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BATTLE OF FRANKLIN

THE

BATTLE OF FRANKLIN

TENNESSEE

NOYEMBER 30, 1864

^ ilonograpi)

By JACOB D. COX
Late Major-General Commanding Twenty-third Abmy Corps

WITH MAPS

NEW YORK
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS
1897

Copyright, 1897,
By Charles Scribner's Sons.

John Wilson and Son, Cambkidgk, U.S.A.

CONTBI^^TS

CHAPTER I
PAGE
Introductory   1
Eesults of the Atlanta Campaign — Hood's Movement on Sherman's
Communications — Jefferson Davis's Relations to it — Beauregard's
— Hood's March across Alabama — Delay at Tuscnmbia — Sher
man's Decision tp March to the Sea ¦ — I'homas left in Tennessee —
Schofield joins him — Strength of contending Forces — Problem of
Concentration — Schofield .it I'ulaski — Hood's Advance — Scho
fleld 's Eetreat to Prauklin — Offer of Battle — Confederate Disaster
— Tactical Problems — Comparisons — Erroneous Accounts —
Official Records of the War — Schofield as Commander.

CHAPTER II
From Columbia to Franklin .... .21
The Line of Duck Eiver — Thomas urgent that Hood should be held
back — Positions of the Armies — Hood begins the Plank Movement
— Telegraphic Correspondence — How not to do it — Division of
Confederate Forces — Schofield's Cavalry lose Communication with
him — Combat at Spring Hill — ¦ Midnight March to Franklin.
CHAPTER III
Taking Position at Franklin .  37
Arrival at Franklin — No Bridge or Pontoons — Hood to be held back
— Schofield's Oral Directions — His Correspondence with Thomas
— Delay in Arrival of Eeinforcements at Nashville — Can you hold
Hood back three Days ¦? — Orders to continue Eetreat — The Posi
tion at Frankliu — The Carter House — The Towu and the Eiver
— The Field in Front — The Defensive Line — Repairing Bridges
— Twenty-third Corps Positions — Reilly's Division — Ruger's
Division — The Works on Carter Hill — Retrenchment across
Turnpike — Kimball's Division.

vi Contents
CHAPTER IV page
The Rear Guard — Wagner's Division  64
Guarding the Trains — Collecting the Stragglers — Halt on Winstead
HiU — Conditional Orders — Skirmishing with Forrest — Hood's
Infantry press close — Will he turn the Position or attack t —
AVagner withdraws Lane's Brigade to Privet Knob — Conrad's far
ther in Eear — Opdycke's within our Works — Wagner's Message
to Stanley — His Colloquy with Opdycke — His Orders to Lane and
Conrad to Fight — The Sergeants to fix Bayonets — lluger's Prep
arations — Confederates forming for the Attack.
CHAPTER V
The Confederate Array  83
Hood at Spring Hill — Discovers Schofield's Escape — Cavalry in
Pursuit — Infantry hastening after — He decides to Assault — His
Cavalry Positions — The Infantry — Deployment and Formation —
Stewart's Corps on Hood's Right — Cheatham's in Centre and Left
— Part of Lee's in Eeserve — Artillery in Intervals — Chalmers's
Cavalry on extreme Left — Hood's Headquarters.
CHAPTER VI
The Assault on Wagner's Outpost  91
View from the Knoll on our Left — Skirmishing in Front — The Out
post trying to intrench — Confederate Advance — Colonel Capers's
Description — Artillery opens on both Sides — Surgeon Hill's View
from Fort Granger — Orders sent along our Line — To Opdycke
in Eeserve — Eetreat of tbe Outpost — My Ride to the Centre —
Momentary Break there — Reilly's Rally — Opdycke's Rush for
ward — Strickland's Eaily — Meeting Stanley — i'he Din of Battle
— Stanley wounded. CHAPTER VII
The First Fight at the Centre . . . . . 102
Hood's Advance retarded by the Outpost- His Right Wing farthest
forward — My Staff at the Carter House — Wagner also there —

Contents vii
Messages from the Outpost — Wagner's Replies — Marshall's Guns
come in — Disorganized Eetreat of the Outpost — Wagner's Efforts
to rally — Swept along to the Town — Cannon iu the Enemy's
Hands — But soon retaken — Fight over the Batteries — Reilly's
Second Line charges — Fight at the Cotton-Giu — Destruction of
Confederates — Heroism of their Officers — Eeilly's Eeport —
Opdycke's Formation for the Charge — Position ofhis Regiments
— Of Strickland's — Focus of the Fight — Two Lines on Carter
Hill — Turn of the Tide.

CHAPTER VIII PAGE
The Fight of Our Left Wing .  121
Advance of Stewart's Corps — The narrowing Field — Thorny Hedges
— Changes in the Array — "Walthall's Report — Loring's Division
strikes Stiles — Fighting in the Railway Cut — Batteries at Close
Range — Loring Repulsed — The Attack ou Casement — General
Adams's Death — Our Line successfully held.

CHAPTER IX
The Fight of Our Right Wing . . .... 130
Cheatham's Corps — Convergent Attack of Cleburne and Brown —
Line of Lane's Eetreat — Moore's Brigade Front unmasked — Our
Artillery Cross-fire— - Advance of Bate's Division —Battery at the
Bostick" Place — Close Quarters at Moore's Centre — Help from
Kimball — Chalmers's Cavalry attack Kimball — Infantry attack
his Left — Cavalry his Centre and Eight — Confederates Repulsed.

CHAPTER X
The Situation at Sunset .... .... 141
Determined Fighting at the Centre — Examination of Strickland's
Line — Enemy holding outside of his Works — The Second Line
— Relative Position of Opdycke and Strickland — Orders to the
latter — Visit to Ruger — Wagner reorganizing— Visit to extreme
Left — Reinforcements for the Centre.

viii Contents
CHAPTER XI PAGE
From the Confederate Standpoint  148
Multiplication of Lines of Attack — How caused — Walthall's Descrip
tion of the Assault — In the Abattis — Eepulsed in Confusion — The
Ditch at the Cotton-gin — Brown's Attack on Right Centre— Bate
overlaps him — Johnson's Attack after Dark — Hood's Description
— S. D. Lee's — Colonel Capers's — Capture of Gordon — His
Account of the Charge — Cleburne falls.
CHAPTER xn
The Battle after Dark  160
In the Locust Grove — The Two Lines — Tbe 112th Illinois — Eeilly's
Detachment — Sweejiing tlie Ditches — Captain Cunningham's
Story — The Sergeant Major's — General Strahl's Death — Hood's
Eeserves — Rallying on them — Later Alarms — Orders to Wood's
Division — Preparations for Withdrawal.
CHAPTER XIII
Wilson's Cavalry Engagement  172
Morning Positions — Covering both Flanks of the Army — Forrest's
Advance — The Fords of the Harpeth — Confederates cross at
Hughes's Ford — Wilson attacks — Sharp Combat — Enemy re
treat across the Eiver — Covering the March to Nashville.
CHAPTER XIV
Our Withdrawal . . .  180
The Medical Department — Field Hospitals — Ambulance Train —
Sick and Wounded sent to Nashville — Work of Surgical Corps
during the Battle — Artillery graduaUy withdrawn — Arrangement
of Skirmish Lines — Movement of the Infantry — Orders as to Kim
ball's and Wagner's March — Misunderstanding — Marcli of Euger,
Opdycke, and Reilly — A burning Building — The Field in Front
— The March to Nashville.

Contents ix
CHAPTER XV
PAGE
Franklin after the Battle  194
Hood's Midnight Order — Condition of his Array — Discussion of
Probabilities — Confederates move by the Flank — Experiences of
the Carter Family — Colonel Carter's Story — Defensive Armor —
Kefuge in the CeUar — The terrible iSighfc — Captaiu Carter's Fate
— Private Gist's Adventures — General Cooper's Retreat.
CHAPTER XVI
Results and Lessons  207
Sources of Statistical Knowledge — Hood's Forces before the Battle —
Schofield's — Numbers actually engaged — Hood's . Casualties —
Loss of Officers — Schofield's Losses — Analysis of them — The
Problem of Attack and Defence - Fire Discipline.
CHAPTER XVII
Discussion of Wagner's Conduct . . .... 220
Natural Rise of Controversies — Corps Feeling — Good Comradeship
¦ — Wagner's Personal Situation — Disposition to befriend him —
Criticisms by his Subordinates — Efforts to allay the Irritation
— Correspondence — Preliminary Reports — Conrad's Eeport —
Wagner retired from the Division — Leaves the Army.
CHAPTER XVIII
Double Breastworks on Carter Hill  233
Tbe Two Lines at our Right Centre — Conflicting Memory of Eye
witnesses — Confederate Testimony — Solution of tbe Matter —
BuUet Marks on Brick Smoke-house — Summary of the Evidence.
CHAPTER XIX
The Rallying of the Outpost Brigades .... 243
Value of Detailed Reports — Landmarks — Lines of Retreat from the
Outpost— Crowding toward the Centre — Significant Omissions —
Lists of Missing — What they Teach — Reports Compared — Inci
dents relating to Captured Flags — Statements of various Officers
— ¦ Conclusions from the Facts.

X Contents

CHAPTER XX
PAGE
An Unexpected Controversy  258
Colonel Stone's Paper in Century War Book — General Stanley's
Criticism — A Violent Attack — Earlier Correspondence — Nine
Points — Two Corrections — Basis of a 11 istorical Narratii'e.

CHAPTER XXI
Controverted Points ...  266
Work assigned the Twenty-third Corps — Detachment of Fourth
Corps Batteries — Orders to Ruger and Kimball — Detachments
often Necessary — Articles of War and Regulations — Questions
of Command — ¦ Stanley on North Side of River — His Eide to the
Front — Soon Wounded — lie Retires — Statements of Officers —
At the F''ield Hospital — At Schofield's Headquarters — Summary
— Official Reports — Analysis of Stanley's — Contemporaneous
Eeeords — Conclusion.

APPENDICES
A. General Schofield's Report .
B. General Cox's Report . .
C. General Wood's Report .
D. General Stanley's Report .
E. Colonel Dew's Statement
F. Colonel Cox's Statements . .

305
311323327
332336

INDEX . .  341

BOOKS OF FREQUENT REFERENCE
Their Full Titles
Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Series
I. Referred to by the initials O. R., -with the numbers of
the original volumes in parts.
Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. 4 vols. The Century
Co. 1884-88. Referred to as Century War Book.
Sketches of War History. Papers published by the Ohio Com-
mandery of the Loyal Legion. Referred to as Ohio L. L.
Papers.
History of the Army of the Cumberland. By Thomas B. Van
Horne, Chaplain U. S. A. 2 vols. 8vo, and Atlas. Cincin
nati: Robert Clarke & Co. 1875. Referred to as Van
Home's Army of the Cumberland.
The Life of Major General George H. Thomas. By Thomas B.
Van Horne, U. S. A. New York : Charles Scribner's Sons.
1882. Referred to as Van Home's Life of Thomas.
Narrative of Military Operations directed, during the late War
between the States, by Joseph E. Johnston, General C. S. A.
New York: Appleton & Co. 1874. Referred to as Johnston's
Narrative.
Rise and Fall of the Confederate Govemment. By Jefferson
Davis. New York : Appleton & Co. 1881. Referred to as
Da'yis's Rise and FaU, etc.
Advance and Retreat: Personal Experiences in the United
States and Confederate States Armies. By J. B. Hood,
Lieut. General Confederate Army. New Orleans. 1880.
Referred to as Hood's Advance and Retreat.
Campaigns of the Civil War : Atlanta. By Jacob D. Cox, late
Major General Commanding Twenty-third Army Corps.
New York : Charles Scribner's Sons. 1881. Referred to
as Atlanta.
Campaigns of the Civil War : The March to the Sea, Franklin
and Nashville. By Jacob D. Cox, etc. New York : Charles
Scribner's Sons. 1882. Referred to as Franklin and Nash
viUe.
Campaigns of the Civil War : Statistical Record of the Armies
of the United States. By Frederick Phisterer, late Captain
U. S. A. New York : Charles Scribner's Sons. 1883. Re
ferred to as Phisterer's Statistical Record.

LIST OF MAPS
1. Map of Middle Tennessee and Northern Alabama. To face Chapter I.
2. Sketch Map of Carter Hill, from Survey by Colonel M. B.
Carter. To face Page 43.
3. Map of the Battle-field of Franklin. By Major W. J. Twi
ning, U. S. A., Chief Engineer Army of the Ohio. The
original of this Map is in the Atlas accompanying the
Official Records, Plate CXXXV., C, No. 5. To face Page 45.
4. Map of the Battle-field of Franklin. By Major W. F. Foster,
Engineer of Stewart's Corps, Confederate Army. The
original of this Map is in the Atlas accompanying the
Official Records, Plate LXXIIL, No. 3. To face Page 83.

THE BATTLE OP FRANKLIN
CHAPTER I
INTEODUCTORY
Results of the Atlanta Campaign — Hood's Movement on Sherman's
Communications — Jefferson Davis's Relations to it — Beauregard's
— Hood's March across Alabama — Delay at Tuscumbia — Sher
man's Decision to March to the Sea — Thomas left in Tennessee
— Schofield joins him — Strength of contending Forces — Prob
lem of Concentration — Schofield at Pulaski — Hood's Advance —
Schofield's Retreat to Franklin — Offer of Battle — Confederate Dis
aster — Tactical Problems — Comparisons — Erroneous Accounts
— Official Records of the War — Schofield as Commander.
That the battle of Franklin was a hard fought and
bloody combat is now generally known ; but this of
itself would not warrant a monograph giving with
some fulness of detail the progress and the incidents
of the fight. There must be a limit to the minuteness
of history even in the most important events, and in
military history no less than in the narration of civil
affairs. When, however, a battle proves to be a turn
ing point in a decisive campaign, — when it marks
the "beginning of the end " in such a contest as our
civil war, — when it justifies the strategy of such a
leader as Sherman in his division of his forces in
Georgia and making the March to the Sea, — when in
addition to this the combat may be fairly said to be a
crucial experiment in the problem of attack and de
fence of fieldworks iu an open country, — we can
1

2 The Battle of FrankUn
hardly place a limit to the desirability of detailed
knowledge. Everything which helps to a complete
understanding is then made welcome. Even those
things which at first blush may seem trivial are not
so if they aid us in comprehending how men live, and
act, and think, and fight, and die, on such a stub
bornly contested field.
In all these respects the battle of Franklin was an
important one ; but besides these claims upon histori
cal attention, it was for a long tirae greatly mis
understood, and controversies of all sorts grew out of
it and the campaign of which it was a part. For
thirty years the author has been frequently urged by
his comrades to accept the task of writing the story
of the battle, and when he had prepared a brief his
tory of the campaign,^ the desire for a much fuller
account of the battle itself did not appear to be
satisfied. He made conditional promises that, if he
should live to see the completion of the great work
undertaken by the government in printing the " Offi
cial Records of the Union and Confederate Armies,"
he would accept the duty. The last volumes of the
principal series of those records are passing through
the press, and the following pages are written in the
effort to redeem his promise.
Soon after the fall of Atlanta, Mr. Davis, the Con
federate President, visited General Hood in his
Georgia camp for a conference upon the further
prosecution of the campaign. Hood's energy was
indomitable, and he still believed in aggressive strat
egy. In this he had the sympathy of Davis, who had
constantly shown his dissatisfaction with Johnston's
defensive policy, and who was ready to believe Hood's
I The March to the Sea : Frankliu and Nashville. Charles Scrib
ner's Sons, 1882.

Introductory 3
over-sanguine assertions that his army had not suf
fered in its morale by the bloody and unsuccessful
engagements around Atlanta or by the loss of that
important strategic point. Hood's proposal to turn
Sherman's position by a somewhat wide detour to the
west of Atlanta, and to carry the war again into
Northern Georgia, or even into Tennessee, met with
Mr. Davis's complete approval, and in a speech to
the troops he was so far carried away by the desire
to stimulate their confidence and their courage that
he imprudently announced the general plan of cam
paign. The speech got into the newspapers, and came to
Sherman's ears. It need hardly be said that, with
his characteristic alertness of mind and quickness of
decision, he set himself the task of defeating his
enemies' expectation. He would not give them the
appearance even of success, and at the last moment,
before breaking his communications with the North,
and starting on his March to the Sea, he used Davis's
defiantly proclaimed purpose to overcome the last of
Grant's doubts. "The whole burden of his song,"
he wrote to the General in Chief, " consisted in the
statement that Sherman's communications must be
broken, and his army destroyed. Now it is a well
settled principle that, if we can prevent his succeed
ing in his threat, we defeat him, and derive all the
moral advantages of a victory. " ^ Sherman gave
Hood full credit " for his skilful and rapid lodgment
made on the railroad,"^ but pointed out that he had
preserved his own communications by his rapid chase
of the enemy, and had taken from Hood the advan-
1 Sherman to Grant, November 6, 1864, O. E., xxxix. part iii.
p. 659. 2 Ibid,

4 The Battle of FrankUn
tage of the movement, by forcing him into the long
march in retreat across northern Alabama into
Mississippi. "To have dogged him far over into
Mississippi, trusting to some happy accident to bring
him to bay and to battle," though rauch might be
said in favor of it, "would be," he concluded, to
" play into his hands by being drawn or decoyed too
far away from our original line of advance. " ^ So
he cut the knot, and gave orders for the concentra
tion of his own column at Atlanta, and for the raarch
through Georgia.
The game, at this stage, was a magnificent one.
Hood's plan proved a railitary character and mind
of no ordinary powers, and he had carried it out
with a celerity and vigor that were in complete keep
ing with it. The probabilities were all in favor of
his success. The odds were a hundred to one that
his march to Tuscumbia, in the northwest corner
of Alabama, would be met by Sherman's transfer
by railroad to meet him at Columbia or Pulaski, in
southern Tennessee. Grant's dispatches show that
he would have continued the pursuit, and this alone
is a sufficient tribute to Hood's ability.^ Sherraan
met him with a still greater audacity than his
own, and with a success followed by far reaching
consequences, which precipitated the fate of the
Confederacy. Under pressure frora influential men in the Con
federate Congress, Mr. Davis had assigned General
Beauregard to the coraraand of the two departments
which had been under Generals Hood and Taylor,
but with limitations which iraplied that he should
1 Sherman to Grant, November 6, 1864, 0. R., xxxix. part iii.
p. 659. 2 Id., p. 576.

Introductory 5
not assume active command of either army in the
field unless an exigency made it necessary. Hood
was disposed to raake the most of his independence,
and Beauregard limited himself generally to advice
and suggestions, the larger plan being supposed to
have been settled between Davis and Hood at the
beginning of the new campaign.^ Beauregard's rela
tions to the active army remained merely nominal,
though he gradually became more pressing in his
urgency that Hood should resume vigorous offensive
activity. The latter found the railways near Tus
cumbia badly out of order, and thought it necessary
to accumulate twenty days' supplies before crossing
the Tennessee River. ^ General Wheeler, the cavalry
comraander, who had been left near Georgia, had
sent him accurate information of the movements of
Sherman's different corps, and of the stateraents of
prisoners that Sherman was expecting to march to
Savannah; but he preferred to interpret the news
in accordance with his wishes, and on the 4th of No
veraber reported to Richraond that Sherman seeraed
to be concentrating his army at Huntsville and
Decatur in Alabama.^ When he finally became con
vinced that Sherman in person, with a veteran army,
was marching toward the Atlantic coast, he was torn
by conflicting motives as to his own course, and it
required the peremptory orders of Beauregard to put
an end to his delay. But it was now the last week
in November; nearly a month had been given
Sherman and Thomas to complete the arrangements
^ See dispatches between Davis and Beauregard, O. R., xxxix.
part iii. pp. 782, 785, 870, 874, 879.
2 Hood to Taylor, Id., p. 868 ; to Seddon, Secretary of War, p. 870;
to Railway Officials and Quartermaster, p. 871 ; to Beauregard, p. 888.
3 Wheeler to Hood, O. R., xxxix. part iii. pp. 859, 878. Hood to
War Department, Id., p. 888.

6 The Battle of FrankUn
for a double campaign, and Sherman's start was too
long a one, both in time and in distance, to give the
Confederates any hope of overtaking him. To force
the fighting with Thomas was the only course left,
and this was what Beauregard ordered.^
The contrast between the boldness and vigor of
Hood's October campaign and his delay after reach
ing Tuscumbia points to a consciousness on his part
that he had been outgeneralled, though he kept up a
show of satisfaction at Sherman's division of his
array, followed by the wide separation of its parts.
He even wrote to Davis, that, should Sherman " move
two or three corps south from Atlanta," he thought
it would be " the best thing that could happen for
the general good" of the Confederacy. ^ But Davis
reminded hira that this iraplied that prompt advan
tage should be taken of the dispersion to beat his
adversary in detail.^ The troops left under General
Thomas were necessarily scattered, and for Hood to
give him time to concentrate was to imperil the cam
paign. His true policy was, plainly, to risk every
thing on the quickest and strongest advance against
Thomas, living upon the country, or trusting to suc
cess to give him possession of some of the national
depots of supply. He was at Tuscumbia on the 30th
of October, and next day reported that he was in
possession of Florence (on the north bank of the
Tennessee), and was laying a pontoon bridge.* He
did not begin his advance northward till the 21st of
November.^ Knowing, as we do, the energy of his
'' Beauregard to Hood, November 17, 0. R., xiv. part i. p. 1215.
Hood reported that he had only seven of the twenty days' needed sup
plies on hand. Ibid.
2 O. R., xxxix. part iii. p. 891. s Id, p. 896.
4 Id., p. 870. '- 0. R., xiv. part i. p. 1236.

Introductory 7
character, it is incredible that he should have waited
so long unless he were hoping that soraething would
happen to raake it feasible to follow Sherraan, by
showing that the latter was raoving upon Selraa or
Mobile instead of Savannah.
In arranging his plans for the March to the Sea,
Sherman had from the first deterrained to put
Thoraas in general command of all that was left
behind, and which lay east of the Mississippi River.
For himself, he did not mean to make a subordinate
operation with a detachment, but to move an army
which would be fit to make the campaign of the
Carolinas after he should reach Savannah, and
which could cope even with Lee's army if it should
break away from Richraond. Definite plans beyond
Savannah were postponed till he should be successful
in reaching the coast, but the contingency of a march
northward was prominent in his raind from the
beginning. As he raust move from Atlanta with
out lines of supply or communication, he must strip
his army of every unnecessary weight or encum
brance, and must look for no help or reinforcement
on the way. His column must necessarily dirainish
by the attrition of the campaign, and would be
strongest at the start. Thomas's, on the other hand,
would be weakest at the start, but would be rapidly
increased by new troops which were moving to the
front, by return of the convalescents of the whole
army, and by detachments from the departments
west of the Mississippi. The principal of these last
was a portion of the Sixteenth Corps, supposed to
be ten thousand strong, under General A. J. Smith,
who was already under orders to proceed from
Missouri to Tennessee.^
1 O. R., xxxix. part iii. pp. 477, 494, 595.

8 The Battle of Franklin
Sherman had at first planned to send back the
Fourth Corps, and to take the Twenty-third Corps
with him, leaving General Schofield to support
General Thomas with the troops of the Department
of the Ohio wliich were in Kentucky and East
Tennessee. But when Schofield returned from ab
sence at the North, and rejoined the array at Gayles-
ville, Alabaraa, on October 22d, he was very unwilling
to part with the corps. It was, besides, much re
duced by the casualties of the year's campaigns, and
greatly needed to be recruited. When, then, we
got news that Hood had appeared at Decatur, and,
being repulsed there, had marched to Tuscumbia,
Schofield suggested that, if the corps were sent into
Tennessee, it could be recruited, a division of new
troops could be added to it, and he himself could
take active field service under Thomas. Before that
time it had seemed probable that Hood would follow
Sherraan southward with at least the greater part
of his army; but his committal to a movement in
force into middle Tennessee made it apparent that
Thoraas might need reinforcement before troops frora
distant positions could come to him. Thomas was
fearful that troops from Missouri could not reach
him soon enough, but said that if he had Schofield
he should feel perfectly safe. On the 28th of October,
therefore, Sherman announced his intention of send
ing the Twenty-third Corps, as well as the Fourth,
to General Thomas, and to take with him the re
mainder of his army, thus reduced to about fifty
thousand men. It turned out that the hurry of ab
sentees to rejoin their commands increased his num
bers somewhat, before communications were broken. ^
' 0. R., xxxix. part iii. Sherman to Halleck, October 27, p. 461 ;
Schofield to Sherman, p. 468 ; Sherman to HaUeck, October 28, p. 476 ;

Introductory 9
The effective force under General Thomas, in
middle and southern Tennessee, was sixty-five thou
sand five hundred, officers and men "present for
duty equipped," which was the official phrase indi
cating complete readiness for active service. The
aggregate present was some twenty thousand raore. ^
These figures do not include the troops in Schofield's
Department of the Ohio in East Tennessee and
Kentucky, nor those of the Military Division between
the Tennessee and Mississippi Rivers, all of which
were subject to Thomas's orders. Hood's army in
the field numbered forty-two or forty -three thousand
men of all arms, and had been very closely estimated
by General Sherman.^ Thoraas's problem, therefore,
was chiefly one of concentration in time to raeet
Hood's advance, and the delay of the latter, whether
necessary or not, was more than could have been
hoped for. As early as October 29th, Sherman, in
promising to send Schofield back, had urged Thomas
to " break up all minor posts, and get about Columbia
as big an array as you can, and go at hira. " ^ Again,
two days later, he reiterated, "You must unite all
your men into one army, and abandon all minor
points, if you expect to defeat Hood."* In pursu
ance of this policy, Thomas ordered Schofield with
the Twenty-third Corps to join Stanley and the
Fourth Corps at Pulaski, on the railroad between
Sherman to Beckwith, p. 477 ; Thomas to HaUeck, p. 582 ; Sherman
to Thomas, pp. 484, 497, 499, 514.
I Tri-monthly Official Return of General Thomas for November 20,
1864, which was the first after the severance from Sherman. The
effectives were increased by 9,700 in the next ten days. O. R., xiv.
part i. pp. 52, 53, 54. As to Hood's forces, see chap, xxi., post,
2 Sherman to Grant, 0. R., xxxix. part iii. p. 576 ; to Thomas, Id.,
p. 599. 8 Id., p. 498. * Id., p. 535.

10 The Battle of Franklin
Columbia and Decatur, though it was necessary to
send one brigade temporarily to Johnsonville, on the
Tennessee River west of Nashville, to meet a raid
that Forrest was making in West Tennessee by way
of diversion in favor of Hood.
General Schofield reached Pulaski on November
13th,i and assumed command of the two corps of
infantry, and of the cavalry corps under General
Jaraes H. Wilson, as the latter gradually asserabled,
and the army in the field consisted of these organiza
tions until the general concentration at Nashville on
December 1st, after the battle of Franklin. Bach
of these corps was reinforced by some new troops,
and some small detachments of older ones, but their
general organization remained. A question of rank
between General Schofield and General Stanley was
before the War Department, but General Thomas had
not heard of its decision in favor of Schofield when
he assigned him to coraraand in the field. He in
forraed General Halleck of what he had done, and
gave his reasons for hoping that his action would be
sustained, as was in fact done.'-' Sherman advised
that the two veteran corps should be filled up to
twenty-five thousand each, and that Thomas should
take the field in person when the enemy should ad
vance. Thomas replied that such was his purpose.^
Both the corps, however, had only the force intended
for one, in the period of the campaign we are now
considering, and at Pulaski only one division of the
Twenty-third Corps was present.
1 0. R., xxxix. part iii. p. 768 ; Id., xiv. part i. pp. 885, 886.
2 Thomas to Halleck, 0. R., xxxix. part iii. p. 666 ; to Schofield,
p. 691. See also Thomas's order, Id., p. 638; Grant to Halleck, Id.,
p. 684 ; Halleck to Sherraan, Id., p. 64.
8 Id., p. 68.5.

Introductory 11
Hood moved his infantry forward from his bridge
at Florence on the 21st and 22d of Noveraber, i march
ing upon Colurabia by way of Lawrenceburg and
Mount Pleasant, turning Schofield's position at
Pulaski upon the Nashville and Decatur Railroad.
Schofield withdrew his little army in echelon, by
way of Lynnville and Hurricane, keeping just ahead
of Hood in the convergent movements upon Columbia,
and reaching the latter place on the 24th, barely in
tirae to prevent Hood from anticipating him. Our
army remained there till the 27tli, when the enemy's
operations to turn the position by the other flank
(our left) forced our retirement to the north bank of
Duck River. There, the more detailed account of
events preceding the battle of Franklin will begin.^
At Franklin, on the 30th of November, Hood was
pressing so close upon our columns that it becarae
necessary to choose between abandoning our wagon
trains and resisting him on the south side of the
Harpeth River. Schofield resolved to take the risk
of fighting although the stream was at our backs,
and the result fully justified hira. The repulse of
the Confederates was so destructive, that, though
Thomas thought it wise to withdraw Schofield to
Nashville and make his concentration there where
A. J. Smith's troops had just arrived. Hood's advance
from the Harpeth was the merest bravado, and was
naturally followed by the final ruin of his army. No
intelligent officer on either side was ignorant of the
fact that the heart of the Confederate army was
broken, and the character of the fighting was, from
that day, in marked contrast with what it had been
before. 1 O. R., xiv. part i. p. 1236.
2 Chap, ii., post.

12 The Battle of Franklin
Anticipating the judgraent which history must
give, ranking the battle of Franklin as the crisis in
the campaign and the veritable "beginning of the
end," Hood, in his report of December llth, treated
it as a necessary result of the failure of his subor
dinates on the 29th of November, at Spring Hill, to
obey his orders with energy. There, he said, "was
lost the opportunity for striking the eneray for which
we had labored so long, the best which this cam
paign has offered, and one of the best afforded us
during the war. " ^ A critical examination does
not justify this effort to shift the responsibility, but
it remains a very significant recognition of the fact
that Franklin sealed the fate of the campaign.
Jefferson Davis clearly, though in cautious phrase,
bears witness to the same truth when, in his " Rise
and Fall of the Confederate Government," he says
of the battle, that it was " one of the bloodiest of the
war, whose results materially affected the future. "^
Davis sympathized with and defended the brilliant
aggressive strategy of the campaign, though he
limited his own advice to the operations within the
State of Georgia, and the confines of northeastern
Alabama. He had removed Johnston frora command
because of his persistent Fabian policy, but was forced
by the results to throw doubts upon the wisdom of
the attack at Franklin. Beauregard, Hood's imme
diate superior, in his general report of April 15th,
added his testimony by saying, "It is clear to ray
mind that, after the great loss and waste of life at
Franklin, the army was in no condition to make a
successful attack on Nashville. " ^ He would rather
1 O. R., xiv. part i. p. 657.
2 Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, vol. ii. p. 575,
? 0. R., xiv. part i. p. 651.

Introductory 13
have moved on Murfreesboro, and then sought winter
quarters behind the Duck or Tennessee River, detach
ing a force for the protection of South Carolina. His
tribute to the character and courage of the troops, all
who had personal knowledge of the carapaign will
unite in. " Untoward and calamitous as were the
issues of this campaign," he said, "never in the
course of this war have the best qualities of our
soldiery been more conspicuously shown ; never more
enthusiasm evinced than when our troops once more
crossed the Tennessee River; never greater gallantry
than that which was so general at Franklin; and
never higher fortitude and uncomplaining devotion
to duty than were displayed on the retreat from
Nashville to Tupelo. " ^ General Johnston supports,
in substance, both parts of Beauregard's statement,
though his words are strongly tinged with sarcasm
at the results which followed his own removal from
command. Of the officers and raen of that army, he
says, " Their courage and discipline were unsubdued
by the slaughter to which they were recklessly offered
in the four attacks on the Federal army near Atlanta
as they proved in the useless butchery at Franklin,
and survived the rout and disorganization at Nash
ville as they proved at Bentonville. " ^
I need not go beyond these Confederate authorities
of the first rank for support of my assertion that this
battle was the turning point in a great campaign,
and fully justified Sherman's plan. Its character as
a crucial experiment in the problem of attack of field
1 0. R., xiv. part i. p. 651.
2 Narrative of Military Operations, p. 365. The battle of Benton-
viUe, North Carolina, was the last engagement between Sherman and
the Confederates, and Johnston had been restored to his command.
For the four attacks by Hood near Atlanta, see my volume " Atlanta "
(Scribner's Campaigns of the Civil War), chap. xii.

14 The Battle of FrankUn
fortifications will appear in the progress of my nar
rative. Hood bore with patience the penalty of fail
ure, but justice requires the clear acknowledgment
that his faith in the attack has been, and perhaps
still is, the prevalent military creed in Continental
Europe. Plis tactics of assault in deployed line with
supports are not far from the approved methods sup
posed to be developed by late wars. It would be
hard to match in dash or in perseverance the veteran
Confederate battalions of 1864 ; it would be impos
sible to surpass the leadership of the officers who
headed the charges upon the field. If theory is
worth testing at all, no real soldier will be hard on
Hood for testing it. It was, without doubt, our
general conclusion in 1864-65, that the strategic
initiative and tactical defence had the best of it.
But the race characteristics and the educated qual
ities of men make such a difference that it would be
rash to conclude that American experience is con
clusive for Germans or Frenchmen. To raake a
rapid march, then halt and construct efficient cover
whilst a vigorous eneray is approaching, requires an
intelligence, alert handiness, and coolness in the
rank and file and in the subordinate officers which
cannot always and everywhere be expected. The
ability to await an attack is also a very variable
quality. In bayonet charges, it is notorious that
one side or the other usually breaks before bayonets
are actually crossed. With material like our fron
tiersmen, among whom a half-dozen cool and deter
mined soldiers and scouts, burrowing in a "buffalo
wallow " upon the plains, will " stand off " a hun
dred Indians, almost anything can be done.^ The
^ General Nelson A. Miles's Personal RecoUections, p. 173.

Introductory 15
reader must judge how far the personal element
counted at Franklin on both sides.
The comparative smallness of the opposing armies
is likely to lead to an under estimate of the desperate
character of the fighting. The analysis of the forces
engaged in the actual attack and defence will come
later. 1 It is enough now to note the fact that Hood
had more men killed at Franklin than died on one
side in sorae of the great conflicts of the war where
three, four, or even five times as many men were
engaged. His killed were more than Grant's at
Shiloh, McClellan's in the Seven-days' battle. Burn-
side's at Fredericksburg, Rosecrans's at Stone's
River or at Chickamauga, Hooker's at Chancellors-
ville, and alraost as many as Grant's at Cold Harbor.
The concentration in time, in those few hours of a
winter afternoon and evening, raakes the comparison
still more telling. ^ It raay be properly said, there
fore, that the intrinsic iraportance of the battle, frora
the purely railitary point of view, warrants a full
study of its history in all its features.
The early treatment of the subject was peculiarly
unsatisfactory to the great majority of the officers
and men who participated in it on either side. This
was in great part due to the fact that the period
following the war was one in which military writ
ings took naturally the form of personal memoirs or
1 See chap, xvi., post.
2 See tables in Phisterer's Statistical Record of the Armies of the
United States (Scribner's Campaigns of the Civil War), pp. 213-218.
The comparisons are necessarily made with losses on the National side,
because no analyzed tables of the Confederate losses exist. The num
ber of Hood's killed at Frankliu is that given in General Thomas's
official report, i. e. 1,750. See chap, xvi., post. Colonel Maurice gives
the number of those actually killed at Waterloo, out of the British
army of 43,000, as 1,759. Maurice, War, p. 83.

16 The Battle of Franklin
histories of particular organizations, such as regi
ments, brigades, divisions, and corps. In the narra
tives of the experience of a single organization, it
was not to be expected that a symmetrical history
of a campaign should be given, and there would be
little ground for complaint that other organizations
should receive scant attention, even when all were
busily participating in the events described. In
regard to the larger organizations, however, such as
corps and wings of a larger army, it was almost
inevitable that such a mode of writing should be
misleading. The whole history of a campaign or
battle would seem to be given, and the reader would
naturally assume that he had the whole, unless he
were distinctly told that the narrative was confined
to a part of the array.
In the carapaign of Noveraber, 1864, against Hood,
the two organizations of the Army of the Cumberland
and the Army of the Ohio were each represented by
a corps. Only those quite farailiar with the army
know this, and when Chaplain Van Horne wrote his
history of the Array of the Cumberland, including
this campaign, it was commonly supposed to cover
the whole field and the services of both corps referred
to. The book was an important one among the earlier
historical publications concerning the Civil War,
and was largely quoted and followed by general his
torians of the period. As to the battle of Franklin,
the troops which occupied during the whole battle
five sixths of the line, a raile long, on which Hood
made his desperate infantry attacks, found them
selves ignored. They read accounts of the battle in
which they were not even mentioned. Time, of
course, gradually corrected some of the errors and
misapprehensions. In a second book, the "Life of

Introductory 17
General Thoraas," Van Horne materially modified
his earlier treatraent of the subject, and handled it
in a more comprehensive way. Other noteworthy
papers appeared, written by participants in the cam
paign or by eminent journalists and literary men
who personally visited the field. ^ A much more
correct idea of the campaign and of the battle was
the result of this free discussion, although for a
time each new publication seemed to start new
questions for debate. It was entirely natural that
my own statements of fact, in my little volume
already mentioned, should be questioned; for the
brevity of treatment raade it impossible to give the
wide array of public documents and private evidence
which supported my own recollection. As new points
appeared, I have tried to obtain the well considered
remembrance of surviving actors in the campaign,
but the reader will notice how largely this had been
done prior to the publication of ray book in 1882.
It will thus be seen that I did not speak at randora,
and that I used reasonable diligence in testing ray
own meraory before raaking historical statements.
Absolute freedom from error was, of course, improb
able ; but raore thorough investigation has fully sus
tained the general accuracy of ray narrative.
The publication of the Official Records begins a
new epoch in the study of our Civil War. The
1 Among these were a narration by Gen. Eraerson Opdycke, New
York Times, Sept. 10, 1882 ; F. H. Burr, in Philadelphia Press,
March, 1883; Rev. Dr. H. M. Field, in New York EvangeUst, and
in his book " Bright Skies and Dark Shadows " ; Prof. W. W. Gist, iu
Cedar Rapids, Iowa, Republican, September, 1883 ; Col. Henry Stone,
in Century War Book ; Capt. Thomas Speed and Capt. L. T. Scofield,
in Loyal Legion papers of Ohio Commandery ; Maj. D. W. Sanders
(Confederate), in Southern Bivouac, 1885; Gen. B. F. Cheatham,
in Louisville Courier Journal, December, 1881 ; General Hood's
"Advance and Retreat," etc. 2

18 The Battle of FranMin
fortunate preservation of Confederate records and
their careful collection by the commissioners must
be a matter of congratulation amongst all lovers of
truth, and of pride in the heart of every Araerican.
The notion of saving only the records of our own
side was promptly discarded. The whole truth was
wanted, and as part of the officially collected records
of the Confederate governraent were lost in the clos
ing scenes of the conflict, neither labor nor cost was
spared to replace missing papers by authentic copies
which had been privately preserved. The voluminous
mass which fills the hundred bulky volumes may
seera at first like an excess of material; but there
can be no excess in such a matter. Formal reports
may give distorted views of past events, but the cur
rent dispatches and correspondence from day to day
and hour to hour expose all glozing of errors or
false clairas of victory. We cannot have too perfect
a presentation of the details which make up the
actual life of the scene, with the hopes and the pur
poses, the current knowledge and apprehension, the
hesitation and the decisive act of every responsible
participant in such great events. In this library of
telltale evidence each officer of any prominence has
accumulated the proofs of character as to accuracy,
candor, judgment, modesty, and, when the question
of the value of his statement or the weight of his
opinion is raised, the historian will not have far to
seek for the means of determining it. In the same
cloud of witnesses will be found the raeans of set
tling the truth when formal statements are conflict
ing. Established facts will be fixed by the general
current of evidence ; and accord with these, or dis
agreement, will test the correctness of particular
reports or claims. Bearing these things in mind, I

Introductory 19
have not spared pains in verifying my recollection
by references to the Official Records, so that the
reader who chooses to do so may test the statements
of the text by the original sources of knowledge in
this field.
A few matters have been subjects of discussion or
of controversy to such an extent that their complete
treatment would too much impede the current of
continuous narrative. My method, therefore, will
be to tell the story first, with, as nearly as may be,
an equal fulness of detail in the parts, and then
devote a few chapters to the raore particular discus
sion of sorae controverted points, taking up each in
turn. When we fasten our attention upon the subordinate
parts in such a battle as Franklin, we seera to lose
sight of the most important of all, — the controlling
will which directs the whole. This is especially
true as to the national side, because the plan of
defence was a simple one, and there were few oppor
tunities for new orders after the battle was opened.
It must not be forgotten that the decision as to each
step in the movement from Pulaski to Franklin had
rested with General Schofield as commandant in the
field. This decision had to be made in what were
sometimes very trying circumstances, as at Columbia
and Spring Hill. It was his responsible duty to
decide at Franklin whether he would place his forces,
as they arrived, upon the north bank of the Harpeth
River, running the great risk of the loss of his array
trains, or give battle on the south side, in. front of
the town, with the great disadvantage of having the
river at our back. When he had deterrained to fight,
he had to fix the general plan, and give the orders
which alloted to his subordinates their positions and

20 The Battle of FrankUn
their duty. He was always ready to listen to sug
gestions and opinions, and was most considerate in
allowing all reasonable discretion in the perform
ance of duty by those under him ; but he fully as
sumed his own burden of responsibility, and decided
promptly what his duty called upon hira to decide.
He selected his own position with thoughtful refer
ence to the efficient performance of his own task,
present or future, according to the actual situation
or the probable sequence of affairs.
But it is not only in the foresight shown in plan
ning and in issuing the larger orders that a com
manding officer makes himself felt by his immediate
subordinates. He can do much by keeping up fre
quent communication with them, even though no new
directions are called for. His messages of encour
agement, of inquiry, of suggestion in case of contin
gencies, in a hundred ways keep up the contact of
mind with raind, and carry his own spirit and will
to those who are executing his commands. In all
these respects. General Schofield had a high ideal of
duty, and fully performed it. If, then, the account
of the battle of Franklin shall seem to the reader to
be mostly made up of the personal actions of those
who were upon the fighting line, from private soldiers
upward, he may well be reminded that, from begin
ning to end, those whose duty it was to carry out the
purposes of the commander found theraselves in con
stant touch with hira, and were conscious of the dis
tinct influence of his courage, his confidence, and his
full comprehension and coraraand of the situation.

CHAPTER n
FROM COLUMBIA TO FRANKLIN
The Line of Duck River — Thomas urgent that Hood should be held
back — Positions of the Armies — Hood begins the Flank Move
ment — Telegraphic Correspondence — How not to do it — Division
of Confederate Forces — Schofield's Cavalry lose Communication
with him — Combat at Spring Hill — Midnight March to Franklin.
On Monday, the 28th of November, 1864, the army
under General Schofield was holding the line of the
Duck River, opposite Columbia. Hood's advance from
Florence, on the Tennessee, had been by way of Law
renceburg upon Columbia, and had made our position
at Pulaski untenable, for the route of the Confederates
carried them far beyond our right flank. To gain
time for the expected arrival of reinforcements frora
Missouri under General A. J. Sraith was the eager
wish of General Thomas, who was in supreme com
mand, and his dispatches to General Schofield from
Nashville, where his headquarters were, had con
stantly suggested the most dilatory strategy. Each
day was of great value, and if he could hold Hood
south of Columbia and the Duck River for a week, he
believed that he could bring enough reinforcements
to that point to make him willing to seek a decisive
engagement with the Confederate army on the ground
which had been pointed out to him by General Sher-

22 The Battle of Franklin
man as the proper place for concentration.^ Whilst,
therefore, he acquiesced in the retrograde steps which
Schofield was obliged to take, it was with manifest
reluctance. His assent was usually coupled with the
condition that his subordinate should find the neces
sity still raanifest after careful consideration. He
indicated the steps in the approach of his reinforce
ments, and the little margin of time he needed to
make him strong enough to resume the aggressive.
The effect of this was that Schofield felt bound to
take considerable risks, and to delay each step in
retreat until (as he said in his dispatch of the day
of the battle of Franklin) the slightest mistake on
his part or failure of a subordinate might have proved
disastrous.^ From Thomas's point of view his con
clusions were the natural ones, and his strong desire
to hold back his adversary was most proper ; we are
now considering only its effect upon Schofield in mak
ing him stick to the positions he occupied more stoutly
than his own judgment would have dictated. When
he abandoned Columbia in the night of the 27th, he
felt so strongly the disappointraent it would be to
Thomas that his dispatch announcing the fact was
apologetic in tone.^ He said that he regretted ex
ceedingly the necessity, but believed it to be absolute,
and would explain fully in time.
It is necessary to keep this phase of the situation
very cleai'ly in mind ; for Schofield's critics have made
the deliberateness of his retreat a favorite point for
attack ; overlooking the pressure upon him to make it
still more so, and the indisputable fact that, had he
1 For Sherman's directions on this point, see 0. E., xxxix. part
iii. pp. 498, 535, et seq. ; for Thomas's correspondence with Schofield,
id,, xiv. part i. pp. 896-1170.
2 0. R., xiv. part i. p. 1170. » Id., p. 1106.

From Columbia to FrankUn 23
hastened his moveraent by a single day, Thomas's con
centration would have been balked by Hood's intercept
ing the railway trains that were bringing Steedraan's
two divisions frora Chattanooga to Nashville.
The position on the north side of Duck River at
Columbia was a difficult one to hold against a su
perior enemy determined to force a crossing. The
river makes a large bend to the southward, enclosing
a tongue of land considerably lower than the banks
on the other side. It was just such a place as the
enemy approaching from the south would choose for
forcing the passage of the stream. Artillery could
be placed on either side of the bend so as to cross-fire
upon the bottom land and enfilade any intrenchments
or lines of troops facing the crossing place at the apex
of the bend. The bridges had been destroyed and the
river was high, but falling. Behind the low land in
the bottora, however, a ridge rises to a height equal to
the south bank of the river, and this raade a strong
position in which to resist a hostile advance north
ward, even if the crossing were accoraplished. Scho
field did not feel much concern, therefore, as to his
ability to hold these heights ; but the river was fall
ing and fords might already be available, above or
below, by which Flood could turn the position. Then
tlie advance, when we should be prepared to resume
the aggressive, could not be made at this point, be
cause the features of the position gave the enemy
such a coraraand of the crossing as to make it im
pregnable against a movement from the north. It
seemed wiser therefore to retire a little farther and
find ground from which we should have a choice of
roads by which we might march against the enemy
when our reinforcements should come.
In the forenoon cf the 28th, Schofield sent dis-

24 The Battle of FrankUn
patches to General Thomas,^ discussing the situa
tion and suggesting the concentration of his own
forces so that he should be ready for prompt move
ment. This had special reference to the withdrawal
of Brigadier General Cooper's troops from Centerville,
thirty railes down the river, where they had been sta
tioned by Thomas in the belief that Hood was most
likely to advance upon Nashville by that route.^
Early in the afternoon news came to Schofield ^ that
the enemy's cavalry under Forrest had crossed the
river near the Lewisburg Turnpike, sorae twelve railes
eastward, and had pushed back our horsemen, under
General Wilson, beyond Rally Hill. They had thus
put themselves on our left flank, but it was not cer
tain at nightfall whether Hood was using his infantry
in this turning raovement.
In sending this information to Thomas,* Schofield
(at 4 P. M.) put the direct question where he proposed
to concentrate and fight if it should prove true that
Hood was moving in force upon our rear by the route
his cavalry had taken. He also suggested sending a
pontoon bridge from Nashville to Franklin to make
1 0. R., xiv. parti, p. 1106.
2 General Joseph A. Cooper (of East Tennessee) had temporarily
coramanded a division in the Twenty-third Corps. On our reaching
NashviUe, coming from Georgia in the early days of October, be had
been sent with parts of two brigades and a battery of artillery to John
sonville on the 'I'ennessee River to assist in repelling Forrest's raid in
that valley. After our concentration at Pulaski had begun, Cooper
had marched -n-ith these troops to Centerville and Beard's Ferry (see
map), by orders from General Thomas direct. 0. R., xiv. part i.
p. 1007. Meanwhile General Ruger had been transferred to the corps,
and at Colurabia a division was provisionally organized for him, con
sisting of Colonel Moore's brigade and a temporary one under
Colonel Strickland, the latter raade up by adding to Strickland's
50th Ohio other regiments which came up as reinforcements. See
chap, iii., post.
8 Id., p. 1109, 1110. 4 Id., p. 1107.

From Columbia to Franklin 25
good a crossing of the Harpeth at that place, the
wagon bridge having been burned in one of the
skirmishes of the carapaign, and the river being too
high to be easily forded.
The dispatches written by Thomas during the
evening all attest his continued reluctance to con
sider the necessity of further retreat, and his strong
wish that Schofield should hold the Duck River line
till Smith's arrival ; but none of them reached Scho
field until eight o'clock next morning, and one written
at half past three in the morning of the 29th did not
reach its destination at all, but was captured by the
enemy on its way.^ This was the one in which defi
nite instructions were given to retire to the Harpeth,
in answer to Schofield's question of 4 p. m. of the
28th.2 Schofield was thus left without orders, but
1 Hood's Report, 0. R., xiv. part i. p. 653.
2 Id,, p. 1137. The importance of this dispatch, and the value of
its information to the eneray, warrant me in giving a full copy of it.
The Schofield dispatch of 4 p. m. seeras to have been telegrajjhed from
Franklin at 9 p. M., and is referred to by General Thomas as of that
hour. See note 2 ou next page. " Nashville, November 29, 1864, 3.30 a. m.
"Major General Schofield, near Columbia, —
" Your dispatches of 6 p. m. and 9 p. M., yesterday, are received. I
have directed General Hammond to halt his command at Spring HiU,
and report to you for orders, if he cannot communicate with General
Wilson, and also instructing him to keep you well advised of the ene
my's movements. I desire you to fall back from Columbia and take
up your pasition at Franklin, leaving a sufficient force at Spring Hill
to contest the eneray's progress until you are securely posted at
Franklin. The troops at the fords below WiUiamsport, etc , will be
withdrawn, and take up a position behind Franklin. General A. J.
Smith's coramand has not yet reached Nashville ; as soon as he arrives
I will make immediate dispositions of his troops, and notify you of the
same. Please send me a report as to how matters stand upon your
receipt of this.
" George H. Thomas,
Major General U. S. Vol's., Commanding.''

26 The Battle of Franklin
under the influence of a long scries of dispatches,
every one of which breathed the strong desire that
he should stubbornly resist the enemy's further ad
vance. He resolved to await positive knowledge of
the moveraent of Hood's infantry, and to risk mak
ing successful manoeuvres in retreat when his oppo
nent should be on the north side of the river. The
result proved his capacity as well as his courage.
The sun rose about seven o'clock on the morning
of the 29th, and a little earlier than that hour Scho
field had received by courier a dispatch from General
Wilson that was a duplicate of one written at one
o'clock, which seems to have miscarried. The dupli
cate had a postscript written at three in the morning,
and was sent frora Hurt's Cross Roads on the Lewis
burg Turnpike, by way of Spring Hill, a route of
more than twenty miles. This dispatch told of in
formation procured from prisoners,^ showing that the
whole of Forrest's command was in Wilson's front,
on the north side of the river, and that pontoons
were being laid for the passage of infantry.^ Infor
raation frora prisoners is apt to be unreliable, and is
sometiraes purposely deceptive ; but Wilson seemed
so confident of the truth of this that Schofield deter
mined to act upon it, by putting his trains and three
divisions of infantry at Spring Hill, and keeping
Wood's and my own in position during the day, if
possible, or until he should get answers from Thomas
1 O. R., xiv. parti, p. 1143.
2 General Schofield has put on file in the War Department com
plete copies of all dispatches which passed between General Thomas
and himself in November, 1864, annotated with notes giving tiraes of
sending and of receiving, as determined by all available public and
private memoranda, as well as by a careful coraparison of the contents
of the dispatches themselves. Nearly every question as to their order,
the delays or faUure in transmission, etc., is thus conclusively solved.

From Columbia to Franklin 27
to his dispatches of the previous evening. Whilst
these orders were preparing, the enemy opened with
so lively an artillery fire from the town, and from the
high banks encircling the tongue of bottom land, as
to prove that most of his artillery was still in our
front, with part, at least, of his infantry in support.
Messages to Wilson were too slow, and it was evident
that Forrest could prevent our cavalry from getting
more definite news, and a strong infantry reconnois-
sance was determined upon as a preliminary before
deciding finally to leave the line of Duck River.
About sunrise, Schofield therefore ordered Stanley
to march with all of his command, except Wood's
division and two batteries of artillery, to Spring Hill.^
The trains were ordered to the same place, and Ruger
was also directed to call in his sraaller detachments
down the river, and to move the parts of his division
present, except one regiment at the ruins of the rail
way crossing (Ducktown), which was to remain as an
outpost till night. My own division held the tongue
of land in the bend of the river, covering the crossing
by the turnpike, near which was a ford barely passa
ble at a little lower stage of water. We were ordered
to hold on till night, and then, leaving pickets till
midnight, to follow the movement to Spring Hill.
Wood was directed to send a brigade on a brisk re-
connoissance in force up the river till it should develop
the truth in regard to the actual crossing of the ene
ray's infantry. Captain Twining, Chief Engineer on
General Schofield's staff, accorapanied the reconnois-
1 Spring HiU, eleven miles north of Columbia on the Franklin
Turnpike, was at an important cross-roads, directly connected also by
a diagonal road with Rally Hill, where our cavalry concentrated. It
was therefore the first rallying place for the array in a retrograde
movement.

28 The Battle of FrankUn
sauce, and reported its progress.^ These orders were
given, partly by notes sent through staff officers, and
in part by conferences of General Schofield with his
principal subordinates in person.
He had hardly given thera when he received Gen
eral Thomas's reply to his dispatches sent about
nine o'clock of the previous forenoon, before he got
the news from Wilson that Forrest was over Duck
River.^ This reply expressed the wish that he should
retain his position at Duck River ^ till the arrival of
Smith with his reinforcements, if he were confident
of his ability to do so. It gave permission to have
the distant detachments of infantry relieved, but di
rected that they should obstruct the crossings of the
river by felling timber, and do this thoroughly as far
down stream, on our right flank, as Centerville. The
same courier brought an answer to Schofield's dis
patch of 3.30 P. M., in which he had announced the
first news of Forrest's crossing the river.* Hc' had
added the rumor that infantry was with Forrest, but
said that he did not regard it as very probable. The
report was, in fact, premature. Thomas's answer is
couched in language which so vividly shows his frame
of mind, and the conditions on which alone he could
bring himself to think of further retreat, that it must
be given in his own words : —
" Your dispatch of 3.30 just received. If Wilson can
not succeed in driving back the enemy, should it prove
true that he has crossed the river, you will necessarily
have to make preparations to take up a new position at
Franklin behind Harpeth, immediately, if it becomes
necessary to fall back." ^
1 0. R., xiv. part i. pp. 1139, 1140, 1141, 1142.
2 Jd., p. 1106. 4 W., p. 1107.
'^ Id., p. 1108. 6 /(/., p. 1108.

From Columbia to FrankUn 29
On the receipt of these dispatches, Schofield resolved
to take the risks of a more deliberate moveinent. He
countermanded Ruger's order to march,i and directed
him to raake thorough obstruction of the fords and
roads down the river, in accordance with Thomas's
instructions. A messenger was sent to Cooper at
Beard's Ferry, near Centerville, ordering him to
march to Franklin.^ Kimball's division was ordered
to halt at Rutherford's Creek, three or four miles in
rear of Wood's position. The trains, however, were
pushed onward to Spring Hill, where Stanley went in
person 'with Wagner's division. Schofield informed
Thomas that he would await the result of the infantry
reconnoissance, and asked him to send orders directly
to Cooper, as it was doubtful whether his messenger
could reach Centerville.^ This closed communication
between Thomas and Scliofield till the latter reached
Franklin next morning ; but when the forraer knew
all the circumstances, he expressed the warmest ap
proval of the conduct of his subordinate.
During the week preceding the 29th, the greatest
source of embarrassment had been the organization of
the telegraph service. The Secretary of War had, a
year before, raade the telegraph so far independent of
commanders in the field that not even General Grant
was allowed to have the key of tlie cipher used in his
dispatches. This naturally led to great uncertainty
in the service, the operators becoming lax in the per
formance of the task of ciphering and deciphering the
dispatches which carae into their hands. In the crisis
of this carapaign the telegraph was practically of no
use, for a special messenger could have carried dis
patches more speedily than they were transmitted by
the wire. As early as the 20th of November, Scho-
1 O. R., xlv. part i. p. 1142. ''^ Id., p. 371 ^ /^.^ p. 1137.

30 The Battle of FrankUn
field had been obliged to ask why it should take all
day to communicate between Pulaski and NashviUe.^
Again, on the 27tli he informs General Thomas that
he had just got a translation of the cipher dispatch
of the 25th, two days after it was written.^ A com
parison of the times of writing and receipt will show
that six or eight hours was the common interval. To
cap the climax of embarrassments, the operator at
Schofield's headquarters becarae alarmed for his per
sonal safety on the 27th, and deserted his post, going
to Franklin and refusing to return when ordered. He
seemed to think it was a sufiicient performance of his
duty to decipher dispatches there and send the trans
lation by a courier twenty miles. The security of the
cipher was thus used over the line from Nashville to
Franklin, which was perfectly safe, and the insecurity
of sending the translation by a courier was suffered
upon the route througli Spring Hill in the presence of
the enemy, and where, in fact, the most important
dispatch of the series was captured by thera.^
But this sarae dispatch had begun its misadventures
at General Thomas's headquarters. It was written
at half past three in the raorning, but had not been
sent to Franklin at six, and the recorded explanation
is proof of the looseness of administration.* Why the
Secretary of War liad insisted upon such a system, in
spite of the protests of military commanders, is one of
the mysteries of the history of the war. In this in
stance it operated for the benefit of the Confederate
general alone. The only rational plan was to put the
key of the cipher in the hands of a confidential aid of
1 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 958.
2 Id., p. 1086.
3 See the facts as brought out in court martial proceedings, 0. R.,
xlv. part ii. p. 289, and Id., part i. p. 1172.
* 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 1137.

From Columbia to Franklin 31
the general to whom the dispatches were addressed,
and lirait the operator of the telegraph to the mechan
ical work of transmission. If a courier had to be used
where the wire could not reach the general's tent, the
dispatch would at least be unintelligible to tiie enemy
that might capture it.
But let us return to the progress of events in Scho
field's little army. At about eleven o'clock Captain
Twining liad reported a column of the enemy's infan
try raoving northward, on what proved to be the
road from Davis's Ford (five miles above Colurabia)
to Spring Hill.' The discovery was mutual, for our
column was seen by the enemy, and raised doubts in
Hood's mind which grew more serious as the day wore
on. The Confederate commander had marched with
the greater part of his array, leaving General S. D. Lee
in Columbia with his corps, diminished by Johnson's
division, with orders to detain Schofield by an active
demonstration until the afternoon. He was then to
push seriously his effort to cross whilst Hood himself
should attack our left flank.^ The trains, and all the
artillery except two batteries were with Lee, so that
Hood might not be encumbered in his march upon the
by-roads. About noon Forrest's cavalry reached Spring Hill,
having driven Wilson back toward Franklin on the
Lewisburg Turnpike, and separated him frora connec
tion with our infantry.^ Stanley reached Spring Hill
with Wagner's division and raost of the Fourth Corps
artillery at about the sarae time with Forrest, and
easily checked his advance. The trains which were
just arriving there under the escort of a regiment
from my division (103d Ohio) were parked ; the artil-
1 0. R., xlv. parti, p. 1139.
2 Lee's Report, Id., p. 687. " Id., p. 763.

32 The Battle of FrankUn
lery was placed on comraanding ground and positions
'ft^ere taken to cover the approaches to Spring Hill
frora the south and east. Stanley was also ordered
to communicate with Wilson, and tell the latter not to
let Forrest get between him and the infantry.^ It
was too late, however, to accomplish the last direc
tion, for the whole of our cavalry was now on the
Lewisburg and Franklin road several miles to the
eastward, and our communication with it was not re
newed till we reached Franklin next morning.
About three o'clock Schofield became satisfied that
Hood was not intending to make his attack on Kim
ball's and Wood's divisions, which were in echelon on
my left and rear. He therefore led Ruger's two bri
gades in person by a rapid inarch to Spring Hill, leav
ing a regiment of that command to guard the river at
the broken railway bridge, as has already been men
tioned.^ As he passed Rutherford's Creek he ordered
a brigade of Kimball's division also to follow him, for
by that time the noise of the combat at Spring Hill
told of a vigorous attack by the enemy. In anticipa
tion of the probable course of events, written orders
had been prepared at Schofield's headquarters direct
ing a continuous movement toward Franklin, begin
ning at dark, and these had been distributed before
Schofield went himself to Spring Hill. They were
necessarily modified in several particulars to meet the
changing events of the afternoon and evening. ^
The trains did not leave Spring Hill for Franklin
until my division passed at midnight and took the ad-
1 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 1141.
2 Ante, p. 27.
" 0. R., xlv. pp. n 39, 1 1 40. The order in General Schofield's order
book is dated at Spring HiU, but its issue was frora his headquarters at
Duck River early in the afternoon. He issued no written orders at
Spring HUl.

From Columbia to Franklin ' 33
vance. Ruger's division was raoved under Schofield's
oral orders, and was the first to reach Stanley. The
orders for the cavalry could not take effect, for the
two brigades which Schofield supposed were at Spring
Hill had joined Wilson, and when he arrived at that
place were out of reach of orders. The organization
of the column had to be changed in all these respects,
therefore, and it was ordered by General Schofield
orally and in person.
It is not my purpose to give the details of Stanley's
sharp engagement at Spring Hill, or of my own bick
ering combat with Lee's corps at the river. I have
already given these in another place.^ My present
aim is to show what new light we may get from the
publication of the official records upon General Scho
field's reasons for his action in the conduct of the re
treat upon Franklin. These records give us the means
of accurately knowing the situation from hour to hour,
and the dispatches received by him, as well as those
which miscarried.
Hood's attack upon Spring Hill failed, and Lee did
not succeed in crossing the river at Columbia. At
nightfall my division was withdrawn from its position
at the river,^ leaving the pickets in position supported
by the 12tli and 16th Kentucky Regiments, the whole
under command of Lieut. Colonel Laurence H. Rous
seau of the former regiraent, accompanied by Major
T. T. Dow, Inspector General on my staff.^
The picket lines were maintained till past midnight,
and were then withdrawn without molestation. The
1 See March to the Sea, Franklin and Nashville, chap. iv.
2 O. R., xlv. parti, p. 1143.
' In my history above referred to, 1 said that Lieut. Colonel J. S.
White of the 16th Kentucky was in command. Both these gallant
officers were present, but I have learned that Colonel Rousseau was the
senior. 3

34 The Battle of FrankUn
enemy was not aware of this till about half past
two, when Lee's corps began its preparation for fol
lowing us.^
When Schofield reached Spring Hill with Ruger's
division, darkness had put an end to the fighting
there ; but he learned that some force of the eneray
was upon the turnpike at Thompson's Station, three
miles north. Cheatham's corps lay in front of Stan
ley, his camp-fires within half a milo of our road,
seeming much nearer in the darkness. Indeed, Scho
field's own escort, moving in advance of Ruger, had
brushed away a hostile picket from the road itself as
he drew near to Spring Hill.^ The brigade from
Kimball's division accompanying hiin (Whitaker's)
was ordered to extend Stanley's line to the right,
giving better cover to our line of raarch. When
Scliofield learned of the presence of the enemy on his
line of communications, and that our cavalry was
wholly beyond reach, he inarched with Ruger at once
for Thompson's, leaving with Stanley directions for
me to halt at Spring Hill till I should hear further
from liim.^ He found the road clear, however, the
detachment of Forrest's men who had been there
having retreated, leaving tlieir carap-fircs burning.
Schofield now posted Ruger's division there, and
rode back to Spring Hill, arriving a few rainutes after
I rayself had readied Stanley's quarters. It was now
midnight. The troops were marching left in front, so
as to face the enemy on our right with least delay,
and as the movement was in retreat, I was with the
rear of my column. The division had massed by the
1 Lee's Report, Id., p. 687.
2 Letter of Colonel Wherry of Schofield's staff. The escort was
Captain Ashbury's company, 7th 0. V. Cavalry.
* Schofield's Report, 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 342.

jFVom Columbia to FrankUn 35
roadside as it came up, and moved again as soon as
I had my interview with the commandant of the army.
Wood's division was already following ray march, and
Kimball's was preparing to follow Wood. The pick
ets at Duck River were gathering upon Rousseau's
support, and the infantry and artillery of our little
army were steadily concentrating upon Spring Hill.
Schofield ordered me to take the advance at once,
and march to Franklin, still twelve miles distant.'
The trains followed, convoyed by Ruger's and Wood's
divisions marching by the side of the wagons; Kim
ball's division followed, and Wagner's acted as rear
guard. The pickets with their supports, under Lieut. Colonel
Rousseau, reached Spring Hill at about four o'clock in
the morning. Wagner's division was still there, and
Rousseau, pressing vigorously forward, overtook Gen
eral Wood's column near Thompson's Station, as day
broke, and at his request joined his coramand in de
fending the trains against some spirited attacks of
the enemy's cavalry, and marched the rest of the way
in company with that division.^ Wagner did not get
wholly away from Spring Hill, till six o'clock but
was not vigorously pursued.^ His greatest erabarrass
raent was with the stragglers. Some two thousand
new recruits had joined the army during the halt at
Duck River, and were not yet inured to the fatigue of
marching. It was hard work keeping them up with
the column, so that they should not be captured. Their
I The distance from Columbia to Franklin by the turnpike is
twenty-three miles. My position at Duck River being a mile from
Colurabia, my whole night march was twenty-two miles. See Report,
Appendix B.
2 Colonel Dow's statement. Appendix E.
3 Opdycke's Report, 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 239.

36 The Battle of Franklin
knapsacks were carried for them or thrown away.
Ambulances and wagons took those who were most
footsore, and, though the rear of the column was de
layed, they were safely brought into camp at Franklin
before noon.

CHAPTER III
TAKING POSITION AT' FRANKLIN
Arrival at Franklin — No Bridge or Pontoons — Hood to be held back
— Schofield's Oral Directions — His Correspondence with Thomas
— Delay iu Arrival of Reinforcements at Nashville — Can j'ou hold
Hood back three Days f — Orders to continue Retreat — The Posi
tion at Franklin — The Carter House — The Town and the Eiver —
The Field in Front — The Defensive Line — Eepairing Bridges —
Twenty-third Corps Positions — Reilly's Division — Euger's Divis
ion — The Works ou Carter Hill — Retrenchment across 'Turnpike
— Kimball's Division.
My own march frora Spring Hill to Franklin had
been undisturbed. We had taken an easy gait, so
as not to outraarch the trains and their guards, and
it was about half past four o'clock, or two hours and
a half before day, when we approached the outskirts
of the village. General Schofield had ridden for
ward and overtaken rae after he had issued his final
orders at Spring Hill, for it was of the greatest
importance that he should study the position north
of the Harpeth, and the means of crossing that river.
It was hardly less so that he should get into direct
telegraphic communication with General Thomas.
On reaching Thompson's Station in the night, he
had sent Captain Twining, his engineer, with a
small escort, to Franklin, to communicate with
Thomas, and to examine the means of crossing the
river. Twining was also instructed to order forward
any troops of A. J. Smith's coraraand that might

38 The Battle of FrankUn
have reached the Harpeth. He arrived at Franklin
at one o'clock in the raorning, and telegraphed Scho
field's situation to General Thomas, and his ex
pectation that he might not get beyond Thompson's
Station that night. He added that Schofield thought
it likely that he might be forced into a general battle
on the 30th, or lose his wagon train. ^
When the outermost house of the village carae
dimly into view as we marched northward, Schofield
directed rae to mass my division on both sides of the
turnpike, leaving the way clear for the trains, and
let the men make their coffee, whilst he rode into
town to find Captain Twining, and learn the con
dition of the river crossings. He was especially
anxious to know whether the pontoons had arrived
which he had asked for by a second and urgent
dispatch.^ To Schofield's first request (sent on the
28th), Thoraas had answered by giving authority to
use sorae of those which had been at Columbia ;2
but the fact was that those had been very heavy
wooden boats, for which there were no trucks large
enough to carry them up to the railway, or proper
cars for their transportation, and they had been
destroyed when the crossing was abandoned. The
second despatch (dated at 1 P. M. on the 29th) reached
Spring Hill after the enemy had possession of the
road northward, and could go no farther. Not being
informed of this, Schofield was hopeful that he would
find a bridge train awaiting him at the river.
1 0. E., xlv. part i. p. 1138. Twining's dispatch as printed in the
Records is dated at 10 o'clock p. m. of the 29th, but General Thomas
in replying (p. 1168) speaks of it as "your dispatch of 1 A. M. to-day,"
i. e. the 30th, and this best accords with other events. Schofield was
at Thompson's Station at about eleven, and returned in haste to Spring
Hill, where he raet rae, whilst Twining was on his way to Franklin.
2 /d., p. 1138. 8 /rf., pp. 1107, 1108.

Taking Position at FrankUn 39
After giving orders for resting the troops, I rode
on with my staff to the house before me which was
on our left hand as we approached the town, and was
partly hidden by a grove of trees a little way south
of it. Rousing the family, they were told that we
should have to make use of part of the house as tera
porary headquarters. They put their front sitting-
room at our disposal, and, loosening sword belts and
pistol holsters, we threw ourselves upon the floor to
get a few minutes of greatly needed sleep. I had
fallen into a doze when General Schofield returned.
In all my intimate acquaintance with him, I never
saw him so manifestly disturbed by the situation as
he was in the glimmering dawn of that morning.
Pale and jaded frora the long strain of the forty-
eight hours just past, he spoke with a deep earnest
ness of feeling he rarely showed. "General," he
said, "the pontoons are not here, the county bridge
is gone, and the ford is hardly passable. You must
take coraraand of the Twenty-third Corps, and put it
in position here to hold Hood back at all hazards
till we can get our trains over, and fight with the
river in front of us. With Twining's help, I shall
see what can be done to improve the means of cross
ing, for everything depends upon it. Let your artil
lery and trains go over at once. I will give you
batteries from the Fourth Corps, in place of yours,
as they come in." So vivid is this recollection,
that, as I recall it, I seem to hear the very words.
The written orders which were issued when Major
Campbell, the Adjutant General, established his
office later in the day, were only the formal embod
iment of the purpose thus expressed. On this I
acted. It will becorae necessary, by and by, to
examine the text of the orders, and note the points

40 The Battle of Franklin
of discussion which have arisen concerning them.
This is the reason why I state so fully the raanner in
which General Schofield's purposes and commands
were made known to rae by hiraself.^
On his first arrival at Franklin, General Schofield
found Captain Twining, and read General Thom
as's dispatch of four o'clock, giving the news that
A. J. Smith's coraraand was upon boats at the levee. 2
Thoraas thought, however, that it would be imprac
ticable for Sraith to reach Franklin that day, and
indicated a wish that Schofield should get into posi
tion on the north side of the Harpeth, and continue
the efforts to delay Hood. Schofield's answer is
dated at five o'clock, and urges that Smith should
march at once, as he could, at least, protect the
wagon trains if further retreat became necessary.^
A half-hour later he reported his hope to get his
troops and trains over the river during the morn
ing,* and that he would try to get Wilson, with the
cavalry, upon his flank again. A little before ten,
he informed Thomas that half his troops were in,
and the other half about five miles out, coming on
in good order; that Wilson had joined him, and was
in position on his flank, but could not cope with
Forrest, by whose help Hood could cross the river
1 Major C. S. Frink, Brigade Surgeon and Medical Inspector on
my staff, in a letter of Juue 26, 1881, relating to the hospital service
during the battle, incidentally said that he judged a battle to be immi
nent " from the conversation I overheard between you and General
Schofield wben he formally placed the command of the whole Une in
your hands." He later reaffirmed this, referring for corroboration of
his memory to a letter he had written horae the day after the battle,
aud which was before him. At the time of this correspondence, in
1881, I was collecting material for my historical volume already
mentioned. 2 0. E., xlv. parti, p. 1168.
8 Ibid. * Id., p. 1169.

Taking Position at FrankUn 41
whenever he should seriously attempt it. He there
fore asked whether he should hold on till compelled
to fall back.'
We must not forget that Schofield had heard noth
ing of his cavalry since the middle of the forenoon
of the 29th. Lie was relieved of some anxiety,
therefore, when he found at Franklin a dispatch
from the cavalry commander, dated at ten o'clock in
the evening, frora a point two and a half railes from
Franklin, on the road to Triune (east).^ Wilson
had ordered Hammond's brigade to march to the
latter place (twelve miles) without halting, and
report all movements of the enemy in that direc
tion. One of Schofield's first acts after sending his
earliest dispatch to Thoraas was to send directions
to General Wilson-^ to cover his iraraediate flank and
rear during the day, with at least a portion of his
cavalry. He felt that the absence of his raounted
troops had added greatly to the perils of his situation
during the retreat from Columbia.
It will tend to clearness to dispose at once of the
subsequent correspondence between Thomas and
Schofield on this day. A dispatch from the former,
at 10.25 A.M. (written before the receipt of Scho
field's of 9.50), stated that it would take Smith's
troops the whole day to disembark, but he would
then send them to Franklin or to Brentwood (half
way), unless he found it necessary to keep them at
Nashville.* This proviso refers to his appehension
^ 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 1 1 69. In General Schofield's report this dis
patch is correctly dated at 9.50 a. m. General Thoraas's report has it
12.30 M. By the latter hour, Wagner's division was in position on
Winstead Hill, and the rest of the army and the trains had passed
the lines in front of Franklin.
2 O. R., xlv. part i. p. 1145.
8 id, p. 1177. 4/rf., p. 1169.

42 The Battle of Franklin
that Forrest would make a raid upon Nashville.
Wilson's dispatches to Thomas had been full of this
idea, which, though a mistaken one, was manifestly
influencing Thoraas's action. Schofield was there
fore told that Franklin should be held till the prob
lera might be cleared up a little, unless this should
involve " too rauch risk. " Of course the whole gist of
the question was. What is too rauch risk? Schofield
answered at noon ' that he thought he had already
been running too much risk, using the language
already quoted; that the slightest mistake on his
own part or failure of a subordinate during the last
three days would have proved disastrous.^ Yet he
promised the most cheerful obedience in carrying
out his superior's views when they should be dis
tinctly expressed. He urged concentration, if not
at the front, then at some point further in the rear.
His question whether he was to hold fast " until com
pelled to fall back " had not been answered. A
little later Thomas learned that one division of
Smith's forces had not arrived. He telegraphed
Schofield that they would have to try to hold Hood
back till these troops could come.^ "After that,"
he said, "we will concentrate here, reorganize our
cavalry, and try Hood again." He therefore asked
Schofield whether he thought he could keep Hood at
Franklin for three days longer. As Schofield had
already expressed the opinion that Hood could cross
the Harpeth whenever he attempted it, the question
seems unnecessary; but Schofield replied, at 3 p.m.,
that he did not think he could insure three days.*
One day he might answer for, because the manoeuvres
of the enemy would require about so much time when
1 O. R., xlv. part i. p. 1169. s Id., p. 1170.
2 Ante, p. 22. 4 Ibid.

ID

i

h,

^-54-ft^-*
M
O
;
ri
i^
:
s
„v
i/
S^.'
Taking Position at FrankUn 43
a new flanking movement should begin. In fact,
preparations to cross above and below were at that
time making, and skirmishing between Forrest's and
Wilson's forces, three railes above, had just been
reported. Schofield's opinion, which Thomas had
asked for, was that he should, in view of Thomas's
decision that Smith's forces could not leave Nash
ville that day, take position at Brentwood, and that
Smith's division, which had arrived in the night,
together with the Murfreesboro garrison, should join
him there.' In this, so far as Schofield's own
movement was concerned, Thomas acquiesced, and
directed the wagon trains to be put on the road at
once. Hood's attack came to cut the knot, probably
before Schofield received the last despatch, and the
battle materially changed the situation. This corre
spondence exhibits the frame of mind in which the
two generals were, and emphasizes the purpose which
Schofield expressed to me at the Carter house before
the break of day, that my duty was to use the forces
put under my command to hold Hood back, at all
hazards, until the trains and the rest of the army
should be safely across the Harpeth.
The house at which I had stopped belonged to Mr.
P. B. Carter, an aged raan, who occupied it with
several grown children and near relatives. A son
was a Confederate officer, who had been taken pris
oner, and was now at home on parol. ^ The house
1 0. R., xlv. parti, p. 1170.
2 The younger man, Mr. M. B. Carter, is now the owner of the
farm, and still resides there, and has been raost courteous and helpful
in fixing the important points of location and topography connected
with the battle-field. He himself levelled the breastworks, and as he
has continuously lived upon the spot he is a conclusive authority on some
interesting questions iu regard to which accounts have differed. See
the account of a visit to the field in 1 888 by Captain Thoraas Speed,

44 The Battle of FrankUn
was of brick, of ample dimensions on the ground,
but not very high, as it was built of one lofty and
airy story, with attics above. An ell extended the
suite of rooms on the north side of the hall some
thirty feet toward the rear. On the south side of
the door-yard, sixty feet south of the house, and
opposite the ell, two smaller buildings stood. The
one nearest the road was of wood, and was used as
an office; the other was a brick sraoke-house, and
the passage between the two was ten or a dozen feet
wide. The house itself stood forty-five feet back
frora the road, which was bordered by a line of
shade trees. A barn with a log corn-crib and some
sraaller outbuildings were a little over a hundred
yards back from the road, and some thirty yards
farther north than the line of the house. This group
of buildings was to become the focus of so desperate
a conflict that it is well to have their situation and
relative position clearly understood.'
As soon as it was light enough to select positions
for the troops, I carefully examined the ground.
Looking northward toward the town, a well marked
slope leads to a lower level on which the place is
built, the public square in its centre being forty
feet lower than the knoll or bench at the Carter
house. The pretty village itself is a third of a
" Sketches of War History," vol. iii. p. 44 ; published by the Ohio
Commandery of the Loyal Legion. In company with Captain Speed
and Major D. W. Sanders (formerly of the staff of General French,
who.commanded a division in Hood's army), I visited the field recently
and made careful verification of the topography.
1 For the accurate measureraents about the Carter house I am in
debted to Colonel M. B. Carter, who is a practical surveyor. The office
building has, since the war, been moved from the place it occupied in
the battle, and is now an extension of the ell of the dwelling-house.
In mo-ving it, it was turned about so that its south side, which is. rid
dled 'svith bullets, now faces northward, toward the town.

Taking Position at Franklin 45
mile away, an open belt of fields and gardens then
encircling it from river to river as it stands in the
deep re-entrant angle of the Harpeth. The bend oi
the river is almost a riglit angle, and the stream
washes the east and north sides of the towu. As
one goes up stream, he finds, after getting beyond
the houses, that the valley turns to the southeast;
but down stream it trends to the northwest, which
is the general course of the river till it falls into
the Cumberland, some thirty miles away. In the
re-entrant angle the northerly bank is the command
ing one, being not only of a higher general level,
but having also well marked hills, on one of which
(Figuer's Hill), enfilading the stream and railway on
the eastern side of the village, was Fort Granger, a
dismantled earthwork, built a year or two before.
The railway bridge is perfectly covered by any
artillery placed in the fort, and a deep cut in the
railway at the edge of the town raay also be
thoroughly swept frora that position.
The streets in the town are not in the same direc
tion as the turnpike at the Carter house. When the
highway from Columbia enters the village, it turns
to the right to reach a favorable place at the river
for the bridge, and the squares are symmetrical with
this line.^ The turnpike bridge had been destroyed
early in the war, and had not been rebuilt. It was
a single span of covered wooden truss, resting on
high abutments. What was in 1864 known as the
County Bridge was a lower and cheaper structure on
trestles, built near the railway crossing, where a
hollow on the north side made a practicable ascent
for the roadway. This departure frora the straight
line of the turnpike added nearly half a mile to the
1 See Map.

46 The Battle of FrankUn
length of the road, besides raaking it raore difficult
by reason of the grades. The ford was between the
site of the former turnpike bridge and the county
bridge. From the Carter house through the village
to the ford is about a mile.
Turning now to the south, from the same point
of view, it is seen that the Columbia Turnpike is
nearly level, rising slightly till it crosses a low
sumrait half a raile distant, and then dipping again
so as to hide men or teams in the road. Most of the
space to the Winstead Hill, two miles away, is so
gently undulating as to look like a plain with a few
depressions in it on right and left of the central
ridge and road, where small watercourses run either
way to the Harpeth. About half way to Winstead
Hill, a bold, stony hill rises on the west of the turn
pike, isolated in the general level around it, and
known in the neighborhood as Privet Knob.' Win
stead Hill bounds the valley on the south, making
part of a circle of ridges and heights, which seem to
surround the basin in which the to'wu lies. The
Columbia Turnpike runs straight south, lost to view
after it passes the low sumrait above mentioned, but
coming into view again, climbing Winstead Hill by
a white line rising from left to right, and passing
over the crest between two of the rounded summits,
which give the elevation a picturesque outline.
Two other turnpikes run fora the town southward.
That to Lewisburg goes up the Harpeth valley in a
southeasterly direction. The other is at the west,
and leaves the town by a similar angle. It is called
the Carter's Creek Turnpike. The map of Franklin
1 In some of the reports of the battle this hill is called Stone Hill ;
in others, Merrill's HiU. Privet Knob is the local name given it in a
forraer generation, from the privet thicket which covered it.

Taking Position at FrankUn 47
and its surroundings has been aptly corapared to
the left hand extended with separated fingers. The
little finger and thumb at right angles represent
the Harpeth River in its course from left to right,
whilst the three fingers spread in the raidst indicate
the three turnpikes diverging southward from the
village. Half a mile southwest of the Carter house, and
near the Carter's Creek Turnpike, is a hillock with a
mansion and orchard known as the Bostick place.'
Between the two houses is a gentle hollow, which is
about thirty feet below the lovel in the direct line
frora house to house. In it heads a sraall water
course, which meanders through it, and, crossing
the Carter's Creek Turnpike, curves northwardly to
the Harpeth. This hollow, with its marshy brook,
bounds the village on the west.
Looking eastward, the Carter Hill went forward a
little, and one then saw, a hundred and twenty yards
in front and eighty yards east of the turnpike, a
cotton-gin, a strong frame building like a barn on
the most advanced salient of the hill. To the left
of this the ground descended a little, but rose again
on reaching the Lewisburg Turnpike, half a mile
away, where, between it and the railroad and a little
in the rear, was another well marked knoll, through
which the railway excavation cuts, as has been already
mentioned. 2 In the middle of this recurved line, on
the left, were two large oak trees, still standing,
landmarks which show the curve of the natural lines
of defence. Beyond the knoll and the railroad was
1 In the Twining Map (p. 45) it is marked as a group of buildings
.in a square enclosure. The name F. B. Carter, near it, is that of the
owner of the large surrounding farm, but he did uot own this mansion.
2 Ante, p. 45.

48 The Battle of FrankUn
the upper reach of the river, widening the field in
front as it bore off to the eastward.'
Such was the field as it lay before us under the
level beams of the rising sun. It was evident that
the Carter Hill was- the key to any strong system of
defence in front of the town, and that the line from
the cotton-gin as a salient by the oaks to the knoll
near the river bank must form our line of battle on
the left flank. Artillery in Fort Granger, on Figuer's
Hill, would be a powerful support to it. As to the
right flank, a gallop to the Carter's Creek Turnpike
showed that it would not do to throw that wing out
to the Bostick place, although that position was the
most commanding one in itself. Our flank resting
there would be "in the air, "with no security against
its being readily turned by the enemy. Having but
two divisions of the corps in hand, we raust find a
shorter line, and let the hollow with its watercourse
determine the outline of our breastworks in that
direction. Our position would, in part, be lower
than the Bostick Hill, and coraraanded by it, but we
could assist our troops there by an artillery cross
fire from the Carter Hill. I hoped we might have
reserve enough to make a second line on the extreme
right. At any rate, it was the best we could do, and
if we could hold back the enemy during the day, we
should be at liberty to put the river between us and
him at nightfall.
The situation, as I have described it, and the
general topography of the region, made it probable
that Hood, after passing Winstead Hill, would push
his right flank forward on the shortest line to our
1 The knoll on our extreme left is now occupied by the residence.
and grounds of Mr. Rolffs, a merchant of Franklin. There was no
house on it at the time of the battle.

Taking Position at FrankUn 49
communications with the north bank of the Harpeth,
for both the bridges, the wagon bridge and that of
the railway, as well as the ford, were in rear of the
left of our defensive line. On the upper reaches of
the river were also the nearest and most available
fords by which his cavalry, under Forrest, could
cross and turn our position. These considerations
decided me to put my own division (the only troops
then in hand) on the line from the Carter house
toward the left, making the knoll near the river
strong with a recurved line, which should guard the
railway cut. The raost essential part of our defences
would thus be first prepared, and Ruger's division,
as it should come in, could extend the lines west
ward with a refused flank at the Carter's Creek
Turnpike. Let us now go back and follow the actual course
of events from the time General Schofield gave me
his general directions, and loft rae in coraraand at
the Carter house, whilst he went, in the raorning
twilight, to give personal supervision to the all-
important work of improving the means of crossing
the river. We had in the corps an efficient engineer
battalion, made up of intelligent mechanics, and it
was ordered at once to report to Captain Twining,
Chief Engineer. The artillery of the corps under
Captain Cockerill, Chief of Artillery, was ordered to
cross at once by the ford, and as it reached the
north bank Cockerill's own battery of three-inch
rifles was placed in Fort Granger by General Scho
field's personal order. The rest of the cannon were
parked near by. '
The trains were also ordered to proceed at once to
the town, and prepare to follow the artillery across
1 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 432.
4

50 The Battle of FrankUn
as soon as possible. The approaches to the ford had
to be mended by scarping the bank on either side, so
as to make a practicable grade for our heavy laden
army wagons. Most of the Twenty-third Corps aiu-
raunition train also passed over to the north side, as
the uniforra calibre of the infantry arras enabled
us to rely on the Fourth Corps trains, which came
in last.'
The county bridge had been burned in a skirmish
earlier in the season, but had not been wholly
destroyed. It was found that, by sawing off the
posts quite close to the water, and raaking new
stringers and flooring beams for the intermediate
spaces, a temporary structure of a useful character
could be made. It was only intended at first for
the passage of the troops themelves, but it was found
to be so substantial that loaded wagons could be
taken over it with a little care. Its floor was so
near the water that many who crossed it thought it
was a pontoon bridge, and it was so spoken of by
several officers in reports and printed stateraents.
They had heard that a pontoon bridge was expected,
and naturally assumed that it had been laid.^ The
change of grade necessitated a good deal of work at
the approaches of this crossing also, before it could
be available for teams. But we had still a third
1 Overlooking this fact. Van Horne speaks as if the great quantity
of ammunition used from the Fourth Corps train were expended by
the troops of that corps alone. Army of the Cumberland, ii. p. 202.
It probably represents what was expended by all tbe troops engaged
except the few companies having repeating rifles.
2 After the publication of " The March to the Sea," etc., I learned
from General Schofield that the pontoons be had telegraphed for
arrived in the course of the forenoon by railway train, but the other
bridges had by that time been put in such condition that he thought
it best not to lay the pontoon bridge, and sent the train back to
Nashville.

Taking Position at FrankUn 51
means of getting over the river, — the railway bridge.
By dismantling some stables and sheds in the town
this was planked, and by skilful grading at the ends
was brought into use for wagons as well as for the
marching troops. ' It was late in the forenoon before
any other crossing was practicable for wagons, ex
cept the ford. The wagon trains as they came in
were parked in the cross streets, leaving the main
thoroughfare open, and one by one they slowly, and
with great difficulty, made their way through the
ford. As soon as either of the bridges was avail
able, more continuous lines of teams were set in
motion; and when the battle opened, in the after
noon, most of our wagons were quietly wending their
way toward Nashville. Nothing but the most intel
ligent and energetic use of the means at hand had
made possible the saving of our trains by these im
provised bridges, and nothing but strict discipline
and systera in the handling of the wagons by the
quarterraaster's staff and employees prevented con
fusion and consequent blocking of the way.
As soon as the troops of my own division had eaten
their breakfast. Brigadier General Janies W. Reilly
was put in temporary coraraand of thera, and was
directed to intrench them in the position on the left
of the Colurabia Turnpike which I have already
described. The three brigades were marched at once upon
this line, making their front conform to its angles,
as our habitual custom was. Their arms were then
stacked in rear, intrenching tools distributed, and
each regiment ordered to cover its own front. Cal
culation was made to leave room for two batteries of
artillery on the left of the turnpike, and two others
1 Schofield's Report, 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 342.

62 The Battle of FrankUn
were promised me for position in the line on the
centre and right.
Henderson's brigade (Colonel I. N. Stiles in tera
porary coraraand on account of Colonel Henderson's
illness) was placed on the extrerae left, holding the
line between the river and the Lewisburg Turnpike.
Casement's brigade came next, occupying a straight
line toward the cotton-gin, marked by the two oak
trees which were left standing. Reilly's brigade was
the right of the division, and had a short front frora
the Colurabia Turnpike eastward, joining Casement
beyond the cotton-gin. It will be remembered that
two of Reilly's regiments (12th and 16th Kentucky)
were the support of the picket line left at Duck River,
and did not reach Franklin till noon. Reilly there
fore made his front of two regiments only, — the
100th Ohio next the turnpike, arfd the 104th Ohio
on its left, — the cotton-gin being in rear of this
regiment. The 8th Tennessee (a small regiraent of
loyal raen from East Tennessee) was placed in reserve
at the centre of the brigade, leaving roora in second
line for Rousseau's and White's Kentuckians when
they should arrive. A new regiraent of Ohio re
cruits, the 175th Ohio, which had very recently
arrived, had been assigned to duty in guarding the
railway south of Franklin. Its detachraents were
collected as our columns withdrew, and when these
assembled at Franklin, in the course of the morning,
the regiment was temporarily assigned to Reilly, and
placed in reserve. Caseraent's brigade was formed
with the 65th Indiana on the right, with the 65th
Illinois and the 124th Indiana completing his first
line.^ His reserve was the 5th Tennessee,^ and his
own regiment (103d Ohio), which was greatly reduced
1 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 425. 2 /(^^ p 409.

Taking Position at FrankUn 53
in number by casualties of the preceding campaign,
was on detached duty as guard for the Twenty-third
Corps headquarters and ordnance trains. Stiles's
brigade completed the line, having the 128th Indiana
next to Casement on its right, the 63d Indiana in the
centre, and the 120th Indiana on the extreme left.
He had also the 112th Illinois in reserve. Part of
Stiles's front was just in rear of a hedge of Osage
orange, which was thinned out so as to make an
admirable palisade outside the ditch, and the mate
rial obtained from this, as well as from some other
hedges near by, was used as an abattis on the rest
of the line, nearly or quite to the Columbia Turn
pike. It was too small in size, but it was tough
and very thorny, and proved to be a useful obstruc
tion, troublesome to meddle with under fire. We
lacked timber for revetment of the earthworks, and
consequently a ditch was made both inside and out
side the parapet in many places. We succeeded in
finding raaterial to make the ordinary head-logs,
and so before noon this division had a fair defensive
line. As soon as ray headquarters wagon carae in, two
or .three tents were pitched in the door-yard of the
Carter house, on the slope toward the village.
Captain Cox, my Adjutant General, opened his office
there, and the headquarters flag was unfurled in its
front. This was the centre of the line when Ruger's
division came into its position, and it was during
the whole day and night the point to which all cora-
munications carae, both frora the line itself and from
General Schofield, when he sent orders or inquiries
relating to this front, until the battle was over.
Ruger's division began to arrive about seven
o'clock, and was assigned to position between the

54 The Battle of Franklin
Colurabia and the Carter's Creek Turnpikes.' He
had but two brigades present. Cooper's, having been
at Centerville, was now raaking its way toward a
crossing of the Harpeth River, several miles farther
down the streara. Cooper had with him also two
regiments of Strickland's brigade, and their place
was temporarily supplied to Strickland by the 72d
Illinois and the 44th Missouri, which belonged to
the Army of the Tennessee, and had been brought
from Memphis to Nashville in time to join Schofield's
army at Columbia. The 44th Missouri was a new
regiment, very recently organized from fresh re
cruits.^ Another new regiment, the 183d Ohio, had
also reached us a day or two before, and was, for
the tirae, under Strickland's orders, whose brigade
therefore contained only one regiraent of the old
troops of the corps. The two veteran regiments
(50tli Ohio and 72d Illinois) were put in front line
on the right of the Columbia Turnpike, in the order
naraed, and they were supported in second line by
the 44th Missouri and the 183d Ohio. Moore's
brigade was on the right of Strickland, and had to
be stretched out in single line, without reserves, to
enable it to reach and cover the Carter's Creek

1 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 364.
2 These two regiments have sometimes been spoken of as if they
were the advance of General A. J. Smith's column. They had uot been
with him in Missouri, but were later assigned to his coraraand. The
72d Illinois was part of the Seventeenth Corps, and had been left iu
garrison on the lower Mississippi, and brought to Nashville by Gen
eral Thomas under bis authority as Comraandant of the Military
Division of the Mississippi in Sherman's absence. It reached Colura
bia, November 22d (0. R., xlv. part i. p. 999), and was attached to
Strickland's brigade (Id., p. 1039). The other regiments which came
from the Mississippi prior to the battle of Franklin may be traced in
the sarae volurae of the Records, pp. 1056, 1057, and 1084. The 44th
and 24th Missouri were assigned to the Twenty-third Corps.

Taking Position at FrankUn 55
road.^ Its order from left to right was as follows,
viz. : 111th Ohio, 129th Indiana, 107th Illinois, 23d
Michigan, 118th Ohio, and 80th Indiana. It was
still too short, and two corapanies were detached from
the 183d Ohio, and sent to Moore to be placed at
his centre, between the 107th Illinois and the 23d
Michigan.^ The breastworks built by. Ruger's men were sim
ilar to Reilly's. The right and front of the south
west slope of the Carter Hill (looking toward the
Bostick place) was covered with a grove of young
locust trees, ^ and these, with an apple orchard near
by, were used to make an abattis, though, like the
material used for the sarae purpose on the other side
of the turnpike, it was too light to be quite what was
needed. The position of the works frora the cotton-gin to
the barn and corn-crib in rear of the Carter house
proved so iraportant in the engagement, and becarae
raoreover the subject of so much controversy, that
a fuller description of them should be given. As
has already been said, the cotton-gin formed a
raarked salient in the line, the space between it and
the parapet in front of it being only enough for the
passage of troops and the working of the cannon
which were in battery there. A little to the right
of it the works made an angle toward the rear, com
ing back to join the ^paulement for four guns on
the left of the turnpike, ninety yards south of the
Carter house. Where the line crossed the road, a gap

1 O.R., xlv. parti, p. 351.
2 The order of Moore's regiments is uot given in the division or
brigade report, and is made up from the reports of the regiments.
The list in my own official report was incomplete. See Appendix B.
3 See Twining Map, p. 45.

56 The Battle of FrankUn
was left of the full width of the road, for the contin
uous lines of wagons and artillery crowded it all the
morning. On the west of it, the line continued at
right angles to the road for fifty yards on level ground,
and then bent to the rear, descending the slope sorae
what as it did so. This was with the purpose of
placing a battery on the suramit at the right of the
brick smoke-house, which could fire over the heads
of the infantry in the front line, and sweep the
approaches in the direction of the Bostick place.
In rear of the opening in the front line, I ordered
a retrenchment built across the road, and a turnout,
so that the array trains could go around it on the
left and regain the road. This retrenchraent was in
line with the south side of the office and sraoke-house
of the Carter place.' The retrenchment was con
tinued to the right by Strickland's men, till it
reached the sraall buildings. Space for a battery
was left on the right of the sraoke-house, and the
men in the reserve line extended the infantry trench
some distance farther. My personal knowledge of
this was not distinct, as no second infantry line of
trench had been ordered by me ; for my purpose had
been to keep the brigade reserves as a movable force
to support the main line in case of need, and I did
not wish the troops in the first line to be tempted to
think they could leave it and fall back to another.
But when soldiers at rest have intrenching tools they
are apt to use thera, and a sheltering ditch may be
dug without any authority but that of a regiraental
or brigade comraander.
My own recollection is, that about noon I had
stopped at the centre of the 183d Ohio, the new
1 See Sketch Map, p. 43. This is from a plat made by Colonel
Carter, who verifies the position of the earthworks and retrenchment.

Taking Position at FrankUn 57
regiment on the right of Strickland's second line, to
speak to Lieut. Colonel Clark, who had served in
my command at the beginning of the war, when he
was a meraber of the 7th Ohio, and who was to lay
down his life heroically in this bloody struggle. As
I recall the situation, the raen of the 183d were then
lying down, with no cover except the natural curve
of the ground. The regiment next on its left was
the 44th Missouri, and its commanding officer (after
the fall of Colonel Bradshaw), Lieut. Colonel Barr,
reported that it built breastworks on its line.' This
was so fully corroborated by other official reports, and
by my inspection of the field on our advance after the
battle of Nashville, that I had no hesitation in stat
ing, in ray own official report of the battle, that here
during the fight the troops, "under cover of the
smoke, strengthened a barricade and breastwork that
had been there before. " ^
Late in the forenoon the artillery of the Fourth
Corps began to arrive, and, in accordance with Gen
eral Schofield's promise. Captain Bridges, Chief of
Artillery, reported to me . with four batteries. ^ In
his official report he says, "By direction of Briga
dier General Cox, commanding Twenty-third Army
Corps, at 12 M., I placed the 1st Kentucky Light Bat-
1 O. R., xlv. part i. p. 395. 2 i^^ p. 354^ and Appendix B.
^ 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 1172. The following is the text of the
order : — "Headquarters, Army of the Ohio, Feanklim, Tenk.,
November 30, 1864.
"Captain Bridges, —
" The Commanding General directs that you report four batteries
from your command to Brig. Gen. J. D. Cox for position on the line
to-day. " Very respectfully,
" J. A. Campbell,
Major and Assistant Adjutant General,"

58 The Battle of FrankUn
tery, 6th Ohio Light Battery, 20th Ohio Light Battery,
and Battery B, Pennsylvania Veteran Volunteers, in
position in line, and had good embrasures made for
their guns. " ^
I had marked places for these batteries, and they
were placed thus : the Kentucky Battery, four guns,
on the left of the Columbia road, in the line of the
100th Ohio Infantry, the 6th Ohio Battery, two guns
in the salient at the cotton-gin and two guns on the
left of the Lewisburg Turnpike, the 20th Ohio Bat
tery on the right of the Colurabia road just west of
the Carter house, and the Pennsylvania Battery at
the Carter's Creek Turnpike on Ruger's right. ^ A
little later, when it became evident that the enemy
was forming to attack in force. General Schofield
sent Colonel Schofield, his Chief of Artillery, to
meet Captain Bridges at my headquarters, with
authority to use all the artillery that might be avail
able. ^ Battery M, 4th D. S. Artillery, and Battery
G, 1st Ohio, were placed on the extrerae left, and
Bridges's own Battery, Illinois Light Artillery, with
Battery A, 1st Ohio, were held in reserve near the
centre. The batteries were nominally six-gun bat
teries, but, in consequence of the hard work of the
last two or three days, they were nearly all reduced
to four guns each when reporting to me.
At noon our line of breastworks was completed on
the left, and nearly so on the right of the Columbia
Turnpike. The artillerymen were making embras-
1 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 320.
2 In the Official Records as published (vol. xlv. part i. p. 351) there
is an omission by a clerical error in copying. The words " on the
right of the Columbia," etc., are raade to follow " 6th Ohio Bat
tery," oraittiug all that is between. My private copy is correct. See
Appendix B.
8 0. R., xlv. part i. pp. 321, 351.

Taking Position at Franklin 59
ures for the guns of the four batteries already placed
in the line, and were heightening and strengthening
the inf antry parapet to adapt it to this purpose. The
guns of the Kentucky battery, close on the left of
the turnpike at the centre, displaced three companies
of the 100th Ohio Infantry, and Lieut. Colonel Hayes,
their comraander, placed these raen immediately
behind the battery, inclose support.-' Lieut. Colonel
Rousseau also arrived at this time with the 12th and
16th Kentucky, the supports of the picket line at
Duck River, and on reporting to General Reilly, these
were placed in second line, fifty paces in rear of the
first. Lieut. Colonel White, with the 16th Ken
tucky, had his right as close to the turnpike as the
limbers and caissons of the battery would permit.
The 8th Tennessee and 12th Kentucky extended this
line to the left.
It will be seen that, ,in anticipation of a severe
struggle on the line of the Columbia road, our lines
were doubled there, and strengthened by artillery.
On the extreme left, not only was the knoll in Stiles's
brigade a strong position, but the artillery in Fort
Granger, on the north bank of the Harpeth, flanked
the position, and Cockerill's three-inch rifles had
range enough to raake their shell fire as effective as
if they were in the line.
The only weak place was our extrerae right; for
though it was iraprobable that Hood's attack would
extend farther in that direction than the Carter's
Creek road, his cavalry raight find the end of the
line, and, unless there were some reserve there, might
give us trouble. Indeed, our skirmishers, who were,
as usual, well out on our front and flanks, reported
at this time that a body of the enemy's cavalry was
I 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 419.

60 Tie Battle of FrankUn
reconnoitring on this road, aud I called General
Schofield's attention to the fact that Ruger's right
flank had no secure point to rest upon.' Kimball's
division of the Fourth Corps was just coming in
theu, and Schofield ordered it to report to me to
strengthen this right flank. ^ I did not think it
necessary or desirable to extend our proper front
beyond the Carter's Creek Turnpike, and directed
General Kimball to put his brigades in echelon on
Ruger's flank and rear, to provide against a flank
attack from the west. The low ground along the
little brook made a continuous line unadvisable,
and Kimball occupied the higher grounds northward
toward the river, so that his brigades could mutually
support one another as well as cover Ruger's flank.
His barricades were of a slighter kind than our
intrenchments on the front, and were necessarily
more hastily constructed. As they were not contin
uous, and had no abattis, the Confederates expressed
their regrets afterward that they had not known
this, so as to modify their attack accordingly.^ No
doubt an attack in force by Hood's left would have
changed the character of the battle; but it by no
means follows that it would have been more success-
1 0. E., xlv. part i. p. 351.
2 Id., p. 1172. The order was nearly identical in tenor with that
which had sent the batteries to me. It was as follows, viz. : —
" Headquarters Army of the Ohio, Franklin, Tenbt,,
NoTember 30, 1864.
" General Kimball, —
'' The Comraanding General directs that you report with your com
mand to Brig. Gen. J. D. Cox for position on the line to-day.
" Very respectfully,
" J. A. Campbell,
Major and Assistant Adjutant General."
^ See Hood's report, O. E., xlv. part i. p. 653, and especiaUy General
Bate's report. Id., p. 743.

Taking Position at Franklin 61
ful. In fact, it is doubtful if he could have changed
the position of his array in time to have delivered an
assault in that form before dark, and, by morning,
we should have evacuated the town. We had rightly
judged of his probable action and of the points of his
heaviest assault, and had nothing to correct in the
arrangement of our main line and in the distribution
of its forces.
Kimball's division consisted of three brigades,'
and he placed that of Grose on his left, iraraediately
supporting the right of Ruger and the Pennsylvania
battery. Kirby's brigade was in the centre, and
Whitaker's on the right. As already indicated, the
general line of this division was nearly north and
south, facing to the west. General Grose's brigade
was raade up of seven sraall regiments,^ and in his
first line were the 84th Indiana, 30tli Indiana, 75th
Illinois, and 9th Indiana, numbering from left to
right. The three first naraed were in continuous
line, reaching to the bank of the little watercourse
which here makes a large curve to the east. The
9th Indiana was on the north side of this hollow,
and drawn back about a hundred and fifty yards. In
Grose's second line were the 80th and 84th Illinois,
the latter being so placed as to cover the ravine and
low piece of ground between the 9th Indiana and
the rest of the first line. The 77th Pennsylvania
was put on duty as skirmishers covering the large
curve from the Carter's Creek Turnpike northward.
Kirby's brigade had the 21st Illinois, 38th Illinois,
and 31st Indiana, with two companies of the 101st
Ohio in the first line, supported by the 81st Indiana,
90th" Ohio, and eight companies of the 101st Ohio.**
1 0. E., xlv. part i. p. 177. 2 j^., p. 208.
8 Id., pp. 184, 1197.

62 The Battle of Franklin
General Whittaker's brigade, which was the right
of the division, was stretched out northward toward
the river, having the 35th Indiana, 21st Kentucky,
40th Ohio, and 45th Ohio in line, the 96th Illinois,
23d Kentucky, and the 41st Ohio in reserve.^
The placing of Kimball's division on our right
completed the array in front of the village of Frank
lin. The troops at the breastworks were busy get
ting their noonday meal. The Columbia road had
been crowded all the morning, double lines of wagons
and of cannon hastening through the opening in the
works at the centre. Wood's division of the Fourth
Corps had marched across the new foot-bridge as
soon as it was completed, and was placed on the
commanding north bank of the river with the artil
lery of the Twenty-third Corps, to cover the final
crossing of the army. The array wagons were laho-
riously pulling through the ford, and, after some
careful experiments, were being cautiously driven
over the bridges which had been meant only for the
marching troops. General Schofield had industri
ously supervised all that had been done under his
orders, and soon moved his own headquarters to the
north side also. He reckoned that the wagon trains
could all pass the river before sunset, and that the
troops could be withdrawn soon after, if the enemy
should make no attack.
There was now a period of rest and refreshment
for the officers and men of the main line. Quiet
followed the rattling of wheels and the clatter of
arms that had made a continuous din in front of
the Carter house all the morning. Our camp din
ner over, the tents at ray headquarters were struck,
the baggage packed, and the wagons sent into the
1 O. R., xlv. part i. p. 195.

Taking Position at FrankUn 63
town to fall in at the rear of the trains when the
rest should be over the river. Our horses were fed
and saddled, and the group of orderlies lounged on
the grass by the roadside at the foot of the hill, while
the officers were sitting in the veranda of the house,
smoking or sleeping, as the mood took them. Tlie
day had proved to be a bright and warm one, a good
sample of Indian sumraer weather coraing after the
first sharp frosts and snows of opening winter. The
air was hazy, and, except an occasional straggler
following his command in, nothing was to be seen
between us and the Winstead Hill, two miles away.
A distant cannon shot now and then told us that
Wagner's division of the Fourth Corps, the rear
guard, was checking the eneray's advance on the
other side of the hill.

CHAPTER IV
THE REAR GUARD — WAGNER'S DIVISION.
Guarding the Trains — Collecting the Stragglers — Halt on Winstead
Hill — Conditional Orders — Skirmishing with Forrest — Hood's
Infantry press close — Will he turn the Position or attack t —
Wagner withdraws Lane's Brigade to Privet Knob — Conrad's
fartlier iu Rear — Opdycke's within our Works — Wagner's Mes
sage to Stanley — His Colloquy with Opdycke — His Orders to Lane
and Conrad to Fight — The Sergeants to fix Bayonets — Ruger's
Preparations — Confederates forming for the Attack.
Wagner's division of the Fourth Corps had well
perforraed a laborious and difficult task in acting as
rear guard. Two of its brigades, Bradley's (cora
raanded by Colonel Conrad after General Bradley
was wounded at Spring Hill) and Lane's, were on
the flanks of the wagon trains, and raarching with
them as guard, in a way sirailar to that of the rest
of the troops of the corps. Opdycke's brigade retired
in line, halting and facing to the rear when they
were too closely pressed by the enemy's cavalry.'
The troublesome duty of getting forward the strag
glers and footsore had of course fallen upon thera.
At eleven o'clock the division reached Winstead
Hill,2 and, by direction of General Stanley, Wagner
deployed his whole coramand. Opdycke's brigade
1 0. E., xlv. part i. p. 231.
2 In Wagner's and Opdycke's reports this is called Stevens Hill,
but I use the name which was then as now iu common use in the
vicinity.

The Rear Guard — Wagner's Division 65
was at the gap over which the turnpike runs, but also
occupied the high point on the east, having there
a section of Battery G, 1st Ohio Light Artillery.
Lane's and Conrad's brigades extended the division
line eastward toward the Lewisburg Turnpike. The
division stacked arras, and the raen were allowed
to get their breakfast. At this time Whitaker's
brigade of Kimball's division occupied the high
ground west of the gap, with a section of Battery M,
4tli U. S. Artillery, but was under orders to follon'
the rest of that division into the town when the road
should be clear.'
It was not long before the enemy's advance guard
appeared, and Wagner called his men to arms. He
soon noticed, however, that Whitaker's brigade
was marching toward Franklin, and having then no
special orders to separate himself from the rest of
the column, he directed his brigades to follow.
Opdycke's brigade at the gap was again the rear
guard, 2 and his statement is that he had been at rest
about an hour and a half. Wagner, at the head of
his division, had come within half a mile of the
town,^ as he says (he probably means our main line
of works), and Opdycke's rear was just leaving the
hill when the column was halted, and Wagner ordered
its return to the heights they had just left.*
The occasion for this " right about face " is thus
stated -in his official report.^ "I met a staff officer
from General Stanley, with written orders, directing
me to reoccupy the heights and hold them, unless
too severely pressed. " He is equally explicit as to
what he did. "In obedience to this order," he
says, " I returned to the position from which I had
1 O. R., xlv. part i. pp. 195, 338. '' Id., p. 240.
5 Id., p. 331. * Id., p. 240. ^ Id., p. 231.
5

66 The Battle of Franklin
just withdrawn ray coramand, except that I now
detached one regiment from Colonel Lane's brigade,
and directed it to be placed on the heights to the
right of the pike, from which General Whitaker
had just withdrawn his brigade. " ' The reports of
his brigade commanders corroborate him. Opdycke
says, " When I reached the top of the hill I at once
discovered heavy and parallel columns of infantry
approaching rapidly. I was ordered off again after
sending a number of shell and solid shot at the
advancing eneray. " ^
Before following this second retrograde raovement,
it will be well to analyze raore fully the circum
stances under which the written order was sent to
Wagner, which he interpreted as a coraraand to
return to the crest of Winstead Hill. We are for
tunate in having the text of the order preserved.^
" Headquarters Fourth Army Corps, Franklin, Tenn.,
Noveraber 30, 1864, 11.30 A. M.
"Beigadiek General Wagnek,
Commandinf) Second Division, —
"The general commanding directs that you hold the
heights you now occupy until dark, unless too severely
pressed ; that you relieve Colonel Opdycke with one of
your brigades, and leave his and the remaining brigade
as a support ; and that yon cross the river to the north
bank after dark, at which time the position you are to
occupy will be pointed out to you.
"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
" [J. S. FULLEETON,]
Assistant Adjutant General."
The understanding at headquarters of the Fourth
Corps is given in a journal kept by Lieut. Colonel
1 O. R., xlv. part i. p. 231. 2 j^^ p 240. 8 JJ^^ p_ i]74_

The Rear Ouard — Wagner's Division 67
Fullerton, who apparently penned the order.' This
has the following entry, viz. : "12 m., Colonel Opdycke
reaches the high knoll two miles frora Franklin ; and
General Wagner is ordered to hold him in this posi
tion and support him with his other two brigades
until he is seriously threatened by a superior force
of infantry. " ^ General Stanley was at this time at
General Schofield's headquarters in the village, at
the house of Dr. Clift, near the public square, and it
was about this hour of the day that Schofield deter
mined to withdraw everything to the north bank of
the river at dark, if the eneray should not attack.
Schofield soon afterward raoved his headquarters
across the Harpeth, to the house of Mr. Alpheus
Truett, and Stanley accorapanied him.^ Schofield
had no wish to have any part of his army seriously
engaged with the river at its back ; but the crossing
of the trains was work for the whole afternoon, and
my task of covering this crossing would not be com
plete till all should be over. If Hood did not attack
before dark, the cover of niglit would manifestly be
a security for the safe transfer of the troops and
artillery in the line.
The hostile force with which Opdycke had been
skirmishing seeras to have been Forrest's cavalry;
for the first distinct mention of columns of infantry
^ The brackets enclosing the uame of Colonel F'uUerton in the copy
of the order indicate that the order is not the original which was handed
to General Wagner, but is the official record of it kept at corps head
quarters, and has no signature. I think it more probable that it was
signed by Major Sinclair, also Assistant Adjutant General on Stanley's
staff ; for Colonel Fullerton in raaking the entry in his diary was evi
dently not aware of the fact that Opdycke's brigade was changed from
the advanced position to that of support by the order itself.
2 0. E., xlv. part i. p. 149.
^ Mr. Truett is still living (1896). His house is on the east side of
the NashviUe Turnpike, about half a mile north of the river.

68 The Battle of FranMin
is when our rear guard went back to the top of
Winstead Hill. It seemed most probable that Hood
would use the same strategy as at Columbia, and
force us to make a farther retreat by crossing the
Harpeth either above or below us. The correspond
ence between Thomas and Schofield is based on
this theory, and none of us were quick to believe
that a coup de main would be attempted.
The order to Wagner which has been quoted was
evidently written on the supposition that he was still
in position on Winstead Hill. It was " the heights
you now occupy," and the really raaterial part of
the order was the direction to retire at nightfall,
and sooner if "too severely pressed." Except for
Wagner's information, there was no need to hurry
the issue of the order for the general movement to
the north bank, and it was sent to rae at the time
Schofield's headquarters were taken across the river.
My own report states that I received it at two
o'clock.' The order, as issued by General Schofield,
does not seem to have been preserved, and was prob
ably delivered orally by a staff officer. That which
was issued by General Stanley to Kimball's and
Wagner's divisions of the Fourth Corps was in writ
ing. It directed those officers to "commence with
drawing your command at dark. General Kimball
will take the foot-bridge, and General Wagner the
railroad bridge. General Kimball will not with
draw his pickets until 12 o'clock to-night."^ It was
signed by Ma.jor Sinclair, the assistant adjutant
general before mentioned, and was, of course, in
conformity with the order from General Schofield,
which went to Stanley and myself alike.
But when Opdycke reached the gap in Winstead
1 0. E., xlv. part i. p. 352. 2 j^^ p 1574

The Rear Guard — Wagner's Division 69
Hill in obedience to the order of Wagner to return
there, a new condition of things was revealed. The
eneray's infantry was now plainly seen coining on
rapidly in parallel columns. The section of Mar
shall's battery which was still with the division
opened on the columns with shot and shell. The
two turnpikes from Columbia and Lewisburg draw
near each other as they approach Franklin, and
Wagner, finding that the enemy's column on the
Lewisburg road was turning his left flank, proraptly
deterrained to withdraw again, and sent an officer
of his staff to notify General Stanley of the move
raent. ^
He now followed the directions of the order he had
received by giving to Lane's brigade the advanced
position, putting Opdycke and Conrad in support.
The section of artillery was with Lane on Privet
Knob, which afterward became the place of Cheat
ham's headquarters in the battle. It has already been
described as a stony hill on the west of the Columbia
Turnpike, half way between Winstead Hill and the
Carter house, and the most considerable elevation
in the general plain surrounded by the higher hills
like the Winstead.
The officer sent by Wagner to notify General
Stanley of his retiring from Winstead Hill is said to
have been Captain Whitesides, his acting adjutant
general, and a statement has been published pur
porting to be his, in which he speaks of carrying a
message to General Stanley at about 2. 30 p. m. , re
porting the strong objections made by Colonel Lane
to keeping his brigade and Conrad's out any longer.
The statement contains the additional fact that he
found General Stanley at Schofield's headquarters in
1 0. R., xlv. parti, p. 231.

70 The Battle of FrankUn
Dr. Cliffs house in the village, and that no orders
were sent back to Wagner.^ This helps to make it
clear that the message was the one Wagner says in
his report was sent by hira imraediately after retir
ing frora Winstead Hill, though the tirae of day is
probably an error of recollection, which is corrected
by Colonel Fullerton's note of its reception in his
journal. No subsequent message is mentioned by
Wagner as having been sent by him before the
battle, and any sent as late as half past two would
not have found Generals Schofield and Stanley at
Dr. Cliffs in the village. Colonel Fullerton's
journal reads thus : —
"1 P.M. General Wagner reports two large columns
of the enemy's infantry approaching Colonel Opdycke's
position, moving on the Lewisburg and Columbia pikes,
and, as he cannot successfully resist the forces, he is
moving his division within the bridge-head constructed
by General Cox around the town of Franklin." 2
An approval of this by his superiors was all the
answer the message required, and whether it were
given tacitly by the mere acknowledgment of its
receipt or by a raore formally expressed assent is a
matter of no moment. Wagner was acting within
the spirit of the instructions given him, and only
needed to complete his movement as he had begun it.
It is plain, however, that in some manner instruc
tions were given to him tha.t upon coraing within my
lines — ¦ the " bridge-head around the town, " as Colonel
Fullerton calls the works — he was to place his com
mand by my direction where it would be conveniently
in reserve, and could be called upon in case of need.
The official evidence of this is clear.
1 See Van Home's Life of General Thoraas, pp. 289, 291.
¦¦* 0. E., xlv. part i. p. 149.

The Bear Guard — Wagners Division 7l
In his official report (dated December 2d),i Gen
eral Wagner states that, when the coramand retired
from Stevens (Winstead)_ Hill, "he directed Colonel
Opdycke to forra in the rear of Carter's house, to
the right in rear of the raain line of works, to act as
a reserve. "
In my own brief preliminary report (dated Decera
ber 2d), 2 1 said that General Wagner reported to me,
giving the situation of his brigades, Opdycke's being
already in reserve within the lines. That he further
informed me " that he was already under orders to
keep out the two other brigades till the enemy should
raake an advance in line in force, when he was to
retire skirmishing, and become a reserve for the line
established by me. " In my full official report (dated
January 10), ^ the same facts are narrated with more
detail, and accompanied by my own directions to
Wagner as to position and duty when he should come
within the lines.
General Schofield's report (dated December 31)
says of the heavy loss in Wagner's two brigades,
that it arose "from their reraaining in front of the
line after their proper duty as outposts had been
accoraplished, and after they should have taken their
positions in reserve. " *
The concurrence of all these leaves no room for
dispute that Wagner was to come within the lines
and act as reserve, and that he understood his orders
accordingly. He in fact carae in person within the
intrenchments, at the head of Opdycke's brigade,
and this was placed in close column of regiments

1 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 232.
2 Id., p. 348.
3 Id., p. 352. See Appendix B.
* Id., p. 344. See Appendix A.

72 The Battle of FrankUn
on the right of the turnpike, about two hundred
yards north of the Carter house.'
In ray account of the battle, written in 1882, and
published in another form, ^ I have stated that "the
commandant upon the line was notified by General
Schofield that Wagner's orders directed him to
remain in observation only till Hood should show a
disposition to advance in force, and then to retire
within the lines to Opdycke's position, and act as a
general reserve. Wagner, on being shown the note
conveying this notice, said that such were his
orders." The note referred to does not seera to
have been preserved, and the stateraent has only the
weight which would be given it by clear recollection.
It was corroborated by much earlier statements to
the same effect contained in my correspondence, as
well as by the assent of Generals Schofield and
Stanley. Being clearly in accord with the evidence
already presented from the Official Records, it adds
to the story an additional authentic detail among
the circumstances attending the situation between
two and three o'clock in the afternoon.
We shall get some light upon Wagner's condition
of mind and purpose, by going back to consider more
carefully the steps in the movement from the Win
stead Hill about one o'clock. The written order
frora Stanley's headquarters directed that Opdycke's
regiraent should be relieved frora the duty of extreme
rear guard, which it had been gallantly performing
all the morning. This was an unusual interfer
ence with the discretion of a division commander
having his whole division in hand, and indicates
some chafing between him and his subordinates
1 0. R., xlv. part i. pp. 240, 352.
2 The March to the Sea, Franklin and NashviUe, p. 86.

The Rear Guard — Wagner's Division 73
which made the action of the corps comraander ne
cessary. Wagner, having put Lane's brigade with the sec
tion of artillery in position on Privet Knob,' Opdycke
and Conrad were raarched to the point about half a
mile in front of our raain line. The official reports
are silent as to a discussion which occurred here,
but it is narrated in a published account of the cam
paign written by Colonel Opdycke.^
" On the way in frora Stevens (Winstead) Hill,
Opdycke was ordered by Wagner into line with the
two brigades ; but having in a forraer campaign be
come familiar with the military features of the
locality, he thought the position so extremely faulty
that he objected, and so was allowed to go into
reserve on the rear slope of Carter's Hill, about two
hundred yards from the main line of earthworks.
Wagner then said to hira, ' Now, Opdycke, fight
when and where you think best: I may not see
you again. ' " ^
It must be kept in mind that Privet Knob, where
Lane was halted, was midway from Winstead Hill
to our lines near the Carter house, the distance
being about a mile each way. Conrad's brigade was
put in position where Lane finally joined him, the
place being variously stated as frora three hundred
or four hundred yards to half a mile from the lines.
The larger distance is that which I gave in my official
report, and this was written after I re-examined the
field in our pursuit of Hood three weeks later.*
1 Ante, p. 69.
2 The New York Times, September 10, 1882.
8 In private correspondence with me, in February, 1876, General
Opdycke used still more vigorous terras to express his unwillingness
to halt in the advanced position.
* O. R., xlv. part i. p. 352. This is conclusively corroborated by

74 The Battle of FrankUn
As Wagner's purpose seems to have been to with
draw by alternately passing his brigades, it was
probable that he would put Conrad's in support of
Lane's at about half the distance from Lane's to the
lines within which Opdycke's was marching to take
position. This arrangement in echelon was not a
bad one if the brigades were not allowed to become
involved in a serious fight with superior forces.
Lane should have left his hill in time to pass Conrad
and join Opdycke in reserve, and Conrad should have
followed, so as also to be wholly out of the way when
the advancing enemy should be within range of fire
from my lines. Wagner's preliminary arrangements
all indicated this purpose. It was one which any
competent division commander handling a rear guard
is presumed to be familiar with, and for which he
should need neither instruction nor suggestion from
his corps commander. The preliminary steps had
been well taken under his actual orders, which have
been fully detailed. There was no change in his
orders. At headquarters of the Fourth Corps and of
the army, we have seen that he was supposed to be
in the act of thus deliberately and progressively retir
ing.' We have to inquire how this intelligent plan
was interrupted in execution, and becarae, instead,.
a nearly irretrievable blunder. ^
Colonel Carter, the owner of the farm, who says the surveyed distance
from his house to the fir.-it ripe of ground on the turnpike southward,
is 160 rods. This first rise of ground was the position of Conrad and
Lane. See p. 46, ante.
I See the quotation frora Colonel Fullerton's journal, ante, p. 70.
2 In the newspaper discussion in which, at one tirae, survivors of
this carapaign largely indulged, it was soraetiraes argued that General
Schofield must have given personal orders that Wagner's two brigades
should flght iu front of the line which he had so carefully planned as
the only one on which to resist Hood. It is suggested also in Van
Home's Life of Thomas, pp. 289-291. Such a contention is sufficiently

The Rear Guard — Wagner's Division 75
Colonel Lane tells us in his official report that at
two o'clock he sent word to General Wagner that
the enemy was advancing in force and was about to
envelop his flanks.' "With ray skirraish line, and
a section of artillery posted on Stone Hill " (Privet
Knob), he adds, "I retarded the advancing column
until I received orders, and withdrew my command
to a position one third of a mile in advance of the
main line of works, on the right of the Third Brigade
(Conrad's)." The report of Captain Marshall of
Battery G, 1st Ohio Artillery, fully corroborates
Colonel Lane. He tells us that at 1 p.m. he moved
Lieutenant Mitchell's centre section of the battery
out on the Columbia Turnpike, and upon a hill near
the skirmish line (Lane's on Privet Knob).^ Here
he opened on the enemy, who was found advancing
in strong force. At 2.30 p.m. he withdrew the sec
tion, in compliance with orders, " into the turnpike
within our first line of works, and continued firing. "
He thus accompanied Lane's brigade in its retreat
to Conrad's line, which he calls the "first line of
works " as distinguished from " our main line," which
he mentions in the next sentence.^
Wagner, in his official report, agrees with the
account given by Lane. The latter Avas halted on
Conrad's right, instead of raarching past and enter
ing the intrenched position occupied by the Twenty-
answered when it is plainly stated. It will be seen that the result of
my compilation of official evidence is to relieve the Fourth Corps head
quarters also of any imputation of error iu the matter.
1 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 256.
2 Id., p. 331.
3 The Confederate accounts "also speak of the line occupied by
Conrad and Lane when they were struck by the enemy as our first
line. This is apt to lead to confusion, for in the fight about the Carter
house it will by and hy appear that there were two lines there in the
latter part of the engagement.

76 The Battle of FranMin
third Corps. Conrad's arrangement of his troops
was not wholly on the left of the turnpike.' He
placed one regiment on the right, leaving the road
wholly open. The other regiments were finally
placed in single line. Their order from right to
left was as follows, viz. : 15th Missouri, 79th Illinois,
51st Illinois, 42d Illinois, 64th Ohio, and 65th Ohio.
When Lane came back to this line, between half
past two and threCj^the section of Marshall's battery
occupied the open road in the interval between
Conrad's right regiments.
Colonel Lane does not give, in his report, the
order of his regiments in line, and we cannot supply
the omission by the separate regiraental reports, for
none 'O'cre made except by the 97th Ohio, his own
regiment. The regiments in the brigade were, be
sides the one named, the 26th Ohio, 28th Kentucky,
40th Indiana, 57th Indiana, and 100th Illinois, and
it is understood that, like Conrad's, they were
deployed in single line.^ Each brigade had its outer
flank well retired, so that the whole forraation was
almost wedge-shaped.* As to his orders from Gen
eral Wagner, Lane is sufficiently explicit. He says,
" I here received orders to give battle to the enemy,
1 0. E., xlv. part i. p. 270.
2 Lane sent to Wagner for orders, as we have seen, at two o'clock,
and waited to receive an answer at Privet Knob before beginning his
raovement. Wagner was then just bringing Opdycke's brigade within
ray lines, and in going and returning the messenger raust travel two
miles. The raovement then began, and the infantry marched half a
mile to Conrad's position. All this would take raore than half an
hour. 3 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 255.
* The section of artiUery took position iu the road far enough north
of the low summit in front of my lines to make the curve of the ground
partly cover the guns. Conrad formed on this position, a hundred
yards or raore on the hither side of the crest at the road. See raap,
p. 45, ante.

The Rear Guard — Wagner's Division T]
and, if able, drive him off ; if overpowered, to check
hira as long as possible, and then retire to the raain
line of works."
In his visit to ray headquarters at the Carter house,
when he came in with Opdycke, Wagner had himself
seen the character of the lines. The intrenchments,
the artillery at the embrasures, the retrenchment
covering the road, the abattis in front, were all
exarained, and made the subject of conversation by
him. His experience in the construction of such
lines and their purpose ran through the whole of
the Atlanta campaign, and he not only knew that
the lines were planned to meet any serious attack the
eneray might raake, but he had just reported to head
quarters of the corps to which he belonged that he
was moving his division within these lines. As, in
addition to this, his official report makes no sugges
tion of any change in his orders from any source, it
is conclusive that the change in his conduct raust
have been spontaneous with him.
Conrad's arrangement of his troops so as to leave
the road open, and his placing a regiment on the right
of it, plainly looked like a temporary halt, with the
expectation of covering the march of Lane's brigade
down the turnpike. There is an indication, too, that
he did not at once deploy his brigade in single line,
but placed one regiment on each side of the road and
the others in support. The barricade which his men
made, imperfect as it all was when compared with our
more carefully constructed lines, was yet a stronger
defence close to the turnpike than it was on the outer
flanks, showing that this outer part was more hastily
thrown up.^
1 Colonel Carter states that he personally leveUed down these bar
ricades, and that where Lane's brigade stood, on the west of the road,

78 The Battle of FranMin
When the enemy began to deploy on the hither
side of Winstead Hill, Conrad sent to inquire of
Wagner whether it was expected that he should hold
this line; but, as he reports, just as his officer was
starting, Wagner rejoined hira in person, and not
only gave orders to hold the line as long as possible,
but directed him to have the sergeants fix their
bayonets, and keep the men to their places.' "I
accordingly gave the same instructions to my regi
mental commanders," Conrad adds, "and, believing
an attack would soon be made on my line, I ordered
them to build a line of works in front of their regi
ments respectively." How much time there was for
this attempt at intrenching we cannot accurately tell,
but it is doubtful if more than half an hour elapsed
when the enemy advanced to the attack. Conrad
says it was while his raen "were very busily engaged
in throwing up the work. " ^ As to Lane's brigade,
the only evidence is the report of Lieut. Colonel
Barnes, who says they "had but fairly begun to
throw up a temporary work. "^
All accounts show that there was neither time nor
means to raake a solid intrenchment at this out
post. The regiments had marched without intrench
ing tools, and it is said that, finding a wagon broken
down by the roadside, in which were some shovels
and pickaxes, they had helped themselves to these.*
The army and corps comraanders were ignorant that
they had any intrenching tools at all.^
they were not continuous, but were in the shape of disconnected " half
moons," and that all were of the hasty kind made by throwing fence
rails together and piling a little earth behind them.
1 O. E., xlv. part i. p. 270.
2 Ibid. 3 /(^.^ p. 265. 4 Id., p. 280.
^ Major Atwater, commanding 42d Illinois, says, " when the enemy
came upon us we had a very poor line of works." Id., p. 276. Cap-

The Rear Guard — Wagner's Division 79
It would seem, therefore, that General Wagner,
chafing at the urgency, akin to insubordination, with
which Opdycke had wisely opposed any stop in the
continuous retireraent of the division after passing
Privet Knob, and excited by the rapid approach of
a crisis in the stirring events of the day, gave way to
an impulse to fight the whole army of Hood upon the
line of raere outposts. Such impulses, unfortu
nately, are not uncomraon in officers who are brave
enough, but who lack the power of calra self-control
under fire.' He was thus led to issue the order
which involved the two brigades in terrible con
sequences.'^ In his own report, Wagner said that
tain Atwater, coramanding 51st Illinois, says his men "threw up hasty
works." Id., p. 278. Colonel Buckner, of the 79th Illinois, says the
" works were constructed in a short time," and " it was not long till •
the skirmishers were engaged in our front." Id., p. 280. Lieutenant
Colonel Brown, coramanding 64th Ohio, says that " the raen with a
few spades, threw up a bank, which, in consequence of no timber,
was very low." Id., p. 284. Lieutenant Colonel Barnes, commanding
97th Ohio (Lane's brigade), says, " we had but f,airly begun to throw
up a, temporary work, with the very limited means at our disposal,"
when the enemy .attacked. Id., p. 265. All of these except the last
are in reports from Conrad's brigade, aud as we have seen that their
barricades were rauch better than Lane's, it is fair to say that the lat
ter, the disconnected " half-moons," were scarce worth mentioning.
1 A noteworthy example of this impulse to conduct a battle by
"feeding the pickets," is that attributed by Kinglake to General Penne-
father at the opening of the battle of Inkerman in the Crimean War.
Kinglake's Invasion of the Crimea, vol. iii. pp. 101, 154 (Harpers'
edition). 2 Conrad's report was made on Deceraber 1st. The division reached
Nashville about noon of that day, and though he had been fighting
and marching two days and nights without rest, the report was written
before he slept. Wagner's was raade on the 2d, though his subordi
nates, Opdycke and Lane, did not make theirs till the 5th and 7th
respectively. Conrad's reporting that he was ordered to fight, even
by making the file closers use bayonets, was equivalent to " charges "
against Wagner, and the latter hastened his own report to reply to it,
not waiting to receive those of his other brigade commanders. I shall
have occasion to notice the sequel of this. Post, chap. xvii.

80 The Battle of FrankUn
Conrad and Lane were "directed to hold their posi
tion long enough to develop the force of the enemy,
but not to attempt to fight if threatened by the enemy
in too strong a force. " ' He thus puts himself in
accord with the orders which he had received from
his superiors, and makes by implication a denial of
the truth of Conrad's statement.
From the breastworks at the Carter house the
enemy could be seen as a dark line coming diag
onally down Winstead Hill, blotting out the white
streak of the turnpike. Two miles is too long a dis
tance, however, to see more than a very general out
line of a moving column, livened here and there by
the glint of light flashing from a gun barrel. At
the foot of the hill the ground was not only lower
than it was at one or two points nearer to us, but
there was an open wood or grove with forest trees
enough to hide the deployment when they began to
prepare for the attack. For an army of thirty thou
sand raen it takes two or three hours at least to pass
from column into line, properly aligned, with sup
ports also in position, artillery in the proper inter
vals, and all properly " dressed up " with accuracy ;
because this accuracy is more necessary than on
parade, when the event of a great battle hangs on the
unity and vigor with which an assault is delivered.
After my interview with Wagner, when Opdycke's
brigade came within the lines, I had made a final
inspection of our preparation. I had visited General
Ruger, who, knowing that I expected to be person
ally at my headquarters at the Carter house, had
rightly judged that the next critical point would
probably be at the Carter's Creek road, where the
Bostick place might give the enemy a coramanding
1 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 231.

The Rear Guard — Wagner^s Division 81
position for artillery. He therefore fixed his per
sonal position on the line in rear of his right brigade.
The recurved part of his line was in danger of en
filading fire, and he had constructed it as a crSmail-
Zere,Hhe indentations in it having rauch of the effect
of traverses in protecting the men. In at least one
of the regiments regular traverses were also built
between the corapanies. The locust grove near the
Carter house, and the orchard beyond, had both dis
appeared under the demand for material to make
abattis, and the clear range for infantry fire 'svas
unobstructed for half a mile. General Reilly, in
command of my own division, made his headquar
ters at the cotton-gin, where the salient occupied by
the battery was not only a point likely to be aimed
at in an assault, but was also prominent enough to
give a view along the front if the smoke should
permit. The troops in the line were everywhere agog with
the news of the imposing formation of the enemy in
full view of Wagner's advanced brigades. From
officers coming to me with reports from our left, 1
learned that the hostile array could be well seen
from the knoll in Stiles's brigade, and I determined
to go there for a brief visit, to judge for myself of
Hood's organization and the points at which his
attack would be aimed. It was now three o'clock,
and as we were only three weeks from the winter
solstice, the sun would set at five o'clock. Hood
must attack soon or not at all. Wagner had come
1 In the official raap of the field made by Captain Twining, the
Chief Engineer of the Twenty-third Corps (see map, p. 45), part of
General Ruger's line is drawn as having traverses inside a straight
breastwork. General Ruger's official report, however, says that it was " a
broken line.'' Colonel Spaulding, 23d Michigan, says he built " traverses
on the flanks of each company." O. R., xlv. part i. pp. 365, 386.

82 The Battle of FrankUn
in from his t'n'O brigades, and, meeting him in the
road in front of the Carter house, he confirmed the
information that the eneray was probably forming
for an assault. I reminded him of his orders not to
leave his brigades out too long, and warned him of
the dangers that would come from a hurried retreat.
I then rode off to the left.
General Schofield's staff had kept up frequent
communication between us during the day. Colonel
Schofield had just inspected the position of the addi
tional batteries which Captain Bridges had put in
position. Colonel Wherry, the Chief of Staff', had
just carried the latest news from the front. On
the report of the deployment of the enemy. General
Schofield had gone to Fort Granger, from the para
pet of which, much higher than any point in my line,
he had a complete view of the whole field.
At a quarter past three General Wilson found
that the enemy's cavalry were pushing back our own
mounted outposts, and were making efforts to force
a crossing of the Harpeth three railes up stream, at
Hughes's Ford.' There had been brisk skirmishing
for an hour before, and Croxton's cavalry brigade had
retired to the north bank of the river at McGavock's
Ford, about a mile below Hughes's. The river, so
far up, was reported by the inhabitants to be fordable
in raany places, and as soon as the advance of the
enemy was developed, Wilson concentrated Hatch's
and Johnson's divisions to resist it. Thus the ball
opened nearly simultaneously on the Columbia Turn
pike by the infantry assault upon Wagner's brigades,
and at the up-river fords by Forrest's attack upon
our cavalry. All this will grow clearer as we now
trace the enemy's advance from Spring Hill.
i 0. R., xlv. part i. pp. 559, 560, 1184.

CHAPTER V
THE CONFEDERATE ARRAY
Hood at Spring HiU — Discovers Schofield's Escape — Cavalry in
Pursuit — Infantry hastening after — He decides to Assault — His
Cavalry Positions ->- The Infantry — Deployment and Formation —
Stewart's Corps on Hood's Eight — Clieatham's in Centre aud Left
— Part of Lee's in Reserve — ArtiUery in Intervals — Chalmers's
Cavalry on extreme Left — Hood's Headquarters.
It was not till daylight of the 30th November that
Hood learned at Spring Hill that Schofield's little
array had evaded him. Forrest was dispatched in
pursuit with Buford's and Jackson's divisions of cav
alry ; but Chalmers was sent with his division to
explore the roads leading westward into the Carter's
Creek Turnpike, Hood being unable to persuade him
self that all Schofield's troops and trains could have
moved by the direct road to Franklin in the night.'
He had suspended operations late .in the evening of
the 29th, in the belief that Forrest blocked the way to
Franklin, and had persuaded himself that Schofield
must surrender in the raorning.^ Chalraers fully
expected to find that part, at least, of our column
had been forced to leave the Columbia and Franklin
1 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 764.
2 See an important paper by General Cheatham, and the accompa
nying docuraents, in Southern Bivouac for April, 1885. Chalmers's
report for his cavalry division is not preserved iu the official archives,
but a copy found araong bis papers is published in the Official Records,
and is no doubt authentic. Id., p. 763.

84 The Battle of Franklin
Turnpike by a detour to the west, and was amazed to
find that our whole army had passed up the direct
road to Franklin, within a very short distance of their
infantry lines. ^ He continued his route, however, in
accordance with his orders, and on reaching the Car
ter's Creek Turnpike he turned northward upon it
toward Franklin, although it was demonstrated that
no part of Schofield's forces had travelled that road.
Hood's infantry at Spring Hill consisted of Stew
art's and Cheatham's corps, with Johnson's division
of Lee's. He had with him also two six-gun bat
teries, — Guibor's and Presstman's. Tiiese were put
in march for Franklin as soon as Forrest was fairly
off. The cavalry had run short of ammunition in
yesterday's fight, and as the ordnance trains were
with the other wagons at Columbia, Forrest had
to borrow some araraunition of the infantry. His
men were really a mounted infantry, and were armed
with guns of the same calibre with some of the line
troops. S. D. Lee's corps at Columbia, reduced by the ab
sence of Johnson's division, consisted of Clayton's
and Stevenson's divisions ; but he had with him nearly
all the artillery, and all the wagon trains. He became
aware that we had left his front about half past two
in the raorning; but he had double the distance to
raarch that the other corps had, and although he
began his raoveraent before day, he reached Franklin
after the attack had begun, and too late to take
part in it.^

1 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 764.
2 His report says that he reached Franklin about four o'clock, as
Hood was about to attack ; but he apparently had ridden forward
in person, for Clayton says they found the bloody engagement begun.
O. E., xlv. part i. pp. 687, 697.

The Confederate Array 85
The bold front shown by Wagner's division at
Winstead Hill had forced Hood to deploy, for his
failure at Spring Hill had not encouraged him to
attack with the head of column. He tells us that,
having gathered from the despatches he had captured
at Spring Hill that Thomas was intending to hold
Franklin in force by concentrating there, he knew it
was all-important to attack Schofield before he could
make himself strong.^ It was undoubtedly wise for
him to force the fighting with Schofield if he could
catch him at a disadvantage, and crush him if possi
ble before he could unite with Thomas's other troops,
or be greatly reinforced at Franklin. At any rate,
he determined, as he says, not to delay for flanking
movements, but to attack at once in front.
He had followed up our column so closely that he
might well assume that we had not had tirae to fortify,
though his experience in the Atlanta campaign ought
to have taught him that it did not take us long to
throw up a formidable line of breastworks when we
had deliberately chosen a position for defence. His
exasperation at what he regarded as a hair's breadth
escape on our part from the toils in which he thought
he had encompassed us at Spring Hill had probably
clouded his judgment. He blamed some of his sub
ordinates for the hesitation which he seems himself to
have been responsible for, and now, in an exciteraent
which led hira astray, he determined to risk everything
upon a desperate assault.
Forrest's reputation as a "raider" was so great that
it was apt to be assumed on the national side that he
never confined himself to the strictly auxiliary work
of a cavalry column accompanying an army. In this
campaign, both on the advance and the retreat, he
1 O. R., xlv. part i. p. 653.

86 The Battle of Franklin
proved that he could cover the movements of the in
fantry as brilliantly as he performed his independent
raids. He had admirably assisted Hood as a flanking
force all day on Tuesday, and now, on Wednesday the
30th, with his two divisions, he opened the way for
the infantry, harassing our rear guard, and raaking
dashes at the trains, sticking closely to his work of
helping Hood forward, and with no thought of distant
expeditions. When, about one o'clock, Wagner's withdrawal of
his division left the way over Winstead Hill open.
Hood's infantry advanced at once by the Colurabia
and Lewisburg turnpikes, whilst Forrest's two cavalry
divisions skirted the hill upon their right, leaving room
for the deployment of the infantry.-' Jackson's division
was on Forrest's right, facing Hatch's division of our
cavalry near Hughes's Ford, and Buford's on his left,
near the Lewisburg Turnpike, was facing Croxton's
brigade near McGavock's Ford. Both Confederate
divisions were halted while the deployment of the
infantry was going on, and Buford was ordered to
advance close upon Stewart's right when the corps of
the latter should go forward.
Chalmers had come up with the other cavalry
division by way of the Carter's Creek Turnpike, and
was directed to cover and extend the attack of Hood's
left wing. By noon he was already in sight of Ruger's
skirmishers, who were well in front of the right flank
of the Twenty-third Corps line, accompanying the
movement of Wagner's men as they withdrew to
Privet Knob. It was on the report of Chalmers's
appearance there, as we have seen, that I requested
more troops to support and guard Ruger's flank."'^
I Forrest's Eeport, O. R., xlv. part i. p. 754.
2 Ante, pp. 59, 60.

The Confederate Array B7
Hood saw, as we did, that an attack by his right
against our left promised raost decisive results, if suc
cessful. If Forrest were able to drive Wilson back,
our line of communications was most easily reached
by that flank where the fords of the upper river were
close to the line of the infantry advance, so that
Stewart could aid Forrest as he went forward, and
be aided in turn by every mile of vantage that the
cavalry should gain.
The Confederate commander, therefore, not only
kept two thirds of his cavalry under Forrest upon his
right, but made Stewart take ground in that direction
so far as to make room for Cleburne's division of
Cheatham's corps between the Colurabia Turnpike and
Stewart's left. He thus deployed four divisions of
infantry between the road which led to our centre and
the Harpeth River on our left, whilst only two were
deployed upon the west of the turnpike ; ^ for Johnson's
division of Lee's corps was kept in reserve until after
the first assault, and Lee's other two divisions did not
arrive on the field in time to take an active part in
the engagement.
The order of battle on the Confederate side was an
array of two brigades in front line and one in support
in each division, with intervals for artillery between
the divisions. The field of battle converged to a
narrower front as the eneray approached our lines;
for Reilly's single division of three brigades in our
trenches was thus to bear the assault of four divisions,
and Ruger's was to be attacked by two divisions, be
sides a subsequent onset by a division of Lee's corps.
It will be seen, by and by, that tlie attack upon Ruger
lapped over upon Kiraball's left brigade, and that the
advance against Kiraball's centre and right was made
1 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 708.

88 ' The Battle of Franklin
by Chalmers's cavalry ; but Hood's orders contem
plated guiding his infantry on the left by the Carter's
Creek road, and the extension west of it was caused
by the crowding of the lines as they converged upon
our narrow front.
In his deployment Stewart had Loring's division on
his right, consisting of Scott's, Featherston's, and Ad
ams's brigades. Walthall's division was his centre,
consisting of Quarles's, Shelley's, and Reynolds's brig
ades. French's division was Stewart's left, having at
this time but two brigades, Cockrell's and Sears's,
for Ector's was away acting as guard and escort for
the pontoon train.'
Of Clieatham's corps, Cleburne's division, as I have
already said, was east of the Columbia Turnpike, and
took the road itself for its left guide. Its brigades
were Polk's, Govan's, and Granbury's. Brown's divis
ion was on the west of the turnpike guiding its right
by the road. It was made up of the brigades of Gor
don, Strahl, Carter, and Gist. Bate's division was the
left of the line, with orders to take ground to the west
till it cleared Brown's division and Privet Knob,^ then
to advance guiding its left by the Carter's Creek
Turnpike, in front of the Bostick house. His brig
ades were those of Finley, Jackson, and Smith.
Johnson's division of Lee's corps was held in reserve
at the opening of the battle, until the rest of that corps
arrived upon the field.^ Its brigades were those of
Brantly, Deas, Manigault, and Sharp. We shall have
occasion to notice the arrangement of these brigades
when we have to tell of their advance to the attack,
and of those of all the divisions engaged. It is enough
for the present to say that a space for artillery was left
between the divisions of Stewart's corps, and that a
1 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 708. 2 /,/ p 743 a/t/., p. 681.

The Confederate Array 89
section of Guibor's battery was placed in each of these
intervals, and between French and Cheatham.^ Presst
man's battery seems to have fought as a unit, be
ing first placed on the slope of Privet Knob, where
Cheatham had liis headquarters, and later on the knoll
at the Bostick place near the Carter's Creek Turnpike,
and in Bate's division.
Chalmers's division of cavalry, which was ordered
to advance beyond Bate's left flank, after meeting our
skirmishers soon after midday, moved still farther to
the left and front, so that when it came forward later
to join in the general attack it came out of a hollow
nearly at right angles to the line of General Bate's
march. Whilst in this hollow it had been hidden from
Bate's view as he advanced, aud, as he was not aware
of its exact position, he thought it had not come for
ward upon his flank in accordance with the plan of
the engagement. It had really got into its concealed
position before his deployment, and he does not seem
to have learned that it took any part in the fight, for
he reported that his left suffered for lack of the sup
port the cavalry was to have given it.^ We shall see
more of this as the incidents of the battle develop.
Hood fixed his headquarters on the field at the old
Neely house, not far frora the foot of Winstead Hill, on
the Columbia Turnpike. The position was not one
from which he could view the engagement, and lie
had to rely upon the reports of his subordinates for
his information of the progress of the battle. This,
however, was of little moment, for the smoke of battle
was soon to obscure everything and make personal
observation of little use. He was a good deal ex
hausted in body by the labors and fatigues of the past
two days, and in his maimed and crippled condition,
1 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 708. 2 /rf^ p 743.

90 The Battle of Franklin
lacking a leg and an arm lost in former battles, he lay
on the ground upon sorae blankets, a saddle support
ing his shoulders and head, and so received the reports
his corps commanders sent to him, aud gave his orders
in the desperate fight.'
1 These particulars were given me by Major Sanders, of General
French's staff, among his personal recoUections of the battle.

CHAPTER VI
THE ASSAULT ON WAGNER'S OUTPOST
View from tbe Knoll ou our Left — Skirmishing in F'ront — The Out
post trying to intrench — Confederate Advance — Colonel Capers's
Description — Artillery opens on both Sides — Surgeon HiU's View
from Fort Granger — ^ Orders sent along our Line — To Opdycke
in Eeserve — Eetreat of the Outpost — My Eide to the Centre —
Momentary Break there — Reilly's Rally — Opdycke's Rush for
ward — ¦ Strickland's Rally — Meeting Stanley — The Din of Battle
— Stanley wounded.
Such was the situation when I left my headquarters
at the Carter house and rode along the lines of Reilly's
division to the knoll in Stiles's brigade near our ex
treme left. It was known araong the troops that the
enemy was deploying, and officers and men were all
upon the alert. From the parapet at the knoll, look
ing southward, a slight hollow ran diagonally up to the
right toward the water-shed on which the Columbia
road was built. This enabled rae to look behind the
rise of ground on which Wagner's two brigades were
now deployed, and to see the gradually extending
array of the Confederate array. It was evident that
Hood was deploying, but it might be only for the pur
pose of encamping in line of battle just beyond the
range of projectiles, as he had done at Columbia before
beginning his flanking movement.
The day continued bright and warm ; but the sun
would set before five o'clock,^ and it was already low
1 See note at end of chap, x., post.

92 The Battle of Franklin
enough in the west to make the haze seem thicker under
its slanting rays, which flashed from the weapons and
the accoutrements of the enemy more than a mile
away. Their line could be continuously traced from
the Harpeth River on our left front till it was lost near
Privet Knob, in front of our right centre, from which
Cheatham's corps had driven Lane's brigade half an
hour before, though our skirmishers were still holding
the shoulder of the hill and making a lively resistance
to the Confederate advance on that part of the field.
Our cavalry on tiie river above us, at the fords, were
considerably in advance of our left, and a brisk en
gagement between them and Forrest's men was already
going on.
My attention was now attracted to the centre by
the efforts of Lane's and Conrad's raen to raake some
cover for themselves. They seemed to be digging
hard to throw up a breastwork. I attributed it to the
habit of our raen to raake some sort of shelter when
ever halted, unless they certainly knew they were
immediately to march, and I moraently looked for
the evidence that they were ordered to cease the use
less labor and retire. From the Carter house I had
not noticed any such work going on. Conrad's brig
ade seemed to stand by a fence, facing southward,
and anything they had done to strengthen a barricade
of rails had not been seen by me, though I had not
had occasion to examine thera closely, occupied as I
was with my own duties.
Soon the long lines of Hood's army surged up out
of the hollow in which they had formed, and were
seen coming forward in splendid array. The sight
was one to send a thrill through the heart, and these
who saw it have never forgotten its raartial magnifi
cence. In our forest-clad and sparsely inhabited

The Assault on Wagner's Outpost 93
Southern States it was a rare thing to have a battle
field on which the contending armies could be seen.
We usually fought in tangled woods and thickets,
where we knew the extent of the engagement only by
the sound of the distant artillery and the crash of the
musketry. Here, however, we could see the field and
follow the movements of the contending hosts.
That it impressed our opponents, as it did our
selves, we know from many sources ; but a vivid de
scription, given in the report of Colonel Ellison Capers
of the 24th South Carolina, enables us to see the field
as it looked to an officer in the front line of Brown's
division as it passed over the crest of Privet Knob,
and raarched against our works just in rear of the
Carter house. Colonel Capers was destined himself
to fall severely wounded in that desperate charge,
and we can well understand that the beautiful land
scape and the stirring pageant before him should be
imprinted on his memory as it looked before he dashed
into the sulphurous clouds of the battle storm.
Brown's division had come down from the Winstead
Hill, where it had been deployed,' marching by the
right flank of regiments until they reached the hollow
at its foot. They then formed " forward into line,"
Gordon's and Gist's brigades in front line, supported
by Strahl's and Carter's. "As we advanced," says
Colonel Capers, " the force in front opened fire on us,
and our line moved steadily on, the enemy retreating
as we pressed forward.^ Just before the charge was
ordered, the brigade passed over an elevation from
which we beheld the magnificent spectacle the battle-
1 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 736.
2 This was Lane's line of skirmishers on Privet Knob, before he
joined Conrad in their last position. See Lane's' Report, 0. R., xlv.
part i. p. 256.

94 The Battle of FrankUn
field presented. Bands were playing, general and
staff officers were riding in front of and betw^een the
lines, a hundred battle-flags Avere waving in the smoke
of battle, and bursting shells were wreathing the air
in great circles of smoke, while twenty thousand
brave men were marching in perfect order against
the foe."
The customs of military service discourage the in
dulgence in sentiment in military reports, but the
results of this battle, and its terrible scenes, seem
to have impressed Confederate soldiers with an un
usual power, so that many of them speak with un
wonted emotion in their reports, whilst many others
are wholly silent, as at a great catastrophe of their
cause. We are thus indebted to the extraordinary
feelings the event excited for the vivid picture of
the field as seen from the lines of the foe. I shall
have occasion to borrow again from Colonel Capers's
report, but must now return to the view frora the left
of our lines.
Although Stewart's corps had been formed in
double lines, with two brigades in front and one in
rear in each division, the rapidly narrowing field
made it quickly necessary to reduce the front, so
that by the time their lines could be distinguished
from each other at our position, each division was a
column of brigades, coming on at a quickstep with
trailed arms. In the intervals between the divisions
the artillery galloped forward, unlirabered, and fired
till their lines passed to the front, then rushed for
ward again to repeat the manoeuvre. The section of
Marshall's battery which was with Wagner's men
opened first on our side, and kept up a steady fire
on the approaching enemy. Cockerill's battery in
Fort Granger, north of the river, opened next with

The Assault on Wagner's Outpost 95
its long-range rifles, having a most commanding posi
tion, where they could sweep the front of our recurved
left flank, or fire over the hea;ds of our men in the
lines. The batteries on both our flanks increased the
fire as the Confederate columns came into range.
Surgeon Hill- of the 45th Ohio, the medical officer in
charge of the field hospital of Kiraball's division, was
in Fort Granger when the battle opened. " Standing
on this fort," he says, in a private letter, " where I
could have an excellent view of the country, I could
very well follow the flight of the heavy shells, and see
their explosion araong the enemy. The closing up of
the broken ranks with such well directed and deter
mined progress was most wonderful and commenda
ble, even in an enemy. The artillery duel was most
terrifically beautiful and grand, and our guns must
have wrought immense damage." It was from this
commanding position, it will be remembered, that
General Schofield was directing his little army.
Uneasy that the two brigades in front were not
already retiring, I sent an aid (Lieutenant Coughlan)
down the line to warn the troops at the centre to
withhold their fire till Wagner's men should get in,
and to direct Opdycke to be ready to charge with his
brigade if any break should occur. If Wagner should
be at the lines near the Carter house, the order relat
ing to his command would, of course, go to him ; but
if he were not found, the aid-de-camp was to deliver
the order directly tp Opdycke, and this was what he
did.i I saw Mitchell retire his section of guns frora
Conrad's line, and come leisurely within the works on
a slow trot. He had wound up his firing with canis-
1 In his official report, dated December 5, Colonel Opdycke says,
" General Cox sent me a request to have my brigade ready." 0. R.,
xlv. part i. p. 240.

96 The Battle of FranMin
ter as the enemy drew near,^ and had lost two men
killed and five wounded in this exposed service with
the outpost. Now surely the outlying brigades must
begin their retreat ! No, they did not, but they
opened a rapid musketry fire in hopeless contest
with the overwhelming masses of the eneray. For a
little while they checked Cheatham's advance, but he
outflanked them far on left and on right. Still they
fought till their foes dashed over the frail barricades
and were amongst them, and then they broke to the
rear in confusion.
When I saw that the two brigades Avere committed
to a hand to hand fight, I sent a second aid (Captain
Tracy), with reiterated orders for Opdycke's brigade.
The two officers were the only ones who had accora
panied me on my ride to the left. I waited alone a
few moments till I saw the break of the unfortunate
outpost, then, after a final word with Henderson and
Stiles, I mounted and galloped back toward the centre.
I had meant to time my ride so that I should reach
the centre before Wagner's men, but was delayed a
little by an incident not unlikely to occur upon a
battle-field. The artillery fire on our left and in Fort
Granger had opened rapidly when the enemy's lines
rose into view, and, as I passed behind the line (already
firing) near the Lewisburg Turnpike, one of the en
eray's shells, bursting close by, had frightened the
horses attached to a gun limber, and the runaway team
of six animals dashed by in the drifting smoke. This
with the din of the discharges so scared my horse that
he commenced rearing and plunging violently. He
kept this up till, finding that I was making little
^ See Captain Marshall's Report, O. R., xlv. part i. p. 331. Also
report of Captain Bridges, Chief of Artillery, Fourth Corps, Id.,
p. 321.

The Assault on Wagner's Outpost 97
headway, I dismounted, and, holding him by the head,
succeeded in quieting him by rubbing his nose and
ears. Remounting, I went on my Avay ; but a half-
rainute perhaps had been lost. When I came near
the cotton-gin in Reilly's line, his reserve was just
rising to the charge.' Seeing that these troops were
going gallantly forward, I continued on toward the
Columbia Turnpike. A glance showed that a break in
the line had occurred there, and a crowd of men in the
road was just passing out of sight among the nearest
houses of the village. Between me and the Carter
house a good many fugitives were still running to the
rear, and some Confederates were advancing ; but
at that moment Opdycke's left regiments deployed
from column into line across the road, between the
crowd hastening into the village and the eneray who
were trying to reforra inside our works for a new ad
vance. The Confederates were apparently hesitating
to leave the cover of the breastworks and retrench
ment, for the quick and stout rally on Reilly's line
drove back their men who had got over our works
west of the cotton-gin. The Carter house and out
houses prevented any charge by thera in continuous
line, and the splendid appearance of Opdycke's bri
gade deploying at double quick showed that the way
was not open to them, though they had possession of
our works to the extent of a brigade front. I could
not see what was going on behind the Carter buildings,
but the roar of the fight from that direction showed
that only the left of Ruger's division had given back.
1 See Captain Speed's description of the situation at this tirae, iu
his paper before referred to. Ohio Loyal Legion Papers, vol. iii. p. 44.
Captain Speed was then adjutant of the 12th Kentucky Infantry in
Reilly's second line, and speaks as an eyewitness, lie is nephew of.
Mr. Speed, Attorney General of the United States, and is now the clerk
of the United States Circuit and District Courts at Louisville, Ky.
7

98 The Battle of FrankUn
Strickland's men were holding the buildings them
selves, and a fierce fight was going on about them.
Changing ray direction toward Opdycke's brigade, I
passed the flank of his advancing line, and on the
turnpike, urging his brave raen to redoubled exertion,
I joined Colonel Opdycke himself, and with hira Gen
eral Stanley and Captain Tracy. The latter was the
aid-de-carap whora I had sent with the last order
for Opdycke. Stanley ,i as we learn from himself, had
come to the front only a raoment before, and just as
Opdycke's raen were rising to their feet and preparing
to deploy. There was no time for conference or ques
tioning. Every officer was fully employed rallying
the disordered lines and cheering forward the advan
cing brigade. The scene was a startling one. The
enemy filled the spaces about the Carter house, and
were trying to form upon the turnpike in front of the
buildings. They had possession of the cannon on both
sides of the road, and sought to turn them upon us.
They held in their hands a number of our men pris
oners, but had not time to send them all to the rear.^
As Opdycke's line charged forward, the roar of mus
ketry on right and left and front was deafening,
so deafening as to produce the effect of dumb show.
The men looked as if breasting a furious gale with
strained muscles and set teeth. Hood, who had
ordered Cheathara and Stewart " to drive the enemy
I 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 116. See Appendix D.
2 Long afterward, au inteUigent soldier of the 100th Ohio told me
in graphic language how be was captured at the breastworks close to
tbe cannon on the lett of the road. He bad stayed iu his place till he
was run over by our men retreating from the front, and the eneray fol
lowed so close that he could not get away. He saw tlic efforts to turn
the guns so as to rake Eeilly's line, but while they were looking for
priraers our second line aud reserve were upon tliem and he was again
free.

The Assault on Wagner's Outpost 99
from his position into the river at all hazards," now
heard the fearful din at his headquarters a raile and a
half away, and his narrative shows how even he was
impressed by it. " At this moment," he says, " re
sounded a concentrated roar of rausketry, which
recalled to rae sorae of the deadliest struggles in
Virginia, and which now proclaimed that the posses
sion of Nashville was once more dependent upon the
fortunes of war. The conflict continued to rage with
intense fury." ^
The distance from Reilly's reserve line to Op
dycke's had been about a hundred and fifty yards.^ I
had passed just in rear of Rousseau's and White's Ken
tuckians and the East Tennesseans as they sprang for
ward, and now Opdycke's brigade was coming forward
on their flank. The mel^e about the Carter house was
desperate but short. Opdycke was in the thickest of
it, and, after he had emptied his revolver at the enemy,
he used it clubbed till it was broken. Stanley rode
close in rear of the line, hat in hand, cheering them
on. The Confederates were driven back over the
works, leaving in our hands their dead and wounded,
and a goodly number of other prisoners.
Opdycke's men now held the retrenchment which
crossed the turnpike just beyond the Carter house ; ^
his left regiment (44th Illinois) under Lieut. Colonel
Russell, was on the left of the road joining the right
of Reilly's command, and occupying the ground where
the guns of the Kentucky battery which were retaken
had been.* General Stanley now asked me to look at
a wound he had received, and I saw that a ball had
1 Advance and Retreat, pp. 293, 294.
2 Opdycke's Report, 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 240.
3 Ante, p. 56.
* Reilly's Report, 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 412. RusseU's Report, Id.,
p. 246.

100 Tlie Battle of FrankUn
raked across his neck, passing over his shoulder diago
nally. The holes in his coat showed the place of the
wound, and that it was not very deep, but, as the exit
of the ball was close to the spine, I urged him to have
surgical attention to it at once. We noticed also that
his horse was disabled, and I dismounted my aid,
Captain Tracy, who was riding one of my horses, and
gave it to Stanley, who rode away toward the town.
When we parted we were in the middle of the turn
pike directly in front of the door-yard of the Carter
house, where my headquarters had been all day. This
position was also in the centre of my command. Ru
ger's division stretched near half a mile to the west,
and Reilly's equally far to the east. Opdycke's bri
gade was the only organized body of the Fourth Corps
infantry now in this space, and it was crowded to
gether so that it and Strickland's brigade only occu
pied the space of one, except that Russell's regiment,
as has been stated, was on the left of the turnpike.
The duration of time in battle is judged so differ
ently by different people that one may well hesitate to
guess at it ; but it is enough to say that we were in
the lull which followed the repulse of the eneray's first
assault, the first of a considerable series of persistent
attacks which continued on into the night. My own
opinion has been that about fifteen rainutes had
elapsed since the beginning of Opdycke's charge.
Others, with equal opportunity of judging, thought the
time much shorter than this. Stanley was entirely
alone, for he had outridden his attendants, or they had
stopped to rally the crowd of fugitives in the streets
of the village. Had any of thera been present, there
would have been no occasion to dismount my staff
officer to furnish a horse for the retiring general.
These things show how brief must have been the time

The Assault on Wagner's Outpost 101
occupied in the rush and the struggle to retake the
works. I saw Stanley ride away toward the village,
and I saw hira no more till next day. He returned
my horse to me then at Nashville.'
^ The importance of these details of tirae aud place will appear later,
when I shaU have to discuss controversies that have arisen over them.
See chap, xxi., post. I also postpone the discussion of the numbers of
disorganized troops from Vi'^aguer's division who rallied at the works
aud fought with Strickland, Opdycke, and Eeilly. One of my staff
officers recollects seeing a mounted man meet General Stanley on his
way toward the viUage, aud go back with bim : whether such person
was an officer or an orderly he cannot tell.

CHAPTER VII
THE FIRST FIGHT AT THE CENTRE
Hood's Advance retarded by the Outpost — His Right Wing farthest
forward — My Staff at the Carter House — Wagner also there —
Messages from the Outpost — Wagner's Replies — Marsli.iU's Guns
come in — Disorganized Retreat of the Outpost — Wagner's Efforts
to rally — Swept along to the Town — Cannon iu the Eneray's
Hands — But soon retaken — Fight over the Batteries — EeUly's
Secoud Line charges — Fight at the Cotton-Gin — Destruction
of Confederates — Heroism of their Officers — Eeilly's Report —
Opdycke's Formation for tbe Charge — Position of his Regiments
— Of Strickland's — Focus of the Fight — Two Lines on Carter
HiU — Turn of the Tide.
I HAVE thus far followed the progress of the battle
fi'ora my personal point of view, telling what came
under my own eye, and have necessarily oraitted
much that had happened at the centre. Let us go
back and pick up the thread of events that took place
there whilst I was absent on my ride to the left of
the line.
The bold skirmishing of Colonel Lane's brigade
at Privet Knob, assisted by the good practice of
Lieutenant Mitchell's section of artillery, had, from
the first deployment of the enemy, produced a visible
effect; and when the two brigades of Conrad and
Lane took the position where they raade their fight,
the delay of Hood's advance in the centre became
very noticeable. The lines of the two brigades mak
ing a wedge Avith the apex forward, the Confederates

The First Fight at the Centre 103
showed a corresponding hollow in their formation,
so that when the final break came the enemy was
nearer my works than the men of the two brigades.^
Thus it happened that Hood's lines, especially on
our left, reached our breastworks almost as soon as
the two brigades in front were fully engaged.
Conrad says that the enemy were actually repulsed
for a little while, and "fell back under the crest of
a small hill " in his front, but quickly reforraed
and advanced again. ^ It was not till, on this re
newed advance, Cleburne's troops were actually over
the barricade, and fighting with clubbed muskets
had occurred, that the rush to the rear began. ^
Three or four of ray staff had remained at the
Carter house. General Wagner had ridden out to
Conrad's brigade and returned, and was now rest
ing, dismounted, at the opening in the works where
the turnpike passed through the line. My division
engineer officer. Captain Scofield, was there, direct
ing some strengthening finish of the breastworks,
and tells the story.*
"They remarked that the musketry firing was
becoraing more rapid, also that frora the two guns
1 Twining Map, ante, p. 45.
2 O. R., xlv. part i. p. 271. He and Lane each report that he fell
back only after finding tlie other brigade was retreating. Id., pp. 256
and 271. Such conflict between reports is common in sirailar circura
stances. Their retreat needed no such excuse.
3 Ibid. Conrad raade a separate report to the Adjutant General of
Missouri for his own regiraent, the 15th Missouri. The two reports
supplement each other. See Report of the Adjutant General of Mis
souri for 1864, p. 92.
* Captain L. T. Scofleld of the 103d Ohio, detailed as topographer,
etc. He is a very prorainent architect of the city of Cleveland, and a
leading citizen there. The extract is from his paper read before the
Ohio Commandery of the Loyal Legion, and published in their second
volume of " Sketches of War History," pp. 133, 134. The paper is en
titled, "The Retreat from Pulaski to Nashville."

104 The Battle of FrankUn
in front.* By and by a staff officer rode fast from
one of the brigades, and reported to Wagner, ex
citedly, ' The eneray are forming in heavy columns :
we can see them distinctly in the open timber, and
all along our front.' Wagner said, firmly, ' Stand
there and fight thera,' and then, turning to the
engineer officer, said, ' And that stubbed, curly-
headed Dutchman ivill fight them too,' meaning
one of his brigade commanders. ' But, General, ' the
officer (Captain Scofield) said, ' the orders are not to
stand, except against cavalry and skirmishers, but
to fall back behind the main line if a general engage
ment is threatened. ' In a short time another officer
rode in from the right in great haste, and told
him the rebels were advancing in heavy force. He
received the same order. The officer added, ' But
Hood's entire army is coming. ' Then Wagner
struck the ground with his stick, and said, ' Never
mind, fight them. ' "
Captain Scofield next describes vividly the appear
ance of the unfortunate outpost and the pursuing
eneray as they surged into sight, with the warning
that "Hell had broke loose," which was given by
Mitchell's artilleryraen as the section came in.
Then followed the disordered infantry. "Through
the gap, at last, and over the works they came, with
Cleburne and Brown hot after them. Wagner by
this time was on his horse, riding backward and
facing the disorganized brigades, trying as hard as
ever raan did to rally thera. With terrible oaths he
called thera cowards, and shook his broken stick at
them ; but back they went to the town, and nothing
could stop thera. " ^
1 The section of Marshall's battery that was with Conrad and Lane.
2 In a private letter (November 30, 1889), Captain Scofleld gave me

The First Fight at the Centre 105
Wagner's objurgations in trying to rally his troops
must not be taken for his real judgment of their
soldierly character. They only proved the heat of
his wrath over the visible results of his own mis
take. It is true that the regiments had within a
few days received large numbers of fresh recruits,
and this weakened their cohesive power; but they
had each a large nucleus of veterans, who had proved
their admirable quality on every field where the
Army of the Cumberland had gathered glory, from
Shiloh to Atlanta. Even in their false position in
front of our raain lines, they had stood their ground
till Cheatham's corps had nearly enveloped them.
If any fault were to be found, it would rather be for
an excess of stubborn courage when they knew that
" Some one had blundered." Once broken, and raili
tary organization lost, a brigade becomes a mere
crowd. A rout is then pretty sure to become
panicky, and the dictate of sound judgment is that
their officers should reform them at some place in
the rear, out of the fire, where their organization can
be restored ; for until then they cannot be handled
for any military purpose. The cover for them in
reorganizing must be found in reserves that are in
unbroken array and can be manoeuvred by the tac
tical words of command. This was the task of
other details of this scene, as follows : " General Wagner was on his
horse directly in front of the Carter house, and was making super
human efforts to check his men. His horse was backing against his
will, crowded to the rear by the surging mass of his own soldiers, who
were pressing against hirn in great numbers. . While the great
mass of the men took to the pike after getting over the earthworks, a
great raany were crowding along in the open ground east of the pike.
I saw a chance there to help a little in checking the retreat, and left
Wagner's side to do so. I did not see him again, only as he drifted
out of sight with his men toward the town. . . I know that General
Wagner did not return to our lines during daylight."

106 The Battle of FranMin
Opdycke's brigade, lying in column on the right of
the road, whilst the broken mass rushed by, and
then deploying and charging with a front of steel.
It Avas the task also of Reilly's and Strickland's
reserves, restoring the line near the cotton-gin, and
raaking the second line behind the Carter house the
rallying place to repulse the eneray. Numbers of
brave men in the broken ranks Avould obey the
impulse to turn Avhen they reached the breastworks,
and have a hand in the repulse of the enemy, but it
would be the plain duty of their officers to collect
thera for reorganization the moment the lines were
held by the organized reserves. This was practi
cally what occurred in the present instance. Wag
ner, with his principal subordinates, stopped the
retreating mass in the town, and, establishing their
place of reorganization near the river, where there
was room for the purpose, gradually brought into
shape the disordered regiments, sending officers to
collect and bring to the colors their scattered men.'
The stateraent of Captain Scofield in regard to
the orders sent back by Wagner through the messen
gers that came from his brigades is so completely
in accord with the official reports of Conrad and
Lane that further corroboration is hardly necessary.
One of these raessages was delivered to Wagner in
the presence of Captain Theodore Cox, my Adjutant
General, and he, with Lieutenant D. C. Bradley, one
of my aids, also remonstrated Avith Wagner for send
ing back orders to fight Hood's army advancing in
force. Wagner's excited persistence in his order
was his only reply. ^ The messenger himself has
^ The details of the evidence establishing this will be given in
chap, xix., post.
2 Captain Cox's statement was prepared when I was collecting raa-

The First Fight at the Centre 107
written his account of what occurred. Conrad and
his brigade had the "understanding that when the
eneray appeared in heavy force they were to retire
inside of the main line." When Hood's array ad
vanced, Conrad sent hira to report the fact. He
found Wagner at the porch of the Carter house, and
made his report. " General Wagner said, ' Tell
Colonel Conrad that the second division can whip
all Hell, and for him to hold his position ' ; Avhich
I reported to Colonel Conrad, and the Colonel said,
' All right, he would try. ' " ' It is only fair toward
Wagner, however, to note that at the last moment
he seems to have been recalled by the remonstrances
of ray staff officers to a consciousness that he was
coraraitting an error, and tried to modify his order.
Conrad reports that, after all the imperative direc
tions to hold his ground, "just as the enemy got
within good musket range, a staff officer of the gen-
terial for my volumes of campaign history in the " Scribner's Series,"
already referred to. As it contains matter pertinent to several inci
dents of the battle, it is given iu full in Appendix F. My brother
became the Adjutant General of the Twenty-third Corps witli rank of
Lieutenant Colonel, and was my Chief of Staff. After the close of the
war he returned to civil life, and when he died was Secretary aud
Treasurer of the Little Miami Railroad Corapany.
I The messenger, Mr. T. C. Gregg, who was taken for a staff officer,
was in fact the regular orderly at the brigade headquarters, who had
served with General Bradley till he was wounded at Spring Hill, and
then with Colonel Conrad. He had been with General Sheridan at
Stone's Eiver, was twice wounded at Chickamauga, and left on the
fleld. Taken by the enemy, he was sent to Eichmond, and after a time
was exchanged. He returned to his regiraent (5Ist Illinois) in tirae to
take part in the assault on Kennesaw Mountain and in the rest of the
Atlanta carapaign. After the war he becarae a Justice of the Peace,
Clerk of the District Court of Calhoun County, Iowa, and flnally
Mayor of Rockland City, — a career that shows the good stuff there
was in the ranks. Hearing of him accidentally, I asked Mr. Gregg
for his knowledge of the facts, and he sent me his pithy statement in
reply.

108 TJie Battle of FrankUn
eral commanding the division rode up and said that
the general ordered that, if the enemy came on me
too strong and in such force as to overpower me, I
should retire my line to the rear of the main line of
works ; . . . but as the enemy was so close to me,
and as one half of my men Avere recruits and drafted
men, and knowing that if I then retired my lines my
men would become very unsteady and confused, and
perhaps panic-stricken, I concluded to fight on the
line where I then was. So I ordered the men to
comraence firing. " '
Two batteries of artillery had been kept in reserve
near the Carter place, and, just before the battle
opened, Captain Bridges placed his own battery
(Illinois Light Artillery) on the right of the turn
pike, near the middle of Strickland's brigade line.
One section of Battery A, 1st Ohio, was sent to rein
force the 20th Ohio Battery, just Avest of the Carter
house, in the ^paulement there, and Lieutenant Sco-
vill of the former was directed to take command of
all six guns, as the only officer with the 20th was a
junior lieutenant, Mr. Burdick.^ The other section
of Scovill's battery was placed close to the turnpike
on the left, to rake the road if the enemy should
break through.
When Wagner's two brigades broke away from the
ridge in front on which they had been placed, the
1st Kentucky Battery, which was at the iraraediate
left of the opening in our works, was of course
masked by the crowd of fugitives, and could not be
put in action. Nothing is more helpless than a
battery in such circumstances. It occupies a place
where infantry might possibly do something if they
1 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 270.
2 Bridges's Report, Id., pp. 320, 321.

The First Fight at the Centre 109
were there, but in their absence, and unable itself
to fire, it only adds to the width of the open door
through Avhich our broken brigades and the enemy
with them could rush pell-mell. The limbers and
caissons retreated, but the guns were, as we have
seen, in the enemy's hands, until the counter charge
of Reilly's and Opdycke's men regained them. For
a little while the guns were worked by volunteers
from Colonel Russell's regiment (that on Opdycke's
left),' but the gunners were soon collected again, the
caissons brought up, and the battery was steadily
worked till dark, firing over a hundred rounds. ^
The enemy hung on stubbornly for a while to the
outside of the breastwork, but then surrendered and
came over the works as prisoners.
Lieut. Colonel Hayes, coramanding the 100th Ohio,
which had been next to the guns, tells us in his
report, that the eneray swarmed in on the road, and
where the battery was, taking his line in flank, as
Avell as folloAving Wagner's men, AAdio trampled over
it.^ He himself shouted to the fugitives to rally at
the rear, and his own men, thinking the order was
meant for them, broke away; but he says that his
color sergeant (Baldwin) led the rally, and placed
the colors on the works, though he did it at the cost
of his life. The acting Major (Captain Hunt) Avas
also killed fighting at the parapet.
Lieut. Colonel White of the 16th Kentucky led
his men into the space occupied by the battery, and,
Colonel Russell following hira close, the line was
made at least four deep, and their fire destroyed the
Confederates who did not seek a moraentary protec-
1 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 246.
2 Thomasson's Report, Id., p. 326.
" /(/., p.419.

110 The Battle of FrankUn
tion in the outside ditch. In like manner the 8th
Tennessee and the 12th Kentucky under Lieut.
Colonel Rousseau doubled on the line of the 104th
Ohio, the right wing of which had also been borne
away, and the line of Reilly's brigade was made too
solid to be shaken again, even for a moment. Rous
seau says he saw the men leaving the works at the
angle near the cotton-gin Avhen he ordered his men
forward, and it is impossible to tell exactly where
the line of the break began.' The rally was so
prompt, and the rush forward was so determined,
that it was but a raoraent till every Confederate
inside the Avorks was dead or a prisoner.
The section of the 6th Ohio Battery, which was in
the salient angle at the cotton-gin, was never for a
moraent in the enemy's hands. Lieutenant Baldwin,
who commanded it, gives a graphic picture in his
report of the hand to hand conflict there. ^ The
enemy tried hard, he says, to force a passage at the
right embrasure of the battery. They several times
got into the embrasure, pushing their guns through,
and firing upon the cannoneers. "They were so
unpleasantly close that we had to resort to the use
of sponge-staves, axes, and picks, to drive thera
back. "3
The left of the second line of Reilly's brigade had
been advanced before there was any break in front, and
1 0. R., xlv. part i. pp. 415, 416.
2 Id., p. 334.
s Ihid. Mr. Baldwin adds : " No less than thirteen stand of colors
were captured on the battery front by General Reilly's brigade, one of
which by right should, as a trophy of that bloody eng.agement, be in
the possession of the battery." I sympathize with the gallant artillery-
raan, but no commands kept the flags as trophies. They were sent
to Washington. The battery fired 550 rounds of ammunition in th§
battle.

The First Fight at the Centre 111
the line of Rousseau's 12th Kentucky was oblique,
ready to dash upon the flank of any force coming
over the works. It charged in this Avay, and min
gled in the hand to hand fight at the parapet, and
around the battery. One of its officers was seen
doing the work of a cannoneer in his enthusiasm,
with foot and hand on the spokes of the gun carriage,
helping the SAvift handling of it.' A Confederate
soldier thought to hinder the loading of the gun by
thrusting a fence rail into it, and only added to the
destruction caused by the discharge. Two of the
companies of the i2th Kentucky were armed with
revolving rifles, and this was just the pinch when
this multiplication of efficiency in the weapon told
with decisive effect. Human courage could not
endure the fire. An officer looking out under the
smoke says the Confederates on the brink of the
ditch were as thick as sheep in a pen, tumbling
about in a confused mass. Captain Brown of the
same regiment seized the flag and leaped to the
top of the works, waving it, and shouting. Strange
to tell, he leaped down again unhurt. Ammunition
ran short. The Adjutant rushed a detachment of
men down a ravine to the left, where ammunition
wagons were, and in a few minutes they came back,
each with a box of cartridges on his shoulder. As
these were thrown down, the soldiers fell upon them
with axes, and split the covers off to save time in
their distribution. The same officer, with others,
carried hatsful of the cartridges along the line.
What was happening at this point was going on
everywhere; the enthusiasm and desperate courage
were the same.^
I From a written statement of Captain Thomas Speed, giving de
taUs not included in his printed article before referred to.
2 Ibid.

112 The Battle of FrankUn
Colonel Sterl of the 104th Ohio reports with clear
ness the condition of the front line, of which it
formed the centre and left in Reilly's brigade. The
salient in the breastworks near the cotton-gin gave
an oblique fire in both directions, and his three com
panies on the left opened first on the enemy advancing
against Casement and Stiles, as Loring's division
was a little ahead of Walthall's, for reasons that will
presently appear.' Almost immediately, however,
the retreating brigades of Wagner's division poured
over the works from the salient westward. These
"had scarcely crossed our works until the ditches in
front were filled with rebels scrambling to get over.
. . . The confusion and hurry of the crossing of this
advance line, their officers crying to them to ' get to
tho rear and reform,' carae near throwing our line
into confusion, and the three right companies, borne
back by them, and in doubt as to the commands, fell
back a few paces, but, in almost a raoment after
ward, rushed back with fixed bayonets and regained
their works. "2 He tells us that our second line
rushed up simultaneously with thera, and all together
" kept up a constant and destructive stream of fire,
cutting down by hundreds the rebels who had accu
mulated and massed in the ditches and immediately
in front. "
Colonel Rousseau adds another telling incident,
which shows the energy and heroism of the Con
federate officers. The hostile battle-flags were on
our Avorks, and " a number of their men had gained
the top and fired down into our ranks. Even bayo
nets and clubbed muskets were used. " When these
were shot down or hurled back into the ditch, their
officers were heard exhorting the men to stick to the
1 See chap, xi., post. 2 gterl's Eeport, O. E., xlv. part i. p. 421.

The First Fight at the Centre 113
Outside of the parapet, shouting that " they had them,
if they knew it. " '
The briefer description by General Reilly is in
close accord Avith the consistent and clear details
given by his subordinates. He speaks also Avith
praise of the conduct of the 175th Ohio, a new regi
ment, only for that day attached to the brigade, and
frora which we have no formal report. They came
up with the rest in the crisis of the fight, and gal
lantly shared Avith the others the glory of restoring
and holding the line. They had been ou their way
across the river in the afternoon, when Lieut. Colonel
McCoy, their commander, went in person to General
Schofield, and begged permission for his regiment
to stay and support the line. Reilly, Avith Colonel
Hayes and Colonel White, heartily recognized the
help given also by Colonel Russell with his 44th
Illinois of Opdycke's brigade,^ who came up "right
nobly " close to the turnpike, among the guns of the
Kentucky battery, which, as we have seen,^ was
recaptured and turned on the enemy. Anticipating
the questions which raight be mooted, Reilly closed
this part of his report with careful explicitness by
saying, "that with the exception of the aid rendered
by the 175th Ohio Volunteer Infantry and 44th
Illinois Volunteer Infantry, as herein stated, the
brigade receiA'ed no assistance during the fight, un
less, perhaps, some of the men coming in over the
works may have rallied in or behind the lines. " *
1 0. E., xlv. part i. p. 416.
2 Eeilly's Report, Id., p. 412. ^ Ante, p. 109.
* 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 412. General Eeilly retained coraraand of
his own brigade, Avhilst also in teraporary command of the division.
His brigade report is fuller than that for the division, as, after writing
the first, circurastances combined to give him no time to do much
more than transmit the other brigade reports. Id., p. 410. No brigade

114 'The Battle of FrankUn
In gallantly leading the 16th Kentucky forward,
Colonel White was severely wounded in the face,
but he kept on without halting, and remained in
command of his regiment till the brunt of the fight
was over. He made no mention of his wound in his
official report. The casualties in the brigade (not
including the 175th Ohio) were two hundred and
thirty-two. Six officers and twenty-seven raen were
killed, seven officers and one hundred and tAventy-
three raen wounded, and one officer and sixty-nine
raen were missing. An analysis of these casualties
affords instructive evidence of the extent of the break
under the rush of the retreating brigades of Conrad
and Lane. I postpone it, however, till we shall have
traced the progress of the fight along the whole
line.' The order of movement on the part of the
Confederate divisions can also be more intelligently
considered a little later.
Whilst speaking of the fight near the cotton-gin,
I may be perraitted to raake special mention of one
young hero who fell there, a brilliant type of the
volunteers who shed their blood for the national
cause. Lieutenant Jaraes Coughlan of the 24th Ken
tucky had been one of ray aids through the cam
paigns of the year. Of humble birth, and in the
raain self-educated, he developed military talents
of a high order. His eye was quick, his judgment
clear, his courage indomitable, his soldierly bearing
comraander bore a better reputation than General Reilly. He was au
exceUent disciplinarian, always with his men, keeping his eye on every
thing, and leading them admirably in battle. He had been promoted
from the colonelcy of the 104th Ohio for distinguished services as bri
gade commander in the Atlanta carapaign. After the war he resumed
his profession as a lawyer and afterward a banker, and is one of the
best known citizens of eastern Ohio.
1 See chap, xvi., post.

The First Fight at the Centre 115
inspiring. His reports were so true and just that
he gaA-e his chief just the help needed by one who
cannot be everywhere, yet must know Avliat is hap
pening. He had carried my first order to Opdycke
to be ready to charge to the front in case of trouble,
and on his return dashed into the thickest of the
mel^e with his old comrades of Reilly's brigade,
conspicuously cheering them on to regain their
breastworks. He fell near the cotton-gin in the
moraent of victory, and there his fellow staff officers
and friends buried him in the darkness of the night,
in the intervals of the fierce fighting.
The charge of Opdycke's brigade was not made in
a single line, but as the brigade had been lying in
reserve on the right of the turnpike in column of
regiments, the leading regiment becarae the centre
in the advance, the others taking ground to right
and left in echelon on its flanks. This leading regi
ment was the 88th Illinois (with Avhich the 74th had
recently been consolidated), and Avas coramanded by
Lieut. Colonel Smith,' of whom Opdycke says in his
report that he " was conspicuous, even among heroes. "
In rear of Smith, on the left, Avere the 73d and 44th
Illinois respectively, and on the right the 24th Wis
consin, 125th Ohio, and 36th Illinois.^
It is impossible to tell, frora the evidence which
has been preserved, what was the line of march of
the leading regiraent, though the place of each, when
the line in front Avas restored, is definitely fixed. ^
1 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 241 .
2 Id., p. 251. Opdycke's report places the 24th Wisconsin on the
right of the 125th Ohio, but as the official report of the latter explicitly
places it between the 24th Wisconsin and the 36th Illinois, I follow this
order. In such details the knowledge of the regiraental coraraanders
is most immediate.
3 Ante, p. 98.

116 The Battle of FrankUn
We have already found Russell, Avith his 44th Illinois,
among the guns immediately on the left of the turn
pike. The 73d Illinois reports that it " reached the
works now upon the right of the pike ' just in time
to drive the eneray back and save a battery which
had been left without any support." Next on the
right Avas Smith's consolidated regiment, and beyond
him the 24tli Wisconsin. The reports of these regi
ments speak of charging up to works. Still farther
on the right came the 125th Ohio, whose command
ant (Captain Bates) reports that "two guns at the
right of the regiment that had been deserted by all
but a single corporal Avere quickly brought into
action again, new barricades constructed, stragglers
forced back to them, and disaster averted."^ Last
on the right flank of the brigade came the 36th
Illinois. The position of the guns recaptured is conclusive
proof as to the positions taken up by these regiments.
The guns nearest the turnpike on the right were the
20th Ohio Battery, which had been placed " just west
of Carter's house " by my own direction, and their
^pauleraent was close on the right of the brick
sraoke-house. 3 The two guns farther west were a
section of Bridges's battery, which he as chief of
artillery had, just before the battle opened, "placed
near the centre of Strickland's brigade."* There
was no artillery beyond these guns till we come to
the Pennsylvania battery on the Carter's Creek
Turnpike, on the extrerae right of Ruger's division,
and nearly half a mile away.^
1 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 248. 3 Id., p. 351.
2 7c/., p. 251. 4 W., pp. 320, 351.
^ General Ruger, in his report [Id., p. 365) says, that he placed a
section of the 20th Ohio near the right of Strickland's brigade. The

Tlie First Fight at the Centre 117
It thus becomes tolerably clear that Opdycke's
regiments, going forward in a wedge-shaped forma
tion by echelon, doubled their ranks, and occupied a
little more than the left half of Strickland's brigade
line, together with the retrenchraent on the Columbia
Turnpike, the ditch along the east side of the road,
and sorae space imraediately on its left. To reach
their positions by direct lines from the place where
they lay in reserve. Colonel Smith must have led
forward just in rear of the Carter house, through the
yard, and up to the outbuildings. The other regi
ments partly overlapping him and each other carae
in on right and left. The house, of course, pre
vented an advance in continuous line, but it also,
with the outbuildings, had raade points of rallying
and stubborn defence for some of Strickland's men
and some of those retreating from the front. The
troops on the turnpike had no obstructions in their
way, and could move most rapidly. The break in
Reilly's line had been first closed up, and frora the
salient at the cotton-gin as well as frora the breast
works near, an oblique fire swept across the road and
down between the first and second lines, raaking it
easier to regain possession of the interior line of
works beyond the outbuildings, which had been built
by the 44th Missouri, and which Lieut. Colonel Barr
declares in his report they never left. '
artiUery reports show that this was modified by Lieut. Colonel Scho
field and Captain Bridges, chiefs of artiUery. As the 20th Ohio had
only one officer with it, it was kept together, and Lieutenant ScovUl of
Battery A, 1st Ohio, was sent to command it. A section of Captain
Bridges's own battery was placed near tbe centre of Strickland's brigade
just hefore the action opened, and about the time of Bate's attack was
reinforced by the other section, aud with Ziegler's Pennsylvania battery
crossed fire on tbe advancing eneray. Bridges's Report, Id., pp. 320,
321 ; Scovill's Report, Id., p. 330 ; Sergeant Horn's Report, Id., p. 336.
1 Colonel Bradshaw was very severely wounded in the battle, and

118 The Battle of FrankUn
In Strickland's brigade, the 50th Ohio, which was
the left of his front line, was driven back on the
Carter buildings, and rallied with Opdycke's men as
these advanced. The 72d Illinois, which was the
right of the same line, held fast to the breastworks
on the extreme right; but the left wing of the regi
ment Avas swept back, and rallied upon the 183d
Ohio, the new regiment which Avas its support, and
continued the second line of breastAvorks built by
the 44th Missouri (as part of Opdycke's raen were
also doing) by throAving together fence rails and any
other raaterial out of which a barricade could be
hastily raade.' The right wing of the regiment was
ordered back by the Colonel to join the left in second
line,2 and to them also rallied larger numbers of
men from Wagner's broken brigades than were found
elscAvhere in the line.^
All the circurastances show that the gap west of
the Carter house was longest open, and that bodies
of the enemy got farthest within our lines there.
General Cheatham says that on the next day they
found some of the Confederate dead fifty yards
within the breastAvork at this point.* As they ad
vanced, however, they had Opdycke's charging regi-
the report was made by Lieut. Colonel Barr. His fullest statement
is in his report to the Adjutant General of Missouri (1865, p. 276).
My references will be to that when I speak of his report. See also
sketch map, p. 43, ante.
I 0. E., xlv. part i. p. 354.
2 Sexton's Eeport, Id., p. 393.
2 Statement in writing by Captain Sexton, who commanded the regi
ment after Lieut. Colonel Stockton and Major Jaraes were wounded.
I shall have occasion to refer to this again in estimating the number
of Conrad's and Lane's men who rallied at tbe line.
* Private letter to Colonel Opdycke, of which I have a copy. Also
statement hy General Gordon in his memorial address, hereafter men
tioned. See chap, xi., post.

The First Fight at the Centre 119
ments on one side with the 44th Missouri, and on
the other the 72d Illinois and 183d Ohio, crossing
tlieir fire upon them, and as they hesitated these
troops charged upon thera and they fell back in
confusion to the outer side of the main line of
breastworks. The retreat of Strickland's men from the main line
had left the flank of Moore's brigade exposed, but
Captain Dowling, the brigade inspector, gallantly
led two companies to the flank of the brigade and
placed them in position to sweep with their fire the
open space between the lines. The enemy Avas thus
driven from close proxiraity to Moore's left, and his
line never budged from its position.'
That the focus of the fight Avas around the position
of the 44th Missouri, just in rear of the Carter house,
is shown by the list of casualties in that regiment,
which had raore men killed than all the other regi
ments of the brigade.^ The distance between the
two lines at the turnpike Avas sorae sixty-five yards,
growing less toward the Avest,** and across this space
the fire leaped frora the rauzzles of the rifles and of
the cannon, now hotly in action again. The raen in
and about the Carter buildings Avere better covered
than the rest, though, frora the nature of the case,
they were more broken in their order. They fired
from the windows of the buildings and frora CAcry
opening or interspace that could be used as a loop
hole. They clustered at the corners and between the
out-buildings, and fired obliquely frora this cover.
1 See also chap, ix., post.
2 Its losses were 30 killed, 35 wounded, and 86 missing, total 151.
The lasses of the whole brigade were 47 killed, 150 wounded, and 281
missing, total 478. O. R., xlv. part i. pp. 368, 369.
n Id., p. 354.

120 'The Battle of FrankUn
From both Reilly's line and Moore's, oblique fire
also crossed the deadly field, and the balance of for
tune turned heavily against the Confederates. It
was not now the case that "they had the works if
they only knew it," as their officers had shouted in
front of Reilly : the truth rather was that they had
lost the battle if they only knew it, and it would
have been Aviser to have drawn off the shattered
battalions. But they did not know it. The smoky
battle-cloud so hid the field that Hood and his corps
commanders long thought our lines were irretriev
ably broken, and pushed forward their troops to
slaughter. With the new establishraent of a defensible line
at the centre, the first step toAvard complete success
had been well taken, and though the lull which fol
lowed was to be short, it will give us tirae to trace
the current of the fight on either flank of our posi
tion across the whole front frora river to river.

CHAPTER VIII
THE FIGHT OF OUE LEFT WING
Advance of Stewart's Corps — The narrowing Field — Thorny Hedges
— Changes in the Array — Walthall's Eeport — Loring's Division
strikes Stiles — Fighting in the Eailway Cut — Batteries at Close
Range — Loring Repulsed — The Attack ou Casement — General
Adams's Death — Our Line successfully held.
I HAVE already described the manner in which the
centre of Hood's line of battle was momentarily
checked by the fire of Conrad's and Lane's brigades
at their outpost, and how the enemy's wings swung
forward.' It thus happened that the fierce attack
on our works fell first on Stiles's and Casement's
brigades in Reilly's division ; for Wagner's two hap
less brigades were nearly half a mile in front, and
their useless struggle gave time for Stewart's corps
to outmarch Cheatham's. We have followed also
the fate of Wagner's men as the natural key to the
events of the battle till the imminent peril at our
centre was passed.
It would have been more in accord Avith the actual
order of events if we had begun our exaraination of
the history of the battle at our extrerae left, in Stiles's
brigade; for it was there that Hood's infantry first
struck our raain line. But the connection of cause
and effect is, in this case, raore iraportant than the
sequence of the hours. The position assumed by
1 Ante, p. 103.

122 The Battle of Franklin
Wagner as an outpost gave its peculiar character to
the battle, and its detailed progress on other parts of
the field could only be properly understood when we
had seen the results of the Confederate attack upon
the two brigades, whose rout seemed to open the way
into the heart of our position.
We may now go back and trace the progress of the
attack upon our tAVO Avings in succession : first upon
Stiles's and Casement's brigades in Reilly's division,
and then upon Moore's brigade of Ruger's division,
lapping upon Kimball's division where Chalmers's
Confederate cavalry extended the eneray's efforts to
our extreme right flank. On these parts of the line
was fairly tested the ability of the Southern army
to carry such fieldworks as ours by an assault over
open ground, without the advantage of following
close behind a broken and retreating body of our
own men. The result was not encouraging to such
attacks. The formation of the Confederate corps under
Stewart was, as Ave have seen,' a line of battle of
three divisions, each division formed of two brigades
in front with the third brigade marching in reserve.
The exception was his left division under French,
which was formed with one brigade in front and
one in second line, the third brigade (Ector's) being
absent, guarding the pontoon train. ^ The right of
the corps was near the Harpeth River, which here
ran northwestAvard till it reached the flank of our
works. The width of the field of battle contracted
rapidly as Stewart adA'anced, and it had, besides,
several obstacles Avhich were not visible at a dis
tance, or did not seem formidable till one was upon
them. Of these the chief was a field which had been
1 Ante, p. 87. 2 Q. R., xlv. part i. p. 708.

The Fight of Our Left Wing 123
surrounded by the quickset hedge of Osage orange,
of Avhich mention has already been made. '
Walthall's division was the central one, and hc
alone made any full report of the engagement, so far
as the official records show.^ Ho describes with
clearness how the thicket and hedge on the farther
side of the great field through which he advanced
raade it necessary for his left brigade (Reynolds's)
to get around it by taking ground to the left, and
on passing it Reynolds was not able to get back to
his place in line. Walthall therefore brought up
Shelley's brigade, Avhich was in reserve, and put it
in the gap. A short halt was raade to reform, and
then the command to charge was given. As tho
Confederates of this wing were guiding by the right
flank and along the river bank, both Loring and
Walthall had to take ground to their left as they
advanced, and this brought Walthall in front of
Cleburne, delayed as the latter Avas by the resistance
of Wagner's men. Walthall's left seems to haA-e
run over part of the outpost line held by Conrad, or
to have gone so near to it that hc speaks as if he had
had a part in routing it.^
It was Loring's division, therefore, with the right
of Walthall's, that fell upon Stiles and Casement.
As soon as the enemy's line carae up into view upon
the open plain in front, it Avas opened upon by the
two batteries on the knoll at our left, as well as by
one which had been placed in Fort Granger.* Stiles's
1 Ante, p. 53. 2 Q. R., xlv. part i. p. 720. s /jj^;,
'' This was Battery D, 1st Ohio Light Artillery, composed of 3-inch
rifled ordnance guns. It was admirably adapted for this long range
work, and was under the eye of Captain Cockerill, who was also Chief of
Artillery of my division. It expended 160 rounds of shell and three
rounds of case-shot in assisting to repel this attack of Loring upon
Stiles. See 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 432.

124 The Battle of FrankUn
left regiment (120th Indiana) was sharply recurved
along the railway cut, which was quite deep, and the
regiment was exposed to an enfilading fire of both
cannon and sraall arms, but held its place firmly.
The centre of the brigade Avas covered by the thorny
hedge parallel to the front, and the enemy, charging
up to this, Avas dismayed and exasperated at finding
it impassable, whilst the small tough trunks of the
trees, thinned out as they had been, did not protect
them from the destructive fire of Stiles's line.' On
the right of the brigade the first assault of Loring's
men met a bloody repulse. His second line soon
came on and reached the works in front of the 128th
Indiana. They planted their colors on the parapet,
and some climbed over the Avorks. The color bearer
was shot down, and the men Avho had got over Avere
made prisoners. The obstinacy of the Confederates
was raet by an equal pertinacity of courage, and the
assault was repulsed. ^ Then the rebel officers raade
strenuous efforts to press their raen to their right,
and to get between the river and our left. "They
were heard to exclaira, ' Soldiers, as you love your
country, press to the right ! press to the right ! ' But
the terrific and well directed fire of the .battery of
regulars (M, 4th U. S. A.) and the musketry fire of
the brigade kept them in check. "^
1 The hedges perpendicular to the front had been cut away to extend
an abattis toward tbe turnpike, and the farther one, across the great
field, was that which had disarranged the advance of WalthaU.
2 Stiles's Eeport, 0. E., xlv. part i. p. 430.
' From the statement of Colonel Henderson which I have more fully
mentioned in chap, x., post. To explain Colonel Henderson's position
it should be understood that he had been seriously ill, but had remained
with the brigade, though Colonel Stiles of the 63d Indiana was tem
porarily assigned to the command. This condition of things had lasted
for several days ; yet at Franklin he could not stay away from the front
aud, weak as he was, was on the line. Technically, Colonel Stiles

The Fight of Our Left Wing 125
The regular battery (Lieutenant Samuel Canby in
coraraand) swept the field in front of the brigade till
the eneray were close to the works, and then its
right section Avas placed on the left of the left sec
tion, where it could enfilade the railroad cut in front
of Colonel Prather's regiment (120th Indiana) as
well as the river bank. Colonel Henderson says,
"The battery of regulars behaved so gallantly that
my admiration was excited. " It did most effective
service.' But Canby's battery was not alone on the
left flank. When Mitchell's section of Battery G,
1st Ohio, came Avithin our Avorks at the centre, it
joined the rest of the battery, and Captain Marshall
Avas sent to reinforce the left, near the railroad, just
as the attack on Stiles's brigade Avas fully developed.
He carried still further the extension of artillery to
the left, Avhich Canby had made by the transfer of
his right section, and opened with canister, enfilad
ing the railroad in front of the original position of
the regular battery. He tells us that the enemy
were there in stroug force, and coming up to our
works on their hands and knees. ^ The rifled guns
in Fort Granger, across the river, were also in rapid
action, and the sharp, continuous, grinding rattle of
the musketry combined with the cannon roar to tell
why it was that Scott's and Featherston's brigades
of Loring's division had so terrible a list of casual -
remained in command, but Henderson gave assistance in everything
as he was able, and the cordial good understanding between the two
officers gave the brigade the benefit of the skUl and courage of
both. 1 I take the more pleasure in quoting Colonel Henderson's praise
because Lieutenant Canby's official report is a very brief and modest
statement of the battery's part in the action. See 0. E , xlv. part i.
p. 338. 2 0. E., xlv. part i. p. 331.

126 The Battle of FrankUn
ties.' The fight here was bitter and stubborn. It
is difficult to determine how long it lasted. The
enemy's reserves renewed the action at least twice,
but at last they gave it up, and those who could get
aAvay straggled back to the holloAvs in front to re
form. Numbers surrendered in the ditch, and came
over the works as prisoners. Others lay flat along
the ground in front of the hedge, and waited for
darkness to cover their retreat. At the end of an
hour from the opening of the fight, Stiles's front
was clear of aggressive bodies of the enemy, and in
the dusk of the early evening a skirmish line Avas
advanced, and kept out till the line Avas withdrawn
at midnight. During the advance of Loring's divis
ion, Guibor's Confederate battery had hotly engaged
our artillery at the extreme left, and had raade the
position of the 120th Indiana, formed as it Avas en
potence, facing the east, a most trying one. When,
however, the contest of the infantry became close,
the eneray's guns were withdrawn from the range
of Fort Granger.
The fighting on the line of Caseraent's brigade
was similar to that upon Stiles's front, but as the
line itself was straighter, and had no recurved flanks,
the contest was more even, one regiment being no
more exposed than another. So also no part of
Casement's line had any advantage, such as the
tough standing hedge gave to Stiles's centre. The
whole brigade front was covered with the light abattis
made frora the hedge material, but this was not
pinned doAvn, and was raore a show' of obstruction
to the eneray than a reality. The flanking corapany
of the 65th Indiana (which was the extreme right of
1 Loring officially reported an aggregate of 876 casualties in his
division. O. R., xlv. part i. p. 715.

The Fight of Our Left Wing 127
the brigade) was arraed with repeating rifles.' The
head -logs on the parapet were perhaps more contin
uous than in some other brigades in the line, but the
chief advantage of Casement's position was that it
had clear range in front, and Avas just beyond the
disturbing influence of the rush of routed men from
the outpost.
No officer of the division had a stronger personal
influence on his men than Casement. At once
impetuous and clear-headed, he was CA'crywhere
present, his ringing voice heard above the din. His
men Avere well in hand, and opened fire as soon as
the enemy came within reach of their rifle balls. It
was probably the left Aving of Featherston's brigade
which first struck this part of our line. The struggle
was sharp, but the attack was repulsed. The Con
federates reformed and tried it again, but again
and still again they were driven back, leaving the
ground covered with their dead and wounded. Case
ment reported that "the firing Avas kept up with
great vigor until dark, during which time the enemy
raade scA'eral distinct charges, but were repulsed
each tirae with terrible slaughter. "^
In one of the lulls betAveen these attacks, when
the sraoke was so thick that one could see a A-ery
little way in front, the oflicers of the line seized the
opportunity to look over the parapet, the better to
learn the situation. The eneray's line was diraly
seen, and a raounted officer in front of them, upon
a fractious horse, either forming them for a fresh
1 It was only toward the close of the war that repeating and breech-
loading arms were issued, and at first in so small numbers that only a
corapany here and there was supplied with them. In such cases the
company was the ranking corapany of the regiment, which stood ou its
right. 2 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 425.

128 The Battle of Franklin
assault or rallying them after the last repulse.
Several shots Avere fired, and horse and rider both
fell. Presently the horse struggled to his feet, and
dashed Avildly forward, straight for the breastwork,
leaped upon it, and fell dead astride of it. The
officer, shot through the thighs, tried to crawl away.
Casement, who was at the moment at the extreme
right of his brigade, shouted to him to come in and
save his life; but he kept on, probably not hearing
the well meant advice in the horrid noise, and flying
shots pierced hira again. He lay helpless till, the
repulse of his command being complete and dark
ness coining on, Casement ordered forward a skir
mish line to cover his front. The wounded officer
was General John Adams, whose brigade was the
left of Loring's division. He Avas brought in still
living, and iraraediate surgical care was given him;
but his condition was past help, and he soon died.'
The incident has historical importance, as fixing
Adams's place nearly opposite the right of Casement's
brigade, and showing that he probably came up as a
reserve behind Walthall's right. Four Confederate
brigades thus attacked two of ours, and our line
was shortened by having two regiments in reserve.
Neither in Stiles's brigade nor in Casement's was
there any need to call upon the reserves. Those of
the Confederates were all brought into action, and

1 O. R., xlv. part i. p. 353. In my official report I followed the
account first circulated, which was that General Adams mounted the
parapet in a charge, and fell there. I was set right in tliis matter by
i\-ritten statements of General Casement and of Captain Hornhrook of
the 65th Indiana, made independently and in substantial accord. Ad
ams's saddle with the bullet holes in the flaps was long a relic in Gen
eral Casement's possession. His watch and other valuables were sent
to his famUy under a flag of truce, in our North Carolina campaign in
the next spring.

The Fight of Our Left Wing 129
the short line which they attacked made their flanks
lap upon each other. In this way was produced the
effect of an attack in columns several lines deep,
which was the description of the attack universally
given by our officers and men. The front line, when
repulsed, rallied on its supports, and the efforts to
storm the intrenchments were thus renewed re
peatedly as long as daylight lasted. Casement's
losses were slight, and he touches the true cause of
this when he says in his report, " Not a man left the
works unless ordered to do so, Avhich accounts for
the small loss. " ' The experience of the brigade
goes far to prove that, even Avith muzzle-loading rifles
such as our troops were then arraed with, the pro
tection of fairly good earthAvorks is sufficient to
enable the line forraed in two ranks to cripple so
seriously an enemy twice as strong, that his aggres
sive impetus is lost, and his attack fails when raade
over open ground. And this Avas done with a loss
to the defenders scarcely worth mentioning. ^
1 0. R., -xlv. part i. p. 425.
2 The same lesson was taught at Cold Harbor in Virginia, where
the sides were reversed. Caseraent's casualties in the brigade were
only nineteen. O. R., xlv. part i. p. 411. Those of Loring's division
have been mentioned above, p. 126.

CHAPTER IX
THE FIGHT OF OUR RIGHT WING
Cheatham's Corps — Convergent Attack of Cleburne aud Brown —
Line of Lane's Eetreat — Moore's Brigade Front unmasked — Our
Artillery Cross-fire — Adv.ance of Bate's Division — Battery at tiie
Bostick Place — Close Quarters at Moore's Centre — Help from
Kimball — Chalmers's Cavalry attack Kimball — Infantry attack
his Left — Cavalry his Centre and Eight — Confederates repulsed.
The right of Ruger's division (Moore's brigade) was
not engaged quite so early as Strickland's brigade,
and the circumstances were somewhat different.
The wedge shape of Conrad and Lane's lines caused
the attack of the Confederate divisions of Cleburne
and Brown to become convergent, for their charge
came straight at the front of the two brigades resist
ing them. When these broke, the lines both of
retreat and pursuit all led toward the turnpike and
the opening in our breastworks there. In all the
enemy's regiments Avhich attacked Lane, therefore,
the left shoulder Avas thrown forward, and that flank
was turned obliquely to Moore's line. The fire
opened as soon as the Confederates Avere unmasked
by our retreating men, and it told with terrible effect.
No part of the fugitives made for the breastworks
here, for, as we have seen,' their path was bounded
by the centre of the 72d Illinois in Strickland's right
wing. Moore's men proved, as did Casement's and
' Ante, p. 118.

The Fight of Our Right Wing 131
Stiles's on the east of the turnpike, that there Avas
no doubt of their ability to hold the Avorks where
there Avas any scope for their fire, and where the
direct impact of the flying crowd was not added to
the advantage the enemy had in coming to the very
ditch under such a cover.
When the front line in Strickland's front gave
way, the left of Moore's brigade was seriously com-
proraised, but the courage and deterraination of
officers and raen were equal to the task. Colonel
Sherwood, commanding the left regiment (111th
Ohio), had his men fix bayonets and prepare for a
hand to hand fight on the parapet.' Captain Dow
ling, the Inspector of the brigade, rallied some of
the broken troops by heroic efforts, and led them
into position as a flanking force to cover the left of
Moore's line.^ A little later, when the eneray was
raaking renewed efforts to break through, part of the
101st Ohio, from Kimball's division, Avas sent by
my order to reinforce Ruger's line. With these.
Captain DoAvling established a short line nearly at
right angles to the main one, where they swept with
their fire the space in front of the new line of
Strickland's men, and drove the enemy frora the
works in the immediate vicinity of Sherwood's flank.
Dowling was wounded in the struggle, but his work
was well done, and the line thus reinforced remained
unshaken. Ziegler's Pennsylvania battery on the Carter's
Creek Turnpike was ordered to fire obliquely to the
left, where the enemy Averc seen to be forming upon
the elevation on the farther side of the hollow
already described, Avhich meandered in front, and
1 SherAvood's Report, 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 387.
2 Moore's Report, Id., p. 380.

132 The Battle of FrankUn
ran diagonally through our lines near the extreme
right. Bridges's Illinois battery, Avhich was on the
slope near the centre of Strickland's brigade, crossed
its fire Avith Ziegler's, and the infantry also carefully
directing their rifles against the same height, the
Confederate line, as General Ruger says, visibly
wasted and disappeared under the concentrated fire.'
The first attack upon the front of Ruger's division
had been made by Brown's diAnsion of Cheatham's
corps, which had marched forward, guiding its left
upon the Columbia Turnpike. But for the reason
already stated, the Confederate brigades had changed
their direction more toward our left. Gordon had
partly crossed the turnpike, and his brigade was
astride of it when he struck our works. Gist had
extended the line so as to involve Moore's brigade
on our side in the attack. ^ Strahl and Carter re
spectively supported Gordon and Gist. These seem
to be the troops who, after their repulse, were reform
ing beyond the hollow where Lane's brigade had
stood, and who were withered in the fearful fire.^
Bate's division of Cheatham's corps had been
deployed on Brown's right and rear. It was formed
with two brigades in front line, Jackson's on the
right, and Sraith's on the left, with Bullock's in sec
ond line.* Presstman's battery was also with him.
Bate had a longer road to travel than Brown, and
this made his attack somewhat later. ° His advance
was guided by the house of Mrs. Bostick, near the
1 Ruger's Report, O. R., xlv. part i. p. 365.
2 Capers's Report, Id., p. 736.
3 The evidence for this will be given when I analyze more fully the
lines of advance from the Confederate standpoint, post, chap. xi.
¦* The permanent commanders of the two brigades last naraed were
Generals Tyler and Finley, but they Avere both absent.
^ Bate's Report, Id., p. 743.

The Fight of Our Right Wing 133
Carter's Creek Turnpike, and when he reached it he
had one brigade on each side of it, his left being close
to the road. Presstman's battery went into action on
the knoll by the house, whilst Bate, finding a stout
line of skirmishers on his left flank (from Kiraball's
division as well as Ruger's), moved his reserve
brigade to the left so that it was astride of the
Carter's Creek road with two regiments on the west
of it. He had found his left under a furious fire from
Ziegler's battery and the right of Ruger's line, and
this further deployment was to give the needed ex
tension to his own front. He expected Chalmers's
cavalry division to have joined his left, but Chalmers
was much farther around, in front of Kimball, and
was advancing nearly at right angles to Bate's line
of march. The latter therefore thought himself en
tirely unsupported.'
The tendency to move by convergent lines is seen
in Bate's as well as in the other Confederate divis
ions. His right swept over the " half -moon " barri
cades that Lane had held, and came up to our works,
where Gist's and Carter's brigades of Brown's divis
ion had preceded him. His centre came full upon
Moore's brigade, and his left, beyond the Carter's
Creek Turnpike, lapped upon Grose's brigade of
Kimball's division.
The struggle was a severe one, and in several
places along Moore's front the enemy came to close
quarters over the breastworks. The centre of the
brigade was occupied by the sraall detachment of
two companies Ruger had taken frora the 183d Ohio
to fill a gap in his attenuated line. These raen were
raw recruits, and in the pressure gave way. Moore
took two corapanies frora the 80th Indiana (on his
1 Bate's Report, 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 743.

134 The Battle of Franklin
extreme right), and hurried them to the centre, where
they made good the momentary gap. At Ruger's
request, I also ordered Kimball to send a regiment
to reinforce him, as has been already stated. A full
regiment was not at the moraent available, and Lieut.
Colonel McDanald was sent with part of the 101st
Ohio.' These were put in at the Aveak place on the
left of Moore's brigade, and did brave and efficient
service. At Moore's centre, where the enemy had gained
some brief advantage, they raade desperate efforts.
They made a bold dash for the flag of the 107th
Indiana, which was on the Avorks a little to the left
of the centre, but those wdio grasped it were shot
down before they could accomplish their purpose.
Battle-flags were planted on the parapet, but the
23d Michigan turned its fire obliquely to the left,
and shot down two color bearers and cleared the
Avorks of the assailants. The space was iramediately
filled by the two corapanies of the 80th Indiana
hastening by orders from the right, and the line was
no more in danger.^ The sharp fighting was, how
ever, confined to Moore's centre and left. His right,
which was recurved, was not at close quarters with
the eneray; for Bate's left brigade kept its align
ment with the centre, and did not reach our works
at the Carter's Creek Turnpike by a hundred and
fifty yards. The casualty returns support this view.
The two regiments on the right (80th Indiana and
118th Ohio) report nine raen wounded only. The
total loss of the brigade Avas one hundred and ten,
1 General Ruger says five companies. Colonel Kirby, commanding
Kimball's brigade, says eight. O. R., xlv. part i. pp. 367 and 1 84.
2 Moore's Report leaves it doubtful what troops supported the left of
his Une and the centre respectively, but the reports of the 23d Michi
gan and 80th Indiana seem to make it certain. Id., pp. 383, 380.

The Fight of Our Right Wing 135
of which only fifteen were missing. The heaviest
loss fell naturally upon the 111th Ohio, Avhich was
exposed by the break in Strickland's brigade. This
regiment reported forty-four casualties, of which
nine Avere missing.' Bate reported a loss of three
hundred and nineteen in his division, of Avhich nine
teen only were missing.^ The Confederate reports
as to their raissing, however, cannot be reconciled
with the nuraber of prisoners turned over to our
provost marshal.
The time when Bate's attack was delivered Avas
necessarily soraewhat later than the attack upon our
centre and left. He was deploying and taking dis
tance tovirard his left, whilst Brown Avas advancing,
and, with the longer route necessary to reach our
refused flank, he had probably a mile farther to go.
This, with the halts raade to correct the alignment,
and to change the place of Bullock's brigade from
second line to the extreme left, Avould account for
the time which intervened betAveeii the attack of
Stewart's corps east of the turnpike, and this Avhich
Bate was making on the west.
Chalmers's division of cavalrj^ had been watching
our right since noon, and being hidden from Bate's
view by rolling ground, Avith orchards and woods,
the latter thought that tho cavalry had failed to
accompany his raoA^ement on that flank. In fact,
however, they seera to have been a little ahead of
hira, and some distance frora his left.^ The hol-
loAv with its brooklet, Avhich ran diagonally across
I 0. E., xlv. part i. p. 369. In a private letter Colonel Sherwood
informs rae that his missing were afterward proven to be dead. This,
of course, is more or less true of all reported raissing. 1 follow the
figures of the Official Records.
2 Id., p. 743.
3 Chalmers's Report, Id., p. 764.

136 The Battle of FranMin
Ruger's front, made a turn and entered our lines in
Kimball's division, between Grose's brigade (which
stood next to Ruger) and Kirby's, which was Kim
ball's centre. Whitaker's, on the extreme right,
reached to the Harpeth RiA'cr.' The Avhole of Kim
ball's division line faced to the west, and beyond the
roll of ground in that direction, in the next hollow,
Chalmers prepared for his demonstration. There his
horses were left with the regular details of horse
holders, and his line was formed dismounted.
A road running northwest left the Carter's Creek
Turnpike close to Ruger's right, and its direction
was about the same as that of Ruger's breastAvorks
where they reached the turnpike. Kimball's brigades
being in echelon, his left Avas near a hundred yards
in rear of the road, and the distance increased as
one went toward the right ;2 so that opposite Kim
ball's centre this road was two hundred and fifty
yards distant. It was there crossed by another
road running out from the toAvn through Kimball's
lines, and at the intersection was the place of the
reserves of the skirraish line. I have said that the
whole of the 77th Pennsylvania was detailed as
skirraishers for Grose's brigade, and its commandant
(Colonel Rose) had his reserves near the cross-road,
whilst his line of sentinels was nearly half a mile
out from our main line, connecting at the Carter's
Creek Turnpike Avith those of Ruger's division. ^
On his right he connected with the skirraishers of
Kimball's other brigades.
Bate's advance pushed back our skirmish lines,
and as Rose's men retreated they rallied on the
1 See ante, p. 62.
2 See Major Twining's Map, p. 45, ante.
» Grose's Report, 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 208 ; Rose's, Id., p. 226.

The Fight of Our Right Wing 137
reserve farthest toward the right,' and took advan
tage of the little ravine to check the enemy from this
cover. Here they held on for some time, till the
advance of Chalmers's dismounted cavalry subjected
them to a sharp fire on tlieir right flank. They then
retired within the lines by way of the hollow.
This movement of the skirmishers uncovered, at
first, only the Pennsylvania battery and the left of
Grose's brigade. These were brought into action,
and the check given the eneray by the stout resist
ance of the picket was turned into defeat by the fire
of the line. Grose says that his firing began when
the enemy Avas about tAvo hundred and fifty yards
away, and that few of thera got nearer than a hun
dred yards. It was a short, sharp combat, and the
Confederate infa.ntry retreated to the cover of the
hill at the Bostick house. ^
It must be remerabered that only two regiraents of
Bate's division were deployed west of the Carter's
Creek Turnpike, and they did not extend over the
whole of Grose's front. This is explicitly stated in
the report of the 9th Indiana (Colonel Suraan), which
was his right regiment, and was separated frora the
rest by the little ravine and watercourse. " Only a
skirraish line, " Colonel Suraan says, " showed itself
in front of my regiment, though their line of battle
was seen very close in front of the 75th Illinois. ^
One volley, an oblique fire, was all the fighting ray
regiment did. There were no casualties. " There-
port of the 75th confirms this, telling us that the
first volley checked the enemy as soon as he was
within good musket range, and a few more sent hira
back in confusion. This regiment also suffered no
1 Grose's Report, 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 208 ; Rose's, Id , p. 226.
2 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 208. ^ Suman's Eeport, Id., p. 221.

138 The Battle of Franklin
casualties.^ Indeed, the casualties in the whole
brigade raay be said to be trifling, for out of an
aggregate of thirty-seven, full half were in the 77tli
Pennsylvania, which Avas the skirraish line.^ The
regimental reports shoAV that the firing lasted ten or
fifteen minutes, when the enemy retreated and made
no further serious effort on Grose's front.
As we have passed beyond the scope of Bate's
attack in our examination of events as they occurred
from left to right, we must conclude that whatever
fighting there was on the front of Kirby and Whit
aker (the centre and right brigades of Kimball's
division) was with the Confederate cavalry under
Chalmers. Though no fully authenticated report by
this officer has been found among the Confederate
archives which came into possession of the govern
raent at the close of the war, the original draught
found araong General Chalmers's papers and fur
nished by him has been accepted without question,
and is printed in the Official Records. ^ That the
commanding officers on the national side do not seem
to have recognized thera as cavalry does not mili
tate against the facts, which prove beyond question
Chalmers's advance on this part of the field, and that
Bate's infantry fell far short of reaching it.
The gray uniforms of the enemy, soiled and worn
with hard service, Avere indistinguishable in the dif
ferent corps, and as to arms or equipment the case
was nearly the same. Forrest relied upon the car
bines or muskets of his men, and despised the sabre,
so that his horsemen were more than any others a
mounted infantry at a time when the usual custom
1 Bennett's Report, O. R., xlv. part i. p. 214.
2 Grose's Report, Id., p. 209.
' Id., p. 763, aud ante, p. 83, note.

The Fight of Our Bight Wing 139
on both sides was for this arm of the service to fight
in line dismounted.
The heavy firing had been heard for some tirae on
the left by Kiraball's men, when at last, about sun
set, a line was seen on the ridge in front of Kirby
and Whitaker.i Two or three volleys drove the
enemy back, the skirmishers were again advanced,
and though a lively skirmish fire was kept up late in
the evening, they maintained their position without
difficulty, and the main line in this part of the field
was not again engaged.
In Whitaker's brigade the efforts of the enemy to
test the strength with which the extrerae flank was
held were possibly more persistent than in front of
Kirby, for Whitaker speaks of the fight as "short
but severe. The enemy persisted in the assault
about fifteen minutes, when they broke and fled, to
return no raore. " ^ Whitaker's casualties were only
one killed and eight Avounded. Kirby's aggregate
was fourteen, but McDanald's regiment, which was
sent to reinforce Ruger's division, belonged to this
brigade. Chalmers tells us that his line advanced about
half past four, driving in the skirmishers, till he
Avas "within sixty yards of the fortifications," but
his "force Avas too small to justify an attempt to
storm thera." He reports his loss at one hundred
and sixteen, killed and wounded. ^ His claim to
have "held his position " in Kimball's front can
only mean the position behind the rolling ground, out
of range, for certainly his raen were seen no more
frora Kimball's line, nor did they manifest their
presence when the troops were withdraAvn at mid-
1 Kirby's Report, 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 184.
2 Id., p. 195. s Id., p. 764.

140 The Battle of FrankUn
night. On this part of the line, therefore, we must
conclude that a forced reconnoissance was all that
Chalmers really attempted, and that, though boldly
pushed, it was easily repulsed.
The extent of front covered by Kimball was so
great that we had not attempted to make a contin
uous line of infantry trench, but only to hold the
salient points, putting in the brigades where they
would mutually support one another, and sweep A^'ith
their fire the spaces between. Even this had not
been fully accomplished when the fighting began,
and the reports of brigade and regimental command
ers show that the works were incomplete, and the
troops had to drop the intrenching tools to seize
their rifles. ' This was what led both Hood himself
and Bate to express their regret that a more vigorous
attack was not made on our right flank. I have
already given reasons for my opinion that it was not
practicable, and that we were right in considering
the Carter's Creek Turnpike as the limit of our proper
front on that side, Kimball's division being more in
the position of a support for the flank than as part
of the line itself.^
1 O. R., xlv. part i. pp. 195, 214. 2 Ante, p. 60.

CHAPTER X
THE SITUATION AT SUNSET
Deterrained Fighting at the Centre — Examination of Strickland's
Line — Enemy holding outside of his AVorks — The Second Line
— Relative Position of Opdycke and Strickland — Orders to the
latter — Visit to Ruger — Wagner reorganizing — Visit to extreme
Left — Reinforcemeuts for the Centre.
We have now followed the progress of the battle
during the hour betAveen four and five o'clock, and
have seen that the severe repulse of the enemy on
both our flanks was coraplete and final. In these
parts of the field skirmishers had been advanced as
the Confederates retreated, and were kept out till
our final withdrawal at midnight. The skirmishing
was active, and a lively, rattling fire continued along
the front on both wings, but no serious efforts to
advance again in force were raade by the eneray any
where but at and near the centre. Whenever a new
assault was raade near the Columbia road, brisk
demonstrations would be made by Stewart's corps
on our left, and by Bate's division on our right; the
artillery in our line would sweep the front with
canister, and the sounds would indicate a battle,
but the only really determined work by the Con
federates was done upon the front of the central
brigades of Reilly and Strickland, between which
Opdycke's sturdy regiments were now solidly placed,
the lines of all three brigades being more or less

142 The Battle of FranMin
thickened by disorganized but brave groups of Con
rad's and Lane's raen, who had rallied at the
works. My personal observation of these earlier scenes in
the fight has been brought doAvn to the time when the
disorder at the centre was corrected by the splendid
charges of our reserA-es. It may be Avell to take up
the story there, and tell what passed under my own
eye, so far as it is raaterial to an accurat'C under
standing of the persistent struggle.
I have said that frora the turnpike we could not
see Avhat was occurring behind the Carter house and
its group of farm buildings. The comfortable farm
stead was surrounded by shade trees, with some fruit
trees in the enclosure nearest the house. This grove
was mostly on the northern slope toward the town,
after the locust trees at and in front of the breast
works had been felled, and, with the house and farm
buildings, quite shut off the view looking westAvard.
As soon as the first repulse of the enemy on Reilly's
line and on the turnpike left rae free to turn my
attention elsewhere, I went in person to examine
the condition of affairs at the centre of Strickland's
brigade line. I had seen Opdycke's men at the
retrenchment crossing the road in line with the
brick smoke-house and adjacent building in rear of
the opening in the works left for the incoming troops
and trains, but I could not see how they connected
on the right Avith Strickland's men.' The sinoke
obscured the view, but enough could be seen to make
me suspect that the enemy still held the outside of
our main intrenchments for some distance west of the
turnpike and southwest of the Carter buildings.
Passing round the grove and houses under cover of
1 Ante, pp. 97, 98.

The Situation at Sunset 143
the southern slope, I saw, as soon as I got beyond
the obstructions to the view, that my suspicion was
correct, and that our men were holding a new line,
apparently running frora the brick smoke-house above
raentioned, standing south of the dwelling-house.'
The efforts of the enemy to break through at this
point were so quickly renewed that the lulls were
short and there was small chance for extended inves
tigation. Not meeting Colonel Strickland in per
son, I sent to him, by a staff officer, an order to
make the most strenuous efforts to carry his brigade
forward to their original place in the front line of
intrenchment. We have seen how embrasures had been made for
the four guns of the 20th Ohio Battery in the second
line just west of the sraoke-house and the other small
building that stood between it and the road. The
infantry now made a continuous line frora the re
trenchment in the road to and between these build
ings, and araong the guns. Just west of the battery
was the breastwork which the 44th Missouri had
built. When the break occurred at the front line,
the buildings and this breastwork raade a rallying
place, and Opdycke's brigade on the left, with
Strickland's on the right, had forraed upon it as
the reserves rushed forward. In the first raSlde,
officers and men of both brigades were intermixed,
and scattered araong thera here and there were some
of those whose pell-mell rush from the front had
swept frora the intrenchraent part of its defenders.
The bulk of Opdycke's, however, were nearer the
turnpike, and most of Strickland's gathered toward
the right, 2 so that, although they lapped upon each
other, Strickland occupied substantially the right
1 See Sketch Map, ante, p. 43. 2 Ante, p. 117.

144 The Battle of Franklin
half of the line originally allotted to him. When
ever a lull occurred in the fight, the men instinct
ively crowded to left and right so as to get the
organizations better separated, and both brigades
strengthened and extended the barricade in the
second line on which they had rallied.'
In reply to the order to Strickland to reoccupy the
front line of breastworks, he soon sent word that he
had done so; but still noticing frora the turnpike
that, in the repeated onslaughts of the Confederates
that folloAved each other quickly, their fire carae
frora what I recognized as the outside of our original
intrenchments, I went a second time to his position,
just before sunset. I found hira just west of the ell
or wing of the Carter house, in rear of what was the
centre of his brigade line before the battle opened,
but now was near the point where his left and
Opdycke's right appeared to join.
From this position I pointed out to him, as well
as the smoke would permit, the difference between
the present line held by his men and that which they
had originally occupied, and from the other side of
which the enemy were firing. Urging hira to watch
for an opportunity to get forward and drive his oppo
nents away from the works, I passed on to Moore's
brigade, and visited General Ruger, the division
commander. The whole of Moore's front was firmly
held, and Ruger's report indicated that the fighting
beyond the Cartersville Turnpike had not been seri
ous. I therefore felt free to call upon Kimball to
send a regiment to Ruger to strengthen the flank of
Moore's brigade and assist in Strickland's movement
forward, as has heen stated.^
In this personal visit to the different brigades in
1 O. R., xlv. part i. p. 354. 2 Ante, p. 134.

The Situation at Sunset 145
line, my object was to verify the actual situation and
come into touch with subordinate commanders, so
that the action of all might be co-ordinated to secure
victory. I now kncAV that Kimball and his brigades
were firmly in place. So Avas Ruger with his, ex
cept the change in Strickland's line which has been
described. Opdycke's brigade Avas astride the Colura
bia Turnpike, crowding upon Reilly on the left and
upon Strickland on the right. Had there been any
other division or brigade coraraander there, my quest
would have discovered him, for my ride Avas an
inspection for the express purpose of knowing what
strength we had in hand to coraplete our task. I
did not find Wagner or either of his brigade com
manders except Opdycke. I have never doubted that
the other two were where duty called them, busy in
the reorganization of the two disordered brigades;
but they were not in the line nor visible from it.'
Returning to the centre, I found that Strickland
thought he needed the help of fresher well organized
troops to lead forward to the breastworks in front,
and I determined to continue my ride to the extreme
left and judge, after conference Avith Reilly and his
brigade commanders, whether a reinforcement for
Strickland could be spared.
At my headquarters on the turnpike I was met by
a message from my acting Quartermaster, Captain
Hentig,^ complaining that the passage of wagons
and ambulances at the bridge was obstructed by
croAvds of Wagner's men. I sent my Adjutant Gen-
1 The reason for making this statement so detailed and explicit will
appear when, in chapter xix., I shall have to notice the controversies
in regard to this part of the battle history.
2 Captain Hentig was Commissary of Subsistence, but in the absence
of my Quartermaster on leave, he was performing temporarily the duties
of both offices. 10

146 The Battle of FranMin
eral to the place to ask General Wagner to correct
the evil. Captain Cox found Wagner seeking to
reorganize his brigades in the open space along the
river, and exhorting those Avhom he and his officers
had there halted and brought into sorae kind of
order.' He promised to place a guard at the bridge
to stop stragglers and keep the passage free, and
this he did.
After communicating thus with Wagner, I passed
on to the left and saw Henderson and Stiles in per
son, and, from their reports, feeling assured as to
the safety of that part of the line, directed that their
reserve regiment, the 112th Illinois, should be sent
to the right centre to assist Strickland in fully re
gaining the works. My Inspector General, Major
Dow, was with me, and as he Avas an officer of this
regiment, he was, at his own request, alloAved to
accompany it in its new task.^
On my Avay back I consulted with General Reilly
and Colonel Casement, and informed them of my
action. I also directed General Reilly to have a
detachment in readiness to form on the outside of
his breastworks, and to sweep with an enfilading
fire the enemy who held on in front of the right
centre, if the ncAV effort from Strickland's line
should not succeed. ^
1 Captain Cox's statement, Appendix F.
2 Henderson, the brigade commander, was colonel of the regiment,
which was therefore in command of Lieut. Colonel Bond. Colonel
Henderson for many years represented his district in Congress, and is
one of the most honored public men of western Illinois. His recol
lection of my visit to the brigade for the purpose noted is included in
an interesting written statement from which I have quoted, and shall
have other occasions to quote.
^ In a letter from General Casement (in 1881) replying to inquiries
of mine when I was preparing the volurae of history of this carapaign,
he mentions the last order, reminding me of an amusing personal occur-

The Situation at Sunset 147
The sun was just setting behind the hills in the
west as I got back to my station on the Columbia
Turnpike, close to the Carter house. Twilight and
darkness soon settled down upon the field, for the
true sunset Avas at almost exactly five o'clock.'
Subordinates were notified where to find me, and
to raake their reports during the evening, so that
there might be no miscarriage of communications
in the darkness. The 112th Illinois had raore than
half a mile to march, in order to reach and reinforce
Strickland, and it was completely dark when the
regiment reported to him. Meanwhile the fight at
the centre had been bitter and unceasing, for Hood's
brave men were still possessed with the belief that
they could turn their brief advantage there into a
coraplete victory, and they fought with almost unex
ampled tenacity to accomplish their desire.
reuce connected with it. In a subsequent f uUer stateraent he confirmed
it, with other raatters to which I shall refer later. General Casement
was colonel of the 103d Ohio, aud was brevetted Brigadier General
for services in this carapaign. He afterward won a national reputa
tion in connection with the track-laying of the Union Pacific Eailway,
and in other great works of railway construction. He was Territorial
Delegate in Congress, and filled other important public positions. Few
business men have been so prominent or so well known.
I Professor ,T. G. Porter of the Cincinnati Observatory has kindly
computed the actual sunset at Franklin ou November 30, 1 864, and
finds it to have been at 4h. 59 m., local time. Colonel M. B. Carter,
living on the field, has also been good enough to note the apparent sun
set on one of the anniversaries of the battle, and found it to be 4 h. 51 m.
The low hills westward account for the difference between the real and
the app.arent sinking of the sun below the horizon. He also noted that
at 5 h. 2 ra. it was too dark to read ordinary newspaper print, raarking
the twilight which is commonly called " early candle-lighting."

CHAPTER XI
FEOM THE CONFEDERATE STANDPOINT
MnltipUcation of Lines of Attack — How caused — Walthall's Descrip
tion of the Assault — In the Abattis — Repulsed in Confusion — The
Ditch at the Cotton-gin — Brown's Attack on Right Centre — Bate
overlaps him — Johnson's Attack after Dark — Hood's Description
— S. D. Lee's — Colonel Capers's — Capture of Gordon — His
Account of the Charge — Cleburne falls.
It Avas the irapression made on those who fought
near our centre, that the enemy's original formation
was that of deep columns of attack, charging one
after another to the number of a dozen or more, and
intended to break through our lines at the Carter
house by their numerous and rapidly repeated as
saults. This Avas a natural conclusion from the man
ner in which the charges Avere renewed and persisted
in, long after the flanks at right and left were relieved
from serious fighting. This was, hoAvever, the result
of fortuitous circurastances and not of a plan, for the
official reports of all the Confederate officers prove
that their first deployment was, like our own, a line
of battle in Avliich each division Avas arrayed Avith two
deployed brigades in first line, supported by one in
second line. The exceptions Avere in French's divis
ion, which (as one of the brigades was absent) had
but one in front and one in support, and in Brown's
division, which had four brigades, and therefore put
two in each line. Reasons have already been given

From the Confederate Standpoint 149
for concluding that Hood's real design was to turn or
break our left flank, which was by far closer to the
bridges and ford which were our line of retreat in
case of disaster.'
As Flood, however, in his first advance, sent eigh
teen brigades to attack our main line of five between
the railroad and Carter's Creek Turnpike, it neces
sarily turned out that the Confederate movement was
a convergent one. Their brigades being the tactical
units which actually controlled, these not only lapped
over each other, but unforeseen circumstances made
the multiplication of the brigade lines greater at the
centre by the spontaneous crowding in from the flanks
Avhen the word passed among them that they had
possession of our parapet near the Carter house.
As each division had its own support, there was a
double assault when it struck our front, with as many
successive rallyings and fresh attacks as its men
could be induced to make. The divisions of Loring,
Walthall, French, and Cleburne were all east of the
Columbia Turnpike, and Cleburne's left guided upon
the road.^ Loring's right was necessarily guided by
the line of the river and railroad, and as, by reason of
the check at the centre caused by the brief resistance
of Wagner's two brigades, the enemy's right got for-
Avard fastest, Walthall came in echelon to Loring, lap
ping over him in rear to the extent of a brigade, whilst
French Avould be similarly in rear of Walthall.
By the same crowding process Cleburne's division
would be thrown behind French, and imraediately upon
the road and on its east side there Avould result a
coluran of five brigades, for Walthall distinctly declares
that his left brigade (Shelley's) assaulted our works
" just to the right of the pike," which brings him in
1 Ante, p. 87. 2 gge Stewart's Map, facing p. 87.

150 The Battle of Franklin
front of Reilly's brigade on our side.' He further
says that General Shelley was among those that got
over the works ; and as we certainly know that Case
ment's brigade Avas nowhere pierced, it seems clearly
proved that it was between the cotton-gin and the
turnpike that Shelley was in person. Reynolds's bri
gade had apparently been thrown into the second line
by obstructions in the advance, which haA-e been be
fore raentioned, and it may have been in rear of
Quarles, who attacked Casement.^ But behind Shel
ley must have been Cockrell's and Sears's brigades of
French's division, and two of Cleburne's three, mak
ing five in column. But even this does not complete
the full tale ; for Gordon's brigade of BroAvn's div-is-
ion got also astride of the road, and Gordon himself
Avas captured in Reilly's brigade line, as I shall show.^
Thus, at brief intervals, six distinct lines here made
furious attacks, to say nothing of repeated rallyings
and new efforts of each.
Let us summarize these attacks upon our left wing.
Loring's division in two lines attacked Stiles's brigade,
and made the brave but fearfully costly effort to turn
our flank by Avay of the raihvay cut. Featherston's
brigade of the sarae division seeras to have come first
against Casement's works, and to have been followed
by Quarles's and Reynolds's brigades of Walthall's
division in succession. The front of Reilly's brigade,
including the Kentucky battery at the turnpike, was
struck by the six brigades in succession that have
been enumerated in the last paragraph.
Walthall's OAvn report of the advance of his division
is such indisputable evidence of the desperate nature
of the struggle that it deserves to be quoted at some
1 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 720. 2 Ante, p. 123.
s Post, p. 159.

From the Confederate Standpoint 151
length. " Both officers and raen," he says, " seeraed
fully alive to the iraportance of beating the enemy here
at any cost, and the line moved steadily forward until
it neared his outer works,' and then fell upon it so
irapetuously that the opposing force gave way without
even retarding the advance, and retired in disorder to
the strong intrenchraents in the rear. There was an
extensive open and alraost unbroken plain between
the outer and inner lines, across which Ave raust pass
to reach the latter. This Avas done under far the raost
deadly fire of small arms and artillery that I have ever
seen troops subjected to. Terribly torn at every step
by an oblique fire frora a battery advantageously posted
at the eneray's left, no less than by the destructive
fire in front, the line raoved on and did not falter till,
just to the right of the pike, it reached the abattis
fronting the works. Over this no organized force
could go, and here the main body of my command,
both front line and reserve, was repulsed in confu
sion ; but over this obstacle, irapassable for a solid line,
many officers and men (among the former Brigadier
General Shelley) raade their way, and some crossing
the ditch in its rear were captured, and others killed
and wounded in the effort to mount the embankraent.
Nurabers of every brigade gained the ditch and there
continued the struggle, Avith but the earthwork sepa
rating them from the enemy, until late in the night." ^
The gallant division commander does not tell of
his OAvn experience, but his corps commander. Gen
eral Stewart, reports that " Major General Walthall
had two horses killed, and was himself severely
bruised." ^ General Quarles was severely wounded
in the advance, all his staff officers Avith hira on the
1 The flank of Conrad's brigade at its outpost position.
2 0. R., xlv. part i. pp. 720, 721. 3 j^., p. 708.

152 The Battle of FrankUn
field were killed, and we are told that "so heavy were
the losses in his command that when the battle ended
its officer highest in rank Avas a captain." ' It is
greatly to be regretted that so few of the Confederate
reports of the battle are preserved, if indeed they
were made ; but this of Walthall shows what must
have been their character.
On the west of the turnpike Brown's division went
forward in two lines. In the first line Avere Gordon's
brigade (guiding on the Columbia Turnpike) Avith Gist's
on Gordon's left. In the second line Strahl's was in
support of Gordon's and Carter's in support of Gist's.^
It also appears that Cockrell's brigade of French's
division lapped over Gordon and Strahl. Later in the
fight Bate's division lapped upon Brown's to the extent
of two brigades, for he attacked with the three in sin
gle line, and his left brigade was astride the Carter's
Creek Turnpike.^ Two and a half of his brigades were
therefore in front of our two (Strickland's and Moore's),
and Bate's right raust have reached nearly or quite to
the Colurabia road, making the third line which at
tacked our right centre. But this was not all. An
hour after dark Johnson's division of Lee's corps,
which was in reserve, went to the assistance of
Cheatham's men, and this strong division of four bri
gades raade a fifth and a sixth line of battle attacking
near the Carter house,* where Opdycke was now filling
half of Strickland's line and Moore's left was holding
grimly to its breastwork, the regiment from Stiles on
our extreme left and another frora Kimball on our ex
treme right gallantly helping the defence at the critical
point. For the attack by Johnson's division we are depend-
1 0. E., xlv. part i. p. 721. " Bate's Eeport, Id., p. 743.
2 Capers's Report, Id., p. 736. '' Lee's Report, Id., p. 687.

From the Confederate Standpoint 153
ent upon the official report of General Stephen D.
Lee, the corps commander. " This division," he says,
" moved against the enemy's breastworks under a
heavy fire of artillery and musketry, gallantly driving
the enemy frora portions of his line. The brigades of
Sharp and Brantley (Mississippians) and of Deas (Ala-
baraians) particularly distinguished theraselves. Their
dead Avere mostly in the trenches and on the Avorks of
the enemy, where they nobly fell in a desperate hand
to hand conflict. Sharp captured three stand of colors.
Brantley was exposed to a severe enfilading fire. These
noble brigades never faltered in this terrible night
struggle. Brigadier General Manigault, commanding
a brigade of Alabamians and South Carolhiians, was
severely wounded in this engagement while gallantly
leading his troops to the fight, and of his two succes
sors in command. Colonel ShaAv was killed and Colonel
Davis wounded. I have never seen greater evidence
of gallantry than was displayed by this division under
the coramand of that admirable and gallant soldier,
Major General Edward Johnson." '
Here, as on the other side of the turnpike, the fear
ful destruction of Confederate officers is the reason
for the scarcity of official reports ; but all that we
have are so telling in their references to the despera
tion of the conflict, that we would perhaps shrink
from further repetition. Flood himself says of it that
" the engagement A\^as of the fiercest possible charac
ter. Our men possessed themselves of the exterior of
the works while the enemy held the interior. Many
of our men were killed entirely inside the Avorks. The
braA'e men captured were taken inside his works in the
edge of the town. The struggle lasted till near mid
night, when the enemy abandoned his works and
1 0. R., xlv. part i. pp. 687, 688.

154 The Battle of FrankUn
crossed the river, leaving his dead and Avounded in our
possession. Never did troops fight more gallantly." '
There are errors in these statements, but they fairly
describe the general character of the fight. Lieut.
General S. D. Lee tells also how he was ordered to
put Johnson's division in, because it was a stubborn
fight and Cheatham had informed him about dark
that assistance was needed at once. " Owing to the
darkness and want of inforraation as to the locality,"
he says, " his attack Avas not felt by the enemy till
about one hour after dark." He calls it a " desperate
hand to hand conflict," and a " terrible night strug
gle." Of our side he says, " The enemy fought gal
lantly and obstinately at Franklin, and the position
he held Avas, for infantry defence, one of the best I
have ever seen." ^
Major General Clayton, of the same corps, says that
his division reached Franklin late in the afternoon.
" We found that bloody and disastrous engagement
begun, and were put in position to attack, but night
mercifully interposed to save us from the terrible
scourge which our brave companions had suffered." ^
In General Brown's division of Cheatham's corps,
the report of Colonel Capers of the 24th South Caro
lina, from Avhich 1 have already quoted,* is the only
one preserved. He tells how his brigade comraander.
General Gist, had first his horse shot under hira, and
then, leading his brigade on foot, fell, pierced through
the heart. At the locust abattis the brigade was
checked, and there they captured and sent to the rear
many of Wagner's men. " Fortunately for us," he says,
" the fire of the enemy slackened to let their advance
troops come in, and we took advantage of it to work
1 0. R., .xlv. part i. p. 653. 8 Id., p. 697.
2 Id., p. 689. 4 Ante, p. 93.

From the Confederate Standpoint 155
our way through. Gist's and Gordon's brigades charged
on and reached the ditch, mounted the work, and met
the enemy in close combat. The colors of the 24th were
planted and defended on the parapet, and the enemy
retired in our front sorae distance, but soon rallied
and came back iu turn to charge us. He never suc
ceeded iu retaking the line we held. About dusk there
was a lull in the firing west of the pike. Brown's
division had established itself in the ditch of the work,
and so far as Gist's brigade front, on the crest. Torn
and exhausted, deprived of every general officer and
nearly every field officer, the division had only strength
enough left to hold its position. Strahl's and Carter's
brigades came gallantly to the assistance of Gist's
and Gordon's, but the enemy's fire from the houses in
rear of the line, and from his reserves thrown rapidly
forward, and from guns posted on the far side of
the riA'er so as to enfilade the field, tore their line to
pieces before it reached the locust abattis." '
Colonel Capers was wounded and fell in the early
part of the attack, and lie does not claim to narrate
the whole engagement as an eyewitness, but com
pleted his report from statements of his subordinates.^
It also contains errors, but it is contemporaneous and
important testiraony. He informs us that, at the close
of the engagement. Captain Gillis of the 46th Georgia
was the senior officer of the brigade, and that the men
in the ditch loaded the muskets and passed them up
to those Avho could fire over the parapet, and thus an
effective fire was maintained until nine o'clock.
The meagre Confederate official reports are supple
mented by recollections of Southern officers published
I 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 736.
2 Colonel Capers became a minister of the Protestant Episcopal
Church after the war, and is now (1896) Bishop of South Carolina.

156 The Battle of Franklin
since the war. General George W. Gordon, who was
made prisoner in the engagement, delivered in 1891 an
address at the unveiling of a statue of General Cleburne,
full of valuable raatter drawn from his OAvn experience
in the battle. He describes the formation of Hood's
army on either side of the Columbia Turnpike, Cle
burne's and Brown's divisions of Cheatham's corps
advancing, the one on the east and the other on the
Avest of the highAvay, which Avas the left guide of
Cleburne and the right guide of BroAvn. General
Granbury's brigade was Cleburne's left wing, and
Gordon's own brigade the right of Brown's. These
two brigades moved to the attack in the front line
separated only by the road. " As the array," he con
tinues, " with a front of tAvo railes or more in length,
moved steadily down the heights and into the valley
below with flying banners, beating drums, and bris
tling guns, it presented a scene of the most imposing
grandeur and magnificence. When we had arrived
within about four hundred paces of the enemy's
advanced line of intrenchments,' our columns were
halted and deployed into two lines of battle prepara
tory to the charge. This advanced position of the
enemy was not a continuous, but a detached line,
manned by two brigades, and situated about six hun
dred paces in front of his main line of formidable works,
and was immediately in front of Cleburne's left and
Cheatham's (BroAN^n's) right.* When all was ready the
charge was ordered. With a wild shout, Ave dashed for
ward upon this line. The enemy delivered one volley
at our rushing ranks, and precipitately fled for refuge
to his main and rear line. The shout was raised, ' Go
into tiie works with them.' This cry was taken up and
vociferated from a thousand throats as we rushed on
I He here refers to the outpost line of Wagner's two brigades.

From the Confederate Standpoint 157
after the flying forces avc had routed, — killing sorae
in our running fire, and capturing others who Avere
slow of foot, — sustaining but small losses ourselves
until Ave arrived Avithin about one hundred paces of
their main line and stronghold, Avhen it seemed to
me that Hell itself had exploded in our faces. Tiie
enemy had thus long reserved their fire for the safety
of their routed comrades Avho were flying to them for
protection, and who Avere just in front of and mingled
with the pursuing Confederates. When it became no
longer safe for theraselves to reserve their fire, they
opened upon us (regardless of their own men Avho
were mingled with us) such a hailstorm of shot and
shell, rausketry and canister, that the very atmos
phere Avas hideous with tlie shrieks of the messengers
of death. The booming of cannon, the bursting of
bombs, the rattle of rausketry, the shrieking of shells,
the whizzing of bullets, the shouting of hosts, and the
falling of men in their struggle for victory, all made
a scene of surpassing terror and awful grandeur."
I haA-e not felt at liberty to abridge this description
by General Gordon, for nothing short of the whole
would quite convey the impression made on his mind
by that terrible charge. It is not the story of an
imaginative Avriter of fiction, but the words of a
brave soldier at the head of his brigade, giA'ing the
best and truest narrative he can of the actual situ
ation of his command and of himself. He had at
an exceptionally early age won his rank by distin
guished services on many a hard fought field, and this
only makes more terribly significant the pre-eminence
lie giA^es to the field of Franklin over all others he
had seen. It was in the centre of this storm of war
that Cleburne appears, whose meraory his friend was
celebratinsr.

158 Tlie Battle of Franklin
"Amid this scene General Cleburne came charging
down our line to the left, and diagonally toward the
enemy's Avorks, his horse running at full speed, and
if I had not personally checked my pace as I ran on
foot, he Avould have plunged over and trampled me to
the earth. On he dashed, but for an instant longer,
when rider and horse both fell, pierced with raany
bullets, within a few paces of the eneiny's works. On
we rushed, his men of Granbury's brigade and mine
having mingled as we closed on the line, until we
reached the enemy's works ; but being now so ex
hausted and so few in numbers, we halted in the
ditch on the outside of the breastworks among dead
and dying men, both Federals and Confederates. A
few charged over, but Avere clubbed down with mus
kets or pierced with bayonets. For some time we
fought them across the breastworks, both sides lying
low and putting their guns under the head-logs upon
the works, firing rapidly and at random and not ex
posing any part of the body except the hand that fired
the gun." Suffering frora fire in every direction, —
front, flanks, and rear, — they finally shouted to our
men Avithin the works that they Avould surrender.
"At length," says General Gordon, "they heard us
and understood us, ceased their fire, and we crossed
their Avorks and surrendered. It was fatal to leave
the ditch and endeavor to escape to the rear. Every
raan who attempted it (and a number did) was at
once exposed and was shot down without exception."
He concludes his description Avith an important fact
Avhich fixes his own location as avcU as that of the
rest of his brigade.
" The left of my brigade," he says, " under com
mand of Colonel Horace Rice (I was on the right)
successfully broke the line, and some of ray brave and

From the Confederate Standpoint 159
noble men Avere killed fifty paces or raore Avithin the
AVorks. But just at this critical juncture a reinforce
ment of a Federal brigade confronted them with a
heavy fire, and being few in numbers they Avere driven
back to the opposite side of the works, behind which
they took position and bravely held the line they had
pre\-iously taken." '
The particulars so vividly told by General Gordon
leave no doubt as to his position on the field. The
left of his brigade is placed at the break in Strick
land's line on the west of the turnpike, whilst his
right (with which hc was) extended across the road to
the east, occupying part of Cleburne's ground, and
mingling with Granbury's brigade. This explains
also Cleburne's hasty ride towards them to see the
cause of the interference in the movement, and cor
roborates the general opinion that that distinguished
officer fell on the east of the turnpike, nearly in front
of the Carter cotton-gin and a very few rods from
our breastworks.^ It shoAvs also that Gordon and his
surviving companions carae over the Avorks as prison
ers in Reilly's brigade line not far frora the cotton-
gin, the fire frora that salient being mentioned as one
of the causes of his surrender, and the head-logs
spoken of being east of the Kentucky battery front,
which was constructed with embrasures for the cannon,
and not with the head-log for infantry protection.
1 The address from which these extracts were taken was delivered
at Helena, Arkansas, and published in the Memphis Appeal of May
11, 1891.
2 See also a statement by Mr. John McQuaide of Vicksburg, one
of the party which found the body. Century War Book, iv. 439. It
substantially agrees also with the position shown by the Carter family
and other residents of the neighborhood.

CHAPTER XII
THE BATTLE AFTER DARK
lu the Locust Grove — The Two Lines — Tbe 1 12th Rlinois— ReiUy's
Detachment — Sweeping the Ditches — Captain Cunningham's
Story — The Sergeant Major's — General Strahl's Death— Hood's
Reserves — Rallying ou them — Later Alarms — Orders to Wood's
Division — Preparations for Withdrawal.
Having seen from the Confederate standpoint the
repeated heroic assaults made upon our lines, we
must again turn our attention to the progress of 'the
equally determined defence, especially at the criti
cal point at the locust grove, Avhere our raen had
given back from the main line and were holding
their second line of hastily constructed barricade.
It will be remembered that, after the main line of
works crossed the Columbia Turnpike and ran west
some fifty yards, it turned toward the northwest,
following the curve of the hill, and descending a
little upon its slope.' The body of the eneray that
held on to the outside of the parapet and filled the
ditch was just west of the angle in the line where
the men Avere sheltered from the fire of the salient
near the cotton-gin by both the angle itself and the
depression of the ground below the level of the turn
pike. The Confederates there were hardly an organ
ized body, but were a mingling of men frora all the
different coramands that had followed Gordon's and
1 See ante, p. 43, and the sketch there given.

The Battle after Dark 161
Gist's brigades in the first charge. In this respect
the confusion of comraands on both sides was not
dissimilar. Those of the eneray who were within
the range of our oblique fire frora left or right were
swept away, and as to the crowd at the ditch at the
place indicated, it may fairly be said that it was less
perilous for thcin to reraain than to retreat across
the storm-swept field behind them. There they stood
in desperation, the men in the ditch passing up
loaded guns to those Avho stood on the berrae, who
were thus able to keep up a continuous fire over the
parapet. It was desirable that the fire from the salient at
the cotton-gin should have the most effective enfilad
ing sweep along the front, and it was for this reason
that the 112th Illinois, when brought from our left,
was ordered to report to Strickland for the purpose
of bringing our line forAvard to the raain works by
advancing frora his right. Lieut. Colonel Bond,
commanding the regiment, accorapanied by Major
Dow of my staff, led it to the right of Strickland's
brigade,' the position of the 72d Illinois, Avhicli was,
by the casualties of the battle, left in command of
Captain Sexton. This intrepid officer was consulted
as to the extent of the eneray's front in contact with
the earthworks, and it was decided to pass Colonel
Bond's regiment out near the small log building or
corn-crib which was standing in rear of Sexton's
line,2 and try to reach the main works close to the
flank of Moore's brigade, supporting the moveraent
by the troops in second line advancing on the left of
Bond as he reached the parapet. Captain Carier
of the 72d Illinois acted as guide for Colonel Bond
in the advance.
1 Ante, p. 146. 2 gee sketch, ante, p. 43.
11

162 The Battle of Franklin
As it had already become dark, in the double
gloom of night and the pall of smoke the position
and the extent of the enemy could only be known by
the flashing of the musketry. The 112th Illinois
got over the barricade in front of Sexton's line and
crawled forward, led by Bond and Dow, and keeping
low so as to be beneath the line of fire. They had
no great difficulty in getting close to the parapet in
front, but when they rose to occupy the work the
fire of the enemy Avas so close that, as Colonel Bond
says, his face was burned by the powder.' But the
fire in front was not the only peril in the darkness.
Although word had been sent to the troops on right
and left to cease firing, the din of battle made it
hard to get the orders understood by the men in line,
and they could not be restrained from firing obliquely
at the flash of the enemy's guns. Sexton's regiment
had gone forward on the left of Bond's, and both
dropped to the ground to wait for a cessation of the
fire. Colonel Bond w-as tAvice AVOunded slightly, one
ball cutting the tendon of his heel. "As I was very
close to the first line," he says, "the Confederates
could not have fired so low. " ^
Finding that the front line was now made unten
able by this fire frora their friends, the regiments
returned to the second line, the 11 2th Illinois pass
ing through the locust grove and around the west
end of the barricade, Avhich, in Colonel Bond's judg
ment, extended some fifty feet west of the log build
ing, and there ended Avithout connecting Avith Moore's
brigade, whose left rested on the northAvest slope of
1 Letter of Colonel Emery S. Bond, Septeraber 29, 1885. Colonel
Bond was then a coraraission merchant in Chicago. See also statement
of Major Dow, in Appendix E.
2 Letter of October 22. 1885.

The Battle after Dark 163
the Carter Hill, as Moore's report tells us.' The
regiment reraained during the evening in support
of Strickland's brigade, awaiting a jnore favorable
opportunity for the renewal of the effort to reoccupy
the raain works. The two lines were here, as the
officers stated, about three or four rods apart.
To keep up the active efforts to clear the front of
Strickland's brigade, I had directed General Reilly
to put a detachraent from his oavu brigade over the
Avorks near the cotton-gin, giving orders to sweep
down along the front to the turnpike upon the flank
of any of the enemy that raight be hanging on in
front of Opdycke, thus assisting in dislodging those
also Avho Avere farther down behind the angle already
described. 2 This he did, the result being consider
able additions to the number of prisoners and flags
in our hands. It was now near nine o'clock in the
evening. The attack of General Edward Johnson's
division from Hood's reserve had been made and
repulsed, and as it fell back from the holloAV toward
the higher ground, Avhere the barricades held by
Wagner's men at the beginning of the fight still
were, the remnant of the Confederates in the ditch
who were not too much disabled made their way
also to the rear. Heavy volleying and continuous
fire Avas still for some tirae kept up, but it was noAV
across a considerable interval, and not from the
outside of our own parapet at any point.
I Captain Sexton fully corroborates Colonel Bond's account of
these details. In February, 1894, without any knowledge of Colonel
Bond's letters referred to above, he wrote me an interesting statement
accompanied by a sketch map from raeraory. At the time of writing.
Captain Sexton was just closing his terra as postmaster of the city of
Chicago. It would be hard to find a stronger concurrence of indepen
dent testimony than that which establishes the situation ou this part of
the fleld. For Moore's Report, see O. E., xlv. part i. p. 379.
2 Ante, p. 146.

164 The Battle of FranMin
Captain W. E. Cunningham, of the 41st Tennessee,
in Strahl's brigade, Avho Avas hiraself among the
severely Avortuded, and was among the last to crawl
back from the fatal ditch in the locust grove, has
described the situation clearly and vividly.' "The
remnants of Strahl and Gordon held the works in
pure desperation. It was certain death to retreat
across that plain, and equally as bad to reraain. The
raen fought doggedly across the Avorks without officers,
and Avith no light save the lurid glare of the enemy's
artillery, Avhich seemed to sear the eyeballs. This
portion of the works was held against every attack
of the enemy to regain thera. The thicket had been
cut down as if by a raowing machine, and the ground
was all in deep furrows. About nine o'clock the
firing gradually dwindled into a slight skirmish.
Those who were able walked or crawled back from
under the works."
Sergeant Major Cunningham, of the same regi
ment (a near kinsman of the captain), has also left
a truthful picture of this doomed and dwindling
reranant, when, as he says, there Avas not an efficient
man left between this group and the turnpike, and
among themselves hardly enough to hand up guns to
the short and thin line firing from the outside of the
parapet.2 "It was evident that we could not hold
out much longer, and it was thought that none of us
would be left alive. It seemed expedient that we
should either surrender or try and get away, when
the General (Strahl) Avas asked, and he responded,
' Keep firing,' and just as the man to my right was
1 Communication to the Philadelphia Times, May 27, 1882.
2 I have referred to the reliability and value of Sergeant Major
Cunningham's pamphlet in my volume on the carapaign, " Franklin and
Nashville," etc., p. 93.

The Battle after Dark 165
shot and fell against me with terrible and loud
groans. General Strahl was shot. He thrcAV up his
hands, falling on his face, and we thought him dead;
but in asking the dying raan, who still rested against
my shoulder, how he was Avounded, our General, not
dead, and thinking my question was to hira, raised
up, saying he was shot in the head, and called for
Colonel Stafford to turn over his command. He
crawled over the dead, the ditch being three deep,
about twenty feet to where Colonel Stafford was.
His staff officers started to carry hira to the rear, but
he received another shot, and directly a third, Avhich
killed hira instantly. . . . Captain W. E. Cunuing
hara had lost an eye, and as he sat in the ditch
waiting for the terrible night to end, called to his
devoted comrade and told him of his misfortune.
An almost helpless handful of us were left, and
the Avriter was satisfied that our condition Avas not
known, so he ran to the rear to report to General
Brown coramanding the division. He met Major
Flampton of the division staff, who told him that
General Brown was wounded, and that General
Strahl was in command of the division. This con
firmed his prediction, so he went on the hunt of
General Cheatham, and after having failed to find
him for some tirae, and seeing that relief was being
sent, he lay doAvn to rest and sleep. His shoulder
Avas black with bruises from firing, and it seemed
that no moisture was left in his systera. These per
sonal raentions are all he can give, for it was night,
and the writer never knew other than what he saw.
It was not long after the recruits [reserves ?] were
sent forward until the last gun was silenced. "
Hood's reserves consisted of Clayton's and Steven
son's divisions of Lee's corps after the repulse of

166 The Battle of FrankUn
Johnson's division of the same corps. Reference
has already been made to the fact that they were
put in position to attack.' General Stovall, who
coramanded the advanced brigade of Clayton's divis
ion, states that he occupied "the enemy's first line
of Avorks," as the Confederates designated the out
post line of Wagner's two brigades as distinguished
from our " main line. " ^ Just in rear of this posi
tion, sheltered by the roll of the ground, the rest of
the reserve was placed, "preparatory," as General
Stevenson reports, "to an assault which it was
announced was to be raade by the entire army at
daybreak. " '^ Upon this centre the remnants of the
corps of Cheathara and Stewart Avere rallied after
the repulse of Johnson's division and the return of
the handful frora Brown's division who escaped
destruction, as has been so graphically told by the
two Cunninghams.
The front of both armies was now covered by
skirmishers, and, though the Confederates did not
venture any further assaults, " alarms occurred fre
quently until eleven o'clock, and frequently caused a
general musketry fire on both sides from our centre
toward the right, but I found no evidence that any
real attack was made at so late an hour, the demon
strations being manifestly raade by the rebels to dis
cover Avhether our lines were being abandoned during
the evening. " *
I have followed the successive stages of the fight
ing upon the line down to the time in the evening
when the enemy definitely accepted defeat, and
sought only to reform his lines and collect the rem
nants of his broken divisions under the shelter of the
1 Ante, p. 154. 2 0. E., xlv. part i. p. 701. » /c7., p. 694.
^ My own report, 0. E., xlv. part i. pp. 354, 355, and Appendix B,

The Battle after Dark 167
two divisions of Lee's corps, which had not been
engaged. We could not tell, in the darkness, much
beyond what Avas revealed by the partial contact of
the skirmish lines. Frora time to time a general
fire would roll along the front of Flood's reserve,
our skirmishers would run in, and the fire would be
returned frora our line. After a little itAvould quiet
down, skirraish lines Avould be sent forward again,
and the rattle of single shots here and there would
take the place of the continuous roar. When this
had been a few times repeated, we became satisfied
that no further attack Avould be made, and the eneray
concluded in like manner that we Avere determined
to hold our position through the night.
It will be remembered that General Schofield's
orders in the morning had directed a withdrawal to
the north side of the Harpeth at dark, if Hood had
not before that time engaged us on our lines. The
orders sent to Wagner on Winstead Hill prolonged
his duty as rear guard in that contingency.' The
south bank of the river would have been cleared of
everything by six o'clock, and Wagner's division
would have been the last to cross the Harpeth.
Hood's attack had changed all that. From his posi
tion at the fort on Figuer's Hill, General Schofield
could himself see the progress of the battle better
than Ave could who were in its din and sraoke, and
for the details of what was occurring upon the line
he had the help of his staff, who were kept constantly
going and coming between his headquarters and my
own at the Carter Hill.
During the desperate raglde he had ordered General
Wood's division of the Fourth Corps to be held in
readiness to cover the crossing of the river ^ in case
1 Ante, p. 66. 2 q -r ^ ^Iv. part i. p. 1174.

168 The Battle of Franklin
the enemy should succeed in breaking our lines on
the south side, and dispositions were carefully made
by General Wood for that purpose.
A little earlier, on General Wilson's report that
the eneray's infantry Avas threatening to cross at
Hughes's Ford, three miles above Franklin, Schofield
had directed a brigade from Wood's division to be
sent to support the cavalry there,' and to delay the
flank movement of Hood, which Avas his most prob
able, as it Avas certainly his wisest raoveraent. Gen
eral Wood ordered Beatty's brigade to that duty,^ but
it Avas delayed a little for the issue of rations, and
before it actually marched the advance of the Con
federates against us in force solved the problem of
Hood's intentions, and the order was countermanded.
General Wood, in accordance with the later orders,
now made the disposition of his division to coA'cr the
withdrawal of our troops frora the intrenched line if
it should become necessary.^ Beatty's brigade was
deployed on the north bank of the river aboA-e the
town; Streighfs brigade along the bank of the
river immediately opposite the town; and Post's
brigade on the bank of the river below the town.
The telegraphic correspondence between General
Schofield and General Thomas was going on at this
time, and on the announcement of Hood's preparing
to cross the Harpeth on our left flank above the
town, Thomas ordered the army trains sent back to
Brentwood and Nashville, covered and followed by
the troops.* The stirring scenes of the battle quickly
followed, necessarily suspending the orders for retir
ing at dark. When night shut down on the field,
1 0. E., xlv. part i. p. 1178. 2 j^., p. 1174.
3 Wood's Report, 0. R., xlv. part i. pp. 125, 126, and Appendix C.
* Ante, p. 43, aud 0. R., xlv. part i. p 1171.

The Battle after Dark 169
although the confiict seemed as fierce as ever, we
who were upon the line knew that the impetus of
Hood's assault Avas broken, and that we could hold
our position. Colonel Wherry, the chief of staff,
had been able to report this confidence to General
Schofield, who noAV issued new orders for a midnight
Avithdrawal, anticipating the total cessation of the
battle by that time. These directed that the lines
should be drawn back from the right and left of the
centre at the Carter Hill simultaneously, troops from
the left passing by the railroad bridge, and those
from the right by the foot-bridge, all then marching
to Brentwood by the Nashville Turnpike. The skir
raishers of the Avhole line were to be kept out until
the rear of the columns had crossed the river, and
Avere then to be withdrawn together. General Wood
was to cover the crossing, as he had earlier prepared
to do, and then to act as rear guard.'
This order was issued between six and seven
o'clock, and received by me about the last named
hour. 2 Fearing that General Schofield did not know
the full confidence I had in our ability to hold our
lines, I sent at once ray Adjutant General, Captain
Theodore Cox, to his headquarters to express
strongly my willingness to be personally answer
able for holding the position, and ray opinion that
there was now no need to retreat. The trains had,
however, been some hours on the road toward Nash
ville under General Thomas's order, and with a
warmly congratulatory message. General Schofield
1 O. R., xlv. part i p. 1172.
2 The order from Fourth Corps headquarters in obedience to Gen
eral Schofield's was issued at 7.15 r. m. Allowing for time to raake
copies of the original, this supports ray stateraent that General Scho
field issued his between six and seven. No hour is raarked on the
original. Ibid., and p. 1173.

170 Tlie Battle of Franklin
sent word that it would be necessary to carry out
the orders already issued.'
At General Schofield's headquarters my staff officer
found General Stanley, who had gone there after his
Avound had been dressed and the necessary changes
of clothing had been raade. Somewhat later, my
Inspector General, Major Doav, Avent also to the
army headquarters in obedience to a call to meet
there Colonel Hartsuff, Schofield's Inspector Gen
eral, and to arrange the details of the order for
covering our withdrawal by the skirmish lines and
then bringing these off together at a later hour.
Major Dow also met General Stanley at the head
quarters. ^
Another incident of the early evening Avas the re-
establishment of the second line at the centre as it
had been organized before the battle. Colonel Rous
seau of the 12th Kentucky describes this in his
report. 3 The repulse of the enemy at the first series
of fierce assaults made it, as he says, comparatively
easy to hold the works afterward, and, a skirraish
line in connection Avith that of Casement's brigade
having been advanced frora the left front of Reilly's
brigade, Rousseau's regiraent was ordered back into
the reserve position he occupied at the beginning.
The right of Reilly's brigade was longer involved in
the struggles which continued on the west of the
turnpike. But in Opdycke's brigade also the dictate of mil
itary judgment was obeyed, though necessarily later,
^ For the detailed statement of Captain Cox, see Appendix F. This
was corroborated by a letter frora General Schofield to Captain L. T.
Scofield, February 2, 1887, the latter having pubUshed the incident
in his paper on the campaign quoted ante, p. 103.
2 See also chap, xxi., post.
' 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 416.

The Battle after Dark 171
and a brigade reserve was also drawn out of the
overcroAvded front line, and placed in support before
the raoveraent in evacuation of the lines was begun.'
The men of Lane's and Conrad's brigades who had
remained scattered among the organized forces in
the line went back to join their standards near the
river, where General Wagner had been all the evening
busy in the reorganization of his command.^
Before describing the midnight withdrawal of the
troops, however, it will be proper to narrate the part
in the day's work which was performed by the cav
alry under General Wilson. For the sake of clear
ness, I have, as far as possible, omitted reference to
their movements, and must go back and give their
positions in the early morning, as Avell as their
spirited engagement in the afternoon.
1 0. R., xlv. part i. pp. 251, 253.
2 For fuUer discussion of this point, see chap, xix., post.

CHAPTER XHI
WILSON'S CAVALRY ENGAGEMENT
Morning Positions — Covering both Flanks of the Array — Forrest's
Advance — The Fords of the Harpeth — Confederates cross at
Hughes's Ford — Wilson attacks — Sharp Combat — Eneray re
treat across the River — Covering the March to Nashville.
During the night of the 29th, the principal body of
General Wilson's cavalry force was concentrated at
the cross-roads two miles and a half east of Franklin,
on the Triune road.' Liis headquarters were at the
MatthcAvs house, and his outposts observed the fords
of the Harpeth River for several miles above the
toAvn.2 The only important detachraent was Ha.ra-
raond's brigade, which had been sent to Triune to
learn whether Forrest was making a turning move
ment in force, as Wilson apprehended.^ Hamraond's
brigade reported directly to the coraraander of the
cavalry corps, and the rest of the force was organ
ized in two divisions, Johnson's and Hatch's. The
forraer consisted of two brigades, Croxton's and
Capron's, the latter coraraanded by Colonel Thoraas
J. Harrison.* Under Hatch were Coon's brigade and
Stewart's. Soon after daylight of the 30th, in obedience to
orders frora General Schofield, Wilson sent Croxton's
1 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 550. ^ j^,, pp. 1145^ ii46.
2 Id., p. 598. 4 Id., pp. 576, 598.

Wilson's Cavalry Engagement 173
brigade across the Harpeth to the south side, and
thence out upon the LcAvisburg Turnpike to the
Douglass church.' Here Croxton covered the flank
of our infantry coluran inarching upon the Columbia
Turnpike, and Avhen the rear guard of the Fourth
Corps passed this point Croxton also retired and
formed upon General Wagner's left (facing south),
Wagner having halted upon the Winstead Hill and
checked the advance of Hood's army.
In pursuance of similar directions from head
quarters of the army, Wilson directed Hammond's
brigade not to remain at Triune if no considerable
force of the eneniy were found there, but to return
by way of Petersburg to Wilson's mill, a position
on the Brentwood Turnpike, northeast of the general
position of our cavalry at the Matthews corners, and
covering our communications with Nashville on the
east and by the rear.^ Hammond had found no
signs of the enemy near Triune, and in the course
of the forenoon took up the position indicated.^
To cover the right flank of the army, well out
toward the west, and to try to open communication
Avith General Cooper, who, Avith parts of two brigades
was supposed to be marching from Centreville on
the Duck River to join us at Franklin, the Fifth
Iowa cavalry was detached from Harrison's brigade
and sent down the river to the turnpike leading from
Hillsboro to Nashville.*
The array of General Schofield's army was thus
completed and raade compact as possible. Apart
from the fault inherent in a position astride of a
river which circumstances had forced upon us, the
preparation to meet the enemy was a satisfactory
1 0. R., xlv. part i. pp. 559, 572. » Id., pp. 1182, 1183.
2 Id., p. 559. * Id., p. 598.

174 The Battle of Franklin
one, especially in the relations of the cavalry to the
rest of the coraraand.
On the part of General Hood, the knowledge that
Cooper Avas somewhere to the Avestward of our line
of march and might at any time appear on his left
flank, had made it necessary to divide Forrest's
cavalry corps raore nearly in equal parts, sending
Chalmers with a division and a fraction of another to
the Carter's Creek Turnpike, Avhilst Forrest hiraself
led Buford's and Jackson's divisions in advance of
the army, and endeavored by flank movements to cut
in upon and destroy our trains.
When Wagner had halted at the Winstead Hill
and checked there the Confederate advance, Croxton's
cavalry brigade Avas, as a^'c have seen, upon his left.'
Forrest aAvaited the arrival of Stewart's corps, and,
leaving to that officer the direct movement by the
turnpike, took both his mounted divisions across to
and beyond the Lewisburg road, turning the position
of Opdycke's brigade on the hill, and gradually for
cing Croxton back toward Franklin. Then followed
the retreat of Wagner to his unfortunate position
between the armies; but Forrest did not hasten the
advance of his overwhelming force against Croxton's
brigade. He awaited quietly the coraplete deploy
ment of Hood's array, timing his advance by it. Hc
ordered the whole of Buford's division, dismounted,
to deploy on the right of Loring's division of infan
try, and to go forward with it when Stewart should
giA^e the word to attack."'' The horses were left in
the wooded hollows where the deployment had been
made, under cover from the fire of our artillery in
the line and in Fort Granger on the hill north of the
river. 1 Ante, p. 173. - 0. ll., xlv. part i. p. 754.

Wilson's Cavalry Engagement 175
Jackson's division was not dismounted at once
like Buford's, but was ordered to reconnoitre toward
Hughes's Ford, which was nearly east from the ex
treme right flank of the Confederates when they
passed the Winstead Hill. The road from the ford
northward led directly to General Wilson's position
at the Matthews place. When the general advance
should be raade, Jackson's directions Avere to cross
the river and dislodge our forces frora the hill at
Fort Granger, from Avhich Cockerill's rifled guns
had opened fire as soon as Forrest's men had come
within range.'
Croxton reported that about two o'clock the
enemy's cavalry made a dash at him, but, being
repulsed, moved off to Plughes's Ford, Avhilst infantry
took their place. ^ The Confederate reports are so
explicit in stating that Buford's dismounted men
occupied the space between the Lewisburg Turn
pike and the river whilst Jackson's division made
the movement toward the ford, that there is little
room for doubt that Croxton mistook the dismounted
men for infantry, as was so frequently done when
the horses and their holders were not in sight. ^ We
have seen the mistake appear in the reports of
Kimball's division on the extreme right, and shall
1 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 754. It was the general belief among the
Confederates that we had a battery upon a hill farther up the north
bank of the river than the fort. This is indicated in the map accom
panying Stewart's report (Official Atlas, plate Ixiii. fig. 3), and is raen
tioned in Major Sanders's valuable paper (Southern Bivouac, July,
1885, p. 9). The belief is nevertheless a raistaken one. No artiUery
was with AVilson's cavalry, all tlie batteries of the Fourth Corps were
in our raain lines, and the Twenty-third Corps batteries, except that in
the fort, were parked with Wood's division, and so remained during
the day. 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 432. (Eeport of Chief of ArtiUery,
Twenty-third Corps.) For Stewart's Map, see p. 83, ante.
2 Id., p. 573. s Ante, p. 138.

176 The Battle of Franklin
find it again in Forrest's report of his advance
against Wilson's position on our extreme left, later
in the day.
Within the limits of the field of battle there were
two fords across the Harpeth. Hughes's, which has
been already mentioned, was some three railes above
Franklin, and about as far frora the Colurabia Turn
pike where that road passes the Winstead Hill.
McGavock's Ford was a raile and a half from the
centre of the town, and not far from the Lewisburg
Turnpike, Avhich for some distance follows the
general direction of the river.
Seeing the array of Flood's army in line of battle,
Croxton A\'ithdrew his brigade,' and crossed the river
to the right bank by McGavock's Ford, having one
regiment (the 2d Michigan) on the hither side, which
for sorae time skirmished with Buford's advancing
raen. About three o'clock, and nearly simultane
ously with the advance of Hood's infantry against
our lines, Wilson was definitely informed of Forrest's
crossing at Hughes's Ford, and prepared to meet the
enemy's moveraent. The first report frora the out
post up the river, when Jackson's division first
approached the ford, had brought news that both
infantry and cavalry were threatening to cross, and,
this being sent to General Schofield, he had ordered
General Wood to send a brigade of infantry to sup
port our cavalry, as we have seen. ^ But the desper
ate assault of Stewart's and Cheathara's corps coming
at that time had raade Schofield revoke his order
till it should be seen whether Wood's reserve might
not be more needed at the centre. It turned out
that Jackson was not supported by infantry ; the one
division of cavalry was all that crossed to the right
1 O. R., xlv. part i. p. 573. 2 Ante, p. 168.

Wilson's Cavalry Engagement 177
bank of the Flarpeth, and this Wilson was able to
take care of. He ordered Llatch's division to ad
vance from the Matthews place to meet the enemy in
front, and Croxton to inarch frora McGavock's Ford
and attack in flank.' Harrison's brigade was held
in reserve on the left and rear.
The Confederate cavalry advancing frora Flughes's
Ford had driven back the picket with its supports,
Ross's brigade having the advance. ^ A series of
lively charges and countercharges between single
regiments occurred before Hatch could move the
body of his command forward. The Confederates
had gained the summits of several steep hills look
ing down abruptly into a little valley between them
and our advancing cavalry. Their line extended
beyond Hatch's left. The latter dismounted his
men and moved them forward in line to the foot of
the hills, when the order was given to charge. The
men now sprang forward with great spirit, carrying
the crests. Giving his men a moment to breathe.
Hatch again ordered them forward, and the enemy
broke. ^
Jackson's men now retired across the river, the
pickets were established at the fords as before, and
there was no further collision between the cavalry
forces on this wing of the two armies. At the time
1 0. R., xlv. part i. pp. 560, 573.
2 General Ross is the only subordinate of Forrest whose report of
this affair is found in the Official Records. It seeras to claim that his
brigade was the only force which fought with Hatch and Croxton.
Id., p. 770. Forrest's report, however, states that Jackson's division
crossed and engaged both infantry and cavalry. Id., p. 754. The
infantry was imaginary, and some other parts of the very general
statement are inaccurate. Boss's report is the safer one to foUow in
matters of detail, as he was in personal contact with events on the
field. 3 O. R., xlv. part i. p. 576. 12

178 The Battle of Franklin
Croxton received his orders to co-operate Avith Hatch
in the attack upon Jackson's division, he Avithdrew
his regiraent from the left bank at McGavock's Ford,
but was delayed in his advance by a report that the
Confederates were crossing still further down, near
the town. He left two of his regiments to look after
this reported movement, and raarched up the stream
Avitli the remaining tAVO. The report proved un
founded, and he recalled the regiments. Marching
noAv with his whole brigade, he moved forward in
support of Hatch's left, and took part in the pursuit
of Jackson.' At five o'clock General Wilson Avas
able to report the defeat of the enemy in his front,
and his messenger reached General Schofield a half
hour later, when our repulse of tho first assaults of
the infantry along the line gave him assured confi
dence that we should be equally successful against
the reiterated efforts of the Confederates, hoAvever
persistent.^ Wilson soon folloAved his messenger in
response to an invitation sent hira just before the
battle opened,^ and early in the evening had a per
sonal conference with General Schofield, in which
he received full instructions as to his part in the
general withdrawal toward Nashville. The cavalry
was ordered to maintain its position till daylight,
keeping its pickets at the upper fords, and then to
withdraw by the Brentwood or Wilson Turnpike,
being joined by Hammond's brigade as it went, and
seeking to keep abreast of General Wood, whose
division of infantry was to leave the river by the
Nasvhille Turnpike at the same time.* Brentwood
was indicated as the next place of concentration for
the army. 1 0. E., xlv. part i. p. 573. 3 Id., p. 1178.
2 Id. p. 1179. i Id., pp. 1179, 1185.

Wilson's Cavalry Engagement 179
On the Confederate side, Forrest withdrew Buford's
division to the place where their horses had been
left, and kept Jackson's division near Hughes's
Ford in observation and covering the right of the
army. ' A few hours had wrought a great change in
the outlook, as seen by the leader of the Confederate
cavalry. When the line of battle was forming for
the attack, his boiling irapatience led him to ride
along the infantry lines of Stewart's corps, urging
haste in formation, so that the Yankees could not
retreat before they could be brought to battle.^ At
midnight there was need of all his indomitable spirit
to resist the conviction rife among the remnants of
the shattered Confederate army, that, as an army,
it was nearly destroyed, and its career practically
ended. 1 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 754.
2 This incident was told me by a staff officer iu French's division of
Stewart's corps.

CHAPTER XIV
OUR AVITHDRAAVAL
The Medical Department — Field Hospitals — Ambulance Train —
Sick and AVounded sent to Nashville — Work of Surgical Corps
during the Battle — Artillery graduaUy withdrawn — Arrangement
of Skirmish Lines — Moveinent of the Infantry — ¦ Orders as to Kim
ball's .nnd Wagner's March — Misunderstanding — March of Ruger,
Opdycke, and Reilly — A burning Building — The Field in Front
— The March to Nashville.
In the preparation for evacuating our lines at mid
night, the reraoval of the wounded from the field and
the disposal of the field hospitals became an irapor
tant part, and an outline of the practical organization
of the medical department in a campaign should be
understood. Our surgeons did not enter upon their battle duties
at Franklin without some embarrassment from the
accuraulation of patients during the preceding week.
The ambulance train as it came in was pretty well
filled Avith the raen wounded in the affairs a.bout
Colurabia and Spring Hill, and with the sick. The
first Avintry Aveather had naturally been followed by
an increase of hospital cases araong the troops. All
these must be disposed of so that the ambulances
could be ready for new work.
As soon as I assumed the temporary command of
the corps. Surgeon C. S. Frink, the Surgeon in Chief
of ray division, took in hand the task of preparation

Our Withdrawal 181
for active work. The organization of the medical
department in the field was an excellent one, the
outgrowth of the experience of severe campaigns.
The army and corps Medical Directors had, of
course, a general supervision, but, under them, the
division constituted the principal unit of adminis
tration in the field. Its medical supply train was
independent, and contained the full equipment for
a field hospital in tents, stores, medicines, and sur
gical instruments and appliances. A surgeon was
selected as the head of the hospital by the Surgeon
in Chief, and was detailed by proper order from
headquarters. The medical officer thus in charge of
the field hospital was responsible for the selection
of its site, for the erection of the tents, the arrange
ments for operating, and the general administration
which would raake the hospital work run sraoothly
and rapidly. The hospital and ambulance train was
under the charge of a lieutenant of the line, selected
for his fitness for the work, and the drivers and
stretcher bearers were under his railitary coraraand,
as he was under that of the Surgeon in Chief and the
surgeon in charge of the hospital. The stretcher
bearers were permanently detailed men, who were
drilled in their duties and thoroughly efficient in
them. The division medical train consisted of
thirty-six ambulances and six wagons.
The Surgeon in Chief was assisted by an Operating
Board of three surgeons, and as many assistant sur
geons as were required, all these being detailed from
the regiments on the selection of the Surgeon in
Chief. Each operation of the graver class was per
formed under the immediate direction of one of the
Operating Board. Surgeon Frink was ably seconded
in the Third Division by Surgeons G. A. Collaraore,

182 The Battle of FranMin
J. H. Rodgers, and C. W. McMillin of the Board,
and by Surgeon Joseph S. Sparks as Chief of the
Hospital. Lieutenant Alexander W. Beighle was
in charge of the ambulance train. These officers
worked together during the campaigns of the last
two years of the war, and their harraony, discipline,
system, and professional ability was of wonderful
benefit to the command.
To complete the sketch of the practical organiza
tion of the surgeon's department, it is only neces
sary to add that in battle brigade depots for the
wounded Avere placed as near the fighting line as
practicable, in any spot sheltered from direct fire.
Here the first temporary surgical assistance was
given, and frora these the ambulances carried the
disabled to the field hospital in the rear. These
depots were conducted by the surgeons and assistant
surgeons of the regiments who Avere not detailed for
the hospital Avork, as the distribution of labor would
be made by the Surgeon in Chief in the exigencies
of varying circumstances. The Avhole medical corps
worked together with a zeal and self-devotion as
worthy of reraembrance as that of their comrades of
the line.
When the ambulance train came in from Columbia
in the forenoon, Surgeon Frink's first duty was to
arrange for the proper disposal of the sick and
wounded who filled it, so that it could be ready for
further use. Fortunately he found a railway train
of box cars on the north side of the river, loaded
with forage, and just ready to start for Nashville.
The surgeon persuaded the conductor of the train to
wait a few minutes, while he galloped to General
Schofield's headquarters, and procured frora the
general in person an order to unload cars enough

Our Withdrawal 183
to accommodate the disabled men of both army
corps, and to take these to Nashville. The ambu
lances with their loads could uot safely cross the
river at the rough and deep ford, and waited for
the repairs on the county bridge to open this way of
passing to the north bank. It Avas thus made late
in the day before the transfers could be raade, and
the railway train started toward its destination.
Surgeon Sparks, raeanwhile (acting for the Twenty-
third Corps), had selected a place for the general
field hospital on the Nashville Turnpike sorae dis
tance north of the bridges, the tents were pitched,
and the hospital organized for work. The tirae of
Hood's delay in his attack had barely sufficed for
these arrangements.'
In the Fourth Corps the medical organization, was
similar to that of the Twenty-third which I have
described. The field hospital was placed on the west
of the Nashville Turnpike, not far frora that of the
Army of the Ohio. It was in charge of Surgeon
R. J. Hill of Kimball's division, under the direc
tion of Surgeon J. T. Heard, Medical Director. The
medical staff of both corps co-operated with com
plete harmony, and the description of the raethods
of one will apply to both.
The failure of the Confederate attacks upon the
flanks of the position, and the consequent early ces
sation of severe fighting there, had made it easy to
carry out the regular systera at these parts of the
1 I have been assisted in these details by an interesting letter from
Surgeon Frink, dated June 26, 1881. Several years later he wrote for
me a stiU more full account of the work and organization of the medi
cal corps frora which I have also borrowed. After the war he returned
to his home at Elkhart, Indiana, and until his death was known as
one of the eminent men of his profession aud a devotee of scientific
investigation.

184 The Battle of FrankUn
line. The ambulances could reach the brigade
depots without difficulty after the first hour's fight
ing,' and the disabled were promptly carried to the
field hospitals on the north side of the riA'er.
At the centre the situation was a much more
troublesome one. The turnpike there came from
the village by so gentle a slope that the road was
storm-sAvept with rifle balls till late in the evening,
and the arabulances could not approach the lines by
that route. They came up the hollows on right and
left as near as they could, and the wounded were
carried by the stretcher bearers to meet them. Those
who had fallen in the retreat of Wagner's two brig
ades were out in front, mingled with the Confed
erate dead and wounded, and could not be reached.
Others lay between the two lines in Opdycke's and
Strickland's brigades, and as the battle waned in
the evening, were brought in and sent to the rear.
But in a night engagement the darkness prevents
the full scrutiny of the field by the officers, and raen
crept into buildings that were near, thinking only of
present shelter, and forgetting that they were liable
to be overlooked and left to fall into the hands of
the eneray.
Some that were not wounded were so overcorae by
the fatigue of several days' raarching and fighting
that they too fell asleep wherever they raight be,
and did not wake till their companions had raarched
away in silence, the orders to "Fall in " being given
Avith bated breath. Stragglers had taken refuge in
various places in the village, secure in the darkness
which prcA'cnted the provost guards from finding
them. It thus happened that there were sorae who
fell into the eneray's hands who would not have done
' See ante, p. 126.

Our Withdrawal 185
so had the battle and the withdrawal occurred in
daylight. The same lateness of the hour prevented the sur
geons at the division hospitals on the north side of
the Harpeth frora attending to more than the pre
liminary dressing of wounds, and all for whom trans
portation could be provided were sent forward to the
Nashville hospitals. The ambulance trains, hoAV-
ever, were not enough for all, and a good many had
to be left in the field hospitals. For these, regu
lar details of surgeons were assigned to remain in
charge, with medical stores and supplies. On our
return after the battle of Nashville, a fortnight later,
most of our Avounded thus left came again into our
hands, together with great numbers of the Confed
erates who were not yet able to join Hood's army in
its rough experience of a winter retreat beyond the
Tennessee River.'
1 Paper of Surgeon Frink, referred to on p. 183, ante, and published
in Ohio Loyal Legion Papers, vol. iv. p. 418. Eeport of Medical Di
rector, Army of the Cumberland, 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 108. Reports of
General Thomas, Id., p. 41, and of Surgeon Heard for Fourth Corps,
Id., p. 174. An incident illustrating the pathetic scenes occurring in an
army surgeon's experience was told rae by my friend. Dr. Stephen C.
Ayers, one of the surgical staff at the Curaberland Hospital in Nash
viUe at the time of the battle of I'ranklin, and now Professor of Dis
eases of the Eye in the Cincinnati College of Medicine and Surgery.
Araong the wounded brought to the hospital from Franklin was a
youug soldier, a raere boy, who was unconscious from a gunshot wound
iu the head. The long ride from the battle-field had left him iu extreme
exhaustion, but Surgeon Ayers, noticing that he was still alive, at
tempted to give him sorae relief. He had been struck by a glancing
ball which tore the scalp and left a well marked depression in the skiiU.
After washing the parts and trimming away the hair, the surgeon, by
the careful use of forceps, was able to lift the plate of bone and relieve
the brain of pressure. The boy immediately opened his eyes, looking
intelligently into the doctor's face. The latter seized the opportunity
to ask his name and his home, and was answered clearly. In a moraent,
however, the clot pressed again upon the brain and consciousness was

186 The Battle of FranMin
The method of withdraAving our troops from the
intrenched line Avas such as Avas usual Avith us.
Skirmish and picket lines were under the charge of
the Inspector Generals of corps and division, and a
brigade officer of the day from each brigade reported
with his detail for duty to the staff officer. Lieut.
Colonel tlartsuff. General Schofield's Inspector Gen
eral, was assigned to the general supervision of
this duty, and Major Dow, my own inspector, met
him at headquarters for consultation which should
make thorough co-operation in the important task.
The order of withdraAval Avas that Avhich Avould put
an end to my general command upon the line from
the moment that the moveraent should begin ; for no
other order, Avritten or oral, had modified or recalled
those which had been issued in the morning, and
which have been already quoted.'
Major Dow at once instructed the officers of the
day on the Twenty-third Corps front as to their
duty, and the whole skirraish line was carefully pre
pared for cool and intelligent obedience to orders.
The Major himself Avas directed to collect and bring
off the skirmishers after the last of the troops of the
line had crossed the bridges.
The withdraAval of the artillery was not quite so
simple a matter as marching off the infantry, for some
batteries had suffered severely in horses, and refit
ting and rearrangement became necessary. Colonel
Schofield, Chief of Artillery of the Army of the Ohio,
again lost. Before permanent surgical relief could be given, the young
soldier died, but the moment of lucidity had saved him from a grave
among the " unknown dead," and gave to his family the comfort of
knowing the glorious end of his patriotic service and the means of iden
tifying and reclaiming his body.
1 Ante, p. 57, et seq. The effect of General Stanley's appearance at
the Carter hill is considered in chap. xxi.,fpos^

Our Withdrawal 187
had been in frequent consultation with me during
the day, and Captain Bridges, the Fourth Corps Chief
of Artillery, had remained under iny orders and with
my staff at my position near the Carter house.'
As it Avas desirable to get the batteries over the river
before the infantry should leave the trenches. Cap
tain Bridges was authorized to withdraAV them one
or two at a tirae, and as quietly as possible, begin
ning Avith those on the extrerae flanks where there
had been no serious fighting after dark.
Captain Scovill's Ohio battery, Avhich was in
reserve, and the regular battery under Lieutenant
Canby, drew out at about eight o'clock. ^ Ziegler's
Pennsylvania battery, and part of Baldwin's Ohio
battery soon followed. Between nine and ten o'clock
the Twentieth Ohio Battery, which had been in the
focus of the fight back of the Carter house and gar
den, was withdrawn. Lieutenant Burdick, its cora
raander, had been desperately wounded in the last
effort of the eneray but a few rainutes before, and
the guns were under the command of Sergeant Horn.
The loss in men and horses had been so severe that,
at Captain Bridges's request, a detail of infantry
men was furnished from Opdycke's brigade to haul
the guns out to the turnpike by hand.^
Captain Marshall's Ohio battery next followed,
but the Kentucky battery on the Colurabia road
under Captain Thoraasson, and Captain Bridges's
own Illinois battery under Lieutenant White (which
was in position in Strickland's brigade), Avere still
kept to strengthen the centre, and it was nearly
raidnight when the last of the artillery took its way
to the bridge.*
1 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 321. « Id., p. 321.
2 Id., p. 338. 4 Id., p. 327.

188 The Battle of Franklin
The actual movement of the infantry from the
lines of intrenchment and over the river was a quiet
one, and was not disturbed by the enemy. Sorae of
the details, however, show how easy it is for rais
takes to occur in orders which are issued without
full knowledge. General Schofield's order neces
sarily gave only the outline of the raoveraent, leav
ing minor raatters to the judgment and discretion
of his subordinates commanding the Fourth and
Twenty-third Corps. It indicated the centre, on
the Columbia Turnpike, as the dividing line, the
troops on the right of it to cross the river by the
foot-bridge and those on the left of it by the rail
way bridge.' No special mention was made of the
artillery, but, in consultation Avith the chiefs of
artillery, I arranged for the gradual withdrawal of
this in advance of the infantry, as has been narrated.
Let us recall the actual position of the troops.
On the right of the Columbia Turnpike, in the line,
were Opdycke's brigade of Wagner's division, Ruger's
division, and Kimball's division. On the left Avas
my own division, now commanded by General Reilly.
The two brigades of Wagner's division, Avith which
he was in person, were at the river bank, and quite
to the left of the Columbia road, and the central
street of the village. They were in fact close to
the head of the county bridge (the foot-bridge spoken
of in the order), over which Wagner had placed a
guard at my request. An earlier order, issued from
Fourth Corps headquarters before the battle began,
and when it was expected that the withdrawal would
be at dark, had directed Wagner to cross by the
railroad bridge and Kimball by the other. ^ The
order for the midnight withdrawal had been issued
1 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 1 172. 2 ij,^ p. 1174.

Our Withdrawal 189
from Fourth Corps headquarters in the form of a
copy of General Schofield's, adding the further direc
tion that "General Kimball will AvithdraAV by his
right flank, followed by General Wagner."' This
sent them both by the county bridge, and assigned
three divisions to cross there, and only one by the
railroad. Later in the evening the position of Wagner's two
brigades in reserve seems to have been considered,
and, as we learn frora the diary of Colonel Fullerton,
Wagner was ordered to take the advance in crossing.
"December 1, 12.30 a.m. The troops of this corps
coraraenced to Avithdraw from the line in front of
Franklin, Wagner's division first, then Kimball's
division, and to cross the Harpeth River. "^ Kira-
ball does not appear to have been notified of this
change, and on coraing to the bridge he was sur
prised to find it occupied by Wagner's men. In his
official report he says : " At raidnight, in obedience
to orders, I withdrew my division from its position,
leaving my skirraishers on duty in front of the line,
and raoved to the bridge to effect a crossing, as I
had been directed to move at once upon Brentwood
to take up position till the array should arrive ; but
to ray surprise I found the way blocked up by other
troops Avho had left their position in advance of the
tirae, and hence was unable to cross in advance, but
was compelled to wait and take the position which
others should have taken. " ^
From General Wagner's point of view, however,
it was Kimball who was in the wrong, and in his
official report he also refers to the circumstance,
saying "About raidnight, finding the troops which
were to follow rae across the river already crossing,
1 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 1173. 2 f^., p. 151. a id., p. 178.

190 The Battle of FranMin
I directed my brigade commanders to get ready and
cross the river at once and raarch out on the Nash
ville pike. " ^ Pie here refers to the two brigades
Avith him at the river, for no orders were sent to
Opdycke, as we shall presently see.
Kimball's supposition evidently was that the
whole of Wagner's division had been in the line
Avliere Opdycke's brigade in fact Avas, and had that
been the case he might Avell have been startled at
finding the troops Avhich Avere supposed to crown the
arch which resisted the pressure of the enemy cross
ing the bridge before he Avho had constituted the
most distant flank could reach it. The reader who
has followed the narrative Avith care Avill not need to
be told that no such compromising blunder had been
committed. Wagner's tAvo reorganized brigades in
reserve were properly the troops first to leave the
south side of the river; but Opdycke's brigade of
the same division was still in place at the centre,
between the tAvo divisions of the Twenty-third Corps,
grimly holding the line it had so glorious a part
in restoring in the afternoon. And there it stayed
till everything else from the right of the line had
marched, and accorapanied Ruger's division as it
raoved toward the bridge. "My withdrawal," says
Colonel Opdycke in his official report,^ "was under
General Cox's instructions, and was accoraplished at
midnight." My own official report states the same
fact. " The whole movement was made without inter
ruption or molestation from the enemy, the third
division (Reilly's) moving by the left flank and
crossing the river upon the railroad bridge, and the
second division (Ruger's) with Opdycke's brigade
of the Fourth Corps, moving through the town, and
1 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 232. 2 Jd., p, 241.

Our Withdrawal 191
crossing by a wagon bridge a little below the railroad
crossing."' From my headquarters at the Carter Hill,^ I had
kept track of the movement of the Fourth Corps
divisions of which I have spoken. There Avas no
guaranty that Hood might not again press in upon
us if he suspected we were retiring, and it was a
plain duty not to uncover the centre until Kimball
should be out of the way, and the road to both bridges
clear. As I have already explained, ^ the bridges and
the ford Avere all near the left flank of our line, and
Reilly's division alone could have drawn back through
the town, covering all the crossings in case of need.*
That division was therefore kept to the last in line,
and after Ruger and Opdycke had marched into the
town, Reilly's division faced to the left and moved
through the trenches to the railway bridge. Accord
ing to the rule in cases of retreat, I was Avith my
staff at the rear of the column, and, except the
pickets, we were the last to cross the river.
An incident had occurred late in the evening which
made a vivid impression upon all Avho witnessed it.
A fire broke out in the town, and a burning building
lighted up the sky. Against this lurid background
every raan stood out a black figure raore easily seen
than in broad daylight. There could be no thought
of moving till the fire should be put out. General
Wood sent sorae of his staff frora the north side of
I In my account of this moveraent given in " F'ranklin and Nash
ville," p. 94, I stated that the whole of the Twenty-third Corps crossed
at the railway bridge. I was led to believe, by evidence based on the
recollection of others, that this was the case, lapse of time having
dimmed my own memory of the fact, and full access to official reports
being then beyond my power. The fuller examination of the official
records has corrected this error.
2 O. R., xlv. part i. p. 355. See also Appendix B.
' Ante, p. 49. * See Map, p. 45, ante.

192 The Battle of FranMin
the river to superintend the efforts of the towns
people, and some detachments of soldiers. On the
line the officers were busy keeping the men from
exposing themselves and showing that we were on
the alert, and it was a great relief when the dying
light proved that the fire was not spreading, and
that our raovement would not be long delayed.
The fact that the enemy did not in any way dis
turb our withdrawal is sufficient evidence that none
but the disabled and the dead reraained near our
works. Direct testimony, however, is not lacking.
Major Dow tells of what he himself saw after the
troops had raarched off'. He says : " When the com
mand moved out of the works near raidnight, I was
left in charge of the skirmish line which was
detailed to occupy them for another hour. I went
over the works and walked some distance out in
front. No enemies were there but those disabled
or dead, and the cries of the wounded for help were
very distressing. At that time I heard no signs of
any force on either side of the pike. There had been
occasional sharp volleys all the evening, but these
had ceased, and there was no shot fired while our
troops were Avithdrawn, nor during the time I stayed,
or while I Avithdrew the skirmishers. We moved off
entirely undisturbed, and overtook the coraraand
after daylight. " '
General Schofield halted the troops as they crossed
the river, and kept the whole in hand until all but
the skirraish line were over. He then ordered me
to take the advance with my division and march to
Brentwood, the half way station to Nashville. ^ The
orders of General Thomas implied that we should be
1 See Appendix E.
2 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 355, and Appendix B.

Our Withdrawal 193
joined there by the reinforcements under General
A. J. Smith.' We halted accordingly, and prepared
to take position on the hills facing southward; but
Smith's troops, disembarking from steamboats, were
not supplied with wagon trains, and Steedman's,
coming frora Chattanooga, were delayed, so that
General Thomas decided to make the rendezvous for
the whole army within the lines of Nashville, and
give some time to the increase of his cavalry. ^ The
march was therefore resumed, and Nashville was
reached by our advanced guard before noon. The
rest of the troops arrived in good condition during
the course of the day.
1 O. R., xlv. part i. p. 1171. 2 jd., part ii. p. 17.

13

CHAPTER XV
FRANKLIN AFTER THE BATTLE
Hood's Midnight Order — Condition of his Army — Discussion of
Probabilities — Confederates raove by the Flank — Experiences of
the Carter Faraily — Colonel Carter's Story — Defensive Arraor —
Refuge in the Cellar — The terrible Night — Captain Carter's Fate
— Private Gist's Adventures — General Cooper's Retreat.
Hood's stubborn purpose had not yielded to the ter
rible lesson of the day, and at midnight he issued
orders for the renewal of the fight in the morning.
He directed that his artillery be massed and open a
concentrated cannonade upon our lines, and that his
infantry be arrayed and ready at the signal to assault
again at the point of the bayonet.'
It is not at all probable that his troops could have
been led to a new assault if we had reraained in
our lines. The slaughter of the battle had pro
duced a depression which is seen in every reference
to it by those who were present. The itinerary of
Cheatham's corps has a brief but very significant
entry for the 1st of December: "To-day spent in
burying the dead, caring for the wounded, and reor
ganizing the remains of our corps. "^ Brigadier
General James A. Sraith, who joined the army after
the battle and succeeded to Cleburne's command,
1 Hood's Report, 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 654. Hood's Tennessee Cara
paign, by Major D. W. Sanders, Adjutant General, French's division,
iu Southern Bivouac for June, 1885, p. 13.
2 0. R., xlv. parti, p. 731.

FranMin after the Battle 195
reported its great depletion in numbers, especially in
officers, and added, "Nor was the tone and morale
such as was desirable, owing to the fearful loss sus
tained in that battle."' Major-General Clayton's
mention of "the terrible scourge which our brave
companions had suffered " has already been referred
to, 2 and is especially significant as coraing frora one
Avhose own coraraand had not been engaged. It indi
cates also his conviction of its uselessness, since he
speaks of the merciful interposition of night which
saved his men from a similar fate. Reading these
things, one is convinced that Hood would have found
his subordinates protesting against the renewal of
what they plainly saw was a hopeless effort, and even
if he persisted we should have repulsed him far
more easily than on the previous day.
It must be remerabered, too, that had we reraained
in our lines we should not have been idle. Our
earthworks would have been strengthened. Rein
forcements frora Nashville would have been an essen
tial part of our plan. A. J. Smith's corps, coming
forward during the night, Avould have taken position
on Hood's right flank, holding the east bank of the
Harpeth, and enfilading with artillery the Confed
erate lines as they attempted to advance. At the
first evidence of weakness or hesitation on the part
of the enemy, these fresh troops would have been
ready for a decisive flank attack, and we who were
in the lines could have joined them in what might
well have proved an anticipation of the crowning
victory which was gained at Nashville a fortnight
later. Flood had no great reason to think he could have
shelled us out of our position by a superior artillery
1 O. R., xlv. part i. p. 739. 2 Ante, p. 154.

196 Tlie Battle of Franklin
fire in the early morning. He could not have had a
more favorable opportunity than at Columbia a few
days before, where ray division had held hira at bay,
although his guns encircled the tongue of land which
we held, and looked down upon us from the com
manding ground around the bend of Duck River.
Nerved by the knowledge that aggressive tactics on
our side were being executed by strong reinforce
ments, we should not have been less tenacious of our
position than we had been at Duck River. But the
conclusion was not to be tried there, and we now
know that the Confederate officers and raen drcAV a
breath of deep relief when the dawn of day showed
that our trenches were empty.
Rendered prudent by his experience. Hood did not
follow us by the direct turnpike to Nashville, think
ing it quite probable that Schofield raight turn and
deliver a dangerous blow when part of the Confeder
ate forces were across the Harpeth. Lie sent Forrest
forward with the cavalry upon the Brentwood or Wil
son Turnpike, and followed with Lee's and Stewart's
corps, till the convergence of the roads made both
available. One of his division commanders sarcas
tically reminded him that the same flank moveraent
made on the day before would have saved the fearful
losses which had crippled the array.' A skirmish
between Forrest and Wilson was the only incident
which enlivened the march to Nashville, and in a
day or two Hood closed in upon the capital of Ten
nessee, impelled, we must believe, far more by a
wish to give an air of victory to the engagement at
Franklin than by any sound principles of military
strategy. The heart of his array was broken, and
1 The author was told this fact by a Confederate officer who heard
the conversation.

Franklin after the Battle 197
Beauregard was unquestionably right (as was proved
by the event) in saying, " It is clear to my mind that,
after the great loss and waste of life at Franklin, the
array was in no condition to raake a successful attack
on Nashville. " ' It was a sacrifice of military prin
ciple to tho pride of the comraander, and was nat
urally folloAved by a still greater disaster, Avhich
marked the beginning of the rapid doAvnfall of the
Confederacy. The personal experience of the Carter family was
a singular one, and illustrates so Avell the terrible
straits into which private persons are thrust in tirae
of war, that the narrative would hardly be coraplete
without their story. ^
I have already said that the head of the faraily was
Mr. F. B. Carter, an aged gentleman,^ Avith whom
were living four grown daughters (one ot them raar
ried) and a daughter in law. Of two sons, one.
Captain Theodoric Carter, was on the staff of General
Thomas B. Smith in Hood's army, and was in the
centre of Bate's division as it advanced over his
father's farm to attack our lines a little west of the
homestead. The other son, Colonel M. B. Carter,
was at home, a Confederate officer on parole, hav
ing been made prisoner in an earlier engagement.
Three families of young grandchildren were also in
the house, and a couple of female servants, making
1 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 651.
2 Besides my own very vivid remembrance of the anxiety of the
family in the early part of the day of battle, and of their statements
when we saw them again on our southward march a month later.
Colonel M. B. Carter, the present proprietor of the place, has given
me, at ray request, a written narrative of what occurred iu and about
the house.
^ Ante, p. 43.

198 The Battle of FranMin
a household of seventeen souls. To these were added
a family of five, near neighbors, who sought the pro
tection of the stout brick walls of the Carter house
just before the combat opened. When the storm
broke, therefore, there were three men and nine
teen women and children, non-combatants, in the
mansion. Early in the day Mr. F. B. Carter had asked me,
with sorae anxiety, whether he had better reraove his
family frora the house and abandon it. Without
knowing how large the faraily in fact was, I advised
hira not to leave the house unless it should become
certain that a battle was imminent; for Avhilst my
headquarters tents were in his door-yard, there was
no danger of annoyance from the men of my cora
raand. If the house were abandoned, it Avould be
impossible to answer for the safety of its contents.
But if there were to be a battle, the very focus of it
would certainly be there, and it would be no place
for woraen and children. I thought it most probable
at that time that Hood would not attack in front.
The very thoroughness of our preparation to meet an
assault was a reason Avhy he should not make it. It
seemed Avise for the family to reraain as they were
till they saw that a battle was about to open, and
then to hasten into the village.
Soon after our noon meal, my headquarters tents
were struck and loaded on the wagon, which was sent
to the rear. From this time I was in the saddle
and saw nothing of Mr. Carter's household. His
son, the prisoner on parole, naturally kept somewhat
secluded, and avoided inquiries as to his own status;
but when the peril was actually upon them, he be
came the leader of the terrified and helpless group.
I shall let him tell the tale himself.

FrankUn after the Battle 199
" While the preparations for the impending battle
were going on," he says, "the Carter family were
not inattentive observers. They had Avitnessed on
other occasions sharp skirmishes betAveen Rebel cav
alry raiders and the Federal pickets stationed about
the premises, in Avhich men Avere killed and wounded,
sorae in the yard, and even in the house itself. They
felt theraselves soraewhat inured to the casualties of
war ; but the great number of men noAV so hurriedly
and so intently engaged in demolishing houses and
constructing works of defence, looked to thein pain
fully ominous. The scene presented Avas on a bigger
scale than anything they had ever seen before. It
created feelings of profound anxiety. Whether to
abandon home and the little that was left to thera
after three years and more of devastation, and to
seek personal safety by flight, was the all-absorbing
thought. In either aspect the prospect was discour
aging. To leave home, pillage Avas almost certain,
and blackened ruins might be all that Avould be left
to greet their return. With one accord it Avas deter
mined to remain: perhaps their presence Avould be
respected and the house spared. They would trust
to God to shield themselves frora harra. . . .
"Although Hood was said to be a rash fighter, it
was hardly thought he would be reckless enough to
make a determined assault on the formidable works
in front of him; but to be prepared for any emer
gency, it was directed that a bundle of clothing pro
portioned to the strength of each one be prepared,
for the twofold purpose of having that much saved
in case all else was lost, and for partial protection
should they be forced to leave the house. If the
latter became necessary, all were instructed to throw

200 The Battle of Franklin
their respective bundles over their backs, and follow
the leader whithersoever he led.'
"In a little Avhile all doubts were solved as to
Hood's intentions. His solid lines, to the right, to
the left, and in front, advancing at a rapid pace,
showed plainly enough that the crash was at hand.
Although the house had withstood the shock of
former conflicts, they seeraed as child's play to the
approaching storra. The cellar afforded the securest
retreat, and hardly Avas it reached before the din of
battle grew appalling. In the gloom of the cellar
the children cowered at the feet of their parents,
and while the bullets rained against the house, and
a cannon ball went crashing through, ^ all seemed in
a state of acute expectancy, but gave no audible
sound of fear.
" The first onset having passed, and no one harmed,
reassurance returned, and hope revived Avith some :
with others, the comparative lull increased the ten
sion and awakened fears of unknown dangers yet to
corae. In this state of alternating hope and fear,
they dragged through the weary hours unti-1 the last
shot was fired and deliverance assured. Mutual
congratulations were scarcely exchanged when a
Confederate soldier brought the sad tidings that
Captain Theodoric Carter, a son and brother, lay
wounded on the field. An elder brother, who had
thus far directed affairs, went iraraediately in search,
but by raisdirection went to another part of the field.
^ It was a shrewd device to provide such defensive armor if they
had to run toward town with the hail of Confederate bullets coming
frora behind. Nothing would stop a bullet better than a well rolled
bundle of clothing.
2 The ball went through the wing or ell of the house, and the holes
raade by its entrauce from the south and exit on the north are still there
(1896).

Franklin after the Battle 201
In the mean time, General Thomas B. Smith, of
whose staff young Carter was a member, reported
the casualty and led the Avay, followed by the father,
three sisters, and sister in law, to Avhere the young
officer lay, mortally wounded. They lifted him gen
tly and bore hira back to die in the horae he had
not seen for two years and raore. He had fallen
when his heart's wish was alraost attained, only a
few rods distant from the home of a lifetirae. "
When daylight came it was found that wounded
men and some skulkers had possession of the prin
cipal floors of the house. Some of the wounded had
crawled away from the lines in the darkness, and
getting into the house lay down there and were over
looked by the stretcher bearers who were carrying
the injured men to the rear. Others had been laid
in order upon the ground to aAvait the ambulances,
already overloaded. These, of course, fell into the
hands of the Confederates. The movement in retir
ing from the position at midnight was conducted so
quietly that even sorae soldiers who were at the
breastworks, overpowered by sleep after exhausting
fatigue, did not get sufficiently awake to fall into
line with their comrades. These were aroused and
sent after the column by the pickets left to cover
the movement.
Among the men of Lane's brigade, who turned and
fought at our breastworks, was an intelligent young
soldier, a private in the ranks of the 26th Ohio, who
lived to become a college professor after the war,
and to write a very clear and modest account of his
personal recollections of the fight. ^ Mr. Gist was
1 Professor W. W. Gist's paper, " The Battle of Frankliu as seen
hy a Private," was pubUshed in the Cedar Rapids (Iowa) Weekly
Republican, September 6, 1883. If aU personal accounts of stirring

202 The Battle of FranMin
one of those weary ones who were overpowered by
sleep, and we may accept his well told story of
his experience as a lesson in the condition of an
army which had been fighting and marching day
and night.
"After the firing ceased," he says, " we waited for
a long time in terrible suspense, expecting that the
battle Avould be renewed at any moment. At last,
wearied by the marching and the terrible scenes of
the two days, and stupefied by the gunpowder, I fell
asleep with my head resting against the works, I
think. It must have been nearly midnight Avhen I
awoke. I was amazed to find that the line of battle
was gone, and that only a skirmish line remained.
I think that one of the skirmishers aroused me. At
all events, he told me to hasten across the river, as
the army was nearly all gone. I started without
debating the question a moment. As I passed back
of the line a horrible sight met ray view. Here was
along line of woimded, lying as they had been placed,
and moaning most piteously. They did not seem to
understand that the army had gone, and that soon
they Avould fall into the hands of the enemy. Reach
ing the pike, 1 started on the double-quick and soon
crossed the river. The road Avas filled Avith soldiers
moving toward Nashville, but there did not seem to
be any organization. Almost as soon as I crossed
the river, I met a raan of ray corapany, and to hira
I owe ray escape. I was Aveary beyond anything that
I had ever experienced, and hungry, and I could not
walk a quarter of a raile Avithout resting. As soon
as I would sit down I Avould fall asleep, and in a few
zvents were equally candid and careful, the work of the historian would
be a coraparatively easy one. I shall have further occasion to refer to
this valuable paper.

Franklin after the Battle 203
minutes he would wake me. This was repeated, I
should think, a hundred times."
The physical powers of the soldier place a limit to
the work which may be required of him. Excessive
weariness is as absolute a barrier to vigorous exer
tion as would be mutilation by wounds or collapse
frora disease. It reaches, at last, a point where both
mind and body become physically unreliable. Ordi
nary motives lose their power. The stimulus of
ambition, of hope, even of duty, loses its power, and
the body and mind imperatively demand rest at
whatever cost. The weaker men and those upon
whom some extra stress of exertion has fallen will
show first the failure of powers, and straggling
begins. Discipline will postpone mischievous re
sults for a time, but not for long. It is hard to state
any definite criterion of the endurance of raen or
horses, and historians sometiraes fall into the error
of assuming that marching and fighting may be kept
up indefinitely. Mr. Gist's description of his own
suffering is equally true of many more. Men have
told me that on that night raarch they fell asleep as
they walked, and found themselves stumbling or fall
ing when a hollow in the road threw them out of
poise. Continuous exertions for severa.l successive
days and nights in part of the command had brought
them too near the limit of their strength, and this
was a legitimate reason in favor of giving the troops
a night's rest in the lines, even with the risk of
further fighting on the morrow. It should be fully
weighed in deciding whether it would have been
wiser to push reinforcements forward to Franklin,
rather than put upon exhausted raen the additional
strain of another night raarch in retreat.

204 The Battle of FrankUn
The narrative of Schofield's army would not be
complete without sorae further raention of the brig
ade under General Cooper, which we left in the
vicinity of Centerville on the Duck River, some
thirty miles Avest of Colurabia, on the 29th.' Doubt
ful Avhether the raessenger could get through who
was sent by General Ruger to order Cooper to inarch
to Franklin, Schofield requested General Thomas to
send orders directly from Nashville to Cooper to the
same effect. In the early afternoon of the 29th,
therefore, Thomas sent a despatch by telegraph to
Colonel C. R. Thompson, commanding the post at
Johnsonville, on the Tennessee River, ^ ordering him
to send a mounted messenger to Cooper at Center
ville with an accompanying order to the latter to
march by the Nashville road till he should cross the
Harpeth at the farm of the Widow Demos, and from
there report to Schofield at Franklin.^
Ruger's raessenger reached Cooper at Beard's
Ferry in the raorning of the 30th, when Schofield's
array was already assembling at Fra.nklin, and Cooper
marched the portion of his brigade with him to
Killough's, five miles north of Duck River, sending
orders to the rest of the command, which was at
Centerville, to join him at once. The raap seemed
to make the distance between Centerville and Beard's
1 Chap, ii., ante, pp. 24, 29.
2 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 1163.
" In the official records the " AA''idow Dean " is the name given, but
Cooper's report (Id., p. 370) has the narae "Demoss," which agrees
with the name " Deraos " on the map then used by the army, which
had been compUed in 1862 by the Engineer Corps at Array of the Ohio
and Cumberland headquarters. The crossing was where the Nashville
and Hardin Turnpike reached the Harpeth. South of that river the
road was a common country road to Centerville. The distance from
Nashville to CenterviUe was supposed to be fifty-five miles, of which
fifteen were north of the Harpeth.

FranMin after the Battle 205
Ferry some four or five miles ; but Cooper found it
fifteen by the shortest route,' and as the ferry was
nearer to Columbia he had rightly established his
headquarters there to shorten the time in communi
cating with Ruger and Schofield. The concentration
of his whole coraraand was not effected till noon of
December 1st, when our little army was already at
Nashville. At two o'clock Cooper received Thomas's
message, which had been two days in reaching him.
He immediately marched toward Nashville, and
crossed the Harpeth at the place assigned on the
evening of December 2d. During this day he learned
from Rebel deserters that our army had fallen back
from Franklin, and that his own route to Nashville
was probably intercepted by Hood's array. ^
At Franklin, on the 30th, Schofield learned frora
Thoraas what orders had been sent to Cooper, and
he sent a raessenger down the Harpeth to order the
latter to march at once to Nashville. But Cooper,
of course, was still near Centerville, and the mes
senger was chased by Confederate patrols into Nash
ville. ^ Upon this, Thomas telegraphed to Lieut.
Colonel Sellon, commanding the post at Kingston
Springs on the railway leading to Johnsonville, to
send a mounted party to Centerville at once, to
direct Cooper to raake for Clarksville on the Cumber
land River forty miles west of Nashville, which was
made the rendezvous for the posts along the Ten
nessee which might be cut off from Nashville by
Hood's advance.* This message did not reach
1 O. R., xlv. part i. p. 370. 2 id,, p. 371.
3 Id., pp. 1171, 1175. In the dispatches between Thomas and
Schofleld the name of the crossing is again given as the " Widow
Dean's," and Schofield says he can find no such place on the map. It
was probably misspelled in telegraphing.
* /(?., pp. 1194, 1195.

206 The Battle of Franklin
Cooper, who continued his march, as we have seen,
reaching the Harpeth in the evening of Deceraber 2d.
He now marched cautiously toward Nashville on the
Hardin Turnpike, until he reached a high hill eight
miles from the city, from the top of which he saw
the numerous camp fires on both sides of the road in
front of hira. He then moved across country to his
left and rear till he reached the Charlotte Turnpike,
which follows the general westerly course of the
Cumberland River, and, marching hard upon it all
night, he recrossed the Harpeth at daybreak of the
3d. His own good judgment now indicated Clarks
ville as his objective point, and he continued his
movement in that direction. He arrived there on
the evening of the 5th, joining Colonel Thompson's
Johnsonville garrison, which had just preceded him
under orders from General Thomas. Resting two
days, Cooper resumed his march to Nashville, where
he rejoined the Twenty-third Corps, and reported to
General Schofield on the evening of the 8th. Instead
of fifty-five railes, his devious raarch frora Center
ville had stretched to two hundred and ten, and
might easily have ended in captivity; but his cool
ness and good judgment had made a successful escape
from the perils and difficulties of his situation, and
good discipline, with the good marching qualities of
his veterans, had brought the coraraand in without
loss.' 1 Cooper's Report, 0. R., xlv. part i. pp. 370, 371.

CHAPTER XVI
RESULTS AND LESSONS
Sources of Statistical Knowledge — Hood's Forces before the Battle —
Schofield's — Numbers actually engaged — Hood's Casualties —
Loss of Officers — Schofield's Losses — Analysis of them — The
Problera of Attack and Defence — Fire Discipline.
It is not easy to be very exact in stating the num
bers of men engaged at Franklin in the two armies
under Hood and Schofield, or the numbers of casual
ties in the battle. On the side of the Confederates
there was a natural disposition to avoid too great
explicitness ; for the results of the battle produced a
sensible shock throughout the Southern States, and
it was generally looked upon as a fatal blow to their
hopes of independence. On the national side the
army under Schofield did not have a permanent
organization, but Avas, in some sense, an accidental
assemblage of such portions of the troops under
Thomas in the Military Division of the Mississippi
as were at the time in hand for operations against
Hood's invading army. By carefully coraparing the
reports of strength now published in the Official
Records, we can, however, elirainate raost of the
sources of error, and make approximations that are
very close to accuracy.
The tabulated reports of Hood's army on which
we must chiefly rely are those of November 6th and

208 The Battle of Franklin
December 10th.' No intermediate reports seem to
have been preserved. There had been a little desul
tory fighting on the way north Avard from the Tennessee
River to Columbia, and sharp affairs at the crossing
of Duck River and at Spring Hill. It is probable,
however, that the casualties prior to the battle of
Franklin were raore than offset by recruiting; for
one of the avowed advantages which Hood expected
to gain in Tennessee was the increase of his army
both by voluntary enlistments and by the enforce
ment of the Confederate conscription laws.^ There
is evidence that up to the battle of Franklin, at least,
there was considerable success in gathering up raen
who had straggled horaeward frora the Tennessee
regiments, and in bringing in fresh men who were
liable under their laAvs to military duty.^ We shall
therefore be probably within the mark if we assume
that the difference between Hood's morning reports
of the dates above given is due to the casualties of
the battle of Franklin, and check this by the reports
of Generals Thoraas and Schofield of the direct
information obtained at Franklin on our return there
after the battle of Nashville.
On the 6th of November Hood reported his infantry
and artillery present for duty to be 32,861.* Jack
son's division of cavalry was 2,801. But Forrest's
cavalry corps consisted of three divisions, the com
raanders being Jackson, Buford, and Chalmers ; and
there is no doubt that Buford's division was a larger
one than Jackson's. It is most probable that the
average strength of Forrest's divisions was 3,000,
1 0. R., xlv. part i. pp. 678, 679.
2 Hood's "Advance and Retreat," p. 305.
3 Dispatch of Colonel Blake to General Rousseau, 0. R., xlv. part i.
p. 896. 1 Id., pp. 678, 679.

Results and Lessons 209
making the strength of his corps 9,000. Notes upon
Hood's original returns show that Forrest made no
tabulated reports of his corps through the whole
campaign, and we have to rely on approximate calcu
lations. Gathering the best information that could
be got from prisoners and deserters, and comparing
it with other evidence. General Schofield stated in
his own official report that the smallest estimate of
Forrest's corps was 10,000, and this he thought was
nearly accurate.' The total strength of Hood's army,
then, was from 42,000 to 43,000 of all arras.
The data for determining the strength of General
Schofield's army are raore complete, since we have
the regular tri-monthly morning reports. As to
infantry and artillery, these would be all we could
wish if the published tables gave in detail the
strength of detachments, such as that under General
Cooper, who marched from Centerville on the 30th
of Noveraber, with his brigade and two additional
regiraents belonging to the Twenty-third Corps. '-^
As Cooper did not rejoin the corps until it had
reached Nashville, his coraraand must not be counted
as among the combatants at Franklin. No return
of the Union cavalry with General Schofield was
separately made till the morning of the 30th Novem
ber, and even then it was only provisionally organ
ized, so that it is difficult to separate it from other
parts of the cavalry corps at Nashville and elsewhere.
The discrepancies as to the cavalry on either side
are, however, of minor importance, as the strongly
dominant feature of the battle of Franklin was the
infantry engagement.
On the morning of November 20th, the infantry
and artillery of the Fourth Army Corps, present for
1 O. R., xlv. part i. p. 341. See Appendix A. 2 id., p. 367.
14

210 The Battle of Franklin
duty equipped, numbered 13,119 ; of the Twenty -third
Army Corps, 9,823: total, 22,942. On the morning
of the battle, Noveraber 30tli, the nurabers Avere, of
the Fourth Corps 15,207, of the Twenty-third Corps
10,527, besides two regiraents of the Array of the
Tennessee (44th Missouri and 72d Illinois), detached
and temporarily assigned to the latter corps.' These
two regiments were more full than most of the old
organizations, and numbered, perhaps, a thousand
men.2 The gain of 2,792 in the aggregate of the
two corps consisted of ncAV regiments and recruits
which joined Schofield at Colurabia. But the absence
of Cooper's coramand reduces the number present at
Franklin in the Twenty-third Corps by about 3,000
men, and makes the aggregate of Schofield's infantry
and artillery at the opening of the battle 23,734.
The national cavalry under General Wilson must
be estimated in part, for reasons already given.
Hatch's division is reported as numbering 2,638,
Johnson's 2,286, and Hammond's brigade is not
reported. 3 The aggregate was about 5,500, and the
total strength in all arms of Schofield's army 29, 234.
For the purposes of military criticism and infor
mation it will be profitable to consider also the
forces on both sides actually employed in attack and
defence. Of Hood's array two divisions of Lee's
corps were held in reserve and not engaged, and
one brigade of Stewart's corps (Ector's) was absent,
escorting the pontoon train. Only two batteries of
his artillery appear to have been under fire. The
numbers of Hood's infantry and artillery actually
1 See ante, p. 54, and Ruger's Report, O. R., xlv. part i. p. 367.
2 On the concentration of the army at Nashville, these two regi
ments were transferred to General A. J. Smith's " Detachment of the
Army of the Tennessee."
* O. R., xlv. part i. p. 54.

Results and Lessons 211
delivering the assault on our lines were, therefore,
two or three hundred less than 24,000.
The assault was received upon the continuous
intrenched line between the Harpeth River above
the town on the left, and the Carter's Creek Turn
pike on the right. As we have seen,' Kimball's
division of the Fourth Corps was rather a guard or
cover for the right flank than a part of the continu
ously intrenched front, and, except part of its left
brigade, it was only slightly engaged with Chalraers's
division of the eneray's cavalry. It, as well as our
cavalry engagement across the river on the east,
might properly be dropped from the consideration
of the conditions and results of the infantry assault
by the Confederates, though both must of course be
considered in the statistical results of the whole
engagement. I shall analyze the latter first.
Upon our reoccupation of Franklin, December 18th,
unusually full opportunities for knowledge of the
enemy's losses were made available. Their hos
pitals fell into our hands, and we recovered our own,
with our raedical officers and attendants who had
been left in charge of thera. General Schofield was
thus enabled to report definitely that Hood's losses
were "1,750 buried upon the field, 3,800 disabled
and placed in hospitals in Franklin, and 702 pris
oners, making 6,252 of the enemy placed hors de
comhat, besides the slightly Avounded. The eneray's
loss in general officers was very great, being six
killed, six wounded, and one captured," ^ As to
1 Ante, p. 60.
2 O. R., xlv. part i. p. 344, and Appendix A. General Thomas's
report gives the same figures. Id., p. 35. My own investigation on the
field at the time made the killed 1,800, the wounded in hospital, 3,800,
and the number of prisoners captured by the Twenty-third Corps,

212 The Battle of FranMin
the slightly wounded. Hood's own dispatches to the
Confederate War Departraent are conclusive. On
the 5th of December, trying to remove the stunning
effect of the terrible loss in general officers, he tele
graphed to the Secretary, Mr. Seddon : " Our loss of
officers in the battle of Franklin on the 30th was
excessively large in proportion to the loss of men.
The medical director reports a very large propor
tion of slightly Avounded men. " ' Any accepted
ratio betAveen killed and wounded which military
experience has established, will show that the tem
porarily disabled who had been treated in their
quarters or who had left the hospitals and returned
to the ranks before Hood's next return of his force
was made (December 10th) would add about two
thousand to the list of casualties and swell the
aggregate to eight thousand or raore.
It is interesting, in confirraation of this, to cora
pare the Confederate returns of December 10th with
those of November 6th, which have been analyzed
above. The returns of infantry and artillery of the
later date show 24,074 present for duty.^ To these
must be added four absent brigades, which at the
proportionate part of the divisions to which they
702. I added : " Thus, without estimating the prisoners taken hy any
part of the Fourth Corps, or the stragglers and deserters, who are
known to have been nuraerous, the eneray's loss was not less than
6,300." Official Eeport, W., p. 356, and Appendix B. General Wag
ner's Eeport (Id., p. 232) says his brigade commanders claim 753
prisoners, lu his special report of prisoners, flags, etc., he adds the
postscript : " The above is the report of brigade commanders. Only
about 400 prisoners (officers and men) passed through the hands of
my provost marshal." Id., p. 234. The reports of Generals Schofield
and Thoraas include only the prisoners reported by me for the Twenty-
third Corps. See also chap, xix., post.
1 O. R., xlv. part ii. p. 650.
2 Id., part i. p. 679.

Results and Lessons 213
belong would amount to 2,387,' making the aggregate
26,461.2 The difference between this and 32,861,
the similar aggregate for Noveraber 6th, is 6,400,
which would show the losses in infantry and artil
lery. To these must of course be added those of the
cavalry, which are reported as being 269 for the
month of November. The total is thus raised to
6,669, which excludes all cases of slight wounds
where the men had returned to duty within ten days
after the battle.^ The resemblance of these figures
to those of General Schofield's report raade at the
tirae is very striking.
It would, of course, be very desirable to have full
official returns of the Confederate losses, and thus
be saved the need of coraparison and calculation;
but no reports are preserved, if ever raade, of Cheat
ham's divisions (Cleburne's and Brown's), which
suffered most heavily, and we are therefore obliged
to have recourse to the kind of evidence which has
been presented.
The thing which most impressed the world at the
time was the unusual number of general officers who
appeared in the casualty lists. Hood gave the list
with laconic brevity in his dispatch to the Confed
erate War Department on December 3d. " We haA'.e
to lament, "he said, "the loss of many gallant officers
and brave men. Major General Cleburne, Brigadier
1 A striking example of the destruction of some of the brigades is
that of Cockrell's of French's division, one of those included in the ab
sentees on December 10. It went into the fight with 696 officers and
men, and suffered 419 casualties. 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 716.
2 Ante, p. 211.
' There are discrepancies in the reports of the cavalry which can
not easily be reconciled. The report quoted gives the losses of Chal
raers's division for the month of November as 35 (Id., p. 762) ; but
Chalraers's report raakes them 116 killed and wounded in the battle of
Franklin. Id., p. 764.

214 The Battle of FranMin
Generals John Adams, Gist, Strahl, and Granbury
were killed: Major General John C. Brown, Briga
dier Generals Carter, Manigault, Quarles, Cockrell,
and Scott were wounded ; Brigadier General Gordon
was captured.'
But this was only a part of the response to his
order immediately after the battle, that " Corps com
manders will send in at once a list of the divis
ion, brigade, and regimental commanders by name
and rank, who were killed or wounded so as to be
unfit for service, in the engagement of yesterday
evening." ^
The complete return is a roll of honor which fills
nearly three pages of the published official records,
and of which the summary is five general officers
killed, six Avounded, and one captured ; six colonels
killed, fifteen wounded, and two missing ; two lieu
tenant colonels killed and nine wounded; three
majors killed, five wounded, and tAVO missing; two
captains killed, three wounded, and four missing : a
total of sixty-five.^ Remember that none of these
Avere exercising a less command than that of a regi
ment. Every captain on the list was serving three
grades above his rank Avhen he fell, stepping forward
to fill vacancies as they had been made by the for
tunes of war. The other field and line officers Avho
fell are mingled in the long list of the thousands in
which the sacrifices of war are sumraed up. When
silence fell upon the field, there was more than one
brigade in which a captain was the ranking officer
in command.*
1 0. R., xlv. part ii. pp. 643, 644.
2 Id., p. 629. 8 Id., part i. pp. 684-686.
* This was the case in Quarles's brigade of Walthall's division, and
in Gist's brigade of Cheatham's di'vision. Id., pp. 721, 738.

Results and Lessons

215

The losses on the national side are more readily
ascertained from the official reports, for the complete
aggregate by divisions in the Fourth and Twenty-
third Corps Avas reported by General Schofield.'
'J'hose of the cavalry are returned for the whole
campaign, including the battle of Nashville, so that
the losses of General Wilson's command at Franklin
cannot be separately stated. ^ It was understood that
they were not large. General Schofield's tabulated
statement is as follows : —

Killed.

Wounded.

Missing.

Aggregate.

Fourth Army Corps :

First Division (Kimball) .
5
37
18
60
Second Division (Wagner)
52
519
670
1,241
Artillery ....
10
51
6
67
Twenty-third Army Corps :
Second Division (Ruger) .
74
241
313
628
Third Division (Eeilly) .
48
185
97
330
Total 
189
1,033
1,104
2,326
The analysis of this total of 2,326 casualties shows
several important and instructive facts.
First, nearly half of the whole are in the list of
"missing." Whilst it is true that among the miss
ing would be some of the dead who fell outside the
works, and a few stragglers and fugitives from the
battle-field who did not rejoin their colors, the
greater part would be men, wounded or unwounded,
who fell into the eneray's hands. In his dispatch
of December 3d, Hood claims that he captured about
a thousand prisoners. His claim is corroborated by
this list of 1,104 raissing. 3
Second, nearly the whole of the raissing are in
Wagner's and Ruger's divisions, and nearly two
1 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 343. 2 Jd., pp. 47, 568.
8 Id., part ii. p. 643.
216 The Battle of FranMin
thirds of the whole are in Wagner's alone. Analyz
ing still further by brigades, the number of raissing
in Moore's brigade of Ruger's division is trifling;
so is it in Casement's and Stiles's brigades of
Reilly's division.' As to the Twenty -third Corps,
therefore, the missing are nearly all frora Reilly's
and Strickland's brigades, the two which were re
spectively on the right and left of the Colurabia
Turnpike, and there Avere three tiraes as raany in
Strickland's as in Reilly's brigade. In Wagner's
division Opdycke's brigade returns 70 raissing,^ and
the 600 remaining are from Lane's and Conrad's
brigades. Those in Opdycke's brigade are almost
exactly the same as in Reilly's brigade. These
figures demonstrate that where the line was un
shaken and the troops held firmly to the works, the
loss was small ; where the break was momentary and
the line quickly restored (as by Reilly and Opdycke),
the prisoners lost were still moderate in number;
where the break was more coraplete and the enemy
held the works for a longer time (as in Strickland's
line), the losses were large; but where the enemy
came in pell-mell with our men Avho were driven in
from the position nearly half a mile in front, both
wounded and raissing were multiplied, as one would
naturally expect.
Third, the lists of the killed tell a similar story.
They are trifling everywhere but near the centre, on
the national side, though the Confederates lost nearly
as heavily in front of Stiles and Casement as any
where on the field. ^ It helps to show the character
of the fighting in Strickland's brigade when we find
that the number of the killed in it was 53, whilst
1 O. R., part i. pp. 381, 409. . 2 Jd., p. 241.
3 See ante, pp. 124, 126.

Results and Lessons 217
the number killed in Lane's and Conrad's brigades
together was 36.' In Opdycke's brigade 16 were
killed, making 52 in the three brigades of Wagner's
division to 74 in the two brigades of Ruger's. This
shows not only that Strickland's regiments rallied
stoutly and fought stubbornly, but that the second
hastily constructed breastworks Avere poorer cover
for them than the original works in the main line.
Thus every coluran of the tables corroborates the
narrative of the battle as we have read it in the
preceding pages.
The iraproveraents in repeating arras raade since
our civil war, and the current discussion of the
practical range and rapidity of fire frora a line of
battle, receive light frora our experience at Franklin.
We found that the slight undulations of the field
were scarcely noticeable from our parapet, and yet
they were sufficient to cover Hood's advancing lines
of infantry so well that it was not till they had
passed the position first occupied by Wagner's two
brigades that they came under infantry fire. They
thus got within fiv-e or six hundred yards of our lines
practically unharmed from musketry. We rarely
found a field, during the war, so open or so level
as this, and one raight fairly be sceptical as to the
practical value of much greater range in small
arms. As to rapidity of fire, however, the proof seems
strongly in its favor. The few repeating rifles we
had bore no important ratio to the number of men
in line, though the enemy, exaggerating the number
of such weapons, credited thera with much of the
terrible destruction of the field. The truth was that
the crowding of our second line and reserves into the
1 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 381, and table, ante, p. 215.

218 The Battle of FranMin
works practically raade all our Avcapons repeaters.
For as the men Avere three or four deep in most
places, they supplied the front rank so rapidly with
loaded pieces that I doubt if any ordinary line armed
with the latest magazine gun could have delivered
so continuous a fire as we Avitnessed. As darkness
carae on, the appearance Avas so exactly that of a
sheet of fire lying stationary and uninterrupted at
the level of the parapet, that the engagement is
rarely mentioned by one Avho Avas there without
speaking of this, a striking phenomenon of the
battle. With the weapons of to-day a sirailar result
would be produced by a line in two ranks.
The engagement also sheds instructive light on
the question, much mooted in recent military discus
sions, of the lirait of endurance of loss by Avell dis
ciplined troops, beyond Avhich they cannot go. No
one competent to judge denies that for a union of
personal courage with intelligence, the material of
the Union and Confederate armies in 1864 cannot
be excelled. Their fire discipline was also of a very
high order. Soraething less than 24,000 of such
raen ' actually delivered the Confederate assault upon
the line of breastworks between the Harpeth RiA'er
and the Carter's Creek Turnpike, say a mile long,
held by about 10,000 national troops, made up of
Reilly's and Ruger's divisions and the artillery.^
About 5,000 more (Wagner's division) were in the
fight; but the preceding narrative makes it clear
that, under the circumstances, their participa.tion
was a misfortune and not a benefit to the national
army. The incidents at the opening of the battle
greatly increased the confidence of the Confederates,
and stimulated their hopeful courage far beyond
1 Ante, p. 211. 2 Ante, p. 210.

Results and Lessons 219
the ordinary. Their total casualties, including the
slighter but temporarily disabling wounds, were about
one third of their whole number before they yielded
to the inevitable and ceased their efforts. It would
be hard to find a better test of what courage, nerve,
and discipline are capable of.' It helps to establish
a practical limit where the sense of hopelessness and
impossibility quenches will. Beyond that point
continued struggle is not heroism, it is insanity.
The raen who held the works and restored the line
Avhen broken, may also fairly claira that they too
showed what nerve and will may do to retrieve an
error and turn a threatened disaster into victory.
Among the trophies of the battle General Schofield
was able to report thirty-three flags. Twenty of these
were captured along Reilly's parapet, ten at Opdycke's,
and three at other points. Many of these were taken
in hand to hand conflict, but some were dropped upon
the field, where the fearful destruction left no one to
lift them again. Hood also clairaed several, taken in
the rout of Wagner's outpost before the rally at the
main line rencAved the continuous front of fire and
steel.2 1 An interesting discussion of the general subject is found iu the
papers of Captain V. N. Maude, R. E., repulilished by Captain Arthur
L. Wagner, U. S. A., in the " International Series," vol. i.
2 See Schofield's Report, Appendix A, pp. 306, 307. Opdycke's
Report, 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 242. Hood's Report, id., p. 658.

CHAPTER XVII
DISCUSSION OF WAGNER'S CONDUCT
Natural Rise of Controversies — Corps Feeling — Good Comradeship
— Wagner's Personal Situation — Disposition to befrieud liiin —
Criticisms by his Subordinates — Efforts to aUay the Irritation
— Correspondence — Preliminary Reports — Conrad's Report —
Wagner retired from the Division — Leaves the Army.
I HAVE noAV corapleted the connected narrative of the
battle of Franklin Avith what raay seera abundant
fulness of detail; but, as I have had to note on
several occasions, controversies have arisen in regard
to various points in the history Avhich may be con
clusively settled, as it seems to me, by a careful
weighing of the evidence, official and private, Avhich
we now have access to. One of the most interesting
features of a civil Avar waged by a people of so gen
eral intelligence and mental alertness as ours is the
great activity of discussion which follows it. Our
old soldiers Avere keen critics of what they saw, and
in the long delay in publishing the official records
of the war debated its issues and fought its battles
over with none the less zest because their informa
tion was limited and their memory iraperfect.
As it fell to ray lot to publish in 1882 ' a corapar
atively brief history of the campaign of which the
battle of Franklin Avas a part, it was an altogether
natural result that I should find some of my state-
1 Ante, p. 2, note.

Discussion of Wagners Conduct 221
ments and conclusions challenged. The brevity of
my narrative made it irapossible to give the evidence
which supported it. I was obliged to state facts and
conclusions succinctly, trusting to a confident belief
that candid investigation would show that I had
asserted nothing without strong proof. My personal
familiarity with the events of which I wrote gave
me some advantage in following the clues which
lead to the truth. On many points 1 was also an
eyewitness who owed it to himself to be explicit in
telling Avhat he knew, leaving it to the reader to give
proper Aveight to his testimony.
I have little reason to complain of my treatment
as an author. The most competent judges have
accepted the authority of my volumes, and the pub
lication of the government records has practically
quieted discussion. There are, however, several sub
jects still debated which should be settled, if pos
sible; and those who are interested in historical
investigation will, I hope, be glad of the additional
light I may be able to give.
A very natural esprit de corps led sorae worthy
men who served in Wagner's division to question
the justice of the criticism upon his handling of the
division in the battle. The quotation from the
official records of the written orders given him and
his own report of his understanding of them fully
disposes of the contention that the responsibility for
his giving battle in front of our lines of works should
rest upon his superiors. There have, however, been
occasional allegations of a disposition on the part of
General Schofield and other officers of the Twenty-
third corps to be unfriendly to hira in the exaraina
tion which General Thomas instituted on the arrival
of the army at Nashville. The fact was quite the

222 The Battle of FrankUn
opposite. General Schofield Avas well aware of jeal
ousies which grew out of his assignment to the com
mand of the army in the field, and had sought by
every raeans in his power to allay them. In this he
was heartily seconded by his principal subordinates
in his OAvn corps. General Ruger had just been
transferred from the Army of the Curaberland to
the Twenty-third Corps, and could not be otherwise
than warm in his relations to his old comrades. My
own had been scarcely less so from the day we had
welcoraed Wood's and Sheridan's divisions as rein-
forceraents near Knoxville in the winter campaign
of 1863-64. How we proved this cordiality Avill be
shown in the events of the Aveek following the
battle. It was past noon on the 1st of December when we
reached Nashville, and the troops Avere hardly put
in position about the town when General Wagner
called upon me. He was in distress over the results
of the engagement to his division, and was most
anxious to soften the judgment of his superiors as
to his action under his ordera. His stateraent regard
ing the orders he gave to his own subordinates was
that AA'hich he erabodied in his official report the
next day.' It was, in brief, that they Avere directed
" to develop the enemy, but not to attempt to fight
if threatened by the enemy in too strong a force."
But the eneray's "onset was so sudden that Colonel
Conrad found his brigade heavily engaged and about
to be flanked before he could withdraw his line.
His men fought gallantly, refusing to retire till
completely flanked and driven out of their hastily
thrown-up barricades, when they retired on the main
1 See quotations in chap, iv., ante, aud the whole report, 0. R., xlv.
part i. p. 231.

Discussion of Wagner's Conduct 223
line. " ' There was no room for disagreement between
us, and there was none, as to the rallying and reor
ganization of Conrad's and Lane's brigades near the
river, or as to Opdycke's charging to restore the lines
at the centre. General Waigner's anxiety was to
get me to accept the view that his two brigades
made a retreat, in accordance, substantially, Avith
his orders, and took a position within the lines where
they would be in reserve supporting my line in the
works. Wagner had seen a good deal of active field ser
vice, and under a rough exterior had a generous and
genial character. If his account of the matter were
accurate, it was rather the excess of courage in the
two brigades which had compromised thera, and
there was no occasion for blaraing him. To one
who was friendly, it was easy to yield to his appeal
for help in setting his conduct in a favorable light.
There had been no time to investigate. We had not
even rested from the fatigue and the excitement of
the past three days. I had seen the first break of
his raen from the outer line, but I had not seen and
had not yet learned the particulars of what occurred
whilst I was riding frora the left to the centre. I
felt at liberty, therefore, to accept his view, and to
promise him the assistance of a friendly report,
raade provisionally and expressly preliminary to an
official one which should come later, when subordi
nate reports should be received and investigation be
completed. General Schofield accepted the same
favorable views ; and the preliminary reports which
went to General Thomas immediately, attributed the
momentary break at the centre to the cover afforded
the enemy by our retreating outpost, and the mis-
1 O. R., xlv. parti, p. 231.

224 The Battle of Franklin
understanding of orders by the troops in the breast
works near the turnpike, in the confusion Avhen
Wagner's two brigades passed over thera.
I should hesitate to state what occurred at this
visit of an officer now dead, were there not contem
poraneous written evidence of it, so that it does not
depend on my recollection.^ The substance of his
conversational stateraent I have been content to put
in the language of his own official report; though it
was raore earnestly eraphatic in the freedom of such
an oral intervieAv, and claimed that his two brigades
made a leisurely retreat. He was well aware of
scA-ere criticism among his subordinates, and that
it was likely to lead to official inquiry if not to a
court-martial. This was in fact the motive for his
so great haste in seeking to remove unfavorable
impressions from the minds of those imraediately
above him. Feeling that the glorious result of the
engagement raade it easy to take the favorable view
of his action, as he stated it, and to treat it rather
as an accidental mishap than as a disobedience of
orders, I was entirely cordial in giving him prompt
friendly assistance and counsel.
The tart exchange of opinions between himself
and Colonel Opdycke at the time the brigade was
marched within the lines, ^ I advised him to ignore;
and as I was personally witness to Opdycke's hero
ism in the magnificent charge of his brigade, I urged
him to do full justice to it, and to recommend the
colonel's proraotion. As he had been busy with the
reorganization of the other brigades, and had not
personally seen Opdycke's conduct, I agreed to take
the initiative and write the recommendation for pro
motion which he would sustain in his report. With
1 Post, p. 226. 2 Ante, p. 73, note.

Discussion of Wagner's Conduct 225
regard to the irritation in Conrad's and Lane's
brigades, I comforted him with saying that, the facts
being as he stated thera, a full recognition of the
courage which had been only too persistent Avould
be likely to allay the irritation and bring the whole
into harmony again. I did not then know the inci
dent which my Adjutant General had Avitnessed at
Franklin, when General Wagner, haranguing his
partially reorganized troops near the river, had said,
"Stand by me, boys, and I'll stand by you." The
effort to overcome the insubordinate feeling began
there. '
The contemporaneous documents to which I have
referred are so necessary a part of the narrative that
I give them in full. First is my official recommen
dation of the promotion of Colonel Opdycke.
" Headquarters Third Division, Taventt-Third Army
Corps, Nashville, Tenn., Dec. 3d, 1864.
"Majoe General Thomas,
Commanding Army ofthe Cumberland.
" General, —
" I have the honor of calling to your notice the con
spicuous gallantry and meritorious conduct of Colonel
Emerson Opdycke, commanding a brigade in General
Wagner's division. Fourth Corps, in the battle of the
30th ultimo.
" In the early part of the engagement a portion of the
Second Division, Twenty-third Corps, was somewhat
disordered by misunderstanding the purpose of retiring
through the lines of the two brigades of Wagner's divis
ion which had been engaged in advance. It was at this
time that Opdycke's brigade was lying in reserve on the
Columbia pike, and, being called upon, he led them for
ward in the most brilliant manner, charging the ad-
1 Ante,/p, 146, and Appendix F.
15

226 The Battle of FrankUn
vancing rebels and restoring the continuity of our lines,
which were not again disordered in the slightest degree.
Colonel Opdycke's promptness and courage deserve of
ficial notice, and, as I was commanding the line at that
time, I deem it my duty to bring the facts to your atten
tion, the more especially as he does not belong to my
division. " Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
"J. D. Cox,
Brigadier General Commanding."
This letter was sent, by the usual railitary rule,
through the headquarters of General Schofield, and
is still on the files of the War Department. ^ The
recommendation Avas adopted and indorsed by General
Schofield in his own report, dated December 7th. ^
I caused a copy of this to be raade and sent it to
General Wagner with the following letter of ray
own: — "Headquarters Third Division, T-wentt-third Army
Corps, Nashville, Tenn., Dec. 3d, 1864.
"General, —
"1 have the honor of handing you herewith a copy
of a paper forwarded by me to General Thomas's head
quarters, concerning the subject matter of Avhich I had a
conversation with you a couple of days since. I think
this would be a proper time to press the subject of
Colonel Opdycke's promotion, and if this can be made
the means of doing so, I shall be most happy. Please
inform me Avhat steps you think can be advantageously
taken, and it Avill give me great pleasure to co-operate
further. " I desire also to express my admiration of the gal
lantry of your whole command. Indeed an excess of
bravery kept the two brigades a little too long in front,
^ O. R., xlv. part i. p. 409.
2 Id., p. 343, and see Appendix A.

Discussion of Wagner's Conduct 227
so that the troops at the main line could not get to firing
upon the advancing enemy till they were uncomfortably
near. " Very truly and respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
"J. D. Cox,
Brigadier General Commanding."
"To Brigadier General G. D. Wagner,
Commanding 2d Division, Fourth Army Corps."
This letter, which by its tenor General Wagner
was permitted to use for the friendly purposes already
stated, was not strictly official, and does not ap
pear to have been preserved in the Official Army
Records or in my private letter-book. Finding an
extract from it quoted in one of the many newspaper
articles upon the battle. Major E. C. Dawes (the well
known military statistician and Avriter) procured
a copy attested by an officer of General Wagner's
staff. It fixes the date of the interview between
General Wagner and myself on the 1st of December,
the day after the battle, when, after our twenty-mile
march begun at midnight, we went into position in
the fortifications about Nashville in the afternoon.
In connecting the two papers now given, I have
outrun the order of events and raust return to the
2d of Deceraber. On the morning of that day General
Schofield informed me that General Thomas desired
a preliminary sketch of the battle for iraraediate use,
and, although it Avas quite irapossible to get subordi
nates' reports, asked me to write it at once, as the
officer who had fullest and most direct personal
knowledge of what occurred upon the line. I did
so without a moraent's delay, and it was forwarded
to General Thomas, bearing that date.^ General
^ 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 348. See also Appendix A.

228 The Battle of FrankUn
Schofield made a report for the army, also prelimi
nary, on the 7th of December; but neither of the
regular official reports from the corps headquarters
was made for more than a month afterward.'
In this preliminary report, thus raade without
time for investigation or official data, and both
expressly and impliedly subject to full correction in
the official one which was to follow, I felt not only
at liberty to follow my friendly feeling toward
General Wagner, but, with only his statements of
the preceding evening before rae, I felt it due to
hira to accept them in regard to the retreat of his
two brigades. In this clause of the report, there
fore, I used his freshly uttered words, and said, " At
three o'clock the enemy engaged the two brigades of
Wagner's division, which, in accordance with orders,
fell leisurely back within our lines, and the action
becarae general along the entire front. " ^
Everything, therefore, which kindly personal feel
ing or syrapathetic comradeship could do to assist
General Wagner had been done in the Twenty-third
Corps. How did it happen that it did not avail?
On the evening of the 1st of December,'^ before
resting frora the fatigues of the battle and the march.
Colonel Conrad made his report for the Third Brigade
of Wagner's division. He had not waited for the
reports of his regimental commanders, the earliest
of Avhich are dated on the 5th.* Of the other brigade
reports, Opdycke's was dated on the 5th and Lane's
on the 7th. ^ As I have already said, this haste was
^ The regular official report of tbe Fourth Corps was made by
General Thoraas J. Wood, from Huntsville, Ala., on the 10th of Jan
uary, 1865, and mine for the Twenty-third Corps was made from CUf
ton, Tenn., on the sarae date. 0. R., xlv. part i. pp. 119 and 349.
2 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 349. * Id., p. 275, etc.
3 Id., p. 269. "5 Xd., pp. 239, 255.

Discussion of Wagner's Conduct 229
not only unusual, but it was equivalent to preferring
charges against the division commander' when the
character of the report is considered. It anticipated
and contradicted General Wagner's theory that the
two brigades had been compromised by the persist
ence of its officers and raen in fighting when their
orders directed their withdraAval, and asserted that
the general's orders had been explicit, even to direct
ing the file-closers to hold the men to the line Avith
fixed bayonets.^ That this was intended to be fol
lowed up by personal complaints at General Thoraas's
headquarters needs no argument. General Wagner
evidently so understood it, for he hastened his own
report and presented it on the next day, three days
before any other report from his subordinates was
received. There is internal evidence that he sought
in it to soften the collision between his own and
Colonel Conrad's statements, but the consequences
speak for themselves.
In Colonel Fullerton's Itinerary of the Fourth
Corps, under date of 3d December, this entry is
found : " Brigadier General Elliott has been assigned
to the Second Division of this corps, and he takes
command of it to-day. General Wagner, who has
been commanding it, resumes command of his bri
gade, — Second Brigade of the same division. " ^ This
was the brigade of which Colonel Lane had recently
been in coramand. The chagrin caused by this order
of General Thomas was of course hard for General
Wagner to bear, and one is not surprised to find it
followed by his request to be allowed to retire frora
the Array of the Cumberland. On the 9th of Decem
ber, in one of Thomas's Special Field Orders, a para
graph reads as follows : " Brigadier General George
1 Ante, p. 79, note. 2 q. R., xlv. part i, p. 270. ^ jd., p. 152.

230 The Battle of Franklin
D. Wagner is at his OAvn request relieved from further
duty with the Army of the Cumberland, and will pro
ceed to Indianapolis, Indiana, and report by letter
to the Adjutant General of the Army for orders. " '
As soon as there was time for investigation, the
evidence becarae conclusive that General Wagner's
version of his orders to his subordinates and the
character of the retreat frora the outer line could not
be sustained, and that the truth as to the facts was
that which I have narrated in a preceding chapter.^
When ray official report Avas Avritten, a raonth later,
it had necessarily to be in accord Avith the facts as
we had then learned thera. The inconsistency be
tween this and the preliminary report in regard to
the points on which I had at first accepted General
Wagner's stateraent is not a raatter of regret, because
it makes record evidence of my desire to take the
most friendly and favorable view of a comrade's
conduct while it was possible to do so.
It is right that we should even now recollect that
Wagner recovered his balance before the two brigades
had corae to blows with the enemy, and that he then
gave orders consistent Avith those he had received.^
The period of over-excitement, however, had lasted
long enough to prevent the correction of the error.
His report was not Avholly erroneous as to his com
mands. It omitted, as he would have been glad to
have his subordinates omit, the contradictory orders
which in his excitement he had issued. General
Thomas Avas forced to conclude that this loss of self-
possession showed that he was overweighted with the
coraraand of the division, especially as the brigade
commanders had evidently lost confidence in his
capacity. 1 0. R., xlv. part ii. p. 117. 2 Ante, chap. vn. ^ Ante,-p. 107.

Discussion of Wagner's Conduct 231
General L. P. Bradley had been the permanent
comraander of the brigade Avhich Avas under Colonel
Conrad at Franklin, the latter having taken com
mand by seniority after Bradley was severely wounded
at Spring Hill, the day before. At the close of the
war General Bradley was commissioned in the regu
lar army in recognition of his services in the volun
teers. In a letter to rae, dated November 13, 1889,
he says: "I Avas not in the fight at Franklin, as you
will remember, but was in the toAvn Avhen the battle
was being fought, and soon after saw and talked
with officers who were wounded there. There has
never been any doubt in ray mind since then as to
the responsibility for the exposed position of the tAvo
brigades of the Fourth Corps in front of the lines.
It was one of the vagaries of Wagner's mind that an
assault in force should be resisted by the pickets in
front of a fortified line, and 1 remember a difference
I had with hira at Columbia, where it was thought
we might be attacked when I Avas in charge of the
picket lines. I felt justified then in saying to hira
that if Hood's army attacked, I should retire the
pickets after giving information of the enemy's move
ment. Wagner distinctly ordered the brigades to
reraain outside the line and fight, after he was
informed of the approach of Hood's columns by one
of Conrad's staff officers. Flis orders and conduct
at Franklin justified his removal frora coraraand of
the division."
It will at once be seen that this also throws strong
light on the difference between Colonel Opdycke and
General Wagner in regard to this very point of risk
ing a serious engagement in front of our main lines.'
Opdycke practically took the responsibility of dis-
1 Ante, pp. 73, 226.

232 The Battle of Franklin
obedience by raarching his brigade to the position in
reserA'C, which proved so iraportant to us. He did
in fact what Bradley had notified Wagner he would
do in a similar juncture. That Colonel Conrad,
Bradley's successor, shared this judgment of the
two senior brigade comraanders, his report leaves no
room for doubt. Lane's report, though made after
Wagner's removal from the command of the divis
ion, is in accord with Conrad's as to the principal
facts. It is thus made plain where Avere tho dissatis-
action and want of confidence Avhich General Thomas
judged to be well founded.

CHAPTER XVIII
DOUBLE BREASTWORKS ON CARTER HILL
The Two Lines at our Right Centre — Conflicting Meraory of Eye
witnesses — Confederate Testiraony — Solution of the Matter —
BuUet Marks on Brick Smoke-house — Summary of the Evidence.
Among the questions at one time warmly discussed
was the construction of the second line of earthworks
and barricade near the Carter house, continuous Avith
the retrenchment across the Colurabia Turnpike, and
the office and smoke-house of the Carter place.' This
was the line held by Opdycke's and Strickland's bri
gades, after the break at the centre was restored, as
we have seen ; and it was through this second line
that Colonel Bond passed with the 112th Illinois in
the effort to regain the original front line at the
locust grove.2
In my official report, I spoke of this matter in these
terms : " The condition of the atmosphere was such
that the smoke settled upon the field without drifting
off, and after the first half hour's fighting it became
almost impossible to discern any object along the line
at a few yards' distance. This state of things ap
peared to have deceived Colonel Strickland in regard
to his line, as he reported the first line completely
reoccupied along his entire front after the repulse
of the enemy's first assault, whilst in fact a portion
1 Ante, pp. 56, 117. 2 Ante, p. 161.

234 The Battle of Franklin
of it at his left was not filled by our troops, and
Colonel Opdycke, not being personally acquainted Avitli
the lines, was not aware for some tirae that he had
not reached the first line in Colonel Strickland's front,
where the outbuildings of Carter's house prevented the
line from being distinctly seen from the turnpike, even
if the smoke had not forraed so dark a covcrino' " '
The only inaccuracy in this report Avas that in tho
sraoky air and the quickly advancing twilight, I un
derestimated the length of this second line of Strick
land's, and thought his confidence that he held his
original front was justified as to his right, where the
72d Illinois Avas placed. The curve of the lines
toAvard the rear made them appear to unite.^ But Ave
have seen that the right Aving of that regiment, Avliich
had not been involvi^d in the rush of Lane's brigade
from the front, Avas ordered back to the second line,
and the left flank of Moore's brigade was covered by
the companies of the 101st Ohio, Avhich were sent by
General Kimball in obedience to my order.^ At this
point, however, the distance between the lines Avas
very small.
When the opportunity came to examine the field
again in December, on our advance after the victory
at Nashville, the exact extent of the break from the
first line was still uncertain, for the loose barricade
of rails and logs in front of Strickland's right had
been scattered, or used as fuel by encamping troops
that had twice traversed the ground. The solider
parapet, Avhich had been occupied by the 44th Mis
souri, was there, and its length Avas that which I took
to be the extent of the whole second line, or nearly
so. All this has since been satisfactorily settled by
1 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 354, and Appendix B.
2 See sketch, p. 43, ante, ^ Ante, pp. 131, 134.

Double Breastworks on Carter Hill 235
the comparison of Confederate reports and accounts
with our own, and by the stateraents of Mr. Carter,
the proprietor of the farm, who subsequently levelled
the earthworks themselves.
Yet some of the most able and intelligent of the
officers and men who fought there continued to be
lieve that the charge of the reserves at the centre had
carried our line up to the original front line of earth
works on the right of the turnpike, as it certainly
had done on the left. Colonel Opdycke strenuously
insisted upon this as long as he lived, and in a very
interesting correspondence Avitli me on the subject in
1880, maintained the same view. Major A. G. Hatry
of the 183d Ohio, which was part of Strickland's
reserve, is one of the officers to whom I ara indebted
for valuable rerainiscences of the carapaign ; yet he
also, in reply to inquiries on this point, had no recol
lection of the second line, and believed that the line
first constructed along Strickland's brigade front was
that on which the brigade rallied and fought until it
was withdrawn at midnight. More reputable witnesses
it would be impossible to find ; and yet the fact that
the Confederates continued to hold the outside of the
parapet near the locust grove is so thoroughly estab
lished that one feels impelled to seek a solution of
this problem of varying memory among men of perfect
honesty of character with full opportunity, apparently,
of knowing the facts.
In the case of Colonel Opdycke, it seeras to me
that the explanation is found in his position as com
raandant of a reserve which lay on the slope of the
knoll sorae two hundred yards or more in rear of the
Carter house, the houses and trees as well as the roll
of the ground hiding the breastworks at which our
men stood. As his brigade deployed and advanced

236 The Battle of FrankUn
driving the enemy before them, he found the Confed
erates holding the outside of the retrenchment which
we had built across the turnpike in rear of the
opening where the main line crossed the road. This
retrenchment, it must not be forgotten, was abreast
of and in line with the wooden office building and
brick sraoke-house in the yard of the Carter house.'
West of these was the dpaulement for the 20th Ohio
Light Artillery, and still farther to the right the
breastwork of the 44th Missouri Regiraent in the
second line. This line of buildings and works was
ablaze with the enemy's musketry fire, and was the
objective for Opdycke's men as they charged forward
on both sides of the Carter house.
From the turnpike, where Opdycke was in person,
nothing could be seen of our works beyond, even if
the air had been clear ; but in the smoke of battle,
the line of retrenchment connecting with the build
ings and the Ohio battery seemed so naturally the
original main line that ho assumed it to be such with
undoubting confidence. His mention of the recap
tured battery shows that he thought it was in the
original front line.^ The successive lines of the enemy
coming forward in headlong assault allowed no time
for investigation, even if there had been anything to
suggest it, and the desperate fight to hold the works
thus gained continued on late into the night. West
of the turnpike the ground fell away raore rapidly,
and the main line was on a level so much lower than
the house and outbuildings, that it could not be seen
at all from the turnpike in rear of the retrenchment
crossing the road, where the brigade headquarters
were during the fight.
1 See sketch, ante, p. 43.
2 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 240.

Double Breastworks on Carter Hill 237
Besides the overwhelming personal evidence which
fixes this second line, there are to be seen to this day
the bullet marks on the east side of the brick smoke
house. The Avooden office building was nearest the
turnpike, and the men who stood in the space between
the two buildings fired obliquely to the right, in the
evening, to reach the Confederates who still held the
outside of the main parapet at the locust grove. In
the darkness they soraetiraes obliqued too much, and
their bullets struck the brick Avail. The leaden mis
siles left a glaze upon the brick surface before pene
trating enough to be stopped or to rebound. The wall
is dotted with these peculiar comet-shaped marks, the
groove deepest toward the enemy, with the film of
lead adhering where the bullet first touched. There
is thus a demonstration that the firing was outAvard
from the line of these buildings.
Major Hatry's experience in the battle was such as
to account easily for his being misled on this point.
He had been field officer of the day in command of
General Ruger's skirmishers, and they had only come
in with Wagner's two brigades when these were driven
back. He came through our lines at the Columbia
Turnpike, and, separating himself from the crowd of
Wagner's men that were surging along toward the
village, he rejoined his regiment on foot, and found
them in the rifle pits, fighting the Confederates hand
to hand. Lieut. Colonel Clark of the regiment and
a number of other officers had been killed, and he
found his own work fully cut out for him. He states
explicitly that the regiment remained where he found
it till it was ordered out at midnight.' As the line
1 From a written statement, made by Colonel Hatry in January,
1894, in which he kindly answered specific inquiries raade by me. He
is a retired business man of Pittsburgh, Pa., of high standing in that
city.

238 The Battle of Franklin
had been re-formed before Major Hatry joined the
regiment in the turmoil of that furious combat, we
can easily coraprehend the impression on his memory,
Avhen at a later tirae the subject of the two lines was
broached, that this Avas " news to him."
There is scarcely an engagement recorded in which
there are not similar discrepancies of recollection ; for
in the midst of fierce excitement the thing one is
specially occupied about is so absorbing that it fre
quently occurs that no mental note is made of other
things happening under one's eyes. Remoter events,
outside the range of immediate duty, are as if they
had never been. It is the concurrence of positive
testimony from different and independent sources
which establishes beyond dispute such a fact as the
construction of the second line. The lack of knowl
edge or of raeraory can hardly compare in weight
with the distinct and affirmative statement of an act
by one who took part in it. Such a statement as that
of Captain Bates ' of the 125th Ohio (in Opdycke's
brigade), that his men constructed "new barricades,"
greatly overweighs, even when standing alone, the
absence of recollection by another. But when we
find the same fact reiterated by nuraerous eycAvit-
nesses whose reports are unknoAvn to each other
and are sent up through different channels, — when
both National and Confederate reports agree in re
gard to the raatter, — when the official raap of the
field raade by General Schofield's chief engineer
shows the artillery epauleraent in the second line
which was extended to the right by the breastworks
of the 44th Missouri, the question of fact must be
regarded as settled, and the only problem remaining
is the interesting but much less important one touch-
1 Ante,)^. 116.

Double Breastworks on Carter Hill 239
ing the lack of memory in the case of those whom we
should expect to know.
A brief summary of the affirmative and independ
ent statements from Union officers who knew of the
existence of the two lines will show how surprisingly
strong is the support for the narrative of my official
report and of my historical volume, for which, of
course, my personal knowledge was the original
basis. General Ruger's official report states that " at the
first onset of the enemy, the left of the line, held by
the 50th Ohio Volunteers and the 72d Illinois Volun
teers, fell back some fifty yards from the breastworks,
at which position they were rallied and maintained a
firra stand, holding this new position, which was has
tily intrenched during the intervals of the fighting." '
Beginning at the right of Strickland's brigade, the
official report of the 72d Illinois, made by Captain
Sexton, describes the disorderly retreat of the outpost
brigades with the enemy upon their heels. " At the
same time," it adds, " the support on our left gave
way, and the flank of our regiment being turned, the
four left corapanies fell back, and as our right flank
also became exposed to the enemy the remaining com
panies were also ordered to retire to the second line
of works, which was done."^ All the field officers
being wounded. Captain Sexton took command. He
ordered an effort to regain the first line, which was
unsuccessful, the whole color guard being shot down
in the charge across a space of some twenty yards.
The 44th Missouri built its breastworks in the sec
ond line and held them throughout the battle,^ being
the nucleus on which the first line rallied. Its official
report to the Adjutant General of Missouri also de-
1 O. R., xlv. part i. p. 365. 2 Jd., p. 393. ^ Ante, p. 117.

240 The Battle of Franklin
scribes the rout of Wagner's men, saying they " re
treated in great disorder and confusion, literally
running over the 44th, who, notwithstanding the
shock, stood firm. . . . About sunset we received
orders to charge over the works and retake the lower
ditch, out of which the enemy had driven several of
our regiments in the first charge. . . . Here Colonel
Bradshaw fell, pierced with seven balls, but fortu
nately not killed. . . . We were forced back to our
old position without being able to carry off our dead
and wounded." ' Lieut. Colonel Barr then assumed
the command and made the report.
My inspector. Major Dow, accompanied the 112th
Illinois, which I sent to assist in regaining the first
line after dark. His description has already been
quoted, and is explicit as to the relation of the two
lines.2 Lieut. Colonel Bond, who led the 112th Illinois, is
equally clear in his statement of the position of the
two lines.^
General J. S. Casement, in a letter of December
26th, 1881, giving recollections for which I had in
quired, and replying to my question Avhether he knew
anything of the second line or barricade on the right
of the Columbia road, said : " I was at that barricade
with you that night, and recollect how anxious you
were to have the first line regained so that the rebels
raight not be so near to us when Ave withdreAV." In
that connection he mentions the combination of a sally
from the left of the turnpike with the direct advance
frora the second line.
Captain L. T. Scofield,* topographer, in a letter of
December 23d, 1870, giving his personal memories of
I Report of Adjutant General of Missouri, 1865, p. 276.
2 Appendix E. ^ Ante, p. 162. * See ante, pp. 103, et seq.

Double Breastworks on Carter Hill 241
the field, said : " The first brigade on the right of the
pike did not stand so well [as the line on the left], for
they were partly made up of new troops, and the forti
fications were not as strong, which resulted in their
being compelled to fall back to the second line, where
they were reinforced by Opdycke's brigade of Wag
ner's division."
The 36th Illinois Regiment (of Opdycke's brigade)
published a regimental history, in which it is said
that " the charge of the first brigade [in which they
were] was not entirely successful in regaining the
whole line at the first onset," but that " a small
salient to the right of the Colurabia pike for a short
time was held by the enemy, Avho determined to use
it as an entering wedge through which to break the
Federal line and recover the works." '
The report of Captain Bates for the 125th Ohio,
also of Opdycke's brigade, that they constructed new
barricades, with the 36th Illinois on their right and
the 24th Wisconsin on the left, need not be repeated
in full.2
The 24th Wisconsin, of the same brigade, in report
ing to the Adjutant General of that State, says that
the charge succeeded in " retaking a part of the line
which had been momentarily held by the enemy." ^
Colonel Sherwood, whose regiraent (the 111th Ohio)
was at the left of Moore's brigade, and Captain Dow
ling, the brigade inspector, are explicit in stating that
Strickland's men occupied the second line during the
hottest of the fight.*
1 History of the 36th Regiment Illinois Volunteers, by Bennett and
Haigh, Aurora, IU., 1876.
2 O. R,, xlv. part i. p. 251.
2 Eeport Adjutant General of Wisconsin, 1865, p. 372.
* Ante, p. 131. 16

242 The Battle of Franklin
Mr. Carter, the present proprietor of the Carter
place, levelled the " new barricades," and pointed out
to Captain Speed and others the site of this second
line as he found it when the battle ended.'
Captain Twining's official map shows the artillery
epauleraent in rear of the Carter house, which Avas in
the 44th Missouri line, as a second line in rear of the
raain intrenchment on the right of the turnpike.
Major Foster's Confederate map, made for Stewart's
corps, also shows the double line at that point.^
Thus frora more than a dozen independent sources
comes the multiplied confirmation of the stateraents
of ray official report, without mentioning the reports
of the Confederates, which are to the sarae effect.
1 Ohio Loyal Legion papers, vol. iii. p. 61.
2 Ante, pp. 45, 83.

CHAPTER XIX
THE RALLYING OF THE OUTPOST BRIGADES
Value of Detailed Reports — Landmarks — Lines of Retreat from the
Outpost — Crowding toward the Centre — Significant Omissions —
Lists of Missing — What they Teach — Reports Compared — Inci
dents relating to Captured Flags — Statements of various Officers
— Conclusions from the Facts.
Another subject of debate has been the question. What
became of Wagner's two brigades which were driven
in from the front ? I have already given the story of
their break from their outer position, the rush of the
main body along the turnpike, and into the town of
Franklin, the effort at reorganization near the river,
and their final collection near the wagon bridge and
withdrawal in the night under the orders to march to
Nashville. I have also noted the fact that numbers
of men from these two brigades turned and fought at
our raain lines with the brigades of Reilly, Opdycke,
and Strickland which were the organized troops
holding the centre on both sides of the Columbia
Turnpike. The reports of the commandants of Wagner's two
brigades in question ignore the fact that the division
and brigade commanders made their official rallying
place in the town, and confine their statements to
those disorganized portions of their commands which
halted and fought at the main line. These are spoken
of as if they were " the command." Nothing is more

244 The Battle of Franklin
notorious in regard to military reports than that they
are apologetic in cases of mishap, and no forra of gloss
ing the facts is more common than the omission of
unpleasant features whilst more creditable ones are
amplified. The task of the historian will be to reach the truth
by running down and fixing the facts Avhich are
omitted, and constructing an authentic narrative
based upon everything which is satisfactorily and
affirmatively established. The greatest help in this
Avork is found in detailed subordinate reports, and the
help is increased just in proportion as these are full in
incidents, with tirae, place, and circurastance which
may be compared with evidence deriA-ed from other
sources. With general and rather vague statements
that a command rallied at the line and fought bravely
for hours, we can do little except to show opposing
statements that are inconsistent with these ; but Avhen
details are given, as of the other troops on right and
left with whom they were in contact, commands re
ceived and given, by whom and to whom, the general
picture begins to assume shape that can be tested, and
apparently insignificant incidents often become of great
significance. It would have overburdened ray narrative to have
analyzed the evidence to which I ara now referring,
and I have preferred to give a connected story frora
my own standpoint, as I knew it and had to act upon
it at the time. I trust that now, however, it will not
be unprofitable to consider some of the statements
which may at first appear conflicting, and to weigh
more fully the evidence as to the rallying of the out
post brigades.
First, as to the place in the main line where Lane's
and Conrad's brigades must have crossed our works.

The Rallying of the Outpost Brigades 245
In their outpost position they had been in a wedge-
shaped formation on both sides of the Columbia Turn
pike, the road being in the apex of the wedge. Conrad
was on the left and Lane on the right.' In our main
works nearly half a mile in rear, Reilly's brigade
was behind Conrad, and Strickland's was behind Lane.
Opdycke's brigade was some two hundred yards still
farther in rear, lying in column of regiments in re
serve on the west side (right) of the turnpike behind
Strickland. As to all this there is no controversy,
and the places are distinctly marked in the official
map of General Schofield's chief engineer, Captain
Twining. The same map marks the place of the
locust grove near the right of Strickland's brigade,
which was partly cut down to form an abattis in that
part of the line, and which is so often mentioned in
the official reports that it becomes- a fixed and impor
tant landmark.
These positions indicate so plainly what must occur
when Wagner's two brigades should be overwhelraed
and driven in by the eneray, that every narrative raust
be interpreted with reference to thera. Conrad's and
Lane's men would naturally converge toward the turn
pike which was the unobstructed way to safety, the
abattis in front of the works being a most inconven
ient thing to cross. All the details in the reports
and in authentic personal narratives that have been
published show that such was in fact the line of re
treat of Wagner's men. The mass crowded the turn
pike on the way into the town, whilst thinner portions
of the line threaded the abattis and climbed the breast
works on either side of the turnpike.^ Lane's report
mentions the " heavy line of abattis of locust boughs,
placed there for some purpose, through which ray line
^ See map, p. 45, ante. 2 Ante, pp. 104, 109, 118.

246 The Battle of Franklin
had to pass." ' Not only do all the official reports
show that Moore's brigade, on the right of Strickland,
firmly held its place, but the statement of Mr. Gist
(to which reference has already been made), who be
longed to the right regiment of Lane's brigade, is
explicit, that " Moore's brigade repulsed the attacks
made on their part of the line," and " had not been
disorganized in the least." ^ He also says that his
part of Lane's line " reached the Avorks just at the
right of the Columbia pike, near a grove of small
locust trees."
On the left of the turnpike there is a sirailar concur
rence of testiraony that Casement's brigade remained
unmoved, and that those of Conrad's men who did not
come in upon the road "Avere mixed from the cotton
gin on to the pike."^ It is thus put beyond dispute that
whatever these two brigades of Wagner's did or suf
fered in the main line was betAveen the cotton gin on
the left and the locust grove on the right, comprising
not quite the whole of the original front of Reilly's
and Strickland's brigades, in the centre of which was
the Carter house where Opdycke's brigade (also of
Wagner's division) was, after its rush forAvard from
its place in reserve, and where my personal head
quarters had been since daybreak in the morning and
remained till we withdrew at midnight.
If Conrad's and Lane's brigades were in the main
line, as nobody doubts that Opdycke's was, then the
whole of Wagner's division, except stragglers, was
there. Wagner's place should have been close to my
own, Conrad should have been close to Reilly, Lane
I 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 256.
2 Professor Gist's Narrative, referred to, ante, p. 201.
'" Report of Colonel Buckner, 99th Illinois (of Conrad's brigade),
O. E., xlv. part i. p. 280.

The Rallying of the Outpost Brigades 247
close to Strickland and Opdycke. Each of them should
have been cognizant of what occurred there, have been
necessarily in comraunication with General Stanley
during the short tirae he Avas with Opdycke's brigade
before he was wounded, and with myself afterAvard.
My efforts completely to restore the line in Strick
land's front, in which I called for assistance from
Kimball's division on the extreme right and brought
a regiraent from Stiles's brigade on the extreme left,
must have involved co-operation Avith Wagner and his
brigade comraanders. Of Opdycke's presence and the
place of his regiraents, myself and his neighbors on
right and left were well aware, as both official and un
official reports show ; but none of us had any knowl
edge of the others or coraraunication with thera, nor
do their reports show any relations to us. It cannot
be necessary to point out the significance of this as
bearing upon the question of their actual whereabouts,
and the place of the formal reorganization of the two
brigades. Before passing to the examination of the reports of
General Wagner and his subordinates, it may be in
structive to notice that the reports of the " missing,"
in the case of such a ra§l(^e as occurred at our centre,
fix the extent to which the enemy Avere temporarily
within our works, in a manner which strikingly cor
roborates the other evidence. On reaching Casement's
brigade on the left and Moore's on the right, the list
of missing becomes merely nominal, amounting only
to a few who would straggle in the darkness. In
Reilly's, Opdycke'sJ and Strickland's brigades, how
ever, they are numerous enough to indicate a consid
erable number of wounded and other prisoners who
fell into the enemy's hands within our breastworks,
and were carried back Avith them into captivity when

248 The Battle of Franklin
they were driven out of our lines. The statistical
tables thus mark the extent of the hand to hand
fight at the works as accurately as an eyewitness
could do.
Second, I shall bring together some of the evidence
from the reports and documents corroborating the
account which I have given of the reorganization of
Wagner's two brigades at the river.'
Wagner's own report, written on December 2d, and
in advance of the receipt of his subordinates' reports
(except Conrad's), is very vague and partly unintelli
gible in its reference to the rallying of his command.
The language as found in the Official Records is this :
" On reaching the main line of AVorks the officers
rallied their men as best they could, and placed them
in position to support the Avorks which were give up
\sic'\ their position at the approach of the enemy who
followed close on the steps of our retiring lines." ^
The latter part of this sentence (which is the only
attempt in the report to describe the rallying) is
without meaning, and shows that the writer had
found difficulty in casting his statement into any
forra which should harmonize his own knowledge of
what occurred with the report of Colonel Conrad,
which alone was then before him.^ It is significant,
however, in this, that the troops are said to have been
" placed in position to support the works." This
implies that they were as a body at some distance in
1 Ante, chap. x. 2 o_ r,^ xlv. part i. p. 232.
^ The original raanuscript of Wagner's report in the War Records
Office is literally as given above. It was apparently copied frora some
previous draught iu preparation for his signature, as there are no eras
ures or interlineations in the passage quoted. Its lack of connection
suggests that possibly soraething had been erased in the draught
with a purpose to change the form of expression, and that haste had
caused this to be forgotten.

The Rallying of the Outpost Brigades 249
rear, for thus only would they be in " support " of the
fighting line. The report raakes no mention of the
troops of other commands, or his contact with them ;
and the omission is in harmony with the facts as to
the general rallying place of the two brigades, which
have been already narrated. He had no personal
knowledge of the situation on the line, and could
not speak of what occurred after he had passed to
the rear.
Colonel Opdycke's official report necessarily implies
the total severance of comraunication between the
brigade and his division commander from the time it
was placed in position as a reserve until the Avith
drawal at midnight. As to this period, it makes no
allusion whatever to General Wagner (to whora the
report was addressed), but states that the order to be
ready to charge up to the line and the directions to
withdraw at raidnight came from myself. In his
narrative of the battle, published after the close of
the war,' he explicitly states what is thus impliedly
contained in his report, saying that " General Wagner
was carried to the rear in the rush of disordered
troops, and did not again find his Avay to the front."
My own opinion that he was properly engaged in the
reorganization of the broken brigades, and that this
Avas his first duty, has already been given.^
Colonel Allen Buckner, of the 79th Illinois, seems
to have been the officer next in seniority to Colonel
Conrad in that brigade. He thus describes the rally
at our works in his report : " We fell back to the
works to the left of the pike, and I was enabled to
rally, and afterward fought in connection with troops
of the Twenty-third Corps, and others of our brigade
and corps (for here we Avere mixed from the cotton
1 New York Times, September 10, 1882. 2 Ante, p. 145.

250 The Battle of Franklin
gin on to the pike) until some time in the night.
The troops being thick and we not needed longer, I
told General Reilly that I Avould get ray regiment
back, and try to get off our Avounded. In a short
time orders came, and Ave got the brigade together,
and came out of the town about midnight." '
This shoAvs very clearly that Reilly's brigade of
the Twenty-third Corps was in position at the cotton
gin, with General Reilly personally in command ; that
Colonel Buckner and the men Avith him fought in that
line after rallying ; that Reilly's raen were enough to
hold the line after the first repulse of the enemy,
and that because the troops Avere so " thick " Colonel
Buckner very rightly gathered his raen for reorgani
zation ; that his brigade and division coraraanders of
the Fourth Corps were not present, so that it was
to General Reilly of the Twenty-third Corps that he
communicated his wish to get his men back from the
line ; that it was after this that " orders came "
(from his own superiors), and they " got the brigade
together." Stronger corroboration of my general
narrative could hardly be given.
No regimental reports of the battle were made by
the regiments of Lane's brigade, except the 97th Ohio
(Colonel Lane's OAvn), in command of which was Lieut.
Colonel Barnes. His vivid description of the retreat
of his regiment through the abattis in front of the
locust grove on the right of the Colurabia Turnpike
has already been quoted, as well as his statement
of the utter confusion and disorganization of the bri
gade. In concluding it he says that about ten o'clock
the firing gradually ceased, and he "received an order
from Colonel Lane in person to draw off the regiment
and reorganize the line." "In gathering them to-
1 O. R., xlv. part i. p. 280.

The Rallying of the Outpost Brigades 251
gether," he adds, " they came from the front." ' This
iraplies that the order was given at sorae place in
the rear, and to it, as the place of reorganization, the
group of Lane's raen, who had been stubbornly fighting
with Strickland's brigade, " came from the front " as
word reached them that a rallying place had been
established. In response to a call for flags and trophies captured,
several regiments of Wagner's division, two or three
months later, made claim to the capture of flags,
which, as Avas said, had been turned over to officers of
the Twenty-third Corps. The alleged circumstances
throw light on the situation.
Such a claira was raade for Sergeant Ransbottom
of the 97th Ohio, Colonel Lane's regiment, a rem
nant of which we have just seen was fighting at the
locust grove in Strickland's brigade line. Lieut.
Colonel Barnes says that after nightfall " volun
teers were called for to pass through a gap in our
works on the Columbia pike that they might enfilade
the enemy, and capture a portion of the storming
party." ^ Sergeant Ransbottom is said to have volun
teered among others, and to have captured a flag.
The only order of the kind given that evening was
my own order to General Reilly already mentioned,^ to
be executed by the troops of his command on the east
of the turnpike. There was no attempt to pass out
at the gap on the Columbia Turnpike. That was in
Opdycke's brigade line, and Avas quite too near the
enemy, who were holding the outside of the original
line in Strickland's front. The party made the move
ment from the salient at the cotton gin. If the ser
geant volunteered for that sally, he was in the left
wing of Reilly's brigade, with two full brigades inter-
1 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 265. 2 Id., p. 267. " Ante, p. 146.

252 The Battle of Franklin
vening between it and the locust grove, where Colonels
Lane and Barnes locate the group of the regiment to
Avhich he belonged. He acted, if at all, as an indi
vidual temporarily attached to another command, and
far separated from his own comrades. No call Avas
made upon any troops on the right of the turnpike to
participate in the sally mentioned. Yet the incident
is referred to in the brigade report as an item in the
creditable conduct of that command.'
In a similar report as to flags, under date of Jan
uary 5, 1865, Major Atwater of the 42d Illinois (Con
rad's brigade) states that different men of his regiment
captured flags (three or four) or Avent over the works
in the evening and picked them up where the enemy
had let them fall, but that on their coining in they
were ordered by officers of the Twenty-third Corps to
give thera up, and they obeyed.^ These officers are
said in his communication to have been of the 104th
Ohio, which was in Reilly's brigade, and stationed at
the cotton gin. If the incident is correctly reported,
it shows that no officers of Conrad's command were
present, for had they been, their men would have
appealed to them and they would have asserted the
claims of that coraraand. The controversy would then
have been between commissioned officers, and Avould
not have rested on the stateraent of private soldiers
alone. It shows also that the officers and raen of
Reilly's brigade were in orderly line attending to their
duties, and that the scattered individuals of Conrad's
coraraand were acting Avith Reilly's regiments and
under the orders of his officers. Thus frora unex
pected sources we get aid in establishing the true
condition of things upon the line.
The narrative of Mr. Gist, frora which I have already
I 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 256. 2 Id., p. 276.

The Rallying of the Outpost Brigades 253
quoted,' says : " Long after night there was a lull in the
battle, and we began to hope that there would be no
other charge. I moved around to the right a little, on
the Avorks, and met a member of my company, the
only one of the regiment that I had seen since the
opening of the fight." As his regiment was one of
Lane's brigade, and his own position was at the locust
grove where was the only considerable group of the
raen of that brigade, the fact is more significant of
the thin scattering of his corarades than any general
estiraate of their numbers could be. Fie tells another
incident also which corroborates my statement that
this part of the line was held by the 72d Illinois of
Strickland's brigade.^ " A colonel of some regiment
tried hard in the thickest of the fight to get the line
to charge. . . . He mounted the works himself and
called upon the disorganized portions of a dozen com
mands to follow. He was pierced by a ball and fell a
few feet to my left." This officer was Lieut. Colonel
Stockton of the 72d Illinois, who with Major James of
the sarae regiraent was wounded and fell. Captain
Sexton,^ upon Avhom the coraraand devolved, has
perraitted me to read a letter from Lieutenant Molir-
raann of the sarae regiment describing the scene Avhen
Colonel Stockton mounted the breastwork, Avhich
Captain Sexton also confirms.
Captain Sexton estimates higher than any other
officer of the Twenty-third Corps the nuraber of men
from Conrad's and Lane's brigades Avho rallied on the
line, placing them at " about five hundred men." No
doubt a larger body of thera took temporary place in
his regiment than in any other on the line. He says
of them, " There were a few line, but no field officers
with them." He saw nothing of their division or
1 Ante, p. 246. 2 ggg (i„te, p. 118. ^ See ante, p. 118, note.

254 The Battle of FrankUn
brigade commanders. As to the place where the bulk
of the tAVO brigades Avere rallied, he says : " I was in
formed that part of them were stopped by Wood's
command near the river, and the rest at Nashville." '
His narrative is full of admiration for the soldierly
conduct and courage of those who rallied in his line,
and for the cool discipline they showed in maintaining
the fire along with his own raen.
Major Hatry, of the 183d Ohio (also of Strickland's
brigade), we have seen^ in command of the skirmish
line of Ruger's division which came in with Wagner's
broken brigades. These, he says, in his written reply
to questions from me, " crowded the Columbia pike at
the Carter house." Leaving thera he went to his own
regiraent which he found in line with the 44th Mis
souri and 72d Illinois, the centre and right of Strick
land's brigade, holding breastworks which, as he says,
they did not move out of " until we evacuated them at
midnight." As to the raen of Conrad's and Lane's
brigades, his stateraent is : "I don't think many stayed
with us in the front line. They proceeded down the
village, and were rallied down there by some officer
Avhom I saw come up with reinforcements. How many
came back, and where they weijt, I could not say, but
think that some of them went to both sides of the pike
or very close to it in tlie rifle-pits there." To the dis
tinct question whether he saw Wagner, Lane, Conrad,
or any of their regimental commanders there, he re
plies, " I did not." He clearly identifies his position
on the field. " The line we fought in was in front of
the locust grove and to the right and front of the Car
ter house, I mean as the ground descends from the
^ From Captain Sexton's Avritten statement referred to at p. 163,
ante. 2 Ante, p. 237.

The Rallying of the Outpost Brigades 255
house. Our regiment and the part of the line in
Avhich they were was near the rear of the Carter house
and to the right of the locust grove." '
The graphic description by Captain Scofield of the
retreat of the two brigades has already been given,^
but in the same correspondence hc adds what is di
rectly in point touching the organization of the line
when it was restored. " I did not see," he says, " any
superior officers commanding a brigade, except Reilly,
Opdycke, and Strickland, between Casement's right
and Moore's left, and I am sure there were none there,
for I should have seen them, as I was not out of sight
of Columbia pike from the time the battle commenced
till 10 o'clock p. M." Again, he says : " There were
no detachments from the retreating brigades, in com
mand of officers, brought to our line during the action.
There raay have been stragglers from the rear that
returned to our position singly or in squads that would
escape my notice, but anything like a regiment or com
pany I could not have missed seeing."
Major Dow, my division inspector, in his written
statement says, " I don't remember seeing Wagner
during the battle." ^ The visit of my Adjutant Gen
eral to General Wagner at the place near the river
where he was reorganizing the two brigades need
not be repeated.* In a correspondence with General
Stanley to which I shall have occasion by and by to
refer,^ he recognized the fact that Opdycke's brigade
remained under my command till the midnight Avith
drawal, separate communication being had by hira and
Wagner with the other two brigades of that division
1 See map at p. 45, ante. The slope from the Carter house is here
toward the southwest, and the line foUowed the curve.
2 Ante, p. 104. * See Appendix F.
2 See Appendix E. ' Post, chap. xx.

256 The Battle of Franklin
of his corps. To any one having the slightest knowl
edge of military organization this is completely de
structive of any theory that Conrad's brigade was on
one side of Opdycke and Lane on the other, the whole
under the usual diA'ision organization. In such a case
the withdrawal of Conrad and Lane in the night leaA'-
ing Opdycke without orders or communication with
his superiors would be a military absurdity. It could
only have been done by full communication between
such superior officers and myself, with careful precau
tions to prevent raischievous results on the line.
Nobody has ever pretended that this w-as the case.
The fact that Opdycke alone remained under my
orders and was Avithdrawn by me, as he officially re
ported, would of itself prove that the other brigades
were not there.
Thus from every source, affirmative and negative,
the mass of evidence establishes the historical facts
as I narrated them from my personal knowledge.
Various motives of pride and anger led the superior
officers of that division to omit the report of the two
brigades reassembling and reorganizing at the Har
peth River, and to treat the groups Avhich rallied with
the organized brigades upon the line as if they were
the whole command. I think the candid reader Avill
see how futile such a treatment of the subject is, when
once the raass of evidence official and unofficial, direct
and circumstantial, is considered. But I again repeat
that after the two brigades had been compromised
and broken in front, it Avas no fault of Wagner or his
subordinates to rally for reorganization wherever the
crowd surging along the Columbia Turnpike into the
town could be stopped. To get them into form so that
they could be handled was their first duty as officers.
Those who stopped at the line obeyed a noble impulse

The Rallying of the Outpost Brigades 257
in doing so, but it Avas their manifest duty also to find
the cadres of their regiments and brigades at the ear
liest moment Avhen it was evident that the organized
brigades of Reilly, Opdycke, and Strickland were hold
ing the position.
With the facts before us there is little use in trying
to estiraate the numbers of Lane's and Conrad's dis
organized men who halted at our breastworks and
fought. General Reilly was prompt to give credit to
the 175th Ohio' (a new and unassigned regiment),
and to the 44th Illinois (the left wing of Opdycke's
brigade), which gave hira organized help in regaining
and holding his breastworks. There is not the slight
est ground to doubt the equal candor of his report
that " with this exception the brigade received no
assistance during the fight, unless perhaps some of
the men coming in over the works may have rallied
in or behind the lines." Colonel Opdycke assured me
that onl} detached individuals or small groups rallied
with his men. In Strickland's line it appears that
considerably larger numbers rallied at the locust
grove, but, like the rest, completely disorganized. At
this point alone does my own memory recall anything
like a collection of Wagner's men going to join their
brigades in town. Seeing iu the evening what I took
to be about a company diraly outlined in the darkness
passing, at a little distance, my own position on the
turnpike near the Carter house, I directed a staff
officer to inquire where they were going, and was
informed that they were some of Wagner's men who
had been collected and were going to join the com
mand in the village. Others had doubtless done the
same, but in groups too small to attract attention.
1 O. R., xlv. part i. p. 412.
17

CHAPTER XX
AN UNEXPECTED CONTROVERSY
Colonel Stone's Paper in Century War Book — General Stanley's
Criticism — A Violent Attack — Earlier Correspondence — Nine
Points — Tavo Corrections — Basis of a Historical Narrative.
The matters of more or less debate which I have
discussed were such as involved no special interest on
my part, beyond that which is felt by every actor in
important events, and by every student of history who
desires to solve correctly the problems of a great war.
I must now, however, give some attention to a con
troversy which more nearly concerns rayself. I would
gladly be excused from this ; but historical truth is
involved, and the discussion of the battle of Franklin
would be incomplete without it.
In the series of iraportant papers upon the Civil
War published in the Century Magazine, and after
ward collected into the Century War Book,' was one
upon the campaigns of Franklin and Nashville by
Colonel Henry Stone, formerly upon the staff of Gen
eral George H. Thomas. In this paper Colonel Stone
had said of the main line in front of the village of
Franklin, that " all the troops in the works were
ordered to report to General Cox, to whom was as
signed the coramand of the defences." To this
statement of Colonel Stone, made entirely upon his
1 Battles aud Leaders of the Civil War, Century Co., 1884-88.

An Unexpected Controversy 259
independent investigation. General Stanley took ex
ception, in a letter which was published in the Cen
tury Magazine for February, 1889. He asserted that
the stateraent of Colonel Stone was not raade " from
the standpoint of an officer well informed as to the
rights of coraraand," for " all the troops in the works
could not haA-e been ordered to report to General Cox
Avithout reraoving rae [Stanley] frora the command of
the Fourth Corps, and no one will claira that the
latter idea was ever thought of by any one." Cer
tainly no one has been raore explicit than rayself in
saying that General Stanley was in coraraand of the
Fourth Corps, and continued so.
This, as a criticism of Colonel Stone's paper, whether
well or ill raade, would have involved me in no way,
had General Stanley not added an ostensible excuse
for Colonel Stone, " as he could easily have been led
into making this raisstateraent by General Cox him
self ; for the latter, in the book written by hira, enti
tled ' The March to the Sea, Franklin and Nashville,'
on page 86 complacently styles himself ' Commandant
upon the line.' " General Stanley then proceeded to
controvert this assuraption.
By the courtesy of the editors of the Century, an
opportunity was given to Colonel Stone and rayself to
reply in the sarae nuraber of the raagazine, and I was
quite content to leave the raatter where it was thus
placed. In the following autumn, however, a new
attack appeared in a daily newspaper, which did not
come to my notice till a fortnight after its publication.
Foiled in an effort to put a reply before the readers
of the sarae journal, I allowed the subject to await
that clearing up of controversies which I have had an
abiding confidence would follow the completed publi
cation of the Official War Records. I was the raore

260 The Battle of FrankUn
easily led to do thus because the matter, tone, and
style of the last publication mentioned were not such
as one ordinarily feels the need of replying to.
In an attempt at a somewhat full historical investi
gation, however, it would manifestly leave the discus
sion incomplete if the question of command on the
line did not receive the same attention as other ques
tions. I shall try to treat it as a simple historical
inquiry, in which the evidence, both official and other,
seems to me pretty coraplete and clear. To let it fall
below this level would be to forfeit the respect of
intelligent readers.
When I was preparing, in the sumraer of 1881, to
write the volume in the Scribner War Series of His
tories, entitled " The March to the Sea, Franklin and
Nashville," General Stanley opened a correspondence
with rae, offering to assist me by the loan of pa
pers, etc. In my reply, dated August 24th, accepting
the offer, I took the opportunity to corapare our
recollections of the principal facts. I wrote : —
" Let rae state a few consecutive points within my
own memory, and ask you to compare it with yours,
premising that I have not yet begun the systematic
review of the documents in ray possession.
" 1. Two divisions of the Twenty-third Corps were
present, and acting under ray command, Ruger's on
the right of the Columbia pike, and my own (Reilly
commanding) on the left.
" 2. Schofield had only intended to cover the cross
ing of trains, and had not meant to fight south of the
Harpeth. Ete had therefore ordered me to send my
own artillery and wagons over the river early, and
had arranged that Major Goodspeed,' your chief of
1 This should be Captain Bridges : Major Goodspeed was Chief of
Artillery of the Fourth Corps a little later.

An Unexpected Controversy 261
artillery, should detail some batteries as your troops
came in, and they reported to me.
" 3. After putting my own command in position, I
reported to General Schofield that my troops were not
sufficient to reach tho river on the right, and that
flank was consequently exposed. Kimball's division
reported to me, and was assigned that place.
" 4. I received a written dispatch from General
Schofield saying that two brigades of Wagner's Avere
out as rear guard, and one (Opdycke's) would report
within the lines to act as my reserve ; that Wagner
was ordered to bring the other two brigades in Avhen-
ever Hood shoAved a purpose of serious attack. I
showed this note to Wagner, and found he had such
orders. " 5. When Hood forraed and advanced, Wagner
did not order in the two brigades, but ordered them
to fight. One of my staff, still living, heard him send
the order from the Carter house. In his excitement,
he had forgotten his orders, apparently, and did not
change though reminded of them.
" 6. Being at the left of the line on the parapet,
watching the enemy's advance, I Avas amazed to see
Wagner's two brigades open fire. They were quickly
run over by the eneray, and came back in confusion.
" 7. I imraediately sent an aid to Opdycke to warn
hira to be ready to advance in case of a break at the
centre, and to order the coramandants of brigades,
etc., to withhold their fire till Wagner's men should
get in. The two aids who were with rae are both
dead, one being killed while performing part of the
above duty. Opdycke afterward told me that he got
no order, and acted on his own judgment, and I have
accepted that as the fact.
" 8. I almost iramediately followed my order, and

262 The Battle of Franklin
rode to the pike. There I met Opdycke advancing,
and met you also. We all went forward together.
When Opdycke reached the parapet, you and I were
trying to rally the fugitives immediately in rear of the
line. While thus employed you were wounded, and
your horse was also hit. You asked me to look at
the hurt, and I urged you to go and have surgical
attention to it. I dismounted Captain Tracy, one of
my aids, and gave you my horse which he was riding.
To say anything here of the impression your conduct
made on me would violate the old maxim about
' praise to face,' etc.
" 9. Opdycke and the artillery continued to act
under my orders till we left the lines at midnight.
Orders to the rest of Wagner's division and to Kim
ball went frora your headquarters, you continuing in
coraraand of the Fourth Corps till we got back to
NasliAdlle, notwithstanding your hurt.
" As I have said above, I have not yet begun the
collation of documents ; but I have taken advan
tage of your kind letter to give the above outline, and
to ask for any illustration, correction, or addition which
raay occur to you, so that I raay give careful attention
to any point on which ray memory should differ from
yours." To this General Stanley replied from Fort Clarke,
Texas, under date of October 17, 1881, saying, among
other tilings : —
" The nine points subraitted in your letter are, to
the best of ray memory, exactly correct. I think it
may be true that Opdycke did not receive your order.
When I arrived at the left of his brigade, the men
Avere just getting to their feet, as they had been lying
down, I presume to avoid the enemy's bullets."
Replying on the 31st of October to this letter,

An Unexpected Controversy 263
I said : " It gives me sincere pleasure to know that
we agree in meraory as to the outline of the battle
of Franklin. It increases my confidence in my rec
ollection, and will give me more assurance in going
forward." This outline, so explicitly agreed upon, needs cor
rection in but two points, in both of which the official
reports show that I understated ray own command
upon the line. First, Opdycke's official report ' shows
that he received my order mentioned in the seventh of
the points stated "to be ready to advance in case of a
break at the centre," and that it was the second order
raentioned in my official report,^ calling on him to
charge at once, which he anticipated. Finding my aid.
Captain Tracy, with him when I joined him on the
turnpike, I of course assumed that the order had been
delivered, and did not know till Opdycke afterward
told me of it, that the beginning of the actual charge
was spontaneous on his part, and made it unnecessary
for Tracy to deliver the order when he reached the
brigade. The evidence that Opdycke recognized my
authority was thus officially complete. In a corre
spondence with him at about the same time as that
Avith General Stanley, he very frankly and clearly put
the matter on this footing, as he did in his published
narrative of the battle.^ General Stanley's assent to
the points recognizes also my right to exercise the
command over that brigade and the artillery, and to
continue it till the raidnight withdrawal.
Second, in the ninth point I understated my exer
cise of authority as to Kimball's division, for that
officer's official report * shows that I called upon him
to detach a regiment to reinforce the left of Moore's
1 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 240. " See ante, p. 96.
2 See Appendix B. * 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 178.

264 The Battle of FranMin
brigade, and that Colonel McDanald's was sent in
response to the order.'
In my history of the campaign, I had followed the
outline thus explicitly assented to by General Stanley.
When it is remembered that this Avas the result of his
own offer to help rae fix the more important facts of
the campaign for the expressed purpose of a historical
narrative, their conclusiveness upon him is indispu
table. If there were anything Avhich he should after
ward wish to modify or question, a courteous and
temperate tone Avas certainly demanded as Avell as a
recollection of the points which he had so emphati
cally indorsed.
So far as my use of the phrase " commandant upon
the line " A\'as concerned, I said, in my reply in the
Century, that it was used chiefly to avoid the repeti
tion of my own name in a narrative written by myself,
and that I should be quite content to have the reader
substitute my name for the phrase. I might have
added that in my desire to keep upon ground where I
supposed we were agreed, I had spoken of myself as
" commandant upon the line " only in the events prior
to General Stanley's appearance at the front, and my
language after that was, " the commandants of the
two corps raet on the turnpike just as Opdycke and
his men Avere rushing to the front." ^ Controversy
^ AVhen the correspondence printed in the Century Magazine for
February, 1889, appeared, I bad uot seen General Kimball's official
report and had forgotten the fact that I had sent the order. Colonel
Stone, however, referred to it in his reply to General Stanley, and I
then procured a copy of the official report. I discovered, a little later, in
my files of preserved letters, one from Mr. Edward C. RusseU, a hard
ware merchant at Corning, Iowa, dated January 4, 1876, iu which he
recalled himself to my memory as one ot my orderlies at the battle of
Franklin, and the messenger who carried ray order to Kimball for the
reinforceraent at the centre.
2 Franklin and Nashville, etc., pp. 86, 89.

An Unexpected Controversy 265
on that point was therefore wholly gratuitous. But
the challenge of ray accuracy Avent the Avhole length
of our relations to the line engaged in the defences of
Franklin at all tiraes during the 30th of Noveraber.
My well meant purpose to keep within the lines of
uncoiitroverted facts in ray history Avas thus, some
seven years after its publication, disappointed. I had
in fact accorded to General Stanley more than he had
any claim to, and the outcome was that I found my
own candor and accuracy assailed.
In writing to rae after the appearance of the little
volume referred to. General Schofield, in November,
1882, spoke strongly of my manifest effort, in treat
ing the whole campaign, to avoid unnecessary criti
cism and to deal liberally Avith all who had a
responsible part in it. He even suggested that I
might "feel estopped" from a raore rigid analysis
" by the generous treatment you have already given "
to others. If the Avord " generous " be properly used
in regard to anything I have said of that campaign, I
am very sure it would nowhere be more appropriate
than to my references to General Stanley, from ray
preliminary report in the field to my last printed
word. Whether well or ill requited, I should not
have modified the creditable picture which I had
helped to draw. Fie has himself made it seem ne
cessary to exaraine more critically the relative parts
we bore in that day's work. The fulness of the nar
rative in the preceding pages will enable rae to make
the summary comparatively brief.

CHAPTER XXI
CONTROVERTED POINTS
Work assigned the Twenty-third Corps — Detachment of Fourth
Corps Batteries — Orders to Euger and Kimball — Detachments
often Necessary — Articles of War aud Regulations — Questions
of Command — Stanley on North Side of River — His Eide to the
Front — Soon Wounded — He Eetires — Statements of Officers —
At the Field Hospital — At Schofield's Headquarters — Summary
— Official Eeports — Analysis of Stanley's — Contemporaneous
Records — Conclusion.
In an early chapter ' I have told how, before the break
of day. General Schofield came to the Carter house,
upon the Columbia Turnpike, and gaA'e to me in
person the direction to put the Twenty-third Corps
in position, make defensive works, and hold back
Hood at all hazards. With the Columbia road as
a centre, the line as first laid out extended about
equal distances to right and left, say half a mile
each way, reaching from the Harpeth River on the
left to the Carter's Creek Turnpike on the right.
This line was occupied and intrenched wholly by
the tAVO divisions of the corps. This was "the line "
in front of Franklin during the forenoon. Even the
artillery in it Avould have been the batteries of the
Twenty-third Corps, except that General Schofield
as a wise economy of time ordered rae to send my
artillery at once over the Harpeth, promising to
detail batteries from Stanley's Fourth Corps, and
^ Ante, chap. iii.

Controverted Points 267
give them to me to supply the place of mine. About
this there has never been any question : every report,
official and private, is in accord, and General Stanley
has said that it is "exactly correct."
The work of holding back the Confederates in
front of Franklin Avas thus definitely committed to
me, and Hood was advancing from Columbia by the
road which cut the centre of the line thus estab
lished. As to the artillery, General Schofield, in
accordance with his proraise, made a detachment of
certain batteries from the Fourth Corps to fight in
such positions in my line as I should direct. To
say that they did not come under my general cora
raand would be a military absurdity. There neither
is nor for the past century has there been an army
in Christendora in which a corjps commander has not
control of the batteries assigned to him. A reserve
is often separately massed for a special purpose, but
the batteries detailed to a corps are always part of
"the command," for the time at least. The Twenty-
third Corps had no reserve artillery, but the batteries
were integral parts of the divisions ; and when their
place was supplied by others, as in this case, the
substitutes carae, by the fixed rule of the service,
under the orders of the general officer to whom they
were ordered to report. Any other rule would make
utter confusion.
General Stanley recognized this in its full effect,
since, for the very purpose of settling points as to
the battle for a published narrative, he admitted the
exact correctness of my stateraent that the batteries
were " detailed " to report to me generally, and that
they " continued to act under my orders till we left
the lines at midnight."' General Schofield's pur-
1 Ante, p. 262.

268 The Battle of FrankUn
pose that they should so report to me and act under
my orders is too plain for discussion. He had said
so to me orally, and the written order frora his head
quarters was meant to do this, neither more nor less.
Now Avhat Avas the language in Avhich he expressed
the purpose? It ordered Captain Bridges to "report
four (4) batteries from your command to Brig. Gen.
J. D. Cox for position on the line." It is thus con
clusively proved that he and his adjutant general
regarded that language as aptly expressive of the
purpose. But the officer to whora it was addressed also
understood it so. Captain Bridges states in his
official report that he placed the Fourth Corps bat
teries in the positions in the Twenty-third Corps
line "by direction of Brigadier-General Cox," and
describes them in detail. Then, after describing
the opening of the battle and the fighting of the
artillery, he adds: "Receiving orders from Briga
dier General Cox, commanding the TAventy-third
Army Corps, and Lieut. Colonel Schofield, Chief of
.Artillery Department of the Ohio, to remain upon
the line with the batteries, I remained near the
Columbia pike, which seemed to be the place upon
the line where the eneray made the most effort to
obtain a lodgment, and Avhich was a position from
which I could see the entire line."' From the first
of these quotations to the last, including the whole
action of the artillery upon the line, he makes no
mention of General Stanley whatever, although, as
chief of artillery of the Fourth Corps, he was attached
to that officer's staff. It should be noted also that
his position was close to my headquarters on the
turnpike near the Carter house, where Stanley was
1 O. R., xlv. part i. pp. 320, 321.

Controverted Points 269
for a few minutes in the first mSl^e, and where he
would have been likely to be had he remained at the
front. When Captain Bridges in the succeeding sen
tence speaks of the order to Avithdraw the batteries,
he correctly says ' that it came from General Stanley.
The withdrawal orders we have already examined.''^
The report of Captain Bridges thus becomes proof
not only of his recognition of iny oavu command
upon the line, but that General Stanley was not
there long enough even to raise a question as to
subordination or command there.'*
General Ruger of the Twenty-third Corps was also
ordered to report to me, and in this case also there
is no possible dispute as to the fact or as to General
Schofield's purpose to do it. It was part of the
authority and instruction he gave me orally in the
early morning, and, like that in regard to the bat
teries, was a little later put in form as an order.
In this, as in the other case. General Stanley admits
the exact accuracy of my statement,* that Ruger's
division was thus put under my coraraand for the
day, and General Schofield's official report declares
that I was teraporarily in coraraand of the Twenty-
third Corps.^ Again avc have to ask in what lan
guage was this purpose expressed in the order, and
General Ruger answers the question. In his official
report of the battle he says he was ordered to report
to rae "for assignraent to position."^ This not only
shows that the same language was used as in the case
of the batteries, but, by his unquestioning recogni
tion of my authority. General Ruger shows that he
1 0. R., xlv. part i. pp. 320, 321.
2 Ante, p. 169. ' Ante, p. 100.
* Ante, p. 260. * See Appendix A.
« O. R., xlv. part i. p. 364.

270 The Battle of FranMin
regarded the words as appropriate to convey the
meaning intended.'
When, later in the day, as we have seen,^ the
appearance of the enemy's cavalry on my right flank
showed the need of strengthening that part of the
position, I reported the fact to General Schofield.
He ordered General Nathan Kimball, coinmanding
a division of the Fourth Corps, to report to me, and
I placed hira on the recurved extension of my right.
For the third time that day the language of the order
was, "The Commanding General directs that you
report with your command to Brig. Gen. J. D. Cox
for position on the line to-day." General Kimball
not only took the position assigned him, but in the
first hour of the battle, while it was yet broad day
light,^ he obeyed my order to send a regiment to
the centre, where, between Strickland's right and
Moore's left, help was sorely needed.
Of these orders, thus successively sent and thus
successively obeyed. General Stanley argues that
they conveyed no authority except such as an " aid-
de-carap " or " an orderly or guide " raight have had,
" to show General Kimball where he was to go " ! *
Such interpretation would discredit a freshly com
missioned subaltern. He goes further, and in igno
rance of the fact that General Kimball's official
report contradicts him, completes the absurdity by
saying that, if I "had atterapted to assume the
authority to give orders," his division comraanders
"would have paid no attention to thera." ^
The truth is that no rule is raore rigidly enforced
in our array than that an officer is never ordered to
1 General Thomas H. Ruger is now (1896) a Major General U. S. A.
2 Ante, p. 60. * Century Magazine, loe. cit.
» Ante, p. 134. ^ Ibid.

Controverted Points 271
report to one of lower rank. To talk of a general
officer being ordered to report to a captain or a guide
"for position," or for any purpose whatever, is a
glaring solecism which exposes any one who uses it.
A little pains to recall the circurastances under which
the orders were given would raake their form appear
very natural. Their purpose and substance could
never have been doubtful till the remerabrance of
events a quarter of a century old had becorae dim.
The line of defences in front of Franklin had, quite
early in the morning, taken the form of a fortified
enceinte, the batteries with embrasures being con
nected by an infantry parapet. Both the enemy's
and our own officers and men spoke of thera as forti
fications. An order to report to the comraandant of
a fortification "for position in the redan," for in
stance, carries with it the duty of serving there also,
and not raerely of finding a place. This usage was
common at headquarters on the day in question, as
is shown by the diary of Colonel Fullerton, Stanley's
chief of staff. He notes at 1 p. m., that General
Wagner is supposed to be moving his division " within
the bridge-head constructed by General Cox around
the town of Franklin. " ' With this somewhat formal
idea of " the works," there was no danger that any
officer ordered to report to me for position there
would doubt his subordination. No one, in fact, did
doubt it. It required twenty -five years to create that ¦
illusion. The raatter, then, is a very siraple one. To meet
a temporary exigency, General Schofield ordered cer
tain detachments frora the Fourth Corps to report to
the coraraandant of the Twenty-third. When the
exigency was past, the sarae power would order them
I O. R., xlv. part i. p. 149.

272 The Battle of FranMin
back. It could, of course, do so at any raoment.
To speak of this as removing Stanley frora the com
mand of his corps is nonsense. It is not pleasant
to find the units of one's command scattered, but it
often happens, and the loyal subordinate submits
without a murmur. At the battle of Chickamauga
one of the incidents Avas that the divisions of
McCook's corps Avere sent to reinforce Thoraas, till
he was left with only Sheridan's. At the battle of
Atlanta my division of fivQ brigades (including one
of dismounted cavalry) Avas scattered by Sherman's
order, until I was left with only one, covering the
extreme left of the army on the Decatur road.
Nobody has any right to complain of such things.
Had Hood concluded to turn our position at Frank
lin instead of attacking in front, General Schofield
would no doubt have Avithdrawn Kimball's and
Wagner's divisions from the south side of the
Harpeth, possibly sending Ruger also to report to
Stanley, and leaving rae alone with one division in
my works. In the forenoon this seemed most prob
able. It was the fortune of war that it turned out
otherwise. A brief reference to the orders giA'en to General
Wagner will coraplete all that it is necessary to say
of the troops on the line. The tenor of those orders
need not be repeated.' If he had withdrawn from
the front and come within my "bridge-head" in
accordance with them, his whole division would have
been, where Opdycke's brigade was, in reserve be
hind the line and in close support. General Scho
field's official report tells us that such was his
intention.^ There is also no dispute that an order
placing troops thus in reserve gives to the com-
1 Ante, pp. 66, 71. 2 gee Appendix A.

Controverted Points 273
mandant of the principal line the power to call upon
them when needed. Opdycke's brigade was thus
called upon,' and in the "nine points" approved by
General Stanley the rightful subordination of that
command to my orders is unquestioned. The dis
organization of the other two brigades raade it
irapracticable for them to act as reserves, and the
scattered groups which rallied at the works fell
under the command of the organized brigades in
which they happened to be.
With this understanding of the situation, and of
the application of military rules, what might hap
pen on the line was provided for. General Schofield
could leave the south side of the river and the vil
lage, and go to any central position north of it, from
which he could be equally near to the cavalry corps,
to Wood's division of the Fourth Corps, and to the
Twenty-third Corps artillery, all of which were on
the north bank of the Harpeth. He would thus be
prepared for most efficient control of all his forces,
whatever raight turn out to be the plan adopted by
his adversary. General Hood. General Stanley could
properly accompany his superior to be ready promptly
to take the iraraediate command of troops used to
checkmate Hood in any other move than that of a
direct and rash attack upon my works.
If I were not in the relation to the line in front of
the town which I have described, the arrangement
would have been radically faulty. General Stanley
should in that case have remained in as close touch
with the troops he claimed to coraraand as I was with
the Twenty-third Corps. We all knew beforehand
what the event proved, that if anything went wrong
on any part of that line, there would be no time to
1 Ante, p. 95.
18

274 The Battle of FrankUn
correct it by reporting it to the Truett house or even
to Fort Granger, north of the river. It must be cor
rected instantly and on the spot. The fact, there
fore, that General Schofield and General Stanley both
moved their headquarters frora the village over the
river soon after noon helps to prove the complete
understanding that the whole "bridge-head around
the town of Franklin " was under ray coramand. On
this view, contingencies Avcre provided for, and a
responsible head was left on the line. On any other,
they were not.
In the letters in the Century Magazine,' the sug
gestion appears that under the Articles of War a
momentary authority might have devolved upon me
by reason of portions of the Fourth Corps troops
happening to do duty with mine, upon the line,
whilst I was senior there, and that my right to com
mand would thus be dependent upon military laAv,
and not on the tenor of the written orders. I then
replied that I should be entirely indifferent as to the
source of power, were it not that the facts proved
that everybody, at the time, recognized it as depend
ent upon the orders, as General Stanley himself had
most explicitly done in the "nine points."
It raay be interesting, however, to inquire briefly
as to the application of the military rule. The 62d
of the Articles of War^ is this: "If upon marches,
guards, or in quarters, different corps of the army
shall happen to join or do duty together, the officer
highest in rank of the line of the army, marine corps,
or militia by commission, there on duty or in quar
ters, shall command the whole and give orders for
what is needful to the service, unless otherwise
specially directed by the President of the United
1 Ante, p. 259. 2 Army Regulations (1861), p. 508.

Controverted Points 275
States, according to the nature of the case. " Very
good authority could be quoted for holding that this
law meant by "different corps," those differing in
function, as the engineers, ordnance corps, marine
corps, or medical corps, and that it does not apply
to different bodies of troops, like companies, regi
ments, brigades, divisions, etc. The "army corps,"
as everybody knows, was created long after the
article quoted was enacted. The right to command
in general is much more fundamental, and is found
in the very first paragraph of the Regulations, which
says that "all inferiors are required to obey strictly
and to execute with alacrity and good faith the law
ful orders of the superiors appointed over them. " '
As is usual in such raatters, the difficulty arises
when it becoraes necessary to decide who is the
"superior," has he been "appointed over" another,
and what are " lawful orders. "
Waiving all technical discussion of the raeaning
of the phrase " different corps " in the Article of
War, it is very clear that its principle could only
apply in the case of the absence of a common supe
rior. The captain of Corapany A in a regiraent
does not acquire any command over the captain of
Company F, who follows him on the march, or is
next to hira in line, by raere virtue of contiguity.
If the regiraent is under the coraraand of a field
officer, the captains are independent of each other,
and strictly subordinate to the common superior
present. If no field officer were present, the com
mand of the whole regiment would devolve on the
captain of Company A. The elementary principle
applies to divisions or army corps as well as to
companies. I Army Regulations (1861), p. 9.

276 The Battle of FranMin
But if Companies A and F were separated from
the regiment so that no field officer could exercise
practical control, then, undoubtedly, in matters not
explicitly provided for in previous orders, the two
corapanies Avould becorae, by necessary implication,
a ncAV temporary organization for the comraon pur
pose, and by virtue of his seniority the captain of
Company A would become the commander. Here,
too, the rule for divisions or army corps is identi
cally the same. In the larger organizations, how
ever, it is more difficult to say when a common
superior is present, and it is correspondingly diffi
cult to sa.y, as between tAvo of his subordinates, when
a case arises in Avhich one could assume command
over the other. As the grades of rank and command
increase, the discretion of the subordinate increases
in the mode of executing his own orders; but it does
not increase in the matter of assuming authority
over other equal organizations. On a field of battle,
above all other places, it would be intolerable and
disastrous for one corps or diA'ision commander to
assume authority over another, by reason of con
tiguity, when there is a general in chief present in
actual command. From top to bottora of the army
organization this is a fundamental principle, under
which Article 62 is only a grouping of particular
cases. It applies to two corporal's guards as well
as to two army corps.
In the battle of Franklin General Schofield was
present, commanding three corps, two of infantry
and one of cavalry. He had issued no orders put
ting either of his three principal subordinates under
the command of another, and no one of them has
ever pretended to have had such authority. General
Stanley, in express terms, disclaimed it.' They
1 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 118. See Appendix D.

Controverted Points 277
each looked to General Schofield, and to hira alone,
for orders. No case had arisen, therefore, either
under Article 62 or any other clause of the Regula
tions, for looking to anything else than the actual
orders for the authority of his subordinates.
Our experience in the Atlanta carapaign was a
constant lesson as to the diffxculties likely to arise
from disputed authority when different bodies of
troops came into casual connection. General Scho
field found such a question arise between him and
General Stanley, in the movement turning Atlanta,
on the thirty-first day of August, and the authorita
tive decision of it was not announced till the 7th
of November, after the opening of the new cam
paign.' It gave rise to a somewhat voluminous cor
respondence which was referred to Washington.
Schofield himself was far too prudent an officer to
leave such questions open among his own subordi
nates. From first to last in the campaigns of the
year, he provided against dispute by explicit direc
tions embodied in his orders.
As the Atlanta campaign opened, on the 1st of
May, 1864, the Twenty-third Corps was at Charles
ton, Tenn., a little north of the Georgia line. The
corps was ordered to march to Cleveland, Tenn.,
on the 3d, " in order of rank of division command
ers. " General Schofield intended to precede the
troops to Chattanooga for consultation Avith General
Sherman, and to rejoin the corps when it should
reach Cleveland. Here was (if ever there was) a
plain case under the principle of the 62d Article,
and without special order I should have had, by vir
tue of my seniority, the command of the corps on
the march. But General Schofield did not trust to
1 0. R., xxxviii. part v. p. 734; xxxix. part iii. p. 685.

278 The Battle of Franklin
such implied authority. In the order itself, addressed
to me, " he directs that you assume coramand of the
whole, and conduct the march, and place the troops
in position at or near Cleveland." '
Again, on the 3d of May, two divisions of the
corps were ordered to advance to Red Clay in Georgia
(now in the presence of the enemy) ; and " he directs
you to take command of the two divisions and place
them in position at Red Clay, and retain command
until the arrival of the commanding general or till
further orders. " ^
Passing to one of the latest incidents of the
Franklin campaign, on the march from Pulaski to
Columbia, General Schofield directed me to take the
adA'ance, and on NoA'ember 21st wrote: "I desire you
to move to Lynnville to-morrow morning. General
Wagner will follow you. I will probably join you
there before night. Reports indicate that Forrest is
raoving with Hood. He may, however, push out and
strike the railroad to-raorrow ; if so, try to prevent
hira. In ray absence take coraraand of Wagner's
division. "2
In the face of such evidence of the custora not to
trust to the understanding of the Regulations, can
we be asked to believe that in preparing for the
battle of Franklin, when Hood's forraidable array
showed the imminence of" one of the deadliest and
most persistent combats of the war. General Scho
field intended to leave the question of command and
responsibility on the line to the interpretation of
the officers involved, and to their decision, without
direction, in the excitement of the battle itself? He
did no such thing. He gave written orders, which
1 0. R., xxxviii. part iv. pp. 5, 6. 2 id., p. 23.
3 O. R., xlv. part i. p. 974.

Controverted Points 279
were unhesitatingly interpreted, both by myself and
by every one of the officers ordered to report to me,
as clearly fixing their subordination and ray authority,
as we have seen. In each case the official reports
have demonstrated it, and the whole was in perfect
accord with the purpose he had orally expressed at
daybreak. Flaving seen the organization of the line to meet
the contingencies of battle or of withdrawal, and the
transfer of headquarters of the army and of the
Fourth Corps to the north side of the river, it will
be natural to inquire whether the orders given and
arrangements raade were changed or affected by
General Stanley's appearance at the front when the
battle opened. To understand the matter clearly
we need to learn just what General Stanley did.
There has never been any pretence that General
Schofield issued any new orders changing the com
mand upon the line. Both in his letter to the Cen
tury, and elsewhere. General Stanley has contended
only that the orders Avhich have been already dis
cussed had another meaning frora that Avhich I attrib
uted to thera. He was not ordered to corae to the
front or to assume any command. He contends that
he had sufficient authority at all times during the
day. The error of this having been shown, I shall
inquire as to the railitary effect of his volunteered
appearance on the line after settling as distinctly as
possible what the facts actually were.
In his so called official report' General Stanley
said: "From one o'clock until four in the evening
the enemy's entire force was in sight, and forming
for attack; yet in view of the strong position we
1 The irregular paper, styled an official report, by General Stanley,
Appendix D, will be examined presently.

280 The Battle of Franklin
held, and reasoning from the former course of the
rebels during this campaign, nothing appeared so
improbable as that they would assault. I felt so
confident in this belief that I did not leave Gen
eral Schofield's headquarters until the firing com
menced. " '
Colonel Wherry, General Schofield's senior aid
and chief of staff, had been with me upon the line
but a few minutes before, bringing final directions
frora the general in view of the expected engageraent,
and on his way back to headquarters at the Truett
house on the Nashville road, was overtaken by one
of ray orderlies bearing the message that the enemy
was about to attack. Hastening on across the bridge,
within half a mile, he met Generals Schofield and
Stanley riding toward the river. Schofield went into
Fort Granger, and Stanley came to the front, where
he and myself met on the Columbia Turnpike, near
the Carter house. ^
1 O. R., xlv. part i. p. 115. Appendix D.
2 Ante, pp. 98, 100. Colonel 'Wherry's letter to rae, dated October
7, 1895, describing this incident, is worthy of fuller quotation, as
giving interesting circumstances attending the opening of the battle,
and showing the exigencies of staff service at such a time. In his state
ment his memory was assisted by original meraoranda made at the time.
Speaking of General Schofield's movements ou that day, he proceeds : —
" Our first stop was early in the morning at the Carter house ;
then down at the river by the bridges. Frora there the General and
his staff went to Dr. Cliffs house with General Stanley about 10 or
10.30 A. M. We reraained there, the staff going and coming as re
quired by duty, until after dinner. About 2 p.m. Generals Schofield
and Stanley removed their headquarters to the north bank of tbe river ;
to a house some distance out ou the Nashville road. They gave per
sonal attention to sorae details in respect to the placing of Wood's
division as a reserve to cover the crossings of the Harpeth.
"About 3 p. M. I was sent with an order to the south bank, which
having delivered, as I was suffering with a severe toothache frora a
tooth prepared for filling but not filled, 1 repaired to Dr. CUft's house
again to get the doctor to draw the tooth. He was absent, aud I

Controverted Points 281
This meeting with General Stanley on the Columbia
Turnpike, near the Carter house (our first and only
meeting that day), has already been described,' and
is one of the points on which he declared that we
were exactly agreed. In my investigation in 1881
I found that General Opdycke took exception to the
statement of General Stanley that his men were lying
down when the latter reached them. Fie wrote to
me (December 6th) : " Before he [Stanley] carae, I
had received your request to have my brigade ready.
It was then lying down by the stacks of muskets,
having just got something to eat. The whole com
mand must have been in order in a minute after your
request came. I did not see Stanley nor know any
thing of his whereabouts till after the line was
waited for his return, leaving my horse in charge of my orderlies at
the gate. Very shortly after 3.30 a messenger from you to Gen-
ral Schofield, with your information that the enemy was forming up
and about to attack, carae by the house which had been our headquar
ters up to 2 o'clock, and, recognizing my horse and orderlies, delivered
. his message to me. I raounted, and, taking the raan along, rode across
the bridge, and within half a raile — a few hundred yards ray memo
randum has it — I met Generals Schofield and Stanley riding toward
the river. They had received frora sorae other source the inforraation
I was conveying. 1 turned aud rode with thera. At the bridge Gen
eral Stanley crossed and went to his troops at the Carter house, and
General Schofield rode into Fort Granger, which, as you know, was
very close to the railroad bridge and was the prolongation of our left,
only separated from the line of battle on that flank by the narrow
stream. It overlooked the front nearly to the Colurabia pike at the
Carter house, aud was where comraunication with the reserves and
line of battle could best be had. General Schofield's headquarters were
there until after the battle, when we went to the sarae house out on
the Nashville pike about a mile, where was General Stanley, who had
been wounded, and his staff. There we reraained until after mid
night, when the head of column carae along from the river and we
rode to Brentwood hills."
Colonel Wherry was Brevet Brigadier General at the close of the
war, and is now (1896) Lieut. Colonel Second Infantry, U. S. A., aud
Brevet Colonel.
1 Ante, pp. 98, IOO,

282 The Battle of FrankUn
restored, when he rode up to me and showed nie
that he was wounded, tie immediately rode away. "
The omission to notice General Stanley at the
instant of his arrival is not remarkable in the in
tense preoccupation in his own Avork at such a
moment. The order of events is important as show
ing that under my direction he had already begun
preparation for the movement forward.
The same letter bears directly upon the question
next in order. How long did General Stanley remain
upon the line ? Immediately after the quotation last
made, it says : " I have always insisted that his report
did you a grave injustice. It simply represents you
as gallantly assisting him, when the fact was that
you were coinmanding the whole line of battle, and
he aided you, I suppose about five minutes, and then
left, wounded." In his published account of the
battle, Opdycke stated with equal distinctness that,
"soon after coraing under fire, Stanley's horse was
shot under hira, and he himself wounded and so
compelled to leave the field. " '
There is no room for dispute as to the time and
circurastances of General Stanley's receiving his
wound. In the " report " he himself says it was
" just after the retaking of the line by our troops. " ^
In the eighth of the nine points to which he agreed
it was said to be "when Opdycke reached the para
pet," and we "were trying to rally the fugitives
immediately in rear of the line. " ^ All who Avere
personally witnesses of what occurred corroborate
Opdycke's statement as to the wounding in that first
mel^e, and Stanley's immediate retireraent for surgi
cal treatraent, as I urged upon hira.
1 New York Tiraes, September 10, 1882.
2 Appendix D. ^ Ante, p. 262.

Controverted Points 283
Major Dow, my Inspector General, was himself in
the group at the turnpike, rallying the men as the
reserves went forward. He says : " Generals Stanley
and Cox were on the pike with them" (Opdycke's
troops). " General Stanley was Avounded in the first
mel^e, and his horse shot also. I saw his wound in
the neck, and saw him remounted on one of General
Cox's horses. . . . Stanley exercised no command
while there, but rallied the men."'
Captain Cox, Adjutant General, says: "General
Stanley rode up to the front at this point; but he
had scarcely done so (and before he had time to view
the field, or give or suggest an order) when he was
wounded and his horse shot. Captain Tracy then
dismounted from your dun horse, A\'hich he had been
riding, and gave it to General Stanley, who irarae
diately raounted, and rode off through the village.
This was the only tirae I saw General Stanley that
day, until I went over the river in the evening to see
General Schofield at his headquarters. " ^
Captain L. T. Scofield, Topographical Engineer,
also speaking as an eycAvitness, says in his paper
on the campaign already quoted : " General Stanley
was also there, showing great gallantry in encourag
ing the troops, but was Avounded before he had been
on the field ten minutes, and retired."^
General Reilly, under date of February 21, 1876,
wrote me: "I did not receive orders that day, as you
are aware, from any other than yourself, and sup
posed, as I do yet, that you were in chief command
on south side of river. General Stanley, although
wounded in rear of line of Third Division (Twenty-
third Array Corps), did not give or assume any
command." 1 Appendix E. 2 Appendix F.
3 Ohio Loyal Legion papers, vol. ii. p. 137.

284 The Battle of Franklin
The earliest formal history of the Army of the
Cumberland was that by Van Horne, who, though
not present at this battle, had long been connected
with General Thomas's staff, and had full access to
all his papers at the time he Avrote. He may there
fore be considered as giving the general understand
ing at Thomas's headquarters when he said that
Stanley " Avas pierced in the neck by a bullet and
was compelled to leave the field. " '
There are also statements of officers whose posi
tions at and near the centre gave thera the oppor
tunity of knowing what general officers were or were
not there after the first restoration of the line ; and
though negative in form, they are hardly less con
clusive in fact than the testiraony of those Avho saw
General Stanley go to the rear at that early stage of
the battle.
General Caseraent, whose brigade was next east
of the cotton-gin, in a letter to rae of October 21,
1889, (from which I have already quoted, 2) after tell
ing of his being "along the line several times to the
Carter house " during the battle, says of General
Stanley that he did not see him, and that " he was
never on my portion of the line, either while in
course of construction, after it was finished, or dur
ing the progress of the battle." He mentions also
coming to me, near the Carter house, just about
dark, and adds : " I know that there was no officer
of superior rank to yourself on the field ... I
never heard of such an officer till long after the war
was over." I had put to him the direct question,
1 Van Horne, "Army ofthe Cumberland" (1875), vol. ii. p. 201.
This book had been published seven years when my volurae, " Frank
lin aud Nashville," appeared.
2 Ante, p. 146, note.

Controverted Points 285
"Prom all you saw of ray position and action at the
tirae, and the conduct of others in recognizing ray
orders, what did you as an officer understand my
relations to the line to be ? " His answer was, " I
understood you to be in command of the line, and
so understand now ; and it is too late to change the
facts. "
The 73d Illinois was one of the regiments of
Opdycke's brigade of the Fourth Corps, and its
officers were therefore General Stanley's subordi
nates. The regiment published its own history, and
Captain E. J. Ingersoll was one of the contributors
to it. He says of his own movements immediately
after the restoration of the line : " I passed from the
Carter house to the cotton-gin, then returned to first
piece of artillery in rear of Carter house. . . . Met
General Cox on the pike in front of the Carter house
about 5 p.m., and again about 10 p.m. ^ — ^the only
general officer I saw on the ground. " ^
Captain Sexton, in command of the 72d Illinois,
in Strickland's brigade, in his communication frora
which I have already quoted,^ says : "The only supe
rior officer I saw after the battle opened was General
Cox." When it is reraembered that the gist of General
Stanley's contention is that he remained throughout
the battle on the line, and at the centre, which was
the critical point, the appositeness of these quota
tions is plain.
Our next step is to find where General Stanley
received the surgical attention which he wentto seek
when he left me on the line at the Carter house. ^
I have already quoted frora a letter of Surgeon Hill ^
1 History of the 73d Hlinois Regiraent, p. 642.
2 .4n«e, p. 254. ^ Ante,^.lO\. * 4nfe, p. 95.

286 The Battle of FrankUn
(of Kimball's division), Avho stood near General
Schofield on the parapet of Fort Granger, and saw
the opening of the fight. He then went to his field
hospital, Avhich he says was "sorae distance to the
right of the fort (looking toward the south), a little
to its rear, and north of the river — also a little west
of the Nashville pike." This description accurately
locates the field hospital a short distance northwest
of the place where the temporary road frora the
wagon bridge over the Harpeth joins the Nashville
Turnpike on the north side of the river.'
To this hospital General Stanley went, still in
wrathful excitement frora traversing the crowds of
disorganized men and stragglers in the village,
aggravated by the painful sraarting of his Avound.
He at first mistook the group at the hospital for a
crowd of skulkers, and it took. Dr. Hill says, a little
time to get him to dismount. "An examination
revealed a flesh wound running transversely across
the nape of the neck, probably three inches long
and equal in depth to half the diameter of the ball.
The wound stung furiously. . . . After quieting
down, the Avound was dressed, an opiate adminis
tered, and he was put in an ambulance, Avhich moved
off up the Nashville road. ... He must have met
rae," the surgeon concludes, "within half an hour of
the receipt of his injury, and was not to exceed a
half hour in my hands. "
As soon as the repulse of the enemy's first assaults
gave assurance that we should be able to hold our
lines against hira, and probably immediately upon
the receipt of the order to withdraw at midnight,^
^ Surgeon Hill was also kind enough to locate the place upon a
sketch traced frora one of the published maps.
S Ante, p. 169.

Controverted Points 287
I sent my Adjutant General to General Schofield's
headquarters to express my strong confidence that
we could await the expected reinforcements where
we Avere. This Avas very soon after dark. He says
of it : " At General Schofield's headquarters, besides
his usual staff, I saw General Stanley and several
officers. " ' A little later, on a call to consult Gen
eral Schofield's Inspector General in reference to
the placing of pickets and skirmish line when we
should retire, I sent Major Dow to the same head
quarters. Fie, too, found Generals Schofield and
Stanley together at the Truett house. ^
General James FI. Wilson, the cavalry cominander,
in a paper upon the campaign published in the
Century War Book,^ also raentions meeting Stanley
at General Schofield's headquarters. He says that
"immediately after the close of the cavalry battle
... I rode to General Schofield's headquarters.
. . . Schofield and Stanley, the latter severely
wounded, were together, discussing the events of the
day. " * The dispatches Avhich passed help to fix
the time pretty accurately. At five o'clock (just as
the sun was setting) General Wilson had been able
to announce the Confederate cavalry defeated and
driven back across the Flarpeth. It was a half
hour's ride frora his headquarters to General Scho
field's, and the la.tter acknowledged the receipt of
the welcome dispatch at half past five.^ Waiting
1 Appendix F. 2 Ante, p. 170, aud Appendix E.
s Battles and Leaders, vol. iv. p. 466.
^ In the paper referred to, General Wilson speaks of the headquar
ters as being in Fort Granger. It is agreed on all hands that they
were moved from the fort to the Truett house when it became too dark
to see the lines from that point. The slip of memory as to the place
is corrected by Colonel Fullerton's diary.
5 O. E., xlv. part i. p. 1179.

288 The Battle of Franklin
only to make sure that his front was really quiet,
General Wilson tells us he " immediately " rode in
person to see Schofield, as he had been asked to do
in an earlier message.' In the first darkness of the
evening (for it was dark within half an hour after
sunset),^ General Wilson found Generals Schofield
and Stanley together, the wound of the latter having
been already dressed, and he sufficiently comfortable
to join in the discussion of the events of the day.
After this visit General Wilson returned to his
headquarters at the cross-roads two railes and a half
east of Franklin, Avhere he was again established in
time to write instructions to General Hammond, his
subordinate, dated at 8.45 p. m.^ The raention by
Colonel Wherry of General Stanley's presence at
headquarters when General Schofield reached the
Truett house, has already been noted.*
After General Stanley's arrival at the Truett
house, before seven o'clock in the evening, Colonel
Fullerton, his chief of staff, was prepared to resume
the annotation of events in his diary, and had entered
an outline of what had occurred between four and
seven o'clock.^ A series of entries runs through the
evening. At seven it is noted that " the enemy has
been steadily fighting up to this hour since 4 p.m."
At half past seven the visit of General Wilson is
mentioned. At eight the preparations for with
drawing from the lines are spoken of, but it is said
to be "very doubtful whether these troops can be
withdrawn, as they are very close to the enemy,
1 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 1178. » 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 1184.
2 Ante, p. 147, note. * Ante,-^. 281, note.
' The hours at which entries are made in such diaries must be
taken with due allowance. The outline referred to is dated 4 p. m., but
its contents show that it must have been written after Colonel FuUer-
ton's return with General Stanley to the headquarters.

Controverted Points 289
with whom they are keeping up a continual skirmish
fire," and the Confederates still making frequent
though feeble assaults. At nine the reports are that
" the enemy is relieving his troops, which have been
engaged, and is substituting others for thera." At
ten the fire in the town is noted, supposed to be
started "by the enemy in order to show thera any
atterapt we raight raake to retreat, " and which " with
difficulty was put out by midnight. " The retirement
of the troops then began. '
It is not often that the movements of a single
officer can be so consecutively accounted for as in
this instance : the circumstances also become vividly
clear. Through the long evening it is very plain
that everybody at General Schofield's headquarters
appreciated the fighting going on upon the line, and
1 0. R., xlv. parti, pp. 150, 151. If further evidence of the pro
longed night engagement were needed, one cannot go amiss in refer
ring to any of the official reports on either side.
General Hood, in his official report, said that " the struggle lastad
till near midnight." 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 653. In another place that
" the struggle continued with more or less violence till nine o'clock iu
the evening, and theu much desultory fighting through raost of the
night." Advance and Eetreat, p. 295.
General Schofield reports that "the enemy assaulted persistently
and continuously with his whole force from about 3.30 p. m. until after
dark, and made numerous intermittent attacks at a few points until
about 10 p, M." 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 342, and Appendix A of this
volume. My own report states that the assaults on Ruger's division and
Opdycke's brigade " were obstinately repeated till nightfall, and even
as late as nine o'clock attacks were made, which were, however, easily
repulsed, aud the eneray withdrew the reranants of his shattered lines
to the position occupied at the opening of the battle by Wagner's divis
ion, in advance of our lines about eight hundred yards. Alarms oc
curred frequently until eleven o'clock, and frequently caused a general
musketry fire on both sides from our centre toward the right, but I
found no evidence that any real attack was raade at so late an hour."
0. R., xlv. part i. p. 354, and Appendix B of this volume ; also chap.
xii., ante. 19

290 The Battle of FranMin
the danger that at any moment Hood's efforts would
resume the desperate character of the earlier assaults.
The delicacy of the operation of withdrawing was
also evidently discussed and comraented upon. If
the Fourth Corps troops in the line were not with
the men of the Twenty-third Corps under a common
head, empowered to meet such emergencies as might
momently arise, it is too plain for argument that a
comraander for the Fourth Corps ought to have been
by my side near the Carter house, mutually to assist
in instant decision and in action. The Fourth Corps
staff diary, like every other contemporaneous report,
emphatically contradicts the assumption that the
battle was OA'cr when General Stanley left the front,
and the distance between the Carter house and the
Truett house was altogether too great for communi
cation by raessenger before acting in emergencies
that raight arise.
The simple sequence of facts destroys all such
fictitious theories of the situation. General Stanley
left the lines, wounded in the first mel^e. My task
of inspection iramediately followed.' Orders were
sent to Kimball's division of the Fourth Corps
for the reinforceraent at the centre, and Colonel
McDanald raarched his regiraent to its assigned posi
tion in Ruger's line before the setting sun marked
that five o'clock was reached, and two hours before
the hour at which Colonel Fullerton entered in his
diary, "The enemy has been steadily fighting since
four o'clock."
The Twenty -third Corps headquarters on the
Columbia Turnpike, near the Carter house, was the
only place with which comraunication Avas kept up
with reference to the conduct of the battle at the
1 Ante, p. 144.

Controverted Points 291
works ; and the messages sent and receiA'cd through
both General Schofield's staff officers and my own
fully implied my coraplete reponsibility for affairs
there. On this point the statement of Colonel
Opdycke, which I have quoted, ^ is supported by that
of Captain Scofield, who says: "I knew early in
the day that you had been placed in command of the
troops in the fortifications south of the Harpeth
River. I did not see the written order assigning
you to coraraand, but during the day and night I was
present when officers from General Schofield's head
quarters brought such instructions and received such
inforraation as would only corae to and from one in
active command."^
Among the staff officers who were indefatigable
in duty that day and night, none was raore actiA-e
than Colonel Wherry, General Schofield's chief of
staff, and none knew better the relations of officers
on that field. It has raore than ordinary conclusive
ness, then, when he, before the publication of ray
volume on that campaign, wrote: "Not only has it
been attempted to withhold from General Schofield
the raeasure of honor due hira as coraraander of the
corabined forces in the field, including Franklin, but
your part as commanding the line at Franklin has
been usurped by others. " ^
General Stanley hiraself becomes a witness to the
truth of the situation thus described, Avhen, remem
bering that Wagner was reorganizing two of his
1 Ante, p. 282.
2 Letter of November 3, 1889. See also statement of Surgeon
Frink, ante, p. 40, note.
2 Letter of June 21, 1881. I do not understand that General
Wherry intended to express a judgment as to any theoretic right
to coraraand during the time General Stanley was actually present
on tbe line.

292 The Battle of FranMin
brigades in the town, we find him in the last of the
" nine points " assenting unequivocally to the fact
that "Opdycke and the artillery continued to act
under my orders till we left the lines at midnight. " '
What Kimball, his other division comraander, did,
is told by the official report of that division.^
The inquiry propounded at the beginning of this
chapter as to the military effect of Stanley's brief
appearance at the front may be answered by saying
that the orders under which troops are detached
continue in force until they are revoked by the
authority which issued them, or the duty is com
pletely performed. " On the return of a detachment
the commander reports to the headquarters from
which he received his orders," and no officer can
put himself on duty without orders from competent
authority. ^
Portions of the Fourth Corps having been tem
porarily detached, and ordered to report to another
officer. General Stanley could not, at his own Avill,
resume coramand of thera. However gallant the
motive, he appeared at the lines siraply as a volun
teer. He did not in fact issue any orders, and as he
soon retired, wounded, no question arose as to his
status or his authority.
How then can we account for his intemperate
assaults upon the veracity of statements which are
carefully within the limits of the truth so abundantly
sustained as we haA'c seen? We must look for the
answer in the examination of the document which
he calls his " official report. "
1 Ante, p. 262.
2 Ante, p. 263.
3 Army Regulations of 1861, §§ 8, 655.

Controverted Points 293
After the battle of Nashville (Deceraber 15, 16,
1864), General Thomas called upon his subordinates
for official reports of the preceding carapaign. These
were naturally divided into two parts: first, the
campaign in the field, including the battle of Frank
lin, when General Schofield was in command of the
active array, consisting of the Fourth and Twenty-
third Corps and the Cavalry Corps; and second, the
subsequent period, including the battle of Nashville,
when General Thoraas Avas personally in command.
For the forraer period the reports should all pass
through General Schofield's hands, his own report
being a general one for the whole array in the field.
For the latter period the corps coraraanders would
collect their subordinates' reports and forward them
with their own to General Thomas direct.
In the regular report of the Fourth Corps for the
latter period. General Wood, the senior division
commander,' says: "Maj. Gen. D. S. Stanley, hav
ing been Avounded in the conflict at Franklin, on the
30th of November, and having received a leave of
absence on account of his wound, relinquished, and
I assuraed coramand of the corps on the 2d of
December. " ^ Being thus in coraraand. General
Wood, on the 10th of January, 1865, raade the reg
ular official report of the Fourth Corps for the first
period of the carapaign. He says that he did it " in
pursuance with orders received frora the headquarters
Departraent of the Cumberland," and that "the
duty devolved upon " him, in consequence of the
relinquishment of command by General Stanley.^
The report was a full and detailed one, and no one
I General Thoraas J. Wood, now Brevet Major General, U. S. A.,
retired. 2 0. R., xlv. part i. p. 126. ^ Id., pp. 119, 126. Appendix C.

294 The Battle of FranMin
will question General Wood's title to equal ability
and experience with General Stanley. With this
regular official report of the Fourth Corps went up
the subordinate reports. On the sarae date I made
the report for the Twenty-third Corps. ^ General
Schofield's report for the active army in the field
was made on Deceraber 31st.? Upon the receipt of
these reports. General Thomas prepared his own,
which is dated January 20th, and the whole, with
the accompanying papers, went to Washington.^
General Stanley's absence from the army continued
through the crisis of the campaign, the battle of
Nashville, the pursuit of Hood, and until the latter
part of February, when he resumed command of
the Fourth Corps at Huntsville, Ala. In January,
General Schofield and the Twenty-third Corps were
transferred to the Atlantic coast, and our connection
with the Army of the Cumberland was finally severed.
After all this, on the 25th of February, 1865, Gen
eral Stanley writes what he styles a " Report of the
services of the Fourth Army Corps from the time of
separating from General Sherman's Array at Gayles-
ville, Ala,, to and including the Battle of Franklin,
Tenn."* This paper wholly ignores the regular official
report of the corps made in ordinary course of duty
by General Wood, and traverses the identical ground,
as if no such report had been made. General Wood's
report is in the usual impersonal style of military
reports, stating what was done by the corps and its
parts. General Stanley's is throughout rauch more
1 0. E., xlv. part i. p. 349. Appendix B.
2 Id., pp. 339-347. Appendix A.
8 Id., pp. 32-46.
* Id., xxxix. part i. p. 907, and xlv. part i. p. 112. Appendix D.

Controverted Points 295
in the form of a personal narrative, emphasizing his
personal part and his opinions. The matter, how
ever, is in substance the same until the affair at
Spring Hill (November 29) and the battle of Franklin
(November 30) are reached, tiere the raison d'etre of
the new paper becomes plain. The personal relations
of the author of it to the battle is the theme. It is
not, however, with the style or taste of the docu
ment that we have now to do, but Avith its official
character and its value as a narrative.
It was wholly irregular. The official report of the
corps had been regularly raade in accordance with
the rules of the service. If anything in General
Wood's report had been unjust or erroneous, or if
anything really iraportant was oraitted, it Avas Gen
eral Stanley's privilege, on its coming to his knowl
edge (as it would have been of any other officer in
the service), to address a letter to the Adjutant
General pointing out the errors. This would lead
to official inquiry in an established method. The
character of the new matter in the so called report
could in no way be so well shown as by culling out
all that is additional to General Wood's report, and
embodying it in the form of such a letter to head
quarters. It consists, in the main, of the personal
experience of General Stanley on the field. The
description of the battle would give the reader no
suspicion of the actual rela,tions of the troops of the
two corps. One would not guess that Opdycke's
brigade and the batteries were the only organized
bodies of the Fourth Corps in the lines near the
centre ; that Ruger's whole division of the Twenty-
third Corps was in line between Opdycke's brigade
and Kimball's diA'ision; and that Reilly's division
of the Twenty-third Corps extended on the left from

296 The Battle of Franklin
Opdycke's brigade to the river. We get no assist
ance in learning why General Wagner and his two
brigade comraanders were not on the line, or where
and how the two brigades were reorganized. The
things which Avould enable the comraander of the
army to get definite knowledge of the battle through
the relations of the several bodies of troops to each
other and to the whole are conspicuously absent.
General Stanley's appearance on the field and
what the soldiers said are dramatically told, but no
mention is made of his visit to Surgeon Hill's field-
hospital north of the river, or his spending the rest
of the evening at the Truett house. On the other
hand, after saying that his wound "did not prevent
his keeping the field," the continuous narrative pre
sents him in undiminished closeness of contact with
the fighting lines in each successive incident until
" at midnight the Avithdrawal Avas made successfully. "
That we raay have no doubt of his meaning, he
quoted the passage, in his newspaper letter, as proof
of the falsity of the assertion that he "was reluc
tantly persuaded to return to his quarters for surgical
help."' But two or three sentences in the document are
¦Avorthy of more careful examination. He says : " Just
after the retaking of the line by our troops, as I was
passing toAvard the left to General Cox's position,
ray horse Avas killed, and no sooner had I regained
ray feet than I received a rausket ball through the
back of ray neck. My wound, however, did not pre
vent ray keeping the field, and General Cox kindly
furnished rae a remount. " ^ A couple of pages far
ther on, at the end of the lively narration, he adds:
"Although Brig. Gen. J. D. Cox was not in my
1 March to the Sea, p. 90. 2 o. R., xlv. part i. p. 116.

Controverted Points 297
comraand, he was my close neighbor in the battle of
Franklin, and I take this opportunity to express to
him ray thanks for his gallant help at that time. " ^
I have already referred to the first of these quota
tions as fixing the time at which he was hurt, in sub
stantial accord with my OAvn recollection subraitted
to hira in 1881,^ and said by him to be exactly cor
rect. The next statement, however, deraands notice.
What can be raeant by " passing to the left to General
Cox's position "? We were in the highway of the
Columbia Turnpike, in front of the Carter house,
where my headquarters had been since daybreak,
where they remained till midnight, and where they
are marked on Captain Twining's official map.
That we went forward together, were together rally
ing the troops, when he was hit, that he asked me
to examine his wound, and that I urged him to go
for surgical attention. General Stanley perfectly re
membered in 1881.^ As to position, we were not
only at my headquarters, but were at the centre of
the Twenty-third Corps line; he could not possibly
be more exactly at my military position or my bodily
station. Yet the reader of this " report " would cer
tainly understand that here was something like a
passing from one corps position to another, off at
the left!
As to his "keeping the field," I need not repeat
the statements of the eyewitnesses (including my
self), who saw him ride away toward the village,
and who know that he did not return,* or of those
by whom his whereabouts, from half an hour after
he was hurt till midnight, are consecutively given.
The facts were known to such a cloud of witnesses,
1 O, R., xlv. part i. p. 118. ^ See map, ante, p. 45; also p. 262.
" Ante, p. 262. * Ante, p. 282, et seg.

298 The Battle of Franklin
including nearly every general and staff officer in
the army, that one wonders at the rashness which
could raise any question about it, until the so called
report is read, when the assuraption of heat in sus
taining its assertions becoraes intelligible. With
the final artistic touch, thanking rae for the aid I
had incidentally given him in his arduous and con
tinuous labors, the sketch is complete. Anything
inconsistent with it must be stormed down as falsi
fication. As he had probably forgotten the sweeping
assertions of this report when, in 1881, appealing
to his actual recollection,' he pronounced the "nine
points " exactly correct, so in 1889 we may assume
that the emphatic indorsement of the " nine points "
was forgotten, and the thick-and-thin reiteration of
the " report " was in order.
Except for such forgetfulness, the remembrance
that he had distinctly agreed, as the basis for a his
torical publication, upon the fact that Opdycke's
brigade and the batteries "continued to act under
my orders till we left the lines at midnight," ^ would
have suggested the inquiry what need there was of
his remaining at the lines or returning to them after
the first repulse of the enemy at the centre. Those
organizations were the only Fourth Corps troops in
line there. The disorganized groups or individuals
scattered araong the rest were not in need of his
presence. Wagner's two other brigades were reor
ganizing near the river, as we have seen. ^ Kiraball's
division was three quarters of a raile away on the
extreme right, had easily repulsed the rebel cavalry,
and was not again attacked. It is not alleged that
General Stanley went there. What then was he
in active coraraand of, at the front, after he was
1 Ante, p. 260, etseq. 2 Ante, p. 262. 3 Ante, p. 146.

Controverted Points 299
wounded, that he so hotly treats as calumny the
statement that he did the sensible thing of going to
have his hurt attended to ? He himself being the
witness, the answer must be, of nobody and of noth
ing. Opdycke and the batteries being under my
orders, the line of my comraand is continuous and
coraplete from the Harpeth on the left to Carter's
Creek Turnpike on the right. Kimball neither
needed nor had any orders as to the right flank
beyond Ruger, except to send the reinforcement to
the centre, and that order went from me, as he
officially reported.^ We search the Official Records
in vain for evidence of any order issued by General
Stanley in the conduct of the battle, or any recog
nition of his presence on the line after he was
wounded. It was, then, the fatal necessity of sus
taining that extraordinary "report" that led to
General Stanley's persistent and violent attacks
upon other people's veracity.
To complete the consideration of the subject, it
is only necessary to examine the contemporaneous
records of the engagement which I myself made, so
that the view I took of it at the time may be com
pared with the historical account written in 1882.
As a memorandum of official action, I kept a brief
journal, which, like sirailar headquarters diaries,
has been published with the Official Records.^ In
this, under date of Noveraber 30th, the day of the
battle, I entered the following : "Reached Franklin
before day, having raarched twenty railes during the
night, passing the rest of the army on the way. No
means for crossing Harpeth River, and I am ordered
to take both divisions Twenty-third Corps, and hold
a line above the town till the trains and the rest of
1 Ante, pp. 263, 264. 2 Q. R., xlv. part i. p. 356, et seq.

300 The Battle of FranMin
the army are over. Enemy follows close, and two
divisions of Fourth Corps — Kimball's and Wagner's
— are ordered to report to me. Eneray assault at
3.30 p.m. Gain some temporary advantage in the
centre at first, but are soon repulsed with terrible
slaughter. We held the lines till raidnight."
On the next day, Deceraber 1st, I noted in the
journal the inarch to Nashville, and a brief outline
of the results of the battle, concluding with this:
"Whole loss of the army about 2,000, of which most
was in Wagner's division, which was driven in from
the front in confusion. " ^
In my preliminary report,^ dated December 2d, I
stated the duty intrusted to me in substantially the
same form as in my journal, and that Kimball's and
Wagner's divisions of the Fourth Corps reported to
rae by order of General Schofield.
On December 3d I recommended Colonel Opdycke
for promotion, giving as a reason for doing so that
his heroic service was whilst under my orders, "as
I was commanding the line at that time." ^
It is thus clearly shown that my view of my rela
tions to the troops and to the line is not one that
has been born of long brooding over the stirring
affairs of that campaign, but was that which I held
at the time, and which is sustained by the mass of
evidence both official and private. But in my re
ports, sincerely sympathizing with an officer who
was wounded in the performance of a gallant act in
circurastances that gave him no official position, I
understated my own authority, and attributed to
him a comraand which he did not exercise. The
reassertion of the truth in regard to this raatter has
1 0. R., xlv. part i. pp. 358, 359. 2 id., p. 348.
* Id., p. 409, and ante, p. 228.

Controverted Points 301
not been of ray seeking. My iiistorical account of
the battle was entirely consistent with the "nine
points " which General Stanley had unqualifiedly
assented to for the express purpose of such a publi
cation.' Fie has himself forced the comparison be
tween the facts and his so-called report of February
25, 1865. He has also brought out the truth that
in my official report I clairaed much less than the
reports of the officers of his own corps show that I
was entitled to.
After I had thus voluntarily diminished the state
ment of the extent of my authority on the actual
line, I was of course estopped (to use General Scho
field's word) frora calling public attention to the
truth until General Stanley's so called report came
to light. It was a number of years after the war,
when I first heard of that document. It completely
removed any cause for delicacy in thoroughly review
ing the facts, and, in the preparation to write the
history of the campaign, I was considering this
matter, when General Stanley hiraself took the initi
ative by addressing rae the letter already mentioned. ^
If he had then challenged the accuracy of the " nine
points " I submitted to him in reply, the discussion
of the subject would have been fully opened. As,
however, he unqualifiedly assented to their exact
correctness, I was glad to find an accepted outline of
a narrative in which controversy could be avoided.
I informed General Schofield, General Wherry, his
chief of staff, and General Opdycke, and they all
expressed their satisfaction that such an outline had
been agreed upon.^ The volume was published, and
1 Ante, p. 262, and March to the Sea, chap. v. 2 Ante, p. 262.
^ All this correspondence took place in 1881, and the letters are in
my private files. General Schofield's was dated December 5, and said :

302 The Battle of Franklin
nearly seven years passed, when the literary peace
was wantonly broken in the manner which has been
sufficiently stated.
In the light of the evidence which has been given,
the candid reader can judge who, if anybody, has
grasped at honors which were unearned. The means
are offered of testing by the Official Records the
vanity or the modesty, the selfish or the generous
motives, of the reports of the carapaign. The lesson
is one which I even think may be useful to the care
ful student of our war history as showing how the
abundance of the official documents and private
material gives unexpected clues to the truth, and
helps in the exposure of false assumptions.
A reference to my method in preparing both my
little volumes of Avar history, the " Atlanta " as well
as the "March to the Sea," will close what I have
to say. Both General Sherraan and General Scho
field scrupulously refrained frora pressing upon me
their own views of their campaigns, and strictly
limited their assistance to furnishing me copies of
papers, raaps, and docuraents. They concurred with
rae that it was not best that they should see any part
of my work till it should appear in print. I was
happy to find, when it was published, that they both
regarded the narrative as authentic and authoritative.
After the volume on Franklin and Nashville appeared.
General Schofield kindly gave it a careful reading,
and noted even minute errors for my assistance in
revising for a new edition. In the account of the
battle of Franklin he noted none, and suggested no
" It is very gratifying to me that you and Stanley have, upon a com
parison of views, found yourselves iu substantial accord in respect to
the relations of your two comraands at Franklin. I believe your way
is now clear to a just and impartial account of that battle."

Controverted Points 303
changes. It was with a satisfaction which was not
unnatural that I had found hira saying of that cam
paign in general : " No doubt you raust be prepared
to meet unjust assaults upon your history ; but you
are fully fortified by the evidence and by sound mili
tary principles. You may well stand fast on the
record, as you have stated it, and I shall take great
pleasure, if there be any need, in defending the
truth as you have written it. " ^ In his letter written
after the more careful reading, ^ the tone is the same,
and it is in it that he spoke of my being possibly
" estopped " from a more critical treatment of these
events ^ by " the generous treatment already given"
to others. Such commendation seemed to me to set
the seal of candor and fairness upon my work.
1 Letter of September 13, 1882.
2 November 29, 1882.
8 See ante, p. 265.

APPENDIX A
GENERAL SCHOFIELD'S REPORT
Dated December 7, 1864
(Part relating to the Battle of Franldin''-')
I arrived at Franklin with the head of column a little
before daylight on the 30th, and found no wagon bridge
for crossing the river, and the fords in very bad condition.
I caused the railroad bridge to be prepared for crossing
wagons, and had a foot bridge built for infantry, which
fortunately also proved available for wagons, and used
the fords as much as possible. I hoped, in spite of the
difficulties, to get all my material, including the public
property, and a large wagon train at Franklin, across the
river, and move the army over before the enemy could
get up force enough to attack me. But I put the troops
in position as they arrived on the south side, the Twenty-
third Corps on the left and centre, covering the Colum
bia and Lewisburg pikes, and General Kimball's division
of the Fourth Corps on the right, both flanks resting on
the river. Two brigades of General Wagner's division
were left in front to retard the enemy's advance, and
General Wood's division, with some artillery, was moved
to the north bank of the river to cover the flanks should
the enemy attempt to cross above or below.
The enemy followed close after our rear guard, brought
up and deployed two full corps with astonishing celerity,
1 0. R., xlv. part i. pp. 342-344.
20

306 Appendix A
and moved rapidly forward to the attack. Our outposts,
imprudently brave, held their ground too long, and hence
were compelled to come in at a run. In passing over the
parapet they carried with them the troops of the line for
a short space, and thus permitted a few hundred of the
enemy to get in. But the reserves near by instantly
sprang forward, regaining the parapet, and captured
those of the enemy who had passed it. The enemy
assaulted persistently and continuously with his whole
force from about 3.30 p. m. until after dark, and made
numerous intermittent attacks at a few points until about
10 p. M. He was splendidly repulsed along the whole line
of attack. The enemy attacked on a front of about two
miles, extending from our left to our right centre, Gen
eral Kimball's left brigade. Our two right brigades
were only slightly engaged. I believe the enemy's loss
in killed and Avounded cannot have been less than 5,000,
and may have been much greater. We captured 702
prisoners and 33 stand of colors.
Our loss, as officially reported, is as follows.*
I am not able at this time to give fully the names of
the killed and wounded oiflcers. Among the latter is
Major General Stanley, commanding the Fourth Corps,
who was severely wounded in the neck while gallantly
urging forward his troops to regain the portion of our
line which had been lost. General Stanley is deserving
of special commendation, and has my hearty thanks for
his cordial support and wise counsel throughout the short
but eventful campaign. Brigadier General J. D. Cox,
commanding temporarily the Twenty-third Corps, de
serves a very large share of credit for the brilliant vic
tory at Franklin. The troops were placed in position
and intrenched under his immediate direction, and the
greater portion of the line engaged was under his com
mand during the battle. I recommend General Cox to
I Tabular statement oraitted. It will be found in chap, xvi., ante.
For the final stateraent of the enemey's losses, see the closing para
graph of this report.

Appendix A 307
the special consideration of the Government. Brigadier
General Ruger, commanding Second Division, Twenty-
third Corps, held the weakest portion of our line, and
that upon which the enemy's assaults were most persist
ent. He is entitled to very great credit. Brigadier
General Eeilly, coinmanding (temporarily) the Third Di
vision, Twenty-third Corps, maintained his lines with
perfect firmness, aud captured twenty battle flags along
his parapet. I am also under great obligations to the di
vision commanders of the Fourth Army Corps, Brigadier
Generals Wood, Wagner, and Kimball, for the admirable
manner in which they discharged every duty, and cannot
refrain from expressing my high commendation, though
in advance of the official report of their immediate com
mander. Colonel Emerson Opdycke, commanding First
Brigade, Second Division, Fourth Army Corps, the re
serve which recaptured the lost portion of our line, is
spoken of by Generals Stanley and Cox as having dis
played on that occasion the highest qualities of a com
mander. I cordially indorse their recommendation. For
other special instances of gallantry and good conduct 1
must refer to subordinate reports.
On my arrival at Franklin I gained the first informa
tion from General Wilson since the enemy commenced
his advance from Duck Eiver. I learned that he had
been driven back and had crossed the Harpeth above
Franklin on the preceding day, leaving my left and rear
entirely open to the enemy's cavalry. By my direction
he sent General Hatch's division forward again, on the
Lewisburg pike, to hold Forrest in check until my trains
and troops could reach Franklin. This was successfully
done, and General Hatch then retired before a superior
force, and recrossed the river, connecting with my infan
try pickets on the north bank early in the afternoon. A
short time before the infantry attack commenced, the
enemy's cavalry forced a crossing about three miles above
Franklin, and drove back our eavalry, for a time seriously
threatening our trains, which were accumulating on the

308 Appendix A
north bank, and moving toward Nashville. I sent Gen
eral Wilson orders, which he had, hoAvever, anticipated,
to drive the enemy back at all hazards, and moved a bri
gade of General Wood's division to support him if neces
sary. At the moment of the first decisive repulse of the
enemy's infantry I received the most gratifying intelli
gence that General Wilson had driven the rebel cavalry
back across the river. This rendered my immediate left
and rear secure for the time being. Previous to the
battle of the 30th I had ordered all trains except ammu
nition and hospital Avagons to Nashville, preparatory to
falling back from Franklin when it should become neces
sary, which I expected on the folloAving day. The enemy,
having nearly double my force of infantry and quite
double my cavalry, could easily turn any position I might
take and seriously endanger my rear.
Only one division of the enemy's cavalry had been
engaged with General Wilson during the 30th. The re
maining three divisions were free to strike my line of
communications, which they could easily do about Brent-
Avood by daylight the next morning. My experience on
the 29th had shown hoAv utterly inferior in force my
cavalry was to that of the enemy, and that even my im
mediate flank and rear were insecure, while my commu
nication with Nashville was entirely without protection.
1 could not even rely upon getting up the ammunition
necessary for another battle. To remain longer at Frank
lin was to seriously hazard the loss of my army, by giving
the enemy another chance to cut me off from reinforce
ments, which he had made three desperate though futile
attempts to accomplish. I had detained the enemy long
enough to enable you to concentrate your scattered troops
at JSTashville, and had succeeded in inflicting upon him
very heavy losses, which was the primary object. I
had found it impossible to detain him long enough to
get reinforcements at Franklin. Only a small portion of
the infantry and none of the cavalry could reach me in
time to be of any use in the battle, which must have been

Appendix A 309
fought on the 1st of December. For these reasons, after
consulting with the corps and division commanders, aud
obtaining your approval, I determined to retire during
the night of the 30th toward Nashville. The artillery
was Avithdrawn to the north bank during the early part
of the night, and at twelve o'clock the army withdrew
from its trenches and crossed the river without loss.
During the next day, December 1, the whole army was
placed in position in front of Nashville.
Information obtained since the above report Yfa,s
written,' and principally since the reoccupation of
Franklin by our troops, makes the enemy's loss 1,750
buried upon the field, 3,800 disabled and placed in hos
pitals in Franklin, and 702 prisoners, making 6,252 of
the enemy placed hors de combat, besides the slightly
wounded. The enemy's loss in general oflicers was very
great, being 6 killed, 6 wounded, and 1 captured. It is
to be observed that more than half of our loss occurred
in General Wagner's division of the Fourth Corps, which
did not form part of the main line of defence. This loss
arose in two brigades of that division from their remain
ing in front of the line after their proper duty as out
posts had been accomplished, and after they should have
taken their positions in reserve, and in the other brigade
(Colonel Opdycke's) in its hand to hand encounter with
the enemy over the portion of the parapet which had
been temporarily lost by the precipitate retreat of the
other two brigades. When it became apparent that we
should have to fall back from Columbia, orders to rejoin
the army were sent to General Cooper, commanding the
troops guarding the crossings of Duck Eiver below Co
lumbia at Centerville, both by myself and the Major Gen
eral commanding, which were obeyed as soon as received,
and General Cooper marched for Franklin. Owing to
delays in receiving his orders and the time necessary to
' The final report was dated Deceraber 31, 1864, incorporating and
adopting the preliminary report of Deceraber 7, preceding.

310 Appendix A
concentrate his troops. General Cooper could not reach
Franklin before its occupation by the enemy, and turned
his column direct for Nashville. Arrived at the Brent
wood Hills by the Charlotte pike on the night of Decem
ber 2, and again found the enemy between him and the
army. He then marched to Clarksville, where he arrived
in safety on the 5th and rejoined my command on the
8th of December. General Cooper deserves great credit
for the skill and judgment displayed in conducting his
retreat.

Appendix B 311

APPENDIX B
GENERAL COX'S REPORT
Dated January 10, 1865
{Battle of Franklin ')
I HAVE the honor to make the following report of the
operations of the Twenty-third Army Corps in the battle
between the U. S. forces, under Major General Schofield,
and the rebel army, under General Hood, at Franklin,
Tenn., on the 30th day of November, 1864.
My own division (Third Division, Twenty-third Army
Corps) reached Franklin about an hour before daybreak
on the morning of the 30th, having marched from Co
lumbia, twenty-two miles, during the night. The division
was halted and massed on the ground upon Avhich the
battle Avas fought, and the men were allowed to cook their
breakfast A\'hilst the trains which were following filed
past into the town. General Schofield, being with the
head of the column, after an examination of the means
of crossing the army to the north side of the Harpeth
Eiver, informed me that the means were so inadequate as
to demand his immediate personal attention, and ordered
that I assume command of the corps and put it in posi
tion to cover the crossing of the remainder of the army
to the north bank of the river. The whole command
Avas moving in from Columbia and Spring Hill by the
turnpike leading from those places to Franklin, and the
enemy was known to be following with his infantry by
1 O. R., xlv. part i. pp. 349-356.

312 Appendix B
the same route, his cavalry being chiefly upon the turn
pike leading from Lewisburg to Franklin. A reconnois
sance of the position as soon as it was light showed that
the ground immediately south of the village was almost
level, and without any cover from woods or orchards for
a distance of nearly a mile from the outskirts of the
village, and even for a considerably longer distance on
the Columbia pike.
A brick dwelling, belonging to a Mr. Carter, the south
ernmost one of the town, stands on the west side of the
turnpike upon a slight knoll over Avhich the road runs
as it leaves the village. This knoll has an elevation of
about ten feet above the lower ground around it, and
even less above that directly south, the slope there being
so slight as to be scarcely perceptible to one approaching
from that direction. The crest of this elevation is about
two hundred yards in length from right to left, and is
divided nearly equally by the Columbia pike. Two other
turnpikes diverge from the village going southward, the
Lewisburg pike on the left (east) and the Carter's Creek
pike on the right (west). A curved line, intersecting
these two last-mentioned roads at the edge of the village,
crossed each of them upon slight elevations of ground,
similar to that at Carter's house on the Columbia pike.
This being the only line apparently tenable near the out
skirts of the town, and sufficiently short to be occupied
in reasonable strength by the two divisions of the corps
(the Second being weakened by the absence of the strong
est brigade), and it being also substantially the line
indicated by the major general commanding upon our
approach to the town, I ordered the troops into position
upon it, and directed that they throw up breastworks
immediately. To completely understand the nature of
the field it is, however, necessary to notice that the rail
road also passes out of the town toward the southeast,
and a little to the left of the Lewisburg pike, and that
the Harpeth Eiver, running northwestwardly, is nearly
parallel to the railroad and quite near to it for some dis-

Appendix B 313
tance, whilst on our right it opens a considerable space
between it and the Carter's Creek pike. Upon the north
bank of the Harpeth and near the left of our line, as
indicated, is a fort, erected some two years since (Fort
Granger), which commands a stretch of the river to the
left, and also a cut of the railroad, through which troops
might advance under cover toward the left of our line.
Eeilly's brigade (First), of my own division, was placed
with its right resting upon the Columbia pike, its front
line consisting of the 100th Ohio and 104th Ohio Volun
teers, its second line of the 12th and 16th Kentucky, and
the 8th Tennessee Volunteers. Its left extended some
what beyond a cotton gin, which stood in a slight angle
of the line about one hundred yards from the Columbia
Turnpike. The Second Brigade (Colonel J. S. Casement,
103d Ohio, commanding) extended the line from Eeilly's
left to the Lewisburg pike, the 65th Indiana, 65th Illi
nois, and 124tli Indiana Volunteers forming his first line,
and the 6th Tennessee Volunteers in the second line.
The Third Brigade (Colonel I. N. Stiles, 63d Indiana, tem
porarily commanding) continued the line from Casement's
left to the Harpeth Eiver, the 128th Indiana, 63d Indi
ana, and 120th Indiana Volunteers in the first line, and
H2th Illinois Volunteers in the second line.
Upon the right of the pike I directed Brigadier Gen
eral Euger, commanding Second Division, Twenty-third
Army Corps, to put his division upon the line indicated,
reaching as far to the right as he could firmly hold the
line. He accordingly placed Strickland's brigade (Third)
upon his left, being immediately on the right of the Co
lumbia pike, the 50th Ohio and 72d Illinois Volunteers
in the first line, and the 183d Ohio and 44th Missouri
Volunteers in the second line. Moore's brigade (Second)
Avas placed on the right of Strickland's, and in order to
cover the Carter's Creek pike was deployed in one line
in the following order : 80th Indiana, 23d Michigan, 129th
Indiana, and 111th Ohio Volunteers, numbering from
right to left, as in the cases of all the other brigades

314 Appendix B
mentioned above. Moore's line being still weak on ac
count of its extent, General Euger ordered fifty men of
the 1 83d Ohio (Strickland's second line) to report to him,
aud they Avere placed by Colonel Moore between the
129th Indiana and 23d Michigan.' By noon a tolerably
good line of breastworks had been erected along the
front described, and in a portion of the line a slight
abattis had been constructed. A small locust grove and
some fruit trees in front of Euger's division had been
used for this purpose, and some Osage orange hedges
about a small enclosure in front of Stiles's brigade on
the left had also been made good use of. One line of this
hedge parallel to Stiles's left front Avas slightly thinned
out and left standing, and in the end proved most useful.
The remainder of the hedge was used along the front of
the Third Division, but there was not sufficient material
near at hand to make the line continuous, nor was there
time to stake it down, so that it amounted simply to a
slight obstruction of small branches and twigs that could
offer no serious obstacle to an advancing enemy, except
as the thorny nature of the Osage orange made it an un
expectedly troublesome thing to handle or remove under
fire. The artillery of the corps had been moved to the
north side of the river early in the morning, under the
direction of Lieutenant Colonel Schofield, Chief of Artil
lery, and a portion of it placed in the fort.
As the troops of the Fourth Corps came in, later in
the forenoon, four batteries from that corps were ordered
to report to me, and I assigned them positions as follows :
1st Kentucky Light Artillery, four guns, on tbe left of
the Columbia pike, in the line of the 100th Ohio Infantry;
Gth Ohio Light Artillery, two guns at the left of the
cotton gin, and two guns on the left of the Lewisburg
pike ; 20th Ohio Light Artillery, four guns, on the right
of the Columbia pike, just west of Carter's house ; and
Battery B, Pennsylvania Volunteers, at the Carter's Creek
1 For a corrected statement of the array of Moore's troops, see
p. 55, ante.

Appendix B 315
pike.' Although not strictly in the order of occurrence,
it Avill tend to greater clearness to add that about three
o'clock in the afternoon, when an attack by the enemy
in force had become more immediate, other batteries of
the Fourth Corps Avere placed in position by Lieutenant
Colonel Schofield and Captain Bridges, Chiefs of Artillery
of the Twenty-third and Fourth Corps, respectively', viz. :
Battery M, 4th U. S. Artillery, and Battery G, 1st Ohio
Light Artillery, were thus placed near the left of Stiles's
brigade, Third Division, Twenty -third Army Corps ; Bat
tery A, 1st Ohio Light Artillery, was placed in reserve
near the Columbia pike ; and Bridges's Battery, Illi
nois Light Artillery, was placed near the centre of
Strickland's brigade, Second Division, Twenty-third
Corps. About noon, some appearance of the enemy's
cavalry being reported on the Carter's Creek pike, I
called the attention of the commanding general to the
fact that Euger's division could not reach any secure
point at which to rest on the right, and shortly after
Brigadier General Kimball, commanding First Division,
Fourth Corps, reported to me by order, and I directed
him to go into position on General Euger's right, filling
the space between the Carter's Creek pike and the river.
At two o'clock I received orders to withdraw the com
mand to the north bank of the river at six o'clock, in
case there should be no attack by the enemy. At this
time nearly the Avhole of the trains and Wood's (Third)
division of the Fourth Corps, had crossed the Harpeth.
Shortly after. Brigadier General Wagner, commanding
Second Division, Fourth Corps, presented in person his
orders to report to me and act under my orders. He
informed me that one brigade (Opdycke's) of his divis
ion was already within the lines, and that the other
two, with a section of artillery, had been acting as rear
guard for the army and were then some two miles at the
1 Two lines in the description of the positions of artillery were, hy
a clerical error, oraitted in the report forwarded to Washington, and
are inserted frora my retained copy of the original.

316 Appendix B
rear, where the Columbia pike passes through a high
range of hills before reaching the plateau on Avhich the
village stands ; that his orders then were to hold the
enemy back until they developed a heavy force mani
festly superior to his own, and then slowly retire within
my lines. I directed Opdycke's brigade to be placed on
the right of the Columbia pike, about two hundred yards
in rear of our centre, as a general reserve; that the or
ders under which General Wagner was then acting as to
the two brigades serving as rear guard should be carried
out, and that when the troops Avere Avithdrawn within the
lines they should be placed in position near Opdycke's
brigade and held in reserve awaiting further orders and
in readiness to support any part of the line. At three
o'clock the two brigades of Wagner's division in front
had fallen back to a position about half a mile in front
of the lines, and reported the enemy developing in force
in their front, Avhilst they opened upon the rebels Avith
the section of artillery Avhich was with them. The order
was then reiterated to General Wagner to Avithdraw the
brigades AA'henever the enemy appeared to be advancing
in decidedly superior force, Avithout allowing his troops
to become seriously engaged. General Wagner was at
that time in person upon the Columbia pike near the
Carter house, where my headquarters had been during
the day.
A slight depression beyond the lines held by Wagner's
advanced brigades prevented the enemy from being seen
from our lines till about four o'clock, Avhen the officers
on the skirmish line reported him advancing in several
lines and in very great force. Almost simultaneously
Avith this report the two brigades of Wagner's division
in front opened a brisk musketry fire, and part of them
were seen making a barricade of rails, etc., apparently
Avith a view of endeavoring to make a stand there, though
the section of artillery retired leisurely within our lines.
Before an order could reach them they were so hotly en
gaged that they could not be withdraAvn in order. The

Appendix B 317
enemy wasted no time in firing, but charged them, and,
being enveloped on the flanks, the two brigades, after a
short and brave though useless struggle, broke to the
rear in confusion. The momentary check at the centre
brought the right wing of the enemy farther forward,
and they came on at a double-quick with trailed arms,
some pieces of artillery advancing and firing between
brigade intervals. As soon as they were seen the bat
teries on our left opened upon them, as Avell as the guns
in Fort Granger, and as they advanced into rifle range
of our infantry, Stiles's and Casement's brigades opened
fire also. The rebel lines could now be plainly seen, as
Avell as the general disposition and apparent purpose of
their movement. Their heaviest masses were advancing
on the line of the Columbia pike, reaching quite to the
river on our left, the two points of assault at that time
being apparently our centre and our extreme left ; the
latter being the point nearest to our bridges, which Avere
necessarily much nearer that flank (one of them being
the railroad bridge), and that being the line of move
ment by which they would most rapidly have cut us off
from crossing the river had our lines been broken. The
extreme left was the portion of our main line first warmly
engaged. The enemy endeaA'ored to pass up the railroad
cut above mentioned, but were enfiladed not only by the
guus in Fort Granger but by Battery M, Fourth U. S.
Artillery, and driven from that shelter. Their lines on
either side, however, advanced steadily. On reaching
the Osage orange hedge in front of Stiles's left, they first
endeavored to force their way through it and pull it
aside. The tough and thorny nature of the shrub foiled
them in this, and they attempted to file around the hedge
by the flank, and under a terrible, withering fire from
Stiles's and Casement's brigades and the batteries on that
flank. They soon abandoned this effort, and most of
those remaining unhurt lay down behind the hedge, and
after keeping up a desultory fire for a time, straggled to
the rear, singly and in small squads.

318 Appendix B
In front of Stiles's right and Casement's left, the ob
structions being fewer and more insignificant, the enemy
advanced rapidly and in good order, though suffering
very severely, up to the breastworks, and made desper
ate efforts to carry them. Their officers showed the most
heroic example and self-sacrifice, riding up to our lines
in advance of the men, cheering them on. One general
officer (Adams) was shot down upon the parajjet itself,
his horse falling across the breastwork. In all this part
of the line our men stood steadily Avithout flinching, and
repulsed the enemy, inflicting terrible loss upon him and
suffering but little in return. Meanwhile, iu the centre,
the enemy gained some temporary advantage. When
the two brigades of Wagner's division, Fourth Corps,
broke, the enemy were close upon them and followed
them in, overtaking and capturing considerable numbers
of the fugitives. Our own men in the lines along the
centre were restrained from firing, in order not to injure
those who were retreating, and the enemy were thus
enabled to come up to the breastworks pell-mell with
Wagner's men, without suffering loss or being seriously
exposed to fire. Immediately upon the pike the crowd
of the retreating troops and the advancing enemy over
whelmed the men at the breastworks there, and a portion
of the right of Eeilly's brigade (Third Division) and
most of Strickland's brigade (Second Division) broke
from the first line. This was not due altogether to
the pressure upon their immediate front, but partly
also to the fact that the orders given by their oflicers
to the rear of Wagner's division coming in from the
front to rally at the rear were supposed 'by many of
the men in the lines to apply to them also. When
the two brigades of Wagner's Avere first seen to be
compromised by getting seriously engaged, as a pro
vision against danger in the centre I had ordered
Opdycke's brigade to be ready to charge up to the
lines instantly, if there should be any confusion there.
This brigade was now ordered up, and came up the

Appendix B 319
turnpike in the most gallant manner; Eeilly's rushed
forward at the same moment.
Major General Stanley, commanding Fourth Corps,
Avho had been ill during the prior part of the day, came
on the field on hearing the sound of battle, and arrived
in time to take an active part in the effort to rally Wag
ner's men, but Avas soon wounded aud his horse shot
under him. The most strenuous efforts were made by
all officers along that part of the line to rally the men,
and Avere so far successful that the line was quickly
restored on the left of the turnpike, and after a sharp
struggle on the right of Strickland's brigade also, though
the enemy continued to occupy in some force a portion
of the outside of the parapet on Strickland's left for a dis
tance of about one regimental front. Opdycke's brigade
occupied the second line, which at that point was not
over twenty-five j'ards in rear of the first, and under
cover of the smoke strengthened a barricade and breast
work which had been before there. The 176th Ohio
Volunteers, a new regiment, unassigned to a brigade,
had reported early in the afternoon by direction of the
commanding general, and was by me temporarily as
signed to Eeilly's brigade and placed in reserve. It
also advanced with the rest of the supporting troops
and did good service, behaving with great steadiness
and courage. The attack extended toward our right to
the Carter's Creek pike. The enemy, being apparently
satisfied of the impracticability of advancing again upon
our left for the reason before stated, pressed farther to
our right, and especially after they had seemed to have
gained some advantage in the centre, their efforts there
and upon their own left were redoubled. Colonel Moore's
brigade held its ground firmly, and although it was in
imminent dauger at the moment when the centre wavered,
repulsed a determined assault, and preserved its line in
tact throughout the battle. The condition of the atmos
phere was such that the smoke settled upon the field
without drifting off, and after the first half hour's fighting

320 Appendix B
it became almost impossible to discern any object along
the line at a few yards' distance. This state of things
appeared to have deceived Colonel Strickland in regard
to his line, as he reported the first line completely re
occupied along his entire front after the repulse of the
enemy's first assault, whilst in fact a portion of it at his
left Avas not filled by our troops, and Colonel Opdycke,
not being personally acquainted with the lines, was not
aware for some time that he had not reached the first
line in Colonel Strickland's front, where the outbuild
ings of Carter's house prevented the line from being dis
tinctly seen from the turnpike even if the smoke had
not formed so dark a covering.
After a short lull the attack was resumed by the
enemy with the same audacity and determination as
before, and, Strickland's brigade suffering considerably,
and being reported by him a good deal weakened, 1
withdrew the 112th Illinois Volunteers from the second
line of Stiles's brigade on the extreme left, and ordered
it to rexDort to Colonel Strickland and to aid in re-estab
lishing the line in his front. It was led forward very
gallantly by Lieut. Colonel Bond commanding, who was
wounded in the advance. The smoke and growing dark
ness deceived also the enemy, who apparently supposed
they had gained full possession of our lines in the
centre, and continued to push iu fresh masses of troops,
only to be destroyed or captured, for very few went back'
insomuch that prisoners captured continually expressed
the utmost surprise, declaring that they supposed and
had been informed that our lines were occupied by their
troops which had assaulted before, and of whom nothing
since had been seen. The ditches in front of the whole
line of the corps, and particularly in the centre, contained
many of the enemy who were unable to get back, and
Avho at the first opportunity surrendered and came over
the breastworks as prisoners. The assaults on the cen
tre, extending considerably to the right of the Columbia
pike and involving Moore's brigade more or less, were

Appendix B 321
obstinately repeated until nightfall, and even as late as
nine o'clock attacks were made, which were, however,
easily repulsed, and the enemy withdrew the remnants
of his shattered lines to the position occupied at the
opening of the battle by Wagner's division, in advance
of our lines about eight hundred yards. Alarms occurred
frequently until eleven o'clock, and frequently caused a
general musketry fire on both sides from our centre toward
the right ; but I found no evidence that any real attack
was made at so late an hour, the demonstrations being
manifestly made by the rebels to discover whether our
lines were being abandoned during the evening.
At midnight, all being quiet in the front, in accordance
with orders from the commanding general, 1 Avithdrew
my command to the north bank of the river, leaving a
skirmish line in the earthworks an hour later, when
they also were withdrawn. The whole movement was
made without interruption or molestation from the
enemy, the Third Division moving by the left flank and
crossing the river upon the railroad bridge, which had
been planked, and the Second Division (with Opdycke's
brigade of the Fourth Corps) moving through the town
and crossing by a wagon bridge a little below the railroad
crossing. Upon reaching the north bank I took up the
line of march with my own division for Brentwood in
advance of the army, by command of General Schofield.
General Wagner rallied the two brigades of his division
at the river, but they were not again brought into action.
Kimball's division of the Fourth Corps was to some
extent engaged upon its extreme left in the late attacks,
which reached to and somewhat beyond the Carter's
Creek pike, and that command also suffered somewhat
from the diagonal fire of the enemy upon Euger's divis
ion of this corps. This, however, I state from my own
casual observation alone, as I took no control of the
troops of the Fourth Corps (except Opdycke's brigade)
after General Stanley came upon the field, and have no
official report of their part in the engagement. The
21

322 Appendix B
casualties of the corps during the engagement are
reported to me as follows.'
These lists were made up soon after the engagement,
aud I am convinced that corrected ones, when procured,
will show a considerable diminution in the list of the
missing. The loss of the enemy we are enabled to ap
proximate with some accuracy from the public admissions
from their commander as well as from the statements of
prisoners, our own examination of the field after it again
came into our possession, and the statements of citizens
and hospital attendants remaining in Franklin. From
all these sources the testimony is abundant that the
rebels lost 6 general officers killed, 6 wounded, and 1 cap
tured ; that they buried 1,800 men on the field, and that
3,800 were wounded. The number of prisoners captured
by this corps was 702. Thus, Avithout estimating the
prisoners taken by any part of the Fourth Corps, or the
stragglers and deserters, Avho are known to have been
numerous, the enemy's loss was not less than 6,300.
The attack was made by Stewart's and Cheatham's corps
of Hood's army, Lee's corps being in reserve, and it is
only repeating what is proven by the concurrent testi
mony of all officers and men of the rebel army who were
captured, when I assert that the two assaulting corps
were so weakened in numbers and broken in morale in
this engagement as to lose for the rest of the campaign
the formidable character as opponents which these vet
eran soldiers had before maintained. Their remarkable
loss in general officers attests sufficiently the desperate
efforts to break our lines and the heroic bravery of our
own troops, who repulsed their repeated assaults.
The transmission of this report has been delayed by
reason of waiting for reports of subordinate commanders,
and the whole are noAv submitted.
1 See table, chap, xvi., ante.

Appendix G 323

APPENDIX C
GENERAL WOOD'S REPORT
Dated January 10, 1865
(Part relating to Battle of Franklin'^)
Headquaetees Fouktii Arma- Corps,
Huntsville, Ala., January 10, 1865.
In pursuance with orders received from the headquarters
Department of the Cumberland to report the operations
of the corps from the time it was detached from the
main army of the Military Division of the Mississippi,
in the latter part of October, to its arrival at Nashville,
on the 1st of December ultimo, I have the honor to sub
mit the following. . . .
On arriving at Franklin the Twenty-third Corps had
taken position in the suburbs of the village, with its left
resting on the river above the town and its right extend
ing across and west of the turnpike road. The First Di
vision of the Fourth Corps (Kimball's) Avas posted on
the right of the Twenty-third Corps, with its right flank
resting on the river below the town. Intrenchments
were at once thrown up by the Twenty-third Corps and
Kimball's division, of the Fourth Corps. The Third
Division of the Fourth Corps arrived next, and was
ordered to cross the river and take post on the north
side. This was done. Wagner's (the Second Division),
which was marching in rear, was ordered to halt on a
range of hills nearly two miles south of the town and
deploy his command to hold the enemy in check should
he attempt to press us. In the mean time the transpor-
1 0. R., -xlv. part i. pp. 119-126.

324 Appendix C
tation was being passed rapidly across the river. At
12 M. General Wagner reported the appearance of the
enemy in heavy force in his front, and later he reported
that the enemy was evidently making preparations to at
tack him in force. The position General Wagner then
held was entirely too extensive to be covered by one
division, and as the country was open on both flanks and
favorable to the movement of troops, the position could
be readily flanked ; hence General Wagner very judi
ciously determined to retire his command nearer to the
town. He posted two brigades, Conrad's and Lane's,
across the pike, with their flanks slightly refused, about
a third of a mile south of the intrenched position of the
Twenty-third Corps. The other brigade, Opdycke's, was
sent inside of our main works, — a most fortunate dispo
sition of this brigade, as the sequel of this narrative will
show. Conrad's and Lane's brigades hastily threw up rude
barricades to protect themselves from the coming storm.
Their orders were to maintain their position as long as
it could be done without becoming too severely engaged,
and then retire on the main line. At 4 p. m. the enemy
made a vigorous attack on the front of these two ad
vanced brigades, threatening at the same time their
flanks with strong columns. Unwilling to abandon their
position so long as there was any probability of main
taining it, unfortunately the gallant commanders re
mained in front too long, and as a consequence, when
they did retire, they were followed so closely by the
enemy as to enter the works through the break which
had been caused by the burst over them of the retiring
brigades. The enemy had come on with a terrific dash,
had entered our intrenchment, and victory seemed almost
within his grasp. Our line had been broken in the cen
tre, two four-gun batteries had fallen into the hands of
the enemy, and it seemed that it was only necessary for
him to press the advantage he had gained to complete his
success. But at this critical moment the gallant, prompt,
and ready Opdycke Avas at hand, calling to his men in a

Appendix G 325
stentorian tone, " Forward to the lines ! " and, adding
example to command, he, Avith his bold brigade, with
lowered bayonets, rushed forward, bore the exultant
enemy back over our intrenchments, recovered the lost
guns, and captured nigh 400 prisoners. But this reverse
did not seem to discourage the enemy ; it seemed rather
to add to his determination and increase the vigor of his
assaults. On, on, he came, till he made four distinct as
saults, each time to be hurled back with heavy loss. So
vigorous and fierce were these assaults that the enemy
reached the exterior slope of the rude intrenchments, and
hand to hand encounters occurred between the courageous
combatants across the Avorks ; and between the assaults
the work of death was not stopped. The undulations of
the ground are such as to afford good protection to an
attacking force. Under this cover the enemy pressed
sharpshooters as near our lines as possible, and kept up
a most galling fire. While these vigorous attacks were
being made on our centre and left, the right, held by
Kimball's division, was also fiercely attacked three times,
all of which assaults were handsomely repulsed, with
comparatively slight loss to us, but with terrific slaugh
ter of the enemy. At no time did the enemy gain any
advantage on this part of our lines. As night approached
the enemy desisted from his fierce assaults, and his offen
sive efforts degenerated into a sharp skirmish fire.
Thus terminated one of the fiercest, best contested,
most vigorously sustained passages at arms which have
occurred in this war.
When the enemy had temporarily broken our centre,
Major General Schofield, commanding the forces in the
vicinity of Franklin, under the apprehension that our
forces engaged on the south side of the river might be
compelled to pass to the north side, ordered the follow
ing disposition, which Avas raade, of the Third Division
(then in reserve) of the Fourth Corps, with a view to
covering the withdrawal of our troops, should it become

326 Appendix C
necessary : Beatty's brigade was deployed on the north
bank of the river above the town ; Streight's brigade
along the bank of the river immediately opposite the
town ; and Post's brigade on the bank of the river below
the town. Fortunately the exigency for which this dis
position was made did not occur in the progress of the
contest, but the brigades retained their positions to cover
the Avithdrawal at night, which had been ordered before
the occurrence of the attack. To prepare for the with
drawal and retirement toward Nashville, the trains were
started before nightfall of the 30th. At midnight the
troops on the south side of the river began to withdraw
from the lines and pass to the north side of the stream ;
this work was rapidly and successfully accomplished.
The enemy probably suspected what was going on, but did
not attempt to interfere with the movement. The Third
Division of the Fourth Corps had been designated to
move in rear and cover the retrograde movement. By
3 A. M. of the 1st of December all the troops had been
withdraAvn from the south side of the river, and the
bridges were fired. So soon as the conflagration was so
far advanced as to insure its being complete, the Third
Division commenced to withdraw, and by 4 A. m. the
whole of it was on the road. As the flames rose from
the bridge and communicated fully to the enemy our
movements, he opened a heavy cannonade, which fortu
nately did no injury, and was soon suspended; other
wise the enemy did not attempt to molest us. The rear
of the command reached Brentwood, nine miles north of
Franklin, at 9 A. m.
In conclusion it is proper that 1 should remark that
during the operations briefly sketched in this report the
corps was commanded by Major General Stanley. He
Avas wounded in the battle at Franklin, and was com
pelled by the casualty to relinquish command of the
corps before he could submit a report of its operations;
hence the duty has devolved on me.

Appendix D 327

APPENDIX D
GENERAL STANLEY'S REPORT
Dated February 25, 1865
(Part relating to Battle of FranMin ')
General Kimball's division reached Franklin soon
after nine o'clock and took up position on the right of
the Twenty-third Corps, the right flank of the divis
ion resting on the Harpeth below Franklin. The line
selected by General Schofield was about a mile and a
half in length, and enclosed Franklin, resting the flanks
upon the river above and below the town. The trains
were all crossed over to the north side of the Harpeth;
Wood's division was also crossed and posted to watch
the fords below the place. Colonel Opdycke reached
the heights two miles south of Franklin at 12 m. He
was directed to halt on the hills to observe the enemy.
Croxton's brigade of cavalry was steadily pushed back
by the enemy's infantry column on the Lewisburg pike,
and at one o'clock General Wagner reported heavy col
umns of infantry approaching on the Columbia and
Lewisburg pikes. General Wagner was instructed to
fall back before the advance of the enemy, observing
them. About the same time word was received that
the rebels were trying to force a crossing at Hughes's
Ford, two miles above Franklin.
From one o'clock until four in the evening the enemy's
entire force was in sight and forming for attack, yet in
I O. R., xlv. part i. pp. 112-118.

328 Appendix D
view of the strong position we held, and reasoning from
the former course of the rebels during this campaign,
nothing appeared so imjprobable as that they would as
sault. I felt so confident in this belief that I did not
leave General Schofield's headquarters until the firing
commenced. About four o'clock the enemy advanced
with his whole force, at least two corps, making a bold
and persistent assault, Avhich, upon a part of the line,
lasted about forty minutes. When Wagner's division
fell back from the heights south of Franklin, Opdycke's
brigade Avas placed in reserve in rear of our main line, on
the Columbia pike. Lane's and Conrad's brigades were
deployed — the former ou the right, the other the left of
the pike — about three hundred yards in front of the
main line. Here the men, as our men always do, threw
up a barricade of rails. By whose mistake I cannot tell,
it certainly was never a part of my instructions, but
these brigades had orders from General Wagner not to
retire to the main line until forced to do so by the fight
ing of the enemy. The consequence Avas that the bri
gades stood their ground until the charging rebels were
almost crossing bayonets with them, but the line then
broke — Conrad's brigade first, then Lane's — and men
and officers made the quickest time they could to our
main lines. The old soldiers all escaped, but the con
scripts being afraid to run under fire, many of them were
captured. Conrad's brigade entered the main line near
the Columbia pike, Colonel Lane's several hundred yards
to the right of the pike. A large proportion of Lane's
men came back with loaded muskets, and, turning at the
breastworks, they fired a volley into the pressing rebels
now not ten steps from them. The part of the Twenty-
third Corps stationed in the works for a distance of about
three [hundred] or four [hundred] yards to the right
of the Colurabia pike, and which space took in the 1st
Kentucky and 6th Ohio Batteries, broke and ran to
the rear Avith the fugitives from Conrad's brigade. To
add to the disorder the caissons of the two batteries gal-

Appendix D 329
loped rapidly to the rear, and the enemy appeared on
the breastAvorks and iu possession of the two batteries,
which they commenced to turn upon us. It was at this
moment I arrived at the scene of disorder, coming from
the town on the Columbia pike ; the moment was criti
cal beyond any I have known in any battle — could the
enemy hold that part of the line, he was nearer to our two
bridges than the extremities of our line. Colonel Op
dycke's brigade was lying down about one hundred yards
in rear of the works. I rode quickly to the left regi
ment and called to them to charge ; at the same time I
saw Colonel Opdycke near the centre of his line urging
his men forward. I gave the colonel no order, as 1 saw
him engaged in doing the very thing to save us, viz., to
get possession of our line again. The retreating men of
Colonel Conrad's brigade, and, I believe, the men of the
Twenty-third Corps, seeing the line of Opdycke's brigade
start for the works, commenced to rally. I heard the
old soldiers call out, " Come on, men, we can go wher
ever the general can," and, making a rush, our men im
mediately retook all the line, excepting a small portion
just in front of the brick house on the pike. A force of
the rebels held out at this point, and for fifteen or twenty
minutes, supported by a rebel line fifty yards to the rear,
poured in a severe fire upon our men. So deadly was
this fire that it was only by the most strenuous exertions
of the officers that our men could be kept to the line ;
our exertions, however, succeeded, and in twenty min
utes our front was comparatively clear of rebels, who
fell back to the position formerly held by the two bri
gades of the Second Division in the commencement of
the fight, from whence they kept up a fire until mid
night, when we withdrew. Just after the retaking of
the line by our troops, as I was passing toward the left
to General Cox's position, my horse was killed ; and no
sooner had I regained my feet than 1 received a musket-
ball through the back of my neck. My wound, however,
did not prevent my keeping the field, and General Cox

330 Appendix D
kindly furnished me a remount. The rapidity of the
firing made it very difficult to keep up the ammunition,
the train being some two miles distant on the road to
Nashville when the battle commenced, and our greatest
danger at one period of the battle was that we would
exhaust our ammunition. One hundred Avagon-loads of
ammunition, artillery and musket cartridges, were ex
pended in this short battle, belonging to the ordnance
train of the Fourth Army Corps; this train, however,
supplied in great part the wants of the Twenty-third
Corps. After the first great attack and repulse the enemy
made several feeble demonstrations, and until nine
o'clock in the evening formed and advanced upon the
Columbia pike three or four times. 1 think these move
ments were made to keep us from moving, or to ascer
tain the very moment we left. At the commencement
of the engagement word came that the enemy's cavalry
had forced a crossing at Hughes's Ford, and calling upon
me for support for our cavalry. General Wood was
directed to send a brigade, and General Beatty's brigade
had started, when information came that our cavalry
had driven the rebels back and the reinforcements would
not be needed. General Kimball's division, holding the
extreme right of the line, had comparatively an easy
thing of this fight ; being well posted behind breast
works, their volleys soon cleared their front of rebels.
One brigade, Colonel Kirby's, only had the opportunity
to fire one volley, and this was a very effective one, at a
rebel brigade which endeavored to move obliquely across
our front to gain the right bank of the river. It having
been determined to withdraw the troops to Nashville,
they were directed to leave the line at midnight, the
flanks withdrawing first and simultaneously, the pickets
to be withdrawn when all the troops had crossed. Some
villain came very near frustrating this plan by firing a
house in Franklin ; the flames soon spread, and the pros
pect was that a large fire would occur, which, lighting

Appendix D 331
up objects, would make it impossible to move the troops
without being seen. My staff officers and General Wood's
found an old fire engine, and getting it at work, the flames
were soon subdued, and the darkness was found to be in
creased by the smoke. At midnight the withdrawal was
made successfully, although the enemy discovered it and
followed our pickets up closely.
General Wood's division remained on the north side
of the Harpeth until four o'clock in the morning as rear
guard, destroying the bridges before he left. The enemy
indulged in a furious shelling as soon as they found Ave
had left. In the fight of the day before their artillery
had not come up, and but two batteries were used upon
us. These two batteries threw shells into the town dur
ing the entire fight.
Although Brigadier General J. D. Cox was not in my
command, he was my close neighbor in the battle of
Franklin, and 1 take this opportunity to express to him
my thanks for his gallant help at that time.

332 Appendix E

APPENDIX E
STATEMENT OF COLONEL DOW
November 29, 1864. Was left as Inspector, Third Divis
ion, Twenty-third Corps, in charge of pickets at Duck
Eiver, when the division was moved to Spring Hill aud
Franklin. Had with me the pickets actually on duty
and 12th and 16th Kentucky as supports, with tAvo
ambulances and one Avagon loaded Avith ammunition.
The skirmish line was a long one, and consisted of some
hundreds of men besides the supports.
Eemained till midnight, as ordered, then relieved the
skirmishers, and drew them in, and started Avith them
for Spring Hill and Franklin to overtake the division.
Passed Spring Hill just as the sun was rising, and over
took the rear of the Fourth Corps a mile or so north of
Spring Hill.
Met General T. J. Wood, Avho was at what I supposed
was the rear of the column. After informing him who
I Avas and the command with me, General Wood made a
remark which I remember. He said, "Well, Major, do
you think the Lord will be Avith us to-day ? " I marched
in rear of all the column of which 1 knew anything,
some four or five miles, when the enemy's cavalry made
an attack on our right, and had evidently been trying to
reach the train. They were occupying higher ground to
the east of the pike, perhaps a thousand yards away.
General Wood told me to take my command and go over
the fence, and drive those fellows off. I obeyed him,
and did so, and we drove them off easily. A section of
artillery took part in this affair from a position, say a
quarter of a mile ahead of us, on the pike.

Appendix E 333
We passed some wagons which had been destroyed
by the dash of the enemy's cavalry, but whether then
or at another time that morning, can't be sure. They
(the wagons) were already nearly burned up when Ave
saw them.
We reached Franklin about noon, when I reported my
command, which was ordered into second line of Reilly's
brigade to which it belonged. I distinctly remember
that the 16th Kentucky lay with its right at the pike iu
Eeilly's second line, and the 12th lay on its left. After
these joined their command, I returned to staff duty.
Being greatly fatigued, I threw myself down somewhere
after 1 got my dinner, and slept till about the time of
the enemy's advance to open the battle.
Being told they were forming, 1 went to the lines on
the pike, where the pike passed through the breastwork.
I saw the enemy advancing. I saw the battery that had
been with Wagner's two brigades trot leisurely through
the works. Don't remember anything about Wagner
himself. Saw the break at the front, and saw Wagner's
men coming in in confusion. Several of the staff were
together, and when we called for our horses, the orderlies
had disappeared with them. Some went to bring them
up again or to join the General (Cox), who was at that
time farther to the left.
The first incident I distinctly remember after this was
seeing the 16th Kentucky go forward in fine style along
the left of the pike to the works from which the 100th
Ohio had been driven with the crowd of fugitives that
came in. They regained the line. Opdycke's brigade
came forward, and Generals Stanley and Cox were on the
pike with them. Captain Tracy was with General Cox,
and I joined in the effort to rally the men who had come
in in confusion or who had left the line. General Stan
ley was wounded in the first melde, and his horse shot
also. I saw his wound in the neck, and saw him re
mounted on one of General Cox's horses. General Cox's
headquarters were close to the pike on its left, in rear of

334 Appendix E
Eeilly's right, during the remainder of the battle, and
from there he and the staff went to do any duty that
called. 1 don't remember seeing Wagner during the battle.
Stanley exercised no command while there, but rallied
the men. 1 was along the line on duty, more or less,
during the engagement. 1 carried the order to the 112th
Illinois to go to the right and attempt to get Strickland's
line up to the original breastworks. I led the regiment
across, halted them near the pike, and explained the
thing expected of them ; then took them to Strickland's
line, and we got over his barricade and crawled forward
to the front line, a distance of three or four rods. It
Avas already dark or dusk, and I can't be entirely certain
as to the distance back of the Carter house where we got
over the works. It was a short distance west of the
pike. We crept forward to the front, and as we rose
were met with so heavy a fire that we were obliged,
after a little, to go back to Strickland's new (or second)
barricade. I knew at the time that part of the 104th Ohio got
over the works in their front soon after our effort in
Strickland's line, captured the enemy lying in the
trenches, and cleared the front there if not in front of
Strickland. For reasons 1 will state presently, 1 am
confident none of the enemy's force stayed at the out
side of our breastworks long after dark, and that they
retired under cover of darkness, all who were able to, to
positions near where Wagner's two brigades had been.
Some time in the evening 1 was sent by General Cox
to General Schofield's headquarters on the north side of
the river. 1 found him and General Stanley together.
They were at a house, say half or three quarters of a
mile from the river, where I understood General Scho
field fixed his headquarters about dark. I had been sent
to arrange with Colonel Hartsuff, Inspector of the Corps,
for the skirmish line which was ordered to be left when
the line should be withdrawn. When the request had

Appendix E 335
first been sent to General Cox to have me go to meet
Hartsuff, General Cox did not permit me to go, as we
were busy at the front, but later in the evening 1 went
over at the General's direction.
I am confident a good many of the 100th Ohio went
back to the line after the second line advanced. The
works east of the pike were full of men, three or four
deep, showing that the ranks were practically doubled,
or more. Indeed, there was quite a crowd all along
there. When the command moved out of the works, near
raidnight, I was left in charge of the skirmish line,
which was detailed to occupy them for another hour.
1 went over the works, and walked some distance out
in front. No enemies were there but those disabled or
dead, and the cries of the wounded for help were very
distressing. At that time I heard no signs of any force
on either side of the pike. There had been occasional
sharp volleys all the evening, but these had ceased, and
there was no shot fired while our troops were withdrawn,
nor during the time I stayed, or while I withdrew the
skirmishers. We moved off entirely undisturbed, and
overtook the command after daylight.
The foregoing is written at my dictation, and is a
correct statement of the facts which 1 remember as to
the battle of Franklin and the events of the preceding
night. (Signed) T. T. Dow.

336 Appendix F

APPENDIX F
STATEMENTS OF COLONEL COX

Cincinnati, Ohio, June 16, 1881.
My dear General, — Perhaps my personal recollec
tions of some of the incidents connected Avith the battle
of Franklin may be of service some day in connection
with more important testimony, and I jot them down for
your use.
After we had established our lines about the town to
cover the crossing of our army trains over the Harpeth
Eiver, most of the officers of your staff were trying to get
a little rest after our hard night march from Columbia
and Spring Hill, and were lolling around on the porch
and grass in front of the Carter house near to the Frank
lin pike. Two brigades of General Wagner's division of
the Fourth Corps were in line some distance in advance
of the main line, they having been the rear guard in the
retreat from Columbia. I recollect your having a con
versation with General Wagner about the position of his
troops and the necessity of their being retired within the
main line should Hood attack us, and before there should
he any danger of their being engaged where they were.
You then rode off toward the left with Captain Tracy,
and, I think, Lieutenant Coughlan.
A short time after this Captain Bradley and I were
sitting on the steps of the Carter house, when the first
premonition to us of battle came in the shape of a shell
tearing off a portion of the cornice of the porch and ex-

Appendix F 337
ploding in the yard near by.' We immediately ran to
our horses, preparing to take the direction you had gone,
down the line, and as we crossed the road saw a staff
oflBcer come dashing in from the front, up to where Gen
eral Wagner was, near the opening in the main line on
the pike, and we very naturally stopped to hear what he
had to say. He reported that the enemy was moving
forward in line of battle, evidently in force, and would
overlap the two brigades in front on both flanks, and he
did not think they ought to remain there any longer. " Go
back," said General Wagner, « and tell them to fight, —
fight like hell ! " Bradley and I at once remonstrated
with General Wagner, saying that such an order we were
sure was not in accordance with the understanding had
with you. But he simply reiterated it more forcibly, if
possible, than before, and the staff officer rode off to the
front. Bradley and I then started off to report this
strange affair to you. Before it could be corrected, how
ever, the mischief was done, and Wagner's two brigades
came in only as they came with the enemy on their
heels. After the break in our line on the pike (caused by
Wagner's men and the enemy mounting our works at the
same time and so obliging that part of our corps to with
hold its fire) was re-established by General Opdycke's
brigade, General Stanley rode up to the front at this
point ; but he had scarcely done so (and before he had
time to view the field or give or suggest an order) when
he was wounded and his horse shot. Captain Tracy then
dismounted from your dun horse which he had been
riding, and gave it to Stanley, who immediately mounted
and rode off through the village. This was the only time
I saw General Stanley that day until I went over the
river in the evening to see General Schofield at his head-
I A veranda on the south side of tlie ell of the Carter house faced
toward our front. A cannon shot passed under this veranda, aud
through the eU. The holes of entrance and exit are stiU to be
seen. 22

338 Appendix F
quarters. Of the great battle itself, it is hardly proper
for me to say anything here.
When the many desperate charges in column of the
enemy had been repulsed and the firing along the line
had so far subsided as to indicate that Hood had given
up the fight for the night, I went by your direction over
the river to General Schofield's headquarters to report
the position at the front, and suggest to General Scho
field that you were so well satisfied with the punishment
Hood had received, that you urged the holding of the
lines and the reinforcement of them from Nashville that
night, so that we might take the offensive in the morn
ing, and that you were willing to guarantee our success
from that point, with your head.
At General Schofield's headquarters, besides his usual
staff, I saw General Stanley and several officers. After
making my report and delivering your message to Gen
eral Schofield, he said to me in the presence of all there,
" Go back and tell General Cox that he has won a glo
rious victory, and however much his suggestions weigh
with me, my orders from General Thomas are to fall
back to Nashville as speedily as possible, and it must be
done. Therefore, so soon as the enemy withdraws suf
ficiently and General Cox thinks it safe, tell him to put
the whole command in motion and cross the river."
We crossed the river that night late, having been kept
in position an hour or so by the burning of a barn in
town that so illuminated our movements that we were
obliged to wait and see it out. Yours,
(Signed) Theo. Cox.
General J. D. Cox. II Cincinnati, October 2, 1889.
Mt dear General, — I remember very distinctly that
our headquarters at Franklin, November 30, 1864, were

Appendix F 339
fixed at the Carter house when we first reached the town
early in the morning. After it was determined that the
Twenty-third Corps must remain there and defend the
position until bridges could be made over the Harpeth
and all our army trains crossed to the north bank, a few
of our most necessary tents were taken out of the wagons
and put up on the slope of the hill just north of the
house. During the day and up to midnight, members of
your staff and orderlies were always in that vicinity.
The tents, however, were removed about the time the
battle opened, and 1 did not see them again till we got
settled down at Nashville.
A short time after the line had been restored, Captain
Hentig, A. Q. M., reported that stragglers had taken pos
session of the old county bridge to such an extent as to
block his trains, and you sent me down there to help
right matters and put a guard upon the bridge. While
in that vicinity I saw General Wagner making efforts to
rally what I suppose was a part of his broken and demor
alized command. He was very excited and demonstra
tive. In his pleading and remonstrating with his men,
I have the most vivid recollection of his using these
words : " Stand by me, boys, and I '11 stand by you ! "
Upon my stating to General Wagner my orders, he
volunteered to place a guard on the bridge, and see that
no more trouble occurred between the men and the cross
ing trains. Ever truly,
(Signed) Theo. Cox.
General J. D. Cox, Cincinnati.

INDEX

N. B. — Tlie rank of officers engaged at Franklin is thai which they lore at the time.

Adams, John, Brig. Gen. com'g
Brigade, 88. His charge and
death, 127, 128.
Ammunition. Twenty-third Corps
trains sent over the Harpeth, 50.
Supply from Fourth Corps trains,
50, note.
Artiolks op Wak, Interpretation
of, 274 et seg.
Artillery positions at Franklin, 55-
59, 75, 84, 108, 175, note. With
drawal, 186 et seq. First orders,
267.
Ashbuey, Capt. com'g Schofield's
cavalry escort, 34, note.
Atwater, Frederick A., Capt.
com'g 51st Illinois, 79, note.
Atwater, Merritt B., Major
com'g 42d Illinois, 78, note, 252.
Ayehs, Stephen C, Surgeon.
Hospital work, Incident, 185, note.
Baldwin, A. P., Lieut, com'g Bat
tery, 110. At the Cotton-Gin, ib.
Withdrawal, 187.
Baldwin, Byron C, Color Serg't.
Leads a rail}', 109.
Barnes, Milton, Lieut. Col. com'g
97th Ohio. At outpost, 78, 79,
note. Ee-organization, 250.
Bare, Andrew J., Lieut. Col. 44th
Missouri, 57. Position at Frank
lin, ib. Report, 118, note. Breast
works, ib., 240. Eegiment trans
ferred, 210, note.
Bate, William B., Maj. Gen.
com'g Division, 88. Formation for
attack, 132. Convergent advance.

133. Casualties, 135. Line laps
Brown, 152.
Bates, Edward P., Capt. com'g
125th Ohio. In Opdycke's charge
at centre, llfi. New barricades,
ib., 238.
Beatty, Samuel, Brig. Gen. com'g
Brigade, 168.
Beauregard, G. T., General. His
command, 4. Relations to Hood,
5, 6. Judgment on battle of
Franklin, 12, 197.
Bennett and Haigh, History 36th
Illinois, cited, 241.
Bieghlb, Alexander W., Lieut.
com'g ambulances, 182.
Bond, Emery S., Lieut. Col. com'g
112th Illinois. Reinforces Strick
land, 161. Effort to retake main
line, ib. Wounded, 162. Later
career, 162, note. Second line,
240.
Bostick Place. Topography, 47.
Battery there, 132. Bate's line, ib.
Bradley, D. C, Lieut. & A. D. C.
Wagner's orders, 106.
Bradley, Luther P., Brig. Gen.
com'g Brigade, wounded at Spring
Hill, 64. Wagner's characteris
tics, 231.
Bradshaw, Egbert C, Colonel
44th Missouri. AVounded, 57,
117, note, 240. Eegiment trans
ferred, 210, note.
Brantly, William F., Brig. Gen.
com'g Brigade, 88. Attack, 153.
Bridges at Franklin, 45. Repair
of County Bridge, 50. Eailway

342

Index

bridge, 51. Retirement of troops,
188 et seq.
Bridges, Lyman, Captain and Chief
of Artillery, 57. Batteries re
ported to Cox, ib., 58, 82, 260,
note. Position of batteries, 108,
117, note, 132. Withdrawal, 187.
Understanding of orders, 208.
Brown, John C, Maj. Gen. com'g
Division, 88. His advance, 93,
104. Attacks Euger, 132. Lines
of attack, 152, 155. Wounded,
165.
Brown, John H., Capt. 12th Ken
tucky. At the Cotton-Gin, 111.
Brown, Robert C, Lieut. Col.
com'g 64th Ohio, 79, note.
Buckner, Allen, Colonel 79tli
Illinois, 79, note. At Franklin,
249. Reporting to Eeilly, 25U.
Buford, Abraham, Brig. Gen.
Cavalry Division, 83. At Frank
lin, 86, 174.
Bullock, Robert, Colonel com'g
Brigade, 132, 135.
Burdick, John S., Lieut, com'g
Battery, 108. Wounded, 187.
Buenside, Ambrose E., Maj. Gen.
Losses at Fredericksburg, 15.
Buer, Frank H. Article cited, 17,
note.
Campbell, John A., Major &
A. A. G., 39, 57, 60.
Canby, Samuel, Lieut, com'g
Battery, 125. In action, ib. With
drawal, 187.
Capers, Ellison, Colonel 24th
South Carolina, 93. Description
of field, 93, 94, 154. Wounded,
155. Later career, 155, note.
Cafron, Horace, Brig.-Geu. Cav
alry, 172.
Carter, F. B., his house the centre
of the line, 43. Topography, 44,
45. Fighting around the house,
97, 116, 119, 142. Experience of
his family, 197.
Carter, John C, Brig. Gen.
com'g Brigade, 88. In second
line, 93, 132, 152. Attack, 155.

Carter, M. B. Aids in fixing lo
calities, 43, 44, 77. His narrative,
199. Second line, 242.
Carter, Theodoeic, Captain.
Wounded, 197, 200.
Cakter, Captain 72d Illinois. Effort
to retake first line, 161.
Casement, John S. Colonel 103d
Ohio, com'g Brigade, 52. Position
at Franklin, ib., 112. Attacked,
121, 123. Repulses the enemy,
126, 127. Slight loss, 129, note.
Incident, 146, note. Later career,
147, note. Second line, 240. Cox
in command ou the line, 284,
285.
Casualties at Franklin, compared
with other battles, 15. Reilly's bri
gade, 114. Loring's division, 126,
note. Moore's brigade, 134. Bate's
division, 135. Chalmers's do., 139,
213. Cockrell's brigade, 213, note.
In general, 211 et seq.
Cheatham, Benjamin F., Maj.
Gen. com'g Corps, 17, note. Field
headquarters at Franklin, 69. De
ployment, 88. Advance, 98, 105.
His dead within our works, 118.
Lines of attack, 152. Condition of
troops, 194.
Chalmers. James E., Brig. Gen.
Cavalry Division, 83. March to
Franklin, 84. At Franklin, 86,
89. Line of attack, 133, 135.
Eeport, 138. Casualties, 139.
Clark, Mervin, Lieut. Col. 183d
Ohio, 57. Killed, 237.
Clayton, Henry D., Maj. Gen.
com'g Division, 84. Report
quoted, 154. In reserve, 165.
Condition of troops, 195.
Cleburne, Patrick R., Maj. Gen.
com'g Division, 87, 88. His
charge at the centre, 104, 123, 149,
156. Killed, 158. Place, 159.
Condition of troops, 194.
Clift, Dr. His house Schofield's
headquarters in morning, 67, 280,
note.
Cockerill, Giles J., Capt. and
Chief of Artillery, 49. Guns in

Index

343

Port Granger, 59, 95, 123, note.
Guns parked, 175, note.
Cockrell, Francis M., Brig. Gen.
com'g Brigade, 88. His attack,
150, 152.
Collamore, G. a.. Major, Surgeon.
Field work, 181.
Columbia, Tenn. The position,
21, 23.
Conrad, Joseph, Colonel 15th
Missouri, com'g Brigade. At
Winstead Hill, B5. Final outpost
position, 73, 76. Asks for direc
tions, 78. His criticism of Wag
ner, 79, note. The orders, 80.
Makes barricade, 92. Hood's
centre checked, 103. Message
to Wagner, 104. Wedge-shaped
line, 131. Groups rallying, 142.
Reorganization, 171. Report, 228,
232. Discussion of rallying place,
iii etseq. Line of retreat, 245, 246.
Coon, Datus E., Colonel com'g
Cavalry Brigade. At Franklin,
172.
Cooper, Joseph A., Brig. Gen.
Commands detachment at Cen
terville, 24. Ordered to Franklin,
29. His troops, 54. Expected at
Franklin, 173. Devious march to
Nashville, 204.
Coughlan, James, Lieut. & A. D. C.
Sent with order to Opdycke, 95.
KiUed at the Cotton-Gin,"ll4.
Cox, Jacob D., Brig. Gen. com'g
Division, 27. Holds crossing of
Duck River, 27, 31. At Spring
Hill, 34. March to Franklin, 37.
At the Carter House, 39. Ordered
to hold Hood back, ib. Put in
command of Twenty-third Corps,
ib. Headquarters, 53. Fourth
Corps batteries report to him, 57.
Schofield's orders for the evening,
68. Wagner's orders, 71. Inspec
tion of lines, 80, 81. Warning to
Wagner, 82. Eide to the left, 91.
Order to Opdycke, 95. Visits
Strickland's line, 142, 144. Visits
Ruger, 144. Orders reinforce
ment from Kimball, 144. Eide

to Stiles's brigade, 146. Case
ment and Reiny, ii., 163. Confi
dence of holding position, 169.
Withdrawal, 186 et seq. Oi'ders
to Opdycke, 190. Burning build
ing, 191. March to Nashville,
192. Discussion of Wagner's
conduct, 220 et seq. His visit at
Nashville, 222. Friendly judg
ment, 223. Opdycke's promotion,
225. Letter to Wagner, 226.
Preliminary report, 227. Official
report, 230, 311. Double breast
works, 233 et seq. Wagner's
men, 257. Command ou the line,
258 et seq. Nine points, 260.
Schofleld quoted, 265. ' Gener
osity,' ib. The ' line ' first estab
lished, 266. The artillery, 267.
Orders to Bridges, 268. To
Ruger, 269. To Kimball, 270.
Relation to the line, 271 et seq.,
291. The Articles of War, 274.
Examples of orders, 277, 278.
Fighting in the night, 289, note.
Eeport of Twenty-third Corps,
294, 311. Stanley quoted, 296,
297. Personal position, 297.
Contemporaneous records, 299,
300. Schofield on the agreed out
line, 301, note. Wherry and
Opdycice, 301. Method in prepar-
ins former histories, 302. Scho
fleld on their accuracy, 303.
Cox, Theodore, Capt. & A. A. G.
At Carter House, 53. Wagner's
orders, 106. His later career, 107,
note. Visits Wagner at river,
146, 225. Sent to Schofield, 169.
Stanley wounded and retires, 283.
At Schofield's headquarters, ib.,
287. Written statements, 336, 338.
Croxton, John T., Brig. Gen.
com'g Cavab'v Brigade, 82. At
Franklin, 86, 173, 175, 177, 178.
Cunningham, S. A., Sergt. Major.
Description of fight, 164. Death
of Strahl, 165.
Cunningham, 'W. E., Capt. 41st
Tennessee. Description of fight
at centre, 164. Wounded, ib.

344

Index

Davis, Jefferson, visits Hood in
Georgia, 2. His approval of Hood's
plan of campaign, 3. His speech
and its pubUcation, ib. Assigns
Beauregard to command in Gulf
States, 4. Judgment on battle of
Franklin, 12.
Davis, Newton, N., Colonel com'g
Brigade. Wounded, 153.
Dawes, Epheaim C-, Major, 227.
Deas, Zachariah C, Brig. Gen.
com'g Brigade, 88.
Dow, This. T., Major 112th lUinois,
Inspector General. On picket at
Duck Eiver, 33. Leads reinforce
ment to Strickland, 146, 161. Sent
to Schofield, 170. Covers with
drawal, 186. Scene on the field,
192. Second line, 240. Wagner,
255. Stanley wounded, and re
tires, 283. AVritten statement, 332.
Dowling, Patrick H., Capt. &
Act'g Insp. Gen. Leads a rally,
119. Wounded, 131. Second line,
241.
Duck River. The position, 23.
Ector, Matthew D., Brig. Gen.
com'g Brigade, 88. Guarding pon
toons, ib., 122.
Elliott, Washington L., Brig.
Gen. assigned to Wagner's divis
ion, 229.
F.4TIGUE op Teoops. Liuiits of
physical endurance, 203.
Featherston, AA'infield S., Brig.
Gen. com'g Brigade, 88. His at
tack, 125, 127, 150.
Field Fortifications. Problem ot
attack and defence, 13, 14, 122, 126,
129, 131.
Field, H. M., Rev. Cited, 17, note.
Figuer's Hill. Topography, 45.
Fort Granger ib. Artillery there,
48, 94, 125, 175.
Finley, Jesse J., Brig. Gen., 88,
132, note.
Fire Discipline, 218, 219. Capt.
F. N. Maude cited, 219, note.

Flags captured, 110, note, 219, 251,
252, 306.
FoEREST, Nathan B., Maj. Gen.
His cavalry corps crosses Duck
Eiver, 24, 26. At Spring Hill, 31,
32, 34. At Franklin, 82. The
march thither, 83. Covering the
infantry, 86. Positions of divisions,
174. Combat at Hughes's Ford,
177. Evening ordei's, 179. March
to Nashville, 196.
FoKT Geahgee, 45, 48, 94, 125, 175.
FosTEE, AVilliam F., Major and
Engineer Stewart's Corps, Map,
83; cited, 242.
Feench, Samuel G., Maj. Gen.
com'g Division, 88. Formation
aud attack, 122, 149.
Frink, C. S., Major, Surgeon, and
Medical Inspector, 40. Schofield's
orders, ib. Field work, 180 et seq.
Paper cited, 185, note.
FULLEETON, JOSEPH S., LiCUt. Col.
& A. A. G., 66. His journal
quoted, 67, 70, 229, 271, 288. Wil
son's visit to the Truett house,
288.
General Officers. Fatality
amongst, 213, 214.
Gist, W. W. Narrative, 17, note,
201. Private soldier, afterward
College Professor, ib. Cited, 246,
252.
Gist, S. E., Brig. Gen. com'g Bri
gade, 88. Advance, 93, 132, 152,
155.
Goodspeed, Wilbur F., Major of
Artillery, 260.
Gordon, George W., Brig. Gen.
com'g Brigade, 88. Advance, 93,
132. Captured, 150, 162. His
attack, 155. Quoted, 156. His
surrender, 158.
GovAN, Daniel C, Brig. Gen.
com'g Brigade, 88.
Granbury, HiiiA:ii B., Brig. Gen.
com'g Brigade, 88. Attack, 156.
Grant, TJlys3ES S., Lieut. Gen.
View of the campaign, 4. Losses
at Shiloh and Cold Harbor, 15.

Index

345

Gregg, T. C. Messenger from Con
rad to Wagner, 107.
Gkose, William, Brig. Gen. com'g
Brigade, 61. Position at Frankliu,
ib. Attacked, 133, 136.
Guibor's battery, 84, 8i), 126.
Haigh, Bennett and. History 36th
Illinois cited, 241.
Halleck, Henuy W., Maj. Gen.,
Chief of Staff of the Army, 10.
Hammond, John H., Bt. Brig. Gen.
com'g Cavalry Brigade. At Tri
une, 172; at Wilson's Mill, 173.
Hampton, Henry, Major & act'g
A. A. G., 165.
Harrison, Thomas J., Colonel
com'g Cavalry Brigade at Frank
lin, 172.
Haetsuff, AVilliam, Lieut. Col. &
Insp. Gen. Details of withdrawal,
170, 186.
Hatch, Edward. Brig. Gen. com'g
Cavalry Division, 32. At Franklin,
86, 172. Combat, 177.
Hatry, August G., Major 183d
Ohio,235. Commands Ruger's skir
mishers, 237. Later career, J6., note.
Wagner's raen, 254.
Hayes, Ed-win L., Lieut. Col. com'g
100th Ohio. Position in line, 59.
Fight at centre, 109.
Heard, J. Theodore. Major, Sur
geon, & Medical Director, 183.
Report, 185, note.
Henderson, Thomas J., Colonel
112th Illinois, coninianding Bri
gade, 52. In the fight, 124, note,
146.
Hentig, Frederick G., Capt. &
C. S., acting Q. M. Message as to
Wagner's men, 14.^.
Hill, R. J., Major, Surgeon. De
scription of the Confederate ad
vance, 95. Field work, 183. Field
hospital north of .iver, 286.
Dresses Stanley's wound, ib.
Hood, John B., Lieut. Gen. Con
ference with President Davis, 2.
Plan of campaign, 3, 4. Subordi
nate to Beauregard, 4, 5. Prelim

inary movements, 5. Delay at
Tuscumbia, 6. His forces, 9. Ad
vances from Florence upon Colum
bia, 11. Criticises his subordinates
at Spring Hill, 12. His tactics at
Franklin, 14. Turns the position
at Duck River, 26. Moves ou
Spring Hill, 31, 32. Attack re
pulsed, 33. Maicli to Franklin,
83. His artillery, 84. Determines
to aitack, 85. Deployment, 87, 88.
Field headquarters, 89. Advance
of his line, 92. Orders to Cheat
ham and Stewart, 98. The roar of
musketry, 99. His centre retarded,
102. His extreme left, 140. Many
lines of attack, 148 et seq. Fierce
ness of tight, 153. His reserves,
165. Chalmers's cavalry, 174.
Forrest's, ib. Night orders, 194.
Condition of troops, ib. March to
NashviUe, 196. Statistics, 207 et
seq. Kecruiting m Tennessee, 208.
The night flghting, 289, note.
Hooker, Joseph, Maj.-Gen. Losses
at Chancellorsville, 15.
Horn, Heney, Sergeant com'g Bat
tery, 187.
Hornbrook, Capt. 65th Indiana,
128, note.
Hunt, AVilliam W., Capt. 100th
Ohio, Acting Major, killed at the
parapet, 109.
Ingersoll, E. J., Capt. 73d Illinois.
Quoted, 285.
Jackson, Henry R., Brig.-Gen.
com'g Brie;arte, 88. Position in
attack. 1.32.
Jackson, William H., Brifr.-Gen.
com'g Cavalrv Divi.=;ion, 83. At
Franklin, 86, 175. Ordered over
the Harpeth, ib. Combat, 177.
James, William, Jr.. Major 72d
Illinois. Wounded. 118, note, 253.
Johnson, Edward, Maj.-Gen. com'g
Division, 31, 84, 88. His attack,
152.
Johnson, Richard W., Brig.-Gen.
com'g Cavalry Division, 82, 172.

346

Index

Johnston, Joseph E., General.
Judgment on battle of Franklin, 13.
Kimball, Nathan, Brig.-Gen.
com'g Division, 29. At Ruther
ford's Creek, ib., 32. March to
Franklin, 35. Coming into posi
tion, 60. His brigades, 61. Orders
for the evening, 68. Rein
forces Ruger's division, 131. Ex
tent of line, 136. Breastworks not
complete, 140. Position firmlv
held, 145. Withdrawal, 188".
Conflict ot orders, 189. Relations
to Cox, 261, 263. Interpretation
of orders, 270.
Kinglake's Invasion of the Crimea,
cited, 79, note.
Kirby, Isaac M., Brig.-Gen. com'g
Brigade. Position at Franklin, 61.
Eeinforces Moore, 134, note, 136.
Lane, John Q., Colonel 97th Ohio,
com'g Brigade. At Winstead Hill,
65. At Privet Knob, 75. Final
outpost position, ib., 76. Wag
ner's orders, 80. Makes barricade,
92. Hood's centre checked, 103.
Wedge-shaped formation, 131.
Groups rallying, 142. Eeorgani-
zation, 171. Eeport, 228, 232.
Discussion of rallying place, 244
et seq. Line of retreat, 245, 246.
Lee, Stephen D., Lieut.-Gen. At
Columbia, 31, 33. FoUows Scho
field's retreat, 34. At Franklin,
84, 152. Eeport quoted, 153, 154.
Locust Grove. Its place, 55, 245,
246.
LoEiNG, William W., Maj.-Gen.
com'g Division. Position and
advance. 123, 124. Casualties, 126,
note. His right, 149.
McClellan, George B., Maj.-Gen.
Losses in Seven-days' battle, 15.
McCoy, Daniel, Lieut.-Col. com'g
175th Ohio. Helps restore the
line, 113.
McDanald, Bed an B., Lieut.-Col.

com'g 101st Ohio. Reinforces
Moore, 134, 234, 264.
McMillin, C. W., Major, Surgeon.
Field work, 282.
McQuaide, John. Finding Cle
burne's body, 159, note.
Manigault, Arthur M., Brig. Gen.
com'g Brigade, 88. His attack, 153.
March to the Sea. Development
of the plan, 7, 8. Number of
troops, 8.
Marshall, Alexander, Captaiu
of Artillery, 69. Section of bat
tery at Winstead Hill, ib., 95. At
Stiles's left, battery in action, 125.
Withdrawal, 187.
Maude, F. N., Capt. R. E., cited,
219, note.
Maurice, J. F., Col. R. A. English
casualties at AVaterloo, 15, note.
Medical Department. Its work,
180 el seq.
Merrill's Hill. See Privet Knob.
Missing, The. Significance ot, 216,
247.
Mitchell, George H., Lieut, of
Artillery. Com'g section with
rear guard, 75, 95.
Mohkmann, Lieut. 72d Illinois.
Letter cited, 253.
Moore, Orlando H., Col. 25th
Michigan, com'g Brigade, 24, note.
Position at Franklin, 54. Repels
enemy's attack, 119, 130, 246.
Reinforced from Kimball's divis
ion, 131, 134. Casualties, 134.
Neely House, Hood's headquarters,
89.
Official Eecoeds. Importance of
the publication, 17, 18.
Opdycke, Emerson, Col. 125th
Ohio, com'g Brigade. His narra
tive, 17, note. Rear guard duty,
64. At Winstead Hill, 65. In re
serve near Carter house, 71. Order
from Cox, 95 & note. His
charge, 98. In the mel^e, 99, 106.
Formation of his troops, 115. At
the retrenchment, 143, 145. Second

Index

347

lino placed, 170. Withdrawal,
190. Promotion, 225. Difference
with Wagner, 224, 231. The
second line, 233 el seq, Separa
tion from Wagner, 249, 256
Lane's and Conrad's men, 257.
Cox's orders, 261, 263. Command
on the line, 282. Stanley's pres
ence, ib. Stanley wounded aud
retires, ib,
Pennepather, Gen., at Inkerman,
79, note.
Phisteker, Frederick, Capt. U. S.
A. Cited, 15, note.
Polk, Lucius E., Brig. Gen. com'g
Brigade, 88.
Pontoons, Schofield's request, 24,
39. Arrive but not used, 50, note.
Porter, Prof. J. G., computes sun
set time, 147, note.
Post, P. Sidney, Colonel com'g
Brigade, 168.
Prather, Allen W., Colonel 120th
Indiana, 125.
¦Presstman, Stephen W., Colonel
of Artillery, 84. Position of guns,
89, 132.
Prisoners, 211, 215.
Privet Knob. Topography, 46,
73. Cheatham's headquarters, 69,
89. Artillery, ib. Lane's skir
mishers, 75. Confederate battery,
89.
Quarles, William A., Brig. Gen.
com'g Brigade, 88. His attack,
150. Wounded, 151.
Ransbottom, Alfred, Sergeant
97th Ohio, 251.
Reilly, James W., Brig. Gen. In
command of division, 51. Posi
tion at Franklin, ib. His own
brigade, 62. Headquarters, 81.
Advance of his second line, 99,
106. Fight at centre, 113. His
later career, ib., note. To whom
opposed, 150. Second line re
placed, 171. Withdrawal, 190.
Conrad's men in his line, 250.

Sally in the evening, 251. Wag
ner's men, 257. Cox in command
on the line, 283.
.Repeating Eifles. A few compa
nies armed with them, 50, note,
Ul, 126, 127, 217.
Reports, value of subordinate ones,
18, 244.
Eetrenohment on Carter Hill, 56,
117, 161. The double breast
works at centre, 233 et seq.
Eeynolds, Daniel H., Brig. Gen.
com'g Brigade, 88. Advance, 123.
Rice, Horace, Colonel com'g Bri
gade wing, 158. At the works, ib.
Eodgers, J. H., Major, Surgeon.
Field work, 182.
Rose, Thomas E., Colonel 77th
Pennsylvania. On skirmish line,
136.
Rosecrans, William S., Maj. Gen.
Losses at Stone's River, 15.
Ross, Lawrence S., Brig. Gen.
com'g Cavalry Brigade. Combat
at Hughes's Ford, 177, note.
Eousseau, Laurence H.^ Lieut.
Col. com'g 12th Kentucky. On
picket at Duck River, 33. March
to Franklin, 35. Position iu line,
52, 69. Charge, 99, Ul.
Ruger, Thomas H., Brig. Gen.
com'g Division, 24, note. Ordered
to Spring Hill, 27, 32, 33. At
Thompson's Station, 34. Position
at Franklin, 49. His arrival, 53,
54. Artillery, 58, 116. Head
quarters, 80. His breastworks,
81, note, 86, 87. Formation of
brigades, 118 et seq. The attack
on Strickland's brigade, ib. On
Moore's, 130. Reinforced from
KimbaU's division, 131, 134. Po
sition firm, 145. Withdrawal,
190. Orders to Cooper, 204.
Service in Cumberland army, 222.
Second line at centre, 239. Un
derstanding of orders, 269.
Russell, Edward C, Orderly,
carries order to Kimball, 264,
note.
Eussell, John, Lieut. Colonel,

348

Index

com'g 44th Illinois. In Opdycke's
charge, 99, 109, 113, 116.
Sanders, D. W,, Major & A. A. G.,
17, note, 44, note. Paper cited,
175, note. Incident, 179, note.
Schofield, George W., Lieut.
Colonel- & Chief of Artillery, 58.
Inspects positions, 82. With
drawal of artillery, 186.
Schofield, John M., Maj. Gen.
Duty assigned to him, 8, 9.
Commands in the fleld under
Thomas, 10. Questions of rank
with Stanley, ib. Reasons for
fi.ghting at Franklin, 11. Ordered
to withdraw to Nashville, ib. His
qualities as commander, 19, 20.
Ordered to delay Hood, 21, 25.
The position at Duck River, 26,
27. Asks for pontoon bridge at
Fi'finklin, 24. Holding Duck
River, 28-32. Thomas's dis
patches, ib. At Spring Hill, 32,
33. Reaches Franklin, 37. Com
munications with Thomas, 38,
40-43. The pontoons, 39. Orders
to Cox, 39, 40. Artillery in Fort
Granger, 49. Pontoons, 50, note.
Orders as to artillery in line, 58.
Moves headquarters, 62, 67, 70.
Forecast of Hood's action, 68. At
Fort Granger, 82, 95, 167. Orders
to Wood, ib. Orders from Thomas,
168. Orders midnight withdrawal,
169. Orders to cavalry in moi-n-
ing, 172. Afternoon, 176. Even
ing, 178, 188. March to Nash
ville, 192. Statistics, 207 et seq.
Preliminary report, 228. Quoted,
265. First orders as to the line,
266. As to artillery, 267. Present
in command, 267. Examples of
orders, 277, 278. Fighting in the
evening, 289, note. The subject
in controversy, 301, 303. His
report, 305.
Scofield, Levi T., Capt. & Act
ing Topographer, 17, note. What
he saw at the centre, 104. Wag
ner's orders, ib. Quoted, 170,

note. Second line, 240. Wagner's
men, 255. Stanley wounded and
retires, 283. Cox in active com
mand on the line, 291.
Scott, Thomas M , Brig. Gen.
com'g Brigade, 88. Attack, 125.
ScoviLL, Charles W., Lieut.
com'g Battery, 108, 187.
Sears, Claudius W., Brig. Gen.
com'g Brigade, 88. His attack,
150.
Seddon, James A., Sec. of War,
212.
Sellon, William R., Lieut. Col.
com'g Post, 205.
Se,xton, .Iames a., Capt. com'g
72d Illinois, 118, note. Effort to
retake first line, 161, 163, note.
Later career, ib. Regiment trans
ferred, 210, note. Second line at
centre, 239, 253. Wagner's men,
253. General oflicers on the line,
285.
Sharp, Jacob H., Brig. Gen.
com'g Brigade, 88. His attack,
153.
Sha-w, Thomas P., Colonel com'g
Brigade. Killed in attack, 153.
Shelley. Charles M., Brig. Gen.
com'g Brigade, 88. Advance, 123,
149. Over our works, 150.
Sherman, William T., Maj. Gen.
Learns Hood's plan, 3. His
counter-plan, 4. Correspondence
with Grant, ib. His forces, 8.
Directions to Thomas, 9, 10. Men
tioned, 272, 277, 302.
Sherwood, Isaac R., Lieut. Col.
com'g lUth Ohio. Position at
Franklin, 131. Repels attack, ib.
His missing, 135, note. Second
line, 241.
Sinclair, William H., Major &
A. A. G., 67, note, 68.
Smith, Andrew J., Maj. Gen.
Ordered to reinforce Thomas, 7.
Arrives at Nashville, 11, 21, 40,
42, 54, note. Name of his com
mand, 210, note.
Smith, George W., Lient. Colonel
com'g 74th and 88th Illinois, con-

Index

349

solidated. In Opdycke's charge,
115.
Smith, James A., Brig. Gen. com'g
Division, 194. Condition of Cle
burne's troops, 195.
Smith, Thomas B., Brig. Gen.
com'g Brigade, 88. Position in
attack, 132, 197, 201.
Spaeks, Joseph S., Major, Surgeon.
Field work, 182.
Spaulding, Olivee L., Colonel
23d Michigan. Builds traverses,
81, note.
Speed, Thomas, Lieut. & Adjt.
12th Kentucky, 17, note. Paper
by him, 43, note, 97, note. His
later career, ib. Description of
fight at the Cotton-Gin, Ul.
Speing Hill. Distance from
Columbia, 27, note. Combat
there, 33.
Stapfoed, Fountain E. P., Colo
nel 31st Tennessee, com'g Brigade,
165.
Stanley, David S., Maj. Gen. In
command of Fourth Corps at
Pulaski, 9. Question of rank
with Schofield, 10. At Spring
Hill, 27, 29, 34. At Frankliu,
orders to Wagner, 64, 66. At
Dr. Cliffs, 6T. At Truett House,
ib., 70. Rides to the front, 98.
In the charge, 99. Wounded, ib.
Eetires, 100. At Schofield's quar
ters, 170. Criticism of Col. Stone's
paper, 259. Extent of Cox's
command, 259 tt seq. Nine points,
260, 262. Gratuitous controversy,
265. Assent to essential facts,
267. Misinterpretation of orders,
270. Effect of his appearaace at
the front, 279 et seq. Leaving
Schofield, 280. Joins Opdycke,
281. Wherry's statement, 281,
note. How long at the front, 282,
283. At the hospital, 286. At
Schofield's quarters, 287. Absence
from the army and return, 294.
Irregular Report, ib., 327. Cox's
help, 297. Passing to the left, ib.
Keeping the field, 297, 298.

Statistics of the battle, 207 et seq.
Stekl, Oscae W., Colonel 104th
Ohio. Eeport of flght at centre,
112.
Stevens's Hill. See Winstead
Hill.
Stevenson, Carter L., Maj. Gen.
com'g Division, 84. In reserve,
165.
Stewaet, Alexandee p., Lieut.
Gen. com'g corps, 87. At Frank
lin, 88, 94. His orders from Hood,
98. Advance of his corps, 122 ei
seq., 150.
Stewaet, Egbert R., Colonel
com'g Cavalry Brigade. At
Franklin, 172. "
Stiles, Israel N., Colonel 63d
Indiana com'g Brigade, 52. Posi
tion at Franklin, 52, 53, 81, 112.
Eariiest attacked, 121, 123. The
hedge, 124. The railway cut, 1 25.
Repulses the enemy, 128, 129.
Sends help to centre, 146.
Stockton, Joseph, Lieut. Col.
com'g 72d Illinois. Wounded,
118, 253.
Stone, Henry, Capt. & A. A. G.,
17, note. Paper in Century War
Book, 258. Extent of Cox's com
mand, ib.
Stone Hill. See Privet Knob.
Stovall, Marcellus A., Brig.
Gen. com'g Brigade. Eeport cited,
166.
Strahl, Otto F., Brig. Gen. com'g
Brigade, 88. In second line, 93, 132,
152. Attack, 155. Killed, 165.
Streight, Abel D., Colonel 51st
Indiana, com'g Brigade, 168.
Strickland, Silas A., Col. 50th
Ohio, com'g Brigade, 24, note.
Position at Franklin, 54. Fight
at the centre, 106. Formation of
regiments, 118. Eeinforced from
Stiles, 146, 152, 161. His second
line, 233.
SuMAN, Isaac C. B., Colonel 9th
Indiana. Extent of Bate's attack,
137.
Sunset. Time of, 147, note.

350

Index

Tactics of Assault. The lesson
of Franklin, 14, 218, 219.
Taylor, Richard, Lieut. Gen. His
department and relations to Beau
regard, 4.
Telegraph. Eccentricities of man
agement, 29, 30.
Thomas, George H., Maj. Gen.
His command, 5, 6, 7. His troops
scattered, 6. His problem, 9.
Sherman's suggestions, ib. His
forces, ib. Orders Schofleld to
assume command in the fleld, ib.
Intends to command in person
when concentration is effectel, 10.
Urges Schofield to delay Hood, 21,
22. Dispatches to Schofield at
Duck River, 21-25. At Franklin,
38, 42, 168. Withdrawing army
to Nashville, 192. Orders to Coo
per, 204, 205. Calls for reports,
227. Relieves Wagner, 230.
Thomasson, Theodore S., Captain
com'g Battery, 187.
Thompson, Charles R., Colonel
com'g Brigade, 204, 206.
Tracy, EdwardE., Capt. & A.D.C.
Sent with oi'ders to Opd3'cke, 96,
261, 263. Dismounted, 262.
Truett, Alpheus. House Scho-
fleld's headquarters, 67.
Turnpikes at Franklin, 46.
Tyler, Robert C, Brig. Gen., 132,
note.
Twining, W. J., Capt. and Chief
Engineer Army of Ohio, 27. Re
connoissance up Duck River, ib.
His report, 31. At Franklin, 37,
38. Repairing the bridges, 49.
His map, 45. Cited, 238, 242, 245.
Van Horne, Thomas B., Historv
of the Army of the Cumberland,
16. Life of Gen. Thomas, 17.
Ammunition expended at Frank
lin, 50, note. Wagner's orders, 74,
note. Stanlev wounded and leaves
the fleld, 284.
AVagner, Arthur L., Captain
U. S. A., cited, 219, note.

Wagner, George D., Brig. Gen.
com'g Division, 29. At Spring
Hill, ib. 35. Bear guard to
Franklin, 35. Checking the ene
my, 63. Deployed at Winstead
Hill, 64. Orders from Stanley,
65, 68. AVithdraws to Privet
Knob, 69, 70. Places Opdycke
in reserve, 71. The division to
do the same, 71, 72. Colloquy
with Opdycke, 73, 224. New
position for Conrad and Lane, 73,
74. Character of the outpost, 77,
78. Orders, 80. At the Carter
house, 82. Orders to Conrad and
Lane, 103 et seq. Eallying his
men, 146. Eeorganization, 171.
Withdrawal, 188. Conflict of or
ders, 189. Discussion of his con
duct, 220 et seq. Visit to Cox,
222. Opdycke's promotion, 225.
His report, 229. Believed, 230.
Rallying place at Franklin, 243
et seq. Line of retreat, 245, 246.
Report cited, 248. The order to
become the reserve, 261, 272.
Walthall, Edward C, Maj. Gen.
com'g Division, 88. Deployment,
ib. Advance, 123, 149. Eeport,
151.
Wheeler, Joseph, Maj. Gen. His
information to Hood, 5.
Wherry, William M., Major &
A. D. C. 82, 169. Letter giving
incidents, 280, note. Later career,
281, note. Stanley at Schofield's
headquarters, ib. Cox command
ing on the line, 291.
Whitaker, Walter C, Brig.
Gen. com'g Brigade. At Spring
Hill, 34. At Franklin, 62, 136.
White, John S., Lieut. Col. com'g
16th Kentucky. On picket at
Duck River, 33, note. Position at
Franklin, 52, 59. Charge, 99,
109. Wounded, 114.
White, Lyman A., Lieut, com'g
Battery, 187.
Whitesides, Edward G., Capt.,
Act'g A. A. G. Bearer of mes
sage, 69.

Index

.361

Wilson, James IL, Bt. Maj. Gen.
Commands cavalry corps, 10.
Resists Forrest at Duck Eiver, 24.
26, 27. To keep touch with infan
try, 32. Connection broken, 33.
Joins Schofield at Franklin, 41.
Cavalry dispositions, 82,168, 172 et
seq. Headquarters, 172. Ham
mond's brigade at Triune, ib.
Advance at Hughes's Ford, 177.
Engagement there, ib., et seq. At
Schofield's quarters, 178. Orders
as to withdrawal, 178. March to
Nashville, 196. Stanley at Scho
field's quarters, 287. The hour,
288.

AVinstead Hill. Topography, 46.
Wagner halts there, 64, 63, 68, 71.
AA^ooD, Thomas J., Brig. Gen.
com'g division, 26. March to
Franklin, 35. Position north of
Harpeth Eiver, 62. Ordered to
cover crossing of Harpeth, 167.
To send brigade to Hughes's Ford,
168. Disposition of troops, ib.
To cover withdrawal, 178. Ee
port, 228, note, 323. Command
ing Fourth Corps, 293.
Ziegler, Jacob, Captain of Artil
lery. Position at Franklin, 117,
note, 131, 133. Withdrawal, 187.

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