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YALE UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY

THE

WAR WITH SPAIN

BY

HENRY CABOT LODGE

ILLUSTRATED

NEW YORK AND LONDON
HARPER & BROTHERS PUBLISHERS
1899

BY HENRY CABOT LODGE

CERTAIN ACCEPTED HEROES, and Oth
er Essays in Literature and Politics. {Con
temporary Essayists.) Post 8vo, Cloth, $1 50.
Contents : — A$ to Certain Accepted Heroes : The Last
Plantagenet : Shakespeare's Americanisms ; Chatterton :
Dr. HoJmes: A Liberal Education: The Home of the
Cabots: English Elections: Our Foreign Policy.
Senator Lodge is a clear and forcible writer. . . . He
makes his points in a manner which prevents any misun
derstanding, and then enforces them in temperate but
unmistakable language. There is not a single paper in
the collection that will not repay reading, — Brooklyn
Eagle.
A SHORT HISTORY OF THE ENG
LISH COLONIES IN AMERICA. Map.
8vo, Half Leather, $3 00.
The life, the thought, the manners and habits of the
people were the subjects that the author investigated and
has well described. The volume may be commended as
a scholarly production. — C. K. Adams.

NEW YORK AND LONDON
HARPER & BROTHERS, Publishers

Copyright, 1899, by Harper & Brothers.

^// rights reserved.

PREFACE

The war of the United States with Spain was very
brief. Its results were many, startling, and of world
wide meaning. Hence its importance. The history
of this war, in the broadest and truest sense of the
word, cannot be written for many years, because until
years have passed it will be impossible to get all the
necessary material, or to secure the perspective and
proportion which distance alone can give.
It is not too soon, however, to write the brief chron
icle of the time, or to give, in connected and coherent
narration, a history which, like Browning's poem, shall
tell " How it strikes a contemporary."
This story of the war of the United States with Spain
is based on the official reports of the military and naval
operations, everything accessible having been carefully
examined. The official reports have been supplemented
by an examination, so far as possible, of all the accounts
of eye-witnesses which had either interest or authority,
and which have appeared in such abundance. The
political portions of the story, and the account of events
in Washington, have been written from a somewhat close
personal knowledge of all that happened at the capital
during the war period.

PREFACE
I desire to thank Adjutant- General Corbin and Gen
eral Schwan for the courtesy and readiness with which
they aided me in getting access to the army reports
and to statistics very difficult to obtain. I am very
much indebted to my friend Secretary Long, and to
Mr. Allen, the Assistant-Secretary of the Navy, for the
kindness with which they have helped me in all that
related to naval affairs. I also owe an especial debt of
gratitude to Captain Crowninshield, Chief of the Bureau
of Navigation, for the unfailing patience with which he
answered my many inquiries, and for the help which he
was always ready to give me in the kindest and most
generous manner.
H. C. Lodge.
Washington, iSgg.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE
I. The Unsettled Question .... .... i
II. The Coming of War . .  31
III. Manila  45
IV. The Blockade of Cuba ....  68
V. The Pursuit of Cervera . .  8^
VI. Santiago — The Land Fight ...  108
VII. Santiago — The Sea Fight  134
VIII. The Surrender of Santiago . . . 153
IX. The Campaign in Puerto Rico . . . . . . 168
X. The Blockade of Manila and the Capture of Guam 191
XI. How Peace Came . . . 222
APPENDIX A — Resolutions of Congress Demanding
Withdrawal of Spain from Cuba . . 237
APPENDIX B — Proclamation of the President . 240
APPENDIX C — Peace Protocol of August 12, 1898,
AND Correspondence  248
APPENDIX D— The Treaty of Peace  267

ILLUSTRATIONS

THE MAINE AT HER FINAL BERTH IN HAVANA HARBOR .
THE VIRGINIUS OVERHAULED BY THE SPANISH GUNBOAT
TORNADO ... ... ...
SEfSOR CAnOVAS del CASTILLO . . ...
GENERAL FITZHUGH LEE ... ...
GENERAL STEWART L. WOODFORD . . .
SENOR DUPUY DE LOME 
THE MAINE OFF MORRO CASTLE .
CAPTAIN CHARLES D. SIGSBEE . . . . .
WILLIAM R. DAY . .... ....
SENOR PRAXEDES MATEO SAGASTA . ...
UNITED STATES SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AF
FAIRS .... . ....
REDFIELD PROCTOR . . . . ....
PRESIDENT MCKINLEY SIGNING THE ULTIM.ATUM .
PLAZA DE FONDO, MANILA 
PRIESTS GATHERING TAXES IN THE PHILIPPINES .
WRECK OF THE CRUISER ISLA DE CUBA . . .
WEST BATTERY, CAVITfi, AFTER DESTRUCTION . .
WRECK OF THE FLAG-SHIP, THE CRUISER REINA CRISTINA
WRECK OF THE CRUISER ISLA DE LUZON . . .
RESIDENCE OF AGUINALDO 
THE SAILING OF THE AMERICAN FLEET FROM TAMPA
THE BOMBARDMENT OF MATANZAS . . .
THE SPANISH SQUADRON AT CAPE VERDE ISLANDS
COLONEL DORST'S EXPEDITION IN THE CUSSIE — THE
LANDING AT POINT ARBOLITAS
CUTTING THE CABLES UNDER FIRE AT CIENFUEGOS .
THE HOME-COMING OF THE OREGON ... . .
vii

FrOJitispiece

Faciitg p.

10i6
2224262832343638
404244
48 545658
6064
68 707276
8082

ILLUSTRATIONS
THE DAILY POSITIONS OF THE SPANISH SQUADRON UNDER
ADMIRAL CERVERA . .  Facing p. 84
BOMBARDMENT OF SAN JUAN .  " 86
THE DAILY POSITIONS OF FLEET IN CAMPAIGN AGAINST
THE SPANISH SQUADRON  " 88
CAPTAIN EVANS OF THE IOWA SIGHTING THE CRISTOBAL
COLON AND THE MARIA TERESA IN SANTIAGO HARBOR . " 94
THE LAST OF THE MERRIMAC . . . . ... " 100
SOLDIERS OF THE CUBAN ARMY .... . . " 104
THE LANDING OF THE AMERICAN ARMY AT DAIQUIRI " 112
GENERAL GARCIA AND BRIGADIER-GENERAL LUDLOW. " II4
JOSEPH WHEELER .  " II6
WILLIAM R. SHAFTER .... . " I18
THE HOTCHKISS BATTERY IN ACTION AT LAS GUASIMAS . " I20
THEODORE ROOSEVELT  ... " 122
THE CAPTURE OF EL CANEY . " 124
THE CAPTURE OF THE BLOCK-HOUSE, SAN JUAN " 126
GENERAL H. S. HAWKINS AT SAN JUAN . . " 128
GENERALS IN THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN ... . . " I32
PASQUALE DE CERVERA  . . " I36
NAVAL OFFICERS IN SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN . . . . " I38
THE GLOUCESTER AND THE SPANISH TORPEDO-BOATS. . " I42
THE LAST OF CERVERA'S FLEET. .... " I48
THE MEETING OF THE GENERALS TO ARRANGE THE SUR
RENDER OF SANTIAGO ... . . . " 158
RAISING THE AMERICAN FLAG ON THE CITY HALL OF
SANTIAGO . . . " 162
NAVAL OFFICERS IN PUERTO RICAN CAMPAIGN . " 166
SAN JUAN, PUERTO RICO, FROM THE HARBOR " 168
AN ANCIENT GATEWAY, SAN JUAN, PUERTO RICO. - . " 1 70
THE STREET OF THE CROSS, SAN JUAN, PUERTO RICO " 172
THE LANDING AT GUANICA ... . " 174
THE BANNER OF PONCE . . " 176
SPANIARDS SURPRISED BY COLONEL HULING'S REGIMENT
IN THEIR FLIGHT FROM COAMO . . ... " 178
GENERALS IN PUERTO RICAN CAMPAIGN . ... " 180
MAP OF PUERTO RICO .... . . " 182
A VIEW OF THE MILITARY ROAD TO THE SOUTH OF THE
SPANISH POSITION AT AYBONITO  " 1 84
THE EXPEDITION AGAINST LARES AND ARECIBO ... " 186
THE MILITARY ROAD LEADING INTO YAUCO .... " 188
ON THE ADJUNTAS TRAIL ,  . " 190
viii

ILLUSTRATIONS

GEORGE DEWEY  ...
THE OFFICIAL RESIDENCE OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL,
MANILA . 
ELWELL S. OTIS . . . . .
HENRY GLASS  ...
THE CHARLESTON ENTERING THE HARBOR OF GUAM .
THOMAS M. ANDERSON .... ....
FRANCIS V. GREENE.
MAP OF THE BATTLE OF MANILA . . .
THE ADVANCE TOWARD MANILA
THE MONTEREY IN ACTION
WESLEY MERRITT ....
RESISTANCE FROM THE HOUSES IN MALATE,
AFTERNOON ON THE LUNETA, NORTH OF THE ERMITA
SUBURB OF MANILA . . . . ...
PUERTA REAL, OR THE KING'S GATE, IN THE OLD WALL
OF MANILA . . . . . 
NEWS OF THE PEACE PROTOCOL — GENERAL BROOKE
STOPPING THE ARTILLERY IN ITS ADVANCE UPON
AYBONITO .... . .
THE OCCUPATION OF MAYAGUEZ
JULES CAMBON . .
PUERTA DE ESPANA, FROM THE CHURCH OF SANTO
DOMINGO ... . . 
MOUTH OF THE PASIG RIVER, FROM THE CHURCH OF
SANTO DOMINGO . . . . . ...
THE CATHEDRAL, MANILA . 
ESCOLLA, MANILA . 
THE PEACE COMMISSION . . . 
ix

Facingp. I92

194196
200202
204206208210212 214216

218

222224226 228230232234
266

THE WAR WITH SPAIN

CHAPTER I
THE UNSETTLED QUESTION
Three hundred and fifty years ago the empire of
Charles V circled the globe, and was the greatest mili
tary and political power among civilized men. Of that
mighty fabric, the year 1898 has witnessed the unla-
mented end. We of to-day have thus beheld the closing
scene of one of the great dramas of history. The colo
nies planted in America by the English and the Dutch
have risen to be a great nation, and that nation has fin
ished the work begun by the followers of William of
Orange, when, amid the dikes of Holland and upon the
stormy waters of the English Channel, they struck at
the power of Philip II even in its pitch of pride. Such
events as these are not accidents, nor are they things
of yesterday. The final expulsion of Spain from the
Americans and from the Philippines is the fit conclusion
of the long strife between the people who stood for civil
and religious freedom, and those who stood for bigotry
and tyranny as hideous in their action as any which
have ever cursed humanity. The work has been a long
one, but Spain at last is confined practically to her

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
peninsula, where her people can do as they please with
each other, but whence they can trouble the world no
more. Spain has ceased to rule; her once vast empire
has gone, because she has proved herself unfit to gov
ern, and for the unfit among nations there is no pity in
the relentless world-forces which shape the destinies of
mankind. The irrepressible conflict between Spain on the one
side and England and Holland on the other, after the
former had been crippled in Europe, was transferred
from the Old World to the New. They seemed at first
very remote from each other in the vast regions of the
American continents, but nevertheless the two opposing
forces, the two irrevocably hostile systems, were always
drawing steadily together, with the certainty that when
they met one of them must go down before the other.
The Seven Years' War drove France from eastern
North America, and fixed forever the fate of that re
gion. It was to be English, not French :
The lilies withered where the lion trod.
The expulsion of France not only removed the long
standing northern peril to the English colonies, but
swept away the last barrier between them and Spain.
In the American Revolution, France, seeking her re
venge for the conquests of Pitt, forced Spain to become
her ally against England ; but Spain had no love for the
rebellious colonists. A treacherous, nominal friend, she
tried to wrest advantage from their weakness, and to
secure to herself in final possession the Mississippi val
ley and the great Northwest. Failing in this, she
sought, after American independence had been won, by

THE UNSETTLED QUESTION
false and insolent diplomacy and by corrupting in
trigues among the Western settlers, to check the Amer
ican advance across the continent. It was all in vain.
Through woodland and savanna, over mountain and
stream, came the steady tramp of the American pioneer.
He was an adventurer, but he was also a settler, and
what he took he held. He carried a rifle in one hand,
he bore an axe in the other, and where he camped he
made a clearing and built a home. The two inevitable
antagonists were nearing each other at last, for they
were face to face now all along the western and south
ern borders of the United States. The time had come
for one to stop, or for the other to give way. But
there was no stopping possible to the Americans,
and through the medium of French ownership the
Louisiana purchase was made, the Mississippi be
came a river of the United States, and their pos
sessions were stretched across the continent even to the
slopes of the Rocky Mountains. Still not content, the
Americans pressed upon the southern boundary until,
in 1 8 19, they forced Spain, in order to avoid war, to
sell them Florida and the northern coast of the Gulf
of Mexico as far as Louisiana. Meantime, inspired by
the example of the United States in rejecting foreign
dominion, and borne forward by the great democratic
movement which, originating in America, had swept
over Europe, the Spanish colonies rose in arms and
drove Spain from Central and South America.
A few years passed by, and then the restless Amer
ican advance pressed on into Texas, took it from Mex
ico, and a territory larger than any European state ex
cept Russia was added to the United States. Still the
3

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
American march went on, and then war came with
Mexico, and another vast region, stretching from Ore
gon to Arizona, became an American possession. All
the lands of North America which had once called
Spain master, which Cortez and De Soto, Ponce de
Leon and Coronado, had bestowed upon the Spanish
crown, had passed from the hands of the men who
could not use them into those of the men who could.
The expulsion of Spain from the Antilles is merely the
last and final step of the inexorable movement in which
the United States has been engaged for nearly a cen
tury. By influence and example, or more directly by
arms and by the pressure of ever-advancing settle
ments, the United States drove Spain from all her con
tinental possessions in the Western Hemisphere, until
nothing was left to the successors of Charles and Philip
but Cuba and Puerto Rico.
How did it happen that this great movement, at once
racial, political, and economic, governed as it was by
forces which rule men even in their own despite — ^how
did it happen to stop when it came to the ocean's edge?
The movement against Spain was at once natural and
organic, while the pause on the sea-coast was artificial
and in contravention of the laws of political evolution in
"the Americas. The conditions in Cuba and Puerto Rico
did not differ from those which had gone down in ruin
wherever the flag of Spain waved upon the mainland.
The Cubans desired freedom, and Bolivar would fain
have gone to their aid. Mexico and Colombia, in 1825,
planned to invade the island, and at that time invasion
was sure to be successful. What power stayed the on
coming tide which had swept over a continent? Not
4

THE UNSETTLED QUESTION
Cuban loyalty, for the expression "Faithful Cuba" was
a lie from the beginning, like many other Spanish state
ments. The power which prevented the liberation of
Cuba was the United States; and more than seventy
years later this republic has had to fight a war because
at. the appointed time she set herself against her own
teachings, and brought to a halt the movement she had
herself started to free the New World from the oppres
sion of the Old. The United States held back Mexico
and Colombia and Bolivar, used her influence at home
and abroad to that end, and, in the opinion of contem
porary mankind, succeeded, according to her desires, in
keeping Cuba under the dominion of Spain.
The reason for this action on the part of the United
States is worse than the fact itself. The Latin mind is
severely logical in politics, which accounts in a measure
for its many failures in establishing and managing free
governments. Being of this cast of mind, the Spanish-
American states, when they rose to free themselves
from Spain, also freed their own slaves, and in this in
stance they were not only logical, but right. The peo
ple of the United States, on the other hand, were at
once illogical and wrong, for they held just then that
white men should be free and black men slaves. So
they regarded with great disfavor this highly logical
outcome of South-American independence, and from
this cause Southern hostility brought the Panama Con
gress, fraught with many high hopes of American
solidarity, to naught. The sinister influence of slavery
led the United States to hold Cuba under the yoke of
Spain, because free negroes were not to be permitted to
exist upon an island so near their Atlantic seaboard. It
S

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
was a cruel policy which fastened upon Cuba slavery to
Spain as well as the slavery of black men to white,
when both might have been swept away without cost to
America. Those who are curious in the doctrine of
compensations can find here a fresh example. Lincoln,
in the second inaugural, declared once for all that our
awful Civil War was the price we paid for the sin of
slavery; and the war of 1898 was the price paid at last,
as such debts always are paid by nations, for having
kept Cuba in bondage at the dictates of our own slave
power. The United States had thus undertaken to stop the
movement for the liberation of Spanish colonies at the
point selected by itself, and had deliberately entered
upon the policy of maintaining Spanish rule in its own
neighborhood. This policy meant the assumption of a
heavy responsibility, as well as a continuous effort to
put to rest an unsettled question, by asserting stoutly,
and in defiance of facts, that it really was settled if peo
ple would only agree pleasantly to think so. But in
this, as in all like cases, the effort was vain. Cuba was
held under Spanish rule, and the question which had
received the wrong answer began almost at once to
make itself heard, after the awkward fashion of ques
tions which men pretend to have disposed of, but which
are still restlessly seeking the right and final answer,
and, without respect for policies or vested interests,
keep knocking and crying at the door. Some American
statesmen saw that there was a real question in Cuba
demanding a real settlement, and declared, like John
Quiney Adams and Henry Clay, that Cuba must be an
nexed, and that it would become indispensable to the
6

THE UNSETTLED QUESTION
integrity of the Union. Even then did Adams also as
sert that the transfer of Cuba to some other power was
a danger obtruding itself upon our councils. But the
plan of leaving the island with Spain prevailed. Cuba
had come near to both independence and annexation,
but both gave way before the slave power, and for
twenty years the policy of 1825 had sway. As late as
1843, indeed, Webster said that negro emancipation in
Cuba would strike a death-blow to slavery in the United
States, thus giving cynically and frankly the bad and
true reason for the policy steadily pressed since 1825.
Never at rest, however, the slave power itself, a few
years after Webster's lucid definition of its Cuban pol
icy, changed its own attitude completely. From desir
ing to keep Cuba in the hands of Spain, in order that
the Cuban negroes might remain slaves, it passed, as
dangers thickened round it at home, to the determina
tion to secure Cuba, in order that more slave territory
might be added to the United States. Hence a con
tinuous effort to get the island by annexation, and vari
ous projects, all fallen into more or less oblivion now,
to bring that result about, were devised by American
slaveholders and their allies. Their schemes ranged
from Buchanan's offer to purchase, rejected with deep
scorn by Spain the intelligent, to the Ostend Manifesto
— a .barefaced argument for conquest— and included at
tempts to briiig^out CuBaiTrndependence by exciting
insurrections and landing filibustering expeditions.
But the time was fast drawing near, even while the
American slaveholders were thus seeking new territory,
when the slave power would be thinking not of exten
sion, but of existence. In 1861 American slavery in-
7

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
voked the ordeal of battle, and perished utterly. With
it died its political power, and the policies, foreign and
domestic, which it had so long imposed upon the United
States. But slavery also left a number of debts to
humanity which were not buried with it, but which re
quired payment at the hands of the American people,
who had been responsible for slavery living, and could
not avoid settling its debts when it was dead. Among
these debts was Cuba. Nobody had thought of it much
since the Ostend Manifesto. If anybody chanced to
remember it during or after the Civil War, the thought
probably was that Cuba at last was well out of the way,
together with the slave power which had been forever
meddling with it, and talking about it, and casting
covetous eyes upon its rich lands and forests.
None the less, although the slave power of America
had undertaken to fix the destiny of Cuba, and, spurred
by its own sense of weakness to eternal restlessness, had
kept the question constantly alive, it was' not the ques
tion itself. Cuba and Spain and Spanish oppression
remained, even if American slavery was dead. More
over, the slaveholders who had caused the United
States to force Cuba back under Spanish rule ha3'gone
a step~Beyond~this,-and'had warned off all other na-
jtjnns .^In a word, the United States had become re
sponsible for Cuba, and had drawn a ring-fence around
^4lie island to exclude all other nations. In this way we
undertook and sought to maintain a wrong settlement
of a great question, and wrong settlements are equiv
alent to none at all. So, after the inconsiderate fashion
of unsettled problems, the Cuban questioja would not
stay quiet. The slave powejr kep^tirring it; and when
- — -fi"'"

THE UNSETTLED QUESTION
the slave power perished and men thought it was all
over, the ancient wrong reared its head again, and
turning to the power responsible for its existence, de
manded redress.
This time the movement came from the island itself.
Cuba, although uninvaded, had not been untouched by
the revolutionary movement in the first quarter of the
century. Societies were formed to support Bolivar and
the Mexicans; and after the movement was checked,
Spain, acting in her usual fashion, instead of ignoring
the indications of revolutionary sympathy, proceeded
to give the Captain-General the powers of the gov
ernors of besieged towns, or, in other words, put the
whole island under martial law. With this piece of
sweeping and needless tyranny, resistance to Spain be
gan in Cuba, and has continued at intervals to the pres
ent day, each successive outbreak becoming more for
midable and more desperate than the one which pre
ceded it.
The first rising came at once. In 1826, only a year
after the intervention of the United States, an insur
rection broke out, and its two chiefs were executed.
Soon after came another, known as the "Conspiracy of
the Black Eagle," which was also harshly repressed, and
those engaged in it were imprisoned, banished, or exe
cuted. In 1837 the representatives of Cuba and Puerto
Rico were excluded from the Cortes, on the ground
that the colonies were to be governed by special law.
In 1850 and 185 1 occurred an expedition for the libera
tion of Cuba, and the death of its leader, Narciso
Lopez. There were also expeditions under General
Quitman and others, and in 1855 Ramon Pinto was put
9

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
to death, and many other patriots banished. These last
raids were part of the slaveholders' movement intend
ed to bring about the independence of the island, and
subsequent annexation to the United States, but they
failed like their predecessors. After this, for a num
ber of years, the Cubans attempted by peaceful methods
to secure from the government at Madrid some relief
from the oppression which weighed upon them, and
some redress for their many wrongs. All their efforts
came to naught, and such changes as were made were
for the worse rather than for the better.
The result of all this was that in 1869 a revolution
broke out under the leadership of Carlos Manuel de
Cespedes, and the United States was aroused to the
fact that the Cuban question was as unsettled as ever.
The existence of slavery in Cuba dulled the edge of
American sympathy, for the bitterness of our own con
flict was still upon us. Still there was much interest in
the United States, and a strong feeling in behalf of
men struggling for freedom. The old American senti
ment against the domination of Europe in the New
World, which slavery for its own objects had for a time
suppressed, woke again and found active and ardent
expression. The revolutionists, it is true, did not suc
ceed in getting beyond the eastern part of the island,
but they were successful in many engagements, they
crippled still further the already broken power of Spain,
and they could not be put down by force of arms. At
first the United States held carefully aloof ; but the war
went on ; Spain was in the throes of revolution at home ;
and the administration of President Grant, however re
luctant, was compelled to take notice of the fire burning

THE UNSETTLED QUESTION
at our very doors. Mr. Fish, Secretary of State, re
verted to the old idea of purchase, and informally
brought the proposition to the attention of the Spanish
government. General Prim, the one very able man
Spain has produced in recent times, saw at once the
sense and advantage of this solution, but the scheme
got noised about prematurely, there was an outbreak
of silly passion which the Spaniards call pride, and
Prim was obliged to declare vehemently against any
alienation of the national territory. Then in 1873 came
what was certain to come sooner or later, an outrage by
Spain against the United States. The Virginius, a
vessel of American register, was captured on the high
seas, taken to a Cuban port, and some fifty of her of
ficers and crew, Americans for the most part, summa
rily shot. The wrath of the American people flamed
out; President Grant could have had war and ended
everything in a moment; but the forces which cared
nothing for humanity and a great deal for an undis
turbed money market prevailed. The register of the
Virginius was opportunely proved to be fraudulent, we
took money for our dead, and peace was preserved.
The unsettled question had come very near a solution,
and had shown, to all who cared to think, that Spanish
tyranny was capable of dangerous crimes against others
than its own subjects.
Still the war dragged on. It was very annoying,
especially to those who were afraid of being disturbed
in their daily business, and the administration was
forced to intimate, in 1875, that if Spain did not stop
the war, the intervention of other powers might be
come necessary. The hint was not without effect, and.

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
coupled with Spain's increasing exhaustion, hastened
the end. In two years more, after the insurrection had
lasted ten years, peace was made with the insurgents,
but only by a treaty in which Martinez Campos, in the
name of Spain, promised to the Cubans certain reforms
for which they had taken up arms. In consideration of
these reforms the insurgents were to abandon their
fight for independence, lay down their arms, and re
ceive a complete amnesty. The insurgents kept their
word. They laid down their arms and abandoned their
struggle for independence. Spain unhesitatingly vio
lated the agreement. With a cynical disregard of good
faith, her promise of amnesty was only partially kept,
and she imprisoned or executed many who had been
engaged in the insurgent cause, while the promised re
forms were either totally neglected or carried out by
some mockery which had neither reality nor value.
The result of this treachery, of the bloodshed which ac
companied it, and of the increased abuses in govern
ment which followed, was that the Cubans again pre
pared for revolt, and in February, 1895, Jose Marti
landed in eastern Cuba and another revolution broke
out. The unsettled question had again appeared, still
demanding the right answer.
There is no need to trace here the history of this last
insurrection. The insurgents formed a government,
carried on a vigorous guerrilla warfare, swept over the
island from Santiago to the outskirts of Havana and
into Pinar del Rio, and soon held sway over most of
the provinces outside the towns. They fought better,
and were better led, by partisan chiefs like Maceo and
Garcia, than ever before. But the head and front of the

THE UNSETTLED QUESTION
Rebellion was Maximo Gomez, a man of marked ability
and singular tenacity of purpose. His plan was to re
fuse all compromises, to distribute his followers in de
tached bands, to fight no pitched battles, but incessant
skirmishes, to ravage the country, destroy the pos^sibil-
ity of revenue, and win in the end either through the
financial exhaustion of Spain or by the intervention of
the United States, one of which results he believed must
come if he could only hold on long enough. His wis
dom, persistence, and courage have all been justified,
for the results have come as he expected, and the rest
of the story is to be found in the course of events in the
United States.
When the insurrection of 1895 broke out it excited,
at first, but a languid interest among the people of the
United States, who are only too well accustomed to
revolutions in Spanish-American countries. It soon
was apparent, however, that this was not an ordinary
South- American revolution, that the Cubans were fight
ing the old fight of America to be free from Europe,)
that they were in desperate earnest, would accept nof
compromises, and would hold on to the bitter end.
Then, too, a few months sufficed to show that this time
the Cubans were well led, that their forces were united,
that they were not torn with factional strife, and that
they were pursuing an intelligent and well-considered
plan. Interest in the United States began to awaken,
and grew rapidly as the success of the Cuban arms be
came manifest. In the Ten Years' War the insurrection
never spread beyond the hill country of the extreme
east. Now, in six months, the province of Santiago,
except for the seaports, had fallen into Cuban control,
13

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
and the Cuban forces marched westward, taking pos
session of all the rural districts as far as Havana.
i~ This brave fight for liberty and against Spain pres-
ntly aroused the sympathy of the American people,
rhich showed itself in the newspaper press and in pub
lic meetings, always with gathering strength. When
Congress met, the popular sentiment sought expression
in both branches. A minority desired the immediate
recognition of Cuban independence, a large number
wished to recognize belligerency, an overwhelming ma
jority wanted to do something, while the naturally con
servative elements were led by a few determined men
who were opposed to any interference of the remotest
kind, and a few of whom, even if they did not openly
avow it, were bent on leaving Spain a free hand in the
island. Out of this confusion came, as might have been
expected, a compromise, in which the men in the small
minority, who knew just what they wanted, got the
substance, and the large, divided, and undecided ma
jority, who vaguely desired "to do something for
Cuba," obtained nothing but a collection of sympathetic
words. The compromise took the form of a concurrent
resolution, which, after much debate, delay, and con
ference, finally passed both Houses.
This resolution merely declared that a state of war
existed in Cuba, that the United States would observe
strict neutrality, and that the President should offer the
good offices of the United States with the Spanish gov
ernment to secure the recognitioin of the independence
of the island. As the resolution was concurrent, it did
not require the President's assent, and was nothing but
an expression of the opinion of Congress. It therefore
14

THE UNSETTLED QUESTION
had little weight with Mr. Cleveland, and none at all
with Spain. Whatever was done by the administra
tion in offering our good offices to secure the recogni
tion of Cuban independence, there was no result, ahd
the only part of the resolution which was scrupulously
carried out was in observing neutrality, which was done
by the President with a severity that bore heavily upon
the Cuban side alone.
The administration was in fact opposed to any inter
ference in Cuba, and the action of Congress left it free
to follow its policy of holding rigidly aloof. Spain re
lied with entire confidence on the friendly attitude of
Mr. Cleveland, and this confidence was not misplaced.
But the unsettled question could not be put down in
this fashion, or pushed into a corner. It kept on pro
claiming its ugly existence. The war did not die out,
as the opponents of Cuba confidently predicted that it
would, in the course of a month. On the contrary, it
continued ; the insurgents were successful in their plan
of campaign; they kept gaining ground and getting a
more and more complete control of the interior of the
island. On July 13, 1895, the battle of Bayamo was
fought — the only considerable action of the war, for
Gomez avoided steadily all stricken fields. At Bayamo,
however, they won a decisive victory, and Martinez
Campos, who barely escaped, was forced to resign, and
was recalled, six months later. The retirement of
Martinez Campos was an important advantage to the
Cuban cause, for he was the wisest and most humane
of the Spanish Captain-Generals. He had settled the
last revolt, and by diplomacy and good management
there was always danger that he would divide the iii-
15

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
surgents again and bring about another compromise.
He was, however, neither successful enough nor suf
ficiently ferocious to satisfy Spain, and hence his re
moval. The man who succeeded him, if, as events
proved, equally unsuccessful in war, left nothing to be
desired in the way of ferocity. Valeriano Weyler came
to Cuba February lo, 1896, with an evil reputation for
cruelty and corruption earned in the Philippines and
in the suppression of the disorders at Barcelona, a repu
tation which he not only maintained, but enhanced in his
new government. His military movements were farci
cal, consisting in marching columns out here and there
from garrisoned posts, having an ineffective brush with
the Cubans, and then and there withdrawing the troops,
with as little effect as the proverbial King of France
who marched up the hill. The insurgents continued
their operations without serious check; they broke
through the trochas, swarmed into Pinar del Rio,
wandered at will about the country, and carried their
raids even into the suburbs of Havana. Weyler, who
seems never to have exposed himself to fire, but to have
confined his operations in the field to building more
trochas, made his few military progresses by sea, and
preferred to stay in Havana, where he could amass a
fortune by blackmailing the business interests, and
levying heavy tribute on all the money appropriated to
public uses by the bankrupt and broken treasury of
Spain. If, however, Weyler was ineffective as a com
mander in the field and no lover of battle, he showed
that he was energy itself in carrying out a campaign
of another kind, which was intended to destroy the peo
ple of the island, and which had the great merit of be-
16

^*""* -^

SENOR CANOVAS DEL C.\M !LI
Late Prime Minister of Spr.in

THE UNSETTLED QUESTION
ing attended with no risk to the person of the Captain-
General. A large portion of the Cuban population in
the country were peasants taking no part in the war,
and known as "pacificos." They were quiet people, as
a rule, and gave no cause for offence, but it was well
known that their sympathies were with the insurgents,
and it was believed that they furnished both supplies
and recruits to the rebel forces. Unable to suppress or
defeat the armed insurgents, the Spanish government
characteristically determined to destroy these helpless
"pacificos." Accordingly an edict, suggested apparent
ly by Weyler, was issued on October 21, 1896, which
applied to Pinar del Rio, and was afterwards extended
to all the island, and which ordered the army to con
centrate all the pacificos, practically all the rural popu
lation, in the garrisoned towns. These wretched peo
ple were to be driven in this way from their little farms,
which were their only means of support, and herded in
the towns and in the suburbs of Havana, where they
had nothing before them but starvation, or massacre at
the hands of Spanish soldiers and guerrillas. Whether
the idea of this infamous order originated in Havana
or Madrid is not of much consequence. The Queen-
Regent, for whom some persons feel great sympathy,
because she is an intelligent woman and the mother of a
little boy, set her hand to the decree which sent thou
sands of women and children to a lingering death, and
the whole government of Spain is just a,s responsible
for all the ensuing atrocities as Weyler, who issued the
concentration edict and carried it out with pitiless thor
oughness and genuine pleasure in the task.
By March, 1896, Spain had sent 121,000 soldiers to
2 17

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
the island, which gave her, at that time with the forces
already in Cuba, 150,000 men. Her debt was piling up
with frightful rapidity ; the insurgent policy of prevent
ing the grinding of the sugar-cane was largely success
ful, had paralyzed business, and wellnigh extinguished
the revenues. It was apparent to all but the most prej
udiced that even if the insurgents could not drive the
Spaniards from Cuba, the island was lost to Spain.
With 200,000 soldiers in 1897 Spain had utterly and
miserably failed to put down the rebels, who never had
in arms, in all parts of the island, over 35,000 men. The
Spanish government could give protection neither to
its own citizens nor to those of foreign nations, nor
could it even offer security to business, agriculture, or
property. So Spain, impotent and broken, but as sav
age and cruel as she had ever been in her most pros
perous days, turned deliberately from the armed men
she could not overcome to the work of starving to death
the unarmed people, old and young, men and women,
whom she could surely reach.
These facts began to grow very clear to the people
of the United States in the spring of 1896, and the two
great political parties, at their national conventions,
passed resolutions of strong sympathy with Cuba, and
demanded action. Even the excitement of the most
bitterly fought election ever known in the United
States could not wholly shut out Cuba, and whenjthe
election_was over, the_Cuban question came to thejront
agaio-as soon as CongrgsTmeE Everrthellf^absorb-
ing financial question could neither obscure nor hide it.
There it was again, under discussion, and the reason
for its reappearance was simply that the feeling of the
18

THE UNSETTLED QUESTION
American people was growing constantly keener and
stronger, and forced the subject forward in Congress.
Among those who sympathized with Cuba there was
a general belief that it was not merely right to recog
nize the independence of the island, but that such ac
tion would enable the insurgents to raise money, fly the
flag of the republic on ships of war, and open ports,
and that they would then secure their independence
without involving the United States in war with Spain.
Subsequent events have shown that even recognition
would not probably have strengthened the insurgents to
such a degree that they could drive out the Spaniards.
But it is equally clear now that recognition was the
only chance of saving the United States from ultimate
intervention and war. A majority of the Senate Com
mittee on Foreign Relations holding this opinion. Sen
ator Cameron reported from that committee on De
cember 21, 1896, a brief resolution recognizing the Re
public of Cuba, and setting forth the reasons for doing
so in a very able and elaborate report.
This resolution of the Foreign Relations Committee
caused much excitement. Stocks fell, and the financial
interests of the great Eastern cities rose in wrathful
opposition. They declared, without any reservation,
that war "would unsettle values" — a horrid possibility
not to be contemplated with calmness by any right-,
thinking man. The error of the financial interests was'
in thinking that war would "unsettle values." That'^
which "unsettled values" was the Cuban question, ane
so long as that remained unsettled, "values" would fol
low suit. There was but one way to remove this dis
turbing element, and that was for the United States to
19

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
bring the Cuban War to an end. So long as it was per
mitted to go on, the damaging uncertainty and suspense
were sure to continue, and sooner or later, out of the
fighting in Cuba and the agitation in the United States,
would come the overt act which would bring the sword
from its scabbard. Nevertheless, financial interests had
their way. Mr. Olney announced, in an interview in
the Washington Star, that no attention would be paid
to the joint resolution even if it passed both Houses
over the veto, because the right of recognition pertained
solely to the Executive, and the resolution would only
be the opinion of certain eminent gentlemen. This was
quite conclusive at the moment in regard to the Cuban
war, for nothing can be plainer than that under our
system of government no serious measures can be wise
ly undertaken, or indeed undertaken at all, against a
foreign nation unless the Executive and Congress act
together. This was entirely obvious to the Foreign Re
lations Committee of the Senate. It was doubtful if
they could carry the resolution for recognition of the
Cuban Republic through the Senate, and quite certain
that it would be useless if they did. So the resolution
slumbered on the calendar and was never called up, the
wise financial interests prevailed, Gjiban independence
was not to be recognized, and we w?r-e to go on pre
tending that the war was not there, and that we had
answered the unsettled question, when we really had
simply turned our heads aside and refused to look.
And then when the troublesome matter had been so
nicely laid to sleep, the result followed which is usual
when Congressmen and Presidents and nations are try
ing to make shams pass for realities. Only a few weeks

THE UNSETTLED QUESTION
went by, and the Cuban question was up again. It
could not be kept out of the newspapers, or the minds
of men, or the debates in Congress. We were engaged
in enforcing the neutrality laws and preventing fili-
"bustering expeditions. If an expedition got out of our
ports it was a success in almost every instance, for the
Spanish were so inefficient that they could hardly ever
prevent a landing, and the upshot was that the United
States did the main work in checking the insurgents.
In other words, the enforcement of neutrality meant in
practice our being the ally of Spain. This fact came
gradually into public view and gained general appre
ciation, with a consequent increase of feeling among
the American people, who, horrified by the reports of
the starvation of the "reconcentrados," did not at all
relish being made even indirect participants in that
odious crime against humanity. A still deeper source
of irritation was in the treatment accorded to Amer
icans by the Spaniards. Cases were continually arising
in which American citizens were seized, thrown into
prison, kept in solitary confinement, and subjected to
every kind of cruelty, in total disregard of both treaty
and international rights. So long as these unfortunate
men were of Cuban birth and had Spanish names, the
opponents of Cuba felt that they had in these facts a
complete answer, and that the additional fact that they
held the naturalization papers of the United States
could be entirely disregarded. Still the cases kept on
coming to the surface, gave rise to sharp debates in
Congress, and stimulated popular feeling. The Span
iards, however, emboldened by our government's ap
parent indifference to the rig'hts and the protection of
21

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
American citizens, soon ceased to confine their out
rages to naturalized citizens of Cuban extraction, and
proceeded to extend the same treatment to men whose
names were as American as their birth-place. The ad
ministration could not plead ignorance of the situation,
for General Lee, who had taken charge of the Consul-
General's office in Havana on June 3, 1896, informed
the State Department three weeks after his arrival that
while the insurgents could not drive the Spaniards
from the island, it was equally impossible for Spain to
subdue the insurrection. The President therefore knew
that without decided measures on our part there was
nothing possible in Cuba _tait bloodshed, pillage, the
wholesale destruction of life and property, and the
gradual extermination of the inhabitants by starvation
and massacre, but he remained entirely unmoved in his
determination not to interfere even to the extent of
putting pressure on Spain. As the winter of 1896-7
wore away it also became generally understood that
General Lee, whose good sense and firm courage had
steadily won the confidence of the country, was not sus
tained by the administration as he should have been in
some of the cases of American prisoners. The manner
in which the consular reports were withheld, or only
grudgingly or partially given out, augmented the pop
ular distrust, for the secrecy observed convinced every
one that the publication of the official truth was feared
by those who wished to hold aloof from Cuba and to
pretend that there was no question there demanding
settlement. The American people are justly sensitive
in regard to the protection of American citizens, and
the imprisonment of Scott, the murder of Ruiz, and

(GENERAL FITZHUirll LEE
United States ConsLil-General in Havana

THE UNSETTLED QUESTION
the treatment of the Coinpetitor prisoners, together
with many other cases, especially when there were added
to them the ill-concealed differences between the ad
ministration and General Lee, stirred popular feeling
and excited popular anger to a high degree. The situ
ation growing out of the Spanish treatment of Amer
icans was fast bringing on a crisis which threatened
to prove not only acute, but decisive.
Just at this moment, when the unrighted wrong
seemed about to force the inevitable decision, Mr.
Cleveland went out of office, and with the interest
awakened by a new administration, and the hopes of a
changed policy, the immediate excitement subsided, and
men who realized that however absorbing the tariff
might be, the real and great question lay south of Flor
ida, were content to wait and give to the new authority_^
every possible opportunity and assistance. The Repub
lican party, which now returned to power, had taken
very strong ground at its convention in regard to Cuba,
asserting practically that it would charge itself with the ,
duty of compelling a final settlement of the question, j
President McKinley not only sympathized with tRe~'
declaration of his party, but he felt profoundly the
gravity of the Cuban situation, and cherished a deep
desire to meet it successfully and conclusively. The
question had been left in such an acute state, and so
near to extreme action, by neglect of the cases of Amer
ican prisoners, that it was plain that something must
be done at once or the new administration would find
itself plunged into hostilities before it had fairly taken
the reins of power into its hands. The crucial point
was the American prisoners, and President McKinley,
23

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
less sensitive than his predecessor in regard to injuring
the feelings of Spain, immediately demanded prompt
release and redress in every case. His tone was so
firm that the Spaniards at once gave way, and by the
end of April every American prisoner had been re
leased. With the removal of the immediate and crying
evil the situation grew quieter, the crisis passed by, and
the impending peril of war rolled back again into the
distance. The cause of war would not come from
Spanish outrages upon American citizens. So much
was fixed by the President's decided action. But the
question was still there, still moving and pressing, nev
er at rest. And just when every one who was against
doing anything was saying again contentedly that all
was nicely over, and that the sham was a reality, and
that there was no Cuban question, out the question
would break in a new quarter. May 20, 1897, the Sen
ate, without division, passed a joint resolution recog
nizing Cuban belligerency. This resolution, taking its
usual course, had scarcely had time to reach the House
and be sent by the Speaker to slumber in the Commit
tee on Foreign Affairs, because there was not and ought
not to be a Cuban question, when in came a message
from the President on that very subject. It appeared
oddly enough, that war was still going on, and that
under the reconcentration system American citizens, as
well as natives of the island, were being starved to death
in Cuba. This the President, thoroughly informed
by the consular reports, thought that he could not
permit, and he therefore asked Congress for $50,000
to purchase and send supplies to these Americans who
were being put to death by the methods of war em-
24

GENEK.VL >.rK\VART L- AVOODF(_)KD
United States Alinister to Spain

THE UNSETTLED QUESTION
ployed by Spain. Congress gave the money at once,
and the act was approved May 24, 1897. We de
manded and received the assent of Spain, and there
upon ships were chartered and food sent to all the
American consuls, in order to feed starving Americans.
The Americans were fed, and many others not Ameri
cans also, and the United States by this action had at
last interfered in Cuba; for no more complete act of
intervention than this, which tended to cripple the mili
tary measures and check the starvation campaign of
the Spaniards, could be imagined. It was not admitted,
certainly not generally realized, that the United States
had finally broken from the old policy of holding aloof,
and had entered on the new policy of intervention in
Cuba; but, nevertheless, the true answer to the unset
tled question was beginning to draw visibly nearer.
Meantime the President, after careful consideration,
selected General Stewart L. Woodford for minister
to Spain — ^the most important diplomatic post to be
filled at this juncture. No one could have been chosen
who was more conciliatory than General Woodford,
or more desirous to obtain a peaceful solution of the
ever-increasing differences with Spain. With such a
minister at Madrid it was certain that no effort would
be spared to soothe Spain and bring about an agree
ment calculated to gratify everybody, if such a thing
were possible under the circumstances, which seemed
unlikely, for it looked as if the question had gone be
yond the stage when it could be dealt with by soft and
gentle handling. Nevertheless, until the new adminis
tration and the new President, through the freshly ap
pointed minister, could take up the thread of the nego-
25

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
tiations with Spain, there came a pause in the con
troversy between the two nations. There was no
pause in Cuba, no pause in starving to death the misera
ble "reconcentrados," or in the desolating raids of both
combatants, which were fast making the island a desert
waste. There was no -pause in the agitation in the
United States, or in the growth of the popular feeling
about Cuba and the horrid scenes there existent. The
unsettled question kept moving on, even though ne
gotiations paused. Then came another delay, for be
fore General Woodford reached Spain on September
I, Senor Canovas, the Prime Minister, was murdered,
on Sunday, August 8, 1897, by an Italian anarchist.
There was much alarm, a ministerial crisis, and then
Senor Sagasta came in and formed a Liberal ministry.
At last General Woodford was able to open his nego
tiations, and the demands of the United States were
seriously pressed. We asked for the recall of Weyler,
and, above all, for the revocation of the reconcentration
edict. The new ministry made haste to comply in ap
pearance with every request, and to promise every
thing we demanded. Then they asked in turn that we
should give them opportunity to try autonomy in Cuba
— another wrong answer to the old question, absolutely
useless, and quite gone by in the autumn of 1897. But
after all the ostensible compliance of the Sagasta min
istry with our requests, the opportunity to try auton
omy could not well be refused. The trouble was that,
jffiitb-tbe-exc£gtionof the recalLofJWeyler, on October
9, 1897, about which no deception or postponement
was possible, not one of ^these_Spanish_ promises was.
worth the paper upon which it was written. It was all

SKN^ IR DUrU^ DK LOME
3ijatii-ii ^Lniste^ II- the United States

THE UNSETTLED QUESTION
entirely characteristic of Spanish diplomacy, much
vaunted by Spaniards, and much admired in Europe,
and consisted simply of lying, evading, and making
promises which there was no intention of performing.
As the representatives of the United States tried to tell
the truth, they laid themselves open to much European
criticism for their rude diplomacy, and for not under
standing the refined methods of older nations ; but they
had one grave disadvantage in a failure to realize that
Spanish diplomacy consisted chiefly of falsehood, as it
had done for some centuries, and that no faith could
be put in anything they alleged or promised.
Meantime all agitation in the United States was
restrained on the ground that after the Spanish con
cessions we were bound to give them a reasonable time
to try autonomy, which was an entirely just view if the
concessions had been real and autonomy either honest
or practical. But as the weeks passed by it became ap
parent that autonomy was neither practical nor gen
uine; the atrocities and starvation went on despite the
withdrawal of Weyler and the coming of the less brutal
Blanco, and both Congress and people again began to
grow restless.
The situation of the Americans in Havana also began
to cause uneasiness, and there was so much disquiet
that the administration very wisely determined to send
a ship of war to that port. The battle-ship Maine was
selected for this duty, and reached Havana on the
morning of January 24, 1898. We were at peace with
Spain, and we had an entire right to send a ship to
any Cuban port. If it had been done, as it ought to
have been done, at the beginning of the Cuban troubles,
27

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
it would have excited no comment ; but at this late date
in the war it assumed an importance which did not
rightfully belong to such an accident. The Spanish
minister, Senor Dupuy de Lome, blustered in private
and talked about war, but being informed quietly and
decidedly by Mr. Day that the ship was going in any
event, he quieted down in public, and the Spanish
cruiser Vizcaya came to New York to demonstrate
that the presence of the Maine at Havana was only a
friendly visit. The sending of the Maine was received by
the country with a sense of relief, and the action of the
President was universally approved. Public atten
tion, however, was soon distracted from this subject
by an incident which in a flash revealed the utter worth
lessness of all the Spanish concessions and promises.
A letter of Senor Dupuy de Lome, dated December 25,
1897, and addressed to a friend, Senor Canalejas, had
been stolen in Havana by some one in the Cuban in
terest, and sent to the Cuban Junta in New York, which
gave it to the press on February 9, 1898. This letter
contained a coarse and vulgar attack upon President
McKinley, which led to the immediate resignation
and recall of the writer, who had served Spain well and
unscrupulously. But far more important in its wider
bearings than this disclosure of the character of Du
puy de Lome was the fact that the letter revealed the
utter hollowness of all the Spanish professions, and
(showed that the negotiations in regard to autonomy
sand commercial relations were only intended to amuse
land deceive the United States. The effect of this revj;_
elation was just beginning to make itself felt when
the American people were stunned by an event which
28

THE UNSETTLED QUESTION
drove everything else from their minds. On the morn
ing of February i6 came the news that on the previous
evening the battle-ship Maine had been blown up and
totally destroyed in the harbor of Havana. The ex
plosion occurred under the forward part of the ship,
and 264 men and two officers were killed. The overt
act had come. Thi^-^gantic -mu-rd&r-^of sleepingLmen
in the fancied^ securiLy:-QL.a^ friendly harbor was the
direct l3iitcome and the perfect expression of Spanish
rule, the appropriate action of a corrupt system strug
gling in its last agony. At last in very truth the un
settled question had come home to the United States,
and it spoke this time in awful tones, which rang loud
and could not be silenced. A wave of fierce wrath
swept over the American people. But a word was
needed, and war would have come then in response to
this foul and treacherous act of war, for such in truth
it was. But the words of Captain Sigsbee, the com
mander of the Maine, whose coolness, self-restraint,
and high courage were beyond praise, asking, even in
the midst of the slaughter, that judgment should be
suspended, were heeded alike by government and
people. Scarcely a word was said in either House or Senate,
and for forty days the American people and the Amer
ican Congress waited in silence for the verdict of the
board of naval officers who had been appointed to re
port on the destruction of the Maine. To those who
understood the American people this grim silence, this
stern self-control, were more threatening than any
words of sorrow or of anger could possibly have been.
Spain, rushing ignorantly, arrogantly, on her doom,
29 "

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
understood nothing. A generous sympathy, a prompt
offer to make every reparation, while she disclaimed
all guilt, and she could have turned the current of feel-
__ing and gone far to save herself and her colonies. In
stead of that, with incredible stupidity and utter mean
ness of soul, she announced, before any one had even
looked at the wreck, that the ship was blown up from
the inside, owing to the carelessness of the American
officers. Her ambassadors abroad reiterated this min
isterial falsehood, and, not content with that, insulted
the brave men who had the Maine in charge, while
offid.al_Spa n ia rds-_e_ygiywhere insinuated j3r_ declared
that lack of discipline was^what blewup the battle-

^ip. There was much anger, mostly"oFtHe^very silent
sort, in the United States as these charges flew on
wires and cables about the world ; but the American re
ply to them was not given until some months later on
May I and July 3 when certain proofs were given of
the discipline and quality of American sailors which
even Spain could not overlook. Still the Spanish at
titude in regard to the Maine had one undoubted merit
— it moved the unsettled question forward, and made a
wrong answer more difficult than ever.

CHAPTER II
THE COMING OF WAR
As the weary days went by after the destruction of
the Maine, public feeling grew tenser every instant, and
the waiting became more intolerable, until at last the
report of the American board appeared, closely fol
lowed by that of the Spaniards, which told the lie
agreed upon forty days before, and which they had not
even taken the trouble to back up with any substantial
evidence, or with more than a perfunctory examination
of the wreck. No one heeded the Spanish report ; pub
lic men, of course, read it, but the people knew Spain at
last, and their instinct told them with entire certainty
that here was a sham and an untruth, very patent and
flagrant, upon which time was not to be wasted. The
American report was based upon a most elaborate ex
amination of the wreck and of witnesses, and upon the
most carefully sifted testimony. It was honest and cool,
and said that the Maine had been blown up from
outside. There was no mortal doubt after reading
the report, and Captain Sigsbee's evidence before^the.
Senate committee, that the outside engine of destruc
tion was a government submarine mine, and had been
exploded without the authority or knowledge of the
Spanish government, by men who wore the uniform
of Spain. — — -'
31

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
The President transmitted the report of the board to
Congress without comment. It was perhaps needless to
make any, for Senate and House and country supplied
all that was necessary. Moreover, the President, as
became a chief magistrate, had been and still was using
every possible effort to avert war by peaceful and dip
lomatic methods, and continued to hope against hope
for a successful result. The American people like
wise were averse to war. An overwhelming majority
would have so declared even after the report on the
Maine had been submitted to Congress. On the other
hand, an equally overwhelming majority were deter
mined that there should be atonement for the Maine,
and that Spanish rule in Cuba — which had caused the
destruction of the ship — and the horrors of the "re
concentrados" should end. These demands ipeant war
even if those who made them did not realize it, and it
was this public sentiment that drove Congress forward
to meet the popular will, which members and Senators
very well knew could be fulfilled by war and in no
other way. Against the sentiment springing from
the popular instinct which at the great crisis of Amer
ican history has always been true and right, an opposi
tion strong in purpose although in large measure con
cealed, was arrayed. The naturally timid and con-
__^ervative elements of the community shrank from war,
and the powerful financial interests of the Eastern cities,
too short-sighted to see that their selfish advantage was
in the certainty of action an(l not in suspense, exerted
their great force to stop every forward step along the
Jaevitable path. For the result now was inevitable;
had been so, in reality, since the fatal isth of February,
32

United States Battle-ship IMaine

THE COMING OF WAR
although men did not understand it at the moment, and
still thought that they could stay the current of events
which had been gathering strength for seventy years
and broken loose at last.
The Maine message was sent in on March 28, and
as men everywhere discussed the evidence, it became
clear that although the President was reluctant to
abandon hope, the resources of diplomacy had failed.
What the exact course of the negotiations conducted
by the President and the able Assistant Secretary of
State, Judge Day, had been was unknown then, is not
known now, and will not be thoroughly known until the
time comes when the secret correspondence between
Washington and Madrid is open to the historian. But
it was perfectly well understood that Spain would not
grant independence to Cuba, and that whether our min
ister had made the fact plain to the Spanish govern
ment or not, no peaceful settlement was possible on
any other basis. Diplomats might plan, and twist, and
devise, and exchange notes, and deal in all the forms
\ so futile at a great crisis, but the American people had
Viade up their minds that the only real and possible
Solution was the end of Spanish rule in Cuba. They
had determined that the unsettled question must receive
this time a right answer, that it should knock at their
door no longer, and the American people were right.
Meantime the tension and exciteme.nt steadily in
creased. The peace-at-any-price people fought hard
but in vain against the sweeping tide of public senti
ment. It was understood that a message would come
to Congress on Monday, April 4. Then it was given
out that it would be sent in on Wednesday, April 6,
3 33

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
and the Capitol vras thronged in expectation of the
great event. When the House met, there was delay,
and then the leaders of the House and three Senators
of the Foreign Relations Committee were summoned
suddenly to the White House. There the President
showed them a despatch from General Lee, saying that
if the message went in that day he could not answer
for the lives of the Americans in Havana, and that he
ought to have until Saturday at least to get them out
of Cuba. To this appeal there could be but one answer.
The message must be held back, and the Senators and
members returned and made the announcement to their
respective Houses.
Thereupon the tension, the excited suspense,
the doubts, the rumors, were all renewed and
intensified. It was generally believed that Spain
would take advantage of this respite to make some
new proposition, even if she had not already done so,
and Saturday proved the correctness of the anticipa
tion. On that day word came that Spain proposed an
armistice with the insurgents, and that her council had
voted $600,000 for the relief of the "reconcentrados."
Those who wished to be deceived by these offers were
so deceived, but no one else. An armistice was im
possible without the assent of both parties to the war,
and the Cubans, on the eve of victory, of course would
not consent. Moreover, the armistice, as soon ap
peared, consisted merely in an invitation to the in
surgents to come in and lay down their arms. The
proposition was not even a well-framed or judicious lie.
As to the money for the "reconcentrados," it was an
empty sham. There is no proof that a peseta was ever
34

THE COMING OP WAR
really appropriated ; and if it had been, as General Lee
justly said, it would all have been absorbed by Spanish
officials before it reached its destination. The Spanish
case closed fittingly with these false and fraudulent
promises. Anxious as the President vras for peace, he could
not and would not accept as realities such shams as
these, and on Monday, AgriljUj^ the fateful message
on Cuban affairs at last came in, and was referred to the
Foreign Relations Committees of both Houses. The
reading of the message was listened to with intense
interest and in profound silence, broken only by a wave
of applause when the sentence was read which said,
"In the name of humanity, in the name of civilization,
in behalf of endangered American interests which give
us the right and duty to speak and to act, the war in
Cuba must stop." The President led up to this declara
tion by a dispassionate review of the Cuban question,
and by a strong and moving description of the condi
tions of the island, which he characterized as a wilder
ness and a grave. He asked Congress to empower him
to end hostilities in Cuba, and to secure the establish
ment of a stable government, capable of maintaining
order and observing its international obligations." He
said that he had exhausted diplomacy, and therefore
left the issue with Congress, while he referred to Con
gress for its consideration the statement that the
Queen-Regent had ordered a suspension of hostilities.
In the deep excitement of the moment many persons
felt that the message was too gentle, and that the Presi
dent really did not desire as yet decided measures. But
it was pointed out that when he asked Congress for au-
35

THE WAR With spain
thority to establish a government in Cuba "capable of
observing international relations," he requested power
to make Cuba independent, because only an independent
people can maintain relations of that character. More
decisive still, indeed absolutely conclusive, was the sim
ple fact that the President, having declared that he had
exhausted diplomacy, had remitted the question to
Congress. Congress has no diplomatic functions or
attributes. With a foreign nation it has but one weapon
— the war power; and when a President calls in Con
gress in a controversy with another nation, his action
means that Congress, if it sees fit, must exercise its
single power, and declare war. On this sound ground,
which is constitutionally the only ground possible under
such conditions, Congress proceeded to act.
For more than a week a draft of a resolution to be
passed by Congress had been in existence, and had been
seen by some Senators and a few others, which pro
vided that the President should be authorized to in
tervene in order to stop the war in Cuba, to secure their
peace, order, and a stable government established by
the free action of the people, and to use the army and
navy of the United States for these purposes. Whence
this resolution came, or who drafted it, was not known,
but some of those to whom it was submitted pointed out
that it was utterly vague, that under its carefully loose
terms the forces of the United States could be used to
crush the insurgents, and that the government to be set
up might be Spanish just as well as independent.
Whether this resolution emanated from those opposed
at all hazards to Cuba and to war, or not, it sank out
of sight for a time, and then reappeared in the report
36

THE COMING OP WAR
of the Committee on Foreign Affairs made in the
House on April 13. It read as follows :
Resolved, That the President is hereby authorized and directed
to intervene at once to stop the war in Cuba, to the end and with
the purpose of securing permanent peace and order there, and
establishing by the free action of the people thereof a stable and
independent government of their own in the island of Cuba; and
the President is hereby authorized and empowered to use the land
and naval forces of the United States to execute the purpose of
this resolution.
One very important change had been made in the
original draft, without which, it is safe to say, it could
not have passed the House committee. The alteration
was the insertion after the word "stable" of the words
"and independent." This greatly improved the reso
lution, but it still remained dangerously loose and
vague, and had the cardinal defect of not saying square
ly and honestly what the American people and Congress
intended, which was the expulsion of Spain from Cuba.
Nevertheless, after the Republican majority had voted
down the Democratic proposition to recognize the in
surgent government, the resolution as reported by the
committee passed by a vote of 324 to 19, and was sent
to the Senate.
The situation in the Senate was quite different. For
a week before the message of April 11 came in, the
Committee of Foreign Relations had been at work upon
a resolution based upon one introduced by Senator
Foraker of Ohio. The committee were determined
that any resolution reported by them should be perfectly
clear on the point that the object of the United States
was to put an absolute end to Spanish rule in Cuba.
With a preamble setting forth the treatment of the
37

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
"reconcentrados" and the destruction of the Maine
as the grounds of intervention, a resolution of this
' character was agreed to tentatively, and Senator Davis
of Minnesota, the chairman of the committee, drafted
a report to accompany it. Both the resolutions and the
report were sent to the President for such suggestion
and comment as he might see fit to make. After the
message of April ii came in, these resolutions were
taken up for immediate action. There was a desire
on the part of some members of the committee to come
as near as might be to the general line taken in the
House resolution, but the chief point of difference
arose upon the question of recognizing the government
of the insurgents. The President, with wisdom and
foresight, had declared in his message against any
such recognition. A majority of the Senate committee
sustained the President's position ; and while the whole
committee supported the main and essential resolution
as to the withdrawal of Spain, a minority reported, as
an amendment, a clause recognizing the insurgent gov
ernment. Senator Davis made the report for the com
mittee, and in that report the case of the United States
against Spain and the grounds of armed intervention
were stated not only in the best way, but with a force
and power, both legally and historically, which left
nothing to be desired. The resolutions of the commit
tee and the minority amendment submitted to the
Senate on April 13 were as follows :
REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS.
Whereas the abhorrent conditions which have existed for more
than three years in the island of Cuba, so near our own borders,
have shocked the moral sense of the people of the United States,
38

(jj^ iHEUiY M.CULLOM ^ , V}1 JOSEPH B.FOR.\KER ^Js%-\
r.!^^iii "-ll^m^^ ¦ tCa^^ OHIO a/ggS

Till'; ll.MTEl

.\ PES SEN.\rK rilllMMTKIC I l.\ Ei'kEIIIN ,\ EIWI US

THE COMING OF WAR
have been a disgrace to Christian., ciidlization culminating as they
have, in the destruction 'of a United States battle-ship, with 266
of its officers and crew, while on a friendly visit in the harbor of
Havana, and cannot longer be endured, as has been set forth by
the President of the United States in his message to Congress of
April nth, 1898, upon which the action of Congress was invited;
Therefore, Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled.
First. That the people of the island of Cuba are, and of right
ought to be, free and independent.
Second. That it is the duty of the United States to demand,
and the government of the United States does hereby demand,
that the government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and
government in the Island of Cuba, and withdraw its land and
naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters.
Third. That the President of the United States be, and he
hereby is, directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval
forces of the United States, and to call into the actual service of
the United States the militia of the several States, to such extent
as may be necessary to carry these resolutions into effect.
VIEWS OF THE MINORITY.
The undersigned members of said committee cordially concur
in the report made upon the Cuban resolutions, but favor the im
mediate recognition of the Republic of Cuba, as organized in the
island, as a free, independent, and sovereign power among the na
tions of the world. David Turpie.
R. Q. Mills.
Inc. W. Daniel.
J. B. Foraker.
The amendment reported by the minority-committee
was to amend the first paragraph, by inserting, in line
4, after the word "independent," the following :
And that the government of the United States hereby recog
nize the Republic of Cuba as the true and lawful government of
that island.
On the presentation of the resolutions to the Senate
a very earnest and very able debate ensued, which
39

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
turned almost entirely upon the question of recognizing
the insurgent government, and scarcely touched at all
the second resolution, which was the one really effect
ive and essential portion of the measure, which meant
war, and could mean nothing else. The discussion
lasted until Saturday evening, and then the Senate,
with only one absentee, voted in the presence of
crowded galleries and in the midst of intense excite
ment. The amendment of the minority of the Com
mittee on Foreign Relations was adopted by a vote of
51 to 37, thirty-three Republicans and four Democrats
constituting the minority, and ten Republicans voting
with the Democrats and the Populists in the majority.
The amendment of Senator Teller of Colorado, dis
claiming any intention of seeking sovereignty or do
minion over Cuba, was accepted by the committee and
agreed to without division. All other amendments
were voted down, a few short speeches were made,
chiefly by those opposed to the resolutions, the Senate
resolutions were substituted for those of the House, and
then the resolutions as amended were passed by a vote
of 67 to 21, nineteen Republicans and two Democrats
forming the minority, and twenty-four Republicans
voting with the Democrats and Populists in the major
ity. The resolutions were then sent to the House with
out a request for a conference, and the Senate ad
journed until Monday.
The Sunday which intervened was a day of rumors
and excitement. There was a well-founded appre
hension that enough Republicans would break away
and unite with the Democrats to carry concurrence
in the Senate resolutions as they stood, including the
40

KKIiFIKLli I'RCM'TOR
Whose report of liis nbser\'atinns i^f ih^ results oi Sji.niish rule in C'.".
profoundU' inlluenced public feeling in Anieiica

THE COMING OF WAR
recognition of the Cuban Republic. To prevent this
the Republican leaders of the House put forth all their
power, and made every exertion, with entire success,
as the event proved, so far as recognition was con
cerned. When the House met on Monday, Mr. Ding-
ley of Maine moved to concur in the Senate resolu
tions, with an amendment striking out the words "are
and" in the first resolution, and the entire clause em
bodying the recognition of the insurgent government.
This motion prevailed by a majority of 22. Thus did
it come about that in the struggle over the question
of recognition, forced into the resolutions by the ac
tion of the ten radical Republican Senators, every
thing else had been lost sight of, and in "everything
else" was the one essential, vital resolution which de
manded the withdrawal of Spain from Cuba. This
second resolution was the effective one, for it meant
war, and to this the leaders of the House, in their
eagerness to defeat recognition of the republic, had
been forced to agree, and the House accepted it with
out debate. With the two Houses agreed on this reso
lution, the real issue was settled, but much remained
to be done in order to end the controversy under which
had been carried the one absolutely vital clause in the
entire measure.
So the amended resolutions came back to the Senate,
the crowd rushed over from the House, pouring into
the deserted galleries, there was a short debate, and then
the motion of Senator Davis to concur was voted down
by 46 to 32, and the resolutions went back to the House
with the Senate's insistence and without a request for
a conference. The excited crowds of onlookers swept
41

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
over to the House, the resolutions were at once taken
up, and the House, by a majority of 26, voted to insist
on its amendments, and asked for a committee of con
ference. Again the crowds passed from the House to
the Senate, and the resolutions were once more taken
up. There was another debate, the ten dissenting Re
publicans announced that they would no longer insist
upon recognition of the Cuban Republic, a conference
was agreed to, and both Houses took a recess until
eight o'clock.
It was generally understood that on the Senate's re
ceding from its position in regard to recognition the
House would recede from its first amendment striking
out the words "are and," and personal assurances
were said to have been given to that effect. When
Senators and members returned to the Capitol, there
fore, they expected an agreement to be reported from
the conference, an immediate acceptance of the report,
and an adjournment in a few minutes. To every one's
surprise, and to the great indignation of the Senate,
a disagreement was reported from the committee, be
cause the House refused to recede on its amendment
to the first line striking out the words "are and." The
point was not worth a contest on either side, for the
whole phrase was purely rhetorical. It was rhetoric
when Richard Henry Lee first read it to the Conti
nental Congress, it was rhetoric still, hallowed by time
and association, when applied to Cuba. At the most
it was merely a declaration of intention, which it was
proposed to make good by converting the intention
into a fact. But personal feelings had been aroused,
and now began to run high. The Senate, justly or un-
42

THE COMING OF WAR
justly, believed that it had been unfairly dealt with,
while the House felt that the Senate was unreasonable.
In this mood the House, by a majority of 32, voted to
insist and asked for a further conference, which was
agreed to by the Senate. Again the conferees with
drew and the two Houses waited. The hours wore
drearily away, and rumors came thickly that there
would be another disagreement and a deadlock. Sen
ator Morgan of Alabama sent a plain declaration of
war up to the desk, and announced that at the proper
time he would call it up. The hint was not without
its effect. Senators hostile to Cuba crossed the Capitol
and urged upon the Speaker that the House should
give way. At this juncture the House conferees asked
to withdraw from the conference and hold a consulta
tion apart. They then saw the Speaker, returned, and
receded on the words "are and." After this an agree
ment was immediately reached, and reported to both
Houses. Midnight had passed and a new day* begun.
It was the 19th of April, a date very memorable in the
history of the United States, when the Senate, by a
vote of 42 to 35, and the House, by a vote of 31 1 to 6,
accepted the conference report. The resolutions as
finally agreed upon were precisely word for word those
reported by the majority of the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, with the single addition of Senator
Teller's amendment, which the committee had accepted.
The Congress of the United States had gone clear of
all pitfalls, and had declared just what the American
people meant it to declare, that Spanish rule in Cuba

*The legislative day was still the i8th of April.
43

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
must cease. In fact, if not in terms, it vras a declara
tion of war.
The resolutions thus adopted went at once to the
President, who held them over one day and then signed
them. He sent a copy, early on the morning of the
2 1 St, to the Spanish minister, Senor Polo y Bernabe,
who thereupon asked for his passports and left the
country. Before this, the resolutions had been cabled to
our minister at Madrid, but the despatch was there
held back long enough to enable the Spanish ministry
to send General Woodford his passports before he
could present the resolutions, a feat which called forth
much admiration on the Continent among those who
love diplomatic futilities, but which was as silly as
shams usually are in the presence of realities. For the
reality was war, and the precise manner in which it
was brought into existence was of trifling consequence
except to the arid diplomatic mind of Europe.
As soon as Spain severed her relations with the
United States, on April 21, the American fleet, under
the command of Admiral Sampson, was ordered to
Havana, and the President proclaimed a blockade of
that and certain other Cuban ports. On April 23, the
guns of the Nashville cracked across the bows of the
Buena Ventura, a Spanish merchantman; and Con
gress, on April 25, formally declared that war with the
kingdom of Spain had existed since April 21. The
pretences were over, the wrong which had lived on for
three-quarters of a century was now to be redressed,
the restless unsettled question was to get its true and
right answer at last. 44

CHAPTER III
MANILA
Fernao da Magalhaens, or Magalhaes, was a boy
when the discovery of Columbus fired the imagination
of western Europe, but he was also one of those whose
adventurous spirit was kindled and roused by this won
der tale of new lands beyond the Atlantic. He was still
young when, in 1505, he made one in an expedition
from Portugal, his native land, which, coming from the
West, discovered some of the famous Spice Islands.
Not long after, wounded by an insult from the Portu
guese government, which impugned his honor as a man
and a soldier, he left his country, solemnly and publicly
renounced his allegiance to Portugal, was naturalized
as a Spaniard, and took service with Charles V, who
had the instinct of greatness in picking out able and ef
fective men to do his work. Magellan, as we call him,
was imbued with the Columbian ideas, and also held
that, despite the Columbian discoveries, a short route
by water to the East could be found by sailing west
ward. It was a great conception, and a true one, ex
cept that the route was longer than that round the
Cape of Good Hope. With an expedition splendidly
equipped by the Emperor, Magellan set sail on August
10, 1 5 19. He crossed the Atlantic, touched at the bay
of Rio de Janeiro, made his way southward, repressed
45

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
savagely a dangerous mutiny, and on October 21 en
tered the strait which bears his name. On November
28 he passed out of it with only three of his five vessels
left, and found himself and his rejoicing crews in the
Pacific. He felt that he had succeeded, but he had mis
calculated the vast extent of the new ocean ; and sailing
on for days and days, in some fashion missed the count
less islands of the Pacific, and did not see land until he '
reached the little group which he called the Ladrones,
because the inhabitants stole a boat from him. There
he lingered a short time, either at Rota or in the cu
rious harbor of Guahan, destined, nearly four hundred
years later, to receive the war-ships of a nation of
whose future existence even those old believers in El
Dorado never dreamed. From the Ladrones, which
were discovered March 6, 1521, the weary voyage was
continued until a new archipelago was reached, on the
fifth Sunday in Lent. Gradually the magnitude of this
new discovery became apparent, and Magellan named
the new group in honor of St. Lazarus, on whose day
it was discovered. They landed on Mindanao, made
their way to Cebu, flattered themselves that they had
converted and subdued the inhabitants, and then be
coming involved in a tribal war, Magellan was killed,
and his chosen successor, Serrano, was left behind to
death and torture. Two ships escaped, one going east,
and one, the Victoria, under Elcano, which left Timor
on February 11, sailing still to the westward. On Sep
tember 6, 1522, after many hardships and perils, the
Victoria reached Spain, and a great voyage, the first
which circled the globe, second only to that of Colum
bus in conception, and beyond all in the daring
46

MANILA
displayed and the distance traversed, came to an
end. Thus was a new possession added to the dominion of
Spain; yet, although her navigators discovered it, a
fraud finally made it hers. By the treaty of 1494, as
afterwards expounded, all the world beyond the merid
ian 1,080 miles west of the Azores was divided be
tween Spain and Portugal, the eastern half going to
Spain. The Spaniards, however, made the maps, and
putting Magellan's discovery twenty-five degrees east
of its true position, brought it within the Spanish half,
when it really belonged to the portion allotted to Por
tugal. Twenty years later Villalobos, sailing from
South America, visited the islands of Magellan, and
named them the Philippines, in honor of the Prince of
Asturias, afterwards Philip II. Again twenty years
passed, and in 1565 a great expedition went from Mex
ico, and Spanish rule was established by Legaspi in the
Philippines — first in Cebu, and later in Luzon — which
was destined to continue unbroken for more than three
"lundred years.
Even in its last stage of decay, an empire which had
once thus arrogated to itself the possession of half the
world outside Europe still showed traces of its former
grandeur in scattered fragments lying far apart on
either side of the globe. When war came, and the
United States looked out to see where to strike its foe,
it found Spain present not only at its own doors, but
far away across the Pacific, and there in the distant
East the first blow fell.
The Navy Department, with watchful prevision, as
the relations with Spain grew more strained, began to
47

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
send out orders which would make all ready in case of
war. Even in January the commander-in-chief of the
European squadron was ordered to retain all men
whose enlistments had expired ; the Helena was stopped
at Funchal, the Wilmington in the West Indies, and at
the end of the month orders were sent to assemble the
European squadron at Lisbon. A month later orders
went to all the squadrons to fill their bunkers with coal,
and to be ready to move on the click of the wire. As
early as January 27 the Asiatic squadron also had been
directed to retain all men whose enlistments had ex
pired, and on February 25 a cable message was sent to
Commodore Dewey by Mr. Roosevelt directing him to
assemble his squadron at Kong-kong, retain the Olym
pia, which had been ordered back to San Francisco, and
be prepared in case of war for offensive operations in
the Philippines. On the 3d of March the Mohican was
sent with ammunition to Honolulu, there to await the
Baltimore, which was to take the ammunition on board
and proceed at once to join the Asiatic squadron. No
wiser or more far-sighted precautions were ever taken
by an administration than these, and it was all done so
quietly that no one on the outside knew what was hap
pening. While the country was stirring to its depths
with the events which were fast bringing our relations
with Spain to the breaking point, while the air was
filled with rumors and debates and the strife of con
tending forces, the Baltimore was speeding across the
Pacific carrying ammunition to the Asiatic squadron,
and Commodore Dewey was preparing very carefully
and accurately for certain work which he saw before
him. The order directing the Asiatic squadron to as-
48

MANILA
semble at Hong-kong had gone on February 25, and on
the following day another went telling the commodore
to fill all the bunkers with the best coal to be had. By
March 28 the squadron had assembled, and then came
a period of waiting. Very dreary and very hot this
waiting was, long drawn by constant strain and listen
ing. With much anxiety, and always on the alert all
through the trying time of suspense, the commodore
was constantly making ready. First he sent the fleet
paymaster over to the consignees of the English steam
ship Nanshan and bought her as she was, with 3,300
tons of good Cardiff coal on board. Then he bought the
Zaiiro, a steamship of the Manila-Hong-kong line,
just as she was, with all her fuel and provisions, and on
her was placed all the spare ammunition, so that she
became the magazine of the fleet. On April 18 the
McCulloch came in and joined the squadron. She was
only a revenue cutter, it is true, but she was as good as
a gunboat, being built of steel, having 1,500 tons dis
placement, and carrying four 4-inch guns and a crew
of 130 men all ready to fight. The news coming now
from the United States was fast removing every doubt
as to the future, and on the 19th of April, the day of
Concord, when the two Houses were passing the war
resolution, the American sailors in Hong-kong went
over the sides with their paint brushes, and in a few
hours the white was gone, and the ships looked leaden
and sombre in the dull dark drab of the war-paint. On
the 2 1 St, when General Woodford was leaving Madrid
and Senor Polo was slipping out of Washington, the
Baltimore appeared, a powerful addition to the fleet,
and bringing also her load of ammunition so that she
4 49

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
was doubly welcome. Hardly had the new-comer found
time to put on her war-paint when news came of the
declaration of war, and then of the English proclama
tion of neutrality. This compelled a departure from
Hong-kong on April 25 to the Chinese harbor of Mirs
bay, a few miles to the north ; but there was not to be
much more of the dreary waiting at this new anchor
age. On the following day the McCulloch, left behind
at Hong-kong, came rushing up the bay bringing a
despatch dated at Washington, April 24, and worth
reading just as it was written, for it opened a new page
in history, and has become famous from its results —
Dezvey, Asiatic Squadron:
War has commenced between the United States and Spain. Pro
ceed at once to Philippine Islands. Commence operations at once,
particularly against the Spanish fleet. You must capture vessels
or destroy. Use utmost endeavors. Long.
It is a great thing to be ready and to be without
doubts, and Commodore Dewey was both. Before
the day closed the captains had all been called to consul
tation on the flag-ship, and at two o'clock on April 2j
the sailing-pennant went up, and the fleet steamed out
of Mirs bay and steered southward across the 620
miles of one of the roughest seas in the world which lay
between them and the Philippines. On the morning
of April 30 the fleet was off Bolinao bay, and looked
in carefully. Nothing there. Then came Subig bay.
More care here, for the last report from Manila — a
report that had flown on the cables all over the world
— was that the Spanish admiral had broug'ht his fleet
to Subig bay, and meant to give battle there. The
Boston and Concord went ahead as scouts and exam-
5°

MANILA
ined the harbor. No enemy here either. Only two
little fishing-boats, from which not even information
could be obtained. Quite clear now that the Spaniards
had determined to make their stand at the gates of
their capital, and thither the fleet must go. So, on Sat
urday afternoon, April 30, the fleet started slowly
along the thirty miles which lay between it and Manila.
The tropical sun sank red across the land, and the
great yellow moon rose, on the other hand, out of the
sea to light them on their way.
Let us look at the squadron for a moment as it forges
onward past the Luzon coast. There are nine ships in
all, of which two the Nanshan, a collier, and the Za
iiro, a supply-ship, are non-combatants. Then there
is the McCulloch, a revenue-cutter, but, as has been
said, well enough built and armed to pass as a gunboat.
Next is the Petrel, a true gunboat, but very small, only
892 tons, and carrying four 4-inch and four small ma
chine guns. The Concord, also a steel gunboat, but
with a displacement of 1,710 tons, carries six 6-inch
guns, and a secondary battery of eleven machine-guns,
and has her deck and conning-tower protected. The
next step is a marked advance in power, and brings us
to the Raleigh, a second-rate steel cruiser of 3,213 tons.
Her armament consists of one rapid-fire 6-inch, and ten
rapid-fire 5-inch guns, with a secondary battery of eight
6-pounders, four i -pounders, and two Catlings. Her
deck and conning-tower are protected with armor; she
has a cellulose belt and steel sponsons. The Boston is
another cruiser of the second rate, of 3,000 tons, a par
tially protected deck, two 8-inch, and six slow-fire
6-inch guns, two 6-pounders, two 3-pound, two
51

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
i-pound rapid-fire, and four machine guns. The 5a/-
timore is a third steel cruiser of the second rate, with
a displacement of 4,413 tons, and a protection of steel
deck-plates and shields for all the guns and conning-
tower. Her armament is heavy, and consists of four
8-inch and six 6-inch guns, with two 6, two 3, and two
I pounders, all rapid-fire, and six machine guns. Last
in the list comes the Olympia, the flag-ship, a first-class
steel cruiser of 5,870 tons, protected by steel deck-
plates, steel-covered barbettes, gun-shields, and con
ning-tower, and a cellulose belt thirty-three inches thick
and eight feet broad. Her main battery is composed
of four 8-inch guns, her secondary battery of ten quick-
fire fives, and in addition fourteen 6-pounders, six
I -pounders, all rapid-fire, and four Catlings.
The speed of the ships varied from 21.5 knots for
the Olympia, to 13.7 knots for the Petrel, the latter,
or less, being of course the highest speed of the fleet.
Speed, however, played no part in the action, and need
not, therefore, be considered. From this summary it
will be observed that although the American ships were
all modern, and armed, as a rule, with the best modern
guns, there was not a single armor-clad among them.
They were all practically unarmored, and they were go
ing through channels which were said to be filled with
torpedoes, to encounter, so far as they knew, a more
numerous fleet, composed of old ships, it is true, but
armed with modern guns, and backed, as was under
stood, by forts mounted with the finest and heaviest
modern rifles. The prospect was serious, and it was
faced by officers and men alike with quiet confidence.
The night was still, and the fleet, as it drew near to Ma-
52

MANILA
nila, waited until the moon set, and then rounding the
last point, saw the entrance to the great bay, which
runs nearly thirty miles into the land, open before it.
A very splendid bay indeed it is — ^one of the finest har
bors, and one of the greatest of roadsteads ; as a har
bor, in fact, one of the prizes of the world, quite unde
veloped, because it has been in feeble, incompetent, and
corrupt hands ever since it was taken from its original
owners. Twenty-six miles from the mouth is Manila.
Some 250,000 people there, the vague Spanish statistics
tell us. It is an interesting town, low-lying, and called
the Venice of the East, because rivers intersect it. There
is a new and also an old town, the latter beautifully
walled in the manner of three hundred years ago, with
moats, drawbridges, and portcullises, altogether very
picturesque, and worthy of preservation. Ten miles
nearer the bay's mouth, and on the same side, lies Ca
vite, a suburb of Manila, with some 5,000 people, a
navy-yard, arsenal, and fortifications. At the entrance
of the harbor lie two islands pretty well in the middle
— one large, over 600 feet high, called Corregidor, one
small, but over 400 feet in height. Between the islands
is a narrow channel with eight fathoms of water at
the narrowest part. Between Caballo and the little is
land of El Fraile three miles width of channel with
eighteen fathoms of water, and known as the Boca
Grande. On the other side, between Corregidor and
San Jose point, a channel known as the Boca Chica,
two miles wide and of ample depth. Taken together,
they are very fit and stately entrances to the great bay
b'eyond. There are forts on Corregidor and Caballo,
as well as light-houses, and batteries also on El Fraile,
53

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
which lies to the southward. More forts are on Lim-
bones and San Jose points, heavily armed with the best
Krupp guns, according to the information brought to
Hong-kong. Nevertheless, they ah were to be passed,
and as the ships headed for the bay they saw the great
light, the guardian of peaceful commerce, burning
bright upon Corregidor. There was no light on the
ships, but the throb of the engines shook the still air
as they entered the Boca Grande, expecting each mo
ment a shot from the batteries. On they went, well into
the channel now, and still no sign of life from the shore.
The war-ships had all passed, when some enthusiast on
the McCulloch flung coals upon the fires, there was a
rush of sparks and black smoke from her funnel, and
the Spaniards waked up. A shot from the south side
of the channel broke the stillness, and then two more,
the shells dropping into the water. The reply came
from the Concord, and one of her 4-inch shells struck
the fort with a crash, followed by a cry in the darkness.
A shot from the El Fraile batteries was answered by
the Raleigh. Then an 8-inch gun boomed out from the
Boston, and the McCulloch snapped away with her
4-pounders; there was more firing from the batteries,
and then the islands and the mainland relapsed into
profound quiet, and it was all as if nothing had hap
pened. The American fleet had passed the dreaded
forts at the entrance, and was in the bay of Manila.
On glided the ships, ever more slowly and quietly,
until it seemed as if they hardly moved at all, and then
with the sudden dawn of the tropics came day, and
there ahead lay the Spanish fleet, close under the forts
and batteries of Cavite. The moment had come.
54

WRECK (JI- THE CRL'ISER ISLA DR CUIl.-l

MANILA
It came, fortunately, to a man who knew exactly
what he meant to do — a most victorious quality, and
one all too rare in a world given overmuch to uncer
tainty and stumbling. Commodore Dewey had his plan
thoroughly laid out, and now proceeded to carry it into
execution. Making a wide detour to the east to drop
the supply-ships out of range, the fleet swept slowly
along. As it passed, the batteries and ships at Cavite
opened fire, the sharp crack of the modern rifle min
gling with the heavier roar of the older guns. The
American fleet made no answer.
As the ships turned and passed in front of Manila
the sight-seers on the walls and the cathedral towers
could be seen with a glass, and the guns of the Luneta
flung some heavy shells far out and wide of the ships,
and a steady and useless fire continued from these bat
teries throughout the engagement. The Concord re
plied, and up went the signal on the flag-ship, "Hold
your fire until close in." So the fleet moved silently
and steadily down toward Cavite. Suddenly, just
ahead of the flag-ship, there came a quivering shock,
and a great column of water leaped into the air; an
other quiver and another burst of mud and water fol
lowed, again too far away for harm. The dreaded
mines were really there, then, and the fleet was upon
them; but no ship swerved, no man stirred, and, as
sometimes happens, the brave were favored, and this
was the last of the Spanish torpedoes. If there were
others, they failed to explode, and those which had ex
ploded failed to check the American ships for an in
stant. On they went, still silently, holding their fire,
the Spanish batteries and ships now beginning to pour
55

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
out shot and shell as their enemy drew near. Closer
and closer they came, until at last the distance was but
little over five thousand yards. "If you are ready,
Gridley, you may fire," said the commodore to the
captain of the Olympia. It seemed that the captain
was ready. The port 8-inch gun of the forward turret
rang out, and the great shell sped over the water to the
Spanish flag-ship. Up went the signal "Fire as con
venient," and the ships behind the Olympia opened at
once. The Spaniards were not behindhand. From
ships and forts there was a continuous roar, and the
shells began to strike all about the American squadron.
One burst so near the Olympia that its fragments cut
the rigging, ploughed a furrow in the deck, and tore
the bridge where the commodore stood. Still, none
were hit, and on the order to "Open with all the guns,"
the American ships poured forth a fire which in volume,
rapidity, and accuracy could not have been surpassed.
Back they came from the second round, within four
thousand yards this time, pouring in the same volume
of concentrated fire from the starboard as before from
the port batteries. The Boston and Baltimore were
both hit, but not materially injured, and again they
swung round in front of Manila, and again, nearer
than before, steamed steadily down toward Cavite. On
each turn they drew nearer to the Spanish fleet, and
the heavy, well-aimed American broadsides became
more and more deadly. The Spaniards were suffering
severely, and at seven o'clock the fiag-ship, Reina Cris
tina, left her moorings and steamed bravely out, di
recting her course toward the Olympia. What the pur
pose of the Spanish admiral may have been no one
56

-'^^¦*^-i^^#™'

WEST B.'VTTERY, C.W'ITE, AETER UESTRUCTIuN

MANILA
knows, but word was at once passed to concentrate all
fire on his advancing flag-ship. As she drew nearer,
the storm of the American fire thickened about her.
Her sides were torn, her bridge shot away; she could
not stand the awful battering, and turned about to re
turn to her anchorage. As she swung round, an 8-inch
gun of the Olympia sent a shell which struck her oppo
nent squarely in the stern. The great projectile raked
the Reina Cristina, tore up her decks, and exploded her
after boiler, so that she could barely reel back to the
shelter of the forts, with one hundred and fifty of the
crew dead and ninety wounded on board. While the
flag-ship was thus engag^ed, two gunboats equipped as
torpedo-boats slipped out from Cavite, one making for
the supply-ships. The Petrel rushed after the latter,
opened with the 4-pounders, drove her ashore, and then
blew her to pieces with her rapid-fire guns, which was
the end of the first Spanish torpedo-boat. The second
headed for the Olympia, kept on despite the fire of the
secondary battery, and began to get ominously near,
men thought, but coming under the fierce storm of the
machine-guns in the tops, turned to fly. So her end
came. A well-directed shell struck her fairly inside
the stern railing. There was an explosion, the gunboat
seemed to break in the middle, and down she went.
Meantime the Baltimore had set the Castilla, the only
wooden ship in the Spanish squadron, on fire, and she
was soon a mass of flames.
Five times in all did the American ships turn and
move past their opponents, each time closer, and each
time with a more deadly broadside. There had been
now two hours' hot work under the rising tropical sun,
57

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
and at a quarter before eight the commodore, errone
ously informed that ammunition for the 5-inch guns
was running short, ran up the signals to cease firing and
follow the flag-ship, so that he might consult with his
captains, and if needful redistribute the ammunition.
Something quite new and unheard-of, this stopping in
the middle of a great naval action for any purpose. It
is said that the American sailors, before they under
stood the nieaning of it all, began to grumble at not be
ing allowed to go on and finish up their task. The Span
iards, battered as they were, set up a cheer as they saw
their foe withdraw to the other side of the bay, and
sundry telegrams flew over the cable to Madrid saying
that the Spanish fire had "forced the American ships to
manoeuvre" (the Spanish version of the skillful evolu
tions which had helped so much the American fight
ing), and that the enemy had now retreated to land
their dead and wounded. Very characteristic and wor
thy of note these messages to Spain — no longer able to
recognize facts, living among lies and delusions, and
quite lost to that veracity of mind so essential, as Car
lyle has pointed out, to the successful existence of men
and nations. The evolutions of the American fleet were
all planned beforehand ; there were no dead and wound
ed, as the Americans found, not a little to their own
astonishment, when the reports were made after this
first round, and although several of the ships had been
hit, no injury in the least serious had been done to any
of them. Moreover, Commodore Dewey, as at the
start, knew just what he meant to do. The Spanish
fleet could not possibly escape. It had been disabled
and crippled in the first round, but it still held the har-
58

WRECK OF THE E1,.\G-SHIP, THE CRLHSER RE/.VA CK/STL\A

MANILA
bor, and the land batteries remained to be dealt with.
The orders were to "capture or destroy." There must
be none left ; none must escape to harass future opera
tions, or to try to cross the Pacific and alarm and per
haps attack the western coast of the United States. The
work demanded could be most surely finished and made
perfect if the men upon whom everything depended
were kept in the best possible condition. So, after the
withdrawal to the other side of the bay, there was a
good rest for all the crews, a hearty breakfast eaten
quite at leisure, a cleaning of decks and turrets, an ex
amination of all the guns, a fresh supply of ammuni
tion brought up, and then, at a quarter before eleven,
after three hours thus occupied, up went the signals,
the shrill whistles of the boatswains rang out, and off
the fleet went for the second and last assault.
This time the work was to be more direct. Again
the fleet swung round in front of Manila, and again it
steamed down toward Cavite, the Baltimore in the lead.
On it went, and first one Spanish shell, then another,
struck the Baltimore, and men were wounded by the
splinters. Still silence on the American ship, and no
reply to the Spanish fire until at last the range was less
than three thousand yards. Then the Baltimore poured
her broadside into the Reina Cristina, whence the ad
miral had transferred his flag to the Isla de Cuba, and
the former flag-ship, fatally wounded in the duel with
the Olympia, went to pieces under the fierce fire of her
new antagonist. Her magazines blew up, and she sank.
Then the Baltimore turned on the Don fuan de Austria,
and was joined by the Olympia and Raleigh. While
the Spanish ship quivered under the heavy fire, a shell
59

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
from the Raleigh pierced her magazine and she blew
up, tearing off also the upper works of a gunboat, which
was then destroyed by the Petrel. The General Lezo,
another gunboat, was driven ashore by the Concord
and burned, the Velasco went down before the Boston,
the burning Castilla was scuttled, and the Don Antonio
de Ulloa, the last ship which was able to fight, sank
under the fire of the Baltimore with her flag nailed to
the mast. Meantime the Petrel, running into shoal
water, set on fire and destroyed the Marques del Duero,
Don fuan de Austria, Isla de Cuba, Isla de Luzon, and
General Lezo. Just before this. Admiral Montojo, on
his new flag-ship, the Isla de Cuba, with his guns si
lenced and his fleet gone, had run the gunboat ashore,
hauled down his flag, left his vessel to its fate, and es
caped to Manila. Thus the Spanish fieet was complete
ly destroyed ; but the shore batteries continued to fire,
and one after another of them had to be silenced, which
was done as fast as the American ships could close in
upon them. They held out longest at Cavite, but a last
and well-placed shell entered the arsenal magazine, a
terrific explosion followed, the batteries all fell silent,
and the white flag went up on the citadel. The battle
of Manila had been fought and won.
The next day the fleet went into Cavite, and a land
ing party destroyed the batteries. On May 3 the forts
on Corregidor, at the entra'nce of the harbor, surren
dered to the Raleigh and Baltimore. At Cavite there
was an effort to pretend that no white flag had been
run up, and some cheap falsehood was indulged in, but
facts were a little too strong even for Spaniards. The
Spanish commander ran up the white flag again before
60

WRECK OF THE CRUISER ISLA DE LLVJUjV

MANILA
eleven o'clock, and departed with his men, whereupon
the American marines landed, and having assured the
priests and nuns that they were not going to massacre
the wounded in hospitals, as the Spanish had stated,
established a guard, and took possession of the arse
nal and dock-yards of Cavite. Commodore Dewey,
through the British consul, announced the blockade of
Manila ; and as the Spaniards, still unable to recognize
more than one or two facts at a time, refused to let him
control the cable, he promptly cut it, and thus held the
great harbor and city firmly in his grasp, stripped of all
means of communication with the outside world which
he did not allow.
The rapidity, brilliancy, and completeness of the
American victory at Manila riveted the attention of
the world. In Europe, where hostility to the United
States was everywhere felt and expressed, the news was
received either in the silence which is sometimes the
sincerest flattery, of with surprised expressions of won
der and grudging admiration. England, which from
the beginning manifested a genuine and cordial friend
ship, praised Dewey's work generously and freely. Yet
both on the Continent and in England, after the first
shock had passed, critics appeared who sneered at the
battle, called it a butchery, exaggerated the American
force and diminished that of Spain. One English critic
called it marvellously easy, and a well-known English
journal said Dewey had merely destroyed a few old
wooden ships. The last allegation was, of course,
merely a wilful falsehood, for there was only one wood
en ship, the Castilla, in the Spanish fleet, and the fact
that the others also burned proved nothing, for all Cer-
6i

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
vera's ships, the very latest productions of European
dock-yards, took fire, in the Santiago fight, just like the
older types at Manila. As to "its being so easy," it
certainly looked easy after it was all done, and so did
setting an egg on end seem easy after Columbus had
shown how to do it. Such criticisms are really beneath
contempt, but it is important to bring the facts clearly
together and examine them, for on those facts Dewey's
victory can stand without fear, and take its place in
history. The greatest naval action in which the victor came
down upon his enemy anchored in a harbor was Abou
kir. Of the splendor of Nelson's performance, and of
the victory which he won, there can be no question. Let
us try Dewey by that high standard.
The Bay of Aboukir is an almost open roadstead.
All that was necessary was to keep clear of the shoals
which make out from Aboukir point and island, and
then, if the wind were fair, as Nelson's was, to bear
down on the hostile fleet. The French fleet was an
chored at Aboukir, and so were the Spaniards at Ma
nila, with the additional protection of a boom at Ca
vite. The distance to be traversed by Nelson from the
open sea to the French fleet was trifling. He had no
channels to come through, no entrance-forts to pass, no
mines to fear. Dewey had to pass through a wide chan
nel, with powerful forts armed with modern guns on
either side, in order to enter the bay. He then had to
steam sixteen miles before he came opposite Cavite,
while, from the best information received, he expected
mines to be all about him, and two actually exploded in
his near neighborhood. Nelson's fleet was numerically
62

A Comparative View of the American and the Spanish Fleets engaged at Manila.
AMERICAN FLEET.

NAME.

Class.

Armament.

Men and
Officers.

BuUt in

Olympia 

Protected Cruiser 

Four 8-in., ten 5-in., 24 R. F 

466395272
295 150
100 130

1893

Protected Cruiser 

Four8-in., six 6-in., 10 R. F 
Two 8-in., six 6-in., 10 R. F 

1888

Boston 

Par. Protected Cruiser 

1884

One «-1q., ten 5-in., 14 R. F 

1892

Concord 

Gunboat 

Six 6-in., 9 R. F 
Four 6-in., 7 R. F 

1891

Petrel 

1888
1888
1,808
SPANISH FLEET.*
Reina Cristina 
Castilla 
Don Antonio de UUoa
Don Juan de Austria. ,
Isla de Luzon 
Isla de Cuba 
Velasco 
Marques del Duero . . .
General Lezo 
Argos 
Steel Cruiser 
Wooden Cruiser 
Iron Cruiser 
Iron Cruiser 
Steel Protected Cruiser. .
Steel Protected Cruiser. .
Iron Cruiser 
Gunboat 
Gunboat 
Gunboat 
Two torpedo-boats and t
Six 6.3-in., two 3.7, 13 R. F 
Four 5.9, two 4.7, two 3.4, two 3.9, 13 R. F.
Fonr4.7,5R.F 
Four 4.7, two 3.7, 31 R. F 
Six4.7, 8R. F 
Six4.7, 8R.F 
Three 6-in., two 3. 7, 3 R. F 
One 6.2, two 4 . 7, 1 R. F 
One3.5,lR.F) 
wo transports, practically not in action.
352349159179 156
156147
18871881 1875
188718871887 188118751885
>>
* El Correo is mentioned in Admiral Dewey's list of May 4, but is omitted in that given in his despatch of July 9, which
is followed here.
THE WAR WITH SPAIN
the same as that of his opponent, but all the English
fighting-ships were seventy-fours, while the French had
three heavier, one of 120 guns and two of 80 each. It
has been said freely and frequently that the Spanish
were so hopelessly inferior that they could only hope to
die, and that Dewey's sole glory was in the rapidity
with which he and his captains and men did their work
without injury to themselves. There is scarcely more
foundation for this statement than for the wholesale
falsehood of the English weekly that all the Spanish
ships were made of wood. The statistics on this point
are worth consideration and study.
Commodore Dewey had six fighting-ships, and the
revenue-cutter McCulloch, acting as convoy to the sup
ply-ships, and not taking part in the action. These six
ships have already been described, but for a better un
derstanding, their tonnage, armament and state of con
struction are given in the table on page 63.
Numerically the Spaniards had ten fighting-ships
and two torpedo-boats against the American six. Com
modore Dewey had no armored ships at all, and no
more protection against shell than his opponent. The
Spanish ships, compared to the American, were older
and of inferior types, but as they fought from an an
chorage, speed and engines did not count, and they
were armed with modern guns, which was by far the
most important qualification. The Spaniards had 52
classified big guns* and 72 rapid-fire and machine guns ;
the Americans 57 classified big guns, and 74 rapid-fire
and machine guns. The Americans had 10 eight-inch
guns, while the largest Spanish guns were 6.2 inches.
*Argos guns estimated at three.
64

KESIDE.N'CE OF AGUINALDO

MANILA
Commodore Dewey therefore had the advantage in
weight of metal and in heavy guns, and his flag-ship,
the Olympia, far outclassed anything opposed to him.
Nelson at Aboukir was slightly inferior to his antago
nist in weight of metal and number of guns, and had
no ship as powerful as L'Orient. On the other hand,
he equalled his foe in number of ships, while the Span
iards outnumbered Dewey two to one, and had 1,796
men against the American 1,678 engaged in action. A
far more important difference was that, while Nelson
had only the French fleet to deal with, the Spaniards
at Manila were supported by powerful, strongly
manned shore batteries mounted with modern rifled
guns, some of very large calibre. This last fact, too
much overlooked, made the odds against Dewey very
heavy, even after the two mines had exploded without
result. Both Dewey and Nelson hunted down the enemy,
and engaged them at anchor where they found them.
Nelson entered an open roadstead by daylight, began
his action at sunset, and fought on in the darkness.
Dewey ran past powerful entrance-forts and up a deep
bay in the darkness, and fought his battle in daylight.
Neither took the enemy by surprise, for Admiral Mon
tojo's report shows that he had tried Subig bay and
given it up, and that he then made every preparation
possible to meet the Americans at Cavite under the
shelter of the batteries. Nelson practically destroyed
the French fleet, but Admiral Villeneuve escaped the
next morning, with two ships of the line and two
frigates, and there was only one English ship, the Zeal
ous, not enough for the purpose, in condition to follow
5 65

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
them. Dewey absolutely destroyed every Spanish ship,
including the transport Mindanao, and captured the
other transport, the Manila. He silenced all the land
batteries and took Cavite. Aboukir had its messengers
of death in the escaping French ships ; Manila had none.
Absolute completeness like this cannot be surpassed.
The Spaniards admitted a loss of 634 killed and wound
ed in ships and forts, while the Americans had none
killed and only eight wounded, all on the Baltimore.
The American ships were hit several times, but not one
was seriously injured, much less disabled. This has
been attributed to the extremely bad marksmanship of
the Spaniards, and has been used to explain Dewey's
victory. It is easy to exaggerate the badness of the
Spanish gunnery. They seem, as a matter of fact, to
have shot well enough until the Americans opened upon
them. The shells which struck the Baltimore effect
ively were both fired before that ship replied in the sec
ond round. But when the American fire began, it was
delivered with such volume, precision, and concentra
tion that the Spanish fire was actually smothered, and
became wholly wild and ineffective. The great secret
of the victory was in the accuracy and rapidity of the
American gunners, which have always been character
istic of the American navy, as was shown in the frigate
duels of 1812, of which the United States won against
England eleven out of thirteen. This great quality was
not accidental, but due to skill, practice, and national
aptitude. In addition to this traditional skill was the
genius of the commander, backed by the fighting ca
pacity of his captains and his crews. True to the great
principle of Nelson and Farragut, Dewey went straight
66

MANILA
after his enemy, to fight the hostile fleet wherever
found. In the darkness he went boldly into an unfa
miliar harbor, past powerful batteries the strength of
which his best information had magnified, over mine
fields the extent and danger of which he did not and
could not know. As soon as dawn came he fell upon the
Spanish fleet, supported as it was by shore batteries,
and utterly destroyed it. The Spanish empire in the
East crumbled before his guns, and the great city and
harbor of Manila fell helplessly into his hands. All this
was done without the loss of a man or serious injury
to a ship. The most rigid inspection fails to discover a
mistake. There can be nothing better than perfection
of workmanship, and this Dewey and his officers and
men showed. The completeness of the result, which
is the final test, gives Manila a great place in the his
tory of naval battles, and writes the name of George
Dewey high up among the greatest of victorious ad
mirals.

CHAPTER IV
THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA
To THE American fieet which through many weary
weeks had been waiting for action in grim impatience
at Key West the news of the resolution of Congress and
of the President's order to sail brought great relief.
The order came in the late afternoon of April 21, but
there were still some ships to coal, some more detailed
instructions to be received from Washington, and it
was not until the next morning at half past six o'clock
that they got under way and steamed slowly off toward
Havana. The blockade proclaimed by the President
covered Havana and all ports east and west between
Cardenas and Bahia Honda, as well as Cienfuegos on
the south coast, from which a railroad ran to the capital
city. It was generally believed at the outbreak of the
war that Havana, which drew most of its supplies from
the United States, would soon be starved into surrender
when cut off from the continent and with nothing but a
desolated country behind it to turn to for relief. Events
showed that this conception, a perfectly natural one at
the time, was absolutely unfounded. Either Havana
had vast stores on hand, or the surrounding country
and the blockade-running through the southern ports
were able to supply the city, or all three sources com
bined were sufficient for that object. Whatever the ex-
68

THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA
planation, certain it is that although there was a great
deal of suffering in the capital, tliere is no indication
that at the end of tlie war it was, as a military position,
much nearer to surrender on account of starvation than
at the beginning of hostilities. Nevertheless, with the
theory then prevalent as to the desperate condition of
the city whose fall meant the end of Spanish rule in
Cuba, the American blockade closed tightly over Ha
vana, and in the opening days of the war Spanish ves
sels and steamships plying to the blockaded port fell
rapidly into the hands of the Americans, until this com
merce was practically stopped or destroyed.
Blockading and prize-taking were not, however, the
sole duties of the American fleet. It was obvious that
any attempt to get into the harbor of Havana through
its narrow channel crammed with mines would be at
once mad and useless. But it was at the same time very
desirable to keep open and unprotected, so far as possi
ble, the other harbors, because at that moment the
theory was that we should either land a large army to
proceed against Havana, or important expeditions to
co-operate with the insurgents in a movement to cut off
the capital from the interior. This theory, whether
strongly or lightly held, was soon set aside by events
and never acted upon — a very fortunate thing, for it
rested upon a gross underestimate of the strength of
Havana and of the Spanish forces, and upon an equally
gross over-estimate of the numbers and efficiency of the
insurgents. In the early days of the war, however, it
had sufficient strength to affect the naval operations
near Havana, but very luckily led, practically, only to
work which it would have been well to do in any event.
69

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
The first affair growing out of these conditions,
and the first action of the war, occurred at Matan
zas. It was discovered that the Spaniards were es
tablishing batteries and raising new fortifications at
that port, and on April 27 Admiral Sampson's flag
ship, the New York, supported by the monitor Puritan
and the unarmored cruiser Cincinnati bombarded the
defences. The Spanish shooting was very bad, only
three shots coming near the New York, and none hit
ting the Cincinnati, which was much exposed. The
American shooting, on the other hand, was good, from
the guns of the Puritan to the rapid-fires of the
Cincinnati. The Spanish batteries and earth-works
were badly shattered and broken up, and many
guns dismounted. As the Captain-General of Cuba
announced that only one mule was killed, we may con
clude with almost absolute certainty that there must
have been a very considerable loss of life among the
troops exposed to the American fire. Except as a warn
ing to the Spaniards, and as a test of American marks
manship, the affair of April 27 at Matanzas was of tri
fling importance, although great attention was given to
it at the moment because it was the first action of the
war by land or sea. But while the fleet was thus carry
ing out its orders by its vigorous blockade, by opening
a bombardment on the lesser ports, and by harassing
the coast batteries and garrisons, events were occurring
elsewhere which determined the future course of the
war. On April 23 the President called for 125,000 volun
teers, and on April 25 Congress adopted a formal dec
laration of war, which stated that war had existed since
70

THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA
April 21 — an unquestioned truth. On the 26th the
President announced that the United States, although
not a signatory, would adhere to theagreement of Paris,
and permit no privateers. The wisdom of this prompt
and righteous declaration was seen at once in the ap
proval which it received abroad, and in the embarrass
ment which it caused to Spain, where hopes were enter
tained that, all social and national efficiency being dead,
something might still be done by legalized piracy. In
ternational opinion was still further conciliated by our
giving thirty days to all Spanish ships to leave our
ports. Thus, while Congress was voting money and
preparing a bill for war revenue, while the call for vol
unteers was going through the land, while camps were
being formed, men mustered in, the regulars brought
together from all parts of the country and mobilized at
Tampa, we were settling rapidly and judiciously our
relations with the other powers of the earth. There
was never a moment when any European power could
or would have dared to interfere with us, although col
umns of speculations, predictions, and mysterious warn
ings filled the newspapers on this subject. And as there
was no danger that any one power would interfere, so
after Manila there was no peril to be apprehended from
any combination of powers. That was the crisis, and
when England refused to join the concert of Europe
in interfering with us in the Philippines — an act not to
be forgotten by Americans — all possible danger of in
terference from any quarter was at an end. Neverthe
less, as we adjusted our relations to the rest of theworld
wisely and quickly, when we caught Spain by the throat,
71

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
so the rest of the world made haste to define their rela
tions, both to us and to our antagonist.
England declared her neutrality on April 23, the
same day on which the Governor-General of Hong
kong requested Commodore Dewey to leave English
waters within forty-eight hours — a polite invitation
fraught with much meaning to what remained of
Charles V's empire in the East. But we were not the
only people who had a fighting fleet in neutral waters.
For some time past Spain had been collecting a torpedo-
boat flotilla and a squadron of armored cruisers. The
fleet thus brought together had come to the Canaries,
and thence had proceeded to the Cape Verde Islands.
In the days after the Maine explosion, when relations
between the two countries were straining to the break
ing point, the movements of these Spanish ships excited
intense interest. It was rumored that they were to
come to Puerto Rico, and had they done so their arrival
would have precipitated war. But they did not start ;
they remained quietly at the Cape Verde Islands, and
when war came they still lingered. It may well be
doubted whether they would have moved at all if they
had been in a Spanish harbor, but, unluckily for them,
the Cape Verde Islands were Portuguese, and al
though Portugal was entirely friendly to Spain,
she was obliged to issue a proclamation of neu
trality on April 29. Thereupon the Spanish fleet
departed, under orders from Madrid. The light tor
pedo boats, unprotected cruisers, and transports went
north to the Canaries, and thence to Spain. The fight
ing-squadron was lost sight of steering westward.
This squadron consisted of the Colon, the Almirante
72

THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA
Oquendo, the Viscaya, and the Maria Teresa, armored
cruisers of the first class, all new, all the best work of
European dock-yards, with heavy batteries of the finest
modern rifles, eight inches of armor, and a contract
speed of over twenty knots, and of three large torpedo-
boat destroyers, the Furor, Pluton, and Terror, just out
of English yards, the last expression of Scotch and
English building, and with a contract speed of thirty
knots. The squadron, as it appeared on paper and in the
naval registers, was, as a whole, powerful in armament,
fast, and very formidable. There it was, then, loose on
the ocean, and the question which at once arose and
overshadowed all others was where Admiral Cervera
and his ships were going, for they represented the Span
ish sea power. When they were found and destroyed,
the campaign on the Atlantic side would be over, and
the expulsion of the Spaniards from the American hem
isphere could be effected at the pleasure of the United
States. Until they were destroyed no movement could
be safely or conclusively undertaken against either Cuba
or Puerto Rico. It was the old, ever-recurring prob
lem of the sea power, as crucial and decisive to the
United States in the spring of 1898 as it was to Rome
when Hannibal faced the legions, or to the English
when Napoleon banded all Europe together against
Great Britain.
The Spanish fleet was somewhere in the mid- Atlantic ;
that was all that was known, and speculation was rife as
to its destination. The people of the Atlantic seaboard
thought that a descent upon the coast towns was at
hand — an obviously impossible solution, because in the
waters of New England the Spaniards, far removed
73

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
from any base, would have courted destruction. So
this opinion was rejected by the Navy Department.
Another opinion was that Cervera was steaming away
southward to cut off the Oregon. Here, unfortunately,
there was much greater probability of truth than in the
chimera of the descent on the Atlantic coast towns.
But the Strategy Board wisely decided that to divide
or scatter the fleets in an effort to protect the Oregon
would be a mistake of the first order. The great bat
tle-ship must take her chance. Either she would slip
by her enemies safely, or, if she met them, she would so
cripple them that their effectiveness would be gone.
So the Oregon was left to her fate.
Thus two possibilities for the Spanish fleet were con
sidered and set aside. A third was that, after making
a wide turn, the fleet would return to Spain, and rumors
of its reappearance at Cadiz kept coming until the mo^
ment when the truth was known. Such a proceeding
as this, however, seemed too absurd, even for a Span
iard, to a world which had not yet seen Admiral Camara
go back and forth through the Suez Canal ; and the au
thorities in Washington, in consultation with Admiral
Sampson, decided that Cervera was intending to do the
sensible thing from a naval standpoint and make for a
port from which he could operate toward the relief of
Havana. It was further conjectured, and on all the
known facts and conditions very wisely conjectured,
that the Spanish fleet would come to Puerto Rico, the
natural and only strong Spanish base for operations
directed toward Cuba. On the speed to be fairly esti
mated for such a fleet the time of their arrival at Puerto
Rico could easily be determined. So it came about, on
74

THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA
this theory of the conditions, that soon after noon on
May 3 the battle-ships Iowa and Indiana left Key West,
whence the flag-ship New York followed them at night.
The rendezvous was at Juruco Cove about twelve miles
east of Havana. There they were joined by the two
monitors Terror and Amphitrite, from the blockading
squadron, the two unarmored cruisers Detroit and
Montgomery, the torpedo-boat Porter, the tug Wom-
patuck, and a collier. Then they started east to find the
Spanish fleet. A more ill-assorted squadron it would
have been difficult to imagine, and the necessity which
made it so came from the insufficient, unsystematic
naval authorizations of Congress running back over
many years. In the two essential qualities of the
modern fleet, homogeneity of type and evenness of
speed, they were painfully deficient. The squadron
was composed of the most discordant types, and varied
in speed from the twenty knots or more of the New
York to the monitors' maximum of less than ten. The
monitors, in fact, were nothing but a perilous incum
brance. Their low speed and limited coal capacity
made it necessary to tow them, and they thus reduced
the speed of the fleet to about seven knots. In any sort
of seaway it was impossible to fight their guns, and if
an enemy had been encountered in the open ocean, they
would have been a hindrance and a danger, not a help.
Thus burdened with ships fit only for the smooth waters
of a harbor, and with a fleet-speed of seven knots. Ad
miral Sampson, thanks to the parsimony of Congress,
set forth in pursuit of a powerful squadron of homo
geneous armored cruisers, with a uniform contract
speed of twenty knots. 75

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
His departure was the end of the crude idea with
which the war opened, that we were to batter down the
Morro Castle and the Cabanas forts, land a few thous
and troops, and take Havana out of hand. Before the
war a high authority was reported to have said that in
ten days we could have 40,000 men ready for operations
in Cuba. April 23 the President called for 125,000
volunteers, and a month later for 75,000 more. It was
at once discovered that but very few of the regiments
furnished by the States were fully equipped; most
of them were only partially prepared, and many were
not equipped at all. Instead of being able to mobilize
40,000 soldiers in ten days, it was found that it was not
possible to even muster them in that time. While
sundry newspapers were clamoring for an immediate
advance on Havana, it was becoming quite clear to all
men, even in those confused days, that it would take
weeks and months, rather than days, to make these
really fine volunteers into an army ; that the machinery
of transportation, supplies, hospital service, and the rest
was utterly inadequate for the strain suddenly put upon
it, even if it had been good, and that it was not good,
but bad and rusty. On May 14, ten days after Samp
son's departure for Puerto Rico, there were only a little
over 10,000 men at Tampa, and the wise men who had
said from the beginning that we ought to move on
Puerto Rico, the Spanish base, and not begin in early
summer on Havana, ultimately carried their point be
cause of facts more potent than the best reasoning.
But no military movement being possible until we
had command of the sea, the pursuit of Cervera's fleet,
from both the military and the naval point of view, was
76

THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA
the one thing to which all else had to be subordinated.
So while the generals and admirals of civil life were
laying out and discussing campaigns in the newspapers,
facts were putting the real war into the right channels ;
and while the prepared navy was off after Spain's sea
power, the unprepared army was occupying the time
thus fortunately given in getting ready with an energy
and speed most remarkable when one understood the
wretched system imposed upon it by Congress, and the
weight of needless clerks, endless red-tape, and fear of
responsibility which had grown up in choking luxuri
ance during the long, neglectful peace.
But although the direct attack on Havana so confi
dently looked for at the outset was thus practically
abandoned the work of blockading the island and cut
ting it off from all outside communication went dili
gently forward. Various expeditions were undertaken
to open connection with the Cuban insurgents and sup
ply them with arms and ammunition, as the exagger
ated estimate then existing of their numbers and
efficiency made the belief general that they could be
developed into a powerful offensive force, and be used
with effect against the Spaniards. Then and later
various expeditions were sent forth- in the Leyden,
Gussie, and Florida, but they had no result. The
earlier landings, managed and conducted in large
measure by Captain Dorst of the regular army, a most
gallant and accomplished officer, were effective some
times in the face of a sharp fire. The first skirmishing
took place on one of these expeditions, much courage
was shown, some blood was shed, arms were landed,
and communication opened with the insurgents, but
77

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
that was the end of it. There was no trouble about the
expeditions, but nothing was developed by them among
the insurgents.
More serious work was that entailed by the blockade
and by attacks upon the lesser ports to break down the
defences and destroy any lurking gunboats. Before
the New York went eastward she had broken up some
parties of Spaniards who, with strange absence of hu
mor, had opened on her with Mauser rifles at Mariel,
but she was drawing very near to San Juan when, on
May II, a far more serious affair than any which had
yet taken place occurred at Cardenas. Off that port
the gunboats Machias and Wilmington, the torpedo-
boat Winslow, and the converted revenue-cutter Hud
son were maintaining the blockade. After a time it
was learned that there were three Spanish gunboats
in the harbor, and on the Sth of May an attempt was
made to decoy them out of the harbor, which so far suc
ceeded that one came within range of the Machias, got
a 6-pounder shell landed upon her, and quickly re
treated. It was obvious, after this, that to fight the
Spaniards it was necessary to go after them wherever
they might be, a discovery which became later an ac
cepted principle of the war. Acting on this theory, the
Wilmington, Winslow, and Hudson, on May ii, made
their way into the bay along an unused channel, which
was free from mines, until they were within a mile and
a half of the wharves where the enemy's gunboats were
lying. Then the water became too shoal for the Wil
mington, and the Winslow was ordered ahead to at
tack. It was a most reckless piece of work to under
take, for the Winslow was a torpedo-boat, not a fight-
78

THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA
ing-ship, her sides were not over a quarter of an inch
thick, and she was going to meet ships carrying 12-
pounders. Her daring commander. Lieutenant Berna
dou, and his officers and men, were, however, only too
eager to make the attempt. On they went, opening
vigorously with their i-pounders to which the Span
iards replied fiercely. Presently they found themselves
among some red buoys, which, as it proved, marked
ranges, and the shots from the batteries and the gun
boats began to come home. Ten struck the unpro
tected boat; Lieutenant Bernadou was badly wounded,
but managed to keep his feet, the steering-gear was
smashed, and one engine. Then came the eleventh
shot, which killed Ensign Bagley and four men. The
brave little boat was now floating helplessly in full
range of the Spanish guns. Her destruction seemed
certain, but the Hudson, really nothing more than an
armored harbor tug, but commanded by a gallant rev
enue officer. Lieutenant F. H. Newcomb, came bravely
to the rescue. The Hudson had crept slowly after the
Winslow, and firing rapidly on the Spaniards, now
started, in the midst of a storm of projectiles, to bring
off the disabled torpedo-poat. Twice she got a line to
the Winslow, and twice it parted. Then the Hudson
got alongside, and towed the wounded boat, with her
blood-stained decks and broken sides, out of range and
into safety. There were five killed and five wounded
out of the Winslow's complement of twenty-one officers
and men, a terrible percentage, and the heaviest loss
incurred by the American navy in any action of the
war. It was a rash undertaking, but most gallantly
faced and brilliantly attempted, a proof, to those who
79

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
rightly interpreted it, of a very high and victorious
spirit in the navy of the United States, waiting only for
a large opportunity to win corresponding triumphs.
Nor did the blow dealt the Winslow go unavenged.
When the Hudson and her consort were out of the way,
the Wilmington drew in, destroyed the Spanish gun
boat which had been engaged, and smashed and si
lenced all the shore batteries, with a heavy loss to the
garrisons. There was nothing more to be feared from
the gunboats or defences of Cardenas.
The same day that the Winslow, the Hudson and
the Wilmington were having their action at Cardenas,
far away on the southern coast of Cuba another fight
was taking place, in the progress of the work of sepa
rating the great island from the rest of the world. On
the night of May lo. Captain McCalla of the Marble-
head called for volunteers to protect the cable-cutters
in their work. The roll was soon filled, and the next
morning the steam-launches of the Marblehead and
Nashville, towing the two sailing-launches under com
mand of Lieutenants Winslow and Anderson, started
into the harbor of Cienfuegos about quarter before
seven. They carried a squad of marines picked for
proficiency as marksmen, and a machine-gun in the bow
of each boat. The Nashville and Marblehead then
opened fire on the Spanish batteries, and under cover
of this, and that of the steam-lauiiches, the crews of
the other boats went to work. It was a perilous busi
ness, but the sailors grappled and cut successfully the
two cables they had been ordered to destroy. They also
found a third small cable, but the grapnel fouled the
bottom and was lost. Meantime the Spanish fire grew
80

CUTTING THE CABLES UNDER FIRE AT CIENFUEGOS

THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA
hotter and hotter, pouring out from the batteries and
machine-guns, and the boats began to suffer. The
well-directed fire from the rifles of the marines and
from the one-pounders kept the Spaniards from reach
ing the switch-house which controlled the submarine
torpedoes, but launches could not contend with bat
teries at close range, and when the work for which they
came, and which had all been performed under a heavy
fire, was done, they withdrew to the ships. Nine men,
including Lieutenant Winslow, had been wounded,
some seriously, and three, as was reported later, mor
tally. It was a very gallant exploit, coolly and thor
oughly carried through, under a galling fire, and it
succeeded in its purpose of hampering and blocking in
the enemy at the important port of Cienfuegos, which
was the road to Havana from the southern coast. It
was another twist in the coil which the United States
was tightening about Cuba.

CHAPTER V
THE PURSUIT OF CERVERA
Meantime the ill-assorted fleet under Admiral
Sampson was making the best way it could eastward,
and the pursuit of Cervera's fleet had fairly begun. It
was known when the Spaniards had sailed, but whither
they had gone could only be a matter of guess. They
might be going to harry the New England coast, or at
least, as has been said, some persons thought this possi
ble. More reasonable was the second theory already
alluded to that they intended to intercept the Oregon.
The great battle-ship had arrived on March 9 at San
Francisco, and on the 19th, with Captin Clark in com
mand, she started on her long voyage round Cape Horn,
to join the North Atlantic Squadron. On April 7 she
left Callao, where she coaled, for Sandy Point, run
ning steadily on through heavy seas, and maintaining
high speed. On April 16 she reached the strait, and
rode out a severe gale at her anchors, at Port Tamar.
The next day the battle-ship was at Sandy Point, where
she coaled again, and picked up the gunboat Marietta.
On the 2 1 St the ships ran through the strait by which
Magellan passed to found Spain's empire in the East,
and turned northward in Atlantic waters. Here came
the shadow of a new danger, for the Spanish torpedo-
boat Temerario was at Montevideo, menacing an at-
82

THE PURSUIT OF CERVERA
tack in the night. But there was no change in speed or
direction. On the ships forged, with guns shotted, the
rapid-fires ready, and lights screened at night. Offi
cers and men stood double watches, and those carried
insensible from the fire-room begged to return as soon
as they came to themselves. Luckily for her, the Tem
erario never became visible, and on April 30 the Ameri
can ships were at Rio. Here they met a cordial recep
tion, and once more were coaled. Here too came news
of the existence of war, and of the sailing of the Span
ish fleet with an unknown destination. Four power
ful armored cruisers and three torpedo-boats, some
where, perhaps on the track to the north : heavy odds
these for one ship. But Captain Clark leaves Rio on
May 4, drops his slower consorts, the Marietta and
Nictheroy, off Cape Frio, and there is no quiver in his
despatch of May 9, from Bahia. He says, quite simply,
"The Oregon could steam fourteen knots for hours,
and in a running fight might beat off and cripple the
Spanish fleet," and those who read these words think
of Sir Richard Grenville in the years gone by, and
know that the sea spirit of the north, drawn from a far-
distant past, is still burning strong and clear in this
American captain and his crew. So he leaves Bahia,
and on May 18 he is at Barbadoes, and then comes an
other space of anxiety, deeper among men on land than
among those on the battle-ship, and then the country
hears, on May 24, that the Oregon is at Jupiter Inlet,
Florida, her great voyage done. A pause, and then the
world knows that the Oregon, after her 14,000 miles
through all seas and weather, is on her way to join the
fighting-line, not a rivet, nor a bolt, nor a gearing
83

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
broken or out of place. It appears very sharply in this
fashion that, despite wise critics in Europe, American
battle-ships can make great voyages and face the seas
as well as fight, and that there is a capacity for true
and honest workmanship in the United States very
comforting to think on. Very clear, too, is the still
greater fact that the American seamen, captain and
crew, are filled to-day with the old spirit of the sea-
conquerors shining undimmed and strong.
So the Spanish fleet did not seek the Oregon, and
would have been crippled and shattered if it had made
the attempt, and the department very wisely left the
battle-ship to take care of herself, and would not divide
the fleet. And it was also decided, as has already been
said, that the enemy would not go to New England,
but that, on the assumption (a very violent one, as ap
peared later) of intelligent action, they would go to
the obvious and all-important Spanish base of Puerto
Rico. So thither went Admiral Sampson, warned at
Cape Haitien from Washington not to risk damage to
his ships in a bombardment, and on May ii, when the
Winslow was fighting desperately at Cardenas, and
other American sailors were cutting cables at Cien
fuegos, the fighting-fleet was drawing near to San Juan.
It was still dark when the lights of the town became
visible the next morning, and when the sun rose the
city lay before them. The admiral's flag was shifted to
the Iowa, the tug Wompatuck was anchored to mark
the ten-fathom line, and then the ships, with the De
troit leading, went in and opened fire, while the Mont
gomery ran by and silenced the batteries of Fort Canelo,
on the other side of the bay. The Spanish gunnery
84

THE DAILY POSITIONS OF THE SPANISH SQUADRON UNDER ADMIRAL CERVERA
Taken from the log-book of the Cristobal Colon

THE PURSUIT OF CERVERA
was bad, the American, improving after the first round,
very good. The forts were seriously damaged, but
neither destroyed nor silenced. Some shells passed
over into the town, wrecking and setting fire to certain
buildings. In the third round both the New York and
Iowa were hit, but not seriously, and one man was
killed and seven wounded. The best reports ob
tainable put the Spanish loss at forty killed and
seventy wounded. After three hours of this work
the signal was made to cease firing, and the bom
bardment of San Juan was over. It had answered en
tirely its purpose, which was merely that of a recon
noissance in force. That it was a mistake to send the
fighting-ships on such an errand is probably true but at
least it had been demonstrated that the Spanish fleet
was not there, which was of high importance, and that
the surrendei of the city could be compelled, know
ledge, of which no advantage was taken at any time,
and which was useless at the moment, as we had no
landing force. Such were the results of the affair of
San Juan to the Americans ; but there was another out
come, which affected only the Spaniards.
The authorities at Washington were striving to
guess accurately the probable destination of the Spanish
fleet, and they very naturally based their reasoning on
what was publicly known of the character and quality
of the enemy's ships, and upon the proposition that
they had a plan, and would endeavor to do the best and
most effective work possible. We know now that the
Spaniards had no plan whatever, that their ships were
defective in guns and ammunition, and that, instead
of having a homogeneous and high speed rate, they
85

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
were in poor condition, and the Vizcaya in such a state
that, in Admiral Cervera's words, she was "a boil on
the fleet." All calculations, therefore, based upon the
contract speed of the Spanish cruisers, and upon the
theory that the Spaniards had a plan, were quite idle
in regard to an enemy with ships in bad condition and
no plan at all. So while Washington was carrying the
Spanish fleet rapidly over the ocean at ten to twelve
knots an hour toward a well-defined objective-point, in
reality they were creeping along at seven knots an hour
and making vaguely for some point in the West Indies,
to do they did not know what. On May 12, without
any apparent reason, they brought up at the friendly
French port of Martinique, and there they heard of the
bombardment of San Juan, which had its last result
in convincing the Spaniards that, whatever happened,
they would not go to Puerto Rico and run into the arms
of Admiral Sampson. So, leaving behind the Terror,
which had been damaged by the voyage they went on
in purposeless fashion to the Dutch island of Curacoa,
like Martinique, within touch of cables, so that the
wastes of ocean no longer sheltered them, and their
whereabouts was published to the world. This fact and
the laws of neutrality made a stay impossible, and on
May 15 the poor, aimless, vaguely wandering fleet, af
ter getting a little coal, set forth again and went to
Santiago de Cuba, for no better reason, seemingly, than
that it was the nearest port under the Spanish flag
where they could hope to coal and refit.
This haven, the last they were ever to enter, was a
typical Cuban harbor. A narrow entrance, with a chan
nel only a hundred yards wide, cuts sharply between
86

''ff/l \
'il''
¦1 '^'' I

THE PURSUIT OF CERVERA
high hills, one of which is crowned by the picturesque
"Morro Castle." An island faces the entrance chan
nel, which, dividing, passes on either side, and then
opens out in a broad and beautiful bay, with the city
lying at the foot of the encircling hills. Everything
in the harbor is quite invisible from the open sea. No
more secure place could be imagined; for no hostile
fleet, unsupported by an army could pass that narrow
channel sown with mines; while on the other hand, no
harbor could be more readily blockaded, and to go out
unperceived in the face of an alert and watchful enemy
was impossible.
Here, at all events, was a chance to rest. There was
no military or naval purpose to be served in Santiago,
which had no communication with Havana except by
telegraph, but it was better than helpless wandering.
Coal, slow in delivery, as well as provisions, was to be
had there, and it was a very inviting hiding-place if
not trusted in too long. In this wise, at all events,
whatever their reasons, the Spaniards hid themselves,
and the more active part of the game was meantime
carried on by the Americans, whose one object now
was to seek and find. This was a very difficult task.
We knew when the Spaniards reached Martinique, we
knew again when they left Curacoa, and then the veil
dropped, and Washington went to guessing and con
jecturing, much hampered by the difficulty of getting
news and orders to the fleets before the former had
been superseded by fresh information and the latter
had become obsolete. Nevertheless the department did
its best in all the confusion of reports and conjectures.
On May 13, the day after the arrival of the Spaniards
87

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
at Martinique, the Flying Squadron under Commodore
Schley, consisting of the Brooklyn, Massachusetts, and
Texas, which had been kept for this contingency in
Hampton Roads, sailed for Key West, and every effort
was made to convey information to the Puerto Rican
expedition. The same day Admiral Sampson, knowing now that
Cervera was not in San Juan, with prompt decision
sailed for Havana, the central point to be guarded in
case Cervera was aiming to break the blockade there,
as he ought to have been. When Sampson reached
Cape Haitien he received despatches announcing the ap
pearance of the Spaniards at Martinique, and then at
Curacoa, with the subsequent departure from the latter
island. Telegrams went at once to warn blockaders
at Cienfuegos and to the scout Harvard. In the latter,
dated May 15, the admiral said that the destination
of the Spaniards was unknown, but was probably San
tiago or San Juan — an instance of sagacity and insight
which is most remarkable, for at that time nobody had
thought of Santiago, which on the face of things was a
most unlikely refuge. This done, the admiral left his
slow-going squadron, and in the New York steamed
as rapidly as possible to Key West. On the way he got
tidings from a despatch-boat, which told him that
Schley had sailed, and that Cervera had with him mu
nitions of war (which is now known to have been un
true), and that therefore his object must be to connect
in some way with Havana. The statement as to the
munitions pointed directly to Cienfuegos as the obvious
destination of the Spanish fleet. Therefore, on ar
riving at Key West he sent the Flying Squadron, con-
88

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THE DAILY POSITIONS OF FLEET IN CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE SPANISH SQUADRON
THE PURSUIT OF CERVERA
sisting of the Brooklyn, Massachusetts, Texas, and
Scorpion, on May 19, with orders to proceed as rap
idly as possible to Cienfuegos. The following day the
Iowa, Castine, and the collier Merrimac, with over
3,000 tons of coal on board, were despatched to re-en
force them. Although she did not leave until eleven
o'clock on May 20th, twenty-seven hours after Com
modore Schley and looked in at Havana on her way,
the lozva when she reached Cienfuegos shortly after
noon on May 22, had gained nearly twenty hours on the
Flying Squadron. Commodore Schley in starting after
the enemy went fifty miles wide of Cape San Antonio
and did not reach Cienfuegos until after daybreak on
May 22 consuming nearly seventy-two hours with
every reason and incentive to hurry in traversing a dis
tance which Captain Evans in the Iowa had covered
in fifty hours. The Iowa carried a note from the ad
miral to Commodore Schley repeating the information
as to Cervera's munitions of war which seemed to make
Cienfuegos their absolutely necessary destination and
advising the close blockade of that port.*

*NoTE. — Particular mention is made of this note because Ad
miral Schley produced it in his reply to the communication made
to the Senate on February 6, 1899, by the Secretary of the Navy.
He called especial attention to it with the object of apparently
showing: first, that this important despatch had been suppressed
by this department, an inference certain newspapers were quick to
draw ; and second, that this despatch furnished a complete ex
planation and defence of his doings and his delays at Cienfuegos.
The department did not suppress the "Dear Schley" note, for it
had no knowledge of its existence on February 6th and did not
receive a copy of it until February gth. The note existed only in
the original in Commodore Schley's possession and he alone had
the power to withhold or suppress it. It is impossible to suppose
that he was so disingenuous as to intend to convey the impression
that the Department or Admiral Sampson had suppressed some-
89

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
Just after the Iowa and her consorts had gone word
came from the department that press despatches re
ported the Spaniards at Santiago. The next day. May
21, the press report corresponding with his own opin
ion. Admiral Sampson sent the Marblehead with or
ders to Commodore Schley to go to Santiago if he was
satisfied the Spaniards were not at Cienfuegos. Later
in the day, after he had left Key West for Havana, and
evidently growing more certain as to Santiago, he sent
the Hawk with another message to Commodore Schley,
ordering him imperatively and without qualification
to go to Santiago, and, as the Hawk would reach Cien
fuegos on May 23, to leave before daylight on the 24th.
Turning now to the Flying Squadron it appears that
Commodore Schley reached Cienfuegos on the 21st,
and on the 22d he wrote that he could not say whether
the Spanish fleet was there or not, and complained of
the difficulty of coaling. On the 23d he wrote, in re
ply to the unqualified orders conveyed by the Hawk,
that on account of the smoke visible in the harbor he
believed that the Spaniards were there, that he doubted
the report about Santiago, that he thought it unwise
to chase a probability, and should remain where he was.
In other words he said that he proposed to disobey the
unqualified "Hawk" orders for the reasons he stated.

thing not in their possession, but this impression got abroad, and
once for all should be shown to be entirely false. As to the sec
ond point, the "Dear Schley" note furnished neither defence nor
excuse for the de'ay at Cienfuegos, for on arriving on May 22nd
at one o'clock it was superseded together with the original in
struction of May 19 at 7.30 A. M., on May 23d, when the Haivk
arrived with imperative orders to proceed at once to Santiago, or
ders which were not obeyed by Commodore Schley until the late
afternoon of May 24th. '
90

THE PURSUIT OF CERVERA
Later in the day he sent another despatch, saying that
a steamship, the Adula, just in reported seven ships
seventy miles south of Santiago, but that from the
firing of guns which he had heard in the harbor, a
salute of welcome, as he guessed, although obviously
very belated, he still believed the Spaniards to be there.
The next day May 24, at 8 A.M., the Marblehead ar
rived and Captain McCalla at once asked permission to
communicate with the Cubans in camp at Colorados
point and find out from them whether the Spanish fleet
was in the harbor or not. This was a sure means of
getting absolute information as to the presence of Cer
vera in Cienfuegos but Commodore Schley had con
tented himself with guessing from the appearance of
smoke or the sound of guns and had refrained from
asking the simple direct question from those who knew
because he considered that the surf was heavy and
did not think that he could land boats to make the nec
essary inquiries. Captain McCalla was less anxious
about the surf and having obtained the required author
ity ran in, opened communication with the Cubans,
learned at once that Cervera was not in Cienfuegos and
had never been there and before three o'clock Com
modore Schley had the information. He sent on that
day a long despatch complaining of the difficulty of
coaling where he was, and declaring that he could not
coal off Santiago, but saying that he should start east
ward on the following day. But after the direct know
ledge obtained in quick and energetic fashion by Cap
tain McCalla there was no possible reason or excuse
for further delay and at quarter before six on May 24
the squadron started having lost two days, for if the
91

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
Hawk orders had been obeyed they would have been
at Santiago on May 24th as Sampson expected instead
of just leaving Cienfuegos. So, on May 25, while
Sampson, disturbed by Schley's reply to the Hawk des
patches, and by the delay he foresaw, when every hour
was precious, was sending still another boat to Cien
fuegos with orders for Santiago more imperative than
any which had gone before, the Flying Squadron, con
vinced at last by Captain McCalla's direct information
from the insurgents that the enemy were not in Cien
fuegos, was steaming to the eastward very slowly in
order to allow the little Eagle which was of no import
ance whatever to the fighting line to keep up. On the
26th, at noon, they were forty-seven mjles west-south
west of Santiago's Morro; at eight o'clock in the
evening, twenty-two miles to the southward of the cas
tle. There the three scouts the Minneapolis, St. Paul
and Yale were met and Captain Sigsbee of the St. Paul
who had been there since the 21st of May reported
that he had not seen the Spanish fleet but that he
thoroughly believed it to be there and the Cuban pilot
Nunez although of opinion that the Spanish vessels
could not enter the harbor admitted that they might
have got in with tugs.* Acting on this informa
tion and without an effort to find out whether Cervera

*NoTE. — Admiral Schley in his letter to the Senate Committee
states that Captain Sigsbee assured him that he did not believe
that the Spanish fleet was in Santiago. Captain Sigsbee in his
letter of February 24th to the Secretary of the Navy says that
his belief constantly and openly expressed was the exact contrary
of that attributed lo him by Admiral Schley and that Nunez ad
mitted that Cervera's fleet might have got in by the aid of tugs,
a statement Admiral Schley omits to repeat in giving the opinion
of Nunez. 92

THE PURSUIT OF CERVERA
was in Santiago, Commodore Schley then signalled,
"Destination, Key West via south side of Cuba and
Yucatan Channel as soon as collier is ready; speed,
nine knots." For one week the door of Santiago had
been open to Cervera, coaling slowly and feebly within,
to issue forth and go where he pleased. At last an
American fleet was in the neighborhood, and still the
door stood open. Obeying the signal of the flag-ship,
the fleet started slowly westward for Key West. On
the morning of May 27th the retreating Flying Squad
ron which had gone some eighteen miles to the west
ward and was forty miles from Santiago when it
stopped, met the Harvard and Captain Colton gave Ad
miral Schley the following order from the Navy De-
" Washington, Afoji 25, 1898.
Harvard, St. Nicholas Mole, Haiti:
Proceed at once and inform Schley, and also the senior officer
present off Santiago, as follows: All Department's information
indicates Spanish division is still at Santiago. The Department
looks to you to ascertain facts, and that the enemy, if therein, does
not leave without a decisive action. Cubans familiar with San
tiago say that there are landing places S or 6 nautical miles west
from the mouth of harbor, and that there insurgents probably
will be found, and not the Spanish. From the surrounding
heights can see every vessel in port. As soon as ascertained, noti
fy the Department whether enemy is there. Could not squadron
and also the Harvard coal from Merriinac leeward of Cape Cruz,
Gonaives Channel or Mole, Haiti? The Department will send
coal immediately to Mole. Report without delay situation at San
tiago de Cuba. Long.
To this unqualified order Admiral Schley made the
following reply. Kingston, May 28, i8g8.
Secretary of the Navy, Washi-ngton: (written May 27, 1898.)
The receipt of telegram of May 26* is acknowledged. Deliv-
93

THE WAR WITH SPAiN
ered by Harvard off Santiago de Cuba. Merrirnac engines dis
abled; is heavy; am obliged to have towed to Key West. Have
been unable absolutely to coal the Texas, Marblehead, Vixen,
Brooklyn from collier, all owing to very rough sea. Bad
weather since leaving Key West. The Brooklyn alone has more
than sufficient coal to proceed to Key West; can not remain off
Santiago present state squadron coal account. Impossible to
coal leeward Cape Cruz in the summer, all owing to southwester
ly winds. Harvard reports coal sufficient for Jamaica; leaves to
day for Kingston; reports only small vessels could coal at
Gonaives or Mole. Minneapolis only coaled for Key West; also
Yale, which tows Merrimac. Much to be regretted, can not obey
orders of Department. Have striven earnestly ; forced to proceed
for coal to Key West by way of Yucatan passage. Can not as
certain anything respecting enemy positive. Obliged to send
Eagle — admitted no delay — to Port Antonio, Jamaica ; had only
25 tons of coal. Will leave St. Paul off Santiago de Cuba. Will
require 10,000 tons of coal at Key West. Very difficult to tow
collier to get cable to hold. Schley.
This telegram repeated to Admiral Sampson at Key West,
May 29.
This was direct and admitted disobedience of orders.
Far from striving earnestly, he had made no effort
further than to ask the opinion of the scouts to de
termine whether Cervera was in Santiago or not and
now announced that he was forced to proceed to Key
West for coal and that he was unable to coal at sea.
Neither statement was correct. The coal supply on the
ships was as follows.
Extracts from logs of vessels for May 2J.
Massachusetts : Tons
Coal remaining on hand at noon 5 to 6 days' supply. . . . 789
Texas :
Coal remaining on hand at noon 5 to 6 days' supply. . . . 394
Brooklyn :
Coal remaining on hand at noon 10 to 12 days' supply. . 940
94

THE PURSUIT OF CERVERA
Marblehead : Tons
Coal remaining on hand at noon 3 to 4 days' supply  116 '
Iowa: Coal remaining on hand at noon 8 to 10 days' supply. . . 762
Merrimac :
Coal at noon, on hand  4,300
As to not being able to coal at sea from the Merri
mac with her 4,300 tons on board the ships were coaled
from her at sea during the two following days.
The Merrimac before this had broken down and the
Squadron had drifted about while efforts were made to
repair her and while the Yale was trying to take her
in tow but after sending his despatch announcing that
he could not obey the orders of the Department, Admi
ral Schley started again to the westward away from
Santiago. The Squadron made about twenty-five miles
and then stopped and remained where it was perform
ing the impossible feat of coaling at sea until between
one and two o'clock on May 28th. Then being about
forty-eight miles west of Santiago the door all this time
having remained wide open to Cervera to go whither
he pleased Admiral Schley apparently changed his mind
once more and made a signal from the flag-ship to move
to the eastward. Steaming slowly, the squadron reached
Santiago that evening. The next morning, at quarter
before eight, the Iowa made out the Colon and two
other cruisers in the harbor. The game of hide-and-
seek was at an end, and the Spanish fleet had been
found at last. There was and could be no question
now as to going away, and the squadron during May
30 stood to and fro off Santiago, well out from the
land with the Marblehead and Vixen patrolling
95

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
nearer inshore. During that day the New Orleans ap
peared with the collier Sterling, and on the next day
when night came the squadron went away out of sight
from land giving Cervera ample opportunity to run out
in the darkness ; Admiral Schley's theory being appar
ently that a close blockade by daylight was sufficient.
On May 31, the Massachusetts leading, with Admiral
Schley on board, and followed by the New Orleans and
lozva, ran in and opened fire upon the ships and bat
teries in the harbor. The ranges began at 7,500 yards
and were increased to 1 1 ,000, the bombardment lasting
half an hour, the shots falling short, and no damage
whatever being done to the Spaniards. Then the ships
drew off to their station, well out from the land, to con
tinue during the daytime this somewhat remote block
ade and to retire out of sight from land at night.* Cer
vera's door was closing upon him. He could still come
out at his pleasure more readily at night than by day
but at the cost, perhaps, a fight.
The anxiety in Washington and on board the flag
ship of the North Atlantic fleet during these perilous
days, while the Flying Squadron was making its slow
way eastward from Cienfuegos and drifting about some
forty miles away from Santiago, was intense, and grew
more feverish as the presence of the Spanish fleet be
came more assured and the despatches from Commodore
Schley more uncertain. On May 2y, after sending, as
?Note. — The Marblehead at night remained within about six
miles of the Morro, and the other ships steamed to and fro before
the entrance, where they could make out the entrance clearly, but
so far off that they could not be seen from land at all. See diary
of Lieutenant Muller y Fejeiro, published by Bureau of Naval In
telligence, pages 16 and 17. 96

THE PURSUIT OF CERVERA
has been said, imperative orders for the third time to
leave Cienfuegos, Admiral Sampson received Commo
dore Schley's despatch of the 24th depicting the diffi
culties of coaling and announcing his departure for
Santiago. Thereupon he ordered Captain Folger, in
the New Orleans, to proceed at once to Santiago, di
rect Commodore Schley to maintain the blockade there
at all hazards, and to use the collier Sterling (a sten
ographer's mistake for the Merrimac) for the obstruc
tion of the channel by sinking her in the narrowest part.
The next day. May 28, at midnight, came news from
Secretary Long of Schley's despatch of the 27th an
nouncing his departure from Santiago for Key West,
which had made the day of its arrival the darkest of
the whole war to the Navy Department. The Secre
tary asked if Sampson could go with the New York,
Oregon, and Indiana to Santiago, and how long he
could blockade. Sampson replied that he could block
ade indefinitely, and asked leave to go at once with the
New York and Oregon. Permission came in the even
ing, and at eleven o'clock Sampson left Key West in
the New York, was joined the next morning by the
Oregon, the converted yacht Mayflower, and the tor
pedo-boat Porter, and set off at high speed for Santi
ago. On the way, filled with anxiety because the last
news was that the Flying Squadron had left Santiago,
the admiral met the Yale and the St. Paul, and re
ceived from Captain Sigsbee a despatch from Commo
dore Schley of May 29, announcing that the Spanish
cruisers had been seen and that he was blockading the
port. Greatly relieved, the admiral sped on, and at six
in the morning of June i he saw the Colon inside the
7 97

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
Morro point, and the Flying Squadron lying off the
narrow entrance. All was well ; the Spaniards had been
found, they were still in their hiding-place, and now
the door was really to be closed by night as well as day
so that Cervera would only be able to choose between
capture in the harbor, or breaking open the door and
rushing to destruction outside.
The first movement of Admiral Sampson was to ob
struct the narrow channel. He did not hope to block it
permanently, for he knew that any obstruction could
sooner or later be removed by dynamite. But he be
lieved, and with reason, that he could obstruct it tem
porarily, and his object was to gain time for the ar
rival of the troops, whose coming was already an
nounced, and whose presence would be absolutely nec
essary to enable him to get at the Spaniards, either by
forcing Cervera to leave the harbor, or by obtaining
control of and clearing the mine-fields so that he could
himself enter and attack. To attain this object he had
decided to sink a collier in the channel, and gave orders
to that effect to Captain Folger when he sent him off
on May 27 to Santiago. On the 29th he opened the
subject to Lieutenant Richmond Pearson Hobson, a
young naval constructor of marked ability and energy,
and by the time the fleet reached Santiago on June i
Hobson had prepared his plan, which was so thorough
and excellent that the admiral decided to place the peril
ous and important work wholly in the hands of that
young officer. Thus far nothing had been done toward
closely locking Cervera up in his retreat, but as soon
as Admiral Sampson arrived the Merrimac was se
lected to be sunk in the channel, and the work of strip-
98

THE PURSUIT OF CERVERA
ping her and making ready the anchors which were to
hold her, and the torpedoes which were to shatter her
bottom, went forward with hot haste under the direc
tion of Lieutenant Hobson. The call for volunteers
was made by signal, and hundreds of the sailors came
forward. Men begged to be taken, implored Hobson to
choose them, and turned away utterly miserable be
cause they could not go on a desperate undertaking
which every one believed meant certain death while
those who were chosen thanked their officers weeks aft
erwards for kindly allowing them to go when so many
were seeking this terrible chance. Here again was a
very fine and noble spirit, telling what the American
navy was, and why it was soon to be victorious — some
thing here quite worthy of the consideration of Spain,
which had so insisted upon senseless war.
Hobson finally selected from the crowd of appli
cants Phillips, Kelly, Mullen, and Deignan, of the
Merrimac, because they were familiar with the ship;
then he took Charette, a gunner's mate, and Montague,
chief master-at-arms, from the New York, and thus
completed his little crew. Captain Miller of the Mer
rimac was bitterly disappointed when the admiral told
him he could not go, but that did not prevent him from
giving every advice and help to the men who were go
ing on his ship. The preparations, although pushed
with such intense energy, were so many that it was
difficult to get them finished, and the night was far
gone when all was done. At last the ship started, and
then there was more delay in trying to tow the launch,
which was to run in as near as possible and wait to
rescue any survivors after the ship had sunk. When
99

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
they finally set forth there was already a streak of light
in the east, and as the Merrimac was steaming to the
harbor entrance, the torpedo-boat Porter dashed up
with an order of recall from the admiral. Back went
the Merrimac, and a day of waiting and suspense fol
lowed, not easy to bear when men's nerves were strung
to such work as lay before Hobson and his crew. Mul
len, utterly exhausted by his labors in preparing the
ship, gave out, and his place was taken by Murphy, a
coxswain on the Iowa. Robert Crank, the assistant
engineer of the ship, with bitter disappointment, was
ordered away at the last moment and not allowed to go.
Finally the long day passed, night came, and at half
past three in the morning the Merrimac started again,
this time with an additional man, Clausen, who was
coxswain of the barge, and had come on board with
Ensign Powell. He asked permission to go, and was
accepted by Hobson, thus getting his chance at the
great prize of death in battle. This time there was no
recall; on she ran, every man at his post, the young
lieutenant standing upright and alone on the bridge,
Deignan at the wheel, steering coolly and taking every
order with absolute correctness, and not a sailor mov
ing except at the word of command. Nearer and
nearer the doomed ship went, with gradually slackening
speed. Then the Spaniards saw her, and there came a
storm of shot and shell, fierce, resistless, like a torrent.
Still on the ship steered, still slackening in speed — goes
too far, as the event proved, her steering-gear having
been shot away, and the lashings of Montague's anchor,
which dropped too soon — and then, torn by her own
torpedoes and by those of the enemy, she sinks far up
lOO

THE LAST OF THE MERRIilAC

THE PURSUIT OF CERVERA
in the channel. The parting of the anchors, the loss
of the steering-gear, and consequent running in too far,
the sweep of the current, combine, and she goes to the
bottom, lying lengthwise, and not across. The crew,
every task performed, lie at the appointed place upon
the deck in the storm of projectiles, the torpedoes ex
ploding beneath, and go down with the reeling ship into
the whirl of dark waters. They have done their duty.
The Merrimac, as she lies now, makes the entrance
perhaps a little more difficult, but does not block it. So
far the attempt fails, but the brave deed does not fail,
for such gallantry is never a failure. It rouses and up
lifts the American people, for these men are theirs ; it
appeals to the lovers of daring the world over; it is a
shining and splendid feat of arms; it tells to all what
the American navy is; it ranks Hobson with Cushing
when he pushed his torpedo against the Albemarle,
with Decatur when he fired the Philadelphia. And the
men who did the deed cling, chilled and spent in the
water, to the raft which is fast to the sunken ship, and
in the darkness are not hit or found, but in the morning
are taken off by Admiral Cervera, who greets them as
"valiente." On the American side, brave young
Powell, creeping about with his launch, in the midst of
a heavy fire from the batteries, on the chance of res
cuing Hobson and his men, comes out at last, much fired
at, but with none of the Merrimac crew on board, and
when he closes his report, saying simply, "and no one
came back, sir," the fleet fear the worst, and believe
that the gallant deed has been paid for with eight lives.
But later in the day comes out a Spanish boat, with a
flag from Admiral Cervera, to announce that Hobson

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
and his sailors are prisoners, alive and well, and little
hurt. It is sad that for the sake of Spain they could
not have remained with Admiral Cervera — a brave
man facing inevitable ruin with courage — but they were
turned over to the military authorities on land, who
placed them and kept them for some days in the Morro
Castle, in range of the American bombardment — an
act rather sullying to a people who are fond of talking
about honor, but appear to think that in that connection
words are enough.
So closed the first move of Admiral Sampson to
blockade the enemy. The second, which began at the
same time, lasted for many weary days, and was neither
suddenly brilliant nor vividly picturesque, but like much
of what is best in the world, without show, with no
chance of ever getting the due meed of praise, except
from history and posterity did efficiently and well the
work that was there to do. This second move was the
establishment of the blockade of the harbor by the ships.
Foreign experts doubted whether it were possible to
blockade four cruisers and two fine torpedo-boat de
stroyers in any harbor. The latter, it was thought,
would surely slip out in the darkness, and then would
come in a moment's space the destruction of a battle
ship or two, and so an end of the blockade. But there
was no darkness in the entrance of Santiago Harbor
after the Sth of June. Two battle-ships, relieving
and supporting each other, went in every night within
four miles, and the rays of the powerful search-lights
made the narrow channel as bright as day. So great
was the glare that when the fatal moment came Admiral
Cervera did not dare to issue forth into that zone of

THE PURSUIT OF CERVERA
white light, where he, blinded by the glare, would have
been a helpless target for an enemy veiled in the dark
ness. At night also picket-launches ran in less than a
mile from the shore, and there, within rifle range, toss
ing often on rough seas, watched through the long
hours, ready to give warning of the slightest movement
from inside the harbor. The close blockade by day
begun on June i was kept up and constantly increased
in stringency. The ships, at first stationed at six miles
from the harbor mouth, were drawn in to four miles a
little later, and the enemy thus hemmed in, so that at no
hour in the twenty-four could he come forth without
meeting the American fieet in carefully chosen posi
tions, ready for battle, and with orders which left no
room for doubt as to just what they should do. In this
blockade, where nothing was overlooked and nothing
forgotten, Admiral Sampson, by strenuous honest
work, by keen foresight, and by unwearying and un
ceasing vigilance, made not only possible, but humanly
speaking, certain, the victory which was to come, a
great feat in naval warfare, and a very fine and lasting
service to the American campaign.
The blockade was varied by a bombardment on June
6, by an attack on the battery east of the Morro by the
New Orleans on June 14, and by another general bom
bardment on June 16. In all these attacks the Ameri
can gunnery was excellent, and the batteries were for
the time silenced. To these bombardments were added
the assaults of the Vesuvius, which arrived on June 13,
and began at once to run in at night and hurl her dyna
mite shells at the forts and harbor. The ship had a
terrible weapon, but as she was unable to get direction
103

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
or aim, the falling of her shells was largely a matter of
accident. If by chance they struck near a battery, a
ship, or a building, wreck and ruin followed, but wher
ever they dropped the explosion was so terrific, coming
as they did silently out of the darkness, that they car
ried consternation and alarm, and had a moral effect
wholly out of proportion to their actual results, tending
in this way, no doubt, to prevent any attempts on the
part of the Spaniards either to seek escape at night or to
send out torpedo-boats.
Only one point remained to be covered in order to
assure the successful maintenance of the blockade, and
that was to possess a safe harbor for shelter, coaling,
and repairs. This indispensable adjunct Admiral Samp
son secured by sending the Marblehead and Yankee to
Guantanamo, where they drove the Spanish gunboats
to the inner harbor, which was protected by mines in the
channel, and made themselves masters of the outer har
bor, which was excellently suited to the needs of the
fleet. To make possession useful as well as complete,
it became necessary to hold a position on shore and
drive back the enemy, so that they could not annoy the
ships and boats in the bay. For this work the first bat
talion of marines, which had left Key West on June 7,
was employed, and on June 10 their transport, the Pan
ther, arrived in Guantanamo Bayf The marines, be
tween five and six hundred strong,^'i?Hed immediately,
and established themselves on a low hill wliere a Span
ish block-house had been destroyed bv ;ne guns of the
Yankee. The next evening they were attacked by the
Spaniards concealed in the chaparral, and two men on
outposts were killed. The attack was renewed in the
104

SOLDIERS OF TIIK cnilAX ARM\'
I'lMni ,1 [ilii>tugra['li taken at the time ofthe landing fjf the American arni\

THE PURSUIT OF CERVERA
night by the unseen enemy and Surgeon Gibbs was
killed and two privates wounded. The next day the
camp was shifted to a better position, and some sixty
Cubans came in and joined the Americans. The firing
of the Spanish continued throughout the night, and
Sergeant Good was killed, but on the i3tli, with the aid
of the Cubans, who knew the country, they were easily
repelled. On the 14th the Americans took the offen
sive. Two companies of marines, supported by the
Cubans, left the camp at nine o'clock to destroy the well
at Cuzco, which was the only water-supply for the
Spaniards within twelve miles. They failed to cut off
the enemy, as they had hoped, but they drove the Span
iards steadily before them, reaching the intervening hill
first, and carrying the crest under a sharp fire. As the
marines descended into the valley the Spaniards broke
cover and retreated rapidly, and at three o'clock the
fight was over, the well filled up, and the heliograph
signal station captured and destroyed. One lieutenant
and seventeen men were taken prisoners, and they re
ported a Spanish loss of two officers and fifty-eight men
killed, and a large number of wounded. On the Amer
ican side one marine was wounded, and about a dozen
were overcome by heat. This was the end of the Span
ish attacks. They had had enough, and withdrew,
leaving the American post undisturbed to the end of the
campaign. The marines had done their work most ad
mirably. For three days and nights they had met and
repelled the attacks of a concealed enemy, never flinch
ing under the strain whch had been upon them without
a moment's relief. Then they had taken the offensive,
and had marched and fought for six hours under the

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
tropical sun and through a dense forest and under
growth with the steadiness and marksmanship of ex
perienced bushfighters. It was a very brave, honest,
and effective piece of work, showing admirable disci
pline and a surprising readiness to meet new and strange
conditions. On June 15 the work of the marines was followed up
by the Marblehead, Texas, and Suwanee going into
Caimanera, silencing the batteries, and driving the
Spaniards completely away. The ships penetrated so
far into the channel of the inner harbor that they ran
on to torpedoes, the Marblehead picking up one on her
propeller, fortunately so thick with barnacles that it
did not explode by contact, as it was intended to do.
Thus the affair at Guantanamo Bay was finished, and a
secure refuge, base, coaling and repair station were
secured for the fleet, which assured its ability to con
tinue the blockade — a very important operation, per
formed with the thoroughness, foresight, and minute
care which characterized all Admiral Sampson's work.
But the best arranged and most systematic blockade,
the most vigorous and sustained bombardments, the
workmanlike establishment of a fine naval base — none
of these things could bring the American ships along
side the Spanish cruisers. It was fiiot the compara
tively feeble batteries of the Morro, the '(Socapa, or Es
trella Point which stood in the way. That which held
back the American fleet was the mine-field at the en
trance of the harbor, sown thick with torpedoes and
submarine mines, exploding either by contact or by
electric wires leading to batteries on shore. The navy
which offered hundreds of volunteers to accompany
106

THE PURSUIT OF CERVERA
Hobson had plenty of officers and men who would
have cheerfully dared all the dangers of that narrow
channel, defying alike shore batteries and sunken mines.
But such an attempt would have been not only perilous,
and worthless, but a blunder of the first magnitude.
Small ships, which perhaps might have slipped in,
would have been utterly useless against the heavy Span
ish cruisers, and a battle-ship sunk by torpedoes in the
narrow channel would have been a useless and crippling
sacrifice, and would have blocked the entrance so that
the Spaniards could never have been forced out and the
American fleet could never have gone in. Once the
mine field was cleared, the ships could enter, but the
mines could not be reached or removed until the bat
teries at the entrance were taken and the garrisons
driven away. For this land-work the fleet had no ade
quate force. To reach and destroy the sea power of
Spain in the West Indies, upon which the whole cam
paign against both Cuba and Puerto Rico turned, an
army was needed to support the fleet, to take the en
trance forts and thus permit the ships to enter, or else
to capture the town itself and force the Spaniards out
into the open. Thus it was that while Admiral Samp
son was perfecting his blockade at every point, he was
urgently asking that land forces be sent to his support,
and all the officers and men of the fleet were waiting
impatiently for the coming of the army which should
deUver the Spanish cruisers into their hands.

CHAPTER VI
SANTIAGO  THE LAND FIGHT
The American navy was ready, as ships of war must
always be, and when the President signed the Cuban
resolutions, the fleet started for Cuba without a mo
ment's delay. With the army, the case was widely dif
ferent. Congress had taken care of the army in a spas
modic and insufficient manner, consistently doing noth
ing for it except to multiply civilian clerks and officials
of all kinds, who justified their existence by a diligent
weaving of red-tape and by magnifying details of work,
until all the realities of the service were thoroughly ob
scured. Thus we had a cumbrous, top-heavy system of
administration, rusted and slow-moving, and accus
tomed to care for an army of 25,000 men. Then
war was declared. An army of 200,000 volunteers and
60,000 regulars was suddenly demanded, and the poor
old system of military administration, with its coils of
red-tape and its vast clerical force devoted to details,
began to groan and creak, to break down here and to
stop there, and to produce a vast crop of delays, blun
ders, and what was far worse, of needless suffering,
disease, and death, to the brave men in the field. There
upon came great outcry from newspapers, rising even
to hysterical shrieking in some cases, great and natu
ral wrath among the American people, and much anger
108

SANTIAGO— THE LAND FIGHT
and fault-finding from Senators and Representatives.
Then came, too, the very human and general desire to
find one or more scapegoats and administer to them
condign punishment, which would have been eminently
soothing and satisfactory to many persons — just in
some cases, perhaps, unjust in most, but in any event of
little practical value. There was undoubtedly a certain
not very large percentage of shortcomings due to indi
vidual incapacity, which should have been sharply
rooted up without regard to personal sensibilities. But
the fundamental fact was that the chief and predomi
nant cause of all the failures, blunders, and needless
suffering was a thoroughly bad system of military ad
ministration. An inferior man can do well with a good
system better than a superior man with a bad system,
for a good administrative organization will go on for
generations sometimes, carrying poor administrators
with it. But a really bad system is wellnigh hopeless,
and the men of genius, the Pitts, the Carnots, and the
Stantons, who, bringing order out of chaos and strength
out of weakness, organize victory, are very rare, and are
produced only by the long-continued stress of a great
struggle, and after bitter experience has taught its
harshest lessons. At the outset of our war we had a
bad system, and men laid the blame here and there for
faults of system and organization which were really
due to the narrowness and indifference of Congress,
of the newspaper press, and of the people, running back
over many years. To-day the system stands guilty of
the blunders, delays, and needless sufferings and deaths
of the war, and war being over, reforms are resisted
by patriots who have so little faith in the republic that
109

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
they think a properly organized army of 100,000 men
puts it in danger, and by bureau chiefs and their friends
in Congress who want no change, for reasons obvious
if not public-spirited.
Thus much by the way of preface, essential to the
comprehension of even the barest outline of our mili
tary operations in the war of 1898, and to make clear
not merely why there were shortcomings, which any
account must notice, but also the fact that the wonder
of it all lies not in the blunders and failures of organi
zation, but in the indomitable energy and force of the
American people which made the rusty, clumsy ma
chine work in some fashion, and in the ability and bra
very of American officers and soldiers which brought
unbroken victory out of such conditions.
On April 23, 125,000 volunteers were called for, and
a month later, on May 25, 75,000 more. It was soon
found that it was one thing to call out volunteers, and
quite another to make them into an army, which,
strangely enough, appeared to surprise the country.
Even the mobilization of the regulars was not rapid,
and the middle of May had passed before they were
assembled at Tampa. By the beginning of June, how
ever, the regulars were gathered ; but of all the volun
teers, slowly mustering in different camps and in vari
ous stages of unreadiness, only three regiments were
sufficiently prepared to join the forces at Tampa. These
three were the Seventy-first New York, the Second
Massachusetts, and the First United States Volunteer
Cavalry. It was to this army of regulars and volun
teers that the government turned when it became evi
dent that troops were needed at Santiago, and the com-

SANTIAGO— THE LAND FIGHT
mand of the expedition was given to General Shafter,
a brave Michigan soldier of the war of the rebellion
and an officer of the regular army.
On the night of June 7 orders came from Washing
ton that the army should leave the next morning, and
then was displayed a scene of vast confusion. The
railroad tracks were blocked for miles with cars filled
with supplies tightly shut by red-tape, at which men
unused to responsibility and to the need of quick action
gazed helplessly. The cars not only kept the supplies
from the army, but they stopped movement on the line,
and hours were consumed where minutes should have
sufficed in transporting troops from Tampa to the Port.
Once arrived, more confusion and a widening of the
area of chaos. No proper arrangement of transports —
no allotment at all in some cases, and in others the same
ship given to two or three regiments. Thereupon much
scrambling, disorder, and complication, surmounted at
last in some rough-and-ready fashion, and the troops
were finally embarked. Then came orders to delay de
parture. There was a false report brought of a Spanish
cruiser and torpedo-boats seen by the Eagle and Nash
ville. Admiral Sampson put no faith in the report,
guessed accurately that the Eagle had been misled in the
darkness by certain ships of our own ; but unfortunately
he was at the other end of the line, and in the United
States the false but definite report of hostile ships was
accepted, and the army waited, sweltering on board
the crowded transports, many of them lying near the
wharves in the canal or channel, which was festering
with town sewage. A very heavy price this to pay for
a mistaken vision of the night, and for hasty acceptance
III

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
of its truth. But the long hot days, laden with suffering
and discomfort to the troops, finally wore by, and at last
the transports, on June 14, made their way down the
bay, pushed on the next day, were joined near Key
West by some dozen ships of war as convoy, and then
on the 1 6th were fairly on their way to Santiago. Far
pleasanter this than broiling in Tampa Harbor, and the
spirits of the troops improved. Yet the movement, so
infinitely better than the hot, still waiting, was deliber
ate enough. Some of the transports were very old and
very slow, and as they set the speed, the fleet crept
along about eight knots an hour over a sapphire sea,
with beautiful star-lit nights, and glimpses by day of the
picturesque shores and distant mountains of Cuba. On
Sunday, June 19, they were off Cape Maisi, and at day
break the next morning they came in sight of the wait
ing war-ships and of Santiago Harbor. Then came
consultations between General Shafter and Admiral
Sampson and the Cuban generals Garcia and Castillo.
The plan of capturing the Morro and the other entrance
batteries, as the admiral desired, so that the mine-field
could be cleared, the fleet go in, destroy the Spanish
cruisers, and compel the surrender of Santiago, was
abandoned. General Shafter decided to move directly
upon the city, and orders were given to make the land
ing at Daiquiri. The army had neither lighters nor
launches. They had been omitted, forgotten, or lost,
like an umbrella, no one knew exactly where; so the
work of disembarking the troops fell upon the navy.
Under cover of a heavy fire from the ships, the land
ing began, and was effected without any resistance from
the enemy. On an open coast, without any harbor or
112

SANTIAGO— THE LAND FIGHT
shelter, with nothing but an iron pier so high as to be
useless, smoothly, rapidly, efficiently, through a heavy
surf, on the beach and at an unfloored wooden wharf,
the boats and launches of the navy landed 15,000 offi
cers and soldiers, with a loss of only two men. It was
a very excellent piece of work, thoroughly and punc
tually performed, exciting admiration among foreign
onlookers, who had just beheld with amazement the
very different performances connected with the em
barkation at Tampa.
The next morning General Wheeler, commanding
the division of dismounted cavalry, under direct orders
from General Shafter, rode forward, followed by two
squadrons of the First volunteer cavalry, and one each
of the First and Tenth regular cavalry. When General
Wheeler reached Juraguacito, or Siboney, he found
that the Spaniards had abandoned the block-house at
that point, retreated some three miles toward Sevilla,
and had there taken up a strong position, their rear
having been engaged by some 200 Cubans with little
effect. By eight o'clock that night the cavalry division
reached Siboney, and General Wheeler, after consul
tation with General Castillo, determined to advance
and dislodge the enemy lying between the Americans
and Santiago. The next morning before daylight the
movement began. The troops marched along two roads,
which were really nothing more than mountain trails.
The First and Tenth regular cavalry, under the im
mediate command of General Wheeler, and General
Young who had with him some Hotchkiss guns,
marched by the main or easterly road to Sevilla. Along
the westerly road went the First volunteer cavalry,
8 113

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
nearly five hundred strong. This regiment, enlisted,
officered, disciplined, and equipped in fifty days, may
well be considered for a moment as it moves forward
to action only two days after its landing. It is a very
typical American regiment. Most of the men come
from Arizona, New Mexico, and Oklahoma, where the
troops were chiefly raised. There are many cowboys,
many men of the plains, hunters, pioneers and ranch
men, to whom the perils and exposure of frontier life
are a twice-told tale. Among them can be found more
than two score civilized but full-blooded Indians —
Americans by an older lineage than any of those who
are fighting just now for the final domination of the
New World. Then there are boys from the farms and
towns of the far-western territories. Then, again,
strangest mingling of all, there are a hundred or more
troopers from the East — graduates of Yale and Har
vard, members of the New York and Boston clubs, men
of wealth and leisure and large opportunities. They
are men who have loved the chase of big game, fox
hunting and football, and all the sports which require
courage and strength and are spiced with danger. Some
have been idlers, many more are workers, all have the
spirit of adventure strong within them, and they are
there in the Cuban chaparral because they seek perils,
because they are patriotic, because, as some think, every
gentleman owes a debt to his country, and this is the
time to pay it. And all these men, drawn from so many
sources, all so American, all so nearly soldiers in their
life and habits, have been roughly, quickly, and effec
tively moulded and formed into a fighting regiment by
the skillful discipline of Leonard Wood, their colonel,
114

CENEKAI. i;AR(TA AM> HRKiADI KR-fJEXERAI. LLDLOW
'I'.ikeii during their ctrnference at the timt; nl the landing of tlie American army

SANTIAGO— THE LAND FIGHT
a surgeon of the line, who wears a medal of honor won
in campaigns against the Apaches ; and by the inspira
tion of Theodore Roosevelt, their lieutenant-colonel,
who has laid down a high place in the administration
at Washington and come hither to Cuba because thus
only can he live up to his ideal of conduct by offering
his life to his country when war has come. -.i
These Rough Riders, as they have been popularly
called, marched along the westerly trail, so shut in by
the dense undergrowth that it was almost impossible to
throw out flankers or deploy the line, and quite impos
sible to see. And then suddenly there were hostile vol
leys pouring through the brush, and a sound like the
ringing of wires overhead. No enemy was to be seen.
The smokeless powder gave no sign. The dense chap
arral screened everything. Under the intense heat men
had already given way. Now they began to drop, some
wounded, some dead. The Rough Riders fire and ad
vance steadily, led onward by Colonel Wood and Lieu
tenant-Colonel Roosevelt. A very trying place it was
for perfectly new troops, with the burning tropical heat,
the unseen enemy, the air filled with the thin cry of
the Mauser bullet. But there was no flinching, and the
march forward went on.
Along the eastern road the regulars advanced with
equal steadiness and perfect coolness. They do not draw
the public attention as do the volunteers, for they act
just as every one expected, and they are not new, but
highly trained troops. But their work is done with
great perfection, to be noted in history later, and at the
time by all who admire men who perform their allotted
task bravely and efficiently in the simple line of daily duty.
"5

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
Thus the two columns moved forward constantly, along
the trails and through the undergrowth, converging to
the point at which they aimed, and Colonel Wood's
right flank finds the anticipated support from the ad
vancing regulars. The fire began to sweep the ridges
and the strong rock forts on the ridge. Spaniards were
seen at last apparently without much desire to remain in
view ; the two columns pressed forward, the ridge was
carried, the cross-road reached, and the fight of Las
Guasimas had been won.
There was no ambush or surprise about it, as was
said by some people in the first confusion, and by others
later without any excuse for the misstatement. The
whole movement was arranged and carried out just as
it was planned by the commanding general of the divi
sion. It had been a hot skirmish, and victory had come
to the steady American advance, unchecked by the
burning heat, the dense, stifling undergrowth, and the
volleys of an unseen enemy. That night the Spanish
soldiers said in Santiago : "Instead of retreating when
we fired, the Americans came on. The more we fired
the more they advanced. They tried to catch us with
their hands." The Spanish official report stated that
they had repulsed the Americans and won, but as the
Americans had 10,000 men they had retreated, which
was, perhaps, to the Spanish mind, dwelling these many
centuries among mendacities, and thereby much con
fused, a satisfying explanation. The plain truth was
that the entire American force amounted to 964 officers
and men. The Rough Riders suffered most severely,
having 8 killed and 34 wounded. The regulars lost 8
killed and 18 wounded. The Spanish accounts give
116

Loi.yrii;li[.
JOiEPH WHEELER

.:-:, Il}' Aiiiit Dupunt

SANTIAGO— THE LAND FIGHT
their own force in various figures from 2,500 down to
1,400, the last statement being made long after the bat
tle, when the number of Americans who had defeated
them could no longer be concealed. A comparison of
their varying statements and all the best evidence would
seem to indicate that the Spanish troops engaged were
not less than 2,000. Forty-two Spaniards were found
dead on the field; ff were reported in the Santiago
newspapers the next day to have been killed, and after
the surrender General Toral admitted to General
Wheeler a loss of killed and wounded of 265 at Las
Guasimas and in the brushes with the Cubans of the
two preceding days.
This action, in which, in less than an hour, American
regulars and volunteers had driven a superior Spanish
force from a strongly intrenched position on high
ground, put the army in high spirits. It also encour
aged the mistaken idea which Admiral Sampson had
expressed at first, and which General Shafter apparently
held to firmly, that the soldiers of the United States
had nothing to do but to press forward, drive the Span
iards from them, and take the town in forty-eight
hours. If the Americans had gone on at once, there is
every reason to believe that they might have gone
through successfully to the city itself. But to take the
town in forty-eight hours in the first advance was one
thing, and to attempt to take it on the forty-eight-hours
plan after a week's delay was another and widely dif
ferent business. In a short time it was to be proved
that a strong line of defences, constructed for the most
part while the advance begun at Las Guasimas was
halted, lay between the Americans and Santiago, and
117

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
that the Spaniards, after their fashion, would fight hard
and stubbornly under cover of entrenchments and
block-houses. Nevertheless, it was with such views
prevailing that the army finally moved forward. Law-
ton's and Chaffee's brigades came up to the front the
day of the fight at Las Guasimas, and the other troops
advanced during the following days to the high ground
around Sevilla, which the victory of the cavalry divi
sion had brought within American control. During
three days there seems to have been great confusion, in
the movement of troops, and still more in the trans
portation of supplies. The narrow trails, bad at the
best, were soon torn up by wagons, and were choked
by the advancing regiments, which moved slowly and
with difficulty. The army stretched back for three
miles from El Pozo, where an outpost was sta
tioned, and whence the Spaniards could be seen hard at
work, the line of entrenchments and rifle-pits length
ening continually along the hills of San Juan, and the
defences of El Caney constantly growing stronger.
Yet during these days of waiting no battery was
brought to El Pozo to open on the Spanish works, no
effort was made to interfere with the enemy in
strengthening his position, which meant the sacrifice
of just so many more lives by every hour that it went
on unimpeded. There was no attempt during these
comparatively unoccupied days to make new roads
through the forest and undergrowth, so that the troops
could emerge all along the line of woods instead of in
dense narrow masses from the two existing trails.
There were officers who saw, knew, and suggested all
these things, but they were not done. So, too, the val-
1x8

WILLLV.M R. SHAFTER

SANTIAGO— THE LAND FIGHT
ley or basin which lay between the heights we held and
the heights of San Juan remained silent, unpenetrated,
unexplored. There does not appear to have been any
reconnoitring done at all, except by General Chaffee,
who, with the skill and coolness of an experienced In
dian fighter, explored the ground in front of his com
mand thoroughly, even to the Spanish lines at El Caney,
a village lying toward the northeast of Santiago, and
very strongly defended by block-houses and a fort.
It was at this point, finally, that it was determined to
make an attack, and this was, so far as can be judged,
the only operation that was planned beforehand. All
the rest of the fighting which ensued came about largely
by chance. The movement against El Caney was in
trusted to Generals Lawton, Chaffee, and Ludlow,
brave, skilful, and gallant soldiers, in command of the
Second Division, with the addition of an independent
brigade under General Bates, in all a trifie over six .
thousand men. The plan was that they should capture
El Caney, which it was calculated would consume about
half an hour to an hour, and then, swinging to the left,
cut off and take in the flank the Spaniards on San Juan
hill, against which the main army was then to move in
direct assault. So, on the afternoon of June 30, the
order came at three o'clock that the whole army was to
move at four, and then began a slow advance as the
troops crushed and crowded into the narrow trail. Part
of Lawton's division got off first, then the rest, and they
all marched on silently during the night, making their
way over the ground General Chaffee had reconnoitred
through woods and underbrush. By dawn they were
in position and it was arranged that Chaffee's brigade
119

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
was to attack from the north and east, and Ludlow's
from the south and west, and so carry the position.
But to take a strongly fortified town with infantry
quickly and without needless loss it is absolutely essen
tial to clear the way by a powerful and destructive ar
tillery fire. For this all-important object the division
had only Capron's battery of four guns, so absurdly in
adequate to its task that the fact needs only to be stated.
This meagre battery opened on the Fort at El Caney
with a deliberate fire at half past six, producing little
more effect than to very slowly crumble the walls.
Moreover, the battery was not only grossly inadequate,
but it used black powder, and immediately established
a flaring target for an enemy concealed and perfectly
familiar with the ranges. Why were there no more
guns ? Why were they left at Tampa or in the trans
ports? The fact requires no committee of investiga
tion to prove it, and somebody was responsible for the
scores of men shot at El Caney because there were only
four guns there to open the way. Why was the powder
black, so that a target of smoke hung over the Ameri
can position after every discharge? Any smokeless
powder was better than none. Even poor, broken-
down Spain had smokeless powder for her artillery.
Why did not we have it ? While the War Department
had been passing years in trying to find a patent powder
just to its liking, our artillery was provided with black
powder and went to war with it, and men died need
lessly because of it. No need of a committee to establish
this fact, either. Who was responsible? One thing
is certain — a system of administration which is capable
of such protracted inefficiency is little short of criminal,
I20

SANTIAGO— THE LAND FIGHT
and the Congress and the people who permit such a sys
tem to exist, now that it has been found out, will share
in the heavy responsibility of a neglect for which men's
lives have dearly paid if they do not promptly rem
edy it.
But these reflections did not help matters at El Caney
that July morning, and the feeble battery, the slow fire
and the target-smoke soon disposed of the pleasant
headquarters plan of taking the village in the course of
an hour. There was nine hours' savage work ahead
before the desired consummation could be reached.
The Spaniards, although without artillery or siege-
guns, numbered about eight hundred men; were en
tirely protected and under cover in a stone fort, rifle-
pits, and strong block-houses; knew perfectly and ac
curately all the ranges ; could not retreat without rush
ing on destruction after our troops surrounded them
— a sharp incentive to desperate resistance. So, while
the slow artillery fire went on, the infantry began to
suffer seriously from the deadly Spanish fire. They
worked their way forward, creeping from point to point,
but it was very slow, and equally costly. At half past
one the situation looked badly. The Americans were
holding their own, but losing far more heavily than
the Spaniards. An order from General Shafter at
this moment to neglect El Caney and move to the as
sistance of the troops at San Juan must have seemed
like a grim satire, and was disregarded. But the evil
hour had really passed. The artillery fire was quick
ened, and the fort began at last to go rapidly to pieces
under the steady pounding. Colonel Miles's brigade
joined General Ludlow in pressing the attack on the

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
south ; and then at last General Chaffee, whose men had
been enduring the brunt of the fight, gave the order
to storm, and the Twelfth regiment sprang forward at
the word, eager for the charge. Up the ravine they
went to the east side, then swung to the right, broke
through the wire fences, rushed upward to the top of
the hill, and the fort was theirs. The enemy who had
fought so stubbornly at rifle range could not stand the
American rush; they had no desire to be taken "by the
bare hands." The price paid had been heavy, but the
dearly bought fort, in the words of an eye-witness, was
"floored with dead Spaniards," a grewsome sight. Yet,
even as the wild cheers went up, it was seen that they
were still exposed, and a heavy fire came from the
block-houses. Lining up in the fort, the Americans
poured volley after volley into these other strongholds ;
and the other brigades pressing home their charge, the
Spanish gave way, even retreat seeming less hopeless
now than resistance, and fled from the village, drop
ping fast as they went under the shots of Ludlow's men.
By four o'clock the firing had died away, and El Caney,
at a cost which proper artillery would have greatly re
duced, had been won by the unyielding, patient gal
lantry of the American regular infantry.
The Spaniards had less than a thousand men at El
Caney, but they were under cover, strongly fortified,
and knew the ranges. Shut in, desperate, and almost
surrounded as they were, they appeared at their best,
and fought with a stubborn courage and an indiffer
ence to danger which recall the defence of Saragossa
and Gerona. Worthless as the Spanish soldiers have
too often shown themselves to be, behind defences and
122

THEODORE ROOSEVELT

SANTIAGO— THE LAND FIGHT
penned in by enemies, they have displayed a fortitude
worthy of the days, three centuries ago, when the in
fantry of Spain was thought the finest in Europe. Of
this tradition El Caney offered a fresh and brilliant
illustration. The Spaniards lost nearly five hundred
men in killed, wounded, and prisoners, much more
than half their number, and among the killed was the
commander. General Vara del Rey, his brother, and
two of his sons. On the American side the killed num
bered 4 officers and 84 men ; the wounded, 24 officers
and 332 men — the loss falling chiefly on Ludlow's and
Chaffee's brigades, comprising the 4,000 men who were
actively engaged throughout the day. The force was
composed entirely of regulars, with the exception of
the Second Massachusetts Regiment, in Ludlow's bri
gade. These volunteers, never in action before, be
haved extremely well, coming up steadily under fire,
and taking their place in the firing-line. But the mo
ment they opened with their archaic Springfields and
black powder, which they owed to the narrow parsi
mony of Congress, and to the lack of energy and ef
ficiency in the system of the War Department, they be
came not only an easy mark for the Spanish Mausers,
but made the position of more peril to all the other
troops. In consequence of this they had to be with
drawn from the firing-line, but not until they had suf
fered severely and displayed an excellent courage. The
lack of artillery and the black powder made the assault
on El Caney a work to which infantry should not have
been forced. Yet they were forced to it, and supported
by only four guns, but splendidly led by Lawton, Chaf-_
fee, and Ludlow, they carried the position at heavy
123

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
cost by sheer courage, discipline, and good fighting,
manifesting these great qualities in a high degree, and
one worthy of very lasting honor and remembrance.
Lawton and Chaffee and Ludlow had gone to El
Caney with a well-defined purpose but it is difficult,
even after the most careful study and repeated reading
of the official reports, to detect any plan whatever in
the movements of the rest of the army. The troops had
been moved up the narrow trail the night before, and
at seven in the morning Captain Grimes's battery
opened from El Pozo hill. Black powder again, and a
magnificent target, so that the Cubans in the farm
house. Rough Riders in the yard, and the First and
Tenth Cavalry, all thoughtfully massed by some one
in the immediate neighborhood of the battery, where
they could be most easily hit, began to suffer severely.
Then the two brigades of the cavalry division under
General Sumner, the First, commanded by Colonel
(now General) Wood, leading, moved down the road
to Santiago. When the Rough Riders reached the
ford of the San Juan, they crossed and deployed in
good order. Then a captive observation-balloon was
brought along and anchored at the ford where the
troops were crossing and were massed in the road. As
one reads the official statement of this fact, comment
and criticism alike fail. That such a thing should have
been done seems incredible. The balloon simply served
to give the Spaniards a perfect mark and draw all the
rifle and artillery fire to the precise point where our
men were densely crowded in a narrow road. Fortu
nately the balloon was quickly destroyed by the enemy's
fire, but it had given the place and the range, and there
124

SANTIAGO— THE LAND FIGHT
the troops remained for nearly an hour, exposed to
heavy fire from the forts and block-house, and from
guerillas in trees, who here and elsewhere devoted them
selves especially to picking off surgeons, wounded men,
and Red Cross nurses. There the men staid, drop
ping under the shots of the Spaniards, able to do noth
ing, waiting orders. No orders from headquarters
came; the situation was intolerable; retreat meant not
only defeat, but useless and continual exposure to a
slaughtering fire. No other resource remained, ex
cept to take rifle in hand and, with infantry alone,
carry strong intrenchments and block-houses, defended
by well-covered regulars supported by artillery. Still
no orders, and at last the division, brigade, and regi
mental commanders acted and ordered for themselves.
Colonel Roosevelt led his Rough Riders forward from
the woods, and asking the men of the Ninth to let him
pass through, the regiment of regulars rose and fol
lowed him, and then the whole cavalry division went
out and on up the first hill, where there was a red-
roofed farm-house, whence they drove the enemy. A
pause here, a taking breath, exposed all the time to a
heavy fire from the strong main intrenchments now in
plain view. Again Colonel Roosevelt calls on his men,
starts, comes back because they had not heard, and off
they go again over the long open space, more than
half a mile, which separates them from the Spanish
post. The line of blue figures looks very thin and very
sparse to those who are watching it. It seems to move
very slowly. But it is moving all the time. Men stag
ger and drop, but the line goes on and up. It nears the
top, the Spaniards break and run, and the cavalry di-
125

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
vision — six regiments — all mingled now, finds itself
with the heights carried, and the intrenchments on the
right in its firm but tired grasp. With it has gone the
Gatling battery under Captain Parker, who in really
splendid fashion has kept his guns right at the front,
a powerful ally and support in these trying moments.
Colonel Roosevelt, who rode at first, has left his horse
at a wire fence, and now finds himself the senior offi
cer present and in command of all that is left of the
six gallant regiments, having led dauntlessly and un
hurt one of the most brilliant charges in our history.
Meantime over on the left the regular infantry are
repeating against the fort of San Juan — the strongest
of all the Spanish positions, and on a larger scale — the
splendid work of the dismounted cavalry. This divis
ion, consisting of eight regiments of regulars and one
of volunteers, was admirably commanded and led by
General Kent. They moved up the road on the after
noon of June 30, and started again early on the next
morning as soon as Captain Grimes's battery opened
at El Pozo, with the First Brigade, under General Haw
kins, in the lead. Their orders were to keep their
right on the main road to Santiago. They too were held
back by the crowd in the narrow trail, and still further
delayed by waiting for the passage of the cavalry divi
sion, who were given the right of way. As they began
at last to advance slowly they too came under the Span
ish fire, they too received the punishment brought upon
the army by the luckless balloon, and thus crowded to
gether, at a halt almost, suffered severely. The enemy's
fire steadily increased, the shrapnel poured in where
the balloon had marked the position, and the sharp-
126

SANTIAGO— THE LAND FIGHT
shooters in the trees busied themselves, as they were
doing already with the cavalry division. General Kent
attempted to send the Seventy-first New York through
a by-path, so as to bring them out in their proper posi
tion with the First Brigade, but when they came under
the heavy fire of the enemy the first battalion broke,
and were only held from a panic by the exertions of
General Kent's staff-officers. The other two battal
ions remained steady, for the regiment was of first-
rate material, and the trouble arose from their being
badly officered and besides being endowed with a col
onel who apparently did not come on to the field of
action. In the end they rallied, and many went for
ward in the final charge with the regulars, notably the
company under the gallant lead of Captain Rafferty.
But at the moment the confusion in the New York regi
ment still further checked the already impeded advance.
The First Brigade had gone on without the volun
teers, and the Third regiment was hurried forward by
General Kent into the blocked road, and finally pushed
through the New York regiment. As they came out
and crossed the lower ford Colonel Wikoff was killed,
and two lieutenant-colonels who succeeded him in com
mand of the brigade were quickly shot down, all in
the course of ten minutes. Yet nothing could shake
the nerve or break the discipline of this splendid brig
ade. Following orders, making all the formations,
operating in companies, battalions, and regiments, on
they went through the heavy under-growth, waist-
deep through the streams, and across barbed-wire de
fences. Nothing could break them as they went
steadily and fiercely onward. The Second Brigade,
127

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
finely led by Colonel Pearson, was pushed through in
the same way beneath a galling fire, out of the narrow
trail and across the ford. Two regiments of Pear
son's men went to the support of the Third Brigade,
one to that of the First. Meantime the Third
Brigade, connecting with the First on the right and
sweeping round through a heavy fire, turned the ene
my's right, and shared with the First in the assault.
On they went up a steep hill 125 feet above the level,
tangled with barbed wires, and crowned with deep
trenches and the strong brick fort of San Juan. No
artillery to help them. Regular infantry, rifle in hand,
were going to take this high and heavily fortified posi
tion. Steadily and quickly they went at it, General
Hawkins, a noble figure, white-haired, and with all
the fire of youth in his gallant heart, leading the
charge at the head of his two regiments. To those who
watched, it seemed to take a long time. But it was
twenty minutes past twelve when the Third Brigade
followed the First out of the death-trap in the woods,
and at half past one the steady, strong-moving mass of
infantry had cleared an outlying knoll, crossed the val
ley, scaled the rough steep hill, and with Hawkins at
their head, and the men of the Third Brigade sweeping
up on the left, stood triumphant on the crest, where they
fell to intrenching themselves, and sent the Thirteenth
Infantry off to support the cavalry division, while the
Twenty-first regiment pushed on 800 yards farther
and took an advanced position. Altogether a very
splendid feat of arms, very perfectly performed.
One other movement was made on July ist at the
extreme left. General Duffield was ordered to move
128

SANTIAGO— THE LAND FIGHT
along the railroad by the coast and make a demon
stration at Aguadores, in order to keep the Spaniards
engaged at that point and prevent their attacking our
left. General Shafter especially ordered General Duf
field not to sacrifice his men, but to "worry the
enemy." When he reached the river at the point of
crossing, he found that the bridge had been in part
destroyed. The river also was deep, and, according
to General Duffield's estimate, 600 to 700 feet wide.
He therefore made no attempt to cross, but kept
the enemy under fire until three o'clock, engaging
them again the next day, and carrying out in this
way his orders to the entire satisfaction of General
Shafter, who recommended him for gallantry and good
conduct at Aguadores. The total loss in their skir
mishes, when the Thirty-third Michigan behaved very
well, was two killed and fifteen wounded.
The battle of San Juan, as it is called, consisted
really of two detached attacks on the hill of that name
and the separate action of El Caney. There were 6,464
officers and men at El Caney, and 7,919 engaged at
San Juan, apart from the small brigade (323 all told)
of light artillery. There were among them three regi
ments of volunteers, but the Second Massachusetts, after
suffering severely, had to be withdrawn from the firing-
line on account of its black powder, and the Seventy-
first New York was only partially engaged. Deducting
these two regiments, there were 12,507 officers and
men engaged, including, of volunteers, only the Rough
Riders, who, like the regulars, were armed with mod
ern magazine rifles, and who showed themselves on
that day the equal of any regulars in desperate fight-
9 129

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
ing; but they numbered only 583 of the more than 12,-
000 men brought into action. The battle of San Juan,
therefore, was pre-eminently the battle of the Ameri
can regulars, of the flower of the American standing
army. With scarcely any artillery support, armed
only with rifles, they were set to take heights and a
village strongly held by regular soldiers and defended
by forts, intrenchments, batteries, and a tangle of
barbed-wire fences. This is something which the best
military critics would declare well-nigh impossible and
not to be attempted. The American army did it. That
is enough to say. They lost heavily, largely through
the awkward manner in which they were crowded and
delayed at the start. There were 21 officers and 220
men killed, and 93 officers and 1,280 men wounded,
the percentage of the officers being remarkably high,
except at Aguadores, where none were injured. On
the Spanish side it is almost impossible to get any
figures of the slightest value, even their official reports
being filled with obvious falsehoods and contradic
tions. General Wheeler gives the number at El Caney
as 460; the official Spanish report puts it at 520, of
whom only 80 returned unwounded. Captain Arthur
Lee, of the British army, who has written by far the
best account of El Caney, says there were somewhat
less than 1,000 Spaniards in the works, and that at
least half were killed and wounded. As his estimate
of the losses agrees with the Spanish report, I have
accepted it. The Spanish statement of their numbers
at El Caney is so absurd, on their own report of
losses, that Captain Lee's dispassionate estimate of
the total force must also be accepted. The case at San
130

SANTIAGO— THE LAND FIGHT
Juan is much more difficult. According to Lieutenant
Muller y Tejeiro, quoting what professes to be official
reports, there were only 3,000 men defending Santiago,
including the sailors, and only 250 men at San Juan
heights. This is so grotesquely false that it is easy to
throw it aside, but it is not easy to reach the truth.
Muller gives 520 men at El Caney and 250 at San
Juan, and in one place gives the total killed and wounded
as 593, and in another as 469, both manifestly absurd
losses for 770 men. The Spaniards said at different
times that they had as few as 1,400 and as many as
2,500 at Las Guasimas, which hardly coincides with the
statement that there were only 3,000 men in the city.
Deducting Escario's force, which came in on July 2,
there were 13,000 rifles, Mausers and Remingtons,
surrendered in Santiago city when it capitulated, which
indicates a total force of that number, unless we assume
that each of Lieutenant MuUer's 3,000 soldiers carried
four rifles. As a matter of fact, the Spaniards had ul
timately 12,000 to 13,000 men in Santiago; they had
over 9,000 along the line of defences on the east side
confronting the Americans*; and the works at San
Juan were strongly held by at least 4,000 men, as stated
by Mr. Ramsden, the British consul, a thoroughly
trustworthy witness. Their actual losses it is not
easy to detect through the clouds of falsehood in the
official reports ; but as we know that they were heavier
than the American at El Caney, and also at Las Guasi
mas, we may safely assume that the case was nearly
the same at San Juan, although they had all the advan-
* General Wood puts the number of men on the whole eastern
line of defences at 9,600. 131

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
tage of cover and position. It is certain that when
the city surrendered they had more men in hospital
than the Americans. The Spaniards stood their ground
bravely, fired heavily in volleys, and bore their punish
ment unflinchingly, but nowhere did they face the
American rush and onset when they came close upon
them. It was a hard-fought battle, and both sides
suffered severely, but the steady and irresistible Ameri
can advance won.
After the victorious charge there was still no rest
for the men who had climbed the steep sides of San
Juan. Worn and weary as they were, they went to
work to make intrenchments, and with scant food —
Colonel Roosevelt's men feeding on what the Span
iards had left behind — they all toiled on through the
night. At daylight the Spaniards attacked, opening
a fire which continued all day. Yet, despite the fire
and the drenching rain, the men worked on, and the
new intrenchments, now frowning down toward the
city, grew and lengthened. At nine o'clock in the even
ing another attack by long range firing was made by the
Spaniards, and repulsed. The losses on the American
side during this fighting on the 2d were not severe, as
they were protected by breastworks, and the Spaniards
were utterly unable to take the hill they could not hold,
from the men who had driven them from it when they
had every advantage of position. Nevertheless, the
situation was undoubtedly grave. With 3,000 men
only on the extreme ridge at first, we were confronted
by 9,000 Spaniards. Our men were exhausted by bat
tle, marching, and digging. They were badly fed,
transportation was slow, and supplies scarce, and they
132

CENER.VLS L\ THE SANTL\(',o CA^H'All;^¦

SANTIAGO— THE LAND FIGHT
were at first unsheltered. Under these conditions
some officers thought about and urged withdrawal,
while General Wheeler, backed strongly by many of
the younger officers and later by Lawton and Sumner,
opposed any such movement. The spirit which car
ried the heights of San Juan held them, but to General
Shafter, away from the front and the firing-line, the
voices of doubt and alarm came with effective force.
During the day he fluctuated from doubt to confidence.
He wanted Sampson to try at once and at all hazards
to break in, and he proposed to General Wheeler to
move against the entrance forts of the harbor, thus
giving a tardy adhesion to the wise plan of Sampson
and Miles, which he had abandoned. Early on the
morning of July 3 there came a despatch from him,
written under the first depressing influences, to the
War Department, saying that he had Santiago well in
vested, but that our line was thin, the city strongly de
fended, and not to be taken without heavy loss ; that he
needed re-enforcements, and was considering with
drawal to a position which an examination of the map
showed to mean a retreat to the coast. This news —
the first received in twenty-four hours — came upon
those in authority at Washington with a depressing
shock. General Shafter was urged to hold the San
Juan heights, and in a confused hurry every effort was
made to get together more transports — none having
been brought back from Santiago — and to drive for
ward the departure of troops. It was the one really
dark day of the war, and the long hot hours of that
memorable Sunday were heavy with doubt, apprehen
sion, and anxiety. 133

CHAPTER VII
SANTIAGO  THE SEA FIGHT
By one of the dramatic contrasts which fate de
lights to create in human history, at the very time when
the Shafter despatch was filling Washington with
gloom, the sea-power of Spain was being shot to death
by American guns, and her ancient empire in the West
Indies had passed away forever. It matters little now
why Cervera pushed open the door of Santiago Har
bor and rushed out to ruin and defeat. The admiral
himself would have the world understand that he was
forced to do so by ill-advised orders from Havana and
Madrid. Very likely this is true, but if it is, Havana
and Madrid must be admitted to have had good grounds
for their decision. It did not occur to the Spaniards,
either in Santiago or elsewhere, that the entire Ameri
can army had been flung upon El Caney and San Juan,
and that there were at the moment no reserves. Their
own reports, moreover, from the coast were wild and
exaggerated, so that, deceived by these as well as by
the daring movements and confident attitude of the
American army, they concluded that the city was men
aced by not less than 50,000 men. Under these con
ditions Santiago would soon be surrounded, cut off,
starved, and taken. It is true that Admiral Cervera
had announced that if the Americans entered Santi-
134

SANTIAGO— THE SEA FIGHT
ago he would shell and destroy the city, and he would
probably have done so, with complete Spanish indif
ference to the wanton brutality of such an act. But
it is difficult to see how this performance would have
helped the army or saved the fleet. With the American
army on the heights of San Juan, and extending its
lines, the ultimate destruction or capture of the entire
squadron was a mere question of time. The process
might be made more or less bloody, but the final out
come could not be avoided, and was certain to be com
plete. On the other hand, a wild rush out of the har
bor might result possibly in the escape of one or more
ships, and such an escape, properly treated in official
despatches, could very well be made to pass in Spain
for a victory. In remaining, there could be nothing
but utter ruin, however long postponed. In going out,
there was at least a chance, however slight, of saving
something. So Cervera was ordered to leave the har
bor of Santiago. He would have liked to go by night,
but thanks to the precautions of Admiral Sampson the
narrow entrance glared out of the darkness brilliant
with the white blaze of the search-lights, and beyond
lay the enemy, veiled in darkness, waiting and watch
ing. The night was clearly impossible. It must be
daylight, if at all. So on Sunday morning at half past
nine the Spanish fleet with bottled steam came out of
the harbor with a rush, the flag-ship Maria Teresa lead
ing; then the other three cruisers about 800 yards
apart; then, at 1,200 yards distance, the two crack
Clyde-built torpedo-boat destroyers Furor and Pluton.
As Admiral Sampson was to meet General Shafter that
morning at Siboney, the New York had started to the
^35

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
eastward, and was four miles away from her station
when, at the sound of the guns, she swung round and
rushed after the running battle-ships, which she could
never quite overtake, although she came up so fast that
she was able to get two shots at the torpedo boat de
stroyers before they went down which was only twenty
minutes after they had emerged from the harbor en
trance. It was a cruel piece of ill fortune that the ad
miral, who had made every arrangement for the fight,
should, by mere chance of war, have been deprived of
his personal share in it. Equally cruel was the fortune
which had taken Captain Higginson and the Massa
chusetts on that day to Guantanamo to coal. These
temporary absences left (beginning at the westward)
the Brooklyn, Texas, Iowa, Oregon, Indiana, and the
two converted yachts Gloucester and Vixen lying near
inshore, to meet the escaping enemy. Quick eyes on
the Iowa detected first the trailing line of smoke in the
narrow channel and signal was made at 9.34 "Enemy
Escaping" which was acknowledged on the Brooklyn
at 9.35. Then all the fleet saw them and there was no
need of any other signals. Admiral Sampson's order
had long since been given : "If the enemy tries to es
cape, the ships must close and engage as soon as possi
ble and endeavor to sink his vessels or force them to
run ashore." Every ship was always stripped for ac
tion, each captain on the station knew by heart this or
der which was posted in every conning tower, his crew
needed no other, and the perfect execution of it was
the naval battle at Santiago.
The Spanish ships came out at eight to ten knots'
speed, cleared the Diamond Shoal, and then turned
136

Cij|iyt-i-ht, iSqS, hy G. R. Buft'liain
FASi^UALE DE CERVERA

SANTIAGO— THE SEA FIGHT
sharply to the westward. As they issued forth they
opened a fierce, rapid, but ill-directed fire with all guns,
which shrouded them in smoke. The missiles fell
thickly and seemed to come in a dense flight over all
the ships. Around the Indiana the projectiles tore the
water into foam, and the Brooklyn, which the Span
iards are said to have had some vague plan of disa
bling, because they believed her to be the one fast ship,
was struck several times, but not seriously injured,*
The Spanish attack, with its sudden burst of fire, was
chiefly in the first rush, for it was soon drowned in the
fierce reply. The American crews were being mus
tered for Sunday inspection when the enemy was seen.
They were always prepared for action, and as the sig
nal went up the men were already at quarters. There
was no need for Admiral Sampson's distant signal to
close in and attack, for that was what they did.
This signal had no importance so far as the action
was concerned for it was merely a repetition of the
*NoTE. — Through the kindness of the Hon. Charles H. Allen,
Assistant Secretary of the Navy, I have been able to procure the
exact amount expended to repair the damage caused by the Span
ish shots in the battle of July 3d. The statement is as follows :
Cost of Repairing Damage Caused hy Spanish Guns in Battle of
July 3& :
Oregon  None
Texas  $ 752.32
Brooklyn  i.303-iS
Indiana  4,078.58
Iowa  4,993-65
This table is instructive and seems to dispose of the proposition
that the Brooklyn suffered more than the other ships, bore the
brunt and was the especial object of Spanish attack.
137

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
standing order posted up in the conning towers. But it
has importance in another respect because it was a sig
nal made by the commanding admiral. Technically Ad
miral Sampson was in command of the fleet through
out the action for he was never out of signal distance.
The signal which he made when he started for Siboney
"Disregard movements of flag-ship" never implies re
linquishment of command and did not then. So long as
he was within signal distance he was in command and
he remained within that distance constantly shortening
it, from beginning to end of the action. His first signal
when seeing the enemy coming out, he turned his ship
was neither needed nor heeded but his orders to the
Iowa later to stop by the Viscaya and similar orders
to other ships were seen and obeyed as the New York
rushed along after the Oregon and Brooklyn. He was
within easy signal distance when the Colon surren
dered and her surrender was at once reported to him.
As it is undoubtedly true that Admiral Sampson was
technically in command throughout it is equally true
that Admiral (then Commodore) Schley the next in
rank was never technically in comrhand for a single
moment. As to actual command the case is equally
clear. At 9.35 the Brooklyn acknowledged the Iowa's
signal "Enemy escaping." The signal-book of the
Brooklyn shows that she then made signal "Clear for
action" which was superfluous when addressed to ships
which had been cleared for action for thirty days. She
then made signal to close with the enemy a mere repe
tition of Sampson's standing order which all the ships
were carrying out to the fullest extent. The Brook
lyn's signal-book also shows that these signals were
138

^^ imd }S^

^

^

[,Wiiilii.ld i J>ohle\^

NAV.\L DFKICEKS IX N.\N IT.M'.i ) I ; ANH".-\IG.\

SANTIAGO— THE SEA FIGHT
not acknowledged and as a matter of fact they were
never heeded or noticed and probably were never seen
by the other ships. In a word Admiral Schley never
controlled or directed in the slightest degree the move
ments of any ship but the Brooklyn and exercised no
general command whatever. There was no fleet action.
Each ship followed the standing order and fought
under it for its own hand. The result was harmonious
but it was a captain's fight without a single fleet move
ment directed at the time by anybody.
Each ship following the standing order to close
put its helm to starboard and bore down on the enemy.
The Brooklyn alone disobeyed not only the standing
order but the order which she herself had just set
directing the other ships to close. The Brooklyn
put her helm to port came round in the reverse of
the other ships, with her stern to the enemy and after
this wide sweep away from them bore on to the west
ward parallel to and outside the Spanish ships. Ad
miral Schley had signalled to the other ships to close
but he made no signal when he reversed his own order
by putting his helm to port. In this unexpected move
ment he not only took himself out of the way of the
enemy but he checked the advance of the Texas. Had
he put his helm to starboard and borne down like the
other ships or even if he had not held the Texas back
the Spanish ships would probably never have been able
to clear the shoal and turn to the westward. They
would in all probability have been headed and never
got out of the pocket in which they were and which was
opened for them by the movement of the Brooklyn and
the consequent checking of the Texas.
139

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
Admiral Schley's first explanation of his movement
was that he was afraid of being rammed it being under
stood that the Spaniards were especially anxious to
destroy the Brooklyn because she was so fast. His
second explanation of his turning away from the enemy
in a direction contrary to that taken by the other ships
was that he wished to avoid blanketing their fire. For
the ship in the lead, and with the highest speed to
blanket ships in the rear seems difficult on its face but
for the leading ship to blanket the fire of four battle
ships strung out over a mile that fire being directed
against four ships strung out over an equal or greater
distance appears practically impossible.
This necessary definition as to the command with
proof that the captains fought the action for them
selves under the standing order of Admiral Sampson*
together with the closely related description of the
exceptional and isolated movements of the Brooklyn
have led us away from the general narrative of the
battle itself.
The only disadvantage to the Americans at the out
set was that they were under low steam, and it took
time to gather way, so that the Spaniards, with a full
head of steam, gained in the first rush. But this did
not check the closing in, nor the heavy broadsides which

*NoTE. — See report of Captain Clark of the Oregon addressed to
Admiral Sampson in which he says : "Acting under your orders"
i. e. Under Sampson's standing orders which Admiral Schley re
peated by signal from the Brooklyn and then disobeyed. That is,
he did not follow his own order and gave no notice or signal to
the other ships that he was going to do just the opposite to what
he had ordered them to do; namely, "close with the enemy."
140

SANTIAGO— THE SEA FIGHT
were poured upon the Spanish ships as they came by
and turned to the westward. Then it was that the
Maria Teresa and the Oquendo received their death-
wounds. Then it was that a 13-inch shell from the
Indiana struck the Teresa exploding under the quarter
deck; and that the broadsides of the Iowa, flung on
each cruiser as it headed her in turn, and of the Oregon
and Texas, tore the sides of the Oquendo, the Vizcaya,
and the flag-ship. The Spanish fire sank under that
of the American gunners, shooting coolly as if at target
practice, and sweeping the Spanish decks in a manner
which drove the men from the guns. On went the
Spanish ships in their desperate flight, the American
ships firing rapidly and steadily upon them, always
closing in, and beginning now to gather speed. The
race was a short one to two of the Spanish ships, fatally
wounded in the first savage encounter. In little more
than half an hour the flag-ship Maria Teresa was
headed to the shore, and at quarter past ten she was a
sunken, burning wreck upon the beach at Nima Nima,
six miles from Santiago. Fifteen minutes later, and
half a mile further on, the Oquendo was beached near
Juan Gonzales, a mass of flames, shot to pieces, and a
hopeless wreck. For these two, flight and fight were
alike over.
At the start, the Brooklyn as has been said putting
her helm to port, had gone round, bearing away from
the land, and then steamed to the westward, so that,
as she was the fastest in our squadron, she might be
preserved to head off the swiftest Spanish ship. In
the lead with the Brooklyn was the Texas, holding
the next position in the line and checked temporarily
141

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
by the Brooklyn's movement. But the Oregon was
about to add to the laurels she had already won in her
great voyage from ocean to ocean. With a burst of
speed which astonished all who saw her, and which
seemed almost incredible in a battle-ship, she forged
ahead to the second place in the chase, for such it had
now become. The Teresa and the Oquendo had gone
to wreck, torn by the fire of all the ships. The Vizcaya
had also been mortally hurt in the first outset, but she
struggled on, pursued by the leading ships, and under
their fire, especially that of the Oregon, until, at quarter
past eleven, she too was turned to the shore and beached
at Asseraderos, fifteen miles from Santiago, a shat
tered, blazing hulk. Meantime the two torpedo-boats,
coming out last from the harbor, about ten o'clock, had
made a rush to get by the American ships. But their
high speed availed them nothing. The secondary bat
teries of the battle-ships including that of the New York
as she came driving past were turned upon them with
disastrous effect, and they also met an enemy especially
reserved for them. The Gloucester, a converted yacht,
with no armor, but with a battery of small rapid-fire
guns, was lying inshore when the Spaniards made their
break for liberty. Undauntedly firing her light shells
at the great cruisers as they passed, the Gloucester
waited, gathering steam the while for the destroyers.
The moment these boats appeared, Lieutenant-Com
mander Wainwright, unheeding the fire of the Socapa
battery, drove the Gloucester straight upon them at top
speed, giving them no time to use their torpedoes, even
if they had so desired. The fierce, rapid, well-directed
fire of the Gloucester swept the decks of the torpedo-
142

SANTIAGO— THE SEA FIGHT
boats, and tore their upper works and sides. Shattered
by the shells from the battle-ships, and overwhelmed
by the close and savage attack of the Gloucester, which
fought in absolute disregard of the fire from either
ships or shore, the race of the torpedo-boat destroyers
was soon run. Within twenty minutes of their rush
from the harbor's mouth the Furor was beached and
sunk, and the Pluton had gone down in deep water.
At the risk of their lives the officers and men of the
Gloucester boarded their sinking enemies, whose decks
looked like shambles, and saved all those who could be
saved. There were but few to rescue. Nineteen were taken
from the Furor, 26 from the Pluton; all the rest of the
64 men on each boat were killed or drowned. It is
worth while to make a little comparison here. The
Furor and Pluton were 370 tons each, with a comple
ment together of 134 men. They had together four 11-
pounders, four 6-pounders, and four Maxim guns, in
addition to their torpedoes. The Gloucester was of 800
tons, with 93 men, four 6-pounders, four 3-pounders,
and two Colt automatic guns. The Spanish boats were
fatally wounded by the secondary batteries of the bat
tle-ships, but they were hunted down and destroyed
by the Gloucester, which, regardless of the fire of the
Socapa battery, closed with them and overwhelmed
them. There is a very interesting exhibition here of
the superior quality of the American sailor. The fierce
rapid, gallant attack of the Gloucester carried all before
it, and showed that spirit of daring sea-fighting with
out which the best ships and the finest guns are of little
avail, and which has made the English-speaking man
the victor on the ocean from the days of the Armada.
143

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
When the Viscaya went ashore at quarter past
eleven, only one Spanish ship remained, the Cristobal
Colon. She was the newest, the fastest, and the best
of the squadron. With their bottled steam, all the
Spanish cruisers gained at first, while the American
ships were gathering and increasing their pressure, but
the Colon gained most of all. She did, apparently,
comparatively little firing, kept inside of her consorts,
hugging the shore, and then raced ahead, gaining on
all the American ships except the Brooklyn, which
kept on well outside to head her off. When the Vis
caya went ashore, the Colon had a lead of about six
miles over the Brooklyn and the Oregon, which had
forged to the front, with the Texas and Vixen following
at their best speed. As the Nezv York came tearing
along the coast, striving with might and main to get
into the fight, now so nearly done. Admiral Sampson
saw, after he passed the wreck of the Vizcaya, that the
American ships were overhauling the Spaniard. The
Colon had a contract speed five knots faster than the
contract speed of the Oregon. But the Spaniard's best
was seven knots below her contract speed, while the
Oregon, fresh from her 14,000 miles of travel, was
going a little faster than her contract speed, a very
splendid thing, worthy of much thought and considera
tion as to the value of perfect and honest workmanship
done quite obscurely in the builder's yard, and of the
skill, energy, and exact training which could then get
more than any one had a right to expect from both ship
and engines. On they went, the Americans coming
ever nearer, until at last, at ten minutes before one, the
Brooklyn and Oregon opened fire. A thirteen-inch
144

SANTIAGO— THE SEA FIGHT
shell from the great battle-ship, crushing her way at top
speed through the water, fell in the sea beyond the
Colon while the eight-inch shells of the Brooklyn began
to drop about her. But the big shell from the Oregon
turret was enough ; and without waiting for another of
those grim messengers from the battle-ship, without
firing another shot, the Spaniard hauled down her flag
and ran at full speed ashore upon the beach at Rio Tar
qulno, forty-five miles from Santiago. Captain Cook
of the Brooklyn boarded her, received the surrender,
and reported it to Admiral Sampson, who had come up
just in time to share in the last act of the drama. The
Colon was only slightly hurt by the shells, but it was
soon found that the Spaniards, to whom the point of
honor is very dear, had opened and broken her sea-
valves after surrendering her, and that she was filling
fast. The New York pushed her in nearer the shore,
and she sank, comparatively uninjured, in shoal water.
So the fight ended. Every Spanish ship which had
dashed out of the harbor in the morning was a half-
sunken wreck on the Cuban coast at half past one. The
officers and men of the Iowa, assisted by the Ericsson
and Hist, took off the Spanish crews from the red-hot
decks and amid the exploding batteries and ammunition
of the Vizcaya. The same work was done by the
Gloucester and Harvard for the Oquendo and Maria
Teresa. From the water and the surf, from the
beaches, and from the burning wrecks, at greater peril
than they had endured all day in battle, American offi
cers and crews rescued their beaten foes. It was a
very noble conclusion to a very perfect victory. The
Spanish lost, according to their own accounts and the
IO 145

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
best estimates, 350 killed or drowned, 160 wounded,
and 99 officers and 1,675 ^^^ prisoners, including,
of course, those on the Furor and Pluton, as already
given. The American loss was one man killed and one
wounded, both on the Brooklyn. Such completeness
of result and such perfection of execution are as striking
here as at Manila, and Europe, which had been disposed
at first to belittle Manila, saw at Santiago that these
things were not accidental, and considered the perform
ances of the American navy in a surprised and flatter
ing, but by no means happy, silence. At Santiago the
Spaniards had the best types of modern cruisers, three
built by British workmen in Spanish yards, and one,
the Colon, in Italy, while the torpedo-boat destroyers
were fresh from the Clyde, and the very last expression
of English skill. The ships of the United States were
heavier in armament and armor, but on the average
much slower. The Americans could throw a heavier
weight of metal, but the Spaniards had more quick-fire
guns, and ought to have been able to fire at the rate of
seventy-seven more shots in five minutes than their op
ponents.* According to the contract speed, the Spanish
cruisers had a great advantage over all their American
opponents, with the exception of the Brooklyn, and of
the New York, which was absent at the beginning. If
they had lived up to their qualities as set down in every
naval register, they ought to have made a most brilliant
fight, and some of them ought to have escaped. They
also had the advantage of coming out under a full head
* See the admirable article in Harper's Magazine for January
(p. 291) upon the "Naval Lessons of the War," by H. W. Wil
son, author of "Ironclads in Action." 146

SANTIAGO -THE SEA FIGHT
of steam, which their opponents lacked, and yet in less
than two hours all but one were shattered wrecks along
the shore, and in less than two hours more that one sur
vivor had been run down and had met the same fate. It
is no explanation to say, what we know now to be true,
that the Colon did not have her ten-inch guns, that the
Viscaya was foul-bottomed, that much of the ammu
nition was bad, and the other ships more or less out of
order. One of the conditions of naval success, just as
important as any other, is that the ships should be kept
in every respect in the highest possible efficiency, and
that the best work of which the machine and the organ
ization are capable should be got out of them. The
Americans fulfiled these conditions, the Spaniards did
not; the Oregon surpassed all that the most exacting
had a right to demand; the Colon and Vizcaya did
far less; hence one reason for American victory. It
is also said with truth that the Spanish gunnery was
bad, but this is merely stating again that they fell short
in a point essential to success. They fired with great
rapidity as they issued from the harbor, and although
most of the shots went wide, many were anything but
wild, for the American ships were all hit repeatedly.
When the American fire fell upon them, the Spanish
fire, as at Manila, slackened, became ineffective, and
died away. Again it was shown that the volume
and accuracy of the American fire were so great
that the fire of the opponents was smothered, and
that the crews were swept away from the guns. The
overwhelming American victory was due not to the
shortcomings of the Spaniards, but to the efficiency of
the navy of the United States and to the quality of the
147

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
crews. The officers and seamen, the gunners and engi
neers, surpassed the Spaniards in their organization
and in their handling of the machinery they used.
They were thoroughly prepared ; no surprise was pos
sible to them; they knew just what they meant to do
when the hour of battle came, and they did it coolly,
effectively, and with perfect discipline. They were pro
ficient and accurate marksmen, and got the utmost from
their guns as from their ships. Last, and most import-.
ant of all, they had that greatest quality of a strong, liv
ing, virile race, the power of daring, incessant dashing
attack, with no thought of the punishment they might
themselves be obliged to take. The whole war showed,
and the defeat of Cervera most conspicuously, that the
Spaniards had utterly lost the power of attack, a sure
sign of a broken race, and for which no amount of for
titude in facing death can compensate. No generous
man can fail to admire or to praise the despairing cour
age which held El Caney and carried Cervera's fleet out
of the narrow channel of Santiago; but it is not the
kind of courage which leads to victory, like that which
sent American soldiers up the hills of .San Juan and into
the blood-stained village streets of El Caney, or which
made the American ships swoop down, carrying utter
destruction, upon the flying Spanish cruisers.
Thus the long chase of the Spanish fleet ended in its
wreck and ruin beneath American ^ns. As one tells
the story, the utter inadequacy of X.ie narrative to the
great fact seems painfully apparent. One wanders
among the absorbing details which cross and recross the
reader's path, full of interest and infinite in their com
plexity. The more details one gathers, puzzling what
148

'1 i

iiaAjMji/t/" J-

'SB
'f

M"^Mm.»

.^

SANTIAGO— THE SEA FIGHT
to keep and what to reject, the denser seems the com
plexity, and f^e dimmer and more confused the picture.
The historian writing calmly in the distant future will
weave them into a full and dispassionate narrative ; the
antiquarian will write monographs on all incidents,
small or large, with unwearying patience; the naval
critic and expert will even now draw many technical
and scientific lessons from everything that happened,
and will debate and dispute abdut it, to the great ad
vantage of himself and his profession. And yet these
are not the things which appeal now, or will appeal in
the days to come, to the hearts of men. The details,
the number of shots, the ranges, the part taken by each
ship, the positions of the fleet — all alike have begun to
fade from recollection even now, and will grow still
dimmer as the years recede. But out of the mist of
events and the gathering darkness of passing time the
great fact and the great deed stand forth for the Ameri
can people and their children's children, as white and
shining as the Santiago channel glaring under the
search-lights through the Cuban night.
They remember, and will always remember, that hot
summer morning, and the anxiety, only half whispered,
which overspread the land. They see, and will always
see, the American ships rolling lazily on the long seas,
and the sailors just going to Sunday inspection. Then
comes the long thin trail of smoke drawing nearer the
harbor's mouth. The ships see it, and we can hear the
cheers ring out, for the enemy is coming, and the
American sailor rejoices mightily to know that the
battle is set. There is no need of signals, no need
of orders. The patient, long-watching admiral has
149

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
given direction for every chance that may befall.
Every ship is in place; and they close in upon
the advancing enemy, fiercely pouring shells from
broadside and turret. There is the Gloucester fir
ing her little shots at the great cruisers, and then
driving down to grapple with the torpedo-boats. There
are the Spanish ships, already mortally hurt, running
along the shore, shattered and breaking under the fire
of the Indiana, the Iowa, and the Texas; there is the
Brooklyn racing by outside to head the fugitives, and
the Oregon dealing death-strokes as she rushes for
ward, forging to the front, and leaving her mark every
where she goes. It is a captain's fight, and they all
fight as if they were one man with one ship. On they
go, driving through the water, firing steadily and ever
getting closer, and presently the Spanish cruisers, help
less, burning, twisted wrecks of iron, are piled along
the shore, and we see the younger officers and men of
the victorious ships periling their lives to save their
beaten enemies. We see Wainwright on the Glouces
ter, as eager in rescue as he was swift in fight to avenge
the Maine. We hear Philip cry out: "Don't cheer.
The poor devils are dying." We watch Evans as he
hands back the sword to the wounded Eulate, and then
writes in his report: "I cannot express my admira
tion for my magnificent crew. So long as the enemy
showed his flag, they fought like American seamen;
but when the flag came down, they were as gentle and
tender as American women." They all stand out to us,
these gallant figures, from the silent admiral to the
cheering seaman, with an intense human interest, fear
less in fight, brave and merciful in the hour of victory.
150

SANTIAGO— THE SEA FIGHT
And far away along the hot ridges of the San Juan
heights lie the American soldiers, who have been fight
ing, and winning, and digging intrenchments for forty-
eight hours, sleeping little and eating less. There they
are under the tropic sun that Sunday morning, and
presently the heavy sound of guns comes rolling up the
bay, and is flung back with many echoes from the sur
rounding hills. It goes on and on, so fast, so deep and
loud, that it is like continuous thunder filling all the
air. A battle is on ; they know that. Wild rumors be
gin to fly about, drifting up from the coast. They hear
that the American fleet is coming into the harbor ; then
for an hour that it has been defeated and that the Span
iards have escaped ; and then the truth begins to come,
and before nightfall they know that the Spanish fleet
is no more, and the American soldier cheers the Ameri
can sailor, and is filled anew with the glow of victory,
and the assurance that he and his comrades have not
fought and suffered and died in vain.
The thought of the moment is of the present victory,
but there are men there who recognize the deeper and
more distant meanings of that Sunday's work, now
sinking into the past. They are stirred by the knowl
edge that the sea power of Spain has perished, and that
the Spanish West Indies, which Columbus gave to Leon
and Castile, shall know Spain no more. They lift the
veil of the historic past, and see that on that July morn
ing a great empire met its end, and passed finally out of
the New World, because it was unfit to rule and govern
men. And they and all men see now, and ever more
clearly will see, that in the fight off Santiago another
great fact had reasserted itself for the consideration of
151

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
the world. For that fight had displayed once more the
victorious sea spirit of a conquering race. It is the
spirit of the Jomsberg Viking who, alone and wounded,
ringed round with foes, springs into the sea from his
sinking boat with defiance on his lips. It comes down
through Grenville and Drake and Howard and Blake,
on to Perry and Macdonough and Hull and Decatur.
Here on this summer Sunday it has been shown again
to be as vital and as clear as ever, even as it was with
Nelson dying at Trafalgar, and with Faragut and his
men in the fights of bay and river more than thirty
years before.

CHAPTER VIII
THE SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO
Despite the depressing despatch to Washington say
ing that he was considering withdrawal. General Shaf
ter, at IO o'clock on Sunday morning, sent to General
Toral a demand for immediate surrender, threatening
to shell the city, although he had no siege-guns and
nothing but light artillery to carry out his threat in case
his demand was not complied with. General Toral
answered at once, declining to surrender, and saying
that he would notify the foreign consuls and the inhabi
tants of the proposed bombardment. Thereupon the
foreign consuls appeared at General Wheeler's head
quarters, and asked that the bombardment be postponed
until the 5 th; that the non-combatants, women and
children, and the foreign residents, be allowed to leave
the town and pass into the American lines, to be there
fed and cared for. General Shafter granted the respite
until the 5 th, provided that there was no firing from the
Spanish lines. By the evening of the 3d it was known
that Cervera's fleet had been completely destroyed, and
the purpose of the expedition had been fully attained.
But in effecting that purpose the army had been so far
advanced toward Santiago that, although the purely
military value of the place was next to nothing after
what had happened, not to take it would have been a
153

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
blow to the prestige of the United States which could
not be accepted. If the army had never advanced
toward Santiago, but had confined its operations to the
capture of the Morro and other harbor defences, thus
allowing the navy to clear the mine-fields, the fleet could
have entered, destroyed Cervera's ships in the harbor,
and forced the surrender of the city. In this event the
bulk of the troops could have been placed immediately
on the transports and despatched to Puerto Rico, the
natural Spanish base in the Antilles, and the point
which General Miles rightly believed from the begin
ning should be the main objective of the American cam
paign, subject only to the destruction of the cruisers
which represented the Spanish sea power in the West
Indies. But since the plan of attacking the shore
batteries and clearing the channel had been abandoned,
and the army marched straight against Santiago, it
was no longer possible to withdraw the troops in order
to send them to Puerto Rico, or for any other purpose.
The capture of Santiago had become by the operations
of our army a moral and consequently a military neces
sity. The brilliant victory of the American fleet raised
every one's spirits, and gave assurance of the final
triumph on land. General Shafter, who had first sent
out the telegram intimating withdrawal, telegraphed
General Miles later that he was master of the situation
and could hold the enemy for any length of time, and in
the evening, after the news from the fleet had been fully
confirmed, cheerfully sent word that his line completely
surrounded the town from the bay on the north of the
city to a point on San Juan river on the south, and that
154

THE SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO
he thought General Garcia would be able to check the
advance of Pando's column. Nevertheless the situa
tion of the American army was in some respects se
rious. The defenses of Santiago in the immediate neigh
borhood of the city. General Shafter said, were "almost
impregnable." They were certainly very strong, and it
would have cost many lives to carry them with troops
insufficiently provided with artillery. This was a very
grave fact, because time had become extremely im
portant to the American forces, and it was pressingly
necessary to bring the siege to an end. Haste was im
perative, not on account of anything to be feared from
the enemy, but through the surrounding conditions.
The entire force of the United States, with the excep
tion of Duffield's brigade, had gone through the battle
of the 2d of July, and had suffered severely in killed
and wounded. For the next thirty-six hours they had
been exposed to the enemy's fire, repeatedly obliged to
repel an advance, always on the alert, and, in addition,
constantly digging and laboring on the intrenchments.
The tenacious, unwavering courage with which they
clung to the advanced line, laboring and fighting, was
as fine in its way as the daring, irrresistible rush with
which they had swept up the slopes of San Juan. But
courage and energy could not prevent the exhaustion
incident to so much fighting and digging. There was
no reserve. All the troops practically were on the line,
with no chance for any substantial relief. The trans
portation was bad, so that the men were underfed and
insufficiently tented. With their exhausting labors, and
not fortified by food, with a hospital service which had
in large measure broken down, the men were exposed to
155

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
scorching tropic heats and torrential rains, all in a cli
mate famous for malarial fevers. It was only a ques
tion of a very short time when these fevers would be
come general, striking first the sick and wounded, who
were insufficiently cared for and who could not be re
stored to health on a diet of pork and beans, and then
the well and unwounded men in the trenches. Worst
of all, behind the climatic diseases lurked the dread epi
demic of yellow fever, hidden in the cabins of Siboney,
which ought to have been burned at once as the ma
rines burned the fishing villlage at Guantanamo, and
in the hordes of refugees who were presently to come
out of the besieged city.
On the other side, the Spaniards were in reality much
worse off, although it may have appeared at Havana
and in Madrid as if they had only to hold firm and trust
to the climate and the ravages of fever to inflict severe
losses upon the Americans, delay them, and possibly
force them to withdraw. The Spanish commmanders
were in the midst of a hostile population. The Cuban
insurgents had for some time practically shut them up
in the city on the land side, breaking their communica
tions and cutting off their supplies. They believed that
the American forces numbered fifty thousand men, and
although they were mistaken in this, they knew that
their opponents could easily receive unlimited re-en
forcements, new regiments, as a matter of fact, soon
arriving and extending the lines rapidly around the
doomed city. They knew, also, that Cervera's fleet
had been destroyed, and that no relief coming oversea
could possibly be hoped for. To draw in the outlying
troops from other parts of the province was a work of
156

THE SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO
time and difficulty, and meanwhile, with a beaten and
discouraged army which had suffered severely in battle,
with disease rife, and their water supply impaired, they
were face to face with a vigorous enemy constantly in
creasing in numbers. Under these conditions the sur
render of the city was only a question of time, but how
long that time would be was of infinite importance
to the American army when delay meant disease and
death. The first truce of two days following Toral's curt and
useless refusal to consider surrender did not help the
American situation, for it brought on July 5 a general
exodus of non-combatants from the city. These un
happy refugees, mostly women and children, came
pouring into the American lines at El Caney to the
number of twenty-two thousand. They were in sad
plight — ragged, sick, starved. They made a fresh
strain upon the American resources, for they had to
be fed; they brought yellow fever with them as they
scattered through the camps, and they relieved very
much the situation of the Spanish forces in the city.
After their arrival there was skirmishing along the
lines, sometimes of quite a lively character, varied by
flags of truce and consequent intervals of repose. Our
losses were slight, as the men were now well protected
by intrenchments and breastworks. This condition of
affairs lasted until the 9th, when another demand for
surrender was made. The Spaniards, in reply, offered to
evacuate if allowed to withdraw untouched to Holguin,
which was declined. They then peremptorily refused
to surrender, being encouraged in their attitude proba
bly by the fact that General Escario, with the Pando
157

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
column, ponsisting of 3,300 men, had come in some days
before.* General Garcia had endeavored to stop this
re-enforcement, and had fought an action in which the
Spanish loss is said to have been 27 killed and 67
wounded ; but General Escario forced his way through,
apparently without serious difficulty, and reached the
city in safety. Whether the arrival of these fresh
troops was the cause or not, the surrender was declined,
and thereupon the American lines opened with small
guns and artillery, and continued the fire until nightfall
of Sunday, the loth, being supported on that afternoon
by the eight-inch guns of the Brooklyn, Indiana, and
Texas, which came in near shore and fired, most of
their shells falling short. The Spaniards replied stead
ily, but, according to their own accounts, slowly, owing
to their desire to economize their ammunition. The
American losses were trivial ; the Spanish, by their own
reports, 7 killed and 47 wounded ; but the result of the
bombardment was neither substantial nor effective.
The next day the New York, Brooklyn, and Indiana
came in to within 400 yards of the shore at Aguadores,
anchored, and opened fire with their eight-inch guns
over the coast hills, at the city they could not see, with
a range of 8,500 yards. This time the practice was ex
cellent. The army officers watching the fall of the
shells, although they could not tell exactly what hap
pened, saw enough to make it clear that the shots were
effective, and that fires broke out in several places. It
was found afterwards to have been far more destruc
tive than the watchers on the hills supposed. Captain
West reported forty-six shots, but was unable to tell
*The night of July 2.
158

THE .MEEIT.M; iif TIDO CENEK.VLS id .iKK.\.\(;E tiie Sl'KUFNDER ilF
S.>iNTIAi;i.i

THE SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO
the result of most of them. After the surrender naval
officers found fourteen houses wrecked by shells, and
nineteen shells in the Calle de la Marina near the water
front; while Lieutenant Muller states that fifty-nine
houses were wrecked or injured, and that no lives were
lost, solely because the inhabitants had deserted the city.
As General Linares said in the pathetic despatch which
he sent to Madrid describing his hopeless and miserable
situation. "The fleet has a perfect knowledge of the
place, and bombards by elevation with a mathematical
accuracy." General Shafter considered that the bom
bardment had been sufficiently accurate and effect
ive to warrant him in advancing the lines and de
manding again an unconditional surrender. At the
same time he desired a continuous bombardment
from heavier guns, and Admiral Sampson brought
down the Oregon and Massachusetts and prepared
to open with the 13-inch guns the next day; while
General Miles, who had just arrived, was ready
to land fresh troops. But neither the 13-inch guns
nor the re-enforcements were needed. The Span
iards knew that the naval bombardment was effective,
whatever doubts the officers of our own army may have
had in regard to it. The navy, despite the long range
and the intervening hills, had managed to supply the
place of the lacking siege-guns, and the Spaniards had
had enough. A truce was agreed to on July 12 ; and on
July 13 General Miles, who had come up from the coast
after ordering the burning of Siboney, a precaution
which ought to have been taken two weeks before,
joined General Shafter and General Wheeler, and go
ing through the lines with them, had a long interview
IS9

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
with General Toral, commanding the Spanish forces.
It was evident then, and is still clearer now, that the
fight was really over, and that nothing remained but an
arrangement of the terms of surrender. General Toral
asked for a day to consult Madrid as to the deportation
of the Spanish troops, which was granted. The next
day there was another meeting of the generals, and it
was supposed that all was arranged; but it appeared
that there had been misunderstandings; other meet
ings followed, and it was not until after midnight that
the preliminary agreement was finally signed. This was
sent to Madrid, and being accepted there, was put into
due form as articles of capitulation, and signed on July
1 6. The terms of capitulation provided that all the
Eastern District and the troops therein should be sur
rendered ; that the United States' should transport the
Spanish troops to Spain at its own expense; that the
Spanish officers should retain their side arms, but that
all other arms and ammunition of war were to be sur
rendered, the American commissioners recommending
to their government, as a sop to Spanish pride, that the
soldiers should be allowed to keep the arms they had
so bravely defended, to which recommendation no heed
was or could be paid.
So the city and Eastern District of Santiago passed
into American hands, the outward and visible sign of
the victorious fighting of the army, as the twisted
wrecks to the westward were of that of the navy. The
ceremonies of surrender took place on July 17. Early
in the morning General Shafter, with General Wheeler
by his side, started from the American lines, followed
by the division and brigade commanders and their
160

THE SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO
staffs. They were plainly dressed, without stars or or
ders — hard fighters all — and presented a contrast to
General Toral and his staff, who were glittering with
decorations. It was half past nine when the two com
manders met and shook hands, and the American con
gratulated the Spaniard upon his gallant defence. Then
a battalion of Spanish infantry marched past, piled their
arms, and marched back again, in sign of the surrender,
and setting the example soon to be followed by the
rest of the army. This done, the generals and their
staffs rode forward into the city. Along the road lay
the carcasses of horses, and the shallow graves of sol
diers torn open by vultures — grim and silent witnesses
of the work which had brought the Spaniards to defeat.
Presently the Spanish lines were reached, and the cav
alcade passed through the intrenchments, wire fences,
and barricades of paving-stones, which it would have
cost many brave lives to force. So on through streets
lined with Spanish soldiers, silent, but apparently re
lieved to have it over, and bearing the inevitable with
cheerful philosophy. When the plaza was reached the
generals entered the palace, while the Ninth Infantry
and two troops of cavalry cleared the square. In the
palace General Shafter received the head of the Church,
gorgeous in purple robes and many decorations. Pos
sibly, as the archbishop, after his brief interview, took
his way across the square through the bowing crowds,
he may have thought upon the after-dinner speech in
which he had so lately declared that with ten thousand
men he would hoist the Spanish flag over the Capitol
at Washington, and thus pondering, have found fresh
force in the words of Ecclesiastes. The time slipped
" i6i

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
by as the crowds waited — the natives rejoicing, the
Spanish soldiers cheerful, the Spanish officers and
priests sad and dejected — until, as all watched the
cathedral clock, the hand came round to five minutes
before twelve. Then a sharp command rang out, the in
fantry and cavalry came to attention and stood motion
less. The five minutes dragged on with leaden feet, and
then at last the bells began to sound from the cathedral,
and the American flag went up on the staff over the
palace. The band played "The Star-Spangled Banner,"
the officers bared their heads, the troops presented
arms, the artillery thundered from the trenches, and all
down the long and distant line ran the American cheers
— strong, vigorous, inspiring, the shout of a conquer
ing people.
It was all over. Santiago had passed away from
Spain, and with it all Cuba, for what had been done
there could not be hindered elsewhere, as was now very
plain to all men. It was one of the dramatic points in
the war. It was the moment when the American flag,
mounting proudly in the air, told the world that Spain's .
empire in America had finally and forever departed.
Out of that harbor, famous before, more famous now,
Grijalva and Cordova had sailed on the perilous voy
ages which had discovered Central America. Thence
in the early dawn of a November morning in 1518
Cortez had slipped away with his fleet to escape an un
friendly Governor, and raising afterwards at Havana
his standard of black and gold, with a red cross flaring
in the centre, had passed on to conquer Mexico and pour
untold wealth into the coffers of the Spanish King.
The last Spanish fleet had just left that harbor a des-
162

THE SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO
perate fugitive, and had perished in its mad fiight a few
miles beyond the harbor mouth. Now the speech of
the men who, three hundred years before, had hunted
the Armada and saved English freedom was heard in
the market place of Santiago, repeating the old mes
sage of liberty, grown wider and stronger than ever
before in the hands of the great republic. The flag of
the United States fluttered in the breezes which for
three centuries had carried the arms and colors of
Spain, now fallen and gone. Only outward symbols
these, but representing many facts and many events
worthy of much attention and consideration from those
who think tyranny, falsehood, and bigotry are suitable
instruments for the government of mankind.
It is well also not to forget that while these great and
conclusive events were happening at Santiago, while
Sampson was shutting in Cervera with his strong and
patient blockade, the better to crush him when he rushed
out to fight, while the American army was advanc
ing from the coast, winning the hot fight at San Juan
and taking the city in token of victory, other Ameri
cans in ships of war were diligently and efficiently car
rying steadily forward the work which was cutting off
Cuba from the rest of the world, and making inevitable
the surrender of the island, even as the eastern province
had surrendered. North and south, all along that far-
stretching and broken coast-line, American gunboats
and cruisers kept up a ceaseless patrol. Ships at the
western end were scarce enough, but nevertheless the
blockade was held tight and firm around Havana and
the ports covered by the first proclamation. To tell in
fitting detail all the work that was done would fill many
163

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
pages, and would be no more than the officers and sail
ors deserve who performed hard and often obscure duty
with an efficiency equal to that shown by their more
fortunate comrades in a larger and more brilliant thea
tre. But it is impossible here to render this justice to
all. The work was patient and unceasing, and the in
cidents of fighting were of almost daily occurrence.
Now a great blockade-runner was hunted down and de
stroyed, as the Eagle dealt with the Santo Domingo
at Rio Piedras, and the Hawk, aided by the Castine,
with another six-thousand-ton ship at Mariel, the men
on the ships or in boats facing a heavy fire in their re
lentless pursuit. Blockade-running became a danger
ous, almost impossible, business under the conditions
imposed by the American navy. Again it was the land
ing of an expedition to bring aid and supplies to Gomez,
as was done by the Peoria and Helena convoying the
Florida, with a fight in consequence against the bat
teries and block-houses at Las Tunas. Again it was the
Dixie smashing the block-houses at the San Juan and
Guayximico rivers, and the gunboats at Casilda. These
are but samples of the manner in which the Spanish
defences were harried and broken up all along the
coast, and the efforts to get supplies to the main army
at Havana frustrated and brought to naught.
More serious was the affair of June 26 at Man-
zanillo. On the morning of that day the Hist, under
command of Lieutenant Young, the senior officer pres
ent, together with the Hornet and the Wompatuck,
attacked a gun-boat near the block-house in Niguero
Bay, and, after a sharp action, destroyed her. They
pushed on to the harbor of Manzanillo in the after-
164

THE SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO
noon, and came upon nine vessels, including four gun
boats and a torpedo-boat, drawn up in crescent for
mation, and supported by four pontoons and strong
shore batteries. Nothing daunted, these two converted
yachts and one tug, with their hght batteries, pressed
forward and attacked vigorously, under a heavy fire.
The odds were strongly against them ; the Hist was hit
eleven times ; the Hornet, also struck many times, was
disabled finally by a shot through her main steam-pipe,
and was towed off by the Wompatuck, which received
her share of shots, fighting her guns steadily and ef
fectively. The Spanisii torpedo-boat was disabled, one
gunboat sunk, as well as a sloop loaded with soldiers,
and a pontoon was destroyed. It was a very plucky
fight against a far superior force. The next day the
Scorpion, under command of Lieutenant Marix, and ac
companied by the tug Osceola, went in and vigorously
renewed the attack, but was inadequate to dispose of
such odds against them. These affairs made it obvious
that a stronger force was necessary in order to really
destroy the Spanish ships assembled in the harbor.
On July 1 8 the five small vessels which had already
been engaged, re-enforced by the gunboats Helena
and Wilmington, Commander Todd of the latter being
the senior officer present, went in early in the morning
and opened fire at ten minutes before eight. At the end
of two hours and a half they had destroyed three large
transports, the Ponton, a guard-ship, and three gun
boats. As they worked in closer, batteries opened from
the shore, and soldiers with rifles, to which they replied
effectively ; but when the shipping was disposed of, the
American flotilla withdrew, the work to which it had
i6s

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
been assigned having been performed with entire thor
oughness, excellent shooting, cool courage, and in the
same spirit of completeness as had been shown to the
world at Manila.
Three days afterwards the Annapolis, commanded by
Commander Hunker, supported by the Topeka, with the
Wasp and Leyden leading, went in through the mine-
sown channel of Nipe bay, on the northern coast. There
they found the gunboat Don forge fuan, of 935 tons
and armed with 6-inch rifles, lying at anchor in the
restful belief that no enemy would dare to venture past
the mines. Unluckily the enemy inconsiderately did
that very thing, faced the fire of the Don forge fuan,
closed in, and in half an hour the Spaniard, shot to
pieces, had surrendered and sunk. Again, three days
later, the Nashville, under command of Commander
Maynard, took possession of Gibara, supporting the
Cubans who were already in the town. Thus the sea
ports of Cuba were falling rapidly and steadily into
American hands, and thus the net was being drawn ever
closer and tighter upon the main army at Havana. In
pursuance of this policy it was determined to complete
the work at Manzanillo, where the shipping had been
so thoroughly destroyed, by taking the town itself,
which, strongly held by a large force of troops and well
defended by batteries, was a source of trouble to the
American campaign on land, as well as a constant
temptation to blockade-running^ With this object in
view, the Newark, under Captain Goodrich, on her way
to the Isle of Pines to conduct certain operations
ordered by Admiral Sampson, gathered together the
Resolute, Suwanee, Hist, Osceola, and the Alvarado — a
166

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THE SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO
recently captured Spanish gun-boat — and entered Man
zanillo Harbor on August 12. A demand for surrender
under pain of bombardment was refused, and the ships
opened upon the batteries at twenty minutes before
four. In half an hour white flags were seen on a Span
ish gunboat ; the American fire stopped ; the Alvarado,
running in under a flag of truce, was fired upon, and
the action was immediately renewed. Cuban forces
then appeared in the rear of the town, and opening
fire, were supported by the ships. At half past five the
ships anchored ; a slow fire from the Newark was kept
up through the night, and preparations were made to
renew the bombardment and force the surrender of the
town the next morning. When daylight came, white
flags were seen in Manzanillo, and the Captain of the
Port brought off to Captain Goodrich a brief despatch,
saying, "Protocol of peace signed by the President;
armistice proclaimed." No more bombardment, there
fore, and Manzanillo was to be yielded without a strug
gle. The road of peace was opened again, hostilities
were suspended, and the last shot of war from Amer
ican guns in Cuban waters had been fired.

CHAPTER IX
THE CAMPAIGN IN PUERTO RICO
The island of Puerto Rico, the easternmost and the
most beautiful of the Greater Antilles, with its large
population and commanding strategic position, was
constantly in the minds of both army and navy as soon
as war began. It was there that Admiral Sampson had
gone to find Cervera at what seemed the most probable
place, but the Spanish fleet was not in the harbor of San
Juan. The noise of the bombardment died away, and
the people of the island continued to believe that all was
well, that Spain was triumphant and had won a great
victory at Manila. American cruisers fluttered about
the coast, and it was true that there seemed always to
be a ship off San Juan. But this did not shake the
general confidence, and there was much elation when
the crack torpedo-boat destroyer Terror, detached at
Martinique because out of order, came into the harbor.
On June 22 it seemed that it would be a good thing for
the Terror to go out, with the cruiser Isabel II, and at
tack the St. Paul, commanded by Captain Sigsbee of
the Maine, just then watching the port. The St. Paul
was only a huge Atlantic liner hastily armed and con
verted into an auxiliary cruiser, and probably the Span
iards thought her an easy prey, if only she would not
run away. It is said that they invited their friends
168

1j I J

s 9 Mw'm,: iij

• f »¦,'<' 1,11

THE CAMPAIGN IN PUERTO RICO
down to the shore to see the performance. The cruiser
came out first, apparently did not like the outlook, and
clung to the shelter of the batteries, firing ineffectively,
while the St. Paid, apparently undisturbed, took a few
shots to try the ranges. Then came the Terror, and as
she steamed to the eastward the St. Paid steamed along
outside and parallel. Then the torpedo-boat made a
dash, and the St. Paul, instead of running away, waited
to be torpedoed, and when the Terror got within 5,400
yards, opened on her, sweeping her decks with frag
ments of shell and rapid-fire projectiles. It was clearly
easier to blow Captain Sigsbee up in a peaceful harbor
at night than in broad day, and the Terror turned
round. Then a beautiful shot at nearly three miles dis
tance from the St. Paul's 5 -inch gun hit her on the star
board side, smashed her engine, and killed the chief and
assistant engineers, so that the dreaded boat was just
able to struggle back and be dragged sinking to the
beach by a couple of tugs. This disposed of that mem
ber of Cervera's fleet for the time being, and the pretty
bit of shooting which was responsible for it was the
only incident until the Yosemite appeared and drove the
Antonio Lopez ashore, and ca.\i^e6.t\\e Alphonso III ., Isa-
bellall.,3.nd a torpedo-boat to seek shelter in the harbor.
General Miles, from an early period of the war, was
convinced that it would be an error to undertake a sum
mer campaign on a large scale in Cuba and directed
against the principal Spanish army at Havana. He
thought, and very justly, that the correct objective,
from a military point of view, was Puerto Rico, which
was the Spanish base for all operations in the West
Indies, and where the climate was much better for
169

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
Northern troops than was the case in Cuba. This plan
was laid before the War Department, which was still
considering the advisability of a general movement
against Havana. The coming of Cervera's fleet and its
final imprisonment in the harbor of Santiago changed
the situation and made that city the objective of the
highest moment. General Miles, appreciating the im
portance of this expedition, telegraphed on June 5, from
Tampa, that he desired to go at its head ; but the com--
mand was given to General Shafter, and on June 6 Gen
eral Miles, instead of being sent to Santiago, was asked,
in a despatch from the Secretary of War, how soon
he could have a sufficient force ready to go to Puerto
Rico. General Miles replied that it could be ready in
ten days, and there the matter seems to have dropped.
On June 8 the Santiago expedition was ready, and on
June 14 it sailed with 15,000 men and 800 officers, in
stead of the 25,000 it was expected to send. This was
owing to a break-down in the ocean transportation, due
to lack of knowledge of the steamships, which proved
insufficient, and compelled the leaving behind at Tampa
of 10,000 men who ought to have gone, and whose
presence at Santiago would have greatly quickened the
results and thereby saved much of the mortality caused
by fever. The day after the Shafter expedition finally
departed, General Miles was summoned to Washing
ton, and there, on June 26, an order was finally given
to organize an expedition to operate against the enemy
in Cuba and Puerto Rico, and General Miles was di
rected personally to take the command. For some little
time before, efforts had been making to collect trans
ports for Puerto Rico, and this work went slowly for-
170

AX AXCIENT C.ATEWAY, S.VX JF.VX, I'UERTO RIC(

THE CAMPAIGN IN PUERTO RICO
ward, for everything connected with the business of
transportation was tardy and imperfect. Then came a
spur to the lagging transport service, which had already
appealed to the navy for aid, and secured the help of
vessels of war in carrying troops. It was a very sharp
spur too, and struck home hard, being nothing less, in
fact, that General Shafter's despatch of July 2, saying
that he was considering withdrawal, depicting the
strength of the inner defences of the city, and the im
possibility of carrying them with the force he had with
him. General Miles replied, congratulating him upon
the splendid fighting of his army, and said that he ex
pected to be with him in a week. But General Miles
overrated the transport service. Even under the tre
mendous pressure then existing he did not get away un
til July 8, and as it was he went on the Yale, a vessel of
the navy, with 1,500 troops on board, accompanied by
the Columbia, and followed by the Duchesse with more
soldiers. When he reached Santiago, on July 11, how
ever, no time was lost, for General Miles had a good
plan already made, and knew just what he meant to do
— a .very great advantage in affairs requiring action,
where even a poor plan is better than none at all, and
is always an immense advance over chaos. So General
Miles, knowing what he wanted, arranged at once with
Admiral Sampson — delighted to meet with a plan and
cordially acquiescing — that everything should be pre
pared to land the new force on the west side of the bay,
and either attack the harbor forts and open the way to
the fleet, or else, if it seemed better, march on to the
city and take the Spanish position in reverse. This
done. General Miles landed, burned the cabins at Sibo-
171

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
ney, and the next morning rode to the front and joined
General Shafter. After taking part in the negotia
tions which resulted in the capitulation of the city, and
issuing orders looking to the proper camping of the
troops and their protection, so far as possible, from dis
ease, and especially from yellow fever, which had now
become menacing. General Miles betook himself to the
Yale, and telegraphed to Washington, asking permis
sion to proceed as soon as possible to Puerto Rico. After
some delay the necessary authority was given. All the
troops at Santiago were more or less infected, so that
it was not safe to take any of them, as had been orig
inally planned in connection with the fresh regiments
which had been kept on shipboard. This reduced the
effective force which General Miles had with him to
3,300 men, and he was obliged to rely on these alone
until the re-enforcements, which were expected, arrived
from the United States, to face the Spanish forces in
Puerto Rico, amounting, it was reported, to over
17,000 men. Tugs, launches, and lighters were ordered
and anxiously awaited, but none came, and the expedi
tion finally started on July 21, trusting to the navy and
to what they could find at their destination to land the
troops. The fieet consisted of seven transports carry
ing troops, and the Massachusetts, Dixie, Gloucester,
Yale and Columbia as convoy, the last two also having
troops on board. The plan was to land at Fajardo, on
the eastern side of the island a little south of the cape,
and not far from the city of San Juan. This continued
to be the objective until the expedition started; but
General Miles, being satisfied that Fajardo had been
widely advertised as the landing-place, and that, owing
172

'^^•'¦\

THE CAMPAIGN IN PUERTO RICO
to the delays and the publicity, the Spaniards had had
ample opportunity to concentrate at that point, very
wisely decided that he would not go where the enemy
expected him, but to Guanica, where nobody looked
for him, on the southwestern coast. He also had trust
worthy information, which events subsequently veri
fied, that at Guanica he could get sugar-lighters, and
still more at Ponce, the principal city of the island in
the immediate neighborhood, whence a fine military
road ran to San Juan, and that the people of that region
were disaffected to Spain and friendly to the Amer
icans. Captain Higginson objected, naturally, to this
change, because at Guanica he could not get in with his
heavy ships to support the troops, whereas he could
cover their landing at Fajardo. So it was first decided
to. go to Fajardo, observe the conditions, and if they
were unfavorable, return. Later this plan too was
changed, and the Dixie being sent to pick up the New
Orleans at San Juan, and the transports which were
¦supposed to be on their way to the original point of at
tack, the fleet went on direct to Guanica. They reached
their destination a little after five o'clock on the morn
ing of July 25, and the Massachusetts and Gloucester,
standing in, came to anchor at quarter before nine. The
battle-ship could go no farther, and although it was
clear that there were no entrance batteries; no one knew
what batteries might be concealed inside, or what mines
might be placed in the channel. Lieutenant-Com
mander Wainwright at once asked permission to go for
ward, and on the request being granted, the Gloucester
ran briskly in, firing as she entered. A landing party,
consisting of Lieutenant Wood and twenty-eight men,
173

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
under command of Lieutenant Huse, was put ashore,
and, on their hauling down the Spanish flag the enemy
opened upon them on both sides and from the village.
Deploying, they drove the enemy back through the vil
lage, and at the end of the street built a stone wall and
strung barbed wire to meet the re-enforcements re
ported to be coming from Yauco. This attack and the
fire from the Gloucester scattered the small body of
Spanish regulars who had resisted the landing. Mean
time Captain Higginson, listening anxiously and atten
tively after the Gloucester had disappeared from sight,
became satisfied that there were no inside batteries, and
ordered the transports to go in. This was quickly done ;
it was found that the men of the Gloucester had seized
a lighter, and soldiers from Colonel Black's regiment of
engineers were at once landed at Captain Wainwright's
request to support the Gloucester landing party. In
a few minutes, as soon as the naval launches could
tow them in, the town of Guanica was in the
hands of the American army, and the first landing in
Puerto Rico had been successfully accomplished. The
path was opened very swiftly and effectively by the men
of the Gloucester, as prompt and efficient in the seizure
of the town as they had been in the destruction of the
Furor and Pluton.
The next day at dawn General Garretson, with six
companies of the Sixth Massachusetts and one company
of the Sixth Illinois, moved out and attacked a strong
force of Spaniards at Yauco, driving them before them
and taking the town, which gave us possession of the
railroad and of the highway to Ponce, for the advance
of General Henry's brigade. That evening the Dixie
174

lilt; L.\XDixc; .vv gu,vxic.\

THE CAMPAIGN IN PUERTO RICO
returned, and the next day General Wilson, on the
Obdam, and General Ernst, on the Grande Duchesse,
arrived with more troops, and the Annapolis and Wasp
also joined the squadron. Captain Higginson was now
strong enough to detach a force against Ponce, which
it was most desirable to secure with the least possible
delay, not only because it was the largest city of the
island and the terminus of the military road, but be
cause it had a good harbor and excellent facilities for
disembarking, in which Guanica was very deficient.
Captain Davis of the Dixie was therefore ordered to
proceed at once with the Annapolis, Wasp, and Glou
cester to Ponce, reconnoitre, seize lighters, and occupy
any position necessary for landing the army. The Dixie,
accompanied by the Annapolis and Wasp, started at
quarter before two, and the Gloucester at half past four.
At three o'clock the first three ships were in the chan
nel, and by half past five they had all anchored with
out resistance in the harbor. Captain Davis ordered
the Wasp to lie in such a way that her broadside would
command the main street of La Playa, and Lieutenant
Merriam was sent ashore with a flag of truce to demand
the immediate surrender of Ponce, under threat of bom
bardment, which was no idle menace, as the heavy
six-inch battery of the Dixie entirely commanded
the town, the main part of which was a mile and a
half distant from the port. When Lieutenant Merriam
returned, he reported that the Spanish forces had with
drawn from the port, and that he had been unable to
open communications with their commander. He was
closely followed on board by the British and German
consuls, and several gentlemen representing the com-
175

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
mercial interests, who said they had authority from the
Spanish commander to negotiate for surrender. The
fact was that although Colonel San Martin and his 700
Spanish regulars were quite ready to fight, their re
sistance would have resulted only in the destruction of
the city by bombardment — something much disliked by
the property owners — and the consequent general ris
ing of the hostile people, productive probably of much
bloodshed and disaster to the soldiers themselves.
Hence the readiness to allow the commercial interests
to surrender the town. A delay was asked for, long
enough to permit communication with the Spanish
headquarters at San Juan, which was refused by Cap
tain Davis. Return to the town for further consulta
tion followed, and then they came back and surrendered
the town, subject only to the condition that the Spanish
troops should be permitted to withdraw unmolested,
and that the municipal government should be allowed
to remain in authority until the arrival of the army.
This done, the Americans occupied the night by look
ing over all the vessels in the harbor and taking such as
were good prize, Lieutenant-Commander Wainwright
of the Gloucester, energetic and efficient, gathering in
some seventy lighters, and getting them ready for the
army. At half past five Lieutenant Merriam went in,
followed closely by Lieutenant Flaines of the Dixie,
with the marines, and received the surrender of the
port. The flag was raised by a cadet of the Dixie over
the office of the Captain of the Port, the marines were
posted, and by this formal act Ponce passed into Amer
ican hands. About seven o'clock the Massachusetts,
convoying General Miles with General Wilson and the
176

THE R.VNNER OF I'OXCE

THE CAMPAIGN IN PUERTO RICO
transports, now increased by two more which had just
come up with the Cincinnati, had joined them. By half
past seven General Wilson had landed, and in less than
an hour Lieutenant Haines was able to withdraw his
sentries and turn over the port to the army. Meantime
some officers of the Dixie had driven up to the centre of
the town, where they were received with enthusiasm by
the people, which they soon reported at La Playa. Re
turning at once, they went to the City Hall, accom
panied by Lieutenant Haines, who released the political
prisoners found there, and Cadet Lodge of the Dixie
hauled down the Spanish and raised the American flag,
the great crowd in the square cheering wildly, and then
received ^f rom the Mayor the municipal banner and the
formal surrender of the city. Presently Major Flagler
appeared with troops and took formal possession. Thus
the whole business was quickly done without hesitation
or delay, and the American army held the city of
Puerto Rico as a base from which they could advance
at will to the capital, and by which they controlled the
whole southern coast of the island.
Once on shore, thanks to the capture of the lighters
and the efficient aid of the navy. General Wilson moved
rapidly. That same afternoon he had established his
headquarters at Ponce. Then he proceeded to organize
the government of the city which had passed into his
hands, and at the same time his own command, which
was composed of General Ernst's brigade, consisting of
the Sixteenth Pennsylvania and the Second and Third
Wisconsin — all volunteers — a battalion of regular light
artillery, a troop of volunteer cavalry, and a company of
the Signal Corps. On August 3 he was able to relieve
12 177

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
the brigade of their black-powder Springfields, and sup
ply them with smokeless-powder Krag-Jorgensons — a
highly beneficial change, which ought to have been
made years before, but for which there should be due
gratitude, after the Santiago experience, that it was
made at all, even toward the end of a war. So the work,
civil and military, was driven rapidly and efficiently
forward, and in the midst of it all the country was
reconnoitred, and as fast as possible the outposts were
advanced along the great road to San Juan.
In this way, and from spies and deserters, it was
learned that a force of the enemy, numbering 2,000, had
taken position at Aibonito, about thirty-five miles from
Ponce, a place of great natural strength, and indeed al
most impregnable. Between Aibonito and our ad
vanced parties lay the town of Coamo, also a very
strong position naturally, held by 250 men. Coamo was
capable of a very stubborn defence, and was still further
protected by a block-house on the Bancs road, which
could open fire upon troops moving along the main
military road. General Wilson decided, therefore, to
turn the position. The Sixteenth Pennsylvania, under
the command of Colonel Hulings, and guided by Col
onel Biddle and Captain Gardner of General Wilson's
staff, was ordered on the evening of August 8 to move
to the rear of the town. In the darkness, over difficult
mountain trails and across deep ravines, they made
their way, with difficulty and much hard marching. At
seven in the morning of the 9th, General Ernst, with
the other two regiments of his brigade, and supported
by the artillery and cavalry, advanced directly upon
the town. Captain Anderson's battery opened at once
178

THE CAMPAIGN IN PUERTO RICO
upon the block-house, which replied with an ineffective
fire, and was in flames in fifteen minutes. The two Wis
consin regiments at the same time moved forward
along the Bancs and the military roads. As they ad
vanced they heard the sound of sharp firing, and knew
that the Pennsylvania troops were engaged. The march
was quickened, and the whole force pressed rapidly for
ward, reaching and entering the town to find the enemy
gone and the intrenchments deserted. General Wilson's
skilful disposition of the Sixteenth Pennsylvania had
given him Coamo with hardly a struggle, and the fight
had been made and won in the rear of the town before
the main advance reached it.
The flanking regiment, pushing along over the
mountains in the darkness, had come out too far to the
north, and had been obliged to move to the south by a
difficult path, which made them an hour late in arriving
at the point agreed upon. But when they reached their
destination they found the Spaniards in a strong po
sition, covered by the trees and ditches, and holding
the road. The first battalion was rapidly formed along
two ridges parallel to the road, whence they at once
opened fire, and a sharp skirmish ensued. Meantime
the second battalion moved to the left, toward a posi
tion whence they could enfilade the road, and the Span
iards surrendered. The action lasted an hour. The
Americans lost 6 men wounded. On the Spanish side
the commander, who exposed himself with reckless
courage, another officer, and 4 privates were killed, and
between 30 and 40 were wounded. Five Spanish of
ficers and 162 men were made prisoners.
Within five minutes after the fight Captain Clayton
179

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
with his troop of cavalry rode through the town in
rapid pursuit of the beaten enemy. The troopers pushed
on fast, preventing, except in one instance, the de
struction of the bridges, and carrying the American ad
vance forward until they came within range of the
strong positions of El Penon and Assomante, where
batteries were placed which swept the road. To take
these defences by direct assault, it was obvious, would
involve a heavy loss of life to the limited forces General
Wilson had at his disposal, and he accordingly resolved
to again turn the enemy by a flanking movement on the
right. Before doing so, however. General Wilson de
termined to make a reconnoissance with artillery, and
our batteries opened on the Spanish positions at one
o'clock on the 12th of August. We apparently silenced
their batteries, but as we slackened they opened again
with a vigorous fire, and once more, as at Santiago,
black powder furnished the enemy a fine target, while
the smokeless powder made it difficult to get their range
or exact place. We lost 2 men killed, and 2 officers and
3 men wounded, and demonstrated the strength of the
Spanish position. General Wilson, before beginning to
turn the Spaniards, sent in a demand for surrender,
which was naturally and quite curtly refused. Then,
just as General Ernst was starting on the flank move
ment which would have forced Aibonito to surrender
like Coamo, word came that the peace protocol with
Spain had been signed and hostilities suspended. So
the movement along the military road into the heart of
the island and across to San Juan, which had been
pushed so skilfully and successfully, came to a stop, and
did not begin again until Spain had surrendered on a
180

GENERALS IX i'CFRID RICAN C.VMI'AICX

THE CAMPAIGN IN PUERTO RICO
larger scale and it was able to go forward to the capital
without resistance.
Other movements were in progress while General
Wilson was operating along the main military road.
General Brooke, with the brigade commanded by Gen
eral Hains, reached Guanica on July 31, and going
thence to Ponce, was ordered to Arroyo, about thirty-
six miles east of Ponce, the port of the large town of
Guayama, and near the point where the coast begins to
turn and trend toward the north. Arroyo had surren
dered to the little Gloucester and the Wasp on August
I, but on the arrival of the army the old story of the
inefficient transport service — no lighters, no boats, no
means of getting the soldiers on shore, always desirable
things to have in military expeditions of this character
— was repeated, and then, as usual, came the appearance
of the navy, and the navy got the troops on shore, to
the great relief of the general in command. Once
landed, there was little delay. On August 4 General
Hains was ordered to move on Guayama, and on the
following morning he advanced with the Fourth Ohio,
holding the Third Illinois in reserve. Meeting the en
emy about a mile east of Guayama, our men drove the
Spaniards before them and through the streets, had a
sharp skirmish with them on the other side, in which
four men were wounded, and in the evening, still ad
vancing, took and held two strong positions on the out
skirts of the town. The position was held until the Sth,
when a reconnoissance was made by Colonel Coit, with
about no men, along the road running north from
Guayama. Pushing forward, the party had advanced
about five miles when they ran into the Spaniards, came
181

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
under a heavy fire, and had five men wounded Falling
back steadily, they were met and supported by the rest of
the regiment, and easily checked and drove the Span
iards back. The reconnoissance had developed the fact
that the enemy were in force and held strong positions
on the north. General Brooke therefore determined to
turn the position. He waited until the 13th in order to
get two troops of cavalry and four light batteries, and
then sending General Hains with one regiment to make
a detour and reach the enemy's rear, he advanced with
the rest of his force along the road directly against the
Spanish position. He moved slowly, in order to give
time to the flanking regiment to reach its destination,
and when sufficient time had elapsed he brought his
guns within range and unmasked them. Just as the
men were about to open fire, a message came in from
Ponce announcing the signing of the protocol and that
all was over. General Brooke retired to camp at Guay
ama, and there waited until, as one of the commission
ers, he rode over the hills to receive the surrender of the
island, watch the departure of the soldiers of Spain,
and become himself the first American Governor of
Puerto Rico.
On the same day that General Brooke received his
orders for Arroyo, General Schwan arrived, and on
August 6 received orders from General Miles to organ
ize an expedition at Yauco and proceed against. Maya-
guez, a large town, the centre of a sugar district in the
extreme west of the island, and thence, swinging to the
right, to advance by Lares to Arecibo, the principal city
on the north coast. On August 9 the expedition was
ready. It consisted of the Eleventh infantry and two
182

THE CAMPAIGN IN PUERTO RICO
light batteries, all regulars. They marched twelve miles
in intense heat and over a bad road to Sabana Grande,
where they were joined by Captain Macomb with a
troop of the Fifth cavalry, also regulars. Giving his
men a good night's rest. General Schwan started at
eight o'clock. Having provided himself with guides
and spies, and from the beginning having made every
arrangement to secure all possible information, General
Schwan soon had news that the enemy, whose force was
reported to be superior in numbers to his own, had
marched out from Mayaguez to contest the American
advance. The cavalry and the advance-guard were or
dered, therefore, to exercise great care; they were
drawn nearer to the brigade, and then the whole force
pressed rapidly and steadily forward along the San
German road. As they drew nearer to Mayaguez they
came into a country intersected by two rivers and their
tributaries. The road runs along the valley of the Rio
Grande, through flat lands widening out here and there
to a thousand yards, fenced with wire and crossed by
creeks and streams, some running swiftly and with a
considerable depth of water — altogether a rather dif
ficult country for troops to operate in, and susceptible
of a strong defence. As the Americans approached the
little village of Hormigueros, Spanish scouts opened fire
ineffectively from behind the hedges near some sugar-
mills. On went the cavalry, and the Spanish skir
mishers fled, pursued by the troopers, who rode along
under shelter of a railroad embankment, keeping up a
steady fire and getting control of a covered wooden
bridge. Just beyond this point it had been intended
to camp, but General Schwan determined, although his
183

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
men had marched thirteen miles in the heat, to finish
with the enemy, now that he had them in his near
neighborhood, and in order to gain possession of an im
portant iron bridge on the main road. The soldiers re
sponded cheerfully and readily. The whole force
pressed on, and when within four hundred yards of the
bridge the enemy opened with a light fire, and then
heavily with volleys, at the main body of troops. The
artillery was brought up. There was difficulty in decid
ing the position of the enemy, thanks to their smokeless
powder, but soon the direction was obtained from the
course of the Spanish bullets. Then the artillery
opened, and the whole command moved forward. Un
able to cross a creek, the advance made its way over a
bridge. The Catlings went forward with the infantry,
concentrating their fire and supported by the cavalry.
Still forward, and they were over the iron bridge, and
masters of the approach to Mayaguez. The rest of the
artillery came up again, the infantry pressed forward,
the enemy gave way in all directions, and the Amer
icans occupied the Spanish position and camped there
for the night. Again had it been shown that the Span
iards could not stand the steady onset of the American
troops. They had equal numbers, knowledge of the
country, and the advantage of position. They fired
heavily as at Guasimas as soon as the Americans came
within range, and then as the Americans came on, open
ing with all arms and going at them without flinching,
the Spaniards, nearly all regulars in this case, gave way
and fled. The action was over at six o'clock. The
American loss was i killed and 1 5 wounded ; the Span
ish, 15 killed and about 35 wounded. The skirmish
184

THE CAMPAIGN IN PUERTO RICO
was well and skilfully fought, and illustrated as per
fectly as a much larger affair the inability of the Span
iards to either attack, take the initiative, or make a firm
stand in the open.
The next morning, August 1 1 , by half past eight, the
American scouts were in Mayaguez, an hour later the
cavalry, and then came General Schwan and his staff
and the infantry, with bands playing and colors fly
ing. The Spaniards had gone, the town gently yielded
itself, the Mayor declared himself subject to the or
ders of the American general, and the people crowded
the streets and cheered the American troops. The bri
gade then went into camp near the town, and the cav
alry were ordered to keep in touch with the retreating
enemy. Following the easterly road to Lares, the cav
alry drove some Spaniards before them, but it was soon
discovered that the main body had taken the western
road, and the next morning Colonel Burke started in
pursuit with about seven hundred men all told. The
morning was intensely hot, and the afternoon brought
a drenching rain, but the troops kept steadily on, and
encamped for the night at the forks of the Las Marias
and Maricao roads. Here news came that the Span
iards, with a force variously estimated at 1,200 to 2,500
men, intended to make a stand at Las Marias. As Col
onel Burke's one desire was to reach them, he was off
at daylight. The utmost speed was made, but the road
in places was so bad and so heavy that the artillery
could only be got along by the infantry hauling the
guns. This caused delay, and there was much anxiety
and bitter disappointment when it was reported that
the enemy had abandoned Las Marias and were fleeing
185

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
toward Lares. Then word came that seven hundred
were still on the hither side of the Rio Grande, which
at that season was running deep and full. The Amer
icans hurried through the town, and presently the cav
alry came up with the fugitives, and then the engage
ment began. A large number of Spaniards had, as re
ported, failed to cross the river, and they replied with
volleys to our fire. By some means the artillery was
dragged up, the guns opened, and our infantry fol
lowed. The Spaniards gave way in all directions, now
thoroughly demoralized. Many were drowned in try
ing to ford the stream, and the American skirmishers,
advancing rapidly, picked up more than 50 prisoners,
as well as 200 rifles and large quantities of ammuni
tion, which strewed the road. The American loss was
only 6 wounded ; 5 Spaniards were buried by our men
in addition to those lost in the river, and many more
were wounded. General Schwan now had the enemy
broken and in full flight. Lares was within his grasp,
and a clear line to the principal northern town of Are
cibo. And then came the fatal message announcing the
signature of the protocol, and "no troops ever suspended
hostilities with a worse grace." But a suspension it
had to be, and this expedition, which had marched and
fought with so much spirit and such restless energy,
stopped like the rest.
Not far from them another comraand was brought
in like manner to a stand-still. General Stone, with a
small party, had pushed along a trail considered impas
sable, by way of Adjuntas and Utuado, and had made
a practical road through the centre of the western re
gion, along which General Henry marched with his
186

THE CAMPAIGN IN PUERTO RICO
command. In a day or two more they would have been
able to head off the Spanish detachments retreating be
fore General Schwan, and would have effected a junc
tion with the latter, thus gaining complete control of all
the west, and at the same time of the northern towns,
and of the railroad on the coast. But they too were
stopped, and thus the Puerto-Rican campaign came to
an end.
The operations of the American army in Puerto Rico
have been described in some detail, not on account of
the engagements which occurred, for they were hardly
rnore in any instance than sharp skirmishes, but be
cause the result of the campaign was of great impor
tance, and the manner in which the operations were
conducted, and the behavior of the troops, merit con
sideration. There has been an impression that the
Puerto-Rican campaign was little more than a parade,
and it has even been spoken of contemptuously as a
"picnic," owing probably to the too prevalent notion
that military operations must be estimated solely by the
losses, or, as a British admiral of the last century is
isaid to have put it, in somewhat brutal phrase, "by the
,butcher's bills." The number of killed and wounded is
'undoubtedly a test of the severity of fighting, of the
force of an attack, and of the strength of the resistance.
But a campaign as a whole must be judged, if it is to
be judged fairly, by larger and different standards.
Malplaquet and Oudenarde were important and bloody
battles, but their direct effect upon the final results of
the war was but small. Washington forced Howe out
of Boston without an action, and with the loss of
hardly a man, yet the military and political results were
187

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
enormous; the feat was so admirable that the last
historian* of the Revolution says it gave Washington
at once a place in history, and compares it with Napo
leon's performance at Toulon in making his future
fame. In nineteen days the different divisions under the
command of General Miles had overrun nearly the en
tire western half of Puerto Rico, and had made it evi
dent that in another fortnight they would have swept
over the whole island and cooped up the Spaniards in
San Juan, if they had not actually gained possession of
the capital itself. The success of the American troops
was so rapid and complete, and their future was so
clearly assured, that a claim to the island had been es
tablished of such an undeniable character that, when it
came to signing the protocol, there was no possibility of
withholding from the United States the cession of
Puerto Rico. Thus the object of the campaign was
completely achieved, which, after all, will always weigh
heavily in making up the final judgment of history.
Coming next to the actual operations of the campaign,
it is found that there was the same lack of means for
disembarking troops, the same defective transportation
service, as in Cuba. These difficulties were overcome
by the assistance of the navy, and with their boats or
the lighters they had captured. The men were rapidly
and skilfully handled at separated points, showing that
the two services worked well together; and although
many of the soldiers arrived in poor condition from the
camps in the United States, with a consequent prone-

*Sir George Trevelyan.
1 88

THE MILITARY RGAH LEVDING INTO VAUC

THE CAMPAIGN IN PUERTO RICO
ness to suffer from the climatic diseases, they were so
well managed that every division was enabled to push
steadily and rapidly forward, making hard marches,
very often through difficult country, and carrying out
successfully everything which was demanded from
them. Last and most important of all, there was an
intelligent plan throughout, which, in its execution,
was swiftly and comprehensively taking possession of
the entire island. Each movement of troops was so ar
ranged as ultimately to support and fit in with every
other. The engagements which took place were all
marked by the same qualities. General Wilson, Gen
eral Schwan, and General Brooke all fought their
troops with skill. They reconnoitred their country,
they knew what they meant to do, they had plans which
proved their own soundness when carried into execu
tion. The strong positions were turned by judicious
flanking movements, and when the positions were not
strong the direct onset drove the Spaniards back in con
fusion, as at Hormigueros. In every action or skirmish
the troops behaved admirably, and their advance was
constant and unchecked, so that the general plan de
veloped steadily from the beginning, and showed its
merits in its results. It is quite true that the popula
tion was friendly, and received the American troops
with acclamation, a condition which smooths away
many troubles in any campaign. But this was equally
true of Cuba, and does not impair the excellence of the
operations in the eastern island, or diminish the im
portance of the general result. To this campaign we
owe the island of Puerto Rico, and the manner in which
189

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
it was carried forward through many difficulties re
flects the highest credit on the generals who com
manded, and upon the discipline, quality, and courage
of the soldiers, both regulars and volunteers.

ON TIIE ADJCNTAS TRAIL

CHAPTER X
THE BLOCKADE OF MANILA AND THE CAPTURE OF GUAM
Admiral Dewey employed the first two days after his
victory in making all fast, seizing the arsenal at Cavite
and the islands at the harbor mouth, and announcing
a blockade of the port of Manila, lying somewhat help
less just now before his guns. Then, having prudently
cut the cables, he sent to Washington, by way of boat
to Hong-kong, a laconic despatch, telling of his victory
in a few simple sentences, and in figures as dry as the
multiplication table. It had one great merit — exact
truth — a quality much lost and clouded in the Span
ish reports which had gone to Madrid, and from which
alone the world knew anything of the doings in the dis
tant East on May i. Yet the victory had been so abso
lute, the destruction of Montojo's squadron so utter and
complete, that even the Spanish could not hide the facts
with language, an exercise in which they have great
proficiency. The truth tore its way through the thin
phrases ; it broke the pompous sentences, and made it
self sufficiently visible to Europe. To the great powers
there it came with a shock. They were not pained by
the unhappy lot of Spain, for that they regarded with
all the philosophy which had just manifested itself so
attractively in regard to poor Greece. The downfall of
a broken, bankrupt nation, they bore well enough ; and
191

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
although they were surprised and annoyed by the
swiftness, accuracy, and fighting efficiency of the
Americans, they were prepared to belittle the whole af
fair, and to pretend that it was no such great matter,
after all. But what shocked and alarmed them very
seriously indeed was that a new power, known to be
of great wealth and strength, had suddenly swept down
on Manila, toppled over in ruin the harmless remains
of Spanish power, and in one morning had risen up
master of a great port and city, and a disagreeable fac
tor of unlimited possibilities in the East, where they
were having a "question" and starting in to divide the
vast Empire of China. This was obviously objection
able, and ought to be stopped. It became clear at once
to several imperial and many diplomatic minds that
something should be done. There was much running
about, much sending of cipher despatches, many grave
unofficial conversations and representations, and a gen
eral urgency to set the concert of Europe, which had
performed so beautifully in the Cretan business, to
playing again. And then it was found that the most
important performer, the great sea power of the world,
would not take part. It appeared that these people who
had flung Spain's fleet to destruction spoke the English
tongue ; that as long as they sent their grain across the
ocean to Great Britain, England had a base on the
Atlantic, and could defy the world; that England
rather wanted them as neighbors in the East, and had
no mind to be aught but friendly to them. So England
would not play her part, and without her fleets, still
more with those fleets hostile, there could be no concert
of Europe ; and that harmonious body sank into silence
192

GEORGE DEWEY

THE BLOCKADE OF MANILA
after this attempt at turning up, and was never heard
of in the Philippines. Many results came from this
English action. The people of the United States knew
instinctively what had happened, although all details
were kept quite obscure ; they valued the friendly deed,
which was not to be forgotten ; and they saw in a fiash
the community of interests which bound them to their
kinsrnen over-seas. So the two great English-speaking
nations drew together — a very momentous fact, well
understood and much disliked on the Continent of Eu
rope, and something destined to have serious effect on
the world's history in the future. The more immediate
and direct outcome of England's refusal to interfere —
as well as her evident intention to let no one else inter
fere in what was going on in the Philippines — was that
Admiral Dewey was left with a free hand to work out
the situation which he had himself created.
He had sprung in a few hours into the ranks of the
world's great admirals. It was now to be seen whether
the victorious seaman was also a commander in the
widest naval sense, and at the same time a statesman
and diplomatist. The conditions were full of peril. He
was seven thousand miles from home, the enemy held
the city in his front, he had no troops to aid him, and
he knew that unfriendly eyes were watching him nar
rowly, while he could not know at first that the concert
of Europe had broken down, and that England was the
friend of the United States.
The war-ships of other powers began to collect at
Manila — French, English, Japanese, and German, the
latter finally reaching five in number, and including two
armored vessels. What was their meaning and intent ?
13 193

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
— a question very important to Admiral Dewey, and
demanding much thought. As they watched him, it
quickly became apparent that in England and Japan he
had friends and sympathizers. In France an ill-wisher
was soon discovered, but nothing more. The ill wishes
of the French indeed never took the form of overt ac
tion, but we can learn their feelings from the diary of
a naval lieutenant at Manila, thoughtfully published in
the Revue de Paris. The diarist was much disturbed
that Europe did not intervene. He writes mournfully
that the European powers were doing no more than
watching fate, which was true enough. His mind was
filled with dark suspicions of England and of the
Anglo-Saxon, and he thought that America ought
promptly to be shut out from the East. He belittles
Dewey's victory, but blames the Spaniards for allow
ing him to win it, which is, of course, one way of look
ing at that event. Such a fact ought not to have been,
and yet it was. The explanation of it is that we had
English gunners, deserters, picked up in Hong-kong
— a dear old falsehood which has done much hard serv
ice, never harder than in this case, for Dewey's crews,
except for a few Chinamen, were practically all Amer
ican. But the thought soothes the French diarist, who
has never heard of Trtixtun and L'Insurgente, or of
some American shooting at French frigates just a hun
dred years ago. Then comes the conventional cry that
the Americans care only for dollars, are treacherous,
mean, braggarts (this last a heinous offence in French
contemplation), and, saddest of all, have no nobility
of soul. And the philosopher, as he reads, wonders
about the nobility of soul shown in the Dreyfus case
194

iHii^i^

f^'^'fi

1 '(
V'*iii

1 *
i \ 1

ii'f.w,?i^*v!)|;.
THE BLOCKADE OF MANILA
and some of its attendant incidents, and thinks how
differently the phrase is interpreted in different coun
tries. But the lieutenant's diary is none the less in
structive, and, joined to many much louder manifes
tations by Paris newspapers and Frenchmen generally,
causes Americans to draw some conclusions as to
French friendship not soon to be forgotten. Still what
ever they felt or thought, the Frenchmen did nothing
serious while they watched fate, and hostile feelings
certainly troubled Admiral Dewey little enough. But
there was one power present who pushed her hostility
from thoughts and words to action. This power was
Germany. She had no especial claim to be there, no
large or peculiar interests, but she sent more ships than
any other power, kept on meddling, and went to the
verge of war. The Germans broke through Dewey's
regulations, which he had the right to make, and he
called them sharply to order. They would violate the
rules by moving about at night, and then the American
search-lights fell with a glare upon them, and followed
them about in a manner which checked and annoyed.,
them. One German ship put out her lights and tried
to slip in at night, but a shell across her bows brought
her to. Another made herself offensive by following
and running close up to our transports when they first
arrived. A German ship went up to Subig bay and
prevented the insurgents from taking the Isla Grande.
So the Raleigh and Concord went up too, stripped for
action, and as they went in the Irene went out, and
the Americans took Isla Grande. Very trying all this
to a man charged with great responsibilities and seven
thousand miles from home. There must be no haste,
195

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
no rashness, nothing that could give his opponents a
hold, and yet there must be no yielding, and no threat
except with action behind it, and on a provocation
which the whole world would justify. Every annoy
ance, every improper movement, was quickly checked.
The diplomacy was perfect. Then came the sufficient
provocation, and the teeth were shown. To the vigi
lant admiral the opportunity came at last when one of
the German vessels was proved to have landed provi
sions in Manila. Let us read what follows, as it is
told by Mr. Stickney, an eye-witness.
"Orderly, tell Mr. Brumby I would like to see him," said Ad
miral Dewey, one forenoon.
"Oh, Brumby," he continued, when the flag-lieutenant made his
appearance on the quarter-deck, "I wish you to take the,barge and
go over to the German flag-ship. Give Admiral von Diederich
my compliments, and say that I wish to call his attention to the
fact that vessels of his squadron have shown an extraordinary
disregard of the usual courtesies of naval intercourse, and that
finally one of them has committed a gross breach of neutrality in
landing provisions in Manila, a port which I am blockading."
The Commodore's voice had been as low and as sweetly modu
lated as if he had been sending von Diederich an invitation to
dinner. When he stopped speaking. Brumby, who did not need
any better indication of the Commodore's mood than the unusu
ally formal and gentle manner of his chief, turned to go, making
the usual official salute, and replying with the customary, "Ay, ay,
sir." "And, Brumby," continued the Commodore, his voice rising and
ringing with the intensity of feeling that he felt he had repressed
about long enough, "tell Admiral von Diederich that if he wants
a fight, he can have it right now !"
Thereupon the German admiral became sorry for
what had happened, and, it appeared, did not know
what his captains had been doing — a sad reflection
upon German discipline. But it seemed that, although
196

ELWELL S. OTIS
Major-General in command of the American forces in the Pliilippines

THE BLOCKADE OF MANILA
he had two armored ships, and Dewey none, he did not
desire a fight, and the meddling abated sensibly. Then
much later, in a manner to be described hereafter, when
the Monterey came in, with her heavy armor and big
guns, it was found that important interests required
the presence of the German war-ships elsewhere. Why
the Germans behaved as they did, manifesting every
possible dislike and hostility without doing anything
effective, and breeding a strong and just enmity toward
them in the United States, is difficult to understand.
To the higher and more refined statesmanship of Eu
rope it may have seemed wise. To the ruder and simp
ler American mind it seems stupid and profitless, and,
in any event, Americans will not forget it. But every
one can admire the manner in which Admiral Dewey
mixed tact with firmness, and in the midst of jealous
and meddling neutrals steered his course without an
error, and never relaxed for a moment his iron grip
on the great bay he had conquered and the city which
lay beneath his guns.
To keep the sympathy and support of the friendly
powers and hold at bay the hostile nations were diffi
cult and perplexing tasks, trying to nerves, temper, and
wits. But this was not all. The war in Cuba had in
due course lighted up the flames of insurrection in the
Philippines, where Spanish tyranny and extortion,
supplemented by the oppression, cruelty, corruption,
and outrages of the powerful monastic orders, had
been heaping up the material of revolt. To this mass
of explosives the troubles of Spain in Cuba had applied
the torch. The black robed bodies of the hated monks
floating down the Pasig river were grim signals of the
197

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
coming storm. Rebellion broke out in the back country
and in the provinces of Luzon, and a guerrilla war
fare began to desolate the country. The Spaniards met
the outbreak vigorously and repressed it savagely,
shooting down their prisoners by scores to make a holi
day spectacle for the crowds on the Luneta. The fight
ing dragged along, exhausting to the Spaniards and
without substantial gain to the rebels, until July, 1897,
when the insurgent chiefs surrendered, on condition
that certain reforms should be made and that a sum of
money should be paid over to the families of those who
had been killed in the war or ruined by it. Spain, as
usual, broke her word, as she had done with the Cubans
in 1878. The reforms were not made, and only a part
of the money was ever paid. Emilio Aguinaldo and
the other leaders withdrew to Hong-kong in Septem
ber 1897, bringing with them $400,000, which they
had received from the Spanish government. The in
surrection was over, although there was fitful fighting
here and there; but the chiefs had retired to a safe
haven and were helpless at Hong-kong. Such was the
situation which Admiral Dewey found when war was
declared. The insurgent chiefs, however, stimulated
by the approach of trouble between the United States
and Spain, put themselves in communication with Mr.
Wildman, our consul at Hong-kong, and opened ne
gotiations with him. They declared that they desired
annexation to the United States, above all independ
ence of Spain and relief from Spanish rule, and wished
to aid the Americans in all possible ways. Admiral
Dewey took the obvious course of encouraging them,
which from a military point of view was entirely sound.
198

THE BLOCKADE OF MANILA
He caused Aguinaldo to be brought over, and pro
tected his landing on May 19. So little response came
at first to Aguinaldo's appeal to his countrymen that
he wished to turn round and return to Hong-kong,
and was kept only by much pressure. Gradually at
first, and then rapidly, the natives began to come in;
Admiral Dewey furnished arms from the arsenal at
Cavite, and the insurgents had presently a respectable
force. They soon found that, with the Spanish sea
power destroyed and an American fleet in possession of
Manila bay, the situation was widely different from
that in which they had struggled alone, desperately and
helplessly against the forces of Spain. They began
to win victories, to cut off detached bodies of Spanish
troops and take outlying towns. With victory their
numbers rapidly increased, and they were soon able,
under cover of the American war-ships, to surround
Manila. So far all went well, and the insurgent forces
and their operations put Manila even more securely at
Admiral Dewey's mercy. Then the difficulties began.
The insurgents forgot that they owed their position
entirely to the American fleet, and that but for the
American war-ships the chiefs would have been vege
tating in exile at Hong-kong, and their followers hew
ing wood and drawing water for the Spaniards, as of
yore. Aguinaldo, who had never adjusted his rela
tions to the universe, began to regard himself as a gov
ernment and a nation, and started to plan for a dicta
torship. Admiral Dewey, who had most carefully
avoided recognizing the insurgents or treating them as
allies, was obliged to hold them constantly under con
trol. He forced them to conduct their war in a civi-
199

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
lized manner ; he insisted upon and secured the humane
treatment of their Spanish prisoners, and he kept a
watchful eye upon their intrigues with foreign powers,
which they almost at once began.
Taken altogether, it was a most difficult position,
and required all the best talents of the statesman and
diplomatist. But the admiral proved himself to be
both in high degree, and kept the whole situation al
ways in hand, never losing the mastery for a moment.
So the slow days wore by. Very slow and very anxious
they must have been to a victorious sailor suddenly
charged with vast responsibilities, with hostile Eu
ropean powers on one side, and dangerous and untrust
worthy supporters on the other. Very often must he
have thought of the seven thousand miles which sepa
rated him from home as he paced the deck, counting
the days which lay between him and the coming of re
enforcements. For the re-enforcements were very slow
in starting, owing to the great delay in getting trans
ports and in mobilizing the troops at San Francisco.
So deliberate did the movements seem, so many were
the announcements of departure, only to be followed
by postponement, that the country began to grow res
tive, and there were mutterings about the apparent
abandonment of Dewey and the fate of Gordon at
Khartoum. But the delays which undoubtedly existed were due
to the surprise of Dewey's victory, to the magnitude
of its results, and to the unreadiness of the military
organization to meet such an emergency. Admiral
Dewey had asked on May 13 for 5,000 men, and needed,
of course, fresh ammunition and naval re-enforcements

HENRY GLASS

THE BLOCKADE OF MANILA
as well. Three weeks elapsed after the eventful ist
of May before the cruiser Charleston left San Fran
cisco, and then she went without the troops. The three
transports the City of Pekin, Australia, and City of
Sydney finally got off on May 25, carrying the First
California and Second Oregon regiments of volun
teers, five companies of the Fourteenth Infantry United
States regulars, a detachment of California artillery —
in all, 115 officers and 2,386 enlisted men — under Gen
eral Anderson, the division commander. They joined
the Charleston at Honolulu, where she was waiting
for them, and started thence on June 4. As soon as they
were clear of the land Captain Glass of the Charleston
opened the sealed orders brought to him by the Pekin,
and found that he was directed to stop at the Ladrones
on his way to Manila and capture the island of Guam.
The course was then shaped toward the first land seen
by Magellan, after his long wandering over the wastes
of the Pacific, and on June 20, at daylight, the Ameri
can ships were off the island. They looked in at the
port of Agana, the capital, found no vessels there, nor
any sign of a Spanish force, and so proceeded to the.
other port of San Luis d'Apra, where rumors at Hono
lulu had placed a Spanish gunboat and soldiers. When
they reached the harbor, shut in by Apepas Island and
the peninsula of Orote, the Charleston suddenly disap
peared from the sight of the watching eyes on the troop
ships. She had plunged boldly in, following the deep,
narrow, and tortuous channel hedged by coral reefs.
Against the gray and green of the cliffs, with sudden
rain squalls coming and going, the lead-colored cruiser
could not be made out from the transports. At last

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
something white was discovered moving against the
cliffs. Then the white spots were discovered to be the
boats on the superstructure of the Charleston, and it
was apparent that the cruiser was going steadily in.
Presently she made out the masts of a vessel beyond
Apepas, and the spirits of the crew rose at the hope of
an action. Then they rounded the end of the island,
and disappointment fell upon them when they dis
covered that the longed-for enemy was only a peace
ful Japanese brigantine. No fight there. On the
cruiser crept through the dangerous waters, past old
Fort St. lago. No sound, no movement, no enemy
there. All as quiet, one would think, as in Magellan's
day. On again, and now the Charleston was opposite
Fort Santa Cruz, and opened sharply with her three-
pounders. The guns cracked, the shells whistled over
the fort, a dozen shots were fired, there was no reply,
and in five minutes the only action seen by Guam was
over. The Charleston slipped along a little further,
ever more slowly, and at last stopped. Soon boats put
off from the shore, and the captain of the port and
some other Spanish officers came on board the Charles
ton. They began to apologize in the best Spanish man
ner for their inability to return the American "salute."
"What salute?" said Captain Glass. It appeared that
they referred to the shelling of Fort Santa Cruz.
"Make no mistake," said Captain Glass, "I fired no
salute. Our countries are at war, and those were
hostile shots." Poor Spanish officers, stranded far
away in the dim Pacific 1 They had heard no news of
war, and now they were prisoners. Then Captain
Glass demanded the Governor, who was at Agana, and

r""

,. ' .'

THE BLOCKADE OF MANILA
paroled his suddenly acquired prisoners to go ashore
and get him. This brought a pause in the operations,
and the three transports were convoyed in and an
chored near the cruiser. As evening drew on a mes
sage arrived from the Governor, stating that the mili
tary regulations of Spain forbade his going aboard an
enemy's ship, and that he would be happy to see the
American commander at his office. This characteristic
exhibition of pompous Spanish etiquette and of piteous
inability to recognize facts made the American captain
hesitate between anger and amusement. But good
nature and the sense of humor prevailed, and word was
sent to the Governor that the captain or some officer
representing him would call on the following day. The
next morning Lieutenant Braunersreuther went ashore
with only four sailors, but with two Oregon companies
and fifty marines in the background making ready to
follow. Before the soldiers and marines could be
landed, however — a somewhat slow piece of work —
Lieutenant Braunersreuther appeared, his task com
pleted, and the Spanish Governor and his staff pris
oners in the whale-boat. The poor Spaniards had faced
the inevitable, and bowed to the inexorable argument
of an overwhelming force. The Governor had written
an order to the commandant of the troops to bring
them down and surrender them, had then penned a
melancholy letter to his wife, and in deep dejection
had followed his captors to the Charleston. After
they had been assigned to quarters Captain Glass went
ashore and inspected Fort Santa Cruz, and there on
the southeast corner of the terre-plein the flag was
hoisted. As it climbed slowly to the top of the staff
203

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
the national salute rang out, gun after gun, from the
cruiser, and the air was filled, as the crash of the re
ports died away in echoes, with the music of the regi
mental bands on the troop-ships. Then all was done,
and the flag which had risen first on the distant Atlan
tic coast floated out before the afternoon breeze of these
remote islands which were henceforth to know new
masters. The ceremony done, the practical work
which the flag symbolized was soon finished. At four
o'clock the two companies, one of Spanish regulars,
and one of native Chamorros, came down to the boat-
house where Lieutenant Braunersreuther, backed by
his bluejackets and forty marines, received the sur
render. The Spanish troops were all disarmed, the
regulars were taken on board the ships as prisoners,
and the Chamorros, perfectly overjoyed at the over
throw of Spain, as is the case with all who have called
Spain master, were left behind. The little play, in
which comedy and tragedy had mingled closely, was
over. The moss-grown, picturesque old forts, the
slender Spanish garrison, the whole civil government
of Spain, had passed into the power of the United
States. There were scenes which seemed to recall the
fantastic conceptions of comic opera, and bring only
laughter to the onlookers. Yet behind the absurdity
was the pathos of the helpless yielding Spaniards, and
the stern historic fact that the first possession in the
Pacific which Magellan had given to the Spain that
dominated and frightened Europe had passed away for
ever from the Spain which had ceased to rule, and be
come a part of the Western republic, whose very exist-

204

THC.MAS M. ANUERSON

THE BLOCKADE OF MANILA
ence depended on the denial of all that Charles V and
Phillip II, represented among men.
On June 22 the Charleston steamed away with her
prisoners, followed by the transports. In the early
afternoon of Tuesday, June 28, they were off Cape
Engano, and in a short time were joined by the Balti
more, sent out to meet them. Two days more and they
were running into Manila bay. As they passed Cor
regidor, three German vessels were lying near by, and
the Kaiserin Augusta, a large armored cruiser, got up
steam and followed close to the Australia, hung to her
until the flag-ship was reached, and then broke out the
American flag and saluted. The whole movement was
offensive, and to be offensive without doing anything to
support it is not only ill-bred, but stupid. So the per
formance of the Kaiserin Augusta went down in the
American books charged to the German account, and
the ships went on. Before them lay the French ships,
sulky and suspicious, the Japanese, the trim black Eng
lish ships, with the "old red ensign" looking very
friendly and very welcome to the American troop
ships. And then came the ships flying the flag they
loved, and which they had come so far to serve. There
was the victor fleet near together off Cavite, and the
salutes rang out from tlie Olympia and the Charleston.
Support had come at last, and Dewey had a new cruiser
and troops of the United States at his back. It must
have been a great relief to feel that the long separation
from home was over, and that the Pekin and her con
sorts were but the first in a long line of re-enforcements
now fairly started from the United States. The moral
effect of the arrival of General Anderson and his troops
205

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
was great, although in actual numbers the force was a
small one, but it was put to immediate use. The sol
diers were quickly landed and established at Cavite,
which had been in American possession since the bat
tle of May I. Then the admiral faced the situation
again. There was still the hostility of the European
powers to be met. German enmity was still shown in
a way which bordered on intolerable insolence. The
American troops had been barely a week in their new
quarters when Admiral Dewey was obliged to drive
the Irene from Subig bay and stop German interfer
ence at that point with the insurgents. On the
other hand were the insurgents themselves, massed
round Manila, and inflated by the victories won and
the prisoners captured from outlying Spanish forces.
It was the 15th of July when Aguinaldo, destitute of
either loyalty or gratitude, forgetting the hand which
had raised him up, and swelling with a sense of his
own importance, felt it necessary to establish a govern
ment, of which he duly apprised Admiral Dewey. The
government consisted simply of himself as dictator, but
he showed his Latin blood by accompanying the fact
of his own dictatorship with high-sounding proclama
tions, and a constitution in many paragraphs, which he
apparently made himself, and which was therefore cer
tainly new, and to him probably satisfactory. The
cloud of words which he emitted was of little moment,
but the fact of his dictatorship and his assumption of
autocratic power added to the perils of the situation.
Altogether the conditions were menacing enough. In
the front was Spain, an open and public enemy, com
paratively easy to deal with. On either hand were the
206

y^A'l

FRANCIS \'. GREEXE

THE BLOCKADE OF MANILA
war-ships of unfriendly powers watching sullenly and
eagerly for an error, for a sign of weakness, for the
least excuse for interference. All around Manila were
the insurgents, supporters in theory, but untrustworthy,
treacherously led, and capable at any moment of ac
tions which might endanger our relations with other
powers, or of intriguing with those same powers
against us.
So the days dragged by, the admiral, cool, firm, and
vigilant, always ready, and making no mistakes, and
then, two days after Aguinaldo's announcement of his
own greatness, came a great and signal relief. On July
17 the second expedition, under General Greene, which
had left San Francisco on June 25, arrived. General
Greene came on the China, and the three other trans
ports — the Senator, Colon, and Zealandia — came in
soon after. They brought the First Nebraska, the
First Colorado, the Tenth Pennsylvania, and the Utah
artillery — all volunteers — eight companies of regulars,
and a detachment of engineers, in all 158 officers and
3,428 enlisted men. This raised the total force at Ma
nila to more than 6,000 men, and greatly strengthened
the American position. The net about the Spaniards
holding the Philippine capital was beginning to draw
tighter. This second expedition had stopped at Wake Island
— a barren sand strip, but with possible value for future
cables — had then looked in at Guam, and now, on a
peaceful Sunday, rapidly disembarked on the shores
of Manila bay. Thus re-enforced, the American troops
were moved forward, and the camp established between
the beach and the Manila road, about two miles from
207

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
Malate. This brought the lines very near the Spaniards
and the Malate fort. There was a false alarm one night,
produced by some Spanish shots at the insurgents, but,
on the whole, the Spaniards kept quiet enough, having a
proper respect, no doubt, for the war-ships frowning
upon them from a very reasonable range. But events
were moving faster now than in the long dreary time
which followed the battle of May i. The second ex
pedition had scarcely time to settle down in their camps
when, on July 25, General Merritt, one of the most dis
tinguished officers in the army, arrived on the Newport.
To him had been confided the command of all the
American forces in the Philippines — both those already
there and those which were still to come. He had in
tended to bring with him the third expedition, but, im
patient of delay, had sailed with his staff on the New
port, on June 27, and pushed on alone at the highest
speed attainable. When he arrived, he found General
Anderson with headquarters at Cavite, and some troops
holding the town, and General Greene encamped with
his brigade near Paranaque. On the north flank Gen
eral Greene was within 3,200 yards of the outer de
fences of Manila, which ran from old Fort San An
tonio south of the Malate suburb, with more or less de
tached forts to the eastward, and to the swamps on the
Spanish left. The queer feature of the situation was
that between our lines and those of the Spaniards the
insurgents, who had established scattered posts all about
the city, had entrenched themselves within 800 yards
of the old powder-magazine fort. Thus in the direct
line of the American advance lay the forces of their
would-be allies. In order to make that advance it was
208

Bitas Iim((

EXPLANATION: ^¦o= = = = .-D»er/cans
........ Filii'inoff
 Spaniards

BORMAV 4 CC.,ENGHiB,M.V.

MAP OF THE BATTLE OF MANILA

THE BLOCKADE OF MANILA
necessary to get this intervening line out of the way.
General Merritt, as clear on this point as Admiral
Dewey, was wisely determined that he would recognize
the insurgents in no way which could possibly involve
the government of the United States. He was equally
determined that he would have no military operations
which depended in any degree upon them, and no joint
military movements, the difficulties and perils of which
he plainly foresaw. He therefore opened no communi
cations with Aguinaldo, who had now reached such a
point of pompous self-importance that he had not come
to see the American commmander-in-chief upon the
latter's arrival. This made it all the easier for General
Merritt to ignore him, which was desirable, but did not
clear the insurgent line away from the American front.
The difficulty was solved by General Greene's inducing
the insurgent brigade commander to move to the
right, which did not commit us to anything, and gave
us what we wanted — an unobstructed control of the
roads necessary for the forward movement. With this
point gained. General Greene, on July 29, advanced and
took possession of the insurgent trenches with a bat
talion of regulars, another from the Colorado regi
ment, and a portion of the Utah battery. Finding the
trenches weak and of bad construction, General Greene
ordered another line constructed 100 yards further to
the front, which was rapidly done during the night by
the Colorado men. The line of intrenchments was
short, not more than 270 yards in length, and on the
right was protected only by some scattered barricades
of the insurgents. Facing it, at close quarters now,
were the stone fort, heavy intrenchments with seven
14 209

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
guns, a block-house, which flanked the Americans on
the right — all manned by regular soldiers, with abun
dant reserves in the city near at hand. The position
was by no means a safe one, and the Spaniards,
disturbed by the American advance, now begin
ning to press upon them, undertook to break up
the intrenchments before they should be further
strengthened or extended, and drive their approaching
enemies back. They kept up a desultory firing upon
our lines, as they had done with the insurgents, but it
had been entirely harmless, and so long as our men kept
under cover the bullets had spent themselves vainly
against the earthworks or flown high and wide through
the air. On the night of July 31, however, a serious
and concerted effort was made to force our lines back.
The night was intensely dark, a tropical storm was rag
ing, and the rain was falling in torrents. In the black
ness and noise of the storm it was almost impossible
to know just what happened. The Tenth Pennsylva
nia was in the trenches, and when the Spanish fire in
creased in volume they began to reply to it, exposing
themselves in doing so. Then their outposts came in
with a report of a Spanish advance, and although the
outposts of regulars staid where they were through the
night, there can be little doubt that the enemy came for
ward, and also tried to flank us from the block-house
and on our exposed right. No circumstances could be
imagined more trying for new troops, with an unseen
enemy firing heavily, an utter impossiblity of seeing
or hearing anything, and a welter of confusion caused
by storm and darkness. But the Pennsylvanians fired
vigorously, and their reserves, brought up through the

THE BLOCKADE OP MANILA
zone of fire in rear of the firing line, suffered not a lit
tle. The Utah and regular artillery stood their ground
undisturbed, served their guns steadily and efficiently,
and held the Spaniards in check. Nothing could have
been better than their behavior. General Greene, in
formed of what was occurring by some excited and not
over-accurate messengers, sent forward to the trenches
the California regiment and the Third artillery, sup
ported by the First Colorado, who were to stop just out
of range. The Californians and the artillery suffered
in crossing the open ground in rear of the trenches, but
went steadily forward, and by the time they reached
the firing line the Spanish fire was slackening and the
attack had been repulsed. The firing, which soon
after ceased, was renewed in the morning about nine
o'clock, but was without effect. In this night assault
the American loss reached lo killed and 43 wounded,
but despite the most trying conditions, after the first
excitement and confusion our men stood their ground
coolly; and the heavy fire of the infantry, and espe
cially of the Utah and regular artillery, proved too
much for the Spaniards, whose attempt failed com
pletely. Many Spanish dead and wounded were car
ried into Manila, but what their actual loss was it is im
possible to determine, as even their wild official reports
are lacking in this instance.
The Americans naturally held their line, but General
Greene, feeling that the right flank could no longer be
left as it was, weak and exposed, opened a new line of
trenches, which were rapidly extended for 1,200 yards
from the bay to the Pasay road. This was a strong line
and well protected on both flanks, but the work both of

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
making the trenches and of holding them was severe in
the extreme. The incessant rain washed away the para
pets, which could only be sustained by bags of earth.
In the trenches themselves there were two feet of water,
but the men worked away effectively and rapidly with
out complaint. They had also, as an accompaniment
to their labors, constant firing from the Spanish lines.
Sometimes it was heavy and concerted. At other times
it was desultory, but any man working in the trenches
who showed his head above the parapet was likely to
be shot. When the firing became heavy the Utah bat
tery would reply ; and if it was thought that the Span
iards were coming out, the infantry would join in. The
heaviest firing came on August 5, when the Spaniards
opened at seven o'clock and kept it up until ten, and the
Americans replied vigorously and effectively. Our loss
was 3 killed and 7 wounded, but beyond this the whole
of the Spanish firing was utterly futile. It was their
appproved method of conducting war in Cuba, and, as
it now seemed, everywhere else ; but although it had no
results, and was pitifully useless as a substitute for fight
ing, it was none the less annoying to men in trenches
who were not yet ready to advance, because the com
manders meant to take the city, if possible, without reg
ular assault. So it was decided to put a stop to the
Spanish firing, and word was sent, on August 7, that if
there was not an end to it the ships would bombard.
Thereupon silence fell upon the Spanish lines, and no
more shots were fired in the American direction until
the general and final advance began, a week later.
At no time would the Spaniards have failed to com
ply with any reasonable request backed by a suggestion
212

THE BLOCKADE OF MANILA
of bombardment, but now the threat had a deeper mean
ing than ever before. The third expedition, which fol
lowed General Merritt, arrived on July 31, the day of
the fight at Malate, and brought nearly 5,000 officers
and men — a powerful re-enforcement. But the arrival
which was most impressive, and which at once changed
the situation in a very important manner, occurred on
August 4. The new-comer was eagerly expected, and
every American was on the lookout for the arrival
which meant so much. Officers in the yard of the ar
senal at Cavite heard the men on the walls cry out:
"There she comes 1" "There's the Monterey f Hastily
climbing up, they looked forth toward the harbor en
trance, and it was true — there indeed was the Monterey.
Leaving San Diego on June 1 1 she had toiled across the
Pacific slowly, not being built for such wide seafaring,
and here she was at last safe and sound. Lying low
in the water, she was not very fair to see; but she was
clad in armor, and four 12-inch guns looked out from
her turrets, altogether a very formidable ship for the
smooth waters of Manila bay. To Admiral Dewey,
facing armored ships with nothing but unarmored
cruisers, and quite prepared to give a good account of
himself against any odds, the coming of the Monterey
was worth many regiments,, and the balance of naval
power began to come down toward his side. The
meaning of the Monterey was easily understood — and
by others than the Americans. The morning after her
arrival, officers looking at the line of foreign war-ships
thought there had been some change. They counted,
and found that in truth there had been a change, for
one or two of them had slipped off in the night. So
213

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
they gradually departed until only a proper force for
observation remained, and the German squadron, with
its interference and ill-concealed threats and insolence,
was reduced to suitable proportions. The Monterey
had demonstrated once more Nelson's famous saying —
that his fighting-ships were the best negotiators in Eu
rope. With all danger of foreign meddling gone, with more
than ten thousand soldiers on shore, and with the Mon
terey lying low and menacing alongside the American
cruisers. Admiral Dewey and General Merritt felt that
the time had come to bring matters to a conclusion and
take possessionof the city, which hadbeen won on the ist
of May. On August 7 the American commanders no
tified the Spanish general-in-chief that after the expira
tion of forty-eight hours they might attack the defences
of Manila, and that they sent the notice in order to ena
ble non-combatants to leave the city. Augustin the tru
culent, the maker of the proclamation which described
Dewey and his men as the "excrescences of civilization"
who were about to cast down altars and carry off wives
and virgins, had slipped away under orders from Ma
drid, it is said, when the decisive moment drew near ;
with German aid getting safely off, and leaving Gen
eral Jaudenes to face the inevitable. That officer now
replied to the American communication, expressing his
thanks, but declaring that he was unable, owing to the
presence of the insurrectionary forces, to find a place
of refuge for the women and children under his care.
It was a manly letter, not without a note of pathos hid
den under the polite and ceremonious words. His op
ponents were quite as anxious as he to avoid extremi-
214

^YESLEY• jMERRITT

THE BLOCKADE OF MANILA
ties if they could ; and so, two days later, they again
wrote to General Jaudenes, asking for the surrender of
Manila. They pointed out the hopelessness of his sit
uation which made surrender consistent with honor,
the useless sacrifice of life which an attack and bom
bardment would cause, and expressed the earnest de
sire to spare the women and children and the wounded
from all the perils which might ensue. The Governor-
General, who, it is reported, had been appointed be
cause Augustin wanted to surrender unconditionally,
replied with a refusal of the American demands, and
then asked for time to consult his government. This
General Merritt and Admiral Dewey very properly re
fused. Through the Belgian consul they sent a mes
sage that if the heavy batteries along the water-front
kept silent they would not shell the city, but Manila
they meant to have. It was also clear that the Span
iards were really ready to surrender, but that their
honor or their politics or something demanded a fight
and a show of force. They so clung to shams and so
shrank from realities that, although they meant to sur
render, they were determined to have an attack made
upon them; and the American general, equally deter
mined to have an end to the business, ordered an attack
on August 13.
The ships left their anchorage at Cavite early in the
morning. As they got under way and the Olympia
moved off, the English band on the Immortalite struck
up "See, the Conquering Hero Comes," and then, as
the battle-flags broke out on the fighting fleet, the Eng
lish band played the "Star-Spangled Banner," and the
cheers of the American seamen rang strong and clear
215

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
across the water. As the American ships drew away,
the English followed them a little further out, and when
they came to their old anchorage near the Pasig river,
the French and Germans got under way too. The Ger
man flag-ship steamed down behind the Concord, so
that a high shot from Manila aimed at the latter might
easily have struck her, and thereupon the Immortalite
came in between the German and the American, and
stopped. The hint was not lost. The Germans and
French remained near Manila, while the English and
Japanese were grouped on the American side ; and with
this arrangement the closing act of the drama went for
ward. It was after nine o'clock when the Olympia, followed
by the Petrel and Raleigh, and with the Callao near in,
opened on the Malate forts. For the first few minutes
the shots fell short. Then the squalls of mist and rain
passed away, the range, which was now seen to be er
roneous, was readjusted, and what General Merritt
called "a hot»and accurate fire of heavy shells and rapid-
fire projectiles" was poured upon the forts. The
Utah battery also opened, and at half past ten the
ships, on signal, ceased firing, the infantry were let
loose, and the skirmish-line of General Greene's brigade
rushed into the powder-magazine fort and the trenches,
which they found deserted. Up went the American
flag, and, as the troops went forward, they were met by
a second line of defence and a sharp fire. The Ameri
cans replied with volleys, subduing the Spanish fire,
and then advanced steadily through the streets of Ma
late, with only some straggling shots from the direc
tion of Paco. Passing through Malate and then Er-
216

RESISIAXij.; l.R(_i.\l ¦IIII.', Hor^ES IX M.VL.Mi:

THE BLOCKADE OF MANILA
mita, they emerged on the open space at the Luneta, to
see the white flag over the walled city. As General
Greene rode forward under a heavy fire he came upon
a thousand Spanish troops — those who had been shoot
ing from the Paco road, but had now stopped. Detain
ing their commander. General Greene sent the Span
ish soldiers into the walled city, and then halted his men
in such a position that, if there were any more fighting,
he might be in a position to rush the gates.
Meantime General MacArthur, advancing along the
Pasay road, had encountered a sharper resistance and
met with a more serious loss ; for the Spaniards there,
well out of range of the ships, made a better stand.
After an artillery engagement which silenced two
Spanish guns in the Spanish battery, and hearing the
cheers of Greene's men on the left, the brigade ad
vanced and had a sharp action at the village of Singa-
lon, where the enemy vigorously defended a block
house. The ground was difficult and the advance slow ;
but the men were well handled and fought well, so that
at the end of an hour and a half the Spanish, yielding
before the steady pressure, retreated; the Americans
followed, and, passing through the Paco district, en
tered the city.
In this advance of the two brigades upon the city
General Greene lost i killed and 6 wounded, and General
MacArthur 4 killed and ¦;iff wounded. What loss their
opposition suffered does not appear to have been ascer
tained or reported. But the price paid was not a heavy
one for the great city which fell into the hands of the
Americans and which the Spanish would not yield
without an actual attack. It is obvious, from the fig-
217

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
ures, that the resistance was neither serious nor pro
longed, and there is no doubt that it might have been
both. The Spanish had 13,000 good troops, nearly all
regulars, and 22,000 stand of arms. Their intrench
ments, supported by block-houses and forts, were excel
lent and formidable, while in front of the old city and
on the Luneta they are said to have had more than sev
enty heavy modern rifled guns. Here was abundant
material for a desperate defence, which, if made, would
have cost the Americans many lives and the utter de
struction of the city.
No such defence was attempted, and the reasons are
obvious. In the first place, the Spaniards had been de
prived of any hope of final escape by the victory of May
I, and by the manner in which Admiral Dewey firmly
held and controlled the bay, thus cutting them off from
all prospect of assistance. In the second place, they
were well aware that if they forced the final test the
American fleet, now strengthened by the Monterey,
would wreck and destroy the city, and that under those
conditions the American troops could not be withstood.
They might kill many of their foes, they would lose
many themselves, and the end would always be the
same. But there was another and still more convincing
reason than any of these. The long years of tyranny,
oppression, and torture were ready at last to exact their
compensation. All about Manila were the insurgent
bands, with bitter wrongs to avenge, half-civilized peo
ple raised now into very deadly activity by the coming
of the new conqueror, and watching eagerly for the op
portunity to settle certain long outstanding accounts.
These native people wanted to kill and plunder. A de-
218

THE BLOCKADE OF MANILA
termined resistance meant a bombardment with a fierce
assault by the American troops, and when they rushed
in, there behind them, uncontrollable in the confusion
of a stormed and shattered city, would come the insur
gents with pillage, bloodshed, and fire in their train.
The Spaniards shrank from such a prospect, for they
knew the insurgents, and they also knew what they
had done to these people now in arms. The only es
cape was through the Americans, who would protect
them and the city and curb the insurgents. So the
white flag went up soon after the naval fire ceased, and
then Lieutenant Brumby, representing the admiral, and
Colonel Whittier, representing the general, went in and
held a conference. General Greene went in also at the
head of his troops, and General Merritt came ashore.
They passed through the plaza, crowded with Span
ish soldiers, found General Jaudenes in a chapel of the
cathedral, and there the capitulation was signed and the
city surrendered. The Oregon troops brought up by
water from Cavite landed through the surf and
marched up the Luenta. While they were advancing,
Lieutenant Brumby and his men hauled down the Span
ish standard from the bigflag-staff in front of the walls.
As the great banner came down, the Americans were
silent and the crowd looked on wondering, some of
the Spaniards among them shedding tears. Then there
rose in its place a flag brought from the Olympia. Up
it went, and then broke out before the breeze, the sun
coming through a rift in the clouds and shining bright
upon it. The marching Oregon troops saw it, their
cheers rang out, and their band sent the strains of "The
Star-Spangled Banner" floating down the promenade.
219

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
The ships saw it too, and the national salute pealed out
from the guns of the Olympia. The emblem of what
had been done was at last in place. Meantime, the real
ities were going on elsewhere in the surrounded city,
where General Merritt, in the palace of a long line of
Spanish governors, was taking possession of the treas
ure and the arms, and preparing the way for the gov
ernment of Manila. Other realities were the entrance
of Greene's and MacArthur's men through streets lined
with Spanish soldiers, neither sullen nor revengeful, but
glad that it was all finished, and that the days of use
less fighting and of wasted lives were over. Still other
realities were the American troops posted at the bridges
and approaches to the city, holding back the insurgents,
forbidding their entrance entirely, determined that
there should be no pillage, no slaughter, no burning,
nothing to dim or sully the fine record which had run
on without fleck or stain from the May day of the vic
tory. It was all very simple. There was very little
pomp and parade. The navy of the United States were
masters of the great bay. The soldiers of the United
States — the highly trained regulars, the hardy volun
teers from the States of the West and Northwest
where half a century ago was only wilderness — held
the city. Their general was in the palace, their flag
fluttered on the Luenta. That was all. Yet under the
simple facts were many meanings. The empire which
Magellan had found for Spain in the East had passed
away forever. Unfit to rule, she had been expelled at
last from the Western Hemisphere. Unfit to rule, the
war which she had drawn down upon her own head
had driven her also from the East, and a new flag and

fl

THE BLOCKADE OF MANILA
a new power in their onward march had risen up in
the Orient. The youngest of nations had come again
to the edge of that marvelous region, the cradle of the
race, whence the Aryans had moved westward so very
long ago.

CHAPTER XI
How PEACE CAME
More fortunate than the generals and the troops of
Puerto Rico, Admiral Dewey and General Merritt,
thanks to distance and a severed cable, were able to
complete their work and set the final crown upon their
labors by taking Manila before the order reached them
to cease hostilities. That order, when it came, found
them masters of the great Eastern city they had fought
to win. In Puerto Rico the news stayed Schwan's cav
alry in pursuit of the Spaniards, Brooke's gunners with
the lanyards in their hands, and halted the other col
umns in their march over the island. In Cuba it saved
Manzanillo, just falling before the guns of Goodrich
and his little squadron, and checked the movements
which were bringing port after port into American pos
session. It stopped also the departure of a fieet which,
by its existence and intention, was a potent cause of the
coming of peace. Even before the battle of the 3d of
July the department at Washington was making ready
to send a fleet consisting of the Iowa, Oregon, Yankee,
Yosemite, and Dixie, under Commodore Watson in the
flag-ship Newark, direct to Spain, primarily to fight the
fleet of Admiral Camara, which had wandered help
lessly across the Mediterranean with vague outgivings
about going to Manila, but which merely went through

HOW PEACE CAME
the Suez Canal, and then turned round and came back
again. But after the battle of July 3 the preparations
of Commodore Watson's squadron were pushed more
energetically than ever, re-enforcements were prepared,
and it was known that it was to cross the Atlantic in
any event, and carry war to the very doors of Spain's
coast cities. This fact was soon as well known in Eu
rope as in America. Presently it became clear that
Watson's fleet was no pretence, but a very grim reality ;
that it was nearly in readiness; and finally that it was
on the very eve of departure. What American ships
and seamen could do had just been shown at Manila
and Santiago, and there was no reason to suppose that
they would be less effective on the Spanish coast. Spain
did not like the prospect, and some of her neighbors
were as averse as she to the sound of American guns in
the Mediterranean, not heard in those waters now for
nearly a century. It would be something new, some-
thingwhich might disturb concerts and Bunds and other
excellent arrangements, and must not be permitted.
It became clear to the diplomatic mind that Spain musF
make peace and make it at once, on any terms. Hence
arose what is politely called pressure, although poor
Spain did not need much pressing. The war which she
had forced — no one knows exactly for what reason —
for what she called her pride or her point of honor, had
resulted in a series of rapid, crushing, and unbroken
defeats. She had expected, perhaps, to make a stand,
to win a fight, somewhere; but her whole system, her
entire body politic, was rottener than any one dreamed,
and the whole fabric went to pieces like an egg-shell
when struck by the hand of a vigorous, enterprising
223

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
enemy. Her sea power was shattered and entirely gone
in the Pacific and in American waters. Manila bay
was in the hands of Dewey, and the surrender of the
city waited only for his demand. Cuba could not be re
lieved ; Santiago province was in American hands, and
the rest of the island would go the same way as fast as
the United States could land troops and capture ports.
Puerto Rico was half gone, and the American columns
were marching as rapidly as possible to complete con
quest of the island. And then there in the background
was Watson's fleet, very imminent now, and likely to
be off Cadiz or Barcelona in a fortnight.
Clearly it was high time for peace, and on July 22
the Duke of Almodovar del Rio, Minister of State,
transmitted through M. Cambon a letter to the Presi
dent, asking if it were not possible to terminate hostili
ties, and confessing to the defeats which Spain had suf
fered, and the unequal character of the struggle in
which she was engaged. This letter reached the Presi
dent on July 26, and four days later Mr. Day, Secre
tary of State, made reply. He said that the President
was anxious to end the war, and disposed to deal most
generously with a brave adversary. He then laid down
the American conditions, which were absolutely essen
tial by their preliminary acceptance to any negotiations
for a peace. These terms were — first, relinquishment
by Spain of all claim of sovereignty over Cuba, and the
immediate evacuation of that island ; second — the Pres
ident, in a spirit of generosity, not wishing to demand
any pecuniary indemnity — ^the immediate cession to
the United States of Puerto Rico, all other West Indian
islands, and an island in the Ladrones to be selected by
224

'/mm

HOW PEACE CAME
the United States ; third, that the United States should
hold and occupy the city and bay of Manila pending
the conclusion of a treaty of peace which should deter
mine "the control, disposition, and government of the
Philippines." On August 7 the Duke of Almodovar
del Rio replied, accepting with many words, but still
accepting, the first two conditions, and answering the
third demand in a manner which might be taken as an
acceptance or not, but which was evidently designed to
open up discussion and controversy. But Mr. Day had
had recently a thorough if brief schooling in Spanish
diplomatic correspondence, and he had no idea of in
volving himself or his government in further debate of
any kind. Spain was to accept our demands or war
was to go on. The day of words, of phrases, and of
language generally had passed away in the smoke of
war, and now, if war was to cease, it was to be Yes or
No. So, with admirable decision and great cleverness
and ability, Mr. Day decided that the Spanish note
was a plain acceptance of our terms, and nothing else.
He accordingly wrote to M. Cambon, on August 10,
and to this effect, added that any lack of explic-
itness in the Duke's note being due undoubtedly,
to errors in transmission, or in the translation of
the cipher, he proposed to end all doubts and avoid
all misunderstandings by inviting M. Cambon to
sign, on behalf of Spain, a protocol embodying
in precise terms the three demands of the letter
of July 30, and three other articles providing for
the method of evacuating Cuba and Puerto Rico, for
the appointment of commissioners to negotiate a treaty
of peace, and for the cessation of hostilities on the sign-
15 225

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
ing of the protocol. No room any more for explanations
and notes and arguments. War or the protocol, that
was the choice. Spain at last had been brought, by her
refusal to admit truth, face to face with an ugly reality
from which there was no escape. Shams and false
hoods and large language were of no use here before
the fact which could not be hidden any longer, and she
authorized M. Cambon to sign the protocol. The sign
ing took place at Washington, on August, 12, and hos
tilities ceased.
This was the practical end of active war, but it was
only a truce or an armistice. The war was not ended
or over, and could not be until a treaty was concluded.
For this work, under the provisions of the protocol, the
President appointed Mr. Day, who resigned the Secre
taryship of State, Senator Davis of Minnesota, Sena
tor Frye of Maine, Senator Gray of Delaware, and the
Honorable Whitelaw Reid commissioners on the part
of the United States, to negotiate a treaty of peace at
Paris. The Spanish government appointed a like com
mission, headed by Don Eugenio Montero Rios, the
president of the Senate, and a very learned and able
lawyer of high distinction. The commissioners of both
governments met in Paris on October i, and exchanged
their powers. The negotiations then began, and lasted
until December 10, when the treaty was signed. The
Spaniards struggled hard and resisted stoutly. All Eu
rope was with them in sympathy, and especially France
and Germany. The Americans were doing their work
in a hostile atmosphere, with no friendly nation near
except England, and they did it in a way which added
another triumph to the annals of American diplomacy.
226

JULES CAMBON
The French Ambassador who signed the peace protocol on behalf of Spain

HOW PEACE CAME
They were all men of the highest distinction, of experi
ence, and tried ability, and they not only met the Span
ish arguments strongly and thoroughly, but they con
ducted their difficult task without stumbling or error.
There was a contest over the Cuban and other debts,
which called forth much discussion, and a most suc
cessful parrying of all the Spanish efforts to secure for
those debts some recognition or some acceptance by
the United States. There was also discussion on some
minor points, but the question upon which the real con
flict turned, and which soon overshadowed everything
else, was the Philippines. Dewey's victory had come
with the shock of a great surprise as well as the splen
dor of a great glory. No one had dreamed that the war
meant the entrance of the United States into the Orient.
But there the flag was, there it fluttered victorious, and
the stream of events, so much more powerful than hu
man plannings when they are the outcome of world
forces, moved relentlessly on. Dewey must be sup
ported and relieved. So a ship and some troops
went to him. Then it was clear that they were
inadequate, and more ships and more troops followed
across the Pacific. They could not be there for nothing.
Manila must be taken, and so it was taken before news
of the protocol could reach that distant place with its
cut cable. Hostilities ceased, and we held Manila in
our grasp. No one would have consented to give up
that city and its noble harbor — the prize and pearl of
the East. But if we were to retain Manila, the scene of
Dewey's victory, which the American people would
never surrender, were we to hold it alone and nothing
else, surrounded by territory in other hands, with all
227

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
the burdens and perils which such a situation implied.
We must hold Manila, and if Manila, then the only pos
sible thing was to hold the island of Luzon as well.
That was as far as the President on the mass of the
American people had gone when the commissioners
sailed for Paris in September. Some members of the
commission were utterly opposed to the retention of
the Philippines or any considerable portion of any one
of them. But when they settled down to work, when
the inexorable demand for action came upon them,
when they could no longer speculate upon possibilities
without responsibility, as their fellow-citizens at home
could do, then the question broadened and deepened,
and began to settle itself and burn away all doubts, as
great questions have a way of doing. The stream of
events was running on in the game inevitable fashion.
Those who had rejoiced in the rush of the current, and
those who tried to stem it, alike went with it. The
forces which had been let loose by the Spanish war
were world forces, and they presented their arguments
with the grim silence and the unforgiving certainty of
fate. Will you go away and leave the Filipinos to
Spain, they asked, leave them to a tyranny and oppres
sion tenfold worse than that in Cuba which carried you
into the war? Clearly impossible. Will you force
Spain out of the islands, and then, having destroyed
the only government and the only sovereignty which
have ever existed there, will you depart yourselves and
leave the islands to anarchy and bloodshed, to sangui
nary dictatorship, and to the quick seizure of European
powers and a possible world-wide war over the spoils ?
Again clearly impossible. Again no thoroughfare.
228

HOW PEACE CAME
Again a proposition which no strong, high-spirited peo
ple could entertain. Will you, then, call in the other
powers of the earth to help you settle the question of
these islands, determine their destiny, and establish a
government for their people ? Once more, no. Such a
solution is incompatible with decent pride and honest
self-respect, and could lead only to mischief and con
fusion, to wars and rumors of wars. What then will
you do ? Is there aught you can do but replace the sov
ereignty you have dashed down, and with your own
sovereignty meet the responsibilities which have come to
you in the evolution of the time, and take yourselves
the islands you have won? Quite clearly now the an
swer comes that no other course is possible. The
American commissioners heard in all this, as the great
master of music heard in the first bars of his immortal
symphony, "the hand of fate knocking at the door."
Some of them had always believed in this outcome,
some had not, but all became absolutely convinced that
there was but one road possible, and so they demanded
all the Philippines from Spain, and made the demand
an ultimatum. The Spaniards struggled hard. They
disputed our right to make the demand under the terms
of the protocol ; they argued and resisted ; they threat
ened to break off the negotiations; and then they
yielded, because they could do nothing else. This done,
the treaty was soon made, and it was an admirable in
strument, a masterpiece in every respect. No loop-hole
was left for any claim for debts or aught else ; no words
could be found which could be strained to bind the
United States in any way in the future. The Ameri-

229

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
can commissioners came home with a triumphant
treaty, a very fit result of an entirely victorious war.
Much dispute and opposition have arisen among peo
ple successful in war in times past, and will rise again,
over treaties of peace, but such opposition has always
proceeded on the ground that the victor nation received
too little. The treaty of the United States with Spain,
signed in Paris on December lo, 1898, has the unique
distinction of having excited opposition and attack
among the victors because it secured too much and was
too triumphant. An organization called by the strange
name of the Anti-Imperialist League was formed in the
Eastern States. Some men who had once been emi
nent in politics gave their names to its support, and oth
ers who felt that they ought to be eminent in politics
gave it their services. A vigorous crusade was begun,
but the popular response in the way of the easily signed
petition was surprisingly small for the good sense of
the American people made two points clear to them.
One was that a peace treaty ought to be ratified, the
other that they had won these new possessions, and
had no doubt that they could trust themselves to deal
with them honestly, ably, and for their own truest and
best interests, as well as for those of the people of all
the islands. A failure in the field of popular discussion
before the people and in the newspapers, the fight
against the treaty was transferred to the Senate of the
United States.
The constitutional provision which requires a vote
of two-thirds of the Senate to ratify a treaty simpli
fies the work of opposition to ratification. It seemed
incredible at first that a treaty of peace could possibly
230

HOW PEACE CAME
be defeated. Party lines were not drawn on the ques
tion, and it was at first supposed that resistance to the
ratification of the treaty would be confined to a very
few Senators, who had been opposed to the movement
in favor of the Cubans, as well as to the entrance into
war, and were now consistently opposed to its re
sults. But as time went on the necessities of factions
in the Democratic party developed an opposition which
included a majority of the Democratic Senators, and
this made the minority formidably large — nearly one-
third of the Senate, if not in excess of it. It is not need
ful to trace in detail the course of the debate, which
from the side of opposition proceeded on three liries —
lack of constitutional power to acquire and hold the
Philippines, the violation of the principles of the Dec
laration of Independence involved in doing so, and
sympathy and admiration for the Filipinos, feelings as
profound as they were rapid in growth. The friends of
ratification took the very simple ground that the treaty
committed the United States to no policy, but left them
free to do exactly as seemed best with all the islands,
that the American people could be safely intrusted with
this grave responsibility, and that patriotism and com
mon-sense alike demanded the end of war and the re
establishment of peace, which could only be effected by
the adoption of the treaty. The contest was earnest
and bitter, the canvass energetic to a degree never seen
in the Senate, and the result close. When the Senate
went into executive session on Monday, February 6,
with the time for the vote fixed for three o'clock, the
treaty had only 58 sure votes, 60 being needed for rati
fication ; the opposition had 29 sure votes, and the re-
231

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
maining 3 were doubtful. At half past two one of the
doubtful voters was declared to be for the treaty, mak
ing 59. Just before three o'clock another vote was
promised, and the third doubtful vote was given to the
treaty after the roll had been called. The final vote
stood 57 to 27 — including the pairs, 61 to 29, just two-
thirds and one vote to spare. It had been a heated
struggle. Opinion as to the outcome had fluctuated,
even among those best informed, down to the last mo
ment. Yet as one looks back when all is done, it
seems clear that no other result was possible. The re
sponsibility which had come to the American people
with the flash of Dewey's guns on May i could not be
avoided, and the American people were too strong, too
high-spirited, too confident, to run away from it. The
hand of fate was knocking at the door of the Senate as
it had knocked at the door of the American commis
sioners in Paris. To that knock all doors fly open,
and to the stern visitant without but one answer could
be given.
Nothing remained after the end of the conflict in the
Senate but the exchange of ratifications, which took
place on April 11, 1899, and so the war ended. Its
causes lie far tack in the history and character of na
tions. Its immediate results were as striking as they
were important and full of meaning. What the more
distant outcome of these results will be in the future
years no man can tell. We can only say with certainty
that they will be far reaching and momentous. The
war was brief, but it served to let loose forces which
had long been gathering strength, and to complete
movements which had been going on for centuries. For
232

t

THE C.VIHEDRAE, .M.VXILA

HOW PEACE CAME
three hundred years the conflict between the English-
speaking people on the one side, and the French and
Spanish on the other, for the control of the New World,
had been in progress. France went down in 1760, the
last vestige of Spanish power was swept away by the
war of 1898. The result was inevitable, and the Eng
lish-speaking people owned at last one-half of the New
World, and had shut out Europe from all control in
the other half or in the great islands of the West
Indies.* Thus were the immediate object and purpose of the
war achieved in fulfilment of the irresponsible conflict
of centuries between races, systems, and beliefs inher
ently antagonistic. But war is a fire, and when it be
gins no one can tell where it will stop or what it will
burn away. The only thing we can be quite sure of is
that war, once entered upon, cannot be limited, and
may produce results of which no man dreamed at the
outset. This war, merely as such, was not only short,
but was far from being a large or extensive one. Yet
it suddenly made clear many things not realized before,
and brought forth unimagined results. For thirty
years the people of the United States had been binding
up the wounds and trying to efface the scars of their
great and terrible Civil War. They knew that they had
done much, they felt that the old passions had softened
and were dying. The war came, and in the twinkling
of an eye, in a flash of burning, living light, they sud
denly saw that the long task was done, that the land
was really one again without rent or seam, and men
?The remaining Danish, Dutch, and French possessions are too
small to constitute an exception to the general proposition.
233

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
rejoiced mightily in their hearts with this knowledge
which the new war had brought.
For thirty years the people of the United States had
been absorbed in the development of their great her
itage. They had been finishing the conquest of their
continent, and binding all parts of it together with the
tracks and highways of commerce. Once this work
was complete, it was certain that the virile, ambitious,
enterprising race which had done it would look abroad
beyond their boundaries and seek to guard and extend
their interests in other parts of the world. The work
was done, but they did not realize it. Even the Venezu
ela intervention, a pure manifestation of the new spirit
i and the new time, did not make it clear to them. Then
the war note rang through the land, and with dazzled
eyes at first, and then with ever clearer and steadier
gaze, they saw that in the years of isolation and self-
absorption they had built up a great world power, that
they must return to the ocean which they had tem
porarily abandoned, and have their share in the trade of
every country and the commerce of every sea. Suddenly
came the awakening to the great fact that they had
founded an empire on their Western coasts, that they
held one side of the Pacific, and could not longer be in
different to the fate of the other side in the remote East.
Now they read with instructed vision the prophecy of
Seward, which foretold that the future course of trade
and empire would lie in the Pacific. They knew at last
that the stream of Eastern trade, which for centuries
had flowed to the West, building up great cities and en
riching nations as it passed from Byzantium to Venice,
from Venice to Portugal, and from Portugal to Hol-
234

HOW PEACE CAME
land and to London, was now to be divided, and in part,
at least, to pour eastward over the Pacific. Now men
saw that the long connection, ever growing closer, with
the Hawaiian Islands had not been chance; that the
culmination of the annexation movement in the very
year of the Spanish War was not accident, but that it
all came from the instinct of the race, which paused in
California only to learn that its course was still west
ward, and that Americans, and no one else, must be
masters of the cross-roads of the Pacific.
But while the United States had moved so slowly for
half a century toward Hawaii, the work of one May
morning carried them on to the Philippines and made
them an Eastern power. Whatever the final disposition
of the islands, whether we hold and govern much or
little, our flag is there, our footing has been made, and
in the East we shall remain, because we are entitled to,
and will surely have, our share of the great commerce
with the millions of China, from whom we shall refuse
to be shut out.
One other great result of the war, like the last a
world result. We found in the trial of war who were
our enemies in Europe, and we saw that they were
many. We also found who our friend was, not as a
matter of sentiment or community of speech and
thought, but on the firm and solid ground of common
interests. In the brief crash of the short-lived Spanish
war the English-speaking people came together. In the
light of those eager, hurrying days we saw that the
English fleets made any attack on Dewey, even by com
bined Europe, impossible; and England saw that so
long as the United States was her friend her base on the
235

THE WAR WITH SPAIN
Atlantic was secure, her food-supply safe, and that all
Europe in arms could not harm her. Very plain also
did it become to all men that in the East, where Eng
land had been so long, and where we had just entered,
the interests of both nations were identical in preserv
ing China for equal trade to all.
All these things the war made clear and certain.
What these new conditions may come to mean in the
future no one now can safely say. But if that future
is to bring the struggle which many men peering into
the darkness foresee — a conflict between the Slav and
so much of Europe as he can drag with him on the one
side, and the English-speaking man on the other; be
tween the military socialism of Russia and Germany
and the individualism and freedom of the United States
and England; between the power of the land and the
sea power-^then the future historian will date the open
ing of this new epoch and of this mighty conflict, at
once economic and social, military and naval, from the
war of 1898, which in three months overthrew the em
pire of Spain in the Antilles and the Philippines.

APPENDIX A
resolutions of congress demanding withdrawal
of spain from cuba
Joint resolution for the recognition of the independ
ence of the people of Cuba, demanding that the Gov
ernment of Spain relinquish its authority and govern
ment in the island of Cuba, and to withdraw its land
and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters, and di
recting the President of the United States to use the
land and naval forces of the United States to carry
these resolutions into effect.
Whereas the a;bhorrent conditions which have ex
isted for more than three years in the island of Cuba, so
near our own borders, have shocked the moral sense of
the people of the United States, have been a disgrace
to Christian civilization, culminating as they have, in
the destruction of a United States battle ship, with two
hundred and sixty-six of its officers and crew, while on
a friendly visit in the harbor of Havana, and can not
longer be endured, as has been set forth by the Presi
dent of the United Staites in his message to Congress
of April eleventh, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight,
upon which the action of Congress was invited : There
fore, Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives
of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
237

APPENDIX
First. That the people of the island of Cuba are, and
of right ought to be, free and independent.
Second. That it is the duty of the United States to
demand, and the Government of the United States does
hereby demand, that the Government of Spain at once
reHnquish its authority and government in the island
of Cuba and withdraw its land and naval forces from
Cuba and Cuban waters.
Third. That the President of the United States be,
and he hereby is, directed and empowered to use the
entire land and naval forces of the United States, and
to call into the actual service of the United States the
militia of the several States, to such extent as may be
necessary to carry these resolutions into effect.
Fourth. That the United States hereby disclaims
any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, ju
risdiction, or control over said island except for the
pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when
that is accomplished, to leave the government and con
trol of the island to its people.
Approved, April 20, 1898.
declaration OF WAR.
Chap. 189. — An Act Declaring that war exists be
tween the United States of America and the Kingdom
of Spain.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Represent
atives of the United States of America in Congress
assembled, First. That war be, and the same is hereby,
declared to exist, and that war has existed since the
twenty-first day of April, anno Domini eighteen hun-
238

APPENDIX
dred and ninety-eight, including said day, between the
United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain.
Second. That the President of the United States
be, and he hereby is, directed and empowered to use the
entire land and naval forces of the United States, and
to call into the actual service of the United States the
militia of the several States, to such extent as may be
necessary to carry this act into effect.
Approved, April 25, 1898.

APPENDIX B
proclamation of the president
By the President of the United States of America:
A PROCLAMATION.
Whereas, by a joint resolution passed by the Con
gress and approved April 20, 1898, and communicated
to the Government of Spain, it was demanded that said
Government at once relinquish its authority and gov
ernment in the island of Cuba, and withdraw its land
and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters; and
the President of the United States v/as directed and
empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of
the United States, and to call into the actual service of
the United States the militia of the several States to
such extent as might be necessary to carry said resolu
tion into effect ; and
Whereas, in carrying into effect said resolution, the
President of the United States deems it necessary to
set on foot and maintain a blockade of the north coast
of Cuba, including all ports on said coast between Car
denas and Bahia Honda and the port of Cienfuegos
on the south coast of Cuba :
Now, therefore, I, William McKinley, President of
the United States, in order to enforce the said resolu
tion, do hereby declare and proclaim that the United
240

APPENDIX
States of America have instituted, and will maintain a
blockade of the north coast of Cuba, including ports
on said coast between Cardenas and Bahia Honda and
the port of Cienfuegos on the south coast of Cuba,
aforesaid, in pursuance of the laws of the United States
and the law of nations applicable to such cases. An
efficient force will be posted so as to prevent the en
trance and exit of vessels from the ports aforesaid. Any
neutral vessel approaching any of said ports, or at
tempting to leave the same, without notice or knowl
edge of the establishment of such blockade, will be duly
warned by the commander of the blockading forces,
who will endorse on her register the fact, and the date,
of such warning, where such endorsement was made;
and if the same vessel shall again attempt to enter any
blockaded port, she will be captured and sent to the
nearest convenient port for such proceeding against her
and her cargo as prize, as may be deemed advisable.
Neutral vessels lying in any of said ports at the time
of the establishment of such blockade will be allowed
thirty days to issue therefrom.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand
and caused the seal of the United States to be
affixed. Done at the City of Washington, this 22d day of
April, A. D. 1898, and of the Independence
[seal] of the United States, the one hundred and
twenty-second.
William McKinley.
By the President :
John Sherman,
Secretary of State.
16 241

APPENDIX [No. 5.]
By the President of the United States,
A PROCLAMATION.
Whereas- a joint resolution of Congress was ap
proved on the twentieth day of April, 1898, entitled
"Joint Resolution For the recognition of the independ-
"ence of the people of Cuba, demanding that the Gov-
"ernment of Spain relinquish its authority and govern-
"ment in the island of Cuba, and to withdraw its land
"and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters, and
"directing the President of the United States to use the
"land and naval forces of the United States to carry
"these resolutions into effect," and
Whereas, by an act of Congress entitled "An Act to
"provide for temporarily Increasing the Military Es-
"tablishment of the United States in time of war and
"for other purposes," approved April 22, 1898; the
President is authorized, in order to raise a volunteer
army, to issue his proclamation calling for volunteers to
serve in the army of the United States.
Now, therefore, I, William McKinley, President of
the United States, by virtue of the power vested in me
by the Constitution and the laws, and deeming sufficient
occasion to exist, have thought fit to call forth and
hereby do call forth, volunteers to the aggregate num
ber of 125,000, in order to carry into effect the purpose
of the said Resolution ; the same to be apportioned, as
far as practicable, among the several States and Ter
ritories and the District of Columbia, according to pop-
242

APPENDIX
ulation, and to serve for two years, unless sooner dis
charged. The details for this object will be immedi
ately communicated to the proper authorities through
the War Department.
In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and
caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.
Done at the City of Washington, this twenty-third
day of April, A. D., 1898, and of the Inde-
[seal] pendence of the United States the one hun
dred and twenty-second.
William McKinley.
By the President :
John Sherman,
Secretary of State.

[No. 6.]
By the President of the United States of America,
A PROCLAMATION.
Whereas by an Act of Congress approved April 25,
1898, it is declared that war exists and that war has
existed since the 21st day of April, A. D. 1898, includ
ing said day, between the United States of America and
the Kingdom of Spain ; and
Whereas, it being desirable that such war should be
conducted upon principles in harmony with the present
views of nations and sanctioned by their recent prac
tice, it has already been announced that the policy of
this Government will be not to resort to privateering,
but to adhere to the rules of the Declaration of Paris ;
Now, Therefore, I, William McKinley, President of
243

APPENDIX
the United States of America, by virtue of the power
vested in me by the Constitution and the laws, do here
by declare and proclaim :
I. The neutral flag covers etaemy's goods, with the
exception of contraband of war.
2. Neutral goods, not contraband of war, are not
liable to confiscation under the enemy's flag.
3. Blockades in order to be binding must be effec
tive. 4. Spanish merchant vessels, in any ports or places
within the United States, shall be allowed till May
21, 1898, inclusive, for loading their cargoes and de
parting from such ports or places; and such Spanish
merchant vessels, if met at sea by any United States
ship, shall be permitted to continue their voyage, if, on
examination of their papers, it shall appear that their
cargoes were taken on board before the expiration of
the above term; Provided, that nothing herein con
tained shall apply to Spanish vessels having on board
any officer in the military or naval service of the enemy,
or any coal (except such as may be necessary for their
voyage), or any other article prohibited or contraband
of war, or any despatch of or to the Spanish Govern
ment. 5. Any Spanish merchant vessel which, prior to
April 21, 1898, shall have sailed from any foreign port
bound for any port or place in the United States, shall
be permitted to enter such port or place, and to dis
charge her cargo, and afterward forthwith to depart
without molestation ; and any such vessel, if met at sea
by any United States ship, shall be permitted to con
tinue her voyage to any port not blockaded.
244

APPENDIX
6. The right of search is to be exercised with strict
regard for the rights of neutrals, and the voyages of
mail steamers are not to be interfered with except on
the clearest grounds of suspicion of a violation of law
in respect of contraband or blockade.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and
caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.
Done at the City of Washington, on the twenty-sixth
day of April, in the year of .our Lord one
thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight,
[seal] and of the Independence of the United
States the one hundred and twenty-second.
William McKinley.
By the President :
Alvey a. Adee,
Acting Secretary of State.

By the President of the United States,
A PROCLAMATION.
Whereas an Act of Congress was approved on the
twenty-fifth day of April, 1898, entitled "An Act De
claring that war exists between the United States of
America and the Kingdom of Spain," and
Whereas, by an Act of Congress entitled "An Act to
provide for temporarily increasing the Military Estab
lishment of the United States in time of war and for
other purposes," approved April 22, 1898; the Presi
dent is authorized, in order to raise a volunteer army,
to issue his proclamation calling for volunteers to serve
in the army of the United States.
245

APPENDIX
Now, Therefore, I, William McKinley, President of
the United States, by virtue of the power vested in me
by the Constitution and the laws, and deeming sufficient
occasion to exist, have thought fit to call forth and
hereby do call forth, volunteers to the aggregate num
ber of 75,000 in addition to the volunteers called forth
by my proclamation of the twenty-third of April, in the
present year ; the same to be apportioned, as far as prac
ticable, among the several States and Territories and
the District of Columbia, according to population, and
to serve for two years, unless sooner discharged. The
proportion of each arm and the details of enlistment
and organization will be made known through the War
Department. In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and
caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.
Done at the City of Washington, this twenty-fifth
day of May, in the year of our Lord one
thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight,
[seal] and of the Independence of the United
States the one hundred and twenty-second.
William McKinley.
By the President :
William R. Day,
Secretary of State.

By the President of the United States of America,
A PROCLAMATION.
Whereas, for the reasons set forth in my Proclama
tion of April 22, 1898, a blockade of the ports on the
246

APPENDIX
northern coast of Cuba, from Cardenas to Bahia
Honda, inclusive, and of the port of Cienfuegos, on the
south coast of Cuba, was declared to have been insti
tuted ; and
Whereas, it has become desirable to extend the
blockade to other Spanish ports :
Now, Therefore, I, William McKinley, President of
the United States, do hereby declare and proclaim that,
in addition to the blockade of the ports specified in my
Proclamation of April 22, 1898, the United States of
America has instituted and will maintain an effective
blockade of all the ports on the south coast of Cuba,
from Cape Frances to Cape Cruz, inclusive, and also of
the port of San Juan, in the island of Porto Rico.
Neutral vessels lying in any of the ports to which the
blockade is by the present Proclamation extended, will
be allowed thirty days to issue therefrom, with cargo.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand,
and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.
Done at the City of Washington, this twenty-seventh
day of June, A. D., 1898, and of the Inde-
[seal] pendence of the United States the one hun
dred and twenty-second.
William McKinley.
By the President :
J. B. Moore,
Acting Secretary of State.

APPENDIX C
peace PROTOCOL OF AUGUST 12, 1898, AND CORRES
pondence. Message OF the
Government of H. M. the Queen Regent of
Spain, Submitted by H. Exc. Mr. J. Cambon,
Ambassador of the French Republic, to Wil
liam McKinley, President of the United
States of America. Madrid, fuly 22, i8p8.
Mr. President:
Since three months the American people and the
Spanish nation are at war because Spain did not con
sent to grant independence to Cuba and to withdraw
her troops therefrom.
Spain faced with resignation such uneven strife, and
only endeavored to defend her possessions with no
other hope than to oppose, in the measure of her
strength, the undertaking of the United States, and to
protect her honor.
Neither the trials which adversity has made us en
dure nor the realization that but faint hope is left us
could deter us from struggling till the exhaustion of
our very last resources. This stout purpose, however,
248

APPENDIX
does not blind us, and we are fully aware of the re
sponsibilities which would weigh upon both nations in
the eyes of the civilized world were this war to be con
tinued. This war not only inflicts upon the two peoples who
wage it the hardships inseparable from all armed con
flict, but also dooms to useless suffering and unjust sac
rifices the inhabitants of a territory to which Spain is
bound by secular ties that can be forgotten by no nation
either of the old or of the new world.
To end calamities already so great and to avert evils
still greater, our countries might naturally endeavor to
find upon which conditions the present struggle could
be determined otherwise than by force of arms.
Spain believes this undersitanding possible, and
hopes that this view is also harbored by the Govern
ment of the United States. All true friends of both
nations share no doubt the same hopes.
Spain wishes to show again that in this war, as well
as in the one she carried on against the Cuban insur
gents, she had but one object : the vindication of her
prestige, her honor, her name. During the war of in
surrection it was her desire to spare the great island
from the dangers of premature independence; in the
present war she has been actuated by sentiments in
spired rather by ties of blood than by her interests and
by the rights belonging to her as mother country.
Spain is prepared to spare Cuba from the continua
tion of the horrors of war if the United States are, on
their part, likewise disposed.
The President of the United States and the Ameri
can people may now learn from this message the
249

APPENDIX
true thought, desire, and intention of the Spanish na
tion. And so do we wish to learn from the President of
the United States upon which basis might be estab
lished a political status in Cuba and might be termi
nated a strife which would continue without reason
should both Governments agree upon the means of paci
fying the island.
In the name of the Government of H. M. the Queen
Regent I have the honor to address this message to
your excellency, with the expression of my highest
consideration. Due d' Almodovar del rio,
Ministre d'Etat.

Department of State,
Washington, fuly jo, i8p8.
Excellency :
The President received on the afternoon of Tues
day, the 26th instant, from the hand of his excellency
the Ambassador of France, representing for this pur
pose the Government of Spain, the message signed by
your excellency as minister of state in behalf of the
Government of Her Majesty the Queen Regent of
Spain, and dated the 22d instant, as to the possibility
of terminating the war now existing between the
United States and Spain.
The President received with satisfaction the sugges
tion that the two countries might mutually endeavor to
ascertain the conditions on which the pending strug
gle may be brought to an end, as well as the expres-
250

APPENDIX
sion of Spain's belief that an understanding on the sub
ject is possible.
During the protracted negotiations that preceded the
outbreak of hostilities the President earnestly labored
to avert a conflict, in the hope that Spain, in considera
tion of her own interests, as well as those of the Span
ish Antilles and the United States, would find a way
of removing the conditions which had, for half a cen
tury, constantly disturbed the peace of the Western
Hemisphere and on numerous occasions brought the
two nations to the verge of war.
The President witnessed with profound disappoint
ment the frustration of his peaceful efforts by events
which forced upon the people of the United States the
unalterable conviction that nothing short of the re
linquishment by Spain of a claim of sovereignty over
Cuba which she was unable to enforce would relieve a
situation that had become unendurable.
For years the Govei'nment of the United States, out
of regard for the susceptibilities of Spain, had by the
exercise of its power and the expenditure of its treasure
preserved the obligations of neutrality. But a point
was at length reached at which, as Spain had often been
forewarned, this attitude could no longer be maintained.
The spectacle at our very doors of a fertile terri
tory wasted by fire and sword, and given over to deso
lation and famine, was one to which our people could
not be indifferent. Yielding, therefore, to the demands
of humanity, they determined to remove the causes in
the effects of which they had become so deeply involved.
To this end the President, with the authority of Con
gress, presented to Spain a demand for the withdrawal
251

APPENDIX
of her land and naval forces from Cuba, in order that
the people of the island might be enabled to form a
government of their own. To this demand Spain re
plied by severing diplomatic relations with the United
States, and by declaring that she considered the action
of this Government as creating a state of war between
the two countries.
The President could not but feel sincere regret that
the local question as to the peace and good government
of Cuba should thus have been transformed and en
larged into a general conflict of arms between two great
peoples. Nevertheless, having accepted the issue with
all the hazards which it involved, he has, in the exercise
of his duty, and of the rights which the state of war
confers, prosecuted hostilities by land and sea, in order
to secure at the earliest possible moment an honorable
peace. In so doing he has been compelled to avail
himself unsparingly of the lives and fortunes which his
countrymen have placed at his command; and untold
burdens and sacrifices, far transcending any material
estimation, have been imposed upon them.
That as the result of the patriotic exertions of the
people of the United States the strife has, as your ex
cellency observes, proved unequal, inclines the Presi
dent to offer a brave adversary generous terms of
peace. The President therefore responding to your excel
lency's request, will state the terms of peace which will
be accepted by him at the present time, subject to the
approval of the Senate of the United States hereafter.
Your excellency in discussing the question of Cuba
intimates that Spain has desired to spare the island the
252

APPENDIX
dangers of premature independence. The Government
of the United States has not shared the apprehensions
of Spain in this regard, but it recognizes the fact that
in the distracted and prostrate condition of the island,
aid and guidance will be necessary, and these it is pre
pared to give.
The United States will require:
First. The relinquishment by Spain of all claim of
sovereignty over or title to Cuba and her immediate
evacuation of the island.
Second. The President, desirous of exhibiting sig
nal generosity, will not now put forward any danand
for pecuniary indemnity. Nevertheless he cannot be
insensible to the losses and expenses of the United
States incident to the war or to the claims of our citi
zens for injuries to their persons and property during
the late insurrection in Cuba. He must, therefore, re
quire the cession to the United States and the imme
diate evacuation by Spain of the island of Porto Rico
and other islands now under the sovereignty of Spain
in the West Indies, and also the cession of an is
land in the Ladrones, to be selected by the United
States. Third. On similar grounds the United States is en
titled to occupy and will hold the city, bay, and harbor
of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace
which shall determine the control, disposition, and
government of the Philippines.
If the terms hereby offered are accepted in their en
tirety commissioners will be named by the United
States to meet similarly authorized commissioners on
the part of Spain for the purpose of settling the de-
253

APPENDIX
tails of the treaty of peace and signing and delivering
it under the terms above indicated.
I avail myself of this occasion to offer to your excel
lency the assurances of my highest consideration.
William R. Day.
His Excellency the Duke of Almodovar del Rio,
Minister of State, etc.

Message of His Excellency the Duke of Almo
dovar Del Rio, Minister of State of Spain, Sub
mitted BY His Excellency Mr. J. Cambon, Am
bassador of the French Republic, to Honor
able William R. Day, Secretary of State of
THE United States. [Translation.] Madrid, August ph, i8p8.
Mr. Secretary of State :
The French ambassador at Washington, whose good
offices have enabled the Spanish Government to address
a message to the President of the United States, has
forwarded by cable your excellency's reply to this doc
ument. In examining the arguments used as a preamble to
the specification of the terms upon which peace may
be restored between Spain and the United States, it
behooves the Spanish Government to deduct from the
order of events that the severance of diplomatic rela
tions with the United States had no other purpose than
254

APPENDIX
to decline the acceptance of an ultimatum which Spain
could only consider as an attempt against her rightful
sovereignty over Cuba.
Spain did not declare war ; she met it because it was
the only means of defending her rights in the Greater
Antilles. Thus did the Queen and the United States
see fit to transform and enlarge the purely local ques
tion of Cuba.
From this fact your excellency draws the conclusion
that the question at stake is no longer only the one
which relates to the territory of Cuba, but also that the
losses of American lives and fortunes incident to the
war should in some manner be compensated.
As to the first condition, relating to the future of
Cuba, the two Governments reach similar conclusions
in regard to the natural inability of its people to es
tablish an independent government ; be it by reason of
inadequate development, as we believe, or on account
of the present distracted and prostrate condition of the
island, as your excellency states, the fact remains that
Cuba needs guidance. The American people are will
ing to assume the responsibility of giving this guidance
by substituting themselves to the Spanish nation, whose
right to keep the island is indisputable; to this intima
tion we have nothing to oppose. The necessity of with
drawing from the territory of Cuba being imperative,
the nation assuming Spain's place must, as long as this
territory shall not have fully reached the conditions
required to take rank among other sovereign powers,
provide for rules which will insure order and protect
against all risks the Spanish residents, as well as the
Cuban natives still loyal to the mother country.
255

APPENDIX
In the name of the nation the Spanish Government
hereby relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over or
title to Cuba, and engages to the irremeable evacua
tion of the island, subject to the approval of the Cortes
— a reserve which we likewise make with regard to the
other proffered terms — ^just as these terms will have
to be ultimately approved by the Senate of the United
States. The United States require, as an indemnity for or
an equivalent to the sacrifices they have borne during
this short war, the cession of Porto Rico and of the
other islands now under the sovereignty of Spain in
the West Indies, and also the cession of an island in
the Ladrones, to be selected by the Federal Govern
ment. This demand strips us of the very last memory of
a glorious past, and expels us at once from the pros
perous island of Porto Rico and from the Western
Hemisphere, which became peopled and civilized
through the proud deeds of our ancestors. It might,
perhaps, have been possible to compensate by some
other cession for the injuries sustained by the United
States. However, the inflexibility of the demand
obliges us to cede, and we shall cede, the island of Porto
Rico and the other islands belonging to the Crown of
Spain in the West Indies, together with one of the
islands of the archipelago of the Ladrones, to be se
lected by the American Government.
The terms relating to the Philippines seem, to our
understanding, to be quite indefinite. On the one hand,
the ground on which the United States believe them
selves entitled to occupy the bay, the harbor, and the
256

APPENDIX
city of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of
peace, can not be that of conquest, since in spite of the
blockade maintained on sea by the American fleet,
in spite of the siege established on land by a native
supported and provided for by the American admiral,
Manila still holds its own, and the Spanish standard
still waves over the city. On the other hand, the whole
archipelago of the Philippines is in the power and under
the sovereignty of Spain. Therefore the Government
of Spain thinks that the temporary occupation of Ma
nila should constitute a guaranty. It is stated that
the treaty of peace shall determine the control, dispo
sition, and government of the Philippines; but as the
intentions of the Federal Government by regression
remain veiled, therefore the Spanish Government must
declare that, while accepting the third condition, they
do not a priori renounce the sovereignty of Spain over
the archipelago, leaving it to the negotiators to agree
as to such reforms which the condition of these posses
sions and the level of culture of their natives may ren
der desirable.
The Government of Her Majesty accepts the third
condition, with the above mentioned declarations.
Such are the statements and observations which the
Spanish Government has the honor to submit in reply
to your excellency's communication. They accept the
proffered terms, subject to the approval of the Cortes
i)i the Kingdom, as required by their constitutional
duties. The agreement between the two Governments im
plies the irremeable suspension of hostilities and the
designation of commissioners for the purpose of set-
17 257

APPENDIX
tling the details of the treaty of peace and of signing
it, under the terms above indicated.
I avail myself of this occasion to offer to your excel
lency the assurances of my highest consideration.
Almodovar del Rio.

Department of State,
Washington, August lo, i8p8.
Excellency :
Although it is your understanding that the note of
the Duke of Almodovar, which you left with the Presi
dent on yesterday afternoon, is intended to convey an
acceptance by the Spanish Government of the terms
set forth in my note of the 30th ultimo as the basis on
which the President would appoint commissioners to
negotiate and conclude with commissioners on the
part of Spain a treaty of peace, I understand that
we concur in the opinion that the Duke's note, doubt
less owing to the various transformations which it has
undergone in the course of its circuitous transmission
by telegraph and in cipher, is not, in the form in which
it has reached the hands of the President, entirely ex
plicit. Under these circumstances it is thought that the
most direct and certain way of avoiding misunder
standing is to embody in a protocol, to be si,gned by
us as the representatives, respectively, of the United
States and Spain, the terms on which the negotiations
for peace are to be undertaken.
I therefore inclose herewith a draft of such a proto-
258

APPENDIX
col, in which you will find that I have embodied the
precise terms tendered to Spain in my note of the
30th ultimo, together with appropriate stipulations for
the appointment of commissioners to arrange the de
tails of the immediate evacuation of Cuba, Porto Rico,
and other islands under Spanish sovereignty in the
West Indies, as well as for the appointment of com
missioners to treat of peace.
Accept, excellency, the renewed assurances of my
highest consideration.
William R. Day.
His Excellency M. Jules Cambon, etc.

PROTOCOL.

William R. Day, Secretary of State of the United
States, and His Excellency Jules Cambon, ambassador
extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Republic of
France at Washington, respectively possessing for this
purpose full authority from the Government of the
United States and the Government of Spain, have con
cluded and signed the following articles, embodying
the terms on which the two Governments have agreed
in respect to the matters hereinafter set forth, having
in view the establishment of peace between the two
countries, that is to say :
Article i. Spain will relinquish all claim of sover
eignty over or title to Cuba.
Article 2. Spain will cede to the United States the
island of Porto Rico and other islands now under Span-
259

APPENDIX
ish sovereignty in the West Indies, and also an Island
in the Ladrones, to be selected by the United States.
Article 3. The United States will occupy and hold
the city, bay, and harbor of Manila pending the con
clusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the
control, disposition, and government of the Philippines.
Article 4. Spain will immediately evacuate Cuba,
Porto Rico, and other islands under Spanish sover
eignty in the West Indies; and to this end each Gov
ernment will, within ten days after the signing of this
protocol, appoint commissioners, and the commissioners
so appointed shall, within thirty days after the signing
of this protocol, meet at Havana for the purpose of
arranging and carrying out the details of the aforesaid
evacuation of Cuba and the adjacent Spanish islands;
and each Government will, within ten days after the
signing of this protocol, also appoint other commis
sioners, who shall, within thirty days after the signing
of this protocol, meet at San Juan, in Porto Rico, for
the purpose of arranging and carrying out the details
of the aforesaid evacuation of Porto Rico and other
islands under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies.
Article 5. The United States and Spain will each
appoint not more than five commissioners to treat of
peace, and the commissioners so appointed shall meet
at Paris not later than October i, 1898, and proceed
to the negotiation and conclusion of a treaty of peace,
which treaty shall be subject to ratification according
to the respective constitutional forms of the two coun
tries. Article 6. Upon the conclusion and signing of this
protocol hostilities between the two countries shall be
260

APPENDIX
suspended, and notice to that effect shall be given as
soon as possible by each Government to the com
manders of its military and naval forces.
[Signed at Washington, August 12, 1898. J

Department of State,
Washington, August 10, i8p8
Excellency :
I have the honor to say, as I assured you orally this
morning, that upon the suspension of hostilities be
tween the United States and Spain, as the result of the
signing and sealing of the protocol upon the terms of
which we have agreed, it is the purpose of this Govern
ment to take prompt and efficient means to aid the in
troduction of food supplies into the ports of Cuba.
Accept, excellency, the renewed assurances of my
highest consideration.
William R. Day. ,
His Excellency Mr. Jules Cambon, etc.

William R. Day,
Secretary of State:
You are hereby authorized to sign, on the part of
the United States, the protocol of this date embody
ing the terms on which the United States and Spain
have agreed to treat of peace.
William McKinley.
Executive Mansion,
Washington, August 12, i8g8.
261

APPENDIX
[Translation.]
Embassy of the French Republic
IN THE United States,
Washington, August 12, i8p8.
Mr. Secretary of State : I have the honor to in
form you that I have just received, through the inter
mediation of the department of foreign affairs at Paris,
a telegram, dated Madrid, August 11, in which the
Duke of Almodovar del Rio announces to me that, by
order of Her Majesty the Queen Regent, the Spanish
Government confers upon me full powers in order that
I may sign, without other formality and without delay,
the protocol whereof the terms have been drawn up by
common accord between you and me. The instrument
destined to make regular the powers which are thus
given to me by telegraph will be subsequently addressed
to me by the post.
His excellency the minister of state adds that in ac
cepting this protocol and by reason of the suspension
of hostilities which will be the immediate consequence
of that acceptance, the Spanish Government has pleas
ure in hoping that the Government of the United States
will take the necessary measures with a view to re
strain (empecher) all aggression on the part of the
Cuban separatist forces.
The Government of the Republic having, on the other
hand, authorized me to accept the powers which are
conferred upon me by the Spanish Government, I shall
hold myself at your disposition to sign the protocol at
the hour you may be pleased to designate.
262

APPENDIX
Congratulating myself upon thus cooperating with
you toward the restoration of peace between two na
tions, both friends of France, I beg you to accept, Mr.
Secretary of State, the fresh "assurances of my very
high consideration.
Jules Cambon.
Hon. William R. Day,
Secretary of State of the United States, etc., Wash
ington.

No. 94.] Department of State,
Washington, August 75, i8p8.
Excellency : I have the honor to make formal ac
knowledgement of the note you addressed to me, un
der date of the 12th instant, informing me of your re
ceipt, through the medium of the department of foreign
affairs at Paris, of a telegram, dated Madrid, August
II, in which the Duke of Almodovar del Rio, minister
of state of Spain, by order of Her Majesty the Queen
Regent, conferred upon you full powers to sign, with
out other formality and without delay, the protocol al
ready drawn up by you and me, leaving the documen
tary confirmation of your said full powers to follow by
mail ; and adding that, the Government of the Republic
having authorized you to accept the powers so con
ferred upon you by the Spanish Government, you were
ready to sign the protocol at such time as I might des
ignate. The signing of the protocol on the afternoon of the
1 2th instant by you and me, in the presence of the Pres
ident, followed by the immediate action of the Presi
dent in issuing his proclamation suspending hostilities,
263

APPENDIX
in accordance with the appropriate stipulation of that
protocol, testified in a most gratifying manner the full
recognition by this Government of the powers con
ferred upon you, and, I am glad to believe, marked the
first and most effective step toward the happy restora
tion of peace between the United States and Spain. It
is especially gratifying to the President and to this Gov
ernment that you, as the honored representative of the
French Republic, allied to our American commonwealth
by the unbroken ties of more than a century of close
friendship and to the Kingdom of Spain by propinquity
and intimate association, should have been thus instru
mental in contributing to this auspicious result.
Referring to the observation contained in your note
relative to the internal order of Cuba during the sus
pension of hostilities, I may remark that the forces of
the United States, in proportion as they occupy Cuban
territory in the course of the evacuation thereof by
Spain and its delivery to the arms of the United States
under the terms of the protocol, will, it is believed, be
adequate to preserve peace and order, and no doubt is
entertained of their ability to restrain any possible in
jury to the inhabitants of the island in the country
which shall by degrees come under their control.
Be pleased, Mr. Ambassador, to accept the renewed
assurances of my highest consideration.
William R. Day.

[Translation.]
The French ambassador, referring to his communica
tion of the 1 2th instant, has the honor to inform the
264

APPENDIX
Secretary of State of the United States, that he has just
received, through the department of foreign affairs at
Paris, the full powers which had been conferred upon
him, in the name of the King of Spain, by Her Majesty
the Queen Regent, to enable him to sign the preliminary
protocol of the negotiations for the establishment of
peace between Spain and the United States.
Mr. J. Cambon requests the Flon. William R. Day to
please to find inclosed the said document, and avails
himself of the occasion to renew the assurances of his
highest consideration.
Washington, August so, i8p8.
Hon. Wm. R. Day,
Secretary of State of the United States, etc., Wash
ington.

[Translation.]
DON ALFONSO XIII
by the grace of god and the constitution, king
OF SPAIN, and in his NAME AND DURING HIS MINOR
ITY. DONA MARIA CRISTINA,
QUEEN REGENT OF THE KINGDOM.
Whereas it has become necessary to negotiate and
sign at Washington a protocol in which the prelimina
ries of peace between Spain and the United States of
America shall be settled, and as it is necessary for me
to empower for that purpose a person possessing the
265

APPENDIX
requisite qualifications : Therefore, I have decided to
select, after procuring the consent of His Excellency
the President of the French Republic, you, Don Julio
Cambon, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary
of the French Republic in the United States of Amer
ica, as I do, by these presents, select and appoint you
to proceed, invested with the character of my plenipo
tentiary to negotiate and sign with the plenipotentiary
whom His Excellency the President of the United
States of America may designate for that purpose the
aforesaid protocol. And I declare, from the present
moment, all that you may agree upon, negotiate,
and sign in the execution of this commission ac
ceptable and valid, and I will observe it and exe
cute it, and will cause it to be observed and exe
cuted as if it had been done by myself, for which
I give you my whole full powers in the most am
ple form required by law. In witness whereof I
have caused these presents to be issued, signed by my
hand, duly sealed and countersigned by the under
signed, my minister of state. Given in the palace at
Madrid, August ii, 1898. [l. s.] Maria Cristina.
Juan Manuel SancheZ y Gutierrez de Castro
Minister of State.

° i

APPENDIX D

the treaty of peace

The United States of America and Her Maj
esty the Queen Regent of Spain, in the Name of
Her August Son Don Alfonso XIII, desiring to end
the state of war now existing between the two coun
tries, have for that purpose appointed as Plenipotentia
ries:
The President of the United States,
William R. Day, Cushman K. Davis, William
P. Frye, George Gray, and Whitelaw Reid, citizens
of the United States ;
And Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain,
Don Eugenio Montero Rios, President of the Sen
ate, Don Buenaventura de Abarzuza, Senator of
the Kingdom and ex-Minister of the Crown, Don Jose
de Garnica, Deputy to the Cortes and Associate Jus
tice of the Supreme Court, Don Wenceslao Ramirez
de Villa-Urrutia, Envoy Extraordinary and Minis
ter Plenipotentiary at Brussels, and Don Rafael Ce
rero, General of Division :
Who, having assembled in Paris, and having ex
changed their full powers, which were found to be in
due and proper form, have, after discussion of the
matters before them, agreed upon the following ar
ticles : 267

APPENDIX Article I
Spain relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over and
title to Cuba.
And as the island is, upon its evacuation by Spain, to
be occupied by the United States, the United States
will, so long as such occupation shall last, assume and
discharge the obligations that may under international
law result from the fact of its occupation, for the pro
tection of life and property. Article II
Spain cedes to the United States the island of Porto
Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty
in the West Indies, and the island of Guam in the Ma
rianas or Ladrones. Article III
Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago
known as the Philippine islands, and comprehending
the islands lying within the following line :
A line running from west to east along or near the
twentieth parallel of north latitude, and through the
middle of the navigable channel of Bachi, from the one
hundred and eighteenth (ii8th) to the one hundred
and twenty-seventh (127th) degree meridian of longi
tude east of Greenwich, thence along the one hundred
and twenty-seventh (127th) degree meridian of longi
tude east of Greenwich to the parallel of four degrees
and forty-five minutes (4° 45') north latitude, thence
along the parallel of four degrees and forty-five minutes
(4° 45') north latitude to its intersection with the me
ridian of longitude one hundred and nineteen degrees
268

APPENDIX
and thirty-five minutes (119° 35') east of Greenwich,
thence along the meridian of longitude one hundred
and nineteen degrees and thirty-five minutes ( 1 19° 35')
east of Greenwich to the parallel of latitude seven de
grees and forty minutes (7° 40') north, thence along
the parallel of latitude seven degrees and forty minutes
(7° 40') north to its intersection with the one hundred
and sixteenth (ii6th) degree meridian of longitude
east of Greenwich, thence by a direct line to the inter
section of the tenth (loth) degree parallel of north
latitude with the one hundred and eighteenth (ii8th)
degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, and
thence along the one hundred and eighteenth (ii8th)
degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich to the
point of beginning.
The United States will pay to Spain the sum of
twenty million dollars ($20,000,000), within three
months after the exchange of the ratifications of the
present treaty. Article IV
The United States will, for the term of ten years
from date of the exchange of the ratifications of the
present treaty, admit Spanish ships and merchandise
to the ports of the Philippine islands on the same terms
as ships and merchandise of the United States.
Article V
The United States will, upon the signature of the
present treaty, send back to Spain, at its own cost the
Spanish soldiers taken as prisoners of war on the cap
ture of Manila by the American forces. The arms of
the soldiers in question shall be restored to them.
269

APPENDIX
Spain will, upon the exchange of the ratifications of
the present treaty, proceed to evacuate the Philippines,
as well as the island of Guam, on terms similar to those
agreed upon by the Commissioners appointed to ar
range for the evacuation of Porto Rico and other is
lands in the West Indies, under the protocol of August
12, 1898, which is to continue in force till its provi
sions are completely executed.
The time within which the evacuation of the Phil
ippine islands and Guam shall be completed shall be
fixed by the two Governments. Stands of colors, un-
captured war vessels, small arms, guns of all calibres,
with their carriages and accessories, powder, ammuni
tion, livestock, and materials and supplies of all kinds,
belonging to the land and naval forces of Spain in the
Philippines and Guam, remain the property of Spain.
Pieces of heavy ordnance, exclusive of field artillery,
in the fortifications and coast defences, shall remain in
their emplacements for the term of six months, to be
reckoned from the exchange of ratifications of the
treaty; and the United States may, in the meantime,
purchase such material from Spain, if a satisfactory
agreement between the two Governments on the subject
shall be reached. Article VI
Spain will, upon the signature of the present treaty,
release all prisoners of war, and all persons detained
or imprisoned for political offences, in connection with
the insurrections in Cuba and the Philippines and the
war with the United States.
Reciprocally, the United States will release all per
sons made prisoners of war by the American forces,
270

APPENDIX
and will undertake to obtain the release of all Spanish
prisoners in the hands of the insurgents in Cuba and
the Philippines.
The Government of the United States will at its own
cost return to Spain and the Government of Spain will
at its own cost return to the United States, Cuba, Porto
Rico, and the Philippines, according to the situation
of their respective homes, prisoners released or caused
to be released by them, respectively, under this article.
Article VII
The United States and Spain mutually relinquish all
claims for indemnity, national and individual, of every
kind, of either Government, or of its citizens or sub
jects, against the other Government, that may have
arisen since the beginning of the late insurrection in
Cuba and prior to the exchange of ratifications of the
present treaty, including all claims for indemnity for
the cost of the war.
The United States will -, adjudicate and settle the
claims of its citizens against Spain relinquished in this
article. Article VIII
In conformity with the provisions of Articles I, II,
and III of this treaty, Spain relinquishes in Cuba, and
cedes in Porto Rico and other islands in the West In
dies, in the island of Guam, and in the Philippine Ar
chipelago, all the buildings, wharves, barracks, forts,
structures, public highways and other immovable prop
erty which, in conformity with law, belong to the pub
lic domain, and as such belong to the Crown of Spain.
And it is hereby declared that the relinquishment or
271

APPENDIX
cession, as the case may be, to which the preceding par
agraph refers, cannot in any respect impair the property
or rights which by law belong to the peaceful posses
sion of property of all kinds, of provinces, municipali
ties, public or private establishments, ecclesiastical or
civic bodies, or any other associations having legal ca
pacity to acquire and possess property in the aforesaid
territories renounced or ceded, or of private individ
uals, of whatsoever nationality such individuals may
be. The aforesaid relinquishment or cession, as the case
may be, includes all documents exclusively referring
to the sovereignty relinquished or ceded that may ex
ist in the archives of the Peninsula. Where any docu
ment in such archives only in part relates to said sov
ereignty, a copy of such part will be furnished when
ever it shall be requested. Like rules shall be recipro
cally observed in favor of Spain in respect of docu
ments in the archives of the islands above referred to.
In the aforesaid relinquishment or cession, as the
case ma^ be, are also included such rights as the Crown
of Spain and its authorities possess in respect of the of
ficial archives and records, executive as well as judicial,
in the islands above referred to, which relate to said
islands or the rights and property of their inhabitants.
Such archives and records shall be carefully preserved,
and private persons shall without distinction have the
right to require, in accordance with law, authenticated
copies of the contracts, wills and other instruments
forming part of notarial protocols or files, or which
may be contained in the executive or judicial archives,
be the latter in Spain or in the islands aforesaid.
272

APPENDIX

Article IX

Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing
in the territory over which Spain by the present treaty
relinquishes or cedes her soverei'gnty, may remain in
such territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in
either event all their rights of property, including the
right to sell or dispose of such property or of its pro
ceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry on
their industry, commerce and professions, being subject
in respect thereof to such laws as are applicable to other
foreigners. In case they remain in the territory they
may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain
by making, before a court of record, within a year from
the date of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty,
a declaration of their decision to preserve such allegi
ance ; in default of which declaration they shall be held
to have renounced it and to have adopted the national
ity of the territory in which they may reside.
The civil rights and political status of the native in
habitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United
States shall be determined by the Congress.
Article X
The inhabitants of the territories over which Spain
relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty shall be secured
in the free exercise of their religion.
Article XI
The Spaniards residing in the territories over which
Spain by this treaty cedes or relinquishes her sover
eignty shall be subject in matters civil as well as crim-
273

APPENDIX
inal to the jurisdiction of the courts of the country
wherein they reside, pursuant to the ordinary laws gov
erning the same; and they shall have the right to ap
pear before such courts, and to pursue the same course
as citizens of the country to which the courts belong.
Article XII
Judicial proceedings pending at the time of the ex
change of ratifications of this treaty in the territories
over which Spain relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty
shall be determined according to the following rules :
I. Judgments rendered either in civil suits between
private individuals, or in criminal matters, before the
date mentioned, and with respect to which there is no
recourse or right of review under the Spanish law,
shall be deemed to be final, and shall be executed in due
form by competent authority in the territory within
which such judgments should be carried out.
2. Civil suits between private individuals which
may on the date mentioned be undetermined shall be
prosecuted to judgment before the court in which they
may then be pending or in the court that may be sub
stituted therefor.
3. Criminal actions pending on the date mentioned
before the Supreme Court of Spain against citizens of
the territory which by this treaty ceases to be Spanish
shall continue under its jurisdiction until final judg
ment; but, such judgment having been rendered, the
execution thereof shall be committed to the competent
authority of the place in which the case arose.

274

APPENDIX
Article XIII
The rights of property secured by copyrights and
'patents acquired by Spaniards in the island of Cuba,
and in Porto Rico, the Philippines and other ceded ter
ritories, at the time of the exchange of the ratifications
of this treaty, shall continue to be respected. Spanish
scientific, literary and artistic works, not subversive of
public Older in the territories in question, shall continue
to be admitted free of duty into such territories, for the
period of ten years, to be reckoned from the date of the
exchange of the ratifications of this treaty.
Article XIV
Spain shall have the power to establish consular of
ficers in the ports and places of the territories, the sov
ereignty over which has been either relinquished or
ceded by the present treaty.
Article XV
The Government of each country will, for the term
of ten years, accord to the merchant vessels of the other
country the same treatment in respect of all port
charges, including entrance and clearance dues, light
dues, and tonnage duties, as it accords to its own mer
chant vessels, not engaged in the coastwise trade.
This article may at any time be terminated on six
months' notice given by either Government to the other.
Article XVI
It is understood that any obligations assumed in this
treaty by the United States with respect to Cuba are
275

APPENDIX
limited to the time of its occupancy thereof ; but it will
upon the termination of such occupancy, advise any
Government established in the island to assume the
same obligations. Article XVII
The present treaty shall be ratified by the President
of the United States, by and with the advice and con
sent of the Senate thereof, and by Her Majesty the
Queen Regent of Spain; and the ratifications shall be
exchanged at Washington within six months from the
date thereof, or earlier if possible.
In faith whereof, we, the respective Plenipotentia
ries, have signed this treaty and have hereunto affixed
our seals.
Done in duplicate at Paris, the tenth day of Decem
ber, in the year of Our Lord one thousand eight hun
dred and ninety-eight.
[seal] William R. Day,
[seal] Cushman K. Davis,
[seal] William P. Frye,
[seal] Geo. Gray,
[seal] Whitelaw Reid.
Hecho por duplicado en Paris a diez de Diciembre
del ano mil ochocientos noventa y ocho.
[seal] Eugenio Montero Rios,
[seal] B. de Abarzuza,
[seal] j. de Garnica,
[SKAL] W. R. DE Villa Urrutia,
[seal] Rafael Cerero.
276