YALE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY BUTLER'S WORKS GLADSTONE VOL. I. Jionfcott HENRY FROWDE Oxford University Press Warehouse Amen Corner, E.C. Q1m» ?)orft MACMILLAN & CO., 66 FIFTH AVENUE THE WORKS OF JOSEPH BUTLER, D.C.L. SOMETIME LORD BISHOP OF DURHAM ~\ DIVIDED INTO SECTIONS ) WITH SECTIONAL HEADINGS AN INDEX TO EACH VOLUME ; AND SOME OCCASIONAL NOTES ALSO PREFATORY MATTER EDITED BY THE RIGHT HON. W. E. GLADSTONE Cuius sacra fero ingenti perculsus amore IN TWO VOLUMES VOL. I: ANALOGY, ETC. AT THE CLARENDON .PRESS 1896 ©jfotb PRINTED AT THE CLARENDON PRESS BY HORACE HART, PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION . NATURAL AND REVEALED I'D THE CONSTITUTION AND COURSE OF NATURE TO WHICH ARE ADDED TWO BRIEF DISSERTATIONS I. OF PERSONAL IDENTITY ; II. OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUK AND A CORRESPONDENCE WITH DR. SAMUEL CLARKE BY JOSEPH BUTLER, D.C.L. SOMETIME F.ORD BISHOP OF DURHAM EDITED BY THE RIGHT HON. W. E. GLADSTONE AT THE CLARENDON PRESS 1896 EDITOR'S PREFACE THE purpose with which this edition of Bishop Butler's Works is published, is to give readier access to the substance and meaning of those works than the student has heretofore enjoyed. The reasons why such access should be afforded, and that in the largest possible degree, are too wide for statement in a Preface, and will perhaps be sufficiently understood from a collection of Essays which is meant promptly to follow the present publication. But it will be well to set forth the means which have been adopted. These are in brief as follows : — I. The Analogy, and the other works with slight exceptions, have been broken into sections. 2. Every section has been supplied with a heading, intended to assist the eye, and, as far as may be, the mind of the reader, by an indication of its contents. 3. Indexes to each Volume have been provided : and they are framed upon a separate perusal and following of the Text, as close as the present Editor could make it. 4. He has ventured to add a limited number of Notes, in part explanatory, and in part illustrative. 5. An Appendix has been added to Vol. II. The viii EDITOR'S PREFACE. several pieces which it contains are all of them either by Butler, or associated with his name. 6. The Text of the Analogy has been duly con sidered under the supervision of the authorities of the University Press, and with the aid furnished by Bishop Fitzgerald's edition of the Analogy (Dublin, 1849), in which many corrections of the current edition of 1844 were made, and a collation with the original text of 1736 was embodied. And now a few words with respect to some of these particulars. First, the labour of the Editor has in the aggre gate been considerable. The smallest and least arduous part of it has also been that where he feels most sanguine as to the results. To provide the students of Butler with this facility for com parison and for reference, appeared to him nothing less than a glaring necessity. The embarrassment heretofore felt has been two fold : it has been experienced alike in perusing Butler, and in testing what has been written upon him. Dr. Whewell, in 1848, made a step towards it by prefixing to his edition of the Three Sermons on Human Nature a brief syllabus in seventy-nine heads. In 1849, publishing an edition of six more of the Fifteen Sermons, as the Six Sermons on Moral Subjects, he made a more daring advance, and divided each of them into a continuous series of paragraphs or articles regularly numbered, while he prefixed to them a corresponding list in 160 sentences, each of a very few words. They were such as might have been printed as headings on the margin. Another editor, Dr. Angus, who has laboured on Butler with care and ability, perceived that some- EDITOR'S PREFACE. ix thing was wanted in order to afford easier access to the Analogy, and was struck by the example of Dr. Whewell, but concluded that 'this plan seemed a liberty which he was not justified in taking1.' And notwithstanding that this very same liberty has now been taken, and that on the largest scale, a tribute of sympathy may still be paid to the temper which made Dr. Angus feel that the mere body and figure of works such as those of Butler were to be handled with scruple and with reverence. It would have been well if the modesty of Butler had allowed him to anticipate that his leading productions would become classics in the philosophical theology of his country, and if he had accordingly furnished them with all facilities for perusal in the mode and form which he was of all men by far the best fitted to determine. But the dominant consideration with the present Editor has been this, that for want of an easily available power of reference from part to part of works so close in tissue and so profoundly charged with vital matter, the difficulty of mastering Butler has been seriously aggravated, if not multiplied manifold. Most of the editions are without index ; but an index is an imperfect help, and the reference to a particular page, good for the particular edition, is valueless for every other. The consequence is that it is often necessary to spend half an hour in looking for a passage. And the further consequence is that, as a high tariff engenders smuggling, so readers, and even critics, of Butler are often compelled or induced to forgo this trouble, and let remote recollection or vague impression shift for itself. It is indeed too easy to show how disastrously censors of Butler 1 Preface to Angus's Butler. x EDITOR'S PREFACE. in some instances have failed to represent him correctly, owing, as I believe, to this cause. Without sectional divisions, would not our mani pulation of the ancient philosophers be hopelessly embarrassed? And yet who is there among them, unless perhaps Aristotle, the tissue of whose thought is closer than that of Butler? Secondly, with the plan of sectional division has been combined that of sectional headings. And here the Editor must admit that, while the task of framing them is one of a difficulty not to be wholly overcome (as far as his experience enables him to speak) by any amount of labour, the result may probably remain far from satisfactory. Still, on the one hand, these headings may often be useful guides to the eye of a searcher ; and, on the other hand, they may supply in a form more direct and easy, if less complete, the same description of help as is aimed at by a more formal analysis. Thirdly, as to Indexes. The Analogy, to which is subjoined the Clarke correspondence as well as the Two Dissertations, has so close a coherence in itself between every chapter, and indeed every sentence, that, although at numerous points it touches the same subject- matter as the Sermons, there is upon the whole a marked distinction ; and it appeared desirable therefore to give a separate Index to each Volume. While perhaps no writer requires an index so much as Butler, it may be also said that for no writer is it more difficult to frame an index which shall answer its proper purpose. A number of indexes have been framed for the Analogy. I do not remember any for the Sermons, which however also require this auxiliary. But what is the proper EDITOR'S PREFACE. xi basis of an index? Not to present an exhaustive analysis, but rather to supply an aid to the memory of the student. The student ought to find in the several items of an index, under the most natural and (so to speak) salient heads, every point of his author's text to which it is likely that, in default of exact recollection, he may desire to refer. This has been the conception or plan on which these Indexes have been constructed ; but the task is difficult, and, though labour has not been spared, the execution may be far from perfect. Fourthly, this edition is also provided with occa sional Notes. Their purpose is limited, and their number not very large. Dr. Angus indicates in his brief Preface three, indeed four, purposes of his notes, which may here be repeated in substance. First, to give the history of opinions with which the text has dealt. Secondly, to trace the influence of Butler himself on later writers. Thirdly, to question or qualify his arguments, or to explain his expressions. Fourthly, to make good deficiencies in point of evangelical tone. It appears, however, highly desirable that the student of Butler should not be burdened with unnecessary or distracting notes. In the case of great works like these, as in the case of the Ethics of Aristotle, a mass of notes encumbers and obstructs the road to the author's meaning, which may be accessible enough with the aid of close attention and free reference. The student ought not to find extraneous matter too largely interposed between it and his mind. The last of the heads above given is, in the view of the present Editor, illegitimate and causeless. The second, which would open a very wide field, does not seem well suited to fragmentary xii EDITOR'S PREFACE. discussion. The first is useful on account of the amount of tacit reference to prior writers, which Butler, in his anxiety to avoid controversy, has embodied with out names in his text ; but it should be confined to indicating immediate sources. The third, while requiring circumspection, is proper, and is directly auxiliary to the purposes of the student. Only in a very few cases of reference to the greatest masters have citations been made for the purpose of corroborative illustration. But, as a general rule, the safest basis of annotation upon Butler probably is to consider not what the text admits, but what it, more or less, requires. With regard to the Editor's task at large, he is impressed with two convictions in particular. The first of these is, that it was work requisite on broad grounds to be done. The second is, that it might have been — perhaps may yet be — better done by others. Nor does he use the word 'others' vaguely; for he has in view such minds (always of necessity rare) as the mind which produced the masterly Sermon J by Dean Church on his illustrious predecessor. The apology for the present effort is comprised in few words : Better thus, than not at all. W. E. GLADSTONE. Hawarden Castle : December, 1895. 1 See the recent Volume, Blaise Pascal and other Sermons (Macrnillan). CONTENTS OF VOL. I. PAGE Preface by the Editor vii Chronology of Bishop Butler's Life . . . xvii Epitaph ascribed to Dr. Forster ..... xviii Account by Bishop Halifax of the Moral and Religious Systems of Bishop Butler ..... xix Dedication xxxix Advertisement ......... i Introduction ......... 3 PART I. OF NATURAL RELIGION. Chapter I. Of a Future Life Chapter II. Chapter III. Of the Moral Government of God . 19 Of the Government of God by Rewards and Punishments ; and particularly of the latter . . . . .47 63 xiv CONTENTS OF VOL. I. Chapter IV. PAGE Of a State of Probation, as implying Trial, Difficulties, and Danger ........ 94 Chapter V. Of a State of Probation, as intended for Moral Discipline and Improvement . . . . . . -105 Chapter VI. Of the Opinion of Necessity, considered as influencing Practice . . . . . . . . -138 Chapter VII. Of the Government of God, considered as a Scheme or Constitution, imperfectly comprehended . . .160 Chapter VIIL Conclusion . . . . . . . . .176 PART II. OF REVEALED RELIGION. Chapter I. Of the Importance of Christianity 185 Chapter II. Of the supposed Presumption against a Revelation, con sidered as miraculous . . . . . . .200 Chapter III. Of our Incapacity of judging, what were to be expected in a Revelation ; and the Credibility, from Analogy, that it must contain Things appearing liable to Objections . . . . . . . . .221 CONTENTS OF VOL. I. Chapter IV. Of Christianity, considered as a Scheme or Constitution imperfectly comprehended . . . . . .242 Chapter V. Of the particular System of Christianity ; the Appointment of a Mediator, and the Redemption of the World by Him .......... 252 Chapter VI. Of the Want of Universality in Revelation : and of the supposed deficiency in the proof of it . . .276 Chapter VII. Of the particular Evidence for Christianity . . . 302 Chapter VIII. Of the Objections which may be made against arguing from the Analogy of Nature, to Religion . . . 353 Chapter IX. Conclusion ... ...... 371 DISSERTATION I. Of Personal Identity 3^7 DISSERTATION II. Of the Nature of Virtue 397 Correspondence between Dr. Butler and Dr. Clarke . 413 Index 437 ERRATUM. P. xxxvii. Delete Note I. I'tler'x Wwkx. Vol. I. Dean of St. Paul's May 23, 1740 Clerk of the Closet to King George II .... 1746 Bishop of Durham Oct. 16,1750 Charge to his Clergy . ....... 1751 Death June 16, 1752 J VOL. I. CHRONOLOGY OF BUTLER'S LIFE. Joseph Butler born ...... May 1 8, 1692 Entered at Oriel College, Oxford March 17, 1714 1718 B.C.L June 10, 1721 1722 1725 Publication of the SermQns • 1726 D.C.L . 1733 Clerk of the Closet to Queen Caroline 1736 Publication of the Analogy !73<5 Bishop of Bristol ..... Dec. 3, 1738 Dean of St. Paul's ..... May 23, 1740 Clerk of the Closet to King George II • 1746 Bishop of Durham ..... Oct. 16, i75o i75i June 16, 1752 | VOL. I. EPITAPH ASCRIBED TO DR. FORSTER. The following Epitaph, said to be written by Dr. Nathanael Forster, is inscribed on a flat marble stone, in the cathedral church of Bristol, placed over the spot where the remains of Bishop Butler are deposited ; and which, as it is now almost obliterated, it may be worth while here to preserve. H. S. REVERENDUS ADMODUM IN CHRISTO PATER JOSEPHUS BUTLER, LL.D. HUJUSCE PRIMO DIOECESEOS DEINDE DUNELMENSIS EPISCOPUS. O.UALIS QUANTUSQUE VIR ERAT SUA LIBENTISSIME AGNOVIT AETAS : ET SI QUID PRAESULI AUT SCRIPTORI AD FAMAM VALENT MENS ALTISSIMA, INGENII PERSPICACIS ET SUBACTI VIS, ANIMUSQUE PIUS, SIMPLEX, CANDIDUS, LIBERALIS, MORTUI HAUD FACILE EVANESCET MEMORIA. OBIIT BATHONIAE 1 6 KALEND. JULII, A.D. 1752. ANNOS NATUS 60. AN ACCOUNT BY BISHOP HALIFAX OF THE MORAL AND RELIGIOUS SYSTEMS OF BISHOP BUTLER . TN what follows I propose to give a short account of -*- the Bishop's moral and religious systems, as these are collected from his Works. I. His way of treating the subject of morals is to be gathered from the volume of his Sermons, and particularly from the three first, and from the preface to that volume. 'There is,' as our author with singular sagacity has observed, 'a much more exact correspondence between the natural and moral world, than we are apt to take notice of".' The inward frame of man answers to his outward condition; the several propensities, passions, and affections, implanted in our hearts by the Author of nature, are in a peculiar manner adapted to the circumstances of life in which he hath placed us. This general observation, properly pur sued, leads to several important conclusions. The original internal constitution of man, compared with his external condition, enables us to discern what course of action and behaviour that constitution leads to, what is our duty re specting that condition, and furnishes us besides with the most powerful arguments to the practice of it. What the inward frame and constitution of man is, is a question of fact ; to be determined, as other facts are, from a Serm. vi. 1 This portion ofthe Preface written there is no occasion to displace from by Bishop Halifax has been retained the ground it has long and usefully as a clear and able summary, which occupied. — Ed. b2 xx BISHOP HALIFAX ON BUTLER'S experience, from our internal feelings and external senses, and from the testimony of others. Whether human nature, and the circumstances in which it is placed, might not have been ordered otherwise, is foreign to our inquiry, and none of our concern : our province is, taking both of these as they are, and viewing the connection between them, from that connection to discover, if we can, what course of action is fitted to that nature and those circumstances. From con templating the bodily senses, and the organs or instruments adapted to them, we learn that the eye was given to see with, the ear to hear with. In like manner, from considering our inward perceptions and the final causes of them, we collect that the feeling of shame, for instance, was given to prevent the doing of things shameful ; compassion, to carry us to relieve others in distress ; anger, to resist sudden violence offered to ourselves. If, continuing our inquiries in this way, it should at length appear, that the nature, the whole nature, of man leads him to and is fitted for that par ticular course of behaviour which we usually distinguish by the name of virtue, we are authorized to conclude, that virtue is the law we are born under, that it was so intended by the Author of our being ; and we are bound by the most intimate of all obligations, a regard to our own highest interest and happiness, to conform to it in all situations and events. Human nature is not simple and uniform, but made up of several parts ; and we can have no just idea of it as a system or constitution, unless we take into our view the respects and relations which these parts have to each other. As the body is not one member, but many ; so our inward structure consists of various instincts, appetites, and propensions. Thus far there is no difference between human creatures and brutes. But besides these common passions and affec tions, there is another principle, peculiar to mankind, that of conscience, moral sense, reflection, call it what you please, by which they are enabled to review their whole conduct, to approve of some actions in themselves, and to disapprove of others. That this principle will of course have some influence on our behaviour, at least at times, will hardly be disputed: but the particular influence which it ought to have, the precise degree of power in the regulating of our MORAL AND RELIGIOUS SYSTEMS. xxi internal frame that is assigned it by him who placed it there, is a point of the utmost consequence in itself, and on the determination of which the very hinge of our author's moral system turns. If the faculty here spoken of be, indeed, what it is asserted to be, in nature and kind superior to every other passion and affection ; if it be given, not merely that it may exert its force occasionally, or as our present humour or fancy may dispose us, but that it may at all times exercise an uncontrollable authority and govern ment over all the rest; it will then follow, that, in order to complete the idea of human nature, as a system, we must not only take in each particular bias, propension, instinct which are seen to belong to it, but we must add besides the principle of conscience, together with the subjection that is due to it from all the other appetites and passions : just as the idea of a civil constitution is formed, not barely from enumerating the several members and ranks of which it is composed, but from these considered as acting in various degrees of subordination to each other, and all under the direction of the same supreme authority, whether that authority be vested in one person or more. The view here given of the internal constitution of man, and of the supremacy of conscience, agreeably to the con ceptions of Bishop Butler, enables us to comprehend the force of that expression, common to him and the ancient moralists, that virtue consists in following nature. The meaning cannot be, that it consists in acting agreeably to that propensity of our nature which happens to be the strongest; or which propels us towards certain objects, without any regard to the methods by which they are to be obtained: but the meaning must be, that virtue con sists in the due regulation and subjection of all the other appetites and affections to the superior faculty of conscience ; from a conformity to which alone our actions are properly natural, or correspondent to the nature, to the whole nature, of such an agent as man. From hence too it appears, that the Author of our frame is by no means indifferent to virtue and vice, or has left us at liberty to act at random, as humour or appetite may prompt us ; but that every man has the rule of right within him ; a rule attended in xxii BISHOP HALIFAX ON BUTLER'S the very notion of it with authority, and such as has the force of a direction and a command from him who made us what we are, what course of behaviour is suited to our nature, and which he expects that we should follow. This moral faculty implies also a presentiment and apprehension, that the judgment which passes on our actions, considered as of good or ill desert, will hereafter be confirmed by the unerring judgment of God ; when virtue and happiness, vice and misery, whose ideas are now so closely connected, shall be indissolubly united, and the divine government be found to correspond in the most exact proportion to the nature he has given us. Lastly, this just prerogative or supremacy of conscience it is, which Mr. Pope has described in his Universal Prayer, though perhaps he may have ex pressed it rather too strongly 1, where he says, 'What conscience dictates to be done, Or warns me not to do, This teach me more than hell to shun, That more than heaven pursue.' The reader will observe, that this way of treating the subject of morals, by an appeal to facts, does not at all interfere with that other way, adopted by Dr. Samuel Clarke and others, which begins with inquiring into the relations and fitness of things, but rather illustrates and confirms it. That there are essential differences in the qualities of human actions, established by nature, and that this natural difference of things, prior to and independent of all will, creates a natural fitness in the agent to act agreeably to it, seems as little to be denied, as that there is the moral difference before explained, from which we approve and feel a pleasure in what is right, and conceive a distaste to what is wrong. Still, however, when we are endeavouring to establish either this moral or that natural difference, it ought never to be forgotten, or rather it will require to be distinctly shown, that both of these, when traced up to their source, suppose an intelligent Author of nature and moral Ruler of the world; who originally appointed these differences, and by 1 Among readers of the present day, most, I hope, will in this matter hold with Pope. — Ed. MORAL AND RELIGIOUS SYSTEMS. xxiii such an appointment has signified his will that we should conform to them, as the only effectual method of securing our happiness on the whole under his government. And of this consideration our prelate himself was not unmindful ; as may be collected from many expressions in different parts of his writings, and particularly from the following passages in his eleventh Sermon. ' It may be allowed, with out any prejudice to the cause of virtue and religion, that our ideas of happiness and misery are of all our ideas the nearest and most important to us ; that they will, nay, if you please, that they ought to prevail over those of order, and beauty, and harmony, and proportion, if there should ever be, as it is impossible there ever should be, any incon sistence between them.' And again, ' Though virtue or moral rectitude does indeed consist in affection to and pur suit of what is right and good, as such; yet, when we sit down in a cool hour, we can neither justify to ourselves this or any other pursuit, till we are convinced that it will be for our happiness, or at least not contrary to it b.' Besides the general system of morality opened above, our author in his volume of Sermons has stated with accuracy the difference between self-love and benevolence — in opposition to those who, on the one hand, make the whole of virtue to consist in benevolence °, and to those who, on the other, assert that every particular affection and action is resolvable into self-love. In combating these opinions, he has shown, I think unanswerably, that there are the same kind of indications in human nature, that we were made to promote the happi ness of others, as that we were made to promote our own : that it is no just objection to this, that we have dispositions to do evil to others as well as good; for we have also dis positions to do evil as well as good to ourselves, to our own most important interests even in this life, for the sake of gratifying a present passion: that the thing to be lamented is, not that men have too great a regard to their own real good, but that they have not enough: that benevo- b Serin, xi. 0 See the second Dissertation ' Of the Nature of Virtue,' at the end of the Analogy. xxiv BISHOP HALIFAX ON BUTLER'S lence is not more at variance with or unfriendly to self-love, than any other particular affection is: and that by con sulting the happiness of others a man is so far from lessening his own, that the very endeavour to do so, though he should fail in the accomplishment, is a source of the highest satis faction and peace of minda. He has also, in passing, animadverted on the philosopher of Malmesbury, who in his book Of Human Nature has advanced, as discoveries in moral science, that benevolence is only the love of power, and compassion the fear of future calamity to ourselves. And this our author has done, not so much with the design of exposing the false reasoning of Mr. Hobbes, but because on so perverse an account of human nature he has raised a system, subversive of all justice and honesty6. II. The religious system of Bishop Butler is chiefly to be collected from the treatise, entitled, The Analogy of JReligion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature. ' All things are double one against another, and God hath made nothing imperfect f.' On this single observation of the Son of Sirach, the whole fabric of our prelate's defence of religion, in his Analogy, is raised. Instead of indulging to idle speculations, how the world might possibly have been better than it is ; or, forgetful of the difference between hypothesis and fact, attempting to explain the divine economy with respect to intelligent creatures, from preconceived notions of his own; he first inquires what the constitution of nature, as made known to us in the way of experiment, actually is; and from this, now seen and acknowledged, he endeavours to form a judgment of that larger constitution, which religion discovers to us. If the dispensation of Provi dence we are now under, considered as inhabitants of this world, and having a temporal interest to secure in it, be found, on examination, to be analogous to, and of a piece with, that further dispensation, which relates to us as designed for another world, in which we have an eternal interest, depending on our behaviour here; if both may be traced d See Serm. i. and xi. and the Preface to the volume of Sermons. 6 See the Notes to Serm. i. and v. f Ecclus. xiii. 24. MORAL AND RELIGIOUS SYSTEMS. xxv up to the same general laws, and appear to be carried on according to the same plan of administration ; the fair pre sumption is, that both proceed from one and the same Author. And if the principal parts objected to in this latter dispensation be similar to and of the same kind with what we certainly experience under the former ; the objections, being clearly inconclusive in one case, because contradicted by plain fact, must, in all reason, be allowed to be incon clusive also in the other. This way of arguing from what is acknowledged to what is disputed, from things known to other things that resemble them, from that part of the divine establishment which is exposed to our view to that more important one which lies beyond it, is on all hands confessed to be just. By this method Sir Isaac Newton has unfolded the system of nature ; by the same method Bishop Butler has explained the system of grace ; and thus, to use the words of a writer, whom I quote with pleasure, has 'formed and concluded a happy alliance between faith and philosophy8.' And although the argument from analogy be allowed to be imperfect, and by no means sufficient to solve all difficulties respecting the government of God, and the designs of his providence with regard to mankind (a degree of knowledge, which we are not furnished with faculties for attaining, at least in the present state) ; yet surely it is of importance to learn from it, that the natural and moral world are intimately connected, and parts of one stupendous whole or system ; and that the chief objections which are brought against religion may be urged with equal force against the constitution and course of nature, where they are certainly false in fact. And this information we may derive from the work before us ; the proper design of which, it may be of use to observe, is not to prove the truth of religion, either natural or revealed, but to confirm that proof, already known, by considerations from analogy. After this account of the method of reasoning employed by our author, let us now advert to his manner of applying e Mr. Mainwaring's Dissertation, prefixed to his volume of Sermons. xxvi BISHOP HALIFAX ON BUTLER'S it, first to the subject of natural religion, and secondly to that of revealed. i. The foundation of all our hopes and fears is a future life; and with this the Treatise begins. Neither the reason of the thing, nor the analogy of nature, according to Bishop Butler, give ground for imagining, that the unknown event; death, will be our destruction. The states in which we have formerly existed, in the womb and in infancy, are not more different from each other than from that of mature age in which we now exist: therefore, that we shall continue to exist hereafter, in a state as different from the present as the present is from those through which we have passed already, is a presumption favoured by the analogy of nature. All that we know from reason concerning death, is the effects it has upon animal bodies : and the frequent instances among men of the intellectual powers continuing in high health and vigour, at the very time when a mortal disease is on the point of putting an end to all the powers of sensation, induce us to hope that it may have no effect at all on the human soul, not even so much as to suspend the exercise of its faculties ; though, if it have, the suspension of a power by no means implies its extinction, as sleep or a swoon may convince us \ The probability of a future state once granted, an im portant question arises, How best to secure our interest in that state. We find from what passes daily before us, that the constitution of nature admits of misery as well as happiness; that both of these are the consequences of our own actions; and these consequences we are enabled to foresee. Therefore, that our happiness or misery in a future world may depend on our own actions also, and that rewards and punishments hereafter may follow our good or ill be haviour here, is but an appointment of the same sort with what we experience under the divine government, according to the regular course of nature *. This supposition is confirmed from another circumstance, that the natural government of God, under which we now live, is also moral; in which rewards and punishments are the consequences of actions, considered as virtuous and h Part I. chap. i. i Chap. ii. MORAL AND RELIGIOUS SYSTEMS. xxvii vicious. Not that every man is rewarded or punished here in exact proportion to his desert ; for the essential tendencies of virtue and vice, to produce happiness and the contrary, are often hindered from taking effect from accidental causes. However, there are plainly the rudiments and beginnings of a righteous administration to be discerned in the con stitution of nature : from whence we are led to expect, that these accidental hindrances will one day be removed, and the rule of distributive justice obtain completely in a more perfect state k. The moral government of God, thus established, implies in the notion of it some sort of trial, or a moral possibility of acting wrong as well as right, in those who are the subjects of it. And the doctrine of religion, that the present life is in fact a state of probation for a future one, is rendered credible, from its being analogous throughout to the general conduct of Providence towards us with respect to this world ; in which prudence is necessary to secure our temporal interest, just as we are taught that virtue is neces sary to secure our eternal interest ; and both are trusted to ourselves '. But the present life is' not merely a state of probation, implying in it difficulties and danger; it is also a state of discipline and improvement ; and that both in our temporal and religious capacity. Thus childhood is a state of dis cipline for youth ; youth for manhood ; and that for old age. Strength of body, and maturity of understanding, are acquired by degrees; and neither of them without continual exer cise and attention on our part, not only in the beginning of life, but through the whole course of it. So again with respect to our religious concerns, the present world is fitted to be, and to good men is in event, a state of discipline and improvement for a future one. The several passions and propensions implanted in our hearts incline us, in a multitude of instances, to forbidden pleasures: this inward infirmity is increased by various snares and temptations, perpetually occurring from without: hence arises the necessity of recollection and self-government, of withstanding the calls k Chap. iii. l Chap. iv. xxviii BISHOP HALIFAX ON BUTLER'S of appetite, and forming our minds to habits of piety and virtue ; habits, of which we are capable, and which, to creatures in a state of moral imperfection, and fallen from their original integrity, must be of the greatest use, as an additional security, over and above the principle of conscience, from the dangers to which we are exposed m. Nor is the credibility here given, by the analogy of nature, to the general doctrine of religion, destroyed or weakened by any notions concerning necessity. Of itself it is a mere word, the sign of an abstract idea ; and as much requires an agent, that is, a necessary agent, in order to effect any thing, as freedom requires a free agent. Admitting it to be speculatively true, if considered as influencing practice, it is the same as false : for it is matter of experience, that, with regard to our present interest, and as inhabitants of this world, we are treated as if we were free ; and therefore the analogy of nature leads us to conclude, that, with regard to our future interest, and as designed for another world, we shall be treated as free also. Nor does the opinion of necessity, supposing it possible, at all affect either the general proof of religion, or its external evidence ". Still objections may be made against the wisdom and good ness of the divine government, to which analogy, which can only show the truth or credibility of facts, affords no answer. Yet even here analogy is of use, if it suggest that the divine government is a scheme or system, and not a number of unconnected acts, and that this system is also above our comprehension. Now the government of the natural world appears to be a system of this kind; with parts, related to each other, and together composing a whole : in which system, ends are brought about by the use of means, many of which means, before experience, would have been suspected to have had a quite contrary tendency ; which is carried on by general laws, similar causes uniformly producing similar effects: the utility of which general laws, and the inconveniences which would probably arise from the occasional or even secret suspension of them, we are in some sort m Part I. chap. v. " Chap. vi. MORAL AND RELIGIOUS SYSTEMS. xxix enabled to discern0; but of the whole we are incompetent judges, because of the small part which comes within our view. Reasoning then from what we know, it is highly credible, that the government of the moral world is a system also, carried on by general laws, and in which ends are accomplished by the intervention of means ; and that both constitutions, the natural and the moral, are so connected, as to form together but one scheme. But of this scheme, as of that of the natural world taken alone, we are not qualified to judge, on account of the mutual respect of the several parts to each other and to the whole, and our own incapacity to survey the whole, or, with accuracy, any single part. All objections therefore to the wisdom and goodness of the divine government may be founded merely on our ignorance ; and to such objections our ignorance is the proper, and a satisfactory answer p. 2. The chief difficulties concerning natural religion being now removed, our author proceeds, in the next place, to that which is revealed ; and as an introduction to an inquiry into the credibility of Christianity, begins with the consideration of its importance. The importance of Christianity appears in two respects. First, in its being a republication of natural religion, in its native simplicity, with authority, and with circumstances of advantage; ascertaining, in many instances of moment, what before was only probable, and particularly confirming the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments. Secondly, as revealing a new dispensation of Providence, originating from the pure love and mercy of God, and conducted by the mediation of his Son, and the guidance of his Spirit, for the recovery and salvation of mankind, represented in a state of apostasy and ruin. This account of Christianity being admitted to be just, and the distinct offices of these three divine persons being once discovered to us, we are as much obliged in point of duty to acknowledge the relations we stand in to the Son and Holy Ghost, as our Mediator and Sanctifier, as we are obliged in point of duty ° See a Treatise on Divine Benevolence, by Dr. Thomas Balguy, partii. P Part I. chap. vii. xxx BISHOP HALIFAX ON BUTLER'S to acknowledge the relation we stand in to God the Father; although the two former of these relations be learnt from revelation only, and in the last we are instructed by the light of nature ; the obligation in either case arising from the offices themselves, and not at all depending on the manner in which they are made known to us q. The presumptions against revelation in general are, that it is not discoverable by reason, that it is unlike to what is so discovered, and that it was introduced and supported by miracles. But in a scheme so large as that of the universe, unbounded in extent and everlasting in duration, there must of necessity be numberless circumstances which are beyond the reach of our faculties to discern, and which can only be known by divine illumination. And both in the natural and moral government of the world, under which we live, we find many things unlike one to another, and therefore ought not to wonder if the same unlikeness obtain between things visible and invisible; although it be far from true, that revealed religion is entirely unlike the constitution of nature, as analogy may teach us. Nor is there any thing incredible in revelation, considered as miraculous; whether miracles be supposed to have been performed at the beginning of the world, or after a course of nature has been established \ Not at the beginning of the world ; for then there was either no course of nature at all, or a power must have been exerted totally different from what that course is at present : all men and animals cannot have been born, as they are now; but a pair of each sort must have been produced at first, in a way altogether unlike to that in which they have been since pro duced ; unless we affirm, that men and animals have existed from eternity in an endless succession : one miracle therefore at least there must have been at the beginning of the world, or at the time of man's creation. Not after the settlement of a course of nature, on account of miracles being contrary i Part II. chap. i. 1 The argument in this sentence, matter which appears to be in the purporting to be Butler's, seems to be nature of expansion and interpolation founded on Part II. ch.ii. §§ 7-9 (II. into the original text. — E;d. in the older editions) ; but contains MORAL AND RELIGIOUS SYSTEMS. xxxi to that course, or, in other words, contrary to experience ; for, in order to know whether miracles, worked in attestation of a divine religion, be contrary to experience or not, we ought to be acquainted with other cases, similar or parallel to those, in which miracles are alleged to have been wrought. But where shall we find such similar or parallel cases ? The world which we inhabit affords none : we know of no extra ordinary revelations from God to man, but those recorded in the Old and New Testament ; all of which were established by miracles : it cannot therefore be said, that miracles are incredible, because contrary to experience, when all the experience we have is in favour of miracles, and on the side of religion. Besides, in reasoning concerning miracles, they ought not to be compared with common natural events, but with uncommon appearances, such as comets, magnetism, electricity ; which, to one acquainted only with the usual phenomena of nature, and the common powers of matter, must, before proof of their actual existence, be thought incredible r. The presumptions against revelation in general being dispatched, objections against the Christian revelation in particular, against the scheme of it, as distinguished from objections against its evidence, are considered next. Now, supposing a revelation to be really given, it is highly probable beforehand, that it must contain many things appearing to us liable to objections. The acknowledged dispensation of nature is very different from what we should have expected : reasoning then from analogy, the revealed dispensation, it is credible, would be also different. Nor are we in any sort judges at what time, or in what degree, or manner, it is fit or expedient for God to instruct us, in things confessedly of the greatest use, either by natural reason, or by super natural information. Thus, arguing on speculation only, and without experience, it would seem very unlikely that so important a remedy as that provided by Christianity, for the recovery of mankind from a state of ruin, should have been for so many ages withheld ; and, when at last vouchsafed, should be imparted to so few ; and, after it has been imparted, should be attended with obscurity and doubt. And just so r Chap. ii. xxxii BISHOP HALIFAX ON BUTLER'S we might have argued, before experience, concerning the remedies provided in nature for bodily diseases, to which by nature we are exposed : for many of these were unknown to mankind for a number of ages ; are known but to few now ; some important ones probably not discovered yet ; and those which are, neither certain in their application, nor universal in their use : and the same mode of reasoning that would lead us to expect they should have been so, would lead us to expect that the necessity of them should have been super seded, by there being no diseases; as the necessity of the Christian scheme, it may be thought, might also have been superseded, by preventing the fall of man, so that he should not have stood in need of a Redeemer at all s. As to objections against the wisdom and goodness of Christianity, the same answer may be applied to them as was to the like objections against the constitution of nature. For here also, Christianity is a scheme or economy, com posed of various parts, forming a whole; in which scheme means are used for the accomplishing of ends; and which is conducted by general laws, of all of which we know as little as we do of the constitution of nature. And the seeming want of wisdom or goodness in this system is to be ascribed to the same cause, as the like appearances of defects in the natural system ; our inability to discern the whole scheme, and our ignorance of the relation of those parts which are discernible to others beyond our view. The objections against Christianity as a matter of fact, and against the wisdom and goodness of it, having been obviated together, the chief of them are now to be considered distinctly. One of these, which is levelled against the entire system itself, is of this sort: the restoration of mankind, represented in scripture as the great design of the gospel, is described as requiring a long series of means, and persons, and dispensations, before it can be brought to its completion ; whereas the whole ought to have been effected at once. Now every thing we see in the course of nature shows the folly of this objection. For in the natural course of Providence, ends are brought about by means, not operating immediately and 8 Chap. iii. MORAL AND RELIGIOUS SYSTEMS. xxxiii at once, but deliberately and in a way of progression ; one thing being subservient to another, this to somewhat further. The change of seasons, the ripening of fruits, the growth of vegetable and 'animal bodies, are instances of this. And therefore, that the same progressive method should be followed in the dispensation of Christianity, as is observed in the common dispensation of Providence, is a reasonable expectation, justified by the analogy of nature '. Another circumstance objected to in the Christian scheme is the appointment of a Mediator, and the saving of the world through him. But the visible government of God being actually administered in this way, or by the mediation and instrumentality of others, there can be no general pre sumption against an appointment of this kind, against his invisible government being exercised in the same manner. We have seen already, that with regard to ourselves this visible government is carried on by rewards and punish ments ; for happiness and misery are the consequences of our own actions, considered as virtuous and vicious; and these consequences we are enabled to foresee. It might have been imagined, before consulting experience, that after we had rendered ourselves liable to misery by our own ill con duct, sorrow for what was past, and behaving well for the future, would, alone and of themselves, have exempted us from deserved punishment, and restored us to the divine favour. But the fact is otherwise; and real reformation is often found to be of no avail, so as to secure the criminal from poverty, sickness, infamy, and death, the never-failing attendants on vice and extravagance, exceeding a certain degree. By the course of nature then it appears, God does not always pardon a sinner on his repentance. Yet there is provision made, even in nature, that the miseries, which men bring on themselves by unlawful indulgences, may in many cases be mitigated, and in some removed ; partly by extraordinary exertions of the offender himself, but more especially and frequently by the intervention of others, who . voluntarily, and from motives of compassion, submit to labour and sorrow, such as produce long and lasting incon- * Chap. iv. VOL. I. C xxxiv BISHOP HALIFAX ON BUTLER'S "veniences to themselves, as the means of rescuing another from the wretched effects of former imprudences. Vicarious punishment, therefore, or one person's sufferings contributing to the relief of another, is a providential disposition in the economy of nature : and it ought not to be matter of surprise, if by a method analogous to this we be redeemed from sin and misery, in the economy of grace. That man kind at present are in a state of degradation, different from that in which they were originally created, is the very ground of the Christian revelation, as contained in the scriptures. Whether we acquiesce in the account, that our being placed in such a state is owing to the crime of our first parents, or choose to ascribe it to any other cause, it makes no difference as to our condition : the vice and unhap- piness of the world are still there, notwithstanding all our suppositions ; nor is it Christianity that hath put us into this state. We learn also from the same scriptures, what experience and the use of expiatory sacrifices from the most early times might have taught us, that repentance alone is not sufficient to prevent the fatal consequences of past transgressions : but that still there is room for mercy, and that repentance shall be available, though not of itself, yet through the mediation of a divine person, the Messiah ; who, from the sublimest principles of compassion, when we were dead in trespasses and sins u, suffered and died, the innocent for the guilty, the just for the unjust*, that we might have redemption through his blood, even the forgiveness of sinsJ. In what way the death of Christ was of that efficacy it is said to be, in procuring the reconciliation of sinners, the scriptures have not explained : it is enough that the doctrine is revealed; that it is not contrary to any truths which reason and experience teach us ; and that it accords in perfect harmony with the usual method of the divine conduct in the government of the world z. Again it hath been said, that if the Christian revelation were true, it must have been universal, and could not have been left upon doubtful evidence. But God, in his u Ephes. ii. i. x 1 pet jy l8 y Coloss. i. 14. * Chap. v. MORAL AND RELIGIOUS SYSTEMS. xxxv natural providence, dispenses his gifts in great variety, not only among creatures of the same species, but. to the same individuals also at different times. Had the Christian revelation been universal at first, yet, from the diver sity of men's abilities, both of mind and body, their various means of improvement, and other external advantages, some persons must soon have been in a situation, with respect to religious knowledge, much superior to that of others, as much perhaps as they are at present : and all men will be equitably dealt with at last ; and to whom little is given, of him little will be required. Then as to the evidence for religion being left doubtful, difficulties of this sort, like difficulties in practice, afford scope and oppor tunity for a virtuous exercise of the understanding, and dispose the mind to acquiesce and rest satisfied with any evidence that is real. In the daily commerce of life, men are obliged to act upon great uncertainties, with regard to success in their temporal pursuits ; and the case with regard to religion is parallel. However, though religion be not intuitively true, the proofs of it which we have are amply sufficient in reason to induce us to embrace it ; and dis satisfaction with those proofs may possibly be men's own fault a. Nothing remains but to attend to the positive evidence there is for the truth of Christianity. Now, besides its direct and fundamental proofs, which are miracles and pro phecies, there are many collateral circumstances, which may be united into one view, and all together may be considered as making up one argument. In this way of treating the subject, the revelation, whether real or otherwise, may be supposed to be wholly historical : the general design of which appears to be, to give an account of the condition of religion, and its professors, with a concise narration of the political state of things, as far as religion is affected by it, during a great length of time, near six thousand years of which are already past. More particularly it comprehends an account of God's entering into covenant with one nation, the Jews, that he would be their God, and that they should be his people ; of his a Chap. vi. C 2 xxxvi BISHOP HALIFAX ON BUTLER'S often interposing in their affairs ; giving them the promise, and afterwards the possession, of a flourishing country ; assur ing them of the greatest national prosperity, in case of their obedience, and threatening the severest national punishment, in case they forsook him, and joined in the idolatry of their pagan neighbours. It contains also a prediction of a particular person to appear in the fulness of time, in whom all the pro mises of God to the Jews were to be fulfilled : and it relates, that, at the time expected, a person did actually appear, assum ing to be the Saviour foretold ; that he worked various miracles among them, in confirmation of his divine authority ; and, as was foretold also, was rejected and put to death by the very people who had long desired and waited for his coming ; but that his religion, in spite of all opposition, was established in the world by his disciples, invested with supernatural powers for that purpose ; of the fate and fortunes of which religion there is a prophetical description, carried down to the end of time. Let any one now, after reading the above history, and not knowing whether the whole were not a fiction, be supposed to ask, Whether all that is here related be true? and instead of a direct answer, let him be informed of the several acknow ledged facts, which are found to correspond to it in real life ; and then let him compare the history and facts together, and observe the astonishing coincidence of both : such a joint review must appear to him of very great weight, and to amount to evidence somewhat more than human. And unless the whole series, and every particular circumstance contained in it, can be thought to have arisen from accident, the truth of Chris tianity is proved b. b Chap. vii. To the Analogy are subjoined two Dissertations, both originally inserted in the body of the work. One on 'Personal Identity,' in which are contained some strictures on Mr. Locke, who asserts that con sciousness makes ©r constitutes personal identity ; whereas, as our author observes, consciousness makes only personality, or is necessary to the idea of a person, i. e a thinking intelligent being, but presupposes, and therefore cannot constitute, personal identity ; just as knowledge pre supposes truth, but does not constitute it. Consciousness of past actions does indeed show us the identity of ourselves, or gives us a certain assurance that we are the same persons or living agents now, which we were at the time to which our remembrance can look back : but still we should be the same persons as we were, though this consciousness of what is past were wanting, though all that had been done by us formerly were MORAL AND RELIGIOUS SYSTEMS, xxxvii The view here given of the moral and religious systems of Bisnop Butler, it will immediately be perceived, is chiefly intended for younger students, especially for students in Divinity ' ; to whom it is hoped it may be of use, so as to encourage them to peruse, with proper diligence, the original works of the author himself. For it may be necessary to observe, that neither of the volumes of this excellent prelate are addressed to those who read for amusement, or curiosity, or to get rid of time. All subjects are not to be comprehended with the same ease ; and morality and religion, when treated as sciences, each accompanied with difficulties of its own, can neither of them be understood as they ought, without a very peculiar attention. But morality and religion are not merely to be studied as sciences, or as being speculatively true ; they are to be regarded in another and higher light, as a rule of life and manners, as containing authoritative directions by which to regulate our faith and practice. And in this view, the infinite importance of them considered, it can never be an indifferent matter whether they be received or rejected. For both claim to be the voice of God ; and whether they be so or not, cannot be known, till their claims be impartially examined. If they indeed come from him, we are bound to conform to them at our peril : nor is it left to our choice, whether we will submit to the obligations they impose upon us or not; for submit to them we must, in such a sense, as to incur the punishments denounced by both against wilful disobedience to their injunctions. forgotten ; unless it be true, that no person has existed a single moment beyond what he can remember. The other Dissertation is ' Ofthe Nature of Virtue,' which properly belongs to the moral system of our author, already explained. 1 Bishop Halifax here states it to special, addresses himself mainly to be obvious that the Analogy was the more serious and candid thinkers intended by its author ' for younger among men of the world. students,' especially in Divinity. I do not find that the Analogy was This, I confess, is very far from being published in any University before obvious to me. In the absence of the year 1807 ; at a date seventy-one evidence to the contrary, I should years later than its original appear- incline to the belief that Butler, so ance. — Ed. far as his intention is in any way TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE CHARLES, LORD TALBOT BARON OF HENSOL LORD HIGH CHANCELLOR OF GREAT BRITAIN THE FOLLOWING TREATISE IS, WITH ALL RESPECT, INSCRIBED IN ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF THE HIGHEST OBLIGATIONS TO THE LATE LORD BISHOP OF DURHAM AND TO HIMSELF BY HIS LORDSHIP'S MOST DUTIFUL MOST DEVOTED AND MOST HUMBLE SERVANT JOSEPH BUTLER ADVERTISEMENT § i. This Treatise is to be regarded as a whole. Its subject gives weight to its matter. TF the reader should meet here with any thing -*- which he had not before attended to, it will not be in the observations upon the constitution and course of nature, these being all obvious ; but in the application of them : in which, though there is nothing but what appears to me of some real weight, and therefore of great importance ; yet he will ob serve several things, which will appear to him of very little, if he can think things to be of little im portance, which are of any real weight at all, upon such a subject as religion. However, the proper force of the following Treatise lies in the whole general analogy considered together. § 2. Case against Christianity is largely assumed to be clear; but untruly. It is come, I know not how, to be taken for granted, by many persons, that Christianity is not so much as a subject of inquiry ; but that it is, now at length, discovered to be fictitious1. And accordingly 1 This complaint, uttered in 1 736, the Charge to the Clergy of Dur- Butler repeats in 175 1. He opens ham by lamenting 'the general \Tf\T T "D VOL. I. 2 ADVERTISEMENT. they treat it, as if, in the present age, this were an agreed point among all people of discernment ; and nothing remained, but to set it up as a principal subject of mirth and ridicule, as it were by way of reprisals, for its having so long interrupted the pleasures of the world. On the contrary, thus much, at least, will be here found, not taken for granted, but proved, that any reasonable man, who will thoroughly consider the matter, may be as much assured, as he is of his own being, that it is not, however, so clear a case, that there is nothing in it. There is, I think, strong evidence of its truth ; but it is certain no one can, upon principles of reason, be satisfied of the contrary. And the practical conse quence to be drawn from this is not attended to by every one who is concerned in it. May, J736- decay of religion in this nation, those who profess themselves un- which is now observed by every believers, he says, 'increases, and one.' Besides the decline of re- with their numbers their zeal' ligious influences, the number of (Char. § i). INTRODUCTION § I. Probable evidence, from lowest to highest, is matter of degree. PROBABLE evidence is essentially distinguished from demonstrative by this, that it admits of degrees ; and of all variety of them, from the highest moral certainty, to the very lowest presumption. We cannot indeed say a thing is probably true upon one very shght presumption for it ; because, as there may be probabilities on both sides of a question, there may be some against it : and though there be not, yet a slight presumption does not beget that degree of conviction, which is implied in saying a thing is probably true. $ 2. Presumption is admissible ; may be small, or may rise to moral certainty. But that the slightest possible presumption is of the nature of a probability, appears from hence ; that such low presumption, often repeated, will amount even to moral certainty. Thus a man's having ob served the ebb and flow of the tide to-day, affords some sort of presumption, though the lowest imagin able, that it may happen again to-morrow : but the observation of this event for so many days, and B 2 4 INTRODUCTION. [§ 3 months, and ages together, as it has been observed by mankind, gives us a full assurance that it will. § 3. Probability means some likeness to observed truth or fact. That which chiefly constitutes probability is ex pressed in the word likely, i. e. like some truth a, or true event ; hke it, in itself, in its evidence, in some more or fewer of its circumstances. For when we determine a thing to be probably true, suppose that an event has or will come to pass, it is from the mind's remarking in it a likeness to some other event, which we have observed has come to pass. And this observation forms, in numberless daily instances, a presumption, opinion, or full conviction, that such event has or will come to pass ; according as the observation is, that the like event has some times, most commonly, or always so far as our observation reaches, come to pass at like distances of time, or place, or upon like occasions. Hence arises the belief, that a child, if it lives twenty years, will grow up to the stature and strength of a man ; that food will contribute to the preservation of its life, and the want of it for such a number of days, be its certain destruction. So likewise the rule and measure of our hopes and fears concerning the success of our pursuits ; our expectations that others will act so and so in such circumstances ; and our judgment that such actions proceed from such principles ; all these rely upon our having observed the like to what we hope, fear, expect, judge ; I say upon our having observed the hke, either with respect a Verisimile. § 4] INTRODUCTION. 5 to others or ourselves. And thus, whereas the prince1' who had always lived in a warm climate, naturally concluded in the way of analogy, that there was no such thing as water's becoming hard, because he had always observed it to be fluid and yielding: we, on the contrary, from analogy conclude, that there is no presumption at all against this : that it is supposable there may be frost in England any given day in January next; probable that there will on some day of the month ; and that there is a moral certainty, i. e. ground for an expectation without any doubt of it, in some part or other of the winter. § 4. Is imperfect ; and deals with limited beings ; yet is for us the guide of life. Probable evidence, in its very nature, affords but an imperfect kind of information ; and is to be con sidered as relative only to beings of limited capacities. For nothing which is the possible object of knowledge, whether past, present, or future, can be probable to an infinite Intelligence ; since it cannot but be dis cerned absolutely as it is in itself, certainly true, or certainly false. But to us, probability is the very guide of life 1. b The story is told by Mr. Locke in the chapter of Probability. [Locke, On the Understanding, Bk. iv. c. 15, § 5.] 1 Butler's doctrine of Proba- Theology, Dr. Fairbairn observes bility may by some be considered (p. 11) that Butler's Analogy drew commonplace. But Toland had more attention than his Sermons shortly before taught that in the on Human Nature, and that 'the absence of demonstration we ought fundamental inconsistency ' of the to hold our judgments in suspense, supremacy of conscience with the See Leslie Stephen, English Thought doctrine of probability was never in the Eighteenth Century, c. iii. perceived. In proof ofthe assertion 14. In his Place of Christ in Modern thus hazarded, Dr. Fairbairn has 6 INTRODUCTION. [§5 § 5. Even on low probabilities, prudence binds to action. From these things it follows, that in questions of difficulty, or such as are thought so, where more satisfactory evidence cannot be had, or is not seen ; if the result of examination be, that there appears upon the whole, any the lowest presumption on one side, and none on the other, or a greater presumption on one side, though in the lowest degree greater ; this determines the question, even in matters of specula tion ; and in matters of practice, will lay us under an absolute and formal obligation, in point of pru dence and of interest l, to act upon that presumption or low probability, though it be so low as to leave the mind in very great doubt which is the truth. For surely a man is as really bound in prudence to do what upon the whole appears, according to the best of his judgment, to be for his happiness, as what he certainly knows to be so. supplied the statement that the into a casual mistake, when he reason deals with probabilities holds that Butler borrowed his which it analyses, whereas the con- doctrine of probability from Locke. science commands ; the first being But is it not the fact that Locke, an operation of the mental faculty, in his Essay on the Understanding, while the second is in the domain deals with probability (very ration- of religion (pp. 25, 26). Is there ally) as it stands apart from moral any shadow of inconsistency be- obligation ; while Butler, borrow- tween the two? The conscience, ing nothing from him, simply takes in order that it may legitimately up the question at the point where command.requires the state of facts he had laid it down ? (Locke, On the on which it has to judge to be Understanding, Bk. iv. cc. 15, 16. ascertained: and this is ascertained 1 Butler has explained himself for it by the reason. But Butler's elsewhere upon the nature of pru- fundamental contention is, that dence. See Il.viii. 19, and especially probability involves moral obliga- Dissertation II. § 8 ; where, after tion ; and the two powers deal explaining the nature of prudence, with the same process, but at dif- he goes on, ' it should seem that ferent stages. this is virtue, and the contrary This able author falls, I think, behaviour faulty and blamable.' §§ 6, 7] INTRODUCTION. 7 § 6. Sometimes, though the chances be less than even, Nay further, in questions of great consequence, a reasonable man will think it concerns him to remark lower probabilities and presumptions than these ; such as amount to no more than showing one side of a question to be as supposable and credible as the other : nay, such as but amount to much less even than this. For numberless instances might be men tioned respecting the common pursuits of life, where a man would be thought, in a literal sense, distracted, who would not act, and with great application too, not only upon an even chance, but upon much less \ and where the probability or chance was greatly against his succeeding0. § 7. Analogy has weight in determining judgment, and practice. It is not my design to inquire further into the nature, the foundation, and measure of probability ; or whence it proceeds that likeness should beget that presumption, opinion, and full conviction, which the human mind is formed to receive from it, and which it does necessarily produce in every one ; or to guard against the errors, to which reasoning from analogy is liable. This belongs to the subject of Logic ; and is a part of that subject which has not yet been c See Part II. c. vi. 1 It is easy to provide illustrations been discovered. But another road, of what may at first view seem nearly, though not quite, as con- a paradox. Suppose that with venient, was perfectly safe. The a journey in prospect we hear that odds against our being molested the ordinary road to the place of in the first case might be slight, our destination is infested by or might be (say) three or five to robbers, that a party had been one ; but every prudent person stopped in the preceding week, would in such a case take the safe and that the criminals had not road. Comp. II. vi. 24. 8 INTRODUCTION. [§ 7 thoroughly considered. Indeed I shall not take upon me to say, how far the extent, compass, and force, of analogical reasoning, can be reduced to general heads and rules ; and the whole be formed into a system. But though so little in this way has been attempted by those who have treated of our intellectual powers, and the exercise of them 1 ; this does not hinder but that we may be, as we unquestionably are, assured, that analogy is of weight, in various degrees, towards determining our judgment and our practice 2. Nor does it in any wise cease to be of weight in those cases, because persons, either given to dispute, or who require things to be stated with greater exact ness than our faculties appear to admit of in practical matters, may find other cases in which it is not easy to say, whether it be, or be not, of any weight ; or instances of seeming analogies, which are really of none. It is enough to the present purpose to observe, that this general way of arguing 1 This may seem to glance at duction not so much in kind as in Locke's discussion of probability, degree.'' We may perhaps say : to referred to above, as inadequate. establish a sound analogy, the 2 Butler passes from probability resemblance of relations need not to analogy without describing the be entire, but ought to be very resemblance between them. substantive and marked. Fitzgerald (Butler's Analogy, Analogy then (1) is not demon- by William Fitzgerald, Dublin, strative, but probable ; (2) is not 1849) says (p. 1), ' Analogy is pro- to be predicated of mere quantity. perly the resemblance of relations'; It would mislead were we to say and 'in the common use of modern there was an analogy between the metaphysical writers, is used to relation of one foot to two feet, and express such arguments from re- that of one pound to two pounds. semblance as fall short of full For the relation is absolutely proof.' And he cites Mill (Logic, identical. We may perhaps adopt ii. 97, 98), describing Butler : ' The Fitzgerald's definition thus modi- analogies, with which his argument fied: analogy is the resemblance of deals, are, indeed, in general, of that qualitative relations. Fitzgerald imperfect sort, which do not amount refers us to Coplestone's Four Dis- to strict inductions. But, according courses, and to Whately's Rhetoric, to his view, they differ from in- I. iii. 7. §8] INTRODUCTION. 9 is evidently natural, just, and conclusive. For there is no man can make a question, but that the sun will rise to-morrow, and be seen, where it is seen at all, in the figure of a circle, and not in that of a square. § 8. From difficulties in nature, Origen infers a likelihood of similar difficulties in scripture. Hence, namely from analogical reasoning, Origen cl has with singular sagacity observed, that he who believes the scripture to have proceeded from him who is the Author of nature, may well expect to find the same sort of difficulties in it, as are found in the constitution of nature1. And in a like way of reflection it may Xpr] p.tv toi ye rbv a.Tra£ irapa8e£dp,evov toB ktictolvtos tov koct/xov eivat ra.VTas ras -ypac/ias miriio-Oai, 6Vi oo-a 7repi ttJ's ktio-«os cm-arm tois tflTovcn tov mpl avrrj-£XPl tov tvxovtos ypdfifiaTos.' Fitzgerald. St. Irenaeus, after adducing in- io INTRODUCTION. [§ 9 be added, that he who denies the scripture to have been from God upon account of these difficulties, may, for the very same reason, deny the world to have been formed by him. On the other hand, if there be an analogy or likeness between that system of things and dispensation of Providence, which revelation informs us of, and that system of things and dispensation of Providence, which experience together with reason informs us of, i. e. the known course of nature ; this is a presumption, that they have both the same author and cause ; at least so far as to answer objections against the former's being from God, drawn from any thing which is analogical or similar to what is in the latter, which is acknowledged to be from him ; for an Author of nature is here supposed. § 9. Facts, tvith reasons, give the only just basis for inference from the known to the less known. Forming our notions of the constitution and government of the world upon reasoning, without foundation for the principles which we assume, whether from the attributes of God, or any thing else, is building a world upon hypothesis, like Des cartes 1. Forming our notions upon reasoning from stances of strange and unaccount- futuro ' (Adv. Haer. ii. 47, p. 203). able things in the economy of the Fitzgerald. world, proceeds : ' Si ergo et in 1 He, says Mr. L. Stephen, deter- rebus creaturae quaedam quidem mined the starting-point of much adjacent Deo, quaedam. autem et English speculation. It was theo- in nostram venerunt scientiam, logical. Questioning all which he quid mali est, si et eorum, quae in thought could be doubted, he as- Scripturis requirantur, universis sumed the certainty of what he Scripturis spiritualibus existenti- thought could not. Self-attesting bus, quaedam quidem absolvamus innate ideas were discoverable in secundum gratiam Dei, quaedam the mind (English Thought, i. 9). autem commendemus Deo, et non The movements of the world and solum in hoc seculo, sed et in the heavens he considered to be § 10] INTRODUCTION. n principles which are certain, but applied to cases to which we have no ground to apply them, (like those who explain the structure of the human body, and the nature of diseases and medicines from mere mathematics without sufiicient data,) is an error much akin to the former : since what is assumed in order to make the reasoning applicable, is hypothesis. But it must be allowed just, to join abstract reason ings with the observation of facts, and argue from such facts as are known, to others that are like them ; from that part of the divine government over intelligent creatures which comes under our view, to that larger and more general government over them which is beyond it ; and from what is present, to collect what is likely, credible, or not incredible, will be hereafter. § 10. Postulating a natural Governor of the world, he will argue thence for religion. This method 1 then of concluding and determining being practical, and what, if we will act at all, we cannot but act upon in the common pursuits of life ; being evidently conclusive, in various degrees, proportionable to the degree and exactness of the whole analogy or likeness ; and having so great authority 2 for its introduction into the subject of religion, even revealed religion ; my design is to apply it to that subject in general, both natural and due to tourbillons or vortices, the the constitution and course of spring of which were to be found nature, to those unknown, namely in the earth as the centre of the ' the larger and more general solar system, and in the fixed stars. government ' contemplated by na- This scheme it is which Butler tural and revealed religion. seems to have in view (Biogr. 2 For example, John iii. 12: 'If Universelle, vi. 1 50). I have told you earthly things, and 1 Viz. of proceeding in argument ye believe not, how shall ye believe, from facts known, that is to say, if I tell you of heavenly things ? ' 12 INTRODUCTION. [§ n revealed : taking for proved, that there is an in telligent Author of nature, and natural Governor of the world. For as there is no presumption against this prior to the proof of it : so it has T)een often proved with accumulated evidence ; from this argument of analogy and final causes ; from abstract reasonings ; from, the most ancient tradition and testimony ; and from the general consent of man kind. Nor does it appear, so far as I can find, to be denied by the generality of those who profess them selves dissatisfied with the evidence of religion. $ ii. Some build tip world-systems of imagined optimism. As there are some, who, instead of thus attending to what is in fact the constitution of nature, form their notions of God's government upon hypothesis : so there are others, who indulge themselves in vain and idle speculations, how the world might possibly have been framed otherwise than it is ; and upon supposition that things might, in imagining that they should, have been disposed and carried on after a better model, than what appears in the present disposition and conduct of ' them \ Suppose now a person of such a turn of mind, to go on with his reveries, till he had at length fixed upon some particular plan of nature, as appearing to him the best. One shall scarce be thought guilty of de traction against human understanding, if one should say, even beforehand, that the plan which this specu lative person would fix upon, though he were the wisest of the sons of men, probably would not be the very best, even according to his own notions of 1 'I suppose that Butler had Bay le chaeus, Origen, Paulicians), Fitz- particularly in his eye in this gerald. passage' (see Crit. Diet., Mani- § 12] INTRODUCTION. 13 best ; whether he thought that to be so, which afforded occasions and motives for the exercise of the greatest virtue, or which was productive of the greatest happi ness, or that these two were necessarily connected, and run up into one and the same plan. However, it may not be amiss once for all to see, what would be the amount of these emendations and imaginary improvements upon the system of nature, or how far they would mislead us. And it seems there could be no stopping, till we came to some such conclusions as these : that all creatures should at first be made as perfect and as happy as they were capable of ever being : that nothing, to be sure, of hazard or danger should be put upon them to do ; some in dolent persons would perhaps think nothing at all : or certainly, that effectual care should be taken, that they should, whether necessarily or not, yet eventually and in fact, always do what was right and most conducive to happiness, which would be thought easy for infinite power to effect ; either by not giving them any principles which would endanger their going wrong ; or by laying the right motive of action in every instance before their minds continually in so strong a manner, as would never fail of inducing them to act conformably to it : and that the whole method of government by punishments should be rejected as absurd ; as an awkward roundabout method of carrying things on ; nay, as contrary to a principal purpose, for which it would be supposed creatures were made, namely, happiness. $ 12. But, even if agreed as to ends, we are incompetent judges of means. Now, without considering what is to be said in particular to the several parts of this train of folly 14 INTRODUCTION. [§ 13 and extravagance ; what has been above intimated, is a full direct general answer to it, namely, that we may see beforehand that we have not faculties for this kind of speculation. For though it be admitted, that, from the first principles of our nature, we unavoidably judge or determine some ends to be absolutely in themselves preferable to others, and that the ends now mentioned, or if they run up into one, that this one is absolutely the best ; and consequently that we must conclude the ultimate end designed, in the constitution of nature and con duct of Providence, is the most virtue and happiness possible : yet we are far from being able to judge what particular disposition of things would be most friendly and assistant to virtue ; or what means might be absolutely necessary to produce the most happiness in a system of such extent as our own world may be, taking in all that is past and to come, though we should suppose it detached from the whole of things 1. Indeed we are so far from being able to judge of this, that we are not judges what may be the necessary means of raising and conducting one person to the highest perfection and happiness of his nature. Nay, even in the little affairs of the present life, we find men of different educations and ranks are not competent judges of the conduct of each other. $ 13. E. g., as an end, that virtue must be happiness, and vice misery, for us all, Our whole nature leads us to ascribe all moral perfection to God, and to deny all imperfection of 1 This is possibly a first glimpse in an unknown degree the breadth given us of an idea rooted in of the stage on which they are Butler'sphilosophical speculations, visibly carried on. See inf. c. iii. that the operations of this world 26, 28. are of an eventual scope exceeding § 14] INTRODUCTION. 15 him. And this will for ever be a practical proof of his moral character, to such as will consider what a practical proof is ; because it is the voice of God speaking in us. And from hence we conclude, that^ virtue must be the happiness, and vice the misery, of every creature ; and that regularity and order and right cannot but prevail finally in a universe under his government 1. But we are in no sort judges, what are the necessary means of accomplishing this end. $ 14. Will build on the experienced conduct of nature to intelligent creatures. Let us then, instead of that idle and not very innocent employment of forming imaginary models of a world, and schemes of governing it, turn our thoughts to what we experience to be the conduct of nature with respect to intelligent creatures ; which may be resolved into general laws or rules of admin istration, in the same way as many of the laws of nature respecting inanimate matter may be collected from experiments. And let us compare the known constitution and course of things with what is said to be the moral system of nature ; the acknowledged dispensations of Providence, or that government which we find ourselves under, with what religion teaches us to believe and expect ; and see whether they are not analogous and of a piece. And upon such a comparison it will, I think, be found, that they are very much so : that both may be traced up to the same general laws, and resolved into the same principles of divine conduct. 1 It must not be supposed that supposition, sustained by our ex- this final triumph dispenses with perience, that the inequalities of all rendering of account for the that period will be subservient to period which precedes it. We have the purposes of discipline in the here to introduce the reasonable improvement of characters. 16 INTRODUCTION. [§§ 15, 16 § 15. And so vindicate both religion and its evidences. The analogy here proposed to be considered is of pretty large extent, and consists of several parts, in some, more, in others, less, exact. In some few instances perhaps it may amount to a real practical proof; in others not so. Yet in these it is a con firmation of what is proved other ways. It will un deniably show, what too many want to have shown them, that the system of religion, both natural and revealed, considered only as a system, and prior to the proof of it, is not a subject of ridicule, unless that of nature be so too. And it will afford an answer to almost all objections against the system both of natural and revealed religion ; though not perhaps an answer in so great a degree, yet in a very considerable degree an answer to the objections against the evidence of it : for objections against a proof, and objections against what is said to be proved, the reader will observe are different things. § 16. Chapter of summaries : Beligion. (a) Natural, in five heads ; (b) Revealed, in six heads x. Now the divine government of the world, implied in the notion of religion in general and of Chris- 1 See note on I. ii. 4. Here we hav e a summary : — Natural Beligion. Revealed Religion. 1. A future life, I. i. I. Sin, ruin, and a blinded sense, 2. Of reward and punishment, required a further plan, II. i. I. ii. 2. Proved by miracles, II. ii. 3. For good and evil conduct, 3- Contents partly strange and I. iii. unexpected, II. iii. 4. This life a probation, I. iv. 4- Constituting a scheme or 5. And discipline, I. v. system, II. iv. 5- Worked by the Messiah for our [Objection of Necessity, I. vi. recovery, II. v. Scheme known only in part, 6. Partially revealed and with I. vii.] partial evidence, II. vi, vii. § 16] INTRODUCTION. 17 tianity, contains in it ; that mankind is appointed to live in a future state e ; that there every one shall be rewarded or punished f; rewarded or punished respectively for all that behaviour here, which we comprehend under the words, virtuous or vicious, morally good or evil s : that our present life is a pro bation, a state of trial11, and of discipline1, for that future one ; notwithstanding the objections, which men may fancy they have, from notions of necessity, against there being any such moral plan as this at all k ; and whatever objections may appear to lie against the wisdom and goodness of it, as it stands so imperfectly made known to us at present ' : that this world being in a state of apostasy and wicked ness, and consequently of ruin, and the sense both of their condition and duty being greatly corrupted amongst men, this gave occasion for an additional dis pensation of Providence ; of the utmost importance™ ; proved by miracles n ; but containing in it many things appearing to us strange and not to have been expected ° ; a dispensation of Providence, which is a scheme or system of things p ; carried on by the mediation of a divine person, the Messiah, in order to the recovery of the world 1 ; yet not revealed to all men, nor proved with the strongest possible evidence to all those to whom it is revealed ; but only to such a part of mankind, and with such particular evidence as the wisdom of God thought fit1". e Part I. Ch. i. f Ch. ii. s Ch. iii. h Ch. iv. i Ch. v. k Ch. vi. l Ch. vii. >» Part II. Ch. i. " Ch. ii. 0 Ch. iii. p Ch. iv. 1 Ch. v. J Ch. vi, vii. VOL. I. c 18 INTRODUCTION. § 17. Will show that both rest on analogies from the constitution and course of nature. The design then of the following Treatise will be to show, that the several parts principally objected against in this moral and Christian dispensation, including its scheme, its publication, and the proof which God has afforded us of its truth ; that the particular parts principally objected against in this whole dispensation, are analogous to what is expe rienced in the constitution and course of nature, or Providence ; that the chief objections themselves which are alleged against the former, are no other than what may be alleged with like justness against the latter, where they are found in fact to be incon clusive J ; and that this argument from analogy is in general unanswerable, and undoubtedly of weight on the side of religion s, notwithstanding the objections which may seem to lie against it, and the real ground which there may be for difference of opinion, as to the particular degree of weight which is to be laid upon it. This is a general account of what may be looked for in the following Treatise. And I shall begin it with that which is the foundation of all our hopes and of all our fears ; all our hopes and fears, which are of any consideration ; I mean a future life. 8 Part II. Ch. viii. 1 It is charged by some against will be observed that, on the con- Butler, that he leaves ' the course trary, even in this contracted sum- of nature, or Providence,' to meet mary he inserts the express pro- unprotected the storm of objections viso on its behalf, conveyed in the carried over to it from Religion, words 'where they are found in which he has in a manner ex- fact to be inconclusive.' Comp. I. onerated by the transfer. But it vii. 3. THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION TO THE CONSTITUTION AND COURSE OF NATURE PART I OF NATURAL RELIGION CHAPTER I\ OF A FUTURE LIFE. $ I. Let experience test for us the probable effect of death. STRANGE difficulties have been raised by some concerning personal identity, or the sameness of living agents, implied in the notion of our existing now and hereafter, or in any two successive moments ; 1 If we set out from the sen- principal hopes and fears, so that tence in which Origen has supplied without it men will not cross the the basis ofthe Analogy, the natural threshold of this inquiry. order of the subject would probably 2. That it had been darkened suggest dealing with the pheno- and, so to speak, intercepted, by mena and experience of life before speculations then fresh in the considering those of death. But public mind respecting personal the author seems to have given identity, a subject lying at the precedence to this subject on the root of the doctrine. (See Locke, special and double grounds : On. the Understanding, II. xxvii. 10.) 1. That the doctrine of a future He however hereby exposed him- life is the foundation of all our selfto these inconveniences: (i)That C 2 20 OF A FUTURE LIFE. [I.i. which whoever thinks it worth while, may see con sidered in the first Dissertation at the end of this Treatise. But without regard to any of them here, let us consider what the analogy of nature, and the several changes which we have undergone, and those death rather hides than exhibits the course of nature with respect to our condition, by shutting off all the evidence of what follows, so that his argument works at a disadvantage from scantiness of material in a narrowed field. (2) That a chapter purporting to treat ' of a future life ' seemed to promise a full discussion of the subject ; whereas here the author is confined to a very partial treat ment, and does not, indeed cannot, present at all the great moral argument in favour of our survival, while the general doctrine of the natural immortality of the soul (on which he reserves his opinion) seems to have no natural place in the discussion, as it is not derived from the ' constitution and course of nature.' Hence there may arise with some a sense of disappointment with the contents of the chapter, which may perhaps be removed or mitigated if we bear steadily in mind that the author was confined by the conditions of his work to a closely limited and partial in vestigation. He has to leave aside all moral arguments whatever: and the sum of what he can do is to rebut adverse presumptions drawn from the extinction of our sensu ous life ; to marshal such favour able presumptions as he can gather from certain observed facts, while not venturing to lay great stress upon them ; and to give as the main considerations in his favour, the incapacity of death to destroy perhaps the corporeal but certainly the mental life, and the argument from continuance. Now that last argument in favour of survival as sumes a great strength when we can take our stand upon the moral incompleteness of our present ex istence. But this is for the present a forbidden topic ; and, in connec tion with merely physical con siderations, the contention seems hardly corroborated enough to bear our laying any very great stress upon it. On the whole it may seem that the best mode of conceivingButler's attitude is to treat the two heads of argument as one ; and to put it thus. Considering the disproof which has been given of any power possessed by death to destroy men tal (and, it might have been added, still more to destroy moral) quali ties, and finding these indestructi ble qualities nowactually embodied in a living subject, it is strictly rational, on grounds quite apart from religion, to suggest the sur vival of that subject after the change brought about by death, as at least a matter of high proba bility. Angus (p. 19), citing Chalmers in aid, observes that while this chapter cannot be taken as sup plying an affirmative proof of the future life, it is triumphant in the confutation of objections. Observe Butler's own claim in § 32. § 2] OF A FUTURE LIFE. 21 which we know we may undergo without being destroyed, suggest, as to the effect which death may, or may not, have upon us ; and whether it be not from thence probable, that we may survive this change, and exist in a future state of life and perception. § 2. In us and in other creatures identity survives great changes. [I.] From our being born into the present world in the helpless imperfect state of infancy, and having arrived from thence to mature age, we find it to be a general law of nature in our own species, that the same creatures, the same individuals, should exist in degrees of life and perception, with capacities of action, of enjoyment and suffering, in one period of their being, greatly different from those appointed them in another period of it. And in other crea tures the same law holds. For the difference of their capacities and states of life at their birth (to go no higher) and in maturity; the change of worms into flies, and the vast enlargement of their loco motive powers by such change : and birds and insects bursting the shell their habitation, and by this means entering into a new world, furnished with new ac commodations for them, and finding a new sphere of action assigned them ; these are instances of this general law of nature. Thus all the various and wonderful transformations of animals are to be taken into consideration here '. ! 1 Fitzgerald observes that in his the womb we are entirely deprived comparison of states Butler does of any medium in which to act ; not allow for the fact that death and Butler's comparison is one not differs from the others in seeming rigid, but only general. It is con- to deprive us wholly of bodily or- ceivable that the death-state may ganisation. On the other hand, in be found to differ from known life- 22 OF A FUTURE LIFE. [I. i. § 3. Death may be no greater. But the states of life in which we ourselves existed formerly in the womb and in our infancy, are almost as different from our present in mature age, as it is possible to conceive any two states or degrees of life can be. Therefore, that we are to exist hereafter in a state as different (suppose) from our present, as this is from our former, is but according to the analogy of nature ; according to a natural order or appointment of the very same kind, with what we have already experienced. § 4. Unless it has a power to destroy, continuance after it is to be presumed. [II. ] We know we are endued with capacities of action, of happiness and misery : for we are conscious of acting, of enjoying pleasure and suffering pain. Now that we have these powers and capacities before death, is a presumption that we shall retain them through and after death ; indeed a probability of it abundantly sufficient to act upon, unless there be some positive reason to think that death is the destruction of those living powers J : because there states, only in such a way that the by showing that even within the differences between one life-state known limits of existence it admits and another may be 'almost,' if of enormous diversities. not altogether, as great. ] Dr. Eagar, one of the most Butler is not here dealing with recent writers on the Analogy, and any objection to a future life in general a supporter of its argu- which may be grounded on the ments, holds that this chapter is phenomenon of death, but only ' out of tune with present know- dealing with the novelty of that ledge ' : which he explains by saying state to which it may be intro- that no one would now suggest ducing us. Death seems to suggest that our reflective powers ' might that, if there be a future state, it be independent ' of our physical must be very foreign to the present organs (Butlers Analogy and Mo- state. It seems legitimate to reply dem Thought, c. iv. p. 102). The §§3,4] OF A FUTURE LIFE. 23 is in every case a probability, that all things will continue as we experience they are, in all respects, except those in which we have some reason to think they will be altered. This is that kindA of presump tion or probability from analogy, expressed in the very word continuance, which seems our only natural reason for believing the course of the world will continue to-morrow, as it has done so far as our experience or knowledge of history can carry us back1. Nay, it seems our only reason for believing, that any one substance now existing will continue to exist a moment longer ; the self-existent substance only excepted. Thus if men were assured that the unknown event, death, was not the destruction of our faculties of perception and of action, there would be no apprehension, that any other power or event unconnected with this of death, would destroy these faculties just at the instant of each creature's death ; and therefore no doubt but that they would remain a I say land of presumption or probability ; for I do not mean to affirm that there is the same degree of conviction, that our living powers will continue after death, as there is, that our substances will. assertion is one which Butler has adopt Butler's own language, ' we nowhere made. The word is indeed, see with our eyes as with glasses.' on account of its ambiguity, alto- The verbal surrender of Butler's gether unsuitable. He continually argument appears to be a pure recognises in various forms the mistake. See further on §§ 10 and near relation between the living 14. powers and the bodily organs. 1 Continuance, however, only But in § 23 he points out that raises this presumption in connec- the living powers do not depend tion with purpose ; and while the upon the body ' in the manner ' in purpose for which the substance which perception by our organs of exists remains not yet accomplished sense does. And Dr. Eagar goes in full, the continuance of its ex- on to show (p. 105) that the phy- istence until the full accomplish- sical changes in the brain which ment may be reasonably presumed. accompany the act of perception See note on § 1. ' are yet different from it,' and to 24 OF A FUTURE LIFE. [I. i. after it : which shows the high probability that our living powers will continue after death, unless there be some ground to think that death is their de struction13. For, if it would be in a manner certain that we should survive death, provided it were certain that death would not be our destruction, it must be highly probable we shall survive it, if there be no ground to think death will be our destruction. § 5. Mere apprehension to the contrary is of no weight. Now though I think it must be acknowledged, that prior to the natural and moral proofs of a future life commonly insisted upon, there would arise a general confused suspicion, that in the great shock and alter ation which we shall undergo by death, we, i.e. our living powers, might be wholly destroyed ; yet even prior to those proofs, there is really no particular distinct ground or reason for. this apprehension at all, so far as I can find. If there be, it must arise either from the reason of the thing, or from the analogy of nature. b Destruction of living powers is a manner of expression un- Distinguish destruc- avoidably ambiguous ; and may signify either tion absolute from the destruction of a living being, so as that the destruction of pre- same living being shall be uncapable of ever sent conditions. perceiving or acting again at all : or the de struction of those means and instruments by which it is capable of its present life, of its present state of perception and of action. It is here used in the former sense. When it is used in the latter, the epithet present is added. The loss of a man's eye is a destruction of living powers in the latter sense. But we have no reason to think the destruction of living powers, in the former sense, to be possible. We have no more reason to think a being endued with living powers, ever loses them during its whole existence, than to believe that a stone ever acquires them. §§ 5, 6] OF A FUTURE LIFE. 25 § 6. (a) In the reason of the thing ; for death does not suggest the destruction of the living agent. But we cannot argue from the reason of the thing, that death is the destruction of living agents, because we know not at all what death is in itself; but only some of its effects, such as the dissolution of flesh, skin, and bones. And these effects do in no wise appear to imply the destruction of a living agent. And besides, as we are greatly in the dark, upon what the exercise of our living powers depends, so we are wholly ignorant what the powers them selves depend upon ; the powers themselves as dis tinguished, not only from their actual exercise, but also from the present capacity of exercising them ; and as opposed to their destruction : for sleep, or however a swoon, shows us, not only that these powers exist when they are not exercised, as the passive power of motion does in inanimate matter ; but shows also that they exist, when there is no present capacity of exercising them : or that the capacities of exercising them for the present, as well as the actual exercise of them, may be sus pended, and yet the powers themselves remain un- destroyed. Since then we know not at all upon what the existence of our living powers depends, this shows further, there can no probability be collected from the reason of the thing, that death will be their destruction : because their existence may depend upon somewhat in no degree affected by death ; upon somewhat quite out of the reach of this king of terrors1. So that there is nothing 1 We have also probable evidence upon any thing that we know to be that their existence does notdepend affected by death. Inf. §§ 14, 16, 29. 26 OF A FUTURE LIFE. [I. i. more certain, than that the reason of the thing shows us no connection between death, and the destruction of living agents. § 7. Or (b) in the analogy of nature. It destroys only the sensible proof of living powers. Nor can we find any thing throughout the whole analogy of nature, to afford us even the slightest presumption, that animals ever lose their living powers ; much less, if it were possible, that they lose them by death : for we have no faculties wherewith to trace any beyond or through it, so as to see what becomes of them. This event re moves them from our view. It destroys the sensible proof, which we had before their death, of their being possessed of living powers, but does not appear to afford the least reason to believe that they are, then, or by that event, deprived of them. § 8. Bepeats arguments of §§ 3 and 4. And our knowing, that they were possessed of these powers, up to the very period to which we have faculties capable of tracing them, is itself a probability of their retaining them, beyond it. And this is confirmed, and a sensible credibility is given to it, by observing the very great and astonishing changes which we have experienced; so great, that our existence in another state of life, of perception and of action, will be but according to a method of providential conduct, the like to which has been already exercised even with regard to ourselves ; according to a course of nature, the like to which we have already gone through. §§7-i°] OF A FUTURE LIFE. 27 § 9. Warning against trespasses of the imaginatl ion However, as one cannot but be greatly sensible, how difficult it is to silence imagination enough to make the voice of reason even distinctly heard in this case ; as we are accustomed, from our youth up, to indulge that forward delusive faculty, ever obtruding beyond its sphere ; of some assistance indeed to apprehension, but the author of all error : as we plainly lose ourselves in gross and crude con ceptions of things, taking for granted that we are acquainted with, what indeed we are wholly ignorant of: it may be proper to consider the imaginary pre sumptions, that death will be our destruction, arising from these kinds of early and lasting prejudices ; and to show how little they can really amount to, even though we cannot wholly divest ourselves of them. And, § 10. Such apprehension (c) is futile, unless the living agent be discerptible : which it seems not to be. [I.] All presumption of death's being the destruc tion of living beings, must go upon supposition that they are compounded ; and so, discerptible 2. But 1 Butler appears here to charge sage. In imagination proper it upon the imagination all the er- would appear that Butler was by raticwhims and fancies of thebrain. no means wanting, if we may These no doubt are regardless of judge from the mode in which evidence, and apt, too, to palm he treats the subject of beauty, themselves upon us as if they were referring it as he does to fixed fact. But imagination proper is principles. See Serm. xi. 21. totally different, and knows itself 2 Dr. Eagar refers us to a modern to be a denizen of a world dif- physiological theory, which ap- ferent from the world of fact, and pears to go far in supporting the unsuited to masquerading in any ideas propounded here and in character other than its own. It § 14. 'In the highly organised seems necessary to make these multicellular being, most of these allowances in considering the pas- cells are what are called somatic 28 OF A FUTURE LIFE. [I. i. since consciousness is a single and indivisible power, it should seem that the subject in which it resides must be so too. For were the motion of any par ticle of matter absolutely one and indivisible, so as that it should imply a contradiction to suppose part of this motion to exist, and part not to exist, i. e. part of this matter to move, and part to be at rest ; then its power of motion would be indivisible ; and so also would the subject in which the power inheres, namely, the particle of matter : for if this could be divided into two, one part might be moved and the other at rest, which is contrary to the sup position. In like manner it has been argued0, and, for any thing appearing to the contrary, justly, that since the perception or consciousness, which we have of our own existence, is indivisible, so as that it is a contradiction to suppose one part of it should be here and the other there ; the perceptive power, or c See Dr. Clarke's Letter to Mr. Dodwell, and the defences of it. cells, i. e. cells that are continually mortality arises out of the fact of being changed and replaced during death,unlessthe soulbecliscerptible, life, whose persistence is not ne- and therefore material. The pas- cessary to the life of the being. sage then does not seek to rule the But the cell, that has brought life, question of the soul's immortality. is of a different kind. It is never May it not be truly said, that of replaced, and never loses its life. the growth and dissolution of the The cell of the unicellular animal body we know a little, but of is of this kind, a germ-cell. From the generation and dissolution the nature of the case it can have of the soul, considered as natural no somatic cells' (Eagar, p. in). processes, nothing whatever ? But I need hardly add that these words Butler is not made responsible by are quoted by way of illustration what he has -written for Clarke's onry- doctrine. It is indivisibility on As regards the text, we must which he argues ; and so he escapes closely observe its terms. This is the association with matter which not an argument to prove the im- ¦ attachestotheword'indiscerptible.' mortality of the soul ; but only to On the Natural Immortality of show that no presumption of its the Soul, see inf. §§ 21, 31. "] OF A FUTURE LIFE. 29 the power of consciousness, is indivisible too : and consequently the subject in which it resides ; i. e. the conscious being. $11. And, if not, the body is mere foreign matter, ivithout nisus toivards destroying us. Now upon supposition that living agent each man calls himself, is thus a single being, which there is at least no more difficulty in conceiving than in con ceiving it to be a compound, and of which there is the proof now mentioned ; it follows, that our organized bodies are no more ourselves or part of ourselves, than any other matter around us. And it is as easy to conceive, how matter, which is no part of ourselves, may be appropriated to us in the manner which our present bodies are ; as how we can receive impressions from, and have power over any matter. It is as easy to conceive, that we may exist out of bodies, as in them ; that we might have animated bodies of any other organs and senses wholly different from these now given us, and that we may hereafter animate these same or new bodies variously modified and organized ; as to conceive how we can animate such bodies as our present1. And lastly, the dissolution of all these several organized bodies, supposing ourselves to have successively animated them, would have no more conceivable 1 This appears a hazardous as- In Dante the spirits cast no sertion. May it not even be asked shadow from the sun, yet are, as whether the human faculties have inall other points, absolutely visible ever yet fully conceived an exis- in shapes. Compare the case of tence living and active, and yet the anxiety of demons in the N. T. wholly discharged from body ? It to be in bodies ; and the language is of course another question of St. Paul (2 Cor. xii. 2] : ' whether whether there may not actually be in the body, or out of the body, existence under such conditions. I cannot tell.' 30 OF A FUTURE LIFE. [I. i. tendency to destroy the living beings ourselves, or deprive us of living faculties, the faculties of per ception and of action, than the dissolution of any foreign matter, which we are capable of receiving impressions from, and making use of for the common occasions of life *. $ 12. Observation likeivise proves the body to be no part of ourselves. [IL] The simplicity and absolute oneness of a living agent cannot indeed, from the nature of the thing, be properly proved by experimental observations. But as these fall in with the supposition of its unity, so they plainly lead us to conclude certainly, that our gross organized bodies, with which we perceive the objects of sense, and with which we act, are no part of ourselves 2 ; and therefore show us, that we have no reason to believe their destruction to be ours : even without determining whether our living substances be material or immaterial. For we see by experience, that men may lose their limbs, then- organs of sense, and even the greatest part of these bodies, and yet remain the same living agents. And persons can trace up the existence of themselves to a time, when the bulk of their bodies was extremely 1 The impressions from other 2 In scripture, the body is indeed foreign matter are upon the ex- our ' tabernacle ' • but it is also the terior organs of the body. But temple of the Holy Ghost (i Cor. these organs, we now know, trans- vi. 19), and we are formed of body, mit tidings to the brain, and there soul, and spirit (1 Thess. v. 23). the body has communications with To warrant Butler's assertion we the soul, as to which we know that must confine it strictly to that there is nothing similar in the which indeed he is arguing upon, contact of ordinary matter, though namely, the present and natural their nature remains wholly inscrut- body as distinct from the future able to us. and spiritual body. S§ia-i4] OF A FUTURE LIFE. 31 small, in comparison of what it is in mature age : and we cannot but think, that they might then have lost a considerable part of that small body, and yet have remained the same living agents ; as they may now lose great part of their present body, and remain so. § 13. As does the fluxion of its particles. And it is certain, that the bodies of all animals are in a constant flux, from that never-ceasing attri tion, which there is in every part of them. Now things of this kind unavoidably teach us to distin guish, between these living agents ourselves, and large quantities of matter, in which we are very nearly interested : since these may be alienated, and actually are in a daily course of succession, and changing their owners ; whilst we are assured, that each living agent remains one and the same perma nent being d. And this general observation leads us on to the following ones. § 14. Unless the living agent be bulkier than the atom, no presumption against its survival. First, That we have no way of determining by experience, what is the certain bulk of the living being each man calls himself: and yet, till it be determined that it is larger in bulk than the solid elementary particles of matter, which there is no ground to think any natural power can dissolve, there is no sort of reason to think death to be the dissolution of it, of the living being, even though it should not be absolutely indiscerptible. d See Dissertation I. 32 OF A FUTURE LIFE. [I. i. § 15. If our bodies be not the ego, no ground to think any other matter is. Secondly, From our being so nearly related to and interested in certain systems of matter, suppose our flesh and bones, and afterwards ceasing to be at all related to them, the living agents ourselves remaining all this while undestroyed notwithstanding such alien ation ; and consequently these systems of matter not being ourselves : it follows further, that we have no ground to conclude any other, suppose internal systems of matter, to be the living agents ourselves ; because we can have no ground to conclude this, but from our relation to and interest in such other systems of matter : and therefore we can have no reason to conclude, what befalls those systems of matter at death, to be the destruction of the living agents. We have already several times over lost a great part or perhaps the whole of our body, according to certain common established laws of nature ; yet we remain the same living agents : when we shall lose as great a part, or the whole, by another common established law of nature, death ; why may we not also remain the same? That the alienation has been gradual in one case, and in the other will be more at once, does not prove any thing to the contrary. We have passed undestroyed through those many and great revolutions of matter, so pecu liarly appropriated to us ourselves; why should we imagine death will be so fatal to us? § 16. No proof that the original solid body, if any, is affected by death1. Nor can it be objected, that what is thus alienated or lost, is no part of our original solid body, but 1 See note on § 10. §§ 15-17] OF A FUTURE LIFE. 33 only adventitious matter ; because we may lose entire limbs, which must have contained many solid parts and vessels of the original body: or if this be not admitted, we have no proof, that any of these solid parts are dissolved or alienated by death. Though, by the way, Ave are very nearly related to that ex traneous or adventitious matter, whilst it continues united to and distending the several parts of our solid body. But after all ; the relation a person bears to those parts of his body, to which he is the most nearly related ; what does it appear to amount to but this, that the living agent, and those parts of the body, mutually affect each other? And the same thing, the same thing in kind though not in degree, may be said of all foreign matter, which gives us ideas, and which we have any power over. From these observations the whole ground of the imagina tion is removed, that the dissolution of any matter, is the destruction of a living agent, from the interest he once had in such matter. § 17. Like other instruments, our senses present objects, but do not perceive *. Thirdly, If we consider our body somewhat more distinctly, as made up of organs and instruments of perception and of motion, it will bring us to the same conclusion. Thus the common optical experi ments show, and even the observation how sight is assisted by glasses shows, that we see with our eyes in the same sense as we see with glasses. Nor is there any reason to believe, that we see with them in any other sense ; any other, I mean, which would 1 Plato, Alcibiades, i. 51 • erepov apa avdpamos icrn too o-wparos tov apa tTKVTOTopos Kni Kidnpiarrji Yei/iav iavrou. Ka\6(pda\po>v olsipyd^ovrai ', . . . erepov VOL. I. D 34 OF A FUTURE LIFE. [I. i. lead us to think the eye itself a percipient. The like is to be said of hearing : and our feeling distant solid matter by means of somewhat in our hand, seems an instance of the like kind, as to the subject we are considering. All these are instances of foreign matter, or such as is no part of our body, being instrumental in preparing objects for, and conveying them to, the perceiving power, in a manner similar or like to the manner in which our organs of sense prepare and convey them. Both are in a like way instruments of our receiving such ideas from external objects, as the Author of nature appointed those external objects to be the occasions of exciting in us. However, glasses are evidently instances of this ; namely of matter which is no part of our body, pre paring objects for and conveying them towards the perceiving power, in hke manner as our bodily organs do. And if we see with our eyes only in the same manner as we do with glasses, the like may justly be concluded, from analogy, of all our other senses. It is not intended, by any thing here said, to affirm, that the whole apparatus of vision, or of perception by any other of our senses, can be traced through all its steps, quite up to the living power of seeing, or perceiving : but that so far as it can be traced by experimental observations, so far it appears, that our organs of sense prepare and convey on objects, in order to their being perceived, in like manner as foreign matter does, without affording any shadow of appearance, that they themselves perceive. § 18. We can (ttos) part with them; and act, in dreams, without them. And that we have no reason to think our organs of sense percipients, is confirmed by instances of §§ i8, 19] OF A FUTURE LIFE. 35 persons losing some of them, the living beings them selves, their former occupiers, remaining unimpaired. It is confirmed also by the experience of dreams ; by which we find we are at. present possessed of a latent, and, what would otherwise be, an un- imagined unknown power of perceiving sensible objects, in as strong and lively a manner without our external organs of sense as with them. § 19. Limbs are instruments, and raise no presumption of one dying with them. So also with regard to our power of moving, or directing motion by will and choice : upon the destruction of a limb, this active power remains, as it evidently seems, unlessened ; so as that the living being, who has suffered this loss, would be capable of moving as before, if it had another limb to move with. It can walk by the help of an artificial leg ; just as it can make use of a pole or a lever, to reach towards itself and to move things, beyond the length and the power of its natural arm : and this last it does in the same manner as it reaches and moves, with its natural arm, things nearer and of less weight. Nor is there so much as any appearance of our limbs being endued with a power of moving or directing themselves ; though they are adapted, hke the several parts of a machine, to be the instruments of motion to each other ; and some parts of the same limb, to be instruments of motion to other parts of it. Thus a man determines, that he will look at such an object through a microscope ; or being lame suppose, that he will walk to such a place with a staff a week hence. His eyes and his feet no more determine in these cases, than the microscope and d 2 36 OF A FUTURE LIFE. [I. i. the staff. Nor is there any ground to think they any more put the determination in practice ; or that his eyes are the seers or his feet the movers, in any other sense than as the microscope and the staff are. Upon the whole then, our organs of sense and our limbs are certainly instruments, which the living persons ourselves make use of to perceive and move with : there is not any pro bability, that they are any more ; nor consequently, that we have any other kind of relation to them, than what we may have to any other foreign matter formed into instruments of perception and motion, suppose into a microscope or a staff; (I say any other kind of relation, for I am not speaking of the degree of it ;) nor consequently is there any pro bability, that the alienation or dissolution of these instruments is the destruction of the perceiving and moving agent. § 20. If we can survive such matter, why not all matter ? And thus our finding, that the dissolution of matter, in which living beings were most nearly interested, is not their dissolution; and that the destruction of several of the organs and instruments \ of perception and of motion belonging to them, is not their destruction ; shows demonstratively, that there is no ground to think that the dissolution of any other matter, or destruction of any other organs and instruments, will be the dissolution or destruction of living agents, from the like kind of relation. And we have no reason to think we stand in any other kind of relation to any thing which we find dissolved by death. §§2o, 21] OF A FUTURE LIFE. 37 § 21. Obj. Then brides may come to rational and moral nature. Answ. May, but need not l. But it is said these observations are equally appli cable to brutes : and it is thought an insuperable difficulty, that they should be immortal, and by con sequence capable of everlasting happiness. Now this manner of expression is both invidious and weak : but the thing intended by it, is really no difficulty at all, either in the way of natural or moral con sideration. For first, Suppose the invidious thing, designed in such a manner of expression, were really implied, as it is not in the least, in the natural immortality of brutes ; namely, that they must arrive at great attainments, and become rational and moral agents ; even this would be no difficulty : since we know not what latent powers and capacities they may be endued with. There was once, prior to experience, as great presumption against human creatures, as there is against the brute creatures, arriving at that degree of understanding, which we have in mature age. For we can trace up our own existence to the same original with theirs. And we find it to be a general law of nature, that creatures endued with capacities of virtue and religion should be placed in a condition of being, in which they are altogether without the use of them, for a con siderable length of their duration ; as in infancy and childhood. And great part of the human species go out of the present world, before they 1 Angus quotes from Clarke's Re- the present ; and after all there ply to Collins : ' Brutes may for all are other and stronger arguments we know become rational agents, for the future life of man, which as infants do. If not, the system of do not hold equally in the case of the universe may require the future brutes.' existence of brutes, as it requires 38 OF A FUTURE LIFE. [I. i. come to the exercise of these capacities in any degree at all. But then, secondly, The natural immortality of brutes does not in the least imply, that they are endued with any latent capacities of a rational or moral nature 1. And the economy of the universe might require, that there should be living creatures without any capacities of this kind. § 22. Our ignorance regarding them no bar to the argument as it relates to man. And all difficulties as to the manner how they are to be disposed of are so apparently and wholly founded in our ignorance, that it is wonderful they should be insisted upon by any, but such as are weak enough to think they are acquainted with the whole system of things. There is then absolutely nothing at all in this objection, which is so rhetorically urged, against the greatest part of the natural proofs or presumptions of the immortality of human minds : I say the greatest part ; for it is less applicable to the following observation, which is more peculiar to mankind : $ 23. No presumption anywhere against survival of reason, memory, and affections 2. [III.] That as it is evident our present powers and capacities of reason, memory, and affection, do not 1 Disclaiming any positive doc- 2 To the whole argument of But- trine of a rational and moral nature ler for the survival of the reason, for brutes, Butler stops short of dis- memory, and affection, Dr. Eagar claiming the argument for their appears to make a valuable addi- immortality, as implied in a spirit tion by producing the case of the distinct from the body, which arises moral powers distinctly and apart upon §§ 17-19. (Eagar, p. 107) : The natural immortality of the ' The moral powers of the man humansoulmentionedhere,isagain likewise grow, but they have no noticed in §3 1, but in neither case is period of decay, confined within there any explicit acceptance of it. the apparent limits of life. They §§22-24] OF A FUTURE LIFE. 39 depend upon our gross body in the manner in which perception by our organs of sense does ; so they do not appear to depend upon it at all in any such manner, as to give ground to think, that the dissolution of this body will be the destruction of these our present powers of reflection, as it will of our powers of sensation ; or to give ground to con clude, even that it will be so much as a suspension of the former. § 24. Our state is dual, (a) of sensation, (b) of reflection. No sign that death touches (b). Human creatures exist at present in two states of life and perception, greatly different from each other ; each of which has its own peculiar laws, and its own peculiar enjoyments and sufferings. When any of our senses are affected or appetites gratified with the objects of them, we may be said to exist or live in a state of sensation. When none of our senses are affected or appetites gratified, and yet we perceive, and reason, and act ; we may be said to exist or live in a state of reflection. Now it is by no means certain, that any thing which is dissolved by death, is any way necessary to the living being in this its state of reflection, after ideas are gained. For, though, from our present constitution and con dition of being, our external organs of sense are necessary for conveying in ideas to our reflecting powers, as carriages, and levers, and scaffolds are in architecture : yet when these ideas are brought 1 in, we are capable of reflecting in the most intense degree, and of enjoying the greatest pleasure, and not only last, but maintain their the senses, grows weak; but the full vigour, and even strengthen, man does not weaken in truth, to the end. The brain, as Well as honesty, uprightness, love.' 40 OF A FUTURE LIFE. [I. i. feeling the greatest pain, by means of that reflec tion, without any assistance from our senses; and without any at all, which we know of, from that body which will be dissolved by death. It does not appear then, that the relation of this gross body to the reflecting being is, in any degree, necessary to thinking ; to our intellectual enjoyments or suf ferings : nor, consequently, that the dissolution or alienation of the former by death, will be the destruction of those present powers, which render us capable of this state of reflection. § 25. As some mortal diseases leave the ego unaffected, this may be so with all. Further, there are instances of mortal diseases, which do not at all affect our present intellectual powers ; and this affords a presumption, that those diseases will not destroy these present powers. Indeed, from the observations made above e, it appears, that there is no presumption, from their mutually affecting each other, that the dissolution of the body is the destruction of the living agent. And by the same reasoning, it must appear too, that there is no presumption, from their mutually affecting each other, that the dissolution of the body is the destruc tion of our present reflecting powers : but instances of their not affecting each other, afford a presump tion of the contrary. Instances of mortal diseases not impairing our present reflecting powers, evidently turn our thoughts even from imagining such diseases to be the destruction of them. Several things indeed greatly affect all our living powers, and at length suspend the exercise of them ; as for instance drowsi- B Sup. §§ 15, 16. §§ 25, 26] OF A FUTURE LIFE. 41 ness, increasing till it ends in sound sleep : and from hence we might have imagined it would destroy them, till we found by experience the weakness of this way of judging. But in the diseases now men tioned, there is not so much as this shadow of probability, to lead us to any such conclusion, as to the reflecting powers which we have at present. For in those diseases, persons the moment before death appear to be in the highest vigour of life. They discover apprehension, memory, reason, all entire ; with the utmost force of affection ; sense of a char acter, of shame and honour ; and the highest mental enjoyments and sufferings, even to the last gasp : and these surely prove even greater vigour of life than bodily strength does. Now what pretence is there for thinking, that a progressive disease when arrived to such a degree, I mean that degree which is mortal, will destroy those powers, which were not impaired, which were not affected by it, during its whole progress quite up to that degree ? And if death by diseases of this kind is not the destruction of our present reflecting powers, it will scarce be thought that death by any other means is. § 26. Death may not even suspend its activity. It is obvious that this general observation may be carried on further : and there appears so little con nection between our bodily powers of sensation, and our present powers of reflection, that there is no reason to conclude, that death, which destroys the former, does so much as suspend the exercise of the latter, or interrupt our continuing to exist in the like state of reflection which we do now. For suspension of reason, memory, and the affections which they excite, is no part of the idea of death, nor is implied 42 OF A FUTURE LIFE. [I. i. in our notion of it. And our daily experiencing these powers to be exercised, without any assistance, ||that we know of, from those bodies, which will be dissolved by death ; and our finding often, that the exercise of them is so lively to the last ; these things afford a sensible apprehension, that death may not perhaps be so much as a discontinuance of the exercise of these powers, nor of the enjoyments and sufferings which it implies f. So that our posthumous life, whatever there may be in it additional to our present, yet may not be entirely beginning anew ; but going oh. § 27. Death may resemble a birth, and forthwith enlarge life. Death may, in some sort, and in some respects, answer to our birth ; which is not a suspension of the faculties which we had before it, or a total change of the state of life in which we existed when in the womb ; but a continuation of both, with such and such great alterations. Nay, for ought we know of ourselves, of our present life and of death ; death may immediately, in the natural course of things, put us into a higher and more enlarged state of life, as our birth does e ; a state f There are three distinct questions, relating to a future life, here considered : Whether death be the destruction igumen^ Q£ jjvmg agen^s . jf no^ Whether it be the destruc tion of their present powers of reflection, as it certainly is the destruction of their present powers of sensation ; and if not, Whether it be the suspension, or discontinuance of the exercise, of these present reflecting powers. Now, if there be no reason to believe the last, there will be, if that were possible, less for the next, and less still for the first. s This, according to Strabo, was the opinion of the Brachmans, vopi£,uv p.\v yap 8rj tov p,ev ivOdSe /Ji'ov, u>s av a.Kpt.rjv Kvop.ivu>v dvaC §§27-29] OF A FUTURE LIFE. 43 in which our capacities, and sphere of perception and of action, may be much greater than at present. For as our relation to our external organs of sense, renders us capable of existing in our present state of sensation ; so it may be the only natural hin drance to our existing, immediately and of course, in a higher state of reflection. The truth is, reason does not at all show us, in what state death naturally leaves us. § 28. Distinguish suspension from destruction. But were we sure, that it would suspend all our perceptive and active powers ; yet the suspension of a power and the destruction of it, are effects so totally different in kind, as we experience from sleep and a swoon, that we cannot in any wise argue from one to the other ; or conclude even to the lowest degree of probability, that the same kind of force which is sufficient to suspend our faculties, though it be increased ever so much, will be sufficient to destroy them. § 29. Vegetables, not having living powers, supply no analogy. These observations together may be sufficient to show, how little presumption there is, that death is the destruction of human creatures. However, there is the shadow of an analogy, which may lead us to imagine it is ; the supposed likeness which is observed tov oe Odvarov, yiveaiv eis tov oVtojs (iiov, (cat tov ev8aip.ova tois (pi\oo-ocprjo-ao-i. Lib. xv. p. 1039, ed. Amst. 1707. To which opinion perhaps Antoninus may allude in these words, Isa. lx, 21. §§31,32] GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 89 \ 31. If these anticipations seem trifles for virtue, what, if they were for vice ? Consider now the general system of religion : that the government of the world is uniform, and one, and moral ; that virtue and right shall finally have the advantage, and prevail over fraud and lawless force, over the deceits, as well as the violence of wickedness, under the conduct of one supreme governor: and from the observations above made, it will appear, that God has, by our reason, given us to see a peculiar connection in the several parts of this scheme, and a tendency towards the completion of it arising out of the very nature of virtue : which tendency is to be considered as somewhat moral in the essential constitution of things. If any one should think all this to be of little importance ; I desire him to consider, what he would think, if vice had, essentially, and in its nature, these advan tageous tendencies ; or if virtue had essentially the direct contrary ones. § 32, His aim is to shoiv whither the facts of nature point. But it may be objected, that, notwithstanding all these natural effects and these natural tendencies of virtue ; yet things may be now going on through out the universe, and may go on hereafter, in the same mixed way as here at present upon earth: virtue sometimes prosperous, sometimes depressed ; vice sometimes punished, sometimes successful. The answer to which is, that it is not the purpose of this chapter, nor of this Treatise, properly to prove God's perfect moral government over the world, or the truth of Religion; but to observe what there is in go OF THE MORAL [I. in. the constitution and course of nature, to confirm the proper proof of it, supposed to be known : and that the weight of the foregoing observations to this purpose may be thus distinctly proved. § 33- But this mixed state, if continued, ivould not conclude in favour of vice. Pleasure and pain are indeed to a certain degree, say to a very high degree, distributed amongst us without any apparent regard to the merit or demerit of characters. And were there nothing else con cerning this matter discernible in the constitution and course of nature ; there would be no ground from the constitution and course of nature to hope or to fear, that men would be rewarded or punished hereafter according to their deserts : which, how ever, it is to be remarked, implies, that even then there would be no ground from appearances to think, that vice upon the whole would have the advantage, rather than that virtue would. And thus the proof of a future state of retribution would rest upon the usual known arguments for it : which are I think plainly unanswerable ; and would be so, though there were no additional confirmation of them from the things above insisted on. But these things are a very strong confirmation of them. For, § 34. For God is shown to have taken sides already in the contest. First, They show, that the Author of nature is not indifferent to virtue and vice. They amount to a declaration from him, determinate and not to be evaded, in favour of one, and against the other: such a declaration, as there is nothing to be set over against or answer, on the part of vice. So §§33-36] GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 91 that were a man, laying aside the proper proof of religion, to determine from the course of nature only, whether it were most probable, that the righteous or the wicked would have the advantage in a future life ; there can be no doubt, but that he would determine the probability to be, that the former would. The course of nature then, in the view of it now given, furnishes us with a real prac tical proof of the obligations of religion. § 35. The change we hope is in degree only, not in kind. Secondly, When, conformably to what religion teaches us, God shall reward and punish virtue and vice as such, so as that every one shall, upon the whole, have his deserts ; this distributive justice will not be a thing different in kind, but only in degree, from what we experience in his present government. It will be that in effect, toward which we now see a tendency. It will be no more than the completion of that moral government, the principles and beginning of which have been shown, beyond all dispute, discernible in the present constitution and course of nature. And from hence it follows, § 36. The lower degree warrants hope of the higher. Thirdly, That, as under the natural government of God, our experience of those kinds and degrees of happiness and misery, which we do experience at present, gives just ground to hope for and to fear, higher degrees and other kinds of both in a future state, supposing a future state admitted : so under his moral government, our experience, that virtue and vice are, in the manners above mentioned, actually rewarded and punished at present, in a certain degree, gives just ground to hope and to 92 OF THE MORAL [I. m. fear, that they may be rewarded and punished in an higher degree hereafter. It is acknowledged indeed that this alone is not sufficient ground to think, that they actually will be rewarded and punished in an higher degree, rather than in a lower : but then, § 37. Essential tendency supplies a firmer basis than accidental hindrance. Lastly, There is sufficient ground to think so, from the good and bad tendencies of virtue and vice. For these tendencies are essential, and founded in the nature of things : whereas the hindrances to their becoming effect are, in numberless cases, not necessary, but artificial only. Now it may be much more strongly argued, that these tendencies, as well as the actual rewards and punishments, of virtue and vice, which arise directly out of the nature of things, will remain hereafter, than that the accidental hindrances of them will. And if these hindrances do not remain ; those rewards and punishments cannot but be carried on much further towards the perfection of moral government : i. e. the tendencies of virtue and vice will become effect : but when, or where, or in what particular way, cannot be known at all, but by revelation. § 38. Sum of the foregoing arguments. Upon the whole : There is a kind of moral govern ment implied in God's natural government k : virtue and vice are naturally rewarded and punished as beneficial and mischievous to society l ; and rewarded and punished directly as virtue and vice m. The notion then of a moral scheme of government is not fictitious, but natural ; for it is suggested to ^ Sup. §§ 8-1 1, l Ibid. >» Sup. §§ 12, 13. §§37,38] GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 93 our thoughts by the constitution and course of nature : and the execution of this scheme is actually begun, in the instances here mentioned. And these things are to be considered as a declaration of the Author of nature, for virtue, and against vice : they give a credibility to the supposition of their being rewarded and punished hereafter ; and also ground to hope and to fear, that they may be rewarded and punished in higher degrees than they are here. And as all this is confirmed, so the argument for religion, from the constitution and course of nature, is carried on further, by observing, that there are natural tendencies, and, in innumerable cases, only artificial hindrances, to this moral scheme's being carried on much further towards perfection, than it is at present11. The notion then of a moral scheme of government, much more perfect than what is seen, is not a fictitious, but a natural notion ; for it is suggested to our thoughts, by the essential tendencies of virtue and vice. And these tendencies are to be considered as intimations, as implicit pro mises and threatenings, from the Author of nature, of much greater rewards and punishments to follow virtue and vice, than do at present. And indeed, every natural tendency, which is to continue, but which is hindered from becoming effect by only accidental causes, affords a presumption, that such tendency will, some time or other, become effect : a presumption in degree proportionable to the length of the duration, through which such tendency will continue. And from these things together, arises a real presumption, that the moral scheme of govern ment established in nature, shall be carried on much n Sup. §§ 22-26. 94 PROBA TION, [I. iv. further towards perfection hereafter ; and, I think, a presumption that it will be absolutely completed. But from these things, joined with the moral nature which God has given us, considered as given us by him, arises a practical proof0 that it will be com pleted : a proof from fact ; and therefore a distinct one from that, which is deduced from the eternal and unalterable relations, the fitness and unfitness of actions. CHAPTER IV. OF A STATE OF PROBATION, AS IMPLYING TRIAL, DIFFI CULTIES, AND DANGER. § I. This probationary life involves trial, difficulty, danger, and future account. THE general doctrine of religion, that our present life is a state of probation for a future one, com prehends under it several particular things, distinct from each other. But the first, and most common meaning of it seems to be, that our future interest is now depending, and depending upon ourselves ; that we have scope and opportunities here, for that good and bad behaviour, which God will reward and punish hereafter ; together with temptations to one, as well as inducements of reason to the other. And this is, in great measure, the same with saying, that we are under the moral government of God, and to give an account of our actions to him. For the notion of a future account and general righteous judgment, implies some sort of temptations ° See this proof drawn out briefly, chap. vi. §§i,2] AS IMPLYING TRIAL. 95 to what is wrong : otherwise there would be no moral possibility of doing wrong, nor ground for judgment, or discrimination. But there is this dif ference, that the word probation is more distinctly and particularly expressive of allurements to wrong, or difficulties in adhering uniformly to what is right, and of the danger of miscarrying by such tempta tions, than the words moral government. A state of probation then, as thus particularly implying in it trial, difficulties, and danger, may require to be con sidered distinctly by itself. § 2. Does the like for this world by natural government, And as the moral government of God, which reli gion teaches us, implies, that we are in a state of trial with regard to a future world : so also his natural government over us implies, that we are in a state of trial, in the like sense, with regard to the present world. Natural government by rewards and punishments, as much implies natural trial, as moral government does moral trial. The natural government of God here meant a consists in his annexing pleasure to some actions, and pain to others, which are in our power to do or forbear, and in giving us notice of such appointment before hand. This necessarily implies, that he has made our happiness and misery, or our interest, to depend in part upon ourselves. And so far as men have temptations to any course of action which will proba bly occasion them greater temporal inconvenience and uneasiness, than satisfaction ; so far their temporal interest is in danger from themselves, or they are in a state of trial with respect to it. Now people a Chap. ii. 96 PROBA TION, [I. iv. often blame others, and even themselves, for their misconduct in their temporal concerns. And we find many are greatly wanting to themselves, and miss of that natural happiness, which they might have obtained in the present life : perhaps every one does in some degree. But many run them selves into great inconvenience, and into extreme distress and misery : not through incapacity of know ing better, and doing better for themselves, which would be nothing to the present purpose ; but through their own fault. And these things necessarily imply temptation, and danger of miscarrying, in a greater or less degree, with respect to our worldly interest or happiness. Every one too, without having religion in his thoughts, speaks of the hazards which young people run, upon their setting out in the world : hazards from other causes, than merely their ignor ance, and unavoidable accidents. And some courses of vice, at least, being contrary to men's worldly interest or good ; temptations to these must at the same time be temptations to forego our present and our future interest. Thus in our natural or temporal capacity, we are in a state of trial, i. e. of difficulty and danger, analogous, or like to our moral and religious trial. § 3. This probation, in both spheres, is twofold : (a) by temptation ab extra ; This will more distinctly appear to any one, who thinks it worth while, more distinctly, to consider, what it is which constitutes our trial in both capa cities, and to observe, how mankind behave under it. And that which constitutes this our trial, in both these capacities, must be somewhat either in our external circumstances, or in our nature. For, on §§3,4] AS IMPLYING TRIAL. 97 the one hand, persons may be betrayed into wrong behaviour upon surprise, or overcome upon any other very singular and extraordinary external occasions ; who would, otherwise, have preserved their character of prudence and of virtue : in which cases, every one, ift speaking of the wrong behaviour of these persons, would impute it to such particular external circumstances. § 4. And (b) by ill habits contracted, and passions. And on^ the other hand, men who have contracted habits of vice and folly of any kind, or have some particular passions in excess, will seek opportunities, and, as it were, go out of their way, to gratify them selves in these respects, at the expense of their wisdom and their virtue ; led to it, as every one would say, not by external temptations, but by such habits and passions. And the account of this last case is, that particular passions are no more coin cident x with prudence, or that reasonable self-love 2, the end of which is our worldly interest, than they are with the principle of virtue and religion ; but often draw contrary ways to one, as well as to the other : and so such particular passions are as much 1 In the Sermons Butler has set in Serm. iii. 12 : 'Self-love then, forth that self-love is entirely dis- though confined to the interest of tinct from particular passions and the present world, does in general affections. Serm. i. 6, xi. 8 ; also perfectly coincide with virtue : ' Serm. ii. 15. 'though' being equivalent to 'even 2 I understand Butler here to if,1 ' even when.' It may be ad- mean no more than his words mitted that the grammatical form actually convey, namely, that there is awkward : but the alterna- is a form or attitude of self-love tive interpretation seems to be which addresses itself to ourworldly nothing less than absurd. For interest, and that it is reasonable : Butler associates reasonable self- but not that this interest is the love with conscience as the ' chief only one contemplated by self- or superior principles ' in our love. There is a parallel passage nature. Serm. iii. 13 subfn. VOL. I. H 98 PROBA TION, [I. iv. temptations, to act imprudently with regard to our worldly interest, as to act viciously b. However, as when we say, men are misled by external circum stances of temptation ; it cannot but be understood, that there is somewhat within themselves, to render those circumstances temptations, or to render them susceptible of impressions from them : so when we say, they are misled by passions ; it is always sup posed, that there are occasions, circumstances, and objects, exciting these passions, and affording means for gratifying them. And therefore, temptations from within, and from without, coincide, and mutu ally imply each other. Now the several external objects of the appetites, passions, and affections, being present to the senses, or offering themselves to the mind, and so exciting emotions suitable to their nature ; not only in cases where they can be gratified consistently with innocence and prudence, but also in cases where they cannot, and yet can be gratified imprudently and viciously : this as really puts them in danger of voluntarily foregoing their present interest or good, as their future ; and as really renders self-denial necessary to secure one, as the other : i. e. we are in a like state of trial with respect to both, by the very same passions, excited by the very same means. § 5. The trial is identic : but is, in the temporal sphere, of our prudence ; Thus mankind having a temporal interest depending upon themselves, and a prudent course of behaviour b See Sermons preached at the Eolls, 1726, 2nd ed. p. 205, &c. Pref. p. 25, &c. Serm. p. 21, &c. [I have no means of tracing this reference exactly, but I think it contemplates Preface § 30, and perhaps Serm. III. §§ 3, 4. Ed.] §§5-7] AS IMPLYING TRIAL. 99 being necessary to secure it ; passions inordinately excited, whether by means of example, or by any other external circumstance, towards such objects, at such times, or in such degrees, as that they cannot be gratified consistently with worldly prudence ; are temptations, dangerous, and too often successful temptations, to forego a greater temporal good for a less ; i. e. to forego what is, upon the whole, our temporal interest, for the sake of a present gratifica tion. § 6. In the religious, of our virtue l. This is a description of our state of trial in our temporal capacity. Substitute now the word future for temporal, and virtue for prudence ; and it will be just as proper a description of our state of trial in our religious capacity ; so analogous are they to each other. § 7. Some are deceived into wrong ; others face it with deliberate intent, and for both spheres. If, from consideration of this our like state of trial in both capacities, we go on to observe further, how mankind behave under it ; we shall find there are some, who have so little sense of it, that they scarce look beyond the passing day : they are so taken up with present gratifications, as to have, in a manner, no feeling of consequences, no regard to their future ease or fortune in this life ; any more than to their happiness in another. Some appear to be blinded 1 Inasmuch as prudence is here reckoning with the future it draws so clearly distinguished from virtue, to itself and assimilates virtuous ele- he appears, when he says elsewhere ments, while it likewise has regard that it has the nature of virtue to other inducements not in them - (see Diss. II. 8), to mean that it has selves virtuous, though allied with a share of that nature. In its virtue, and consequent upon it. H 2 100 PROBA TION, [I. iv. and deceived by inordinate passion, in their worldly concerns, as much as in religion. Others are, not deceived, but, as it were, forcibly carried away by the like passions, against their better judgment, and feeble resolutions too of acting better. And there are men, and truly they are not a few, who shame lessly avow, not their interest, but their mere will and pleasure, to be their law of life : and who, in open defiance of every thing that is reasonable, will go on in a course of vicious extravagance, foreseeing, with no remorse and little fear, that it will be their temporal ruin ; and some of them, under the appre hension of the consequences of wickedness in another state. And to speak in the most moderate way, human creatures are not only continually liable to go wrong voluntarily, but we see likewise that they often actually do so, with respect to their temporal interests, as well as with respect to religion. § 8. Our state in each is analogous to the other. Thus our difficulties and dangers, or our trials, in our temporal and our religious capacity, as they proceed from the same causes, and have the same effect upon men's behaviour, are evidently analogous, and of the same kind. § 9. Our dangers aggravated by (a) acts of others, (b) ill training, (c) corruptions in religion, (d) our own prior acts. It may be added, that as the difficulties and dangers of miscarrying in our religious state of trial, are greatly increased, and one is ready to think, in a manner wholly made, by the ill behaviour of others ; by a wrong education, wrong in a moral sense, some- ?§8,9] AS IMPLYING TRIAL. 101 times positively vicious ; by general bad example ; by the dishonest artifices which are got into busi ness of all kinds ; and, in very many parts of the world, by religion's being corrupted into supersti tions ', which indulge men in their vices : so in like manner, the difficulties of Conducting ourselves prudently in respect to our present interest, and our danger of being led aside from pursuing it, are greatly increased, by a foolish education ; and, after we come to mature age, by the extravagance and carelessness of others, whom we have intercourse with ; and by mistaken notions, very generally prevalent, and taken up from common opinion, con cerning temporal happiness, and wherein it consists. And persons, by their own negligence and folly in their temporal affairs, no less than by a course of vice, bring themselves into new difficulties ; and, by habits of indulgence, become less qualified to go through them : and one irregularity after another, embarrasses things to such a degree, that they know not whereabout they are ; and often makes the path of conduct so intricate and perplexed, that it is difficult to trace it out ; difficult even to determine what is the prudent or the moral part. Thus, for instance, wrong behaviour2 in one stage of life, youth ; wrong, I mean, considering ourselves only in our temporal capacity, without taking in religion ; 1 Here Butler evidently looks himself from § 4. Our ill conduct beyond the Christian pale. In impairs our subsequent position other passages he specially regards 8i\S>s— it. See II. i. I3,vi. 5. In Six Sermons, 1. By the habits formed, biassing i. 4, ho points out the provision of us ab intra (§ 4). the Divine word, whereby, with 2. By marring our environment the corruption, the confutation is ab extra, e.g. by ill repute. transmitted. The second is what he here deals 2 Butler is not here repeating with exclusively. 102 PROBA TION, [I. iv. this, in several ways, increases the difficulties of right behaviour in mature age ; i. e. puts us into a more disadvantageous state of trial in our temporal capacity.§ 10. In neither sphere are the demands on us extravagant. We are an inferior part of the creation of God. There are natural appearances of our being in a state of degradation c. And we certainly are in a con dition, which does not seem, by any means, the most advantageous we could imagine or desire, either in our natural or moral capacity, for securing either our present or future interest. However, this condition, low and careful and uncertain as it is, does not afford any just ground of complaint. For, as men may manage their temporal affairs with prudence, and so pass their days here on earth in tolerable ease and satisfaction, by a moderate degree of care : so like wise with regard to religion, there is no more required than what they are well able to do, and what they must be greatly wanting to themselves, if they neglect. And for persons to have that put upon them, which they are well able to go through, and no more, we naturally consider as an equitable thing ; supposing it done by proper authority. Nor have we any more reason to complain of it, with regard to the Author of nature, than of his not having given us other advantages, belonging to other orders of creatures. 0n. The religious part is accredited by the natural part. But the thing here insisted upon is, that the state of trial which Religion teaches us we are in, c Part II. chap. v. §§ 10, n] AS IMPLYING TRIAL. 103 is rendered credible, by its being throughout uniform and of a piece with the general conduct of Providence towards us, in all other respects within the compass of our knowledge. Indeed if mankind, considered in their natural capacity, as inhabitants of this world only, found themselves, from their birth to their death, in a settled state of security and happiness, without any solicitude or thought of their own : or if they were in no danger of being brought into inconveniences and distress, by carelessness, or the folly of passion, through bad example, the treachery of others, or the deceitful appearances of things : were this our natural condition, then it might seem strange, and be some presumption against the truth of religion, that it represents our future and more general interest, as not secure of course, but as de pending upon our behaviour, and requiring recollection and self-government to obtain it. For it might be alleged, 'What you say is our condition in one respect, is not in any wise of a sort with what we find, by experience, our condition is in another. Our whole present interest is secured to our hands, without any solicitude of ours ; and why should not our future interest, if we have any such, be so too ? ' But since, on the contrary, thought and consideration, the voluntary denying ourselves many things which we desire, and a course of behaviour, far from being always agreeable to us ; are absolutely necessary to our acting even a common decent, and common prudent part, so as to pass with any satisfaction through the present world, and be received upon any tolerable good terms in it : since this is the case, all presumption against self-denial and attention being necessary to secure our higher interest, is re moved. Had we not experience, it might, perhaps ! I 104 PROBA TLON, [I. iv. §§ 12, 13 speciously, be urged, that it is improbable any thing of hazard and danger should be put upon us by an infinite Being ; when every thing which is hazard and danger in our manner of conception, and will end in error, confusion, and misery, is now already certain in his foreknowledge. § 12. Though why we are put in hazard ive cannot say. And indeed, why any thing of hazard and danger should be put upon such frail creatures as we are may well be thought a difficulty in speculation and cannot but be so, till we know the whole, or, however, much more of the case. But still the constitution of nature is as it is. Our happiness and misery are trusted to our conduct, and made to depend upon it. Somewhat, and, in many circum stances, a great deal too, is put upon us, either to do, or to suffer, as we choose. And all the various miseries of life, which people bring upon them selves by negligence and folly, and might have avoided by proper care, are instances of this : which miseries are beforehand just as contingent and undetermined as their conduct, and left to be determined by it. § 13. In religion, as in nature, we do not accept, but acquire. These observations are an answer to the objections against the credibility of a state of trial, as implying temptations, and real danger of miscarrying with regard to our general interest, under the moral 1 This mystery, however, like mitted introduction of evil into the most others, seems to run up into universe, through the creation of the one grand mystery, the per- free wills. v. § i] AS INTENDED. FOR DISCIPLINE, ETC. 105 government of God : and they show, that, if we are at all to be considered in such a capacity, and as having such an interest ; the general analogy of Providence must lead us to apprehend ourselves in danger of miscarrying, in different degrees, as to this interest, by our neglecting to act the proper part belonging to us in that capacity. For we have a present interest, under the government of God which we experience here upon earth. And this interest, as it is not forced upon us, so neither is it offered to our acceptance, but to our acquisition ; in such sort, as that we are in danger of missing it, by means of temptations to neglect, or act contrary to it ; and without attention and self-denial, must and do miss of it. It is then perfectly credible, that this may be our case, with respect to that chief and final good, which religion proposes to us. CHAPTER V. OF A STATE OF PROBATION, AS INTENDED FOR MORAL DISCIPLINE AND IMPROVEMENT. § 1. We cannot supply fully the why of our condition. FROM the consideration of our being in a pro bation-state, of so much difficulty and hazard, naturally arises the question, how we came to be placed in it. But such a general inquiry as this would be found involved in insuperable difficulties. For, though some of these difficulties would be lessened by observing, that all wickedness is volun- 106 PROBATION, AS INTENDED FOR [I. v. tary, as is implied in its very notion ; and that many of the miseries of hfe have apparent good effects : yet, when we consider other circumstances belonging to both, and what must be the conse quence of the former in a life to come ; it cannot but be acknowledged plain folly and presumption, to pretend to give an account of the whole reasons of this matter : the whole reasons of our being allotted a condition, out of which so much wicked ness and misery, so circumstanced, would in fact arise. Whether it be not beyond our faculties, not only to find out, but even to understand, the whole account of this ; or, though we should be supposed capable of understanding it, yet, whether it would be of service or prejudice to us to be informed of it, is impossible to say. 0 2. No proof lies against this why : and religion shoivs its aim to be our improvement. But as our present condition can in no wise be shown inconsistent with the perfect moral govern ment of Gqd : so religion teaches us we were placed in it, that we might qualify ourselves, by the practice of virtue, for another state which is to follow it. And this, though but a partial answer, a very partial one indeed, to the inquiry now mentioned ; yet, is a more satisfactory answer to another, which is of real, and of the utmost importance to us to have answered : the inquiry, What is our business here ? The known end then, why we are placed in a state of so much affliction, hazard, and difficulty, is, our improvement in virtue and piety, as the requisite qualification for a future state of security and happiness. §§2-4] DISCIPLINE AND IMPROVEMENT. 107 § 3. That this life is to a future one as youth to manhood, is credible. Now the beginning of life, considered as an edu cation for mature age in the present world, appears plainly, at first sight, analogous to this our trial for a future one : the former being in our temporal capacity, what the latter is in our religious capacity. But some observations common to both of them, and a more distinct consideration of each, will more distinctly show the extent and force of the analogy between them ; and the credibility, which arises from hence, as well as from the nature of the thing, that the present life was intended to be a state of discipline for a future one. 0 4. Our environment corresponds with our selves. [I.] Every species of creatures is, we see, designed for a particular way of life ; to which, the nature, the capacities, temper, and qualifications of each species, are as necessary, as their external circumstances. Both come into the notion of such state, or particular way of life, and are constituent parts of it. Change a man's capacities or character to the degree, in which it is conceivable they may be changed ; and he would be altogether incapable of a human course of life, and human happiness : as incapable, as if, his nature continuing unchanged, he were placed in a world, where he had no sphere of action, nor any objects to answer his appetites, passions, and affec tions of any sort. One thing is set over against another, as an ancient writer expresses it. Our nature corresponds to our external condition. With out this correspondence, there would be no possi bility of any such thing as human life and human 108 PROBATION, AS INTENDED FOR [I. v. happiness : which life and happiness are, therefore, a result from our nature and condition jointly : meaning by human life, not living in the literal sense, but the whole complex notion commonly understood by those words. So that, without determining what will be the employment and happiness, the particular life of good men hereafter ; there must be some deter minate capacities, some necessary character and quali fications, without which persons cannot but be utterly incapable of it : in like manner, as there must be some, without which men would be incapable of their present state of life. Now, § 5. Our powers of storage, self-adaptation, attaining fitness and facility ~by use. [II. ] The constitution of human creatures, and indeed of all creatures which come under our notice, is such, as that they are capable of naturally be coming qualified for states of life, for which they were once wholly unqualified. In imagination we may indeed conceive of creatures, as incapable of having any of their faculties naturally enlarged, or as being unable naturally to acquire any new qualifications : but the faculties of every species known to us are made for enlargement ; for acquirements of expe rience and habits. We find ourselves in particular endued with capacities, not only of perceiving ideas, and of knowledge or perceiving truth, but also of storing up our ideas and knowledge by memory. We are capable, not only of acting, and of having different momentary impressions made upon us; but of getting a new facility in any kind of action, and of settled alterations in our temper or char acter. The power of the two last is the power of habits. But neither the perception of ideas, nor §§5,6] DISCIPLINE AND IMPROVEMENT. 109 knowledge of any sort, are habits ; though absolutely necessary to the forming of them. However, appre hension, reason, memory, which are the capacities of acquiring knowledge, are greatly improved by exercise. Whether the word habit is applicable to all these improvements, and in particular how far the powers of memory and of habits may be powers of the same nature, I shall not inquire. But that perceptions come into our minds readily and of course, by means of their having been there before, seems a thing of the same sort, as readiness in any particular kind of action, proceeding from being accustomed to it. § 6. Habits, bodily and mental, are both passive and active. And aptness to recollect practical observations of service in our conduct, is plainly habit in many cases. There are habits of perception, and habits of action. An instance of the former, is our con stant and even involuntary readiness, in correcting the impressions of our sight concerning magnitudes and distances, so as to substitute judgment in the room of sensation imperceptibly to ourselves. And it seems as if all other associations of ideas not naturally connected might be called passive habits; as properly as our readiness in understanding lan guages upon sight, or hearing of words. And our readiness in speaking and writing them is an instance of the latter, of active habits. For distinct ness, we may consider habits, as belonging to the body, or the mind : and the latter will be explained by the former. Under the former are comprehended all bodily activities or motions, whether graceful or unbecoming, which are owing to use : under the no PROBATION, AS INTENDED FOR [I. v. latter, general habits of life and conduct ; such as those of obedience and submission to authority, or to any particular person ; those of veracity, justice, and charity ; those of attention, industry, self- government, envy, revenge. And habits of this latter kind seem produced by repeated acts 1, as well as the former. § 7. These last begot by inward principles carried into act. And in like manner as habits belonging to the body are produced by external acts : so habits of the mind are produced by the exertion of inward practical principles, i. e. by carrying them into act, or acting upon them ; the principles of obedience, of veracity, justice, and charity. Nor can those habits be formed by any external course of action, otherwise than as it proceeds from these principles : because it is only these inward principles exerted, which are strictly acts of obedience, of veracity, of justice, and of charity. So likewise habits of atten tion, industry, self-government, are in the same manner acquired by exercise ; and habits of envy and revenge by indulgence, whether in outward act, or in thought and intention, i. e. inward act : for such intention is an act. Resolutions also to do well are properly acts. And endeavouring to en force upon our own minds a practical sense of virtue, or to beget in others that practical sense of it, which a man really has himself, is a virtuous act. All these, therefore, may and will contribute towards forming good habits. 1 Comp. Aristotle, Eth. Nic. II. ivepyeiav al e£eis yivovrai.. fab 8« i. 7, 8 : K.a\ ev\ Sij \6yia ex rav opoiaiv Tas ivepyeias iroias dnodidovai. §§7,8] DISCIPLINE AND IMPROVEMENT. in § 8. Passive habit loses in power by repetition, active gains. But going over the theory of virtue in one's thoughts, talking well, and drawing fine pictures, of it ; this is so far from necessarily or certainly conducing to form an habit of it, in him who thus employs himself, that it may harden the mind in a contrary course, and render it gradually more in sensible, i. e. form an habit of insensibility, to all moral considerations. For, from our very faculty of habits, passive impressions, by being repeated, grow weaker. Thoughts, by often passing through the mind, are felt less sensibly : being accustomed to danger, begets intrepidity, i. e. lessens fear ; to dis tress, lessens the passion of pity ; to instances of others' mortality, lessens the sensible apprehension of our own. And from these two observations together ; that practical habits are formed and strengthened by repeated acts, and that passive im pressions grow weaker by being repeated upon us ; it must follow, that active habits may be gradually forming and strengthening, by a course of acting upon such and such motives and excitements, whilst these motives and excitements themselves are, by proportionable degrees, growing less sensible, i. e. are continually less and less sensibly felt, even as the active habits strengthen. And experience con firms this : for active principles, at the very time that they are less lively in perception than they were, are found to be, somehow, wrought more tho roughly into the temper and character, and become more effectual in influencing our practice. The three things just mentioned may afford instances of it. 112 PROBATION, AS INTENDED FOR [I. v. § g. Though perhaps with diminished emotion. Perception of danger is a natural excitement of passive fear, and active caution : and by being inured to danger, habits of the latter are gradually wrought, at the same time that the former gradually lessens. Perception of distress in others is a natural excitement, passively to pity, and actively to relieve it : but let a man set himself to attend to, inquire out, and relieve distressed persons, and he cannot but grow less and less sensibly affected with the various miseries of life, with which he must become acquainted ; when yet, at the same time, benevo lence, considered not as a passion, but as a practical principle of action, will strengthen : and whilst he passively compassionates the distressed less, he will acquire a greater aptitude actively to assist and befriend them. So also at the same time that the daily instances of men's dying around us give us daily a less sensible passive feeling or apprehension of our own mortality, such instances greatly con tribute to the strengthening a practical regard to it in serious men ; i. e. to forming an habit of acting with a constant view to it. § 10. The passive may give aid in forming the active. And this seems again further to show, that passive impressions made upon our minds by admonition, experience, example, though they may have a re mote efficacy, and a very great one, towards forming active habits, yet, can have this efficacy no other wise than by inducing us to such a course of action : and that it is not being affected so and so, but acting, which forms those habits : only it must be always remembered, that real endeavours to enforce §§9-12] DISCIPLINE AND IMPROVEMENT. 113 good impressions upon ourselves are a species of virtuous action. Nor do we know how far it is possible, in the nature of things, that effects should be wrought in us at once, equivalent to habits, i. e. what is wrought by use and exercise. However, the thing insisted upon is, not what may be possible, but what is in fact the appointment of nature : which is, that active habits are to be formed by exercise. § 11. The formation hard to trace, but proved by experience. Their progress may be so gradual, as to be imper ceptible of its steps : it may be hard to explain the faculty, by which we are capable of habits, through out its several parts ; and to trace it up to its original, so as to distinguish it from all others in our mind : and it seems as if contrary effects were to be ascribed to it. But the thing in general, that our nature is formed to yield, in some such manner as this, to use and exercise, is matter of certain experience. 0 12. Habit gives readiness, ease, pleasure. Thus, by accustoming ourselves to any course of action, we get an aptness to go on, a facility, readi ness, and often pleasure, in it. The inclinations which rendered us averse to it grow weaker : the difficulties in it, not only the imaginary but the real ones, lessen : the reasons for it offer themselves of course to our thoughts upon all occasions : and the least glimpse of them is sufficient to make us go on, in a course of action, to which we have been accus tomed. And practical principles appear to grow stronger, absolutely in themselves, by exercise ; as vol. 1. 1 114 PROBATION, AS INTENDED FOR [I. v. well as relatively, with regard to contrary principles ; which, by being accustomed to submit, do so habi tually, and of course. And thus a new character, in several respects, may be formed ; and many habitudes of life, not given by nature, but which nature directs us to acquire. § 13. Without habit, nothing in us would mature. [III.] Indeed we may be assured, that we should never have had these capacities of improving by experience, acquired knowledge, and habits, had they not been necessary, and intended to be made use of. And accordingly we find them so necessary, and so much intended, that without them we should be utterly incapable of that, which was the end for which we were made, considered in our temporal capacity only : the employments and satisfactions of our mature state of life. § 14. Mature powers given at birth ivould embarrass and disable. Nature does in no wise qualify us wholly, much less at once, for this mature state of life. Even maturity of understanding and bodily strength, are not only arrived to gradually, but are also very much owing to the continued exercise of our powers of body and mind from infancy. But if we suppose a person brought into the world with both these in maturity, as far as this is conceivable ; he would plainly at first be as unqualified for the human life of mature age, as an idiot1. He would be in a manner distracted, with astonishment, and appre- 1 This argument (perhaps some- above ('§ 4) as to the correspond- what succinctly expressed) admir- ence between self and the environ- ably illustrates what he has argued ment. §§13-16] DISCIPLINE AND IMPROVEMENT. 115 hension, and curiosity, and suspense : nor can one guess, how long it would be, before he would be famiharized to himself and the objects about him enough, even to set himself to any thing. It may be questioned too, whether the natural information of his sight and hearing would be of any manner of use at all to him in acting, before experience. And it seems, that men would be strangely head strong and self-willed, and disposed to exert them selves with an impetuosity, which would render society insupportable, and the living in it imprac ticable ; were it not for some acquired moderation and self-government, some aptitude and readiness in restraining themselves, and concealing their sense of things. Want of every thing of this kind which is learnt would render a man as uncapable of society, as want of language would ; or as his natural ignor ance of any of the particular employments of hfe would render him uncapable of providing himself with the common conveniences, or supplying the necessary wants of it. 0 15. Nature leaves us unfurnished, In these respects, and probably in many more, of which we have no particular notion, mankind is left, by nature, an unformed, unfinished creature ; utterly deficient and unqualified, before the acquire ment of knowledge, experience, and habits, for that mature state of life, which was the end of his creation, considering him as related only to this world. § 16. But with a capacity for furnishing, But then, as nature has endued us with a power of supplying those deficiencies, by acquired knowledge, 1 2 116 PROBATION, AS INTENDED FOR [I. v. experience, and habits: so likewise we are placed in a condition, in infancy, childhood, and youth, fitted for it; fitted for our acquiring those quali fications of all sorts, which we stand in need of in mature age. Hence children, from their very birth, are daily growing acquainted with the objects about them, with the scene in which they are placed, and to have a future part ; and learning somewhat or other, necessary to the performance of it. The subordinations, to which they are accustomed in domestic life, teach them self-government in common behaviour abroad, and prepare them for subjection and obedience to civil authority. § 17. By effort, and progress of life. What passes before their eyes, and daily happens to them, gives them experience, caution against treachery and deceit, together with numberless little rules of action and conduct, which we could not live without ; and which are learnt so insensibly and so perfectly, as to be mistaken perhaps for instinct : though they are the effect of long experience and exercise ; as much so as language, or knowledge in particular business, or the qualifications and behaviour belonging to the several ranks and professions. Thus the beginning of our days is adapted to be, and is, a state of education in the theory and prac tice of mature life. We are much assisted in it by example, instruction, and the care of others ; but a great deal is left to ourselves to do. And of this, as part is done easily and of course ; so part requires diligence and care, the voluntary foregoing many things which we desire, and setting ourselves to what we should have no inclination to, but for the necessity or expedience of it. For, that labour and §§17-19] DISCIPLINE AND IMPROVEMENT. 117 industry, which the station of so many absolutely requires, they would be greatly unqualified for, in maturity ; as those in other stations would be, for any other sorts of application ; if both were not accustomed to them in their youth. And according as persons behave themselves, in the general education which all go through, and in the particular ones adapted to particular employments ; their character is formed, and made appear ; they recommend them selves more or less ; and are capable of, and placed in, different stations in the society of mankind. 0 18. Analogy between preparation for maturity, and for survival. The former part of life then is to be considered as an important opportunity, which nature puts into our hands ; and which, when lost, is not to be recovered. And our being placed in a state of discipline throughout this life, for another world, is a providential disposition of things, exactly of the same kind, as our being placed in a state of dis cipline during childhood, for mature age. Our con dition in both respects is uniform and of a piece, and comprehended under one and the same general law of nature. § 19. Which might hold even were the how of this preparation undiscoverable. And if we were not able at all to discern, how or in what way the present life could be our pre paration for another ; this would be no objection against the credibility of its being so. For we do not discern, how food and sleep contribute to the 118 PROBATION, AS INTENDED FOR [I. v. growth of the body: nor could have any thought that they would, before we had experience. Nor do children at all think, on the one hand, that the sports and exercises, to which they are so much addicted, contribute to their health and growth; nor, on the other, of the necessity which there is for their being restrained in them: nor are they capable of understanding the use of many parts of discipline, which nevertheless they must be made to go through, in order to qualify them for the business of mature age. Were we not able then to discover, in what respects the present life could form us for a future one : yet nothing would be more supposable than that it might, in some respects or other, from the general analogy of Providence. 0 20. Is corroborated, if ice take God's moral government into view. And this, for ought I see, might reasonably be said, even though we should not take in the con sideration of God's moral government over the world. But, [IV.] Take in this consideration, and consequently, that the character of virtue and piety is a necessary qualification for the future state ; and then we may distinctly see, how, and in what respects, the pre sent life may be a preparation for it : since we tcant, and are capable of, improvement in that character, by moral and religious habits; and tlie present life is fit to be a state of discipline for such improvement : in like manner as we have already observed, how, and in what respects, infancy, childhood, and youth, are a necessary preparation, and a natural state of discipline, for mature age. §§20-22] DISCIPLINE AND IMPROVEMENT. 119 § 21. The future life is probably active ; common ; and more sensibly under divine government. Nothing which we at present see would lead us to the thought of a solitary unactive state here after : but, if we judge at all from the analogy of nature, we must suppose, according to the scrip ture account of it, that it will be a community. And there is no shadow of any thing unreasonable in conceiving, though there be no analogy for it, that this community will be, as the scripture repre sents it, under the more immediate, or, if such an expression may be used, the more sensible govern ment of God. Nor is our ignorance, what will be the employments of this happy community, nor our consequent ignorance, what particular scope or occasion there will be for the exercise of veracity, justice, and charity, amongst the members of it with regard to each other ; any proof, that there will be no sphere of exercise for those virtues. Much less, if that were possible, is our ignorance any proof, that there wiU be no occasion for that frame of mind, or character, which is formed by the daily practice of those particular virtues here, and which is a result from it. This at least must be owned in general, that, as the government estab lished in the universe is moral, the character of virtue and piety must, in some way or other, be the condition of our happiness, or the qualification for it.. 0 22. Habits are the fitting antidote for our liability to lapse, Now from what is above observed, concerning our natural power of habits, it is easy to see, that 120 PROBATION, AS INTENDED FOR [I. v. we are capable of moral improvement by discipline. And how greatly we want it, need not be proved to any one who is acquainted with the great wicked ness of mankind ; or even with those imperfec tions, which the best are conscious of. But it is not perhaps distinctly attended to by every one, that the occasion which human creatures have for discipline, to improve in them this character of virtue and piety, is to be traced up higher than to excess in the passions, by indulgence and habits of vice. Mankind, and perhaps all finite creatures, from the very constitution of their nature, before habits of virtue, are deficient, and in danger of deviating from what is right : and therefore stand in need of virtuous habits, for a security against this danger '. § 23. Which arises because tve have propensions not subjected to virtue. For, together with the general principle of moral understanding, we have in our inward frame various affections towards particular external objects. These affections are naturally, and of right, subject to the government of the moral principle, as to the occa sions upon which they may be gratified ; as to the times, degrees, and manner, in which the objects of them may be pursued : but then the principle of virtue can neither excite them, nor prevent their being excited. On the contrary, they are naturally felt, when the objects of them are present to the mind, not only before all consideration, whether they can be obtained by lawful means, but after it is found they cannot. For the natural objects of affection continue so ; the necessaries, conveniences, and pleasures of life, remain naturally desirable ; 'Inf. § 29. §§23)24J DISCIPLINE AND IMPROVEMENT. 121 though they cannot be obtained innocently : nay, though they cannot possibly be obtained at all. And when the objects of any affection whatever cannot be obtained without unlawful means ; but may be obtained by them : such affection, though its being excited, and its continuing some time in the mind, be as innocent as it is natural and necessary; yet cannot but be conceived to have a tendency to incline persons to venture upon such unlawful means : and therefore must be conceived as putting them in some danger of it. § 24. Habit gives us a security ab intra. Now what is the general security against this danger, against their actually deviating from right? As the danger is, so also must the security be, from within : from the practical principle of virtue a. a It may be thought, that a sense of interest would as effectually restrain creatures from doing wrong. But Smse of inUre^ as if by a sense of interest is meant a speculative mere pleasure in- conviction or belief, that such and such in- sufficient; as com- dulgenee would occasion them greater un- prehensive regard to easiness, upon the whole, than satisfaction ; happiness, is part it is contrary to present experience to say, of virtue. that this sense of interest is sufficient to restrain them from thus indulging themselves. And if by a sense of interest is meant a practical regard to what is upon the whole our happiness : this is not only coincident with the principle of virtue or moral rectitude, but is a part of the idea itself. And it is evident this reasonable self-love wants to be improved, as really as any principle in our nature. For we daily see it overmatched, not only by the more boisterous passions, but by curiosity, shame, love of imitation, by any thing, even indolence : especially if the interest, the temporal interest, suppose, which is the end of such self-love, be at a distance. So greatly are profligate men mistaken, when they affirm they are wholly governed by interestedness and self- love. And so little cause is there for moralists to disclaim this principle. See pp. 96-98. 122 PROBATION, AS INTENDED FOR [I. v. And the strengthening or improving this principle, considered as practical, or as a principle of action, will lessen the danger, or increase the security against it. And this moral principle is capable of improve ment, by proper discipline and exercise : by recol lecting the practical impressions which example and experience have made upon us : and, instead of following humour and mere inclination, by con tinually attending to the equity and right of the case, in whatever we are engaged, be it in greater or less matters ; and accustoming ourselves always to act upon it ; as being itself the just and natural motive of action : and as this moral course of be haviour must necessarily, under divine government, be our final interest. Thus the principle of virtue, improved into an habit, of which improvement we are thus capable, will plainly be, in proportion to the strength of it, a security against the danger which finite creatures are in, from the very nature of propension, or particular affections. § 25. May have place in a future life; is anyhow an advance in virtue. This way of putting the matter, supposes particular affections to remain in a future state ; which it is scarce possible to avoid supposing. And if they do ; we clearly see, that acquired habits of virtue and self-government may be necessary for the regulation of them. However, though we were not distinctly to take in this supposition, but to speak only in general ; the thing really comes to the same. For habits of virtue, thus acquired by discipline, are improvement in virtue : and improvement in virtue must be advancement in happiness, if the govern ment of the universe be moral. §§25-27] DISCIPLINE AND IMPROVEMENT. 123 § 26. Liberty renders falling possible, but does not account for it. From these things we may observe, and it will further show this our natural and original need of being improved by discipline, how it comes to pass, that creatures made upright fall ; and that those who preserve their uprightness, by so doing, raise them selves to a more secure state of virtue. To say that the former is accounted for by the nature of liberty, is to say no more, than that an event's actually happening is accounted for by a mere possibility of its happening. § 27. It seems explained by the nature of particular propensions. But it seems distinctly conceivable from the very nature of particular affections or propensions. For, suppose creatures intended for such a particular state. of life, for which such propensions were necessary : suppose them endued with such propensions, together with moral understanding, as well including a practical sense of virtue, as a speculative perception of it ; and that all these several principles, both natural and moral, forming an inward constitution of mind, were in the most exact proportion possible ; i. e. in a proportion the most exactly adapted to their intended state of life : such creatures would be made upright, or finitely perfect. Now particular propen sions, from their very nature, must be felt, the objects of them being present ; though they cannot be gratified at all, or not with the allowance of the moral principle. But if they can be gratified with out its allowance, or by contradicting it ; then they 124 PROBATION, AS INTENDED FOR [I. v. must be conceived to have some tendency, in how low a degree soever, yet some tendency, to induce persons to such forbidden gratification. This ten dency, in some one particular propension, may be increased, by the greater frequency of occasions naturally exciting it, than of occasions exciting others. The least voluntary indulgence in forbidden circumstances, though but in thought, will increase this wrong tendency ; and may increase it further, till, peculiar conjunctures perhaps conspiring, it becomes effect ; and danger of deviating from right, ends in actual deviation from it : a danger neces sarily arising from the very nature of propension ; and which therefore could not have been prevented, though it might have been escaped, or got inno cently through. The case would be, as if we were to suppose a strait path marked out for a person, in which such a degree of attention would keep him steady: but if he would not' attend in this degree, any one of a thousand objects, catching his eye, might lead him out of it. § 28. Disobedience, single, produces disorder, of unde fined amount; if repeated, habit. Now it is impossible to say, how much even the first full overt act of irregularity might disorder the inward constitution ; unsettle the adjustments, and alter the proportions, which formed it, and in which the uprightness of its make consisted : but repetition of irregularities would produce habits. And thus the constitution would be spoiled; and creatures made upright, become corrupt and depraved in their settled character, proportionably to their repeated irregularities in occasional acts. §§28, 29] DISCIPLINE AND IMPROVEMENT. 125 § 29. Is the counterpart to that capacity of betterment, which might raise us up to safety. But on the contrary, these creatures might have improved and raised themselves, to an higher and more secure state of virtue, by the contrary beha viour : by steadily following the moral principle, supposed to be one part of their nature ; and thus withstanding that unavoidable danger of defection, which necessarily arose from propension, the other part of it. For, by thus preserving their integrity for some time, their danger would lessen ; since propensions, by being inured to submit, would do it more easily and of course : and their security against this lessening danger would increase ; since the moral principle would gain additional strength by exercise : both which things are implied in the notion of virtuous habits. Thus then vicious indul gence is not only criminal in itself, but also depraves the inward constitution and character. And virtuous self-government is not only right in itself, but also improves the inward constitution or character : and may improve it to such a degree, that though we should suppose it impossible, for particular affections to be absolutely coincident with the moral principle ; and consequently should allow, that such creatures as have been above supposed, would for ever remain defectible ; yet their danger of actually deviating from right may be almost infinitely lessened, and they fully fortified against what remains of it : if that may be called danger, against which there is an adequate effectual security. But still, this their higher perfection may continue to consist in habits of virtue formed in a state of discipline, and this their more complete security remain to proceed 126 PROBATION, AS INTENDED FOR [I. v. from them. And thus it is plainly conceivable, that creatures without blemish, as they came out of the hands of God, may be in danger of going wrong ; and so may stand in need of the security of virtuous habits, additional to the moral principle wrought into their natures by him. That which is the ground of their danger, or their want of security, may be considered as a deficiency in them, to which virtuous habits are the natural supply \ And as they are naturally capable of being raised and improved by discipline, it may be a thing fit and requisite that they should be placed in circumstances with an eye to it : in circumstances peculiarly fitted to be, to them, a state of discipline for their improvement in virtue. § 30. Need of training enhanced for us who have ' corrupted our natures.' But how much more strongly must this hold with respect to those, who have corrupted their natures, are fallen from their original rectitude, and whose passions are become excessive by repeated violations of their inward constitution ? Upright creatures may want to be improved : depraved creatures want to be renewed. Education and discipline, which may be in all degrees and sorts of gentleness and of severity, is expedient for those : but must be abso lutely necessary for these. For these, discipline of the severer sort too, and in the higher degrees of it, must be necessary, in order to wear out vicious habits ; to recover their primitive strength of self- government, which indulgence must have weakened ; to repair, as well as raise into an habit, the moral principle, in order to their arriving at a secure state of virtuous happiness. 1 Sup. § 22. §§3°, 3i ] DISCIPLINE AND IMPROVEMENT. 127 § 31. The varied lessons of the present state peculiarly fit it for discipline. Now whoever will consider the thing, may clearly see, that the present world is peculiarly fit to be a state of discipline for this purpose, to such as will set themselves to mend and improve. For, the various temptations with which we are surrounded ; our experience of the deceits of wickedness ; having been in many instances led wrong ourselves ; the great viciousness of the world ; the infinite disorders consequent upon it ; our being made acquainted with pain and sorrow, either from our own feeling of it, or from the sight of it in others ; these things, though some of them may indeed produce wrong effects upon our minds, yet when duly reflected upon, have, all of them, a direct tendency to bring us to a settled moderation and reasonableness of temper : the contrary both to thoughtless levity, and also to that unrestrained self-will, and violent bent to follow present inclination, which may be observed in undisciplined minds. Such experience, as the present state affords, of the frailty of our nature ; of the boundless extravagance of ungoverned passion ; of the power which an infinite Being has over us, by the various capacities of misery which he has given us ; in short, that kind and degree of experience, which the present state affords us, that the constitution of nature is such as to admit the possibility, the danger, and the actual event, of creatures losing their innocence and happiness, and becoming vicious and wretched ; hath a ten- lf dency to give us a practical sense of things, very different from a mere speculative knowledge that we are liable to vice, and capable of misery. And 128 PROBATION, AS INTENDED FOR [I. v. who knows, whether the security of creatures in the highest and most settled state of perfection, may not in part arise, from their having had such a sense of things as this, formed, and habitually fixed within them, in some state of probation? And passing through the present world with that moral atten tion, which is necessary to the acting a right part in it, may leave everlasting impressions of this sort upon our minds. But to be a little more distinct : allurements to what is wrong ; difficulties in the discharge of our duty ; our not being able to act an uniform right part without some thought and care ; and the opportunities which we have, or imagine we have, of avoiding what we dislike, or obtaining what we desire, by unlawful means, when we either cannot do it at all, or at least not so easily, by lawful ones ; these things, i. e. the snares and temp tations of vice, are what render the present world peculiarly fit to be a state of discipline, to those who will preserve their integrity : because they render being upon our guard, resolution, and the denial of our passions, necessary in order to that end. § 32. Wherein habit is confirmed by persistent effort, and by wariness against temptations. And the exercise of such particular recollection, intention of mind, and self-government, in the prac tice of virtue, has, from the make of our nature, a peculiar tendency to form habits of virtue ; as implying, not only a real, but also a more continued, and a more intense exercise of the virtuous principle ; or a more constant and a stronger effort of virtue exerted into act. Thus suppose a person to know himself to be in particular danger, for some time, of doing any thing wrong, which yet he fully resolves §§32,33] DISCIPLINE AND IMPROVEMENT. 129 not to do : continued recollection, and keeping upon his guard, in order to make good his resolution, is a continued exerting of that act of virtue in a high degree, which need have been, and perhaps would have been, only instantaneous and weak, had the temp tation been so. It is indeed ridiculous to assert, that self-denial is essential to virtue and piety : but it would have been nearer the truth, though not strictly the truth itself, to have said, that it is essen tial to discipline and improvement 1. For though actions materially virtuous, which have no sort of difficulty, but are perfectly agreeable to our par ticular inclinations, may possibly be done only from these particular inclinations, and so may not be any exercise of the principle of virtue, i. e. not be virtuous actions at all ; yet, on the contrary, they may be an exercise of that principle : and when they are, they have a tendency to form and fix the habit of virtue. But when the exercise of the virtuous principle is more continued, oftener repeated, and more intense ; as it must be in circumstances of danger, temptation, and difficulty, of any kind and in any degree ; this tendency is increased proportionably, and a more confirmed habit is the consequence. § 33. This law, even if limited by the law of a mean in moral character, is not subverted. This undoubtedly holds to a certain length : but how far it may hold, I know not. Neither our intellectual powers, nor our bodily strength, can be 1 Because if the state of virtue or mortify. Comp. also Aristotle, be perfect, all the inclinations are Eth. Nic. II. iii. 1. right, and there is nothing to deny VOL. I. K 130 PROBATION, AS INTENDED FOR [I. v. improved beyond such a degree : and both may be over-wrought. Possibly there may be somewhat ana logous to this, with respect to the moral character ; which is scarce worth considering. And I mention it only, lest it should come into some persons' thoughts, not as an exception to the foregoing ob servations, which perhaps it is ; but as a confutation of them, which it is not. And there may be several other exceptions. Observations of this kind cannot be supposed to hold minutely, and in every case. It is enough that they hold in general. And these plainly hold so far, as that from them may be seen distinctly, which is all that is intended by them, that the present world is peculiarly fit to be a state of discipline, for our improvement in virtue and piety : in the same sense as some sciences, by requiring and engaging the attention, not to be sure of such persons as will not, but of such as will, set them selves to them ; are fit to form the mind to habits of attention. § 34. Life as a discipline of vice to the majority is thereby enhanced as a discipline of virtue to the good. Indeed the present state is so far from proving, in event, a discipline of virtue to the generality of men, that, on the contrary, they seem to make it a discipline of vice. And the viciousness of the world is, in different ways, the great temptation, which renders it a state of virtuous discipline, in the degree it is, to good men. The whole end, and "the whole occasion, of mankind's being placed in such a state as the present, is not pretended to be accounted for. That which appears amidst the general corruption, is, that there are some persons, §§34,35] DISCIPLINE AND IMPROVEMENT. 131 who, having within them the principle of amend ment and recovery, attend to and follow the notices of virtue and religion, be they more clear or more obscure, which are afforded them ; and that the present world is, not only an exercise of virtue in these persons, but an exercise of it in ways and degrees, peculiarly apt to improve it : apt to improve it, in some respects, even beyond what would be, by the exercise of it required in a perfectly virtuous society, or in a society of equally imperfect virtue with themselves. But that the present world does not actually become a state of moral discipline to many, even to the generality, i. e. that they do not improve or grow better in it, cannot be urged as a proof, that it was not intended for moral disci pline, by any who at all observe the analogy of nature. 0 35. The enormous waste in creation, though unaccount able, does not disprove design. For, of the numerous seeds of vegetables and bodies of animals, which are adapted and put in the way, to improve to such a point or state of natural maturity and perfection, we do not see perhaps that one in a million actually does. Far the greatest part of them decay before they are improved to it ; and appear to be absolutely destroyed. Yet no one, who does not deny all final causes, will deny, that those seeds and bodies, which do attain to that point of maturity and perfection, answer the end for which they were really designed by nature ; and therefore that nature designed them for such perfection '. And 1 The waste impairs design as So the argument, if reduced, is not a whole : but not as to all the parts, destroyed. K 2 132 PROBATION, AS INTENDED FOR [I. v. I cannot forbear adding, though it is not to the present purpose, that the appearance of such an amazing waste in nature, with respect to these seeds and bodies, by foreign causes, is to us as unaccount able, as, what is much more terrible, the present and future ruin of so many moral agents by them selves, i.e. by vice. 0 36. Obedience from hope or fear forms habits, and groivs into morality1. Against this whole notion of moral discipline, it may be objected, in another way ; that so far as a course of behaviour, materially virtuous, proceeds from hope and fear, so far it is only a discipline and strengthening of self-love. But doing what God commands, because he commands it, is obedience, though it proceeds from hope or fear. And a course of such obedience will form habits of it. And a constant regard to veracity, justice and charity, may form distinct habits of these particular virtues ; and will certainly form habits of self-government, and of denying our inclinations, whenever veracity, justice or charity requires it. Nor is there any foundation for this great nicety, with which some affect" to distinguish in this case, in order to depre ciate all religion proceeding from hope or fear. For, veracity, justice and charity, regard to God's autho rity, and to our own chief interest, are not only all three coincident ; but each of them is, in itself, a just and natural motive or principle of action. And he who begins a good life from any one of them, and perseveres in it, as he is already in some 1 See Shaftesbury, Inquiry concerning Virtue, Part III. iii. 3. §§36,37] DISCIPLINE AND IMPROVEMENT. 133 degree, so he cannot fail of becoming more and more, of that character, which is correspondent to the constitution of nature as moral ; and to the relation, which God stands in to us as moral Go vernor of it : nor consequently can he fail of ob taining that happiness which this constitution and relation necessarily suppose connected with that character. \ 37. Passive virtue, or resignation, is also good. Training in patience may be needful. These several observations, concerning the active principle of virtue and obedience to God's commands, are applicable to passive submission or resignation to his will 1 : which is another essential part of a right character, connected with the former, and very much in our power to form ourselves to. It may be im agined, that nothing but afflictions can give occasion for, or require this virtue ; that it can have no respect to, nor be any way necessary to qualify for, a state of perfect happiness : but it is not experience which can make us think thus. Prosperity itself, whilst any thing supposed desirable is not ours, begets ex travagant and unbounded thoughts. Imagination is altogether as much a source of discontent, as any thing in our external condition. It is indeed true, that there can be no scope for patience, when sorrow shall be no more : but there may be need of a temper of mind, which shall have been formed by patience. 1 In Serm. xiv. §§ 5, 6, on the beyond what the word itself in love of God, a much larger scope is strictness admits. given to resignation : perhaps one 134 PROBATION, AS INTENDED FOR [I. v. § 38. Self-love, not always conforming to God's will, may require aid from the habit of resignation 1. For, though self-love, considered merely as an active principle leading us to pursue our chief interest, cannot but be uniformly coincident with the prin ciple of obedience to God's commands, our interest being rightly understood ; because this obedience, and the pursuit of our own chief interest, must be in every case one and the same thing : yet it may be questioned, whether self-love, considered merely as the desire of our own interest or happiness, can, from its nature, be thus absolutely and uniformly coincident with the will of God ; any more than particular affections can b : coincident in such sort, as not to be liable to be excited upon occasions and in degrees, impossible to be gratified consistently with the constitution of things, or the divine appoint ments. So that habits of resignation may, upon this account, be requisite for all creatures : habits, I say ; which signify what is formed by use. However, in general it is obvious that both self-love and particular affections in human creatures, considered only as passive feelings, distort and rend the mind; and therefore stand in need of discipline J. Now denial of those particular affections, in a course of active virtue and obedience to God's will, has a tendency to mode rate them ; and seems also to have a tendency to habituate the mind, to be easy and satisfied with that degree of happiness which is allotted us, i.e. to mode rate self-love. h Sup. § 23. 1 1n the Second Sermon onHuman under watch and ward, so to speak : Nature, § 15, self-love is described 'reasonable' and 'cool' self-love. as a principle superior in kind to J Comp. Serm. xi. 7. passion ; but then it is self-love §§38-40] DISCIPLINE AND IMPROVEMENT. 135 § 39. Passive obedience is suited to affliction, and integrates the active. But the proper discipline for resignation is affliction. For a right behaviour under that trial ; recollect ing ourselves so as to consider it in the view, in which religion teaches us to consider it, as from the hand of God ; receiving it as what he appoints, or thinks proper to permit, in his world and under his government ; this will habituate the mind to a dutiful submission. And such submission, together with the active principle of obedience, make up the temper and character in us, which answers to his sovereignty ; and which absolutely belongs to the condition of our being, as dependent creatures. Nor can it be said, that this is only breaking the mind to a submission to mere power ; for mere power may be accidental, and precarious, and usurped : but it is forming within ourselves the temper of resigna tion to his rightful authority, who is, by nature, supreme over all. § 40. Character proper for this life and another depends upon action. Upon the whole : Such a character, and such qualifi cations, are necessary for a mature state of life in the present world, as nature alone does in no wise bestow ; but has put it upon us, in great part, to acquire, in our progress from one stage of life to another, from childhood to mature age : put it upon us to acquire them, by giving us capacities of doing it, and by placing us, in the beginning of life, in a condition fit for it. And this is a general analogy to our condition in the present world, as in a state 136 PROBATION, AS INTENDED FOR [I. v. of moral discipline for another. It is in vain then to object against the credibility of the present life's being intended for this purpose, that all the trouble and the danger, unavoidably accompanying such dis cipline, might have been saved us, by our being made at once the creatures and the characters, which we were to be. For we experience, that ivhat we were ^ to be, was to be the effect of ivhat ive would do: and that the general conduct of nature is, not to save us trouble or danger, but to make us capable of going through them, and to put it upon us to do so. § 41. Attainment of right qualifications parallel to the supply of legitimate wants. Acquirements of our own, experience and habits, are the natural supply to our deficiencies, and security against our dangers : since it is as plainly natural to set ourselves to acquire the qualifications, as the external things, which we stand in need of. In particular, it is as plainly a general law of nature, that we should, with regard to our temporal interest, form and cultivate practical principles within us, by attention, use, and discipline, as any thing whatever is a natural law ; chiefly in the beginning of life, but also throughout the whole course of it. And the alternative is left to our choice : either to im prove ourselves, and better our condition ; or, in default of such improvement, to remain deficient and wretched. It is therefore perfectly credible, from the analogy of nature, that the same may be our case, with respect to the happiness of a future state, and the qualifications necessary for it. §§4i, 42] DISCIPLINE AND IMPROVEMENT. 137 § 42. Manifestation of character may be 7roAXaxws a further purpose of our probation. There is a third thing, which may seem implied in the present world's being a state of probation ; that it is a theatre of action, for the manifestation of persons' characters, with respect to a future one : not to be sure to an all-knowing Being, but to his creation or part of it. This may, perhaps, be only a consequence of our being in a state of probation in the other senses. However, it is not impossible, that men's showing and making manifest what is in their heart, what their real character is, may have respect to a future life, in ways and manners which we are not acquainted with : particularly it may be a means, for the Author of nature does not appear to do any thing without means, of their being disposed of suitably to their characters ; and of its being known to the creation, by way of example, that they are thus disposed of. But not to enter upon any conjectural account of this ; one may just mention, that the manifestation of persons' characters contributes very much, in various ways, to the carry ing on a great part of that general course of nature, respecting mankind, which comes under our observa tion at present. I shall only add, that probation, in both these senses, as well as in that treated of in the foregoing chapter, is implied in moral govern ment : since by persons' behaviour under it, their characters cannot but be manifested, and, if they behave well, improved. 138 OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, [I. vi. CHAPTER VI1. INFLUENCING PRACTICE. § 1. If this opinion comports with nature, why not also with religion? THROUGHOUT the foregoing Treatise it appears, that the condition of mankind, considered as inhabitants of this world only, and under the govern ment of God which we experience, is greatly analogous to our condition, as designed for another world, or under that further government, which religion teaches us. If therefore any assert, as a fatalist must, that the opinion of universal necessity is reconcilable with the former 2 ; there immediately arises a question in the way of analogy, whether he must not also own it to be reconcilable with the latter, i. e. with the system of religion itself, and 1 This chapter may be said not vinistic school, most powerfully re- to fall strictly within the lines of presented by Jonathan Edwards, the proper argument of the work. whose work, however, did not ap- It removes, however, out of Butler's pear until 1754. way a superficial objection, which 2 A fatalist holds as such 'the he shows to be inapplicable to the opinion of universal necessity.' Mr. treatment of practical questions. Stephen (English Thought, c. v. He may have done this because § 18) distinguishes fatalism, as an the idea was too prominent among occasional necessity, from universal the philosophical notions of the necessity, charges Butler with con- day to be simply passed by with founding them, and hence infers safety. For he tells us (§ 14) that Butler's weakness as a metaphy- the opinion of necessity was the sician. But we see from this pas- fashionable plea for unbelief. It sage that fatalism is in Butler's is to be borne in mind that the view a synonym for universal neces- notions of the fatalists received sity. a powerful support from the Cal- §§i,a] AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE. 139 the proof of it. The reader then will observe, that the question now before us is not absolute, Whether the opinion of fate be reconcilable with religion ; but hypothetical, Whether, upon supposition of its being reconcilable with the constitution of nature, it be not reconcilable with religion also : or, what pretence a fatalist, not other persons, but a fatalist, has to conclude from his opinion, that there can be no such thing as religion. And as the puzzle and obscurity, which must unavoidably arise from arguing upon so absurd1 a supposition as that of universal necessity, will, I fear, easily be seen ; it will, I hope, as easily be excused. But since it has been all along taken for granted, as a thing proved, that there is an intelligent Author of nature, or natural Governor of the world ; and since an objection may be made against the proof of this, from the opinion of universal necessity, as it may be supposed, that such necessity will itself account for the origin and preservation of all things : it is requisite, that this objection be dis tinctly answered ; or that it be shown, that a fatality, supposed consistent with what we certainly experi ence, does not destroy the proof of an intelligent Author and Governor of nature ; before we proceed to consider, whether it destroys the proof of a moral Governor of it, or of our being in a state of re ligion. $ 2. Fate or no fate, agency by choice is matter of experience. Now, when it is said by a fatalist, that the whole constitution of nature, and the actions of men, that 1 Comp. § 8. 140 OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, [I. vi. every thing, and every mode and circumstance of every thing, is necessary, and could not possibly have been otherwise ; it is to be observed, that this necessity does not exclude deliberation, choice, preference, and acting from certain principles, and to certain ends : because all this is matter of un doubted experience, acknowledged by all, and what every man may, every moment, be conscious of. § 3. Only alleges an incident of being, no way explains the how. And from hence it follows, that necessity, alone and of itself, is in no sort an account of the con stitution of nature, and how things came to be and to continue as they are ; but only an account of this circumstance relating to their origin and continu ance, that they could not have been otherwise than they are and have been. The assertion, that every thing is by necessity of nature, is not an answer to the question ; Whether the world came into being as it is, by an intelligent agent forming it thus, or not : but to quite another question ; Whether it came into being as it is, in that way and manner which we call necessarily, or in that way and manner which we call freely. For suppose further, that one who was a fatalist, and one who kept to his natural sense of things, and believed himself a free agent, were disputing together, and vindicating their respective opinions ; and they should happen to instance in a house : they would agree that it was built by an architect. Their difference concerning necessity and freedom would occasion no difference of judgment concerning this ; but only concerning another matter ; whether the architect built it necessarily or freely. Suppose then they should §§3,4] AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE. 141 proceed to inquire concerning the constitution of nature : in a lax way of speaking, one of them might say, it was by necessity ; and the other, by freedom : but if they had any meaning to their words, as the latter must mean a free agent, so the former must at length be reduced to mean an agent, whether he would say one or more, act ing by necessity : for abstract notions can do nothing. § 4. God exists by a necessity antecedent to design : this is but a manner of speech. Indeed we ascribe to God a necessary existence, uncaused by any agent. For we find within our selves the idea of infinity, i. e. immensity and eternity, impossible, even in imagination, to be removed out of being. We seem to discern intuitively, that there must, and cannot but be somewhat, external to ourselves, answering this idea, or the archetype of it. And from hence (for this abstract, as much as any other, implies a concrete) we conclude, that there is and cannot but be, an infinite, an immense eternal Being existing, prior to all design contri buting to his existence, and exclusive of it. And from the scantiness of language, a manner of speaking has been introduced ; that necessity is the founda tion, the reason, the account of the existence of God. But it is not alleged, nor can it be at all intended, that every thing exists as it does, by this kind of necessity ; a necessity antecedent in nature to design : it cannot, I say, be meant that every thing exists as it does, by this kind of necessity, upon several accounts ; and particularly because it is admitted, that design, in the actions of men, contributes to many alterations in nature. For if 142 OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, [I. vi. any deny this, I shall not pretend to reason with them. § 5. Fatalism postulates an agent, as much as freedom. From these things it follows ; first, That when a fatalist asserts, that every thing is by necessity, he must mean, by an agent acting necessarily ; he must, I say, mean this, for I am very sensible he would not choose to mean it : and secondly, That the necessity, by which such an agent is supposed to act, does not exclude intelligence and design. So that, were the system of fatality admitted, it would just as much account for the formation of the world, as for the structure of an house, and no more. Necessity as much requires and supposes a necessary agent, as freedom requires and supposes a free agent, to be the former of the world. And the appearances of design and of final causes in the con stitution of nature as really prove this acting agent to be an intelligent designer, or to act from choice ; upon the scheme of necessity, supposed possible, as upon that of freedom. § 6. Destroys no proof of religion. It appearing thus, that the notion of necessity does not destroy the proof, that there is an intelli gent Author of nature and natural Governor of the world; the present question, which the analogy before mentioned a suggests, and which, I think, it will answer, is this : Whether the opinion of neces sity, supposed consistent with possibility, with the constitution of the world, and the natural govern- a Sup. § 1. §§5-7] AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE. 143 ment which we experience exercised over it, destroys all reasonable ground of belief, that we are in a state of religion : or whether that opinion be recon cilable with religion ; with the system, and the proof of it. \ 7. A child, trained as not accountable, would be insupportable, and would find his own life so. Suppose then a fatalist to educate any one, from his youth up, in his own principles ; that the child should reason upon them, and conclude, that since he cannot possibly behave otherwise than he does, he is not a subject of blame or commendation, nor can deserve to be rewarded or punished : imagine him to eradicate the very perceptions of blame and commendation out of his mind, by means of this system ; to form his temper, and character, and behaviour to it ; and from it to judge of the treat ment he was to expect, say, from reasonable men, upon his coming abroad into the world : as the fatalist judges from this system, what he is to ex pect from the Author of nature, and with regard to a future state. I cannot forbear stopping here to ask, whether any one of common sense would think fit, that a child should be put upon these speculations, and be left to apply them to practice. And a man has little pretence to reason, who is not sensible, that we are all children in speculations of this kind. However, the child would doubtless be highly delighted to find himself freed from the restraints of fear and shame, with which his play fellows were fettered and embarrassed ; and highly conceited in his superior knowledge, so far be yond his years. But conceit and vanity would be the least bad part of the influence, which these 144 OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, [I. vi. principles must have, when thus reasoned and acted upon, during the course of his education. He must either be allowed to go on and be the plague of all about him, and himself too, even to his own destruc tion : or else correction must be continually made use of, to supply the want of those natural percep tions of blame and commendation, which we have supposed to be removed ; and to give him a practical impression, of what he had reasoned himself out of the belief of, that he was in fact an accountable child, and to be punished for doing what he was forbid. It is therefore in reality impossible, but that the correction which he must meet with, in the course of his education, must convince him, that if the scheme he was instructed in were not false ; yet that he reasoned inconclusively upon it, and somehow or other misapplied it to practice and common life : as what the fatalist experiences of the conduct of Providence at present, ought in all reason to convince him, that this scheme is mis applied when applied to the subject of religion b. But supposing the child's temper could remain still formed to the system, and his expectation of the treatment he was to have in the world be regulated by it ; so as to expect that no reasonable man would blame or punish him, for any thing which he should do, because he could not help doing it : upon this supposition it is manifest he would, upon his coming abroad into the world, be insupportable to society, and the treatment which he would receive from it would render it so to him ; and he could not fail of doing somewhat, very soon, for which he would be delivered over into the hands of civil justice. And h Sup. § 21. §§8,9] AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE. 145 thus, in the end, he would be convinced of the obligations he was under to his wise instructor. § 8. The scheme, however tested, lands in absurdity. Or suppose this scheme of fatality, in any other way, applied to practice, such practical application of it will be found equally absurd 1 ; equally fallacious in a practical sense : for instance, that if a man be destined to live such a time, he shall live to it, though he take no care of his own preservation ; or if he be destined to die before that time, no care can prevent it : therefore all care about preserving one's life is to be neglected : which is the fallacy instanced in by the ancients. § 9. Our entire state is as if we were free. But now on the contrary, none of these practical absurdities can be drawn, from reasoning upon the supposition, that we are free ; but all such reasoning with regard to the common affairs of life is justi fied by experience. And therefore, though it were admitted that this opinion of necessity were specula tively true ; yet, with regard to practice, it is as if it were false, so far as our experience reaches ; that is, to the whole of our present life. For, the con stitution of the present world, and the condition in which we are actually placed, is, as if we were free. And it may perhaps justly be concluded, that since the whole process of action, through every step of it, suspense, deliberation, inclining one way, determining, and at last doing as we determine, is as if we were free, therefore we are so. But the thing here insisted upon is, that under the present 1 Comp. § 1. VOL. 1. L 146 OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, [I. vi. natural government of the world, we find we are treated and dealt with, as if we were free, prior to all consideration whether we are or not. § 10. It misleads then if true : so may it not again mislead, and in maximis ? Were this opinion therefore of necessity admitted to be ever so true ; yet such is in fact our condition and the natural course of things, that whenever we apply it to life and practice, this application of it always misleads us, and cannot but mislead us, in a most dreadful manner, with regard to our present interest. And how can people think themselves so very secure then, that the same application of the same opinion may not mislead them also, in some analogous manner, with respect to a future, a more general and more important interest? For, religion being a practical subject ; and the analogy of nature showing us, that we have not faculties to apply this opinion, were it a true one, to practical subjects ; whenever we do apply it to the subject of religion, and thence conclude, that we are free from its obliga tions, it is plain this conclusion cannot be depended upon. There will still remain just reason to think, whatever appearances are, that we deceive ourselves ; in somewhat of a like manner, as when people fancy they can draw contradictory conclusions from the idea of infinity. §11. It being as if false, to entertain it is against reason. From these things together, the attentive reader will see it follows, that if upon supposition of freedom the evidence of religion be conclusive, it remains so, upon supposition of necessity ; because the notion of necessity is not applicable to practical §§ io-ia] AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE. 147 subjects : i. e. with respect to them, is as if it were not true. Nor does this contain any reflection upon reason : but only upon what is unreasonable. For to pretend to act upon reason, in opposition to prac tical principles, which the Author of our nature gave us to act upon ; and to pretend to apply our reason to subjects, with regard to which, our own short views, and even our experience, will show us, it cannot be depended upon ; and such, at best, the subject of necessity must be ; this is vanity, conceit, and unreasonableness. § 12. As it allows of will and character in us, so it may in our Author. But this is not all. For we find within ourselves a will, and are conscious of a character. Now if this, in us, be reconcilable with fate, it is recon cilable with it, in the Author of nature. And besides, natural government and final causes imply a character and a will in the Governor and Designer c ; a will concerning the creatures whom he governs. The Author of nature then being certainly of some character or other, notwithstanding necessity ; it is evident this necessity is as reconcilable with the particular character of benevolence, veracity, and justice in him, which attributes are the foundation c By will and character is meant ' that, which, in speaking of men, we should express, not only by these words, 'but also by the words temper, taste, dispositions, practical principles, that whole frame of mind, from whence we act in one manner rather than another. 1 Not that each of the Swapeis termine action, they are included he proceeds to mention is a syno- in the phrase 'will and character' nym for character or for will ; but from which action immediately that, as powers contributing to de- springs. ti L 2 148 OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, [I. vi. of religion, as with any other character : since we find this necessity no more hinders men from being benevolent, than cruel ; true, than faithless ; just, than unjust ; or if the fatalist pleases, what we call unjust. For it is said indeed, that what, upon sup position of freedom, would be just punishment ; upon supposition of necessity, becomes manifestly unjust : because it is punishment inflicted for doing that which persons could not avoid doing. As if the necessity, which is supposed to destroy the injustice of murder, for instance, would not also destroy the injustice of punishing it. However, as little to the purpose as this objection is in itself, it is very much to the purpose to observe from it, how the notions of justice and injustice remain, even whilst we endeavour to suppose them removed ; how they force themselves upon the mind, even whilst we are making suppositions destructive of them : for there is not, perhaps, a man in the world, but would be ready to make this objection at first thought. § 13. It leaves intact the relation of God to veracity and justice, But though it is most evident, that universal necessity, if it be reconcilable with any thing, is reconcilable with that character in the Author of nature, which is the foundation of religion ; ' Yet, does it not plainly destroy the proof, that he is of that character, and consequently the proof of religion?' By no means. For we find, that happi ness and misery are not our fate, in any such sense as not to be the consequences of our behaviour; but that they are the consequences of it d. We d Chap. ii. §§ 13, 14] AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE. 149 find God exercises the same kind of government over us, with that, which a father exercises over his children, and a civil magistrate over his subjects. Now, whatever becomes of abstract questions con cerning liberty and necessity, it evidently appears 0 to us, that veracity and justice must be the natural rule and measure of exercising this authority or government, to a Being who can have no competi tions or interfering of interests, with his creatures and his subjects. § 14. And all that shows his government to correspond with our nature. But as the doctrine of liberty, though we expe rience its truth, may be perplexed with difficulties, which run up into the most abstruse of all specula tions ; and as the opinion of necessity seems to be the very basis, upon which infidelity grounds itself; it may be of some use to offer a more particular proof of the obligations of religion, which may distinctly be shown not to be destroyed by this opinion. The proof from final causes of an intelligent Author of nature is not affected by the opinion of necessity ; supposing necessity a thing possible in itself, and reconcilable with the constitution of things e. And it is a matter of fact, independent on this or any other speculation, that he governs the world by the method of rewards and punish ments f : and also that he hath given us ' a moral faculty, by which we distinguish between actions, and approve some as virtuous and of good desert, e Sup. §§ 1, 2. *' Chap. ii. 150 OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, [I. vi. and disapprove others as vicious and of ill desert?. Now this moral discernment implies, in the notion of it, a rule of action, and a rule of a very peculiar kind : for it carries in it authority and a right of direction ; authority in such a sense, as that we can not depart from it without being self-condemned11. And that the dictates of this moral faculty, which are by nature a rule to us, are moreover the laws of God, laws in a sense including sanctions ; may be thus proved. Consciousness of a rule or guide of action, in creatures who are capable of consider ing it as given them by their Maker, not only raises immediately a sense of duty, but also a sense of security in following it, and of danger in de viating from it. A direction of the Author of nature, given to creatures capable of looking upon it as such, is plainly a command from him : and a command from him necessarily includes in it, at least, an implicit promise in case of obedience, or threatening in case of disobedience. But then the sense or per ception of good and ill desert \ which is contained in the moral discernment, renders the sanction explicit, and makes it appear, as one may say, expressed. For since his method of government is to reward and punish actions, his having annexed to some actions an inseparable sense of good desert, and to others of ill, this surely amounts to declaring, upon whom his punishments shall be inflicted, and his rewards be bestowed. For he must have given us this discern ment and sense of things, as a presentiment of what is to be hereafter : that is, by way of information before hand, what we are finally to expect in his world. s Dissert. II. h sernli jj#- at ^e Roils 1 Dissert. II. §§i5, 16] AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE. 151 § 15. As then God governs, we infer the duty of worship to him, There is then most evident ground to think, that the government of God, upon the whole, will be found to correspond to the nature which he has given us : and that in the upshot and issue of things, happiness and misery shall, in fact and event, be made to follow virtue and vice respectively ; as he has already, in so peculiar a manner, associated the ideas of them in our minds. And from hence might easily be deduced the obligations of religious worship, were it only to be considered as a means of preserving upon our minds a sense of this moral government of God, and securing our obedience to it : which yet is an extremely imperfect view of that most important duty. $ 16. Against this general proof, necessity has nothing to say. Now I say, no objection from necessity can lie against this general proof of religion. None against the proposition reasoned upon, that we have such a moral faculty and discernment ; because this is a mere matter of fact, a thing of experience, that human kind is thus constituted : none against the conclusion ; because it is immediate and wholly from this fact. For the conclusion, that God will finally reward the righteous and punish the wicked, is not here drawn, from its appearing to us fitk k However, I am far from intending to deny, that the will of God is determined, by what is fit, by the right The will of God and reason of the case ; though one chooses to is determined decline matters of such abstract speculation, and % what is ft. to speak with caution when one does speak of them. But if it 152 OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, [I. vi. that he should; but from its appearing, that he has told us, he will. And this he hath certainly told us, in the promise and threatening, which it hath been observed the notion of a command implies, and the sense of good and ill desert which he has given us, more distinctly expresses. And this reasoning from fact is confirmed, and in some degree even verified, by other facts ; by the natural tendencies of virtue and of vice ' ; and by this, that God, in the natural course of his providence, punishes vicious actions as mischievous to society ; and also vicious actions as such in the strictest sense ra. So that the general proof of religion is unanswerably real, even upon the wild supposition which we are arguing upon. § 17. Nor against the evidence ab extra afforded by long duration. It must likewise be observed further, that natural religion hath, besides this, an external evidence ; be intelligible to say, that it is fit and reasonable for every one to consult his own happiness, then fitness of action, or the right and reason of the case, is an intelligible manner of speaking. And it seems as inconceivable, to suppose God to approve one course of action, or one end, preferably to another, which yet his acting at all from design implies that he does, without supposing some what prior in that end, to be the ground of the preference ; as to suppose him to discern an abstract proposition to be true, without supposing somewhat prior in it, to be the ground of the discernment. It doth not therefore appear, that moral right is any more relative to perception, than abstract truth is : or that it is any more improper, to speak of the fitness and rightness of actions and ends, as founded in the nature of things, than to speak of abstract truth, as thus founded. l Sup. chap. iii. §§ 22-24. m Sup. chap. iii. §§ 11-13. § 17] AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE. 153 which the doctrine of necessity, if it could be true, would not affect. For suppose a person, by the ob servations and reasoning above, or by any other, convinced of the truth of religion ; that there is a God, who made the world, who is the moral Governor and Judge of mankind, and will upon the whole deal with every one according to his works : I say, suppose a person convinced of this by reason ; but to know nothing at all of antiquity, or the present state of mankind. It would be natural for such an one to be inquisitive, what was the history of this system of doctrine ; at what time, and in what manner, it came first into the world ; and whether it were believed by any considerable part of it. And were he upon inquiry to find, that a particular person, in a late age, first of all pro posed it, as a deduction of reason, and that mankind were before wholly ignorant of it : then, though its evidence from reason would remain, there would be no additional probability of its truth, from the account of its discovery. But instead of this being the fact of the case, on the contrary, he would find, what could not but afford him a very strong confirmation of its truth : First, That somewhat of this system, with more or fewer additions and altera tions, hath been professed in all ages and countries, of which we have any certain information relating to this matter. Secondly, That it is certain historical fact, so far as we can trace things up, that this whole system of belief, that there is one God, the Creator and moral Governor of the world, and that mankind is in a state of religion, was received in the first ages. 154 OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, [I. vi. § 1 8. Which began ivith a primitive revelation '. And Thirdly, That as there is no hint or intima tion in history, that this system was first reasoned out ; so there is no express historical or traditional evidence, as ancient as history, that it was taught first by revelation. Now these things must be allowed to be of great weight. The first of them, general consent, shows this system to be conform able to the common sense of mankind. The second, namely, that religion was believed in the first ages of the world, especially as it does not appear that there were then any superstitious or false additions to it, cannot but be a further confirmation of its truth. For it is a proof of this alternative : either that it came into the world by revelation ; or that it is natural, obvious, and forces itself upon the mind. The former of these is the conclusion of learned men. And whoever will consider, how un apt for speculation rude and uncultivated minds are, will, perhaps from hence alone, be strongly inclined to believe it the truth. And as it is shown in the second part11 of this Treatise, that there is nothing of such peculiar presumption against a revelation in the beginning of the world, as there is supposed to be against subsequent ones : a sceptic could not, I think, give any account, which would appear more probable even to himself, of the early pretences to revelation ; than by supposing some real original one, from whence they were copied 2. And the n Part II. chap. ii. 1 On the origin of natural religion be a theist) held it to be impossible comp. II. ii. io. for the Creator to find any means 2 Unless the sceptic (supposed to beyond what external nature sup- §§i8, 19] AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE. 155 third thing above mentioned, that there is express historical or traditional evidence as ancient as history, of the system of religion being taught mankind by revelation ; this must be admitted as some degree of real proof, that it was so taught. For why should not the most ancient tradition be admitted, as some additional proof of a fact, against which there is no presumption? And this proof is mentioned here, because it has its weight to show, that religion came into the world by revelation, prior to all con sideration of the proper authority of any book sup posed to contain it ; and even prior to all consideration, whether the revelation itself be uncorruptly handed down and related, or mixed and darkened with fables. Thus the historical account, which we have, of the origin of religion, taking in all circumstances, is a real confirmation of its truth, no way affected by the opinion of necessity. And the external evi dence1, even of natural religion, is by no means inconsiderable. § 19. Our perceptions, though faulty, are still our guides, and are not to be superseded by fashion. But it is carefully to be observed, and ought to be recollected after all proofs of virtue and religion, which are only general ; that as speculative reason may be neglected, prejudiced, and deceived, so also may our moral understanding be impaired and per- plies for conveying his will to the which is against all testimony con- minds of his creatures: or else held, cerning the earliest history of our as is now pretended by some, that race. all approaches to religion were 1 Videlicet, that of history, monu- made by innumerable slow and ments, and traditions ; to which gradual steps, reaching, after this some reference has already been illimitable series, the idea of God : made. 156 OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, [I. vi. verted, and the dictates of it not impartially attended to. This indeed proves nothing against the reality of our speculative or practical faculties of percep tion ; against their being intended by nature, to inform us in the theory of things, and instruct us how we are to behave, and what we are to expect in consequence of our behaviour. Yet our liable- ness, in the degree we are liable, to prejudice and perversion, is a most serious admonition to us to be upon our guard, with respect to what is of such consequence, as our determinations concerning virtue and religion : and particularly not to take custom, and fashion, and slight notions of honour, or imagina tions of present ease, use, and convenience to mankind, for the only moral rule0. § 20. Suppose the fatalist to argue against religion that punishment of necessary action is incredible, The foregoing observations, drawn from the nature of the thing, and the history of religion, amount, when taken together, to a real practical proof of it, not to be confuted : such a proof as, considering the infinite importance of the thing, I apprehend, would be admitted fully sufficient, in reason, to influence the actions of men, who act upon thought and reflection ; if it were admitted that there is no proof of the contrary. But it may be said : ' There are many probabilities, which cannot indeed be confuted, i. e. shown to be no probabilities, and yet may be overbalanced by greater probabilities on the other side ; much more by demonstration. And there is no occasion to object against particular arguments alleged for an opinion, when the opinion itself may 0 Dissert. II. §§20,21] AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE. 157 be clearly shown to be false, without meddling with such arguments at all, but leaving them just as they are P. Now the method of government by rewards and punishments, and especially rewarding and punishing good and ill desert as such respectively, must go upon supposition, that we are free and not necessary agents \ And it is incredible, that the Author of nature should govern us upon a sup position as true, which he knows to be false ; and therefore absurd to think, . he will reward or punish us for our actions hereafter ; especially that he will do it under the notion, that they are of good or ill desert.' $ 21. Necessary action is not punishable : but we have tlie experimental fact of moral government ; Here then the matter is brought to a point. And the answer to all this is full, and not to be evaded : that the whole constitution and course of things, the whole analogy of Providence, shows beyond1 possibility of doubt, that the conclusion from this reasoning is false ; wherever the fallacy lies. The doctrine of freedom indeed clearly shows where : in supposing ourselves necessary, when in truth we are free agents. But upon the supposition of necessity, the fallacy lies in taking for granted, that it is p Pages 1, 10 [corresponding with Introd. §§ 1, 2, 14-16, in the present edition. I fail, however, to trace the reference intended by the author. — Ed.]. 1 Fitzgerald thinks it important there is a persuasion of our being to distinguish between the 'religious free, though a false persuasion. necessitarian,' who in regard to a But Butler's argument strikes alike particular action denies that he both of these unfounded and mis- could have willed otherwise, and chievous opinions. the irreligious, who allows that 158 OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, [I. vi. incredible necessary agents should be rewarded and punished. But that, somehow or other, the con clusion now mentioned is false, is most certain. For it is fact, that God does govern even brute creatures by the method of rewards and punishments, in the natural course of things. And men are rewarded and punished for their actions, punished for actions mischievous to society as being so, punished for vicious actions as such ; by the natural instrumen tality of each other, under the present conduct of Providence. Nay even the affection of gratitude, and the passion of resentment, and the rewards and punishments following from them, which in general are to be considered as natural, i. e. from the Author of nature ; these rewards and punishments, being naturally See Part II. ch. il §§ 1-3] CONCLUSION. 177 § 2. No escape found by denying an intelligent Author ; For, will any man in his senses say, that it is less difficult to conceive, how the world came to be and to continue as it is, without, than with, an intelligent Author and Governor of it ? Or, admitting an intelligent Governor of it, that there is some other rule of government more natural, and of easier conception, than that which we call moral? In deed, without an intelligent Author and Governor of nature, no account at all can be given, how this universe, or the part of it particularly in which we are concerned, came to be, and the course of it to be carried on, as it is : nor any, of its general end and design, without a moral Governor of it. That there is an intelligent Author of nature, and natural Governor of the world, is a principle gone upon in the foregoing Treatise ; as proved, and generally known and confessed to be proved. § 3. Whose character and goodness give us an interest in his scheme, And the very notion of an intelligent Author of nature, proved by particular final causes, implies a will and a character c. Now, as our whole nature, the nature which he has given us, leads us to conclude his will and character to be moral, just, and good : so we can scarce in imagination conceive, what it can be otherwise. However, in consequence of this his will and character, whatever it be, he formed the universe as it is, and carries on the course of it as he does, rather than in any other manner ; and has assigned to us, and to all living c Sup. ch. vi. § 12. VOL. I. N 178 CONCLUSION. [I. viii. creatures, a part and a lot in it. Irrational creatures act this their part, and enjoy and undergo the pleasures and the pains allotted them, without any reflection. But one would think it impossible, that creatures endued with reason could avoid reflecting sometimes upon all this : reflecting, if not from whence we came, yet, at least, whither we are going ; and what the mysterious scheme, in the midst of which we find ourselves, will, at length, come out and produce : a scheme in which it is certain we are highly interested, and in which we may be interested even beyond conception. § 4. To presume extinction at death is rroWa^ox; irrational. For many things prove it palpably absurd to conclude, that we shall cease to be, at death. Parti cular analogies do most sensibly show us, that there is nothing to be thought strange, in our being to exist in another state of life. And that we are now living beings, affords a strong probability that we shall continue so ; unless there be some positive ground, and there is none from reason or analogy, to think death will destroy us 1. Were a persuasion of this kind ever so well grounded, there would, surely, be little reason to take pleasure in it. But indeed it can have no other ground, than some such imagination, as that of our gross bodies being our selves 2 ; which is contrary to experience. Experience too most clearly shows us the folly of concluding, 1 See I. i. 4. Butler would probably have dis- 2 I. e. our whole selves : or our- tinguished between the body here selves so far as to determine the mentioned, and the sensuous or fate of the whole. Still the body ' gross * bodies which he denies to of the Christian is a temple of the be ' ourselves.' Holy Ghost (1 Cor. iii. 16; vi. 19). §§4-5] CONCLUSION. 179 from the body and the living agent affecting each other mutually, that the dissolution of the former is the destruction of the latter. And there are remarkable instances of their not affecting each other, which lead us to a contrary conclusion. The supposition then, which in all reason we are to go upon, is, that our living nature will continue after death. § 5. Hence a scope for hope and fear in the future ; which, like as in the present, may bear upon conduct. And it is infinitely unreasonable to form an insti tution of life, or to act, upon any other supposition. Now all expectation of immortality, whether more or less certain, opens an unbounded prospect to our hopes and our fears : since we see the constitution of nature is such, as to admit of misery as well as to be productive of happiness, and experience ourselves to partake of both in some degree ; and since we cannot but know, what higher degrees of both we are capable of. And there is no presumption against believing further, that our future interest depends upon our present behaviour : for we see our present interest doth ; and that the happiness and misery, which are naturally annexed to our actions, very frequently do not follow, till long after the actions are done, to which they are respectively annexed. So that were speculation to leave us uncertain, whether it were likely, that the Author of nature, in giving happiness and misery to his creatures, hath regard to their actions or not : yet, since we find by experience that he hath such regard, the whole sense of things which he has given us, plainly leads us, at once and without any elaborate inquiries, to think, that it may, indeed must, be to good actions x 2 180 CONCLUSION. [I. vm. chiefly that he hath annexed happiness, and to bad actions misery ; or that he will, upon the whole, reward those who do well, and punish those who do evil. § 6. Natural government lias a moral element, leaning to virtue, operative in part, To confirm this from the constitution of the world, it has been observed, that some sort of moral govern ment is necessarily implied in that natural govern ment of God, which we experience ourselves under : that good and bad actions, at present, are naturally rewarded and punished, not only as beneficial and mischievous to society, but also as virtuous and vicious : and that there is, in the very nature of the thing, a tendency to their being rewarded and punished in a much higher degree than they are at present. And though this higher degree of distributive justice, which nature thus points out and leads towards, is prevented for a time from taking place : it is by obstacles, which the state of this world unhappily throws in its way, and which therefore are in their nature temporary. Now, as these things in the natural conduct of Providence are observable on the side of virtue ; so there is nothing to be set against them on the side of vice. A moral scheme1 of government then is visibly established, and, in some degree, carried into execution : § 7. And, subject to risk and labour, promises an enlarged action in a future state. And this, together with the essential tendencies of virtue and vice duly considered, naturally raise 1 See sup. iii. 4, 5. §§6-8] CONCLUSION. 181 in us an apprehension, that it will be carried on further towards perfection in a future state, and that every one shall there receive according to his deserts. And if this be so, then our future and general interest, under the moral government of God, is appointed to depend upon our behaviour ; notwithstanding the difficulty, which this may occa sion, of securing it, and the danger of losing it : just in the same manner as our temporal interest, under his natural government, is appointed to depend upon our behaviour ; notwithstanding the like diffi culty and danger. For, from our original consti tution, and that of the world which we inhabit, we are naturally trusted with ourselves ; with our own conduct and our own interest. And from the same constitution of nature, especially joined with that course of things which is owing to men, we have temptations to be unfaithful in this trust ; to forfeit this interest, to neglect it, and run ourselves into misery and ruin. From these temptations arise the difficulties of behaving so as to secure our temporal interest, and the hazard of behaving so as to miscarry in it. There is therefore nothing incredible in supposing there may be the like diffi culty and hazard with regard to that chief and final good, which religion lays before us. § 8. We can partly give the why of our position ; bid not fully. Indeed the whole account, how it came to pass that we were placed in such a condition as this, must be beyond our comprehension. But it is in part accounted for by what religion teaches us, that the character of virtue and piety must be a neces sary qualification for a future state of security and 182 CONCLUSION. [I. vm. happiness, under the moral government of God ; in like manner, as some certain qualifications or other are necessary for every particular condition of life, under his natural government : and that the present state was intended to be a school of discipline, for improving in ourselves that character. § 9. We observe an intention for our improvement. Now this intention of nature is rendered highly credible by observing ; that we are plainly made for improvement of all kinds : that it is a general appointment of Providence, that we cultivate prac tical principles, and form within ourselves habits of action, in order to become fit for what we were wholly unfit for before : that in particular, childhood and youth is naturally appointed to be a state of discipline for mature age : and that the present world is peculiarly fitted for a state of moral dis cipline. § 10. Fatalism is disabled from objecting. And, whereas objections are urged against the whole notion of moral government and a proba tion-state, from the opinion of necessity; it has been shown, that God has given us the evidence, as it were, of experience, that all objections against religion, on this head, are vain and delusive. J 11. Natural government is a buttress to moral. He has also, in his natural government, suggested an answer to all our short-sighted objections, against the equity and goodness of his moral government : and in general he has exemplified to us the latter by the former. §§9-12] CONCLUSION. 183 § 12. Hence we are bound to self-discipline and piety. These things, which, it is to be remembered, are matters of fact, ought, in all common sense, to awaken mankind ; to induce them to consider in earnest their condition, and what they have to do. It is absurd, absurd to the degree of being ridiculous, if the subject were not of so serious a kind, for men to think themselves secure in a vicious life ; or even in that immoral thoughtlessness, which far the greatest part of them are fallen into. And the credibility of religion, arising from experience and facts here considered, is fully sufficient, in reason, to engage them to live in the general practice of all virtue and piety ; under the serious apprehension, though it should be mixed with some doubt d, of a righteous administration established in nature, and a future judgment in consequence of it : espe cially when we consider, how very questionable it is, whether any thing at all can be gained by vice e ; how unquestionably little, as well as precarious, the pleasures and profits of it are at the best ; and how soon they must be parted with at the longest 1. For, in the deliberations of reason, concerning what we are to pursue and what to avoid, as temptations to any thing from mere passion are supposed out of the case : so inducements to vice, from cool expectations of pleasure and interest so small and uncertain and short, are really so insignificant, as, in the view of reason, to be almost nothing in themselves ; and in comparison with the importance of Religion, they quite disappear and are lost. d Part II. ch. vi. e Sup. ch. iii. §§ 5-7. 1 Argued more at length in Serm. iii. on Human Nature, §§ 9-1 1. 184 CONCLUSION. § 13. Temporal regards, adverse to vice; coincide with virtue. Mere passion indeed may be alleged, though not as a reason, yet as an excuse, for a vicious course of life. And how sorry an excuse it is, will be mani fest by observing, that we are placed in a condition, in which we are unavoidably inured to govern our passions, by being necessitated to govern them ; and to lay ourselves under the same kind of restraints, and as great ones too, from temporal regards, as virtue and piety, in the ordinary course of things, require. The plea of ungovernable passion then, on the side of vice, is the poorest of all things : for it is no reason, and but a poor excuse. § 14. Beligious proofs are religious motives. But the proper motives to religion are the proper proofs of it, from our moral nature, from the pre sages of conscience, and our natural apprehension of God under the character of a righteous Governor and Judge ; a nature and conscience and apprehen sion given us by him : and from the confirmation of the dictates of reason, by life and immortality brought to light by the Gospel; and the wrath of God revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men. THE END OF THE FIRST PART. THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION TO THE CONSTITUTION AND COURSE OF NATURE PABT II OF REVEALED RELIGION CHAPTER I. OF THE IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY. § I. A Bevelation was (a) required, (b) serviceable. SOME persons, upon pretence of the sufficiency of the light of nature, avowedly reject all revela tion, as, in its very notion, incredible, and what must be fictitious. And indeed it is certain, no revelation would have been given, had the light of nature been sufficient in such a sense, as to render one not wanting and useless. But no man, in seriousness and simplicity of mind, can possibly think it so, who considers the state of religion in the heathen world before revelation, and its present state in those places which have borrowed no light from it : 186 OF THE IMPORTANCE [II. i. particularly the doubtfulness of some of the greatest men, concerning things of the utmost importance, as well as the natural inattention and ignorance of mankind in general. It is impossible to say, who would have been able to have reasoned out that whole system, which we call natural religion, in its genuine simplicity, clear of superstition : but there is certainly no ground to affirm that the generality could l. If they could, there is no sort of probability that they would. Admitting there were, they would highly want a standing admonition to remind them of it, and inculcate it upon them -. And further still, were they as much disposed to attend to religion, as the better sort of men are : yet even upon this supposition, there would be various occa sions for supernatural instruction and assistance, and the greatest advantages might be afforded by them. So that to say revelation is a thing superfluous, what there was no need of, and what can be of no service, is, I think, to talk quite wildly and at random. Nor would it be more extravagant to affirm, that man kind is so entirely at ease in the present state, and life so completely happy, that it is a contradiction to suppose our condition capable of being, in any respect, better. 1 For the origin of natural re- sins and shortcomings of the in- ligion see sup. 1. vi. 18, and inf. ii. dividuals, partly in the degradation IO- of the current religions of the - Fitzgerald refers, for the de- heathen world, which had sunk velopment of this argument, to far below the level of natural Leland's Advantage and Necessity religion. Butler's propositions do of the Christian Revelation ; shown not stand in need of particular from the state of Religion in the illustrations, but such illustrations, ancient heathen world. 2nd ed., infinite in detail, are of the deepest Dublin, 1765. The ground of this interest. necessity would lie partly in the §2] OF CHRISTIANITY. 187 § 2. Weigh well Christianity as to (a) its importance, (b) its credibility, as added to natural religion. There are other persons, not to be ranked with these, who seem to be getting into a way of neglect ing, and, as it were, overlooking revelation, as of small importance, provided natural religion be kept to. With little regard either to the evidence of the former, or to the objections against it, and even upon supposition of its truth ; ' the only design of it,' say they, ' must be, to establish a belief of the moral system of nature, and to enforce the practice of natural piety and virtue. The belief and practice of these things were, perhaps, much promoted by the first publication of Christianity : but whether they are believed and practised, upon the evidence and motives of nature or of revelation, is no great matter a.' This way of considering revelation, though it is not the same with the former1, yet borders nearly upon it, and very much, at length, runs up into it : and requires to be particularly considered, with regard to the persons who seem to be getting into this way. The consideration of it will likewise further show the extravagance of the former opinion, and the truth of the observations in answer to it, just mentioned. And an inquiry into the importance of Christianity, cannot be an improper introduction to a Treatise concerning the credibility of it. a Invenis multos propterea nolle fieri Christianos, quia quasi sufficiunt sibi de bona vita sua. Bene vivere opus est, ait. Quid mihi praecepturus est Christus ? Ut bene vivam ? Jam bene vivo. Quid mihi necessarius est Christus ? Nullum homicidium, nullum furtum, nullam rapinam facio, res alienas non concupisco, nullo adulterio contaminor. Nam inveniatur in vita mea aliquid quod reprehendatur, et qui reprehenderit faciat Christianum. Aug. in Psal. xxxi. 1 Viz. (§ 1) 'to say revelation is a thing superfluous.' 188 OF THE IMPORTANCE [II. i. § 3. If its commands be divine, it is certain. Now if God has given a revelation to mankind, and commanded those things which are commanded in Christianity ; it is evident, at first sight, that it cannot in any wise be an indifferent matter, whether we obey or disobey those commands : unless we are certainly assured, that we know all the reasons for them, and that all those reasons are now ceased, with regard to mankind in general, or to ourselves in particular. And it is absolutely impossible we can be assured of this. For our ignorance of these reasons proves nothing in the case : since the whole analogy of nature shows, what is indeed in itself evident, that there may be infinite reasons for things, with which we are not acquainted. § A. It purports to teach religion, as (a) natural, (b) revealed. But the importance of Christianity will more dis tinctly appear, by considering it more distinctly : first, as a republication, and external institution, of natural or essential religion, adapted to the present circumstances of mankind, and intended to promote natural piety and virtue : and secondly, as containing an account of a dispensation of things not discover able by reason, in consequence of which, several dis tinct precepts are enjoined us. For though natural religion is the foundation and principal part of Chris tianity, it is not in any sense the whole of it. § 5. Viz. as a republication 1. [I.] Christianity is a republication of natural re ligion. It instructs mankind in the moral system 1 See, on this republication, the first of the Six Sermons, § 3. §§3-7] OF CHRISTIANITY. 189 of the world : that it is the work of an infinitely perfect Being, and under his government ; that virtue is his law ; and that he will finally judge mankind in righteousness, and render to all accord ing to their works, in a future state. And, which is very material, it teaches natural religion in its genuine simplicity ; free from those superstitions, with which it was totally corrupted, and under which it was in a manner lost. § 6. With fresh authority. Revelation is further, an authoritative publication of natural religion, and so affords the evidence of testimony for the truth of it. Indeed the miracles and prophecies recorded in scripture, were intended to prove a particular dispensation of Providence, the redemption of the world by the Messiah : but this does not hinder, but that they may also prove God's general providence over the world, as our moral Governor and Judge. And they evidently do prove it ; because this character of the Author of nature, is necessarily connected with and implied in that particular revealed dispensation of things : it is like wise continually taught expressly, and insisted upon, by those persons who wrought the miracles and delivered the prophecies. So that indeed natural religion seems as much proved by the scripture revelation, as it would have been, had the design of revelation been nothing else than to prove it. § 7. For miracle (including prophecy) adds to credibility. But it may possibly be disputed, how far miracles can prove natural religion ; and notable objections may be urged against this proof of it, considered as 190 OF THE IMPORTANCE [II. i. a matter of speculation : but considered as a practical thing, there can be none. For suppose a person to teach natural religion to a nation, who had lived in total ignorance or forgetfulness of it ; and to declare he was commissioned by God so to do : suppose him, in proof of his commission, to foretell things future, which no human foresight could have guessed at ; to divide the sea with a word ; feed great multi tudes with' bread from heaven ; cure all manner of diseases ; and raise the dead, even himself, to life : would not this give additional credibility to his teaching, a credibility beyond what that of a common man would have ; and be an authoritative publica tion of the law of nature, i. e. a new proof of it ? It would be a practical one, of the strongest kind, perhaps, which human creatures are capable of having given them. The law of Moses then, and the gospel of Christ, are authoritative publications of the religion of nature ; they afford a proof of God's general pro vidence, as moral Governor of the world, as well as of his particular dispensations of providence to wards sinful creatures, revealed in the law and the gospel. As they are the only evidence of the latter, so they are an additional evidence of the former. § 8. Has force in confirming a wavering mind. To show this further, let us suppose a man of the greatest and most improved capacity, who had never heard of revelation, convinced upon the whole, notwithstanding the disorders of the world, that it was under the direction and moral government of an infinitely perfect Being; but ready to question, whether he were not got beyond the reach of his faculties: suppose him brought, by this suspicion, into great danger of being carried away by the §§8-io] OF CHRISTIANITY. 191 universal bad example of almost every one around him, who appeared to have no sense, no practical sense at least, of these things : and this, perhaps, would be as advantageous a situation with regard to religion, as nature alone ever placed any man in. What a confirmation now must it be to such a person, all at once, to find, that this moral system of things was revealed to mankind, in the name of that infinite Being, whom he had from principles of reason believed in ; and that the publishers of the revelation proved their commission from him, by making it appear, that he had entrusted them with a power of suspending and changing the general laws of nature. § 9. Eminently brings life and immortality to light. Nor must it by any means be omitted, for it is a thing of the utmost importance, that life and immortality are eminently brought to light by the gospel1. The great doctrines of a future state, the danger of a course of wickedness, and the efficacy of repentance, are not only confirmed in the gospel, but are taught, especiaUy the last is, with a degree of light, to which that of nature is but darkness. $ 10. Miracle, taken up and recorded by the church, has advanced natural religion. Further : As Christianity served these ends and pur poses, when it was first published, by the miraculous 1 But if immortality were known Butler's position would be far already and independent of the stronger if, with many Christian gospel, it is only in a feeble and writers of the earliest centuries, he secondary sense that we can say of had been liberated from the belief it (as e.g. of right and wrong) that that the soul was indefeasibly it was brought to light by the immortal. gospel. See I. i. 31. Evidently 192 OF THE IMPORTANCE [II. i. publication itself ; so it was intended to serve the same purposes in future ages, by means of the settlement of a visible church 1 : of a society, distin guished from common ones, and from the rest of the world, by peculiar religious institutions ; by an instituted method of instruction, and an instituted form of external religion. Miraculous powers were given to the first preachers of Christianity, in order to their introducing it into the world : a visible church was established, in order to continue it, and carry it on successively throughout all ages. Had Moses and the Prophets, Christ and his Apostles, only taught, and by miracles proved, religion to their contemporaries ; the benefits of their instruc tions would have reached but to a small part of mankind 2. Christianity must have been, in a great degree, sunk and forgot in a very few ages. To prevent this, appears to have been one reason why a visible church was instituted : to be, like a city upon an hill, a standing memorial to the world of the duty which we owe our Maker : to call men continually, both by example and instruction, to attend to it, and, by the form of religion, ever be fore their eyes, remind them of the reality : to be the repository of the oracles of God : to hold up 1 For the development of this of these bodies, upon which their idea see Sermon before the S.P. G., vitality depends, is in truth in- § 4- eluded within the creeds of the 2 At first sight a doubt may be universal church (with some small suggested as to the validity of this allowance perhaps for partial ex- argument from the prolonged exist- aggerations). So that they are, so . ence in modern times of sects who to speak, in tow of the visible can hardly be said to have col- church, carried onwards with and lectively a visible church, such as by it. At least, it supplies for them Congregationalists and Quakers. that portion of Christian evidence, But the answer is, I think, con- in which they seem to be defec- clusive. All the positive teaching tive. § n] OF CHRISTIANITY. 193 the light of revelation in aid to that of nature, and propagate it throughout all generations to the end of the world — the light of revelation, considered here in no other view, than as designed to enforce natural religion. And in proportion as Christianity is pro fessed and taught in the world, religion, natural or essential religion, is thus distinctly and advan tageously laid before mankind, and brought again and again to their thoughts, as a matter of infinite importance. § 11. Especially as a church implies positive teaching institutions. A visible church has also a further tendency to pro mote natural religion, as being an instituted method of education, originally intended to be of more peculiar advantage to those who would conform to it. For one end of the institution was, that by admonition and reproof, as well as instruction ; by a general regular discipline, and public exercises of religion ; the body of Christ, as the scripture speaks, should be edified ; i. e. trained up in piety and virtue for a higher and better state. This settlement then appearing thus beneficial ; tending in the nature of the thing to answer, and in some degree actually answering, those ends ; it is to be remembered, that the very notion of it implies positive institu tions ; for the visibility of the church consists in them. Take away every thing of this kind, and you lose the very notion itself. So that if the things now mentioned are advantages, the reason and im portance of positive institutions in general is most obvious ; since without them these advantages could not be secured to the world. And it is mere idle wantonness, to insist upon knowing the reasons, why VOL. I. 0 194 OF THE IMPORTANCE [II. i. such particular ones were fixed upon rather than others. | 12. Thus natural religion has had supernatural aid. The benefit arising from this supernatural assist ance, which Christianity affords to natural Religion, is what some persons are very slow in apprehending. And yet it is a thing distinct in itself, and a very plain obvious one. For will any in good earnest really say, that the bulk of mankind in the heathen world were in as advantageous a situation with re gard to natural religion, as they are now amongst us : that it was laid before them, and enforced upon them, in a manner as distinct, and as much tending to influence their practice ? $ 13. Despite perversions of Christianity, The objections against all this, from the perver sion of Christianity, and from the supposition of its having had but little good influence, however innocently they may be proposed, yet cannot be insisted upon as conclusive, upon any principles, but such as lead to downright atheism : because the manifestation of the law of nature by reason, which, upon all principles of theism, must have been from God, has been perverted and rendered ineffectual in the same manner. It may indeed, I think, truly be said, that the good effects of Chris tianity have not been small ; nor its supposed ill effects, any effects at all of it, properly speaking. Perhaps too the things themselves done have been aggravated ; and if not, Christianity hath been often only a pretence ; and the same evils in the main would have been done upon some other pretence. However, great and shocking as the corruptions and §§ 12-15] OF CHRISTIANITY. 195 abuses of it have really been, they cannot be insisted upon as arguments against it, upon principles of theism. $ 14. Divine government leaves its provisions open to abuse. For one cannot proceed one step in reasoning upon natural religion, any more than upon Christianity, without laying it down as a first principle, that the dispensations of Providence are not to be judged of by their perversions, but by their genuine ten dencies : not by what they do actually seem to effect, but by what they would effect if mankind did their part ; that part which is justly put and left upon them. It is altogether as much the language of one as of the other ; He that is unjust, let him be unjust still: and he that is holy, let him be holy stillh. The light of reason does not, any more than that of revelation, force men to submit to its authority ; both admonish them of what they ought to do and avoid, together with the consequences of each ; and after this, leave them at full liberty to act just as they please, till the appointed time of judgment. Every moment's experience shows, that this is God's general rule of government. § 15. As such a republication, Christianity has a title to be examined. To return then : Christianity being a promulga tion of the law of nature ; being moreover an authori tative promulgation of it ; with new light, and other circumstances of peculiar advantage, adapted to the b Bev. xxii. n. O 2 196 OF THE IMPORTANCE [II. i. wants of mankind ; these things fully show its im portance. And it is to be observed further, that as the nature of the case requires, so all Christians are commanded to contribute, by their profession of Christianity, to preserve it in the world, and render it such a promulgation and enforcement of religion. For it is the very scheme of the gospel, that each Christian should, in his degree, contribute towards continuing and carrying it on : all by uniting in the public profession and external practice of Christianity ; some by instructing, by having the oversight and taking care of this religious community, the church of God. Now this further shows the importance of Christianity ; and, which is what I chiefly intend, its importance in a practical sense : or the high obligations we are under, to take it into our most serious consideration ; and the danger there must necessarily be, not only in treating it despitefully, which I am not now speaking of, but in disregarding and neglecting it. For this is neglecting to do what is expressly enjoined us, for continuing those benefits to the world, and transmitting them down to future times. And all this holds, even though the only thing to be considered in Christianity, were its subserviency to natural religion. But, j) 1 6. Is also a new plan of recovery for a world in ruins. [II. ] Christianity is to be considered in a further view: as containing an account of a dispensation of things, not at all discoverable by reason, in con sequence of which several distinct precepts are enjoined us. Christianity is not only an external institution of natural religion, and a new promul gation of God's general providence, as righteous §§16-18] OF CHRISTIANITY. 197 Governor and Judge of the world ; but it contains also a revelation of a particular dispensation of Providence, carrying on by his Son and Spirit, for the recovery and salvation of mankind, who are represented, in scripture, to be in a state of ruin. § 17. Bevelation is especially of the Son and Spirit. And in consequence of this revelation being made, we are commanded to be baptized, not only in the name of the Father, but also, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost: and other obligations of duty, unknown before, to the Son and the Holy Ghost, are revealed. Now the importance of these duties may be judged of, by observing that they arise, not from positive command merely, but also from the offices, which appear, from scripture, to belong to those divine persons in the gospel dispensation ; or from the relations, which, we are there informed, they stand in to us. By reason is revealed the relation, which God the Father stands in to us. Hence arises the obligation of duty which we are under to him. In scripture are revealed the relations, which the Son and Holy Spirit stand in to us. Hence arise the obligations of duty, which we are under to them. $ 18. Hence baptism is triune. The truth of the case, as one may speak, in each of these three respects being admitted : that God is the Governor of the world, upon the evidence of reason ; that Christ is the Mediator between God and man, and the Holy Ghost our Guide and Sanctifier, upon the evidence of revelation : the truth of the case, I say, in each of these respects being admitted ; it is no more a question, why it should be commanded, 198 OF THE IMPORTANCE [II. 1. that we be baptized in the name of the Son and of the Holy Ghost, than that we be baptized in the name of the Father. This matter seems to require to be more fully stated c. $ 19. Christianity has two parts, both essential: (a) inward, (b) outward. Let it be remembered then, that religion comes under the twofold consideration of internal and ex ternal : for the latter is as real a part of religion, of true religion, as the former. Now when religion is considered under the first notion, as an inward principle, to be exerted in such and such inward acts of the mind and heart ; the essence of natural religion may be said to consist in religious regards to God tlie Father Almighty : and the essence of re vealed religion, as distinguished from natural, to consist in religious regards to the Son, and to the Holy Ghost. And the obligation we are under, of paying these religious regards to each of these divine persons respectively, arises from the respective re lations which they each stand in to us. How these relations are made known, whether by reason or revelation, makes no alteration in the case : because the duties arise out of the relations themselves, not out of the manner in which we are informed of them. § 20. Dictates religious regards to Son and Spirit. The Son and Spirit have each his proper office in that great dispensation of Providence, the re demption of the world; the one our Mediator, the other our Sanctifier. Does not then the duty of c See The Nature, Obligation, and Efficacy of the Christian Sacra ments, &c. [by Archdeacon Waterland, 1734], and ColUber, Of revealed Religion, as there quoted. §§19-22] OF CHRISTIANITY. 199 religious regards to both these divine persons, as immediately arise, to the view of reason, out of the very nature of these offices and relations ; as the inward good-will and kind intention, which we owe to our fellow-creatures, arises out of the common relations between us and them ? But it will be asked, ' What are the inward religious regards, appearing thus obviously due to the Son and Holy Spirit ; as arising, not merely from command in scripture, but from the very nature of the revealed relations, which they stand in to us ? ' I answer, the religious regards of reverence, honour, love, trust, gratitude, fear, hope. § 21. Form of the outward is governed by command. In what external manner this inward worship is to be expressed, is a matter of pure revealed command ; as perhaps the external manner, in which God the Father is to be worshipped, may be more so, than we are ready to think : but the worship, the internal worship itself, to the Son and Holy Ghost, is no further matter of pure revealed com mand, than as the relations they stand in to us are matter of pure revelation : for the relations being known, the obligations to such internal worship are obligations of reason, arising out of those relations themselves. In short, the history of the gospel as immediately shows us the reason of these obliga tions, as it shows us the meaning of the words, Son and Holy Ghost. § 22. Our relation to Christ is strictly moral, and under moral sanctions. If this account of the Christian religion be just ; those persons who can speak lightly of it, as of 200 OF THE IMPORTANCE [II. i. little consequence, provided natural religion be kept to, plainly forget, that Christianity, even what is peculiarly so called, as distinguished from natural religion, has yet somewhat very important, even of a moral nature. For the office of our Lord being made known, and the relation he stands in to us, the obligation of religious regards to him is plainly moral, as much as charity to mankind is ; since this obligation arises, before external command, immedi ately out of that his office and relation itself. Those persons appear to forget, that revelation is to be considered, as informing us of somewhat new, in the state of mankind, and in the government of the world : as acquainting us with some relations we stand in, which could not otherwise have been known. And these relations being real, (though before revelation we could be under no obligations from them, yet upon their being revealed,) there is no reason to think, but that neglect of behaving suitably to them will be attended with the same kind of consequences under God's government, as neglecting to behave suitably to any other relations made known to us by reason. And ignorance, whether unavoidable or voluntary, so far as we can possibly see, will just as much, and just as little, excuse in one case as in the other : the ignorance being supposed equally unavoidable, or equally volun tary, in both cases. § 23. Disregard whereof may entail penalty in a natural way. If therefore Christ be indeed the Mediator between God and man, i. e. if Christianity be true ; if he be indeed our Lord, our Saviour, and our God ; no one can say, what may follow, not only the obstinate, §§23,24] OF CHRISTIANITY. 201 but the careless disregard to him, in those high re lations. Nay no one can say, what may follow such disregard, even in the way of natural consequence A. For, as the natural consequences of vice in this life are doubtless to be considered as judicial punish ments inflicted by God ; so likewise, for ought we know, the judicial punishments of the future life may be, in a like way or a like sense, the natural consequence of vice e : of men's violating or disre garding the relations which God has placed them in here, and made known to them. § 24. Same is true as to use of enjoined means of grace. Again : If mankind are corrupted and depraved in their moral character, and so are unfit for that state, which Christ is gone to prepare for his disciples ; and if the assistance of God's Spirit be necessary to renew their nature, in the degree requisite to their being qualified for that state ; all which is implied in the express, though figurative declaration, Except a man be born of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God* : supposing this, is it possible any serious person can think it a slight matter, whether or no he makes use of the means, expressly com manded by God, for obtaining this divine assistance? Especially since the whole analogy of nature shows, that we are not to expect any benefits without making use of the appointed means for obtaining or enjoying them. Now reason shows us nothing, of the particular immediate means of obtaining either temporal or spiritual benefits. This therefore we must learn, either from experience or revelation. And ex perience, the present case does not admit of. d Sup. I. i. 31. e Chap. v. f John iii. 5. 202 OF THE IMPORTANCE [II. i. § 25. Conclusion : that to treat Christianity with levity is wildly rash. The conclusion from all this evidently is, that, Christianity being supposed either true or credible, it is unspeakable irreverence, and really the most presumptuous rashness, to treat it as a light matter. It can never justly be esteemed of little consequence, till it be positively supposed false. Nor do I know a higher and more important obligation which we are under, than that of examining most seriously into the evidence of it, supposing its credibility ; and of embracing it, upon supposition of its truth. § 26. Commands distinguished as (a) positive, (b) moral. The two following deductions may be proper to be added, in order to illustrate the foregoing obser vations, and to prevent their being mistaken. First, Hence we may clearly see, where lies the distinction between what is positive and what is moral in religion. Moral precepts are precepts, the reasons of which we see : positive precepts are pre cepts, the reasons of which we do not see s. Moral duties arise out of the nature of the case itself, prior to external command. Positive duties s This is the distinction between moral and positive precepts considered respectively as such. But vet, since How the two agree, ,, , u , , , , , , and differ latter have somewhat of a moral nature, we may see the reason of them, considered in this view. Moral and positive precepts are in some respects alike, in other respects different. So far as they are alike, we discern the reasons of both ; so far as they are different, we discern the reasons of the former, but not of the latter. See sup. § 10 sqq. [But I do not see the relevancy of the reference. — Ed.], and inf. § 27. §§25-27] OF CHRISTIANITY. 203 do not arise out of the nature of the case, but from external command ; nor would they be duties at all, were it not for such command, received from him whose creatures and subjects we are. § 27. But the positive have a moral force; and may rest either on natural or revealed religion. But the manner in which the nature of the case, or the fact of the relation, is made known, this doth not denominate any duty either positive or moral. That we be baptized in the name of the Father, is as much a positive duty, as that we be baptized in the name of the Son ; because both arise equally from revealed command : though the relation which we stand in to God the Father is made known to us by reason ; the relation we stand in to Christ, by revelation only. On the other hand, the dispensation of the gospel admitted, gratitude as immediately becomes due to Christ, from his being the voluntary minister of this dispensation, as it is due to God the Father, from his being the fountain of all good ; though the first is made known to us by revelation only, the second by reason. Hence also we may see, and, for distinctness sake, it may be worth men tioning, that positive institutions come under a twofold consideration. They are either institutions founded on natural Religion, as baptism in the name of the Father ; though this has also a par ticular reference to the gospel dispensation, for it is in the name of God, as the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ : or they are external insti tutions founded on revealed religion ; as baptism in the name of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. 204 OF THE IMPORTANCE [II. i. § 28. In principle they have a moral basis : but take the second place. Secondly, From the distinction between what is moral and what is positive in religion, appears the ground of that peculiar preference, which the scripture teaches us to be due to the former. The reason of positive institutions in general is very obvious ; though we should not see the reason, why such particular ones are pitched upon rather than others. Whoever therefore, instead of cavilling at words, will attend to the thing itself, may clearly see, that positive institutions in general, as distinguished from this or that particular one, have the nature of moral commands ; since the reasons of them appear. Thus, for instance, the external worship of God is a moral duty, though no particular mode of it be so. Care then is to be taken, when a comparison is made between positive and moral duties, that they be compared no further than as they are different ; no further than as the former are positive, or arise out of mere external command, the reasons of which we are not acquainted with ; and as the latter are moral, or arise out of the apparent reason of the case, without such external command. Unless this caution be observed, we shall run into endless confusion. § 29. In case of conflict, the moral precept prevails. Now this being premised, suppose two standing precepts enjoined by the same authority; that, in certain conjunctures, it is impossible to obey both; that the former is moral, i.e. a precept of which we see the reasons, and that they hold in the §§ 28-31] OF CHRISTIANITY. 205 particular case before us ; but that the latter is positive, i. e. a precept of which we do not see the reasons : it is indisputable that our obligations are to obey the former ; because there is an appa rent reason for this preference, and none against it. Further, positive institutions, I suppose all those which Christianity enjoins, are means to a moral end : and the end must be acknowledged more excellent than the means. Nor is observ ance of these institutions any religious obedience at all, or of any value, otherwise than as it pro ceeds from a moral principle. This seems to be the strict logical way of stating and determining this matter ; but will, perhaps, be found less applicable to practice, than may be thought at first sight. § 30. Has double title, from (a) scripture, (b) natural law. And therefore, in a more practical, though more lax way of consideration, and taking the words, moral law and positive institutions, in the popular sense ; I add, that the whole moral law is as much matter of revealed command, as positive institutions are : for the scripture enjoins every moral virtue. In this respect then they are both upon a level. But the moral law is, moreover, written upon our hearts ; interwoven into our very nature. And this is a plain intimation of the Author of it, which is to be preferred, when they interfere. §31. Men strive to substitute rite for virtue ; but in vain. But there is not altogether so much necessity for the determination of this question, as some 206 OF THE IMPORTANCE [II. i. persons seem to think. Nor are we left to reason alone to determine it. For, first, Though mankind have, in all ages, been greatly prone to place their religion in peculiar positive rites, by way of equiva lent for obedience to moral precepts ; yet, without making any comparison at all between them, and consequently without determining which is to have the preference, the nature of the thing abundantly shows all notions of that kind to be utterly sub versive of true religion : as they are, moreover, contrary to the whole general tenor of scripture ; and likewise to the most express particular declara tions of it, that nothing can render us accepted of God, without moral virtue. Secondly, Upon the occasion of mentioning together positive and moral duties, the scripture always puts the stress of religion upon the latter, and never upon the former : which, though no sort of allowance to neglect the former, when they do not interfere with the latter, yet is a plain intimation, that when they do, the latter are to be preferred. § 32. Our Lord has settled the matter, by his teaching on the Sabbath. And further, as mankind are for placing the stress of their religion any where, rather than upon virtue ; lest both the reason of the thing, and the general spirit of Christianity, appearing in the intimation now mentioned, should be in effectual against this prevalent folly : our Lord himself, from whose command alone the obliga tion of positive institutions arises, has taken occa sion to make the comparison between them and moral precepts ; when the Pharisees censured him, for eating with publicans and sinners; and also when §32] OF CHRISTIANITY. 207 they censured his disciples, for plucking the ears of corn on the Sabbath-day. Upon this comparison, he has determined expressly, and in form, which shall have the preference when they interfere. And by delivering his authoritative determination in a proverbial manner of expression, he has made it general: I will have mercy1, and not sacrifice^. The propriety of the word proverbial is not the thing insisted upon : though I think the manner of speaking is to be called so. But that the manner of speaking very remarkably renders the deter mination general, is surely indisputable. For, had it, in the latter case, been said only, that God preferred mercy to the rigid observance of the Sabbath ; even then, by parity of reason, most justly might we have argued, that he preferred mercy likewise, to the observance of other ritual institutions ; and in general, moral duties, to positive ones. And thus the determination would have been general ; though its being so were inferred and not expressed. But as the passage really stands in the gospel, it is much stronger. For the sense and the very literal words of our Lord's answer are as applicable to any other instance of a comparison, between positive and moral duties, as to this upon which they were spoken. And if, in case of competition, mercy is to be preferred to positive institutions, it will scarce be thought, that justice is to give place to them. h Matt. ix. 13 and xii. 7. 1 ' Obedience to positive com- spring from a principle of natural mand, it will be noticed, is often morality ; the former, if not the a more decisive test of religious result of hypocrisy or of mechanical character, than the practice of habit, is an evidence of reverence moral duties. The latter may for the divine will.' Angus. 208 OF THE IMPORTANCE [II. i- § 33. Superiority of virtue to observance taught by the Old Testament. It is remarkable too, that, as the words are a quotation from the Old Testament, they are intro duced, on both the forementioned occasions, with a declaration, that the Pharisees did not understand the meaning of them. This, I say, is very remark able. For, since it is scarce possible, for the most ignorant person, not to understand the literal sense of the passage, in the prophet i ; and since under standing the literal sense would not have prevented their condemning the guiltless k ; it can hardly be doubted, that the thing which our Lord really in tended in that declaration was, that the Pharisees had not learnt from it, as they might, wherein the general spirit of religion consists : that it consists in moral piety and virtue, as distinguished from forms, and ritual observances. However, it is certain we may learn this from his divine application of the passage, in the gospel. § 34. The obligation to obey positive precepts is moral. But, as it is one of the peculiar weaknesses of human nature, when, upon a comparison of two things, one is found to be of greater importance than the other, to consider this other as of scarce any importance at all : it is highly necessary that we remind ourselves, how great presumption it is, to make light of any institutions of divine appoint ment ; that our obligations to obey all God's com mands whatever are absolute and indispensable ; and that commands merely positive, admitted to be from him, lay us under a moral obligation to obey them : 1 Hos. vi. t see Matt. xii. 7. ii. § i] OF CHRISTIANITY. 209 an obligation moral in the strictest and most proper sense. § 35- We are to accept the sense of scripture, not import it. To these things I cannot forbear adding, that the account now given of Christianity most strongly shows and enforces upon us the obligation of search ing the scriptures, in order to see, what the scheme of revelation really is ; instead of determining before hand, from reason, what the scheme of it must be1. Indeed if in revelation there be found any passages, the seeming meaning of which is contrary to natural religion ; we may most certainly con clude, such seeming meaning not to be the real one. But it is not any degree of a presumption against an interpretation of scripture, that such interpreta tion contains a doctrine, which the light of nature cannot discover m ; or a precept, which the law of nature does not oblige to. CHAPTER II. CONSIDERED AS MIRACULOUS. § 1. Will deal (a) with presumption, (b) with positive evidence. HAVING shown the importance of the Christian revelation, and the obligations which we are under seriously to attend to it, upon supposition of its truth, or its credibility : the next thing in order, 1 See chap. iii. m Inf. ii. 3, 4. VOL. I. P 210 SUPPOSED PRESUMPTION AGAINST [II. n. is to consider the supposed presumptions against revelation in general ; which shall be the subject of this chapter : and the objections against the Christian in particular ; which shall be the subject of some following onesa. For it seems the most natural method, to remove these prejudices against Christi anity, before we proceed to the consideration of the positive evidence for it, and the objections against that evidence0. § 2. He discusses under protest a plea lie deems frivolous. It is, I think, commonly supposed, that there is some peculiar presumption, from the analogy of nature, against the Christian scheme of things ; at least against miracles : so as that stronger evidence is necessary to prove the truth and reality of them, than would be sufficient to convince us of other events, or matters of fact. Indeed the considera tion of this supposed presumption cannot but be thought very insignificant, by many persons. Yet, as it belongs to the subject of this Treatise ; so it may tend to open the mind, and remove some prejudices : however needless the consideration of it be, upon its own account. § 3. Nature sustains no presumption against the gospel idea, [I.] I find no appearance of a presumption, from the analogy of nature, against the general scheme of Christianity, that God created and invisibly governs the world by Jesus Christ ; and by him also will here after judge it in righteousness, i. e. render to every one according to his works : and that good men are a Chaps, iii. iv, v, vi. t> Chap. vii. §§2-4] A REVELATION WITH MIRACLE. 211 under the secret influence of his Spirit. Whether these things are, or are not, to be called miraculous, is, perhaps, only a question about words ; or how ever, is of no moment in the case. If the analogy of nature raises any presumption against this general scheme of Christianity, it must be, either because it is not discoverable by reason or experience ; or else, because it is unlike that course of nature, which is. But analogy raises no presumption against the truth of this scheme, upon either of these accounts. § 4. (a) Because it is undiscoverable ; like so much else ; First, There is no presumption, from analogy, against the truth of it, upon account of its not being dis coverable by reason or experience. For suppose one who never heard of revelation, of the most improved understanding, and acquainted with our ^ whole system of natural philosophy and natural religion : such an one could not but be sensible, that it was but a very small part of the natural and moral system of the universe, which he was acquainted with. He could not but be sensible, that there must be innumerable things, in the dispensa tions of' Providence past, in the invisible govern ment over the world at present carrying on, and in what is to come ; of which he was wholly ignorant c, and which could not be' discovered without revela tion. Whether the scheme of nature be, in the 1- strictest sense, infinite or not ; it is evidently vast, even beyond all possible imagination. And doubt less that part of it, which is opened to our view, is but as a point, in comparison of the whole plan c Sup. I. vii. 2-4. P 2 212 SUPPOSED PRESUMPTION AGAINST [II. n. of Providence, reaching throughout eternity past and future ; in comparison of what is even now going on in the remote parts of the boundless universe ; nay in comparison of the whole scheme of this world. And therefore, that things lie beyond the natural reach of our faculties, is no sort of presump tion against the truth and reality of them : because it is certain, there are innumerable things, in the constitution and government of the universe, which are thus beyond the natural reach of our faculties. § 5. Or (b) because not always like nature : which is not uniform; nor is moral government. Secondly, Analogy raises no presumption against any of the things contained in this general doctrine of scripture now mentioned, upon account of their being unlike the known course of nature. For there is no presumption at all from analogy, that the whole course of things, or divine government, natur ally unknown to us, and every thing in it, is like to any thing in that which is known ; and therefore no peculiar presumption against any thing x in the former, upon account of its being unlike to any thing in the latter. And in the constitution and natural government of the world, as well as in the moral government of it, we see things, in a great degree, unlike one another : and therefore ought not to wonder at such unlikeness between things visible and invisible. However, the scheme of Christianity is by no means entirely unlike the scheme of nature ; as will appear in the following part of this Treatise. 1 That is, against any particular contradict the purpose of this work thing. For, were there an univer- as declared in the title. sal or general unlikeness, it would §§5-7] A REVELATION WITH MIRACLE. 213 § 6. So that ancdogy supplies no adverse presumption \ The notion of a miracle, considered as a proof of a divine mission, has been stated with great exact ness by divines ; and is, I think, sufficiently under stood by every one. There are also invisible miracles, the Incarnation of Christ, for instance, which, being- secret, cannot be alleged as a proof of such a mission ; but require themselves to be proved by visible - miracles. Revelation itself too is miraculous ; and miracles are the proof of it : and the supposed pre sumption against these shall presently be considered. All which I have been observing here is, that, whether we choose to call every thing in the dis pensations of Providence, not discoverable without revelation, nor like the known course of things, miraculous ; and whether the general Christian dis pensation now mentioned is to be called so, or not ; the foregoing observations seem certainly to show, that there is no presumption against it from the analogy of nature. § 7. Was there a primaeval revelation ? is a question of common fact, [II. ] There is no presumption, from analogy, against some operations, which we should now call mira- 1 Butler's argument is not con- ex. Art. 4. What seems the essence cerned with proving the Christian is perhaps this, that the act should miracles, but only with showing reasonably convey to the human that the fact of their having been mind the belief that it could only be used to prove Christianity raises no done by an exertion of the divine presumption against its truth. power above and beyond the settled The definition of a miracle had order of things. It is conceivable not been perhaps as closely ex- that a miracle of one age might, amined in mediaeval, or even in owing to the advance of natural Butler's, days, as in our own. knowledge and resource, cease to Aliguid dicitur esse miraculum, quod be a miracle for another. ft praeter ordinem totius naturae 2 Evidently meaning sensible : creatae. So Aquinas, Summa, I. Qu. cf. the miracle of the ' rushing 214 SUPPOSED PRESUMPTION AGAINST [II. n. culous ; particularly none against a revelation at the beginning of the world : nothing of such pre sumption against it, as is supposed to be implied or expressed in the word miraculous. For a miracle, in its very notion, is relative to a course of nature ; and implies somewhat different from it, considered as being so. Now, either there was no course of nature at the time which we are speaking of: or if there were, we are not acquainted what the course of nature is, upon the first peopling of worlds. And therefore the question, whether mankind had a revelation made to them at that time, is to be considered, not as a question concerning a miracle, but as a common question of fact. And we have the like reason, be it more or less, to admit the report of tradition, concerning this question, and concerning common matters of fact of the same antiquity ; for instance, what part of the earth was first peopled. § 8. Certainly foreign to the present course of nature. Or thus : When mankind was first placed in this state, there was a power exerted, totally different from the present course of nature. Now, whether this power, thus wholly different from the present course of nature, for we cannot properly apply to it the word miraculous T ; whether this power stopped immediately after it had made man, or went on, and exerted itself further in giving him a revela tion, is a question of the same kind, as whether an mighty wind,' and the speech in miraculous : for there was not at tongues previously unknown to the time, so far as known to us, the speaker (Acts ii. 4) on the day and perhaps hardly could be, any of Pentecost, and thereafter. ' course of nature ' from which 1 The following up of creation it could be (see § 7) ' somewhat by revelation can hardly be called different.' §§8-io] A REVELATION WITH MIRACLE. 215 ordinary power exerted itself in such a particular degree and manner, or not. § 9. Our Lord's miracles not a question of degree. Or suppose the power exerted in the formation of the world be considered as miraculous, or rather, be called by that name ; the case will not be different : since it must be acknowledged, that such a power was exerted. For supposing it acknowledged, that our Saviour spent some years in a course of working miracles : there is no more presumption, worth mentioning, against his having exerted this mira culous power, in a certain degree greater, than in a certain degree less ; in one or two more instances, than in one or two fewer ; in this, than in another manner. It is evident then, that there can be no peculiar presumption, from the analogy of nature, against supposing a revelation, when man was first placed upon the earth. § 10. Upon the evidences, religion first came by revela tion. Inferred doubly \ Add, that there does not appear the least intima tion in history or tradition, that religion was first reasoned out : but the whole of history and tradition makes for the other side, that it came into the world by revelation. Indeed the state of religion in the first ages, of which we have any account, seems to suppose and imply, that this was the original of it amongst mankind. And these reflections together, without taking in the peculiar authority of scrip ture, amount to real and a very material degree of 1 On the origin of natural religion, comp. I. vi. 18. 216 SUPPOSED PRESUMPTION AGAINST [II. n. evidence, that there was a revelation at the beginning of the world. Now this, as it is a confirmation of natural religion, and therefore mentioned in the former part of this Treatise d : so hkewise it has a tendency to remove any prejudices against a sub sequent revelation. $11. Strong presumptions lie against many known facts. [III.] But still it may be objected, that there is some peculiar presumption, from analogy, against miracles ; particularly against revelation, after the settlement and during the continuance of a course of nature. Now with regard to this supposed presumption, it is to be observed in general, that before we can have ground for raising what can, with any pro priety, be called an argument from analogy, for or against revelation considered as somewhat miraculous, we must be acquainted with a similar or parallel case. But the history of some other world, seemingly in like circumstances with our own, is no more than a parallel case : and therefore nothing short of this can be so. Yet, could we come at a presumptive proof, for or against a revelation, from being in formed, whether such world had one, or not ; such a proof, being drawn from one single instance only, must be infinitely precarious. More particularly : First of all ; There is a very strong presumption against common speculative truths, and against the most ordinary facts, before the proof of them ; which yet is overcome by almost any proof1. There is d Sup. I. vi. 18. 1 It is difficult to comprehend itself seems hard to defend. Butler Butler's mode of arrival at this founds probability upon likeness proposition, and the proposition (Introd. § 3). Improbability there- § u] A REVELATION WITH MIRACLE. 217 a presumption of millions to one, against the story of Caesar, or of any other man. For suppose a fore requires an unlikeness of the same kind. But there is no such unlikeness in these most ordinary facts, which are here declared im probable. True, the improbability spoken of is one before proof. But surely it is a startling assertion that very high improbabilitycan be over come by almost any thing in the nature of proof; which I take to be the meaning of Butler's words. Suppose it autumn : I am looking at a great tree with an hundred thousand leaves, and the fall ofthe leaf has commenced at what may be called an uniform rate. A leaf falls : the chances (appreciable by me) that that particular leaf would fall at that particular moment was one to ten thousand. Still these chances, as I should say, constituted something in its nature different from an improbability. But could I have seen into the physical condition of the ligaments which connected each leaf with the tree, according as they still lived or came near to death, I might then have said the early fall of this leaf is probable, of that one improbable. But the im probability to be real must be somewhat in the thing itself and in its relation to other things. There is improbability, antecedent to proof, in the life of Alexander the Great or of Mahomet, but it is because those lives are so unlike the lives of common men, or the ordinary course of nature. Accord ingly Bishop Fitzgerald quotes with a just approval the contention of Mill (Logic, ii. 192, 194) that these observations of Butler afford no answer to the argument of Hume against miracles, because that argu ment proceeds upon ' contrariety to the uniform course of experi ence.' Chance, on which Butler here rests, can only be predicated where there is no substantial un likeness, as in the case of the tickets in a lottery. The case of Caesar (standing alone) imports an element of improbability, founded on unlikeness : but an improbability removable by proof (see Fitzgerald's Analogy, p. 184 ».). The word presumption, then, appears, as well as improbability, to be inapplicable to the case now before us. Mill takes his distinction in a convenient form between improba bility before the fact, and im probability after the fact. All this is quite independent of the validity of Hume's argument. If we set up contrariety to the uniform law of nature it may surely be observed, (1) that nature is extremely various ; (2) that we are not entitled to assert that we know the limit of these variations ; (3) that as by our will we can set in motion forces antagonistic to other known natural forces, so it is possible that, by will-power other and greater than ours, other natural forces may be contravened ; (4) that this action of will is as much a part of the law and course of nature as any other portion of the operations established by ex perience. This subject is discussed in Mr. Leslie Stephen's History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century, ch. viii. § 28. 218 SUPPOSED PRESUMPTION AGAINST [II. n. number of common facts so and so circumstanced, of which one had no kind of proof, should happen to come into one's thoughts ; every one would, without any possible doubt, conclude them to be false. And the like may be said of a single common fact. § 12. (a) The real question: Is there a presumption against miracles, such as to make them incredible? And from hence it appears, that the question of importance, as to the matter before us, is, concerning the degree of the peculiar presumption supposed against miracles ; not whether there be any peculiar presumption at all against them. For, if there be the presumption of millions to one, against the most common facts ; what can a small presumption, ad ditional to this, amount to, though it be peculiar? It cannot be estimated, and is as nothing. The only material question is, whether there be any such pre sumption against miracles, as to render them in any sort incredible. § 13. (b) Antecedent to proof, the presumption against miracles in general less than against particular facts. Secondly, If we leave out the consideration of religion, we are in such total darkness, upon what causes, occasions, reasons, or circumstances, the present course of nature depends ; that there does not appear any improbability for or against supposing, that five or six thousand years may have given scope for causes, occasions, reasons, or circumstances, from whence miraculous interpositions may have arisen. And from this, joined with the foregoing observation, it will follow, that there must be a presumption, beyond all comparison, greater, against the particular §§ 12-15] A REVELATION WITH MIRACLE. 219 common facts just now instanced in, than against miracles in general; before any evidence of either1. § 14. (c) But religion supplies particular reasons for them. But, thirdly, Take in the consideration of religion, or the moral system of the world, and then we see distinct particular reasons for miracles : to afford mankind instruction additional to that of nature, and to attest the truth of it. And this gives a real credibility to the supposition, that it might be part of the original plan of things, that there should be miraculous interpositions. § 15. (d) They are to be compared with the extraordinaries of nature. Then, lastly, Miracles must not be compared to common natural events ; or to events which, though uncommon, are similar to what we daily experience : but to the extraordinary phenomena of nature. And then the comparison will be between the presumption against miracles, and the presumption against such uncommon appearances, suppose, as comets, and against there being any such powers in nature as magnetism and electricity, so contrary to the proper ties of other bodies not endued with these powers 2. 1 This argument appears to be had supposed ; and the broad differ- entangled in the fallacious idea ences between them and other laws, propounded in § 11. which were not always known, pre- 2 These powers differfrom the case pare us to anticipate other differ- of miracles in that they are capable ences of great breadth and strange- of systematic verification ; but are ness. Fitzgerald observes, that available for Butler's purpose in miracles may be regarded as physi- that, as we learn new effects and cal events having moral antece- characteristics of these laws, we find dents: which fall under Butler's the bounds of nature wider than we reference to ' reasons.' 220 SUPPOSED PRESUMPTION, ETC. [II. n. § 16 And before any one can determine, whether there be any peculiar presumption against miracles, more than against other extraordinary things ; he must consider, what, upon first hearing, would be the pre sumption against the last-mentioned appearances and powers, to a person acquainted only with the daily, monthly, and annual course of nature respecting this earth, and with those common powers of matter which we every day see. § 1 6. Thus they appear rather to have a degree of positive title to belief. Upon all this I conclude ; That there certainly is no such presumption against miracles, as to render them in any wise incredible : that on the contrary, our being able to discern reasons for them, gives a positive credibility to the history of them, in cases where those reasons hold : and that it is by no means certain, that there is any peculiar presump tion at all, from analogy, even in the lowest degree, against miracles, as distinguished from other extra ordinary phenomena : though it is not worth while to perplex the reader with inquiries into the abstract nature of evidence, in order to determine a question, which, without such inquiries, we seee is of no im portance. e P. 169 [in edition of 1844. But the reference appears to be to p. 210, § 2.] ni. § i] THINGS UNEXPECTED, ETC. 221 CHAPTER III. OF OUR INCAPACITY OF JUDGING, WrHAT WERE TO BE EXPECTED IN A REVELATION ; AND THE CREDIBILITY, FROM ANALOGY, THAT IT MUST CONTAIN THINGS APPEARING LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. § 1. Enumerates divers objections taken to the Christian scheme. BESIDES the objections against the evidence for Christianity, many are alleged against the scheme of it ; against the whole manner in which it is put and left with the world ; as well as against several particular relations in scripture : objections drawn from the deficiencies of revelation ; from things in it appearing to men foolishness a ; from its containing matters of offence, which have led, and it must have been foreseen would lead, into strange enthusiasm and superstition, and be made to serve the purposes of tyranny and wickedness ; from its not being universal ; and, which is a thing of the same kind, from its evidence not being so convincing and satisfactory as it might have been : for this last is sometimes turned into a positive argument against its truth b. It would be tedious, indeed impossible, ta enumerate the several particulars comprehended under the objections here referred to ; they being so various, according to the different fancies of men. There are persons, who think it a strong objection against the authority of scripture, that it is not com posed by rules of art, agreed upon by critics, for a 1 Cor. i. 23. b See chap. vi. 222 THINGS UNEXPECTED OR [II. in. polite and correct writing. And the scorn is inex pressible, with which some of the prophetic parts of scripture are treated : partly through the rashness of interpreters ; but very much also, on account of the hieroglyphical and figurative language, in which they are left us. Some of the principal things of this sort shall be particularly considered in fol lowing chapters. § 2. Mostly frivolous; except those against the evidence. But my design at present is to observe in general, with respect to this whole way of arguing, that, upon supposition of a revelation, it is highly credible beforehand, we should be incompetent judges of it to a great degree : and that it would contain many things appearing to us liable to great objections ; in case we judge of it otherwise, than by the analogy of nature. And therefore, though objections against the evidence of Christianity are most seriously to be considered ; yet objections against Christianity itself are, in a great measure, frivolous : almost all objections against it, excepting those which are alleged against the particular proofs of its coming from God. § 3. Cautious not to vilify reason, whereby we judge even of revelation. I express myself with caution, lest I should be mistaken to vilify reason x ; which is indeed the only faculty we have wherewith to judge concerning any thing, even revelation itself: or be misunder stood to assert, that a supposed revelation cannot be proved false, from internal characters. For, it may contain clear immoralities or contradictions ; and 1 See inf. ix. 7. §§2-5] LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. 223 either of these would prove it false. Nor will I take upon me to affirm, that nothing else can possibly render any supposed revelation incredible. Yet still the observation above is, I think, true beyond doubt ; that objections against Christianity, as distinguished from objections against its evidence, are frivolous. To make out this, is the general design of the present chapter. § 4. Dislike of consequences no relevant plea. And with regard to the whole of it, I cannot but particularly wish, that the proofs might be attended to ; rather than the assertions cavilled at, upon account of any unacceptable consequences, whether real or supposed, which may be drawn from them. For, after all, that which is true, must be admitted, though it should show us the shortness of our faculties ; and that we are in no wise judges of many things, of which we are apt to think our selves very competent ones. Nor will this be any objection with reasonable men, at least upon second thought it will not be any objection with such, against the justness of the following observations. § 5. Taking objection to nature, we are likely to object to revelation. As God governs the world, and instructs his creatures, according to certain laws or rules, in the known course of nature, known by reason together with experience : so the scripture informs us of a scheme of divine Providence, additional to this. It relates, that God has, by revelation, instructed men in things concerning his government, which they could not otherwise have known ; and reminded them of things, which they might otherwise know : 224 THINGS UNEXPECTED OR [II. in. and attested the truth of the whole by miracles. Now if the natural and the revealed dispensation of things are both from God, if they coincide with each other, and together make up one scheme of Providence ; our being incompetent judges of one, must render it credible, that we may be incompetent judges also of the other. Since, upon experience, the acknowledged constitution and course of nature is found to be greatly different from what, before experience, would have been expected ; and such as, men fancy, there lie great objections against : this renders it beforehand highly credible, that they may find the revealed dispensation likewise, if they judge of it as they do of the constitution of nature, very different from expectations formed beforehand ; and liable, in appearance, to great objections : objec tions against the scheme itself, and against the de grees and manners of the miraculous interpositions, by which it was attested and carried on. $ 6. As a bad judge of ordinary temporal government would be the like of extraordinary. Thus suppose a prince to govern his dominions in the wisest manner possible, by common known laws ; and that upon some exigencies he should suspend these laws ; and govern, in several instances, in a different manner : if one of his subjects were not a competent judge beforehand, by what common rules the government should or would be carried on; it could not be expected, that the same person would be a competent judge, in what exigencies, or in what manner, or to what degree, those laws commonly observed would be suspended or deviated from. If he were not a judge of the wisdom of the ordinary administration, there is no reason to §§ 6, 7] LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. 225 think he would be a judge of the wisdom of the extraordinary. If he thought he had objections against the former ; doubtless, it is highly sup posable, he might think also, that he had objections against the latter. And thus, as we fall into infinite follies and mistakes, whenever we pretend; otherwise than from experience and analogy, to judge of the constitution and course of nature ; it is evidently supposable beforehand, that we should fall into as great, in pretending to judge, in like manner, concerning revelation. Nor is there any more ground to expect that this latter should appear to us clear of objections, than that the former should. § 7. What inspiration, or revelation, would or should be, we are bad judges. These observations, relating to the whole of Christianity, are applicable to inspiration in par ticular. As we are in no sort judges beforehand, by what laws or rules, in what degree, or by what means, it were to have been expected, that God would naturally instruct us : so upon supposition of his affording us light and instruction by revelation, additional to what he has afforded us by reason and experience, we are in no sort judges, by what methods, and in what proportion, it were to be ex pected, that this supernatural light and instruction would be afforded us. We know not beforehand, what degree or kind of natural information, it were to be expected God would afford men, each by his own reason and experience : nor how far he would enable and effectually dispose them to communicate it, whatever it should be, to each other : nor whether the evidence of it would be certain, highly probable, or doubtful : nor whether it would be given with vol. 1. Q 226 THINGS UNEXPECTED OR [II. m. equal clearness and conviction to all. Nor could we guess, upon any good ground I mean, whether natural knowledge, or even the faculty itself, by which we are capable of attaining it, reason, would be given us at once, or gradually. In like manner, we are wholly ignorant, what degree of new knowledge, it were to be expected, God would give mankind by revelation, upon supposition of his affording one : or how far, or in what way, he would interpose miraculously, to qualify them, to whom he should originally make the revelation, for communicating the knowledge given by it; and to secure their doing it to the age in which they should live ; and to secure its being transmitted to posterity. We are equally ignorant, whether the evidence of it would be certain, or highly probable, or doubtful c : or whether all who should have any degree of instruction from it, and any degree of evidence of its truth, would have the same : or whether the scheme would be revealed at once, or unfolded gradually. Nay we are not in any sort able to judge, whether it were to have been expected, that the revelation should have been committed to writing ; or left to be handed down, and consequently cor rupted, by verbal tradition, and at length sunk under it, if mankind so pleased, and during such time as they are permitted, in the degree they evidently are, to act as they will. § 8. E. g. as between written and oral forms. But it may be said, 'that a revelation in some of the above mentioned circumstances, one, for instance, which was not committed to writing, and thus secured c See chap. vi. §§8,9] LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. 227 against danger of corruption, would not have answered its purpose.' I ask, what purpose? It would not have answered all the purposes, which it has now answered, and in the same degree : but it would have answered others, or the same in different degrees. And which of these were the purposes of God, and best fell in with his general government, we could not at all have determined beforehand. § 9. Thus ignorant a parte ante, we are incompetent a parte post. Now since it has been shown, that we have no principles of reason, upon which to judge beforehand, how it were to be expected revelation should have been left, or what was most suitable to the divine plan of government, in any of the forementioned respects ; it must be quite frivolous to object after wards as to any of them, against its being left in one way, rather than another : for this would be to object against things, upon account of their being different from expectations, which have been shown to be without reason. And thus we see, that the only question concerning the truth of Christianity is, whether it be a real revelation : not whether it be attended with every circumstance which we should have looked for : and concerning the authority of scripture, whether it be what it claims to be ; not whether it be a book of such sort, and so promulged, as weak men are apt to fancy a book containing a divine revelation should. And therefore, neither obscurity, nor seeming inaccuracy of style, nor various readings, nor early disputes about the authors of particular parts ; nor any other things of the like kind, though. they had been much more considerable in degree than they are, could overthrow the authority 228 THINGS UNEXPECTED OR [II. m. of the scripture : unless the prophets, apostles, or our Lord, had promised, that the book containing the divine revelation should be secure from those things. § 10. Attack feasible only on (a) proofs of miracle, (b) prophecy. Nor indeed can any objections overthrow such a kind of revelation as the Christian claims to be, since there are no objections against the morality of it d, but such as can show, that there is no proof of miracles wrought originally in attestation of it ; no appearance of any thing miraculous in its obtaining in the world ; nor any of prophecy, that is, of events foretold, which human sagacity could not foresee. §11. If but partially proven, their authority will abide. If it can be shown, that the proof alleged for all these is absolutely none at all, then is revelation overturned 1. But were it allowed, that the proof of any one or all of them is lower than is allowed; yet, whilst any proof of them remains, revelation will stand upon much the same foot it does at present, as to all the purposes of life and practice, and ought to have the like influence upon our behaviour. $ 12. Arguments good for ordinary books will not always hold in tlie case of scripture. From the foregoing observations too, it will follow, and those who will thoroughly examine into d Inf. § 26. 1 I suppose we may fill up the but not destroyed, we should not, argument thus. The disproof in under the rules of probability and this or that case would not affect good sense, be discharged from all the credit generally due. If the duty in regard to them. general proof of all were weakened §§ 10-13] LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. 229 revelation will find it worth remarking ; that there are several ways of arguing, which, though just with regard to other writings, are not applicable to scripture : at least not to the prophetic parts of it. We cannot argue, for instance, that this cannot be the sense or intent of such a passage of scripture ; for, if it had, it would have been expressed more plainly, or have been represented under a more apt figure or hieroglyphic : yet we may justly argue thus, with respect to common books. And the reason of this difference is very evident ; that in scripture we are not competent judges, as we are in common books, how plainly it were to have been expected, what is the true sense should have been expressed, or under how apt an image figured. The only question is, what appearance there is, that this is the sense ; and scarce at all, how much more determinately or accurately it might have been expressed or figured. § 13. Internal improbabilities (a) hard to establish, (b) may be set aside by evidence. 1 But is it not self-evident, that internal improba bilities of all kinds weaken external probable proof?' Doubtless. But to what practical purpose can this be alleged here, when it has been proved before e 1, e Sup. ii. 11, 12. 1 Again we appear to be en- moral certainty ' is plain at once tangled in the argument of §§ 11 from the fact that the things re- and 12, ch. ii. Still, the statement ferred to are (' the most common there does not go beyond pro- facts ') such as do actually happen. pounding that an adverse presump- These are not ' real internal impro- tion of millions to one may be babilities,' for they do not grow out overcome by almost any proof. of any thing in the things theni- That such a presumption, as Butler selves, but are a mere conjecture as there has in view, does not ' rise to to the number of possibilities, any 230 THINGS UNEXPECTED OR [II. m. that real internal improbabilities which rise even to moral certainty, are overcome by the most ordinary testimony ; and when it now has been made appear, that we scarce know what are improbabilities, as to the matter we are here considering : as it will further appear from what follows. $ 14. Wliy preconceived notions are sure to mislead. For though from the observations above made it is manifest, that we are not in any sort competent judges, what supernatural instruction were to have been expected ; and though it is self-evident, that the objections of an incompetent judgment must be frivolous : yet it may be proper to go one step further, and observe ; that if men will be regardless of these things, and pretend to judge of the scripture by preconceived expectations ; the analogy of nature shows beforehand not only that it is highly credible they may, but also probable that they will, imagine they have strong objections against it, however really unexceptionable : for so, prior to experience, they would think they had, against the circumstances and degrees and the whole manner of that instruction, which is afforded by the ordinary course of nature. Were the instruction which God affords to brute creatures by instincts and mere propensions, and to mankind by these together with reason, matter of probable proof, and not of certain observation ; it would be rejected as incredible, in many instances of it, only upon account of the means by which this instruction is given, the seeming disproportions, one of which might have become but on improbabilities which are fact, instead of that which did intrinsic. The closing lines of the become so. This discussion must section stand clear of this difficulty. turnnotuponmereadversechances, See sup. § 11 ofch. ii. §§ 14-16] LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. 231 the limitations, necessary conditions, and circum stances of it. $ 15. E. g. as to (a) comparative access to different kinds of knowledge, (b) invention, (c) language. For instance : Would it not have been thought highly improbable, that men should have been so much more capable of discovering, even to certainty, the general laws of matter, and the magnitudes, paths, and revolutions of the heavenly bodies ; than the occasions and cures of distempers, and many other things, in which human life seems so much more nearly concerned, than in astronomy? How capricious and irregular a way of information, would it be said, is that of invention, by means of which nature instructs us in matters of science, and in many things, upon which the affairs of the world greatly depend : that a man should, by this faculty, be made acquainted with a thing in an instant, when perhaps he is thinking of somewhat else, which he has in vain been searching after, it may be, for years. So likewise the imperfections attend ing the only method, by which nature enables and directs us to communicate our thoughts to each other, are innumerable. Language is, in its very nature, inadequate, ambiguous, liable to infinite abuse, even from negligence ; and so liable to it from design, that every man can deceive and betray by it. i) 16. Greater certainty of brutes in their mental operations. And, to mention but one instance more ; that brutes, without reason, should act, in many respects, 232 THINGS UNEXPECTED OR [II. in. with a sagacity and foresight vastly greater than what men have in those respects, would be thought impossible. Yet it is certain they do act with such superior foresight : whether it be their own indeed, is another question. § 17. Case would probably be similar in any (supposed) further revelation. From these things, it is highly credible before hand, that upon supposition God should afford men some additional instruction by revelation, it would be with circumstances, in manners, degrees, and respects, which we should be apt to fancy we had great objections against the credibility of. Nor are the objections against the scripture, nor against Christianity in general, at all more or greater, than the analogy of nature would beforehand — not per haps give ground to expect ; for this analogy may not be sufficient, in some cases, to ground an ex pectation upon ; but no more nor greater, than analogy would show it, beforehand, to be supposable and credible, that there might seem to lie against revelation. § 18. Objection from the disorderly use of miraculous gifts futile. By applying these general observations to a parti cular objection, it will be more distinctly seen, how they are applicable to others of the like kind : and indeed to almost all objections against Christianity, as distinguished from objections against its evidence. It appears from scripture, that, as it was not un usual in the apostolic age, for persons, upon their con version to Christianity, to be endued with miraculous §§ 17. 18] LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. 233 gifts ; so, some of those persons exercised these gifts in a strangely irregular and disorderly manner ; and this is made an objection against their being really miraculous. Now the foregoing observations quite remove this objection, how considerable soever it may appear at first sight. For, consider a person endued with any of these gifts ; for instance, that of tongues : it is to be supposed, that he had the same power over this miraculous gift, as he would have had over it, had it been the effect of habit, of study and use, as it ordinarily is ; or the same power over it, as he had over any other natural endowment1. Consequently, he would use it in the same manner he did any other ; either regularly, and upon proper occasions only, or irregularly, and upon improper ones : according to his sense of decency, and his character of prudence. Where then is the objection? Why, if this miraculous power was indeed given to the world to propagate Christianity, and attest the truth of it, we might, it seems, have expected, that other sort of persons should have been chosen to be invested with it ; or that these should, at the same time, have been endued with prudence ; or that they should have been continually restrained and directed in the exercise of it : i. e. that God should have miraculously in terposed, if at all, in a different manner, or higher degree. But, from the observations made above, it is undeniably evident, that we are not judges in what degrees and manners it were to have been expected he should miraculously interpose ; upon sup position of his doing it in some degree and manner. 1 This seems to be expressly the spirits of the prophets are declared in 1 Cor. xiv. 32, ' and subject to the prophets.' 234 THINGS UNEXPECTED OR [II. m. $ 19. Similar risk in other gifts. Nor, in the natural course of Providence, are superior gifts of memory, eloquence, knowledge, and other talents of great influence, conferred only on persons of prudence and decency, or such as are disposed to make the properest use of them. Nor is the instruction and admonition naturally afforded us for the conduct of life, particularly in our education, commonly given in a manner the most suited to recommend it ; but often with circumstances apt to prejudice us against such instruction. § 20. Analogy of nature and revelation in the relations of loiver to higher knowledge. One might go on to add, that there is a great resemblance between the light of nature and of revelation, in several other respects. Practical Chris tianity, or that faith and behaviour which renders a man a Christian, is a plain and obvious thing : like the common rules of conduct, with respect to our ordinary temporal affairs. The more distinct and particular knowledge of those things, the study of which the apostle calls going on unto perfection f, and of the prophetic parts of revelation, like many parts of natural and even civil knowledge, may re quire very exact thought, and careful consideration. The hindrances too, of natural, and of supernatural light and knowledge, have been of the same kind. § 21. So it is as to the further opening of scripture. And as it is owned the whole scheme of scripture is not yet understood ; so, if it ever comes to be ' Heb. vi. 1. §§ 19-22] LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. 235 understood, before the restitution of all things?:, and without miraculous interpositions ; it must be in the same way as natural knowledge is come at : by the continuance and progress of learning and of liberty ; and by particular persons attending to, comparing and pursuing, intimations scattered up and down it, which are overlooked and disregarded by the generality of the world. For this is the way, in which all improvements are made ; by thoughtful men's tracing on obscure hints, as it were, dropped us by nature accidentally, or which seem to come into our minds by chance. Nor is it at all incredible, that a book, which has been so long in the possession of mankind, should contain many truths as yet undiscovered. For, aU the same phenomena, and the same faculties of investigation, from which such great discoveries in natural know ledge have been made in the present and last age, were equally in the possession of mankind, several thousand years before. And possibly it might be intended, that events, as they come to pass, should open and ascertain the meaning of several parts of scripture. § 22. Natural knowledge sometimes of high stamp : is given not as we expect, but differently1. It may be objected, that this analogy fails in a material respect : for that natural knowledge is of b Acts iii. 21. 1 Dr. Angus in his analysis of the gives not as we expect, but chapter brings out the numerous differently. points of this short section : (e) Herein a full analogy between (a) Objection is taken to natural nature and revelation is ex- knowledge as unimportant. hibited. (6) That is, irrelevant. See Butler's Analogy, edited by (c) Also untrue. Dr. Angus, p. 180. (d) The argument is that God 236 THINGS UNEXPECTED OR [II. in. little or no consequence. But I have been speaking of the general instruction which nature does or does not afford us. And besides, some parts of natural knowledge, in the more common restrained sense of the words, are of the greatest consequence to the ease and convenience of life. But suppose the analogy did, as it does not, fail in this respect; yet it might be abundantly supplied, from the whole constitution and course of nature : which shows, that God does not dispense his gifts according to our notions of the advantage and consequence they would be of to us. And this in general, with his method of dispensing knowledge in particular, would together make out an analogy full to the point before us. § 23. That the supply of light is only partial. But it may be objected still further and more generally ; ' The scripture represents the world as in a state of ruin, and Christianity as an expedient to recover it, to help in these respects where nature fails : in particular, to supply the deficiencies of natural light. Is it credible then, that so many ages should have been let" pass, before a matter of such a sort, of so great and so general importance, was made known to mankind •[;' and then that it should be made known to so small a part of them? Is it conceivable, that this supply should be so very deficient, should have the like obscurity and doubt fulness, be liable to the like perversions, in short, lie open to all the like objections, as the light of nature itself h?' h Chap. vi. §§23,24] LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. 237 § 24. In both schemes, remedies are incomplete. •¦ Without determining how far this in fact is so, I answer ; it is by no means incredible, that it might be so, if the light of nature and of revelation be from the same hand. Men are naturally liable to diseases : for which God, in his good providence, has provided natural remedies1. But remedies existing in nature have been unknown to mankind for many ages : are known but to few now : probably many valuable ones are not known yet. Great has been and is the obscurity and difficulty, in the nature and apphcation of them. Circumstances seem often to make them very improper, where they are absolutely necessary. It is after long labour and study, and many unsuccessful endeavours, that they are brought to be as useful as they are ; after high contempt and absolute rejection of the most useful we have ; and after disputes and doubts, which have seemed to be endless. The best remedies too, when unskilfully, much more if dishonestly applied, may produce new diseases : and with the rightest apphcation the success of them is often doubtful. In many cases they are not at all effectual : where they are, it is often very slowly : and the application of them, and the necessary regimen accompanying it, is, not uncommonly, so disagreeable, that some will not submit to them; and satisfy themselves with the excuse, that, if they would, it is not certain whether it would be successful. And many persons, who labour under diseases, for which there are known natural remedies, are not so happy as to be always, if ever, in the way of them. In a word, * See chap. v. 238 THINGS UNEXPECTED OR [II. m. the remedies which nature has provided for diseases are neither certain, perfect, nor universal. § 25. If we ask perfect remedies, why not ask banishment of disease ? And indeed the same principles of arguing, which would lead us to conclude, that they must be so, would lead us likewise to conclude, that there could be no occasion for them ; i. e. that there could be no diseases at all. And therefore our experience that there are diseases shows, that it is credible beforehand, upon supposition nature has provided remedies for them, that these remedies may be, as by experience we find they are, not certain, nor perfect, nor universal ; because it shows, that the principles upon which we should expect the contrary are fallacious. § 26. In revelation, reason is . to judge (a) the meaning, (b) the morality, (c) the evidence. And now, what is the just consequence from all these things? Not that reason is no judge of what is offered to us as being of divine revelation. For this would be to infer, that we are unable to judge of any thing, because we are unable to judge of all things. Reason can, and it ought to judge, not only of the meaning, but also of the morality and the evidence, of revelation. First, It is the province of reason to judge of the morality of the scripture ; i. e. not whether it contains things different from what we should have expected from a wise, just, and good Being ; for objections from hence have been now obviated : but whether it contains things plainly contradictory to wisdom, justice, or goodness ; §§ 25-27] LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. 239 to what the light of nature teaches us of God. And I know nothing of this sort objected against scripture, excepting such objections as are formed upon sup positions, which would equally conclude, that the constitution of nature is contradictory to wisdom, justice, or goodness ; which most certainly it is not. § 27. Some precepts, not contrary to immutable morality, are made moral only by command. Indeed there are some particular precepts in scripture, given to particular persons, requiring actions, which would be immoral and vicious, were it not for such precepts. But it is easy to see, that all these are of such a kind, as that the precept changes the whole nature of the case and of the action ; and both constitutes and shows that not to be unjust or immoral, which, prior to the precept, must have appeared and really have been so : which may well be, since none of these precepts are contrary to immutable morality. If it were commanded, to cultivate the principles and act from the spirit of treachery, ingratitude, cruelty ; the command would not alter the nature of the case or of the action, in any of these instances. But it is quite other wise in precepts, which require only the doing an external action : for instance, taking away the property or life of any. For men have no right to either life or property, but what arises solely from the grant of God : when this grant is revoked, they cease to have any right at all in either : and when this revocation is made known, as surely it is possible it may be, it must cease to be unjust to deprive them of either. And though a course of external acts, which without command would be immoral, 240 THINGS UNEXPECTED OR [II. in. must make an immoral habit ; yet a few detached commands have no such natural tendency1. § 28. Objection urged against these lies against nature at large, and trial of all kinds. I thought proper to say thus much of the few scripture precepts, which require, not vicious actions, but actions which would have been vicious had it not been for such precepts ; because they are some times weakly urged as immoral, and great weight is laid upon objections drawn from them. But to me there seems no difficulty at all in these precepts, but what arises from their being offences : i. e. from their being liable to be perverted 2, as indeed they are, by wicked designing men, to serve the most horrid purposes ; and, perhaps, to mislead the weak and enthusiastic. And objections from this head are not objections against revelation ; but against the whole notion of religion, as a trial ; and against the general constitution of nature. Secondly3, Reason is able to judge, and must, of the evidence of revelation, and of the objections urged against that evidence : which shall be the subject of a following chapter k. k Chap. vii. 1 I suppose that violence offered by unwarranted imitation. We by order of law may help to illus- need not examine the precise pro- trate Butler's meaning : especially priety of the word offences, since as in the case of an executioner. Butler has given his own definition I deal more fully with this subject of it pro Me vice, as acts liable in my reply to Miss Hennell in a to be perverted. The application separate essay On the Censors of given a few centuries ago to some Butler. See Coleridge's account of of the Old Testament commands Executioners in Germany : Letters may perhaps serve here as an illus- (1895), vol. i. p. 294. tration. 2 Perverted, that is, seemingly, s On this head see inf., ch. vii. §§ 28-30] LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. 241 § 29. Other objections being frivolous, let us try those against the proofs. But the consequence of the foregoing observations is, that the question upon which the truth of Christianity depends is scarce at all, what objections there are against its scheme, since there are none against the morality of it ; but what objections there are against its evidence : or, what proof there remains of it, after due allowances made for the objections against that proof: because it has been shown, that the objections against Christianity, as distinguished from objections against its evidence, are frivolous. For surely very little weight, if any at all, is to be laid upon a way of arguing and objecting, which, when applied to the general constitution of nature, experience shows not to be conclusive : and such, I think, is the whole way of objecting treated of throughout this chapter. It is resolvable into principles, and goes upon suppositions, which mislead us to think, that the Author of nature would not act, as we experience he does ; or would act, in such and such cases, as we experience he does not in like cases. But the unreasonableness of this way of objecting will appear yet more evidently from hence, that the chief things thus objected against are justified, as shall be further shown l, by distinct, particular, and full analogies, in the constitution and course of nature. § 30. We can judge whether a revelation (a) tends to virtue and (b) is due to mere human motive. But it is to be remembered, that, as frivolous as objections of the foregoing sort against revelation are, 1 Chap. iv. latter part, and chaps, v, vi. VOL. I. R 242 CHRISTIANITY, AS A SCHEME, [II. iv. yet, when a supposed revelation is more consistent with itself, and has a more general and uniform tendency to promote virtue, than, all circumstances considered, could have been expected from enthusiasm and political views ; this is a presumptive proof of its not proceeding from them, and so of its truth : be cause we are competent judges, what might have been expected from enthusiasm and political views. CHAPTER IV. OF CHRISTIANITY, CONSIDERED AS A SCHEME OR CONSTITUTION, IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED. § I. Objections against nature have been answered: same answer may serve for Christianity '. IT hath been now shown a, that the analogy of nature renders it highly credible beforehand, that supposing a revelation to be made, it must contain many things very different from what we should have expected, and such as appear open to great objections : and that this observation, in good measure, takes off the force of those objections, or rather precludes them. But it may be alleged, that a In the foregoing chapter. 1 To show this distinctly, But- the case, to show by a threefold ler, as if foreseeing the objection argument that he is entitled to of those who now hold that he has bar the objections as they are in only shifted the burden to the themselves, and not only by show- shoulders of Nature, expressly de- ing that they apply elsewhere. clines in this section to expose that He has already d6ne the same line of defence to the attack : and for Nature, not only in I. vii., but holds it his duty, on the merits of in his Introduction, § 17. §§i, 2] IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED. 243 this is a very partial answer to such objections, or a very unsatisfactory way of obviating them : because it doth not show at all, that the things objected against can be wise, just, and good ; much less, that it is credible they are so. It will therefore be proper to show this distinctly ; by applying to these objections against the wisdom, justice, and goodness of Christianity, the answer above11 given to the like objections against the constitution of nature : before we consider the particular analogies in the latter, to the particular things objected against in the former. Now that which affords a sufficient answer to ob jections against the wisdom, justice, and goodness of the constitution of nature, is its being a consti tution, a system, or scheme, imperfectly compre hended ; a scheme in which means are made use of to accomplish ends ; and which is carried on by general laws. For from these things it has been proved, not only to be possible, but also to be credible, that those things which are objected against may be consistent with wisdom, justice, and good ness ; nay, may be instances of them : and even that the constitution and government of nature may be perfect in the highest possible degree. If Christianity then be a scheme, and of the like kind ; it is evident, the like objections against it must admit of the like answer. And, § 2. It is imperfectly comprehended; and our ignorance bars our objections. [I.] Christianity is a scheme, quite beyond our comprehension. The moral government of God is exercised, by gradually conducting things so in the b Part I. ch. vii. to which this all along rtfers. R 2 244 CHRISTIANITY, AS A SCHEME, [II. i v. course of his providence, that every one, at length and upon the whole, shall receive according to his deserts ; and neither fraud nor violence, but truth and right, shall finally prevail. Christianity is a particular scheme under this general plan of Provi dence, and a part of it, conducive to its completion, with regard to mankind : consisting itself also of various parts, and a mysterious economy, which has been carrying on from the time the world came into its present wretched state, and is still carrying on, for its recovery, by a divine person, the Messiah ; who is to gather together in one the children of God that are scattered abroad c, and establish an everlasting kingdom, wherein divelleth righteousness d. And in order to it ; after various manifestations of things, relating to this great and general scheme of Providence, through a succession of many ages : (for tlie Spirit of Christ which was in the prophets, testified beforehand his sufferings, and the glory that should follow : unto whom it was revealed, that not unto themselves, but unto us they did minister tlie things which are now reported unto us by them that have preached the gospel; which things the angels desire to look into e :)— after various dispensations, looking forward, and preparatory, to this final salvation : in tlie fulness of time, when infinite wisdom thought fit ; he, being in tlie form of God, made himself of no reputation, and took upon him the form of a servant, and was made in tlie likeness of men: and being found in fashion as a man, he humbled himself, and became obedient to death, even the death of the cross : wherefore God also hath highly exalted him, and given him a name, which is above every name : that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of c John xi. 52. d 2 Pet. hi. 13. e j pet, i. M I2. §2] IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED. 245 things in heaven, and things in the earth, and things under the earth; and that every tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father f. Parts likewise of this economy are the miraculous mission of the Holy Ghost, and his ordinary assistances given to good men : the invisible government, which Christ at present exercises over his church : that which he himself refers to in these words ; In my Father's house are many mansions 1 go to prepare a place for you s : and his future return to judge the world in righteousness, and completely re-establish the kingdom of God. For the Father judgeth no man, but hath committed all judgment unto the Son : that all men should honour the Son, even as they honour tlie Father \ All power is given unto him in heaven and in earth1. And he must reign, till he hath put all enemies under his feet. Then cometh the end, when he shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, even the Father ; when he shall have put down all rule and all authority and power. And when all things shall be subdued unto him, then shall the Son also him self be subject unto him that put all things under him, that God may be all in all^-. Now little, surely, need be said to show, that this system, or scheme of things, is but imperfectly comprehended by us. The scripture expressly asserts it to be so. And indeed one cannot read a passage relating to this great mystery of godliness l, but what immediately runs up into something which shows us our ignorance in it ; as every thing in nature shows us our ignorance in the constitution of nature. And whoever will seriously consider that part of the Christian scheme, f Phil. ii. 6— 11. s John xiv. 2. h John v. 22, 23'. 1 Matt, xxviii. 18. k 1 Cor. xv. 24-28. l 1 Tim. iii. 16. 246 CHRISTIANITY, AS A SCHEME, [II. iv. which is revealed in scripture, will find so much more unrevealed, as will convince him, that, to all the purposes of judging and objecting, we know as little of it, as of the constitution of nature. Our ignorance, therefore, is as much an answer to our objections against the perfection of one, as against the perfection of the other111. § 3. Here, as in nature, means to attain ends are used ; which may both be the very best. [IL] It is obvious too, that in the Christian dispen sation, as much as in the natural scheme of things, means are made use of to accomplish ends. And the observation of this furnishes us with the same answer, to objections against the perfection of Christianity, as to objections of the like kind, against the constitution of nature. It shows the credibility, that the things objected against, how foolish a soever they appear to men, may be the very best means of accomplishing the very best ends. And their appearing foolishness is no presumption against this, in a scheme so greatly beyond our comprehension °. § 4. Nature operates by general laws, hard to trace out. [III.] The credibility, that the Christian dispensa tion may have been, all along, carried on by general lawsP, no less than the course of nature, may require to be more distinctly made out. Consider then, upon what ground it is we say, that the whole common course of nature is carried on according to general foreordained laws. We know indeed several m Sup. I. vii. 1 3 sqq. " 1 Cor. i. 0 Sup. I. vii. 13 sqq. p Sup. I. vii. 18. §§3-5] IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED. 247 of the general laws of matter : and a great part of the natural behaviour of living agents is reducible to general laws. But we know in a manner nothing, by what laws, storms and tempests, earthquakes, famine, pestilence, become the instruments of destruc tion to mankind. And the laws, by which persons born into the world at such a time and place are of such capacities, geniuses, tempers ; the laws, by which thoughts come into our mind, in a multitude of cases ; and by which innumerable things happen, of the greatest influence upon the affairs and state of the world ; these laws are so wholly unknown to us, that we call the events which come to pass by them, accidental : though all reasonable men know certainly, that there cannot, in reality, be any such thing as chance ; and conclude, that the things which have this appearance are the result of general laws, and may be reduced into them. It is then but an exceeding little way, and in but a very few respects, that we can trace up the natural course of things before us, to general laws. And it is only from analogy, that we conclude the whole of it to be capable of being reduced into them : only from our seeing, that part is so. It is from our finding, that the course of nature, in some respects and so far, goes on by general laws, that we conclude this of the rest. \ 5. The same may hold as to revelation. ' And if that be a just ground for such a conclusion, it is a just ground also, if not to conclude, yet to apprehend, to render it supposable and credible, which is sufficient for answering objections, that God's miraculous interpositions may have been, all along in like manner, by general laws of wisdom. Thus, 248 CHRISTIANITY, AS A SCHEME, [II. iv. that miraculous powers should be exerted, at such times, upon such occasions, in such degrees and manners, and with regard to such persons, rather than others ; that the affairs of the world, being permitted to go on in their natural course so far, should, just at such a point, have a new direction given them by miraculous interpositions ; that these interpositions should be exactly in such degrees and respects only ; all this may have been by general laws. These laws are unknown indeed to us : but no more unknown, than the laws from whence it is, that some die as soon as they are born, and others live to extreme old age ; that one man is so superior to another in understanding ; with innumerable more things, which, as was before observed, we cannot reduce to any laws or rules at all, though it is taken for granted, they are as much reducible to general ones, as gravitation. Now, if the revealed dispensa tions of Providence, and miraculous interpositions, be by general laws, as well as God's ordinary govern ment in the course of nature, made known by reason and experience ; there is no more reason to expect, that every exigence, as it arises, should be provided for by these general laws of miraculous interpositions, than that every exigence in nature should, by the general laws of nature : yet there might be wise and good reasons, that miraculous interpositions should be by general laws : and that these laws should not be broken in upon, or deviated from, by other miracles. § 6. As to apparent gaps and anomalies, the two are parallel. Upon the whole then: The appearance of defi ciencies and irregularities in nature is owing to its §§6,7] IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED. 249 being a scheme but in part made known, and of such a certain particular kind in other respects. Now we see no more reason why the frame and course of nature should be such a scheme, than why Christi anity should. And that the former is such a scheme, renders it credible, that the latter, upon supposition of its truth, may be so too. And as it is manifest, that Christianity is a scheme revealed but in part, and a scheme in which means are made use of to accomplish ends, like to that of nature : so the credibility, that it may have been all along carried on by general laws, no less than the course of nature, has been distinctly proved. And from all this it is beforehand credible that there might, I think prob able that there would, be the like appearance of deficiencies and irregularities in Christianity, as in nature : i. e. that Christianity would be liable to the like objections, as the frame of nature. And these objections are answered by these observations con cerning Christianity ; as the like objections against the frame of nature are answered by the like ob servations concerning the frame of nature. § 7. Obj. Christianity uses means that are cumbrous and roundabout. Ans. We are not fit judges; and why. THE objections against Christianity, considered as a matter of facti, having, in general, been obviated in the preceding chapter ; and the same, considered as made against the wisdom and good ness of it, having been obviated in this : the next 1 [This sign of reference is left by me as I found it, except that, as elsewhere, I substitute for the variable paging the actual place in the Treatise as fixed in this Edition, viz. I. vii. 1 sqq. But the sign ought, I think, to be attached to the last words of the sentence, ' analogies in nature.' — Ed.] 250 CHRISTIANITY, AS A SCHEME, [II. iv. thing, according to the method proposed, is to show, that the principal objections, in particular, against Christianity, may be answered, by particular and full analogies in nature. And as one of them is made against the whole scheme of it together, as just now described, I choose to consider it here, rather than in a distinct chapter by itself. The thing objected against this scheme of the gospel is, 'that it seems to suppose God was reduced to the necessity of a long series of intricate means, in order to accomplish his ends, the recovery and salvation of the world : in like sort as men, for want of understanding or power, not being able to come at their ends directly, are forced to go roundabout ways, and make use of many perplexed contrivances to arrive at them.' Now every thing which we see shows the foUy of this, considered as an objection against the truth of Christianity. For, according to our manner of conception, God makes use of variety of means, what we often think tedious ones, in the natural course of providence, for the accomplishment of all his ends. Indeed it is certain there is some what in this matter quite beyond our comprehension : but the mystery is as great in nature as in Chris tianity. We know what we ourselves aim at, as final ends : and what courses we take, merely as means conducing to those ends. But we are greatly ignorant how far things are considered by the Author of nature, under the single notion of means and ends ; so as that it may be said, this is merely an end, and that merely means, in his regard. And whether there be not some peculiar absurdity in our very manner of conception, concerning this matter, some what contradictory arising from our extremely im perfect views of things, it is impossible to say. §8] IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED. 251 § 8. Herein it plainly corresponds with nature. However, thus much is manifest, that the whole natural world and government of it is a scheme or system ; not a fixed, but a progressive one : a scheme, in which the operation of various means takes up a great length of time, before the ends they tend to can be attained. The change of seasons, the ripening of the fruits of the earth, the very history of a flower, is an instance of this : and so is human life. Thus vegetable bodies, and those of animals, though possibly formed at once, yet grow up by degrees to a mature state. And thus rational agents, who animate these latter bodies, are naturally directed to form each his own manners and character, by the gradual gaining of knowledge and experience, and by a long course of action. Our existence is not only successive, as it must be of necessity ; but one state of our life and being is appointed by God, to be a preparation for another ; and that, to be the means of attaining to another succeeding one : in fancy to childhood ; childhood to youth ; youth to mature age. Men are impatient, and for precipitating things : but the Author of nature appears deliberate throughout his operations ; accomplishing his natural ends by slow successive steps. And there is a plan of things beforehand laid out, which, from the nature of it, requires various systems of means, as well as length of time, in order to the carrying on its several parts into execution. Thus, in the daily course of natural providence, God operates in the very same manner, as in the dispensation of Christianity : making one thing subservient to another ; this, to somewhat further ; and so on, through a progressive series of means, which extend, both backward and 252 OF REDEMPTION BY [II. v. forward, beyond our utmost view. Of this manner of operation, every thing we see in the course of nature is as much an instance, as any part of the Christian dispensation. CHAPTER V OF THE PARTICULAR SYSTEM OF APPOINTMENT OF A MEDIATOR, AND THE REDEMPTION OF THE WORLD BY HIM. § i. Mediation, or the instrumentality of others, met everywhere in nature. nnHERE is not, I think, any thing relating to Chris- J- tianity, which has been more objected against, than the mediation of Christ, in some or other of its parts. Yet, upon thorough consideration, there seems nothing less justly liable to it. For, [I.] The whole analogy of nature removes all imagined presumption against the general notion of a mediator between God and mana. For we find all living creatures are brought into the world, and their life in infancy is preserved, by the instrumentality of others : and every satisfaction of it, some way or other, is bestowed by the like means. So that the visible government, which God exercises over the world, is by the instrumentality and mediation of others. And how far his invisible government be or be not so, it is impossible to determine at all by reason. And the supposition, that part of it is so, appears, to say the least, altogether as credible a i Tim. ii. 5. §§ i, 2] A MEDIA TOR. 253 as the contrary. There is then no sort of objection, from the light of nature, against the general notion of a mediator between God and man, considered as a doctrine of Christianity, or as an appointment in this dispensation : since we find by experience, that God does appoint mediators, to be the instruments of good and evil to us ; the instruments of his justice and his mercy. And the objection here referred to is urged, not against mediation in that high, eminent, and peculiar sense, in which Christ is our Mediator ; but absolutely against the whole notion itself of a mediator at all. § 2. Punishment may come of course, i. e. in the way of natural consequence. [IL] As we must suppose, that the world is under the proper moral government of God, or in a state of religion, before we can enter into consideration of the revealed doctrine, concerning the redemption of it by Christ ; so that supposition is here to be distinctly taken notice of. Now the divine moral government which religion teaches us, implies, that the consequence of vice shall be misery, in some future state, by the righteous judgment of God. That such consequent punishment shall take effect by his appointment, is necessarily implied. But, as it is not in any sort to be supposed, that we are made acquainted with all the ends or reasons, for which it is fit future punishments should be inflicted, or why God has appointed such and such consequent misery should follow vice ; and as we are altogether in the dark, how or in what manner it shall follow, by what immediate occasions, or by the instrumen tality of what means ; there is no absurdity in supposing it may follow in a way analogous to that, 254 OF REDEMPTION BY [II. v. in which many miseries follow such and such courses of action at present ; poverty, sickness, infamy, un timely death by diseases, death from the hands of civil justice. There is no absurdity in supposing future punishment may follow wickedness of course, as we speak, or in the way of natural consequence from God's original constitution of the world ; from the nature he has given us, and from the condition in which he places us : or in a like manner, as a person rashly trifling upon a precipice, in the way of natural consequence, falls down ; in the way of natural consequence, breaks his limbs, suppose ; in the way of natural consequence of this, without help perishes. § 3. And natural consequence is the act of God. Some good men may perhaps be offended with hearing it spoken of as a supposable thing, that the future punishments of wickedness may be in the way of natural consequence : as if this were taking the execution of justice out of the hands of God, and giving it to nature. But they should remember, that when things come to pass according to the course of nature, this does not hinder them from being his doing, who is the God of nature : and that the scripture ascribes those punishments to divine justice, which are known to be natural ; and which must be called so, when distinguished from such as are miraculous. But after all, this supposition, or rather this way of speaking, is here made use of only by way of illustration of the subject before us. For since it must be admitted, that the future punishment of wickedness is not a matter of arbitrary appointment, but of reason, equity, and justice; it comes, for ought I see, to §§3,4] A MEDIATOR. 255 the same thing, whether it is supposed to be inflicted in a way analogous to that, in which the temporal punishments of vice and folly are inflicted, or in any other way. And though there were a difference, it is allowable, in the present case, to make this supposition, plainly not an incredible one ; that future punishment may follow wickedness in the way of natural consequence, or according to some general laws of government already estab lished in the universe. § 4. Partial impunity or relief is familiar to us in nature. [III.] Upon this supposition, or even without it, we may observe somewhat, much to the present purpose, in the constitution of nature or appoint ments of Providence : the provision which is made, that all the bad natural consequences of men's actions should not always actually follow ; or that such bad consequences, as, according to the settled course of things, would inevitably have followed, if not prevented, should, in certain degrees, be prevented. We are apt presumptuously to imagine, that the world might have been so constituted, as that there would not have been any such thing as misery or evil. On the contrary we find the Author of nature permits it: but then he has provided reliefs, and in many cases perfect reme dies for it, after some pains and difficulties : reliefs and remedies even for that evil, which is the fruit of our own misconduct ; and which, in the course of nature, would have continued, and ended in our destruction, but for such remedies. And this is an instance both of severity and of indulgence, in the constitution of nature. Thus all the bad 256 OF REDEMPTION BY [II. v. consequences, now mentioned, of a man's trifling upon a precipice, might be prevented. And though all were not, yet some of them might, by proper interposition, if not rejected : by another's coming to the rash man's relief, with his own laying hold on that relief, in such sort as the case required. Persons may do a great deal themselves towards preventing the bad consequences of their follies : and more may be done by themselves, together with the assistance of others their fellow-crea tures ; which assistance nature requires and prompts us to. This is the general constitution of the world. Now suppose it had been so constituted, that after such actions were done, as were foreseen naturally to draw after them misery to the doer, it should have been no more in human power to have prevented that naturally consequent misery, in any instance, than it is, in all ; no one can say, whether such a more severe constitution of things might not yet have been really good. But, that, on the contrary, provision is made by nature, that we may and do, to so great degree, prevent the bad natural effects of our follies ; this may be called mercy or compassion in the original con stitution of the world : compassion, as distinguished from goodness in general. And, the whole known constitution and course of things affording us in stances of such compassion, it would be according to the analogy of nature, to hope, that, however ruinous the natural consequences of vice might be, from the general laws of God's government over the universe ; yet provision might be made, possibly might have been originally made, for preventing those ruinous consequences from inevitably following : at least from following universally, and in all cases. §§ 5, 6] A MEDIA TOR. 257 § 5. Total impunity is often reckoned on. Many, I am sensible, will wonder at finding this made a question, or spoken of as in any degree doubtful. The generality of mankind are so far from having that awful sense of things, which the present state of vice and misery and darkness seems to make but reasonable, that they have scarce any apprehension or thought at all about this matter, any way : and some serious persons may have spoken unadvisedly concerning it '. $ 6. Yet neglect has grave consequences ; sin, probably, awful ones. But let us observe, what we experience to be, and what, from the very constitution of nature, cannot but be, the consequences of irregular and disorderly behaviour ; even of such rashness, wilful ness, neglects, as we scarce call vicious. Now it is natural to apprehend, that the bad consequences of irregularity will be greater, in proportion as the irregularity is so. And there is no comparison between these irregularities, and the greater in stances of vice, or a dissolute profligate disregard to all religion ; if there be any thing at all in religion. For consider what it is for creatures, moral agents, presumptuously to introduce that confusion and misery into the kingdom of God, which mankind have in fact introduced ; to blas pheme the Sovereign Lord of all ; to contemn his authority; to be injurious, to the degree they are, to their fellow-creatures, the creatures of God. 1 Butler seems to have had here are now so much more widely pro- in view those unhappy devices of mulgated. what is called Universalism, that VOL. I. S 258 OF REDEMPTION BY [II. v. Add that the effects of vice in the present world are often extreme misery, irretrievable ruin, and even death. And upon putting all this together, it will appear, that as no one can say, in what degree fatal the unprevented consequences of vice may be, according to the general rule of divine government ; so it is by no means intuitively cer tain, how far these consequences could possibly, in the nature of the thing, be prevented, consis tently with the eternal rule of right, or with what is, in fact, the moral constitution of nature. However, there would be large ground to hope, that the universal government was not so severely strict, but that there was room for pardon, or for having those penal consequences prevented. Yet, § 7. Nor does subsequent good behaviour cancel the past in nature; [IV.] There seems no probability, that any thing we could do would alone and of itself prevent them : prevent their following, or being inflicted. But one would think, at least, it were impossible that the contrary should be thought certain. For we are not acquainted with the whole of the case. We are not informed of all the reasons, which render it fit that future punishments should be inflicted : and therefore cannot know, whether any thing we could do would make such an alteration, as to render it fit that they should be remitted. We do not know what the whole natural or ap pointed consequences of vice are ; nor in what way they would follow, if not prevented : and there fore can in no sort say, whether we could do any thing which would be sufficient to prevent them. Our ignorance being thus manifest, let us recollect §§ 7, 8] A MEDIA TOR. 259 the analogy of nature or providence. For, though this may be but a slight ground to raise a positive opinion upon, in this matter ; yet it is sufficient to answer a mere arbitrary assertion, without any kind of evidence, urged by way of objection against a doctrine, the proof of which is not reason, but revelation. Consider then : people ruin their for tunes by extravagance ; they bring diseases upon themselves by excess ; they incur the penalties of civil laws ; and surely civil government is natural ; will sorrow for these follies past, and behaving well for the future, alone and of itself prevent the natural consequences of them? On the contrary, men's natural abilities of helping themselves are often impaired : or if not, yet they are forced to be beholden to the assistance of others, upon several accounts, and in different ways : assistance which they would have had no occasion for, had it not been for their misconduct ; but which, in the disadvantageous condition they have reduced themselves to, is absolutely necessary to their recovery, and retrieving their affairs. § 8. And probably not under revelation. Now since this is our case, considering ourselves merely as inhabitants of this world, and as having a temporal interest here, under the natural govern ment of God, which however has a great deal moral in it : why is it not supposable that this may be our case also, in our more important capacity, as under his perfect moral government, and having a more general and future interest depending? If we have misbehaved in this higher capacity, and rendered ourselves obnoxious to the future punishment, which God has annexed to vice : it is plainly credible, that s 2 260 OF REDEMPTION BY [II. v. behaving well for the time to come may be — not useless, God forbid — but wholly insufficient, alone and of itself, to prevent that punishment ; or to put us in the condition, which we should have been in, had we preserved our innocence. § g. The wide early prevalence of sacrifices shows how repentance was held insufficient. And though we ought to reason with all reverence, whenever we reason concerning the divine conduct : yet it may be added, that it is clearly contrary to all our notions of government, as well as to what is, in fact, the general constitution of nature, to suppose that doing well for the future should, in all cases, prevent all the judicial bad consequences of having done evil, or all the punishment annexed to dis obedience. And we have manifestly nothing from whence to determine, in what degree, and in what cases, reformation would prevent this punishment, even supposing that it would in some. And though the efficacy of repentance itself alone, to prevent what mankind had rendered themselves obnoxious to, and recover what they had forfeited, is now in sisted upon, in opposition to Christianity : yet, by the general prevalence of propitiatory sacrifices over the heathen world, this notion, of repentance alone being sufficient to expiate guilt, appears to be con trary to the general sense of mankind. § 10. Punishment, then, was to be expected. Upon the whole, then : Had the laws, the general laws of God's government, been permitted to operate, without any interposition in our behalf, the future punishment, for ought we know to the contrary, or have any reason to think, must inevitably have §§9-n] A MEDIATOR. 261 followed, notwithstanding any thing we could have done to prevent it. Now, $11. Mediation, then, was (a) appropriate, (b) requisite, (c) effectual. [V.] In this darkness, or this light of nature, call it which you please, revelation comes in ; confirms every doubting fear, which could enter into the heart of man, concerning the future unprevented conse quence of wickedness ; supposes the world to be in a state of ruin ; (a supposition which seems the very ground of the Christian dispensation, and which, if not provable by reason, yet is in no wise contrary to it ;) teaches us too, that the rules of divine govern ment are such, as not to admit of pardon immediately and directly upon repentance, or by the sole efficacy of it : but then teaches at the same time, what nature might justly have hoped, that the moral govern ment of the universe was not so rigid, but that there was room for an interposition, to avert the fatal consequences of vice ; which therefore, by this means, does admit of pardon. Revelation teaches us, that the unknown laws of God's more general govern ment, no less than the particular laws by which we experience he governs us at present, are compas sionate0, as well as good in the more general notion of goodness : and that he hath mercifully provided, that there should be an interposition to prevent the destruction of human kind ; whatever that destruc tion unprevented would have been. God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth, not, to be sure, in a speculative, but in a practical sense, that whosoever believeth in him should fc Sup. § 4. 1 1 262 OF REDEMPTION BY [II. v. not perish c : gave his Son in the same way of good ness to the world, as he affords particular persons the friendly assistance of their fellow-creatures ; when, without it, their temporal ruin would be the certain consequence of their follies : in the same way of goodness, I say ; though in a transcendent and in finitely higher degree. And the Son of God loved us and gave himself for us, with a love, which he him self compares to that of human friendship : though, in this case, all comparisons must fall infinitely short of the thing intended to be illustrated by them. He interposed in such a manner as was necessary and effectual to prevent that execution of justice upon sinners, which God had appointed should otherwise have been executed upon them : or in such a manner, as to prevent that punishment from actually follow ing, which, according to the general laws of divine government, must have followed the sins of the world, had it not been for such interposition d. c John iii. 16. d It cannot, I suppose, be imagined, even by the most cursoiy •Of large ques- reader, that it is, in any sort, affirmed or implied in tions left any thing said in this chapter, that none can have aside. the benefit of the general redemption, but such as have the advantage of being made acquainted with it in the present hfe. But it may be needful to mention, that several ques tions, which have been brought into the subject before us, and deter mined, are not in the least entered into here : questions which have been, I fear, rashly determined, and perhaps with equal rashness contrary ways. For instance, whether God could have saved the world by other means than the death of Christ, consistently with the general laws of his government. And had not Christ come into the world, what would have been the future condition of the better sort of men ; those just persons over the face of the earth, for whom, Manasses in his prayer asserts, repentance was not appointed. The meaning of the first of these questions is greatly ambiguous : and neither of them can properly be answered, without going upon that infinitely absurd supposition, that we know the whole of the § 12] A MEDIA TOR. 263 $ 12. Our sad plight has the sin in Paradise for its occasion, If any thing here said should appear, upon first thought, inconsistent with divine goodness ; a second, I am persuaded, will entirely remove that appearance. For were we to suppose the constitution of things to be such, as that the whole creation must have perished, had it not been for somewhat, which God had appointed should be, in order to prevent that ruin : even this supposition would not be incon sistent, in any degree, with the most absolutely perfect goodness. But still it may be thought, that this whole manner of treating the subject before us supposes mankind to be naturally in a very strange state. And truly so it does. But it is not Chris tianity, which has put us into this state. Who ever will consider the manifold miseries, and the extreme wickedness of the world : that the best have great wrongnesses within themselves, which they complain of, and endeavour to amend ; but that the generality grow more profligate and corrupt with age : that heathen moralists thought the present state to be a state of punishment : and, what might be added, that the earth our habitation has the appearances of being a ruin : whoever, I say, will consider all these, and some other obvious things, will think he has little reason to object against the scripture account, that mankind is in a state of degradation ; against this being the fact : how difficult case. And perhaps the very inquiry, What would have followed if God had not clone as he has ? may have in it some very great im propriety ; and ought not to be carried on any further, than is necessary to help our partial and inadequate conceptions of things. 264 OF REDEMPTION BY [II. v. soever he may think it to account for, or even to form a distinct conception of the occasions and cir cumstances of it. But that the crime of our first ^ parents was the occasion of our being placed in a more disadvantageous condition, is a thing through out and particularly analogous to what we see in the daily course of natural Providence ; as the re covery of the world by the interposition of Christ has been shown to be so in general. § 13. The mediation is by a foreshadowed Priest- victim ; [VI.] The particular manner in which Christ inter posed in the redemption of the world, or his office as Mediator, in the largest sense, between God and man, is thus represented to us in the scripture. He is the light of the world e ; the revealer of the will of God in the most eminent sense. He is a pro pitiatory sacrifice f ; the Lamb of God s : and, as he voluntarily offered himself up, he is styled our High- Priest'1. And, which seems of peculiar weight, he is described beforehand in the Old Testament, under the same characters of a priest, and an expiatory victim1. And whereas it is objected, that all this is merely by way of allusion to the sacrifices of the Mosaic law, the apostle on the contrary affirms, that the law was a shadow- of good things to come, and not the very image of the things k : and that tlie priests that offer gifts according to the law — serve e John i. and viii. 12. f Eom. iii. 25 and v. 11 ; 1 Cor. v. 7 ; Eph. v. 2 ; 1 John ii. 2 ; Matth. xxvi. 28. e John i. 29, 36 ; and throughout the Book of Eevelation. h Throughout the Epistle to the Hebrews. > Isa. liii ; Dan. ix. 24 ; Ps. ex. 4. k Heb. x. 1. § 13] A MEDIA TOR. 265 unto the example and shadow of heavenly things, as Moses was admonished of God when he was about to make the tabernacle : for See, saith he, that thou make all things according to the pattern showed to thee in the mount ! : i. e. the Levitical priesthood was a shadow of the priesthood of Christ ; in like manner as the tabernacle made by Moses was according to that showed him in the mount. The priesthood of Christ, and the tabernacle in the mount, were the originals : of the former of which the Levitical priesthood was a type ; and of the latter the tabernacle made by Moses was a copy. The doctrine of this Epistle then plainly is, that the legal sacrifices were allu sions to the great and final atonement to be made by the blood of Christ ; and not that this was an allusion to those. Nor can any thing be more ex press and determinate, than the following passage. It is not possible that the blood of bulls and of goats should take away sin. Wlierefore when he cometh into the world, he saith, Sacrifice and offering, i. e. of bulls and of goats, thou wouldest not, but a body hast thou prepared me Lo, I come to do thy will, 0 God By which will we are sanctified, through the offering of the body of Jesus Christ once for all m. And to add one passage more of the like kind : Christ was once offered to bear the sins of many ; and unto them that look for him shall he appear the second time, without sin ; i. e. without bearing sin, as he did at his first coming, by being an offering for it ; without having our iniquities again laid upon him, without being any more a sin offering : — unto them that look for him shall he appear the second time, without sin, unto salvation11. 1 Heb. viii. 4, 5. m Heb. x. 4, 5, 7, 9, 10. « Heb. ix. 28. 266 OF REDEMPTION BY [II. v. § 14. With an efficacy transcending that of example, instruction, or government. Nor do the inspired writers at all confine them selves to this manner of speaking concerning the satisfaction of Christ ; but declare an efficacy in what he did and suffered for us, additional to and beyond mere instruction, example, and government, in great variety of expression : That Jesus should die for that nation, the Jews : and not for that nation only, but that also, plainly by the efficacy of his death, he should gather together in one the children of God that were scattered abroad ° : that he suffered for sins, the just for the unjust P : that he gave his life, himself, a ransom Introduction, §§5, 6. VOL. I. U 290 WANT OF UNIVERSALITY AND [II. vi. observation on, and see, that between no evidence at all, and that degree of it which affords ground of doubt, there are as many intermediate degrees, as there are, between that degree which is the ground of doubt, and demonstration. And though we have not faculties to distinguish these degrees of evidence with any sort of exactness ; yet, in proportion as they are discerned, they ought to influence our practice. For it is as real an imperfection in the moral character, not to be influenced in practice by a lower degree of evidence when discerned, as it is in the understanding, not to discern it. § 16. (e) Corruption of the heart operates forcibly where the evidence is short of overbearing. And as, in all subjects which men consider, they discern the lower as well as higher degrees of evidence, proportionably to their capacity of under standing : so, in practical subjects, they are in fluenced in practice, by the lower as well as higher degrees of it, proportionably to their fairness and honesty. And as, in proportion to defects in the understanding, men are unapt to see lower degrees of evidence, are in danger of overlooking evidence when it is not glaring, and are easily imposed upon in such cases : so, in proportion to the corruption of the heart, they seem capable of satisfying them selves with having no regard in practice to evidence acknowledged real, if it be not overbearing. From these things it must follow, that doubting concern ing religion implies such a degree of evidence for it, as, joined with the consideration of its importance, unquestionably lays men under the obligations before mentioned, to have a dutiful regard to it in all their behaviour. §§ i6, 17] SUPPOSED SCANTINESS OF PROOF. 291 $ 17. (a) The duty of effort is enhanced, as by doubt fulness in religion, so by temptations in conduct. Thirdly, The difficulties in which the evidence of religion is involved, which some complain of, is no more a just ground of complaint, than the external circumstances of temptation, which others are placed in ; or than difficulties in the practice of it, after a full conviction of its truth. Temptations render our state a more improving state of discipline0, than it would be otherwise : as they give occasion for a more attentive exercise of the virtuous principle, which confirms and strengthens it more, than an easier or less attentive exercise of it could. Now speculative difficulties are, in this respect, of the very same nature with these external temptations. For the evidence of religion not appearing obvious, is to some persons a temptation to reject it, without any consideration at all ; and therefore requires such an attentive exercise of the virtuous principle, seriously to consider that evidence, as there would be no occasion for, but for such temptation. And the supposed doubtfulness of its evidence, after it has been in some sort considered, affords opportunity to an unfair mind of explaining away, and deceitfully hiding from itself, that evidence which it might see ; and also for men's encouraging themselves in vice, from hopes of impunity, though they do clearly see thus much at least, that these hopes are un certain : in like manner as the common temptation to many instances of folly, which end in temporal infamy and ruin, is the ground for hope of not being detected, and of escaping with impunity ; c Part. I. chap. v. U 2 292 WANT OF UNIVERSALITY AND [II. vi. i. e. the doubtfulness of the proof beforehand, that such foolish behaviour will thus end in infamy and ruin. On the contrary, supposed doubtfulness in the evidence of religion calls for a more careful and attentive exercise of the virtuous principle, in fairly yielding themselves up to the proper influence of any real evidence, though doubtful ; and in practising conscientiously all virtue, though under some uncertainty, whether the government in the universe may not possibly be such, as that vice may escape with impunity. And in general, temptation, meaning by this word the lesser allurements to wrong and difficulties in the discharge of our duty, as well as the greater ones ; temptation, I say, as such and of every kind and degree, as it calls forth some virtuous efforts, additional to what would other wise have been wanting, cannot but be an additional discipline and improvement of virtue, as well as probation of it in the other senses of that word d. So that the very same account is to be given, why the evidence of religion should be left in such a manner, as to require, in some, an attentive, solicit ous, perhaps painful exercise of their understanding about it ; as why others should be placed in such circumstances, as that the practice of its common duties, after a full conviction of the truth of it, should require attention, solicitude, and pains : or, why appearing doubtfulness should be permitted to afford matter of temptation to some ; as why external difficulties and allurements should be permitted to afford matter of temptation to others. The same account also is to be given, why some should be exercised with temptations of both these kinds ; as d Part I. chap. iv. and I. v. 42. § 18] SUPPOSED SCANTINESS OF PROOF. 293 why others should be exercised with the latter in such very high degrees, as some have been, particularly as the primitive Christians were. § 18. (b) As in nature, so in religion, doubts may con stitute for some the capital article of trial. Nor does there appear any absurdity in supposing, that the speculative difficulties in which the evidence of religion is involved, may make even the principal part of some persons' trial. For, as the chief tempta tions of the generality of the world are, the ordinary motives to injustice or unrestrained pleasure ; or to live in the neglect of religion from that frame of mind, which renders many persons almost with out feeling as to any thing distant, or which is not the object of their senses : so there are other persons without this shallowness of temper, persons of a deeper sense as to what is invisible and future ; who not only see, but have a general practical feeling, that what is to come will be present, and that things are not less real for their not being the objects of sense ; and who, from their natural constitution of body and of temper, and from their external condition, may have small temptations to behave ill, small difficulty in behaving well, in the common course of life. Now when these latter persons have a distinct full conviction of the truth of religion, without any possible doubts or difficulties, the prac tice of it is to them unavoidable, unless they will do a constant violence to their own minds ; and religion is scarce any more a discipline to them, than it is to creatures in a state of perfection. Yet these persons may possibly stand in need of moral dis cipline and exercise in a higher degree, than they would have by such an easy practice of religion. 294 WANT OF UNIVERSALITY AND [II. vi. Or it may be requisite, for reasons unknown to us, that they should give some further manifestation6 what is their moral character, to the creation of God, than such a practice of it would be. Thus in the great variety of religious situations in which men are placed, what constitutes, what chiefly and peculiarly constitutes, the probation, in all senses, of some persons, may be the difficulties in which the evidence of religion is involved : and their principal and distinguished trial may be, how they will behave under and with respect to these diffi culties. Circumstances in men's situation in their temporal capacity, analogous in good measure to this respecting religion, are to be observed. We find some persons are placed in such a situation in the world, as that their chief difficulty with regard to conduct, is not the doing what is prudent when it is known ; for this, in numberless cases, is as easy as the contrary : but to some the principal exercise is, recollection and being upon their guard against deceits, the deceits suppose of those about them ; against false appearances of reason and prudence. To persons in some situations, the prin cipal exercise with respect to conduct is, attention in order to inform themselves what is proper, what is really the reasonable and prudent part to act. § 19. Also tlie doubts may be due to faults in the examinant. But as I have hitherto gone upon supposition, that men's dissatisfaction with the evidence of religion is not owing to their neglects or prejudices ; it must be added, on the other hand, in all common reason, e Sup. I. v. 42. § 19] SUPPOSED SCANTINESS OF PROOF. 295 and as what the truth of the case plainly requires should be added, that such dissatisfaction possibly may be owing to those, possibly may be men's own fault. For, If there are any persons, who never set themselves heartily and in earnest to be informed in religion : if there are any, who secretly wish it may not prove true ; and are less attentive to evidence than to difficulties, and more to objections than to what is said in answer to them : these persons will scarce be thought in a likely way of seeing the evidence of religion, though it were most certainly true, and capable of being ever so fully proved. If any accustom themselves to consider this subject usually in the way of mirth and sport : if they attend to forms and representations, and inadequate manners of expression, instead of the real things intended by them : (for signs often can be no more than inade quately expressive of the things signified :) or if they substitute human errors in the room of divine truth : why may not all, or any of these things, hinder some men from seeing that evidence, which really is seen by others ; as a like turn of mind, with respect to matters of common speculation and practice, does, we find by experience, hinder them from attaining that knowledge and right understanding, in matters of common speculation and practice, which more fair and attentive minds attain to ? And the effect will be the same, whether their neglect of seriously considering the evidence of religion, and their indirect behaviour with regard to it, proceed from mere carelessness, or from the grosser vices ; or whether it be owing to this, that forms and figura tive manners of expression, as well as errors, administer occasions of ridicule, when the things 296 WANT OF UNIVERSALITY AND [II. vi. intended, and the truth itself, would not. Men may indulge a ludicrous turn so far as to lose all sense of conduct and prudence in worldly affairs, and even, as it seems, to impair their faculty of reason. And in general, levity, carelessness, passion, and pre judice, do hinder us from being rightly informed, with respect to common things : and they may, in like manner, and perhaps in some further providen tial manner, with respect to moral and religious sub jects : may hinder evidence from being laid before us, and from being seen when it is. The scripture f does declare, that every one shall not understand. And it makes no difference, by what providential conduct this comes to pass : whether the evidence of Chris tianity was, originally and with design, put and left so, as that those who are desirous of evading moral obligations should not see it ; and that honest- minded persons should : or, whether it comes to pass by any other means. § 20. The proof of religion, in both kinds, upon inquiry, lies level to common men. Further : The general proof of natural religion and of Christianity does, I think, lie level to common f Dan. xii. 10. See also Is. xxix. 13, 14 ; Matth. vi. 23, and xi. Texts; and Grotius 25, and xiii. 11, 12 ; John iii. 19 and v. 44 ; on the purpose of 1 Cor. ii. 14 and 2 Cor. iv. 4 ; 2 Tim. iii. 13 ; restricted evidence. and that affectionate as well as authoritative admonition, so very many times inculcated, He that hath ears to hear, let Mm hear. Grotius saw so strongly the thing intended in these and other passages of scripture of the like sense, as to say, that the proof given us of Christianity was less than it might have been, for this very purpose : Ut ita sermo Evangelii tanquam lapis esset Lydius ad quern ingenia sanabilia explorarentur. De Ver. E. C. lib. ii. towards the end. §20] SUPPOSED SCANTINESS OF PROOF. 297 men ; even those, the greatest part of whose time, from childhood to old age, is taken up with pro viding for themselves and their families the common conveniences, perhaps necessaries, of life : those, I mean, of this rank, who ever think at all of asking after proof, or attending to it. Common men, were they as much in earnest about religion, as about their temporal affairs, are capable of being convinced upon real evidence, that there is a God who governs the world : and they feel themselves to be of a moral nature, and accountable creatures. And as Chris tianity entirely falls in with this their natural sense of things, so they are capable, not only of being persuaded, but of being made to see, that there is evidence of miracles wrought in attestation of it, and many appearing completions of prophecy. But though this proof is real and conclusive, yet it is liable to objections, and may be run up into difficul ties ; which, however, persons who are capable, not only of talking of, but of reaUy seeing, are capable also of seeing through : i. e. not of clearing up and answering them, so as to satisfy their curiosity, for of such knowledge we are not capable with respect to any one thing in nature ; but capable of seeing that the proof is not lost in these difficulties, or destroyed by these objections. But then a thorough examination into religion, with regard to these ob jections, which cannot be the business of every man, is a matter of pretty large compass, and, from the nature of it, requires some knowledge, as well as time and attention ; to see, how the evidence comes out, upon balancing one thing with another, and what, upon the whole, is the amount of it. Now if persons who have picked up these objections from others, and take for granted they are of weight, upon 298 WANT OF UNIVERSALITY AND [II. vi. the word of those from whom they received them, or, by often retailing of them, come to see or fancy they see them to be of weight; will not prepare themselves for such an examination, with a com petent degree of knowledge ; or will not give that time and attention to the subject, which, from the nature of it, is necessary for attaining such informa tion : in this case, they must remain in doubtfulness, ignorance, or error ; in the same way as they must, with regard to common sciences, and matters of common life, if they neglect the necessary means of being informed in them. § 21. Accrediting an ambassador is not a parallel case, as it aims only at a formal act. But still perhaps it will be objected, that if a prince or common master were to send directions to a ser vant, he would take care, that they should always bear the certain marks, who they came from, and that their sense should be always plain : so as that there should be no possible doubt, if he could help it, concerning the authority or meaning of them. Now the proper answer to all this kind of objections is, that, wherever the fallacy lies, it is even certain we cannot argue thus with respect to him, who is the Governor of the world : and particularly that he does not afford us such information, with respect to our temporal affairs and interests, as experience abundantly shows. However, there is a full answer to this objection, from the very nature of religion. For, the reason why a prince would give his direc tions in this plain manner is, that he absolutely desires such an external action should be done, without concerning himself with the motive or prin ciple upon which it is done : i. e. he regards only the §§ 21-23] SUPPOSED SCANTINESS OF PROOF. 299 external event, or the thing's being done ; and not at all, properly speaking, the doing of it, or the action. Whereas the whole of morality and reli gion consisting merely in action itself, there is no sort of parallel between the cases. But if the prince be supposed to regard only the action ; i. e. only to desire to exercise, or in any sense prove, the under standing or loyalty of a servant ; he would not always give his orders in such a plain manner. § 22. Whether God's will be regarded, herein, as absolute, or as conditional, the argument remains. It may be proper to add, that the will of God, respecting morality and religion, may be considered either as absolute, or as only conditional. If it be , absolute, it can only be thus, that we should act virtuously in such given circumstances ; not that we should be brought to act so, by his changing of our circumstances. And if God's will be thus abso lute, then it is in our power, in the highest and strictest sense, to do or to contradict his will ; which is a most weighty consideration. Or his will may be considered only as conditional, that if we act so and so, we shall be rewarded ; if otherwise, punished : of which conditional will of the Author of nature, the whole constitution of it affords most certain instances. § 23. Sums up tlie foregoing Sections. Upon the whole : That we are in a state of religion necessarily implies, that we are in a state of probation: and the credibility of our being at all in such a state being admitted, there seems no peculiar difficulty in supposing our probation to be, just as it is, in those respects which are above objected against. There 300 WANT OF UNIVERSALITY AND [II. vi, seems no pretence, from the reason of the thing, to say, that the trial cannot equitably be any thing, but whether persons will act suitably to certain information, or such as admits no room for doubt ; so as that there can be no danger of miscarriage, but either from their not attending to what they certainly know, or from overbearing passion hurrying them on to act contrary to it. For, since ignorance and doubt afford scope for probation in all senses, as really as intuitive conviction or certainty ; and since the two former are to be put to the same account as difficulties in practice ; men's moral pro bation may also be, whether they will take due care to inform themselves by impartial consideration, and afterwards whether they will act as the case requires, upon the evidence which they have, however doubt ful. And this, we find by experience, is frequently our probations', in our temporal capacity. For, the information which we want with regard to our worldly interests is by no means always given us of course, without any care of our own. And we are greatly liable to self-deceit from inward secret prejudices, and also to the deceits of others. So that to be able to judge what is the prudent part, often requires much and difficult consideration. Then after we have judged the very best we can, the evidence upon which we must act, if we will live and act at all, is perpetually doubtful to a very high degree. And the constitution and course of the world in fact is such, as that want of impartial consideration what we have to do, and venturing upon extravagant courses because it is doubtful what will be the consequence, are often naturally, i. e. s I. ii. 12, and sup. §§ 17-19. §24] SUPPOSED SCANTINESS OF PROOF. 301 providentially, altogether as fatal, as misconduct occasioned by heedless inattention to what we cer tainly know, or disregarding it from overbearing passion. § 24. Invites the objector to consider whether the obstacle lies within himself. Several of the observations here made may well seem strange, perhaps unintelligible, to many good men. But if the persons for whose sake they are made think so ; persons who object as above, and throw off all regard to religion under pretence of want of evidence ; I desire them to consider again, whether their thinking so be owing to any thing unin telligible in these observations, or to their own not having such a sense of religion and serious solicitude about it, as even their state of scepticism does in all reason require ? It ought to be forced upon the reflection of these persons, that our nature and con dition necessarily require us, in the daily course of life, to act upon evidence much lower x than what is commonly called probable ; to guard, not only against what we fully believe will, but also against what we think it supposable may, happen ; and to engage in pursuits when the probability is greatly against success, if it be credible, that possibly we may succeed in them. 1 Comp. Introd. §§ 3, 6. 302 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [II. vn. CHAPTER VII. OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE FOR CHRISTIANITY. § i. Will now try the evidences for Christianity by our rules of temporal action. THE presumptions against revelation, and objec tions against the general scheme of Christianity, and particular things relating to it, being removed ; there remains to be considered, what positive evi dence we have for the truth of it : chiefly in order to see, what the analogy of nature suggests with regard to that evidence, and the objections against it : or to see what is, and is allowed to be, the plain natural rule of judgment and of action, in our temporal concerns, in cases where we have the same kind of evidence, and the same kind of objections against it, that we have in the case before us. § 2. These evidences are (a) direct and particular, (b) general and resulting. Now in the evidence of Christianity there seem to be several things of great weight, not reducible to the head, either of miracles, or the completion of prophecy, in the common acceptation of the words1. But these two are its direct and fundamental proofs : 1 After the discussions of the last I. The apostles were not con- century and a half, Butler would verted by miracles as commonly perhaps have somewhat altered understood. what he has written respecting the . 2. The miracles of our Lord were twin office of miracle and prophecy of wide local notoriety, but we asevidences of revealed religion. have no evidence of their having As regards miracle, we may do led to extended conversions. They well to remember— may have had more powerful and §§ I, 2] FOR CHRISTIANITY. 3°3 and those other things, however considerable they are, yet ought never to be urged apart from its direct proofs, but always to be joined with them. Thus the evidence of Christianity will be a long series of things, reaching, as it seems, from the beginning of the world to the present time, of great variety and compass, taking in both the direct, and also the collateral, proofs ; and making up, all of them together, one argument : the conviction arising from which kind of proof may be compared to what they call the effect in architecture or other works of extended operation through the preaching of the apostles. 3. The great miracle of Lazarus is noted for the specialty of its effect (John xi. 45). 4. There were three miracles which may be denominated as of the first order : — (a) The Incarnation itself; which, as Butler observes, is not avail able as proof, but requires to be proved. (6) The miracle of the Resur rection ; which, after it had happened, became powerfully available, and may be taken as sustaining very broadly this declaration of Butler's. (c) The miracle of our Lord's own person and character ; which was too spiritual for the mass, but operated marvellously on a few. It is well to observe that the apostles largely converted without miracle : and, in his address to the Athenians (Acts xvii. 31), St. Paul appeals to no miracle except the Resurrection. This appeal brought about an interruption, and he de sisted from further speech. With regard to prophecy — 1. It seems to imply the action of divine power operating with large combinations, such as belong to the government of the ages as a whole. 2. There are miracles ascribed to preternatural agencies of evil, as well as of good. But we have no similar recognition in Holy Writ of prophecy as being placed at the command of any evil agent. It is obvious that the evidential force of the existence of the Church, and its operation on the world and on society, has grown progressively with the lapse of time, and the development of the varying conditions of life. In Great Britain, especially, it was to be expected that this idea should be come more prominent and vivid with the great extension and in creased efficiency of Christian mis- sionsduring the nineteenth century. Also Christianity and the Church are far larger and weightier facts than heretofore in comparison with the rest of the world : nor is the great increase in the numerical proportion of Christians wholly without bearing on the case. 304 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [Il.vn. art ; a result from a great number of things so and so disposed, and taken into one view. I shall therefore, first, make some observations relating to miracles, and the appearing completions of prophecy ; and consider what analogy suggests, in answer to the objections brought against this evidence. And, secondly, I shall endeavour to give some account of the general argument now mentioned, consisting both of the direct and collateral evidence, considered as making up one argument : this being the kind of proof, upon which we determine most questions of difficulty, concerning common facts, alleged to have happened, or seeming likely to happen ; especially questions relating to conduct. § 3. On the direct, (a) The miracles are told in narratives plain and unadorned; First, I shall make some observations upon the direct proof of Christianity from miracles and pro phecy, and upon the objections alleged against it. [I.] Now the following observations relating to the historical evidence of miracles wrought in attestation of Christianity, appear to be of great weight. [1.] The Old Testament affords us the same his torical evidence of the miracles of Moses and of the prophets, as of the common civil history of Moses and the kings of Israel ; or, as of the affairs of the Jewish nation. And the Gospels and the Acts afford us the same historical evidence of the miracles of Christ and the apostles, as of the common matters related in them1. This indeed could not have been 1 Fitzgerald cites Bolingbroke, which goes on very well without Posthumous Works, iii. 279 : ' The them. But the miracles of the miracles in the Bible are not like Jewish historian are intimately those in Livy, detached pieces that connected with all the civil affairs, do not disturb the civil history, and make a necessary and insepar- §§3,4] FOR CHRISTIANITY. 305 affirmed by any reasonable man, if the authors of these books, like many other historians, had appeared to make an entertaining manner of writing their aim ; though they had interspersed miracles in their works, at proper distances and upon proper occasions. These might have animated a dull relation, amused the reader, and engaged his attention. And the same account would naturaUy have been given of them, as of the speeches and descriptions of such authors : the same account, in a manner, as is to be given, why the poets make use of wonders and prodigies. But the facts, both miraculous and natural, in scripture, are related in plain unadorned narra tives : and both of them appear, in all respects, to stand upon the same foot of historical evidence. § 4. Sustained by, and accounting for, great known consequent events; Further : Some parts of scripture, containing an account of miracles fully sufficient to prove the truth of Christianity, are quoted as genuine, from the age in which they are said to be written, down to the present : and no other parts of them, material in the present question, are omitted to be quoted in such manner, as to afford any sort of proof of their not being genuine. And, as common history, when called in question in any instance, may often be greatly confirmed by contemporary or subsequent events more known and acknowledged ; and as the common scripture-history, like many others, is thus confirmed : so likewise is the miraculous history of it, not only in particular instances, but in general. able part. The whole history is history of them, it would be a founded in them : it consists of history of nothing.' little else ; and, if it were not a VOL. I. X 306 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [II. vn. For, the establishment of the Jewish and Christian religions, which were events contemporary with the miracles related to be wrought in attestation of both, or subsequent to them, these events are just what we should have expected, upon supposition such miracles were really wrought to attest the truth of those religions. These miracles are a satisfactory account of those events : of which no other satis factory account can be given; nor any account at all, but what is imaginary merely and invented. § 5. Hard to account for, except by supposing them true. It is to be added, that the most obvious, the most easy and direct account of this history, how it came to be written and to be received in the world, as a true history, is, that it really is so : nor can any other account of it be easy and direct. Now, though an account, not at all obvious, but very far-fetched and indirect, may indeed be, and often is, the true account of a matter ; yet it cannot be admitted on the authority of its being asserted. Mere guess, supposition, and possibility, when op posed to historical evidence, prove nothing, but that historical evidence is not demonstrative. 9 6. Not mere objection, but disproof is here required. Now the just consequence from all this, I think, is, that the scripture-history in general is to be admitted as an authentic genuine history, till some what positive be alleged sufficient to invalidate it. But no man will deny the consequence to be, that it cannot be rejected, or thrown by as of no authority, till it can be proved to be of none; even though §§ 5-7] FOR CHRISTIANITY. 307 the evidence now mentioned for its authority were doubtful. This evidence may be confronted by his torical evidence on the other side, if there be any : or general incredibility in the things related, or in consistence in the general turn of the history, would prove it to be of no authority. But since, upon the face of the matter, upon a first and general view, the appearance is, that it is an authentic history; it cannot be determined to be fictitious without some proof that it is so. And the following observations in support of these and coincident with them, will greatly confirm the historical evidence for the truth of Christianity. § 7. The Epistles of St. Paul possess distinct verifying evidences. [2.] The Epistles of St. Paul, from the nature of epistolary writing, and moreover from several of them being written, not to particular persons, but to churches, carry in them evidences of their being genuine, beyond what can be in a mere historical narrative, left to the world at large. This evidence, joined with that which they have in common with the rest of the New Testament, seems not to leave so much as any particular pretence for deny ing their genuineness considered, as an ordinary matter of fact, or of criticism : I say particular pre tence, for denying it ; because any single fact, of such a kind and such antiquity, may have general doubts raised concerning it, from the very nature of human affairs and human testimony. There is also to be mentioned a distinct and particular evidence of the genuineness of the Epistle chiefly referred to here, the First to the Corinthians ; from the manner in which it is quoted by Clemens Romanus, in an x 2 308 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [II. vii. epistle of his own to that church a. Now these epistles afford a proof of Christianity, detached from all others, which is, I think, a thing of weight ; and also a proof of a nature and kind peculiar to itself. For, In them the author declares, that he received the gospel in general, and the institution of the communion in particular, not from the rest of the apostles, or jointly together with them, but alone, from Christ himself; whom he declares likewise, conformably to the history in the Acts, that he saw after his ascension0. So that the testimony of St. Paul is to be considered, as detached from that of the rest of the apostles. And he declares further, that he was endued with a power of working miracles, as what was publicly known to those very people, speaks of frequent and great variety of miraculous gifts as then subsisting in those very churches, to which he was writing ; which he was reproving for several irregularities ; and where he had personal opposers : he ¦ mentions these gifts incidentally, in the most easy manner and without effort ; by way of reproof to those who had them, for their indecent use of them ; and by way of depreciating them, in comparison of moral virtues ; in short he speaks to these churches, of these miraculous powers, in the manner any one would speak to another of a thing, which was as familiar and as much known in common to them both, as any thing in the world c. And this, as hath a Clem. Eom. Ep. I. c. 47. b Gal. i ; 1 Cor. xi. 23, &c, xv. 8. c Eom. xv. 19 ; 1 Cor. xii. 8, 9, 10-28, &c. and xiii. 1, 2, 8, and the whole fourteenth chapter ; 2 Cor. xii. 12, 13 ; Gal. iii. 2, 5. §8] FOR CHRISTIANITY. 309 been observed by several persons, is surely a very considerable thing. § 8. Christianity and Judaism alone allege miracles publicly wrought. [3.] It is an acknowledged historical fact, that Chris tianity offered itself to the world, and demanded to be received, upon the allegation, i. e. as unbelievers would speak, upon the pretence, of miracles, publicly wrought to attest the truth of it, in such an age ; and that it was actually received by great numbers in that very age, and upon the professed belief of the reality of these miracles. And Christianity, including the dispensation of the Old Testament, seems dis tinguished by this from all other religions. I mean, that this does not appear to be the case with regard to any other : for surely it will not be supposed to lie upon any person, to prove by positive historical evidence, that it was not. It does in no sort appear that Mahometanism was first received in the world upon the foot of supposed miracles d ], i. e. public ones : for, as revelation is itself miraculous, all pretence to it must necessarily imply some pretence of miracles. And it is a known fact, that it was immediately, at the very first, propagated by other means. And as particular institutions, whether in paganism or popery, said to be confirmed by miracles after those institutions had obtained, are not to the purpose : so, were there what might be called historical proof, that any of them were introduced by a supposed 11 See the Koran, chap, xiii and chap. xvii. 1 See the argument hereupon in from the Arabic by Sir W. Muir, The Beacon of Truth, translated chap. i. (1895). 310 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [II. vii. divine command, believed to be attested by miracles ; these would not be in any wise parallel. For single things of this sort are easy to be accounted for, after parties are formed, and have power in their hands ; and the leaders of them are in veneration with the multitude ; and political interests are blended with religious claims, and religious distinctions. But before any thing of this kind, for a few persons, and those of the lowest rank, all at once, to bring over such great numbers to a new religion, and get it to be received upon the particular evidence of miracles ; this is quite another thing. And I think it will be allowed by any fair adversary, that the fact now mentioned, taking in all the circumstances of it, is pecuhar to the Christian religion. However, the fact itself is allowed, that Christianity obtained, i. e. was professed to be received in the world, upon the belief of miracles, immediately in the age in which it is said those miracles were wrought : or that this is what its first converts would have alleged, as the reason for their embracing it. § 9. The converts, ivho sacrificed interest and pleasure, must be believed sincere. Now certainly it is not to be supposed, that such numbers of men, in the most distant parts of the world, should forsake the religion of their country, in which they had been educated; separate them selves from their friends, particularly in their festival shows and solemnities, to which the common people are so greatly addicted, and which were of a nature to engage them much more, than any thing of that sort amongst us ; and embrace a religion, which could not but expose them to many inconveniences, and indeed must have been a giving up the world §9] FOR CHRISTIANITY. 311 in a great degree, even from the very first, and before the empire engaged in form against them : it cannot be supposed, that such numbers should make so great, and, to say the least, so inconvenient a change in their whole institution of life, unless they were really convinced of the truth of those miracles, upon the knowledge or belief of which they professed to make it. And it wiU, I suppose, readily be acknowledged, that the generality of the first con verts to Christianity must have believed them : that as by becoming Christians they declared to the world, they were satisfied of the truth of those miracles ; so this declaration was to be credited. And this their testimony is the same kind of evidence for those miracles, as if they had put it in writing, and these writings had come down to us. And it is real evidence, because it is of facts, which they had capacity and full opportunity to inform themselves of. It is also distinct from the direct or express historical evidence, though it is of the same kind : and it would be allowed to be distinct in all cases. For were a fact expressly related by one or more ancient historians, and disputed in after ages ; that this fact is acknowledged to have been believed by great numbers of the age in which the historian says it was done, would be allowed an additional proof of such fact, quite distinct from the express testimony of the historian. The credulity of mankind is acknowledged : and the suspicions of mankind ought to be acknowledged too ; and their backwardness even to believe, and greater still to practise, what makes against their interest. And it must particularly be remembered, that education, and prejudice, and authority, were against Christianity, in the age I am speaking of. So that the immediate 312 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [II. vii. conversion of such numbers is a real presumption of somewhat more than human in this matter : I say presumption, for it is not alleged as a proof alone and by itself. Nor need any one of the things mentioned in this chapter be considered as a proof by itself: and yet all of them together may be one of the strongest6. § 10. Tlie onus probandi lies upon the objector. Upon the whole : As there is large historical evidence, both direct and circumstantial, of miracles wrought in attestation of Christianity, collected by those who have writ upon the subject ; it lies upon unbelievers to show, why this evidence is not to be credited. This way of speaking is, I think, just ; and what persons who write in defence of religion naturaUy fall into. Yet, in a matter of such unspeak able importance, the proper question is, not whom it lies upon, according to the rules of argument, to maintain or confute objections : but whether there really are any, against this evidence, sufficient, in reason, to destroy the credit of it. However, unbe lievers seem to take upon them the part of showing that there are. §11. He says (a) other enthusiasts have borne erroneous witness. Yes : but to opinions, not facts. They allege, that numberless enthusiastic people, in different ages and countries, expose themselves to the same difficulties which the primitive Christians did ; and are ready to give up their lives for the most idle follies imaginable. But it is not very clear, to what purpose this objection is brought. e Inf. § 60. §§ 10-13J FOR CHRISTIANITY. 313 For every one, surely, in every case, must distinguish between opinions and facts. And though testimony is no proof of enthusiastic opinions, or of any opinions at all ; yet it is allowed, in all other cases, to be a proof of facts. And a person's laying down his life in attestation of facts or of opinions, is the strongest proof of his believing them. And if the apostles and their contemporaries did believe the facts, in attestation of which they exposed them selves to sufferings and death ; this their belief, or rather knowledge, must be a proof of those facts : for they were such as came under the observation of their senses. § 12. Martyrs of the sub-apostolic age. And though it is not of equal weight, yet it is of weight, that the martyrs of the next age, notwith standing they were not eye-witnesses of those facts, as were the apostles and their contemporaries, had, however, full opportunity to inform themselves, whether they were true or not, and gave equal proof of their believing them to be true. § 13. (/S) Enthusiasm weakens even testimony to facts. But were these witnesses enthusiasts ? But enthusiasm, it is said, greatly weakens the evidence of testimony even for facts, in matters relating to religion : some seem to think it totally and absolutely destroys the evidence of testimony upon this subject. And indeed the powers of enthu siasm, and of diseases too, which operate in a like manner, are very wonderful, in particular instances. But if great numbers of men, not appearing in any peculiar degree weak, nor under any peculiar suspicion of negligence, affirm that they saw and 314 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [II. vu. heard such things plainly with their eyes and their ears, and are admitted to be in earnest ; such testimony is evidence of the strongest kind we can have, for any matter of fact. Yet possibly it may be overcome, strong as it is, by incredibility in the things thus attested, or by contrary testimony. And in an instance where one thought it was so overcome, it might be just to consider, how far such evidence could be accounted for, by enthusiasm : for it seems as if no other imaginable account were to be given of it. But till such incredibility be shown, or contrary testimony produced, it cannot surely be expected, that so far-fetched, so indirect and wonderful an account of such testimony, as that of enthusiasm must be ; an account so strange, that the generality of mankind ean scarce be made to understand what is meant by it : it cannot, I say, be expected, that such account will be ad mitted of such evidence ; when there is this direct, easy, and obvious account of it, that people really saw and heard a thing not incredible, which they affirm sincerely and with full assurance, they did see and hear. § 14. The things not being incredible, the charge of enthusiasm is not to be entertained. Granting then that enthusiasm is not (strictly speaking) an absurd, but a possible account of such testimony : it is manifest, that the very mention of it goes upon the previous supposition that the things so attested are incredible ; and therefore need not be considered, till they are shown to be so. Much less need it be considered, after the contrary has been proved. And I think it has been proved, to fuU satisfaction, that there is no incredibility in §§ i4-i6J FOR CHRISTIANITY. 315 a revelation, in general ; or in such an one as the Christian, in particular. § 15. Many prejudices operate like enthusiasm; yet testimony prevails. However ; as religion is supposed peculiarly liable to enthusiasm, it may just be observed, that pre judices 1 almost without number and without name, romance, affectation, humour, a desire to engage attention or to surprise, the party-spirit, custom, little competitions, unaccountable likings and dis- likings, these influence men strongly in common matters. And as these prejudices are often scarce known or reflected upon by the persons themselves who are influenced by them, they are to be con sidered as influences of a like kind to enthusiasm. Yet human testimony in common matters is naturaUy and justly believed notwithstanding. § 16. So it will, even if we assume partial untruth, exaggeration, or reticence2. It is intimated further, in a more refined way of observation, that though it should be proved, that the apostles and first Christians could not, in some respects, be deceived themselves, and, in other respects, cannot be thought to have intended to impose upon the world ; yet it wfll not follow, that 1 On the connection between interests, where the subject to be virtue and sound judgment, see elucidated is truth at large ; and Aristotle, Eth. Nic. I. iv. 6 ; III. iv. not with evidence hostile to the 4 ; X. ix. 6. life and property of an individual, 2 In estimating what Butler here where detection of untruth in a says of the effect of partial untruth, part is held to render the whole we must bear in mind that we are unavailable for carrying penal con- dealing with the case of statements sequences home. supposed to be made in the general 316 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [II. vn. their general testimony is to be believed, though truly handed down to us : because they might still in part, i. e. in other respects, be deceived them selves, and in part also designedly impose upon others ; which, it is added, is a thing very credible, from that mixture of real enthusiasm, and real knavery, to be met with in the same characters. And, I must confess, I think the matter of fact contained in this observation upon mankind is not to be denied ; and that somewhat very much akin to it is often supposed in scripture as a very common case, and most severely reproved l. But it were to have been expected, that persons capable of applying this observation as applied in the objection, might also frequently have met with the like mixed character, in instances where religion was quite out of the case. The thing plainly is, that mankind are naturally endued with reason, or a capacity of distinguishing between truth and falsehood ; and as naturally they are endued with veracity, or a regard to truth in what they say : but from many occasions they are liable to be prejudiced and biassed and deceived themselves, and capable of intending to deceive others, in every different degree : insomuch that, as we are all liable to be deceived by prejudice, so likewise it seems to be not an uncommon thing, for persons, who, from their regard to truth, would not invent a lie entirely without any foundation at all, to propagate it with heightening circumstances2, after it is once invented and set a-going. And others, 1 As in the case of Balaam. See tion : not to what is systematic, Serm. vii, on Balaam, and Serm. x, which would go far to falsify. And, on Self-Deceit. again, the reticence glanced at can ': Evidently we must understand only apply to secondary matters, this to refer to incidental exaggera- or it might totally falsify. §§ 17, 18J FOR CHRISTIANITY. 317 though they would not propagate a lie, yet, which is a lower degree of falsehood, will let it pass without contradiction. But, notwithstanding all this, human testimony remains still a natural ground of assent ; and this assent a natural principle of action. § 17. No proof that danger here is more than ordinary. It is objected further, that however it has happened, the fact is, that mankind have, in different ages, been strangely deluded with pretences to miracles and wonders. But it is by no means to be admitted, that they have been oftener, or are at all more liable to be deceived by these pretences, than by others. § 18. Nor does failure of like evidence in other cases prove this evidence fabulous. It is added, that there is a very considerable degree of historical evidence for miracles, which are, on aU hands, acknowledged to be fabulous. But suppose there were even the like historical evidence for these, to what there is for those alleged in proof of Christianity, which yet is in no wise allowed, but suppose this ; the consequence would not be, that the evidence of the latter is not to be admitted. Nor is there a man in the world, who, in common cases, would conclude thus. For what would such a conclusion really amount to but this, that evidence, confuted by contrary evidence, or any way over balanced, destroys the credibility of other evidence, neither confuted, nor overbalanced? To argue, that because there is, if there were, like evidence from testimony, for miracles acknowledged false, as for those in attestation of Christianity, therefore the evidence in the latter case is not to be credited ; this is the same as to argue, that if two men of equally 318 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [II. vii. good reputation had given evidence in different cases no way connected, and one of them had been con victed of perjury, this confuted the testimony of the other. § 19. Testimony always liable to be weakened without being destroyed. Upon the whole then, the general observation that human creatures are so liable to be deceived, from enthusiasm in religion, and principles equivalent to enthusiasm in common matters, and in both from negligence ; and that they are so capable of dis honestly endeavouring to deceive others ; this does indeed weaken the evidence of testimony in all cases, but does not destroy it in any. And these things will appear, to different men, to weaken the evidence of testimony, in different degrees : in degrees propor tionable to the observations they have made, or the notions they have any way taken up, concerning the weakness and negligence and dishonesty of man kind ; or concerning the powers of enthusiasm, and prejudices equivalent to it. But it seems to me, that people do not know what they say, who affirm these things to destroy the evidence from testimony, which we have of the truth of Christianity. Nothing can destroy the evidence of testimony in any case, but a proof or probability, that persons are not competent judges of the facts to which they give testimony ; or that they are actually under some indirect influence in giving it, in such particular case. Till this be made out, the natural laws of human actions require, that testimony be admitted. It can never be sufficient to overthrow direct historical evidence, indolently to say, that there are so many principles, from whence men are liable to be deceived §§ i9-ai] FOR CHRISTIANITY. 319 themselves and disposed to deceive others, especially in matters of religion, that one knows not what to believe. And it is surprising persons can help re flecting, that this very manner of speaking supposes they are not satisfied that there is nothing in the evidence, of which they speak thus ; or that they can avoid observing, if they do make this reflection, that it is, on such a subject, a very material onef. § 20. Liability to error, how reduced in the Christian witnesses. And over against aU these objections is to be set the importance of Christianity, as what must have engaged the attention of its first converts, so as to have rendered them less liable to be deceived from carelessness, than they would in common matters ; and likewise the strong obligations to veracity, which their rehgion laid them under : so that the first and most obvious presumption is, that they could not be deceived themselves, nor would deceive others. And this presumption, in this degree, is peculiar to the testimony we have been considering. § 21. Tlie objector is bound in limine to abate his objections. In argument, assertions are nothing in themselves, and have an air of positiveness, which sometimes is not very easy : yet they are necessary, and necessary to be repeated ; in order to connect a discourse, and distinctly to lay before the view of the reader, what is proposed to be proved, and what is left as proved. Now the conclusion from the foregoing observations is, I think, beyond aU doubt, this : that unbelievers f See the foregoing chapter. 320 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [II. vii. must be forced to admit the external evidence for Christianity, i. e. the proof of miracles wrought to attest it, to be of real weight and very considerable ; though they cannot allow it to be sufficient, to con vince them of the reality of those miracles. And as they must, in all reason, admit this ; so it seems to me, that upon consideration they would, in fact, admit it ; those of them, I mean, who know any thing at all of the matter : in like manner as persons, in many cases, own they see strong evidence from testimony, for the truth of things, which yet they cannot be convinced are true : cases, suppose, where there is contrary testimony : or things which they think, whether with or without reason, to be incre dible. But there is no testimony contrary to that which we have been considering : and it has been fully proved, that there is no incredibility in Chris tianity in general, or in any part of it. § 22. (b) In prophecy, the parts understood are not impaired by those not understood. [II. ] As to the evidence for Christianity from pro phecy, I shall only make some few general observa tions, which are suggested by the analogy of nature ; i. e. by the acknowledged natural rules of judging in common matters, concerning evidence of a like kind to this from prophecy. [i.] The obscurity or unintelligibleness of one part of a prophecy does not, in any degree, invalidate the proof of foresight, arising from the appearing com pletion of those other parts which are understood. For the case is evidently the same, as if those parts, which are not understood, were lost, or not written at all, or written in an unknown tongue. Whether this observation be commonly attended to or not, it §§22, 23] FOR CHRISTIANITY. 321 is so evident, that one can scarce bring oneself to set down an instance in common matters, to exem plify it. However, suppose a writing, partly in cypher, and partly in plain words at length ; and that in the part one understood, there appeared mention of several known facts : it would never come into any man's thoughts to imagine, that if he understood the whole, perhaps he might find, that those facts were not in reality known by the writer. Indeed, both in this example and the thing intended to be exemplified by it, our not under standing the whole (the whole, suppose, of a sentence or a paragraph) might sometimes occasion a doubt, whether one understood the literal meaning of such a part : but this comes under another consideration. § 23. Why general fulfilment, short of absolute, may suffice. For the same reason, though a man should be incapable, for want of learning, or opportunities of inquiry, or from not having turned his studies this way, even so much as to judge, whether particular prophecies have been throughout completely fulfiUed ; yet he may see, in general, that they have been ful filled to such a degree, as, upon very good ground, to be convinced of foresight more than human in such prophecies, and of such events being intended by them. For the same reason also, though, by means of the deficiencies in civil history, and the different accounts of historians, the most learned should not be able to make out to satisfaction, that such parts of the prophetic history have been minutely and throughout fulfilled ; yet a very strong proof of foresight may arise, from that general completion of them, which is made out : as much proof of foresight, perhaps, as the giver of prophecy vol. 1. Y 322 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [II. vii. intended should ever be afforded by such parts of prophecy. § 24. Applicability is to be presumed intentional. [2.] A long series of prophecy being applicable to such and such events, is itself a proof that it was intended of them : as the' rules, by which we naturally judge and determine, in common cases parallel to this, will show. This observation I make in answer to the common objection against the application of the prophecies, that, considering each of them distinctly by itself, it does not at all appear, that they were intended of those particular events to which they are applied by Christians ; and therefore it is to be supposed, that, if they meant any thing, they were intended of other events unknown to us, and not of these at all. § 25. Is taken as proving intention in writings, (a) mythological, (b) satirical. Now there are two kinds of writing, which bear a great resemblance to prophecy, with respect to the matter before us : the mythological 1, and the satirical, where the satire is, to a certain degree, concealed. And a man might be assured, that he understood what an author intended by a fable or parable, related without any application or moral, merely from seeing it to be easily capable of such application, and that such a moral might naturaUy be deduced from it. And he might be fuUy assured, that such persons and events were intended in a satirical writing, merely from its being applicable to them. And, agreeably to the last observation, he might be in a good measure satisfied of it, 1 The word is used by Butler as relating not to mythology, but to fable. §§24-26] FOR CHRISTIANITY. 323 though he were not enough informed in affairs, or in the story of such persons, to understand half the satire. For, his satisfaction, that he understood the meaning, the intended meaning, of these writings, would be greater or less in proportion as he saw the general turn of them to be capable of such applica tion : and in proportion to the number of particular things capable of it. And thus, if a long series of prophecy is applicable to the present state of the church, and to the political situations of the king doms of the world, some thousand years after thess prophecies were delivered, and a long series of prophecy delivered before the coming of Christ is applicable to him ; these things are in themselves a proof, that the prophetic history was intended of him, and of those events : in proportion as the general turn of it is capable of such apphcation, and to the number and variety of particular prophecies capable of it. And though, in all just way of con sideration, the appearing completion of prophecies is to be allowed to be thus explanatory of, and to determine their meaning ; yet it is to be remembered further, that the ancient Jews applied the prophecies to a Messiah before his coming, in much the same manner as Christians do now : and that the primitive Christians interpreted the prophecies respecting the state of the church and of the world in the last ages, in the sense which the event seems to confirm and verify. And from these things it may be made appear : § 26. Intentional, but not necessarily with the utterer, [3.] That the showing even to a high probabnity, if that could be, that the prophets thought of some other events, in such and such predictions, y 2 324 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [II. vii. and not those at all which Christians allege to be completions of those predictions ; or that such and such prophecies are capable of being applied to other events than those, to which Christians apply them — that this would not confute or destroy the force of the argument from prophecy, even with regard to those very instances. For, observe how this matter really is. If one knew such a person to be the sole author of such a book, and was certainly assured, or satisfied to any degree, that one knew the whole of what he intended in it ; one should be assured or satisfied to such degree, that one knew the whole meaning of that book : for the meaning of a book is nothing but the meaning of the author. But if one knew a person to have compiled a book out of memoirs, which he received from another, of vastly superior knowledge in the subject of it, especiaUy if it were a book full of great intricacies and difficulties ; it would in no wise follow, that one knew the whole meaning of the book, from knowing the whole meaning of the compiler : for the original memoirs, i. e. the author of them, might have, and there would be no degree of presumption, in many cases, against supposing him to have, some further meaning than the compiler saw. § 27. But with the Inspirer. To say then, that the scriptures and the things contained in them can have no other or further meaning than those persons thought or had, who first recited or wrote them ; is evidently saying, that those persons were the original, proper, and sole authors of those books, i. e. that they are not inspired : which is absurd, whilst the authority of these books is under examination ; i. e. till you §§ 27, 28] FOR CHRISTIANITY. 325 have determined they are of no divine authority at all. Till this be determined, it must in all reason be supposed, not indeed that they have, for this is taking for granted that they are inspired, but that they may have, some further meaning than what the compilers saw or understood. And upon this supposition, it is supposable also, that this further meaning may be fulfilled. Now events corresponding to prophecies, interpreted in a different meaning from that, in which the prophets are supposed to have understood them ; this affords, in a manner, the same proof, that this different sense was origin- aUy intended, as it would have afforded, if the prophets had not understood their predictions in the sense it is supposed they did : because there is no presumption of their sense of them being the whole sense of them. And it has been already shown, that the apparent completions of prophecy must be allowed to be explanatory of its meaning. So that the question is, whether a series of prophecy has been fulfiUed, in a natural or proper, i. e. in any real, sense of the words of it. For such completion is equaUy a proof of foresight more than human, whether the prophets are, or are not, supposed to have understood it in a different sense. I say, supposed : for, though I think it clear, that the prophets did not understand the full meaning of their predictions ; it is another question, how far they thought they did, and in what sense they understood them. § 28. Merely proving capability of some other interpre tation is wasted labour. Hence may be seen, to how little purpose those persons busy themselves, who endeavour to prove, 326 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [II. vii. that the prophetic history is applicable to events of the age in which it was written, or of ages before it. Indeed to have proved this before there was any appearance of a further completion of it, might have answered some purpose ; for it might have prevented the expectation of any such further com pletion. Thus could Porphyry have shown, that some principal parts of the Book of Daniel, for instance, the seventh verse of the seventh chapter, which the Christians interpreted of the latter ages, was applicable to events, which happened before or about the age of Antiochus Epiphanes ; this might have prevented them from expecting any further completion of it. And, unless there was then, as I think there must have been, external evidence concerning that book, more than is come down to us ; such a discovery might have been a stumbling- block in the way of Christianity itself: considering the authority which our Saviour has given to the Book of Daniel ', and how much the general scheme of Christianity presupposes the truth of it. But even this discovery, had there been any such§', would s It appears, that Porphyry did nothing worth mentioning in this way. For Jerome on the place says, Duas poster iores oestias in uno Macedonum regno ponit. And as to the ten kings ; Decern reges enumerat, qui fuerunt saevissimi : ipsosque reges nonunius ponit regni, veroi gratia, Macedoniae, Syriae, Asiae, et Aegypti; sed de divers-is regnis unum efficit regum ordinem. And in this way of interpretation, any thing may be made of any thing. 1 St. Matt. xxiv. 15; St. Mark marked with a rather peculiar xiii. 14. Two reports of the same solemnity, as in each case we find incident : ' the abomination of appended to it the words, ' who- desolation, spoken of by Daniel so readeth, let him understand' the prophet, standing in the holy (Matt.) ; ' let him that readeth place.' Our Lord's reference is understand' (Mark). §29] FOR CHRISTIANITY. 327 be of very little weight with reasonable men now ; if this passage, thus applicable to events before the age of Porphyry, appears to be applicable also to events, which succeeded the dissolution of the Roman empire. I mention this, not at all as intending to insinuate, that the division of this empire into ten parts, for it plainly was divided into about that number, were, alone and by itself, of any moment in verifying the prophetic history : but only as an example of the thing I am speaking of. And thus upon the whole, the matter of inquiry evidently must be, as above put, Whether the prophecies are applicable to Christ, and to the present state of the world and of the church ; applicable in such a degree, as to imply foresight : not whether they are capable of any other appli cation ; though I know no pretence for saying the general turn of them is capable of any other. § 29. Men shrink from laborious inquiries with indeter minate result; prefer summary rejection. These observations are, I think, just ; and the evidence referred to in them real : though there may be people who will not accept of such im perfect information from scripture. Some too have not integrity and regard enough to truth, to attend to evidence, which keeps the mind in doubt, perhaps perplexity, and which is much of a different sort from what they expected. And it plainly requires a degree of modesty and fairness, beyond what every one has, for a man to say, not to the world, but to himself, that there is a real appearance of somewhat of great weight in this matter, though he is not able thoroughly to satisfy himself about it ; but it shall have its influence upon him, in 328 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [II. vn. proportion to its appearing reality and weight. It is much more easy, and more falls in with the negli gence, presumption, and wilfulness of the generality, to determine at once, with a decisive air, There is nothing in it. The prejudices arising from that absolute contempt and scorn, with which this evidence is treated in the world, I do not mention. For what indeed can be said to persons, who are weak enough in their understandings to think this any presumption against it ; or, if they do not, are yet weak enough in their temper to be influenced by such prejudices, upon such a subject? § 30. The evidence, (a) direct, and (b) circumstantial, to be weighed as a whole. I shall now, secondly, endeavour to give some account of the general argument for the truth of Christianity, consisting both of the direct and cir cumstantial evidence, considered as making up one argument. Indeed to state and examine this argu ment fuUy, would be a work much beyond the compass of this whole Treatise : nor is so much as a proper abridgment of it to be expected here. Yet the present subject requires to have some brief account of it given. For it is the kind of evidence, upon which most questions of difficulty, in common practice, are determined : evidence arising from various coincidences, which support and confirm each other, and in this manner prove, with more or less certainty, the point under consideration. And I choose to do it also : first, because it seems to be of the greatest importance, and not duly attended to by every one, that the proof of revelation is, not some direct and express things only, but a great §§3°, 31] FOR CHRISTIANITY. 329 variety of circumstantial things also ; and that though each of these direct and circumstantial things is indeed to be considered separately, yet they are afterwards to be joined together ; for that the proper force of the evidence consists in the result of those several things, considered in their respects to each other, and united into one view : and in the next place, because it seems to me, that the matters of fact here set down, which are acknowledged by unbelievers, must be acknow ledged by them also to contain together a degree of evidence of great weight, if they could be brought to lay these several things before themselves distinctly, and then with attention consider them together ; instead of that cursory thought of them, to which we are familiarized. For being familiarized to the cursory thought of things as really hinders the weight of them from being seen, as from having its due influence upon practice. § 31. Over and above our reason and affections, God has given us (a) natural religion; and, further, The thing asserted, and the truth of which is to be inquired into, is this : That over and above our reason and affections, which God has given us for the information of our judgment and the conduct of our lives, he has also, by external revelation, given us an account of himself and his moral govern ment over the world, implying a future state of rewards and punishments ; i. e. hath revealed the system of natural religion : for natural religion may be externaUyh revealed by God, as the ignorant may be taught it by mankind their feUow-creatures : h Sup. II. i. 5, 6 ; also ii. 10. 330 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [II. vii. § 32. (b) A revealed dispensation for the recovery of mankind. That God, I say, has given us the evidence of revelation, as weU as the evidence of reason, to ascertain this moral system ; together with an account of a particular dispensation of Providence, which reason could no way have discovered, and a particular institution of religion founded on it, for the recovery of mankind out of their present wretched condition, and raising them to the perfection and final happi ness of their nature. § 33- This revelation alone stands upon matters of fact, (a) past, or (b) alleged in the future. This revelation, whether real or supposed, may be considered as wholly historical '. For prophecy is nothing but the history of events before they come to pass : doctrines also are matters of fact : and precepts come under the same notion. And the general design of scripture, which contains in it this revelation, thus considered as historical, may be said to be, to give us an account of the world, in this one single view, as God's world : by which it appears essentially distinguished from aU other books, so far as I have found, except such as are copied from it. It begins with an account of God's 1 The connection of Christianity to the testing power of the common with fact is one of its most dis- experience of mankind. Thus the tinctive characteristics. In one recorded facts become a guarantee sense 'doctrines are matters of for those not yet recorded. It is fact'; but the great bulk of essential in quite another sense that, e.g., Christian doctrine, as set forth in the freedom of the will, or the Cal- the Apostles' Creed, rests on matters vinian doctrine of reprobation, may of fact already past, and subjected be handled as matters of fact. §§32,33] FOR CHRISTIANITY. 331 creation of the world, in order to ascertain, and distinguish from all others, who is the object of our worship, by what he has done : in order to ascertain, who he is, concerning whose providence, commands, promises, and threatenings, this sacred book, all • along, treats ; the Maker and Proprietor of the world, he whose creatures we are, the God of nature : in order likewise to distinguish him from the idols of the nations, which are either imaginary beings, i. e. no beings at all ; or else part of that crea tion, the historical relation of which is here given x. And St. John, not improbably, with an eye to this Mosaic account of the creation, begins his gospel with an account of our Saviour's pre-existence, and that all things were made by him; and withoid him was not any thing made that was made * : agreeably to the doctrine of St. Paul, that God created all things by Jesus Christ K This being premised, the scripture, taken together, seems to profess to contain a kind of an abridgment of the history of the world, in the view just now mentioned : that is, a general account of the condition of religion and its professors, during the continuance of that apostasy from God, and state of wickedness, which it every where sup poses the world to lie in. And this account of the state of religion carries with it some brief account of the political state of things, as religion is affected by it. Revelation indeed considers the 5 John i. 3. k Eph. iii. 9. 1 There seems now to be little and Redeemer : to which we may room for doubt that the greater add (a) impersonations of the gods of the ancient religions are abstract or of external nature, to a large extent deteriorated and (b) deifications of the deceased, corrupted reproductions of the ori- (c) personified conceptions of the ginal divine idea, as to both Creator evil agent or agents. 332 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [II. vn. common affairs of this world, and what is going on in it, as a mere scene of distraction ; and cannot be supposed to concern itself with foretelling at what time Rome, or Babylon, or Greece, or any particular place, should be the most conspicuous seat of that tyranny and dissoluteness, which all places equaUy aspire to be ; cannot, I say, be supposed to give any account of this wild scene for its own sake. But it seems to contain some very general account of the chief governments of the world, as the general state of religion has been, is, or shall be, affected by them, from the first transgression, and during the whole interval of the world's continuing in its present state, to a certain future period, spoken of both in the Old and New Testament, very distinctly, and in great variety of expression : The times of the restitution of all things l : when the mystery of God shall be finished, as he hath declared to his servants tlie prophets m : when the God of heaven shall set up a kingdom, which shall never be destroyed : and the kingdom shall not be left to other people*1, as it is represented to be during this apostasy, but judgment shall be given to tlie saints °, and they shall reign P : and the kingdom and dominion, and the greatness of the kingdom under the whole heaven, shall be given to the people of the saints of the Most High i. § 34. That in so long a time it has not been confuted, gives a presumption that it cannot be. Upon this general view of the scripture, I would remark, how great a length of time the whole relation 1 Acts hi. 21. m Eev. x. 7. n Dan. ii. 44. 0 Dan. vii. 22. p Eev. xxii. 5. 1 Dan. vii. 27. §34] FOR CHRISTIANITY. 333 takes up, near six thousand years x of which are past : and how great a variety of things it treats of; the natural and moral system or history of the world, including the time when it was formed, all contained in the very first book, and evidently written in a rude and unlearned age ; and in subsequent books, the various common and prophetic history, and the particular dispensation of Christianity. Now aU this together gives the largest scope for criticism ; and for confutation of what is capable of being confuted, either from reason, or from common history, or from any inconsistence in its several parts. And it is a thing which deserves, I think, to be mentioned, that whereas some imagine the supposed doubtful ness of the evidence for revelation implies a positive argument that it is not true ; it appears, on the contrary, to imply a positive argument that it is true. For, could any common relation, of such antiquity, extent, and variety, (for in these things the stress of what I am now observing lies,) be pro posed to the examination of the world : that it could not, in an age of knowledge and liberty, be confuted, or shown to have nothing in it, to the 1 Obviously tobe taken as an obiter to other religions also, which are di-ctum, which assumes the popular as old as, or older than, Christianity. and most accepted chronology, that We are dealing here with presump- of the Hebrew text, but is not to tion only. But even as to presump- be construed as an authoritative tion the case is by no means parallel. judgment upon the age ofthe world For (1) Christianity has stimulated in its present condition. There the forces and faculties of human seems, however, to be no ten- nature into an effective vitality and dency in scientific opinion to any activity quite unknown under other wholesale or vast extension of now current religions. (2) It has the term. Butler's argument in no been the only religion which has way demands an exact specifica- constantly practised aggression, and tion. this as a rule by legitimate, that is From another point of view, this to say by non- coercive, means : and passage is open to the remark that has thus delivered a perpetual chal- the favourable presumption applies lenge to all other creeds. 334 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [II. vii. satisfaction of reasonable men ; this would be thought a strong presumptive proof of its truth. And in deed it must be a proof of it, just in proportion to the probability, that if it were false, it might be shown to be so : and this, I think, is scarce pre tended to be shown, but upon principles and in ways of arguing, which have been clearly obviated1". Nor does it at all appear, that any set of men who believe natural religion, are of the opinion, that Christianity has been thus confuted. But to proceed : § 35. The Old Testament gives a detailed history of God's covenant with the Jews; Together with the moral system of the world, the Old Testament contains a chronological account of the beginning of it, and from thence, an unbroken genealogy of mankind for many ages before common history begins ; and carried on as much further as to make up a continued thread of history of the length of between three and four thousand years. It contains an account of God's making a covenant with a particular nation, that they should be his people, and he would be their God, in a peculiar sense ; of his often interposing miraculously in their affairs ; giving them the promise, and, long after, the possession, of a particular country ; assuring them of the greatest national prosperity in it, if they would worship him, in opposition to the idols which the rest of the world worshipped, and obey his commands; and threatening them with unexampled punishments, if they disobeyed him, and fell into the general idolatry: insomuch that this one nation r Chap, ii, iii, &c. §§35-37] FOR CHRISTIANITY. 335 should continue to be the observation and the wonder of all the world. § 36. Threat of dispersion, and promise of restoration ; It declares particularly, that God would scatter them among all people, from one end of the earth unto the other : but that when they should return unto the Lord their God, he would have compassion upon them, and gather them from all the nations, whither he had scattered them : that Israel should be saved in the Lord, with an everlasting salvation; and not be ashamed or confounded. world without end. And as some of these promises are conditional, others are as absolute, as any thing can be expressed : that the time should come, when the people should be all righteous, and inherit the land for ever: that though God would make a full end of all nations whither he had scattered them, yet would he not make a full end of them: that he would bring again the captivity of his people Israel, and plant them upon their land, and they should be no more pulled up out of their land: that the seed of Israel should not cease from being a nation for ever6. § 37. It predicts a Messiah; It foreteUs, that God wquld raise them up a par ticular person, in whom all his promises should finally be fulfilled ; the Messiah, who should be, in an high and eminent sense, their anointed Prince and Saviour. This was foretold in such a manner, as raised a general expectation of such a person in the nation, as appears from the New Testament, and is an acknowledged fact ; an expectation of his 8 Deut. xxviii. 64, xxx. 2, 3 ; Isa. xlv. 1 7, Ix. 2 1 ; Jer. xxx. 1 1 , xlvi. 28 ; Amos ix. 14, 15 ; Jer. xxxi. 36. 336 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [II. vii. coming at such a particular time before any one appeared claiming to be that person, and when there was no ground for such an expectation but from the prophecies : which expectation, therefore, must in all reason be presumed to be explanatory of those prophecies, if there were any doubt about their meaning. It seems moreover to foreteU, that this person should be rejected by that nation, to whom he had been so long promised, and though he was so much desired by them*. § 38. And a redemption reaching far beyond the Jewish race. And it expressly foreteUs, that he should be the Saviour of the Gentiles ; and even that the com pletion of the scheme, contained in this book, and then begun, and in its progress, should be somewhat so great, that, in comparison with it, the restoration of the Jews alone would be but of small account. It is a light thing that thou shouldest be my servant to raise up the tribes of Jacob, and to restore the preserved of Israel: I will also give thee for a light to the Gentiles, that thou mayest be for salvation unto the end of the earth. And, In the last days, the mountain of the Lord's house shall be established in the top of the mountains, and shall be exalted above the hills ; and all nations shall flow into it for out of Zion shall go forth the law, and tlie word of the Lord from Jerusalem. And he shall judge among tlie nations and the Lord alone shall be exalted in that day, and the idols he shall utterly abolish u. 1 Isa. viii. 14, 15, xlix. 5, ch. liii ; Mai. i. 10, n, and eh. iii. " Isa. xlix. 6, ch. ii, ch. xi, ch. lvi. 7 ; Mai. i. 11. To which Add other pro- must be added, the other prophecies of the like pheciesfrom both kind, several in the New Testament, and very Testaments. many in the Old ; which describe what shall be the completion of the revealed plan of Providence. §§38-41] FOR CHRISTIANITY. 337 § 39. Messiah was expected ; came ; and fulfilled his mission. The scripture further contains an account, that at the time the Messiah was expected, a person rose up, in this nation, claiming to be that Messiah, to be the person, whom all the prophecies referred to, and in whom they should centre : that he spent some years in a continued course of miraculous works ; and endued his immediate disciples and followers with a power of doing the same, as a proof of the truth of that religion, which he commissioned them to publish : that, invested with this authority and power, they made numerous converts in the remotest countries, and settled and established his religion in the world ; to the end of which, the scripture professes to give a prophetic account of the state of this religion amongst mankind. § 40. Suppose an inquirer, at first view : Let us now suppose a person utterly ignorant of history, to have all this related to him out of the scripture. Or suppose such an one, having the scripture put into his hands, to remark these things in it, not knowing but that the whole, even its civil history, as well as the other parts of it, might be, from beginning to end, an entire invention ; and to ask, What truth was in it, and whether the revela tion here related was real, or a fiction? And, instead of a direct answer, suppose him, all at once, to be told the following confessed facts ; and then to unite them into one view. $ 41. Finds (a) how much of the force of natural religion is due to scripture : Let him first be told, in how great a degree the profession and establishment of natural religion, the vol. 1. z 338 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [II. vn. belief that there is one God to be worshipped, that virtue is his law, and that mankind shall be rewarded and punished hereafter, as they obey and disobey it here ; in how very great a degree, I say, the pro fession and establishment of this moral system in the world is owing to the revelation, whether real or supposed, contained in this book : the establish ment of this moral system, even in those countries which do not acknowledge the proper authority of the scripture x. § 42. (b) That the establishment of Christianity is the greatest event in history. Let him be told also, what number of nations do acknowledge its proper authority. Let him then take in the consideration, of what importance religion is to mankind. And upon these things he might, I think, truly observe, that this supposed revelation's obtaining and being received in the world, with all the circumstances and effects of it, considered together as one event, is the most conspicuous and important event in the story of mankind : that a book of this nature, and thus promulged and re commended to our consideration, demands, as if by a voice from heaven, to have its claims most seriously examined into : and that, before such examination, to treat it with any kind of scoffing and ridicule, is an offence against natural piety. § 43. (But revelation imports no disparagement to any proof from reason.) But it is to be remembered, that how much soever the establishment of natural religion in the world x Sup. II. vi. 5. §§42-44] FOR CHRISTIANITY. 339 is owing to the scripture-revelation, this does not destroy the proof of religion from reason ; any more than the proof of Euclid's Elements is destroyed, by a man's knowing or thinking, that he should never have seen the truth of the several propositions contained in it, nor had those propositions come into his thoughts, but for that mathematician. § 44. (c) The antiquity of scripture ; (d) its corrobora tions ; Let such a person as we are speaking of, be, in the next place, informed of the acknowledged anti quity of the first parts of this book : and that its chronology, its account of the time when the earth, and the several parts of it, were first peopled with human creatures, is no way contradicted, but is reaUy confirmed, by the natural and civil history of the world, coUected from common historians, from the state of the earth, and from the late invention of arts and sciences \ And as the scripture contains an unbroken thread of common and civil history, from the creation to the captivity, for between three and four thousand years : let the person we are 1 This confirmation has been no way interfered with by the dis- immensely enlarged since Butler covery of the geologic man ; for wrote, for monuments and scientific there seems to be no reason forasso- results are histories. However, ciating him with the Adamic race, while in itself a most solid and and much reason, perhaps some of it weighty fact, it is not exact and possibly derived from scripture, to particular on behalf of the Hebrew assume the existence of other races chronology, or of any of the three of men, some of them perhaps less competing chronologies of the Old perfect or less capable of perfection. Testament : but it confirms the It is needless to dwell upon the Old Testament history in its basis, marked concurrence between the from which we learn that the belief now generally received as to history of the Adamic race is con- the origin of our solar system, and fined to a very few millenniabefoie the general framewoik ofthe first the Advent. This proposition is in chapter of Genesis. Z 2 340 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [II. vn. speaking of be told, in the next place, that this general history, as it is not contradicted, but is con firmed by profane history as much as there would be reason to expect, upon supposition of its truth ; so there is nothing in the whole history itself, to give any reasonable ground of suspicion of its not being, in the general, a faithful and literally true genealogy of men, and series of things. \ 45. (e) Its self-congruity. I speak here only of the common scripture-history, or of the course of ordinary events related in it ; as distinguished from miracles, and from the prophetic history. In all the scripture-narrations of this kind, following events arise out of foregoing ones, as in all other histories. There appears nothing related as done in any age, not conformable to the manners of that age : nothing in the account of a succeeding age, which, one would say, could not be true, or was improbable, from the account of things in the pre ceding one. There is nothing in the characters, which would raise a thought of their being feigned ; but all the internal marks imaginable of their being real. § 46. (f) Its neutrality as to ornament : its frank encountering of facts. It is to be added also, that mere genealogies, bare narratives of the number of years, which persons called by such and such names lived, do not carry the face of fiction ; perhaps do carry some presump tion of veracity : and all unadorned narratives, which have nothing to surprise, may be thought to carry somewhat of the like presumption too. And the domestic and the political history is plainly credible. §§45-48] FOR CHRISTIANITY. 341 § 47. (It has strange incidents ; as have most lives, or many; but nothing to destroy credit.) There may be incidents in scripture, which, taken alone in the naked way they are told, may appear strange ; especiaUy to persons of other manners, temper, education : but there are also incidents of undoubted truth, in many or most persons' lives, which, in the same circumstances, would appear to the full as strange. There may be mistakes of transcribers, there may be other real or seeming mistakes, not easy to be particularly accounted for : but there are certainly no more things of this kind in the scripture, than what were to have been ex pected in books of such antiquity ; and nothing, in any wise, sufficient to discredit the general narrative. § 48. (g) Divers points : and how, in scripture, proof of the common goes to support the miraculous. Now, that a history, claiming to commence from the creation, and extending in one continued series, through so great a length of time, and variety of events, should have such appearances of reality and truth in its whole contexture, is surely a very remark able circumstance in its favour. And as all this is applicable to the common history of the New Testament, so there is a further credibility, and a very high one, given to it by profane authors : many of these writing of the same times, and confirming the truth of customs and events which are incidentally as well as more purposely mentioned in it ]. And this credibility of the common scripture-history, gives some credibility to its miraculous history : especially as this is interwoven with the common, so as that 1 This appears to be included in the prior allegation, § 44. 342 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [II. vn. they imply each other, and both together make up one relation. § 49. (h) Add the grand sign, viz. the Jews, a nationality dependent on belief. Let it then be more particularly observed to this person, that it is an acknowledged matter of fact, which is indeed implied in the foregoing observa tion, that there was such a nation as the Jews, of the greatest antiquity, whose government and general polity was founded on the law, here related to be given them by Moses as from heaven : that natural religion, though with rites additional yet no way contrary to it, was their established religion, which cannot be said of the Gentile world : and that their very being as a nation, depended upon their acknowledgment of one God, the God of the uni verse. For, suppose in their captivity in Babylon, they had gone over to the religion of their con querors, there would have remained no bond of union, to keep them a distinct people. And whilst they were under their own kings, in their own country, a total apostasy from God would have been the dissolution of their whole government. They, in such a sense, nationally acknowledged and worshipped the Maker of heaven and earth, when the rest of the world were sunk in idolatry, as rendered them, in fact, the peculiar people of God. And this so remark able an establishment and preservation of natural religion a amongst them, seems to add some peculiar credibUity to the historical evidence for the miracles of 1 The expression seems not abso- religion. But with this deduction, lutely correct, because the religion not only was the Jewish religion a of the Jews in no way rested upon manifestation of natural religion; future rewards and punishments, but it is the only one known to his- which Butler includes in natural tory ; which is rarely borne in mind. §§49, 5°] FOR CHRISTIANITY. 343 Moses and the prophets : because these miracles are a full satisfactory account of this event, which plainly wants to be accounted for, and cannot otherwise. § 50. (i) Then the advent of the Messiah and rapid rooting of his religion ; Let this person, supposed wholly ignorant of history, be acquainted further, that one claiming to be the Messiah, of Jewish extraction, rose up at the time when this nation, from the prophecies above mentioned, expected the Messiah : that he was rejected, as it seemed to have been foretold he should, by the body of the people, under the direction of their rulers : that in the course of a very few years, he was believed on and acknowledged as the promised Messiah, by great numbers among the Gentiles, agreeably to the prophecies of scripture, yet not upon the evidence of prophecy, but of miracles y, of which miracles we also have strong historical evidence ; (by which I mean here no more than must be acknowledged by unbelievers ; for let pious frauds and follies be admitted to weaken, it is absurd to say they destroy, our evidence of miracles wrought in proof of Christianity z :) that this religion approving itself to the reason of mankind, and carrying its own evidence with it, so far as reason is a judge of its system, and being no way contrary to reason, in those parts of it which require to be believed upon the mere authority of its Author ; that this religion, I say, gradually spread and supported itself, for some hundred years, not only without any assistance from temporal power, but under constant discouragements, and often the bitterest persecutions from it ; and then became the religion of the world. >' Sup. §§ 7, 8. 2 Sup. §§ 1 8 sqq. 344 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [II. vn. §51. (k) With the dispersion and standing isolation of the Jews; That in the mean time, the Jewish nation and government were destroyed, in a very remarkable manner, and the people carried away captive and dispersed through the most distant countries ; in which state of dispersion they have remained fifteen hundred years : and that they remain a numerous people, united amongst themselves, and distinguished from the rest of the world, as they were in the days of Moses, by the profession of his law ; and every where looked upon in a manner, which one scarce knows how distinctly to express, but in the words of the prophetic account of it, given so many ages before it came to pass ; Thou shalt become an astonishment, a proverb, and a byword, among all nations whither the Lord shall lead thee&- § 52. Insufficiently accounted for as a mere fact, by secondary pro visions. The appearance of a standing miracle, in the Jews remaining a distinct people in their dispersion, and the confirmation which this event appears to give to the truth of revelation, may be thought to be answered, by their religion's forbidding them inter marriages with those of any other, and prescribing them a great many peculiarities in their food, by which they are debarred from the means of incor porating with the people in whose countries they live '. This is not, I think, a satisfactory account a Deut. xxviii. 37. 1 Now let us suppose that these ment perhaps would not be weak- prohibitions were sufficient to ac- ened ; because they spring from count for the isolation. The argu- the original divine appointment, §§5i-53] FOR CHRISTIANITY. 345 of that which it pretends to account for. But what does it pretend to account for? The correspondence between this event and the prophecies ; or the coin cidence of both, with a long dispensation of Providence, of a peculiar nature, towards that people formerly? No. It is only the event itself, which is offered to be thus accounted for ; which single event, taken alone, abstracted from all such correspondence and coincidence, perhaps would not have appeared mira culous : but that correspondence and coincidence may be so, though the event itself be supposed not. Thus the concurrence of our Saviour's being born at Bethlehem, with a long foregoing series of prophecy and other coincidences, is doubtless miraculous ; the series of prophecy, and other coincidences, and the event, being admitted : though the event itself, his birth at that place, appears to have been brought about in a natural way ; of which, however, no one can be certain l. § 53. The part-fulfilment of historical prophecy seems to foreshadow the entire, And as several of these events seem, in some degree expressly, to have verified the prophetic history already ; so likewise they may be considered further, as having a peculiar aspect towards the full completion of it ; as affording some presumption that the whole of it shall, one time or other, be fulfiUed. Thus, that the Jews have been so wonder- so that the entire chain of pheno- fering from other places where mena would hang, unbroken, upon miracle does imply such a variance, that appointment. either self-attested, by the evidence 1 In this section, the word mi- of the human senses ; or (as in the raculous appears to imply marked Incarnation) without that kind of adjustments in the order of nature, attestation. but not any variance from it ; dif- 346 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [II. vn. fully preserved in their long and wide dispersion ; which is indeed the direct fulfilling of some prophecies, but is now mentioned only as looking forward to somewhat yet to come : that natural religion came forth from Judaea, and spread, in the degree it has done over the world, before lost in idolatry ; which, together with some other things, have distinguished that very place, in like manner as the people of it are distinguished : that this great change of religion over the earth was brought about under the pro fession and acknowledgment, that Jesus was the promised Messiah : things of this kind naturally turn the thoughts of serious men towards the full completion of the prophetic history, concerning the final restoration of that people ; concerning the establishment of the everlasting kingdom among them, the kingdom of the Messiah ; and the future state of the world, under this sacred government. Such circumstances and events, compared with these prophecies, though no completions of them, yet would not, I think, be spoken of as nothing in the argument, by a person upon his first being informed of them. They fall in with the prophetic history of things still future, give it some additional credi bility, have the appearance of being somewhat in order to the full completion of it. § 54. For those capable of handling the question. Indeed it requires a good degree of knowledge, and great calmness and consideration, to be able to judge, thoroughly, of the evidence for the truth of Christianity, from that part of the prophetic history, which relates to the situation of the kingdoms of the world, and to the state of the Church, from the establishment of Christianity to the present time. §§54,55] FOR CHRISTIANITY. 347 But it appears, from a general view of it, to be very material. And those persons who have thoroughly examined it, and some of them were men of the coolest tempers, greatest capacities, and least liable to imputations of prejudice, insist upon it as deter- minately conclusive '. § 55. But also the many, large, and plain coincidences will weigh much with any impartial mind : Suppose now a person quite ignorant of histor}r, first to recollect the passages above mentioned out of scripture, without knowing but that the whole was a late fiction, then to be informed of the correspondent facts now mentioned, and to unite them all into one view : that the profession and establishment of natural religion in the world is greatly owing, in different ways, to this book, and the supposed revelation which it contains ; that it is acknowledged to be of the earliest antiquity ; that its chronology and common history are entirely credible ; that this ancient nation, the Jews, of whom it chiefly treats, appear to have been, in fact, the people of God, in a distinguished sense ; that, as there was a national expectation amongst them, raised from the prophecies, of a Messiah to appear at such a time, so one at this time appeared claiming to be that Messiah ; that he was rejected by this nation, but received by the GentUes, not upon the evidence of prophecy, but of miracles ; that the religion he taught sup ported itself under the greatest difficulties, gained ground, and at length became the religion of the 1 ' He had probably in his mind Sir Isaac Newton and Dr. Clarke.' — Fitzgerald. 348 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [II. vn. world ; that in the mean time the Jewish polity was utterly destroyed, and the nation dispersed over the face of the earth ; that notwithstanding this, they have remained a distinct numerous people for so many centuries, even to this day ; which not only appears to be the express completion of several prophecies concerning them, but also renders it, as one may speak, a visible and easy possibility, that the promises made to them as a nation, may yet be fulfilled. § 56. Extending to facts beyond Jewish and Christian history. And to these acknowledged truths, let the person we have been supposing add, as I think he ought, whether every one will allow it or no, the obvious appearances which there are, of the state of the world, in other respects besides what relates to the Jews, and of the Christian Church, having so long answered, and still answering to the prophetic history. Suppose, I say, these facts set over against the things before mentioned out of the scripture, and seriously compared with them ; the joint view of both together must, I think, appear of very great weight to a considerate reasonable person : of much greater indeed, upon having them first laid before him, than is easy for us, who are so familiarized to them, to conceive, without some particular attention for that purpose. § 57. Even this rude sketch shows something more than human; All these things, and the several particulars contained under them, require to be distinctly and most thoroughly examined into ; that the weight §§56-58] FOR CHRISTIANITY. 349 of each may be judged of, upon such examination, and such conclusion drawn as results from their united force. But this has not been attempted here. I have gone no further than to show, that the general imperfect view of them now given, the confessed historical evidence for miracles, and the many obvious appearing completions of prophecy, together with the collateral things b here men tioned, and there are several others of the like sort ; that all this together, which, being fact, must be acknowledged by unbelievers, amounts to real evidence of somewhat more than human in this matter : evidence much more important, than careless men, who have been accustomed only to transient and partial views of it, can imagine ; and indeed abundantly sufficient to act upon. And these things, I apprehend, must be acknowledged by unbelievers. § 58. And with claims upon unbelievers. For though they may say, that the historical evidence of miracles wrought in attestation of Christianity, is not sufficient to convince them that such miracles were really wrought ; they cannot deny, that there is such historical evidence, it being a known matter of fact that there is. They may say, the conformity between the prophecies and events is by accident : but there are many instances in which such conformity itself cannot be denied. They may say, with regard to such kind of collateral things as those above mentioned, b All the particular things mentioned in this chapter, not reducible to the head of certain miracles, or determinate com pletions of prophecy. See sup. §§ 2 sqq. 350 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [II. vir. that any odd accidental events, without meaning, will have a meaning found in them by fanciful people : and that such as are fanciful in any one certain way, will make out a thousand coincidences, which seem to favour their peculiar follies. § 59. To competent judges, circumstantial evidence often as strong as direct. Men, I say, may talk thus : but no one who is serious, can possibly think these things to be nothing, if he considers the importance of collateral things, and even of lesser circumstances, in the evidence of probability, as distinguished, in nature, from the evidence of demonstration. In many cases indeed it seems to require the truest judg ment, to determine with exactness the weight of circumstantial evidence J : but it is very often alto gether as convincing, as that which is the most express and direct. § 60. Serious men, taking aggregate account, will find a high probable proof. This general view of the evidence for Christi anity, considered as making one argument, may also serve to recommend to serious persons, to set down every thing which they think may be of any real weight at all in proof of it, and particularly the many seeming completions of prophecy : and they will find, that, judging by the natural rules, by which we judge of probable evidence in common 1 Meaning in this place not according to the etymology of the evidence from fact as opposed to word; or collateralevidence, which evidence from testimony : but evi- evidently gives scope for largeness dence from matter circumjacent, of view in the inquirer. §§ 59-6i ] FOR CHRISTIANITY. 351 matters, they amount to a much higher degree of proof, upon such a joint review, than could be supposed upon considering them separately, at dif ferent times ; how strong soever the proof might before appear to them, upon such separate views of it. For probable proofs, by being added, not only increase the evidence, but multiply it. § 61. And should examine which is the safest side. Nor should I dissuade any one from setting down, what he thought made for the contrary side. But then it is to be remembered, not in order to influence his judgment, but his practice, that a mistake on one side may be, in its consequences, much more dangerous, than a mistake on the other. And what course is most safe, and what most dangerous, is a consideration thought very material, when we deliberate, not concerning events, but concerning conduct in our temporal affairs. To be influenced by this consideration in our judgment, to believe or disbelieve upon it, is indeed as much prejudice,' as any thing whatever. And, like other prejudices, it operates contrary ways, in different men ; for some are inclined to believe what they hope, and others what they fear. And it is manifest unreasonableness to apply to men's passions in order to gain their assent. But in deliberations concerning conduct, there is nothing which reason more requires to be taken into the account, than the importance of it. For, suppose it doubtful, what would be the consequence of acting in this, or in a contrary manner : stiU, that taking one side could be attended with little or no bad consequence, and taking the other might be attended ' with the greatest, must appear, to 352 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [II. vn. § 62- unprejudiced reason, of the highest moment towards determining, how we are to act. § 62. The stress of our argument lies here : this cannot as a whole (a) be accident, or (b) be otherwise set aside. But the truth of our religion, like the truth of common matters, is to be judged of by all the evi dence taken together. And unless the whole series of things which may be alleged in this argument, and every particular thing in it, can reasonably be supposed to have been by accident ; (for here the stress of the argument for Christianity hes ;) then is the truth of it proved : in like manner, as if in any common case, numerous events acknow ledged, were to be alleged in proof of any other event disputed ; the truth of the disputed event would be proved, not only if any one of the acknowledged ones did of itself clearly imply it, but, though no one of them singly did so, if the whole of the acknowledged events taken together could not in reason be supposed to have happened, unless the disputed one were true. $ 63. Advantages given by attack in detail. It is obvious, how much advantage the nature of this evidence gives to those persons who attack Christianity, especially in conversation. For it is easy to show, in a short and lively manner, that such and such things are liable to objection, that this and another thing is of little weight in itself; but impossible to show, in like manner, the united force of the whole argument in one view. vm. §i] FOR CHRISTIANITY. 353 § 64. Summary in three propositions. However, lastly, as it has been made appear1, that there is no presumption against a revelation as miraculous ; that the general scheme of Christi anity, and the principal parts of it, are conformable to the experienced constitution of things, and the whole perfectly credible : so the account now given of the positive evidence for it, shows, that this evidence is such, as, from the nature of it, cannot be destroyed, though it should be lessened. CHAPTER VIIL OF THE OBJECTIONS WHICH MAY BE MADE AGAINST ARGU ING FROM THE ANALOGY OP NATURE, TO RELIGION. § 1. Chief objections of thinking and unthinking men ; IF every one would consider, with such attention as they are bound, even in point of morality, to consider, what they judge and give characters of; the occasion of this chapter would be, in some good measure at least, superseded. But since this is not to be expected ; for some we find do not concern themselves to understand even what they write against : since this Treatise, in. common with most others, lies open to objections, which may appear very material to thoughtful men at first sight ; and, besides that, seems peculiarly liable to the objections of such as can judge without thinking, and of such as can censure without judging ; it may 1 Especially in chapters ii, iv, v, vii. VOL. 1. a a 354 UPON ARGUING FROM THE [II. vm. not be amiss to set down the chief of these objec tions which occur to me, and consider them to their hands. And they are such as these : § 2. (a) To the plan of meeting difficulties by showing the like elsewhere. ' That it is a poor thing to solve difficulties in revelation, by saying, that there are the same in natural religion ; when what is wanting is to clear both of them of these their common, as well as other their respective, difficulties ; but that it is a strange way indeed of convincing men of the obligations of religion, to show them, that they have as little reason for their worldly pursuits : and a strange way of vindicating the justice and goodness of the Author of nature, and of removing the objections against both, to which the system of religion lies open, to show, that the like objections he against natural providence ; a way of answering objections against religion, without so much as pretending to make out, that the system of it, or the particular things in it objected against, are reasonable— — especially, perhaps some may be inattentive enough to add, must this be thought strange, when it is confessed that analogy is no answer to such objections : that when this sort of reasoning is carried to the utmost length it can be imagined capable of, it will yet leave the mind in a very unsatisfied state : and that it must be unaccountable ignorance of mankind, to imagine they will be prevailed with to forego their present interests and pleasures, from regard to reli gion, upon doubtful evidence V 1 No adversary or critic within objections against Butler's argu- my knowledge has ever stated the ment with as much force as Butler §§ 2-5] ANALOGY OF NATURE TO RELIGION. 355 § 3. Such pleas may partially affect considerate men. Now, as plausible as this way of talking may appear, that appearance will be found in a great measure owing to half-views, which show but part of an object, yet show that indistinctly, and to un- determinate language. By these means weak men are often deceived by others, and ludicrous men, by themselves. And even those, who are serious and considerate, cannot always readily disentangle, and at once clearly see through the perplexities, in which subjects themselves are involved ; and which are heightened by the deficiencies and the abuse of words. To this latter sort of persons, the following reply to each part of this objection severally, may be of some assistance ; as it may also tend a little to stop and silence others. § 4. Bemoval of all difficulties would mean comprehension of God's entire plan. First, The thing wanted, i. e. what men require, is to have aU difficulties cleared. And this is, or, at least for any thing we know to the contrary, it may be, the same, as requiring to comprehend the divine nature, and the whole plan of Providence from everlasting to everlasting. § 5. The method is one of regular use in common life. But it hath always been allowed to argue, from what is acknowledged, to what is disputed. And it is in no other sense a poor thing, to argue from himself has given them in this sec- experience, what is true (§ 6) ; tion. Also, he exerts himself to 2. And, in the way of inducement, bring that argument to a head : what is useful (§ 7). I. I show you, on the basis of a a 2 356 UPON ARGUING FROM THE [II. vm. natural religion to revealed, in the manner found fault with, than it is to argue in numberless other ways of probable deduction and inference, in matters of conduct, which we are continually reduced to the necessity of doing. Indeed the epithet poor may be applied, I fear, as properly to great part or the whole of human life, as it is to the things mentioned in the objection. Is it not a poor thing, for a physician to have so little knowledge in the cure of diseases, as even the most eminent have ? to act upon con jecture and guess, where the life of man is concerned ? Undoubtedly it is : but not in comparison of having no skill at all in that useful art, and being obliged to act wholly in the dark. § 6. His principal recourse is to the course of providence experimentally ascertained. Further : since it is as unreasonable, as it is common, to urge objections against revelation, which are of equal weight against natural religion ; and those who do this, if they are not confused them selves, deal unfairly with others, in making it seem, that they are arguing only against revelation, or particular doctrines of it, when in reality they are arguing against moral providence ; it is a thing of consequence to show, that such objections are as much leveUed against natural religion as against revealed. And objections, which are equaUy applicable to both, are properly speaking answered, by its being shown that they are so, provided the former be admitted to be true. And, without taking in the consideration how distinctly this is admitted, it is plainly very material to observe, that as the things objected against in natural religion are of the same kind with what is certain matter of experience in the course §§ 6, 7] ANALOGY OF NA TURE TO RELIGION. 357 of providence, and in the information which God affords us concerning our temporal interest under his government ; so the objections against the system of Christianity, and the evidence of it, are of the very same kind with those which are made against the system and evidence of natural religion. How ever, the reader upon review may see, that most of the analogies insisted upon, even in the latter part of this Treatise, do not necessarily require to have more taken for granted than is in the former ; that there is an Author of nature, or natural Governor of the world : and Christianity is vindicated, not from its analogy to natural religion, but chiefly from its analogy to the experienced constitution of nature. § 7. Shows also that our interest is profoundly involved. Secondly, Religion is a practical thing, and con sists in such a determinate course of life ; as being what, there is reason to think, is commanded by the Author of nature, and will, upon the whole, be our happiness under his government. Now if men can be convinced, that they have the like reason to believe this, as to believe, that taking care of their temporal affairs will be to their advantage ; such conviction cannot but be an argument to them for the practice of religion. And if there be really any reason for believing one of these, and endeavouring to preserve life, and secure ourselves the necessaries and conveniences of it : then there is reason also for believing the other, and endeavouring to secure the interest it proposes to us. And if the interest, which religion proposes to us, be infinitely greater than our whole temporal interest ; then there must be proportionably greater reason for endeavouring to 1 1 358 UPON ARGUING FROM THE [II. vm. secure one, than the other : since, by the supposition, the probability of our securing one is equal to the probability of our securing the other. This seems plainly unanswerable ; and has a tendency to in fluence fair minds, who consider what our condition really is, or upon what evidence we are naturally appointed to act ; and who are disposed to acquiesce in the terms upon which we live, and attend to and follow that practical instruction, whatever it be, which is afforded us. $ 8. The main objection is : ' the evidence is doubtful, therefore the claim is unfounded.' But the chief and proper force of the argument referred to in the objection, lies in another place. For, it is said that the proof of religion is involved in such inextricable difficulties, as to render it doubt ful ; and that it cannot be supposed, that, if it were true, it would be left upon doubtful evidence. Here then, over and above the force of each particular difficulty or objection, these difficulties and objections taken together are turned into a positive argument against the truth of religion ; which argument would stand thus. If religion were true, it would not be left doubtful, and open to objections to the degree in which it is : therefore that it is thus left, not only renders the evidence of it weak, and lessens its force, in proportion to the weight of such objections ; but also shows it to be false, or is a general presumption of its being so. § 9. Like doubt is frequent in matters of high temporal interest. Now the observation, that, from the natural constitution and course of things, we must in our §§ 8-10] ANALOG Y OF NA TURE TO RELIGION. 359 temporal concerns, almost continually, and in matters of great consequence, act upon evidence of a like kind and degree to the evidence of religion, is an answer to this argument : because it shows, that it is according to the conduct and character of the Author of nature to appoint we should act upon evidence like to that, which this argument presumes he cannot be supposed to appoint we should act upon : it is an instance, a general one made up of numerous particular ones, of somewhat in his dealing with us, simUar to what is said to be incredible. And as the force of this answer lies merely in the parallel, which there is between the evidence for religion and for our temporal conduct ; the answer is equaUy just and conclusive, whether the parallel be made out, by showing the evidence of the former to be higher, or the evidence of the latter to be lower. § 10. His aim is, not to vindicate God, but to point out our duty as men. Thirdly, The design of this Treatise is not to vindicate the character of God, but to show the obligations of men : it is not to justify his providence, but to show what belongs to us to do. These are two subjects, and ought not to be confounded. And though they may at length run up into each other, yet observations may immediately tend to make out the latter, which do not appear, by any immediate connection, to the purpose of the former; which is less our concern than many seem to think. For, first, it is not necessary we should justify the dis pensations of Providence against objections, any further than to show, that the things objected against may, for ought we know, be consistent with justice and goodness. 360 UPON ARGUING FROM THE [II. vm. §11. Things, unjust if talen alone, may be vindicable by things circumjacent. Suppose then, that there are things in the system of this world, and plan of Providence relating to it, which taken alone would be unjust : yet it has been shown unanswerably, that if we could take in the reference, which these things may have, to other things present, past, and to come ; to the whole scheme, which the things objected against are parts of ; these very things might, for ought we know, be found to be, not only consistent with justice, but instances of it. Indeed it has been shown, by the analogy of what we see, not only possible that this may be the case, but credible that it is. And thus objections, drawn from such things, are answered, and Providence is vindicated, as far as religion makes its vindication necessary. § 12. He leaves none but inconclusive objections to lie against nature. Hence it appears, secondly, that objections against the divine justice and goodness are not endeavoured to be removed, by showing that the like objections, allowed to be really conclusive, lie against natural Providence : but those objections being supposed and shown not to be conclusive, the things objected against, considered as matters of fact, are further shown to be credible, from their conformity to the constitution of nature ; for instance, that God will reward and punish men for their actions hereafter, from the observation, that he does reward and punish them for their actions here. And this, I apprehend, is of weight. §§ n-i4] ANALOGY OF NATURE TO RELIGION. 361 § 13. If the objections remain unanswered, so does religion, with its proofs. And I add, thirdly, it would be of weight, even though those objections were not answered. For, there being the proof of religion above set down ; and religion implying several facts ; for instance again, the fact last mentioned, that God will reward and punish men for their actions hereafter ; the observation, that his present method of government is by rewards and punishments, shows that future fact not to be incredible : whatever objections men may think they have against it, as unjust or unmerciful, according to their notions of justice and mercy ; or as improbable from their belief of necessity. I say, as improbable : for it is evident no objection against it, as unjust, can be urged from necessity ; since this notion as much destroys in justice, as it does justice. § 14. Tlie credibility of a religion based on fact may be proved apart from its reasonableness. Then, fourthly, Though objections against the reasonableness of the system of religion cannot indeed be answered without entering into considera tion of its reasonableness ; yet objections against the credibility or truth of it may. Because the system of it is reducible into what is properly matter of fact : and the truth, the probable truth, of facts, may be shown without consideration of their reason ableness. Nor is it necessary, though, in some cases and respects, it is highly useful and proper, yet it is not necessary, to give a proof of the reasonableness of every precept enjoined us, and of every particular dispensation of Providence, which comes into the system of religion. 362 UPON ARGUING FROM THE [II. vm. §15. Unless religion has been disproved, the practice of it is reasonable. Indeed the more throughly a person of a right disposition is convinced of the perfection of the divine nature and conduct, the further he will advance towards that perfection of religion, which St. John speaks ofa. But the general obligations of religion are fully made out, by proving the reasonableness of the practice of it. And that the practice of religion is reasonable, may be shown, though no more could be proved, than that the system of it may be so, for ought we know to the contrary : and even without entering into the distinct consideration of this. § 16. Bepeats § 14. And from hence, fifthly, it is easy to see, that though the analogy of nature is not an immediate answer to objections against the wisdom, the justice, or goodness, of any doctrine or precept of religion : yet it may be, as it is, an immediate and direct answer to what is really intended by such objections ; which is, to show that the things objected against are incredible. § 17. Proof in religion does not reach to satisfaction; nor in temporal affairs ; e. g. as to health \ Fourthly, It is most readily acknowledged, that the foregoing Treatise is by no means satisfactory ; very n 1 John iv. 18. 1 Butler seems to use the word (a) In a popular manner, as the satisfaction, or its adjective satisfac- equivalent of comfort or enjoyment. toi-y, in the following senses : — \b) With regard to our Saviour's §§ 15-17] ANALOGY OF NATURE TO RELIGION. 363 far indeed from it : but so would any natural insti tution of life appear, if reduced into a system, together with its evidence. Leaving religion out of the case, men are divided in their opinions, whether our pleasures overbalance our pains : and whether it be, or be not, eligible to live in this world. And were all such controversies settled, which perhaps, in speculation, would be found inA^olved in great diffi culties ; and were it determined upon the evidence of reason, as nature has determined it to our hands, that life is to be preserved : yet stiU, the rules which God has been pleased to afford us, for escaping the miseries of it, and obtaining its satis factions, the rules, for instance, of preserving health, and recovering it when lost, are not only fallible and precarious, but very far from being exact. Nor are we informed by nature, in future contingencies and accidents, so as to render it at all certain, what is the best method of managing our affairs. What will be the success of our temporal pursuits, in the common sense of the word success, is highly doubtful. And what will be the success of them, in the proper sense of the word ; i. e. what happiness or enjoyment we shall obtain by them, is doubtful in a much higher degree. Indeed the unsatisfactory nature of the evidence, with which we are obliged to take up, in the daily course of life, is scarce to be expressed. Yet men do not throw away life, or disregard the interests of it, upon account of this doubtfulness. sacrifice, as the equivalent of atone- ' satisfactory evidence,' viz. what we ment. See sup. II. vi. 17, 18, 22. wish it. In itself it seems to be the (c) In a more scientific way, with equivalent of the Greek alrdpKrjs, regard to sufficiency of evidence. that is to say, self-sufficing or He supplies in the next section ideally complete, not requiring aid a subjective definition of the words or supplement from without. 364 UPON ARGUING FROM THE [II. vm. \ 18. The demand is to change ' the very condition of our being,' The evidence of religion then being admitted real, those who object against it, as not satisfactory, i. e. as not being what they wish it, plainly forget the very condition of our being : for satisfaction, in this sense, does not belong to such a creature as man. And, which is more material, they forget also the very nature of religion, § 19. And the probative power of religious evidences. For, religion presupposes, in all those who will embrace it, a certain degree of integrity and honesty ; which it was intended to try whether men have or not, and to exercise in such as have it, in order to its improvement. Religion presupposes this as much, and in the same sense, as speaking to a man pre supposes he understands the language in which you speak ; or as warning a man of any danger presupposes that he hath such a regard to himself, as that he will endeavour to avoid it. And therefore the question is not at all, Whether the evidence of religion be satisfactory : but Whether it be, in reason, sufficient to prove and discipline that virtue, which it presupposes. Now the evidence of it is fully sufficient for all those purposes of probation ; how far soever it is from being satisfactory, as to the purposes of curiosity, or any other : and indeed it answers the purposes of the former in several respects, which it would not do, if it were as over bearing as is required. §§ 18-21] ANALOGY OF NA TURE TO RELIGION. 365 § 20. Ask, not, does it satisfy ? but, does it bind to action ? One might add farther ; that whether the motives or the evidence for any course of action be satis factory, meaning here, by that word, what satisfies a man, that such a course of action will in event be for his good ; this need never be, and I think, strictly speaking, never is, the practical question in common matters. But the practical question in all cases is, Whether the evidence for a course of action be such, as, taking in all circumstances, makes the faculty within us, which is the guide and judge of conduct1', determine that course of action to be prudent. Indeed, satisfaction that it will be for our interest or happiness, abundantly determines an action to be prudent : but evidence almost infinitely lower than this, determines actions to be so too ; even in the conduct of every day. § 21. His object is to show how men ought in reason to behave; Fifthly, As to the objection concerning the in fluence which this argument, or any part of it, may, or may not, be expected to have upon men ; I observe, as above, that religion being intended for a trial and exercise of the morality of every person's character, who is a subject of it ; and there being, as I have shown, such evidence for it, as is sufficient, in reason, to influence men to embrace it : to object, that it is not to be imagined mankind will be influenced by such evidence, is nothing to the purpose of the foregoing Treatise. i> See Dissert. II. § 8. 366 UPON ARGUING FROM THE [II. vm. For the purpose of it is not to inquire, what sort of creatures mankind are ; but what the light and knowledge, which is afforded them, requires they should be : to show how, in reason, they ought to behave ; not how, in fact, they will behave. This depends upon themselves, and is their own concern ; the personal concern of each man in particular. § 22. And so to put them into probation; ivith some he may succeed. And how little regard the generality have to it, experience indeed does too fully show. But religion, considered as a probation, has had its end upon all persons, to whom it has been proposed with evidence sufficient in reason to influence their practice : for by this means they have been put into a state of probation ; let them behave as they will in it. And thus, not only revelation, but reason also, teaches us, that by the evidence of religion being laid before men, the designs of Providence are carrying on, not only with regard to those who will, but likewise with regard to those who will not, be influenced by it. However, lastly, the objection here referred to, allows the things insisted upon in this Treatise to be of some weight : and if so, it may be hoped it wiU have some influence. And if there be a probability that it will have any at all, there is the same reason in kind, though not in degree, to lay it before men, as there would be, if it were likely to have a greater influence. § 23. Has all along worked from points of departure not chosen by him. And further, I desire it may be considered, with respect to the whole of the foregoing objections, that §§ 22-25J ANALOGY OF NATURE TO RELIGION. 367 in this Treatise I have argued upon the principles of others c, not my own : and have omitted what I think true, and of the utmost importance, because by others thought unintelligible, or not true. Thus I have argued upon the principles of the Fatalists, which I do not believe : § 24. Has waived tlie two great principles, (a) of moral fitness, (b) of liberty; And have omitted a thing of the utmost importance which I do beheve, the moral fitness and unfitness of actions, prior to all will whatever ; which I appre hend as certainly to determine the divine conduct, as speculative truth and falsehood necessarUy determine the divine judgment. Indeed the principle of liberty, and that of moral fitness, so force themselves upon the mind, that moralists, the ancients as well as moderns, have formed their language upon it. And probably it may appear in mine : though I have endeavoured to avoid it ; and, in order to avoid it, have sometimes been obliged to express myself in a manner, which will appear strange to such as do not observe the reason for it : but the general argument here pursued does not at all suppose or proceed upon these principles. § 25. And has treated religion only as matter of fact. Now, these two abstract principles of liberty and moral fitness being omitted, religion can be con- c By arguing upon the principles of others, the reader will observe is meant ; not proving any thing from those principles, but not withstanding them. Thus religion is proved, not from the opinion of necessity ; which is absurd : but, notwithstanding or even though that opinion were admitted to be true. 368 UPON ARGUING FROM THE [II. vm. sidered in no other view, than merely as a question of fact : and in this view it is here considered. It is obvious, that Christianity, and the proof of it, are both historical. And even natural religion is, pro perly, a matter of fact. For, that there is a righteous Governor of the world, is so : and this proposition contains the general system of natural religion. But then, several abstract truths, and in particular those two principles, are usuaUy taken into consideration in the proof of it : whereas it is here treated of only as a matter of fact. To explain this : that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, is an abstract truth : but that they appear so to our mind, is only a matter of fact. And this last must have been admitted, if any thing was, by those ancient sceptics, who would not have admitted the former ; but pretended to doubt, Whether there were any such thing as truth, or Whether we could certainly depend upon our faculties of understanding for the knowledge of it in any case. So hkewise, that there is, in the nature of things, an original standard of right and wrong in actions, independent upon all will, but which unalterably determines the wiU of God, to exercise that moral government over the world, which religion teaches, i. e. finally and upon the whole to reward and punish men re spectively as they act right or wrong 1 ; this assertion contains an abstract truth, as weU as matter of fact. But suppose, in the present state, every man, with out exception, was rewarded and punished, in exact proportion as he foUowed or transgressed that sense of right and wrong, which God has implanted in the nature of every man : this would not be at all an 1 Comp. sup. I. vi. 16 n. §26] ANALOGY OF NATURE TO RELIGION. 369 abstract truth, but only a matter of fact. And though this fact were acknowledged by every one ; yet the very same difficulties might be raised, as are now, concerning the abstract questions of liberty and moral fitness : and we should have a proof, even the certain one of experience, that the government of the world was perfectly moral, without taking in the consideration of those questions : and this proof would remain, in what way soever they were de termined. § 26. Has thus lost much in the proof of final reward and punishment. And thus, God having given mankind a moral faculty, the object of which is actions, and which naturally approves some actions as right, and of good desert, and condemns others as wrong, and of Ul desert ; that he wiU, finally and upon the whole, reward the former and punish the latter, is not an assertion of an abstract truth, but of what is as mere a fact, as his doing so at present would be. This future fact I have not indeed proved with the force with which it might be proved, from the principles of liberty and moral fitness ; but without them have given a really conclusive practical proof of it, which is greatly strengthened by the general analogy of nature: a proof easily cavilled at, easily shown not to be demonstrative, for it is not offered as such ; but impossible, I think, to be evaded, or answered. And thus the obligations of religion are made out, exclusively of the questions concerning liberty and moral fitness ; which have been perplexed with difficulties and abstruse reasonings, as every thing may. vol. 1. b b 370 UPON ARGUING, ETC. [II. vm. §§ 27, 28 § 27. Has shown it absurd to denounce Christianity as false : also that it is credible : and more. Hence therefore may be observed distinctly, what is the force of this Treatise. It will be, to such as are convinced of religion upon the proof arising out of the two last-mentioned principles, an additional proof and a confirmation of it : to such as do not admit those principles, an original proof of itd, and a confirmation of that proof. Those who believe, wUl here find the scheme of Christianity cleared of objections, and the evidence of it in a peculiar manner strengthened : those who do not believe, wUl at least be shown the absurdity of aU attempts to prove Christianity false, the plain undoubted credi bility of it ; and, I hope, a good deal more. § 28. Analogy has a firm basis, and special claims on those who prefer facts to abstractions. And thus, though some perhaps may seriously think, that analogy, as here urged, has too great stress laid upon it ; and ridicule, unanswerable ridicule, may be applied, to show the argument from it in a disadvantageous light : yet there can be no question, but that it is a real one. For rehgion, both natural and revealed, implying in it numerous facts ; analogy, being a confirmation of all facts to which it can be applied, as it is the only proof of most, cannot but be admitted by every one to be a material thing, and truly of weight on the side of religion, both natural and revealed : and it ought to be particularly regarded by such as profess to follow nature, and to be less satisfied with abstract reasonings. d Sup. I. vi. 12-14. ix. §§ i, 2] CONCLUSION. CHAPTER IX. CONCLUSION. 371 § 1. Upon the known facts, disregard of religion would be incredible but for experience. WHATEVER account may be given of the strange inattention and disregard, in some ages and countries, to a matter of such importance as religion ; it would, before experience, be incredible, that there should be the like disregard in those, who have had the moral system of the world laid before them, as it is by Christianity, and often inculcated upon them : because this moral system carries in it a good degree of evidence for its truth, upon its being barely proposed to our thoughts. § 2. A simple matter is obscured by intricacies of speculation. There is no need of abstruse reasonings and dis tinctions, to convince an unprejudiced understanding, that there is a God who made and governs the world, and wiU judge it in righteousness ; though they may be necessary to answer abstruse difficulties, when once such are raised : when the very meaning of those words, which express most intelligibly the general doctrine of religion, is pretended to be un certain ; and the clear truth of the thing itself is obscured by the intricacies of speculation. But to an unprejudiced mind, ten thousand thousand instances of design cannot but prove a designer. And it is intuitively manifest, that creatures ought to live under a dutiful sense of their Maker ; and that justice and b b 2 372 CONCLUSION. [II. ix. charity must be his laws, to creatures whom he has made social, and placed in society. § 3. Bevelation requires proofs ; offers them : to refuse inquiry is immoral; Indeed the truth of revealed religion, peculiarly so called, is not self-evident, but requires external proof, in order to its being received. Yet inatten tion, among us, to revealed religion, will be found to imply the same dissolute immoral temper of mind, as inattention to natural religion : because, when both are laid before us, in the manner they are in Christian countries of liberty, our obligations to inquire into both, and to embrace both upon sup position of their truth, are obligations of the same nature. For, revelation claims to be the voice of God : and our obligation to attend to his voice is surely moral in all cases. And as it is insisted, that its evidence is conclusive, upon thorough considera tion of it ; so it offers itself to us with manifest obvious appearances of having something more than human in it, and therefore in all reason requires to have its claims most seriously examined into. § 4. Especially in view of its claim as miraculous. It is to be added, that though light and know ledge, in what manner soever afforded us, is equally from God ; yet a miraculous revelation has a peculiar tendency, from the first principles of our nature, to awaken mankind, and inspire them with reverence and awe : and this is a peculiar obligation, to attend to what claims to be so with such appearances of truth. It is therefore most certain, that our obliga tions to inquire seriously into the evidence of Chris tianity, and, upon supposition of its truth, to embrace §§3-6] CONCLUSION. 373 it, are of the utmost importance, and moral in the highest and most proper sense. § 5. Negation is apt to pass into virulent hostility. Let us then suppose, that the evidence of religion in general, and of Christianity, has been seriously inquired into, by aU reasonable men among us. Yet we find many professedly to reject both, upon speculative principles of infidelity. And aU of them do not content themselves with a bare neglect of religion, and enjoying their imaginary freedom from its restraints. Some go much beyond this. They deride God's moral government over the world. They renounce his protection, and defy his justice. They ridicule and vilify Christianity, and blaspheme the Author of it ; and take all occasions to manifest a scorn and contempt of revelation. This amounts to an active setting themselves against religion ; to what may be considered as a positive principle of irreligion : which they cultivate within themselves, and, whether they intend this effect or not, render habitual, as a good man does the contrary principle. And others, who are not chargeable with all this profligateness, yet are in avowed opposition to reli gion, as if discovered to be groundless. § 6. His opponents proceed on (a) prejudice against revela tion; (b) strange things in Scripture; (c) pleas as sup. ch. vi. ; (d) that doubt warrants denial. Now admitting, which is the supposition we go upon, that these persons act upon what they think principles of reason, and otherwise they are not to be argued with ; it is really inconceivable, that they should imagine they clearly see the whole evidence 374 CONCLUSION. [II. ix. of it, considered in itself, to be nothing at all : nor do they pretend this. They are far indeed from having a just notion of its evidence : but they would not say its evidence was nothing, if they thought the system of it, with all its circumstances, were credible, like other matters of science or history. So that their manner of treating it must proceed, either from such kind of objections against all religion, as have been answered or obviated in the former part of this Treatise ; or else from objections, and difficulties, supposed more peculiar to Christianity. Thus, they entertain prejudices against the whole notion of a revelation, and miraculous interpositions. They find things in scripture, whether in incidental passages, or in the general scheme of it, which appear to them unreasonable. They tak£ for granted, that if Christianity were true, the light of it must have been more general, and the evidence of it more satisfactory, or rather overbearing : that it must and would have been, in some way, otherwise put and left, than it is. Now this is not imagining they see the evidence itself to be nothing, or inconsiderable ; but quite another thing. It is being fortified against the evidence, in some degree acknowledged, by think ing they see the system of Christianity, or somewhat which appears to them necessarily connected with it, to be incredible or false : fortified against that evidence, which might, otherwise, make great impres sion upon them. Or, lastly, if any of these persons are, upon the whole, in doubt concerning the truth of Christianity ; their behaviour seems owing to their taking for granted, through strange inattention, that such doubting is, in a manner, the same thing, as being certain against it. §§ 7, 8] CONCLUSION. 375 § 7. This treatise meets them by (a) establishing a moral government ; (b) removing presumptions against Chris tianity as fact ; To these persons, and to this state of opinion concerning religion, the foregoing Treatise is adapted. For, all the general objections against the moral system of nature having been obviated, it is shown, that there is not any peculiar presumption at all against Christianity, either considered as not dis coverable by reason, or as unlike to what is so discovered ; nor any worth mentioning against it as miraculous, if any at aU ; none, certainly, which can render it in the least incredible. It is shown, that, upon supposition of a divine revelation, the analogy of nature renders it beforehand highly cre dible, I think probable, that many things in it must appear liable to great objections ; and that we must be incompetent judges of it, to a great degree. This observation is, I think, unquestionably true, and of the very utmost importance : but it is urged, as I hope it will be understood, with great caution of not vilifying the faculty of reason1, which is the candle of the Lord within us a ; though it can afford no light, where it does not shine ; nor judge, where it has no principles to judge upon. § 8. (c) As against its goodness, by showing their failure as against nature. The objections here spoken of, being first answered in the view of objections against Christianity as * Prov. xx. 27. 1 Sup. II. iii. 3. 376 CONCLUSION. [II. ix. a matter of fact, are in the next place considered as urged more immediately against the wisdom, justice, and goodness of the Christian dispensation. And it is fuUy made out, that they admit of exactly the like answer, in every respect, to what the like objections against the constitution of nature admit of: that, as partial views give the appearance of wrong to things, which, upon further consideration and knowledge of their relations to other things, are found just and good ; so it is perfectly credible, that the things objected against the wisdom and goodness of the Christian dispensation, may be rendered instances of wisdom and goodness, by their reference to other things beyond our view : because Christianity is a scheme as much above our com prehension, as that of nature ; and like that, a scheme in which means are made use of to accomplish ends, and which, as is most credible, may be carried on by general laws. And it ought to be attended to, that this is not an answer taken merely or chiefly from our ignorance ; but from somewhat positive, which our observation shows us. For, to like objec tions, the like answer is experienced to be just, in numberless paraUel cases. § 9. Particular objections are next met : e. g. that the remedy was not summary. The objections against the Christian dispensation, and the method by which it is carried on, having been thus obviated, in general and together ; the chief of them are considered distinctly, and the particular things objected to are shown credible, by their perfect analogy, each apart, to the constitution of nature. Thus, if man be fallen from his primitive state, and to be restored, and infinite wisdom and §§9-n] CONCLUSION. 377 power engages in accomplishing our recovery : it were to have been expected, it is said, that this should have been effected at once ; and not by such a long series of means, and such a various economy of persons and things ; one dispensation preparatory to another, this to a further one, and so on through an indefinite number of ages, before the end of the scheme proposed can be completely accomplished : a scheme conducted by infinite wisdom, and executed by almighty power. But now, on the contrary, our finding that every thing in the constitution and course of nature is thus carried on, shows such expectations concerning revelation to be highly un reasonable ; and is a satisfactory answer to them, when urged as objections against the credibility, that the great scheme of Providence in the redemption of the world may be of this kind, and to be accom plished in this manner. § io. As to operating through a mediator. As to the particular method of our redemption, the appointment of a mediator between God and man : this has been shown to be most obviously analogous to the general conduct of nature, i. e. the God of nature, in appointing others to be the instru ments of his mercy, as we experience in the daily course of Providence. §11. Heathen recognition of our fallen state. The condition of this world, which the doctrine of our redemption by Christ presupposes, so much falls in with natural appearances, that heathen moral ists inferred it from those appearances: inferred, that human nature was fallen from its original recti- 378 CONCLUSION. [II. ix. tude, and, in consequence of this, degraded from its primitive happiness. Or, however this opinion came into the world, these appearances must have kept up the tradition, and confirmed the belief of it. § 12. As to the insufficiency of repentance ; And as it was the general opinion under the light of nature, that repentance and reformation, alone and by itself, was not sufficient to do away sin, and procure a full remission of the penalties annexed to it ; and as the reason of the thing does not at all lead to any such conclusion : so every day's expe rience shows us, that reformation is not, in any sort, sufficient to prevent the present disadvantages and miseries, which, in the natural course of things, God has annexed to folly and extravagance. § 13. And the further provision made; Yet there may be ground to think, that the punish ments, which, by the general laws of divine govern ment, are annexed to vice, may be prevented : that provision may have been, even originally, made, that they should be prevented by some means or other, though they could not by reformation alone. For we have daily instances of such mercy, in the general conduct of nature : compassion provided for misery0, medicines for diseases, friends against enemies. There is provision made, in the original constitution of the world, that much of the natural bad consequences of our follies, which persons themselves alone cannot prevent, may be prevented by the assistance of others ; assistance, which nature enables, and disposes, and b Sermons V, VI, at the Eolls. §§ 12-15] CONCLUSION. 379 appoints them to afford. By a method of goodness analogous to this, when the world lay in wickedness, and consequently in ruin, God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son to save it : and he being made perfect by suffering, became the Author of eternal salvation to all them that obey himc. $ 14. Beyond comprehension in its mode, bid efficacious, agreeably to experience. Indeed neither reason nor analogy would lead us to think, in particular, that the interposition of Christ, in the manner in which he did interpose, would be of that efficacy for recovery of the world, which the scripture teaches us it was : but neither would reason nor analogy lead us to think, that other particular means would be of the efficacy, which experience shows they are, in numberless instances. And therefore, as the case before us does not admit of experience ; so, that neither reason nor analogy can show how, or in what particular way, the inter position of Christ, as revealed in scripture, is of that efficacy, which it is there represented to be ; this is no kind nor degree of presumption against its being reaUy of that efficacy. § 15. As to partial propagation, and imperfect evidence. Further : the objections against Christianity, from the light of it not being universal, nor its evidence so strong as might possibly be given us, have been answered by the general analogy of nature. That God has made such variety of creatures, is indeed an answer to the former: but that he dispenses c John iii. 1 6 ; Heb. v. 9. 380 CONCLUSION. [II. ix. his gifts in such variety, both of degrees and kinds, amongst creatures of the same species, and even to the same individuals at different times ; is a more obvious and full answer to it. And it is so far from being the method of Providence in other cases, to afford us such overbearing evidence, as some require in proof of Christianity ; that, on the contrary, the evidence upon which we are naturally appointed to act in common matters, throughout a very great part of life, is doubtful in a high degree. And admitting the fact, that God has afforded to some no more than doubtful evidence of religion : the same account may be given of it, as of difficulties and temptations with regard to practice. $ 16. The doubtfulness may be due to ourselves; But as it is not impossible13, surely, that this alleged doubtfulness may be men's own fault ; it deserves their most serious consideration, whether it be not so. $ 17. And doubtful evidence binds. However, it is certain, that doubting implies a degree of evidence for that of which we doubt : and that this degree of evidence, as really lays us under obligations, as demonstrative evidence. § 18. Beligion varies from nature not more than nature from herself. The whole then of religion is throughout credible : nor is there, I think, any thing relating to the d Sup. II. vi. 19. §§16-20] CONCLUSION. 381 revealed dispensation of things, more different from the experienced constitution and course of nature, than some parts of the constitution of nature are from other parts of it. § 19. Beason almost intuitively approves of natural religion, taken up by the gospel: so the guilt of immorality is aggravated. And if so, the only question which remains is, What positive evidence can be alleged for the truth of Christianity? This too in general has been con sidered, and the objections against it estimated. Deduct, therefore, what is to be deducted from that evidence, upon account of any weight which may be thought to remain in these objections, after what the analogy of nature has suggested in answer to them : and then consider, what are the practical consequences from all this, upon the most sceptical principles one can argue upon : (for I am writing to persons who entertain these principles :) and upon such consideration it will be obvious, that immorality, as httle excuse as it admits of in itself, is greatly aggravated, in persons who have been made ac quainted with Christianity, whether they believe it or not : because the moral system of nature, or natural religion, which Christianity lays before us, approves itself, almost intuitively, to a reasonable mind, upon seeing it proposed. § 20. The sceptic must own that Christianity may be true; by this he is bound. In the next place, with regard to Christianity, it will be observed; that there is a middle between a full satisfaction of the truth of it, and a satisfaction 382 CONCLUSION. [II. ix. of the contrary. The middle state of mind between these two consists in a serious apprehension, that it may be true ; joined with doubt whether it be so. And this, upon the best judgment I am able to make, is as far towards speculative infidelity, as any sceptic can at all be supposed to go, who has had true Christianity, with the proper evidence of it, laid before him, and has in any tolerable measure considered them. For I would not be mistaken to comprehend all who have ever heard of it : because it seems evident, that in many countries caUed Christian, neither Christianity, nor its evidence, are fairly laid before men. And in places where both are, there appear to be some, who have very httle attended to either, and who reject Christianity with a scorn proportionate to their inattention ; and yet are by no means without understanding in other matters. Now it has been shown, that a serious apprehension that Christianity may be true, lays persons under the strictest obligations of a serious regard to it, throughout the whole of their life : a regard not the same exactly, but in many respects nearly the same, with what a full conviction of its truth would lay them under. § 21. Blasphemy is without excuse. Lastly, it will appear, that blasphemy and pro- faneness, I mean with regard to Christianity, are absolutely without excuse. For there is no tempta tion to it, but from the wantonness of vanity or mirth : and these, considering the infinite importance of the subject, are no such temptations as to afford any excuse for it. §§ 21, 22] CONCLUSION. 383 § 22. For it, and for disregard, even demonstration might fail as remedy 1. If this be a just account of things, and yet men can go on to vilify or disregard Christianity, which is to talk and act as if they had a demonstration of its falsehood ; there is no reason to thmk they would alter their behaviour to any purpose, though there were a demonstration of its truth. 1 If we project the following classification : 1. 2.3- 4- 5- Thi ngs demonstrated ; of moral certainty; , likely ; not unlikely ; , neutral ; 6. , improbable ; , demonstrated false; will range from (2) down to (4). (The distinction between (2), (3), (4), is taken by Maurice, Mm: and Met. Phil. ch. viii. § 31.) Butler's complaint is that men so irrational as to place it in (7) are such offenders against reason, that they would probably defy even a demon stration on behalf of religion. Butler's arguments for religion THE END OF THE SECOND PART. TWO BRIEF DISSERTATIONS i. OF PERSONAL IDENTITY II. OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE vol. I. cc ADVERTISEMENT In the first copy of these Papers, I had inserted the two following Dissertations into the chapters, Of a Future Life, and, Ofthe Moral Government of God; with which they are closely connected. But as they do not directly fall under the title of the foregoing Treatise, and would have kept the subject of it too long out of sight; it seemed more proper to place them by themselves. DISSERTATION I OF PERSONAL IDENTITY § i. There are misleading subtleties on personal identity ; WHETHER we are to live in a future state, as it is the most important question which can pos sibly be asked, so it is the most intelligible one which can be expressed in language. Yet strange perplexities have been raised about the meaning of that identity or sameness of person, which is implied in the notion of our living now and hereafter, or in any two successive moments. And the solution of these difficulties hath been stranger than the difficulties themselves. For, personal identity has been explained so by some, as to render the inquiry concerning a future life of no consequence at all to us the persons who are making it. And though few men can be misled by such subtleties ; yet it may be proper a little to consider them. § 2. An idea, which definition can only perplex : Now when it is asked, wherein personal identity consists, the answer should be the same, as if it were asked, wherein consists similitude, or equality ; that all attempts to define would but perplex it. Yet there is no difficulty at all in ascertaining the idea. For as, upon two triangles being compared or viewed c c 2 388 OF PERSONAL IDENTITY. [Diss. I. together, there arises to the mind the idea of simili tude ; or upon twice two and four, the idea of equality : so ' likewise, upon comparing the consciousnesses of one's self, or one's own existence, in any two moments, there as immediately arises to the mind the idea of personal identity. And as the two former com parisons not only give us the ideas of similitude and equality ; but also show us, that two triangles are alike, and twice two and four are equal : so the latter comparison not only gives us the idea of personal identity, but also shows us the identity of ourselves in those two moments ; the present, suppose, and that immediately past ; or the present, and that a month, a year, or twenty years past. Or in other words, by reflecting upon that, which is my self now, and that, which was my self twenty years ago, I discern they are not two, but one and the same self1. § 3. Not constituted by, but presupposed in, recollection (or consciousness of the past). But though consciousness of what is past does thus ascertain our personal identity to ourselves, yet to say, that it makes personal identity, or is necessary to our being the same persons, is to say, that a person has not existed a single moment, nor done one action, but what he can remember; indeed none but what he reflects upon. And one should really think it self-evident, that consciousness of personal identity presupposes, and therefore cannot constitute, per sonal identity; any more than knowledge, in any other case, can constitute truth, which it presupposes. This wonderful mistake may possibly have arisen 1 Reflection on the past, or re- perhaps not recollection, without collection, is for us, consciousness of consciousness proper. the past. But brutes have memory, §§3,4] OF PERSONAL IDENTITY. 389 from hence ; that to be endued with consciousness is inseparable from the idea of a person, or intelligent being. For, this might be expressed inaccurately thus, that consciousness makes personality : and from hence it might be concluded to make personal identity1. But though present consciousness of what we at present do and feel is necessary to our being the persons we now are ; yet present consciousness of past actions or feelings is not necessary to our being the same persons who performed those actions, or had those feelings. § A. Differs from sameness in vegetables ; where all the parts may be different: The inquiry, what makes vegetables the same in the common acceptation of the word, does not appear to have any relation to this of personal identity : because, the word same, when applied to them and to person, is not only applied to different subjects, but it is also used in different senses. For when a man swears to the same tree, as having stood fifty years in the same place, he means only the same as to all the purposes of property and uses of common 1 This is a bold description of or habit ; it is a doubled mental personality. But can a better be function : it presents to us an active supplied ? As to dictionaries, and a passive function, or perhaps Johnson gives, 'The existence or in- a reciprocation of activities imply- dividualityofanyone.' Lathamand ingdualism. Not two Intelligences, Webster withdraw the first phrase. but one, gifted with the power of Locke says, ' Person belongs only to turning back upon itself. The per- intelligent agents, capable of a law, sonality of brutes is defective ; is not and happiness and misery.' This this because their consciousness is definition, or account, seems to go defective '? Do we gain anything beyond the personality of God. For by adding to Butler's succinct a law is something extrinsic ; and phrase ? Consciousness is, at the capabilityof misery is surely here a least, personality in action, and is thing utterly beyond our power to the basis and distinctive mark of predicate. What is consciousness ? all that belongs to personality. It is a developed intelligence, in act 390 OF PERSONAL IDENTITY. [Diss. I. life, and not that the tree has been all that time the same in the strict philosophical sense of the word. For he does not know, whether any one particle of the present tree be the same with any one particle of the tree which stood in the same place fifty years ago1. And if they have not one common particle of matter, they cannot be the same tree in the proper philosophic sense of the word same: it being evidently a contradiction in terms, to say they are, when no part of their substance, and no one of their properties is the same : no part of their sub stance, by the supposition : no one of their properties, because it is allowed, that the same property cannot be transferred from one substance to another. And therefore, when we say the identity or sameness of a plant consists in a continuation of the same life, communicated under the same organization, to a number of particles of matter, whether the same or not ; the word same, when applied to life and to organization, cannot possibly be understood to signify, what it signifies in this very sentence, when applied to matter. In a loose and popular sense then, the life and the organization and the plant are justly said to be the same, notwithstanding the perpetual change of the parts. But in a strict and phUosophical manner of speech, no man, no being, no mode of being, no anything, can be the same with that, with which it hath indeed nothing the same. Now same- ' May there not, however, remain mechanical or chemical action ? behind, and untouched by this But the total absence of conscious- argument, the question, What is it ness seems of itself to supply the that constitutes life in a vegetable, immeasurable separation, which and wherein and whereby is it Butler's argument requires. He transmitted ? If we look to parts uses below the phrase ' same life ' : alone, how does a vegetable differ but this life cannot be regarded as from any mineral, subject only to exchangeable. §5] OF PERSONAL IDENTITY. 391 ness is used in this latter sense, when applied to persons. The identity of these, therefore, cannot subsist with diversity of substance. § 5. And consciousness, if at different times, is different. The thing here considered, and demonstratively, as I think, determined, is proposed by Mr. Locke in these words, Whether it, i.e. the same self or person, be the same identical substance? And he has suggested what is a much better answer to the question, than that which he gives it in form. For he defines Person, a thinking intelligent being, &c, and personal identity, the sameness of a rational being a. The question then is, whether the same rational being is the same substance : which needs no answer, because Being and Substance, in this place, stand for the same idea. The ground of the doubt, whether the same person be the same substance, is said to be this ; that the consciousness of our own existence, in youth and in old age, or in any two joint succes sive moments, is not 1 the same individual action b, i. e. not the same consciousness, but different successive consciousnesses 2. Now it is strange that this should have occasioned such perplexities. For it is surely conceivable, that a person may have a capacity of knowing some object or other to be the same now, which it was when he contemplated it formerly : yet in this case, where, by the supposition, the object is perceived to be the same, the perception of it in any two moments cannot be one and the same per- a Locke's Works, vol. i. p. 146- b Locke, pp. 146, 147. 1 See Anal. Li. 1. it should be argued that the faculty 2 The argument ascribed to Locke or affection of love is in me not the is frivolous : as if, because Isaw and same. loved A last year and B this year, 392 OF PERSONAL IDENTITY. [Diss. I. ception. And thus though the successive conscious nesses, which we have of our own existence, are not the same/ yet are they consciousnesses of one and the same thing or object ; of the same person, self, or living agent. The person, of whose existence the consciousness is felt now, and was felt an hour or a year ago, is discerned to be, not two persons, but one and the same person ; and therefore is one and the same. § 6. Locke's hasty ideas pushed by others to confusion. Mr. Locke's observations upon this subject appear hasty : and he seems to profess himself dissatisfied with suppositions, which he has made relating to itc. But some of those hasty observations have been carried to a strange length by others, whose notion, when traced and examined to the bottom, amounts, I think, to this d : ' That personality is not a permanent, but a transient thing : that it lives and dies, begins and ends continually : that no one can any more remain one and the same person two moments together, than two successive moments can be one and the same moment : that our substance is indeed continually changing ; but whether this be so or not, is, it seems, nothing to the purpose ; since it is not substance, but consciousness alone, which constitutes personality ; which consciousness, being successive, cannot be the same in any two moments, nor consequently the personality consti tuted by it.' And from hence it must foUow, that it is a fallacy upon ourselves, to charge our present selves with any thing we did, or to imagine our c Locke, p. 152. d See an Answer to Dr. Clarice's Third Defence of his Letter to Mr. Dodwell, 2nd edit. pp. 44, 56, &c. §6] OF PERSONAL IDENTITY. 393 present selves interested in any thing which befell us yesterday ; or that our present self will be interested in what will befall us to-morrow : since our present self is not, in reality, the same with the self of yesterday, but another like self or person coming in its room, and mistaken for it ; to which another self will succeed to-morrow. This, I say, must foUow : for if the self or person of to-day, and that of to-rnorrow, are not the same, but only like persons ; the person of to-day is really no more interested in what will befall the person of to morrow, than in what wiU befall any other person. It may be thought, perhaps, that this is not a just representation of the opinion we are speaking of: because those who maintain it allow, that a person is the same as far back as his remembrance reaches. And indeed they do use the words, identity and same person. Nor will language permit these words to be laid aside ; since if they were, there must be I know not what ridiculous periphrasis substituted in the room of them. But they cannot, consistently with themselves, mean, that the person is really the same. For it is seU-evident, that the personality cannot be really the same, if, as they expressly assert, that in which it consists is not the same. And as, consistently with themselves, they cannot, so, I think it appears, they do not, mean, that the person is really the same, but only that he is so in a fictitious sense : in such a sense only as they assert, for this' they do assert, that any number of persons whatever may be the same person. The bare unfolding this notion, and laying it thus naked and open, seems the best confutation of it. How ever, since great stress is said to be put upon it, I add the following things. 394 OF PERSONAL IDENTITY. [Diss. I. § 7. It is imagination against conviction; First, This notion is absolutely contradictory to that certain conviction, which necessarily and every moment rises within us, when we turn our thoughts upon ourselves, when we reflect upon what is past, and look forward upon what is to come. All imagi nation of a daily change of that living agent which each man calls himself, for another, or of any such change throughout our whole present life, is entirely borne down by our natural sense of things. Nor is it possible for a person in his wits to alter his conduct, with regard to his health or affairs, from a suspicion, that, though he should live to-morrow, he should not, however, be the same person he is to-day. And yet, if it be reasonable to act, with respect to a future life, upon this notion, that personality is transient ; it is reasonable to act upon it, with respect to the present. § 8. As all perceive in temporal concerns. Here then is a notion equally apphcable to religion and to our temporal concerns ; and every one sees and feels the inexpressible absurdity of it in the latter case. If, therefore, any can take up with it in the former, this cannot proceed from the reason of the thing, but must be owing to an inward unfairness, and secret corruption of heart. § 9. The experiences of a being supply a bond independent of memory. Secondly, It is not an idea, or abstract notion, or quality, but a being only, which is capable of life and action, of happiness and misery. Now all beings confessedly continue the same, during the §§7-i°] OF PERSONAL IDENTITY. 395 whole time of their existence. Consider then a living being now existing, and which has existed for any time alive : this living being must have done and suffered and enjoyed, what it has done and suffered and enjoyed formerly, (this living being, I say, and not another,) as really as it does and suffers and enjoys, what it does and suffers and enjoys this instant. All these successive actions, enjoyments, and sufferings, are actions, enjoyments, and sufferings, of the same living being. And they are so, prior to aU consideration of its remembering or forgetting : since remembering or forgetting can make no alteration in the truth of past matter of fact. And suppose this being endued with limited powers of knowledge and memory, there is no more difficulty in conceiving it to have a power of knowing itself to be the same living being which it was some time ago, of remembering some of its actions, suffer ings, and enjoyments, and forgetting others, than in conceiving it to know or remember or forget any thing else. § 10. Whether the self be property or substance, consciousness declares its identity; Thirdly, Every person is conscious, that he is now the same person or self he was as far back as his remembrance reaches : since when any one reflects upon a past action of his own, he is just as certain of the person who did that action, namely, himself, the person who now reflects upon it, as he is certain that the action was at all done. Nay, very often a person's assurance of an action having been done, of which he is absolutely assured, arises wholly from the consciousness that he himself did it. And this he, person, or self, must either be 396 OF PERSONAL IDENTITY. a substance, or the property of some substance. If he, if person, be a substance ; then consciousness that he is the same person is consciousness that he is the same substance. If the person, or he, be the property of a substance, still consciousness that he is the same property is as certain a proof that his substance remains the same, as conscious ness that he remains the same substance would be : since the same property cannot be transferred from one substance to another. ^ n. And is deceivable in all, if in this. But though we are thus certain, that we are the same agents, living beings, or substances, now, which we were as far back as our remembrance reaches ; yet it is asked, whether we may not possibly be deceived in it? And this question may be asked at the end of any demonstration whatever : because it is a question concerning the truth of perception by memory. And he who can doubt, whether perception by memory can in this case be depended upon, may doubt also, whether per ception by deduction and reasoning, which also include memory, or indeed whether intuitive per ception can. Here then we can go no further. For it is ridiculous to attempt to prove the truth of those perceptions, whose truth we can no other wise prove, than by other perceptions of exactly the same kind with them, and which there is just the same ground to suspect ; or to attempt to prove the truth of our faculties, which can no otherwise be proved, than by the use or means of those very suspected faculties themselves. DISSERTATION II OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE § I. We have powers of reflection and approval, and by this become capable of moral government l. THAT which renders beings capable of moral government, is their having a moral nature, and moral faculties of perception and of action. Brute creatures are impressed and actuated by various instincts and propensions : so also are we. But additional to this, we have a capacity of reflect ing upon actions and characters, and making them an object to our thought : and on doing this, we naturally and unavoidably approve some actions, under the peculiar view of their being virtuous 1 I extract from Dr. Angus (in loc.) ' By denying that prudence is the portions of his concise account of whole of virtue, he meets the abuse the tacit references of Butler in this whichHobbes committed, and which Dissertation to the doctrines of some modern writers have revived. immediately preceding writers : Benevolence he reckons a most ' Within a hundred years, Hobbes important virtue, and yet denies, had published his Theory of Human against Leibnitz, that all virtue is Mature, in which he taught that resolvable into it. In his doctrine of personal gratification was the sole a moral sense, he agrees substan- endof every act, that every exercise tiallywith Hutcheson, his contem- of passion or faculty was equally porary, and in the importance he authoritative, and that man has no attaches to the distinction between moral faculties of perception or mere acts and the dispositions or action. . . . The first and last part principles from which they spring, of Hobbes's theory Butler here re- he condemns Hobbes and sanctions rates : the second he notices in his Malebranche.' Sermons. . . . 398 OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. [Diss. II. and of good desert ; and disapprove others, as vicious and of ill desert. That we have this moral approving and disapproving a faculty, is certain from our experiencing it in ourselves, and recognizing it in each other. § 2. Shown by our common language, judgments, behaviour; and by moral systems. It appears from our exercising it unavoidably, in the approbation and disapprobation even of feigned characters : from the words, right and wrong, odious and amiable, base and worthy, with many others of hke signification in all languages, applied to actions and characters 1 : from the many written systems of morals which suppose it ; since it cannot be imagined, that all these authors, throughout aU these treatises, had absolutely no meaning at all to their words, or a meaning merely chimerical": a This way of speaking is taken from Epictetus *, and is made use of as seeming the most full, and least Phrase, of Epictetus, Hable to cayiL And the moraj facuity may y emp oye . -^ un(jerst00(j £0 ^ave these two epithets, SoKifiacrTiKT] and airohoKiixaa-TtKr], upon a double account : because, upon a survey of actions, whether before or after they are done, it determines them to be good or evil ; and also because it determines itself to be the guide of action and of life, in con tradistinction from all other faculties, or natural principles of action : in the very same manner as speculative reason directly and naturally judges of speculative truth and falsehood ; and at the same time is attended with a consciousness upon reflection, that the natural right to judge of them belongs to it. * Arr. Epict. lib. i. cap. I. 1 We may add the cttuivos and upon a basis merely subjective, and \j/oyos of Aristotle ; but it is char- to look rather for tests founded in acteristic of Butler not to rest the nature of the thing itself. §§2,3] OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 399 from our natural sense of gratitude, which implies a distinction between merely being the instrument of good, and intending it : from the like distinction, every one makes, between injury and mere harm, which, Hobbes says, is peculiar to mankind 1 ; and between injury and just punishment, a distinction plainly natural, prior to the consideration of human laws 2. It is manifest great part of common language, and of common behaviour over the world, is formed upon supposition of such a moral faculty 3 ; whether called conscience, moral reason, moral sense, or divine reason ; whether considered as a sentiment of the understanding, or as a perception of the heart 4 ; or, which seems the truth, as including both. § 3. It has an acknowledged standard ; and conclusive tests. Nor is it at all doubtful in the general, what course of action this faculty, or practical discerning power within us, approves, and what it disapproves. For, as much as it has been disputed wherein virtue consists, or whatever ground for doubt there may be about particulars; yet, in general, there is in reality an universally acknowledged standard of it. It is that, which all ages and aU countries have made profession of in public: it is that, which 1 Evidently Butler's intention is first instance, we discern good and rather to record as against Hobbes evil ? When the perception thus generally this valuable admission, acquired has passed under the view, than to imply that the opposite andreoeivedthejudicialsanction, of opinion was one anywhere held. the conscience, it has passed under 2 On the distinction see Serm. the view of the court of appeal. viii. 6 8. '^nls sentence is one in which 3 Comp. Serm. xii. 6. Butler allows himself more elasti- 4 Is this not an exercise of the city in the use of terms than is faculty by which, as in a court of quite usual with him. 400 OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. [Diss. II. every man you meet puts on the show of: it is that, which the primary and fundamental laws of all civil constitutions over the face of the earth make it their business and endeavour to enforce the practice of upon mankind : namely, justice, veracity, and regard to common good. It being manifest then, in general, that we have such a faculty or discernment as this, it may be of use to remark some things more distinctly concerning it. § 4. Has action for its object, apart from (a) mere truth, (b) consequences. First, It ought to be observed, that the object of this faculty is actions b, comprehending under that name active or practical principles : those principles from which men would act, if occasions and circumstances gave them power ; and which, when fixed and habitual in any person, we call his character. It does not appear, that brutes have the least reflex sense of actions, as dis tinguished from events : or that will and design, which constitute the very nature of actions as such, are at all an object to their perception. But to ours they are : and they are the object, and the only one, of the approving and disapproving fuculty. Acting, conduct, behaviour, abstracted from aU regard to what is, in fact and event, the consequence of it, is itself the natural object of the moral discern ment ; as speculative truth and falsehood is of speculative reason. Intention of such and such b Oi8e r) upcTr] Kai Kaicia . . . . iv weian, aWa ivepydq. M. Anton. lib. ix. 16. Virtutis laus omnis in actione consistit. Cic. Off. lib. i. cap. 6.' §§4.5] OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 401 consequences, indeed, is always included ; for it is part of the action itself: but though the intended good or bad consequences do not follow, we have exactly the same sense of the action as if they did. In like manner we think well or ill of characters, abstracted from all consideration of the good or the evil, Avhich persons of such characters have it actually in their power to do. We never, in the moral way, applaud or blame either ourselves or others, for what we enjoy or what we suffer, or for having impressions made upon us which we consider as altogether out of our power : but only for what we do, or would have done had it been in our power ; or for what we leave undone which we might have done, or would have left undone though we could have done it. § 5. By nature, we link vice with misery for ill desert. Secondly, Our sense or discernment of actions as morally good or evil, implies in it a sense or discern ment of them as of good or ill desert. It may be difficult to explain this perception, so as to answer all the questions which may be asked concerning it : but every one speaks of such and such actions as deserving punishment ; and it is not, I suppose, pretended that they have absolutely no meaning at all to the expression. Now the meaning plainly is not, that we conceive it for the good of society, that the doer of such actions should be made to suffer. For if unhappily it were resolved, that a man, who, by some innocent action, was infected with the plague, should be left to perish, lest, by other people's coming near him, the infection should spread ; no one would say he deserved this treatment. Innocence and ill desert are inconsistent ideas. Ill vol. 1. D d 402 OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. [Diss. II. desert always supposes guilt : and if one be no part of the other, yet they are evidently and naturally connected in our mind. The sight of a man in misery raises our compassion towards him ; and, if this misery be inflicted on him by another, our indignation against the author of it. But when we are informed, that the sufferer is a villain, and is punished only for his treachery or cruelty ; our com passion exceedingly lessens, and in many instances our indignation wholly subsides. Now what produces this effect is the conception of that in the sufferer, which we call ill-desert. Upon considering then, or viewing together, our notion of vice and that of misery, there results a third, that of ill-desert. And thus there is in human creatures an association of the two ideas, natural and moral evil, wickedness and punishment. If this association were merely artificial or accidental, it were nothing : but being most unquestionably natural, it greatly concerns us to attend to it, instead of endeavouring to explain it away. § 6. Desert is higher or lower according to circumstances. It may be observed farther, concerning our percep tion of good and of iU desert, that the former is very weak with respect to common instances of virtue. One reason of which may be, that it does not appear to a spectator, how far such instances of virtue proceed from a virtuous principle, or in what degree this principle is prevalent : since a very weak regard to virtue may be sufficient to make men act well in many common instances. And on the other hand, our perception of ill desert in vicious actions lessens, in proportion to the tempta tions men are thought to have had to such vices. §§6,7] OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 403 For, vice in human creatures consisting chiefly in the absence or want of the virtuous principle ; though a man be overcome, suppose, by tortures, it does not from thence appear to what degree the virtuous principle was wanting. All that appears is, that he had it not in such a degree, as to prevail over the temptation : but possibly he had it in a degree, which would have rendered him proof against common temptations. § 7. Judgment on acts must measure them by the agent '. Thirdly, Our perception of vice and ill desert arises from, and is the result of, a comparison of actions with the nature and capacities of the agent. For the mere neglect of doing what we ought to do would, in many cases, be determined by all men to be in the highest degree vicious. And this determination must arise from such comparison, and be the result of it ; because such neglect would not be vicious in creatures of other natures and capacities, as brutes. And it is the same also with respect to positive vices, or such as consist in doing what we ought not. For, every one has a different sense of harm done by an idiot, madman, or chUd, and by one of mature and common under standing ; though the action of both, including the intention, which is part of the action, be the same : as it may be, since idiots and madmen, as well as children, are capable not only of doing mischief, but also of intending it. Now this difference must arise from somewhat discerned in the nature or capacities of one, which renders the action vicious ; and the want of which, in the other, renders the 1 Comp. Serm. ii. 15, iii. 13. D d 2 404 OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. [Diss. II. same action innocent or less vicious : and this plainly supposes a comparison, whether reflected upon or not, between the action and capacities of the agent, previous to our determining an action to be vicious. And hence arises a proper application of the epithets, incongruous, unsuitable, disproportionate, unfit, to actions which our moral faculty determines to be vicious. § 8. Prudence, or a due regard to our own welfare, is a part of virtue. Fourthly, It deserves to be considered, whether men are more at liberty, in point of morals, to make themselves miserable without reason, than to make other people so : or dissolutely to neglect their own greater good, for the sake of a present lesser gratification, than they are to neglect the good of others, whom nature has committed to their care. It should seem, that a due concern about our own interest or happiness, and a reason able endeavour to secure and promote it, which is, I think, very much the meaning of the word prudence, in our language ; it should seem, that this is virtue, and the contrary behaviour faulty and blamable : since, in the calmest way of reflection, we approve of the first, and condemn the other conduct, both in ourselves and others 1. This approbation and 1 I suppose it indisputable that instead of another; it continues to the study and prosecution of good bethestudyand prosecution of good with a practical aim is virtuous. with a practical aim : how can the Let us suppose then that it is act have changed its own essential done for the benefit of x. If x nature, because it is now for the mean another person than our- benefit, not of B, but of A ? So that selves, this is benevolence, and Butler's contention appears per- benevolence is a virtue. But let x fectly just. It undergoes perhaps mean a man's own self. The act is some disadvantage from the fact still the same, done to one person that prudence, as the wise choice of §§8,9] OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 405 disapprobation are altogether different from mere desire of our own, or of their happiness, and from sorrow upon missing it. For the object or occasion of this last kind of perception is satisfaction or uneasiness : whereas the object of the first is active behaviour. In one case, what our thoughts fix upon is our condition : in the other, our conduct. \ 9. Why not fortified so strongly, as other parts, with disapproval of the contrary. It is true indeed, that nature has not given us so sensible a disapprobation of imprudence and folly, either in ourselves or others, as of falsehood, injustice, and cruelty: I suppose, because that constant habitual sense of private interest and good, which we always carry about with us, renders such sensible disapprobation less necessary, less wanting, to keep us from imprudently neglecting our own happiness, and foolishly injuring ourselves, than it is necessary and wanting to keep us from injuring others, to whose good we cannot have so strong and constant a regard : and also because imprudence and folly, appearing to bring its own punishment more immediately and constantly than injurious behaviour, it less needs the additional punishment, which would be inflicted upon it by others, had they the same sensible indignation against it, as against injustice, and fraud, and cruelty. Besides, unhappiness being in itself the natural object of compassion ; the unhappiness which means for an end, extends to all dence. Compare Aristotle (Eth. common matters lying beyond the Nic. VI. v. 4) on yet this is only the certainty of a thing true in fact, not in itself necessary: and demonstration is applicable to nothing but what is necessary in itself, necessary in all places and at all times equally. To your second difficulty, I answer : What exists necessarily, not only must so exist alone, as to be independent of any thing else ; but (being self-sufficient) may also so exist alone, as that every thing else may possibly (or without any con tradiction in the nature of things) be supposed not to exist II] DR. BUTLER AND DR. CLARKE. 419 at all : and consequently, (since that which may possibly be supposed not to exist at all, is not necessarily existent,) no other thing can be necessarily existent. Whatever is necessarily existing, there is need of its existence in order to the supposal of the existence of any other thing; so that nothing can possibly be supposed to exist, without pre supposing and including antecedently the existence of that which is necessary. For instance ; the supposal of the existence of any thing whatever includes necessarily a pre supposition of the existence of space and time; and if any thing could exist without space or time, it would follow that space and time were not necessarily existing. Therefore, the supposing any thing possibly to exist alone, so as not necessarily to include the presupposal of some other thing, proves demonstrably that that other thing is not necessarily existing ; because, whatever has necessity of existence can not possibly, in any conception whatsoever, be supposed away. There cannot possibly be any notion of the existence of any thing, there cannot possibly be any notion of existence at all, but what shall necessarily preinclude the notion of that which has necessary existence. And consequently the two propositions, which you judged independent, are really necessarily connected. These sorts of things are indeed very difficult to express, and not easy to be conceived but by very attentive minds: but to such as can and will attend, nothing, I think, is more demonstrably convictive. If any thing still sticks with you in this or any other part of my books, I shall be very willing to be informed of it ; who am, Sir, Your assured friend and servant, S. C. Nov. 10, 1713. PS. Many readers, I observe, have misunderstood my second general proposition ; as if the words [' some one un changeable and independent being,'] meant [one only — being ;] whereas the true meaning, and all that the argument there requires, is, [some one at least.] That there can be but one, is the thing proved afterwards in the seventh proposition. E e 2 420 CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN [Corr. III. THE SECOND LETTER. (C.) Butler argues in reply that ubiquity and self-existence are separable ; and the necessity of ubiquity has to be proved. On the second head, demands the title for asserting that the necessary being is required in order to the existence of any other being. Reverend Sie, T HAVE often thought that the chief occasions of men's -*- differing so much in their opinions, were, either their not understanding each other; or else, that, instead of ingenuously searching after truth, they have made it their business to find out arguments for the proof of what they have once asserted. However, it is certain there may be other reasons for persons not agreeing in their opinions: and where it is so, I cannot but think with you, that they will find reason to suffer each other to differ friendly ; every man having a way of thinking, in some respects, peculiarly his own. I am sorry I must tell you, your answers to my objections are not satisfactory. The reasons why I think them not so are as follow : You say, ' Whatever is absolutely necessary at all is absolutely necessary in every part of space, and in every point of duration.' Were this evident, it would certainly prove what you bring it for ; viz. that ' whatever may, without a contradiction, be absent from one place at one time, may also be absent from all places at all times.' But I do not conceive, that the idea of ubiquity is contained in the idea of self -existence, or directly follows from it ; any otherwise than as, whatever exists must exist somewhere. You add, ' Whatever can at any time be conceived possible to be absent from any one part of space, may for the same reason [viz. the implying no contradiction in the nature of things] be conceived possible to be absent from every other part of space, at the same time.' Now I cannot see, that Ill] DR. BUTLER AND DR. CLARKE. 421 I can make these two suppositions for the same reason, or upon the same account. The reason why I conceive this being may be absent from one place, is because it doth not contradict the former proof, [drawn from the nature of things,] in which I proved only that it must necessarily exist. But the other supposition, viz. that I can conceive it possible to be absent from every part of space at one and at the same time, directly contradicts the proof that it must exist somewhere ; and so is an express contradiction. Unless it be said, that as, when we have proved the three angles of a triangle equal to two right ones, that relation of the equality of its angles to two right ones will be wherever a triangle exists ; so, when we have proved the necessary existence of a being, this being must exist every where. But there is a great difference between these two things : the one being the proof of a certain relation, upon supposition of such a being's existence with such particular properties ; and consequently, wherever this being and these properties exist, this relation must exist too: but from the proof of the necessary existence of a being, it is no evident consequence that it exists everywhere. My using the word demonstration, instead of proof which leaves no room for doubt, was through negligence, for I never heard of strict demonstration of matter of fact. In your answer to my second difficulty, you say, 'What soever is necessarily existing, there is need of its existence, in order to the supposal of the existence of any other thing.' All the consequences you draw from this proposition, I see proved demonstrably; and consequently, that the two pro positions I thought independent are closely connected. But how, or upon what account, is there need of the existence of whatever is necessarily existing, in order to the existence of any other thing ? Is it as there is need of space and duration, in order to the existence of any thing ; or is it needful only as the cause of the existence of all other things? If the former be said, as your instance seems to intimate : I answer ; space and duration are very abstruse in their natures, and, I think, cannot properly be called things, but are considered rather as affections which belong, and in the order of our thoughts are antecedently necessary, to the existence of all 422 CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN [Corr. things. And I can no more conceive how a necessarily existent being can, on the same account, or in the same manner as space and duration are, be needful in order to the existence of any other being, than I can conceive extension attributed to a thought; that idea no more belonging to a thing existing, than extension belongs to thought. But if the latter be said, that there is need of the existence of what ever is a necessary being, in order to the existence of any other thing ; only as this necessary being must be the cause of the existence of all other things: I think this is plainly begging the question; for it supposes that there is no other being exists, but what is casual, and so not necessary. And on what other account, or in what other manner than one of these two, there can be need of the existence of a necessary being in order to the existence of any thing else, I cannot conceive. Thus, sir, you see I entirely agree with you in all the consequences you have drawn from your suppositions, but cannot see the truth of the suppositions themselves. I have aimed at nothing in my style, but only to be intelligible; being sensible that it is very difficult (as you observe) to express one's self on these sorts of subjects, especially for one who is altogether unaccustomed to write upon them. I have nothing at present more to add, but my sincerest thanks for your trouble in answering my letter, and for your professed readiness to be acquainted with any other difficulty that I may meet with in any of your writings. 1 am willing to interpret this, as somewhat like a promise of an answer to what I have now written, if there be any thing in it which deserves one.I am, Reverend Sir, Your most obliged humble servant. Kov. 23, 1 7 13. IV] DR. BUTLER AND DR. CLARKE. 423 IV. THE ANSWER. (D.) Clarke holds in reply that necessity -of existence is original, absolute, and antecedent to all besides ; so that the necessary, if anywhere, must for the same reason he everywhere. Declares Butler assumes a finite necessary being. On No. 2 : a necessary being is a sine qua non to the existence of any (= every) other being. Sie, TT seems to me, that the reason why you do not apprehend -*- ubiquity to be necessarily connected with self-existence, is because, in the order of your ideas, you first conceive a being, (a finite being, suppose,) and then conceive self- existence to be a property of that being ; as the angles are properties of a triangle, when a triangle exists : whereas, on the contrary, necessity of existence, not being a property consequent upon the supposition of the things existing, but antecedently the cause or ground of that existence; it is evident this necessity, being not limited to any antecedent subject, as angles are to a triangle ; but being itself original, absolute, and (in order of nature) antecedent to all existence ; cannot but be everywhere, for the same reason that it is any where. By applying this reasoning to the instance of space, you will find, that by consequence it belongs truly to that substance, whereof space is a property d, as duration also is. What you say about a necessary being existing somewhere, supposes it to be finite ; and being finite, supposes some cause which determined that such a certain quantity of that being should exist, neither more nor less : and that cause must either be a voluntary cause; or else such a necessary cause, the Quantity of whose power must be determined and limited by some other cause. But in original absolute necessity, antecedent (in order of nature) to the existence of any thing, nothing of all this can have place ; but the necessity is necessarily everywhere alike. d Or, mode of existence. 424 CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN [Corr. Concerning the second difficulty, I answer: That which exists necessarily, is needful to the existence of any other thing ; not considered now as a cause, (for that indeed is begging the question,) but as a sine qua non ; in the sense as space is necessary to every thing, and nothing can possibly be conceived to exist, without thereby presupposing space: which therefore I apprehend to be a property or mode of the self-existent substance ; and that, by being evidently necessary itself, it proves that the substance, of which it is a property, must also be necessary ; necessary both in itself, and needful to the existence of any thing else whatsoever. Extension indeed does not belong to thought, because thought is not a being ; but there is need of extension to the existence of every being, to a being which has or has not thought, or any other quality whatsoever. I am, Sir, Your real friend and servant. London, Nov. 28, 1713. V. THE THIRD LETTER. (E.) Disclaims the finite being : holds by one eternal and necessary. Admits great force of Clarice's argument on head No. 1; continues to contest No. 2. Reverend Sir, I" DO not very well understand your meaning, when you say -*- that you think, ' in the order of my ideas I first conceive a being (finite suppose) to exist, and then conceive self -exist ence to be a property of that being.' If you mean that I first suppose a finite being to exist I know not why ; affirming necessity of existence to be only a consequent of its existence ; and that, when I have supposed it finite, I very safely conclude it is not infinite ; I am utterly at a loss, upon what expressions in my letter this conjecture can be founded. But if you mean, that I first of all prove a being to exist from eternity, and then, from the reasons of things, prove V] DR. BUTLER AND DR. CLARKE. 425 that such a being must be eternally necessary ; I freely own it. Neither do I conceive it to be irregular or absurd ; for there is a great difference between the order in which things exist, and the order in which I prove to myself that they exist. Neither do I think my saying a necessary being exists somewhere, supposes it to be finite ; it only supposes that this being exists in space, without determining whether here, or there, or everywhere. To my second objection, you say, ' That which exists neces sarily, is needful to the existence of any other thing, as a sine qua non ; in the sense space is necessary to every thing: which is proved (you say) by this consideration, that space is a property of the self -existent substance ; and, being both necessary in itself, and needful to the existence of every thing else ; consequently the substance, of which it is a property, must be so too.' Space, I own, is in one sense a property of the self -existent substance ; but, in the same sense, it is also a property of all other substances. The only difference is in respect to the quantity. And since every part of space, as well as the whole, is necessary ; every substance consequently must be self -existent, because it hath this self-existent property. Which since you will not admit for true; if it directly follows from your arguments, they cannot be conclusive. What you say under the first head proves, I think, to a very great probability, though not to me with the evidence of demonstration : but your arguments under the second I am not able to see the force of. I am so far from being pleased that I can form objections to your arguments, that, besides the satisfaction it would have given me in my own mind, I should have thought it an honour to have entered into your reasonings, and seen the force of them. I cannot desire to trespass any more upon your better employed time; so shall only add my hearty thanks for your trouble on my account, and that I am, with the greatest respect, Reverend Sir, Your most obliged humble servant. Pec. 5, 1713- 426 CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN [Corr. VI. THE ANSWER. (F.) Nothing finite can he (antecedently) necessary: nothing (thus) necessary finite. Matter. Motion. Space a property or mode of the self-existent : of it only. It alone does not exist in space. Space and duration necessary. Sir, HPHOUGH, when I turn my thoughts every way, I fully -*- persuade myself there is no defect in the argument itself; yet in my manner of expression I am satisfied there must be some want of clearness, when there remains any difficulty to a person of your abilities and sagacity. I did not mean that your saying a necessary being exists some where, does necessarily suppose it to be finite; but that the manner of expression is apt to excite in the mind an idea of a finite being, at the same time that you are thinking of a necessary being, without accurately attending to the nature of that necessity by which it exists. Necessity absolute, and antecedent (in order of nature) to the exist ence of any subject, has nothing to limit it; but, if it operates at all, (as it must needs do,) it must operate (if I may so speak) everywhere and at all times alike. Determination of a particular quantity, or particular time or place of existence of any thing, cannot arise but from somewhat external to the thing itself. For example: why there should exist just such a small determinate quantity of matter, neither more nor less, interspersed in the immense vacuities of space, no reason can be given. Nor can there be any thing in nature, which could have determined a thing so indifferent in itself, as is the measure of that quantity; but only the will of an intelligent and free agent. To suppose matter, or any other substance, neces sarily existing in a finite determinate quantity; in an inch-cube, for instance; or in any certain number of cube- inches, and no more; is exactly the same absurdity, as supposing it to exist necessarily, and yet for a finite VI] DR. BUTLER AND DR. CLARKE. 427 duration only: which every one sees to be a plain con tradiction. The argument is likewise the same, in the question about the original of motion. Motion cannot be necessarily existing; because, it being evident that all determinations of motion are equally possible in themselves, the original determination of the motion of any particular body this way rather than the contrary way, could not be necessarily in itself, but was either caused by the will of an intelligent and free agent, or else was an effect produced and determined without any cause at all ; which is an express contradiction: as I have shown in my Demon stration of the Being and Attributes of God, [Page 14, edit. 4th and 5th; page 12, edit. 6th and 7th.] To the second head of argument, I answer: Space is a property [or mode] of the self -existent substance ; but not of any other substances. All other substances are in space, and are penetrated by it; but the self -existent substance is not in space, nor penetrated by it, but is itself (if I may so speak) the substratum of space, the ground of the exist ence of space and duration itself. Which [space and duration] being evidently necessary, and yet themselves not substances, but properties or modes, show evidently that the substance, without which these properties could not subsist, is itself much more (if that were possible) necessary 1. And as space and duration are needful (i. e. sine qua non) to the existence of every thing else ; so consequently is the substance, to which these properties belong in that peculiar manner which I before mentioned. I am, Sir, Your affectionate friend and servant. Dec. 10, 1713. 1 We may suppose, say, that love, Out of this difficulty we slide, in justice, power, the faculty of knowing, the text, by treating time as synony- exist in God : and so are above and mous with duration. But is not this outside the idea of creation. But to pass from one impasse into another ? who can suppose that space or time, Who will upon reflection venture to such as we conceive them, are in God? define eternity? and to define it, The assumption of necessary exist- moreover, as 'time without a begin- ence which I cannot but question as ning and interminably prolonged ' ? to both, seems to be especially ques- I cannot help surmising that within tionable as to time, because the idea of the veil there may lie explanations time, if it have an ending, involves of these, as well as of many other that of a beginning. secrets. 428 CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN [Corr. VII. THE FOURTH LETTER. (G.) Noiv admits the first of the arguments impugned in A. Both spirit and body exist in space. He cannot tell tlie mode. Does not accept ' substratum. ' Thinks space antecedently necessary, and necessary even to the self-existent substance. Search for truth is the business of his life. Reverend Sir, WHATEVER is the occasion of my not seeing the for,ce of your reasonings, I cannot impute it to [what you do] the want of clearness in your expression. I am too well acquainted with myself, to think my not understanding an argument, a sufficient reason to conclude that it is either improperly expressed, or not conclusive ; unless I can clearly show the defect of it. It is with the greatest satisfaction I must tell you, that the more I reflect on your first argument, the more I am convinced of the truth of it; and it now seems to me altogether unreasonable to suppose absolute necessity can have any relation to one part of space more than to another; and if so, an absolutely necessary being must exist everywhere. I wish I was as well satisfied in respect to the other. You say, 'All substances, except the self-existent one, are in space, and are penetrated by it.' All substances doubtless, whether body or spirit, exist in space : but when I say that a spirit exists in space, were I put upon telling my meaning, I know not how I could do it any other way than by saying, such a particular quantity of space terminates the capacity of acting in finite spirits at one and the same time; so that they cannot act beyond that determined quantity. Not but that I think there is somewhat in the manner of the exist ence of spirits in respect of space, that more directly answers to the manner of the existence of body ; but what that is, or of the manner of their existence, I cannot possibly form an idea, And it seems (if possible) much more difficult to determine what relation the self-existent Being hath to space. To say he exists in space, after the same manner that other substances VII] DR. BUTLER AND DR. CLARKE. 429 do, (somewhat like which I too rashly asserted in my last,) perhaps would be placing the Creator too much on a level with the creature ; or however, it is not plainly and evidently true : and to say the self-existent substance is the substratum of space, in the common sense of the word, is scarce intelligible, or at least is not evident. Now though there may be an hundred relations distinct from either of these; yet how we should come by ideas of them, I cannot conceive. We may indeed have ideas to the words, and not altogether depart from the common sense of them, when we say the self-existent sub stance is the substratum of space, or the ground of its existence : but I see no reason to think it true, because space seems to me to be as absolutely self-existent, as it is possible any thing can be: so that, make what other supposition you please, yet we cannot help supposing immense space; because there must be either an infinity of being, or (if you will allow the expression) an infinite vacuity of being. Perhaps it may be objected to this, that though space is really necessary, yet the reason of its being necessary is its being a property of the self-existent sub stance; and that, it being so evidently necessary, and its dependence on the self-existent substance not so evident, we are ready to conclude it absolutely self-existent, as well as necessary; and that this is the reason why the idea of space forces itself on our minds, antecedent to, and exclusive of (as to the ground of its existence) all other things. Now this, though it is really an objection, yet is no direct answer to what I have said; because it supposes the only thing to be proved, viz. that the reason why space is necessary is its being a property of a self -existent substance. And supposing it not to be evident, that space is absolutely self-existent ; yet, While it is doubtful, we cannot argue as though the contrary were certain, and we were sure that space was only a property of the self-existent substance. But now, if space be not absolutely independent, I do not see what we can conclude is so : for it is manifestly necessary itself, as well as ante cedently needful to the existence of all other things, not excepting (as I think) even the self-existent substance. All your consequences, I see, follow demonstrably from your supposition ; and, were that evident, I believe it would 430 CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN [Corr. serve to prove several other things as well as what you bring it for. Upon which account, I should be extremely pleased to see it proved by any one. For, as I design the search after ¦ truth as the business of my life, I shall not be ashamed to learn from any person ; though, at the same time, I cannot but be sensible, that instruction from some men is like the gift of a prince, it reflects an honour on the person on whom it lays an obligation. I am, Reverend Sir, Your obliged servant. Bee. 16, 1713. VIIL THE ANSWER. (H.) Clarke replies that space and time are not substances, but qualities or relations necessarily existing which infer a substance. Illustrated by the ideas formable of body by men without touch or sight respectively. Sir, MY being out of town most part of the month of January, and some other accidental avocations, hindered me from answering your letter sooner. The sum of the difficulties it contains is, I think, this : that ' it is difficult to determine what relation the self-existent substance has to space : ' that ' to say it is the substratum of space, in the common sense of the word, is scarce intelligible, or, at least, is not evident : ' that ' space seems to be as absolutely self-existent, as it is possible any thing can be : ' and that ' its being a property of the self-existent substance is supposing the thing that was to be proved.' This is entering indeed into the very bottom of the matter; and I will endeavour to give you as brief and clear an answer as I can. That the self -existent substance is the substratum of space, or space a property of the self-existent substance, are not perhaps very proper expressions ; nor is it easy to find such. But what I mean is this : The idea of space (as also of time or duration) is an abstract or partial idea; an idea of a VIII, IX] DR. BUTLER AND DR. CLARKE. 431 certain quality or relation, which we evidently see to be necessarily existing ; and yet which (not being itself a sub stance) at the same time necessarily presupposes a substance, without which it could not exist; which substance con sequently must be itself (much more, if possible) necessarily existing. I know not how to explain this so well as by the following similitude. A blind man, when he tries to frame to himself the idea of body, his idea is nothing but that of hardness. A man that had eyes, but no power of motion, or sense of feeling at all ; when he tried to frame to himself the idea of body, his idea would be nothing but that of colour. Now as, in these cases, hardness is not body, and colour is not body ; but yet, to the understanding of these persons, those properties necessarily infer the being of a substance, of which substance" itself the persons have no idea: so space to us is not itself substance, but it necessarily infers the being of a substance, which affects none of our present senses ; and, being itself necessary, it follows, that the substance, which it infers, is (much more) necessary. I am, Sir, Your affectionate friend and servant. Jan. 29, 1 7 13. IX. THE FIFTH LETTER. Cannot disprove, hut pauses before admitting that space and duration are properties of a substance. Is at a loss about their nature. If the thesis could be demonstrated, Atheism would be confuted. Apologizes for his observations on omnipresence. Reverend Sir, YOU have very comprehensively expressed, in six or seven lines, all the difficulties of my letter; which I should have endeavoured to have made shorter, had I not been afraid an improper expression might possibly occasion a mistake of my meaning. I am very glad the debate is come into so narrow a compass; for I think now it entirely 432 CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN [Corr. turns upon this, whether our ideas of space and duration are partial, so as to presuppose the existence of some other thing. Your similitude of the blind man is very apt, to explain your meaning, (which I think I fully understand,) but does not seem to come entirely up to the matter. For what is the reason that the blind man concludes there must be somewhat external, to give him that idea of hardness ? It is because he supposes it impossible for him to be thus affected, unless there were some cause of it ; which cause, should it be removed, the effect would immediately cease too; and he would no more have the idea of hardness, but by remembrance. Now to apply this to the instance of space and duration : Since a man, from his having these ideas, very justly concludes that there must be somewhat external, which is the cause of them ; consequently, should this cause (whatever it is) be taken away, his ideas would be so too : therefore, if what is supposed to be the cause be removed, and yet the idea remains, that supposed cause cannot be the real one. Now, granting the self -existent substance to be the substratum of these ideas, could we make the supposition of its ceasing to be, yet space and duration would still remain unaltered: which seems to show, that the self-existent substance is not the substratum of space and duration. Nor would it be an answer to the difficulty, to say that every property of the self-existent substance is as necessary as the substance itself ; since that will only hold, while the substance itself exists ; for there is implied, in the idea of a property, an impossibility of subsisting without its substratum. I grant, the supposition is absurd: but how otherwise can we know whether any thing be a property of such a substance, but by examining whether it would cease to be, if its supposed substance should do so ? Notwithstanding what I have now said, I cannot say that I believe your argument not conclusive ; for I must own my ignorance, that I am really at a loss about the nature of space and duration. But did it plainly appear that they were properties of a substance, we should have an easy way with the atheists : for it would at once prove demonstrably an eternal, necessary, self-existent Being ; that there is but one such ; and that he is needful in order to the existence of all other things. Which makes me think, that though it X.] DR. BUTLER AND DR. CLARKE. 433 may be true, yet it is not obvious to every capacity : other wise it would have been generally used, as a fundamental argument to prove the being of God. I must add one thing more; that your argument for the omnipresence of God seemed always to me very probable. But being very desirous to have it appear demonstrably conclusive, I was sometimes forced to say what was not altogether my opinion: not that I did this for the sake of disputing, (for, besides the particular disagreeableness of this to my own temper, I should surely have chosen another person to have trifled with;) but I did it to set off the objection to advantage, that it might be more fully answered. I heartily wish you as fair treatment from your opponents in print, as I have had from you ; though, I must own, I cannot see, in those that I have read, that unprejudiced search after truth, which I would have hoped for. I am, Reverend Sir, Your most humble servant. Feb. 3, 1 7 13. X. THE ANSWER. (J.) Clarke thinks that Butler, in allowing that the removal ofthe self- existent substance is an absurd idea, has conceded his argument. Animadverts on the mischief done hy Descartes in referring origins to mechanical laws, as drawing us away from God. Other animad versions. Sir, IN a multitude of business, I mislaid your last letter ; and could not answer it, till it came again to my hands by chance. We seem to have pushed the matter in question between us as far as it will go ; and, upon the whole, I cannot but take notice, I have very seldom met with persons so reasonable and unprejudiced as yourself, in such debates as these. VOL. I. F f 434 CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN [Corr. . I think all I need say, in answer to the reasoning in your letter, is, that your granting the absurdity of the sup position you were endeavouring to make, is consequently granting the necessary truth of my argument1. If <* space and duration necessarily remain, even after they are supposed to be taken away; and be not (as it is plain they are not) themselves substances ; then the e substance, on whose existence they depend, will necessarily remain likewise, even after it is supposed to be taken away : which shows that supposition to be impossible and contradictory 2. As to your observation at the end of your letter ; that the argument I have insisted on, if it were obvious to every capacity, should have more frequently been used as a funda mental argument for a proof of the being of God: the true cause why it has been seldom urged, is, I think, this ; that the universal prevalency of Cartes's absurd notions (teaching d Ut partium temporis ordo est immutabilis, sic etiatn ordo partium spatii. Moveantur hae de locis snis, et movebuntur (ut ita dicam) de seipsis. Newton, Princip. Mathemat. Schol. ad definit. 8. 6 Deus non est aeternitas vel infinitas, sed aeternus et inflnitus ; non est duratio vel spatium, sed durat et adest. Durat semper, et adest ubique ; et existendo semper et ubique, durationem et spatium, aeternitatem et infinitatem, constitnit. Cum unaquaeque spatii particula sit semper ; et unumquodque durationis indivisibile momentum ubique ; certe rerum omnium Fabricator ac Dominus non erit nunquam nusquam. Omni- praesens est, non per virtutem solam, sed etiam per substantiam : nam virtus sine substantia subsistere non potest. In ipso continentur et moventur universa, &c. Newton, Princip. Mathemat. Schol. general. sub finem. 1 This seems to be a fallacy. The (ft) 'Evidently seen to be necessarily concession, that a certain supposition existing.' was absurd, was grounded on con- This evidence, this necessity, I siderations drawn aliunde ; and did have never been able to see. No one not deprive Butler of his right to has taught us so well as Butler the point out that space and time do limitedness of our faculties. When not logically depend upon our recog- we say that this or that necessarily nition. exists, do we not run a risk of travel- 2 We have here (i) space, (2) time, ling too fast and far? For we place set down as — that particular thing outside the (a) Being each of them a quality or creative power, and in independence relation. (Why a quality or relation of it. What title have we to lay down only ? Why more than sound or such a proposition as to either space light ?) or time ? X.] DR. BUTLER AND DR. CLARKE. 435 that*' matter is necessarily infinite and necessarily eternal, and ascribing all things to mere mechanic laws of motion, exclusive of final causes, and of all will and intelligence and Divine Providence from the government of the world) hath incredibly blinded the eyes of common reason, and prevented men from discerning him in whom they live, and move, and have their being. The like has happened in some other instances. How universally have men for many ages be lieved, that eternity is no duration at all, and infinity no amplitude! Something of the like kind has happened in the matter of transubstantiation, and, I think, in the scholastic notion of the Trinity, &c. I am, Sir, Your affectionate friend and servant. April 8, 1713 [? 1714]. f Puto implicare contradictionem, ut mundus [meaning the material world] sit finitus. Cartes. Epist. 69 Partis primae. P f 2 INDEX TO VOLUME I [References to the body of the Analogy are indicated by figures only : thus I. ii. 3 means the First Part, Second Chapter, Section 3. Those to the Introduction by Intr. To the Advertisement by Adv. To the Disserta tions by Diss. I., Diss. II. Those to the Butler and Clarke Correspondence by Corr.] Action, is the main instmment appointed for the formation of character, I. v. 40. includes consequences intended to follow it, Diss. II. 4. judgment on acts should measure them by the agent, Diss. II. 7. Affection. See Living powers ; also Propensions. Agent, nature of, to be regarded in estimating virtuous action, Diss. II. 7. Analogy, false, drawn by prince whom Locke names, Intr. 3. true counter-analogy, ibid. omits to discuss its general nature, Intr. 7. between scripture and nature, Intr. 8. as dealt with by author, between nature and religion natural and revealed, supplies answers to almost all objections, Intr. 15. with varying force in different parts of the argument, ibid. its force as regards ridicule, ibid. applies to religion natural and revealed alike, Intr. 17. furnishes argument generally unanswerable ; undoubtedly of weight, in whatever degree, ibid. what materials it furnishes for estimating probable effects of death on us, I. i. 1. affords no presumption of the loss of living powers at death or otherwise, I. i. 7. between relation of early to later life, and of this life to survival, I. v. 3, 18. might hold even were the mode of our discipline inscrutable, I. v. 19. of nature, does not disprove waste of souls, I. v. 35. between acquisition of right qualities, and supply of wants, I. v. 41. begins with proving the fact rather than the right of divine government, I. vii. 1. 438 INDEX. Analogy {continued). leads us to expect a scheme, and one imperfectly comprehended, I. vii. 2. many analogies show we are bad judges of schemes not fully known, I. vii. 22. none from nature against the gospel idea, II. ii. 3-6. between nature and revelation, brings the like objectors against both, II. iii. 5. between nature and revelation, as to advance into the ulterior stages of knowledge, II. iii. 20, 21. between unlikeness of creatures and unlikeness of environment for like creatures, II. vi. 8. between scanty evidence in religion, and temptation in environment, II. vi. 17. Analogies, principal, between nature and the gospel, or Christianity. the provisions made in each are open to abuse, II. i. 14, iii. 18, 19. between our obligations under natural and under divine relations, II. i. 22, 23. in the injunction to use means for the attainment of benefits, II. i. 24. the gospel undiscoverable ; so is much in nature, II. ii. 4. the want of uniform agreement with nature, and the inconformity of nature to herself, II. ii. 5. adverse presumptions in each are to be set aside by proofs, II. ii. 13, iii. 13. our incompetence to anticipate in nature, what it should be, and in revelation, II. iii. 5 seqq. and like incompetency to judge, II. iii. 9. in the modes, inscrutable to us, by which the different parts of knowledge are opened to us, II. iii. 15. as to progress through the stages of knowledge, II. iii. 20, 21. modes of giving it, in each, not such as we should choose, II. iii. 22. the supply of light in each is only partial, II. iii. 23, ix. 15. in both schemes remedies are incomplete, II. iii. 24. in both, the scheme imperfectly comprehended, II. iv. 1. in both, apparent want of aptitude in means, II. iv. 3. in nature, method of operation is by general laws ; may be so in the gospel, II. iv. 4-6. would not of itself lead us to anticipate the efficacy of Christ's mediation, II. ix. 14. the cumbrousness of the methods used, II. iv. 7, 8. mediation, proposed in the gospel, is interwoven with all nature, II. v. 1 . in the arrival of punishment as natural consequence, II. v. 2. reliefs from full consequences of misconduct, II. v. 4, 5. in nature reformation does not cancel the past : so it may be in the gospel, II. v. 7, 8. between mediation in the world, and in the Christian system, II. v. 1, 22. as to great diversities in the evidence, referably to times, persons, and otherwise, II. vi. 4-6. is real, though some may think it here overstrained, II. viii. 28. that the Christian remedy is not summary, II. ix. 9. principal analogy, to vindicate the gospel, not with natural religion, but with nature, II. viii. 6. Ancients were alive to the power dwelling in liberty and moral fitness, II. viii. 24. INDEX. 439 Anticipation, formed by us, no safe guide to the provisions made by God, II. iii. 25. Argument, that as ' we see not the why, ergo it cannot be,' illegitimate, almost infatuated, II. v. 24. Arguments, in a Treatise like this, are important unless futile, Adv. 1. Astronomy compared with medicine, as to amount and nature of progress made, and in reference to our probable anticipations respecting them, II. iii. 15. Atheism does not disprove a future state, I. i. 32. objections taken to Christianity from its perversions, lead to. II. i. 13. would be confuted, could we prove that space and time were properties of a substance, Corr. ix. Atonement of Christ. See Satisfaction. Author. See Nature. Baptism, why triune, II. i. 18. Behaviour, enjoyment (all) and suffering (much) ' dependent on, I. ii. 1. possible reasons hereof: forewarning is one of them, II. ii. 2. Benevolence, not the whole of virtue, I. iii. 3. examined at large, Diss. II. 12-16. Birth, its possible analogy with death, I. i. 27. second, figuratively but expressly declared by John iii. 5, II. i. 24. Blasphemy, how the spirit of negation may carry men to it, II. ix. 5. wholly without excuse in the face of the Christian argument, II. ix. 21. demonstration might fail to arrest it, II. ix. 22. Body, is no more part of ourselves than any other matter, I. i. n. we may exist out of the body, or in a new body, ibid. its destruction, no more tends to destroy the ego than that of any other foreign matter, ibid. large and important parts of it can be dispensed with, I. i. 12, 15. probably even of the small body of childhood, I. i. 12. its particles in continual flux, change their owners, I. i. 13. unless the living being exceed an atom in bulk, which we do not know, how can death dissolve it ? I. i. 14. if body be not the ego, no other matter can be supposed it, I. i. 15. original solids of, may not be dissolved or removed at death, I. i. 16. only reciprocal action of, and living agent, provable, ibid. true in degree of foreign matter generally, ibid. i. e. sense, conveys but does not perceive, I. i. 17. on parting with it : we act, in dreams, without it, I. i. 18, 25. limbs, are instruments not agents, I. i. 19. if dissolution of such matter (I. i. 17-19) do not destroy, why of any matter ? I. i. 20. Brutes, can they attain immortality? I. i. 21. with or without, their rational and moral rank, ibid. may, but need not, ibid. puzzles about them are founded only in our ignorance, I. i. 22. certain, stronger than man, yet reason tends to obtain superiority, I. iii. 22. their faculties work with greater security, II. iii. 16. Burden of proof ; there is evidence for the gospel sufficient to throw onus probandi on the opponent, II. vii. 10. 440 INDEX. Caesar, presumptions against the story of, II. ii. 1 1 . Chances, adverse, even when enormous may be countervailed by slight proof, II. ii. ii, 12. there can be no such thing as chance, II. iv. 4. Child trained as a necessitarian, his case supposed, I. vi. 7. Christianity. See Gospel. now extensively assumed to be false, Adv. u. assumption wholly unproven, ibid, Judaism is just what we should expect it to be supposing the miracles true, II. vii. 4. and Judaism are alone in claiming assent on the ground of miracles publicly wrought, II. vii. 8. Church, visible, included in the gospel plan ; its object, II. i. 10, n. Civil punishments are natural, and often temporally final, I. ii. 16. government, an aid to virtue, I. iii. 16. Clemens Bomanus, quoted, II. vii. 7. Commands, distinguished as (a) positive, and (ft) moral, II. i. 26 ; they both agree and differ, ibid. it. (a) precepts founded on command, (ft) anterior to it, II. i. 26. yet (a) have a moral force, and may rest on natural religion, or revealed (example), II. i. 27, 33. have moral force, especially in principle apart from form, II. i. 28. in case of conflict, the moral command prevails, II. i. 29. has a double title (o) from scripture, (b) from nature, II. i. 30. as between (a) and (6) our Lord has determined the case, II. i. 32 ; and this from the Old Testament, ibid. 33. makes moral some precepts that would be otherwise immoral, II. iii. 27. they must not be contrary to immutable morality, ibid. Conduct, difficulty of, sometimes consists in discovering the right, more than in doing it, II. vi. 18. Consciousness makes personality but not identity, Diss. I. 2, 3. Consent as to religion in all ages and countries, I. vi. 16. Continuance of existence is to be presumed in the absence of reasons to the contrary, I. i. 4, 8. this extends to all substances ; and, except as to the self-existent, is the only reason for presuming a future, I. i. 4. presumption higher for our substances, than for our living powers, I. i. 4 n. mere contrary apprehension is of no weight, I. i. 5. Conversions to the gospel, with the sacrifice of interest and pleasure, must be believed sincere, and perhaps something more, II. vii. 9. Corruption of heart begets intellectual error, Diss. I. 8. Corruptions in religion, obscure the evidence, II. i. 13, vi. 5. have been great and shocking ; form no argument against the gospel, I. iv. 9, II. i. 13. Course of nature, as now known, has no application to the Origines, II. ii. 7, 8. Credentials of an ambassador, contemplating only formal outward acts, not analogous to proofs in religion, II. vi. 21. Cypher, illustration from part use of, in a writing, to case of a prophecy dark in a part of it, II. vii. 22. INDEX. 441 Daniel, Book of, authority given it by our Lord, II. vii. 28. its truth presupposed in the general scheme of Christianity, ibid. Death, change at, may be no greater than other changes known to allow survival, I. i. 3, 8. relation of, to the living powers, essentially unknown, I. i. 6. removes only the sensible proof of our having them, I. i. 7. not known in itself, but only in certain effects, I. i. 6. cannot be presumed to end our existence unless the soul be discerptible, I. i. 10. the argument to show that it is indiscerptible. ibid. yields no sign of destroying anything that belongs to our ' state of reflection,' I. i. 24. may not even suspend our reflective life, I. i. 26. may be analogous to birth, as continuance with alteration, I. i. 27. argument a fortiori against the idea that death destroys, I. i. 27 n. may be a birth into a higher state, I. i. 27. to presume extinction at death is ' palpably absurd,' I. viii. 4. scope given to hope and fear in the future bears upon conduct, I. viii. 5. See Ruin. Demonstration ofthe Being of God, has not succeeded in finding, Corr. i. Depravity, imported into our natures, enhances need for discipline, I. v. 30. neglect of evidence is a real depravity, II. vi. 11. Descartes builds a world upon hypothesis, Intr. 9. censured by Clarke, as leading away from God, Corr. x. Desert, associated by us with the moral quality of actions, Diss. II. 5. higher or lower, according to the particulars of the case, Diss. II. 6. Design, is to be inferred (a) from creation, (6) from natural government, I. iii. 1. in no way disproved by necessity, I. vi. 5. Difficulty, in the evidence of religion may be indispensable as a means of training, II. vi. 10, 18. the difficulties of the moral scheme may be things good, the best possible, indispensable, I. vii. 13, 15, II. iv. 1. total removal of, demanded, II. viii. 4. which removal may mean demand to comprehend the divine nature and plan, ibid. Disoerptibility. See Death. Discipline, moral ; describes our condition in this life, I. v. passim. the vieiousness of the world makes the discipline of life specially effective, I. v. 34. wrought out principally through action, I. v. 40. of religion less stringent where conviction is absolute, II. vi. 18. Discoveries, greatness of recent, in the material world, I. iii. 28, II. iii. 21. Diseases, some though mortal leave the ego unaffected all through, I. i. 25. Disobedience, single, produces disorder ; and repeated, habit, I. v. 28. Disregard of the gospel argument betokens a temper which even demon stration might fail to rouse, II. ix. 22. Doubt : presupposes evidence for that of which we doubt, II. vi. ±, ix. 17. promoted by corruption of the heart where the evidence is not over bearing, II. vi. 16. commands increase of effort, as temptations do in conduct, II. vi. 17. may even constitute the capital article of our trial, II. vi. 18. 442 INDEX. Doubt {continued). may be due to our own fault ; remissness of thought, levity, prejudice, II. vi. 19, ix. 16. as to the evidence of the miracles, would not warrant their rejection, II. vii. 5. the doubtfulness of the evidence for religion, bearing the test of long experience and examination, becomes an evidence in its favour, II. vii. 34- the middle or doubtful state of mind is the most negative of what is found among persons of tolerable capacity and opportunity, II. ix. 19. Dreams show we have latent powers of perception, not dependent on sense, I. i. 18. Enthusiasm, weakens testimony ; but the Christian witnesses were not enthusiasts, II. vii. 13. can only be imputed if the things be incredible, II. vii. 14. Epictetus : why his phrase is employed, Diss. II. 1 n. Evidence, real but doubtful, imposes a moral obligation, Intr. 5, II. vi. 12. implied alike by doubt, belief, certainty ; but in different degrees, II. vi. 15 ; obligations entailed by the lower degrees, ibid. for the gospel, to be viewed as a whole, and in the reciprocal relations of its parts, II. vii. 30, 59, 62. series of generally uncontested propositions (II. vii. 41-56) which may be laid before an unprepossessed mind, and their proper effect in giving proof of something more than human, II. vii. 40, 57. summary of propositions available for this purpose, II. vii. 41-56, viz. : natural religion, how rooted in scripture, II. vii. 41. the establishment of Christianity is the greatest fact in history, without any disparagement to reason, II. vii. 42, 43. the antiquity of scripture, and the corroborations it has received, II. vii. 44. the marks of reality in the simple self-congruous narratives, II. vii. 45. frank dealing with facts, and disregard of ornament, II. vii. 46. strange incidents in it, as in other narratives, but nothing to destroy credit, II. vii. 47. vast range joined with apparent truthfulness, and force of the common in supporting the miraeulous, II. vii. 48. add the grand sign of the Jews, a nationality dependent on belief, II. vii. 49 with the Advent, and establishment of the gospel, II. vii. 50. and the dispersion and standing isolation of the Jews, ill accounted for by secondary causes, II. vii. 51, 52. and the presumption from part-fulfilment in favour of entire, II. vii. 53. fair capacity in the judge presupposed, II. vii. 54. all these particulars to be taken in consideration, II. vii. 55. their range going beyond that of Jewish and Christian history, II. vii. 56. something more than human is shown, with claims on unbelievers, II. vii. 57, 58. with competent judges, circumstantial evidence weighs largely, II. vii. 59. serious men, dealing with the aggregate, will admit high probable proof, II. vii. 60. INDEX. 443 Evidence {continued). stress of the argument ; this cannot as a whole be accident, and cannot otherwise be set aside, II. vii. 62. advantages enjoyed by attack in detail, II. vii. 63. summed up in three propositions : {a) no adverse presumption on the ground of miracle, II. vii. 64. (ft) general scheme agrees with the constitution of things, ibid. (c) direct evidence, even if lessened, cannot be destroyed, ibid. to ask for the removal of all difficulties is really asking for an entire comprehension of the divine nature, II. viii. 4. as presented in this Treatise, is far from satisfactory, II. viii. 17. commonly accepted to guide conduct, is most unsatisfactory, ibid, demand for full, changes the very condition of our being, II. viii. 18. its nature is appointed for our probation, II. viii. 19. true question, does it bind to action ? not, does it satisfy ? II. viii. 20. Example : there may be those who exist only to serve as examples, I. ii. 21. the weight of our responsibility enhanced by the power of our example, II. vi. 14. Experience of moral government, how an answer to fatalists, I. vi. 20-22. teaches, that often means we deem unsuitable are available for their ends, I. vii. 14. used in this Treatise exclusively as the plea for religion, II. viii. 25. Extension does not belong to thought, Corr. iii. Exterior of religion, provided by a visible church, II. i. 10. an essential part of Christianity, II. i. 19. its form fixed by command, II. i. 21. Eyes are vehicles which convey to the perceiving power, I. i. 17. Fable: applicability having been shown, intention is presumed, II. vii. 24, 25. Fact, its peculiar relation to the gospel, as foundation, II. vii. 33. a religion founded on, may be proved credible, apart from its reasonable ness, II. viii. 14, 16. plea for religion herein confined to the authority of fact and experience, II. viii. 25. foregoing the aid of argument from freedom and moral fitness, author has provided an independent proof of future righteous judgment from this source, II. viii. 26. in matter of, strict demonstration is unheard of, Corr. iii. Fatalism. See Necessity. Fear, as also hope, a legitimate motive to obedience, I. v. 36. Fitness, moral, has waived reasoning from, though true and important, II. viii. 24. Freedom, its contrast with necessity, I. vi. 5. our entire state is what it would be if we were free, I. vi. 9. our experience shows its truth, I. vi. 14. Future life, the foundation of all our hopes and fears, Intr. 17. in proof relies mainly on presumption from the doctrine of continuance, and on the incapacity of death to destroy, I. i. 30. has quashed the negative presumption, I. i. 32. has shown a high probability of survival, I. i. 32. to predicate extinction at death is palpably absurd, I. viii. 4. 444 INDEX. Future life {continued). draws its importance from our capacity to enjoy and suffer, I. ii. i. analogy between relation of early to later life, and of this life to a future one, I. v. 3, 18. probably active, and under the more sensible dominion of God, I. v. 21. awakens hope and fear ; these bear upon conduct, I. viii. 5. enlarged action of moral elements probable in, I. viii. 7. future righteous judgment, proved here from fact, may be separately proved from liberty and moral fitness, II. viii. 26. proof of, would not per se prove religion, I. i. 32. amendment in, of those capable of amendment, I. iii. 28. has natural and moral proofs commonly insisted on, I. i. 5. General laws, attended with particular irregularities, I. iii. 20. the method appointed for natural government, I. vii. 18. allow of action with forethought, ibid. as to corrective interposition, we are no judges, I. vii. 18, 19. God : the manifold proofs of his existence (fivefold) ; not denied by opponents, Intr. 10. uses pleasures and pains for government, I. ii. 8, vi. 23. has a natural government over the world, I. iii. 1. and a moral government, I. ii. 2-4, iii. 10, 35, 36, iv. 2, II. iv. r, v. 2, 7, 20, viii. a. carried on by general laws, I. vii. 18, 19. even now takes the side of the good, I. iii. 21, 34. an infinite and immense eternal Being exists by necessity, I. vi. 4 ; but this is only a manner of speaking, ibid. his character and will, untouched by fatalism, I. vi. 12. his will determined by the right and reason of the case, I. vi. 16 ». disobedience to him, its weighty and terrible character, II. i. 2, v. 6. his plans liable to abuse, II. i. 14. the form of his purposes only knowable to us by experience, II. iii. 7. has appointed our existence to be in progi-essive stages, II. iv. 8. argument from his government here to his government hereafter, II. v. 1, 2. his goodness in remedies and mitigations of evil, II. v. 4. we cannot expect instruction on the divine conduct as large as on our own duty, II. v. 25. whether we regard his will as absolute or as conditional, the case is the same, II. vi. 22. Treatise does not seek to vindicate, but to show our duty, II. viii. 10, 21 ; author has made it his business to seek proof of the being and at tributes, Corr. 1 ; has only found probable arguments. Not convinced by Clarke's demonstration, ibid. exists in space, Corr. v. Gospel, the, republishes natural religion with new authority,- II. i. 5, 6. derives additional credibility from miracle, II. i. 7, 8. illuminates doctrines of immortality and the efficacy of repentance, II. i. 9. as a republication of natural religion has a title to be examined, II. i. 15- is a dispensation for the recovery of a world in ruins, II. i. 16. INDEX. 445 Gospel {continued). is especially a revelation of the Son and Spirit, hence triune baptism, II. i. 17, 18. method of, has two essential parts, {a) inward, and (ft) outward, II. i. 19. no presumption against it as undiscoverable, II. ii. 4. nor as being unlike nature, which herself has inequalities, II. ii. 5. things objected to in, may be good or the very best, as is the case in nature, II. iv. 1. is a dispensation of righteousness, but like nature beyond our competency to judge, II. ii. 2. means for ends, though not seen by us to be good, may be the very best, I. vii. 13, 15, II. iv. 3. our ignorance bars our objections, II. iv. 2. method of general laws operates alike in nature and grace, II. iv. 4, 5. the parallel found in each as to gaps and anomalies, II. iv. 7. objection to the modes as circuitous and cumbrous ; we are incompetent, ibid. objection to mediation : most common, most causeless, II. v. 1. partial reliefs and remedies are often mercifully provided for us, II. v. 11. total impunity blindly reckoned on, II. v. 5. evidence for, suffices to throw onus probandi on the objector, II. vii. 10. every Christian bound to share in its propagation, II. i. 15. Government, God is a Governor, by rewarding and punishing, I. ii. 9. by punishments, not incidental, but systematic, I. ii. 17. its indications confirmed by religion as to the future, ibid. extreme gravity of the present scheme of punishments, its effect on teaching as to the future, I. ii. 18. scheme of natural punishments operates perceptibly but not uniformly, I. ii. 19. it ought to check the audacity of this age, I. ii. 20. as known by experience, like creation, implies design, I. iii. 1. God is a moral Governor, by rewarding and punishing righteously, I. iii. 2, 3, 8, Diss. II. 14. balance in favour of virtue ; not invariable, nor always clear, I. iii. 5. especially in cases of reformed life, I. iii. 6. no presumption against perfectly righteous final award, I. iii. 8. good acts sometimes punished, but never as being good, I. iii. 12. regard is had to quality and intent of acts, not acts only, I. iii. 13. the sum of results is favourable {a) in what is, (ft) in indicating what will be, I. iii. 17. this regard to the quale is due {a) to our moral nature, (6) to the effects upon related destinies, I. iii. 18. even now God takes the side of the vir bonus, I. iii. 21, 34. the tendencies of, run ahead of the present facts, I. iii. 22. providential, must be vast in proportion to the material universe, I. iii. 28. objection taken, that this mixed state may continue: even so, vice would not triumph, I. iii. 32, 33- doctrine of a future rectification strongly sustained by the points here shown, I. iii. 33- its having veracity and justice for its rule, and its correspondence with nature, not impaired by necessity, I. vi. 13, 14- 446 INDEX. Government {continued). divine, corresponds with our nature, I. vi. 15. is a scheme, and a scheme imperfectly comprehended, in both points analogous to nature, I. vii. 3, 4. may have relations to all, or some, other parts ofthe universe, I. vii. 5. our ignorance of the whole precludes judgment upon the parts, I. vii. 9. and bars objections against Providence, I. vii. 10. which holds, apart from any question of scheme ; but the objection is valueless, I. vii. 11, 12. solution may lie in some unknown relation, or possibility, I. vii. 13. may even be good, and indispensable, I. vii. 13, 15, II. iv. 1. experience proves means to be effective which we judge unfit, I. vii. 14. permission of evil may under conditions tend to good, like diseases which act as remedies, I. vii. 16, 17. makes our temporal, and probably our higher interest, depend upon be haviour, I. viii. 7. we can furnish the reason of it only in part, I. viii. 8. and can trace an intention of our improvement, I. viii. 9. its provisions are left open to abuse, II. i. 14. both governments are by general laws, II. iv. 4. a linked succession of stages in both, with complication, II. iv. 7, 8. the plan of divine, one of allowance and universal equity, II. vi. 7. alone in standing upon matters of fact (a) past, or (6) anticipated, II. vii. 33. has shown {a) it absurd to denounce this plan as fable, (ft) it is credible, and (c) more, II. viii. 27. carrying so much moral evidence, makes the prevailing disregard of religion incredible but for experience, II. ix. 1. simplicity of the argument for, is darkened by intricacies of speculation, II. ix. 2. immoral to refuse examination of the proofs it freely offers, II. ix. 3. especially in view of the high claims of miracle, II. ix.' 4. Government, Moral, essence of, lies in righteous award, I. iii. 3, Diss. II. 14. subsists in the world not absolutely but in degree, I. iii. 4. further indicated by mental states attaching to virtue and vice, and by our power of forecast, I. iii. 10. and by civil punishments, and the fear of them, I. iii. n. is implied in the natural, is a voice of God, and the seen tendencies are a promise of the future, I. iii. 38. enhances view of life as a preparatory stage, I. v. 20. as a fact, proves that Action is not Necessary, I. vi. 21, 22. Government, Natural, implies a probation for this life, I. iv. a. may be subservient to moral, and one part of moral to another, I. vii. 7, 8. is under general laws, I. vii. 18, 19. See General laws. has a moral element already in part operative, I. viii. 6 ; exemplifies moral do., ibid. n. is everywhere pervaded by mediation, II. v. 1. is conditioned by faculty of moral approval and disapproval, Diss. II. 1. Grotius, cited, II. vi. 19 n. INDEX. 447 Habits are of perception or of action, I. v. 6. of the body or of the mind, produced by use ; both due to repeated acts, I. v. 6, 7. passive or active. I. v. 6. mental, formed by carrying principles into action or decision, I. v. 7. thoughts regardless of action, and passive impressions, lose force by repetition, I. v. 8. but active habits gain, ibid. this gain may be attended with loss of emotion, I. v. 9. passive, if bent towards action, may help to form active, I. v. 10. formation of, not easy to trace, I. v. 11. contribute to readiness, ease, and satisfaction in action, I. v. 12. the means whereby we attain maturity, I. v. 13. without it, duration would not give capacity, I. v. 14. nature casts us forth unfurnished, but capable of furnishing, I. v. 15, 16. by effort, and the education of life, I. v. 17. improve character, I. v. 20. the fitting antidote for our liability to lapse through particular propen sions, I. v. 22. giving us a security ab intra, I. v. 24. may have place in a future state, is an advance in virtue, I. v. 25. evil, produced by repetition of disobedience, I. v. 28. enhancement of good, by continual battle and wariness against tempta tion, I. v. 32. law of confirmation in good, may perhaps have limits, I. v. 33. immoral habit would grow out of multiplied acts, not out of few, in certain cases, II. iii. 27, 28. Happiness is to be pursued, not simpliciter, but within bounds, Diss. II. 16. if now perfeet, would make strange the teaching of our uncertain future, I. iv. 11. Health, extreme deficiency of evidence on which we have to act, II. viii. 17. Heathen : condition of the heathen world was such as to require revelation, II. i. 1. moralists were partially conscious of our fall from rectitude, II. ix. n. and felt repentance to be insufficient, II. ix. 12. History : tradition refers the origin of religion to primitive revelation, I. vi. 18, II. ii. 10. Hobbes says that to distinguish between injury and harm is peculiar to man kind, Diss. II. 2. Holy Ghost : God the Son and God the Holy Ghost principally brought into our view by the gospel, II. i. 17, 18. Hope, like fear, a legitimate motive of obedience, I. v. 36. Identity, strange difficulties raised as to personal, I. i. 1, Diss. I. 1. in us and in animals, survives great changes, than which death may be no greater, I. i. 2, 3. so handled by some as to leave no interest in a future life, Diss. I. 1. hard, not to ascertain, but to define ; so with equality, similitude, Diss. I. 2. not constituted by, but presupposed in, recollection, Diss. I. 3. differs from sameness in vegetables, Diss. I. 4. 448 INDEX. Identity {continued). according to Locke, the sameness of a rational being, where being means substance, Diss. I. 5. shown also by continuity of act, enjoyment, suffering, Diss. I. 9. I did it, is as certain as il was done : and often serves as a basis, Diss. I. 10. we are no more deceivable in this than in our other surest perceptions, Diss. I. 11. Ignorance : we cannot give the whole account of any one thing whatever, I. vii. 6. does not disable us from judging of the proofs of religion, I. vii. 20. we may be bad judges of schemes not fully known, yet good ones of proofs, I. vii. 23. absurd to suppose we know the whole case, II. v. 20, 21. Imagination, a forward delusive faculty, apt to trespass beyond its sphere, but of some utility, I. i. 9. Immortality, natural, of the soul, an hypothesis, I. i. 21, 31, iii. 26. within possibility for brutes, I. i. 21. eminently brought to light by the gospel, II. i. 9. Impunity, partial, familiar to us in provisions of nature, II. v. 4. Insufficiency of the supply of light by revelation ; so in nature, II. iii. 22, 23. Interest, sense of. See Self-love. as abstract idea, worthless, I. v. 24 n. ; or may be a part of virtue, ibid. our interest is profoundly involved in the religious argument, II. viii. 7 . Jews. See Judaism. Judaism : the prosperity promised to the Jews, I. iii. 30. like Christianity, is such as we should expect it to be on the supposition that the miracles are true, II. vii. 4. alone among religions, together with Christianity, in appealing to miracle, II. vii. 8. God's dealings with the Jews, II. vii. 35-39. the Jews as an historical phenomenon, II. vii. 49. their dispersion and isolation, II. vii. 51-55 ; confirm Christianity, ibid. 52. Justice, distributive, or award according to right, the most natural rule, I. iii. 9. things which taken singly seem unjust may be compatible with and even instances of justice, II. viii. 11. Knowledge : great advances recently made in natural, I. iii. 28, II. iii. 21. reasons for placing us in this state of hazard unknown, I. v. 1 ; to know, might not be for our advantage, ibid, natural, sometimes of high consequence, II. iii. 22 ; is not given according to our notions of advantage, ibid. not absolute and exhaustive, as to any one thing in nature, II. vi. 20. Language inadequate to its purpose, and liable to abuse, II. ii. 15. Liberty, its relation to lapse from right, I. v. 26. u consideration powerful in this argument, which has been waived, II. viii. 24. Life. See Present life ; Future Ufe. Limbs. See Body. INDEX. 449 Living powers, or Living being, or Living agent, or Living person. powers, I. i. 4 n., 5 ; agent, ibid. 6; being, ibid. 10 ; person, ibid. 19. of enjoyment, action, suffering, I. i. 4. as they exist, their continuance presumable, in the absence of reasons against it, ibid. capable of existence in a state of suspension, I. i. 6. may depend on something quite apart from death, ibid. unless the living being exceed an atom in bulk, how can death destroy it ? I. i. 14. acts and is acted on by the body : no more provable, I. I. 16. which is true in a degree of other foreign matter, ibid. reason, memory, affection, do not depend on, like as sense does, or so as to raise any presumption of end at death, I. i. 23. our dual state of sensation and of reflection, I. i. 24. no sign that the latter is dissolved by death, ibid. some mortal diseases, leaving the ego unaffected to the last, raise a pre sumption that it will remain untouched in death, I. 1. 25. suspensions in drowsiness and sleep would lead, but for experience, to false inferences, ibid. may not even be suspended by death, ibid. suspension of, distinguish from destruction, I. i. 28. has continuity of act, enjoyment, and suffering, Diss. I. 9. Locke, his story of the Prince of Siam, Intr. 3. on personal identity, Diss. i. 5, 6. Mahometanism was not received on the evidence of miracle, II. vii. 8. Mahometans, modern, compared with ancient Persians, II. vi. 5. Man, the acknowledged governing animal upon earth, I. iii. 22. Manifestation of character may have unknown uses : is a great instrument in the actual course, I. v. 42, II. vi. 18. Maturity, is attained by habit, I. v. 13. if given at birth would not confer capacity, I. v. 14. Meaning, of scripture, to be accepted, not imposed, II. i. 34, iii. 12. of revelation, to be judged of by reason, II. iii. 26. Means (for ends), shown by experience to be good, though in our eyes unlikely, I. vii. 14 ; may even be indispensable, ibid. 2-15. their suitability often beyond our power to judge, as in nature, so in the gospel, II. iv. 3. Mediation, for good and evil, is interwoven with the whole scheme of natural government, II. v. 1, 22, ix. 10. explained to mean the instrumentality of others, II. v. 1. was appropriate, necessary, and effectual, II. v. 11. is by means of a foreshadowed Priest-victim, II. v. 13. has an efficacy beyond instruction, example, and government, II. v. 14. was by a Prophet, II. v. 15. who had a Church or Kingdom, II. v. 16. and made an atonement or expiation, whereof the mode is not revealed to us, and has been unduly distended or reduced, II. v. i7-i9> =i> ix. 14. thus we are enabled to escape wrath and obtain life, II. v. 19. how far these means might have been varied, we cannot judge, II. v. 20. tends to vindicate the authority of the divine laws, II. v. 23. VOL. I. G § 45© INDEX. Medicine, the rarity, lateness, and incompleteness of remedies for disease, II. iii. 24. Memory. See Living powers. Method, of this Treatise, to take known facts for a basis of reasoning about unknown, Intr. 10, 14. of divine government, leaves its provisions open to abuse, II. i. 14. of general laws, in government by nature, I. vii. 18. and in government by revelation, II. iv. 4. Miracle, sing, or plur., adds to the credibility of a revealed moral system, II. i. 7, 8. has advanced natural religion, II. i. 10. presumption against the gospel as miraculous, is frivolous ; why dis cussed, II. ii. 1, 2. has been sufficiently defined, II. ii. 6. the Incarnation, a miracle but not a proof, requires to be proved, ibid. a thing relative to the course of nature, and departing from it, II. ii. 7. origin of mankind, wholly outside the present course of nature, II. ii. 8. our Lord's, not a question of degree, II. ii. 9. the essential question is, are they credible? II. ii. 12. presumption against, less than against many common facts, II. ii. 13. strong positive reasons for, II. ii. 14. proper standard of comparison is with things extraordinary, II. ii. 15. presumption on the whole favourable, II. ii. 16. disorderly use of miraculous gifts no ground of objection, II. iii. 18. other gifts open to like animadversions, II. iii. 19. is, with prophecy, the direct and fundamental proof of Christianity, II. vii. 2. of the gospel, have the same evidence as the non-miraculous contents, II. vii. 3. narratives of them plain and unadorned, ibid. some of Holy Scripture largely confirmed by history, II. vii. 4. of Holy Scripture hard to account for, except by their truth, II. vii. 5. can be set aside only by disproof, II. vii. 6. subsequent to the institution of a religion, are not available in the argument, II. vii. 8. miracles publicly wrought form a main ground of appeal by Christianity and Judaism alone among religions, ibid. pretences to, may and have deceived, but not more than other pretences, II. vii. 17. enhances force of the claim to examination, II. ix. 4. Morality, the right and reason of the case determine the will of God, I. vi. 16 n. its obligation being based upon our nature, does not depend upon the consequences of acts, I. vii. 21. all moral duty is enjoined by scripture, II. ii. 30. of revelation, is within the cognisance of reason, II. iii. 26. moral fitness, a consideration of great power in this argument, which has been waived, II. viii. 24. Natural : means stated, fixed, settled, similar, uniform, I. i. 31 ; conformable to God's other dealings, ibid. our present ' supernatural,' may to us hereafter, or now to beings of wider view, be natural, ibid. knowledge given us, in measures, not as we expect, II. iii. 22. INDEX. 451 Natural {continued). And see Religion, Natural. as to immortality ofthe soul, I. i. 10, 21, 31. government of God, has a great deal moral in it, II. v. 8. Nature : an Author of nature is here presupposed, Intr. 8, 10, I. ii. 3. has been often proved from four sources, Intr. 10, I. viii. a. denied by few among the non-acceptors of religion, Intr. 10. imaginary optimistic schemes of nature, wholly beyond the scope of our faculties to frame aright, Intr. n, 12. especially as to the means for attaining ends, Intr. 12, 13. nature, in this case a true voice of God, prompts us to ascribe to God all perfection, Intr. 13. observed facts of, to be resolved into general laws, Intr. 14. objections taken against scheme of, in common with religion natural and revealed, are of little weight, Intr. 17, I. vii. 3, II. ix. 7. present dispensation of: puts enjoyment wholly, suffering largely, in our own power, I. ii. 2. due to nature, which means the Author of nature, I. ii. 3. has a scheme of government by punishments, I. ii. 10-18. not uniform, yet sufficient to warn, I. ii. 19. its voice not drowned by the undoubted intrusion of perverse rules, I. iii. 20. greatness of recent discoveries in the material world, I. iii. 28, II. iii. 21. leaves us unfurnished, but capable of furnishing, I. v. 15, 16. by effort, and the education of Hfe, I. v. 17. exhibits waste, unaccountable, but vast, I. v. 35. Author of, his character and goodness give us an interest in the scheme under which we live, I. viii. 3. supplies no presumption against the gospel-idea of rule by Christ, II. ii. 3-6. scheme of, is vast beyond imagination, II. ii. 4. as we object to nature, so we are likely to object to revelation, II. iii. 5. like revelation, partial in remedies, and incomplete, II. iii. 24. the things objected to in, may be good, nay, the very best, I. vii. 13, 15, II. iv. 1. subsequent good behaviour does not cancel an evil past, II. v. 7. the complexity of, suggests the likelihood of large varieties in the divine plans, II. vii. 9. all objections here admitted to lie against nature are inconclusive, II. viii. 12. Necessity, or necessitarianism, its position quoad nature and quoad religion, the favourite basis of unbelief, I. vi. 14. exactly parallel, I. vi. 1, 24. the supposition of universal necessity absurd, I. vi. 1, 8. fate or no fate, agency by choice is matter of experience, I. vi. 2. only asserts an incident of being, in no way explains the how, I. vi. 3. God's' existence by necessity, a manner of speech, I. vi. 4. requires and supposes a necessary agent, as freedom a free, I. vi. 5. proves nothing as against intelligent design, or religion, I. vi. 5, 6. case of a child trained as a necessitarian, I. vi. 7. our state is as if we were free, I. vi. 9. in the known sphere only misleads, may do the like in the unknown, I. vi. 10. G ar 2 452 INDEX. Necessity {continued ). being as if false, to entertain it is against reason, I. vi. n. it comports with will and character in us, may do the same in God, I. vi. la. on the general proof of religion, is mute, I. vi. 16. and on the evidence from duration and extension, I. vi. 17. admitting that necessary action is not punishable, the fact of moral government shows that action is not necessary, I. vi. 20-22. thus proved false as an opinion referable to practice, I. vi. 23. estopped from objecting, I. viii. 10. author has argued on principles (of fatalism) through rejecting them, II. viii. 23. Negation, passing into virulent defiance, II. ix. 5. Neglect often operates as positive misbehaviour, I. ii. 15. Nicety, which rejects all religion of hope or fear, is illegitimate, I. v. 36. Obedience founded on hope and fear is materially virtuous, a natural prin ciple of action, grows into morality, I. v. 36. passive = resignation, is also a requisite, as a training in patience, I. v. 37. as resignation, a barrier against bias of self-love, I. v. 38. receives a training from affliction, I. v. 39. and integrates active obedience, ibid. Objections to the gospel, except to its proofs, mostly frivolous, II. iv. 1, 2. to want of universality and to deficiency of proof, in no case justify rejection, II. vi. 1, ix. 15. how both run through the whole system of nature, II. vi. 3, 3. ground of, often lies in the objector, II. vi. 24. to the gospel, why to be at least abated in limine, II. vii. 21. that it is a poor thing to solve difficulties by showing the like elsewhere, II. viii. 1, is. how such avails with certain minds, II. viii. 3. the method is one of constant use in common life, II. viii. 5. is legitimate, if the standard of appeal be acknowledged, II. viii. 6. the burden is shifted not on natural religion, but ultimately on the experienced constitution of nature, ibid. on the plea of doubtfulness, the objection treats the claim of religion as unfounded, II. viii. 8. like doubt in matters of temporal interest is not so treated, II. viii. 9. even if unanswered, leaves religion with its proofs unanswered also, II. viii. 13. until religion has been disproved, the practice of it is proper, II. viii. 15. largely taken from (a) prejudice in limine, (6) strange things in scripture, (c) points raised in II. vi, {d) it treats doubt as warranting denial, II. ix. 6. are met in this Treatise by— (a) establishing the fact of a moral government, II. ix. 7. (6) removing presumptions against Christianity as fact, ibid. (c) and against its righteousness by showing that the like objections are invalid as against nature, II. ix. 8 ; lie against nature rather than against natural religion, II. viii. 6, 12. (d) and as taken against nature are insufficient, Intr. 17, I. vii. 3, II. ix. 6. INDEX. 453 Objections {continued). things objected to in the moral scheme, may be good, even indispensable, I. vii. 13, 15, II. iv. 1. Old Testament history and prophecy, their vast range, and the manner in which they have stood the test of experience, II. vii. 35-39. Omnipresence : author contests the doctrine of Clarke that if God could be absent somewhere he might be absent everywhere, Corr. i. ubiquity is separable from self-existence and has to be proved, ibid. accepts Clarke's argument, Corr. vii. Opportunity, if lost, rarely returns, I. ii. 14. Origen supplies the germ of the entire argument, Intr. 8. Pain. See Pleasure. Paul, St., his epistles present distinct verifying evidence, II. vii. 7. 1 Corinthians, quoted by St. Clement, witness to the supernatural, ibid. Persians, of old, may be said to have had natural religion, but not revelation, II. vi. 5. Personality, how said to constitute identity, Diss. I. 3. wrongly said to reach back only as far as remembrance, Diss. I. 6. also that the same personality can exist in many individuals, ibid. imagination is here set up against our natural sense of things, Diss. I. 7. to apply this idea to temporal affairs would be ridiculous, Diss. I. 8. whether viewed as substance or as property, identity remains, Diss. I. 10. Pleasure and Pain, given us as general guides to action, I. ii. 4. doubtful which preponderates in life, II. viii. 17. Porphyry and the Book of Daniel, II. vii. s8 and re. Positive. See Commands. Power ; reason tends to acquire as against force, I. iii. 23. and virtue, as against vice, I. iii. 24. virtue, with less of, avails against vice with more of, I. iii. 25. Precepts, things otherwise immoral, in some cases made moral by command, II. iii. 27. acts under them, if multiplied, would create an immoral habit, II. iii. 27, 28. Prejudice operates to warp the judgment : testimony prevails notwithstand ing, II. vii. 15. Present life, is under government, I. ch. ii. ; moral government, I. eh. iii. ; probation, I. ch. iv. ; probation for improvement = moral discipline, I. ch. v. a preparation for future life, as youth is for age, I. v. 3, 18. well suited for discipline by the variety of its lessons, I. v. 31, 34. seems to be for the generality a discipline of vice, I. v. 34. and to be (a) related to something beyond it, (6) progressive, (c) not fully comprehensible, I. viii. 1. no escape herefrom by denying an Author of nature, I. viii. a. survey of, entails obligation to self-government and piety, I. viii. 12. is it worth living? II. viii. 17. Presumption in favour of the gospel, from its having lain so long open to confutation and not been confuted, II. vii. 34. even if strong, readily overcome by ' anything of proof,' II. ii. n. 454 INDEX. Probability, or probable evidence, unlike demonstrative, admits of degree, Intr. i, 2. founded in likeness to known truths and observed facts, Intr. 3. is limited, and is concerned with limited beings, Intr. 4. is for us the very guide of life, ibid. when low may still bind to action, Intr. 5. Probation, implies trial, difficulty, danger, and future account, I. iv. 1. we are also in a probation for this life under natural government, I. iv. 2 ; of our prudence, ibid. 5. comes {a) by temptation of circumstance ab extra, I. iv. 3 ; (6) by habits and passions ab intra ; each aiding the other, ibid. 4. in the sphere of religion, is of our virtue, I. iv. 6. some deceived into wrong, others rush at it, I. iv. 7. analogy between the two probationary states, I. iv. 8. aggravation of danger. See Danger. our state has ill symptoms, but is not intolerable in either sphere (of nature and of religion), I. iv. 10. doctrine of religious probation accredited by the facts of temporal, I. iv. n. the why of our hazardous condition is beyond us, I. iv. 12, v. 1. in both spheres, we have to acquire, not merely accept, I. iv. 13. our probation is meant for our benefit, I. v. a. relations of youth to age, and this life to future life, analogous, I. v. 3, 18 ; pointing to acquisition of quality, ibid. 3. our powers of storage, self-adaptation, fitness, and facility through use, I. v. 5. may minister to the highest condition of perfection, I. v. 31. a part of moral, may be furnished by doubtfulness in the evidence, II. vi. 10. presentation of evidence imposes it upon us, II. vi. 11. state of, is thoroughly in accord with limitations of evidence, II. vi. 23. constituted by presentation of evidence ; as some recognise, II. viii. 22. Proof, insufficiency of, charge lies against religion, both natural and revealed, I. iii. 3 re. of revelation, to be judged of by reason, II. iii. 26. objections to the proofs : here lies the stress of the argument, II. iii. 29. of religion, in both kinds, lies level to common sense, II. vi. 20. with varieties of demand and opportunity, ibid. Proofs, even when slight, may countervail vast adverse chances, II. ii. n, 12. Propensions, particular, entail danger of lapse, I. v. 23. often the road to lapse, I. v. 27. are the counterpart to our capacity of betterment and eventual safety, I. v. 29. Prophecy and miracle are the two direct and fundamental proofs of Chris tianity, II. vii. 2 ; any others are subsidiary, ibid. if part be unknown, it cannot invalidate the part known, II. vii. 22. fulfilment short of absolute may give proof of foresight (a) sufficient, (ft) as much as intended, II. vii. 23. applicability to the facts is to be presumed intentional, II. vii. 24. as in the cases of (a) fable, (ft) satire, II. vii. 25. intention need not be that of the utterer, but of the Inspirer, II. vii. 26, 27. INDEX. 455 Prophecy {continued). it is futile simply to show susceptibility of another interpretation.II. vii. 28. of the Old Testament, partly fulfilled ; argument hence arising, II. vii. 53. Providence. See Government. its plans must be proportioned to the vastness of the universe, I. iii. 28. provision made for us : (a) reason and affections, (6) natural religion, (c) revealed religion, II. vii. 31, 32. Prudence obliges us to act upon low probability, Intr. 5. with some, it is harder to discover the prudent course than to act on it, II. vi. 18. the main question of conduct : is such and such an act prudent? II. viii. 19. includes a due regard to our own happiness ; and defined to be as such a part of virtue, Diss. II. 8. why not fortified as strongly as other virtues with disapproval of its opposite ? Diss. II. 9. disapproval is, however, strong in grave cases, Diss. II. 10. holding by the disapproval, we may dispense with virtue and vice as predicates, Diss. II. 11. Punishment. See Reward. why to be the more particularly considered, I. ii. 10. miseries due to our own conduct are natural punishments, I. ii. n. often (a) following after pleasure reaped, (b) exceeding it, (c) long delayed, {d) hard to foresee, I. ii. 12. often due to habits formed in youth, I. ii. 13. civil, being natural, often temporally final, I. ii. 16. future, viewed by Gentiles (heathens) as by scripture, I. ii. 16 n. religion is distinctive in annexing them to our next state, ibid. may follow vice in the manner of natural consequence, II. v. 2. partial impunity is familiar to us in nature, II. v. 4. and total impunity blindly reckoned on, II. v. 5. Reason. See Living powers. tends to superiority over brute force : may use union, require time, and not be uniform, I. iii. 23. the lessons derivable from the defects of our faculties, I. vi. 19. our only instrument for judging even of revelation, II. iii. 3. action of revealed proofs in no way disparages proof from reason, II. vii. 43. Recollection is our consciousness of the past : does not constitute identity, Diss. I. 2, 3. Redemption: nothing said to confine it to those who know of it here, II. v. 11 n. Keflection, state of, distinguished from our state of sensation, I. i. 24. may not even be suspended by death, I. i. 26. Regeneration, necessity of renewal by the Holy Ghost shown by the declaration , John iii. 5, II- i- 24. Beligion will be argued for, upon the postulate of a deity, Intr. 10. summed up : (a) Natural, in four heads ; (6) Revealed, in six, Intr. 16. both natural and revealed religion rest on the same basis of analogy to nature, Intr. 17. as principle of conduct, is not illegitimate when proceeding from hope or fear, I. v. 36. 456 INDEX. Religion {continued). in no way disproved by necessity, I. vi. 6. proofs of, are motives to, I. viii. 14. does not vary from nature more than nature from herself, II. ix. 18. duty of an ' awful solicitude ' about, and of avoiding all immorality and profaneness, II. vi. 12. doubts upon, do not absolve from moral obedience, II. vi. 13. proof of, in both kinds, lies level to common sense, II. vi. 20. Religion, External : provided for in the gospel scheme of a visible church, II. i. 10. an essential part of Christianity, II. i. 19. form of its manifestation is fixed by command, II. i. 21. Religion, Natural : its four heads, Intr. 16. its origin, probably by revelation, I. vi. 18, II. ii. 10. doubtful whether it could have been reasoned out, or would, II. i. 1. republished by Christianity, II. i. 4, 5. miracle added to its credibility, II. 1. 7. obtained supernatural aid, II. i. 12. specially contemplates God the Father, II. i. 19. effect of, in aggravating the guilt of immorality, as it has the almost intuitive approval of reason, II. ix. 19. scripture can never contradict it, II. i. 35. Religion, Kevealed, or revelation. summed up in six heads, Intr. 16. is distinctive in annexing punishments to a future state, I. ii. 16 re. early consent in certain beliefs due to a primitive revelation, I. vi. 18. came to be (») requisite, (6) serviceable, II. i. 1. if of divine authority, its importance undeniable, II. i. 3. Christianity republishes natural religion, and adds another dispensation, II. i. 4, 5 ; with fresh authority, ibid. 6. specially contemplates God the Son and the Holy Ghost, II. i. 19, 20, 21. our relation to Christ is strictly moral, under moral sanctions, II. i. 22. disregard whereof, punishable in a natural way, I. i. 31, II. i. 23. our need of divine grace, and duty as to appointed means, II. i. 24. levity in treating it is the extreme of rashness, II. i. 25. was there a primitive, a question of fact, not presumption, II. ii. 7. there is no presumption against, at the beginning, II. ii. 9. primitive ; the evidence is in favour of, II. ii. 10. later ; how presumptions lie against many known facts, II. ii. 11. objections taken to the substance, mostly frivolous, except those against the proofs, II. iii. 1, 2. subject to the judgment of reason, quoad {a) immoralities, (6) contra dictions, II. iii. 3. dislike of consequences, an invalid plea, II. iii. 4. as a bad judge of ordinary government will be the same of extraordinary, so here in the field of religion, II. iii. 6. we are bad judges what revelation or inspiration should be, II. iii. 7, 9, bad judges as between written and unwritten form, II. iii. 7, 8. our deficiency of power, either to anticipate or to judge, II. iii. 9. attack is feasible only as to proofs, (a) of miracle, (6) of prophecy, II. iii. 10. INDEX. 457 Religion, Revealed, or revelation {continued). even partial proof of them will bind, II. iii. ir. the common tests of judgment are not uniformly applicable to scripture, II. iii. 12. we cannot judge with what conditions miraculous gifts should be con ferred, II. iii. 18. urgency of our need does not prove that light given will be more than partial, II. iii. 23. supplies only partial light : nature partial too, II. iii. 24. reason is to judge, {a) the meaning, (6) the proof, (c) the morality, II. iii. 25. whether it tends to virtue, and is not fanatical or political, we are com petent judges, II. iii. 30. if founded on fact, may be proved credible, apart from its reasonableness, II. viii. 14, 16. proved credibility of a, makes its practice reasonable, II. viii. 13. proof in, does not reach to satisfaction ; nor in temporal things, e. g. health, II. viii. 17. Remedies, incomplete both in nature and revelation, II. iii. 24. demand for complete, would warrant a demand to banish disease, II. iii. 25. Repentance : ill behaviour is not in nature cancelled by good, following it, II. v. 7, 8. felt to be insufficient while standing alone, II. ix. 12. divine provisions, and that by the gospel, II. ix. 13. Republication of natural religion by the gospel, II. i. 4-7. gives the gospel a title to be examined, II. i. 15. Resignation. See Obedience. Reward and punishment, for conduct, are already in operation, I. ii. 6. whether by propelled or self-acting laws, I. ii. 7. and by small pains as well as great, I. ii. 8. Righteousness, as the rule of reward and punishment, makes government moral, I. iii. 2. requires more than simple benevolence, I. iii. 3. Ruin : this world in a state of apostasy, wickedness, and ruin, Intr. 16, II. i. 16, iii. 23, v. 11, 12. the depravity imported into our nature enhances need for discipline, I. v. 30. life a discipline of vice for the generality, I. v. 34. bad example almost universal, II. i. 8. mankind are corrupted and depraved ; need regeneration, II. i. 24. the present state one of vice, misery, and darkness, II. v. 5. what confusion and misery we have brought into the kingdom of God, II. v. 6. manifold miseries, extreme wickedness of the world, and advancing deterioration of the generality with their age, II. v. 12. perceived in part by heathen moralists, II. ix. 11. Sacrifice : its prevalence proves a sense of the insufficiency of repentance, II. v. 9. of Christ, its efficacy, II. vi. 17. Satire : where applicability has been proved, intention is presumed, II. vii. 25. 458 INDEX. Satisfaction, {a) of Christ, II. vi. 17, 18, 22 ; (6) in evidence, that which supplies all we desire, II. viii. 18. Sceptic, immorality of, much aggravated in view of the case of natural religion, II. ix. 19. if owning that the gospel may be true, thereby becomes bound, II. ix. 20. how far in negation any tolerably informed sceptic is found to go, ibid. Scripture, required as part of our training, I. v. 17. prefers moral precepts to positive, II. i. 28. enjoins every moral virtue, II. i. 30. we are to accept its sense, not impose it, II. i. 34, iii. 12. cannot contradict natural religion, II. i. 36. informs us of a scheme of revealed Providence additional to nature, II. iii. 5- not to be judged wholly as other books are, e. g. as to prophecy, II. iii. 12 ; and improbabilities, ibid. 13. preconceived expectations no guide in interpreting, II. iii. 14. nor are they as to comparative access to different kinds of knowledge, or inventions, or the efficiency of language, II. iii. 15. same arguments applicable to any prospective revelation, II. iii. 17. the whole scheme of, is not yet understood, II. iii. 21. how variously made known to times, places, persons, II. vi. 4, 5. gives imperfect information : trouble saved by summary rejection, II. vii. 29. Self-denial, necessary for our present not less than our future interest, I. iv. 4, n. not of the essence of virtue and piety, I. v. 32. tends to moderate both particular affections and self-love, I. v. 38. Self-existent, the, its relation to space, very hard to determine ; is not the ' substratum ' of space, Corr. vii. Self-interest. See Self-love. Self-love : there is a reasonable self-love, I. iv. 4. as a sense of self-interest, wants education and improvement, I. v. 24 re. enters into the idea of virtue, ibid. is at variance with the passions, I. iv. 4. apt to diverge from the will of God, and to distort and rend the mind ; stands in need of discipline ; may require habits of resignation ; denials of self-love tend to moderate it, I. v. 38. a reasonable self-love with worldly interest for its end, I. iv. 4. not coincident with the passions, ibid. Sense. See Body. Sin. See Ruin, Sleep (compare swoon) shows that living powers exist without being exercised at will, I. i. 8. Son : God the Son, with the Holy Ghost, principally brought into view by the gospel, II. i. 17. Soul. See Body ; Living powers. Space and time are necessarily presupposed in the existence of anything whatever, Corr. ii., iii. are rather mental affections than things objective, Corr. iii. INDEX. 459 Space {continued). absolutely self-existent, Corr. vii. ; presupposed even in the self-existent, ibid. with time, exists necessarily, but dependency (Clarke), Corr. viii., x. does not admit that space and duration presuppose anything else, but cannot fathom their nature, Corr. ix. State. See Civil. ideal state, deriving power from virtue, I. iii. 29. would obtain a great pre-eminence, I. iii. 30. Supernatural. See Natural. Suspension of living powers, to be distinguished from destruction, I. i. 28. Swoon. See Sleep. Testimony prevails on the whole, despite the known force of prejudices, II. vii. 15. also despite partial untruth, reticence, or exaggeration in the witnesses, II. vii. 16. the failure even of like testimony in some other case would be no proof of its falsity here, II. vii. 18. all human, liable to be weakened without being destroyed, II. vii. 19. is destroyed, only where the witnesses are (a) incompetent, (ft) under falsifying influence, ibid. liability to error was at a minimum in the Christian witnesses, II. vii. 20. for gospel facts, is {a) real, (ft) considerable, (c) not incredible, {d) not overthrown by contrary evidence, II. vii. 21. Thought, cursory, danger of, if habitual, II. vii. 30. has no extension, Corr. iii. ; because not a being, ibid. iv. Time and space are necessarily presupposed in the existence of anything whatever, Corr. ii., iii. are rather incidents of the order of our ideas, than things objective, Corr. iii. And see Space. Tradition, historical, in favour of a primitive revelation, has weight due to it, I. vi. 18. Treatise (this), its force to be measured by the aggregate effect of its argu ments, Adv. 1, II. vii. 30, 40, 57, 63, 63. its design is not to vindicate God, but to establish the duty of man, II. viii. 10. object of, is to show how man ought in reason to behave, II. viii. 21. has all along worked from points of departure chosen by opponents, II. viii. 23. has waived the use of powerful weapons, liberty and moral fitness, II. viii. 24. has dealt with religion only as fact, II. viii. 25. meets objectors by showing {a) the existence of a moral government, and that there is no presumption against Christianity, (6) as fact, (c) as righteous, II. ix. 7, 8. general upshot of, II. viii. 27. is very far from satisfactory, II. viii. 17. Ubiquity. See Omnipresence. Understanding : not all are to understand, II. vi. 19. 460 INDEX. ^Uniformity of nature : the gospel does not more vary from, than nature from herself, II. ix. 18. Universe : dispensations of earth may operate beyond its limits, I. iii. 26, 28. material, its immensity, and presumption thence arising, I. iii. 28. creatures in very high states of perfection may perhaps owe it to pro bation, I. v. 31. manifestation of human character to other portions of creation, its pos sible intent and uses, I. v. 42. the scheme of government under which we live may have relations extending throughout the universe, I. vii. 5. Unknown : we may reason about, on the basis of the known, Intr. 9. Vegetables, not having perception or action, supply no analogy, I. i. 29. Veracity is, with justice, our rule of life ; but is not easy of application, Diss. II. 17. Vicarious punishment may be fit and necessary, II. v. 22 ; a providential appointment of every day's experience, ibid. Vice. See Virtue. becomes possible through liberty, I. v. 26. and through the nature of particular propensions, I. v. 27. this world a discipline of vice for most men, I. v. 34. absurd to feel secure in a life of: its pleasures trivia], I. vii. 12. punishment may follow it in the way of natural consequence, which is the act of God, II. v. 2, 3. its terrible aggravations, must have consequences in proportion, II. v. 6. linked with misery in our faculty of approval and disapproval, Diss. II. 5. vicious acts are also unfit, incongruous, and so forth, Diss. II. 7. not required as a predicate for the opposite of prudence. Diss. II. 11. produces an overbalance of misery, but this is not all, Diss. II. 13. Virtue : has the balance cast in its favour, but not invariable, nor always clear, I. iii. 5. especially in cases of lives once bad but reformed, I. iii. 6. balance clear as a whole, but initial, I. iii. 7. has support in the mental states annexed to it, and the forecast, I. iii. 10. also in civil punishments and in the fear of them, I. iii. 11. never punished as such, nor vice as such rewarded, I. iii. 12, 13. fears and hopes of a future life count on the same side as facts, I. iii. 14. also the favour and disfavour of the good, I. iii. 15. and the moral qualities in (a) civil government, (ft) treatment of children, (c) regard to virtue as such, {d) pardons given in absence of guilt, I. iii. 16. a, reversal of the relative estimates of virtue and vice, imaginary or unnatural, I. iii. 19, already God takes the side of, as against vice, I. iii. 21, 34. tendencies are, on its behalf, in excess of the facts, I. iii. 22, 24. this tendency, as against vice, compared with the tendency of reason to overcome force, I. iii. 23. can, with much less of power, hold its ground against vice, and is likely to prevail with a fair field, I. iii. 25. the hindrances to it may disappear hereafter, I. iii. 26. is, per se, a bond of union, I. iii. 27. INDEX. 461 Virtue {continued). may supposably attract hereafter spirits inaccessible to it here, I. iii. 28. if these advantages seem trifling matters, what should we say were they on the side of vice ? I. iii. 31. the change we anticipate is of degree, not kind, I. iii. 35. the lower degree warrants hope of the higher, I. iii. 36. the tendency is essential, the hindrances accidental, I. iii. 37. how men corruptly strive to substitute rites for virtuous action, II. i. 31. we have a faculty of moral approval and disapproval, Diss. II. 1. this is shown by evidence from many sources, Diss. II. 2. it has (a) a standard, (6) tests, Diss. II. 3. has action for its object, not consequences, nor abstract truth, Diss. II. 4. includes the notion of desert, and links misery with vice, Diss. II. 5. desert higher or lower according to the particulars of the case, Diss. II. 6. acts to be measured with reference to the agent, Diss. II. 7. includes a due regard to the happiness of ourselves, as of others, Diss. II. 8. virtue and vice not required as predicates in the discussion on prudence, Diss. II. 11. benevolence is a part only of virtue, its opposite of vice, I. iii. 3, Diss. II. 12 seqq. includes other matter besides the balance of enjoyment and suffering, Diss. II. 13. some authors open to misapprehension on the point, Diss. II. 15. basis for the pursuit of happiness, Diss. II. 16. Waste in nature, enormous, but unaccountable : does not disprove design, I. v. 35. Waterland, Dr., cited, II. i. 18 re. Whole : evidences of religion are to be viewed as a whole and in the reciprocal relations of their parts, II. vii. 30. WiU, of God, follows moral fitness, or the right and reason of the case, I. vi. 16 n., II. viii. 25. moral fitness anterior to will, II. viii. 24. ¦Witnesses, to the gospel : how their sacrifices, and all their circumstances, show their sincerity and otherwise give weight to their evidence, II. vii. 9. of the sub-apostolic age have also a great weight, II. vii. 12. their testimony may be weakened by enthusiasm ; but are they enthu siasts? II. vii. 13. the Christian : liability to error, how reduced in them to a minimum, II. vii. 20. Worlds, evidences of design in, I. iii. 1. Worship, a duty to be inferred from the harmony of God's government with our nature, I. vi. 15. Writing : whether revelation should be transmitted by, we are incompetent to judge, II. iii. 7> 8- Youth, related to maturity, as present life to future, I. v. 3, 18. END OF VOL. I. ©jforo PRINTED AT THE CLARENDON PRESS BY HORACE HART, PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY 3 9002 00571 2915