SIDNEY HERBERT
LORD HERBERT OF LEA
VOL. II

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SIDNEY HERBERT
LORD HERBERT OF LEA
A MEMOIR BY
LORD STANMORE
WITH PORTRAITS AND ILLUSTRATIONS

A sweeter and a lovelier Gentleman,
Trained in the prodigality of Nature,
The spacious world cannot again afford
RicAard II/.,'Act I., Scene 2.

VOL. II

LONDON
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W.
1906

PRINTED BY
HAZELL, WATSON AND VIHEY, LD.,
LONDON AND AYLESBURY.

CONTENTS
VOL. II

CHAPTER I

PAGE

THE DAWN OF PEACE (1855-56) .... I
CHAPTER II
AFTER THE WAR ( 1 856-57)  40
CHAPTER III
THE EXTINCTION OF PEELISM ( 1 857-5 8) • • 76
CHAPTER IV
THE SANITARY COMMISSION (1856-59) . . . I18
CHAPTER V
FALL OF LORD DERBY (1859)  164
CHAPTER VI
NATIONAL DEFENCE (1859-60) .... 202

vi CONTENTS
CHAPTER VII

PAGE

THE CHINESE WAR (1859-61)  ^^^
CHAPTER VIII
WORK AS MINISTER (1859-61)  SS^
CHAPTER IX
CLOSING DAYS (1861)  402

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
VOL. II

SIDNEY HERBERT  Frontispiece
From the statue by J. H. Foley, R.A., in Pall Mall FACING PAGE
MONUMENT IN WILTON CHURCH  440

T

SIDNEY HERBERT
LORD HERBERT OF LEA

CHAPTER I
THE DAWN OF PEACE
1855-56
HE fall of Sebastopol, on September Sth, 1855,

renewed, and justly so, the hopes of those who
longed for peace ; for of the two reasons ^ which had
led the Emperor Louis Napoleon not to give effect to
his own inclination to make peace in the spring, one
had ceased to exist, and the other he now felt himself
strong enough to disregard.
Nor was Lord Palmerston any longer so anxious
as he had been for the prosecution of the war. He
was too clear-sighted not to perceive both the reluctance
of the French Emperor to continue it, and the danger
of carrying it on with the half-hearted assistance of
an unwilling ally. He was therefore ready to make
peace, provided his following in the country would
allow him so to do.
On his return to England, Mr. Herbert wrote to
Mr. Gladstone, on September 27th, that :
" Great events have happened since we met, and
a great deed has been done. All, I think, tends to
' The indisposition of the French Army to make peace before Sebas
topol was taken, and the indisposition of the English Government to
make peace at all. See Vol. I., p. 423.
VOL. II. 1

2 THE DAWN OF PEACE [chap, i
peace, though you will not agree with me there, but
if it should so end, the taking of Sebastopol will give
us for many years great security in India, where the
prestige of force goes for so much, and where the
Orientals watched this struggle as one for Asiatic
supremacy between Russia and ourselves. The
Russians raade a fine defence, and the whole campaign
reflects immense credit on the Army actually engaged,
but shows far less formidable resources on the part
of Russia than I had supposed them to possess. The
truth is they have neither the money nor the popula
tion to maintain or justify their peace establishment,
and they cannot extend or reproduce it in war without
internal ruin. The Government now have but one
course, namely, to follow up their success by repeated
blows if they can. The mortification of defeat the
Russians have encountered, and the greater their
material loss the sooner will they recover the anger
incidental to it, and treat for peace. You know I am
not of your opinion on that head. I think the man who
gets the worst of it is the one soonest tired of fighting.
Last summer, the English public thought success
was coming, and were unready to make peace. The
Russians have no prospect of bettering themselves :
on the contrary, a mere blockade on our part must
reduce them to terms. With the inaction of tne winter,
therefore, all parties ought to cool, and there seems
to me a better chance of peace than we have yet had.
I fear the obstinacy of Lord Stratford has seriously
imperilled Kars, and as the future must depend a good
deal on the Turks themselves, however much we may
help them, a mishap in that quarter will be very serious.
If we should lose them their fortress, (and it will be
our fault, as the French Emperor threw every obstacle
in the way of Omar Pasha's going to Asia Minor in
his desire to concentrate on Sebastopol, where the
Turks were, and could be, of no use,) the least we can
do will be to convert the Turkish Loan into a gift.
" I trust the Army will lynch The Times correspon
dent when they read his letter of yesterday. I think
it the most scandalous performance I ever read. While
he admits that he cannot get satisfactory evidence
of any details he brings the most serious and dis
graceful accusations against officers and men who
under circumstances of desperate danger were risking

1855-56] MR. GLADSTONE'S CRITICISM 3
and laying down their lives. The Daily News letter
is written in a juster and fairer spirit. If they were
to hang Mr. Russell (alas! there are no Pictons in
our Army) I believe the public here would be very
well pleased, provided The Times found another
man who could amuse them as well. There is no
talk of a dissolution that I hear, which surprises me,
for Palmerston is not apt to underrate his popularity,
which is undoubtedly great, and the Government
generally are not in love with the existing Parliament.
We have had the Ellesmeres here. You are very
much in their black books for your last speech."
Mr. Gladstone replied :
" Hawarden, October ist, 1855.
" I am glad you have got back, and hope that your
journey has fully answered its purpose.
" I am not sure that I can gather with precision
from your letter what is your view of the future.
You say ' the Government now have but one course,
namely, to follow up their success by repeated blows
if they can.' But also 'with the inaction of the winter
all parties ought to cool, and there seems to me a
better chance of peace than we have yet had.' I
need not tell you which of these passages is most
in my sense.
" In the spring we said, ' You have gained the
objects for which you went to war; the difference
between what you ask and what they give is admitted
to be trumpery; so make peace.' But they replied,
' We are in a great military operation ; the fall of
Sebastopol is the object of the war; when that is
gained, then talk about peace if you like.' Now
Sebastopol has fallen ; but The Times says no one
must talk of peace, but this is the great step towards
it, and the rest must be made in due order and in
pari materia. This makes me sick. We all believe
we shall have to answer at the bar of God for our
share in this war as much as for any act of our private
lives, and I am not able to answer for it on the
Frinciples on which it appears to be carried on.
still believe that the question of a war is a question
of right and wrong, just or unjust ; that a great part
of strength consists in justice, and that without
justice strength is a curse. Now, in my speeches

4 THE DAWN OF PEACE [chap, i
I may have mixed up all kinds of follies with these
principles, and so far as I have done this I am greatly
to blame ; but it seems to me that my censurers in
the public Press and in Parliament do not admit the
principles themselves, but support the war by reason
ing of much the same kind as was held conclusive
twenty years ago in favour of duelling.
" I am, however, very glad to find you sanguine in
your hopes of peace. I am not quite up to your
mark, but yet I have hopes too, relying mainly, I
am sorry to say, on France and not on England for
their basis. But I confess myself to be wholly in
the dark: I have no idea what it is that Ministers
propose to themselves ; to judge them upon the
surface, one would say it was to go on fighting as
long as it is popular and then to stop ; but this it
would be doing them injustice to believe.
"The Times letter is no doubt an affair of no small
moment. There can, I should think, be but one
opinion as to the gross misconduct of writing and
publishing such an account of the English operations
sit such a time and with no authority: except in
Printing House Square, where the gravity of the
business is well seen and where it will be worked
accordingly. Apart, however, from the criminality of
The Times, the matter is serious. First, it is a dis
grace in the eyes of Europe to have such a thing
published ; secondly, is it true ? for if so, this also is
serious ; lastly, it read to me as if a good deal of it
came rather too directly from the lips of officers
themselves. " I do not whisper even to myself the word
dissolution. It would be a public evil, but a minis
terial triumph — heavily bought in the end, but, at the
moment, light enough. Can it be the inert peace
majority in the Cabinet who prevent it? or is it
prudence in Lord Lansdowne, the only one of the war
section whom I take to be much burdened with it ?
"We have seen Admiral Remington's death in the
papers with much concern. The little I knew of him
helps me to believe and understand all you say.
" I hope we are here until January. I am much
occupied in some studies upon Horace, which I have
long had at heart, and which may during this period of
insulation perhaps make some progress.

1855-56] MR. HERBERT'S EXPLANATION 5
" From various quarters I hear of pacific tendencies
in the Derby party. I know nothing of Graham ; but
I am about to fire my speeches at him — of which I
send yovi two copies by this post. Last week I had
an excellent account of Lord Aberdeen. We occupied
September most agreeably in touring among the
Welsh mountains and bathing at the foot of Pen-
maenmaur. Argyll writes to me that Newcastle
exposed himself very much on the great day. Do you
go to Ireland and when? On that must, I suppose,
depend our hope of seeing you and Mrs. Herbert."
To Mr. Gladstone's criticism as to the apparent con
tradictions in his letter, Sidney Herbert thus replied :
"Wilton, October 7 th, 1855.
" Here is my meaning as expressed in the two pass
ages quoted in your letter, and which are, I tnink,
reconcilable. People make peace either because they
think it right or because they think it prudent, or
because they cannot help it. After a defeat, if they
think the disaster recoverable, they think it neither
right nor prudent, and if they make peace at all it is
because they think the disaster is not recoverable, and
they will only make their position worse by going
on. The Russians have now had all the mortification
of defeat. The feeling while fresh of course in
disposes to peace. But the more in number are their
disasters the less will be the prospect of recovering
them. A certain amount of time still remains
available for operations in the field — some is gone
since I wrote. This should be made vigorous use of,
and the worse the material position of the Russians
when the campaign closes the more the chance of
peace after the winter shall have given time for
reflection. " The public is very noisy, the Press still more so,
and all I have seen or heard during the last fortnight
makes me less hopeful. But still I hear that among
thinking men there is an increasing leaning to peace,
and I am glad to hear of people ' croaking ' as to the
prospects of peace — i.e. fearing that it won't be, or, in
other words, hopiijg that it may be — who were a few
months ago as sanguine that the war would continue.
Wood comes here on Wednesday, and Granville

6 THE DAWN OF PEACE [chap, i
next day. I hope to pick up something from them,
but Palmerston is master of his Cabinet now.
" I saw Cook in London. He is coming out with
the aid of all his old Chronicle staff with a Saturday
Review, a review without news, but with reviews of
all the stirring subjects. He purposes to begin on
the first Saturday in November. He is to write for
peace, but not from the Vienna Conference basis,
which he thinks used up and blown upon. I take
it his intention is rather to conceal his hand and get
a hearing before he comes out with his peace view.
He has asked me to contribute either something on
the war, or the army, or English diplomacy, or
Gerraan opinicfhs of English motives and objects, on
which subjects I had some talk with him. He is very
eager to get you to contribute an article on the finance
of the war, something which, without entering into
the question of peace or war, shall put before the
public the cost and the burden in a manner which
will force the question on their own minds without any
suggestion directly made to them by the writer.
"I think his tactics are good. Every one who
meddled with the question last year is considered
out of court and will not be listened to, and he.
Cook, must first gain his audience's ear and establish
his character for blood-thirstiness up to the latest
moment. " I am furious with The Times and their corre
spondent's tone about the Army. I believe that on
the Sth a large combined movement was happily ex
ecuted. Six attacks were made (the Russians say
seven), of which one was the real and main attack,
the others not feints, but diversions. The one attack
was successful. All the diversions failed in them
selves, but succeeded as contributing to the one
success. We had one, and the French four of these
so-called failures. They don't foul their own nest
or cry stinking fish through all Europe, but a penny-
a-liner, sitting in his house, describes what he did
not see, and what he says he cannot vouch for as true,
and brands as cowards men who maintained them
selves hopelessly for an hour and a half inside the
enemy's position. But I raust end."
About the middle of October Mr. Herbert went as

1855-56] VISIT TO HAWARDEN 7
usual to Ireland, for the purpose of fishing, a sport
in which he delighted, and to visit his Irish property.
On his way he stayed a few days at Hawarden,
whence he wrote to his wife that the faraily had
been amusing themselves by acting a play, which —
" went off very well, and made us laugh very much,
Susie Clinton, who is here with the new duenna, being
Cinderella, and the Glynne and Phillimore children
doing the rest. It was a misfortune that the slipper
which did Jit Cinderella would have held both feet of
her two sisters, who, however, with great gravity
declared it too small, and last of all appeared Mrs.
Gladstone herself as the Prince, in a costume half
bloomer, and a great sword in her hand, at which
appearance I, forgetful of all decencies, went into an
outrageous fit of laughter.
" Gladstone seems to me to be under an illusion
as to the state of public feeling. I reproached him
with The Daily Telegraph, but he had been likewise a
victim, the paper having turned short round on finding
its sale affected by its peace doctrines."
Almost the first intelligence received by Mr. Herbert
on reaching Ireland was that of the death of Sir
William Molesworth, who on Lord John Russell's
resignation had succeeded him at the Colonial Office.
It called from him the following corament :
". . . . So poor Molesworth is dead. I am sorry
for hira, though, in spite of his araiable qualities (for
he was kind-hearted and good-tempered), he created
no attachment; just as, though a clever and well-
informed man, one was not influenced by his opinion.

A vacancy was thus created in the Cabinet, and it
was very generally anticipated that Lord Palmerston
would endeavour to effect a reconciliation with the
moderate peace party. Mr. Herbert hiraself thought
otherwise.

8 THE DAWN OF PEACE [chap, i
". ... I am in despair," he wrote,^ "at the ill
ness of the Bishop of London. God knows whom
Palmerston will appoint. You seem to think he will
offer it to me, as the enclosed will show. But, seriously,
Pam is just as likely to offer the Bishoprick to me as
the Colonies. I could not "accept without loss of
character. He could not offer without endangering
the popularity of his Government, which rests on its
supposed war-at-all-price leanings."
Nevertheless, a fortnight later, the offer, which he
had supposed impossible, was actually raade, as told
in the following letter to Lord Aberdeen.
" W^iLTON House, Salisbury, November 13*%, 1855.
" You will have seen in the papers last week a
paragraph stating that I, among others, had refused
the Colonial Office upon grounds connected with the
war. The statement had no truth in it except as a
prophecy, for on Sunday last I got a note from
Palmerston asking me to Broadlands on Monday, as
he wished to have ten minutes' conversation with me.
As I foresaw the subject and the result, I did not
fancy spending an evening alone with Palmerston
and Lady Palmerston after a refusal, and as a post
raight be of value to him I went over by train on
Sunday afternoon, spent two hours there, and returned.
" When we raet, 1 gave hira the last reason for com
ing a day earlier than he asked me, wishing thereby
to give him an indication of ray indisposition to accept,
and put hira on his guard against making stateraents
and disclosures, which, unless they succeeded in their
object, he raight wish to keep for himself
" He was not by any means disposed to be retentive.
He began by saymg that so far as the raanner of carry
ing on the war we should not disagree; at least he
judged by the line I had taken when in the Cabinet,
and paid me compliments as to the measures taken
at my suggestion for the efficiency of the Army. I
answered that so long as we were of necessity at war
he could not make war too vigorously to please me,
and if I were disposed to find fault, it was not the
' To Mrs. Herbert, from Mount Merrion, October 28th, 1855.

1855-56] DISCUSSION WITH PALMERSTON 9
vigour, but the plan of campaign since the capture
of Sebastopol, which I should be disposed to object
to : but for that 1 knew the Government was not
answerable. He said they had greatly suffered from
the incapacity of the generals, and assented to some
observations I made on the attack on Kinburn. He
then went to peace, and talked, as I thought, very
wildly, and as if he had never given his mind to the
consideration of what would constitute a just, and
therefore good, peace for England. He seemed to
have no thought except for what you could ask and
how much you could get. He talked as though there
was but one rule, — namely, that whatever is worst for
Russia is best for England. He said Austria had pro
posed and pressed upon them ' neutralisation.' This
we discussed at some length. The insecurity of a
country with a seaboard and no fleet [was suggested
by mej, to which he answered that the mare clausum
secured the seaboard. But in case of war raight not
the Dardanelles be forced, or the Turks connive at a
passage ? or, lastly, if the Turks were at war, the
"whole Russian seaboard would be at the mercy of
their fleet. He said Turkey making war on Russia
was so unlikely as not to be worth considering, and
said generally that if the terms were bad for Russia
she had brought it on herself I asked about the
Crimea, and he talked about giving it to the Turks ;
and then went on to conquer Georgia and make it
an independent kingdom.
" We nad some argument, which I need not repeat,
about the Turco-Crimean plan. He talked about the
plan for the next campaign of having two corps d'armee,
one under Sir Colin Campbell and one under Eyre,
the whole under Codrington, and operating in Georgia.
He said the French were very cordial, far more
warlike than they were ; though the French never
felt towards the war as we do here. I spoke of the
danger of the war changing its character altogether,
and gradually assuming a propagandist character,
which, I added, will never suit France. He said the
war would not take that character, but if it did, the
French would like a war in which the map was to be
altered far better than one whose results were so
indirect as that in which we are now engaged. I
told him that his Government was very strong at this

IO THE DAWN OF PEACE [chap, i
moment; that this strength was derived frora the
belief that he, Palmerston, was for a war to the knife ;
that his popularity depended on that opinion ; that
insensibly it must bias his judgment, and he would be
carried on step by step beyond what was required by,
and contrary, therefore, to, the interests and honour
of this country ; that his taking me into the Govern
raent would either create suspicion as to the sincerity
of his warlike professions, which he would probably
raeet by still stronger declarations, or destroy ray
character by assuraing that, though I had professed
opinions in favour of peace, I had swallowed those
opinions, and joined a War Government for the sake
of office ; and I added that I had myself reasoned in
the same way on the subject of Lord Stanley's offer.
It appeared to me by his tone in answering that he
agreed to all this.
" I told him that, so far as my own course was
concerned, I had made up my mmd as to the line I
should take. That I thought the liraitation proposal
of April last a bad one, and that we had an escape in
the Russians rejecting it. That the feeling of the
country had been that terms were imraaterial while
we left unfinished a great railitary enterprise like the
siege of Sebastopol, that failure then would have
had a very disastrous effect in Asia, and that the
prestige of success was necessary for our Indian
Empire, and that I did not deny that there was sound
ness in this view; but that, granting that, we had no
business to go to Vienna at all, and that our rupture
of the Conferences for fear we should get peace on
our own terras was a breach of faith. That that
opportunity for peace was gone — that it was im
possible to say when another would recur, (he said
that Russia had made no sign). That, till it did recur,
we had nothing left but to fight on as vigorously as
we can. That I should support him in so doing.
That when the opportunity does recur, he has
advantages over any one else for making peace, as his
views are unsuspected, and a peace would be taken
from him which would be scouted if offered by any
one else. That I would support his peace with all
the means I possess, provided he made it, and would
not look too closely at his terras ; but if the oppor
tunity were lost through his proposing terras which

1855-56] LORD ABERDEEN'S REPLY 11
in my opinion rendered peace impossible, my support
would be at an end. He said that was quite fair. I
spoke to him then about the tone of his own speeches
as being offensive to Russia, and contrasted the
conduct and language of the French, and said that
whenever peace came the French would reap the
benefit of it, and that already the Russians marked
the distinction, and say that the French make war
like gentlemen, and we like fish-wives, and they look
on France as their friend among the allies. He de
fended himself on this score, and said he had never
said things 'like Johnny.'
" This, of course, is a mere outline, as our conversa
tion lasted an hour and a quarter. We parted very
good friends.
" Charles Wood, who is here, says that his language
about the Crimea, Georgia, etc., etc., means nothing ;
that he has no defined ideas on the subject, and that
he never holds such language to the Cabinet ; that
it is mere talk and bluster, such as he constantly uses,
but never acts upon. To some extent this is true,
for Palmerston has a good deal of Irish braggadocio
about hira. His colleagues evidently want to strengthen
themselves against him, but he must win — for, if in
a majority in the Cabinet, they could not carry on
the Government for peace, he resigning and opposing
it."

Lord Aberdeen, in a long reply, gave his approval
to the course Mr. Herbert proposed to adopt as
being perfectly just and fair in principle. In the
course of the coraraents which followed upon the
possible contingencies of the future he expressed the
opinion that —
" should our Press prove triuraphant, and Russia,
according to their own phrase, be ' finally crushed,'
I think it would be the greatest possible raisfortune
for Europe; for I believe that England and France,
closely united, would then corarait raore injustice in
one year than raight be expected from Russia in
twenty," — a remark perhaps worthy of record.

12 THE DAWN OF PEACE [chap, i
Mr. Herbert to Mr. Gladstone.
"Wilton, November i6tA, 1855.
" My dear Gladstone,
" I wrote to Lord Aberdeen a detailed though very
hurried report of my conversation with Palmerston,
when he offered and I refused the vacant Colonies.
As you will probably see it I do not re-write it, but
only give you my general impressions. I have often
been struck by Palmerston's clumsiness in managing
discussions of this kind, and certainly his talk on
this occasion was not of a nature to attract a raan
holding opinions which I had publicly expressed. He
left on my mind the impression that he had never
devoted any serious thought to the question, 'What
kind of peace is it the interest of England to get
or to give ? ' He seems to have laid down no principles
on the subject, but merely thinks the more you can
get the better. The more you ask the more you
are likely to get, and whatever is worst for Russia
must be best for England. He said Austria is very
friendly — she proposes and prefers neutralisation.
He talked in a loose sort of way, as if throwing out
ideas as they came, of giving the Crimea to Turkey
and making Georgia independent. I told him I
thought the latter an English and not an European
object, and, therefore, not so likely to be done, as
being less desirable, and that his Crimean proposal
was against the interest of any nation concerned,
including Turkey. His colleagues say he has held
no such language to them. I had the opportunity
of telling him some truths as to his own language
and speeches, and tried to put them so as to impress
him with the ultiraate danger to his own power of
any extreme courses.
" He said Russia had made no proposals to nego
tiate, nor conveyed any through any third party. I
laid down my own course for the future as to support,
specifying the bounds beyond which it cannot go —
\yhich he declared to be perfectly fair. I have very
little hope of him, but I am confident that if we intend
to influence public opinion in favour of peace we
must place ourselves in a better position than that
which we occupied at the end of the Session, when

I8S5-S6] PROSPECTS OF PEACE 13
we put ourselves nearly out of court. All this,
however, raust be talked over, and is too delicate
for paper.
" The colleagues who want help against the chief
are at their wits' end for a new raan."
Mr. Gladstone to Mr. Herbert.
"Hawarden, November 20th, 1855.
" I am afraid the Cabinet will be the worse for
not having you ; but I hope you will not be the
worse for having declined to join it. I conclude,
from your proceeding to London, that you went so
far as to entertain the proposition ; if you had accepted,
I should have had much comfort in reflecting that
it implied a better hope of peace than I fear is now
before us.
" For your interesting letter confirms my worst
apprehensions as to Palmerston and the Government.
It matters little that in the counting of votes the
men of peace outnumber the men of war, (and they
have received, too, an accession in the person of
Labouchere). Mere willingness, or even a vague de
sire to have peace, will not extricate this country
from its position. It raust be sought with ardour ;
or (unless help come from France, which is a separate
and our best hope) it will not come. It does not
tumble into people's mouths ; and the path towards
it is beset with obstacles, which require a serious will
and purpose to surmount them. In this state of
things Palmerston, who represents for this subject
(and this for the Government is the only subject)
the whole motive power of the Government, has no
clear sense of what duty or policy require of him,
and cannot tell what are in his mmd the objects of
the war.
" To the carrying on a war without defined objects,
or to the supporting of a man willing to carry on
a war without defined objects, I have the greatest
repugnance. "From the will and intention of the Cabinet as a
whole I look for nothing good ; and every day con
firms me in the fear I have had from its first formation
as to the moral and practical preponderance of the
elements most favourable to war. From the Emperor

14 THE DAWN OF PEACE [chap, i
of the French I still hope something. The commercial
and financial state of France and her prospects for
the future, and the connection between these subjects
and his own position, must have weight with him;
and I shall spend the tirae until the meeting of
Parliament in hoping that he may drag Palmerston
and Clarendon into peace, notwithstanding 'pubhc
opinion.' " I see it stated in The Press, which is now
admirably written, in its articles on the war, that
the Eraperor has raoved in this direction — I also see
with pleasure the mere rumour that Drouyn is to
come back. Either or both of these may indicate
something good.
" For us, there may be a sharp time coraing. We
cannot well remain much longer between wind and
water. The first thing to be hoped is, that we shall
follow our consciences and keep right ; the second
that we shall all in keeping right also keep together ;
and if there be a third, no doubt it is that we may
have the comfort of being intelligible, and visibly and
immediately useful.
" There is a most able and interesting paper in The
Saturday Review, No. 2, on our diplomacy. Many
things in it would lead me to think it yours; but
what it says of the nation having been right and the
Government wrong shows that, if it be yours, you
wrote in an abstract character and with reference to
the public. This article has also, consciously I
suppose, the strangest possible -vein of latent sarcasm
when it sets up the doctrine that England is not
responsible as a whole to Europe, but haaj^dualistic
existence, and may speak, when it piea^^ through
Ahrimanes or Oromasdes without breach of faith
or liability to reproach.
"Were I a Russian diplomatist I should say. Give
me, ye gods, such a security as that one arm, and I
will throw aside all vulgar resources of trick and
falsehood as comparatively worthless.
" There is a clearness, point, and precision in the
analysis of the Vienna proceedings which this article
contains (though it leaves more to be said) which makes
me wish I had it by heart.
"I have begged Lord Aberdeen to let you know
directly on what day he will be here, as I thought it

1855-56] THE SATURDAY REVIEW 15
possible there raight not otherwise be sufficient
notice. " I have a letter from Graham ; very gloomy, very
short. I do not quite like the handwriting — it gives
me the idea of his not being strong.
"So Russia has made no proposals. Alas for her
if she had — as P.'s conversation too clearly shows."
Mr. Herbert to Mr. Gladstone.
"My dear Gladstone,
" Here are two or three hurried lines on the
same number of subjects.
"You guessed right as to the authorship of the
article in The Saturday Review, though I may say
parenthetically that I maintain the anonymity to
every one else. It was partly adapted to the tone and
tactics of the paper. It would be difficult, however,
in a letter to define where the abstract view com
mences or ends. As you know, I was not satisfied as
to our raove in the summer, nor did I agree with you
as to the policy of fighting for a gone chance when
our identification with it would, I thought, destroy our
authority hereafter for the practical struggle."
Mr. Gladstone to Mr. Herbert.
"Hawarden, November 2yth, 1855.
"When we raeet I shall be glad to know from you
precisely what is the point either we, or I, went in
the summer, and short of which you think we ought
to have stopped ; I mean as to the general question,
not as to tqjp Turkish loan, with respect to which I
remember what you said. Then it raay be worth
considering, at which you glanced in your last letter,
whether anything can be done to rectify misappre
hension, if it exists. There is no doubt that we are
confounded a great deal too much with a party, whose
position — whether it be worse or better being quite
another question — is wholly distinct from ours."
Mr. Gladstone to Mr. Herbert.
"Hawarden, November yth, 1855.
" The peace article in The Times rejoiced my heart ;
all the more from the abuse of me, because this

1 6 THE DAWN OF PEACE [chap, i
pleasant sauce to a dish, which it was evidently
thought raight be unpalatable, helped to show design
and inspiration frora Downing Street.
" But how is it possible to make neutralisation
tolerably fair to Russia ? If it is as unfair as on the
face of the thing it would seem, I shall accept the
peace with a bad opinion of her sincerity and with
fears for the future. But we, or at least I, ara the very
last person who if it becomes a reality ought to pick
holes in it by references either backwards or forwards.
" Your letter adds greatly to ray pleasure. A word
on The Saturday Review. It seems to be written
with great ability; but is it in the nature of things
feasible that a weekly collection of rather long
leading articles and short literary papers should be
raade to live?
" I daresay you did not write the article on rae ; but
whoever did, he has done rae a service. There is
great truth and force in the critical part of his remarks.
The worst of it is with m,e, that similar errors might
recur ; for like absorption in the work of a department
might again (not I hope as to a war, but as to other
great questions) disable rae frora giving them due — i.e.
calm and disengaged consideration.
" I put my question as to The Saturday Review
with some fear lest the weight of it, commercially
speaking, should rest on you. You have, I know,
laboured, and I fear bled, in the past, and this, which
hardly any other man would have done, without ever
making use of it to advance in the slightest degree
your own personal interests and position. I trust
there may be limits to your self-sacrifice in this
respect." Before the end of the year it had become tolerably
clear both that Russia desired peace, and that, for
his own reasons, it was equally desired by Louis
Napoleon. Lord Palmerston would have wished to
continue the war, at all events until such tirae as
sorae striking and decisive military success had been
obtained by the Allies which might efface the memory
of their winter sufferings, and of the repulse sustained
in their last attack on Sebastopol, a repulse all the

I8SS-56] PEACE OR WAR 17
more galling because the French forces had succeeded
in accomplishing that part of the assault which they
had undertaken. Probably a large majority of the
EngHsh nation shared the wishes of the Prime
Minister, but it was not the view of the more sober-
minded and thoughtful portion of the public, and it
need hardly be said that it was not the view of Sidney
Herbert, or of the friends with whom he acted.
" We are all alike, I suppose, on tenterhooks,"
wrote Mr. Gladstone on January 7th, "about peace
and war. I had thought Russia was about to accept
neutralisation with an intention to break it. It now
looks as if she were about to pursue a more honourable
course. I am bound to say I know of no state of
things which would induce me, were I Russia, to agree
to it, except that, I fear, impossible one, of hermetically
sealing the Bosphorus for time of war as well as
peace. I see nothing else which would not leave it
my duty to say to the Allies : ' You have a right to
take my territory if you can, or at any rate I raight
acquiesce in it ; but you have no right to require me
to nold territory and to forego the means and the
right to defend it.'
" Look at the other alternative. Ought we not to
expect that if L. N. continues the war out of deference
to us, he must save himself by changing its character ;
and we en revanche must acquiesce in that change ? I
fear that the present position, unless it turn to peace,
will become worse than any we have yet had. Hard
terms are one thing, terms involving that deepest of
all disgraces, the forfeiture of duty to the territory you
hold, are quite another. Neutralisation, I think, as
compared with Limitation, is far more dishonouring !
far raore dangerous if observed ; just as effectually
liable to complete evasion."
Mr. Herbert's views had been very fully expressed a
little earlier in the following letter to Lord Malmesbury :
"Wilton, December %th, 1855.
" My dear Fitz,
"A thousand thanks for your letter. I have no
doubt you are right as to the facts of the case of
vol. II. 2

1 8 THE DAWN OF PEACE [chap, i
the French line-of-battle ships passing the Castles;
indeed, you are sure to be so, having been cognisant
of them, which I was not. I alluded to it only as,
if true (which you show it is not), being one of the
raany evidences of the disposition of France to make
political capital in the East by establishing French
influence, and possibly acquiring rights if not territory.
What with the campaigns of Napoleon in Egypt,
the capitulations of Francis I., and even old St. Louis
and Tunis, the French have a traditional field for
ambition in the East. But they have not the same
interests in the East that Russia has, and we have,
therefore, far less to apprehend in that quarter frora
her than from Russia.
" Every country situated as Russia is will encroach
on its neighbours if not prevented. Her relations with
Circassia, Georgia, Persia, are the same as ours with
Rangoon, Scinde, the Sikhs, and Oude. The stronger
and more civilised necessarily absorb the weaker and
more barbarous, but Russia, as compared with us,
has this to her advantage, that one of those provinces,
though barbarous and Asiatic in religion and habits,
is partly European in geography, and we in Europe
will not allow the process of absorption to go on.
The public here are right in thinking of Russian
aggression, but wrong in attributing it to a wonderful
foresight, skill, and design. The Russians are just
as great fools as other people, but they encroach as
we encroach in India, Africa, and everywhere — because
we can't help it. We, however, have an interest in
preventing her, and by a combination of circumstances
we have the power. We have rightly and justly
availed ourselves of it, and we may flatter ourselves
that vve have, for a generation at least, put a check
upon it; more than that we can't say.
"Now, as you say, we must not form our opinion
from an incorrect view of facts. So I must correct
one opinion of yours— namely, that I hold that a
Russian is better for us than a French alliance, and
that it arises from my having a natural bias in favour
of Russia. Now, I have no bias in favour of Russia,
but on the contrary, arising from the natural bias of
my mind, am in favour of a liberal policy. I don't mean
I am in favour of intervention to set up Brummagem
constitutions, such as Palmerston and Lord John

1855-56] LETTER TO LORD MALMESBURY 19
Russell talk about, but are too wise to act upon;
but I mean that the Russian system and politics are
the opposite of ours, and do by their intervention
arrest the progress of good government in Europe.
Russia is not in these days a possible ally for us, in
the sense in which you use tne word when talking
of a French alliance.
" I, from my Russian connection, have heard and
known more of their interior and exterior policy than
the generality of people here. I recollect your grand
father's letters well, and I believe the Duke and
Aberdeen were right in 1827-S (I am not sure of the
date), when they would have resisted the march on
Adrianople, but Palmerston and the Whigs, who
were then full of Phil-Hellenism, and were intriguing
with the Princess Lieven to turn the Duke out,
succeeded in preventing any move in that direction ;
Palmerston, I think, called it Austro-Turco barbarism.
"Had I held their views I could not have been a
member of Lord Aberdeen's Government, nor advo
cated in the Cabinet the cementing in every way
the French alliance and striking the blow at Russia.
I felt that it must come sooner or later, and that
no such opportunity would probably ever again
recur. " France is the obvious ally of England for many
reasons. I do not know that I can select a better
one from among them than that she is the only
country who, if on bad terras, can injure us. There
is no other nation we need fear. But there are other
and less selfish reasons', which I need not enuraerate
to you.
"My only fear is lest the too long continuance of
a state of things bringing us into daily communication
and requiring necessarily great forbearance and much
give-and-take, should end in jealousy or coolness.
I think it of pararaount importance to England, with
a view to the future, to end the war before any
one of the Allies is tired of it, and before France
begins to ask whether she is making sacrifices of
her own honour at our instance. I want to secure
all that we have got and all we have gained, and
to lose none of the ulterior advantages if possible.
" Now, with this full explanation, I do not think
there is rauch difference between us. I feel sorae

20 THE DAWN OF PEACE [chap, i
remorse at the length of the letter, but console myself
by reflecting that you brought it on your own head."
On December 19th Sir Charles Wood inquired
of Mr. Herbert whether he thought there was " any
chance of Russia's agreeing to Austria's terms ? They
are substantially hers, for any alterations we have
suggested do not alter them materially, and in some
cases relax rather than tighten the strings. One can
hardly suppose that Austria can have taken this step
without some notion of what Russia would do, and
yet I can hardly bring myself to think that Russia will
accept the terms." Mr. Herbert replied :
"Wilton, December 2i,th, 1855.
" It is impossible to give a guess what Russia will
do. Austria has a great interest in our extracting
high terms frora Russia, though her weakness and
exposure prevent her aiding us to obtain them, and
if you recollect, her proposals at Vienna in May last
were more severe than those we had originally offered,
and increased in point of severity the original French
terms from which they were taken. The fact is,
though the Austrians have considerable political sym
pathy with Russia, all her material interests are
different, and there lies underneath, the hatred which
jealousy, propinquity, and fear all create. I do not,
therefore, think the Austrian terms are Russian terms,
or that Austria has ascertained before forwarding
them that Russia would accept them.
" It seems to me that the neutralisation of the Black
Sea is a worse thing for Russia to swallow than
the cession of part of Bessarabia. It is better to cede
a portion of territory than to tie yourself up not to
defend the remainder. I do not see how any recipro
city can be established, or at least any real equality.
Russia can have no fleet in the Black Sea — no more
shall any other Power — but every maritime Power
may and will have fleets within a few hours' sail of
it, except Russia. The French have Toulon ; we have
Malta; the Turks, the Bosphorus. The Russians
have nothing in the Mediterranean. There raay be

1855-56] PLAN OF NEUTRALISATION 21
sixty sail of the line ready at any moment to come
in. In peace, of course, there could be no question
of their entering, but it is for war and not for peace
that we are making conditions. How are the other
maritime Powers to be prevented frora going in if
at war with Russia or in connivance with Turkey ?
There is no precedent in the law of nations or their
practice. How would it be easy to restrain, say,
France, for exaraple, if at war with Russia, frora
yielding to the temptation the undefended coasts of
Russia would offer? The penalty might be war
with us, but I doubt very much whether we should
go to war with France in defence of the Treaty,
which would virtually be in defence of Russia.
" You are quite right to ask anything if you raean
to concede something, which in all negotiations, if
honestly conducted, both parties should be ready to
do. But, unfortunately, the previous publication of the
terms constitutes them an ultimatum, and unless our
French ally helps us out of the difficulty by some
middle term, I do not see rauch chance of a solution."
In writing to Mr. Gladstone, he said :
"January ()tk, 1856.
" My dear Gladstone,
"In re peace.
" I do not understand the machinery by which
the neutralisation is to be made effective in war as
well as peace. I suppose there must be a solemn
European compact and guarantee by which the Black
Sea must be removed from the map. Unless this can
be done effectually it will be no settlement at all —
because the want of security to Russia will force her
to evade the Treaty, and the evasion will either be
repressed or it will not. If it be, there will be another
war ; if it be not, there will have been no settlement
as the result of the present war. All therefore
depends upon the degree of security which we can
give to Russia for the maintenance of our proposed
arrangement. If this can be done and she accepts it,
I shall be content. I am anxious therefore to know
how they propose to effect it before I give any opinion
upon it. The Austrians must have had some definite
ideas as to the raode of carrying their project into
execution when they raade the proposal.

22 THE DAWN OF PEACE [chap, i
"The French, judging by The Morning Post, are
threatening Prussia if she don't take part. I am
not sorry that they hold this language, for it ought
to open people's eyes to the prospect for the future
and the danger of a rupture with France.
" Malmesbury has been here. He talks of hot attack
about Kars, and moving for Lord Stratford's correspon
dence with Williams and Clarendon's with everybody
concerned. He thinks peace impossible — under-rates
our military carnpaign, and thinks we have not done
enough to force Russia to concede the original objects
for which we went to war. I think his view is a
merely partisan one. He seems to entertain a sincere
antipathy to Lord Stratford, with whom he quarrelled
when at the Foreign Office."
Mr. Gladstone to Mr. Herbert.
" Hawarden, ya««a^ nth, 1856.
" My dear Herbert,
" With respect to neutralisation, my fear is that
there is no machinery at all for giving to the coasts of
Russia that security during war which seems necessary
to compensate for a compulsory defencelessness. I
fear the determination here, on the part of those who
really determine, is to look resolutely at one-half the
case, and refuse as resolutely to look at the other at
all. That is, to urge that the aggressive projects of
Russia will be crippled by the want of a fleet, and to
decline to entertain at all the question of her defensive
rights. If this is done, Russia will either refuse, and
then my hope is in L. N. alone, or she will accept with
the firm intention to break the engagement on the
first opportunity.
"The last accounts are more favourable, it seems,
and let us hope in God there will be peace. But if
there is not, my view of duty I feel will turn very much
upon the question whether the break is upon a matter
only of more or less, or whether it is upon sorae demand
of ours essentially untenable as striking at the per
manent security of Russia. To make war for such an
aim as that is a horrible and hopeless affair, and I
should lean to going any length compatible with
prudence and honour in opposing it. But if it be only
a matter of amount of concession, and does not vitally

1855-56] LORD ABERDEEN'S PREDICTION 23
touch character or safety, a different order of con
siderations comes into play.
" As far as I see from your letter, we are entirely
of one mind. I also quite agree in your view of the
anti-Prussian bluster. The Post, by-the-bye, appears
to have become the best paper for news.
" So you take Stanley to Manchester. Disraeli, I
see, has been the sandwich between you and us.
" Malmesbury has told me that prestige was every
thing, and that he could not help wishing for a httle
more war to set ours right. He seemed to me no
witch. " One other word about neutralisation. It is hardly
possible to give enough without giving too much. If
you could hermetically close the Bosphorus for war
as well as peace, Europe would be finding for Russia
an immunity from attack (not even except Turkey's)
upon that part of her coasts. I am always driven
back upon the opinion that though all proposals may
be bad, the Russian one was for us all the least bad."
Lord Aberdeen, though not less anxious for peace,
equally with his friends doubted the wisdom of the
terms imposed on Russia with regard to her naval
force in the Black Sea. He predicted that she would
take the first opportunity of disregarding the obliga
tions of the Treaty, and that we should be obliged
to acquiesce in her doing so — a prediction verified
when, fourteen years later, Russia, at the instigation
of Prince Bismarck, coolly announced her intention
of no longer observing the limitations imposed by the
Treaty of Peace.
Lord Aberdeen to Mr. Herbert.
"Argyll House, January 21st, 1856.
" My dear Herbert,
" I am going to Windsor to-morrow, and am to
remain there until Friday. This will prevent me
from seeing you at the time you propose ; but I shall
be delighted to do so whenever you please after my
return, as I very much desire to have some con
versation with you on the present prospects of peace.

24 THE DAWN OF PEACE [chap, i
"No doubt a great step has been made, but it is
very uncertain if any sincere desire to arrive at peace
exists here. It is difficult to imagine that any such
condition as that contained in the fifth Austrian pro
position could ever have been made with the hope
of its being accepted. I suppose no negotiation ever
commenced under such auspices before ; for, strictly
speaking, it would authorise us to make any demands
whatever, and, of course, it would equally entitle
Russia to reject any we make.
" The plan of neutralisation is simply absurd. It has
nothing to recommend it but the name. It sounds
well, but is really impracticable. People forget that
the Bosphorus is as much a part of the Black Sea
as Sebastopol itself If the Turkish fleet is to be
stationed there, and liable to be indefinitely increased,
bad as they are, they must be masters of the sea. I
presume, however, that it is not intended to interfere
with Russia at Nicolaieff, or in the rivers. She may
therefore build as much as she pleases, but cannot
venture into the sea. Can such a state of things last
long? No doubt if we could really shut up the
Bosphorus, and render the Black Sea as inaccessible
as the North American lakes, Turkey and Russia
might come to an agreement respecting the force to
be maintained in it by each. Russia and Persia might
do this in the Caspian. But when the Black Sea is
open to the navies of all the world, and would
only be closed by a treaty not worth more than the
parchment upon which it is written, nothing can be
more irrational than to talk of an exclusively com
mercial sea.
" The cession of territory in Bessarabia is humiliating
to Russia, without adding materially to the security of
Turkey. The freedom of the Danube may be quite as
well established by other means.
" The state of the Christian population in Turkey
opens a chapter of endless difficulty. No treaty will
ever secure real privileges to the Christians, and at
the same time preserve the independence of Turkish
despotism. " Although these terms of peace are clumsy and
impracticable, I do not think it would be wise to
object to them on these grounds, and still less in
consequence of their being unnecessarily humiliating

1855-56] NEUTRALISATION AGAIN 25
to Russia. But there is one solid ground of objec
tion arising Out of the insecurity of any peace founded
upon such terms. The terms will be evaded, or the
peace will not last. You may call it honourable —
glorious if you please — but it will not be secure."
Mr. Herbert to Mr. Gladstone.
"January 21st, 1856.
"My dear Gladstone,
" I have been turning over neutralisation in
every possible aspect, and I do not see how a secure
peace is to be made on such a basis.
" My expectation was that Russia would argue :
' This arrangement will be good for peace, but not for
war. No one will have a fleet in the Black Sea, and
if we have it not there we can only have it at Cron-
stadt. But you, France and England, have stations
in the Mediterranean, and Turkey in the Bosphorus —
you three Powers raay always have three fleets within
a day's sail of the Black Sea — we shall therefore
always be at the mercy of your good faith.'
" But she has yielded — i.e. Esterhazy has satisfied
Nesselrode that the neutralisation can be guaranteed
in such a manner as virtually to convert the Black
Sea into land, that in war as in peace, without
reference to the circumstances of the war, the other
maritime Powers, as well as Russia, are to be pre
cluded from entering the Black Sea with armed ships.
" Then we give over Turkey and Persia to Russia.
Merchant ships can carry her munitions and her
troops. No defence will be required for them, because
every Power will have been precluded by treaty from
attacking them.
" Neutralisation, if effective, binds us to defend
Russia in the Black Sea from all comers, and ties
us up not to attack her even if at war with her. We
have forced Russia to submission now by operations
in the Black Sea. In any future quarrel this means
will be lost to us. If I am right, we should do much
better without any treaty save a general one of amity
and goodwill.
" How does this strike you ? I would give any
thing to get the old Vienna terms instead.
" r.S. — I met a Minister of State after I saw you.

26 THE DAWN OF PEACE [chap, i
My fears were founded on a misapprehension. The
neutralisation only applies to peace, and to Turkey
and Russia only. In war all is at an end.
" I have just time to scrawl this."
Mr. Gladstone to Mr. Herbert.
"4, Carlton House Terrace,
"January 2bth, 1856.
" My dear Herbert,
" I, too, have seen a great man, a Minister
of State, and he does not agree with your great man
at all. I put to him the question — if America quarrels
with Russia and wants to get at her through the
Bosphorus, will you be bound to keep her out ? The
answer was, ' I suppose we should.'
" But I do not think the case comes or can come
right, whichever's great man is correct. It is only
removing one horn of the dilemma to be impaled upon
the other. If Russia is to be liable at any moment
to be assailed and have her coasts ravaged by any
Power who may declare war against her, and can force
or wheedle Turkey, then she has what may be called
a natural right to prepare the means of self-defence
when she sees such a danger coming, and it will require
no great wit by means of this right to devise means
for evading the treaty without giving an available case
for forcible repression.
" My great man, I must say, was very reasonable,
and admitted the objections, not seeming to agree with
the world in attaching so much value to neutrahsation.
" In consequence of what you said to me yesterday
morning, I at first taxed my memory, and then sent
to Hayward for the note, for I was not without the
fear that I had committed the betise of the tailors of
Tooley Street, with the additional aggravation that
I am one instead of three. The opinions I expressed
were that we were in danger of having to continue the
war for neutralisation ; that it was not worth it ; that
England would take any reasonable peace that France
approved, and that L. N. would be perfectly safe in
acting on this principle. All this, I think, was rational,
and the substance of it I might have said in Parliament
or upon any fair public occasion ; but I think I was
wrong, because impertinent, in adding that the Emperor

1855-56] NEGOTIATIONS BEGUN 27
of the French ought to know this, which Hayward
would have been justified in interpreting as a message,
¦which, however, he did not, as he assures me. So his
discretion has saved me.
" I mean to write to Newcastle, but need not name
you, which, indeed, I did not understand you to
authorise. "The French, I imagine, are slippery about Bomar-
sund, for it seems they agreed to make it a sine qua
non, but did not tell Russia anything about it. The
point is not yet settled."
Mr. Herbert to Mr. Gladstone.
''January 2ith.
" My dear Gladstone,
" I begin to think that our great men have never
come to a clear understanding among themselves as
to what they mean by neutralisation. If so, what
chance is there of six separate, divergent, disputatious
nations hitting on a common meaning? However,
we shall soon have some indication of what is really
meant. I suppose the bench below us will be very
inquisitive and suspicious, and Mr. Otway will represent
the honour of the nation.
" If Layard wrote the article in The Quarterly (which,
however, I have not read) there will be trouble about
Kars, and there ought to be, for it was a disgraceful
neglect. The fact is, Palmerston has a great turn for
a warlike policy, but no genius whatever for war.
" I see The Times is beginning to attack the French
ministers, which the French nation will, of course,
resent. That the French press should attack the
English for its war-at-all-price tone I am not surprised
at.'*^ When at length negotiations for peace were opened
at Paris it was felt that a pacific result was certain,
but they were long protracted, and pending their
course another raatter occupied the first place in
Mr. Herbert's thoughts and occupied much of his time.
Before the fall of Lord Aberdeen's Government it
had been determined to send a Commission to the

28 THE DAWN OF PEACE [chap, i
Criraea to inquire into the alleged defects in the
Quartermaster-General's Department and the Com
missariat of the Army. This decision was given
effect to in the very first days of Lord Palmerston's
Government, and while the Peelite Ministers were
still members of it. Two very able men. Sir John
McNeill and Colonel TuUoch, were despatched to the
Crimea to conduct this inquiry, and in due time they
reported the result of their investigations.
Their Report absolved the military authorities on
the spot from responsibility for the want of a road
between Balaclava and the camp. " The deraand for
the services of the troops in the trenches and for other
military duties was such," they said, " that they could
not be spared " for road-making.
To this want of a road the failure of supplies to
reach the camp was admittedly in a great measure due,
but in the opinion of the Commissioners it was also
partly attributable to short-comings on the part of
the Commissary-General, Mr. Filder. Certain "animad
versions" were also passed upon the administrative
qualities shown by four officers, especially Major-
General Sir Richard Airey, the Quartermaster-General.
General Airey naturally and rightly asked that the
accuracy of the statements and insinuations of the
Commissioners should be inquired into, and in this
request he was joined by the other officers who had
been the subject of the Commissioners' strictures.
Such an inquiry it was justly deterrained by the
Governraent to grant, nor do I think the equity of
such a step was questioned by Sidney Herbert. But
he was extreraely anxious that the proposed investiga
tion should not appear to imply any reflection on
Sir J. MacNeill and Colonel TuUoch. He objected
to what he called a Commission on a Commission.

1855-56] THE CHELSEA BOARD 29
Instead of an investigation into the accuracy of
the Coraraissioners' Report, Mr. Herbert wished to
substitute a Court of Inquiry into the conduct of the
officers named by them, and he engaged actively in
correspondence to effect this end.
On February 21st he wrote to Sir C. Wood, pointing
out that the proposed inquiry was —
" a military judicial proceeding, and it ought, if you
hope to satisfy the public, to be invested with all
its distinctive forms and characteristics.
" The Cintra Inquiry was conducted by what in the
King's warrant was called a Board, but it was called
by every one else (the Duke of W. among others) a
'Court of Inquiry.' The word would sound raore
judicial and raore military too. You want to impress
the public with the conviction that you are not going
to shield officers who may be delinquents because,
when ignorant of the delinquency, you bestowed
honours and rewards upon thera. You want to im
press the accused officers with the conviction that
you are not going to sacrifice them to clamour if the
charges against them are unfounded.
"You cannot for these purposes make the investi
gation too judicial or too solemn."
A few days later Sidney Herbert addressed Lord
Palmerston himself: To Lord Palmerston. " I, Grafton Street,
"February 2%th, 1856.
" My dear Lord Palmerston,
" I have had so much connection with the
administration of the Army that you will not think
it impertinent in me to make one or two observations
on the proposed Court of Inquiry before whom Sir
Richard Airey and other officers are to be brought.
I understand the position of the case to be this. Sir
John McNeill and Colonel TuUoch have, in accordance
with their instructions, taken evidence, and reported
on certain facts, have investigated causes and, as far
as possible, suggested remedies. They were not

30 THE DAWN OF PEACE [chap, i
instructed to examine or ascertain what had been the
conduct of this or that officer, and with the exception
of a single sentence they impute blame to no man,
but the evidence which they recite implies blame, and
leads to inferences which the public have been at
no trouble to escape from, and accusations which the
Commissioners properly abstained from making are
freely made by the public against officers in high
employment. The Report of the Commissioners is
a document of too much importance, from its own
character as well as the character of the Commis
sioners themselves, to be put in the waste-paper
basket. The inferences to which it leads are too
obvious to be passed over, the Report would necessarily
become the basis of further proceedings. A Court
of Inquiry is to be summoned before whom these
officers are to appear. This Court is, I apprehend,
in the nature of a grand jury whose business it is
to decide whether there is a case for trial by court-
martial or not, and if not to give an opinion on the
conduct of the accused officers, which may have been
unexceptionable or which may have been blamable
through incapacity, though not of a nature to be made
the subject of charges before a court-raartial.
" Now, whether for acquittal or conderanation, the
Court raust be so composed and the proceedings so
conducted as to inspire confidence in the pubhc both
as regards its competency and its impartiality. A
court of general officers is a tribunal to which in
a case like this, where the authorities at the Horse
Guards and the War Department are in a certain
sense parties, a good deal of public suspicion will
necessarily attach. The best check upon it is publicity.
I do not know whether the Court which sat after the
convention of Cintra was open or not. Lord Castle
reagh wished it to be open ; if he was overruled it must
have been on the ground that the case turned upon
the nature of the future operations to be affected in
the campaign and the means at our disposal for their
execution, which of course it was important to keep
secret. No such reasons apply in this case. Without
publicity all the proceedings will be suspected. The
fear is that the trial of the officers whose conduct
IS impugned will degenerate into a trial of the Com
missioners whose conduct no one impugns.

I8S5-S6] LETTER TO LORD PALMERSTON 31
" One of these is a civilian ; the other an officer
better known for civil than for military service. That
there will be in the minds of the court of general
officers a prejudice against them is scarcely to be
doubted. Even if it does not exist it will be believed
to exist, and it is the more important to constitute
the Court not only in the fairest way but in the
way which shall the most convince the public of its
fairness. " For this purpose it must not be composed of men
too much wedded to past systems, nor of men directly
or indirectly under the influence of the Horse Guards,
or at any rate there must be a due admixture of
men who are independent of them. Lastly, they must
be men still in the vigour of their intellect. Lord
Seaton is, I believe, a wonderful man of his age,
but still he is above 80. Looking at the opinions
expressed on this subject but a few days ago in the
debate on Baron Penefather, is it wise to place Lord
Seaton on the Board? Again, ought there not to
be some officer representing the Ordnance Corps?
and some officer who has had practical knowledge
of the peculiar difficulties which our Army had to
encounter in the late campaign ? Sir Howard Douglas
and Sir de Lacy Evans appear to me to fulfil these
conditions. Sir Howard has in an independent spirit
objected to the policy of the invasion of the Crimea.
So far he has expressed opinions not in accordance
with those of the Horse Guards or of the Government,
and has shown an independence of judgment which
would inspire confidence in his impartiality, while the
accused officers would derive benefit from his appre
ciation of the difficulties which he thought to be so
great as to render the expedition inadvisable. Sir
de Lacy Evans was present in the Crimea long
enough to know what were the difficulties to which
an army was about to be exposed, but not there
during the period when the errors are supposed to
have been coraraitted by which the sufferings of the
Army are said to have been aggravated.
" A verdict of acquittal, if they obtain one, is every
thing to these officers, if the Court be well constituted
— but it will be of no value to them whatever if the
Court that gives it does not carry with it the con
fidence of the public.

32 THE DAWN OF PEACE [chap, i
" I have come to the conclusion that for this purpose,
after well considering the balance of inconvenience
both ways, an open Court is necessary. And that
in naming the Court no man of extreme age should
sit upon it, and that two men so prominent as Sir
Howard Douglas and General Evans cannot be ex
cluded without leading to so much suspicion as to
the ground of their exclusion that the verdict of the
Court will carry no weight with it. If this be the
result, the position of the accused officers will be no
better than it is now, and that of the Government
will be worse."
This letter was supplemented by another on the
2Sth: " I trouble you again," he wrote, " on the subject of
the Court of Inquiry.
" The danger was that it should be, or if it is not,
that it should look like, a Commission to try the
Commissioners instead of a Court to try the officers.
Sir J. Pakington adopts this view, and makes it a
ground of accusation in his motion. At this moment,
unfortunately, out comes the Warrant, the wording of
which is a complete confirmation of Sir J. Pakington's
accusation. " It is called in the heading a ' Board ' ' to inquire
into the statements contained in the report of Sir
J. McNeill and Colonel TuUoch, and the evidence on
which that report is founded.' This appears to me
to admit the whole of Pakington's case.
"There is no mention of the officers whose conduct
is to be investigated, nor any reference to further
measures if their conduct should deserve punishment ;
while the two Crimean Commissioners are mentioned
— the nature of their report is inaccurately described—
and the inaccurate description is so coupled with
the recital of their instructions as to imply an accusa
tion against them.
" It will require a very strong statement in Parlia
ment, if not a new Warrant, to get over the impression
made by this document as it stands."
Mr. Gladstone concurred with Sir James Graham

1855-56] THE CHELSEA BOARD 33
in adopting Mr. Herbert's views. Nevertheless, it
may be questioned, notwithstanding this weight of
agreement, whether they were right in desiring to
see Sir Howard Douglas and Sir de Lacy Evans
merabers of the Board. The former was nearly as
old as Lord Seaton ; the latter could not be regarded
as an impartial judge. His personal animosity to
wards some of the officers concerned was well known,
and on some of the points in dispute he had already
expressed his opinion in the House of Comraons.
In protesting against secrecy, and demanding a public
and open inquiry, they were, however, clearly right,
and the course ultimately chosen by the Government
was probably deterrained by the firm stand thus taken.
The decision of the Board was in every case favourable
to the officers assailed, and it is impossible, I think,
now coolly to read over the evidence given without
arriving at the conclusion that, with possibly some
exception in the case of Mr. Filder, the decision was
well justified by it. This was the last of the Enquiries,
and they may be said to have resulted in this, that
the short-comings of the hospital service were almost
wholly due to local want of energy and sense, and that
the short-comings of the transport and commissariat
were due partly to hesitation on the part of the Home
Government in supplying forage, and partly to want
of energy on the part of Mr. Filder. Another genera
tion recognised that the most violently attacked of
all the officers assailed. Sir Richard Airey, had fully
deserved the entire confidence and support which he
had received from Lord Raglan, and had been largely
instrumental in preventing the trials of that memorable
winter from being converted into disasters. He was
raised to the peerage with general approval in 1 877.
Sidney Herbert's attention was, however, at this
VOL. II. 3

34 THE DAWN OF PEACE [chap, i
time drawn away from public affairs by more en
grossing cares. His whole time was now absorbed in
attendance on his mother, whose increasing illness
excited just alarm. From the beginning of February,
1856, it was clear that her end was approaching, and
on March 27th she died.
Catherine Woronzow, Countess of Pembroke and
Montgomery, was no ordinary woman. To the pos
session of the more ferainine attributes of wit, humour,
and practical good sense, she added a man's breadth
of view and strength of will. But the masculine
vigour of her mind did not in the least impair her
exquisite tenderness of heart, or diminish the wealth
of her affection and unselfishness. She was idolised,
and justly idolised, by all her children, who found
in her not only the most loving of mothers, but the
most shrewd and practical of advisers. And this
adoration was as fully bestowed by her sons-in-law,
step-daughter, and daughter-in-law as by her own
children. Though born a Russian, and a resident in St.
Petersburg in her earlier years, she had lived so long
in England — having accompanied her father to this
country some years before her marriage — as to have
become virtually an Englishwoman. But she never
forgot her Russian origin, and the last years of her
life were saddened by the war which had broken
out between the country of her birth and that of her
adoption. Before her death, however, she had the
satisfaction of knowing that the restoration of peace
between them, though not proclaimed, had as a fact
been accompHshed.
Sidney Herbert, who had been devoted to her
during her life and unremitting in his attention to her
during her long illness, sent to her brother. Prince

1855-56] DEATH OF LADY PEMBROKE 35
Woronzow, the following pathetic account of her illness
and death : " 49, Belgrave Street,
"March 2'ith, 1856.
" My dear Minga,
" You will have known before this by the
telegraphic despatch that God has taken to His
blessed rest my dear mother ; but it was impossible in
such a despatch to express all the consolation, all the
gratitude we feel to God for her happy and painless
death. For many days past she had been slowly
sinking, though her natural strength of constitution
often raUied to a degree which at the beginning of
her illness deceived us with hopes of her recovery.
During all the autumn and winter there had been a
marked change in her health. She came to us at
Wilton the day before Christmas Day with a constant
and harassing cough. Though she got rid of it before
she left Wilton at the end of January, yet she left
the house but a few times while she was with us, and
then only to church or to drive out with my wife,
who watched her like a daughter, and was rewarded
with a mother's love. She complained of shortness of
breath in walking about, and she frequently spoke of
herself as failing. The day she went away, as she was
leaning on me, she stopped in the cloister and looked
round, saying, ' Ah ! I never shall see this dear old
place again ! ' A week after she was in London the
difficulty of breathing rauch augmented, but she still
dined every day with us all downstairs. But from
that time the symptoms of her malady were rapidly
aggravated, and the physicians found, the heart so
weak as to be scarcely able to perform its functions,
and she suffered very much from that distress, which
is worse to bear than pain, arising from great difficulty
of breathing and the frequent recurrence of faintness.
Blisters on the heart and side, for which she was
always asking, gave her great relief, though the
formation of water could not be arrested by them. All
this time she showed the most accurate knowledge
of her own state, and put questions to the doctors
with a coolness which showed that it was neither
possible nor necessary to conceal her danger from her.
She had so long contemplated death, and was so

36 THE DAWN OF PEACE [chap, i
fully prepared to raeet it, so strengthened by that
Eeace and comfort which God grants to prayers like
ers, that death had lost all its terrors for her. Even
this highest result of all earthly excellence to her
humble mind was for a moment the source of
misgiving. She said to me that she had always put
her whole faith and trust in God — that ' Darden ' had
taught her that from a child — but that she had so
loved Him that she doubted whether she had feared
Him as she ought. ' My heart has been so full of love
that there has been no room for fear. Even now, at
this awful moment, I cannot feel fear. Is not this
wrong?' After this Charles Harris and the Bishop of
Salisbury at different times both prayed and conversed
with her, and this one doubt seems to have left her.
Indeed, hers was that ' perfect love which casteth out
fear.' " For a time she seemed much better. The syrap
toras of her disease abated : her breathing became
more free, the pulse stronger, and during the whole
time of her illness she never had a headache, which,
suffering as she had done from them formerly, she said
she counted among. her daily blessings. But even
when her raalady caused, as at first, so much suffering,
she was not only patient and coUected, but she gave
the most minute directions as to everything which she
wished done after her death with a calmness as though
she were going on an ordinary journey, and between
each access of suffering she was as cheerful as when
in health. I cannot in writing convey the playfulness
of manner as well as the tenderness with which she
treated us all. Latterly, all the distressing symptoms
disappeared. As the water subsided to the feet, her
breathing and the acticn of the heart seemed to be
restored. She said she was perfectly happy. She
constantly thanked those around her in the most
touching way for their little services to her, and spoke
of the happiness of being nursed by all her children.
Only one face was wanting in that room to complete
the happiness with which she left the world. She
had your picture (the one painted at Berlin) brought
into her roora and placed opposite her bed. She
gazed on it with the greatest affection, and once or
twice, when lying back in bed, she clasped her hands,
suddenly crying, ' Oh ! my Minga, my Minga ! '

1855-56] LETTER TO PRINCE WORONZOW 37
"Three days ago it became evident that her strength
was failing so fast that her end must be near. Almost
daily she asked the question, ' Will it be to-day ? '
From the first she had insisted on the doctors telling
her the whole truth. When told it might last some
time, she said, ' One can never be so prepared but
that a few days may make one more ready ; but it
is bad news for me too, for I had hoped I should
not suffer long.' And, thank God ! though her life
was protracted, she did not suffer more, for she said
to the last she had no pain.
" She took leave of her grandchildren the day
before her death — one of those partings was affecting
beyond any. Little Fanny Vesey was lying ill in
the room below, unable to move. Of all her grand
children, she was the one whom she loved with the
most passionate fondness. She had never seen her
grandmother since her illness, and she begged to be
carried up to see her. She was carried up and laid,
while my mother was sleeping, on a couch by the
bedside. When she awoke, in the darkened room, she
did not see her till the candle was turned upon the
child's face, who lay, pale as marble, with her large
eyes full of tears gazing on my dear mother's face.
But the moment she saw her, her countenance lit
up with an expression of the most intense love and
delight, and she lay looking at her and calling her
by the most endearing names till they lifted little
Fan's face up to her to kiss, and she was carried out
again. The same day she told me she wished to be
laid next to my father under the church at Wilton.
By this time she had great difficulty in speaking
clearly, though her mind remained present, and she
listened with the greatest comfort to the prayers
offered up at her bedside. She rallied a little towards
evening, and had much sleep at night, but through
the day her breathing, though undisturbed, became
slower and slower, and at last, at a quarter before
five, she expired, without a struggle or a sigh, so
peacefully that we, standing and kneeling round her
bed, were unable to tell the moment when her spirit
passed away. Never was there a raore peaceful and
blessed end to a pure and holy life.
" My poor sisters are terribly broken by this great
sorrow. They were indefatigable around her, and

38 THE DAWN OF PEACE [chap, i
their constant and watchful care gave her inexpress
ible happiness. But we none of us yet know the void
which her loss creates. But we have the best ot
all consolations in the thought of the blessed life
to which she is now called.
" Dear Minga, our hearts all turn to you, and we
pray God to strengthen and comfort you in the loss
of your dear sister. Give our love to Lise and
Simon. Clanwilliam is also writing to you. God
bless you. " Your affectionate nephew,
" Sidney Herbert."
In a letter to Mr. Gladstone, written a few days later,
the restoration of peace and Lady Pembroke's funeral
are closely joined.
" The guns last night brought sad memories to us.
I trust the nation may show wisdom and moderation.
. . . We had a day of tempest and rain yesterday,
but a vast number of people reverently followed my
mother's coffin to the grave. There was much feeling
shown." The Treaty of Paris was a disappointment to those
who wished the war to be prolonged until Russia had
been not only defeated, but humiliated and crushed,
and objects attained which had not been contemplated
when the war began. Those who so wished were
perhaps at the time the majority in the country, for
they comprehended all those who ignorantly and lightly
adopt a popular cry appealing to the vanity and self-
sufficiency of the nation. But the number of those
who saw the advantages of peace was large enough
to sustain the Government which had made the Treaty.
When, on May Sth, an Address of Congratulation
to the Queen was moved in the House of Commons,
Sidney Herbert warmly defended the peace, the
terms of which he considered "fully commensurate
with the success of our arms," though he avowed
his distrust of the scheme of "neutralisation," and

1855-56] LORD CLARENDON 39
pointed out with prophetic accuracy the futility of
the Porte's concessions to its Christian subjects.
He eulogised Lord Raglan, clearly explained and
defended the attitude of Austria, and, above all, praised
the conduct of the negotiations by Lord Clarendon, of
whom he said :
" What was lost in the conduct of the military
campaign has been more than regained by the skill
of Lord Clarendon in the negotiations at Paris. I
sat with Lord Clarendon in the Cabinet of Lord
Aberdeen. I have seen how he bore a weight of
responsibility which few men could have sustained.
I have witnessed the vigilance, the untiring patience,
and the skill with which he at one and the same time
managed a variety of important transactions. . . . The
skill and ability displayed by Lord Clarendon have
enabled us to secure terms which without the advantage
of his services we could not have hoped to obtain.
The despatches written by Lord Clarendon upon
military subjects, which have been much criticised,
merely transmitted the opinions and decisions of others.
The despatches by him upon the terms of peace are
his own."
This speech elicited warm thanks from Lord
Clarendon, who a few days later wrote that he was —
" much pleased at the manner in which the Treaty
has been received, considering the war spirit and the
party spirit and all the different spirits that I thought
would be at work to tear it to pieces ; but I believe
that people were beginning to count the cost of the
war, and after they had read, marked, and inwardly
digested the conditions, they doubted whether another
campaign would have given them better guarantees
for the future.
" Nothing, however, has gratified me more than your
most friendly and generous speech, which I value so
much because I know you are incapable of saying any
thing you don't think. I wanted to tell you all I felt
about it, but you had left London on the day when I
sent over to ask if you were at home.
" Yours gratefully,
" Clarendon."

CHAPTER II
after the war
1856-57
DURING the time Mr. Herbert was absent from
the House of Commons an unpleasant quarrel
with the United States had arisen, which at one time
threatened to assume a serious character.
After the passing of the Foreign Enlistment Act of
1854, and during Mr. Herbert's short tenure of the
Colonial Office, instructions were given to the British
authorities in North America to open a depot at
Halifax for those inclined to take service under its
provisions ; but the establishment of any agency for
enlistment beyond the limits of the British provinces
was neither directed nor desired.
In their anxiety to secure recruits, however, the
Governor of Nova Scotia, Sir Gaspard le Marchant,
and Mr. Crampton, the English Minister at Washington,
unquestionably infringed the municipal law of the
United States. This was pointed out to the British
Cabinet, and a request made by the Governraent of
the United States for the recall of Mr. Crarapton.
This request being refused and Mr. Crampton's con
duct upheld, the Governraent of the United States
took the matter into its own hands and dismissed him
from Washington. If, in accordance with the practice
usual in such cases, the United States Minister in
London had been also recalled by his own Govern-
40

1856-57] ENLISTMENT IN AMERICA 41
ment, or had his passports been sent him by that of
Great Britain in consequence of the dismissal of the
British Envoy, a state of relations would have ensued
in which the danger of war, resulting from various
questions then pending between the United States and
Great Britain, would have been very greatly increased.
The efforts of all friends of peace were therefore
directed to the retention in England of Mr. Dallas,
the United States Minister. In this they fortunately
succeeded. Sidney Herbert, in common with his
Peelite friends, thought the action of the English
officials in America unwarrantable, and that the
Government had acted injudiciously in giving them
support. But they had no desire to dwell severely
on an error which was at all events a generous one,
and as such easily pardoned. Their attention was
exclusively given to the maintenance of the friendly
relations existing between the United States and the
mother country. How seriously the question was
regarded by them may be judged from the following
pages : Mr. Herbert to Sir James Graham.
"Wilton, May i6tA, 1856.
"My dear Graham,
" I have read carefully through the American
recruiting Papers. It is clear that there has been
great carelessness and confusion on one side and
unfriendliness on the other. Crampton seems to
have been constantly professing and believing that
he was not infringing the U.S. municipal law, and
scarcely moving a step without doing it.
"On the other hand, the American remonstrance
seems to have been an after-thought ; but whether
the motives were good or bad, there is no doubt
they have a case.
" In war you must run risks, and clearly our Foreign
Enlistment Bill, though a necessary and good measure,
was full of risk.

42 AFTER THE WAR [chap, ii
"I look upon Baillie's motion to be the natural
following up of the original opposition to the Bill.
They said the measure would embroil us -with foreign
countries, and they wish now to vindicate their
former opposition by fixing upon our measure the
evil results which they had prophesied.
" It appears to me impossible to abet such a
proceeding. To an Opposition the course is open,
and they have a right to thrust at a weak place in
the armour of the Government"
Sir James Graham replied that he too had the
enjoyment during the holidays of reading the Blue
Book on recruiting in the United States, and that
the conclusion at which he reluctantly arrived was
unfavourable to the British authorities concerned.
In the course of this letter (the body of which will
be found in Mr. Parker's forthcoming Life of Sir James
Graham) Sir James said :
" I was very reluctant to consent to the enlistment
of foreign troops. It was a mistake into which we
were hurried by the urgent necessities of the raoraent ;
but the enlistment in America was the most unwise
portion of the error ; and much of what has happened
ought to have been foreseen. These foreign troops
which we have enlisted are now an incumbrance ;
they have not done one stroke of work, except at
Malta, where the British garrison has been almost
compelled to fire on them ; and although we cannot
condemn acts for which we are in part responsible,
yet in defending them I am resolved not to be hustled
into complicity with this American quarrel, of which
we stand entirely clear ; the answer to your dispatch
to Sir Gaspard Le Marchant not having arrived when
we quitted office.
He added : " My desire is not to ovei-throw Palmer
ston, but to keep him in the right course, and to prevent
his dangerous tendencies. But if he be determined
to swagger and to attempt a course of bullying with
the United States, I am not disposed 'to take a hand
in this fatal game. I am rather prepared to resist
him in that case to the utmost ; and, in my opinion,

i8s6-57] FOREIGN ENLISTMENT ACT 43
his early overthrow would be a much less evil than the
imminent danger of an American war. I wish you
would come up to London for a day, that we might
have a meeting at Lord Aberdeen's, when we could
talk these matters over with great advantage."
Mr. Herbert did not altogether relish the condem
nation of a measure largely his own work, and replied
from Devizes, May 22nd :
" I agree with you that we are worsted in the
argument with the U.S. Government, and that the
apology was not a full one. The manner in which the
U.S. Government press the case is unfriendly and
unhandsome, but they have right on their side, and
we must end by knocking under.
" I do not agree that the Foreign Enlistment measure
was a bad one. The peace came so soon that the
forces raised under it have done no work, but that
applies equally to our British augmentations, to our
gunboats, floating batteries, etc., yet their existence
contributed to the pacification."
The state of his health precluded Mr. Herbert from
taking part in the discussions which ensued. He was
imperatively ordered to Carlsbad, and left England
early in June, but not before he had on the 4th of
that month delivered a remarkable speech on Military
Education, which will be more fully noticed in a sub
sequent chapter where that subject is dealt with.
During his stay at Carlsbad he received reports from
Mr. Gladstone of the steps taken by his friends to
ensure the maintenance of peace.
Mr. Gladstone to Mr. Herbert.
"June "jth, 1856.
" My dear Herbert,
" Yesterday Palmerston's answer was taken to
be a retractation of the one given on Thursday ; but
between anticipation and rumour all the men seem
to look upon Crampton as dismissed. The Times

44 AFTER THE WAR [chap, ii
writes to-day, if possible, more shamefully than ever ;
and men who have not read the Papers hold the same
high language. Still, they are gradually filtering
through people's minds, and to-day The Herald, with
out any change towards the Americans, holds that
our Government are in the wrong.
" We met yesterday morning at Lord Aberdeen's.
Newcastle did not come. Lord Aberdeen's first
suggestion was, ' If Crampton is gone, try to prevent
Dallas going.' But the question has become infinitely
complicated by the state of things in Central America,
where we now depend on the discretion of naval
captains on both sides to decide whether there shall be
bloodshed, and after bloodshed in this state of feeling
it may be hard indeed to avert war. We determined
that I should tell Heathcote, for him to communicate
[to Lord Derby] that we thought : (i) That there
should be no motion unless with the assurance of
very extensive support. (2) Peace should be the great
and permanent end of it, but the proceedings of
Government, as per Blue Book, cannot be justified.
(3) Any motion should be made by an independent
member of high standing (such as F. Baring), and if
one in opposition, then it would be well to get, if
possible, a man not in opposition, (such as, e.g., Lord
H. Vane), to second.
"From what Heathcote says. Lord Derby is sensible
of the great gravity of the question, but by no means
keen to take it up in a party sense.
" We do not know when the debate wUl come.
Your letter 1 wiU, of course, be a prominent subject.
I imagine the two points to put are : (i) That it is
written subject to Newcastle's pubhc pledge ; (2) that
it contemplates no system of British agency within
the U.S.
" I write late and in haste."
Mr. Gladstone to Mr. Herbert.
"House of Commons, June 16th, 1856.
" My dear Herbert,
"Since I wrote to you the American question
has passed through one or two phases. The U.S.
' To Sir Gaspard Le Marchant.

1856-57] PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT 45
Government made a most adroit move in entrusting
to Dallas power to settle the Central American ques
tions at the moment when they dismissed Crampton,
but a maladroit one in their attempt to draw a broad
distinction between Crampton's responsibility and
that of the British Government at home ; because the
Blue Book shows beyond all doubt that Crampton
and Matthew's highest acts, though at variance, per
haps, with official instructions, indeed, I think clearly
so, yet were completely covered by subsequent ap
provals and by the clause as to recruiting which
Clarendon has advanced in the correspondence. It
is hard to say what will be the effect of the new
indistinctness thus introduced into the case.
" Last week we had made up our minds at Lord
Aberdeen's that Dallas should be retained, but that
this of itself would not set the case right, and we
suggested to Baillie, on his application and request,
the words as expressive of our views, which he
adopted bodily of his own accord or on the advice of
others. These were printed on Friday night. To
day P. has announced, in answer to Lord J. R., that
the Queen has not been advised to remove Dallas —
that pacific instructions have been given to the captains
of ships — and that our great strength enables us to
practise moderation. Disraeli said in reply, but with
evident timidity, that he hoped that the House of
Commons would not consent to make Crampton and
the Consuls the scapegoats in this case. We are
puzzled at the moment to see what this will work out
into ; on the whole it looks most like blowing over ;
but I am inclined to doubt how far the distinction be
tween Crampton and the Government can be taken, or
rather, to think it cannot, and to regard the proceeding
of the U.S. Government as a very dirty one, while
one must be thankful that affairs have taken a turn
in favour of peace."
Mr. Herbert to Mr. Gladstone.
" Carlsbad, June 20th, 1856.
"My dear Gladstone,
"Your letter of the i6th was very welcome, for
it holds out better prospects for the future. I shall
look with great anxiety to the debate on Baillie's

46 AFTER THE WAR [chap, ii
motion, which looks as if it might be carried. Cer
tainly, as you say, the investing Dallas with large
powers of settlement on the Central American ques
tion was a good stroke of the U.S. Government, and I
do not think their attempting to draw the distinction
between Crampton and his Government was maladroit,
though it might be illogical, for it helped to compass
the object — namely, to deprive as far as possible the act
of expulsion of its character of an insult to England,
They wUl have succeeded in the object of getting
credit with the Yankee democracy for insulting
England, and yet escape the consequences by softening
the blow as much as possible to England. They
have right on their side, though they have used their
right unhandsomely and for a dirty purpose.
" But the position of our Government is a very bad
one. If Clarendon's despatches were sincere and he
believes his own arguments as to Crampton's in
nocence, Dallas ought to go. If Crampton be innocent,
we are grossly insulted, and Palmerston, the fire-eater,
is compelled to pocket the affront. I am very glad
they do not send Dallas away, because it is clear to
me that Clarendon's statements are untenable, and our
selves thoroughly in the wrong; but then we ought
to have withdrawn Crampton, and not let him be
turned out. In point of fact, we have never apologised.
To say to a man who complains that you have trod
on his toe, ' I beg a thousand pardons ; it was entirely
an accident, and I never did it,' is not only no apology,
but an aggravation to the proprietor of the injured
corn. Vve shall look small to foreign nations in this
transaction. It is the natural fruit of Palmerston's
bullying tone and indifference to what claims or
positions he maintains, provided only he maintains
them. If there were a decent Opposition, one capable
of taking the Government, the proper course would be
a change. No Government should take a reversal of
a peace and war pohcy from the House of Commons.
To fight such a question to the last moment and then
give in is most discreditable to the Government, and,
what is worse, to the nation whom the Government
represents. " I see The Daily News (which represents Panmure,
I am told) is very angry with me and my military
education plans. I augur ill from this, and fear that

1856-57] END OF RECRUITING DISPUTE 47
if he does anything in my sense he will cripple and
spoil it, or at least spit in the soup to make it his own.
I have several letters from men who take an interest
in these matters, approving. I hope Panmure will
manage his reductions carefully. At the end of the
great war, under the pressure of old Hume and Co.,
it was most extravagantly done. Discharging men
before their service is out entitles them to pensions,
and we paid men 6d. a day for life to save paying them
IS. a day for four or five years.
" By stopping recruiting and granting discharges to
those wishing to leave you may reduce all that is
necessary, and next year the period of the first ten
years' service men under the Act of 1847 will have
expired. " Woronzow, whom I saw at Dresden, says that the
French are very popular in Russia ; we very much
the reverse, and he thinks it will take years to efface
the feeling against us. He attributes it to the Baltic
campaign, and the attacks on undefended places and
destruction of private property. Remember me to
Graham. 1 hope he is better ; he looked very ill when
I left."
Mr. Gladstone to Mr. Herbert.
" London, Z?!!/)/ \2th, 1856.
" My dear Herbert,
" I ought long ago to have acknowledged your
welcome letter of June 20th, in which you summed
up with so much acuteness and justice the bearings
of the American case as to recruiting.
" When you left us we were all uneasy at your going
off, with reference to the American debate then in view.
But we afterwards found from the hopelessly impractic
able condition of affairs that you were fortunate in
being absent with a just cause. We had a most em
barrassing business to manage ; but we stuck together,
which seems to be more than any three of Derby's
men now do. The British case turned out in debate
quite as bad as we thought it. One man defended
and lauded the conduct of the Gdvernment : it was
J. G. Phillimore! Exceptio probat regulam. But
Palmerston, having consulted Hayter's infallible watch,
was in the greatest force and good humour, and his

48 AFTER THE WAR [chap, ii
speech was a brilliant Parliamentary success. He not
only made the House of Commons drunk, but made
them drunk on ginger beer. I had a conversation
with him the next night at the Palace and found him
overflowing. " I had myself a good deal of difficulty about the
vote : but I felt this vanished entirely, when it ap
peared how entirely Moore ^ was without the support
of even a shadow of a party. I had previously, how
ever, made up my mind to speak and act in full
concert with Graham."
Sidney Herbert benefited considerably by his stay
at Carlsbad, and much enjoyed the opportunity af
forded him of prolonged intercourse with his uncle
Prince Woronzow, whom he now saw for the last
time. On his return to England he was greeted by
the following letter from Sir James Graham :
Sir James Graham to Mr. Herbert.
" Netherby, August loth, 1856.
" My dear Herbert,
" I see by the newspapers that you have re
turned to England, and restored, as I hope, to health
by your visit to the waters. You lost nothing by
being absent at the close of the session : I never
remember a more barren and more annoying sitting.
No two people can agree about anything, except in
the firm determination to follow their own wayward
fancies, without the least regard to consequences ;
and the result is, that an incompetent administration
is all-powerful, and rules triumphant amidst the ruins
of party. I fear that the peace of Europe is hollow ;
and that our relations with Russia are by no means
re-established on a firm or friendly footing. Turkey
in the East, and Spain in the West, may wrap us in
a flame at any moment ; and when the bellows is in
the hands of Palmerston, I know not where the ex
tinguisher is to be found — unless, indeed, our faithful
ally at Paris be disposed, as I believe he is, to cold
water us considerably.
" Have you read Guizot's articles on Peel in the
' Who had moved a vote of censure.

1856-57] IRISH SALMON FISHING 49
last three numbers of the Revue des Deux Mondesi
They are admirable, and do Peel more ample justice
than anything which has yet appeared, either under
his own hand or from that of a friendly biographer.
" Did you see your uncle Woronzow at Carlsbad ?
I hope that peace, which wUl have comforted him,
has also revived him. He is no bad judge of the
dark future. The relative positions of Russia and
Turkey in the East cannot be durable. The trial of
statesmanship will be to find a solution for the difficul
ties in that quarter without a renewal of the war.
Affairs, when left alone, often settle themselves ; but
this is a lesson which the experience of half a century
does not teach all aged ministers.
" My principal object in writing to you is to plead
tuilty to an impertinence. My second son and his
rst cousin made an excursion last month into the
south of Ireland. They are children of the rod and
delight in fishing. In your absence, I took the liberty
of asking permission for them from your agent in
Dublin to fish in your Atlantic River. This per
mission he gave in the most obliging manner, and
they passed three or four days on the banks of your
stream. They saw salmon innumerable ; but they
were not successful in killing one, though your water-
bailiffs were most attentive and gave every possible
assistance. My son begs me to thank you, which I
do very cordially, both on his behalf and on my own.
Pray remember me kindly to Mrs. Herbert, and
believe me always, yours sincerely."
Mr. Herbert to Sir James Graham.
"Wilton, August 14M, 1856.
" My dear Graham,
" I should have been very much vexed if your
son or any one of your kith and kin had passed my
Irish river and not taken whatever sport or pleasure
the said river could give him. I am only sorry he
was not more successful. All the Irish rivers have
failed this year, not from want of fish, but from want
of disposition to rise on the part of the fish themselves.
I start to-morrow for Newport, where I intend to
spend a few days, hoping for better luck than my
predecessors. VOL. II. A

50 AFTER THE WAR [chap, ii
" I saw Woronzow at Dresden on my way to and at
Frankfort, and again on my way from Carlsbad. He
is well in health, though feeble. He greatly laments
the anti-English feeling which exists in Russia, and
which is exclusively anti-English, for our allies have
contrived to stand better, partly from the notorious
fact of the greater inclination in France for peace,
partly from the virulence of our Press and the
language of our public men, and lastly from the
feelings created in the population on the sea-board by
the operations of the Baltic fleet.
" It will take a generation to efface the impression
araong the peasants and middle classes.
" I hear from a guest at Brocket ^ that Louis Napoleon
refuses to back our remonstrances with Russia about
the Isle of Serpents, Kars fortifications, etc., and that
matters are advancing to a state of things in which it
will be England and Austria v. France and Russia. I
believe this to be an exaggeration, for the interests of
France are too strongly engaged in the English
alliance, and there is too much popular and political
antipathy between Austria and England to allow of
any very close alliance or intimacy. It is curious,
however, to find Palmerston leaning upon Austria.
Anyway, Palmerston will find himself both out-
weighted and outwitted, too, by the French, but I am
very much afraid that we shall suffer in influence and
character, however popular our Blue Books may look,
and however loud the cheers of the House of
Commons. " The Government in a mere party sense is very
strong, although Palmerston's happy-go-lucky style
of conducting it shakes the confidence of the
raelancholy minority composed of thinking men.
There is a certain dash and charlatanism about him
which takes with the public, and they excuse and even
are amused by and admire in him what they would call
any other Minister to a severe reckoning for.
"We have the prospect of an abundant harvest
here, with no more complaint on the part of the
farmers than serves to relieve them of too heavy a
sum of obligation to Providence.
" I am the better, I think, for Carlsbad, though the
journey home nearly laid me up."
' Lord Palmerston's residence.

1856-57] VISIT TO IRELAND 51
On his return from Carlsbad Mr. Herbert went at
once to Ireland as usual for a raonth's fishing — his
favourite relaxation. While there he wrote to Mrs.
Herbert that:
"August <)th, 1856.
"The postboy from HoUymount having a bad
foot — his horse had trod on it — I took him alongside
of me to drive, and was repaid by much information.
He told me Sir Roger Palmer was just expected down
the first time for many years. His son just come from
the Creemaa where he was in the cavalry — sure the
likes of him wouldn't go afoot — his sister Miss Palmer
went with him to the wars, and was riding, he hears
the other day, on the Curragh with her two raedals
and one star upon her. ' Where did she get them ? '
says I. ' Sure the Queen gave them to her.' ' But what
for ? ' says I. ' Well, just for her speerit and valour in
the field.' This is a curious historical fact rivalling
lona." "Newport, August 20th.
" The furniture of the O'Donnel Arms is not elegant.
In my bedroom there is not one pane in the window
which is not either mended with paper and putty,
or else has a thing like the bottom of a bottle in the
middle, and as the weight-string of the sash is broken,
it is kept open by the insertion of a boot-jack. Indeed,
boot-jacks seem to be provided with this view, as
I see another bedroom window kept open in the same
way."^ And he tells Mr. Gladstone (September 14th) that
he has been to Curraghmore, which he finds —
"... a noble place — magnificent woods of iraraense
extent on fine hills rising upwards into grouse moun
tains, and fringing a rocky stream at the bottom, with
great stretches of pasture on the hill sides covered
with deer and cattle.
y. ' I find this note written outside this letter by Lady Herbert :
" S. sold this fishery because he could not stand the distress of the
people round, and, unless he had given up every other duty, nothing
effectual could be done for their relief."

52 AFTER THE WAR [chap, ii
" Everything bears evidence of the genius of the
woman who reigns over it, and has tamed and ira
proved the Centaur who possesses it."
The conclusion of peace had increased that divergence
of opinion which already existed among the principal
members of the Peelite party. So long as the war
lasted, their common repugnance to it bound them
comparatively closely together. When that strong
external bond of union was removed, the tendency
to fall apart became more and more evident. The
profound distrust of Lord Palmerston's foreign poHcy
entertained by Lord Aberdeen, Mr. Gladstone, and
Sir James Graham was not to be allayed. But that
distrust, though felt, was not felt so keenly by Mr.
Herbert or Mr. Cardwell, who were disposed to con
done much which they admitted to be objectionable,
for the sake of reunion with the Liberal party, and
in order to regain the power of acting in unison with
the old friends and former colleagues of whom the
Cabinet was chiefly composed. They were therefore
not indisposed to accept Lord Palmerston as the inevit
able head of what was virtually little more than a re
construction of Lord Aberdeen's Government under
another chief Lord Aberdeen and Sir James Graham
agreed with them in desiring the reunion of the Liberal
party, but being unable to overcome their well-founded
objection to Lord Palmerston's policy and personal
character, they looked rather to Lord John Russell
as its leader. Mr. Gladstone went further, and not
only shared their objections to Lord Palmerston, but
had no wish for any close union with the Liberal
party, and indeed denied that there could be any
reunion with a party which he vehemently declared
he never had joined at all, nor would join. His in-
cHnations were strongly in favour of a nearer approach

1856-57] MR. GLADSTONE'S ARTICLE 53
to the Conservatives and to Lord Derby, and though
admitting that the moment for such a junction had not
yet arrived, he looked hopefully to time and the
chapter of accidents as the means of one day naturally
effecting it.
Mr. Herbert's views on the political questions
which attracted attention during the last few raonths
of 1856 will be most completely and most clearly
shown by a selection from his correspondence during
that period. The first of these letters is one in answer
to an intimation from Mr. Gladstone that he was the
author of an article in The Quarterly Review on "The
Declining Efficiency of Parliament." This article,
which is not reprinted in the collected volume of Mr.
Gladstone's contributions to that periodical, was
powerfully written, and at the time attracted con
siderable notice. After dealing with other reasons
in some measure accounting for what appeared to him
the diminished efficiency and waning authority of
the House of Commons, the writer proceeded to
assign the conduct and methods of the Prime Minister,
Lord Palmerston, as the main cause of what he called
" the demoralisation of Parliament."
Mr. S. Herbert to Mr. Gladstone.
"Wilton, October 22nd, 1856.
" My dear Gladstone,
" I had not read the article when I got your
letter, but I did so last night, and think it very good.
There is but one point which you omit, or do not
dwell upon, which is the effect produced not only
on the Government, but on the supporters of the
Government, by the absence of an Opposition pre
pared for office. It is not worth while to rally round
and defend a Government whose existence is not
threatened — and, there being no fear of letting in the
enemy, each man can afford to kick and cuff or desert

54 AFTER THE WAR [chap, ii
the Government on his own account and then talk
to his constituency of his independence.
"There is an occasional tone in the article which
I attribute to the Editor, or to your necessity of
making your article look Quarterly-like."
A more unrestrained criticism on Mr. Gladstone's
article is contained in a letter to Lord Granville, to
whom, on October 29th, Sidney Herbert wrote :
" Apropos of Pam, read an article in The Quarterly
Review on the declining efficiency of Parliament. It
is an able paper — very severe on Palmerston, and
giving a good account of the dislocation of parties
and its effects. I think one could answer a good
deal of it — i.e. it overlooked the fact that the destruc
tion of the simple old party organisation, though
immensely inconvenient to Members of Parliament, is
by no means an unmixed evil as regards the country."

Mr. Gladstone to Mr. Herbert.
"Liverpool, October 2i,th, 1856.
" I am glad you are not displeased with the article ;
Graham's judgment too was favourable. Lord Aber
deen had not yet seen it. Pray remember my
secret. "You are quite right in supposing that I en
deavoured to write up to the character of a '¦Quarterly
Reviewer ' when I could do so with propriety. The
local praise of Pakington in New Zealand, and a com
mendation of Henley, (by the way, they are at daggers
drawn) are both, I think, justified, but, of course,
they were things that it was not necessary to say.
The editor told me he had struck out some epithets
laudatory of relief measures ; but I do not know that
he has put in anything abusive, so that for what
there may be of that kind I am probably responsible.
" The truth is, I am a good deal pressed in mind
by two considerations, the first that my own presence
in Parliament is more than worthless under the present
circumstances, for I think any good done upon a
particular question is more than counterbalanced by

1856-57] STATE OF PARTIES 55
the evil of helping so materially to prolong a bad
state of things in Parliament. The second is that 1
have very strong feelings against Lord Palmerston
as Prime Minister. His inefficiency at the Home
Office was an evil, but it averted greater evils. His
inefficiency now at home and his meddlesomeness
abroad are each of them very great evils, and threaten
not to avert but to bring about greater ones. I have
not the least doubt that the substitution of Derby
would be the substitution of a better man ; I am not
sure that it would be the substitution of a better
Government, but a Government under him would be
kept in order by the Liberal Party, which is at present
disqualified for good. The Liberal Party should never
occupy the Treasury Benches excepting under a power
ful Government like that of Lord Grey, or, at any
rate, a tolerably active one like that of Lord Melbourne.
At present the sheep are set to play the part of watch
dog, and the watchdog is busy with his sop.
"You are quite right about the effect on the sup
porters of the Government ; there is also much to be
said on the state of the so-called Conservative Party,
but I did not think it was for me to say. The Morning
Post had rather a curious leader yesterday."
Mr. Herbert to Mr. Gladstone.
"Wilton, October 26th, 1856.
" My dear Gladstone,
" Your secret shallremain inviolate. After having
assented to so much of your article the reaction comes,
not as to the causes, but as to the extent and intensity
of the evil. We who are members of Parliament and
have to work the machinery are very much disturbed
at finding our routine interfered with, and are troubled
at the necessity of devising new ways for ourselves ;
but it does not follow that the country suffers. In
some respects they have gained considerably ; the old
party organisation maintained by a blind adherence
on the part of foUowers to an unquestioned superiority
on the part of the leader could not, in the nature of
things, last. The diffusion of political information and
intelligence, together with the removal of the old
subjects of party contest, make it impossible. The

56 AFTER THE WAR [chap, ii
break-up must have come sooner or later. Peel only
hastened or precipitated it. We must recollect that
the great party fights up to 1841, however exciting
and easy from the perfection of the discipline they may
have been to members of Parliament, were far from
wholesome for the country, which was divided into
hostile factions, one half of the population fiercely
embittered against the other. All the social relations
of life, even trade, suffered when grocers were em
ployed, not for the goodness of their cabbages, but
for the goodness of their votes.
" I do not think it is possible, even if it were desir
able, to restore the old state of things. The change
has come upon us, and we must work out a solution
of the difficulty by adapting ourselves to the new condi
tions of political life, which refuse to adapt themselves
to us. If you ask me how, I can give you no answer,
but no more can you, as to the means of re-establishing
the status quo. You look forward to no nearer ap
proach to it than the existence of two parties, each
offering to do the same thing, but one claiming to
do it better than the other."
Mr. Herbert to Mr. Gladstone.
" Wilton, November 10th, 1856.
" Palmerston seems to have flourished much at
Manchester, and the papers are in a chorus of delight
at a man making three commonplace speeches in
one day. I confess to being surprised also at any
man being able to make three speeches with scarcely
an idea in one of them.
"There seems to be a restless and uncomfortable
feeling brewing everywhere. The Queen had Persigny
to Windsor the other day without Lord Clarendon, as
Albert thought he could better smooth some diffi
culties without the Foreign Minister being present.
I have no right to know this, but I believe it. It
argues a sore and irritated feeling between the two
Governments. There is a curious statement in The
Globe or Times, I forget which, that Sardinia is to be
excluded by our desire from the proposed Paris
Congress because she is against the line taken by
Austria and England.
" Bitter cold weather here."

1856-57] GLADSTONE ON PALMERSTON 57
Mr. Gladstone to Mr. Herbert.
" Hawarden, November \6,th, 1856.
"With your argument against The Quarterly Review
I only go up to a certain point. I do not beHeve that
the settlement of the great questions is the main cause
of the disorganisation and partial abeyance of party ;
the main cause, I believe, has been in personal
considerations, acts, and feelings, which first led the
Protectionists to throw off Peel, and then Peel to
throw off the Protectionists not only quoad Protection,
but quoad everything, because he took it into his
head that Protection was everything — i.e. that there
would be a struggle to restore it when the Protec
tionists came in, which would absorb all other
questions. However, tongue is better than pen to
work through a discussion of this kind, which, though
interesting and somewhat historical, is apt to become
long, and at the present moment I am particularly
busy (literally) with the politics of Troy.
" But Foreign Affairs are so strange, gloomy,
and mysterious that not even Troy can keep them
out. I think Palmerston's denunciation of the
secondary states at Manchester is one of those
shabby apologies for himself which no one but a
man with a reputation for courage could venture
upon. But that is of less importance than the
Eastern question. I hope the case for the Govern
ment is something quite different from, and very far
beyond, that which The Times has made, or The
Morning Post. It must be a very good one indeed
to justify their having played such tricks with the
French alliance, and kept the Austrians for another
winter in the principalities.
" Louis Napoleon is weak at this moment, or I
imagine he would have been more difficult to deal
with. I interpret his words to Kisseleff, however, as
a most distinct declaration that he does not mean to
quarrel with Russia, and has no fault to find with her.
" I think that, at best, Lord P.'s premiership will
cost the country a few millions a year. To such
fine words we cannot be treated without good large
establishments. But if in addition to that we are
to see every alliance spoiled and every nation offended

58 AFTER THE WAR [chap, ii
one after another, and ourselves only isolated and
hated, the day must be close at hand when the first
duty will be to put an end, or contribute towards
putting an end, to so great and unmitigated an evil.
" The remedy for the French difficulty in Prince
Albert's intervention is anything but pleasing."
The features in the foreign relations of the country
which appeared to Mr. Gladstone to be strange,
gloomy, and mysterious, were (i) the prospect of a
fresh quarrel with Russia as to the interpretation of
those Articles of the Treaty of Paris which related
to the boundaries between the Russian and Turkish
Empires ; (2) a demonstration against the misgovern
ment prevailing in the kingdom of Naples, which, begun
blusteringly, had ended tamely ; (3) a war with Persia,
commenced without any communication to Parliament
and carried on from India and with Indian troops.
Mr. Herbert to Mr. Gladstone.
"Wilton, November iSth, 1856.
" Foreign affairs certainly look ill. But they will,
I expect, be much mended before Parliament meets
so far as regards France and Russia. It is difficult to
know the facts, but so far as I can gather the question
of the Isle of Serpents is one which we should have
been wise to have gracefuUy yielded rather than show
up the difference with France, and by so doing we
might more effectually have closed the Bolgrad
difficulty which I imagine to be important. The real
merit of the Treaty of Paris was its satisfactory settle
ment of the navigation of the Danube and of the
Turkish frontier, and this compensated for the mere
reproduction of the condemned Hmitation in the
Black Sea under the new name of neutralisation.
Any material departure, especially one involving
the loss of a main security for the position conquered
on the Danube, is therefore a grave affair, and I have
no doubt that Walewski, and some of his colleagues
who are about as honest as himself, have been com-

1856-57] PALMERSTONIAN POLICY 59
bining with Russia for objects of their own and were
ready to sacrifice the Danube or anything else.
" I have little doubt, however, that our views, right
or wrong, have been urged in the manner most offensive
to the French Government, for I assume that the tone
of The Times has been borrowed from Downing Street.
"Palmerston is in the meantime more popular and
stronger than ever. He will be rebuked for his
Neapolitan policy and well backed up in his Russian
policy, and he will consider and adopt the net result
as a triumph.
" There does not appear to be the slightest chance
of any one turning him out. To make Palmerston
useful or even harmless his Ministry should have been
leavened and not opposed.
" I was staying at Heytesbury last week. Lord Bath
had been going about saying that the Government were
sure to be turned out, as the Foreign Ministers were
all going to move against Palmerston. If they do, they
will set hira up to all time. Even Lord Heytesbury,
who is no admirer of his, answered that if anything
could make him support Palmerston that would, for
he should resent any such interference, as would the
whole country. The mere suspicion of such complicity
served him on the Greek question."

Sir James Graham to Mr. Herbert.
" Netherby, November i6th, 1856.
" I thank you sincerely for the kindness of your
inquiries respecting my wife. She has been danger
ously ill, but all cause for immediate alarm is at an
end. I wish that I could add I consider her safe and
recovered. However, I must hope the best, and be
thankful for the mercy already vouchsafed.
"This Neapolitan affair appears to me to be the
height of absurdity. Nobody knows better than Lord
Heytesbury the fatal and cruel consequences of British
interference in the cause of Italian independence and
of Sicilian freedom  '
" We may have patched up for a moment our differ-
' The omitted portion of this letter will be found in Mr. Parker's
Life of Sir James Graham,

6o AFTER THE WAR [chap, ii
ences with France, and Napoleon, in this crisis of
his financial difficulties, cannot afford an open rupture
with us ; but the warmth of the friendship has
evaporated, and the new love is proclaimed, while
cold excuses only are offered to the discarded old
love ; and still the question remains, ' Shall the Con
ferences at Paris be re-opened ? ' On this will depend
the triumph or defeat of England, the enmity or
transient goodwill of France. I never confided in the
French Alliance or valued it as a permanent security
for peace. The Duke of Wellington was right, ' Con
cert with France, if you please, but no love : point
d'amour.' I wish this precept had been observed at
Windsor."

Mr. Gladstone to Mr. Herbert.
"Hawarden, November 20th, 1856.
" I feel with you that we are really in the dark
as to the facts of the Eastern question. My principal
misgiving arises from the extraordinary manner in
which the case has been stated by journals, which
I suppose really derive their information from Lord P.
and from the Foreign Office. Why does The Times
bluster with unparalleled insolence and vulgarity, but
carefully eschew telling us the facts? Why are we
left in the dark on a question as plain as whether
Chester or Hawarden is the larger place?
"Again I want to know, would Bolgrad Tabab give
Russia an access to the Danube? And has she not
one already by the Pruth, or why not by that, if by
the other?
" You would do me a charity if you have any light
on these matters that you could shed upon rae.
" With regard to leavening, -was not that what
we tried, with the worst possible result ? Was it not
quite clear that the first time he and the leaven dis
agreed about a question of which he had the popular
side (he was perfectly sure to have or take the
popular side of all questions) the leaven would go
to the wall ? After all, it is not strange if Lord P.
is still the man of July, 1850, the date of the Greek
debate. I admit that if you answer any of my ques
tions, it will not be human but heroic virtue.

1856-57] DEATH OF PRINCE WORONZOW 61
Mr. Herbert to Mr. Gladstone.
"Wilton, November 26,th, 1856.
" I was called up to town on Saturday to attend a
funeral service, held in the Greek Chapel, for Prince
Woronzow. We had heard of his death, which took
place on Tuesday last at Odessa, by telegraph. We
are still receiving letters from his wife and family,
describing the happiness of their life, his enjoyraent
of his rides, his delight at the growth of the iraprove-
raents he had commenced, and the warm and heartfelt
affection and respect shown to him. So it must have
been at the last very sudden, though his age and
broken health made his life precarious. So ends
another noble and well-spent life. It was said of him
that through the whole of South Russia you could
talk to no man half an hour without hearing his name,
and never without a blessing.
" I can't tell you much about Bolgrad ; I gather
from Wood that Brunow himself had proposed the
more Northern Bolgrad at the Conference, and that
the importance attached to it rests on the access to
vessels of larger draught than the upper part of the
Pruth, where the new frontier is drawn, affords.
" They expect that the whole question wUl be settled
before Parliament meets and Naples forgotten."
Sir James Graham to Mr. Herbert.
" Netherby, January 2()th, 1857.
" My dear Herbert,
" I hope to meet you on Tuesday. If Persia has
succumbed, I agree with you in opinion that an attack,
however well founded, which proceeds on the ground
that the means used were unjustifiable will be of little
avail. You probably are right that Palmerston is still
in the ascendant, and that he will not quail before a
multitude of divided opponents, more especially if his
secret friends outnumber his covert eneraies. I have
little doubt that John Russell will play him a slippery
trick if he have the opportunity, and I regard him as

62 AFTER THE WAR [chap, ii
a more formidable adversary than Derby and D'Israeli.
' The Jew and the Jockey ' are still in bad odour, and
when it comes to the point, this nation will not be
governed by them. Gladstone's strong ground will be
finance and expenditure, and however much Palmerston
may dislike this financial policy, it is more likely to win
public favour and to stand the test of a general election
than any other great question now open. If Persia
be not settled, it presents a breach most inviting for
an assault, but the luck of the Government is such that
I conclude they have effected a settlement on their
own terms. Sir J. McNeill's comments on Panmure's
treatment of his own Coraraission are stinging and
quite just. I should iraagine that the relations between
the Horse Guards and the War Department are not
altogether amicable, and Panmure's influence is not
of a soothing character. It would require much dulcet
modulation to harmonise these jarring elements."
Mr. Herbert to Sir James Graham.
" Wilton House, Salisbury,
"December \^h, 1856.
"My dear Graham,
" I ought to have written before this to thank
you for your kind and feeling letter. Poor Woronzow
was not ill more than three days, and up to the
commencement of his illness had been daily riding
on horseback and greatly enjoying the sight of the
growth of his creations at Odessa. He had been
much touched at the respect and affection shown by
the population on his arrival. He was one of the
foremost of the public men in Europe — a good soldier,
a skilful administrator, and a model of integrity and
virtue in a corrupt Court and a corrupt country. I
preserve a very happy recollection of a week spent
with him this summer.
" I hoped by my delay to be able to send you
some account of the state of our Russian and French
difficulties. I have had Granville here, but I did not
get rauch from him. He thinks the Russians have
more case for the Southern Bolgrad than is generally
supposed, but I do not think that his account gives
them much locus standi.

1856-57] THE BOLGRAD QUESTION 63
" It appears that from an excess of caution, or of
suspiciousness, which is a very different thing, the
Conference would not so much as look at a Russian
map, but trusted solely to a French map, on which
there was marked but one, and that the Northern
Bolgrad. The first line proposed went to the north
even of that, but on the representation that Bolgrad
is the Chef lieu du dcpartement, and therefore on that
ground important to Russia, the line was drawn south
of it, but equally to the north of the lake, which
has a deep-water communication with the Danube.
Of the two Bolgrads, however, now shown to exist,
the southernmost, half-way down the lake, turns out
to be the one which is the Chef lieu.
" Now, the concession as to the drawing of the
line south of Bolgrad was undoubtedly made for the
purpose of leaving to Russia the provincial capital ;
but it was given as clearly in the belief that the
Bolgrad was to the north of the lake, and that the con
cession did not invalidate the principle on which the
new frontier was drawn, which was the exclusion
of the Russians from any port having access to the
Danube. For this reason they were driven up the Pruth
till the shallow water was reached on which no armed
boat could float.
" The sudden yielding of a renewed Conference
after a refusal conveyed so acrimoniously, and main
tained so pertinaciously as to have seriously alienated
the French Government and people, is a confession
of wrong in the first instance, or of weakness now,
which must injure us seriously in the eyes of Europe.
But it is the old game of brag which Palmerston has
always delighted to play till the last raoraent, then
shamelessly abandon. '
Under the influence of the Emperor of the French
a compromise on this question was arranged in which
all the parties interested were content to acquiesce.
In the early part of December it seemed probable
that Mr. Gladstone would come to the conclusion that
the time had arrived for closer co-operation with the
Conservative party; in which case the divergence
already existing between himself and the other Peelite

64 AFTER THE WAR [chap, ii
leaders would have been widened by his open junc
tion with Lord Derby. With great difficulty, and
contrary to his own opinion, Mr. Gladstone was
then dissuaded from returning an affirmative answer to
a proposal made to him that he should meet Lord
Derby, with a view to concerted action against the
Government — a meeting which at that time could have
had but one result. The decision was a moraentous
one — far more so than was at the time apparent — and
one which, not improbably, some of those who were
most instrumental in securing its adoption would
have regretted had they known its far-reaching
consequences. The following letters will show how
very narrowly a contrary decision was escaped.
What most inclined Mr. Gladstone to hesitate was the
fact that he had received no direct invitation from
Lord Derby. The day after he had sent his letter
courteously declining the proposed meeting he
received that direct personal invitation from Lord
Derby which, had it arrived but one day earlier,
would almost certainly have been accepted.
Mr. Gladstone to Mr. Herbert.
"Hawarden, December i^th, 1856.
" My dear Herbert,
" I have just sent to Sir James Graham, who
will forward them from Netherby to you to-raorrow,
copies of two letters of my own : one to a corre
spondent ("who, not being a politician, remains nameless/
on the subject of a message, as I construed it, that
he sent me from Lord Derby, expressing a wish to
communicate with me on public affairs ; the other to
Lord Aberdeeen, in answer to one in which he had
written to me on the subject of this correspondence.
" I had in the meantime come to the conclusion in
my own mind that perhaps I should have done better
' Mr. Elwin, editor of The Quarterly Review.

1856-57] GLADSTONE AND LORD DERBY 65
to write at once on ray own responsibility, for the
delay incident to exchanging letters with Aberdeen
shire, and indeed exchanging them twice, tends rather
to give the formality to this communication (if it takes
place), which it is, above all things, desirable that it
should not possess. I also felt that, after the awk
ward and roundabout proceedings of last session
through Heathcote, it would be hardly possible for
me to decline the proposal.
"Should Lord Derby desire to meet me, I think our
conversation must be confined to public questions
and the position of the Government, and must not
enter upon any question of political approxiraation as
a thing to be arranged in private. Upon that footing
I shall be glad to raeet hira ; for I think that a con
versation conducted in honourable confidence and the
freedora it inspires, will enable me, and possibly you,
to form some better opinion at least than I can now
form how far he and his party offer the smallest hope
of efficient aid in controlling the Government. The
difficulties of our position are extreme, and its con
tinuance is anything but favourable either to the
public interests or to our own characters ; even J.
Wortley's acceptance of office ^ is another warning ;
while feeling all this I do not see the way of escape,
but I own I look with earnest desire to any iraprove
raent in the means of making the Government do right
and preventing them from doing wrong, quite irre
spective of any iraproveraent or change in our own
condition. " You will, of course, hear when I have more to say.
With kindest messages."

Sir James Graham to Mr. Herbert.
"Netherby, December i6th, 1856.
^'My dear Herbert,
" By the desire of Gladstone I forward to you
the two enclosures which came to me frora him this
morning. I have not been taken entirely by surprise.
My recent correspondence with Gladstone had led
me to the conclusion that some such measure was
impending ; and though I have only discussed it as a
' He had become Solicitor-General.
VOL. II 5

66 AFTER THE WAR [chap, ii
speculative case, I have given no encouragement. On
the contrary, I have said that I could have no hand in
it; and that I am not prepared to cross the House
and to join the band which surrounds D'Israeli. I
have told Gladstone that in my opinion two things
for his own honour are indispensably necessary : first,
that he should be a Leader, and not a Follower, under
any new arrangement ; and secondly, that the trans
action should be in the face of day and in the presence
of the public, on some broad, intelligible public ground,
which shall involve national interests and raise a new
landmark of separation between statesmen. In the
raain I agree with Gladstone in his opinions, but I
am raore patient and less discontented with the im
potent lassitude of neutrality. We shall see what
coraes of this ; but I do not augur favourably. Have
the goodness to return the enclosures to Gladstone
as soon as you have read them.
" I ara obliged by your accurate and raost intelligible
account of the present state of the question pending
between Russia and the allies. One striking fact is
prominent — England resisted the re-opening of the
Paris Congress, and she has yielded under strong
compulsion. This is the triumph of France and
Russia united ; it is the debasement of Austria and
England in their new confederacy. This Persian war
also, declared at Calcutta, is a most awkward circum
stance at this juncture, and the tone recently adopted
by the Foreign Office towards Brazil has been such
as to call down the thunder even of The Times.
Everything appears to me to be out of joint, and I
ara gloomy and morose in the extreme, but never
cease to be most sincerely yours."
Mr. Herbert to Mr. Gladstone.
"Wilton, December igth.
" My dear Gladstone,
" I return your letters which Graham forwarded
to me. Your answer is quite safe and guarded, but
though the step binds you to nothing, it wiU tend to
what I think you wish— viz. political approximation
to Lord Derby. I cannot say that I wish to see it;
for though you might infuse fresh vigour and responsi
bility into a party which is much in want of^ both

1856-57] MR. GLADSTONE'S PERPLEXITIES 6j
(if there is such, or ever again will be such, a thing
as a party, which I am inclined to doubt), yet vou
will always be in a false position with them. Your
opinions really are essentially progressive, and when
all measures — I mean the raeasures of any Government
— must be liberal and progressive, the country will
prefer the men whose antecedents and mottoes are
liberal, while the Conservatives will always prefer
a leader whose prejudices are with themselves.
However, ehe sard sard. We reckon on you for
the 17th."

Mr. Gladstone to Mr. Herbert.
" Hawarden, December 2'ird, 1856.
" Our visit will supply, I hope, such a clear and
free opportunity of talking politics that I need hardly
trouble you with a word now. I am sensible too that
a man ought never to have less credit for self-know
ledge than when he thinks he knows his mind. Not
at all attempting to escape from the mesh of this
proposition, I think you see farther for me than I do
for myself I am undeniably conscious of the greatest
objection to Lord P. as rainister ; were it in ray power
to sign the warrant for turning him out, I would do
it with the ink that is now in my pen. I do sincerely
believe him to be a most demoralising and a most
destructive minister for the country; and as unfortu
nately he is the minister, and gives the ministry its
tone as well as its popularity, this becomes equivalent
to objecting to men to whom in themselves I do not
object. But beyond this, and as respects myself, I do
not see one inch. The inch you speak of represents
half my mind, but there is another half: I feel the
full force of all you say, and could add much of
my own in the same sense. As I have admitted,
a man cannot tell his own intentions; but he can
try, and depend upon it I shall not fail for want
of trying.
" I have heard nothing on the subject of my last. It
makes me think my informant may have been deceived ;
nor ara I eager that it should prove otherwise. De
spairing of the Liberal party's disposition to do the
good that is essential so long as they have Lord P. at

68 AFTER THE WAR [chap, n
their head, I ara naturally anxious to see whether the
others are disposed to it ; but this I ara going to try
through The Quarterly, and by that channel advice will
corae to thera without any factitious element, whether
of attraction or repulsion, that might attend my author
ship if known. Please to keep this quite close as
before."

Mr. Herbert to Mr. Gladstone.
"V^YLTO'^, January ifh, 1857.
"My dear Gladstone,
"I ought to have written to you to close with
your offer of the 16th, on which day we hope to see
you. We look forward to your visit with great
delight. The Bishop of Salisbury promises to spend
Sunday here in order to talk with you and preach
to us.
" I postpone politics, but I must say I look on
Palmerston as a fixture, if only by the process of
exhaustion. He is the only public man in England
who has a name. Many criticise, many disapprove,
but all, more or less, like him and look on him as the
only man. He has on his side that which is the
strongest element in the mental organisation of all
human society, namely, the public's national pre
judices. Some one said, ' Give me the national
songs, and I will rule the nation ' ; and Canning said,
' Don't talk to me of the " sense of the nation " ; give
me the nonsense, and I will beat it hollow.'
" To return confidence for confidence. If you take
in The Saturday Review, read in the number of
Saturday, December 27th, an article headed 'Our
Foreign Policy,' and in to-day's 'SaiHng before the
Wind.' There will be one next week on the American
question, which, however, I know less of than the old
Vienna case. I have proraised one, if not two, more.
I have Httle hope in the opposite side of the House.
They require regeneration, if not absolute creation.
It will be a task of years, which in the meanwhile
will have disposed of our poor Pam., in the way,
not of all ministers, but of aU flesh.
" Yours affectionately."

1856-57] PALMERSTON'S SAFE POSITION 69

Mr. Herbert to Sir James Graham.
"Wilton House, Salisbury,
"January 2'jth, 1857.
" My dear Graham,
"I hear to-day from London, at second-hand
from Vernon-Smith, that the Government have re
ceived a telegram from Stratford to the effect that
the Persian Government have conceded all our
demands, whatever they may be.
" I do not share your expectation of a change in the
Government, or in any important portion of it during
this Session. You, I gather, expect it from Lord John
Russell : Gladstone from the opposition side of the
House. I am satisfied that this latter expectation has
no foundation to rest on. Palraerstons popularity
is very great with the country gentlemen. His old
Protectionist leanings, his unconcealed aversion to
Gladstone's financial policy, his objection to Par
liamentary Reforra, in any shape or degree, and his
noisy foreign policy, which they understand the use
of on a hustings as well as he, combined with the
distrust they feel to their own leader, all incline them
to support him. Many who sit opposite to him would
like to sit behind him, and no doubt would do so,
were it not that the old machinery of party is stronger
than its spirit, and the club in London and the
attorneys in the country prevent them. Nor do I see
how Lord John is to do it. Why is an unpopular man
out of office to oust the most popular man in England
who is in office, and who will use his nine points of
the law with a hearty determination to keep every
one of them ?
" With the exception of China all the foreign ques
tions are closed. Parliament does not enter into the
main questions of how they have been closed. I have
no doubt, from all I hear, that the Government of
Louis Napoleon has been unnecessarily irritated, and
that L. N. himself complains loudly both of Clarendon
and Cowley. Disraeli, I hear, half persuaded him that
the Government would be displaced soon after the
meeting of Parliament. I don't believe it will, but his
willingness to accept the prophecy is an indication
of his leanings. Nevertheless, these are not raatters

70 AFTER THE WAR [chap, ii
capable of Parliamentary proof, though sensible raen
are getting uneasy at the world-wide unpopularity
which we are achieving.
" I am very glad you inspired some caution into
Gladstone's sanguine and irapatient mind. I have little
inclination to the party, if party it can be called,
towards whom his sympathies are tending.
" He is gone to Oxford to look up his supporters
there. Lord Aberdeen very kindly came down here
for a night, which I suppose was the foundation on
which The Herald built up its new coalition. The only
thing which I wished were true was your imputed
visit. We go to town on Monday next.
" I hear that Panmure has got into an odd difficulty
on the subject of officers' instruction, on which you
raay recollect that I made a statement last year in the
House of Commons. He has drawn up a plan, or
rather has had one drawn up by Colonel Lefroy, and
the Duke of Cambridge has produced another, which
he purposes to work himself. I have seen both, and
have no hesitation in saying that the Duke of Cam
bridge's is far the best, but the two are, of course,
at issue as to the merits of their respective bantlings,
and the Duke, I am told, proposes that I should
arbitrate between the two !
" As Lewis has referred to a compromise, the ques
tion how the Government is to pay the Government
servants, I should not be surprised if in some shape
the Duke's proposal is adopted by Panmure. But the
question as to the authority of the Secretary of State
is one which he must necessarily settle for himself, and
I have no doubt that he finds it far from easy with
Windsor Castle watching his every move."

Mr. Gladstone to Mr. Herbert.
" Oxford, January 28th, 1857.
" My dear Herbert,
" On Monday I sent my letter to Lord D[erby]
after it had gone to Lord A[berdeenJ, and on Tuesday
morning I received a very unexceptionable letter from
the former, wishing to see me in London on Sunday
or Monday. The epistles crossed on the road. Of
course I raust adhere to my letter. At the same time

1856-57] LETTER FROM MR. GLADSTONE 71
the conclusion expressed in it is not mine, but is accepted
from others, you among them. I admit the incon
veniences of meeting, but I should have been disposed
to face them had I acted alone.
"My visit to Wilton, besides all its pleasure, was
I think really of use in enabling us to compare notes
as to the state of our rainds respectively ; and I estiraate
our several views as follows :
" I think we have very nearly the sarae opinions
as to the raorality and as to the public utility of Lord
Palmerston's system of managing public affairs. I
honestly think you would feel even a stronger repug
nance against stooping to it than I should. It seems
to me that we are further agreed in the opinion that
this systera ought to be put an end to ; though we
may not estimate alike the chances of such an issue,
which I think less violently improbable than it seems
to you. Then I think we go another step, and a great
one onwards, in company. We feel ourselves to be
without any party connection, and to be under the
clear and simple obligation to do what we can to point
out the right line of public policy, let those pursue
it who will. From this results the further duty of
supporting (be it officially, be it independently, is
another, and may be a difficult, question) those by
whom it shall be pursued ; if any such party there
shall be, with respect to which neither of us, perhaps,
are sanguine.
"This, I have concluded, is our common stock of
propositions concerning public duty applicable to the
present state of affairs. To this stock I add some
others, on which perhaps there are shades of difference
between us. I seem to feel more keenly than you do
that in our present position we are, or that beyond
doubt I am, a public nuisance. I am raore hopeful
than you about seeing some nearer approximation
than we now have to the old system of Governraent.
I am more wiUing than you to see Derby and his
people zealously embrace the right course ; but this, I
nope, is more a difference in speculation than an5'thing
else, because as I have no disposition whatever (I hope)
to prevent the Liberal party from so acting if they
are disposed, so I am certain that Derby would have
your fair and even full, though reluctant support, if
they wiU iiot do right, and he wiU,"

72 AFTER THE WAR [chap, ii
But though a formal severance had been for the
moment avoided, it was the impression, not only of
Mr. Herbert, but of alraost all Mr. Gladstone's friends,
that it was only postponed, and that the time was
rapidly approaching at which Mr. Gladstone would,
if not rejoin the Conservative party (which he main
tained he had never abandoned), at all events renew
that close and intimate connection with it which since
1846 had been suspended.
In February the interview with Lord Derby, from
which Mr. Gladstone had two months earlier allowed
himself to be dissuaded, actually took place. It was
followed by others, which were kept carefully secret,
to the great dissatisfaction of Lord Aberdeen, who
maintained that if the contemplated junction was to
be creditable to both parties, it must take place in the
light of day and as the result of open agreement on
questions before Parliament. But in truth these
conferences never assumed the same serious character
which they would have worn had they been entered
into before the commencement of the Session. What
had then been possible was no longer so.
Meanwhile, subjects of difference multiplied, and
on March 6th Sidney Herbert wrote that the " few
gentlemen referred to — i.e. the Peelites — had, on almost
every question lately submitted to Parliament, voted
in different lobbies." And the tone of his warning
to Mr. Gladstone not to press unduly his schemes of
retrenchment, while it shows no abatement of personal
friendship, clearly implies an absence of concert in
political action. " Wilton, March ith, 1857.
" I Stay for the grand jury to-morrow, for my affairs
want looking after here, and I shall not be at the
debate to-morrow. I do not know what you decided

1856-57] THE CHINESE WAR 73
about your retrenchment motion, but if you bring it
on, I hope you will be guarded and moderate in the
extent to which you propose any reduction. I sus
pect your views are extreme, and we have seen in the
case of Cobden and the financial reform apostles, how
little very extreme views can catch. They are looked
on as unpractical, and pooh-poohed. There is also
a great alarm as to the extent you are ready to go.
There is very little really to be reduced from the
military estimates, and the sanitary state of our
barracks requires a large, though I trust not a lasting,
expenditure. " You must also make allowance for the prevailing
passions and prejudices of the public. You can never
lead men by reason alone. Not one in man a hundred
ever exercises his reason, but all act on other motives,
and you raust establish a bond of sympathy by sharing
their feelings before you can induce the multitude to
follow you. What a sermon ! — but it is Sunday."
Nevertheless old friendship and old habits kept up
the practice of coramon consultation among all the
members of the Peelite party, though such consultation
frequently failed to result in combined action.
They still sat together in the House of Commons,
and a certain likeness of thought still led them more
frequently than not to act together. They were again
thoroughly united in their disapproval of the pro
ceedings of Sir J. Bowring in China. That functionary
as Governor of Hong Kong had called on the Admiral
Commanding on the Station to undertake hostilities
against the Chinese authorities on account of their
refusal to recognise as of British nationality a Chinese
lorcha carrying a licence from the East of Hong Kong.
The forts in the neighbourhood of Canton had conse
quently been taken, the city itself shelled, and its
suburbs burnt. When Mr. Cobden raoved a resolu
tion condemnatory of the policy of the Governraent,
it was supported in speeches of great brilliancy by

74 AFTER THE WAR [chap, ii
Mr. Gladstone, Sir James Graham, and Mr. Herbert.
The last showed by the confession of half a dozen
official authorities that the Arrow was not a British
vessel, or one belonging to a British owner, and
that the registration undei; which it was sought to
give it that character was altogether ultra vires and
illegal. He further pointed out the grave impolicy of
a step which would have given to it and similar vessels
the character of a British ship in all parts of the
world, and drew an amusing picture of a crowd of
yellow-faced, pig's-eyed, and pig-tailed Chinese sailors
who had got into a scrape in some Mediterranean
port, marching up to the British Consul and demanding
redress from that astonished functionary with shouts
of Cives Romani Sumus.
Passing from the trivial details of the particular
case and from strictures on the conduct and motives
of Sir John Bowring, he took a higher line, and
accepting, for the sake of argument, the contention of
the Government with regard to them, he denounced
the punishment inflicted as out of all proportion to the
offence committed. Reprisals, the seizure of a greater
or smaller number of junks, would have amply sufficed
to satisfy our honour; nor did the capture by the
Chinese police of the soi-disant British but really
Chinese schooner in any way call for or justify the
bombardraent of a great and populous commercial
city. He sternly reprobated the language he had heard
in debate, and which was prevalent out of doors, which
implied that Chinese only deserved bad treatment
and merited every injury inflicted upon thera. " Were
the Chinese people to be judged by the puriieus
of Canton ? Were the British people fairly repre
sented by the rabble of Shoreditch and Wapping?"
And in the na,me of humanity and justice he called

1856-57] DISSOLUTION OF 1857 75
on the House to censure the outrage on both, which
had received the approval of the Government.
Lord John Russell spoke and voted for the resolu
tion, which, on March 4th, was carried by a majority
of sixteen.
Parliament was immediately dissolved.
The appeal to the country thus made by Lord
Palmerston was erainently successful. The already
small number of Peelites was reduced to insignificance.
Of those who had voted against the Government,
Mr. Cobden himself, Mr. Bright, Mr. Cardwell, and
Mr. Roundell Palmer lost their seats. Lord John
Russell narrowly escaped the same fate. Of the lesser
members of the so-called party. Lord Alfred Hervey,
Dr. Philliraore, Mr. G. Vernon, and others were
defeated, and the one pledge given by the majority of
the new Parliament was that of unhesitating trust
and confidence in Lord Palmerston.
On the whole, and looking back after an interval of
nearly fifty years, I am inclined to believe that the
instinct which led the country to rally to Lord
Palmerston's support was right, and that the course
taken in opposing measures which had become inevit
able was wrong. Abstractly the arguments used in
condemnation of the policy of Sir John Bowring were
perfectly sound, but perhaps hardly sufficient allowance
was made for the effect which would have been pro
duced on the relations between English and Chinese
by acquiescence in the pretensions of the Chinese
authorities with regard to the lorcha Arrow.

CHAPTER III
the extinction of PEELISM
1857-S8
THE Dissolution of 1857 may be said to have
terminated the existence of the Peelites as a
party, whilst it accentuated the differences existing
between the individuals who had coraposed it and
were still popularly known by that name.
Sir James Graham and Mr. Herbert differed
altogether from Mr. Gladstone as to that party in
the new Parliament to which support should be
given. Lord Aberdeen, as usual, acted the part of
a mediator, and their common regard and respect for
him enabled him to prevent, or, as he himself
thought, only to postpone, a separation, which to
all appeared inevitable.
Nearly a year before the Dissolution, Mr. Gladstone
had shown that he was not disinclined to support
a Governraent led by Lord Derby. Writing to Mr.
Herbert on April 22nd, 1S56, on the subject of hiring
and letting houses, he adds :
" It is odd to pass from house agency in this sense
to house agency in a very different one, but after
leaving Lord Aberdeen's on Saturday I was sorry to
find I had just missed Northcote, who had two things
fresh to tell me, both of which were satisfactory.
"The first was that JoUiffe had been working in
various places to prevent trouble to persons of our
political complexion, and with some success, but he
had not yet been able to prevail with Lord Bath, and
76

i85;-58] CONSERVATIVE OVERTURES 77
much regretted it. I believe JoUiffe to be a very
honourable man (as 1 am told he is also an admirable
whip), and with this belief I replied this was kind and
handsome, perhaps premature.
"The other point was that Derby had asked
Northcote something of this sort : ' What if the
Government is thrown out without their co-operation
in the act, but under circumstances such that they
could not disapprove. Is it a possible case that,
without being prepared to take office, they might
notwithstanding look with a friendly eye on ray
attempting to form a Government, and be disposed to
give such support as we gave Peel in 1835? I said
I thought it was quite possible that this might be the
best solution. In truth I was relieved and glad to
find Derby spontaneously starting it. Had we
mentioned it he would probably have considered
it a trap. It is the same thing which formed the
substance of my letter to him, and I think of yours in
some degree, in February, 1855. I think Graham
received this with some satisfaction."
At a later period, as related in the preceding
chapter, he had felt strongly inclined to comply with
an invitation to meet Lord Derby with a view to
¦consider the possibility of co-operation with hira. It
was only with extreme difficulty, and as he himself
declared, contrary to his own opinion, that he was
persuaded in Deceraber, 1855, to refrain from a step
which, if then taken, would have almost certainly led
to his open and active co-operation with the Con
servative party.
The raeetings, which at a subsequent period did
take place, between Lord Derby and Mr. Gladstone,
though not resulting in agreeraent, did not dirainish
the probability of their closer union.
When the Dissolution becarae imminent, overtures
were raade to Mr. Herbert and Mr. Gladstone frora
the Conservative wire pullers, suggesting that if the
Peelites were prepared to exercise a benevolent

78 THE EXTINCTION OF PEELISM [chap, hi
neutrality in their favour rather than in a Liberal
direction, their seats would not be contested by
Conservatives. Sidney Herbert replied thus to Lord
Malmesbury, through whom the offer had been made :
"Belgrave Square,
"March 6th, 1857.
" My dear Malmesbury,
" I write, as I promised, before I leave town, in
answer to the questions which you put to me to-day,
and my answer must be the same as that which I
gave in conversation with you. I can, however, speak
for no one but myself There is no such thing as a
Peelite party, and I have studiously avoided doing
anything which could tend to keep together as a body
the few gentlemen who had followed Sir Robert Peel
and supported Lord Aberdeen's Governraent. They
are much divided, and on almost every question lately
submitted to the House of Commons they have voted
in different lobbies. When, therefore, any case arises
in which the intentions or opinions of an individual
member raay appear to be of importance, they had
best be ascertained by a direct reference to himself
In truth the number is not so large as to raake the
task difficult.
" So far as I am concerned, I have been already in
communication with some of ray friends and constitu
ents, and I have assured them that, having entered
into no combination for party purposes, but having
voted upon any question submittecl to the House of
Commons on its merits alone, without reference to its
origin or its effects on mere party politics, I should
hold myself free to continue the same course, and
would give no party pledges whatever, either for or
against any Government, either present or future.
" Having made this declaration, you will acknow
ledge that I could not in honour enter into any
arrangement with any party as regards election
matters." This is not the answer which would have been (and
probably was) returned by Mr. Gladstone to a similar
appeal. He disapproved of the coldness of tone in
Mr. Herbert's letter, and said so plainly.

i8s7-S8] CONTESTED ELECTION 79
" I have heard," he wrote,^ " with the utmost concern
of your contest in Wiltshire. I frankly own it appears
to me that you turned what is called the cold shoulder
upon Malmesbury and Co., and that it would have
been well to use some words and raake some allowance
for the actual co-operation which has taken place
during the present session. The absence, however, of
such words and such allowances does not justify the
measure that has been adopted. This is strongly felt
by JoUiffe, Walpole, H. Lennox, and I believe gener
ally ; but when tney go about expressing their feelings
and trying to do good in the matter, they are met
by rumours of conversations in which you are sup
posed, I am sure falsely, to have said that you would
support Palmerston after the Dissolution, and that
(this last upon the credit, I am told, of Ernest Bruce)
you would never upon any consideration sit in the
same Cabinet with Lord Derby."
The Conservative party in Wiltshire, irritated by
the coldness of his reply to Lord Malmesbury, put
forth all its strength to oppose Sidney Herbert's
return for South Wilts. He had much to contend
against. As he himself wrote, a day or two after
going down to Wilton to commence his canvass,^ " I
find every one here warmly with Para. They know
nothing of the Budget, nor of Bowring's contradictory
letters, nor of any part of the case. But they read
the leading articles of The Times. It is mortifying
to see a sensible nation so Press led."
A few days later he wrote to Sir James Grahara :

" Wilton House, Salisbury,
"March i^th, 1857.
" My dear Graham,
"I enclose a copy of ray address, which you
will see I have a little altered and added to since you
saw it in MS.
' March nth. * Wilton, March Sth.

8o THE EXTINCTION OF PEELISM [chap, hi
" I went into the market at Warminster yesterday
and was weU received, and since the publication of
my address stand much better. The suspicion of
coalition did great harm. But the general opinion,
I might almost say the universal opinion, is in favour
of Palmerston at any price. Measures or no measures,
principle or no principles, he is the man. The debate
on the Chinese question has percolated very little,
though had there been time, and had it not assumed
the aspect of a party question, I cannot doubt that
public opinion would have been strong on our
side. " There was one expression in your letter to your
agent at Carlisle which appears to me of very doubtful
policy: 'They must choose between Mr. Fergusson
and me.' Now, why are they to make any such choice ?
You need not coalesce, but surely you need not court
opposition from a large, probably the largest, section
of the Liberal party there.
" Palmerston is an exceptional Prirae Minister. We
never shall again see an old-fashioned ultra-Tory lead
ing the Liberal party, and this exceptional state of
things cannot last very long, looking at the age of the
raan and the ordinary teraper of the raen on whose
support he must ultimately rely. It seeras to rne that
under these circumstances you do wrong to divide the
Liberal party, perhaps permanently, for a very
ephemeral cause.
" Gladstone's position is becoming every day
more difficult, and in my opinion the result more
certain. I take it he is in frequent communication
with Lord Derby, and I do not see how he can
ever effect a reconcihation with the Liberal party,
or break through the meshes in which I fear he has
involved himself with his friends opposite. You
cannot confer with men on pohtical raatters and
reraain uncompromised by acts of so confidential
a nature. " It grieves rae very much, but I foresee political
separation, and a great career marred by the false
steps into which his impatience and his predilections
have hurried him.
" I have so much to do here that I do not contem
plate returning to town, unless for a night. I shaU
be very anxious to hear what are your prospects. I

1857-58] COUNTY ELECTION 8i
was pleased at our success on the last night I was in
the House, when an act of justice to an ill-used man *
was extorted from the Governraent.
" Believe rae, yours faithfully,
" Sidney Herbert."

But though the contest was an uphill one, it was
well fought by Herbert, and ended in his return by
a raajority of 247.
His own views as to his position are clearly stated
in a letter to his wife, written during the progress of
the county election : "Wilton, March iSth, 1857.
" I have, ever since I joined Lord Aberdeen's
Governraent, considered rayself a member of the
Liberal party, and certainly have never had the least
intention of leaving it, so your answers were quite
right. I wrote strongly in that sense, and as to the
necessity of healing the breach in the Liberal party,
to Graham. I took the opportunity of writing to-day
to Strelecki on emigration topics to put in sorae
general views as to politics, which are pretty safe
to be circulated by him. I wrote also to Gladstone,
stating my own course, and expressing my fear that
he was so committed as to be now bound in honour
elsewhere. I fear he is a lost man, but he has no
judgment, and does not seem to understand the
purport or value of his own acts. The meeting
at Westbury had excellent effects. They had been
well plied with handbiUs from the other side, all
about Odessa, and Roman Catholic chapels, and God
knows what, and though the audience seemed hostUe
at first, and the questioning and interruptions were
loudly cheered, after a time they were silenced and
my speech cheered and approved, and at the end,
when I had done, some one called out for three cheers
for Thynne, for which not a voice was raised; then
three cheers for Herbert shook the room."
' Colonel TuUoch.
VOL. II. 6

82 THE EXTINCTION OF PEELISM [chap, hi
To Mr. Gladstone he wrote on the same day :
"March i8th.
"My dear Gladstone,
" I have been so rauch engaged here that I
have scarcely time to write a line, and in contested
elections nothing is so fatal as over-security and
consequent neglect. I have no fear whatever for the
result, and every day is strengthening me. It is clear
now that the Dissolution will effect great good. It
will have taught the Government a lesson, and it will
simplify parties. The accession of Moderate Liberals
will, I think, be considerable, and will keep the
Government in order. I am weary of the evils which
the existence of a third party (which you called a
public nuisance) created, and shall take my place
where my opinions and predilections alike keep me
— namely, on the Liberal side of the House. There
will be a great deal very painful to me, for I fear we
shall be divided, and that you have cast in your lot
with Lord Derby. I say this because I hear of
further meetings, letters, and conversations, and no
one can be on these terms in politics and not be
bound by the consequences.
" The state of opinion here is curious : the Palmerston
fever is still very rife, though a little cooling. The
anti-China feeling is only a lesser part of the former.
" There is an entire apathy about and indifference
to measures. The Tories are the keenest for Palmer
ston, as being the greatest buffer against change.
The Liberal party look upon him as the greatest
buffer against Lord Derby, and in a general state of
aversions he has the suffrages of both."

Mr. Gladstone to Mr. Herbert.
"ii, Carlton House Terrace,
"March 22nd, 1857.
" My dear Herbert,
"I ara going into Flintshire very early to
morrow morning, and must not longer postpone
answering your letter. I did not reply to it when it
arrived, because it touches principally upon subjects

1857-58] LETTER FROM MR. GLADSTONE 83
with respect to which I feel that my mind has been
wrought into a state of sensitiveness which is
excessive and morbid.
" For the last eleven years, with the exception of
only two among them, the pains of political strife have
not for us found their usual and proper compensation
in the genial and extended sympathies of a great body
of comrades, while suspicion, mistrust, and criticism
have flanked us on both sides and in unusual measure.
Our one comfort has been a concurrence of opinion,
which has been upon the whole remarkably close, and
which has been cemented by the closer bonds of feeling
and of friendship. The loss of this one comfort I have
no strength to face. Contrary to your supposition,
I have nothing with which to replace it ; but the
attachments, which began with political infancy and
which have lived through so many storms and so
many subtler vicissitudes, cannot be replaced. You
wiU never be able to get away from me as long as
I can cling to you, and if at length, urged by your
conscience and deliberate judgment, you effect the
operation, the result will not be to throw rae into the
staff of Lord Derby ; I shall seek my duty, as well
as consult my inclination, first by absconding frora
what raay be termed general politics, and secondly
by appearing, whenever I must appear, only in the
ranks. " I can neither give even the most qualified adhesion
to the ministry of Lord Palmerston, nor follow the
Liberal party in the abandonment of those very
principles and pledges which were my original and
Frincipal bonds of union with it. On the other hand,
never have had any hope of Conservative recon
struction except (and that both slender and reraote)
such as presupposed the co-operation — I ara now
speaking for the House of Comraons only — of yourself
and Graham in particular. By adopting Reform as
a watchword of present political action he has un
doubtedly inserted a certain amount of gap between
himself and me, which may come to be practically
material or may not. If you make a gap upon this
opportunity, I beHeve it will be a novelty in political
history; it will be the first case upon record of
separation between two men, all whose views upon
every pubhc question, political, administrative, or

84 THE EXTINCTION OF PEELISM [chap, m
financial, are, I believe, in as exact accordance as,
under the laws of the huraan mind, is possible. But
if, as I have said, by the act of others, not my owrn, I
find myself isolated, I shall still retain ray conviction
that no reconstruction of a Conservative party ought
to be attempted, unless under circumstances which
will enable it usefully to serve and in case of need
creditably and firmly to govern the country. Never
having felt certain that such a reconstruction could
be effected even by our united force, I shall be certain
enough under any circumstances such as I can foresee,
that it cannot be effected by any such small fraction
of it as I should carry. The severance among us,
therefore, if it come, will not enable, but still more
disable, one at least of us, frora contributing towards
the cure of the present unhealthy and injurious state
of things.
" Having referred to what I regret in Sir James
Graham's operations at Carlisle, I must not fail to
raention the far exceeding pleasure they have given
me. In a period both of gross delusion and of gigantic
imposture they have been the most gallant, outspoken,
energetic, and apparently successful protest against
both that eye could see or heart desire ; they enthrone
honesty and courage — the two great English virtues
which England seeras now alraost everywhere to be
trarapling under foot.
" I do not know to what you refer when you say
you ' hear of further meetings, letters, and conversa
tions ' between Lord Derby and rae. Meeting there
has been none for several weeks, nor, I believe, since
the last you heard of The whole letters are at your
service; the last was dated March 7th, and enclosed
one frora rae to Cobden. I believe they would add
nothing to your knowledge or I should send them to
you at once. Lastly, as to conversations, the one
which went the farthest was the first, which I re
counted as faithfully as I could to you on the same
day and on the next, taking particular care to name all
in it that was wrong or that appeared to look forward.
" I rejoice sincerely to hear that you are secure in
the vexatious contest to which you have been sub
jected. Your account of the Palraerston fever is, I
think, aUke succinct and true ; it is abating, however,
unless among the gentry. I do not clearly gather

1857-58] LORD ABERDEEN'S VIEW 85
from your letter whether you mean to keep or change
your ' seat,' i.e. bench.
" Before concluding let me add what I have for
gotten to say above, that my relations to Lord Derby
rest, as I consider, on the memorandum to which you
were a party.
" I like your address very rauch."
At the close of the elections, Mr. Gladstone
addressed a long letter to Lord Aberdeen, pointing
out how much more his views on public questions
resembled those of Lord Derby than those of Lord
Palmerston, and while intimating his indisposition
actively to support the former, expressed his absolute
inability to give the smallest assistance to the latter.
If Graham and Herbert persisted in sitting on the
Ministerial side of the House, a split between him
and them must follow. Lord Aberdeen replied that
the Peelites had already virtually merged themselves
in the Liberal party. It was true, he said, that on the
formation of Lord Derby's Governraent in 1852, no
important difference, except on the question of
Protection, existed between it and Sir Robert Peel's
friends, but the separation was widened by the conduct
of the Government during the elections, and confirmed
by its action in the new Parliament. After the over
throw of Lord Derby by the joint action of the Peelites
and the Liberal party, and the formation of a Govern
ment which recognised Parliamentary Reform as one
of its fundamental measures, the whole relation of
parties was changed and an amalgaraation of Peel's
friends and the Liberal party took place. " This is
so true that, although frequently torraented by the
personal waywardness of Lord John, the amalgaraa
tion was coraplete so long as the Governraent lasted."
On its fall. Lord Aberdeen and the Duke of
Newcastle were extruded, but the Governraent

86 THE EXTINCTION OF PEELISM [chap, hi
remained coraposed of the same individuals. Mr.
Gladstone had left it with Graham and Herbert on a
ground entirely unconnected with " Peelism," and on
which any other three merabers of the Cabinet raight
equally have resigned. They were not thereby
thrown any nearer to Lord Derby or his party, or
necessarily relieved from the duty of supporting the
Liberal policy to which they had recently adhered.
They had, since their retirement, remained on the
Liberal side of the House, and did not declare any
general hostility to the Governraent. Now, had any
thing since happened essentially to alter this position ?
Lord Aberdeen thought not, and that, until it was
so altered, Gladstone's place was "by the side of
Grahara and Herbert, both from political affinity and
private friendship."
But Mr. Gladstone was hard to persuade, and
almost passionately denied that any amalgamation
with the Liberal party had taken place. If it had, he
protested that he had been deceiving both himself and
his constituents, and the deception had reached its
climax in his selection as a candidate for the
University of Oxford under a totally contrary sup
position. At Mr. Gladstone's request. Lord Aberdeen
sent the correspondence to Mr. Herbert, who returned
it with the following letter:
Mr. Herbert to Lord Aberdeen.
"Wilton, April 12th, 1857.
" My dear Lord Aberdeen,
" Many thanks for your letter and its enclosures.
Nothing can be clearer or truer than your two answers
to Gladstone's letters. But some things occur to me
upon them as well as upon Gladstone's letters, which
I may as well say in the order to which they occur
to me, as I am not sure that the time is not d.rawing

1857-58] LETTER TO LORD ABERDEEN 87
near, which all of us have foreseen, when our positions
with regard to one another will become more difficult
than that with regard to existing parties in the House
of Commons : for the results of the General Election
have unfortunately made the latter simple enough.
" I entirely agree with you that the fusion of the
Peelites with the Liberal party took place in 1852,
when your Government was formed, though it virtually
took place earlier, when all gave a common opposition
to Disraeli's Budget. 1 don t see that my position or
Gladstone's in this respect materially differs from
Graham's and Cardwell's. It is true that our opposition
dated frora a later period than theirs, as did also Lord
Palmerston's, who acted with us. And we all ended
alike — i.e. we all disapproved of his measures, opposed
them and turned out the Government, which surely
constitutes opposition. I saw my way to the formation
of the Government which succeeded, thought it a public
advantage to be attained, and acted throughout with
my eyes open to the consequences.
" I don't believe that one man in a hundred would
now recollect that any difference in our course existed
during any period of Lord Derby's Government.
" Your Government formed, the fusion was com
pleted, and though we afterwards differed from and
left another Government formed from the same side
of the House, it was a Government far less liberal
than yours, and our secession from it, in my view,
could not affect our relations with the Liberal party,
and we continued to sit on the Liberal side of the
House, which to the Parliament and to the country
is more significant of one's own view of one's party
position and intentions, than any profession of faith,
oral or written.
" Since then we have been thrown into opposition
to Lord Palmerston's Government because we held
to principles more liberal than those to which his
party, rather than secede from the only man on this
side who could hold the Government, were inclined,
and encouraged by the apathy of the country to place
in temporary abeyance.
"We were independent Liberals, rather more liberal
than the Government, but less so than the men with
whora ' geographically ' we were sitting.
" Our maintenance of these principles entirely faUed :

88 THE EXTINCTION OF PEELISM [chap, hi
firstly, because we had lost our power and influence
through two errors, as I think, which we had com
mitted, (a) when we left the Government for reasons
good at any other time but wrong then ; and (b)
when we appeared to be weary of the war before its
objects were attained. The public has set down all
our conduct since as the spite of men who had seen
a policy successfully carried out in their teeth. I
won't now go back upon the objections I felt at the
time to the course taken. We tried to pull up a
high-spirited horse suddenly in the middle of his
stride, and he took the bit in his teeth and went
all the faster.
" But another cause of our failure was the temporary
adoption of our financial principles, obviously for party
purposes, by the Opposition. The Opposition as a
body (and its leader in the Commons) had been hearty
advocates of the war. Their constituents the same,
not because they hate Russia, but because it was war.
No Tory party can ever be, unless under pressure,
the advocates of real retrenchment. The hoUowness
of the proposed support given by the Opposition to
these principles reacted on our character, and we were
confounded with those who would use Liberal pro
fessions to turn out the Government, but no further,
and the general election has done what is thought
justice upon us. Besides which the country now
cares very little about retrenchment, whatever it may
do next year when the immediate prospect of new
taxes may make it sing to a very different tune.
"This is a point — namely, the feeling out of doors — of
which we have never made sufficient account. If there
is an apathetic House of Commons, we may be sure
there is an apathetic people behind. The result is that
what the world called Peelites are extinct. I raaintain
that they were extinct in 1852, and that accidental
circurastances brought us, or a few of us, together
again latterly. I have always, so far as I could, dis
couraged the appearance or affectation of party, and
Gladstone felt we were a 'public nuisance.'
"We have now at any rate been spared the pain
of suicide, for we exist no longer ; and I confess I do
not regret the fact, though I lament the men who
might have been most useful to the public, and I hope
will be again.

1857-58] LETTER TO LORD ABERDEEN 89
" Now comes the question, what are we three,
Graham, Gladstone, and myself, to do ?
" We are agreed on the subject of foreign policy.
On the subject of retrenchment there would probably
be a considerable difference in degree, nor, now that
we are embarked in a difficult Chinese war of which
the country has just recorded its approval, does any
very large retrenchment seem possible.
" On retrenchment, then, we should stand probably :
" 1. Gladstone.
" 2. Graham.
"3. S. Herbert.
"On the subject of Parliamentary Reform, which
seems to me the only doraestic subject in which the
country takes any interest, we should stand :
" I. Graham.
"2. Herbert.
" 3. Gladstone.
" The Budget is over, and can no more be re-opened
with any hope of a hearing than the Chinese question.
The estimates have to be voted, and will be voted
with little change, probably, beyond what the Govern
ment may themselves have again introduced. Reform
will be the question of the Session. Lord John Russell
in a congratulatory note written to me the other day
adds : ' They say Palmerston has a Reform Bill ; we
shall see.' Lord John, in default of the Government,
promises to bring in a Bill of his own ; and even Sir
Fitzroy Kelly undertakes to do the same thing in
default of the Government and Lord John.
" I do not believe that a large measure is necessary
or wished for by anything Tike a majority of the
comraunity. The prevalent feeling seeras to me to
be that it must come sooner or later, and that it is
better to compromise the matter and anticipate later
a greater demand by early but moderate legislation.
" Palmerston hates Reform as he hates the Devil.
He only dislikes peace because it must lead to it.
But the country has returned a Parliament to support
Palmerston and Reform, and the two must be brought
into harmony, or the former will go to the wall.
Palmerston has the sense to know it, and colleagues
who are, I suspect, determined to drag or drive him

90 THE EXTINCTION OF PEELISM [chap, hi
in that direction. Mr. Vernon Smith's speech at
Northampton is a strong indication.
" Locke King will reproduce his motion immediately.
When it is brought forward, the Government must
declare their course, not only on the Bill, but on the
whole subject.
" Now, 1 have no great faith in Lord John Russell
as a reformer. His ambition and hopes will induce
him probably to go much further than is either
necessary or wise, or even politic for his own objects.
The country cannot again be made drunk with Reform
as it was in 1832, and even the men who are the organs
of extreme opinions on this subject would prefer pro
testing against a moderate measure to passing a large
one. When, therefore. Lord John outbids Palmerston,
I doubt whether his higher bid will not repel raore
people than it will attract. I, therefore, shall not be
sorry to see the Government take up the question, and
I look upon it as safer in their hands than either those
of Lord John, who would go too far, or Lord Derby,
who could produce nothing which would satisfy the
Liberal party, whose property the question is.
" Here, I fear, I differ both with Graham, who wants
more, and with Gladstone, who wants less, or rather
wants nothing.
"Graham, I think, looks to Reform as the weapon
with which to destroy a Government which, for other
reasons, he disapproves of I rather look on Reform
as a subject for the sake of which the Government
should be kept in, always assuming that they make
up their minds to deal with it, which I expect they
will. If they do not, alors comme alors.
" These are really the only practically irnportant
questions before the House. Education no Govern
ment can grapple with. Law reform all Governments
will deal with alike.
" Upon foreign policy and finance, for the present,
Palmerston is unassailable. We have carried those
questions to an appeal, and he has got the verdict.
I think this is partly our own fault, for our attacks
were of a force beyond what the case seeraed to a
previously uninstructed public to justify. In a year's
time, possibly, the case will be understood, but our
bolt will have been spent.
"Now, if my speculations are right, and they may

1857-58] LETTER TO LORD ABERDEEN 91
be so, and if my estimate of the leanings of my two
friends are accurate, then Graham wishes to turn out
Palmerston to bring in Lord John ; Gladstone wishes
to turn him out to bring in Lord Derby ; and I wish
to keep him in.
"Now, these are great differences, and necessarily
imply separate action for the present, though I cordially
trust we shall ultimately find ourselves acting together
again. But even in our present separate action, if
separate it must be, for all of us it seems to me that
quiescence is the right course ; but if we sit in our
old places will quiescence be possible for any, or at
any rate for all of us ? The speech of each will be
taken to express the intention or the opinion of the
whole three ; or each raust make a protest for himself
Either result would be mischievous. The first would
place two of us in a false position, as appearing to
coincide with opinions frora which we differ. The
second would give the appearance even if it did not
create a forraal permanent separation between us.
Last session I was obliged to speak on Locke King's
motion because I was sitting next to Graham, and
differed with him. Had we not sat together it would
have been unnecessary. Next month will it be wise
for all three of us to sit together, and each answer
the other on the general subject when the same motion
comes on again ?
" It is quite clear that we stand, since the General
Election, m an altered relation to the Government —
all opposition is based on a presumed support out
of doors. The appeal to the country has been made.
We have been beaten, and we cannot appeal from the
people. The reappearance of the Peel party, seated
together in the same place, will indicate an intention
of beginning again where we left off, and it will
indicate our belief in the continued existence of a Peel
party, which I think it is important in every practicable
way to contradict. Consulting together as independent
members of Parliament, sitting on the same side of
the House, and being private friends is quite another
thing ; but anything having the appearance of hoisting
a banner is surely most objectionable : it would deprive
our advice of all weight, and ourselves of much in
fluence, and would only seem to rally men round the
Government against ourselves.

92 THE EXTINCTION OF PEELISM [chap, hi
" I think Palmerston's popularity a bubble, which,
if only let alone, will, like all bubbles, amplify till it
bursts. Our activity has certainly helped him wonder
fully on one or two occasions, besides which, as I have
before said, the verdict of the country imposes quies
cence on us, so far as opposition on past matters is
concerned. I have written with an entire absence of
reserve the painful conclusions at which I have arrived.
Gladstone's position is far more difficult than mine,
especially if he thinks that no fusion has ever taken
place between hira and the Liberal party, and still
more if, as he says, his constituency share his opinion.
I am more and more perplexed at it, and torn opposite
ways, by one's sensitiveness as to what his honour
may require, and by one's anxiety to retain his great
powers and high character for that Moderate Liberal
party which I think must govern this country, to say
nothing of that co-operation with one's self which his
noble qualities have made it a privilege to enjoy ; but
I trust that you and he will have worked out some
possible course."
Mr. Herbert to Mr. Gladstone.
"Wilton, April 13/^, 1857.
" My dear Gladstone,
" Lord Aberdeen has sent me copies of his
recent correspondence with you, and I have written
hira a terribly long letter in returning them. I should
have written to you before, but elections have occupied
each of us, and I have had a narrow escape of a
rheumatic fever since.
J' I am very much disappointed at your result in
Flintshire,^ but it was a moment when everything was
against you, and therefore against Glynne, and I do
not suppose that the result is a fair indication of
what would happen in a General Election in ordinary
times. Here, I was, at the end of the contest, struck
¦ Mr. Gladstone had taken an active part in supporting the candidature
of his brother-in-law Sir Stephen Glynne in the Conservative interest
for Flintshire. To use the words of the Duke of Argyll, he had " been
making a speech in every town, every village, every cottage, everywhere
where he had room to stand ! And at Liverpool it was an avowed
canvass for Derby on his part."

1857-58] LETTER TO MR. GLADSTONE 93
by the fact that furore for Palmerston lasted far longer
in Conservative than in Liberal households. The
regular old-fashioned country gentlemen who are not
Londoners enough to have come within the vortex
of the Carlton are Palmerstonian pur et simple, as the
only man who can make peace and ward off democ
racy. With the Liberals Palmerston is fast becoming
secondary to some undefined but not immediate
measure of Reform. Indeed, there is a wholesome
fear of extreme measures ; even those who advocate
them hope to be beaten.
"As for ourselves — i.e. Graham, yourself, and me —
we are rari nantes, and we are not only broken up as a
party (though I maintain we were not one), but the
country intends us to be so broken up, and would, I
think, resent any attempt at resuscitation. The fear
of the cliques and sections is universal, and they bear
more than their due in the way of reputation for mis
chief intended or done. I gather from your Flintshire
speeches that you do not consider the result of the
elections as a final verdict on past questions, though
being engaged in an election, by the way, you, of
course, were still pleading the cause.
" However, I have written at such length to Lord
Aberdeen that I cannot by this post do the same to
you. The whole question of our future is very
difficult and perplexing, though, within a certain dis
tance, I can see my course ahead clearly enough. I
ara raore puzzled about yours since I read your second
letter to Lord Aberdeen, and your difficulties are ira
raediate and not prospective. I ara certain, however,
that for the public good we ought not to reappear as
a triumvirate on our old bench, nor for our own sakes
either, for with this Reform question ahead we should
differ, but the difference would be far more eclatant
if we were acting as a party together up to the
moment of differing.
"These are terrible questions to discuss between
men who have sat together so many years, but the
discussion seems inevitable.
" Do you know anything about Wortley, how he
is, or to what extent recovering, or likely to recover ?
What I fear is, he is another of our old friends gone.
Altogether the prospect is most depressing. I try
to console myself with the idea that I shall occupy

94 THE EXTINCTION OF PEELISM [chap, hi
myself out of the House with commissions, and leave
Parliamentary discussions and tactics to those who
have better heart for them. Whatever happens, the
warmth of friendship will, I know, remain among us
all undiminished.
" Remember me and Liz to your wife, and believe
me, ever affectionately yours."
Mr. Herbert to Sir James Graham.
"Wilton House, Salisbury,
"April 14th, 1857.
" My dear Graham,
" I received on Saturday a letter from Lord
Aberdeen, enclosing a correspondence with Gladstone
on the subject of his future course and the position
to be taken up on the opening of the new Parliament.
Gladstone's second letter is the key to much that has
lately happened. He says that if we were fused with
the Liberal party on the formation of Lord Aberdeen's
Government, then he has unwittingly deceived the
whole world and his own constituency, who have
elected him in the belief that no such fusion has ever
taken place.
"To me, the siraple fact that we have reraained
sitting on the Liberal side of the House seeras con
clusive, and made the awkwardness of Gladstone's
communications with Lord Derby, for had we not
been sitting on the Liberal side there would have been
neither embarrassment nor objection arising from
such communications.
" But this view of his own position makes his course
the more difficult. The General Election has altered
the aspect of public questions. It has shelved China
and the Budget, as the House of Lords shelves a law
suit. Reform has risen into the first place, or, at any
rate, a front place. I doubt whether you and I are
agreed in degree on the subject, though we are so as
to the principle. You have had your hand in such
matters in times more troublous, and your nerves are
used to what rather shakes mine. The difference,
however, may be, and I trust is, less than I think ; but
of this I am certain, that the more we agree the more
shall we disagree with Gladstone, and I do not like the
idea of recommencing the session in our old places

1857-58] LETTER FROM SIR JAMES GRAHAM 95
with an affectation of ' Peelism ' as a party badge,
when a few weeks must show how great the difference
is between us. I trust we two will be able on this
Reform question to act together, tho' I shall be con
tent to halt when you are still anxious to go on ; but
I do not see how Gladstone is to act with us at all.
It is very perplexing and very painful.
" I have assumed throughout, and perhaps with
little or insufficient evidence, that Gladstone is pre
pared to resist Reform, or, at any rate, not prepared
to further it. Do you know anything of his intentions ?
" I hope Lady Graham is better, and that you are
relieved from the anxiety you were suffering under
a few weeks back, at any rate for a time. The weather
is very trying to all who are ill or delicate."
Sir James Graham to Mr. Herbert.
" Grosvenor Place,
"April i$th, 1857.
" My dear Herbert,
" I have not seen Gladstone since his return to
London, but I have seen the correspondence between
Lord Aberdeen and him, to which your letter relates.
Lord Aberdeen's letters appeared to me excellent, and
I subscribe to every word of them. Whatever may
be Gladstone's ultimate decision, which must be guided
by events and measures hitherto unknown, I should
be sorry for his own sake to see hira cross the House
at the raeeting of Parliament.^
" But it is vain to speculate on possibilities which the
lapse of a short time will convert into certainties, and
then, and not until then, the raoraent for decisive action
will arrive. In the meanwhile, it would appear to me^
natural and decorous that those who have been united
by every bond of private friendship and of a common
sense of public duty should continue to sit and to act
together until some serious difference of opinion shall
arise. It may not occur, and then the pain of separa
tion will be averted. If it does occur, let the ground
be broad and intelligible, and let the dissolution of the
union be in the face of day and in the presence of the
public. The political connection will then be severed ;
' The remainder of this letter will be found in Mr. Parker's Life of
Sir James Graham.

96 THE EXTINCTION OF PEELISM [chap, hi
but the debt due to private friendship will have been
satisfied, for we shall have maintained the union to the
last raoraent consistent with the higher claims which
love of country and public duty raay irapose."

Mr. Gladstone to Mr. Herbert.
"ii, Carlton House Terrace,
"April 17th, 1857.
" My dear Herbert,
" It was only to-day that I found Lord Aberdeen,
and saw your letter to him. Practically the point at
issue is, I imagine, nothing but this — where we are to
sit in the new Parliament. I agree with you to the
full in thinking that Peelism should be held extinct,
and that we ought not to form a clique or party ; but I
do not agree, so far as I can see my way, in thinking
that the legitimate way to effect these ends is to
divorce ourselves locally from one another : the
fundamental objection to that, I think, is, that it would
be the understood and regular sign of a final and
formal separation, that it ought to follow, not precede,
such a separation, and that such a separation, to
be justified in the face of the public, must be sus
tained by reasons, which reasons raust show not
only the objections to our holding the place we have,
but the propriety of our sitting down in the places
we go to. 1 grant that to put forward the appear
ance of identity at this moment, after what the
elections have done, would be a deception ; ' but it
seems to me that it would also be a deception
were we to cease to occupy the same bench — the
bench which is, of all places, in the House of
Commons the most nearly one of pure neutrality
for ex-Ministers — for though it is on the ministerial
side of the House, it is traditionally the place of
men who, having been in office, may be either
practically connected with, or wholly dissociated
from, the existing Government.
" Agreeing in your premises, and dissenting from
your conclusion, I am bound to answer the question,
in what way I should myself give effect to the
principle I have admitted, that we ought no longer
to appear as a clique or section. I know of but one

1857-58] THE SEAT QUESTION t^j
way, nor do I pretend that it is entirely satisfactory —
it is the way of silence and of absence. As far as I
can forecast the coming session, it is not unlikely to
allow us both these privileges in a high degree.
" We have agreed together, and have differed from
the Governraent, on finance, expenditure, and foreign
policy; but I do not see any likelihood of our doing
good, certainly none of my own doing good, by raising
the fight at the present junction. Pen m hand, I think
the acquiescence of the country in the handling of the
Persian affair, in a constitutional sense, an infamy ; but
I know of no advantage to arise frora starting the
subject afresh, though, if it were taken up with power
from any quarter independent of us, it might be a duty
to follow; this, however, is little likely.
" It appears to rae that in your letter, wearied out
(and no wonder) with the prolonged and increasing
pain of our political suspense, just as a man roasted at
a slow fire would, if he could, make it a quick one,
you have cut the knot by treating as actual and
mature, differences between Graham, yourself, and me,
on public questions, which are only remote and
possible. You raay think me too backward about
Parliamentary Reforra, as on my side I doubt whether
you have taken an accurate measure of the forces
arrayed in its favour, as compared with the chances of
its miscarriage; but this difference may never be
come practical in the slightest degree, and different
shading of sympathy and antipathy, not admitted as
pararaount in action, whether they be as to questions
or to persons, do not appear to me to justify the final
act of severance arriong old political associates, not
to say personal friends. In a word, it appears to
me that, were the views you incline to adopted, the
issue might probably be that instead of one false
position, which in the last Parliament we have shared
together, we should have three false positions, each of
us one, in the new House.
"At the same time, whatever happens, I shall be
little, I hope, in any one's way ; since, for rayself, I can
see no choice except between mischief and inaction.
" But once more I say, do not let us separate
corporally, which ought to be the final act of an
ascertained, practical, and incurable difference — when
it is still perfectly possible that upon emergencies as
VOL. II. 7

98 THE EXTINCTION OF PEELISM [chap, hi
they arise, by which, and not by theories, we must in
the last resort be governed, we may find ourselves
compelled to act together.
"I may be biassed in my judgment by disinclina
tion to a process intensely painful, but I have not
knowingly subraitted to any such influence. I have
striven to estimate calmly the bearings of duty in a
difficult case, and I have distinctly included in my
estiraate the effect of the elections, which raay in
given contingencies raaterially modify my course with
reference to the existing Government.
" We have still time before us. I ara dehghted to
hear you have recovered."
Finding the course which he would hiraself have
preferred thus strongly deprecated, not only by Lord
Aberdeen, but by Sir James Graham and Mr. Glad
stone also, Mr. Herbert ceased to press its adoption,
and at the meeting of the new Parliament the three
friends resuraed their forraer seats next to each other
below the gangway.
The ascendancy of Lord Palraerston was so coraplete
as to render the earlier part of the Session dull and
uneventful. Mr. Gladstone consequently found no
difficulty in carrying out his announced intention of
habitual non-attendance. Mr. Herbert also was to
a great extent drawn away from his Parliamentary
duties by the business of the Sanitary Commission,
of which he had undertaken the direction. But he
was always in his place when questions affecting the
Army were under discussion.
The Crimean War had taught many lessons —
araong thera the necessity for the training and hand
ling of larger bodies of raen than it had hitherto
been usual to bring together in England in time
of peace.
With this view a considerable vote was proposed
for the permanent Camp at Aldershot, and Sidney

I857-S8] ALDERSHOT CAMP 99
Herbert gave the full weight of his support to the
Government proposal. On June 5th he said :
" The first encarapraent established in this country,
within the recollection of the present generation, was
that which existed at Chobham. Public opinion had
not previously been directed to the deficiencies of our
Array, and our troops were afforded very few oppor-
tunites of acting together in large masses. When I,
as Secretary at War, proposed that there should be
a military encampment, the doctrine which I advocated
of the expediency of having the various regiments of
the Array brought together in divisions and brigades
was very much questioned, upon the ground of the ex
pense which the carrying of that doctrine into practical
operation would entail upon the country. Economy
was at that time the order of the day, and efficiency
was but little regarded in comparison. During the
war a different state of things prevailed, but we may
now perceive again a tendency to revert to economy.
I must confess I ara myself a great advocate for
economy in matters such as that under our notice ;
but I feel bound to consider how far we should be con
sulting that opinion by lopping off a sum of ;^5o,ooo
from this vote, and spoiling the whole of our plan.
It is proposed on the part of the Government to
construct permanent barracks at Aldershot, but not
to do away with the system of having masses of
troops encamped there during the summer months.
It was, however, I maintain, necessary to purchase
the ground at Aldershot. The extent to which the
land is enclosed in England accounts for the circum
stance that it is not easy to find an open space which
is well supplied with water, and which in other respects
is not open to objection. I believe the erection of
permanent barracks at Aldershot to be a necessary
step, and for this reason, that there is not at present in
England a sufficient amount of barrack accommodation
for our troops. When the Committee examines into
the detail of that accommodation, they will, I think,
be surprised at the sanitary considerations which it
will present to their view. Those who enter our
Army are picked men, in the prime of life, their period
of service varying 20 to 30 years of age ; they are
examined by a medical man, and must, before their

IOO THE EXTINCTION OF PEELISM [chap, hi
admission into the service, be reported free frora
raalformation and all tendency to disease. How
coraes it so to pass, then, that araong that class of
men the mortality is greater than among those of
the sarae age in civil life? There must be some
reason to account for the circumstance ; a good one, in
my opinion, is that they are generally badly housed.
Well, the Government propose to construct permanent
barracks at Aldershot, by which that objection will,
to some extent, be met.
" I must say that I hope greater care will in future
be taken to instruct our soldiers in those minor points
of military education in which they are so extremely
deficient. Not one among thera, unless he happens
to have learned the trade of a glazier, or to have
come from the bogs of Ireland or the Highlands of
Scotland, where men must, more or less, shift for them
selves, knows how to put a pane of glass into a window,
or to accomplish any of those small contrivances in
the way of cooking and hutting which are of so much
use to an army in the field. For these reasons I should
be glad to see raore of the work at Aldershot done
by the troops themselves. You cannot, it is true,
create an efficient commissariat in time of peace. I
do not believe that it can be done until the second or
third year of war. No man in his senses would dream
in the present state of England, of marching a troop
of soldiers from one quarter of the country to another
with a commissariat in its rear, going into every farm
yard and purchasing its contents, when they raight
get the necessary provisions by contract with half
the trouble and at half the price."
The great Sepoy rautiny broke out in May, and
by the raiddle of July all doraestic raatters were over
shadowed by the rapidly darkening news received
from India. In these events, Sidney Herbert took his
full share of interest, but few references appear to
them in his correspondence. One letter of his,
however, written at this period, deserves preservation
as an admirable example of the courteous exposure
of an impracticable scheme.
Among the innumerable suggestions to which the

1857-58] "JACK STEELE" loi
excitement of the time gave birth was one for the
formation of a regiraent, or regiraents, of gentlemen to
serve in India. Mr. Herbert was asked to give his
support to this movement, and thus replied :
" Wilton, September 2^th, 1857.
" Dear Mr. Raikes Currie,
" Nothing would be easier than to organise a
rendezvous where all the young men of the 'Jack
Steele ' ' type might enlist, so as to form a battalion
or battalions together, if that be their object. This
would secure to them that which they naturally
enough desire — namely, the fellowship and company of
men of their own habits, class, and education. If
that is what they want, and all that they want, so far
as the feasibility of recruiting them is concerned, a
few pounds would open a house where they should
enroll themselves, and a few more would advertise
and publish its whereabouts. But then come two
other questions. Is this all that they want ; and, if it
be so, are they likely to make good soldiers ?
" Now, it is not clear that this is all they want. I
observe in their letters to The Times such conditions
as, ' Provided I am secured as good a position as that to
which I am accustoraed,' ' Provided I am not thereby
placed in a lower scale than that in which I have
hitherto moved,' and so on, from which I gather that
either they don't intend to be privates, or, if privates,
that they are to be paid (for pay marks rank and
social position in this country) as. officers. Now, for
the State to pay a man more for doing that which
another man will not only do, but do better, for less,
would be absurd. Even without higher pay these
battalions would be to the line what the Bengal Army
was to the Madras, a caste soldiery : fine gentlemen
who would hold themselves superior to, and keep
aloof from, their comrades in less favoured regiments.
Again, are they to elect their own officers, or take
them from the line (there are none on the half-pay
list below field officer's rank, fit or willing to serve).
If they elect from among themselves, will they never
repent their choice? Will they obey as blindly (for
' The signature of letters to The Times on the subject.

I02 THE EXTINCTION OF PEELISM [chap, hi
that is how a soldier must obey) a raan who has no
superiority to themselves, except his temporary rank ?
In despotic (which are always military) countries, the
strong military feeling induces railitary obedience as
a raatter of course, nor does the railitary system offer
much contrast to the civil. But here, where our freedom
has created a strong feeling of independence and self-
assertion from authority, military obedience would
be impossible, were it not that the soldier comes from
the class that is accustomed to respect and obey the
class from which the officer comes. The peasant
touches his hat to the lord, the squire, the banker,
the rich tradesman, and the yeoman ; he sees the
farmer ride alongside while he walks at the plough,
and he says ' Sir ' to him. I doubt the military
obedience of the volunteer private to the volunteer
officer. Again, would the former cheerfully perform
all the duties of a soldier, which are those of a day-
labourer, a cook, a scullion, a scavenger, and a servant ?
If they would not they would be worse than useless,
for they would set an example fatal to those who
would. " On the other hand, would they obey the regular
Queen's officer with his peremptory word of command,
or would they not damn the insolent aristocrat, unless
the latter diplomatised and wheedled them, which, for
example, would be equally mischievous?
" I fear a caste army. I have done something to
reduce the privUeges of the officers of the Guards ; but
here we should be creating a body of Guards, whose
privates are to have exclusive privileges as well as
the officers. But are they likely to serve zealously ?
I rather doubt the permanence of enthusiasm. These
fellows if placed in a row opposite a sepoy battery
to-morrow morning would charge and take it; but
win their enthusiasm — I don't mean of one or two, but
of the mass— last through two or three months' driU
here, and a long sea-voyage to India, and stUl longer
marches backward and forward under weights to which
they are unaccustomed, without the commonest com
forts to which they are accustoraed, and under a burning
sun and drenching rains, undergoing labour which
previous habit only makes tolerable — viz. labour with
pickaxe and spade?
" Many of our recruits from the peasant class, nay,

1857-58] "JACK STEELE" 103
the raajority of them, you will say, are entering from
a feeling of enthusiasm. That is true, and they do
not, as a body, either repent or repine afterwards.
But then they leave a hard Hfe of physical labour
in exchange for another, which gives them besides
better food, better clothing, and generally a better
income than they had before (for a man could not
lodge, feed, and clothe himself as a soldier for
less than 13 or 14 shiUings a week), and he gains in
social position. Whereas Jack Steele goes downwards
instead of upwards in all these particulars, but yet is
always to be satisfied that he has made a very wise
choice. " I enclose three letters cut out of The Daily News
of yesterday, in two of which Jack Steele, who has
been told to enlist, instead of offering to do so, puts
clearly enough the loss of caste and position and
prospects which he would incur; and another shows
that he will only be a private on condition that he is
made an officer. Now we have plenty of officers, and
can only admit more by keeping others out.
" I do not say that if we had a war of invasion you
should not adopt plans of this description, for then the
want would be to arm all male adults ; but for a distant
war of a very trying character real soldiers are best, and
happily we are getting plenty of them, more than 1,000
a week. We have an array of professional privates,
the best in the world, with officers against whora it
can only be said that some of them are not professional
enough ; but that is an evil which will soon be remedied,
and I doubt the policy of organising battalions of
unprofessional privates. The feeling that dictates the
proposal is a very fine and creditable one, but on the
balance of advantage and disadvantage I think the
latter predominates.
" Pardon this long letter, but I thought it due to
you to give you, however hastily and imperfectly, the
reasons and doubts which prevent ray acceding to
your proposal."
The greater part of Sidney Herbert's time during
1857 ^nd 1858 was, however, devoted to the Com
mission on the Sanitary State of the Army, which
forms the subject of another chapter in this book.

104 THE EXTINCTION OF PEELISM [chap, hi
The autumn of 1857 was saddened by the death of
Lady Graham, and the dangerous illness of Lord
Aberdeen. Mr. Herbert to Mr. Gladstone.
" Lwas grieved indeed to hear of the sad misfortune
at Hawarden Church.^ Will you give the enclosed
to Mrs. Gladstone, that I may have a few stones in
the new buUding?
" There is great gloom here. The panic in monetary
affairs has been greater to-day than ever. I have
reason to think the Government will do now what
they did in 1847, and suspend the operation of the
Bank Charter Act to the same extent. If so, the
question will arise whether Parliament must not be
called together.
" Palmerston's speech at the Mansion House has
been a good deal criticised, and justly, for the tone of
his allusion to supposed threats of foreign Powers^
which threats have had no existence whatever, (for
the Governments and their organs in the Press have
been studiously civil, though the public opinion of
the nations themselves has been often hostile to us).
But his reference to Canning was creditable, and
will turn out to be right, I think, into the bargain,
for he seems to have done well on the whole, and
it is not in parts that any person's conduct in such
emergencies can be judged.'
The already overwhelming popularity of Lord
Palmerston was, in the first instance, only increased
by the Indian Mutiny. He was regarded, and per
haps regarded himself, as the one man necessary and
able to meet the emergency. The strains of adulation
were as loud and the expressions of confidence as
strong on the part of the Conservative Opposition as
on that of the Liberal supporters of the Governraent.
But at the height of his power it began to wane.
It was thought that the Revolt was looked on by
' It had been burned by an incendiary.

1857-58] DECLINE OF PALMERSTON 105
him with optimistic levity, and that his measures
for its repression were lacking in expedition and
energy. In the early days of 1858 a severe shock
was given to his popularity by his injudicious ad
mission of the Marquess of Clanricarde (a man
universally and justly disesteeraed) to the Cabinet.
Of this appointraent Sidney Herbert wrote :
" I hear that Granville was the only colleague con
sulted on the introduction of Clanricarde into the
Cabinet, and that he, strange to say, approved of the
step. As Leader of the House of Lords, no doubt,
he was well pleased to stop the mouth of an angered
and pertinacious opponent, but his usual tact must
have failed him if he did not foresee the results on
public opinion on the strength or weakness of the
Government. " It is said that Lord Lansdowne wrote to Palmerston
to ask him if he was out of his mind on the occasion.
Lord Landsdowne, who is here, is evidently much
alarraed at the prospect of the India Bill and its
Iraperial Governraent. He said very little, but by
showing a gesture he implied a very modified satis
faction. " I suspect Granville does not approve ; but Palmer
ston has not in his Cabinet a raan who can hold his
own."
"Sir James Graham to Mr. Herbert.
" Nm^HERBV, January 2ist, 1858.
" My dear Herbert,
" I am sincerely obliged by your kind inquiries.
I am getting better, but the process is slow, and
there is a sinking of energy and of heart from which
I never shall recover.
"The prospect of public affairs must have been
alluring, which would have made my return to the
discharge of public duties a public service. As matters
stand, r regard it with aversion. I dread the Indian
Bill of the Government. I am not prepared to hand
over to Vernon Smith the fate of that tottering empire ;
and I am still less prepared to hand over the fortunes
of England to ' the Jockey and the Jew.' In these

io6 THE EXTINCTION OF PEELISM [chap, hi
circurastances I would gladly stay away, for I foresee
a fierce struggle of parties, in which I take no in
terest, when the greatest and raost difficult question
of modern times demands solution, and when a mistake
with respect to the future Government of India may
be attended with fatal consequences.
" I have had some correspondence with Lord J.
Russell on the subject, but he, I am afraid, is hampered
by communications which have passed between him
and the ministers respecting the outline of the Govern
ment raeasure.
" I have studiously kept rayself free to judge the
raeasure by its merits, when it is produced, and I
have avoided P.C, which in Cannon Row^ means
' Previous communications.' When we meet I will
tell you all that has passed. I have kept Lord Aberdeen
constantly informed ; and he, I hope and believe,
approves what I have said and done.
" I have not heard from Gladstone since the end
of the short Session. My unwillingness to go into
the lobby, under the guidance of Dizzy, opposite to
the Government, is rather increased by the untoward
accident which led Gladstone astray on that occasion,
when his speech was right, and his vote was wrong;
but the present state of parties is a serious aggravation
of the national dangers. There must be some limit
to the necessity of upholding Para, at all hazards.
If his colleagues do not check him, the nation will be
undone, unless the Commons have the courage to
interpose. The old Whigs are subservient, and lick
the hand which feeds them. They call Palmerston
their ' Swiss ' Commander ; but the troops are no less
mercenary than their chief
" The kindness of your wife's message delights me.
My heart is not yet insensible to the charm of the
affection of a good and beautiful woman."
The decay of Lord Palmerston's authority was not
yet apparent when Parliament met in 1858, and in the
absence of all opposition and consequent abeyance
of party contests, it appeared probable that the
attention of the House of Coraraons would be raainly
' Where the office of the Board of Control was situated.

1857-58] CONSPIRACY BILL 107
occupied by legislation on the subject dealt with in
the above letter — the future Administration of India.
But no progress was made in that direction by
Lord Palmerston, for imraediately after the intro
duction of the Bill to transfer authority from the East
India Company to the Crown, his Government was,
on February 19th, suddenly and unexpectedly dis
placed from office. Three days before, a cynical
flatterer had told Lord Palmerston that like the
hero of a Roman triumph he ought to have at his
side some one to remind him that he was raortal.
Deep and even dangerous irritation had been
excited in France by the discovery, after the daring
attempt of Orsini to assassinate the Emperor Louis
Napoleon, that England was not only the home
and refuge of conspirators, but the workshop of their
weapons, and the asylum whence assassins went forth
on their mission of murder. It was thought desirable
to do something to allay this irritation, and the law,
as it existed, rendering it very difficult to convict or
punish crimes committed by a resident in England
in a foreign country, a Bill was brought in by the
Government to araend the law with regard to such
offences. Its provisions were not in themselves
unreasonable, but a strong distaste was felt throughout
the country to a raeasure supposed to be dictated
by France. It was popularly held to be a weak
yielding to the threats contained in an address to
the Eraperor from the colonels of many regiments,
which had been published, without comment, in
the pages of the official journal. The Moniteur, and
backed by an insolent and unanswered despatch
from the French Minister of Foreign Affairs. Even
the first reading of the Bill was opposed, and
that by Lord John Russell. On this occasion, Mr.

io8 THE EXTINCTION OF PEELISM [chap, hi
Herbert assumed a calm and neutral attitude. He
counselled extreme caution and deliberation, and urged,
in opposition to Lord John Russell, that the Bill
should be read a first time. Great circumspection, he
said, was at all times necessary, but especially when
the Government had abandoned its own duty, and the
House of Commons was virtually asked to answer
the despatch of a foreign Government. He pointed
out the extraordinary change of feeling which had
arisen as to the Emperor of the French. He had been
the subject of great adulation — adulation in which
the speaker had never joined — and had never been
more popular in this country than when the attempt
to murder hira was made. That attempt was as rauch
deplored in England as in France. What in the last
few days had caused so entire a change of feeling?
This sudden change was due to three causes : the
official publication of the Colonels' addresses, the
irritation felt at the suggestion of foreign interference,
and the unanswered despatch. For the first, Louis
Napoleon had apologised, for the second he was not
responsible, and the third needed raore light. In the
hope of obtaining such light justifying the silence of
the Government, he was content to vote for the first
reading. But his support thus given to the Govern
ment was largely qualified by a strong denunciation
of the Palmerstonian policy of meddling and interfering
in the domestic affairs of proud and independent
nations. This he believed to be the true and
chief cause of the ill-will with which England was
regarded on the Continent. It was said— not in
reprobation, but as a raatter of praise — that England
was feared and hated on account of this raeddling.
It was called a distinguished policy, a spirited policy.
That was not the light in which he himself regarded it.

1857-58] CONSPIRACY BILL 109
Writing to Mr. Gladstone on the following day, Mr.
Herbert said :
" I thought Lord John very wrong in the course he
took, which was unexpected by me. I had, therefore,
to make the case of Cardwell and myself The House
received it very favourably, and the issue was, I think,
a sound one. Palmerston was very feeble and dis
heartened. Sir George Grey spoke very well.
Roebuck, the night before, excellent in his way, and
more Roebuck than Roebuck. Monday is the second
reading. I have not a guess what your feeling may
be on it. Mine is that we should not refuse to do
right — if it be right — on the ground that we are asked
to do it by a foreign country ; but we raust be sure
that it is right, safe, and effectual. I think we ought
not to proceed in our present ignorance of the law
as it is and as it may be."
In the interval which elapsed between the first
and second reading of the Bill, however, he became
convinced that the action, or rather the inaction, of
the Government could not be defended, and was
prepared to agree with Mr. Gladstone, who wrote
that— " on the Conspiracy Bill, Palmerston's speech was
even worse than usual ; Grey seeras to have tried
all that could be said for the measure. Having now
read what its advocates had to say, I am decidedly
and strongly against it. I feel with you the difficulty
of refusing to do right because it is demanded by
some one who has no title to make the demand ; but
that despatch of Walewski is intolerable, and no
Minister would have left it unanswered except the
one who betrayed the Belgian Press — I mean aban
doned its liberties in 1855 at the Conferences of Paris.
I must say I do not see the case against the law upon
its merits, nor do I see how that case can arise until
it has been tried and has failed. It was imprudent
in Lord John to divide, but I must have voted with
him." Once more the friends found themselves united in

IIO THE EXTINCTION OF PEELISM [chap, m
opposition to the Governraent, and their votes, along
with those of Lord John Russell and some of his
friends, defeated, on its second reading, the "Con
spiracy to Corarait Murder" Bill. Lord Palmerston
at once resigned, and Lord Derby succeeded him.
Lord Derby went imraediately to Lord Aberdeen, and
requested hira to use his influence with Mr. Gladstone
and Mr. Herbert to induce thera to join his Cabinet;
but this Lord Aberdeen was not prepared to do. The
Duke of Argyll meanwhile endeavoured to mitigate
Sidney Herbert's objections to Lord Palmerston, and
I quote his letter for the sake of the answer it
elicited.
The Duke of Argyll to Mr. Herbert.
" March %th, 1858.
" My dear Herbert,
" As our conversation was cut short, and I do
not meet you often, I am going to overflow in ink.
" I was a little surprised by the severity of your
Pamphobiacal symptoms : an affection under which I
knew Gladstone to have been long suffering, though
it certainly has not reached in him that latter stage—
lock-jaw.
" But joking apart, there are one or two things I
wish to say on the view you expressed to me — of
Pam.
" In respect to his faults, that view is one, I think,
of very great exaggeration ; and, in other respects, 1
am satisfied that it is essentially unjust.
" None of us ought to forget his conduct at the
close of Aberdeen's Government. I thought it then,
and think it now, highly honourable to him. I believe
you thought so too ; and I can't forget that in the
consultation to which I was a party, your impressions
as to the propriety of our serving under him were
very different from those of Gladstone and Graham.
I agreed with you, so did Aberdeen, and he per
suaded the junction which then took place. I have
no knowledge of the secret history of the subsequent

I8S7-S8] ARGYLL ON PALMERSTON in
separation. I thought, and I still think, it was not
justified by the circumstances, and I am persuaded
that with Graham and Gladstone it was in great
measure determined by that invincible personal dis
trust which made them so long refuse to join. I
did not share in that feeling, and I was determined
not to follow their lead under its influence.
" I now come to subsequent events. I put aside
the Yankee affair, because it was not one of^policy at
all. We should have fallen into it equally if all of
you had remained. There was nothing in it of
Palmerstonianism. It was local mismanagement, and
we acted rightly in dealing with the difficulty when
it had arisen.
" Since then, in making the peace with Russia, in
the negotiations for the fulfilment of its terms, and in
other matters of Foreign Policy, Pam.'s conduct has
not been open to the charges you made against it.
He may have been right or wrong in his estimate
of the importance of particular points — e.g. Bolgrad,
the union or separation of the Principalities, etc. On
these questions opinions may well differ, but I can
witness that Pam. has acted with firmness and courage
towards the strong — even towards the French Govern
ment, on whose alliance he sets great store.
" In this last affair we made a mistake in tactics,
I admit. I doubt whether our course was not the
best, after all, in other senses; but in this, Pam. has
not been actuated by any disposition to truckle to
the strong. He values more than Gladstone does the
French alliance and the present French Government.
But I am bound to say in justice to him, that, so far
from truckling to them, he has shown during the last
two years a readiness to oppose and confront them
that has surprised rae, and arose only from an honest
adherence to his own opinions on European policy.
" I hear he is now attacked for not having assaulted
Naples on the ' Engineer ' question. We were with
held from doing so, solely out of respect to the
principles of public law. If Pam. had acted solely
from the motives you attribute to him, he could have
had no better opportunity.
"Both the possible leaders of the Liberal party
have great faults; I see no justice in running down
either of them. Of the two, ram. is far more amenable

112 THE EXTINCTION OF PEELISM [chap, hi
to the opinion of his colleagues. I have seen both
in Council, and I affirm this without a doubt of its
truth. " In other respects, in knowledge of home affairs,
and in some valuable instincts. Lord John is the
superior man, no doubt. But I protest against the
exaggeration with which you seem disposed to look
at P.'s faults. None of them are any just impediments
in the way of acting with him. He is perfectly fair
to his colleagues, and fairly represents his Cabinet."

Mr. Herbert to the Duke of Argyll.
"Wilton House, Salisbury,
"March ij,th, 1858.
" My dear Argyll,
" I ought to have answered your letter before,
but I thought it necessitated a detailed answer, which
would take tirae; after all, however, it would lead
to discussions very lengthy in themselves, and not
likely to be very profitable in the way of conversion
to either of us. I quite admit all you say of
Palmerston's conduct and Lord Aberdeen, and I am
as ignorant as you are of the secret history of our
secession — if that is the word for it — from Palmerston's
Government. I supported the Governraent through
the war, and upon more points than one did not
let ray opinion stand in my way in so doing. I
think now, as I thought then, that more raight have
been done with our Array, and more raight have been
got by treaty; but I know how rauch you were
hampered by our allies. Since then we have had
differences to which I have given out-spoken utter
ance, and some which I have kept to myself I
confess that I disapproved of the withdrawal of our
Minister from Naples, and the subsequent attempt
to negotiate through a Consul when the principles
of public law were violated by the King of Naples.
Malmesbury, I see, has been unwise enough to run on
in the old grooves, which is excusable in a minister
who began in it, but inexcusable in one who had
tabula rasa.
" These things, however, are all now matters of
history. What I wish is that disagreements should

1857-58] ELLENBOROUGH'S DESPATCH 113
cease. I look forward to a gloomy future. I had
rather make no contrasts between the faults of possible
Prime Ministers. There is too much material of the
kind to make it either difficult or pleasant.
" In the meanwhile the present people seemed in
clined to try and outbid the Liberal party — a course
which will be justly fatal to themselves, but, what is
more important, will be very fatal to the country
too : whatever they propose, our friends must cap. If
Derby goes for universal suffrage, Palmerston or
Johnny will produce the women and chUdren.
" It will require cautious steering on the part of
those who prefer the interests of the country to the
interests of^ party, to prevent mischief being done
between them all. I look upon you as one able and
willing to take an important part in so regulating
matters, and I, though wearied and disquieted with
politics and politicians, would contribute what I could
towards this desirable, but I fear unattainable, object."
The remainder of the Session seeraed likely to be
fairly calra, but the publication of a despatch frora
Lord EUenborough, the new Minister for India, con
veying a strong censure on the measures adopted
by the Governor-General, Lord Canning, to secure
the pacification of Oude, evoked a violent storm.
Sidney Herbert wrote thus to Mr. Gladstone :
"May loth, 1858.
"You have been terribly wanted these ten days in
Council. Here is the existing state of things :
" Cardwell moved a Resolution, reserving all opinion
on Canning's Proclamation, but expressing our regret
that, when in the midst of difficulties, a despatch should
be published which must weaken his authority and
tend to protract the armed resistance of the insurgents.
" There may be strong party reasons against this
move, but, as Lord Aberdeen says, if Parliament is
Parliament, they cannot allow so flagrant a proceeding
to pass uncensured. The fear is the despatch will
arrive in India in time to ensure the failure of
Canning's policy, or, indeed, anybody's policy, for it
is a justification of the Oude insurgents, and an
VOL. II. 8

114 THE EXTINCTION OF PEELISM [chap, hi
invitation to them to fight on for the good cause.
Melville says that Canning's Proclamation will have
pacified Oude before the despatch reaches. That
shows greater confidence in the Proclaraation than I
have, but he is a better and, indeed, the best of all
judges. The motion is for Thursday. I hope you
will be up to-morrow. Grahara went to Wirabledon
yesterday afternoon, still undecided, but Lord Aberdeen
says he is confident he will support Cardwell."
Lord EUenborough gave way before the popular
expression of disapproval, and resigned. This was
considered by such of Lord Canning's friends as were
not swayed by party considerations to be a sufficient
vindication of his action, but plausible reasons were
not wanting to justify those who wished to over
throw the Government in still pressing for a vote
of censure. In the end, Mr. Cardwell's motion was
withdrawn, but how difficult Mr. Herbert found a
decision on the point to be is shown in the following
letter to Mr. Gladstone : "May ijth, 1858.
" I can assure you I did not want your note to reraind
me of the terms of your letter to Lord Derby, nor
can events well occur more important there to our
Empire, or on which one way or another men's con
scientious convictions can be stronger. As a mere
party move, the continuance of the motion had my
continued opposition ; as an assertion of right against
wrong, being once put, it must have my determined
support. Lord EUenborough's resignation was an
iraplied revocation of this policy. But the Govern
ment have now accepted it fully, and I think we
are bound to publish in India our reprobation of it.
If it leads, as it honestly should, to the return of Oude
to the King, it is the first step in a downward policy,
made in defiance of all consideration for the happiness
of the people. If it does not, it is the hypocritical
penitence of a thief who still retains his plunder. If
Canning's Proclamation be right, and I think that
looking to the future government of Oude and not

1857-58] RELATIONS WITH GLADSTONE 115
to the railitary Question alone, it probably is so, then
EUenborough s despatch is a serious, but not irreraedi-
able, blunder; but if Canning is wrong, then the
success of any policy in the face of that inflaramatory
despatch is impossible. One must put parties at
home and Canning abroad out of sight. It is a great
national danger, produced by the insane vanity of
one man, and we must do what we can to mitigate
the evil. This, I fear, for I am told so, is not your
view. Let it not be more than a difference on a
political question. My friendship and affection for you,
believe me, can stand rougher shocks than this."
But that such rougher shocks were impending, and
that the two friends were likely to be henceforth
politically alienated, if not actively hostile, was pain
fully foreboded by Sidney Herbert. He wrote to
Mrs. Herbert a few days later (May 31st) that he had
"seen Lord Aberdeen and read Gladstone's corre
spondence on the late offer [of a seat in Lord Derby's
Cabinet], which he declined, rather, I think, against
Lord Aberdeen's and Grahain's advice, who seem to
have thought that — as he raust do it ultiraately — he
would be happier if he did it at once." But though
Mr. Gladstone was not unwilling to work with Lord
Derby, he was less disposed to co-operate with Mr.
Disraeli, and stuck to his refusal.
In the discussion of the Resolutions as to the future
governraent of India, proposed by Lord Derby's
Government, Sidney Herbert took great interest and
an active part, and on June 14th he spoke at some
length on the question of the composition and at
tributes of the Secretary of State's Council. Lord
Palmerston had proposed that the members of this
Council should be nominated by the Crown for a
fixed period ; Lord John RusseU that they should be
nominated for life ; Lord Stanley and the Govern
ment, that they should be partly nominated and partly

ii6 THE EXTINCTION OF PEELISM [chap, hi
elected. The scheme of appointment during good
behaviour — i.e. practically for life — was that which
Herbert himself preferred, and he pointed out that
without such a guarantee the Council could have no
real independence or moral weight.
The autumn was for the raost part devoted by
Mr. Herbert to visits of inspection to nearly every
railitary barrack in England and to drafting schemes
for their iraproveraent. In the raidst of this useful
work Mr. Herbert was visited with a great and
sudden sorrow — the death of his eldest and favourite
sister. Countess Clanwilliara.
Mr. Herbert to Sir James Graham.
"Wilton House, Salisbury,
" October %th, 1858.
" My dear Graham,
" I thank you most truly for your kind and feel
ing letter. This sudden loss has been a terrible shock
to us all. Of all my sisters she was the one whom,
by common consent and without jealousy,- each of us
loved the best. She had been apparently, and, for
her, unusually well before the short iUness which
carried her away at the little wretched roadside inn
where she died. I had been struck by, and remarked
upon, the strong sense of enjoyment that her letters
breathed during her Highland tour. The peace with
China, too, had relieved her of an immense anxiety
which had gnawed at her heart this last year, though
she had given her two boys bravely and cheerfully to
their duty. Hers was a noble character, and its truth
and affection were marked, even to strangers, in her
face. " But I cannot speak of our sorrow in the presence
of Clanwilliam. I know no one whose whole exist
ence was so much within his home as was his. His
interests, occupations, were all centred there, and his
desolate life, now to begin, is fearful to think of
Hitherto, the battle with his grief has necessarily
something of excitement in it which helps to support ;
but he has worse to cbme. God only can give him

1857-58] GLADSTONE'S POSITION 117
strength, and to Him he looks. I could not wish him
otherwise than he is — in any respect. The affection
of all his family and the sympathy of his friends is
very soothing to him. He has asked me to delay this
letter that he may add a note from himself I had
projected an excursion northwards to see Lord
Aberdeen when our calamity overtook us. I fear
from your account that he will not be long among us.
You say nothing of yourself I wish you had adhered
to your plan of going to Vichy. I have great faith in
suitable waters. I got great good frora mine, though
it may not last long."
No fresh offer of office was raade to Mr. Gladstone,
but his assistance was requested by Lord Derby to
settle on the spot certain questions which had arisen
as to the administration of the Ionian Islands. He
accepted the task, and left England as Lord High
Commissioner Extraordinary early in November.
Beyond a hint given that Sir E. Bulwer Lytton's
deafness made him desirous to retire from the
Colonial Office, nothing was said with regard to any
closer approximation to the Governraent, but it was
tacitly understood that on Mr. Gladstone's return from
Corfu he would be asked to take Sir E. B. Lytton's
place. Had matters remained as they were when
Mr. Gladstone started on his mission, I believe this
proposal would have been not only made, but ac
cepted. But before Mr. Gladstone was again in
England, the influence of great and unlooked-for
events had swept him away in a totally different
political direction from that towards which he had
for sorae time past seemed to incline.

CHAPTER IV
the sanitary commission
1856-59
THE Crimean War not only made manifest raany
shortcomings in the organisation and raanage
raent of railitary hospitals, but also incidentally
disclosed the fact that the whole structure of the
Medical Department of the Army was unsound and in
need of radical reforra. It was generally felt that no
adequate attention had been given to the soldier's
corafort when in barracks, and that while but little
had been done to cure him when sick, nothing had
been done to keep him in health when well. A change
in this respect was demanded with great unanimity
by the Press and the Public, and the War Office
authorities were constrained to take steps in that
direction, though hampered by the reluctance of the
Treasury to provide funds for expenditure of this
character, and by the' apathetic inattention born of
an irrational apprehension that the soldier would
be spoiled by any amelioration of the hardships of
his life.
Towards the close of 1856, Sidney Herbert was
requested by Lord Panmure, then Secretary of State
for War, to preside over a Coraraission of Inquiry
into the Sanitary State of the Array. To this
invitation he replied as foUows :
118

1856-59] LETTER TO LORD PANMURE 119
"Wilton, November 22nd, 1856.
"My dear Panmure,
" My faith in Commissions is rather shaken.
We have all of us seen elaborate reports shelved,
together with the subjects to which they refer. A
Coraraission may draw out the truth, and, by the
authority of its recommendations, strengthen the
hands of the executive for action. But a Commission
may also get rid of the necessitj'' for immediate action,
ancl hang up the subject till public feeling or expecta
tion has died away.
" I confess that I think that the proper Head of a
Coraraission to investigate raatters of administration
under a department is the Head of the department,
for the authority which his responsibility gives him
enables him to sway his Commission and secure his
Report : then a few hours' labour converts the Report
into a Warrant, and the thing is done. But I know
you have an answer to this, and I admit its weight.
" Supposing, then, that ray past experience fits rae,
in your absence, for the task you propose to me to
undertake, that a Coraraission is necessary, and that
its labours are likely to produce good fruit, I hold,
that so far as my time or exertions can be made
profitable to the public service, I am bound to give
them. " I am not, however, without doubt as to the
advisability of a Commission, and should have pre
ferred the exercise, either comprehensively or step
by step, of the authority of the executive in the
direction of reform. I cannot conceal from myself
that there is a strong professional feeling in the Army
Medical Departraent which is averse to all change.
The knowledge of detail and the authority over its
members possessed by its heads may greatly influence
the evidence at our disposal. If the result of the
Coraraission should be to produce a raass of cumulative
assertion frora a number of witnesses meeting allega
tions as to practice by the production of unobserved
regulations, and allegations as to the regulations by
statement of practice of an opposite character, all
tending to establish that our present system is perfect,
we shall have done rauch harm.
"On the other hand, supposing we get from our

120 THE SANITARY COMMISSION [chap, iv
witnesses a fair and unreserved expression of the
truth, we must not have a Coraraission so composed
as to endanger the chance of a fair and unreserved
statement of the evils which may exist and the
necessary remedies. Again, the composition of the
Commission must be such that not only the Report
shall be truthful and fair, but that the public shall
have confidence that it is so. Lastly, the instructions
should be such that there shall be no part of our rules
and regulations and system in any branch of the Army
which bears on the sanitary condition of our troops
which shall not be open to the investigation of the
Coraraission, by which I mean that not only the
hospital practice after disease, but the prevention of
disease, and the powers of the medical authorities for
that purpose, shall be considered; ration, clothing,
camping, and the modes of supply and its quality,
etc., etc.
" The finance ; the relative authority of departments
within hospitals ; the organisation and authority of the
Medical Department ; the education, promotion, and
position of medical officers ; the facilities for acquiring
and dispensing knowledge ; the advantages, if any,
offered as to the treatment, and science in civil
hospitals, which are not available in Army hospitals,
etc., etc. ; the statistics of disease, their accuracy,
completeness, and the purposes to which they are
and may be applied, — all these things ought to be
within the scope of the inquiry.
Before I accept, therefore, the office of Chairman of
such a Commission, and with it the responsibility
of its failure or success, I raust ask you to tell me who
you propose to name as the other members of the
Commission, and what will be the instructions under
which they will act — i.e. what will be the scope of the
inquiry, and what its restrictions or limitations. Upon
these two points, as it appears to me, rest the policy
or impolicy of having a Coraraission at all, and you
will understand therefore why I ask for inforraation
on them before I give an answer to your proposal as
regards myself
"It will perhaps save tirae, and relieve you from
some responsibility also, if I at once give a sketch
of what appears to me desirable in the composition
of the Commission. I should like to see two miUtary

i8s6-59] LETTER TO LORD PANMURE 121
officers possessing a practical knowledge of the subject,
one of whom should represent the scientific branch
of the Army. I find from General Storks and Colonel
Lefroy, whom I consulted as to the possibility of the
inquiry being successful, that you contemplate their
serving on the Commission. You could not have made
a better selection. There should, I think, be two Army
doctors, one representing the Medical Department,
and one the active part of the profession ; two civil
doctors to give us the means of coraparison with civil
practice ; some one to represent the sanitary as con
tradistinguished from the purely medical element,
who, I hope, would be Dr. Sutherland, who now com
bines Army and campaign experience to his previous
general knowledge ; and, lastly, a good examining
lawyer. The Commission would then, with myself,
consist of nine members, of whom five would be
official. There are several reasons which incline me
to think that Sir James Clark should be one of the
civil medical men.
" But the most important selection would be that of
the two Army doctors. You will, I suppose, name
Sraith,^ and it is most important that the other should
be a man well known and respected by the junior
gart of the profession. Very early in the war, I
card from various sources that Alexander was the
ablest and most effective man with our Army. That
opinion has been fully confirmed since. I know of
no other person who could be of half the use to the
Commission. He has the interests of the profession
thoroughly at heart, and the Army has justly great
confidence in him. I hear that he is in Canada, but
he could, I hope, be spared from a healthy station for
such a service as this, which is iraportant far beyond
the duties of any local appointraent. Nor would his
nomination entail any delay, as the Commission could
not go into much business for some time to come. I
frankly say that I look on Alexander's nomination
as indispensable to the success of the Commission.
" I assume throughout that the object of the inquiry
is not to rip up questions regarding the past conduct
or fitness of persons, but to examine into the system,
and lay the foundation for its utmost future improve-
' Then Director-General.

122 THE SANITARY COMMISSION [chap, iv
ment, with a view to render impossible, so far as
human means can, the recurrence of the sufferings
and the evils we have undergone.
" Pardon this long letter. The matter is very
important, and the subject, if undertaken, will require
great labour, more, I confess, than I am inclined to
give, unless I have a good prospect of a successful
result. " Pray believe rae,
" Yours faithfully,
"Sidney Herbert."
Mr. Herbert was assured that his wishes, both as
regards the persons to be employed and the instruc
tions to be given, should be complied with ; but many
weeks elapsed without any further step being taken
towards the issue of the Commission, and on
February 12th Mr. Herbert again addressed Lord
Panmure, reminding hira that —
" the Medical Commission will be a very long affair,
and if not begun without loss of tirae, it will be
irapossible to conclude it in tirae for you to have
the report for next recess.
" I trust you have sent for Alexander. If you have
not, pray do so without loss of tirae. You know he
is the man on whom I rely. He did right well in the
Crimea, and he sees with his own eyes, is unpre
judiced, and is not deterred from saying what he
thinks ought to be done by the fear of disagreeing
with others. That is the reason for making his
presence on the Commission the condition of my
acting upon it.
"A well-constituted Commission with their heart
in the work may do much good, and may enable you
to overcome evils which, without their assistance,
it would be difficult to grapple with.
" Will you let me know whether you have sent for
Alexander, or whether you can do so by the first
available post?"
Miss Nightingale strongly dissuaded Mr. Herbert
from accepting the Chairmanship of this Commission

1856-59] ACCEPTS CHAIRMANSHIP 123
without a pledge that its recommendations should
be acted on.
"All that Lord Panmure has hitherto done," she
wrote, " (and it is just six months since I came home),
has been to gain time, and this Commission, I hold
it, granting it only as he does now, is also merely to
gain tirae.
" He has broken his most solemn promise to Dr.
Sutherland, to me, and to the Crimea Commission.
And three months from this day I publish my experi
ence of the Crimea carapaign, and my suggestions for
iraproveraent, unless there has been a fair and tangible
pledge by that time for reform."
A few days later Miss Nightingale's dissatisfaction
with the War Office was raised to vehement indig
nation by its approval of the Report of the Board
which had sat at Chelsea to investigate the charges
against certain officers on whom reflections had been
cast, or rather suggested, in the Report of Sir J.
MacNeill and Colonel TuUoch, to which reference has
already been made (Vol. II. pp. 28-33).
I agree with Mr. Kinglake in thinking the findings
of the Chelsea Board to have been sound and equitable.
I believe that such would be the impression made on
any one now, coolly studying the question after a long
lapse of years. But at the time they were not so
regarded, and Miss Nightingale, with her usual
impetuosity of language, pronounced the Report of
the Board to be " a deliberate insult " to the Crimean
Coraraissioners, whose conclusions it in some degree
questioned. She at once renounced all active partici
pation in the work of the proposed Sanitary Com
mission, and strongly urged Sidney Herbert to do
the same.
More prudent counsels, however, prevailed. Mr.
Herbert, though rauch influenced by Miss Nightingale,
was not prepared to follow her lead in this raatter.

124 THE SANITARY COMMISSION [chap, iv
He saw that whatever vexations and disappointments
he might have to encounter, the Commission would
effect good, even if not in such full measure as he
could desire, and that, if he threw it up, things would
probably be left as they were, without iraproveraent.
His doing so would, therefore, unjustifiably throw
away an opportunity not to be neglected. Skilfully
handled, much might be done — and, in fact, was
done — by the Commission. Miss Nightingale, sur
prised to find that others were in favour of proceeding,
ultimately accorded a more or less reluctant acquies
cence, and though she declined to take an official part
herself in the inquiry, she remained throughout its
continuance in constant intercourse with Mr. Herbert,
whose conclusions were greatly influenced by her
experience, and generally sound, if somewhat harsh,
judgment. Months more, however, were wasted in official
procrastination, and it was not till May 5th, 1857, th^t
the Commission was actually issued.
During this interval of time Mr. Herbert and Miss
Nightingale were busily employed in endeavours to
persuade or coerce the Secretary of State into granting
to the Commission real powers of inquiry into abuses,
and liberty to recommend real reforms ; while the War
Office was as busily engaged in efforts to narrow the
scope of the investigation, and so limit the powers of
the Commission as to make it difficult for thera to go
beyond the recommendation of measures of the most
" harmless " character.
When the Commission at length met, the time and
thoughts of Sidney Herbert were for the next year
and a half almost exclusively devoted to its work, and
that of the four sub-comraissions which sprang out
of it, and of each of which he was the head.

1856-59] PERSONAL INQUIRIES 125
It would be impossible, in the space at my command,
to convey an adequate idea of the amount of labour
involved in the task thus undertaken. The field of
inquiry was of vast extent, and the patient diligence
with which Mr. Herbert raade hiraself master of
enormous masses of minute details can only be truly
appreciated by those who have had an opportunity
of examining the piles of papers and mountains of
statistics which were collected, perused, annotated,
and digested by him during the preparation of the
report, the draft of which proceeded entirely from
his own hand.
But Mr. Herbert was not satisfied with returns,
however accurate and voluminous, or viva-voce evi
dence, however carefully tested. He personally visited,
during the course of 1858, nearly every barrack and
every railitary hospital in Great Britain and Ireland,
and not a few in France and other Continental States.
That frora this apparently overwhelraing accurau-
lation of facts he and his colleagues were able to
deduce clear and startling conclusions is no raean
evidence of their sagacity and skill. They had to
deal with problems of a most complex nature, and
to grapple with difficulties which often threatened
to baffle solution. Nor were the difficulties inherent
in the questions theraselves the only sturabling blocks
in their way. The Coraraission had also to en
counter obstacles at every step, due to official languor
and indifference, professional prejudice, antiquated
conservatism, departmental jealousies, and personal
interests. How wide its field of labour, and how vigorously
work was done when once commenced, may be judged
from the account of its first fortnight's proceedings
contained in the following letter to Sir John MacNeill :

126 THE SANITARY COMMISSION [chap, iv

"49, Belgrave Square,
"May \%th, 1857.
" Dear Sir John,
" I take advantage of your proraise to listen,
consider, and advise, to give you a report of the
progress our Army Medical Commission has made,
and to ask for your opinion on some points.
"At our first meeting I proposed to the Commission
to take our subjects in a certain order, beginning :
" (i) By the introduction of the medical officer into
the service, the qualifications required of him and their
sufficiency, the means of enlarging and increasing his
knowledge afterwards, especially as regards railitary
hygiene. "(2) The second head would be the organisation of
General Hospitals, the distribution of duties within
thera, the raode and character of supply, the co-opera
tion of the different branches of the service, the forms
and financial checks. The same as regards Regimental
Hospitals. " (3) The sanitary division of the subject will
coraprise : Barracks, Hospitals, Clothing, Rations, ' et
quibusdam aliis.'
" (4) We reserve the pay, rank, and promotion of
the Medical Department till after the duties to be
performed, as well as the nature of the preparation
for them, has been decided : (istly) Because without
so laying the ground for an increase of pay, and a
general bettering of their position, we shall not get
it from the Treasury ; (2ndly) Because we should not
get the required concessions as to duties and system
from the Army Medical Department if we gave the
plans first.
" (5) Lastly would come the constitution of the
Army Medical Department at Whitehall, with its
powers and authority.
"The Commission agreed to this course, though
there was a proposal to put No. 4 in place of No. i ;
but it was overruled.
" We have had four meetings, and have examined
Dr. Andrew Smith, Sir John Liddell, Sir Benjamin
Brodie, Mr. Paget (Chairman of the E. J. Co.), Mr.
Ferguson, Dr. Parkes, Dr. Meyer (Purveyor at
Chatham), Mr. HiU (Governor of the London Hospital),

1856-59] LETTER TO SIR J. MACNEILL 127
and on Wednesday we shall examine Mr. Robertson
(late Purveyor at Scutari) and Dr. Steele (Superin
tendent of St. Thomas's).
" This has carried us through the first head, and a
good way through into the second.
"These are the conclusions which, I think, the
Coraraission are prepared to advocate :
"(i) That some medical diploma, as well as the
surgical one, shall be required of the candidate, the
majority of cases in military hospitals being medical
even in war.
"(2) That no course in military hygiene (which is
now allowed to be taken as a substitute for some other
course, which is probably far more useful as well as
much more effectually taught) should be required ;
but that we should seek for a good knowledge of civil
medicine and surgery, and, if possible, test likewise
the general education of the candidate (this is strongly
pressed by Brodie, with reasons which appear sound).
" (3) That there should be an independent Board of
Examiners unconnected with the Army Departraent,
as already done in the case of the East India Co., and
that, if the arrangeraent can be effected, the same
Board should examine for the Army, the Navy, and
the East India Co.
" (4) That the specialities of the military profession,
which, by the way, are mostly sanitary, shall be
taught in a course to be given in the new General
Hospital at Netley, where the passed candidate shall
be kept for six raonths on a raodified scale of pay
and aUowances, with quarters. (At Chatham only the
three seniors receive anything.) Three permanent
professors, one of whom will be the Curator of the
Museum (now at Fort Pitt), will give clinical
pathological instruction.
"(5) That there should be a second examination
before promotion to a surgeoncy.
" (6) That prizes be given, not for essays where the
thoughts may all be pilfered from books, but for
"cases" described with their treatment and the
conclusions derived from thera.
"(7) That private practice should be encouraged,
and leave of absence granted for hospital study.
" This disposes of No. i, though we have strong
opinions given us that without better pay and the

128 THE SANITARY COMMISSION [chap, iv
prospect of rising by raerit, so far as selection in the
place of seniority can ensure it, we shall not attract
our fair share of the cleverest and raost ambitious
students. " We have got likewise an unanimous condemnation
against the imposition of any but raedical duties on
the medical officers, and we have established, I think,
by comparison between Army and other hospitals,
that our routine is unnecessarily complicated and
efficiency sacrificed to it; that the system of requi
sitions ought to be, and can be, greatly curtailed;
and that all that is indispensable to the treatment of
every case in a hospital, as regards furniture, diet, or
medicine, should be done, not by requisition, but
under a general warrant as a matter of course, or by
diet-roll, requisition being necessary only for a very
reduced list of extras, which, of course, can be reduced
in proportion as the ordinary ration is enlarged.
Indeed, the diet-roll might take the place of requisition
altogether with a liberal table of extras.
" But the question of the supply of the ration is
very difficult. Here in England the Purveyor is a
Commissariat officer. Mr. Pratt, at Chatham, not only
supplies the hospital where he resides, but every
hospital in the south-east of England, even crossing
the Thames to Ipswich, Colchester, etc., and going
south to Dover and Canterbury.
" Abroad in peace, and, I believe, in war, the
hospitals are rationed by the Commissariat ; the pur
veyors only supply medical comforts. Clearly in war
the Regimental Hospitals in the field must be rationed
by the Comraissariat, and if the General Hospitals be
likewise in the field — and no campaign can last a
month without them — I do not see how the two hospitals
can be victualled upon different systems, nor, indeed,
how any one except the Commissary can victual them
at all. We must not be misled by the peculiarities
of the last war — peculiarities which may never occur
again — when the van of our operations and our
hospitals were not even in the same country, nor
even in the sarae continent with the war and the
Army conducting it.
" It seems to me that, however far removed inland
be the invading army, even when the van and the
large general hospitals with it are on the sea coast

1856-59] LETTER TO SIR J. MACNEILL 129
of the same country, though miles away from the
actual operations, yet the whole country will be, as
far as the sources of supply are concerned, under the
immediate pressure of the perquisitions of the Com
missary-General ; and the Purveyor raust take from
his hand or starve.
"This is the Indian system. Indeed, with them it is
carried further, for everything which is required in a
hospital is supplied by the Commissariat. We shall,
I hope, be agreed that the Purveyor shall not be
dependent on the barrack department for furniture,
beds, light, fuel, etc., etc., but that each hospital shall
have its own stores. And we had evidence to this
effect to-day from Mr. Pratt which will, I think, if
supported, establish this.
"But I am fairly puzzled by this ration question.
It is fair to say that in the Peninsular War the General
Hospitals were rationed by the Purveyor, and the
Regimental by the Comraissary, none but Regiraental
Hospitals, probably, moving on with the Army, which
at the time I speak of was an advancing Array.
" Could you, some time before we close, come to
town and give evidence? We are at work on facts,
so far as they can be got, and very rare they seem
to be. Nor is it much good asking for opinions from
men whose bias leads them to think their own ex
isting system necessarily the best. But by the time
we have examined as to facts through all our five
heads, and before we attempt to decide upon our
recommendations, it would be of great service if you
would give us the advantage of your observation and
experience, and the weight of your authority likewise,
in favour of the changes which we discussed when
you were in town the other day. It would, I feel
certain, settle many doubtful questions, and assist us
in arriving at the conclusion on which the reformation
of the Army Medical Department and the sanitary
regulations of the Army raust depend.
" If you can do this, will you tell rae at what date
it would be most convenient for you to come up
to town?
" I think another fortnight will get us through the
hospitals and the sanitary head. The ration will
be the most difficult question there, for it touches
other departments, and raises delicate questions. As
VOL. II. 9

130 THE SANITARY COMMISSION [chap, iv
regards other sanitary arrangements, there is rauch to
create ; but at any rate nothing to destroy or raodify,
for there are now no arrangeraents at all. Do you
think, then, that after Whitsuntide you could come
up ? And would you prefer coming soon after, or at a
later date? " Pray believe me,
"Yours sincerely,
"Sidney Herbert."'
Six months had elapsed between Mr. Herbert's
acceptance of its Chairmanship and the actual appoint
raent of the Commission. By dint of sheer hard work
on his part, the Report of the principal Coraraission
was prepared in half that time, and on August 7th,
1857, he was able to write to Lord Panmure that —
"the Commission on the Sanitary State of the
Array has now closed its labours, and in a few days
the Report will be reprinted with the alterations
made in it during discussion, and some changes in the
order of subjects, which I'have authority to make."
The investigations of the Commission revealed the
appalling fact that the rate of mortality in the Army
at home in time of peace was more than double that
of the civilian population. The case wUl be best
stated in the words of the Report itself:
"The soldier's is a picked life. He is recruited
generally at 19 years of age. He is drawn from
two classes — the agricultural labourer and the work
ing class in towns. All men offering to enlist who
bear signs of physical weakness, or of tendency to
disease, are rejected, and even after acceptance can be
discharged, on the representation of the regimental
surgeon, at any period within three years from their
admission ; and all these rejected lives are thrown
back on the civil population.
" On the other hand, the apparent health of the
Array is raaintained by the continued influx of fresh
lives in the place of those who are weeded out by the
process of invaliding, by which raeans a large number

i8s6-59] SANITARY REPORT 131
of men whose physical powers are exhausted are
thrown back on the civil population, while their
removal lowers the rates of mortality of the Army,
though their deaths are owing to the military service
which first undermined their health.
" It is obvious, therefore, that the rates of mortality,
taken alone, represent a part only of the loss annually
caused in the ranks of the Array by disease."
Nevertheless, the Coraraissioners were able to show,
by the inexorable statistics furnished by the Registrar-
General, that while the rate of mortality in the civil
population of England, taking town and country to
gether, amounted to 9*2 per thousand, and in the
country alone to only 77 per thousand, that of the
Army at home was 175 per thousand, and in the
foot-guards reached the fearful figure of 20*4 per
thousand. The rates of mortality per 1,000 men of the Army at
horae, and of the English civil male population at
corresponding ages, as stated by the Registrar-
General, were even more startling :
Ages 20 to 25 — Civilians  ... ... 84
Soldiers  170
Ages 25 to 30 — Civilians   9-2
Soldiers  18-3
But the terrible nature of the facts disclosed is
perhaps even more forcibly brought home to the mind
by the comparison of the civil and military mortalitj^
in certain London parishes :
Civilians Military
St. Pancras ... 2-2 2nd Life-Guards, Regent's Park 10-4
Kensington ... 3'3 Rl. Horse-Gds., Knightsbridge 17-5
East London and 2nd Batt. Coldstreamsl
Whitechapel ... 5-4 and Batt. Fusiliers .../Towner 10
The Report goes on to say that —
"the occupation which comes nearest to the Army as
regards its rate of mortality is that of clerks. The
close application to business, the sedentary attitude,

132 THE SANITARY COMMISSION [chap, iv
the want of exercise and of fresh air, render their
employment one of the most unhealthy of all extensive
occupations. " It seems almost incredible that it should be
necessary to have recourse to the most unhealthy
occupations in order to institute any comparison in
which the rates of mortality shall approximate to
those prevailing among Your Majesty's troops, for at
present the Army stands almost at the head of un
healthy occupations in the United Kingdom."
The Coraraissioners proceeded to investigate the
causes of this abnormal mortality.
"That in war men should die from exposure,
from fatigue, from insufficient supplies is intelligible,
or that the occupation of a town of 30,000 inhabitants
by an army of^ 30,000 men, without any sanitary
precaution, suddenly doubling the population to the
area, and thereby halving the proportion of every
accommodation, of supplies, water, drainage, sewerage,
etc., etc., should engender disease, is readily under
stood ; but the problem submitted to us is to find the
causes of a mortality more than double that of civil
life among 60,000 men, scattered in numbers seldom
exceeding a thousand in one place, among a
population of 28,000,000, in time of profound peace, in
a country which is not only the healthiest, but which
possesses the greatest facility of communication, and
the greatest abundance of supply in Europe.
" The causes assigned to us for these high rates of
mortality are :
" I. Night duty.
" 2. Want of exercise and suitable employment.
"3. Intemperate and debauched habits among the
soldiers. " 4. Crowding and insufficient ventilation, and
nuisances arising from latrines and defective sewerage
in barracks."
While not denying that the three first causes
might have some effect, the Commissioners assigned
reasons for believing that their influence was com
paratively inconsiderable. The Police had severer

i8s6-59] THE SUB-COMMISSIONS 133
and more constant night duty than the troops, but
their rate of mortality was comparatively low. Want
of exercise and employment had a greater influence,
but they doubted whether much of the mortality could
be attributed to drunkenness and debauchery, point
ing out that it was due not to diseases of the nerves
or digestive organs, but to pulmonary affections.
" If therefore," they went on to say, " it can be
shown that the soldier in barracks breathes a vitiated
and polluted atmosphere, it follows that of the four
predisposing causes above enuraerated, the last is
the one to which the excessive liability of the soldier
to this class of disease [pulraonary] may be chiefly
attributed." In writing to Lord Panmure on the subject of this
Report, Mr. Herbert made the following suggestions :
" The true way to carry the recommendations into
effect will, it seems to rae, be the appointraent of sub-
commissions or coraraittees to settle the details on each
head ; but there should be one executive Coraraission,
with powers not only to examine and report on each
hospital and barrack, but to execute minor works
within a certain specified limit. Otherwise, while
reports are being considered time will have slipped
away, and you will lose the prestige which attaches
to rapid action on a subject likely to arrest a good
deal of general attention. I will gladly help you in
any way I can, either by serving on these sub-
commissions, or by drawing up, or helping to draw
up, regulations, or both.
"There will, I think, be four Sub-Commissions
required : (i) To ventilate, drain, and re-arrange the
hospitals and barrack buildings. (2) To draw up the
scheme of a statistical branch in the Army Medical
Departraent, and to decide on the forras to be used,
and the results to be published. (3) To revise the
hospital regulations, and so rauch of the Queen's
Regulations as touch on sanitary subjects, and draw
up a warrant for the promotion of medical officers (I
have raade a sketch of one), and to lay down a scherae
for the details and business of the Director-General's

134 THE SANITARY COMMISSION [chap, iv
office. (4) To draw up the plan for the raedical school
to be established in our chief military general hospital.
" You will, I think, find it advantageous to make
as much use as possible of the merabers of the original
Commission in working out these details. They are
fresh from the subject, and have it at their fingers'
ends, and the relief to your office at a raoraent of
pressure will be great if you can haye everything
Presented to you in a working form, with the aid of
»r. Andrew Smith for some portions, TuUoch for
statistics, and Crooms, if he is well enough, for
warrants and regulations. They could put it all into
a shape that would only require your judgraent and
decision upon it.
" I will gladly help you in any way I can, and will,
if you wish it, serve on any of the Coraraittees or
Sub-Commissions I have mentioned.
" I will, as we agreed the other day, raove at the
end of the Session fpr a copy of the Report, and any
orders founded upon it ; and if Sir John Ramsden will
then put in a dummy, you can later send in the Report
with evidence and appendix and all your orders and
regulations founded upon it, which will satisfy the
public and give the prestige which promptitude always
carries with it.
" Let me have a line to say whether you agree. I
send you a copy instead of the original of this letter,
in consideration of the time to be saved to the reader
of good handwriting."
On the 14th of the same month Mr. Herbert had an
interview with Lord Panmure, at which an agreement
was arrived at as to the appointraent of the sub-
commissioners to carry out the works recommended in
the Report, and as to the powers they were to possess.
Mr. Herbert, however, thought it expedient, ad
majorem, cautelam, to address the following letter to
Lord Palmerston : " Belgrave Square, October dth, 1857.
" Panmure has promised rae to send for your ap-
E roval instructions which I have drawn up and given
im for some sub-comraittees to carry into effect, or

1856-59] LETTER TO LORD PALMERSTON 135
rather to supply him with the means of carrying into
effect, the measures which the Coraraission on the
Sanitary State of the Army have decided on recom
mending for adoption. I beHeve you are cognisant of
their general character, and also of the magnitude
of the evil which we have to cope with. There raust
be soraething radically wrong when soldiers at home,
picked lives, at the healthiest and strongest period
of life, offer an amount of mortality exceeding that
of the most notoriously unhealthy trades and double
that of ordinary civil life. If you add to this the
number of men invalided and who die out of the Array,
though killed by it, and who instead of counting as
soldiers in the coraparison with civil life actually go
to swell the raortality of the latter, the excess becoraes
positively frightful.
"We have done our best to account for this and
to advise reraedies. With an Array raised by volun
teering the country cannot afford to let men die in
this way, even were there no other motive for doing
our utmost to secure health and life to thera. I cannot
undertake to say that we have fathomed the depth
of the evil, that we know all its causes, or have
suggested all the remedies, but we know sorae causes
and have urged sorae reraedies, and I am very anxious
to commence their trial without loss of tirae. The
War Office is overdone with work at this raoraent,
and that is the reason why I have offered to relieve
it of these details, and to put the whole plan into
such a shape that the Secretary of State shall be able,
with such alterations as he may think right, to set it
in motion at once without trouble and without delay.
The barrack inspection ought to begin iramediately.
The days are shortening, and the weather in which
iraraediate alteration can be effected is passing away.
I have proposed that for sraall alterations to secure
ventilation, light, etc., the Coraraissions should be
authorised to spend a small sum at once on the spot
on their own authority, reporting all large works to
be done to the War Office for consideration. I wish
I could get more than ;^ioo per barrack for this
purpose. "My object in writing is to beg you to give first
turn to this raatter araong the raany coraing daily
before you, so as to give us time to begin our work

136 THE SANITARY COMMISSION [chap, iv
and finish sorae of it before Parliaraent meets. I
know the interest you feel in the subject, and am
confident that you wUl pardon ray troubling you with
this letter urging immediate action and asking your
assistance and co-operation."
Nor was this precaution needless, for, subsequently,
Lord Panmure revoked the consent he had given to
the formation of the third of these proposed Sub-
Commissions, on the ground that it involved too large
a delegation of the powers of the War Office with
respect to pay and promotion in the medical branch
of the Army. Mr. Herbert, who, so long as it was
effected, was quite indifferent whether the work he
wished to see done was done by the War Office itself
or by the Commission, returned to the charge in the
following letter : "49, Belgrave Square, Nov. ii, 1857.
" My dear Panmure,
"All our Sub-Commissions or Coraraittees are
at work, and with more or less advanced progress.
One only you did not appoint, on the ground that
the constitution of the medical departraent and the
warrant for promotion ought not to be delegated
out of the War Office. But by this arrangement
the hospital and medical regulations (to which that
objection does not apply) remain untouched, and
Alexander and Crooms, both of whom could do us
good service, are not utilised as they should be.
" I have therefore recast the instructions for them,
excluding all reference to the Army Medical Depart
ment and to the promotion Warrant, and those Iwill
ultimately give you ray ideas upon in confidence.
" Alexander is hard at work for me on the hospital
regulations, and if you will send us the enclosed
authority we will prepare a revised code. You will,
of course, adopt it or not as you think best, but this
I am certain of, that it is very much required, and
that if it is not done by us it will not be done at
all. No one in the office has time to give to it, nor
enough familiarity with the subject.

1856-59] GENERAL PEEL WAR MINISTER 137
"We are doing well with barracks, and I will
report progress to you on that head in a few days.
Nothing can be more obliging or anxious to help
than the authorities."
The third Sub-Coraraission thus insisted on was
then, though with evident reluctance on the part of
the War Office, allowed to sit.
In the spring of 1858 Lord Palmerston's Government
was overthrown, and in that of Lord Derby, which
succeeded it. General Jonathan Peel replaced Lord
Panmure at the War Office. The change was one
welcome to Mr. Herbert. Lord Panmure was, in his
way, a military reformer, but his views were raainly
liraited to the substitution of civil for military control.
He himself shared the antiquated prejudices, and
the instinctive dislike to improvement, which Sidney
Herbert had set himself to corabat. General Peel
was far raore in syrapathy with Sidney Herbert's
airas, but was hardly gifted with sufficient originality
heartily to appreciate them. Nor had he sufficient
decision and strength of will to overcome the vis
inertice of the office over which he presided, or to
brush aside the host of petty obstacles urged against
every measure of reform.
To General Peel, on his entering office, Sidney
Herbert addressed the following letter, containing a
short account of what had been done by the Com
mission and Sub-Commissions up to that time :
" My dear Peel,
" I proraised to send you a report of the pro
gress made in the various Sub-Commissions and
Coraraittees appointed by Lord Panraure to aid in
carrying into effect the recoramendations of the Royal
Commission. You are in possession of the instructions
given to the four Sub-Commissions or Coraraittees
appointed by him — namely, the Sub-Commission to

138 THE SANITARY COMMISSION [chap, iv
inspect and report on Barracks and Hospitals, the
Committee to revise the Medical Hospital Regulations,
the Statistical Committee, the Committee to draw up
a Scheme for the proposed Array Medical School.
The Quartermaster-General, Sir R. Airey, was on the
Committee on Regulations, and Captain Galton, R.E.,
who was lately employed to report on the sewerage
of London, was the engineer officer named on the Sub-
Commission on Barracks and Hospitals. The progress
made by the several committees is as follows : The
scheme for the medical school is drawn up and finished,
all but a few details of minor importance, which one
more meeting will complete. It will, I hope, be in the
hands of the Secretary of State by ETaster. The
statistical forms have been considered, and some
changes are being effected, but they may be ready
about the same time. The Regulations Committee
have made considerable progress. All regulations on
instructions referring to medical officers, and which
are now scattered through the Queen's Regulations
or the War Office Regulations, have been collected
together, so that the medical officer can at once find
what concerns his own Department. But besides
the introduction of new matter pointing to prevention
rather than to cure, the revision and codification of
the Hospital Instructions, and the definition and
distribution of the duties of the officers of the various
departraents, on whom devolve not only the treatment
of the sick, but the supply of food, medicine, medical
comforts, and furniture of the hospitals, as well as the
repair of the buildings themselves, constitute a work
of much difficulty and require great care and attention.
We will make every endeavour to complete them in
the next three weeks, but I am far from positive that
it can be done. The Barrack and Hospital Sub-
Commission have inspected all the London barracks
and hospitals — the Tower Barracks and hospital ; the
Wellington Barracks and three hospitals ; the Port-
man Square Barracks ; the St. George's Barracks,
Trafalgar Square; the Magazine Barrack, Hyde Park;
the Knightsbridge Barracks and hospital ; the Kensing
ton old Cavalry Barrack ; the Kensington old Infantry
Barrack; the Kensington new Cavalry Barrack; the
Kensington new Infantry Barrack ; the St. John's
Wood Barrack; and the Albany Street Barrack,

1856-59] LETTER TO GENERAL PEEL 139
Regent's Park. They have inspected the barracks at
Portsmouth, on the Gosport side, ten in number,
besides the hospital and new barrack building at
Gosport ; also the barrack at Winchester ; the barracks
for artillery, cavalry, and infantry at Aldershot. They
are preparing a Report on the London barracks, but
they wish to await the results of experiments now
being tried, or about to be tried, in ventilation before
they send in their report ; and as these results must
affect the recommendations which it will be their duty
to make with reference to almost all other barracks,
they think it right thoroughly to satisfy themselves by
practical experiment before they venture to make
recomraendations which may entail sorae expense on
the country. They will afterwards be able to report
very rapidly upon the other barracks which they
have inspected, as well as on those which it will be
their duty subsequently to visit.
" There are sorae other matters which Lord Panmure
referred either to the Barrack and Hospital Commis
sion or to rayself individually, which I raay as well
here raention.
"The Sub-Coramission on Barracks and Hospitals
was desired to inspect Netley and to report what
alterations, if any, are advisable in the plans, and
what course we should recommend to be adopted with
regard to it. This report will be ready in a few days.
I also undertook, at the request of Lord Panmure,
to put together the materials for a draft Warrant to
regulate the admission to the service, the rank, and
relative rank of raedical officers, their promotion, full
pay, half-pay, and retirement. This includes a new
scale of pay, half-pay retireraent, less in araount than
that proposed in 1856 or 1857 t>y the Director-General,
and which was psoposed to but refused by the
Treasury ; but it appeared to me to be a liberal and
sufficient provision. I have accompanied it by a draft
letter to the Treasury, explaining and justifying the
changes embodied in the Warrant, and the increased
rates of pay; this I will send in a few days."
On May loth, in the House of Commons, Mr. Herbert
vigorously defended the Government from the charge
of having " fooled away " raoney on the iraproveraent

140 THE SANITARY COMMISSION [chap, iv
of barracks and hospitals, showing conclusively how
great an econoray was in fact involved in raaintaining
the soldier in health and corafort. Two days later.
Lord Ebrington, prompted by Mr. Herbert and Miss
Nightingale, moved Resolutions in the House of
Commons to the effect that the long-continued
excessive mortaUty of the British Army had been
mainly caused by the bad sanitary condition of their
barracks, the increase and iraproveraent of which
were imperatively called for, not less by good policy
and true econoray than by justice and huraanity.
Lord Ebrington's Resolutions were accepted by the
Governraent, and although General Peel's speech on
the occasion showed more good will than accurate
knowledge, a great step had no doubt been gained in
thus pledging the House of Commons to the principle
of the reforras advocated by the Coraraission. But
Mr. Herbert was well aware that there was still rauch
raore to be done before they could be regarded as
safely established.
Not content with the acquiescence of Parliaraent,
his efforts were unremitting to excite the interest of
the country generally in the reforras he advocated.
Besides inspiring, and often writing, articles in the
newspapers, he contributed an article to The West
minster Review for January, 1859, which, contrary to
the custom of that periodical, appeared signed with
his initials.
A considerable part of this paper was devoted to
a controversy which no longer possesses any interest,
and in which he combated the views of a scientist,
who had endeavoured to prove that overcrowding in
barrack rooms was not one of the causes of the high
death-rate in the Army, and indeed had little, if any,
influence on health. Another portion of it dealt with

1856-59] WESTMINSTER REVIEW 141
the recomraendations of the Royal Commission,
and the work already accoraplished, which have
been described in an earlier part of this chapter.
But that part of the article which set forth the
objects yet unaccoraplished merits somewhat closer
notice. After welcoming the new Warrant with respect to
the reorganisation of the Army Medical Department
as a great improvement on a system scathingly
described as combining " all the evils of seniority
without its certainty, and all the evils of selection
without its stimulus," he thankfully acknowledges the
improvements in progress in barrack accommodation
and expresses belief that the pledges given by the
Government during the debate on Lord Ebrington's
Resolutions were being faithfuUy redeemed. But he
calls attention to the fact, that nothing had yet been
done to reform the organisation of military hospitals,
and points out the extraordinary corabination of
entirely independent authorities by which they were
governed. " In fact there is no governing power at all, nor
are the subordinate departraents so placed relatively
to one another that they can supply the deficiency.
All are equal — all can obstruct ; none need assist —
because none feel that they need obey. The medical
officer can ask the purveyor for something which he
considers necessary for his patients, and the purveyor
may procure it, or he may exercise his discretion and
refuse it. The building may require repair, and the
barrack raaster exercises his discretion whether or not
he shall apply to the engineer to effect it, who exercises
his discretion whether he shall or shall not coraply.
Each covers his own responsibility by asking. . . .
And yet the War Office attempts, whether at home
or abroad, to regulate and govern hospitals organised
by such a raachinery as this. These jarring eleraents
are to be reconciled and the machine made to work by

142 THE SANITARY COMMISSION [chap, iv
a Secretary of State, through the medium of the post.
There is but one condition on which he can succeed.
If he be infallible, omniscient, and omnipresent, the
plan is a good one ; if he be not, it is absurd."
He then sketches the organisation by which he
proposes to replace the existing system, or no system,
of hospital government, and proceeds to that which
of all reforms he was most anxious to introduce, and
the necessity for which, even at this day, is far too
little realised— the recognition of the fact that the
main duty of the Army Medical Department is not
the cure of disease, but the prevention of its causes.
To carry out this reform he urges that there should be
a Sanitary Adviser attached to every Army Corps,
that such an officer should also be attached to the
Army Medical Council, and that the medical men
entering the Army in future should be educated in
the principles of sanitary science. But on these topics
it will be well to let him speak in his own words.
"The General Hospital is the one in which the
greatest pains should be bestowed, because it is there
that the existing system is the most defective. You
cannot do without them in war, and you cannot have
them effective in war unless you give them a good
organisation, siraple and suited to the rough exigencies
of war, and in which those who are to conduct them
have been thoroughly practised during peace.
" But as these military General Hospitals have to be
extemporised in war, as their habitat is often shifting,
as they must frequently be established in buildings
never intended for the purpose, and in localities
requiring minute inspection and rauch sanitary pre
caution before they can be adapted to hospital purposes
with any security to the sick, it will be necessary to
provide the governor, who is to be responsible for the
safety and efficiency of the whole, with the best
possible advice on points on which obviously he
cannot himself be a competent judge. This is the
reason why a sanitary adviser should be attached to

1856-59] WESTMINSTER REVIEW 143
hira as to the Quartermaster-General of an Army. The
duty of an Array surgeon is curative, but it is not so
much so as it is preventive. Health is the first
condition of success to an Army, for health means
numbers. Precaution alone can arrest the constant
thinning of the ranks by disease. Reraedy, however
effectual, coraes too late. For the raere purpose of
the carapaign, putting aside huraanity and duty to the
soldier, the success or failure of the remedy is not
very material. Indeed, death affects an army less
than disease. For death only diminishes numbers,
whereas disease not only diminishes numbers, but
detracts from the efficiency of the remainder who are
still unaffected by it. The hospital intercepts rations,
transports, guards, surgeons, raoney, all of which are
wanted to maintain, in efficiency, the Army at the
front. " Sanitary science is looked upon as mere humbug
by the raass of mankind. It is not till we have been
decimated by cholera that we can be persuaded to
cleanse our dwellings, to remove our cesspools, and
attend to our sewers. Neither is the civil surgeon as
much in advance of the lay civilian on these matters
as his education and knowledge should make him.
The generality of civil physicians and surgeons live
not by prevention but by cure, and what men live by
they raost esteem. They neither live by prevention,
nor practise it, nor do they teach it. Our Army
surgeons have acquired the groundwork of their
medical knowledge in civil schools, but the speciality
of sanitary science they have never been taught. . . .
The combatant military officer, again, like the lay
civilian, is seldom practically convinced of the necessity
of measures of prevention, and is conscious that he is
too ignorant to know whether the advice offered him
is sound ; and if convinced of the necessity, perhaps
doubts, and often justly doubts, whether his adviser
knows much more about the raatter than himself
" When the medical officer goes to the General-in-
coraraand, who, under a tropical sun, up a river
surrounded with swaraps, is feeding his troops on
salt pork, and tells him that unless he gives them
fresh meat and vegetables, they will be down with
scurvy and fever, he does no raore than his duty, and
what is iraperative that he should do. But if he is

144 THE SANITARY COMMISSION [chap iv
met by the man in authority with the rejoinder, 'Sir,
when your advice is wanted it will be asked for,' he
probably vows never again to expose himself to such
a rebuke. Six weeks afterwards he is called upon to
cure disease which is not curable at all, or not curable
in time, though care and precaution a few weeks
earlier raight have obviated much of it.
"Such things ought to be impossible, and the
Commissioners urge that so far as regulations can
effect it they shall be made impossible.
"At present a military disaster is like a railway
accident, no one is ever to blame; but when once
the raan whose business it is to advise is raade to
record his advice, and the raan who is to act to record
his reasons, we shall know, as the Turkish Pasha
said, 'whose beard to pull.'
" There would be a direct economy in estabhshing in
the office of the Director-General a Sanitary Branch,
with a competent officer at its head, specially devoted
to the overlooking and directing all sanitary raeasures.
We have thrown away not hundreds of thousands,
but raillions, in the course of the last ten years, from
our blind and reckless neglect of the simplest laws
in this respect. A man who has seen the raodern
hospitals at Paris, such as Lariboisiere and Vincennes,
would have been struck by the wonderful siraplicity
of the plans, and by the light, the airiness, the cheer
fulness of the wards ; and that in a cliraate far raore
severe than ours. But we had no sanitary department
in the office of the Director-General to look into these
things, and no one whose business it was to study
the construction of buildings for the use of the sick,
nor the conditions necessary to a healthy site. Hence,;
when an immense sum was voted to create a General
Hospital, with all England to choose from, our selection
fell on three acres of clay standing over ten miles of
mud bank, with a soft damp climate, in a district to
which there is no record of any man having been
sent for his health by any physician that ever lived;
and this is to be a place of recovery for our soldiers
returning from abroad, the majority of whom come
from tropical climates, and whose constitutions, ac
cording to the highest living authority. Dr. Martin,

1856-59] WESTMINSTER REVIEW 145
require a high, dry, bracing cliraate ! A plan was
adopted, raagnificent in scale, far raore extensive than
is liKely to be required, and far raore costly than was
necessary, and which, with reduction, was admirably
adapted for a barrack, though quite unsuitable to a
hospital. Not but that Netley is a step in advance.
To get a good barrack instead of a hospital is an
advantage which the sick soldier is not everywhere
Erovided with. In the majority of our stations, the
est hospitals are those which were built, not for
hospitals, but for barracks. Where a hospital was
designed as such, the constructor seems to have raked
his ingenuity to devise as many crooked corners, blank
walls, dark and unventilated spaces as possible, as
though light and air, instead of being the two first
requisites of a hospital, were dangers to be carefully
guarded against. At Woolwich, not in the benighted
days of the Georges, nor even of King Williara, but
in the reign of Queen Victoria, in this very decade,
during the Russian War, a ward was added to the
General Hospital, which we venture to say is the
largest room with the smallest window-space which
can be found in all England built to be inhabited by
human beings.
" At Dumdum, within a drive from Calcutta, upwards
of 300 women and children perished from disease in 1 5
raonths out of a mean strength of about 1,000, from
sheer overcrowding in unventilated rooms. It seems
as though we wanted to rescue the memory of Shah
Soujah and the Black Hole from infamy by showing
how, by our ignorance or neglect, or both, we can
emulate his world-known crime. For it is ignorance
and it is neglect, and it is horrible to find that so little
is the responsibility of the authorities felt in this
respect, that the Government is actually praised for
its energy, because one of the officers as soon as the
details of the tragedy were known (that is, when the
victims had been dying for weeks), drove over in a
buggy and made a report. As if a report would
resuscitate the dead, or save the living! How carae
the details not to be known? And who was the
military, and who the medical, officer who ordered,
or who allowed the crowding which destroyed these
poor creatures?
" These things would not be possible if the Army
vol. IL 10

146 THE SANITARY COMMISSION [chap, iv
medical officers were made to understand that their
first great duty is prevention.
" There must be, in the office of the Director-General,
a Department with a recognised competent head, to
overlook, to advise, and, above all, to be responsible
for the advice givfen on these subjects. At present the
Director-General has no responsible adviser. Medical
officers who happen to be near at hand are seized
upon and constituted advisers, pro hac vice, not because
they are competent, but because they are near at hand.
Chance makes them advisers, and chance is to blame,
not they, if the advice they give turns out to be
bad. If they are right, they get no credit for it,
and it is but fair that if they are wrong, they should
escape blame. This was the composition of the office
under the late Director-General, and it is so still.
The work is multifarious, and in extent and variety
far beyond the powers of any one man. There is a
vast routine business to transact with the 700 or 800
medical officers, over whom he is the sole professional
authority. He must have that undefinable tact in
governing men which induces thera to follow willingly
and acquiesce in his decisions even when against
thera. He raust be gifted with discernraent to judge
of raerit and capability, not only for the purpose of
awarding proraotion with justice, but of allotting to
each the task for which his attainments especially fit
him. He is ultiraately responsible for the health of
an array of 150,000 or 180,000 men scattered over
the world in every latitude and in every cliraate. He
has to deal with sanitary questions on the largest
scale, and in the greatest possible variety. He has to
deal with raedical questions, with surgical questions,
and with statistical questions. He must be able to
interpret rapidly the dry array of figures before him,
and argue from them to sound conclusions; to trace
the evils detected to their true causes, and to apply
the proper reraedies.
" It is an impossible task. A simple recurrence to
the old form of an ordinary board will not meet the
difficulty. A board consisting of raerabers having
equal powers, voting on each measure as it arises,
is a form of government almost incompatible with a
decided and energetic administration. It divides the
power without strengthening it. It either produces

1856-59] WESTMINSTER REVIEW 147
continual difference and continual bickering; or it
results in a series of comproraises in which every
convenience except the public convenience is con
sulted. " Where adrainistration alone is the object, where
rapid but not hasty decision, energetic but well-
considered action are required, the responsibility and
the decision raust be vested in one raan, but the mind
of that man must be strengthened by friction with
the minds of men whose special acquaintance with
each of the classes of subjects on which he has to
decide, make them competent to inforra hira. They
should be responsible for the advice they give ; but
he, and he alone, should be responsible to the Govern
raent and to the public for the decision taken.
" A Director-General, solely responsible, but assisted
by three counciUors, one raedical, one sanitary, and
one statistical, through whora all business would pass
which raight appertain to the speciality of each before
it carae up to hira for decision, all important measures
being reserved for discussion by all, but for the
ultimate decision of one, appear to us to constitute
a machinery the most likely to perform the duties
which have hitherto proved too much, either for an
unaided autocrat or an irresponsible board.
" But one thing is wanting, and on that the Report
of the Commission was silent. They propose to
educate the medical officer to give advice, but they
do not propose to educate the combatant officer to
receive it and appreciate it. True, they fix upon him
the responsibility of rejecting it by compelling him
to affix his reasons for the rejection. If the advice
shall prove bad, well and good, the reasons will be
given and the course will be justified; and if the
advice be good, and it be rejected, the blame will
ultimately fall on the right shoulders ; but the mischief
done in the interim may be incalculable. Authority
may visit the error on the head of the officer, but
it cannot compensate for the disaster. Means must
therefore be taken to inform the combatant officers on
these subjects, that they raay be protected frora their
own errors, and, what is more important, that those
under their coraraand raay be protected frora them.
Our Army is, perhaps, at present, the least pro
fessional of all our professions. The education for

148 THE SANITARY COMMISSION [chap, iv
the Army, and the examination previous to admission,
has been as yet but very superficially military.
"Our belief is that unless the railitary authorities
give to our officers the means and encourage them
to acquire this knowledge and secure its acquisition
by them through the means of examination, much
of the advantage of the measures recommended by the
Coraraissioners, and now, we hope, about to be
adopted, will be neutralised or lost."
The last paragraph of this paper may well be quoted
in extenso :
" But there are other and higher motives for im
mediate and energetic action. Every raonth that is
allowed to pass while nothing is done brings into the
Service fresh batches of young raen to whora are
entrusted duties for which they have received no
previous instruction. They are sent out to be taught
m their turn by disaster what they have learned from
no teacher at home. Their experience will again be
acquired at the expense of the soldier, whose life and
health are in their hands. If there be war, fresh
sufferings and fresh disasters will again lower our
reputation as a military nation, and, pro tanto, deprive
us of the security which rests on military reputation.
Every day's delay, therefore, is a loss. While these
plans, matured by practised and experienced hands,
are being handed from branch to branch in the
cumbrous consolidation of the War Office, not only
are the evils complained of unarrested, but the seeds
are being sown for their long continuance. Delay,
then, is not only a loss but a sin, and one which we
trust that the country will not long allow our rulers
to corarait. Its officers and its raen are of the finest
material which the world can show ; they have under
gone rauch unnecessary suffering, and been exposed
to much unnecessary difficulty, but they have endured
those sufferings and overcome those difficulties with
a patience and a courage which have never failed. It
remains for us to give them the organisation and the
skill, which shall utilise those great qualities to the
utmost, and constitute our Array a raachine perfect for
its purpose."
Forty-six years have passed since these paragraphs

1856-59] LETS AND HINDRANCES 149
were written. Can it be said that they have no
application even at the present day ?
The whole article frora which these quotations have
been raade is very remarkable as the production of
one who had been, and was again to be, a responsible
Minister of the Crown. Of the sincerity and earnest
ness of the writer there could be no doubt, and it
might well be supposed that when again in power,
all that he had so powerfully advocated would be
speedily accomplished. The sequel will show how
far this was frora being the case, notwithstanding
Mr. Herbert's persistent efforts.
A better idea of the raany lets and hindrances which
Mr. Herbert encountered in the prosecution of his
work will be conveyed by telling the story of two or
three in some detail, than by the simple enumeration
of a larger number.
In July, 1858, Mr. Herbert, in a letter to General
Peel, had expressed his anxiety that the different parts
of the scheme which was proposed for the reorganisa
tion of the Array Medical Service " should all be
considered in relation to one another, and not, by
' being criticised and altered piecemeal, be made utterly
incongruous and unworkable as a whole," and that " if
there were points which seeraed obscure or regulations
which appeared questionable or the object of which
was not evident on the face of them," he hoped " before
any change in thera is decided on, the subject-raatter
of such change would be referred back to the Cora
raissioners for consideration." "The subject," he
added, " is so important that no one, I am sure, will
grudge the trouble. The same applies to all the
Reports which I have enuraerated as forming part of
the whole scheme, and to the Medical School."
But this suggestion was by no means in harmony

150 THE SANITARY COMMISSION [chap, iv
with the ways of the War Office, which at once set
itself vigorously to work to discover or create obstacles
to the realisation of the proposals raade, and subjected
them to narrow and pedantic criticism in detail, with
out any reference to the general scheme.
One of the chief recommendations of the Royal
Commission had been the establishment of a Medical
Council, of which the Director-General was to be
the head, but which should be able to afford him
expert advice on statistical, sanitary, and other ques
tions not purely medical in the technical sense of that
word. The draft Warrant forraing this Council, and
the Instructions for it, were written by Sidney Herbert
hiraself, after rauch conference with Sir John MacNeill
and Miss Nightingale.
These Instructions clearly defined the position and
duties of the Director-General and of each raeraber
of the Council. But they were by no raeans palatable
to the existing heads of the Military Medical Staff or
the perraanent officials of the War Office. As Miss
Nightingale wrote, with her usual incisiveness,
(January 4th, 1859):
" As there are striking and original views of English
history now to be found only in the Prayer Book,
in Burke's Peerage, and Mrs. S . . . , so there are
striking and original ways of doing business, now
only to be found in the War Office. To strike a
blow at these ways of doing business in one direction
was quite as rauch the object of your instructions to
the Medical Council as to organise the Medical
Director-General's Office. . . . That the War Office
does not like the instructions I can well believe.
They are in opposition to all its ways. . . . Without
your instructions to the council there had better be
no council, and without the quinquennial appointraents
there can be no independence. ... If Hawes likes
to call it a Board, that does not signify. But without
the instructions the departraent would have no strength,

1856-59] THE MEDICAL SCHOOL 151
nor the Director-General any aid in specialities.
Rather than Hawes' plan, let Alexander go on as he
is — Don't you think so ? "
Another recoraraendation as little relished at the
War Office was that which dealt with the subject of
medical education of Army surgeons, and the suggested
establishment of a Medical School. These proposals
were the work of another of the four Sub-Commissions;
but it was suggested by General Peel that they should
still remain under consideration, and any active steps
with regard to the matter be for the present postponed.
Had the head of the Coraraission been a raan of less
deterraination, or held a personal position of less
weight than Sidney Herbert, the recoramendations
of the sub-committee would probably have been
verbally approved and practically set aside, as is too
often the case. But Sidney Herbert was not easily
overborne. He at once wrote to General Peel :
" 49, Belgrave Square,
"November 26M, 1858.
" My dear Peel,
" I have been thinking over the subject of the
Medical School, and I am the more anxious on the
subject since a short conversation I had with Lord
Hardinge yesterday.
" It never will do to hang it up. We used to send
out no assistant surgeons who had not passed through
the existing school at Chatham (for it is a school,
though a very defective one, inasmuch as it merely
teaches what the exaraination at the Medical Board,
if it be good for anything, proves that they know
already — namely, medicine and surgery as taught in
the civil schools — and does not teach what is still
more iraportant, and what the civil schools do not
and cannot teach — namely, railitary hygiene).
" Still, looking at the possible insufficiency of the
exaraination in the Array Medical Departraent, it has
the advantage of securing that the young raedical
officer is a civil general practitioner.

152 THE SANITARY COMMISSION [chap, iv
" But we are now sending the young men out
direct from the examination without passing through
Chatham. What was thought necessary in peace is
being dispensed with in war.
" Unless we can get these young raen back, and
raake them pass through the reforraed Array Medical
School, we shall have grafted on the Array raedical
service a stock of untutored and uninforraed ignorance
which will lower its efficiency and its character for
years. " I know that the pressure is great, and that on
emergencies you must put up with shifts ; but be
prepared to substitute a good system for the existing
bad one immediately.
" There are great facilities at Chatham. You have
there soldiers in all states, recruits, raade soldiers,
and invalids frora abroad, and especially from the
tropical climates — i.e. both chronic and acute cases
together. We never shall have both either at
Aldershot or Netley, and it is most important to
ascertain before you finaUy locate your school at
either, which is the class of cases raost iraportant to
the teacher, and which can be most easily dispensed
with, if both cannot be had.
"There is a theatre at Chatham and a museum,
and lodgings can be procured either at Stroud or
Rochester. A corrugated iron hut with glass in the
roof can easily and at small cost be run up for
pathological demonstrations.
" If you will authorise Alexander to meet Sutherland
and myself and Sir Jaraes Clark, I ara sure we should
all prove willing to undertake and devise a teraporary
arrangeraent by which the school should be at once
put, though on a limited, still on a useful footing.
" It will not do to send out batch after batch of
young men, who have never had the slightest
instruction in the most important part of their duty—
naraely, the sanitary — especially when we are sending
thera to India.
" We could also relieve the Array Medical Depart
ment of a function for which they are not properly
competent, and which consumes time which is in
valuable for other purposes during the present
pressure, or indeed at any tirae. This ought, under
existing circumstances, to be done at once. If, owing

1856-59] MORE DELAYS 153
to the exigencies of the service, the examination is
the only test, it ought to be made as efficient and as
trustworthy as possible. 1 hope, therefore, you will
immediately send the Medical School Plan to the
Treasury, with my draft letter explaining its object.
Now is the time to strike while the iron is hot. The
public are looking with anxiety to these raeasures.
They do not Hke the expenditure of half a million a
year in recruiting to fill vacancies which ought not
to exist.
"Pray, therefore, knowing how slow these com
munications between Departments are, lose no time
in sending this, and everything else you can, on to
the Treasury.
"The Regulations, I should think, do not require
their sanction, as they carry no increase of expense ;
but the Medical School and the Council are urgent,
and cannot be adopted without them."
This seems to have satisfied the War Office that Mr.
Herbert was inexorable, and that "something must
be done ; " but to corabine the appearance of doing
something with a practical assurance of further delay,
the War Office, through the medium of the Permanent
Under-Secretary, Sir B. Hawes, next proposed that
a fresh Coraraission, including among its merabers
Dr. Acland of Oxford, and sorae London physician of
celebrity, should be appointed to consider and report
on the recommendations of the Sanitary Coraraission
and of the Sub-Coramission in this connection. To
this proposal Sidney Herbert was as little rainded to
agree as to the former one.
Mr. Herbert to General Peel.
" Plymouth, December 1st, 1858.
" My dear Peel,
" You cannot, I think, expect me to agree to
Sir B. Hawes's proposal. He clearly has never given
his attention to the subject of Army medical education,
for he is too acute a raan to write such questions as
those in his memorandum, if he had ever done so.

154 THE SANITARY COMMISSION [chap, iv
" He assumes that the mode of introduction into the
Army Medical Department is now perfect, instead of
being condemned by the first physicians and surgeons
in London.
" He proposes to reopen all the questions decided
by the Royal Coraraission, though the Report has been
affirmed, and commissions appointed to put its re
comraendations into practical shape.
" As to calling in Dr. Acland and a first-rate London
physician to decide on these questions, we should
have to begin by instructing them as to the nature
of the duties which ought to be performed by railitary
surgeons, and then to ask their opinion on a plan
which has already received the sanction of the late
and present Directors-General, Sir J. Clark, Sir R. D.
Martin, and Dr. Sutherland, and on which we consulted
Sir D. Bredin, Mr. Parker, and the exarainers for
the East India Company.
" It is impossible to have a higher or more dis
interested authority than that which we already
possess. The raerao. proposes, in fact, that the Royal
Coraraission shall go for nothing, and that the evidence
of the first raedical raen in London shall be set aside.
" You have before you the results of the labours
of the men whose names I have mentioned, and you
can seldom get results backed by such high authority.
You are Secretary of State, and it is you who must
judge whether you will adopt thera or not.
"I have in conjunction with ray raedical colleagues
bestowed much labour and time upon thera. I will
be no party to throwing thera over. AU I can say
is this: that I never would have had anything to do
with the new warrant increasing pay and proraotion
unless the raedical officers were to be raade corapetent
to discharge increased and higher duties. Without
this the warrant is an unnecessary extravagance.
"I ara satisfied of the urgency of the various
proposals raade. They may require some raodification
as to expense. I care little about that part of the
subject, and would give every assistance in my power
to meet the views of the Treasury in that respect
But the sanitary instruction raust be given, and the
hospital organisation raust be introduced, if the Army
is to be efficient.
" That is all I look to. I have given up a great

1856-59] THE MEDICAL COUNCIL 155
deal to it, and I shall do my utraost to carry the
measures through.
"It is absurd to appeal frora men who know the
subject to others who do not. I, at any rate, will
be no party to the proceeding. I return the memo.
" I can only again urgeyou to decide these questions,
and have soraething done before Parliament meets,
and I repeat my offer to endeavour, in conjunction
with the Director-General, to modify the plan so as
to enable you to coramence it on a teraporary footing
at Chatham. But I protest against all devices re
opening settled questions, and introducing unnecessary
delay." General Peel did that which in the circumstances he
could hardly help doing : he yielded.
But now the composition of the Medical Council
raised a fresh plea for inaction. Sidney Herbert
had proposed that the Council should consist of three
persons : the Director-General, a Sanitary and a
Statistical officer, each of whom was to direct his
own special branch of work, but who should advise
the Director-General, on whora the ultiraate responsi
bility rested. Sir Benjamin Hawes considered that
it was essential that there should also be a medical
member of the Board in addition to the Director-
General, and that he should have precedence over,
and higher pay than, his two colleagues, and such
being the case, he " feared " that the Treasury might
consider such an establishment too expensive to be
allowed. But Mr. Herbert would have none of this.
Mr. Herbert to Sir Benjamin Hawes.
"January <)th, 1859.
" My dear Sir Benjamin,
" I confess I am alarmed about the Medical Coun
cil. As regards expense I care little, provided you can
get the raen — i.e. capable and independent raen. I

156 THE SANITARY COMMISSION [chap, iv
originally did not wish to have a medical councillor
at all. The Director-General would, I thought, be
the representative of the purely medical element, and
be quite competent to advise himself thereon, and I
proposed only a Sanitary and a Statistical councillor.
I still think it might be so worked. The Director-
General would always have in his office a medical
subordinate to do the drudgery of his work ; but
the proposal of making the Medical councillor (who
would be the only one not head of a branch) the first
in rank is, I think, fatal.
" If one must be of a higher rank than the others,
it should be the Sanitary or the Statistical, though the
Sanitary has this superiority, that he could, in the
absence of the Director-General, more fitly represent
him. Two councillors, one sanitary, one statistical,
both of the same rank, and sufficient rank to secure
the best man in the profession, would cost no more
than your plan, and would be more efficient for our
object. I do not see that a medical councillor is
absolutely necessary, though he would raake the
thing more complete ; but to put the other two on
a lower footing would be most mischievous.
"You want to show to the Army and the medical
profession that at last we have come to the conclusion,
on which all great military commanders have been
agreed, that the science of prevention is better than
the science of cure :— your proposal reverses this. I
hold likewise to the quinquennial appointments, and,
above all, to the modes of transacting business, keeping
each to his own work, and avoiding as far as possible
the system in vogue at the War Office, where each
raan does somebody else's work as well as his own,
and time is consuraed through the multiplicity of hands
through which each matter passes.
" I want responsible action on the part of the
Director-General, and responsible advice from the
Council. It is the only form of administrative despotism
which has worked well whether in India or in England.
I think there is an error in your estimate of the cost
of the Director-General's office. I took Smith's office
as it was ; not as it showed on the estiraate for the
departraent. But it had raen in it paid under other
heads, which in a new office there ought not to be.
You ought to have none but very good men to assist

1856-59] LETTER TO SIR B. HAWES 157
the Director-General. The difference in the cost
of getting them is the difference between the pay of
an Inspector and a Deputy-Inspector. If you had had
a competent Sanitary Councillor in Smith's tirae, we
should have saved from ;^ 100,000 to ;£'2oo,ooo at Netley,
where we have twice as much building as we want,
with an enormous expense in adrainistration from
defective structure on a site which is disastrous.
" Our Coraraission is now doing much of the work
of a Sanitary Councillor. I asked Alexander to give
me some statistics about Aldershot ; on these may
depend an expenditure or a saving of a sum which
in the long run raust be counted in millions. He told
me, and with truth, that his office could not work
them out. He has no one capable of it in his present
establishment, nor are the raaterials in working order
for any one that can.
" It will end as penny wisdora generally does — in
found folly. Wherever I have been in our inspections,
have been struck by lavish expenditure in pounds,
and the niggardness in small coin.
" Pardon this long letter, but I am afraid of what
you are going to do, and I would sooner you delayed
altogether than start on the wrong principle, for you
cannot reconstruct an office once a week."
Sir B. Hawes replied, partly explaining away his
former letter, and in a measure, but only to a limited
extent, acquiescing in Mr. Herbert's views. He
rejoined :

''WiVTOti, January nth, 1859.
"My dear Sir Benjamin,
" We are clearly each writing in ignorance of
the plans of the other. I thought you were going to
make a Board, and, ray object being to avoid division
of responsibility, I object ; but, if I require undivided
responsibility, I raust give my autocrat every means
of coming to a right decision. Boards don't do that,
and have accordingly been swept away. We have
swept away the Government of India, and have now
substituted an autocrat with a council. The Governor-
General governs so — so also do the Governors of the

158 THE SANITARY COMMISSION [chap, iv
Presidencies ; but the responsibiliy is undivided,
because the Governor's autocracy is preserved. Now
as to ranks. I never objected to a medical Head in
the shape of the Director-General. What I say is that
the three subordinates (if three are necessary to your
plans) ought to be of equal rank. I object to any
superiority, and I particularly object to it where the
sanitary, which is the most iraportant, and the neglect
of which subject has cost thousands of raen in the last
war, in Bulgaria, before Sebastopol, at Balaclava, and
at Scutari, and is now so doing in India frora aU I
hear, is put on a lower rank than the other, or than
any one. I do not ask for a civil statistician. If you
could not get any one of the councillors frora the Army,
I would go to the civil professions without scruple,
but we can get them from the ranks of the Army
raedical profession.
" Balfour is quite as good a statistician as Bullock.
I must have made some great confusion in ray letter
if I implied otherwise : but without proper rank and
pay you won't get men from the Army who will carry
weight. I fear you greatly undervalue the qualities
required, and the difficulties of finding a good sanitary
opinion ; — you will find 50 good curative for one pre
ventive opinion. There are perhaps not three in
England. Please read the programme of the sanitary
lecture in our report on the medical school. It requires
a thorough knowledge of physical geography, geology,
chemistry, and almost every science in a practical
shape. It was the belief that uninstructed common
sense is sufficient that has destroyed our armies, and
makes them so costly now. I should be very glad if
you would read also (they are very short) the passages
in the Report of the Royal Coraraission on the sanitary
duties and on the constitution of the office of the
Director-General. I think you can get a fair sanitarian
frora the ranks of the Army, but the science is new,
and few have as yet adopted it ; you will get better
soon. There was a time when I thought on this
subject as you do, but since I have gone so deeply
into the raatter, I confess I have lorraed a very
different opinion. I am certain that unless every
encouragement is given to the study of sanitary /r^-
vention, we shall never be able to reduce the cost of
our Army, as it ought to be reduced, if it is to be

1856-59] MR. HERBERT'S MEMORANDUM 159
maintained on the scale which the state of India and
Europe requires. I have, however, said my say, and
the responsibility does not rest on me. The action
lies, and very properly, with others. My reason for
liking appointments limited as to time is that you
can then get rid of a raan who is not up to the mark,
but not so inefficient as to be dismissible. You also
get occasionally a new broom, which is an advantage,
and more raen pass through the office and leave it.
The Director-General is only appointed for a limited
time — you can always re-appoint a first-rate or
necessary man."
A month later the discussion still continued, and
on February i8th, 1859, Mr. Herbert summed up his
remarks on the War Office minutes as follows :
" I have read over these various rainutes with care,
and I have read again the proposed instructions frora
the Secretary to ascertain what words in thera could
have given rise to the interpretation put on their
raeaning. " One of the rainutes very properly observes that
the instructions are raeant as a sketch of how a
Council would work, and would necessarily have to
be greatly modified and generalised in practice.
"The evils which you have to guard against are those
from which the War Office Administration is supposed
to suffer, and which are with some exaggerative
smartness described by Mr. Russell in his description
of the working of the Indian Council at Calcutta,
which he would assimilate to another Council —
namely, the Cabinet Council in Downing Street.
" It appears to me necessary to lay down in the
draft instructions that each raan is to rainute his
own papers, and not those of his colleagues. One
of the rainutes oddly advances against the instructions
the charge that each of the three Councillors are to
minute the papers on the subjects belonging to other
than his own department. This is exactly what he
is not to do.
"The Secretary of State now works by raeanS of
a Council held every Saturday. I am told that rauch
writing and rauch difference of opinion have been
saved by this simple form of raeeting.

i6o THE SANITARY COMMISSION [chap, iv
" There is no such waste of time, temper, and
stationery as raen sitting on stools and writing at
one another through a partition.
" When an object is to be effected by joint and
simultaneous action, unless there be previous concert
viva voce, it will be days before an agreement is
arrived at.
" I therefore proposed a Director-General to be
made the immediate authority of the Secretary
of State, and three, with three subordinates, of
equal rank and pay. I make them equal because,
though the Sanitary is the most important, any
difference in position would be invidious.
" I say ' most important ' because prevention is more
important than cure. Prevention gives us soldiers.
Cure gives us pensioners.
" I propose that each, under the Director-General,
should do the routine of his own department, but
that in a case of any novelty, difficulty, or importance,
the Council — i.e. the Director-General and all three
colleagues — should be made acquainted with it, and
the Director-General decide what should be done.
" A number of cases must constantly arise when
the co-operation of all three branches will be necessary.
The Statistical branch will have detected an evil by
the returns, the Medical will have killed or cured
so many men, and the Sanitary are responsible, and
raust ascertain why the men were ever ill.
" I want this to be done, not by a lengthened
correspondence, nor an infinity of minutes, but by a
viva-voce discussion of the facts over the papers.
Thus you can hope for speedy, and at the same time
well-considered, results.
" As to expense, do it as cheaply as you can,
consistently with getting the best men. Whether
they be Inspectors or Deputy-Inspectors need really
make no difference in net cost. You have some
Inspectors in foreign stations who would be better at
home. Hard work and expense in this field require
youth and vigour ; office work at home requires ex
perience, judgment, and caution. As an illustration of
this, I would observe that we have an Inspector in the
East Indies whom the Commander-in-Chief, rightly or
wrongly, will not allow to join the Army. We have,
perhaps, too many Inspectorships abroad, and too few

1856-59] MOCK REPORT i6i
at horae. In sorae of our colonies a Deputyrlnspector
would do as well, or better, than an Inspector, and
the rank might be transferred to an appointment
at horae.
" But if they are all to be not additions to the
existing numbers, and not, as in ordinary tiraes one
would contemplate, men already possessing the rank
and appointed for a limited period to the office, it
would not at any rate, as is supposed in one of the
minutes, add to the number of promotions."
In the end Sidney Herbert succeeded in getting
his own way, but at the cost of much friction, delay,
and worry of the most wearying character. It is
easy to sympathise with the mood in which the
following sarcastic draft Report, as to the nature of
the existing Medical Board, and that by which it
was proposed to replace it, was penned :
Draft Report addressed to General Peel.
" Sir, " We have the honour to say :
" I. As to the Army Medical Board.
" It has nothing but administrative duties to
perform, not one of which it performs in
an adrainistrative manner.
"2. As to general hospitals.
"They do no one thing efficiently but put the
sick to death.
" 3. As to sanitary duties of Medical Department.
" It waits till the raen are dead before it takes
their health in hand.
" We propose in future :
" I. To give the Array Medical Departraent sorae
thing to do, and leave it to you to raake it do it.
" 2. To give the sick, who are unfortunate enough
to find theraselves in general hospitals, a fair chance
of escaping alive therefrora.
" 3. Not to inquire why the men died, after they
are dead."
Sidney Herbert's position during 1858 and the first
half of 1859 was a very singular and probably an
vol. il II

i62 THE SANITARY COMMISSION [chap, iv
unprecedented one. Not in office himself, and, indeed,
an avowed raember of the Opposition, he virtually
relieved the War Office by perforraing sorae of its
most iraportant duties. For it will be reraembered
that the Sub-Coramissions of which he was Chairraan
had power not only to make recommendations, but
to carry them at once into execution if their cost did
not exceed certain limits.
The preceding pages substantially set forth the
recomraendations raade by the third and fourth of
these Sub-Comraissions. The other two had raean-
while not been idle. That on barracks and hospitals
diligently visited and reported on those institutions.
It was speedily discovered that the amount of money
placed at its disposal, to effect urgent and necessary
alterations, was altogether insufficient ; and with rauch
trouble sorae augraentation of the sura was secured.
Of this Sub-Coramission Mr. 'Herbert was the head.
Its Reports were in raost cases written by him, and
those which were not so were subjected to his careful
revision. The proof sheets of the draft Reports are
covered with emendations in his handwriting, and the
Reports theraselves are of the most thorough and de
tailed character. Every barrack visited was found to
have its rooms overcrowded in a greater or less degree.
In many they were low, cold, dark, and unsuitable.
In none was there rational or sufficient ventilation.
Few barracks had a bath, and the ablution-rooms were
usually narrow and inadequate. All sanitary arrange
raents were of the raost defective character. In the
cavalry barracks the dorraitories were in raost cases
imraediately over the stables. At Northarapton, by
a singularly unfortunate atterapt at ventilation, the
foul air frora the lower storey was conducted into the
rooras above, while that of the upper rooras was

1856-59] REPORTS ON BARRACKS 163
drawn down and discharged into the sleeping-rooras
on the ground floor. Day-rooras and recreation-
rooms were all but non-existent. Libraries were
few and far between.
At Dover and at Plymouth the casemates were used
as barrack-rooms, or married quarters, overcrowded
with women and children. Such an arrangeraent,
Mr. Herbert wrote, " might, during a siege, tend to
preserve life; at other tiraes it has an opposite
tendency." The first Report on the London barracks was sent
in on May iSth, 1858, and the last which bears Sidney
Herbert's signature — that on the Cavalry Barracks at
Chichester — is dated March 23rd, 1859.
After Mr. Herbert becarae Secretary of State, this
Sub-Comraission continued to pursue its useful labours
without his direct aid, but the Commissioners had
the satisfaction of knowing that their Reports were
addressed to a Chief thoroughly in sympathy with
them, and by whora their recommendations would
be listened to with a desire to execute and not to
thwart them.
The Statistical Sub-Commission had nearly cora
pleted its useful work before the fall of Lord Derby's
Governraent, and little raore remained for Mr. Herbert,
when he carae into office, than to give his forraal
sanction to its recoraraendations — that is to say, his
own. The difficulties which Mr. Herbert, however,
encountered in getting his plans executed, even
when possessing all the powers of the Secretary of
State, will be dealt with in another chapter.

CHAPTER -V
FALL OF LORD DERBY
1859
AT the beginning of 1859 Lord John RusseU,
restless as usual, was full of plans for over
throwing Lord Derby's Government, and hiraself
replacing it. In these schemes he sought the aid of
Sidney Herbert, but his overtures, though kindly
met, did not elicit any very hearty response from
either Mr. Herbert or his intimate associates. Sir
Jaraes Grahara, writing on January 9th, after raaking
a proposal to visit Wilton, says :
" Lord John Russell, I daresay, has made to you
an offer of another kind. He has intimated to me
a desire that you, Lewis, and I should form a little
coterie around hira for the purpose of concert on
questions of Reform and of Finance. He excludes
questions of Foreign Policy, because he knows how
much I differ frora him with respect to the invasion
of Italy by France and Piedmont under the mask
of liberty. But in civil terms I have declined any
such compact. I told hira, with truth, that I had
no desire for new corabinations, that ' I have had
my hour,' and that the time for my departure is
drawing nigh. I added that I was on the kindest
terms with you, and that I regarded Lewis always
as a friend ; but that Lewis by natural affinities was
bound to Clarendon and Palmerston, and that you,
though perfectly free, could not be regarded as an
164

i859] LORD J. RUSSELL'S OVERTURES 165
ardent reformer. At the sarae time I assured Lord
John that I was always ready to communicate with
him frankly and confidentially on public affairs.'
"ffC flF TF W V
I am raost anxious to remain unfettered by any
private engagements, and to be free to act as sense
of duty and of public safety may prorapt in a
critical eraergency. This resolution by no raeans
precludes the most free and constant coraraunica
tion with friends whora I love and trust like you
and Lord Aberdeen. Indeed, I wish to correct
my opinions in difficult circumstances by the light
of others, but I am afraid of arabitious intrigues
and of dangerous steps in clarabering to power,
or in clinging to office, on the part of^ rival
Premiers. But we will adjourn further discussion
till we raeet."

Sidney Herbert replied on the following day :
"Wilton House, Salisbury,
"January loth, 1859.
"My dear Graham,
" I have been anxiously waiting for news of the
date of the coramencement of the Session, to write and
reraind you of your promise, and I am delighted that
you have so honestly recollected it. Pray come on
the 27th. You will all be right welcorae. I shall be
very glad, too, to talk over the black future before we
have to grapple with it.
"I am very much pleased at the answer you have
given Lord John. He and the Whigs are incurable
in their superstitions about ducal houses. I see no
prospect of the formation of an efficient party, let
alone Governraent, out of the chaos on the Oppo
sition benches. No one reigns over or in it, but
discord and antipathy. The aristocratic Whigs seera
to be nearly used up, and the party produces no
new raen, but at the sarae tirae coraplains of the
old ones. Middle-aged raerchants, shrewd raen of
business, feel their vanity hurt that they have not
the refusal of office, which the absorbing love of
' The body of this letter will be found in Mr. Parker's forthcoming
Life of Sir James Graham.

i66 FALL OF LORD DERBY [chap, v
their own pursuits prevents them from accepting, and
for which they have not had the leisure to qualify
theraselves. "If Lewis spoke his raind at Hereford, he is against
all Reform. It is very difficult to find any one very
keen for it, the tide of discussion of late having set
strongly against it. I was surprised to find even Dr.
Chapman, of The Westminster Review, against any large
extension of the suffrage.
" On the whole I still incline to think that the country
and Parliaraent will prefer to keep this Government
to trying a new one, be the chief who he may.
" If Louis Napoleon attacks Austria, the reputation
of the Emperor Nicholas will be avenged. It will be,
unless some very new and different cause of quarrel
arises, a flagitious crime. Has Derby the go in him
to say ' you shan't ' ? Our foreign seals are not in
strong or even in prudent hands, and I am afraid
Louis Napoleon knows that better than most people.
I like our projects, whether abroad or at home,
very little indeed.
" We shall look for you on the 27th, unless Parha
ment should meet earlier, in which case you must
corae earlier."

This elicited another letter frora Sir James Graham,
written on the 17th :
" I have not heard much frora any one since I last
wrote to you. I expect EUice here to-day, and I shall
then have enough and to spare. But we have only
dark visions in this twilight which precedes the dawn.
Lord Aberdeen writes in bad spirits, and apprehends
a war in Italy as alraost inevitable. This Piedraontese
raarriage is an evil omen. The unhappy female des
cendants of Maria Theresa never enter France in
bridal array without war and bloodshed and sorrow
in their train.
" What is Gladstone about ? I never hear from him.
He knows how entirely I dissented from the policy
of his mission ; and I particularly dwelt on the
awkwardness of his position towards Young, if it were
intended that he should be the instrument of dis
placing an old friend and colleague. Is this really

i859] GLADSTONE'S MISSION TO CORFU 167
to be the result ? and can he accept the office in the
Ionian Islands without vacating his seat in Parliament ?
' Hie finis Priami fatorum ? hie cxitus ilium. Sorte
iulit?' " It is sad that it should be thought possible ; sadder
still if the event should realise the fear. An early
attack will be opened on this ground, and I know not
what the most attached friends can urge in defence
of this strange proceeding. Lord Aberdeen dislikes
the subject, and will not write upon it ; but silence
will be difficult when Parliaraent raeets.
" ' Noisy John ' ^ is to open his Reforra Bill in detail
at Bradford this evening. He thus gives to his
opponents every advantage. He is very rash, if he
really desires to carry his measure ; he is very dis
honest if, not intending to carry it, he hiraseu takes
the surest raeans of rendering it abortive."

Sidney Herbert's answer was as follows :
" Savanake Forest,
"January i()th, 1859.
"My DEAR Graham,
" I have just received your letter, and rejoiced
to hear that you are true to the 27th.
" I cannot say how much I ara annoyed about
Gladstone. His appointraent without salary went
out to hira, I believe, last Friday ; but I doubt very
rauch whether the absence of salary can affect the
tenure of his seat. It will be very awkward for
him to have to be re-elected. His course is unin
telligible. He writes to Hayward that he sees no
prospect of doing any good ; that it is now only
for England a question of character, in which the
balance is not now on the right side, and he praises
John Young's adrainistration as deserving of^ rauch
credit ! Then Young writes that he has no in
tention of resigning, but supposes he shall be re
called, ' as Gladstone has recommended it ! ' What
an infernal position he has placed himself in ! He
really is not safe to go about out of Lord Aberdeen's
' Bright,

i68 FALL OF LORD DERBY [chap, v
roora. It is heart-breaking to see him throwing so
much away.
" Lord Henry Lennox is quoted to me for these
things — all not unHkely :
" (i)That the Government will bring in the Reform
Bill early.
" (2) That it will be of rather a liberal character.
" (3) That they apprehend no danger from this, as
their supporters will swaUow anything."

Mr. Herbert to Sir James Graham.
"49, Belgrave Square,
"February itth, 1859.
" My dear Graham,
" I agree with you that this letter' indicates a
very unpleasant state of raind. It looks like the
irritation of conscious failure. Unfortunately, as far
as one can judge frora a perusal of the speech to the
Parliaraent,* failure in carrying the reforras will be
the best terraination, for if they be carried it seeras to
me that the Government of the Ionian Islands will be
at once at a deadlock.
"I do not see that England is bound in honour
to give to the lonians an exact counterpart of
EngHsh institutions ; on the contrary, the further
we go in that direction, the more inapplicable to
the Ionian character, and consequently the more
noxious, those institutions will become. It is a
very bad business."

Mr. Herbert to Mr. Gladstone.
"49, Belgrave Square,
"February 19/A, 1859.
" My dear Gladstone,
" Graham tells rae he has written to you, so you
probably know all the last phases of pohtics here.
The Navy Estimates, announced by Pakington, with
one of his loudest flourishes, as a 'reconstruction'
•From Mr. Gladstone. ^i.e. the Ionian Parliament.

i859] LETTER TO MR. GLADSTONE 169
of the Navy, come on on Friday next, the 21st. The
phrase gave rise to rauch expectation here, and some
alarm abroad, and was certainly ill-chosen. Now,
people having seen the Estimates (;£' 1,000,000 increase)
are positively disappointed, and want more^^^
"But before we get into the Navy Estimates,
Palmerston, in concert with Lord John, is to raise
a discussion on the Italian question. I see nothing
but mischief in the proceeding. Their Italian speeches
will act as an encouragement to Louis Napoleon in
his aggressive designs, and a spark will now set
the train on fire. I do not rayself see how peace
is now possible, but I hoped that England and
English statesraen would in no way share the re
sponsibility of the French designs. Europe is passing
frora a state of terror to one of wrath, and I suppose
we shall have some years of blood and waste and
crime, of which, before it is ended, we shall have
our share.
" I do not think you ought to delay your going
home ; there is a storm brewing, but it awaits
your return, when I have no doubt a motion will
be made impugning your mission. If the Ionian
Parliaraent accepts your reforms, the motion will be
a serious affair. If you fail, so will the motion here,
I think. " Poor Thesiger has got into a dreadful mess in
appointing his son-in-law (little Higgins) a Master
in Lunacy. At the eleventh hour, and after being
installed, he was obliged to resign.
" Seymour Fitzgerald answered one or two awkward
questions connected with his departraent reraarkably
hardily yesterday, including Malraesbury's letter on
the Navigation Laws.
"The House is raore dead than I ever saw it, but
there is stormy weather ahead, and the Reform Bill
on the 28th will effect great changes in the aspect
of parties in the House."

On the raeeting of Parliament, the Governraent
produced a Reforra Bill. Its chief principle was
the establishraent of one uniform franchise quali
fication, and one of its prominent features was the

170 FALL OF LORD DERBY [chap, v
abolition of the votes of the forty-shilling free
holders in counties. This latter provision was
imraediately denounced as a " retrograde " step, and
Lord John Russell began to concert measures for the
introduction of a Resolution condemning it, and assert
ing the desirability of a further extension of the
franchise. After a conversation with Lord John, Mr.
Herbert, at his request, drafted a Resolution to this
effect, and sent it to him with the following letter.
Lord John's motive in requesting Mr. Herbert to
draft the Resolution had been that he was known
to be by no means enthusiastic in the cause of
Parliamentary Reforra, and it was supposed that
what he was willing to adopt would probably be
accepted without difficulty by other men of moderate
opinions. Mr. Herbert to Lord John Russell.
" My dear Lord John Russell,
" I enclose a draft Resolution comprising the
same objects which are set forth in the one you
showed rae to-day, but altering the wording of the
latter portion of it. In the first part I only propose
to substitute the word ' hitherto ' for the word ' now,'
as it implies long existing rights on the part of the
forty-shilling freeholders. This I think you will not
object to. I would suggest also that better words
could be found than ' interfere with ' the freehold
franchise. " I have discussed the matter with Graham, who
agrees with me that it is desirable to exclude from
the wording of the Resolution any phrase which has
become the catchword of any particular section of
reformers, and would give rise to apprehension as
iraplying an intention to adopt any particular and
extreme franchise.
" The term ' industrious classes ' is not a good one,
for the artisan class is not more industrious than

i859] LETTER TO LORD J. RUSSELL 171
other classes, but it has been used to designate those
masses who, if admitted wholesale to the franchise,
would, it is held, swamp by their superior numbers
all other classes put together, and points to a measure
larger, I think, than is contemplated by any one who
wishes to preserve something like the present balance
of interests.
" For the sarae reason, after discussion, we omitted
the word 'householders,' which suggested itself as
an alternative expression, but which would be thought
to point to ' household suffrage.' So much for the
wording of the Resolution.
"As regards the measure to be carried, I shall be
quite content to take the borough franchise proposed
in the BUl of 1854; but I must add that I attach far
more importance to length of residence and payment
of rates tnan to any amount of value, as being a better
test of habitual industry, sobriety, and respectability
than any other.
"As regards the counties, I do not know whether
it is possible, after the Government proposal, to re
cede from the ;^io; but there were indications in
the debate on Mr. Locke King's Bill last year, that
the House of Comraons would have been better
pleased with a higher franchise — the precise amount
was not then fixed, as the Bill never went into
Committee. I ara an advocate for maintaining a
marked difference between the county and borough
franchise. " There ought to be disfranchisement of pure nomina
tion boroughs, and I should myself like, with a view
to permanent settleraent, to see a soraewhat larger
disfranchiseraent than that contemplated by the
Government Bill; but every additional borough
disfranchised creates a fresh difficulty in redistribution.
The selection, too, is very difficult, for population
affords no real test of nomination or independence.
This, too, is certain, that every additional borough
disfranchised diminishes the chance of passing the
Bill. A Bill, however, without any disfranchisement
would invite and justify immediate agitation for a
further measure. It is therefore wise, as it seems to
rae, to restrict any future proposal on this head to the
liraits, or nearly to the liraits, of the Governraent Bill.
"We know much more of the temper of the country

172 FALL OF LORD DERBY [chap, v
on this subject, and we know much more of the
subject itself now than we did in 1854. I might add,
more than we did a fortnight ago. There is little
enthusiasm, but rauch alarra, raore, perhaps, than is
justifiable, nor will it be allayed even by the franchise
I have mentioned ; but without some such extension
we cannot reckon on effecting, I do not say a final,
but a durable, settleraent.
" I ara satisfied that the House of Comraons is^
for the raost part, too deeply impressed with the
iraraense importance of the subject to allow any party
considerations to have much influence on their de
cision, and they will not deal sumraarily with the
Government Bill, bad and dangerous as it is in
principle, unless they see clearly the prospect of
obtaining a sound and prudent measure in its place,
frora whatever quarter it may proceed. I entirely
share this feeling. It becomes, however, the more
important that the Resolution to be raoved by you
should be so worded as to give rise to no raisappre-
hension which raay raise false hopes or excite fears
which would be fatal to its success.
" Pray pardon this long letter, which is the
fruit of the anxiety with which I regard the whole
subject." In the closing sentence of the proposed Resolution,
Mr. Herbert had written that no settleraent of the
question would be " satisfactory or permanent " which
did not include some extension of suffrage. Lord
John, before reading the accompanying letter, had
no sooner glanced at the Resolution itself than he at
once wrote to make the odd objection that the words
"no arrangeraent can be final or satisfactory" had
forraed part of the famous Irish Appropriation Resolu
tions, the withdrawal of which had not been a glorious
incident in his career, and observed that " a burnt
child dreads the fire." In short, the words being
connected with one discomfiture, he seems to have
had a half-superstitious fear that a repetition of their
use raight forebode another.

i859] RESOLUTIONS ON REFORM 173
Mr. Herbert, of course, coraplied with Lord John's
request for an alteration in the language of his draft,
but confessed that, though he " had tried it different
ways, he was fairly beat," and that though he sent
a new sketch as desired, he owned that he "liked
the one you have already got best," adding the very
natural reraark that there was " so wide a difference
in the two subjects of Parliamentary Reforra and
Irish emoluraents," that he " should not raind the
similarity of phrase with the Appropriation Clauses.
The extension of the suffrage is sure to be carried
in some shape and to some extent."
Lord John, of course, had his way, and altered the
terms of the Resolution, which he divided into two :
one to the effect that no settlement without extended
franchise would " satisfy the House of Comraons or
the country," and a second condemning the with
drawal of the rights long enjoyed by forty-shilling
freeholders. When, on March 21st, the second reading
of the Governraent Reforra Bill was moved. Lord John
proposed his Resolutions as an amendment.
The debate on these Resolutions was reraarkable.
Mr. Gladstone spoke in favour of rotten boroughs,
and Mr. Disraeli made use of language which called
forth the indignant denunciation of Sir James Graham.
He had been ill, and wrote :
" I am better this morning, and hope to call on
you in an hour or two. Light does not dawn on rae
after this wintry night of darkness which raay be felt.
It is too impudent to laugh and to raake fools of us
from the Treasury Bench by alternate declarations of
tame subserviency and of high honour. We used to
boast that we were .a body of English gentlemen.
There was a day when conduct of this kind would
have been scouted as intolerable with unanimous
scorn ; but the House of Coraraons had never then
consented to be led by a Jew Adventurer."

174 FALL OF LORD DERBY [chap, v
Araong the best speeches raade — it was said by good
authorities to be the only striking one raade on the
side of the Opposition during the first two nights
of the debate — was Mr. Herbert's.
Much of his speech consisted of references to inci
dents in the debate, and retorts on previous speakers,
which, though highly effective at the time, have now
lost their point and interest ; but he stated in clear
terms his own views as to the moderate and con
servative reform he desired to see effected. Court
eously, but firmly, he repudiated all association with
Bright and Cobden. He was, he declared, no demo
cratic reformer, he had no sympathy with the senti
ments expressed by them, and as little for the Bill
introduced by the Government.
" I occupy a raiddle position, a position which I
believe is occupied by the great raass of the country
who are attached to our ancient institutions, who look
upon thera as sacred traditions handed down to them
from their ancestors, and which it is their duty to
maintain inviolate. Enlarge them if you like, iraprove
them if you can, but still keep thera unimpaired in
their vitality. Such would be my policy, and, enter
taining those opinions, I cannot refrain from speaking
them frankly, notwithstanding that their expression
may give to sorae gentlemen temporary offence.
Does, then, this Bill, with its principle of uniformity,
meet the requirements which I have specified ? For
ray own part, I raust confess that, looking beyond
the morrow and into the future, I regard it with the
greatest alarm. It sacrifices everything to uniformity,
a principle which is unknown to our constitution."
He saw great danger in the Bill — uniformity of
franchise, which was its only principle, was novel and
alien to our ideas and traditions. Ancient ways might
be improved ; but to get upon a wrong track was
another matter. There were several courses which
might be followed.

1859] SPEECH ON REFORM 175
" One of them is to vote against its second reading
if you dislike the principle of this Bill. Another is,
if it be not the principle but the details to which
you object, then go into Comraittee and discuss its
provisions there. A third is not to vote against the
second reading, but to vote for this Resolution. If
you vote against the second reading you throw out
the Bill conturaeliously, and do not even specify to
the country what you object to and what you approve.
If you want to turn out the Government, then vote
against the second reading. That is intelligible and
according to precedent. Precedent is a great thing
in these matters, and I ought, perhaps, to apologise
for not taking notice of this argument. Yet this
species of Parliamentary red-tapisra really does not
require rauch reasoning to dispose of it. I see a bad
Bin before me. I want to get rid of it, and I think
the weapon that comes to my hand is about the best
I can use for the purpose. I wish to destroy this
Bill, and to get another in its place founded on a
different principle, and I should like the Government,
if they could be induced to do it, to bring it in."
He ridiculed the idea, much pressed by supporters
of the Bill, that it could be substantially recast in
Committee, and showed the absurdity of attempting
in that raanner to construct a rational and consistent
measure. " Why, when a Cabinet of 15 or 16 raerabers want
to construct a Reform Bill they find themselves too
many for so delicate and difficult a task. They there
fore appoint a Comraittee of three or four out of
their nuraber to frarae a raeasure for thera, and then
the Cabinet discuss it." What he desired was "not
a Bill fraraed — as Lord Stanley had told them this Bill
was fraraed — to pass : he wanted a Bill that would
last." In a remarkable passage he predicted — in which,
however, he had been anticipated by Lord Stanley —
the decline of party influence in the House, and marked
the growing influence of groups and individuals.

176 FALL OF LORD DERBY [chap, v
" I wish the House to listen for a short time while
I ask this question. We are a mixed body in this
House, to an extent that I never knew before. The
noble Lord, the Secretary for India, says that the
Government is in a minority, party government is a
thing of the past, the House is divided into sections,
and Ministries must for the future depend not upon
the organised raachinery of party, but upon the
raeasures which they raay submit ; if good, he adds,
those raeasures will be carried ; if bad, they will fail ;
but all raust be tentative, and all that Ministries can
henceforth rely upon is a clear insight into the wishes
of the people, and of the House which represents the
people. Now, I confess I have corae to very much
the same conclusion myself, I believe the old system
of party government to be pretty well at an end.
The change of policy which it will entail will be a
very difficult one. It will require in the Minister who
is Leader in this House, all the tact, all the ability
which I am bound to say the right hon. gentleraan
the Chancellor of the Exchequer displays in the
leadership of the House. But the phase through
which we shall have to pass will be a very difficult
and a very dangerous one, and Governraents will be
unwise who refuse to listen to the voice of large
numbers in this House, bound together by no party
ties, who try to lead them in the direction in which
they believe that the safety of the country hes.
" I say your principle is new to this House, new
to the country, and new to the Governraent theraselves.
They cannot have any great affection for a scheme
which has been familiar to their minds but for a few
weeks. They have not hit the public wishes, nor the
wishes of this House. I ask them again, therefore, to
look upon this Resolution as an indication of what it is
that this House objects to, and what it is that it wants.
When you speak of the two sections of a great assembly
like this, tnere must, no doubt, be raany raen on
both sides occupied with party objects, and aniraated
by party spirit ; but the great raajority of this House,
I am persuaded, think it of far more importance than
any change of Ministry that the country should be
satisfied. I am not one of those who attach so rauch
importance as many do to the formation of particular
Governraents or to changes of Government. I have

i859] PARLIAMENT DISSOLVED 177
seen many changes of Government, and small change
in the conduct of public affairs. But of this I am
certain, that even if you impose on us a change of
Ministry, very inconvenient and much to be deprecated
as that raay be, we have a stronger attachraent to the
constitution of the country than to allow personal
feelings, and considerations of convenience, to in
fluence us in the settleraent of a grave question like
this. Sorae years hence what raan will ask, ' Who
was Prime Minister in 1859?'"
The debate was continued with great spirit till
April ist, on which night Lord John's Resolution was
carried by a majority of 39, and the Government
resolved on an immediate dissolution. So far as his
own seat was concerned, Mr. Herbert was able to
anticipate the result with confidence.
" I suppose," he wrote on the loth to Mr. Gladstone,
" you will in a day or two be the ' last man.'
" Tuesday's foreign policy debate will probably
conclude the Session for all who have or fear contests,
so I trust to you to let me know of anything eventful
which may occur. This suggestion arises frora the
fact that I was informed after church that rumours
had come down by the wire that war had actually
commenced, etc., etc., etc.
" All seems quiet in this county. The only fear is
the return of Danby Seymour frora Cuba, who will
find himself ejected from Poole, and is restless and
wrong-headed enough to try and get a beating in the
county, which he certainly would do if he tries it ; but
the attempt would, of course, involve rae in all the
trouble and expense which I wish to save rayself
"Dizzy's quibblings about the date of dissolution
are very disgraceful. No possible public reasons can
justify delay. Every possible public reason must be
on the side of celerity. But the rogue is capable of
anything for a party or personal object."
The fears of a contest in Wiltshire, here expressed,
proved groundless, and Sidney Herbert's return was
unopposed. It was destined to be his last election.
VOL. IL 12

178 FALL OF LORD DERBY [chap, v
But the interest of party squabbles at home paled
before that of the impending war between France and
Austria. Mr. Gladstone wrote (April 12th):
"You are quite right about Disraeli's quibbles on
Friday. Graham and I continually had to observe
to one another on the lengthening catalogue of his
fibs, and we thought, as we looked over the shoulder,
that we could see Walpole and Henley doing much
the sarae. All is in suspense about foreign affairs.
For the raoraent the turn of the scale is towards peace,
but I suppose it has now become almost beyond hope.
Lord Aberdeen, as you know, has stuck to his text
throughout, and always anticipated war. The foreign
debate is to be on Friday, and one must still suppose
that the Government expect that before that time the
matter will have been decided ; if decided then, it
must be the wrong way."
And a few days later (April 23rd), he writes :
"War seems to be all but a fact now. Horrible as
it is, and while fears predominate, I am not without
hopes from it. I trust we have blown up the plan
betrayed by Disraeli's observations on Trieste. Is
not Graham's speech at Carlisle superlative ? I ara
rather sorry to add, however, that it is so in more
senses than one. However, it is not so bad about
ballot as it was first reported in epitome."
Whatever opinion may be entertained as to the
causes and results of the Italian War of 1859, there
can be, but one as to the unscrupulous perfidy of the
French and Italian Governments.
We know now that war with Austria was a foregone
conclusion, and that when the Emperor Louis Napoleon
succeeded in completely hoodwinking Lord Cowley,
and in deluding half Europe into a beHef that he
earnestly desired peace, the treaties which bound
France to aid Sardinia, and Sardinia to give up Savoy,
Nice, and Mentone to France, were actually signed
and sealed ; but this, of course, was unknown at

i859] PARLIAMENT DISSOLVED 179
the time. In January, 1859, few believed that the
Emperor Louis Napoleon's "rash" speech to Baron
HObner, (in point of fact a coolly calculated one) would
be followed by grave results. Rather later, no doubt,
serious uneasiness prevailed, but some faith was
still given to the Emperor's disclaimers of any war
like intention, and it was thought that though he
might have gone dangerously near the brink of war,
he would, when the decisive moment carae, throw
over his Sardinian friends. Nor is it at all impossible
that he raight have done so, had he not put hiraself
so completely into the power of Count Cavour, and
known that the menace of the latter to publish to
the world full evidence of the engagements into which
he had entered was no idle threat, but would certainly
be carried into effect without the slightest mercy or
compunction. By the middle of March, war was
recognised as inevitable, and at the end of April it
was declared.
The position of affairs in Italy had an iraportant
influence on the working of party politics at home.
During 1858, Mr. Gladstone had, step by step, drawn
nearer to Lord Derby's Government. He had accepted
from it a mission to Corfu, and was in that island at
the beginning of 1859. He had no wish for a fresh
measure of Parliaraentary Reform, and he abhorred
the system of election by ballot, which a few years
later became law on his proposal. But he had a pro
found antipathy to Austria and the Austrians, and an
equally profound sympathy with Italian aspirations
for unity and freedom ; and as the Conservative
Ministry was strongly prejudiced against the Italian
cause, and the Liberal leaders as strongly in its
favour, this powerful attraction produced a great
change in the attitude, and even in the opinions, of Mr.

i8o FALL OF LORD DERBY [chap, v
Gladstone. Parliaraentary Reform, when accompanied
by a sympathetic attitude towards Sardinia, seemed
to him a far raore tolerable thing than it had appeared
to be shortly before.
In Hke raanner. Lord Palmerston, who, since his
expulsion from office in 1858, had shown no great
cordiality towards Lord John Russell, and had been
suspected of more or less friendly approaches to Lord
Derby, hastened to lay aside his known aversion to
Parliamentary Reforra, and declared hiraself in entire
agreement with Lord John on that point — a declaration,
however, which deceived nobody. The desire on the
part of Lord Palmerston to replace the existing
Government by one raore in harmony with his own
views on the Italian question was only natural, and
might have been anticipated ; but as it had hitherto
been assumed that if not animated by hostility to
Lord John, he at least felt coldly towards him, this
declaration made no slight difference in the position
of the latter, and introduced a fresh and perplexing
element into the impending scramble for power. In
writing to Mr. Herbert on March loth. Sir James
Graham mentions that he had met Lord Palmerston
at a ball at the Palace, and adds :
"He held out his hand, and we conversed freely.
The new complication is inextricable, it cannot be
unravelled ; cutting is^ the sharpest and raost ready
process, but not always the safest. The ' imraortal
truth ' of time and opportunity must not be dis
regarded." Parliament was dissolved on April 22nd ; the General
Election followed immediately, and at its close it
appeared that the Governraent had gained about
thirty seats, but that it was still in a minority, though
a minority so small as to make it doubtful whether

i859] THE NEW PARLIAMENT

I8I

the Opposition, split up as it was into factions divided
by mutual jealousies and animosities, would be able
to replace Lord Derby's Governraent by a new one,
if it succeeded in ejecting hira from office. It was
difficult to suppose that Lord Palmerston and Lord
John Russell could be sincerely reconciled, or that Lord
John would long consent to play a subordinate part
in a Cabinet formed and headed by another man.
Still raore incredible did it appear that Mr. Gladstone,
who for the past three or four years had constantly,
in season and out of season, assailed Lord Palmerston
with a vigour approaching to violence, and at the
General Election in 1857 had dilated on his iniquities
in almost every town and village in Flintshire, should
consent to take office under a man whom he had
denounced as the raost profligate and raischievous
Minister of the nineteenth century.
The history of the negotiations which preceded the
overthrow of Lord Derby's Cabinet, and the share
taken in them by Mr. Herbert, are so fully set forth
in the following correspondence that it seeras to rae
better to let the actors themselves speak, than to give
in my own words a suraraary of their letters :
Lord John Russell to Mr. Herbert.
"Pembroke Lodge, May idth, 1859.
" There has been much talk lately in London of an
amendment [on the Address], and I have now re
ceived, through George Lewis, a coraraunication frora
Palmerston on the subject.
"As I understand, he thinks an amendment raight
be based on the four following topics, the last of
which only he approves :
" I. Censure of the dissolution — inexpedient.
" 2. Foreign affairs — inexpedient.
" 3. Pledge for iraraediate Reforra — inexpedient.

1 82 FALL OF LORD DERBY [chap, v
" 4. Vote of want of confidence, either as an araend
raent to the Address or as a separate raotion.
This he thinks the right course to take.
" I entirely concur in this view, and think Peel's
araendraent to the Address in 1841, moved by S.
Wortley, the best precedent to follow.
" I told G. Lewis that I would consult you, and
ask you to coraraunicate with Gladstone. I don't
know how far Gladstone is willing or averse to a
direct motion of want of confidence, but he raust
see that the foreign policy of the present Governraent,
intended to abet Austria, but ' letting I dare not wait
upon I would,' is raost dangerous to our position,
and to the peace of Europe. France will not forget
it if the Emperor has any success, and Lord Derby
remains in power.
" Many Liberals of cool heads and cautious tempers
say they cannot approve of an araendraent unless
the Liberal chiefs are agreed as to what is to follow.
" For ray part, I should like to see Grahara, you,
Gladstone, and Milner Gibson merabers of any new
Cabinet. If that could be accoraplished, I should
not be difficult about the post, or no post, that I
was to take. Perhaps, however, this is too much
to say. I shall be quite content to stay out of office ;
but if I ara to hold any office, it raust be at least
equal to that which I held under Lord Melbourne and
Lord Aberdeen. Reform must, of course, be a matter
of clear understanding as to the principles of any new
raeasure."

Mr. Herbert to Lord John Russell.
"May 17 th, 1859.
"There will obviously be great difficulties in the
new Parliament. The Government will rauster 300
men at least, who will run together like a pack of
hounds ; add to these some half-dozen Irish Roman
Catholics, who will always be glad tp support them
on a pinch, a few extreme Radicals, who will support
them on the ground that they will yield more to
extreme deraands than any one else, and a few crotch
ety Liberals, who will vote as they did the other day
upon your Resolution. This brings members nearly

1859] LETTER TO LORD J. RUSSELL 183
to a tie, and at any rate does not constitute a very
encouraging prospect on which to form a Government
if a vote of censure be carried. We could not have
carried such a vote in the last Parliament, when the
Liberal majority was much larger, but it is true that
the position of the Government was then different,
and there was a kind of tacit understanding that the
Parliament, which had tolerated the formation of a
Government by a minority, was also to tolerate its
continuance. " Since that, the Government has set up for itself,
has spurned the understanding, and defied the Liberal
party. An acquiescence in their continued exercise of
fower would be an avowal of helpless disunion, which
should be sorry to see, unless there be hopeless dis
union, in which case, the sooner it is plainly avowed
the better, with a view, in default of a good Govern
ment, to contribute as good an Opposition as we can,
to direct and control a bad Governraent.
" But if there be a good prospect of a fair co
operation araong the Liberal party, the present Govern
raent ought to be put an end to. Their system of
government is eating away all political morality, and
destroying all confidence in public men. Jews let in
by men who think this very raeasure destructive to
Christianity, and Reform Bills brought in by men who
think no reforra necessary and any reforra hurtful !
But I agree with the ' Liberals of cool heads and
cautious terapers,' that on this subject of Reform there
should be a clear understanding before the move is
made. I fear that there will be more difficulty in
coming to an agreement on this subject in this Parlia
ment than in the last, and more difficulty in carrying
a Bill. Mr. Disraeli and his friends will no doubt
contrive to add their weight to some embarrassing
araendraent raoved by sorae man of extreme opinions.
Still, with the prospect of an early post-Reforra disso
lution, I think it could be done, if^ we have the first
condition of a real wish on the part of the raass of the
Liberal party to unite for the practical carrying on
of affairs. As regards foreign affairs, there was a
time when the Government could have used strong
language against whoever should break the public
peace, but now that it is broken there must be an
honest neutrality. I agree with you that the late

184 FALL OF LORD DERBY [chap, v
antecedents of the Government make it alraost
impossible that their neutrality should be so looked
upon. " It appears, therefore, to me that the conditions
necessary to a successful raove are :
"ist. The establishment of an union araong the
mass of the Liberal party.
"2nd. A clear understanding as to Reform — i.e. as
to the borough franchise.
" 3rd. A certainty that the proposed motion can be
carried. "What you say of your own position is most
honourable to yourself, but your absence would be
fatal to the constitution of a new Governraent. The
raatter, however, is too delicate to discuss on paper.
" I send a copy of your letter and mine to Gladstone
by this post."
Mr. Herbert to Mr. Gladstone.
" Wilton, May 17th, 1859.
" I this morning received a letter on the public
prospects frora the 'little man,' and, as it concerns
yourself as well as rae, I think the best thing I can do
is to send a copy of it on to you, with a copy of my
answer. Knowing his precipitancy, I have thought
it best to put all the difficulties before him. You will
observe that the propositions corae from Palraerston
to hira, and frora his language about himself I deduce
that he contemplates Palraerston Prime Minister in
the Lords. I think the future very glooray. The new
Parliaraent looks thoroughly obstructive, whichever
party be in. I thought Dizzy's foreign speech a
dangerous one. My wishes are all for a result which
is impossible— namely, the threshing of both the
Emperors as the only hope of Italian freedora. Did
you observe the French Minister's announceraent
to the bishops that the Pope's Governraent raust be
preserved, and demagogic doctrines (we know what
that means) be prevented from spreading in Italy ? "
Mr. Gladstone to Mr. Herbert.
"May i%th, 1859.
"Like other people, I find the situation of public
affairs extreraely embarrassing. Two great questions

i859] LETTER FROM MR. GLADSTONE 185
at this raoraent predominate : the War abroad, and
Reforra at horae. As respects the forraer, I was much
dissatisfied with some declarations of the Government,
nor can 1 place implicit confidence in Malraesbury's
future course ; but the latter bears more upon imme
diate duties. For one, I am earnestly desirous to have
it settled or put in train of settlement, and by this
desire my conduct will be principally governed. Your
test on this subject is a forraidable one. If you will
not have Reform Bills brought in by raen who think
no reform necessary, and any reform hurtful, you will
have room to spare in your Cabinet. I am not pre
pared to dismiss the Government on grounds of political
morahty; but I admit that they have lost the great
opportunity they had before them : nor do I feel it
a duty with reference to Reform that I should assist
to keep them in power, but only that I should con
sider what better prospect is opened by any
measure proposed to be taken for their removal.
" I do not know the reasons which may have
recoraraended to the rainds of others a vote of want
of confidence, but I regard it both individually and
generally with scruple. I could not, as at present
advised, undertake to support it. In a more general
view I should much doubt whether it will be carried.
Again, will the personal difficulties in the way of
constituting a new Cabinet be got over ? Will there
be the necessary agreement on Reform ? Let me
assume both affirmatories ; no small assumptions,
though to the first Lord John offers a handsorae
contribution. It would reraain to see in what way a
moderate raeasure of Reforra, which we suppose to
have been agreed on, is to be carried. I apprehend
in no other way than by the aid of a section of the
supporters of the present ministry ; but the chances
of obtaining such aid will be better or worse, according
to the nature of the measures which may have pre
ceded the downfall of the Cabinet now existing. If
recourse be had to the most summary and forcible
process, those chances will be lessened, Disraeli's
force in opposition will be increased, and he will
use it, if a judgment is to be formed frora the past,
with very little scruple.
"Like you and raany raore, I had hoped to see
Reforra settled by Lord Derby's Government pur et

m FALL OF LORD DERBY [chap, v
simple. This can now hardly be. As affording the
next best chance, I should have been glad if they
could have effected it by a combination with moderate
Liberals. I presurae that all chance of this, too, has
now disappeared. If so, there reraains only the
alternative of a Governraent founded on the ruins
of the present one. I can well understand that it
raight become a duty to support or to promote the
forraation of such a Government, but only with a fair
prospect of its doing its work — a prospect now hard
to raake, and very easy to raar.
" In this reply I do not know that I start greater
difficulties than are offered by your three conditions
of successful action, but I have looked at the subject
from a somewhat different point of view.
" 1 am sorry you are not likely to be here soon,
the raore so as I fear there is no hope of our escaping
to Wilton, which Mrs. Herbert kindly suggests.
Graham is not come up, and Lord Aberdeen thinks
not coraing soon. Did you raean rae to speak to
Lord Aberdeen ? I told hira in general terms that
I believed there were comraunications afloat about
a vote of no confidence, to which he eraphatically
replied : ' I hope it will fail.' He is not very well."
Mr. Herbert to Mr. Gladstone.
"May igth, 1859.
" One line to ask whether you wish me to send
your letter to Lord John, or whether I ara merely
to give him the substance.
" It seeras to rae that the result of a dissolution
alraost of necessity involved a duel to the death be
tween the two parties. I only wish it were to be
one with a raore decided advantage on either side.
" What I raean about Reforra is that it will be
brought in by raen within the scope of whose avowed
principles it lies. The present raen had been open
and bitter opponents of their own raeasure up to the
time of its introduction."
Lord John Russell to Mr. Herbert.
"Pembroke Lodge, May 21st, 1859.
" I had Palmerston here yesterday for two hours,
and we talked over the four points : i. Foreign affairs.

i859] CONTINUED CORRESPONDENCE 187
2. Reforra. 3. Araendraent on Address. 4. Compo
sition of any Government that raight succeed to the
present. (Jn the first we were quite agreed that
the continuance of the present rainistry was dangerous
to neutrality and to peace. Palraerston had a long
talk with Persigny, who blaraes his Eraperor, but
says he is still ready for peace. 2nd. On reform we
came to an agreement about the county and borough
franchise. 3rd. The araendraent or Resolution of want
of confidence we thought ought to be as simple as
possible. 4th. The future Government, we agreed,
ought to be on the broadest basis. I reserved my
entire freedom about accepting office myself, which
Palmerston said was quite right, and, indeed, nothing
could be done till the Queen raade the first move.
" Palmerston said he understood from GranviUe
that Gladstone wished his forraer score to be rubbed
out. But, as you say, Oxford University is a drag
not easily shaken off. Peel shook it off though."
Mr. Herbert to Mr. Gladstone.
"Wilton, May 22nd, 1859.
" I have another letter frora the ' little man,' who
has had ' two hours ' with Palraerston, with whora he
seeras to be wondrously agreed ! Being anxious
to get Palraerston's views at first hand however, I
wrote to him, confidentially, on Saturday morning,
and I hope to hear from hira either to-raorrow or next
day. Lord John says they are agreed both as to
county and borough franchise — agreed as to neutrality.
On the archdelicate question they were agreed that
nothing could be settled till the Queen had sent for
some one, but Lord John reserves his entire freedom
as to acceptance. So far for counting the chickens.
Reste d voir about hatching them."
Lord Granville wrote on May 23rd :
" I believe it was owing to a letter of raine to
Palraerston, and a subsequent conversation, that he
sent Lewis to Lord John yesterday week. That
communication produced a very cordial letter from
Lord John to Palmerston, which was foUowed by an
interview on Thursday or Friday last. The pith of
what took place there, as related to rae by Palmerston,

1 88 FALL OF LORD DERBY [chap, v
is as follows : Lord John and he agreed that it was
desirable that a vote of want of confidence in the
present Government should be proposed by some
independent member; that it should not touch on
the questions of the criminality of the dissolution, or
Reforra, or foreign affairs, but should siraply declare
that the Government had not the confidence of the
new House. The mover to be subsequently settled,
and the whole matter to depend upon the ascertained
wishes of the party. They also agreed that it would
not be difficult to frame a Reform Bill upon which
they would both agree. They did not pledge them
selves as to details, but they neither of them appeared
averse to a measure with no Schedule A, with a six-
pounds rating for boroughs, and a ten-pound franchise
for counties. They agreed as to the character and
composition of a new Government to be as corapre-
hensive as possible. You, Gladstone, and advanced
Liberals. Lord J. Russell thought Milner Gibson,
Palmerston, Cobden, and the best of the Whigs. They
both abstained from pledging themselves as to their
own course on the formation of the Government.
They thought it not right to anticipate any decision
of the Queen. I have not the slightest idea whom
the Queen will send for of the two.' She does not
like Derby or Dizzy. She is not very averse to
Malmesbury, whom, however, she thinks incapable.
She is full of criticisms upon the Austrians, but her
strong feeling is detestation of the Emperor of the
French, and of Russia. I do not know whether either
of the Lords, if sent for, would propose to me to join.
I should be sorry for their own sake and for mine
own, to encourage either to forra a feeble Governraent.
" My view of foreign politics is neutrality, irapartial
and watchful, taking an opportunity of raaking the
best settlement for Italy which circumstances would
allow at the proper tirae. I should be raost anxious
that a distinct pledge should be given that the Cabinet
should be kept informed of everything that was done.
'[ I believe Bright is in a very excited state of mind,
writing in different senses every day, and generally
abusive both of Lord John and Palmerston. I think
him out of the question for office. I should be very
anxious to get Cobden : if Palmerston was in the
Government people would not be afraid of him, and

i859] LETTER FROM SIR CHARLES WOOD 189
he is an honest and clever raan, and would remain
a real but very practicable representative of the
middle class. Milner Gibson would lose this character
in office."
Sir Charles Wood to Mr. Herbert.
"10, Belgrave Square, May 2j^th.
" Dear Herbert,
" I am very sorry indeed that I cannot corae
down to you, as I should rauch have wished to do
so, both for private and public reasons, but I had made
several engagements for this week which I could
not throw over, and I have been obliged to decline
going down to Barings as well as to Wilton. My
boy coraes up from Oxford to-morrow, and I have
more than one other engagement that I cannot
postpone. " You will know from Lord John what has passed
between him and Palraerston. The latter is quite
satisfied. There is a general disposition to vote the
Governraent out ; but then people very naturally ask
what is to come next, and expect to see a reasonable
prospect of forming a Governraent as strong as pos
sible, in existing circurastances, in the place of that
which now exists. Now, in my opinion, the man who
can forra the strongest Governraent at present is
Palraerston. The fear of Lord John's connection with
Bright, unreasonable as it raay be, and the unforgiving
dishke (to say no raore) of the Roraan Catholics,
render it irapossible for him to be the head of a
Governraent at present. Men enough of our side
would withdraw their support to put this out of the
question. Palraerston, therefore, raust be the head,
and his opinion on Reforra is rauch raore in accordance
with that of the raajority of the country than Lord
John's. "Palmerston, Lord John, and Gladstone I suppose
agree pretty well on foreign politics in present circura
stances; and, indeed, the latter concurred so much
in opinion as to the merits of Lord John's Resolution,
though he voted against it, that there can be no
great difference of opinion there. I have not seen
him, but I hear that he is anxious to see a strong
Government, and, if he is sincere in that desire, he

190 FALL OF LORD DERBY [chap, v
ought to join in removing a very incapable one and
forraing the best possible Governraent as things stand.
As regards Lord John, I have not spoken as plainly
to him as I am writing to you, but I believe that
he is aware ot the difficulty which would attend his
atterapt to form a Government. I do not suppose
that he is convinced of its being impossible, but after
what had passed I do not think that he could do ^
otherwise than serve under Lord P., if the Queen ^
sent for the latter. He has not said as much, and,
indeed, he has not been called upon to say as much,
and Palmerston does not think that he could have
said more in this sense than he did.
" If, however, you agree with me m my view of
the only possible Governraent, you would do very
good service by talking to him in this sense, and
seeing how far he will say that he would take office
under P. In order to ensure a majority, our friends
must be convinced that such a Governraent will be
forraed. If they are so assured, our raajority I believe
to be safe enough. The Governraent admit a majority
of thirteen against them on a vote of no confidence.
" The raove should be the sarae as Peel made in 1841,
not referring to any particular subject, but general.
This Palmerston and Lord John agree to, and it seems
to raeet everybody's views. I have been looking
over the naraes with Hayter and Brand, and we are
to do so carefully to-morrow. -There are sorae absent
and sorae doubtful, but Hayter's calculation is twenty-
seven. The accidents are generally pretty equal on
both sides, and when the majority is so small, three
or four make a great difference on the poll.
" Yours truly,
"C. Wood.
"Gladstone's concurring would of course raake a
great difference, because it would exclude all notion
of Derby's strengthening hiraself"
Lord Palmerston to Mr. Herbert. "May 24/4, 1859.
" I have duly received your letter of the 21st. I
went on Friday to Pembroke Lodge, and had a long
and, as relates to the topics discussed, a satisfactory
talk with John Russell. We agreed that if a move

i859] LETTER FROM LORD PALMERSTON 191
is to be made, it should be a simple Resolution of no
confidence in the present Government, in answer to
the question put by the Government to the country
by the Queen's Speech and the dissolution ; but that
whether such a move should be made as an araendraent
to the Address or as a substantive raotion, as well as
the question whether it should be raade at all, should
remain for further consideration on communication
with the leamed in such matters. But I think we
both leant to the opinion, that it would be best made
as an amendment to the Address, and that this ques
tion put by the Government to the country ought to
be answered, whatever the answer to be given raight
be. We both agreed that the raotion, if made, should
be made and seconded by some independent members.
" We talked over the leading details of a Reform
Bill. We agree as to a six-pound rating franchise for
boroughs, and to a ten-pound rating for counties. I
should much prefer eight-pound value for boroughs,
and twenty or fifteen rating for counties, but after
what has passed on these matters I fear that I must
give up my preferences. I think John Russell has
not quite abandoned the notion of a Reform Bill this
session ; ray own opinion is that a House of Coraraons
fresh from the expense and trouble of a General
Election, would not like a raeasure which would lead
to another dissolution in a few months. John Russell
thought that the registration under a new Bill might
be put off till next spring, and the dissolution till May
or June of next year ; but that would not make much
difference. On the other hand, I should be glad to get
rid of the question by a raoderate measure, which
would be more easily done when people are sick of
the subject than when the fever returns. As to
transfer of seats, he would disfranchise no place
entirely, but wishes to raake a somewhat larger trans
fer than was proposed by the Government ; but I said
that was quite a raatter of detail.
" As to the formation of a Government, in the event
of the present one being upset, you may well imagine
that the subject was one which each of us felt difficulty
in touching upon. He only said at the end of our
conversation, that in the event of a change he must
keep himself free frora engagements. I said, of course
we must hold ourselves free,, and that we had no right

192 FALL OF LORD DERBY [chap, v
to assurae who the Queen raight send for in such a
case ; we cannot discount the Queen's intentions.
" Whatever difficulties there might be as to arrange
ments in such a case, those difficulties would be more
easily overcome by the pressure of the moment. But
if you and Gladstone and sorae others were willing
to forra part of any new Government to be made,
I should not fear any insurmountable difficulty in
forming a very efficient adrainistration, and if the
administration was good and strong, it seems to me
that for a time at least it would be sufficiently
supported. "I raay as well say with reference to a part of your
letter, that I should not like to go to the House of
Lords, at least at present."
Sir Charles Wood to Mr. Herbert.
"May 26th, 1859.
"Dear S. Herbert,
"Thanks for your letter. I am glad to hear
what you say of Gladstone. I do not think that there
will be any difficulty about Church patronage. I
always thought that when you three quitted Palmer
ston's Governraent, you threw away a power which
raight have been usefully exercised in Government in
more ways than one. I am against all party patronage
in the Church; but you cannot be much surprised
that a man exposed to strong influences in one
direction, and uncounteracted by anybody, should lean
to one side. It will be a very good thing if a counter
influence should be brought into play by the presence
of Gladstone and yourself in the Government. I wrote
once from Wilton about some Church appointment,
but I have no claim to speak with authority on such
matters. He would be able to do so, and might
ensure a less one-sided description of appointments.
" With regard to the House of Commons, I have in
my own mind no doubt of adequate support to a
Government if it is forraed. I have no doubt of a
raajority if one co-nd\t\on precedent is fulfilled — that is,
if the raerabers of the House of Coraraons are con
vinced that the chiefs of the Liberal party are united
in their deterraination to form a Government. If
Palraerston, Lord John, Gladstone, and yourself are

i859] SUGGESTED MEETING 193
shown to be now acting cordially together, with the
botid fide intention of acting together in a Government,
I have no fear of our not having a fair majority. But
our majority depends on their being assured of that
union, and it is most desirable that some outward and
visible sign of this should be given. The Duke of
Bedford suggests to me that Lord John should dine
with Palraerston on the 6th, and I wrote to him
accordingly ; but he declines. There is a great
objection to a public meeting, where awkward ques
tions raight be asked, and the extrerae party raight
endeavour to impose terms which could not be
assented to. I have written to Lord John by to-day's
post to ask what he would suggest as the best mode
of doing what is indispensable, not only effecting,
but proclaiming the union. I wish you would talk
it over with him, and see what can be done. The
more I see, the more convinced I am that no strong
Government can be formed, except by such an union
as I have contemplated and pointed out, and that such
an union would form the strongest Governraent
which the present eleraents of the House of Commons
render possible.
" If it is not raade, we shall have the present weak
Governraent tottering on, liable to be upset on any
accidental question, and that which all men deprecate
inflicted on us — an unsettled state of things prolonged.
"This is my real opinion, and certainly not dic
tated by any wish to put ourselves in office at such a
time."

Mr. Herbert to Lord Granville.
"Wilton House, Salisbury,
"May 27th, 1859.
" My dear Granville,
"Lord John left us this morning. I had two
conversations with hira of some duration. He is in a
very unsettled state of mind : thinks a great deal of
what 'ray friends will say'; what the Liberals will
think, etc.
" He sometimes talks of serving under Palmerston —
he leading the Comraons, and Palmerston, of course,
going to the Lords; sometiraes of Palmerston
vol. ii. 13

194 FALL OF LORD DERBY [chap, v
forming a Governraent, and he supporting it out of
office. "The latter is siraply irapossible, and the former
depends on Palmerston, who, I have been led to
believe, objects to such a course for himself, at least
for the present. They are very well agreed as to a
Reforra measure — i.e. to a franchise of £io in the
counties, and £6 in boroughs rating.
" I tried to impress on hira that the man who
forgets hiraself the raost will be the best remembered
by the country, and I told hira very unraistakably
that neither he nor Palraerston can form a Governraent
without the other, and that Palraerston, Prime
Minister, would have a far better chance than he.
Lord John, would in that position.
" I do not think it a fair proposal to urge on Lord
John that he should dine at Palmerston's dinner in
order to give an outward and visible sign of union,
for that would iraply following a lead, whereas the
junction should be forraed in the face of day, for public
objects, on terras of previous equality. I ara satisfied
that if any step is taken to turn out the Governraent,
two things are necessary — viz.:
" I. That the two rivals should agree to serve to
gether as the Queen raay direct.
" 2. To take the whole Liberal party into council,
discuss the risks to be run, and the objects to be
attained. They will no doubt say very disagreeable
things, but they had better be said now than later —
better in a dining-room than in the House of Commons.
It is well to know how far the two sections are
willing to sink differences and support a Government
if formed. The party require it, and have a right to
demand it. They are very independent in habits and
feelings, and the time is gone by when they will vote
like a flock 6f sheep for whatever some half-dozen
raen raay concoct in a library. Depend upon it, with
out previous frank consultation and interchange of
opinion, no estimate can be formed of the chances
of durability of a Liberal Government, and without
such an estimate it is raadness to turn out the existing
Ministry. Even if you can get a bare majority to turn
them out, which I doubt, without a clear understanding
as to the future, who would risk the huraihation of
having to take thera back and subrait to their rule

1859] LETTER TO MR. GLADSTONE 195
after having declared our want of confidence in
thera?
" I hear that Palmerston is very averse to a raeeting,
so I think is Wood ; but 1 am satisfied that you will
not succeed without one, and raay get into the raost
serious hobble if the consent or zeal of men is counted
on, when they have not been consulted nor raade
responsible for the raove to be taken.
"Lord John told me he had no complaint against
Palmerston, but only against his subordinates, who
had treated hira very ill."
Mr. Herbert to Mr. Gladstone.
"Wilton, May 28th, 1859.
" The ' little raan ' went yesterday in rather an un
satisfactory state of mind. He says sometiraes that
he would lead the House of Comraons for and under
Palraerston in the Lords, but he does not like it,
and talks then of supporting out of office a Govern
ment formed by Palmerston, which is nonsense. I
endeavoured to impress on him that abnegation is
his best, safest, and wisest course ; that neither he
nor Palmerston can form a Government without the
other, and that the one who leads the Conservative
element in the Liberal party must inspire the most
confidence at this juncture, when fear of Bright is
the predominant feeling in the country ; that it is the
belief in his — Lord John's — sincerity on the subject of
Reform which rendered people timid with regard to
him, a disadvantage from which Palmerston is free.
They are agreed on a Reform measure ! — £\o in
counties, and £6 rating in boroughs, which were the
franchises in Lord Aberdeen's Bill ; also on no Schedule
A, and disfranchisement of one seat carried rather
further than in the late Bill. So far good ; but I urge
on all that, if any move is to be raade, a raeeting of
the whole Liberal party should be held, and we
should have it out with thera. Palraerston, I under
stand, objects on the ground that they will say dis
agreeable things, and ask awkward questions. Of
course they will, and if they have not the opportunity
in a dining-room, they will do it in the House of
Commons. Unless the raen who are to turn out the
present Government are prepared to support the

196 FALL OF LORD DERBY [chap, v
Government that is to follow, it is folly to make any
hostile move ; but, before such a raeeting is called,
the two leaders must have come to this understanding
that both are willing to serve the Queen together,
and in such rautual relation as she may herself think
best. If they do not do this, the party will not be
satisfied, nor will the leaders have any security tiU
they have had a frank explanation with the party.
This said Liberal party consists of men who think
for themselves, and when they don't, think they do,
and their independent habits of thought and action
must be considered. They must be raade parties
to, and responsible for, the course to be taken, by
previously being taken into council. They won't
blindly follow a course concocted by sorae half-dozen
gentleraen in a library."

Mr. Gladstone to Mr. Herbert.
"May 2i)th, 1859.
" My position is a very odd one. The pararaount
?uestion of the day is our relation to the war in
taly. On that subject I agree raore nearly (indeed,
I believe rayself to agree exactly) with Palmerston
and Lord John than with any other, so far as I know,
of our public raen. On the other hand, I believe
Malmesbury to be quite unfit for guiding the country
in its foreign policy at such a crisis. Under such
circumstances it will not be pleasant to me to have
to give a vote which will appear to raean confidence
in the Government, of which (apart from any other
point) Malmesbury is at this raoraent nearly the
raost important raember. Such, however, seems likely
to be my fate. For I have not brought myself to
think that a man who has been acting as I have
wholly out of concert with Opposition, can safely, 1
would alraost say can honourably, enter Opposition,
so to speak, by a vote of such sweeping and strong
condemnation as a vote of no confidence must always
be — and one avowedly, and, of course, intended for
the resumption of office.
" This personal difficulty I have intimated to EUice,
to Wood, and last night to Lord Palmerston, who

1859] MR. GLADSTONE'S POSITION 197
broke ground with his usual good humour, at his
party, on the subject of the coming vote.
" I admit that the vote is one perfectly legitimate
for an Opposition. There are differences between
your position and raine in regard to it, such, for
instance, as the opposite courses we pursued on the
Resolution, in punishment for which I have figured
as a Derbyite and Disraelite to boot throughout the
tabular account of the elections.
" For a motion disapproving of the Dissolution in
any moderate terms I must certainly have voted,
and I think that such a motion would (despite of
Bright) have yielded a better division ; but it would
not have had the same certain and iraraediate killing
quality. " I told Wood that at this peculiar crisis a ' broad-
bottora ' Government would have pleased me best.
His reply was : ' Who can be expected to join with
Disraeli ? '
" Lord Aberdeen is in the main for Derby, but can
look at nothing except through Austrian spectacles.
At this juncture he holds me to be the most extra
vagant and abandoned of English politicians. It is
rather odd that he and Lyndhurst are at each point
the opposites of one another. The domestic part
of Lord Aberdeen's opinions, and the foreign part
of Lyndhurst's, would make a stout Liberal when
put together, and the other parts respectively a very
considerable Tory."
Mr. Herbert to Mrs. Herbert.
"June yd, 1859.
"People seem very doubtful about the proceeding
to be taken,' and feel, not without truth, that it is a
desperate undertaking, requiring rauch raore hearty
co-operation and goodwill than we all possess. In
this sense talk the Speaker, E. EUice, and others.
" I saw Gladstone yesterday. He objects, after
having supported Lord Derby's Governraent up to the
last raoraent, and even spoken and voted for them on
Lord John RusseU's Resolution, suddenly to vote no
confidence in thera, but he would vote any censure of
' The meeting of the Liberal party.

198 FALL OF LORD DERBY [chap, v
a particular act. He is evidently now anxious to see
them upset, and ready to join a Governraent to
succeed them !
"June 4.th.
" There is a good deal of adverse opinion as to the
course to be taken; the Whigs at Brookes being, I
am told, inclined against any move, rauch nervousness
also as to the meeting, of which I am not a bit afraid,
for if it turns out that there is no unanimity, and no
prospect of carrying on a Government, it will be well
to know before we are committed, and so avoid a
still more disgraceful Cardwellisation. "June 6fh.
" I am just returned in a state of liquefaction from
Willis's Rooms. There were about 280 raerabers
present, which is thought very large, as the Irish
raerabers are not yet come over in any number. Para.
first got upon the raised dais, and when he helped
Johnny up by the hand there was a droll burst of
cheering. Pam. spoke shortly and well, described the
challenge in the Queen's dissolution speech, alluded to
the failures of the Government in legislation, and
the danger of their involving us in a war, said that he
and Johnny were at one (great cheering). Then there
was a pause, and a call for Lord John, who spoke
in the same sense, and said if the vote succeeded it
was necessary to look forward, and if the Queen sent
for Pam., he, Johnny, would cheerfully co-operate with
him in the formation of a Government — broad basis,
etc.^ — ^and then Pam. whispered to hira, and he added
as much for Pam. Then calls for Bright, who spoke
in a — for him — decent raanner enough ; said the
differences had been in the party as well as the
leaders, and the fault of the leaders. Wanted some
clearer assurance about war, but upon the whole'
promised co-operation. Para, gave the clearer assur
ance, and I got up : said I also came frora below the
gangway (here comes Edward, who says it is post
time). 1 preached union, and said I did not mind if
we were beat, as if we are a minority we should know
our place and watch, but also support the Government
in all national raatters. Then carae Mr. E. James,
Mr. Loch, Mr. Monckton Milnes, Mr. Roebuck, Mr.
Horsman, Mr. Lindsay, Mr. EUice, Col. Dearing. The

i859] THE LIBERAL MEETING 199
underlined [italicised] raen against. Roebuck very ill
received, Horsman only raising difficulties, and wanting
it put off for ten days, but the rest all for. So the pro-
Eosition was put and carried amidst loud cheers, and
,ord Hartington and Mr. Hanbury are to raove and
second the identical amendment which Peel carried
against Lord Melbourne in 1841. On the whole it
was very successful, no one objecting who was not
expectedi to do so, and others concurring who had not
been reckoned on."
The alliance thus effected was not long in bearing
fruit. A vote of want of confidence, in the terms
referred to in the preceding pages, was moved by
Lord Hartington as an araendraent to the Address,
and on June nth was carried by a raajority of 13.
Lord Derby resigned, and the Queen, to the mortifica
tion and disappointraent of the two elderly rivals for
his post, sent for Lord Granville, a man, as Charles
Greville observed, young enough, to be the son of the
one, and the grandson of the other. Lord Palmerston
consented to serve under him. Lord John refused to
do so. Lord Granville upon this relinquished the task
which, at the Queen's coraraands, he had undertaken.
Lord Palraerston was then sent for, and succeeded
(though not without some difficulty) in forraing a
Governraent. Immediately on its formation, Sidney Herbert wrote
as follows to Sir Jaraes Graham :

" 49, Belgrave Square,
"June 14th, 1859.
" My dear Graham,
" I saw Palmerston yesterday evening. He
offered me the War Office, which I accepted, but on
the condition that I should go to the Lords if I found
the work too much, together with the House of
Comraons ; and I even offered (in homage to advice)
to go there now if convenient to the Government.

200 FALL OF LORD DERBY [chap, v
Palmerston declared it to be highly mconvenient, spoke
of the great battle to be fought under great difficul
ties in the Comraons, and ' after compliraents,' as the
Indians say, begged rae at any rate to try the Comraons
with the Office. The only other office then settled
was Johnny in the Foreign Office, but others were
settled last night.
" We have met to-day and sat for five hours, going
through all the appointraents, as no new writ can be
moved till Wednesday the 22nd — i.e. after the expira
tion of fourteen days from the meeting of Parliament —
and, as there can be no council till Saturday, it was
agreed that the arrangements should not be announced
till the forraal acceptances, and this arrangeraent will,
no doubt, be strictly kept, barring a leading article
in The Times to-raorrow. There met this morning
Gladstone, Chancellor of the Exchequer (I found he
would not have joined the Government otherwise) ;
Wood, India ; Lord John, F.O. ; Lewis, H.O. ; Sir G.
Grey, Chancellor of the Duchy; and myself I fear
we must run the risk of the three Dukes. Granville
cannot do without ArgyU to help him; all wish to
do an act of justice by Newcastle ; and Somerset
seems to be the only available man for the Admiralty,
where he would have the incalculable advantage of
constant and intimate intercourse with you. I think
Palraerston will offer the Chancellorship to John
Campbell, the only man who could, without offence,
be put over the heads of both Cranworth and Bethell,
and with the advantage of an early succession to some
one. The one thing which most annoys rae is the
absence of Clarendon. I believe the Queen has raade
personally every effort with hira, but in vain. I think
he greatly raislikes Johnny at the F.O. ; but with our
too Italian complexion, his presence would have been
most valuable, both in appearance and in substance.
" I urged, I hope with success. Sir B. Hall's eleva
tion to the peerage, which would make room for
Cardwell, who will be very valuable in the Comraons.
" We had much general discussion on raany topics.
I started the necessity of an Erabassy at Vienna, so
as to displace Lord A. Loftus, and give all due weight
at this iraportant raoraent to our coramunications. I
think Elgin would do well there — at any rate he will
be soraewhere, possibly P. O. Newcastle, probably

I8S9] ARISTOCRATIC CABINET 201
Colonies. Nothing finally settled about Ireland, except
Carlisle's suprerae claim. Brewster's name was very
favourably received. Sir George Grey wished to
retire altogether, but consented to join in a norainal
office. Ben Stanley does not now stand in the pro-
grarame. Lord John seemed in high good humour —
may at last !
" Palmerston seemed much touched at your kindness
and bienveUlance in making suggestions, which he
seemed much struck by. Berkeley, I have little doubt,
will have a peerage. Sir F. Baring refused one when
Palraerston was last in office. They liked all your
froposed Board of Adrairalty, except Duncan, and
think they are disposed to risk the Green connections
and take Clarence Paget.
"This is ray budget in strict confidence. I hope
to see you on Monday night."
The Cabinet thus formed was of the old Whig type.
It contained three Dukes, and the brother of a fourth.
Of its remaining merabers five were peers or the
sons of peers ; three were highly connected Baronets
of good family and estate. Mr. Gladstone, Mr. Card-
well, and Mr. Milner Gibson were the only three raen
without titles who found place in it.
In spite of eleraents of discord which in ordinary
circurastances would have caused its early disruption,
this last of the aristocratic Whig Governraents
retained office till Lord Palraerston's death, and for
sorae raonths subsequently — a period of about seven
years.

CHAPTER VI
national defence
1859-60
SIDNEY HERBERT was now, for the first tirae.
Secretary of State for War. He held the
office for only two years, during nearly the whole
of which he was in bad health, and for the last six
raonths so ill as to render work difficult and painful.
But in that short time he did more, and effected
more salutary reforras, than most of those who have
held the post for a much longer period.
They were not easily accoraplished, nor raust it be
supposed that it was only necessary that he should
give an order or prepare a plan, to see the one
carried out by docile subordinates, or the other
adopted by acquiescent colleagues. On the contrary,
the measures he proposed were strongly, and some
tiraes successfully, resisted, and often raarred and
rautilated by other members of the Cabinet, or to a
great extent neutralised by the vis inertice of his own
subordinate officials.
The daily life of a Secretary of State is not an
enjoyable one, and presents little resemblance to the
popular picture which represents hira as sitting
serenely at a table, writing decisive orders on rainutes
and questions submitted to him in regular order, and
in a coraplete form.
The earlier hours of his day, whilst at home, are
«02

i859-6o] DAY OF A MINISTER 203
probably devoted in the first instance to catching up
the arrears of the past night, by initialling or coraraent-
ing on the minute papers which his Under-Secretaries
of State have sent up to hira on the previous evening.
The rest of his raorning is employed in finishing
some piece of work during which it is imperative
that he should be free frora interruption, in attending
to such private correspondence as he finds it possible
to carry on, and perhaps, at rare intervals, in taking
sorae hasty and iraperfect glance at his private affairs.
If he is careful of his health, he seizes this tirae
also for such little exercise as he is able to obtain,
but which he often is obliged wholly to forgo.
About noon he goes to his office, and on ordinary
days when Parliaraent is not sitting reraains there till
seven o'clock or later. While there he has to see
raany persons on business of the raost varied
character. In the intervals he endeavours to consider
the fragments of information placed before him
daily with regard to the raany questions pending,
but he is seldom many minutes free from interruption.
A " circulation " despatch-box arrives, the contents of
which have at once to be read, considered, and
perhaps rainuted on, before the scarlet box with
its long projecting label is carried on by the waiting
raessenger to the next rainister on the list. A
colleague calls to speak to hira on sorae urgent point,
and cannot be denied. Sorae local raagnate, not
on the list of appointed audiences for the day,
asks to see him, and, though his business may be
trivial, it is inexpedient to refuse him admission.
Notes come from the Prirae Minister, or other
important members of the Cabinet, to which a reply is
necessary. When the Minister is at length able to
leave his office, jaded and wearied, it is with a sense of

204 NATIONAL DEFENCE [chap, vi
dissatisfaction, produced by a tonsciousness of un
finished despatches, imperfect interviews, and a
general sense of incompleteness. He goes home,
taking with him a pile of red boxes full of papers
to sign, initial, or consider. After a hasty dinner, he
almost iramediately sits down to grapple with these
papers, and is busy over them till an early hour of
the morning, when overpowering lassitude compels
him to relinquish the task, probably unfinished, and
to seek a few hours of as probably unrefreshing sleep.
This is his ordinary routine during those months
of the year when Parliament is not sitting, and, but
for an occasional Cabinet, he has only his own
departraent to attend to. But during the Session,
if he be in the House of Coraraons, his work and the
amount of worry he is exposed to are both greatly
increased. He goes earlier to his office, abandoning
all thought of his private affairs, and all attempts at
private correspondence or domestic life. It is only
too probable that want of tirae will terapt him to
sacrifice the already short space of the day which
considerations of health have led him to devote to
exercise, and which he knows to be essentially
necessary to him. But though he goes earlier to
his office he has to leave it so much earlier that
the time spent there is even more cut into fragments
than before, and even raore dissatisfying to him.
He raust attend the House of Comraons, and in that
heated and unwholesome atmosphere he must remain
till one or two o'clock in the morning, when he goes
home exhausted to see the pile of unopened boxes
yet accumulating, to be wrestled with when he wakes,
imperfectly rested, a few hours later. On the days
when the House of Commons does not sit there will
probably be a Cabinet which will last some hours.

i8s9-6o] DAY OF A MINISTER 205
Of course the Minister's labour will be greatly
increased in both Parliament and Cabinet if, as must
often be the case, he has to speak in the one, and to
urge or defend in the other, some measure in which
he takes special interest.'
A few days of such a life would be sufficient to
induce great fatigue, but that which renders the
Minister's burden wellnigh intolerable is that it is
not for a few days only, but that, for month after
month, one day of this description follows another
without respite or intermission. There is no interval
of repose. Even Sunday shines no Sabbath day to
hira. He raay rise later, raay have a quiet raorning,
and even be able to attend church, but later in the
day there are sure to be interviews and discussions
which it is irapossible to avoid. And however
assiduous and watchful his private secretary raay
be, there raust always be a raass of letters for his
own personal consideration^ — those frora colleagues,
frora high officials, or from private friends, bearing
the agreed secret raark which acts as defence against
the inspection of a private secretary. And I fear that
the quiet and comparative freedom frora interruption
on Sunday too often tempt successfully to its employ
ment for the composition of papers requiring sorae
elaboration, instead of giving the overworked and
over-harassed brain the rest it so sorely needs.
Under such pressure an indolent and self-indulgent
' In the present day the Minister's Room gives some refuge to a
Minister not immediately engaged in debate, but no such accommoda
tion existed at the time of which I write, and a Minister had then no
escape from the House except the library or smoking-room, nor was
it thought "seemly" for a Cabinet Minister to frequent these, though I
have seen them working in the library. The place for a Minister if at
the House was held to be in the House.
* Cabinet Ministers receive their letters on Sundays, even in
London.

2o6 NATIONAL DEFENCE [chap, vi
man throws off on his subordinates his own responsi
bilities and work, leaves Under-Secretaries and clerks
to read despatches, and suggest the answers to them,
and contents himself with reading and approving
their minutes, and performing the external functions
of the office, representing it in Parliaraent, and grant
ing personal interviews. Much the sarae result is
arrived at if the holder of the seals be commonplace,
ignorant, and stupid, though honest and conscientious.
He soon discovers that he can lean on his Permanent
Under-Secretary (of whom, as being fully acquainted
with matters as to which his own knowledge is
iraperfect, he is, in his heart, a little afraid), and
enjoys the luxury of being able to do so. It is with
genuine surprise and sorae self-satisfaction that he
finds how invariably his own more sluggish judgment
coincides with that of his adviser. He works harder
— that is, he reads raore papers and sees raore people
than an idle Minister — but he does not work so hard
as to injure his health, for he does not really tax his
powers of decision and judgment.
Very different is the case of the man who has a
serious sense of his own responsibility, who has
set great objects before him which he passionately
desires to effect, and whose conscience forbids him
to delegate to others, powers which it is his own
duty to exercise, and decisions which it is his own
duty to raake. If he be a man of cold heart, patient
teraperaraent, and iron constitution, he raay with
credit perform his work, without suffering materially
in health ; but if he be a raan of sensitive feelings,
working not only with his head, but with his whole
heart thrown into his task, and is at the sarae time
of but weakly frame and in indifferent health, his
giving way under the strain is inevitable.

i8s9-6o] HERBERT'S OBJECTS 207
Sidney Herbert sank under it in little more than
two years, but not before he had succeeded in
accomplishing administrative reforms of the highest
importance. The subjects which chiefly occupied the thoughts
of Mr. Herbert when he entered office, and which,
so far as the exigencies of departmental work and
the pressure of unforeseen events perraitted, raost
interested him till the end, were iraproveraents in the
barrack accoramodation, social condition, and physical
comfort of the private soldier, the better education of
officers, the entire reorganisation of the Array Medical
Service, and the raore effective defence of the coasts
of the United Kingdora.
As regards the three first of these objects, no differ
ence of opinion exists. Mr. Herbert's efforts to attain
thera commanded a large raeasure of public syrapathy
in his own tirae, and are, perhaps, even more justly
appreciated now than they then were. But it is
otherwise with the measures for defence of which
Mr. Herbert desired the adoption. It was disputed
at the time, and is disputed still, whether any de
fensive preparations were required, and if they were
so, whether those suggested by Sidney Herbert were
those best calculated to effect their object. It is
to this subject alone that I propose to devote the
remainder of the present chapter.
The Crimean War closed in 1856, and frora that
tirae forward the cordiality of the relations between
the French and English Governraents rapidly cooled.
The raenacing language of the French colonels, ex
cited by the failure of the " Conspiracy to Coramlt
Murder" BiU of 1858 — language, the use of which was
permitted, if not encouraged, by the Emperor — raay
be said to have called into existence the Volunteer

2o8 NATIONAL DEFENCE [chap, vi
Force of England. The Italian carapaign of 1859
excited fresh alarm, and when Sidney Herbert re
ceived the seals of the War Office, he regarded a
rupture with France as probable, and perhaps
imrainent. He consequently deemed it as his duty
to jnake preparations to raeet such an eventuality.
Shortly speaking, those raeasures consisted in the
construction of fortifications for the protection of our
Arsenals, the increase of the Army by about twenty-six
thousand men, and the reorganisation of the Militia
on a better footing.
Before making any formal proposals to the Cabinet,
Mr. Herbert had assured himself of the strenuous
support of the Prirae Minister, Lord Palraerston.
In earlier days Lord Palraerston had been the
apologist of Louis Napoleon. He had condoned and
defended the coup detat of 185 1. He had been the
warraest partisan of the French Alliance in 1854,
and a firra believer in the friendliness of the Eraperor
to Great Britain. Before the end of 1859, however,
these sentiraents had been greatly raodified, and he
had come to regard Louis Napoleon with suspicion
and dislike hardly less strong than the goodwill he
had once borne him.
A great majority of the Cabinet shared with raore
or less earnestness the views of Lord Palraerston,
and though the Duke of Argyll and some Others
did not conceal their distaste for increased military
expenditure, they were not prepared to contest its
necessity when that necessity was pressed upon them
by Lord Palmerston and Mr. Herbert. One, however,
of the rnost important of his colleagues failed to share
his views as to the danger incurred, and disapproved
the measures by which he proposed to meet it.
Mr. Gladstone disbelieved in the existence of

1859-60] GLADSTONE'S DISSATISFACTION 209
danger ; he objected with all his raight to any augmen
tation of the Array, the strength of which he thought
should rather be dirainished ; to the construction of
fortifications, which he deeraed unnecessary, or to any
delay in the diserabodiraent of the Militia, and declared
his inability to provide for the vast suras which would
be required for the purposes Mr. Herbert had at heart.
The note of dissatisfaction had been early sounded,
and the interference and criticisra of the Chancellor
of the Exchequer was not confined to considerable
questions of finance, but exercised on even minute
matters of purely departmental moment. One example
of these somewhat petulant censures, only a few
raonths after the forraation of the Governraent, raay
suffice. The raoat of Fort Augustus, on the Caledonian
Canal, was crossed by a wooden bridge. The darap
and variable cliraate of the Scottish Highlands is not
favourable to the long life of wooden structures, and
when, in 1859, this bridge required entire renewal, the
Engineer officer in charge suggested that it should be
replaced by one of stone, which would be permanent,
needing neither constant repair nor frequent recon
struction. Some one reported the erection of this
bridge to Mr. Gladstone, who, forgetting that stone
is not a luxury in the Highlands, but the material of
which every cottage and every fence is built, at once
took fire, and wrote to Mr. Herbert to denounce what
seemed to him a profligate expenditure. Mr. Herbert
explained the facts, but Mr. Gladstone, far frora being
satisfied, rejoined that it appeared to hira —
" a case of wanton extravagance on the part of the
officer who recommended a stone bridge to Sir John
Burgoyne, and who, I submit, ought to be called on
for his reasons, and, if they are not satisfactory,
reprimanded and desired to do better in future."
VOL. II. 14

2IO NATIONAL DEFENCE [chap, vi
In the sarae letter he suggests that econoray may
be effected by reducing the number of corapany
officers in the Array.
" I have never," he writes, " heard a reason intelli
gible to me for maintaining in time of peace the present
enormous nuraber of subalterns. It is to me a
perfect mystery, which I suppose I must regard with
the sarae silent reverence as the mysteries of religion
and Providence."
Mr. Herbert was, therefore, well aware that any
proposals for increased expenditure would raeet with
anything but a favourable reception, and in writing to
Sir Jaraes Grahara on Noveraber 13th, says:
" It is indeed a time of great care and anxiety.
I am preparing a paper for the Cabinet on the
araount of force to be maintained. It will be a heavy
bill. I do not know how Gladstone will stand the
deraands made on him by Seyraour and rayself I
ara pressing on arms, cannon, ammunition works ;
everything is going on at full work. I have closed
altogether the Royal Gun Factory at Woolwich, not
without much gnashing of teeth. But I satisfied
myself that the concern was a failure, not producing
better guns or cheaper guns than the French, and,
what is worse, not producing them at all. The whole
building will now be thrown into the Rifle Cannon
Factory under Armstrong, and will make his guns,
and hoop cast-iron guns, to strengthen them for rifling.
Woolwich will, therefore, be devoted to doing what
the trade cannot do for us, and we shall trust to the
trade to do for us that which it can do, and do well.
The Royal Gun Factory was a child of Monsell's, and
a very ailing child it has been ; but I expect a search
ing coroner's inquest on the body by hira in Parhament,
for he was tenderly attached to it. His other child,
the Enfield Factory for small arms, is a noble contrast
to it. It is the best-managed concern I ever saw,
the model of what a public institution should be, and,
in the intensity of the work, a great contrast to the
dockyard steam factories."
A few days later, Mr. Herbert had prepared and

i859-6o] HERBERT'S MEMORANDUM 211
circulated to the Cabinet the Memorandum referred
to in the foregoing letter. In it he stated the reasons
which led him to entertain suspicion as to the designs
or dreams of Louis Napoleon, and, after reviewing in
detail the existing force of the Army and its distribu
tion, he proposed its augmentation by about twenty-
six thousand men, the chief increase being in the
Artillery. He next discussed the position of the Militia,
and after showing the forcible objections to treating
it as, ex necessitate, it had been treated during the
Crimean War, as little more than a recruiting agency
for the time, he proposed gradually to disembody
the whole force, which, however, he would have had
strictly called out every year for training, and to
recruit which he proposed to revert to the still legal
agency of the ballot.
This paper is so important a one that I have thought
it well to quote here its most salient passages.
" For raany years previous to the Russian war the
nurabers of the Array were annually fixed without
rauch reference to the state of our foreign relations.
" Europe, exhausted by the long wars of Napoleon,
was the source neither of jealousy nor apprehension.
" Differences there were, and war even there was ;
but at a distance, and generally over the corpus vile of
sorae Asiatic or African Power, whora all felt not to
be worth perraanently quarrelling about. For these
objects, augmentations of the Navy sufficed, and our own
insular security at home reraained unchallenged. The
Navy was looked upon as our only and sufficient
defence. In fact, the cadre of the Array was fixed raore
with a view to Colonial service than to Home defence.
It was only necessary, after fixing the number of
regiments or men for Colonial and Indian service,
to add such a number to remain in England as should
give a fair share of home service to recruit their
health to the battahons returning from abroad ; the
general rule being ten years abroad to five at home
except in India, where they usually reraained longer.
" We must look at our Army now altogether from

212 NATIONAL DEFENCE [chap, vi
a different point of view. Our insular security as
such is lost. No raere preponderance of our fleet in
the Channel can insure perfect safety. Steara has
in a great raeasure deprived us, even if preponderating,
of the power of blockade.
" Neither adverse winds nor adverse currents can
prevent a fleet putting to sea in a dark night. Indeed,
such conditions would tell raore for the blockaded,
than for the blockading, fleet, who would be forced,
for their own security, to stand out frora a lee shore.
Nor could the blockade be maintained by the
whole force, a portion of which must always, at inter
vals, be returning to our own ports to coal.
" The popular expression that steam has bridged
the Channel is a very insufficient description of the
change that has taken place in our position. A bridge
is a known point, and can be raade, by a tete de pont,
by a few well-placed batteries raking it, or by a mine
under an arch, much raore irapassable than any sea.
The passage by sea cannot be rained, and has no
known terrainus.
" An erainent writer on the defence of England has
said that England would be far safer if she had no
Navy. This paradox, in itself exaggerated, means,
that we put an undue trust in our first line of de
fence, which may constantly be evaded, if not broken
through, and that, putting that blind confidence in it,
we neglect the second, which must resist aggression
on our own shores.
" We raust, therefore, now consider our Home Force
as something raore than a recruiting depOt for our
Indian and Colonial Armies. We must, in some degree,
measure the proportion of our forces at home by
the nurabers which our neighbours maintain abroad.
I apprehend that if the Great Powers of .Europe
were to reduce their Armies to the nurabers which
we now have in England, we should disband two-
thirds of our force. In fact, our strength must bear
some relation to the strength of others. We must
look, then, to the moral and material state of Europe
in deciding what are to be the forces which we must
in future maintain.
"In 1854 the spell of the long peace, which had
lasted between the Great Powers since 181 5, was.
broken. Since that tirae, Europe has resounded with

i8s9-6o] HERBERT'S MEMORANDUM 213
the din and rumours of war, and the preparation for
it. A Bonaparte has seized on the throne of France,
backed by the iraraense raajority of the votes of the
French people, whose choice, if only for his own
security, he seeks to confirm as well as to justify,
by adding in every way to the power and influence
of France.
" He has, in his writings, when it seemed very
improbable that he should ever have it in his power
to accomplish his designs, announced it to be his
raission to destroy the treaties of 18 15, and to punish
those who were parties to thera.
The treaties of 181 5 have already received a heavy
blow at his hands. Of the Great Powers who forced
those treaties on France, he has, in concert with
others, humiliated, first, Russia, and secondly, Austria ;
and he has had the skill, by great and sudden raodera
tion, in the hour of victory, to secure each of those
Powers as allies, alraost as confederates, against those
whom he might afterwards attack. Prussia and
England still reraain.
" These opinions or speculations may appear fanci
ful ; but we have to deal with a man who has himself
proclaimed his readiness to make war for an idea.
He clearly has no horror of war, nor any scruple in
making it. The traditions of his family have leavened
his whole mind, and in his statecraft, peace and war
are two alternatives which it is always at the option
of a ruler to choose from, as the convenience of the
raoraent raay suggest. There is, however, more
tangible evidence in the enormous preparations, naval
and military, and the accumulation of warlike stores
which is going on in France.
" The Italian war is concluded. When peace was
raade, a reduction of the French Array took place;
but not to nurabers so low as the peace establishment
previous to the war. This reduction was effected
by the granting of unlimited furloughs to the number
of men by whom it was intended that the total of
the Army should be reduced ; but in doing so, the
Emperor raade a change in the terras hitherto iraposed
on the raen, and reduced frora thirty down to fifteen
days the time within which, on his call, these men
were to return to their standards.
"The vast number of horses which had been

214 NATIONAL DEFENCE [chap, vi
collected for the Italian war were not sold, but lent
to the farmers, to be resuraed at any raoraent.
"The gun-boats which had conveyed the Arrny and
its stores and munitions from Marseilles to Genoa
were paid off, but not at Toulon. They were sent
round to be laid up at Brest and Cherbourg. Since
that time ninety guns have been added to the arma
ment of Brest.
" The islands adjacent to the coast, and the forts
along it, have been connected by electric telegraphs.
" At Cherbourg, as we have just read in the report
of Mr. Hamond, ten forts raounting rifled guns are
about to be added to the sea-face of Cherbourg, and
a large additional fort is to be erected on the shore
opposite to Isle Pelee.
" Iraraense contracts for coal have been entered into
with Belgiura with a good deal of secrecy, where
the Eraperor has paid a much larger sum per ton,
for a very inferior coal, than he would have done had
he made his contracts at Newcastle. About 35,000
tons will thus corae by rail, in addition to 15,000
tons of English coal. At Brest a sirailar enorraous
accuraulation of coal is being made. The railway
is also bringing large supplies of ammunition.
" Enorraous deliveries of herap are also being raade
from Russia, though this last contract, says Mr.
Hamond, was made before the Italian war : (though
how far a great outlay in naval stores was necessary
for an attack on Austria may be doubtful). At any
rate, Cherbourg was not a natural selection for a base
of operations against Lombardy. On the other hand,
it is fair to state that no extraordinary exertions are
being made at Toulon.
" In England we know of large contracts now making
by France for every description of store : one house
alone in Liverpool contracting for iron plates to be
applied to ten frigates, and to be delivered in the
year. We know of a contract for 2,500 guns for some
one European Power, name not stated. But the French
Governraent is in treaty with Mr. Whitworth for the
use of his patent, and Mr. Whitworth is erecting
large factories for the raaking of rifles and guns.
"The French Government are not about to use,
in order to convey their force to China, the large
amount of steam transports which they bought or

i8s9-6o] HERBERT'S MEMORANDUM 215
built during the last few years, but are going to buy
steara-transport here, as being cheaper than hiring.
"These are some of the indications of coming
mischief and of warlike intentions on the part of the
French Governraent. Each may not be of importance
in itself; but the aggregation of them is not without
significance. At the same tirae there is an iraraense
araount of exaggeration afloat, which adds to the fears
by which it is generated. 1 have referred only to
facts authoritatively known. But what is far worse
is the hostile feeling in the French nation, brought
about, no doubt, in great part, by the constant and
unraeasured abuse of the Eraperor by our Press.
War with England is the popular topic. It is can
vassed in every cafe. The expectation of it seems
universal. At St. Malo the tradesmen send in their
bills to the English residents, fearing a sudden
departure. "Colonel Claremont tells us that the plan of lending
out the superfluous horses failed entirely at Chalons ;
the farraers refusing the loan of thera on the ground
that it was not worth while when they would have
to give thera up so soon for a war against England.
" The provincial Press is much more under the
thumb of the authorities than the Parisian. In Paris
there is sorae decency observed and sorae latitude
allowed. In the provinces raatters are carried on
with much less delicacy. The result is that " La
Presse de la Prefecture," as it is called, reflects
exactly the wishes and feelings of the local authorities,
and it is far more open-mouthed against England
than the Paris Press. So far back as the Queen's
visit to Cherbourg, paraphlets exciting hostility to
England were distributed araong the troops. This
has been since continued. It is irapossible to believe
that this is done without the cognisance of the highest
authority. " France has becorae rauch raore raercantile than
forraerly. Being so, she was rauch opposed to the
Italian war. She feared the disturbance to trade, and
the lowering of securities which a war was sure to
create. The Emperor for a time apparently yielded to
the feeling, but he ultimately made war, and France,
which was so opposed to it, became reconciled to and
adopted it the moment a successful battle was fought.

2i6 NATIONAL DEFENCE [chap, vi
There is no such feeling to restrain the Emperor
now; nor much sign of the Emperor desiring to
restrain the people. There is, however, rauch cora-
raercial uneasiness at Paris, and trade is said to be
rauch checked.
" Other nations in Europe are alarraed. Prussia is
reorganising her Array and Landwehr, and making
iraraense exertions in the creation of a new artiUery.
Russia has, by Colonel Simraons's report from
Warsaw, made an increase to her Army which he
estimates at 100,000 men. After her successes in
Circassia it is difficult to understand why this sudden
increase is made. I mention it merely as an instance
of the general uneasiness and preparation against
danger. "Lastly, we raust not omit to take into our
consideration the deep suspicion and fear of the
designs of France which fill the public mind at this
moment. These national instincts are not often
entirely wrong, and, if there be evidence of their
being well founded, we must not throw them out of
consideration. At any rate, be they right or be they
wrong, they are an element of danger, for they
contribute to familiarise the public mind, on both
sides of the water, with the prospect of the war which
one hopes for and the other fears.
" It appears, then, to me, that, in fixing the amount
of military force in future to be maintained in England,
we cannot throw out of view either the altered position
and the diminution of our security which the universal
application of steam has effected, or the iraraense
armaraents within two hours' sail of us to which I
have already alluded."

Elaborate calculations as to the araount of force
at horae, and the raanner in which it could be employed,
follow. These it is unnecessary to reproduce, but
the conclusion arrived at, and very clearly shown, was
that, in the event of any sudden outbreak of war, that
force was quite insufficient even for defensive purposes.
" We cannot now produce in the field as many raen as
the French lost in the Italian carapaign."

i859-6o] HERBERT'S MEMORANDUM 217
Mr. Herbert next discusses in much detail various
rearrangements as to organisation and the location of
regiments, which have now lost all interest. The pro
blems presented by the reorganisation of the Indian
Army are also dealt with, and he then proceeds to the
garrisons in Colonies, since withdrawn from all points
save those of Iraperial iraportance.
" A plan for the regulation of our military colonial
expenditure will be shortly before the Government.
By this plan I hope we shall be enabled to place the
Iraperial contribution to the defence of the Colonies
on some better and more intelligible footing. At
f resent, places which we occupy as garrisons for
mperial purposes alone, such as Malta and Corfu,
contribute to their own defence ; while Colonies not
iraportant as Iraperial garrisons, with a large popula
tion and a thriving revenue, contribute nothing.
I entertain hopes of sorae ultimate saving in men
and in money from the adoption of this plan, if
approved ; but the proceedings raust be cautious, and
the good effects proportionably slow. It will operate,
probably, in two ways : partly by reducing the araount
of force now called for by the Colonies, and partly
by relieving the Iraperial exchequer of a portion of
the cost of raaintaining those forces. Perhaps, on the
whole, it will tend raore to the dirainution of the
Iraperial force in the Colonies than to their pay
ment frora the colonial exchequers ; but the Colonies
are distant, and the proposal will not be agreeable to
them, so that their future relation to the Iraperial
Governraent as regards defence raust be a raatter
of negotiation.
" I cannot venture, therefore, to reckon on the
withdrawal, during the next year, of raore than
two battalions, if even I can get thera. Between
India, China, and the Colonies, however, I hope to
have nine or ten battalions home by the end of the
year 1860-61.
" What I am anxious, therefore, to do is, to make the
augmentation which is iraperatively necessary for our
safety now, so far as it is possible, in such a manner

2i8 NATIONAL DEFENCE [chap, vi
as may enable us to reduce our Home and Colonial
force without difficulty or expense as the regiments
frora India and China return, and gradually so to
redistribute our forces between the Colonies and
India as to give us the benefit of a larger force at
horae." He proceeds to point out that the pay of the soldier
in 1S59 is what it was in 1797, and proposes its in
crease to fifteen pence a day.
He next turns to the Militia Force and shows that
it was at that raoraent raaintained at a raaxiraum
of cost and a rainiraum of utility. Less that half
the norainal strength was present with the battalions.
" An erabodied Militia costs as rauch as an equivalent
force of regulars, nay, sometimes raore, for under the
volunteering systera it is generally short in nurabers
as far as the privates are concerned, while the coraple-
raent of the officers is always full.
" It is not, therefore, a cheap substitute for regular
troops, and is a great weakening of the Reserve. It
is bringing into the first line in peace that which
ought to be reserved for war.
" As, however, it is clear that if embodied it is just
as important that the battalions of Militia should be
kept in the highest state of efficiency as the battalions
of the Line, it is a mere waste of money to give
bounty to raen volunteering from the one to the other.
It is simply an attempt to lengthen the blanket by
sewing on at one end what has been cut off from
the other. If men were encouraged to volunteer from
one half of our regular battalions into the other, and
paid money for so doing, it would not be raore absurd
or raore wasteful or raore destructive to discipline.
I propose, therefore, to put an end entirely to' the
systera of inviting or encouraging volunteering from
the Militia to the Line, whether from embodied or dis
embodied regiments. ...
" If the Government will consent to the additions
to the Regular Forces which I have already proposed,
I strongly advise that the whole force of embodied
Militia shQuld be gradually disembodied, and that we

i8s9-6o] HERBERT'S MEMORANDUM 219
should return to the system recognised and established
by the Militia Law, keeping the MUitia permanently
disembodied but annually trained.
" No one is raore responsible than I ara myself for
another part of the present system, not meant ever
to be a systera, but introduced under the pressure
of circumstances, and as a temporary expedient, during
the Russian war.
"We called out the Militia in a war in which in
vasion was not only not apprehended, but irapossible.
Every part of Russia was blockaded, and France,
the only other European maritime Power, was our
close Ally.
"We had no Army, and we wanted to create one
to operate imraediately, and I thought then, and I
still think, that raany who were unwilling to enter
the Army, and undertake its lengthened liabilities,
would enter the Militia with its short and corapara
tively lucrative conditions, and thus contract such
a taste for railitary life as would induce thera after
wards to volunteer for the Line. As an expedient —
a costly but very effective expedient that was com
pletely successful — every encouragement was given
to volunteering from the Militia unto the Line. The
Militia was for a tirae ruined, but the regular Army
was recruited.
" The numbers who so passed through the Militia
into the Line were very great, amounting altogether
to 71,182 men formally released, but a vast nuraber
likewise joined the regulars, of whom we have no
account, they having so passed surreptitiously from
the embodied or the disembodied Militia, and not
under the regulations adopted in order to proraote
the raoveraent.
" Unfortunately, however, when the necessity passed
away the practice was continued. The War Office,
who are responsible for the expense, did not interfere,
and the mihtary authorities were, of course, not likely
to originate the abandonment of a system by which
they got for the Army not only raany recruits,
but also partially, and soraetiraes perfectly, trained
raen. " I have slowly, and raost unwillingly, arrived at
the conclusion that here ?gain our true policy is to

220 NATIONAL DEFENCE [chap, vi
return to the old and traditional system, and to the
practical execution of the law as it now exists.
" With our jealousy of a standing Army we have
never perraitted a conscription for the Queen's forces.
But tirae out of raind we have ruled that all raales
capable of bearing arms are liable to be called upon
for the defence of the country.
" The ballot is now the law of the land. By merely
abstaining frora an exceptional proceeding, with a
view to its suspension, the ballot coraes into operation ;
but its machinery is very complicated. It ignores
altogether the existence of a census, which, indeed,
did not exist when the present MiHtia Act was first
passed. " It takes us a year to augraent our Array to any
sensible extent. When it is augmented it is still
a raw, young, unseasoned, and weak augmentation,
and when the eraergency is over, whether we maintain
the augraentation or reduce it, either course is still
raost expensive.
" This panic is growing, and a resistance to its
deraands only irritates and increases it. What raen
want now is security against a danger which they see
clearly, but which, not seeing the means of ready
resistance, they perhaps overrate. I think their fear
not unfounded, and their estimate of our means of
defence just in principle, even if it be exaggerated ;
but if allowed to grow, it will invite, and perhaps
provoke, the very danger it fears, for nothing is so
dangerous as panic, and fear soon turns into hate.
"I propose, then, to bring in a Bill to araend the
Militia Law, by rendering the processes of the ballot
shorter, raore siraple, cheaper, and, I think, less
oppressive. If this be passed, I propose to introduce
a Bill for the consolidation of the whole Militia Law,
which is now scattered through raany Acts of Parlia
raent, and, frora their partially repealing one another,
very nearly unintelligible."
As might have been expected, the views expressed
in this Meraorandura were by no raeans palatable to
Mr. Gladstone, and the following correspondence
took place between hira and Mr. Herbert :

I859-60] GLADSTONE'S REPLY 221
Mr. Gladstone to Mr. Herbert.
" Downing Street,
" November 27th, 1859.
" My dear Herbert,
" I have sorae reraarks to offer on your printed
paper. They shall be as few and brief as possible, and
they are rendered with every readiness to submit,
where they touch on military questions, to the raost
suraraary correction.
" I pass by the prefatory part, at present, with the
single reraark that the statements which it contains
respecting warlike preparations, and respecting the
teraper of the people in France, considering that
they are made to carry in the sequel a very heavy
weight, should surely enter more into particulars both
of detail and of verification. I mean, for example,
where you speak of ' the vast number of horses '
lent to the farraers, the ' immense contracts for coal,'
the ' enormous accumulation ' at Brest, the ' large
supplies ' of aramunition, the ' enormous deliveries '
of hemp, the ' large contracts ' in England for ' every
description of store.' You may have measured the
araounts, and verified the sources; but neither of
these is raade to appear. This seeras the more need
ful, as some of the statements are such as scarcely
can be correct in the breadth with which they are
stated. "It is true that we live at a raoraent when passion
in its various forras will supply any deficiencies of
evidence, but this is not the resource on which you
would wish to depend.
" I go, however, to the other parts of the plan.
" I. Your expectations frora iraproved arrange
raents with the Colonies are feeble, for they corae only
to this, that you 'entertain hopes of some ultimate
saving.' " In this matter little or nothing will be effected,
unless language is held, however cautiously, showing
that the people of this country have their rights, and
that its Government will no longer continue the follies
in which they have so long indulged. I do not raean
that these are the terras to be eraployed, but they
are the ideas to be conveyed, and they are the only
ones which will do any justice to the subject.

222 NATIONAL DEFENCE [chap, vi
" Time, as you say, will be requisite for working
the plan fully out, should it be adopted, but why
should nothing be done at present ? Why should not
the force in British North America be nearer the
Eoint at which it stood in 1855 ? (The latest statement
efore me is that of 1857.) Why should not the work
of reduction be prosecuted in the West Indies, which
it might almost be said are safer without our troops
than with them ?
" 2. In the Mediterranean Colonies you propose to
increase the force. I do not see the reasons stated for
this increase in Gibraltar and Malta ; but with regard
to the Ionian Islands I go a step further, and avow
that I am more than sceptical about the expediency of
maintaining there a force of 3,876 men. Some eleven
or twelve hundred of these men are in the outlying
islands, and are raerely a bait to an enemy. It would
be, in my opinion, ludicrous to say that such a force
was required for maintaining order. There is no fear
of political outbreak. I venture to tell you that much
more harra than good has been done by the main
tenance of so large a force in Cefalonia. It first en
couraged men of the highest class in very oppressive
proceedings against their tenants, and then gave them
the opportunity of throwing upon England the im
mense odium (known throughout Europe, though not
here) of repressing the consequences of their acts.
But even for that purpose no such amount of force
is requisite as we keep in the outlying islands : I again
say, a prize to our enemy and a trap to ourselves.
"3. You propose, if I understand you rightly (but
I cannot raake the figures square), to add 26,500
men to the Army. A large part of this increase
is to be in the Artillery, and frora soraething you say
I presurae that you do not think we shall even then
have done with the augmentation of that particular
arm. (I would, in passing, just beg you again to
inquire whether Corfu requires 700 artillerymen ; the
guns in the other islands are, as I believe and have
always understood, a pure and sheer folly, unless for
saluting.) Your reasons for a present increase are
clear, and I do not doubt that, as you propose, it may
be right to set about recruiting immediately.
"4. But as regards the proposed general increase
of force, I would again suggest to you that the time

1859-60] GLADSTONE'S REPLY 223
is not yet come when it is desirable to fix the precise
araount of force for the coraing year. We shall soon
know whether the French are sincere in the intention
of making a commercial arrangement. If they make
it, the raoral and political significance of the raeasure
will be such as to deserve being taken into full con
sideration in fixing the Estimates for the coming year.
Unless within a few weeks there is progress on their
side, we must, I fear, come to the conclusion that
nothing is likely to be done. And I do not know
any other early hope of acting on the public mind in a
sense favourable to peace.
" 5. Apart frora this consideration, I find you
appear to propose an augmentation of the regiments
of the Line, which is temporary in two senses and
in two different degrees. You propose to provide
for the interval before twenty-six battalions shall
have returned from India. Considering how uncer
tain is the tirae of their return, I do not venture to
say you can wait for all these. Still I do not see that
it would be unreasonable to put pressure on the
Government of India, and require the sending home
forthwith of some not inconsiderable force, unless upon
its responsibility it shall declare such a measure to be
dangerous. This is what would at once be done if
there were at home an impatience of taxation. I submit
that we should act, as nearly as may be, as if such
impatience existed. For its turn will assuredly come,
and then we shall not be excused for having put the
country to needless charge, because we may plead
that it was disposed to be liberal.
" 6. But, secondly, your augmentation is to be tem
porary in the sense of supplying a gap which will
most probably be supplied of itself to the extent
of nine or ten battalions, by the end of the year
1860-61. You say you will take thera into account.
But the calculation you proceed to raake, which is
the basis of your subsequent proposal, is founded
on a previous computation, and omtts them. I would
argue that we ought not now to raise men to supply
the place of these nine or ten battalions, or of such
others as might also be obtained by prompt raeasures
within moderate liraits frora the Colonies or frora
India. " 7. The objection which I cannot but feel to antici-

224 NATIONAL DEFENCE [chap, vi
pating, in the apparent absence of all immediate
danger, supplies that are likely to be available within
six, twelve, or fifteen months, is greatly strengthened
when it is proposed to throw a fraction of the recruit
ing into this year, or, in other words, (i) again to
unsettle this year's Estimates over and above what
events in China may be requiring, justify ; and (2) to
do this in the hope of relieving somewhat the
Estimates of next year.
"The practice of Supplemental Estimates is raost
injurious, not only to all financial arrangements, which
they throw into confusion, but likewise to Parlia
raentary control, which, pushed a little further than
they now have gone, they would reduce to a nullity.
I feel it ray duty to resist, to the best of ray power,
all new demands growing up after the Estimates have
been voted, unless when they are founded upon
circurastances of an urgent character that are also
posterior to the annual settleraent, but specially if
they be in any degree intended to relieve the coraing
Estiraates. "8. I have not a word to say against the proposal,
if you think the time has come for it, to increase the
pay of the soldier. I should have been very glad if
the increase could have been so adjusted as to work
in favour of raerit ; but probably you have considered
this, and found it impracticable. 1 ask, however, two
queries : First, why the pay of the Artillery is increased
if the artilleryman has in fact a much raore agreeable
duty, and if, as I gather frora your paper, you
recruit without difficulty for that service. Secondly,
is it not possible to iraprove the condition of the
soldier and his character by allowing hira, more than
is done in our service, free use of spare time for
occupations which might bring him sorae gain, and
which would even in many cases be of great service
to him, and through him to the State, during the
operations of a campaign ?
" 9. There is a great deal of interesting and valuable
raatter in the development of your plans, on which
it is needless for me to attempt any coraraent ; but
ray last criticism on your paper is this, that it does
not clearly state whether on the basis of it you wiU
ask the Cabinet to decide on the proper amount of
force for the coming year. Independently of such

i859-6o] GLADSTONE'S REPLY 225
reraarks as I have raade above, let rae observe that
if this be intended, and if you ask for that decision
now, we ought to be informed raore fully and clearly
what is to be the amount of charge. The estimate
you have given includes a part only of those addi
tional charges which your plan seeras to entail ;
nor do I see that, on the other hand, it takes credit
for the relief which, as I understand, some parts of it
would bring. Above all, it contains no specific state
ment of intentions with regard to the great subject
of a systera of new fortifications and their cost. This,
I apprehend, ought clearly to be before us, as forraing
a very weighty part of a scherae which we ought not
to dispose of piece-raeal, were it for no other reason
than this, that it will be issued and judged of as a
whole by Parliaraent and the world.
" On sorae points I raay have failed to apprehend
your meaning, and I am not sure that in every place
it is quite clearly expressed ; but what is wanting
on ray side you will easily supply.
" Ever yours,
" W. E. Gladstone.
"The formidable question of the ballot [i.e. for the
Militia] is opened to me for the first time ; it requires
to be considered in raany points of view."

Mr. Gladstone to Mr. Herbert.
" 12, Downing Street,
"November 2ith, 1859.
" My dear Herbert,
" This is ray second barrel, and is airaed at
your general views of French invasion, expressed in
your letter of the 23rd, and in the prefatory portion
of your confidential paper. Take this as a notice
generously given that you need not read the letter
forthwith unless you please.
"As I understand you, your forraer disincHnation
to give credit to the scherae of a French invasion
has been overcome by evidence, and you are now
convinced that 'a great calamity is impending.' You
do not think Louis Napoleon will be deterred by
principle. You think he has no serious difficulty to
VOL. IL 15

226 NATIONAL DEFENCE [chap, vi
overcorae in the interposition of the sea between us,
for that is now easier to pass than if we were
divided only by a river. You state that the French
Array has for years been inflaraed by paraphlets dis
tributed araong them, and recommending invasion :
if, as I presume, that is the meaning of your words
' provoking hostility.' You describe the upshot as
being that war with England is discussed in every
cafe and is universally expected.
"To one of these opinions I subscribe. I do not
believe that any scruples would deter the Eraperor
of the French if he saw, or thought he saw, a clear
interest in the invasion of England.
"Yet I cannot think it right to assume, as you
seem to rae to do, that in his character of an ideologist
he is ready for that desperate measure. All the great
steps of his foreign policy are under our view. Some
of their features are clear. He has had in them a
large regard to his own personal position. Feeling
has, as in the case of the Italian war, entered into
them. But they have been generally, alraost uni
formly, governed by a spirit of great moderation — a
moderation which I do not think equally traceable
in the proceedings of our own Foreign Office during
the sarae period ; a raoderation which we turn against
hira in the spirit I think of an almost paradoxical
partisanship, when we say that his plan is to go round
the nations of Europe, and first by beating, to humble,
then by coaxing, to attach them.
" I have too good an opinion of his understanding
to suppose he entertains a scheme so chiraerical. And
I say if this was his object, he has not succeeded;
he has not attached either Austria or Russia. Temp
orarily associated they may be, attached they cannot
be, to a revolutionary dynasty, of which it is one
among the curses that, however destructive it may be
to liberty, it cannot solidly or permanently harmonise
with authority.
" Russia had two eneraies : of these one proved to
be less, and the other more exacting. If you are
Qonvinced that where we differed with France about
Russia we were right and he was wrong ; if you think
it would have been wise to continue the war after
the taking of Sebastopol instead of closing it ; if you
think the language (not of armed neutrality, but of

1859-60] GLADSTONE'S REPLY 227
disarraed hostility, or peace in the spirit of war) held
in this country by the Press and otherwise was the
wise and the right language, — then there is roora for
the inference that Louis Napoleon was engaged in
the coaxing policy. But if our course was on the
whole less reasonable than his, if it was better to
give Russia credit for having sraarted under her
terrible inflictions, and to put a fair construction on
her acts and words where they could bear it, then
any advantage which France gained after the peace,
from greater favour with Russia, was really owing
to our own acts more than hers, and was in the
main a fair advantage.
" But this I assert : that if we will but divest our
selves of that arrogance in tone and bearing — I must
add, of that onesidedness in our modes of judgment
for ourselves and for others, which are so much com
plained of — then we, though we have a free Govern
raent, have it in our power to stand better in the long
run as the real props of peace and of order even with
the despotic governments of Europe, than France with
her revolutionary and really — ?.e. ultimately — anarchical
despotisra, her greater raeans of injuring the rest of
the Continent of Europe, and the teraptations to such
a course, greater in proportion to those raeans.
" Now, with regard to the evidence of a coraing
French invasion, you evidently fear that I ' shut my
eyes to an immense risk ' ; and I frankly retaliate by
telling you that I do not think you handle the testi
raonies altogether in a judicial spirit, and that I doubt
whether araong the agencies that have produced your
conversion is not included the power, influence, and
infection of national eraotion upon a generous and
syrapathetic raind. I will first criticise a little what
you say of it, and then lay rayself open to your fire
in return.
" First, I frankly own, that notwithstanding your
disparaging cornparison, I still greatly prefer the
Channel to the Rhine, and I shall attach far greater
value than you do to our nautical means of defence
when once we begin to correct (as we may very
rapidly do) our senseless system of dispersing force
all over the world, mainly for purposes, and with
consequences either null or absolutely mischievous.
No army but an overwhelraing one would land in

228 NATIONAL DEFENCE [chap, vi
England for the purpose of occupation. I do not
believe in the facility of landing an overwhelraing
array (of course I raean overwhelraing as corapared
with our force) with its materiel; I am yet raore
sceptical as to the chances France would run in
estabhshing a base of operations. It not only seeras
plain to rae that it would not answer for her, in point
of that miserable abortion called prestige, even to
occupy London itself, and then see her occupying
army reduced to surrender; but I am convinced that
this is plain to her also — not indeed, to every wiseacre
in every cafe, but to the minds that direct the policy.
" You seem to infer the EngHsh from the Italian
war. I think it an illegitimate inference. For four
hundred years France and Austria have struggled
frora tirae to tirae for supreraacy of influence in Italy.
The renewal of that struggle, when for nearly Haifa
century Austria has had the upper hand, presents in
itself nothing so very strange. The occupation of
Ancona in 1831 wanted but a little of renewing it;
but this was not a mere renewal of the ancient con
test. Italy has been confessedly for years an European
danger — quite as much an European danger as were,
in 1853, the relative positions of Turkey and Russia.
We used force in that latter question (at least so we
said) for European objects. Had there been the same
union of sentiment araong the Great Powers, they
raight just as rationally have corapelled Austria to
come to an arrangement. There was not that union ;
and we wisely held off. France thought otherwise,
and doubtless had airas of her own ; but still the fact
remains that she used force to deal with an European
danger. The further facts remain : first, that she
earnestly besought us to concert with her (Blue Book,
p. 328) the best raeans of attaining the objects professed
by our previous policy ; secondly (I raust say), in the
course of the negotiations, she over and over again
bound herself to fair and raoderate terras of adjust
ment. It is no just inference from her having made
such a war (apart from all questions of coraparative
danger or facility) that she is ready to invade England.
"But this invasion seems to be at our doors, for
the farmers at Chalons refused the loan of horses from
the Government, on the ground that they would be
wanted so soon for a war with England. I know

i859-6o] GLADSTONE'S REPLY 229
Colonel Clareraont is believed to be a good witness ; but
surely such a stateraent, put into so prorainent a place,
was well worth verifying and testing. For if this was
the real ground of the proceeding, the farmers about
Chalons must be very extraordinary farmers. It is to
be presumed that they were not full stocked already,
otherwise the offer would fail on other grounds. Did
they then suppose, when this offer was raade in
auturan, that England was to be invaded before
winter ? Hardly ; and if they did not, and wanted
horses for their ploughing and seed tirae, and would
not accept the loan of them, because in the next or a
future year they would be reclaimed, I again say they
must be very extraordinary farmers. Now, do not
condemn this as minute criticisra. My raeaning is
that the evidence is unsifted evidence, and I avow my
opinion that such evidence, until sifted, should not
be used nor reported as part of the foundation for the
proceedings of a Government — proceedings which, by
multiplying preparations for war, have in the present
state of men's minds no small tendency to bring it
about. " If you ask me what I would do with this evidence,
I answer at once. Sift it ; appoint raen ; use your
raultitude of agents abroad, and your ample means,
to examine every one of these stories, which may be
mountains or may be molehills, and let us have, with
the utmost degree of particularity that can be reached,
the whole attainable evidence on such a vital matter.
" It seems a little hard to say that the treaties of
181 5 have already received a heavy blow at the hands
of the Emperor of the French, when our great com-
Elaint of him is that, having entered into his work,
e did not go through with it, but left Venetia in the
hands of the Austrians ; and that he has since been
endeavouring, above and under ground, to bring about
the restoration of the Grand Duke of Tuscany — in
conformity with the treaties of 1815.
" If pamphlets exciting hostility to England have
for years been distributed among the French troops,
cannot ' English gold ' buy a single copy ? Would
it not be well that we should see one or two, or
know something of their contents ? Particularly as
our informants know thera, since they tell us that
they excite hostility against us.

230 NATIONAL DEFENCE [chap, vi
" It appears to me hardly impartial to speak of the
evidence of coming war as if it were consentient and
universal. You heard the other day, at this house,
of a witness who seeraed to be, from the descriptions,
competent, trustworthy, and of wide experience, and
who reported that he could not find any of this
evidence. Mr. Charles Sumner has lately spent some
time in France. He mixes largely with raen, and is
alike constant and acute, as I know, in his endeavours
to learn their views. He says he found that when
they knew hira to be an Araerican they spoke to him
about England without reserve. He declared (at the
Duke of Argyll's table) that he had nowhere found
any trace of a desire for war with England.
" But as I have said, the whole question of the state of
feeling in France, and of the preparations made by the
French Governraent, appears to me to deserve, I might
say to require, a secret, comprehensive, and searching
investigation, which might furnish us with definite and
collected results, at least for parts of the question.
" Now I will venture on some general observations
of ray own. They are by no raeans offered as con
clusive. I admit that I cannot dismiss all uneasiness
at French preparations, but I think that such observa
tions may present to view true eleraents of the case.
" There is no question with us of an aggressive war
against France. The question is of a war in which
they are to be aggressors without cause, and we are
innocently. to defend ourselves, I mean to begin with
defending ourselves.
" There are some evidences of fact against the
supposition that such a war is intended. It cannot
well, I assume, be brought about without a previous
development of acrimony in . our mutual relations.
There was strong acrimony in the relations of France
with Austria long before the declaration of January ist
to M. Hubner; and yet, as I have said, France was
willing (at the least) to have waived that war long after
the date of the declaration.^ Has France shown any
tendency to bring this acrimony into her relations with
us ? I must confess it appears to me that she has, on the
contrary, been most friendly, eminently and peculiarly
so, in the raanageraent of those relations.
' No: the engagement with Sardinia had been previously con
cluded ; but this was not known at the time. — S.

i859-6o] GLADSTONE'S REPLY 231
" In some cases, such as the Principalities and the
Suez Canal, we have, whether rightly or wrongly,
pressed very hard upon her. In the former, we
f)ledged her publicly in the face of Europe to a policy
avouring the Union, and then turned right round upon
her, joining with Austria, and ourselves turning the
scale against the raeasure we had forraerly proraoted.
In the affair of Perira, in that of Morocco too, and
perhaps other exaraples raight readily be found, there
has been a like spirit shown by France. It raay be
said, ' Yes, but she is storing up a catalogue of
grievances to be produced at the proper tirae against
us.' It is, however, a little hard that if France (as in
the Austrian case) coraplains, it is to stand as proof
of hostile intention ; if she does not coraplain, but
shows rauch patience and long-suffering, that is to
stand as proof of hostile intention too.
" Her great anxiety to obtain our support and con
currence in the Italian congress does not square with
the assuraption that she is resolved on a rupture. It
raay be replied that she does this in order to extricate
herself from the embarrassraents of Villa Franca, and
therefore for her own interest. Yes, but this is one
proof araong raany, or one instance how rauch her
interests run in the sarae track with ours, and how
unlikely we are to have legitiraate causes of quarrel.
" The comraon effort against China, so rauch desired
and urged by her, much more than by us, is an
important circumstantial proof in the same sense.
She cannot fight beside us there and against us here.
She cannot limit the tirae which operations in that
distant quarter will occupy. We hope there raay
be none, or, if any, that they raay be short ; but this
we and she can neither guarantee nor effectively
control. It is most improbable that, if she had a
fixed purpose of quarrel with us, she would place the
tirae of beginning that quarrel by any voluntary act
beyond her own command, or hamper herself in any
degree on a point so vital to her airas.
"A short time ago we were in a desperate
emergency, and every available man was sent to
India. France had, at the very same raoraent, a
plausible cause of war in the affair of the conspiracy
of Orsini. On that question the feeling of all the
despotic States would have been cordially with

232 NATIONAL DEFENCE [chap, vi
Napoleon. Had he not more than a plausible cause
of coraplaint when not only was one Governraent
overthrown upon the Conspiracy Bill, but another,
which for its first act proraised him to proceed with
the measure, for its second turned round upon him
and broke its word ? But ' he was not then prepared.'
Let that pass. Why at least did he not then, under
circurastances so incoraparable, lay his ground for a
change in relations when convenient ?
" There is a raode of judging the conduct of France
which makes the attainment of truth hopeless. Do
what we will, we raay err ; but with this raode we are
certain to err, and that not only with error of the
understanding, but also with raoral error. It is that
raode, too much in vogue araong us, of requiring the
best construction to be put on our own acts, or, worse
still, of forgetting that they can bear more constructions
than one, and at the same time resolutely putting the
very worst construction on the acts of others.
" There is an act of ours, or rather a continuing
action, which, if judged in the way in which we judge
others, appears raore purely offensive than anything
we can charge on France. I raean the harbour and
fortifications of Alderney. If there were a French
island at the distance from Portsmouth which lies
between Alderney and Cherbourg ; if upon this island,
worthless for any other purpose, a sum of from two
to three millions of raoney were being laid out on
considerable fortifications, and on a harbour which
was to have contained (for so we were positively
assured) a large fleet in perfect security ; if, in short,
it were known that French engineers and naval
authorities had promised that Portsmouth should be
hermetically sealed ; we should not raerely have seen
general complaint and alarm, but in all probability it
would have become a subject of forraal reraonstrance
to the Government of France, possibly with ulterior
consequences. " I by no means dismiss the subject of French pre^
parations — I wish to be far better informed upon it;
but I think we should remeraber that they raay be
susceptible of sorae explanations, and even if these
explanations be insufficient to raeet the reports, they
might not be inadequate to the true dimensions of the
facts when ascertained.

i859-6o] GLADSTONE'S REPLY 233
" The English piously believe themselves to be a
peaceful people ; nobody else is of the same belief
The English Press is in constant war against France,
and claims that this shall go for nothing, because the
Government has no control over newspapers. The
answer, from the French point of view, is obvious. If
the newspapers do not write to order, they write to
live, and the tone they take is the true measure of
the public feeling on which they depend. We may
offer explanations, but in order that those explanations
may tell, they must be received in a spirit of^ calm and
impartiality, very different from our own.
" We desire to be strong, but without purposes of
offence. If France desires to be strong at sea, we
assume that it can be for offence only. She has no
Colonies to defend (1 would to God she had) — that is,
she has a few ; she once had a great many, but we
took them frora her. An excellent reason, indeed, why
all her attempts to extend a Navy should be offensive
only, and why she should believe that we never injure
anyone. " The impressions of a people are formed mainly
by their traditions. The tradition of France respect
ing England is that at a very early period of history
her constant policy was invasion of France ; at all
later periods she has been active in leagues against
France. France knows that she is, from her great
power on the Continent, a natural and standing object
of hostile European combinations. She probably does
not yet fully believe, what we know, that the English
nation has ceased to regard her as (in the language
of Mr. Fox) our natural enemy. But she may, nay
must, act in no small degree under the habitual appre
hension of European combinations ; and, although it
raight be absurd to suppose England making war
upon her, it is not so absurd to suppose England a
meraber of one of these corabinations. England was
not far frora a position of this kind at one period of
the present year.
" I think, I believe in comraon with you, that we
raay, before the year expires, have sorae further
evidence of French intentions ; and I ara very sensible
that in this country we raust act with reference not
only to what we think ourselves, but likewise to what
the people think, and may, under all the circumstances

234 NATIONAL DEFENCE [chap, vi
of the case, be expected to think. I will therefore not
pursue the detailed consideration of the supposed
plans of France which you think to be settled, but
will add one or two words of general reraark.
" I do not believe the French to be a ' godless
nation.' It is adraitted that the wise and good of
that nation are against war with England, and I
see no proof as yet that the wise and good there will
fail to have as rauch influence over foreign policy
there as they have here.
" The scheme imputed to France is not merely
wrong, not merely wild and wicked, it is diabolical.
The supposition is that in the raiddle of the nineteenth
century the first nation of the Continent, and the one
which raost exults and least adraits any question about
its realised wealth in railitary glory, is resolved, with
such a resolution as is to bear down all opposition,
to raake a raurderous invasion of England, and to
shake the world with the convulsive conflict of its
two by far mightiest nations, in the total absence of
any rivalry of interest or cause of quarrel, and upon
the contemptible ground that half a century ago
England had the principal share in the last decisive
action of the revolutionary war — England, with whom
France has been ever since at peace, and for more
than half the tirae in peculiar and close alliance.
" Upon the whole, unless in the face of rauch public
and clearer evidence, I do not believe in this Satanic
wickedness. I have more faith in France. I have
also more faith in the public opinion of Europe.
Araidst raany evils and sorrows of the world I see
with joy that that power is graduaUy ripening and
gaining force, and iraposing salutary restraints on
all individual States, at least as to their proceedings
in this quarter of the globe. I believe the action of
that power to be unfavourable to the perpetration of
great criraes, and unfavourable to an assault, alike
gratuitous and raurderous, by France upon England,
which, after all that can be said about our Foreign
Office, and our arrogance and insularity, would stUl
be, and would still be adraitted to be, a monstrous
and a hideous crime. For in the mind of foreign
nations the account after all is not wholly against
England, it is against her chiefly in things partial and
superficial; she is not the less known and felt to

1859-60] GLADSTONE'S REPLY 235
be, in things raore substantial, a mainstay of the
European order, and a great benefactress to the world.
"On the other hand, I cannot think we are suffi
ciently alive to the shame and scandal with which
(not, perhaps, rainutely apportioning the blarae)
posterity, and that an early posterity, will look back
upon the present state of things ; that we labour
sufficiently to find raeans of counteracting the evil,
or are sufficiently anxious to take care for reraoving
sraall causes of offence given by us which, under
fiven circumstances, raay be taken for great. Neither,
must own, does it seem to me that we have any
adequate idea of the predisposing power which an
iraraense series of raeasures of preparation for war
have in begetting war. They constantly familiarise
ideas which when familiar lose their horror ; and they
light an inward flame of excitement, of which, when
it is habitually fed, we lose the consciousness. I do
not share all your dread, I cannot share all your
hopes. If your fears are well founded, safety will
not be found in using convulsive efforts 'to make
the atterapt (at invasion) so dangerous as to be alraost
impossible.' These calls which Lord Brougham has
thundered forth prove nothing so much as that we
are drifting away from the calra which is the first
(though not the only) condition of safety ; and there
remains behind the raelancholy but undeniable
possibility that what raay have been a dream may
also grow to a reality by virtue of the very measures
adopted for its prevention. " Ever yours,
"W. E. Gladstone.
" P.S. — I hear that the Addingtons are corae back
frora travelling in France, and that they report they
have been unable to find evidence of enmity or wrath,
but have heard something to the contrary effect."
Mr. Herbert to Mr. Gladstone.
"War Office,
"November 2Zth, 1859.
" My dear Gladstone,
" Thanks for your letter. It would have been
better perhaps if I had put marginal references to
the facts I quote, showing ray authority. There is

236 NATIONAL DEFENCE fcHAP. vi
only one which I have any doubt about, and I have
sent to Wodehouse to look out the despatch for me —
namely, the statement that the French tradesmen at
St. Malo (not Brest) sent in their bills to the English,
thinking war coming. That, I think, and all the
others I know, I copied from the consular reports
which came round in the red boxes, or from Colonel
Claremont's despatches or reports. The inference, of
course, may be wrong; but I assume the facts to
be good.
" The only statements I have raade with regard
to contracts entered into, or atterapted to be entered
into, by the French Governraent here, are founded
on the word of the contractor, or a report raade to
rae by our officers on the word of the contractor to
one or other of thera.
" Where I have said vast accumulations of coal at
Brest, I should have stated 50,000 tons. I cannot
give the nuraber of horses lent out, but I can give
the nuraber of horses which the Eraperor bought in
England alone for the Italian war, as I have the
returns of the report from the custom house.
" You say that my expectations from the Colonies-
are feeble. 1 am only attempting to estimate what
I think will be done. I am not Colonial Minister,
and cannot and ought not to act in this raatter as if
I were, and I know the difficulties which beset the
path, and the delay that will intervene.
" As regards North America, we have reduced the
force and have withdrawn a battalion, to which loss
the colonists will no doubt gradually accustom
themselves. " I am all for doing whatever can be done so soon
as the Cabinet is agreed on the principle of action ;
but you will not, I fear, find the principle so readily
accepted, and the distance of the Colonies will inter
pose delay, while they themselves will oppose every
resistance. Even Godley warns us that the threat
of separation will be loudly used. The truth is, the
Colonial mind is in no way educated to or prepared
for this change ; . nor is this country as ready for it
as the bearing of the case on their pockets would
lead one, at first, to suppose.
" I propose to strengthen the Mediterranean
garrisons, because, next to England, their danger

i8S9-6o] HERBERT'S REJOINDER 237
would be the greatest if war be imminent. I am not
by any means unwiUing to reduce the force in the
Ionian Islands, which stands on quite other grounds
frora Malta and Gibraltar. I go beyond you in this
matter. 1 am ready to be quit of them and turn them
over to Greece under the sanction of an European
Congress, and with a general guarantee.
" As regards India, 1 have written raost urgently
to Canning. He spares troops for China with reluct
ance. He will give us none till he gets them back.
We shall have them in the beginning of 1861-62. 1 am
willing to concur in putting any pressure upon him ;
but, if there were an impatience of taxation here, the
pressure would be the other way, and we should urge
hira to keep the troops where they cost the country
nothing. But if he sends us troops, I can reduce to
meet the cost of their arrival. I have between augmen
tation of rank and file, which can be instantly lowered
by stopping all recruiting and the embodied militia,
which can be disembodied, a power of reduction under
my plan amounting to no less than 45,000 men.
" I mentioned the question of relieving the Estimates
of next year in your interest. It must a good deal
depend on your financial position. But there is
another view which is more important. The recruit
ing is slow and difficult. It will take a long time
to raise our increased force : the sooner we begin,
therefore, the better. The sooner we have a respect
able available force in the country, the sooner and
more quietly will the present excited state of feeling
subside. " It is true that I have not given a detailed estimate
of the cost of the plan I have proposed, or rather
not an exact estimate. We cannot raise the raen, and
have to maintain them for a whole year in 1860-61.
They will be short of the number during a large
portion of the year. I have stated things at their
worst, which is always the best way ; but I want the
principle of the scheme to be sanctioned, and steps
taken towards its coraraencement.
" I have not included the fortification question,
because, though I have an estimate in rough about
;£¦ 12,000,000, I am confident that it will be susceptible
of rauch reduction in detail, and I had rather Know
raore about it before formaUy proposing it. AU these

238 NATIONAL DEFENCE [chap, vi
questions, however, press for an early decision, for
the Estiraates will have to be raoved earlier than
usual, and they are being made up later than usual.
" Believe me,
" Yours affectionately,
" Sidney Herbert."
To Mr. Gladstone's second letter Sidney Herbert
does not seem to have returned a written answer.
None could be found among the papers at Hawarden,
and it was Mr. Gladstone's own irapression that none
was sent.
When, however, the tirae carae for the preparation
of the Estimates, the discussions of the Cabinet
assuraed a very animated character. Mr. Gladstone
refused to consider the proposed augmentations of
the Military and Naval Estimates, unless it were agreed
that their whole cost should be defrayed by an increased
Income Tax, and that his proposals for a repeal of the
Paper Duty should not be interfered with. When
expostulated with as to the impolicy of abandoning
existing sources of revenue at a tirae at which an
increased expenditure was conteraplated, he answered
that an Incorae Tax was the recognised raode of pro
viding for exceptional railitary wants ; and to the
observation that the increased Incorae Tax would be
highly unpopular, he virtually replied that he hoped
" it would be so," and that nothing would sooner
induce the people to demand the reduction of the
expenditure he abhorred than the pressure of such
a tax upon them. After rauch discussion the remis
sions he wished for were agreed to, and the amount
of the charge to be incurred becarae the sole field
of battle. At length Mr. Gladstone agreed to a total of
;£"29,664,ooo for the whole Naval, MUitary, and Trans
port Estimates, conditionally on the acceptance of his
proposed remissions of taxation. But the prospect

I859-60] REDUCTION OF ESTIMATE 239
of agreement thus raised became again immediately
overclouded. On February 3rd Mr. Herbert received
the following notes :
"There seera to have been raistakes either with
Anderson, or in your departraent. The Estiraates
agreed to by the Cabinet — that is by the raajority,
and acquiesced in by rae after the Cabinet, or rather
again the raajority, had deterrained on the remissions —
were ;£'i 5,050,000 and ;£'soo,ooo for China. They have
now come in, as sent to me by Anderson, at ;^i 5,600,000,
irrespective of the China vote of credit.
" If this were so, it would, I fear, upset the whole
affair. I have not a shilling to spare — i.e. ray surplus
is ^247,000, on an expenditure passing seventy
raillions. " Yours affectionately,
"W. E. G."
" I assure you, with pain, that the state of things
is raost serious. You heard me give the balances
in the Cabinet founded on your statement. I refused
to accept the decision of the Cabinet, which fixed the
total Array, Navy, and Packet Estiraates at £2^,66^,000,
until the Cabinet had also made certain remissions
of duty. I then accepted, and am prepared to abide
by that total of ;^29,664,ooo — the whole taken together
entailing an incorae tax of lod.
"You now propose a further charge of about half
a million. I cannot provide for it. " Ever yours."
Mr. Herbert's answer shows how deeply he felt
the sacrifices made to satisfy, or rather to appease,
Mr. Gladstone. " 49, Belgrave Square,
" February yd.
" The Army Estimates are exactly as I stated to
Sou. The diserabodied Militia Estiraates are what
Ir. Anderson has apparently added to the Army
Estimates. They are entirely distinct from them, and
moved generally at a later period of the session.
" If the disembodied Militia service has not been
previously taken into account, I am afraid it will be

240 NATIONAL DEFENCE [chap, vi
disastrous to you, but I do not see what reraedy
there is. I have reduced the nuraber of raen yet
further to keep within my amount."
" February 6,th.
" I have gone through the disembodied Militia
Estimates and the Array Estimates. The first was
considerably larger than you sta,ted yesterday. By
reducing ;£"24o,ooo on the Army Estimates I have
raade it corae right.
" You have got all the hearts blood out of me"
Meanwhile, the apprehensions of a rupture with
France daily increased, and the annexation of Savoy
and Nice by the Emperor did not diminish them.
Sidney Herbert came to the conclusion that in the
existing circumstances it would be imperative to
suspend the disembodiment of the Militia force, which
it had been proposed to carry out gradually as
regiments of the Line returned from India and other
foreign stations. But such suspension would render
it necessary to resort to a Loan for the purpose of
carrying out the fortification scheme agreed on, as
the whole of the sum which it had been intended to
place on the Estimates for that purpose would be
swallowed up by the pay of the Militia regiraents
which it had been intended to disembody. Sidney
Herbert was well aware that Mr. Gladstone would
strenuously oppose any pause in the reduction of the
MUitia force, and that he, on principle, altogether
objected to a Loan for the construction of fortifications.
Nevertheless, after full reflection, Mr. Herbert ad
dressed the following letter to Lord Palraerston:
" Belgrave Square,
"March 27th, i860.
" My dear Lord Palmerston,
" The last few weeks have seen raany rapid
changes in the prospects of Europe. War between
PVance and Austria. Close friendship between France

1859-60] LETTER TO LORD PALMERSTON 241
and Austria. Coolness between France and Sardinia.
Treaty between France and England. Hostility
between France and the Pope. Treaty between
France and Sardinia. Friendship between France and
Russia. Reconciliation with the Pope, etc., etc., etc.
" No one can tell what the next day may bring
forth ; but this is certain : that whereas a few weeks
ago we thought we might reckon that there was no
danger of an immediate interruption of our good
understanding with France, a coolness, to say the
least of it, now exists, and a new point of departure
now exists, which make it necessary to be on the
watch for any indications of a coming storm.
" We have to deal with a man very uncertain in
his conduct, wielding an immense power, and acting
on his decision, when it is made, with great rapidity
and vigour.
" If we have a rupture with France, there is a risk
that we may have to bear the brunt of it alone.
Spain, with the hope of Gibraltar as a prize, could,
I think, be induced to join France; and her recent
military successes,^ of which she probably greatly
overrates the value, have possibly renewed in her the
taste for military glory. On the other hand, Russia
has never forgiven us the Crimean war, and she
cultivates intimacy with France ; Austria will not
soon forgive us our Italian policy ; and Prussia leans
on Russia, not on England.
" There is very little material as yet for an alliance
strong enough to face danger. We ought, therefore,
I think, to take a careful review of our state of
preparation, in case of any sudden rupture with
France. "On February ist we had, on the British establish
ment at home, in round nurabers 76,000 men and 25,000
Militia, together, 101,000 men. It was then decided
to disembody a portion of the Militia ; and on April
ist we shall have in round numbers about 80,000
raen, including a regiment of cavalry not yet arrived
frora India, and 20,000 MiHtia — raaking a total of
100,000 raen.
" According to the plan for the gradual diserabodi
raent of the Militia, 8,000 raen would be diserabodied
next raonth, leaving 92,000 men. Another regiment
* In Morocco.
VOL. II. 16

242 NATIONAL DEFENCE [chap, vi
of cavalry from India, and increase by recruiting,
would give us 93,000 men ; and we had intended
now to maintain a force for the rest of the year of
about 94,000 raen, which we should do by disera-
bodying an equivalent number of Militia for every
battalion arriving from India, which, when all shall
have arrived that have been announced, will leave us
a remainder of about 5,000 Militia till March, 1861.
"The result of these arrangeraents is siraply a
reduction of 13,000 infantry against an increase of, say,
1,000 Cavalry coraing horae frora India.
" The reduction of 5,000 men is already effected.
There reraains, therefore, to be carried into effect a
reduction of 8,000 raen, which, as now arranged, wiU
be effected next raonth.
" Since this was decided, however, as I said before,
our position is materially altered. It is irapossible
to deny that it is very much altered for the worse.
To increase our force at this moment might have a
bad effect, as iraplying intentions of quarrel which we
do not entertain ; but to dirainish and disband an
existing force is to invite the belief that we are not in
earnest, and will yield rather than raeet the possible
consequences of our reraonstrances. Add to this the
danger of generating a fresh panic at horae, which the
appearance of defencelessness is sure to create.
"Taking all these circurastances together, I do not
see how a further reduction of force at this raoraent
can be justified.
" But the question next to be considered is, how can
the cost of maintaining this force of 8,000 men be met ;
if not for the whole year, at any rate for part of
it? If the Government decide on adopting the
proposal to complete the fortifications of our dock
yards in three years, by means of raoney raised on
terminable annuities, the difficulty could be raet. I
have taken on the Estiraates a lurap sum of ;^645,ooo
for fortifications, of which in round numbers ^^41 5,000
would be devoted to the works round our dockyards
if no Loan were taken. The' rest is for our foreign
fortresses, repairs, alterations, etc., etc. Of this sum
of ;^4i 5,000 a portion, say ;£'20o,ooo, must be reserved
for payment of interest on the capital sum of ;£"3, 000,000
borrowed in the first year.
"There remains the sum of ;^2i5,ooo, which, without

1859-60] LETTER TO LORD PALMERSTON 243
adding to the gross araount of the Estiraates or
trenching on our prearranged financial arrangeraents,
could be transferred to the Militia vote, and would
maintain the 8,000 men for six raonths, giving us,
at any rate, time to see how matters go, before
depriving ourselves of this force.
" But for this purpose it would be necessary for the
Government to decide, forthwith, whether they will
adopt the system of Loan or not ; as it is necessary that
the recasting of the fortification vote, if decided upon,
should be shown on the reprinted Estiraates.
" I know the internal difficulties which beset us on
this question, and I have delayed as long as I can the
raising of the discussion upon it. But circumstances
are much altered since it was discussed before, and the
uncertain state of our foreign affairs raake the Salus
populi suprema lex to a degree which it has not done
before. " I have no wish to press unduly on the Governraent
matters which raust be subjects of difference ; but the
responsibility on rayself is a heavy one, and I should
fail in ray duty if I acquiesced now in a proceeding —
namely, the reduction of our force — which though
practicable a few weeks ago, seems to me in the
present state of affairs so imprudent as not to be
justifiable. " Believe me, dear Lord Palmerston,
" Yours very sincerely,
" Sidney Herbert."
Mr. Herbert to Sir James Graham.
"49, Belgrave Square,
April 1st, i860.
" My dear Graham,
" You have kindly taken so much interest in
these unhappy differences between two very old and
close friends, that, as you have seen Gladstone's
letter to me, I should like you to see the letter I
wrote to Palmerston, the copy of which I enclosed
to Gladstone. I have not a copy of my note to him.
It stated generally the iraportance of not suddenly
dirainishing force at this juncture, and ray wish to
take no step without his full knowledge, with the
hope, most earnestly felt, that the difference should

244 NATIONAL DEFENCE [chap, vi
be political only. I quote frora raeraory, and not
accurately. Please to return rae ray letter when you
have done with it."
Sir Jaraes Grahara's coraraentary on the letter to
Lord Palmerston was as follows :
" Grosvenor Place,
"April 2nd.
" My dear Herbert,,
" I return the copy of your letter. It mixes
two proposals, and the questions at issue are thereby
coraplicated. By separating the two, and by treating
them as distinct, the ground of difference would be
narrowed, and in the spirit of mutual concession
and accommodation a just arrangement appears to be
quite possible. My earnest desire is that these means
may be found. The final decision should be postponed
to the last moment, if unhappily adjustment fail. Un
foreseen events occur day by day, and three weeks hence
some natural solution of present difficulties raay present
itself, which at this raoraent cannot be anticipated.
An immediate rupture alone is fatal and irremediable,
and is therefore avoided {sic\ by friends and colleagues
as the greatest evil, and at considerable risks."
As above stated, a copy of Mr. Herbert's letter to
Lord Palraerston was also sent to Mr. Gladstone.
He replied :
Mr. Gladstone to Mr. Herbert.
"Downing Street,
March ^ist, i860.
" I had hoped, and I still hope, you wUl be able
to devise some raeans of adjourning the forraidable
question raised in your letter until after we shall
have finished our task, in which I will not voluntarily
lose a day, of completing the raain financial raeasures
and carrying them through Parliament. After ah
that has been said, it is alraost a raatter of personal
honour to me not to leave them unfinished. I also
hope you will not, before it is necessary, raise this
question in the Cabinet. I had heard nothing of it

i859-6o] LETTER FROM MR. GLADSTONE 245
until one this raorning (or last night), and I think a
conversation between us would be a good preparation.
" On the Fortification Loan you know ray individual
conviction and intention. When the financial measures
are over that will be a matter of no great concern to
any one but myself; and, rely upon it, the personal
relations between us will never be in the slightest
degree affected by your simply persevering in what
you believe to be a public duty, even were you not
sustained, as you perhaps are, by the prevailing
feeling of the public and the Cabinet.
"The increase of force, apart from the question of
charge, appears to rae at this raoraent most undesir
able. I mean increase as compared with what was
determined two raonths ago. To the increase of charge
there likewise appear to me to be insurmountable
objections. You have (I believe) most kindly, and at
great sacrifice, lowered your views. I, with the
extremest effort, raised raine, and concurred in Esti
mates which, I believe, ought at the least to have been
accompanied with the actual initiation of measures of
reduction. The cord is at its utmost point of tension.
But, apart from this, I think there are most serious
questions connected with the character of the Govern
ment, and involved in any increase of the Military
Estiraates. 1, for one, could not answer to the charge
which would be raade that the success of the Budget
had been obtained under false pretences, and that
we had entrapped Parliament by obtaining eleven
raillions of revenue without a single remission of
duty having passed into law.
"When our plans are squared, probably a month
hence, those who may think increase of charge
necessary would at least be in a better position for
bringing it before Parliament."
On Tuesday, April 3rd, Mr. Herbert received the
following letter from Mr. Gladstone :
Mr. Gladstone to Mr. Herbert.
"Downing Street,
"April yd, i860.
" I must entreat you and the Cabinet not to come
to a decision to-day to alter the amount of force and

246 NATIONAL DEFENCE [chap, vi
increase the charge. I think you will hardly consider
it unreasonable that I should petition to be allowed to
present that subject deliberately, as it appears to me,
in connection with the general considerations which it
raises. "I see no inconvenience attending this on your
side, but that you should either separate the proposal
from the reprint of the Estimates, or, as you say that
is inadvisable, that you should delay the reprint for
a week beyond the first day of meeting, when there
will have been time to consider the whole.
" It is surely most desirable for us all that, with the
fortification question in view, we should endeavour to
bring our plans together and adopt something that
will last for more than a few weeks. But if this
cannot be, I again ask at least for time to review
the considerations immediately concerned with your
proposal, which I have not had since I first heard of it
three days ago."
On the afternoon of the same day the Cabinet
adopted a species of compromise between the views
of Herbert and Gladstone. It was agreed that
disembodiment of the Militia force should be arrested,
but at the same time that no increase should be raade
in the Estimates. Mr. Herbert, for the sake of peace,
acquiesced at the moment, but a very few hours'
reflection convinced him that the position was one
which could not be maintained, a view in which
Sir Jaraes Grahara concurred, as is clearly shown
by a memorandum of the language used by hira in
conversation on the following day, taken down at the
tirae and subsequently corrected by himself :
"April 4ih, i860.
" Sir J. Graham.: What is Sidney going to do about
the revised Estimates? I heard him tell the House
he would produce them on Monday, the i6th.
" Now, at the Cabinet yesterday it was agreed that
the remaining regiments of Militia were not, for the
present, to be diserabodied.

i8s9-6o] SIR J. GRAHAM'S OPINION 247
" I think this decision perfectly right. J agree with
Lord Aberdeen that to diserabody or otherwise reduce
our force at the present raoraent would be perfect
raadness. " Well, if this course be agreed to, how is it possible
that Herbert should reprint his Estiraates (as Glad
stone proposes) at the sarae figure ?
" It would be impossible. In the first place. General
Peel, who is on the qui vive to pick holes, would
instantly ask awkward questions. The House is
already suspicious of these Revised Estimates. It is
an unusual course, and betokens an increase of
expenditure. But that increase will, I am convinced, be
cheerfully met if stated frankly and honestly. But
resort to delay and evasion, and what will be the result ?
" Sidney must either equivocate, or state that his
Estimate does not cover tne whole intended expendi
ture, so that he means to ask for a Supplementary
Estimate by-and-by.
" As to the first course, it is an irapossible one for
any honourable man. The question is sure to be
asked, ' How do you raean to provide for the raain-
tenance of the Militia ? ' Already there has been
something very like equivocation in the raatter of
the China vote, and Peel hit the blot at once.
" As to the second, of course the House would at
once say, ' We cannot give away raore revenue without
knowing clearly what our expenditure will be,' and the
abolition of the paper duties becomes impossible.
" There is only one course for Sidney to take as an
honourable man.
" Let him have his Estimates revised and reprinted,
including all possible charges consequent on the
maintenance of his present force. Let hira, if he likes,
leave the fortification question alone for the present,
but for Heaven's sake don't let hira meet the House
with a lie, which could not be concealed, even for a
night. No one was more in favour of delay than
I ; but now I think the moment is come when you
can postpone the decision on these questions no
longer. Herbert's honour is at stake, and in this case,
as in every other, honesty is the best policy. Equivo
cation would involve him in endless difficulties, and
ensure the break up of the Government far more than
a present decision, however painful."

248 NATIONAL DEFENCE [chap, vi
On reaching Netherby, Sir James wrote as follows
to Mrs. Herbert:
" April i,th.
" I promised to write to Herbert from Netherby.
Subsequent reflection, and a conversation with Lord
Aberdeen, have convinced rae that a letter such as I
raust write is better oraitted. To be useful it raust
be shown to others, and in the present delicate state
of affairs ray interference would be considered an
intrusion, and might be misconstrued. Herbert knows
my opinion, and I can add nothing to what I said
to you this morning. I could only repeat my sense of
the dangers which beset an undecided course. Herbert
is quite aware of thera, and no friendly warning is
requisite so far as he is concerned. With respect to
others,^ the iron is too hot to be touched with safety.
Quiet and country air may cool down this excitement.
I shall rejoice if they lead to greater harraony and
united counsels."
After mature consideration, Sidney Herbert, on April
6th, tendered his resignation to Lord Palmerston in
the following letter :
Mr. Herbert to Lord Palmerston.
"April 6th, i860.
" I have two subjects to write upon, both personal
to rayself, and at this raoraent very rauch raixed up
with one another.
" I am very much shaken in health, so much so that
I doubt whether I can get through the session. I
need not trouble you with the how and the why,
but I want rest, which I shall not get. On the con
trary, the easy part of the session is now over, and
the bad weather and late nights are coming. Few men
have your frame ; few men, I am glad .to say, have
mine, or they would break down very soon.
'J I owe it to you to say this thus early, — a struggle
is impending in the Cabinet on a question in which
I take great interest. I do not know how it will be
decided either in the Cabinet or in Parliament, but
if it be decided in accordance with ray views, it will,
' i.e. Gladstone.

1859-60] HERBERT'S RESIGNATION 249
I fear, entail the loss of one whom the House of
Comraons and Cabinet can ill spare, one whose energy
and oratorical power are unequalled, and whose
weight and influence have been greatly augmented by
the wonderful ability with which he has conducted the
debates on the Budget.
"I do not know whether, on the question of the
fortifications, there is any possible mode of corapromise
with Gladstone. But if there be, you ought, I think,
to try it, provided the main object is attained in some
way, for his loss would be a heavy one to the Govern
ment. His temperament too is such, that if not in
the Government, he will soon be in opposition to it.
I think he would consent to the land being paid for
by raoney raised by Loan, for the purchase of land
is an investraent, and the paper duty postponed till
next year would enable you to take a very large sura
for fortifications, as large, probably, as you could
spend in the first year, in addition to the .^400,000
taken on the Estiraates for portions of the works in
question. Be this, however, as it may, I am unable
to look forward to remaining long in office.
" I come now to the second point, which is pressing,
and requires an immediate decision.
" On Tuesday last the Cabinet decided that, beyond
the 3,700 Militia who are under orders for diserabodi
raent this month, no more Militia shall be disembodied
at present. They likewise decided that no addition
should, for the present, be made to the Estiraates.
" I turned this over every way on Wednesday with
those who are raost conversant with these matters.
The thing is impossible. It is making bricks without
straw. If I present to the House Estimates founded
on the assumption that the Militia is all to be disem
bodied by July, and yet announce that they are not
to be diserabodied, it will be at once seen by the
amount of the Estimate that I have not taken raoney
to effect what I have undertaken to do. It will be
assumed, therefore, either that I intend to come again
to Parliament and ask for more when Parliament will
no longer have the raeans of granting the increase,
or that it is the intention of the Governraent to
denude the country of troops during the autumn
and winter at a time when our relations with France
are of a most precarious character.

250 NATIONAL DEFENCE [chap, vi
" I ara not proposing to raise additional troops ;
that raight be objected to as tending to create distrust
and precipitate the very dangers against which we
wish to guard. But to disband troops which we
already have, in the face of an increasing danger and
uneasiness, is quite another thing.
" The Eraperor of the French has just made a very
serious addition to his field artillery, which by the
way was announced in the Moniteur as a reduction.
" The French Estiraates I see to-day have been
voted for 600,000 men, a proposed reduction having
been negatived.
" I cannot consent to present to the House, Estimates
framed on the assumption that this is a moment when
a considerable reduction of force can be made, nor
to present Estimates which would be dishonest, as
being inadequate to cover the pay of the men we
profess to maintain.
" Since January the whole aspect of affairs is
changed. We are estranged frora France, and have
not yet secured such an alliance with other Powers
as would raake the Eraperor hesitate before he attacks
us. Now, no man can tell from day to day what
to-morrow may bring forth.
" These are the circurastances which justify the
retention and maintenance of a large force. No one
is less inclined to such a policy than I ara. Men
when not wanted are a waste. They consurae pay
and clothing and rations, and leave nothing to show
for the future. I prepared the Estiraates for the year
with a view to the future rather than the present.
I conteraplated a large reduction of force, but a great
increase of guns, rifles, fortifications, and materiel
generally. This, however, was when a comraercial
treaty with France appeared to proraise, at any rate
for the tirae, most friendly relations. There was no
appearance of iraraediate danger, and the risk could
safely be incurred. This is no longer the case.
" There are then two things which I raust dechne
to do : first, to be a party to a great reduction of force
after the first suramer months, in the present state
of Europe ; second, to produce Estimates inadequate to
the maintenance of the force which we profess to
maintain. "The latter would be a deception on the House

i859-6o] HERBERT'S RESIGNATION 251
of Commons, which I cannot practise. I shall be
asked. Will these Estiraates cover the maintenance
of a sufficient force through the year? My answer
is, ' No.' I shall be asked. Do you mean to apply
to Parhament for a Supplementary Estiraate ? My
answer is 'Yes.' It will be asked. Where is the
Revenue to corae frora ? I can tell now, but six weeks
hence it raay be all irretrievably gone. I have no
right to calculate on Supplementary Estiraates when
there will be no Revenue left to meet them.
"It is best to deal frankly with the House of
Commons, as with an assemblage of gentleraen. If
you take thera into council they will go with you ;
but a reticence or a deception they resent.
" Now, all these difficulties are the result of the
judgraent which I have forraed as to the risk and
danger attending the course proposed to me by the
Cabinet. I quite admit that I may be in error in
the opinion I have forraed, but I ara thoroughly in
earnest in holding it. Holding it, I am asked to
propose either what I believe to be an insufficient
force, or what I know to be an insufficient Estimate.
" If this be so, and the Cabinet adhere to this
decision, I must explicitly say that I cannot do
either. I feel that the best and indeed only course
I can take under the circumstances I have described
is to retire frora it at once.
" I can assure you I have not corae to this con
clusion in a hurry, nor without the most calm
deliberation ; but I can no longer in justice to you
or to rayself postpone the decision, or allow you
to believe that I acquiesce in the opinion of the
Cabinet on Tuesday last.
" This coraraunication, however, raay relieve you
frora sorae embarrassment, and me from a difficulty
which, with ray opinions, I cannot raeet."
Mr. Herbert to Sir James Graham.
"Wilton House, Salisbury,
"April %th, i860.
" My DEAR Graham,
" I was very glad on ray return here to find
how corapletely your advice accords with the de
cision to which I had corae. I have written to

252 NATIONAL DEFENCE [chap, vi
Palmerston pointing out the risk of losing Gladstone,
but declining on my part to produce Estimates which
provide for a force which I believe to be inadequate,
or amounts which I know to be insufficient, to pay
what we propose to maintain, and I therefore pro
posed — if the Cabinet decision is to be adhered to —
at once to leave office.
" To-morrow I expect to hear from him. I have
no time to write more, as I have to write for the
Indian mail. I cannot say how rauch I feel your
kindness in all this painful matter."
Mr. Gladstone to Mr. Herbert.
"II, Downing Street,
"April loth, i860.
" My dear Herbert,
" Apart from other matters, your letter to Lord
Palmerston is surely premature. It cannot be a
matter of the first necessity that the Estiraates should
be presented in their new shape on Monday ; even
if it be indispensable that, when presented, they
should contain the final judgment of the Cabinet
as to the MiHtia. But unless it is one, why drive thus
rapidly at any conclusion ?
" Then as to the particular conclusion : How can you
take such a step before you know the judgment of
the Cabinet on the main question depending ? Could
anything be more out of place — to use a mild word —
than that you should find yourself parting from
colleagues with the great bulk of whom you ttiay,
for all you and I know, be agreed ? Is it not alike
required by justice to yourself and them that you
should, at any rate, let it be seen what is the route
of their minds ? I ara far from knowing it, but
were I to guess, it would be that they, or the greater
part of thera, think with you ; while, perhaps, some
think the other way as strongly as I have done. It is,
then, probable that if a case for resignation is to
arise, it is on me, and not on you, that it will fall ;
but there are at least a hundred reasons why no
such question should be entertained, unless and until
a real necessity shall have arisen. Time removes
raany difficulties, and sometiraes effectually cures one
by another. Let hira try his hand. I feel confident
that Lord Palmerston will consider that we have

i859-6o] LETTER FROM MR. GLADSTONE- 253
not yet reached the point when these matters need be
brought to issue.
" It is certainly true that we differ on these wretched
questions of defence in a manner which some two
or three years ago I could not have believed possible.
" I am not conscious of having changed (unless with
the tide). You may have passed frora wrong to right,
but I think your forraer self is on my side. I well
remeraber saying to you, in 1857, ^^id your apparently
agreeing, that the defence Estiraates raight be, and
should be, further reduced. Since then they have
increased, I think, ten millions. But this is by the
bye. what I really want is, in conformity with what
you kindly said in the Cabinet (I mean to me as
you went to your seat), whether it is not even yet
possible for us to find a ground of common action
with respect to the whole subject. It is, however,
necessary to think and raove deliberately, and, un
fortunately, I have much distracting raatter on ray
hands. I will not adrait to rayself, one moment before
it is necessary, that one or both of us are such altered
men as to make this irapossible.
" Believe rae, affectionately yours,
" W. E. Gladstone."
Mr. Gladstone to Mr. Herbert.
"Downing Street,
April llth, i860.
" I have seen Lord Palmerston, but can only report
very briefly.
" I. I found frora hira that the suggestion, adopted
by the Cabinet, for total disembodiment in the autumn
had been abandoned on the objection of the railitary
authorities. " This, I venture to say, and must say, is, so far as
I know, quite a new method of governraent for us.
Surely the araount of force is a political question. If
it is to be fixed against the Cabinet by the railitary
authorities, had they not better find the raoney ?
" 2. His whole heart is set upon the Fortification
Loan, and, as I learned to-day, has been for a great
many years. I cannot, in fairness, expect him to
recede from this cherished idea now that he has
a War Minister, and probably a Cabinet and a Public,

254 NATIONAL DEFENCE [chap, vi
with hira. Still, I think it right, on the other hand,
that I should, when I have got the best Estimate
of Revenue in my power, sketch out roughly the
basis of that raode of proceeding which would seera to
rae adraissible.
" 3. I think he felt the force of the reasons which
seem to rae to show the great expediency of post
poning the issue. The Reforra Bill, or twenty other
things, raay dispose of us in the interval before you
can go into Array Estimates, which, as well as I can
judge, you can hardly effect, except, perhaps, just
before the Whitsuntide recess."
Lord Palraerston's own account of this interview is
given in the following letter : "April llth.
" My dear Sidney Herbert,
" I have had a talk with Gladstone to-day. He
clings to the arrangeraent agreed to by the Cabinet at the
last meeting, but only proposes that the Militia question
should be put off for a short time. He expects in
the course of the next week to be better able to judge
as to the probable produce of the Revenue. The
income-tax addition passed into law before Easter,
and we cannot, therefore, put off the repeal of the
paper excise duty without sorae event of a grave
character which has not yet happened.
" I opened the fortification question, stating, in
regard to it, my long-ago formed opinions, ray sense
of the urgency of the duty to provide for the defence
of the workshops of our Navy, and ray intention to
propose the raeasure rayself He repeated his own
opinions adverse, but said nothing as to any intentions
on his part, adraitting that the opinion of the Country
is with us on these raatters. He pointed out some
technical difficulties, of which I ara aware, in the
construction of a Bill, but did not say that they were
insurmountable. I am just off to Brockett."
Mr. Herbert to Sir James Graham.
"Wilton, April 12th, i860.
" My dear Graham,
" Palraerston carae over here yesterday on his
way to town — nothing could be kinder. He said

1859-60] RESIGNATION REFUSED 255
my going would relieve him from no difficulty,
because no possible War Minister would take any
other course.
" He was to see Gladstone in town, and I have
to-day the result of the interview, which is not
satisfactory. I send you copies of Gladstone's two
letters : one on the receipt of^ mine, telling him what
I had done ; the other after seeing Palmerston. Clearly
he shook Palmerston as to delay. I have written to
hira adhering to ray text and deterraination. There
is in Gladstone's letter a tone from which it will be
inferred that he would yield or coraproraise. I do not
believe that, when the time comes, he will do either.
He is not capable of deliberately deceiving others,
but he can deceive himself to almost any extent when
it accords with his wishes, and he wishes for delay
because it will make his finance safe — ie. irretrievable.
I write very hurriedly.
" His notion that the force is to be changed at the
request of the military authorities is clearly a mis
understanding of something Palmerston has said."
Mr. Herbert to Mr. Gladstone.
"Wilton, April 12th, i860.
" I am not aware that the objection of the railitary
authorities has anything to do with the decision not
now to diserabody raore Militia beyond a certain point,
and to retain the means of keeping a portion of them
through the winter.
" I merely undertook to see what could be done,
and, finding that the delay now would force the
diserabodiraent of every raan in the Militia after har
vest, I did not even consult the Duke of Carabridge
on a proposed course of proceeding which ray own
judgment told me was clearly wrong. It is not
wise or prudent to entrust the defence of England
and Ireland to thirty-eight battalions of infantry, for
infantry is the staple reliable force to which one must
always look, and to which other arms are suppleraentary.
We have now a strong Militia force in addition.
As the aspect of foreign affairs looks darker, it is
proposed to disband this force. But it is said, ' All
raay be again sraooth by Septeraber.' No one, I
think, would be justified in acting on such a calcula
tion.

256 NATIONAL DEFENCE [chap, vi
" I admit that I carried the reductions much too far,
in January last, when the Cabinet had decided to
make the sacrifice of revenue necessary to the Budget.
I have regretted it, I frankly say, ever since ; but at
that time we had great hopes from the treaty. The
suspicion and alarra which had existed as to the
intentions of France were to be dispelled, and to be
succeeded by close coraraercial relations and the peace
ful feelings engendered by them. All this prospect,
however, has been overclouded. France has shown
an unmistakably restless and aggressive spirit.
There is great and just alarm throughout Europe.
Assurances from Louis Napoleon are of very little
value. He maintains iraraense armaments, has enlarged
his artillery (which the Moniteur stated was de
creased), and has, since we parted, decreed a conscrip
tion for the year which is the opposite of a reduction,
though he has 150,000 men on conge whom he can
recall in a fortnight.
" By the end of this month we shall have 8,000 raen
less in England than we had in February. I propose
as regiments return from India to reduce more ; but
to leave ourselves under the necessity of sweeping
away the whole 17,000 by September, with the pro
spects we have before us, is what I cannot undertake
to do. I think the decision urgent.
" On Monday the House will ask. Where are the
Army Estimates ? What are they intended to cover ?
" If we wait till all the reductions in revenue are
made, and new taxes are to be found, it will be too
late. "The Estimates now to be proposed must of course
be final ones. Even if, as you say, the Reform Bill
or anything else disposes of us in the interim, the
Estimates will be there as evidence of our intentions.
" It is hardly worth whUe now to go back to 1857,
or conversations held then, when the Emperor was
our trusted Ally, and his empire supposed to be
founded on a policy of peace. Since then everything
has changed. Wars carefully prepared and Hghtly
undertaken. Alarm and anxiety everywhere.- No
man can now count from day to day on what may
happen to-morrow.
"1 wrote to Graham to tell him what I had done.
He has written me a letter of warm approval. He

i8s9-6o] QUESTION OF ESTIMATES 257
says the revised Estimates should include what I
consider to be the minimum of force and expenditure
necessary for the year, ' but they must be stated fully
and at once.'
" I feel that my own character for truth and straight
forwardness are very much at stake. I confess I do
not see what we should gain by delay or evasion of
these questions, even if they were right and possible,
except that we should be more completely deprived
of the means of raaintaining a portion of the force,
if we should ultimately decide on so doing. But
such a course will not be possible, for we shall be
challenged at once, and must give an answer, ' aye '
or ' no,' as to what the Estiraates will cover.
" Palmerston must decide the question ; I cannot
pretend to impose my will or ray opinion on the
Cabinet, but my own course is clear."

Mr. Gladstone to Mr. Herbert.
" Downing Street,
"April 13//^, i860.
" I Vk?as just about to reply to your first letter
when your second arrived.
" My reply to the first is : First, that I am glad
to find I was misinformed about military authorities ;
secondly, that you had plainly (but probably through
my own fault) misunderstood me as to tirae. I
did not propose that we should 'wait till all the
reductions in revenue are made, and new taxes are
to be found,' but simply that, having made up my
statement in February from Estimates which were
necessarily premature and inadequate, I should now,
having arrived at the new financial year, have the
opportunity of revising thera, and so being in a
condition to know what our means are with reference
to increased expenditure. With this view I had
written for the preparation with all practicable speed
of the necessary information.
"I have a great deal more which I raight say on
receiving the peremptory deraand in your second
letter,^ but I think I do better not to say it, especially
on paper. I left Lord Palraerston on Wednesday,
' This second letter has not been found.
VOL. II. 17

258 NATIONAL DEFENCE [chap, vi
agreed with rae that the presentation of the Estimates
should be postponed. I presume that this being
so, you will hardly press that deraand ; but if you
do, ray duty is plain, to decline corapliance, and
absolutely to ask the time and deliberation which
my responsibilities require.
" P.S. — I should certainly think it my duty to argue
in the Cabinet for the necessity of considering as a
whole what yet remains to be considered with refer
ence to the military expenditure of the year."
This was quickly followed by a second note :
"Downing Street,
"April i^th, i860.
" I write with very defective information, but to
do what depends upon rae towards preventing rais-
apprehension, I beg you to notice that the deraand
to which I decline to accede without delay is that
which reverses the decision of the Cabinet for the
diserabodiraent of the remaining Militia before the
winter." Mr. Gladstone to Viscount Palmerston.
" Downing Street,
•'April llth, i860.
" By the time I corae back frora Edinburgh I hope
to know what are the Estiraates of revenue and
expenditure for the year, and what (either in aug
mentation or diminution) has become of the surplus
as it appeared to stand in February.
" I did not understand you on Wednesday to recede
in any manner from the opinion you had formed
that, contrary to the opinion of the Cabinet last
week, this ;^ 150,000 should be placed upon the
Estimate, but only to agree with rae, that, under
the circumstances of the case, it was desirable that
the production of the altered Estimate should be
postponed. "A very short delay would enable us both to
know how we stand as to the revenue, and,. likewise,
to consider the bearing of this proposal on the larger
and more important question,^ which stands for early
consideration. " I send a copy of this to Herbert."
' The Fortification Scheme.

1859-60] LETTER TO PALMERSTON 259

Mr. Herbert to Viscount Palmerston.
"Wilton, April i^th, i860.
" My dear Lord Palmerston,
" I have had a letter from Gladstone, in which
he assuraes that the difficulty as to the amount of
force arises entirely frora the opinion entertained at
the Horse Guards.
" I have written to say that that certainly has
nothing to do with it, as I have not seen the Duke
of Carabridge, or heard from him on the subject, since
these discussions arose.
" I cannot, however, see the advantage of delay.
The House is very suspicious about these Estiraates,
has asked several times when they will be ready,
what they will contain, etc. They have clearly an
alternative attack. If there is an increase of charge,
they will say that the Budget will not bear it, which
will be to sorae extent true ; and if there be no increase
of force, they will say that the defence of the country
is sacrificed to the Budget, which will also be true.
"In the raeanwhile Gladstone goes to Edinburgh,
and we shall have no raeans of holding a Cabinet on
this subject till after questions shall have been put
and answered. May I desire the Estimates to be
prepared with the addition of £1 50,000 ? I will do
it with less if I possibly can.
" If asked whether they raake provision for a larger
force of Militia, I can then say that the Estiraate on
the table will show. Here is what Graham says, in
answer to a letter of mine : ' Whatever it is resolved
to do should be stated fully and at once. You are
bound in your revised Estimate to state the sum total
which in present circurastances you consider necessary
for the service of the year. If the means are not
provided, you are right in refusing to continue re
sponsible minister.' In truth, we have no excuse for
further delay. The intention of reprinting the
Estimates was announced a fortnight before Easter,
and we have had a fortnight since. A further delay
can only be accounted for by disagreement, or a fear
of stating frankly what we are going to do.
"I see nothing to be gained in any way by de
lay, and a good deal in the way of suspicion, and

26o NATIONAL DEFENCE [chap, vi
consequent loss of character. Gladstone is incapable
of deceiving others, but he is very capable of deceiving
himself when his wishes are strong in one direction.
He asks for delay in the hope of agreement, but when
once his remissions of taxation are irretrievably
passed, he wUl find his objections to Force and
Fortification alike insurmountable. He always reasons
as his wishes go, and we shall have lost the means
of carrying our measures into effect.
" I confess I am in great difficulties as to Monday.
Will you therefore send me an answer by messenger
as to whether I may do what I propose about the
Estimates, which I have only one day left to prepare ? "

Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Herbert.
"Brockett, April li^th.
" My dear Sidney Herbert,
" I have received your letter of yesterday, and
one from Gladstone, of which he says he has sent
you a copy. His was in answer to one in which I
said that we surely could find an additional ;^i 50,000.
You raust judge whether you can put off corapleting
your Estimates till after Tuesday, the day on which
he returns from Edinburgh, and whether we ought
to change the arrangeraent agreed to by the Cabinet,
at its last meeting, without telling them the new
intended arrangement. Your answer on Monday
would be easy : your Estimates will be laid on the
table in the course of a few days, in good tirae for
the discussion on thera, and they will show any
changes that have been raade. You raight, how
ever, go on in preparing them according to your
last scherae, and we would have a Cabinet on
Wednesday."

Sir James Graham to Mr. Herbert.
" Netherby, April lifli.
" I hasten to return the copies of the two
letters. Gladstone, not unnaturally in his position, is
fighting for time ; in yours you can afford none beyond
the day when you are to present your revised
Estimate.

i859-6o] LETTER FROM SIR J. GRAHAM 261
" I, too, was an advocate for delay, until 1 was made
aware of the fixed purpose of you and Palmerston
with respect to the mUitary expenditure of the current
year. It is now clear that your views and intentions
cannot be reconciled with Gladstone's.
"You think the Estimate as originallry presented
insufficient ; he regards it as excessive. You seek to
augment it ; he does not proraise to find the ways
and means. You intend to ask for a Loan of ten
millions for fortifications ; he has told you distinctly
that he will not be a party to any such Loan.
" This conflict of opinion is brought to an iraraediate
issue, not only by the presentation of the amended
Estimate, but by the advanced state of the Budget
measures. In time of peace you cannot contemplate
a Loan without the provision of a large sinking fund
to secure the rapid extinction of a new debt so unusual
in its character. The balance of the Budget, as it
stands, is quite unequal to meet this new charge. The
sacrifice of^ revenue under the French treaty is accom
plished ; but there remains the paper duty, yielding
;£'i, 400,000 a year. Is it possible for the Cabinet, in
fairness, to press forward this large reduction of
income, when at the sarae tirae they are resolved
to propose an increase of expenditure, which they
do not avow, and for which no provision has been
made? " You must remeraber also, that there is a debt
of one million of Exchequer Bonds falling due within
the year ; and these also are left uncovered by the
Budget. " The question then really comes to this : Shall there
be a Loan for fortifications and no repeal of the Paper
Duty ; or, a repeal of the Paper Duty and no Fortifica
tion Loan ? I cannot bring rayself to think that it
would be right to advance the Paper Duty Bill another
stage, at the same tirae leaving the House in ignor
ance of the resolution of the Cabinet regarding an
addition to the railitary outlay. Jealousy in the
House of Coraraons is a virtue, where the number
and charge of the Army in time of peace is the matter
at issue.
" I conclude, therefore, that before you present the
amended Estiraate, and before further progress is raade
in the Paper Duty Bill, you will corae to a final settle-

262 NATIONAL DEFENCE [chap, vi
ment among yourselves in the Cabinet, and agree
either to compromise or to break. I must add that,
in my opinion, evasions and delay are pregnant with
public evils, and with great risk to the character - of
all parties concerned. I shall probably reraain here
for a week longer. I can do no raore. In return
for your generous confidence, I have stated ray opinion
frankly; it raay be erroneous, but it is dictated by
friendly anxiety in a case which touches so nearly
both you and Gladstone."
When Monday the iSth arrived, the Naval Estiraates
were taken up, and the final decision on the Army
Estimate a trifle longer delayed.
A Cabinet was to have been held on April i8th,
but Mr. Gladstone insisted vehemently on further
postponement, and on the 20th circulated an elaborate
Memorandum, the first sentence of which betrayed the
object with which, consciously or unconsciously, he
had been fighting for delay :
"The financial measures of the Budget have now
either become law, or been adopted in principle by
the House of Coraraons, after full debate."
He therefore entreated the attention of the Cabinet
to the prospects of the country with respect to its
future finance. The sources of revenue, as well
as the revenue itself, he states to be on the whole
satisfactory. " Our indirect taxation in general has been brought,
by a long ¦ course of operations, nearly to a state in
which its inconveniences will be at a miniraura, and
its productiveness at a raaxiraura."
But he " observes with sorae apprehension that the
sources of revenue are well nigh exhausted." " By a
high incorae tax, such as now exists, in time of peace,
we greatly narrow and weaken our reserve of taxing
power for time of war. If we were also to resort to a
Loan, we should not have then a single form of

1859-60] GLADSTONE'S MEMORANDUM 263
financial resources left entire for a period of national
struggle." He then turns to the subject of expenditure :
" It has been shown, in a siraple forra, that the
expenditure of the country, central and local, is in
creasing at a rate very much greater than its wealth."
"The increase has been so rapid and extraordinary
as to constitute a case wholly, I believe, without
parallel in our history, and such as must convict of
some gross folly either the present time and system,
or that system upon which we acted for a whole
generation down to the outbreak of the Russian
war." In the Miscellaneous Estimates some improvement
had been effected.
"We have obtained, with much effort, a sraall result '
in the Education Vote. We have resisted deraands for
telegraphic as well as packet contracts : the Gibraltar
and Malta telegraph has been postponed. We have
checked the growth of the Consular Service, and
substituted for the vast demand on account of
harbours of refuge, a scheme under which the public
would not pay, but only advance.
" But we must not assurae that this represents a
solid and perraanent retrenchraent. With great labour
we have beaten back the tide for one year, but it will
probably return upon us.
" For the present year we raay sum up as follows.
With very high taxation, and with more than ;^i, 500,000
appropriated from extraordinary sources, we are just
able to show on paper a small surplus. A bad harvest
raight possibly — the continuance of the China quarrel
would certainly — convert that surplus into a defici
ency. "Suppose that next year the charge for China
continues ; that an increased payraent has to be raade
for fortifications; that our line-of-battle ships having
then been raultiplied so as to equal those of, perhaps,
nearly the whole world, iron-cased ships shall have
come into fashion, and we shall bethink ourselves that
i.e. in tbe way of reduction.

264 NATIONAL DEFENCE [chap, vi
in this department France is really ahead ; that a new
and probably more costly scheme of naval reserve is
devised upon the collapse of the former one, and that
the miscellaneous Estimates resume their ordinary
upward movement. Unfortunately, neither any one of
these suppositions, nor the combination of the whole
of them, in any manner strains probability. . . .
"In what form would the finance of 1861-62 then
have to be presented to Parliament ? . . . In a
word, if the Cabinet are of opinion that an income
tax of i4.d. or i^d. in the pound is a safe experiment
to try upon the people for a series of years, then,
undoubtedly, I do not pretend that, presuming the
continuance of peace in Europe, we have any reason
to be uneasy."
Such an experiment, however, he considered neither
safe nor right. He proceeds to coraraent on " the
slight grounds upon which increase of charge is now
ordinarily proposed and entertained."
"In 1857 the Military Estiraates were about
;^20,ooo,ooo. They have risen in i860 to nearly
;^30,ooo,ooo." " We are so far from having attained a summit
with a clear prospect of descent before us that a new
and vast demand for fortifications is impending." He
admitted that the House of Commons rather favoured
increase than diminution. But he predicts there will
be a change, and some day the public will make
the discovery " that great savings might have been
effected had they been prosecuted with one half the
energy that 4s now displayed by the advocates of
every form of large expenditure."
As for maintaining a Naval force at horae, and the
Mediterranean, it is "frora the centre local deraands
for force may coraraonly best be raet."
" We have doubled in raen, and raore than doubled
in charge our systera of ubiquitous Naval arraa-
ment.

i859-6o] GLADSTONE'S MEMORANDUM 265
"In 1821 we had on foreign stations 9,791 raen.
„ 1829 „ „ „ 8,606 „
,. 1849 „ ,, „ 12,817 „
.. 1859 „ „ „ 171O90 „
" The raeaning of the systera seems to be that
wherever there are British subjects and British trade,
there shall be British force to protect them."
" This cannot be done, and leaves our shores ex
posed, if (as sorae iraagine) they are endangered."
" The true principle " is " that there should be
ships where there is service." " For instance, where
there is piracy there may be service ; where there
is slave trade there may be service ; where there is .
fear of actual violence there may be service. But
. . . there was no service in June last in the Peiho.
To send a rainister with a fleet behind him was a
positive mischief"
Then as to the building of ships.
France has afloat line-of-battle ships  33
„ building ... .0  6
39
Russia has afloat line-of-battle ships  10
„ building ... ... ... ... 6
16
United  SS
England has afloat  40
„ building  16
,, convertible  13
60
" Is it not then the fact that we have done aU, and
much more than all, that is necessary in the matter
of building line-of-battle ships? Yet it appears
timbers are being prepared for three new ones."
He next reraarks that in British North Araerica,

266 NATIONAL DEFENCE [chap, vi
the West Indies, the Cape, and Australia, the people of
this country are put to a charge of ;£"2,ooO)000. " For
military and imperial purposes these colonial garrisons
are, on the whole, rather worse than useless." It is
discreditable to Colonies calling themselves free to
have their defence provided for wholly or mainly at
the charge of England.
He ends by calling for a reconsideration of our
policy and measures, and declares that if " efforts
of the kind " he indicates, " and the difficulties they^
entaU, cannot be faced, then it is ray deliberate
belief that this country will have to travel, and is.
even now beginning to travel, into both general
and railitary weakness, through the surest road of
financial confusion."
Mr. Herbert's resignation had been tendered and
refused. Mr. Gladstone's Memorandum had been con
sidered by his colleagues, and on April 24th they de
liberately adopted Mr. Herbert's recommendations,
both as to the augraentation of the Army and the
suspension of the disembodiment of the MiHtia. Mr.
Gladstone's resignation was now in turn looked for.
It was not, however, tendered, and the conclusion
of the struggle, with its somewhat comic sequel,
is told in a letter from Sidney Herbert to Sir James
Graham. Mr. Gladstone acquiesced in the increase
of the Estimates by ;^i 30,000, and ,the dispute was
thus for the time settled. At this juncture it was
discovered that there was ;^ 150,000 available in the
Treasury, of which no account had been taken, and
which rendered any additional Vote unnecessary.
Had this discovery been made sooner, much trouble
and much disagreeable antagonism would have been
saved, and it is singular that the sum in question
should have been overlooked.

1859-60] LETTER TO SIR J. GRAHAM 267
Mr. Herbert to Sir James Graham.
" War Office,
"April 2W1, i860.
" My dear Graham,
" I have delaj-ed writing to you, hoping every
day to hear of your arrival in Grosvenor Place, where
the open shutters and gas lamps inspired me with
the hope of seeing you.
" Gladstone jaelded the point of an additional
;^i3o,ooo for ray Estimate without much resistance.
When it was all done, Anderson came from the
Treasury and said they had a sum of ;^i 50,000 in the
Commissariat chest since 1848, paid by the East India
Government, and which would be paid into the
Exchequer unless disposed of in reduction of ray
Estimates in the way of repayment to the East India
Government for the troops coming home from India
(on whom there is always a large sum to be refunded
to the East India Governraent).
" I of course accepted, only wishing that this
' Deus ex machina ' had interposed a fortnight before,
which would have saved much correspondence and
trouble. As it is, it places me comparatively on
velvet, for I have got the increase without any
apparent addition to charge.
" I have given notice for Monday of the reappoint
ment of the Committee on War Office Organisation,
but will w^ait till you come to appoint a day 6f
raeeting. If there should be any vacancy on the
coraraittee. Sir W. RusseU is a candidate.
"I think I see dayhght for the Reforra Bill. The
continuous debates, so far as Governraent nights are
concerned, have brought us to a better prospect of
a termination, and Lord John's sensible and moderate
speeches have inspired the hope of passing the Bill
without much modification. He is reasonable about
it, and sees the hopelessness of passing any but
a very cautious and moderate raeasure. The dis
cussion last night produced, on the subject of the
accuracy of the returns, several iraportant ad-
raissions. From Stanley and Paget the admission
(before denied) that, as regards their constituencies,
the returns after examination have proved correct.
From others that no unfairness is attributed, but

268 NATIONAL DEFENCE [chap, vi
that the return cannot be raore than an approximate
estimate of the nurabers, and, lastly, that there is no
way of getting nearer to the truth. A close division
on the Church Rates. If the Lords are wise they
will take advantage of this reflux to pass a coraproraise
on very liberal terras ; but Lords are not always wiser
than other men.
" Lytton Bulwer raade a brilliant speech against
all reforra ; better than the one he made against the
Bill of his own Governraent — which is natural.
" I hope we shall see you on Wednesday."
Sir James Graham to Mr. Herbert.
" Netherby,
" April 2qih, i860. »
" My dear Herbert,
" The figures of your araended Estimate puzzled
me in the absence of your explanation. I am glad
that a godsend has been found in the Exchequer
wherewith to stave off the immediate difficulty. The
windfalls must be nearly exhausted — malt-credits,
hop-credits, unappropriated balances will corae to an
end, and the day of reckoning between increased
expenditure and inadequate taxation raust arrive at
last. I ara willing to hope that it may not be an
angry one. I conclude that the paper duty is gone.
How are the interest and sinking fund of the
Fortification Loan to be met?
"It is evident that the fear of dissolution pre-
dorainates over every other fear in this House of
Coraraons, and nothing will appease this apprehension
but the postponement of the Reform Bill. I do not
expect to see it come out of Comraittee in the present
Session. In a calra the propelling power is in
sufficient; in a gale of wind the ship raay miss
stays and be stranded ; but it is clear that the present
is not regarded as the convenient moment for any
change. The Comraittee which you have granted
to Lord Grey will afford an araple excuse for delay,
even were it less universally desired. Bulwer's
speech is an admirable argument against the increase
of popular power ; but it coraes too late. Mr. Canning
urged the sarae objections. The Duke of Wellington
thought that he could stand on thera ; but the terapest

i859-6o] FORTIFICATION LOAN 269
came and swept them all away. The means of re
sistance were far stronger then than now. I am not
impatient for the change ; but it is inevitable, and
those who live to see it will rue the day when moderate
proposals were rejected or postponed.
"I hope to be in London on Wednesday evening.
If you like to summon the Coraraittee on Military
Organisation for Thursday at half-past two o'clock
we could then raeet to choose the chairman and to
consider the course of proceeding."
But though a modus vivendi was for the raoraent
found, the controversy between the War Office and
the Treasury was only adjourned, to be raised again,
even raore sharply, over the Fortification Loan.
Mr. Herbert had long been of opinion that in order
to ensure the security of our dockyards it was neces
sary to construct works for their protection. This
opinion was equally entertained by Lord Palraerston
and the great majority of his colleagues, and one of
Mr. Herbert's first acts as Secretary of State was the
appointraent of a Coraraission to consider in detail the
nature of the works to be erected. He received
the seals of office on June iSth, 1859, and on July 19th
the draft of the proposed Coraraission was subraitted
to the Queen for approval. Some apprehension was
at first felt by Her Majesty whether such a Commis
sion might not rather retard than expedite the accora-
plishraent of the end desired, and it must be admitted
that past experience went far to justify the doubts
expressed in the following letter, addressed by the
Prince Consort to Mr. Herbert : " Osborne,
"July 20th, 1859.
" My dear Mr. Herbert,
" I have laid your letter of yesterday before the
Queen, who wishes for some further information
before coming to a decision upon it. Nothing has

270 NATIONAL DEFENCE [chap, vi
impeded the vigorous undertaking and prosecution
of public works in this country more than the appoint
raent and re-appointment of Committees and Corarais
sions of Inquiry. They are, in fact, contrivances to
shift responsibility from the responsible departments
of the Government on irresponsible persons — I mean
irresponsible to the country for the advice they give,
and irresponsible to the Crown for the carrying out of
their recommendations. When the War Department
was established this arose from the conviction in the
mind of the public that responsibility for our military
security should be fixed somewhere. Since that tirae
a systera has been introduced which has worked well
as far as the Works are concerned. A defence Com
raittee of the Cabinet, consisting of the Prime Minister,
Secretary for War, First Lord of the Admiralty, and
Commander-in-Chief, with, I believe, the Home Secre
tary, has discussed the political and general bearings
of the scheraes laid before it by the Secretary for
War. He again has, together with the Coramander-
in-Chief, the Inspector-General of Fortifications, and
Director-General of the Artillery, and (I believe) one
Naval officer, gone through the details of the Works
and frequently appointed committees of officers to
report upon the special cases and projects of the
Engineer i Department. The Works when approved
by them were laid before the Queen with a Memoran.'
dum of the Inspector-General of Fortifications, ap
proved by the Secretary of State, justifying on scientific
and railitary grounds the general features of the
' project ' submitted, which received the Queen's
signature ; then followed the details similarly sub
mitted and approved. When approved they were
considered fixed, and the Works could begin with
the certainty of not being disturbed again, and the
signature to the plan fixed the responsibility. If the
Works have not proceeded satisfactorily in many
cases, this has merely arisen frora the fluctuating
condition of the yearly Estiraates, and there is no
doubt that nothing can be less economical and less
conducive to the progress of Works than to raalce them
dependent upon fluctuating yearly Estimates, and
frequently stopping them in the midst of their con
struction to wait for the Estimate being passed, and
this, generally in the spring and suramer, just when

I859-60] LETTER FROM PRINCE CONSORT 271
it is the best part of the building season, leaving
frequently the Engineer officer unable to make
arrangements from a want of knowledge how much
he will have to spend.
" If the Comraittee you propose to appoint is to
re-open the question of the Works sanctioned and
approved, and to submit them to a discussion on
first principles, in which many Engineer officers and
civilians differ, or to a criticism of their details half
constructed and wholly contracted for, the greatest
injury would be done to the country which can, under
present circurastances, be imagined. If, on the other
hand, the Works already sanctioned are excepted
from the reference to the Comraittee, and they are
directed to consider merely what might further be
wanted to complete our defences, good might come
out of it, as giving the public confidence in the schemes
of the Government. You have, however, already
Major Jervois and Sir John Burgoyne's Memoranda
before you, and two reports of February 22nd and
April 7th, of a Comraittee coraposed of the Duke of
Carabridge, Sir John Burgoyne, General Hay,
Colonel Foster, R.E., Captain Sir W. Wiseman, R.N.
(who carried on the experiraents with Arrastrong's
gun). Colonel Dickson, R.A., and Colonel Smythe,
R.A. — a Coraraittee quite as strong in abilit}' as the
one you recoraraend. What has become of their re
coraraendations ? Are they to be set aside ? and why ?
" Mr. Horsman, I see, is going to move ' that the
expenses of providing for the national defences should
be paid by a sum specially devoted to that purpose,
and independent of the annual Votes of Parliament.'
I trust you will support this Resolution : it would
save the country large sums of money, and tend more
than anything else to gain for it that security for
which it so anxiously calls out. Mr. Disraeli had
proraised us to do something of the kind next year (!).
He intended to ask for a Loan for the purpose.
"Will you consider these points and let me hear
again for the Queen's inforraation ?
"Ever yours truly,
" Albert."
To this letter Mr. Herbert replied upon the
foUowing day :

272 NATIONAL DEFENCE [chap, vi

"War Office,
"July 2ist, 1859.
"Sir, — I have the honour to acknowledge the
receipt of Your Royal Highness's letter.
" I entirely agree with Your Royal Highness's
opinion that Commissions have often been appointed
either with a view to gain time, or to shelve a
question, or to throw responsibility on others. But
they may also be appointed with a view to accelerate
a Work and to secure the public confidence, which is
necessary when a great outlay has to be incurred
and the public has to provide the means.
" We have in this office, as Your Royal Highness
observes, excellent and most scientific reports on
the subject of our fortifications and defences, and the
Government can desire little raore ; but these Com
mittees are not known to the public. What I wish
to show is, that the Government are not about to
ask for the immediate outlay of immense sums
without a thorough consideration of the plans to be
carried into effect. The schemes on which it was
proposed to defend Portsmouth and Plymouth have
been greatly extended in radius, owing partly to
the greater range of projectiles. At Portsmouth a
Work which was contemplated at Porchester Castle
is to be given up, and a Work in advance on Portsdown
Hill substituted for it. At Woolwich, ground has
never yet been broken nor any plans finally approved.
The Works will be very large and very costly.
" I do not contemplate that the proposed Coraraission
should spend their tirae in criticising what is done,
but take existing and comraenced Works as fails
accomplis, and sanction the continuance of the plan,
or suggest such changes as would make what we
have already more available, if such changes are
necessary. Without some such guarantee the Parlia
ment will not be well inclined to deal with the matter
on a large and comprehensive scale. My own opinion
is that the works must be executed as rapidly as we
can obtain the labour and material necessary to do
thera, and that a Loan for this especial purpose,
repayable in annual instalraents over the period
which, at our present rate, the fortifications would take
to coraplete, is the best way of raeeting the difficulty.

i8s9-6o] DEFENCE COMMISSION 273
But the Coraraission seeras to me to be a necessary
instrument to enable us to arrive at the second and
more iraportant object — namely, to take these works
out of the category of Works to be proceeded with in
a leisurely manner by the application of sraall sums
voted year by year over a long period of time.
" But the manner of proceeding raust depend upon
two conditions :
" I. The total amount of money required.
"2. The araount of work which can be executed
within a year, and the consequent period within which
the whole can be completed.
" I shall have some difficulty to-night, in con
sequence of the receipt of your Royal Highness's
letter, in knowing how to deal with Sir De Lacy
Evans and Mr. Horsraan, but I trust — an immediate
answer being unavoidable — that if I appear to assume
Her Majesty's consent, it will be attributed to ray
anxiety to further the public service, and to put the
preparation of our defences, once for all, on a satis
factory footing.
"As regards the additional sums for fortification,
taken in the supplementary Estiraates, I thought it
right to anticipate the vote of Parliaraent rather than
lose so rauch of the building season and the long days,
and the new works at Portland are comraenced, and
the increased rate of work is, I hope, begun in the
other cases."
Mr. Herbert's reasoning appears to have carried
conviction, and the Commission, of which General Sir
Harry Jones, R.E., was the Chairman, was issued on
August 20th.
The report of the Commissioners was sent in before
the end of the year. It stated that, while recognising
the iraraense iraportance of the Channel Fleet and
of the Channel itself as a first line of defence, they
had unanimously arrived at the conclusion that in the
existing condition of things, and for reasons given
by them, "the nation cannot be secured against
invasion if depending for its defence upon the Fleet
alone." VOL. II. 18

274 NATIONAL DEFENCE [chap, vi
From the assumption that an enemy's force, small
indeed, but large enough to hold the way open for the
disembarkation of a larger army, might at any moment
be thrown on our shores, they deduce the con
sequence that to ensure the safety of our dockyards
and arsenals, either the regular Army must be greatly
augmented, or fortifications raust be constructed for
their protection.
Any such augraentation of the Array as would be
of effective use for this purpose was estimated by
the Coraraissioners to involve an original cost of
;^8,ooo,ooo, and an annual expenditure of ;^4,ooo,ooo
in all subsequent years for raaintenance. The same
original outlay of ;^8,ooo,ooo would, they pointed out,
be more efficiently employed for the defence of the
dockyards if spent in the construction of Works for
their protection, while such Works would require a
comparatively small annual outlay for their future
maintenance. The erection of such defences was
therefore recommended. " " If," say they, " the invio
lability of our shores cannot be secured by the Fleet
alone, neither can our arsenals and dockyards rely
on it solely for protection. To station perraanently
at each of them a Naval force sufficient for its defence
and having no other object would be inconsistent
with the duties of a Fleet, and would, in fact, be using
the Navy to maintain the dockyards, instead of using
the dockyards to raaintain the Navy " — a sentence
probably emanating from Mr. Herbert's own pen.
The remainder of the Report was devoted to re
commendations in detail as to the defences required
for the dockyards at Portsmouth, Plymouth, and
Pembroke, the ports of Dover, Portland, and Cork,
the approaches to Sheerness and Chatham, and the
arsenal at Woolwich.

1859-60] MEMORANDUM ON DEFENCE 275
On Deceraber 13th, before the Report was actually
signed, but after its contents had been settled and
subraitted to him for approval, Mr. Herbert circulated
a confidential Memorandum to the Cabinet, strongly
urging the necessity for defensive works of the
character conteraplated, giving reasons for raising the
funds for their construction by a Loan, and ingeni
ously arguing that the cost should be regarded as, in
truth, a Naval rather than a Military expenditure.
From this Memorandum the following extracts are
taken: " Our Navy must be our first and greatest defence
— but our Navy is not safe while we leave the
dockyards, which produce that Navy and raaintain it,
exposed, in case of war, to constant risk of destruction.
If it were not for our Navy, there is no reason
that can be given why Portsmouth or Plymouth
or Pembroke should require or receive greater care
or defence against the danger of attack than Ramsgate
or Brighton.
" You are defending the Navy, and not the land,
when you defend the dockyards. Without the means
of reproducing a fleet we cannot survive a defeat, nor
scarcely even a victory."
" Mr. Horsraan's raotion was resisted by the Govern
raent on the ground that, before such a step as that
he recommended, and of which the full iraportance
was felt, could be taken, the Governraent and the
country must have grounds for believing that the
works were necessary, and were, if comraenced, cora-
raenced on plans so well considered and matured as
to give confidence that they would, when executed,
secure the great object in view. I avowed my own
opinion in favour of the proceeding, and stated that
I had made a proposal similar in spirit to his own to
the Governraent ; but with the proviso that inquiry
must precede the act, and that Parliament raust be
raade cognizant ofi and a party to, all the details of
the plan.

276 NATIONAL DEFENCE [chap, vi
" The House rejected the raotion, with the spirit
of which they evidently agreed, and which it is very
questionable whether we could have resisted success
fully, without giving a pretty plain indication of the
intentions of the Government to adopt it in some
shape or degree next Session.
" General Peel has repeated to me in private what
he intimated in the House of Commons, that the late
Government had intended to pursue this year a
sirailar course had they reraained in office, and I have
received privately from another meraber of the late
Governraent an earnest exhortation not to abandon it.
" I raention these things, not because they prove
that the course is right or wrong, but because it raay
enable the Governraent to calculate what chance there
would be of resisting Horsraan's raotion next Session
when backed by the party opposite or by the strong
feeling of the country. If the course be wrong, this
would be no reason for adopting it. Believing it to
be right, and urgently required, I should be quite ready
to adopt it, even against strong opposition. Nothing,
as Mr. Horsraan observed, could be raore unjustifi
able than to borrow money to carry on the ordinary
expenditure of the country; but this is no part of
the ordinary or current expenditure of the country.
We spend vast suras for raen, and the raen pass
away, and the defence with thera. The country which
has successfully deterred attack by a standing array
of, say, 300,000 men, is not a bit stronger afterwards
than if it had been defended by 50,000, rather less so,
indeed, for the withdrawal of sO many raen frora
industrial and productive pursuits raust have weakened
her rnaterial resources. We pay annually large sums
for rifles and for guns. We are doing so at this
moraent to an almost unprecedented extent ; but in a
few years those implements will be worn out, even
if not superseded by some newer and better arrii.
But the fortification reraains to all tirae. Posterity
will gain nothing frora our men or our rifles or our
shells, but everything from our fortifications, which
wUl be useful to raany generations."
" The Coraraissioners are about to report. They have
visited all our dockyards and arsenals, including Cork
and Weedon, which latter they condemn as the site

1859-60] MEMORANDUM ON DEFENCE 277
of any proposed arsenal or depot. They approve of
the Works hitherto constructed, with one or two ex
ceptions. They have sent me, at my request, a rough
estimate of the cost of the Works which they propose.
Of these proposals I have great doubt as to the
adoption of one — namely, that having reference to
Woolwich — which can be made safe from any attack
by the river, but which cannot be defended by land,
except at an expense which seeras hardly comraensurate
with the results. Sorae place d'armes, or entrenched
camp, is, however, recommended by many authorities
within a certain distance south of Woolwich as likely
to aid in the resistance to an advance on London or
Woolwich from the south. These estimates are stated
to be purposely high, lest any raistake should occur,
and the Government led into a larger expenditure
than they had reason to anticipate. At Spithead,
however, the Commissioners think that the cost will
exceed what they first put down.
" Till these Works are completed, unless we greatly
increase our standing Array, which I trust we shall
not do, the public, conscious of the insecurity of the
great reproductive establishments on which our Navy
depends for its efficiency, and apprehensive of the
ambition of our neighbours, will be subject to alarms
and excitements which tend to provoke the very evils
and dangers which they fear. We are pledged to
deal with this question this next Session, and it is
important that we should decide on the mode of
dealing with it as soon as possible."
The Prirae Minister and the great majority of the
Cabinet shared Mr. Herbert's views as to the necessity
of making further and efficient provision for the
security of the dockyards, but this agreement was
not unaniraous, and Mr. Herbert found hiraself forced
into sharp and painful antagonisra with one who was
not only an important and influential colleague, but
one of the oldest and most intimate of his friends.
Mr. Gladstone's rooted aversion to all expenditure on
works of fortification was unconcealed. He regarded
the danger of invasion as altogether visionary; he

278 NATIONAL DEFENCE [chap, vi
had a rooted and reasoned dislike of railitary influence
and military ideas, which was unconsciously accom
panied by a less rational antipathy to all military
questions, and a distrust and jealousy of military men.
He was, therefore, inclined to regard all military
expenditure as raore or less wasted, and especially to
consider raoney spent on defensive works as so rauch
treasure absolutely thrown away. He was, raoreover,
at this raoraent bent on raaking the first Budget of
the new Governraent memorable by the repeal of
the Paper Duty, and could not wholly shut his eyes
to the inconsistency of, on the one hand, proposing
a large increase in the public expenditure, and at
the sarae tirae dispensing with an already existing
tax, the pressure of which was not generally felt,
and the only injurious effect of which (if it were
injurious) was that it acted as a check on the unliraited
multiplication of cheap periodicals and newspapers.
From the first, Mr. Gladstone made it clear that he
would be no willing agent in the prosecution of
Sidney Herbert's plans for the construction of large
Works of Defence. On receiving, in a letter from
Lord Palmerston,^ a rough outline of the measure^
conteraplated, in which his concurrence appears to
have been assuraed, he wrote thus to Mn Herbert :
" Hawarden, " December igtli, 1859.
" My dear Herbert,
" I think you should see the enclosed letter,
which appears to have been written at your instance.
" I hope you will see that in asking inforraation as
a prelirninary to dealing with a question so novel and
so vast in the shape it has assuraed, and in hesitating
to agree to an expenditure of raany raillions, and to a
' It is given at p. 268 of the last volume of Mr. Ashley's Life of Lord
Palmerston.

I859-60] LETTER FROM MR. GLADSTONE 279
proposal that the money for the purpose should be
borrowed, while in ignorance of the Reports on which
the plan is founded, 1 have in reality done no more
than discharge an elementary duty of my office, and
ask adherence to a rule which 1 have never before
known to be departed frora.
"You are aware that I have had no inforraation
from or coraraunication with the ' War Coraraittee,' of
which I have known but recently, and only under its
collective narae.
" Directly that I receive your proposal in the form
you may ultimately give to it, with the statements on
which you wish it to rest, so that I may know I have
the case before me, I will not lose a raoment in
preparing such observations and suggestions as I
raay think it incurabent on rae to make.
" I ara particularly anxious, and I state it now as
time raay thus be saved, that the inforraation may be
careful and precise as to the time within which it can
be securely calculated that all the preliminary opera
tions will have been accoraplished. I raean such as
the exercise of the powers of expropriation and
obtaining possession of the land, the completion of
working designs for the fortifications, with the
specifications necessary for contractors, the issue
of tenders and concluding contracts upon them, the
collection of plant and of people, and finally the time
after actual commencement and before the work will
be, to use a homely phrase, in full swing, together
with the probable monthly or quarterly rate of
expenditure at each place, both after and before that
period. " I say this because my first duty is to consider the
plan in its bearing upon the finance of the year, and
to consider the provision necessary to raeet the charge
during the year ; which will, or raay, be a year of
exception in some points that you probably may not
yet be aware of
" The other points on which I should anxiously
look to be informed are such as I conclude the report
must contain, and I understood you to say at the
Cabinet that it was to be prepared with all speed.
" It seems to me that it would be highly advan
tageous if, in connection with this subject, you were
to appoint some of your best men, such as Mr. Godley,

280 NATIONAL DEFENCE [chap, vi
to raake a special examination of your Fortifications
and Buildings Vote. I heard you say you-were at
work upon it, but with all your activity and quickness
I hardly suppose you can go into all the detail.
" There is no reason visible to me why the subject
of the proposed fortifications should erabarrass you
in the preparation of your Estiraates. Your civil
buildings, and the sum requisite for necessary repairs,
you can determine at once, and I am sure you will
do all that is practicable to keep it within bounds.
As to everything beyond this, without prejudice to
any question depending, either about the particular
works to be undertaken or the raode of obtaining
the money, I apprehend it may with great propriety
be presented separately to the House of Comraons.
We raay, I suppose, assume that we shall not proceed
simply as heretofore, but that some considerable step
will be taken. If so, this seeras a good basis for a
separate proposal, which raight, perhaps, be introduced
by resolution. Pray read, if you have not read, the
debates and papers of Pitt's tirae upon the subject.
" Yours affectionately,
"W. E. Gladstone."
Mr. Gladstone to Mr. Herbert.
" Hawarden,
"December 2ist, 1859.
" My dear Herbert,
" There is another point which I ought to have
mentioned in my letter about fortifications. I am
anxious to know, at any rate by rough estimate,
how much of the ;^i, 250,000 for land (if that be the
amount) is to remain capable of profitable use, and
how rauch to be (so to speak) consumed in fortifying.
I take for granted we shall clearly gather frora the
report how the arsenals are to be defended against
the long-range guns (such as those with which the
Spaniards were to have cannonaded the Straits of
Gibraltar). The French (when they corae !) are sure
to bring a good stock of thera ! "
Mr. Gladstone was told that the Report would be
sent to hira, and rejoined :
"Am I to take the Fortification Report, when re
ceived, as your plan and recomraendation ? Or when

1 859-60] GLADSTONE'S SUGGESTION 281
(if it be not so) shall you be able to let rae understand
what you adopt and recoraraend?"
On Januar}^ 26th he wrote again :
"January 26th, i860.
" My dear Herbert,
" I will send to Mr. Laing about Colonel Jaraes's
paper. But we have raore serious matters depending.
" Pray consider my suggestion that we should
agree forthwith upon a sum which shall be the charge
for the coming year in respect of fortifications. This
^ou might put in your Estimates by means of a Vote,
postponing all details and explanations; or, if such
a plan be inconvenient, I could say in the Financial
Statement how much we think ought to be borne
upon the charge of the year in respect of fortifications.
" If, as I gather frora your note, you intend to per
severe in proposing a Loan, you would have to make
provision for the interest, and would, I presume, take
such a sum as would represent more than the interest
on the first instalment. I, on the other hand, might
take the sarae sum without prejudice to ray views and
intentions. " But as I raust be ready on Monday week with the
results of our deliberations on a set of extensive and
varied raeasures, which the Cabinet has not yet con
sidered — as the Estimates are not fixed, and there raay
still be much to say upon their scale with reference
to the present position of affairs — and as I presurae
it to be now impossible that the affair of the fortifica
tions can be satisfactorily discussed and decided
before the Budget, I make the suggestion I have
raentioned in the hope of its reraoving a present
practical difficulty without prejudice to the free dis
cussion and deliberate settlement which may take
place some weeks hence."
This scherae of voting in the Estiraates of the year
a sum which should be regarded by Mr. Herbert as
the interest of a Loan, plus a certain amount to be
employed in building operations during the year,
while in Mr. Gladstone's eyes it was to represent
expenditure wholly devoted to construction, naturally
did not commend itself to Mr. Herbert or his col-

282 NATIONAL DEFENCE [chap, vi
leagues, and was not adopted. But the keen contest
which arose as to the araount ef the Army Estiraates
had the effect of postponing, as desired by Mr. Glad
stone, all discussion on the Fortification Scheme until
after agreeraent had been arrived at with regard to the
provisions of the Budget, and the Governraeijt had
been irrevocably coraraitted to the reduction of the
Paper Duty. On May 26th Mr. Gladstone wrote :
"The question to which you refer has, as you
know, been for six or seven raonths before ray mind,
and amidst all their varied vicissitudes it has never
swerved. In truth, my belief is that this is a drunken
tirae, and one which will hereafter be looked back
upon with much surprise, and not high estiraation
so far as that point is concerned. I never corae to
conclusions before the tirae. On any question of
mere amount I raight shake and waver much ; but
on the principles involved here I do not think that
I shall ever change without a greater upsetting and
transforming process within me than I have under
gone in the whole lapse of a quarter of a century.
" I can understand how any one ^ who raerely seeks
to burke the Reform Bill should make light of the
difficulty of launching your plan under present cir
curastances, but I do not believe this to be your case,
and, unless it were, I think you raust feel the difficulties
of present execution to be very grave."
After the Whitsuntide recess, Mr. Gladstone cir
culated a Meraorandura in which he deprecated the
necessity or expediency of constructing Works of
Defence, and intiraated very plainly that he would not
be a party to them.
Mr. Gladstone's position raay be shortly stated thus :
He was reluctant to incur any additional mihtary
expenditure, but was open to conviction as to its
necessity, and prepared to raake provision out of the
revenue of the year for such works as were shown
to him to be so. But he was firmly opposed to a
' i.e. Lord Palmerston.

i859-6o] A DIVIDED CABINET 283
Loan for the purpose, or to any enactment providing
for an expenditure extending over several years.
This, nevertheless, was the method which, to Mr.
Herbert, and to most of his coUeagues, seeraed the
only safe one to pursue. Its adoption was forcibly
urged on Mr. Herbert in a letter frora the Duke of
Soraerset. He wrote that, having deliberately con
sidered every practicable alternative, he had come
to the conclusion that resort to a Loan would be not
only the simplest course to adopt, but that most in
accordance with constitutional practice, and which
would raost coraraend itself to the House of Coraraons
and the Nation. The Duke was an able man of
eminently judicial teraper. As Lord Seyraour he had
filled a prominent position in the House of Comraons,
and was a high authority on all questions connected
with its working. His opinion therefore carried
rauch weight, but no support frora others could
compensate Mr. Herbert for the continued opposition
of Mr. Gladstone.
From the time they left Oxford, Gladstone and
Sidney Herbert had been united by ties of close and
intimate friendship. It is honourable to both that
keen antagonism in the Cabinet left that friendship,
clouded indeed, but practically unimpaired, and
caused no disturbance of their relations in private
life. Whether this would have been the case had
Mr. Gladstone's " impetuous moods " — (his own
phrase) — been raet by similar impetuosity on Herbert's
part may be doubted ; but the latter well knew how
to render quarrel irapossible. Mr. Gladstone had
'not anticipated so unaniraous a repudiation by his
colleagues of his views on a financial question, and
his letters assuraed a tone which raight almost be
described as querulous.

284 NATIONAL DEFENCE [chap, vi
Mr. Gladstone to Mr. Herbert.
"II, C. H. Terrace,
"July i<)th, i860.
" My dear Herbert,
" I have just got and read the raeraoranda on
ray paper of last Monday. To this hour, I ara bound
to say, I know neither the legislation nor the plans to
be proposed. All that I know is that some day soon I
may be asked to say Aye or No on them, with all it
involves, at a quarter of an hour's notice.
" I gather from your paper, for the first tirae, that a
selection is to be raade. Can you tell me how much
can be spent on the selected works during the autumn
and winter — i.e. before the first of April next?
"You say you mean by the year, frora July to
July — that is, a year as yet unknown — not the natural
year, nor the financial year, nor the year of twelve
months from your announcement. You may fix that
date, but it must be for some purpose.
"You say that it is not intended to commit the
Government to the scherae of the Coraraission. Allow
me to say this would be the only possible raeaning of
mentioning nine millions in the Bill. Parliament
never gives powers to borrow money except on
occasion shown. If a nine millions' scherae is not
approved, it would be alike unusual and even uncon
stitutional to deal with the raising of the raoney at
all. But it is really a significant raode of expressing
the adoption of the scheme in principle as a whole,
and though I think this in this point of^view exception
able, from any other it would be unintelligible.
" Let me remind you of another point — the absolute
necessity of making known, before the scherae as a
whole is adopted, or rather proposed for adoption,
the opinion of the railitary authorities respecting
the necessity of an addition to the regular Army.
"The regular course would have been for me to
wait until you raade known to rae the forra of your
proposal with the cost, but the year is so far spent
that I have gone out of ray way to save delay.
"Ever yours,
"W. E. Gladstone."
Mr. Herbert wrote a few lines to deprecate any
immediate decision. To these Mr. Gladstone repHed :

i859-6o] MR. GLADSTONE'S ATTITUDE 285
"II, Downing Street, Whitehall,
"July 20th, i860.
" My dear Herbert,
" It is my strong sense of the innumerable
reasons against carrying raatters to extreraes that has
led rae to think it my duty not to decline being a
party, even to such works as you describe, or to
providing the raeans of meeting them, provided both
be limited to the financial year.
" But to a Bill which at this tirae pledges Parliaraent
to the scherae as a whole, and provides (though
contingently upon annual votes) for executing it by
Loans, it is impossible for rae to be a party.
" It is better to be brief, and I do not dwell upon
3'our kind words — they are not therefore unfelt."
But notwithstanding this apparently decisive
rupture, there were reasons which might well make
Mr. Gladstone reluctant to carry his threat into
execution. He discovered to his surprise that those
of his colleagues on whose support he had counted
were not prepared to join him in quitting the Cabinet,
and that if he left office he would find himself in a
position of alraost absolute isolation. The supporters
of the Governraent and the Conservative Opposition
were agreed in their deterraination to iraprove the
existing raeans of national defence, and it was clear that
the public opinion of the country was strongly on the
sarae side. Mr. Bright and the extrerae Radicals
no doubt shared Mr. Gladstone's abhorrence of
military expenditure, but he shrank at that time frora
any closer connection with raen whose principles
and raodes of action he still regarded with suspicion
and distrust. Nor was he prepared for the compara
tive equanimity with which the prospect of his
secession appeared to be regarded by his colleagues.
When, on May 24th, Lord Palraerston wrote to
the Queen that Mr. Gladstone had, through the Duke
of Newcastle, intiraated his intention of retiring if

286 NATIONAL DEFENCE [chap, vi
the Fortification Scherae were persevered in, he
added that " however great the loss to the Govern
raent, it would be better to lose Mr. Gladptone than
to run the risk of losing Portsmouth or Plymouth."
In these almost contemptuous words he spoke the
language of nearly the whole Cabinet.
Still, the loss of Mr. Gladstone would have been
so serious a blow to the Government that it was felt
worth while to make some concession to retain him.
In the BUl as originally drawn, though the only
enactment was the authorisation of a Loan of two
millions, they were spoken of as voted on account as
part of the expenditure on a scheme of defence costing
;^9,oQO,ooo " to be raised by Loan." The Duke of
Argyll strongly urged Mr. Herbert to consent to the
omission of these words, which, as he pointed out,
in no wise pledged the House of Comraons to that
expenditure, and were therefore useless.
The Duke of Argyll to Mr. Herbert.
" Post Office, July oath, i86i.
" My dear Herbert,
" I really think that the Bill, as now drawn,
is nonsense. Read the Preamble frora the words
" cheerfully granted.' What is it that you cheerfully
grant? It is the 'supply hereinafter raentioned,' and
it is a s,upply ' to defray the expenses incurred in
the year.'
"But the only supply 'hereinafter raentioned' is
the whole nine millions, and the words ' such further
supplies as we may from time to tirae grant ' must
refer to some supply further than the nine millions!
What else can the word ' further ' apply to ? Further
than what ? Clearly further than the ' supply herein
after mentioned,' which supply is specifically defined
to be nine millions. The truth is that the attempt to
reconcile the ' granting ' of the whole nine millions,
with a profession of granting only so much) of it as
is required in the year, is an attempt which makes
a mess of the whole thing.

1 859-60] LETTER FROM DUKE OF ARGYLL 287
"You raay araend the Preamble in either of two
ways : you raay either say, ' We have granted the
supply hereinafter raentioned to defray the expenses
of the year, together with such further expenses as
raay be incurred during the three years following,'
and then mention your nine millions ; or else you
must say, ' We have granted, to defray the expenses of
the year, a supply not exceeding (say) three millions.'
Then the BiU is confined to the operation of the year,
and is consistent with the first part of the Preamble.
"The Parliamentary course is to grant supplies
for the year. The words in the Preamble referring
to the year's outlay are intended to sound like an
adherence to this constitutional rule. The succeeding
words are wholly inconsistent with those preceding,
and are intended as a sort of pledge that supplies
beyond this year will be voted this year. I cannot
see the use of this. Parliament is just as likely to
withhold the necessary vote in another year, as to
withhold the requisite Continuance Act.
"The Preamble also seems to rae to pledge the
House to raise the whole sum by loan — even if other
raodes of provision be possible. ' We have resolved
that . . . be raised by annuities.'
" 1 think serious blarae will attach to us if we
persist in so anomalous a forra of Bill, at the cost
of schisra araong ourselves. Apart frora this danger,
it is an object of no sraall raoment to raake the
whole proposal bulk as sraall as possible in the
eyes of foreign nations. It is an act iraplying
vehement suspicion — which may be only too well
justified. But it should be done with as little noise as
possible. We are choosing a mode which, with an
united Cabinet, would raeet strong opposition frora its
departure from usage, and which, with a divided
Cabinet, will attract attention from all the world.
" I ara, my dear Herbert,
" Yours most sincerely, " Argyll."
" Post Office,
"July 21st, i860.
" My dear Herbert,
" I don't wish to ' begin works this year and
leave thera off next,' or to proceed 'without a cora-

288 NATIONAL DEFENCE [chap, vi
prehensive plan.' But surely it is a delusion to
suppose that you bind Parliament to the scheme as a
whole, or prevent them from stopping the Works, so
long as they have power to withhold the Vote.
"in the Minister's speech, and even in the Preamble,
it is easy to set forth that the first year's vote is
' to account ' of a certain specified scheme. But there
is no need, or use, that I can see, in putting it in the
Bill. And there is the objection (besides the great
object of avoiding a split), that it proposes to bind
future Parliaments, not merely to the Works, but
to the special raode of raising the funds. It is quite
possible that the Chinese War may be over next
year, and there may be a flourishing Revenue, ar|d
though this may be iraprobable, it surely need not
be concluded against in the very terms of the Bill.
Some such words as ' unless otherwise provided for
by Parliament ' might obviate this objection.
"I think you over-estimate very much the practical
value of the Bill appearing to commit Parliaraent
to the whole, when it really leaves it open to them
to stop. If there is any reaction in public feeling on
the subject of fortifications, it will be quite as easy to
stop the Vote as a Bill, which will be really nothing
but a Continuance Bill.
" Gladstone, under pressure, is willing to submit,
I think, to all you propose this year, and he can't
object to the explanation that it is part of a scheme
to be continued to a given result. I can't see the
necessity of forcing him farther. His first concession
will involve him in the whole. I approve of your
plan, which is really and substantially sea defences,
and I see no risk whatever of the works being
interrupted, except such risk as must attend all forms
of renewable Parliamentary sanction. If we split on
such a point, both parties will be blamed for un
reasonable obstinacy. '
This reasoning prevailed, and it was finally arranged
that the words referring to the scherae as a whole,
and raentioning nine millions as its cost, should be
omitted, and that the two millions needed for the
works to be imraediately comraenced should be raised,
not by a Loan of that araount, as originaUy intended.

i859-6o] SPEECH ON DEFENCES 289
to be paid off in twenty years, but by an issue of
annuities terminable in thirty years ; Lord Palmerston
characteristically consoling himself with the reflection
that "the raode of proceeding which we have adopted
will have one advantage, and that is, that we shall
not be tied down by any Parliamentary docuraent
¦to nine raillions ! " With these concessions, Mr.
Gladstone professed himself, not indeed satisfied, but
content to acquiesce in the proposed measure.
Resolutions, on which the Fortification Loan Bill
was founded, were accordingly proposed on July
23rd by Lord Palmerston hiraself, and an animated
discussion followed, in which Sidney Herbert took a
conspicuous part.
He assumed that the House would agree with him,
that of all the places to be defended, Portsraouth was
the raost iraportant, and corabated the notion that its
defence ought to be entrusted to a Fleet.
" You want your Fleet to be constantly moving
about, and if once you are induced to defend Ports
mouth by a Fleet at Spithead, you have lost the use
of that Fleet. You are then endeavouring to do the
work of permanent fortifications with perishable
materials. Those ships are invaluable because they
have the power of raoving to whatever point requires
immediate defence, but if you condemn thera to be the
fortifications by which your dockyard is to be defended,
you cannot move them, and lose that which con
stitutes their chief value. What is the object of a
dockyard, except to make a Fleet ? But if the object
of the Fleet is to defend the dockyard, it would be
cheaper and better to have neither the one nor the
other. You raust defend that which makes the Fleet
by something other than the Fleet which is made by
it. You raust be able to send your Fleet at a moment's
notice to act hostilely against the enemy ; but, in order
to do that, you must have soraething left behind which
shall not be raoveable, which shall be permanent, and
capable of defending these dockyards. . . ."
VOL. II. 19

290 NATIONAL DEFENCE [chap, vi
He answered the objection that the existing weak
ness of Portsmouth ought not to be exposed, by saying
that— " in a constitutional Governraent we raust risk a great
deal. If the House of Coraraons is to deal, as I hope
it will deal, in a generous and patriotic spirit with
this question, you must take it into your confidence.
You cannot use reserve; you cannot say to this
House, ' We call upon you to spend large sums,
but we will not show any justification. You must
take it upon trust. We will not tell you how the
money is to be expended ; it is a question of con
fidence in the discretion of the Government.' The
House of Commons would rightfully say, ' Lay before
us the materials upon which you forraed your judg
raent, in order to enable us to forra one for ourselves.'
In this country you raust deal with Parliament in that
spirit, at whatever risk, and it would be an immense
risk if you had a doubt about the success of the
measure. But I have no doubt as to the success of
the raeasure. I do not care about showing up the
weak places, if I know that you will assist the
Governraent to raake them strong."
He then proceeded to state what were the Works
contemplated at Plymouth, Pembroke, Portland,
Dover, and the Thames.
" The hon. member for Birmingham (Mr. Bright)
says he knows what public works are, and he will
be much surprised if we get out of these under
;£"24,ooo,ooo instead of ;^i2,ooo,ooo. The Government
have excluded frora their proposals the cost of every
thing which is perishable. It would not be honest to
saddle posterity, even in the liraited forra of terminable
annuities, with a charge for that which perishes soon
after it is created. Armaraents are perishable. Your
cannon becorae useless and unserviceable after a few
years. Floating batteries which are proposed as one
raeans of defence, and which are popular with many
gentlemen, would cost more than solid defences,
because they are like ships, which live only about
thirty years. At the end of^ that time, having cost an

i8s9-6o] SPEECH ON DEFENCES 291
enorraous amount for repairs in the meanwhile, they
would have to be rebuilt. The Estiraates, raoreover,
have been fraraed studiously, and on purpose, upon
the largest possible scale.
" We have taken a very large sura for the purchase
of land, and I intend to introduce a Bill which wiU
give us a power that, under the Defences Act, the
Secretary of State does not possess. It will enable
us, where we want land as a rayon round a work, not
to purchase the fee sirnple, but to buy up the building
rights, paying the difference of value between agri
culture and building land. There will be a consider
able advantage in that provision. It will prevent us
frora purchasing raore land than is absolutely necessary
for our purpose, and as most of the places where the
contemplated works are to be erected are Parliamentary
boroughs, it is neither wise nor wholesome that
Government should become large landed proprietors
within them. Public opinion, raoreover, is subject to
sudden changes. We recollect the time when there
were no apprehensions of war, and when in consequence
of the economical notions which prevailed, land of
immense value to the national defence was sold. The
Committee will understand that it would be rauch less
lucrative to sell a right of building upon land than the
land itself, and therefore we shall not be exposed to
one very obvious teraptation. As I have said, the
Estimates are very large because our defences ought
to be made as perfect as possible ; but the Government,
as they were bound to do, have exercised a discretion,
especially on the land side, as to whether or not,
looking at the probabilities of attack, the whole of
the works recoraraended by the Coraraissioners are
absolutely necessary 
" It has been asked. While you are doing so rauch
for the dockyards and arsenal, why do you not do
soraething for the defence of London ? Undoubtedly
that is a very popular view. But how is that de
fence to be accoraplished ? A writer of great ability,
and an erainent mUitary authority, in a popular
periodical, has proposed to defend London by six
forts, placed apart at distances of something like seven
or eight miles. What military comraander, bent upon
entering London, would stop because he knows he
has got two sraall forts, one on either side of him.

292 NATIONAL DEFENCE [chap, vi
each five railes off? Such a defence Would not, 1
iraagine, shake his resolution to make a raid upon
London. But it is proposed that the forts in question
should be built for fabulously sraall sums. The land,
for example, is to be got for ;^200 an acre. I know
something about the purchase of land in the iramediat^_
suburbs of London, and I say you would be more
likely to pay from £"2,000 to ;£5,ooo an acre. Moreover,
the very places you would select for your forts are
just the sites which, from their height and picturesque
character, are the best suited for villas and expensive
gardens, and which consequently bring the highest
prices. The zone around London is far more valuable
than that round any town in the world. Each fort
would require to be surrounded by a clear space — in
fact, you would have to raake a kind of desert round
London, and the land would have to be purchased at
a cost so enorraous as to render the completion of
the scheme impossible.
"That is the objection taken to the plans of the
Coraraissioners. I am not certain whether it is a
sound one. The plans have been modified, and a
less fofce of men will be required than that contem
plated by the Coraraissioners. We have to consider
the relative expense of raen and works : when works
are cheaper let us take works ; when raen are cheaper
let us take men. It so happens that we are strongest
in raw levies. Raw levies cannot be manoeuvred in
the field, but they may make a brilliant and successful
defence behind works. The raost untutored nations
in the world — the Turks for instance — fight stoutly
behind works, but they cannot stand in the field. So
your irregulars and raw levies should be used to
defend your arsenals and dockyards.
" But it is said that there is no necessity for solid
and perraanent fortifications. It has been stated that
Sebastopol is an instance of a successful defence made
by earthworks hastily erected. But those earthworks
were not erected on a sudden. We were never able
to force the sea defences, regular fortifications which
were erainently successful, and we gave the enemy
three weeks or a month to raake their land defences.
That is a peculiarity in the case, and I believe that if
Sebastopol had been defended by perraanent works
on the south side, to which we went because there

I859-60] SPEECH ON .DEFENCES 293
were strong fortifications on the north, it would never
have been attacked at all. Such a step would have
been looked on as impossible."
He concluded thus :
" I have laboured at the raatter with great anxiety,
and I confess I should despair of this country if I
thought the people would hesitate to make the
sacrifice we ask. Of course, a large expense is to be
incurred, and to be defrayed not in the cheapest way—
by means of terminable securities. It is said that the
money may be had more cheaply and easily by raeans
of Consols. No doubt ; but is it not iraportant to show
that we are not iraposing a burden on posterity, and
raaking no effort ourselves, and that this is an
exceptional and extraordinary proceeding ? "
The Resolutions were carried by a very large
majority, and the Bill consequently introduced en
countered no serious opposition in either House of
Parliament. Mr. Gladstone, however, absented himself frora the
House of Commons on the night when the Resolutions
were proposed, and took Httle if any pains to conceal
his disapproval of the step to which he had reluctantly
assented.

CHAPTER VII
the CHINESE WAR
1859-61
THE war wdth China, which resulted from the
seizure of the lorcha Arrow, comraenced early
in 1857, and received the approval of the country
at the General Election of that year. But its active
prosecution was temporarily suspended in consequence
of the outbreak of the great Indian Mutiny, and the
iraperative necessity for the employraent of all avail
able forces in its suppression. Operations were,
however, resuraed before the end of the year. They
were attended with uniform success, and a Treaty, by
which several additional ports were thrown open to
trade and increased facilities for European enter
prise secured, was signed at Tientsin before the close of
1858. That Treaty was described by Sidney Herbert,
in a speech on the Navy Estimates on February 25th,
1859, as "a Treaty of Peace with a casus belli in every
clause." The accuracy of this description was shown
sooner than he had anticipated. For on September
nth, 1859, telegraphic news reached the English
Government that the English and French Ministers
in China, having been refused access to the Peiho River,
on their way to Pekin — a right clairaed by thera under
the Treaty — the British naval force had endeavoured
to force a passage, and had been repulsed with a
294

i8s^6i] PEIHO DISASTER 295
loss of three gunboats, and nearly 400 killed and
wounded, the British Admiral himself being among
the nuraber of the latter. The strength of the barriers
in the river had been underrated, as had also that of
the forts, an atterapt to storm which ended in utter
failure. On the receipt of this intelligence, Mr. Herbert
wrote to Lord Palmerston as follows :
"War Office, September \2th, 1859.
" My dear Lord Palmerston,
" This is very bad news from China, and the
renewal of the war has come sooner than I expected.
We have at Hong Kong 789 infantry, 321 artillery,
and 198 engineers; total, 1,308, all ranks. But from
this the officers and non-commissioned officers must
be deducted, and a large further allowance must be
made in that cHraate for ineffectives in hospital. This
is a poor force. On the other hand, we have very
large stores — ammunition of all sorts, siege guns,
ships' guns in great plenty, and camp equipage for
10,000 men. I ara havmg a list made out and printed
for circulation in the Cabinet.
" Whatever is sent in the way of force must be
sent frora India. In the present state of feeling in
France it would be unwise to send a raan frora here.
" The sepoys are even more unhealthy at Hong
Kong than the Europeans. The latter die annually
at the rate of 80 per 1,000. The sepoys, by the last
return, 120 per 1,000. This is attributed to the low
diet of the Hindoos. A Sikh regiraent of Mussulraen,
which come on from the Punjab, might make part of
the forces to be sent (as it must be) frora India."
Meanwhile, Lord Palraerston, who had received
the news siraultaneously with Mr. Herbert, had
written to hira that :
"This is very disagreeable frora China. It is
useless to conjecture whether sufficient precautions
were or were not taken to ascertain the state of the
defences before the attempt to ascend the river was
made. But the question now is. What is to be done ?

296 THE CHINESE WAR [chap, vii
I should like to know what you consider the military
force in China to be, and what reinforceraents from
India, England, or elsewhere could easily be sent
thither. "There seems to me three things we might do.
First, we raight attack and occupy Pekin, but that
would require a pretty strong military force to
accompany the ships, and we do not well know how
far up the river any sea-going vessels would go, nor
what force we should be likely to meet with when
we got to Pekin, or on our way up to it. Upon these
points Elgin and those who went with him raight
give inforraation, but this would be an enterprise of
sorae magnitude, and in which we should have to
take care not to fail.
"Secondly, we might take possession of Chusan,
which the Chinese would greatly dislike, but then
unluckily we are erabarked in these affairs with the
French, and we should be obliged to have thera
with us in Chusan, and the Eraperor would be very
liberal in sending plenty of his Italian campaigners
thither. We should soon be in a minority there, and
that raight in the end be inconvenient.
"Thirdly, we might take up a position in the
Yangtse Kiang at the point where the Grand Canal
opens into it, and we might there, and in the Gulf
of Pechelee, establish a blockade of Pekin, which, after
a time, would bring John Chinaraan to his bearings.
This would require the least araount of force, and,
indeed, would chiefly be done by a sraall Naval force.
We should require possession of an island in the
raiddle of the river, which we should raake our dep6t
or headquarters."
The general irapression that the disaster had been
rashly invited increased as its details were better
known, and Lord Palraerston (September 14th)
wrote :
" I suppose our officers were piqued to do something
desperate in the presence of France and Araerica, but
the whole operation seeras, by the account in The
Times, to have been ill managed."
A Cabinet was held on the following Saturday, at

i859-6i] EXPEDITION ORDERED 297
which the opinion that the enterprise which had
ended so unfortunately should not have been under
taken seems to have prevailed, but this, of course, did
not remove the necessity for taking immediate steps
to reverse the effect of so serious a check from so
unexpected a quarter. It was deterrained that an
expedition on a considerable scale should be sent
to China in the spring, and that Lord Elgin should
be asked to resurae the position of Arabassador and
High Commissioner in China. Viewed in the light of
subsequent events, it may be regretted that the course
was not adopted which, judging from Lord Palraer
ston's letter of September 12th, most comraended itself
to him. The blockade of the Grand Canal — undertaken
at once — would probably have effected its purpose as
thoroughly as the more extended operations of the
following year, and that without the expenditure of
treasure, the loss of valuable lives, and the vandalic
revenge taken for them which actually occurred.
Though on every ground a lover of peace, it can
hardly have been without a certain degree of satis
faction that Sidney Herbert found himself engaged
in directing a war of some magnitude at an even
greater distance from home than the Crimea. He had
now an opportunity of showing how raisfortunes,
sirailar to those of that campaign, might be avoided ;
and how well, and with what coraplete success, he
used that opportunity the result proved. But in
justice to those engaged in the Criraean war it raust
be observed that it is easy to he wise after the event,
and that mistakes made and detected so recently were
hardly likely to be repeated ; that the operations, if
undertaken at greater distance from horae, were on a
far smaller scale, while the forces eraployed consisted
largely of Indian troops, not so given to complaint, or

298 THE CHINESE WAR [chap, vii
so able to make their complaints heard at home, as
British soldiers. Above all, the risks of campaigning
during a severe winter in a hostile country were in
this case carefully shunned.
This, however, does not detract frora the raerit of
the excellent foresight displayed in securing the health
and comfort of the troops engaged, and in providing
for every contingency likely to affect the success of
the campaign.
The character of the expedition having been resolved
on, it was in the next place necessary to determine its
strength. Considerations of economy made it desirable
that it should be as small as possible ; and not con
siderations of economy alone, for the suspicions
entertained as to the attitude and intentions of Louis
Napoleon rendered it unsafe, in the opinion of Mr.
Herbert and many others, to diminish the strength
of the forces maintained at home. At the sarae time
it was necessary that the force should not be of inferior
proportions to that sent by the French Emperor,
who offered to the British Government a co-opera
tion more embarrassing than welcome. His ships had
not been engaged at Taku, but the honour of France
was, he declared, wounded by the refusal of admission
to his Ambassador, who was on board one of the
English vessels.
Lord Palmerston wrote on October 5th that he
had had a —
" letter from Persigny, telling rae that the Eraperor
is preparing for his China expedition twelve battalions
of infantry, two squadrons of cavalry, eight -batteries
of artillery, and twenty gunboats drawing only three
feet water.
" I conceive that it would be very injurious to
our reputation and position in Asia if our force was
inferior to that of the French ; but have we the raeans

i8s9-6i] FRENCH ASSISTANCE 299
of sending frora India the same number and descrip
tion of troops? I should think we have. Some
native cavalry would probably be a good match for
the Mongols, but half of what we send might be
British. How could we do about artillery, which
would certainly be wanted ? I forget how raany
guns go to a battery ; but eight batteries at all events
must include a good number. We could send all
we want more easily and cheaply frora India than
the French can frora France ; but may it not be
necessary to supply the place of some part of the
force sent from India by troops sent to India frotti
hence ? The French guns will, of course, all be
rifled — we have none such in India; but ours will
probably do well enough for the Chinese. The
question is whether, if we send Arrastrong guns
out for this conjoint operation, the French would
be able to learn anything about them which we wish
or can be able to keep from their knowledge. If not,
it raight be well to send sorae Armstrongs both for
land and for sea service."
Mr. Herbert replied :
" Wilton, October 7th, 1859.
" My dear Lord Palmerston,
" Our Ally is inconveniently liberal in the
amount of his assistance ; not but that by great effort
we may maintain an equality in numbers, if native
troops can count against French. But it is a drain
which weakens us, and if he sent 50,000 men instead
of 15,000, we should have almost to denude ourselves
here, if the rule be laid down that our force is in
any event to equal his. We can take one regiment
from the Cape, possibly two. We could send two
batteries, one wnth Armstrong guns and one with
ordinary field pieces, or if going by the Red Sea,
both with Armstrong's guns. I have suggested to
Wood to get two battalions of infantry from Bombay,
two from Madras, and one, perhaps, from Bengal.
This, with what we have at Canton, would exceed
the French proposal.
" But these preparations imply a plan of campaign
which I think it is scarcely our interest to proraote.
The feeling araong the English in China is very

300 THE CHINESE WAR [chap, vii
different frora what it was in the Canton business.
They have no wish to hurailiate the Chinese. On
the contrary, their fear is lest we upset the whole
concern by still further destroying the prestige of
the present dynasty, and so plunging the country
into a state of anarchy which would be fatal to our
trade, the prosecution of which is the object of all
our proceedings. Nor do I like sending even a
couple of batteries away from home in the present
precarious state of European politics. We have bad
weather ahead, and raust keep all our resources
against danger ready. But even if we get all the
force we hope for frora India, if it is to be on the scale
now talked of, we shall greatly have exceeded our
Votes and the nuraber of raen authorised by the
Mutiny Act. We must consider whether we must
not have an autumn session. The Opposition will
attack on this Chinese question, and the extrerae
Radical party say they must go with them. They
cannot help themselves.
" In the present state of public feeling it will not
do to appear to be dragged on beyond our opinion
and intentions by France. Had we not better have
a Cabinet next week ? Say on Thursday or Friday,
by which day all could be got together, and a clear
exposition of policy as regards China ought to be
raade to the French, Governraent."
Mr. Herbert did not at all relish the large araount
of French aid proffered, and was glad to find that
it was as little agreeable to Lord John Russell, who
wrote to hira frora Haddo House on October nth
that there had now been —
" some correspondence with France, as Palraerston
will have informed you, about troops for China. The
French propose sending 15,000 men, and they kindly
suggest that if we do not send so many, we raight
furnish transport for thera, as in the case of the
Crimea. Now, I decidedly object to being again beasts
of burden for the French. I think it absolutely
essential that we should send, of European troops,
an equal number with that of the French of infantry,
and as many cavalry, if not more.
" I confess the size of the expedition seeras to rae

i859-6i] HOPE GRANT'S APPOINTMENT 301
too large, but there is no chance, I suppose, that
the French would dirainish their numbers.
Mr. Herbert was not only disposed to share Sir
James Grahara's opinion that the expedition would
act as " a decoy " ; he foresaw that the expenditure
involved would excite grievous opposition within
the Cabinet itself, and he dreaded the results to
the stability of the Chinese Empire of a march on
Pekin, which he did his utmost to discourage. Such
a march had in the first instance been advocated by
the French Government, but they had seen the dan
gers involved, and had in the end given an opinion
against going to Pekin at all. It was ultiraately left to
the discretion of the Coraraanders of the allied forces.
The selection of a Coraraander also presented sorae
difficulties. The choice finally lay between Sir
William Mansfield, afterwards Lord Sandhurst, and
Sir Hope Grant. The Viceroy and the India Office
were in favour of the former. The railitary authori
ties preferred the latter, and the appointraent was
conferred upon hira. How araply he justified the choice
the event showed, but at the time there were not
wanting, even araong good and corapetent judges,
raurraurs of apprehension at his selection, and regrets
that he had been preferred to his raore brilliant
rival, who was offered, but declined, the coraraand
of a Division. Sidney Herbert at once coraraenced
his correspondence with Sir Hope Grant as follows :

" War Office, " November 26th, 1859.
" Dear Sir J. Hope Grant,
" I trust that an early mail will bring your
acceptance of the appointraent to the coraraand of
the expedition to China. In that case our relations
will henceforth be of such an intimate character that

302 THE CHINESE WAR [chap, vii
I feel I may, without scruple, address you as I have
done in this letter."
After giving nuraerous details as to the composition
of the expedition, he proceeds :
" The command which has been offered to j^ou
is one requiring, from the peculiar circumstances
which surround it, both temper and judgment, and
I do not think the Queen could have chosen an
officer more likely than yourself to discharge its
duties successfully.
" There are two difficulties which beset our course —
one as regards our eneray, the other as regards our
Ally. "As regards the Chinese, the deplorable mishap
at the mouth of the Peiho raakes retaliation unavoid
able, unless we could in the interira receive, which
I fear is very unlikely, a disavowal of the act, and
sorae offer of reparation. But our quarrel is not
with the people, but with the Governraent. At the
ports where we trade our peaceful relations have re
mained unimpaired. Our object in going to China is to
trade, and they trade with us uninterruptedly, though
the Central Government fires on our ships and
arrests the progress of our Ambassador. It is impor
tant to raaintain, if possible, this good understand
ing with the Chinese people at the trading ports.
The pressure, therefore, whatever it be, should
be as far as is possible confined to the Central
Governraent. They can be approached by the Gulf
of Pecheli and the Peiho. I trust that the reduction
of the forts at the raouth of the river, and — if that,
though successful as an operation, should fail to
bring thera to terms — an advance up the Peiho to
Tientsin, would enable us to dictate a peace to the
Chinese Emperor.
" Our object is to get our peace ratified without
being obliged to have recourse to an advance on
Pekin itself With the numbers which the Chinese
Governraent have at their coraraand, the advance of
what after all is but a handful of men into an enor
mous capital is hazardous, and the operation, if
successful, might possibly, in the present disorganised
state of the Chinese Empire, end in upsetting the
existing dynasty and throwing the whole country

i859-6i] LETTER TO SIR HOPE GRANT 303
into a state of anarchy, fatal to the interests of
comraerce, because destructive of all production.
Again, the Chinese capital is so situated that it is,
first, from ice, and secondly, frora the N.E. monsoon,
almost unattackable till the beginning of May, and
the great heats of June and July are almost as
powerful for its defence. Should this season be
missed, as I trust it will not be, an equally short
season intervenes after the diminution of the August
heat and the recommencement of the cold. An ex
pedition, therefore, requiring time may involve us in
a campaign at a time of year when the temperature
raay tell with fearful severity on European constitu
tions, and it is important to get our terms and finish
our business as soon as possible. Add to this that .
the Government are most anxious, whether from
China or frora India, to effect a greater concentration
of our troops in England as soon as possible. An
early termination of our Chinese " difficulty " is,
therefore, most desirable. Our Allies probably have
different views. They have no great commercial
interests at stake. The good-will of the Chinese, or
the stability of the Chinese Empire, is not important
to them ; but the prestige of a bulletin dated from
Pekin would give great satisfaction to the French
people. Our plenipotentiary, Mr. Bruce, may there
fore have difficult cards to play.
" I need scarcely irapress on you the necessity of a
raost open, cordial, and conciliatory bearing towards
the commanders of the French forces. Although the
two Governments are on perfectly friendly terms, it is
impossible to deny that there exists between the two
nations a jealous and uneasy feeling. A perfectly
frank and unreserved course of conduct is, as in all
such cases, the best and safest."
It was resolved that the expedition should consist of
such European regiments in India as would in the
natural course of events have been sent back to
England that year, and of a considerable contingent
of native troops. The consequent arrangeraents
forraed the subject of correspondence between Mr.
Herbert and the Viceroy, Mr. Herbert's old and
intimate friend, Lord Canning.

304 THE CHINESE WAR [chap, vii

Mr. Herbert to Viscount Canning.
"War Office,
"November loth, 1859.
" My dear Canning,
• ¦»«'¦
" It is difficult steering with our French friends.
They have not been so seriously hurt as we, but they
want to date a bulletin from Pekin, and have no end
of glory for nothing, and to secure the latter by levying
a large contribution from the Chinese. We wish for
neither. We don't want to upset the dynasty nor to
ruin the Government, as on their stability and pros
perity depends all our trade, which, after all, though
of late years we have rather forgotten it, is th^ sole, or
at least the first, object for which we go to China
at all."

" November 26th, 1859.
. . • . *
" It will be a very delicate and disagreeable
affair. We don't want to upset the Chinese dynasty,
and, therefore, we don't want to go to Pekin. The
French don't care about the dynasty because they
do not care about trade, and they want to date a
bulletin from Pekin. Then, above all, we want a
quick operation, because we want every available man
home here as soon as he can be got. I trust you
will be able to send us some battalions home soon.
Nothing can be raore suspicious than the enorraous
preparations of every kind making by France. We
are going to raise our home force by 25,000 raen, but
we shall get thera slowly, and when got they are but
raw recruits. What we really want is twenty good
battalions from India; we should then have some
sense of security in the country, and I earnestly hope
that you will make every effort, and even run risks,
to send us as much as you possibly can.
" We have some doubt here whether you can find
tonnage enough for the force we have asked for
China. Whatever steam tonnage can be got should
"he used, as a quick blow is everything. But pray
keep in mind our great want, which is troops at home."

I859-6I] HOPE GRANT'S INSTRUCTIONS 305
Sidney Herbert submitted to Lord Palraerston the
forraal instructions he had drafted for Sir Hope
Grant, and received the following reply :
Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Herbert.
" November 27th, 1859.
" My dear Sidney Herbert,
" I return you your Instructions, which seem
very good, and provide for everything. I would,
however, suggest a substitute for the passage I have
marked A in page 13.
" I am myself entirely incredulous as to the sup
posed overthrow of the Imperial authority and dynasty
by our occupation of Pekin, and if we really thought
such a result inevitable, it would be a graver question
whether we ought to meditate an attack on Pekin,
and whether we ought not rather to have recourse
to blockade of the capital and occupation of Chusan
or some other place.
" I know that Elgin entertains the opinion that
such might be the effect of our occupation of Pekin,
but it is not always true that those who have been
nearest to an object have seen it best ; at all events
I think it would be better to leave out of our
Instruction the contemplation of the overthrow of
dynasty and order by our getting to the points we
are aiming at.
" Query instead of paragraph A, page 13, say :
" It is possible that the occupation of Tientsin, by
so large a European force as that which the British
and French Governments are about to send to China,
may of itself induce the Emperor of China to yield
to our deraands ; but if that occupation should not
produce this effect, an advance on Pekin may, in the
opinion of the diplomatic agents and of the military
commanders, become necessary or expedient. It is
impossible for Her Majesty's Government, at this
distance of tirae and place, to give any definite instruc
tions upon a point the decision of which raust be
left to the discretion of those who may have the
direction of these matters at the time, and who will
best be able to judge what course it will, under the
circumstances of the raoment, be fittest to pursue.
But there are some considerations of a general
VOL. II. 20

3o6 THE CHINESE WAR [chap, vn
nature to which Her Majesty's Government think
it right to advert.
" It may reasonably be expected that the allied
forces would overcome every obstacle or resistance
that might oppose their march upon Pekin, and it
may well be supposed that the near approach of such
a force to the capital of China, or the actual occupa
tion of that capital by such a force, would induce the
Chinese Eraperor to submit. In such case, the objects
of the expedition having been accomplished, there
would be no difficulty in making such ulterior
arrangements as might be agreed upon by the
diplomatic agents and by the military and naval com
manders. But it is possible that the Emperor raight
retire from Pekin and take refuge in his northern
provinces rather than yield to our demands. In such
case the occupation of Pekin might become a serious
erabarrassraent to the allied forces.
" Arrangements might, indeed, be made to preserve
order in the town, as has been done at Canton since
it has been occupied by the allied troops, and during
the summer months there might be no material
difficulty in securing quarters and provisions at Pekin,
and in keeping up communication with the coast.
But the winter sets in at Pekin with great severity
in the month of October, and if the Emperor had
quitted his capital on the approach of the allied Army,
and had not yielded to our demands before the
winter was setting in, the allied diplomatists and
commanders would have to consider whether the
troops should or could pass the winter at Pekin, or
whether they should, before the weather became too
inclement for a raarch, retire to the south to some
other winter quarter. The decision on that question
would, of course, depend upon many considerations
turning upon knowledge only to be acquired on the
spot and at the time, and it must, therefore, be left
to the discretion of the allied comraanders."
Mr. Herbert sent this suggestion to Mr. Gladstone,
saying that —
" Lord P. proposes to add a paragraph half desiring
a raarch on Pekin, but at the end suggesting dangers
and difficulties which ought to involve a contrary

i8s9-6i] CHINESE INSTRUCTIONS 307
advice. We can't winter at Tientsin any raore than
at Pekin, for we should be shut in there by the ice.
Neither ought we to winter anywhere except in
England. We ought to avoid all operations requiring
tirae, or likely to lead us, or force us, to stay in the
country. Tell rae what you think."

Mr. Gladstone to Mr. Herbert.
" November 2()th, 1859.
"My dear Herbert,
"I agree with the letter and spirit of your
Instructions. I have made one or two very slight
notes in pencil, initialled.
"As respects Lord Palraerston's query on p. 13,
I cannot doubt the evidence (to say nothing of Elgin)
supplied by the Taeping rebellion as to the perilous
disorganisation of the Chinese Empire. But it occurs
to me that Lord P.'s Mera. well states some of the
military considerations affecting, rather in an adverse
sense, the question of an advance upon Pekin. To
occupy it, and then retreat re infecta — apparently no
iraprobable contingency — would of itself be a great
discredit to us, and at the same time a great blow
would have been dealt to the dynasty. The Duke of
Somerset's letter seeras to suggest supplemental matter
for comment. I should think that, as a general rule,
where in an operation very distant frora the centre
of authority there is such difference among agents
on the spot as to raise a difficulty, the doubt ought
to rule, coeteris paribus, in favour of inaction, or of the
course which risks the least at the moment."
To the proposed instructions the French raised
sorae objections, which were dealt with by Herbert
in the following Meraorandura :
" The French object to our proposed instructions on
three points :
" I. On the first, apparently, they so clearly saw the
danger of an advance on Pekin, that they proposed to
leave no discretion to the coraraanders on that subject,
but to insist on a reference horae first, which, looking
at the distance, raakes the advance impossible. We
have since heard, however, that the French Govern-

3o8 THE CHINESE WAR [chap, vu
ment have withdrawn their objection on this head.
Feeling the force of all that raay be urged against an
advance on Pekin, I am still glad to find that the
French have come round to our opinion as to the
necessity of leaving to the authorities of the two
countries on the spot a discretion on that point.
" 2. The Military Commander should, in the opinion
of the French Government, be at all tiraes supreme
over the Naval. I confess I still think our proposal
the right one by which the Admirals are supreme on
the sea, and the Generals on the land. The attention
of the French Governraent should, I think, be called
to the fact that the operation about to be undertaken
raust, at any rate, begin by being naval ; and the
Navy must not only carry the force thither and co
operate with thera, even when landed, but raust be
there to support, to supply, and, lastly, to carry them
away. Even the inland advance to Tientsin wUl
probably be partly, if not principally, effected by
water, and the operations of the Fleet and Array raust
necessarily be so interwoven that it is difficult to say
where the one will cease and the other coraraence.
Clearly, however, the raen on the spot, who have
passed the whole winter in exaraining and surveying
the coast, are the raost capable of directing the
commencement of the operations.
" In the last Chinese hostilities we are infornled
that the French concurred in and acted on the system
we now propose, and placed the Admiral, in case
of division of opinion, over the General. We have
hitherto done so in our previous expeditions, and
our experience is in favour of a continuation of the
sarae course. Captain Bourgeois in his late confer
ences with the Adrairalty always assuraed that such
would now, as before, be the case.
"3. As regards the Generals and the Plenipoten:
tiaries, we do not intend, by our instructions, to make
the latter supreme over the Generals, nor to give them
any authority whatever in military operations. All
we propose is that the diplomatists should be judges
of peace, as the naval and military coraraanders will
be of hostUities. The whole object of these hostilities
being the attainraent of peace, if the Plenipotentiaries
can obtain the latter, it would be absurd, and worse
than absurd, to continue the forraer for the sake of

i859-6i] HERBERT'S MEMORANDUM 309
barren military successes, which can bring no prestige
to our Armies, and which might materially impede the
peace we seek.
" But we should clearly state to the French Govern
ment that while hostilities continue, and no offer of
peace is made, although the Plenipotentiaries should
be instructed to accompany the force, we do not
contemplate the exercise of any authority by them
over the Admirals or Generals, except in the case
already specified ; and, as the instructions do not
appear to the French Government to be sufficiently
explicit upon this head, we will gladly insert words
to reraedy the defect.
" But all this hypothetical conferring of authority of
Generals over Adrairals, and Admirals over Generals,
and Plenipotentiaries over both under certain
specified conditions, are raerely rules laid down in
the last resort for the settleraent of possible disputes.
Success must depend upon cordial co-operation and
mutual deference and forbearance. All should con
cert together and act together, and if the occasion
should arise when any party appeals to the Instructions,
and stands upon his right as defined by them, we
may feel pretty confident that the risk of failure will
be imminent. Both Governments should, therefore,
impress on their Plenipotentiaries and on their naval
and military Comraanders the necessity of acting in
the most cordial and conciliatory spirit, and with the
one desire to promote the common object which the
allied nations hope to obtain."
That part of the expedition which was to proceed
from India was organised with great celerity and
thoroughness by Lord Canning and Lord Clyde,
and a larger force detailed for it than had in the first
instance been asked for, or contemplated, by the
Government at Home. The increased expenditure in
volved was by no means regarded with complacency
by the Treasury, and it appears to have been feared
that every augraentation of force would or raight
furnish additional opportunities for friction with the
French Army.

3IO THE CHINESE WAR [chap, vii
Mr. Herbert to Viscount Canning.
"War Office, December loth, 1859.
" My dear Canning,
" Your letter has had rather a disturbing effect.
You will see by Wood's letter that the French force
is not to exceed 8,000 raen, including five batteries
of artillery. For sorae reason (they say on account
of the irapossibility of repair), they take a double set of
guns for their batteries. We have done the same,
lest our Armstrong guns, about to be practically tried
for the first time, should fail.
" When our business is happily over, if it should
ever be happily over, the French talk of a great
impression to be raade on Cochin-China.
" The French, I hear, are very nervous as to the
terras the two Armies may be on, fearing that the
feeling among Englishmen at this moment may be
such as to raake it difficult to keep the peace. I am
not sorry that they have this fear, as it may raake
them careful.
" We cannot raake any serious additions to the
force now without an appearance of deception to
the French ; but as your battalions turn out rauch
weaker than we had assumed them to be, the two
additional battalions now ordered will be useful, and
enable us to strengthen Hong Kong and Canton
without weakening the expeditionary force. We will
coraraunicate the change to the French Governraent.
" As regards the Coraraanders. We raust not,
because we fear the French raay try to jockey us,
atterapt on our side to jockey thera. Between the
two raen proposed I take Grant to be the best soldier,
but Mansfield to be a rauch abler and raore powerful
raan. But his reliance on his own opinion is not, 1
suspect, unaccompanied by a contempt for those of
others, which last peculiarity it is, I suppose, that makes
him so raany eneraies. If he did not quarrel with
the French I agree with you that he would very
probably rule them. Bruce is present, and would
do rauch diploraacy with our allies as well as our
eneray, and he has no want of will if even he has not
sorae to spare. We have had to-day a conference
with the Duke of Carabridge (by we, raeaning Wood
and I), and have decided that Grant had best reraain

i859-6i] LETTER FROM LORD CANNING 311
in chief command, but Mansfield be put second in
coraraand with the rank of Lieutenant-General and
the command of the infantry division. This gives
two strings to one bow, and in that cliraate the
appointment of a successor is a necessary precaution.
Wood will have told you that this arrangement need
not deprive Mansfield of his reversion to Bombay or
to Madras— so he will be no loser by it."

Viscount Canning to Mr. Herbert.
"Camp Phillour,
"January yith, i860.
" My dear Herbert,
" 1 regret the decision about Mansfield, more
than if 3'ou had negatived my proposal altogether,
seeing how it has ended. You will see Mansfield's
letter giving the reasons of his request to be allowed
to decline the Divisional command in China. I don't
know how this will be taken ; but so far as the public
grounds upon which he bases it are concerned, I
agree with him. It would not be to the advantage
of the public service that he should go.
" I have no doubt that Mansfield has, as you say,
raany eneraies. No raan could have discharged
thoroughly the duties of a Chief of the Staff in this
country, during the past two years and with two
arraies to deal with, without that result to hiraself
He is supercilious too. But his teraper is not bad,
or, if it be so, it is under complete control. It is,
however, no longer necessary to discuss his pros
and cons.
" Of the two Generals who have been appointed,
Lord Clyde thinks highly of Sir J. Michel. I know
nothing of him except that his work in Central India
was well done. Sir R. Napier I know well. He is
quite first rate in everything that he sets his hand
to, and certainly the ablest railitary raan of the local
Army on this side of India. His only fault is in
experience of regimental discipline in European
regiraents, but this, in the position which he will
hold, is not of rauch importance. It has not prevented
his turning the Gwalior Brigade to the best advantage
during the last eighteen months, and winning the
good opinion of all under him and above him.

312 THE CHINESE WAR [chap, vii
"Your reasons for not allowing a greater increase
of the force for China, are conclusive, and I ara glad
to hear that the French are so moderate in their
intentions. Of the regiments which will not now
be wanted for China, two shall be sent to England
imraediately (the 53rd and ist battalion, 6oth), and
two shall be kept under hand, ready for any call
from China. One of these last will be stationed close
to Calcutta for embarkation at the shortest notice.
The two then kept in readiness shall go to England
also, as soon as we can feel pretty sure that they
will not be required in China, and probably two
more. I admire you for asking for twenty, and I
knew that Mansfield had given his opinion that
twelve could be spared. But he and other soldiers
are fond of assuming that when the chief military
stations are occupied everything has been accora
plished. This is a raistake, as yet. I raust still keep
sorae disposable regiraents to be moved in any direction
in which disturbance may arise, without taking away
the garrisons of the chief stations. I do not expect
disturbance. It is as certain as anything can be in
this country that nothing of the kind will happen — in
Bengal, at all events ; but with new taxes impending,
and amongst this inscrutable people, appearances must
not be trusted too far, and any delay in showing a
European force, if the need should arise, would be
most injurious to us now. I wish too to avoid
ostentatious reduction, such as the sending home of
many regiments at once. I think that if in the course
of the sumraer I can despatch six regiraents to England
(as I have indicated), besides providing those that you
have required for China, you ought to be content. If '
the state of things at home really requires that risk
should be run in India, the six shall be sent at short
notice ; but, unless you are pressed, let the reduction
be gradual. I have no desire to keep a single regiment
longer than necessary. They are costing us at the
rate of ;^6o,ooo a year apiece, and raore.
" As to China, steam transport is the only serious
difficulty. The dates which you have prescribed —
Feburary ist for arrival at Singapore, and so on —
are impracticable for the cavalry and artillery, although
a great part of the infantry will not be much in arrear.
Whatever your naval authorities raay say, all here,

i8s9-6i] LETTER FROM LORD CANNING 313
without exception, are against the early passage up
the China Sea. Admiral Hope (who is impatient for
the arrival of the force), General v. Straubenzee,
Admiral Wellesley at Bombay, the officers of the
Indian Navy in Calcutta, and Captain Lacy, who carae
down with one of the steam transports frora Hong-
Kong, the China merchants, the Superintendent of
Marine at Madras — all urge the imprudence of sending
the vessels to meet the N.E. monsoon. I told Wood
that this shall not interfere with the despatch of the
infantry ; and I hope that the presence of our infantry
in force will keep us frora being at a disadvantage,
even if the French expedition, or part of it, should
arrive before our cavalry and artillery. But of what
earthly use is it to send horses in transports plunging
against a heavy head sea in half a gale of wind
for 1,700 miles — that is, from Singapore to Hong Kong ?
The length of the whole sea voyage frora India to
the Peiho will be quite crippling enough to our aniraals
under the most favourable conditions. Why should
we make sure of losing many, and of landing the rest
in a hopeless condition?
" Two of our steamers are quite incapable of towing
a ship against the monsoon, and will have enough
to do to make their own way.
" Oude is going on swimmingly. I want Granville
to take a model farm there."
The discussion as to the march on Pekin had re
sulted in the omission of all mention of it in the official
instructions. In Mr. Herbert's private letters any
such enterprise had been discouraged, though not
forbidden, and Sir Hope Grant, with a soldier's
straightforward bluntness, begged to be inforraed
distinctly whether he was or was not prohibited frora
going there.
" You stated," he wrote from Calcutta, on February,
15th, i860, "in a forraer private letter that the
Government did not think it advisable that troops
should advance above Tientsin, the head of the Grand
Canal. I beg you will inform me if I am to consider
this as a positive order of Her Majesty's Government,
and that, should the French General wish to proceed

314 THE CHINESE WAR [chap, vu
with a force to Pekin, I ara to withhold my troops
from going there? This, of course, does not refer to
any guard of honour which the Ambassadors raight
wish to accorapany thera to Pekin for the ratification
of the treaty, but only to a force proceeding there with
hostUe intentions."
This raised the question in a manner which could
not be evaded, and Mr. Herbert sent on the letter
to Lord Palmerston, observing (April 4th, 1866) that
he had —
" marked the passage which requires an answer. In
a letter to hira [Sir H. Grant] I put before him all the
dangers and difficulties which make an advance on
Pekin a very undesirable proceeding. He asks, is
he to withhold his troops from going there should
the French General wish to proceed there ? I think
he should use every effort to dissuade the French
from such a course ; but I do not know whether the
French General is also warned against proceeding to
Pekin by his Government. We clearly cannot winter
there, and if we advance to Pekin, occupy it, and then
withdraw, it will be looked upon as a defeat by the
Chinese. I should like to know your opinion and
that of Lord John on this matter, which is iraportant."
Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Herbert.
" 94, Piccadilly, "April 20th, i860.
" My dear Sidney Herbert,
" I should be for leaving to the military com
manders (who should, of course, consult with the dip
lomatists as to the diplomatic bearing of the question)
full latitude of discretion as to advancing on Pekin.
1 have never thought such an advance as formidable
and hazardous as raany consider it, and raost of the
reasons against it apply equaUy to an advance oh
Tientsin, or on any inland operation beyond the
destruction of the forts at the raouth of the Peiho ;
and, in fact, would go against our expedition alto
gether, or, at least, against the araount of land force
we and the French are sending. It is said that if
we go to Pekin, and the Eraperor flies and does not

8i59-6i] LORD PALMERSTON'S OPINION 315
yield, we shall have to go away before the winter,
and shall be deemed to have retreated in failure. But
that would be equally the case, or rather much more
so, if we took Tientsin and stopped, because if the
Emperor did not yield we could not stay at Tientsin,
but must go away before the winter, and then it
would be said by the Chinese war party that we had
not only retreated from being baffled, but that we
had been afraid to encounter the Chinese army drawn
up at Pekin ; and the damage to our prestige would
be great and irretrievable. Our occupation of Pekin
would be a manifest triumph, and in all human
probability would bring the Emperor to our terms,
and perhaps even before we had got to the town.
The occupation by a barbarian army of a capital into
which even a barbarian diplomatist is not to be
admitted, would go further to proclaim our power,
and therefore to accomplish our ends, than any other
military success, and I raust own I have no belief
whatever in the supposition that such an occupation
would overthrow the Chinese Empire. Depend upon
it, that occupation would bring the Emperor to reason.
" Besides, we might do many things and carry off
many trophies and leave behind us many records
of our having been there which would have a lasting
effect. Besides, if we were only to winter where
Elgin recommends, we could pay another visit to
Pekin the next spring, and the Emperor would by
no raeans fancy a second visit."
Mr. Herbert accordingly inforraed Sir Hope Grant
that, subject to cpnsultation with the diploraatists as to
the political expediency of such a raove, full latitude of
discretion as to advancing on Pekin was left to the
military coraraanders. He added :
"You will, however, on the spot judge far better
than we can here of the prudence of the advance.
I doubt now whether the French are rauch bent upon
it They have apparently sorae other designs in the
way of settleraent in sorae part of the China seas."
But while raaking every preparation to ensure the
success of the campaign, Mr. Herbert eagerly desired

3i6 THE CHINESE WAR [chap, vu
to see the return to England itself of the European
force engaged in it, and the officers who had gained
experience and earned distinction in the suppression of
the Indian Mutiny. This is evidenced by the following
extract from a letter to the Duke of Cambridge :
" I apprehend Your Royal Highness is apprehensive
of disturbing the order of the reliefs, else the sending
regiments back to India and others from India home
will be a complicated, if not an expensive, arrangeraent,
and I would suggest that this raatter be kept open
until Sir C. Wood returns, when a final arrangeraent
can be raade. There is no fear of its being too late ;
on the contrary, we are reckoning our chickens rather
early. "As regards Sir John Michel, Your Royal Highness
is the best judge, but you know my hankering after
these tried Indian officers for home employraent.
India ceases to be a school for our officers if we do
not bring home the men who distinguish theraselves,
and when the Head-quarter Staff is to be renewed at
home, I should look to some of these Indian officers,
who, if given another spell in India, will be used up.
We have more necessity, too, for men of tried ability at
horae at this raoraent than in India, where there is a
calm after a great storm.
" Hope Grant would do excellently for Inspector of
Cavalry, and Mansfield, I believe, would, under your
eye and hand, raake himself very useful to you at
Head Quarters.
" I went all over the projected line of defence at
Portsmouth. The three centre forts on the Alverstoke
side are fine works. I wish we had had Jervois to
plan the two flank ones. But looking at the smallness
of our regular force, I should hope that sorae reduction
will, or might, be made in size on Portsdown Hill,
where Nature has already given great strength, and
Hilsea forms a second line."
On the arrival of the expedition at Hong Kong; in
the raiddle of March, Sir H. Grant found, to his great
disappointment, that the French forces had not yet

i859-6i] HOPE GRANT AT HONG KONG 317
arrived. General de Montauban, their Commander,
had, however, done so, and with him Sir Hope Grant
at once entered into communication. The bulk of the
force General Montauban was to coraraand did not
arrive until two months later — a delay which involved
a great waste of tirae. Meanwhile, Sir Hope Grant
raade preparations for occupying Chusan or sorae
sirailar localit}^ The story of the carapaign, as told
in Sir Hope Grant's own unpublished letters to
Mr. Herbert, is so interesting, that I venture to
quote frora them more largely than the space at ray
command would perhaps otherwise warrant.
Sir Hope Grant to Mr. Herbert.
"Government House, Hong Kong,
"March 27th, tS6o.
" My dear Mr. Herbert,
" Everything here is going on very satisfactorily.
I visited Canton last week and inspected the positions
held by the troops, the barracks, etc. They seemed
good and well chosen, and the Governor General,
' Lun,' appears wilhng and ready to do anything that is
required of him, so much so that he has given a lease
of the Kowlung promontory to the British Govern
raent as long as we please to retain it, for the sraall
rent of .£"160 per annum, This, in my opinion, is
indispensably necessary for the security of Hong
Kong, as the nearest part of the promontory only lies
three-quarters of a mile distant from the town, which it
commands with the harbour. It is a decidedly healthy
situation, being open to the south-west raonsoon, and
with much water. I strongly advised Sir Hercules to
have, if possible, a lease made out with ' Lun's ' signature
to it. ' Lun ' at once agreed to sign the paper, and
I occupied the promontory with the wings of the 31st
and 44th regiments. This ground holds out great
advantage to our troops, as, besides being healthy,
there is araple room for drill and artillery practice,
and the men are kept from many of the temptations of

3i8 THE CHINESE WAR [chap, vu
Hong Kong. By this lease we prevent any other
Power from locating on the ground ; and, should after
wards a cession of it be effected, it would be raost
desirable for building barracks and store-houses, etc.
The cliraate at present is most enjoyable. Warm
clothing is worn, and a fire all day long is really
an indispensable comfort. It surprises me to find
such cold weather in a latitude the sarae as Calcutta,
as a month ago there 1 found it very hot."
Mr. Herbert to Sir Hope Grant.
" London, May loth, i860.
"We have been surprised here at the large amount
of native force despatched from India to China,
raaking the whole force 18,000 or 19,000 men; our
agreement with France included no more than 10,000
altogether, exclusive of the then garrison at Canton
and Hong Kong. We were of opinion that in a
country in which the climate will not permit railitary
operations by Europeans for much more than three
months, and that period intersected by a spell of
intolerable hot weather, a small force, compact but
well appointed, would have been raore effective.
Almost the whole operation will be on the coast or
up rivers. We, therefore, spoke of a sraall proportion
of cavalry and a reduced number of followers. In
fact, I fear that you will find that you have not
steamers enough to move rapidly so large a force.
" I trust you will not find difficulties as to feeding
thera, but we know very little of the country, nor of
the possibility of drawing supplies frora Japan or
the neighbouring localities.
" Lord Elgin will be with you before this. He is,
I think, too sanguine as to the probability of the
Chinese yielding to mere demonstration. But his
arrival, not having been mixed up with the Peiho
affair, and having successfuUy negotiated before, may
have a good effect on the policy of the Chinese.
" We have been advised here : first, that it is
difficult to send furs or skins by the long sea route
without great risk of injury; secondly, that they are
very difficult to get good here where such things
are little worn, and the mode of preparing them,
therefore, not understood. But excellent sheepskin

i859-6i] LETTER TO LORD CANNING 319
clothing can be obtained at Borabay in great quanti
ties, at low rates, and with a comparatively short
voyage. But 1 should think the intense cold in
China itself would cause the use of garments fitted
to resist it, and that a supply of some description of
warm clothing could be found there.
" Sir E. Lugard mentions that the military train
raake excellent cavalry in India when not wanted for
train purposes. You will have been aware of that,
and may possibly find them again useful in the
former capacity.
" We shall soon be looking for the first indications
of the effect of your preparations on the Chinese
Governraent. Though the war is not popular here,
every one syrapathises with the raen who corapose
and the officer who commands the expedition."
The " surprise " expressed in the above letter at
the amount of force despatched from India was
intimated to Lord Canning in terms which made it
synonymous with displeasure.
Mr. Herbert to Earl Canning.
"War Office, May yd, i86o.
"My dear Canning,
" I wrote for the last mail a letter which will
only go by this one in answer to yours as to an
increased force for China.
" Our intention was that the whole force, exclusive
of what was in China before the affair of the Peiho,
should consist, between natives and Europeans, of
10,000 men. We have to make war in a country very
distant, in which the means of transport by sea are
not abundant, and the raeans of feeding an array
not well ascertained. The cliraate gives at the out
side only three months suitable to active operations,
those three months intersected by a period of intoler
ably hot weather. All, therefore, leads us to feel
that a compact force that could be easily and quickly
moved, that could strike its blow and be off again
(for we cannot occupy in the north), was the force
raost available for what we wanted. But instead of
10,000 raen we have something like 20,000 raen in
China; that is, you have sent 13,255 instead of 8,000,

320 THE CHINESE WAR [chap, vu
exclusive of the 3,221 natives sent to relieve the three
native regiments in garrison at Canton and Hong
Kong. These, with the 1,235 Europeans already
there, make up 4,456, and 1,578 since sent, being a
total of 19,289. t say nothing of camp followers,
baggage aniraals, etc., etc.
" But as our operations will in all probability be
confined to the destruction of the forts at Taku, and ,
an advance or seizure of Tientsin, where there is a
water communication the whole way, our China
advisers here think we shall be greatly embarrassed
with this immense number of people and animals to
transport.
" Lastly, the cost is, of course, double that for which
any provision has been raade, and altogether we are
greatly scared at the raagnitude of the dimensions
which the expedition has assumed. Large armies
are expected to do large things, and in this case there
are no large things to be done unless great risks are
run for the attainment of objects which are far from
advantageous in themselves, such as the capture of
Pekin, which I trust they will not attempt. I enter
into these details that you raay see what are the
reasons which make us here very averse to any increase
of force, which seems to us to be already too large
for the purpose for which it is meant."
Earl Canning to Mr. Herbert.
" Calcutta, June loth, i860.
"My dear Herbert,
" The last mail brought your letters of April
25th and of May 3rd, chiefly about China. 1 think
the last is a little hard upon rae.
"A despatch which I wrote to Wood from Simla,
on April i6th, and its inclosures, will have shown
you how the numbers of the China force really stand.
1 send you in another cover copies of these papers
for convenient reference. If I have construed my
instructions too liberally (and I acknowledge that 1
have felt greatly tempted to overstep them) I am of
course open to censure in proportion to the excess
committed, but I have not exceeded them to the
extent you describe. In any case, however, I demur
to your using on your side arguments which belong
to raine.

i8s9-6i] LETTER FROM LORD CANNING 321
" The great distance of the scene of action, and the
short and broken spell of weather suitable for active
operations, are, I contend, reasons for making the
force a large one from the first — not for skimping it.
The means of transport by sea in China, are, as you
say, not abundant — and what is the consequence?
Adrairal Hope is at this raoraent reaping the benefit
of using for transport to the northward, and of
thereby conveying the troops thither almost en
masse, those vessels which carried out sorae of the
surplus troops (as you consider them), which will
be retained at or near to Hong Kong. I do not
mean that this particular advantage was before my
raind when the force was despatched, but it shows
the usefulness of raaking a force which is to operate
at an iraraense distance frora extra resources as large
as circurastances will allow, and as self-sufficient as
possible. " You say that you wanted a corapact force that
should be able to strike its blow and be off again.
Are you really going to buccaneer in this fashion?
I cannot believe it.
" Again, you say large arraies are expected to do
large things, and there are no large things to be
done — unless great risks are run for objects which
are not advantageous, such as the capture of Pekin.
I trust, with you, that the capture of Pekin will
not be atterapted ; but let rae add that a large array
is likely to prove, even for our sraall purposes, better
and cheaper than one calculated at a minimum. If
we hope to succeed by intimidation — and I see you
are clinging to this hope at horae — the larger the
force the better our chance. And if intiraidation fails,
and we atterapt coercion by raoderate raeasures, or,
failing those again, are content with small retribution,
a large force raakes this all the easier. With a large
force there raay be sorae hope that even the Chinese
will understand forbearance to be raercy ; and, at all
events, we can forbear with dignity ; but if we have
barely force enough to do the little at which we
wish to stop, forbearance is sure to be attributed,
by our eneray at least, to exhaustion and impotency.
As to cheapness, it is certain that a force which could
raake success pretty sure in one carapaign would cost
less than the very smallest force which, hostilities
VOL. IL 21

322 THE CHINESE WAR [chap, vu
lasting, we could prudently maintain there to the
close of a second series of operations.
" There are those who, as usual, denounce this
China war as wicked. I do not; but I am sure that
if anything can make it so, it is to undertake it with
a scanty force in a lingering, dallying way. From
the beginning I have longed to see it entered into
in such a manner as to bring it to the speediest
possible close. The bargain with the French inter
fered with this ; but still I think we ought to take
all the liberty we can under that bargain, to have on
or near to the scene of operations an abundant force —
for instance, by making our garrisons at Canton and
Hong Kong stronger than strictly necessary. And
this is all I have done. At least, the stoppage of one
Sikh regiment at Singapore reduced ray excesses to
this, as the papers sent on April i6th show. I
want to see a close of this Mvar for India's sake, as
well as for huraanity and general policy's sake. The
sending away of the regiments is a relief to our
finances at the moraent ; but, if we are to be liable to
further calls, reductions raust be suspended. Opium
may take a bad turn any day, indeed, it is beginning
to do so ; and the knowledge that our Indian armies
are engaged in distant hostilities keeps the native
mind, where there is a disposition to settlement,
from settling down, and is a constant theme in native
newspapers. Rest is what we want in India, and
we shall not have it so long as your China war goes
simmering on.
" After adding up the force, as you suppose it to
stand, you say, ' I say nothing of carap followers,
baggage aniraals, etc.,' and then, that we shall be
greatly erabarrassed with the iramense number of
people and aniraals to transport.
"Pray reraeraber that the carap followers from
India have been increased by about one-half at the
special demand of your officers in China, and that
the strong coolie corps has been entirely created
in China. Of baggage aniraals India has sent less
than were called for by General Straubenzee and
the Adrairal, by sorae hundreds, and this on account
of exorbitant freight.
" Bear in mind, too, when you speak of our opera
tions being confined to the destruction of the Taku

i859-6i] LETTER FROM LORD CANNING 323
forts, and the seizure of Tientsin, and of there being
water coramunication the whole way, that it is by
your own orders that a cavalry force has been sent.
1 had contemplated no raore than, at most, 100
irregulars to act as orderlies in case of need. Now
we have a fighting force of cavalry ; and, unless they
are meant to be horse raarines, 1 suppose they raust
be prepared to land and to move on shore, and if
they move the infantry must move, and neither
can raove without carriage. 1 really do not know
what you expected.
" Upon the whole, I cannot help thinking, with
reverence be it said, that you gentleraen in England
have not looked this China affair in the face. More
than once your letters and Wood's have spoken of
good hopes of avoiding a contest, and of symptoms
of a concession to our demands. I don't know how
these good signs get to you. They certainly pass
India by. I have seen no shadow of them from
the beginning, except six weeks ago, when it was said
(quite untruly) that the ultimatura was favourably
received at Pekin. I do not think that Bruce has
furnished them to you. And really, except Lord
Clyde, I do not know any experienced authority who
has given an opinion that the Chinese Government
will be easily brought to terms. From your letter,
and frora Gladstone's modest demand for ;^8oo,ooo!
(though he may have reasons for beginning mildly,
of which I am not aware), I judge that you expect
to get a short, sharp, and decisive carapaign done
at a low price. It is the old story : Blood, bone, and
action, speed, bottora, and fencing, all for fifty pounds ;
and I only hope we may not get a rattling fall for
our money. That, indeed, is not much to be feared.
The material of the force is too good, and the
comraanders are too prudent to raake a disaster likely.
But I do greatly fear that the end of this season will
come and will find us sitting down at Tientsin,
perhaps, but not much nearer to gaining our point
than when we started. I have no wish to see the
troops entangled on land, but I do regret that we
have not the raeans of occupying raore points on
the coast, and of holding them in strength as long
as necessary.
"You will have seen Sir Hope Grant's despatch

324 THE CHINESE WAR [chap, vii
of May 1 2th before this reaches you, but pray read
a letter (' private ') from hira, of the sarae date, which
I enclose. I think it ought to persuade you that
his force is not such an overgrown or over-equipped
one after all.
" I shall be curious to see what Elgin does with
the regiraent which I have stopped at Singapore,
whether he will wish to be rid of it or to take it on
with hira. I have a letter from him from Galle of
June 4th, just starting for Hong Kong. It is not
written in good spirits.
" The sending back to India the Bengal comraissariat
officers is no doubt right, so far as the working of
that departraent goes, but I ara a little anxious as
to what may corae of it in the raanageraent of the
native troops. All will go sraoothly at headquarters
under Hope Grant's eye ; but with detachments
unaccompanied by any officer of Indian experience,
and high in authority, I shall not be surprised if
the usages of the men get little attention. Already
I have heard of killed meat being given to the
Mahomedans, which is an aboraination to them.
Hope Grant has been cautioned in this.
" Ever yours sincerely, " Canning."
Most people, I imagine, will consider Lord Canning
to have had the best of this argument. To judge by
his rejoinder, Sidney Herbert seeras to have been
rather of that opinion hiraself
Mr. Herbert to Earl Canning.
"War Office,
" July 2ist, 1860.
" My dear Canning,
"I am afraid you were vested at ray letter as
to the araount of China force. I don't at all deiiy
that for the purposes of demonstration you are quite
right, and Hope Grant has very wisely, I think,
detained the additional force which, as the expense
has been incurred, had best be nlade the greatest
use of You call ray notion of a rapid blow and a

i859-6ij HERBERT'S REPLY 325
withdrawal ' buccaneering ' ; but I do not see why
a short operation is raore buccaneering than a long
one. If we atterapt to winter in the north we shall
lose our Array, and, whatever raay be done or not
done, I hope the allied commanders will not risk a
winter in the ice. Grant still writes that he has
hopes, not now as at first, of a bloodless termination,
but of the Chinese yielding if we take the forts at
Taku. "It is altogether a bad prospect. I confess I do
not see the value of a Treaty which is sure to be
broken, and every infraction of which will be the
source of a new quarrel. We shall spend an enor
mous sum of raoney, and get nothing but the seeds
of fresh difficulty in return. We began by taking
;^2, 500,000 — i.e. ;£'8so,ooo vote of credit immediately,
;£^5oo,ooo to follow, and the rest on the ordinary
Estimates. Now, instead of ;^500,ooo we have taken
;£'3, 300,000 as an instalment.
" The fact is, that Pekin is so placed that no
European power can do rauch against it. We have
lost the first half of the practicable season, and the
rest is too short to do anything which shall have a
very perraanent effect. But 1 do not at all deny that
your policy of a large force has its great advantages.
The gros bataillon is the true thing in war ; but I
heartily wish we were out of this business. I do
not think that after the misadventure in the Peiho we,
or any other Government, could have done otherwise
than we have done. But, if it lasts, the public here
will leave us and our war in the lurch. When we
were in the wrong in the lorcha affair, they were
all for blood and fury. Now they are weary of the
whole thing, and are as tame as sucking doves.
" Lord Clyde is come, and looks younger than when
he went. It did one's heart good to hear hira talk
of you.
" Poor Elphinstone's death is too melancholy. Poor
fellow ! I did not see him, but heard that he was
dreadfully altered.
" I will write about the cavalry separately."

Sir Hope Grant took advantage of the enforced
delay caused by the non-arrival of the French troops.

326 THE CHINESE WAR [chap, vii
to proceed to Shanghai, and there confer with Mr.
Bruce and the French Generals and Admiral who
were there assembled. He was there when the reply
of the Chinese Government to the ultiraatura of the
Allies arrived. It contained an absolute refusal of all
the deraands raade, and a Conference was held to
decide on the course of action to be pursued. The
French General objected to the plans proposed by
Sir Hope Grant, and it was finally determined that
the two Armies should act separately, though with a
comraon object ; the French landing to the south, and
the English to the north of the Taku Forts. In all
these discussions the tact, teraper, and diplomatic
ability of the English Commander-in-Chief were
conspicuously shown.
Mr. Herbert to Sir Hope Grant.
"London, /««« loth, i860.
" Dear Sir Hope,
"The Chinese are certainly the strangest
people on the face of the earth, and your excellent
arrangement with regard to the peninsula of Kewlong
certainly would prove it, had we no other evidence
on the subject. The commissariat speak of readiness
to provide supplies, but I fear, as you get further
north, you will meet with a more patriotic but less
cpnvenient spirit on the part of the Chinese population.
" I have read with the greatest interest your account
of the meeting and discussion with the French officers,
and the Government entirely approves of the arrange
ment you have made. By it you seera to have secured
what IS best for both ; each will act on the plan they
themselves advocate. There will be coraplete co
operation, but each Array will act under the sole
direction of its own General in the particular operation.
There will be a comraon object separately attained,
and no collision or jealousies on the road to it. Last,
but not least, you seera to have the best plans and
the least hazard.
" I trust you may prove right in the hopes you

i859-6i] LETTERS TO SIR H. GRANT 327
entertain of a bloodless termination to all our prepara
tions, and that the Chinese who have rejected rather
conturaeliously the ultiraatura of a distant eneray,
will yield to a visible force appearing off Taku. But
I fear that their success last year, and their numbers
this year, may encourage them to hold out.
" 1 should be very glad to have some of your
battalions home in the winter, but it is too good to
hope for.
"We are building hospital huts here to send out
to the Cape ; they will leave in August. Their plan
is excellent, and you have no healthier place to wnich
you could send your sick for recovery."

Mr. Herbert to Sir Hope Grant.
"War Office,
"July 2ist, i860.
" Dear Sir Hope,
" I am very glad you have retained the ad
ditional force which Lord Canning proposed to stop
and send back. Once the expense has been incurred
of their transport to your seas, it is well to get all
the good out of them which is possible, and you have
exercised a sound discretion in keeping thera and
turning thera to the best account. Clearly, by your
account of the French, we shall have to do the work,
and the more we have to do it with now the better.
" I regret very much the loss of the Indian com
raissariat. I fear that our people will raake blunders
as to native caste prejudices and so on, which
would be serious. It is another instance of the great
inconvenience of having two separate rival and jealous
services in lieu of one with a common interest and
object. " We got our China vote, not without the display of
a good deal of dissatisfaction from all parties in the
House of Coraraons. We have now taken on the ordi
nary Estimates about ;^4, 200,000 ; — by a vote of credit
at the commencement ;^8so,ooo, — and ;£'3, 300,000 now.
The war was, in my opinion, after the Peiho affair,
inevitable, but though the country was keen for war
on the raiserable lorcha affair, in which we were
in the wrong, it is now weary of the expense and

328 THE CHINESE WAR [chap, vn
unsatisfactory results, and ready for any raeans oi
escaping from the difficulty. There is no fear,
however, but that the good conduct of the forces
engaged will meet with all the approbation and
reward they deserve."
On the conclusion of the Conferences at Shanghai
Sir Hope Grant returned to Hong Kong to expedite
the departure of the troops, and await the arrival of
Lord Elgin and Baron Gros, who had been ship
wrecked on their outward passage. After much
vexatious delay he again went north, arriving at
Ta-lien-Whan on June 26th, where he found that the
whole of the English force, except about 120 of the
King's Dragoon Guards, had already arrived. Writing
to Mr. Herbert on July 4th, he said:
" We are, however, tied by the leg, and, of course —
according to the instructions received frora home —
cannot proceed to attack the forts till the French are
ready. On my way to this place I visited Chefoo,
where the French have established themselves and
mean to form a depot. General Jasmin, who was in
command, stated that it would be impossible for them
to commence active operations even by July isth.
Their infantry had all disembarked, amounting, I
understand from him, to about 5,600, but that only
114 ponies had arrived for their artillery; that the
artillerymen had not yet come, and that they had
not yet coraraenced to land their guns. General
Montauban was not expected to sail from Shanghai
until the 2nd or 3rd instant at the soonest. These
ponies appeared to me strong and serviceable, ^ut
till they have been put into harness and taught to
draw they will be of little use, and at least 500 or
600 more will be required before they can horse their
batteries. Their infantry is at present in good health,
and at Chefoo they appear to get a fair quantity of
goats, pigs, and fowls, as well as vegetables, but the
supply of water is small. By digging wells they only
get sufficient for drinking purposes, and are obliged to
wash their clothes in sea water.
" Wei-hi-wei, which I visited on my way to Chefoo,

i859-6ij TA-LIEN-WHAN 329
1 found would not do for a dep6t. There was a great
scarcity of fresh water, and the harbour was too small
and exposed. There is a small town near the beach,
containing about 2,000 inhabitants, who appeared very
poor. The houses were, however, substantially and
well built, and they have apparently a wise raode of
keeping theraselves warm in winter — viz. by lighting
a fire underneath their beds, which are built of clay.
In consequence of this delay 1 have been obliged
to land the whole force at Ta-lien-Whan, at three
different places in the bay — the cavalry, artillery,
and ponies to the east of the entrance, where there
are sorae very small running streams, and the two
divisions, one to the north, and the other to the west,
where they can get water easily by digging. The
population are very civil, and apparently well disposed
towards us, but are in great dread of their mandarins,
who say they would chop their heads off if they
were discovered selling provisions to the Europeans.
Goats, pigs, fowls, and vegetables are, however,
brought in, and, after confidence is established, the
supply will, no doubt, increase.
" I forward you a plan of the bay of Ta-lien-Whan.
It ought to feel proud of having 170 vessels in its
waters coraposed of transports and ships belonging to
Her Majesty. The bay is about twelve miles long by
ten wide, and there is scarcely a rock in any part
of it.
"On the 13th instant General Montauban and
General Charnier carae over to Ta-lien-Whan to pay
a visit of ceremony to Lord Elgin, and, after it, I took
thera over to Adin Bay, to show thera our force
of cavalry and artillery. We had about 1,000 raen
on parade, and the turn-out they raade was really
beautiful. The raen, both European and Sikh, were
fine, handsome, stalwart fellows, well dressed, very
clean, and their horses all in rare condition, and with
shining coats. It really was a sight worth seeing, and
I felt proud in being the commander of such a force.
General Montauban said it was a sight to see in
Hyde Park or Paris, but one he never expected to see
so far away from home. The infantry force is also
very fine, and their behaviour excellent.

,330 THE CHINESE WAR [chap, vii
" Adrairal Hope is the best colleague I could
Eossibly have had. He has a first-rate head, and
is zeal and energy are untiring. His arrangements
are all first-rate, but he does everything hiraself, which
I think is an error."

Sir Hope Grant to Mr. Herbert.
"Peh-tang Forts,
"August ^th, i860.
" My dear Mr. Herbert,
" We have effected a landing at Peh-tang, which,
I am happy to say, was made out without rauch
difficulty and without firing a shot. The fleet arrived
at an anchorage about twenty railes frora the forts on the
26th and 27th, and within ten miles on the 30th ultimo.
The weather proved very rough till the morning of
August ist, on which day we crossed the bar and
anchored about 2,000 yards from the forts, which
looked sufficiently formidable. The bar had only twelve
feet of water over it, and at high tide it appeared
on both sides a great sea. We had, however, ascer
tained that the water was quite shallow, and the
ground not very muddy. I landed a brigade on the
south side, and the French an equal force, and we
proceeded to a raised causeway which leads to the
Pei-ho, on which we bivouacked for the night, about
two miles from the river, securing a bridge which
lay near the town. It was arranged by the two
Admirals that they were to proceed up the river at
night with their gunboats, and get above the forts, and
at 4 o'clock on the morning of the 2nd we were to
form a combined attack upon them — the Navy firing
into the north and we into the south fort. I, however,
ascertained that there would be no resistance, and
in the morning of the 2nd we marched into the town.
In the fort it was discovered that there were two large
mines which were intended to explode on walking
across them by means of a trigger and raatch. Since
our occupation of the town we have been landing
troops here, and no easy matter it has been ; the ships
lying out at least 10 miles frora the town, and smaU
vessels only being able to cross the bar at full tide.
" I regret much the change the French made in
coraing to this side. There is barely enough room

1859-61] CONDITION OF PEH-TANG 331
in the town for one force, and the robbery and plunder
that has been carried on in the part of the town
occupied by them is very bad, and a dreadful example
to our men. The French troops — here at least —
appear to rae the worst I have ever seen, and I
fear are not much to be depended upon. The country
about is very wretched looking, and there is not a
spot where you could encamp a force upon. There
is not a drop of fresh water to be got in the town,
and all there is is brought frora a distance of sorae
seven or eight miles, and kept in large earthenware
vessels. The only road out of the town is the raised
one on which we bivouacked, and two days ago 1
sent out a party in corapany with a French force
to reconnoitre the road. At five railes' distance they
found a strong force of the eneray, principally Tartar
cavalry, in an entrenched position. We had three raen
struck with spent gingal balls. Everything, I expect,
will be ready by Wednesday or Thursday, the Sth or
9th, when I trust we shall raake a good account of the
Tartars ; but I raust say it is a raost difficult country to
march a force in, and it must be done with great
caution. I fear it will not be in ray power to write
you an account by this mail of our attack on their
entrenched carap, as the raail leaves on the 7th."
Mr. Herbert to Sir Hope Grant.
" Wilton,
" October 2\th, i860.
" Dear Sir Hope,
" Your last raail was very tantalisin_g, and we
are in a state of anxious suspense, only knowing
that your attack on the Taku forts was about to be
raade. God grant that the next may bring us good
news. Your accounts of the loose conduct of our
allies is serious, for it may, and indeed must, endanger
greatly our relations with the Chinese people.
" One thing has made me rather anxious — naraely,
the postponement of sending for warm winter clothing,
I think for the purpose of ascertaining whether it can
be got in China. I trust you may winter south, but
if not you will have a fearful climate to contend with.
At Borabay a great supply of sheepskin clothing can.

332 THE CHINESE WAR [chap, vu
I understand, be obtained. No doubt in China the
same skins and furs can be got, but can they be got
by an eneray? However, I have no doubt you will
have thought of all this.
" I earnestly trust that your operations may have
a good and speedy result. Every one speaks in the
highest terms of the adrairable discipline of your Army,
of its perfect efficiency, and admirable arrangement
as regards supplies. You deserve success, but your
difficulties are great, and will require all your skill
and tact to surmount."
Sir Hope Grant to Mr. Herbert.
"SiNHO,
"August i8t&, i860.
" My dear Mr. Herbert,
"The last letter I wrote told you of our having
secured Peh-tang. I commenced landing everything,
and, having divided the town with the French, we
were enabled to get our men—though crowded — under
cover. The horses were picqueted in the narrow lanes
and streets.
'' Shortly after our arrival it comraenced to rain
very heavily, and I don't think it is possible to con
ceive anything more wretched than the state of the
town.^ The narrow streets became almost impassable
frora raud, filth, and dead animals, which there was no
' Before the rain came there had been great danger from fire, as is
shown by the following extract from Sir Hope Grant's private journal :
"The occupation of this town was fraught with the most fearful risks
it has ever fallen to my lot to encounter, and had we not been pro
tected by that great Being who rules above, terrible and fearful
consequences would have ensued. The town was very small, not
much more than 500 yards square, and in it were crowded 11,000 ol
our men, exclusive of the French force, amounting to above 6,700 more,
and about 4,000 of our horses, mules, and ponies, all stowed away in
houses and in narrow lanes. The buildings were almost all thatched,
fires burning, dinners cooking, men smoking — in fact, all the
accessories for the outbreak of a blaze. After the storm the weather
became very hot, and the thatched roofs as dry as tinder. Had a
spark fallen on one of them it is difficult to say what would have been
the result ; probably almost all our fine horses and ponies would have
been destroyed, and many of the men would have been unable to effect
their escape out of the narrow, thickly thronged lanes. At length
heavy rain set in, and the danger of fire was much lessened, but the
streets became almost impassable from the mud, filth, and dead
animals."

i859-6i] CAPTURE OF CHINESE CAMPS 333
place to bury, and when thrown into the river the
tide was sure to return them to us and leave them on
some muddy bank, where the stink they made was
most offensive. The weather cleared up, and, having
ascertained that a cart track went up to the right of
the causeway about 800 yards from the town, I sent a
cavalry reconnoitring party on the morning of the 9th
to ascertain the way it took, and if it was practi
cable for artillery. The officer in coraraand. Colonel
Wolseley, D.A.Q.M.-General, raade his way along it
to the right of the eneray's entrenchraents, and reported
to me that it was possible to move guns along it, and
after the first two miles the ground became more
sound. The sarae afternoon it again coraraenced to
rain very heavily, and the town and country became in
a worse state than ever. It appeared to rae that remain
ing in such a position might seriously injure the
health of the men, and I accordingly determined, at
any risk, as soon as it was possible, to get the troops
out and attack the eneray.
"On the nth I accordingly went to General
Montauban and told him ray intention of moving
out the following raorning, but the French General
did not seem disposed to think the raove wise or
necessary, stating an advance to be irapracticable on
account of the nature of the ground. I was, however,
determined to go, and told him that he raight corae or
not, as he pleased. He said if I went he raust go,
but that he would only take a portion of his force.
" I reconnoitred the two miles reported to be bad
myself I found that, though muddy, guns could be
got through with the help of fascines, which I directed
to be laid down imraediately, and at 4 o'clock on
the morning of August 12th (grouse-shooting day) I
started off the 2nd Division under Major-General
Sir Robert Napier, the cavalry brigade, an Arrastrong
battery, three 6-lb. guns, and a rocket battery, along
the road to the right. The guns were dragged
through every difficulty, but the wagons stuck, and
it was necessary to take the tiraber off and leave the
remainder under charge of a party behind.
" This force at last got over the difficulties of the
two miles of bad ground, and I left it and went with
Sir John Michel's Division along the causeway. As
soon as I got within about 2,000 yards of the enemy's

334 THE CHINESE WAR [chap, vu
position I managed to deploy a regiment to the right
across the swampy ground, and the French were
enabled to do the same to the left, a battery of Arm
strong guns being placed in the centre. We advanced
to within 600 yards of the enemy's entrenchraents
without a shot being fired, when they opened, and
which we returned with great effect. I brought up as
soon as possible another battery of 9-prs. and a
French battery, and we opened a fire frora these
eighteen guns at such close range upon the crenellated
walls of the entrenchment that the enemy could not
remain, and after half an hour's firing the place was
evacuated. Sir Robert Napier's force on the right was
attacked by a large body of Tartar cavalry, some 3,000,
who in the most daring way came up close to the guns.
Our cavalry were let loose upon the Tartars, and they
had a hand-to-hand fight, cutting down about seventy
or eighty. The eneray behaved very gallantly, and
under better rulers would raake excellent troops.
They corapletely surrounded Sir Robert's division
in skirraishing order, and remained about it like a
flock of hornets. Our whole loss with both divisions
was two men killed, three officers and eleven raen
wounded. It was a beautiful field day, the two
divisions coraing up at the sarae tirae, one on the
enemy's left and the other on his front, doubling
him up and taking all his camp. Major Probyn and
Captain Fane, of the irregular Sikh horse, did their
work admirably. General Montauban tried to follow
up the eneray after we had driven thera through the
town (or rather village) of Sinho, but he was obliged
to return after having fired some few shots at long
ranges at another large entrenched camp which lay on
the Peiho some three miles distant. There was only
one narrow causeway which led up to this position,
and on which the enemy had guns bearing. 1 deemed
it raore advisable to reconnoitre the country before
attempting to attack the entrenchment. The country
to the right of the road appeared in parts marshy,
but round the edge of the Peiho the ground was
higher and looked rauch firmer. I had two bridges
placed across the canal at the side of the causeway,
and found after a reconnaissance that it was perfectly
practicable for guns.
" Having arranged with General Montauban, we

i859-6i] CAPTURE OF CHINESE CAMPS 335
attacked the enemy's position on the 14th, and after
a heavy fire of six batteries of artillery and three
rocket batteries, two of the former French and one of
the latter, within 500 yards, we knocked their bastions
to pieces and dismounted their guns. We got up so
close to them with our artillery that they could not
take aim, and I am happy to say in the whole attack
we had only three men wounded, and the French one
man killed and about twenty-nine wounded. As the
fire of the enemy began to slack 1 passed the
6oth Rifles down the side of the river, through
the reeds, at a part of the wall and ditch which the
enemy had not raade so strong, and they were enabled
to get into the fort without much difficulty. 1 then
sent to the French and told them what we had done,
and they advanced and also got in. Sixteen excellent
brass guns were taken in the fort, besides a number of
iron ones. But, with exception of one gun, they were
of small calibre. We are now in rear of the Peiho forts,
on the banks of the river, but the nature of the ground
about there is anything but favourable to an advance.
They are surrounded by great salt marshes intersected
with numerous large canals in every direction. We
are now forraing a bridge across the Peiho, and trust
to find the country there raore adapted for the move
ments of an army. We have succeeded in procuring a
sufficient number of junks, but I fear it will be several
days before it can be got ready for crossing.
"The Coraraander-General of Pecheli has sent in
several letters praying Lord Elgin to put a stop to
the war, and offering to take hira up to Pekin to
settle a treaty. But Lord Elgin, of course, will not
listen to this, and in his answer states that in conse
quence of the unsatisfactory reply to the demands
of the British Minister, conveyed in his letter of
March last, the Navy and Military are now engaged
in taking possession of the Taku forts and opening
a passage for him to Tientsin. Lord Elgin's letter
has been sent to Pekin, and an answer may be down
to-morrow. I am raost happy to inforra you that our
whole force is in excellent health, notwithstanding all
the difficulties they have had to contend with. There
is not above one per cent. sick. The horses are also
looking well and in excellent condition. I ara happy
also to be able to give a good account of the

336 THE CHINESE WAR [chap, vii
Armstrong guns. Their precision of fire is adrairable,
and when the percussion shell explodes, nothing can
be raore effective; but I am sorry to say the damp
seeras to have affected thera, and raany appear use
less. The tirae fuzes have also got injured in thfe'
same way, and have not been used.

"Tangkoo, " August 2yd.
" Having reconnoitred the ground very closely,
on the left bank up to the northern fort, I found by
bridging several canals an approach could be got
to it, and as it appeared to me it was the key of the
position, I deterrained to attack it. I accordingly
went to General Montauban and stated my proposi
tion. The French General strongly objected, and
wrote me the accompanying memo., which I forward
to you with my answer. I told hira, however, I was
perfectly ready to undertake the attacks rayself, if
he did not wish to corae ; but he found it necessary
to send a force to co-operate with me.
"The night of the 20th, bridges had been made
over the canals and batteries forraed for heavy guns
and mortars.
" I took 1,500 men of the 2nd division under Major-
General Sir Robert Napier, two Armstrong batteries,
and four 24-lb. howitzers ; the French General sent
General CoUineau with 1,000 raen and two batteries,
and in the morning of the 21st, the troops and guns
being in position, the enemy from the fort and bat
teries on the other side of the river opened a heavy
fire which, however, annoyed us Httle, and they were
soon answered by our guns, which fired with great
precision, and mortar shell fell into their raagazine
and exploded it. The English and French gunboats
now coraraenced a heavy fire upon the lower north
fort, and also exploded one of their large raagazines.
The effect of these two going off was raagnificent,
and it was supposed the enemy would have evacuated
the forts imraediately after. I, however, never saw
a stouter resistance, and when our troops — English
and French — got up to the walls with their scaling
ladders, they fought raost desperately with pikes
and lances, and struck down raany a brave fiellow.

i859-6ij CAPTURE OF TAKU FORTS 337
Our men were, however, not to be kept back, and
they got over at two parts of the wall. The poor
Chinese had little hope of escape, two deep ditches
ran round the walls, and between them an abattis
and two broad rows of pointed bamboo stakes, which
it was nearly impossible to get over. Two Tartar
Generals were killed, and numbers of their men. The
fort being in our possession, we had coraplete command
of the highest one on the other side of the river, the
fire of which was silenced, and as white flags were
imraediately hoisted upon all the other forts, we
sent a flag of truce to summon them to surrender.
The enemy, however, stated that they had no orders
on the subject, and we proceeded to attack the lower
fort on the north side. Not a shot was fired by the
eneray, and we entered without any opposition.
Upwards of 2,000 prisoners were taken, and numerous
fine large brass guns, also several of the large guns
which had been taken out of the gunboats in 1859.
The white flags still continued flying on the other
forts, and as the garrison were seen marching out of
the large southern one, I sent a party in conjunction
with the French to occupy it, and our two flags are
now flying frora the surarait of the highest bastion. I
iramediately sent Mr. Parkes over — who has proved
himself a raost useful interpreter, and has on all
occasions displayed the greatest zeal and ability — to
confer with the Governor-General, who agreed to
surrender unconditionally the whole of the guns,
forts, camps, and munitions of war about the forts,
and I trust that war is nearly, if not completely, at an
end. I regret to say our loss has been comparatively
heavy — 17 men killed; 19 officers and about 153 raen
wounded. The French loss is, I believe, about 100.
" Half an hour after the attack was completed it
comraenced to rain very heavily, and our heavy guns
could not be raoved. We have been prospered in the
raost wonderful manner. If the rain had commenced
earlier in the raorning we could not have gone on with
the attack, nor could we have moved a gun. I do not
yet know the number of guns that have fallen to our
arms, but it must be great. Admiral Hope and
Adrairal Charnier have proceeded up the river to-day
to reconnoitre, and it is expected they will reach
Tientsin. VOL. IL 22

338 THE CHINESE WAR [chap, vu
" August 24th.
" I have heard from Adrairal Hope. He had got
up within a short distance of Tientsin, and the
forts, etc., were all abandoned. A mandarin and
deputation came out from the town and tendered
their submission. Supplies, 1 have no doubt, will be
got in abundance."

H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge to Mr. Herbert.
" Horse Guards,
" November yd, i860.
" My dear Herbert,
"I cannot deprive myself of the pleasure of
congratulating you on the glorious news which has
reached us from China by to-day's mail. The success
of our operations seeras to have been complete, and,
which is still raore valuable, the efficiency of the
Arrastrong guns is corapletely established. I do
really think this latter success is even raore important
than the whole expedition to China, for we are no
longer working in the dark, and can go on feeling that
we are in the right direction in what we are doing.
You will observe, however, that complaints are made
of the weight of the carriages. I always felt that this
would be the case, and I have drawn your attention to
it frequently. I hope, therefore, that the lighter gun
for horse artillery purposes will be at once sanctioned,
and that a raethod will be adopted for lightening the
present gun-carriages and waggons more particularly.
Another most satisfactory part of the news is the
admirable raanner in which Sir Hope Grant has
conducted the operation, and his firraness in council
as regards the French General; for the whole plan
was Grant's, and he carried his point in opposition to
his French colleagues. This fully justifies the choice
we made when we selected him for the coraraand, and
stuck by the appointraent even after it was questioned
by high authorities in India. I think that Sir Hope
Grant should at once receive the Grand Cross of the
Bath, and I hope you will take steps with Her Majesty
to authorise me to make this communication to him
by the next mail. I shall try at once to promote the
Ensign who planted the 67th colour on the fort.

i859-6i] HERBERT'S CONGRATULATIONS 339
and also the Lieutenants who distinguished thera
selves specially. There is nothing like promptness
in these rewards, they are doubly acceptable. I
presume that the Army will move on Pekin, after all,
accompanying the Ambassadors, and 1 hardly think
we should be justified in calculating upon any of
these troops for New Zealand. 1 shall repeat to
Hope Grant, in ray next letter to hira, the mode in
which we think he had better dispose of the troops
after their services are no longer required.
" Yours most sincerely, " George."

Mr. Herbert to Sir Hope Grant.
" War Office,
"November loth, i860.
" My dear Sir Hope,
" I must add to the public despatches which
go out to you by this raail my own congratulations
on the brilliant success which you have achieved.
There is really not a drawback to it, all the depart
ments seera to have been well up to their work, good
coramissariat, good raedical staff, good health, and
good discipline, things not to be attained without
vigour and vigilance on the part of the Coraraander.
You have every reason to be proud of the force under
you, and never was a Grand Cross better won. The
Queen, to whom I sent your correspondence with
General de Montauban, spoke most warmly of the
admirable raanner in which you had behaved under
trying circurastances. To your firmness in council,
as well as to your just views of what was the course
to be taken, must be attributed rauch of the success
achieved. I cannot tell you with how much satisfac
tion I have seen this, and the Government partake
of my feeling on the subject.
" I trust no ' rancour ' is left in the minds of your
allies ; at any rate, the joint success should remove
any, if it existed.
" We are looking eagerly for your next despatches,
which will give us the coraplement of your last ones
by specifying the naraes of those who raost distin
guished themselves, and bringing, I have no doubt,

340 THE CHINESE WAR [chap, vn
the account of iraportant events' as regards the
prospects of peace."
The public despatch referred to ran as follows :
The Secretary of State for War to Sir
Hope Grant. " War Office,
"November loth, i860.
" I have now received Her Majesty's gracious orders
to express to you her sense of the great service you
have rendered to the country, and her adrairation
of the gallantry and discipline which have been
generally displayed by the troops under your coraraand.
tinder your guidance a British force has encountered
and overcome all the difficulties interposed by a
dangerous cliraate, and by a country scarcely known,
and presenting singular obstacles to the raoveraent
of troops.
"At a distance of thousands of miles from home the
force under your coraraand has attacked and van
quished eneraies fighting in the neighbourhood of
their own capital, in the midst of their resources,
strong in nurabers, entrenched in works, to the
construction and strengthening of which all their
energy and skill had been for sorae tirae directed, and
possessed of a nuraerous and powerful artillery.
Flushed with the success of a former attack treacher
ously made, they have displayed on this occasion, in
defence of their forts, a courage and resolution which
entitle them to our respect, though it proved unavailing
against the superior gallantry and skill of the allied
forces. The Queen deeply deplores the inevitable
loss incidental to the achievement of this great
success. "To the relatives of those who have fallen Her
Majesty offers her heartfelt syrapathy, and the ex
pression not only of her own sorrow, but that of her
people for their bereavement.
" For the wounded she feels confident that every
thing will be done which care and skill can effect for
the alleviation of their sufferings, for which she feels
the deepest concern, and she trusts that they may

i859-6i] FIGHTING RENEWED 341
soon be restored to the ranks in which they have so
nobly fought.
" To yourself as Commander-in-Chief, to the Generals
of divisions, to the Brigadiers, and to all the officers
and raen engaged. Her Majesty tenders her warm
and heartfelt thanks."

Sir Hope Grant to Mr. Herbert.
"Tientsin,
" September Zth, i860.
" My dear Mr. Herbert,
"You will see by the date of this that we are
now at Tientsin. After the fall of the Taku forts
the Tartar array appeared corapletely disorganised,
and fled in utter confusion.
"The forts on the banks of the river above Taku
were all abandoned, the guns dismounted and
buried, and a deputation carae out frora Tientsin
stating that they were ready to do everything we
required of them. I encamped the British force about
two miles outside the town on the right bank of the
river, and the French on the left, and everything has
gone on most peaceably and quietly. The forces are
supplied with any amount of provisions, and the
soldier thinks it necessary to have his grog iced
every day, abundance of fine block ice being brought
round and sold for a very small sum. The Chinese
Commissioners have come from Pekin, and have
agreed to everything demanded by the Ambassadors."

Unhappily, when peace was on the point of conclu
sion, an unexpected and apparently unauthorised
attack was raade on the British force, whicfi led to
the resumption of hostilities, and a raarch on Pekin.
The advance raet with little or no opposition, but was
not unattended with its own difficulties.
" The country at this tirae of the year," wrote Sir
H. Grant, " is very bad for raoving in both for cavalry
and infantry, as the large fields of raaize with which it

342 THE CHINESE WAR [chap, vii
abounds, and which has just been cut down, form a
covering of spikes in the ground which injures the legs
of the horses, and raakes it very difficult for men to
walk through. The Arrastrong guns have done their
work adrairably. I never saw anything raore beautiful
than the precision of their fire at long ranges, and
if the fuzes had only been good, the destruction of
the eneray would been rauch greater. The Enfield
rifles appear, however, to be a raistake. They teach
men to fire at long ranges, and at close distances they
do not appear so effective as the old Brown Bess.
I never saw a raore rich country than it is about
here. The fields are full of fine crops, and grapes
are in abundance."

Mr. Herbert to Sir Hope Grant.
" War Office,
" November 27th, i860.
"My dear Sir Hope,
" I have again to congratulate you on two
successful engageraents, and which I hope raay have
the effect of procuring peace. I ara glad to see that
your Array continues in good health, and you have
got so favourable a climate ; but you have not much
margin in the way of tirae, and as the Chinese, if they
knew how to play their garae, could put you in an
awkward fix, we here cannot but be anxious as to
the future. I ara glad to hear that you do not intend
wintering in Pekin, or near it. So long as you have
open and clear coraraunications with the sea you
can do well. For the force which may remain in the
south I presume you can get araple supplies of warm
clothing, such as skins, furs, etc., etc. A country in
which people sleep with a stove under their bed must
require, and therefore produce, warm clothing.
" I have stopped all reinforcements going out to
join their respective battalions, and have sent half
supplies of medicines, coraforts, etc. ; what are not
wanted will keep, and can be stored at Hong Kong.
"The red-tapists here were, I find, much shocked
at your specially recoraraending  for the Bath. I
did not see who else could if you did not, but they say

i859-6i] ARRIVAL AT PEKIN 343
that you should have spoken to his merits, but not
specified the reward.
"Your accounts of the Armstrong guns are very
satisfactory. The defects mentioned in the reports of
your officers, had, 1 think, nearly all been discovered
in practice here, and have been more or less remedied.
The injury to the fuzes, as you know, was owing to
unpardonable neglect in storing on board ship, by
which they got damp. The one defect which I think
serious is the flying out of the breech-piece, because
it can only be prevented by tight screwing up, and
you cannot depend on that being done in great hurry
and excitement. Those we now are fitting have a
better carriage, a simple block trail. I won't take
your judgment on the Enfield as final. At Inkermann
at close quarters it saved the day, for its penetration
was such that it killed not only the front man fired at,
but two, three, and once four behind. But if at short
distances men fire high, the better the weapon the
less harm they will do. The badness of Brown Bess
made the ball drop so soon that a bad aim, if too high,
was corrected. But it proves, I think, that our men
want raore training still to raake the raarksman equal
to his weapon."

A few days later Sir Hope Grant's despatches
arrived. Sir Hope Grant to Mr. Herbert.
" Under the Walls of Pekin,
' ' November <)th, 1 860.
" My dear Mr. Herbert,
" You will perceive we are now at Pekin,
though we have not yet got into the city. Every
thing having arrived, the French General and I
determined to go at the force under Sang-ko-lin-sin,
which had taken up a position on the north side of
Pekin, and on the 5th we started. I must just tell
you that after the two lickings we gave the Chinese
array on the 18th and 21st last raonth, the Prince
Kung sent in letters to the two Arabassadors praying
for peace, but stating nothing about the prisoners.
An answer was sent back to hira desiring their

344 THE CHINESE WAR [chap, vu
iraraediate release, that they had gone in under a flag
of truce, and that they were unlawfully detained, that
no Treaty would be signed till this had taken place.
An answer carae back stating that the prisoners were
in their possession, and would he sent back as soon
as the convention was signed. Lord Elgin and Baron
Gros wrote again in very severe terms, and told the
Prince that they had acted with the greatest perfidy,
and that it was now in the hands of the Comraanders-
in-Chief, who, if the prisoners were not returned,
would raarch on Pekin and take it. We accordingly
started on the 5th, and, as the way was very difficult
frora trees and houses, it took us two days to get up
to where we understood Sang-ko-lin-sin's carap lay.
We arrived at the position he had occupied on the
5th, but found he and all his array had decaraped and
retired towards a suraraer palace of the Eraperor, which
lay sorae four miles to the north-west. I had raade
up ray raind to attack the place after beating his army
away, and had sent the cavalry force with two guns to
drive them first, and follow thera up as far as possible.
The French, who at the tirae were in my rear, also
determined to follow the same course. I, however,
carae upon a force of Tartar cavalry araounting to
sorae 2,000 men, who retired upon the town, and, as I
was determined to drive them away, I followed them
up, cleared them out of the bulwarks, and as it was
getting late, and the men had had a hard day's work, I
halted within a mile of the town, where we remained.
The cavalry had raet with no opposition, and reached
the outside of the palace, having only seen a body
of cavalry which retreated at their approach. The
French now carae up, and took the palace with little or
no opposition, and reraained therein. The next day
letters arrived for Lord Elgin and Baron Gros from
the Prince Kung, stating that he hoped a peace would
be concluded, and written in a much raore subdued
tone. General Montauban and I wrote, saying that if
all the prisoners in the town were given up and a
gate of the city, we should not attack the town. It
appeared, however, that Prince Kung had left, and the
Eraperor and all his council, and no person was there
but Hangkee, a sub-coraraissioner, who at once, or
at least the next day, gave up the prisoners, but stated
that he- had no power to give up the gate, but that he

i859-6i] LETTER FROM SIR H. GRANT 345
would write to Kung on the subject. I am delighted
to say Mr. Parkes, Mr. Loch, and one sowar came in
yesterday, and a French officer and four privates also
were given up. The whole of our people on the
28th of last month had started to join our force,
and had got within 500 yards of it, when a large
force of cavalry and infantry closed round them
— the firing began from the eneray's lines, and they
were seized. Mr. Parkes accorapanied by the two
others were allowed to go and remonstrate with
Sang-ko-lin-sin, and his party were in consequence
separated from the remainder of the party, none of
whom they have seen since. They state that upon
first being taken they were badly treated, their hands
were tied behind their backs, they were put into
a cart and taken up to Pekin, where they were con
fined in the comraon prison and put in irons, but
after sorae days they were taken out and treated with
attention. Hangkee states that the other prisoners
will be returned to us in four or five days, and General
Montauban and I have to-day written a letter to
Prince Kung deraanding a gate to be given up to
us, and that if this is done the city shall be spared,
and no troops shall be allowed to enter except the
Arabassador's escort.
" A sum of raoney, araounting to about ;^20,ooo, has
been taken by the prize agent, at the Iraperial Sumraer
Palace, which the French occupied. There were
quantities of other valuable articles, which, I regret
to say, have been greatly plundered by the French
soldiery, and, knowing the deraoralising effect this
would have upon our men, I strictly forbade any of
them going to the palace, and had roll calls every two
hours. As, however, the men will feel very much their
not being able to secure any of the loot, seeing our
allies have got so rauch, I have taken upon rayself
— and I trust I have not done wrong — to order this
money to be given amongst them : two-thirds to the
raen and one-third to the officers; the two General
officers and rayself desiring no share in the prize. If
the Prince Kung will not give up the gate, we raust
only go at it and take the town ; but I trust he
will have more sense. We are well supplied with
provisions at present, and here alone we have at least
1,200 sheep, and Mr. Turner, the Coraraissary-General,

346 THE CHINESE WAR [chap, vu
who has arrived to-day, tells me he can keep the Army
for any length of time. Adrairal Hope is really worth
his weight in gold, and keeps us supplied by the Peiho
with everything required. The heavy guns have
arrived also, and plenty of aramunition, so I trust,
if called on, we shall soon make a good breach in
the waU."

Sir Hope Grant to Mr. Herbert.
" Pekin,
" October i^th, i860.
" My dear Mr. Herbert,
" The Chinese have found it necessary to give
us up a gate of the city, which is now occupied by
ourselves and the French. The people and rich
merchants in the town were praying for peace, and
sent up a petition to the Emperor to try and put a
stop to the war. Prince Kung was, however, fright
ened for his head, but said if the wealthy people of
Pekin would support him he would do so. They
at once stated their willingness, and the gate was
imraediately given up. All our batteries — viz. four
8-inch guns, seven 8-inch raortars, and nine cohorns —
are now in position in an excellent place for trenching
behind a thick wall of the ' Temple of the Earth,'
within about a hundred yards of the city walls, and I
have no doubt in four or five hours we should have
made a breach. The field pieces were also in position
for keeping down the fire frora the walls, and I have
no doubt the Arrastrong guns would have proved
most useful. I trust, however, they will not be
required. " The magnificent Summer Palace of His Majesty
has been occupied by the French, and completely
gutted. Silver and gold was discovered in it, and
innuraerable beautiful articles of vertu, which all soon
disappeared. We at last made a division of the spoil
left, and one portion alone has been sold by auction
for ;^i,ooo. I kept my raen out of it, I ara happy to
say, as the demoralising effect on the French was
terrible, and I am only too glad we have not been
obliged to take Pekin, as it would have been impossible,
at all events, to have restrained the French, and the

i859-6i] SUMMER PALACE DESTROYED 347
loss of life raight have been very severe, as there are
60,000 Tartars — soldiers — in the town, and all their
wives and farailies were not allowed to reraove, and
every raan would have fought for his home, or mur
dered his wife and family and probably hiraself too.
" We have also taken 800 guns from them since we
first came to the country, and their prestige is quite
broken. " The population of the whole country, nearly,
between this and Pehtung, have deserted their homes,
and I have been obliged to destroy several villages
on the line of road coming up where our Sikh
messengers were fired at. Everything is, I am happy
to say, going on well at Tientsin, and supplies are
abundant both here and there, and the road is open
all the way. It has been a most singular campaign.
" I am sorry to find you do not Hke my sending
away the Indian comraissariat. But everything has
gone on so admirably under Mr. Turner that I have
found no reason to regret it."

Sir Hope Grant to Mr. Herbert.
" Pekin,
" October 17th, i860.
" My dear Mr. Herbert,
" I regret to say only two of the five prisoners
were returned to us alive, and they give a fearful
account of the atrocities coraraitted on theraselves and
the other prisoners with thera. Twenty-one bodies in
coffins have also been sent in by the Chinese chiefs,
presumably to show the prisoners had not been
murdered by their own hands, and araongst the
number have been recognised the bodies of Lieutenant
Anderson, Mr. de Norman, Mr. Boultby, and a man
of the King's Dragoon Guards called Phipps, one
of the escort. The two raen who carae in were Sikhs,
and their stateraent is that they were bound hand
and foot behind their backs and water poured upon
the cords to tighten thera. That they were kept in
this fashion for three days till worras burst out of
their wrists, and all died except their two selves.
" The barbarity and treacherous conduct of these
Tartars has deterrained me, with the full concurrence
of Lord Elgin, to destroy and burn — completely —

348 THE CHINESE WAR [chap, vu
the splendid Suraraer Palace of Yuen-raing-Yuen,
where these atrocities were first put into execution.
I don't know whether I shall be justified at home for
comraitting this, what may be called barbaric act,
but in my opinion it is a just retribution.
" The walls of the park contain at least forty
different palaces or buildings, and it is the principal
residence of the Emperor, who is the cause of these
acts of barbarity having been comraitted. In a pro
clamation also in the town it appears by his orders
prices have been put upon all our heads, at least for
any one under the rank of an arabassador or general
officer. We were to be kept, I suppose, for some
special act of brutality ; but they have been pre
vented frora carrying out their vile intention, and
Sang-ko-lin-sin's Array is completely broken up. He
has neither money to pay thera nor coraraissariat to
feed them, and the Mongolians have all bolted to
their homes.

" October 2yd.
" The palace of Yuen-raing-Yuen has been de
stroyed, and Lord Elgin's letter was sent to the Prince
of Kung. On the morning of the 20th an answer
came in, and everything was given in. The Prince
of Kung agreed at once to pay the compensation
money, and to sign the Treaty. One of the stipula
tions is that Kowlung, opposite Hong Kong, is to be
given up, and I trust Her Majesty's Government
will allow barracks for the troops to be built on it,
as the situation is so much superior to Hong Kong,
and I have no doubt will be healthy.

"2Sth.
"The 300,000 taels have been paid up, and the
Treaty and Convention have been signed. I took the
2nd division and part of the ist into the town, and
lined the streets with the men, and yesterday, in place
of the 23rd, as Lord Elgin could not get anything
ready by that day, we proceeded to the ' HaU of
Cereraonies,' where we were raet by the Prince of
Kung, and sorae 400 or 500 other mandarins. The
Prince was a young man of about twenty years of age.

1859-61 ] SUMMER PALACE DESTROYED 349
He was like a puny schoolboy, brought up to be
punished for some offence by his master, and kept
turning his eyes about, first at Lord Elgin, and then
at rae, to see which had the rod. The Convention was
handed to him, which he at once signed, and agreed to
anything that was required of hira. They all seemed
excessively glad when we went away, and I have no
doubt they will have a regular jollification when we
march away from Pekin, which I propose to do on
November ist. I forward a return showing the force
I propose leaving at Tientsin. But 1 raust reduce it
still raore. The health of the raen has been wonderful
in this country, and it is a pity we did not take
possession of it when we took India. If it had been
well defended, it would have been almost impossible
for any foreign nation to have got into it, but the
Chinese are no soldiers. The country about here is
truly rich and fine. A fine range of hills lies on three
sides of the town, and the country round about the
city is beautifully wooded.

" I have been now — counting this war in China —
four bad seasons fighting in these warra latitudes,
and to be one season under tents in India is a trying
time for any man's constitution. I should be very
thankful to be allowed to get horae to ray native land
to have a good rest and setting up. I have been
certainly greatly blessed with good health the whole
time I have been out, but such work raust try the
constitution. The French sign their convention to-day,
and I trust everything will go on well."
It is curious to notice how little coraraent was raade
on the destruction of the Summer Palace. Beyond
mentioning the fact in the fewest possible words in his
letter to Mr. Herbert, and recording in his private
journal that the conflagration was "a raagnificent
sight," Sir Hope Grant says not a word about it. Mr.
Herbert's letters are absolutely silent on the subject,
and when raoving the vote of thanks in Parliament
he observed a similar reticence. Lord Palmerston

350 THE CHINESE WAR [chap, vu
characteristically not only gave full approval, but
expressed regret that the palace in Pekin had not
shared the same fate.
" I am heartily glad, " he wrote to Mr. Herbert
(Deceraber 20th, i860), "that Elgin and Grant deter
rained to burn down the Sumraer Palace, and that ' the
blackness of ashes shall mark where it stood,' though
the Emperor and his raandarins will no doubt take
care that ' the wild raother ' shall not ' screara over her
famishing brood.' It was absolutely necessary to
stamp by some such permanent record our indig
nation at the treachery and brutality of these Tartars,
for Chinese they are not. I should have been equally
well pleased if the Pekin palace had shared the sarae
fate. It is satisfactory to know that in the conjoint
operation our people have throughout had their own
way and have led the way. I do not like, however,
Shanghai being in the possession of a French garrison
stronger than ours. The French are constantly
swayed by such unavowed motives, and impelled by
interests so different from our own, that it is not
pleasant to see the welfare of a large and thriving
English community so much depending upon French
good behaviour. It seems to me that if the Emperor
does not send orders for his troops to come away
from Shanghai, we ought, if possible, not only to send
at least another battalion thither, but to make our
garrison equal to theirs if it can be done."

But though no doubt Lord Palraerston was right
in thinking that as "a record of indignation" the
destruction of Yuen-raing-Yuen raade a deep irapres
sion on the Chinese, it is not clear that this justifies
the action taken. The treachery shown at the fall
of Rorae was felt by Alaric to deserve the infliction
of "a permanent record of indignation," but the
moral effect of that lesson was soon forgotten, while
the sack of Rome is remerabered, lamented, and
condemned, to this day. At this tirae, few, I think.

i859-6i] CONGRATULATIONS ON SUCCESS 351
will deem the sack and destruction of the Summer
Palace to have been absolutely necessary ; and if not
absolutely necessary, the destruction in a moraent
of the accuraulated splendour of centuries, and of
the finest monuraents of an aged civilisation, raust
be a subject for regret. In all published narratives
of the expedition, the subject is judiciously dealt
with in the fewest possible words ; but those who,
Hke myself, remember the detailed accounts, both
of what they found and of what they did, given in
conversation by men who took part in the destruc
tion, cannot but feel that while doubts raay well exist
as to the necessity of the step, none can exist as to
its ruthless effaceraent of a great monument wholly
irreplaceable.
Lord Herbert to Sir Hope Grant.
" War Office,
"January loth, 1861.

"The public here are, I think, very much pleased
at the way in which everything has been done in
China : firmness, temper, skill, and success. But
they are puzzled as to the future ; they doubt the
stability of any treaty, and have a growing ob
jection to wars which succeed in obtaining inderanities,
but which cost far raore than the inderanities re
covered. I trust, however, that the severity of the
lesson, the appearance of a hostile force in Pekin,
and the rapidity and cornpleteness of the campaign,
may produce a lasting effect. In the raeantirae, the
whole thing has been so well done, that provided
it does not recur, every one seeras satisfied. A
first-rate General, a capital staff, an excellent cora
raissariat, and a good raedical departraent, are four
things which the English public are especially pleased
to see, and the raore so, when all are got together.
" I hope when you are at Hong Kong you will look
carefully over Kowloon. There is a strong feeling

352 THE CHINESE WAR [cHap. vn
among the Hong Kong civilians that all the advantages
of the acquisition must be reserved for them. I have
urged on the Colonial Office that merchants go out to
Hong Kong or elsewhere at their own risk and for
their own good, but that the soldier is sent to protect
the merchant, without any option on his part, prob
ably against his will and certainly not for his good,
and that the duty of the Government is to give hira
the best chance of health and comfort.

" I ara about to change ray appellation under
circumstances which are far from agreeable. I had
a very hard session last year, and got through it
apparently well enough, but I have suffered from it
since so rauch that I am forbidden to try another in
the House of Comraons, and I ara forced, therefore, to
take refuge in the Upper House by the title of ' Lord
Herbert.' It has been a great blow to me, for I was
fond of the House of Coraraons, and had raany and old
friends in it beside whom I have been fighting through
various fortunes, for a quarter of a century."
The successful termination of the operations in China
was welcomed with a certain degree of satisfaction
by the public ; but, on the whole, little interest was
shown either in the progress or termination of the
war. The House of Commons, whilst it voted the
suras asked for by the Governraent, displayed a raani-
fest disinclination to sanction any great or continued
expenditure on its prosecution. Though it forraed
the subject of various interpellations, only one real
debate took place on the policy of the war, and that
was raarked rather by criticisra than concurrence.
Writing to Lord Elgin in the auturan (October 24th),
Mr. Herbert said :

" The public feeling here is not rauch excited by
the war. The truth is they are rather tired of China
wars, and still raore tired of paying for thera, especially

i859-6i] LETTER FROM LORD ELGIN 353
on the present scale of expenditure. Gladstone has
just received frora the Indian Government a demand
for three millions.
"On the discussion which took place on the loan no
one spoke for the war, and Tom Baring's speech
agaii^st it was very well received from all parts of
the House. He argued that we are spending raore
than the trade is worth. We want not political
relations, which can't be got except by force, but tea,
which can be got without fighting for it. The Tories
and the Peace party think to effect a junction against
the Governraent on this question next session, which I
do not think will be successful, though Cobden has
rather persuaded the French that it will. I do not,
however, think we could get any raore money, except
to wind up if the war is at an end. All this makes
me the more anxious for a speedy conclusion. There
is nothing very promising in the proceedings of uor
allies ; we have cHraate, distance, and an enorraous
cost to contend with. The public, though this war
was, after the Chinese outrages at the Taku forts, both
just and inevitable, are too rauch engrossed by Euro
pean politics to be eager about China. In short,
it seems to me that whatever is to be done should be
done now. Nothing raust, if possible, be left to next
year, and what is atterapted, therefore, now would
only be what is feasible this year.
" You will, I ara confident, be much pleased with
Hope Grant. He is a fine fellow, a capital officer, and
a thorough gentleman. He (Hope) will do anything
that can be done.
" We ended our session with some failure, but some
great successes. I am glad to count our Fortification
Bill among the latter."
Lord Elgin replied : " Canton, January i^^h, 1861.
" That this war with China is unpopular is not
news to rae. It is, however, news to rae, for I had not
read the debate attentively, that Tora Baring should
have uttered, and the House of Coraraons applauded,
anything so silly as the sentiraent which you ascribe
to him — namely, ' that we want not pohtical relations
with China, which can't be got except by force, but tea
VOL. II. 23

354 THE CHINESE WAR [chap, vii
which can be got without fighting.' You might,
perhaps, have trade with France or with any other
state in Christendom without political relations, be
cause there is some analogy between their notions of
right and wrOng and our own, and sorae security,
therefore, for the treatment to which your traders
would be exposed, even in the absence of formal
stipulations for their protection. But how can you
trade with such a country as China without political
relations ? The first difficulty — and even Tom Baring
raust adrait that it is a considerable one — is this : that
the Chinese Government will not, under these con
ditions, allow you to trade at all. But if it should
so far depart frora its systera as to allow you to do so,
under what restrictions, in the absence of these much-
abused political relations, will you exercise this
privilege ? 1 do not refer only to restrictions on
trade properly so called, arbitrary imposts levied
without any regard to fairness, and capricious inter
ferences of all kinds with its course ; though, perhaps,
even Tom Baring's philosophy might give way if
constituents to whom he had made heavy advances
proved insolvent in consequence of proceedings of this
description on the part of a Government which could
not be kept in check because it was not deemed expedi
ent to have political relations with it. But these, depend
upon it, are by no means the most awkward dileramas
in which you get involved when you corae to apply
the doctrine of non-political tea to a country like this.
I should like to place Tom Baring between the horns
of this, which is not a hypothetical dilemma, but one
which has a place in history. Some years ago, when
we were dealing in tea non-politically, a woman in a
sampan was killed by the wadding of a gun from a
merchant ship which was firing a salute soraewhere
in the Canton River. The raandarins iraraediately
forbade all trading, and declared that they would not
remove the prohibition until the sailor who had fired
the peccant gun had been delivered to thera. The
traders of that day, being, I presurae, of the Tom
Baring school, and having the courage of their con
victions, gave up the man at once, who incontinently
disappeared from the historical page, and was probably
at least beheaded and disembowelled. But this oc
curred before the raodern civis Romanus was invented.

i859-6i] VOTE OF THANKS TO THE ARMY 355
Do you think that Tom Baring would have the pluck
to go in for that sort of thing now, or would he
prefer his Roraan citizen to his trade? But then
what becoraes of his non-political tea ?
"I hope that you will corae to sorae understanding
with the French Governraent without delay to give
up this place. It is of no use to us whatsoever, and I
do not understand why the French wish to retain it,
except as a basis for their operations against Cochin
China. I cannot say rauch about its condition, for
the weather is so bad that I have not been able to
see rauch. Within a week's tirae I hope to have left
China for good, and to be really on ray way to
England." The speech in which Lord Herbert moved the
thanks of the House to the Forces engaged in the
war with China was the first raade by hira in the
House of Lords.
He declined to enter on the questions raised with
regard to the origin of the previous war of 1857, fully
recognising that after the disaster on the Peiho it
became necessary to take prorapt measures, lest the
Chinese, intoxicated by their success in repulsing
our forces, destroying our ships, and capturing our
guns, should rise in other places and endanger our
large mercantile population. The campaign itself he
described as " short, brilliant, and decisive."
He mentioned as a remarkable feature of the
operations the use for the first time in war of the
Armstrong gun, and he paid a graceful corapliraent to
his predecessor. General Peel, for having had the
courage to introduce it on a large scale into the Array.
It had been prophesied that this gun would be found
too delicate and compHcated for the rough usage of a
campaign, but this had not proved to be the case, and
he congratulated the country on the possession of " the
best gun in the world." At the same time, as before

356 THE CHINESE WAR [chap, vu
th^ beginning of the campaign^ the Armstrong gun
was untried in active service, each piece had been ac
corapanied by one of the old smooth-bore construction
to take its place in case of necessity.
He concluded, with sorae pardonable pride, by
calling attention to a feature of the campaign which
had distinguished it from all previous ones. There
had been no failures in the Civil Department of the
Expedition. It had an excellent Coraraissariat under
Mr. Turner ; it had an excellent Medical Staff, and for
the first time a raedical officer had been appointed for
purely preventive and sanitary purposes. The
greatest success had attended the operation of this
systera. Prevention Avas at all times better than cure.
The cost of these precautions had been hardly criticised,
and it was said that if the cost of the hospital ships
were divided by the number of patients on board of
thera, it would show that each patient cost an extra
ordinary amount. That was because the Expedition
had been so singularly healthy. If there had been a
great araount of sickness, the cost of each patient
would, of course, have been rauch less. The apparent
large cost was the result of the success which had
attended the sanitary precautions. After all, what ex
pense, he asked, could be too great which ensured the
perfect efficiency of an Army? Including casualties
of all kinds, there was a better state of health and a
lower rate of mortality araong the troops forraing the
Expedition in China than usually exists araong troops
in tropical cliraates in tirae of peace. Hostile critics
had said of English expeditions, that we could always
obtain fighting raen, but we could not find a General
to lead thera, nor a Staff to direct them, nor a
Comraissariat to feed them, nor a Medical Staff to
maintain thera in health ; but Sir Hope Grant's Army

i859-6i] VOTE OF THANKS ADOPTED 357
had given the lie to aU those assertions. We had had in
this Campaign an admirable force beautifully handled,
and universally successful ; there had not been a single
reverse or drawback ; and he, therefore, with perfect
confidence anticipated unanimous assent to the motion
which he proposed.
The Vote of Thanks was adopted without dissent by
both Houses of Parliament, though not without some
adverse criticisra. But it was not easy to find fault
with operations so speedily successful and which had
been conducted with so little loss or discorafort to the
troops engaged in them. Whatever differences there
might be as to the policy of the war, there were none
as to the excellence of Herbert's arrangements for its
conduct. On that point all parties united in a tribute
of well-merited praise.
The country was tired of the subject and the
campaign was soon forgotten, but it had done its
work. The war of 1859 was the third which had
been waged against China in a period of twenty years,
but more than forty were now to elapse before British
soldiers were again seen in hostile array on Chinese
soil.

CHAPTER VIII
WORK AS MINISTER
1859-61
THE improvement of the sanitary and social condi
tion of the soldier had engrossed Mr. Herbert's
attention for years. It was certain that it would not
be neglected by him when in office, and it might
be supposed that, power being in his hands, the
reforras he had advocated, and others which he had
as yet merely contemplated, would now be rapidly
and easily adopted. But this was not the case. In
one respect, his accession to office may be said to
have diminished his power of effecting such changes.
Out of office he was able to give full attention to
elaborating the details of the scheraes he had fraraed,
and to exercise persistent pressure on the Governraent
for their adoption. In office, the iraproveraent of the
soldier's condition was but one among raany subjects
to which the duties of his post compelled hira to
devote an equal and soraetiraes a greater araount of
thought and tirae.
Nor was this all. Other circurastances contributed
to render Sidney Herbert less able when Secretary
of State effectively to attack the insanitary buildings
in which the Army was lodged than he had been
as Chairman of the Sanitary Coraraission. General
358

i859-6i] SALE OF DEFECTIVE BARRACKS 359
Peel and the Governraent of Lord Derby raoved
slowly, but they had not been disinclined to devote
a considerable sura to structural reforra, and some
thing had already been done to put in force the re
commendations of the Sanitary Commission. Almost
imraediately after entering office in 1859 Mr. Herbert
drafted a Bill to give effect to its suggestions with
regard to barrack accommodation for the Army
and the devotion to its iraproveraent of any sums
which might be acquired by the sale of unhealthy
or defective barracks. The Bill recited these recom
raendations, and proceeded to enact that when such
barracks were sold, the net proceeds of the sale
should be paid to a separate account, and from tirae
to time applied to the construction of barracks or
otherwise for the iraproveraent of the barrack accora
modation of the Army (including the purchase of
sites), in aid of other moneys provided and appro
priated for the same purposes in the usual way.
But against any such enactraent Mr. Gladstone
steadfastly set his face. A raemorandum was sent
from the Treasury to Mr. Herbert, setting forth that
the proposal was " inconsistent with present practice
and all our existing regulations," and it was denounced
as " the reintroduction of a vicious and exploded
principle." It was iraperatively deraanded by the
Chancellor of the Exchequer that any raoney obtained
by the sale of barracks should at once be paid into
the Consolidated Fund, and so placed at the disposal
of Parliaraent as part of the General Revenue for the
year. Mr. Herbert well knew how much the difficulty of
accomplishing his contemplated iraproveraents would
be increased by his having to ask annually for a
grant to continue thera, instead of merely having to

36o WORK AS MINISTER [chap, vii
ask for the appropriation of a sum frora a Fund
already existing; but when told by Mr. Gladstone
that the scherae was one which could not con
sistently be defended by the Governraent, and
one which he "not only would not propose, but
was determined to oppose," Sidney Herbert could
hardly venture to press the adoption of a financial
novelty in the teeth of the Chancellor of the Ex
chequer, and reluctantly consented to abstain from
the further prosecution of the Bill.
Though this Bill was abandoned, Mr. Herbert pro
posed to accomplish his object by Votes for the re
construction of military buildings condemned by the
Sanitary Coraraission. But with Mr. Gladstone Chan
cellor of the Exchequer, every proposal to rebuild
or enlarge a barrack or to construct a hospital involved
a battle with the Treasury. Bearing in raind the
difficulty he experienced in obtaining funds for the con
struction of the defensive works which seeraed to him
indispensable, Mr. Herbert felt corapelled to abandon,
or at least to postpone, the execution of a large
number of the improvements in barracks which in the
report of the Sanitary Commission he had shown to
be iraperatively called for. He did not conceal his
reluctance to forgo their prosecution. Had he lived
they would no doubt have been gradually executed.
As it was, they were, after his death, practically
abandoned. The results of that abandonment were such as might
have been anticipated. The retention at Windsor and
at Dublin of barracks which on sanitary grounds had
been conderaned, caused the loss of raany young and
valuable lives frora typhoid. Officers and raen both
suffered, but years elapsed before efficient raeasures
were taken to correct evils to which Mr. Herbert

i859-6i] DEFECTIVE BARRACKS 361
would have put a stop some decades earlier. In other
places, not attracting so large a share of public atten
tion as Windsor and Dublin, similar results raust have
followed sirailar neglect. But, to avoid expense,
defective barracks were allowed to reraain unrepaired
and unaltered, and for the same reason any new
barracks were still built on old and insanitary plans,
the faults of which were but imperfectly recognised
by those in authority. The baths, libraries, and re
creation rooms, to which Mr. Herbert attached so
rauch iraportance, were but sparingly supplied, and
ideas that the soldier was being parapered at the
expense of the civil population, and that sanita
tion was a raere passing fad, were not altogether
at a discount in some quarters of the War Office
itself Great changes took place between i860 and 1890 in
the organisation and discipline of the Army ; but for
many years after his death comparatively little was
done to complete or perfect the schemes which
Sidney Herbert had formed to protect the soldier's
health, and raise him in the social scale by proraoting
his self-respect, increasing his corafort, and stiraulating
his intelligence.
Araong the privations of a soldier's life few pressed
more severely, or contributed in a greater degree to the
unpopularity of the service among the raore respect
able of the lower classes, than the hard lot of the
raarried soldier and his wife, even if "on the
strength," and even in time of peace. As we have
already seen,^ they were often lodged in casemates
and other unhealthy and unsuitable places, and
under the best circumstances were only entitled to a
share of an ordinary barrack room. As many as four
' Page 163.

362 WORK AS MINISTER [chap, viii
families, and sometimes a larger number, were herded
together in one roora, only separated frora each other
by exteraporised curtains of barrack rugs. Mr.
Herbert insisted that every new barrack should con
tain special quarters for raarried couples, and that,
wherever possible, such quarters should be added to
barracks already existing. Till this could be effectively
done, lodging allowance was given to married soldiers
" on the strength " for whom proper accomraodation
could not be provided in barracks. Mr. Herbert, with
Miss Nightingale's co-operation, also prepared plans
for special hospitals for soldiers' wives and children,
and the last letter written by hira before his death was
one to Miss Shaw Stewart, thanking her for accepting
the charge of the first established of these institutions.
No one could have been raore keenly alive than Mr.
Herbert to the truth that the raaterial conditions of a
soldier's life necessarily exercise a vast influence on his
raoral condition, his tastes, habits, and character. He
was fond of saying that an unhealthy raan would
never be either an efficient or contented soldier,
and that if his surroundings were corafortless, and
his barracks destitute of raeans of recreation, he
would naturaUy and certainly seek amuseraent else
where, to the but too probable ruin of health and
efficiency. Such means of recreation he sought to supply, and
though not able to effect all he desired, he was able,
but only at the expense of continued struggles,
so far to overcome the persistent resistance of the
Treasury as to comraence the erection of recreation
rooms and reading rooras, and to give renewed life to
the garrison and regiraental libraries, which had long
been in existence, but which had been little used.
Cricket grounds were provided at all large garrison

i859-6i] GYMNASIA 363
towns, and at the larger barracks; skittle alleys and
quoit grounds were even more generally established.
It was in connection with these raeasures that a
regular system of gymnastic instruction was introduced
into the Army by Mr. Herbert.
A school of systematic gyranastics had in 1857
been set up at Oxford, where it had attained great
popularity. Its founder and director, Mr. Maclaren,
was consulted, and with his aid a code of regulations
for gymnastic drill was drawn up and enforced in
the Army by Mr. Herbert. A model gymnasium
was erected at Aldershot frora Mr. Maclaren's plans,
and gymnastic appliances were furnished even to
the smaller stations at which regular gymnasia could
not be built. The physique of the average soldier
was thus greatly iraproved, and he was at the same
time furnished with a new and engrossing interest
and amusement.
The expenditure thus involved, though grudged as
for a " fad " of Mr. Herbert's, was indulgently tolerated,
but when, going a step further, he proposed to eraploy
soldiers in the construction and repair of railitary
buildings, and to teach them trades, he had to
encounter both the passive opposition of the military
authorities at the Horse Guards and the raore active
opposition of the Treasury. The Headquarter Staff
feared that such occupations might interfere with
the more strictly military training of the troops,
while the Chancellor of the Exchequer was shocked at
the idea of soldiers being taught at the public expense
to compete with the industry of the civil population.
Though the attempt to get such a scherae considered
was raore than once raade, it had to be abandoned
in face of this double opposition, which formed a
corabination too strong to be resisted.

364 WORK AS MINISTER [chap, viu
The importance of securing a raore efficient class of
medical officers to attend on the soldier when sick, was,
in Herbert's eyes, only second to that of providing
him with healthy surroundings when well. His
persevering efforts to effect the establishment of the
Medical School at Chatham, narrated in an earlier
chapter, will not be forgotten.
During the whole of 1858, and the first half of
1859, Sidney Herbert bestowed unceasing, but
somewhat Sisyphoean, labour on the establishment
of this Medical School, through which raedical
raen were to find adraission to the Array. But as
fast as the War Office did anything Mr. Herbert
desired, it practically undid it. It was agreed that
there should be five teachers in the school ; but it was
ruled by the War Office that only two should be
" Professors," and the reraaining three " Lecturers " at
a lower rate of pay. It was pointed out to the
Secretary of State that the subjects with which these
three latter gentlemen would have to deal were as
important as those of railitary medicine and military
surgery, and that if good raen were to be secured for
these chairs they raust not be given inferior rank.
When the War Office had reluctantly yielded on this
point, a fresh obstacle was started. It had been con
templated as practically necessary that some of the
chairs should be filled by civilians ; but it was intiraated
to Mr. Herbert by the Secretary of State that this was
inadraissible, and that none but Army medical officers
would be eligible for employment. It was in vain
urged by Mr. Herbert that however capable Army
surgeons might be of filling the professorships of
military raedicine and surgery, few Array raedical
men had any knowledge of chemistry or of pathology,
and still less of hygiene, "which is a new subject,

i859-6i] THE MEDICAL SCHOOL 365
hitherto untaught and unknown." ^ General Peel,
whUe not personally denying the force of these
considerations, raaintained that the opinion of the
Army doctors themselves was too strongly opposed
to the admission of civilian raedical raen to
perrait it to be done, and took refuge in asserting
that " there were as good raen to be found in the
Army for professors as in civil life." He was told
that no one denied there being good men in the
Army, and that for subjects they understood none
could make better professors, but that circumstances
made it irapossible that they should have such a
knowledge of the real state of raedical science and
of current pathology as would qualify thera to teach
on that subject, whilst of hygiene and cheraistry they
were profoundly ignorant. Indeed> the circurastance
that all the raedical candidates for professorships stated
themselves to be ready and qualified to fill every chair,
cast some doubt upon their capacity to fill any. As it
was not contemplated that the Medical School should
be under the control of the Director-General of the
Medical Departraent, but under that of the Secretary
of State, General Peel was urged to make the appoint
ments himself, on his own responsibility, and relieve
the Director from any odium for having made a
suggestion so unpalatable to his subordinates. It
was at the same tirae pointed out that unless he did
this boldly, and without delay, there was the greatest
risk of the school being a failure. But, like too
many other Secretaries of State, General Peel shrank
frora placing on his own shoulders responsibilities
that could be transferred to those of others, while,
of course, the longer the delay, the raore the Array
' Sir James Clark to Sidney Herbert, December 5th, 1857.

366 WORK AS MINISTER [chap, viu
medical men worked against the scheme, and the
more puzzled General Peel grew. Sidney Herbert
was in despair. Sir Jaraes Clark " wiped his hands of
it," and Miss Nightingale indulged in rauch vigorous
denunciation. And so raatters stood when Sidney
Herbert received the seals of the War Department.
On his assuming office, the regulations by which
the school was to be governed were speedily drawn
up, efficient professors appointed, and the school
officially established before the end of 1859. It was
not all that Mr. Herbert had wished, for it had been
his desire to make it a school not for the raedical
officers of the Array alone, but for those of the Navy
and the East India Corapany also. This he was
unable to accomplish, departmental and professional
jealousies being too strong for him. But though
his plans were thus partially baffled, a reform of
immense iraportance was effected in securing the
proper instruction of Array medical officers, and
thus rendering thera better qualified for their
arduous duties.
With the establishraent of the school its affairs
passed out of the raore iraraediate view of the
Secretary of State, who, considering that work done,
turned raore of his attention to other matters urgently
requiring it. But the moraent Mr. Herbert's irarae
diate and direct impulse was withdrawn, a species
of paralysis again attacked the subordinate officials
of the War Office, and though the school had been
established, and its staff appointed in 1859, it was
not until the raonth of September, i860, that the first
ten students arrived at Chatham. When they did
so, they stared in astonishraent at the bare waUs of
the building, and, marking the absence of all arrange
ments for carrying on their work, they, in Miss

i859-6i] THE MEDICAL SCHOOL 367
Nightingale's incisive words, came to the conclusion
"that the school was a hoax."
On inquiry being made as to the cause of the
absence of fittings and instruments, it appeared that
the estimate for thera had been sent in b}^ the
professors early in April, but had not received the
sanction of the Treasury until late in August. The
" authority to expend " was, when at length obtained,
sent first to the Tower, whence it was returned with
the reraark that no surgical instruraents were kept
there. It was next despatched to the arsenal at
Woolwich, which could only supply guns. It then
went back to the Director-General, with whom it
had already lain so long, and finally, Mr. Dreury,
the head clerk in the Financial Department of the
War Office, authorised the necessary expenditure
from the Sanitary Vote, stipulating, it was said, that
the Secretary of State should not be told of the
delay. After this a week elapsed, being the time
it took for the paper to travel frora Mr. Dreury's
room to that of the Assistant Under-Secretary of
State, Sir E. Lugard, where it again slumbered.
What raight have been its further adventures remains
matter for conjecture, for at this juncture a trenchant
letter from Miss Nightingale called back the personal
interposition of the Secretary of State, which soon
set raatters to rights — for a time.
The Medical School has since been removed from
Chatham to Netley. The three Professorships to which
Herbert attached so much iraportance, and for which
he so earnestly contended, have been again reduced to
Lectureships, and all appointments to the school are
now filled from the raedical staff of the Array — let us
hope because it is now so much better educated than
formerly as to be perfect in all those branches of

368 WORK AS MINISTER [chap, viii
knowledge in which in Herbert's time it was so
generally deficient.
But though National Defence and Sanitary Reform
were the objects which principally occupied Mr.
Herbert's thoughts, there were, of course, many other
matters which called for his attention, and absorbed
no inconsiderable portion of his time. Many of these
were dull and insignificant, others have now lost
any interest they raay have once possessed, and sorae,
though of teraporary iraportance, had no lasting
significance. But there reraain others, sorae account
of which is necessary to any correct appreciation
of Herbert's work, and which cannot be altogether
passed over in any account of his official life.
Office Organisation.
At the tirae of Mr. Herbert's accession to office the
War Office, as a separate department, had existed
for only five years, but it already exhibited raany of
those faults which have since been so conspicuous,
which it has been found so hard to eradicate, and
which even now, fifty years later, reraain to a great
degree uncured.
Mr. Herbert's dealings with the War Office in
connection with the Sanitary Coraraission had made
him keenly alive to the defective organisation and
narrow bureaucratic officialism of the department,
and he set to work, at first with a light heart and
certainty of success, to reform its raodes of doing
business. The task was, however, a hopeless one. He
<fcould bend aside for a moment the supple boughs which
obstructed his path, but when once his hand relaxed
its grasp they sprang back to their original position,
and before his death he felt that he was bafiled.

i859-6i] WAR OFFICE ORGANISATION 369
and that the vis inertice of the office was stronger
than he.
Miss Nightingale, in her usual vein of exaggera
tion, but not wholly without justice, described the War
Office as " a very slow office, an enormously expensive
office, a not very efficient office, and one in which
the rainister's intentions can be entirely negatived
by all his sub-departraents and those of each of the
sub-departraents by every other." ^
The delays, and some of the other defects of
the office, were, in Mr. Herbert's opinion, largely
due to the araount of rainute writing which prevailed.
Under the systera in force when Mr. Herbert
received the seals, every paper entering the office
was rainuted upon by a clerk in the department to
which its subject related. His minute was again
rainuted upon, perhaps raore than once, by a superior
but still subordinate official, before it reached the head
of the departraent. He minuted on it for the Assistant
Under-Secretary of State, who again minuted on it
for the Perraanent Under-Secretary, whose minute
was commented on by the Political Under-Secretary,
by whom the whole batch of rainutes was subraitted
to the Secretary of State hiraself
The author of the original rainute probably under
stood the subject on which he wrote. Of those to
whora it was subsequently subraitted sorae as probably
did not, but coraraented adversely on its proposals to
show their own acuteness. The original minute writer
had no opportunity of answering their objections —
objections which naturally influenced the Under-
Secretary of State when making his minute for his
chief If in the end the original rainute writer stuck
to his guns, and protested against the conclusion
' Miss Nightingale to Mr. Herbert, November i8th, 1859.
VOL. II. 24

370 WORK AS MINISTER [chap, viu
arrived at, the whole wearisorae process had to be
gone over with a fresh set of arguraents and replies.
For this raass of writing Mr. Herbert desired to
substitute — and, so far as he could, did substitute —
conversations between the parties concerned, in the
presence of the Under-Secretary of State, or, on
really iraportant occasions, the Secretary of State
hiraself In nine cases out of ten, personal discussion
led to agreeraent ; but where this was not the case,
the fact of having heard both sides raade the Secretary
of State's decision infinitely easier, and reraoved the
feeling of dissatisfaction always created by being
overruled without a hearing.
It was objected that conversations left no record of
even iraportant suggestions, and were liable to cause
raisunderstandings which could not arise where every
step of every transaction was fully recorded in
writing. To this it was replied that a better understanding
was usually effected by a short conversation than by
sheets of rainutes, in the coraposition of which much
valuable tirae was lost, and the facts of the case to
which they related greatly obscured. The final
decision being always in writing it was inaccurate
to say that no record was preserved, while, as a
raatter of fact, in a great majority of cases, when
action was once taken, the necessity for record dis
appeared. One result of the reluctance of the permanent
officials of the War Office to part with any shred
of their power over the smallest minutiae of detail,
and the consequent reference to headquarters of
even the most unimportant decisions, was a pro
fitless waste of the time of the Secretary of State
in adjudicating on matters which should have been

i8S9-6i] RELATIONS WITH THE CROWN 371
promptly dealt with on the spot, and never corae
under his consideration at all.
Let a single instance suffice in illustration.
According to a precis paper gravely laid before the
Secretary of State for his decision and judgraent,
the Principal Medical Officer at Yarmouth and the
Steward of the General Hospital there quarrelled
with regard to some poultry kept by the latter, and
to the presence of which in the hospital the forraer
naturally objected. Full of indignation at the
Steward's raisdeeds, the Principal Medical Officer
not only denounced the presence of his fowls, but
accused hira of eraploying an orderly to dig his
potatoes. The Steward retorted by a charge that
the Principal Medical Officer used a hospital rug as
a carpet. The Principal Medical Officer rejoined that
the Steward issued linen not thoroughly washed.
The Steward replied that the Principal Medical Officer
used a hospital bath for washing his dog, and dried
him with a hospital sheet. The Principal Medical
Officer then brought against the Steward a forraal
charge of " insubordination."
This ridiculous quarrel by no raeans stands alone,
and is but a type of scores of sirailarly trivial cases
solemnly submitted to the Secretary of State for
adjudication, instead of being at once disposed of, as
they should have been, by the General of the District.
Relations with the Crown.
The relations between the Secretary of State for
War and the Sovereign, always of a somewhat special
character, were of course especiaUy delicate during
the earlier stages of the process which transferred
to the Secretary of State that substantial control of

372 WORK AS MINISTER [chap, viu
the Army which had previously been exercised by
the Comraander-in-Chief and the Crown.
On the efficiency of the Array depends not only
our success in foreign wars, but the prompt suppres
sion of disorder at home, and the iraraediate care and
defence of the Sovereign's person.
It was, therefore, not only natural, but a part of
her duty, that the Queen should watch with great
solicitude and sorae jealousy any step which raight
tend to render the Army the instrument not of the
nation, but of a party. In this delicate position the
Queen and Prince Consort showed the greatest tact,
caution, and prudence.
Shortly after taking office Mr. Herbert wrote to
Sir James Graham that he "found in those quarters
a great thirst for information, but a scrupulous
abstinence from interference or dictation." Objec
tions, or apparent objections, to proposals raad^ were
frankly pointed out by the Prince Consort. They
were argued with persistency, and often with great
skill and good sense, though but unfrequently with
success. The limit to which resistance could proceed
was always instinctively recognised, and though
friendly remonstrance and discussion might be
strongly pressed, they were never allowed to assume
the appearance of a conflict between the will of
the Sovereign and the advice of her responsible
rainisters. Reading these controversies nearly half a century
afterwards, it is irapossible not to recognise that in
arguraent Prince Albert frequently had the advantage,
and that recomraendations made were not always
uninfluenced by the pressure of colleagues, the
exigencies of Parliamentary support, and other con
siderations foreign to the question under discussion.

i859-6i] PURCHASE SYSTEM 373
Of these controversies one of the most protracted
took place over a scherae for the reorganisation of
the Household Cavalry.
Mr. Herbert proposed to reduce the nuraber of
officers and non-comraissioned officers by reducing
the troops of each regiment from eight to six. The
officers of the suppressed troops would thus be
disposed of, while the men belonging to thera would
have been distributed araong the reraaining troops.
The net result would have been a slight increase in
the numerical strength of the brigade, and at the
same time a reduction of expenditure by about ;£"9,ooo
per annum. He also proposed to equalise the pay
of the whole brigade. At that tirae the Life Guards
received ^d. a day raore than the Blues, for which,
as they were raised under the sarae conditions and
perforraed identically the same duties, no adequate
reason could be assigned. Mr. Herbert proposed
slightly to lower the pay of two regiments of Life
Guards, and slightly to raise that of the third, effecting
on the whole operation a saving of ;£'2,ooo a year.
These discussions ended, shortly before Lord
Herbert's death, in an arrangement to which Mr.
Gladstone, who wished for further reductions but
desired to avoid controversy with his dying friend,
gave, on behalf of the Treasury, what he hiraself
described as a "surly" assent.
Purchase System.
Araong the reforms which Sidney Herbert desired
to effect was the abolition of the existing system
of purchasing commissions in so far as related to
the higher ranks of the Army. The systera was
itself a strange one, but it no doubt had one useful

374 WORK AS MINISTER [chap, viu
effect — that of securing raore rapid promotion than
would have been the case without it. Mr. Herbert
hoped to retain this advantage by continuing to
allow purchase in the lower grades while restricting
it to authorised prices. These proposals were not
in some respects acceptable, either to the Court or
to the Commander-in-Chief, and were in those par
ticulars combated by the Prince Consort in very
able and very temperate letters.
Mr. Herbert's proposals, of course, did not satisfy
those who wished for the total abolition of the
purchase system, and were equally unacceptable to
those who disapproved of any alteration, even in
the case of the coraraand of regiments, of the existing
system. These latter were by no means confined to
old soldiers and bigoted Tories. Lord Grey and
Lord Panmure, though great Army reformers, alike
deprecated the abolition of purchase. The proposal
was by the Queen's coraraand subraitted to the
Commander-in-Chief, who in raoderate but decided
terms expressed his decided disapproval of it.
But the strongest objections to the plan were
those of the Prince Consort, who at once perceived
that it must transfer the control of proraotion and
railitary appointments from the Comraander-in-Chief
to the Secretary of State — that is to say, to
Parliaraent. Mr. Herbert corabated this view, and
raaintained that no such change would be effected
or conteraplated, and expressed his opinion that any
such transfer was to be deprecated. But in the face
of the opposition raised he did not think it then
needful, even if possible, to enforce his plan.
The change has since been made, and the transfer
of power and responsibility foreseen by the Prince
effected, with mixed results doubtless, of the balance

i8S9-6i] MILITARY EDUCATION 375
of advantage or disadvantage in which let future
generations decide. Military Education.
The interest which Sidney Herbert had always
taken in the promotion of education in the Army
was not likely to fail now that he had reached a
station in which he could most powerfully aid it, and
this is probably the most fitting place for recounting
the work done by hira in this connection.
Regimental schools were founded early in the
nineteenth century, and garrison and regiraental
libraries were established by Lord Grey (then Lord
Howick) in 1838; but it is not too rauch to say that
all the iraproveraents introduced into the English
systera of military education between 1845 and 1861
were due to Sidney Herbert's exertions and advocacy.
The first steps towards a real improvement of educa
tion in the Army were taken by him when Secretary
at War in Sir Robert Peel's Governraent.
As Secretary to the Adrairalty he had already
reorganised and revived the Royal Naval School at
Greenwich. His educational efforts at the War
Office began by a thorough reforra of the Duke of
York's School for the sons of soldiers, the discipline
and teaching of which had been allowed to fall into
a wretched condition. The whole course of in
struction and system of raanageraent were reorganised
and adapted to raodern requirements. This was in
itself a raost salutary change, but it was of less
iraportance to the Array generally than another which
was its iraraediate consequence. Schools had been
established in every regiraent, at the suggestion of
the Duke of York, in 181 1, but though they had so

376 WORK AS MINISTER [chap, vui
long existed, scarcely anything had been done to
secure their efficiency. The instruction given varied
according to the caprice of the Colonel and the capacity
of the schoolmaster. These schoolmasters had no
special qualification. They were simply men of the
regiment, appointed by the commanding officer,
possibly because they possessed a little raore educa
tion than their feUows, but raore frequently in order
to provide an old soldier with an easy berth. The
first of these defects Herbert sought to reraedy by
constituting the Duke of York's School a raodel
school, on the pattern of which every regiraental
school throughout the Array was to be organised and
taught. He also sought to secure the efficiency of
these schools by securing the efficiency of the teaching
staff. A normal school or training institution was
grafted on the Duke of York's School, frora which
Array schoolraasters, properly qualified, were to be
sent forth, and to whora for the first tirae Array rank
as " Schoolmaster-Sergeant " was now granted.
To ensure the proper working of the new system,
Sidney Herbert created the office of Inspector-General
of Military Schools. His duties consisted in the
superintendence of primary education in the Army,
making periodical inspections of, and reports on,
regimental schools, and recoraraending fresh raeasures
which raight occur to him with respect to them.
His supervision did not, however, extend to the
institutions devoted to the education of officers, such
as the College at Sandhurst or the Academy at
Woolwich. The Rev. G. Gleig, however, who was
appointed to the new post, took the warmest interest
in those institutions, and was able to give Mr. Herbert
much valuable assistance, both by his counsel and
by writing in periodicals. To this assistance Mr.

i859-6i] MILITARY EDUCATION 377
Herbert cordiall}- acknowledged his obligations in
his speech on the education of officers in 1857.
Mr. Herbert's reform of the regimental schools
was not wholly completed when he went out of
office in 1846, but his measures were so far advanced
as to admit of their being easily carried out, without
alteration, by his successor, Mr. Fox Maule, whose
tribute to the work done by Sidney Herbert has been
already mentioned.^ From that tirae the Chelsea
Asylum has been not only the standard raodel for
regiraental schools, but the source whence the agents
for spreading education in the ranks of the service
have been supplied.
These reforms, important in themselves, inevitably
entailed consequences of even yet greater iraportance.
With the supply of increased facilities for the educa
tion of the private soldier, a demand arose for the
better education of the officer. " We shall soon,"
it was urged, " require from the private soldier more
than subalterns were required to know when the
Duke of Wellington began his career. Will it be
safe either to leave the officer behind or to trust to
his voluntary exertions to save him frora being so ? "
The subject excited a good deal of popular interest,
and articles appeared from time to tirae in various
periodicals advocating different schemes of reform.
Among these were several articles in the Quarterly and
Edinburgh Reviews from the pen of Mr. Gleig, the
Inspector of Schools, and subsequently Chaplain-
General. These articles represented Sidney Herbert's
opinions, and were probably to a greater or less
extent prompted by him. But although rauch was
written, and a certain languid interest aroused, nothing
further of a practical character was done until Mr.
1 Vol. I., p. 78.

378 WORK AS MINISTER [chap, viii
Herbert was again Secretary at War in Lord
Aberdeen's Governraent in 1853.
The only step taken in the interval was the issue by
the Duke of Wellington, in 1849, of a General Order
requiring officers to subrait themselves for exaraina
tion on proraotion to a higher rank. The step was
of iraportance as being the first official recognition
of the necessity of educational qualifications of any
kind on the part of officers, but the vague character
of the proposed exarainations, and the faulty raachinery
contrived for conducting thera, would probably have
rendered them in any case inefficient. The Duke
might, indeed, have insisted on some observance
of his own order, but he died not long after its
issue, and from that tirae its provisions became
a dead letter, at all events so far as examinations
on promotion were concerned. And so the raatter
slumbered until Mr. Herbert was again at the War
Office. He at once turned his attention to the subject,
and elaborated a plan, the chief features of which
were : (i) The appointment of a Board of Examiners,
by whora the exaraination, both of candidates for
commissions and of officers awaiting proraotion, should
be conducted. (2) The appointraent in every railitary
district of a special officer to afford professional
instruction to officers after having entered the service.
(3) The conversion of the existing "Senior Depart
raent " at Sandhurst into a staff school. The scheme
was approved by Lord Hardinge, then Commander-in-
Chief, and sanctioned by the Cabinet, and a sum
of ;^2,ooo was voted on the Estimates for 1854-55 to
raeet the preliminary expenses of district instruction.
The scheme was explained to the House of Commons
by Mr. Herbert on February 24th, 1854, and a selection
made of two of the officers to be employed as

i859-6i] MILITARY EDUCATION 379
instructors. But the coraraencement of the Crimean
War caused the suspension of the scheme, and Mr.
Herbert's resignation in February, 1855, proved fatal
to it ; for though the Vote still appeared on the
Estimates for 1855-56 (which had been prepared by
Mr. Herbert), no part of it was expended, and in
the revised Estimates for 1856 the itera was altogether
oraitted. This was naturally regarded as a retrogade
step by Mr. Herbert. In April, 1856, he brought the
raatter before the House of Coraraons in a remarkable
speech, which was listened to with the utmost attention
and respect. Surprise was expressed at the abandon
ment of Mr. Herbert's plans by the Governraent,
and a speech raade by hira on June sth, 1856,
to which reference has before been made, went far
to corapel the Governraent — however reluctantly — to
grapple with the subject. He stated at great length,
and with greater force, the principles which are laid
down in his letter to Lord Hardinge; he exposed
unsparingly the rottenness of the existing systera,
and explained his own proposals for its iraproveraent.
It may be said, without going into details, that his
first proposal was the conversion of Sandhurst into
a general military school, giving only a strictly pro
fessional education, to which boys should not be
admitted before the age of sixteen. After a course of
eighteen months there, those cadets destined for the
infantry were to receive their coraraissions, while
candidates for the Engineers, Artillery, or Cavalry
were to undergo a further period of training in schools
to be established at Chatham, Woolwich, and Maid
stone respectively. At the sarae tirae he strongly
deprecated the idea of raaking these schools the sole
doors of entrance to the Array, while he insisted that
all should pass the sarae examination. His second

38o WORK AS MINISTER [chap, vm
proposal was the continued instruction of officers who
had obtained commissions by district instructors in
the raanner recoraraended in his letter to Lord
Hardinge; and the third was the establishraent of
a Staff College at Farnhara, the existing "senior
departraent" at Sandhurst having fallen into a con
dition of absolute inefficiency.
Lord Palmerston gave the usual official answer, that
the subject would be carefully considered, but pleaded
for awaiting the Report of a Commission which had
been appointed on the training of the Scientific
Corps. As a consequence of this debate. Lord Panmure,
then Secretary of State for War, seeras to have
arrived at the unwelcome conclusion that " soraething
raust be done," and after a long period, certainly of
inaction, though possibly also one of careful reflection,
he, before the close of the year, called on a nuraber of
officers, raore or less connected with the War Office,
individually to subrait separate schemes for the
education of regimental and staff officers. Lord
Hardinge, the Duke of Cambridge, Colonel Lefroy,
and Mr. Gleig were among those who complied with
the invitation. Almost all the schemes submitted
proved to be substantially identical with Mr. Herbert's
proposals, the suggested modifications of it concerning
for the most part matters of detail only.
Having before hira all these raaterials on which
to forra an opinion hiraself. Lord Panmure appeared
still desirous to gain further time, and to throw on
others the responsibility of any raeasures taken. He
accordingly, in April, 1857, decided to appoint a
Council of Military Education, to which should be
entrusted the duty of preparing "a coraprehensive
scheme of mUitary education" for the consideration

i859-6i] MILITARY EDUCATION 381
of the Government, and which was to include an
improvement of the examinations for proraotion, the
provision of raeans for the professional instruction
of officers, and the conversion into a Staff CoUege
of the Sandhurst senior departraent. These three
iraportant reforras raight thus be considered as being
to a certain extent secured.
Frequent discussions took place in both Houses of
Parliaraent, in 1857, on the subject of railitary education,
and on July 28th Mr. Herbert took a leading part
in a debate arising out of Sir De Lacy Evans's motion
for the abolition of purchase. He advocated examin
ations on promotion, and argued that there was
nothing in the purchase system incompatible with
them. He recommended a staff school, admission to
which should be competitive, in preference to a mere
qualifying exaraination for the staff, and raaintained
that the education of staff officers should extend to
the personal staff of coraraanding officers as well
as to the staff generally. He expressed a general
approval of the Governraent scherae, so far as he
understood it, but regretted there had been so much
delay in introducing a system for the instruction
of officers generally. He would still wait in patience,
hoping that the Government would provide satis
factorily for it in the Estiraates of the following year.
He ended by paying a high corapliraent to Mr.
Gleig, the Chaplain-General, from whose advice and
assistance he had derived " the greatest possible
benefit." It now appeared as though an educational reform
was iraraediately impending, but the outbreak of the
Indian Mutiny afforded a reason or an excuse for
another year's delay. So great was the demand for
officers that there could be no thought of examining

382 WORK AS MINISTER [chap, viu
those who had already obtained coraraissions. Even
the slight entrance exaraination prescribed by the Duke
of Wellington was suspended, and on September ist,
1857, ^ circular was issued announcing that cora
raissions would be given without examination to all
candidates raising a certain number of recruits.
So far the cause of railitary education seeraed to
have retrograded rather than advanced, but its friends
were not disheartened, and at the end of the year
won their first substantial victory. On the re
commendation of the Council appointed by Lord
Panmure, the Senior Department of Sandhurst was
converted into a Staff College. One of Sidney
Herbert's raost warraly cherished scheraes was thus
accoraplished, and in February, 1858, the first exarain
ation for the adraission of students took place. Mr.
Herbert could now congratulate hiraself on the fact
that his exertions in the cause of railitary education
were bearing fruit, and frora that time onwards it
has made steady, if slow, progress. The first stone
of the new Staff College was laid by the Duke of
Cambridge in December, 1858. The Council also
recommended the amalgamation of the Cadet College
at Sandhurst with the Royal Military Acaderay at
Woolwich, and this recomraendation was adopted by
Lord Panmure and the Government, and approved
by the Queen, before the fall of Lord Palraerston's
Governraent in March, 1858. General Peel, who
succeeded Lord Panraure at the War Office, adopted
the scherae already settled by his predecessor, and
some progress was made in carrying it ont. By this
time, however, considerable jealousy as to the pro
posed changes had been manifested in the House of
Commons, raainly based on the fear that they raight
interfere with the open competition which had already

i859-6i] MILITARY EDUCATION 383
been established for entrance at Woolwich. Frequent
discussions on the subject took place in the early
part of the Session, and on April 26th, on the raotion
of Mr. Monsell, an address to the Queen, hostile to
the proposed araalgamation, was carried by a con
siderable majority.
Mr. Herbert had given but a qualified support to
the scheme of amalgaraation as presented to the
House. In the course of the debate he explained,
in an important speech, that it differed materially
from his own original plan, and he feared would
render admission to Sandhurst the only door to
Woolwich, thus preventing the competition of boys
frora public schools, to which he attached rauch
importance. In consequence of the vote of the House of Commons,
the idea of amalgaraating Sandhurst with Woolwich
was abandoned, and the attention of the War Office
was directed to plans for passing all candidates for
the Cavalry and Infantry through a railitary school
before entering the service. This change was not
only held to diminish, which it did, the necessity
of Mr. Herbert's original proposal for the instruction
of officers after receiving their commissions, but
was thought to render it wholly unnecessary, which
it certainly did not.
Several proposals were submitted to General Peel,
during the reraainder of 1858 and the early part of
1859, for the reorganisation of Sandhurst on its new
basis, but no definite decision had been corae to with
regard to any of thera when General Peel left the
War Office on the overthrow of Lord Derby's
Governraent in 1859. The Indian Mutiny, and later
on the Dissolution, forraed admirable excuses for
delay and indecision ; but a stronger minister than

384 WORK AS MINISTER [chap, vui
General Peel would not have allowed his conclusions
on so grave a raatter to have been set aside by
them. One step, indeed, he took, with a view
of giving greater reality to the examination of
officers on their first appointraent and on proraotion.
In Noveraber, 1858, he issued fresh regulations,
restricting the examination to purely professional
subjects, and providing that every subaltern should
be examined as to his fitness for promotion within
eight months of his joining his regiment. It was
also directed that these examinations should be
conducted, not regimentally, as had till then been the
case, but by a Board of Field Officers not belonging
to the regiment. But practically these regulations
were as corapletely ignored as those issued fourteen
years previously had been.
Matters were still in this state when, on June 19th,
1859, Mr. Herbert received the seals of the War
Department. He at once took up the consideration
of the various plans proposed, and was not slow
in deciding on the general policy to be adopted.
But the plan he preferred rendered necessary an
enlargeraent of the Royal Military College suffi
cient to provide accoraraodation for 600 cadets —
an arrangeraent involving great expense, araounting
even in estiraate to not less than ;£'i25,ooo. This
expenditure was strongly opposed by the Treasury,
and in view of the other and yet more serious
controversies pending with that department on
the subject of military expenditure, Mr. Herbert
did not press, as he would have liked to do,
the inclusion of this sum in the Array Estiraates
for i860.
Mr. Herbert did not wish to render it corapulsory
on all candidates for commissions to pass through

i859-6i] MILITARY EDUCATION 385
Sandhurst, and in his speech in June, 1856, had
argued against that plan. He then said :
" It has been argued that every raan who goes
into the Army should pass through Sandhurst ; but
I do not think that would do. It would tie up parents
too much, and I do not think it would be suitable to
our English habits to force all through one particular
or exclusive educational establishment. . . . Besides,
as a competition between boys keeps boys up to their
work, so a competition between schools keeps masters
up to their work, which is equally important."
I do not think that his views on this subject were
materially changed at a later period, but the conscious
ness of failing strength and diminished powers of
combat, corabined with the desire to secure, before
the rapidly approaching end, at least some guarantee
for that better education of officers for which he had
been so long fighting, induced him to modify his
proposals, and to assent, in January, 1861, to the
preparation of a scheme which proposed to abolish
entirely the grant of direct commissions, and while
retaining Woolwich as the door of adraission to the
Artillery and Engineers, raade it compulsory on all
candidates for commissions in the Cavalry or Infantry
to undergo a preliminary course of military instruction
at Sandhurst. It was arranged that the new scheme
should come into force on January ist, 1862.
The plan was again opposed in the House of Cora
raons, and, ostensibly on this ground, again postponed.
But Parliaraentary opposition might have been faced
had it been possible to overcome the reluctance, or
rather the peremptory refusal, of Mr. Gladstone to
include in the Estimates for 1861 any vote to raeet the
expenses which the reforra of Sandhurst would involve.
In all that concerned the reforra of Sandhurst
Mr. Herbert had a warra and judicious supporter
vol. II. 25

386 WORK AS MINISTER [chap, vui
in H.R.H. the Prince Consort, thanks raainly to
whose untiring exertions the Sandhurst scherae was
ultimately adopted ; but Mr. Herbert had not the
satisfaction of seeing his plans carried into execution,
or of knowing that his sacrifice of his own opinion
had been useful. Before January ist, 1862, both the
Prince Consort and Mr. Herbert were no more.
Rapid as this sketch has been it is sufficient to
show that Lord Herbert, frora the date of his first
eraployraent at the War Office to the raoraent of his
death, had few things more at heart than the advance
ment of education in the Army.
The Volunteers
It is to the Eraperor Louis Napoleon that England
in no slight degree owes the creation of the Volun
teer Force, which sprang into existence between
1858 and i860, and which is now a recognised
feature of English life. His tacit approval of the
insolent language of the French Colonels' Addresses
in 1858 had excited violent irritation in England. His
ambiguous language and doubtful intentions aroused
alarm, which his invasion of Italy and consequently
increased railitary power did not tend to allay. The
annexation of Savoy did far more to alienate English
feeling than the Commercial Treaty of i860 did to
conciliate it. A burst of national enthusiasm impelled
thousands of every rank to volunteer, and the Govern
raent of the day, unable to direct or grasp the raove
raent, and equally unable to resist it, dealt with it
timidly and tentatively. About a month before the
fall of Lord Derby's Cabinet a circular to the Lords
Lieutenant of Counties was issued, laying down the con
ditions on which the offer to form volunteer corapanies

i859-6ij THE VOLUNTEERS 387
would be accepted. Such offers at once poured in on
every side, and were, in almost all cases, favourably
received ; but hardly any true effort was raade to
organise the force on an uniforra or definite system.
The Volunteers of 1859-60 were a very different
body from the Volunteers of the present day. The
Volunteer of the twentieth century is to a great degree
armed, clothed, and paid by the State ; the Volunteer
of 1859 received no pay, and received no advantages
from the Government beyond the loan of arras and
the allowance of a few rounds of araraunition annually.
Nor were these accorded till after Mr. Herbert assuraed
the seals. They did not form part of the original
War Office plan as issued by General Peel. The
movement was also very differently looked on by
the public. At its outset it was regarded with an
enthusiastic admiration on the one hand, or a keen
dislike on the other, which have now both given
place to a feeling of coraparative indifference.
No such indifference existed in 1859. A wide
spread feeling of popular enthusiasm, now worn off,
raised the Volunteer force to a strength of 160,000
within a year frora the date on which the formation
of corapanies was first authorised. But, on the other
hand, the new raoveraent had to encounter an
open hostility or covert dislike now altogether
unknown. This hostility came chiefly from two
very dissimilar quarters. Military men, with few
exceptions, felt and expressed disapproval of citizen
soldiers, who clumsily imitated the movements of
fully trained men, and who, they predicted, would
prove wholly useless in peace, and a constant peril,
if not a fruitful cause of disaster, should they be
eraployed in tirae of war. Men of the Manchester
school of politics, not often to be found in agreement

388 WORK AS MINISTER [chap, viii
with military men, united with them in disapproval
the of new force. Nor was it to the Manchester
school alone that the movement was distasteful. A
great body of far more moderate men, lovers of peace,
deplored the birth of a spirit which they feared would
prorapt a rash foreign policy abroad, and prove the
cause of rauch loafing, idleness, and raisconduct at
horae. The extent and strength of this sentiment
are now hard to be understood. But I have, rayself,
heard men of sound and sober judgment — cabinet
ministers, judges, eminent persons of usually moderate
views — loud in their condemnation of the railitarisra
they thought likely to be fostered by what they
terraed the craze for Volunteering. They denounced
the waste of raoney on uniforms, the waste of time
involved in drill instruction, and even went so far
as to wax indignant over the music and measured
step of a column marching down Portland Place as
disturbing the rest of invalids and infants in the
houses along their line of march.
Receiving, as they did, little frora the Governraent
beyond a bare recognition, the Volunteers necessarily
enjoyed a rauch greater degree of independence than
is now the case — an independence, indeed, bordering
upon anarchy. Every Volunteer corapany elected its
own officers, and though they had to receive formal
commissions from the Lord Lieutenant of the County,
these nominations were almost invariably accepted.
Paying as they did for their clothing, it was difficult
to deny them sorae voice in its choice. Each corapany
accordingly uniforraed itself according to its own
fancy, and strange enough sorae of these fancies were.
Every corps, too, whether corapany or battalion, had
its own special " Rules " and an elective " Coraraittee"
by which the affairs of the corapany were discussed

i859-6i] THE VOLUNTEERS 389
and settled, to the great detriment of discipline. The
force practically consisted only of isolated corps, with
out systematic organisation or adequate supervision.
This was the condition of affairs when Sidney
Herbert received the seals of the War Department.
He was not himself an enthusiast in the Volunteer
cause, which he regarded with a somewhat jealous
eye, as likely to interfere with the forraation of an
efficient Militia force.
" I ara perfectly satisfied," he wrote in a letter to
Lord Tweeddale, "that the Volunteer system is not
adapted to the rural districts. Men who are engaged
in business must be close to their store, their practice
ground, and one another, to make the short periods they
can give to drill available for any effectual purpose.
" I have always discouraged, as much as I can, the
formation of corps consisting of members who are
unable to provide their own outfit, and also to pay an
annual subscription to maintain their drill sergeant,
etc. The corps who depend on external subscriptions
will clearly melt away. Nor is it wise to enlist in
Volunteer Corps men who might, so far as their
class is concerned, enter the Militia. I do not raean
embodied Militia, but a Militia permanently dis
embodied except in case of invasion. I am, therefore,
opposed to the formation of corps whose existence is a
perpetual struggle and difficulty.
"If, as is suggested, the Government were to pay
for clothing, accoutrements, and time, they ought
to have a better security for their money than a
fourteen days' engagement. A local Militia gives
this, or, indeed, any Militia, for no Militia can by law
be embodied, though we have had an exceptional Act
passed to meet an emergency, and which expires in
March, 1861, never, I hope, to be re-enacted.
" My view, therefore, is to keep up a fair standing
Army, with a disembodied Militia behind it, and an
auxiliary force of Volunteers, composed of men who
will do the work for the liking of it, and maintain
themselves. But the two first, one with a ten year
and the other with a five-year engagement, are the
really dependable force."

390 WORK AS MINISTER [chap, viu
But the force, even in the rural districts, had been
already raised, and this fact, as well as the strong
national feeling which had called it into existence,
had to be reckoned with. It was impossible to ignore
the moveraent, and it was therefore imperative to
direct and organise it. What were called Adminis
trative Battalions were formed, in which, though
usually drilling and acting apart, and possessing
separate coraraittees, a number of corapanies were for
adrainistrative purposes treated as a single unit, and,
when possible, brought together. Inspecting officers
for the different military districts, and adjutants for
the Adrainistrative Battalions, were appointed, who
laboured, and that not unsuccessfully, to introduce a
greater uniformity of system and methods.
The company coraraittees were gradually got rid of,
or essentially altered in character, and restricted in
their attributes ; the raanifold costumes which had
been adopted were judiciously brought into a general
uniformity ; a stricter discipline was cautiously intro
duced; raore frequent opportunities were taken for
bringing together different corps in battalions and
brigades ; and before his death Sidney Herbert had the
satisfaction of seeing the Volunteer Force assurae a
raore coherent and effective character, without any loss
of the spirit which had originally called it into being.
In the spring of i860, 20,000 of the Volunteers of
London and the southern counties were reviewed
in Hyde Park by the Queen. No force so numerous
had ever before assembled there, and those who
remembered the Duke of Wellington's dictum as to
the irapossibility of getting 10,000 raen out of Hyde
Park, if they ever got in there, were not without
anxiety. A wish was consequently expressed by some
members of the Government to restrict the gathering

i859-6i] THE VOLUNTEERS 391
to the London Volunteers alone. But to this course
neither the Prince Consort nor Lord Herbert would
consent, and the result fully justified their decision.
Not the slightest difficulty arose, either in bringing the
battalions into the park or in withdrawing them, an
operation which was conducted with astonishing
celerity. The march past itself was a raagnificent
spectacle, gratifying alike to the Sovereign, the people,
and the Volunteers themselves.
In the autumn of i860 another great review of
Volunteers, which surpassed that of Hyde Park in the
numbers attending it, was held by the Queen at
Edinburgh. Sidney Herbert was present at it and
thoroughly appreciated its success and the pictur-
esqueness of its surroundings.
" The review," he wrote,' " will be beautiful. Already,
two o'clock, the whole face of the mountain opposite
my window is crowded, and up paths above, strings of
people, like ants, are creeping up for still higher seats.
Every crag and ruin is covered with people and tents.
It is wonderfully beautiful. The number of Highland
Volunteers in kilts adds eminently to the nationality
of the whole throng, and the others all have sprigs
of heather in their caps. Poor Hyde Park pales
wonderfully before it. There are over 20,000 raen
to be reviewed, so that even in numbers London
is beaten. Every five minutes there passes a band
or a battalion, and I run to the window to look at
thera." And to Mr. Gladstone he wrote :
" I write with a window looking on Arthur's Seat,
and the whole face of the mountain and every crag
and ruin is covered with heads, like the pit of a theatre.
It is a magnificent sight."
Later still in the year there was a great review of
the Volunteers of Lancashire and other northern
' To Mrs. Herbert.

392 WORK AS MINISTER [chap, viii
counties at Knowsley, the residence of Lord Derby,
who lent his park for their asserably.
It was not unnatural that the Volunteers should
becorae slightly intoxicated with their own success and
popularity, and in the course of the sumraer a proposal
was made that they should pay a visit to Paris and
exhibit themselves to the admiring gaze of the French
metropolis — a proposition speedily nipped in the bud
by Mr. Herbert, who clearly saw the raany obvious ob
jections to such a step, and entirely shared the opinions
of Lord Palraerston as expressed by that shrewd and
clear-sighted raan of the world in the following letter :
"November Zth, i860.
"My dear Sidney Herbert,
" Mr. Jeffs, the bookseUer, the bearer of this,
carae to me to tell me the evil things which he knows
of  , the projector of the proposed excursion of
London Volunteers to Paris. He says he knows the
said  to be a rogue, and believes him to be a spy
of the French Government, and that this excursion
scherae has been got up to further some French views.
"It seems to me that it would be desirable to stop
the scheme, which might be done by communication
with the comraanding officers of corps. At present
the Volunteer moveraent in this country, seen by
foreign nations at a distance, and in the aggregate,
as at the reviews in Hyde Park, at Edinburgh,
Knowsley, and elsewhere, assuraes the shape of
a formidable element of national defence; but this
impression would be destroyed by the exhibition
at Paris of a couple of hundred raw shop boys
dressed in the garb of soldiers, but not individuaUy
looking like soldiers. They would be paraded before
the French troops, treated with outward civility, and
laughed at behind their backs, and the French Army
would be taught to look with contempt upon a
shopkeeper force, which at present they regard as
something which might give them rauch trouble if
they were to land here. Omne ignotum pro magnifico,
and let us for the present at least enjoy the advantage
of the indefinite in regard to the individual soldierlike

i859-6i] THE MILITIA 393
quahties and appearance, as well as with regard to the
possible numbers, of our Rifle Volunteers."
The newly created organisation did not work with
out friction, and many were the complaints and
questions which came to Mr. Herbert for settlement.
But in all that concerned the Volunteers he had a
most efficient and painstaking assistant in his Under-
Secretary, Lord de Grey, now Marquess of Ripon,
to whom alraost all the details of the adrainistration
of the force and the correspondence involved in it
were ultimately committed, and who performed the
task entrusted to hira in a raanner which secured the
gratitude of his chief, and the respect and approval of
all who becarae acquainted with his work.
The Militia.
Whatever doubts Mr. Herbert may have enter
tained as to the practical value of the Volunteer Force,
he had none with regard to the importance of raain
taining the efficiency of the Militia, and as little
hesitation in denouncing as radically wrong the
system under which it was adrainistered in 1859.
Sidney Herbert's attempt to revive and reorganise
the MiHtia Force, when a member of Sir Robert Peel's
Cabinet, has been already mentioned in an earlier
chapter.^ But the Free Trade measures introduced
in the spring of 1846 demanded undivided attention,
and the Bill which, with the assent of the Cabinet,
Mr. Herbert had prepared to give effect to his views,
was never introduced. For sorae years longer the
Militia remained practically extinct, but was again
called into existence by an Act passed in 1852.
When Herbert was once more in office as a .raember
1 Vol. I., Chap. III.

394 WORK AS MINISTER [chap, viu
of Lord Aberdeen's Government, the Militia was,
after the beginning of the Russian War, regarded
mainly as a feeder for the Army. As such it proved
so useful — over 71,000 men having passed from the
Militia into the Regular Forces during the progress
of the War — that after the restoration of peace in
1856, the Militia was allowed to reraain erabodied,
and during the Indian Mutiny of 1857-8 was used
in rauch the same manner as it had been a few years
before. Mr. Herbert, on his accession to office in 1859, found
the Militia practically a recruiting agency, and an
efficient one. But its efficiency in this capacity was
equalled by the irrational extravagance of the methods
by which that efficiency was secured.
In his Meraorandura on National Defence, quoted
in an earlier chapter,* Mr. Herbert clearly showed the
wastefulness and absurdity of an expenditure which,
by reason of its success, might be tolerated at a
moment of extreme emergency, but which as a per
manent systera raerited nothing but conderanation. In
addition to the evils raentioned in the Meraorandura
referred to, the double bounties given acted as a
practical incentive to desertion with a view to re-
enlistment under another name and in another locality.
The nuraber of deserters in a single year under these
conditions exceeded 20,000.
To this systera Mr. Herbert announced his intention
to "put an end entirely." He proposed that the
erabodiraent of any part of the Militia in time of
peace should be discontinued, and a return made to
the older system of keeping the force perraanently
diserabodied but annually trained. This force, he
held, as he had done in 1845, should be raised by
1 Vol. II., Chap. VI., p. 218.

i859-6i] THE MILITIA 395
ballot. That it should be so raised was, and still is,
the existing law, the operation of which is only
suspended by an annual enactment.
But a mere abstention frora the introduction in
any given year of this suspensory enactment would
not in itself be sufficient to secure the efficient opera
tion of the ballot. The raachinery provided by Acts
raore than half a century old was coraplicated and
obsolete. The process to be gone through was so
slow that it required eleven weeks to raise a single
raan, and eleven weeks was, in the raiddle of the
nineteenth century, a period within which a carapaign
raight be not only commenced but concluded.
A Bill was therefore drawn, early in i860, to give
effect to Mr. Herbert's views. Though not unobjected
to, it obtained the general assent of the Cabinet.
But it was never read even a first time in the House
of Commons. The Session of i860 was an unusually
busy one. Legislation consequent on the Comraercial
Treaty with France, a Reform Bill, which though
ultimately withdrawn was lengthily discussed, the
repeal of the Paper Duties, the Fortification Loan
BiU, to say nothing of discussions on Foreign Affairs,
a war with China, and a quarrel with the House of
Lords, fully occupied the tirae of the House, and
crowded out the consideration of any measure which,
though important, was not of immediate urgency.
The introduction of the Militia Bill was postponed
till the following year. But when the Session of
1861 opened, Sidney Herbert was no longer a member
of the House of Commons, nor was his health such
as, had he remained there, would have enabled him
to grapple with the details of a complicated and highly
controversial measure.
But though no legislation with respect to the

396 WORK AS MINISTER [chap, vui
Militia was effected, reforras which could be accora
plished without resort to Parliaraent were persistently
pressed forward. The erabodied force was rapidly
reduced, and it was arranged that the diserabodied
battalions should be called together for their annual
drill as nearly as possible on the same day throughout
the country; that fourteen days of the twenty-eight
for which they were called out should be devoted
to rifle practice; and that, in addition to the annual
training, every new recruit should, on first joining,
be drilled for twenty-five days at the depot. To
give greater reality to the local character of the
force, it was directed that recruits should be taken
only frora the county to which the battalion belonged.
Disappointed though he was in his hopes of establish
ing the Militia Force on what he thought a proper
footing, Mr. Herbert never abandoned the intention
of ultimately effecting what he desired, and never
ceased to insist on the importance of recognising the
Militia as the great reserve force of the nation, second
only in importance to the Regular Army, though to
be used for home service and horae service only.
Mr. Herbert and his Subordinates.
Mr. Herbert was a considerate chief His equaniraity
was imraovable, his patience wellnigh inexhaustible,
and honest raistakes or failings were treated by him
with much indulgence. But while the discovery
of petty schemes for personal advantage seeraed
to afford hira a sort of arausement rather than
displeasure, it was far otherwise when he detected
any effort to stifle reasonable coraplaints, or to
make him the mouthpiece of an erroneous state
raent in the House of Coraraons. It sometimes

i859-6i] HATRED OF EVASION 397
happened that he was furnished from the office with
raeraoranda glossing over sorae departraental raistake
or railitary irregularity, and was thus led to give a
raisleading answer to questions put to him in the
House of Coraraons. Any atterapt at deception of
this sort roused in hira anger which was all the raore
formidable from its contrast with his habitual gentle
ness. Yet so engrained in the office was its desire to
" make the best of things " that no severity on his
part sufficed to extirpate the abuse.
The suppression of complaints made by officers in
the Army against the action of the office itself,
especially in financial matters, roused him to almost
equal anger. The discovery of any such case — and
they were not uncoraraon — always excited Mr.
Herbert's hottest indignation, and he finally estab
lished a rule that every such coraplaint should, if
pressed, be brought to hiraself for settleraent.
I have thus indicated some, though by no means
all, of the subjects which chiefly engrossed Sidney
Herbert's attention during his tenure of the War
Office. Of the drudgery and labour involved in
dealing with the myriad questions of minor import
ance which carae before hira in the routine of daily
work, it would be irapossible within reasonable liraits
to give any accurate account.
Nor is it to be forgotten that, as a member of the
Cabinet, Mr. Herbert had to take a share, and sorae
times an important one, in decisions which had no
reference to the business of the War Office. Though
differing from Lord Palraerston in regard to his
Italian policy, he raight be described as generally
adhering to the Palraerstonian section of the Cabinet.
His instincts were conservative, and he cannot be

398 WORK AS A MINISTER [chap, vui
supposed to have been greatly concerned at the
failure of Lord John RusseU's Reforra Bill. Friendly
in the first instance to the Repeal of the Paper Duties,
he would have abandoned the raeasure, when the
commencement of the war with China showed the
inexpediency of abandoning an already existing tax.
Nor could he heartily associate hiraself with the
financial policy of Mr. Gladstone, who, he thought,
looked too rauch to saving as an object for its own
sake, without regard to its effect on the efficiency
of the public service.
But the engrossing nature of the business of his
own office precluded Mr. Herbert frora taking so
prorainent a part in the considerations of general
policy as would otherwise have been the case.
No written account of the work of a minister and
of the questions with which he had to deal, however
clear and accurate it may be, can present those
questions to the mind of a reader in the same raanner
in which they originally developed theraselves in the
raind of the rainister hiraself It would be unreadable
if it attempted to do so. Indeed, the clearer and more
definite the detailed account, the greater will be the
difference between the record of isolated and finished
transactions, and the gradual and confused way in
which, in varying phases, a question from day to day
presented itself araong a crowd of others.
In any written meraoir the narrative of each
transaction must be clearly separated from other
topics, raust narrate each step in its proper sequence,
and as though it alone had occupied at the tirae the
attention of the rainister. But it is not in this raanner
that such questions originally present theraselves or
are dealt with. Each coraes up for notice from time
to tirae, whether day by day, or at raore distant

i859-6i] UNCERTAINTIES OF PROPORTION 399
intervals, as one among a crowd of other matters,
great and small, all demanding attention and decision,
and many of which, though not in themselves specially
important, require immediate treatment, and, conse
quently, take up time which might, as we now believe,
have been more usefully employed.
We see things in the light of the past, and with a
knowledge of the consequences which have ensued
frora a minister's action or inaction. But, at the time,
the relative importance of the multitude of matters
calling for attention is not always apparent, and
cannot be so. Many questions, having in thera
potentialities of rauch disturbance, never come to a
head, being rapidly and firmly disposed of, and are
speedily forgotten, though, if neglected, they might
have been the cause of much mischief On the other
hand, questions at first seemingly trivial, and but
an insignificant item in the mass of matters submitted
to a minister, have sometimes a way of assuraing
enormously greater proportions, and an importance
wholly unexpected.
Who, for example, would have supposed that a
dispute between the monks of two convents in Syria,
about the possession of a door-key, would have been
the original cause of a great European war, in which
thousands of lives were lost and millions of treasure
wasted ?
It is not always possible to say at first sight what
is the relative importance of questions deraanding
consideration at the same time. Sorae raay at once
be recognised as manifestly of real consequence, others
as clearly as of no importance at all ; but between
them are a number of matters as to which no such
definite judgraent can at once be passed. With regard
to thera a minister may easily sometimes mistake, and.

400 WORK AS A MINISTER [chap, viu
among the many subjects clamorously calling for his
attention, may give a disproportionate amount of care
to sorae less worthy of it than others at the sarae
raoraent before him.
In a written narrative coraposed long afterwards it
is essential, for the reader's sake, that every subject
should be separately treated, as though it alone had
required and received the minister's thought and
sanction, and as if each step in each transaction was as
plain to him then as it now is to us. But, in fact,
this never is so. We, with our after-knowledge and
power of isolating the particular topic, can lay our
finger on the blot, and wonder why such a contingency
was overlooked, or such a step taken or neglected. The
explanation is generally to be found in the fact that
a hundred other raatters distracted the rainister's
attention. When a man's mind is full of the speech
he is about to deliver, and on the success or failure
of which may hang the fate of the Government;
when a contest in the Cabinet is impending between
himself and a powerful colleague, when he is im-
raersed in the elaboration of some great scherae, it is
not always easy to give full and patient attention to
details of sorae raatter apparently trivial. We can
now see that those details, as well as the matter
itself, were in fact important, and in a narrative
dealing only with the subject to which they relate,
they seem to have been strangely and inexcusably
neglected. I do not say that the surrounding cir
cumstances afford an excuse, but they certainly afford
an explanation. It is worry and not work that
renders life so trying to a minister. Work for a
single object raay weary, but it does not distract
or strain raind and body as does the necessity
for keeping in view a myriad different subjects, and

1859-61] EFFECTS OF MENTAL STRAIN 401
the consciousness of inability to attend to any one of
thera with the fullness and deliberation which their
being thoroughly dealt with demands. It has been
remarked that not a few of the Roman Emperors went
raad under their load of world-wide responsibUity. It
is, perhaps, rather raatter for surprise that they should
not all have done so.

vol. II. 26

CHAPTER IX
closing days
I86I
WHEN, after a long and fatiguing session. Parlia
ment was prorogued in the month of August,
i860, no great eagerness was felt by Ministers for an
early resumption of Cabinet meetings. Some took a
not ill-earned holiday ; some pursued quietly the work
of their respective departments, free frora the criticism
of Parliament and the supervision of their colleagues.
With the dirainution of personal intercourse there
was less insistence on differences of opinion, and the
controversies which had agitated the Cabinet during
the session of i860 were for the tirae allowed to sleep.
Mr. Herbert accorapanied the Queen to Scotland,
and was a witness of the great Volunteer Review at
Edinburgh, a sight which highly pleased him, and
of which he wrote with enthusiasm to Mrs. Herbert
in a letter which I have already quoted.^ After
leaving the Queen he paid a few visits, including
one to Dunrobin and one to Haddo House, where he,
for the last time, saw Lord Aberdeen, who died a
few weeks later.
In the auturan of 1859, when writing to Sir Jaraes
Graham, Sidney Herbert had described himself as
never having had better health than then, and it
is no doubt a fact that he bore the fatigues of office,
and of the short session which followed the General
¦ P. 39°-
02

i86i] FAILURE OF STRENGTH 403
Election of that year, with rauch less apparent injury
than had been apprehended. But the case was
raaterially different twelve months later. The con
tinued labours of the War Office, the stress and
fatigue of the session of i860, during which he was
compelled to speak nearly 200 tiraes, and the great
personal pain caused by his altered relations with
Mr. Gladstone, accelerated the progress of the fatal
disease under which he was already suffering.
During Mr. Herbert's stay in the north, it became
manifest that he could no longer endure the strain
of the double labour iraposed on hira, and he determined
to take — too late — a step which, if taken earlier, might
have afforded him sensible relief On December 9th
he wrote to Lord Palmerston, claiming the fulfilment
of a promise that he should be reraoved to the
House of Lords, if he found hiraself unable to endure
the fatigue attendant on a seat in the House of
Coraraons. Lord Palraerston replied :
" 94, Piccadilly, "December nth, i860.
" My dear Sidney Herbert,
" I have received your letter of the 9th. . . .
I see, on looking to May's book about the usages
of Parharaent, third edition, in p. 155 that, in the
case of elevation to a peerage during a recess,
the Speaker is by law erapowered to issue a new
writ for the place he represents, upon a certi
ficate frora two raerabers that a writ of suraraons
for such raeraber to the House of Peers has been
issued. In the cases, however, of raerabers of the
House of Commons made peers during my tirae, it
has been found convenient, though frora May's
book it seems not to have been necessary, that
instead of waiting for a writ of summons, they
should vacate by taking the Chiltern Hundreds.
Look, however, at May's book, and settle the question
of time according to your own convenience.

404 CLOSING DAYS [chap, ix
" You say that you have communicated with your
chief supporter, and hope to be able to make a safe
arrangeraent for the county, but as yet I have said
nothing to the Queen, and it was settled that I should
not do so ; but if county arrangeraents are to be raade,
sorae reports raay be got out and reach the Queen,
and she would not like to hear that steps were taken
in anticipation of an exercise of her prerogative upon
which her pleasure had not been taken. Would it not
be best that I should take her pleasure, enjoining
secrecy, which I think she would observe ? Answer
this question by return of post. I do not go to Broad-
lands till Thursday afternoon."

Mr. Herbert to Lord Palmerston.
"Wilton, Salisbury,
"December 2yd, i860.
" My dear Lord Palmerston,
" I think it is important to your Government
now to raake the arrangements for supplying a
representative of the War Office in the House of
Commons as soon as possible. The new Under-
Secretary will have a difficult task, for he will have
very early in the session to open the War Estimates
to the House of Coraraons, and of course it will
be an advantage to him to have seen something of
their preparation.
" 1 have to-day told De Grey,^ who is staying here,
in confidence, of my approaching removal to the House
of Lords. The raanner in which he received the
announceraent, which necessarily affects hira so rauch,
only adds to the high opinion I had forraed of his
ctiaracter. He will do anything to facilitate raatters
for his successor, and will try to finish the details
of the re-organisation of the office which we contem
plate as coraing frora the Report of Sir J. Grahara's
committee. " I find likewise that it is impossible to delay rauch
longer the announceraent to the county. Mr. Grove,
who intends to stand, thinks it of iraportance, as soon
as possible, publicly to occupy the ground. I think,
therefore, the intention had better be declared soon.
' Now Marquess of Ripon, K.G.

i86i] BECOMES A PEER 405
Perhaps, therefore, you would kindly ask Her Majesty's
leave to declare it.
" Lord de Grey would wish to see you when next
you are in town. He is a man who ought, whenever
there is an opportunity, to be again employed. He is
an excellent man of business, full of tact and good
sense, a thorough gentleraan, and fond of work, which
he executes thoroughly. He managed a great part of
the Volunteer business, seeing a good number of
people upon it, and did it with the greatest success and
credit. He will be a great loss to the office."
Lord Palmerston to Mr. Herbert.
" Broadlands,
" December 24*%, i860.
" My dear Sidney Herbert,
" I think the reasons you give for making
known your intended removal to the Upper House,
and for appointing at once a new Under-Secretary for
the House of Commons work, are quite sufficient,
and I will lose no time in communicating with the
Queen. But as she expressed some disinclination to
Osborne, although the appointment is in fact not to
be raade by her but by you, it would smooth matters
if you would write rae a few lines which I raight send
to her, stating the reasons for which you think that
Osborne would be the best raan to do our work in
the House of Coraraons. The Prince raade a good
observation, which was that Osborne, having hiraself
been in the Army, would bring to the performance of
his duties a useful knowledge of, and sympathy with,
the feelings of the Service. I pointed out also that
his power of speaking would be useful in corabating
Radical raotions for reduction of railitary establish
ments. " What you say of De Grey entirely confirms the
opinion which I had formed of him, though frora far
less raeans of forming one than you have had.
" With regard to yourself, what would you prefer-
that your removal should take place now and during
the recess, or that it should be delayed till the meeting
of Parliament, when your seat in the House of
Commons might be vacated by your taking the
Chiltern Hundreds?

4o6 CLOSING DAYS [chap, ix
"We are still in a difficulty about the Morocco
Loan : the Emperor has, as he says, treasure enough
to pay off the whole sura due to Spain ; but it is in
the interior, and he is afraid of popular outbreak if
he was [sic'] to bring it down to the coast to send it to
the Spaniards. On the other hand, he is in daily
dread of some collision between the Moors in the
neighbourhood of Tetuan, and the Spanish garrison ;
and he asserts that if Tetuan were evacuated, he could
establish his authority all over his territory and be
able, after a time, to send his money about as he
pleased. But the Spaniards will not evacuate Tetuan
till another instalment of the indemnity is paid.
" The Spanish Government seems willing to join us
in guaranteeing the interest of the loan to be raised
by Morocco. They would prefer guaranteeing a loan
for the whole amount due to them, so as to make
a clean score between Spain and Morocco.
" I do not know how cold it may have been in
your valley, but my register thermoraeter recorded
itself to have been down at 15° last night; quite cold
enough to satisfy the greatest lovers of seasonable
weather." Lord Herbert's raigration to the House of Lords
rendered it necessary that the Under-Secretary of
State for War, Lord de Grey, should be replaced by
a Meraber of the House of Coraraons. Though it is
not now a raatter of any iraportance by whora this
subordinate post was filled in 1861, the correspon
dence relating to the appointraent is of sorae interest
as giving the contemporary opinion of experienced
statesmen as to the qualities of men then new to
public life, but most of whora have since raade their
raark and filled high office. Lord Herbert sent to
Lord Palraerston a list of possible candidates for
the post, and on that list Lord Palraerston coraraented
as follows :
" The Hst of names you sent me for Under-Secretary
to represent the War Departraent in the House of

i86i] CHOICE OF UNDER-SECRETARY 407
Commons are all good. 1 should say, however, that
it would be a pity to take Frederic Peel * away from
the Treasury, for which he has been working hard
to qualify hiraself; and as to Layard,^ though he is a
clever raan, he is a wild one, and 1 should doubt his
being to be depended on in harness. Osborne ' is a
very clever raan, and a good and ready speaker ; he
was idle at the Admiralty because he disliked being
nailed to his chair in the Boardroom and having no
opportunity of speaking in the House. He is accus
toraed to business, and, if he took to the collar, would
do it well. Of the others, Hartington * in what he
has done in the House, has shown rauch ability and
power ; whether he would like the confinement, 1
know not. Enfield ° is clever, but wanting in power.
Gifford is certainly clever, and has spoken well, but
how is his health? not very good, I believe.* Of
Austin Bruce ' one has heard a good account. It will
be well, however, to consult Brand when the proper
time coraes, and we must find a man who will not
only do the business well in the House, but also suit
you in the office.
" The Emperor has advised Francis to leave Gaeta.
If he had ' ordered ' Barbier de Tisant to do so, it
would have been more to the purpose. The Empress
was better in health and spirits at Stafford House on
Sunday than when I saw her at Windsor. It now
appears that she travels only for change of air and
scene, that she wanted to go to Spain, and the Eraperor
advised her to come to England. The Duchess of
Sutherland had forty workmen for three days taking
down brown Holland and preparing Stafford House
for the luncheon of the Erapress."
Mr. Herbert was willing to acquiesce in Lord
Palmerston's wish that Mr. Bernal Osborne should
become his Under-Secretary; but he doubted the
' Sir Robert Peel's second son.
2 Sir A. H. Layard, G.C.B.
' Who had been Secretary to the Admiralty.
* The present Duke of Devonshire, K.G.
' Afterwards Earl of Strafford.
' Lord Gifford died in 1862.
' Afterwards Lord Aberdare.

4o8 CLOSING DAYS [chap, ix
wisdora of the choice, and was, perhaps, not altogether
sorry to find objections raade to the expediency of
the step.

The Prince Consort to Mr. Herbert.
" Windsor Castle,
"December 27th, i860.
" My dear Mr. Herbert,
" I have to acknowledge the receipt of two con
fidential letters frora you. I need hardly say, in reply,
how much distressed both the Queen and rayself are
at your having reason to be apprehensive about the
state of your health ! You are quite right to leave
the House of Commons under the circumstances you
allude to, and we trust that the lighter work in the
House of Lords may permit you to continue long
to discharge, with undiminished success, the important
but onerous duties of the War Departraent.
" We shall regret the loss of Lord de Grey very
much, who had won golden opinions in the discharge
of his duties of Under-Secretary, and will be much
regretted by the Array.
" It will be uncommonly difficult to find a good
successor for the office in the House of Comraons.
The list of candidates you send is not a brilliant
one ! The person at whose name you have arrived
at last, by the process of exhaustion, is certainly not
free from grave objections. I can say nothing on
these to you which will not have occurred to you
before, and while Sir Jaraes Grahara's testiraony to
Mr. B. Osborne's discretion and willing subordination
while at the Adrairalty is most valuable in his favour,
it must be borne in mind, that whilst Sir Jaraes sate
in the sarae House with him and conducted the parlia
mentary business himself, there was little room left
for his secretary to distinguish hiraself one way or
the other. His first speech on leaving office, and last
speech (I believe), about the Array was the faraous
outburst ' that it would require all the waters of the
Tharaes and the Serpentine to be let through the
Horse Guards to cleanse thera frora their filth and
corruption.' " I consider it of the greatest iraportarice for the

i86i] LETTER FROM PRINCE CONSORT 409
well-being of the Array and the conduct of military
raatters, both with respect to the Array and to the
Crown, that there shouldexist the raost perfect harraony
and good understanding between the Secretary of
State's office and the Comraander-in-Chief, perhaps
only next in importance to the person entrusted with
the conduct of the Secretary of State's department
in the House of Comraons possessing the confidence
of that House.
" While you are, therefore, going to collect more
inforraation frora two or three men very familiar with
the House of Commons, I would ask you to put your
self in coraraunication with the Duke of Carabridge
also. Should he consider that, notwithstanding what
has been said by Mr. Osborne, he can work harmo
niously and safely with hira, and that his talent for
debate and ease of temper and conscience should out
weigh the effect produced by his former parliamentary
bearing, the Queen (I ara sure) will not prevent your
obtaining that instrument with which you think that
you will be best able to carry on the business of
your department, even if she should consider it as
an experiraent. " Ever yours truly,
" Albert."
The Duke of Carabridge was accordingly consulted,
with the following result :
H.R.H. THE Duke of Cambridge to Lord Herbert.
"January 2nd, 1861.
" I will now reply to that portion of your letter
in which you so considerately ask ray opinion as to
the new arrangeraent that has becorae necessary by
your removal to the House of Lords. The removal
of Lord de Grey frora the position of Under-Secretary
I most sincerely deplore. He has done his work
with great tact and great judgment, and his place
will not be easily filled up. But, the necessity for
the change having arisen, we raust endeavour to find
the best raan to take charge of the difficult office of
conducting the affairs of the Array in the House of

4IO CLOSING DAYS [chap, ix
Commons. Of the gentleraen you narae to rae I have
no hesitation in preferring Mr. Baring ^ to any of the
others naraed. 1 do not think that either F. Peel,
Sir J. Ramsden, Lord Hartington, or Lord Bury
would do. The two forraer have been tried and were
not very successful, the two latter are quite inex
perienced. Bernal Osborne is a man I personally
like, but his appointment would, I think, be raost un
palatable to the Army, who have no sort of confidence
m hira, and besides his tone has at times been very
offensive to the constituted railitary authorities, how
ever friendly he has always been personally to rayself
Mr. Baring has had a good deal of parliamentary
experience, he is clever and speaks well, at all events
fairly, and I have always understood that he is a good
raan of business. I, therefore, strongly advocate him
as successor to Lord de Grey, the more so as I think
he is a very right thinking and safe raan. I trust,
therefore, that your choice will fall upon hira, and
that there will be no difficulty on his part to accept
of the offer made to him. In conclusion, let me thank
you for the frank and unreserved manner in which
you have consulted rae on this subject, and trusting
that the year 1861 may not end without seeing you
restored to perfect health."
Mr. Baring accordingly received the appointraent.
Mr. Herbert's intention to quit the House of Com
raons was not iramediately made known to the public ;
but Mrs. Herbert was permitted to comraunicate it to
a few friends, and araong thera to Sir James Graham,
who replied^ that he was —
" quite prepared for the information, which you gave
me in confidence. I have long urged the necessity of
Sidney leaving the House of Commons ; and you may
remember that, on the formation of the Governraent,
in concert with you, I represented the danger of
continuing a heavy office, such as the War Depart
raent, with the waste of strength and life which
constant attendance in the House of Commons entails.
' Afterwards Earl of Northbrook.
' Netherby, December 30th, i860.

i86i] LETTER FROM SIR J. GRAHAM 411
Subsequent observation has confirraed ray appre
hensions. In the country, with air, exercise, free
enjoyment of his happy home and simple occupations,
he is a healthy man, and gay as a summer morning
on your Wiltshire Downs. In London, during the
sitting of Parliament, he is care-worn, drooping,
languid, and every exertion leaves a fatal mark behind
it. I will hope that the half measure now about to
be taken will be equal to the occasion ; but anxieties
will still be heavy ; and inadequate defence of
measures in the House of Commons will not be an
alleviation of the burden. However, it is right to
begin with the step now about to be taken. Your
fond, but just, alarms must not be smothered. You
must watch ; and if you see the necessity for greater
privacy and care, you must be prompt and bold in
declaring it ; and Sidney has no sincere friend who
will not back you. His wife and children have the
strongest claims ; his colleagues and the interests
of the Governraent are quite secondary.
" I suffered very rauch frora my journey to London^
and from exposure to extreme cold. I kept my bed
for a day or two on my return here, but snow and
the thermoraeter often approaching zero are not
reviving ; and for many sad reasons my heart sinks
within rae, and I often think that to depart would
be far better. While I live, you raay rely always on
ray warmest sympathies and sincere affection, and
Sidney has few friends who have loved him longer or
better. "Say what is most kind from me to hira on this
occasion ; and believe rae always,
" Yours very affectionately."
Sir Charles Wood had a few days earlier thus
expressed his regret at the —
" loss of the best and raost agreeable colleague in
the House of Coraraons that ever I knew. There
cannot," he went on to say, " be the sarae constant
intimacy between men in the different Houses of
Parliament, and though it raust have corae sooner
or later, that does not raake the actual separation
less painful and disagreeable when it does come.
' To attend Lord Aberdeen's funeral.

412 CLOSING DAYS [chap, ix
Therefore, whilst I ara glad that he should have the
relief, I cannot quite suppress the selfish feeling of
regretting his loss."
On January ist, 1861, Sidney Herbert issued his
farewell address to the electors of South Wilts,
announcing his resignation of his seat in Parliaraent.
It was siraple, dignified, and not without a touch of
manly pathos :
" To the Electors of the Southern Division of the
County of Wilts.
" Wilton,
"January ist, 1861.
" Gentlemen, " It is with pain and regret that I find rayself
corapelled to relinquish the seat in the House of
Comraons which I have so long filled as your
representative. The incessant attendance and late
hours unavoidable to a Meraber of Parliament seeking
thoroughly to discharge his duty, and aggravated in my
case by the labour of representing a heavy department,
have proved too much for my strength ; and I have, at
last, most reluctantly arrived at the conclusion that I
must not risk the result of another year of so much
fatigue. " I entered Parliament a very young raan. Through
your favour I have represented the division uninter
ruptedly for twenty-eight years. I have never had
to seek for another constituency.
" Neither has this uninterrupted honour been the
result of a coraplete identity of opinion, nor have I
purchased it by any dishonest submission of my
opinion to yours. Not doubting my earnestness, you
have left rae a free agent ; and though differences
have existed and been unreservedly expressed, you
have treated me with a confidence and an indulgence
which I can never forget.
" For myself, I can truly say that I have never made
a toy or a pastime of the position you have given me,
but I have looked upon it as a solemn trust, and have
laboured constantly, assiduously, and to the utraost
of my ability so to discharge its duties as best to
ensure what appeared to me to be the public good.

i86ij FAREWELL ADDRESS 413
" Through the favour of the Crown I hope still to
be enabled, though at the cost of less physical
exertion, to take a part in the CouncU of the nation ;
and the interests which you have hitherto coraraitted
to ray hands will not be less sacred in my eyes when
no longer directly confided to me by you.
" In bidding you fareweU, I must offer to the many
and true friends who have given me so generous and
constant a support my raost warm and heartfelt thanks.
I must thank also those who have been opposed
to me for a forbearance and courtesy honourable to
thera, and now most gratifying to me to reraeraber.
To you all I offer ray best wishes for the future,
and I pray for a continuance to you of every blessing.
" 1 have the honour to be. Gentlemen,
" Your most grateful and faithful Servant,
" Sidney Herbert."
Unfortunately, partly from his own chivalrous sense
of duty, which prorapted hira to stick to his post so
long as he could perform its duties, and partly in defer
ence to the strength of the wish generally expressed
that he should retain it. Lord Herbert allowed himself
to be persuaded not to retire from office at the sarae
tirae that he left the House of Commons — the only
thing which could then have saved or materially pro
longed his life. Had he done so, he might have lived
some years raore ; as it was, he was fated not to see
the close of that which had just commenced. One or
two friends had the courage to express regret that he
should not have given himself a fair chance. Araong
thera was Sidney Godolphin Osborne, who wrote :
" 1 ara truly glad you are going to get some rest,
or rather alleviation in the matter of work. I am
not patriot enough to wish my friends sacrificed to
ray country, so I wish you were out of office altogether
for a good two years. The brain will kick when
hard pressed. Cabinet Ministers have the sarae
organisation as other men ; if they will tamper with
nature, the liver and heart will coraplain, then rebel,
at last corae to open war, and we are beat. Do

414 CLOSING DAYS [chap, ix
think raore of yourself and your own folks, etc.,
than of this country. Were I worldly wise, I should
always wish my friends in the Cabinet ; but where
I really love them, it is the last thing I desire for
thera. I don't congratulate you on the Peerage, for
you do not need the first-class ticket, though I am
glad you get into an easier carriage."
But most of the letters which he received expressing
regret and syrapathy at his leaving the House of
Coraraons contained also expressions of satisfaction
at his not leaving his post at the War Office — a post
he was to retain for so short a tirae. These letters
carae frora all quarters, and raany of thera raust have
given him sincere pleasure. The Duke of Cambridge,
who had not always been at one with him on points
of War Office administration, wrote as follows :
" Horse Guards,
"January 2nd, 1861,
" My dear Herbert,
" It was with feelings of real sorrow that I read
your letter of yesterday, which reached me this
raorning. I had heard it reported for sorae little time
that the state of your health would compel you to
leave the House of Comraons and be reraoved up
to the House of Lords. 1 hoped it would not be so ;
I raean that the necessity for such a step had not,
and would not, arise. Your letter has, however,
confirraed the report I had heard, and frora ray heart
I deplore the cause of it, though I raost sincerely
hope and trust that by taking these precautions you
raay see your health corapletely restored at no very
distant period. It is to rae at the sarae tirae a great
relief to find that, in the House of Lords, the Army
and country will retain your valuable services as
Secretary of State for War. Had it been otherwise,
I can conscientiously say that no event could have
taken place that would have given rae deeper sorrow
or regret. I have now sorae little experience in
matters of government, and I do not believe that there
is a single statesraan or public raan who could perform
the onerous duties of your office with greater advan-

i86ij LETTER FROM MR. GLADSTONE 415
tage to the Army or to the country than yourself
As for myself, you know, 1 think, by this tirae, that
1 look upon you as a valued friend, and no greater
raisfortune could happen to rae at the present raoraent,
in ray public capacity, than to lose you as my valued
colleague. However, fortunately, there is no proba
bUity of this, and I am so far relieved in the com
munication you have raade to rae."
This letter raay be relied on as the honest expression
of the feelings of a thoroughly straightforward raan,
and considering the nature of their official relations,
it is highly creditable to both.
Lord Granville wrote frora Bowood on January 4th :
" You will be an iramense addition to us, useful,
ornamental, and agreeable — and you will find our
parliaraentary work perfect child's play after the
Commons. You will be an equal loss in the House
of Coraraons. I consider it a blow to the Governraent
there. I trust that it is only a wise precaution on your
part ; but if you are feeling unwell, you are acting
prudently in taking the step, which must be a
painful one."
Mr. Gladstone, in reply to Mrs. Herbert's intimation,
addressed the following letter to Mr. Herbert hiraself:
" Hawarden, Januaty 2nd, 1861.
" My dear Herbert,
" I had caught sorae of the ruraours, which,
notwithstanding all precautions, raight well in such
a case float about ; but it was only this raorning
and from Mrs. Herbert's kind letter that I learned
we are about to lose you from the House of Comraons,
where you and I have sumraered and wintered it,
and, except for a few raonths, have rubbed shoulders
together for a large piece of our lives. This is a
great event and a sad one ; but though you will
miss us, and we shall more miss you, you are
doubtless doing a wise act, and not only could I
not wish you to do otherwise, but I feel that the

4i6 CLOSING DAYS [chap, ix
erabarrassments it may occasion for the moment are
of very sraall account corapared with the objects you
have had in view. I cannot, therefore, thicken my
condolences with quite so black an ink as Mrs. Herbert
would have me — though a slow observer of faces, I
could not but see this recess had failed to do for
you what was to be desired, and it is a sincere pleasure
to think that you will gain relief without being lost, at
any rate, to the Government and to the adrainistrative
service of the country.
" I shall be curious and anxious to know what the
secondary arrangeraents are to be. Should they for the
raoraent be hard upon De Grey, they will only quicken
his excellent claims for preferment; but I am rather
at a loss to know what you will do to procure a fit
representative of so vast a department in the House of
Coraraons. " It is very unfortunate that both the huge spending
departraents should have their heads in the Lords ; but
these things cannot always be helped.
" I hope, and suppose, that you will, when you bring
forward your Estiraates, be able to forra sorae judgraent
on the cause and liraits of the reraaining China
expenditure. But there will not, I think, be a great
pressure in point of tirae; for though there raay be
sorae reasons for finance, there are raore against it.
The greatest question after all, there and elsewhere, is.
Shall we be raore discreet in our foreign policy here
after, not so much as to its principle, but as to its
temper and humour ?
" I have received, with pleasure, a good account of
Graham since Lord Aberdeen's funeral, when he
appeared to suffer excessively frora the cold."

Lord John Russell, on first learning Mr. Herbert's
intention, wrote to express a hope that " removal to
the pure air of the House of Lords may have the
invigorating effects which are expected frora it."
A few days after he seeras to have thought, or to
have been told, that this was hardly an adequate
appreciation either of the sacrifice made by Mr.
Herbert or the loss sustained by the House of Com-

i86i] LETTERS FROM FRIENDS 417
raons, and added at the commenceraent of a note on
other raatters :

"January <)tk.
" I fear that, though I felt rauch grieved at the
necessity of your giving up the House of Coraraons, I
wrote rather lightly about it. If so, I ara sorry for it."
The Speaker' wrote to Mrs. Herbert: " OSSINGTON, "January ^th.
"... The loss to the House of Coramons will be very
great indeed. The work of the War Department in
the last session was frightfully laborious and trying
to the last degree. It was gone through most ably
and most gallantly. To me, rauch considering these
things, it seeraed that in S. H. were asserabled those
rare qualities and powers which raark their possessor
as Leader of the House of Commons.
"... I am ready to congratulate you upon it, and
to rejoice with you that his services will be pre
served to the public (let us hope) without too
great a sacrifice of health ; whUe a little raore of
the tirae of the pleasantest gentleraan in England
will be spared to yourself, to his faraily, and his
friends."

The anticipation as to Leadership here expressed
was very widely shared, and would no doubt have
been realised had Herbert's life been prolonged. Mr.
Cardwell, after laraenting in a letter to Mrs. Herbert
the inevitable dirainution of intiraate intercourse
which must result from sitting in different Houses,
added : " However, all these considerations are in some
degree selfish, for Herbert will not lose the coraraand
he has attained, by going now to the House of
Lords." ' Rt. Hon. J. Evelyn Denison, afterwards Viscount Ossington.
VOL. IL 27

4i8 CLOSING DAYS [chap, ix
Bishop Wilberforce wrote a day later:
"... Whilst I can fully enter into all your feelings at
giving up the county and the House of Coraraons,
so far frora your raoving into the House of Lords
standing in the way of your political course, ray own
belief is (and I do not believe that I ara deceived
by ray great pleasure in having you there) that it
will distinctly tend to help on the end I so fully
expect, of seeing you at the Head of the Government
of the country." '
Escape from the House of Commons no doubt
lightened Lord Herbert's labours, but there was little
really gained by the change, except comparative
iraraunity frora late hours and a heated and unwhole-
sorae atmosphere. The manifold worries of the War
Department, small and great, permitted no diminution
of mental anxiety or toil, and the close rooms of the
office in which Lord Herbert was daily iraprisoned
' A delay in the announcement of Lord Herbert's title produced the
following elaborate piece of ponderous pleasantry from the Russian
Ambassador : " Chesham House,
"6 Janvier, 1861.
" Mon CHER VoisiN et Ami,
" Les journaux me disent que vous etes un homme charmant.
Je le savais, fort longtemps, avant qu'ils m'en eussent fait la decouverte.
lis se lamentent de votre retraite de la Chambre des Communes. Je
vous en fais mon compliment, car je me rejouis de vous voir diner a
8 heures et aller ensuite k I'Opera, surtout si vous voulez bien y venir
avec nous. Enfin, iis pr^tendent que vous etes d'une sant6 delicate,
affaiblie par le travail. Je n'en crois rien du tout. Vous etes, Dieu
merci, d'une constitution plus forte que celle de la plupart des Etats,
vos amis et allies du Continent, sans en excepter celle de la Sardaigne !
Mais, aprds tout, une chose essentielle que les journaux ne me disent
pas : c'est le nom qu'il faut donner d^sormais k mon itts honorable
ami et voisin ! N'allez pas me dire que cela ne me regarde pas du
tout. Je vous repondrais : que voili bien 40 ans que j'ai I'honneur
d'etre au nombre des amis les plus ddvouSs de votre famille. Je re
clame ainsi mon droit d'anciennet6, en venant a vous, chapeau bas,
pour vous demander, mon cher et aimable ami, comment faut-il que
je vous addresse les lettres ennuyeuses, dont je vous demande mille
pardons chaque fois qu'il m'arrive de vous importuner, je vous I'avoue
bien malgr6 moi ? " Mille et mille amities,
"Brunnow."

i86i] ARMY ESTIMATES 419
were wholly wanting in the fresh air he required and
longed for.
The recess had passed away quietly, but the differ
ences in the Cabinet were not less existent and not
less real because argument with respect to them had
for the moment ceased. With the approach of a fresh
session they sprang into renewed activity.
During the same month in which he resigned his
seat in the House of Coramons Lord Herbert was
engaged in almost hopeless efforts to reconcile the
discordant views of his colleagues as to the nature of
the Estiraates to be presented to Parliaraent. He had
his own well-considered plans, but was subjected
on the one hand to strong pressure from Mr. Gladstone
and the economists to reduce the Army Estimates
below what he deeraed safe, and on the other was
urged by Lord Palraerston, the Commander-in-Chief,
and the Prince Consort, not to consent even to
reductions which Sidney Herbert himself thought
justifiable and perhaps desirable. Mr. Gladstone,
" after two long days' hard fighting " and threats of
resignation, succeeded in getting "the Navy Estimates
a little down," ' and wrote to Lord Herbert the same
day, January 26th :
" Without entering into details, I entreat you to
consider how the Governraent may place its pro
ceedings with regard to the Army in conforraity with
those respecting the Navy.
" Last year there was a sentiment of danger at times
which disposed people to wish for a strong Array
as well as a strong Navy. This year the sentiraent of
danger has materially abated, and a counter-cry for
econoray has become audible, though I by no means
venture to say how far it will prevail. But I wish
to take an impartial view of the two cases relatively.
' Morley's Life of Gladstone, Vol. II. p. 93.

420 CLOSING DAYS [chap, ix
The sentiment of dignity and the desire to be strong in
Europe when Continental convulsion is probably near
at hand, certainly will tell much more in favour of
keeping up the Navy than the Army. Under these
circumstances, and notwithstanding the special urgency
of iron shipbuilding, we are going to raake a sensible
reduction upon the Navy. I will not say how this has
been brought about, but it is now a matter of fact.
How can we offer this Estimate to Parliament, and at
the sarae tirae leave the Array Estiraates where they
were? " When you told me you had a reduction of 600 men,
but would lose the benefit, or nearly the whole, by
losing payraents frora the East Indian Governraent,
I was quite prepared to say we raust confront dis
advantageous appearances and stand on the substance.
But when I find that sorae two-thirds of that are
a nominal reduction, obtained, I must say, in what
seeras to rae an exceptionable manner (never known
to me until to-day), I am obliged to confess that what
remains is a reduction so trivial that it raust be put
out of view in dealing with these vast sums,
" If, on the other har^d, it is true we are to lose early
in the financial year 8,000 men for Indian dep6ts,
is nothing to be allowed for the great addition to
reserve force in Militia and the large and increasing
nuraber of Volunteers ?
"After the war with China has ended, it is true
a part of the expeditionary force remains ; but how is
it possible to justify adding to the effective number of
the force at home the 3,000 or 4,000 men who are,
as we have every reason to suppose, coming home
shortly from Tientsin?
" Waiving detaUs, however, I will now put it to you
that your plans for the Array, as they stand, do not
agree either in a political or in a popular and parlia
mentary sense with those for the Navy ; and I cannot
say how earnestly I trust that you will bring them
into a better relation.
" It is, I trust, the last time that you or any one wiU
receive from me an appeal of this nature."
But Lord Palraerston on the same day had written :
" It seems to me that you have proposed quite
sufficient reductions, and that we ought not to go

i86i] ESTIMATES OF 1861 421
fiirther. We ought not to dirainish the force which
you propose for the United Kingdom, which is small
enough to face any emergency, your colonial garrisons
ought not to be reduced, and the force in India is paid
for out of Indian revenues. As to stores, we ought to
have a good many more muskets, and it is absolutely
necessary that our fleet and our land forces should
be fully furnished with the best and heaviest guns
applicable to the purposes of the sea and land services.
Gladstone, Bright, and Cobden, and some forty or fifty
of the Liberals may clamour for further reductions ;
but I am fully convinced that we shall have on our
side a large majority in Parliament and in the
country." And the Prince Consort, on a yet earlier day,
had thus expressed hiraself: "Windsor Castle,
"January ist, 1861.
" My dear Lord Herbert,
"There are ruraours afloat in your office of
intended reductions in the Array. I sincerely trust
they are without foundation, as we were never in a
condition to want raore our railitary resources to be
developed. I feel certain that the Cobden circular,
got up at Paris, has found, and will find, no favour
with the British nation. Lord Palmerston and Lord
John both declared to us that they would resist the
reduction of a single man, and I know that the whole
Conservative party is prepared to support the
Estimates of the Governraent. " Ever yours truly,
" Albert."
After hot discussion, a slight reduction was effected
on the Military Estiraates, which was, however, re
garded by Mr. Gladstone as " purely norainal."
Had Military Questions been those on which alone
divergent opinions were held, the matter would
have been speedily settled by the retireraent of
those raerabers of the Governraent who were un
able to assent to the Fortification Loan, who objected

422 CLOSING DAYS [chap, ix
to the erection of the works which the Prime Minister
and the great majority of the Cabinet were determined
to construct, and who desired a reduction in the
strength of the Array.
But there were other subjects ^hich caused differ
ence of opinion and dissatisfied feeling in the Cabinet,
and yet, curiously enough, tended to prevent secession
frora its ranks. Both of Lord Palmerston's principal
lieutenants thought that they had causes of grievance
against him, unconnected with the Fortification Loan.
Lord John Russell considered that the Reforra Bill
which he had been allowed to bring forward had been
supported without sincerity, and abandoned without
reluctance by the Prirae Minister, as was indeed
in some degree the case, for there was nothing
Lord Palmerston raore cordially disliked than any
scherae of Parliamentary Reform.
Mr. Gladstone not only loathed with his whole soul
the measures of Defence which to Lord Palraerston
seeraed iraperative, but had a raore personal and
direct cause of offence with his Chief, who had
connived, if not raore than connived, at the rejection
by the House of Lords of Mr. Gladstone's scherae
for the removal of what were raagniloquently and
soraewhat inaccurately styled the Taxes on Knowledge
— in other words, the Excise and Iraport Duties upon
Paper. Lord Palraerston had not only done this, but
had refused to carry reprisals against the House of
Lords to the extent desired by Mr. Gladstone.
Moreover, Mr. Gladstone, though in cordial agree
raent with Lord Palmerston and Lord John as to the
propriety of interference to any extent in the domestic
affairs of Italy, was, soraewhat inconsistently, as" rauch
opposed as he had ever been to such meddling
in any other quarter, and was never tired of

i86i] CABINET DISSENSIONS 423
denouncing what seeraed to him the follies and
wickednesses of the Foreign Office.
Lord Palmerston on his side had reason to com
plain that Mr. Gladstone had in an unmistakable
manner shown to the world, by his speeches, how
strongly he dissented from the policy of the Govern
ment of which he was a meraber, both as regarded
the Fortification Vote and the course to be pursued
on the rejection of the Paper Duty.
There were, therefore, strong grounds for difference
which might, and under other circumstances probably
would, have led to a complete rupture between Mr.
Gladstone and the Head of the Government, and
which were aggravated by the fact that neither Mr.
Gladstone nor Lord Palmerston ever understood or
appreciated one another at a true value. They
were essentially dissirailar. Lord Palraerston's poco
curante levity in the treatraent of affairs, and his not
over-rigid raorality, were abhorrent to Mr. Gladstone's
anxious teraperaraent and grave view of public
questions; while Mr. Gladstone's high ideals seeraed
to Lord Palraerston to be tinged with fanaticisra or
hypocrisy. The good as well as the bad qualities
of Lord Palraerston's character tended to increase his
distrust and dislike of his colleague. Remarkable
hiraself for the loyalty with which he adhered to
friends and followers, even when little deserving it,
he looked on Mr. Gladstone's sudden volte-face with
distrust, and, though he profited by it, he did not
conceal his disapproval of what he regarded as the
abandonraent by Mr. Gladstone of those with whora,
for sorae years, he had been drawing into closer and
closer relations, and had so recently been on the
point of joining in Lord Derby's Cabinet. Nor was
it possible, unless he had been more than huraan.

424 CLOSING DAYS [chap, ix
for him wholly to forget that, alraost up to the
moment of becoming his colleague, Mr. Gladstone'
had for some years been in the habit of denouncing
him as the worst and most profligate minister of the
nineteenth century. As the strongest opponent of
his cherished Fortification Scheme, Lord Palraerston
would have rejoiced to rid himself of Mr. Gladstone,
could he have safely done so.
But there were considerations which had a re
straining effect on both Mr. Gladstone and Lord
Palmerston, and on Lord John Russell also. Mr.
Gladstone and Lord John were the only two raerabers
of the Cabinet who thoroughly agreed with Lord
Palraerston in his Italian policy, which was regarded
by raost of the Cabinet with half-hearted approval
or positive dislike. Lord Palmerston could not afford
to lose the most earnest and powerful advocate, both
in the Cabinet and in the House of Commons, of the
Italian cause. Mr. Gladstone could not afford to risk
the weakening of the Government which would result
from his secession, and which might involve the
downfall of the only Ministry likely to be really
zealous in its support of the Italian Revolution, the
triumph of which was so near his heart A rupture
was therefore adjourned, and in the end altogether
avoided. But the tension was great, and the breaking-
point often seeraed to have been reached.
In the raiddle of March, the Militia Estiraates raised
as great a storra in the Cabinet as the Array Esti
raates had done two raonths previously. Mr. Glad
stone again threatened resort to what he caUed the
ultima ratio, and on March 13th addressed Lord
Herbert as follows :
" 1 think you will agree with me that there was
an understanding in the Cabinet, when the Army

i86i] GLADSTONE AND PALMERSTON 425
Estimates were agreed to, with a slight and scarcely
stateable reduction, that the Militia Estimate was not
to be raaterially varied. 1 remember observing that
some sum that was naraed, and that was much like
that you now propose by way of increase (viz. ;,f 148,000),
would absorb practically the whole of that small
reduction which we presented.
" I am bound to say that without that reduction —
in ray opinion, as you know, most insufficient — I for
one could not have assented to the Estimates, but
should at once have taken, however reluctantly, the
only other course open to me.
" 1 have always felt that in the present inflated
state of our establishments it is wholly irapossible
for rae to consider Array and Militia Estiraates other
wise than as one. With great difficulty I brought
myself to acquiesce in proceedings which — after peace
with China — simply indicated the turning of the tide.
That was a miniraura which, in ray view, adraitted of
no further concession ; while of course it was, and
is, hardly a matter for me to say whether the ground
thus taken could be best maintained by withholding
augmentations from the Militia or offering diminu
tions in some part of the Army votes.
" 1 think the Cabinet, like rayself, looked at the two
chiefly as a whole."
Mr. Gladstone, a few days after, while paying a
visit at Wilton, declared that he would not "yield
another inch, or listen to any further proposals." This
was not unnaturally understood to raean that he would
resign ; but on April 3rd he wrote :
" I want to correct a raisapprehension which I raay
have conveyed to your mind on Monday when we
were on horseback. After speaking of the manner
in which things had been held together up to this
point, and expressing my opinion that it raust soon
end, I said that I had got to the end of ray tether,
and would not accede to any raore proposals. Con
strued literally, this would raean that I raeant to
refuse my concurrence during this year to any Act
for giving further effect to the Fortifications Act of
last year. This is not so : I consider as a part of the

426 CLOSING DAYS [chap, ix
concession then made what may be necessary to
execute the works that then obtained the sanction
of Parliament, whatever my opinion raay be of the
scherae itself, which, I ara sorry to say, grows worse
every day. Under all circurastances I hope, and it is
no sraall pleasure and relief to hope so, all debates
between you and rae on these matters are ended.
" Our visit gave us rauch delight, but it wanted
one thing, and the chief — naraely, the knowledge that
you were giving yourself fair play."
Mr. Gladstone's decision to reraain in office was
a cause of surprise to all his colleagues and of dis
appointraent to sorae. It appeared, however, to be
only postponed, for in another week disruption was
again threatened, and I find Lord Herbert writing
thus to Mr. Gladstone on April loth :
" I earnestly trust that we raay corae together again
to-day, for all our sakes and for yours likewise.
It would never do to break up about the distribu
tion of a surplus, which is a question of convenience,
with rauch to be said as to many courses, so I hope.
"I cannot help thinking that Anderson has not
given you the araount of the excess on the Array votes
for 1859-60. The question of araount depends on
what portions can be properly charged to the China
vote of credit. The last accounts I had was that it
would amount to about ;^20o,ooo. This, at any rate,
ought to be stated, or General Peel will be talking
of concealment."
By comraon though tacit consent, discussion as to
the further prosecution of the Fortification Scheme
was adjourned to the latest possible moment, and, in
point of fact, it did not come before the Cabinet
until after Lord Herbert had left England in July.
But its shadow was always impending, and Mr.
Gladstone's views and intentions were clearly known
to his colleagues.
While willing to vote for such additional sums

i86i] MR. GLADSTONE'S ATTITUDE 427
as might be required to coraplete the works authorised
in the previous year, Mr. Gladstone raaintained that
he was free to oppose, and would oppose, the com
menceraent of any fresh works, although forming a
part of the scherae which had been subraitted to
Parliaraent, the whole cost of which had been esti
mated at ;^9,ooo,ooo.
The general difference in aim and principle between
Mr. Gladstone's views on Military Questions and that
of his colleagues of course led to a different mode
of viewing all questions, even though minor and
subsidiary ones, which affected the reduction, raain
tenance, or increase of railitary expenditure. Lord
John Russell wrote to Lord Herbert on January 4th :
" We are in trouble with Mexico. The Governraent
there have stolen i^'i 30,000 from the bondholders,
secured under the padlock and seal of the Legation.
The merchants want us to occupy Vera Cruz, and
march to Mexico. But there are strong objections
to both operations. Could we, however, furnish an
auxiliary force to help the other and rival Governraent
to get into the city of Mexico? They are already
very near it. I should think 2,000 men might suffice.
Could they be sent from the West Indies ? I would
not propose to send them, except in the healthy
season. What would you say to this ? I wish to
know before I write to Palraerston. Sorae persons
suggest that part of the force frora China might raarch
through Mexico. But this would be costly and very
uncertain, and would require a large force."
To this suggestion Lord Herbert objected, and Lord
John gave way : "January Sth.
" I do not wonder," he wrote, " at your deraurring to
an expedition to Mexico, and it is just what I ex
pected. On the other hand, you raust not expect me to
get the robbers to disgorge ;£"i 30,000 by merely asking
them to do so in a despatch. I therefore propose

428 CLOSING DAYS [chap, ix
to recognise Juarez, as Buchanan has already done,
and to give hira our moral support, provided he aids
us in getting back the bondholders' raoney."
Discussions with the United States respecting
conflicting claims to the islands in Vancouver Sound
induced Lord Russell to write Lord Herbert two
or three days later, January Sth :
" I hope you will find no difficulty in sending a
regiment to Vancouver."
Mr. Gladstone opposed this measure, as also the in
tention to retain troops in China till the War indemnity
was paid, and wrote to Lord Herbert on January loth :
" It surely cannot be that we are going to levy
instalraents of 'inderanity' in China at a cost of
occupation heavier than said instalraents. Such a
question seeras insulting; but in these tiraes every
thing is credible.
" The F[oreign] 0[ffice] is a furnace which raust be
fed with a certain quantity of fuel ; and if the wicked
ness of raen, original and actual, will not furnish the
requisite supplies, we must raake more. This seems
to be the ' principle ' of our policy. . . .
" It seems to me a point of duty and principle to
decline putting force into the hands of our diplornatist
in Mexico (I know not who) until reparation has been
refused. Perhaps that raay have happened. If not,
the error will be that which has been at the root
of all our raisfortunes in China. I might ^ay of our
sins there too."
In another letter written on the same date he said :
" To increase force in Vancouver's Island at this
raoraent of distraction for the United States would
surely be soraething like carrying bullying to the
point of shabbiness. It seeras equally unsuited to the
juncture when we have just proposed arbitration.
I, on the contrary, should look for a decrease of force
in that quarter for the next financial year."

i86i] LETTER FROM LORD PALMERSTON 429
Lord Palmerston, with perhaps larger foresight,
took a different view, and asked Lord Herbert to
concert with the Duke of Cambridge and the Duke
of Newcastle the best raeans of strengthening our
force in Canada.
"The account we got frora Lyons of the temper
and behaviour of Seward, araply corroborated by what
we saw of that worthy when he was here, lead to the
conclusion, which Lyons very urgently irapresses on
us, that there is great danger that at any tirae, and
soon as likely as late, Seward may create some
serious differences between the two Governments.
" It is obvious that he would be encouraged so to
do just in proportion as he might think us weak in
any point which he could reach, and of course our
North American provinces are that point. We have
proposed, and we all agreed, that one additional regi
ment should be sent to Canada ; but I would strongly
urge that we should send at least three. They might
go successively if that was thought best, or at once
and together if it was thought that their so going
raight be a useful hint to Seward and Lincoln and
their associates. It is quite true that four or five
regiments of the line would not of themselves con
stitute a force sufficient to make head against a large
United States force ; but they would be a most ira
portant foundation upon which a Militia and Volunteer
force raight be forraed into an array. Their presence
would impose confidence, and stimulate and organise
local exertion. The summer is the only time at which
troops can be sent, and they ought to arrive soon
in order to prevent things which it might require
more active efforts to correct after they had happened.
The accounts we shall from time to time receive will
show whether it will or will not be advisable still
further to strengthen our North American garrison
before the navigation is closed by frost.
"The Federal Government have been rousing the
railitary spirit of the people, and have been telling
thera that their national dignity and power and posi
tion among the nations of the earth will be greatly
damaged by the separation of the Southern States.
"The military ardour raay soon be satiated by an

430 CLOSING DAYS [chap, ix
encounter with the Southern States, and it raay seek
a vent against what they raay think a weaker antagon
ist in our provinces. The Northern States raay find
that it is beyond their power to reunite the broken
Federal lock, and they raay then think of inderanifying
theraselves in the North for what they have irrecover
ably lost in the South. For these reasons coraraon
prudence seems to require that we should be seen
and known to be strong enough for defensive purposes
in our provinces.
" I apprehend that we could without inconvenience
X)r risk at horae send a respectable force to Canada, if
required. It would be well also to consider how we are
off in those provinces for artiUery and good Enfields.
" The Americans will be well armed, and our Militia
and Volunteers ih North America ought to be furnished
with arras as good as those of the people whom they
may have to raeet.
" It was not a bad dodge of Seward and Lincoln
to try to get away all our spare muskets from Canada,
with the intention of being more easily able afterwards
to threaten us with a quarrel without danger to
theraselves. " I have just got your Iceland inforraation, which
I have sent on to John Russell. It confirras with
raore detail what we knew generally before as to
French proceedings in Iceland, and it corroborates
the conviction which every reasoning raan ought to
entertain, that our friend, the Emperor, is only waiting
till he has succeeded in being strongest at sea (which
it is our business to prevent) to launch his thunders
and his long-pent-up and craftily concealed enmity
against England."
Lord Herbert was willing to yield a good deal to
Mr. Gladstone by withdrawing a part of the force
in China, but Lord John Russell was not. On
receiving Lord Herbert's announcement that he
proposed to direct the evacuation of the Taku forts
and Canton, coupled with a request that Mr. Bruce
might be instructed accordingly. Lord John formaUy
and officially replied :

i86i] LETTER FROM LORD J. RUSSELL 431
" Foreign Office,
"April 2nd.
" My Lord,
" I have had the honour to receive your
lordship's letter of yesterday's date. It appears
to rae that the grave questions of Imperial policy
carried in it cannot be decided except by the Cabinet,
with the approbation of Her Majesty. If the force
at Tientsin were brought away prematurely, I should
be apprehensive that Mr. Bruce and the members
of his Legation raight suffer the fate of Major
Anderson and Captain Brabazon, who were captured
during a flag of truce and inhuraanly raurdered.
" But this is a question not raerely affecting Mr.
Bruce and his Legation ; it is a question affecting
peace and war with China. Nor is it simply a
auestion of econoray. We have not asked an in-
emnity frora China as a raatter of financial gain
or financial saving : we have asked and obtained it
to show to the Chinese the consequences of a breach
of faith. I will not enter into the diploraatic relations
now subsisting with China. They are uncertain
and unsettled. I will content myself with saying
that until Mr. Bruce shall have written from Pekin,
and the Cabinet shall have decided on the contents
of his despatches, I must decline to accede to your
lordship's request to send instructions to Mr. Bruce
in conforraity with your lordship's views.
" I have, etc.,
" J. Russell."
And on the 5 th he wrote privately frora Perabroke
Lodge :
" My recollection of what passed is this. I proposed
that the Cabinet should keep in its own hands the
power of recalling the troops frora China, on reports
of our agents there. Gladstone wished that, in order
to expedite the evacuation, Bruce should be authorised
to order the evacuation, and with this wish I
coraplied. " It is now proposed that this discretion should
be taken away frora Bruce, and that he should be
exposed to the raurderous attacks of the Chinese,
if they are so minded. Would England leave his

432 CLOSING DAYS [chap, ix
death unavenged? And if not, where would be the
economy ?
" I cannot take upon myself to send peremptory
orders to Bruce to evacuate Tientsin till I get his
reports from Pekin.
" I should have thought that the furnishing of
transports to bring away 10,000 men would be a very
costly operation. But I suppose the Naval Estimates
would have to provide the raoney. Still, the cost
to the country will be the sarae.
" In fraraing the Estimates you had the treaty before
your eyes, and that treaty provides for the occupation
of Tientsin and the Taku forts till the indemnity is
paid. The Indian troops may be reraoved when
you like, provided the British troops reraain."
Mr. Gladstone's coraraent was that —
" It appears quite clear that the Chinese occupation,
prolonged in order to get the indemnity, is costing
us much more than the indemnity itself! But these
are not days in which notes of exclamation ought
to be used on these subjects."
The matter was, as usual, compromised, On April
28th Lord John writes of a draft prepared by Lord
Herbert :
"This letter will do very well, and I will frame
my despatch upon it. . . . The force at Canton may
be entirely taken away, if, as I understand frora
Thouvenel, the whole French force is to be withdrawn
from China in order to raake the conquest of Cochin
China." All through the spring Lord Herbert's illness was
increasing, nor had his transfer to the House of Lords
afforded him any real relief As early as February the
Prince Consort had written of him that " death had
hira in his grasp." ^ To avoid sleeping in town he
lived almost entirely at a villa at Highgate, lent to
him by Lady Dufferin, He was now unable to walk
' Martin's Life of the Prince Consort, Vol. V. p. 272.

i86i] INCREASE OF ILLNESS 433
upstairs without distress, and, when in London, only
used the ground floor of his house in Belgrave
Square. He spent Whitsuntide at Wilton, but re
turned to Highgate on May 27th.
But, ill though he was, he still paid unremitting
attention to details of service. In the last few days
of June he received and wrote raany letters. There
was correspondence with the Prince Consort as to
the gift and exchange of decorations ; with the Duke
of Cambridge on the sarae subject ; with the Duke
of Newcastle and the Duke of Carabridge as to the
suppression and araalgaraation ol colonial regiraents,
about leave to the Governor of Gibraltar, about the
system of education, marks, and discipline at Sand
hurst, about staff appointments in Ireland, the military
and civil governraent of the Ionian Islands, and other
subjects, among them the reluctance of Generals to
accept West Indian coraraands — a raatter which
occupied raore tirae and gave raore trouble than
was at all deserved by its intrinsic iraportance.
On June 21st he spoke at sorae length — and for the
last time — in the House of Lords on a raotion for
the adraission of natives of India to the exaraination
for entrance into the Army Medical Service. He
contended that it was only in India that natives were
entitled, as of right, to compete with other British
subjects, so that the question was one not of
principle, but of expediency. He fully recognised the
skill and care shown by the Jndian doctors ; but the
fact reraained that the British soldier had a prejudice
against them, and did not trust them. However un
reasonable that prejudice might be, its existence raust
be taken into account, and he considered that as
soldiers had no choice in the selection of their doctor,
and could not go where they would for medical
VOL. II. 28

434 CLOSING DAYS [chap, ix
advice, it was only reasonable that their wishes
should receive attention.
Nor was it to official work only that his attention
was directed. On June i i^h he wrote to the Bishop
of Salisbury, earnestly dissuading him from the
contemplated prosecution of the Rev. R. Williaras for
his article in " Essays and Reviews," urging that :
" Public opinion is the true corrective of these
errors. At present the whole feeling of the cora-
raunity is against a raan who eats the bread of the
Church and underraines her doctrines. He is looked
upon as a faithless servant, and a traitor to his
vows, and his doctrines are discredited with him. If,
however, he is ejected from his benefice he stands
in a different light. He is quits with the Church,
for he has paid the penalty of his offence. He is a
self-denying raartyr who has sacrificed all to what
he considers truth. It is assumed that that for
which he has made the sacrifice may be truth, or have
sorae truth in it. A large araount of public sympathy
always rallies round a raan in this position. He
becoraes the weaker party, and a certain indis-
crirainating generosity of feeling sides with him and
supports him. His narae becoraes a rallying point,
a standard is raised, and the doctrines receive a
certain irapriraatur."
More coraplete rest was urgently enjoined on him,
and on June 29th he went down to Wilton rauch
exhausted. The sarae night he was taken ill with
an attack of a character which he had not before
experienced — a species of pleurisy. After rauch
suffering, he partially recovered, and his cheerfulness
and deterraination to hide, as far as possible, his
sufferings frora others are shown in a letter written
to Mr. Gladstone frora Wilton on July 5th, in which
he says :
"Thanks for a raost kind and affectionate letter
frora you about my wretched self I am very much

i86i] LAST DAYS OF OFFICE 435
better ; but I am doing now what I ought to have
done raonths ago. I was very unwell on Friday
and Saturday, and carae down here skipping the
Cabinet, and going to bed when I arrived. Here
I have had perfect quiet, rest, a cool temperature,
and every corafort, to say nothing of a doctor who
always sets rae up, and alraost always by the siraple
Process of stopping all drugs and leaving me alone.
Ie has put all the London doctor's drugs behind the
fire ; and 1 have had three nights' sleep and three days'
comfort, such as I have not had for these six months.
Goodbye." It was on the following day that Dr. Bence Jones told
Lord Malmesbury that the case was hopeless.^ There
was no diminution in the more serious symptoms of
Lord Herbert's illness, and it was deterrained, at his
own wish, and with the rather reluctant acquiescence
of his raedical advisers, that he should go at once
to Spa. He was hiraself aware of the incurable
nature of his disease, but had deterrained to fight
against it so long as there was any scope for his
being of use to others. He now, however, felt that
the battle was over, and placed his resignation in
Lord Palraerston's hands, leaving him free to use
it when convenient. Lord Palmerston acquiesced,
as indeed he could not but do, in his retirement
from the War Office, but begged him to remain
in the Cabinet, a delicate attention to the dying
Minister, with whom Lord Palraerston but too well
knew he would never again sit in Council.
Even yet he was pestered by official business —
at all events up to July 6th, on which day, araong
raany other letters, he received one from Lord
Palraerston of considerable iraportance as showing
that the Fortification Question with all its troubles
was iramediately about to come before the Cabinet.
' " Diary of an Ex-Minister," Vol. II. p. 256.

436 CLOSING DAYS [chap, ix
" I shall have very soon to propose to the House
of Comraons a Bill authorising a further issue of
terminable annuities on account of our fortifications,
and I should wish to add to the sura required for
thera a further sum to enable Soraerset to raake
progress with the additional iron-plated ships, which
it will be necessary for us to build in order to keep
pace with the French ; but Soraerset is not at present
ready with his estiraates for that purpose.
"With regard to the fortifications I can, without
troubling you, get frora Jervois and Burgoyne and
others a stateraent of what may be required this
year for the works already authorised and begun.
" I should, however, much like to get from the
House of Commons authority for the additional fort
which was intended to be placed nearly opposite
the entrance of Portsraouth Harbour, and for the
corapletion of the chain of forts round Chathara — the
western portion of which we last year postponed.
If Chathara Dockyard is enlarged, the line of defence
to the east, south, and west ought to be raade complete.
But these two matters may be considered by-and-by.
"The Sultan seems destined to resuscitate the
Turkish Empire. He has put on half pay, and other
wise disposed of, the 2,000 female inhabitants of his
brother's establishment. He has dismissed 500 un
worthy servants, and the still raore unworthy Minister
of War, Riza Pasha."

In the face of subsequent events this last paragraph
reads like satire !
I do not think this letter was answered. At all
events, Herbert's last word on the subject of Fortifica
tion had been spoken, nor was he to take part again
in the discussions which had so deeply interested hira.
On July 9th Sidney Herbert left Wilton, and on
that evening saw and took leave of his raore intiraate
personal and political friends. Araong thera was
Sir Jaraes Grahara, who was greatly overcorae. He
tried to attribute his emotion to other causes, but he and
all others admitted and recognised that though their

i86i] RESIGNATION 437
farewells were avowedly only those given to a friend
contemplating a short absence at a foreign watering-
place, they were, in fact, final. It was the day
on which the Queen's birthday was that year kept,
and, before leaving Belgrave Square, Lord Herbert
wandered through the reception-rooms, looking at
the preparations for the Birthday dinner, which was
to be given in his narae that evening, and at which
in his absence the Duke of Carabridge had consented
to preside. About four o'clock he quitted the house,
and on his way to the station stopped to order
a wedding present for a niece who was just about
to be raarried, and to take leave of Miss Nightingale.
He spoke cheerfully and even hopefully about hiraself,
but was under no illusion as to the inevitable result.
Count Strelecki, who accorapanied Lord and Lady
Herbert to Spa, talked to hira, while waiting at the
station, about the purchase of sorae ponies, and a
light open carriage for drives at Wilton after his
return. It so happened that on a truck of the train
in which they were about to travel a hearse was being
conveyed to some point on the line. To this Lord
Herbert pointed, and said, " That's the only carriage I
shall ever want," and then earnestly added, after a
short pause, " Don't tell Liz ! "
The party reached Spa on the 13th, and at first the
change seemed to amuse Lord Herbert and do him
good. On the i6th he sent to Lord Palmerston his
forraal resignation of the War Departraent. It con
cluded with the words, " I hope Her Majesty will
believe that, while my strength enabled rae, I
laboured to the best of ray ability in her service."
In a private letter which accorapanied the more
forraal one, he wrote, " I think I raay say without
vanity that I leave England in a rauch more advanced

438 CLOSING DAYS [chap, ix
state of defence than I found it in, and my two years,
therefore, have not been wasted." On the same day
he wrote to Miss Shaw Stewart, thanking her for with
drawing her previous refusal to take charge of the first
military female hospital. He had appealed to her to
overcorae the reluctance she felt to assume the post,
assuring her that " if this systera is not introduced by
rae, I fear it will never be introduced at all, and if it
is not done now, it will not be done by rae." This
wish of his was gratified, and this anxiety relieved.

" I accept," he wrote, " your offer of under
taking the little hospital at Woolwich as Super
intendent — the four nurses under you to be chosen
by yourself, and on your own conditions. Colonel
Wilbrahara has been appointed Governor. You will
find hira a gentleman in every sense of the word,
and one with whora I feel sure you will have no
difficulty in acting. All questions of salary, etc., you
will find specified in the Regulations. On one point
only you are in error. Ever since the Criraean War
I have inquired and searched after a lady of the class
you describe. I have tried several in various ways
and places, but they have been invariably found
wanting in the raost essential qualities. You your
self, who have had as great opportunity as any one,
bear the sarae testiraony. You have no one to
propose to rae, nor has Miss Nightingale ; therefore
you cannot wonder at ray selecting one who, like
yourself, corabines the experience of both civil and
railitary hospitals, and who is actuated by the purest
and best raotives in undertaking the charge."

These three letters were the last ever written by
Sidney Plerbert. On the following day he was
decidedly less well, and the local physicians strongly
urged his iraraediate return to England if it were
desired that he should die in peace at horae, and
not in a Belgian hotel. Accordingly, on July 2Sth, a

i86i] LAST LETTERS 439
little raore than ten days after reaching it, Lord and
Lady Herbert left Spa in the railway saloon of the
King of the Belgians, which His Majesty had kindly
placed at their disposal. Lord Herbert's favourite
saddle-horse " Andover " had been brought over to
Spa for his use, and up to the day before that on
which he set out on his return he rode every raorning.
On dismounting for the last tirae he kissed the horse's
neck and fed him with sugar, saying, as he did so, " I
shall never ride again." Lord Herbert's last act at
Spa was one of kind thoughtfulness. On one of the
little expeditions he had taken during the first few
days of his stay he had found a poor young priest
very iU, and suffering - from the want of stimulants,
which he was unable to purchase. These were pro
vided by Lord Herbert's care.
Lord and Lady Herbert arrived at Brussels early
in the afternoon, and reraained there that evening
and the next day. The first night was a very bad
and breathless one, and the application of blisters and
other reraedies gave hira no relief The next day he
was better, and in the evening discussed military
hygiene eagerly, and at great length, with Baron
Sentin (King Leopold's physician), and dwelt at length
on the probable effect of new medical and surgical
discoveries, especially those of Baron Sentin himself,
with which he showed hiraself well acquainted. The
Baron left the house exclaiming, " Impossible de
croire qu'il soit si gravement malade ! "
On the 27th the journey was resuraed. Notwith
standing every precaution, it produced extreme
exhaustion, and on the 29th he was carried into his
house in Belgrave Square, manifestly very rauch
nearer his end than when he had left it less than
three weeks previously. His one great desire was

440 CLOSING DAYS [chap, ix
to see Wilton once again, and, after a day in London,
the journey there was perforraed with less fatigue
than raight have been anticipated. Mr. Gladstone
watched hira frora ari adjoining house as he got into
the carriage, and followed hira in a cab to the station,
to catch one more glimpse oi his friend's face on the
platform. He had intimated his intention to Lady
Herbert in the following note :
"II, Carlton House Terrace,
"July list, 1861.
" My dear Lady Herbert,
" I sent a letter to your husband at Brussels,
with one frora Araerica that I then thought raight
interest hira. Perhaps it did not reach you, and in any
case I fear he is suffering too much discomfort to have
anything read to him.
" I have designedly kept away frora his house, and
should have done so even had I not gathered it to
be your very reasonable wish that all should be still
there at this solemn time. But my thoughts are ever
with you, and you and he must know that if not mine
alone, but universal grief and love could avail, you
would have no cause to be anxious about him.
But we raust leave him in the hands, of his Father,
Who counts and treasures all, and will take counsel for
hira better than we, or even than you can. May His
help be wanting to neither of you !
" I shall go and see hira frora a distance as he quits
his threshold. Give him ray raost earnest love — if
there be a raoraent when it can be done without
disturbance, but not otherwise — and ask him, what
I know is needless, to forgive me if I have ever tom
his tender spirit. " Ever affectionately yours,
" W. E. Gladstone."
It was a great joy to the dying man to be permitted
once more to see the home he loved so dearly, and
to look again upon the faces of his children. On
the day after his arrival, August ist, he was well
enough to go out in a bath chair, and gaze for the

i86ij CLOSING HOURS 441
last tirae on the green lawns, the stately cedars, and
the Palladian bridge, reposing in all the glory of
an English summer afternoon. After coming in
again he lay for some time on a sofa by the window
enjoying the calm beauty of the evening and its sunset
lights. Somewhat later he took leave of his children
and sisters, and received the Holy Coraraunion.
Then, with perfect calra and resignation he waited
for the end. No expression of irapatience escaped
hira throughout his illness, nor to the very end did
he lose his cheery playfulness of raanner, or his
thoughtfulness for others. Throughout the night,
alone with the devoted wife who had watched and
tended hira with unreraitting solicitude, he repeatedly
expressed his thankfulness to God for many raercies,
and his trust in the proraises of the Saviour. At
half-past eleven on the following raorning he expired,
surrounded by his faraily and near relations. Alraost
his last words were, " Well, this is the end. I have
had a life of great happiness : a short one, perhaps ; but
an active one. I have not done all I wished ; but
I have tried to do my best.''

#
» *

A great writer and thinker of our own days ^ has
told us that one of the chief uses of an aristocracy
is its early introduction into Parliaraentary and
official life of young men between twenty and thirty
years of age. They are, he observes, free, as a
rule, frora selfish objects, and, even if possessing
abUities but slightly above the average, acquire a
skill in the conduct of public affairs rarely attained
by men of greater capacity whose intelligence and
' W. E. H. Lecky, " History of England in the Eighteenth Century,''
Vol. I. chap. ii.

442 CONCLUSION
character have been moulded in other spheres of
thought and action.
Of this type of statesmen Sidney Herbert was a
striking example. When he entered Parliaraent he
was but a boy. All the temptations which attend the
possession of rank, wealth, and social popularity were
spread before him in unwonted measure. He had no
strong ambition for personal distinction. He was
inclined to shrink from the fatigues and disappoint
ments of political strife, and he heartily despised the
petty meannesses of party interests. But a grave
sense that from those who have received rauch, much
may rightly be required, led him to devote his whole
life from boyhood to the grave to the service of the
State. By the present generation he is wellnigh forgotten.
Of the thousands who daily pass his statue in Pall MalP
few know or ask whom it represents. Fewer still
have any idea that his life was spent and indeed
sacrificed in labours to promote the welfare of the
rank and file of the British Army, and to render that
Army a more efficient force.
The effects of Herbert's death soon showed them
selves. Six months later we find Mr. Gladstone
exulting in the " heavy blow " given to the scherae for
fortifying the dockyards'^ by the omission of the
annual Vote for the continuance of the works, — a
blow which was indeed fatal to the scheme, for though
the Vote was stated to be only teraporarily suspended
on account of pressing financial eraergencies of the
moment, it never again appeared upon the Estimates.
Lord Palraerston's wishes and convictions reraained
unchanged, but age had enfeebled his control over
• Now about to be removed to the New War OfSce.
' Morley's Life of Gladstone, Vol. II. p. 50.

CONCLUSION 443
the Cabinet, and after the death of Sir George
Lewis in 1863 he practically abandoned all contest
with his raasterful Lieutenant on any question in
volving considerations of finance.
It would have been well if the arrest of Herbert's
policy had been confined to a raatter so fairly open to
difference of opinion as the Fortification Scherae.
But this was not the case. Mr. Gladstone's eager
ness to reduce expenditure led hira to set aside,
alraost roughly, other considerations. Any proposal
involving outlay — more especially if for Military or
Naval purposes — was coldly received, discouraged,
and probably dismissed. The amount asked for was
more regarded than the merits of the proposal itself
While this was the attitude of the Treasury, the usual
bureaucratic aversion to reforra regained strength in
the War Office itself Few of the scheraes which
Herbert had already initiated for the social and moral
elevation of the soldier were allowed their proper
development, and rauch of his policy was, through
misapprehension of its value, actually reversed.
The bad consequences of the abandonraent of
Herbert's plans for the improvement of barracks
and railitary hospitals have been pointed out in an
earlier chapter.^ The results of a reversal of his
policy in other directions were hardly less unfortunate.
The constitution of the Array Medical Board was
raodified in the sense against which Herbert had so
vigorously and successfully protested. Its Sanitary
and Statistical Merabers were placed in the inferior
position to their colleagues which the War Office
clerks had originally wished them to occupy. The
Professorships of Hygiene and Sanitation at the Array
Medical School, the iraportance of the equality of
' Vol. II. p. 360.

444 CONCLUSION
which with the other Professorships Herbert had so
strongly urged, were reduced to lectureships at a
lower salary. The school itself was removed from
Chatham to Netley. In that unsuitable locality it
still remains. On nothing had Herbert more strongly
insisted than on the necessity of providing every Army
Corps with a Sanitary Officer whose attention should
be devoted to the prevention of epidemics rather than
their cure, and whose business it should be to warn
comraanding officers of the dangers arising from
injudicious selection of a camping ground, from the
supply of improper food, or frora a neglect of pre
cautions against the effects of climate. After Herbert's
death this wise safeguard was discontinued, and has
only very lately been revived. A few pounds were
saved and the prejudices of the War Office gratified,
but at the cost of much loss of life, and to the serious
detriment of the health and efficiency of the Army.
During the last few years much has been done to
correct mistakes and introduce iraproveraents. In
great part this has consisted, in all probability un-
c6nsciously, in the revival -of what Herbert did or
in carrying out what he designed to do.
But though rauch which he desired has since been
done, it was not the less a grave raisfortune for the
Army and for the nation that his career at the War
Office was so soon closed. Had his life been spared a
little longer, reforms lately raade would have been
effected forty years ago, and others accomplished
which as yet have no existence.
As it was, his life was incomplete, and afforded
but an earnest of what it might have been; Its
chief characteristics were his personal charm, the
beneficence of his private life, and the thoroughness
and disinterestedness of the work done by hira.

CONCLUSION 445
The charra he possessed cannot be recalled, or its
raagic described, in writing. It can only reraain as
a fragrant raeraory with the few survivors of those
who, like rayself, have known its influence. His
ever-active benevolence (of which it raight be said,
as it has been finely said of his ancestor Sir Philip
Sidney, whora in other ways he so strikingly re
sembled,^ that " with hira not to give was not to
enjoy what he had ") was to a great extent hidden
frora the view of even those nearest to hira. Nor can
his private life and personal qualities be raore than
dimly outlined. His public career can be raore dis
tinctly traced, and even the feeblest account of it
must ensure agreement with Mr. Gladstone, who, a
few days after Lord Herbert's funeral, wrote of his
dead friend : " Rare indeed — God only knows how rare
— are men with his qualities ; but even a raan with his
qualities raight not have been so happy as to possess
his opportunities. He had them, and he used thera."
' How close the similarity will be seen from the following extract
from Stigant's Essay on Sir Philip Sidney : " He was gentle, loving,
compassionate, forgiving as a woman, and yet had the dignity and valour
of a man. His liberality was so great that with him not to give was
not to enjoy what he had. In his familiarity with men he never
descended, but raised everybody to his own level. So modest, so
humble was he, and so inaccessible to flattery, that he esteemed
not praise except as an encouragement to further exertion in well
doing. His tongue knew no deceit, and his mind no policy but
frankness, courage, and sincerity. . . . England has had greater
statesmen, but never so choice a union of the qualities which make
a Sidney. His fame is founded on those personal qualities of which
his contemporaries were the best judges, although they may not leave
a trace iu books or in history " (Stigant's Essay on Sir Philip Sidney,
1858). Every word in this quotation might have been written with
direct reference to Sidney Herbert.

INDEX

Aberdeen, the Earl of, sup
ports Peel on the Corn Law
question, i. 44, 53 ; his value
as a Foreign Minister, 58 ; his
relations with Mr. Delane, 62 ;
his views as embodied in a
speech by Sidney Herbert, 125 ;
his qualities, 1 30 ; his attitude
towards " Papal aggression,"
131; his communications with
Lord John Russell as to the
formation of a new Cabinet,
141 ; his opposition to the
Ecclesiastical Titles Bill, 141 ;
declines the ofl&ce of Foreign
Secretary offered to him by
Lord Stanley, 141 ; his position
with reference to the leadership
of the PeeUte party, 145 ; is
thanked by Lord Derby for his
kindly attitude to the new
Government, 147 ; the politi
cal attitude assumed by him,
159; is consulted by Lord
John Russell as to the course
to be pursued on the reas
sembling of Parliament, 160 ;
is summoned to Osborne, 167 ;
forms a Cabinet, 168, 170 ;
the nature of the divisions in
his Cabinet on the Crimean
War, 172 ; the useful legisla
tion of his Cabinet, 173 ; his
position with regard to the
negotiations preceding the out
break of the Crimean War,
187 ; his objection to the de
spatch of a British fleet to the

Dardanelles, 193 ; his letter to
Sir James Graham shortly
before the outbreak of the
Crimean War, 204 ; his state
ment of the instructions
agreed upon by the Cabinet
with reference to the position
of the fleets at Constantinople,
208 ; his warning to Turkey,
211, 213 ; allegations against
him, 218 ; he resigns, 251 ; his
qualities as a statesman, 254 ;
the unjust outcry against him,
255 ; his meeting with Sir
James Graham, Gladstone,
and Herbert, 256 ; recom
mends that they should join
Lord Palmerston, 262 ; per
suades Sir James Graham,
Gladstone, and Herbert to
remain in office, 262 ; dis
approves of their resignation,
268 ; his attitude to Milner
Gibson's motion upon the
failure of the negotiations at
Vienna, 431; his view of possible
contingencies after the war,
ii. II ; he doubts the wisdom
of the terms imposed on
Russia with Regard to her
naval force in the Black Sea,
23, 24 ; his view as to the
infringement of the municipal
law of the United States, 44 ;
his distrust of Lord Palmer
ston's foreign pohcy, 52 ; his
dissatisfaction with the se
crecy of the interviews be-

447

448

INDEX

tween Gladstone and Lord
Derby, 72 ; acts as a medi
ator between Sir James
Graham, Herbert, and Glad
stone, 76 ; dangerous iUness,
104 ; his apprehensions of war
in Italy, 166 ; his anticipation
of war between France and
Austria, 178 ; his opinions,
197 ; his last interview with
Herbert, 402
Acland, Dr., ii. 153, 154
A'Court, Elizabeth, her marriage
to S. Herbert, i. 77
— General Charles Ashe, i. 77, 78
Adams, General, i. 345
Admirals, " eflfective," i. 30 '^
Aidin Bay, British cavalry and
artiUery at, ii. 329
Airey, General, ii. 138; his
qualifications, i. 309 ; attacks
on him, 318 ; reflections of the
Crimean Commission uponhim,
ii. 28 ; the proposed Court of
Inquiry into the insinuations
of the Commission, 28, 29;
he deserves Lord Raglan's
confidence, 33
Aland Isles, the, the capture of,
i. 236
Albert, H.R.H. Prince.allegations
against him, i. 218, 243 ; writes
to Herbert on the question of
the protection of our dock
yards, ii. 269 ; his tact, 371 ;
his reasons for deprecating
the aboUtion of purchase from
the Army, 374 ; supports
' Herbert's scheme for the re
form of Sandhurst, 386 ; his
decision as to the Volunteer
Review in Hyde Park, 391 ;
his letter to Herbert upon his
leaving the House of Com
mons, 408 ; his objections to
the appointment of Bernal
Osborne as Under-Secretary,
408 ; urges Herbert not to
consent to reductions in the
^ Army Estimates, 419, 421
Aldershot, the permanent camp
at, ii. 98

Alexander, Dr., iL 121, 122, 136,
157 ,
Alma, the, the battle of, i. 235. ;
medals for, 305 ; the impres
sion which the battle pro
duced on the army, 319
Althorp, Lord, i. 19
America, the U.S. of, infringe
ment of the municipal law of,
ii. 40
Anderson, Lieut., ii. 347
— Major, ii. 431
— Miss EmUy, i. 405 ; is placed
in charge of the General Hospi
tal at Scutari, i. 378 ; of
KuUali, 407
— Mr., ii. 239
Anti-Corn Law League, the,
resistance offered by Sir Ro
bert Peel to its proposals, i. 40
ArgyU, the Duke of, retains office
under Lord Palmerston, i.
268 ; he tries to mitigate
Herbert's objections to Lord
Palmerston, ii. no ; his eager
ness to keep peace with
Russia, 204 ; his distaste for
increased miUtary expendi
ture, 208 ; he urges Herbert
to omit a paragraph from the
Fortifications BiU as originaUy
drawn, 286 ; his advice acted
on, 288
— House, meetings at, i. 424, 427
Armstrong gun, the, the first use
of, ii. 355
Army, the, the Royal Warrant
prepared by Herbert for im
proving the position of ser
geants in, i. 74 ; Commis
sion of Inquiry into the
sanitary state of , ii. 118, 125,
1 30 ; the medical depart-
rdent of, 118 ; proposed in
crease of the Army, 210, 211 ;
vote of thanks to the Army
after the Chinese War, 357 ;
changes in the organisation
and disciphne of, 361
— Board, an, creation of, pro
posed by Herbert, i. 244, 245
— commissions, given without

INDEX

449

any entrance examination, ii,
382
Army hospital administration,
shortcomings of, i. 331 et seq.
— Medical CouncU, proposed
estabhshment of, ii. 150 ; com
position of the Council, 1 5 5
 School, an, proposed es
tabhshment of, ii. 151, 364-8 ;
official estabhshment of the
first students at the school,
366 ; absence of fittings from,
367 ; removal of the school
to Netley, 367
 Service, t;he, scheme for
the reorganisation of, u. 149 ;
the admission of natives of
India to, 433
— purchase, Herbert's desire to
modify it, ii. 373 ; Sir de Lacy
Evans's motion for its aboU
tion, 381
— Sanitary Commission, u. 118,
125, 130; sub-commissions
arising out of it, 133, 134, 136
Arrow, the, seizure of, ii. 74, 75,
294
Ashley, Lord, i. 102, 147
Austria, the Emperor of, his per
sonal pledge for the sincerity of
the Emperor of Russia, i.i86
— the estrangement of, i. 450,
452 ; terms of peace suggested
by her, u. 20, 21 ; her attitude
is defended by Herbert, 39 ;
the impending outbreak of
war vrith France, 178 ; her
struggle vrith France for supre
macy in Italy, 228
Balaclava, mismanagement at,
i- 303. 305, 307. 310
Baring, Sir Francis, ii. 201 ; his
amendment to DisraeU's mo
tion condemning the uncertain
conduct of the Govemment in
the Vienna Conference, i. 429,
434, 442
— Mr. T., his speech against the
Chinese War, u. 353
— Mr., appointed Under-Secre
tary for War, ii. 410
VOL. II.

Barracks, reports on, ii. 163 ;
Gladstone's opposition to Her
bert's proposal for the sale of
defective barracks, 359 ; suf
ferings through insanitary
barracks, 360
Bath, Dowager Marchioness of,
i. 158
— Lord, ii. 59
Batten, Mr., Sidney Herbert's
house master, i. 5 ; his opinion
of Herbert, 6
Beauclerk, Elizabeth, i. 7
Bedford, the Duke of, i. 162, ii.
193
Bennet, Rev. W. E., is called
upon to resign his benefice, i.
157, 158 ; is presented to the
Rectory of Frome, 158
Bentinck, Lord George, his op
position to the Irish Arnis
BUl, i. 65 ; the effect of his
death on Disraeli's course, 89,
122
Berkeley, Admiral Sir M., ii. 201
Bismarck, Prince, instigates
Russia to ignore the Black
Sea hmitations imposed by the
treaty of peace, ii. 23
Black Sea, the, " neutralisation "
of, i. 422, 423, ii. 22-7
Blantyre, Lord, i. 367
Bolgrad Tabab, ii. 60-3
Bomarsund, the destruction of,
i. 236 ; ii. 27
Boultby, Mr., ii. 347
Bowring, Sir John, in China, ii.
73 ; his policy, 75
Brabazon, Captain, ii. 431
Bracebridge, Mr., his impressions
of the hospital arrangements
at Scutari, i. 343
— Mrs., the nurses which she
had to choose for Scutari, i.
342 ; at Scutari, 374
Bradfield, Mr., Sidney Herbert
goes to his school, i. 4
Bramston, Mr., votes against the
proposal of the Roebuck Com
mittee of Inquiry to censure
the Administration, i. 446
Brazil, the tone adopted to-
29

450

INDEX

wards Brazil by the Foreign
Office, ii. 66
Bredin, Sir D., ii. 154
Brest, accumulation of coal at,
ii. 236
Brevets, the abolition of, pro
posed by Herbert, i. 232
Bright, John, urges Milner Gib
son to withdraw his motion
expressing regret at failure
of the negotiations preceding
the Crimean War, i. 428, 429 ;
his speeches on the subject of
peace, 43 1 ; is unseated, ii.
75 ; his Reform Bill, 167 ; his
excitable state, 188 ; speech
delivered by him at a meeting
of the Liberal party, 198 ;
shares Gladstone's abhorrence
of mihtary expenditure, 285
Brodie, Sir Benjamin, ii. 126
Brown, Bishop, i. 84
Bruce, Austin (afterwards Lord
Aberdare), ii. 326, 407, 431
— Countess, i. 34
Brunnow, Baron, his meeting
with Admiral Sir Edmond
Lyons, i. 211; letter from,
ii. 418 {note)
Buccleuch, the Duke of, i. 49
(note) ; appointed Lord Pre
sident of the Council, 61 ; his
suggestion as to the Mihtia,
71, 72
Bulwer, Sir E. Lytton, his pro
posed vote of censure on Lord
John RusseU, i. 454 ; speaks
against Reform, ii. 268 ; Sec
retary for the Colonies, ii.
117
Buol, Count, i. 185, 187, 188,
454, 455 {note)
Burgoyne, Sir John, ii. 208, 271
Bury, Lord, ii. 410
Cabinet, change in the relations
of members of a Cabinet
towards one another, i. 126;
divergence of views in Lord
Aberdeen as to the war with
Russia, 181 ; differences in,
ii. 419, 422, 423

Cabinet Minister, a day's work
of, ii. 202
Cambridge, H.R.H. the Duke of,
ii. 261 ; his plan for the
instruction of officers, ii. 70 ;
conference with, 310 ; con
gratulates Herbert on the
success of the Chinese cam
paign, 338 ; recommends Sir
Hope Grant for the G.C.B.,
338 ; deprecates the abolition
of purchase, 374 ; submits
schemes for military educa
tion, 380 ; lays the first stone
of the Staff College, 382 ; is
consulted as to the appoint
ment of a successor to Lord de
Grey at the War Office, 409 ;
letter to Herbert on his re
tirement from the House of
Commons, 414 ; urges Herbert
not to consent to reductions
in the Army Estimates, 419,
421 ; presides at the Queen's
birthday dinner, 437
CampbeU, Lord, ii. 200
— Mr., i. 311
Canada, mUitary pensioners in,
i. 174
Canning, Viscount, i. 13 ; the
Foreign Secretaryship offered
to him, 141 ; retains office under
Lord Palmerston, 268 ; selected
for the Viceroyalty of India,
447 ; a saying of his, ii. 68 ; his
measures for the pacification
Of Oude, 113; thoroughness
of his equipment of the Indian
force sent to China, 309 ; his
letter to Herbert on the sug
gested appointment of Sir
Wm. Mansfield to command
in China, 311 ; his high
opinion of Sir R. Napier, 311;
his reply to Herbert as to the
force sent from India, 320
Cirdwell, Edward (afterwards
Viscount), i. 431, ii. 200, 417 ;
ponderosity of, i. 173 ; his
anxiety for a union with
the Liberal party, ii. 52 ; is
unseated, 75 ; moves a Re-

INDEX

451

solution upon Lord EUen
borough's despatch upon the
measures adopted by Lord
Canning for the pacification of
Oude, 113; withdraws his
Resolution, 1 14
Carhsle, the Earl of, supports
Herbert's female emigration
• scheme, i. 120; his claim to
the Viceroyalty of Ireland,
ii. 201
Carlos, Don, i. 22
Cathcart, Sir George, i. 3 1 9
Cathedral reform, Herbert's in
terest in, i. loi-io
Cavour, Count, ii. 179
ChanceUor of the Exchequer,
the, delusive hopes of, i. 293
Charlotte, Queen, i. 4
Charmouth, the Herbert Home
at, i. 97, 98
Charnier, General, visits Lord
Elgin at Ta-lien-Whan, ii. 329 ;
reconnoitres towards Tientsin,
337
Charteris, Lady Harriet, i. 90
Chefoo, French depot at, u. 328
Chelsea Asylum, the, ii. 377
— Board, the, findings of, ii. 123
China, feehng of the EngUsh in,
at the time of the Chinese
War, ii. 299 ; reply of, to the
ultimatum of the Alhes, 326
Chinese camps, capture of, u. 335
— War, u. 294-357; speech on
the war by Herbert, i. 25 ;
temporary suspension of its
active prosecution, ii. 294 ;
Herbert's work in connection
with the war, 297 ; selection
of a Commander for, 301 ;
object of the expedition, 304 ;
the vote for the war in the
House of Commons, 327 ; the
only debate on the war, 352,
353
Chisholm, Mrs., i. 115, 118, 120
Chobham, the experimental
camp at, i. 177
Church patronage, Sir Charles
Wood's views on, ii. 192
— rates, division on, ii. 268

Cintra Inquiry, the, ii. 29, 30
Clanricarde, Marquess of, his
admission to the Cabinet, ii. 1 05
Clanwilliam, Countess, death of,
ii. 116
— Earl, i. 35 {itoie)
Claremont, Colonel, ii. 215, 229
Clarendon, Earl of , i. 171; forcible
statement of his reasons for
declining tb accept the Aus
trian suggestion as to a settle
ment of the differences
between England and Russia,
i. 187 ; he presses for the
advance of the Allied fleets,
194 ; letter from him to
Herbert, 255 ; a daily practice
of, 304 ; his conduct of the
peace negotiations, ii. 39 ;
his absence from Lord Palmer
ston's Cabinet, 200
Clark, Sir James, is suggested by
Herbert as a member of the
proposed Sanitary Com
mission, ii. 121, 154; his
attitude towards Herbert's
proposals for a medical school,
366
Clarke, Mrs., i. 344, 374
Clinton, Lady Susan, ii. 7
Clyde, Lord, ii. 325 ; thorough
ness of his organisation of the
force despatched from India
to China, u. 309 ; his high
opinion of Sir J. Michel, 311 ;
his behef in a short campaign
in China, 323
Cobden, Richard, speaks on the
Corn Laws at Bradford, i. 52 ;
his attitude towards the Re
solution recognising that a
Free Trade policy had been
accepted by the Government,
165 ; moves a Resolution con
demning the action of the
Government, ii. 73 ; is un
seated, 75
Codrington, General, i. 417
CoUineau, General, ii. 336
Colquhoun, Mr., i. 102
Commissary-General, the, a "sug
gestion " from, i. 293, 295

452

INDEX

Committee of Im^^uiry, the, re
port of, i. 443, 445, 446
Conservative, the term, i. 18
— party, the, reconstruction of,
u. 84
" Conservative " policy, a, adop
tion of, by Sir Robert Peel, i. 19
Conspiracy Bill, the, opposition
to the first reading of the Bill,
ii. 107 ; neutral attitude of
Herbert towards the Bill, 108 ;
Herbert's views on the Bill,
109 ; the BUl thrown out, no
Constantinople, the possession
of, by Russia, i. 182
Cook, Mr., ii. 6
Corn Laws, the, speech on them
by Herbert, i. 42 ; their
suspension proposed by Peel,
44 ; speech of Cobden on, 52
Corps Legislatif, opening of the,
i. 152
Corry, Capt. Amar, R.N., i. 86
— Mr., his recommendations as
to the Navy, i. 28
Cowley, Lord, i. 201, 423 ; is
hoodwinked by Louis Napo
leon, ii. 178
Crampton, Mr., ii. 40
Crimea, the, the hospitals in,
i. 421
Crimean War, the, nature of the
division in the Cabinet over,
i. 172 ; object of the war,
181 ; the first year of the
war, 223-69 ; success of the
first six months' campaign,
226 ; notice of motion fot a
Committee of Inquiry into the
conduct of the war, 245, 247 ;
the conduct of the war, 248,
249 ; the Committee of In
quiry into the war, 263 ;
sufferings of the Army during
the war, 270-330 ; supplies for
the Army during the war, 276 ;
equipment of the Army, 278 ;
the Army transport, 283 ; lack
of men in, 314 ; French feeling
vrith regard to, ii. 9 ; Com
mission to inquire into the
alleged defects in the Quarter

master-General's department
and the Commissariat, 28
Gumming, Dr., i. 345, 386, 412,
414 ; extract from one of his
letters, 331 ; letter from him
on the state of the hospitals
at Scutari, 364
Daily News, the, letter in, on the
Crimean War, ii. 3 ; objects
to Herbert's Military Educa
tion plans, 46 ; letters to, from
" Jack Steele," loi
Dalhousie, Marquess of, i. 1 3
DaUas, Mr., ii. 41
Danubian Principalities, the,
withdrawal of the Russian
forces from them, i. 236
Dardanelles, the, despatch of
the British fleet to the neigh
bourhood of, i. 193 ; entered
by the British and French
fleets, 213
Dearing, Colonel, speaks at a
Liberal meeting at WiUis's
Rooms, ii. 198
De Grey, Lord (now Marquess of
Ripon), deprecates the aboU
tion of army purchase, ii. 374 ;
his connection with the Volun
teer movement, 393 ; his
reception of the announce
ment that Herbert is taking
a peerage, 404 ; tact and
sense of, 405 ; Prince Albert
expresses his regret at the
loss of his services at the
War Office, 408 ; the Duke of
Cambridge expresses regret.at
his removal, 409
Delane, Mr., his relations with
Lord Aberdeen, i. 62
Denison, Evelyn (afterwards Vis
count Ossington), i. 434, 436,
438, 440, u. 417
Derby, the Earl of, his accession
to office, i. 147 ; his position
with regard to the Mihtia BiH,
156; he resigns, 158, 167;
his attitude to the Peehte
leaders, 160 ; his Government
in the autumn of 1852, 163 ;

INDEX

453

his policy, 163 ; attitude of
pubhc opinion towards him,
164 ; an effect of the common
hostihty to his Government,
170; his failure to form a
Ministry, 251 ; his speech on
the Vienna Conference, 423 ;
he succeeds Lord Palmerston
as Premier, ii. no ; history of
the negotiations which pre
ceded the overthrow of his
Cabinet, 181 et seq.; resigna
tion of his second Ministry,
199 ; lends Knowsley for a
Volunteer review, 392
Derby Party, the, pacific ten
dencies of, ii. 5
Dickson, R.A., Colonel, ii. 271
Disraeh, Benjamin, writes to
Lord Malmesbury about Her
bert's emigration scheme, i.
118, 119; his budget, 155;
rejection of his budget, 166 ;
commencement of the rivalry
between him and Gladstone,
167 ; urges Milner Gibson to
persevere with his motion
lamenting the failure of the
Vienna Conference, 429 ; de
feat of his motion condemning
the uncertain conduct of the
Government, 429 ; his speech
on Lord John RusseU's Reform
BUl, ii. 173 ; his quibble about
the date of dissolution, 177,
178 ; speech on foreign affairs
by, 184
Dissenters, admission of, to the
universities, i. 18
Douglas, Sir Howard, ii. 32, 33
Dreary, Mr., ii. 367
Drummond, Henry, his exag
gerated description of the
conduct of the Crimean War,
i. 250
Drouyn de I'Huys, M., i. 186,
423
Duke ef York's School, the,
reforms at, i. 69 ; Herbert's
reform of, ii. 375
Dundas, Admiral, the instruc
tions to, i. 274, 275

Dunrobin, Herbert visits, ii. 402
Durham, the Bishop of. Lord
John RusseU's letter to, i. 131
East India Co.'s charter, the.
Bill for the renewal of, i. 172
Ebrington, Viscount, his Resolu
tion on the condition of bar
racks, ii. 140
Ecclesiastical Commission, Bill
to amend, i. 107
— Titles Bill, the, i. 132 et seq. ;
opposition of Sir James Gra
ham and Lord Aberdeen to
the Bill, 141 ; progress of the
Bill, 141 ; passage of it, 142 ;
its repeal, 143
Edinburgh Review, The, articles
in, advocating reform of mili
tary education, ii. 377
Elgin, Lord, i. 13, ii. 200;
determination to ask him to
resume the post of Ambassador
in China, 297 ; his sanguine
views as to war with China,
318 ; shipwreck of, 328 ,1 is
begged to stop the war, 335,
343, 344 ; his opinion of Mr. T.
Baring's speech against the
Chinese War, 353
Eliot, Lord, his motion for the
recall of the British troops
from Spain, i. 22, 23 ; opposes
the suspension of the Foreign
Enlistment Act, 23
EUenborough, Lord, appointed
to the Admiralty, i. 61 ; his
despatch censuring the mea
sures adopted by Lord Can
ning for the pacification of
Oude, ii. 113 ; his resignation,
114
EUesmere, Lord, supports Her
bert's female emigration
scheme, i. 118; anxious for a
general meeting of the Peelite
party, 165
EUice, Mr., votes against sug
gested paragraph to the Re
port of Mr. Roebuck's Com
mittee censuring the Adminis
tration in England, i. 446 ;

4S4

INDEX

speaks at a Liberal meeting at
WiUis's Rooms, ii. 198
Elphinstone, Lord, death of,
ii. 325
Elwin, Rev. WhitweU, ii. 64
(note)
Enfield, Viscount, ii. 407
English fleet, the, strength of the
fleet in 1859 compared with
that of France and of Russia,
ii. 265
" English Hospitals and English
Nurses," i. 378 (note)
English Press, the, attitude of,
towards France in 1859, ii. 233
" Essays and Reviews," contem
plated prosecution of Rev. R.
WiUiams for his article in, ii.
434
Estcourt, General, i. 277 ; letter
from him to Herbert, 280 ;
insists on the need of reform
ing the commissariat and
transport service in the Cri
mea, 285-92 ; his letters from
the Crimea, 295-300 ; the
work done by him, 309 (note) ;
his impression of Lord Palmer
ston's letter and despatch to
Lord Raglan, 316; attacks
on him, 318 ; demands pan
niers to carry the wounded,
366 ; writes of the enthusiasm
of the ladies in the hospitals,
379 (note) ; his death, 450
Europe, the Concert of, i. 215
Evans, Sir de Lacy, his expedi
tion to Spain, i. 23 ; objections
to his sitting on the proposed
Court of Inquiry, ii. 32, 33 ;
his motion for the abolition
of army purchase, 381
" Experimental " Squadron, the,
i. 30
Family Colonisation Loan
Society, i. 120
Fane, Captain, ii. 334
Farnham, suggested Staff Col
lege at, ii. 380
Ferguson, Mr., ii. 126
Filder, Commissary-General, i.

295 (note), 301 (note) \ his staff
at Constantinople, 308 ; al
leged want of resource shown
by him, 328 ; his shortcom
ings, ii. 28 ; his want of
energy, 33
Fitzgerald, Seymour, i. 418, 419,
u. 169
FitzwiUiam, the last Viscount,
bequeaths his property to
Herbert, i. 4 ,
Foreign Enlistment Act, i. 22-4 ;
passage of the Bill, 243 ; risk
of the Act, ii. 40, 41 ; Herbert's
opinion of the Act, 43
— Legion, the, i. 305
Forrest, Dr., i. 393
Fortification Loan Bill, the, ii.
353 ; controversy over it be
tween Gladstone and Herbert,
269 ; postponement of the
discussion on, 282 ; introduc
tion of the Resolutions pre
liminary to the Bill, 289,
293 ; is a source of difference
of opinions, 423, 424, 427 ;
the Loan again before Parlia
ment, 435, 436
Fortifications, issue of the Re
port of the Commission on, ii.
273, 275
Foster, R.E., Colonel, ii. 271
Foucarmont village, i. n
France, irritation in, about the
attempt to assassinate Louis
Napoleon, ii. 107 ; her im
pending war with Austria,
178 ; coolness of Great Bri
tain's relations with her after
the Crimean War, 207 ; large
contracts made by her for war
materials, 214 ; her struggle
with Austria for supremacy in
Italy, 228 ; attitude of the
English Press towards, in 1859,
233 ; her traditions respecting
England, 233 ; apprehensions
of a rupture with her, 240 ;
the forces which she sent to
China, 298-300 ; objection
to the proposed instructions
to Sir Hope Grant, 307

INDEX

455

Fremantle, Sir Thomas, ap
pointed Chief Secretary to the
Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, i.
33
French Army in the Crimea, its
equipment, i. 283 (note) ; su
periority of its transport sys
tem, 287 (note) ; its expenses,
447
— artUlery, the, addition to, U.
250
— Colonels, the, their address
in 1858, n. 386
— Estimates, the, addition to, ii.
250
— the, popularity of, in Russia,
ii. 47 ; the Emperor and
Empress of, 407
Froude, Mr., i. 10
Gallipoli, suppUes at, i. 301
(note)
Galton, R.E., Captain, U. 138
" General " Hospital, the, i. 332 ;
Miss Anderson placed in
charge, 378 ; Miss Stanley's
description of the work, 406
Genitchi, i. 274
Gibson, MUner, u. 201 ; his notice
of motion lamenting the faUure
of the Vienna Conference, i.
423, 424. 427, 429. 431
Gifford, Lord, u. 407
Gladstone, WUliam Ewart, his
friendship with Herbert, i. 1 3 ;
an attack on him, 25 ; he quits
the Government, 32 ; he holds
office for six months without
a seat in the House of Com
mons, 61 ; his attitude to the
Gorham Judgment, 128 ; his
opinion of Lord Aberdeen,
1 30 ; his attitude towards
Papal aggression, 131 ; writes
to Herbert on Papal aggres
sion, 136; decUnes the post
of Foreign Secretary, 141 ;
urges the Duke of Newcastle
to assume the leadership of the
PeeUtes, 144 ; his attitude
towards Lord Derby, 159 ; his
attitude towards parties, 161 ;

beginning of his rivalry with
Disraeli, 167 ; his budget of
1853, 171 ; is eager to keep
peace with Russia, 204 ;
speaks against Roebuck's mo
tion for a Committee of In
quiry into the Crimean War,
251; is opposed to taking
office under Lord Palmerston,
251 ; writes to Herbert about
taking office, 255, 259; de
clines office, 256 ; objects to a
Committee of Inquiry into the
Crimean War, 263, 264 ; writes
to Herbert on the state of the
army in the Crimea, 313 ;
supports Milner Gibson's mo
tion lamenting the failure of
the Vienna Conference, 424 ;
urges Gibson to withdraw the
motion, 428, 429 ; his reply
to Herbert's letter about the
motion, 432 ; his views as to
Mr. Lowe's and Sir WUham
Heathcote's amendments, 436 ;
his speech on the reasons for
closing the Crimean War, 442 ;
his views on Roebuck's motion
censuring members of Lord
Aberdeen's administration,
446 ; is not disposed to vote
on Roebuck's motion, 449 ;
his perverseness, 459; his reply
to the letters in the Press on
the Crimean War, ii. 3 ; his
illusion as to the state of pub
lic feeling, 7 ; his letter to
Herbert upon his refusal of
the Colonial Secretaryship, 1 3 ;
writes to Herbert upon his
article in The Saturday Re
view, 15, 16; his views upon
the continuation of the war,
17 ; his letters upon the ques
tion of the neutrahsation of
the Black Sea, 22, 26 ; his
views as to the Chelsea Board
of Inquiry, 32; his views on the
Foreign Enlistment Act, 43,
47 ; his distrust of Lord
Palmerston's foreign policy,
52 ; does not wish for a re-

456

INDEX

union with the Liberal party,
52 ; his inclination towards
an approach to the Conserva
tives and Lord Derby, 53 ;
his strong feehngs against
Lord Palmerston as a Premier,
55 ; his distrust of the foreign
relations of the country, 57,
58 ; writes to Herbert on the
Eastern question, 60 ; his
strong ground, 62 ; his atti
tude to the Conservative
party, 63 ; is dissuaded from
agreeing to a proposal that
he should meet Lord Derby
with a view to concerted action
against the Government, 64 ;
his account of his refusal to
meet Lord Derby, 64 ; his
objection to Lord Palmerston
as Premier, 67 ; uses his influ
ence through The Quarterly
Review, 68 ; tells Herbert of
his summons from Lord Derby,
70 ; his view of Lord Palmer
ston's conduct of affairs, 71 ;
his interviews with Lord
Derby, 72 ; widening of the
political differences between
him and Herbert, 72 ; speaks
in support of Cobden's motion
condemning the action of the
Government, 74 ; his differ
ence from Graham and Her
bert as to the party which
should be supported in the
new Parliament of 1857, 76;
his inclination to co-operate
with Lord Derby, 77 ; his
meetings with Lord Derby, 77 ;
offer made to him by the
Conservative wirepullers, 77 ;
disapproves of the coldness of
tone of Herbert's reply to the
Conservative wirepuUers, 78 ;
difficulty of his position, 80,
92, 197 ; his lack of judgment,
81 ; reviews his position in a
letter to Herbert, 82, 83, 196 ;
his views on public questions,
85 ; his attitude on the ques
tions of retrenchment, foreign

policy, and Parliamentary re
form, 89 ; his support of the
candidature of Sir Stephen
Glynne, 92 (note) ; his inten
tions with regard to reform,
95 ; his seat in the new Parlia
ment, 96, 98 ; seldom in his
place in the House in 1857, 98 ;
he accepts the post of Lord
High Commissioner to the
Ionian Islands, 117, 166, 167;
speaks in favour of rotten
boroughs, 173 ; approaches
Lord Derby's Government,
179 ; his abhorrence of election
by ballot, 179 ; his antipathy
to Austria, 179 ; his sympathy
with Italy, 179 ; change in his
opinions, 179 ; his correspond
ence with Herbert on the faU
of Lord Derby's Government,
184 et seq. ; writes to Herbert
upon his position, 196 ; be
comes ChanceUor of the Ex
chequer, 200 ; is opposed to
Herbert's aims, 208 ; de
nounces a piece of supposed
" profligate " expenditure,
208 ; suggests a reduction
in the number of company
officers in the Army, 210 ; his
reply to Herbert's memoran
dum on National Defence,
221 ; he refuses to consider
the proposed increase in the
Naval and Military Estimates,
238 ; his view of the income
tax, 238 ; his views upon the
proposed alteration in the
numbers of the Army, 244;
writes to Herbert upon the
prematureness of his resigna
tion, 252 ; his power of de
ceiving himself, 255, 260;
writes to Herbert and Lord
Palmerston as to the disem
bodiment of the Militia and
delay in producing the Esti
mates, 257, 258 ; his memor
andum on the postponement
of the Budget, 262 ; he ac
quiesces ill the' increase 6f the

INDEX

457

Navy Estimates, 266, 267 ; his
aversion to expenditure on
fortifications, 277 ; his dislike
of military influence, 278 ; his
eagerness to repeal the paper
duty, 278 ; \vrites to Herbert
on the question of expenditure
upon fortifications, 278. 280,
281 ; he circulates a memo.
deprecating the exjDediency of
constructing works of defence,
282 ; he \\'rites to Herbert on
the Fortifications Loan, 284 ; he
intimates his intention of re
signing if the fortification
scheme is perse\'ered with,
285 ; his proposed resignation
received with equanimity by
his coUeagues, 285 ; concession
made to retain him in the
Cabinet, 286, 289 ; he absents
himself from the House when
the Resolutions prehminary to
the Fortifications BUl are pro
posed, 293 ; writes to Herbert
as to the instructions to Sir
Hope Grant, 307 ; his belief
in a short campaign in China,
323 ; his opposition to Her
bert's proposals as to the sale
of defective barracks, 359,
360 ; refuses to include in the
Estimates for 1861 any vote to
meet the expenses which the
reform of Sandhurst would
involve, 385 ; Herbert's asso
ciation with his financial
poUcy, 398 ; his altered per
sonal relations with Herbert,
403 ; expresses his regret at
Herbert's retirement from the
House of Commons, 415 ;
brings pressure on Herbert to
reduce the Army Estimates,
419 ; his objection to the meas
ures of defence desired by
Lord Palmerston, 422 ; his
misunderstandings with Lord
Palmerston, 423 ; his views on
mUitary questions, 427 ; his
objection to the retention of
troops in China, 428, 432 ;

his letter to Lady Herbert,
440
Gleig, Rev. C, n. 376, 177 ; he
submits a scheme for mUitary
education, 380 ; compliment
paid to him by Sir de Lacy
Evans, 381
Glyn, Mr., i. 118
Glynne, Sir Stephen, ii. 92 (note)
Godley, Mr., ii. 279
Golden Fleece, the, stores sent
out in, i. 280
Gordon, Arthur (Lord Stanmore),
i. 430
— Sir William, i. 309
Gorham, Rev. C, i. 128
— Judgment, the, i. 128
Gortschakoff, Prince, i. 235
Goulburn, Mr., his letter to Mrs.
Herbert, i. 459
Graham, Lady, death of, ii. 104
— Sir James, i. 35 ; supports
Peel's proposal to suspend
Corn Laws, 44 ; letters from
him to Herbert on the potato
crop in Ireland and the posi
tion of Peel's Cabinet, 48, 49 ;
pays a compUment to Herbert,
69 ; supports Herbert's
scheme for the reform of the
Militia, 70, 71 ; writes to the
Duke of Buccleuch about the
Militia, 72 ; his attitude to
wards Papal aggression, 131 ;
writes to Herbert on Papal
aggression, 133 ; Lord John
Russell opens communications
with him as to the formation
of a new Cabinet, 141 ; his
opposition to the Ecclesiastical
Titles BiU, 141 ; Lord John
RusseU's overtures to him,
146 ; letter from Herbert to
him on the Militia BiU, 154;
his reply, 156; his attitude
towards parties, 161 ; depre
cates any change- in the
Parliamentary franchise, 171 ;
he points out the danger of
the instructions sent to Lord
Stratford with reference to the
Black Sea, 198 ; letter from

458

INDEX

him on the state of affairs
preceding the Crimean War,
209 ; underrates the resources
of Turkey, 214 ; is opposed to
taking office under Lord Pal
merston, 251 ; declines office,
256 ; objects to a Committee
of Inquiry into the Crimean
War, 263, 264 ; writes to
Herbert on the subject of
serving under Palmerston,
266 ; supports Milner Gibson's
motion lamenting the failure
of the Vienna Conference, 424 ;
his speech on Mr. Lowe's
amendment, 442 ; his views
as to the Chelsea Board of
Inquiry, ii. 32 ; his views of
the Foreign EnUstment Act,
42 ; writes to Herbert on
the question of the peace
of Europe, 48 ; his distrust
of Lord Palmerston's foreign
policy, 52 ; writes to Herbert
on the Neapolitan affair,
59 ; writes to Herbert on
Gladstone's refusal to meet
Lord Derby, 65 ; speaks in
support of Cobden's motion
condemning the action of the
Government, 74 ; his differ
ence with Gladstone as to the
party which should be sup
ported in the new Parliament
of 1857, 76; his action at
Carlisle, 84 ; his attitude on
the questions of retrenchment,
ioreign policy, and Parlia
mentary reform, 89 ; resumes
his former seat in the House,
•98 ; his unwillingness to go
into the lobby under the
guidance of Disraeli, 106 ;
writes to Herbert upon Lord
John RusseU's overtures, 164 ;
denounces a speech of Dis
raeli's, 173 ; speaks at Carlisle,
178 ; his attitude with regard
to the disembodiment of the
Militia, 246 ; writes to Her
bert as to the delay in produc
ing the Estimates, 260 ; his

testimony as to the discretion
of Bernal Osborne, 408 ; his
letter to Mrs. Herbert on the
retirement of her husband
from the House of Commons,
410 ; Herbert takes leave of
him, 436
Grant, Sir Hope, ii. 316; is
chosen as Commander of the
British troops in China,
301 ; instructions to him,
305 ; presses for definite in
structions as to the proposed
march on Pekin, 313 ; is in
communication with General
de Montauban, 317 ; his ac
count of the Chinese campaign,
317 ; force at his disposal,
324, 325 ; his hopes, 325 ; his
tact, 326 ; objection of the
French General to his plans,
326 ; his return from Shanghai
to Hong Kong, 328 ; arrives
at Ta-lien-Whan, 328 ; is re
commended by the Duke of
Cambridge for the G.C.B.,
338 ; his public despatch on
the taking of the Taku forts,
340 ; demands the surrender
of prisoners and the opening
of a gate at Pekin, 344, 345 ;
his silence as to the destruction
of the summer palace at Pekin,
349-5 1
Granville, Lord, shares Lord
Aberdeen's views, i. 171 ; a
typical party Whig, 172 ; is
eager to keep peace with
Russia, 204 ; agrees to admit
Lord Clanricarde to the Cabi
net, ii. 105 ; sent for by the
Queen, but reUnquishes the
task of forming a Government,
199 ; his letter to Herbert on
his retirement from the House
of Commons, 415
Greville, Charles, his condemna
tion of Lord Raglan, i. 243
Grey, Captain, the instructions
to, i. 274
— Charles, second Earl,hrs retire
ment from the premiership, i. 19

INDEX

459

Grey, Henry, third Earl, recbrd
of a conversation between him
and Herbert, 55 ; decUnes to
enter Lord John RusseU's
Cabinet, 60 ; consents to do so,
67 ; his dictum on the govern
ment of the Army, 304 ; his
motion on the Vienna Con
ference, 425
— Sir George, speaks against
Roebuck's motion for a Com
mittee of Inquiry into the
Crimean War, i. 251 ; becomes
ChanceUor of the Duchy of
Lancaster, U. 20a ; wishes to
retire, 201
Gros, Baron, shipwreck of, u. 328
Grosvenor, Lord, i. 448
Grote, George, his motion for the
adoption of the baUot, i. 22
Grove, Mr., U. 404
Guizot, il., his articles on Peel,
n. 48
Haddington, Earl of, i. 27 ; be
comes Lord Privy Seal, 61
Haddo House, ii. 402
HaU, Dr., i. 369
^ Sir B., is elevated to the
peerage, ii. 200
HamUton, the Duke of, i. 152
Hampden heresy, the, i. 85
Hanbury, Mr., U. 199
Hangkee, surrenders the pri
soners at Pekin, ii. 344, 345
Harding, Colonel, i. 299
Hardinge, Viscount, ii. 151 ; ap
proves of Herbert's scheme of
mihtary education, 378 ; he
submits a scheme for mihtary
education, 380
Harris, Colonel, i. 299
Harrowby, Earl of, i. n 8
Hartington, Lord (now Duke of
Devonshire), u. 199, 407, 410
Hawarden Church, the burning
of, ii. 104
Hawes, Sir B., ii. 153, 155, 157
Hawkins, Ernest, i. 114, 116
Hay, General, U. 27 1
Heathcote, Sir William, i. 434,
436

Herald, The Morniflg, ii. 70 ; on
the Foreign Enlistment Act,
44
Herbert of Lea, Sidney, Lord,
his personal charm, i. i ; his
letters, 2 ; his birth, 3 ;
his beauty, 3, 4 ; a visit
paid to Queen Charlotte, 4 ;
property bequeathed to him
by the last Viscount Fitz
wiUiam, 4 ; goes to Mr. Brad-
field's school and then to
Harrow, 4 ; his house master's
opinion of him, 6 ; his school
life, 6 ; his prominent char
acteristics, 6 ; his interest in
politics, 7 ; his life at Chil-
mark, 9 ; his proficiency in
drawing, 10 ; his life at Ox
ford, 10 ; his first visit abroad,
1 1 ; his enthusiasm over the
beauty of Rouen, 12 ; his
friends and contemporaries at
Oxford, 13 ; takes his degree,
14 ; visits the Irish estates
left to him by Lord Fitz
wiUiam, 14 ; his affection for
Wilton, 15 ; becomes a candi
date for the representation of
South Wilts, 16 ; is returned
for South Wilts without oppo
sition, 16 ; his close associa
tion with the leaders of politi
cal parties, 16, 17 ; his career
in Parliament, 18-38 ; takes
his seat as a Tory and follower
of WeUington, 18 ; his maiden
speech, 18 ; refuses a lordship
of the Treasury, but accepts
the post of Secretary to
the India Board, 19 ; his
official training, 20 ; he be
comes a regular member of the
Conservative Opposition, 20 ;
is re-elected for South WUts,
22 ; speaks against George
Grote's motion for the adop
tion of the ballot, 22 ; he
supports Lord EUot's opposi
tion to the further suspension
of the Foreign Enlistment Act,
23, 24 ; his speeches on the

460

INDEX

Chinese War and the sugar
duties, 25 , is appointed Secre
tary to the Admiralty, 27 ; his
memorandum on the Naval
Estimates, 28 ; naval reforms
suggested by him, 31 ; the
high esteem in which he was
held by Sir Robert Peel, 32 ;
declines the Irish Secretary
ship and is appointed Secre-
at War, 31 ; his letter to
Lady Pembroke on his ap
pointment, 1 1 ; his letter to
Countess Bruce, 34 ; his work
in the Cabinet, 39-76 ; his
feelings upon the proposed
increase in the grant to May
nooth, 40 ; speaks on the
second reading of the Bill
proposing an increase of the
grant, 41 ; speaks on the Corn
Laws, 42 ; supports Peel's pro
posal to suspend the Corn
Laws, 44 ; his memorandum
advising the resignation of the
Cabinet, 50, 51 ; record left
by him of a chance conversa
tion with Lord Grey, 55 ;
advocates in the House of
Commons the repeal of the
Corn Laws, 63 ; denounces the
line adopted by Lord George
Bentinck vrith reference to the
Irish Arms BiU, 65 ; dechnes
to enter Lord John RusseU's
Cabinet, 68 ; compliment paid
to him by Sir James Graham,
69 ; work done by him at the
War Office, 69 ; his reorgani
sation of the Militia, 70-3 ;
his private Ufe, 77-90 ; marries
Elizabeth a Court, 77 ; speaks
in favour of the suspension of
the Navigation Laws, 79 ; his
views upon length of service in
the Army, 79 ; is again a
candidate for South Wilts, 80 ;
is re-elected for South Wilts,
8 1 ; travels on the Continent,
8 1 ; his views upon diplomatic
relations between the Vatican
and the English Government,

86 ; his speech on Mr. Hume's
motion with respect to Parlia
mentary Reform, 87 ; his
-character, 91-6 ; Sir Robert
Meade's devotion to him, 92
(note) ; the improvements
made by him on his Irish
estate, 98, 99 ; his interest in
ecclesiastical questions, 99,
loi-io ; his eagerness to im
prove the condition of the
parochial clergy, 10 1 ; his
views upon the possible uses
of a cathedral chapter, 105 ;
Urges the introduction of an
Act to facilitate the creation
of additional bishoprics, 107 ;
declines to serve on a Royal
Commission to inquire into the
condition of the cathedral
establishments, 109 ; his letter
to Mr. Gladstone on the
subject of cathedral estabUsh-
ments, no; writes to The
Morning Chronicle on assisted
female emigration, no, in;
writes to Mr. Gladstone with
reference to his scheme for
female emigration, 113; his
reply to Sir Robert Peel's
objections to assisted emigra
tion, 117; Disraeli's comment
on Herbert's emigration
scheme, 119; votes in favour
of Jewish emancipation, 122^;
his support of Lord John
RusseU's educational policy,
122 ; speech by him exposing
Lord Palmerston's treatment
of Austria and the folly of Lord
Minto 's mission, 124, 125 ;
result of Sir Robert Peel's
death to him, 126 ; his dis
approval of the Gorham
Judgment, 128 ; his letter to
Mr. Gladstone on affairs ifl
Ireland, 1 29 ; his appreciation
of the qualities of Lord Aber
deen, 1 30 ; his attitude to
wards the Bull constituting
the new Roman Catholic hier
archy in England, 131 ; his

INDEX

46i

correspondence with Sir James
Graham and Mr. Gladstone on
the subject of the " Papal
aggression," 131-8 ; his views
on the subject as expressed at
the county meeting in WUts,
138 ; his letter to Mr. Glad
stone on the prospects of the
Cabinet, 140 ; correspondence
with the Duke of New
castle as to the leadership of
the Peelite party, 146 ; over
tures made to him by Lord
John RusseU, 146 ; is sum
moned to Paris owing to the
illness of Lord Pembroke, 148 ;
his letter to his wife on the
state, of affairs when Lord
Derby assumed office, 148 ;
his letter to Mr. Gladstone on
the assumption of office by
Lord Derby, 149 ; his attitude
towards Lord Derby's Govern
ment, 159, 161 ; his letter to
Lord Aberdeen expressing his
views upon Lord Palmerston's
endeavours to lay the ground
for the formation of a Liberal
ministry under Lord Lans
downe, 162 ; his effective
speech during the debate on
Free Trade, 166 ; resumes his
post as Secretary at War in
Lord Aberdeen's Cabinet, 168 ;
his interest in military reform,
175 ; his views as to going to
war with Russia, 181 ; his
personal views and action
during the negotiations pre
ceding the Crimean War, 201 ;
his alarm at the growth of the
popular desire for war, 203 ;
his eagerness to preserve
peace, 204 ; his letter to Lord
Clarendon expressing his views
upon the position of the Turks
during the negotiations, 204 ;
his authority as Secretary at
War and responsibility for the
conduct of operations in the
Crimea, 225 ; his opinion of
the Reform BiU of 1854, 228 ;

proposes the abolition of tho
system of " brevets," 232 ;
supports the BUl for raising
mercenary troops for the
Crimea, 238 ; his speech on
the conduct of the Crimean
campaign, 239 ; he defends
Lord Raglan, 241 ; proposes
the formation of an Army
Board, 244, 245 ; speaks
against Mr. Roebuck's motion
for a Committee of Inquiry
into the conduct of the Cri
mean War, 247 ; urges his
views upon agreeing to serve
under Lord Palmerston in a
letter to Mr. Gladstone, 251 ;
Mr. Gladstone's reply, 255 ;
meeting between Herbert,
Sir James Graham, Glad
stone, and Lord Aberdeen to
discuss the advisabUity of
serving under Lord Palmer
ston, 256 ; Herbert declines
office under Lord Palmerston,
256 ; his dissatisfaction vrith
his decision, 257, 259 ; his
correspondence on the subject
with Gladstone and Lord
Aberdeen, 258, 259 ; is per
suaded to remain in office and
becomes Secretary of State
for the Colonies, 262 ; resigns
the seals of the Colonial Office,
265 ; his responsibihty for
measures taken to supply the
Army in the Crimea, 270 ;
thought devoted by him to the
subject of clothing the Army,
279 ; his exertions to relieve
the wants of the Army in the
Crimea, 302 ; memorandum
by him on the war, 318 ; his
connection with the Govern
ment is severed, 325 ; letter
from him to General Estcourt,
325 ; letter from him to Lord
Raglan, 326 ; his advice as to
the attitude which the Direc
tor-General of the Army
Medical Service should adopt
towards the Crimean Fund got

462

INDEX

up by The Times, 335 ; his
interest in the amelioration of
the condition of the soldiers
when in hospital, 337 ; his
letter to Miss Florence Night
ingale asking her to take
charge of the nurses who were
being sent to Scutari, 338 ; his
confidence as to the success
of the nursing scheme, 343 ;
skill with which he advocated
hospital reforms at Scutari,
352-5 ; intimates to Dr. Gum
ming his intention of enlarging
the nursing staff, 356 ; his
letters to Major Sillery and
Mr. Wreford urging the neces
sity of hospital reforms, 357,
359 ; his letters to Mr. Brace
bridge and Lord Raglan
dealing with the question of
hospital reforms, 359, 360 ;
his letter to Dr. Smith on the
subject of hospitals, 365 ; his
letter to Lord Raglan with
reference to Scutari, 368 ;
refuses to entertain any idea
of Miss Nightingale's resigna
tion, 372 ; mass of communi
cations received by him on
the subject of hospitals, 382 ;
embodies the substance of
these communications in his
letters to Lord Raglan and
the medical authorities, 382 ;
suggests to the Duke of New
castle that the advice given
to Lord William Paulet should
be repeated in formal instruc
tions, 382 ; becomes Secretary
of State for the Colonies in the
reconstituted Cabinet, 401 ;
the reforms ultimately effected
at Scutari due to him, 410 ;
his letter to Miss Nightingale
on quitting the Government,
412 ; his unabated interest in
the hospitals, 416 ; his reply
to Miss Nightingale's request
that he would support her
grievances against the Govern
ment by a motion in the

House, 417 ; his disapproba
tion of Milner Gibson's motion
lamenting the failure of the
Vienna Conference, 424 ; his
letter to Lord Aberdeen on
Milner Gibson's motion, 424 ;
coolness between him and
Mr. Gladstone, 427 ; his dislike
of the Manchester School,
430 ; his letter to Gladstone,
430 ; Gladstone's reply, 432 ;
his letter to Gladstone with
regard to Lowe's amendment
t.o Sir F. Baring's amendment
to Milner Gibson's motion,
438 ; his speech on Lowe's
amendment, 442 ; is caUed as
a witness before Roebuck's
Committee of Inquiry, 44c; ;
is censured for disregarding
precedent, 446; vyrites to Glad
stone on Roebuck's motion of
censure, 45 1 ; his enhanced re
putation, 458 ; goes to Kis-
srngen, 460 ; his letters to
Gladstone on the fall of
Sebastopol, U. i, 5 ; visits his
Irish property, 7 ; writes to
Lord Aberdeen that he has
refused the office of Secre
tary to the Colonies, 8 ;
his account of a visit to
Broadlands, 8 ; writes to Glad
stone about an interview
he has had with Lord Palmer
ston, 12 ; acknowledges the
authorship of an article in
The Saturday Review, 14 ; ex
presses his views on peace with
Russia in a letter to Lord
Malmesbury, 17 ; his reply to
Sir Charles Wood's letter as
to the terms of peace which
Russia will accept, 20 ; his
letter to Gladstone on the
subject of peace with Russia,
21 ; writes to Gladstone on
the subject of " neutrahsa
tion " of the Black Sea, 25,
27 ; his objection to the
proposed inquiry at Chelsea
upon the Crimean War Com-

INDEX

465

mission, 28 ; writes to Sir
Charles Wood and Lord Pal
merston on the subject of the
proposed Board, 29 ; his
anxiety that it should not
reflect on Sir J. McNeill or
Colonel TuUoch, 28, 29 ; his
account of Lady Pembroke's
illness and death, 35 ; de
fends the Treaty of Paris
in the House of Com
mons, 38 ; his eulogy of Lord
Raglan, 39 ; his defence of
the attitude of Austria, 39 ;
praises Lord Clarendon's con
duct of the peace negotiations,
39 ; his letters deahng with
the infringement of the United
States municipal laws, 41 ; his
opinion of the Foreign Enhst-
ment Act, 43 ; is ordered to
Carlsbad, 43 ; his military
education schemes, 46 ; visits
Ireland, 5 1 ; his anxiety for a
reunion with the Liberal party,
52 ; his views on pohtical
questions during the last few
months of 1856, 53 ; his
opinion of Gladstone's pro
posed pohtical approximation
tp Lord Derby, 66 ; an article
by him in The Saturday Review,
68 ; vridening of the political
differences between him and
Gladstone, 72 ; speaks in
support of Cobden's motion
condemnatory of the Govern
ment's action in China, 73 ;
differs from Gladstone as to
the party which should be sup
ported in the new Parliament
of 1857, 76; offer made
to him by the Conservative
vrire-puUers, 77 ; his reply to
Lord Malmesbury, 78 ; op
position of the Conservatives
in Wilts to his re-election
in 1857, 79 ; his poUtical
position, 81 ; re-elected for
South Wilts, 81 ; writes to
Gladstone about his meet
ing vrith Lord Derby, 82 ;

writes to Lord Aberdeen with
reference to the fusion of the
Peelites with the Liberal
party, 86 ; his attitude on the
questions of retrenchment,
foreign policy, and Parlia
mentary reform, 89 ; his letter
to Gladstone on the extinction
of the Peelite party, 92 ; his
letter to Sir James Graham on
the position to be taken up in
the new Parliament, 94 ; re
sumes his former seat in the
House next to Sir James
Graham and Gladstone, 98 ;
his absence from the House
excepting when Army ques
tions are discussed, 98 ; sup
ports the vote for a permanent
camp at Aldershot, 99 ; his
letter to Mr. Raikes Currie on
the proposal to raise a regi
ment of gentlemen for service
in India, loi ; his atti
tude towards the Conspir
acy Bill, 108 ; expresses his
views on the Conspiracy BiU
to Gladstone, 109 ; his ob
jections to Lord Palmerston,
no, 1X2; his letter to Glad
stone upon Lord EUen
borough's despatch censuring
the measures adopted by
Lord Canning to secure the
pacification of Oude, 114;' his
relations with Gladstone, 115;
active part taken by him
in the discussion of the re
solutions as to the future
government of India proposed
by Lord Derby's Government,
115 ; his visits to military
barracks, 116; is invited to
preside over the Army Sani
tary Commission, 118 ; his
letter to Lord Panmure on the
question of appointing a
Sanitary Commission, 119; the
names suggested by him to
serve on the Sanitary Com
mission, 121 ; accepts the
chairmanship of the Army

464

INDEX

Sanitary Commission, 123 ;
endeavours to widen the scope
of the Commission's inquiries,
1 24 ; his labours in connection
with the Commission, 125 ;
his account given to Sir John
McNeill of the first fortnight's
proceedings of the Commis
sion, 126 ; his suggestions
made to Lord Panmure on
mortahty in the Army, 133 ;
his letters to Lord Palmerston
upon the proposed sub-Com
missions to carry into effect
the recommendations of the
Sanitary Commission, 1 34, 1 36 ;
his letter to General Peel
detaihng what had been done
by the Army Sanitary Com
mission and the sub-Com
missions, 137 ; defends the
Government from the charge
of having wasted money on
the improvement of barracks
and hospitals, 1 39 ; contri
butes articles on barracks to
The Westminster Review, 140 ;
the hindrances to his work,
149 ; protests against the
proposed postponement of
active steps for the formation
of an Army Medical School,
151; objects to the War O^ce
proposal to appoint a fresh
Commission to report on the
recommendations of the Army
Sanitary Commission and of
the sub-Commission as to an
Army Medical School, 153 ;
his suggestions as to the
composition of the Army
Medical CouncU, 155 ; his
letter to Sir Benjamin Hawes
upon the Army Medical Coun
cil, 155; his memorandum on
War Office minutes, 1 59 ; his
position during 1858 and the
first half of 1859, 161, 162;
overtures made to him by
Lord John Russell, 164 ; his
letter to Gladstone on the state
of affairs at the beginning of

1859, 168 ; his letter to Lord
John Russell on the proposed
abolition of 40s. freeholders
Tin counties, 170 ; is asked to
alter the wording of his draft
of a resolution condemning the
proposed abolition of 40^.
freeholders, 172 ; speech by
him, 174 ; predicts the de
cline of party influence in
the House of Commons, 175 ;
re-elected for the last time
(unopposed) for South WUts,
177 ; his letters to Lord
GranvUle and Gladstone upon
the state of public affairs,
193 ; accepts the post of
Secretary of State for War,
199 ; work in that capacity,
202 ; his aims, 207 ; his
views as to measures of de^
fence, 207 ; his memorandum
upon the proposed increase of
the Army, etc., 210, 211 ;
proposes to increase pay of
soldiers, 218 ; his suggested
amendment of the MUitia law,
218 ; his reply to Gladstone's
criticisms of his suggestions,
235 ; his letter to Lord Pal
merston on the state of foreign
affairs, 240 ; his letter to Sir
James Graham upon his differ
ences with Gladstone over the
reduction of the forces, 243 ;
tenders his resignation to Lord
Palmerston, 248 ; his letter
to Sir James Graham, 251 ;
his letter to Gladstone on the
disembodiment of the MUitia,
255 ; his letter to Lord Pal
merston on the disembodiment
of the MUitia and delay in
producing the Estimates, 259 ;
his resignation refused, 266 ;
adoption of his recommenda
tions as to the disembodiment
of the MUitia and augmenta
tion of the Army, 266 ; his
letter to Sir James Graham
upon his difference with
Gladstone, 267 ; appoints a

INDEX

4G5

Commission to consider the
question of protecting our
dockyards, 269 ; his reply to
Prince Consort's letter on the
protection of our dockyards,
272 ; his memorandum to the
Cabinet urging the necessity
for defensive works, 275 ; his
views as to defensive works
shared by the Premier and
most of the Cabinet, 277 ; his
speech on the introduction of the
Resolutions preliminary to the
Fortifications Loan Bill, 289 ;
his description of the Treaty of
Tientsin, 294 ; his letter to
Lord Palmerston about the
repulse on the Peiho River,
295 ; his work in connec
tion with the Chinese War,
297 ; discourages a march on
Pekin, 301 ; his letter to Sir
Hope Grant on the Chinese
War, 301 ; his letter to Lord
Canning, 304 ; consults Glad
stone as to a paragraph
suggested by Lord Palmerston
in the instructions to Sir Hope
Grant, 306 ; his memorandum
on the proposed instiuctions,
307 ; his letter to Lord Can
ning with reference to the
French force for China, 310;
consults Lord Palmerston
as to the proposed march
on Pekin, 314; inforins Sir
Hope Grant of the discretion
given to him as to marching
on Pekin, 315 ; extract from
a letter of his to the Duke of
Cambridge, 316 ; his letter to
Lord Canning as to the size
of the force to be despatched
to China from India, 318, 319 ;
his letter to Lord Canning on
the force at Sir Hope Grant's
disposal, 324 ; his correspond
ence with Sir Hope Grant upon
the Chinese War, 326 et seq. ;
his letter of congratulation to
Sir Hope Grant upon his suc
cessful prosecution of the
VOL. II.

war, 339 ; informs Sh Hope
Grant of the delight of the
public at the success of the
Chinese expedition, 351; is
created Lord Herbert of Lea,
352 ; his first speech in the
House of Lords, 355 ; his
work as a Minister, 358 et seq. ;
his insistence on special quar
ters in barracks for married
couples, 362 ; his plan for
special hospitals for soldiers'
wives and children, 362 ; his
efforts to provide recreation
for soldiers, 362 ; his efforts
to have soldiers taught trades,
363 ; his efforts to establish
an Army Medical School at
Chatham, 364-8 ; his efforts
to reorganise the War Office,
368-71; his scheme for re
organising the Household
Cavalry, 373 ; his desire to
reform the system of purchase
in the Army, 373 ; his interest
inmilitary education, 375 ; his
reform of the Duke of York's
School, 375 ; his reorganisa
tion of the Royal Naval School
at Greenwich, 375 ; elaborates
a plan for military education,
378 ; his scheme of education
suspended, 379 ; his speech
on the suspension of his
scheme of education, 379 ; his
qualified support to the pro
posed amalgamation of Sand
hurst and Woolwich, 383 ;
he takes up the consideration
of the various schemes pro
posed for military education,
384 ; the support given to him
by Prince Albert, 368 ; his
lack of enthusiasm in the
Volunteer cause, 389 ; his
decision as to the review of
Volunteers in Hyde Park, 391 ;
is present at the Volunteer
Review in Edinburgh, 391 ;
is opposed to the suggested
visit of Volunteers to Paris,
392 ; his interest in the

466

INDEX

Militia, 393 ; his views as to
the embodiment of the Militia,
394 ; his consideration to
wards his subordinates, 396 ;
his political instincts, 397 ;
his attitude towards Lord
John RusseU's Reform Bill,
and the repeal of the Paper
Duty, 398 ; his association
with Gladstone's financial
policy, 398 ; accompanies
Queen Victoria to Scotland,
402 ; sees Lord Aberdeen for
the last time, 402 ; his wish to
retire from the House of
Commons, 403 ; his reply to
Lord Palmerston's letter on
the question of his taking a
peerage, 404 ; doubts the
wisdom of appointing Bernal
Osborne to the War Office,
407 ; his farewell address to
the electors of South WUts,
412 ; his efforts to reconcUe
the discordant views of his
coUeagues, 419 ; his willing
ness to yield a good deal to
Gladstone's views, 430 ; an
nounces his proposal to evacu
ate the Taku forts, 430 ; his
draft as to the withdrawal of
troops from China, 432 ; in
crease of his illness, 432 ; his
correspondence, 433 ; his last
speech in the House of Lords,
433 ; his letter to the Bishop
of Salisbury upon the contem
plated prosecution of Rev. R.
Williams, 434 ; is attacked by
pleurisy, 434 ; cheerfulness of
his letter to Gladstone during
his illness, 434 ; his- case
pronounced hopeless, 435 ;
places his resignation in Lord
Palmerston's hands, 435, 437 ;
takes leave of Sir James
Graham and his friends, 436 ;
arrives at Spa, 437 ; sends
his thanks to Miss Shaw
Stewart for withdrawing her
previous refusal to take charge
of the first military female

hospital, 438 ; the last letters
written by him, 438 ; his last
act at Spa, 439 ; his arrival at
Brussels, 439 ; his return to
Wilton, 439 ; his last mo
ments, 440 ; his death, 441
Herschell, Sir John, i. 218 (note)
Hervey, Lord Alfred, ii. 75
Heytesbury, Lord, ii. 59 ; his
appointment to the Governor-
Generalship of India, i. 20 ; at
St. Petersburg, 77 ; his oppo
sition to the Crimean War, 425
HiU, Mr., ii. 126
Himalaya, t'ne, stores shipped in,
i- 303
Hong Kong, the Sepoys at, ii.
295 ; arrival of the Chinese
expedition at, 316
Hope, Admiral, ii. 313 ; his zeal
and energy, 330 ; he recon
noitres towards Tientsin, 337 ;
receives a deputation, 338 ;
the valuable assistance given
by him, 346
— George, i. 90
Horsman, Edward, i. loi ; an
annual Church reform motion
brought forward by him, 108 ;
brings before the House the
appointment of Rev. W. E.
Bennet to the living of Frome,
158 ; speaks at a meeting of
Liberals at Willis's Rooms, ii.
198 ; motion by him, 271, 275
Hospital orderlies, nursing by,
i. 337
Household Cavalry, Herbert's
scheme for the reorganisation
of, U. 373
Hume, Mr., i. 87
Income tax, the, Gladstone's
view of, ii. 238
India, Bill, the, ii. 105
— steamship mail service to,
i. 21 ; proposal to raise a
regiment of gentlemen to serve
in, ii. IOI ; the military train
in, 319
Indian Commissariat in China,
the, loss of, ii. 327, 347

INDEX

467

Indian Mutiny, the, outbreak of, |
ii. 100 ; its, effect on military
education, 381 j
Inglis, Sir Robert, i. 41 i
Inkerman, the battle of, i. 237 I
Ionian Isles, the, Gladstone's
mission to, ii. 117, 166, 167,
168
Irish Arms Bill, rejection on
the second reading, i. 64
— Church, the, i. 59
— estate, the, Herbert's im
provements on, i. 98, 99 j
— question, an, i. 24
IsabeUa II. , i. 22
Itahan campaign, the, of 1859,
u. 208 I
— question, the, ii. 169
Italy, influence of, on poUtics at
home, ii. 179
James, E., ii. 198 I
Jasmin, General, U. 328 i
Jason, the, stores sent out in, i. I
280 I
Jebbut, Miss, i. 381 (note)
Jewish disabUities, removal of,
i. 121
Jones, Dr. Bence, u. 435
— General Sir Harry, R.E., ii,
273
Juarez, U. 428
Jura, the, stores shipped in, i. ;
203 jI
Kars, ii. 2, article on, in The \
Quarterly Review, 27 j
KeUy, Sir Fitzroy, ii. 89 1
Kertch, i. 274 j
King, Locke, i. 140 ; motion by, i
U. 90, 91
Kinglake, Mr., i. 305, 306, 307
Kowlung Promontory, leased to
the British, u. 317, 348
KulaU, the hospital at, i. 332 ;
good work done by Miss
Stanley and her nurses at, 371 ;
Miss Stanley placed in charge
of the hospital, 378 ; her
letters describing the work,
406
Kung, Prince, prays for peace.

ii. 343 ; agrees to pay the
compensation demanded by
Lord Elgin, 348 ; his behavi
our at the signing of the
Treaty of Pekin, 349
Lacy, Captain, ii. 313
Laing, Dr., i. 386
Lansdowne, Marquess of, i. 57 ;
his qualities as a leader, 162 ; is
summoned to Osborne, 167 ;
dissents from Gladstone's bud
get of 1853, 171 ; deprecates
any change in the Parliament
ary franchise, 171 ; is in
favour of serving under Lord
Palmerston, 257 ; his attitude
towards the question of peace,
ii. 4 ; his alarm at the prospect
of the India Bill, 105
Larkum, the carpenter, i. 97
(note)
Layard, Mr. (afterwards Sir A.
H.), ii. 407 ; proposes a vote
of censure on the Government,
i. 219 ; complaint by him, 306 ;
his views on the sanitation of
the camps in the Crimea, 312
Lear, Dean Francis, death of,
i. 127
— Rev. F., acts as tutor to
Herbert, i. 9
Lefroy, Colonel, i. 417, u. 70,
121 ; he submits a scheme for
mUitary education, 380
Le Marchant, Sir Gaspard, u. 40
Lennox, Lord Henry, ii. 168
Lewis, Sir George, ii. 181 ; poh
tical affinities of, ii. 164, 166 ;
becomes Home Secretary, 200
Liberal meeting at Willis's
Rooms, U. 198
Liddell, Sir John, u. 126
Lieven, Princess, i. 151
Lincoln, Lord ( afterwards Duke
of Newcastle), i. 1 3 ; his atti
tude towards Papal aggression,
131
— President, ii. 429, 430
Lindsay, Colonel, i. 446, U. 198
Loch, Mr., u. 345 ; speech by.

468

INDEX

Loftus, Lord A., ii. 200
London, Bishop of, ii 118 ; ill
ness of, ii. 8
¦ — Society, during the first ten
years of Queen Victoria's reign,
i- 37
Lowe, Mr., 1. 434, 436, 441, 442
— Sir H., i. 309
Loyd, Jones, i. 115, 118
Lugard, Sir E., ii. 319, 367
Lyndhurst, Lord, ii. 197
Lyons, Sir E., i. 211
Macdonald, Mr., The Times
almoner, i. 335, 344; the
assistance which he gave to
the Government, 369 ; his
claims, 403
MacGregor, Dr., i. 345
MacHale, Archbishop, i. 82, 84
MacMurdo, Colonel, i. 305, 308
McNeU, Sir John, ii. 28, 29, 126 ;
his comment on Lord Pan
mure's treatment of his own
Commission, ii. 62
Mahon, Lord, presents a petition
against the first Reform Bill
from the undergraduates of
Oxford to the House of Com
mons, i. 14
Majendie, Mr., acts as tutor to
Sidney Herbert, i. 9
iWalakoff, the, failure of the
assault on, i. 447
Malmesbury, Earl of, his opinion
of Herbert's emigration
scheme, i. 118; his Memoirs,
243 ; his views as to peace
with Russia, ii. 22, 23 ; his
antipathy to Lord Stratford, 22
Manchester School, the, Her
bert's dislike of, i. 430 ; their
disapproval of Volunteers, ii.
387
Manilla, the, the stores in, i. 303,
305. 307. 310
Manning, Cardinal, i. 13, 85
Mansfield, Lord, presents a peti
tion against the first Reform
BiU from the undergraduates
of Oxford to the House of
Lords, i. 14

Mansfield, Sir WiUiam, ii. 301,
316; his qualifications for
command, 310; second in
command in China, 311
Marmont, Marshal, his views up
on holding Constantinople, i.
221
Martin, Sir. R. D., ii. 154
Maule, Fox (afterwards Earl of
Panmure), his compliment to
Herbert, i. 78, ii. 377 ; his
attitude toward the Militia
Bill, i. 154
MaxweU, Mr., i. 386
Maynooth, Roman Catholic Col
lege at, i. 32 ; Herbert's feel
ings with regard to, 40, 41
— Bill, the, passes the second
reading, i. 42
Meade, Sir Robert, his devotion
to Herbert, i. 92 (note)
Mediterranean garrisons, U. 236
Melbourne, Lord, speech by
Herbert on vote of want of
confidence in, i. 24 ; defeat
of his Government, 25-7 ;
his relations with his Cabinet,
58
Menchikoff, Prince, i. 192; evacu
ates Sebastopol, 273
Menzies, Dr., i. 345, 393 ; replies
to the statement of The Times
as to the state of the hospitals
at Scutari, i. 334
Merchant Sliipping Act, i. 231
Mexico, Lord John RusseU's
letter to Herbert about, u.
427
Meyendorff, M. de, i. 189, 208
Meyer, Dr., i. 373, 413 ; is a
vritness before the Army Sani
tary Commission, u. 126
Michel, Sir J., ii. 316; Lord
Clyde's high opinion of him,
ii. 311 ; his division, 333
MiUtary Estimates, Gladstone
refuses to consider the pro
posed increase of, ii. 238
— education, Herbert's interest
in, ii. 375 ; Lord Panmure
decides to appoint a Council
of Military Education, 380

INDEX

469

Mihtary schools, ii. 376
MiUtia, the, reorganisation of,
i. 70-3 ; disembodiment of,
u. 240, 241, 246 ; its value
during the Crimean War and
Indian Mutiny, 394 ; its effi
ciency, 395 ; incentives to
desertion from it, 394 ; reduc
tion of the embodied force,
396
— BUl, ii. 395 ; debate on, i.
I S4 ; postponement of its
introduction, ii. 395
— Estimates, the, ii. 424, 425,
426
— Law, u. 218
Milnes, Monckton, afterwards
Lord Houghton, U. 198
MUton, Mr., i. 385, 386, 410
Moberly, George, afterwards
Bishop of Sahsbury, his esti
mate of Sidney Herbert, i. 10 ;
goes abroad with Herbert, 1 1
Moldavia (see also Danubian
Principahties), is occupied by
Russian troops, i. 193
Molesworth, Sir Wilham, the
advanced Liberahsm of, i. 172;
his death, ii. 7
Moniteur, the, i. 452 ; pubhshes
the addresses of the French
Colonels, ii. 107
Monsell, Mr. (afterwards Lord
Emly), carries an address
hostile to the proposed amal
gamation of Sandhurst with
Woolwich, U. 383
Montalembert, i. 447
Montauban, General de, ii. 317 ;
at Shanghai, 328 ; visits
Lord Elgin at Ta-lien-Whan,
329 ; his objections to an
advance, 333, 336 ; his efforts
to follow up the enemy, 334 ;
demands the opening of a gate
at Pekin, 344, 345
Morning Chronicle, The, articles
in, on the state of the labouring
classes in England, i. no, in
Morning Post, The, ii. 22, 23 ; a
leader in, 5.5 : its case for the
Government, 57

Morocco Loan, ii. 406
Napier, Sir R., ii. 336 ; Lord
Canning's high opinion of him,
ii. 311 ; is in command of the
second division in China, 333 ;
attack on his division, 334
Napoleon, Louis, Lord Palmer
ston's distrust of him, i. 163 ;
considers the adoption of the
original Vienna Note impossi
ble, 186 ; he despatches the
French fleet to Salamis, 193 ;
his aims, 200, 201 ; rejects
the Austrian proposals at the
Vienna Conference, 423, 455 ;
his inclination to make peace
with Russia, ii. i, 16 ; his
attitude towards our remon
strances with Russia about
the Isle of Serpents, Kars, etc.,
50 ; his attitude towards
Russia, 57 ; his complaints of
Lords Clarendon and Cowley,
69 ; Orsini's attempt on his
hfe, 107"; his aggressive de
signs, 169 ; his perfidy, 178 ;
his speech to Baron Hiibner,
179 ; his foreign policy, 226 ;
suspicions as to his intentions,
298 ; his share in the creation
of the \^olunteer force, 386
National defence, Herbert's me
morandum on, ii. 218, 394
Naval Estimates of sixty years
ago, i. 27 ; Sir John Paking
ton's, ii. 168
— reforms, suggested by Her
bert, i. 28-32
Navigation Laws, i. 79 ; their
repeal, 121
Neapolitan affair, the, ii. 59
Nesselrode, Count, i. 185, 195
Newcastle, the Duke of, ii. 200 ;
is urged by Gladstone to
assume the leadership of the
Peelite party, i. 144 ; his letter
to Herbert on the leadership,
145 ; Lord John RusseU's
overtures to him, 146 ; his
attitude towards political par
ties, 161 ; his warhke tone.

470

INDEX

172 ; he remains Secretary for
War, 224 ; the assistance
rendered to him by Herbert,
226 ; supports enlistment of
foreigners, 238 ; an unjust cry
against him, 255 ; is in favour
of Herbert serving under Lord
Palmerston, 257 ; his exer
tions at the War Office during
the Crimean War, 302 ; ap
pointed Secretary for the
Colonies, ii. ; remonstrates
against statements made by
newspaper correspondents, 306 ;
his despatch to Lord Raglan,
315 ; supports Herbert's
views on hospital nursing, 337
Nice, the annexation of, by
France, ii. 240
Nicholas, Emperor of Russia,
accepts the Vienna Note, i.
178 ; his personal assurances
to Lord Westmorland, 186 ;
suggests a substitute for the
Vienna Note, 195 ; is sum
moned to evacuate Moldavia
and Wallachia, 199, 220 ;
his objects, 201 ; his death,
329
Nightingale, Florence, statement
by her as to the French medi
cal men at Scutari, i. 329 ; her
intimate acquaintance with
Mr. and Mrs. Herbert, 336 ;
she assumes command of a
private expedition of nurses,
336 ; is asked by Herbert to
take charge of the nurses being
sent to Scutari, 338 ; her ready
response, 341 ; her arrival at
Scutari, 343 ; her cordial re
ception, 346, 348 ; her com
plaints of the Purveying De
partment, 352, 361 ; her
energy and organising capa
city, 362 ; a satisfactory re
port from her, 364 ; her
objection to the despatch of a
second batch of nurses, 370 ;
sends home her resignation,
371 ; her gloomy view of
affairs, 379 ; her disclosures.

393 ; her great qualities, 404,
405 ; her exaggeration of
the faults of those who dis
agreed with her, 404 ; com
plaints from her, 416 ; the
direction of her censure, 420 ;
tries to dissuade Herbert from
accepting the Chair of the
Sanitary Commission, ii. 122,
123 ; her anger at the findings
of the Chelsea Board, 123 ;
is in constant communication
with Herbert, 124 ; her critic
ism of the War Office, 1 50 ;
her attitude towards Herbert's
scheme for an Army Medical
School, 366 ; her denunciation
of the War Office, 369, 371 ;
Herbert takes leave of her, 437
Norman, Mr. de, u. 347
Normanby, Marquess of, his
Irish pohcy, i. 24
Nursing institutions, refusal of
some to assist the Government
in providing nurses for the
Crimea, i. 342
Olmutz overture, the, i. 185-7
Omar Pasha, attacks the Russian
force in WaUachia, i. 197 ;
attacks WaUachia, 214
Order of Merit, the proposed, i.
305
Orloff, Count, i. 189, 190 ; his
manifest desire for peace, 217
Orsini, his attempt on the hfe of
Louis Napoleon, ii. 107
Osborne, Bernal, ii. 407, 408 ;
the Queen's disinclination to
his appointment as Under-
Secretary for War, ii. 405
— Hon. and Rev. S. G., his
description of what he saw at
Scutari, i. 349 ; his letter to
Herbert on his retirement from
the House of Commons, U. 413
Paget, Mr., is a witness before
the Army Sanitary Commis
sion, ii. 126
— Lord Clarence, ii. 201
Pahlen, Count, i. 151

INDEX

471

Pakington, Sir John, i. 163, 238 ;
his proffered support of the
Govemment, 242 ; his view
of the proposed Commission
of Inquiry into the Crimean
War, ii. 32 ; his Navy Estim
ates, 168
Palmer, Sir Roger, ii. 5 1
— RoundeU, unseated, ii. 75
Palmerston, Lord, as a foreign
Minister, i. 58 ; his meddle
some action, 60 ; his
" spirited " foreign policy,
123; his dismissal, 146; his
part in the debate on the
MUitia BiU, 155 ; his views
upon the state of parties,
162 ; he dissents from Glad
stone's budget of 1853, 171 ;
he deprecates changes in the
Parliamentary franchise, 171 ;
his views on the fortification
of the Channel Islands, 178,
179 ; eulogises the Turkish
Govemment, 202 ; his propo
sals in the event of the out
break of war, 203 ; he con
sents to the substance of Lord
Aberdeen's warning to Turkey,
211 ; jealousy between him
and Lord John RusseU, 212 ;
he speaks against Roebuck's
motion, 251 ; asks Lord Aber
deen's friends to join him in
forming a Cabinet, 251 ; his
position as a statesman, 254 ;
he gains some important in
formation on the defences of
Sebastopol, 272 ; his attitude
after the faUure of the Vienna
Conference, 449 ; his readiness
to make peace with Russia, ii.
I ; is master of his Cabinet,
6 ; his desire to continue the
war, 16 ; his turn for a warhke
policy but lack of genius for
war, 27 ; his leaning on
Austria, 50 ; his conduct and
methods, 53, 54 ; at Man
chester, 56, 57 ; his popu
larity, 59, 92 ; his NeapoUtan
and Russian policy, 59 ; his

position in the eyes of the
people, 68, 69 ; his successful
appeals to the country on Cob
den's Resolution upon China
being carried, 75 ; his position
as a leader, 80 ; his hatred of
reform, 89, 422 ; his unassail
able position on foreign policy
and finance, 90 ; his ascend
ency in the new Parliament,
98 ; his speech at the Mansion
House, 104 ; waning of his
popularity, 104-6 ; the over
throw of his Government, 107 ;
discussion raised by him on
the Italian question, 169 ; sus
pected of approaches to Lord
Derby, 180; lays aside his
aversion to Parhamentary re
form, 180; his attitude to
Lord John Russell, 181 ;
writes to Herbert with refer
ence to his conversation with
Lord John Russell, 190 ; his
speech at the Liberal meeting
at WilUs's Rooms, 198 ; is
wiUing to take office under
Lord Granville, 199 ; forms
a new Government, 199, 200 ;
his strenuous support of Her
bert, 208 ; the modification of
his sentiments towards Louis
Napoleon, 208 ; his eagerness
to carry the Fortification Loan,
253 ; his account of his inter
view with Gladstone upon
Herbert's offered resignation,
254 ; writes to Herbert as to
the delay in producing the
Estimates, 260 ; informs the
Queen of Gladstone's proposed
resignation, 285 ; writes to
Herbert on the Chinese War,
295 ; letter from him with
reference to the instructions
to Sir Hope Grant, 305 ;
suggests the insertion of a
paragraph in the instructions
to Sir H. Grant, 305 ;
suggests the giving of full
discretion to the commanders
in China, 314; his approval

472

INDEX

of Sir Hope Grant's destruc
tion of the summer palace
at Pekin, 350 ; his official
answer to Hert)ert's scheme
of mihtary education, 380 ;
his opposition to the pro
posed visit of Volunteers
to Paris, 392 ; his view of
Herbert's elevation to the
peerage, 403 ; his opinion of
Lord de Grey, 405 ; his views
as to the possible candidates
for the post of Under-Secre
tary for War, 406 ; urges
Herbert not to consent to any
reduction of the Army Esti
mates, 419, 420 ; his political
relations with Gladstone, 422,
423 ; his Itahan pohcy, 424 ;
consults Herbert as to our
forces in Canada, 429
tanmure. Earl of, i. 409, 414, 417,
ii. 46, 47 ; his letter of Febru
ary i2th, 1855, i. 316; his
difficulty over the instruction
of officers, u. 70 ; is accused
by Miss Nightingale of break
ing his promise to her and the
Crimean Commissioners, 123 ;
revokes his consent to the
formation of one of the pro
posed sub-Commissions arising
out of the Army Sanitary
Commission, 136 ; his preju
dices, 137 ; deprecates the
aboUtion of army purchase,
374 ; caUs on officers to
submit schemes for mihtary
education, 380 ; decides to
appoint a Council of MiUtary
Education, 380
Papal Aggression question, the,
i. 123, 131 ; action taken on
it by the Cabinet, 139
Paper duty, repeal of, ii. 238,
261, 282, 398
Parham, SaUy, i, 97 (note)
Paris, negotiations for peace at,
ii. 27, 66 ; the Treaty of, 38 ;
the real merit of the Treaty, 58
Parker, Mr., u. 154, 345
Parkes, Dr., is a witness before

the Army Sanitary Commis
sion, u. 126
ParUament, dissolution of, i. 22
ParUamentary franchise, changes
in, are deprecated by Lords
Palmerston and Lansdowne
and Mr. Gladstone, L 171
Parochial clergy, Herbert's in
terest in, i. IOI
Pasley, Sir Thomas, i. 3 n
Paulet, General Lord WiUiam,
i. 362, 369, 370, 393, 403;
writes to Herbert about the
hospitals at Scutari, 390 ; Miss
Nightingale's opinion of him,
409
PechUi, the commander of, begs
Lord Elgin to stop the war,
il- 335
Peel, Frederick, ii. 407, 410
— General Jonathan, votes
against 'the Report of Roe
buck's Committee censuring
the administration in England,
i. 446 ; moves the previous
question, which is carred when
Roebuck's motion comes on
for discussion, 456 ; succeeds
Lord Panmure' at the War
Office, U. 137 ; suggests the
postponement of active steps
as to estabhshing an Army
Medical School, 151; yields to
Herbert's protests, 155 ; draft
report addressed to him, 161 ;
his connection vrith the ques
tion of the necessity of defen
sive works, 276 ; graceful com
pUment to him, 355 ; his
attitude towards Herbert's
scheme for a medical school,
365 ; schemes submitted to
him for the reorganisation of
Sandhurst, 383 ; issues fresh
regulations as to the examin
ation of officers, 384 ; the
original War Office plan as to
Volunteers issued by him, 387
— Sir Robert, decUnes to present
to the House of Commons a
petition from the undergradu
ates of Oxford against the first

INDEX

473

Reform Bill, i. 14 ; is sum
moned by the King to form
a Ministiy, 19 ; adopts a
"Conservative" policy, 19;
offers Herbert Secretaryship
to the India Board, 19, 20 ;
resigns, 20 ; moves a \'ote of
want of confidence in Lord
Melbourne's Government, 27 ;
bis high opinion of Herbert,
32 ; vigour of his Cabinet, 39 ;
proposes the suspension of the
Corn Laws, 44 ; opposition in
the Cabinet to Ms views, 49 ;
characteristics of his policy,
54 ; break-up of his Cabinet,
56, 57 ; returns to office,
61 ; is anxicu5 to secure the
support of The Times, 62 ;
his views on the effect of the
repeal of the Corn Laws, 64 ;
defeat of his Cabinet, 64 ;
supports Herbert in his
efforts to reform the MiUtia,
70, 73 ; quits office, 77 ; his
attitude towards assisted emi
gration, 116; his position
after his resignation, 120 ; his
last speech, 1 24 ; his death,
125, 126
Peel, Sir Robert, third Baronet,
his speech ontheMilitia Bill, 155
Peelism, the extinction of, ii.
76-1 17
Peehte neutrahty, i. 91-129
PeeUtes, the, i. 131 ; leader
ship of, 144 ; Lord Derby's
relations with the Peelite
leaders, 160 ; their accord with
the Whigs, 161 ; divergence
of opinion amongst, ii. 52, 72,
78 ; their disapproval of Sir
J. Bowring's proceedings in
China, 73 ; insignificance of
their numbers, 75 ; their
amalgamation with the Liberal
party, 85-7 ; their extinction,
88
Peh-tang, landing effected at, ii.
330, 332
Peiho River, the, repulse of
a British force on, ii. 294, 296

Pekin, proposed march on, ii.
305. 3'3. 315. 341 ; its situa
tion, 325 ; arrival at, 343 ;
surrender of a gate at, 346 ;
the summer palace, 346 ;
atrocities committed on pris
oners, 347 ; destruction of the
summer palace, 349-5 1
Pelissier, General, his misunder
standings with Lord Raglan,
L450
Pembroke, George A., eleventh
Earl of, marriage of, i. 3 ;
death of, 7 ; serves as a
volunteer in Flanders, 8 ; his
influence, 8
— Lady, society at her house in
Grafton Street, i. 17 ; iUness
and death of, ii. 34
— Robert, twelfth Earl of,
romantic marriage of, i. 8 ;
his unfortunate career, 86 ;
iUness of, 148 ; his recovery,
151; his death, 152
Penefather, General, i. 299
Perekop, the Isthmus of, i.
274
Persia, declaration of war with,
U. 66 ; her concession of
British demands, 69
Persigny, Count, i. 450 ; at
Windsor, ii. 56
PhiUimore, J. G., U. 47 ; is un
seated, 75
Portsmouth, projected lines of
defence at, U. 316
traed, Mr., i. 20
Praslin, the Duke of, i. 8 1
Press, The, i. 450, ii. 14
Prince, the, loss of, i. 280, 281,
300
Probyn, Major, U. 334
Protestant bigotry, i. 39
Purchase. See Army Purchase
Purveying department, the, com
plaints of, L 352, 361, 381,
403 ; the staff, 385
Quarterly Review, The, article
on Kars, U. 27 ; article by
Gladstone on the " DecUning
Efficiency of Parhament,"

474

INDEX

5 3 ; a medium for Gladstone's
influence, 68
Raglan, Lord, a measure ur
gently demanded by him, i.
237 ; is supported by Herbert
and the Duke of Newcastle,
238 ; Herbert's defence of him,
241 ; Charles GrevUle's con
demnation of him, 243 ; the
thought he devoted to the
subject of clothing the Army,
279 ; complains of the in
efficiency of the Commissariat,
284 ; the " total insufficiency "
of his assistants, 302 ; his
satisfaction with his staff, 309
(note) ; the accusation that he
was too old to seek information
himself, 310, 311 ; aUeged in
efficiency of his subordinates,
313 ; distrust of him, 315 ;
the despatch addressed to him
by the Duke of Newcastle,
315 ; his dignified reply, 316 ;
the number of sick under his
command, 366 ; his misunder
standings with General PeUs-
sier, 450 ; his death, 450, 452 ;
Herbert's eulogy of him, U. 39
Ramsden, Sir. J., ii. 410
Reade, Mr., i. 361
Redan, the, failure of the assault
on, i. 447
Reeve's Memoirs, i. 243
Reform BiU, the first, petition
against it, i. 14
— of 1854, the, i. 227-30
— of 1859, the, U. 169 ; debate
on the second reading, 173 ;
prospects of, 267
Remington, Admiral, death of,
n. 4
Reserve squadron, the, i. 29
Resolute, the, wreck of, i. 276,
281
Ricardo, Mr., his suggestions as
to the Corn Laws, i. 52
— Mr. Osman, motion disap
proving the Turkish Loan, i. 456
Robertson, Dr., u. 127
Roebuck, Mr., his Resolution of

confidence in Lord Palmerston,
i. 124 ; his aUegations against
Prince Albert, 243 ; his mo
tion for an inquiry into the
conduct of the Crimean War,
245, 400 ; the Report of his
Committee, 271, 443-6 ; urges
Milner Gibson to persevere
with his motion, 429 ; his
motion censuring members of
Lord Aberdeen's administra
tion, 446 ; postponement of
the motion, 448 ; his motion
comes on for discussion, 455 ;
the previous question carried,
456 ; speaks at the Liberal
meeting at WiUis's Rooms, u.
198
Roman Catholics in Ireland,
concUiatory attitude of the
Government towards, i. 39
Ronciere, M. de la, i. 29
Rouen, Herbert's enthusiasm
over the beauty of, i. 12
Royal A Ibert, the, i. 3 n
— Commission, arrival of, in the
Bosphorus, i. 346 ; nugatory
work of, 393
— Naval School, Herbert's re
organisation of, ii. 375
RusseU, Lord John, advocates a
measure with reference to the
Corn Laws similar to that
proposed by Peel, i. 49, 51, 52 ;
is commissioned to form a
Cabinet, 55 ; his manifesto,
56 ; relinquishes the task of
forming a Ministry, 61 ; the
formation of his Cabinet, 67,
68 ; introduces a BiU to
make changes in the functions
of the Ecclesiastical Commis
sion, 107 ; his educational
pohcy, 122 ; his letter to the
Bishop of Durham, 131 ; his
attitude towards the Papal
aggression question, 131 et seq.;
his defeat on a motion by
Locke King, 140 ; his efforts
to form a reconstituted Cab
inet, 141 ; the weakening of
his administration, 146 ; his

INDEX

475

overtures to Graham, Herbert,
and the Duke of Newcastle,
146 ; his resignation, 147 ;
approaches Lord Aberdeen as
to the course to be pursued on
the reassembling of Parlia
ment, 160 ; his view of the
BiU for the renewal of the
East India Co.'s Charter, 172 ;
his faint support of Lord
Pcdmerston, 203 ; his wish to
modify Lord Aberdeen's coer
cive warning to Turkey, 211 ;
jealousy between him and
Lord Palmerston, 212 ; con
sents to the postponement of
the second reading of the
Reform BUl of 1854, 230 ; his
uncertain attitude, 233 ; his
toleration of intrigues at the
time of the Crimean War,
244 ; resigns his office of
Lord President of the
CouncU, 244, 245 ; visits
Paris, 245 ; suggests a modi
fication of the Army Board
proposed by Herbert, 245 ;
resigns on Roebuck's notice
of motion for a Committee of
Inquiry into the Crimean War,
245 ; faUs to form a new
Government, 251, 252 ; he
succeeds Herbert at the
Colonial Office, 269 ; his resig
nation, 400 ; concurs with,
but then rejects the Austiian
proposal at the Vienna Con
ference, 423 ; rumours of his
vrilUngness to make peace at
Vienna, 427 ; his speech on
Lowe's amendment, 442 ; at
tributes to Russia the blame
of continuing the Crimean
War, 453 ; his resignation,
454 ; his conduct at Vienna,
455 ; his opposition to Lord
Palmerston, U. 61 ; votes for
Cobden's vote of censure, 75 ;
his intention of bringing in a
Reform BiU, 89, 90 ; opposes
the first reading of the Con
spiracy BiU, 107 ; his over

tures to Herbert, 164 ; dis
cussion raised by him on the
Italian question, 169 ; re
quests Herbert to draft a
resolution condemning the
proposed abolition of votes of
405. freeholders in counties,
170 ; requests Herbert to
alter the wording of his draft,
172 ; his Resolutions on the
second reading of the Reform
Bill of 1859, 173 ; his Reso
lutions carried, 177 ; his
attitude to Lord Palmerston,
181 ; his correspondence
vrith Herbert on the fall of
Lord Derby, 181 et seq. ;
detaUs to Herbert a conversa
tion which he has held with
Lord Palmerston, 186 ; the
unsettled state of his mind,
i93> 19s ; declines to take
office under Lord Granville,
199 ; becomes Foreign Secre
tary, 200 ; his uneasiness at
the aid proffered by France
for the Chinese War, 300 ;
expresses his regret at Her
bert's retirement from the
House of Commons, 416 ; his
Reform Bill, 422 ; his letter
to Herbert about Mexico, 427 ;
his letter with reference to the
proposal to evacuate the Taku
forts, 430 ; his observations on
a draft by Herbert as to the
withdrawal of troops from
China, 432
Russell, WiUiam Howard, now
Sir, u. 3 ; his view of the
commissariat in the Crimea, i.
277
Russia, the Emperor of, accepts
the Vienna Note, i. 178 ;
declaration of war with, 178 ;
her quarrel with Turkey, 180 ;
her influence over the internal
administration of Turkey,
185 ; the Emperor's personal
assurance to Lord Westmor
land, 186; is summoned to
evacuate Moldavia and WaUa-

476

INDEX

chia, 199 ; proposed peace
terms between Russia and
Turkey, 216; her desire for
peace, ii. 16 ; her interior and
exterior policy, 19 ; is insti
gated by Bismarck to ignore
the Black Sea limitations im
posed by the treaty of peace, 23
St. Barnabas, Pimlico, the in
cumbent of, i. 157
Salamis, despatch of the French
fleet to, i. 193
Sahsbury, the Bishop of, ii. 434
Sandhurst, ii. 382 ; schemes for
the reorganisation of, 383, 385
Sang-ko-lin-sin, the camp of, ii.
344 ; the break-up of his army,
348
Sanitary Commission, the, ii.
118-36
Sardinia, alleged exclusion from
the proposed Paris Congress,
U. 56
Saturday Review, The, founding
of, ii. 6 ; article in it on
diplomacy, 14, 15 ; articles in
it by Herbert, 68
Savoy and Nice, the annexation
of, by France, ii. 240 ; causes
alienation of English feeling,
386
Scutari, i. 331-421 ; the chief
mihtary hospital at, 332 ;
number of patients in hospital,
332 ; state of the hospitals,
334 ; departure of the first
batch of nurses to, 342 ; des
patch of a second batch of
nurses to, 356 ; rapid increase
in the number of patients at,
356 ; the command at, 362 ;
improvement in hospital ad
ministration at, 379 ; origin of
the defects in the hospitals,
408 ; exaggeration of the in
efficiency of the staff, 409 ;
reforms ultimately effected,
410 ; progress of hospital re
form under Lord Palmerston's
Government, 411 ; Roman
Catholic sisters at, 412

Sebastopol, slow progress of the
siege, i. 234, 237 ; its reported
faU, 235 ; the resistance of,
271 ; land defences of, 271 ;
evacuation of, and return
of the garrison to, 273 ; its
faU, ii. I
Sentin, Baron, ii. 439
Seward, ii. 429, 430
Seymour, Danby, ii. 177
— Lord, i. 445, 446
— Sir G., i. 20X
Shanghai, conference o!£ British
and French Admirals and
Generals at, ii, 326
Silistria, the successful defence
of, L 235
Sillery, Commandant, i. 345,
346 ; his timidity,- 363
Simson, General, i. 450
Sinope, destruction of the
Turkish squadron at, i. 198 ;
result of the battle, 216
Smith, Sir Andrew, i. 384 ; his
alleged attitude towards The
Times Crimean Fund, i. 335 ;
his want of foresight and
initiative, 398 ; opposes Her
bert's proposal to have a
civiUan staff at Smjnrna, 398 ;
Miss Nightingale's opimon
of, 409 ; is a witness before
the Army Sanitary Commis
sion, ii. 126
— Su: F., i, 305
— Vernon, his speech at North
ampton, ii. 90
Smyrna, the hospital at, i.
332, 379 ; civUian staff at,
413
Smythe, Colonel, H.A., U. 271
Somerset, Lord Fitzroy, i. 74
— The Duke of, letter from him
to Herbert on the Fortifica
tions Loan, ii. 283
Spa, Herbert's arrival at, u. 437
Spain, disputed succession to the
throne of, i. 22 ; her probable
attitude in the event of war
between England and France,
ii. 241
Spence, Dr., i. 346

INDEX

47;

Spencer, Earl, death of, i. 19
" Stable " Hospital, the, i. 332
Staff CoUege, a, the creation of,
u. 382
Stanley, Lord (afterwards Earl
of Derby), his opinion of
Herbert's suggested naval re
forms, i. 32 ; declines to con
cur with Peel's proposals as
to the Corn Laws, 49 (note) ;
leaves Peel's Cabinet, 61 ; his
resolution condemning Palm
erston, 123, 124; liis efforts
to form a Government, 141 ;
predicts the dechne of party
influence, U. 175
— Mary, selects the first forty
nurses for the Crimea, i. 341 ;
takes charge of the second
batch of nurses sent out, 356 ;
arrives vrith her nurses at
Constantinople, 372 ; her ac
count of her visit to Florence
Nightingale, 373 ; refuses to
succeed Miss Nightingale, 375 ;
her character, 376 ; her influ
ence, 377 ; is placed in charge
of the hospital at KulaU, 378 ;
returns to London, 379 ;
amusing incident recorded by
her, 381 (note); vouches for
the comfort which the nurses
have been to the wounded,
397 ; her description of her
work at KulaU, 406
Steele, Dr., ii. 127
" Steele, Jack," his letters to
The Times, U. 101-3
Stewart, Admiral Houston, the
instructions to, i. 274
— Miss Shaw, i. 379 (note), 405 ;
Herbert thanks her for accept
ing charge of the special
hospitals for the vrives and
chUdren of soldiers, u. 362,
438
Storks, General, ii. 121
iitratford de RedcUffe, Lady, i.
365 ; Miss Nightingale's opinion
of, 409 ; Miss Stanley's praise
of,
— Lord, i. 187, 188, 393 ; sym

pathy with Turkey, 196 ; his
action with regard to the
despatch of the Turkish fleet
to the Black Sea, 198 ; re
sponsibility for the outbreak
of war, 201 ; delusion as to
the regeneration of the Turkish
Empire, 202 ; the instructions
to him, 213, 214; considers
The Times Relief Fund super
fluous, 348 ; his ignorance of
the state of the hospitals at
Scutari, 348, 349 ; Miss Night
ingale's opinion of him, 409 ;
his obstinacy, ii. 2
Straubenzee, General V., u. 313
Strzelecki, Count, i. 115, ii.
437
Sugar duties, the, Herbert speaks
on, i. 25
Sultan's Palace Hospital, the, i.
332
Sumner, Charles, ii. 230
Susse, Admiral de la, i. 29
Sutherland, Dr., ii. 121, 154
— the Duchess of, her pepara-
tions for entertaining the Em
press of the French, U. 407
Suttie, Sir George, i. 90
Taku Forts, the, the proposed
attack on, ii. 331 ; capture of,
337 ; evacuation of, 430
Talbot, Colonel, i. 90
Ta-lien-Whan, Sir Hope Grant's
arrival at, ii. 328 ; landing of
the British force, 329
Therapi^,, the hospital at, i. 332
Thesiger, Sir F., i. 141, ii. 169
Tientsin, the Treaty of, ii. 294 ;
the alhed forces reach, 341
Times, The, premature disclosure
by, of the proposed establish
ment of free trade in corn,
i. 61 ; article in, on Lord
John RusseU and the Austrian
dominion in Italy, 160 ; the
issue of rations to their corre
spondent, 306 ; violence and
abuse of, 308 ; contrast be
tween an article in The Times
and a letter from Mr. Delane

478

INDEX

to the Duke of Newcastle,
312 ; its mischievous repre
sentations, 316 ; denounces
the state of the hospitals at
Scutari, 334 ; gets up a fund
to supply the wants of the
Army in the Crimea, 335, 348 ;
exaggerated complaints of The
Times, 352 ; article and letter
dealing with the number of
deaths in hospital at Scutari,
380 ; its correspondent on the
state of the army, ii. 2, 3, 4, 6 ;
a peace article in, 1 5 ; attacks
the French Minister, 27 ; its
attitude on the question of the
Foreign Enlistment Act, 43 ;
its case for the Government,
57 ; the tone of the paper, 59,
60 ; its comment on the tone
adopted by the Foreign Office
towards Brazil, 66 ; its in
fluence, 79 ; on the rashness
of the Peiho River attack, 296
Todleben, General, i. 271 ; his
skiU, 273
Traktir, the battle of, i. 237
Treasury, the, i. 293, 294 ; dis
covery of a balance, ii. 266, 268
Trevelyan, Sir Charles, i. 292,
294 (note), 395
TuUoch, Colonel, ii. 28, 29 ; an
act of justice to him extorted
from the Government, 81
Turkey, Russia's influence over
the internal administration of,
i. 185 ; note presented to,
188 ; her determination to
declare war with RussW 196 ;
proposed peace terms beWeen
Russia and Turkey, 216 ; the
Christian population in, ii. 24 ;
the Sultan's efforts to resusci
tate, 436
Turkish Loan, the, i. 456
Turner, Commissary-General, ii.
345. 356
Vaillant, Marshal, i. 423
Vancouver Sound, ii. 428
Vane, Lord Harry, i. 428
Varna, transfer of the Army from

Varna to the Crimea, i. 275 ;
accumulation of stores at, 333
Vernon, G., is unseated, u. 75
Victoria, Queen, her poor opinion
of Lord Malmesbury, ii. 188 ;
her dislike of Lord Derby, of
Disraeli, and of Napoleon and
Russia, 188 ; her tact, 371
Vienna Conference, the, opening
of, i, 422 ; proposal made by
Austria, 423
— Note, the, i. 194, 195 ; ac
ceptance of, by the Emperor
of Russia, i. 178 ; rejection of,
185
Volunteers, called into existence,
ii. 207, 386, 387, 388, 390;
review of, in Hyde Park, 390,
391 ; review of them in
Edinburgh and at Knowsley,
391 ; their proposed visit to
Paris, 392
Walewski, ii. 58 ; his despatch,
109
WaUachia (see also Danubian
Principalities), is occupied by
Russian troops, i. 193 ; at
tacked by Omar Pasha, 214
Walter, John, is in favour of
assisted emigration i. 118
War, popular desire for, i. 217 ;
appointment of the Under-
Secretary for, ii. 405-10
— Office, the, proposes a fresh
Commission to report upon the
recommendations of the Sani
tary Commission, ii. 153 ;
Herbert's efforts to organise,
368 ; Miss Nightingale's de
nunciation of it, 369, 371
— Secretary of State, a, the
duties of i. 225 ; his relations
with the Sovereign, ii. 371
Ward, Mr., i. 361
Wear, Miss, i. 413
Wei-hai-wei, exposed position
of the harbour at, u. 328,
329
Wellesley, Admiral, U. 313
WelUngton, the Duke of. Sum
moned by the King to form a

INDEX

479

Ministiy, i. 19 ; his criticism
of the Royal Warrant im
proving the position of ser
geants in the .\rmy, 74 ; his
death, 175 ; his attitude to
wards military reform, 175 ;
step taken by him with refer
ence to military education, ii.
378
West Indian commands, reluct
ance of Generals to accept, ii.
433
Westminster, Marquess of, i. 115
— Review, The, Herbert con
tributes articles to, on bar
racks, ii. 140
Westmorland, Lord, at Olmutz,
i. 185 ; the Emperor of
Russia's personal assurances
to him, 186 ; despatch to him
on the Olmiitz proposal, 209 ;
sends some huts to Lord
Raglan, 369
Wetheral, Captain, i. 306
WetheraU, General, i. 300
Whamchffe, Lord, death of, i. 61
Whig Government, the, i. 19
Whigs, their accord with the
Peehtes, i. 161 ; their anti
pathy to the Aberdeen
Gk)vemment, 172 ; their atti
tude towards Lord John Rus
seU, 254 ; the aristocratic
Whigs, u. 165 ; attitude of the
Whigs on faU of Lord Derby's
Government, 198
Wilberforce, Bishop, i. 167 (note),
U. 418
WUham IV., death of, i. 22
WUliams, Rev. R., his article
in " Essays and Reviews," u.
434

Willis's Rooms, Liberal meeting
at, ii. 198
Wilton church, i. 99, 100
Wiseman, R.N., Captain Sir W.,
ii. 271
Wolseley, Colonel, ii. 333
Wood, Mr., motion by, i. 18
— Sir Charles, ii. n, 316;
dissents from Gladstone's
budget of 1853, i. 171 ; his
eagerness to maintain peace,
204 ; writes to Herbert on the
political differences of his
friends, 266 ; letter to him as
to the terms Russia would be
wiUing to accept, ii. 20 ; writes
to Herbert on the state of
affairs at the fall of Lord
Aberdeen's Government, 189,
192 ; becomes Secretary for
India, 200 ; his regret at
Herbert's retirement from the
House of Commons, 411
Woolwich, its proposed amalga
mation with Sandhurst, ii. 382
Woronzow, Catherine, Countess
of Pembroke, i. 3
— Prince, ii. 35; Herbert's in
tercourse with him, 48, 50 ;
his death, 61, 62
Wreford, Mr., i. 385, 386, 393,
395, 403, 413 ; Herbert's ener
getic instructions to him, i.
359
Yarmouth, a ridiculous quarrel
at, ii. 371
Young, G. F., his opposition to
assisted emigration, i. 118
— Sir John, U. 166, 167
Yuen-ming-Yuen, destruction of
the summer palace of, ii. 348

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