops,

1864.] ATLANTA. 259
hardened to surprises, face steadily about and receive the
enemy from the other side of their breastworks. Cheat
ham again assails them upon their new rear, intending to
cooperate with Hardee. Again the breastworks are re
versed and a cheerful defense offered, for the stout-hearted
troops of the Army of the Tennessee are not easUy discon
certed, even by surprises such as these.
Hardee and Cheatham are attacking at right angles to
each other and do not readily work together. Their as
saults, if simultaneous, would have been fatal to the Feder
als. But McPherson's old soldiers, though hard put to it,
repulse each foe in turn. Our loss has been three thousand
five hundred ; the Confederate, much heavier, was never
officially reported.
In after days Hood passed serious criticism upon Hardee's
conduct of this battle of Atlanta, but without justice.
Hardee had behaved with unusual discretion and skill. He
had simply met his match.
Hooker was senior to both Schofield and Thomas. He
was in a measure entitled to succeed McPherson. But his
peculiarities made Sherman fear that he would not find in
Hooker a cordial support, coupled with such deference to
his judgment as supreme control demands. Howard was
appointed to command the Army of the Tennessee. Hooker
sullenly retired and Slocum was given the Twentieth corps ,
Sherman thus retained lieutenants who were in warm sym
pathy with his plans, and able to second him in their effi
cient conduct.
The raUroad had been finished to the rear of the Army of
the Cumberland. So far Sherman's manceuvre around

260 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864.
the north of Atlanta did not promise success.
He reconsidered the situation and proposed
to try an operation on the west and south of the city,
instead of the one now going on on the north and east.
From the new side he might wrest from Hood the
Macon RaUroad, a manifest advantage. Stoneman was
sent on a raid towards Macon, and Howard was with
drawn from the battle-field of Atlanta to the extreme
right. Hood had been placed in command to fight. He had
fought — boldly and skilfully, but so far with most disastrous
results. But to fight was the condition on which he held
command. He determined to attack Howard on the march
over towards the right, and to repeat the
July 28. tactics, topographically reversed, which he
had employed against McPherson. Advancing along the
LickskUlet road he fell upon Howard at Ezra Church. But
again he was repulsed, with a loss much exceeding our
own, which was about a thousand men.
Sherman's troops have acquired the instinct of victory.
They are almost invincible. Hood's vast waste of life,
without gain of any kind, goes far towards vindicating
Johnston's defensive policy.
Schofield moved upon the heels of Howard and speedily
got into line. Sherman's purpose was to hold the bridge
head at the Chattahoochee, and swing the entire army upon
that pivot into position west and south of Atlanta. Hood
began to see that his tenure of Atlanta depended on a
slender tie. So far his fighting policy was barren. Good
speed enabled Sherman to anticipate him in the possession of

1864.] ATLANTA. 261
Jonesborough, south of the city a dozen miles. Attacking
at a venture, Hardee was here repulsed by the Army of the
Tennessee. Schofield was meanwhile engaged in de- September 1.
stroying the railroad between Jonesborough
and Atlanta. Hood ordered Hardee out to drive him
back, as a last means of holding the city. Sherman
endeavored to surround Hardee, and a serious combat
resulted. The loss on each side was about two
thousand, but we captured fully that number of
prisoners. Unwilling to be cooped up, an event which he now could
not but foresee, Hood reluctantly evacuated
, . September 2.
Atlanta and moved towards Macon. The
Army of the Cumberland at once occupied the city, while
the Army of the Tennessee remained at East Point, and
the Army of the Ohio held Decatur. A season of rest
and preparation for the new conflict ensued.
It is difficult to gauge the relative losses of the opposing
armies during the campaign from Chattanooga to Atlanta.
The Union forces outnumbered the Confederate on the
average probably as ten to seven, if the muster rolls of both
are estimated in the same manner. Sherman captured
thirteen thousand prisoners aU told.
Hood manifestly understated his losses. He placed them
at five thousand two hundred and fifty men, while Hardee
claimed himself alone to have lost seven thousand during
Hood's command. It is asserted that Sherman buried not
far from four thousand Confederate dead during this cam
paign. There is some duplication here no doubt. But

262 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864.
the War Records, which are as exact as careful compari
son can make them, give the Confederate losses in killed
and wounded, from May 7 to September 1, as twenty-two
thousand four hundred, to which number the prisoners are
to be added. The Union losses during the same period
were nearly thirty-two thousand men.

LI.
A PROTRACTED SIEGE.
FOR many weary months, while Sherman was battling
for Atlanta, the Army of the Potomac was detained
by Lee at the portals of Petersburg. The uniform success
with which he managed to check every attempt of Grant
to break or turn his lines became monotonous. But
these faUures must be described in their proper sequence,
though they had no immediate effect on the whole result.
It was the graduaUy growing exhaustion of the resources
of the Confederates which was our strongest aUy.
Another diversion against the lines of Richmond, north
of the James, was attempted by Hancock.
r. -r, , August 12-21.
Crossing as before to where Foster held his
lodgment at Deep Bottom, he advanced out beyond
Malvern Hill, in the hope of finding some favorable point
of attack. But Lee reinforced the troops on the east of
Richmond almost as soon as Hancock arrived, and in a
combat at Bailey's Creek, foUowed by desultory skirmishing
for several days, prevented our forces from gaining any
ground which could be held. The command returned to
camp with a loss of fifteen hundred men.
About the same time Warren conducts another operation
263

264 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864.
against the Weldon Railroad. A foothold is effected on
this road after a smart action at Yellow
August 18-21. .... , , i
Tavern, in which we lost a thousand men.
Lee, unwilling to forego the use of any part of this line,
makes strenuous efforts to recover its possession by a
number of stout attacks, but Warren is not to be dislodged,
and intrenches the position. What he has gained, how
ever, is at a sacrifice of forty-three hundred men. The
scale on which some of these operations are conducted
necessitates heavy work and serious losses.
On his return from his expedition north of the James
Hancock pushes rapidly out to the left of Warren to sup
plement the latter's efforts. He destroys the
August 25. railroad to Reams' Station, and the cavalry
operates beyond his left towards Dinwiddie Court House.
Hancock has with him Miles' and Gibbon's divisions,
some eight thousand men. Lee detaches A. P. Hill
against him. Hill assaults with his usual vigor, and is
favored by his intimate knowledge of the ground. The
conduct of all but Miles' force and the cavalry is of the
weakest character, and the upshot of the entire movement
is a retreat by us with a loss of twenty-seven hundred
men. The whole operation has been disappointing in
the extreme.
A few weeks of rest now supervene. But Grant is not
content to remain long quiet. His continuous hammering
has its valuable side. His tendency is always towards
great activity. An attack in force on the. right is this
time projected, to sustain which a diversion
Sept. 30-Oct. 5. .
on the left is undertaken by Warren with

1864.] A PROTRACTED SIEGE. 265
Parke and Gregg. Ground is gained and intrenched
beyond Peeble's Farm. Loss three thousand.
Butler meanwhUe has been operating against the de
fences of Richmond, and has actuaUy captured and held
Fort Harrison, against a number of strong
™ , „ , , , September 28-30.
ettorts to recover it. His loss has been
heavy. Beyond this the movements on the right appear to
be attended with no success and are shortly abandoned.
But before settling down to winter-quarters Grant was
desirous of dealing one more serious blow to the enemy,
in the hope that some permanent gain could be made with
which to close the year. He again decided for a move
ment by the left in sufficient force to break in the Confed
erate right, and to seize the Southside RaUroad, on which
Lee depended for most of his supplies. The force con
sisted of the bulk of three corps. Warren and Parke
(now commanding the Ninth corps) were to attack the
extreme right of Lee's line in front, while Hancock should
by a circuit seize the Boydton Plank Road
J _ J October 25-28.
and the railroad.
Warren and Parke struck Lee at Hatcher's Run. Parke
assaulted in front whUe Warren endeavored to turn the
Confederate right. Parke feU short of accomplishing his
aim, upon which Meade ordered Hancock and Gregg to
halt on the Boydton road so that Warren and he might
cooperate. But before these two corps could reach each
other, so as jointly to attack Lee's flank, the latter thrust
A. P. HUl into the gap between them.
Moving through the wooded country, with the ease bred
of perfect farrdliarity with every path, whUe our troops

266 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864-0.
blunder about in utter ignorance of their own or the enemy's
whereabouts, Hill suddenly falls upon Hancock's flank.
The attack has well-nigh come to a fatal pass, when Egan
changes front and pours his volleys into the rear of HUl's
column. Unable to hold his own, Hill summarily withdraws.
Gregg has, meanwhile, been skirmishing on Hancock's
front and left, and has made good headway against the
enemy's horse. But, though our losses are seventeen hun
dred men, and the troops have all done creditable work, the
result has been renewed failure to make any satisfactory
gain of ground.
For several months to come nothing in particular was un
dertaken except along the regular lines. But before winter
set in, Warren made one more expedition
December 7-11. down the Weldon Railroad, of which he de
stroyed eighteen or twenty miles, much to the annoyance
of Lee, to whose already serious difficulty in obtaining sup
plies this break greatly added. For it materially increased
the length of his wagon-haul from the point where stores
could be unloaded south of the break to the Richmond and
Petersburg lines.
Still another of the ineffectual manoeuvres by the left
was made during the winter by the Fifth corps and the
Second, — now commanded by Humphreys, — accompanied
by Gregg's cavalry, against the Southside Railroad.
The Second corps moved upon the right of the enemy at
Hatcher's Run whUe the Fifth marched
February 5-7, 1865. around their flank. Next day the tw,o corps
joined bands on either side of Hatcher's Run, at Dabney's
MUls, and Gregg came up from Dinwiddie.

!865.] A PROTRACTED SIEGE. 267
But the enemy are proof at all points. They have spent
many months in devising means to resist an attack from
every imaginable quarter, and are prepared to act decisively
on the spur of the moment, whUe our troops must grope
blindfold over unknown ground. Lee contrives to out-
flank our line. Warren loses fifteen hundred men ; but
we gain ground as far as Hatcher's Run.
This uniform faUure of movements by the left was dis
heartening to a degree. Lee's defences had been made
impregnable to front attack and extended far to the west of
Petersburg. And his interior communications enabled him
at any moment to detach heavUy from his centre to check
any operation against his right.
It had become evident that Petersburg could not be
taken, or the enemy's hold on Richmond compromised, by
a continuance of the policy pursued so far. It is not im
probable that Grant might have made more headway by
leaving a sufficient part of his army in the trenches in front
of Petersburg and by moving with a heavy force far to
the west upon Lee's communications ; or, if it were deter
mined to capture the place d main forte, by making a
massed attack upon some point in the centre after suitable
mining operations had weakened Lee's defences and pre
pared for such an operation.
But the end was to come with opening spring. To the
far-sighted, this was no longer doubtful. The South must
succumb to the greater material resources of the North, de
spite its courage and its sacrifices.
Hancock was unable to resume command of the old
Second corps. His history is that of the Army of the

268 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1865.
Potomac. None of the corps-commanders in Virginia
whose names are household words have earned their laurels
by sounder, better work than he. That he never rose to
the command of a separate army was due solely to circum
stances. He was too necessary to the Army of the Potomac
to be allowed to leave it.
Hancock was one of the most cheerful men under fire we
ever had. In the thickest of the fight, his appearance and
manner infused a singular confidence in the troops. He
was an uniform favorite, rarely made a mistake, and always
finished his work in good style. His is an enviable record
among the great names of the war.

LIT.
SHERIDAN IN THE VALLEY.
EARLY, after the failure of his raid on Washington,
had retired into the Shenandoah Valley. His pres
ence there was a constant threat, and it was evident that
Lee had no intention of recalling him. The Sixth and
Nineteenth corps, of which Grant had sore need at Peters
burg, were thus kept from their legitimate duty for the
protection of Washington. Grant therefore determined to
make a clean sweep of the Valley and if possible prevent
further use of it by the Confederates for campaigning pur
poses. The division of our forces in Northern Virginia into
petty independent commands had up to this time wrought
only mischief. Grant saw that at least one vigorous cam
paign must be conducted there under a
*~ ^ . August 7.
single head. He selected Sheridan for the
task, and promised to give him sufficient force to do his
work fuU justice. This promise in due time took the
shape of the Army of the Shenandoah, and consisted of
forty thousand infantry and a superb body of fifteen
thousand horse.
Sheridan had never yet enjoyed a separate command.

270 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864.
Whatever operations had been his to conduct had shown
him to possess brUliant powers. He was now en
trusted with an army destined for a service of equal im
portance and delicacy. For some weeks he exhibited
great caution, due in part to Grant's unwUlingness that
he should strike out beyond his depth, and in part to his
own appreciation of the fact that in his front lay an old
and wily tactician, who, though commanding a much
smaller force, had both audacity and skill, and the keenest
tools to handle.
Sheridan adopted Hunter's position at Halltown, in the
angle of the Potomac and Shenandoah. Of this he re
solved to retain firm hold, whatever his manoeuvres. He
first moved towards the line of the Opequon.
August 10. Early retired to cover Winchester, for the
reinforcements promised him by Lee were still on the way,
and he must keep a clear road open for them. On his
arrival at Fisher's Hill the reinforcements began to come
in, under Kershaw, with Fitz-Lee's horse. These forces
were commanded by Anderson, who was senior to Early by
commission. Some slight friction thus engendered worked
tardiness in the Confederate plans.
Grant imagined that Early's force might have been in
creased to forty thousand men, and advised Sheridan, who
was at Cedar Creek, not to attack. In consequence the
Army of the Shenandoah was retired to
August 17. Berry vUle. Early followed, but could not
advance further north without uncovering his rear. Some
manoeuvring, however, resulted in Sheridan letting go
Berry ville and retiring again to Halltown, whUe Early

1SG*.] SttSItlDAN IS TITS VALLBY. 271
demonstrated on Shepherdstown as if again to cross the
Potomac. But Lee must have men, and again with-
^ September 14.
drew Anderson. Early retired behind the
Opequon. Quiet reigned for a fortnight.
In all this manoeuvring, during which each general was
gauging the skill of his opponent, the losses had been but
a few hundreds on each side, in occasional skirmishes of
the outposts. Now that Early had been weakened by the
loss of Anderson, was Sheridan's time to w go in," as Grant
tersely formulated his orders.
Early's position along the Opequon protects "Winchester
and at the same time threatens an incursion into Mary
land ; while Sheridan lies in such a position Mid-September.
back of the stream as to threaten Early s
communications if he should move in the latter direction.
Early's first manoeuvre is to operate by his left towards
Martinsburg. Nothing loth, Sheridan crosses the Opequon
and advances straight on "Winchester, to
^ September 19.
strike Early's right while his left is at a
distance. But delays often incident to the movement of
troops in battle enable Early to recall his left and save him
self from a crushing blow. Sheridan has twice Early's
force. It is noon before he is ready to attack. When his
lines advance they meet with a warm reception. But
numbers tell. Except for a temporary check on the left,
due to the impetuosity of Early's attack, the Army of the
Shenandoah carries everything before it. Sheridan throws
his cavalry upon Early's flanks. By nightfall, despite 'the
utmost gallantry, Early is driven from the field, in broken

272

BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864.

ranks, with a loss of thirty-six hundred men, half of which
are in prisoners. Our own loss is five thousand.
This battle of the Opequon, or "Winchester," saved
Maryland and Pennsylvania from future invasion.
Early retired to Strasburg, where he could rest his flanks
on the heights and the north fork of the Shenandoah. His

Opequon, or Winchester, Va. September 19, 1864.

position at Fisher's Hill appeared stronger than it actually
was, for these obstacles could be turned by a superior force.
Sheridan soon put in an appearance and de
spatched Torbert's cavalry by Luray to
Newmarket to seize the upper end of the Valley in
Early's rear. But before awaiting results he attacked the

September 22.

1864.]

SHERIDAN IN THE VALLEY.

273

enemy in his chosen position, tlirowing Crook in force
around his left.
By evening
Crook got into
place and moved
in upon Early's
flank and rear,
whUe the Sixth
and Nineteenth
corps assaulted
in front. Stout
resistance avaUed
Early naught.
He was broken,
and retreated in
five hundred men

Fisher's Hill. September 22, 1864.

September 24.

much disorder. Our loss was only
; Early's one thousand two hundred.
Torbert did not get in Early's rear, being held at Milford
by an insignificant cavalry force of the enemy.
Sheridan pursued Early up the Valley. The latter made
a stand atMt. Jackson, but was driven from
the place and retired through Newmarket.
Lee had ordered Kershaw back to Early, on hearing of
the disaster at the Opequon, and Early moved towards Port
Republic to join force with him. Sheridan marched to Har
risonburg. Torbert made for Staunton, where he began to
tear up the railroad, but was interrupted with
work half done by Early.
Grant believed that Sheridan should now advance toward
Lynchburg and destroy the railroads and the James River
canal. Sheridan objected that his line of operations would

September 28.

274 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864.
be too long, and would take a full corps to protect, and sug
gested, in lieu of Grant's plan, the devastation of the Valley
so as to render it useless to the enemy as a campaigning
ground ; after doing which he could rejoin the Army of the
Potomac with the bulk of his force.
To this suggestion Grant acceded. Sheri
dan commenced his return march, and whUe
retracing his steps he utterly destroyed grain, forage, barns,
agricultural tools and material of all kinds over the entire
breadth of the Valley, collected and drove off the stock,
and left that section a desolate waste. Some two thousand
barns and seventy mills filled with grain were thus destroyed,
He then fell back and took up position along Cedar Creek.
The destruction of provisions, forage, or any supplies
which could enable the enemy to protract the struggle was
no doubt justifiable. It is very questionable, however,
whether the burning of barns, agricultural implements, and
means of future thrift not appUcable to the conduct of an
immediate campaign comes under the same head. Such
destruction is not considered defensible by the best author
ities. "Nor does it appear to have been essential, for a new
crop could not have been raised for many months.
Sheridan did not expect to be foUowed up by Early ; but
the latter again put his divisions afoot towards the old
ground as soon as the Army of the Shenandoah retired.
On the home march, Torbert, with Merritt and Custer,
crossed swords with the enemy at Tom's
October 9. Brook, capturing eleven guns.
Early reached Strasburg, and again reestablished him
self at Fisher's HiU. From here he pushed out a sharp

1864.] SHERIDAN IN THE VALLEY. 275
reconnoissance of our position, at a loss of
three hundred men. October 13.
The Sixth corps had been recaUed, and was actually on
its way out of the VaUey. Upon the return of Early it
was again brought back. Sheridan started for Washing
ton to consult with the authorities as to the best course to
pursue, leaving Wright in command.
Early was soon out of supplies. The Valley was no
longer a granary for the Confederates. He must fight for
his rations or faU back. He planned a surprise of the
Union Army at Cedar Creek. Crook, with the Eighth
corps, lay on the left ; Emory's Nineteenth corps held
the centre ; the Sixth corps under Ricketts, with the cav
alry of Custer and Merritt, formed the right. Crook was
covered by Averell's horse, but insufficiently.
Gordon cautiously moves about the Union left, under
cover of the night and foggy dawn. Kershaw is to make
a heavy demonstration on the Union centre along and south
of the turnpike as a feint to cover Gordon's march.
Advancing with the utmost silence, even
° October 19.
leaving canteens behind, lest their clatter
should disturb the Federal camps, Gordon passes Cedar
Creek, moves well around Crook's flank, and faUs with
Southern vehemence upon his left and rear. The onset
is entirely unexpected. Crook's corps is at once demoral
ized and soon utterly broken up in confused retreat. Gor
don cheerily follows up his gain and soon draws into the
vortex of defeat the centre under Emory. The only
sound member of the Union Army is the Sixth corps.
Ricketts succeeds in making a rapid change of front and

276

BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR.

[1864.

falls upon Early, checking his onset till the Eighth and
Nineteenth corps can reach some place to rally.
An attempt to re-form is made at Middletown, but it is
futile. A second stand, a mile and a half farther back, is
more successful.
Wright patches
up the line upon
a nucleus of
Getty's division,
which this gal-
lant officer lias
rallied on the
pike. The troops
have recovered
their bearings.
The stampede
has not quite de
moralized them.
Early makes no
impression by
a smart attack.
Sheridan op
portunely arrives
upon the field. His magnetic presence caps the structure
already built. Wright is placed on the left ; Emory on the
right ; Crook in reserve. Merritt and Custer with their
horse fall in upon the right and left flanks. It is 4 P.M.
A general advance is ordered upon the Confederates,
who now approach flushed with victory, but disorgan
ized withal. The first onset bears Early back. He has

threle, top mt

Cedar Creek. October 19, 1864.

November 13.

1864.] SHERIDAN IN THE VALLEY. 277
nothing to oppose to the heavy numbers of the Federals.
Sheridan sweeps the field. The enemy is broken, routed,
driven in as wUd confusion up the VaUey as we had just
fled down.
Early's loss was twenty-nine hundred ; ours fifty-six hun
dred, including seventeen hundred prisoners, which the Con
federates got quickly to the rear after the morning's surprise.
Early next turned up at Newmarket,
• i,i October 20.
where he remained three weeks.
Sheridan withdrew for readier supplies to Kernstown.
Early again followed, loth to acknowledge
his defeat, and indulged in a needless com
bat with our outposts. This was the end of the drama.
The bulk of both the Confederate and Union forces was
ordered to Petersburg.
The Battle of Cedar Creek finished forever the Valley
campaigns. Sheridan had forces vastly outnumbering his
opponent. But his handling of his troops, especially the
cavalry, was handsome, and the work done was crisp and
clean. The forces on either side were nearly forty thou
sand men under Sheridan to less than half the number
under Early.
The Confederate general never recovered the prestige lost
in this Valley campaign. And yet he had fought bravely,
skUfully. But he was overmatched in numbers and found
himself opposed by equal skiU. Success could not well be
expected. Except some operations in Loudon County against the
gueriUa Mosby, no further hostilities were attempted in
Northern Virginia.

278 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864.
Sheridan was a typical soldier. Men who love fighting
are rarely the best generals. A distinguished example
of this was Charles XII. The keen enjoyment of the
fray does not often coexist with the power of cool calcula
tion and of intense mental effort essential to the commander
of an army. But it did in Sheridan. It is hard to say
whether he was best fitted to command a cavalry corps or
an army. In either capacity he excelled. WTherever
Sheridan appears in the annals of the war it is in stemming
an adverse tide with a vigor almost unequaUed, or in
leading victorious troops to certain triumph.
We cannot try him in the same balance as we try
Stonewall Jackson, though he has some of the latter's
traits ; for Jackson won his important successes with scant
material, and almost invariably against odds, whUe Sheri
dan's means were always ample. But his methods were
sharp, clear, exact ; and his power over men equaUed his
capacity as a soldier. His is a case of nascitur, non Jit.

LUL
HOOD TAKES THE OFFENSIVE.
LITTLE rest was to be allowed to Sherman after his
arduous labors in the capture of Atlanta. His line
of operations was now one hundred and forty miles longer
than it was at Chattanooga, and liable to interruption at
any moment. Cooperation by Canby from Mobile had
been part of the summer's programme. But Canby's
forces had been depleted by detaUs, and he had not yet
been able to capture Mobile.
Sherman made his dispositions to remain in Atlanta.
He contracted his lines for easier defense, and deemed it
essential to remove the non-mUitary residents. This
course gave rise to a terrible outcry at the South, and
some adverse criticism at the North. But the act was
entirely justifiable as a mUitary measure ; and the necessity
for the removal must be held to have depended upon his
own sole discretion. Sherman extended all possible help
to the departing inhabitants in the matter of rations and
transportation. After consultation with President Davis, Hood now
planned to operate seriously against Sherman's communi
cations. Our army had largely lost in numbers by fur-

280 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864.
loughs, sick and wounded, and the time was opportune.
Wheeler and Forrest were sent out to open the affair by a
raid upon the railroad in Sherman's rear.
Aug.-Sept. But their efforts had no serious results.
Sherman cannot mistake Hood's purpose. But he does
not propose to be tjusted from Atlanta. Thomas is sent
back to Nashville, and about the same time Hood
moves northward. Sherman is not to be called off his
quarry by any ordinary threat. He cautions Thomas to
keep a keen lookout for any attempt to cross the Tennessee,
and leaves Slocum to hold Atlanta. Howard stUl com
mands the Army of the Tennessee, and Cox, during the
absence on political affairs of Logan, commands the Army
of the Ohio.
Hood marches on Marietta. He has no doubt that he
will draw Sherman away from Atlanta and transfer the
seat of war to the Valley of the Tennessee.
The Army of the Cumberland repasses
October 4. the Chattahoochee and reaches Smyrna. It
is difficult for Sherman to divine Hood's immediate pur
pose, but he has no idea of letting go what has cost so
much. A detachment of Hood's army attacks
October 5. AUatoona, but is repulsed with heavy loss.
Sherman's forces are concentrated about
October 12. Rome. Hood pauses at Resaca, but shortly
moves to Dalton. But for the continued possession of
Atlanta it would almost seem that nothing had been gained
by the galling summer's work.
Hood's campaign does not, however, promise immediate

1864.] HOOD TAKES THE OFFENSIVE. 281
great results. Sherman proposes to keep all he has won,
and no serious break has as yet been made in his commu
nications. He has absolute confidence in the solidity of
his position. He asserted later that, if Hood had entered
Tennessee, he could have surrounded him and compelled
the surrender of his entire force.
The bulk of the Union army in pursuitr October 19.
of Hood reaches Gaylesville, Ala. There
are absent only the Atlanta and other garrisons along the
line of the raUroad.

LIV.
HOOD MAKES FOR TENNESSEE
li"H)R some months Sherman had contemplated and had
-L been urging upon Grant a march from Atlanta to the
seaboard, during which he should destroy all munitions of
war, cotton, crops, factories and machine-shops, tear up
raUroads, and render the country useless to the Confederacy
as a means of continuing the struggle. It seems to be well
settled that the plan was of his own conception. And he
urged it many months before it secured a willing ear.
His objective would be Columbia, S.C., at which point
he would be in rear of Lee at Richmond, and could throw
his forces into cooperation with Grant's. But before he
could march on Columbia, he must establish a new base
upon the seaboard. If his manoeuvre should prove suc
cessful he would, by isolating Virginia from all the
Southern States except North Carolina, deal the virtual
death-blow to the Confederacy.
Two general postulates only were a part of the problem.
If Lee should turn upon Sherman, Grant must so follow
him up as that between them they could destroy him. And
Thomas on his part must use up or neutralize Hood.
It was a bold game, this marching away from Hood
282

1864.] HOOD MAKES FOR TENNESSEE. 283
whUe the latter was trying to lure Sherman back to the
line of the Tennessee by threatening his communications.
If Hood had crossed the river near Sherman's army, the
latter might have been seriously compromised by faUing
immediately to foUow him, for he was not yet ready to cut
loose from his base. But when he saw that Hood kept
south of the Tennessee until he reached Decatur, Sherman's
mind was made up.
Schofield, Stanley, and half the horse were sent back to
Thomas, and A. J. Smith, then in Missouri, was ordered
to Nashville as a further reinforcement. These, with some
recruits, swelled Thomas' ranks to a point enabling him
successfully to cope with Hood. And Thomas was the
man for the task. Somewhat too deliberate, almost indeed
lacking the power of assuming the initiative, when he did
move, it was with the stride of a giant ; when he struck, it
was the blow of a battering ram. And on the defense he
had never yet met Iris equal.
Afl er the capture of Atlanta , Governor Brown had fur-
loughed the Georgia militia, which had been caUed out to
make temporary headway against the ruthless invader. He
had aUeged, as a reason for thus disbanding them, the pre
eminent necessity of gathering the crops. There had been
much friction between Hood and Hardee and the latter had
been ordered to the coast. There was no force to oppose
Sherman's march to the eastward.
Beauregard had been placed in command of the entire
military division, including Hood's territory, but with a
caution not to interfere with the hitter's field operations.
Wheeler's cavalry alone was to stay behind to watch

284 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864.
Sherman, while Hood retained both Forrest and Jackson
as a part of his column.
Hood's effective was about fifty-four thousand men.
He expected, by crossing the river at Tuscumbia or
Decatur, to draw Sherman back to NashvUle. His at
tempt to pass at Decatur was successfully resisted. He
then moved on to Tuscumbia and effected a
Oct. 29-Nov. 13. , • i ,
passage. But once on the north side he
found himself compelled to sit down three weeks at
Florence to accumulate the supplies of which he stood in
urgent need. This delay, though doubtless essential, was
fatal to Hood's success in this campaign.
The Confederate armies, both in the East and West,
were always ready to move with less transportation than
our own, partly because they possessed less material and
issued rations and equipage more irregularly to the men.
Certain it is that the Southern soldier did his wonderfully
efficient work on a basis of victuals, clothing, and ammu
nition which would generally have kept a Federal force in
camp, as unfit to move. But even they had sometimes to
delay their march for rations.
Meanwhile Forrest raids on Jackson, Tenn., and
on Fort Henry, hoping to draw Thomas
Nov 10° away from Nashville. But in vain. And
Hood is equally disappointed at not having
decoyed Sherman from hard-won Atlanta. Beauregard
spurs on Hood to a bold initiative. Hood surely needs no
spur. November 4 Stanley's Fourth corps is concentrated at
Pulaski. Schofield joins and assumes com-

1864.] HOOD MAKES FOR TENNESSEE. 285
mand at that place. His force consists of
the Fourth corps and Cox's division of the
Twenty-third corps. Altogether Thomas numbers fifty-
five to sixty thousand men, including Schofield's com
mand.

I

LV.
SHERMAN ASTONISHES HOOD.
N due time Sherman cut loose from his communica
tions. He destroyed the raUroad in his rear, after
first sending back such portions of his corn-
November 12. .
mand as would hamper in lieu of furthering
his movements. None but the stoutest of heart and limb
must follow him on the coming march.
He was now fairly launched on a great strategic ma
noeuvre. The hardihood of this undertaking has been often
overrated ; its conception and its valuable results cannot
be. Sherman himself " regarded the march as a shift of
base, as the transfer of a strong army which had no oppc-
nent and had finished its then work, from the interior to a
point on the sea-coast, from which it could achieve other
important results." He "considered this march as a means
to an end, and not as an essential act of war." As com
pared with his progress through the Carolinas, Sherman
gauges this march as of but slight importance. It was the
result of the entire achievement which made it what it was.
The boldness lay in conceiving its far-reaching advantages ;
not in carrying through the mere details of the progress.
Sherman was by no means certain what point on the
286

1864.] SHERMAN ASTONISHES HOOD. 287
seaboard he should reach ; but he made his calculations to
meet the Union fleet which was to be sent towards him, in
the neighborhood of Ossabaw Sound. He had with him
two corps of the Army of the Tennessee, under command
of Howard, as his right wing, and two of the Army of the
Cumberland, under Slocum, as the left. These troops
numbered over sixty thousand rugged veterans, unham
pered by sick or off-duty men, with twenty days' rations,
plenty of beef on the hoof, about one field-gun per thou
sand effective, and an exceUent canvas pontoon train.
Atlanta Sherman thoroughly destroyed, so far as future
utility to the enemy for the creation of war material was
concerned. In other respects it was left intact.
His first objective was ^lUledgeviUe, threatening both
Macon and Augusta on the way. His route lay between
the Ocniulgee and Oconee, both of which rivers take
their source not far from Atlanta, and flow south-eastwardly
towards the coast, joining to form the Altamaha.
Kilpatrick commanded Sherman's horse. His first dem
onstration was towards Macon, during which he encoun
tered some opposition from Wheeler's cavalry, which was
constantly hovering on Sherman's right front.
WhUe Howard's column crossed the Oc- November 18-20.
mulgee, Slocum, whose wing Sherman per-
sonaUy accompanied, was engaged in destroying the raU
road from Atlanta to Augusta as far as the Oconee.
Beaureo-ard did net long remain sUent. The ebullition
of his zeal took the form of volleys of telegrams, promises,
appeals, threats, addressed alternately to Sherman and to
the entire population of Georgia. Anything to destroy

288 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864.
or impede the invader. Sherman's sole response was an
order that all law-abiding citizens should be protected,
but that any person caught damaging roads or engaged in
any overt act of war should have his houses burned and
his property destroyed as a penalty.
No engagement of serious moment occurred. Walcutt's
Brigade had a sharp skirmish with the enemy near Macon,
suffering the loss of about one hundred men,
Nov. 22-28. . .
and Kilpatrick defeated Wheeler in a smart
combat at Waynesborough. But Kilpatrick's attempt to
release our prisoners at Millen was foiled by their removal.
Leaving Millcdgeville Sherman marched on Millen, and
here broke up the railroad between Savannah
December 3. and Augusta. His route now lay between
the Ogeechee and Savannah rivers, excepting the Fifteenth
corps, which marched south of the former stream. Prog
ress was easy, and no further attack from the enemy was
anticipated. As a permanent interruption of the railroads between
Richmond and the Southern States was one of the great
objects of Sherman's raid, the work of destruction was
accomplished in such a manner as to make it difficult to
repair the damage. The rails, after being taken up, were
heated in the middle upon bonfires made of the ties, and
then twisted around trees or posts in such a manner as
to render them useless. And as all rolling-mills were
wrecked, no means of re-rolling the rails was at hand.
A corps, strung along the track, could in this way utterly
ruin about fifteen miles a day.
AU supplies of food and forage, over a belt of country

1864.] SHERMAN ASTONISHES HOOD. 289
sixty miles wide, from Atlanta to Savannah, in like man
ner fell a prey to this march. Either the Confederates de
stroyed them to prevent their being of benefit to us, or else
we in turn used or wasted them, leaving the people only
the bare necessaries of Ufe. Nothing remained which could
subsist an army.
The negroes who endeavored to follow " Massa Sherman "
proved a great embarrassment. If allowed to join the col
umn they would have seriously jeopardized its safety. A
few able-bodied men were carried along. Famifies and
the extreme young and old could not be.
Much criticism was passed upon this method in the
North, by those who looked upon the war from a merely
poUtical stand-point, or indeed as a war waged against
slavery, and who forgot that its conduct, to secure good
political results, must strictly conform to military usage.
As an instance, General Davis of the Fourteenth corps, from
pure necessity, to carry out his order of march, withdrew his
pontoon bridge at Ebenezer Creek before a horde of col
ored people could cross, who had been fully warned not to
follow his command and yet persisted in their infatuation.
Quite a number were drowned in frantic endeavors to swim
the stream. A cry of horror arose at this " act of barba
rism " and Davis was held up to the bitterest censure,
though absolutely in the right. He was a soldier under
military orders ; not a humanitarian peacefully guiding the
movements of an exodus.
Probably no body of men ever so fully embodied the two
fold purpose of fighting and foraging as Sherman's " bum
mers." The work exactly suited the genius of the people

290 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864.
composing the army, :ind the natural law-abiding quality
of the American checked extravagance and cruelty. It
would be absurd to deny that there was Home looting, and
an occu,sioii:il but very rani act committed in hot blood.
Mayhap Kilpatrick and bin men earned a somewhat, bad
reputation on just grounds. But no army ever enjoyed
such freedom and kept within such bounds. Indeed the
Southern preHS complained si t. (lie time more bitterly of
Wheeler's cavalry for their reckless vandalism than of our
troops. And witli rare exceptions tlic collection of sup
plies was systematically conducted, and the men who were
detailed on this duly fought and foraged with equal
alacrity, good-temper and <:vcn-h:iudediicHH.
It may be confidently asserted that no army ever moved
through an enemy's territory with like purpose, which so
scrupulously observed the humanities it' not the, amenities
of life. The rare exceptions which occurred arc quoted,
multiplied; the thousand instances of moderation arc for
gotten. And war is not a gentle art. Its methods
necessarily partake of the horrible. But during our Civil
Conflict wc may truthfully claim that its terrors were almost
uniformly confined to the actual field of battle.
The weather was bright, and everything tended to give
the whole affair the aspect of a frolic. Certainly it was
the one thoroughly enjoyable operation of the war.
Without the stern duties of the field, all the pleasures of
the soldier's i'rec. and hardy life were ever present; and the
men and animals reached their goal in far finer condition
than that in which they started.

LVT.
SHERMAN'S GOAL.
THE city of Savannah had strong defences on both
its sea and land fronts. Under Hardee's command
were some eighteen thousand men. He prepared to hold
the place, trusting to keep open his conunu-
£ December 10, 186*.
nidations on the north with Charleston.
Arrived before the city, Sherman stretched out his
left in the endeavor to cut Hardee off from tins source
of supply and means of retreat, but to no purpose. Gen
eral Foster, from his foothold on the coast at Port fioyal,
sent Hatch's division to cut the Charleston Railroad, but
for once Governor Brown's militia proved to be of use,
and Hatch's attack was repulsed with a loss of seven
hundred men.
Sherman closed in on Savannah and com- Deeembex- 12*
pleted the investment, save only the above
outlet. To open communication with Dahlgren's fleet in the
offing it became necessary to capture Fort McAllister on
the south side of the town. The detail for the assault fell
toHaxen's division and the work was sturdily IVm_k-_
UOGSSKUttBt 13a.
done. The fort was taken at the first rush. 391

292 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864.
Hardee continued to operate the Charleston RaUroad to
HardeevUle, not far from Savannah, Foster's renewed
efforts to cut it having proved unsuccessful. Sherman
was forced to prepare for regular siege operations again
Savannah. He drained the rice-fields surrounding the
city and began to mount some heavy guns. The men's
rations at this time consisted largely of rice, and the
animals were fed almost exclusively on rice straw.
During these preparations Sherman received Grant's
orders to send the bulk of his forces to Virginia by water.
For the army in front of Petersburg had been greatly de
pleted by the summer's campaign. While preparing to com
ply, though strongly urging the advantages of his own plan
for a march overland, he partly lost his grip on Hardee.
The latter, smelling disaster afar off,
Deaember20. . . °
deemed it wise to evacuate the place before
his sole outlet was cut. Although he lost the chance of
capturing Hardee's forces, Sherman was thus enabled to
make the President a Christmas present of the city of
Savannah.

lvll
HOOD SEEKS TO CRUSH SCHOFIELD. — FEANKLIN.
WHEN Sherman unexpectedly eluded Hood, this
general became doubly anxious to get at Thomas,
and retrieve the standing of the Confederacy by some
brilliant feat of arms. But the November storms inter
fered so materially with his movements, that it was not
until late in the month that he pushed from . November 21.
Florence on towards Duck River. This
stream was the first serious natural obstacle in his path,
and here also lay Schofield.
Thomas occupied Nashville, shaping the somewhat dis
cordant elements now under his command into an army
which he could handle with confidence against an active
enemy. This was a task of no small magnitude. His
force embraced the Fourth corps under Wood, the Twenty-
third under Schofield, three divisions of the Army of the
Tennessee under A. J. Smith, and Wilson's cavalry,
beside a motley collection of clerks, recruits, and quarter
master's employes, of questionable utility in a fight.
Hood's command consisted of Lee's, Stewart's, and Cheat
ham's army corps, and he was ably supported by Forrest's
horsemen. 293

294 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864.
Schofield's orders were to retreat when he must from
before Hood, but to hold him as long as possible so that
Thomas might finish his preparations. Schofield was anx
ious to keep south of the line of Duck River and to pre
serve the important bridge at Columbia. But Hood flanked
him by crossing the river above, and he was obliged to
retire to the north side. Wilson, though
November 29. weaker numerically than Forrest, began
to show himself amply able to cope with this clever
trooper, and protected Schofield's movements against his
sudden dashes.
Hood's next move was to despatch Forrest around Scho
field's left to his rear at Spring HUl, whither he himself
soon followed, obliging Schofield to let go his hold on
Columbia and retire by his left so as readUy to form line
to the east.
A slight interchange of hostilities took place at Spring
HUl, but Hood seemed here to lack his usual strong initia
tive, and the advantage of his manoeuvre was lost by failure
to push the fighting while Schofield was on the retreat.
Schofield wisely retired to Franklin, intending to put the
Harpeth river between himself and the enemy. Lack of
pontoons, however, prevented his crossing at once, and he
was obliged to form line south of the town, and to intrench
in the usual manner. He at once set to
November 30. work, however, to improve the fords, and
reestablish the bridges, by which means he managed to
get his artillery across and out of danger, while it could
stUl be used to advantage from the north side. He planted
the guns on some high ground, and in a fort formerly con-

Is64.]

HOOD SEEKS TO CRUSH SCHOFIELD.

295

structed on that spot. With considerable exertion he also
placed his trains beyond danger.
Hood had rather unnecessarily complained of his subordi
nates for what he termed their lack of enterprise at Spring
Hill, and aU were in high tension at the approaching
opportunity to prove his strictures false. And Hood felt
justly confident that he could crush Schofield, separated as
he was from the main Federal army.
Schofield had ordered the troops to begin the crossing of
the Harpeth River, unless attacked, at 6 P.M. Himself
was on the north of the river, where he could best watch
operations on the other side, as well as pay heed to WUson,
who was holding head against Forrest on our left.
Wagner's two brigades formed the Union rear-guard,
with clear instructions to retire, slowly and without
bringing on a serious combat, within the main fine.
This was protected by exceUent parapets, and able to
give a good account of itself. The ground was
open. The advance of the Confederates could be plainly
watched. Our main line
was bracing itself
for the approaching
conflict, expecting
Wagner's men to
retire in good order
from their front, so
as to afford a clear
sweep for their fire.
But, to every one's Franklin. November 30, 1864.

1- CV *T> CC=»PS.

296 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864.
surprise, Wagner opened upon the approaching Confed
erates, and almost instantly provoked a desperate charge
upon his isolated brigades.
With a yell, Wagner was brushed away, his men rush
ing frantically through our lines, followed by the victorious
enemy, who, absolutely on the heels of Wagner's broken
regiments, overran our parapets in the centre, and drove
our troops back in much confusion. A countercharge by
the reserves managed to recapture a portion of the breast
works, while the enemy was not to be driven from the rest.
But our troops established a new line of intrenchments
within twenty-five yards of the one they had just lost.
This preliminary attack was made about 5 P.M., and
heavy fighting ensued all along the lines until nearly four
hours after dark. The combats were isolated, but desper
ate and sanguinary, without advantage to either party.
Tactically Franklin was a drawn battle, but as his posi
tion could be easily turned, Schofield, at 11 P.M., ordered
a withdrawal to the north side of the river. This was
accomplished without loss.
Nothing better proves the enemy's determined purpose
to crush Schofield's forces in this battle, than their heavy
loss, especially in officers. Hood confesses to six thousand
three hundred men. Our own was twenty-three hundred.
This disproportion savors of inaccuracy. The forces on
the field were twenty-seven thousand Federals to a slightly
less number of Confederates.
Thomas now ordered Schofield to retire on Nashville.

lvlii.
HOOD BROKEN BY THOMAS. — NASHVILLE.
ACCORDING to his wont, Thomas took such time as
he deemed essential to complete his preparations, de
spite constant, almost angry, demands for an advance from
the War Office, the President and General Grant. With
all just confidence in Thomas' ability, the entire North in
sisted on instant action, and Grant finally ordered Thomas
either to move upon Hood at once or else turn over the
command to Schofield.
Thomas quietly replied that he would cheerfully do the
latter, if directed, but would not attack Hood untU he was
satisfied that the time was ripe. He desired both favorable
weather and to increase his force of mounted men.
But the enemy was devastating a considerable part of
Tennessee and was forcing all the young men into their
ranks ; and every one was fearful of a repetition of Bragg's
march to the Ohio in 1862. Logan was finally ordered to
NashvUle to supplant Thomas. But before he could reach
the ground, Thomas had struck his blow.
His preparations had been two weeks before substantially
completed. Small detachments were at Murfreesborough,
Chattanooga, and along the railroad. This latter had
297

298

BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR.

[1864.

December 15.

been, however, interrupted by Hood for a number of days.
A heavy storm of sleet and ice had made the country
almost impassable and would render the operations of the
attacking party uncertain. Thomas had made up his mind
to wait for clearing weather. Finally came
sunshine, and with it Thomas' advance.
Hood lay in his front, with Stewart on his left, Lee in
the centre and
Cheatham on the
right, while a
portion of For
rest's cavalry
was operating
out upon his
right. He had
some forty-four
thousand men,
but his check
and heavy losses
at Franklin had
seriously impair
ed the morale
of his army as
wrell as thinned
his ranks. Hood
could, however,
; not retreat. He
was committed
to a death-
struggle with Thomas. It was his last chance as a soldier.

Nashville. December 15-16, 1864.

1864.] HOOD BROKEN BY THOMAS. 299
Thomas had placed A. J. Smith on his right, Woods
in the centre, and Schofield and Steedman on the
left. He advanced on Hood, bearing heavily with his
right, whUe sharply demonstrating with his left. The
position of the Confederate Army had placed A. J.
Smith's corps obliquely to their general line of battle, an
advantage not to be neglected. Smith pushed in, later
supported by Schofield, and successively capturing the
fieldworks erected by the enemy's main line and reserves,
disastrously crushed and turned Hood's left flank.
Meanwhile WTood was making all but equal headway
against Hood's centre, and. the first day closed with remark
able success for the amount of loss sustained. Still this
was not victory. The morrow might bring reverse.
Hood's fight promised to be with clenched teeth.
Hood seriously missed Forrest, whom he had detached
on a raiding excursion and without whose cavalry his flanks
were naked. Cheatham he moved during the night over
from the right to sustain his left, which had proved the
weaker wing. On the morning of the next day he lay
intrenched upon the hills back of his former December 16.
line, with either flank somewhat refused.
Thomas sent Wilson with his cavalry to work his way
unobserved around the extreme left flank thus thrown back.
At 3 P.M. a general assault was made all along the line.
Upon our left, Wood and Steedman met with no success.
On the right, however, A. J. Smith's onset, concentrated
at the salient of Hood's left centre, proved heavy enough
to break down the Confederate defense. Sharply follow
ing up his successes, allowing no breathing time to the

300 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1864.
exultant troops, Smith pushed well home, and overcoming
all resistance, drove the enemy in wild confusion from the
field. Meanwhile Wilson's troopers, dismounted, fell upon
the Confederate flank and rear and increased the wreck ten
fold. Reaching Granny White Pike, they cut the enemy
from this outlet. Wood and Steedman charged again,
broke through, and with renewed joint effort the rout of the
enemy became overwhelming. Almost all organization
was lost in Hood's army as it fled across the country tow
ards Franklin.
Pursuit was promptly undertaken, but though seriously
harassed, Hood saved himself beyond the Tcn-
Dcccmber 27. nessee River with the remnants of his army.
Thomas' losses were three thousand men. Hood's were
never officially given, but our trophies included forty-five
hundred prisoners and fifty-three guns.
Thomas had settled all adverse speculation upon his slow
ness in attacking Hood by the next to annihilation he
wrought when he actually moved upon him. No army
was so completely overthrown during our war. Nothing
succeeds like success, and wc may be content, perhaps, to
leave the grand old soldier his full triumph. Criticism
may be well laid aside.
But as a pure matter of curious study, it might with some
justice be claimed that Thomas was at any time strong
enough to meet Hood on the line of Duck River; and that
with Schofield's force, reinforced by what he himself had,
he might then and there have overwhelmed him as he did
later before Nashville.
Thomas was a Virginian. In 1861 he had been seek-

1864.] HOOD BROKEN BY THOMAS. 301
ing a college position in his native State, and some un
necessarily feared his loyalty. Man was never born more
true. He was essentially cast in a large mould, in mind
and body; so modest that he shrank from command, to
which he was pecuUarly fitted ; with courage of the stamp
that ignores self; possessing steadfastness in greater
measure than audacity, he yet lacked none of that abUity
which can deal heavy blows ; while no antagonist was ever
able to shake his foothold. Honesty in thought, word,
and deed was constitutional with him. A thorough mUi
tary training, added to a passionate love of his profession,
and great natural powers, made him peer of any soldier.
Sedate in mind, and physically slow in movement, he yet
aroused great, enthusiasm among his men, as well as earned
their warm affection. Uniformly successful in all he un
dertook, from Mill Springs to NashvUle, he has left a
memorable name and an untarnished reputation. He per
haps faUs as little short of the model soldier as any man
produced by this country.

LIX.
SHERMAN MOVES THROUGH THE CAROLINAS.
a RANT'S general plan for a final campaign had in
cluded a march by Thomas, after he should have
used up Hood, on a similar scale to Sherman's, to a new
base which Canby at Mobile should open for him, destroy
ing in his path aU the munitions of war, factories and miUs.
But Thomas considered it unsafe to leave Tennessee, and
preferred to operate only with his cavalry. A. J. Smith
was consequently sent to Canby, while Schofield was
ordered to the Atlantic seaboard.
Schofield moved by way of the Ohio and Washington,
with the Twenty-third corps under Cox, to join forces with
the Tenth corps under Terry, then on the coast of North
Carolina. Here he would be ready to cooperate with Sher
man as the latter moved northward.
Fort Fisher protected the harbor of Wilmington, N.C.
the last of the ports open to blockade runners, Savannah,
Charleston, and MobUe having been closed by our naval and
land forces. It was of importance to neutralize this asylum
also. Admiral Porter had prepared a fleet of seventy
vessels for the expedition, and Grant had selected Weitzel
302

1864-5.] THROUGH THE CAROLINAS. 303
as the officer to accompany him, with some sixty-five
hundred men.
As ill luck would have it, Butler had become greatly
exercised over a scheme for blowing up the magazine of
Fort Fisher by exploding a powder-boat near by, and not
only did he accompany the expedition, but he undertook,
without orders, claiming this right as senior officer present,
to control its operations.
On arrival of the forces three thousand men were landed,
the guns of the fort having been sUenced
i Dec- 24_25> '64'
by a bombardment of the fleet. The ex
plosion of the powder-boat was a complete fiasco, exciting
only curiosity among the enemy at the moment, and
laughter afterwards. The land forces advanced, and
might weU have captured the place, but Butler saw fit to
recall them, alleging that Fort Fisher was so strong that
it could not be taken, and that he was unwUling to sacri
fice the lives of the men.
The foUy of this course was shown within a month.
Terry joined Porter in Butler's stead, and January 15, '65.
with about the same force, after a gaUant as
sault, captured the fort at a loss of seven hundred men.
The navy lost some three hundred more.
The Twenty-third corps having reached Fort Fisher,
Schofield assumed command of the joint
. February 22.
forces and soon after captured WUmington.
From here Cox was ordered to New Berne to make a
new base for future movements and later March 21.
the bulk of Schofield's forces entered Golds-
borough.

304 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1865.
No sooner fairly in Savannah than Sherman, glad
enough to leave political and commercial questions to be
settled by the civil authorities, put his army
January, '65. afoot for Columbia, which had been his ulti
mate objective when he left Atlanta. He purposed to feint
on Charleston and Augusta, and to march through
Columbia to Goldsborough, while Grant, by extending his
left west of Petersburg, would prevent Lee from turning
against him. The projected route followed the water-shed
between the Combahee and the Savannah rivers, as it was
necessary to cross the intervening streams near their
sources, where they were not wide. At this time of year,
even small rivers in this section become swollen and im
passable. Charleston, dear to the Confederate heart, was held too
long — Sherman's advance from Savannah not being ex
pected in the month of January — to enable the enemy to
concentrate in Sherman's front. Beauregard and Hardee
had calculated to oppose the further advance of the Federal
Army in February with some thirty-three thousand men,
but Sherman was well ahead of them before they awoke
to the reality.
The rains had been persistent and heavy. There was
greater difficulty than usual in bridging streams. The soil
was so treacherous that in order to pull through the artillery
and trains, nearly the entire distance marched had to be
corduroyed. It required exceptional energy and vast labor
to push an army through such a country. Joe Johnston
has complimented Sherman's veterans as being the toughest
and most ready men since Julius Cassar commanded his

1865.] THROUGH THE CAROLINAS. 305
Gallic legions. And indeed, as Romans in courage and
endurance, and as Yankees in inventiveness and adaptability,
Caesar's legionaries were a fair prototype of Sherman's bum
mers. The army reached Columbia after an
arduous march. Before entering the town
Sherman ordered aU pubhc property and factories capable
of making munitions of war to be destroyed ; all private
and educational property to be left unmolested. Not the
slightest desire to injure the town was manifest, for no such
intention existed. But a fire was accidentally started, and
before it could be got under control had made such head
way that the greater part of the city was consumed.
The crimination and recrimination which has been in
dulged in about the burning of Columbia probably resolves
itself into the simple fact that a fire of cotton bales,
started by the retiring Confederates, extended beyond con
trol. There is abundant proof that everything possible was
done to extinguish the flames, but to no avail. And after
the calamity Sherman did aU that man could do to help the
citizens to food and shelter. There may have been some
drunkenness and rioting among the men. Under such
circumstances, when are they absent? But the testimony
before and the decision of the Mixed Commission on Amer
ican and British Claims, in the matter of cotton then de
stroyed, settles the responsibility beyond further argument.
That body, as able as disinterested, attached no blame to
the Federal army.
Sherman almost immediately continued his march.
Skirmishing was now incessant with the enemy in his front,

306 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1865.
but the loss of life was small. Hardee, finding Charleston
of no further strategic value and hoping stUl to effect some
thing against Sherman in the field, evacuated the city, upon
which Dahlgren and Foster occupied it.
The Confederates concentrated at Cheraw
March 2. .
to oppose our advance, but by pushing for
ward Slocum's left wing, they were manoeuvred out of their
position. Hampton's cavalry was very active in Sher
man's front. On one occasion he surprised KUpatrick,
who had become somewhat careless about bis outpost ser
vice, and came near to putting a term to the latter 's useful
ness ; but this sUght success eventuated in no gain to the
Confederates. When Lee found that Hardee was making no headway
against Sherman's progress, he assumed the
March. prerogative of commander-in-chief, and
assigned Joe Johnston to command the forces, some
twenty-six thousand men, in front of his late antagonist.
Johnston at once took the reins in hand,
March 16. and began to harass Sherman's van. In
the smaU affair at Averasborough, Sherman gained an
unimportant success, but at BentonvUle came near a
grievous check.
The army, partly owing to the bad roads and partly
to the necessity of foraging on the country, has got
much strung out. Johnston, well aware of this, and
hid behind a curtain of Hampton's cavalry, concen
trates at BentonvUle, hoping to strike a heavy blow
at Sherman before he can effect a junction with
Schofield.

1865.] THROUGH THE CAROLINAS. " 307
Sherman himself is with the right wing, so as aU the
sooner to open communication with his lieutenant. Davis'
division, leading the left wing, stumbles upon Hampton in
a manner indicating the proximity of other troops. Sher
man is duly notified, but makes up his
. March 19-20.
mind — rather hastUy it appears — that it
is only a cavalry force, little suspecting that Johnston,
with twenty-two thousand men, lies massed behind it,
ready to fall upon Slocum, whose entire force within a
day's march is dangerously small.
The blow falls. At first it staggers Davis, whose men
fall back in confusion, but without panic rally and reform.
Slocum speeds back messengers to bring up Williams'
army corps, next in rear. Morgan and Caiiin handle
their divisions to great advantage, and yield no ground to
the attacks of double their number of the enemy. Sher
man's bummers are unfamUiar with defeat. In this pict
uresque combat, which wavers fiercely to and fro from
morn tUl dark, our troops are called on several times to
fight on opposite sides of the same breastworks, so com
pletely are they surrounded by the Confederates. But
they hold their ground without loss of courage.
During the night, reinforcements arrive from the right
wing, and the rear of the left wing comes up. Johnston
retires foUed. But he has been nearer success than he has
guessed. His loss somewhat exceeded two thousand three
hundred men ; ours was over sixteen hundred. This
was his last chance in the Carolinas. And he had
lost it.
Stoneman, accompanied by the Fourth Corps, had been

308 'BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1865.
ordered into the Valley from NashvUle to
March and April. dcgtroythe railroad from Virginia to Ten
nessee. This was designed to cut off from Lee this
means of retreat from Virginia, and source of supply from
such part of Tennessee as was still in the enemy's hands.
The raid was successfully accomplished and had no small
effect upon the morale of the Virginia forces. Stoneman
made his way as far as Salisbury, N.C., where he de
stroyed a vast depot of reserve stores.
WUson led a cavalry expedition into Alabama. His
progress was opposed by Forrest. Wilson drove this
noted partisan into Selma, stormed and carried the town.
Forrest escaped, but only to fall somewhat
April 2. later into the hands of a detachment of our
horsemen. Wilson won great credit by thus ending the
career of this doughty champion of the Confederacy.
Sherman was duly joined at Goldsborough by Schofield
and Terry. This ran his force up to ninety thousand men.
He occupied Raleigh without opposition. The end of the
Confederacy had come within sight.
Sherman's active field-work ends here. What has been
said about his Atlanta campaign sufficiently stamps the
man and the soldier. No praise can add to, no blame de
tract from, Sherman's splendid reputation and services.
He, if any one, showed during our CivU War the divine
military spark.
In his 1864 campaign he was pitted against the strongest
of the Confederates, always excepting Lee; and he wrote
his own strength upon every page of its history. It would
have furnished an interesting study to have seen him at the

1865.] THROUGH THE CAROLINAS. 309
head of the splendid force which started from the Rappa
hannock when he himself started from Chattanooga. For
Sherman's work never taxed him beyond his powers. It
is difficult to say what he stUl held in reserve.

LX.
THE FINAL CAMPAIGN.
THE marvellous gaUantry of the South had availed it
nothing. The toils of its stronger opponent were
drawing closer and tighter. Never had nation fought
more nobly for what it believed to be right. No race can
harbor a more just pride in its achievements than the
American Anglo-Saxon may do in the splendid resistance
of the South. Happy our Northern homes that we were
not called on to endure to such a bitter end !
Sherman, in his march through the Carolinas, has drawn
a line of steel from the Appalachians to the Atlantic. Grant
holds Lee fast in his stronghold. The end must speedily
come. Sheridan's Valley command has been broken up, and the
Sixth and Nineteenth corps have returned to the army
before Petersburg.
Sheridan himself, with ten thousand sabres, is ordered to
operate against Lee's communications at Danville. This
is the plan Grant has been urging on him for six months.
He moves to Staunton and from there to Charlottesville,
crossing swords with the enemy at Waynes
boro. But he is unable to cross the James
310

I860.] THE FINAL CAMPAIGN. 311
on account of high water. Foregoing bis purpose of de
stroying the DanvUle Rtiilroad he breaks up the James River
Canal and the Lynchburg RaUroad and strikes
„ T„, " TT March 19
across country for \\ bite House on the 1 ork
river, from which place he joins the Army of the Potomac.
Lee could not expect further reinforcements. There
were still men to be had ; but the population of the
South was growing tired of the manner in which the
pohticians were conducting the war. And there was not
a house in which there was not one dead. The people
saw the end if the politicians would not. The starv
ing wffe and chUdren called from his duty under the
colors many a brave man who had for four years risked his
life for the cause which he now saw was beyond saving.
These deserters were all but impossible to capture. They
were shielded wholesale from the provost-marshals. The
commissariat, too, was in a condition of collapse. Only
the despauing courage of the leaders remained, and their
dwindfing retinue. The means of carrying on the struggle
had been exhausted. The last ditch had been reached.
Lee had little over sixty thousand effectives. Grant
surrounded him with more than twice the number. The
return of the Valley troops and reinforcements had again
placed Grant in overwhelming strength. He had one
hundred and twenty-five thousand men. No doubt as the
time approached for the opening of what aU saw must be
the last campaign, Lee had fully determined to forsake Rich
mond, and, joining to his own the forces of Johnston, to
retreat to the mountains, where, if he could not prolong
the war, be might, at least, command better terms of

312 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1865.
peace for the Confederacy. He accumulated a supply of
rations at Amelia Court House, west of Richmond, ready
to take with him when he should retire along the DanvUle
Railroad. In order to be able to retire, as he desires, by the south
side of the Appomattox river, Lee must drive Grant from
his hold on the Boydton road. And to make the operation
of disengaging himself from Richmond and Petersburg
safe, he plans to attack Grant as a diversion. Selecting
Fort Stedman, on Grant's centre, as the
March 25. ..,'... . ,
most available point, he vigorously assaults
the place in three columns of selected troops.
Negligently guarded, Fort Stedman is captured by a
coup de main, causing the abandonment of some adjacent
batteries. But the assaulting force is not promptly
supported, and Lee is forced to retire under the concentric
fire of other batteries commanding Fort Stedman, —
(Confederate, "Hare's Hill"). His casualties amount to
twenty-five hundred men and two thousand prisoners, —
a loss he can ill afford.
Grant can not well mistake Lee's purpose. He knows
that the attack on Fort Stedman is but a cover for some
other operation, presumably retreat, for the prisoners re
cently captured have told a sorry tale of the condition of
the Army of Northern Virginia. Grant therefore once
more adopts his ancient tactics of a move by the left. But
this time he leaves a small body only in front of Peters
burg, and makes his turning force solid and strong.
Sheridan is on the extreme left, moving towards Din-
widdie. Warren, with Humphreys on his right, first finds

1865.] THE FINAL CAMPAIGN. 313
the enemy as he pushes for the White Oak road. A com
bat, with loss of four hundred men, results
. ,Tr „ March 29.
in Warrens favor.
The Union line stretches out from the Appomattox
River to Dinwiddie Court House, in order Parke, Wright,
Ord, Humphreys, Warren, Sheridan. With not much
over fifty thousand muskets, Lee has thirty-five miles
of intrenchments to hold. Longstreet is in the Richmond
defences ; Mahone at Bermuda Hundred. In Peters
burg are WUcox, Pickett, Bushrod Johnson, Heth, and
Gordon. Starved as he is for men, Lee stiU clings to his old and
daring tactics. Stripping the lines to the barest, he col
lects fifteen thousand men, and once again essays his so
often successful assault upon our right. A heavy storm
supervenes. Grant arrests the movement
r March 30.
of the Army of the Potomac. Lee com
pletes his preparations.
Warren has formed his divisions in echelon. The habit
of moving forward in line enables an opponent who can
effect a breach in one place to bear back the whole body.
The disposition in echelon allows easy support of one por
tion of the line by another, while not subject to the weak
ness mentioned. Ayres is sent forward to March 31.
seize the White Oak road.
Lee once more makes a sudden swoop upon Warren's
left. Ayres and Crawford are driven in ; but Griffin holds
on, and Humphreys thrusts Miles forward upon Warren's
right. Lee fails, but we lose two thousand men.
Sheridan with his horse moves forward to Five Forks.

314 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. [1865.
Lee, whose safety demands that he shall hold this point,
advances an equal number of foot upon him, and drives
him back towards Dinwiddie.
Grant and Meade become solicitous for Sheridan's
safety, and send Warren to his succor. Warren throws
Ayres forward towards Dinwiddie. Ayres is stopped for
a few hours by a broken bridge. But in reality Sheridan
is in no degree compromised. Lee cannot afford to leave
so many men at Dinwiddie, and withdraws them to Five
Forks. Sheridan again follows up Lee to that
April 1. place. He is in command of the joint cav
alry and infantry forces. Masking the Fifth corps with
his cavalry, and attacking smartly on the right of Lee's
line to divert his attention, he sends a body of horse up the
White Oak road towards Richmond to arrest any rein
forcements which may chance to come from that direction.
Warren forms his corps with Ayres on the left,, Crawford
on the right, and Griffin in rear of Crawford as reserve.
Ayres and Crawford have each two brigades in front,
each brigade in two lines of battle, and a third brigade in
simUar formation in rear of the two advance brigades.
Griffin is in columns by battalion.
The march is directed by the sun, which is to be kept
over the left shoulder. The line of advance is to be upon
and around the left flank of the enemy, thus taking him in
reverse. As in all such cases, in wooded country, there is
some delay in the advance, due to no particular neglect.
, ., The cavalry attack in front, the foot falls
upon the enemy in flank and rear. The

1805.] THE FINAL CAMPAIGN. 315
enemy struggles with all his old nerve, changes front
in good style, and fights manfully ; but outnumbered
and outmanoeuvred, he can make no headway. His line is
broken. Part fly westward, five thousand are captured.
Our loss is less than one thousand men.
After the battle of Five Forks was over, Warren was
relieved by Sheridan from command of his corps, and
Griffin was placed in his stead. It can not be denied that
Sheridan had the right to do this. But it was a hard
blow to one of the most gallant men of the Army of the
Potomac, who had ever made a brilliant record in all that
he had done. To say that a Court of Inquiry found no
want of activity or of intelligent effort in Warren's conduct
affords little consolation. But Warren's history is written.
Few can boast so clear and bright a fame.
After this battle Grant opens on Peters- April 2.
burg a heavy artillery fire, and Parke with
the Ninth corps goes in on the right of the line. He
carries the outer defences, but the inner works are stub-
bornlv held bv a mere handful of the enemy. Wright
with the Sixth corps carries everything in his front and
marches down the Boydton Plank Road towards Peters
burg. Humphreys does the same.
Opposite Ord is Fort Gregg. Here some two hundred
and fifty Confederate marksmen place five hundred of our
men hors de combat. Longstreet brings what reinforce
ments he can from Richmond to Lee at Petersburg.
Lee noblv meets our vigorous attack. , April 2.
None of the fire which in days ot high
emprise and brUliant hopes blazed in his assault, was now

316 BIRDS EYE VIEW Or OUR CIVIL WAR. [1805.
found wanting. But gallantry can no more avail. And
brave A. P. Hill, whose name is written upon everv page
of the history of the Army of Northern Virginia, falls in
this last attack. Our loss is thirty-four hundred men.
During the night, silently, unperceivcd,
Lee retreats from both luehmond and
Petersburg. With twenty-five thousand men, he inarches
sixteen miles west from Petersburg along the north side of
the Appomattox. In the morning the Union forces
enter both the cities which they have so long and so ardu
ously labored to capture.
Little caring for these empty prizes. Grant pursues by
the south side of the river. Lee hurries along towards
the Danville Railroad, still hoping to push beyond his
enemy to a point where he can join to himself the forces of
Johnston. Either Lynchburg or Danville may compass
this end.
A train of supplies has been ordered to remain at
Amelia Court House. Lee proposes to ration his men,
cut loose from any base, and push boldly for the foot-hills
of the AUeghanies. 1 lis is the courage which does not
forsake him. There is yet work to be done.
It is difficult to picture Lee's utter consternation, —
despair, when on reaching Amelia, he discovers that,
under mistaken orders from the capital, this train of
victuals, which is all that stands between him and sheer
starvation, has been run on to Richmond. The authori
ties had wanted the cars on which to load the archives
and valuables of the Confederate Government, intending
that the rations should be left for Lee. The rations had

!865.] THE FINAL CAMPAIGN. 317
not been unloaded, and the cars had been forwarded to
the capital. Lee's twenty thousand men have not a
mouthful to eat save what they can gather in little driblets
along the road.
Sheridan with the Second, Fifth and Sixth
Corps pushes remorselessly onward. Both he and Lee aim
for Burkeville, but Sheridan is the fleeter of foot and
reaches that place first.
Lee dares not halt. He now has Union columns press
ing hard upon his left, upon his rear. Sheridan's cavalry
hurries far ahead to cut him off in the advance.
A running fight is kept up between the armies all the
way. Despite gallant defense, the day generally goes
against the enemy. At Sailor's Creek
Ewell's eight thousand men are cut off and
captured. Our loss is twelve hundred.
The Confederates are literally starving. For four days
they have had nothing to eat save the crumbs of their last
issue of rations. Even the buds of the trees arc put to use
for food. Those who arc best off have but a few haudfuls
of corn. And yet they cling fondly to their chief and
trust that all may yet be well.
Lee crosses the Appomattox at FarmvUle and fires the
bridges. Humphreys comes up barely in April 7.
time to save one of them. On this he
crosses and attacks the Confederate rear. But the gallant
fellows have lost none of their soldier's pride, and repulse
the onset handsomely, with a loss to us of six hundred men.
Lee must escape, if at all, over the narrow neck of land
between the James and Appomattox rivers to the west

318 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR. | IHlif..
of bis present position. lint Sheridan's horse is nimbler-
looted, lie reaches the ground first and closes this lust
outlet also.
Lee is trapped. Like his old self, he promptly decides
to cut bis way through. lint Sheridan
Api'ilH. . . ,.'... , ,.„ .
anticipates him in Ins attack. I he bravo
Army of Northern Virginia, comes to the end of its glori
ous career, and its faithful commander can do no more.
After a short correspondence, the chieftains meet, terms
are agreed upon, anus arc slacked by the
April 9. i a ( n
troops, and, at Appomattox ( ourt llouso,
Lcc surrenders to ( I rant's armies some twenty-nine thousand
men, bearing, it has been said, but ten thousand muskets.
The first act, upon capitulation having been made, is to
ration the starving Confederates. Lee lakes leave of the
tearful veterans who have seconded his purpose so nobly,
and whose very rags art! a shining honor, in a, lew heart
felt words : —
" Men, we have fought through flic, war together. 1
have done the best I could for you."
The Union loss in these closing operations was about
ten thousand men.
General Meade bad remained in command of the Army
of i\io Potomac till the close. Grant, hail directed Ihe
larger operations, but had left Meade the immediate
control. Meade was a ripe, sound soldier. lie fell short
of greatness, perhaps, but, few equalled him ill pre
cision and steady-going capacity. Under him the Army
ol the Potomac, saw its greatest triumph, and its
greatest humiliation. Gettysburg was Meade's victory;

1805.] THE FINAL CAMPAIGN. 319
Cold Harbor was not Meade's defeat. While he was in
command the army was always in safe hands ; its discipUne
was excellent ; its esprit de corps high. All his subordi
nates held him in great esteem.
In minor stations Meade obeyed with alacrity ; in
supreme control he commanded with discretion. His
qualities arc not salient ; but he was well rounded both as
a soldier and as a man.
Johnston surrendered to Sherman towards the close of
the month. There was some friction be
tween Sherman and the Secretary of War as
to the terms granted to Johnston, but the capitulation was
eventually completed. And gradually, so soon as the news
had spread, the smaller armies of the Confederacy sur
rendered upon similar conditions. These were substantially
the giving up of all material of war, and the signing by aU
Confederate soldiers of a parole not to take up arms again
against the United States, and to return at once to their
homes. Transportation and rations were furnished them so
far as could be.
Anger, on the one side, was swallowed up in gladness
for the happy outcome of the war ; regrets on the other
disappeared in the cessation of the unavailing strife.
The men composing the vast armies on either side soon
peacefully dispersed to their homes and were speedily
engrossed in their ancient occupations or in new pursuits.
No act of lawlessness is on record to stain their proud
repute as soldiers and Americans. This remarkable fact is
the most splendid of tributes to the value of the liberties
of the New World. It would be impossible elsewhere.

LXI.
A FEW STRAY ITEMS.
THE theory of the North that no State could leave the
Union by its own sole act had been maintained. The
seceding States were still part and parcel of the nation.
But the inhabitants of this section had waged war upon the
United States, and had thereby forfeited their civU and
property rights. Something must be done to restore the
status quo ante bellum. Within a month after the close of hostili-
May 29, 1865. . .
ties the President issued a proclamation of
amnesty to all who had participated in rebellion, ex
cepting only certain prominent classes, on condition that
each person taking the benefit of the proclamation should
subscribe an oath of allegiance to the United States and
accept the results of the war. This would restore to such
affiant his rights as a citizen and his rights of property ;
but the oath itself, as well as the proclamation, expressly
sustained the emancipation of the slaves.
The great bulk of the Southern population accepted the
amnesty thus offered, and gradually thereafter those per
sons who were excepted in the first proclamation were re
admitted to their citizenship upon promise of future loyalty
820

A FEW STRAY ITEMS. 321
to the laws and constitution of the United States. LegaUy
speaking, the Union was once more what it had been, pro
foundly at peace, and without any stain of discord upon its
garments. To trace the history of Reconstruction in the South ; of
the bestowal of CivU Rights upon the former slaves ; of
the vast frauds committed by the " carpet-bag " administra
tions of the several Southern States, and the unnecessary
hardships arising from this vicious system ; of the turbulence
thereby excited, and the cruel and sometimes bloody
attempts to cow the negro population into its ancient ser-
vUity ; and of the gradual renewal of good feeling and con
cord, is beyond the scope of this little work. The actual
war for the Union had ended ; the Union and the Con
stitution had been maintained ; and, as a result not antici
pated at the outset, freedom had been given to the slave.
The price paid in blood and treasure had been vast. But
the gain for future generations had been equally vast.
North and South now recognized each other's strength, and
each other's readiness to battle for the right. Slavery was
buried. And the Southerner had learned that honest labor
is not only the duty, but the privUege, of every man who
values the heritage of our common country.
A few stray statistics must close. These come mainly
from the War Department records and the tables of the
Treasury Department and Pension Office. Any inaccuracy
in approximation is traceable to paucity of Southern records.
The average population of the North and South from
1861 to 1864 was thirty-five millions, including four
million slaves.

322 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR.
In the North and South alike the first troops were raised
by volunteering. But within a year, in the South, con
scription acts were passed and thereafter kept in force.
In the North, volunteering obtained until late in the third
year of the war, when the draft also went into effect in
most of the States.
Northern troops were furnished for various terms of
service, from three months to " three years or the war."
The actual enlistments were two million seven hundred and
eighty thousand men for the armies and navies, or,
reduced to a three years' term, i.e., counting three one-
year men as one three-years' man, and, estimating as a full
man only one who enlisted for a term which could have
lasted three full years (men who enlisted in January, 1865,
for three years could actually serve only four months, and
would count as one-ninth of one man each), there were
furnished in the North about one million seven hundred
thousand men. In the South, counting in the same man
ner (a man who enlisted for four years was a man and a
third), there were furnished about nine hundred thousand
men. These forces came from a military population,
according to the census of 1861, of four million six hun
dred thousand in the North and one million and sixty-five
thousand in the South. Of these, about one-fifth were, as
usual in every country, exempts. Thus, in the North,
about four men in every nine served three years ; in the
South, exemption being much rarer, nine out of ten did so.
The regular army of the United States wras never large.
Only some sixty-seven thousand regulars served through
the war. The bulk of the forces were called volunteer

A FEW STRAY ITEMS. 323
troops, though few regulars in any country were ever
better soldiers. But the prominent general officers, and
many of the minor ones, were men whom the government
had educated at West Point. This applied equally to the
South. In the North over two-thirds of all the men who served
were American-born. In the South all but a small per
centage were so. Among the foreign-born soldiers the
greater part were naturalized citizens.
Much to the credit of our colored fellow-citizens, there
were one hundred and eighty thousand negro soldiers.
In the North the troops served in twenty-five Army
Corps, consecutively numbered, and one Cavalry Corps.
In the South the corps bore the names of their com
manders. The following was the strength of the United States' and
the Confederate States' forces at various dates, present and
absent. The Southern figures are from accurate data. I£
anything they are understated : — U .o. v/.o. About
Jan. 1, 1861  16,367
July 1, 1861  186,751 98,000
Jan. 1. 1862  575,917 350,000
March 31, 1862  637,126 353,000
Jan. 1, 1863  918,191 441,000
Jan. 1, 1864  860,737 471,000
Jan. 1, 1865  959,460 418,000
March 31, 1865  980,086 175,000
May 1, 1865  1,000,516

324 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR.
This gave the North, on the average, about double the
force of the South (17 to 9) ; but owing to the larger amount
of garrison duty done by the invading force, in the field the
numbers stood, up to 1865, as not far from three to two.
Of every thousand men there were, in the North, on the
average, seventy-three men sick, and two hundred and
thirty-four men absent for various reasons, leaving six
hundred and ninety-three under the colors.
In the South, except towards the close of the war, when
desertions became frequent, the average with the colors was
somewhat higher, as furloughs were much more rare.
The deaths during the war, in the North, were as
follows : —
Killed or died of wounds  110,070
Died of disease (two-thirds due to service ex
posure)  199,720
In Confederate prisons  24,866
Accidents  ^ 9,371
Murders and suicides ........ 1,015
Military executions  331
Other causes  14,155
359,528
In the South, the losses in killed or died of their wounds
were 94,000 men ; those dying of disease are unknown.
The sacrifices of the Confederates were appalling. South
Carolina {e.g.) lost in killed or mortally wounded one-
quarter of her military population — a record probably
unequalled in any war.
The above table of Northern losses does not include the

A FEW STRAY ITEMS. 325
great number who were discharged for disability during the
war, and who died at home from the results of exposure,
wounds, or disease contracted in the line of duty, and other
causes. Counting all losses directly due to the war, it
would be safe to say that half a million men were lost in
the North, and close upon the same number in the South.
There are buried in the national cemeteries three hun
dred and twenty-five thousand Union soldiers.
At least seven hundred men a day were victims of the
four years' war; and there was, in battle, during this
period, a daily loss in killed and wounded of over four
hundred men.
These casualties occurred in some two thousand four
hundred actions of sufficient importance to be identified
by name ; in eighteen hundred and eighty-two of which a
regiment or more was engaged. This is nearly two for
each day. There were one hundred and twelve of these
actions in which the loss exceeded five hundred men. All
this tale makes no count of the innumerable small affairs
on the picket-line and outpost service, and in scouting and
reconnoitring duty.
At the outset of the war no prisoners were exchanged
between North and South. But, later on, better counsels
prevailed and a system of exchange was inaugurated. The
exchanges covered several hundred thousand men, and
were made on equal terms. Retaliatory measures on
prisoners were, except in isolated cases, not resorted to.
The medical service and the ambulance system of the
Northern armies were more efficient than had ever before
existed. The Sanitary and Christian Commissions rendered

326 BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR.
services never to be forgotten. Scores of thousands of
men to-day owe their lives to the fidelity and skill of these
ministers of mercy. Numberless surgeons and their attend
ants lost their lives oh the field of battle in pursuit of their
humane duties. In the South scant means prevented the
same lavish outlay for this purpose.
At the close of the war one hundred and seventy-five
thousand Confederates surrendered.
The South raised its means for carrying on the war by
internal revenue and by loans of various kinds at home and
abroad. Some of these had the cotton-crops pledged to
secure the bonds issued. None of the debt created by the
South has been or ever can be paid.
The North raised its moneys from loans similarly placed.
The United States debt was, substantially,
June 30, 1861  $65,000,000
June 30, 1865  2,682,000,000
Increase of debt  $2,617,000,000
There was raised by customs, etc., in
addition to the above, and spent on
the war, some  783,000,000
making the whole cost of the war . . $3,400,000,000
or nearly two and a half millions a day, as a rough calcu
lation, during the entire struggle.
Republics are said to be ungrateful. But the United
States has paid to its soldiers, in addition to larger emolu
ments than any nation ever gave its troops, three hundred

A FEW STRAY ITEMS. 327
millions in bounties, and has already paid two thousand
millions in pensions. Add to this the pensions which will
continue to be paid until the pensioners gradually drop off
the rolls, and we reach a total of probably four thousand
million dollars. This is about eight thousand dollars for
each man who died in service, or who was discharged for
disability and died at home, in addition to his pay, rations,
and clothing while in the service. This does not look like
ingratitude. The like of it has never been known.

GLOSSAET,

Abatis. — Trees cut down and having the branches stripped and their
ends sharpened and pointed towards the enemy in front of intrench-
ments. Abatis delays the attacking party and keeps it longer
under fire.
Act of War. — Any act which is incompatible with the friendly relations
which exist among nations at peace with each other is an act of war,
unless immediate reparation is made. War usually follows such an
act among nations of equal strength.
Ambulance. — A vehicle specially adapted to carrying wounded men.
Sometimes used, in a broader sense, as the hospital system of an
army.
Affair. — A small engagement or action between forces which are not
very numerous. A skirmish.
A main forte.— " With a strong hand." By a sudden or overwhelm
ing attack or movement to capture a place or do any work is to do it
a main forte.
Arms of Precision. — The breach-loading small-arms of to-day, which
are very precise in their fire.
Au fond. "To the bottom." A force is said to fight or to charge au
fond, when it does its work thoroughly, with a will, or to the bitter
end.
Base (of operations') . — The country, city, depot or locality from which
an army starts on its campaign, and on which it relies for victuals,
men and material. The line of operations starts from the base of
operations, and reaches out to the army. Along this line supplies
are carried. The line may be a railroad, a river, or a road ; or sev
eral such.
Battle. — A serious engagement between rival armies which is apt to lead
to decisive results. An action of large proportions.
Belligerents. —Legally, only those nations which are recognized by
other nations as independent, and which are deemed to have the rights
of independent powers, such as the right of carrying on war.
Colloquially, any fighting forces. 329

330 GLOSSARY.
Bivouac. — A temporary encampment. Sometimes used when no tents
are on hand, and the men shelter themselves as best Ibcy may.
Bloclcade. — The closing of a port by an enemy's licet or by oilier means,
to prevent ingress or egress. The object is to keep tho nation
whoso ports are blockaded from receiving contraband of war or from
exporting its own commodities. To be respected by other nations,
a blockade must bo strictly kept up.
Campaign. — A series of operations covering somo period of time, or
beginning with a definite plan and ending with its accomplishment
or with failure.
Cantonments. — Quarters occupied by troops for a considerable time, in
villages or in more or less permanent barracks, huts or shelters.
Winter quarters are often cantonments.
Cashier. — An officer is cashiered when ho is (by sentence of a Court-
martial) dismissed from the service, and forever incapacitated from
holding any office of trust or emolument under tho United States.
Casus Belli. — ¦ That act which is the immediate cauBO of war, or which
is alleged to be tho reason for a declaration of war.
Charge. — An advance to the assault.
Close Order. — Massed in column.
Co/uwn. — Troops in close, compact order, many files deep. A mass of
troops. There are many kinds of tactical means of forming column.
Column by Battalion. — A brigade will bo in column by battalion, when
the battalions composing it are each in lino and in rear of each other.
Combat. — An engagement of no great length or dimensions. 13 lit it
may be sharp and bloody.
Commissariat. — Tho force employed to accumulate and distribute rations
to armies. Colloquially applied to tho supply of food on hand.
Commission. — A permission granted by a government to a ship to go
ona cruise or to do somo definite act of war. The letter appointing
an officer to his rank.
Communications. — The lino of operations. (See Base.) Tho route
by which an army communicates with its depot of supplies. An
army must keep its communications open, or elso live off the coun
try ; this latter is always difficult for a large force.
Concentric. — Towards a common centre; towards tho samo objective
from different places. The movements of tho Army of tho
Potomac, the Army of tho .Tames, and the. Valley Armies on Rich
mond, in 18111, were concentric operations.
Conscription. — A forcible method of raising troops- Every citizen
capable of bearing arms is enrolled (i.e., -put. on a list) in his own
district, and drawings by lot are made from the list, for tho number
of men apportioned to that district when a call for troops is made.
Contraband of War. — Any stores or arms or goods of any kind whatso-

GLOSSARY. 331
ever which will enable a military power or force to carry on or
prolong a war; such as powder, medicines, rations, ship-timber.
Almost any article may be contraband of war, according to the
circumstances, and the use for which it is destined, or the amount
of it on hand, etc. , etc. Such articles may legally be seized by either
belligerent wherever found.
Corduroy. — To mend a road wltieh is deep in mud, by laying across it
small trunks of trees, or rails, and filling the same in with dirt or
brush. This is sometimes done very carefully and a substantial
road produced.
Corral. — A large enclosure into which wild horses or cattle are driven
and captured. A stock-yard. A trap. To entrap.
Counter. — To meet a blow by a blow, or an attack by an attack.
Court of Inquii-y. — Military tribunals may be Courts-martial or Courts
of Inquiry. The former try officers or soldiers for crimes or of
fences against military law. Courts of Inquiry inquire into any
matter, the facts of which are in dispute. They may find the facts
such as to warrant the calling of a. Court-martial.
Counter-charge. — A charge made by the army or body of troops which
is on the defensive upon another which is advancing upon it, in
order to break up the onset of the latter. A charge from intrench-
ments upon a body of troops, which has attacked and recoiled from
them, in order to disperse the assailants more effectually.
Counter-march. — When marching in one direction, to face to, and march
in substantially the opposite. To retrace one's steps. There are
tactical manoeuvres specifically called counter-marches.
Coup de grace. — The death stroke. So called because it may put a suf
fering creature out of its agony. The finishing stroke.
Coup de main. — A quick, sudden attack by which any place is seized or
any object accomplished. A surprise.
Cut de sac. — " The bottom of a bag." A blind alley. Any place hav
ing but one means of entrance or exit. A trap.
Cut. — To interrupt or sever, as a road or other means of retreat or ad
vance.
Debouch. — Any place from which you can unobserved fall upon the
enemy, or so move as to compromise him. To debouch is to fall
upon the enemy or to move from such a place. Troops may
debouch from a bridge, a town, a pass in the mountains.
Declaration of War. —A formal notice by one nation to another that it
considers its friendly relations 'with the latter at an end. It is usual
to give it before opening a war.
De facto. — Absolutely done or accomplished, whether rightfully or
wrongfully. A de facto government is the one actually in power,
whether legally or not.

332 GLOSSARY.
Defile. — A long narrow pass which obliges troops to march through it
in very extended order, as a bridge, or a gap in the mountains. To
pass a defile is a delicate operation, because the troops are not in
such order, at the moment of passing, as to be ready to meet an
attack. To force a defile is difficult because only a few men can
move through it abreast, and the enemy can do great damage
to the long line of troops by firing on them as they march through.
De jure. — A de jure right is a legal right to do or to be anything
whether you assert it or not. One man might be de jure (i.e.,
rightful) governor of a place while another might, by usurpation,
be de facto governor.
Deploy. — If troops are in column or close order they deploy into line
or open order. If in line or open order, they ploy into column or
close order. Troops fight in line, as a rule. They used to charge
in column. They camp generally in more or lesl close order, but
taking up more space than if drawn up for manoeuvres.
Demonstrate. — To operate against or to attack in order to ascertain the
condition or position of the enemy, or to blind him as to what you
intend to do. To demonstrate is to make a diversion, q. v.
Detail. — A selection of men for any purpose from a larger body. Such
as a detail for picket duty from each company of a regiment. The
detail may be regular, i.e., from all the men by rote, or it may be a
special detail of reliable men for a work requiring intelligence or
courage.
Develop. — To adopt means, as by a reconnoissance or by a slight attack,
to ascertain all about the force opposing you. To do any act which
makes the enemy develop his strength or position.
Direction, Column of. — That body by whose movements the rest of an
army has to govern its line of march.
Diversion. — Any attack, large or small, which will divert the enemy's
attention from the main object you have in view and enable you to
carry out your plans. A diversion often draws the enemy's
troops away from the main point where you intend to attack.
Draft. — Conscription. The actual drawing by lot of a required num
ber from the enrolled men of a district.
Eccentric. ¦ — Out of the central line on which military movements should
be conducted, in order to protect tho base of operations. If an
army retreats along any except its line of operations, it makes an
eccentric retreat, which may be disastrous to it unless it has an
other base to fall back upon. Even then, it leaves its old base open
to the attack of the enemy.
Echelon. — A line. of columns or bodies of troops in which each succes
sive column or body is placed a trifle in rear of the line of the one
next on its right or left, — like a ladder (ichelle), or more like the

GLOSSARY. 333
tread of a pair of stairs. The bodies do not lap, or stand behind
each other, but only stand in line, each one further to the rear.
Effective. — That portion of a body of troops which is " for duty," i.e.,
ready to do effective duty ; which will be able to fight. Every army
has many non-combatants, often not reckoned as a part of the effective.
Ela n . — Dash. That vigor or spirit which carries troops forward with
a rush.
Enfilade. — To fire, with artillery or musketry, along a line of troops,
i.e., from a position on their flanks. Such a fire is very destruc
tive and demoralizing.
Engagement. — A smaller battle.
Entrenchment. — (See Intrenchment.)
Esprit de corps. — When companies, regiments, and brigades have
served beside each other for so long a time that they have learned
to know and to have confidence in the courage and energy of each
other, a spirit of pride and reliance animates the whole body,
which is of the greatest value in a military sense.
Fall in. — To take one's place in line, or column.
Field-icorks. Intrenchments thrown np on the field out of the most
available means on hand. Fortifications not of a permanent
nature.
File. — A file is the depth of a body of troops from front to rear, with
one man front. Eank is the length from right to left. Thus, in
a company of eighty men in two ranks, the file will be two deep, —
the rank will consist of forty men. To file out of a place generally
means to march out of it by the flank, for when a line faces to either
flank, its then front has the width only of the depth of a file, and it
marches by file. Tactical formations, however, for ease of
marching, generally double these files, so that a body in two ranks
marching by the flank, has four men abreast.
Flank. — Troops in line of battle have a front, a rear, and two flanks.
The flanks are the ends of a line of troops. Troops can only fight
towards their direct, or slightly oblique, front. If attacked in the
flank thev must change front in whole or in part towards the attack-
insr partv. This is more or less difficult. If attacked in rear they
can face about ; but troops cannot fight with equal confidence faced
to the rear.
Flankers. — Small bodies of troops marching in the same direction as
the main column, but at a distance on either side of it, to protect
its flanks from sudden attack. The distance varies according to
the size of the columns and the nature of the ground.
Flank March . — Troops march in action by the front; for short dis
tances by the rear ; when not in presence of the enemy by the right
or left flank. A flank march sometimes means a march with either

334 GLOSSARY.
flank leading ; but as generally used, it means a march around the
flank of an enemy ; a circuitous march to reach and attack the
enemy in flank or rear.
Flying Wing. — A body of troops out on the right or left of an army,
and at some distance, but under independent control and command
as to all but its general operations. It acts in a larger way as
flankers do.
Flying Column. — A body of troops cut loose from its base to do some
special work, and meanwhile to live on the country or on the rations
it starts with.
Forage. — Food for the beasts which form part of an army. To
forage is to go out for, capture, and bring in any kind of food or feed
for man or beast. Foraging parties detailed for the purpose gen
erally do this work.
Forced Marches. — Twelve to twenty miles a day is good marching for
a column. If the troops are forced they can do much more than
this amount for awhile, but not keep it up. Forced marches are
made to reach a place where the troops are much needed, with the
utmost despatch.
Forlorn Hope. — A body selected to capture by assault a very dangerous
position. So called because the hope which each man has of sur
viving the attempt is a forlorn one. A forlorn hope, if it makes
a breach in the enemy's defences, is followed up by reserves, so as
to hold what the forlorn hope has seized.
Furlough. — A permission to a soldier to be absent for a definite
period.
Garrison. — A body of men holding or defending a town or fort or
other place.
General Engagement. — A battle.
Grand-tactics. — The art of moving large bodies of men on the field of
battle. " Tactics " is also used to express the art of handling arms
and performing manoeuvres by soldiers or small bodies of troops,
as companies and regiments. — See Strategy and Tactics.
Guerillas. — Irregular troops which conduct irregular warfare. Land
pirates. Unorganized forces. " Peaceful farmers " when they are
not making raids or shooting from behind trees and hedges.
Troops which are raised for a sudden incursion, and then disappear
into the population. The word means petty war in Spanish.
Guerilla warfare is not considered legitimate. War is supposed to
be conducted only by organized bodies of troops under recognized
leaders. For organization alone can control the actions of the indi
vidual soldiers.
Honors of War. — When your enemy has made a gallant defense of a
citadel, and you find you cannot easily reduce it, he may still per-

GLOSSARY. 335
haps agree to surrender it to you, if its importance has ceased, or if he
thinks he cannot, hold it much longer, on condition that you will allow
him to march out with colors flying, drums beating, and such parade
as to show that he has not been vanquished. Such a body so marching
out is entitled to be saluted by you. These courtesies and parade
are called the "honors of war." Surrender of the place alone is
usually made, and not of the troops as prisoners of war. In an or
dinary surrender the troops give up their arms and become prisoners.
Hors de (or du) Combat. — "Out of the fight "; killed, wounded or
missing men are said to be placed 7iors de combat.
Incursions. — Attacks across the border, and into the enemy's territory ;
or into territory occupied by him.
Intrenchments. — Defensive works thrown up to help troops to hold a
position. The simplest form is a ditch the dirt from which is piled
up in an embankment behind which the defenders stand. Abatis,
and various kinds of entanglements, are erected in front, when
time allows, to keep the enemy long under fire from the in-
trenchments.
Itinerary. — Order of march. Instructions or minutes showing when
and on what roads each portion of an army is to march.
Key of a Position. — That point of » battle-field which stands in such
relation to the enemy's position that if captured it will oblige him
to retreat or will compromise him in some way. A hill overlooking
or enfilading his line may be the key to a battle-field.
Left (by tlie). — A body of troops moves by its left when it moves with
its left flank in advance. An army must be so marched as most
readily to face towards the enemy, and may be marched by its right
or left for this purpose.
Letters of Marque. — Permission given by a government to private indi
viduals to equip vessels and prey upon the commerce of the enemy.
X ine. — The length of a body of troops from right to left. Troops used
in ancient days to be fought in masses, with files many men deep.
This depth has been gradually decreasing. In the last century the
file was of eight, six and four men. In this it has come down to three
and two. A line of battle of a regiment now consists of two ranks.
But a number of regiments may each be in column and the whole
army or part of it may be in line of such columns.
Line of Columns by Battalion. — A common form in action for making
a heavy line. Each battalion or regiment is ployed into column.
Line of Defense. — A line along which troops are posted across the path
of the enemy to resist his further advance. Such a line maybe near
our base, or out beyond it and connected with it by our line of
operations. A river, or u. chain of hills, or other natural ob
stacle is desirable as » line of defense. Such a. line is generally
intrenched, often with permanent fortifications.

336 GLOSSARY.
Line of Operations. — (See Base.) The line along which an army is
advancing or retiring and by which it is victualled.
and such columns stand in line, with suitable intervals.
Lodgment. — A foothold in the enemy's territory, or position, or works.
Logistics. — Originally the art of lodging troops. (Logis.) Now the
art of supplying troops with rations, material of war, transporta
tion, camp and garrison equipage, and of marching it from place to
place. In short, the art of doing everything for an army except
manoeuvring or fighting it.
Lunge. — The fencer's thrust, to which he gives strength by a quick
forward step so as to add to the thrust the weight of his moving
body.
Manceuvre. — Any movement of a body of troops intended to accomplish
a tactical or a strategic result.
Materia I of War. — ¦ Anything in the nature of arms, ammunition or sup
plies which pertains to the conduct of war or the support of an
army. The word materiel is often used to convey a larger meaning
than the English word.
Melie. — A mixed fight, in which the troops on either side are huddled
together in a mass, neither party yielding.
Morale. — That cheerful confidence in itself, or its situation, or its
leaders, which makes an army full of courage and readiness to
encounter danger. The converse of demoralization.
Munitions of War. — Generally applied to ammunition, ordnance and
fighting-material of any kind. It may be used in a larger mean
ing.
Muster. — To bring together a number of men. To enrol men. Spe
cifically, to swear into the U. S. service. A volunteer or drafted man
only became entitled to pay and allowances when he was sworn
into the U. S. service, or mustered. It might be weeks or months
after enlistment before he was mustered. In raising a regiment,
the men were enlisted singly, and the regiment, or its companies,
when full, were mustered.
Non-combatants. Any one in the military service whose duties do not
oblige him to bear arms or to take an active part in battle. Such
are surgeons, quarter-masters, their assistants and camp-followers.
Objective. — That. place or goal to reach or capture which is the
object of the movement going on.
Observe. — To keep watch of a place with a body of troops, so as to
hold an enemy in it, or to prevent his attacking you from it.
Offensive-Defensive. —In offensive warfare we attack the enemy to
destroy him. In defensive warfare we repel his attack. In offen
sive-defensive warfare we are on the defense but we attack the
enemy to keep him busy so that he shall not invade our territory,
or attack us at a disadvantage.

GLOSSARY. 337
Open Older. — Extended in line.
Outpost. — A small body posted out beyond an army in camp to give
timely notice of danger, and to hold the enemy in check until the
main body can form to resist his attack. An army in camp is sur
rounded by a circle of such outposts.
Overslaugh. — When a senior officer has a junior promoted over his
head he is said to be overslaughed.
Overi Act of War. — Communities on whose territory the operations of
war are being conducted are by the law of nations entitled to pro
tection from harm if they remain peaceful, unless grave public
necessity requires the destruction of what may be contraband of
war within their limits, or the taking of provisions and supplies
for the armies. But any community whose inhabitants interfere
with these operations (as by burning bridges, obstructing
roads or taking any part in the strife) is liable to be treated as part
of the enemy's forces and to be visited with punishment by fire and
sword.
Parade Order. — With the steadiness of troops on parade. In action
troops rarely preserve anything like such order.
Parapet. — A breastwork. Part of an intrenehment.
Parley. — A communication between enemies for which a temporary
cessation of hostilities is made, in order to arrange terms for sur
render, or attend to the burial of the dead, care of the wounded,
etc., etc. During a parley it is understood that neither party shall
alter its position, or take advantage of the situation.
Parole. — The promise on honor given by a prisoner that he will not
take up arms again to serve against his captors. Prisoners of
war are often paroled when they cannot well be kept and are then
set at liberty. They are thereafter exchanged as if still prisoners
of war.
Patrol. — A force which moves to and fro to keep watch of a certain
point, or which moves around from place to place inspecting the
condition of affairs. The force which moves among the outposts of
a camp to see that everything is in order.
pickd. — Substantially the same as outposts. The picket-line is gener-
allv understood to mean the line of individual sentinels furthest
out; the outposts are small bodies acting as reserves to the picket-
line.
Place d'armes. — An open spot on which troops can form in proper order
as the successive bodies arrive. A parade-ground. It is difficult
to deploy troops and start them on their work quickly and in good
order, without suitable ground to do it on. Such ground is an
essential point in the calculations of any general planning a
manoeuvre.
ploy. — To form close-order from opex (See Deploy.)

338 GLOSSARY.
Pontoon. — A portable boat used to bridge rivers. Several pontoons
anchored in line at suitable distances with their length up and down
stream, and joined by timbers, form a pontoon bridge. Pontoons
and their timbers are transported in wagons. The whole is a,
pontoon-train.
Prestige. — The credit attached to having accomplished success, or to
having acted with conspicuous gallantry.
Provost-marshal. — An officer whose duty it is to arrest and hold desert
ers, spies, etc., and substantially to do the police work of an army
or military post.
Raid. — A sudden operation; generally upon the communications of
the enemy, or into the enemy's territory. Cavalry, because it moves
more swiftly, is used, as a rule. A raid which cuts an enemy's
communications with his base seriously compromises his safety,
unless he can at once repair damages.
Raise a Siege. — To withdraw from besieging a fortress.
Rank. — A line of men standing shoulder to shoulder ; a file is a line
of men standing one behind another. " Eank and file " form any
body of troops, and is applied to include all but officers.
Rear-guard. — A portion of an army following at a suitable distance
to protect it from attack. On the retreat the rear guard is large
and important.
Reconnoissance. — The operation of a body sent out to reconnoitre, or
discover the whereabouts and force and probable intentions of the
enemy. Eeconnoissances often end in heavy combats, and some
times rise to the dignity of battles. A reconnoissance in force is one
on a large scale, ready to do heavy fighting if it becomes essential.
Reduce. — To capture a place.
Refused. — When one flank of a line is bent back in crochet-form it is
said to be refused. This is often done to protect the line from a
probable flank attack.
Retire upon. — To move towards, so as to derive support from a depot
or citadel or friendly force.
Right (by the). — A body of troops moves by its right when it moves with
its right flank in advance.
Riposte. — A return lunge in fencing, after a parry.
Salient. — A salient is anoutward angle thrown out from a line of troops
or fortifications. Its weakness consists in the fact that there is a
point in its front from which the enemy can enfilade its sides. Still,
a salient is sometimes useful, for if strongly held and protected
it can flank an enemy attacking the line on its left or right.
Sally-port. — A gate by which a force can make a dash from a fortress
upon the besiegers.
Scout. — A man or a party sent out to discover the enemy and his con
dition. Also used as a verb.

GLOSSARY. 339
Siege batteries. — Batteries of heavy guns which cannot be readily
moved with an army, as batteries of field-guns are. Siege guns are
kept at the rear until wanted. They are generally mounted on
specially prepared foundations.
Sit down before. — A besieging or observing force sits down before a
fortress or strong place.
Skirmish. — A scattering engagement of no great moment. It often
precedes more serious work.
Sortie. — A sudden attack from a strongplace upon its besiegers, in order
to interrupt their plans or break up their lines of approach.
Strategy. — The art of making war on the map. The movement of
armies out of sight of each other, after the opening of the cam
paign. The manoeuvres or marches by which a general seeks to
place the enemy in such a position that he can fight him at a
disadvantage. Strategy is the art of so moving your army that
you may in some manner compromise or weaken the enemy's
army before you fight it. (See Tactics and Grand-tactics.)
Tactics. — In its lesser meaning, the instruction of the soldier or squad
or company or regiment in. bearing arms and moving as one body.
In its larger meaning, the art of moving bodies of troops on the
field of battle or in the immediate presence of the enemy. (See
Strategy.) Having been brought upon the field of battle by such
strategic movements that your enemy i3 less well placed than you
are (with regard to retreat if he is beaten, or in respect to the
ground he actually occupies, or numbers, or in any other
way), it still behooves you so to manoeuvre tactically that
you shall defeat him by actual fighting. E.g., a move
ment of an army or part of an army so as to threaten
its enemy's line of operations, if at a distance, would be
be a strategic movement. Such was Jackson's march through
Thoroughfare Gap, in Pope's campaign. The same movement on
the field of battle would be a tactical manoeuvre. Such was
Jackson's march about Hooker's left flank at Chancellorsville.
Again, Lee threw Longstreet upon Meade's left and Early upon his
right at Gettysburg on July 2d, and Pickett next day upon Meade's
centre, as tactical manoeuvres ; but the operations by which the
Army of Northern Virginia and the Army of the Potomac moved
away from and towards each other, starting at Fredericksburg
and moving until they reached Gettysburg, were strategic. Tactics
often trench on the domain of strategy, and vice versa. Many
soldiers would call Jackson's manoeuvre at Chancellorsville a
strategic one ; but it -wa3 constantly in the presence of the
enemy.
Take in reverse. — To attack an enemy in his rear or well back of his
flank.

340 GLOSSARY.
Terrain. — The actual ground on which manoeuvres or marches are
conducted. Generally used in a, topographical sense; i.e., with
reference to the surface of the land, whether flat, rolling, sandy,
much cut up by ravines or streams, or covered with forests,
etc., etc.
Threaten. — So to place your army as to be able, unless your enemy
alters his position, to attack some weak spot in his defense.
Transports. — Vessels used for transporting troops.
Turn an enemy out of a place. — To oblige an enemy to evacuate a
position by moving around his flank and threatening him from this
quarter.
Turn the right or left. — To march around the right or left flank of an
enemy so as to oblige him to change front or move in retreat.
Uncover. — An army uncovers its line or base or communications when
it so moves that the enemy is nearer to them than itself is. Though
not directly in front of its base an army may still cover it.
Vanguard. — A smaller force preceding an army by a distance varying
according to the numbers and ground, to protect it from sudden
attack.
Wing. — An army has a centre and a, right and left wing. These
three parts may be substantially equal, or either may be larger, ac
cording to the lay of the land, the position of the enemy, the work
to be accomplished, etc., etc.
Wot ks. — Fortifications or intrenchments of any kind.

INDEX,

Ackworth, 234.
Acquia Creek, 70.
Adairsville, 228.
Alabama, 195.
Albemarle Sound, 37.
Alexandria, 73, 79, 163, 193.
Allatoona, 280.
Allatoona Pass. 231.
Allen's Farm, 66.
Alpine, 176.
Altamaha, 2S7.
Amelia C. H., 312. 316.
Anderson, Kobt., 7.
Anderson, E. H, 270.
Antietam, 105.
Appomattox, 210, 24S, 312, 317. 31-
Arkansas, 94.
Arkansas Post, 101.
Atchafalaya, 144, 163, 164.
Atlanta, The, 35.
Atlanta, 119, 223 et seq., 227 et
seq., 279. 2S7.
Augusta. ^7, 304.
Austrians, 121.
Averasborough, 306.
Averell, -'53, 275.
Ayres, 313, 314.
Bailey, 194.
Bailey's Creek, 263.
Baker, 60.
Baker's Creek, 153.
Ball's Bluff, 50.

Baltimore, 8, 102, 252.
Banks. 70, 162 et seq., 193, 225.
Baton Eouge, 93, 94, 14S, 163.
Battle above the Clouds, 187.
Bayou Pierre, 149.
Bayou Teche, 163.
Beaufort, 37.
Beauregard, 17, 43, 45, 83, 209,
2S3, 2S7, 304.
Belmont, 24.
Bentonville, 306.
Bermuda Hundred, 209, 244, 248,
313.
Berry ville, 270.
Beverly Ford, 132.
Big Bethel, 14.
Big Black Eiver, 147, 151.
Bisland, Fort, 164.
Black Eiver, 144.
Blair, 10, 158.
Blunt, 191, 192.
Bolivar, 89.
Bolton, 153.
Booneville, 21.
Boston Mts., 31.
Bottom's Bridge, 62.
Bowling Green, 213.
Boynton Road, 312, 315.
Bragg, 45, 84, 123, 125, 172 ei
seq., 179.
Brashear City, 103, 164.
Breckenridge, 94, 124.
Bridgeport, 43, 154, 176.
341

342

INDEX.

Bristoe Station, 73, 168.
Brock Road, 202.
Brown's Ferry, 183.
Brownsville, 192.
Bruinsburg, 148.
Brush Mt., 234.
Buell, 25, 43, 45, 83 et seq. ,88.
Bull Run, 16 et seq., 72, 74, 169.
Burkesville, 317.
Burnside, 37, 106, 111, 127, 174,
185, 245, 249.
Butler, 14, 36, 38, 199, 209, 303.
Cabell, 192.
Caesar's legionaries, 305.
Cairo, 10.
Camp Creek, 228.
Canby, 41, 195, 279,
Canton, 159.
Carlisle, 134.
Carlin, 307.
Carnifex Ferry, 19.
Carolinas, The, 302 et seq.
Carthage, 21.
Casey, 60.
Cassville, 228.
Catlett's Station, 72.
Cedar Creek, 211, 270, 274, 275.
Cedar Mountain, 70.
Cemetery Hill, 137.
Centreville, 79, 169.
Chambersburg, 108, 254.
Champion's Hill, 153.
Chancellorsville, 127 et seq.
Charles City, 244.
Charleston, 190, 304.
Charlottesville, 310.
Chattahoochee, 231, 242, 256.
Chattanooga, 84, 174, 182, 184
et seq.
Chattanooga Valley, 185.
Cheatham, 256, 259, 298.
Chickamauga, 129, 179 et seq., 182.

Chickamauga Creek, 178.
Chickasaw Bayou, 99.
Chickahominy, 215.
Churchill, 101.
Cincinnati, 86.
City of Vicksburg, 143.
City Point, 209.
Clear Creek, 257.
Cobb, Howell, 104.
Cold Harbor, 215, 217 et seq.
Columbia, 282, 294, 304.
Combahee, 304.
Corinth, 47, 82, 89, 90.
Cox, 280, 302.
Crampton's Gap, 104.
Crawford, 314.
Crittenden, 122, 124, 176.
Crook, 199, 210, 253, 273, 275.
Cross Keys, 57.
Crump's Landing, 44.
Culpeper, 109, 198.
Culp's Hill, 137, 139.
Cumberland Gap, 86.
Curtis, 22, 31, 32, 82, 95, 195.
Custer, 276.
Dabney's Mills, 266.
Dahlgren, Adm., 191, 291, 306.
Dahlgren, Col., 192.
Dallas, 231.
Dalton, 119, 224, 227, 280.
Danville, 310, 316.
Danville R.R., 311, 312, 316.
Davis, Adm., 37, 47, 255.
Davis, Gen., 289, 307.
Decatur, 43, 243, 261, 284.
Decherd, 173.
Deep Bottom, 248, 263.
De Russey, Fort, 193.
Dinwiddie C.H., 264, 312, 314.
Dix, 134.
Donelson, Fort, 27, 28, 172.
Dranesville, 50.

INDEX.

343

Drury's Bluff, 210, 244.
Duck River, 86, 293.
Dug Gap. 177.
Dunker Church, 106.
Dupont, 36, 37. 190.
Early, 114. I'll. 252, 269 et seq.
East Point, 261.
Ebenezer Creek, 289.
Edward's Depot, 152.
Elizabeth City, 37.
Ellet, 143.
Etlieott's Mills. 253
Ely s Ford, 200.
Emmetsburg, 139.
Emory, 164. 275.
English, 121.
Etowah. 229, 231.
Ewell, 132, 199, 317.
Ezra Church, 260.
Fairfax, 79.
Fair Oaks, 58 et seq.
Falmouth, 111. 128.
Farmville, 317.
Farragut. 39. 93, 164.
Fisher, Fort. 302.
Fisher's HiU, 270, 274.
Five Forks. 313. 314.
Florence, 2;*4.
Florida, The, 195.
Foote, 30.
Forrest. 172, 1S8. 2S4. 308.
Fort Hill, 155.
Foster. 37. 191, 248. 291, 306.
Frankfort, 86.
Franklin, 54, 60, 62, 111, 127.
193, 293 et seq.
Frazier's Farm, 67.
Frederick, 103. 120. 133, 134, 252.
Fredericksburg, 110 et seq., 128.
Fremont, 10, 21, 22. 23. 52, 57.
French, 114, 170.

French, The, 121.
Front Royal, 56.
Gaines, Fort, 194.
Gaines' Mill. 62, 64, 216.
Gainesville, 75.
Gallic Legions, 305.
Galveston, 192.
Gardner, 165.
Garfield, 25. 181.
Gauley River, 20, 212.
Gaylesville, 281.
Georgia, The, 195.
Germanna Ford, 200.
Germans, 121.
Getty, 276.
Gettysburg, 135 et seq.
Gilgal, 236.
Gilmore, 37, 190, 209.
Glendale, 67.
Goldsborough, N. C., 191.
Goldsborough, Adm.J 37, 303.
Gordon, 275.
Gordon's Mills, 177.
Gordonsville, 70.
Grand Eeore, 194.
Grand Gulf, 145, 147.
Granger, Gordon, 181, 188.
Granny White Pike, 300.
Grant, 26, 42, 84, 89, 94, 142, 151,
160, 1S4 et seq., 244 et seq.,
248 et seq., 263 et seq., 310.
Grapevine Bridge, 64.
Greenbrier River, 20.
Gregg. Fort, 315.
Grenada, 95, 97, 145.
Grierson, 148.
Griffin, 314.
Groveton, 76, 78.
Haines' Bluff, 99.
Halleck, 23, L'4, 68, SO, 82, S4,
103, 133.
Halltown, 270.
Hampton, 306, 307.

344

INDEX.

Hancock, 53, 114, 140, 199, 206,
245, 263, 267.
Hanover OH, 58.
Hanover Town, 215.
Hardee, 45, 124, 256, 258, 259,
283, 291 et seq., 30i.
HardeevUle, 292.
Hare's Hill, 312.
Harper's Ferry, 8, 14, 57, 103
et seq., 133, 253.
Harpeth River, 294.
Harrisburg, 134.
Harrisonburg, 64, 273.
Hatcher's Run, 265, 267.
Hatchie River, 92.
Hatteras Inlet, 36.
Hawkinson's Ferry, 151.
Haymarket, 75.
Hazen, 291.
Heintzelman, 58, 62.
Helena, 32. '
Henry, Fort, 26, 27, 284.
Henry House Hill, 79.
Herron, 191.
Hill, A. P., 60, 62, 113, 134, 169,
199, 246, 264, 316.
Hill, D. II., 62.
Hilton Head, 36.
Hindman, Fort, 101.
Hindman, Gen., 191.
HoUy Springs, 95, 97.
Holmes, 166.
Hood, 255 et seq., 282 et seq.,
286 et seq., 293 et seq., 297
et seq.
Hooker, 53, 78, 105, 114, 127,
134, 167, 183, 259.
Hoover's Gap, 173.
Horseshoe Ridge, 181.
Howard, 131, 260, 280, 287.
Huger, 62.
Hurlbut, 142.
Humphreys, 266, 312, 313.

Hunter, 37, 190, 211, 253.
HuntsvUle, 82, 84, 224.
Imboden, 211.
Imperial, 166.
Iuka, 89.
Jackson, Stonewall, 18, 51, 55
63, 70, 73, 75, 129, 131.
Jackson, Miss., 95, 145, 159, 160,
284,
Jackson, Fort, 39.
JacksonvUle, 192.
James River, 65, 244.
James River Canal, 273, 311.
Jericho Ford, 213.
Johnston, A. S., 25, 42, 46, 61, 86.
Johnston, J. E., 50, 59, 97, 103,
145, 152, 158, 159, 160, 224, 255
et seq., 306, 319.
Jonesborough, 261.
Kanawha, 199, 212.
Kautz, 246.
Kearney, 53, 67, 78, 73.
Kearsarge, 195.
Kenesaw, 239 et seq.
Kentucky River, 86.
Kernstown, 51, 254.
Keyes, 58, 62.
Kilpatrick, 192, 287, 290, 306.
Kingston, 228.
Knoxville, 83, 174, 188.
LaFayette, 177.
Lagrange, 148.
Lander, 51.
Lawrence, 192.
Lee, R. E., 19, 63, 102, 115, 128,
137, 141, 252, 256, 263 et seq.,
310.
Lee, 298.
Leesburg, 50.

INDEX

345

Leuthen, 118.
Lexington. 22.
Libby, 62, 192.
Lickskillet, 260.
Little Rock. 192, 194.
Little Round Top, 137.
Logan, 258, 29 7.
Logan's Cross-Roads, 26.
Long Bridge, 244.
Longstreet, 53, 62. 75, 134, 137,
139, 167, 179, 188, 199, 206,313.
Lookout Mt., 176, 185.
Lookout Valley, 176.
Loring, 154.
Lost Mt., 234.
Loudon County, 277.
Luray, 272.
Lynchburg, 211, 273, 816.
Lyon, 10. 21. 22.
Macon, 261, 287, 288.
Macon, Fort, 37.
Macon R.R., 260.
Magruder, 53. 62, 192.
Mahone, 313.
Malvern Hill 67, 263.
Manassas, 50.
Manassas Gap, 167.
Manassas Station, 73.
Manchester, 173.
Mansfield, 106, 193.
Marietta. 2:'.l et seq., 235 et seq.,
280.
Marmaduke, 191.
Marshall, 25.
Martinsburg, 271.
Marye's Heights, 112, 130.
Marylaud Heights, 252.
McAllister. Fort, 291.
JleClellan, 13, 19, 49, 62 et seq.
McClernand, 45, 95, 97, 101, 102,
109, 142, 157, 159.
McCook, 122, 124, 176.
McDoweU, 17, 52, 70, 75, 78.

McDowell, Va., 56.
McLemoro's Cove, 176.
McPherson, 142, 224, 226, 256,
258.
Meade, 106, 113, 134, 137, 140,
169, 318.
Meadow Bridge, 64, 212.
Mechanicsville, 64.
Memphis, 47, 89.
Meridian, 162, 224.
Merrimac, 3S.
Merritt, 276.
Middletown, 276.
Miles, 104.
Milledgeville, 287, 288.
Millen, 288.
Millikcn's Bend, 147, 159.
Mill Spring, 26.
Milroy, 56, 133.
Mine, Petersburg, 248 ct seq.
Mine Run, 167 et seq.
Missionary Ridge, 185, 187.
Mississippi, 184.
Mitchell, 42, S2, 84, 190.
Mobile, 162, 194. 225, 279.
Monoeaey, 10:1.
Monocacy Junction, 253.
Monitor, 38.
Monroe, Fort, 134.
Montgomery, 162.
Moon Lake, 144.
lUoorfield, 254.
Morgan, 307.
Morgan, Fort, 194.
Morgan, John, 122, 172.
Morris Island, 191.
Mosby, 27 7.
Mud March. 127.
Mulligan, 22.
Mumfordsville, 86.
Murfreesboro', 85, 122, 172.
Nachitoches, 193.
Nashville, 85, 283, 293, 297 etseq

346

INDEX.

Natchez, 93.
Nelson, 86.
New Berne, 37, 303.
New Bridge, 218,
New River, 20.
New Carthage, 147.
New Hope Church, 232.
New Madrid, 29 et seq., 211.
Newmarket, 272, 277.
New Orleans, 38, 92, 162, 225.
Noonday Creek, 236.
Norfolk Navy Yard, 8, 190.
North Anna, 213.
Ocmulgee River, 287.
Oconee River, 287.
Ogeechee River, 288.
Old Wilderness Tavern, 200.
Olustee, 192.
Oostanaula, 228.
Opelousas, 164.
Opequon, 271.
Orange, 198.
Orange & Alexandria R.R., 168.
Orange Turnpike, 200.
Ord, 50, 90.
Ossabaw Sound, 287.
Oxford, 97.
Paducah, 10, 188.
Pamlico Sound, 37.
Pamunkey, 215.
Parke, 37.
Patterson, 18.
Peach Tree Creek, 256.
Pea Ridge, 31.
Peeble's Farm, 265.
Pemberton, 92, 145, 151, 160.
Perryville, 87.
Petersburg, 70, 210, 245, 248 et
seq., 263 et seq., 316.
Phillipi, 13.

Pickens, Fort, 36.
Pickett, 140.
Pickett's Mills, 232.
Piedmont, 211.
Pigeon Mt., 176.
Pillow, 10.
Pillow, Fort, 47, 188.
PineMt., 234, 236.
Pipe Creek, 135.
Pittsburg Landing, 43.
Pleasant Hill, 194.
Pleasonton, 109.
Po, 206.
Polk, 10, 179.
Pope, 23, 29 et seq., 84.
Pope's Campaign, 69 et seq.
Porter, Adm., 93, 97, 100, 143,
148, 302.
Porter, Fitz John, 39, 58, 60, 62,
64, 78, 80, 99, 101, 156, 193
Port Gibson, 149.
Port Hudson, 144, 162 et seq.
Port Republic, 57.
Port Royal, 36, 215, 291.
Powell, 194.
Prairie Grove, 191.
Prentiss, 45, 166.
Prestonburg, 26.
Price, 22, 31, 89, 195.
Providence, Lake, 144.
Prussians, 121.
Pulaski, 37, 284.
Pumpkin Vine Creek, 231.
Quaker Road, 67.
Quantrell, 192.
Queen of the West, 143.
Raccoon Mts., 176.
Raleigh, 308.
Rapidan, 168.
Rappahannock, 167.
Raymond, 152.

INDEX.

347

Ream's Station, 246, 264.
Red River, 144, 163, 164, 192.
Reno, 37.
Resaca, 227, 280.
Reynolds, 113, 136.
Richmond, 86, 313.
Rich Mountain, 13.
Ricketts, 76, 252, 275.
Ringgold, 225.
Rio Grande, 41.
Roanoke Island, 37.
Rocky Face Ridge, 227.
Rome, 280.
Rosecrans, 19, 88, 89, 121 et seq.,
172 et seq.
Rossville, 182, 187.
Rossville Gap, 178.
Round Top, 137, 139.
Sabine Cross Roads, 193.
Sabine Pass, 192.
Sailor's Creek, 317.
Salisbury, 308.
Sandtown, 260.
Savage Station, 60, 66.
Savannah, 37, 291 et seq.
Savannah River, 288, 304.
Sehenck, 56.
Schofield, 32, 188, 226, 256, 283,
2^5 et seq., 299, 302.
Sedgwick, 128, 130, 199.
Selma, 308.
Seminary Ridge, 137, 140.
Semmes, 195.
Sequatchie Valley, 85, 176.
Seven Days' Battle, 62 et seq.
Seven Pines, 59.
Sharpsburg, 104.
Shelbyville, 173.
Shenandoah VaUey, 55, 269.
Shepherdstown, 252, 271.
Sheridan, 125, 203, 209, 217, 246,
269, 278, 310, 312, 317.

Sherman, T. W., 36.
Sherman, W. T., 24, 25, 95, 97,
101, 142, 156, 159, 160, 185,
188, 223 et seq., Ill et seq., 255
et seq.
Shields, 51, 57.
Shiloh, 42.
Ship Island, 38.
Shreveport, 193.
Sibley, 41.
Sickles, 139.
Siege of Vicksburg, 156 et seq.
Sigel, 22, 70, 199, 210.
Slocum, 259, 287.
Smith, A. J., 193, 245, 283, 299,
302.
Smith, Kirby, 86.
Smyrna, 280.
Snake Creek, 45.
Soap Creek, 242.
South Mt., 104.
Southside, 246.
Spotsylvania, 204.
Spring Hill, 294, 295.
Stanley, 172.
Staunton, 310.
Stedman, Fort, 312.
Steedman, 299.
Steele, 192, 194.
Stewart, 256, 298.
Stone, 50.
Stoneman, 260, 307.
Stone's River, 119, 122.
St. Philip, Fort, 39.
Strasburg, 272.
Stringham, 36.
Stuart, 61, 72, 108, 132, 203.
Sturgis, 22.
Sudley Springs, 76.
Sulphur Springs, 73.
Sumner, 60, 62, 106, 111, 127.
Sumter, Fort, 7, 191.
Susquehannah, 134.

348

INDEX.

Tallahatchie, S5, 144.
Taylor, 164, 193.
Tennessee River, 300.
Tensas, 144.
Terry, 302, 303.
Thomas, 26, 85, 86, 122. 173, 176,
179, 181, 187, 226, 280, 283 et
seq., 293, 297 et seq., 300 eiseq.
Thoroughfare Gap, 72.
Tiptonville, 29 et seq.
Todd's Tavern, 202.
Tolopotomoy Creek, 215.
Tom's Brook, 274.
Torbert, 272.
Trenton, 176.
Tullahoma, 174.
Tunnel Hill, 185.
Turkey Bend, 67.
Turner's Ferry, 241.
Turner's Gap, 104.
Tuscumbia, 284.
Tybee Island, 37.
United States Ford, 129.
Valley Head, 176.
Van Dorn, 31, 89, 92.
Vicksburg, 93, 94.
Vienna, 15.
Wagner, Fort, 191.
Wagner, Gen., 295.
Waynesboro', 288, 310.
Walker, Fort, 36.
Wallace, 252.

Walnut Hill, 155.
Warren, 168, 199, 263, 312, 313,
315.
Warrenton, 72, 109.
Washington, 250.
Waterloo, 73.
Wauhatchie, 184.
Weehawken, 35.
Weitzel, 163, 302.
Weldon R. R., 245, 264, 266.
West Va., 13, 19, 20.
Wheeler, 172, 290.
White House, 54, 65, 212, 215.
White Oak Bridge, 67.
White Oak Rd., 313.
Wilderness, 128, 197 et seq.
Williams, 93, 94, 307.
Williamsburg, 53.
Wilmington, 302, 303.
Wilson, 246, 294, 299, 308.
Wilson's Creek, 22.
Winchester, 133, 270.
Winslow, 195.
Wood, 180, 299.
Wright, Col., 230.
Wright, Gen., 253, 275, 276.
Yazoo, 99, 143, 144.
Yazoo City, 156.
Yellow Tavern, 264.
York, 52, 134.
Yorktown, 53.
Young's Point, 142.
Zollicoffer, 26.

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