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LIFE

C A M P A I '&-&. S

GEOKGE B. M°CLELLAN

MAJOR-GENERAL U.S. ARMY.

G. S. HILLAED.

PHILADELPHIA:
J. B. LIPPINCOTT & CO.
1864.

Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1864, by
J. B. LIPPINCOTT & CO.
in the Clerk'a Office of the District Court of the United States for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

trmg of t\t %$tmmt,

WHOSE COURAGE, CONDUCT, AND PATRIOTISM
BEAR RECORD ALIKE TO THEIR OWN GLORY AND TO
THEIR UNSHAKEN DEVOTION TO THE

§.0M* (t5>mmnn&tv

WHO WAS PERMITTED, FOR A TIME, WITH CONSUMMATE
WISDOM AND ABILITY,
TO LEAD THEM ONWARD IN THE PATHS ALWAYS
OF HONOR AND OFTEN OF VICTORY.

PREFACE.

The purpose of this work is to exhibit General
McClellan's title to the gratitude and admiration
of his countrymen by simply telling them what
he has done. The treatment he has received has
made it, indeed, necessary sometimes to take the at
titude of controversy, and to assail others in order
to do him justice. But this has been done no more
than the interests of truth required.
G. S. H.
Boston, August, 1864.

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.
PAGE
Birth and Parentage — Early Education — West Point —
Enters the Army — Services in the Mexican War.... 9

CHAPTER II.
Fort Delaware — Captain Marcy's Expedition to the
Upper Bed Eiver — Texas — Pacific Railroad Sur
vey — Secret Expedition to the West Indies  81
CHAPTER III.
Military Commission to Visit Europe — Report on the
Armies of Europe — Retirement from the Army  69
CHAPTER IV.
The Campaign in Western Virginia in 1861  82
CHAPTER V.
Organization of the Army of the Potomac  104

(JHAPTER YL

Commencement of the Peninsular Campaign of 18G2.... 1.S3
7

8 CONTENTS.
CHAPTER VII.
PAOE
Siege of Yorktown — Battle of Williamsburg — March
to Richmond — Merrimac and Monitor — General Jack
son's Campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah —
Battle of Fair Oaks  169
CHAPTER VIII.
"The Seven Days"  232
CHAPTER IX.
The Army of the Potomac withdrawn from Richmond... 261
CHAPTER X.
Campaign in Maryland — Battle of South Mountain —
Battle of Antietam  280
CHAPTER XI.
Differences with the Administration — Removal from
the Command of the Army  307
CHAPTER XII.
Farewell to the Army — Reception at Trenton — Visit
to Boston in the Winter of 1863 — Oration at West
Point in June, 1864  330
CHAPTER XIII.
Concluding Reflections  348
APPENDIX.
Oration at West Point  375

LIFE

MAJOR-GENERAL MCCLELLAN.

CHAPTER I.

THE name of McClellan, common in many parts
of the United States, is borne by the descendants
of a Scotch family, the head of which was Lord
Kirkcudbright. The last nobleman of this name
died April 19, 1832, when tbe title became ex
tinct. Three brothers of the name emigrated to
America about the middle of the last century.
One went to Maine, one to Pennsylvania, and one
to Connecticut : from the last of these the subject
of this memoir is descended.
George Brinton McClellan was born in Phila
delphia, December 3, 1826. He was the third child
and second son of Dr. George McClellan, a distin
guished physician, a graduate of Yale College, and
the founder of Jefferson College, who died in May,
1846. His mother, whose maiden name was Eliza
beth Brinton, is still living. The eldest son, Dr.
J. H. B. McClellan, is a physician in Philadelphia ;
9

10 WEST POINT. [1842.
and the ^yoitngest, Arthur, is a captain in the
arrjjy',. attached to the staff of General Wright.
* The first school to which George was sent was
kept by Mr. Sears Cook Walker, a graduate of
Harvard College in 1825, and a man of distin
guished scientific merit, who died in January, 1853.
He remained four years under Mr. Walker's charge,
and from him was transferred to a German teacher,
named Schipper, under whom he began the study of
Greek and Latin. He next went to the preparatory
school of the "University of Pennsylvania, which
was kept by Dr. Crawford, and in 1840 entered
the University itself, where he remained two years.
He was a good scholar, and held a high rank in his
class, both at school and in college; but he was not
a brilliant or precocious lad. His taste was for
solid studies : he made steady but not very rapid
progress in every thing he undertook, but he had
not the qualities of mind that make the show-boy
of a school.
In June, 1842, he entered the Military Academy
at West Point, being then fifteen years and six
months old. He went there in obedience to his
general inclination for a military life. He had no
particular fondness for mathematical studies, and
was not aware that they formed so large a part of
the course of instruction at the Academy. Having
a modest estimate of his own powers and attain
ments, it was a source of surprise as well as pleasure
to him to find, at the examination in January, 1843,
that he was coming out one of the best scholars in
the class.

Age 15.] COURSE AT THE AC^D XM y.-7* ^

&&,

The Academy was at that time
of Colonel De Russey. Among his etal
several persons who have served with dliTiBTfilion
in the army of the United States, as well as some
whose mistaken sense of duty led them at the
breaking out of the civil war into the ranks of the
Confederates. Among these latter was that remark
able man, Thomas Jonathan Jackson, better known
by his far-renowned name of Stonewall Jackson,
who in his brief military career seems to have
foiriKinprl all ~thfl_jJjjish_pTirl hrilliflTip.y nf one of
Prince Rupert's Cavaliers^_wilL-th»--w.lifiiouB en-
thusiasm of one of Cromwell's Ironsides.
Toung McClellan was a little under the pre
scribed age when he entered the Academy; but his
manly character and sound moral instincts were
a sufficient protection against the dangers incident
to all places of education away from the pupil's
own home, and from which the vigilant care and
absolute power of the Government cannot entirely
guard the young men committed to its charge at
West Point. He showed at the start a more careful
intellectual training than most of the youths ad
mitted to the Academy. His conduct and bearing
throughout his whole course were unexceptionable.
His deportment then, as always, was singularly
free from that self-assertion which is frequently
seen, but not always pardoned, in men of superior
powers. He showed perseverance, a strong will,
and resolute habits of application. His acquisi
tions were not made without hard work, but, when
made, they were securely held. At the close of

12 PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS. [1864.
the course at West Point, he stood second in general
rank in the largest class which had ever left the
Academy. In Engineering and Geology he was first.
The highest scholar in the class was Charles G.
Stewart, now a major of engineers. He came out
first because he was more uniformly strict in
complying with the rules and regulations of the
Academy, as well as more attentive to its regular
studies? McClellan was graduated in the summer of
1846, before he had completed his twentieth year.
Eew young men have ever left West Point better
fitted by mental discipline and solid attainments
for the profession of arms than he. He had also a
precious gift of nature itself, in that sound health
and robust constitution which are large elements
of success in every department of life, but without
which distinction in a military career is almost
hopeless. He was of middle height, and his frame
was well proportioned, with broad shoulders and
deep chest. His muscular strength and activity
were very great, and all manly exercises came
easy to him. He was patient of heat and cold,
capable of severe and long-continued application,
and able to sustain fatigues and exposures under
which most men would have broken down. Such
he was at the age of twenty, and such he is now.
Aide's by strictly temperate habits, his body has
always been the active and docile servant of his
mind. In all the toils and exposures of his mili
tary life, in sickly climes and at sickly seasons,
he has preserved uninterrupted good health. He

Age 20.] MEXICAN WAR. 13
could to-day discharge with ease the duties of a
common soldier in any arm of the service ; and in
the shock of encountering steel, few men would
be more formidable, whether on horseback or on
foot. At the close of his student-life, a new impulse
had been given to the military spirit of the coun
try, and of the army especially, by the breaking
out, a few weeks previously, of the Mexican War.
The brilliant victories of Palo Alto and Resaca de
la Palma (May 8 and 9, 1846), gained against im
mense odds, had shed new lustre upon American
arms, and opened to the officers of the army the
prospect of a more congenial and animating em
ployment than the dreary monotony of a frontier
post or a harbor fort. McClellan went at once
into active service as brevet second lieutenant
of engineers, and was assigned to duty as junior
lieutenant of a company of sappers and miners*
* Sappers and miners form a part of the Corps of Engineers.
They are employed in building and repairing permanent forti
fications, in raising field redoubts and batteries, in making ga
bions and fascines, in digging trenches and excavating galleries
of mines during sieges, and also in forming bridges of rafts,
boats, and pontoons. Their duties require higher qualities,
mental and physical, than those of the common soldier. A
sapper and miner must have a strong frame, a correct eye,
steady nerves, and a certain amount of education. It may be
well to add, for the benefit of civilians, that gabions are baskets
made of twigs, which are filled with earth and used as screens
against an enemy's fire ; that fascines are bundles of twigs,
fagots, and branches of trees which are used to fill up ditches,
form parapets, &c. ; and that pontoons are a kind of flat-bot-
2
: t I \

14 SAPPERS AND MINERS. [1816.
then in the course of organization at West Point,
under charge of Captain A. J. Swift. The first
lieutenant was G. W. Smith, now a general in the
service of the Confederate States. Captain Swift
had studied the subject in Europe ; and he instructed
his lieutenants, and the latter drilled and exercised
the men. The summer was spent in training the
company, and in preparing their equipments and
implements. It was a branch of service till that time
unknown in our country, as since the peace of 1815
our army had had no practical taste of war, except
in an occasional brush with the Indians, where the
resources of scientific warfare were not called into
play. The duties in which Lieutenant McClellan now
found himself engaged were very congenial to him,
and he devoted himself to them with characteristic
ardor and perseverance. In a letter written in the
course ofthe summer to his brother, Dr. McClellan,
with whom his relations have always been of the
most affectionate and confidential nature, he says,
" I am kept busy from eight in the morning till
dinner-time. After dinner, I have to study sap
ping and mining until the afternoon drill, after
which I go to parade. After tea, we (Captains
Swift, Smith, and myself) generally have a con
sultation. Then I go to tattoo. The amount of
it is that we have to organize by the 1st of Sep
tember the first corps of engineer troops that have
tomed boat carried along with an army for the purpose of
making temporary bridges.

Age 20.] tampico. 15
ever been in the country. The men are perfectly
raw, so that we have to drill them; and we are now
(to-day) commencing the practical operations to
prepare us for the field. Smith and I have been
in the woods nearly all the morning, with tbe men,
cutting wood for fascines, gabions, &c. We have
now fifty men, and fine men they are too. I am
perfectly delighted with my duties."
Lieutenant McClellan sailed with his company,
seventy-one strong, from New York, early in Sep
tember, 1846, for Brazos Santiago, and arrived there
immediately after the battle of Monterey. They
then moved to Camargo, where they remained
for some time. Thence they were transferred to
Matamoras in November, and from this point
started on their march to Victoria, under the
orders of General Patterson. Before leaving Ma
tamoras, Captain Swift was taken ill, and the
company was left under command of Lieutenant
Smith. At Victoria the company joined the forces under
General Taylor, and were assigned to the division
of regulars under command of General Twiggs,
with whom, in January, 1847, they marched to
Tampico. The distance from Matamoras to Tam
pico is about two hundred miles. The intervening
country is unfavorable for the march of an army;
and every thing necessary for the support of the
troops had to be carried with them. The sappers
and miners found frequent occasion for the exercise
of their skill in making and repairing roads and
bridges. They did excellent service, and were as-

16 VERA CRUZ. [J847.
sisted by men detailed from other corps, for that
purpose, from time to time.
The company arrived at Tampico in the lattor
part of January, and remained there about a month,
and then sailed for Vera Cruz. They landed,
March 9, with the first troops which were disem
barked, and immediately began to take an active
part in all the operations of the siege. The officers
and men did a large part of the reconnoitring
necessary to determine the plan of the siege, the
officers reporting immediately to Colonel Totten,
the chief of engineers, and executing in detail the
works subsequently prescribed by orders from
head-quarters. The corps of engineers, including
the company of sappers and miners, encountered
great difficulties in drawing the lines of invest
ment and in constructing batteries, arising from
the nature of the ground, which was broken into
innumerable hills of loose sand, with dense forests
of chapparal between. In common with all the
troops, they suffered from scarcity of water and
the excessive heat of the weather. But nothing
could exceed the zeal of the officers or the cheerful
obedience of the men. Their valuable services
were duly recognized by the able and accomplished
chief of the department of the service to which
they were attached, as appears by a letter addressed
to the commander-in-chief, as follows : —
Camp Washington, before Vera Cruz, 1
March 28, 1847. j
Sir: — Before leaving camp with the despatches in
which you inform the President of the United States of

a°e 20.] VERA CRUZ. 17
the brilliant success which has attended your attack
upon this city and the Castle of San Juan d'Ulloa, I
seize a moment to solicit your attention to the merits and
services of the officers of engineers who have been en
gaged in that attack.
If there he any thing in the position, form, and arrange
ment of the trenches and batteries, or in the manner of
their execution, worthy of commendation, it is due to the
ability, devotion, and unremitting zeal of these officers.
By extraordinary and unsparing efforts, they were en
abled, few as they were, to accomplish the work of many ;
and, so far as the success of your operations before this
city depended on labors peculiar to thair corps, no words
of mine can overrate their services.
The officers thus engaged are Major John L. Smith,
Captains E. E. Lee and John Sanders, First Lieutenants
J. L. Mason, P. Gr. T. Beauregard, and I. I. Stevens, Se
cond Lieutenants Z. B. Tower and Gr. W. Smith, Brevet
Second Lieutenants Gr. B. McClellan and J. Gr. Foster.
The obligation lies upon me also to speak of the highly
meritorious deportment and valuable services of the sap
pers and miners attached to the expedition. Strenuous
as were their exertions, their number proved to be too
few, in comparison with our need of such aid. Had their
number been fourfold greater, there is no doubt the labors
of the army would have been materially lessened and the
result expedited.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obe
dient servant, Jos. Gr. Totten,
Colonel and Chief Engineers.
Majoe-General W. Scott,
Commanding the Army qfthe United States, Mexico.
The city of Vera Cruz and Castle of San Juan
d'Ulloa were surrendered to the American forces
2*

18 CEEBO OOEDO. [1847.
on the 29th day of March, 1847, the articles of
capitulation having been signed two days before.
On the 8th of April, the army, with the exception
of a regiment of infantry left behind to serve as a
garrison, began its march into the interior, num
bering in all about eight thousand five hundred
men. They were soon made to feel that their
path of progress was not without difficulties and
dangers. At Cerro Gordo, sixty miles from Vera
Cruz, a Mexican army, thirty-five thousand strong,
under the command of General Santa Anna,
was found posted in a mountain-pass, a position
of great natural strength, fortified and defended
by powerful batteries, bristling with cannon. But.
in spite of superior numbers and of almost im
pregnable defences, the enemy's position was as
saulted and carried, and his forces utterly routed,
on the 18th of April, by the American army, in
one of the most brilliant battles on record, in
which the skilful plans of the commander-in-chief
were carried out and crowned with success by the
zeal and energy of all the subordinate officers and
the splendid courage of the men. The company
of sappers and miners had reached the place on
the day before the battle, and shared in the dangers
and honors of the field. Lieutenant McClellan,
with ten of his men, was with General Pillow's
brigade on the left, with directions to clear away
the obstacles in front of the assaulting columns.
This was a service of no common danger, as the
heavy and well-served Mexican batteries in front
swept the space before them with a most destructive

Age 20.] AM0Z0QUE. 19
fire, under which Pillow's command, mostly com
posed of volunteers, reeled and fell into confusion.
General Pillow, in his official report to the com
mander-in-chief, says, " Lieutenants Tower and
McClellan, of the Corps of Engineers, displayed
great zeal and activity in the discharge of their
duties in connection with my command."
After the battle of Cerro Gordo, Lieutenant
McClellan accompanied the advance corps under
General Worth on the march to Puebla, passing
through Jalapa and Perote, and arriving at Amo-
zoque, a small town twelve miles from Puebla, on
the 13th of May. Our officers did not dream of
finding any portion of the enemy here, and the
usual precautions adopted to guard against surprise
were somewhat relaxed. On the morning of the
14th, the soldiers were busily occupied in cleaning
their arms and accoutrements, in order that they
might enter Puebla in good trim, when a drummer-
boy, who had strayed in advance of the pickets,
ran in and gave the alarm that the enemy was
approaching in force. The staff-officers mounted
and galloped to the front, and discovered the ad
vance of a body of Mexican lancers from twenty-
five hundred to three thousand in number. The
long roll at once called the troops to arms, and the
different regiments were quickly paraded. Lieu
tenant McClellan, who was in a house on the side
of the town nearest the enemy, at once sprang
upon his horse and rode out to observe them.
After riding a few hundred yards, at the turn of a
street he came upon a Mexican captain of cavalry

20 PUEBLA. [1847.
riding into the town to reconnoitre. Each was
alone, and both were armed with sabres and pistols.
The Mexican officer turned; but his opponent, being
better mounted, pursued, overtook him, and com
pelled him to surrender. The two went back toge
ther, and, while on their way, the Mexican officer
suddenly put spurs to his horse and attempted to
draw his pistol; but Lieutenant McClellan caught
him again, and gave him to understand that if he
renewed the attempt to escape, he should be obliged
to put a bullet through him. After this the two
rode together quietly, and Lieutenant McClellan
surrendered his prisoner to his commanding officer.
The Mexican cavalry were checked by the well-
served guns of our artillery, and retired without
doing us any damage.
At Puebla a pause of several weeks was made
in the progress of the army, in order that its
numbers might be increased by reinforcements and
that due preparations might be made for a march
upon the city of Mexico. And here seems a fitting
place to introduce that portion of the official
annual report of Colonel Totten to the Secretary
of War in which he speaks of the services of the
company of sappers and miners and their officers,
though it was not drawn up until a somewhat later
period : —
" The law adding the company of sappers, miners,
andpontonniers (otherwise called engineer soldiers)
to the Corps of Engineers, was passed on the 15th
of May, 1846. On the 11th of October following,
this company, seventy -two strong, landed at Brazos

Age20.] COLONEL TOTTEN'S REPORT. 21
Santiago; having in the interim been enlisted by
great exertions on the part of several engineer
officers, and been organized and drilled by Captain
A. J. Swift and Lieutenants G. W. Smith and Mc
Clellan, of the Corps of Engineers. The captain
being disabled by sickness at Matamoras, Lieu
tenant Smith led the company, as part of Major-
General Patterson's division, in the march from
that place to Tampico, — a march in which the
services of the company, constantly in advance
and engaged in removing impediments and making
the road practicable, were of great value. The
company landed with the first line on the beach at
Vera Cruz, being then again under the command of
Captain Swift ; who, in his desire to lead in its dan
gers and toils, strove nobly, but vainly, against an
inexorable disease. A too ardent sun prostrated
him at once, depriving the country of his services
at a moment when his high and peculiar attain
ments would have been of the greatest value.
During the siege of Vera Cruz, I was a witness to
the great exertions and services of this company,
animated by, and emulating, the zeal and devotion
of its excellent officers, Lieutenants Smith, Mc
Clellan, and Foster. Since the surrender of that
place, we have no official accounts giving the par
ticular employments or engagements of the com
pany. We know only that it has been on the march
with General Scott's army to the city of Mexico.
I will venture to say, however, that the oppor
tunities of that service have been profited of, by
the sergeants and rank and file, as well as by tho

22 MARCH TO MEXICO. [1847.
commissioned officers, to display the highest qua
lities as soldiers, demonstrating, at the same time,
the great advantage to armies, however engaged
in the field, of possessing troops well grounded in
the peculiar exercises of engineer soldiers."
On the 7th of August the American army, num
bering not quite eleven thousand men, began their
march from Puebla, starting upon an enterprise
which would have been pronounced extremely
rash bad it not been crowned with success, but
which, having been successful, ranks among the
most daring and brilliant in the annals of war.
A mere handful of men, volunteers and regulars,
undertook to capture a city of nearly two hundred
thousand inhabitants, strong in its natural defences,
and protected by numerous works, constructed by
able engineers, in conformity with the most ap
proved rules of military science. Around it was
distributed an army of thirty-five thousand men,
composed of regular troops and volunteers, and
comprising artillery, cavalry, and infantry. These
were by no means despicable soldiers, and they
often fought with a courage which extorted the
respect of their enemies. Their artillery in par
ticular was well served and effective, as our troops
often learned to their cost. The weak points in
the Mexican army were the want of courage and
want of capacity in its officers, just as the weak
point in the civil history of that unhappy country
has been the want of rulers who were at once
honest and able. Had the Mexican officers been
men and soldiers like our own, history might have

Age 20.] VALLEY OF MEXICO. 23
had a different record to make upon the event of
the Mexican War.
Lieutenant McClellan's company of sappers and
miners was attached to the second division of re
gulars, under command of General Twiggs, which
formed the advance of the army. Soon after
leaving Puebla, they were joined by General Scott,
the commander-in-chief. Our troops entered the
Valley of Mexico on the 10th, and General Scott
fixed his head-quarters for the time at Ayotla, a vil
lage on the northeastern edge of the Lake of Cbalco,
about nine miles east of the fortified position of
El Penon, which was carefully reconnoitred on the
12th and its great strength fully discovered. On
the next day, another reconnoissance was pushed
upon the route by Mexicalcingo. This was pro
nounced by General Scott the most daring recon
noissance of the whole war, as the small corps of
observation was obliged to pass close by the strong
position of El Pefion and to leave it for a con
siderable space in the rear. In both of these re-
connoissances Lieutenant McClellan took part; and
in one of them he was saved from probable death
or captivity at the hands of about a dozen Mexican
lancers by Lieutenant Beauregard and three dra
goons. When, in consequence of the great strength of
the defences at El Penon, the project of advancing
upon Mexico by the great road from Puebla, and
assaulting it upon the eastern side, was abandoned,
and it was determined to march round the south
ern shore of Lake Chalco and attack the city on

24 BATTLE OF CONTRERAS. [1847.
the south and west, the company of sappers and
miners was transferred to General Worth's divi
sion, which now took the lead, and the company
moved at its head to San Augustin, occasionally
repairing the roads as far as was practicable. As
soon as General Santa Anna learned this movement
of the American forces, he withdrew the greater
portion of his troops, with several pieces of artil
lery, from El Penon and Mexicalcingo, where he
had been expecting the first shock of battle, and,
establishing his head-quarters at the hacienda (ham
let) of San Antonio, began to labor upon the lines
of defence in that vicinity.
On the morning of the 18th, General Worth's
division was moved forward a couple of miles on
the causeway leading from San Augustin to San
Antonio, and took up its position in front of the
latter place, the men encamping on both sides of
the road. Here a careful reconnoissance was made
of the defences of San Antonio, in which Lieu
tenant McClellan took part. His company was
then transferred to General Twiggs's division, and
moved at its head, across the Pedregal, to Con-
treras. During the first day of the battle of Con-
treras (August 19), Lieutenant McClellan, while
reconnoitring, ran into a Mexican regiment, and
had his horse shot under him by a musket-ball.
On the same day, while posting Magruder's bat
tery, he had another horse killed under him by a
round shot. Still later, while in temporary com
mand of a section of the same battery whose officer
had been mortally wounded, he was knocked down

Age 20.] PAUIERNA. 2.5
by a grape-shot which struck plump upon the hilt
of his sword. " Stonewall" Jackson, who belonged to
Magruder's battery, relieved Lieutenant McClellan
from command of the section, and the latter then
took charge for some time of a battery of mountain-
howitzers whose officer had been wounded, and,
after a day of severe toil and great exposure, re
joined his company, which was at San Geronimo, a
small village on the western edge ofthe Pedregal,*
a little north of Contreras.
At a very early hour the next morning (August
20) the intrenched camp of General Valencia at
Padierna was stormed and carried at the point
of the bayonet by tbe left wing of the American
army, under the command of General P. F. Smith.
This was the battle of Contreras, of Avhich Gene
ral Scott saj'S, in his official report, " I doubt
whether a more brilliant or decisive victory —
taking into view ground, artificial defences, bat
teries, and the extreme disparity of numbers,
without cavalry or artillery on our side — is to be
found on record." In this battle Lieutenant Mc-
Clellan's company of sappers and miners led Gene
ral Smith's brigade of regulars in its attack on the
flank of the enemy, and is thus mentioned in the
report already quoted from : — " In the mean time,

* The Pedregal is a field of broken lava, about nine miles
BOuth of Mexico, nearly circular in form, and about two miles in
diameter, entirely impracticable for cavalry or artillery except
by a single mule-path, and only practicable for infantry at a,
few point3.

26 REPORT OF GENERAL TWIGGS. [1847.
Smith's own brigade, under the temporary com
mand of Major Dimmick, following the movements
of Riley and Cadwallader, discovered opposite to
and outside of the works a long line of Mexican
cavalry, drawn up as a support. Dimmick, having
at the head of tho brigade the company of sappers
and miners under Lieutenant Smith, engineer, who
had conducted the march, was ordered by Bri
gadier-General Smith to form line faced to the
enemy, and, in a charge against a flank, routed the
cavalry.'' In the reports of the officers immediately com
manding, honorable mention is made of Lieutenant
McClellan and his corps. General Twiggs says,
" Lieutenant G. B. McClellan, after Lieutenant
Callender was wounded, took charge of and managed
the howitzer battery (Lieutenant Reno being de
tached with the rockets) with judgment and suc
cess, until it became so disabled as to require
shelter. For Lieutenant McClellan's efficiency and
gallantry in this affair, I present his name for the
favorable consideration of the general-in-chief."
And again, " To Lieutenant G. W. Smith, of the
engineers, who commanded tbe company of sappers
and miners, I am under many obligations for his
services on this and many other occasions. When
ever his legitimate duties with the pick and spade
were performed, he always solicited permission to
join in the advance of the storming-party with
his muskets, in which position his gallantry, and
that of his officers and men, was conspicuously
displayed at Contreras as well as Cerro Gordo."

Age 20.] CH APULTEPEC. 27
General P. F. Smith, in his report, says, "Lieu
tenant G. W. Smith, in command of the engineer
company, and Lieutenant McClellan, his subaltern,
distinguished themselves throughout the whole of
the three actions. Nothing seemed to them too bold
to be undertaken, or too difficult to be executed;
and their services as engineers were as valuable
as those they rendered in battle at the head of
their gallant men."
General Smith, it will be noticed, speaks of " three
actions" in which the officers of the company of
sappers and miners distinguished themselves. These
include the battle of Churubusco, which was fought
I o
on the same day (August 20) with the battle of
Contreras, and in which the company took part,
both in the preliminary reconnoissances and in the
conflict itself.
After the battles of Contreras and Churubusco,
hostilities were suspended by an armistice which
lasted till September 7. On the 8th the severe
and bloody battle of Molino del Rey was fought,
at which Lieutenant McClellan was not present.
On the 13th the Castle of Chapultepec was taken
by assault, in which also he did not take part, but
during the night ofthe 11th, and on the 12th, he built
and armed, mostly in ojjen daylight and under a
heavy fire, one of the batteries whose well-directed
and shattering fire contributed essentially to the
success of the day.
Immediately after the fall of Chapultepec, and
on the same day, the company of sappers and
miners was ordered to the front, and took the lead

28 SAN COSME GARITA. [1847.
of General Worth's division in one of tho most
difficult and dangerous movements of the assault
upon the city of Mexico, — the attack of the San
Cosme garita, or gate. Of the nature of the im
portant services performed by the company and its
officers at this point, and also after the capture of
the city, a correct notion may be formed from the
statement contained in the report of Major J. L.
Smith, of the Engineer Corps : —
" Lieutenant G. W. Smith, commanding the sap
pers, arrived on the ground some time after this,
while our troops were in front of the battery at
the garita, — the other batteries on the road up to
that point having been carried. Being the senior
engineer present, he was ordered to reconnoitre in
front and ascertain the state of the enemy's forces,
and particularly whether it would be necessary to
move our heavy artillery forward. He reported
his opinion that the advancing of the heavy pieces
should be suspended, and that the sappers should
advance under cover of the houses, by openings
made in the walls of contiguous houses; and, this
being approved, he proceeded, in the manner pro
posed, until he reached a three-story house about
forty yards from the battery, and was enabled
from the roof to open a fire upon the battery which
drove away the enemy's troops, who in their re
treat succeeded in carrying away one of the guns.
Part of his force then descended to the road to
secure the battery, but was anticipated by a body
of our troops, which entered on the right as the
Bappers were about entering on the left. The sap-

Age 20.] STREET-FIGHTING. 29
pers were then moved forward until they reached
strong positions on both sides of tho rear, capable
of affording shelter to our troops, although the
enemy occupied in force a large convent, one hun
dred and fifty 3rards in advance, and had batteries on
the next cross-street. These facts being reported,
a brigade was sent to occupy the strong positions
referred to, and at ten p.m. further operations wero
suspended for the night.
" At three o'clock next morning, a party of the
sappers moved to the large convent in advance,
and found it unoccupied. Lieutenant McClellan
advanced with a party into the Alameda, and re
ported at daylight that no enemy was to be seen.
The sappers then moved forward, and had reached
two squares beyond the Alameda, when they were
recalled. The company during the day, until
three p.m., were engaged in street-fighting, and
particularly in breaking into houses with crow
bars and axes. In this service they killed a
number, and made prisoners of many suspicious
persons. "Lieutenant McClellan had command ofthe com
pany for a time in the afternoon, while Lieutenant
Smith was searching for powder to be used in
blowing up houses from which our troops had been
fired upon, contrary to the usages of war. During
this time, while advancing the company, he reached
a strong position, but found himself opposed to a
large force of the enemy. He had a conflict with
this force, which lasted some time; but the ad
vantage afforded by his position enabled him at
3*

30 SAN COSME GARITA. [1847.
length to drive it off, after having- killed more than
twenty of its number."
A few words may here be added, to explain a
little more in detail the proceedings of the sappers
and miners in making their way through the houses
to which Major Smith refers. At the gate of the
city a powerful and well-served battery swept the
street with continued discharges of grape-shot, so
that it was impossible to move down directly in
front of it. The problem was to take the battery or
to drive the Mexicans from their guns. The houses
on both sides were built mostly in continuous blocks,
with an occasional interval or vacant lot. The walls
ofthe houses were oi adobe, or light volcanic stone.
The operation of breaking through them was thus
conducted. A detachment ofthe sappers and miners,
led by an officer, entered a house at the outer end
ofthe street, with the proper tools and implements,
and made a breach in the party or division wall large
enough for a man to go through to the next house,
and so on successively. Lieutenant McClellan led
the party on one side ofthe street. It was a highly
dangerous service, as every house had Mexican
soldiers in it, and there was continuous fighting
until the Americans drove out the occupants. It
was Lieutenant McClellan's duty — or at least he
considered it to be so — to pass first into the open
ing. In one instance, where it was necessary to
cross a vacant space between two houses which
did not join, he nearly lost his life by falling into
a ditch of stagnant water. The party at length
forced thoir way through the houses till they

Age 21.] CLOSE OF THE MEXICAN WAR. SI
reached those which overlooked the battery, and
where they could fire upon the Mexicans who
manned the guns. These having been shot or
driven away, the Americans descended from the
houses, took the guns, and turned them on the
gate, which was forced, and the city entered.
On the 14th day of September, 1847, General
Scott, with six thousand five hundred men, the
whole of his effective army remaining in the field,
entered and took possession of the city of Mexico.
With the exception of a few slight skirmishes,
this was the close of the war in that part of the
country.

CHAPTER II.

No minute and detailed account has been given
of those military operations in Mexico in which
Lieutenant McClellan was engaged, — which, indeed,
could not have been done without swelling this
part of the memoir to a disproportionate bulk.
Our aim has been merely to present a continuous
and intelligible narrative of what was done by him.
The movements of the campaign, its sieges, assaults,
and battles, were planned by others; and he can
claim no higher merit — though this is not incon
siderable — than that of having faithfully executed
the orders received from his superiors in rank. Nor
has the moral element involved in the Mexican War
— the question how far it was provoked or unpro-

32 TACTICS OF THE MEXICAN WAR. [1847.
voked, or how far we were right or wrong — been
taken into consideration. Such an inquiry has now
become as obsolete as would be a discussion of the
moral judgment to be passed upon the conspirators
who took the life of Julius Csesar. But no candid
person, whatever he may think of the merits of
the contest, can deny that the conduct of the war
and its results reflected the highest honor upon the
courage of the American army, both regulars and
volunteers, as well as upon the skill and accom
plishments of our officers. Not that there were not
grave errors committed, both at Washington and
in the field; not that the volunteers did not some
times show the infirmities of raw troops; but these
shadows in the picture were as nothing to its lights.
The whole campaign was especially remarkable for
the brilliant, dashing, and reckless courage dis
played in it, — for that quality which the French
call elan, which is so captivating to civilians, and
for the want of which so much fault has been found
with our officers and soldiers in the present civil
war. But the tactics in the Mexican War were
founded upon and regulated by an accurate know
ledge of the enemy; and the distinguished and
veteran soldier who led our armies in that cam
paign would never have taken the risks he did had
the Mexican soldiers been like those in the South
ern army, and the Mexican officers men like Lee,
Johnston, Jackson, and Beauregard.
The public mind judges of military movements
and of battles by the event : the plan that fails is
a bad plan, and the successful general is the great

Age21.] TACTICS OF THE MEXICAN WAR. 33
general. Without doubt, this is a correct judgment
in the long run; but in particular cases the rule
could not always be applied without injustice.
Hannibal was defeated by Scipio at Zama, and
Napoleon was defeated by the Duke of Welling
ton at Waterloo; but it does not follow that Scipio
was a greater general than Hannibal, or the Duke
of Wellington than Napoleon. Mexico was taken
by a series of rapid and daring movements, and
Richmond has not yet been taken; and thus the
inference is drawn that, had the latter city been
assailed in the same way as the former was, it too
would have fallen, as Mexico did. But those who
reason thus forget the sharp lesson we learned at
Bull Run, — a disastrous battle forced upon the army
by a popular sentiment which ignorantly clamored
for the dash and rapidity which accomplished such
brilliant results in the Valley of Mexico. Nelson
won the battle of Aboukir by a very daring and
dangerous plan of attack, which had the good for
tune to be successful. Cooper, in his preface to the
last edition of "The Two Admirals," says that had
he attacked an American fleet in the same way he
would have had occasion to repent the boldness of
the experiment; but then Nelson, who, like all great
commanders, was a man of correct observation and
sound judgment, would probably not have tried such
an experiment with an American fleet.
To Lieutenant McClellan his year of active ser
vice in Mexico was of great value in his professional
training; for it was a period crowded with rich op
portunities for putting into practice the knowledge

34 LIEUT. MCCLELLAN'S CONDUCT. [1848.
he had gained at West Point, and which was still
fresh in his mind. The corps of engineers at
tached to the army was so small that much work
was of necessity exacted from each officer, and
higher responsibilities were devolved upon the
younger men than would have been the case in
any European army. Lieutenant McClellan had an
unusually large experience both of field-work and
in the investment of fortified places. And it is no
more than just to him to add that he proved him
self equal to every trust laid upon him. His know
ledge of his profession was shown to be thorough,
exact, and ready, and his coolness and self-possession
on " the perilous edge of battle" was like that of
the bronzed veteran of a hundred fights. The num
ber of men in our country — indeed, in any country
— competent to pass a correct judgment upon mili
tary measures and military men, is not large; but
upon this select body Lieutenant McClellan bad
made his mark during the Mexican War, and he
was recognized by them as a soldier upon whose
courage, ability, and devotion his country might
confidently repose in her hour of need.
Lieutenant McClellan remained with his com
pany in the city of Mexico, in the discharge of
garrison-duty, till May 28, 1848, when they were
marched down to Vera Cruz and embarked for
home, arriving at West Point on the 22d of June.
After his return he was brevetted first lieutenant for
conduct at Contreras, and afterwards captain for
conduct at Molino del Rey, which latter honor he
declined, as he had not been present in the battle.

Age 24.] RETURN TO WEST POINT. 35
He was afterwards brevetted captain for conduct
in the capture of Mexico, and his commission was
dated back to that period.
Upon his return, his company was stationed at
West Point, and he remained there with them till
June, 1851, much of the time in command. His
leisure hours were spent in studies connected with
his profession. Among other things, he prepared
an elaborate lecture upon the campaign of Napoleon
in 1812, which was read before a literary society.
Of this discourse he thus speaks in a letter to his
sister-in-law: — "Well, it is over at last; and glad
I am of it. I read the last part of my Napoleon
paper last night. I have been working hard at it
ever since my return, and the ink was hardly dry
on the last part when it was read. The affair
amounted to one hundred and eleven pages in all ;
and they compliment me by saying that it gave a
clear explanation ofthe campaign: so I am con
tented. I hardly know, but I have an indefinite idea
that we have had fine weather since I returned. I
have some indistinct ideas of sunshine, and some of
rain; but I have been so intently occupied with the
one subject that I have thought of but little else.
Now I must go to work with my company. I've
enough to do to occupy half a dozen persons for a
while; but I rather think I can get through it. I
have had no time to read any of Schiller; but now
I will go at it. I have some thought of writing a
paper on the Thirty Years' War for our club."
His familiar letters breathe a strong desire for a
more stirring and active life than that he was now

36 MANUAL OF BAYONET EXERCISE. [1849
leading, the monotony of which was the more
keenly felt from its contrast with the brilliant ex
citements of the Mexican campaign. In one of his
letters he tells his correspondent that his highest
pleasure is to fall in with some comrade of the war,
and talk over its hardships, perils, and successes
and revive their impressions ofthe glorious scenery
of Mexico. And yet he was never idle. Here is a
specimen of his habits of work, taken from a letter
to his brother, Dr. McClellan, dated January 10,
1849 : — " On Christmas dajr, orders were received
here from the Chief Engineer, requiring plans and
estimates for several buildings to be furnished him
for the Military Committee of the House, by to
day at latest. Among those required was a barrack
for our company ; and I had to make all the draw
ings : the barrack had to be planned and drawn in
the short time allotted; and from two weeks from
to-day until last Saturday night at twelve o'clock,
I drew everjr day, morning, afternoon, and night,
working Sundays, New-Year's day, and all. I had
to make eight different drawings on the same large
sheet, fifty-two inches by thirty-two, all drawn ac
curately to a scale, all the details, &c. painted : so,
you may imagine, I had my hands full."
In the winter of 1849-50, he prepared for tho
use of the army a Manual of Bayonet Exercise,
mostly taken from the French of Gomard. This
was submitted by General Scott, the commander-in-
chief, to the Secretary of War, in which he strongly
recommended its being printed for distribution to
the army, and that it should be made, by reo-ula-

Age25.] RED RIVER EXPEDITION. 37
tion, a part of the system of instruction. The re
commendation was adopted by the War Depart
ment, and the manual was officially printed. It
forms a small duodecimo volume of-»bout a hundred
pages, with a number of plates in outline.
In June, 1851, Captain McClellan was ordered to
Fort Delaware, as assistant to Major John Sanders
in the construction of the works there. Here he
remained till near the close of the ensuing winter.
Early in March, 1852, Captain Randolph B. Marcy,
of the Fifth Infantry, was directed by the War
Department to make an exploration of the country
embraced within the basin of the Upper Red River;
and Captain McClellan was assigned to duty with
the expedition. The other officers accompanying
it were Lieutenant Updegraff and Dr. Shumard.
Captain J. H. Strain, of Fort Washita, and Mr. J.
R. Suydam, were also with it, but not in any offi
cial capacity. The private soldiers were fifty-five in
number. There were also five Indians, serving as
guides and hunters. Up to this time the region
round the head-waters of the Red River had been
unexplored by civilized man; and the only informa
tion we had as to the sources of one of the largest
rivers in the United States was derived from In
dians and semi-civilized Indian hunters.
The expedition started from Fort Belknap, upon
the Brazos River, on the 2d of May, and marched
to Red River at the mouth of the Little Witchita,
and up the right bank of the latter stream to the
mouth of the Big Witchita, where they crossed Red
River. Proceeding westward, between Red River
4

38 CAPTAIN MARCY'S REPORT. [1852.
and a branch of Cache Creek, they struck the north
fork of Red River at the west end of the Witchita
Mountains, and followed that stream to its source
in the Llano Estacado, or Staked Plain. Here an
excursion was made to the valley of the Canadian
River, at Sand Creek, in order to verify the position
of the party by the survey which had been made
along that stream by Captain Marcy in 1849. They
then travelled south to the Kech-ah-que-ho, or main
Red River, and, leaving their train at the place
where the river comes out from the bluff of the
Llano Estacado, ascended it to the spring which
forms its source. From this they returned down
the left bank of the river to the Witchita Mountains,
which were examined, and thence they proceeded to
Fort Arbuckle, on the Washita River, in the Indian
Territory, arriving there July 28. Here the expedi
tion terminated.
Captain Marcy brought back his command with
out the loss of a man. In his Report he says, "I
feel a sincere regret at parting with the company,
as the uniform good conduct of the men during the
entire march of about a thousand miles merits my
most sincere and heart-felt approbation. I have
seldom had occasion even to reprimand one of them.
All have performed the arduous duties assigned
them with the utmost alacrity and good will; and
when (as was sometimes the case) we were obliged
to make long marches, and drink the most disgust
ing water for several days together, instead of mur
muring and making complaints, they were cheerful
and in good spirits. I owe them, as well as the

Age 25.] FORT ARBUCKLE. 39
officers and gentlemen who were with me, my most
hearty thanks for their cordial co-operation with
me in all the duties assigned to the expedition. It
is probably in a great measure owing to this har
monious action on the part of all persons attached
to the expedition that it has resulted so fortunately."
Of Captain McClellan the introduction to the Report
speaks thus : — " The astronomical observations were
made by Captain George B. McClellan, of the En
gineer Corps, who, in addition to the duties properly
pertaining to his department, performed those of
quartermaster and commissary to the command.
An interesting collection of reptiles and other speci
mens, in alcohol, was also made under his super
intendence, and put into the hands of Professors
Baird and Girard, of the Smithsonian Institution,
whose reports will be found in the appendix. For
these and many other important services, as well
as for his prompt and efficient co-operation in what
ever was necessary for the successful accomplish
ment of the design of the expedition, I take this
opportunity of tendering my warmest acknow
ledgments." The party were -received with peculiar warmth
of welcome by the garrison at Fort Arbuckle; for
they were supposed to have been, all massacred b}r
the Comanche Indians. The account was brought
by a Keeehi Indian, and was so circumstantial and
minute in every particular, and showed so perfect a
knowledge of the movements of the expedition, as
well as of its numbers and equipment, that it was
believed to be true. The report was carried to the

40 CAPTAIN MARCY'S REPORT. [1852.
United States; and for several weeks the relatives
of Captain McClellan mourned him as dead.
Captain Marcy's Report was published by order
of Congress, and is one of those books which many
receive, but few read. And yet it is well worth
reading; for it has that fresh and spontaneous charm
of style which we so often observe in the writings
of superior men who are not men of letters by
training and profession, and who tell us in a plain
way of what they have seen and done. Besides a
graphic and animated description of the country
traversed by the expedition, it contains an excellent
account ofthe Indian tribes that roam over it, — not
that impossible creature, "the noble savage" ofthe
poet, the sentimental red man of the novelist, nor
yet the degraded outcast that withers in the shadow
cast by the white man and grafts upon his own
wild stock all the vices of civilization ; but tbe In
dian as he really exists, — a mingled web of virtues
and vices, and certainly holding no low place upon
the scale of savage and nomadic life.
And the remark which has just been made as to
Captain Marcy's Report may be further extended;
and it may be said that comparatively few persons
know any thing of what may be called the civil
victories of the American army. How few there
are who are aware of how much has been done
for science, and especially for geographical science,
during the last thirty or forty years, by the able
and accomplished officers of the regular army! —
what toils and hardships they have endured, what
perils they have met, and what laurels, unstained

Age25.] TEXAS EXPEDITION. 41
by blood and tears, they have won! One might
feel indignant at the injustice which deals out what
is called fame with so unequal a band, were it not
for the reflection that men who are competent to
add to the intellectual wealth of the world, and en
large the domain of knowledge, have learned to
take popular applause at its true value, and to find
in the faithful discharge of honorable duty a satis
faction which is its own reward.
After his duties upon Captain Marcy's expedition
had ceased, Captain McClellan was ordered to
Texas as chief engineer on the staff of General
P. F. Smith. He sailed from New Orleans, accom
panying General Smith, August 29, and arrived at
Galveston on the 31st. In a letter to his brother,
dated September 3, he says, " Galveston is pro
bably the prettiest and most pleasant town in
Texas. It is built on a perfectly level island, whieh
forms a portion of the harbor, and near the point.
The houses are all of frame, with piazzas, and
very pretty and neat: all are surrounded with
shrubbery. They have there the most beautiful
oleanders I ever saw: they, with many other
flowers, the banana, china-tree, orange, lemon,
palm, &c. &c, present, you may imagine, a charm
ing relief to the monotony of the level site. There
is almost always a fine breeze and an elegant surf.
The roads were excellent when we were there, on
account of the frequent rains, which pack them
down." From Galveston he accompanied General Smith
in a tour of military inspection, visiting Indian ol a,
4*

42 CORPUS CHRISTI. [lg52.
St. Joseph's, and Corpus Christi. Of this last place
he writes, " Corpus is about two miles from the head
of Corpus Christi Bay, which is separated from
Nueces Bay by a reef of sand. The shore makes
a beautiful curve, near one end of which the town
is built. The old camp of General Taylor was on
the beach where the town stands, and extended some
mile and a half or two miles above it. The positions
of the tents are still marked by the banks of sand
thrown up to protect them against the Northers.
It is a classical spot with the army, there are so
many old associations, traditions, and souvenirs of
many who are now no more. The country round
Corpus is very beautiful. Below, towards the bay
(gulf, rather), it is a rather flat country, alternately
prairie and chapparal, the prairies interspersed with
' motts'* of live-oak and mesquite,f covered withal
by a luxuriant growth of grass. The chapparal is
the prettiest growth of that nature I remember to
have seen. It is, of course, tropical, — that is, com
posed of the cactus and the stiff thorn-covered
bushes peculiar to the Southern latitudes; but the
ground even now is covered with a great variety
of beautiful flowers, and the whole makes up a very
pretty country."
From Corpus Christi they proceeded to Fort
Merrill, thence to San Antonio, and from there to
Camp Johnston, on the Concho River, where they
arrived October 24.

* "Mott," a local word, meaning a grove, or clump, of trees.
f "Mesquite," au indigenous tree of fhe acacia kind.

Age 26.] COAST snEVEY. 43
Here Captain McClellan found orders relieving
him from duty on General Smith's staff, and as
signing him the charge of the surveys for the im
provement of the harbors on the coast of Texas
from Indianola to Rio Grande, embracing Brazos
Santiago, Corpus Christi, Lavacca, and the San
Antonio River. This change of employment, trans
ferring him from the land to the sea, was not ex
actly to his wish; but he set about his new duties
with his usual promptness and energy. We find
him at Corpus Christi in January, 1853, diligently
at work upon estimates and reports; and on the
13th of that month he addressed to the Chief
Engineer, General Totten, a letter giving a general
description of the bars on the coast. For the
rest of the winter and far into the spring he was
hard at work. Here is a taste of his experiences,
taken from a letter dated Corpus Christi, March
9, 1853:— "I left here on the 22d of February,
one of the most beautiful mornings I ever saw,
bright, clear, and mild, with a nice breeze just in
the right direction. I congratulated myself on the
fine start I made, and felt in fine spirits. Things
went on finely for an hour or so. Then the breeze
became so strong that I had to double-reef all my
sails, and on we went, still handsomely. But pre
sently the breeze changed into the most violent
gale of the winter. The sea ran in young moun
tains. Down we brought the mainsail; and if ever
a boat did run under a foresail, I rather think
mine did that day. How it did blow ! The spray
dashed in your face like hail. The boat is a mag-

44 A GALE OF WIND. [1853.
nificent sailer, aud a splendid sea-boat •» so we still
kept on beautifully, though it was slightly humid.
Just as we were about to anchor, before reaching
the mud-flats, we lost the way; for the spray flew
so that we could not see, and the first thing Ave
knew we were driven about four hundred yards
up on one of the aforesaid flats, and rather halted.
Nothing could be done: so we turned in as best
we could, and waited for morning. When morning
came, there was not an inch of water within three
hundred yards, — could not even float the skiff. A
sand island some six hundred yards off was the
nearest dry place, and in walking to it you would
sink over the knee in mud. In that delightful
place my boat remained about ten days. After the
first three, I went on board the Government steamer
at Aranzas, some four miles off, and went to work
at the bar in her whale-boat. When I got through,
I found there was no use in waiting for the water
to rise : so I took the steamer's crew and dug a canal,
through which, after two days' hard work, we floated
the Alice into deep water. I then at once ran down,
by the outside passage, the Gulf, to Corpus Christi
Pass, satisfied myself very quickly of its utter
worthlessness, and came here, with flying colors,
yesterday. I have finished this harbor and its two
passes : by the end of the month I shall have com
pleted the Brazos survey, and will then run up
towards Indianola, finishing the inland channel and
the San Antonio and Guadalupe Rivers by the end
of April, if I have any thing like ordinary good
luck. In May I shall finish Paso Cavallo Harbor,

Agf.26.] PACIFIC RAILROAD SURVEY. 45
and hope to finish the field-work by the end of that
month at furthest. Then I shall sell out my boats,
and go to Galveston and make out my reports and
maps." On the 18th of April, Captain McClellan ad
dressed to General Totten a report of the result
of the surveys on the coast of Texas, as far as they
had then been completed. It embraces the bars
along the coast from Paso Cavallo to the mouth of
the Rio Grande, the harbors of Brazos Santiago,
Corpus Christi, Aranzas, and Paso Cavallo, and the
inland channel from Matagorda Bay to Aranzas
Bay. It is printed in the Executive Documents
of the first session of the Thirty-Third Congress,
— a brief and business-like document, containing
plans and suggestions for improving the harbors
designated, with estimates of the probable ex
penses. But before the date of his Report he had received
information of his having been assigned to a more
congenial field of duty ; for in a letter to his brother,
dated Indianola, April 7, 1853, he tells him that he
has been offered the charge of a portion of one
of the Pacific Railroad surveys recently author
ized by Congress, to start from Puget Sound
and to go through the Cascade Mountains to
St. Paul on the Mississippi, and adds, "As the
results of the surveys are to be presented to
Congress during the ensuing February, the time
will be limited; and I can never have a better op
portunity of seeing California and Oregon : so I
did not hesitate a moment in determining to accept

40 PACIFIC RAILROAD SURVEY. [1853.
the position. I am told that 'the exploration is
arduous, and will bring reputation.' Hard work
and reputation will carry me a long way."
The expedition to which he was attached was
under the general supervision of Governor Isaac I.
Stevens, of Washington Territory, formerly of the
army, who, to the great loss of his country, met a
glorious death in the battle near Chantilly, Fair
fax county, Virginia, September 1, 1862. It was
charged with the duty of examining the lines of
the forty-seventh and forty-ninth parallels of north
latitude; and the special object of the exploration
was the determination of a railroad-route from the
head-waters of the Mississippi to Puget Sound.
One party, under the immediate direction of Gov
ernor Stevens, was to proceed from the Mississippi
westward, survey the intermediate country, and
examine the passes of the Rocky Mountains. Cap
tain McClellan, at the head of a separate party, was
to explore the Cascade Range of mountains.
Immediately on receiving official news of his ap
pointment, he set out for the Pacific coast, via the
Isthmus, arrived at Fort Vancouver on the 27th
of June, began to make preparations for the expedi
tion, and started on the 24th of July. His party
consisted of Lieutenant Duncan, Third Artillery,
astronomer, topographer, and draughtsman; Lieu
tenant Hodges, Fourth Infantry, quartermaster and
commissary; Lieutenant Mowry, Third Artillery,
meteorologist; Mr. George Gibbs, ethnologist and
geologist; Mr. J. F. Minter, assistant engineer, in
charge of courses and distances; five assistants in

Age 26.] FIELD OF EXPLORATION. 47
observations, carrying instruments, &c; two ser
geants, two corporals, and twenty-four privates
of the Fourth Infantry. Two chief packers, three
hunters and herders, and twenty packers, completed
the party. There were one hundred and seventy-
three animals with the command, — seventy-three
for the saddle, one hundred for packing.
The field of Captain McClellan's exploration
lies in the western part of Washington Territory.
The river Columbia from Fort Okinakane, at about
the forty-eighth degree of north latitude, flows in
a southerly direction, a little inclining to the east,
till it reaches Fort Walla-Walla. Then it makes
a sudden turn to the west, and runs to the Pacific
in a course nearly at right angles to its former
current. The space enclosed between these two
arms of the river on the south and east respect
ively, and the ocean on the west, is partly filled
up by the Cascade Mountains, a continuation of the
Sierra Nevada Range in California, and deriving
their name from the fact that the Columbia breaks
through them in a series of falls in its passage
to the ocean. Captain McClellan's course from
Fort Vancouver was in a northeasterly direction,
along the dividing line between the stream flow
ing westwardly into the Pacific and eastwardly
to form the Yakima, which is an affluent of the
Columbia. The party, starting from Fort Vancouver July
24, as has been said, reached the river Wenass
on the 20th of August, having travelled one hun
dred and sixty-two miles. Here a pause of somo

48 YAKIMA PASS. [1853.
days was made. Lieutenant Hodges was despatched
to Fort Steilacoom, to procure provisions, exchange
their pack-horses for mules, if possible, and examine
the intermediate route. Lieutenant Duncan was
directed to cross to the main Yakima, examine the
upper part of that valley, and obtain all possible
information in relation to the surrounding country,
especially towards the north. Mr. Gibbs was in
structed to examine the valley of the Yakima to
its junction with the Columbia. Captain McClellan
himself, with Mr. Minter and six men, made an
examination of the Nahchess Pass. Lieutenant
Mowry was left in charge of the camp at Wenass.
By the 31st of August all these separate parties,
except that under Lieutenant Hodges, had accom
plished their tasks and returned to the camp. Here
Captain McClellan determined to reduce the num
ber of his party; and, accordingly, on the 2d of
September Lieutenant Mowry was sent back to
the Dalles, on Columbia River, with seventeen men,
of whom but two were to return wTith him. He
took with him the collections made up to this time,
and every thing that could be dispensed with.
On the 3d of September the depot camp was
moved from the Wenass to Ketetas, on the main
Yakima. On the 4th, Captain McClellan left the
camp, with Mr. Gibbs, Mr. Minter, and six men, to
examine the pass at the head of the main Yakima,
and returned to the camp on the 12th. While on
this separate examination, he wrote a letter to his
mother, dated September 11, from which an extract

Age 26.] VALLEY OF THE NAHCHESS. 49
is here made, giving an account of his movements
for the previous fortnight : —
" On about the 23d of August I started from the main
camp on the Wenass Eiver, to examine what is called the
Nahchess Pass, having on the previous day sent in some
fifty pack-animals by the same pass to Steilacoom, for pro
visions, so that I might start from this vicinity (after ex
amining the passes) with three months' provisions. I took
with me my assistant, Minter, three hunters, one packer,
one of my Texas men to carry the barometer, and my
Mexican boy Jim. The first day's work was of no par
ticular interest : we travelled some six miles up the valley
in which we were camped, and struck over the divide to
the southwest into the valley of the Nahch6ss, where we
camped, after a hot march of some eighteen miles over a
rough, mountainous country, — the last fifteen without
water. Next day we travelled about seventeen miles up
the valley of the Nahchess, — th»t is, wherever there was
any valley; for the stream, frequently running through
canons, often threw us back into the mountains, where
the trail was very rough, stony, and steep. These canons
are generally through masses of basaltic rock, varying in
height from fifty to five hundred feet, and generally per
fectly vertical, — the whole width occupied by the bed of
the stream. The scenery here is singularly wild and bold.
Most of the hills and mountains, being of volcanic rocks,
have the sharp, bold outlines peculiar to the formation.
Our next march, of about equal length, and over a rather
worse country, brought us to the divide, — that is, the point
where the waters run in one direction towards the Sound,
in the other towards the Columbia above Walla- Walla.
By ascending a high, bare mountain, called by the In
dians Aiqz, we had a fine view of the mountains. Tha
range had now become exceedingly rough, and the moun
tains large. We were but a short distance from Mount
5

50 SINAHOMIS PASS. [1853.
Ranier, — a magnificent snow peak, — and could count
around us some thirty mountains, with more or less snow
upon them. We remained one day at the divide, exa
mining the country on foot, and then returned by about
the same route we had before taken. The day after I
reached the main camp I received an express from the
officer I had sent into Steilacoom, informing me that most
of his animals (horses) had broken down, and that there
were no mules at Steilacoom to replace them. Therefore
I at once determined to reduce the size of the party. I
sent in the whole escort, and others the next day, so as
to reduce the number from sixty-nine to thirty. I have
mules enough to carry ninety days' provisions for this num
ber, and can now travel much more rapidly. The day
after the escort left, I moved camp from the Wenass Biver
to the main Yakima, — about fourteen miles northward, —
and started the next day, with the same party as before
(with the addition of Mr. Gibbs), to examine the Sina-
homis Pass. Our first two marches were of no peculiar
interest, — passing through. a rather wide valley covered
with an open growth of pines. In the third march we
struck the mountains, (the valley giving out), and had a
terrible road, much obstructed by fallen timber and
brush, and with some very respectable mountains to pass
over. We passed by the foot of a beautiful lake (Kitche-
las) in which this river heads: it is some four or five miles
long, and about one mile wide, surrounded by very lofty
mountains. About two-thirds of the way up the last moun
tain we ascended, we passed between two small lakes, and,
looking down from the top, saw at our feet, some one
thousand feet below us, still another, — Willailootzas. We
passed over the mountain and encamped some distance
down on the farther side, in the bed of an old lake. You
may imagine what kind of weather there is among the
mountains, when I tell you that nearly every morning at
sunrise the thermometer stands at 32°. We remained at

Age 26.] MOUNTAINLAKES. 51
this mountain one day, trudging around on foot. Next day
I sent the animals back by the trail, and started on foot
to examine the divide and Willailootzas. I had a very
rough climb for some six hours, discovered another small
and very pretty lake, from which the water runs both
ways, and found my mule waiting for me on the trail at
about two o'clock.
A ride of about sixteen miles, over a horrible trail,
brought me into camp just before dark and fully pre
pared for a respectable cup of coffee. Next day we went
back about three miles on the trail, and then struck off
to visit the largest lake of all, — Kahchess, — about eight
miles long. It is very beautiful, situated, like the others,
in the midst of the mountains. Yesterday we travelled
about sixteen miles, to visit another large and beautiful
lake, — Kleallum. These are all in the mountains, and
on the heads of different branches of the main Sahawa,
— most of them fully as beautiful and picturesque as
many celebrated in the fashionable world. I doubt
whether any whites ever saw any of them before: cer
tainly they were unknown to the settlers. Whether
steamboats will ever run on them, or Saratogas be estab
lished in their vicinity, is with me a matter of exceeding
doubt. The only things we have seen of much interest
are the mountains and the lakes, — both fine in their
way, but rather hard to get at. To-morrow I shall go into
the main camp, and hope to find things about ready for
me to start into the town incognito to the northward. I
shall send an express in a day or two with reports to the
Secretary of War, and this at the same time. I hope to
reach Mt. Baker in about twenty days from here. Where
I will go to then, circumstances must determine, — I think
to Colville, — perhaps thence to the Rocky Mountains."
Lieutenant Mowry had returned from the Dalles
on the 2d of September, and on the 16th Lieutenant

52 RETURN TO FORT VANCOUVER. [1853.
Hodges arrived from Steilacoom, bringing twenty-
nine pack-horses loaded with provisions. Prepara
tions were now made to move northward: thirty-
two broken-down horses were sent back, under
charge of three men, to the Dalles, and the com
mand was reduced to thirty-six persons, with forty-
two riding-animals and fifty-two pack-animals.
They started on the 20th, and moved in a north
easterly direction. On the 9th of October they
reached their most northerly camp, about thirteen
miles south of the " Great Lake," in latitude 49° 26'.
They then moved west to the Columbia River,
which they crossed at Fort Colville. Thence they
proceeded southerly across the Great Plain of the
Columbia River, and arrived at Walla-Walla on the
7th of November, at Fort Dalles on the 15th. From
Fort Dalles they went down by water to Fort Van
couver, which they reached on the 18th. An extract
from a letter to his brother, dated November 28,
may be here appropriately introduced : —
"From that place [the Yakima valley] we crossed a
rather high mountain-ridge (running nearly east and
west), and struck the Columbia not far above Buck-
land's Rapids, and a little distance below the mouth of
the Pischas. My journal written that night says, 'Soon,
descending a little, you arrive at the edge of the sudden,
precipitous descent that borders the valley of the Colum
bia. Words can hardly convey an idea of the view from
this mountain. Somewhat to the north of west is a hand
some snow peak, part of a long snow ridge. This has no
name, and is probably seen by whites for the first time.
To the north of that the Cascade Range is in full view, the
main range coming directly to the Columbia, and crossing

Age 26.] VALLEY OF THE COLUMBIA. 53
it, until it sinks towards the east into a vast, elevated table
land. In the distance, to the north, is seen a long blue
range, at the foot of which the Columbia runs from Col
ville to Okonogan. To the northeast and east, as far as
the eye can reach, extends the beau-ideal of the sublimity
of desolation, a vast plain (as it appears from the height
and distance), without one indication of water, one spot
of green to please the eye. It is generally of a dead yel
lowish hue, with large "clouds" of black blending into
the general tinge. It must be a sage-desert, with dry
burnt grass and outcroppings of basalt. Not a tree or
bush is to be seen upon it. The valley of the Columbia
is very deep and exceedingly narrow: it is connected
with the great plain by steps of basaltic rock, — most of
them narrow ledges, and varying in height from fifty to
three hundred or four hundred feet. The great river
looks like a narrow blue thread or ribbon. It seems as if
our only means of travelling farther to the north would
be to follow the valley of the river until it leaves the moun
tains. Forward we must go : the means will perhaps pre
sent themselves when we reach the valley.' Sure enough,
we were obliged to follow the valley six days, at the end
of which we reached Okonogan. During this time we
had some very bad and dangerous places to pass over. On
one occasion we made but one and three-quarter miles
from morning till night, — had two mules instantly killed
by falling off a precipice, and two others badly hurt.
"Mt. Okonogan (Okinakane) is delightfully situated on
a gravel flat, without a blade of grass or any thing else
for some distance from it. A little Frenchman is the only
apology for a white man there. He was very kind to us ;
and he and I misunderstood each other most beautifully
in all our conversations. From there I went westward
into the mountains, in vain hopes of finding another pass,
and finally returned to Okonogan, whence I went as far
north as the Great Lake Okonogan. There is little or no

54 OLYMPIA. [W>i.
timber in the valley : small parts of it are tolerably good,
but the greater part worthless. From the forks up to the
Great Lake it is, in fact, nothing but a series of lakes of
different sizes. The Great Lake is some two miles wide
and about seventy in length. The scenery around it is
more remarkable for its desolation than its beauty. In
fact, the whole of this region has something very lonely and
dispiriting about it : you see a very few miserably squalid
Indians, and no other signs of animal life: an occasional
wolf, with now and then a lonely badger, are all you see.
From the forks we struck over to the Colville River, and
followed it down to the Columbia opposite Fort Colville.
The valley of this little river was about the prettiest we
saw,— fine larch timber, and a good deal of yellow pine,
the valley very narrow, the stream a bold and pretty one ;
no Indians ; and not even any salmon in it. At Colville
we crossed the Columbia, swimming the animals, and
ferrying ourselves and ' traps' in canoes."
At Fort Vancouver the party was broken up,
and the portion required for office-work was sent
to Olympia, where Captain McClellan arrived on
the 16th of December. On the 23d he started with
a small party to endeavor to complete the barome
trical profile of the main Yakima Pass and examine
the approaches on the western side; but he was
obliged to return without having accomplished his
purpose, mainly on account of the great depth of
snow and the impossibility of procuring Indian
guides. Some weeks were spent in office-work at Olym
pia. From that place, on the 8th of February,
1854, Captain McClellan addressed to Governor
Stevens a brief report on the railroad-practicability

Age27.] RETURN HOME. 55
of the passes examined by him; and his general
report, sent to the Secretary of War, bears the date
of February 25. Both of these reports appear
in the first volume of tbe official publications on
the Pacific Railroad route, made by order of
Congress. His general conclusions were that be
tween the parallels of 45° 30' and 49° north lati
tude there are but two passes through the range
practicable for a railroad, — that of the Columbia
River and that ofthe Yakima River; that the latter
was barely practicable, and that only at a high
cost of time, labor, and money, while the former
was not only undoubtedly practicable, but remark
ably favorable.
The Secretary of War, in his report to Congress,
dated February 27, 1855, says, "The examination
of the approaches and passes of the Cascade Moun
tains, made by Captain McClellan, of the Corps of
Engineers, presents a reconnoissance of great value,
and, though performed under adverse circumstances,
exhibits all the information necessary to determine
the practicability of this portion of the route, and
reflects the highest credit on the capacity and re
sources of that officer."
In addition to his duties upon the railroad-survey,
Captain McClellan had been directed by the Sec
retary of War to superintend the construction of
the military road from Walla-Walla to Steilacoom.
This road was built after he had left the Pacific
region; but the contracts and arrangements were
made by him before his departure.
He returned home in the spring of 1854. In the

56 SAM ANA. [1854.
summer of that year ho was sent on a secret ex
pedition to the West Indies, the object of which
was to select a harbor and procure a site suitable
for a coaling-station. It was a service of some
danger, as it exposed him to the influences of a
tropical climate in the hottest season of the year.
He went out in a United States vessel under the com
mand of Lieutenant Renshaw, a gallant and excel
lent officer, who was killed at Galveston, January 1,
1863, by the blowing up of the Westfield. Captain
McClellan selected the bay and promontory of
Samana, on the northeast coast of the island of
Hayti, as the most desirable site for the object pro
posed. It is a spot of much historical interest.
Columbus, returning to Spain after his first disco
very of the New World, anchored in this bay,
having first sailed round the promontory and given
names to two of its headlands. Here some of his
crew had an affray with the natives, in the course
of which, much to the grief of the great navigator,
two of the latter were wounded, — the first time that
native blood was shed by white men in the New
World. At a later period, the peninsula, — which
in the old maps is laid down as an island, — as well
as the rocky islets in the harbor, of which there
were several, became haunts of the buccaneers. On
one of these islets, or cays, Jack Banister, a cele
brated English pirate, at the close ofthe seventeenth
century, defended himself successfully against two
English frigates sent to capture him, — in conse
quence of which the name of Banister Cays was
given to the group. Upon the promontory aro

Age 27.] SCHO M BURG K'S MEMOIR. 57
some negro villages, occupied by tho descendants
and survivors of a colony of free colored persons
who went from New Jersey under Boyer's adminis
tration.* * Part of the information in the text is taken from a memoir
on the peninsula and bay of Samana in the "Journal of the
London Geographical Society" for 1853, by Sir R. H. Schom-
burgk, H. B. M. Consul at the Dominican Republic. The con
cluding paragraphs are as follows : —
"I have purposely dwelt long and in detail upon this narrow
strip of land, called the Peninsula of Saman&, and upon its
adjacent magnificent bay. In its geographical position its
greatest importance is centred. The fertile soil is fit for the
cultivation of all tropical productions ; its spacious bays and
anehoring-plaees offer a shelter to the navies of the world ;
and its creeks afford facilities for the erection of arsenals and
docks, while the adjacent forests yield the requisite woods
for naval architecture: still, its chief importance does not con
sist iu these advantages alone, but in its geographical position,
forming, as it does, one of the principal keys to the isthmus
of Central America and to the adjacent Gulf of Mexico. Mr.
Lepelletier de Saint-Remy says, 'Samani is one of those mari
time positions not often met with in a survey of the map of
the world. Samana is to the Gulf of Mexico what Mayotta is
to the Indian Ocean. It is not only the military, but also
the commercial, key of the Gulf; but the latter is of infinitely
greater importance, under the pacific tendencies of European
politics.' "The Bay of Samana being placed to the windward of
Jamaica, Cuba, and the Gulf of Mexico, and lying, moreover,
almost due northeast of the great isthmus which now so power
fully attracts the attention of the world, the French author
ju.st quoted may well call it 'la tlte-du-pont' to the highway
from the Atlantic to the Pacific."
Captain McClellan had never seen or heard of this memoir
at the date of his visit lo the West Indi s ; and it is creditable

58 RAILWAY REPORT. [1854.
Captain McClellan drew up two reports, one on
the harbor and its defences, and one forming a
general memoir on the island. They have never
been printed, and are probably still on file in the
archives of the War Department. Our Govern
ment entered into negotiations with the Dominican
Republic for the cession of tho bay and peninsula;
but they were not crowned with success. It may
be surmised that the influence of France and Eng
land, exerted through their representatives, may
have prevented it.
After returning home from the West Indies,
Captain McClellan was stationed at Washington,
employed on duties connected with the Pacific Rail
road surveys. In the autumn of 1854, he drew up
a very elaborate memoir on various practical points
relating to the construction and management of
railways, which was published in the same volume
with the reports of his explorations. The Secre
tary of War remarks upon it as follows: — "Cap
tain McClellan, of the Corps of Engineers, after
the completion of his field-operations, was directed
to visit various railroads, and to collect informa
tion of facts established in the construction and
working of existing roads, to serve as data in de
termining the practicability of constructing and
working roads over the several routes explored.
The results of his inquiries will be found in a very
valuable memoir, herewith submitted."
to his sagacity to have selected, as the result of his own un
aided observation, a site which so competent an authority as
Sir Robert H. Schombui-gk speaks of in such terms as the above.

Age 28.] CRIMEAN WAR. 59
In the spring of 1855, Captain McClellan received
the appointment of captain in the First Cavalry
Regiment, then under the command of Colonel
Sumner.

CHAPTER III.

In the spring of 1855, while the Crimean War
was raging, the Government of the United States
determined to send a military commission to
Europe, to observe the warlike operations then in
progress, to examine the military systems of the
great Powers of Europe, and to report such plans
and suggestions for improving the organization and
discipline of our own army as they might derive
from such observation. The officers selected for
this trust were Major— now Colonel — Delafield, of
the Engineers, Major Mordecai, of the Ordnance,
and Captain McClellan. The last was by some
years the youngest of the three, Colonel Delafield
having been graduated at West Point in 1818, and
Major Mordecai in 1823. The selection of so young
a man for such a trust is a proof of the high reputa
tion he had made for himself in the judgment of
those by whom the choice was made; and it may
be here mentioned that he was in the first instance
designated for the commission by President Pierce
himself, who had had an opportunity in the Mexican
War to observe what manner of soldier and man he
was. Of the three officers, he, too, was tho only
one who had seen actual service in the field.

60 SECRETARY'S LETTER. [1855.
The exact nature of the duties assigned to the
commission may be learned from the letter of the
Secretary of War, the essential parts of which are
as follows : — -
"War Department, Washington, April 2, 1855.
"Gentlemen: — You have been selected to form a com
mission to visit Europe, for the purpose of obtaining in
formation with regard to the military service in general,
and especially the practical working of the changes which
have been introduced of late years into the military sys
tems of the principal nations of Europe.
"Some of the subjects to which it is peculiarly desirable
to direct your attention may be indicated as follows: —
" The organization of armies and of the departments for
furnishing supplies of all kinds to the troops, especially
in field-service. The m.inner of distributing supplies.
"The fitting up of vessels for transporting men and
horses, and the arrangements for embarking and disem
barking them.
"The medical and hospital arrangements, both in per
manent hospitals and in the field. The kind of ambu
lances, or other means, used for transporting the sick and
wounded. " The kind of clothing and camp equipage used for ser
vice in the field.
"The kind of arms, ammunition, and accoutrements
used in equipping troops for the various branches of ser
vice, and their adaptation to the purposes intended. In
this respect, the arms and equipments of cavalry of all
kinds will claim your particular attention.
"The practical advantages and disadvantages attending
the use of the various kinds of rifle arms which have been
lately introduced extensively in European warfare.
"The nature and efficiency of ordnance and ammuni
tion employed for field and siege operations, and the

Age 28.] ENGLAND AND FRANCE. 61
practical effect of the late changes partially made in the
French field artillery.
" The construction of permanent fortifications, the ar
rangement of new systems of sea-coast and land defences,
and the kind of ordnance used in the armament of them,
— the Lancaster gun, and other rifle cannon, if any are
used. " The composition of trains for siege-operations, the kind
and quantity of ordnance, the engineering operations of
a siege in all its branches, both of attack and defence.
"The composition of bridge-trains, kinds of boats,
wagons, &c.
" The construction of casemated forts, and the effects
produced on them in attacks by land and water. The
use of camels for transportation, and their adaptation to
cold and mountainous countries.
******* "Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
"Jefferson Davis.
"Major E. Delafield,
"Major A. Mordecai,
'¦'Captain G. B. McClellan,
" United Slates Army."
The officers composing the commission sailed
from Boston on the 11th of April. On arriving
in England, they were courteously received by
Lord Clarendon, Secretary of State for the Foreign
Department, — Lord Panmure, the Secretary of War,
being disabled by illness, — and furnished with
letters of introduction to Lord Raglan, Sir Edward
Lyons, the admiral of the Baltic fleet, and the offi
cers in command at Constantinople. In France a
difficulty arose on account of an imperative rule in
the French military service that no foreign officer
6

62 WARSAW. [1855.
could be permitted to go into their camp and after
wards to pass into that of the enemy, and that,
therefore, it would be necessary for the members of
the commission to give a promise that they would
not go from the French camp to any other part of
the Crimea, even although they might first go to St.
Petersburg. This pledge the commission were not
prepared to give, and the matter remained for somo
time in abeyance. But the most ample facilities
were extended to them for visiting such military
and naval establishments as they desired to inspect.
On the 28th of May, the commission left Paris,
intending to proceed to the Russian camp in
the Crimea by the way of Prussia, starting first for
Berlin, in order to confer with the Russian Minister
in that city, Baron de Budberg, to whom the
Russian Minister at Washington had given them a
letter. Their object was to go from Berlin to tho
Crimea by the way of Warsaw and Kiev, on the
Danube; and Baron de Budberg gave them pass
ports and letters to Baron Krusentoin, a Russian
official at Warsaw. But on arriving at Warsaw
they learned that no person there — not even the
veteran hero Paskievitch, with whom they had an
interview, and who treated them with much courtesy
— had the power to grant them permission to go from
Warsaw direct to the Crimea, and that there was
nothing to be done but to proceed to St. Petersburg.
During their stay in Warsaw, they examined the
fortifications of that city and of Modlin.
It was very annoying to the officers of the com
mission to find their progress blocked by cercmo-

Age 28.] POLAND. 63
nials and formalities which they might have escaped
if they had been civilians and private citizens and
gone direct from Constantinople to Sebastopol, as
so many idlers and amateurs had done; but, having
presented themselves in an official capacity, they
could do no less than bear its burdens and encum
brances; and so they went on to St. Petersburg,
where they arrived June 19. A few extracts from
a letter written by Captain McClellan to his younger
brother — now Captain Arthur McClellan — the day
after his arrival in the Russian capital, give some
of his first impressions of the country and people : — -
" We left Warsaw at six p.m. on the evening of the 13th,
and reached here at about the same hour last evening,
having travelled constantly day and night, merely stop
ping a few minutes for meals.
"In Poland the country is either flat or slightly rolling,
the soil improving as you approach the Niemen, but in
many places very poor. There are no towns of any con
sequence on the road, which, you will observe, passes near
the Prussian frontier, but many villages, which are gene
rally of wood and presenting a dirty, squalid appearance.
The villages are mostly inhabited by Jews, — as dirty
and wretched a race as you ever saw, — worse than any
you ever saw. The appearance of the Poles is any thing
but favorable ; they look like a, stupid, degraded race, — ¦
are dirty and ugly. It is difficult to imagine how they
ever fought as they have clone in the past. Ostrolinha
was the site of a great battle in the revolution of 1831.
It is a small wooden town on the Narew [Nareff), which is
here a rapid stream some fifty yards wide. A large monu
ment commemorates the victory gained by the Russians.
Kouno is a town of good size, mostly built of plastered
brick. A portion of it is very old, while the new suburbs

64 RUSSIA. [1855.
are handsome and well built. It presents the appearance
of a flourishing place, there being many small vessels in
the Niemen, and immense trains of carts constantly ar-
viving here from the interior of Russia. They bring down
tallow, hemp, &c, and carry back cotton, groceries, &c.
As the Niemen empties in Prussian territory, a glance at
the map will show you the importance of this place
whilst the Russian ports are blockaded. The Niemen is
here two hundred and twenty yards wide, — a bold and rapid
stream, crossed by a raft-bridge. It was near and at this
place that the great mass of the French army crossed the
Niemen in June, 1812 ; and it was at the gate of this
same town that in the retreat Marshal Ney fought so
desperately, forming in his own person the rear-guard of
the Grand Army. Of course I went to the spot during
the short time we remained here. You now enter the
great forests of Russia. As far as Vilkomir there is but
little cultivation, the country being mostly covered by pine
and beech forests. I should have mentioned that in the
public square of Kouno there is a huge iron monument,
bearing in Russian an inscription to the effect that out of
seven hundred thousand French who crossed the Niemen
in June, 1812, but seventy thousand recrossed in December.
As far as Dunaburg (on the river Duna, or, as some of the
maps have it, Dwina) the country is quite rolling, — almost
broken ; very different from the idea I had formed of it.
You pass through a number of small towns and villages.
"Dunaburg appears to be a small town, presenting no
thing of peculiar interest. There are some defensive works
here. " Before reaching Dunaburg, we passed through one town
(a small one, perhaps hardly deserving the name of more
than a village), called Novo Alexandrowsky, which is re
markably pretty. It is situated on the high banks of a
large and handsome lake broken by little green islets.
The houses and people were remarkably good-looking.

Aqe2S.] ST. PETERSBURG. 65
Rigitza is also a pretty little place: there is here a ruined
castle of long, long ago. Country now not so much
rolling as near Dunaburg, but still by no means flat: it is
fertile and well cultivated. Ostroff is another handsome
little place: the road here crosses the river on a very fino
suspension-bridge ; and on an island in the river is a very
extensive ruined castle, perhaps of some of the Teutonic
knights. Pscov, near which we passed, seems to be espe
cially blessed with churches, the gilded domes of which
shone from afar. The country near here, and, in fact, from
here to St. Petersburg, is low and level, the soil generally
good, — sometimes poor, and sometimes very fertile.
"Pscov is the capital of a province, and at the head of a
large lake. Near Ploosa is a swampy district of consider
able extent, and many large lakes. Nothing of very great
interest until one reaches Gatchina, where is the hunting-
palace of the Emperor: it seems to be a very grand es
tablishment. From there to this city the country is very
flat, the soil not very good, but settlements increasing
as you draw near.
" The general appearance of the portion of Russia I have
seen is much superior to that of Poland; and I like the
appearance of the people very much.
*******
" This is truly a most magnificent city, — wide streets, fine
private houses, magnificent public buildings. Thus far
I have, of course, merely had a glance at the exterior of
things, and will not pretend to describe any thing, more
than to say that it fully equals my expectations. We are
very comfortably fixed at the Hotel de Russie, — good
rooms, good meals, plenty of ice, &c.
"The road from Warsaw here is truly a magnificent one,
— especially the portion of it in Poland. It is all mac
adamized ; and they are now hard at work improving the
Russian part, so that in a couple of months it will be
throughout as fine a road as any in the world. Think of
G'-s

66 ST. PETERSBURG. [1855.
the immense length, — one thousand and seventy-four
versts, or seven hundred and sixteen miles!
" So great is the traffic upon it at present that it is lite
rally covered from one end to the other with trains of
wagons passing in both directions. The trade which
formerly passed down the Baltic now seeks its outlet into
Prussia by this route.
"So great is this now that it seems hardly possible that
Russia can feel the effect of the blockade very sensibly.
New channels are opened, and immense additional num
bers of men, animals, and capital are now employed in
the land-transportation. * * * * *
"June 20 and 21, MldnigU. — I write this paragraph in my
room by the natural light, — no candle or any thing what-
ever : you may imagine the darkness of the night here."
During their residence at St. Petersburg, the
officers of the commission were treated with much
courtesy by the civil and military authorities,
and all possible facilities were afforded to them for
examining the various military establishments in
the vicinity. They were presented to the Emperor,
at his request, and graciously received by him. But
they did not succeed in obtaining permission to go
to Sebastopol, because the officers in command there
had requested that no strangers should be per
mitted to come there, as such visits occasioned them
a great deal of embarrassment; and though the
Emperor, of course, might overrule such objections,
yet he felt bound to defer to the strongly-expressed
wishes of officers placed in such responsible posi
tions. Nothing could be urged in reply to this;
and, disappointed as they were, tbey could not, as

Age 28.] BALAKLAVA. 67
military men, fail to respect the Emperor's defer
ence to the views of his subordinates.
On the 19th of July the commission proceeded to
Moscow, and examined whatever was of interest
in a military point of view there. Hastening back
to St Petersburg, they left that city on the 2d of
August, and arrived at Berlin on the 25th, baving
in the interval observed the fortifications and de
fences at Konigsberg, Dantzig, Posen, and Schwedt.
At Berlin the various military establishments in
that city and at Spandau were carefully inspected.
From Berlin they determined to go to the Cri
mea by the way of Dresden, Laybach, Trieste, and
Smyrna, and found themselves at last on the line of
operations of the allied army at Constantinople,
on the 16th of September. To the courtesy of the
English naval authorities they were indebted for a
passage in the first steamer that sailed for Bala-
klava, where they arrived on the morning of Oc
tober 8. Here every possible facility and kindness,
official and personal, was extended to them by the
officers of the English army, including Sir George
Simpson, the commander. It was hoped that the
French Government would relax the rule they had
laid down in the spring; but the new authorization
to visit their camps and army, received at Bala-
klava, contained substantially the same condition
as had been before exacted, and the commission
could not^ avail themselves of the permission to
which such terms were attached. The result was
that they confined their examination to the camps,
depots, parks, workshops, &c. of the English, Sar-

68 TOULON. [I860.
dinian, and Turkish armies, never entering the
French camps in the Crimea except on visits of
courtesy. On the 2d of November they left Balaklava in an
English steamer, and spent some days in Constan
tinople and Scutari, inspecting the hospitals and
depots of the allies. From Constantinople they
proceeded to Vienna, examining on their route the
defences of Varna and the remarkable triumphs
of civil engineering in the works on the Soemmer
ing Railroad.
On the 16th of December they reached Vienna,
and spent some days in a careful observation of the
Austrian military establishments, and, after leaving
Vienna, went to Venice, Verona, Mantua, and Milan,
examining the military and naval establishments in
each place. At Verona they were most kindly re
ceived by the veteran hero Marshal Radetzky, who
contributed in every way to the attainment oftheir
wishes as well as to their personal gratification.
Colonel Delafield — from the introduction to whose
Report this account of the movements of the com
mission is abridged — speaks in the warmest terms
of the peculiar and uniform courtesy extended to
them by the authorities and functionaries of Austria.
That Government seemed to have quite forgotten
tbe Martin Koszta affair.
On the 2d of February, 1856, they arrived at
Toulon, and, with the authority previously obtained
from the French Government, examined the mili
tary and naval defences of that important depot.
But the only facility extended to them was that

Age 29.] RETURN HOME. 69
afforded by a printed ticket of admission trans
mitted from Paris, which did no more than com
mand the services of a porter to conduct them
through the buildings, docks, and vessels, and gave
them no opportunity to converse with any of the
officers. From Toulon they visited in succession
Marseilles, Lyons, Belfort, Strasbourg, Rastadt,
Coblentz, and Cologne, observing their fortresses
and defences, — in the last three places, however,
without the advantage of any special authority.
The 24th and 25th of February were spent at
Liege, where their time was occupied at the na
tional foundry for artillery and another for small-
arms, both on a more extended scale than any cor
responding establishments in Europe at that time.
On the 1st of March the commission was at Paris
again. Two days were devoted to an examination
of the fortress at Vincennes; and several of the mili
tary establishments in Paris were also inspected.
They were unable, however, to obtain the requisite
authority for seeing those relating to the artillery.
On the 18th of March the commission proceeded
to Cherbourg and examined the works there. On
the 24th of March they arrived at London, and
afterwards visited the arsenal and dockyards at
Woolwich, the vessels at Portsmouth, and the de
fences near Yarmouth, on the Isle of Wight, receiv
ing every courtesy and facility they could desire
from the military and naval officers at those sta
tions in furthering the object of their visit. On
the 19th of April tbey embarked for home.
The above is a brief record of the labors of a

70 MCCLELLAN'S REPORT. [1856.
very busy year, in which, however, much precious
time was lost from delay in obtaining the necessary
official permissions to inspect military establish
ments. And it must be added that in many cases
the commission failed to receive those facilities
which assuredly would have been extended in our
country to a similar board sent from any Govern
ment in Europe. It may be too much to expect
that nations should be governed in their relations
towards each other by the precepts of Christian
morality, but surely it is not too much to ask that
they should conform to the code of courtesy and
good breeding recognized among gentlemen in the
intercourse of social life.
After their return, each of the officers upon tho
commission made a report to the Secretary of War
of the results of their tour of observation; and
these reports were in due time officially published
by Congress in a quarto form, and pretty widely
distributed. They were recognized by all compe
tent judges as productions of great merit, reflect
ing the highest credit upon their respective authors,
and amply vindicating the sagacity of the Govern
ment which selected them. In October, 1861, Cap
tain McClellan's report was republished by the pub
lishers of the present work, in an octavo volume,
with illustrations, with the title, " The Armies of
Europe : comprising Descriptions in detail of the
Military System of England, France, Russia, Prus
sia, Austria, and Sardinia, adapting their Advan
tages to all Arms of the United States Service,
and embodying tbe Report of Observations in

Agk29.] SEBASTOPOL. 71
Europe during the Crimean War, as Military Com
missioner from the United States Government in
1855-56." Its contents are as follows. The first thirty-five
pages are occupied with an able and interesting
summary of the warlike operations in the Crimea,
in which the plans and movements both of the
Russians and the allies a're criticized without a
touch of arrogance, and yet with a manly decision
of tone which reveals a sound military judgment
and» thorough military training. Its merits can
be fully perceived only by a profesgional reader ;
but the general reader cannot fail to recognize in
it the marks which show the writer to be a man of
vigorous understanding and excellent powers of
observation, as well as an accomplished officer. The
style is simple, perspicuous, and direct, the style
of Washington, Collingwood, and Wellington; — in
other words, that good style which a man of sense
will always write who has something to say and
writes on without thinking about his style at all.
As the work, from the nature of its contents, can
never have been generally read, two extracts from
this portion of the volume are here appended, —
enough, it is believed, to justify the commendation
which has been bestowed upon it. The first is a
brief criticism -of the defences of Sebastopol : —
" From the preceding hasty and imperfect account of
the defences of Sebastopol, it will appear how little found
ation there was for the generally received accounts of the
stupendous dimensions of the works, and of new .systems
of fortifications brought into play. The plain truth is

72 ATTACK OP THE REDAN. [1856.
that these defences were simple temporary fortifications
of rather greater dimensions than usual, and that not a
single new principle of engineering was there developed.
It is true that there were several novel minor details,
such as the rope mantelets, the use of the iron tanks,
&c. ; but the whole merit consisted in the admirable
adaptation of well-known principles to the peculiar locality
and circumstances of the case. Neither can it be asserted
that the plans of the various works were perfect. On
the contrary, there is no impropriety in believing that,
if Todtleben were called upon to do the same work over
again, he would probably introduce better close-flanking
arrangements. " These remarks are not intended to, nor can they, detract
from the reputation of the Russian engineer. His labors
and their results will be handed down in history as the
most triumphant and enduring monument of the value
of fortifications, and his name must ever be placed in the
first rank of military engineers. But, in our admiration
of the talent and energy of the engineer, it must not be
forgotten that the inert masses which he raised would
have been useless without the skilful artillery and heroic
infantry who defended them. Much stronger places than
Sebastopol have often fallen under far less obstinate and
well-combined attacks than that to which it was subjected.
There can be no danger in expressing the conviction that
the siege of Sebastopol called forth the most magnificent
defence of fortifications that has ever yet occurred."
The next is a description of the final assault: —
" A few minutes later than the assault upon the Malakoff,
the English attacked the Redan. The Russians being
now upon the alert, they did not pass over the open space
before them without loss ; but the m.iss succeeded in
crossing the ditch and gaining the salient of the work.

Age29.] ENGLISH AND PRENCH ASSAULTS. 73
Finding themselves entirely unsupported, they at once
took shelter behind the traverses, whence the example
and efforts of their officers did not avail to draw them, in
order to occupy the work closing the gorge. Having in
vain used every effort, having despatched every officer
of his staff to the rear urging that supports should be
at once sent up, and seeing that the Russians were now
beginning to assemble in force, the commander of the
English storming party reluctantly determined to pro
ceed himself to obtain reinforcements. Scarcely had he
reached the trenches, and*at last obtained authority to
move up the required succor, when, upon turning to lead
them forward, he saw the party he had left in the work
rapidly and hopelessly driven out at the point of the
bayonet. No further effort was made to carry the work.
It would, in all probability, have failed, and would only
have caused a useless sacrifice of men.
"The failure of the English assault may be attributed
partly to the fact that their advanced trenches were too
small to accommodate the requisite force without confu
sion, in part to their not being pushed sufficiently near the
Redan, but chiefly to that total absence of conduct and
skill in the arrangements for the assault which left the
storming party entirely without support. Had it been
followed at once by strong reinforcements, it is almost
certain that the English would have retained possession
of the work.
' ' The two French attacks on the west of the central ravine
were probably intended only as feints : at all events, the
parties engaged were soon driven back to their trenches
with considerable loss, and effected nothing. Their at
tempts upon the Little Redan, and the works connect
ing it with the Malakoff, met with even less success than
the English assault. The Russians repulsed the French
with great loss, meeting with the bayonet the more ad
venturous men who reached the parapet. Thus, in five
7

74 FRENCH ASSAULT. [1856.
points out of six, the defenders were fully victorious; but,
unfortunately for them, the sixth was the decisive point.
" In their admirable arrangements for the attack of the
Malakoff, the French counted on two things for success: —
first, they had ascertained that the Russians were in the
habit of relieving the guard of the Malakoff at noon, and
that a great part of the old guard marched out before the
new one arrived, in order to avoid the loss which would
arise from crowding the work with men ; in the second
place, it was determined to keep up a most violent verti
cal fire until the very moment of the assault, thus driving
the Russians into the bomb-proofs, and enabling the storm
ing party to enter the work with but little opposition.
The hour of noon was therefore selected for the assault,
and the strong columns intended for the work were at an
early hour assembled in the advanced trenches, all in ad
mirable order, and furnished with precise instructions.
"The mortars maintained an unremitting fire until the
moment appointed. The very instant the last volley
was discharged, the storming party of Zouaves rushed
over the thirty paces before them, and were in the work
before the astonished Russians knew what had happened.
It was stated that this party lost but eleven men in enter
ing the work. Other troops advanced rapidly to the sup
port of the storming party, a bridge was formed by rolling
up five ladders with planks lashed to them, a communi
cation was at once commenced between the advanced trench
and the bridge, brigade after brigade passed over, the re
doubt was at once occupied by the storming party, and thus
the Malakoff, and with it Sebastopol, was won. The few
Russians remaining in the work made a desperate resist
ance. Many gallant attempts were made by Russian
columns to ascend the steep slope in rear and regain the
lost work ; but the road was narrow, difficult, and ob
structed, the position strong, and the French in force.
All their furious efforts were in vain, and tho Malakoff

Age29.] LENGTH OP THE SIEGE. 75
remained in the possession of those who had so gallantly
and skilfully won it. With regard to the final retreat
to the north side, it can only be said that a personal ex
amination of the locality merely confirms its necessity,
and the impression so generally entertained that it was
the finest operation of the war: so admirably was it
carried out that not a straggler remained behind ; a few
men so severely wounded as to be unfit for rough and
hurried transportation were the sole ghastly human
trophies that remained to the allies.
"The retreat, being a more difficult operation than the
assault, may be worthy of a higher admiration ; but the
Russian retreat to the north side and the French assault
upon the Malakoff must each be regarded as a master
piece of its kind, deserving the closest study. It is difficult
to imagine what point in either can be criticized ; for both
evinced consummate skill, discipline, coolness, and cou
rage. With regard to the artillery, I would merely remark
that the Russian guns were not of unusual calibre, con
sisting chiefly of twenty-four-, thirty-two-, and forty-
two-pounders, and that the termination of the siege was
mainly due to the extensive use of mortars finally re
sorted to by the allies. If they had been employed in
the beginning as the main reliance, the siege would have
been of shorter duration.
"The causes of the unusual duration of this siege natu
rally resolve themselves into three classes: the skilful
disposition of the Russians, the faults of the allies, and
natural causes beyond the control of either party. Among
the latter may be mentioned the natural strength of the
position and the severity of the winter. In the first class
there may be alluded to : — the skill with which the Rus
sian engineers availed themselves of the nature of the
ground ; the moral courage which induced them to un
dertake the defence of an open town with a weak garri
son ; the constant use they made of sorties, among which

76 FRENCH ZOUAVES. [1856.
may properly be classed the battles of Balaklava, Inker-
mann, and the Tchernaya; the ready ingenuity with
which they availed themselves of the resources derived
from the fleet ; the fine practice of their artillery ; their
just appreciation of the true use of field-works, and the
admirable courage they always evinced in standing to
their works, to repel assaults at the point of the bayonet ;
the employment of rifle-pits on an extensive scale ; finally,
the constant reinforcements which they soon commenced
receiving, and which enabled them to fill the gaps made
in their ranks by disease and the projectiles of the allies.
" The evidences of skill on the part of the allies, as well
as the apparent faults on all sides, having been already
alluded to, it is believed that the means have been fur
nished to enable any one to draw his own conclusions as
to the history of this memorable passage of arms."
Next after the observations on the Crimean War
follow twenty pages on the European engineer
troops, to which succeed twenty-eight pages on the
French, Austrian, Prussian, and Sardinian infantry.
A brief description of the French Zouave will be of
interest to the reader: —
" The dress of the Zouave is of the Arab pattern : the
cap is a loose fez, or skull-cap, of scarlet felt, with a tassel ;
a turban is worn over this in full dress ; a cloth vest and
loose jacket, which leave the neck unencumbered by
collar, stock, or cravat, cover the upper portion of his
body, and allow free movement of the arms; the scarlet
pants are of the loose Oriental pattern, and are tucked
under gaiters like those of the foot rifles of the guard ;
the overcoat is a loose cloak, with a hood ; the chasseurs
wear a similar one. The men say that this dress is the
most convenient possible, and prefer it to any other.
" The Zouaves are all French ; they are selected from

Agk29.] FRENCH ZOUAVES. 77
among the old campaigners for their fine physique and
tried courage, and have certainly proved that they are
what their appearance would indicate, — the most reck
less, self-reliant, and complete infantry that Europe can
produce. "With his graceful dress, soldierly bearing, and vigilant
attitude, the Zouave at an outpost is the beau-id6al of a
soldier. " They neglect no opportunity of adding to their personal
comforts : if there is a stream in the vicinity, the party
marching on picket is sure to be amply supplied with
fishing-rods, &c. ; if any thing is to be had, the Zouaves
are quite certain to obtain it.
"Their movements are the lightest and most graceful I
have ever seen; the stride is long, but the foot seems
scarcely to touch the ground, and the march is apparently
made without effort or fatigue.
" The step of the foot rifles is shorter and quicker, and
not so easy and graceful.
"The impression produced by the appearance of the
rifles and of the Zouaves is veiy different: the rifles look
like active, energetic little fellows, who would find their
best field as skirmishers ; but the Zouaves have, combined
with all the activity and energy of the others, that solid
ensemble and reckless dare-devil individuality which would
render them alike formidable when attacking in mass, or
in defending a position in the most desperate hand-to-
hand encounter. Of all the troops that I have ever seen,
I should esteem it the greatest honor to assist in defeating
the Zouaves. The grenadiers of the guard are all large
men, and a fine-looking, soldierly set."
Two hundred and ten pages — nearly one-half of
the whole volume, the Appendix included — are next
given to the Russian army, its organization, recruit
ing, rations, &c.

78 COSSACKS. [1856.
The following is a description of the Russian
Cossacks: —
" There are two peculiarities which cannot fail to arrest
the attention and command the reflection of the observer
of the Russian cavalry : these are, the general division of
the cavalry into regulars and irregulars; and the corps
of dragoons.
" The irregulars may be comprehended in the general
name of Cossacks. Yet their peculiarities of armament,
costume, and action are as varied as their origin ; while
the sources of the latter are as multifarious as the tribes
which compose the mass of Russian nationality, and the
circumstances which, through centuries of warfare, have
finally united into one compact whole a multitude of con
flicting and heterogeneous elements. But, with all this
diversity, there are important and peculiar characteristics
which pervade the mass, and are common to every indi
vidual, with as much uniformity and certainty as that with
which the firm government of the Czar is now extended
over them. These peculiarities are: intelligence, quick
ness of vision, hearing, and all the senses ; individuality ;
trustworthiness on duty; the power of enduring fatigue,
privation, and the extremes of climate ; great address in
the use of weapons ; strong feeling for their common
country ; caution, united with courage capable of being
excited to the highest pitch: in short, the combination
of qualities necessary for partisan troops. The events of
more than one campaign have proved, besides, that these
irregulars can be used successfully in line against the best
regular cavalry of Europe.
" Circumstances of geography and climate have given
to these men a race of horses in every way adapted to
their riders; the Cossack horse is excelled by none in
activity and hardiness.
"The Cossack neglects no opportunity of feeding his

Age 29.] COSSACKS. 79
horse ; during short halts, even under fire, he gives him
whatever is to be had ; the horse refuses nothing that is
offered him, and eats whenever he has the opportunity,
for he has not acquired the pernicious habit of eating
only at regular hours. Some idea may be formed of the
power of endurance of the Cossacks and their horses
from the fact that, in a certain expedition against Khiva,
there were three thousand five hundred regular Russian
troops and twelve hundred Cossacks : of the regulars but
one thousand returned, of the Cossacks but sixty perished.
"The tendency of events, during the present century,
has been to assimilate the organization of the Cossacks
to that of the regulars, to a certain extent : whether the
effect of this has been to modify or destroy their valuable
individual characteristics may yet remain to be proved in
a general war; the events of the campaign of Hungary
are said to indicate that more regularity of action has by
no means impaired their efficiency.
"This brief description of the qualities of the irregular
cavalry indicates at once the use made of them in war :
they watch while the regulars repose. All the duty of
advanced posts, patrols, reconnoissances, escorting trains,
carrying despatches, acting as orderlies, &c, is performed
in preference by the Cossacks: the consequence is, that,
on the day of battle, the regular cavalry are brought upon
the field in full force and undiminished vigor. Under
cover of these active irregulars, a Russian army enjoys
a degree of repose unknown to any other; while, on the
other hand, it is difficult for their antagonists to secure
their outposts and foil their stealthy movements.
"The rapidity and length of their marches are almost
incredible; a march of forty miles is a common thing:
they will make forced marches of seventy miles ; in a
thickly-settled country they have, in two days, made six
marches of ordinary cavalry without being discovered.
"In concluding this subject, it is impossible to repress

80 CAVALRY. [1856.
the conviction that in many of the tribes of our frontier
Indians, such as the Delawares, Kickapoos, &c, we pos
sess the material for the formation of partisan troops fully
equal to the Cossacks: in the event of a serious war on
this continent, their employment, under the regulations
and restrictions necessary to restrain their tendency to
unnecessary cruelty, would be productive of most import
ant advantages.
"In our contests with the hostile Indians, bodies of
these men, commanded by active and energetic regular
officers and supported by regular troops, would undoubt
edly be of great service."
The cavalry of Prussia, Austria, France, England,
and the United States are next considered, the
whole occupying about one hundred pages; and an
Appendix, of the same extent, contains a system of
regulations for the field service of cavalry in time
of war. This arm engages the author's particular
attention, naturally enough, as he was a captain of
cavalry at the time.
Besides its other merits, the volume is a record
of the most faithful and persevering industry, and
contains the results of an immense amount of hard
work. It embraces accounts of military schools,
forts, museums, camps, hospitals, and garrisons.
The arms, dress, and accoutrements of the men,
and the equipments of the horses, are minutely
described, down to the most exact details. It is il
lustrated with several hundred engravings, making
every thing plain to the eye where a visible repre
sentation is needed. In short, no one can look at this
volume without seeing that the author has one of
those happily constituted minds which neither over-

Age 30.] LEAVES THE ARMY. 81
looks nor despises details, and yet is not so hampered
by them as to be incapable of wide views and sound
generalizations. No man can be a great officer who
is not infinitely patient of details; for an army is an
aggregation of details, a defect in any one of which
may destroy or impair the whole. It is a chain of
innumerable links; but the whole chain is no stronger
than its weakest link.
In January, 1857, Captain McClellan resigned his
commission and retired from the army. He had
then been fifteen years in the service, — years of busy
activity and energetic discharge of professional
duty. We may suppose him to have been moved
to this step by the consideration that the future
held out no promise of congenial employment and
seemed to open no adequate sphere to honorable
ambition. A dreary life upon some distant frontier,
the monotonous discharge of routine duty, a re
nunciation of all the attractions of civilized life
without the excitement of ennobling adventure or
heroic struggle, presented an uninviting prospect to
a man like him, in the prime of early manhood,
and with unworn energies alike physical and in
tellectual. He thought, too, that in case of war his
chances of occupation and promotion would be
quite as good in civil life as if he had remained
in the army. The rapid growth and material de
velopment of the country created a demand for
capacities and accomplishments like his; and im
mediately upon his resignation he was appointed
chief engineer of the Illinois Central Railroad
then just opened, and went to Chicago to reside.

82 FORT SUMTER. [1861.
In a few weeks he was made vice-president of
the corporation, and took general charge of all the
business of the road in Illinois. In this capacity
he first made the acquaintance of Mr. Lincoln, now
President of the United States, then a practising
lawyer in Springfield, Illinois, and occasionally em
ployed in tho conduct of suits and other professional
services on behalf of the company.
In May, 1860, Captain McClellan was married to
Miss Ellen Marcy, daughter of General R. B. Marcy,
his former commander in Texas, and the chief of
his staff during the Peninsular campaign.
In August, 1860, he resigned the vice-presidency
of the Illinois Central Road, in order to accept
the presidency of the Ohio & Mississippi Railroad,
which post he held, residing in Cincinnati, till the
war broke. out.

CHAPTER IV.

The guns which opened upon Fort Sumter on
the memorable 12th of April, 1861, did not merely
crumble the wails of that fortress, but they also
shattered all hopes of a peaceful solution of the
problems which were then before the country.
Civil war was now a sad necessity. The Presi
dent's proclamation of the 15th called forth tho
militia for objects entirely lawful and constitu
tional; and it was responded to with a patriotic
fervor whieh melted down all previously existing

Age 34.] CIVIL WAR. 83
party lines. This "uprising of a great people," as
it was well termed by a foreign writer, was a kin
dling and noble spectacle. The heart of the whole
land throbbed like the heart of one. But we can
not now look back upon that brilliant and burning
enthusiasm without a touch of sadness, because
there was mingled with it so much ignorance, not
merely of the magnitude of the contest before us,
but of the nature of war itself. The spirited
young men who, at the call of patriotic duty,
thronged to swell the ranks of our volunteer force,
marched off as gayly as if they had been going to a
hunting-party or a picnic excursion. The rebellion
was to be put down at once, and by little more than
the mere show of the preponderating force of the
loyal States; and the task of putting it down was
to be attended with no more of danger than was
sufficient to give to the enterprise a due flavor
of excitement. War was unknown to us except
by report : the men of the Revolution had passed
away, and even the soldiers ofthe War of 1812 had
become gray-haired veterans. We had read of
battles; we had seen something ofthe pride and
pomp of holiday soldiers; but of the grim realities
of war we were absolutely ignorant. Indeed, not
a few had come to the conclusion that war was a
relic of barbarism, which the world had outgrown.
and that modern civilization could dispense with
the soldier and his sword.
It need hardly be added that we were wholly un
prepared for the gigantic struggle that was before
us. Our regular army was insignificant in num-

84 OHIO. [1861.
bers, and scattered over our vast territory or
along our Western frontier, so that it was impossi
ble to collect any considerable force together. Our
militia system had everywhere fallen into neglect,
and in some States had almost ceased to have any
real existence. The wits laughed at it, and the plat
form-orators declaimed against it, to such a degree
that it required some moral courage to march
through the streets at the head of a company.
The South had been wiser, or, at least, more pro
vident, in this respect. The military spirit had
never been discouraged there. Many ofthe political
leaders had long been looking forward to the time
when the unhappy sectional contests which were
distracting the country would blaze out into civil
war, and preparing for it. In some of the States
there had been military academies, where a mili-
tary education had been obtained : so that they
had a greater number of trained officers to put into
their regiments. This gave them a considerable
advantage at the start. Happily for us, graduates
of West Point were scattered all over the North:
to them the civil authority looked for assistance,
and they rendered an assistance which cannot be
too highly estimated.
Ohio was as unprepared as other States. There
was a small force of militia nominally organized;
but the Constitution and laws of the State provided
that all its officers should be elected by the men,
and tho Governor was limited, in his selection of
officers in case the militia was called out, to the
parties so chosen. In an emergency like this, it was

Age 34.] GOVERNOR DENNISON. 85
fortunate that Ohio had so efficient a Governor as
Mr. William Dennison. He at once turned to Cap
tain McClellan for assistance, and sent a request to
Washington that the latter might be restored to
his old rank in the army and the duty of organizing
the Ohio volunteers assigned to him. To this re
quest no answer was received : indeed, the commu
nications with Washington were generally inter
rupted, and the several Governors were thus left
to their own resources.
Governor Dennison summoned Captain McClellan
to Columbus; and he at once applied himself to the
work of organizing the numerous regiments offered.
A bill was also introduced into the Legislature, and
rapidly passed, authorizing the Governor to select
officers for the volunteers outside ofthe State militia.
Under this act, on the 23d of April, 1861, Captain
McClellan was commissioned major-general of the
Ohio "Militia Volunteers."
Under the proclamation of the President of April
15, calling out the militia, thirteen regiments of
infantry were demanded from Ohio for three
months, and afterwards the same number for
three years. To obtain men was then easy enough,
but to find suitable officers was exceedingly difficult;
and arms and equipments were entirely wanting.
A "Department of the Ohio" was formed on the
3d of May, consisting of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois,
and placed under General McClellan's command,
who thus had under his charge the forces of two
other States besides his own. Ho organized his
troops in spite of all obstacles, and within two

86 VIRGINIA AND SECESSION. [1861.
months of the time of his leaving his peaceful
avocations he took the field for the first campaign
of the war.
Secession placed no State in so embarrassing a
position as the great Commonwealth of Virginia.
Separated from the capital only by a river, and ex
tending from the ocean to the Ohio, it lay mid
way between the two contending parties, and early
promised to be what it has since become, — the
Belgium of the war. There is no doubt that the
great body of its citizens were opposed to the
State's seceding; but they were equally opposed
to the coercion of the States which had already
seceded, and sympathized with many of their
alleged grievances. A State convention at Rich
mond, on the 17th of April, when it was evident
that war must ensue, passed an ordinance of se
cession. Although this was not to go into force
until it had been ratified by the people, the in
habitants of the eastern and southern portions of
the State immediately began hostilities.
In the portion of the State lying west of the
Alleghany Mountains, and known as Western Vir
ginia, the feelings of the people were veiy different.
They owned but few slaves, and their soil and
climate were unfitted for those branches of indus
try in which slave-labor is profitable. While dis
approving of the slavery agitation in the North,
they had no particular interest in the extension
of that institution, and were strenuously opposed
to secession for its sake; and they also had some
grievances regarding alleged inequalities of taxa-

Age 34.] C A M P D E N N I S O N. 8 .
tion between Eastern and Western "Virginia, which
had probably caused many of them already to look
forward to the organization of a separate State.
In this conjuncture, a convention of the people of
Western Virginia was called to assemble at Wheel
ing on the 11th of June, to consider the alarming
condition of public affairs.
Early in May, General McClellan received applica
tions for protection from the people of this region,
but was not then prepared to accede to their wishes.
Afterwards, however, it became evident that the
Virginia authorities contemplated occupying this
country, and to secure, by so doing, the command
of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, the importance
of which was appreciated by both parties. Gov
ernor Letcher had already called out the State
militia, and not only Western Virginia, but Southern
Ohio also, might soon be invaded by them.
A small body of Virginia militia had actually
advanced, and were encamped at Grafton, on the
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad. On the 24th of May,
the Secretary of War and General Scott tele
graphed to General McClellan, informing him of
this camp, and asking him whether its influence
could not be counteracted. General McClellan
replied in the affirmative. This was the sole order
whieh he received from Washington regarding a
campaign in Virginia.
General McClellan had formed his principal ren
dezvous at Camp Dennison, near Cincinnati; while
bodies of troops were also at Gallipolis, Bellaire,
and Marietta, on the Ohio River, opposite Vir-

88 PROCLAMATION. [1861.
ginia. At Wheeling the loyalists were organizing
a regiment under Colonel B. F. Kelley. The men
were wretchedly provided for, having nothing but
muskets; but they did good service before the end
of summer. On the 26th of May, intelligence was
received at Camp Dennison that the enemy were
advancing from Grafton upon Wheeling and Par
kersburg, for the purpose of destroying the railroad.
General McClellan at once telegraphed to Colonel
Kelley to move his regiment (since known as the
First Virginia) early the next day along the line of
railroad towards Fairmount, in order to prevent
any further destruction of the bridges and to pro
tect the repair of those already injured. Two Ohio
regiments, under Colonels Irwin and Stedman, were
also directed to cross over into Virginia, one to co
operate with Colonel Kelley and the other to occupy
Parkersburg. On the same day, General McClellan
issued the following proclamation and address : —

"Head-Quarters Department of the Ohio, 1
May 26, 1861. j
" To the Union Men of Western Virginia.
" Virginians : — The General Government has long enough
endured the machinations of a few factious rebels in your
midst. Armed traitors have in vain endeavored to deter
you from expressing your loyalty at the polls. Having
failed in this infamous attempt to deprive you of the exer
cise of your dearest rights, they now seek to inaugurate a
reign of terror, and thus force you to yield to their schemes
and submit to the yoke of the traitorous conspiracy

Age 34.] PROCLAMATION. 89
dignified by the name of the Southern Confederacy.
They are destroying the property of citizens of your
State and ruining your magnificent railways. The Gene
ral Government has heretofore carefully abstained from
sending troops across the Ohio, or even from posting them
along its banks, although frequently urged to do so by
many of your prominent citizens. It determined to await
the result of the late election, desirous that no one might
be able to say that the slightest effort had been made
from this side to influence the free expression of your
opinions, although the many agencies brought to bear
upon you by the rebels were well known. You have now
shown, under the most adverse circumstances, that the
great mass of the people of Western Virginia are true
and loyal to that beneficent Government under which we
and our fathers have lived so long. As soon as the result
of the election was known, the traitors commenced their
work of destruction. The General Government cannot
close its ears to the demand you have made for assistance.
I have ordered troops to cross the Ohio River. They
come as your friends and brothers, — as enemies only to
the armed rebels who are preying upon you. Your ¦
homes, your families, and your property are safe under
our protection. All your rights shall be religiously re
spected, notwithstanding all that has been said by the
traitors to induce you to believe that our advent among
you will be signalized by interference with your slaves.
Understand one thing clearly. Not only will we abstain
from all such interference, but we will, on the contrary,
with an iron hand, crush any attempt at insurrection on
their part. Now that we are in your midst, I call upon
you to fly to arms and support the General Government.
Sever the connection that binds you to traitors ; pro
claim to the world that the faith and loyalty so long
boasted by the Old Dominion are still preserved in

90 ADDRESS. [1861.
Western Virginia, and that you remain true to the Stars
and Stripes. "Geo. B. McClellan,
"Major-General U. S. A., Com'd'g Dep't."
"Head-Quarters Department of the Ohio, 1
Cincinnati, May 26, 1861. J
"Soldiers: — You are ordered to cross the frontier and
enter upon the soil of Virginia.
" Your mission is to restore peace and confidence, to pro
tect the majesty of the law, and to rescue our brethren
from the grasp of armed traitors. You are to act in con
cert with Virginia troops, and to support their advance.
I place under the safeguard of your honor the persons
and property of the Virginians. I know that you will re
spect their feelings and all their rights.
" Preserve the strictest discipline. Remember that each
one of you holds in his keeping the honor of Ohio and
the Union. If you are called upon to overcome armed
opposition, I know that your courage is equal to the task ;
but remember that your only foes are the armed
traitors, — and show mercy even to them when they are
in your power, for many of them are misguided. When,
under your protection, the loyal men of Western Virginia
have been enabled to organize and arm, they can protect
themselves ; and you can then return to your homes with
the proud satisfaction of having saved a gallant people
from destruction. "Geo. B. McClellan,
" Major-General U. S. A., Com'd'g."
General McClellan also wrote full particulars to
the President of what he had done, but, receiving
no reply, inferred that his course was approved of.
Colonel Kelley reached Grafton on the 13th of
May. The enemy retreated at his approach, and he

Age 34.] BATTLE OF PHILIPPI. 91
repaired the bridge, and established railroad-com
munications with Wheeling. Soon after, Colonel
Stedman occupied Clarksburg, and established com
munications with Colonel Kelley. The enemy fell
back from Grafton upon Philippi, on the high-road
from Wheeling to Staunton, in Central Virginia.
General McClellan in the mean time had despatched
three Indiana regiments, under Brigadier-General
Morris, to Grafton. They arrived on the 31st of
May; and General Morris at once assumed the chief
command. Hardly six weeks had elapsed since
Captain McClellan had been first called upon by
Governor Dennison for assistance; and in that time
he had actually created an army and begun the first
campaign !
The first encounter of the war took place at
Philippi, a small town two hundred and ten miles
from Richmond. On the 2d of June, General
Morris determined to endeavor to drive from this
town the rebel force there, under Colonel Porter
field. The attacking force consisted of five regi
ments, formed in two columns, — tbe first under
Colonel Kelley, the second under Colonel Dumont,
accompanied by Colonel (afterwards the lamented
General) Lander. Colonel Kelley's column moved
towards Philippi by way of Thornton, a distance
of twenty-seven miles, partly by railroad. The
other column moved directly on Philippi in front.
This one reached its destination early on the 3d,
notwithstanding deep mud and heavy rain, and
at once opened fire from two pieces of artillery
upon the enemy, who began a retreat, which was

92 PROVISIO.X AL GOVERNMENT. [1861.
turned into a complete rout when Colonel Kelley,
(who had been greatly impeded by the state of the
roads) came up and joined in the attack. The
enemy left behind them their camp-equipage,
seven hundred stand of arms, and several horses.
They lost about fifteen men killed and wounded.
On the Federal side, Colonel Kelley was severely
wounded, but recovered.
General McClellan now pushed the Ohio regi
ments on into Virginia as rapidly as they could be
decently equipped. But the great deficiency which
still existed in all military necessaries much re
tarded him. The loyalists, on the 13th of June,
formed a provisional government at Wheeling, with
the Hon. Francis H. Pierpoint as Governor. But Old
Virginia was determined not to lose the fine country
beyond the Alleghanies without a struggle. Large
reinforcements arrived at Beverly, on the Staunton
road, the head-quarters of the enemy; and with
them came General Robert Selden Garnett, the
former commandant at West Point, and an officer
of high reputation, to assume the chief command.
Upon learning this, General McClellan thought it
time to move; and, his preparations being so far
advanced as to justify it, he left Cincinnati on the
20th of June, and arrived at Grafton on the 22d.
He still received no orders from Washington, and
was even left ignorant of the plan for the campaign
in Eastern Virginia. His own department was very
extensive, and the simple administrative cares con
nected with it extremely arduous. Besides, not only
in Virginia, but in Kentucky and Tennessee, the

Age .34.] WESTERN VIRGINIA. 93
enemy were very active, and it could not be known
how soon he might be called upon to plan a cam
paign for the defence of the Union interests in those
States. The country which now became the scene of ope
rations was that part of Western Virginia lying
between the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad on the
north, the Ohio River on the west, the Little Ka
nawha River on the south, and the Cheat River on
the east. The region is broken and mountainous,
and cut into numerous ravines and valleys by the
many little streams which form the head- waters of
the Monongahela, Great Kanawha, Little Kanawha,
and other rivers. The roads are few in number
and very indifferent in quality; the valleys only are
cultivated, the rest of the country being covered
with dense forests, and a luxuriant growth of
bushes which makes the woods almost impassable.
A turnpike road runs from Wheeling southeasterly
to Staunton, through Philippi, Leedsville, Beverly,
and Huttonsville. From Beverly another turnpike
runs westerly, at an acute angle with the Wheeling
road, to Buckhannon, where it branches off to Clarks
burg on the north and Weston on the west. A
mountainous ridge crosses the two roads from Bev
erly to Philippi and Buckhannon ; and at the inter
section the enemy were strongly intrenched, — Gene
ral Garnett commanding in person at Laurel Hill,
on the Philippi road, a little north of Leedsville
and fifteen miles north of Beverly, and Colonel
Pegram at Rich Mountain, on the Buckhannon
road, five miles west of Beverly. General Gar-

94 GENERAL MCCLELLAN'S PLANS. [1861.
;nett's force was about ten thousand men, and Colo
nel Pegram's about four thousand. Their natural
retreat was by way of Beverly and Huttonsville
through the Cheat Mountain Pass, as it is called.
North of this there is no road over the Alleghanies
passable for artillery until the circuitous road run
ning northeasterly from Leedsville through St.
George and West Union to Moorfield is reached.
If, therefore, by the capture of Beverly the road by
Cheat Mountain Pass (and with it any other road
south of it) were cut off, this north road was the
only retreat open to General Garnett.
General McClellan's plans are best described in
his own language. On the 23d of June he wrote
a letter to General Scott. " I stated," says he,
"that it was now certain that the enemy had a
force of some kind near Huttonsville, with a
strong advanced party intrenched near Laurel Moun
tain, between Philippi and Beverly, and that their
chief object seemed to me to be to furnish and pro
tect guerrilla parties, which were then doing much
mischief; also that the apprehensions which had ex
isted on the part of our people of an attack by this
party of the enemy were not well founded; that,
as soon as my command was well in hand and my
information more full, I proposed moving with
all my available force from Clarksburg on Buck
hannon, thence on Beverly, to turn entirely the de
tachment at Laurel Hill, the troops at Philippi to
advance in time to follow up the retreat of the
enemy in their front. That, after occupying Bev
erly, I would move on Huttonsville and drive the

Age 34.J PROCLAMATION. / 95
enemy into the mountains, whither I aid not pur-._
pose to follow them unless certain of success."1-
In pursuance of this plan, the main body^of his
-army, numbering about ten thousand men, were
transferred to Clarksburg. It consisted of two
brigades, under Brigadier-Generals Rosecrans and
Schleich, with a small body of cavalry, a company
of regular artillery, and two batteries of volunteer
artillery. Another body, under General Morris,
was stationed at Philippi, aud a body of reserve,
under Brigadier-General Hill, of the Ohio militia,
was stationed at Grafton. Before leaving Grafton,
General McClellan issued the following proclama
tion and address :—

"Head-Quarters, Department of the Ohio, ]
Grafton, Va., June 23, 1861.

'}
"To the Inhabitants of Western Virginia.
"The army of this department, headed by Virginia
troops, is rapidly occupying all Western Virginia. This
is done in co-operation with and in support of such civil
authorities of the State as are faithful to the Constitution
and laws of the United States. The proclamation issued
by me under date of May 26, 1861, will be strictly main
tained. Your houses, families, property, and all your
rights will be religiously respected: we are enemies to
none but armed rebels and those voluntarily giving them
aid. All officers of this army will be held responsible
for the most prompt and vigorous action in repressing
disorder and punishing aggression by those under their
command. " To my great regret, I find that enemies of the United
States continue to carry on a system of hostilities pro
hibited by the laws of war among belligerent nations,
and, of course, far more wicked and intolerable when di-

96 ADDRESS. [1861.
rected against loyal citizens engaged in the defence of
the common government of all. Individuals and maraud
ing parties are pursuing a guerrilla warfare, — firing upon
sentinels and pickets, burning bridges, insulting, injuring,
and even killing citizens because of their Union senti
ments, and committing many kindred acts.
" I do now, therefore, make proclamation, and warn all
persons, that individuals or parties engaged in this species
of warfare, — irregular in every view which can be taken of
it, — thus attacking sentinels, pickets, or other soldiers,
destroying public or private property, or committing in
juries against any of the inhabitants because of Union
sentiments or conduct, will be dealt with, in their persons
and property, according to the severest rules of military
law. "All persons giving information or aid to the public
enemies will be arrested and kept in close custody; and
all persons found bearing arms, unless of known loyalty,
will be arrested and held for examination. "Geo. B. McClellan,
" Major-General U. S. A. Com'd'g."
"Head-Quarters Department of the Ohio, 1
Grafton, Va., June 25, 1861. J
" To the Soldiers of the Army of the West.
"You are here to support the Government of your
country, and to protect the lives and liberties of your
brethren, threatened by a rebellious and traitorous foe.
No higher and nobler duty could devolve upon you ; and
I expect you to bring to its performance the highest
and noblest qualities of soldiers, — discipline, courage, and
mercy. I call upon the officers of every grade to enforce
the strictest discipline ; and I know that those of all grades,
privates and officers, will display in battle cool heroic
courage, and will know how to show mercy to a disarmed
enemy.

Age 34.] ADDRESS. 97
" Bear in mind that you are in the country of friends,
not of enemies, — that you are here to protect, not to de
stroy. Take nothing, destroy nothing, unless you are
ordered to do so by your general officers. Remember
that I have pledged my word to the people of Western
Virginia that their rights in person and property shall
be respected. I ask every one of you to make good
this promise in its broadest sense. We come here to
save, not to upturn. I do not appeal to the fear of pun
ishment, but to your appreciation of the sacredness of
the cause in which we are engaged. Carry with you into
battle the conviction that you are right and that God is
on your side.
"Your enemies have violated every moral law: neither
God nor man can sustain them. They have without cause
rebelled against a mild and paternal Government; they
have seized upon public and private property ; they have
outraged the persons of Northern men merely because
they came from the North, and of Southern Union men
merely because they loved the Union ; they have placed
themselves beneath contempt, unless they can retrieve
some honor on the field of battle. You will pursue a
different course. You will be honest, brave, and merci
ful ; you will respect the right of private opinion ; you
will punish no man for opinion's sake. Show to the
world that you differ from our enemies in the points of
honor, honesty, and respect for private opinion, and that
we inaugurate no reign of terror where we go.
"Soldiers, I have heard that there was danger here.
I have come to place myself at your head and to share
it with you. I fear now but one thing, — that you will not > '.
find foemen worthy of your steel. I know that I can
rely upon you. "Geo. B. McClellan,
"Major-General Com'd'g."

98 RICH MOUNTAIN. [1861.
Buckhannon was occupied on the 30th by Gene
ral Rosecrans, and a regiment was sent to take
possession of Weston. General McClellan and
staff and General Schleich's brigade reached Buck
hannon on the 2d of July. Before advancing on
the enemy, General McClellan had to give direc
tions regarding an independent portion of his de
partment. Generals Wise and Floyd had invaded
the country south of the Little Kanawha River,
with a large force. To meet these, General Mc
Clellan directed Brigadier-General J. Dolson Cox
to. proceed thither from Ohio with five regiments,
and assigned to him the district between tbe Great
and Little Kanawha Rivers.
On the 9th, the main column ofthe army reached
Roaring Fork, beyond Buckhannon, and two miles
from Colonel Pegram's intrenchments. A bridge
which had been destroyed had to be rebuilt. On
the 10th, Lieutenant Poe was sent out with a de
tachment to reconnoitre the enemy's position. This
reconnoissance was pushed within two hundred
yards of the enemy's works. Colonel Pegram, it
was found, was strongly intrenched near the foot
of Rich Mountain and on the west side of it. The
position was surrounded by dense forests, and its
natural strength had been increased by rough in
trenchments and by felling trees.
As an attack in front would be followed by a serious
loss of life, and its success with raw troops, to say
the least, was doubtful, General McClellan's plan
was to turn Colonel Pegram's position to the south,
endeavor to cut off his retreat, and, should he sue-

Age 34.] RICH MOUNTAIN. 99
eeed in so doing, to push on to Beverly and cut off
General Garnett's retreat by Staunton, forcing him
to retire by the northeasterly road to Moorfield-
The duty of turning the enemy's works was as
signed to General Rosecrans. His instructions were
to make a circuit to the south and endeavor to
reach and occupy the top of the mountain, get
command of the turnpike road from Beverly to
Buckhannon, and then move on the rear of Pe
gram's defences. His further order, constantly to
communicate with General McClellan, General Rose
crans does not seem to have been able to carry out.
General Rosecrans set out, with a force of eigh
teen hundred infantry and a small body of cavalry,
at four o'clock on the morning of the 11th of July,
to execute these orders. After a fatiguing march
through a country saturated with rain and covered
with dense woods, he reached the summit of Rich
Mountain about one o'clock. The enemy had in
tercepted some letters, and thus obtained intimation
of this movement, and had stationed a considerable
force, with two pieces of artillery, at the top of the
mountain, where some rude intrenchments had been
thrown up. Rosecrans formed his command, and
had proceeded a short way towards the turnpike,
when he came upon a party of skirmishers, who
were driven back upon the main body. The enemy
now opened fire from their artillery. A spirited
attack soon carried the intrenchments, and the
rebels retreated in confusion upon Colonel Pegram,
leaving their artillery in possession of the Federals.
The success of the movement was complete; but

100 DESPATCH PROM RICH MOUNTAIN. [1861.
his troops, unused to such exertions, being greatly
fatigued, General Rosecrans halted.
No communication was received at head-quarters
from Rosecrans after eleven o'clock. The firing at
Rich Mountain was distinctly heard; but great
fears were entertained that the attack had failed.
"Soon after the cessation of the distant firing/'
says General McClellan, "an officer was observed
to ride into the intrenchments and address the
garrison. We could not distinguish the words he
uttered, but his speech was followed by prolonged
cheering, which impressed many with the belief
that it had fared badly with our detachment."
General McClellan determined to attack the enemy
in front, and Lieutenant Poe was sent to select a
proper position for the artillery. Upon his report
ing one, a party was despatched to cut a road to it.
It was now too late in the day to begin an attack;
but one was resolved upon early the next morning,
in hopes of relieving Rosecrans if he were hard
pressed by the enemy. The next morning, how
ever, the pickets reported that Colonel Pegram had
deserted his works and fled over the mountains.
Leaving Rosecrans at Rich Mountain, General
McClellan pushed on to Beverly. He thus effectu
ally cut off General Garnett's communications with
Staunton. His despatch was as follows : —
"Rich Mountain, Va., 9 a.m., July 12.
"Colonel E. D. Townsend, Assistant Adjutant-General; —
" We are in possession of all the enemy's works up to
a point in sight of Beverly. We have taken all his guns,
a very large amount of wagons, tents, &c, every thing he

Age 34. j BEVERLY. 101
had, and also a large number of prisoners, many of whom
are wounded, and amongst whom are several officers.
They lost many killed. We have lost in all perhaps
twenty killed and forty wounded, of whom all but two
or three were in the column under Colonel Rosecrans,
which turned the position. The mass of the enemy
escaped through the woods, entirely disorganized. Among
the prisoners is Dr. Taylor, formerly of the army. Colonel
Pegram was in command.
" Colonel Rosecrans's column left camp yesterday morn
ing and marched some eight miles through the moun
tains, reaching the turnpike some two or three miles
in the rear of the enemy. He defeated an advanced
force, and took a couple of guns. I had a position ready
for twelve guns near the main camp, and as the guns
were moving up I ascertained that the enemy had re
treated. I am now pushing on to Beverly, — a part of
Colonel Rosecrans's troops being now within three miles
of that place. Our success is complete, and almost blood
less. I doubt whether Wise and Johnston will unite and
overpower me. The behavior of our troops in action
and towards prisoners was admirable. " G. B. McClellan,
" Major-General commanding."
On the night of the 11th, General Garnett, learn
ing of the disaster at Rich Mountain, fell back on
Beverly; but, finding his retreat that way cut off,
he retraced his steps, and took the northern road
by St. George and West Union. In accordance with
orders, General Morris followed him, and overtook
him at Carrick's Ford, on the main fork of Cheat
River. The enemy were posted in a tolerably
strong position, but did not withstand the attack,
led by Captain Bonham, and retreated in confusion.
9*

102 ADDRESS. [1861.
General Garnett was himself killed while endeavor
ing to rally his troops. With soldier-like generosity,
General Morris directed the remains to be carefully
removed, and afterwards forwarded them to the
family in Virginia.
The enemy lost in these engagements about two
hundred killed, besides wounded and prisoners,
seven or eight pieces of artillery, and large military
stores. General Hill failed to carry out the direc
tions sent to him to pursue General Garnett's force,
and they escaped. Colonel Pegram, however, find
ing that Garnett had retreated, fell back on Beverly,
and was compelled to surrender at discretion, on
the 13th, with about six hundred men. General
McClellan occupied Huttonsville and the Cheat
Mountain Pass, thus gaining the key to Western
Virginia. On the 19th of July he issued the fol
lowing address to the army : —
"Soldiers of the Army op the West: —
"I am more than satisfied with you. You have anni
hilated two armies, commanded by educated and expe
rienced soldiers, intrenched in mountain-fastnesses, and
fortified at their leisure. You have taken five guns,
twelve colors, fifteen hundred stand of arms, one thou
sand prisoners, including more than forty officers. One
of the second commanders of the rebels is a prisoner ;
the other lost his life on the field of battle. You have
killed more than two hundred and fifty of the enemy,
who has lost all his baggage and camp-equipage. All this
has been done with the loss of twenty brave men killed
and sixty wounded on your part.
" You have proved that Union men fighting for the pre
servation of our Government are more than a match for

Age34.] SUMMONS TO WASHINGTON. 103
our misguided and erring brothers. More than this, you
have shown mercy to the vanquished. You have made
long and arduous marches, with insufficient food, fre
quently exposed to the inclemency of the weather. I
have not hesitated to demand this of you, feeling that I
could rely on your endurance, patriotism, and courage.
In the future I may have still greater demands to make
upon you, still greater sacrifices for you to offer. It shall
be my care to provide for you to the extent of my ability ;
but I know now that by your valor and endurance you
will accomplish all that is asked.
"Soldiers, I have confidence in you, and I trust you
have learned to confide in me. Remember that discipline
and subordination are qualities of equal value with cou
rage. I am proud to say that you have gained the highest
reward that American troops can receive, — the thanks of
Congress and the applause of your fellow-citizens.
"Geo. B. McClellan, Major-General."
In the mean time, affairs looked perilous in Gene
ral Cox's department, south of the Little Kanawha
River. General McClellan was preparing to take
command there in person, when, on the 22d of July,
he received orders to hand over his command to
General Rosecrans and report at Washington, where
a wider field awaited him.
Thus ended the campaign in Western Virginia.
It seems insignificant by the side of some of the
bloody contests which have since taken place; but
its moral effect was remarkable. It was the first
trial that the raw troops of the North were put
to, and its success was most encouraging. This is
shown by the general satisfaction with which, in the
midst of the gloom created by the battle of Bull

104 WASHINGTON. [1861.
Run, the intelligence was received that General
McClellan was summoned to Washington.
In organizing the Western Army, General Mc
Clellan's services were of great value. No pre
parations had been made beforehand for the strug
gle; and it is his deserved honor that, finding the
West unprepared, he organized the germ of that
brave army which has since gained such renown
in Kentucky, Tennessee, and Mississippi.

CHAPTER V.

When General McClellan assumed command in
Washington, on the 27th of July, the whole number
of troops in and around the city was a little over
fifty thousand, of whom less than a thousand were
cavalry, and about six hundred and fifty were ar
tillery-men, with nine imperfect field-batteries of
thirty pieces. They were encamped in places se
lected without regard to purposes of defence or
instruction; the roads were not picketed, and there
was no attempt at an organization into brigades.
The works of defence were very limited in number
and very defective in character. There was nothing
to prevent the enemy's shelling the city from
heights within easy range, and very little to pre
vent their occupying those heights had they been so
-jdiflijosed. The streets of Washington were crowded
haggling officers and disorderly men, absent
stations without authority, whose be-

Age34.] LABORS OF GENERAL MCCLELLAN. 105
havior indicated a general want of discipline, aggra
vated by the demoralizing influences of the recent
disaster at Bull Run, July 21, 1861.
The task of the commanding officer was one of
no common magnitude. He had the materials for
an army, — and excellent materials, too, but still only
materials. He had no more than the block out
of which an army was to be carved. There were
courage, patriotism, intelligence, physical energy,
in abundance; and to these invaluable qualities
were to be added discipline, the instinct of obe
dience, precision of movement, and the power of
combination. A tumultuary military assemblage
was to be organized into brigades, divisions, and
corps, and brought into proper relations with their
commanders. An adequate artillery establishment
was to be created, and a sufficient force of engineers
and topographical engineers was to be provided.
Tho medical department, the quartermaster's, the
subsistence, the ordnance, the provost-marshal's
departments, were all to be set in movement. A
signal corps was to be formed, and instructed in
the use of flags by day and lights by night ; and, to
keep pace with the march of scientific improvement,
a body of telegraphic operators could not be for
gotten. To these gigantic labors General McClellan ad
dressed himself with unwearied diligence; and he
was ably seconded by a most efficient staff, with
numbers increased from time to time as necessity
required. The new levies of infantry, upon ar
riving in Washington, were formed into provi-

106 MEMORANDUM ON THE WAR. [1861.
sional brigades, and placed in camp in the suburbs
ofthe city for equipment, instruction, and discipline.
Cavalry and artillery troops reported to officers
designated for that purpose. Order was restored
in Washington by a military police bureau, at the
head of which were a provost-marshal and a body
of efficient assistants. New defensive works were
projected and thrown up. Everywhere the hum
of active, organized, and harmonious industry was
heard. A preliminary organization was made of
the troops on hand into twelve brigades. These
were all volunteers, except two companies of
cavalry and four of artillery; but all the com
manding officers had been educated at West Point,
with the single exception of Colonel Blenker, who
had had a good military training ih Europe.
On the 4th of August, 1861, General McClellan
addressed to the President of the United States,
at his request, a memorandum upon the objects of
the war, the principles on which it should be con
ducted, and the operations by which it might be
brought to a speedy and successful termination.
As this is an important document in the history of
the war, which should be carefully read by all who
desire to understand its subsequent course, and still
more by those who would do justice to a command
ing officer whose military capacity and even whose
loyalty and patriotism have been called in question
in high places, it is here inserted in full : —
" The object of the present war differs from those in
which nations are usually engaged' mainly in this : that

Age" 34.] MEMORANDUM ON THE WAR. 107
the purpose of ordinary war is to conquer a peace and
make a treaty on advantageous terms ; in this contest it
has become necessary to crush a population sufficiently
numerous, intelligent, and warlike to constitute a nation.
We have not only to defeat their armed and organized
forces in the field, but to display such an overwhelming
strength as will convince all our antagonists, especially
those of the governing aristocratic class, of the utter im
possibility of resistance. Our late reverses make this
course imperative. Had we been successful in the recent
battle (Manassas), it is possible that we might have been
spared the labor and expense of a great effort.
" Now we have no alternative. Their success will
enable the pohtical leaders of the rebels to convince the
mass of their people that we are inferior to them in force
and courage, and to command all their resources. The
contest began with a class ; now it is with » people : our
military success can alone restore the former issue.
"By thoroughly defeating their armies, taking their
strong places, and pursuing a rigidly protective policy as
to private property and unarmed persons and a lenient
course as to private soldiers, we may well hope for a perma
nent restoration of a peaceful Union. But in the first
instance the authority of the Government must be sup
ported by overwhelming physical force.
" Our foreign relations and financial credit also impera^
tively demand that the military action of the Govern
ment should be prompt and irresistible.
"The rebels have chosen Virginia as their battle-field;
and it seems proper for us to make the first great struggle
there. But, while thus directing our main "efforts, it is
necessary to diminish the resistance there offered us, by
movements on other points, both by land and water.
"Without entering at present into details, I would ad
vise that a strong movement be made on the Mississippi,
and that the rebels be driven out of Missouri.

108 MEMORANDUM ON THE WAR. ,_ [1861.
"As soon as it becomes perfectly clear that Kentucky
is cordially united with us, I would advise a movement
through that State into Eastern Tennessee, for the pur
pose of assisting the Union men of that region, and of
seizing the railroads leading from Memphis to the East.
"The possession of those roads by us, in connection
with the movement on the Mississippi, would go far
towards determining the evacuation of Virginia by the
rebels. In the mean time, all the passes into Western
Virginia from the east should be securely guarded; but
I would advise no movement from that quarter towards
Richmond, unless the political condition of Kentucky
renders it impossible or inexpedient for us to make the
movement upon Eastern Tennessee through that State.
Every effort should, however, be made to organize, equip,
and arm as many troops as possible in Western Virginia,
in order to render the Ohio and Indiana regiments avail
able for other operations.
" At as early a day as practicable, it would be well to
protect and reopen the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad.
Baltimore and Fort Monroe should be occupied by garri
sons sufficient to retain them in our possession.
"The importance of Harper's Ferry and the line of
the Potomac in the direction of Leesburg will be very
materially diminished so soon as our force in this vicinity
becomes organized, strong, and efficient ; because no capa
ble general will cross the river north of this city, when
we have a strong army here ready to cut off his retreat.
" To revert to the West. It is probable that no very
large additions to the troops now in Missouri will be ne
cessary to secure that State.
" I presume that the force required for the movement
down the Mississippi will be determined by its com
mander and the President. If Kentucky assumes the
right position, not more than twenty thousand troops will
be needed, together with those that can be raised in that

Age 34.] MEMORANDUM ON THE WAR. 109
State and Eastern Tennessee, to secure the latter region
and its railroads, as well as ultimately to occupy Nash
ville. "The Western Virginia troops, with not more than five
or ten thousand from Ohio and Indiana, should, under
proper management, suffice for its protection.
"When we have reorganized our main army here, ten
thousand men ought to be enough to protect the Balti
more & Ohio Railroad and the Potomac, five thousand
will garrison Baltimore, three thousand Fort Monroe, and
not more thari twenty thousand will be necessary at the
utmost for the defence of Washington.
"For the main army of operations I urge the following
composition: —
250 regiments of infantry, say  225,000 men.
100 field-batteries, 600 guns  15,000 "
28 regiments of cavalry  25,500 "
5 regiments engineer troops  , 7,500 "
Total  273,000 "
"The force must be supplied with the necessary en
gineer and pontoon trains, and with transportation for
every thing save tents. Its general line of operations
should be so directed that water-transportation can be
availed of from point to point, by means of the ocean
and the rivers emptying into it. An essential feature of
the plan of operations will be the employment of a strong
naval force to protect the movements of a fleet of trans
ports intended to convey a considerable body of troops
from point to point of the enemy's sea-coast, thus either
creating diversions and rendering it necessary for them
to detach largely from their main body in order to pro
tect such of their cities as may be threatened, or else
landing and forming establishments on their coast at any
favorable places that opportunity might offer. This naval
10

110 MEMORANDUM ON THE WAR. [1861.
t
force should also co-operate with the main army in its
efforts to seize the important seaboard towns of the rebels.
" It cannot be ignored that the construction of railroads
has introduced a new and very important element into
war, by the great facilities thus given for concentrating
at particular positions large masses of troops from remote
sections, and by creating new strategic points and lines
of operations.
"It is intended to overcome this difficulty by the par
tial operations suggested, and such others as the parti
cular case may require. We must endeavor to seize places
on the railways in the rear of the enemy's points of con
centration, and we must threaten their seaboard cities,
in order that each State may be forced, by the necessity
of its own defence, to diminish its contingent to the Con
federate army.
"The proposed movement down the Mississippi will
produce important results in this connection. That ad
vance and the progress of the main army at the East will
materially assist each other, by diminishing the resistance
to be encountered by each.
"The tendency of the Mississippi movement upon all
questions connected with cotton is too well understood
by the President and Cabinet to need any illustration
from me.
"There is another independent movement that has
often been suggested, and which has always recommended
itself to my judgment. I refer to a movement from
Kansas and Nebraska, through the Indian Territory, upon
Red River and Western Texas, for the purpose of pro
tecting and developing the latent Union and free-.State
sentiment well known to predominate in Western Texas,
and which, like a similar sentiment in Western Virginia,
will, if protected, ultimately organize that section into a
free State. How far it will be possible to support this
movement by an advance through New Mexico from Cali-

Age 34.] MEMORANDUM ON THE WAR. Ill
fornia, is a matter which I have not sufficiently examined
to be able to express a decided opinion. If at all practi
cable, it is eminently desirable, as bringing into play the
resources and warlike qualities of the Pacific States, as
well as identifying them with our cause and cementing
the bond of union between them and the General Govern
ment. "If it is not departing too far from my province, I will
venture to suggest the policy of an intimate alliance and
cordial understanding with Mexico : their sympathies and
interests are with us, — their antipathies exclusively against
our enemies and their institutions. I think it would not
be difficult to obtain from the Mexican Government the
right to use, at least during the present contest, the road
from Guaymas to New Mexico: this concession would
very materially reduce the obstacles of the column
moving from the Pacific. A similar permission to use
their territory for the passage of troops between the
Panuco and the Rio Grande would enable us to throw
a column of troops by a good road from Tampico, or
some of the small harbors north of it, upon and across
the Rio Grande, without risk and scarcely firing a shot.
"To what extent, if any, it would be desirable to take
into service and employ Mexican soldiers, is a question
entirely political, on which I do not venture to offer an
opinion. "The force I have recommended is large; the expense is
great. It is possible that a smaller force might accomplish
the object in view ; but I understand it to be the purpose
of this great nation to re-establish the power of its Govern
ment, and to restore peace to its citizens, in the shortest
possible time.
"The question to be decided is simply this: shall we
crush the rebellion at one blow, terminate the war in one
campaign, or shall we leave it for a legacy to our de
scendants ?

112 MEMORANDUM ON THE WAR. [1861.
"When the extent of the possible line of operations is
considered, the force asked for the main army under
my command cannot be regarded as unduly large. Every
mile we advance carries us farther from our base of opera
tions, and renders detachments necessary to cover our
communications, while the enemy will be constantly con
centrating as he falls back. I propose, with the force
which I have requested, not only to drive the enemy out
of Virginia and occupy Richmond, but to occupy Charles
ton, Savannah, Montgomery, Pensacola, Mobile, and New
Orleans ; in other words, to move into the heart of the ene
my's country and crush out the rebellion in its very heart.
"By seizing and repairing the railroads as we advance,
the difficulties of transportation will be materially di
minished. It is perhaps unnecessary to state that, in
addition to the forces named in this memorandum, strong
reserves should be formed, ready to supply any losses that
may occur.
"In conclusion, I would submit that the exigencies of
the treasury may be lessened by making only partial pay
ments to our troops when in the enemy's country, and
by giving the obligations of the United States for such
supplies as may there be obtained. "George B. McClellan,
"Major-General."
General McClellan, speaking of this memoran
dum in his Report, written two years after, says, —
"I do not think the events of the war have proved
these views upon the methods and plans of its conduct
altogether incorrect. They certainly have not proved my
estimate of the number of troops and scope of operations
too large. It is probable that I did underestimate the
time necessary for the completion of arms and equip
ments. It was not strange, however, that by many civi-

Age 34.] CHARACTER OP THE MEMORANDUM. 113
lians intrusted with authority there should have been an
exactly opposite opinion held in both these particulars."
This simple and modest statement is read with
melancholy interest by the light of the events
which have transpired since the date of the memo
randum. And that portion of the American people —
we believe, the larger portion — which is willing to
hear before it judges, will not fail to recognize in
the memorandum itself the sagacious and compre
hensive views of a man who has carefully studied
the problem before him, and believe that he had
found a solution for it. It steers clear of the safe
generalities in which mediocrity takes refuge, as
well as the wild predictions that rash self-confidence
is apt to make. His conclusions are drawn from a
wide and patient survey of the field before him.
Here is a plan broad in its scope and well con
sidered in its details. It may be that the event
might not, under any circumstances, have responded
to his expectations; it may be that the soldier might
not have had the means to execute what the states
man had conceived: it is enough to know that the
opportunity was never given him to try the experi
ment fairly. When he spoke of the possibility of
ending the war by a single campaign, he perhaps
underestimated both the moral and material forces
arrayed against him ; but, in the multitude of pre
dictions as to the duration of the war which have
not come to pass, an anticipation like this will not
be treasured up against him.
For some weeks after the date of the above
memorandum, the work of organizing and arranging
10*

114 ball's BLUFF. [1861.
the troops went on diligently and uninterruptedly,
and on the 15th of October the grand aggregate of
the forces in and around Washington was one hun
dred and fifty-two thousand and fifty-one, of whom
one hundred and thirty-three thousand two hundred
and one were present and fit for active duty. The
infantry was arranged in brigades of four regiments
each, and divisions of three brigades each were
gradually formed, with artillery and cavalry at
tached to each division as far as was practicable.
The formation into corps was to be postponed until
the army had been for some time in the field, as
were recommendations for the promotion of officers
to the rank of major-generals till actual trial in ser
vice had shown who were best fitted for these im
portant posts.
On the 15th of October, the main body of the
Army of the Potomac was in the immediate vicinity
of Washington, with detachments on the left bank
of the river as far down as Liverpool Point and as
far up as Williamsport and its vicinity. General
Dix was at Baltimore, General Banks at Darnes-
town, and General Stone at Poolesville.
On the 21st of October, the disastrous engage
ment at Ball's Bluff took place. Efforts have been
made to connect the name of General McClellan
with this affair; but the facts in the case, and es
pecially the testimony taken by the Congressional
Committee on the Conduct of the War, show that the
reconnoissances directed by him had been brought
to a close during the preceding day, and that the
movements which led to the battle ofthe 21st were

Age 34.] GENERAL SCOTT. 115
not ordered by him. It is enough to say that the
responsibility ofthe day does not rest upon General
McClellan, without going further and inquiring to
whom it does belong; but it may be added that
the battle of Ball's Bluff is one of the many enter
prises of this war which are held to be brilliant if
successful, and rash if unsuccessful. The praise
in one event and the blame in the other are alike
exaggerated. A great stake is played for, but the
rule of the stern game of war requires that in such
cases a great stake must be laid down.
On the 31st day of October, 1861, Lieutenant-
General Scott addressed a letter to the Secretary
ofWar14njwhmh_lie<rjc|uest^ that, on accountjff
his increasing infirmities and thenecessity of re
pose of mind and body, his name might be placed
on the list of army officers retired from active ser
vice. The letter was laid before a Cabinet meeting,
and General Scott was placed on the retired list of
the army, with the full pay and allowance of his
rank; and on the same day the President, accom
panied by the members of the Cabinet, proceeded
to his residence and read to him the official order
which gave to the decision the force of law. The
venerable commander-in-chief expressed his ac
knowledgments in words and with a manner which
betokened strong emotion, and the President an
swered in appropriate terms. In the official order
announcing General Scott's retirement, the Presi
dent of the United States said, in language the
justice and propriety of which were universally
felt,—

116 GENERAL ORDER. [1S61.
"The American people will hear with sadness
and deep emotion that General Scott has withdrawn
from the active control of the army, while the
President and unanimous Cabinet express their own
and the nation's sympathy in his personal affliction,
and their profound sense of the important public
services rendered by him to his country during his
long and brilliant career, among which will ever
be gratefully distinguished his faithful devotion to
the Constitution, the Union, and the flag, when as
sailed by parricidal rebellion."
Upon the retirement of General Scott, General
McClellan, by a general order dated November 1,
was directed to assume the command of the army
of the United States, with his head-quarters at
Washington, and on the same day the new com
mander-in-chief issued the following order: —
" General Order No. 19.
"Head-Quakters of the Army,
" Washington, D.C, Nov. 1, 1861.
"In accordance with General Order No. 94, from the
War Department, I hereby assume command of the
armies of the United States.
" In the midst of the difficulties which encompass and
divide the nation, hesitation and self-distrust may well
accompany the assumption of so vast a responsibility;
but confiding, as I do, in the loyalty, discipline, and cou
rage of our troops, and believing, as I do, that Providence
will favor ours as the just cause, I cannot doubt that suc
cess will crown our efforts and sacrifices.
" The army will unite with me in the feeling of regret
that the weight of many years, and the effect of increasing
infirmities, contracted and intensified in his country's

Age34.] gift of a sword. 117
service, should just now remove from our head the great
soldier of our nation, — -the hero who, in his youth, raised
high the reputation of his country on the fields of Canada,
which he sanctified with his blood ; who, in more mature
years, proved to the world that American skill and valor
could repeat, if not eclipse, the exploits of Cortez in the
land of the Montezumas ; whose whole life has been de
voted to the service of his country ; whose whole efforts
have been directed to uphold our honor at the smallest
sacrifice of Ufe ; — a warrior who scorned the selfish glories
of the battle-field, when his great qualities as a statesman
could be employed more profitably for his country; a
citizen who, in his declining years, has given to the world
the most shining instance of loyalty in disregarding all
ties of birth and clinging to the cause of truth and honor.
Such has been the career of Winfield Scott, whom it has
long been the delight of the nation to honor as a man
and a soldier.
" While we regret his loss, there is one thing we cannot
regret, — the bright example he has left for our emulation.
Let us all hope and pray that his declining ye.ars may be
passed in peace and happiness, and that they may be
cheered by the success of the country and the cause he
has fought for and loved so well. Beyond all that, let us
do nothing that can cause him to blush for us. Let no
defeat of the army he has so long commanded embitter
his last years, but let our victories illuminate the close of
a life so grand. "Geo. B. McClellan,
" Major-General commanding, U. S. A."
On the next day, November 2, General McClellan
received a sword which had been voted to him by
the City Councils of Philadelphia, a deputation of
which went to Washington and gave the sword to

118 LETTERS OF INSTRUCTION. [1861.
him in person, at his house. In a very brief reply
to the complimentary address which accompanied
the gift, he said, " I ask in the future forbearance,
patience, and confidence. With these we can ac
complish all."
On the '7th, 11th, and 12th days of November,
1861, respectively, letters of instruction were ad
dressed by the commander-in-chief to General Buell,
in charge of the Department of the Ohio, and Gene
ral Halleck, in that ofthe Department of Missouri.
These were general in their scope, rather indicating
what it was desirable to accomplish,, and pointing
out certain principles of government and adminis
tration, than going into details which had been
matters of oral discussion between him and these
officers. A brief extract from the letter to Gene
ral Buell, of the date November 7, will give an
impression of their spirit and purpose :—
"It is possible that the conduct of our political affairs
in Kentucky is more important than that of our military
operations. I certainly cannot overestimate the import
ance of the former. You will please constantly to bear
in mind the precise issue for which we are fighting : that
issue is the preservation of the Union, and the restora
tion of the full authority of the General Government
over all portions of our territory. We shall most readily
suppress this rebellion and restore the authority of
the Government by religiously respecting the constitu
tional rights of all. I know that I express the feelings
and opinions of the President when I say that we are
fighting only to preserve the integrity of the Union and
the constitutional authority of the General Govern
ment."

Age 34.] CAPTURE OP NEW ORLEANS. 119
These letters of instruction should be read in
connection with two others written subsequently
by General McClellan, one dated February 14, 1862,
addressed to General Sherman, commanding at
Port Royal, giving directions as to movements
against Fort Pulaski, Fernandina, Savannah, Fort
Sumter, and Charleston, and one dated February
23, 1862, addressed to General Butler, containing
instructions as to military movements in the South
west. From this letter an extract is here sub
joined: —
"The object of your expedition is one of vital import
ance, — the capture of New Orleans. The route selected
is up the Mississippi River, and the first obstacle to be
encountered (perhaps the only one) is in the resistance
offered by Forts St. Philip and Jackson. It is expected
that the navy can reduce these works: in that case, you
will, after their capture, leave a sufficient garrison in
them to render them perfectly secure ; and it is recom
mended that, on the upward passage, a few heavy guns
and some troops be left at the pilot-station (at the forks
of the river), to cover a retreat in the event of a disaster.
These troops and guns will, of course, he removed as soon
as the forts are captured.
"Should the navy fail to reduce the works, you will
land your forces and siege-train, and endeavor to breach
the works, silence their fire, and carry them by assault.
"The next resistance will be near the English Bend,
where there are some earthen batteries. Here it may be
necessary for you to land your troops and co-operate with
the naval attack, although it is more than probable that
the Navy, unassisted, can accomplish the result. If these
works are taken, the city of New Orleans necessarily falls.
In that event, it will probably be best to occupy Algiers

120 NEW ORLEANS. [1861.
with the mass of your troops, also the eastern bank of
the river above the city. It may be necessary to place
some troops in the city to preserve order ; but, if there
appears to be sufficient Union sentiment to control the
city, it may be best, for purposes of discipline, to keep
your men out of the city.
"After obtaining possession of New Orleans, it will be
necessary to reduce all the works guarding its approaches
from the east, and particularly to gain the Manchac Pass.
" Baton Rouge, Berwick Bay, and Fort Livingston will
next claim your attention.
"A feint on Galveston may facilitate the objects we
have in view. I need not call your attention to the ne
cessity of gaining possession of all the rolling stock you
can on the different railways, and of obtaining control
of the roads themselves. The occupation of Baton Rouge
by a combined naval and land force should be accom
plished as soon as possible after you have gained New
Orleans. Then endeavor to open your communication
with the northern column by the Mississippi, always
bearing in mind the necessity of occupying Jackson,
Mississippi, as soon as you can safely do so, either after
or before you have effected the junction. Allow nothing
to divert you from obtaining full possession of all the ap
proaches to New Orleans. When that object is accom
plished to its fullest extent, it will be necessary to make
a combined attack on Mobile, in order to gain possession
of the harbor and works, as well as to control the railway
terminus at the city. In regard to this, I will send more
detailed instructions as the operations of the Northern
column develop themselves.
"I may briefly state that the general objects of the ex
pedition axe— first, the reduction of New Orleans and all
its approaches ; then Mobile and its defences; then Pen
sacola, Galveston, &c. It is probable that by the timo
New Orleans is reduced, it will be in the power of the

Age 34.] COMPREHENSIVE PLAN. 121
Government to reinforce the land forces sufficiently to
accomplish all these objects. In the mean time, you will
please give all the assistance in your power to the army
and navy commanders in your vicinity, never losing sight
of the fact that the great object to be achieved is the cap
ture and firm retention of New Orleans."
The remarkably sagacious foresight shown in the
instructions to General Butler as to the mode of
attack upon New Orleans can be fully apprehended
only after reading in detail the account of the
brilliant capture of that city, by the combined
military and naval forces of the United States,
a few weeks later.
The several letters above referred to are given in
full in General McClellan's Report, and, when read
together, will be found to indicate a plan which
embraced in its scope all the armies of the Union
and the whole region occupied by the Confederates.
It was the purpose of the commander-in-chief that
the various parts of the plan should be carried
out simultaneously, as far as was possible, and in
co-operation along the whole line of movement.
In this general scheme the Army of the Potomac
was to bear its part, — a leading part, it is true, but
still a part in concert with other forces of the
Union. This should be borne in mind in order to
explain and justify the delay which was necessary
to enable that army to perform its share in the
execution of the whole work.
From what has been said, it is easy to see how
trying was the position of General McClellan during
the closing weeks of the year 1861, and how
11

122 DIFFICULT POSITION. [1861.
painful was the weight of responsibility resting
upon him. He was a young man, whose name
until recently had been unknown to the public,
suddenly set at the head of military operations
which extended over a space and were upon a
scale to tax the strategical skill and vast organiz
ing genius of Napoleon himself. The Army of the
Potomac, which was immediately under him, was
ten times larger than any army that had ever been
under the command of one man upon the soil of
the United States since the Revolution; and the
difficulty of commanding armies increases in much
more than a direct ratio with their numbers, — or,
in other words, it does not follow that among ten
men fit to command ten thousand men there will
always be found one fit to command a hundred
thousand. Even the Duke of Wellington never led
an army of a hundred thousand men.*
His position was thus in itself one of great respon
sibility; but there were extrinsic elements which
added to its burdens. The American people are
easily elated and easily depressed, and they had
passed through both of these states of feeling
during the eventful year 1861. At the breaking
out of the war, amidst the magnificent uprising of
the nation to sustain the Government, we had ex
ulted in the confident expectation that the rebellion
* "Napoleon was of the opinion that he and the Archduke
Charles were the only men in Europe who could manoeuvre
one hundred thousand men: he considered it a very dim cult
thing." — General Heintzeljian. {Report on the Conduct of the
War, Parti, p. 118.)

Age 34.] PUBLIC IMPATIENCE. 123
would at once be crushed and broken into fragments
by the irresistible force arrayed against it. But
the disastrous battle of Bull Run and the untoward
affair of Ball's Bluff had blighted these fervid
hopes, and a despondency had taken possession of
the public mind which was as unreasonable as the
previous assurance had been. This rising and sink
ing of our spirits had tended to aggravate that im
patience which must be admitted to be one of our
national traits; and in the autumn of 1861 a strong
desire had taken possession of the public mind that
some decisive step should be taken, some vigorous
blow should be struck. The people murmured and
chafed at the delay that clogged the movements of
the Army of the Potomac; the press, with its myriad
voices, gave utterance to the feeling, and the cry
" On to Richmond !" became the symbol and motto
of the hour. This was a very natural sentiment,
and, to some extent, commendable, — because it
caught its warmth in part from the patriotism of
the people and their earnest wish to have the
Union restored. They desired to see some re
sults commensurate with their efforts and sacrifices.
But strong feeling is apt to be unjust, especially
when it is general as well as strong; and our igno
rance of war — that happy element in our lot — had
an influence in the same direction. We had read
of armies, but practically we knew nothing about
them. The battles of the War of 1812 and of the
war with Mexico had been fought with small and
manageable bodies of men ; but so immense an army
as that which was encamped in and around Wash-

124 IGNORANCE OF WAR. [1861.
ington was a wholly new thing to us. Wc knew
nothing of the vast amount of transportation ne
cessary to supply a hundred thousand men with
food, — especially on the bountiful scale upon which
our troops are fed, — how dependent such a body
is, in a country like Eastern Virginia, on its base
of operations, and how it must keep up an unin
terrupted connection with a navigable stream or a
railway. We knew little or nothing of the obstacles
presented to the advance of a great army by the
nature of the country, — its woods, its swamps, its
streams, and its mud. From some of the articles
which appeared in the Northern papers, one would
have thought that the writers supposed the soldiers
had wings and could live without food. Their ex
perience would have been enlarged, and their judg
ment corrected, had they been required to trans
port a single battery of siege-guns over the roads
of Eastern Virginia in a rainy December.*
* "Again, the public treat the army as a man or a horse, to
whom it is only necessary to say ' go' and motion follows.
They fancy that a fight can be witnessed from a, hill-top, as
u, boxing-match can be viewed from a third-story window.
Tbey forget that this army, say of sixty thousand men only,
must eat at least one hundred thousand meals a day, and, if
the army is to be kept in prime order, must sleep at least six
hours out of the twenty-four. Where there are turnpike roads,
artillery can get along very well. Where there are no turnpikes,
and the weather is wet, the last carriage of a single company
of artillery — the thirteenth — often mires where the first car
riage — a gun, technically — has found no difficulty. What, then,
must it be when two or three hundred pieces of artillery,
each one accompanied by a, caisson, or ammunition-wagon,

Age 34.] GEN. MCCLELLAN'S FRIENDS NOT WISE. 125
And it must be admitted that the friends of Gene
ral McClellan themselves, or some of them, were
unwise in the lavish praise they heaped upon him,
by which they awakened such wild hopes and im
possible expectations. He was commended not for
what he had done, but for what he was about to do;
and what he did and said, and still more what he
was going to do, was paraded before the public
gaze in a way that to no one could be more dis
tasteful than to him, an essentially modest man,
who knew better than anybody else the weight of
the burden that was upon him. The highest kind
ness to him at that time would have been to let him
alone and say as little about him as possible. To
a manly and truthful nature, nothing is less welcome
than undeserved praise. Undeserved blame is
bitter, but undeserved praise is sickening. Besides,
and every six with a forge, — making six hundred and fifty car
riages that go into a battle, — have to be carried, in wet weather,
through a swampy country, like that, for example, on the
Chickahominy ? This is mere fighting-material ; to which add
two or three thousand wagons for feeding-purposes, and you
begin to have an idea of what has to be moved when an army
moves, to say nothing of the cattle by thousands that have to
be driven along, and u, horde of camp-followers of all kinds.
I am not speaking now of a corps of ten or twenty thousand
men who start on a foray with nothing but their shirts, panta
loons, and boots to carry, besides their arms, but of an army
which, when a victory is gained, is prepared to retain what is
won in an enemy's country, — just such an army as McClellan
had in the Peninsula." — From "Three Great Battles" (a pam
phlet printed, but not published), by J. H. B. Latrobe, Esq.
11*

126 POLITICS. £1801.
extravagant commendation is sure to produce a
reaction, sooner or later.
The newspaper-correspondents who bedaubed
him with flattery, who described his person and
features with the minuteness of a passport, who
chronicled all his movements, who named him the
Young Napoleon, — he being of the same age as the
Emperor was at the date of thebattle of Austerlitz, —
were moved by a friendly spirit, mingled with that
hero-worship which is so decided an American trait;
but they were doing him any thing but a kindness.
Indeed, they were playing directly into the hands
of his enemies and ill-wishers, political and per
sonal. Nor was this all. General McClellan was as little
of a politician as a citizen of the United States
well can be. The subject of politics had never oc
cupied his mind. His time and attention had been
wholly given to the duties of his profession while
he remained in the army, and afterwards to the
duties of his business. It had so happened that
he had never but once, since reaching the legal
age, been in a position to exercise the right of
voting. But he had opinions upon the political
issues of the time; and these opinions were not
those of the party into whose hands the people
had committed the government ofthe country; and
the only time he had ever Voted was in the memora
ble contest in Illinois between Mr. Lincoln and Mr.
Douglas, when he had preferred the latter; but in our
country, sooner or later, every thing is swept into
the gulf of politics; and thus General McClellan's

Aoe 34.] CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE. 127
military capacity, his courage, even his patriotism,
began to be looked at from apolitical point of view,
and to be called in question by heated political par
tisans. When Congress assembled, in December, 1861,
President Lincoln announced the appointment of
General McClellan to the post of commander of
the army, in these terms, which were generally re
ceived as expressing no more than the exact truth : —
" With the retirement of General Scott came the exe
cutive duty of appointing in his stead a general-in-chief
of the army. It is a fortunate circumstance that neither
in council nor country was there, so far as I know, any
difference of opinion as to the proper person to be selected. The
retiring chief repeatedly expressed his judgment in favor
of General McClellan for the position ; and in this the
nation seemed to give a unanimous concurrence. The
designation of General McClellan is, therefore, in a con
siderable degree, the selection of the country, as well as
of the Executive; and hence there is better reason to
hope there will be given him the confidence and cor
dial support thus, by fair implication, promised, and
without which he cannot with so full efficiency serve the
country." Within a few days after the meeting of Congress,
the vague discontent and restless impatience of the
community found expression in the shape of a Con
gressional Committee on the Conduct of the War,
consisting of three members of the Senate and four
members of the House of Representatives. The
first motion towards the formation of the com
mittee was made in the Senate on the 9th clay of

128-.. CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE. [1861.
Deceniber, and the first meeting of the committco
\?as hehl oh the 20th of the same month. From
that time until the close of April they sat nearly
every day; and there were several meetings during
the months of May, June, and July. Had the com
mittee confined their inquiries and investigations
to past transactions, and considered themselves as
charged with the duty of collecting and recording
testimony to be used by future historians of the
war, their labors might have been of value to the
country; but they did not take this limited view
of the scope and sphere of their operations. In
their judgment, the future as well as the past was
committed to their trust. For instance, the very
first witness examined before them was General
I. B. Richardson, and the second was General S. P.
Heintzelman, and both were examined on the same
day, December 24. General Richardson's examina
tion was short, and not very important. The first
question put to General Heintzelman by the chair
man began thus : — " We have inquired a little about
the past: now we want to inquire a little about the
present and the future, which is, perhaps, more
important. As you are a military man of great
experience, we want some of your opinions on
some matters." As to the " opinions" of the wit
ness which they wanted, one or two questions and
answers may suffice to show : —
" Ques. — 'I would inquire whether there has been any
council of war among your officers and the commander-
in-chief.'

Age34.] CONGRESSIONAL COiMMIT#El
"Ans. — ' I have never been consulted upa
subject.' *****
"Ques. — 'You think a council of war among*
officers might be beneficial V
"Ans. — ' I thought so. Certainly it would be very satis
factory to some of them, I know. We have been very
anxious to know what is proposed to be done. I should
act with more confidence if I knew.'
" Ques. — ' Is there any feeling among officers that they
are not consulted, — that they are slighted ?'
"Ans. — 'Yes, sir: I suppose there is some,' " &c. &c*
This particular grievance — the reserve of the
commander-in-chief, and his not consulting with
his inferior officers — was a frequent point of inquiry
on the part of the committee during the winter
months, but by no means the only one. The gene
ral plan of the campaign, the policy which delayed
a forward movement, the organization of the army,
the proportion of cavalry to the other arms, the
defences about Washington, the number of men
requisite to make it secure, were also among tho
subjects to which the inquiries of the committee
were directed. Their investigations were moulded
and colored by a spirit not friendly to the com
mander-in-chief. Day after day, general officers,
and sometimes those of inferior rank, were called
before them, and invited, not to say encouraged,
to give their opinions upon the plans of the com
mander-in-chief, his military views, and the mari
ner in which he discharged his duties, and thus to
* Report on the Conduct of the War, Part I. pp. 117-121.

130 CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE. [1S61.
enter upon a line of discussion which, if not di
rectly forbidden by the Army Regulations,* was
unfavorable to discipline and tended to injure the
relations between the commander-in-chief and his
subordinates. * The following is the 26th Article of the Revised Regula
tions for the Army: —
"Deliberations or discussions among any class of military
men, having the object of conveying praise or censure or any
mark of approbation toward their superiors or others in the
military service, . . . are strictly prohibited."
Some of the officers examined seemed conscious of the diffi
cult position in which they stood between their duty as sub
jects and their duty as officers. General Lander, for instance,
was asked this question: —
"'If you will give us your opinion as a military man on
that subject [the plan of the campaign], I will be obliged to
you.' "Ans. — 'It is against the Army Regulations and laws of
Congress to discuss the views and plans of your superior offi
cer. In answering this question,' " &c. — Report on the Conduct
of the War, Part I. p. 160.
General Fitz-John Porter was asked, —
"'Should' the army 'retire into winter quarters, or should
it attempt an enterprise to dislodge the enemy?'
"Ans. — 'That is a question I cannot answer.'
" Ques. — 'I merely ask your military opinion.'
"Ans. — 'I decline to give a military opinion on th.it point.
I am in possession of information in regard to intended move
ments, — rather, a portion of General McClellan's plans, »
small portion only; and I decline giving any information
whatever in regard to future movements, or what they ought
to be. I do not think it my business to do so, and we are
forbidden by our regulations to discuss or express opinions
on these matters.' " — Report on the Conduct of the War, Part I.
p. 171.

AGE34.] CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE. 131
It is fair to state that at the very first meeting
of the committee " it was agreed that, as a matter
of honor, none of its members should reveal any
thing that transpired in committee until such time
as the injunction of secrecy should be removed;"
but such a determination, by the cloud of mystery
it threw around their proceedings, could only give
rise to conjectures probably more injurious in their
influence than the truth would have been if fully
revealed. Besides, Congressional committees are
human, and not hermetically sealed against the
transmission of that kind of knowledge which has
the charm of being forbidden.
Nor did the committee confine themselves to the
task of taking and recording testimony, and the free
discussion in their own room of military plans and
movements, but, as they say in their Report, "they
were in constant communication with the President
and his Cabinet, and neglected no opportunity of at
once laying before them the information acquired
by them in the course of their investigations." It
is fair to presume that they gave advice as well as
information; and, indeed, the journal of their pro
ceedings shows that they did; and their advice was
probably of weight in the conduct ofthe campaign.
The following is an extract from the journal of the
committee: — "February 26, 1862.
"Pursuant to previous arrangement, the committee
waited upon the President at eight o'clock on Tuesday
evening, February 25. They made known to the Presi
dent that, having examined many of the highest military

132 CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE. [1861.
officers of the army, their statements of the necessity of
dividing the great Army of the Potomac into corps d'armia
had impressed the committee with the belief that it was es
sential that such a division of that army should be made, —
that it would be dangerous to move upon a formidable
enemy with the present organization of the army. The
application was enforced by many arguments drawn from
the usages in France, and every other military nation in
Europe, and the fact that, so far as the committee could
learn, all our military officers agreed that our army would
not be efficient unless such an organization was had.
The President observed that he had never considered
the organization of the army into army corps so essential
as the committee seemed to represent it to be: still, he
had long been in favor of such an organization. General
McClellan, however, did not seem to think it so essential,
though he had at times expressed himself as favorable
to it. The committee informed the President that the
Secretary of War had authorized them to say to him that
he deemed such an organization necessary.
" General McClellan was in favor of an organization
into corps, but only proposed deferring it till time should
show what officers were best fitted for corps commanders,
¦ — which seems reasonable enough. It was a measure
which surely might have been postponed till the army
had taken the field, at least."
Whatever may have been the motives of tho
committee, or however earnest may have been
their desire to see the war brought to a speedy
and successful termination, it is certain that, in
point of fact, they were only aiding the enemy ;
for the interference of such a body, direct or in
direct, with the conduct of the campaign, could

Age35.] CONFEDERATE FORCES. 133
have no other effect than to impair the unity of
action and concentration of purpose which are so
essential to the success of an army.

CHAPTER VI.

We are now brought to the close of the year
1861 and the opening of 1862. The positions and
numbers of the Confederate army in Eastern Vir
ginia were as follows. At Norfolk and Yorktown
there was a considerable force, — probably over thirty
thousand men. The army before Washington occu
pied an extended line running from the southeast
to the northwest. The left wing was at Leesburg
and its vicinity, in force about forty-five hundred;
and there were about thirteen thousand in the valley
of the Shenandoah. The main body, comprising
about eighty thousand men, was at Manassas and
Centreville. At these points the positions were na
turally very strong, with impassable streams and
broken ground, affording ample protection to their
flanks, and with lines of intrenchment sweeping all
the available approaches. The right was at Brooks's
Station, Dumfries, Lower Occoquan and vicinity,
numbering about eighteen thousand. This wing
of the army formed a support to several batteries
on the Lower Potomac, extending from High Point
and Cockpit Point to the Chopawampsic Creek.
These batteries, greatly obstructing the navigation
of the river, and to this extent practically block-
12

134 FORWARD MOVEMENT DESIRED. [1862.
ading Washington, were a source of great annoy
ance to the Administration and of mortification to
the people, and a strong desire was felt that a
movement should be made to destroy them; but
General McClellan was of the opinion that such an
attempt would be attended with danger, and that
the destruction of these batteries by our army
would afford but temporary relief unless we were
strong enough to hold the entire line of the Poto
mac. The desired end could be secured either by
driving the enemy from Manassas and Acquia
Creek by superior force, or by manoeuvring to
compel him to vacate the position. The latter
course was finally adopted, with success.
That an onward movement should be made to
Richmond, and the rebellion be there attacked in
its heart, was a point on which the public, the
Administration, and the commander-in-chief were
agreed; but by what route to make the approach —
Avhether by the Lower Potomac and the Peninsula,
or by a direct attack upon the positions at Manassas
and Centreville — formed a fruitful subject of debate
in the newspapers and among military men; and
the discussion was all the more animated from tho
fact that whatever plans General McClellan had
formed, or was forming, he did not make them
known to others.
Thus far nothing had, apparently, disturbed the
relations between General McClellan and the Ad
ministration, or changed the friendly feeling which
had inspired the paragraph which has been quoted
from the President's message. On tho 14th day of

Age 35.] SECRETARY STANTON. 135
January, 1862, Mr. Simon Cameron resigned his
position as Secretary of War, and Mr. Edwin M.
Stanton was appointed to fill his place. Mr. Stanton
had not been in political life, and was known only
as a lawyer in large practice, of strong grasp of
mind and great capacity for labor. He had been
a member of the Democratic party; and the selec
tion of an able and honorable political opponent
for such a place, at such a time, seemed an act alike
of wisdom and magnanimity, which gave general
pleasure. Thus the appointment was hailed with
universal favoi*, and the highest hopes were enter
tained of an improved administration of the War
Department, under a man fresh from the people,
unscarred and unstained by political strife. But,
in whatever other respects the country may have
been a gainer by the introduction into the Cabinet
of a man of Mr. Stanton's energy, it is certain that
the hands of General McClellan were not strength
ened by the change, and that the confidence reposed
in him by the Administration was not thereby in
creased.*

* The following is an extract from the journal of the Con
gressional Committee on the Conduct of the War, under date
of January 21, 1862, a few days after Mr. Stanton's appoint
ment: —
"Sir: — I am instructed by the. Joint Committee on the Con
duct of the present War to inquire of you whether there is
such an office as commander-in-chief of the army of the
United States, or any grade above that of major-general. If
so, by what authority is it created ? Does it exist by virtue

136 INTERVIEW WITH THE SECRETARY. [18C2.
General McClellan had been taken ill at Christ
mas-time, 1861, and was confined to his bed about
three weeks. Upon his recovery, in .the middle of
January, he says in his Report that he found that
an excessive anxiety for an immediate movement of
the Army of the Potomac had taken possession of
the Administration. He had an interview with the
new Secretary of War, soon after the appointment
of the latter, in which he explained verbally his
design as to the part of the campaign to be exe
cuted by the Army of the Potomac; and this was, to
attack Richmond by the Lower Chesapeake. The
Secretary instructed him to develop his plan to tho
President, — which he did. Unfortunately, it did
not meet with the approbation of the latter; and
of any law of Congress, or any usage of the Government?
Please give us the information asked for, at your convenience.
"I remain, &c,
"B. F. Wade, Chairman.
"Hon. Edwin M. Stanton,
" Secretary of War."
This seems hardly respectful to the President of the United
States, after his announcement in his Annual Message that he
had appointed General McClellan to the very office which the
committee insinuate does not exist; and had Abraham Lincoln
been Andrew Jackson, he would have been a bold man who
would have addressed such a letter to the Secretary of War.
But we may infer that such a communication would not have
been sent to Mr. Stanton unless the committee had surmised
it would be welcome, — which inference is strengthened by the
fact that the committee, on the preceding day, January 20,
had had a conference with the Secretary, at his request, of
several hours' duration.

Age 35.] PRESIDENT LINCOLN. 137
from that moment there began on the part of the
President an active interference with the move
ments of the army, frequently without conference
with the commander, which much increased the
difficulties of the latter, and were most untoward
in their influence upon the results ofthe campaign.
The President's course can be shown out of his own
mouth to have been unwise; for in his Annual
Message of December 3, 1861, he says, immedi
ately after the paragraph which has been already
quoted, announcing the appointment of General
McClellan as commander-in-chief, —
" It has been said that one bad general is better than
two good ones ; and the saying is true, if taken to mean
no more than that an army is better directed by a single
mind, though inferior, than by two superior ones at vari
ance and cross-purposes with each other.
"And the same is true in all joint operations, wherein
those engaged can have none but a common end in view,
and can differ only as to the choice of means. In a
storm at sea, no one on board can wish the ship to sink :
and yet, not unfrequently, all go down together, because
too many will direct, and no single mind can be allowed
to control."
This is well put: it is good sense, enforced by
pertinent illustration; and the question naturally
rises, why did not the President "reck his own
rede " ? Without impugning his patriotism, it may
be presumed that he yielded his own judgment to
the force of that mysterious influence called " press
ure," — " a power behind tho throne, greater than the
12*

138 PRESIDENT LINCOLN. [1862.
throne," — which has done so much harm and so little
good in the conduct of the war.
The President's practical exercise of his constitu
tional functions as commander-in-chief began with
the issuing of the following order, which, be it
always borne in mind, was done without consulta
tion with General McClellan : —
("President's General War Order, No. 1.)
"Executive Mansion, 1
Washington, January 27, 1862. J
" Ordered, That the 22d day of February, 1862, be the
day for a general movement of the land and naval forces
of the United States against the insurgent forces. That
especially the army at and about Fortress Monroe, the
Army of the Potomac, the Army of Western Virginia, the
army near Munfordsville, Kentucky, the army and flotilla
at Cairo, and a naval force in the Gulf of Mexico, be
ready to move on that day.
" That all other forces, both land and naval, with their
respective commanders, obey existing orders for the time,
and be ready to obey additional orders when duly given.
"That the heads of departments, and especially the
Secretaries of War and of the Navy, with all their sub
ordinates, and the general-in-chief, with all other com
manders and subordinates of land and naval forces, will
severally be held to their strict and full responsibilities
for prompt execution of this order. "Abraham Lincoln."
The President, as has been said, disapproved of
General McClellan's plan of attacking Richmond
by the Lower Chesapeake, and substituted one of
his own, by a new order, as follows : —

Age35.] PRESIDENT LINCOLN'S ORDERS. 139
("President's Special War Order, No. 1.)
"Executive Mansion, 1
Washington, January 31, 1862. J
" Ordered, That all the disposable force of the Army of
the Potomac, after providing safely for the defence of
Washington, be formed into an expedition for the im
mediate object of seizing and occupying a point upon the
railroad southwestward of what is known as Manassas
Junction, all details to be in the discretion of the com
mander-in-chief, and the expedition to move before or on
the 22d day of February next. "Abraham Lincoln."
These two orders should be considered together
and carefully pondered by every candid man who
desires to form a correct judgment as to the past,
irrespective of political prepossessions. The out
posts of an army mark the line where the sphere
of party politics ends. A general is a good
general or a bad general, a cautious general or a
rash general; but no military critic will speak of a
tory general or a whig general, a Republican gene
ral or a Democratic general. The President of
the United States is a civilian, without military
training or experience; and he is, moreover, of
necessity, greatly occupied with important civil du
ties, and thus unable to give his time and thoughts
exclusively to military matters. The second in
date of the above orders, by a stroke of the pen,
directs that a most momentous campaign should be
conducted upon a plan which the commanding
officer, charged with the duty and responsibility
of carrying it out, had, after great deliberation,

140 PRESIDENT LINCOLN. [1862.
decided to be inexpedient. It is easy to sec how
unequal, under such difference of opinion, is the
contest between the President of the United States
and the general who acts under peremptory orders
to take a certain step, but has the " details'' in his
own "discretion." Does he succeed? it is because
the plan was good; does he fail? it is because the
"details" were not zealously and ably executed.*
But the first of these orders deserves more
consideration even than the second. The Presi
dent appoints a certain future day for a general
movement of the land and naval forces of the
country, as if it were the marshalling of a civic
procession or the arranging of a mock battle on
the stage. No man can venture to say that a
great army shall move or a great fleet shall sail
* It may be a consolation for us to know that the interference
of civilians in the plans of military commanders has been an
evil in other countries besides ours. A respectable English
writer, speaking of their Peninsular campaign, says, "We may
here observe how hard is the fate of an English general sent
out in command of an expedition. With the single exception
of the first Earl of Chatham, England never has possessed an
able war-minister. Ministers, in general, are far better skilled
in parliamentary tactics and political intrigue than in history,
geography, and the other sciences connected with war. Yet
they will boldly take upon them to plan campaigns, and will even
order impossibilities to be performed, and the whole blame of
failure is laid upon the unfortunate commander. What, for
example, can be conceived more absurd than a, Castlereagh, ;i
Canning, or a Frere, directing a Moore or a Wellington?
Such things, however, were." — Keightley: History of England,
vol. iii. p. .507.

Age 35.] PRESIDENT LINCOLN. 141
on a fixed future day, unless he be endowed with
the gift of prophecy. And the 22d day of Febru
ary was named for the combined movement, it may
be presumed, simply because it was the birthday
of Washington. Thus a sort of melodramatic grace
was attempted to be thrown over the stern aspect
of war, and the corps of fine writers who were in
attendance upon the army were furnished with a
theme for a sensation paragraph. It is melancholy
to think that the lives and blood of brave men
were under the control of those who could be
moved by so trumpery a consideration as this.
General McClellan, on receiving the order of
January 3, asked the President whether it was
to be regarded as final, or whether he could be per
mitted to submit in writing his objections to the
plan ofthe Executive and his reasons for preferring
his own. Permission was granted, and a letter
was addressed to the Secretary of War, under date
of February 3. But, before it had been submitted
to the President, General McClellan received from
him the following note : — ¦

"Executive Mansion, )
Washington, February 3, 1862. j
"My dear Sir: — You and I have distinct and different
plans for a movement of the Army of the Potomac, — yours
to be done by the Chesapeake, up the Eappahannock to
Urbana, and across land to the terminus of the railroad
on the York Eiver: mine to move directly to a point on
the railroad southwest of Manassas.
" If you will give me satisfactory answers to the follow
ing questions, I shall gladly yield my plan to yours:—

142 LETTER TO THE SECRETARY. [1862.
" 1st. Does not your plan involve a greatly larger ex
penditure of time and money than mine?
"2d. Wherein is a victory more certain by your plan
than mine ?
"3d. Wherein is a victory .more valuable by your plan
than mine?
"4th. In fact, would it not be less valuable, in this,
that it would break no great line of the enemy's commu
nications, while mine would?
"5th. In case of disaster, would not a retreat be more
difficult by your plan than mine ?
"Yours, truly,
"Abraham Lincoln.
"Major-General McClellan."
These questions were substantially answered in
the letter to the Secretary of War above referred
to, which appears in General McClellan's Report;
but its length forbids its being copied in full, and
only an abstract of its contents can be given.
He begins with a brief statement of the condition
of the troops when he assumed the command in
July, 1861, and of the defenceless position of the
capital at that time, and thus recapitulates what
had been accomplished up to the date of writing : —
"The capital is secure against attack; the extensive
fortifications erected by the labor of our troops enable a
small garrison to hold it against a numerous army ; the
enemy have been held in check ; the State of Maryland
is securely in our possession'; the detached counties of
Virginia are again within the pale of our laws, and all
apprehension of trouble in Delaware is at an end; the'
enemy are confined to the positions they occupied before
the disaster of the 21st of July. More than all this, I have

Age 35.] LETTER TO THE SECRETARY. 143
now under my command a well-drilled and reliable army,
to which the destinies of the country may be confidently
committed. This army is young and untried in battle ;
but it is animated by the highest spirit, and is capable
of great deeds.
"That so much has been accomplished and such an
army created in so short a time from nothing, will here
after be regarded as one of the highest glories of the Ad
ministration and the nation."
After telling the Secretary that he has not yet
under his command such a force as he asked for in
his earliest papers submitted to the President, he
thus proceeds : —
" When I was placed in command of the armies of the
United States, I immediately turned my attention to the
whole field of operations, regarding the Army of the Po
tomac as only one, while the most important, of the
masses under my command.
"I confess that I did not then appreciate the total ab
sence of a general plan which had before existed, nor did
I know that utter disorganization and want of prepara
tion pervaded the Western armies.
" I took it for granted that they were nearly, if not quite,
in condition to move towards the fulfilment of my plans.
I acknowledge that I made a great mistake.
" I sent at once — with approval of the Executive — ¦
officers I considered competent to command in Kentucky
and Missouri. Their instructions looked to prompt
movements. I soon found that the labor of creation
and organization had to be performed there : transporta
tion, arms, clothing, artillery, discipline, all were want
ing. These things required time to procure them.
"The generals in command have done their work most
creditably ; but we are still delayed. I had hoped that a

144 LETTER TO THE SECRETARY. [1862.
general advance could be made during the good weather
of December: I was mistaken.
" My wish was to gain possession of the Eastern Ten
nessee Eailroad, as a preliminary movement, then to
follow it up immediately by an attack on Nashville and
Eiehmond as nearly at the same time as possible.
" I have ever regarded our true policy as being that of
fully preparing ourselves, and then seeking for the most
decisive results. I do not wish to waste life in useless
battles, but prefer to strike at the heart."
He next proceeds to state that two bases of ope
ration presented themselves for the advance of
the Army of the Potomac, — first, that of Washing
ton, its present position, involving a direct attack
upon the intrenched positions of the enemy at
Centreville, Manassas, &c, or else a movement to
turn one or both of those positions, or a combina
tion of the two plans. The relative force of the
two armies would not justify an attack on both
flanks of the enemy; and an attack on his left flank
alone would involve a long line of wagon-commu
nication, and could not prevent him from collecting
for the decisive battle all the detachments now on
his extreme right and left.
He next sets forth in great detail the difficulties
and dangers of an attack upon the right flank, by
the line of the Occoquan, and a crossing of the
Potomac below that river, showing a minute know
ledge of the localities of the region, and demon
strating to his correspondent the great advantage
possessed by the enemy in the central position he
occupied, with roads diverging in every direction,

Age 35.] LETTER TO THE SECRETARY. 145
and a strong line of defence, enabling him to await
an attack with a small force on one flank, whjle he
concentrates every thing on the other for a decisive
action. Among other difficulties, he speaks of " the
present unprecedented and impassable condition of
the roads." But, supposing the movement in this
direction to be successful, the results, he thinks,
would be confined to the possession of the field of
battle, the evacuation of the line of the Upper Po
tomac by the enemy, and the moral effect of the
victory, — important results, it is true, but not de
cisive of the war, or securing the destruction of the
enemy's main army or the capture of Richmond.
The second base of operations available for the
Army of the Potomac is that of the Lower Chesa
peake Bay, which affords the shortest possible land-
route to Richmond and strikes directly at the heart
of the enemy's power in the East. In favor of this
plan he thus reasons : —
"The roads in that region are passable at all periods of
the year.
"The country now alluded to is much more favorable
for offensive operations than that in front of Washington
(which is very unfavorable) , — much more level, more cleared
land, the woods less dense, the soil more sandy, and the
spring some two or three weeks earlier. A movement in
force on that line obliges the enemy to abandon his in
trenched position at Manassas in order to hasten to cover
Eiehmond and Norfolk. He must do this; for, should he
permit us to occupy Eiehmond, his destruction can be
averted only by entirely defeating us in a battle in which
he must be the assailant. This movement, if successful,
gives us the capital, tho communications, the supplies,
13

146 LETTER TO THE SECRETARY. [1862.
of the rebels; Norfolk would fall, all the waters of the
Chesapeake would be ours, all Virginia would be in our
power, and the enemy forced to abandon Tennessee and
North Carolina. The alternative presented to the enemy
would be to beat us in a position selected by ourselves,
disperse, or pass beneath the Caudine forks.
"Should we be beaten in a battle, we have a perfectly
secure retreat down the Peninsula upon Fort Monroe,
with our flanks perfectly covered by the fleet.
" During the whole movement our left flank is covered
by the water. Our right is secure, for the reason that the
enemy is too distant to reach us in time : he can only op
pose us in front ; we bring our fleet into full play.
"After a successful battle, our position would be —
Burnside forming our left, Norfolk held securely, our
centre connecting Burnside with Buell both by Ealeigh
and Lynchburg, Buell in Eastern Tennessee and North
Alabama, Halleck at Nashville and Memphis.
"The next movement would be to connect with Sher
man on the left, by reducing Wilmington and Charles
ton ; to advance our centre into South Carolina and
Georgia; to push Buell either towards Montgomery or to
unite with the main army in Georgia ; to throw Halleck
southward to meet the naval expedition from New Orleans.
"We should then be in a condition to reduce at our
leisure all the Southern sea-ports, to occupy all the avenues
of communication, to use the great outlet of the Mis
sissippi, to re-establish our Government and arms in Ar
kansas, Louisiana, and Texas, to force the slaves to labor
for our subsistence instead of that of the rebels, to bid
defiance to all foreign interference. Such is the object I
have ever had in view; this is the general plan which I
hope to accomplish.
"For many long months I have labored to prepare the
Army of the Potomac to play its part in the programme.
From the day when I was placed in command of all our

Age 35.] LETTER TO THE SECRETARY. 147
armies, I have exerted myself to place all the other armies
in such a condition that they too could perform their
allotted duties."
He then tells his correspondent that, if it should
be determined to operate from the Lower Chesa
peake, the best point of landing would be Urbana,
on the Lower Rappahannock, and states his reasons
for the opinion ; but, if circumstances should render
it advisable not to land there, either Mobjack Bay
or Fort Monroe might be resorted to. A large
amount of cheap water transportation would be
requisite to move the army to whatever point
might be selected as a base of operations; and he
gives some details in relation to this important
point. The letter thus concludes : —
"The total force to be thrown upon the new line would
be, according to circumstances, from one hundred and ten
thousand to one hundred and forty thousand. I hope to
use the latter number by bringing fresh troops into Wash
ington and still leaving it quite safe. I fully realize that,
in all projects offered, time will probably be the most valu
able consideration. It is my decided opinion that, in that
point of view, the second plan should be adopted. It is
possible — nay, highly probable — that the weather and state
of the roads may be such as to delay the direct movement
from Washington, with its unsatisfactory results and great
risks, far beyond the time required to complete the second
plan. In the first case, we can fix no definite time for an
advance. The roads have gone from bad to worse. No
thing like their present condition was ever known here
before: they are impassable at present. We are entirely at
the mercy of the weather. It is by no means certain that
we can beat them at Manassas. On the other line I re
gard success as certain by all the chances of war. We

148 LETTER TO THE SECRETARY. [1862.
demoralize the enemy by forcing him to abandon his pre
pared position for one which we have, chosen, in which
all is in our favor and where success must produce im
mense results.
"My judgment, as a general, is clearly in favor of this
project. Nothing is certain in war; but all the chances
are in favor of this movement. So much am I in favor
of the southern line of operations, that I would prefer
the move from Fortress Monroe as a, base, as a certain
though less brilliant movement than that from Urbana,
to an attack upon Manassas.
"I know that his Excellency the President, you, and I,
all agree in our wishes, and that these wishes are, to
bring this war to a close as promptly as the means in our
possession will permit. I believe that the mass of the
people have entire confidence in us. I am sure of it.
Let us, then, look only to the great result to be accom
plished, and disregard every thing else."
This carefully-prepared and well-reasoned letter,
and the many verbal conferences which followed
it, seem to have induced the President to give up
his own "plan;" for the execution of his order was
not insisted upon, — though, as it was not revoked
so formally as it had been issued, General McClel
lan stood before the public in the awkward position
of a general officer declining to execute an order
of the commander-in-chief still apparently in force.
But from this time General McClellan's "plan" of
attacking Richmond by way of the Peninsula was
assented to, or acquiesced in, by the President; and
no further conflict of opinion took place between
them on this point.
The plan of operations being settled, the next

Age35.] plan op operations. 119
thing was to devise ways and means to carry it
into execution. Secrecy and despatch were to be se
cured, as far as was practicable. An immense army
was to be moved by water from a point or points
in the neighborhood of Washington, and the plan
of the campaign was to be kept from the know
ledge of the enemy till the latest possible moment.
Immediate measures were taken to provide a force
of steamers and sailing-vessels necessary for the
contemplated object.*
* In the order of time, the following letter of the Secretary
of War may be appropriately introduced here, as showing his
feeling towards General McClellan and the Army of the Poto
mac: — "War Department, 1
Washington, Februa,ry 17, 1862. J
" To Brigadier-General F. W. Lander : —
"The President directs me to say that he has observed with
pleasure the activity and enterprise manifested by yourself
and the officers and soldiers of your command. You have
shown how much may be done, in the worst weather and
worst roads, by a spirited officer, at the head of a small force
of brave men, unwilling to waste life in camp when the ene
mies of their country are in reach. Your brilliant success is
a happy presage of what may be expected when the Army of
the Potomac shall be led to the field by their gallant general.
"Edwin M. Stanton,
"Secretary of War."
A few days after, the Secretary wrote another letter, ad
dressed to the editor of the New York "Tribune," which is as
follows: — " Washington, February 20, 1862.
"Sir: — I cannot suffer undue merit to be ascribed to my
official action. The glory of our recent victories belongs to
13*

150 LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY. [1862.
About the 20th of February, measures were
taken to secure the reopening of the Baltimore &
the gallant officers that fought the battles. No share of it
belongs to me.
"Much has been recently said of military combination and
organizing victory. I hear such phrases with apprehension.
They commenced in infidel France with the Italian campaign,
and resulted in Waterloo. Who can organize victory? Who
can combine the elements of success on the battle-field? We
owe our recent victories to the Spirit of the Lord, that moved
our soldiers to dash into battle, and filled the hearts of our
enemies with terror and dismay. The inspiration that con
quered in battle was in the hearts of the soldiers, and from
on high. Patriotic spirit with resolute courage in officers and
men is a military combination that never failed.
"We may well rejoice at the recent victories ; for they teach
us that battles are to be won now and by us in the same and
only manner that they were ever won by any people or in any
age since the days of Joshua, — by boldly pursuing and strik
ing the foe. What, under the blessing of Providence, I con
ceive to be the true organization of victory and military com
bination to end this war, was declared in a few words by
General Grant's message to General Buckner: — 'I propose to
move immediately on your works.' "Yours, truly,
"Edwin M. Stanton."
It is difficult to believe that this absurd letter, whieh no
officer in the army could have read without indignation and
disgust, could have been written by a Secretary of War. Be
sides its bad taste and false rhetoric, it involves a contemptuous
disparagement of military science, most unbecoming in a man
who was at the head of the War Dep.artment of a great nation
engaged in a momentous war. And there breathes through it
a spirit of hostility towards General McClellan, of ominous
import to the success of our arms. After reading it, the Presi
dent of the United States ought at once to have removed
either that officer or Mr. Stanton himself.

Age 35.] HARPER'S TERRY. 151
Ohio Railroad. The whole of General Banks's
division, and two brigades of General Sedgwick's
division, were thrown across the river at Harper's
Ferry on the 26th, superintended by General Mc
Clellan in person, who had gone up from Washing
ton for that purpose. Materials had been collected
for making a permanent bridge by means of canal-
boats; but, on attempting to pass the boats through
the left lock, it was found, for the first time, that
the lock was too small to permit their passage.
This unexpected obstacle deranged the plans; and
an order which had been given for the movement
of some forces from Washington was counter
manded. Every exertion was made to establish,
as promptly as possible, depots of forage and sub
sistence on the Virginia side, to supply the troops.
On the 28th, Charlestown was occupied by a strong
Federal force; and on the same day General Mc
Clellan returned to Washington. In spite of the
untoward mischance of the canal-boats, — for which
the commander-in-chief could not be responsible, —
the design aimed at had been accomplished, and
before the 1st of April the railroad was in running
order. With General McClellan's return to Washington
on the 28th of February, preparations were begun
for carrying out the wishes of the President and
Secretary of War in regard to destroying the bat
teries on the Lower Potomac,— though in giving
his hand to this movement General McClellan
yielded his own judgment to theirs. He was con
vinced that this operation would require the move-

152 COUNCIL OF OFFICERS. [1862.
ment of tho entire army, that the extremely un
favorable condition of the roads was a serious ob
stacle to be overcome, and that it was unnecessary,
because the proposed movement to the Lower Chesa
peake would — as it subsequently did — force the
enemy to abandon all his positions in front of
Washington. But the preparations for a move
ment towards the Occoquan in order to carry the
batteries were advanced as rapidly as the season
permitted. This brings us down to the 8th of March, 1862,
— an important day in the history of the war. Gene
ral McClellan had invited the commanders of
divisions to meet at head-quarters on that day, in
order to give them instructions and receive their
advice and opinion in regard to their commands;
but at a very early hour on the morning of that
day he was sent for by the President, who ex
pressed his dissatisfaction with the affair of Har
per's Ferry and with the plans for the new move
ment down the Chesapeake. Explanations were
made which, apparently, satisfied the President's
mind. At a later hour in the day, the meeting of
general officers which had been called was held at
head-quarters. The officers present (besides Gene
ral McClellan) were Generals McDowell, Sumner,
Heintzelman, Keyes, Franklin, Fitz-John Porter,
Andrew Porter, Smith, McCall, Blenker, Negley,
and Barnard. The President of the United States
was also there. The plans of General McClellan
were fully explained to the council, and the general
question submitted to them was whether the enemy

Age 35.] PRE SIDE N T' S ORDERS. 153
should be attacked in front at Manassas and Cen
treville, or whether a movement should be made
down to the Lower Chesapeake. After a full dis
cussion, four of the officers — McDowell, Sumner,
Heintzelman, and Barnard — approved of the former
plan, and the remainder of the latter. The details
were not considered as fixed ; though it was gene
rally understood that the point of destination and
landing was Urbana, on the Rappahannock.
At the close of this council of officers, nothing
had transpired to lead General McClellan to sup
pose that there was any lingering distrust of him in
the President's mind; and he was therefore much
and painfully surprised to learn that on that very
8th day of March the President, without consult
ing him, had issued two important military orders.
The first of these was as follows : —
("President's General War Order, No. 2.)
"Executive Mansion, 1
Washington, March 8, 1802. j
" Ordered, 1st. That the major-general commanding the
Army of the Potomac proceed forthwith to organize that
part of the said army destined to enter upon active ope
rations (including the reserve, but excluding the troops
to be left in the fortifications about Washington) into
four army corps, to be commanded, according to seniority
of rank, as follows: —
"First Corps to consist of four divisions, and to be com
manded by Major-General I. McDowell. Second Corps
to consist of three divisions, and to be commanded by
Brigadier-General E. V. Sumner. Third Corps to consist
of three divisions, and to be commanded by Brigadier-

154 PRESIDENT'S ORDERS. [1862.
General S. P. Heintzelman. Fourth Corps to consist of
three divisions, and to be commanded by Brigadier-Gene
ral E. D. Keyes.
"2d. That the divisions now commanded by the officers
above assigned to the commands of army corps shall be
embraced in and form part of their respective corps.
"3d. The forces left for the defence of Washington will
be placed in command of Brigadier-General James Wads
worth, who shall also be Military Governor of the District
of Columbia.
"4th. That this order be executed with such prompt
ness and despatch as not to delay the commencement
of the operations already directed to be undertaken by the
Army of the Potomac.
"5th. A Fifth Army Corps, to be commanded by
Major-General N. P. Banks, will be formed from his own
and General Shields's (late General Lander's) division.
"Abraham Lincoln."
This order was probably of no great practical
importance, as it simply anticipated General Mc
Clellan's purpose. He had always been in favor of
an organization into army corps, but preferred de
ferring its practical execution until some little ex
perience in the coming campaign and on the field
of battle should show what general officers were
most competent to exercise these high commands,
as an incompetent commander of an army corps
might cause very serious damage, while an incom
petent division commander could do no great harm.
These views commend themselves to common sense;
but they failed to convince the President's mind,
who assumed a responsibility from which General
McClellan at that time shrank. The latter at once

Age 35.] PRESIDENT'S ORDERS. 155
issued the order necessary to carry out the com
mand of the President.
The second of the orders issued by the President
on the 8th of March was as follows : —
("President's General War Order, No. 3.)
" Executive Mansion, )
Washington, March 8, 1862. j
" Ordered, That no change of the base of operations of
the Army of the Potomac shall be made without leaving
in and about Washington such a force as, in the opinion
of the general-in-chief and the commanders of army
corps, shall leave said city entirely secure.
" That no more than two army corps (about fifty thou
sand troops) of said Army of the Potomac shall be moved
en route for a new base of operations until the navigation
of the Potomac from Washington to the Chesapeake
Bay shall be freed from enemy's batteries and other
obstructions, or until the President shall hereafter give
express permission.
"That any movement, as aforesaid, en route for a new
base of operations which may be ordered by the general-
in-chief, and which may be intended to move upon the
Chesapeake Bay, shall begin to move upon the bay as
early as the 18th of March instant ; and the general-in-chief
shall be responsible that it so' moves as early as that day.
" Ordered, That the army and navy co-operate in an im
mediate effort to capture the enemy's batteries upon the
Potomac between Washington and the Chesapeake Bay.
"Abraham Lincoln.
"L. Thomas, Adjutant-General."
Here it will be seen that the President again as
sumes to fix a certain day in the future for the
beginning of an important military movement.

156 MERRIMAC AND MONITOR. [1862.
Whether the army would be prepared to move
upon the Bay on the 18th of March depended upon
the state of readiness of the transports, the entire
control of which had been placed by the Secretary
of War in the hands of one of the assistant secre
taries. Unless his arrangements had been com
pleted on or before that day, the army could not
have moved.
But the record ofthe important events ofthe 8th
of March is not completed; for on that day the
Merrimac appeared in Hampton Roads and de
stroyed the Cumberland and Congress, and the
news, flashed far and wide by the telegraph-wires,
filled the whole land with consternation and dis
may. But our spirits rose the next day at the op
portune arrival and gallant and successful achieve
ment of the Monitor. It is needless to dwell upon
the memorable contest between these two vessels,
so important in its effects upon the whole science
of naval warfare; but it was an event of no incon
siderable moment in the fate and fortunes of the
Peninsular campaign. The power of the Monitor
had been so satisfactorily demonstrated, and the
other naval preparations were so extensive and
formidable, that the security of Fortress Monroe
as a base of operations was placed beyond a doubt;
but, on the other hand, the presence of the Merri
mac in the James River closed that river to us, and
threw us upon the York River, with its tributaries,
as our only line of water-communication with the
fortress. The general plan, therefore, remained un-

Age 35.] MOVEMENTS OE THE ENEMY. 157
disturbed, though less promising in its details than
when James River was in our control.
On Sunday, the 9th of March, trustworthy in
formation came to Washington that the enemy was
beginning to evacuate his positions at Centreville
and Manassas, as well as on the Upper and Lower
Potomac. It is not improbable that, in some mys
terious way, they had heard of the council of gene
ral officers held on the preceding day, and of the
conclusions arrived at.*

* " We have the right, we think, to say that McClellan never
intended to advance upon Centreville. His long-determined
purpose was to make Washington safe by means of a strong
garrison, and then to use the great navigable waters and im
mense naval resources of the North to transport the army
by sea to a point near Richmond. For weeks — perhaps for
months — this plan had been secretly maturing. Secrecy as
well as promptness, it will be understood, was indispensable
here to success. To keep the secret, it had been necessary to
confide it to few persons; and hence had arisen one great
cause for jealousy of the general.
"Be this as it may, as the day of action drew near, those
who suspected the general's project and were angry at not
being informed of it, — those whom his promotion had excited to
envy, — his political enemies (who is without them in America?)
— in short, all those beneath or beside him who wished him
ill, — broke out into a chorus of accusations of slowness, in
action, incapacity. McClellan, with a patriotic courage which
I have always admired, disdained these accusations, and made
no reply. He satisfied himself with pursuing his preparations
in laborious silence. But the moment came in which, notwith
standing the loyal support given him by the President, that
functionary could no longer resist the tempest. A council of
war of all the divisional generals was held; a plan of campaign,
14

158 MANASSAS. [1862.
As soon as the news came, General McClellan
determined to cross the river immediately and as
certain by observation whether the intelligence was
true, and then determine what course to pursue.
Orders were accordingly issued, during the 9th of
March, for a general movement of the army the next
morning towards Centreville and Manassas, send
ing in advance two regiments of cavalry as a corps
of observation. At noon on the 10th of March the
cavalry advance reached the enemy's lines at Cen
treville, finding there still burning heaps of military
not that of McClellan, was proposed and discussed. McClellan
was then forced to explain his projects, and the next day
they were known to the enemy Informed, no doubt, by one
of those thousand female spies who keep up his communications
into the domestic circles of the Federal enemy, Johnston
evacuated Manassas at once. This was a skilful manoeuvre.
Incapable of assuming the offensive, threatened with attack
either at Centreville, where defence would be useless if suc
cessful, or at Richmond, the loss of which would be a grave
check, and unable to cover both positions at once, Johnston
threw his whole force before the latter of the two."
The above is taken from a pamphlet published in New York,
in 1 863, with the following title : — ' ' The Army of the Potomac :
its Organization, its Commander, and its Campaign. By the
Prince de Joinville. Translated from the French, with Notes,
by William Henry Hurlbert." The original appeared in the
number of the "Revue des Deux Mondes" for October 15,
1862. It is there entitled " Campagne de l'Arm^e du Potomac,
Mars-Juillet, 1862," and bears the signature of "A. Trognon."
The article has been generally ascribed to the Prince de Join
ville; and, as the translation bears his name'on the title-page
and ha3 been constantly referred to as his, the future extracts
from the pamphlet will be cited under his name.

Age35.] PRESIDENT'S ORDER. 159
stores and much valuable property. The mass of
the army advanced to the vicinity of Fairfax Court-
House, and General McClellan himself went to Ma
nassas. The roads were in so impassable a condi
tion that a rapid pursuit of an enemy who burned
or broke up all the bridges behind him in his re
treat was impossible. The main body of the army
was on the 15th of March moved back to the
vicinity of Alexandria, to be embarked. It was
while General McClellan was absent on this brief
reconnoissance in force that the President saw fit
to remove him from the position of general-in-chief,
by the following order, which appeared in the " Na
tional Intelligencer" of March 12, and which Gene
ral McClellan heard of for the first time at Fairfax
Court-House. ("President's War Order, No. 3.)
" Executive Mansion, 1
Washington, March 11, 1862. J
" Major-General McClellan having personally taken the
field at the head of the Army of the Potomac, until other
wise ordered, he is relieved from the command of the other
military departments, he retaining command of the De
partment of the Potomac.
" Ordered, further, That the departments now under the
respective commands of Generals Halleck and Hunter,
together with so much of that under General Buell as
lies west of a north-and-south line indefinitely drawn
through Knoxville, Tennessee, be consolidated, and desig
nated the Department of the Mississippi ; and that, until
otherwise ordered, Major-General Halleck have command
of said department.
" Ordered, also, That the country west of the Depart-

160 COUNCIL OP WAR. [1862.
ment of the Potomac and east of the Department of the
Mississippi be a military department, to be called the
Mountain Department, and that the same be commanded
by Major-General Fremont.
" That all the commanders of departments, after the
receipt of this order by them, respectively report severally
and directly to the Secretary of War, and that prompt,
full, and frequent reports will be expected of all and each
of them. "Abkaham Lincoln."
Whatever emotions General McClellan may have
felt on reading this order, his sense of duty as a
patriotic citizen, and his instincts of obedience as
a soldier, taught him to suppress all expression of
them; and, in a note addressed by him to the Presi
dent on the 12th of March, the next day, he said, in
language alike distinguished for good feeling and
good taste, —
" I believe I said to you, some weeks since, in connection
with some Western matters, that no feeling of self-inte
rest or ambition should ever prevent me from devoting
myself to the service. I am glad to have the opportunity
to prove it; and you will find that, under present circum
stances, I shall work just as cheerfully as before, and that
no consideration of self will in any manner interfere with
the discharge of my public duties."
On the 13th of March a council of war was as
sembled at Faii-fax Court-Houee, to discuss the
military position. The President's order No. 3, of
March 8, was considered. As future events made
the action of this council of considerable import-

Age 35.] COUNCIL OF WAR. 161
ance, the memorandum of its proceedings is here
given in full : —

' Head-Quarters, Army of the Potomac,
Fairfax Court-House, March 13, 1862,

.}

"A council of the generals commanding army corps, at
the head-quarters of the Army of the Potomac, were of
the opinion —
"I. That the enemy having retreated from Manassas
to Gordonsville, behind the Rappahannock and Rapidan,
it is the opinion of generals commanding army corps
that the operations to be carried on will be best under
taken from Old Point Comfort, between the York and
James Rivers: Provided —
"1st. That the enemy's vessel, Merrimac, can be neu
tralized. "2d. That the means of transportation sufficient for
an immediate transfer of the force to its new base can
be ready at Washington and Alexandria to move down
the Potomac; and,
"3d. That a naval auxiliary force can be had to silence,
or aid in silencing, the enemy's batteries on the York
River. "4th. That the force to be left to cover Washington
shall be such as to give an entire feeling of security for
its safety from menace. (Unanimous.)
" II. If the foregoing cannot be, the army should then
be moved against the enemy, behind the Rappahannock,
at the earliest possible moment, and the means for recon
structing bridges, repairing railroads, and stocking them
with materials sufficient for supplying the army should
at once be collected for both the Orange & Alexandria
and Acquia & Richmond Railroads. (Unanimous.)
"N.B.— That, with the forts on the right bank of the
Potomac fully garrisoned, and those on the left bank oc-
14*

162 ADDRESS TO THE SOLDIERS. [1862.
cupied, a covering force in front of the Virginia line of
twenty-five thousand men would suffice. (Keyes, Heint
zelman, and McDowell.) A total of forty thousand men
for the defence of the city would suffice. (Sumner.)"
This was assented to by General McClellan, and
immediately communicated to the War Depart
ment; and on the same day the following reply
was received : — "War Department, March 13, 1862.
" The President, having considered the plan of operations
agreed upon by yourself and the commanders of army
corps, makes no objection to the same, but gives the fol
lowing directions as to its execution : —
" 1. Leave such force at Manassas Junction as shall
make it entirely certain that the enemy shall not repossess
himself of that position and line of communication.
"2. Leave Washington entirely secure.
"3. Move the remainder of the force down the Potomac,
choosing a new base at Fortress Monroe, or anywhere
between here and there ; or, at all events, move such re
mainder of the army at once in pursuit of the enemy by
some route. "Edwin M. Stanton,'
" Secretary of War.
"Major-General George B. McClellan."
On the 14th day of March, General McClellan
issued the following address to his soldiers : —
"Head-Quarters, Army op the Potomac, }
Fairfax Court-House, Va., March 14, 1862. J
"Soldiers or the Army of the Potomac: —
" For a long time I have kept you inactive, but not
without a purpose. You were to be disciplined, armed,

Age 35.] ADDRESS TO THE SOLDIERS. 163
and instructed; the formidable artillery you now have
had to be created; other armies were to move and
accomplish certain results. I have held you back that
you might give the death-blow to the rebellion that has
distracted our once happy country. The patience you
have shown, and your confidence in your general, are
worth a dozen victories. These preliminary results are
now accomplished. I feel that the patient labors of many
months have produced their fruit: the Army of the Po
tomac is now a real army, magnificent in material, admi
rable in discipline and instruction, excellently equipped
and armed; your commanders are all that I could wish.
The moment for action has arrived, and I know that I
can trust in you to save our country. As I ride through
your ranks, I see in your faces the sure presage of victory ;
I feel that you will do whatever I ask of you. The period
of inaction has passed. I will bring you now face to face
with the rebels, and only pray that God may defend the
right. In whatever direction you may move, however
strange my actions may appear to you, ever bear in mind
that my fate is linked with yours, and that all I do is to
bring you, where I know you wish to be, on the decisive
battle-field. It is my business to place you there. I am
to watch over you as a parent over his children ; and you
know that your general loves you from the depths of his
heart. It shall be my care, as it has ever been, to gain
success with the least possible loss ; but I know that, if it is
necessary, you will willingly follow me to our graves for
our righteous cause. God smiles upon us, victory attends
us. Yet I would not have you think that our aim is to be
attained without a manly struggle. I will not disguise it
from you : you have brave foes to encounter, foemen well
worthy of the steel that you will use so well. I shall de
mand of you great, heroic exertions, rapid and long
marches, desperate combats, privations perhaps. We
will share all these together; and, when this sad war is

164 NOTE TO THE WAR DEPARTMENT. [18C2.
over, we will return to our homes and feel that we can
ask no higher honor than the proud consciousness that
we belonged to the Army of the Potomac.
"Geo. B. McClellan,
"Major-General commanding."
Preparations were immediately begun, in com
pliance with the directions contained in the letter
from the Secretary of War of March 13, above
given. On the 16th of March, General McClellan
addressed a letter of instructions to General Banks
to post his command in the vicinity of Manassas
and intrench himself strongly there, for the gene
ral object of covering the line of the Potomac and
Washington; and on the same day a similar letter
of instructions was addressed by him to General
Wadsworth, who was in command at Washington,
giving him minute and detailed directions as to the
military precautions to be taken to keep the capital
secure. The Secretary of War having expressed a desire
that General McClellan should communicate to the
Departments, in an official form, his designs with
regard to the employment of the Army of the Po
tomac, the latter addressed to the Department a
note under date of March 19, in which he unfolds
briefly his plan, sots forth its advantages, and
states what will be requisite to insure its success
ful accomplishment. He especially urges the abso
lute necessity of a full co-operation of the navy in
a combined naval and land attack upon Yorktown,
as a part of his programme. He enforces this view

Age 35.] INTERVIEW WITH THE PRESIDENT. 165
by many considerations, and thus concludes his
communication : —
"It may be summed up in a few words, that for the
prompt success of this campaign it is absolutely necessary
that the navy should at once throw its whole available
force, its most powerful vessels, against Yorktown. There
is the most important point, — there the knot to be cut.
An immediate decision upon the subject-matter of this
communication is highly desirable, and seems called for
by the exigencies of the occasion."
In the mean time, the troops destined to form the
active army were collected in camps convenient to
the points of embarkation, and every preparation
was made to despatch them as rapidly as possible
when the transports should be ready. While the
army was still encamped at Alexandria, a few
days before sailing for Fortress Monroe, General
McClellan met the President, by appointment, on
board a steamer, and was told by the President
that he had been strongly pressed to take General
Blenker's division from his (General McClellan's)
command and give it to General Fremont; but he,
however, suggested many considerations in op
position to this step, and frankly and voluntarily
avowed his purpose of allowing the division to re
main with the Army of the Potomac. The astonish
ment, therefore, of General McClellan may well be
imagined when by the receipt ofthe following note
he learned that the President had changed his mind,
and determined upon a measure the inexpediency
of which was so obvious to him but a few days
before : —

166 BLENKER'S DIVISION WITHDRAWN. [1862.

"Executive Mans
Washington, March 31

3I0N, )
, 1862. j

"My dear Sir: — This morning I felt constrained to
order Blenker's division to Fremont ; and I write this to
assure you that I did so with great pain, understanding
that you would wish it otherwise. If you could know the
full pressure of the case, I am confident that you would
justify it, even beyond a mere acknowledgment that the
commander-in-chief may order what he pleases.
"Yours, very truly, "A. Lincoln.
"Major-General McClellan."
The weak and deprecatory tone of this note dis
arms, or at least alloys with contempt, the indigna
tion justly awakened by the deliberate breach of
faith which it confesses ; but it is a melancholy fact
that at so critical a period the reins of executive
power were in hands that held them with so slack a
grasp, and that the President, by yielding to un
known and irresponsible advisers in the conduct
of a campaign, seemingly acted as if he thought
that many bad generals were better than one good
one. General McClellan could only acquiesce in the
latest decision of the President, not suppressing
some natural expressions of surprise; but he was
relieved by the President's positive and emphatic
assurance that he might be confident that in no
event should any more troops be detached from his
command. General Blenker's division consisted of
about ten thousand men.
On the 1st of April, General McClellan addressed

Age35.] DEFENCES OF WASHINGTON. 167
another letter of instruction to General Banks,
founded upon the retreat of General Jackson up the
Yalley of the Shenandoah, and the change for the
better in the military position of the Federal cause
in that region.
In view of events which subsequently occurred,
and of questions which were subsequently raised, it
becomes of importance here that the reader should
understand how far the defence of Washington
was provided for before the Army of the Potomac
was withdrawn.
In the first place, the city itself was defended by
a strong system of fortifications, built under the
directions of General Barnard, and sweeping round
a line of thirty-three miles in extent. The troops
which were assigned to garrison these fortifications
wepre eighteen thousand in number, with thirty-two
field-guns. At Manassas there were ten thousand
men; on the Lower Potomac, thirteen hundred; in
the Yalley of the Shenandoah, thirty-five thousand.
Thus, without including General Blenker's division,
which was at Warrenton, there were about sixty-
three thousand men disposed at various points for
the protection of Washington, together with eighty-
five pieces of light artillery, including the thirty-
two above mentioned. There was also a body of
troops in New York, over four thousand in number,
which General McClellan recommended to have sent
to Washington to reinforce the garrison there.
These forces were deemed by him amply ade
quate to insure the safety of Washington and to
give everybody there an entire sense of security, —

168 DEFENCES OF WASHINGTON. [1862.
a conclusion not to be doubted, as the following
facts show.
There was no reason to apprehend an attack by
way of Manassas and Centreville; for the enemy
in their retreat across the Bappahannock had de
stroyed all the railroad-bridges behind them. Had
they attempted such a movement, their progress
must have been very slow; for they must have re
built their bridges, and this would have announced
their purpose beforehand and afforded ample time
to concentrate a large body of forces at Washing
ton. Nor was there any real ground of apprehension
from the Valley of the Shenandoah ; because the
movement of the army on Eiehmond would make
it impossible for the enemy to leave in that region
men enough to overpower the large body of troops
we had there. But, in General McClellan's opinion,
the way to defend Washington was to attack Eieh
mond; and the greater the force thrown against
the rebel capital, the greater the security of our
own. Strongly fortified as Washington was, capa
ble of being readily reinforced from the North, it
was manifest that the enemy could not afford to
detach from his main army a force sufficient to
capture it.
Here were solid grounds enough, it would appear,
for General McClellan's conclusion that he had left
Washington perfectly safe; but, unhappily, fears,
panics, and apprehensions take their rise in that
part of the mind which is not reached by the voice
of reason. Whether Washington were safe or not

Age 35.] EMBARKATION BEGUN. 169
was a matter of sound military judgment; but as
a matter of fact it is certain that from the mo
ment the Army of the Potomac landed upon the
Peninsula an uneasy sense of insecurity took pos
session of the minds of the President, the Cabinet,
and the members of Congress. The public in gene
ral shared this feeling; and the Northern press
encouraged and increased it. All over the loyal
States the question of the safety of Washington
was discussed, with abundant zeal and very little
knowledge. Some of this alarm may have been
counterfeited for political effect; but without doubt
much of it was real; and this should be borne
in mind, when discussing measures subsequently
adopted, disastrous in their consequences, but, un
questionably, inspired by an honest but miserable
fright. It was destined, in the providence of God,
that our cause should suffer alike from unreason
able hopes and extravagant fears.

CHAPTEE VII.

Alexandria was selected as the point of depart
ure, and the embarkation began on the 17th of
March. The removal of a large body of troops,
including cavalry and artillery, with armaments
and supplies, was of necessity a slow work; and
more than a fortnight elapsed before the whole
force was transported. General McClellan reached
Fortress Monroe on the 2d of April. He had in

170 FORTRESS MONROE. [1862.
all between fifty and sixty thousand men with him;
and others wore to follow as fast as means of trans
portation could be supplied.
It should here be borne in mind, as a matter of
mere justice to General McClellan, that for the suc
cessful execution of his projected expedition he had
required that the whole of the four corps under his
command should be employed, with the addition
of ten thousand men drawn from the forces in the
vicinity of Fortress Monroe, — that position and its
dependencies being regarded as amply protected
by the naval force in its neighborhood. Before he
left Washington, an order had been issued by the
War Department, placing Fortress Monroe and its
dependencies under his control, and authorizing
him to draw from the troops under General Wool
a division of about ten thousand men. And, in ad
dition to the land-forces, the co-operation of the
navy was deemed essential in order to reduce or
silence the strong batteries which the Confederates
had erected at Yorktown and Gloucester.
But he had hardly landed upon the Peninsula
when he was doomed to taste the bitterness of dis
appointed hope, and by another experience to have
the conviction forced upon him that the Administra
tion was unfaithful to him. During the night of
the 3d of April, he received a telegram from the
Adjutant-General of the army, stating that, by the
President's order, he was deprived of all control
over General Wool and the troops under his com
mand, and forbidden, without that officer's sanc
tion, to detach any portion ofhis force. No causes

Age 35.] MERRIMAC. 171
were assigned, or have ever been assigned, for this
order, which was in violation of a deliberate and
official engagement, and left the general in com
mand of a most important military movement with
out any base of operations under his own control,
— a situation without parallel, it is believed, in
military history.
Nor was this all. The. terrible Merrimac lay,
"hushed in grim repose," in the James Eiver; and
no one knew when she might reappear or in how
formidable a guise. Admiral Goldsborough, then in
command ofthe United States squadron in Hampton
Eoads, felt, and with justice, that it was his para
mount duty to watch the Merrimac; and he, con
sequently, did not venture to detach for the assist
ance of the army a suitable force to attack the
water-batteries at Yorktown and Gloucester. This
was contrary to what General McClellan had been
led to expect, and a serious derangement of his
''plans. In fact, it should be remembered that during the
operations against Yorktown the navy was not able
to lend the army any material assistance till after
the siege-guns had partially silenced the enemy's
water-batteries. But the heaviest blow was yet to come. On the
4th of April the following telegram was received : —
"Adjutant-General's Office, April 4, 1862,
"By direction of the President, General McDowell's
army corps has been detached from the force under your

172 MCDOWELL'S CORPS. [1862.
immediate command, and the general is ordered to re
port to the Secretary of War. Letter by mail.
"L. Thomas,
" Adjutant-General.
" General McClellan."
This fell with crushing weight upon General Mc
Clellan's hopes. Its effect upon him cannot be
better described than in his own simple language, —
the force of which could not be increased by any
attempt at rhetorical embellishment : —
" The President having promised, in our interview fol
lowing his order of March 31, withdrawing Blenker's divi
sion of ten thousand men from my command, that
nothing of the sort should be repeated, — that I might
rest assured that the campaign should proceed, with no
further deductions from the force upon which its opera
tions had been planned, — I may confess to having been
shocked at this order, which, with that of the 31st ultimo
and that of the 3d, removed nearly sixty thousand men
from my command, and reduced my force by more than
one-third, after its task had been assigned, its operations
planned, its fighting begun. To me the blow was most
discouraging. It frustrated all my plans for impending
operations. It fell when I was too deeply committed to
withdraw. It left me incapable of continuing operations
which had been begun. It compelled the adoption of
another, a different and a less effective, plan of campaign.
It made rapid and brilliant operations impossible. It was
a fatal error."
General McClellan's plan had been, if the works at
Yorktown and Williamsburg offered a serious resist
ance, that General McDowell's corps should land

Age 35.] NATURE OF THE COUNTRY. 173
on the left bank of the York, or on the Severn, so as
to move upon Gloucester and West Point, in order
to take in reverse whatever force the enemy might
have on the Peninsula and compel him to abandon
his positions. But, since McDowell's corps was
withheld, this plan, of course, became impossible,
and there was no choice left but to attack the
enemy's positions directly in front. And a grave
question now rose, — whether these positions should
be assaulted or invested. The problem presented
was not easy of solution.
From the moment of landing upon the Peninsula,
it became obvious that the difficulties in the ad
vance to Eiehmond were sufficient to task all the
resources of the general in command, even if he
had been furnished with the entire force promised
him, — which he had not been. The nature of the
country is very unfavorable to an invading army,
and to the same extent favorable to a force which
stands upon the defensive. It is a low, flat region,
little elevated above the level of the sea, thinly in
habited, and scourged with malaria for many weeks
of the year. It is covered with marshy forests;
and the roads whieh traverse it hardly deserve the
name. It is everywhere veined with streams and
water-courses, which flow lazily along their level
beds, and, by the copious rains which fall there,
are easily swollen into broad and shallow lakes.
The earth was constantly saturated with moisture,
and the mud was deep, pitiless, and universal.
After a rain, the so-called roads became utterly im
practicable for any kind of wheeled vehicle. The
15*

174 CONFEDERATE DEFENCES. [1862.
wagons stuck hopelessly fast in the tenacious mire;
and to transport them it became necessary to con
struct corduroy roads, — a slow and toilsome process.
And, strange to say, though this was the earliest-
settled portion of the whole country and full of
historical interest, serious difficulties were encoun
tered from the want of accurate topographical know
ledge of the region before them. The common
maps were found to be so incorrect as to be of little
or no value. Eeconnoissances, frequently made at
great risk, proved the only trustworthy sources of
information. The progress of our army would have been slow
had natural difficulties alone been in their path; but
they found themselves met by a foe whose courage
and energy they were too brave themselves not to
respect. Among the Confederates there were unity
of purpose and concerted action towards a common
end. They knew that time was on their side, and
their great object was to gain time and delay our
progress as much as possible. Since leaving Ma
nassas, they had been diligently at work, without
the loss of an hour, in strengthening all available
points by skilfully constructed works. It was
found that Warwick Eiver was controlled by the
Confederate gunboats for some distance from its
mouth, — that the fords had been destroyed by dams,
the approaches to which were generally through
dense forests and deep swamps and defended by
extensive and formidable works, — and that York-
town was strongly fortified, armed and garrisoned,
and connected with the defences of the Warwick

Age 35.] YORKTOWN INVESTED. 175
by forts and intrenchments, the ground in front of
which was swept by the guns of Yorktown.
After close personal reconnoissance, and after
careful reflection and consultation, General Mc
Clellan determined not to attempt to carry the
lines of Yorktown by immediate assault, but to
assail it by the regular operations of a siege. As
this decision has been severely criticized by writers
who conduct campaigns in their studies and judge
of military movements and military men by the
light of subsequent events, it may be well to pause
for a moment and consider briefly the grounds of
his determination.
He had with him at that time — General Frank
lin's division not having then arrived — but a little
over fifty thousand men. The number of the Con
federate forces was not known ; but General Johrf-
ston had reached Yorktown on the 6th of April
with heavy reinforcements, and it was believed
that the whole force of the enemy was, or soon
would be, not less than a hundred thousand men.
Our troops were admirable troops, as their subse
quent conduct abundantly showed; but they were
comparatively new; and nothing tries the temper
and nerve of the soldier so much as the assault of
a strongly-defended place.
General Barnard, Chief Engineer of the army,
whose position entitled his opinion to the highest
consideration, expressed his judgment that the
works could not with any reasonable degree of
certainty be carried by assault. There are co
pious extracts from his Eeport embodied in that of

176 GENERAL BARNARD. [1862.
General McClellan. The details are too technical
to be fully understood by the general reader; but a
single sentence will serve to show what our assault
ing force must have been prepared to meet : —
"It will be seen, therefore, that our approaches were
swept by the fire of at least forty-nine guns, nearly all of
which were heavy, and many of them the most formida
ble guns known. Besides that, two-thirds of the guns of
the water-batteries, and all the guns of Gloucester, bore on
our right batteries, though under disadvantageous cir
cumstances." It is true that General Barnard has since changed
his mind, and given it as his opinion that the lines
of Yorktown should have been assaulted; but it is
clear that General McClellan had an opposite judg
ment given at the time and on the spot and under
the gravest official responsibility.*
* This second, or retrospective, Report of General Barnard
was made in January, 1863, at a time when General McClellan
was living in retirement and out of favor with the Administra
tion. The Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the
War copy several of its paragraphs into their Report on the
Army of the Potomac; and the whole of it may be found at
page 394 of their Proceedings, Part First, appended to Gene
ral Barnard's testimony. The Eeport of the Committee has
been translated into French, and published, with notes, by
Colonel Lecomte, an accomplished Swiss officer who served
on General McClellan's staff during the Peninsular campaign.
One of General Barnard's paragraphs which the Committee
copy is as follows : — " However I may be committed to any ex
pression of professional opinion to the contrary (I certainly
did suggest it), my opinion now is that the lines of Yorktown

Age 35.] GENERAL BARNARD. 177
General McClellan, on the 7th of April, sent a
long telegram to the Secretary of War, in which
he explained the reasons why an instant assault was
Bhould have been assaulted. There is reason to believe that
they were not held in strong force when our army appeared
before them; and we know that they were far from. complete.
The prestige of power, the morale, were on our side. It was
due to ourselves to confirm and sustain it. We should proba
bly have succeeded. But, if we had failed, it may be well
doubted whether the shock of an unsuccessful assault would
be more demoralizing than the labors of a siege."
Upon the above, Colonel Lecomte remarks, "We are the
more astonished at this retrospective confidence of General
Barnard, because, on the spot, the engineer officers who were
associated with him, and he himself, we believe, repeatedly
expressed very different opinions."
General Barnard further says, "The siege having been de
termined upon, we should have opened our batteries upon the
place as fast as they were completed. The effect on our troops
would have been inspiring. It would have lightened the siege
and shortened our labors ; and, besides, we should have had
the credit of driving the enemy from Yorktown by force of
arms, — whereas, as it was, we only induced him to evacuate
for prudential reasons."
Upon which Colonel Lecomte remarks, "This is not certain.
On the contrary, nothing discourages an army and inspirits the
enemy more than a fire of artillery that begins feebly, without
taking into account that in this way the calibre of the pieces
is revealed. And as to the 'credit' of taking Yorktown by
force of arms, this slight advantage might also have been
doubtful; because, unless we had inflicted heavy loss upon
the enemy and taken many prisoners at the very moment of
evacuation (which was hardly to be expected), they might
have pretended that they repulsed us, and only evacuated the
place, later, for prudential reasons."

178 PRESIDENT LINCOLN'S LETTER. [1862.
not to be made, prominent among which was the
limited amount of force as yet under his control.
This was replied to by the President, in a letter
dated April 9, in which he restates the grounds
on which Blenker's division had been kept back,
and shows that his mind was still not free from ap
prehensions as to the safety of Washington ! The
concluding paragraphs are as follow : —
"I suppose the whole force which has gone forward for
you is with you by this time. And, if so, I think it is
the precise time for you to strike a blow. By delay the
enemy will relatively gain upon you ; that is, he will gain
faster by fortifications and reinforcements than you can
by reinforcements alone. And once more let me tell you,
it is indispensable to you that you strike a blow. I am
powerless to help this. You will do me the justice to
remember I always insisted that going down the bay in
search of a field, instead of fighting at or near Manassas,
was only shifting, and not surmounting, a difficulty, —
that we would find the same enemy and the same or
equal intrenchments at either place. The country will
not fail to note — is now noting — that the present hesi
tation to move upon an intrenched enemy is hut the
story of Manassas repeated.
" I beg to assure you that I have never written you or
spoken to you in greater kindness of feeling than now,
nor with a fuller purpose to sustain you, so far as, in
my most anxious judgment, I consistently can. But you
must act. "Yours, very truly, "A. Lincoln.
"Major-General McClellan."
To these considerations General McClellan re-

Age 35.] INVESTMENT OF YORKTOWN. 179
plies, in his Eeport, in a few words, which are here
quoted, as they can hardly be improved : —
"His Excellency could not judge of the formidable
character of the works before us as well as if he had been
on the ground ; and, whatever might have been his desire
for prompt action (certainly no greater than mine), I feel
confident, if he could have made a personal inspection of
the enemy's defences, he would have forbidden me risk
ing the safety of the army and the possible successes of
the campaign on a sanguinary assault of an advantageous
and formidable position, which, even if successful, could
not have been followed up to any other or better result
than would have been reached by the regular operations
of a siege. Still less could I forego the conclusions of my
most instructed judgment for the mere sake of avoiding
the personal consequences intimated in the President's
despatch." The investment of Yorktown, as it proved, cost
a month of valuable time, — which certainly was no
inconsiderable gain to the enemy ; but, on the other
hand, it cost us no loss of life. We got it at last
without bloodshed. But suppose General McClellan
had assaulted it early in April, as now he is blamed
by many for not having done, and, after the fright
ful carnage which must have been the result of
such an attempt, — after thousands of the flower of
our population had been mowed down by a tempest
of iron hail, as grass falls before the mower's scythe,
— the attack had been at last unsuccessful, as was
the Duke of Wellington's upon Burgos : what would
have been the public feeling, — bearing in mind al
ways that the judgment of the Chief Engineer,

180 EVACUATION OF YORKTOWN. [1862.
General Barnard, was against an assault? Would-
not such a storm of indignation have been raised
against General McClellan as would have com
pelled his sacrifice at the hands of an Administra
tion not inclined — perhaps not able — to resist that
sweeping power of public opinion which moves and
rages with more than "the force of winds and waters
pent" ?*
On the 22d of April, while the siege of York-
town was going on, General Franklin's division,
forming part of General McDowell's corps, arrived,
and reported to General McClellan. These troops
were kept on board the transports, and not em
ployed for some days. It was General McClellan's
purpose to act on Gloucester by disembarking this
division on the north bank of the York Eiver,
under the protection of the gunboats, but subse
quent events rendered the movement unnecessary.
Our batteries would have been ready to open
upon Yorktown on the morning of the 6th of May
at latest; but in the nights of the 3d and 4th of
May, that position and the Confederate lines ofthe
* "Many of Lord Wellington's proceedings might be called
rash, and others timid and slow, if taken separately : yet, when
viewed as parts of a great plan for delivering the whole Penin
sula, they will be found discreet or daring, as the circumstances
warranted. Nor is there any portion of his campaigns that
requires this wide-based consideration more than his early
sieges, which, being instituted contrary to the rules of art,
and unsuccessful, — or, when successful, attended with a mourn
ful slaughter, — have given occasion for questioning his great
military qualities, which were, however, then most signally
displayed." — Napier.

Age 35.] BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG. 181
Warwick Eiver were evacuated. This work was
doubtless commenced some days before, and was
conducted with skill and energy. On the 3d,
with a view of masking their retreat, the fire of
their batteries was unusually severe.
The Confederates left behind them all their heavy
guns, eighty in number, each piece supplied with
seventy-six rounds of ammunition. A large amount
of warlike stores of every description was also
abandoned or destroyed. The evacuation is said
to have been the result of a council of war at
which President Davis and Generals Lee and
Johnston were present, and to have been very dis
tasteful to General Magruder, the Officer in com
mand, who did not like to retire from his works
without a fight.
THE BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG.
After the evacuation of Yorktown, the next im
portant point before the Federal army was the city
of Williamsburg, the Colonial capital of Virginia.
It is about ten miles from Yorktown, and is on the
narrowest part of the peninsula between the James
and York Eivers, being about three miles from the
former, and five and a quarter from the latter.
On the 4th of May, immediately after the evacua
tion of Yorktown, a portion of the army was put
in motion to pursue the flying foe, and General
Franklin's division was ordered to move by water
to the vicinity of West Point, to cut off the enemy's
retreat in that direction. General Stoneman led
16

182 BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG. [1S62.
the advance upon Williamsburg with the entire
cavalry force and four batteries of horse-artillery,
as fast as the muddy condition of the roads would
permit, and, on reaching a space where the roads
from Yorktown and Warwick Court-House debouch
upon the isthmus, he found a large Confederate
force in a strongly-defended position. After sus
taining and repelling a cavalry charge of the
enemy, and gallantly returning with his batteries
the fire of their artillery, as he had no infantry to
carry the works, he withdrew his command and fell
back to a clearing about half a mile distant.
By this time night was falling. The Federal in
fantry had come up slowly, retarded by the bad
state of the roads, and it was completely dark be
fore they arrived in full force; and, though General
Sumner, who had come up and assumed the com
mand, desired to make an attempt to carry the
works that night, it was impossible to do so, owing
to the late hour and the darkness. The troops
bivouacked in the woods, and, unfortunately, a heavy
rain set in, and continued for thirty hours, convert
ing the country into a vast lake and the roads into
channels of liquid mud. The battle of the next
day cannot be better described than in the clear
and graphic language of the Prince de Joinville,
besides which his account contains the criticism of
a candid and intelligent observer upon a defect in
the organization of our armies, which is the more
worthy of our consideration because offered in so
kindly a spirit.

Age 35.] BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG. 183
"Next day the battle began again, but, of course, in cir
cumstances unfavorable to the Federals. The two roads
leading to Williamsburg were crowded with troops. Upon
that to the left from Lee's Mill were the divisions of
Hooker and Kearney, belonging to Heintzelman's corps ;
but they were separated from each other by an enormous
multitude of wagons loaded down with baggage and for
the most part fast in the mud. Upon that to the right,
two other divisions were moving forward with still greater
difficulty. Such was the condition of the ground that
the cannon sank over the axle into the mud. This
medley of men and baggage thrown pellmell into narrow
and flooded roads had fallen into considerable disorder.
In the United States there is no such thing as a corps of
the general staff. The American system of 'every man
for himself,' individually applied by the officers and
soldiers of each corps to one another, is also applied by
the corps themselves to their reciprocal relations. There
is no special branch of the service whose duty it is to regu
late, centralize, and direct the movements of the army. In
such a case as this of which we are speaking, we should
have seen the general staff officers of a French army
taking care that nothing should impede the advance of
the troops, stopping a file of wagons here and ordering it
out of the road to clear the way, sending on a detail of
men there to repair the roadway or to draw a cannon out
of the mire, in order to communicate to every corps-com
mander the orders of the general-in-chief.
"Here, nothing of the sort is done. The functions of
the adjutant-general are limited to the transmission of
the orders of the general. He has nothing to do with
seeing that they are executed. The general has no one
to bear his orders but aides-de-camp, who have the best
intentions in the world, and are excellent at repeating
mechanically a verbal order, but to whom nobody pays
much attention if they undertake to exercise any initia-

184 BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG. [1862.
tive whatever. Down to the present moment, although
this want of a general staff had been often felt, its con
sequences had not been serious. We had the telegraph,
which followed the army everywhere and kept up com
munications between the different corps: the generals
could converse together and inform each other of any
thing that it was important to know. But, once on the
march, this resource was lost to us, and so farewell to our
communications !
" The want of a general staff was not less severely felt
in obtaining and transmitting the information necessary
at the moment of an impending action. No one knew
the country ; the maps were so defective that they were
useless. Little was known about the fortified battle-field
on which the army was about to be engaged. Yet this
battle-field had been seen and reconnoitred the day before
by the troops which had taken part in Stoneman's
skirmish. Enough was surely known of it for us to com
bine a plan of attack and assign to every commander his
own part in the work. No ! this was not so. Every one
kept his observations to himself, — not from ill will, but
because it was nobody's special duty to do this general
work. It was a defect in the organization ; and, with the
best elements in the world, an army which is not organized
cannot expect great success. It is fortunate if it escape
great disaster.
"Thanks to this constitutional defect of the Federal
armies, Hooker's division, which led the column on the
left-hand road, and had received, the day before, a gene
ral order to march upon Williamsburg, came out on the
morning of the 5th upon the scene of Stoneman's cavalry-
fight, without the least knowledge of what it was to meet
there. Received, as soon as it appeared, with a steady fire
from the hostile works, it deployed resolutely in the
abatis and went into action. But it came up little by
little and alone, — whilst the defence was carried on by

Age 35.] BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG. 185
from fifteen to twenty thousand men strongly intrenched.
The odds were too great.
"Hooker, who is an admirable soldier, held his own
for some time; but he had to give way and fall back,
leaving in the woods and in these terrible abatis some
two thousand of his men killed and wounded, with
several of his guns which he could not bring off. The
enemy followed him as he fell back. The division of
General Kearney, having passed the crowded road, and
marching upon the guns at the pas de course, re-established
the battle. The fight had now rolled from the edges of
the plain into the forest; and it was sharp, for the enemy
was strongly reinforced. The Federals fought not less
firmly, encouraged by their chiefs, Hooker, Heintzelman,
and Kearney. Kearney in especial, who lost an arm in
Mexico, and fought with the French at the Muzaia and
at Solferino, had displayed the finest courage.* All his
* " The general acceded to his urgent request, and immediately
ordered up Kearney's division to his aid. He could not have
sent a better inan. Kearney was of that chivalrous character
so often to be met with in the French army. He had lost an
arm in the Mexican War, and he afterwards joined the French
army as a volunteer aide-de-camp in the Italian campaign,
greatly distinguishing himself at both Solferino and Magenta.
Kearney brought up his men at the double quick to support
Hooker, although the execrable state of the roads somewhat
retarded him ; but he eventually reached the hard-pressed divi
sion. It was a fine sight to see Kearney lead on his men, eager
for the fight as they were. He seemed to be ubiquitous, — now
leading on his centre, now ordering up a battery, in another
moment charging at the head of his troops. His striking, manly
form was prominent wherever the fight was thickest, setting a
noble example to his soldiers. The opposing troops were soon
intermingled in a regular milee, and both sides fought despe
rately. Owing to the state of the ground, our cavalry was not ser
viceable, much to the regret of its officers : it was also very diffi-
16*

186 BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG. [1362.
aides had fallen around him, and, left alone, he had electri
fied his men by his intrepidity. During all this time the
part of the army massed on the road to the right re
mained passive. A single division only had come up,
and the generals in command could not resolve to throw
it into the engagement without seeing its supports. These
supports were delayed by the swollen streams, the encum
bered roads, the shattered wagons sticking in the mud.
"But all the while the sound of Hooker's musketry
was in our ears. His division was cut up and falling back.
His guns had been heard at first in front, then on one
side, and they were receding still. The balls and the
shells began to whistle and shatter the trees over the fresh
division, as it stood immovable and expectant.
"It was now three o'clock, and the generals resolved to
act. One division passed through the woods to flank the
regiments which were driving Hooker, while to the ex
treme right a brigade passed the creek on an old mill-
bridge, which the enemy had failed to secure, and de
bouched upon the flank of the Williamsburg works.
The Confederates did not expect this attack, which, if
successful, must sweep every thing before it. They de
spatched two brigades, which advanced resolutely through
the corn-fields to drive back the Federals. The latter
coolly allowed their foes to come up, and received them
with a tremendous fire of artillery. The Confederates,
cult for the artillery to manoeuvre. The struggle, which had
commenced at the verge of a wood, was gradually drawn into
the forest itself, and here, under the cracking branches of
venerable trees, amidst the roar of the artillery, many des
perate hand-to-hand encounters took place, such as have seldom
been witnessed in other wars." — Estvan's War-Pictures from the
South, p. 277.
The author of the above work was a Prussian officer, serving
in the Confederate army.

Age 35.] BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG. 187
unshaken, pushed on within thirty yards of the cannon's
mouth, shouting, 'Bull Bun! Bull Bun!' as the Swiss
used to shout, 'Granson! Granson!' There, however,
they wavered, and the Federal General Hancock, seizing
the moment, cried to his soldiers, as he waved his cap,
'Now, gentlemen! the bayonet!' and charged with his
brigade. The enemy could not withstand the shock,
broke and fled, strewing the field with his dead. At this
very moment General McClellan, who had been detained
at Yorktown, appeared on the field. It was dusk: the
night was coming on, the rain still falling in torrents.
On three sides of the plateau on which the general was,
the cannon and the musketry were rattling uninterrupt
edly. The success of Hancock had been decisive, and
the reserves brought up by the general-in-chief, charg
ing upon the field, settled the affair. Then it was that
I saw General McClellan, passing in front of the Sixth
Cavalry, give his hand to Major Williams, with a few
words on his brilliant charge of the day before. The
regiment did not hear what he said ; but it knew what he
meant, and from every heart went up one of those mas
culine, terrible shouts which are only to be heard on the
field of battle.* These shouts, taken up along the whole
* "Suddenly a shout of a thousand voices broke upon the air,
like the rushing of a mighty wind from the wood. What did
this portend? There was little time left for us to speculate.
Charge after charge was made upon our men, and the news
then spread that General McClellan, with the main body of
his army, had arrived on the field of battle. This explained
the loud cheers from the wood. Our men could no longer
stand their ground. McClellan, in person, led on his troops
into the midst of the fire. Magruder now, finding that the
battle was lost, ordered a retreat to be sounded, and directed
Hill's division, which had just come up, to cover the movement.
All the wounded and a great portion of the baggage were

188 BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG. [1862.
line, struck terror to the enemy. We saw them come
upon the parapets and look out in silence and motionless
upon the scene. Then the firing died away, and night
fell on the combat which in America is called ' the battle
of Williamsburg.'"
Our loss in the battle of Williamsburg — the greater
part of which was sustained by General Hooker's
division — was as follows : Killed, four hundred
and fifty-six; wounded, fourteen hundred; missing,
three hundred and seventy-two: total, two thou
sand two hundred and twenty-eight. The engage
ment had been fought under the disadvantage on
our part of not knowing the numbers of the enemy
or the strength of his positions; and we became
involved in a serious battle, with a large force
powerfully intrenched, when we had expected to
do no more than attack the rear-guard of a retreat
ing army. This explains the want of concert among
the officers on the field, and the failure to send
support, in all cases, to the place and at the time
when most needed. General McClellan, during the
forenoon of the day, was at Yorktown, engaged in
making arrangements for the forwarding of Gene
ral Franklin's division to West Point, and in con
sultation with the naval commanders, as well as
with the other duties incident to his position. It
left in the enemy's himds. The shades of night put an end
to the fight ; a heavy rain, too, began to fall ; and these circum
stances, fortunately, prevented the enemy from completely over
whelming us. Tired and worn out, our troops returned to
Williamsburg, where the excitement had become intense." 
Estvan's War-Pictures from the South, p. 279.

Age 35.] TESTIMONY OF GENERAL KEYES. 189
was not until about one o'clock that he heard from
his aides that every thing was not going on favor
ably in front, — upon which he hurried up as rapidly
as possible, arriving there between four and five in
the afternoon.
General Keyes, in his examination before the
Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the
War, says, " The battle of Williamsburg was gained
by our side, but at a very great loss in Hooker's
division and considerable loss in Hancock's and
Peck's brigades. The victory, for the reasons I
have stated, was nothing like as decisive as it
should have been, nor gained so early in the day.
In fact, the victory was not what, in military lan
guage, is generally called a perfect victory, because
we were not able to sleep in the enemy's camp ex
cept in part."*
* Upon the battle of Williamsburg, General Barnard says,
"We fought, we lost several thousand men, and we gained
nothing. If we had not fought, the next day a battle would,
in all probability, have been unnecessary. But, if it had been
necessary, we should have had time to have brought up our
resources, reconnoitred the position, and delivered our attack
in such a way that some result would have flowed from it."
Upon this Colonel Lecomte remarks, "We gained there at
least the credit of having carried a position by force of
arms, which General Barnard regrets so much we did not do at
Yorktown. But this is not the only contradiction into which
the honorable general falls. He would not have feared, for in
stance, assaults, however fruitless, upon the strongly-fortified
line of Yorktown and Warwick, and he is inconsolable at the
losses caused by success."

190 WILLIAMSBURG OCCUPIED. [1862.
However imperfect the victory may have been,
the battle had been entirely satisfactory so far as
the courage and conduct of the men were concerned.
They had behaved admirably, regulars and volun
teers alike, and given to their commanding officer
abundant proof that he might depend alike upon
their bravery and their steadiness, — their power to
attack and their power to resist attack. That the
Operations of the army and the course of its com
mander had thus far been approved by the public
sentiment of the country may be inferred from the
following resolutions, offered by Mr. Lovejoy, and
unanimously adopted by the House of Eepresenta-
tives, on the 5th of May: —
"Resolved, That it is with feelings of profound grati
tude to Almighty God that the House of Bepresentatives,
from time to time, hear of the triumphs of the Union
armies in the great struggle for the supremacy of the
Constitution and the integrity of the Union.
" Resolved, That we receive with profound satisfaction
intelligence of the recent victories achieved by the
armies of the Potomac, associated from their localities
with those of the Revolution, and that the sincere thanks
of the House are hereby tendered to Major-General
George B. McClellan for the display of those high mili
tary qualities which secure important results with but
little sacrifice to human life."
On the morning after the battle, finding the
enemy's position abandoned, we occupied Fort
Magruder and tho town of Williamsburg, which
was filled with the enemy's wounded, to whose

Age 35.] WHITE HOUSE. 191
assistance eighteen of their surgeons were sent
by General Johnston. Our troops were greatly ex
hausted by their toilsome march through the mud
from their positions in front of Yorktown, and by
the protracted battle they had fought; and the roads
were in such a state, after thirty-six hours of con
tinuous rain, that it was almost impossible to pass
even empty wagons over them. Under these cir
cumstances, an immediate pursuit of the enemy
was out of the question.
The divisions of Franklin, Sedgwick, Porter, and
Eichardson were sent from Yorktown, by water,
to the right bank of the Pamunkey, in the vicinity
of West Point. Early on the morning of May 7,
General Franklin had completed the disembark
ation of his division. Between ten and eleven
o'clock he was assailed by a large force of the
enemy, but, after a spirited engagement of three
or four hours, the Confederates retired, all their
attacks having been repulsed. The gunboats were
very efficient, and contributed materially to the
success of the day.
As soon as supplies had been received, and the
condition of the roads had somewhat improved, the
army turned its face towards Eiehmond, moving
slowly along the left bank of the Pamunkey, one
of the two affluents forming the York Eiver, and
navigable from its junction with the latter river as
far as White House. The head-quarters of the
army reached this place on .the 16th of May. So
bad were the roads that the train of one division

192 MARCH DESCRIBED. [1862.
took thirty-six hours to get to White House from
Cumberland, a distance of only five miles.*
* "Nothing could be more picturesque than this military
march along the banks of a fine stream through a magnificent
country arrayed in all the wealth of spring vegetation. The
winding course of the Pamunkey, through a valley in which
meadows of the brightest green alternated with wooded hills,
offered a perpetual scene of enchantment to our eyes. Flowers
bloomed everywhere, especially on the river-banks, which
abounded in magnolias, Virginia jessamines, azaleas, and blue
lupines. Humming-birds, snakes, and strange birds of every
hue sported in the branches and about the trunks of the trees.
Occasionally we passed a stately habitation which recalled the
old mansions of rural France, with its large windows in the
roof, — around it a handsome garden, and behind it the slave-
cabins. "As the army was descried in the distance, the inhabitants
would hang out a white flag. One of the provost-marshal's
horsemen would dismount at the door, and, reassured by his
presence, the ladies, in their long muslin dresses, surrounded
by a troop of little negresses with frizzled hair and bare legs,
would come out upon the veranda and watch the passage of the
troops. They were often accompanied by old men with strongly-
marked faces, long white locks, and broad-brimmed hats, —
never by young men. All the men capable of bearing arms
had been carried off, willy-nilly, by the Government, to join in
the general defence.
"So from point to point we moved along the river. The
gunboats went first and explored the country before us ; then
came the topographical officers, moving through the woods with
an escort of cavalry, reconnoitring the country, and sketching
by the eye and the compass provisional maps, which were
photographed at head-quarters for the use of the generals.
The next day, with the help of these maps, the army would
get into motion, mingled in masses with its immense team of
wagons. About one-fourth of each regiment was occupied in

AGE 35.] RESPECT FOR PRIVATE PROPERTY. 193
At White House the Pamunkey ceases to be
navigable. The York Eiver Eailroad, which runs
from Eiehmond to West Point, crosses the river
here by a bridge which the enemy had destroyed.
Some of the rails also had been removed from the
track, and the rolling stock had been carried off; but
the rails were soon relaid, and new cars and locomo
tives took the place of those that had been taken
away. A great depot was established at White
House, under the protection of the gunboats. The
army began its march to Eiehmond, following the
escorting the materiel of the corps, piled up — provisions, am
munition, tents, and furniture — on wagons, at the rate of ten
to a battalion. But for the absence of women, we might have
been taken for an armed emigration rather than for soldiers
on the march.
"On May 16, we reached White House, a fine building, once
the property of Washington, and now of his descendants, the
Lee family. The head of this family, General Lee, was one of
the chief officers of the Confederate Army ; one of his nephews
was in the Federal ranks. General McClellan, always careful
to insist upon respect for private property, stationed sentinels
around the residence of the hostile general, forbade any one to
enter it, and would not enter it himself. He planted his tent
in a neighboring meadow. This respect for Southern property
has been made a reproach to the general in Congress: the
opinion of the army did not take this direction; it endorsed
the delicate feeling of its leader. This feeling was pushed so
far that when a general's servants found one day, in an aban
doned house, a basket of champagne, the general sent it back
again conspicuously the next by an aide-de-camp. We may
smile at this puritanical austerity, to which we are not accus
tomed in Europe. For my own part, I admit that I always ad
mired it." — PK1NCE DE JOINVILLE." 17

194 MERRIMAC DESTROYED. [1862.
line of the railroad, upon which it was dependent
for its daily supplies. On the 20th of May, our
advanced light troops reached the banks of Chick-
ahominy Eiver, about eight miles from Eiehmond.
Meanwhile, important events had been going on
in the Southern Confederacy. The abandonment
of Yorktown without waiting for an assault was
the result of a determination on the part- of the
Southern leaders to transfer the scene of struggle
and resistance from the Penimsula to the neighbor
hood of Eiehmond. The same policy which coun
selled a withdrawal from Yorktown required the
giving up of Norfolk; for General Huger and his
garrison of eighteen thousand men were wanted
elsewhere. Orders were, accordingly, given him
to evacuate the place, which he did early in May,
after destroying a large amount of public property;
and on the 10th of May Norfolk was taken pos
session of by our troops under General Wool.
But a more painful sacrifice yet was exacted at
the hands of the Confederates, — the sacrifice of the
Merrimac, which had done them such substantial
service, and of whose achievements they were so
justly proud. About four o'clock on the morning
of the 11th of May, a brilliant light was seen from
Fortress Monroe, in the direction of Craney Island;
and at half-past four an explosion was heard which
shook the earth far and wide. This was caused by
the blowing up of the Merrimac, which had been
abandoned by her officers and crew and set on fire.
The reasons for destroying her were simply these:
she was wholly unfitted for ocean navigation, and

Age 35.] CONFEDERATE POLICY. 195
must have gone down in the first storm she met;
and her draught of water was such that she could
not get far enough up the James Eiver to be out
of the reach of the Federal navy, to whieh the
river was now opened, and which at any cost would
have avenged upon the Merrimac the loss of the
Cumberland and Congress. She must either be
destroyed or fall into our hands. This now seems
obvious enough; but the sacrifice of the Merrimac —
the Yirginia, as they called her — was a bitter
draught for the Southern people to swallow. It
wounded them in their sectional pride, where the
Southern mind has always been so sensitive. Tho
newspapers were loud and general in lamenting and
denouncing it; and even the court of inquiry which
was summoned to investigate the subject reported
that her destruction was unnecessary at the timo
and place at which it was effected. But, for all
this, the sacrifice of the Merrimac was a necessary
result of the policy of defence which, after great
deliberation, was adopted; and that the policy was
sound, subsequent events have proved beyond a
doubt. It may be not without profit to pause here
a moment, and consider in what spirit and with
what measures the Confederate States prepared
themselves for the conflict before them.
The whole military resources of tho Confederates
at that time were under the control of three men,
President Davis, General Eobert E. Lee, and Gene
ral Joseph E. Johnston, — all of them trained soldiers,
and one of them also a trained statesman. There
was entire confidence and perfect harmony of ac-

196 SOUTHERN INSTITUTIONS. [1862.
tion between them. That fatal apple of discord,
the Presidency, never made any one of them the
rival of any other. They acted together for one
object; and that was success in the military con
test. They resolved to transfer the scene of deci
sive conflict from the Peninsula to the neighbor
hood of Eiehmond; and that this was a wise deter
mination is shown by a glance at the map. The
Peninsula has York Eiver on one side and James
Eiver on the other; these rivers must sooner or later
have been commanded by our gunboats, and then
their forces would have been turned and defeated.
The surrender of Norfolk was a source of mortifi
cation; but it was a judicious step. The garrison
was wanted at Eiehmond much more than at
Norfolk; and as the Confederates had no navy, and
their entire coast was or soon would be blockaded,
the possession of Norfolk, though it gratified their
pride, was of no substantial advantage to them.
The loss of the Merrimac was a more painful
sacrifice still: it was indeed a blow upon the naked
heart; but it was a judicious, nay, an inevitable,
step, and, as such, it was at last acquiesced in.
In the political contests which have ended in the
present civil war, it was often said by Northern
writers and speakers that the South was an olig
archy, and that though their political forms were
democratic their institutions were aristocratic. The
remark is, to some extent, true. In the Southern
States the mass of the people have always been con
tent to follow the lead of a comparatively few per
sons who have practised politics as a profession.

Age 35.] FORT DARLING. 197
This relation between the many and the few, what
ever objections may be urged to it in time of peace
is no disadvantange in the conduct of a war.
The Confederate Congress had passed in April a
very strong and sweeping conscription-law, which
included every able-bodied man between eighteen
and thirty-five, and it was everywhere enforced
by a powerful public sentiment : so that early in
June their army began to be steadily recruited from
this source. The work upon the defences around
Eiehmond, which had been planned some time be
fore, was prosecuted as rapidly as possible.
The destruction of the Merrimac opened the
James Eiver to our gunboats, but not until the
Confederates had had time to protect Eiehmond
against a naval attack. On the 15th of May, a
fleet of five of our gunboats, under Captain John
Eodgers, steamed up the James, running aground
several times, but meeting no artificial impediments
till they came to Ward's Bluff, about eight miles
from Eiehmond, where they encountered a heavy
battery, called Fort Darling, and two separate bar
riers, formed of piles, steamers, and sail-vessels.
The stream was here very narrow, being only twice
as wide as the Galena, the leading gunboat, was
long. The banks of the river were lined with
rifle-pits, from which sharpshooters annoyed the
men at the guns and rendered a removal of the
obstructions impossible. The battery was on a
bluff one hundred and fifty feet high, bristling with
guns of long range and heavy calibre, the shot
from which fell with crushing weight upon our
17*

198 THE MERRIMAC. [1862.
gallant little fleet. A rifled hundred-pound Parrott
gun on board one of the gunboats, the Naugatuck,
burst during the fight, and disabled the vessel.
The great height of the bluff put it out of the
range of many of our guns; and after a fight of
between three and four hours, in which officers and
men fully sustained the high character of the Ame
rican navy, Commodore Eodgers gave the signal
to discontinue the action.
One word more, in conclusion, upon the Merri
mac, or Virginia, and the lessons her career teaches.
Her first appearance upon the stage of the world
was on the 8th day of March, and the drama
closed with the flames of her funeral pyre on the
morning of the 11th of May; and certainly never
was there any mortal craft that within the short
space of two months played a more important part
or led a more eventful life. She was originally
a United States steam screw frigate of fifty guns,
and, being at Gosport when the rebellion broke out,
was, like many of her consorts, partly burned and
sunk when it became certain that Norfolk must fall
into the hands of the seceding State of Yirginia.
After a while the Confederates fished her up, and
it was found that the bottom of the hull, the boilers,
and the essential parts of the engine were little
injured. It was proposed to make this wreck the
nucleus of a casemated vessel with inclined iron-
plated sides and submerged ends. This ingenious
suggestion was carried out with skill and energy.
The peculiar feature of the Merrimac was that her
ends and the eaves of her casemate were sub-

Age 35.] THE MERRIMAC. 199
merged. The inclined roof, covered with railroad-
iron, was pierced with port-holes for ten guns of
very heavy calibre. The inclination of her plates,
and their thickness and form, were determined by
actual experiment. Her bow was armed with a
strong projecting prow or beak of steel. When
completed, she looked something like the roof of
a house floating upon the water.
On the morning of the 8th of March, this strange,
uncouth fabric is seen paddling along the calm
waters of Hampton Eoads, like some huge animal
of the turtle-kind, making not more than five knots
an hour. There the Cumberland and the Congress,
two old-fashioned wooden frigates, were lying at
anchor; and not far from them were the Minne
sota and Eoanoke, screw frigates, and the St. Law
rence, an old sailing-frigate. The Merrimac crawls
by the Congress, delivering a broadside as she
passes, and makes straight for the Cumberland.
The sailors on board the latter vessel greet her
with jokes and laughter; but the officers note with
surprise and uneasiness that the shot oftheir heaviest
broadsides rattle off the roof of the ominous craft
like so many India-rubber balls, without making
the slightest impression upon her iron ribs. In a
few moments she crashes into the Cumberland,
head on, drives her projecting prow into the star
board bow below the water-line, and knocks a
hole in her side as big as a hogshead. The gallant
frigate reels and shivers in every limb under the
death-stroke, settles by the head, and begins at
once to sink, carrying with her two hundred of her

200 THE MERRIMAC. [1S62.
dauntless crew, before they had fairly recovered
from the surprise of the portentous shock.
The Merrimac next approaches the Congress;
but she has probably broken or displaced her prow
in running into the Cumberland, and she attacks the
Congress, therefore, by shot and shells. But before
her tremendous armament the Congress proves as
powerless as was the Cumberland before her beak.
Her colors are hauled down; she is run ashore, and
set on fire by the Merrimac's battery.
Of the other three vessels which have been men
tioned, the Minnesota was the only one which
could have been of any service; and she, unfortu
nately, ran aground. The Merrimac, after firing
a few shots at her, deeming her a sure prey for the
next day, turns aside to shell the camp and batte
ries at Newport News, — but with very little effect.
In the night the gallant little Monitor arrives, — as
opportunely as one of Homer's gods coming down
from Olympus to share in a mortal fray, — attacks
the Merrimac the next morning, and, after a con
test resembling a fight between a swordfish and
a whale, drives away her gigantic adversary, baffled
and disabled, thus rendering us a service cheaply
estimated at her weight in gold.
On the 11th of April, the Merrimac again appears
in Hampton Eoads, attended by five small vessels.
As soon as she is discerned, a large fleet of trans
ports and sailing-vessels in the upper roads scuds
away to a place of safety, like a flock of "tame
villatic fowl" that seeks a sheltering covert when
the hawk is seen in the air. Aided by her at-

Age 35.] THE MERRIMAC. 201
tendant spirits, she captures three sailing-vessels
under the eye of our own fleet, among which was
the Monitor herself. After this, the Merrimac
slowly moves to and fro across the mouth of
Elizabeth Eiver, seemingly inviting a champion to
come out and try conclusions with her; but her
defiance is not accepted, and she retires with her
prizes, unmolested. To make the sting of our mor
tification a little sharper, all this was done under
the bows of two foreign frigates, — one French and
one English.
Thus, the destruction of two frigates and the cap
ture of three small vessels make up the list of the
Merrimac's material triumphs and trophies; but
these were by no means all the services she ren
dered the Confederates, nor all the harm she did to
us. In the first place, she controlled the James
Eiver so long as she lived. This rendered it im
possible for us to make use of that river as the base
of our operations; and this was the best base for a
movement upon Eiehmond, and that one which, un
questionably, we should have adopted but for her
presence. And, in the second place, the necessity
of watching the Merrimac rendered it impossible to
detach from the squadron at Hampton Eoads a suit
able force to attack the enemy's water-batteries at
Yorktown and Gloucester; and this delayed the
army before the lines of Yorktown, and gave the
Confederates — what they so much wanted — time.
Thus the whole current ofthe Peninsular campaign
was turned aside, and the course of the war itself
materially influenced, by this single vessel. Never

202 THE MERRIMAC. [1862.
was there a greater apparent disproportion between
cause and effect.
And the lesson which the Merrimac teaches is,
that in war no chance should be thrown away, no
advantage should be foregone; that counsel never
should be taken of distrust and despondency; that
the game of war is never wholly lost and never
wholly won, and that in desperate straits there is
nothing that ingenuity can suggest which is not
worth trying. A sudden and unexpected charge
by Kellermann, at the head of eight hundred cav
alry, turned the adverse tide of battle at Marengo
into a victory. The little fort of Bard, in the
valley of Aosta, a few weeks earlier, checked,
and, had not the garrison been over-confident and
under-vigilant, would have turned back, the whole
French army.* And the Merrimac may have
saved the city of Eiehmond from capture.
It is curious to reflect, after all the inventions by
which the force and destructiveness of projectiles
have been increased, that in the Merrimac we came
back to the point from which naval architecture,
as applied to war, started. The Merrimac's beak
was nothing more nor less than the rostrum of a
Eoman galley, enlarged and strengthened.
During the march from Yorktown to the banks
of the Chickahominy, besides the weighty cares and
heavy responsibilities of a commanding general at
the head of a great expedition, the mind of General
* See the account in Alison's "History of the French Revo
lution," chap, xxx,

Age 35.] MORE MEN NEEDED. 203
McClellan was constantly burdened with a convic
tion that his troops were not numerous enough for
the work in hand, and that reinforcements were
essential to success. He had carried with him to
the Peninsula about eighty-five thousand men, and
Franklin's division, which had subsequently joined
him, amounted to ten thousand more; but some of
his troops had been killed or disabled in battle,
some had died from disease, and garrisons had been
left at Yorktown, Williamsburg, and Gloucester, so
that now he could not confidently rely upon more
than eighty thousand men. But time, which was
thinning his ranks, was swelling those of the enemy;
and the task before him was that of taking a city
strongly defended, before which was an army larger
than his own. On the 10th of May, from a camp
three miles from Williamsburg, he sent a brief tele
gram to the Secretary of War, setting forth his
position, and urging the necessity of reinforcing
him without delay with all the disposable troops in
Eastern Virginia. He assures the Secretary that
the rebels will not abandon Eiehmond without a
Btruggle, and adds that unless he is reinforced it is
probable he shall be obliged to fight nearly double
his numbers, strongly intrenched.
On the 14th of May, he sent a telegram to the
President in the same strain, stating that the time
had come for striking a fatal blow at the enemies
of the Constitution, and entreating him that he
would cause the Army of the Peninsula to be rein
forced without delay by all the disposable troops of
the Government. To this, on the 18th, an answer

204 LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY OF WAR. [1862.
was received from the Secretary of War, the mate
rial portions of which are as follows : —
"The President is not willing to uncover the capital
entirely ; and it is believed that, even if this were prudent,
it would require more time to effect a junction between
your army and that of the Rappahannock, by the way of
the Potomac and York Rivers, than by a land march. In
order, therefore, to increase the strength of the attack
upon Richmond at the earliest moment, General McDowell
has been ordered to march upon that city by the shortest
route. He is ordered, keeping himself always in position
to save the capital from all possible attack, so to operate
as to put his left wing in communication with your right
wing ; and you are instructed to co-operate so as to esta
blish this communication as soon as possible, by extending
your right wing to the north of Richmond.
*****
" When General McDowell is in position on your right,
his supplies must be drawn from West Point; and you
will instruct your staff officers to be prepared to supply
him by that route.
"The President desires that General McDowell retain
the command of the Department of the Rappahannock,
and of the forces with which he moves forward."
It will be borne in mind that General McClellan
wished and had advised that reinforcements should
be sent to him by water, as their arrival would have
been more certain. Now that the James Eiver was
open, they might have been sent by that route, in
which event our left flank would have rested upon
that river and been protected by it. Eiehmond
could have been approached by the James, and we
should have escaped the losses and delays incurred

Age 35.] INSTRUCTIONS TO GENERAL MCDOWELL. 205
by bridging the Chickahominy, and should have
had the army massed in one body instead of being
necessarily divided by that stream. This judicious
military plan, which in all probability would have
resulted in the capture of Eiehmond, could not be
carried out, because to the President's distempered
fancy Washington was not safe unless it was
covered by McDowell's division in a direct line
between that city and Eiehmond. Under the cir
cumstances of the case, an attack upon Washington
by a Confederate force strong enough to carry its
defences was about as probable an event as an inun
dation of the city by an overflow of the Potomac.
By these orders it will be also noticed that General
McClellan was commanded to extend his right wing
to the north of Eiehmond, in order to establish
the communication between himself and General
McDowell. This was running a great risk in case
General McDowell should not come, because it ex
posed our right in a way that no prudent officer
would have done; and, as General McDowell did
not come, the enemy did not fail to take advantage
of the opportunity thus afforded them.
The Secretary's communication of the 18th was
accompanied by a copy of the instructions which
had been sent to General McDowell on the previous
day, of which the following is the substance : —

"War Department,
Washington, May 17, 1862.

}

"General: — Upon being joined by General Shields's
division, you will move upon Richmond by the general
route of the Richmond & Fredericksburg Railroad, co-ope-
18

206 INSTRUCTIONS TO GENERAL McDOWELL. [1S62.
rating with the forces under General McClellan, now
threatening Richmond from the line of the Pamunkey
and York Rivers.
"While seeking to establish as soon as possible a com
munication between your left wing and the right wing of
General McClellan, you will hold yourself always in such
position as to cover the capital of the nation against a
sudden dash of any large body of the rebel forces."
General McDowell had with him forty thousand
men and ninety pieces of artillery.
On the 21st of May, General McClellan sent
another despatch, of some length, to the President.
He explains to him the position of the army, and
earnestly and respectfully expresses his regret at
the delay of McDowell's advance. He tells the
President frankly that the march of McDowell's
column upon Eiehmond by the shortest land route
will uncover Washington as completely as its move
ment by water; that the enemy cannot advance by
Fredericksburg, and that if they attempt a move
ment, which to him seems utterly improbable, their
route would be by Gordonsville and Manassas. In
conclusion, he desires that the extent of his author
ity over General McDowell may be clearly defined,
and suggests that the dangers of a divided command
can only be surely guarded against by explicitly
placing General McDowell under his orders in the
usual way.
On the 24th he received from the President a
reply to the above, in which he suggests a plan of
military movement against General Anderson in
concert with General McDowell, assures him that

AGE 35.] GENERAL MCDOWELL WITHDRAWN. 207
McDowell's division, strengthened by Shields's com
mand, would begin to move on Monday, the 26th,
and tells him that McDowell, after joining him,
would be under his command.
This, of course, was highly satisfactory, as it gave
General McClellan assurance that he would soon be
reinforced by at least fifty thousand men, and thus
be made sufficiently strong to overpower the large
army confronting him. But his astonishment, his
agony of disappointment, may well be imagined
when all these confident expectations were broken
to pieces by the crushing despatch received at a
later hour of the same day, which ran thus : —
"May 24, 1862, 1
From Washington, 4 p.m. j
"In consequence of General Banks's critical position, I
have been compelled to suspend General McDowell's
movements to join you. The enemy are making a des
perate push upon Harper's Ferry ; and we are trying to
throw General Fremont's force, and part of General
McDowell's, in their rear. "A. Lincoln, President.
"Major-General Geo. B. McClellan."
It is necessary to go back a little and state the
events which occasioned this last despatch.
It wiy be remembered that the State of Virginia,
contrary to sound military maxims, and certainly
for reasons other than military, ifrad been parcelled
out into five separate commands. General Fremont
was west of the mountains, General Banks was in
the Valley of the Shenandoah, General McDowell

208 JACKSON'S MOVEMENTS. [1862.
was on the Eappahannock, and General Wool was
at Fortress Monroe. During the preceding autumn
and winter the Confederate General Jackson had
been at or near Winchester with a body of raw
troops, which he had been engaged in drilling and
disciplining. The campaign opened in the valley
early in March. On the 23d of that month a battle
was fought near Winchester between General Shields
and General Jackson, in which the latter was de
feated. This battle, by revealing the presence of a
considerable force ofthe enemy in that region, was
probably the reason why McDowell's corps was not
sent to the Peninsula with McClellan. After the
battle of Winchester, Jackson had retreated up the
valley to Harrisonburg, and then struck off to the
west. On the 8th of May, he fought a battle of not
very decisive results with the Federal forces under
Milroy and Schenck, at a place called McDowell,
near Bull Pasture Mountain. From this point he
marched to Harrisonburg, thence to New Market,
where a junction was effected with Ewell's division,
whieh had come from Elk Eun Valley. Their
united forces amounted to at least fifteen thousand
men. About the middle of May, an order was issued
from the War Department at Washington for
General Shields to move with his command from
the Valley of the Shenandoah and join General
McDowell at Fredericksburg. This left General
Banks with only five or six thousand men at Stras
burg. The Government was warned of the danger
of leaving him with so small a force when so active

Age 35.] GENERAL BANKS. 209
and vigilant an officer as Jackson was in the valley;
but it was all to no purpose. It is a mistake to sup
pose that General Jackson had been planning and
executing movements ofhis own, and upon his own
responsibility, all this time : he had been under the
control of the commander-in-chief at Eiehmond,
and all his marches and battles had reference to
one sole object, — the defence of that city. The Con
federate authorities knew how important it was for
General McClellan that he should be reinforced by
General McDowell, and they also knew that it was
an apprehension for the safety of Washington that
had thus far prevented the junction ; and they, of
course, reasoned that by keeping up and increasing
this alarm they might postpone indefinitely a com
bination of forces which would be fatal to them.
The time had come, now that General Banks was
left so exposed, when a decisive blow might be struck
towards the end; and the opportunity was not
neglected. After the battle at McDowell, General Jackson
had contrived to conceal his movements from the
observation of our forces. General Banks, as has
been said, was at Strasburg. At Front Eoyal,
twelve miles in advance, Colonel Kenley was sta
tioned, with a Maryland regiment and a few com
panies, — about twelve hundred in all, rank and file.
On Friday, the 23d, at noon, this little handful of
men was suddenly and unexpectedly assailed by
General Jackson at the head of a force at least
ten times as large as its own. Though taken by
surprise, and with such immense odds against him,
is*

210 RETREAT OF GENERAL BANKS. [1882.
Colonel Kenley and his men fought gallantly and
obstinately for three or four hours, and thus re
tarded the Confederate advance; but they were at
last overpowered by superior numbers, and nearly
all cut to pieces or taken prisoners.
The startling news reached General Banks at
nightfall, and, after a little reflection, he determined
to move upon Winchester as rapidly as possible.
Accordingly, at a very early hour the next morning
he began his march. His column was attacked in
flank while on the way, and a portion of the rear
guard turned back to Strasburg. At four o'clock
in the afternoon the advance-guard arrived at Win
chester. The whole force General Banks had with
him was less than five thousand men, while that
of the enemy was fifteen thousand at least. At
Winchester General Banks determined to try the
strength of the Confederates by actual collision;
and preparations were made accordingly during
the night. The engagement began early the next
morning, and held the enemy in check for five
hours. Our soldiers fought well, and were well
handled; but it was in vain to contend against such
odds, and orders were given to withdraw. The
pursuit by the enemy was prompt and vigorous,
and the retreat rapid and without serious loss. A
halt of two hours and a half was made at Martins
burg; and the rear-guard finally reached the Po
tomac at sunset on the 25th. This was forty-eight
hours after the first news of the attack on Front
Eoyal. It was a march of fifty -three miles, thirty-
five of which were performed in one day. The

Age 35.] RETREAT OF GENERAL BANKS. 211
river was crossed the next day; "and," says Gene
ral Banks, in his official report, " there never were
more grateful hearts in the same number of men
than when, at mid-day on the 26th, we stood on
the opposite shore."
General Banks throughout these two disastrous
days behaved with energy and self-possession; and
there is nothing disparaging to his military repu
tation in the fact that he retreated, because he
did it in good order against a force three or four
times as great as his own, saving all his guns,
and losing only fifty-five wagons out of five hun
dred. On the part of the enemy it must be admitted
that this expedition, as a move upon the great
chess-board of war, demands the highest praise.
It was admirably planned and skilfully and suc
cessfully executed. The loss of men on our side
was not great; that of army and medical stores
was more considerable; but the indirect, the moral,
advantages it secured to the enemy were of infi
nitely greater moment. To drive General Banks
from Strasburg across the Potomac was in itself a
play not worth the candle; but the real object of
the expedition was to prevent General McDowell's
division from being sent to reinforce General Mc
Clellan ; and it unfortunately succeeded.
When news of the attack on Colonel Konley's
command at Front Eoyal, on the 23d, reached
General Geary, who was at Eeetortown with a
force charged with the protection of the Manassas
Gap Eailroad, he immediately began to move to

212 ALARM AT WASHINGTON. [1862.
Manassas Junction. His troops, alarmed by exag
gerated reports of the fate of the regiment at
Front Eoyal, burnt their tents and destroyed a
quantity of arms. The contagion of panic spread
to Catlett's Station, where was General Duryea
with four regiments. He hastened to Centreville,
and telegraphed to Washington for help. The
rumors were swelled and magnified on their way
to the capital: the authorities there were thrown
into a most unnecessary fright, and telegraphic de
spatches, pale with the hue of fear, were sent on
the wings of lightning all over the land. Of these
the following is a specimen : —
"Washington, May 25, 1862.
"To ihe Governor of Massachusetts.
" Intelligence from various quarters leaves no doubt that
the enemy, in great force, are marching on Washington.
You will please organize and forward immediately all the
militia and volunteer force in your State.
" Edwin M. Stanton,
"Secretary of War."
It was under the influence of the apprehensions
occasioned by the report of General Jackson's
movements that the President had telegraphed to
General McClellan, on the 24th of May, as we have
before stated, that General McDowell's division
would not join him. On the same day, an order
was sent by the President to General McDowell,
directing him to lay aside at present the move
ment on Eiehmond, and put twenty thousand men
in motion at once for the Shenandoah, in order to

Age 35.] GENERAL MCDOWELL. 213
capture tho force of Jackson and Ewell, either
in co-operation with General Fremont, or alone.
General McDowell's clear military judgment saw
at once the injudiciousness of this order, which
turned him from a point where he was greatly
needed to a quarter where he could be of no use;
and he instantly telegraphed back to the Presi
dent's order the following reply, addressed to the
Secretary of War : —
"The President's order has been received, and is in
process of execution. This is a crushing blow to us."
To this the President responded as follows, still
on the same 24th of May : —
" I am highly gratified by your alacrity in obeying my
orders. The change was as painful to me as it can pos
sibly be to you or to any one. Every thing now depends
upon the celerity and vigor of your movements."
To this General McDowell made a reply in writ
ing, of which the principal and material portion is
as follows : —
"Head-Quarters, Department op the Rappahannock, )
" Opposite Fredericksburg, May 24, 1862. J
" His Excellency the President : —
" I obeyed your order immediately, for it was positive
and urgent ; and perhaps, as a subordinate, there I ought
to stop ; but I trust I may be allowed to say something in
relation to the subject, especially in view of your remark
that every thing depends upon the celerity and vigor of
my movements. I beg to say that co-operation between
General Fremont and myself, to cut off Jackson and
Ewell, is not to be counted upon, even if it is not a prac-

214 GENERAL M°DOWELL. [1S62.
tical impossibility; next, that I am entirely beyond
helping-distance of General Banks, and no celerity or
vigor will be available as far as he is concerned ; next,
that by a glance at the map it will be seen that the line
of retreat of the enemy's forces up the valley is shorter
than mine to go against him. It will take a week or ten
days for the force to get to the valley by the route which
will give it food and forage, and by that time the enemy
will have retreated. I shall gain nothing for you there,
and lose much for you here. It is, therefore, not only
on personal grounds that I have a heavy heart in the
matter, but I feel that it throws us all back, and from
Richmond north we shall have all our large mass para
lyzed, and shall have to repeat what we have just accom
plished." It will be observed that on the 24th of May the
President directed General McDowell to march to
the Shenandoah, to cut off the retreating division
of Jackson, and that on the next day the Secre
tary of War telegraphed the Governor of Massa
chusetts that the " enemy, in great force," meaning
of course Jackson's command, were marchine: on
I o
Washington. This difference of opinion between
two high functionaries as to an enemy's move
ments is rather a curious fact, and only to be ex
plained on the ground that they were acting inde
pendently and without consultation or conference.
What generous mind will refuse to sympathize
with General McDowell's suffering and sadness
of spirit in obeying an order which he perceives
to be most unwise at the very moment he prepares
to execute it !
The silent and incommunicative Jackson — a man

Age 35.] JACKSON'S MOVEMENTS. 215
who never let his left hand know what his right
hand was doing, who rarely spoke and rarely
smiled — would have been amused if he had known
into what a fright he had thrown the authorities at
Washington and no small portion of the Northern
people. He had no more idea of going to Wash
ington than of going to Boston : such a diversion
of his force would have been an act of madness.
Having done all that he desired and proposed to
do, his next thought was to get back again ; and he
accordingly began his retreat up the Valley of the
Shenandoah, which he conducted bravely and skil
fully. He had a great advantage in his perfect
knowledge of the country he was traversing. He
contrived to slip through the Federal forces which
were pressing upon him from the west and the
east. On the 8th of June, he fought a battle with
General Fremont, at Cross Keys, on the left bank
of the Shenandoah, by which he secured the pass
age of his army over the bridge at Port Eepublic,
a few miles distant, and the next day engaged a
portion of General Shields's command near the
latter place. After a hard fight, our forces fell
back, and General Jackson continued his retreat,
to secure which had been his object in both en
gagements. Thus ended General Jackson's memorable cam
paign in the Valley of the Shenandoah, which had
begun on the 11th of March, in which that officer
gave evidence of the highest military qualities —
vigor, celerity, skill in masking his designs from
the enemy, and ability in handling his men — and

216 GENERAL MCCLELLAN AT RICHMOND. [1862.
fully vindicated his title to the enthusiastic admi
ration with which he was regarded by his people
during the remainder of his brief career.
It may be added that, had all the military threads
that united at Eiehmond been held in the hand of
General McClellan, as they should have been, he
would never have left General Banks exposed with
so small a command at an indefensible point. That
this statement is not matter of opinion merely may
be seen by a careful reading of General McClellan's
instructions to General Banks of March 16, to Gene
ral Wadsworth of the same date, and his letter of
April 1 to the Adjutant-General, — all which appear
in full in his Eeport.
We now return to Eiehmond, where we left Gene
ral McClellan with the President's second despatch
fallen like a stone upon his heart. It was already
certain that General McDowell's movements to join
him were suspended, and for an indefinite period;
and there was nothing for him to do but to address
himself to the work before him with such means as
he could command, and doubtless with a sadness
of spirit like that of the Eoman gladiators when
they saluted the emperor, "Morituri te salutamus."
The disposition of our forces around Eiehmond
was controlled by two elements, one artificial and
one natural, — the former being the Eiehmond &
York Eiver Eailroad, and the latter the Chickaho-
miny Eiver. The railroad ran in a direction nearly
easterly from Eiehmond to White House, at which
latter place was our depot of supplies. It is diffi
cult for a civilian to form an adequate notion of

Age 35.] CHICKAHOMINY RIVER. 217
the immense amount of these supplies which must
be furnished every day for the support of an army
of seventy thousand men, including forage for
horses, cavalry and artillery. The communication
between such an army and its base of supplies cannot
be for a moment interrupted or even endangered.
It was therefore a point of paramount importance
to guard this railroad from flank movements on
both sides. The Chickahominy Eiver flows in a
southeasterly direction, and is crossed both by the
Eiehmond & York Eiver Eailroad and the Vir
ginia Central Eailroad, which runs northerly, — the
river and the portions of the two railroads south
of it forming an isosceles triangle, with the apex
towards the east. Place the right hand on a table
with the palm down, the fingers close together,
and the thumb stretched back as far as possible ;
let the thumb represent the course of the Virginia
Central Eoad, and the forefinger that of the Eieh
mond & York. Eiehmond will then be in the hollow
at the bottom of the thumb, and a line drawn from
the ball of the thumb to the first joint of the fore
finger will indicate the course of the Chickahominy
In order to keep the railroad entirely secure,
the course of the river made it necessary to divide
our forces and place part of them on one side of
the stream and part on the other. This is not
usually deemed a prudent disposition of an army;
but there was an imperative necessity for it in
this case. Besides, General McClellan had been
directed to extend his right wing so as to form a
junction with General McDowell; and the order for
19

218 DESPATCHES FROM THE PRESIDENT. [1862.
his co-operation being simply suspended, not re
voked, General McClellan was not at liberty to
abandon the northern approach.
On the 25th of May he received a telegraphic de
spatch from the President, at considerable length,
detailing the enemy's movements as far as they were
known up to its date, stating that twenty thousand
of McDowell's forces were moving back to Front
Eoyal, that one more of his brigades was ordered
to Harper's Ferry through Washington, and that
the rest of his forces were to remain for the pre
sent at Fredericksburg, adding that if McDowell's
force was beyond their reach they (in Washington)
should be entirely helpless. At a later hour on the
same day, the President sent him another despatch,
indicating apprehensions for tho safety of Washing
ton, saying, "I think the time is near when you
must either attack Eiehmond or give up the job
and come to the defence of Washington."*
* Upon the President's first despatch of May 25, in which
he says that apprehensions for the safety of Washington, and
nothing else, prevented McDowell's being sent to the Penin
sula, Colonel Lecomte remarks, "We have full faith in the
sincerity of the frank and honest language of the President;
but the Report" (that of the Congressional Committee, which
quotes a part of the President's despatch) "perverts entirely
the facts relative to Jackson's campaign, and the insane terror
it inspired in Washington, which was the true cause of the
failure on the Peninsula. On quitting Washington, before
having been deprived of a part of his command, General Mc
Clellan had given the most exact and judicious instructions for
the defence of the capital. He had pointed out Manassas and
Front Royal as points forming a good advanced line, and had

Age 35.] MOVEMENTS NEAR RICHMOND. 219
On the 26th of May, news came that a consider
able force of the enemy was in the neighborhood

ordered Banks to intrench himself there. He had distinctly
forbidden him to advance farther into Virginia. But as soon
as General McClellan's back was turned, they wished to make
Banks a rival of him, and, supposing that the Army of the
Potomac would attract all the force of the enemy, it was
thought that Banks might gather some cheap laurels if he
were sent into the upper Valley of the Shenandoah. The Aulio
Council at Washington thought they might in this way strike a
master-stroke, and cause Richmond to fall before McClellan
had time to appear before it. If the Confederates had not been
in so much hurry, if they had let Banks advance farther,
this brave general would have run great risk of being captured
with all his force. Banks having miraculously escaped, it was
enough to hold Harper's Ferry strongly on one side, and Centre
ville on the other, to cover Washington. Jackson might have
moved between Warrenton Junction and Winchester; he might
have pushed cavalry detachments into Western Maryland; but
he could have attempted no serious enterprise.
"Instead of this, it was thought that a good trick might be
played upon Jackson, and that he might be 'bagged,' to use
an American expression. To form a notion of this plan of
the campaign, manufactured at Washington, and the confu
sion which attended its execution, one should read the series of
telegrams by which the President informs General McClellan of
the progress of this wise manoeuvre. Generals McDowell, Banks,
Sigel, and Fremont, each coming from his own position, and
all preserving their independent commands, arrived one after
another, to be beaten in detail, or to let Jackson escape before
their eyes without a, fight. But the most unfortunate result
was that the corps of McDowell, divided, weakened by forced
marches, and transported to another theatre of war, could not
take the part which had been assigned to it. For the second
time, and definitively, it was detained far from the army of

220 HANOVER COURT-HOUSE. [1862.
of Hanover Court-House, to the right and rear of
our army, and thus threatening our communica
tions; and General Fitz-John Porter's division was
ordered to march the next morning at daybreak
to dislodge them. They set off in a heavy storm,
came up with the enemy in the course of the day,
attacked and defeated him, and took and destroyed
his camp at Hanover Court-House. The bridges
of the Virginia Central Eailroad and the Frede-
General McClellan, to which for the second time it thus caused
great mischief, as a few brief explanations will show.
"After the destruction of the Merrimac, and the taking of
Norfolk by the Federals, which opened the James River, Com
modore Goldsborough had proposed to General McClellan to take
the James River as a base of operations and have it flank his left
wing. This change of base, had it then been carried out, would
have made the attack upon Richmond easier, through the aid of
the gunboats. General McClellan abandoned this obvious ad
vantage, because he had been ordered to extend his right wing
towards McDowell, who was coming from Fredericksburg to
reinforce the army of the Peninsula as soon as it had reached
Richmond. General McClellan expected General McDowell
by the railroad from Fredericksburg to Richmond, and had
already sent troops in that direction to effect a junction, —
when, instead of this reinforcement, he received a telegraphic
order to burn the railroad-bridges over the branches of the
Pamunkey, and thus to render all communication with Mc
Dowell impossible, the latter's outposts having been at that
time but twenty-one miles distant from those of McClellan.
But this was the period of Banks's defeat; and such was the
terror at Washington that they thought the whole Confederate
army was marching to the North and that the capital was to
be saved by destroying the bridges. The alarm was so great
that it was even proposed to General McClellan to re-embark.
his army and bring it within the lines of Alexandria."

Age 35.] GENERAL F. PORTER'S MOVEMENT. 221
ricksburg & Eiehmond Eailroad, both over the
South Ann, were destroyed, as well as a consider
able amount of Confederate property at Hanover
Court-House and Ashland. General McClellan was
much gratified at the way in which this brilliant
movement was executed by General Porter, and he
deemed its results valuable, because it was thus ren
dered impossible for the enemy to communicate by
rail with Fredericksburg, or with Jackson except by
the very circuitous route of Lynchburg. More im
portant still, by the clearing of our right flank and
rear, the road was left entirely open for the advance
of McDowell, had he been permitted to join the
Army of the Potomac. His advanced guard was
at this time at Bowling Green, only about fifteen or
twenty miles distant from that of Porter : so near
did we come to seizing the golden opportunity
which Fortune never offers a second time ! Mc
Dowell's withdrawal towards Front Eoyal was, as
General McClellan observes in his Eeport, "a se
rious and fatal error." He was sent to a point
where he could do no good, and diverted from a
point where his presence was greatly needed and
could not have failed to secure important results.
As our army was massed on both sides of the
Chickahominy, it was necessary to maintain easy
communication between them; and this compelled
the building of several bridges, some of which
were new, and others were reconstructions of those
which the enemy had destroyed. Our troops were
very efficient in work of this kind, but they had
great difficulties to struggle against. The Chicka-
19*

222 RAINY WEATHER. [1862.
hominy in this region is a narrow and shallow
stream, fringed with a dense growth of heavy
forest-trees, and bordered by low marshy bottom
lands, varying from half a mile to a mile in width.
A heavy rain would swell the narrow rivulet into
a broad and shallow flood, and the work of days
would be swept away in a single night. When
the waters were low, a child might ford it; when
they were high, a horse and his rider might be
drowned in it. The labors of our engineers were
"Quench'd in a boggy syrtis, neither sea
Nor good dry land."
The elements, too, seemed to have conspired
against us. So rainy a season had never been
known within the memory of man: the pitiless
floods fell upon us without intermission. The petu
lant and rebel stream seemed to take a perverse
pleasure in breaking the fetters with which patriot
hands essayed to bind it. And then these rains
turned the wretched narrow roads of the Peninsula
into tracks of impassable and heart-breaking mire,
in which horses sank to their knees and wagons
stuck hopelessly fast *
* "Unfortunately, every thing dragged with us. The roads
were long in drying, the bridges were long in building. ' Never
have we seen so rainy a season,' said the oldest inhabitant.
'Never did we see bridges so difficult to build,' said the en
gineers. The abominable river laughed at all their efforts.
Too narrow for a bridge of boats, too deep and too muddy for
piers, here a simple brook some ten yards wide, flowing be
tween two plains of quicksand, in which the horses sank up to
the girths, and which offered no bearings, — there divided into a

Age 35.] BATTLE OF FAIR OAKS. 223
During all this time our troops were busily em
ployed, besides building bridges, in intrenching
themselves, throwing up redoubts, digging rifle-
pits, and felling timber in the line of the batteries.

THE BATTLE OF FAIR OAKS.
On the 30th of May, two corps were on the south
side of the Chickahominy, — that of Keyes, com
prising the divisions of Couch and Casey, and Heint
zelman' sr comprising those of Hooker and Kearney.
Casey's division, numbering about five thousand,
was at Fair Oaks, a station on the York Eiver
Eailroad. A redoubt and rifle-pit had been con
structed, and there was also an abatis in front
of them. Couch's division, about eight thousand
strong, was at Seven Pines, three-quarters of a
mile in the rear; while the two divisions of Heint-
zelman's corps, in all about sixteen thousand, were
still farther back. The right flank of Kearney was
on the railroad, and the left of Hooker on White
Oak Swamp.
During the day and night of May 30, there had
been a violent storm, with heavy torrents of rain.
thousand tiny rivulets spread over a surface of three hundred
yards, and traversing one of those wooded morasses which are
peculiar to tropical countries, — changing its level and its bed
from day to day, the river, in its capricious and uncertain
sway, annulled and undid to-day the labors of yesterday,
carried on under a burning sun and often under the fire of the
enemy. And so went by days upon days, — precious, irrecover
able days." — Prince be Joinville.

224 BATTLE OF FAIR OAKS. [1862.
The Confederates, presuming that a rapid rise in
the river would follow, resolved to seize the oppor
tunity, throw their whole force upon our left wing,
south of the Chickahominy, and cut it to pieces
before aid could come from the other side. They
supposed that they should have to deal with no other
troops than those of Keyes, not being aware of the
presence of Heintzelman's corps. Their disposi
tions were skilfully made. Longstreet and Hill,
with thirty-two thousand men, were to advance
along the Williamsburg road; Huger, with sixteen
thousand, was to move down the Charles City road,
which runs southeast from Eiehmond, to attack
our left flank; and Smith, with the same number,
was to march north, along the Nine-Mile road, so
as to turn our right flank and cover the Confede
rate left. Had these plans all been successfully
executed, we could hardly have escaped an over
whelming defeat.
The columns started at daybreak on the 31st,
and Hill, Longstreet, and Smith were in position to
begin the attack at eight o'clock; but Huger did
not appear at the appointed time and place. Hour
after hour rolled away, and brought no tidings of
him : his artillery had been immovably fixed in the
mud, and the passage of his troops arrested. At
noon, Hill and Longstreet resolved to make the
attack without waiting for him. Accordingly, at
about one o'clock they fell in overwhelming mass
upon Casey's division. Some of his troops, thus sud
denly assailed by greatly superior numbers, broke
and fled in disorder; but the larger part stood their

Age 35.] BATTLE OF FAIR OAKS. 225
ground manfully, and were nobly sustained by their
officers. But it was impossible to resist the force
that was hurled against them. Slowly, inch by
inch, they gave way; and it was not until after
three o'clock that they fell back through Couch's
line of battle to the rear, too much exhausted, and
their ranks too much thinned, to take further part
in the contest as a body.
At four o'clock we had lost nearly a mile of
ground, fifteen of our guns had been captured, and
the enemy were in possession of Casey's camp.
Couch's division was now assailed. His troops
stood firm, and the repeated assaults of the enemy
were steadily met, — our left being protected by the
impenetrable morasses of the White Oak Swamp.
Two of Heintzelman's brigades appeared on the field,
with the gallant Kearney at their head. The move
ments of the troops were now directed by General
McClellan in person. But a new element of danger
intervened. General Couch discovered large masses
of the enemy pushing towards our right and cross
ing the railroad, as well as a heavy column which
had been held in reserve and was now making its
way towards Fair Oaks Station. This was part of
Smith's division, which had come by the Nine-Mile
road to attack our right flank. General Couch at
once engaged this column with four regiments; but
he was overpowered, and the enemy pushed be
tween him and the main body ofhis division. Our
position was now critical; for, if the enemy had
succeeded in getting in our rear, we must have been

226 BATTLE OF FAIR OAKS. [1862.
defeated with great loss. "But," says the Prince
de Joinville, —
"But exactly at this moment (six o'clock p.m.), new
actors come upon the stage. Sumner, who has at last
passed the river with Sedgwick's division on the bridge
built by his troops, and who, with a soldier's instinct, has
marched straight to the cannon through the woods, sud
denly appears upon the flank of the hostile column
which is trying to cut off Heintzelman and Keyes. He
plants in a clearing a battery which he has succeeded in
bringing up. His guns are not rifled guns, the rage of
the hour, and fit only to be fired in cool blood, and at
long range in an open country: they are real fighting
guns, old twelve-pound howitzers carrying either a round
projectile, which ricochets and rolls, or a good dose of
grape. The simple and rapid fire of these pieces makes
terrible havoc in the hostile ranks. In vain Johnston
sends up his best troops against this battery, the flower
of South Carolina, including the Hampton Legion ; in
vain does he come upon the field in person : nothing
can shake the Federal ranks. When night falls, it was
the Federals who, bayonet in hand, and gallantly led by
Sumner himself, charged furiously upon the foe, and
drove him before them, with fearful slaughter, as far as
Fair Oaks Station."
Orders had been sent from head-quarters to Gene
ral Sumner, at two o'clock, to move his division
across the river. Two bridges had been built by
his men, one opposite General Sedgwick's division,
and one opposite General Eichardson's, — both cor
duroy bridges. But the latter was already destroyed
by the flood, and the former much injured. The
roads, too, were deep and muddy; and it was not

Age 35.] BATTLE OF FAIR OAKS. 227
until six o'clock, and after great exertions, that
General Sedgwick's division, with a single battery
(Kirby's), was able to reach the field- and exert a
favorable influence upon the fortunes of the day.
The opportune arrival of General Sumner was
not our only piece of good fortune; for about sun
set the Confederate commander-in-chief, General J.
E. Johnston, who had accompanied Smith's corps
and directed the enemy's movements since four or
five o'clock, was struck from his horse, severely
wounded, by the fragment of a shell. In conse
quence of this, utter confusion prevailed for a time
upon the Confederate left.
The next morning, at an early hour, the battle
was renewed, the enemy making an attack upon
General Eichardson's division, which had not taken
part in the engagement of the previous day, and
which was now posted in front. They met it firmly,
and returned with effect the enemy's fire, until
General Howard's brigade was ordered to the front,
when the enemy's line fell back. Other attacks, in
other parts of the field, were repulsed; and finally
our line advanced with the bayonet, and the enemy
retreated, having gained about half a mile of
ground in two days' fighting.
In these severely contested battles our loss was
five thousand seven hundred and thirty-seven, and
that of the enemy six thousand seven hundred and
eighty -three : we also lost ten pieces of artillery.*
* At the time the battle of Fair Oaks began, General Mc
Clellan was confined to his bed by illness. This fact does not

228 BATTLE OF FAIR OAKS. _ [1862.
The battle of Fair Oaks, or Seven Pines, as the
Confederates call it, has some points of resemblance
to that of Waterloo, and, like that, shows how much
military movements are controlled by fortune or
accident. At Waterloo, Bonaparte's attack upon
the British lines was delayed some hours by the
rain, and consequent state of the roads. At Fair
Oaks, the muddy roads held fast Huger's division,
and caused the assault to be postponed four or five
appear in his Report, but is stated by him in his evidence be
fore the Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War.
But that committee say in their Report (p. 22), speaking of the
second day's fight, "General McClellan was with the main
part of the army on the left bank of the Chickahominy. After
the fighting was over, he came across to the right bank of the
river." This statement is as untrue as it is unjust. General
McClellan, enfeebled as he was by illness, immediately got on
horseback when he heard the cannon which opened the battle
of the 31st, was employed during the remainder of the day in
receiving reports and giving orders, spent a portion of the
night in conferring with his officers, and early the next morning
went over to the right bank of the river, while the fight of June
1st was raging. Colonel Lecomte remarks upon the statement
of the committee, that it is " contradicted by many ocular wit
nesses, and, among others, by one of his aides who was with
him the whole day. General McClellan, says this officer,
though severely ill with dysentery, had passed the greater
part of the night in seeking his generals and conferring with
them. About half-past seven in the morning he left the head
quarters of General Sumner, and between eight and nine ar
rived at the place where the latter was engaged. The fight
was then at its height: we were in a clearing, and were
fighting along the edge of a wood, two hundred metres" (about
six hundred and fifty feet) "from the spot where the general
himself (Sumner) was directing the battle."

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Age 35.] THE SEVEN DAYS. 241
a slender tributary of the Chickahominy, which
runs nearly north and south. The front line was
composed of McCall's division : Seymour's brigade
held the left, and Eeynolds's the right. Meade's
brigade was in reserve. The left of the line was
covered by the river, the right by two brigades of
Morell's division, deployed for the purpose of pro
tecting that flank. The position had been carefully
prepared, and was materially strengthened by
" slashings" and rifle-pits. The creek in front,
bordered by beautiful catalpa-trees in flower, was
crossed by only two roads practicable for artillery.
It was to force these roads that the enemy made
especial efforts. Their attack began at three p.m.
along the whole line, and a determined attempt
was made at the same time to carry the upper
road. General Eeynolds succeeded in resisting
this attempt, and the enemy fell back for a while.
Our troops then had a breathing-space for a couple
of hours, — though the fire of the artillery and the
skirmishing did not cease. The passage of the
lower road was then attempted; but here also Gene
ral Seymour was successful. The action ceased as
the darkness gathered, and the enemy retired at
nine o'clock from the front of a position which it
had assailed in vain and with very heavy loss.
We had been successful at all points ; and the troops
that lay that night in front of Eiehmond will never
forget the enthusiasm that ran like wildfire through
our lines, from the heights of the upper Chicka
hominy to the lowlands of White Oak Swamp,
when the news of the success was brought to them,

242 THE SEVEN DAYS. [1862.
and, amid the ringing cheers of men, the bands,
long silent by command, filled the air with strains
of triumphant music.
In the course of the 26th, the rapid movement
of events, and especially the cloud of advancing
forces on our right, every moment growing darker
and moro menacing, determined General McClellan
to put into immediate execution that plan of trans
ferring his base of operations to the James Eiver
which he had been meditating for some days, and
in view of which he had already directed large
supplies of forage and provisions to be forwarded.
The task was one of no common difficulty. The
distance between the points of departure and des
tination was about seventeen miles. An army of
ninety thousand men, including cavalry and artil
lery, was to bo marched this distance ; and, what
was much more difficult, a boundless procession of
four thousand wagons, carrying supplies, must go
with it, a large siege-train must be transported, and
a herd of twenty-five hundred oxen must be driven.
For the wagons, the train, and the cattle there was
but one road available : luckily, it was in good con
dition. But it ran north and south, and between
it and Eiehmond there were several roads going
east and west, along which attacks might be ex
pected from an active and vigilant enemy. Gene
ral McClellan, in short, was attempting one of the
most difficult and dangerous enterprises in war, —
a flank movement in the face of a superior force.
But there was no help for it : it must be done.
Time was now an element of the greatest import-

Age 35.] THE SEVEN DAYS.

243

ance. The design was to be kept concealed from
the enemy till the latest possible moment, and every
instant of the precious interval was to be profitably
employed. Orders were immediately telegraphed
to Colonel Ingalls, quartermaster at the White
House, to run the cars till the last moment, filling
them with provisions and ammunition, to load
all his wagons with subsistence and send them to
Savage's Station, to forward as many supplies as
possible to James Eiver, and to destroy the rest.
These commands were all obeyed, and so promptly
and skilfully that nearly every thing was saved,
and only a comparatively small amount of stores
destroyed.* To begin auspiciously the contemplated move
ment, it was necessary to keep the enemy in check
on the left bank of the river as long as possible, to
give time for the removal of the siege-guns and
trains. The night following the 26th of June was
a busy one on the right of our army, and the work
of removal went on till after sunrise; but shortly
before daylight it was sufficiently advanced to per
mit the withdrawal of the troops from Beaver Dam
Creek. A new position was taken, in an arc of a
circle, covering the approaches to our bridges of
communication. The first line was composed of
the divisions of Morell and Sykes, the former on
* The Prince de Joinville says that a complete railway train,
locomotive, tender, and cars, which had been left on the rails,
was sent headlong over the broken bridge into the river.
Nothing was left for the enemy but three siege-guns; and
these were the only siege-guns he captured.

244 THE SEVEN DAYS. [1862.
the left, the latter on the right. The division of
McCall was posted in reserve, and fifteen companies
of cavalry under General Cooke were in rear of
the left. The battle-ground was a rolling country,
partly wooded and partly open, extending from the
descent to the Chickahominy on the left, and curv
ing around, in rear of Coal Harbor, towards the
river again. Our artillery was posted on the com
manding ground, and in the intervals between the
divisions and brigades; and the slope towards the
river, on our left, was also swept by the fire of four
batteries, one of them of siege-guns, on the right
bank of the river. General Stoneman's movable
column, comprising most of our cavalry and some
picked troops ofthe other arms, which had been cut
off by the rapid advance of Jackson, fell back on
White House, and rendered no assistance during the
battle. Our dispositions were completed about noon of
Friday, June 27, and shortly after that hour the
skirmishers of the enemy appeared, advancing
rapidly, and a general attack was made upon the
whole position. The engagement soon became ex
tremely severe, and General Porter asked for rein
forcements. At two p.m., Slocum's division of the
6th Corps was ordered to cross the river and sup
port him. By three p.m. the pressure of the supe
rior numbers of the enemy had become so heavy
that all the reserves had been moved forward, and
our line, thus strengthened, met and resisted re
peated and desperate attacks along the whole front.
General Slocum's division arrived at half-past three,

Age 35.] THE SEVEN DAYS. 245
and was distributed along the weaker portions of
our line. Our troops, including this division, num
bered about thirty-five thousand men; and it is be
lieved that they were attacked by from sixty to
seventy thousand of the enemy. Many of our men
were wearied by the fighting of the day before,
and most of them by having been under arms for
more than two days. The pressure of the superior
numbers of the enemy was very hard to bear ; but
it was borne manfully, and, time after time, on the
left and on the right, our troops repulsed the deter
mined attacks of the swarming Confederates, who
charged again and again up to their position.
Every effort of the enemy failed to break our lines
until about seven o'clock, when our left was forced,
and the whole position flanked by a furious attack
of fresh troops. The battle of Gaines's Mill was
lost. Our men fell back to the hill in the rear, over
looking the bridge. Two brigades from the 2d
Corps arrived most opportunely at this moment.
They cheeked and drove back the stragglers, and
advanced boldly to the front. Their cheers were
heard by the enemy; and the knowledge that fresh
troops had arrived, the terrible losses they had them
selves sustained, and the gathering darkness, pre
vented them from following up their advantage.
The battle was lost, and with it we lost about
nine thousand men and twenty guns; but the ob
ject for which it was fought had been attained.
The enemy was checked, and the needed time was
gained. Our siege-guns and material were saved,
and the right wing, under cover of the night, joined
21*

246 THE SEVEN DAYS. [1S62.
the main body of the army on the right bank of
the river. The rear-guard crossed at six o'clock
in the morning, destroying the bridge behind them.
Saturday, June 28, was for our army a day rather
of marching and working than of fighting. The
enemy were exhausted by the desperate fight of
tho previous day : they were also on the left bank
ofthe river, or at least the greater part of them were,
and the bridges were destroyed, so that they must
either build new bridges in order to cross the river,
or else fall back to the Mechanicsville bridge. Thus
a few precious hours were gained. In accordance
with orders given by General McClellan to his corps
commanders, assembled by him at his head-quar
ters on the evening of the 27th, the execution of
his plan for a flank movement to the James Eiver
was commenced at once, under his own direction.
General Keyes, with his 4th Corps and its artil
lery and baggage, crossed the White Oak Swamp
bridge, and seized strong positions on the opposite
side, to cover the passage of the other troops and
trains. General Heintzelman and General Sumner,
with the 3d and 2d Corps, remained in the works.
General Franklin, while withdrawing his command
from their position in the works, was attacked by
artillery -firing from three points, and an attempt
was made to carry a part of Lis line. The fighting
here was sharp for a little while, and extremely
damaging to the enemy, who speedily retired.
This was the only fighting of the day. Men were
busy loading the wagons with ammunition, provi
sions, and necessary baggage, and destroying all

Age 35.] THE SEVEN DAYS. 247
that could not be carried off. General Porter, with
the 5th Corps, began the passage of the White Oak
Swamp during the day.
On Sunday, the 29th, the troops ofthe 4th Corps
remained • in their position, covering the road
through the swamp, until relieved, as will be men
tioned, by the arrival of General Slocum ; and those
of the 5th Corps held their ground beyond the
swamp, covering the roads leading from Eiehmond
towards the line of retreat. McCall's division also
crossed the swamp, and took a proper position to
aid in covering the general movement.
Day broke darkly : clouds and fog hung very
low, and a thick mist added to the cheerlessness of
the morning. It was a sorry .sight to see the empty
embrasures, the deserted camps, filled but the night
before, and for so many previous days, with guns
and fighting-men. But the darkness of the morn
ing was good for troops that desired to steal a
march on the enemy, and its coolness was good for
men that were to fight.
Slocum's division of the 6th Corps marched
straight back to Savage's Station, where it was to
be posted as a reserve to the position to be taken
by the rear-guard ; but, on reaching the Station, it
received orders to cross the swamp and relieve the
corps of General Keyes. The rear-guard, composed
ofthe 2d and 3d Corps and Smith's division of the
6th Corps, moved from the works at daylight, and
marched about half-way to Savage's Station, halt-
inn: at Allen's farm, where a line was formed on
both sides of the railroad, towards Eiehmond.

24S THE SEVEN DAYS. [1802.
About nine o'clock the enemy made an attack with
infantry and artillery, and renewed the attempt
twice. The firing of both sides was sharp for a
while, but the assault was repulsed with ease by
the skirmish-line of Summer's corps, supported by
artillery, and our loss was very slight. A report
that the enemy had repaired the bridges, and
crossed the Chickahominy in the rear of our posi
tion at Allen's farm, was brought to General Sumner
at that place, and he at once fell back to Savage's
Station and united his command with Smith's divi
sion of the 6th Corps, which General Franklin, by
reason of the same report, had already moved
thither. The junction took place a little after
noon, and General Sumner assumed command of
the forces so united.
At Savage's Station a large field extended to the
left from the railroad, and the ground sloped stead
ily downwards towards Eiehmond. General Sum
ner formed his line in this field, at right angles to
the railroad. The rise in the ground gave our
troops an excellent view ofthe whole position, and
was favorable for the posting of artillery. Some
regiments were also placed on the right of our posi
tion, nearly parallel to the track, so as to watch the
apprehended approach of the enemy from the left
bank of the river. General Heintzelman, in seem
ing violation ofhis orders, withdrew from his posi
tion on the left before four o'clock, and marched to
the swamp, which he crossed at Brackett's Ford.
Thus the rear-guard was weakened by the loss of
nearly fifteen thousand men, and the situation of

Age 35.] THE SEVEN DAYS. 249
General Sumner appeared critical. His position,
however, was good, and the troops excellent. The
whole of the 2d Corps, said to be the only corps in
the army which has never to this day lost a gun
or a color, was there, with one division of Franklin's
corps. About four o'clock the enemy commenced
his attack in large force by the Williamsburg road,
which here runs nearly parallel to the railroad.
The enemy's left was supported by their boasted
iron-clad railroad battery, mounted, according to
their newspapers, with a rifled thirty-two. The
attack was gallantly met. General Burns, com
manding the front line, rendered special service.
The reserves were successively sent forward, and
the action continued with great obstinacy till after
eight in the evening, when the enemy were driven
from the field and into the woods beyond, where
our deployed companies, which were speedily
thrown forward, found the ground thickly strewn
with the bodies of the sufferers. The position we
had gained in this brilliant and picturesque engage
ment was held till the road in the rear was cleared;
and during the ensuing hours of darkness, all the
troops crossed the White Oak Swamp bridge, and
Sumner's last brigade, commanded by General
French, destroyed the bridge at six o'clock in the
morning. During the same night, the 4th Corps, followed
by the 5th, was moving towards the river, and on
the morning of Monday, June 30, General»Keyes
had arrived there in safety. He took up a position
below Turkey Creek bridge, with his left -resting

250 THE SEVEN DAYS. [1862.
on the river. General Porter posted the 5th Corps
so -as to prolong Keyes's line to the right and
cover the Charles City road to Eiehmond. Gene
ral Franklin, with his own corps, Eichardson's
division of the 2d Corps, and Naglee's brigade,
held the passage of White Oak Swamp. The posi
tion of the remaining troops was changed at times
during the day ; but it is enough to say that they
were so disposed as to hold the ground in front of
the road connecting Franklin's position with Por
ter's right, so as to cover the movement of the
trains in the rear. General McClellan occupied
himself in examining the whole line, rectifying the
position of the troops, and expediting the passage
ofthe trains.
The fierce battle fought on Monday, June 30, is
known by the name of the battle of Glendale, or
Nelson's Farm. It is a little difficult to be under
stood, for two reasons. In the first place, the troops
of tbe 2d and 3d Corps were so divided that the
army may be said on that day to have been without
its corps organization, and to have been an army of
divisions, and those divisions, in several instances,
were separated from their usual connection. In the
second place, though the sharpest fighting was in
or near Glendale, yet there was fighting along a line
of about five miles, extending from White Oak
Swamp to Malvern Hill, and lasting from noon till
after dark.
The first attack was made on Franklin's posi
tion, which was assailed by a concentrated fire of
artillery. A veiy fierce and obstinate artillery-

Age 35.] THE SEVEN DAYS. 251
combat took place here, and there was also some
infantry-fighting. Our men suffered severely; but
repeated attempts of the enemy to cross the swamp
were unsuccessful, and General Franklin held the
position till after dark.
Some two hours after the attack just mentioned
was commenced, a strong column moved down the
Charles City road, near which, on its right, Gene
ral Slocum was posted. General Kearney's divi
sion of the 3d Corps connected with General Slo
cum's left. General McCall, with the Pennsylva
nia Eeserves, prolonged our line to the left, cross
ing the New Market road, and General Hooker's
division of the 3d Corps was on the left of McCall.
General Sumner, with Sedgwick's division in re
serve, was in rear of McCall, on the Quaker road.
The first attempt of the enemy was made on Slo
cum's left; but it was cheeked by his artillery,
and abandoned. Then, passing to their right, the
enemy made a fierce onslaught on General McCall.
His division speedily gave way, with loss of gene
ral officers and guns, and the enemy pressed on
so vigorously that their musketry proved fatal on
the Quaker road. The centre of our army was
nearly pierced, the main road of communication al
most in the enemy's power. At this critical moment
Sumner hurried to the front some regiments of
Sedgwick's division, just returned at the double
quick from White Oak Swamp, to which they had
been marched in order to support Franklin. A gal
lant advance was made; Sumner's artillery opened
sharply. The advance of the enemy was checked,

252 THE SEVEN DAYS. [1862.
some ground was regained, and some guns were re
taken. Hooker, moving to his right, aided in the
repulse. The gap caused by the giving way of Mc-
Call's command was speedily closed, and our line
of retreat was once more securely held. Another
effort was made by the enemy on Kearney's left;
but this also was repulsed, with heavy loss. The
enemy's attack thus failed at all points; but our
success was costly. We lost heavily in killed and
wounded, and in guns. All, or nearly all, of Mc-
Call's guns were left in the hands of the enemy.
On the same day, at about five p.m., an attack
was made on General Porter's left flank, near Mal
vern Hill. It was met by the concentrated fire of
about thirty guns on the hill, by the fire from the
gunboats on the river, and by the infantry-fire of
Warren's brigade. The enemy was soon forced to
retreat, with the loss of two guns. Thus, on the
right, in the centre, and on the left, the fierce and
persistent efforts of the enemy had failed ; but our
trains were not yet in safety, and our communica
tions not yet secure, so that more marching and
more fighting were still before the brave Army of
the Potomac. The troops distributed along the
line between White Oak Swamp and Malvern Hill
fell back to the latter place during the night, and
were posted there, as they arrived, by General Bar
nard, who received his instructions from the general
commanding. On Tuesday, July 1, the sun rose on a scene such
as few but soldiers see, and soldiers rarely. The
whole Army of the Potomac was massed on the

Age 35.] THE SEVEN DAYS. 253
slopes of Malvern Hill. It is an open plateau, and
extends about a mile and a half in width and three-
quarters of a mile in depth. On the highest ground
there is an old-fashioned Virginia house, of brick,
in one story. Trees standing thickly supply it
with grateful shade. Behind the house, the ground
falls away as abruptly as at the Highlands of the
Hudson, and the delighted eye ranges over miles
and miles of level country, profusely clothed with
an almost tropical vegetation, and watered by the
James, the Appomattox, and Turkey Creek. It is
a scene of rare loveliness and peace; and gunboats,
seemingly sleeping at their moorings on the gleam
ing river, half seen through the screen of foliage,
added on that day to the air of repose which brooded
over the whole landscape. But no stronger con
trast could be presented than by the scene in front.
On those broad slopes, in triple concentric lines,
with the guns in the intervals and on the higher
ground in the rear, the weary Army of the Poto
mac was rapidly ranging itself. The general com
manding, and other general officers, were making
the circuit of the position and superintending the
movements of the troops, and, as by magic, the
great army came into the order of battle. Cavalry
escorts, the lancers with their red pennons flutter
ing beneath the glittering points of their weapons,
gave animation to the scene.
The line taken up by our army was something
more than the half of a circle. The left rested on
the hill near the river, and the line curved round
the hill and backwards, through a wooded country,
22

254 THE SEVEN DAYS. [1862.
towards a point below Haxall's, on the James.
The flotilla was so moored as to protect our left
flank and command the approaches from Eieh
mond. Porter's corps was on the left; next came
Couch's division of the 4th Corps, then Heintzel-
man's corps, then Sumner's, then Franklin's, and,
on the extreme right, Keyes, with the remainder
of the 4th Corps. The remains of McCall's division
were in reserve, and stationed in the rear of Porter
and Couch. The right, where the troops were less
compact than elsewhere, was strengthened by
" slashings" and barricades.
Tho enemy began to feel along our lines early
in the day, and annoyed our troops by artillery-fire
from various points. Batteries appeared, and fired,
and disappeared only to present themselves again at
a new point, and so keep our wearied troops from
preparing by rest for the coming struggle. About
three o'clock the real battle began. A heavy fire
of artillery opened on Couch's division and the left
of Kearney's, which was connected with the right of
Couch's; and a brisk attack of infantry on Couch's
front speedily followed. The enem}'-, disregarding
the fire of our artillery, pressed steadily on till they
were within short musket-range. Then Couch's
men, who had been lying down, sprang to their
feet, and delivered a fire which destroyed the order
of the enemy and drove them back in confusion.
Their attack thus failed utterly, and the advantage
gained was improved by an advance of our men
for nearly half a mile, which gave them a better
position.

Age 35.] THE SEVEN DAYS. 255
About two hours of comparative quiet followed
this discomfiture of the enemy, during which the
general surveyed the whole line, and every thing-
was made ready for the coming attack, and kept so.
It was begun at six o'clock; and Porter and Couch
received it. The whole artillery of the enemy sud
denly opened upon them, and brigade after brigade
came rushing forward to carry their position, but
only to meet the crushing fire of a determined in
fantry, and the tempest of grape, canister, and
shell that poured upon them from our massed artil
lery, with the enormous projectiles that came howl
ing over the pleasant woods and fields from the
great guns on the river. Until dark — and the bat
tle was when the days are longest — the enemy per
sisted in their desperate efforts, but to no purpose.
It was a day of useless slaughter for them, but of
comparatively trifling loss for us. The darkness
fell like a curtain, to close and conceal the sublime
spectacle ofthe battle of Malvern Hill.
With the last shots fired by the artillery, after
nine o'clock in the evening of this day, the fight
ing of the " Seven Days" ended. The troops had
little rest that night, for a further movement was
ordered as soon as the enemy were finally repulsed.
By tbe morning of the following day the whole
army was marching rapidly towards Harrison's
Landing, on the James Eiver. As there was but
one main road, it was necessary to crowd it to its
utmost capacity with artillery and cavalry, while
the infantry went on each side. A heavy rain
soon began to fall, — such a rain as is only felt in the

256 THE SEVEN DAYS. [1S62.
South : the road first became slippery, then muddy,
then deep with mud. Through this clinging soil
the weary horses dragged their loads, while on
each side the living stream of infantry forced its
toilsome way through the thick and dripping un
derbrush which bordered the road. Fortunately,
the distance was not great, and the troops poured
rapidly into the vast plain on the river, and sank
to rest upon its trampled wheat, their journey
ended, their great task accomplished. The woods of
the Peninsula were on one side of them, beautiful
in their midsummer luxuriance, and perhaps con
cealing indefatigable enemies; but on the other
was the broad river, bearing on its calm waters the
powerful gunboats which displayed the flag of our
navy, and, thanks to the provident foresight of the
general commanding, bearing also countless ves
sels filled with the ammunition and equipments,
the food and the clothing, of which our troops stood
so much in need.
Mr. Emil Schaik, — a severe military critic, and
chary of praise, — speaking of the retreat from the
Chickahominy to the James Eiver, says, "This
plan of defence reflects the highest credit and honor
on the general who conceived and carried it out."*
Such is the opinion, it is believed, of all competent
judges, whether soldiers by profession, or civilians
who have made the art of war a special subject of
study. It was a military movement of great danger
and difficulty, extending over several days, marked
* Campaigns of 1862 and 1863, p. 179.

Age 35.] THE SEVEN DAYS. 257
throughout by admirable combinations and disposi
tions, — in which nothing was overlooked, nothing
was forgotten, and not a single mistake was made.
The sagacious foresight, the calm self-reliance, the
thorough professional knowledge, the vigilant eye,
of the commanding general formed the power by
which the whole breathing mass of courage and en
durance was guided and propelled. And the conduct
of the army was, to borrow General McClellan's own
expression, " superb." The whole retreat was one
unbroken strain upon their physical energies and
moral force. They had to march all night and
fight all day. The nervous exhaustion produced
by toil and want of sleep was aggravated by the
excessive heat of the weather, by which many a
manly frame was prostrated. The enemy were
brave, vigilant, well handled, superior in numbers,
and confident of success; but only at Gaines's Mill
was any decisive advantage gained. At every
point, at every moment, the Confederates had met
organized courage, disciplined valor, the dauntless
front of men who trusted in themselves and trusted
in their commander ; and at Malvern Hill the closing
hours of danger and suffering were illumined by the
blaze of victory, like the rich red sunset which ends
a day of storm and cloud. And not only had our men
fought admirably, but they had toiled patiently and
intelligently. Guns were to be removed, wagons
and teams were to be helped along, here a piece of
road was to be mended, and there trees were to be
cut down to obstruct the enemy's passage; and for
all these labors the officers found quick faculty,
22$

258 THE SEVEN DAYS. [1S62.
serviceable hands, and a willing spirit. When it
is remembered that the carriages and teams belong
ing to the army, stretched out in one line, would
have reached nearly forty miles, we can understand
that nothing could have insured their safe removal
in the face of an enemy but that universal training
of the brain and hand found among a peojile who
are all taught to handle indifferently the pen, the
axe, the gun, and the spade.
The general in command, when the James Eiver
had been reached, had a right to look around with
just pride upon the army now sheltered and safe.
On the 28th, in the bitterness of his soul, he had
said, in a telegraphic message to the Secretary of
War, "If I save this army now, I tell you plainly
that I owe no thanks to you, or to any other
persons in Washington. You have done your best
to sacrifice this army." That army he had saved;
and the army was conscious of it. But there
was nothing of triumph in his own mind; for their
safety had been won at fearful cost. Our killed,
wounded, and missing from the 26th of June to
the 1st of July reached the mournful aggregate of
fifteen thousand. Of the sick and wounded, many
had of necessity been left behind, but with a proper
complement of surgeons and attendants and a boun
tiful supply of rations and medical stores.
And there was another consideration which might
have deepened the sadness of his mind, if he had
allowed his thoughts to dwell upon it at such a
moment. He had conducted an important move
ment with a skill and success which an intelligent

Age35.] THE SEVEN DAYS. 259
military judgment could understand and appre
ciate; but still that movement was a retreat. This
was the great fact present to the public mind. He
had been compelled to abandon his position before
Eiehmond; the place was not taken : he was a gene
ral in command of a large army, and had failed to
accomplish the object of his own hopes. The facts
and events which had rendered a retrograde move
ment necessary required some reflection to make
them understood and some candor to make them felt.
His knowledge of human nature, and of the bitter
ness and unscrupulousness of party, was enough to
reveal to him the harsh judgments, the misconstruc
tions, the injustice, the cruel insinuations, tho ca
lumnious charges, to which he had exposed him
self by the crime of failure, — that crime which
the public is so slow to forgive. He must have
foreseen how the pert phrase-makers of the land—
who conduct campaigns so admirably in their arm
chairs, and dispose of brigades and divisions as
easily as they fold and label their letters — would
strive to mangle him with their pens, — weapons more
cruel than the tiger's claw or the serpent's tooth, —
and point out what he should have done, and should
not have done, to have escaped the shame and dis
grace of retreating before a rebel foe. Sir John
Moore, dying in the arms of victory at the close
of a successful retreat, said, " I hope the people of
England will be satisfied : I hope my country will
do me justice." His country, in time, did justice
to that great man- Sooner or later, the world
comes round to see the truth ancj do the right;

260 THE SEVEN DAYS. [1862.
and for the coming of that time General McClellan
can afford to wait.
But the saddest of all experiences for a command
ing general is to lose the confidence of his army.
That cup was never put to General McClellan's lips.
His soldiers were intelligent enough to understand
what he had done, and generous enough to be grate
ful to him for it. They had witnessed his toils and
exposures, his calm self-reliance, his resolute front,
his unaltered brow : they had seen him perplexed
but not cast down, anxious but not despairing.
The approach of danger, the burden of responsi
bility, had called forth reserved powers and unre-
vealed energies. Their common perils, their com
mon labors, the trying scenes they had passed
through, the safety they had secured, had created
new ties of sympathy between the commanding
general and his noble army. No muttered curses
fell upon his ear, no sullen, averted countenances
met his eye; but, as he rode along their lines, shouts
of welcome instead, and faces glowing with honest
joy, passed a judgment upon his course that en
abled him to meet with composure the sneers of
the scoffer, the malice of partisan falsehood, and
the rash censures of presumptuous half-knowledge.

Age 35.] ADDRESS TO THE ARMY. 261

CHAPTEE IX.
The history of the Army of the Potomac during
the months of July and August, 1862, may be told
in a few words. During their retrograde move
ment to the banks of the James, they had been
fearfully weakened by losses in killed, wounded,
and prisoners ; but they were not in the least de
moralized. They had conducted themselves in a
way to move the admiration and win the gratitudo
of their commander ; and from a full heart, on the
4th of July, he issued to them the following ad
mirable and heartful address : —

"Head-Quarters Army ofthe Potomac,
Camp near Harrison's Landing, July 4, 1862.

,}

" Soldiers or the Army or the Potomac : — Your achieve
ments of the last ten days have illustrated the valor and
endurance of the American soldier. Attacked by supe
rior forces, and without hope of reinforcements, you havo
succeeded in changing your base of operations by a flank
movement, always regarded as the most hazardous of
military expedients. You have saved all your material,
all your trains and all your guns, except a few lost in
battle, taking in return guns and colors from the enemy.
Upon your march, you have been assailed day after day,
with desperate fury, by men of the same race and nation,
skilfully massed and led. Under every disadvantage of
number, and necessarily of position also, -you have in
every conflict beaten back your foes with enormous slaugh
ter. Your conduct ranks you among the celebrated ar-

202 LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT. [1862.
mies of history. No one will now question that each of
you may always with pride say, ' I belong to the Army
of the Potomac' You have reached the new base, com
plete in organization and unimpaired in spirit. The
enemy may at any moment attack you. "We are prepared
to meet them. I have personally established your lines.
Let them come, and we will convert their repulse into a
final defeat. Your Government is strengthening you
with the resources of a great people. On this, our nation's
birthday, we declare to our foes, who are rebels against
the best interests of mankind, that this army shall enter
the capital of the so-called Confederacy, that our national
Constitution shall prevail, and that the Union, which can
alone insure internal peace and external security to each
State, ' must and shall be preserved,' cost what it may in
time, treasure, and blood. " George B. McClellan."
Tho high spirit which breathes through this ad
dress, animates also his communications with the ¦
Government at Washington. He informs the Presi
dent, in a despatch of July 7, that his men were in
splendid spirits and " anxious to try it again;" and
in this anxiety he himself distinctly shared.
Having a brief interval of comparative leisure,
he drew up and addressed to the President a letter,
under date of July 7, containing certain views re
garding the conduct of the war, which, in his judg
ment, were essential to its objects and success.
The letter is as follows : —
"Head-Quarters Army of the Potomac, 1
Camp near Harrison's Landing, Va., July 7, 1862. j
" Mr. President :— You have been fully informed that
the rebel army is in our front, with the purpose of over-

Age 35.] LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT. 263
whelming us by attacking our position or reducing us by
blocking our river-communications. I cannot but regard
our condition as critical, and I earnestly desire, in view
of possible contingencies, to lay before your Excellency,
for your private consideration, my general views concern
ing the existing state of the rebellion, although they do
not strictly relate to the situation of this army or strictly
come within the scope of my official duties. These views
amount to convictions, and are deeply impressed upon
my mind and heart. Our cause must never be abandoned ;
it is the cause of free institutions and self-government.
The Constitution and the Union must be preserved, what
ever may be the cost in time, treasure, and blood. If se
cession is successful, other dissolutions are clearly to be
seen in the future. Let neither military disaster, political
faction, nor foreign war shake your settled purpose to
enforce the equal operation of the laws of the United
States upon the people of every State.
"The time has come when the Government must de
termine upon a civil and military policy covering the
whole ground of our national trouble.
" The responsibility of determining, declaring, and sup
porting such civil and military policy, and of directing
the whole course of national affairs in regard to the re
bellion, must now be assumed and exercised by you, or
our cause will be lost. The Constitution gives you power
sufficient even for the present terrible exigency.
"This rebellion has assumed the character of war:
as such it should be regarded,.and it should be conducted
upon the highest principles known to Christian civiliza
tion. It should not be a war looking to the subjugation
of the people of any State, in any event. It should not
be at all a war upon population, but against armed forces
and political organizations. Neither confiscation of pro
perty, political executions of persons, territorial organi-

264 LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT. [1862.
zation of States, or forcible abolition of slavery, should
be contemplated for a moment.
" In prosecuting the war, all private property and un
armed persons should be strictly protected, subject only
to the necessity of military operations ; all private pro
perty taken for military use should be paid or receipted
for ; pillage and waste should be treated as high crimes,
all unnecessary trespass sternly prohibited, and offensive
demeanor by the military towards citizens promptly re
buked. Military arrests should not be tolerated, except
in places where active hostilities exist ; and oaths, not
required by enactments constitutionally made, should be
neither demanded nor received.
" Military government should be confined to the pre
servation of public order and the protection of political
right. Military power should not be allowed to interfere
with the relations of servitude, either by supporting or
impairing the authority of the master, except for re
pressing disorder, as in'other cases. Slaves, contraband
under the act of Congress, seeking military protection,
should receive it. The right of the Government to ap-"
propriate permanently to its own service claims to slave-
labor should be asserted, and the right of the owner to
compensation therefor should be recognized. This prin
ciple might be extended, upon grounds of military neces
sity and security, to all the slaves within a particular State,
thus working manumission in such State ; and in Missouri,
perhaps in Western Virginia also, and possibly even in
Maryland, the expediency of such a measure is only a ques
tion of time. A system of policy thus constitutional and
conservative, and pervaded by the influences of Christian
ity and freedom, would receive the support of almost all
truly loyal men, would deeply impress the rebel masses and
all foreign nations, and it might be humbly hoped that it
would commend itself to the favor of the Almighty.
"Unless the principles governing the future conduct

Age 35.] LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT. 265
of our struggle shall be made known and approved, the
effort to obtain requisite forces will be almost hopeless.
A declaration of radical views, especially upon slavery,
will rapidly disintegrate our present armies. The policy
of the Government must be supported by concentrations
of military power. The national forces should not be
dispersed in expeditions, posts of occupation, and nu
merous armies, but should be mainly collected into masses
and brought to bear upon the armies of the Confederate
States. Those armies thoroughly defeated, the political
structure which they support would soon cease to exist.
" In carrying out any system of policy which you may
form, you will require a commander-in-chief of the army,
one who possesses your confidence, understands your
views, and who is competent to execute your orders, by
directing the military forces of the nation to the accom
plishment of the objects by you proposed. I do not ask
that place for myself. I am willing to serve you in such
position as you may assign me, and I will do so as faith
fully as ever subordinate served superior.
"I may be on the brink of eternity ; and, as I hope for
forgiveness from my Maker, I have written this letter with
sincerity towards you and from love for my country.
" Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
"George B. McClellan,
" Major- General commanding.
" His Excellency A. Lincoln, President."
In regard to this communication, two questions
have arisen. First, Was it proper for General Mc
Clellan to write such a letter? This would seem to
be answered by the statement that he had pre
viously asked and obtained tho President's permis
sion to do so. On the 20th of June he had said, in
a despatch, '' I would be glad to have permission
23

266 LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT." [1802.
to lay before your Excellency, by letter or tele
graph, my views as to the present state of military
affairs throughout the country ;" and the next day
the President replied, in language marked by that
personal kindness which generally characterized
his communications, "If it would not divert too
much of your time and attention from the army
under your immediate command, I would be glad
to have your views as to the present state of mili
tary affairs throughout the whole country, as you
say you would be glad to give them."
Second, Are the views which General McClellan
sets forth in his communication sound and wise in
point of fact? Upon this question much has been
and will be said on both sides; but whatever is said
on one side will do but little towards convincing
the other. In short, it raises the issues on which
the country began to be divided soon after the war
broke out, and on which it is now rent in twain.
Every man has made up his fagots on these ques
tions and bound them round with the cords of pas
sion and prejudice ; and it is useless to attempt to
disturb them. Time, which determines all things,
will sooner or later determine whether General
McClellan was right or wrong.
As to the Army of the Potomac, it was General
McClellan's opinion that it ought not to be with
drawn, but that it should be promptly reinforced
and thrown again upon Eiehmond. In his judg
ment, it was our policy to concentrate here every
thing we could spare from less important points,
in order to make a successful demonstration against

Age 35.] GENERAL HALLECK GENERAL-IN-CHIEF. 267
the enemy in his most vital and important point.
The Government was undecided in its plans. On
,the 4th of July the President had informed Gene
ral McClellan that it was impossible to reinforce
him so as to enable him to resume the offensive
within a month or six weeks, and that therefore
for the present a defensive policy was his only care,
— adding, " Save the army, first, where you are,
if you can, and, secondly, by removal, if you
must." On the 11th of July, one of the recommendations
contained in General McClellan's letter of July 7
to the President was adopted, by the appointment
of Major-General Halleck to the post of General-in-
Chief of the entire army of the United States.
This was the position held! by General McClellan
before he left Washington to conduct the Peninsular
campaign. Its duties had subsequently been per
formed by the President and Secretary of War; and
it was understood that they had a military adviser,
in the person of Major-General Hitchcock.
The disposition to be made of the Army of the
Potomac was one of the first subjects to which the
attention of the general-in-chief was called on his
arrival in Washington ; and, in order to observe
for himself its condition, he made a visit to Har
rison's Landing, leaving Washington on the 24th
of July and returning on the 27th. The result of
this visit was that General Halleck, after full con
sultation with his officers, came to the conclusion
that it would not be possible to strengthen the
Army of the Peninsula with the reinforcements

268 GENERAL HALLECK'S ORDER. [1862.
which General McClellan required, and he there
fore determined to withdraw it to some position
where it could unite with that of General Pope,
who was now in command of the Army of Vir
ginia. But this decision was not immediately
made known to General McClellan, who on the
30th of July received a despatch from General
Halleck saying that, in order to enable him to
move in any direction, it was necessary to relieve
him of his sick, and that arrangements had been
made accordingly, adding, " I hope you will send
them away as quickly as possible, and advise me
of their removal." General McClellan began im
mediately to execute this order, but pressed the
general-in-chief to inform him of the views of tbe
Government in regard to the future disposition of
the Army of the Potomac, because if a forward
movement were contemplated many of the sick
could be of service at the depots, and he could not
decide what cases to send off unless he knew what
was to be done with the army.
On the 3d of August, Coggin's Point, on the
south side of the James, was occupied by our troops,
and Colonel Averill, at the head of three hundred
cavalry, attacked and dispersed a cavalry force of
the enemy four hundred and fifty in number, at
Sycamore Church, on the main road from Peters
burg to Suffolk, four miles from Cole's House. On
the 5th of August, General Hooker attacked a very
considerable force of infantry and artillery sta
tioned at Malvern Hill, carried the position, and
drove the enemy back to Newmarket, four miles

Age 35.] ARMY WITHDRAWN. 269
distant; and on the same day Colonel Averill re
turned from a reconnoissance in the direction of
Savage's Station towards Eiehmond, in the course
of which he had encountered the 10th Virginia
Cavalry near White Oak Swamp bridge and driven
them back some distance towards Eiehmond. These
military demonstrations were made with the ex
pectation, or at least the hope, that an offensive
movement upon Eiehmond would still be the policy
of the Government.
On the 3d of August, the decision of the Govern
ment was distinctly communicated to General
McClellan in a despatch from General Halleck, in
which he said, " It is determined to withdraw
your army from the Peninsula to Acquia Creek.
You will take immediate means to effect this,
covering the movement the best you can. Its real
object and withdrawal should be concealed even
from your own officers." This was a heavy blow
to General McClellan; and he earnestly protested
against it in a long telegraphic despatch, dated
August 4, to which General Halleck replied in a
letter dated August 6.
General McClellan's arguments against the re
moval of the army and in favor of an offensive
movement, as presented in his despatch, are briefly
as follows. The army was in excellent discipline
and condition, and in a favorable position, being
only twenty-five miles from Eiehmond, and they
would not be likely to have a battle till tbey were
within ten miles of it.
At Acquia Creek thoy would be seventy-five
23*

270 GENERAL MCCLELLAN'S DE SP ATC H. [1S62.
miles from Eiehmond, with only land-transporta
tion all the way.
The step would demoralize the army, and have
a most depressing effect upon the people of the
North, and might induce foreign Powers to recog
nize our adversaries.
The communication concludes thus : —
" It may be said that there are no reinforcements avail
able. I point to Burnside's force, — to that of Pope, not
necessary to maintain a strict defensive in front of Wash
ington and Harper's Ferry, — to those portions of the
Army of the West not required for a strict defensive
there. Here, directly in front of this army, is the heart
of the rebellion : it is here that all our resources should
be collected to strike the blow which will determine the
fate of the nation.
" All points of secondary importance elsewhere should
be abandoned, and every available man brought here. A
decided victory here, and the military strength of the
rebellion is crushed. It matters not what partial reverses
we may meet with elsewhere : here is the true defence
of Washington ; it is here, on the banks of the James,
that the fate of the Union should be decided.
"Clear in my convictions of right, strong in the con
sciousness that I have ever been, and still am, actuated
solely by the love of my country, knowing that no ambi
tious or selfish motives have influenced me from the com
mencement of this war, I do now what I never did in
my life before : I entreat that this order may be rescinded.
" If my counsel does not prevail, I will with a sad heart
obey your orders to the utmost of my power, directing
to the movement, which I clearly foresee will be one of
the utmost delicacy and difficulty, whatever skill I may
possess. Whatever the result may be — and may God grant

Age 35.] GENERAL HALLECK S REPLY. 2/1
that I am mistaken in my forebodings ! — I shall at least
have the internal satisfaction that I have written and
spoken frankly, and have sought to do the best in my
power to avert disaster from my country."
The considerations urged by General Halleck in
reply were as follows :—
The enemy's forces in and around Eiehmond were
estimated at two hundred thousand. General Pope's
army was only forty thousand; the Army of the Pe
ninsula, effective force, about ninety thousand. The
relative position of the enemy towards them was
such that his command and that of Pope must be
united ; and they could not be united by land with
out exposing both to destruction. It was a military
impossibility to send Pope's forces by water to the
Peninsula; and thus the only alternative was to
send the Army of the Peninsula to Pope.
A simple change of position to a new and by no
means distant base would not demoralize an army
in excellent discipline, unless the officers themselves
should assist in that demoralization, — which he is
satisfied they would not.
The political effect of the withdrawal might at
first be unfavorable; but the public were beginning
to understand the necessity of it, and they would
have more confidence in a united army than in its
separated fragments.
It would be impossible to furnish the requisite
reinforcements under several weeks.
To keep the army in its present position until it
could be reinforced would almost destroy it, in the
sickly region where it then was. In the mean time,

27-2

REMOVAL BEGUN. [1S62.

General Pope's forces would be exposed to the
heavy blows of the enemy, without the slightest
hope of assistance from General McClellan.
A majority of the highest officers of the Army
of the Potomac were decidedly in favor of the
movement. All General McClellan's plans required reinforce
ments; but reinforcements could not be had.
There was nothing, of course, for General Mc
Clellan to do but to submit, and obey the orders of
his superior, — which he did with a heavy heart.
In the mean time, the removal of the sick, in com
pliance with the order of July 30, was going on as
rapidly as possible, though somewhat interrupted
by another order, of August 6, directing the imme
diate shipment of a regiment of cavalry and several
batteries of artillery to Burnside's command at
Acquia Creek. The order of August 3d also re
quired the transportation of a great amount of
material. All this was obviously a work of time;
but in spite of this, in spite of General McClellan's
repeated and emphatic assertions to the contrary,
General Halleck's mind became possessed with the
notion that the removal of the sick had not been
begun when the order was first received, and
that the whole business of transportation was not
pushed on so rapidly as it should have been. But
General McClellan never received from the Ad
ministration " that forbearance, patience, and con
fidence" for which he had asked, — and which
every soldier has a right to ask, — but always had
a countenance of suspicion and distrust turned

Age 35.] REMOVAL NOT DELAYED. 273
towards him. He had now twelve thousand sick and
wounded to transport, besides cavalry, artillery,
wagons, baggage, and supplies. He was working
day and night to speed their removal; he was
in a situation that demanded kind consideration,
for he was the leader of an enterprise which had
failed, whose hopes had been crossed, whose plans
for the future had been arrested, who was obeying
faithfully orders which he deemed unwise; and
surely he did not need at such a moment the further
discipline of a despatch like this, under date of
August 9 :— " Considering the amount of transporta
tion at your disposal, your delay is not satisfactory :
you must move with all possible celerity."
The plain statements in General McClellan's Ee
port, and the letters of the Quartermaster and As
sistant Quartermaster, which are also to be found
there, are sufficient to vindicate him completely
from the charge of negligence or delay in trans
porting his materials and men. Indeed, in an
issue like that between him and the commander-in-
chief the testimony of General McClellan must be
held to be decisive. Here was a certain work to
be done, the removal of a certain number of per
sons, sick and well, and a certain amount of stores,
supplies, and warlike materials from one point to
another. The time within which the task could be
accomplished depended upon several elements which
were wholly matters of fact, — such as the number
of vessels, their capacity, their speed, the state of
the water in the river, and the wharf-accommoda
tions at the points of departure and arrival, — upon

274 REMOVAL NOT DELAYED. [1862.
all which General McClellan had, and General
Halleck had not, the means of being exactly in
formed. Thus, it was General McClellan's know
ledge against General Halleck's surmise or con
jecture. General Halleck, sitting in his office at
Washington, might have thought that there was
unreasonable delay; but General McClellan alone
could have known what was the proportion between
the work to be done and the means to do it.
General McClellan, happily for his peace of mind
and health of body, is not a man of irritable tem
perament, and so he could possess his soul in pa
tience under the rash expressions of General Hal
leck's impatience, which, too, may have had the
excuse of being prompted by patriotic zeal and
professional activity; but this excuse cannot be
offered on behalf of a deliberate wrong. In a letter
subsequently written to the Secretary of War,
General Halleck says, " The evacuation of Har
rison's Landing, however, was not commenced till
the 14th, eleven days after it was ordered." The
authority for this statement — which is neither
more nor less than that General McClellan had re
fused or delayed for eleven days to execute a mili
tary order — is a despatch from the latter, under
date of August 14, which says, —
" Movement has commenced, — by land and water.
All tbe sick will be away by to-morrow night.*
Every thing being done to carry out your orders."
At the date of this despatch, nearly all the sick, a
* This would have "been absolutely impossible if nearly all
of them were not already gone.

Age 35.] GENERAL HALLECK'S CHARGE NOT TRUE. 275
large amount of supplies and materials, a regiment
of cavalry, and five batteries of artillery had been
removed, and the phrase " movement has com
menced" referred obviously to the movement of
the main army ; and yet General Halleck sets his
hand and gives his official sanction to a statement
which distinctly conveys the impression that none
of these things had been done at that time ! Com
ment is unnecessary, as strong facts do not need
the aid of strong language.*
* A passage between General Halleck and General McClel
lan is worthy of being preserved in a note, as one of the curi
osities of official life. On the 12th of August, General McClel
lan's head-quarters were at Berkeley, seventy miles from James
town Island, the nearest telegraph-office. Being desirous of
having more speedy and full explanation of the condition of
affairs in the army than he could get by sending a steamer to
Jamestown Island and waiting ten hours for a reply, he pro
posed to go in person to the office, and so informed General
Halleck at the close of a despatch of the 12th. He accordingly
went to Jamestown Island, but on arriving there found there
was an interruption in the electric current, so that he was
obliged to continue on to Fortress Monroe and across the Chesa
peake Bay to Cherry-Stone Inlet, on the "Eastern Shore."
He arrived there late in the evening, and immediately sent the
following dispatch : —
" Cherry-Stone, August 13, 1862, 11.30 p.m.
" Please come to the office; wish to talk to you. What news
from Pope ? " G. B. McClellan,
Major- General.
"Major-General H. W. Halleck, Washington."
The next day, at half-past twelve, he sent another despatch,
as follows: —

276 TROOPS IN MOTION. [1862.
On the 16th of August all the troops were in
motion by land and water, and late in the afternoon
" Cherry-Stone Inlet, August 14, 1862, 12.30 a.m.
"Started to Jamestown Island to talk with you ; found cable
broken, and came here. Please read my long telegram. All
quiet at camp. Enemy burned wharves at City Point yester
day. No rebel pickets within eight (8) miles of Coggin's
Point yesterday.
" Richmond prisoners state that large force with guns left
Eiehmond northward on Sunday. " G. B. McClellan,
' ' Major- General.
"Major-General H. W. Halleck, Washington."
To which the following reply was received: —
"Washington, August 14, 1862, 1.40 a.m.
" I have read your despatch. There is no change of plans.
You will send up your troops as rapidly as possible. There is
no difficulty in landing them. According to your own accounts,
there is now no difficulty in withdrawing your forces. Do so
with all possible rapidity.
" H. W. Halleck,
" Major-General.
"Major-General G. B. McClellan."
Before General McClellan had time to decipher and reply to
this despatch, the telegraph-operator in Washington informed
him that General Halleck had taken his hat and walked out
of the office without another word or message! General
McClellan then telegraphed thus : —
" Chebry-Stone Inlet, August 14, 1862, 1.40 a.m.
"Your orders will be obeyed. I return at once. I had
hoped to have had a longer and fuller conversation with you,
after travelling so far for the purpose. " G. B. McClellan,
"Major- General.
" Major-General H. W. Halleck,
Washington, D. C."

Age 35.] REMOVAL COMPLETED. 277
of that day, when the last man had disappeared
from the deserted camps, General McClellan fol
lowed with his personal staff in the track of the
grand Army of the Potomac, "bidding farewell,"
as he says in his Eeport, "to the scenes still covered
with the marks of its presence, and to be ever memo
rable in history as the vicinity of its most brilliant
exploits." On the 20th the army was at Yorktown,
Portress Monroe, and Newport News, ready to em
bark for whatever might be its destination.
A brief extract from General McClellan's Eeport
at this point may be here fittingly introduced : —
" As the campaign on the Peninsula terminated here,
I cannot close this part of my report without giving an
expression of my sincere thanks and gratitude to the
officers and men whom I had the honor to command.
" From the commencement to the termination of this
most arduous campaign, the Army of the Potomac always
evinced the most perfect subordination, zeal, and alacrity
in the performance of all the duties required of it.
" The amount of severe labor accomplished by this army
in the construction of intrenchments, roads, bridges, &c.
was enormous ; yet all the work was performed with the
most gratifying cheerfulness and devotion to the interests
of the service.
" During the campaign ten severely contested and san
guinary battles had been fought, besides numerous
small engagements, in which the troops exhibited the
most determined enthusiasm and bravery. They submit
ted to exposure, sickness, and even death, without a mur
mur. Indeed, they had become veterans in their coun
try's cause, and richly deserved the warm commendation
of the Government. 24

278 DEPARTURE FOR ACQUIA CREEK. [ISG2.
" It was in view of these facts that this seemed to me an
appropriate occasion for the general-in-chief to give, in
general orders, some appreciative expression of the ser
vices of the army while upon the Peninsula. Accord
ingly, on the 18th, I sent him the following despatch : —
" ' Head-Quarters Army of the Potomac, 1
August 18, 1862, 11 p.m. j
" ' Please say a kind word to my army, that I can repeat
to them in general orders, in regard to their conduct at
Yorktown, Williamsburg, West Point, Hanover Court-
House, and on the Chickahominy, as well as in regard to
the (7) seven days, and the recent retreat.
" ' No one has ever said any thing to cheer them but
myself. Say nothing about me. Merely give my men
and officers credit for what they have done. It will do
you much good, and will strengthen you much with them,
if you issue a handsome order to them in regard to what
they have accomplished. They deserve it.
" ' G. B. McClellan,
" ' Major-General.
" ' Major-General Halleck,
" ' Washington, D. C
"As no reply was received to this communication, and
no order was issued by the general-in-chief, I conclude
that my suggestion did not meet with his approbation."
Immediately on reaching Fortress Monroe, Gene
ral McClellan gave directions for strengthening the
defences of Yorktown, so as to resist any attack from
the direction of Eiehmond, and left General Keyes,
with his corps, to perform the work and tempora
rily to garrison the place. On the evening of the 23d
he sailed with his staff for Acquia Creek, where he
arrived on the following morning and reported for

Age 35.]

ALEXANDRIA. 279

orders. On the 26th he was ordered to Alexan
dria, and reached there the same day. In the
mean time the corps of Heintzelman and Porter
had sailed from Newport News and Yorktown, on
the 19th, 20th, and 21st, to join General Pope's
army; and those of Franklin and Sumner followed
a day or two after.
General McClellan remained at Alexandria till
the close of the march. A brisk intercourse by
telegraph was kept up between him and the
commander-in-chief with reference to General
Pope's movements and the defence of Washington;
but no specific duty was assigned to him, and his
brave army was by parcels detached from him, and
sent to take part in movements in regard to which
it is easy to see he had the gravest misgivings. Few
experiences in life are more trying than to see
things going wrong and have no power to prevent
it. The following extract from a despatch sent
from the camp near Alexandria, on the 30th of
August, while the disastrous second battle of Bull
Eun was going on, shows how much he felt and
how much he suppressed : —
" I cannot express to you the pain and mortification I
have experienced to-day in listening to the distant sound
of the firing of my men. As I can be of no further use
here, I respectfully ask that, if there is a probability of
the conflict being renewed to-morrow, I may be permit
ted to go to the scene of battle with my staff, merely to
be with my own men, if nothing more : they will fight
none the worse for my being with them. If it is not
deemed best to intrust me with the command even of

280 ORDER PROM THE WAR DEPARTMENT. [1862.
my own army, I simply ask to be permitted to share their
fate on the field of battle."
On the 30th, the following order was issued from
the War Department :—
" War Department, August 30, 1862.
" The following are the commanders of the armies ope
rating in Virginia : —
"General Burnside commands his own corps, except
those that have been temporarily detached and assigned
to General Pope.
"General McClellan commands that portion of the
Army of the Potomac that has not been sent forward to
General Pope's command.
"General Pope commands the Army of Virginia and
all the forces temporarily attached to it. All the forces
are under the command of Major-General Halleck, gene
ral-in-chief.
"E. D. Townsend,
" Assistant Adjutant-General."
The practical effect of this order was that Gene
ral McClellan had no control over anybody, except
his staff, some hundred men in camp near Alexan
dria, and a few troops at Fortress Monroe.

CHAPTEE X.
The campaign of General Pope in Virginia was
closed with the disastrous battle of August 30,
1862, fought on the ill-omened field of Bull Eun,

Age 35.] PRESIDENT LINCOLN. 281
and with that of Chantilly, two days after, in which
our success was dearly bought by the loss of two
of the best officers in the service, General Stevens
and General Kearney. On the 1st of September
General McClellan went into Washington, where he
had an interview with General Halleck, who in
structed him verbally to take command of the
defences ofthe place, with authority expressly lim
ited to the works and their garrisons, and not ex
tending to the troops in front under General Pope.
On the same day General McClellan waited upon
the President of the United States, at the house of
General Halleck, and in obedience to a message
from him. He was then and there told by the Presi
dent that he had reason to believe that the Army
of the Potomac was not cheerfully co-operating
with and supporting General Pope, and was asked
to use his influence in correcting this state of things.
General McClellan replied that the information
could not be true, and that the Army of the Poto
mac, whatever might be their estimate of General
Pope, would obey his orders and do their duty.
But this did not satisfy the President, who seemed
much moved during the interview; and, at his ear
nest and reiterated request, General McClellan tele
graphed to General Porter as follows : —
"Washington, September I, 1862.
" I ask of you, for my sake, that of the country, and
the old Army of the Potomac, that you and all my
friends will lend the fullest and most cordial co-operation
to General Pope in all the operations now going on. The
destinies of our country, the honor of our army, are at
24*

282 GENERAL PORTER. [1S62.
stake, and all depends now upon the cheerful co-opera
tion of all in the field. This week is the crisis of our fate.
Say the same thing to my friends in the Army of the
Potomac, and that the last request I have to make of
them is that, for their country's sake, they will extend
to General Pope the same support they ever have to me.
" I am in charge of the defences of Washington, and
am doing all I can to render your retreat safe, should
that become necessary. " George B. McClellan.
" Major-General Porter."
General Porter sent the following reply : —
"Fairfax Court-House, 10 a.m., September 2, 1862.
" You may rest assured that all your friends, as well as
every lover of his country, Lwill ever give, as they have
given, to General Pope,their cordial co-operation and con
stant support in the execution of all orders and plans.
Our killed, wounded, and enfeebled troops attest our
devoted duty. "F. J. Porter, Major-General.
"General George B. McClellan,
" Washington."
It need hardly be said that General McClellan's
message, unexplained, is open to the obvious infer
ence that he had some doubt whether General Por
ter and the troops under him would be faithful in
the discharge of their duty to the nation and its
cause ; but no such impression ever crossed his
mind, and what he did was done solely at the Pre
sident's request.
On the same day, September 2, the roads leading

Age 35.] GEN. MCCLELLAN AGAIN IN COMMAND. 283
into Washington from the west began to be filled
with the broken fragments of a defeated and de
moralized army, like a lee shore strewn with the
wreck of a noble fleet. Ambulances moved slowly
along with their mournful freight of wounded men.
Groups and squads of straggling soldiers appeared,
weary and footsore, some slightly hurt, and all dis
pirited, some sadly silent, and some uttering curses
and threats. The emergency of the case required
immediate action; and in view ofthe attachment of
the Army ofthe Potomac to their late commander,
and of their unabated confidence in him, the. Pre
sident of the United States did the best and wisest
thing he could have done under the circumstances :
he turned to General McClellan for help. In a per
sonal interview, he begged of the latter to reassume
command of the forces, make provisions for the de
fence of the capital, and act according to the best
of his judgment for the common cause. Not readily,
not without a good deal of anxious misgiving, did
General McClellan yield ; but he did yield at last.
He accepted the trust, and instantly began the dis
charge of its duties with his wonted energy. Aides
were sent out to the commanders of divisions, with
instructions to move their commands to designated
points. On the very day of his reappointment,
General McClellan was himself in the saddle, giving
personal directions to portions of the advancing
army; and the next day he was at Alexandria,
rectifying the positions of the troops and issuing
necessary orders.
The soldiers ofthe Army ofthe Potomac, as soon

284 JOY OP THE ARMY. [1862.
as they learned that their beloved commander was
to lead them again, took heart once more. Confi
dence returned. "Hope elevated and joy bright
ened their crests." Missing men reappeared, the
broken fragments of divisions and brigades were
reunited, order reigned anew in the lately disordered
files, and the shattered and demoralized host began
instantly to assume the method and proportions of
an army, with " degree, priority, and place." Be
fore the close of that very 2d of September, such
dispositions were made as insured the successful
defence of Washington against any attack on the
south side of the Potomac*
* "To-day, by order of the President, General McClellan has
again assumed the supreme command of the army. Imme
diately after accepting the chief command of all the Union
forces in the neighborhood of Washington, General McClellan
proceeded to inspect the troops and fortifications on the south
side of the river. This occupied him until after midnight.
His reception by the officers and soldiers was marked by the
most unbounded enthusiasm. In every camp his arrival was
greeted by hearty and prolonged cheering, and manifestations
of the wildest delight. Many of the soldiers who fought under
him in the hardest battles of the war wept with joy at again
having for their commander one upon whom they could place
implicit reliance. Already his hurried visit to our camps has
wrought a remarkable change in the soldiers. His presence
seemed to act magically upon them : despondency is replaced
by confidence, and all are glad that McClellan will hereafter
direct them." — Ellis's Leaves from the Diary of an Army Surgeon,
p. 214.
' ' To-night the Union army will all be concentratedin the works
around this city, and General McClellan has already assumed
the position of commander-in-chief of all the forces in the field

Age 35.] MARCH OF THE ARMY. 285
But this was not the intention ofthe enemy; for
on the 3d he had disappeared from the front of
Washington, and the information received of his
movements induced the belief that he intended to
cross the Upper Potomac into Maryland. This
made an active campaign necessary in order to
cover Baltimore, prevent the invasion of Pennsyl
vania, and clear Maryland; and measures were im
mediately taken accordingly. General Banks was
left in command of the defences of Washington ;
and on the 4th of September a forward movement
of the army was commenced, and General McClel
lan himself left the capital and took the figld on
the 7th. At this time it was known that the mass
of the rebel army had passed up the south side of
the Potomac, in the direction of Leesburg, and that
a portion had crossed into Maryland; but whether
they intended to send over their whole force with a
view to turn Washington by a flank movement down
the north bank of the Potomac, or to move on Bal
timore, or to invade Pennsylvania, were matters of
uncertainty. This constrained General McClellan to
proceed with great caution for a few days, and so move
as to keep both Baltimore and Washington covered,
and at the same time hold the troops in readiness
to follow the enemy if he went into Pennsylvania.
The general course of the march was in a north
westerly direction, the points of destination being
the city of Frederick, in Maryland, and its vicinity.
in this part of the country. The announcement of this latter
fact has been hailed with acclamations of infinite delight by
nearly the whole population." — Same, p. 218.

286 MARCH OF THE ARMY. [1802.
The army moved in five columns, stretching across
the region embraced between the Baltimore &
Ohio Eailroad and the Potomac. The left always
rested on the river, and the extreme right was as
far out as Cooksville. On the 14th of September,
Burnside and Sumner, each with two corps, were
at South Mountain, Franklin's corps and Couch's
division were at Burkettsville, and Sykes's division
was at Middletown.
As soon as General McClellan had left Washing
ton, an active intercourse by telegraph-wires began
to be kept up between him and the authorities there,
especially the President of the United States and
the commander-in-chief. The communications sent
to General McClellan are tinged with a questioning
and complaining spirit, showing that he no more
enjoyed the confidence of the Administration than
during the campaign in Virginia, and forcing upon
him the conviction that his appointment was rather
extorted from them in deference to the strong senti
ment ofthe army than as a spontaneous movement
of their own. General Halleck's mind was dark
ened with apprehensions for the safety of the capi
tal, and he feared that General McClellan's move
ments were too precipitate, and that he was ex
posing his front and rear. Upon these views of the
commander-in-chief, General McClellan remarks, in
his Eeport, —
" The importance of moving with all due caution, so
as not to uncover the national capital until the enemy's
position and plans were developed, was, I believe, fully
appreciated by me ; and, as my troops extended from the

Age 35.] GENERAL HALLECK'S TE S TI M 0 N Y. 287
Baltimore & Ohio Eailroad to the Potomac, with the
extreme left flank moving along that stream, and with
strong pickets left in rear to watch and guard all the
available fords, I did not regard my left or rear as in any
degree exposed. But it appears from the foregoing tele
grams that the general-in-chief was of a different opinion,
and that my movements were, in his judgment, too pre
cipitate not only for the safety of Washington, but also
for the security of my left and rear.
" The precise nature of these daily injunctions against a
precipitate advance may now be perceived. The general-
in-chief, in his testimony before the Committee on the
Conduct of the War, says, 'In respect to General McClel
lan's going too fast, or too far from Washington, there can
be found no such telegram from me to him. He has mis
taken the meaning of the telegrams I sent him. I tele
graphed him that he was going too far, not from Wash
ington, but from the Potomac, leaving General Lee the
opportunity to come down the Potomac and get between
him and Washington. I thought General McClellan
should keep more on the Potomac, and press forward his
left rather than his right, so as the more readily to relieve
Harper's Ferry.'
"As I can find no telegram from the general-in-chief
recommending me to keep my left flank nearer the Po
tomac, I am compelled to believe that when he gave this
testimony he had forgotten the purport of the telegrams
above quoted, and had also ceased to remember the fact,
well known to him at the time, that my left, from the
time I left Washington, always restfd^HLthaPpTomac^ and
that my centre was contiI1u5^yi5P2£i*i£f1 to reinforce
the"left^LJ22-l^
vanced my leftfUnk~almrgf3TTotoiiIac" more^rapjdly
than the oUier'^iSluSinrmaireQ^TupOTlEFroads to -the
ri^piKTsHotttrEav^tbrtjW^cUstanceTof the othiFtroopsTand greatly exposed it.. And

288 MOVEMENTS OP THE C 0 NEE DER ATE S. [1862.
if I had marched the entire army in_one column_akm.g the
banks of the river, instead of upon five differentj^aiallel
roads, the column, witB. its'SmSjjivould have^extegded
about fifty milesTand theenerny might havejaefjgaitoi-the
advaiu^hefo»^&e.-FeaEU3^^ of
action. Moreow^sij^hrta^rtmpj^e^^
vereoTThe communications with Baltimoreand^J^Mh-
ingfnn riiijTiijftjggT^^ our left and_rear. I
presume itwill be admitted by_eyery military man that
it was necessary to move the army in such order that it
could a^aiiyTiiBe_JbS_concentrated for battle; andl am
of Qianion^-thal^iSisSSfe^^
plishedrtinrtany. other w;ay thanjllie^one^emjdo^ed. Any
other dJ£p£s.iJiaa,Qf_xmrJfflces^^ them
to defeat in detached fragments."
In the mean time the Confederate army had crossed
the Potomac at two fords near Point of Eocks, en
tered Maryland, and marched as far as Frederick,
which they reached and occupied on the 6th. The
main body of the army encamped for some days on
a line between Frederick and the Potomac Eiver.
Eecruiting-offices were opened in the city, and citi
zens invited to enlist ; but very few recruits were
obtained. An address was issued to the people
of Maryland by General Lee, but no enthusiastic
response was made ; and the Confederate leaders
were much disappointed at the coldness and in
difference with which they were received.
On the 10th, General Lee began to evacuate
Frederick, and, taking the road to Hagerstown,
crossed the Catoctin Mountains, passed through the
valley in which Middletown is situated, and drew
up his forces along the crest of South Mountain, to

Age 35.] BATTLE OE SOUTH MOUNTAIN. 289
await the advance of General McClellan. At the
same time he detached a portion of his force,
amounting to twenty fyfi t>""°pT":i ™°", and sent
them, undgEJKUBiiuuid-ei^G^nera^^Tsfcsun
per's Ferry, bv t^° W;lliaTY,°pr'T,t r-naA. On the 13th,
th~e"*rear-guard of tbe °n"my'p fi^y^mn found in
strongpositmnjjftTttraer's Gap of the South Moun
tain, over which the main road from Frederick to
Hagerstown is carried ; and preparationflJEScamade
for an attack the_Bfixiu-Ba»r-ning. The position of
the Confederates was very stron:g-orrtte^^s_and
summit of "the "mount aih~Tb oth to the right- and
leftrgf"T5e~gap^ TEe battle began on the morning
of the 14th, but was some hours merely an artillery
duel, with no very decisive results, though, on the
whole, with gain to our side. At three, our line of
battle was formed, and orders were given to move
the whole forward, and take or silence the enemy's
batteries. They were executed with enthusiasm
and complete success. Our right, centre, and left
advanced simultaneously towards the enemy, un
broken by a fire from two pieces of cannon which
played upon our columns for upwards of an hour
before they were silenced by our batteries. The
right wing, where General Hooker was in command,
was first engaged, and the left followed at no long
interval. The tactics and order of battle were
simple, and substantially the same all along the
line. Steadily, without pause or wavering, our
gallant troops pressed up the slope, and delivered
heavy volleys of musketry as they came within
range. It was for some time a hot and steady fight
25

290 CRAMPTON'S PASS. [1862.
of man against man, company against company,
regiment against regiment. The woods, the ledges
of rock, all the natural lines of attack and defence,
were for some time blazing with steady sheets of
dazzling flame and ringing with sharp volleys.
But our line moved on with the sweeping and irre
sistible force of a mighty flood, and the Confede
rates soon began to waver and give way. They
were driven up to the top of the mountain, and
thence down on the other side. At six o'clock the
enemy had been beaten from all their positions,
and we held undisturbed possession bf the heights.
The battle of South Mountain reflected high
honor upon the officers and men who took part in
it. The judicious plans of the general commanding
were admirably and successfully carried out. Our
numbers were probably somewhat larger than the
enemy's; but this advantage was more than counter
balanced by his superiority in position, on the crest
and sides of a hill, with woods and rocky ledges for
shelter and defence, and broken ground everywhere
to embarrass the movements of our troops.
Our losses were three hundred and twelve killed,
twelve hundred and thirty-four wounded, twenty-
two missing. Among the killed was General Eeno,
a brave and valuable officer, who was General
McClellan's classmate at West Point.
At the same time with the battle of South Moun
tain, an engagement took place at Crampton's Pass,
between a division under General Franklin and a
portion of the Confederate army. The enemy were
found in the rear of Burkettsville, at the base of

Age 35.] SURRENDER OF HARPER'S FERRY. 291
the mountain, with infantry posted in force on both
sides of the road, and artillery in strong positions
to defend the approaches to the Pass. They were
forced from their positions by a steady charge of
our line, and driven up the slope, and at the end of
three hours' fighting the crest was carried, and tho
enemy fled down the mountain on the other side.
On the 12th of September, the Confederate force
under General Jackson, which had been detached
for the purpose, appeared before Harper's Ferry,
and on the 15th the unfortunate and humiliating
surrender of that position took place, — the Union
cavalry having, on the night of the 14th, cut their
way through the enemy's line and reached Green-
castle, Pa., in safety the next morning. The un
toward surrender of this post awakened a very
strong feeling throughout the country, and a court
of inquiry was immediately summoned to investi
gate the circumstances. The court met in Wash
ington on the 25th of September, and their report
was published early in November. It gives a de
tailed narrative of tho surrender, and states the
conclusion that " the incapacity" of Colonel Miles,
the commanding officer (who, happily for him, was
killed during the assault), " amounting almost to
imbecility, led to the shameful surrender of this
important post." The report also strongly reflects
upon " the military incapacity" of Colonel Ford, the
officer second in command, in consequence of which
he was dismissed from the service of the United
States. But the military commission diverges a little

292 SURRENDER OF HARPER'S FERRY. [1862.
from its legitimate path of inquiry, and lends itself
to the persistent hostility with which General Mc
Clellan was pursued by the general-in-chief, in the
paragraphs following : —
"The commission has remarked freely on Colonel Miles,
an old officer, who has been killed in the service of his
country ; and it cannot, from any motives of delicacy, re
frain from censuring those in high command when it
thinks such censure deserved.
" The general-in-chief has testified that General McClel
lan, after having received orders to repel the enemy in
vading the State of Maryland, marched only six miles per
day, on an average, when pursuing this invading enemy.
"The general-in-chief also testifies that, in his opinion,
he could and should have relieved and protected Har
per's Ferry ; and in this opinion the commission fully
concur." Upon these charges General McClellan quietly
and pertinently remarks in his Eeport, —
" I have been greatly surprised that this commission, in
its investigations never called upon me, nor upon any
officer of my staff, nor, so far as I know, upon any officer
of the Army of the Potomac able to give an intelligent
statement of the movements of that army. But another
paragraph in the same report makes testimony from such
sources quite superfluous. It is as follows : —
" ' By a reference to the evidence it will be seen that, at
the very moment Colonel Ford abandoned Maryland
Heights, his little army was in reality relieved by Gene
rals Franklin's and Sumner's corps at Crampton's Gap,
within seven miles of his position.'
" The corps of Generals Franklin and Sumner were a
part of the army which I at that time had the honor to

Ace 35.] SURRENDER OF HARPER'S FERRY. _93="'(
command, and they were acting under my orders at
Crampton's Gap and elsewhere ; and if, as the commis
sion states, Colonel Ford's 'little army was in reality
relieved' by those officers, it was relieved by me."
It will be observed that the general-in-chief tes
tifies and the commission reports on an issue not
then legitimately on trial ; and that is, the rate at
which the army of General McClellan marched
during the Maryland campaign. Good haters
should have good memories; and the general-in-
chief had apparently forgotten, when he was cen
suring General McClellan before the commission
for moving only six miles a day, that only a short
time before he had been apprehensive that the
army was going too fast, and was thus uncovering
Washington as well as exposing its own front and
rear. Why, in point of fact, the army moved no more
than six miles a day may be easily explained.
In the first place, it was not distinctly known
where the rebel army was going, and it was neces
sary to proceed cautiously, so as to keep watch
upon it and be ready to anticipate and foil any
sudden movement. In the second place, the in
vading army was well organized, well disciplined,
led by a skilful commander, and flushed with vic
tory, whereas our own was demoralized by a re
cent defeat and by a sudden change in command;
and these slow marches were necessary for organ
ization and consolidation, and to establish true re
lations between the soldiers and their new leader.
But to return to the surrender of Harper's
25*

294 SURRENDER OF HARPER'S FERRY. [1862.
Ferry. Before General McClellan left Washington,
he recommended to the proper authorities that the
garrison at Harper's Ferry should be withdrawn
by way of Hagerstown to aid in covering the Cum
berland Valley, or that, taking up the pontoon
bridge and obstructing the railroad bridge, it should
fall back to the Maryland Heights and there hold
out to the last. This was unquestionably judicious
advice; but it was not deemed proper to adopt
either of the plans suggested. The garrison was
not withdrawn, — as would have been the wiser
course, for the position was of no value as a
strategic point, as the enemy's troops then stood,
— nor were measures taken to protect them from
capture. It was not until the 12th that General McClellan
was directed to assume command of the garrison at
Harper's Ferry, as soon as he should open commu
nication with that pl ace ; but when this order was re
ceived, all communication from the direction he was
approaching was cut off. Nothing, therefore, was left
to be done but to endeavor to relieve the garrison.
Artillery was ordered to be fired by our advance,
at frequent intervals, as a signal that relief was
at hand ; and these reports, as was afterwards
ascertained, were distinctly heard at Harper's
Ferry. It was confidently expected that Colonel
Miles would hold out till our forces had carried tho
mountain-passes and were in a condition to send a
detachment to his relief; and this he assuredly
might have done, had he been competent to the
important command intrusted to him. And it was

Age 35.] SURRENDER OF HARPER'S FERRY. 295
with a view of relieving the garrison at Harper's
Ferry that Franklin's column was ordered to move
through Crampton's Pass, in front of Bnrketts-
ville, while the centre and right marched upon
Turner's Pass in front of Middletown.
On the 14th a verbal message from Colonel Miles
reached General McClellan, which was the first
authentic intelligence the latter had received as to
the condition of things at Harper's Ferry. The
messenger reported as to the position of our force
there, and stated that Colonel Miles instructed him
to say that he could hold out with certainty two
days longer. General McClellan directed him to
make his way back, if possible, with the informa
tion that he was rapidly approaching and felt con
fident that he could relieve the place. It does not
appear that this message ever reached Colonel
Miles. On the afternoon of the Wth, General McClellan
addressed a letter to Colonel Miles, giving him in
structions and information, assuring him that the
centre was making every effort to relieve him, and
entreating him to hold out to the last extremity.
Three copies of this letter were sent by three dif
ferent couriers on three different routes, but none
of them succeeded in reaching Harper's Ferry.
On the previous day, September 13, General
McClellan had sent to General Franklin a letter
of detailed instructions as to his movements, and
further orders were despatched on the following
day. The results of the battle of South Mountain —

296 BATTLE OF ANTIETAM. [1S62.
considering Franklin's attack on Crampton's Pass
as a part of ono general and concerted plan — re
sponded exactly to General McClellan's hopes and
wishes; and the close of the action, on the evening
of the 14th, found General Franklin's advance
within six miles of Harper's Ferry. A despatch
was sent to him from head-quarters during the
night of the 14th, containing instructions as to his
movements in case he should succeed in opening
communication with Colonel Miles; and this would
have been done had the place held out for twenty-
four hours longer. But the surrender was made
at eight a.m. on the 15th.
Upon a fair examination of the case, it cannot
be maintained that General McClellan is guilty
of tho charge made by the general-in-chief, and
sanctioned by the Committee of Inquiry, that he
failed to relieve and protect Harper's Ferry, having
the power to do so.
THE BATTLE OF ANTIETAM.
The pursuit of the enemy followed immediately
after the battle of South Mountain, and on the 15th
they were found strongly posted behind Antietam
Creek, near Sharpsburg. Our troops were not up
in sufficient force to begin the attack on that day.
The ground occupied by the Confederates was a
rugged and wooded plateau, descending to the
banks of the Antietam, which is here a deep
stream, with few fords, and crossed by three stone
bridges. On all favorable points the enemy's ar-

Age 35.] BATTLE OF ANTIETAM. 297
tillery was posted; and their reserves, hidden from
view by the hills on which their line of battlo was
formed, could manoeuvre without being seen by
our army, and, from the shortness of their line,
could easily reinforce any point which needed
strengthening. Their position, stretching across
the space included between the Potomac and the
Antietam, their flanks and rear protected by these
streams, was very strong, and it had the further
advantage of masking their numbers from our ob
servation. On the morning of the 16th it was discovered
that the enemy had changed the position of his
batteries ; and the whole forenoon was spent in
reconnoitring, in examining the ground, finding
fords, clearing the approaches, and hurrying up
the ammunition and supply trains, which had been
delayed by the rapid march of the troops. About
daylight the enemy opened a heavy fire of artillery
on our guns in position, which was promptly re
turned. Their fire was silenced for the time, but it
was frequently renewed during the day.
General McClellan's plan was to attack tho
enemy's left with the corps of Hooker and Mans
field, supported by Sumner's, and, if necessary, by
Franklin's; and, in case of success at this point, to
move Burnside's corps against the enemy's ex
treme right, and, having carried their position, to
press along the crest towards our right, and, when
ever either of these flank movements should be
successful, to advance our centre with all tho forces
then disposable. The general in command himself

298 BATTLE OF ANTIETAM. [1862.
occupied a ridge on the centre, where Porter's
corps, including Sykes's division, was stationed as
a reserve. About three o'clock, General Hooker Crossed the
Antietam by the bridge on the Hagerstown road
and an adjacent ford, and soon gained the crest of
the hill on the right bank of the stream. He then
turned to the left, and followed down the ridge,
under a sharp fire of musketry, which lasted till
dark. During the night, General Mansfield's corps
crossed the Antietam by the same bridge and ford
used by Hooker's.
At daylight on the 17th, General Hooker at
tacked the enemy's forces before him, and drove
them from the open field in front of the first line
of woods into a second line of woods beyond. But
out of this second line a very destructive fire was.
poured from a body of fresh troops, before whieh
our own forces recoiled. General Mansfield's corps
was now ordered up, and came promptly into ac
tion ; and for about two hours the tide of battle
swayed to and fro with varying fortunes. The
scene of the heaviest fighting was a piece of
ploughed land, nearly enclosed by woods, and
entered by a corn-field in tho rear, on the crest of
the hill. Three or four times this position was
taken and lost, and the ground was thickly strewn
with the bodies of the dead. Early in the fight,
the gallant veteran General Mansfield was mor
tally wounded. General Hartsuff, of Hooker's
corps, and General Crawford, of Mansfield's corps,

Age 35.] BATTLE OF ANTIETAM. 299
were both wounded, the former severely. Between
nine and ten, General Hooker, who had shown ex
cellent conduct and the most brilliant courage, was
shot through the foot, and, after having fainted
with pain, was obliged to leave the field.
At this time General Sumner's corps reached
this portion of the field, and became hotly engaged ;
but it suffered severely from a heavy fire of mus
ketry and shell from the enemy's breast-works and
batteries, and portions of the line were compelled
to withdraw. General Sedgwick and General Dana
were seriously wounded, and taken from the field.
On the left, General Eichardson was mortally
wounded, and General Meagher disabled by the
fall of his horse, shot under him.
At one o'clock the aspect of affairs on our right
flank was not promising. Our troops had suffered
severely, and our loss in officers had been frightful.
Portions of our force were scattered and demoral
ized, and the corn-field before mentioned was in
the enemy's possession. We were in no condition
to assume the offensive, and hardly able to hold
tho positions wc had gained. At this time General
Franklin arrived upon the field with fresh troops;
and while one of his divisions, under Slocum, was
sent forward on the left to the support of French
and Eichardson, another, under Smith, was ordered
to retake the woods and corn-fields which had been
so hotly contested during the day. This order was
executed in the most gallant style, and in ten
minutes the enemy were driven out and our troops
were in undisturbed possession of the whole field.

300 BATTLE OF ANTIETAM. [1862.
This was substantially the close of the battle on our
right, though the artillery on both sides maintained
a fire for some time longer. It was not deemed
safe for Franklin's corps to push on any farther,
because the rest of our troops had suffered too se
verely to be relied upon as an efficient reserve. The
battle had been fought with desperate courage on
both sides, but the advantage, on the whole, was
with us. But we had lost too many men, and were
too much exhausted, to make any new attack, and
the enemy were not able to assume the offensive.
Meanwhile, Burnside had been engaged on the
extreme left of the Federal position in attempting to
cross the lower stone bridge, — a structure strongly
defended by infantry and artillery. After two un
successful attacks, it was finally carried by assault,
and the Confederates driven to a range of hills in
the rear, where their batteries played upon our
troops with damaging effect. A halt was then
made until three o'clock, when urgent orders were
sent from head-quarters to General Burnside to
push forward his force and carry these heights at
any cost. The advance was then gallantly resumed,
the enemy driven from his guns, and the heights car
ried. By this time it was nearly dark, and strong
reinforcements having just then reached the enemy
from Harper's Ferry, attacked Burnside's troops on
the left flank, and forced them to retire to a lower
line of hills nearer the bridge. During this move
ment General Eodman was mortally wounded.
All day long General Porter's reserve corps filled
the interval between the right wing and General

Age 35.] BATTLE OF ANTIETAM. 301
Burnside's command, guarding the main approach
from the enemy's position to our trains of supply.
It had been necessary to maintain this part of our
line in strong force, lest the enemy, taking ad
vantage of an exhibition of weakness there, should
pierce our centre, gain our rear, and capture or
destroy our supply-trains. General Burnside, at
the close of the day, hotly pressed by the enemy,
had sent an urgent request for reinforcements ; but
they could not be had, and he was ordered to hold
his ground, or at least the bridge, till dark. At
one moment, about the middle of tho afternoon,
the position on our right was so critical that two
brigades from Porter's corps were ordered to re
inforce our troops on that wing ; but, after confer
ence with General Sumner, the order was counter
manded while in the course of- execution.
Our entire force engaged at Antietam was about
eighty-seven thousand men. That of the Confede
rates was less at the beginning, but they were re
inforced during the day by Jackson's command
from Harper's Ferry; and during the afternoon the
numbers were probably about equal. Our loss in
killed, wounded, and missing was twelve thousand
four hundred and nine ; that of the Confederates
was at least as great.
Thirteen guns, thirty-nine colors, upwards of
fifteen thousand stand of small arms, and more
than six thousand prisoners were our trophies of
success in the battles of South Mountain and An
tietam. Not a gun or a color was lost by our
army. 26

302 BATTLE OF ANTIETAM. [1862.
Early on the 18th the Confederates sent in a flag
of truce, asking permission to bury their dead who
had fallen between the lines of the two armies.
The request was granted. General McClellan says,
in his Eeport, after a detailed account ofthe battle, —
"Night closed the long and desperately-contested
battle of the 17th. Nearly two hundred thousand men
and five hundred pieces of artillery were for fourteen
hours engaged in this memorable battle. We had at
tacked the enemy in a position selected by the experi
enced engineer then in person directing their operations.
We had driven them from their line on one flank, and
secured a footing within it on the other. The Army of
the Potomac, notwithstanding the moral effect incident
to previous reverses, had achieved a victory over an ad
versary invested with the prestige of recent success. Our
soldiers slept that night conquerors on a field won hy
their valor and covered with the dead and wounded of
the enemy.
"The night, however, brought with it grave responsi
bilities. Whether to renew the attack on the 18th or to
defer it, even with the risk of the enemy's retirement,
was the question before me.
"After a night of anxious deliberation, and a full and
careful survey of the situation and condition of our army,
and the strength and position of the enemy, I concluded
that the success of an attack on the 18th was not certain. I
am aware of the fact that, under ordinary circumstances,
a general is expected to risk a battle if he has a reason
able prospect of success ; but at this critical juncture I
should have had a narrow view of the condition of the
country had I been willing to hazard another battle with
less than an absolute assurance of success. At that mo
ment — Virginia lost, Washington menaced, Maryland in-

Age 35.] BATTLE OF ANTIETAM. 303
vaded — the national cause could afford no risks of defeat.
One battle lost, and almost all would have been lost.
Lee's army might then have marched as it pleased on
Washington, Baltimore, Philadelphia, or New York. It
could have levied its supplies from a fertile and undevas-
tated country, extorted tribute from wealthy and popu
lous cities, and nowhere east of the Alleghanies was
there another organized force able to arrest its march."
He then proceeds to set forth some of the con
siderations which led him to doubt the certainty of
success in attacking before the 19th.
The troops were greatly overcome by the ex
haustion of the recent battles, and the long day and
night marches of the previous three days.
The supply-trains were in the rear, and many of
the troops had suffered from hunger. They required
rest and refreshment.
One division of Sumner's and all of Hooker's
corps, on the right, after fighting valiantly for
many hours, had been driven back in disorder, and
were somewhat demoralized.
Our losses had been very heavy.
Many of our heaviest batteries had consumed all
their ammunition, and they could not be supplied
till late on the 18th.
Large reinforcements which were immediately
expected had not arrived.
Supplies of forage had to be brought up and
issued, and infantry-ammunition distributed.
The 18th was, therefore, spent in collecting the
dispersed, giving rest to the fatigued, burying the
dead, and the necessary preparations for a renewal

304 MESSAGE FROM GENERAL HALLECK. [1862.
of the battle. Orders were given for an attack at
daylight on the 19th. But during the night of the
18th the enemy abandoned their position, and
crossed the Potomac into Virginia, just two weeks
from the day they had entered Maryland. As their
line was near the river, the evacuation presented
little difficulty, and was effected before daylight.
On the 19th, General McClellan sent to the com
mander-in-chief a telegraphic report as follows : —
" I have the honor to report that Maryland is entirely
freed from the presence of the enemy, who has been
driven across the Potomac. No fears need now be enter
tained for the safety of Pennsylvania. I shall at once
occupy Harper's Ferry."
On the following day this despatch was re
ceived : — "Washington, September 20, 1862, 2 p.m.
" We are still left entirely in the dark in regard to your
own movements and those of the enemy. This should
not be so. You should keep me adviseH of both, so far
as you know them.
" H. W. Halleck,
' ' General-in- Chief.
"Major-General G. B. McClellan."
In reply to this curt and ungracious message,
General McClellan, after giving the information
sought, as far as it was in his power to do, said, —
" I regret that you find it necessary to couch every de
spatch I have the honor to receive from you in the spirit
of fault-finding, and that you have not yet found leisure

Age35.] GENERAL HOOKER PRAISED. 305
to say one word in commendation of the recent achieve
ments of this army, or even to allude to them."
On the same 19th of September, in the midst of
his onerous cares and labors, General McClellan
found time to send another despatch to the com
mander-in-chief, as an act of prompt justice to a
brave officer. It was as follows : —
" He ad-Quarters Army of the Potomac, September 19.
" As an act of justice to the merits of that most excellent
officer, Major-General Joseph Hooker, who was eminently
conspicuous for his gallantry and ability as a leader in
several hard-fought battles in Virginia, and who in the
battle of Antietam Creek, on the 17th inst., was wounded
at the head of his corps while leading it forward in ac
tion, I most urgently recommend him for the appoint
ment of brigadier-general in the United States Army, to
fill the vacancy created by the death of the late Brigadier-
General Mansfield. This would be but a fit reward for
the service General Hooker rendered his country. I feel
sure his appointment would gratify the whole army.
"George B. McClellan,
' ' Major- General.
"Major-General H. W. Halleck,
" General-in-Chief."
This suggestion was adopted, and General Hooker
was made a brigadier-general in the regular army
of the United States, his commission bearing date
September 2, 1862.
The result of the victories at South Mountain
and Antietam was to drive the enemy from Mary
land, to secure Pennsylvania from invasion, and to
put Harper's Ferry once more into our possession.
26*

306 GOVERNOR BRADFORD'S ORDER. [1862.
This was much to have been done in a fortnight's
time by an army in the shattered and demoralized
condition that General McClellan's was in when he
took it in hand on the second day of September.
How strong a sense of the value of these services
was felt by those who were most nearly interested
may be learned by an executive order of the Gover
nor of Maryland, as follows : —

"}

" State of Maryland, Executive Department,
Annapolis, September 29, 1S62.
"The expulsion of the rebel army from the soil of
Maryland should not be suffered to pass without a proper
acknowledgment, and the cordial thanks of her authori
ties to those who were chiefly instrumental in compelling
that evacuation.
" I would tender, therefore, on behalf of the State of
Maryland, to Major-General McClellan, and the gallant
officers and men under his command, my earnest and
hearty thanks for the distinguished courage, skill, and
gallantry with which the achievement was accomplished.
It reflects a lustre upon the ability of the commander-in-
chief, and the heroism and endurance of his followers,
that the country everywhere recognizes, and that even
our enemies are constrained to acknowledge. " A. W. Bradford.
" By the Governor:
"Wm. B. Hill,
" Secretary of State."

Age35.] A GRAVE QUESTION. 307

CHAPTEE XI.
It now became a grave question with General
McClellan whether or not he should pursue the re
treating enemy into Virginia. Our losses had been
heavy ; the army was greatly exhausted by hard
work, fatiguing marches, hunger, and want of sleep.
Many of the troops were new levies; and, though
they had fought well, they had not the steadiness
and discipline that were needed for an expedition so
formidable. The means of transportation at our dis
posal, on the 19th of September, were not enough to
furnish a single day's subsistence in advance. Un
der these circumstances, General McClellan did not
deem it wise to cross the river with his army, over
a deep and difficult ford, in pursuit of a retreating
enemy, and thus place between himself and his base
of supplies a stream liable at any time to rise above
a fording stage.
This decision was made known to the authorities
at Washington, and they were duly informed of the
movements of our own troops, and of those of the
enemy, as far as the latter could be ascertained. The
commander-in-chief, to whom, in general, the com
munications were addressed, was urged to push for
ward all the old troops that could be dispensed with
around Washington and other places, so that the
old skeleton regiments might be filled up at once,
and officers appointed to supply the numerous exist-

308 PRESIDENT LINCOLN'S VISIT. [1862.
ing vacancies. The work of reorganizing, drilling,
and supplying the army was begun at the earliest
moment. The different corps were stationed along
the river in the best position to cover and guard
the fords. Eeconnoissances upon the Virginia side
of the Potomac, for the purpose of learning the
enemy's positions and movements, were frequently
made. This was a trying and exhausting service
for our cavalry, with which the army was inade
quately supplied.
On the first day of October the President of the
United States paid a visit to the Army of the Poto
mac, and remained several days, during which time
he passed through the different encampments, re
viewed the troops, and went over the battle-fields
of South Mountain and Antietam. During this
visit, General McClellan explained to him fully, in
conversation, the movements of the army since it
had left Washington, and gave the reasons why the
enemy was not pursued after he had crossed the
Potomac. The twenty-second day of September, 1862, was a
memorable day in the history of the war and the
history of the country ; for on that day the Presi
dent issued his proclamation in which he an
nounced that on the first day of January, 1863,
all persons held as slaves within any State, or any
designated part of a State, the people whereof
should then be in rebellion against the United
States, should be thenceforth and forever free.
All discussion of the expediency of this proclama
tion, or of its legal effect, would be inopportune; but

Age35.] PRESIDENT'S PROCLAMATION. 309
it will be admitted, alike by those who approve and
those who disapprove it, that it gave a new charac
ter to the war and changed its objects. It is hardly
necessary to add that this proclamation became
at once, throughout the country, a subject of ear
nest debate and vehement controversy, which have,
indeed, continued to the present time. From the
character of the men composing the Army of the
Potomac, who were voters and citizens as well as
soldiers, accustomed to read the newspapers and
talk politics, it was obvious that the same division
of opinion upon the President's proclamation would
be found among them as was found in the public
at large ; and there was danger that this conflict
of views might impair that unity of action and
patriotic zeal which are so essential to the success
of all military movements. General McClellan felt
himself called upon to remind the officers and sol
diers under his command of the relations between
the civil authorities and the military forces of the
country, and of the duties of the latter in regard
to the political questions of the day and the path
of civil policy marked out by the Government ;
and he may have done this with the more prompt
ness and emphasis from the fact that he was known
not to belong to that party by whose influence the
proclamation had been extorted from a too-yielding
President. With these views, the following gene
ral order was issued, which may unhesitatingly be
pronounced admirable alike in substance and in
form, animated by a high-toned patriotism, defining
with precision the line where the duty of the citi-

310 GENERAL MCCLELLAN'S ORDER. [1862.
zen ends and the duty of the soldier begins, and
giving to every candid mind an assurance that
General McClellan himself would serve his coun
try as faithfully and zealously in the future as he
had done in the past : —
"Head-Quarters Army of the Potomac, )
Camp near Sharpsburg, Maryland, October 7, 1862. j
General Order No. 163.
" The attention of the officers and soldiers of the Army
of the Potomac is called to General Order No. 139, War
Department, publishing to the army the President's pro
clamation of September 22.
"A proclamation of such grave moment to the nation,
officially communicated to the army, affords to the gene
ral commanding an opportunity of defining specifically to
the officers and soldiers under his command, the relation
borne by all persons in the military service of the United
States towards the civil authorities of the Government.
"The Constitution confides to the civil authorities,
legislative, judicial, and executive, the power and duty
of making, expounding, and executing the federal laws.
Armed forces are raised and supported simply to sustain
the civil authorities, and are to be held in strict subordi
nation thereto in all respects.
" This fundamental rule of our political system is essen
tial to the security of our republican institutions, and
should be thoroughly understood and observed by every
soldier. The principle upon which, and the object for
which, armies shall be employed in suppressing rebellion,
must be determined and declared by the civil authori
ties ; and the chief executive, who is charged with the
administration of the national affairs, is the proper and
only source through which the needs and orders of the
Government can be made known to tlj.e armies of the
nation.

Age35.] general m^clellan's order. 311
" Discussions by officers and soldiers concerning public
measures determined upon and declared by the Govern
ment, when carried once beyond temperate and respect
ful expressions of opinion, tend greatly to impair and
destroy the discipline and efficiency of troops, by substi
tuting the spirit of political faction for that firm, steady,
and earnest support of the authority of the Government,
which is the highest duty of the American soldier. The
remedy for political errors, if any are committed, is to be
found only in the action of the people at the polls.
" In thus calling the attention of this army to the true
relation between the soldier and the Government, the
general commanding merely adverts to an evil against
which it has been thought advisable, during our whole
history, to guard the armies of the republic, and in so
doing he will not be considered by any right-minded per
son as casting any reflection upon that loyalty and good
conduct which has been so fully illustrated upon so many
battle-fields. " In carrying out all measures of public policy, this
army will, of course, be guided by the same rules of
mercy and Christianity that have ever controlled their
conduct towards the defenceless.
"By order of Major-General McClellan.
James A. Hardee,
" IAeut.-Col., Aide-de-Camp, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.
" George B. McClellan,
"Major-General commanding."
The seeming inactivity ofthe Army ofthe Poto
mac after the battle of Antietam was a disappoint
ment to the public, and an annoyance to the Ad
ministration. It was expected that Lee's retreat
ing forces would be instantly and vigorously pur
sued, and a new path to Eiehmond opened through
his broken columns.

312 ADVANCE ORDERED BY THE PRESIDENT. [1862.
The earnest desire of the Administration for a
forward movement at length took the form of a
positive and peremptory order, which was received
on the 7th of October, and is as follows : —
"Washington, D. C, October 6, 1862.
"I am instructed to telegraph you as follows. The
President directs that you cross the Potomac and give
battle to the enemy, or drive him south. Your army
must move now, while the roads are good. If you cross
the river between the enemy and Washington, and cover
the latter by your operations, you can be reinforced with
thirty thousand men. If you move up the valley of the
Shenandoah, not more than twelve thousand or fifteen
thousand can be sent to you. The President advises the
interior line between Washington and the enemy, but
does not order it. He is very desirous that your army
move as soon as possible. You will immediately report
what line you adopt, and when you intend to cross the
river; also to what point the reinforcements are to be
sent. It is necessary that the plan of your operations be
positively determined on, before orders are given for
building bridges and repairing railroads. I am directed
to add that the Secretary of War and the General-in-
Chief fully concur with the President in these instructions.
"H. W. Halleck,
" General-in-Chief.
" Major-General McClellan."
This order was not immediately carried out, for
a forward movement at that moment was an im
possibility, and, had it been insisted upon, General
McClellan must at once have resigned his com
mand ; but, on the other hand, it cannot be said
that it was disobeyed, for every possible effort was

A.GE35.] THE ARMY IN NEED OF REST. 313
made to comply with its directions, and the geno-
ral-in-chief was day by day informed ofthe progress
that wTas making, and of the reasons why the de
sired advance was delayed.
These reasons are set forth in full in General
McClellan's Eeport, and are substantiated by the
testimony of the chief quartermaster, Colonel In
galls, and of other officers. The army was wholly
deficient in cavalry, and a large part of our troops
were in want of shoes, clothing, blankets, knap
sacks, and shelter-tents. It should be borne in
mind that the presence of the Confederates in
Maryland, and the imperative necessity of driving
them out, had made excessive demands upon the
strength and endurance of the Army of the Poto
mac. It was one of those eases in which nervous
energy is called upon to do the work of muscular
strength : for a while tbe claim is answered, but
sooner or later the time of reaction must come.
After the battle of Antietam a natural exhaustion
followed the unnatural excitement which had been
kept up for a fortnight previous. Had the army
been furnished with clothing and supplies, a rest
of some days would still have been required before
a forward movement would have been expedient or
even safe ; but, in consequence of the deficiencies
above mentioned, a yet further delay was compelled.
The order to cross the Potomac was dated on
the 6th of October, as has been seen, but the move
ment did not begin till the 26th ; and during the
intermediate period the Administration and Gene
ral McClellan were fairly at issue. The case on
27

314 DEFICIENCY IN SUPPLIES.

[1S62.

behalf of the latter may be found stated in his
Eeport; that on behalf of tho Administration, in the
report ofthe Congressional Committee on the Con
duct of the War, and in the appendix to the testi
mony of General Halleck, and is summed up in a
letter of his, addressed to the Secretary of War,
dated October 28, 1862, which was published in
the newspapers of the day at the same time with
the order for removing General McClellan. With
out going into minute detail, without spreading
the whole evidence upon the record, the points of
difference were these : —
General McClellan says that the army is deficient
in clothing and supplies of all kinds, and especially
in horses, that requisitions for the needed articles
had been duly made upon the War Department at
Washington, but that in point of fact they had not
been received, and that until they were received it
wTas not possible for the army to advance.
On the other hand, the Administration, repre
sented by the general-in-chief, says that all General
McClellan's requisitions had been promptly referred
to the proper functionaries, that all the supplies
asked for, horses included, had been procured and
forwarded without delay, and that it was not pos
sible that the army could have been in the desti
tute condition alleged. A long letter from General
Meigs, the Quartermaster-General, is given in sup
port of these positions.
It is easy to see that the statements of the Ad-
mini.stration are not inconsistent with the state
ments of General McClellan. The former say,

Ase35.] GENERAL MEIGS NOT BLAMED. 315
substantially, that certain supplies were put on
board freight-trains at Washington to bo forwarded
to an army stationed at different points in the
neighborhood of Harper's Ferry, forty or fifty
miles off. General McClellan says that these arti
cles were not received; and if credible and unim-
peached witnesses, speaking upon matters within
their knowledge, are to be believed, he proves it.
It is obvious that proof that articles have been
received is not made when it is shown that they
have been despatched to their point of destination.
General McClellan, be it remembered, is only de
fending or justifying himself for not advancing,
and is not making any complaint against the Admin
istration, or against any officer, civil or military, at
Washington. This distinctly appears by the fol
lowing despatch, which was published in connection
with General Halleck's letter to the Secretary of
War, before referred to, as a document in justifica
tion of General McClellan's removal : —
"Head-Quarters Army op the Potomac, Oct. 22, 1862.
"Your despatch of this date is received. I have
never intended in any letter or despatch to make any
accusation against yourself or your department for not
furnishing or forwarding clothing as rapidly as it was
possible for you to do. I believe that every thing has
been done that could be done in this respect. The. idea
that I have tried to convey was that certain portions of
the command were without clothing, and the army could
not move until it was supplied. „ Q R McClellan.
"To Brig.-Gen. Meigs,
1 ' Quartermaster- General."

316 LETTER OF GENERAL MEIGS. [1862.
That supplies sent from Washington in season
were not seasonably received by General McClellan
is further shown by the letter of General Meigs
before referred to, which is one of the documents
in the case on the side of the Administration.
At the commencement of this letter he says that
"all the articles of clothing called for by requisition
from General McClellan's head-quarters were not
only ordered, but had been shipped, on the 14th of
October," — a date, it will be observed, eight days
later than the day on which the army had been
ordered to cross the Potomac; but in subsequent
portions of the letter statements and admissions
are made which show that further delays may have
taken place in the transportation, and that indeed
they did. Some of these are transcribed without
further comment : —
" This department cannot control the trains upon rail
roads of which the War Department has not taken the
management into its own hands."
"The railroad companies complain that cars are not
unloaded at their destinations, and that their sidings are
occupied with cars which are needed for forwarding sup
plies. I presume that the missing articles are in some of
these cars, or that they have been unloaded and have not
yet reached the particular corps or detachment for which
they are intended."
"The fact is that no railroad can provide facilities for
unloading cars and transacting the business attending
the supply of an army of the size of General McClellan's
in a short time or in a contracted space. Sidings, switches,
depots, and turn-outs do not exist, and cannot be laid down
at once, for such a traffic."

Age 35.] GENERAL HAUPT'S CIRCULAR. 317
"The railroads are heavily taxed, and transportation
has been delayed. A case is reported in which horses
remained fifty hours on the cars without food or water."
There is yet another piece of evidence showing
that there had been delays in the transportation
of supplies to the army of General McClellan. In
August, 1862, the superintendence and management
of all the railways used by the Government for
military purposes were intrusted to Brigadier-Gene
ral Haupt, a competent and energetic officer. On
the 10th of November, five days after the date of
the order removing General McClellan, he ad
dressed, from Washington, a circular letter to post-
quartermasters, commissaries, officers and agents
of military railroads, from which we make a few
extracts : —
"Gentlemen: — The exceedingly critical condition of
affairs compels me to address to you this circular, and to
endeavor, with all the earnestness and force of language
I can command, to explain some of the difficulties con
nected with military railroad transportation, and ask
your co-operation and assistance in forwarding supplies.
"The army is dependent for its supplies upon a single-
track railroad, in bad condition, without sidings of suffi
cient length, without wood, with a short supply of water,
and with insufficient equipments. This road is taxed
with an amount of business equal to the ordinary freights
of a large city, — an amount four times as large as it has
ever before been called on to accommodate, and twice as
large as I reported to General McClellan its capacity for
transportation. "There cannot be the most distant prospect of keeping
the army supplied without constant, uninterrupted move-
27*

318 WANT OF HORSES. [1862.
ment of trains day and night. The delicate machinery
of the road must not be deranged by any detention or
interference. It must be directed by one mind, and one
only. "Again I say that, if the army is to be supplied, the
condition which, in its importance, transcends all others,
is that no delay — not even a minute — should be allowed
to occur in unloading cars, if it can be avoided. Move
ment, unceasing movement, in the trains, is our only
salvation. Without it, the army must either retreat or
starve." The above extracts alone are enough to make
out General McClellan's case ; for they show that
the road upon which the army was exclusively de
pendent for supplies was taxed beyond its capacity,
and that there was a want of system in its manage
ment by which unnecessary delays were incurred ;
and this was all General McClellan ever asked the
Administration to believe.
In the opinion of General McClellan, the most
important want in the army was the want of horses,
¦ — not merely for cavalry and artillery, but for trans
portation. From the commencement the army had
been deficient in cavalry; and after the battle of
Antietam constant reconnoissances upon the Vir
ginia side of the river, to learn the enemy's position
and movements, had broken down the greater part
of the cavalry-horses. A violent disease, attacking
the hoof and tongue, soon after broke out among
the animals, and at one time put nearly four thou
sand of them out of condition for service. To such

Age35.] NUMBER OF HORSES REQUIRED. 319
an extent had the cavalry arm become reduced, that
when the Confederate general Stuart made his raid
into Pennsylvania, on the 11th of October, with two
thousand men, penetrating as far as Chambersburg,
General McClellan could only mount eight hundred
men to follow him. Few civilians have any notion
of the number of horses which are required by an
army of a hundred thousand men. Indeed, we may
go further, and. say that few civilians have any dis
tinct notion of what an army of a hundred thou
sand men is. We -repeat the words mechanically,
as we repeat the distances of the solar system,
without any very definite impressions of numbers
and mass in one case, or of space in the other. The
following extract from General McClellan's Eeport
will, we presume, be read with some surprise by
most of our readers, as well as with interest.
"In a letter dated October 14, 1862, the general-in-
chief says, —
'"It is also reported to me that the number of animals
with your army in the field is about thirty-one thousand.
It is believed that your present proportion of cavalry and
of animals is much larger than that of any other of our
armies.' "What number of animals our other armies had," says
General McClellan, "I am not prepared to say; but mili
tary men in European armies have been of the opinion
that an army, to be efficient, while carrying on active
operations in the field, should have a cavalry force equal
in numbers to from one-sixth to one-fourth of the in,-
fantry force. My cavalry did not amount to one-twentieth
part of the »rmy, and hence the necessity of giving every
one of my cavalry-soldiers a serviceable horse.

o'20 NUMBER OF HORSES REQUIRED. [1SC2.
"Cavalry may be said to constitute the antenna- of an
army. It scouts all the roads in front, on the flanks, and
in the rear of the advancing columns, and constantly
feels the enemy. The amount of labor falling upon this
arm during the Maryland campaign was excessive.
"To persons not familiar with the movements of troops,
and the amount of transportation required for a large
army marching away from water or railroad communica
tions, the number of animals mentioned by the general-
in-chief may have appeared unnecessarily large ; but to
a military man, who takes the trouble to enter into an
accurate and detailed computation of the number of
pounds of subsistence and forage required for such an
army as that of the Potomac, it will be seen that the
thirty-one thousand animals were considerably less than
was absolutely necessary to an advance.
"As we were required to move through a country which
could not he depended upon for any of our supplies, it
became necessary to transport every thing in wagons, and
to be prepared for all emergencies. I did not consider it
safe to leave the river without subsistence and forage for
ten days.
"The official returns of that date show the aggregate
strength of the army for duty to have been about one
hundred and ten thousand men of all arms. This did
not include teamsters, citizen-employees, officers' servants,
&c, amounting to some twelve thousand men, which gives
a total of one hundred and twenty-two thousand men.
"The subsistence alone of this army for ten days
required for its transportation eighteen hundred and
thirty wagons, at two thousand pounds to the wagon,
and ten thousand nine hundred and eighty animals.
"Our cavalry-horses at that time amounted to five
thousand and forty-six, and our artillery-horses to si.x
thousand eight hundred and thirty-six.
"To transport full forage for these twenty-two thou-

Age 35.]

WANT OF HORSES. 321

sand eight hundred and sixty-two animals for ten day si
required seventeen thousand eight hundred and thirty-
two additional animals ; and this forage would only sup
ply the entire number (forty thousand six hundred and
ninety-four) of animals with a small fraction over half-
allowance for the time specified.
"It will be observed that this estimate does not em
brace the animals necessary to transport quartermasters'
supplies, baggage, camp-equipage, ambulances, reserve
ammunition, forage for officers' horses, &c, which would
greatly augment the necessary transportation.
" It may very truly be said that we did make the march
with the means at our disposal ; but it will be remembered
that we met with no serious opposition from the enemy,
neither did we encounter delays from any other cause.
The roads were in excellent condition, and the troops
marched with the most commendable order and celerity.
" If we had met with a determined resistance from the
enemy, and our progress had been very much retarded
thereby, we would have consumed our supplies before
they could have been renewed. A proper estimate of my
responsibilities as the commander of that army did not
justify me in basing my preparations for the expedition
upon the supposition that I was to have an uninterrupted
march. On the contrary, it was my duty to be prepared
for all emergencies ; and not the least important of my
responsibilities was the duty of making ample provision
for supplying my men and animals with rations and
forage." In regard to the supply of horses, and the con
flicting views of General McClellan and the Admin
istration thereupon, one or two points are worthy
of notice. General Meigs, in a letter written on
the 14th of October and addressed to the general-

322 WANT OF HORSES. [1862.
in-chief, states, " There have been issued, therefore,
to the Army of tho Potomac, since the battles in
front of Washington, to replace losses, (9254) nine
thousand two hundred and fifty-four horses."
From this statement a reader would naturally infer
that this number had been sent to the army under
General McClellan ; but it appears from a report
of Colonel Myers, the chief quartermaster with
that army, that only (3813) three thousand eight
hundred and thirteen came to the forces with which
General McClellan was ordered to follow and at
tack the enemy, and that these were not enough
to supply the places of the animals disabled by
sickness and overwork; and General McClellan dis
tinctly states that on the 21st of October, after de
ducting the force engaged in picketing the river,
he had but about a thousand serviceable cavalry-
horses. General Halleck, in a letter to General McClellan
dated October 14, 1862, in reply to a despatch of
the 12th, says, — •
" In regard to horses, you say that the present rate of
supply is only one hundred and fifty per week for the
entire army here and in front of Washington. I find
from the records that the issues for the last six weeks
have been eight thousand seven hundred and fifty-four,
making an average per week of one thousand four hun
dred and fifty-nine."
The same charge is repeated in his letter to the
Secretary of War of October 28, and is also found
in General Meigs's letter of October 14. In tho

Age 35.] QUESTION OF FACT. 323
original despatch to which General Halleck's letter
is a reply, one thousand and fifty (1050), and not
one hundred and fifty, is the number stated; and,
as it was written out in letters in full, it is difficult
to see how the telegraphic operator could have
made a mistake in transmitting the message. The
gross injustice done to General McClellan in thus
holding him up to the public as guilty either of de
liberate untruth or of enormous carelessness, need
not be commented upon.
The question between the authorities at Wash
ington and General McClellan was a question of
fact. Neither the President nor the general-in-
chief nor the Secretary of War would have insisted
upon the army's advancing without shoes, clothing,
and horses ; but it was charged, or at least inti
mated, that the army, in point of fact, was suffi
ciently supplied with them all, and that the alleged
want of them was a mere pretext put forward by
the general in command to excuse his slowness, in
dolence, or lack of zeal in the cause. Upon this
issue we may repeat, what was said before as to the
charge of needless delay in forwarding the troops
from Harrison's Bar, that General McClellan stands
upon the ground of knowledge and the Adminis
tration upon the ground of inference. The testi
mony of one credible witness swearing affirmatively
to what he knows outweighs that of twenty who
can only contradict him by a process of deductive
reasoning. The case cannot be put more simply
or moro forcibly than has been done by General
McClellan himself in his Eeport : —

324 GENERAL MCCLELLAN'S STATEMENT. [1862.
" The general-in-chief, in a letter to the Secretary of
War on the 28th of October, says, ' In my opinion, there
has been no such want of supplies in the army under
General McClellan as to prevent his compliance with the
orders to advance against the enemy.'
" Notwithstanding this opinion expressed by such high
authority, I am compelled to say again that the delay in
the reception of necessary supplies up to that date had
left the army in a condition totally unfit to advance
against the enemy ; that an advance under the existing
circumstances would, in my judgment, have been attended
with the highest degree of peril, with great suffering and
sickness among the men, and with imminent danger of
being cut off from our supplies by the superior cavalry
force of the enemy, and with no reasonable prospect of
gaining any advantage over him.
"I dismiss this subject with the remark that I have
found it impossible to resist the force of my own convic
tions, that the commander of an army, who from the
time of its organization has for eighteen months been in
constant communication with its officers and men, the
greater part of the time engaged in active service in the
field, and who has exercised this command in many bat
tles, must certainly be considered competent to determine
whether his army is in proper condition to advance on
the enemy or not; and he must necessarily possess greater
facilities for forming a correct judgment in regard to the
wants of his men and the condition of his supplies than
the general-in-chief in his office at Washington City."
Injustice to General McClellan, and that it may be
understood that he was not at all open to the charge
of disobedience of orders, it should be stated that
the President's peremptory instructions of October
6, to cross the Potomac and give battle to the

Age 35.] NO TIME LOST. 325
enemy or drive him south, were nevor distinctly
repeated. From the moment of receiving them,
General McClellan set himself diligently at work
to get his army in condition to obey them; and
from day to day, almost from hour to hour, he sent
to Washington reports of his condition and pro
gress. His telegraphic despatches between Sep
tember 6 and November 7, mostly addressed to
the general-in-chief, were one hundred and fifty-
eight in number ; and no stronger proof can be ad
duced of his attention to his duties, and of his
earnest desire that the Government should be fully
informed alike of the state of his own army, and
of the movements of the enemy as far as he could
learn them. As the orders to cross the river were
not renewed, General McClellan had a right to sup
pose that the Administration were satisfied that he
was straining every nerve to get the army in order
for a forward movement, and on that account for
bore to repeat the command. But the evidence on
this point is not merely negative, but positive, as ap
pears from the following extract from his Eeport : —
" Knowing the solicitude of the President for an early
movement, and sharing with him fully his anxiety for
prompt action, on the 21st of October I telegraphed to
the general-in-chief as follows : —
'"Head-Quarters Army of the Potomac, j
October 21, 1862. j
"'Since the receipt of the President's order to move
•'on the enemy, I have been making every exertion to get
this army supplied with clothing absolutely necessary for
marching. 28

326 NO TIME LOST,

[1862.

" 'This, I am happy to say, is now nearly accomplished.
I have also, during the same time, repeatedly urged upon
you the importance of supplying cavalry and artillery
horses to replace those broken down by hard service; and
steps have been taken to insure a prompt delivery.
" ' Our cavalry, even when well supplied with horses, is
much inferior in numbers to that of the enemy, but in
efficiency has proved itself superior. So forcibly has this
been impressed upon our old regiments by repeated suc
cesses, that the men are fully persuaded that they are
equal to twice their number of rebel cavalry.
" ' Exclusive of the cavalry force now engaged in picket
ing the river, I have not at present over about one thou
sand (1000) horses for service. Officers have been sent in
various directions to purchase horses, and I expect them
soon. Without more cavalry-horses, our communications,
from the moment we march, would be at the mercy of
the large cavalry forces of the enemy, and it would not be
possible for us to cover our flanks properly, or to obtain
the necessary information of the position and movements
of the enemy, in such a way as to insure success. My
experience has shown the necessity of a large and efficient
cavalry force.
" 'Under the foregoing circumstances, I beg leave to ask
whether the President desires me to march on the enemy
at once, or to await the reception of the new horses, every
possible step having been taken to insure their prompt
arrival. George B. McClellan,
" ' Major-General commanding.
" 'Major-General H. W. Halleck,
" ' Geiieral-in- Chief ', Washington.'
"On the same day General Halleck replied as fol
lows: — "'Washington, October 21, 1862, 3 p. jr.
"'Your telegram of 12 m. has been submitted to the

Age 35.]

MOVEMENT SPEEDED. 327

President. He directs me to say that he has no change
to make in his order of the 6th instant.
'"If you have not been, and are not now, in condition
to obey it, you will be able to show such want of ability.
The President does not expect impossibilities ; but he is
very anxious that all this good weather should not be
wasted in inactivity. Telegraph when you will move,
and on what lines you propose to march.
'"H. W. Halleck, General-in-Chief.
" Major-General George B. McClellan.' "
General Halleck's reply is ambiguous, wary, cold;
but General McClellan had a right to draw from it
the inference which he says he did, as follows : —
" From the tenor of this despatch I conceived that it
was left for my judgment to decide whether or not it was
possible to move with safety to the army at that time ;
and this responsibility I exercised with the more confi
dence in view of the strong assurances of his trust in me,
as commander of that army, with which the President
had seen fit to honor me during his last visit.
" The cavalry requirements, without which an advance
would have been in the highest degree injudicious and
unsafe, were still wanting.
" The country before us was an enemy's country, where
the inhabitants furnished to the enemy every possible
assistance; providing food for men and forage for ani
mals, giving all information concerning our movements,
and rendering every aid in their power to the enemy's
cause. " It was manifest that we should find it, as we subse
quently did, a hostile district, where we could derive no
aid from the inhabitants that would justify dispensing
with the active co-operation of an efficient cavalry force.
Accordingly, I fixed upon the 1st of November as the

328 MOVEMENT BEGUN. [1862.
earliest date at which the forward movement could well
be commenced."
The above inference is strengthened by a subse
quent despatch from General Halleck, dated Octo
ber 26, in which he says, —
" Since you left Washington, I have advised and sug
gested in relation to your movements ; but I have given
you no orders. I do not give you any now. The Govern
ment has intrusted you with defeating and driving back
the rebel army in your front. I shall not attempt to
control you in the measures you may adopt for that pur
pose. You are informed of my views ; but the President
has left you at liberty to adopt them or not, as you may
deem best."
On the 26th of October the army began to cross
the Potomac, and by the 2d of November all the
corps were on the right 'bank, marching to the
South, on a line east of the Blue Eidge, which had
been selected by General McClellan partly because
it would secure him the largest accession of force
and partly because the President had always been
in favor of it. His purpose was to march his army
to a point where it could derive its supplies from
the Manassas Gap Eailway, and where it could be
held in hand ready for action or movement in any
direction. On the 7th of November tbe several corps of the
army were at or near Warrenton, and, as General
McClellan says, "in admirable condition and spirits.
I doubt whether during the whole period that I had
the honor to command the Army of the Potomac,

Age 35.] GENERAL McCLELLAN REMOVED. 329
it was in such excellent condition to fight a great
battle." Of the Confederate army, Longstreet's
corps was in front at Culpepper, and tbe remaining
portion was west of the Blue Eidge, near Chester's
and Thornton's Gaps. General McClellan's plan
was to separate the two wings of the enemy's
forces, and either beat Longstreet separately, or
force him to fall back at least upon Gordonsville
so as to effect his junction with the rest of the
army. In the event of a battle he felt confident
of a brilliant victory. Late on the evening of the
7th, the following orders were delivered to him
by General Buckingham : —
"Head-Quarters op the Army, 1
Washington, D. C, November 5, 1862. J
"General: — On the receipt of the order of the Pre
sident sent herewith, you will immediately turn over
your command to Major-General Burnside, and repair to
Trenton, N. J., reporting on your arrival at that place by
telegraph for further orders.
" Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
"H. W. Halleck, General-in-Chief.
"Major-General McClellan."
"War Department, Adjutant-General's Office, }
Washington, November 5, 1862. j
"General Orders No. 182.
"By direction of the President of the United States,
it is ordered that Major-General McClellan be relieved
from the command of the Army of the Potomac, and
that Major-General Burnside take the command of that
army. " By order of the Secretary of War :
"E. D. Townsend, Adjutant-General."
28* '

330 GENERAL HALLECK'S REPORT. [1862.

CHAPTEE XII.
The reasons for this summary and abrupt dis
missal of General McClellan, strange to say, have
never been distinctly and officially given to the
people of the United States. The President, in his
annual message to Congress, only twenty-six days
later than the date of his order of removal, says
nothing upon the subject.
The general-in-chief, in his Eeport, addressed to
the Secretary of War, says, " From the 17th of
September till the 26th of October, McClellan's
main army remained on the north bank of the
Potomac, in the vicinity of Sharpsburg and Har
per's Ferry. The long inactivity of so large an
army in the face of a defeated foe and during the
most favorable season for rapid movements and a
vigorous campaign, was a matter of great disap
pointment and regret. Your letter of the 27th
and my reply on the 28th of October, in regard to
the alleged causes of this unhappy delay, I here
with submit, marked Exhibit No. 5. In reply to
the telegraphic order of the 6th of October, quoted
in my letter of the 28th, above referred to, Gene
ral McClellan disapproved of the plan of crossing
the Potomac south ofthe Blue Eidge, and said that
he would cross at Harper's Ferry and advance upon
Winchester. He, however, did not begin to cross
till the 26th of October, and then at Berlin.
"The passage occupied several days, and was

Age 35.] GENERAL HALLECK'S REPORT. 331
completed about the 3d of November. What
caused him to change his views, or what his plan
of campaign was, I am ignorant ; for about this
time he ceased to communicate with me in regard
to his operations, sending his reports directly to
the President.* On the 5th instant I received

* This is a curious sentence, and deserves a Httle examina
tion. The date of the document on which it appears is Decem
ber 2, 1862, and the general-in-chief says that on that day he
was ignorant of General McClellan's plans because the latter,
from a date about a month previous, had ceased to communi
cate with him personally and had sent his reports directly to
the President. Are we to understand that the relations
between the President and the general-in-chief were such
during the whole month of November, 1862, that the latter
never saw, never was informed of, the communications ad
dressed to the former by the general commanding the largest
army in the field? But, if the statement does not mean this,
it is a mere gratuitous effusion of spite against General Mc
Clellan. If it means this, will any body believe it?
Again, "about this time" General McClellan ceased to com
municate with the general-in-chief. About what time? Two
dates had just before been mentioned, — October 26 and Novem
ber. 3; and there is nothing to indicate which of the two was
meant. If it were the latter, General McClellan could not
have had time to send many communications to anybody after
that day, as he was deprived of his command on the 7th : if it
were the former, then the statement is not true; for in the ap
pendix to General Halleck's testimony, as published by the
Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War, there ap
pear no less than six despatches addressed to him by General
McClellan after October 26.
General McClellan's communications to the President were
generally in reply to inquiries or suggestions from the latter,
whose restless and meddlesome spirit was constantly moving

332 NO CAUSE ASSIGNED FOR THE REMOVAL. [1862.
the written order of the President relieving Gene
ral McClellan and placing General Burnside in com
mand of the Army of the Potomac. This order
was transmitted by a special messenger, who de
livered it to General McClellan at Eectortown on
the 7th."
Here it will be seen that no reason is assigned
for what the general-in-chief chooses to call " re
lieving" General McClellan; but, from the whole
evidence before him, the reader is left to infer that
he was removed because he had disobeyed the
orders of the President without cause or excuse.
The orders in question, to cross the river and
attack the enemy, were given on the 6th of Oc
tober, the forward movement began on the 26th
of the same month, and the removal of General
McClellan was made on the 5th of November,
when the army were thirty or forty miles on
their march, in splendid condition and high spirits.
him to ask questions, obtrude advice, and make comments
upon military matters, which were as much out of his sphere
as they were beyond his comprehension.
It is true that General McClellan did not communicate his
plans of the campaign either to the President or the general-
in-chief; but surely he is to be commended for this. The suc
cess of a military movement often depends upon its being kept
an entire secret from the enemy. General McClellan had
learned by experience tbe danger of revealing, even in official
conversation, his future operations; and it would have been an
increased risk if he had made the telegraph-wire a confidant.
The whole passage is characteristic of the inventive in
genuity which has been shown, from first to last, in devising
pretexts to find fault with General McClellan.

AGE 35.] REMOVED FOR POLITICAL REASONS. 333
In other words, an officer is removed for disobey
ing orders not only one month after they were
given, but eleven days after he had begun to obey
them ! The Administration must have great con
fidence in the credulity of the public if they sup
pose this will be received as the real cause why
General McClellan was deprived of his command.
Had this been done immediately after the 6th of
October, or at least soon after, the pretext would
have had some show of seeming.
The real reasons for which General McClellan
was removed were political, and not military. They
are to be found in the wide difference of views
between his letter of July 7, 1862, written at Har
rison's Landing, on the policy and conduct of the
war, and the President's Proclamation of Septem
ber 22. That letter incurred for General McClellan
the unrelenting hostility of the political party
which constrained the President to issue the Pro
clamation ; and the same influences, or "pressure,"
which procured the, document in question, com
pelled the removal of General McClellan. And
that a strong " pressure" was brought to bear upon
the President is unquestionable; for on the 13th
of September, in an interview with a deputation
from Chicago, when urged to issue a proclama
tion of emancipation, he distinctly declined it,
saying, among other things, " What good would
a proclamation of emancipation from me do, espe
cially as we are now situated ? I do not want
to issue a document that the whole world will see
must necessarily be inoperative, like the Pope's bul..

334 THESE NO JUSTIFICATION. [1862.
against the comet. Would my word free the slaves,
when I cannot even enforce the Constitution in the
rebel States ? Is there a single court or individual
that would be influenced by it there ? And what
reason is there to think it would have any greater
effect upon the slaves than the late law of Con
gress which I approved, and which offers protection
and freedom to the slaves of rebel masters who
come within our lines ? Yet I cannot learn that
the law has caused a single slave to come over to
us." It is hardly possible to suppose that in the
short space of eleven days the mind of the Pre
sident had undergone a process of natural conver
sion upon a point of such vital moment.
But General McClellan's political opinions, and
his manly avowal of them, afford no justifica
tion for his removal from the command of the
army. He had shown by word and deed that he
would do his duty as a soldier, within his sphere,
whatever political policy the Administration might
adopt or whatever political aspects the war might
assume. This was all the Administration had a
right to ask. That he had the confidence and affec
tion of his army is beyond question. His removal
was due to a fact stated affirmatively — though put
in the form of a question to General McDowell—
by a member of the Congressional Committee on
the Conduct of the War, December 26, 1861,— that
"there is a political element connected with this
war which . must not be overlooked." There has
indeed been such an "element" from the beginning
in the conduct of this war; it never has been

Age 35.] FAREWELL ADDRESS. 335
" overlooked," but has always been prominent, and
set in the front of the battle, and has been tbe
fruitful source of mistakes and disasters to our
cause. In the present instance it led to the dan
gerous experiment of changing commanders in
front of an enemy; and the bitter experience of
Fredericksburg was the direct result.
The first act of General McClellan on receiving
the order relieving him of command was to draw
up a farewell address to the army, as follows, —
which was read to them at dress-parade on the
10th :—

,\

" Head-Quarters Army of the Potomac,
Camp near Rectortown, November 7, 1862.
" Officers and Soldiers of the Army of the Potomac : —
"An order of the President devolves upon Major-Gene
ral Burnside the command of this army. In parting
from you, I cannot express the love and gratitude I bear
you. As an army you have grown up under my care. In
you I have never found doubt or coldness. The battles
you have fought under my command will proudly live in
our nation's history. The glory }'ou have achieved, our
mutual perils and fatigues, the graves of our comrades
fallen in battle and by disease, the broken forms of those
whom wounds and sickness have disabled, — the strongest
associations which can exist among men, — unite us still
by an indissoluble tie. We shall ever be comrades in
supporting the Constitution of our country and the nation
ality of its people. "George B. McClellan,
" Major-General, U. S. A."
On Saturday, November 8, General McClellan
was busily occupied in making the arrangements

336 TAKES LEAVE OF THE ARMY. [1862.
necessary for transferring his command to General
Burnside. The two generals, between whom the
personal relations were entirely friendly, were in
consultation for several hours.
At nine o'clock on the evening of Sunday, the
9th, General McClellan took leave of his staff
officers by appointment. It was a touching and
impressive scene. A large fire of logs was blazing
within the enclosure formed by the tents of the
head-quarters. General McClellan stood just inside
of his marquee, the curtains of which were parted
and drawn up. As the officers of his staff ap
proached, he grasped each warmly by the hand,
and, with a few words of friendly greeting, ushered
him inside. The tent was soon filled, and many
were compelled to remain outside. Filling a glass
of wine, General McClellan raised it, and said, " To
the Army of the Potomac," to which an officer
present added, "and to its old commander." An
hour or two of social converse passed, and the
officers took leave of their beloved commander, —
sadly, sorrowfully.
Monday, the 10th, was occupied in visiting the
various camps and bidding farewell to his troops.
A person present at this scene has thus described
it: — "As General McClellan, mounted upon a fine
horse, attended by a retinue of fine-looking military
men, riding rapidly through the ranks, gracefully
recognized and bade a farewell to the army, the
cries and demonstrations of the men were beyond
bounds, — wild, impassioned, and unrestrained. Dis
regarding all military forms, they rushed from their

Age 35.]

LEAVES WARRENTON. 337

ranks, and thronged around him with the bitterest
complaints against those who had removed from
command their beloved leader."
As he rode up to the head-quarters of General
Fitz-John Porter, he was met by a large delega
tion of officers in that command, and addressed by
General Butterfield, who, in a few well-chosen
words, alluded to the affection existing between
General McClellan and his officers, and stated that
those on behalf of whom he spoke were there to
bid him a personal farewell. In reply, General Mc
Clellan said, " I hardly know what to say to you,
my friends, officers associated with me so long in
the Army of the Potomac. I can only bid you
farewell. History will do justice to the deeds of
the Army of the Potomac, if the present generation
does not. I feel as if I had been intimately con
nected with each and all of you. Nothing is more
binding than the friendship of companions in arms.
May you all in future preserve the high reputation
of our army, and serve all as well and faithfully as
you have served me. I will say farewell now, if I
must say it. Good-bye : God bless you."
On the 11th, General McClellan left Warrenton.
On reaching Warrenton Junction, a salute was
fired. The troops, who had been drawn up in line,
afterwards broke their ranks ; the soldiers crowded
around him, and many eagerly called for a few
parting words. He said, in response, while stand
ing on the platform ofthe railroad-station, " I wish
you to stand by General Burnside as you have stood
by me, and all will be. well." 29

338 RECEPTION AT TRENTON. [1862.
He reached Washington, but, without stopping,
went to the station of the Philadelphia Eailroad,
and proceeded to the latter city in the train which
started at five p.m. He arrived at Philadelphia
about midnight, and was there greeted with music
and cheers from a crowd assembled to welcome him.
He appeared upon the platform, and said, —
" Fellow-citizens of Philadelphia, I thank you for your
kindness. I have parted with your brothers and sons in
the Army of the Potomac too recently to make a speech.
Our parting was sad. I can say nothing more to you ; and
I do not think you ought to expect a speech from me."
He arrived at Trenton, his point of destination,
at four o'clock on the morning of the 12th.
On the evening of the 13th, an address of welcome
was made to General McClellan, on behalf of the
citizens of Trenton, by Andrew Dutcher, Esq. A
large number of interested and sympathizing spec
tators were present. In reply, he said, —
"My friends, — for I feel that you are all my friends, —
I stand before you not as a maker of speeches, not as a
politician, but as a soldier. I came among you to seek
quiet and repose, and from the moment I came among
you I have received nothing but kindness ; and, although
1 came among you a stranger, I am well acquainted with
your history. Prom the time I took command, your gal
lant sons were with me, from the siege of Yorktown
to the battle of Antietam. I was with them, and wit
nessed their bravery, and that of the ever-faithful and
ever-true Taylor and the intrepid and dashing Kearney.
One word more. While the army is fighting, you, as citi
zens, should see that the war is prosecuted for the preser-

AaE 36.] VISIT TO BOSTON. 339
vation of the Union and the Constitution, for your nation
ality and rights as citizens."
Since the time of his removal from the command
of the Army of the Potomac, General McClellan
has not had any military duties assigned to him,
but has been living, unemployed, the life of a pri
vate citizen. At this moment of writing (July, 1864),
he resides at Orange, in the State of New Jersey,
where his home has been for some months past.
In the winter of 1863, General McClellan, accom
panied by his wife and two or three officers of his
staff, paid a visit to Boston, arriving there on the
29th of January and remaining till the 8th of
February. He came upon the invitation of seve
ral gentlemen, not all of one political party,
but all uniting in their desire to testify to him in
person their gratitude for his services and the
esteem in which they held him as an officer and a
citizen. Though the visit was thus strictly private,
the general and earnest desire of the people to see
him gave to it something of the nature of a public
reception. His movements were followed and his
steps watched by earnest and interested crowds,
who greeted him, whenever he was seen, with
hearty enthusiasm. His time was busily employed
in visiting the points of attraction in Boston and
its neighborhood, and in receiving those social at
tentions which were tendered to him with a most
liberal hand. His visit must have been highly grati
fying to him; and it is certain that he left a most
agreeable impression upon all who met him, from

8.4.(> '"V; VISIT TO BOSTON. [1863.
¦ his MftdeV and simple manners, and his careful
abstinence from self-reference and complaints of
others. It was easy to see that he had qualified
himself to command others by first learning to
command himself.
During his stay in Boston a very handsome
sword was presented to him; and the value of the
testimonial was enhanced by the fact that the cost,
amounting to several hundred dollars, was defrayed
by a subscription limited to one dollar from each
person. Among the subscribers — to their honor
be it said — were not a few members of the Eepubli-
can party, who, while they supported the Adminis
tration, were willing to acknowledge its mistakes.
The inscription which the sword bore, "Pro rege
ssepe, pro patria semper," excited an amount of
discussion and comment in the newspaper press in
which future observers will recognize an amusing
instance ofthe importance which trifles may assume
when viewed through a properly magnifying
medium. While in Boston, he was invited to visit Concord,
New Hampshire, Portland and Augusta, in Maine,
and other places; but he was not able to accept
any of these gratifying invitations.
In October, 1863, the State election in Pennsyl
vania took place. Governor Curtin was the Eepub-
lican candidate for Governor, and Judge Woodward
the Democratic. The election was contested with
great ardor, and all over the country much interest
was felt in the result. It was thought that the vote
of the soldiers, who were coming into the State

Age 36.] LETTER IN FAVOR OF JUDGE WOOD
in great numbers, was of much import?
would, perhaps, decide tbe contest. They
devoted to General McClellan ; but an impression
was spread among them that he was in favor of
Governor Curtin. A correspondent of" The Press,"
a leading political journal, had so stated. Under
these circumstances, it was deemed by the friends
of Judge Woodward highly important that this
erroneous impression should be removed by a dis
tinct contradiction under General McClellan's own
hand. Accordingly, one of Judge Woodward's
friends left Philadelphia on Sunday evening, Octo
ber 11, — the day of the election being Tuesday,
October 13, — and went to Orange, New Jersey,
and laid the whole matter before General McClel
lan. The result was the following letter : —
" Orange, New Jersey, October 12, 1863.
" Hon. Charles J. Ingersoll, Philadelphia.
" Dear Sir : — My attention has been called to an article
in the Philadelphia ' Press,' asserting that I had written
to the managers of a Democratic meeting at Allentown,
disapproving the objects of the meeting, and that, if I
voted or spoke, it would be in favor of Governor Curtin.
I am informed that similar assertions have been made
throughout the State. It has been my earnest endeavor
heretofore to avoid participating in party politics, and I
am determined to adhere to this course.
" But it is obvious that I cannot longer maintain silence
under such misrepresentations.
" I therefore request you to deny that I have written
any such letter or entertained any such views as those
attributed to me in the Philadelphia 'Press,' and I de
sire to state, clearly and distinctly, that, having some few
29*

342 LETTER IN FAVOR OF JUDGE WOODWARD. [1863.
days ago had a full conversation with Judge Woodward,
I find that our views agree, and I regard his election as
Governor of Pennsylvania called for by the interests of
the nation.
" I understand Judge Woodward to be in favor of the
prosecution of the war, with all the means at the com
mand of the loyal States, until the military power of the
rebellion is destroyed. I understand him to be of the
opinion that, while the war is waged with all possible
decision and energy, the policy directing it should be in
consonance with the principles of humanity and civiliza
tion, working no injury to private rights and property not
demanded by military law among civilized nations ; and,
finally, I understand him to agree with me in the opinion
that the sole great objects of this war are the restoration
of the unity of the nation, the preservation of the Consti
tution, and the supremacy of the laws of the country.
"Believing that our opinions entirely agree on these
points, I would, were it in my power, give to Judge
Woodward my voice and my vote.
" I am, very respectfully, yours,
"George B. McClellan."
The above letter was immediately telegraphed
to Philadelphia, but it was not published till late
in the afternoon of Monday, the 12th, and then it
was freely denounced as a forgery ; and thus it
failed to exert the influence upon the election which
it might have done had it appeared earlier.
General McClellan must have been flattered by
the amount and character of the discussion which
this letter called forth, since it proved how much
weight was attached to his name and opinion.
There are occasions in the life of every public man

Age 37.] FIRST NEW YORK CAVALRY.

313

in which he will be blamed whether he does a cer
tain act or declines to do it; and this was one
of those occasions. Those who were loudest in
denouncing him for writing and publishing the
letter would have been entitled to a better hearing
had they uttered a word of censure upon the shame
ful fraud which drew it forth from a man always
disinclined to embrace opportunities for public dis
play, and who now only exercised the undoubted
right of every freeman.
On the 18th of February, 1864, an incident
occurred in the city of New York, which showed
how much the soldiers of the Army of the Potomac
were attached to their old commander. On that
day, an official reception was given by the munici
pal authorities to the veterans of the First New
York Cavalry, at which General McClellan, under
whom they had served, was present. When the
approach of their old commander was announced,
the soldiers rushed to the door to meet him; and
as he entered the room they crowded round him
so that he could hardly walk. After an inter
change of greetings between him and the officers,
Colonel McEeynolds, who commanded the regi
ment, spoke as follows : —
" Soldiers : — But a, short time ago the chairman of this
occasion did us the honor to refer to the fact that the
First New York Cavalry were the last on the Chicka
hominy and the first to reach the James_River. It was a
proud announcement, gentlemen, and it was true. I
now have the honor, and the great pleasure, to announce
to you that the noble chieftain who led the Army of the

344 SPEECH AT NEW YORK. [1864.
Potomac on that occasion, that matchless chieftain, Gene
ral George B. McClellan — [cheers lasting several minutes],
—I do not blame you for your enthusiasm, — General
George B. McClellan, has honored you with his presence.
If you will keep still for a moment, I have no doubt he
will speak to you."
General McClellan replied, as follows : —
" Mv Friends and Comrades : — I came here not to make
a speech to you, but to welcome you home, and express
to you the pride I have always felt in watching your
career, not only when you were with me, but since I left
the Army of the Potomac, while you have been fighting
battles under others, and your old commander. I can
tell you now, conscientiously and truly, I am proud of
you in every respect. There is not one page of your
record — not a line of it — of which you, your State, and
your country may not be proud. I congratulate you on
the patriotism that so many of you have evinced in your
desire to re-enter the service. I hope, I pray, and I know
that your future career will be as glorious as your past.
I have one other hope; and that is that we may yet serve
together some day again."
Loud cheers followed the conclusion of this
speech, and officers and men cried out, " We'll fol
low you anywhere, general !"
After a speech from Major Harkins, General
McClellan took leave with a few words of farewell,
the soldiers cheering and crowding round him as
he went out of the room.
General McClellan has recently appeared before
the public, with much honor to himself, in a lite
rary capacity. In the autumn of 1863, the officers

Age 37.] BATTLE MONUMENT AT WEST POINT. 345
of the army stationed at West Point formed an
association for erecting at that post a monument
in commemoration of such officers of the regular
army as shall have fallen in the service during the
present war. The permission of the Secretary of
War to erect the proposed monument at West Point
was obtained, and letters were addressed to com
manding generals and others, describing the pro
ject and soliciting co-operation. Many favorable
replies were received; and in January, 1864, a
general circular was sent to the officers of the army,
setting forth the plan and asking subscriptions.
The response to this appeal was so universal,
prompt, and earnest that the committee who had
the enterprise in charge felt authorized to make
choice of a site for the proposed monument and
have it consecrated by appropriate religious cere
monies. Trophy Point, on the northern brow of
the plain on which West Point stands, was accord
ingly selected, and the 15th of June, 1864, was
named as the day for its dedication. General
McClellan was requested to deliver the oration.
On the appointed day the site for the proposed
monument was consecrated by appropriate religious
services. The oration by General McClellan was
heard with great interest and deep attention by a
very large audience, and, after its delivery, was
immediately published in many of the Democratic
newspapers of the country. It was much com
mended by all who had the opportunity to read it
and were unprejudiced enough to avail themselves
of such opportunity, for its high-toned patriotism,

346 SPEECH AT LAKE GEORGE. [1864.
its judicious choice of topics, its natural eloquence,
and manly energy of style.*
In the course of a brief excursion which followed
the delivery of the address above alluded to, Gene
ral McClellan received many gratifying proofs of
the affectionate attachment felt for him by the peo
ple of the country generally, and of the lively inte
rest with which they follow his movements. On
the evening of the 18th of June, at Fort William
Henry, on the banks of Lake George, he was sere
naded; and, at the close of the music, having been
introduced by Judge Brown to the numerous party
which had assembled to pay their respects to him,
he addressed them, as follows: —
" I thank you, my friends, for this welcome and pleasing
evidence of your regard. It is a most happy termination
of the delightful week I have passed in the midst of this
beautiful region, among such warm and friendly hearts.
When men come, as you have done, some many miles
from the mountains and valleys, it means something
more than empty compliment or idle courtesy. At all
events, I so regard it, and understand this sudden gather
ing of men who are in truth the strength of the nation
as intended to show your love and gratitude to the gal
lant men who have so long fought under my command,
* On account of the striking merits both of substance and
form of this discourse, — and it is of no more than moderate
length, — it is inserted in the Appendix in full, in the belief
that General McClellan's friends will be glad to possess, in a
shape less fleeting than that of a newspaper or pamphlet, a
production so strongly stamped with the characteristics of his
mind and character.

Age 37.] SPEECH AT LAKE GEORGE. 347
and as an evidence to any who may dare to doubt, whether
abroad, at home, or in the rebellious States, that the people
of this portion of the country intend to support to the
last the Union of our great nation, the sacredness of its
Constitution and laws, against whoever may attack them.
I do not flatter myself that this kind demonstration is a
mark of personal regard to me, but that it means far
more than that. You add to the cogent arguments af
forded by the deeds of your sons and brothers in the field
the sanction and weight of your opinion in favor of the
justice and vital importance of the real cause for which
we are fighting, and the cause which should never be
perverted or lost sight of.
" It has been my good fortune to have had near me in
very trying times many of your near relations. In truth,
there must be among you now men who went with me
through the memorable seven days of battle that com
menced just two years ago to-day. It is only just that I
should thank you now for the valor and patriotism of
your sons and brothers who were with me in the Army of
the Potomac, from Yorktown to Antietam. Yet how
could they be other than brave and patriotic? for they
first saw the light amid scenes classical in our earliest
history, and sprang from ancestors who won and held
their mountains in hundreds of combats against the In
dians, the French, and the English. After a gallant de
fence of the now ruined ramparts of William Henry, the
blood of many of your grandsires moistened the very
ground on which you now stand, in a butchery permitted
by the cruel apathy of Montcalm, who, two years after
wards, suffered for his crimes in the great battle under the
walls of Quebec, where others of your ancestors bore a
most honorable part. Ticonderoga, Crown Point, Sara
toga, are all names made sacred to you by the bravery
of your fathers, who there made illustrious the name of
American troops.

348 EXTRACT FROM REPORT.
"In this latter and more dreadful war you and yours
have proved worthy of the reputation of your predeces
sors. And, whatever sacrifice may yet be necessary, I am
confident that you will never consent willingly to be
citizens of a divided and degraded nation, but that you
will so support the actions of your fellow-countrymen
in the field that we shall be victorious, and again have
peace and a reunited country, when the hearts of the
North and South shall again beat in unison, as they did
in the good old times of the Eevolution, when our Union
and Constitution shall be as firm as the mountains which
encircle this lovely lake, and the future of the Eepublie
shall be as serene as the waters of Horieon when no
breeze ripples its surface."

CHAPTEE XIII.

The final chapter of the biography of General
McClellan can find no more appropriate opening
than the concluding pages of his Eeport, in which
he gives a brief abstract of the history and fortunes
of the Army of the Potomac, comprising what they
did, what they failed to do, and the reasons for
both. " In this Report I have confined myself to a plain nar
rative of such facts as are necessary for the purposes of
history. "Where it was possible, I have preferred to give these
facts m the language of despatches, written at the time of
their occurrence, rather than to attempt a new relation.
"The reports of the subordinate commanders, hereto

EXTRACT FROM REPORT. 349
annexed, recite what time and space wrould fail me to
mention here, — those individual instances of conspicuous
bravery and skill by which every battle was marked. To
them 1 must especially refer ; for without them this nar
rative would be incomplete, and justice fail to be done.
But 1 cannot omit to tender to my corps commanders,
and to the general officers under them, such ample re
cognition of their cordial co-operation and their devoted
services as those reports abundantly avouch.
"I have not sought to defend the army which I had
the honor to command, nor myself, against the hostile
criticisms once so rife.
" It has seemed to me that nothing more was required
than such a plain and truthful narrative to enable those
whose right it is to form a correct judgment on the im
portant matters involved.
"This Eeport is, in fact, a history of the Army of the
Potomac. "During the period occupied in the organization of
that army, it served as a barrier against the advance of a
lately victorious enemy while the fortification of the
capital was in progress; and, under the discipline which
it then received, it acquired strength, education, and
some of that experience which is necessary to success in
active operations, and which enabled it afterwards to sus
tain itself under circumstances trying to the most heroic
men. Frequent skirmishes occurred along the lines, con
ducted with great gallantry, which inured our troops to
the realities of war.
" The army grew into shape but slowly ; and the delays
which attended on the obtaining of arms, continuing late
into the winter of 1861-62, were no less trying to the
soldiers than to the people of the country. Even at the
time of the organization of the Peninsular campaign,
some of the finest regiments were without rifles ; nor
were the utmost exertions on the part of the military
30

350 EXTRACT FROM REPORT.
authorities adequate to overcome the obstacles to active
service. "When, at length, the army was in condition to take
the field, the Peninsular campaign was planned and en
tered upon with enthusiasm by officers and men. Had
this campaign been followed up as it was designed, I
cannot doubt that it would have resulted in a glorious
triumph to our arms and the permanent restoration of
the power of the Government in Virginia and North
Carolina, if not throughout the revolting States. It was,
however, otherwise ordered ; and, instead of reporting a
victorious campaign, it has been my duty to relate the
heroism of a reduced army, sent upon an expedition
into an enemy's country, there to abandon one and
originate another and new plan of campaign, which
might and would have been successful if supported with
appreciation of its necessities, but which failed because
of the repeated failure of promised support at the most
critical and, as it proved, the most fatal moments. That
heroism surpasses ordinary description. Its illustration
must be left for the pen of the historian in times of calm
reflection, when the nation shall be looking back to the
past from the midst of peaceful days.
" For me, now, it is sufficient to say that my comrades
were victors on every field save one ; and there the
endurance of a single corps accomplished the object of
its fighting, and, by securing to the army its transit
to the James, left to the enemy a ruinous and barren
victory. "The Army of the Potomac was first reduced by the
withdrawal from my command of the division of General
Blenker, which was ordered to the Mountain Depart
ment, under General Fremont. We had scarcely landed
on the Peninsula when it was further reduced by a de
spatch revoking a previous order giving me command of
Fortress Monroe, and under which I had expected to

EXTRACT FROM REPORT. 351
take ten thousand men from that point to aid in our
operations. Then, when under fire before the defences
of Yorktown, we received the news of the withdrawal of
General McDowell's corps of about thirty-five thousand
men. This completed the overthrow of the original plan
of the campaign.
"About one-third of my entire army (five divisions out
of fourteen ; one of the nine remaining being but little
larger than a brigade) was thus taken from me. Instead
of a rapid advance which I had planned, aided by a flank
movement up the York Eiver, it was only left to besiege
Yorktown. That siege was successfully conducted by the
army ; and when these strong works at length yielded to
our approaches, the troops rushed forward to the san
guinary but successful battle of Williamsburg, and thus
opened an almost unresisted advance to the banks of the
Chickahominy. Eiehmond lay before them, surrounded
with fortifications, and guarded by an army larger than
our own ; but the prospect did not shake the courage of
the brave men who composed my command. Relying
still on the support which the vastness of our under
taking and the grand results depending on our success
seemed to insure us, we pressed forward. The weather
was stormy beyond precedent. The deep soil of the
Peninsula was at times one vast morass. The Chicka
hominy rose to a higher stage than had been known for
years before. Pursuing the advance, the crossings were
seized, and the right wing extended to effect a junction
with reinforcements now promised and earnestly desired,
and upon the arrival of which the complete success of
the campaign seemed clear.
"The brilliant battle of Hanover Court-House was
fought, which opened the way for the First Corps, — with
the aid of which, had it come, we should then have gono
into the enemy's capital. It never came. The bravest
army could not do more, under such overwhelming dis-

352 EXTRACT FROM REPORT.
appointment, than the Army of the Potomac then did.
Fair Oaks attests their courage and endurance when they
hurled back, again and again, the vastly superior masses
of the enemy. But mortal men could not accomplish
the miracles that seemed to have been expected of them.
But one course was left, — a flank march, in the face of a
powerful enemy, to another and better base, — one of the
most hazardous movements in war. The Army of the
Potomac, holding its own safety, and almost the safety
of our cause, in its hands, was equal to the occasion.
The seven days are classical in American history, — those
days in which the noble soldiers of the Union and Con
stitution fought an overwhelming enemy by day, and
retreated from successive victories by night, through a
week of battle, closing the terrible scenes of conflicts with
the ever-memorable victory at Malvern, where they drove
back, beaten and shattered, the entire Eastern army of
the Confederacy, and thus secured for themselves a place
of rest and a point for a new advance upon the capital
from the banks ofthe James. Eiehmond was still within
our grasp, had the Army of the Potomac been reinforced
and permitted to advance. But counsels which I cannot
but think subsequent events proved unwise prevailed in
Washington, and we were ordered to abandon the cam
paign. Never did soldiers better deserve the thanks of a
nation than the Army of the Potomac for the deeds of the
Peninsular campaign; and, although that meed was with
held from them by the authorities, I am persuaded they
have received the applause of the American people.
"The Army of the Potomac was recalled from within
sight of Richmond, and incorporated with the Army of
Virginia. The disappointments of the campaign on the
Peninsula had not damped their ardor nor diminished
their patriotism. They fought well, faithfully, gallantly,
under General Pope, yet were compelled to fall back on
Washington, defeated and almost demoralized.

EXTR.VCT FROM REPORT. 353
"The enemy, no longer occupied in guarding his own
capital, poured his troops northward, entered Maryland,
threatened Pennsylvania, and even Washington itself.
Elated by his recent victories, and assured that our troops
were disorganized and dispirited, he was confident that
the seat of war was now permanently transferred to the
loyal States, and that his own exhausted soil was to be
relieved from the burden of supporting two hostile ar
mies. But he did not understand the spirit which ani
mated the soldiers of the Union. I shall not, nor can I,
living, forget that, when I was ordered to the command
of the troops for the defence of the capital, the soldiers
with whom I had shared so much of the anxiety and
pain and suffering of the war had not lost their confi
dence in me as their commander. They sprang to my
call with all their ancient vigor, discipline, and courage.
I led them into Maryland. Fifteen days after they had
fallen back, defeated, before Washington, they vanquished
the enemy on the rugged heights of South Mountain, pur
sued him to the hard-fought field of Antietam, and drove
him, broken and disappointed, across the Potomac into
Virginia. "The army had need of rest. After the terrible expe
riences of battles and marches, with scarcely an interval
of repose, which they had gone through from the time
of leaving for the Peninsula, the return to Washington,
the defeat in Virginia, the victory at South Mountain,
and again at Antietam, it was not surprising that they
were in a large degree destitute of the absolute necessa
ries to effective duty. Shoes were worn out ; blankets
were lost ; clothing was in rags : in short, the army was
unfit for active service, and an interval for rest and
equipment was necessary. When the slowly-forwarded
supplies came to us, I led the army across the river,
renovated and refreshed, in good order and discipline,
and followed the retreating foe to a position where I was
30*

354 EXTRACT FROM REPORT.
confident of decisive victory, — when, in the midst of the
movement, while my advance-guard was actually in con
tact with the enemy, I was removed from the command.
"I am devoutly grateful to God that my last campaign
with this brave army was crowned with a victory which
saved the nation from the greatest peril it had then un
dergone. I have not accomplished my purpose if by
this Report the Army of the Potomac is not placed high
on the roll of the historic armies of the world. Its deeds
ennoble the nation to which it belongs. Always ready
for battle, always firm, steadfast, and trustworthy, I
never called on it in vain ; nor will the nation ever have
cause to attribute its want of success under myself, or
under other commanders, to any failure of patriotism or
bravery in that noble body of American soldiers.
"No man can justly charge upon any portion of that
army, from the commanding general to the private, any
lack of devotion to the service of the United States
Government and to the cause of the Constitution and
the Union. They have proved their fealty in much sor
row, suffering, danger, and through the very shadow of
death. Their comrades, dead on all the fields where we
fought, have scarcely more claim to the honor of a
nation's reverence than the survivors to the justice of
a nation's gratitude."
To this mournful, eloquent, and modest summing
up of the case there is not much to be added.
At the close of the biography of a distinguished
military commander, the reader naturally looks for
an analysis and exposition of his military genius,
and, if not a comparison with the great generals of
other countries and other times, at least some state
ment of his merits, some enumeration of his claims.
But there is an obvious cmbarras.sment in thus deal-

EFFECT OF CIVIL WAR. 355
ing with one who is still living, and may chance to
read the pages in which his military character is
delineated. What is just praise when spoken ofthe
dead may sound like flattery when spoken of the
living. In the interview between Solon and Croesus,
so beautifully narrated by Herodotus, the king was
told by his wise guest that no man could be called
happy until a fortunate life had been closed by a
peaceful death ; for that so long as a man was alive
he was the sport and prey of fortune, and no ono
could tell what the future had in store for him. In
like manner, no accurate estimate can be made of the
worth and services of a soldier or statesman until
the seal of death is set upon his rounded life and
there is no more for him any earthly future. Far
distant, we trust, is the day when it will be season
able to take the gauge and dimensions of General
McClellan's powers and accomplishments and assign
to him his due place on the roll of departed worth.
And there are other reasons why we must be
content to wait for a calm and dispassionate esti
mate of General McClellan's services and merits.
A civil war was raging when he was dismissed
from the command of the Army of the Potomac,
and it is raging still; and the end seems neither
near nor certain. A nation engaged in so fierce
a struggle as ours is in no condition to weigh,
to examine, to compare, and to decide, — as a lake
lashed into fury by the tempest can return no true
image of the sky that bends over it. The passions
which civil war fosters and creates forbid the exer
cise of a judicial understanding. A court of jus-

356 POLITICAL PREJUDICE.
tice must needs adjourn if a battle be going on under
its windows. All our energies, all our faculties, are
absorbed in action, and all questions that requiro
deliberation must be postponed to a more quiet
season. We cannot afford to listen. The only
pause we can brook is such brief interval of repose
as exhausted nature demands. Before justice can
be done him, General McClellan must wait for more
peaceful times and minds less agitated and absorbed.
To-day we adjourn the hearing, as Neptune, in the
iEneid, adjourned the punishment of his rebellious
winds, because of the instant need of stilling the
tempest they had raised : —
" Quos ego — sed motos praestat componere fluctus."
Besides, at this moment a considerable portion
of his countrymen have their minds barred against
all arguments and considerations in defence of
General McClellan, by political prejudice. To deny
him all military capacity is part of the creed of a
great political party. Most supporters of the pre
sent Administration hold it to be a point of duty to
disparage and decry him. This is no strange phe
nomenon. Parallel cases may be found in the his
tory of every country in which public opinion is
allowed free expression. There was a time — and
the period lasted for years — in which every whig
statesman in England felt bound to call in question
the military genius of the Duke of Wellington,*
* Lord Brougham says that some very eminent statesmen
constantly and greatly misjudged the Duke of Wellington till

and just so the Bourbons and their followers con
stantly denied the military greatness of Bona
parte. But General McClellan has been so unjustly
treated and so unscrupulously slandered that
something more is required, simply as a matter
of truth and fair dealing, in vindication and de
fence of him. After what has passed, silence
might seem like acquiescence in charges which are
as false as they are injurious. It is no fault of
General McClellan that events have taken such a
turn that it is impossible to write a life of him
without taking a somewhat controversial attitude.
A few remarks are, consequently, submitted, which
are in the nature of a comment upon some points
of the evidence presented in the preceding pages.
First of all : there are some persons who deny
to General McClellan all merit whatever as a com
mander, maintaining that he has neither the ca
pacity to plan a campaign nor to fight a battle, and
that every thing successfully done by him was
either the work of others or the result of pure acci
dent. With such persons it is useless to reason, as
to do so would be simply a waste of time. No ar
guments or considerations would have any power
to shake an impression like this. Men who hold
this opinion of the conqueror of Malvern Hill and
Antietam are, in the intellectual line, legitimate

the publication of his Despatches, when they at once, and in
the strongest terms, declared how grievously they had erred.
— Statesmen of the Time of George III., ii. p. 355.

358 CHARGES AGAINST GENERAL MCCLELLAN.
descendants of those subjects of George the Third
who used to maintain that Napoleon Bonaparte was
deficient in the quality of personal courage. A
prejudice of this kind is as much proof against
reason as the diseased fancy of a hypochondriac who
believes that his legs are made of glass, or that he
is followed everywhere by a blue dog. "You must
have observed," said Mr. Grenville, in a letter to
Mr. Pitt, " that of all impressions the most difficult
to be removed are those which have no reason to
support them; because against them no reason can
be applied."
But there are other persons, more reasonable,
more discriminating, who, while they allow General
McClellan to be an accomplished and meritorious
officer, capable of doing excellent service in a sub
ordinate sjffiere, hold also the opinion that when at
the head of an army his good qualities are neu
tralized by his slowness, his over-cautiousness, his
want of dash, his inability to take advantage ofthe
sudden opportunities which the fortune of war pre
sents. The force of this objection is in some mea
sure neutralized by the fact that it is so common
in military history. The popular mind is always
eager for results in war, and ignorant of the con
ditions essential to success. Without citing any
further examples, Washington and Wellington,*

* "This spirit of faction, however, was not confined to one
side. There was a ministerial person at this time, who, in his
dread of the opposition, wrote to Lord Wellington complain
ing of his inaction, and calling upon him to do something that
would excite a public sensation ; any thing, provided blood

CHARGE OF SLOWNESS. 359
while their campaigns were going on, were con
stantly censured for their slowness. It is a charge
easily made, and not easily answered; for the de
fence must often rest upon a variety of considera
tions which the critic is too impatient to listen to.
General McClellan is, by nature and temperament,
wisely cautious, prudent, and deliberate, — the re
verse of rash and impulsive; and these traits are,
of course, shown in his military career. He never
incurs great risks or plays a desperate game. He
is, besides, a humane man, very careful of the
lives of his soldiers, and not needlessly shedding
human blood. And, lastly, he is a man of moral
firmness and just self-reliance, who will never be
induced by popular clamor to take a step which he
deems unwise, or forego a precaution which he
deems necessary. A man like this at the head of
an army will often incur the charge of slowness
and inertness, and tbe charge will be made most
positively by those who are the least qualified to
form a correct judgment in the premises. Public
opinion — that is, contemporaneous public opinion —
is not of any great value on a question like this,
Ignorance and prejudice are both obstacles in the
way to a correct understanding of military mea
sures and military men. A battle won is a fact
which all can understand; but comparatively few
are competent to determine how much merit is due,
was spilt. A calm but severe rebuke, and the cessation of all
friendly intercourse with the writer, discovered the general's
abhorrence of this detestable policy." — Napier.

360 INDECISION AND UNREADINESS.
or rather how little blame should be attached, to the
general who has had the misfortune to lose a battle.
Upon a charge of slowness and over-cautiousness
General McClellan has a right to be tried by his
peers, — that is, by the officers of the regular army,
and especially by those who have served under
him. To their judgment he can confidently ap
peal, and by their verdict he is ready to stand or
fall. Indecision and unreadiness are, no doubt, defects
of mind or infirmities of temperament, arising from
not having any plans of conduct, or from not carry
ing them out with promptness In either case,
they are traits which taint the whole being, and
lay their paralyzing touch upon all the currents of
life. A sluggish, dawdling, and dilatory man may
have spasms of activity, but he never acts continu
ously and consecutively with energetic quickness.
When in a commanding general we see a campaign,
or a military enterprise, marked by rapidity of
movement, by plans promptly formed and vigor
ously executed, and when in the same man we see
at another time pauses, delays, which bring upon
him the reproach of slowness, it is fair to infer that
his conduct in the latter case is the result of a cau
tious and far-seeing wisdom, which comprehends all
the difficulties of the position, and knows that the
more baste the less speed, so far as the matter in
hand is concerned. The evidence as to general
character is important in an issue like this.
Let us apply these principles to General McClel
lan's military career.

NOT JUSTLY CHARGEABLE WITH SLOWNESS. 361
In the first place, no one has ever pretended, no
one can pretend, that he is a military commander
who acts without previously-formed plans, without
having determined beforehand what he shall do
and how he shall do it. On the contrary, he is
peculiarly and singularly thoughtful of the future,
carefully meditating every step of his progress,
and vigilant in providing against all possible con
tingencies. Upon this point the evidence is irre
sistible and overwhelming.
But, say General McClellan's assailants and de
tractors, though his plans are judicious and care
fully formed, he lacks quickness and vigor in carry
ing them out; he is slow in the saddle; he does
not take time by the forelock; he lets opportu
nities slip by which never come a second time.
But what is the evidence to support these charges ?
Look at his campaign in Western Virginia in 1861,
— a part of his military career conveniently ignored
by his enemies. Here he had a separate command,
a defined field of action, and was not hampered
and trammelled by interference from Washington ;
and do we see any signs of indecision and want of
promptness here? On the contrary, we observe
the happiest combination of judgment in design
and vigor in execution : one skilful and powerful
blow was instantly followed by another, and the
result was absolute and permanent military success.
Then look at the brilliant and crowded period
between the second and seventeenth days of Sep
tember, 1862. On the former of these dates, the
forces in and around Washington were little better
31

362 NOT JUSTLY CHARGEABLE WITH SLOWNESS.
than a tumultuary and disorganized mob; and
within forty-eight hours, as if at the touch of a
magician's wand, they were converted into an
effective and disciplined army. Within a fortnight
from the time of their leaving Washington, they
bad marched fifty miles, fought two battles, gained
two victories, driven out of Maryland a foe flushed
with recent success, given a sense of security to
Washington, and raised the spirits of every patriot
in the land Was there any time lost here ? Is
there any evidence here of want of decision, want
of energy, want of promptness ? Surely not, but
all the reverse.
But all this is neutralized and made of no effect
because, after the battle of Antietam, he did not
cross the Potomac, pursue Lee's retreating army,
and utterly destroy it ! Nothing but ignorance or
prejudice, one or both, could make this delay a
ground for disparaging General McClellan's mili
tary reputation. Are we to suppose that the man
who for fifteen days had been acting with the most
extraordinary energy and vigor was suddenly so
paralyzed, so smitten with procrastination, that he
folded up his hands, went to sleep, and from mere in
dolence forbore to gather the new laurels which were
within reach of his hand if he had only stretched
it out? Such sudden change is inconsistent with
the laws of human nature. Men are not one week
brimful of fiery energy and the next eaten up by
the rust of inaction. The pause made after the
battle of Antietam must be interpreted by the
fortnight of crowded and intense action which

FAILURE TO TARE RICHMOND. 363
preceded it; and to an unprejudiced and instructed
mind it is vindicated by the soundest military rea
soning. But he failed to take Eiehmond, it is said. This
is true ; but it is equally true that this failure was
no fault of his. To what causes it was due is set
forth in the preceding pages, and especially in the
concluding portion of General McClellan's Eeport,
copied into this chapter. He never would have
undertaken to capture Eiehmond with a force so
small as that to which he was finally reduced by
the interference of the Administration with his
plans, and their broken faith. It is no disparage
ment to a general that, having only ninety thou
sand men, he did not succeed in an enterprise which
he had undertaken upon the assurance that he
should have a hundred and forty thousand. Be
sides, he was forbidden to go on with it, and his
army sent to General Pope; with what result need
not be repeated. The Peninsular campaign of
1862, as planned, was General McClellan's; as exe
cuted, it was that of the President and the Secre
tary of War : and upon them the responsibility of
failure must rest. Had they kept their faith, had
they sent to General McClellan the reinforcements
which again and again had been promised him, and
which he again and again demanded, there is very
little question that Eiehmond would have been
taken. The military chances were greatly in favor
of such a result.
Of course, as Eiehmond in point of fact was not
captured, the enemies of General McClellan may

364 GENERAL M°CLELLAN NOT DEFEATED.
say that it would not have been, even if he had had
all the forces he asked for or desired. An asser
tion like this cannot be denied point-blank. To
bandy opinions about the past is only one whit less
unprofitable than to bandy predictions about the
future. All that can be affirmed is that General
McClellan's plans were such that, in all human
probability, success would have followed had he
been permitted to carry them out.
So much may be said by way of defence of Gene
ral McClellan against the charges most commonly
brought against him, and in rebuttal of the evi
dence put in on the other side; but there are some
considerations which are in the nature of distinct
and positive testimony in his behalf, on which it is
but just to him to say a few words.
In the first place, with the single exception of
the battle of Gaines's Mill, in which some thirty-
five thousand men retired, without disorder or
demoralization, before twice their number, no army
led by General McClellan, or that was under his
control, has ever been defeated. This is a significant
and important fact, and all the more so from the
comparisons which are forced upon every unbiassed
mind by the unjust treatment which General Mc
Clellan has received at the hands of the Adminis
tration. In August, 1862, the Army of the Poto
mac was taken from him and intrusted to General
Pope; and the consequence was the disaster at
Bull Eun on the 30th of the same month, the
second misfortune to our arms on that ill-omened
field. In November of the same year he was

LOVE OF IIIS SOLDIERS. 365
" relieved" of the command of the same army,
and General Burnside was put in his place; and
then came the mournful defeat at Fredericks
burg on the 13th of December. Here is Malvern
Hill against Bull Eun; here are South Mountain
and Antietam against Fredericksburg. But Gene
ral McClellan was practically dismissed from the
army, with every mark of ignominy and disgrace,
and General Burnside and General Pope are now,
and always have been, in honorable and responsi
ble military commands. We have nothing to do
with these two last-named officers, nor do we
care to discuss the policy of the Administration
towards them; but it is unjust and unreasonable
that the tenderness and consideration which have
been so liberally extended to them should be so
utterly withheld from General McClellan, and that
he should be disgraced for his victories while they
are rewarded, or at least forgiven, for their defeats.
He asks no favors; but he has a right to demand
consistency and justice.
In the next place, General McClellan has always
had the love and trust of the soldiers he has
commanded, and, with a few exceptions, has en
joyed the respect, confidence, and affection of
the officers who have served under him. At this
moment his name is a tower of strength with
the Army of the Potomac. This is an important
fact, a weighty piece of evidence in his behalf.
Upon the merits of a general in command, the
opinion of the army which serves under him is of
far more value than the opinion of the public. Tho
31*

366 STRATEGY.
former cannot be deceived or imposed upon by a
reputation made to order by politicians, editors,
and army-correspondents. The judgment of tho
army is like the judgment of experts in a patent-
case, or of nautical men in an insurance-case. The
consequences of incapacity are too serious to per
mit any delusion or mystification on the subject.
And the value of this favorable judgment is en
hanced by the high standard of intelligence in our
army, by the fact that the rank and file, in gene
ral, is made up of men who read, write, think,
and discuss their civil and military leaders. They
know, by personal experience, his skill, judgment,
and wisdom.
It is beyond question that General McClellan is
an accomplished officer, well read in his profession,
and master of such knowledge of the art of war
as can be learned from books. And many of those
who deny to him the praise of rapid and brilliant
execution in the field admit his merit in that de
partment ofthe art of war which is called strategy,
as distinguished from tactics. " Strategy," says
Jomini, "is the art of properly directing masses
upon the theatre of war, whether for the invasion
of a country or for the defence of one's own."
It includes the choice of a fixed base of operations,
of zones and lines of operations, of strategic lines,
and of vital geographical points to occupy offen
sively or to cover defensively; or, in popular lan
guage, it is the planning and laying out beforehand
of a campaign. It supposes an intimate knowledge

STRATEGY. 3b.
of the physical features of the country comprised
within the zone of operations, and a prophetic sa
gacity in determining and selecting those decisive
strategic points the possession of which insures
the control of a region important to hold. It selects
the spots where magazines of supplies should be
formed, as well as where permanent fortifications
should be constructed. The strategist is to the tac
tician what the architect is to the builder. Bliicher
and Ney, among others, were instances of men of
the most brilliant conduct on the field of battle who
had no power of strategy, no capacity of organ
izing a campaign or of directing the movements of
detached bodies of troops so as to bring them to
bear upon a given point at the same time. On the
other hand, the Archduke Charles, who as a stra
tegist had no rival but Napoleon himself, is thought
to have sometimes shown a want of quickness and
decision on the field of battle. That General Mc
Clellan is capable of planning and organizing a
campaign, of designating movements to be executed
by others, can be doubted by no man of candid
mind who will read his memorandum on the con
duct of the war, addressed to the President, and
to be found in the fifth chapter ofthe present work,
and his letters of instruction to Generals Halleck,
Buell, Sherman, and Butler, contained in his Eeport.
Strategy is the most important department of the
art of war, and strategical skill is the highest and
rarest function of military genius. To handle troops
well on the field of battle, to retain self-possession

368 HIGH PERSONAL CHARACTER.
amid " all the currents of a heady fight," to take
advantage of any mistake made by the enemy, to
repair the mischances and disasters in his own
ranks, requires a man of no common capacity; but
yet higher powers are demanded of him who at the
head of a great army executes a series of move
ments, extending over several weeks perhaps, which
finally compel an adversary to give battle at a point
and under conditions which insure his defeat^ The
superiority of the Archduke Charles in this the
most intellectual part of his profession has given
him the second place on the roll of honor of the
great generals in the wars of the French Eevolu
tion. But General McClellan has shown great moral
qualities in his career of public service, which are
elements of what may be called character, in dis
tinction from pure intellectual force. The spotless
purity of his private life has never been called in
question. The rancor of partisan or personal ma
lignity has never accused him of pecuniary corrup
tion, of rapacity, of turning his official opportunities
to his own gain or the gain of others. No swarm
of unworthy favorites or needy dependants has ever
buzzed around him. His record is without a blot;
bis hands are without a stain. His name has never
been mixed up with disreputable or doubtful trans
actions. The charges against him are aimed at
him solely in his military capacity. And this is
not merely negative praise. The life of a soldier
is a life of moral clanger and exposures, as well as
physical; and only the noblest and purest natures

HIGH PERSONAL QUALITIES. 369
entirely escape reproach.* There are no eyes so
sharp as the eyes of hatred; and now, for two long
years, has General McClellan been watched and
scanned by these, in hope to find some speck or
flaw in his record; but vain has been the quest,
fruitless the search. As a shield of steel dazzles
and blinds the eye, so does the spotless purity
of his character repel the envious and sinister
glance. No slanderer, however base, no courtier,
however fawning, has ever dared to accuse him
of intemperance, licentiousness, rapacity, or pro
fanity : nay, more, he has never been even sus
pected of them. No unscrupulous partisan sheet
has ever insinuated or hinted at any such charges;
no reckless platform-orator has ever suggested any
thing of the kind; it has never been whispered
round a camp-fire, or a dinner-table, or in a com
mittee-room, a base Congressional mess, or a baser
legislative lobby. The moral instincts of the
American people are sound and good ; and they
have an instinctive and well-founded perception of
General McClellan's moral worth which is proof
against all the insinuations of malice, all the devices
of calumny. The hold he has upon their hearts is
due to their strong sense of his integrity, his sin
cerity, his disinterestedness, his loyalty to duty, his
moral purity, his unspotted life; and it is a hold
which cannot be lost or shaken.

* " I never knew a Warryer yet, but thee,
From wine, tobacco, debts, dice, oaths, so free."
Thomas Carlton to Captain John Smith.

3/0 SELF-COMMAND.
But this is not all. The training and education
of a soldier tend to make a man keenly sensitive
on the point of honor, and to feel a stain on his
professional reputation like a wound. Observe the
way in which the Administration has dealt with
him. First, he was made general-in-chief of all the
armies of the United States, then reduced to tbe
command of the Army of the Potomac, then de
graded to the post of a quartermaster at Alex
andria, then suddenly and in fright made com
mander of the Army of the Potomac once more,
then dismissed from that command as unceremo
niously and abruptly as one flings a torn envelope
into a waste-paper basket ; and all within a single
year. Such capricious changes are more like the
shifting scenes of a novel or drama than like real
life. But, wounding as such treatment must have
been, we hear no complaint from General McClel
lan. He makes no appeal to the public, no pro
test against injustice, no demand for sympathy.
If any expressions of impatience are wrung from
him, it is because of his army, and not because
of any thing done to, or suffered by, himself.
He submits in silence to the will of the Adminis
tration; he discharges faithfully the duties of every
position devolved upon him; he asks only for the
privilege of serving his country. During the long
period of his enforced idleness, not one word of
complaint has been heard from him: he has made
no proclamation of his wrongs, no denunciation of
those who have wronged him. Yet this is not an
a^e of self-renunciation and self-sacrifice : —

POLITICAL HATRED. 371
"Now our life is only drest
For show, — mean handiwork of craftsman, cook,
Or groom ! We must run glittering like a brook
In the open sunshine, or we are unblest."
Our times are times of self-assertion and self-vin
dication : men push their own claims, vaunt their
own services, sound their own trumpets. The vir
tues of manly silence, of dignified self-command,
of magnanimous fortitude, wbich General McClellan
has shown, are to be the more valued because of their
rarity. And yet the future historian of the crowded
period in which we live will have to record the
fact that the services of this accomplished officer,
patriotic citizen, and good man were denied to his
country during a civil war unparalleled in history
alike for the magnitude of its movements and the
intensity of the passions by which it was sustained,
in which all the energies of the people were taxed
to the utmost limit of endurance, and not only
their wealth, but their best blood, was poured out
on behalf of the Union and the Constitution with
a noble devotion which caused every patriot heart
to swell with pride and admiration. And he will
also record the further fact that, during the long
period in which this man was languishing in in
action, civilian generals, grossly and notoriously in
competent, were allowed to play at the game of war,
for political stakes, with the lives of our bravest
and best for their counters. Such historian will
find in the events which he relates fresh illustration
of the bitterness of political hatred, the ferocity of

372 SOURCES OF SUPPORT.
partisan zeal, and the rank growth of low passions
in high places; for a sullen and smouldering hate,
which never goes out and never bursts forth into
a generous blaze, is a low passion, which debases
and degrades the breast which it haunts. And he
will draw from them the further moral that there
is a harmony and consistency in the works of Na
ture. The venom that chills and curdles the warm
current of life in man is secreted only in creeping
and cold-blooded creatures; and the inveterate
malignity that never forgets or forgives is found
only in base and ignoble natures, whose aims are
selfish, whose means are indirect, cowardly, and
treacherous. Anger is a fierce and sudden flame,
which may be kindled in the noblest breasts; but
in these the slow droppings of an unforgiving tem
per never take the shape and consistency of en
during hatred. The natural instincts of a generous
heart shrink from an inveterate hater as the child
shrinks from the snake in his path. The enemies
of General McClellan, in the persistency and malig
nity of their attacks, furnish a key to unlock their
own characters. As for him, " he will remember,"
to borrow what Burke said of Fox, "that obloquy
is a necessary ingredient in the composition of all
true glory; he will remember that it was not only
in the Eoman customs, but it is in the nature and
constitution of things, that calumny and abuse are
essential parts of triumph. These thoughts will
support a mind which exists only for honor, under
the burden of temporary reproach." And if de
traction has been the meed of patriotic faith, if

SOURCES OF SUPPORT. 6tS
persecution has been the reward of arduous ser
vice, if calumny has followed desert, General
McClellan must find comfort in the reflection that
his is no new experience, but that every genera
tion has had similar examples of the power of tho
weak over the strong, and the triumph, sometimes
transient and sometimes enduring, of the low and
base over the high and noble. How soon the
future is to right the wrongs of the past, cannot be
predicted; but he is sure what the verdict of time
will be, and thus he may wait patiently till it
shall be rendered.

32

APPENDIX.

ORATION DELIVERED BY GENERAL McCLELLAN AT
WEST POINT, JUNE 15, 1864, AT THE DEDICATION OP
THE SITE OE A MONUMENT PROPOSED TO BE ERECTED
IN MEMORY OF THE OFFICERS OF THE REGULAR ARMY
WHO SHALL HAVE FALLEN IN BATTLE DURING THE
PRESENT WAR.
All nations have days sacred to the remembrance of
joy and of grief. They have thanksgivings for success,
fasting and prayers in the hour of humiliation and de
feat, triumphs and paeans to greet the living and laurel-
crowned victor. They have obsequies and eulogies for the
warrior slain on the field of battle. Such is the duty we
are to perform to-day. The poetry, the histories, the
orations of antiquity, all resound with the clang of arms ;
they dwell rather upon rough deeds of war than the
gentle arts of peace. They have preserved to us the
names of heroes, and the memory of their deeds, even to
this distant day. Our own Old Testament teems with the
narrations of the brave actions and heroic deaths of Jew
ish patriots, while the NewT Testament of our meek and
suffering Saviour often selects the soldier and his weapons
to typify and illustrate religious heroism and duty. These
stories of the actions of the dead have frequently sur
vived, in the lapse of ages, the names of those whose fall
was thus commemorated centuries ago. But, although
we know not now the names of all the brave men who
fought and fell upon the plain of Marathon, in the pass
of Thermopylae, and on the hills of Palestine, we have
not lost the memory of their examples. As long as the
375

376 APPENDIX :
warm blood courses the veins of man, as long as the
human heart beats high and quick at the recital of brave
deeds and patriotic sacrifices, so long will the lesson still
incite generous men to emulate the heroism of the past.
Among the Greeks, it was the custom that the fathers
of the most valiant of the slain should pronounce the
eulogies of the dead. Sometimes it devolved upon their
great statesmen and orators to perform this mournful
duty. Would that a new Demosthenes or a second Peri
cles could arise and take my place to-day ! for he would
find a theme worthy of his most brilliant powers, of his
most touching eloquence. I stand here now, not as an
orator, but as a whilom commander, and in the place of
the fathers, of the most valiant dead, — as their comrade,
too, on many a hard-fought field against domestic and
foreign foe, — in early youth and mature manhood, — moved
by all the love that David felt when he poured forth his
lamentations for the mighty father and son who fell on
Mount Gilboa. God knows that David's love for Jona
than was no more deep than mine for the tried friends
of many long and eventful years, whose names are to be
recorded upon the structure that is to rise upon this spot.
Would that his more than mortal eloquence could grace
my lips and do justice to the theme !
We have met to-day, my comrades, to do honor to our
own dead ; brothers united to us by the closest and dear
est ties, who have freely given their lives for their country
in this war, — so just and righteous, so long as its purpose
is to crush rebellion and to save our nation from the in
finite evils of dismemberment. Such an occasion as this
should call forth the deepest and noblest emotions of our
nature, — pride, sorrow, and prayer: pride that our country
has possessed such sons ; sorrow that she has lost them ;
prayer that she may have others like them, — that we and
our successors may adorn her annals as they have done,
and that when our parting hour arrives, whenever and

ORATION AT WEST POINT. 377
however it may be, our souls may be prepared for the
great change. <•
We have assembled to consecrate a cenotaph, which
shall remind our children's children, in the distant future,
of their fathers' struggles in the days of the great rebel
lion. This monument is to perpetuate the memory of a,
portion only of those who have fallen for the nation in
this unhappy war: it is dedicated to the officers and
soldiers of the regular army. Yet this is done in no class
or exclusive spirit, and in the act we remember with reve
rence and love our comrades of the volunteers, who
have so gloriously fought and fallen by our sides. Each
State will, no doubt, commemorate in some fitting way
the services of its sons who abandoned the avocations of
peace and shed their blood in the ranks of the volunteers.
How richly they have earned a nation's love, a nation's
gratitude, with what heroism they have confronted death,
have wrested victory from a stubborn foe, and have illus
trated defeat, it well becomes me to say ; for it has been
my lot to command them on many a sanguinary field. I
know that I but echo the feeling of the regulars, when
I award the high credit they deserve to their brave breth
ren of the volunteers.
But we of the regular army have no States to look to
for the honors due our dead. We belong to the whole
country, and can neither expect nor desire the General
Government to make a perhaps invidious distinction in
our favor. We are few in number, a small band of com
rades, united by peculiar and very binding ties ; for with
many of us our friendships were commenced in boyhood,
when we rested here in the shadow of the granite hills
which look down upon us where we stand ; with others
the ties of brotherhood were formed in more mature
years, while fighting among the rugged mountains and
the fertile valleys of Mexico, within hearing of the eter
nal waves of the Pacific, or in the lonely grandeur of the

378 appendix :
great plains of the far West. With all, our love and con
fidence have been cemented by common dangers and
sufferings, on the toilsome march, in the dreary bivouac,
amid the clash of arms, and in the presence of death
on scores of battle-fields. West Point, with her large
heart, adopts us all, — graduates and those appointed from
civil life, officers and privates. In her eyes we are all her
children, jealous of her fame and eager to sustain her
world-wide reputation. Generals and private soldiers,
men who have cheerfully offered our all for our dear
country, we stand here before this shrine, ever hereafter
sacred to our dead, equals and brothers in the presence
of the common death which awaits us all, perhaps on the
same field and at the same hour. Such are the ties which
unite us, — the most endearing which exist among men ;
such the relations which bind us together, — the closest
of the sacred brotherhood of arms.
It has therefore seemed, and it is, fitting that we should
erect upon this spot, so sacred to us all, an enduring
monument to our dear brothers who have preceded us on
the path of peril and of honor which it is the destiny of
many of us to tread.
AVhat is this regular army to which we belong ?
Who were the men whose death merits such honors
from the living ?
What is the cause for which they have laid down their
lives? Our regular or permanent army is the nucleus which,
in time of peace, preserves the military traditions of the
nation, as well as the organization, science, and instruction
indispensable to modern armies. It may be regarded as
coeval with the nation. It derives its origin from the old
continental and State lines of the Revolution, whence,
with some interruptions and many changes, it has attained
its present condition. In fact, we may with propriety go
even beyond the Revolution to seek the roots of our

ORATION AT WEST TOINT. 379
genealogical tree in the old French wars ; for the cis-At-
lantic campaigns of the seven years' war were not con
fined to the " red men scalping each other by the great
lakes of North America," and it was in them that our
ancestors first participated as Americans in the large
operations of civilized armies. American regiments then
fought on the banks of the St. Lawrence and the Ohio,
on the shores of Ontario and Lake George, on the islands
of the Caribbean and in South America. Louisburgh,
Quebec, Duquesne, the Moro, and Porto Bello, attest the
valor of the provincial troops ; and in that school were
educated such soldiers as Washington, Putnam, Lee,
Montgomerv, and Gates. These, and men like Greene,
Knox, Wayne, and Steuben, were, the fathers of our per
manent army ; and under them our troops acquired that
discipline and steadiness which enabled them to meet
upon equal terms, and often to defeat, the tried veterans
of England. The study of the history of the Revolution,
and a perusal of the despatches of Washington, will con
vince the most skeptical of the value of the permanent
army in achieving our independence and establishing the
civil edifice which we are now fighting to preserve.
The War of 1812 found the army on a footing far from
adequate to the emergency ; but it was rapidly increased,
and of the new generation of soldiers many proved equal
to the requirements of the occasion. Lundy's Lane,
Chippewa, Queenstown, Plattsburgh, New Orleans, — all
bear witness to the gallantry of the regulars.
Then came an interval of more than thirty years of
external peace, marked by many changes in the organi
zation and strength of the regular army, and broken at
times by tedious and bloody Indian wars. Of these the
most remarkable were the Black Hawk War, in which our
troops met unflinchingly a foe as relentless and far more
destructive than the Indians, — that terrible scourge, the
cholera; and the tedious Florida War, where for .so many

380 APPENDIX :
years the Seminoles eluded in tho pestilential swamps
our utmost efforts, and in which were displayed such
traits of heroism as that commemorated by yonder monu
ment to Dade and his command, — "when all fell, save
three, without an attempt to retreat." At last came the
Mexican War, to replace Indian combats and the mono
tony of the frontier service ; and for the first time in many
years the mass of the regular army was concentrated, and
took the principal part in the battles of that remarkable
and romantic war. Palo Alto, Resaca, and Fort Brown
were the achievements of the regulars unaided ; and as to
the battles of Monterey, Buena Vista, Vera Cruz, Cerro
Gordo, and the final triumphs in the valley, none can
truly say that they could have been won without the regu
lars. When peace crowned our victories in the capital
of the Montezumas, the army was at once dispersed over
the long frontier and engaged in harassing and danger
ous wars with the Indians of the plains. Thus thirteen
long years were spent, until the present war broke out,
and the mass of the army was drawn in, to be employed
against a domestic foe.
I cannot proceed to the events of the recent past and
the present without adverting to the gallant men who
were so long of our number, but who have now gone to
their last home ; for no small portion of the glory of which
we boast was reflected from such men as Taylor, Worth,
Brady, Brooks, Totten, and Duncan.
There is a sad story of Venetian history that has moved
many a heart, and often employed the poet's pen and
the painter's pencil. It is of an old man whose long life
was gloriously spent in the service of the state as a war
rior and a statesman, and who, when his hair was white
and his feeble limbs could scarce carry his bent form
towards the grave, attained the highest honors that a
Venetian citizen could reach. He was Doge of Venice.
Convicted of treason against the state, he not only lost

ORATION AT WEST POINT. 3.S1
his life, but suffered besides a penalty which will endure
as long as the name of Venice is remembered. The spot
where his portrait should have hung in the great hall of
the doge's palace was veiled with black, and there still
remains the frame, with its black mass of canvas ; and
this vacant frame is the most conspicuous in the long line
of effigies of illustrious doges !
Oh that such a pall as that which replaces the portrait
of Marino Faliero could conceal from history the names
of those, once our comrades, who are now in arms against
the flag under which we fought side by side in years gone
by ! But no veil can cover the anguish that fills our hearts
when we look back upon the sad memory of the past
and recall the affection and respect we entertained towards
men against whom it is our duty to act in mortal combat.
Would that the courage, ability, and steadfastness they
have displayed had been employed in the defence of the
"Stars and Stripes" against a foreign foe, rather than in
this gratuitous and unjustifiable rebellion, which could
not be so long maintained but for the skill and energy
of those our former comrades !
But we have reason to rejoice that upon this day, so
sacred and so eventful for us, one grand old mortal monu
ment of the past still lifts high his head amongst us, and
graces by his presence the consecration of this tomb of
his children. We may well be proud that we have been
commanded by the hero who purchased victory with his
blood near the great waters of Niagara, who repeated and
eclipsed the achievements of Cortez, — who, although a
consummate and confident commander, ever preferred,
when duty and honor would permit, the olive-branch of
peace to the blood-stained laurels of war, and who stands,
at the close of a long, glorious, and eventful life, a living
column of granite against which have beaten in vain alike
the blandishments and the storms of treason. His name
will ever be one of our proudest boasts and most moving

382 appendix :
inspirations. In long-distant ages, when this incipient
monument has become venerable, moss-clad, and perhaps
ruinous, when the names inscribed upon it shall seem, to
those who pause to read them, indistinct mementos of
an almost mythical past, the name of Winfield Scott
will still be clear-cut upon the memory of them all, like
the still fresh carving upon the monuments of long-for
gotten Pharaohs.
But it is time to approach the present.
In the war which now shakes the land to its foundation,
the regular army has borne a most honorable part. Too
few in numbers to act by themselves, regular regiments
have participated in every great battle in the East and
in most of those west of the Alleghanies. Their terrible
losses and diminished numbers prove that they have been
in the thickest of the fights, and the testimony of their
comrades and commanders shows with what undaunted
heroism they have upheld their ancient renown. Their
vigorous charges have often won the day j and in defeat
they have more than once saved the army from destruc
tion or terrible losses by the obstinacy with which they
resisted overpowering numbers. They can refer with
pride to the part they played upon the glorious fields of
Mexico, and exult at the recollection of what they did at
Manassas, Gaines's Mill, Malvern, Antietam, Shiloh, Stone
River, Gettysburg, and the great battles just fought from
the Rapidan to the Chickahominy. They can also point
to the officers who have risen among them and achieved
great deeds for their country in this war, — to the living
warriors whose names are on the nation's tongue and
heart, too numerous to be repeated here, yet not one of
whom I would willingly omit.
But perhaps the proudest episode in the history of the
regular army is that touching instance of fidelity on the
part of the non-commissioned officers and privates, who,
treacherously made prisoners in Texas, resisted every

ORATION AT WEST POINT. '383
temptation to violate their oath and desert their flag.
Offered commissions in the rebel service, money and land
freely tendered them, they all scorned the inducements
held out to them, submitted to every hardship, and, when
at last exchanged, avenged themselves on the field of
battle for the unavailing insult offered their integrity.
History affords no brighter example of honor than that
of these brave men, tempted, as I blush to say they were,
by some of their former officers, who, having themselves
proved false to their flag, endeavored to seduce the men
who had often followed them in combat and who had
naturally regarded them with respect and love.
Such is the regular army, — such its history and antece
dents, — such its officers and men. It needs no herald to
trumpet forth its praises ; it can proudly appeal to the
numerous fields, from the tropics to the frozen banks of
the St. Lawrence, from the Atlantic to the Pacific, ferti
lized by the blood and whitened by the bones of its mem
bers. But I will not pause to eulogize it. Let its deeds
speak for it : they are more eloquent than tongue of
mine. Why are we here to-day ?
This is not the funeral of one brave warrior, nor even
of the harvest of death on a single battle-field, but these
are the obsequies of the best and bravest of the children
of the land, who have fallen in actions almost numberless,
many of them among the most sanguinary and desperate
of which history bears record. The men whose names
and deeds we now seek to perpetuate, rendering them
the highest honor in our power, have fallen wherever
armed rebellion showed its front, — in far-distant New
Mexico, in the broad valley of the Mississippi, on the
bloody hunting-grounds of Kentucky, in the mountains
of Tennessee, amid the swamps of Carolina, on the fertile
fields of Maryland, and m the blood-stained thickets of
Virginia. They were of all the grades, — from the general

384 appendix :
officer to the private ; of all ages, — from the gray-haired
veteran of fifty years' service, to the beardless youth ; of
all degrees of cultivation, — from the man of science to the
uneducated boy. It is not necessary, nor is it possible, to
repeat the mournful yet illustrious roll of dead heroes
whom we have met to honor. Nor shall I attempt to
name all of those who most merit praise, — simply a few
who will exemplify the classes to which they belong.
Among the last slain, but among the first in honor and
reputation, was that hero of twenty battles, — John Sedg
wick, — gentle and kind as a woman, brave as a brave man
can be, honest, sincere, and able : he was a model that
all may strive to imitate, but whom few can equal. In
the terrible battles which just preceded his death, he had
occasion to display the highest qualities of a commander
and a soldier ; yet, after escaping the stroke of death
when men fell around him by thousands, he at last met
his fate, at a moment of comparative quiet, by the ball
of a single rifleman. He died as a soldier would choose
to die, — with truth in his heart, and a sweet, tranquil
smile upon his face. Alas ! our great nation possesses few
such sons as true John Sedgwick.
Like him fell, too, at the very head of their corps, the
white-haired Mansfield, after a long career of usefulness,
illustrated by his skill and cool courage at Fort Brown,
Monterey, and Buena Vista, John F. Reynolds, and Reno,
both in the full vigor of manhood and intellect, — men
who have proved their ability and chivalry on many a
field in Mexico and in this civil war, — gallant gentlemen,
of whom their country had much to hope, had it pleased
God to spare their lives. Lyon fell in the prime of life,
leading his little army against superior numbers, his brief
career affording a brilliant example of patriotism and
ability. The impetuous Kearney, and such brave gene.-
rals as Richardson, Williams, Terrill, Stevens, Weed,
Strong, Saunders, and Hayes, lost their lives while in the

ORATION AT WEST POINT. 385
midst of a career of usefulness. Young Bayard, so like
the most renowned of his name, that " knight above fear
and above reproach," was cut off too early for his country,
and that excellent staff-officer, Colonel Garesch£, fell
while gallantly doing his duty.
No regiments can spare such gallant, devoted, and able
commanders as Rossell, Davis, Gove, Simmons, Bailey,
Putnam, and Kingsbury, — all of whom fell in the thickest
of the combat, — some of them veterans, and others young
in service, all good men and well-beloved.
Our batteries have partially paid their terrible debt to
fate in the loss of such commanders as Greble, the first
to fall in this war, Benson, Hazzard, Smead, De Hart,
Hazlitt, and those gallant boys, Kirby, Woodruff, Dim
mick, and Cushing ; while the engineers lament the pro
mising and gallant Wagner and Cross.
Beneath remote battle-fields rest the corpses of the
heroic McRea, Reed, Bascom, Stone, 3Sweet, and many
other company officers.
Besides these were hosts of veteran sergeants, corporals,
and privates, who had fought under Scott in Mexico, or
contended in many combats with the savages of the far
West and Florida, and, mingled with them, young soldiers
who, courageous, steady, and true, met death unflinch
ingly, without the hope of personal glory. These men,
in their more humble sphere, served their country with
as much faith and honor as the most illustrious generals,
and all of them with perfect singleness of heart. Although
their names may not live in history, their actions, loyalty,
and courage will live. Their memories will long be pre
served in their regiments; for there were many of them
who merited as proud a, distinction as that accorded to
the "first grenadier of France," or to that Russian soldier
who gave his life for his comrades.
But there is another class of men who have gone from
us since this war commenced, whose fate it was not to die

386 appendix :
in battlej but who are none the less entitled to be men:
tioned here. There was Sumner, a brave, honest, chival
rous veteran, of more than half a century's service, who
had confronted death unflinchingly on scores of battle
fields, had shown his gray head serene and cheerful where
death most revelled, who more than once told me that
he believed and hoped that his long career would end
amid the din of battle: he died at home from the effects
of the hardships of his campaigns.
That most excellent soldier, the elegant C. F. Smith,
whom many of us remember to have seen so often on
this plain, with his superb bearing, escaped the bullet to
fall a victim to the disease which has deprived the army
of so many of its best soldiers.
John Buford, cool and intrepid; Mitchel, eminent in
science ; Plummer, Palmer, and many other officers and
men, lost their lives by sickness contracted in the field.
But I cannot close this long list of glorious martyrs
without paying a sacred debt of official duty and personal
friendship. There was one dead soldier who possessed
peculiar claims upon my love and gratitude. He was an
ardent patriot, an unselfish man, a true soldier, the beau
ideal of a staff officer : he was my aide-de-camp, Colonel
Colburn. There is a lesson to be drawn from the death and ser
vices of these glorious men which we should read for the
present and future benefit of the nation. War in these
modern days is a science, and it should now be clear to
the most prejudiced that for the organization and com
mand of armies, and the high combinations of strategy,
perfect familiarity with the theoretical science of war is
requisite. To count upon success when the plans or exe
cution of campaigns are intrusted to men who have no
knowledge of war, is as idle as to expect the legal wisdom
of a Story or a Kent from a skilful physician.
But what is the honorable and holy cause for which

ORATION AT WEST POINT. 387
these men laid down their lives, and for which the nation
still demands the sacrifice of the precious blood of so
many of her children ?
Soon after the close of the Revolutionary War, it was
found that the confederacy, which had grown up during
that memorable contest, was fast falling to pieces from
its own weight. The central power was too weak ; it
could only recommend to the different States such mea
sures as seemed best ; and it possessed no real power to
legislate, because it lacked the executive force to compel
obedience to its laws. The national credit and self-re
spect had disappeared, and it was feared by the friends
of human liberty throughout the world that ours was
but another added to the long list of fruitless attempts
at self-government. The nation was evidently upon the
brink of ruin and dissolution, when, some eighty years
ago, many of the wisest and most patriotic of the land
met to seek a remedy for the great evils which threatened
to destroy the great work of the Revolution. Their ses
sions were long, and often stormy : for a time the most
sanguine doubted the possibility of a successful termina
tion to their labors. But from amidst the conflict of
sectional interests, of party prejudices, and of personal
selfishness, the spirit of wisdom and conciliation at length
evoked the Constitution, under which we have lived so
long. It was not formed in a day, but was the result of
patient labor, of lofty wisdom, and of the purest patriot
ism. It was at last adopted by the people of all the
States, — although by some reluctantly, — not as being
exactly what all desired, but as being the best possible
under the circumstances. It was accepted as giving us a
form of government under which the nation might live
happily and prosper, so long as the people should con
tinue to be influenced by the same sentiments which actu
ated those who formed it, and which would not be liable

3.S8 appendix:
to destruction from internal causes, so long as the people
preserved the recollection of the miseries and calamities
which led to its adoption.
Under this beneficent Constitution the progress of the
nation was unexampled in history. The rights and liber
ties of its citizens were secure at home and abroad ; vast
territories were rescued from the control of the savage
and the wild beast and added to the domain of civilization
and the Union. The arts, the sciences, and commerce,
grew apace : our flag floated upon every sea, and we took
our place among the great nations of the earth.
But under the smooth surface of prosperity upon which
we glided swiftly, with all sails set before the summer
breeze, dangerous reefs were hidden, which now and then
caused ripples upon the surface and made anxious the
more cautious pilots. Elated by success, the ship swept
on, the crew not heeding the warnings they received, for
getful of the dangers they escaped in the beginning of
the voyage, and blind to the hideous maelstrom which
gaped to receive and destroy them. The same elements
of discordant sectional prejudices, interests, and institu
tions which had rendered the formation of the Consti
tution so difficult, threatened more than once to destroy
it. But for a long time the nation was .so fortunate as to
possess a series of political leaders who to the highest
abilities united the same spirit of conciliation which ani
mated the founders of the Republic ; and thus for many
years the threatened evils were averted. Time and long-
continued good fortune obliterated the recollection of the
calamities and wretchedness of the years preceding the
adoption of the Constitution. Men forgot that concilia
tion, common interest, and mutual charity had been the
foundation and must be the support of our government,
— as is, indeed, the case with all governments and all the
relations of life. At length men appeared with whom
sectional and personal prejudices and interests outweighed

ORATION AT WEST POINT. 389
all considerations for the general good. Extremists of
one section furnished the occasion, eagerly seized as a
pretext by equally extreme men in the other, for aban
doning the pacific remedies and protection afforded by
the Constitution and seeking redress for possible future
evils in war and the destruction of the Union.
Stripped of all sophistry and side issues, the direct
cause of the war, as it presented itself to the honest and
patriotic citizens of the North, was simply this. Certain
States, or rather a portion of the inhabitants of certain
States, feared, or professed to fear, that injury would result
to their rights and property from the elevation of a par
ticular party to power. Although the Constitution and
the actual condition of the government provided them
with a peaceable and sure protection against the appre
hended evil, they preferred to seek security in the de
struction of the government which could protect them,
and in the use of force against the national troops holding
i national fortress.
To efface the insult offered our flag, to save ourselves
from the fate of the divided republics of Italy and South
America, to preserve our government from destruction,
to enforce its just power and laws, to maintain our very
existence as a nation, — these were the causes that com
pelled us to draw the sword.
Rebellion against a government like ours, which con
tains the means of self-adjustment and a pacific remedy
for evils, should never be confounded with a revolution
against despotic power, which refuses redress of wrongs.
Such a rebellion cannot be justified upon ethical grounds ;
and the only alternative for our choice is its suppression,
or the destruction of our nationality. At such a time as
this, and in such a struggle, political partisanship should
be merged in a true and brave patriotism, which thinks
only of the good of the whole country.
It was in this cause and with these motives that so

3tM APPENDIX :
many of our comrades gave their lives; and to this we are
all personally pledged in all honor and fidelity. Shall
such a devotion as that of our dead comrades be of no
avail ? Shall it be said in after-ages that we lacked the
vigor to complete the work thus begun ? — that, after all
these noble lives freely given, we hesitated, and failed to
keep straight on until our land was saved? Forbid it,
Heaven, and give us firmer, truer hearts than that !
0 spirits of the valiant dead, souls of our slain heroes,
lend us your own indomitable will, and, if it be permitted
you to commune with those still chained by the trammels
of mortality, hover around us in the midst of danger and
tribulation, cheer the firm, strengthen the weak, that
none may doubt the salvation of the Republic and the
triumph of our grand old flag !
In the midst of the storms which toss our ship of state,
there is one great beacon-light to which we can ever turn
with confidence and hope. It cannot be that this great
nation has played its part in history ; it cannot be that
our sun, which arose with such bright promises for the
future, has already set forever. It must be the intention
of the overruling Deity that this land, so long the asylum
of the oppressed, the refuge of civil and religious liberty,
shall again stand forth in bright relief, united, purified,
and chastened by our trials, as an example and encourage
ment for those who desire the progress of the human
race. It is not given to our weak intellects to understand
the steps of Providence as they occur : we comprehend
them only as we look back upon them in the far-distant
past. So is it now.
We cannot unravel the seemingly tangled skein of the
purposes of the Creator : they are too high and far-reach
ing for our limited minds. But all history and his own
revealed word teach us that his ways, although inscruta
ble, are ever righteous. Let us, then, honestly and man-

ORATION AT WEST POINT. 391
fully play our part, seek to understand and perform our
whole duty, and trust unwaveringly in the beneficence
of the God who led our ancestors across the sea, and sus
tained them afterward amid dangers more appalling even
than those encountered by his own chosen people in
their great exodus. He did not bring us here in vain,
nor has he supported us thus far for naught. If we do
our duty and trust in him, he will not desert us in our
need. Firm in our faith that God will save our country, we
now dedicate this site to the memory of brave men, t<^
loyalty, patriotism, and honor.

INDEX.

Alison, Sir A., quoted, 202.
Antietam, battle of, 296.
Arbuckle, Fort, 38, 39.
Archduke Charles, 122, 367.
Armies of Europe, report on, 70.
Averill, Col., 268, 269.
Ball's Bluff, disaster at, 114.
Banks, Gen., 114, IM, 209, 211, 236.
Barnard, Gen., 175, 189, 230, 231.
Blenker, Gen., 165.
Bliicher, Marshal, 367.
Bonaparte, Napoleon, 33, 35, 122, 228,
357, 358.
Bradford, Gov., 306.
Brougham, Lord, quoted, 356.
Brown, Judge, 346.
Buckingham, Gen., 329.
Budberg, Baron de, 62.
Buell, Gen., 118.
Bull Pasture Mountain, battle near,
208.
Bull Run, second battle of, 2S0.
Burke, Edmund, quoted, 372.
Burns, Gen., 219.
Burnside, Gen., 280, 286, 300, 301, 336.
Butler, Gen., 119, 121.
Cameron, Secretary of War, 135.
Carrick's Ford, fight at, 101.
Casey, Gen., 223, 225.
Cerro Gordo, battle of, 18.
Chantilly, battle of, 281.
Chapultepec, battle of, 27.
Churubusco, battle of, 27.
Clarendon, Lord, 61.
Columbus, 56.
Committee, Congressional, on the Con
duct of tho War, 114, 128-131, 135,
228, 232, 334.
Contreras, battle of, 25.
Corpus Christi, 42, 43.
Confederate army at the close of 1CG1,
133.
Cooke, Gen., 244.
Cooper, J. F., 33.
Cossacks, 78.
Couch, Gen., 223, 225, 254, 286.
Cox, Gen., 98, 103.
Crampton's Pass, battle of, 290.
Crawford, Dr., 10.
Crawford, Gen., 298.
Cross Keys, battle at, 215.
Curtin, Gov., 340, 341.
Dana, Gen., 299.
Darling, Fort, attack on, 197.
Davis, President, 60, 181, 195.

Delafield, Col., 69.
Dennison, Gov., 85.
Dix, Gen., 114.
Duryea, Gen., 212.
Dutcher, Andrew, 338.
Ellis,. Dr., quoted, 284, 285.
El Penon, 23, 24.
Estvan, quoted, 186, 188.
Ewell, Gen., 213.
Fair Oaks, battle of, 223.
Ford, Col., 291.
Franklin, Gen., 181, 191, 248, 250, 251,
254, 286, 295, 296, 299.
Fremont, Gen., 165, 207, 215, 236.
French, Gen., 299.
Gaines's Mill, battle of, 245.
G.alveston, 41.
Garnett, Gen., 92, 93, 99, 101, 102.
Geary, Gen., 211.
Glendale, battle of, 250.
Goldsborough, Admiral, 171.
Gomard's Manual, 36.
Grenville, Mr., quoted, 358.
IlirtLLECK, Gen., made commander-in-
chief, 267.
despatch to Gen. McClellan, 269.
correspondence with Gen. McClel
lan, 271.
unjust charge against Gen. Mc
Clellan, 274.
telegraphic conversation "withGen.
McClellan, 275, 276.
despatch to Gen. McClellan, 304.
official order to Gen. McClellan,
312.
letter to Gen. McClellan, 322.
telegrams to Gen. McClellan, 326,
328.
order of dismissal to Gen. Mc
Clellan, official report comment
ed upon, 330, 331.
Hanover Court-House, battle at, 220.
Hardee, Gen., 311.
Harkins, Major, 344.
Harper's Ferry surrendered, 291.
Harrison's Landing, 255.
Ilartsuff, Gen., 2JS.
Haupt, Gon., 317.
Heintzelman, Gen., 12S, 185, 223-225,
240, 216, 248, 254, 279.
Herodotus, incident from, 355.
Hill, Gen., 102.
Hitchcock, Gen., 267.
Hodges, Lieut., -18, 52. 303

INDEX.

Hooker, Gen., 185, 223, 251, 252, 268,
289, 297-299, 305.
Huger, Gen., 194, 228, 229.
Ingalls, Col., 243, 313.
Jackson, Gen., 208, 209, 212-215, 234.
Johnston, Gen., 181, 195, 227, 229.
Joinville, Prince de, quoted, 157, 182,
192, 223, 226, 230, 243.
Kearney, Gen., 185, 223, 251, 252, 281.
Keightley's History quoted, 140.
Kellermann, Marshal, 202.
Kelley, Col., 88, 91, 92.
Kenley, Col., 209-211.
Keyes, Gen., 189, 223, 224, 246, 247, 249,
250, 254, 278.
Lander, Gen., 91.
Latrobe, J. H. B., quoted, 125.
Lecomte, Col., quoted, 176, 189, 218, 228.
Lee, Gen. R. E., 181, 195, 288.
Lincoln, President, order on Gen.
Scott's resignation, 115.
message to Congress, Dec. 1861,
127, 137.
issues an order for a general
movement, 138.
directs the plan of the campaign,
139.
letter to Gen. McClellan, 141.
issues an order dividing tho army
into corps, 153.
issues an order for the disposition
and movement of the army, 155.
removes Geu. McClellan from the
post of commander-in-chief, 159.
interview with Gen.McClellan,165.
transfers Blenker's division to
Fremont, 166.
letter to Gen. McClellan, 17S, 206.
suspends Gen. McDowell's move
ment, 207.
despatches to Gen. McClellan, 218.
interview with Gen. McClellan,
2S1, 2S3.
visits the Armyof the Potomac,30S.
removes Gen. McClellan from com
mand, 329.
proclamation of Sept. 22, 1S62, 333.
Longstreet, Gen., 221.
Love jo v, Owen, resolutions offered hy,
190.
Lyons, Sir Edward, CI
Malvern Hill, battle of, 253, 254.
Mansfield, Gen., 2QG.
Marcy, Capt., 27-41.
McCall, Gen., 2D5, 241, 244, 251, 252, 254.
McClellan, Arthur, Capt., 9.
McClellan, George, Dr., 9.
McClellan, J. II. B., Dr., 9, CG.

McClellan, G. B., birth and early educa
tion, 9.
enters West Point, 10.
enters the army as second lieu
tenant of engineers, 13.
letter to his brother, 14.
sails for Mexico, 15.
takes part in the siege of Tera
Cruz, 16.
at Cerro Gordo, 18.
adventure at Amozoque, 19.
reconnoissances by, 23, 24.
services in the Mexican War, 25-30.
leaves Mexico for West Point, 34.
brevotted first lieutenant and cap
tain, 34, 35.
lecture on Napoleon's campaign
of 1814, 35.
letter to his brother, 36.
prepares a manual of bayonet ex
ercise, 36.
ordered to Fort Delaware, 37.
joins Capt. Marcy in an expedi
tion to explore the Red River,37.
attached to the staff of Gen. P. F.
Smith, 41.
letter to his brother, 41.
letters from Texas, 42, 43.
surveys the coast of Texas, 43.
makes a report to Gen. Totten, 45.
ordered on the Pacific Railroad
survey, 45.
letter to his mother, 48.
letter to his brother, 52.
explores the Yakima Pass, 54.
reports to Gov. Stevens, 54.
reports to the Secretary of War, 55.
returns home, 56.
sent on a secret expedition to the
West Indies, 56.
draws up two reports on the pro
montory and bay of Samana, 58.
draws up report on railway, 58.
made captain in the First Cavalry
Regiment, 59.
sent on a commission to observe
the Crimean War, 59.
sails from Boston, 61.
arrives in St. Petersburg, 63.
letter from St. Petersburg, 63.
arrival at Balaklava, 67.
arrival at Taris, 69.
return home, 69.
reporton the armies of Europe, 70,
80.
resigns his commission, 81.
made vice-president of the Illinois
Central Railroad, 81.
marriage, 82.
president of the Ohio & Mississippi
Railroad, £2.
major-general of Ohio "Militia
Volunteers," 85.

INDEX.

395

McClellan, G.B., placed in chargo ofthe
" Department of the Ohio," 85.
issues a proclamation to Western
"Virginia, 88.
address to his soldiers, 90.
letter to Gen. Scott, 94.
proclamation, 95.
address to soldiers, 96.
despatch to Col. Townsend, 100.
address to his soldiers, 102.
summoned to Washington, 103.
begins to organize the army, 105.
addresses a memorandum on the
war to the President, 106.
appointedcommander-in-chief,116.issues an order thereupon, 116.
receives a sword from the city of
Philadelphia, 117.
letters of instruction to Gen. Hal
leck and Gen. Buell, 118.
letters of instruction to Gen. Sher
man and Gen. Butler, 119.
difficulties of his position, 121.
interview with the Secretary of
War, 136.
explains his plans to the Presi
dent, 136.
letter to the Secretary of War, 142.
goes to Harper's Ferry, 151.
consults with division command
ers, 152.
goes to Manassas and Centreville,
158.
removed from the post of com
mander-in-chief, 159.
addresses a note to the President,
160.
issues an address to his soldiers,162.
gives instructions to Gen. Banks
and Gen. Wadsworth, 164.
explains his plans to the War De
partment, 164.
meets President Lincoln, 165.
writes letter to Gen. Banks, 167.
reaches Fortress Monroe, 169.
deprived of control over Gen.
Wool's command, 170.
McDowell's corps detached from
him, 171.
besieges Yorktown, 175.
at the battle of Williamsburg, 1S7.
thanked by the House of Repre
sentatives, 190.
telegraphs to the Secretary of
War from Williamsburg, 203.
telegraphs to the President, 203,
206.
receives despatches from the
President, 218.
at the battle of Fair Oaks, 225, 228.
telegraphs to the Trepidant, 2.J3.
telegraphs to the Secretary of
War, 233.

McClellan, G. B., joined by McCall, 235.
begins movement to James River,
U42.
meeting of his corps commanders,
246.
exertions during the"Seven Days,"
250, 253.
at the battle of Malvern Hill, 253.
telegraphs to the Secretary of
War, 258.
address to his soldiers, July 4,
1862, 261.
telegraph to the President, 262.
letter to the President, July 7,
1862, 262.
protests against the removal of
the Army of the Potomac, 269.
begins removal of the army, 272.
differences between him and Gen.
Halleck, 273, 274.
leaves James River, 277.
arrives at Acquia Creek, 278.
telegraphs to Gen. Halleck, 278.
arrives at Alexandria, 279.
telegraph to Gen. Halleck, 280.
reduced in his command, 280.
interviews with Gen. Halleck and
tbe President, 2S1.
telegraphs to Gen. F. Porter, 281.
reassumes command of the Army
of the Potomac, 283.
effect upon the soldiers, 284.
takes the field, 285.
extracts from report, 286, 292.
not responsible for surrender of
Harper's Ferry, 296.
at the battle of Antietam, 297.
extract from report, 302.
telegraphs to Gen. Halleck, 304.
thanked by Gov. Bradford, 306.
general order on the President's
Proclamation of Sept. 22, 1862,
310.
difference with the Administra
tion, 313, 314.
letter to Gen. Meigs, 315.
extracts from report, 319, 324.
letter to Gen. Halleck, 325.
extract from report, 327.
removed from the command of
tbe Army of the Potomac, 329.
why removed, 333.
farewell address to the army, 335.
takes leave of his officers and tho
army, 336, 337-
reception at Philadelphia and
Trenton, 338.
visit to Boston, 339.
letter on behalf of Judge "Wood
ward, 341.
at the reception of the First New
York Cavalry, 343.
oration at West Point, 345.

396

INDEX.

McClellan, G.B., spoecliat Lake George,
346.
extract from report, 348.
defended against the charge of
slowness, 358-363.
generally successful, 364.
beloved by his soldiers, 365.
a master of strategy, 366.
moral qualities, 3C8.
unjustly treated, 371-373.
McDowell, Gen., 172, 204-207, 212-214,
216, 218, 221, 235, 236.
McRevnolds, Col., 343.
Meagher, Gen., 299.
Meigs, Gen., 314-316, 321,322.
Merrimac, 156, 194, 198-201.
Mexicalcingo, 23, 24.
Mexico, city of, 23. 28, 31, 34.
Miles, Col., 291, 294, 295.
Milroy, Gen., 208.
Molino dol Rey, battle of, 27.
Mordecai, Major, 59.
Morell, Gen., 241.
Morris, Gen., 91, 95, 102.
Mowry, Lieut., 48, 51.
Myers, Col., 322.
Naglee, Gen., 250.
Napier, Sir Wm., quoted, 180, 358.
Nelson, Lord, 33.
Nelson's Farm, battle of, 250.
Ney, Marshal, 367.
Nicholas, Emperor of Russia, 66.
Palo Alto, battle of, 13.
Panmure, Lord, 61.
Paris, 69.
Paskievitch, Prince, 62.
Pedregal, 25.
Pegram, Col., 98, 99.
Philippi, fight at, 91.
Pierpoint, Gov., 92.
Pope, Gen., 236, 279, 280.
Porter, Gen. P., 130, 191, 220, 244, 250,
252, 254, 279, 283, 300, 301, 337.
Puebla, 19, 20.
Radetsky, Marshal, 68.
Raglan, Lord, 61.
Reno, Gen., 290.
Renshaw, Lieut., 56.
Resaca de la Palma, battle of, 13.
Reynolds, Gen., 241.
Richardson, Gen., 128, 191, 226, 227,
250.
Rich Mountain, battle of, 99.
Rodgers, Capt. J., 197.
Rodman, Gen. 300.
Rosecrans, Gen., 95, 98, 99, 103.
Russey, Col. de, 10.
Samana, Bay of, 56.
San Antonio, 24.

San Cosine garita, 28.
Saunders, Major, 37.
Schaick, Emil, quoted, 256.
Schenck, Gen., 208.
Schomburgk. Sir R. II., quoted, 57.
Scott, Gen., 23, 25, 31, 36, 115, 116.
Sebastopol, 71.
Sedgwick, Gen., 191, 227, 251, 293.
" Seven Days," the, 240.
Seymour, Gen., 241.
Sherman, Gen., 119.
Shields, Gen., 208.
Simpson, Sir George, 67.
Slocum, Gen., 244, 247, 251.
Smith, Gen. P. F., 25, 27, 41-43.
Smith, Major, 28, 30.
Stanton, E. M., made Secretary of "War,
135.
letter to Gen. Lander, 149.
letter to the editor of the New
York " Tribune," 149.
letter to Gen. McClellan. 162, 204.
instructions to Gen. McDowell,
205.
telegram to the Governor of Mas
sachusetts, 212.
Stevens, Gen., 46, 54, 281.
Stone, Gen., 114.
Stoneman, Gen., 181, 244.
St. Petersburg, 63, 66.
Stuart, Gen., 236.
Sumner, Gen., 226, 230, 240, 246, 248,
251, 254, 286, 301.
Sumter, Fort, 82.
Sykes, Gen., 243.
Taylor, Gen., 15.
Totten, Gen., 17, 20, 43.
Townsend, Gen., 329.
Vancouver, Fort, 47.
Vera Cruz, siege of, 16.
Vienna, 68.
Vincennes, 69.
Virginia, embarrassing position of, 86.
Virginia, "Western, 87.
Wabe, B. F., 136.
Walker, S. C, 10.
Washington City, how defended, 167.
Wellington, Duke of, 33, 356.
West Point, Va., battle near, 191.
West Point, N. Y., monument conse
crated at, 345.
Williamsburg, battle of, 181.
"Winchester, battle near, 208.
Woodward, Judge, 341.
Wool, Gen., 170,' 194, 208.
Worth, Gen., 19, 24.
Yorktow.v evacuated, 181.
Zouaves, 76.

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